

Impact of Empire

6

Impact of Empire

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VOLUME 6

The Impact of the Roman Army (200 BC – AD 476)

Economic, Social, Political, Religious
and Cultural Aspects

Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop
of the International Network
Impact of Empire
(Roman Empire, 200 B.C. – A.D. 476)
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Edited by

Lukas de Blois & Elio Lo Cascio

With the Aid of

Olivier Hekster & Gerda de Kleijn



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PREFACE

This volume presents the proceedings of the sixth workshop of the international network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, 200 BC–AD 476), which, under the chairmanship of Lukas de Blois (until June 2006), Olivier Hekster (from June 2006), and Gerda de Kleijn (all three from the Radboud University of Nijmegen), brings together ancient historians, archaeologists, classicists and specialists on Roman law from some 28 European and North American universities. The proceedings of the first five workshops, held at Leiden, June 28–July 1, 2000, Nottingham, July 4–7, 2001, Rome, March 20–23, 2002, Leiden, June 25–28, 2003, and Münster, June 30–July 4, 2004, have been published in this series as *Administration, Prosopography and Appointment Policies in the Roman Empire* (Gieben, Amsterdam 2001), *The Transformation of Economic Life under the Roman Empire* (Gieben, Amsterdam 2002), *The Representation and Perception of Roman Imperial Power* (Gieben, Amsterdam 2003), *Roman Rule and Civic Life: Local and Regional Perspectives* (Gieben, Amsterdam 2004), and *The Impact of Imperial Rome on Religions, Ritual and Religious Life in the Roman Empire* (Brill, Leiden/Boston 2006). J.C. Gieben, who previously published the proceedings, died in April 2006, and his company has now been taken over by Brill. The sixth workshop, on the impact of the Roman army, was held on the Isle of Capri, March 29–April 2, 2005. A series of further workshops has been planned by the Academic Board of the network, in a meeting held at Nijmegen, on June 22, 2006, during the seventh workshop of the network (June 20–24, 2006). From this date onwards the network has a management team that also operates as the editorial board of a series Impact of Empire, which will be published by Brill. The series will contain proceedings of workshops, other edited volumes and monographs (including high-quality dissertations), in English or—if necessary—in another language which is in current use in the field of classics, ancient history, archaeology and Roman law.

The sixth workshop of the network was funded by the Netherlands Organization of Scientific Research (NWO), the Research School of Classics in The Netherlands (OIKOS), the Radboud University of Nijmegen, the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome, the Università

Federico II, Naples, and its Dipartimento di Discipline Storiche ‘Ettore Lepore.’

Lukas de Blois (from the Radboud University of Nijmegen), Elio Lo Cascio and Dina Storch Marino (both from the University Federico II of Naples) acted as organizers for the workshop and wish to thank the staff of the Naples Chair of Ancient History, the Centro dei Congressi on the Isle of Capri, and the Nijmegen Chair of Ancient History as well as the British colleagues who kindly corrected the English of some of the contributions in this volume. The sessions of the workshop were chaired by Anthony Birley, Lukas de Blois, Hannah Cotton, Vincenzo Giuffrè, Elio Lo Cascio, Paolo Malanima, Giovanni Salmeri, and Tullio Spagnuolo Vigorita.

Lukas de Blois and Elio Lo Cascio edited this volume, with the aid of Olivier Hekster and Gerda de Kleijn.

The editors,
Nijmegen/Rome, December 2006

ABBREVIATIONS

Acts	Acts of the Apostles
AE	Année épigraphique, eds. R. Cagnat <i>et al.</i> (Paris 1889–)
AJ	Flavius Josephus, <i>Antiquitates Judaearum</i>
AMUGS	Antike Münzen und geschnittene Steine (Berlin 1969–)
ANRW	Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt, W. Haase & H. Temporini, eds. (Berlin/New York 1972–)
AntJ	Antiquaries Journal
BGU	Aegyptische Urkunden aus den staatlichen Museen zu Berlin, Griechische Urkunden
BJ	Flavius Josephus, <i>Bellum Judaicum</i>
BMC	Catalogue of Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum, eds. H. Mattingly <i>et al.</i> (revised edition, London 1976)
BSNAF	Bulletin de la société nationale des antiquaires de France
CAH	Cambridge Ancient History
Ch.LA	Chartae Latinae Antiquiores, eds. A. Bruckner and R. Marichal (Olten 1954–)
CIIP	Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaeae Palaestinae
CIL	Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum
CJ	Codex Iustinianus
Comm. in Es.	Jerome, Commentary on Isaiah
CTh	Codex Theodosianus
Dig. or D.	Digesta
DNP	Der Neue Pauly (Stuttgart 1996–2003)
FIRA	Fontes Iuris Romani Anteiusiniani, S. Riccobono <i>et al.</i> (1940–1943, 2nd ed. 1968)
IG	Inscriptiones Graecae
IGR(R)	Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas pertinentes, eds. R. Cagnat, <i>et al.</i>
ILLRP	Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae, ed. A. Degrassi (2nd ed. Florence 1972)
ILS	Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, ed. H. Dessau (Berlin 1892–1916)
Inscr. Ital.	Inscriptiones Italiae
JRA	Journal of Roman Archaeology
JRS	Journal of Roman Studies
JThS	Journal of Theological Studies
MH	Museum Helveticum
Mish. Ked.	Mishnah Kedoshim
O. Bu Njem	Ostraca de Bu Njem

OGIS	Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae, ed. W. Dittenberger (Leipzig 1903–1905, repr. Hildesheim 1960 and 1970)
P. Dura	The Excavations at Dura-Europos: Final Report V 1, The Parchments and Papyri, ed. C. Bradford-Welles <i>et al.</i> (1959)
P. Fay.	Fayum Towns and their Papyri, eds. B.P. Grenfell, A.S. Hunt and D.G. Hogarth (London 1900)
P. Oxy.	The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, eds. B.P. Grenfell, A.S. Hunt <i>et al.</i> (London 1898–)
P. Yadin	The Documents from the Bar-Kochba Period in the Cave of Letters: Greek Papyri, eds. N. Lewis <i>et al.</i> (Jerusalem 1989)
PIR ²	Prosopographia Imperii Romani (2nd ed., Berlin 1933–)
PSAS	Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland
PSI	Papiri Greci e Latini. Pubblicazioni della Società Italiana per la Ricerca dei Papiri Greci e Latini in Egitto (Florence 1912–)
RGA	Reallexikon der germanischen Altertumskunde (Berlin 1911–)
RE or PWRE or PW	Pauly-Wissowa, Realenzyklopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft
RIB	The Roman Inscriptions of Britain, eds. R.G. Collingwood and R.P. Wright (Oxford 1965; repr. With addenda by R.S.O. Tomlin, Gloucester and Stroud 1990–1995)
RMD	Roman Military Diplomas I–III, ed. M. Roxan and P.A. Holder (London 2005–2006)
SEG	Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum, eds. J.J.E. Hondius <i>et al.</i> (Leiden 1923–)
(S)HA Sylloge	Scriptores Historiae Augustae = Historia Augusta Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, ed. W. Dittenberger (4th ed., Hildesheim 1960)
ZPE	Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

For other abbreviations see J. Marouzeau, *L'année philologique*.

INTRODUCTION

LUKAS DE BLOIS

To many inhabitants of the Roman Empire the army was undoubtedly the most visible and concrete representation of imperial power. Roman troops were the embodiment of imperial control. Military installations and buildings, the imperial guard, other troops, fleets, and militarily tinged works of art brought home the majesty of Rome to anybody who saw them, in Rome itself as well as in other parts of the Empire. To anyone who may not yet have understood the possible impact of Roman military forces this was also made clear by explicit messages. In an inscription from Aphrodisias from the early days of Octavian we read:¹

Imperator Caesar, son of divus Julius, designated consul for the second and the third time, (one) of the Tresviri Reipublicae Constituendae, to the magistrates, council and people of the Plarasians and Aphrodisians, greetings. If you are well it would be good; I too am in good health, together with the army.

With Roman armies came administrators, taxes and requisitions in cash and kind, traders, permanently residing veterans and military personnel, useful relations between local notables and Roman military cadre, and chances of upward social mobility for Italian and provincial *curiales* via Roman armed forces. Roman armies and fleets gave provincials an opportunity to enlist, have a career and rise to functions in the imperial administration. During a long period of service they became thoroughly acquainted with Roman ways.

Roman soldiers and officers spread foreign cults to many parts of the Empire. Just one example: at Woerden, at the Dutch part of the

¹ See J. Reynolds, *Aphrodisias and Rome. Documents from the Excavation of the Theatre at Aphrodisias* (London 1982), 41–44, document 6: [? Αὐτοκράτωρ Καῖσαρ] | [? θεοῦ Ἰουλίου υἱός,] | [ὑπατος ἀποδεδει]- | γμένος τὸ β' καὶ [τὸ γ',] τριῶν ἀνδρῶν τῆς | τῶν δημοσίων πρα- | γμάτων διατάξεως, | Πλαρασέων καὶ Ἀφρο- | δεισιέων ἄρχουσιν, | βουλῇ, δήμῳ χαίρειν | εἰ ἔρρωσθε εὖ ἂν ἔ| χοι, ὑγιαίνω δὲ καὶ | αὐτὸς μετὰ τοῦ στρα- | τεύματος.

Roman border, the Syrian sun-god Elagabalus was venerated by some military men.²

Legions and *auxilia* needed food, goods, services and transportation, and their demands could have a profound impact on regional economies within the Empire, particularly in thinly populated areas that did not have developed monetized market-oriented economies. Soldiers received their pay in bronze or silver money, which they changed for small coins to pay for anything they bought from workshops or at regional and local markets.³ Roman military units also needed weapons, other equipment, building materials, pottery and other goods that could only be produced by specialized craftsmen and so brought new skills and economic activities to the regions where Roman troops were stationed. Military detachments that were on the move needed transportation. The *angareia* (requisitioning of means of transport) became a heavy burden to many towns and villages in military provinces and their direct hinterlands, particularly to those communities that were situated along military transit routes.

Already in republican times the impact of warfare, recruitment and military forces was heavy. There are important discussions going on in modern scholarship about the demographic consequences of Roman warfare in Italy and Rome, and about cultural, economic and demographic effects of Roman expansion in regions that were conquered by Roman armies.

Right from the start of the Principate the impact of the Roman forces was quite strong in the provinces where Augustus had stationed most of the legions and *auxilia*: along Rhine and Danube and in Northern Syria, the Balkans, near Alexandria in Egypt, in Northwestern Spain, and in Numidia.⁴ More so than any other part of the Empire the military border provinces along the Rhine and Danube frontiers underwent important changes as a consequence of the presence of Roman military forces, particularly after Augustus had stationed legions and *auxilia* in *castra stativa* along the Rhine and the Danube. An equally important process of change and adaptation started in Britain after the Romans

² See J.E. Bogaers, 'Sol Elagabalus und die Cohors III Breucorum in Woerden (Germania inferior),' *Oudheidkundige Mededelingen van het Rijksmuseum van Oudheden* 74 (1994), 153–161.

³ See for example F. Kemmers, *Coins for a Legion: an Analysis of the Coin Finds of the Augustan Legionary Fortress and Flavian canabae legionis at Nijmegen* (Nijmegen 2005), 133–137.

⁴ See Tacitus, *Annals* 4.5–7.

had conquered the island in the first century AD and had left there three legions and quite a few auxiliaries. In the East the situation was different. Provinces such as Syria and—from Trajan's times—Arabia harboured ancient cities and villages, and had long-standing infrastructures, which Roman army detachments could use. Most Romans in these parts of the Empire were stationed at or near strategically situated cities.

There was also a noticeable military presence in and near the city of Rome, and in other parts of Italy: the praetorian guard, Germanic bodyguards, urban cohorts, *vigiles*, and the fleets of Misenum and Ravenna, which—together with the praetorians—constituted the central military reserve that could be sent to any part of the Empire. This central reserve became even more important under Septimius Severus, who added his new *legio II Parthica*.

At the end of the Principate, during the third century AD, Roman forces and Roman imperial administration underwent important changes. There is no doubt that the third century AD was a period of rising tensions, and from about 250 even crisis, in the Roman Empire.⁵ Under the emperor Marcus Aurelius (AD 161–180), whose reign was characterised by epidemics and warfare against invading tribes from the North and the Parthians in the East, prosperity seemed to have come to an end, although this period of problems and tensions was followed by a few decades of recovery, which lasted until about AD 230. From AD 230, and even more so from about AD 250, the Empire got into serious trouble again. In the East an aggressive, dangerous opponent, the new, well-organised Persian kingdom of the Sassanids, had taken the place of the less well-organised, less aggressive Parthian empire. From 230 to 266 the Romans and their allies fought one Persian war after the other. In the North previously small Germanic tribes had combined into large conglomerates such as Franks, Alamans, Marcomans and Goths, who had learnt much from Roman warfare and had become dangerous, able opponents, who repeatedly invaded Roman territory, more intensively so from about 238 in the Balkans and from 253 on the Rhine frontier.

⁵ On the third century crisis in the Roman empire see for example D.S. Potter, *The Roman Empire at Bay* (London/New York 2004), 3–298; L. de Blois, 'The Crisis of the Third Century AD in the Roman Empire: A Modern Myth?', in L. de Blois and J. Rich, *The Transformation of Economic Life under the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the Second Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire, Nottingham, July 4–7, 2001* (Amsterdam 2002), 204–217; id., 'The Onset of Crisis in the First Half of the Third Century AD in the Roman Empire', in K.P. John et al., eds., *Transformationsprozesse des Römischen Reiches im 3. Jahrhundert und ihre Rezeption in der Neuzeit* (Berlin 2006).

Epidemics returned with devastating force from about 250.⁶ After the death of the last emperor of the Severan house, which had reigned the empire with some success from 193 to 235, there was no longer a generally accepted strong dynasty, so that civil wars between rivalling armies who all wanted to give the imperial throne to their own generals—if only to lay hands on the returns of the imperial estate—were a constant threat. External and internal warfare brought devastation, death and impoverishment to many regions and put a heavy strain on the hinterlands of the war-zones. As a consequence, the imperial administration had to augment its military forces, to diversify and improve military strategy and tactics, and to expand its bureaucratic apparatus in order to raise the necessary extra funds, in many regions from a shrunken and impoverished population.

Part 1 of this volume contains four contributions that focus on Republican topics. Luuk de Ligt writes about Roman manpower resources and the proletarianization of the Roman armies in the second century BC. Nathan Rosenstein asks himself whether Augustan peace was all that advantageous to small farmers in Italy who now lost an outlet for surplus labour and a hazardous, but profitable source of income. Tony Ñaco del Hoyo concentrates on the nature and impact of Roman war efforts in Spain (218–197 BC). Paul Erdkamp analyses how Polybius and Livy describe the functions and roles of Latins and Italian *socii* in Roman warfare from about the later third century BC. It seems that some long-established ideas about second century BC Roman history and demography are to be revised.

Part 2, entitled ‘The Emperor and his Forces, General Issues’, comprises contributions by Olivier Hekster, on the Emperor as a military leader; Armin Eich, about increasing financial problems caused by military expenditure under the Principate; Vincenzo Giuffrè, on some not frequently discussed juridical aspects of military life; Ségolène Demougin, about some new epigraphical findings concerning equestrian officers; Jasper Oorthuys, on marines and mariners in Roman imperial fleets, and Hans Michael Schellenberg, on Onasandros’ *Strategikos*.

⁶ On the effects of the Antonine plague, see R.P. Duncan-Jones, ‘The Impact of the Antonine Plague’, *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 9 (1996), 108–136. On the plague of about AD 250–280 see E. Lo Cascio, ‘La dissoluzione dell’ impero Romano d’ Occidente: la spiegazione demografica’, in G. Cacciatori, *et al.*, eds., *Filosofia e storia della cultura. Studi in onore di Fulvio Tessitore* (Naples 1997), 168ff. and J.-M. Carrié & A. Rousselle, *L’empire romain en mutation des Sévères à Constantin, 192–337* (Paris 1999), 521ff.

The economic impact of the Roman imperial army is treated in part 3. The first paper, by Elio Lo Cascio, goes into the debate about the mechanisms through which the Roman imperial armies were supplied: were they provided with food and goods by a redistribution of the proceeds of taxes, or was army supply largely based on market mechanisms? Subsequently Karl Strobel shows how consequential the long-continued presence of Roman forces at the Rhine and Danube borders has been: it changed Central European landscape and transport structures for good and created cities which are important still now today. Pierre Cosme's article analyses the impact of the provisioning of Roman soldiers with weapons and other equipment. He tries to establish what the effects were on manufacturing, iron-working and environment. The Romans provided their armies in a rather opportunistic way, depending on private workshops where possible, and on forgeries within the military camps where that was necessary. Military technology is not forgotten. In an elaborate paper Salvatore Martino treats the impact of military technology on civil society. In the last article of this section, on irregular levies and the impact of the Roman imperial army in Egypt, Colin Adams discusses the Chester Beatty papyri from Panopolis in Middle Egypt, which preserve quintessential evidence for military requisitioning and pay, taxation, liturgical service, the dynamics of power between state officials and local administrators, and overall economic effects.

Parts 4 and 5 of this volume offer more regional studies. Part 4, on the impact of the Roman imperial armies on Italy and the West, contains papers by Koenraad Verboven ('Good for Business. The Roman Army and the Emergence of a "Business Class" in the Northwestern Provinces of the Roman Empire, 1st century BCE–3rd century CE'); Alexandra Busch ('*Militia in urbe*. The Military Presence in Rome'); Salvatore Ortisi ('Roman Military in the Vesuvius Area'), Anthony Birley ('The Frontier Zone in Britain: Hadrian to Caracalla'), and Gabriele Weiler ('Römisches Militär und die Gründung niedergermanischer Städte').

In part 5, on the impact of the Roman imperial army in the Eastern and African provinces of the Empire, the reader will find articles by Hannah Cotton, on the impact of the Roman army in the province of Judaea/Syria Palaestina; Ariel Lewin, who—concentrating on the same region—treats the impact of the Late Roman army in the Roman provinces of Palaestina and Arabia; Jonathan Roth, who writes on perceptions and realities in the relationship between Jews and the Roman Army; Wolfgang Liebeschuetz, about the consequences of Roman

rule and military presence in Northern Syria, and Oliver Stoll, who focuses upon transfer of cultic practices and representation at Bostra, the place to which the *legio III Cyrenaica* was transferred from Egypt by the emperor Trajan. In the last article included in this part of the volume Arbia Hilali discusses the many-sided impact of the presence of the *legio III Augusta* in Northern Africa.

The last part of the volume, part 6, contains four papers on third century AD Roman history, particularly on the impact of warfare, military logistics, increasing burdens, and the growing social and administrative importance of military men, the so-called militarization of the Empire. The articles that are published in this section come on top of some important recently published works, such as *Cambridge Ancient History XII. The Crisis of the Empire*, edited by Alan Bowman, Peter Garnsey and Averil Cameron (Cambridge 2005), Peter Eich's *Zur Metamorphose des politischen Systems in der römischen Kaiserzeit: die Entstehung einer 'personalen' Bürokratie im langen dritten Jahrhundert* (Berlin 2005), and Klaus-Peter Johne, Thomas Gerhardt and Udo Hartmann, eds., *Deleto paene imperio. Transformationsprozesse des Römischen Reiches im 3. Jahrhundert und ihre Rezeption in der Neuzeit* (Stuttgart 2006). The third century crisis has become a frequently discussed topic. In his paper Lukas de Blois analyses the military contribution to the onset of crisis in the first half of the third century. Peter Eich endeavours to put the 'militarization' of the Empire in the third century into perspective. The relative importance of the military may be analyzed on the basis of images, as Jon Coulston shows in his paper on the depiction of soldiers on funerary monuments of the 3rd Century AD. Finally, Fernando López Sánchez—in an article called '*Virtus Probi*: Payments for the Battle Cavalry during the Rule of Probus (AD 277–278)'—brings forward a rather original point of view about the emperor Probus and his elite troops.

PART ONE

THE IMPACT OF THE ROMAN REPUBLICAN ARMY

ROMAN MANPOWER RESOURCES AND THE PROLETARIANIZATION OF THE ROMAN ARMY IN THE SECOND CENTURY BC

LUUK DE LIGT

Demographic developments

In his account of the run-up to the passing of the *lex Sempronia agraria* of 133 BC Appian repeatedly underlines the military and demographic rationale of the Gracchan land reforms. In chapter 8, for instance, he describes Tiberius Gracchus as making a powerful speech in which the people of Italy (*Italioītai*) were characterized as excellent fighters but also as declining into poverty and depopulation. Similarly, Tiberius Gracchus is said to have defended his proposal by rhetorically asking whether a citizen was not always a better man than a slave, and a soldier more useful than a non-soldier. The same demographic and military theme is found also in Appian's description of the undoing of the Gracchan reform programme, as a result of which 'the numbers of both citizens and soldiers diminished still more'.¹

At first sight the census figures for the period 163–130 BC seem to tell a similar story: whereas the censors of 164/3 BC were able to register some 337,000 adult male citizens, the census figure for 130 BC is only 319,000. Although a decrease of less than 20,000 in more than three decades may not seem huge, the general trend for these years is in sharp contrast to the steep increase indicated by the census figures for the first 35 years of the second century BC.

Given the existence of these seemingly converging data, it comes as no surprise that many ancient historians have subscribed to Appian's view that Tiberius Gracchus' aim was to resolve a manpower shortage, although the exact nature and seriousness of this demographic and military crisis is disputed. One popular theory is that of Brunt, who thinks that the number of citizens stabilized rather than declined

¹ Appian, *Bella Civilia* 1.8, 1.11 and 1.27. Author and editors owe thanks to Simon Northwood for checking the English of this paper.

during the mid-second century BC. In his view, the perceived decline in the number of *assidui* that seems to have worried Tiberius Gracchus need not imply a corresponding decrease in the number of adult male citizens.²

In many reconstructions the existence of a manpower crisis is deduced not only from Appian's description but also from a reduction of the threshold for membership of the fifth class of the *comitia centuriata* that is usually dated to 141 or 140 BC. Further support seems to be provided by a fragment of a speech in which Quintus Metellus, one of the censors of 131/0 BC, urged the Roman people to marry 'for the purpose of begetting children'.³ It seems to follow that concerns over a slow contraction of the citizen body loomed large in the minds of some prominent politicians of the Gracchan age.

One of the few to dispute this widely accepted reconstruction has been John Rich, who pointed out that the slight demographic decline of the mid-second century BC must be set against a much faster decline in the average number of legions that were annually fielded after the successful conclusion of the Third Macedonian War.⁴ According to Rich, we must conclude that the Gracchan land reforms were not meant to deal with an acute recruitment problem. More probably, the Gracchi were guided by a much more vague concern over a slow contraction of the free Italian population, whose quantitative fate was in marked contrast to that of the proliferating foreign slaves employed on the estates of the elite.

In my view, this challenge to the traditional interpretation is convincing to the extent that it has become difficult to explain the Gracchan land reforms as an attempt to alleviate an *immediate* shortage of citizens eligible for the call-up. On the other hand, it seems possible still to argue that Tiberius Gracchus acted on the assumption that the steady expansion of rural slavery was bound to undermine Roman manpower resources in the long term. In any case, it cannot be denied that the military theme was an essential part of the rhetoric used by Tiberius Gracchus in order to defend his proposals.

² P.A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower* (reissued with a postscript, Oxford 1987), 76–79 and 140.

³ Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 1.6.

⁴ J. Rich, 'The supposed Roman manpower shortage of the later second century BC', *Historia* 32 (1983), 287–331.

This takes us back to the demographic model on which most recent reconstructions of the background to the Gracchan land reforms are based. As we just have seen, the traditional interpretation of these reforms in terms of a manpower crisis is based on the idea that the Roman citizen body ceased to grow and perhaps even started to decline from the late 160s BC onwards. But can we really be sure that this widely shared assumption is correct? As is generally known, the relatively low census figures for the period 160–130 BC are followed by much higher figures for the years 124 and 114 BC. If we are to believe these figures, the censors of 124 BC were able to register some 395,000 adult male citizens, around 75,000 more than had been registered six years earlier. These data are clearly incompatible with the theory that the Roman citizen body was in continual decline from the late 160s BC onwards.

If we accept the census figure for 124 BC as approximately accurate (as I think we should), the number of Roman citizens grew from roughly 337,000 in 163 BC to about 395,000 in 124 BC, that is by some 17 percent in the course of four decades.⁵ Even though a significant proportion of this increase can be accounted for by assuming that the city of Rome became much larger during this period, these figures suggest that the number of country-dwelling citizens also increased. There is, however, no evidence for any corresponding increase in the amount of land cultivated by Roman citizens during the central decades of the second century BC. In this context it should be remembered that the wave of colonial foundations and *viridane* assignments had petered out towards the end of the 170s BC. At the same time both the literary sources and a variety of archaeological data suggest that the second century BC witnessed a proliferation of slave-run *villae*. The only possible outcome of these processes was a decrease in per capita wealth for the country-dwelling population and an increase in the number of rural proletarians.

⁵ My interpretation of the census figures differs from that offered by Lo Cascio in a series of recent publications. See e.g. E. Lo Cascio, 'The size of the Roman population: Beloch and the meaning of the Roman census figures', *Journal of Roman Studies* 84 (1994), 23–40, and id., 'The population of Roman Italy in town and country', in J. Bintliff and K. Sbonias, eds., *Reconstructing Past Population in Mediterranean Europe (3000 BC–AD 1800)* (Oxford 1999), 161–171. For a brief discussion of some of the weaknesses of Lo Cascio's model see W. Scheidel, *Measuring Sex, Age and Death in the Roman Empire. Explorations in Ancient Demography* (Ann Arbor 1996), 167–168, and L. de Ligt, 'Poverty and demography: the case of the Gracchan land reforms', *Mnemosyne* 57 (2004), 731. This is a topic to which I shall return in future publications.

Since the censors tended to register *proletarii* less efficiently than *assidui*,⁶ this scenario provides us with a convincing explanation for the downward trend in the census figures from 163 BC onwards.⁷ As citizens became poorer, the proportion of under-registration increased. At the same time the idea that the mid-second century witnessed an increase in rural poverty caused by continuing population growth explains why rural proletarians loom so large among the supporters of the Gracchi and why access to public land became such a prominent item on the political agenda.

Rural proletarians in the second century BC

Before taking a closer look at the census figures of 124 and 114 BC, I want to focus on a question that receives surprisingly little attention in the existing literature: if the amount of land owned by Roman peasants was continually declining from the 160s BC onwards, how did these people manage to gain access to agricultural produce or monetary income sufficient to keep themselves and their families alive?

One possible answer is intensification. Faced with a decrease in the size of their farms, peasants may have spent more hours in the fields. There is comparative evidence to suggest that peasants are prepared to expend a huge amount of labour cultivating the land and that output per hectare could be increased significantly in this way.⁸ On the other hand, the same comparative evidence suggests that even with hyper-intensive methods of cultivation there is a limit to what can be squeezed from a given plot of land. This means that intensification cannot be the sole answer, especially if the amount of land owned by free peasants continued to shrink.

In his recent monograph, *Rome at War*, Nathan Rosenstein argues that the answer lies in access to public land. In his view, the use of this category of land to supplement inadequate holdings had been one of

⁶ Brunt 1987, op. cit. (n. 2), 79.

⁷ For a more extensive treatment see De Ligt 2004, art. cit. (n. 5), 738–744, where I also discuss the effects of increasingly negative attitudes to military service during the Spanish wars.

⁸ See e.g. P. Halstead, ‘Traditional and ancient rural economy in Mediterranean Europe: plus ça change?’, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 107 (1987), 77–87. Cf. also P. Erdkamp, *The Grain Market in the Roman Empire. A Social, Political and Economic Study* (Cambridge 2005), 13 and 42–43.

the mainstays of small-scale agriculture in Roman Italy from the fourth century BC onwards.⁹ The most important weakness of this solution is that it rests on the assumption that access to public land was always easy and unproblematic. If the literary tradition can be relied upon, this precondition was not fulfilled in Central Italy during much of the second century BC. In fact, there are grounds for thinking that even in other parts of Italy access to most of the *ager publicus* was controlled by the elite. As Brunt pointed out, large parts of Cisalpine Gaul consisted of woodland and marshes. Since clearance and drainage required more capital than small peasants could afford, he considered it likely that most *ager publicus* fell into the hands of large possessors, who either leased it from the state or municipality or merely 'occupied' it.¹⁰ If this scenario is accepted, it must have been difficult for poor peasants to extend their holdings by means of *occupatio*.

A third possibility is that we should envisage poor peasants as supplementing their incomes by hiring themselves out as wage labourers. Among ancient historians the role of wage labour in the Italian countryside has become a much-discussed topic from the early 1980s onwards. The main finding is that the existence of a large pool of free labourers was an essential prerequisite for the successful operation of slave-run *villae*.¹¹ It should, however, be emphasized that the complementary nature of the relationship between slave-run estates and subsistence-orientated family farms has been studied mainly from the perspective of the villa-owner. If the focus is shifted to those free country-dwellers who hired themselves out as harvest-labourers, it is not immediately apparent that wage labour played a prominent part among the survival strategies used by poor peasants without inadequate holdings to support their families. It should not be forgotten that most wage labour in the Italian countryside was done on a seasonal basis. This means that the role of wage labour in the agrarian economy of republican Italy was less important than in many other pre-industrial

⁹ N. Rosenstein, *Rome at War: Farms, Families, and Death in the Middle Republic* (Chapel Hill/London 2004), 78.

¹⁰ Brunt 1987, op. cit. (n. 2), 194–195.

¹¹ P. Garnsey, 'Non-slave labour in the Roman world' (orig. 1980), repr. in id., *Cities, Peasants and Food in Classical Antiquity. Essays in Social and Economic History*, ed. by W. Scheidel (Cambridge 1998), 134–150; D. Rathbone, 'The development of agriculture in the *ager Cosanus* during the Roman Republic. Problems of evidence and interpretation', *Journal of Roman Studies* 71 (1981), 10–23.

societies, including Western Europe during the early-modern period.¹² It is therefore dangerous to assume that wage labour performed on large estates represented an important item in the family budgets of many republican peasants.

A fourth possibility is that instead of trying to increase production many Roman peasant families reduced the number of mouths to feed by volunteering one or several of their members to be recruited for legionary service. I have no doubt that some impoverished peasant families resorted to precisely this option. On the other hand, there are at least three reasons for thinking that the importance of this strategy should not be overrated. As we have already seen, the average number of legions fielded by the Romans was much lower during the mid-second century BC than it had been between 201 and 167 BC. This means that if legionary service was a popular survival strategy, the downscaling of military activity from the mid-160s onwards must have exacerbated the problems faced by the growing population of the Italian countryside. Secondly, the literary sources leave no doubt that most of the wars fought between 163 and 133 BC were unpopular. Of course, this is especially true of the Spanish wars, where no easy victory and rich booty could be expected.¹³ Finally, it should not be forgotten that until at least 140 BC citizens were required to own property worth 4000 *asses* in order to qualify for legionary service. Although volunteers from the ranks of the *proletarii* are known to have been recruited on some occasions before the final decades of the second century BC, the existence of this threshold implies that the option of legionary service was not normally open to those who were most desperate to find sources of supplementary income.

How then did the impoverished sections of the country-dwelling population manage to survive? My solution to this problem is that ancient historians have tended to underestimate the importance of tenancy as an alternative survival strategy during the second century BC. Since this claim runs counter to the picture painted by the recent literature on the economic history of the Republic, it may be useful to start with an examination of some of the arguments used by those who consider the widespread use of tenants to have been a later development.

¹² Cf. Erdkamp 2005, op. cit. (n. 8), 80–83.

¹³ Cf. Rich 1983, art. cit. (n. 4), 317.

In his excellent book on late-republican and early-imperial tenancy the Dutch ancient historian De Neeve called attention to the fact that tenancy did not catch the attention of the Roman jurists until the first century BC. He also argued, however, that juridical developments tended to reflect evolving relations among potential litigants (*i.e.* among members of the social and economic elite) and that most of the surviving legal fragments refer to wealthy tenants.¹⁴ It follows that the legal developments discussed by De Neeve do not permit the conclusion that there were few *poor* tenants before the first century BC.

De Neeve also claimed that tenancy must have remained unimportant during the second century BC because land rents stood at a low level during most of this period. In his view, the underlying cause was the availability of large supplies of provincial and Italian grain, which had a negative effect on the price of grain.¹⁵ One obvious weakness of this argument is that the evidence is confined to a handful of scattered references to grain prices being low in Rome during certain years between 200 and 170 BC. In my view this type of evidence does not unambiguously show that grain prices were low throughout the second century BC.¹⁶

One possible way forward is to focus on the relationship between land rents and demographic developments. Even if we are inadequately informed about grain prices during the second century, it remains the case that some 100,000 citizen soldiers had been killed during the Second Punic War. As a result of this, the free population was relatively low in the early years of the second century BC. Some of the economic effects of this demographic fact can be reconstructed with the help of comparative evidence. One obvious parallel is the demographic void created by the Black Death in large parts of Europe in the second half

¹⁴ P.W. de Neeve, *Colonus. Private Farm-Tenancy in Roman Italy during the Republic and the Early Empire* (Amsterdam 1984), 25–26, 45–47 and 116.

¹⁵ De Neeve 1984, *op. cit.* (n. 14), 106–108.

¹⁶ According to P. Rosafio, 'The emergence of tenancy and the *precarium*', in H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg *et al.*, eds., *De Agricultura. In Memoriam Pieter Willem de Neeve* (Amsterdam 1993), 166: 'it would be more prudent to speak in terms of a continuous fluctuation than a rise in grain prices'. P. Erdkamp, 'The corn supply of the Roman armies during the third and second centuries BC', *Historia* 44 (1995), 168–191, argues that a large proportion of provincial grain surpluses were shipped to Roman armies rather than to Rome. For growing difficulties with the grain supply during the second half of the second century see S. Northwood, 'Grain scarcity and pestilence in the early Republic: some significant patterns' (forthcoming in the *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*).

of the fourteenth century. As many studies have shown, the dramatic population decline that took place in this period resulted not only in lower grain prices and higher real wages, but also in lower land rents. The obvious reason for this is that the collapse of the rural population put serfs and tenants in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis their landlords.¹⁷ It does not seem far-fetched to suppose that this development also took place in Roman Italy after the Second Punic War.

In short, even without good evidence concerning grain prices, it remains plausible that leasing was an unattractive option during the first decades of the second century BC. At the same time there are good grounds for thinking that slaves were relatively cheap during this period.¹⁸ In my view, the interplay between these two factors helps to explain the fast expansion of rural slavery in the early second century BC. The other side of the coin is that land rents are likely to have risen as the population began to recover after the Second Punic War. As Brunt pointed out in his *Italian Manpower*, it took only 35 years for the citizen body to become larger than it had been in 218 BC.¹⁹ This simple demographic fact makes it difficult to maintain that leasing remained an unattractive option during the three or four decades preceding the Gracchan land reforms.

Another factor that must be taken into account is the pattern of landholding during the second century BC. Focusing on the final decades of the Republic, De Neeve suggested the existence of a causal connection between the extensive assignments made to veterans during the first century BC and the increasingly widespread use of tenancy. As he explained, the result of land allocations was the creation of numerous new smallholders, many of whom did not have any farming experience. As a result of this, many veteran plots were put up for sale, allowing wealthy buyers to expand their landed property. Since the plots of land thus acquired were scattered over a large area, it was often impossible

¹⁷ For a quick orientation see the valuable collection of essays in T. Aston and C. Philpin, eds., *The Brenner Debate. Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe* (Cambridge 1985). In late-medieval and early-modern Eastern Europe landlords managed to avoid giving their tenants a better deal by gradually reducing large parts of the rural population to serfdom. In my view, the Roman elite of the early second century BC solved the 'problem' posed by the low profitability of tenancy after the Second Punic War by setting up slave-run *villae*.

¹⁸ Cf. W. Scheidel, 'Real slave prices and the relative cost of labour in the Greco-Roman world', *Ancient Society* 35 (2005), 1–17.

¹⁹ Brunt 1987, op. cit. (n. 2), 74.

for the new owners to organize their new acquisitions as large estates. Hence the only way to derive a steady revenue from these scattered holdings was to lease them out to tenants.²⁰

As far as developments during the first century BC are concerned, the force of this reasoning cannot be denied. It is, however, more difficult to see why a similar process should not have been at work during the second century BC. Interestingly, Appian describes the Roman elite of the early second century BC not only as acquiring many plots of land adjoining their own holdings but also as buying or seizing “any other holdings belonging to poor men”.²¹ We are also told that the land distributed under the *lex Sempronia agraria* of 133 BC was made inalienable by sale precisely in order to prevent the rich from buying up the allotments in question.²² These snippets of information suggest that the Roman elite had started to buy up scattered plots of land well before the first century BC.

More recently, Nathan Rosenstein has argued that tenancy must have been unimportant during the Middle Republic because Roman citizens did not want to be forced into the position of having to lease land from the rich in order to survive. He also claims that Roman landowners are likely to have preferred to cultivate their estates with slaves because, unlike tenants, unfree labourers were not liable to conscription.²³ In his view this preference is illustrated by two pieces of literary evidence. The first of these is a passage from Livy from which it appears that the consuls of 210 BC issued an edict requiring all citizens to contribute military rations and pay on the basis of their census ratings. According to Livy, many well-off citizens protested on the grounds that they owned nothing but barren land, since their slaves had been recruited for military service and their money been taken away in the form of *tributa*.²⁴ The other piece of evidence is Appian’s well-known statement that in the period following the Second Punic War the well-to-do preferred slaves rather than freemen because the former were not liable for conscription.²⁵

²⁰ De Neeve 1984, op. cit. (n. 14), 130–143.

²¹ Appian, *Bella Civilia* 1.7.

²² Appian, *Bella Civilia* 1.10.

²³ Rosenstein 2004, op. cit. (n. 9), 181–182.

²⁴ Livy 26.35.5.

²⁵ Appian, *Bella Civilia* 1.7. Rosenstein also asserts that there is no trace of tenancy in the legal sources before the late second century BC. In making this claim he ignores the prevailing view that the consensual contract of *locatio conductio* was a creation of the

In my view, none of these arguments is decisive. To begin with, although it is certainly plausible that many Roman peasants wanted to avoid economic dependence, it does not follow that they were always able to do so. Rosenstein's optimistic reconstruction of economic conditions in the Italian countryside implies that there were few rural proletarians throughout the Middle Republic. This idea is at odds with the prevailing view that this group made up a very substantial proportion of the Roman citizen body not only before the Second Punic War but also during the decades preceding the Gracchan land reforms.²⁶

It must also be pointed out that the literary evidence cited by Rosenstein does not support his theory. This is particularly evident in the case of Livy's account of the arguments used by those who were unwilling to shoulder the impositions of 210 BC. The reason why Livy does not refer to tenants is quite simply that the passage in question focuses on the census ratings of the protestors. Since tenants, unlike slaves, were not property, no reference to them is to be expected in this specific context. In short, although this episode suggests that slave-ownership was widespread during the final decades of the third century BC, it does not show that tenancy was unimportant.

We are therefore left with Appian's assertion that the rich preferred slaves rather than freemen because the former could not be called up for legionary service. Before exploring the possible implications of this passage, I want to call attention to the well-known fact that it is part of a highly dramatic account of the background to the military and demographic crisis that Tiberius Gracchus allegedly tried to solve. It has often been surmised that Appian's reconstruction was heavily influenced by the rhetoric of the Gracchan age.²⁷ For this reason alone, we should be careful not to press Appian's black-and-white picture.

Despite this caveat, I have no wish to eliminate this piece of evidence from my discussion. I am also prepared, moreover, to accept Rosenstein's view that Appian refers primarily to the choice between slaves and

third century BC. See my remarks in L. de Ligt, 'Studies in legal and agrarian history, II: Tenancy under the Republic', *Athenaeum* 88 (2000), 377–391.

²⁶ E.g. Brunt 1987, op. cit. (n. 2), 23–24 and 77, to be consulted with the critical remarks of Rich 1983, art. cit. (n. 4), 294–295.

²⁷ See e.g. K. Bringmann, *Die Agrarreform des Tiberius Gracchus: Legende und Wirklichkeit* (Stuttgart 1985). The contrast between military useless slaves and citizens who can be recruited for legionary service is found in Appian's summary of one of Tiberius Gracchus' speeches in *Bella Civilia* 1.11.

tenants (even though the text does not say this unequivocally).²⁸ It is, however, quite another matter whether this clue supports the theory that tenancy was unimportant before the last century of the Republic. To begin with, we should not forget that during the central decades of the second century BC the lower threshold for membership of the fifth class stood at 4000 *asses*. Although very little is known about land prices during this period, there are some grounds for thinking that this sum may have represented the notional value of ca. 5 *iugera* of land, the lowest amount received by Roman colonists during the first decades of the second century BC.²⁹ Regardless of the merits of this suggestion, the mere existence of a threshold of 4000 *asses* means that until the final decades of the second century BC the danger of tenants being dragged off to military service could be avoided by leasing out land to people whose property was worth less than this sum.³⁰

A closely related question concerns the number of rural proletarians during the period 'after the war' (*i.e.* after the Second Punic War) to which Appian refers. Although no reliable quantitative data are available, it seems clear that the enormous population losses suffered between 218 and 201 BC resulted in an increase in *per capita* wealth for the surviving rural population. This development alone must have diminished the pool of rural proletarians. At the same time we must consider the effects of the large-scale virginal distributions and of the

²⁸ Although Appian is clearly thinking of poor citizens who had enough property to qualify for military service, we cannot perhaps rule out the possibility that he refers to peasants wanting to supplement their incomes by hiring themselves out as wage labourers. Cf. his reference to the passing of a law that made it compulsory for large landowners to employ a fixed number of freemen, who were to keep an eye on the unfree agricultural workforce.

²⁹ D. Rathbone, 'The census qualifications of the *assidui* and the *prima classis*', in Sancisi-Weerdenburg *et al.* 1993, op. cit. (n. 16), 145. Rosenstein 2004, op. cit. (n. 9), 57–58, points out that citizens participating in maritime colonies enjoyed a formal exemption (*vacatio*) from military service despite the fact that they received only two *iugera* of *ager privatus*. From this he infers that the ownership of two *iugera* sufficed to put citizens in the fifth class. In my view, the claim that the citizens of the maritime colonies enjoyed a *right* of exemption from military service may have rested simply on the *fact* that they had never been recruited because they were technically proletarians. According to this view the Senate was completely justified in asking the colonies to provide soldiers during the tumultuary levy of 207 BC (Livy 27.38.2–3) and also in ruling that the colonists were not exempt from service in the navy (Livy 36.3.4–6).

³⁰ Of course, there are good grounds for thinking that it became increasingly common for volunteers to be recruited during the second century BC. But it seems reasonable to suppose that voluntary military service was attractive especially for those citizens who did not have access to additional land in the form of lease holdings.

colonial foundations that were carried out between 200 and 173 BC. According to a conservative estimate at least 30,000 adult male citizens received substantial plots of land during this period.³¹ This must have further reduced the number of proletarian country-dwellers. These considerations suggest that during the early second century BC many Roman landowners were faced with the choice between direct exploitation based on slave labour and indirect exploitation based on the use of moderately poor *assidui*. As we have seen, many landowners are likely to have preferred the former option for purely economic reasons. It does not seem unlikely, however, that the military aspect referred to by Appian also played a part: unlike slaves, tenants drawn from the ranks of the *assidui* could be recruited for legionary service.

If this interpretation is accepted, Appian correctly identifies one of the reasons why tenancy was regarded as unattractive during the early second century BC. On the other hand, he was probably wrong in maintaining that Roman landowners *remained* reluctant to lease out land to free tenants throughout the second century BC. In my view, the spectacular recovery of the Roman citizen body between 200 and 163 BC—a development which Appian's source preferred to ignore—not only increased the number of proletarians but also eroded the bargaining power of prospective tenants. This makes it difficult to maintain that Appian's remarks about the relative attractions of slavery and free labour are valid for the entire second century BC.

These considerations can be supplemented by looking at tenancy from the perspective of the poorer sections of the country-dwelling population. In his reconstruction of the agrarian economy of pre-Gracchan Italy Rosenstein argues (correctly, in my view) that the sizes of rural households varied over time and that this must have led to frequent adjustments in the amount of land cultivated by Roman peasant families. Using a variety of ancient and modern data he argues that a family comprising a father, a mother and three children may have had to

³¹ In 200–199 as many as 40,000 veterans may have received virgane allotments in Samnium and Apulia. Between 200 and 177 BC some 31,500 adult males (more than half of whom are likely to have been citizens) were sent out to colonies. In 173 BC another programme of virgane assignments was carried out in Cisalpina. The evidence for these distributions is surveyed by Brunt 1987, op. cit. (n. 2), 69 and 72, and by K. Hopkins, *Conquerors and Slaves* (Cambridge 1978), 57.

cultivate as many as 20 *iugera* of arable land.³² At the same time there are strong indications that many peasant families owned fewer than 10 *iugera*. Where did the missing land come from? If wage labour is not the answer and if access to public land was more problematic than Rosenstein thinks, the most plausible solution to this problem is surely that the flexible adjustment envisaged by him was achieved by varying the amount of land leased from well-off peasants and landowners.

*The census figures of 124 and 114 BC*³³

Up until the very last decade of the second century BC Rome stuck to the principle that only those citizens owning a certain amount of property could be called up for military service (except in emergencies). There are, however, clear indications that the threshold for military service did not remain constant during the third and second centuries BC. One important clue is that Livy, who claims to describe the system of *classes* introduced by Servius Tullius, gives the rating of the fifth class as 11,000 *asses*, whereas Polybius gives it as 400 *drachmae*, which is generally interpreted as representing 4000 *asses*.³⁴ Although these figures may seem straightforward, their interpretation is complicated by the fact that Rome adopted a new standard for its bronze coinage during the Second Punic War. At the outbreak of the war the bronze coinage consisted of so-called 'heavy' *asses* that were coined on a weight standard of 10 Roman ounces. After 217 BC this standard was lowered several times until stability was restored in 212 or 211 BC. From then on we find a new system based on a light (so-called 'sextantal') *as* of two Roman ounces. This means that at least two interpretations of the reduction of the *census* of the fifth class can be defended. The simplest and perhaps most plausible of these is that both Livy and Polybius refer to the light *asses* that were used after 212/1 BC. On this interpretation the threshold for military service was reduced by roughly 64 per cent. Alternatively, Livy's figure may be interpreted as representing 1100

³² Rosenstein 2004, op. cit. (n. 9), 68. In my view this estimate takes insufficient account of the gains in output that could be achieved by increasing labour input per hectare.

³³ The first part of this section is based on my chapter for the forthcoming Blackwell *Companion to the Roman Army*.

³⁴ Livy 1.43; Polybius 6.19.3.

'heavy' *asses* (weighing 11,000 ounces). According to this reading the *census* of the fifth class was reduced by a mere 27 per cent in terms of bronze (4000 sextantal *asses* = 8000 ounces).³⁵ Whichever of these readings is correct, there can be little doubt that the aim of this reduction was to increase the pool of potential recruits that could be fielded against Hannibal.

A far more difficult question is whether there was a further reduction in the mid-second century BC. The main evidence for this second adjustment is two passages from Gellius and Nonius, both of which define the *proletarii* as those whose property was worth less than 1500 *asses*.³⁶ In addition to this there is a problematic passage in the manuscript of Cicero's *De Republica*:³⁷ although the original text appears to have given 1100 (heavy?) *asses* as the rating of the fifth class, the late antique corrector of the manuscript is thought to have changed this to 1500 *asses*.³⁸ An important argument against interpreting these scanty sources as evidence for a second reduction is that none of them unambiguously refers to the second century BC.³⁹ Yet there is one clue that points to this period. After defining *proletarii* as the poorest citizens whose declared *census* was less than 1500 *asses*, Gellius goes on to explain that the term *capite censi* was used to denote those whose property was worth no more than 375 *asses*. It is generally agreed that this distinction is due to a mistake, and that the terms *proletarii* and *capite censi* referred to the same group of people. If this is the case, it becomes possible to speculate that Gellius may have misread a reference to the *census* rating of the fifth class being 375 *sestertii*, the exact equivalent of 1500 *asses*. It would then follow that the census rating of 1500 *asses* belongs to the period after 141/0 BC, when the *sestertius* became the normal official unit of reckoning of the Roman state. In terms of silver coinage the reduction

³⁵ This interpretation is preferred by E. Lo Cascio, 'Ancora sui censi minimi delle cinque classi "serviane"', *Athenaeum* 76 (1988), 293, and by Rathbone 1993, art. cit. (n. 29), 144.

³⁶ Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 16.10.10; Nonius p. 228 Lindsay.

³⁷ Cicero, *De Re Publica* 2.40.

³⁸ Lo Cascio 1988, art. cit. (n. 35), 286–288, claims that there is no discernible trace of this correction in the palimpsest containing the text of Cicero's treatise but also admits that many of the corrector's interventions can only be deciphered with great difficulty, mainly because the methods used to bring to light the text of *De Republica* in the nineteenth century had a disastrous effect on the text's quality. Cf. Rathbone 1993, art. cit. (n. 29), 140 n. 12, who reports that faint traces of the correction MILLE quingENTos were seen by Michael Crawford.

³⁹ This point is emphasized by Rich 1983, art. cit. (n. 4), 315.

of 4000 (sextantal) *asses* to 375 sesterces would have been equal to a reduction from 400 to 94 *denarii*.⁴⁰ In practical terms this would have meant that henceforth the ownership of a hut and a garden sufficed to make a Roman citizen liable for legionary service.⁴¹

In view of the paucity and poor quality of the evidence, this reconstruction remains to a large extent conjectural. Yet, as long as no one has come up with a more convincing explanation of the two figures of 375 and 1500 *asses*, we must at least reckon with the possibility that the census rating of the fifth class was reduced to a very low sum after Polybius wrote Book VI (ca. 150 bc). Can we be more precise than this? In a well-argued article on the historical development of the Roman census ratings Dominic Rathbone suggested that the new rating of 1500 *asses* was introduced simultaneously with the numismatic reform of 141/0 bc. A major weakness of this theory is that the putative reduction of 141/0 bc did not lead to more adult male citizens being registered in the census of 136/5 bc. Even though the censors were expected to register all adult male citizens, it is widely agreed that those belonging to the five *classes* were registered more efficiently than the proletarians (for the obvious reason that the latter were not liable for legionary service).⁴² The expansion of the fifth class, implied by the alleged lowering of the threshold for military service, should therefore have reduced the number of adult male citizens not registered by the censors. Yet the census figure for 135 bc is almost 10,000 lower than that for 141 bc.

In an influential study published in 1949 Emilio Gabba argued that the threshold for military service must have been lowered in the early 120s bc. In formulating this theory he started from the assumption that the Roman census figures were to be interpreted as comprising only those Roman citizens having sufficient property to qualify for military service. In other words, Gabba held that these figures did not comprise the (no doubt numerous) proletarians. His next step was to interpret the sudden jump in the census figures after 130 bc (from 318,823 to 394,736) as an indication that the census rating of the fifth class was reduced between 130 bc and 125 bc. Since this reduction must have taken place before the dramatic date of Cicero's *De Re Publica* (129 bc),

⁴⁰ Rathbone 1993, art. cit. (n. 29), 142 and 144.

⁴¹ Rich 1983, art. cit. (n. 4), 298; Brunt 1987, op. cit. (n. 2), 405–406.

⁴² Cf. above at note 6.

he concluded that the census rating of 1500 *asses* was introduced either in 130 BC or in 129 BC.⁴³

During the second half of the twentieth century many scholars have criticized this ingenious theory on the grounds that some ancient sources use the term *capite censi* as a synonym for proletarians, and that the mere existence of this expression proves that the censors were in fact expected to register those adult male citizens whose assets fell short of the property qualification for military service.⁴⁴ Since this counterargument seemed decisive, Gabba's date for the second reduction has generally been abandoned. There are, however, some grounds for thinking that his explanation for the high census figures of 124 BC and 114 BC has been dismissed too easily. This is not to suggest that Gabba's critics were wrong to reject his theory that the censors were expected to register *assidui* only. However, even if in theory all adult male citizens were to be registered, it seems likely that the names of many proletarians were not recorded. For this reason the idea that the introduction of a lower threshold for military service resulted in a more efficient registration of formerly proletarian citizens retains much of its original plausibility. The only serious rival explanation for the census figures of 124 BC and 114 BC is Brunt's suggestion that the partial implementation of the Gracchan land reforms between 131 and 129 BC may have reduced the number of unregistered proletarians.⁴⁵ The main problem with this theory is that it sits uneasily with the census figure for 130 BC (318,823), which is only marginally higher than that for 135 BC (317,933). It is true that few former proletarians may have been settled at the time when the censors of 131/0 BC were registering the citizens, but this does not explain why the figure for 130 BC was not swollen by those poor citizens who became concerned to register once the Gracchan land commission had been established.⁴⁶ In brief, even though one of the premises of Gabba's reading of the census figures is clearly wrong, he may well have been right to date the second lowering of the census rating of the fifth class to 130/129 BC.

⁴³ E. Gabba, 'The origins of the professional army at Rome: the 'proletarii' and Marius' reform' (Italian orig. 1949), published in English in E. Gabba, *Republican Rome. The Army and the Allies* (Oxford 1976), 1–19.

⁴⁴ E.g. Brunt 1987, op. cit. (n. 2), 22–23.

⁴⁵ Brunt 1987, op. cit. (n. 2), 79.

⁴⁶ Cf. D. Stockton, *The Gracchi* (Oxford 1979), 49–50.

Before rounding off my argument I should like to return briefly to the topic of tenancy. In my reconstruction of the history of the rural proletariat during the second century BC I have argued that from the late 170s BC onwards tenancy became an important survival strategy for many rural proletarians. If this hypothesis is correct, the lowering (and eventual abolishment) of the threshold for military service must have made many tenants eligible for the call-up. Is there any evidence for this in the sources?

One clue that may shed some light on this question is the composition of the armies that were raised by Pompey in Picenum in 83 BC and during his conflict with Clodius in the fifties. In his account of the private levy of 83 BC Velleius Paterculus describes Picenum as being filled with clients (*clientelae*) of Pompey's father, while Cicero describes the later army as being called up 'from the land' (*ex agris*).⁴⁷ This has been interpreted convincingly as an indication that Pompey's army consisted largely of veterans.⁴⁸ On the other hand Plutarch explicitly connects the levy of 83 BC with the fact that Pompey owned estates in the *ager Picenus*.⁴⁹ For this reason it seems unwise to rule out the possibility that his armies comprised both veterans and tenants.

Another possible illustration is the army that was assembled by Domitius Ahenobarbus in 49 BC. According to Caesar's *De Bello Civili*, Ahenobarbus manned seven ships with his slaves, freedmen and *coloni*. According to De Neeve most of these slaves and *coloni* were recruited in the coastal districts of South Etruria, where the Domitii are known to have owned landed property.⁵⁰ He also insisted on the vagueness of the term *colonus* and plausibly suggested that Domitius' army consisted largely of private clients and debtors. However, precisely because the term *colonus* is unspecific, we cannot rule out the possibility that the 'farmers' referred to by Caesar also included a significant number of tenants.⁵¹

Although these literary snippets are frustratingly ambiguous, the idea that tenants were recruited for military service during the first century BC is confirmed by a passage from Cicero's *Pro Murena*, from

⁴⁷ Velleius Paterculus 2.29.1; Cicero, *Ad Quintum fratrem* 2.3.4.

⁴⁸ De Neeve 1984, op. cit. (n. 14), 188.

⁴⁹ Plutarch, *Vita Pompeii* 6.1.

⁵⁰ De Neeve 1984, op. cit. (n. 14), 184, followed by W. Scheidel, *Grundpacht und Lohnarbeit in der Landwirtschaft des römischen Italien* (Frankfurt am Main 1994), 46.

⁵¹ In my view the phrase *colonis suis* points in this direction.

which it appears that Roman magistrates could win the favour of local landowners by *not* conscripting their tenants and labourers.⁵² Of course, the emergence of this kind of favouritism does not imply that tenancy was of little importance before the final decades of the Republic. It is simply a question of tenants becoming more visible in the sources after the effective abolishment of the property requirement for military service.

Conclusion

The principle aim of the foregoing discussion has been to show that there is no firm evidence to support the theory that Roman manpower resources were eroded by a demographical decline from the late 160s BC onwards. In fact, the few clues available (mainly the high census figures for 124 and 114 BC) suggest that the period 163–133 BC witnessed a considerable increase in the number of adult male Roman citizens. At the same time it seems clear that the continuing demographic expansion of the mid-second century BC was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in the amount of land available for cultivation by country-dwelling *cives*. In this respect, there was a marked contrast with the period 200–170 BC, when many citizens had benefited from colonial foundations and *virgatus* distributions. The inevitable outcome was an increase in rural poverty that pushed an ever-growing proportion of the adult male citizen population below the threshold for military service. We are therefore faced with the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that the perceived manpower shortage that seems to have worried several politicians of the Gracchan age was caused not by a contraction of the citizen body but by a continuing process of demographic expansion.

The main significance of this new interpretation is that it provides us with a better understanding not only of the Gracchan land reforms but also of the steady proletarianization of the Roman army during the last two centuries of the Republic.

⁵² Cicero, *Pro Murena* 42, with the remarks of P. Brunt, 'Italian aims at the time of the Social War' (orig. 1965), republished with revisions in P. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* (Oxford 1988), 128.

WAR IN OUTER SPACE: NATURE AND IMPACT OF THE ROMAN WAR EFFORT IN SPAIN, 218/217–197 BCE

FREDERIK J. VERVAET AND TONY ÑACO DEL HOYO

Introduction

In 219 BCE, a Roman senatorial commission was sent to Carthage to hand over a threatening complaint about the recent conquest of Sagunt, Rome's most faithful ally on the Iberian Peninsula.¹ In consequence of the Carthaginian Senate's decision to back Hannibal's policy of aggression, a powerful consular army was sent to North-eastern Spain in 218, as a strategic response to thwart Hannibal's march on Italy in what was rapidly evolving into a 'global war' all across the Western Mediterranean, comprising Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Illyria, Africa and, last but not least, the Iberian Peninsula. At the outbreak of the Second Punic War, large tracts of Spain already were an integral and important part of Carthage's sphere of power, as the Barcids had firmly established Carthaginian control of the Southern part of the peninsula. From the Roman geopolitical point of view, however, the war against the Carthaginians and their sundry allies in Spain really was a kind of 'war in outer space'. This paper will indeed argue that both the geographical conditions and the extent of the Spanish theatre of war would deeply affect the nature and impact of the Roman presence in Spain, and this not only during the Second Punic War and its immediate aftermath, but also for the following two centuries.

Both the tremendous strain the war in Italy and Sicily put on Rome's limited number of regular officials *cum imperio* and the importance of the 'Spanish front' impelled the Senate to have the People create a remarkable series of *proconsulatus extraordinarii*. Therefore, the first part of this paper will clarify the overall constitutional framework of the Roman presence in Spain from 217 to 197 BCE. After a brief conspectus of

¹ Polybius 3.15.12; Livius 21.9.3ff; Appianus *Iberica* 10; D. Hoyos, Hannibal's Dynasty. Power and politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247–183 BC (London & New York 2003), 96–97, n. 15.

the precise nature of these extraordinary commands and the Roman command structure in Spain, we will next focus on the scope of the constitutive popular laws, the authority of the Senate with respect to the decision-making in the popular assemblies and the commanders in the field, and a few important aspects of the settlement of 198/197. Finally, the second part of this paper will scrutinize the war economy policies applied by the Roman commanders, in particular with respect to the overall management of the war effort and its consequences for the armies and civil populations that were involved either directly or indirectly.

The commands in Spain from 218/217 to 197 BCE: constitutional aspects

a. *The extraordinary proconsulships in Spain from 217 to 197: nature and command structure*

In 217, in spite of Hannibal's successful invasion of Italy and its formidable challenges, the Senate took a couple of bold and consequential decisions. First, the Senate decided to vigorously carry on the war in Spain. This means that the Senate sanctioned the consul P. Cornelius Scipio's historic decision to send his older brother Gnaeus ahead with the bulk of the consular army before speeding back to Italy in 218. Secondly, the Senate pragmatically solved the resulting structural lack of regular (pro-) magistrates by creating a series of extraordinary proconsulates. Probably around the time of P. Scipio's *prorogatio imperii* in March 217, a popular vote turned his legate Cn. Cornelius Scipio (*cos.* 222) into a proconsul *suo iure* by decree of the Senate.² Both from

² See Livius 21.17.1 and Polybius 3.40.2 for Spain being decreed *provincia consularis* in 218 and assigned to the consul P. Cornelius Scipio, and Livius 22.22.1–3 for the arrangements with respect to his command in 217. For Cn. Scipio's original position as *legatus* acting under the auspices of his younger brother, see Appianus *Iberica* 14 (comp. *Annibaica* 5); Zonaras 8.23 and esp. Livius 21.40.3. As Cn. Scipio was charged with the task of marching the bulk of the consular army into Spain while P. Scipio hurried back to Italy to counter Hannibal (Livius 21.32.3ff.; Polybius 3.49.1; 3.56.6; 3.76.1), it should not be questioned that the latter invested the former with delegated *praetorium imperium*. J.S. Richardson, *The Romans in Spain* (Oxford 1996), 25 rightly underlines the historic importance of both the decision of the Senate to dispatch P. Scipio to Spain in 218 and the latter's own decision to still send his brother into Spain with the greater part of his army, in spite of Hannibal's threatening advance on Italy proper. Although Appianus probably confounds the *s.c.* prolonging the *imperium*

Livius' indirect indications and the fact that Cn. Scipio is repeatedly styled *imperator*, it is obvious that both brothers shared the supreme command in Spain from 217 until their untimely deaths in 211.³

In 211, in consequence of the successive deaths of P. and Cn. Scipio, the Senate instructed the tribunes of the *plebs* to ask the tribes whom they preferred to send with *imperium* to Hispania and to the army of which Cn. Scipio had been commander-in-chief, the appointee being the propraetor C. Claudius Nero (*pr.* 212).⁴ In all probability, the important

of P. Scipio with the popular vote investing Cn. Scipio *extra ordinem* with a *consulare imperium* in Spain, which probably occurred shortly after the decision to dispatch P. Scipio (again) to Hispania, his representation of the facts in *Iberica* 15 & *Annibaeica* 8 also strongly suggests a popular vote with respect to the Spanish command in 217. The fact that Livius does not record the vote of a decree and a subsequent *lex* concerning the command in Spain need not necessarily imply that no such proceeding took place. For the majority of 218 and the beginning of 217, Livius is actually fully absorbed with the dramatic theatre of war. Only after the defeat of Flaminius does Livius return to the events in Rome, since the appointment of dictator Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus heralded a new phase in the war.

³ For both commanders jointly wielding the supreme command (the *sumum imperium auspiciumque*), see Livius 23.26.2 (216 BCE—comp. also Polybius 8.1.(3)4); 23.29.17; 23.48.4; Livius 25.32 (comp. Appianus *Iberica* 16). For Cn. Scipio being styled *imperator*, see Livius 23.27.11; 24.48; 25.32.1ff.; 25.35.4; 25.37.9–11; 27.4.6 (comp. also 26.2.5 and 26.18.3). In 28.32.6f. (206 BCE), Scipio Africanus explicitly refers to the *Scipionum nomini auspiciisque*. Therefore, W.F. Jashemski, *The Origins and History of the Proconsular and the Propraetorian imperium to 27 BC* (Chicago 1950), 22f.; T.R.S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* 1 (New York 1951), 245; 247, n. 10 (see also op. cit., 250 and 260); G.V. Sumner, 'Proconsuls and provinciae in Spain 218/17–196/5 BC', *Arethusa* 3 (1970), 86; 88; J.-M. Roddaz, 'Les Scipions et l'Hispanie', *Revue des Études Anciennes* 100 (1998), 343f. (with reference to Polybius 3.97.4) rightly suggest that Cn. Scipio must have commanded *pro consule* from 217 at the latest. Contra, e.g., Th. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*, 2. Band (Leipzig 1887, 3rd ed.), 652, n. 2 and R. Feig Vishnia, *State, Society and Popular Leaders in Mid-Republican Rome 241–167 BC* (London & New York 1996), 65; 221 n. 60, who argue that Cn. Scipio remained subordinate to Publius as the latter's legate; R.C. Knapp, *Aspects of the Roman Experience in Iberia, 206–100 BC* (Valladolid 1977), 83–88 and J.S. Richardson 1996, op. cit. (n. 2), 36; 29f., who believe that Cn. Scipio only exercised an independent (i.e., 'non-delegated') 'propraetorian' command from 212. T.C. Brennan, *The Praetorship of the Roman Republic* (Oxford 2000), 155; 313 n. 7, however, steers a middle course by arguing that Cn. Scipio was promoted from *legatus* to "a commander with (praetorian) imperium by means of *lex 'de imperio'* voted in 217. R. Develin, 'The Roman Command Structure and Spain 218–190 BC', *Klio* 62 (1980), 356 + n. 9, makes the equally implausible suggestion that Cn. Scipio was first vested with "propraetorian imperium" by virtue of delegation by Publius, "which was in 217 not only confirmed and prorogued by popular vote, but was also raised to proconsular status". See the forthcoming monograph (Vervaeke) on 'The Principle of the *sumum imperium auspiciumque* under the Roman Republic', for an exhaustive discussion of the generally ignored though consequential Republican constitutional principle of the *sumum imperium auspiciumque*.

⁴ For Nero's appointment to the Spanish command by means of a *plebiscitum ex s.c.*, see Livius 26.2.5f. (comp. 26.18.2); Zonaras 9.7; Appianus *Iberica* 17; Develin 1980,

decision to replace both Scipiones by a single supreme commander was prompted by two strategic considerations. In *Iberica* 17, Appianus points out that the result of Nero's failure to turn the tide in Spain "was that, although they [i.e., the Romans] desired to, they were unable to evacuate the Iberian Peninsula, for fear that the war there would be transferred to Italy". Immediately upon this explanation, Appianus goes on to describe the proceedings leading to the election of Scipio Africanus. Obviously, many influential senators were in favour of abandoning Spain altogether in consequence of the disastrous defeat of P. and Cn. Scipio. Since, however, such a decision would have seriously increased the risk of a new Carthaginian invasion of Northern Italy, the Senate eventually decided to carry on the war in Spain, henceforth under the command of a single commander-in-chief. Secondly, this reversal was doubtlessly also dictated by the critical situation in Spain itself, which clearly required a singular and undisputed high command. In this way, any possibility of dangerous disputes between *imperatores* commanding on a footing of equality (*pari imperio*) could be ruled out.

After Nero had failed to fully exploit his successes against Hasdrubal, the Senate decided to get him replaced. However, as the senators could not come to an agreement as to who was to be sent to Spain but all agreed that a successor to this crucial command was to be chosen with extraordinary care (*extraordinaria cura*), the Senate finally decided that the consuls should organise an election in the *comitia centuriata*. When the young but charismatic P. Cornelius Scipio, son of the recently slain P. Scipio, offered himself as a candidate, the *centuriae* voted that he should *pro consule* have the (*summum*) *imperium* in Hispania.⁵ Whereas

op. cit. (n. 3), 358 and Brennan 2000, op. cit. (n. 3), 156. Nero's *imperium* was doubtlessly raised from *praetorium* to *consulare*. The dispatch of C. Claudius Nero is generally perceived as a transitional measure aimed at the consolidation of the position of the Roman army in Spain pending the arrival of a more 'permanent' commander; see, e.g., Knapp 1977, op. cit. (n. 3), 88; Develin 1980, op. cit. (n. 3), 359 (cf. infra) and Brennan 2000, op. cit. (n. 3), 156. However, given (1) the fact that the Senate subsequently gave Claudius adequate means to discharge his duties (Livius 26.17.1f.), (2) the scope of his remarkably successful campaign (Livius 26.17.2–16), and (3) the fact that Livius clearly refers to a procedure aiming at the appointment of permanent successor to the command of Cn. Scipio in 26.2.5, there is every indication that his appointment was originally not meant as a provisory measure.

⁵ Livius 26.18.2–11. See also Livius 26.41.18 for Scipio Africanus receiving his *consulare imperium* by virtue of a *lex centuriata*. Since Scipio was in all likelihood elected at the outset of the consular year 210, the consuls who called for the vote in the *comitia centuriata* at the behest of the Senate were none other than M. Claudius Marcellus and M. Valerius Laevinus. This means that Scipio got his Spanish command by virtue of a *lex Claudia Valeria*.

Livius' summary clearly shows that the *lex* simply named a proconsul who received the supreme command in *provincia Hispania*, the summary but valuable accounts of Appianus and Zonaras contain the real key to the solution of the problem of (the procedure of) Scipio's appointment. Appianus and Zonaras clearly indicate that especially Hasdrubal's cunning escape from the Black Rocks and the ensuing recovery of Carthaginian power in Spain caused increasing panic and dissatisfaction in Rome. As Livius unambiguously shows in 26.18.2–4 that the initiative to appoint a successor to the command of the unfortunate Claudius Nero was taken by the Senate in the first place, it is obvious that the greater part of that body was displeased at the way Nero had handled matters in Spain. Although it was eventually young P. Scipio who got the Spanish command in 210, both Livius' representation and the fact that the Senate decided to send the seasoned propraeor M. Iunius Silanus (*pr.* 212) along with Scipio show that it was the Senate's original idea to replace Claudius Nero by a senior, more experienced senatorial commander. On account of the Senate's inability to work out a solution by themselves, the bitter earnest of the situation in Spain and especially their aim to assign the Spanish command to a senior senatorial commander, the Senate by way of exception decided to have the consuls put the matter to the *comitia centuriata* instead of working through the tribunes of the *plebs*. By doing so, the Senate probably also hoped to forestall any possible popular agitation about the appointment of another commander-in-chief for Spain, expecting that the more 'conservative' *comitia centuriata* would ensure the appointment of a mature and skilled commander. This view is further strengthened by the fact that Scipio had to defend his election before a *contio* after a number of influential senior senators had cast serious doubts on his suitability. Last but not least, it is important to ascertain that although the Senate redefined the propraeor's *imperium* as consular and entitled him to share the *summum imperium* in Spain, Silanus from the very outset voluntarily left the supreme command to Scipio alone.⁶

⁶ For senior senators questioning Scipio's capabilities, see Appianus *Iberica* 17f.; Zonaras 9.7. For the *pro praetore* Silanus being subsequently appointed by the Senate to assist Scipio on a footing of equality (*pari imperio*), his *imperium* being redefined as consular, see also Livius 26.19.10f.; esp. 28.28.14 (*eodem iure, eodem imperio*—comp. Polybius 10.6.7 and Livius 22.27.6). For Silanus leaving the supreme command in Spain to P. Scipio from 210 to 206, see Livius 28.1.5; 28.13.3; 28.14.15; 28.34.12; comp. 28.26.7 and 28.27.12; see also 28.16.9–15 (esp. 14: *ductu atque auspicio P. Scipionis pulsi Hispania Carthaginienses sunt*) and 28.38.1 (*Haec in Hispania P. Scipionis ductu auspicioque gesta*); and Appianus *Iberica* 26; 28; 30.

Although many scholars have questioned the historicity of Scipio's election in the *comitia centuriata*,⁷ a confluence of exceptional circumstances induced the Senate not only to advise the creation of another extraordinary proconsulate, but also to do so by virtue of a vote in the *comitia centuriata*. This strongly suggests that appointments of imperators *extra ordinem* were 'normally' made by the *concilium plebis*. Apart from Scipio's manifest popularity with the people, and the fact that he had already distinguished himself during the battle of Ticinus,⁸ there may have been some other very good reasons explaining the acceptance of the undaunted candidatureship of a twenty-four years old *aedilicius*. J.-M. Roddaz lucidly points to the fact that P. and Cn. Scipio had contracted several private alliances with local dynasts, and built up a *clientela* among Spanish *ciuitates*, and that risings occurred in 206 and 205, respectively provoked by rumours of Scipio Africanus' death and mere contempt of his successors.⁹

In 206, the year after the battle of Metaurus, the Senate doubtlessly felt that the time had come to relieve Scipio and Iunius Silanus of their commands in Spain. Although Livius unfortunately records nothing to the point, the Senate in all likelihood charged the consuls to recommend the *tribuni plebes* to provide *extra ordinem* for two new commanders by means of a *plebiscitum*. In 29.13.7 (204), 30.41.4f. (201), and 31.50.11 (200), Livius indeed relates that the *imperium* of L. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus was prorogued in 204 by virtue of a *plebiscitum*, and that both proconsuls were succeeded in 201 and 200 respectively by means of a *plebiscitum*.¹⁰ G.V. Sumner also rightly explains that the ovations decreed to L. Cornelius and L. Manlius in 200 and 199 successively virtually prove that both commanders had been vested with (full) *imperium* by popular vote.¹¹ Livius' information

⁷ L. Lange, *Römische Alterthümer* (Berlin 1876, 3rd ed.), vol. 2, 178; 708; Mommsen 1887, op. cit. (n. 3), 659, n. 4; Sumner 1970, op. cit. (n. 3), 87 (see also 99, n. 30); Knapp 1977, op. cit. (n. 3), 89f. and R.T. Ridley, 'The extraordinary commands of the Late Republic. A matter of definition', *Historia* 30 (1981), 281 all believe it really concerns a vote of the *plebs*.

⁸ See Livius 21.46.7ff; Polybius 10.3.4ff.

⁹ Roddaz 1998, op. cit. (n. 3), 352.

¹⁰ Livius 29.13.7. Obviously, for one reason or another, there was no unanimity in the Senate concerning a possible prorogation of the *imperium* of L. Cornelius and L. Manlius in Spain. Therefore, the Senate eventually decided to put the question of the supreme command in Spain again to the *concilium plebis*, through the consuls and the tribunes of the *plebs*.

¹¹ Sumner 1970, op. cit. (n. 3), 90; 100, n. 76, with reference to Livius 31.20.3f. and 32.7.4. The decree concerning the exploits of L. Manlius was vetoed. Contra

about the activities of L. Cornelius and L. Manlius strongly suggests that from 206 onward, the supreme command in Spain was shared again, which means that the command structure of the years 217–211 was resumed. At any rate, Livius' words in 29.13.7 seem to imply that the Senate in 204 continued a previously established policy, and that the decision to assign the *summum imperium* there to two other proconsuls in 206 was taken by the Senate.¹²

At the beginning of 201, however, the Senate formally advised the consuls to urge the tribunes to bring before the People the question who by their command should be commander in Hispania. It is obvious that in March 201, several influential senators wanted to effect an important change of policy with regard to the organization of the command in Hispania, since the authorizing decree contained a few clear lines of action. The *tribuni* were to ask the tribes to appoint a single proconsul/*summus imperator*. This appointee was then to enrol a single legion and Latin allies in fifteen cohorts out of the existing two armies. L. Cornelius and L. Manlius were to bring back the veterans to Italy.¹³ Although the *tribuni plebis* indeed convened the *concilium plebis* again at the behest of the consuls and the Senate, they clearly adopted a surprisingly independent stance. On the basis of what we know about C. Cornelius Cethegus, Cornelius Lentulus' successor,¹⁴ and the fact that sometime during the first months of 200, only L. Cornelius Lentulus returned from Spain,¹⁵ it is clear that the Comitia appointed a successor to (only) L. Cornelius Lentulus, and at once confirmed the

Develin 1980, op. cit. (n. 3), 361f., who believes that L. Cornelius and L. Manlius were vested with *praetorium imperium* in 206 by means of delegation by either Scipio or the praetor urbanus. Develin thinks that Cornelius Cethegus (cf. infra) was also given a *praetorium imperium* in 201, "which was subsequently extended and augmented for 200". Concerning Cn. Cornelius 'Lentulus' (Develin believes that not Cn. Cornelius Blasio but Cn. Cornelius Lentulus actually departed for Spain in 199, cf. also infra) and L. Stertinius, who were proconsul in 199, Develin argues that they "could have easily been given delegated *imperium* at the end of 200, after Cethegus' election, which authority the plebs now elevated", and explains that as far as delegation was concerned, "The arrangements and nominations could easily have been made without the participation of the plebs." For a similar view, see, for example, Feig Vishnia 1996, op. cit. (n. 3), 67f.

¹² Since the Senate in 204 simply advised the tribunes to ask the People which two men it wished sent out to Spain, it is only logical to suppose that in 206 the same question had been brought before the People *ex senatus consulto*.

¹³ Livius 30.41.4f.

¹⁴ See Livius 31.49.7 for the fact that Cethegus won a victory in the Ager Sedetanus in 200.

¹⁵ Livius 31.20.1.

command of L. Manlius Acidinus.¹⁶ C. Cornelius Cethegus (*cos.* 197) most probably assumed his command in the course of 201 after being chosen (i.e., *extra ordinem*) proconsul in the spring of that year.¹⁷ J.S. Richardson at any rate rightly concludes that the Senate at this moment clearly had the intention of cutting down the Roman army in Spain, both as for the number of troops and the number of imperators, even if the election of C. Cethegus and the staying on of Acidinus meant that no withdrawal was achieved.¹⁸

At the very end of the consular year 200, yet one more plebiscite was passed with regard to the command in Spain. As C. Cornelius Cethegus was elected curule aedile *in absentia*, the Senate instructed the tribunes to propose which two men they would order to go to the armies in Spain, in order that C. Cornelius might return to enter upon his office, and that L. Manlius Acidinus might be relieved of his *provincia* after many years of service. The tribes ordered Cn. Cornelius Blasio (*pr.* 197) and L. Stertinius to hold *imperium* in Hispania with the status

¹⁶ See also Sumner 1970, op. cit. (n. 3), 91: "On the facts recorded it appears that C. Cethegus actually succeeded only L. Lentulus, that Acidinus was left in command, and that Acidinus' army remained in separate existence. If Livius correctly reports the resolution of 201, it must have been modified at some stage." In my opinion, the Senate issued a new decree regarding the armies in Spain after the unexpected result of the vote in the *concilium plebis*.

¹⁷ Broughton 1951, op. cit. (n. 3), 320 indicates that C. Cornelius was "probably" chosen in 201 to succeed L. Cornelius Lentulus in Spain. It does not strain belief that L. Cornelius Lentulus was succeeded around the late spring/early summer of 201, only to arrive in Rome with his veterans in the first months of 200. The use of the imperfect of *obtinere* in Livius 31.49.7 strongly suggests that C. Cornelius had taken up his command in Spain before 200.

¹⁸ J.S. Richardson, *Hispaniae: Spain and the development of Roman imperialism 218–82 BC* (Cambridge 1986), 68–70. Richardson, however, explains this course of things as an example of "the gap between the thinking about Spain which went on in Rome, and in particular in the Senate, and what was actually happening on the spot." Richardson indeed believes that the reversal occurred in Spain rather than in Rome, and that it is quite possible that it was not until after Cethegus had arrived in Spain to take up his *provincia* that the decision was made to continue with two proconsuls and two armies. As the sources provide no proof for this conjectural and rather far-fetched hypothesis, there are no good reasons to doubt that the main features of strategy and policy were chiefly devised in Rome. See also Richardson 1996, op. cit. (n. 2), 46f. for the hypothesis that "given the size of the territory controlled by the Romans in 201, to say nothing of the immensity of the hinterland, it is more likely that the Senate intended this reduction to be the first stage of a phased withdrawal than the start of a long-term occupation by one legion and a few cohorts of allies." Richardson reiterates the unlikely suggestion that the reversal of the original intention took place in situ, after Cethegus had reached Hispania, after consultation with L. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus. On p. 50, however, Richardson propounds that it may have been the Senate's intention in 201 to have the one commander who was to remain to maintain Roman control of a considerable stretch of the coastal strip.

of proconsuls.¹⁹ The Senate's decision to have the Comitia appoint two commanders at any rate indicates that by now it no longer considered reducing the Roman presence in Spain. Quite possibly, the Senate was already contemplating more orthodox ways to organize Rome's long-term presence on the peninsula.

In sum, this brief survey of the successive commands in Hispania during the Second Punic War results in the following scheme for the command structure in Hispania from 218 to 197:²⁰

218	By decree of the Senate	One <i>summus imperator</i>	The consul P. Cornelius Scipio
217–211	By decree of the Senate and by law	Two <i>summi imperatores</i>	The proconsuls P. and Cn. Cornelius Scipio (<i>cos.</i> 222)
211/210	By law (<i>ex s.c.</i>)	One <i>summus imperator</i>	<i>pro praetore pro consule</i> C. Claudius Nero (<i>pr.</i> 212)
210–206	By law and decree of the Senate By mutual agreement	Two <i>summi imperatores</i> One <i>summus imperator</i>	The proconsul P. Scipio Africanus (<i>cos.</i> 205) and <i>pro praetore pro consule</i> M. Iunius Silanus (<i>pr.</i> 212) P. Scipio Africanus
206 (–204)–201	By law (<i>ex s.c.</i>)	Two <i>summi imperatores</i>	The proconsuls L. Cornelius Lentulus (<i>cos.</i> 199) and L. Manlius Acidinus (<i>pr.</i> 210)
201–200/199	By law	Two <i>summi imperatores</i>	The proconsuls C. Cornelius Cethegus (<i>cos.</i> 197) and L. Manlius Acidinus (<i>pr.</i> 210)
200/199–197	By law (<i>ex s.c.</i>)	Two <i>summi imperatores</i>	The proconsuls Cn. Cornelius Blasio (<i>pr.</i> 194) and L. Stertinius

¹⁹ Livius 31.50.6–11. See Livius 33.27.1–5 for the fact that only Cornelius Blasio celebrated an ovation shortly after the beginning of the consular year 196, whereas L. Stertinius, his fellow proconsul, did not even take the trouble to petition for a triumph. Fortunately, the *ouatio* celebrated by Cn. Cornelius Blasio happens to be also epigraphically on record, see G.V. Sumner, 'A New Reading in the Fasti Triumphales Capitolini', *Phoenix* 19 (1965), 24–26, contra Th. Mommsen, *CIL* 1 (Berlin 1863), 568 and Mommsen 1887, op. cit. (n. 3), 652, n. 4; A. Degraffi, *Inscriptiones Italiae* 13, 1, 78f. The inscription bears testimony to the particular pride taken by Cn. Cornelius in his proconsulate being constituted '*extra ordinem*'.

²⁰ Contra Sumner 1970, op. cit. (n. 3), 85; 87–89; 92, where it is argued that there were two proconsular commands in Hispania from from 217 till 197, "one of them

b. *The scope of the constitutive laws*

The above shows that the laws that created the extraordinary commands in Spain simply defined *nominatim* whom was to have *imperium 'pro consule'* in a definite *prouincia*. In light of what Livius records about the consecutive votes of the Second Punic War and the similar procedure Cicero attests in *Philippicae* 11.18 pertaining to the assignment of the command against Andronicus in 131, it is clear that either any interested citizen was formally called on to stand up for a certain command between the promulgation of the bill and the actual *rogatio*, regardless of his current official status,²¹ or the bill itself provided for the allocation of a certain command to a certain individual.²² The result of, for example, the votes of 204 and 201, shows that it was perfectly feasible for candidates to stand *in absentia*. Those who were *extra ordinem* invested with *imperium consulare* logically carried the official title of proconsul.

c. *The authority of the Senate and the decision-making in the popular assemblies*

Although, at first sight, one would think that the decision-making in the *concilium plebis* proceeded fully in conformity with the preliminary directives of the Senate, the discussion *supra* induces a more nuanced conclusion. During the Second Punic War, the Senate indeed governed most of the decision-making in the Comitia. The quite often recorded procedure of the Senate advising the consuls to arrange with the tribunes of the *plebs* that they should bring a certain question before the Comitia was doubtlessly standard around the time of the Second Punic War. At all events, it is of great importance to note

depending on popular election of *privati* (from Cn. Cornelius Scipio to Cn. Cornelius Blasio), the other beginning as a command assigned by the Senate to magistrates or promagistrates with *imperium prorogued* (P. Cornelius Scipio, cos. 218, C. Claudius Nero, pr. 212, M. Iunius Silanus, pr. 212, pro pr. 211), and changing later to popular election of *privati* (L. Manlius Acidinus, L. Sertinius)", with the implicit suggestion that the former command ("command A") was superior to the latter ("command B"), at least until the election of Manlius Acidinus.

²¹ This was apparently the case in e.g. 211 (C. Claudius Nero), 210 (P. Scipio Africanus), 206 (L. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus), 204 (*idd.*), 201 (C. Cornelius Cethegus and L. Manlius Acidinus), 200 (Cn. Cornelius Blasio and L. Sertinius) and 131.

²² This was probably the case in 217 (Cn. Scipio), perhaps in 205 (P. Sempronius Tuditanus? See Livius 29.12.3–15), and certainly in 215 (M. Claudius Marcellus: see Livius 23.30.17–19.). This would also be the case in e.g. 107 (C. Marius), 88 (C. Marius), 77 (Cn. Pompeius), 67 (Cn. Pompeius), 66 (*id.*), and 57 (Cn. Pompeius).

that in 217, 211, 210, 206, 204, 201 and 200, the *leges* regarding the supreme command in Spain were always passed on the initiative of the Senate, which was doubtlessly also the case for the extraordinary proconsulships of M. Claudius Marcellus and Sempronius Tuditanus in 215 and 205. Especially Livius 30.41.4f. offers a striking example of how the Senate, if necessary, took the initiative to involve the Comitia in the decision-making within a preconceived framework, although this instance necessitates an important annotation.

A number of indirect or secondary but valuable indications in the account of Livius and, to a lesser extent, Appianus and Dio Cassius, indeed point to the fact that during the Second Punic War some important tensions and frictions arose between the Senate on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the decision-making in the Comitia at the instigation of/for the benefit of charismatic protagonists like M. Marcellus and Scipio Africanus. At the outset of 210, Scipio's rather unexpected election by the *comitia centuriata* was contested by the powerful senatorial *seniores* to such a degree that Scipio decided to call for an additional *contio* to strengthen his position. After Scipio's position as proconsul and *summus imperator* of Spain had become unquestionable in this way, the Senate sent the senior *praetorius* M. Iunius Silanus along with Scipio, obviously with the intention of providing Scipio with a more mature counsellor and of having a kind of 'supervisor' in the field. The Senate moreover raised the *imperium* of *pro praetore* Silanus to the level of a *consulare imperium* and entitled him to share the supreme command, which, among other things, must have served the purpose of strengthening his position vis-à-vis young P. Scipio. At all events, Scipio departed for Spain in 210 against the will of an important and influential part of the Senate, armed with the powerful and quite exceptional legitimization of a *lex centuriata*. The careers and extraordinary *prouvinciae/imperia* of C. Claudius Nero and especially M. Claudius Marcellus and P. Scipio Africanus reveal that even after the crushing defeats at Lake Trasimene and Cannae in 217 and 216, the advocates of an aggressive military policy could continue to depend on the undaunted support of the Roman People, and that the protagonists of the hawkish faction in Rome eventually did not refrain from making use of their popularity among the commons in order to pressure the Senate and, if necessary, obtain *imperium* and/or *prouvincia extra ordinem*.

Nonetheless, the authority of the Senate remained by far the foremost factor in the Roman decision-making process during the Second Punic War. Polybius in 6.51.5f. expressly explains the Roman victory

on the basis of the fact that the Roman Senate managed to keep its control of the *consilia publica*, whereas in Carthage, the multitude had already acquired the chief voice in deliberations. Although A. Lintott emphasizes that the role of the Comitia during the Second Punic War should not be underestimated, he argues that in spite of a concentration of command in the hands of a limited number of aristocrats, the position of the Senate was actually reinforced by the need to coordinate strategy over several theatres of war with social and economic policy at home. In this respect, it is very important to make a few important clarifications. First, the Senate never lost its important prerogatives to allocate the *ornatio prouinciae* and to define the duration of the commands in Spain, even if the commanders involved were appointed by virtue of popular law.²³ Polybius indeed strongly emphasizes in 6.15.4–8 that the consuls—and, in extensu, all imperators in the field—were dependent on the Senate in terms of *ornatio prouinciae* (the allocation of corn, clothing and pay), *prorogatio imperii* (continuation or supersession) and triumphal honours (the granting of public triumphs). This means that the Senate carefully retained all of its most powerful instruments to keep the commanders in Spain in check, regardless of the matter whether it was the Senate or the proconsuls who worked out the actual strategy in Spain.²⁴ Secondly, it is important to stress that there is no indication whatsoever that the successive laws concerning the Spanish commands enhanced the *imperium* of the commanders involved with *potestates extraordinariae*. Scipio Africanus' decision to cross over to Africa

²³ For senatorial decisions pertaining to the *ornatio prouinciae* of the commanders in Spain, see Livius 23.48.4f. (P. and Cn. Scipio); 26.17.1f. (C. Claudius Nero); 26.19.10f.; 27.7.17; 27.10.13 and 27.36.12 (P. Scipio Africanus and M. Iunius Silanus). For decrees concerning the duration of the Spanish commands, see Livius 24.10.3; 24.44.4 and 25.3.6 (P. and Cn. Scipio); 27.7.17; 27.22.7 (P. Scipio Africanus and M. Iunius Silanus); 28.45.10; 30.2.7 and 30.27.9 (L. Cornelius Lentulus & L. Manlius Acidinus). Contra Develin 1980, op. cit. (n. 3), 360 and A.W. Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic* (Oxford 1999), 114, who believe that the commands of Scipio and Silanus offer the first known instance of extending a command for more than one year by virtue of a popular vote. The discrepancy between Livius 27.7.17 and 27.22.7 can be easily explained in that the Senate could always revoke, alter or reconfirm its earlier decisions with respect to the term or the formula of the *tempus prorogationis* of a certain command in consequence of new developments in the field.

²⁴ Richardson 1986, op. cit. (n. 18), 43 is one of the proponents of the view that although the Senate provided the basic underlay, in terms of command-structure and supplies, the formulation of the policy in Spain was actually the responsibility of the men on the spot. Richardson argues that this was the inevitable result of the remoteness of Spain and the conditions of war. See also p. 55; 56–57 and Richardson 1996, op. cit. (n. 2), 38 for this view.

and gain over Syphax was taken *suo consilio*. In Africa, Scipio himself emphasized that he could not treat with an enemy without an order of the Senate (*iniussu senatus*).²⁵ In 205, the authoritative Q. Fabius Maximus bitterly reproached the consul Scipio for having crossed over to Africa because of his own ambition and without a valid *ratio publica*, and stressed that Scipio had not the slightest official authorization for this undertaking (*sine lege... sine senatus consulto*).²⁶ In light of these considerations and the tremendous cost of the war effort in Italy proper, it should neither be doubted that the exactions imposed on the Spanish *ciuitates* to provide the troops with *stipendium*, *frumentum* and *uestimenta* concerned ad hoc measures.²⁷ Especially from Livius 23.48.4–6; 12 (cf. also *infra*), it is, however, clear that the Senate normally had to authorize the commanders in the field what provisions precisely they could exact from the local communities. If there simply was no time for senatorial decision-making, such exactions were doubtlessly effectuated *rei publicae causa*, out of sheer want, and ratified as such by the Senate *post factum*, either implicitly or explicitly.²⁸

d. *The settlement of 198/197: regularization of the supreme command*

At the beginning of 197, for the first time six praetors took office, of whom both C. Sempronius Tuditanus and M. Helvius immediately got a Spanish *prouincia*, with significant forces and orders to send the veterans home and fix the boundaries which should be observed between the nearer and the farther *prouinciae*.²⁹ Although most scholars doubt

²⁵ Livius 28.17f. (esp. 28.18.3) and Appianus *Iberica* 29. To our thinking, Livius 29.24.3 (204 BCE) strongly suggests that the Comitia ratified Scipio's agreement with Syphax. It is possible that Scipio put the matter to the vote himself as consul in 205. For Scipio's compact with Syphax, see Livius 28.18.12 and Appianus *Iberica* 30. Until formal ratification on the part of *SPQR*, Scipio's treaty was no more than a military convention, possibly formalized by means of an edict.

²⁶ Livius 28.42.20–22. Fabius perhaps alludes not so much to the fact that Scipio's excursion was not authorized by a supplementary *lex* (and/or *s.c.*) in 206, as to the fact that the *lex* which had vested Scipio *extra ordinem* with a proconsulate for the war in Spain did not adjudge him any extraordinary *potestas* in this respect also.

²⁷ Livius 28.25.6; 28.25.9f.; 28.29.12; 28.34.11 (Scipio Africanus); Livius 29.3.5 and Appianus *Iberica* 38 (Cornelius Lentulus and Manlius Acidinus in 205).

²⁸ Richardson 1986, op. cit. (n. 18), 72 + n. 49 at any rate rightly emphasizes that "at this stage stipendium seems to be still an ad hoc levy to pay the Roman soldiers" rather than a fixed annual sum drawn from the province.

²⁹ Livius 32.27.6f.; 32.28.2; 32.28.11 (*ut dimitterent ueterem ex Hispaniis militem; et terminare iussi qua ulterius citeriorue prouincia seruaretur*). See C. Ebel, 'Dum populus senatusque Romanus vellet', *Historia* 40 (1991), 443 for a plausible explanation of the fact that the

that from this year there existed two distinct, clearly demarcated provinces,³⁰ this remarkable change of policy nevertheless allows for some interesting conclusions.

First, there is an indication that before 197, the Senate regarded Spain as one great command sphere (*provincia*). For convenience's sake, however, its commanders from the first doubtlessly proceeded to a rough geographical and strategic delineation of their respective operational spheres in their *provinciae permixtae*,³¹ which more or less corresponded with what would later be the separate provinces of Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior, presumably usually *ex s.c.*, or, if need be, on their own authority.³² Naturally, this course of things does not exclude that, during the first three decades of the Roman presence in Spain, the commanders-in-chief regularly joined forces or interfered in their mutual spheres of command, *rei publicae causa*. Secondly, J.S. Richardson rightly points out that the dispatch of two additional praetors to Spain in 197 indicates a definitive change in the attitude of the Senate towards the peninsula. Whereas the earlier policy left room for an easy reduction or even withdrawal of Roman troops, the new arrangements point to strong support for a permanent Roman presence.³³

geographical definition of the provincial boundaries was not assigned to a commission of senatorial *legati cum auctoritate*.

³⁰ Sumner 1970, op. cit. (n. 3), 85; 92–98; Develin 1980, op. cit. (n. 3), 364f.; Richardson 1986, op. cit. (n. 18), 77f.: “The record of events in Spain in 197 and the two years following is certainly confused, and indeed, through to the end of the 190s it appears that, if there were any boundaries fixed, the proconsuls in Spain took little notice of them; but this does not mean that the Senate did not decree that the boundary should be established in 197.”

³¹ See Livius 27.35.10 for this expression referring to geographically identical *provinciae*.

³² Both the fact that, apart from the period 211/210, there were officially always two supreme commanders in Spain and the fact that the Senate did not send off one but two praetors (*pro consule*) in 197 further suggest that the peninsula was already roughly divided into two spheres of command during the Second Punic war. For similar views, see also Develin 1980, op. cit. (n. 3), 364f. and Richardson 1986, op. cit. (n. 18), 55–57; 66. On p. 67, Richardson speaks in terms of “The command structure of two proconsuls in one provincia”.

³³ Richardson 1986, op. cit. (n. 18), 75f. It is quite possible that from 206, after the battle at the Metaurus and the final victory over the Carthaginian army in Spain, the Senate compromised between simply evacuating Spain altogether and pursuing the undeniable interests Rome had built up in this lucrative area over the last eleven years by means of a short-lived ‘institutionalization’ of the practice of conferring *imperia ‘extra ordinem’*. Brennan 2000, op. cit. (n. 3), 163 makes the plausible suggestion that the conclusion of the Second Punic War must have prompted strong pressure to work out a lasting arrangement for Spain, but that the decision to divide it into two regular provinces was delayed by the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War in 200. To our

Next, the correlation of the disappearance of the phenomenon of the *imperia extraordinaria* with the extension of the number of praetorships proves that the practice of investing private citizens *extra ordinem* with *imperium* during the Second Punic War and its immediate aftermath did not so much result from a deliberate policy to send the most capable and experienced men where they were most needed, as from a manifest shortage of 'ordinary' imperators (i.e., magistrates and regular promagistrates *cum imperio*) during a protracted period of warfare on different fronts.³⁴ The Senate's decision to retain Spain through a series of extraordinary proconsuls can probably be further explained by the fact that the number of praetors had already been doubled in the early 220s,³⁵ and that it did not take a final decision with respect to the territorial status of Spain before 198.

Finally, the disappearance of the *imperia extraordinaria* and the second increase in the number of praetorships also marks another important turning point in the history of the Republic.³⁶ This quite fundamental change reveals that the Senate had never felt real enthusiasm for *imperia* constituted *extra ordinem*. On the contrary, the very fact that the transfer of the Spanish command from extraordinary proconsuls to regular (pro)magistrates coincides with the decision to maintain the Spanish provinces strongly suggests that the creation of *imperia extraordinaria* was never meant as a durable solution. Doubtlessly, these *imperia*, being entirely beyond the framework of the traditional *cursus honorum* and the regular (pro)magistracies, were increasingly frowned at by a majority of the senatorial nobility as an infringement upon the equal claims its members laid on official *honores* and military *gloria*. Indeed, the fact that only two of the more influential *imperatores extraordinarii* of the Second Punic War actually managed to celebrate an ovation powerfully underscores the suspicion that the Senate harboured towards such commands. Precisely because they had taken up their *imperium auspiciumque*

thinking, this suggestion is corroborated by the Senate's decision to have the Comitia appoint two commanders rather than one at the end of 200 BCE (cf. *supra*).

³⁴ See also Brennan 2000, op. cit. (n. 3), 163: "The Senate had all too few experienced generals to spare in the Second Punic War: Spain was far off and, after 207, not a major military theater."

³⁵ In the early 220's, the Senate had already decided to double the number of praetorships in order to provide for regular commanders in Sicily and Sardinia: see Brennan 2000, op. cit. (n. 3), 91–95, with a discussion of the implications of this increase for the Roman political and administrative system.

³⁶ See Richardson 1996, op. cit. (n. 2), 48 for an assessment of the important political consequences of the increase from four to six praetorships.

outside the established order, i.e. *extra ordinem*, *sine magistratu*, none of the extraordinary proconsuls of this period was granted a full *triumphus publicus*, regardless of often resounding victories.³⁷

Rome's administrative management of Spanish 'outer space'

The second major part of this paper aims at demonstrating that, apart from explaining the successful expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain in 206, the particular way in which Rome conducted its tremendous war effort in Spain during the Second Punic War deeply affected (the nature of its relationship to) local communities. Furthermore, it will be argued that the main features of Rome's military and administrative interference during these first two crucial decades would structurally determine the way Spain was to be governed for the next two centuries.

First, it is important to point out that quite a few Spanish peoples became actively involved in the Hannibalic War, supporting any of both sides ever since 218. In consequence of this involvement, the natives naturally suffered from the consequences of both contenders' ruthless war economy policies, and often even tried to anticipate the next stage of the war. Until the wars of conquest in Spain were finally concluded in 19 BCE, *ad hoc* exactions in the form of money, mining resources, slaves, food and other commodities sufficed to sustain the Roman war effort and even generated a surplus for generals, soldiers, entrepreneurs, and the *aerarium publicum* alike. Because of the mobility of the front, the persistent need of appropriate means to fuel the ongoing war effort over such a long period made it virtually impossible for Roman provincial authorities to set up a permanent and stable system of direct taxation over the *Hispani*, as one might theoretically expect from an expansive empire in the making such as the Roman Republic.³⁸ As Rome's first priority was to keep its legions arriving, circulat-

³⁷ See esp. Livius 28.38.4 (Scipio Africanus in 206); 31.20.3 (L. Cornelius Lentulus in 200) and Valerius Maximus 2.8.5 for the fact that the Senate obstinately refused to grant full public triumphs to extraordinary proconsuls on the grounds that they had not assumed their victorious commands as magistrates.

³⁸ T. Ñaco, *Vectigal incertum. Economía de guerra y fiscalidad republicana en el Occidente mediterráneo: su impacto en el territorio 218–133 a.C.* (Oxford 2003); T. Ñaco, 'Vectigal incertum: guerra y fiscalidad republicana en el siglo II a.C.', *Klio* 87.2 (2005), 366–395.

ing, fighting and leaving again, it is rather difficult to imagine how a *census* of taxpayers could be properly organised, and all sorts of lands registered and taxed. In general terms, local towns and communities could only be taxed on a regular basis after a lasting peace had been achieved by Marcus Agrippa's decisive though hard-won victories over Asturians and Cantabrians, those few possible exceptions proving the rule.³⁹ Irrespective of how things were done in other Mediterranean regions during the last two centuries of the Republic, Spanish 'outer space' seems to have been managed consistently under more or less the same rules as applied by the Roman generals during the Second Punic War, i.e., the ones of a war economy.

Around 218, the Iberian Peninsula still was of secondary importance to Rome's geopolitical interest in the Western Mediterranean, after Sardinia-Corsica, and, of course, Sicily, the very first 'extra-Italian' provinces to be regularly assigned to Roman magistrates.⁴⁰ Roman military intelligence conceivably disposed of some scarce information concerning the peninsula's geography, its inhabitants and its natural resources yet before the actual landing in the Ibero-Greek city of Emporion.⁴¹ Naturally, the amount of reliable information grew lesser as regards the inland regions, most of which being probably even completely unexplored at that time.⁴² So far, Spanish contacts with Italy and Rome had been largely limited to private commerce, as

³⁹ A. Orejas & I. Sastre, 'Fiscalité et organisation du territoire dans le Nord-Ouest de la Péninsule Ibérique: civitates, tribut et ager mensura comprehensus', *Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne* 25.1 (1999), 159–188; I. Sastre, 'Ager publicus y deditio: reflexiones sobre los procesos de provincialización', in M. Garrido-Hory & A. Gonzales, eds., *Histoire, espaces et marges de l'Antiquité. Hommages à Monique Clavel-Lévêque II* (Paris 2003), 157–192.

⁴⁰ M.H. Crawford, 'Origini e sviluppi del sistema provinciale romano', in *Storia di Roma. La Repubblica Imperiale II.1* (Torino 1990), 91–96; J.S. Richardson, *Hispania y los romanos* (Barcelona 1998), 15ff; Brennan 2000, op. cit. (n. 3), 91ff.

⁴¹ Strabo 3.137; 3.142; 3.160–162; Polybius 3.4; 34.8.4–10; Appianus, *Iberica* 56–57; 65; 67–69; Orosius 1.2.2; Diodorus. 5.31.1; 5.34.6–7; Plinius Maior, *Naturalis Historia* 3.2.6; 3.7–17; 4.18–30; Livius 21.43.8; 35.1.5–7; 35.22.5; 39.42; D. Plácido, 'Estrabón III: el territorio hispano, la geografía griega y el imperialismo romano', *Habis* 18–19 (1987–1988), 243–256. Intelligence and information for the army strategies: I. Haynes, 'Britain's first information revolution. The Roman Army and the transformation of economic life', in P. Erdkamp (ed.), *The Roman Army and the Economy* (Amsterdam 2002), 111–126.

⁴² Strabo 3.4.12–13; Plinius Maior, *Naturalis Historia* 4.34.110–112; M.V. García-Quintela, 'Sources pour l'étude de la Protohistoire d'Hispanie. Pour une nouvelle lecture', *Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne* 16 (1990), 181–220; E. Sánchez-Moreno, *Vetones: historia y arqueología de un pueblo prerromano* (Madrid 2000), 19–40; 227ff.

archaeological evidence—especially pottery—clearly record.⁴³ This is hardly surprising in the case of Sagunt, Rome's most faithful ally in the area. Interestingly enough and very much unlike what would happen during the Roman conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, Rome's fateful treaty with Sagunt was signed at a time when there were no Roman soldiers in the neighbourhood. Therefore, the treaty was probably made to strengthen an old commercial relationship and in anticipation of further Carthaginian expansion in Spain.⁴⁴ The Phoenician towns from the Southwest of the peninsula, however, had long-standing ties with Carthage. After 237, the Barcids had, moreover, become particularly influential in Spain, the strategic foundation of New Carthage around 229 being a powerful demonstration of Carthage's growing power in this part of the Mediterranean.⁴⁵

As regards the real impact of the presence of Roman legions in Spain and its population from 218, two patterns of territorial intervention clearly emerge. On the one hand, offensive military action gradually pushed the oscillating front further towards the Southern and Western parts of the peninsula, progress and temporary retreat being the result of the whims of war.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the original landing ports of Emporion and Tarraco, their hinterlands, and later on also some native towns in the Baetis valley like Castulo, increasingly constituted the earliest Roman hinterland.⁴⁷ Literary sources not only emphasise the fact that Rome created a series of new alliances with local tribes

⁴³ J. Principal-Ponce, 'Tarraco, las cerámicas del Grupo Hercúleo y el comercio romano-italico anterior a la Segunda Guerra Púnica', *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 11 (1998), 233–244.

⁴⁴ Richardson 1986, op. cit. (n. 18), 20ff; P.P. Ripollès & M^a.M. Llorens, *Arse-Saguntum. Historia monetaria de la ciudad y su territorio* (Sagunto 2002), 23–30.

⁴⁵ Scipio's capture of Carthago Nova in 209 was a decisive turning point in the war in Spain. In addition to its magnificent natural port, New Carthage held a considerable amount of wealth, weapons and ships, and accommodated several important hostages, which Scipio cleverly used to win the favour and support of many local tribes in the subsequent settlement; see M. Bendala, 'Panorama arqueológico de la Hispania púnica a partir de la época bárquida', in M^a.P. García-Bellido & L. Callegarin, eds., *Los cartagineses y la monetización del Mediterráneo occidental* (Madrid 2000), 75–88; Hoyos 2003, op. cit. (n. 1), 55ff.; S.F. Ramallo Asensio, 'Carthago Nova. Arqueología y epigrafía de la muralla urbana', in A. Morillo, F. Cadiou & D. Hourcade, eds., *Defensa y territorio en Hispania de los Escipiones a Augusto. Espacios urbanos y rurales, municipales y provinciales. Coloquio celebrado en la Casa de Velázquez* 19 y 20 de marzo de 2001 (Madrid & León 2003), 325–362.

⁴⁶ Hoyos 2003, op. cit. (n. 1), 134–151.

⁴⁷ F.X. Hernández, *Història militar de Catalunya I. Dels íbers als carolingis* (Barcelona 2003), 43ff.; A. Goldsworthy, *Las Guerras Púnicas* (Barcelona 2002), 290ff.; 317ff.

and communities, but also stress the renewal of ties that probably existed already before the arrival of Roman armies in Spain.⁴⁸ Roman diplomacy, however, was not always that successful. Recently, particular attention has been devoted to the problems created by the troublesome policy of *ad hoc* recruitments of native auxiliaries, whose loyalty was never completely secure. The notorious disaster of 211 offers a dramatic example, as, if Livius is to be believed, the two Scipio brothers perished after being betrayed by some Celtiberian allies who had been seduced by Carthaginian gold.⁴⁹

Before being sent to the front, the Roman legionaries and their Latin auxiliaries who arrived on a regular basis probably either stayed in temporary seaside camps, or were billeted on native towns that had already been secured with Roman garrisons. At the same time, the armies that were fighting inland moved back to this rearguard to winter or await embarkation for Italy in the spring. Recently, P. Erdkamp cogently argued that Republican armies could not simply live off the land and depended on a steady flow of supplies from outside.⁵⁰ To our thinking, however, the specific nature of the Roman military presence in Spain, comprising a mobile front and a secured hinterland, required flexible lines of supply that drew from both local and external resources.

All of this unavoidably implies that the Roman military activity put some very heavy strains on the native population, in terms of both human and material costs.⁵¹ Under the guise of a series of political alliances between Rome and the pro-Roman factions among the local elites, surrendering native towns were subjected to demanding exactions of auxiliaries and war indemnities in the form of cash, weapons and other valuable goods.⁵² Even in case of occasional purchases, the prices

⁴⁸ E.g. the treaty with Sagunt, see Livius 21.60.4; Polybius 3.76.2.

⁴⁹ J.M. Roldán, 'Los hispanos en el ejército romano de época republicana (Salamanca 1993), 19–27; A. Canto, 'Ilorci, Scipionis rogos (Plinio, NH III, 9) y algunos problemas de la Segunda Guerra Púnica en Hispania', *Rivista Storica dell'Antichità* 29 (1999), 127–167; Roddaz 1998, op. cit. (n. 3), 341–358; B.D. Hoyos, 'Generals and Annalists: geographic and chronological obscurities in the Scipio's campaigns in Spain, 218–211 BC', *Klio* 83.1 (2001), 68–92.

⁵⁰ P. Erdkamp, 'Hunger and the sword. Warfare and food supply in Roman Republican wars 264–30 BC' (Amsterdam 1998), 141ff.; P. Erdkamp, 'War and State Formation in the Roman Republic' (2006, in print). See more recently also C. Carreras Monfort, 'Aprovisionamiento del soldado romano en campaña: la figura del praefectus vehiculorum', *Habis* 35 (2004), 291–311.

⁵¹ Livius 21.65.5; 21.65.7; 22.21.4; Polybius 3.76.2.

⁵² A. Prieto, 'L'espace social du pouvoir en Hispanie romaine', in E. Hermon (ed.), *Pouvoir et "imperium" (III^e av. J.-C.-I^{er} ap. J.-C.)* (Naples 1995), 213–226; E.

were still invariably set by the Senate.⁵³ As J.S. Richardson has pointed out, the requisitions that Romans started to collect from 218 should definitely not be considered as regular taxes. Although Richardson discerns a change in this pattern from around 180, when a direct tax (called *stipendium*) and a half tithe (*vicensuma*) might have been imposed *ex s.c.*,⁵⁴ there is no conclusive proof for this view. At least for the next century or so, the ongoing maintenance of the war economy policy as applied during the Second Punic War perfectly accounts for the amount of wealth arriving in Rome from Spain.

Both Roman and Carthaginian armies experienced similar difficulties in their regular provisioning from outside the Iberian Peninsula. After a series of disastrous defeats in Italy during the early stage of the Second Punic War, Roman public finances equally suffered from a shortage of manpower not directly involved in war activities. Rome not only lost appalling numbers of soldiers, but also of potential taxpayers and food producers.⁵⁵ Ships with provisions regularly arrived in Tar-raco until 217–216,⁵⁶ when Hannibal's resounding victories generated an overall financial crisis. All of this forced the Senate to reassess the way its overseas legions were to be supplied in the near future, under potentially worsening conditions. In 216 and 215, the Senate discussed urgent and persistent demands from the Roman commanders in Spain, Sicily and Sardinia for adequate pay, food and clothing for their armies. In 215, the Scipiones indeed wrote to the Senate that, if need be, they could find ways to get pay from the Spaniards. *Frumentum, uestimenta* and everything for the crews, however, had to be sent from Rome, as usual. If not, both the army and the province would simply be lost. As the Senate subsequently duly arranged for the delivery of clothing,

García Riaza, Celtíberos y lusitanos frente a Roma: diplomacia y derecho de guerra (Vitoria-Gasteiz 2002), 33ff.; F. Quesada Sanz, 'La guerra en las comunidades ibéricas c. 237–c. 195 a.C.: un modelo interpretativo', in Morillo, Cadiou & Hourcade 2003, op. cit. (n. 45), 101–156.

⁵³ Livius 43.2.12. For compulsory purchases of corn from Hispania, Sicily and Sardinia during the second and first centuries BCE, see Ñaco 2003, op. cit. (n. 38), 241ff.

⁵⁴ Livius 40.35.4; 43.2.12; Richardson 1998, op. cit. (n. 40), 68ff.

⁵⁵ See Livius 23.48.7 and C. Nicolet, 'Armées et fiscalité: pour un bilan de la conquête romaine', in *Armées et fiscalité dans le monde antique* (Paris 1977), 435–454; C. Nicolet, *Censeurs et publicains. Économie dans la Rome antique* (Paris 2000), 80–91; 394–397; Y. LeBohec, *Histoire militaire des Guerres Puniques* (Paris 1996), 197ff.; N. Rosenstein, *Rome at War. Farms, Families, and Death in the Middle Republic* (Chapel Hill & London 2004), 3–25.

⁵⁶ Polybius 3.106.7; Livius 22.22.1f.; J.S. Richardson 1986, op. cit. (n. 18), 42–43; 57–58.

grain and whatever else was needed for the crews, it is obvious that it authorized the proconsuls in Spain to exact pay from the local communities.⁵⁷ Except for the extraordinary profits from looting and other occasional forms of income, most Roman legionaries only expected to receive a small part of their regular pay in coins, and especially in Roman coins, at the end of their yearly season of service, just before retiring to winter or going home, where more rewards were waiting.⁵⁸ As only a few Spanish towns were striking coins by 218, it is clear that the huge increase in local coin circulation during the next two decades cannot be explained without taking into account the need of military pay. Instead of striking coins themselves in Spain, both contenders made use of local coinage, the Romans at Emporion and the Carthaginians at Malaka, Abdera or Gadir. Unlike the Carthaginian mercenaries, who probably expected to be paid in silver or gold, or at least in a strong currency, Roman and Italian soldiers received a fair share of their pay in the form of smaller bronze or copper denominations from any mint of their allies in the region, either native or Greek. At any rate, the fact that almost no such coins have been found in Italy strongly suggests that whatever wasn't spent on the local markets, was either exchanged just before departure for Italy, or melted down immediately after arrival home.⁵⁹

In 23.48.4–49.4, Livius records that the Senate in 215 decreed some extraordinary measures to finance the provisioning of armies in Spain (food and clothing). To our thinking, P. Erdkamp probably rightly questions Livius' story about three *societates* of private citizens that contracted

⁵⁷ Livius 23.21; 23.31; 23.48–49. For Carthaginian generals requesting provisions and money to pay for their mercenaries in 217–216, see Livius 22.40.6–9; 23.12.4–5; 26.2–3.

⁵⁸ M.H. Crawford, *Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic* (London 1985), 72; N. Rosenstein, 'Republican Rome', in K. Raflaub & N. Rosenstein, eds., *War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval World. Asia, the Mediterranean, Europe, and Mesoamerica* (Cambridge MA 1999), 193–216; T.M. Lucchelli, 'Cultura della moneta ed espansione romana in Europa', *Rivista Italiana di Numismatica e Scienze Affini* 101 (2000), 75–91; D. Potter, 'The Roman Army and Navy', in H.I. Flower (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic* (Cambridge 2004), 66–88.

⁵⁹ C. Alfaro et al., *Historia monetaria de Hispania antigua* (Madrid 1997), 40ff; 70ff; F. Chaves 'Moneda, territorio y administración. Hispania Ulterior de los inicios de la conquista al final del siglo II a.C.', in *Moneda i administració del territori. IV Curs d'Història Monetària d'Hispania* (Barcelona 2000), 9–35; M. Campo, 'La producció d'Untikesken i Kese: funció i producció a la ciutat i al territori', in *Funció i producció de les seques indígenes. VI Curs d'Història Monetària d'Hispania* (Barcelona 2002), 77–104.

to supply the Scipionic armies.⁶⁰ As a matter of fact, there is not much evidence for the kind of activities described by Livius on the part of *societates publicanorum* in the Western Mediterranean for nearly a century, with the exception, perhaps, of an inscription of *ca.* 150 from Karales in Sardinia (*CIL* I² 2226; *ILLRP* 41), or some lead bricks and other coin material from the Southern Spanish mines dating from the very end of the second century BCE or the very outset of the next one.⁶¹ Although this evidence may seem too marginal to be taken as a serious indicator, and difficulties in applying the term *publicani* to the people concerned persist, some *privati* might indeed have become involved in the military provisioning in the course of the Spanish campaigns, like the *redemptores* who were expelled from camp by M. Porcius Cato as praetor in 198 in Sardinia and as consul in 195 in Emporion.⁶²

From 218 to 206, the redirection of Carthaginian resources in Spain to its own armies had been one of Rome's foremost priorities in Spain. From 206, however, the Iberian Peninsula temporarily became the consistently unstable hinterland of the African front. When the Second Macedonian War finally broke out in 200, the focal point shifted even further East, troops and resources being now diverted to that major theatre of war.⁶³ Livius' mention of two batches of corn from Spain to the Roman army in Africa and Rome itself in 203 indeed illustrates how resources of provincial communities were tapped and used at Rome's discretion.⁶⁴ In any case, Rome's treatment of local communities left

⁶⁰ Crawford 1985, *op. cit.* (n. 58), 58; M^a.P. García-Bellido, 'El proceso de monetización en el Levante y Sur hispánico durante la Segunda Guerra Púnica', in J. Untermann & F. Villar, eds., *Lengua y cultura en la Hispania prerromana* (Salamanca 1993), 317–347; Erdkamp 1998, *op. cit.* (n. 50), 86ff.; 114 ('a rather dubious story'); J.P. Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War 264 BC–AD 235* (Leiden, Boston & Köln 1999), 224ff.; O. Marra, 'Il vittoriatto: sua circolazione e funzione all'interno del sistema monetario romano', *Rivista Italiana di Numismatica e Scienze Affini* 102 (2001), 106–110.

⁶¹ R. Zucca, 'Inscriptiones latinae liberae rei publicae Africae, Sardiniae et Corsicae', in *L'Africa Romana. Atti del XI Convenio di Studio* (Sassari 1996), 1487; F. Chaves & P. Otero, 'Los hallazgos monetales', in J.M. Blázquez, C. Domergue & P. Sillières, eds., *La Loba. Fuenteovejuna, province de Cordoue, Espagne* (Bordeaux 2002), 163–230.

⁶² Livius 34.9.12; Plutarchus Cato Maior 5.2; P. Erdkamp, 'Feeding Rome, or Feeding Mars? A long-term approach to C. Gracchus' Lex Frumentaria', *Ancient Society* 30 (2000), 59ff.; Naco 2003, *op. cit.* (n. 38), 124–126.

⁶³ P. LeRoux, *Romains d'Espagne. Cités & politique dans les provinces. II siècle av. J.-C.-III siècle ap. J.-C.* (Paris 1995), 35ff.; K. Buraselis, 'Vix aerarium sufficeret. Roman finances and the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 37.2 (1996), 149–172; Naco 2003, *op. cit.* (n. 38), 139ff.

⁶⁴ Livius 30.3.2–3; 25.5–6.

no room for interpretation as to what their relationship to the new foreign intruder was, and made it quite clear that the Roman presence might be a long standing one. As the increasing cost of maintaining considerable forces overseas could only be covered for by the profits of conquest,⁶⁵ the Roman commanders in Spain soon realized the actual advantages of recurrent and relatively short but intense campaigns. It indeed regularly occurred that Roman generals mounted military action just before being relieved of their commands, resulting in a surplus of booty, war prisoners and honours, key contributors to a successful political career in Rome.⁶⁶ Besides, in addition to the natural principle that a motivated army requires punctual pay, the mutiny in the Roman camp of Sucro in 206 also demonstrates that prolonged inactivity was not in the interest of maintaining discipline among the legionaries.⁶⁷ Finally, it is important to emphasize that the spoils of war were of vital importance to the Roman rank and file, too. Apart from the fact that booty provided them with the material means for limited social mobility, regular pay could never fully compensate the soldiers for leaving their farms for prolonged periods of time.⁶⁸

Concerning the methods applied by the Roman commanders in the field to secure and extend Rome's stronghold over Spain, it is important to point out that some of the measures taken during the first years of Roman intervention would become permanent features of the Roman military presence throughout the whole conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. In 28.34.7, Livius indeed records that,

The old custom of the Romans in establishing peaceful relations with a people neither on the basis of a treaty nor on equal terms had been this: not to exert its authority over that people, as now pacified, until it

⁶⁵ As has been conclusively demonstrated with respect to the annexation of Macedonia fifty years later by W.V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in the Roman Republic 327–70 BC* (Oxford 1979), 74ff.

⁶⁶ This practice seems to have been an unwritten law in the Roman administration of Spain; see Livius 39.29.5; 40.33.9 and Ñaco 2003, op. cit. (n. 38), 153–155.

⁶⁷ Zonaras 9.10; Livius 28.25.6; 28.25.9–10; 27.1–5; Appianus Iberica 34–36; Polybius 11.25.9; 26.1–3; 28.7–8. S.G. Chrissanthos 'Scipio and the mutiny at Sucro, 206 BC', *Historia* 46.2 (1997), 172–184; Ñaco 2003, op. cit. (n. 38), 134–138.

⁶⁸ M. Tarpin, 'Le butin sonnante et trébuchant dans la Rome républicaine', in J. Andreau (ed.), *Économie antique. La guerre dans les économies antiques. Entretiens d'archéologie et d'histoire* (Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges 2000), 365–376; C. Auliard, *Victoires et triomphes à Rome* (Paris 2001), 27ff.; 90ff.

had surrendered everything divine and human, until hostages had been received, arms taken away and garrisons posted in its cities.⁶⁹

In 28.42.2–4, Livius indeed describes how P. Scipio Africanus was able to move from Tarraco to the river Iberus in 206 through an elaborate network of Roman garrisons spread all over the coastline: “From Tarraco it was then a march from one Roman post to another (*per praesidia*)”. Tarraco, according to Plinius Maior ‘*Scipionum opus*’ (*Naturalis Historia* 3.21), was where Gnaeus Scipio had wintered for the first time in 218/217, pending the arrival of his brother Publius (Polybius 3.76.12f.). Both Roman commanders may have been responsible for the establishment of what Livius calls a *praesidium modicum* (21.61.4), a modest garrison, probably set up in a sort of small fort identified by archaeologists on top of the hill opposite the Iberian Iron Age site by the sea.⁷⁰

Ever since, the Romans consistently extended a network of garrisons in Spain. The first aim doubtlessly was to safeguard the more or less pacified hinterland and to facilitate auxiliary recruitment. Secondly, these strongholds must have served as provisioning stations for the armies that were doing the actual fighting. Unfortunately, however, there is no archaeological evidence for most of those early outposts, forts, or even full-fledged army camps, like the one the consul M. Porcius Cato reportedly built near Emporion in 195. Fifty years later, the siege of Numantia offers another unambiguous example of how complete military camps were built if need be.⁷¹ At any rate, archaeologists have recently traced some evidence of small fortifications, perhaps to be identified with the *castella* of later periods.⁷² Attested in the Northeast, the Ebro valley and Lusitania but only occupied for limited periods of

⁶⁹ Livius 28.34.7: Mos uetustus erat Romanis, cum quo nec foedere nec aequis legibus iungeretur amicitia, non prius imperio in eum tamquam pacatum uti quam omnia diuina humanaque dedidisset, obsides accepti, arma adempta, praesidia urbibus impositum forent.

⁷⁰ P. Otiña & J. Ruiz de Arbulo, ‘De Cese a Tarraco. Evidencias y reflexiones sobre la Tarragona ibérica y el proceso de romanización’, *Empúries* 52 (2000), 107–136; I. Arrayás, ‘Tarraco, capital provincial’, *Gerión* 22.1 (2004), 291–303; I. Arrayás, *Morfología histórica del territorium de Tarraco en época tardo-republicana ss.III–I a.C.* (Barcelona 2006, in print).

⁷¹ J. Pamment Salvatore, *Roman Republican Castrametation. A reappraisal of historical and archaeological sources* (Oxford 1996) 31f.

⁷² A. Morillo ‘Los establecimientos militares temporales: conquista y defensa del territorio en la Hispania republicana’, in Morillo, Cadiou & Hourcade 2003, op. cit. (n. 45), 41–80. For Cato’s army camp at Emporion, see Livius 34.9.11f.

time from late second to early first century BCE, they could have played a role in road building, weaponry manufacture or recruitment and the training of native auxiliaries. In restive areas, however, they might have provided the campaigning legions with vital logistic support.⁷³

Despite the lack of archaeological evidence, the extant literary accounts of the Second Punic War and its aftermath clearly show that the allocation of garrisons in native towns severely affected the daily lives of their inhabitants. Though the commanders of the Roman garrisons (mostly *praefecti*) were definitely accountable to the (pro)magistrate, they could easily overrule local authorities if necessary, as the events in Gades between 206 and 199 seem to suggest.⁷⁴ When this ancient Phoenician town changed sides just before the Carthaginians were driven out of Spain once and for all, L. Marcus, the Roman commander involved, offered a treaty in return, although there could of course be no *foedus legitimum* until formal ratification by *SPQR*. Significantly enough, L. Marcus only took diplomatic steps after having accepted the town's unconditional surrender. The Gaditans duly accepted a small garrison under a Roman prefect, whose subsequent activities made them formally complain before the Senate seven years later. In 171, yet another embassy of Hispani from both provinces equally complained about the misconduct of the *praefecti* put in charge of their towns.⁷⁵

Contrary to what is sometimes believed there is no evidence whatsoever to assume the proclamation of a *lex provinciae* in 198/197, regulating subsequent administrative and juridical procedures in Spain.⁷⁶ As argued in the first part of this paper, the Senate only decided to normalize the command structure in that Spain was henceforth to be governed by

⁷³ Appianus Iberica 38; Livius 21.48.8–10; 21.61.2; Polybius 3.69; 75.5. Knapp 1977, op. cit. (n. 3), 15–35; García Riaza 2002, op. cit. (n. 52), 204–214; F. Cadiou, 'Garnisons et camps permanents: un réseau défensif des territoires provinciaux dans l'Hispanie républicaine?', in Morillo, Cadiou & Hourcade 2003, op. cit. (n. 45), 81–100.

⁷⁴ Cicero, Pro Balbo 34.39; Livius 32.2.5.

⁷⁵ Livius 43.2. See also J. Muñoz Coello, El proceso de repetundis del 171 a.de C. Livio, XLIII,2 (Huelva 1981), 44–51; J.L. Castro, 'El Foedus de Gadir del 206 a.C.: una revisión', Florentia Iliberritana 2 (1991), 269–280; Naco 2003, op. cit. (n. 38), 142.

⁷⁶ J. Muñoz Coello, El sistema fiscal en la España romana. República y Alto Imperio (Zaragoza 1982), 50–51; Richardson 1986, op. cit. (n. 18), see Livius 32.27.6; 28.2–3; 32.28.11–12. For the *lex provinciae* as being really an edict issued by the Roman emperor, often, but not always, on the binding advice of decem legati cum auctoritate ex s.c., see B.D. Hoyos, 'Lex Provinciae and Governor's edict', Antichthon 7 (1973), 47–53.

regular (pro)magistrates instead of extraordinary proconsuls.⁷⁷ Barely a few months after the arrival of the two praetors, however, a general uprising broke out in Hispania Ulterior, quickly spreading to other parts of occupied Spain. As there is any indication that the Romans simply maintained their war economy policies in Spain, regardless of the regularization of the supreme command, it would be at best misleading to term this insurrection a ‘fiscal revolt’. It should rather be seen an *ad hoc* coalition of towns and peoples against Rome’s ongoing and punitive military presence in the region.⁷⁸ As shown above, Rome’s armies maintained Roman control by means of raiding the native communities, or by imposing all kinds of harsh exactions, demanding hostages, war indemnities and other occasional contributions in cash, precious metals, supplies, auxiliaries, etc. It took the Romans two years and, eventually, a genuine consular army to quell this revolt and restore Roman law and order in the area. Quite unsurprisingly, new trouble arose quite soon after the departure of M. Porcius Cato (*cos.* 195), this pattern of endemic warfare, reverse and expansion persisting until well into the reign of Caesar Augustus.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ See also J.S. Richardson, ‘The administration of the empire’, in Cambridge Ancient History IX (Cambridge 1994, 2nd ed.), 564–598; Brennan 2000, *op. cit.* (n. 3), 154–181; 313–322.

⁷⁸ Livius 33.21.7–8; 33.25.9–10; C. González Román, ‘Control romano y resistencia indígena en los orígenes de la Bética’, in *Actas del II Congreso de historia de Andalucía. Historia Antigua* (Córdoba 1994), 131–147.

⁷⁹ Appianus Iberica 42; Livius 35.1.1–4; Ñaco 2003, *op. cit.* (n. 38), 143ff.

POLYBIUS AND LIVY ON THE ALLIES IN THE ROMAN ARMY

PAUL ERDKAMP*

From the fourth or third century until the beginning of the first century BC, Rome's armies were also the armies of her allies. The *socii* and *nomen Latinum* raised at least half of the soldiers that fought wars for Rome. The Italic allies were clearly distinguished from the non-Italic troops, such as Cretan archers or Numidian horsemen, by the fact that they were governed by the *formula togatorum*. This can be concluded from their 'definition' in the *lex agraria* from 111 BC: *socii nominisve Latini quibus ex formula togatorum milites in terra Italia imperare solent*. The *formula togatorum* is seen as a defining element, distinguishing the Latin and Italic peoples from Rome's overseas allies. Although in the second century BC a consciousness of Italy as a political and cultural unity gradually emerged, it was still referred to as a military alliance of Roman citizens and allies at the end of that century.¹ The beginnings of this system remain in the dark, due to the inadequacies of our sources. The *foedus Cassianum* between Rome and the Latin League (traditionally dated to 493 BC) supposedly established a federal army under Roman command, but next to nothing is known about its functioning. The participation of the allied peoples was based on the treaties between their communities and Rome. The position of the Latin colonies was slightly different, because their obligations were probably based on the *lex coloniae* governing each Latin colony.² We may assume that the role of the allies was re-defined

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¹ Thus, T. Hantos, *Das römische Bundesgenossenssystem in Italien* (München 1983), 185; P.A. Brunt, 'Italian aims at the time of the Social War,' in *The fall of the Roman republic and related essays* (Oxford 1988), 113. On the term *socii Italici*, E. Gabba, 'Rome and Italy in the second century BC', *Cambridge Ancient History* VIII (Cambridge 1989), 209 observes, "it is only in relation to the predominant partner, that is to say Rome, that they are seen as a group and thus bear this title".

² W.V. Harris, *Rome in Etruria and Umbria* (Oxford 1971), 85ff.; H. Galsterer, *Herrschaft und Verwaltung im republikanischen Italien. Die Beziehungen Roms zu den italischen Gemeinden vom Latinerfrieden 338 v.Chr. bis zum Bundesgenossenkrieg 91 v.Chr.* (München 1976), 84ff, 101ff.; Hantos 1983, op. cit. (n. 1), 150ff.; D.W. Baronowski, 'Roman treaties with communities

after the Latin War, but we know little about this or how the system worked and developed during the next century.

In the absence of documentary evidence, we have to rely largely on the literary sources. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (20.1.5) may offer a rare glimpse of the structure of the Roman army at an early date, when he tells us that at the battle of Ausculum against Pyrrhus (279 BC), Latins, Campanians, Sabines, Umbrians, Volsci and Frentani were divided into units that were posted between the legions. This is the more remarkable, as the Campanians were *cives sine suffragio*, who at least at the end of the century served in the legions. However, there is no evidence that corroborates Dionysius, and so it remains likely that we are dealing with “eine reine Phantasieschilderung”.³ Livy is missing until the Hannibalic War, while Polybius’ narrative of Roman wars in books 1 and 2 is nearly silent on the role of the allies, except for the famous survey of peoples joining Rome against the Gauls in 225 BC. His account of the Gallic threat leading to mass mobilisation of citizens and allies in 225 BC sheds sudden light, mentioning the *formula togatorum* and manpower figures, but the passage is notoriously fraught with problems.

When the sources start to offer information on the allies, all seems well-established. Livy gives us no general account of the Roman army, comparable to book six in Polybius’ *Histories*, since he is not interested in analysing the Roman state and its institutions. However, his narrative of Roman war in books 21–45 seems to give a good view of the allied system as it functioned during the half-century from 218 to 167 BC. In these books, Livy mentions units consisting of allied peoples (the Paeligni, Marrucini, Vestini and Marsi) and Latin colonies (Firmum, Fregellae, Aesernia, Cremona and Placentia). Moreover, we also meet cohorts from Gaul and Picenum,⁴ and cavalry units of Latin, Lucanian and Etruscan horsemen. In 213 BC, for example, Vibius Accaus from Paeligna, *praefectus* of a *cohors Paeligna*, is rewarded for bravery during a battle near Beneventum against Hanno (Livy 25.14.13). In 204, four *cohortes sociorum Latini nominis* are stationed as garrison in Locri in Brutium (29.19.9). Twice Livy mentions a *praefectus socii* operating inde-

of citizens,’ *Classical Quarterly* 38 (1988), 172–178; id., ‘Sub umbra foederis aequi’, *Phoenix* 44 (1990), 345–369; D. Timpe, ‘Erwägungen zur jüngeren Annalistik’, *Antike und Abendland* 25 (1979), 379ff.

³ Galsterer 1976, op. cit. (n. 2), 106.

⁴ Mobilised during an emergency levy. Livy 23.14.2.

pendently against the enemy, losing the battle and his life.⁵ At Pydna, Marrucinian, Paelignian and Vestinian cohorts fought side-by-side with Samnite or Latin *turmae* (44.40.4ff.).

Polybius

In contrast, Polybius hardly ever mentions the allies explicitly in his account of Roman wars between 218 and 168 BC, although his theoretical passages on the Roman army in book six and elsewhere paint a clear picture of how they functioned. It is sometimes argued by modern scholars that, in contrast to Livy, Polybius underestimated the role of the allies.⁶ See, for instance, the following statement by E. Gabba: "Convinced as he was of the solidity of the Roman state, he saw no need to analyse the bases of the political organization of Roman Italy or indeed the relations between Rome and her allies. Proof lies in his description of Roman military organization in terms of a single citizen militia. In this context, the allied contingents are depicted as integrated and homogeneous parts of the Roman army."⁷

A typical example of a Polybian battle account is that of the battle of Zama, in which the Romans under the command of Scipio Africanus defeated Hannibal's army in 202 BC. Such an important battle receives full treatment by Polybius, including a survey of the Roman and Carthaginian battle array:

Scipio drew up his army in the following fashion. In front he placed the *hastati* with certain intervals between the *semaiai* and then the *principes*, not placing their *speirai*, as is the usual Roman custom, opposite to the intervals separating those of the first line, but directly behind these latter at a certain distance owing to the large number of the enemy's elephants. Last of all he placed the *triarii*. On his left wing he posted Gaius Laelius with the Italian horse, and the right wing Masinissa with the whole of his Numidians. The intervals of the first *semaiai* he filled up with the *speirai* of the *velites*, ordering them to open the action, and if they were forced back by the charge of the elephants to retire, those who had time to do so by the straight passages as far as the rear of the whole army, and

⁵ Livy 25.1.3f.; 31.2.5ff.

⁶ Rejected by W.V. Harris, 'The Italians and the empire', in W.V. Harris, ed., *The imperialism of mid-republican Rome* (Rome 1984), 89ff.

⁷ Gabba 1989, op. cit. (n. 1), 210.

those who were overtaken to right or left along the intervals between the lines. (Polybius 15.9.6–10)

Attention to the contribution of Rome's Italian allies is limited to the cavalry: the Italian cavalry is posted on the left wing. The posting of the Numidian horse on the right wing, however, and the absence of any Roman cavalry makes clear that the Italian cavalry in this case in fact includes that of Roman citizens. Typically Polybius, one might say: 'Roman' or 'Italian' is almost synonymous. This is also indicated by his use of such a phrase as "the allied horse of the Romans" in his account of the battle of Cannae (3.116.6). In his account of the battle of Zama, the Roman army in general or parts of it are referred to in such general terms as 'the Romans' or 'the infantry', and in technical terms, such as *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii*. However, not once do we see an explicit reference to the allied infantry.

The picture is the same in all Polybian battle accounts. Apart from the non-Italic allies of Rome, such as the Aetolians or Spanish peoples, the only part of the allied contribution that is ever referred to is the Italian horse (sometimes in the sense of the Roman and allied Italian horse), and that not even in every battle. Concerning the infantry, Polybius mainly uses technical terms for units or differently armed types of soldiers that do not distinguish between Romans or allies. The only 'ethnic' term he often uses is 'the Romans', but this obviously in most cases means all those on the Roman side. In short, in his narrative of military actions, Polybius seems to ignore the distinction between Romans and allies as far as the infantry is concerned.

One obvious way to distinguish Romans from allies, it might be argued, is by the usage of the term 'legion', since legions are manned by Roman citizens. However, the term used by Polybius to indicate a legion—*stratopedon*—has also much wider meanings.⁸ This is shown for instance in 10.16.4, in which Polybius has the general observation that a consular army consists of "two Roman *stratopeda* and two of the allies". Clearly, also the allies were organized in what Polybius calls a *stratopedon*. The term can have at least three meanings in the histories of Polybius: 1. that of 'army' in general; 2. that of a large unit of heavy infantry in Roman or other armies and 3. as the equivalent of 'legion'. The Loeb translation by W.R. Paton tends to translate the term as 'legion,' but

⁸ Cf. M. Gelzer, 'Die Glaubwürdigkeit der bei Livius überlieferten Senatsbeschlüsse über römische Truppenaufgebote', *Hermes* 70 (1935), 283.

that is misleading, since many times the term clearly refers to citizen as well as allied troops.⁹

The same applies to Polybius' terminology for the sub-units of the *stratopedon*. The main term he uses is '*semaia*', which is derived from the word for the standard of a unit; the direct Latin equivalent is *signum*, not only meaning standard, but also unit (cf. *vexillum*). Basically, the *semaiai* are the tactical units grouped around a military standard. Polybius mainly uses the term *semaia* as the Greek equivalent of *manipulus*. This is most clearly shown in 6.24, where Polybius describes the structure of the Roman legion. In battle, he writes, the three main lines are: the *hastati*, the *principes* and the *triarii*. Each of these is divided in 10 companies, the maniples. "These companies are known as *tagma*, *speira* or *semaia*."¹⁰ The rest of the passage clearly shows that the three terms are used as equivalent in meaning. It is only for the sake of variation that Polybius sometimes uses *semaia* and *speira* in the same passage for the same thing. (See for instance the first lines of the battle array at Zama quoted above.) In short, the main term for *manipulus*, which is the primary tactical unit of the Roman legions in Polybian times, is *semaia*, less often *speira*. Now, the point is that these terms might also refer to allied troops. This is for instance clearly shown in 6.30.4, where Polybius mentions the *semaiai* of the allied infantry. A wider meaning of the term is also indicated in 15.4.4, where it is used as "ten units of Roman horse and foot". In Latin, one cannot use *manipulus* as referring to horse. In sum, even such a basic term, which is used as the Greek equivalent of the Latin *manipulus*, and which occurs numerous times in Polybius' narrative of military operations, refers to allies as well as Romans.

One last item may be allowed to confirm this point: Polybius informs us in book six that a Roman legion had six military tribunes (*chiliarchoi*), its main officers. The allied equivalent of the military tribune, he writes, is the prefect of the allies, in Latin the *praefectus sociorum*.¹¹ It may be noted that the prefects of the allies were Roman citizens, just as the military tribunes were. Hence, there is little difference between them in this regard. The interesting part is that Polybius very often—in almost

⁹ Polybius, *The histories*, transl. W.R. Paton (Cambridge MA 1922).

¹⁰ Polybius 6.24.5.

¹¹ Polybius 6.26.5; 6.37.8.

every battle narrative—mentions military tribunes doing this or that.¹² In contrast, he never ever mentions prefects of the allies. Should we assume that the term *chiliarchos* is used to refer to both? Although it is difficult to prove, it does seem likely.

Hence, when in his battle descriptions, such as that of Zama, Polybius mentions the Romans, the legions, or the maniples, he does not distinguish between citizen and allied troops. However, if Polybius paid any attention to what he wrote himself in book six, he must have been aware of the distinction. Although book six is concerned primarily with the Roman constitution and the citizen troops, he does regularly refer to the allied contingents. Twice he mentions in book six that the allies contributed an equal number of infantry as the Romans. The number of allied horse was three times as high as that of the Romans.¹³ As we have seen, in the consular army, the allies formed two *stratopeda* along the two *stratopeda* (or legions) of the Romans. In battle, one allied *stratopedon* was stationed on the right wing, the other on the left. Part of the allied infantry and cavalry formed a particular group, in Greek the *epilektoi*, in Latin the *extraordinarii*.¹⁴ We also know the position of the allied horse and the allied foot in the consular camp.¹⁵ There are details, furthermore, concerning recruitment, rations and pay, and rewards for valour.¹⁶ Hence, it is not correct to say that Polybius ignores the allies. In matter of fact, without Polybius, we would know much less about the allies in the Roman army.

However, what about his silence regarding the allies in his account of military operations? Doesn't that imply a lack of interest and thus show that Polybius underestimated the role of the allied troops? I think not.

¹² Some scholars have pointed out that Polybius' account of the Roman army in book six "is written entirely from the point of view of a set of important but subordinate officers, the military tribunes". E. Rawson, 'The literary sources for the pre-Marian army', *Papers of the British School at Rome* 39 (1971), 13–31. Reprinted in *Roman culture and society. Collected papers* (Oxford 1991), 36 (with older literature). They therefore conclude that Polybius used some kind of instruction to military tribunes as a starting point. The existence of such documents is unproven. Moreover, reliance on written instructions would seem unlikely in an era in which young nobles had seen many campaigns before their term as officers and in which many posts of military tribunes were taken by ex-praetors and ex-consuls. Finally, military tribunes are not only prominent in book six, they also play a large role in Polybius' account of campaigns.

¹³ Polybius 6.26.7; 6.30.2. According to P.A. Brunt, *Italian manpower* (Oxford 1971), 678, the ratio varied, pointing to Appian and Livy.

¹⁴ Polybius 6.26.7–9.

¹⁵ Polybius 6.31.2–6.32.6.

¹⁶ Polybius 6.39.

The answer is that Polybius described the allied troops as functioning not differently from the Roman troops. As he depicts them, the units of allies and Romans together formed one uniform army, operating in the same way and organised along identical lines. The theoretical passages in Book six and elsewhere support this hypothesis.

The first example is the passage in which Polybius explains the usual procedure in the Roman army for plundering a city and dividing the booty among the soldiers. Polybius emphasizes that many a Greek army had come into trouble when the eagerness of individual soldiers to take spoils resulted in anarchy. In contrast, the Romans went about it in a very disciplined and organised manner. His explanation is given on the occasion of the capture of Carthago Nova in 210 BC.

After a city has been captured the Romans adopt the following procedure with the spoils. According to the size of the town sometimes a certain number of men from each *semaia*, at other times certain whole *semaiai* are told off to collect booty. They never use more than half the army on this task, and the rest remain in their ranks, at times outside and at times inside the city, ready for the occasion. The army are usually composed of two Roman *stratopeda* and two of the allies, and it is only on rare occasions that all four *stratopeda* are assembled together. All those who have been detailed to collect the plunder then bring it back, each man to his own *stratopedon*, and after it has been sold, the *chiliarchs* distribute the proceeds equally among all, including not only those who have been left behind in the protecting force, but also those who are guarding the tents or tending the sick, or who are absent on any special duties. (Polybius 10.16–17)¹⁷

Two elements show that this procedure pertained to the entire army, Romans and allies alike. First is his mention that consular armies consisted of four *stratopeda*, two of Romans and two of allies. Therefore, the division of spoils among the *stratopeda* included the allied ones. Secondly, Polybius emphasizes that the system was used to give absolutely all men an equal share in the spoils. In short, the procedure for the division of spoils implies Roman and allied units organized and functioning equally.

The second example is provided by Polybius' account of the Roman marching order. He writes that:

¹⁷ On this passage, see A.M. Eckstein, 'Physis and nomos. Polybius, the Romans, and Cato the Elder', in P. Cartledge *et al.*, eds., *Hellenistic constructs. Essays in culture, history and historiography* (Berkeley 1997), 85.

At the third signal, the leading troops must advance and set the whole camp in motion. As a rule the *extraordinarii* are placed at the head of the column; after them come the right wing of the allies and behind them their pack animals. Next in the order is the first of the Roman legions with its baggage behind it, after which comes the second followed by its pack animals, together with the baggage train of the allies, who bring up the rear, the left wing of the allies providing the rearguard. (6.40.3–5)

A different marching order is used when the army expects to meet the enemy:

In this case the army advances in three parallel columns, consisting of the *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii*. The baggage trains of the leading *semaiai* are placed in front, those of the second immediately behind, and so on, the baggage trains being interspersed between the bodies of fighting troops. With this information, if the column should be threatened, the troops face to the right or left, according to the direction from which the attack comes, and can then quickly get clear of the baggage and confront the enemy. (6.40.11)

While the first passage explicitly distinguishes between the units of allies and Romans, the battle formation of the second passage implies a homogeneously organized army consisting of three columns. It is clear that the allies were part of the columns of *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii*.

In his description of the formation of the consular army, Polybius tells us explicitly that the allies are organized by Roman officers. The magistrates of the allied communities were first instructed to send a certain number of troops. Polybius (6.21.5) adds that the magistrates of the allies used the same procedure as the Romans to choose their recruits, each community appointing a commander and a paymaster. At the final stage, the recruits selected from among the citizens and those from the Latin and other allies came together and were divided into units. About this final stage, Polybius writes:

The allies having now assembled also at the same places as the Romans, their organization and command are undertaken by the officers appointed by the consuls known as *praefecti sociorum* and twelve in number. (Polybius 6.26.5)

Moreover, the fittest horsemen and foot soldiers among the allied troops were selected by the Romans in order to form the *extraordinarii* (6.26.6). Ethnic units of varying size would not fit the army as he describes it, not only in book six, but also in his account of the Roman army on campaign. There is no contradiction between book six and his accounts of Roman campaigns, which at the least does not support the wide-

spread supposition that book six describes the Roman army as it had once functioned, but not anymore in Polybius' time.¹⁸

One more important point should be made. The Roman light armed soldiers (*velites*) were men of little property. The three lines of *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii* represented different age classes. The *hastati* were the youngest recruits, the *principes* men in their prime, the *triarii* were seasoned veterans.¹⁹ If the allied units were organised in a similar manner, their troops had to be distinguished along similar lines. In other words, also allied troops had to be distinguished according to age and property. This is confirmed by the brief remark that we have seen above concerning the mobilisation of allied troops: the allied magistrates used the same procedure to select their recruits.

We may conclude that Polybius did not ignore or underestimate the role of the allies, on the contrary. However, he chose to depict them as an integral part of the Roman army. It is clear now why he invariably refers to the Roman side as the *Romaioi* and why he uses general terms like the *semaiai*, or *hastati*, *principes* and *triarii* to refer to parts of the Roman army. Since the allied units fought in exactly the same way as the Roman maniples, there was little point in distinguishing between them. The Roman armies that Polybius witnessed and described fought as a single body, in which distinctions between citizens and allies were simply not important.

Allies in Livy's battle descriptions

A similar picture to that in Polybius is found in many of Livy's battle narratives. On occasion we find mention of allies in general terms, usually referring to the allied cavalry. This is the case, for instance, in the battles of Ticinus, Trebia and Cannae. More battle narratives, however, have no references at all to allied units, nor to the allied cavalry. Usually these battle descriptions refer to tactical units, such as maniples or *hastati*, but some are characterised by a total lack of specific terminology, only referring to the Romans, the army or to legions in a way that makes clear that the entire army is meant. In Livy's account

¹⁸ Thus, Brunt 1971, op. cit. (n. 13), 625ff. Otherwise, Rawson 1991, op. cit. (n. 12).

¹⁹ Polybius 6.21.7–10. On the interpretation, see recently N. Rosenstein, *Rome at war. Farms, families and death in the Middle Republic* (Chapel Hill 2004), 141.

of the battle near the Metaurus in 207 BC, for example, no reference whatsoever is given to allied infantry or cavalry, this despite the fact that the left and right wing (*cornu*) are regularly mentioned, while we know that the allied *alae* are usually stationed on the wings of the Roman battle formation. In short, in the majority of full-scale battle narratives, including all the major battles of the Hannibalic War, no mention is made of specific allied units. From this point of view, the majority of Livy's battle scenes closely resemble those of Polybius and paint the same picture of a uniform Roman army. This surely reflects the absence of details on allied units in the sources that Livy in these cases used.

Details concerning the allied contribution are confined to a limited number of battle narratives, all of which have in common other characteristic features, such as numbered legions and the regular mention of legates. Remarkable about this type of battle narratives, which are late-annalistic and can be securely ascribed to Valerius Antias, is the pattern of its occurrence in Livy's third, fourth and fifth decades. Full-scale narratives of this type are confined, first, to the Italian theatre of war during the central period of the Hannibalic War (213–207 BC) in books 25–27, and, second, to the wars in Spain and northern Italy from 205 BC onwards in book 29–41. The last case in which ethnic allied units and numbered legions occur in the extant books of Livy—the battle of Pydna (168 BC)—may be exceptional, since, on the one hand, there is clear Valerian material in Livy's battle narrative of Pydna, but, on the other hand, there is second-century evidence on specific allied units playing a prominent role at Pydna.²⁰

The following table summarises the occurrences of specific allied units and/or numbered legions in Livy's full-scale battle narratives. In other words, these are the battles designated in this article as late-annalistic.

²⁰ A more detailed discussion of Livy's late-annalistic battle scenes and the reliance on Valerius Antias in these cases can be found in P. Erdkamp, 'Late-annalistic battle-scenes in Livy (books 21–44)', *Mnemosyne* 59 (2006[a]), 525–563; id., 'Valerius Antias and Livy's casualty statistics', *Studies in Latin literature and Roman history* 13 (2006[b]), 166–182. In these publications it is shown that (1) Livy used the terminology of his sources on army units; (2) late-annalistic battle scenes are limited to particular periods and theatres of war; (3) characteristic features, such as numbered legions, allied units and details on legates, tribunes and centurions are common features of casualty reports and late-annalistic battle scenes; (4) battle scene and casualty report are often integrated; (5) nearly all casualty reports can be securely ascribed to Valerius Antias.

passage	year	event	source(s)	numbered legions	cives—socii	list of casualties and booty
Livy 25.13.11– 25.14.11	213	attack on Punic camp near Beneventum		3rd legion	cohors Paeligna cohors sociorum et civium legio	6000 enemies killed, 7000 captured, wagons and cattle
Livy 25.21.5– 25.21.10	212	battle near Herdonea		1st legion	ala sinistra	of 18,000 men, only 2,000 escaped
Livy 26.5.7– 26.6.13	211	battle near Capua	‘auctores’ others: no sig- nificant battle	6th legion	equites legionum, equites sociorum	8000 men from Hannibal’s army and 3000 Campanians killed, 15 signa from Hannibal, 18 from the Campanians captured
Livy 27.1.6– 27.1.13	210	battle near Herdonea		5th + 6th legion	sinistra ala	11 tribuni militum 13,000 or 7000 Romanorum sociorumque killed
Livy 27.2.4– 27.2.8	210	battle near Numistro (Italy)		1st + 3rd legion	dextra + sinistra ala	
Livy 27.12.11– 27.12.17	209	battle in Apulia (I)		18th legion	dextra ala extraordinarii	2700 civium sociorumque killed centuriones, tribuni militum 4 signa of the ala + 2 of the legion lost
Livy 27.14.2– 27.14.14	209	battle in Apulia (II)		18th legion	sinistra ala	8000 enemies killed and 5 elephants, 1700 legionaries and 1300 sociorum killed, many civium sociorumque wounded
Livy 27.41.1– 27.42.8	207	battle near Grumentum (Lucania)		1st + 3rd legion	equites legionis dextra ala	8000 enemies killed, 700 captured, 9 signa captured, 4 elephants killed, 2 elephants captured, 500 Romanorum sociorumque victores killed
Livy 29.2.4– 29.2.18	205	battle against Ilergetes e.a. (Spain)		12th +13th legion	Romani equites	13,000 enemies killed, 1800 captured, 200 Romanorum sociorumque

passage	year	event	source(s)	numbered legions	cives—socii	list of casualties and booty
Livy 30.18.2– 30.18.15	203	battle against Mago (Gallia Cisalpina)		11th, 12th and 13th legion		5000 enemies killed, 22 signa captured, 2300 Romans killed, largely from the 12th legion, also tribunes from the 12th and 13th legion
Livy 31.21.5– 31.22.2	201	battle against Boii (Gallia Cis.)			dextra ala equites legionum equitatus sociorum	35,000 enemies killed or taken capture, 70 signa and 200 wagons captured, 2000 Romanorum sociorumque killed
Livy 34.14.1– 34.15.9	194	attack on a city (Spain)	Valerius Antias Cato only says 'many' (on casu- alties etc.)	2nd legion	equites Romanorum dextrae alae	40,000 enemies killed
Livy 34.46.7– 34.47.8	194	battle against Boii (Gallia Cis.)		2nd and 4th legion	cohors extra- ordinaria	19,000 enemies killed, 5000 Romani killed
Livy 35.4.6– 35.5.14	193	battle against Boii (Gallia Cis.)		2nd legion	sinistra ala extraordinarii dextra ala equites legionum equites alarum	14,000 enemies killed, 1092 captured (also 721 horsemen and 3 leaders), 212 signa and 102 wagons captured, 5000 Romani and socii killed, including praefecti socium and tribuni militum of the 2nd legion
Livy 39.30.9– 39.31.16	185	battle on the Tagus (Spain)		5th and 8th legion	equites legionum equites sociorum Romani equites	4000 of 35,000 enemies escaped, 133 signa captured, 600 romani sociique, 150 auxilia killed, including 5 tribuni militum and some equites

passage	year	event	source(s)	numbered legions	cives—socii	list of casualties and booty
Livy 40.27.1– 40.28.6	181	battle in Liguria		1st + 3rd legion	cohortes extraordinarii ala dextra	15,000 enemies killed, 2500 captured
Livy 40.31.1– 40.32.7	181	battle against Celtiberians (Spain)		5th + 7th legion	ala sinistra equites extraordinarii	23,000 enemies killed, 4700 captured, 500 horses and 88 signa captured, 200 Romani milites, 830 socium Latini nominis, 2400 auxilium externorum killed
Livy 41.1.5– 41.4.8	178	attack by Histri (Italy)		2nd + 3rd legion	cohortes Placentina equitatus legionis	8000 enemies killed, none captured, 237 victores killed
Livy 44.40.4– (lacuna) 44.42.8	168	battle of Pydna		2nd legion	cohortes Marrucina, Paeligna turmae Samnitium equitum cohortes Firmana, Vestina, Cremonensis turmae equitum Placentina et Aesernina alae sociorum	20,000 enemies killed, 11,000 captured, 100 victores killed, largely Paeligni

The important point is that all the information that can be found on the tactical functioning of allied units is confined to a limited number of battles narratives, almost all deriving from the same late-annalistic source.

In most cases, allies are referred to as the *extraordinarii* or the left or right ala. See, for instance, Livy's account of a battle against the Boii in 193 BC:

The second legion was sent forward and the *extraordinarii* relieved. Then the battle was restored, since fresh troops, a legion with full ranks, had entered the fight. The *ala sinistra* was withdrawn from the battle and the *ala dextra* took its place in the battle-line. (35.5.6)

As usual, Livy ends his account of the battle with a detailed list of casualties and booty, the latter including military standards and wagons. He notes that among the Roman dead, there were many allied prefects and military tribunes from the 2nd legion.

There are similar cases when Livy briefly mentions a battle without an actual narrative. Two cases are especially interesting: in book 39, Livy mentions an attack by Ligurians, as a result of which not only 4000 Roman soldiers were killed, but 3 military standards from the 2nd legion and 19 standards of the allies were lost.²¹ Similarly, in book 42 Livy says that some authors mentioned a battle against Perseus:

There are those who declare that a great battle was fought on that day, that 8,000 of the enemy were killed, among them Sopater and Antipater, officers of the king, that there were taken alive about 2,800 men, and that 27 military standards had been taken. Nor was the victory bloodless, they say; more than 4,300 of the consul's army fell, and five standards of the *sinistra ala* were lost. (Livy 42.66.9–10)

These instances clearly show that the numbered legions, the details concerning allied contingents and the loss of military standards are closely integrated. We can take this relation between numbered legions and allied contingents even further, since all the battle scenes having details on allied units also have numbered legions. Livy's battle accounts with numbered legions, details concerning allied units and military standards in the lists of casualties and booty can be related to Valerius Antias. We may be certain that Valerius Antias was Livy's only source for battle accounts of the late-annalistic type.²²

Livy clearly distrusted some of the battles he found in the work of Valerius Antias and the figures provided by this late-republican annalist. Sometimes he dismisses outright the obvious falsehoods in his predecessor's account, but on occasion he summarises or copies the information he found, telling the reader of the origin of this information, and leaving it to the readers' judgement whether to trust it or not.²³ The damaging depiction by Livy of Valerius Antias does not inspire confidence in the details on specific allied units that we find in this context.

²¹ Livy 39.20.6–8.

²² Erdkamp 2006[a+b], op. cit. (n. 20).

²³ Livy 30.3.6; 30.29.7; 32.6.5ff; 37.34.5; 38.48.1ff; 42.11.1; 44.13.12ff

Livy's casualty figures for the battle of Pydna are cited as evidence by W.V. Harris for his statement that "the allies suffered more heavily in combat than the citizen legions".²⁴ Besides Pydna, two other instances support this hypothesis, both dealing with battles fought against the Celtiberians in Spain (in 181 and 180 bc). In 40.32.7, Livy writes that 200 Roman soldiers were killed, 830 allies and Latins, and 2400 'external auxiliaries'. The number of casualties reflects the previous account: allied troops and 6000 Spanish auxiliaries played a special role during the battle. In 40.40.13, 472 Roman soldiers, 1019 allies and Latins and 3,000 auxiliary troops were killed. It is only rarely that Livy gives separate numbers of casualties for citizen and allied troops. I can only add one further instance, which Harris, unsurprisingly, fails to mention: 1700 legionaries and 1300 allies fell during the second battle of Marcellus in Apulia in 209 bc (Livy 27.14.14). If these figures are somehow based on official data, it is surprising that only four out of approx. 80 cases distinguish between citizens and allies. Many cases say 'Romans and allies,' but give no separate figures. It is hard to explain why figures specifying citizens and allies were only available for Pydna and three obscure battles in Spain and Italy. Such detail is worrying. All of these four instances include military standards among the booty. In view of what we have seen on the reliability of late-annalistic battle statistics, we should conclude that Harris' statement is founded on shaky evidence.

Livy and Plutarch on the battle of Pydna

In 168 bc, the final year of the Third Macedonian War, the armies of the two powers camped near Pydna, the one under the command of L. Aemilius Paullus, the other led by the Macedonian king Perseus.

There was a stream of no great size nearer the camp of the enemy, from which both the Macedonians and the Romans were drawing water after posting guards on either bank in order to accomplish this mission safely. There were two cohorts on the Roman side, a Marrucinian and a Paelignian, and two troops of Samnite cavalry under the command of the legate Marcus Sergius Silus. Another fixed outpost was stationed before the camp under the legate Gaius Cluvius, composed of three

²⁴ Harris 1984, op. cit. (n. 6), 97. Likewise, A. Keaveney, *Rome and the unification of Italy* (London 1987), 15.

cohorts, from Firmum, the Vestini and Cremona respectively, and two troops of cavalry from Placentia and Aesernia. While there was quiet at the river, since neither side took the offensive, about the ninth hour a baggage-animal shied from the hands of his grooms and escaped towards the other bank. While three soldiers were chasing him through the water, which was about knee-deep, two Thracians dragged the animal from mid-stream to their bank. The soldiers pursued them, killed one, recaptured the animal, and retired to their post. There was a guard of eight hundred Thracians on the Macedonian bank. At first a few of these, angry at the killing of their fellow-countryman before their eyes, crossed the river in pursuit of the killers, then more went, and finally the whole force, and the guard... (Livy 44.40.4ff.)

There is a big lacuna in our text, since two pages of the manuscript are missing, but the further description makes clear that the allied troops came to blows with the forces on the Macedonian side of the river, leading to a fierce battle. The cohorts of Paeligni and Marrucini fearlessly attacked the Macedonian phalanx. The Roman citizen-forces consisted of the 1st and 2nd legion. When Livy's narrative resumes, the 2nd legion attacked the centre of the Macedonian force. On the right wing, Roman elephants and allied troops put the Macedonian wing to flight, which was the first step to a brilliant Roman victory.

The importance of this passage lies in the survey of allied contingents on the Roman side, consisting of infantry cohorts from the Marrucini, Paeligni, Firmum, the Vestini and Cremona, and cavalry units of Samnium, Placentia and Aesernia.

Livy's battle narrative of Pydna contains elements that are clearly late-annalistic, such as the numbered legions. The presence of numbered legions in Livy's account of Pydna shows that Livy did not simply paraphrase Polybius' narrative of the battle, as he did for instance on Cynoscephalae (197 BC) and Thermopylae (191 BC).²⁵ There are two reasons for this assumption: Polybius never has numbered legions in his battle accounts, and numbered legions make only one appearance in battles in the East, viz. at Pydna. As we have seen above, numbered legions are closely connected to Valerius Antias. In fact, they may be seen as characteristic of Antias. Hence, Livy's account partly stems from Antias.

On the other hand, we may not simply assume that the allied contingents originated in the work of Antias. The parallel account of the

²⁵ Livy 33.7.4; 36.18.1.

battle of Pydna in Plutarch's life of Aemilius Paullus also mentions Paeligni and Marrucini. Plutarch refers to three second-century sources in his account of the battle: besides Polybius, he mentions the Roman Scipio Nasica, who was present during the battle, and a pro-Macedonian author called Poseidonius, who wrote a biography of Perseus. Should we then assume that Livy's account of Pydna is partly Polybian and that the Paeligni and Marrucini in Plutarch's narrative were already there in Polybius? Moreover, should we then assume that the other allied units were also part of a second-century source? These questions require a detailed comparison of Plutarch's and Livy's account of the battle.²⁶

(1) Plutarch (*Aem.* 1) notes some disagreement about the start of the battle: some say that Aemilius Paullus himself devised a scheme for making the enemy start the battle. An unbridled horse, driven into the river by the Romans, caused the attack. Others write (Plutarch says) that Thracians, chasing Roman beasts of burden, started the battle. Plutarch's sources agree with Livy on the nature of the events that started the battle. Plutarch's second version closely resembles Livy's narrative.

(2) Livy (44.42.2) briefly notes that, after the Macedonian phalanx had been defeated, the king was the first to flee. This is in disagreement with Polybius' version as mentioned by Plutarch (18.2). According to Polybius, Perseus rode to the city as soon as the battle began under the pretence of sacrificing to Heracles, while Poseidonius gives a favourable account of the king's behaviour.

(3) According to Plutarch (20.1–3), when the Romans unsuccessfully attacked the Macedonian phalanx, the commander of the Paelignians, Salvius, hurled the standard of his unit among the enemy.

Then the Paelignians, since among the Italians it is an unnatural and flagrant thing to abandon a standard, rushed on towards the place where it was, and dreadful losses were inflicted and suffered on both sides.

However, the shields and swords of the Romans were of no use against the long spears of the Macedonians. The Paelignians and Marrucini fought 'with animal fury', but their first line was cut to pieces and the rest driven back. Plutarch only mentions Poseidonius in this context, but the story was probably also in Polybius and/or Nasica. Livy does

²⁶ Cf. H. Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius* (Berlin 1863), 300ff.

not have this story, but it may have been in the lacuna. Noteworthy is that Plutarch has no earlier mention of the Paeligni and Marrucini.

(4) The analysis of the Roman victory in both accounts is similar, but with significant differences. Livy assigns a crucial role to allied units and elephants. Plutarch does not mention them. Plutarch has a detailed tactical analysis, claiming that the rough terrain caused the formation of the Macedonian phalanx to break down, which then fell victim to the superior weaponry of the Romans in close combat. This analysis closely resembles Polybius' comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the Roman legions and Macedonian phalanx in battle.²⁷ The niceties of Plutarch's tactical analysis are missing in Livy's account. It is impossible to say whether this is the result of his lack of interest in such matters, or because the source Livy used did not have these elements.

(5) Livy notes that the Romans killed 20,000 Macedonians and lost about 100 men, most of whom were Paelignians. Plutarch differs from Livy in the number of Macedonians killed (25,000). The number of Roman dead was 100 according to Poseidonius and 80 according to Nasica. No figure for Polybius is given. We may observe, however, that in his extant battle accounts, Polybius never specifies particular groups among the Roman casualties.

All in all, there is little to support the hypothesis that Livy's account is largely Polybian, apart from the fact that normally Livy relies on his Greek predecessor for Greek matters. The Paeligni and Marrucini clearly are part of a tradition that was already present in the second century BC and it is possible that they occurred in Polybius' narrative. However, it is impossible to say which elements were already present in the second-century sources, and which elements derived from Valerius Antias. Cohorts from Firmum, the Vestini and Cremona, and cavalry units from Samnium, Aesernia and Placentia play no role in what remains of Livy's battle narrative and do not occur in Plutarch's account. A firm conclusion is not possible, but we may point out that allied units are not normally a feature of Polybius, while they are of Valerius Antias.

²⁷ Polybius 18.31.

Allied cohorts in Sallust's Jugurthine War

Secure evidence for ethnic allied units does not emerge before the time of Marius, but it is sparse: in the Jugurthine War, Marius commanded a *cohors Paeligna* (*Bell. Jug.* 105.2), while two cohorts from Camerinum fought at his side during the battle of Vercellae against the Cimbri (*Cicero, Balb.* 46; *Valerius Maximus* 5.2.8). In the latter case, we are not informed about their composition or role, since it is only said that these men were rewarded Roman citizenship by Marius for their bravery.²⁸

We learn more from Sallust's *Jugurthine War*, which contains five references that are relevant to our discussion.

- (1) Under the command of Aulus Postumius Albinus (brother of the consul Spurius), a *cohors Ligurum*, two *turmae Thracum* and some legionaries were bribed by the Numidian king and defected to his side (38.6).
- (2) The consul Metellus sent four *cohortes Ligurum* as a garrison to Leptis (77.4). These passages show that we are not dealing with an innovation by Marius.
- (3) Under the command of Marius, a Ligurian soldier—*ex cohortibus auxiliariis miles*—points the way to a position above the Numidians (93.2). *Auxilia* is a term used for specialised troops, usually non-Italic, such as light-armed units, slingers or archers. Hence, the Ligurian cohorts were not part of the 'normal' allied infantry consisting of *socii ac nomen Latinum* that fought at the side of the Roman legionaries.
- (4) During a march, Marius kept his army ready for combat. Aulus Manlius commanded slingers, archers and the *cohortes Ligurum* on the left (100.2). This confirms the conclusion drawn from passage nr. 3.
- (5) When sent to king Bocchus by Marius, Sulla was accompanied by horsemen, Balearic slingers, archers and a light-armed *cohors Paeligna* (*cum velitaribus armis*—105.2). In view of the previous passages and the nature of the other troops accompanying Sulla, the light-armed *cohors Paeligna* should be interpreted as an auxiliary unit of the same nature as the Ligurian cohorts.

²⁸ Plutarch, *Marius* 28.2 does not mention cohorts, but talks about 1,000 men from Camerinum.

The presence of auxiliary cohorts should be seen in the light of developments in the Roman army in the late second century BC. First, legionary cohorts are solely mentioned by Sallust as a unit in relation to the march or foraging. At first, cohorts had no function in combat. The maniples remained the tactical unit of the heavy infantry. In Marius' combat-ready marching order (passage nr. 3), for instance, the core consisted of maniples commanded by tribunes. Interesting is the Polybius-like disregard for the distinction between Roman soldiers and officers and the allied infantry and their prefects, which makes one wonder whether Sallust's 'legion' is used as broadly as Polybius.²⁹ The main point, however, is that the cohort had not yet replaced the maniples as a tactical unit of the Roman and allied heavy-infantry.²⁹

Secondly, in the late second century BC, the light-armed soldiers (*velites*) disappeared as part of the legions, which was a logical consequence of the fact that Roman soldiers were being armed at the cost of the state.³⁰ The troops in citizen and allied contingents became increasingly uniform, consisting of heavy-armed infantry. From this point of view, there was little difference between the army of Marius and that of Caesar, except for the fact that the heavy infantry after the Social War was solely manned by citizen-legionaries. The disappearance of the *socii ac nomen Latinum* made no difference to the functioning of the Roman army, which in itself proves the uniformity in organisation and functioning at least in the late second century BC. At the time of the Jugurthine War and already before Marius took command, the role of the *velites* was largely taken over by foreign units, such as Thracian and Ligurian mercenaries. It is interesting to see that Paelignians had a similar role, which may be related to the long tradition of Italic mountain-peoples to find employment as mercenaries. To conclude: besides the core of Roman and allied heavy-infantry units, the Roman army of the late second century BC consisted of special troops of light-armed infantry, slingers and archers, which were organised in cohorts.³¹ The cohorts Paeligna in Sallust probably was a light-armed

²⁹ I hope to have shown that Livy's regular use of cohorts regarding the wars in Spain is of little consequence. Contra M.J.V. Bell, 'Tactical reform in the Roman republican army', *Historia* 14 (1965), 405.

³⁰ Plutarchus, *C. Gracchus* 5.1. Recently, P. Erdkamp, 'The transformation of the Roman army in the second century BC', in T. Naco del Hoyo *et al.*, eds., *War and territory in the Roman world* (Oxford 2006), 41–51.

³¹ L. Keppie, *The making of the Roman army. From republic to empire* (London 1998), 57ff.

auxiliary unit. The cohorts from Camerinum may have functioned in a similar way.

Loyal allies, former foes and new citizens

A legitimate question to ask is why a late-republican historian like Valerius Antias would bother to add details about ethnic units. What interest would he have in mentioning allied units, when his second-century predecessors did not? Three elements may be given as part of the answer. For one, giving much detail was a means employed in late republican historiography to boost one's credibility. Valerius Antias established his character as a serious and reliable historian by giving many details in a formulaic manner, including lots and lots of figures.³² Even Livy wonders how Antias dared to give the exact number of enemies killed regarding battles fought in the fifth century BC.³³ The most noteworthy fact, however, is that Livy, despite all his criticism of Valerius Antias, includes the latter's information on casualties, captives and booty. Such figures had become part of the historiographical tradition, a natural element of the genre. Valerius Antias undoubtedly improved on his predecessors by giving yet more numbers.³⁴ The same applies to details concerning individuals and units in some of Livy's battles. Instead of anonymous actions of Roman soldiers, as in the works of Polybius and a large part of Livy's battle accounts, we see individual tribunes and centurions performing their heroic feats on the battle field. The same tendency lies behind the mentioning of particular units, such as numbered legions or ethnic units.

³² Timpe 1979, op. cit. (n. 2), 103ff.; S.P. Oakley, *A commentary on Livy I* (Oxford 1997), 75f.; U. Walter, 'Opfer ihrer Ungleichzeitigkeit. Die Gesamtgeschichten im ersten Jahrhundert v.Chr. und die fortdauernde Attraktivität des annalistischen Schemas', In U. Eigler et al., eds., *Formen römischer Geschichtsschreibung von den Anfängen bis Livius* (Darmstadt 2003), 149ff.

³³ Livy 3.5.13. Cf. Brunt 1971, op. cit. (n. 13), 695; R.A. Laroche, 'Valerius Antias and his numerical totals. A reappraisal', *Historia* 26 (1977), 359; Id. 'Valerius Antias as Livy's source for the number of military standards captured in battle in books I–X', *Classica et mediaevalia* 35 (1984), 95; G. Forsythe, 'Dating and arranging the Roman history of Valerius Antias', in V.B. Gorman and E.W. Robinson, eds., *Oikistes. Studies in constitutions, colonies and military power in the ancient world* (Leiden 2002), 110f.

³⁴ Laroche 1984, op. cit. (n. 33), 102.

A second part of the answer must have been the increased integration of Italic families in the political and cultural elite of Rome.³⁵ Valerius Antias, just like Livy, did not come from Rome. There may be little evidence to support the supposition of Dieter Timpe that Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius were members of the Italic municipal aristocracy, but we may agree with him that the first-century historians wrote for a widening audience that increasingly included leading families of the former allies.³⁶ Not only in politics, but also in literature and art, we see individuals from the municipal aristocracies coming to the fore. The losses amongst the elite of Rome in the age of Sulla as a result of political prosecutions and civil wars were partly compensated by the influx of leading Italic families.³⁷ These families had an outlook on Roman history that was not dominated by the city of Rome. While Polybius and the early Roman historians emphasized the homogeneous nature of the Roman army, in which Romans and allies were fully integrated, it suited the interests of many first-century readers to spell out the role that allies had served in Roman history. Later authors celebrated the Italian peoples even in their role as opponents of Rome. Take, for example, the following lines in which Ovid (*Am.* 3.15.7–10) stresses his Paelignian background:

Mantua rejoices in her Vergil, Verona in her Catullus.
It is of the Paelignian race that I shall be said to be the glory,
the race whose desire for freedom had compelled it to take up honourable
arms,
when anxious Rome feared the allied bands.

Rome may have feared the Paeligni, but their cause was freedom and their struggle thus honourable.³⁸ An interesting parallel is offered by

³⁵ Brunt 1988, op. cit. (n. 1), 117ff.; Gabba 1989, op. cit. (n. 1), 210ff. However, H. Mouritsen, *Italian unification. A study in ancient and modern historiography* (London 1998), 59ff. is sceptic about the degree of integration or romanisation: "When looking at Augustan Italy one is immediately struck by the remarkable homogeneity achieved in most areas: language, urbanisation, and monumentalisation, institutions, cult, artistic production, burial practice, epigraphic habits, etc. The obvious romanisation encountered in this period contrasts sharply with the barely traceable Roman influence prior to the Social War" (p. 81).

³⁶ Timpe 1979, op. cit. (n. 2), 113f. Cf. T.P. Wiseman, *Clio's cosmetics. Three studies in Greco-Roman literature* (Leicester 1979), 23; K.-E. Petzold, 'Zur Geschichte der römischen Annalistik', in W. Schuller, ed., *Livius* (Konstanz 1993), 170f.; Walter 2003, op. cit. (n. 32), 141.

³⁷ Galsterer 1976, op. cit. (n. 2), 145.

³⁸ The example was taken and quoted from M. Pobjoy, 'The first *Italia*', in E. Her-ring and K. Lomas, eds., *The emergence of state identities in Italy in the first millennium BC*

the historian Velleius Paterculus, who declared that the cause of the rebellious allies in the Social War had been just.³⁹

The fortune of the Italians was as cruel as their cause was just. For they were seeking citizenship in the state whose power they were defending by their arms. Every year and in every war they were furnishing a double number of men, both of cavalry and of infantry, and yet were not admitted to the rights of citizens in the state which, through their efforts, had reached so high a position that it could look down upon men of the same race and blood as foreigners and aliens. (Vell. Pat. 2.15.2.)⁴⁰

To strengthen his point, he claimed that the allies had provided two soldiers for every citizen soldier. This statement is certainly wrong, but it served his purpose.⁴¹ It agreed with the Italic identity of the historians and that of many of their readers to pay attention to the non-Roman contribution to Roman history. The relationship between identity and historiography was, of course, no new phenomenon: one of the functions of Roman historiography was to define and characterise Roman identity. Virtues and moral superiority were central to the Roman understanding of themselves and their role in world history. This understanding is reflected in the emphasis on moral exempla in Roman historiography.⁴² It was only a natural development that, when the word 'Roman' expanded in meaning and steadily began to incorporate Italic peoples, historiography had to incorporate the identity of these new 'Romans' as well.

The growing tension between Romans and allies at the end of the second century BC, culminating in the Social War, surely increased the interest in the role of the allies in Roman history. As E. Gabba stated:

(London 2000), 197. See also G. Bradley, 'Iguvines, Umbrians and Romans. Ethnic identity in central Italy', in T.J. Cornell and K. Lomas, eds., *Gender and ethnicity in ancient Italy* (London 1997), 62 on the "strong sense of regional heritage in the work of the poet Propertius, who was a native of Asisium [Umbria]".

³⁹ This notwithstanding the fact that his greatgrandfather, Minatius Magius from Acculanum, had remained loyal to Rome, had raised a legion (!) among the Hirpini and fought successfully against the insurgents. He was rewarded Roman citizenship. Velleius Paterculus 2.16.2. M.H. Crawford, 'Italy and Rome from Sulla to Augustus', *Cambridge Ancient History* X (Cambridge 1996), 417f. observes: "Velleius was well aware that the Italian cause was just, but that loyalty to Rome was an overriding obligation".

⁴⁰ Pobjoy 2000, op. cit. (n. 38), 190: "Velleius' presentation of the Italians as effectively Roman in all but formal status."

⁴¹ Brunt 1988, op. cit. (n. 1), 126: "This sounds like a relic of allied propaganda." Cf. Harris 1984, op. cit. (n. 6), 96, 99f.; Bradley 1997, op. cit. (n. 38), 60.

⁴² B. Feichtinger, 'Ad maiorem gloriam Romae. Ideologie und Fiktion in der Historiographie des Livius', *Latomus* 51 (1992), 16ff.

"The allies became increasingly aware that they had helped create an empire in which they enjoyed only part of the fruits."⁴³ I suggest that we see some of the emphasis on the allied role in Rome's glorious past in Livy's account of Roman battles and of the Roman war-effort in general. Two noteworthy examples may be highlighted: the Latin colony of Fregellae and the allied people of the Paeligni.

Every educated first-century Roman will have been aware of the fact that Fregellae, founded as a Latin colony in 328 BC, was taken and destroyed by a Roman army in 125 BC, after part of its citizens had expressed serious discontent with Rome and possibly even had advocated revolt.⁴⁴ A contrasting picture of Fregellan loyalty arises from a few events during the Hannibalic and later wars as described by Livy. In the year 211 BC, Hannibal tried to deflect some of the legions besieging Capua and marched towards Rome. In an attempt to slow down Hannibal's approach, and thus offering precious time to the Roman authorities, the citizens of Fregellae demolished the bridge across the Liris. Furthermore, a messenger from Fregellae, travelling day and night and apparently bringing the first news of Hannibal's approach, caused great panic in Rome.⁴⁵ A few years later, a great crisis emerged in Rome when 12 Latin colonies refused to contribute any more troops, saying that their manpower and resources were exhausted by the past years of fighting. The consuls summoned the envoys from the remaining 18 colonies and asked them to elucidate their position.

On behalf of the eighteen colonies Marcus Sextilius of Fregellae replied that they had soldiers in readiness according to the treaty, and would give more if more were needed, and would exert themselves to do whatever else the Roman people might command and desire. (Livy 27.10.3.)

⁴³ Gabba 1989, op. cit. (n. 1), 223.

⁴⁴ On the causes of the rebellion of Fregellae, Keaveney 1987, op. cit. (n. 24), 64ff.; Mouritsen 1998, op. cit. (n. 35), 118f. Galsterer 1976, op. cit. (n. 2), 179ff. argues that many of its citizens were settled in the citizen-colony Fabrateria Nova, which replaced Fregellae. In other words, the punishment was not as harsh as it seems, since the destruction of the 'political' unity of Fregellae does not imply the destruction of its entire population. Similar, E. Gabba, 'Rome and Italy: the Social War', *Cambridge Ancient History* IX (Cambridge 1994), 105. However, Brunt 1988, op. cit. (n. 1), 96f. disagrees, pointing out "of this there is no evidence" (p. 97). For the image of the peoples of the Central Apennines, see E. Dench, *From barbarians to new men. Greek, Roman and modern perceptions of peoples of the Central Apennines* (Oxford 1995).

⁴⁵ Livy 26.9.3–6. Oakley 1997, op. cit. (n. 32), 83: these events are probably unhistorical.

The prominence of the city and its unwavering support of Rome could not have been expressed more clearly. Their next appearance is during a famous disaster: when Marcellus was killed by a troop of Numidians, he was accompanied by 180 Etruscan and 40 Fregellan horsemen. The negative outcome of this event actually emphasizes the courage and loyalty of the Fregellani, as Livy carefully distinguishes between the conduct of the Etruscans and that of the Fregellans. While the Etruscans all fled when the enemy appeared, the Fregellans defended Marcellus until the end. Seeing that Marcellus was mortally wounded, the few who survived turned to flight with Marcellus's wounded colleague and his son.⁴⁶ No reproach is possible here. Finally, Livy mentions a particular version on the capture of the son of P. Scipio from an unnamed source: he had been captured by the enemy during the War against Antiochus III, while being accompanied by a cavalry contingent from Fregellae. He had fallen from his horse and had been captured together with a few horsemen, so it does not appear that the fault lies with the horsemen from Fregellae.⁴⁷ It was the wealthier people among the allies that served in the cavalry. Hence, it is the upper class of Fregellae that is presented in a very favourable light in these anecdotes and events.

A second example is provided by the Paeligni, who were famous in the first century for the fact that their central town Corfinium had been renamed Italica at the start of the Social War and had served as the capital of the revolt. Their first great appearance in the third decade is during the Roman attack on a Punic camp near Beneventum in 213 BC. Interestingly, this battle, occurring early in book 25, is the first of the late-annalistic type in the third decade, characterised as it is by numbered legions, legates, prefects—and, of course, an ethnic allied unit. The latter plays a prominent role when the Roman consul Fulvius, depicted as weak and indecisive, orders his troops, who are eager to fight, to retreat.

Nearest to the enemy happened to be a Paelignian cohort, whose prefect Vibius Accaus seized the banner and threw it over the enemy's earthwork.

⁴⁶ Livy 27.27.6f. Cf. D.-A. Kukofka, *Süditalien im Zweiten Punischen Krieg* (Frankfurt am Main 1990), 116. To interpret these events as evidence of the anti-Roman attitude of the Etruscan horsemen really goes too far. Harris 1971, op. cit. (n. 2), 137f. contra D.W.L. van Son, 'The disturbances in Etruria during the Second Punic War', *Mnemosyne* 16 (1963), 268; A.J. Pfiffig, 'Die Haltung Etruriens im 2. punischen Krieg', *Historia* 15 (1966), 201f.

⁴⁷ Livy 37.34.6.

Then, with a curse upon himself and the cohort, if the enemy should get possession of that banner, he was himself the first to dash over the trench and wall into the camp. And already the Paelignians were fighting inside the wall, when from the other side of the camp, while Valerius Flaccus, tribune of the soldiers of the third legion, was reproaching the Romans for their cowardice in yielding to allies the honour of capturing the camp... (Livy 25.14.4–5.)

The centurion of the first manipulus follows the Paelignian's example, takes his unit's standard (*signum*) and leads his troops into the fight. After the victory, both officers are rewarded for their valour. Can it really be coincidence that the military tribune—whose role, by the way, is perfectly superfluous—is named Valerius?⁴⁸ In any case, the numbered legions, ethnic unit and prominent role of military standards all point in the same direction. We have already seen that the Paeligni play a crucial role in Livy's account of the battle of Pydna, which is reflected by the fact that most of the casualties on the Roman side were Paelignians. Finally, we may note that in 205 bc, many Paelignians, besides Marsians and Marrucini, volunteer for Scipio's fleet.⁴⁹

It seems remarkable at least that peoples, who had been bitter enemies just a few generations before, are depicted in Livy's work in such a positive way. One may also add the heroic action of Oblacus Volsinius, leader of the Frentani, who in the battle of Heracleia cut his way through the ranks until he was face to face with Pyrrhus and nearly managed to kill him (Dionysius 19.12; Plutarch, Pyrrh. 16.8–10). All these peoples and communities revolted against Rome at the start of the first century.⁵⁰ Of course, the former foes of the Social War are not the only ones that are depicted positively. Placentian knights and units from Praeneste, Firmum or Cremona are also mentioned, for

⁴⁸ On the tendency of Valerius Antias to introduce Valerii in major roles throughout early Roman history, T.P. Wiseman, *Roman drama and Roman history* (Exeter 1998), 77ff. Undoubtedly he also included Valerii in minor roles in later events.

⁴⁹ Livy 28.45.19. One may add that, in 196 bc, a *cohors Marsorum* bears the brunt of a battle against the Insubres (Livy 33.36.10), and that, according to one tradition, a Samnite-lead force saved the army of Minucius from destruction by Hannibal's troops in 217 bc (22.24.10ff.). Note that in the first case, Valerius Antias is mentioned as the source of the casualty figures. Regarding the same passage, A. Ziolkowski, 'Credibility of numbers of battle captives in Livy, books XXI–XLV', *La Parola del Passato* 45 (1990), 27 concludes that 'no battle was fought at all'.

⁵⁰ In *Per.* 72, a list is given of seven peoples that revolted against Rome, which included the Picentes, Vestini, Marsi, Paeligni, Marrucini, Samnites and Lucani. Cf. Appian, *Bell. civ.* 1.39. E.T. Salmon, 'Notes on the Social War', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 89 (1958), 159ff.; Galsterer 1976, op. cit. (n. 2), 189f.

instance, but it would be hard in these cases to show the same deliberate effort to depict the allies in a favourable light. It is impossible to say whether the stories in favour of the rebellious allies were invented when the conflict between Rome and some of her allies emerged, or possibly at a later date, or whether there were actually local traditions that were transmitted somehow to Roman historiography. In the case of Fregellae and the Paeligni, I want to suggest that the above passages are meant as a vindication of these prominent former enemies. The existence of such traditions in the wake of the Social War may be seen as the third element that partly explains the prominent role of the allies in Livy's late-annalistic battles.

Conclusion

In Polybius' view, the allies fought side by side with citizen troops in a uniformly organised army. In his battle narratives, he hardly ever mentions the allies explicitly, let alone ethnic or local units. While the homogeneous nature of the Roman army suited his conception of "the solidity of the Roman state", he did not need to adapt the first to fit the latter. Polybius described the Roman army as he saw it. The picture is no different in many other battle narratives in the work of Livy, where we may suppose that he relied on such other Roman historians as Fabius Pictor or Coelius Antipater. We may observe that the Roman army as depicted by Sallust is as uniform as that described by Polybius. While the second-century Greek author could regard the role of the allies as inherent in Rome's harmonious unification of Italy and his Roman colleagues saw no reason for special emphasis, the position was much different for Roman historians of the first century BC, who felt the need for a more detailed and explicit role for the allies. The disturbed relationship with the allies, and the Social War in particular, played a role in this tendency, as witnessed by the deliberate effort to paint a favourable picture of the role played by soldiers from Fregellae and the Paeligni in the wars against Rome's enemies.

The campaigns that Livy (solely or largely) based on Valerius Antias are notoriously unreliable. Livy's late-annalistic battles in Italy during the years 213–207 BC include some dubious encounters between Marcellus and Hannibal, whereas Appian notes that Marcellus achieved little. The battles fought against the Ligurians, Gauls and Spaniards in the early second century BC are equally untrustworthy. Some of the battles

that Livy took from Valerius Antias never occurred at all. Clearly, the passages in Livy's battle accounts on allied units offer a very insecure base for any theories on their role. The study of allied units should be based on Polybius and the more trustworthy parts of Livy. While the existence of ethnic or 'local' cohorts and cavalry units is beyond doubt, our conclusion leaves us with little secure evidence for their functioning in the period 218–168 BC.

WAR, SEX, AND DEATH: FROM REPUBLIC TO EMPIRE

NATHAN ROSENSTEIN

The last dozen years have seen the emergence of a vigorous debate over the demography of the Roman Republic. In 1994 Elio Lo Cascio published the opening salvo in what would become a sustained attack on the *communis opinio*, the interpretation of the Augustan census figures formulated by Julius Beloch in *Die Bevölkerung der römischen Welt* and vigorously defended by Peter Brunt in *Italian Manpower*. Bringing a powerful historiographic analysis and a more sophisticated quantitative methodology to bear, Lo Cascio argued that the census tallies recorded for the reign of Rome's first emperor do not, as Beloch and Brunt held, represent all Roman citizens—men, women, and children—but only adult males, making the total free population of Italy much higher than the roughly five to seven-and-a-half million Beloch and Brunt had estimated. Therefore, rather than declining over the two centuries since 225 BC, as Beloch and Brunt concluded, Italy's free population must have been growing vigorously during this period. In subsequent articles Lo Cascio has extended this analysis, arguing for a free population of at least thirteen million by 28 BC. His challenge has in turn provoked responses from a number of other scholars, including Neville Morley, Walter Scheidel, and Luuk de Ligt. These last two have made the most recent contributions to the debate, each independently offering new arguments that the free Italian population was not expanding as greatly as Lo Cascio claims but remained stable or was growing only slightly over the last two centuries of the Republic. However, their studies will by no means be the last word in this controversy, and it is to be expected that Lo Cascio will present a vigorous defense of his position in a forthcoming monograph.¹

¹ E. Lo Cascio, 'The Size of the Roman Population: Beloch and the Meaning of the Augustan Census Figures,' *Journal of Roman Studies* 84 (1994), 23–40; J. Beloch, *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt. Historische Beiträge zur Bevölkerungslehre* (Leipzig 1886); P.A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 BC–AD 14* (London 1971); E. Lo Cascio, 'Popolazione e risorse agricole nell'Italia del II secolo a.C.', in D. Vera, ed., *Demografia, sistemi agrari, regimi alimentari nel mondo antico* (Bari 1999), 217–240; E. Lo Cascio, 'The population of Roman Italy in Town and Country,' in J. Bintliff and K. Sbonias, eds., *Reconstructing*

This debate is about much more than mere numbers. It concerns the dynamics of Italy's population: was it growing or declining and in either case, why and how? As is well known, Brunt's interpretation of the census figures rests on a powerful argument about the effects of Roman warfare and the Republic's acquisition of an empire on Italy's economy and society during the second and first centuries BC. The Republic's grinding struggle against Hannibal and the long wars abroad that followed required the conscription of great numbers of Roman and Italian small farmers for many years and so deprived their farms of vital labor. These wars thus ruined the Italian peasantry and forced them off their lands. At the same time, the prisoners these soldiers captured during the city's wars flooded onto the slave markets of Italy. Land and labor abounded, therefore. Money, too, flowed into the purses of Rome's political elite from the spoils of its victorious wars. Lacking other productive outlets for their capital, aristocrats invested in farms worked by slaves producing the wine, oil, grain and other products required to feed the peninsula's urban population, particularly Rome's, which the influx of displaced farmers streaming in from the countryside at that time engorged. Lacking land or other secure means of supporting a family, members of the urban proletariat and their rural brethren were unable to marry and father children or were forced to expose those that were born, leading to the decline in the free population reflected in the Augustan census figures as Brunt interpreted them.²

It will come as no surprise to most readers that much of this reconstruction is now facing serious challenges on a number of fronts. Even as Brunt was publishing *Italian Manpower*, Martin Frederiksen had pointed out that the widespread disappearance of small farms and their replacement by large estates in the second century finds little support in the archaeological record. The slave-run *villa*, the hallmark

Past Population Trends in Mediterranean Europe (3000 BC–AD 1800) (Oxford 1999), 161–171; E. Lo Cascio, 'Recruitment and the Size of the Roman Population from the Third to the First Century BCE,' in W. Scheidel, ed., *Debating Roman Demography* (Leiden 2001), 111–137; N. Morley, 'The Transformation of Italy, 225–28 BC,' *Journal of Roman Studies* 91 (2001), 50–62; W. Scheidel, 'Human Mobility in Roman Italy I: The Free Population,' *Journal of Roman Studies* 94 (2004), 1–26; W. Scheidel, 'Human Mobility in Roman Italy II: The Slave Population,' *Journal of Roman Studies* 95 (2005), 64–79; L. de Ligt, 'Poverty and Demography: The Case of the Gracchan Land Reforms,' *Mnemosyne* 57 (2004), 725–757.

² Brunt 1971, op. cit. (n. 1); discussion and references to additional scholarship in N. Rosenstein, *Rome at War. Farms, Families, and Death in the Middle Republic* (Chapel Hill 2004), 3–6.

of the so-called 'slave mode of production' is largely a first-century phenomenon, appearing many decades after the events in the second century that are supposed to have brought about its rise.³ Likewise, the introduction of the Dressel type 1 amphora, which is closely linked to the great increase in Italian wine production that is usually associated with the rise of slave-run estates, is no earlier than the last third of the second century.⁴ Rather than accepting the common view that commercial, slave-run plantations and small farms constituted antithetical economic forms, Dominic Rathbone in an important article emphasized the dependence of the former on a neighboring network of the latter to meet their needs for labor during periods of peak demand.⁵ Wim Jongmann has lately shown that even at its greatest extent the population of Rome and Italy's other cities would have needed the produce of a minute fraction of Italian agricultural land, on the order of a mere 2 percent, to meet its demand for wine and oil. Even were we to suppose that these cities drew their grain exclusively from Italian farms during the Empire, which is quite unlikely, that would have required no more than 15 percent of the peninsula's crop land.⁶ Walter Scheidel and Luuk de Ligt have each used these figures as the basis for a radical revision downward of estimates of the number of slaves in Italy.⁷ It is no longer possible to suppose, as Brunt and Keith Hopkins did, that the servile portion of the Italian population ever reached two or three million out of a total population of six or seven-and-a-half million in the age of Augustus and displaced much of the free population on the land.⁸ Approaching the problem from a different perspective, John Rich conclusively refuted the claim that the proportion of *assidui* among the citizen body was declining during the late third and second centuries,

³ M. Frederiksen, 'The contribution of archaeology to the agrarian problem in the Gracchan period,' *Dialoghi di Archeologia* 4–5 (1970–1971), 330–357; E. Curti, E. Dench, and J.R. Patterson, 'The Archaeology of Central and Southern Roman Italy: Recent Trends and Approaches,' *Journal of Roman Studies* 86 (1996), 170–189.

⁴ See Rosenstein 2004, op. cit. (n. 2), 195 n. 14 for modern discussions.

⁵ D. Rathbone, 'The Development of Agriculture in the "Ager Cosanus" During the Roman Republic: Problems of Evidence and Interpretation,' *Journal of Roman Studies* 71 (1981), 10–23.

⁶ W. Jongman, 'Slavery and the Growth of Rome. The Transformation of Italy in the Second and First Centuries BCE,' in C. Edwards and G. Woolf, eds., *Rome the Cosmopolis* (Cambridge 2003), 113–115.

⁷ Scheidel 2005, op. cit. (n. 1); De Ligt 2004, op. cit. (n. 1), 746–747.

⁸ Brunt 1971 op. cit. (n. 1), 124; K. Hopkins, *Conquerors and Slaves* (Cambridge 1978), 7–8, nn. 13–14.

long seen as evidence of spreading impoverishment among Roman smallholders.⁹ And I have recently tried to show how patterns of family formation worked to obviate potential conflicts between the war and small-scale agriculture for manpower during the middle Republic.¹⁰

The questions of Italy's population dynamics and their consequences for social and political developments in the late Republic remain very much open, therefore. These are broad and complex problems and a full treatment of them lies well beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, in what follows I will simply attempt to discover what the impact of Rome's acquisition of an empire during the second and first centuries—and in particular the continuous warfare required to win it—might have been on demographic developments in Italy. The answer, it is hoped, will not only contribute to clarifying this problem but also help point the way to a new understanding of the social and economic background to the political developments that roiled the last generation of the Roman Republic.

Demography is about fertility and mortality, births and deaths.¹¹ So what can be said about the impact of Rome's acquisition of an empire on these in Republican Italy? As noted earlier, we can no longer unquestioningly accept Brunt's argument that this led to dispossession and impoverishment among Italy's small farmers and so to their failure to reproduce. Although Appian and Plutarch both assert that this was the case, a generation of scholarship has undercut their credibility, and De Ligt in addition has recently pointed out that the assumption that poverty in and of itself leads couples to have fewer children is unwarranted.¹² Conscription on the contrary under certain conditions can not simply be not detrimental to the families of small farmers but positively advantageous. It is commonly assumed that many if not most of the farms from which the Republic drew its soldiers were quite small, barely sufficient to support the families that worked them. In such circumstances, removing an adult son for military service eased the pressure on the family's economic resources. As a soldier, the son

⁹ J. Rich, 'The supposed manpower shortage of the later second century BC,' *Historia* 32 (1983), 287–331.

¹⁰ Rosenstein 2004, op. cit. (n. 2), 26–106.

¹¹ On these topics for Rome generally, W. Scheidel, 'Progress and problems in Roman demography' in W. Scheidel, ed., *Debating Roman Demography* (Leiden, 2001), 32–46, is fundamental.

¹² Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus* 8.1–3; Appian, *Bella Civilia* 1.7. Rosenstein 2004, op. cit. (n. 2), 3–17 for discussion. De Ligt 2004, op. cit. (n. 1), 748–751.

would be supported by others—either the Roman or Italian taxpayers who supplied the *tributum* that in many cases funded his *stipendium*—or the provincials whose taxes also were a prime source for the food that fed Republican armies, or the Republic's enemies whose crops its armies regularly pillaged. The family's farm consequently had fewer mouths to feed.¹³ More importantly for the present question, military service could facilitate family formation. Neolocality—that is, the custom of a newly married couple setting up an independent household separate from either natal family—was typical of most Roman and Italian families.¹⁴ That practice however required the couple or their natal families to accumulate considerable resources in order to facilitate the creation of a new, independent household. The Republic's successful wars put money into the purses of its soldiers from booty and donatives and from whatever portion of their *stipendium* they might have been able to save. Although the amounts may not often have been large in absolute terms, we should nevertheless not underestimate the importance of this ready cash to those living in a mainly subsistence economy where most exchange was by barter and market transactions capable of generating cash were few.¹⁵ Far more important, however, the conquests these soldiers carried out led indirectly to an increase in the amount of land available to them and other Romans and Italians through the creation of new colonial foundations or *virgane* distributions. In this way, the Republic's warfare enabled some of the sons and daughters of families whose resources would otherwise have been insufficient, especially in land, to marry and begin families of their own, while the out-migration of colonists reduced the competition for farmland among those they left behind.¹⁶

We cannot forget, however, that the Italian victims of Rome's aggressions would not have benefited in these ways. If they were not enslaved, they often lost land and other resources, making family formation more difficult. Still, there were ameliorating factors. In the short term, much of the land confiscated by Rome from its defeated enemies was not immediately occupied by colonists, allowing it to continue to be used to

¹³ Rosenstein 2004, op. cit. (n. 2), 79–80.

¹⁴ S. Treggari, *Roman Marriage* (Oxford 1991), 410.

¹⁵ W.V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327–70 BC* (Oxford 1979), 103.

¹⁶ On out-migration of free citizens in this period see Scheidel 2005, op. cit. (n. 1).

support its previous possessors. In the longer term, those Italians whose capitulation had entailed the requirement to become allies of Rome could, as *socii*, participate in future distributions of conquered land, thus to some extent redressing the loss of their own territory. And the demand for military manpower that their new status as allies brought with it meant that some portion of their young men would be removed for extended periods and fed by Rome, bringing the ally's economic resources somewhat back into balance with its population.

What enabled this scheme to obviate the possible drawbacks of removing so many men from the land for lengthy enlistments is the fact that although citizens (and presumably allies) became liable to conscription at the age of 17, they typically did not begin to marry in large numbers before their late 20s or early 30s. However, the Romans (and, again, presumably allied cities) rarely drafted men older than the age of 30. When for example the Republic found itself confronting a dire military crisis following the defeat of two of its armies at Arausio in 105, the surviving consul, P. Rutilius Rufus, issued an edict forbidding men over the age of 35 from leaving Italy: even in this emergency, in other words, the Romans did not expect to call up men over this age.¹⁷ It was this long period in young men's lives between going to war and starting a family that prevented the potentially deleterious consequences of the former from affecting the latter and enabled warfare to help facilitate family formation.¹⁸

Although this pattern of early military service and late male marriage appears conducive to nuptuality, nuptuality is not identical with fertility. While effective chemical and other forms of contraception did not exist before the modern era, many societies evolved ways of keeping births well below their theoretical maximum. Human beings have an enormous capacity to reproduce. The highest recorded average number of births occurred among North American Hutterites, a religious group practicing early marriage and encouraging large families, among whom women averaged over 10 live births in the mid-twentieth century.¹⁹ Consequently, social controls develop to restrict births, since reproduction at rates much above replacement level have the potential

¹⁷ Granius Licinianus *Reliquiae* 33.26–27Cr.

¹⁸ Rosenstein 2004, op. cit. (n. 2), 81–88.

¹⁹ J.W. Eaton and A.J. Mayer, 'The Social Biology of Very High Fertility Among the Hutterites. The Demography of a Unique Population,' *Human Biology* 25 (1953), 225.

to raise the population in fairly short order well above the capacity of its economic resources to support it. The methods to limit births include a late age for female first marriage, lengthy breastfeeding of infants, and postpartum taboos on the resumption of intercourse, among others.²⁰ Unfortunately, we know very little about the extent to which these or similar practices were employed to keep population numbers under control in Italy during the middle and late Republic. During the first three centuries of the Empire, women seem to have begun to marry mainly between their late teens or early twenties, and it is a fair guess that in the absence of factors that would raise the age of female first marriage women in the second and first centuries BC would have done so at about the same age.²¹ Consequently, women in this period were married during most of their child-bearing years. Furthermore, the fact that Rome's conquests were continually increasing the amount of farmland available to its citizens and allies, at least down to the middle of the second century, suggests that a chronic shortage of land would not have been likely to lead to practices that would severely limit fertility. However, before we can judge the degree to which families were or were not attempting to do so, it is necessary to examine mortality and especially the impact of warfare on it. For obviously the rate at which fertility has to be limited is closely tied to the other half of the demographic equation, namely the rate at which deaths are occurring within a population.

If we can be very certain of one demographic consequence of Roman imperialism, it is that it entailed death on a very substantial scale among soldiers in Rome's armies. Brunt reckoned that about 120,000 male Roman citizens died in the Hannibalic War, of whom 50,000 represent excess deaths beyond those that would have ordinarily occurred within the seventeen year span of the war.²² That figure represents about a sixth of the Rome's pre-war citizen population. Using a different methodology, I have calculated that from 200 down to 167 BC roughly between 183,000 and 210,000 Roman and Italian soldiers

²⁰ A. Coale, 'The Decline in Fertility in Europe Since the Eighteenth Century as a Chapter in Human Demographic History,' in A.J. Coale and S. Cotts Watkins, eds., *The Decline of Fertility in Europe* (Princeton 1986), 8–10; E.A. Wrigley, 'Fertility Strategy for the Individual and the Group' in E.A. Wrigley, *People, Cities and Wealth: The Transformation of Traditional Society* (Oxford/New York 1987), 264–266.

²¹ R. Saller, *Patriarchy, Property, and Death in the Roman Family* (Cambridge 1994), 36–37.

²² Brunt 1971, op. cit. (n. 1), 422.

died fighting the Republic's wars or about 4.8 and 5.5 percent of all conscripts per year. However, the net or excess mortality would have been lower because 1.5 percent of all soldiers serving in the legions or allied forces would have died annually of natural or other causes in the ordinary course of events if they had remained civilians. Subtracting these deaths yields an excess mortality attributable to the wars of this era of about 130,000 to 157,000 deaths or 3.35–3.95 percent annually of all conscripts.²³

The calculations by which I have reached these figures are based on the numbers of casualties that Livy sometimes reports for battles in the period 200–167. On that basis I developed a low figure for the Romans' losses in a typical battle for which Livy reports no number of deaths as well as for other, minor engagements along with fairly optimistic estimates of the number of Roman and allied soldiers who were wounded in these battles and the rates at which they survived their wounds. Also critical in my calculations were estimates, again fairly optimistic, of the increased mortality among soldiers due to exposure to diseases and the hardships of military service over normal civilian rates of mortality for their age cohort. Because these assumptions tended to produce the lowest plausible estimates of military mortality, my impression is that the actual rates of death among the soldiers in Rome's armies were considerably higher.

In the years following 167 Roman armies fought many, many battles: during the 140s and 130s in Spain, Greece, Sicily, and Carthage, and thereafter in Gaul, the Balkans, Asia Minor, Sardinia, North Africa, Spain, and Sicily down to the end of the second century. The first century, too, witnessed plenty of combat in Asia Minor, Spain, and Gaul as well as two bloody rounds of civil war between 91 and 81 and again between 49 and 31. In most cases our evidence does not permit us to estimate the severity of this fighting. While it certainly ranged from minor skirmishing against unorganized opponents to long, hard combat against well-trained and highly motivated enemies, how much of each Roman armies experienced cannot be known nor how many battles fell in between these two extremes. Consequently, the methods used for battles from 201 to 167 cannot be applied to fighting in this period. However, a rough sense of the scale of death in these years can

²³ Rosenstein 2004, *op. cit.* (n. 2), 109–140.

be obtained by applying the rates of excess military mortality developed for the early decades of the second century to the average numbers of men under arms down to 49 bc. Between 167 and 91, on average about 91,000 Romans and Italians were serving with the legions every year.²⁴ If excess mortality among them ranged between 3.25 and 3.95 percent, this amounted to about 2,960–3,600 deaths beyond normal civilian mortality every year, or about 228,000 to 277,000 total additional deaths over 77 years. Between 79 and 49, Brunt calculated that on average 90,000 men were under arms every year.²⁵ At the rates used above, excess mortality again amounted to about 2,900–3,600 deaths per year and totaled 88,000–107,000 over thirty years. However, fighting in these years may not have been as intense as during the period 201–167 and conditions of service less difficult. If military mortality was only 75 percent of the earlier period, then total losses for the years 167 to 91 were only 2,200–2,700 per year, totaling 169,000–208,000 and 2,200–2,700 per year totaling 66,000–80,000 for 80–49 bc. These estimates deliberately leave aside the periods of the greatest mobilization and most intense fighting during the Social War and the civil wars 91–81 and 49–31, when we ought to expect significantly higher rates of military mortality than on average. Nor does it include the Roman disaster at Arausio in 105, when as many as 60,000 Roman and Italian soldiers may have died.²⁶

It must be stressed that the calculations offered above cannot pretend to offer anything more than an impression of military mortality in this period. The figures cited above are presented for heuristic purposes only. They simply put in more concrete terms what ought to have been intuitively obvious anyway, namely that a lot of men died in the Republic's wars in the second and first centuries. These deaths were certainly tragic for the families who lost sons in these conflicts, but their consequences were not universally so for the survivors. Deaths on so vast a scale eased pressure on the supply of farmland, not simply because Rome's wars reduced the number of soldiers who would return to civilian life and take up farming once again, but because these deaths meant that fewer men were available to marry women and father children with them. Productivity is also likely to have increased. With less pressure

²⁴ Brunt 1971, op. cit. (n. 1), 426–434.

²⁵ Brunt 1971, op. cit. (n. 1), 448–472.

²⁶ Brunt 1971, op. cit. (n. 1), 685.

on farmland, areas of marginal fertility are abandoned, and surviving farmers concentrate their efforts on the better land because they have access to more of it. Consequently, the same amount of work on better quality land tends to produce greater yields of the crops grown on it. In addition, whatever market for wage labor existed would have become more favorable to those in a position to supply it. This would have been the case not only in the cities but in the countryside as well, since estates producing cash crops with slave labor depended on hiring temporary free workers from among neighboring small farmers to supplement the permanent servile workforce during periods of peak demand for labor, such as the harvest. As was the case for the survivors of major mortality crises in later eras, such as the Black Death, the prospects for those citizens and Italians whom the Republic's wars did not carry off are likely to have been anything but bleak.²⁷

More importantly for the present purposes, prosperity generally tends to lead to population increase. In Russia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a positive correlation between family wealth and family size. A study comparing the reproductivity of farm families in New England region of the United States with that of families in the Western U.S. during nineteenth century found that the abundance of land in the western frontier areas and significant levels of in-migration allowed fathers of families there to expect much higher rates of return on their capital investments in agriculture than their eastern counterparts. They were therefore willing to have more children because they were confident that they could accumulate enough capital to establish a greater number of children on independent farms when they came of age than their counterparts in the East, where equally large profits from farming and land ownership could not be expected. Confirmation of the benign effects military mortality had on fertility in middle Republic comes from the census figures for period after Hannibalic War. Between 203 and 168, the Republic's citizen population grew by about 1.5 percent per year when deaths of soldiers are factored in, while between 203 and 124 it increased by about 1 per cent per

²⁷ Rosenstein 2004, *op. cit.* (n. 2), 142–145.

annum when military mortality is again included. These are very high rates of increase for a pre-industrial population.²⁸

This is not to argue that rates of increase this high were sustained over the whole course of the last two centuries of the Republic but only that in order to explain them we need to posit strong factors encouraging fertility among the Roman population during the period 203–124 that produced very high rates of increase despite significant military mortality. In my view, the most plausible explanation lies in the improved economic circumstances and an optimistic outlook among survivors brought about by the high level of death among those conscripted to fight Rome's wars. Moreover, these factors were structural and long-term. Consequently, we ought to expect them to have continued to operate throughout the middle and late Republic, even under circumstances that one might expect to have been strongly detrimental to fertility, for example during the Social or civil wars. Episodes such as these were of limited duration, and the mechanisms allowing for high levels of reproductivity, such as limited breastfeeding and early weaning or women's relatively early ages at first marriage, are very unlikely to have altered significantly in response to them. In other words, despite the political and military shocks of the first century, Roman and presumably Italian families probably kept on producing children at a strong, steady rate that may have varied over time, but is unlikely to have ever come fully into balance with rates of mortality from wars and other causes.

The result was a 'high pressure' demographic system in which high fertility was both a cause and an effect of Rome's acquisition of an empire.²⁹ On the one hand, a high birthrate among Romans and Italians was necessary simply to sustain the elevated levels of mortality that the Republic's continuous warfare entailed. Without high fertility, Rome's conquests eventually would have ground to a halt as the city ran out of men to fight its wars. On the other hand, this same high

²⁸ T. Shanin, *The Awkward Class; Political Sociology of Peasantry in A Developing Society: Russia 1910–1925* (Oxford 1972), 63–66; R.A. Easterlin, 'Population Change and Farm Settlement in the Northern United States,' *The Journal of Economic History* 36 (1976), 45–75; Rosenstein 2004, op. cit. (n. 2), 146–147, compare De Ligt 2004, op. cit. (n. 1), 738–744.

²⁹ See E.A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofield, *The Population History of England 1541–1871: A Reconstruction* (Cambridge 1989), xxiv.

mortality and the conquests it made possible produced conditions that generally enhanced the economic prospects of the survivors, creating the conditions that promoted high fertility within families. War, in other words, brought about fewer marriages overall but enabled those marriages that did occur to produce more children than would have been possible if military mortality had not been substantially reducing the number of thirty year-old men available to begin families, thereby easing the struggle for scarce economic resources among the survivors. Or in Malthusian terms, Roman imperialism resulted in a failure to apply extensive preventive checks upon births and so led to the positive check of war coming into play to limit population growth. How effectively it did so, however, must remain a matter of debate. Under the 'low count' interpretation of the Augustan census figures, war together with disease and out migration was how Italy's population remained essentially flat over the final two centuries of the Republic, despite episodes of high short-term growth. If we follow Lo Cascio's interpretation of the census figures of 28 BC and following, however, those positive checks must appear considerably less effective, and that ineffectiveness in turn makes it much easier to explain how Julius Caesar and Augustus could export some 225,000 citizens from Italy between 48 and 28 BC to colonies overseas.³⁰

The end of Republican government and the establishment of Imperial rule raise an equally important question, namely what effect did the military changes that Augustus brought about have on the demographic processes outlined above? In the short-term, the answer is probably very little. Augustus' military establishment numbered 28 legions or about 150,000 legionaries, which represented a larger number of men under arms than during the last years of the Republic prior to the outbreak of civil war in 49. A force this large would have required the enlistment of about 11,000 men each year just to replace those who had died or been discharged over the preceding twelve months.³¹ And as is well known, Augustus fought many wars during his reign. Even following the Verrine disaster of AD 9 and the decision to retrench behind the Rhine frontier, the Romans still made major forays into Germany. We do not for the most part have any way of determining the intensity

³⁰ Brunt 1971, op. cit. (n. 1), 234–264.

³¹ W. Scheidel, *Measuring Sex, Age, and Death in the Roman Empire. Explorations in Ancient Demography* (Ann Arbor 1996), 93.

of the fighting that was carried out during all of these campaigns, but certainly major battles must often have occurred with heavy casualties for the Roman forces. Consequently, we might expect the same factors that had affected the demographic regime during the middle and late Republic to have continued to operate with undiminished effect, reducing population pressures on the land and conducing to high fertility in families. Colonization, too, in this period contributed to these same ends. We may perhaps see confirmation of these trends in the census figures preserved for AD 47, which exhibit a rise of over .5 percent per year over the period between AD 14 and 47. Even allowing, with Brunt, that nearly 40 percent of the citizen population was domiciled abroad in the former year and assuming that fully half of the increase in citizen numbers by 48 occurred among those expatriates, the increase in Italy itself still averaged .45 percent per year, which is a vigorous although not exceptional rate for a pre-industrial population.³²

Over the long term, however, the outlook may not have been so benign. Although Rome's wars certainly did not cease after Augustus, they did become less frequent. More importantly, recruitment from Italy gradually declined over the next century or so until, by the reign of Trajan, only about 30 percent of Roman legionaries came from the peninsula, and the proportion of Italians subsequently grew even smaller.³³ What, therefore, would have been the result when military mortality came to play a smaller and smaller role in Italy's demographic regime? Were the preventive checks on population growth slowly applied, so that fertility declined more or less in step with the decreasing role of military mortality, so that eventually equilibrium was reached between population growth and Italy's agricultural resources? Or did the absence of preventive checks mean that the structural factors that had bought about high birthrates continue unabated, resulting in continuing population increase, so that Italians gradually became impoverished as their numbers grew beyond the capacity of Italy's agricultural resources to

³² Numbers of citizens: in AD 14: 4,937,000, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 8.4; in 47: 5,984,072, Tacitus, *Annales* 11.25. On the latter number see Beloch 1886, op. cit. (n. 1), 371–372. On the proportion of citizens domiciled overseas in AD 14, see Brunt 1971, op. cit. (n. 1), 265.

³³ G. Forni, *Il Reclutamento delle Legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano* (Milan 1953), 65–75, cf. 177–212; *idem*, 'Estrazione etnica e sociale dei soldati delle legioni nei primi tre secoli dell'imperio,' in H. Temporini and W. Haase, eds., *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt; Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung* (Berlin 1972–) 2.1, 381–372.

support them? Or was emigration the answer, with substantial numbers of men and women forced to leave the countryside to seek opportunities to earn a livelihood either in Italy's cities or abroad? Or perhaps all three processes occurred simultaneously? These are difficult and complex questions, but it is essential that we attempt to answer them if we are to understand, in human terms, the impact of empire on Italy under Imperial rule.

PART TWO

THE EMPEROR AND HIS FORCES. GENERAL ISSUES

FIGHTING FOR ROME: THE EMPEROR AS A MILITARY LEADER

OLIVIER J. HEKSTER*

“I and the army are in good health”. The combination of ruler and troops is telling. No phrase could illustrate more clearly the impact of empire (in the form of the emperor) on the armies, or indeed the impact of the armies on the empire. Emperors ruled through military force—even if many tried to disguise this.¹ The importance of military support for successful rule is much discussed. The famous statement of the rhetorician Favorinus—who was reproached by friends for conceding a point to Hadrian though he himself was right—that the “most learned man is the one who has thirty legions”, is only the most eloquent formulation of a state of affairs that was known to all.² The impact of soldiers on the existence of empire is obvious, whereas their impact in various regions of the empire is expertly set out in some of the other papers in these proceedings. But what was the impact of empire on the armies? Perhaps most importantly, the emperor arrived on scene. Where before various military leaders had divided the loyalty of troops, or indeed competed for it, from the reign of Augustus onwards the armies, in general, served their emperor—and him alone. The emperor was the military leader *par excellence*. Legionary commanders owed him their *imperium*; their victories were his to celebrate, as laid out in the ‘constitutional’ settlements of 28/27 BC, 23 BC and 19 BC.³

* I owe gratitude to the participants of the workshop for their comments, especially to Jon Coulston, Hannah Cotton and Jasper Oorthuys. This paper discusses, from a variant point of view, some of the same themes that have been explored in O.J. Hekster, ‘The Roman army and propaganda’ in P. Erdkamp, ed., *A Companion to the Roman Army* (Malden MA and Oxford, forthcoming).

¹ For the phrase as traditional opening line see: Dio 69.14.3; J. Reynolds, *Aphrodisias and Rome: Documents from the Excavation of the Theatre at Aphrodisias* (*Journal of Roman Studies Monographs* no. 1) (London 1982), document 6; 12; Cicero, *Ad Familiares* 5.21 (*Si tu exercitusque valetis, bene est*); 5.7.1 (*S. T. E. Q. V. B. E.*). Cf. J.B. Campbell, *The Emperor and the Roman Army. 31 BC–AD 235* (Oxford 1984), 148–156.

² SHA, *Hadrianus* 15.13; Philostratus *Vitae Sophistarum* 489.

³ The literature is, of course, immense. See, on the constitutional position in general, J.-L. Ferray, ‘À propos des pouvoirs d’Auguste’, *Cahiers du centre G. Glotz* 12 (2001),

Throughout the *Res Gestae*, Augustus emphasises how actions were taken “*meo auspicio*,” and, indeed, decisions on whether to wage war or not were variously ascribed to imperial whim. Augustus was even described as “lord of war and peace”.⁴ The fact that he left an account in his will, as Suetonius (*Augustus* 101.4) writes, of “how many soldiers there were in active service in all parts of [the whole empire, (O.J.H.)]”, implies that nobody else was in possession of those details. That notion is strengthened by a famous passage of Tacitus in which Tiberius

ordered a document to be produced and read. This contained a description of the resources of the State, of the number of citizens and allies under arms, of the fleets, subject kingdoms, provinces, taxes, direct and indirect, necessary expenses and customary bounties (*opes publicae continebantur, quantum civium sociorumque in armis, quot classes, regna, provinciae, tributa aut vectigalia, et necessitates ac largitiones*). All these details Augustus had written with his own hand... (*Ann.* 1.11).

The central position of the emperor is further emphasised by a decree that Claudius is alleged to have passed which “forbade soldiers to enter the houses of senators to pay their respects”. Soldiers could not be clients of anyone but the *princeps* himself.⁵ The person of the emperor was paramount.

This centrality was also made clear visually. The imperial image, through portraiture and statues, was highly visible in military camps. The emperor’s *imago* was present on *dona militaria* and on manipular *signa*.⁶ On the *signa*, in fact, the reigning emperor’s name was written on the *vexillum*, thus identifying the face on the *imagines*, though not only emperors were depicted there—symbols particular to the legions were

101–154. On the settlement of 28/27 BC, J.W. Rich, *Cassius Dio, The Augustan Settlement (Roman History 53–55.9)* (Warminster 1990), 140–143 and J.W. Rich and J.H.C. William, ‘*Leges et iura p.R. restituit*: a new aureus of Octavian and the settlement of 28–27 BC’, *Numismatic Chronicle* 159 (1999), 169–213. On the primacy of Augustus in victory-matters: J.W. Rich, ‘Augustus and the *spolia opima*’, *Chiron* 26 (1996), 85–127.

⁴ Strabo 17.3.25 [840]. Cf. Florus, 2.30; Dio 53.22.5 and Dio 53.17.6. For further discussion see J.B. Campbell, *Warfare and Society in Imperial Rome, 31 BC–AD 280* (London/New York 2002), 5. Cf. Campbell 1984, op. cit. (n. 1), 152.

⁵ Suetonius, *Claudius* 25.1; C. Thomas, ‘Claudius and the Roman Army reforms’, *Historia* 53.4 (2004), 424–452, at 428.

⁶ J. Stäcker, *Princeps und Miles: Studien zum Bindungs- und Nahverhältnis von Kaiser und Soldat im 1. und 2. Jahrhundert n. Chr.* (Hildesheim etc. 2003), 153–221, esp. 179–186; 198–205; D. Richter, *Das römische Heer auf der Trajanssäule. Propaganda und Realität* (Mannheim/Möhnesee 2004), 300–338.

also popular.⁷ In this respect, the creation of the rank of *imaginifer* is telling. In all branches of the army, individuals constantly carried the image of the emperor, reminding the troops of their ultimate leader. The function was one of pride, as is shown by Priscus of Paphlagonian Hadrianopolis, who Trajan rewarded for his courage by promoting him to the rank of *imaginifer*.⁸ They were placed in the first *cohors* of a legion, illustrating the importance of carrying round the imperial image.⁹

The importance of the standards is well known—as is testified by the celebration of birthdays of specific standards or the crowning of standards with roses in the summer.¹⁰ Their symbolism could also be employed, as Germanicus did in AD 16 when, fighting the Cherusci, he saw eight eagles in flight and urged his men to march on, since they should “follow the birds of Rome, the special divinities of the legions”. Instantly after their ensuing victory, they proclaimed Tiberius *imperator*.¹¹ Substantial evidence supports the habit of proclaiming an absent emperor *imperator* through his standards.¹²

Interesting, also, in this context are the recent observations on the importance of the creation and dissemination of glass *phalerae* showing imperial portraits, in the period from Augustus to Claudius. These reveal, possibly, an experiment in bonding specifically with centurions and lower ranks.¹³ The emperors’ faces on coinage were a more obvious way in which imperial images reached the ranks. In the longstanding discussion on the propagandistic value of these coins, an exciting contribution is the research of Fleur Kemmers, who has systematically analysed the coin finds of the legionary fortress and Flavian *canabae legionis* at Nijmegen, the Netherlands. She has shown, firstly, that coins were not chronologically even distributed to the frontier, but that the

⁷ C. Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 2000), 260, with references; E. Dabrowa, ‘Le uexillum sur les monnaies coloniales (II^e–III^e s. après J.-C.)’, *Latomus* 63 (2004), 394–405.

⁸ *SEG* 1993.911.

⁹ Vegetius, *De re militari* 2.6–7 (cf. 2.7.3: *imaginarii vel imaginiferi qui imperatoris imagines ferunt*); A. von Domaszewski, *Die Fahnen im römischen Heere* (Wien 1885), 1–80, at 69–70; *CIL* 3.6178; 3.6180; 13.11868; W. Boppert, *Militärische Grabdenkmäler aus Mainz und Umgebung* (Mainz 1992), 9; Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* 18.3.1.

¹⁰ Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 13.23; *ILS* 9125–9127. See further: V. Hope, ‘The repute and reality of being a Roman emperor’ in J. Huskinson, ed., *Experiencing Rome: Culture, Identity and Power in the Roman Empire* (London 2000), 70–100 at 80–81; Ando 2000, op. cit. (n. 7), 261–262. Cf. Vegetius, *De re militari*, 3.8.15.

¹¹ Tacitus, *Annales* 1.17.2 and 18.2, with Ando 2000, op. cit. (n. 7), 262.

¹² Ando 2000, op. cit. (n. 7), 263 with references.

¹³ Stäcker 2003, op. cit. (n. 6), 153–169, esp. 160–166.

bulk of coins arrived in specific ‘peak years’; secondly, that these coins have very homogenous reverse-types (accounting for over 60% of the coins in these peak years); and thirdly, that these reverse types are found almost exclusively in the military settlements along the Rhine, but not in Britain, a substantial part of Belgium, France or the Mediterranean—with the exception of Rome. Considering that the vast majority of these coins were *quadrantes*—showing the need for small change within the military—it seems clear that there was a mechanism through which the imperial portrait could be brought to the lower ranks in combination with purposely chosen reverse types.¹⁴ In other words, emperors could promote themselves to the armies in regionally diversified—though simple—contexts. One should not, of course, neglect to mention that the emperors were also—and primarily—responsible for making sure that the soldiers were actually paid for their efforts. But within guaranteeing pay, messages could be broadcast.

The presence of the imperial image, and indeed the imperial name—for many emperors named legions after their own name, thus strengthening the link between army and emperor—was a continuous reminder of the role of the emperors.¹⁵ Similarly the near ubiquitous military diplomas; approximately 800 diplomas are known at present, implying between 150,000 and 300,000 granted diplomas in Roman times.¹⁶ The link between emperor and soldier in these documents was apparent. The diploma would start with the name and full titulature of the emperor, and end with the specific name of the individual soldier. The importance of the specific names on the diploma is illustrated through the third-century tendency to write the name of the receiving party with extra large letters on the outside of the diploma, making it highly

¹⁴ F. Kemmers, ‘Not at random: Evidence for a regionalised coin supply?’, *Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Theoretical Roman Archaeology Conference (TRAC 2004)* (Oxford 2005), 39–49; eadem, *Coins for a Legion. An Analysis of the Coin Finds of the Augustan Legionary Fortress and Flavian Canabae Legionis at Nijmegen* (Mainz am Rhein 2006), 204–215 (peak years), 219–244 (ideological messages).

¹⁵ Tacitus, *Historiae* 2.86.2; *AE* 1972, 203; Ando 2000, op. cit. (n. 7), 314; J. Lendon, *Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the Roman World* (Oxford 1997), 262–263.

¹⁶ W. Eck, ‘Der Kaiser als Herr des Heeres. Militärdiplome und die kaiserliche Reichsregierung’, in J.J. Wilkes, ed., *Documenting the Roman Army. Essays in honour of Margaret Roxan* (London 2003), 55–87; at 58. Cf. p. 55: “*Diplomata militaria* waren ein Massenphänomen” (The article appeared in abbreviated form as ‘L’empereur romain chef de l’armée, le témoignage de diplômes militaires’, *Cahiers du centre G. Glotz* 13 (2002), 93–112).

visible.¹⁷ Perhaps more important even in terms of loyalty was the military oath to obey and protect the emperor.¹⁸ In case this direct link between soldiers and their emperor was forgotten, emperors were quick to remind them. Thus, Domitian is said to have executed “Sallustius Lucullus, governor of Britain, for allowing lances of a new pattern to be named ‘Lucullean’, after his own name”. Finally, of course, and perhaps most important of all, was the physical presence of emperors among the troops.¹⁹

The imperial presence, then, was made clear for all to see—but what kind of emperor was portrayed? Rather unsurprisingly, the message was of a leader who fought for Rome—implying that the soldiers did so too. The militarily related qualities *virtus* and *providentia* encompassed 25% of all the imperial virtues that were displayed on *denarii* between AD 69–238. During the third century, the role of *virtus* on coinage rose significantly above that, becoming strongly linked to the individual emperor.²⁰

The massive victory monuments—such as imperial *fora* and arches—that were highly visible in the city of Rome and throughout the Roman Empire may have had a primary urban, rather than military audience, but the image of the emperor as a military leader, fighting for Rome against the barbarians, was clear for all to see.²¹ The triumph, again mostly looked at in terms of a spectacle for an *urban* audience, also, as Campbell already noted “brought emperor and soldiers together in their most honourable function of waging war for the good of Rome”. The special breakfast for the soldiers, the speech by the emperor, and the opportunities for soldiers to show themselves to Rome in full battle

¹⁷ Eck 2003, op. cit. (n. 16), 83–84.

¹⁸ Lendon 1997, op. cit. (n. 15), 253; Campbell 1984, op. cit. (n. 1), 19–32; H. Cancik, ‘Der Kaiser-Eid. Zur Praxis der römischen Herrscherverehrung’, in H. Cancik and K. Hitzl, eds., *Die Praxis der Herrscherverehrung in Rom und seinen Provinzen* (Tübingen 2003), 29–46.

¹⁹ Suetonius, *Domitianus* 10.3; Stäcker 2003, op. cit. (n. 6), 87–151, esp. 120–144; O.J. Hekster, ‘The Roman army and propaganda’ in P. Erdkamp, ed., *A Companion to the Roman Army* (Malden MA and Oxford, forthcoming).

²⁰ C.F. Noreña, ‘The communication of the emperor’s virtues’, *Journal of Roman Studies* 91 (2001), 146–168, at 156; O.J. Hekster and E. Manders, ‘Kaiser gegen Kaiser. Legitimationskonkurrenz im 3. Jahrhundert’, in K.-P. Johné, ed., *Deleto paene imperio Romano. Transformationsprozesse des Römischen Reiches im 3. Jahrhundert n. Chr. und ihre Rezeption in der Neuzeit* (Stuttgart 2006), 135–144.

²¹ Hekster forthcoming, op. cit. (n. 19).

gear must have driven the message home.²² Equally, the soldiers had an important role to play within the funerary processions for deceased emperors. In fact, the final journey of an emperor was, in many ways, a reversed triumph, emphasising once more that emperors needed to be triumphators, surrounded by depictions of conquered provinces, and by the soldiers who had conquered them.²³

Rome's soldiers guaranteed the Roman peace. The importance of emphasising that peace increased as "the buffering force of the *Pax Romana* lost effectiveness".²⁴ It is surely not coincidental that the arch of Septimius Severus, which showed images of Parthian enemies in the Forum for the first time since the Augustan period, showed Rome's arch-enemies in a whole new light. Severus' Parthians (as opposed to Augustus') were shackled prisoners, and his arch made the destruction of their territory abundantly clear.²⁵ The more difficult 'the barbarian' became to beat in war, the more those victories, and the personal role of the emperor in them, needed to be emphasised—up to the point that emperors were depicted fighting themselves, rather than commanding from distance, as they would do in reality.²⁶ Emperor and soldiers fought together for the glory of Rome. That, at least, was the case in normal circumstances. But core qualities of political and ideological frameworks become more prominent in cases of exception. Periods of civil war, or reigns of emperors whose military reputation was dubious, would form such exceptions. When fighting for Rome and fighting for the emperor were no longer obviously overlapping, whom did soldiers fight for?

²² Campbell 2002, op. cit. (n. 4), 144.

²³ P. Zanker, *Die Apotheose der römischen Kaiser. Ritual und städtische Bühne* (Munich 2004), 25–28.

²⁴ R. Brilliant, 'The *pax Romana*: Bridge or barrier between Romans and barbarians', in T. Hölscher, ed. *Gegenwelten zu den Kulturen Griechenlands und Roms in der Antike* (Munich/Leipzig 2000), 391–408, at 404.

²⁵ C.B. Rose, 'The Parthian in Augustan Rome', *American Journal of Archaeology* 109 (2005), 21–75, at 66–67.

²⁶ T. Hölscher, 'Images of war in Greece and Rome: Between military practice, public memory, and cultural symbolism', *Journal of Roman Studies* 94 (2004), 1–17, at 6–7; Brilliant 2000, op. cit. (n. 24). Cf. J.C.N. Coulston, 'Overcoming the barbarian. Depictions of Rome's enemies in Trajanic monumental art', in L. de Blois *et al.*, eds., *The Representation and Perception of Roman Imperial Power. Proceedings of the Third Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, 200 BC–AD 476), Rome, March 20–23* (Amsterdam 2003), 389–424.

Civil wars

During rebellions and usurpations, the would-be-emperors would do well not to be seen to fight *against* Rome. Thus, famously, Vespasian was absent when his troops marched on Rome—something he had wanted to avoid in any case.²⁷ Vespasian's case may be illustrative. Thus, Tacitus emphasises how it was the soldiers' choice to acclaim Vespasian emperor, as does Josephus:

As Vespasian stepped from his quarters, a few soldiers who stood near, in the usual form in which they would salute their legate, suddenly saluted him as emperor. Then all the rest hurried up, called him Caesar and Augustus, and heaped on him all the titles of imperial rank. Their minds had passed from apprehension to confidence of success. In Vespasian himself there was no sign of pride or arrogance, no novelty of conduct with his changed fortunes.²⁸

Vespasian was presented as a capable general (as opposed to the other contenders in the year of the four emperors), who was not aiming for power, but was chosen by fate and Rome's soldiers.²⁹ He was also presented as innocent of the atrocities that took place during the Civil Wars. Whilst the actual fighting took place in Italy, Vespasian was in Alexandria. The responsibility for any action would rest with subordinates. Much ancient literature stresses the later emperor's absence from, and unawareness of, the very bloody sack of Cremona. Others were to blame.

The conduct of Primus Antonius, after the fall of Cremona, was by no means as blameless as before. Either he believed that the necessities of war had been satisfied, and that all else would follow easily, or, perhaps, success, working on such a temperament, developed his latent pride, rapacity, and other vices. He swept through Italy as if it were a conquered country, and caressed the legions as if they were his own (*ut captam Italiam persultare, ut suas legiones colere*).³⁰

Vespasian was free of guilt. He had only done his duty. It is no coincidence that the Flavian dynasty was founded on the reputation of the Judean war—caused by others but solved by Vespasian and Titus. In fact, the celebrated Judean victory of AD 71, memorials to which were

²⁷ B. Levick, *Vespasian* (London/New York 1999), 51–53, with references.

²⁸ Tacitus, *Historiae* 2.80. Cf. *Historiae* 2.5.1; Josephus, *Bellum Judaicum* 4.592–595.

²⁹ Levick 1999, op. cit. (n. 27), 67–68, with 227 n. 7.

³⁰ Tacitus, *Historiae* 3.49. Cf. *Historiae* 3.32–33 for the sack of Cremona.

visible throughout Rome, was delayed so that Titus could return to Rome to participate. That victory, finally, was explicitly to the Roman commonwealth, as is obvious from post-war coins showing Victoria inscribing *SPQR* on the shield of victory.³¹

Not all civil war emperors were in such a position of luxury. Didius Julianus was never going to be a strong ruler, once he had gained himself the reputation of buying the empire.³² Septimius Severus did what he could to further blacken Didius Julianus' name, creating the strongest possible claim to liberate Rome from an unworthy usurper. In fact, he positioned himself as the avenger of Pertinax, as part of his justification to aim for the throne. Like Vespasian before him, he spread the story that he had tried to resist his acclamation, but unlike Vespasian, he had no great victory for Rome to refer to.³³ Eventually, of course, he could boast victories and titles won in east and north, possibly because he was "in any case a lover of glory by nature", or possibly to compensate for a somewhat inauspicious start of his rule.³⁴

For in the end Severus had had to march on Rome. Following an impressive march, a siege of Rome did not prove necessary. But the attempt will still have generated negative publicity. Perhaps one can trace attempts to diffuse this in Dio's overblown description of Didius Julianus' incapable preparations for the defence of the city. By emphasising the ridiculousness of the man who held the city, attempts to dislodge that man become more acceptable.

Yet at times we would be overcome by laughter; for the Praetorians did nothing worthy of their name and of their promise, for they had learned to live delicately; the sailors summoned from the fleet stationed at Misenum did not even know how to drill; and the elephants found their towers burdensome and would not even carry their drivers any longer, but threw

³¹ *BMC* 3, 65 no. 244; Campbell 2002, op. cit. (n. 4), 142. On the importance of the Judean war in Flavian representation: N. Hannestad, *Roman Art and Imperial Policy* (Aarhus 1988), 121–132; C.F. Norrøna, 'Medium and message in Vespasian's *Templum Pacis*', *Memoirs of the American Academie in Rome* 48 (2003), 25–43. Cf. the impact on the city of Rome: F. Millar, 'Last year in Jerusalem: Monuments of the Jewish war in Rome', in J. Edmondson, S. Mason and J. Rives, eds., *Flavius Josephus and Flavian Rome* (Oxford 2005), 101–128.

³² *PIR*² D 77; Herodian 2.6.8–11; Dio 73.11.3–6. Cf. SHA, *Didius Iulianus* 2.7.

³³ SHA, *Severus* 5.1: *multis hortantibus repugnans imperator est appellatus*; SHA, *Severus* 5.4–5: *ultor Pertinacis*, with Herodian 2.10.1–9. Note Herodian 2.9.8–13, setting out how Severus disingenuously uses Pertinax' memory as an excuse for gaining power himself.

³⁴ Herodian 3.14.2; A.R. Birley, *Septimius Severus. The African Emperor* (London and New York 1988), 170.

them off, too. But what caused us the greatest amusement was his fortifying of the palace with latticed gates and strong doors. For, inasmuch as it seemed probable that the soldiers would never have slain Pertinax so easily if the doors had been securely locked, Julianus believed that in case of defeat he would be able to shut himself up there and survive.³⁵

Didius Julianus fell without a great battle. Dio's description of the spectacle and celebrations that followed, reads like a post hoc defence of the new emperor's actions. In the end, however, the actions of the emperor in the remainder of his reign could be used to justify his accession.³⁶

Both Vespasian and Severus presented themselves as reluctant contenders—asked to compete for power by the soldiers themselves. This remained a good role to play. Thus, Julian, who had probably planned rebellion in AD 360, changed the account in the official version of his coming to power. Henceforth the story was that Constantius (partly because he was “nettled by reports of Julian's exploits”) had decided to send “Julian's Herulian and Batavian auxiliaries together with the Celts and Petulantes and 300 picked men from each of the other divisions of his army” from west to east—which Julian was willing but the soldiers unwilling to accept. Julian met the soldiers outside Paris

greeted those whom he knew personally with words of congratulations, reminded them individually of their brave deeds, and encourage them in mild tones to lose no time in joining the emperor... To confer further honour on them at their departure on so long a journey, he invited their leading men to dinner and bade them make any request they had in mind.³⁷

³⁵ Dio 73.16.3, Cf. Herodian 2.11.9.

³⁶ Severus' attempts to boost his military reputation are set out by I. Mennen, ‘The image of an emperor in trouble. Legitimation and representation of power by Caracalla’, in L. de Blois, P. Funke and J. Hahn, eds., *The Impact of Imperial Rome on Religions, Ritual and Religious Life in the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the Third Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, 200 BC–AD 476), Münster, June 30–July 4, 2004* (Leiden/Boston 2006), 253–267. Note also the discrepancy between Dio's and Herodian's account of the decisive battle between Severus and Clodius Albinus. Whereas in Herodian's account (3.7.3) Severus falls off his horse and only escapes detection (and death) by “tearing off his imperial cloak”, Dio (76.6.7) argues that Severus tore off his cloak to join the infantry voluntarily, so as to rally them. The need to boost a limited (and perhaps damaged) military reputation is obvious.

³⁷ Ammianus Marcellinus 20.4.1–14. citations from 20.4.1–2; 20.4.12–13. Cf. J. den Boeft, D. den Hengst and H.C. Teitler, *Philological and Historical Commentary on Ammianus Marcellinus XX–XXI* (Groningen 1987, 1991).

Not very surprisingly the soldiers hesitated only briefly and then decided, that very night, to acclaim Julian emperor.³⁸ Julian, like Vespasian and Severus before him, did not want to be presented as fighting against Rome; Rome's soldiers choose him to defend the realm against incapable or unworthy contenders.³⁹

These are only a few examples, and structured analysis of the messages broadcast by usurpers and would-be-usurpers might show a different picture from the one sketched above. Still, marching on Rome would always remain ideologically problematic—and the equation of emperor and Rome only grew in strength, even when the position of the city of Rome itself grew weaker. Thus, during the Tetrarchy, Rome was where the emperors were. She may still have been “the mistress of nations”, but senators had to leave Rome to visit the emperor.⁴⁰ All the same, the west face of the south pier of the arch of Galerius at Salonica shows a superior Roma, seated and holding globe and circle of the zodiac. In this light, the east face of that same pier is equally interesting. Here one panel shows Galerius receiving a Persian delegation. “The kneeling barbarians are flanked by the emperor and a personification of Roma. Four figures are behind Roma, identified as major cities of the empire”. The city of Rome was not one of them. The goddess Roma had become, in the words of Roger Rees, an “expression of the superior force of the whole Roman Empire in general”.⁴¹ Since at the same time emperors were increasingly seen as ‘the body politic’,⁴² it must have become ever more clear that fighting for the emperor was fighting for Rome. Emperors who wanted to stay in power had to argue that their position and that of Rome coincided.

³⁸ Lendon 1997, op. cit. (n. 15), 261–262, with further references in n. 158.

³⁹ This is, of course, to an extent only a military variant of the *recusatio imperii*—an important ritual within structuring Roman imperial power, on which see A. Wallace-Hadrill, ‘Civilis princeps: between citizen and king’, *Journal of Roman Studies* 72 (1982), 32–48 and now U. Huttner, *Recusatio Imperii. Ein politisches Ritual zwischen Ethik und Taktik* (Hildesheim, Zürich and New York 2004).

⁴⁰ *Panegyrici Latini* 11(3).12.1.

⁴¹ R. Rees, ‘Images and image: A re-examination of tetrarchic iconography’, *Greece and Rome* 40.2 (1993), 181–220; 196; O.J. Hekster, ‘The city of Rome and late imperial ideology: the tetrarchs, Maxentius and Constantine’, *Mediterraneo Antico* 2 (1999), 717–748, at 721–724.

⁴² Ando 2000, op. cit. (n. 7), 336–405, esp. 404–405, citing Symmachus, *Oratio* 4.5–7 and *Panegyrici Latini* 11(3), 16; 19. On the growing relationship between Rome and emperor, see now S. Benoist, *Rome, le prince et la Cité: pouvoir impérial et cérémonies publiques (I^{er} siècle av.—début du IV^e siècle apr. J.-C.)* (Paris 2005).

Non-military emperors

Civil war was one problem. Emperors who were not especially militarily involved another. Fighting for Rome, after all, implied fighting. Hence, all emperors had to show themselves belligerent. Occasionally this was easy. Claudius boosted his reputation by conquering Britain, bringing senators along so that they would not be able to damage his position at Rome, but leaving them at the French coast so that they would not share in his victory.⁴³ He did not have to worry too much about logistics, since all had been put in motion by Gaius Caligula, who, however, at the last moment famously changed his mind, bidding his soldiers to collect shells, which he is said to have called “spoils from the Ocean, due to the Capitol and Palatine”.⁴⁴ Whatever the truth behind the matter, it allowed his successor an easy expedition at the beginning of his reign. This relatively straightforward victory allowed the inexperienced emperor to celebrate himself as the military genius which he was not. In fact, as the *Feriale Duranum* shows, Claudius’ reputation became such that he was included among the most important military figures of the empire. Thus, an ox was sacrificed on the first of August, the *natalis divi Claudii*, up to centuries after the emperor’s death.⁴⁵ Claudius was not, one should add, militarily challenged, and seems to have been responsible for far-reaching reforms of the equestrian command structure, the fleets, the legionary and auxiliary conditions of service, strategy, technical innovations and more.⁴⁶ But his fame was based on conquering Britain, for which he had done remarkably little.

Claudius, then, fitted the mould. He fought for Rome to strengthen his emperorship. But a similar pattern could not be applied to Hadrian, who retreated rather than conquered, and only hesitantly accepted *imperator* into his titulature.⁴⁷ Surely the emperor who “turned from the

⁴³ Suetonius, *Claudius* 17; Dio 60.21. Note especially Suetonius, *Galba* 7.1, pointing out how Claudius delayed departing for Britain till Galba had recovered from (real or feigned) illness.

⁴⁴ Suetonius, *Caligula* 46. Note also J.G.F. Hind: ‘Caligula and the spoils of ocean: a rush for riches in the far North-west?’, *Britannia* 34 (2003), 272–274, who argues that the picking of shells was an attempt to compensate the soldiers for the non-event that invading Britain had proved to be, by allowing them to pick up oyster- and mussel-shells, which produce pearls.

⁴⁵ R.O. Fink, *Roman Military Records on Papyrus* (Ann Arbor 1971), 422–429.

⁴⁶ Thomas 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 452.

⁴⁷ W. Eck, ‘The Bar Kokhba Revolt: The Roman point of view’, *Journal of Roman Studies* 89 (1999), 76–89, at 85–87.

imperial idea of Augustus and all his predecessors, for whom further conquest was always a desirable possibility or a duty postponed, to a policy of permanent fixed frontiers”,⁴⁸ could hardly argue to be fighting for Rome. Yet Hadrian compensated for his abrupt break from Trajanic warfare in two ways.

Firstly, he celebrated the imperial units of the army in his *exercitus* coin series, and visited the troops during his near-continuous travels. The famous Batavian who, “with Hadrian as a judge was able to swim in full battle gear across the vast waters of the deep Danube”, is as exemplary as the imperial address to the Third Augusta in AD 128, in which he not only praises the troops, but also reminds them that: “if anything had been missing, I would have noticed it, (and) | if anything would have stood out (as bad), I would have pointed it out”.⁴⁹ Hence, to the troops Hadrian emphasised that though at the moment they were not fighting, he still valued them greatly, and was, in fact, himself a soldier—even though at the moment his policies were not warlike. Secondly, Hadrian celebrated a famous passion for hunting, which seems even to have led to the city of Hadrianoutherae (Hadrian’s Hunts) in Mysia, near Bithynia, being founded in around 123 AD after a successful bear hunt. The occasion may have been celebrated on local coins showing Hadrian’s and the bear’s heads.⁵⁰ Hadrian’s hunting is documented in our literary sources, confirmed by epigraphic evidence, and probably most famous through the tondos which were later incorporated in the Arch of Constantine, showing scenes of bear, boar, and lion hunt.⁵¹ This, one could argue, is a shift from a literal representation of the emperor fighting for Rome to a symbolic one. Lack of military action was compensated by a personal capacity

⁴⁸ R.R.R. Smith, ‘The *Ethne* from the Sebasteion of Aphrodisias’, *Journal of Roman Studies* 78 (1988), 50–77, at 75.

⁴⁹ *ILS* 2558, ll. 3–4: *Hadriano potui qui iudice vasta profundi aequora Danuvii cunctis transnare subarmis*; Cf. Dio 69.9. On Hadrian’s travels, and how the emperor thus created an almost ‘universal presence’, see A.R. Birley, ‘Hadrian’s Travels’, in L. de Blois *et al.*, *The Representation and Perception of Roman Imperial Power. Proceedings of the Third Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, 200 BC–AD 476), Rome, March 20–23 (Amsterdam 2003)*, 425–438, esp. 435–438. Addresses: *CIL* 3.3676 (= *ILS* 2558); *CIL* 8.2532 and 18042 (= *ILS* 2487 and 9133–5). *Exercitus* series: *RIC* II, p. 267 nos. 322–323).

⁵⁰ H. von Fritze, *Die antiken Münzen Mysiens* (Berlin 1913), 199 nos. 565–566; 200 nos. 567, 567*, 569: Obverse ΑΔΙΑΝΟC ΑΥΤΟΒΚΤΟC, bare head of Hadrian looking right; reverse ΑΔΙΑΝΟΘΗΡΑΙΑΝ, bear head looking left. Cf. SHA, *Hadrianus* 20.13.

⁵¹ D. Kleiner, *Roman Sculpture* (New Haven and London 1992), 251–253.

for and interests in fighting—illustrated though the extermination of dangerous creatures.

A similar argument, of course, could be made for one of Hadrian's more notorious successors, the emperor Commodus. His behaviour, of on the one hand discontinuing extensive warfare, and on the other choosing a mode of self representation that emphasised a symbolic battling of barbarism in the arena, may be telling. Commodus' gladiatorial performances were occasions at which the emperor displayed himself symbolically fighting for Rome—which would make sense of the cryptic comment in the *Historia Augusta* that the emperor: "accepted the names usually given to gladiators with as much pleasure as if he had been granted triumphal decorations".⁵² Might this also have been what Nero tried to accomplish in his often ridiculed mock triumph?

Returning from Greece, since it was at Neapolis that he had made his first appearance, he entered that city with white horses through a part of the wall which had been thrown down, as is customary with victors in the sacred games. In like manner he entered Antium, then Albanum, and finally Rome; but at Rome he rode in the chariot which Augustus had used in his triumphs in days gone by, and wore a purple robe and a Greek cloak adorned with stars of gold, bearing on his head the Olympic crown and in his right hand the Pythian, while the rest were carried before him with inscriptions telling where he had won them and against what competitors, and giving the titles of the songs or the subject of the plays. His car was followed by his clique as by the escort of a triumphal procession, who shouted that they were the attendants of Augustus and the soldiers of his triumph. Then through the arch of the Circus Maximus, which was thrown down, he made his way across the Velabrum and the Forum to the Palatine and the temple of Apollo.⁵³

Ridicule, perhaps, was not wholly uncalled for. But the parallels to the triumphal procession may not just have been Suetonius' invention. Nero, perhaps, was trying to bring fighting for Rome into his own sphere of interest—if not necessarily competence. The experiment, in any case, did not finish well.

⁵² SHA, *Commodus* 11.10–11: *nomina gladiatorum recepit eo gaudio quasi acciperet triumphalia*. On Commodus the gladiator see O.J. Hekster, *Commodus. An Emperor at the Crossroads* (Amsterdam 2002), 146–162.

⁵³ Suetonius, *Nero* 25; C. Edwards, 'Beware of imitations: Theatre and the subversion of imperial identity', in J. Elsner and J. Masters, eds., *Reflections of Nero: Culture, History, and Representation* (London 1994), 83–97, esp. 90; E. Champlin, *Nero* (Cambridge MA/London 2003), 210–234, esp. 229–234.

The emphasis on mock triumphs in our literary sources is striking. Nero and Commodus have already been mentioned. Gaius' aborted invasion in Britain also ended in a triumph. Suetonius writes with relish that Gaius,

then turning his attention to his triumph, in addition to a few captives and deserters from the barbarians, chose all the tallest of the Gauls, and as he expressed it, those who were "worthy of a triumph," as well as some of the chiefs. These he reserved for his parade, compelling them not only to dye their hair red and to let it grow long, but also to learn the language of the Germans and assume barbarian names. He also had the triremes in which he had entered the Ocean carried overland to Rome for the greater part of the way.⁵⁴

Gaius' actions perhaps fitted the above sketched pattern—though in a somewhat idiosyncratic fashion. He too tried to demonstrate how he deserved the troops' loyalties, but his mixture of a symbolic conquest of the ocean coupled with a fake triumph only showed his limits as an emperor too well.

The mock triumph recurs again when Domitian's life is discussed. It again shows the need to justify the emperor's position at the head of his troops. The ridiculing of this justification equally shows the weight that was attached to this core imperial quality. As so often, Tacitus seems to be able to perfectly understand and express the importance of the emperor as a military leader, when he writes about Agricola's victories:

Of this series of events, though not exaggerated in the despatches of Agricola by any boastfulness of language, Domitian heard, as was his wont, with joy in his face but anxiety in his heart. He felt conscious that all men laughed at his late mock triumph over Germany, for which there had been purchased from traders people whose dress and hair might be made to resemble those of captives, whereas now a real and splendid victory, with the destruction of thousands of the enemy, was being celebrated with just applause. It was, he thought, a very alarming thing for him that the name of a subject should be raised above that of the Emperor; it was to no purpose that he had driven into obscurity the pursuit of forensic eloquence and the graceful accomplishments of civic life, if another were to forestall the distinctions of war. To other glories he could more easily shut his eyes, but the greatness of a good general

⁵⁴ Suetonius, *Caligula* 47: *ut ipse dicebat, ὁξιοθριώμρευτον*.

was a truly imperial quality (*cetera utcumque facilius dissimulari, ducis boni imperatoriam virtutem esse*).⁵⁵

One of the great impacts of the empire on the armies will have been the central role that emperors came to play. But to play that role well, emperors had to continuously show that they warranted their troops' loyalty. Many emperors chose to do so by emphasising that their interests and Rome's coincided. Fighting for a good emperor, thus, was fighting for Rome.

⁵⁵ Tacitus, *Agricola* 39.1–2.

DAS BERUFSHEER DER FRÜHEN UND HOHEN KAISERZEIT UND DIE VERARMUNG DER KAISERLICHEN ZENTRALE

ARMIN EICH

Die folgenreichste Entscheidung,* die Augustus in seiner Herrschaftszeit traf, war die Einrichtung einer Berufsarmee von ca. 300 000 Mann Sollstärke mit fixen Besoldungs- und Versorgungsansprüchen für die Mannschaftsdienstgrade und hohen, hierarchisch gestuften Salären für Unteroffiziere und Offiziere.¹ Die Gesamtkosten, nur für Soldzahlungen und postdienstliche Versorgung, sind jüngst auf ca. 370 Millionen Sesterzen *per annum* geschätzt worden (andere Schätzungen bewegen sich in ähnlichen Größenordnungen).² Für dieses Wagnis mochte sprechen, daß Augustus gigantische Mittel unter seine Kontrolle gebracht hatte: Er beherrschte die Geldemissionen und die Edelmetallvorräte des Imperiums nach Belieben, sein Patrimonium erstreckte sich über die gesamte Ökumene, und einige der reichsten Staaten der bekannten Welt waren im Laufe der Expansion der *res publica Romana* als steuerpflichtiges Untertanengebiet in das Imperium integriert worden. Auf der anderen Seite existierte offenkundig ein erheblicher sozialer Druck, die in den Bürgerkriegen entfesselten Militärklientelen politisch wieder einzubinden: Die Stiftung geregelter Versorgungsansprüche diente zweifellos auch der sozialen Pazifizierung und verarbeitete insofern die Erfahrung der vergangenen, von innerer Gewalt geprägten Jahrzehnte.

In den folgenden Ausführungen soll dennoch, d. h. obwohl die genannten Faktoren dem Sieger der ‚Römischen Revolution‘ anscheinend Recht gaben, die These vertreten werden, daß die augusteische Entscheidung die ökonomischen Möglichkeiten des Imperiums überforderte oder, anders gewendet, daß sie die entscheidende Weichenstellung

* Meinem Bruder Peter Eich danke ich für viele Hinweise und Anregungen.

¹ Die einschlägigen Daten und Quellen bei: K. Raaflaub, ‚Die Militärreformen des Augustus und die politische Problematik des frühen Prinzipats‘, in G. Binder, Hrsg., *Saeculum Augustum* I (Darmstadt 1987), 246ff. Die Zahl 300 000 wurde wohl erst nach Augustus erreicht. Genaue Daten für die Auxiliare fehlen.

² B. Campbell, *War and Society in Imperial Rome* (London u.a. 2002), 175.

darstellte, die à la longue durée den Untergang des Imperiums katalysierte. Damit wenden sich die folgenden Zeilen explizit gegen die in der jüngeren Zeit populären Interpretationen, denen zufolge die Krisenphänomene des dritten Jahrhunderts und der Spätantike nur als (zeitlich oder regional) punktuell begrenzte Probleme zu deuten seien.³ An dieser Stelle kann die Argumentation nur unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Verhältnisses von Ausgabendruck und militärischen Konstellationen verfolgt werden. Dieser ist jedoch der entscheidende: Augustus hatte das von ihm geschaffene System unter das unerbittliche Diktat permanent anfallender (und steigender) Ausgaben gestellt. Die Mehrzahl der Untertanen arbeitete und handelte unter dem ständigen Druck, dem Staat die benötigten Ressourcen zur Verfügung zu stellen, die kaiserliche Zentrale war in ihren Handlungsmöglichkeiten immer stärker durch den kategorischen Imperativ eingeschränkt, die überlebensnotwendigen Mittel zu extrahieren. Im Westen kollabierte das System nach langer Agonie zu Beginn des fünften Jahrhunderts;⁴ im Osten bildete sich ein Rumpferum in einen Feudalstaat um. Die Frage, wie sich die stufenweise Verschärfung des Niedergangs auf verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Feldern fühlbar machte, kann im vorgegebenen Rahmen nicht behandelt werden. Soviel nur sei angemerkt: Schon angesichts der Möglichkeiten und der Reichtümer, über die das Imperium verfügte, ist nicht damit zu rechnen, daß sich Krisenphänomene ubiquitär und in gleichmäßiger Manier in allen Sektoren nachweisen lassen. Aus diesem Grunde sollten einzelne archäologische Befunde, die beispielsweise im dritten Jahrhundert in der einen oder anderen Region lokale Prosperität erschließen lassen, nicht überbewertet werden. Um Illusionen bezüglich der allgemeinen Entwicklungstendenz zu vermeiden, sind bei Betrachtung des Imperium Romanum (wie bei anderen Gesellschaften) die Gesamtindikatoren zu betrachten. So hat etwa die quantitative Auswertung der mediterranen Wrackfunde ergeben, daß die Schifffahrtintensität von ihrem Höhepunkt in augusteischer Zeit in mehreren Stufen (in Gestalt eines Treppenkurvenverlaufs) auf ein Niveau abfiel, das im vierten Jahrhundert n. Chr. dem sechsten vorchristlichen

³ Vgl. bspw. B. Meißner, 'Über Zweck und Anlaß von Diokletians Preisedikt', *Historia* 49 (2000), 79ff.; Chr. Witschel, *Krise—Rezession—Stagnation. Der Westen des römischen Reiches im 3. Jahrhundert n. Chr.* (Frankfurt a.M. 1999); D. Rathbone, 'Monetisation, not Price-Inflation, in Third-century AD Egypt?', C.E. King, u.a. (Hrsgg.), *Coin Finds and Coin Use in the Roman World*, Kolloquium 1993 (Berlin 1996), 321ff.; K. Strobel, *Das Imperium Romanum im 3. Jahrhundert—Modell einer historischen Krise?* (Stuttgart 1993).

⁴ Ph. Richardot, *La fin de l'armée romaine* (Paris 2001), 67ff.; 90.

Jahrhundert entsprach.⁵ Einen analogen ‚Gesamtindikator‘ benennt Hans-Joachim Drexhage: „Der Rückgang der gesamten papyrologischen Überlieferung macht uns dramatisch deutlich, daß sich im 3. Jh. n. Chr. im römischen Ägypten insofern ein tiefer Wandel vollzogen hat, als ein Rückgang jeglicher ‚wirtschaftlicher Aktivitäten‘ konstatierbar ist.“⁶ Der bedeutendste dieser Gesamtindikatoren ist die wachsende ‚Armut der kaiserlichen Zentrale‘, die sich angesichts der annähernden Monopolisierung der Edelmetallvorkommen durch den Staat fast paradox ausnimmt. Die Ursachen dieser Verarmung der Kaiser sind im wesentlichen wohl schon richtig gesehen worden. Doch eine etwas weitergehende Systematisierung der vorhandenen Beobachtungen ist möglich und (da die ‚optimistische Interpretation‘ der Reichsgeschichte sie zu marginalisieren droht) sinnvoll. Diese Aufgabe möchte ich nun in Angriff nehmen.

Symptome der Verarmung der kaiserlichen Zentrale

Es ist in jüngerer Zeit, vor allem von Claude Domergue,⁷ darauf hingewiesen worden, daß die Förderung von Edelmetall im Imperium im Laufe des dritten Jahrhunderts an seine natürlichen Grenzen zu stoßen schien. Georges Depeyrot und Dominique Hollard⁸ haben ihre kliometrischen Untersuchungen daher auch unter das Motto der ‚pénurie d’argent-métal‘ gestellt. Doch die ‚natürlichen‘ Grenzen der Erzförderung waren relativ, sie bemaßen sich an den Bedürfnissen, die der römische Staat an den Bodenreichtum stellte. Im Mittelalter ist beständig Gold und Silber in großen Quantitäten aus europäischen Minen gefördert worden, die ‚dakischen‘ Gruben gehören noch heute zu den reichsten der Welt. Das Problem der römischen Kaiser war, daß ihre Ansprüche die Fördergeschwindigkeit der Minen und den

⁵ D. Gibbins, ‘Shipwrecks and Hellenistic Trade’, in Z.H. Archibald u.a., Hrsgg., *Hellenistic Economies* (London u.a. 2001), 273ff., 279.

⁶ *Preise, Mieten/Pachten, Kosten und Löhne im römischen Ägypten bis zum Regierungsantritt Diokletians* (St. Katharinen 1991), 452f.

⁷ *Les mines de la péninsule ibérique dans l’antiquité romaine* (Rom 1990), 215ff.; J.C. Edmonson, ‘Mining in the Later Roman Empire and beyond: Continuity or Disruption?’, *Journal of Roman Studies* 79 (1989), 84ff.; Chr. Howgego, ‘The Supply and Use of Money in the Roman World’, *Journal of Roman Studies* 82 (1992), 1ff., 8.

⁸ ‘Pénurie d’argent-métal et crise monétaire au III^e siècle après J.-C.’, *Histoire et Mesure* 2 (1987), 57ff.

Rhythmus der Neuerschließungen bei weitem überstiegen. Der Nachschub, der den fiskalischen Ansprüchen in augusteischer Zeit genügt hatte, tat dies im dritten Jahrhundert nicht mehr. Von Phasenverschiebungen und Unterbrechungen im einzelnen abgesehen, gilt die Regel, daß seit Marcus die absolute Menge emittierten Silbers absank.⁹ Der steigende Ausgabendruck zwang die Zentrale dazu, die sinkende Gesamtsilbermenge in Pseudosilbermünzen zu legieren, deren absolute Anzahl im 3. Jh. bis zur Regierungszeit Aurelians beharrlich anstieg: Bei einer Indizierung von 100 in der Regierungszeit von Philippus Arabs¹⁰ erreicht die Indexzahl emittierter Münzen unter Aurelian einen Wert von 1000.¹¹

Der Umstand, daß das Römische Reich abgesehen von den Hochkulturen jenseits des Euphrat bzw. Tigris alle Staaten, die Konkurrenzwährungen in Edelmetall hätten ausprägen können, gewaltsam integriert und damit neutralisiert hatte, gewährte der kaiserlichen Zentrale die Möglichkeit, (jedenfalls der Intention nach) den Wert der von ihr emittierten Münzen von dem Marktwert des in den Münzen enthaltenen Metalls abzukoppeln: Den Wert der Münze sollten staatliche Hoheitszeichen signalisieren, die das Geld formaljuristisch unabhängig von seinem Metallwert werden lassen sollten.¹² Natürlich wirkte in der Realität des Marktgeschehens die Auffassung weiter, Gold und Silber seien Träger eines *valor intrinsecus* (ansonsten wäre die kaiserliche Zentrale aller Sorgen enthoben gewesen und hätte Papiergeld ausgeben können). Die Gesamtkonstellation implizierte, daß die Untertanen unter Androhung empfindlicher Strafen gezwungen wurden, daß kaiserliche Geld zu akzeptieren und für Markttransaktionen zu verwenden. Dies ist eine der Ursachen dafür, daß die prozessierende Verschlechterung

⁹ Vgl. den Graph bei Depeyrot und Hollard 1987, a.a.O. (Anm. 8), 69: Die indizierte Menge des emittierten Silbers sank von einer Indexziffer von ca. 80 um 244 n. Chr. auf eine Indexziffer 10 um 275 n. Chr.

¹⁰ Vgl. die Graphik von Depeyrot und Hollard 1987, a.a.O. (Anm. 8), 63.

¹¹ Depeyrot und Hollard 1987, a.a.O. (Anm. 8), 62f. Daß die Autoren einen ‚brutalen‘ Rückgang des Münzaustoßes unter Aurelian konstatieren, ist wohl eine Fehleinschätzung, die darauf zurückzuführen ist, daß ihre Auswertung sich wesentlich auf Horte aus dem nördlichen (ehemaligen) *Imperium Galliarum* stützt (ibid. 59), wo sich der *aurelianus* zunächst nicht durchsetzte (vgl. Anm. 13). Vgl. jedoch zur Reduzierung der Offizinen unter Carus J.-P. Callu, *La politique monétaire des empereurs romains de 238 à 311* (Paris 1969), 337.

¹² Die grundlegende Studie ist K. Hasler, *Studien zu Wesen und Wert des Geldes in der römischen Kaiserzeit von Augustus bis Severus Alexander* (Bochum 1980), besonders 62ff. („*pecunia* als *materia forma publica percussa*“).

des Geldes keinen unmittelbaren Zusammenbruch der Zirkulation nach sich zog. Im Gegenteil: Noch die aurelianische Reform des *antoninianus* vom Frühjahr 274 war unter fiskalischen Gesichtspunkten ein relativer Erfolg, denn die *aureliani* setzten sich zumindest im Osten als Verkehrsmünzen vollkommen durch.¹³ Diese Erfolge der Herrscher, ihre Münzen in Zirkulation zu setzen, sind vor allem damit erklärt worden, daß die Untertanen die jeweils nur geringen (im einstelligen Prozentbereich liegenden) Feingehaltsreduktionen mit den zur Verfügung stehenden technischen Mitteln nicht hätten registrieren können.¹⁴ Auf der anderen Seite seien auch die Schwankungen des Feingehalts und des Gewichts innerhalb derselben Prägeperiode oder sogar Emission so bedeutend gewesen, daß die konkrete Metallverschlechterung oder -verbesserung von einer Emission zur folgenden für die Wirtschaftsteilnehmer nicht fühlbar gewesen wäre.¹⁵ Soweit die kleinschrittigen Bewegungen von einer Emission zur folgenden betroffen sind, sind diese Beobachtungen durchaus zutreffend. Doch es ist vollkommen ausgeschlossen, daß den Untertanen des Imperiums der säkulare Trend der Edelmetallreduktion entgangen ist, d. h. nach menschlichem Ermessen bestand auch unter Aurelian noch eine Erinnerung daran, daß Silbermünzen einmal aus Silber hergestellt worden waren.¹⁶ Der hart sanktionierte Zwang, die gewissermaßen ‚spartanisierte‘ Währung anzunehmen, ermöglichte dennoch über lange Zeitstrecken die formale Aufrechterhaltung der Zirkulation.¹⁷ Die inflationären Reaktionen erfolgten (soweit das Material zur Preisentwicklung dies erkennen läßt) in Schüben, ganz offenkundig in Form von Entladungen aufgestauten Vertrauensverlustes.¹⁸ Wenn es sich bei diesen Preisauftrieben lediglich um momentane Krisenindikatoren

¹³ S. Estiot, ‚Aureliana‘, *Revue Numismatique* 150 (1995), 50ff., 54f. Die Außerkraftsetzung der *antoniniani* gelang nicht auf dem Gebiet des ehemaligen gallischen ‚Sonderreichs‘.

¹⁴ Hasler 1980, a.a.O. (Anm. 12), 125.

¹⁵ K. Strobel, ‚Geldwesen und Währungsgeschichte des Imperium Romanum im Spiegel der Entwicklung des 3. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.‘, ders. (Hrsg.), *Die Ökonomie des Imperium Romanum*, (St. Katharinen 2002), 86ff.; 96ff.; 104ff.

¹⁶ Vgl. Zosimos, *Historia nova* 1.61.3 und bspw. Cassius Dio 78(79).14.4 (zu Severus und Caracalla).

¹⁷ Hasler 1980, a.a.O. (Anm. 12), 69f. (Annahmegerbot); 84ff. (strafrechtliche Sanktionierung). Die Nichtannahme kaiserlichen Geldes (*vultu principum signata moneta*) war strafrechtlich der Fälschung gleichgestellt (Pseudo-Paulus, *Sententiae* 5.25.1). Zu den schweren (und regelmäßig verschärften) Strafen für das *crimen falsi* vgl. auch Th. Pekáry, ‚Studien zur römischen Währungs- und Finanzgeschichte von 161 bis 235 n. Chr.‘, *Historia* 8 (1959), 444ff., 459ff.

¹⁸ Vgl. das Material bei Rathbone 1996, a.a.O. (Anm. 3); siehe auch Anm. 20.

gehandelt hätte, wie wiederholt postuliert worden ist,¹⁹ dann hätten die Preise nach Beendigung der akuten Krisen wieder fallen müssen. Stattdessen sehen wir nachhaltige Anpassungsreaktionen,²⁰ die latente Vertrauensverluste nun ökonomisch in Form von erhöhten Preisen sichtbar machten. — Das Argument, ‚in Gold‘ ausgedrückt habe sich von Augustus bis Diokletian kein wesentlicher Preisauftrieb ergeben,²¹ geht an den ökonomischen Realitäten des Imperium Romanum vorbei: Weder zahlten die meisten Untertanen in Gold, noch garantierte die Regierung einen Goldstandard, zu dem das Markttransaktionsgeld in Relation gesetzt war.

Nun ist die Bestimmung der ökonomischen und sozialen Folgen der Metallmanipulationen eine äußerst problematische Aufgabe. Der säkulare Preisauftrieb war eine offenkundige Realität.²² Doch dürften sich regional und punktuell je nach der konkreten Situation sehr unterschiedliche Folgen der Geldverschlechterung ergeben haben. Beispielsweise waren die Quantitäten des zirkulierenden Geldes in aufeinander folgenden Zeitabschnitten und regional sehr unterschiedlich,²³ d. h. unter Umständen waren die Münzen nicht nur schlecht, sondern auch knapp (was etwa die verbreiteten Fälschungen in Peripherieregionen erklärt).²⁴ Solche mit Geld unterversorgten Märkte haben offenkundig mit anderen Problemen zu kämpfen als überschwemmte Märkte.

Diesen Problemen kann hier nicht weiter nachgegangen werden. Betrachtet werden soll an dieser Stelle zunächst nur das Phänomen der ‚Armut der kaiserlichen Zentrale,‘ die die Metallmanipulationen schließlich nicht aus Freude am wirtschaftspolitischen Experimentieren,

¹⁹ Meißner 2000, a.a.O. (Anm. 3), 98; Rathbone 1996, a.a.O. (Anm. 3); Strobel 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 15), 120ff.

²⁰ Callu 1969, a.a.O. (Anm. 11), 394ff.; K.W. Harl, *Coinage in the Roman Economy* (Baltimore u.a. 1996), 280ff.; Rathbone 1996, a.a.O. (Anm. 3).

²¹ Vgl. M. Corbier, ‚Dévaluations et évolution des prix‘, *Revue Numismatique*, sér. 6, 27 (1985), 69ff.

²² Vgl. Anm. 20. Ein Pfund Gold kostete zu Beginn des ersten Jahrhunderts 1000 Denare, im Jahr 300 betrug der Preis 60 000 Denare (J. Lafurie, ‚Réformes d’Aurélien et de Dioclétien‘, *Revue Numismatique*, sér. 6, 17 [1975], 73ff., 78). Viel weitergehende brutale Inflationssprünge erfolgten dann jedoch im 4. Jahrhundert: J.M. Carrié und A. Rousselle, *L’Empire romain en mutation* (Paris 1999), 568ff.

²³ Vgl. etwa zu den unterschiedlichen Konstellationen innerhalb Ägyptens Drexhage 1991, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 450ff. Bemerkenswert ist das äußerst pessimistische Urteil dieses ausgezeichneten Kenners der Materie (z. B. 445: „[...] in Zeiten großer Teuerung ist es für uns ein Rätsel, wie die Menschen [sc. Lohnarbeiter] überlebt haben können.“).

²⁴ Vgl. bspw. M.R.-Alföldi, ‚Die Gußformen und gegossenen „Fälschungen“ kaiserzeitlicher Münzen‘, *Chiron* 1 (1971), 351ff.

sondern durch Not gezwungen vornahm. Für die Kaiser hatte ihre ‚Verarmung‘ erhebliche Legitimitätseinbußen zur Folge: Das Leben eines Kaisers war den Soldaten schon seit Ende des zweiten Jahrhunderts nicht mehr viel wert. Eine geringfügige Enttäuschung über ein schwächer als erwartet ausgefallenes Donativ oder andere vergleichbar begrenzte Anlässe reichten als Motiv aus, damit ein Kaiser ohne Skrupel erschlagen wurde. Die historisch abgeleitet zentrale Aufgabe der Kaiser, die Militärklientel an sich zu binden, konnte nicht mehr erfüllt werden, wenn die Herrscher aufhörten, das redistributive Zentrum zu sein.

Die Ursachen für die Verarmung der kaiserlichen Zentrale

Wie ist es zu dieser Konstellation gekommen? Die römische Armee ist von Augustus bis Septimius Severus keineswegs dramatisch angewachsen: die Zahl der Legionen stieg von 25 auf 33 bei gleichzeitigem Zugewinn ausbeutbarer Provinzialböden und -bevölkerungen. Viel stärker zu Buche schlugen die Veränderungen in der Besoldungsstruktur. Allein die Hinzufügung eines vierten Stipendiums unter Domitian dürfte die Belastung der zentralen Kassen (in Verbindung mit der Erhöhung der Truppenzahlen unter Caligula und Vespasian) von (augusteisch) ca. 370 Millionen auf ca. 600 Millionen Sesterzen *per annum* vergrößert haben.²⁵ Im zweiten Jahrhundert reduzierte die kaiserliche Regierung sukzessive die Deduktionen, die vom Sold für Ausrüstung und Verpflegung einbehalten wurden.²⁶ Es folgten die nicht genau bezifferbaren, aber sehr beträchtlichen Solderhöhungen unter Septimius Severus, Caracalla und Maximinus, die—einer Schätzung zufolge—insgesamt auf ein Niveau von etwa 280% gegenüber dem augusteischen Niveau führten.²⁷ Richard Duncan Jones²⁸ hat wahrscheinlich gemacht, daß vor allem aufgrund

²⁵ Campbell 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 2), 176.

²⁶ M.A. Speidel, ‘Roman Army Pay Scales’, *Journal of Roman Studies* 82 (1992), 87ff., 97.

²⁷ J. Jahn, ‘Zur Entwicklung römischer Soldzahlungen von Augustus bis auf Diocletian’, *Studien zu den Fundmünzen der Antike* 2 (1984), 53ff., 67. S. bspw. auch M.A. Speidel, *Die römischen Schreiftafeln von Vindonissa* (Brugg 1996), 64. Abweichende Schätzungen (vgl. die Diskussion in den genannten Beiträgen) bringen keine Veränderungen bezüglich der allgemeinen Größenordnungen.

²⁸ *Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy* (Cambridge u. a. 1990), 115, berechnet auf der Grundlage seiner Rekonstruktion der Angaben in den *Beatty Panopolis-Papyri* 12 400 Rechenanre reguläre Zahlungserwartungen *per annum* einschließlich Donative für ‚alares and probably for legionaries.‘ Daß präzise Kalkulationen auf der Basis der

der Verstetigung der regelmäßig gezahlten Donative die Nettozahlungen in diocletianischer Zeit (nach vermutlich deutlicher Erhöhung der Truppenzahlen)²⁹ noch einmal erheblich über dem maximinischen Niveau lagen. Die Belastungen, die durch Solderhöhungen entstanden, erscheinen in der Tat als so erheblich, daß sie allein das Faktum der ‚Verarmung der Zentrale‘ erklären könnten. Ein bestimmter Aspekt allerdings läßt das Verharren bei den Solderhöhungen als monokausaler Erklärung unbefriedigend erscheinen: Die Soldinflation war nur Teil der Dynamik, die die zentralen Kassen unter starken Druck setzte, und nicht der eigentlich bestimmende. Wenn das politisch-ökonomische Gesamtgefüge des Imperiums und seiner Umwelt stabil gewesen wäre, hätten die Herrscher die Notwendigkeit zu drastischen Solderhöhungen nicht empfunden. Die Aufstockung der Zahlungen war jedoch eine *Reaktion* auf die Legitimitätserosion, die oben skizziert wurde. Die Solderhöhungen lagen, soweit das abschbar ist, in zeitlicher Nähe zu Münzdevaluationen:³⁰ Dies ist deutlich bei Domitian (der auf die neronischen und vespasianischen Devaluationen reagierte), wohl auch bei Caracalla und Maximinus, wobei sich, wie im dritten Jahrhundert generell, streiten läßt, ob im Einzelfall die Kaiser Münzverschlechterungen durch Solderhöhungen auszugleichen bestrebt waren oder auf die von ihnen verursachten Mehrausgaben mit Devaluationen reagierten. Wichtiger ist ohnehin, daß die Solderhöhungen in das Gesamtgefüge einer Bewegung gehörten, die die kaiserliche Zentrale einem immer stärkeren Ausgabendruck unterwarf. In diesem Kontext sind auch zu nennen die Baumaßnahmen im Bereich der militärischen Infrastruktur (einschließlich der Befestigung städtischer Kerne, die Lokalstaaten wohl häufig nicht mehr aus eigener Kraft bewältigen konnten).³¹

Beatty Panopolis-Papyri nicht möglich sind, unterstreicht R. Alston, ‘Roman Military Pay from Caesar to Diocletian’, *Journal of Roman Studies* 84 (1994), 113ff., 120.

²⁹ Die Quellenlage ist problematisch. M.J. Nikasie, *Twilight of Empire* (Amsterdam 1998), 76, geht von einer Sollstärke von „mehr als 650 000 Soldaten“ im vierten Jahrhundert aus und setzt 450 000 als „Minimum“ der *De-facto*-Stärke. Überblick über die vorgeschlagenen Zahlen: Richardot 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 4), 76. R. MacMullen, ‘How big was the Roman Army?’, *Klio* 62 (1980), 451ff. rechnet (452) mit 350,000–400,000 Soldaten bereits für die severische Armee.

³⁰ D.R. Walker, *The Metrology of the Roman Silver Coinage*. BAR Suppl. 40 (Oxford 1978), 3, 106ff.; tabellarische Übersicht: 138.

³¹ Vgl. bspw. zu Probus: G. Kreucher, *Der Kaiser Marcus Aurelius Probus und seine Zeit*. Historia Einzelschriften 174 (Stuttgart 2003), 219ff.; zu Diocletian: R. Rebuffat, ‘Comme les moissons à la chaleur du soleil’, *L’Africa Romana* 6 (Sassari 1989), 113ff.

Das entscheidende Moment, auf das die Reichsregierung keinen Einfluß hatte und das die Dynamik vorwärts trieb, war der militärische Druck auf die Grenzen des Reiches, oder besser: die Art und Weise, in der sich dieser Druck fühlbar machte, nämlich in zunehmender Weise an mehreren, häufig wechselnden Kriegschauplätzen zur gleichen Zeit. Das gesamte Konstrukt einer an den Reichsgrenzen aufgestellten Berufsarmee hätte in der Tat wohl stabil sein können, wenn die politisch-strategische Großkonstellation, mit der Augustus gerechnet hatte, stabil geblieben wäre (wogegen allerdings jede historische Wahrscheinlichkeit sprach). Augustus hatte große Verbände da massiert, wo zu seiner Lebenszeit größere Konflikte mit Nachbarn ausgetragen worden waren: am Rhein, am Euphrat und in Ägypten. Die Verlegung dieser Verbände war ein aufwendiges und vor allem kostspieliges Unterfangen, das, wenn es sich um langfristig im voraus geplante Zusammenziehung von Kampfverbänden an einem militärischen Brennpunkt handelte, vom fiskalisch-logistischen System des Imperiums gut bewältigt werden konnte. Die Überforderung setzte ein, wenn in schneller Folge mehrere Kampfverbände gebildet und über große Strecken verlegt werden mußten.

Nun ist dieses Faktum wiederholt konstatiert worden, in der jüngeren Zeit beispielsweise von Ramsay MacMullen³² und Fritz Mitthof.³³ Ich möchte zu dem Gesagten einige Bemerkungen und Zahlen hinzufügen. Zunächst: Warum war eine Armee auf dem Marsch und im Krieg teurer als eine, die sich in ihren Standquartieren aufhielt? MacMullen hat die Transportkosten in den Mittelpunkt seiner Argumentation gerückt.³⁴ Der Verweis auf Transportkosten ist plausibel, bedarf aber in seiner Pauschalität einer gewissen Relativierung. So waren nach den Schätzungen von David Breeze³⁵ in Britannien zu Beginn des dritten Jahrhunderts zwischen ca. 47 000 und 55 000 Soldaten stationiert (für die ein Jahresbedarf von ca. 2,5–3 Millionen *modii* Getreide veranschlagt werden kann). Berücksichtigt man, daß die Soldaten in familienähnlichen Verhältnissen lebten, daß eine Vielzahl³⁶ von Tieren (Pferde, Maultiere, Opfer- und Schlachtvieh) militärisch genutzt wurde und

³² 'The Roman Emperors' Army Costs', *Latomus* 43 (1984), 571ff., 576f.

³³ *Annona Militaris. Die Heeresversorgung im spätantiken Ägypten* (Firenze 2001).

³⁴ *Roman Government's Response to Crisis* (New Haven 1976), 105.

³⁵ 'Demand and Supply on the Northern Frontier', in R. Miket u.a., Hrsgg., *Between and beyond the Walls* (Edinburgh 1984), 264ff., 268.

³⁶ Nach Breeze 1984 a.a.O. (Anm. 35), 271, ist eine hohe fünfstellige Zahl für Britannien zu veranschlagen.

daß außer Getreide zahlreiche Verbrauchsgüter benötigt wurden, ist deutlich, daß auch die Versorgung der ruhenden Einheiten erhebliche Transportleistungen erforderte. Auch die hochgradige Streuung der Quartiere machte die Versorgung der provinzialen *exercitus* zu einer anspruchsvollen Aufgabe.

Der ausschlaggebende Aspekt ist, daß die militärischen Einheiten im Laufe einer langen Stationierungsgeschichte ökonomisch und administrativ in ihren jeweiligen Heimatregionen ‚verwurzelten.‘ Die entsprechenden Strukturen wurden regelmäßig gestört, wenn Einheiten aus ihren permanenten Stationierungskontexten herausgerissen und beweglichen Großverbänden zugeordnet wurden. Einzelmomente der ‚Verwurzelung‘ sind in jüngeren Studien detailliert erforscht worden; einige der Ergebnisse seien kurz skizziert.

Militärische Einheiten bildeten eigene ökonomische Infrastrukturen (a) aus bzw. profitierten von sekundär durch die Militärpräsenz induzierten Strukturen ([b]; zwischen den beiden Polen existierte eine Skala von Übergängen). Zu den erstgenannten gehört das von Harald von Petrikovits sogenannte ‚militärische Nutzland,‘³⁷ das von Einheiten beispielsweise als Weideland (Tab. Vindol. 2,180) oder Holzreservoir genutzt werden oder an Pächter in Parzellen ausgegeben werden konnte. Zur militäreigenen ökonomischen Infrastruktur rechnen auch die den jeweiligen Einheiten zugeordneten und ihrer Leitung unterstehenden Werkstätten (*fabricae*).³⁸ Lagerdörfer und Marketendersiedlungen waren eine Art Grenzfall, insofern sie zwar ‚sekundär‘ an der Existenz von bestehenden Lagern ansetzten, ihre Entstehung, Lage und Gestaltung jedoch von der lokalen militärischen Kommandantur wesentlich beeinflußt wurde.³⁹ Diese Strukturen sicherten den garnisonierten Einheiten eine berechenbare Zufuhr der jeweils produzierten oder gehandelten Güter.

³⁷ Vgl. H. von Petrikovits, ‚Militärisches Nutzland in den Grenzprovinzen des römischen Reiches,‘ in *Actes du VII^e congrès d'épigraphie grecque et latine*, 1977 (Bukarest 1979), 229–242. Zur Realisierung wirtschaftlicher Gefälle (*reditus castelli*) vgl. bspw. Tab. Vindol. 2,178; W. Eck, ‚Die legio I Minervia. Militärische und zivile Aspekte ihrer Geschichte im 3. Jh. n. Chr.‘; Y. Le Bohec, Hrsg., *Les légions de Rome sous le Haut-Empire* (Lyon 2000), 1,87ff., besonders 88.

³⁸ Vgl. bspw. Tab. Vindol. 2,155; Speidel 1996, a.a.O. (Anm. 27), 164ff.; M.P. Speidel, ‚Zum Aufbau der Legion und zum Handwerk in Vindonissa,‘ *Roman Army Studies II* (Stuttgart 1992), 56ff.

³⁹ C.R. Whittaker, ‚Supplying the Roman Army. Evidence from Vindolanda,‘ in P. Erdkamp, Hrsg., *The Roman Army and the Economy* (Amsterdam 2002), 204–235, 216f.

Die Hauptmasse der Versorgungsgüter konnte jedoch nicht vom Militär selbst produziert werden und mußte extern bereitgestellt werden (b). Dieser Versorgungsbedarf militärischer Einheiten konnte in der Regel nicht aus dem unmittelbaren Stationierungsumland gedeckt werden. Aus diesem Grunde spielten sich innerhalb größerer Regionen Lieferwege und -modalitäten ein, die die Stetigkeit des Nachschubs gewährleisteten. Die Basiskonfiguration ist offenbar so beschaffen gewesen, daß die Kommandeure der jeweiligen Einheiten Liefergebote aussprechen (also auf Requirierungen zurückgreifen) konnten,⁴⁰ darüber hinaus jedoch zusätzliche Güter, vor allem solche, die über den unmittelbaren Überlebensbedarf hinausgingen, auf dem freien Markt nachfragten, in der Regel wohl, indem sie Lieferkontrakte mit Privatunternehmern schlossen.⁴¹ Meist ist wohl auch für requirierte Güter eine Entschädigung, deren Höhe staatlich festgesetzt wurde, gezahlt worden. Fritz Mitthof hat den Vorgang der Requirierung (in diesem Fall von Gerste) anhand des sogenannten Damarion-Archives,⁴² einer Papyrusgruppe aus der Zeit des Commodus, dargestellt. Der Requirierungsbefehl, der die Versorgung einer bestimmten Reitereinheit mit Gerste sicherstellen sollte, wurde von der Provinzleitung publiziert und sah eine anteilige Beteiligung der Dörfer der gesamten Provinz vor. Entsprechend ihrer Belastung wurde den Kontribuenten aus dem Provinzialfiscus eine staatlich festgesetzte Vergütung bezahlt.⁴³ Der Bericht läßt sich nur hinsichtlich der Basisstruktur, nicht in seinen Details verallgemeinern, worauf Mitthof in seiner grundlegenden Untersuchung, die auch das Quellenmaterial außerhalb Ägyptens ausführlich einbezieht, nachdrücklich hingewiesen hat. Tatsächlich lassen sich für einzelne Proviantgüter (z. B. Weizen, Futtergerste, Spreu, Öl, Wein usw.) jeweils voneinander abweichende Liefer- und Requirierungstypen ermitteln, die auch regional und historisch-chronologisch bedeutende Unterschiede aufweisen. Aus diesem Grunde bieten die Quellen (wie etwa die Ostraka aus Bu Njem, die Papyri aus Dura Europos, die Wachstafeln aus Vindonissa, Tolsum oder Vindolanda) ein vielgestaltiges Bild, in dem direkte Requirierung durch

⁴⁰ Vgl. bspw. Whittaker 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 39), 228f.; P. Erdkamp, 'The Corn Supply of the Roman Army during the Principate', ders., Hrsg., *The Roman Army and the Economy* (Amsterdam 2002), 56ff.

⁴¹ C.E.P. Adams, 'Supplying the Roman Army: O. Petr. 245', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 109 (1995), 119ff.

⁴² Verzeichnis der Editionen und ausführliche Darstellung bei Mitthof 2001 a.a.O. (Anm. 33), 2, 314ff.

⁴³ Mitthof 2001 a.a.O. (Anm. 33), 1, 43.

Militärpersonal,⁴⁴ Lieferungen durch tributäre Bevölkerungsgruppen (O. Bu Njem 76ff.; Tacitus, *vita Agricolae* 19.4), Ankauf in privater Initiative militärischen oder militärnahen Personals (FIRA 3,137), Lieferung durch private Unternehmer⁴⁵ und Übersendung von militäreigenem Nutzland oder *praedia fiscalia* (P. Dura 64) nebeneinander belegt sind.

In einer Reihe archäologisch orientierter Studien ist gezeigt worden, daß sich in Regionen, die durch Militärpräsenz geprägt waren, die Produktions- und Infrastruktur auf die Versorgungsbedürfnisse der betreffenden militärischen Einheiten ausrichtete. Genannt seien hier die Arbeiten von Charles Whittaker,⁴⁶ Paul Middleton⁴⁷ und Maureen Carroll.⁴⁸ Als typisch tritt hervor, daß sich partiell spezialisierte Versorgungszonen bildeten, aus denen bestimmte Güter oder Gütergruppen an die militärischen Konsumenten geliefert wurden. So hat etwa Carroll unter Heranziehung des keramischen Fundmaterials des niedergermanischen Flottenhafens (Alteburg) solche Versorgungsregionen rekonstruiert (Getreide aus dem belgischen Lößgürtel, Fleisch und Tierhäute aus dem friesischen Gebiet, Fisch von der friesischen Küste, Salz „von der Küste über das Rhein-Schelde-Delta“).⁴⁹ Middleton (1979, a.a.O. [Anm. 47]) hatte ähnliche Zuordnungen unter anderem innerhalb des gallischen Raumes rekonstruiert und betont, daß die Versorgungsleistungen durch eine komplexe Verschränkung von jeweils lokalen, speziellen Bedürfnissen angepaßten Arrangements (vergleichbar den von Mitthof für Ägypten nachgewiesenen speziellen Versorgungswegen für jeweils einzelne Güter), großräumiger Requirierung und einem gewissermaßen ‚parasitär‘ ansetzenden privatwirtschaftlichem Handel bewältigt wurden. Auch wo nicht von ‚Spezialisierung von Versorgungsregionen‘ gesprochen werden kann, ist eine starke Strukturierung von Regionen entsprechend den Versorgungsbedürfnissen des Militärs zu beobachten, etwa in der Ausdifferenzierung der latifundistischen Zone im Süden Britanniens als ‚Versorgungsdistrikt‘ der Militärzone am Hadrians- bzw.

⁴⁴ Quellen bei Whittaker 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 39), 211, 228ff.

⁴⁵ Vgl. die dokumentarischen Belege bei Adams 1995, a.a.O. (Anm. 41), 124, note 32.

⁴⁶ 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 39).

⁴⁷ ‘Army Supply in Roman Gaul: An Hypothesis for Roman Britain’, in Barry C. Burnham u.a., Hrsgg., *Invasion and Response. The Case of Roman Britain* (London 1979), 81ff.

⁴⁸ ‘Supplying the Roman Fleet: Native Belgic, Frisian and Germanic Pottery from Cologne’, *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 14 (2001), 311ff.

⁴⁹ 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 48), 320f.; C.R. Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire* (Baltimore u.a. 1994), 118ff.

Antoninuswall.⁵⁰ Zu beachten sind in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Handels- und Versorgungssymbiosen, die sich zwischen den Militärzonen und den Ethnien jenseits der Militärgrenzen herauszubilden pflegten.⁵¹

Die skizzierten ökonomischen und administrativen Bindungen von Einheiten an ihre Stationierungsregion wurden zerrissen, wenn eine Einheit (oder Abteilung der Einheit) den Marschbefehl erhielt und fern von ihrem Heimatmilieu versorgt werden mußte. Das ist gewissermaßen der negative kostentreibende Effekt. Auf der anderen, positiven Seite waren noch eine Reihe von Faktoren wirksam, die die Kosten der Verlegungen in die Höhe trieben. Zunächst änderte sich die fiskalische Struktur der Versorgung. Fritz Mitthof beschreibt die Vorgänge für Ägypten (Ende des zweiten Jahrhunderts) mit folgenden Worten:

Es handelte sich um einen auf landesweiter Ebene durchgeführten Zwangseinkauf von Lebensmitteln aller Art, wobei das vom Staat angeforderte Gesamtaufkommen mittels Repartition zunächst auf die Gaue, sodann auf die Dörfer umverteilt wurde. Die Staatskasse streckte den Lokalbehörden das zum Ankauf benötigte Geld vor, damit den Kontribuenten der Gegenwert des requirierten Gutes unmittelbar bei dessen Ablieferung erstattet werden konnte.⁵²

In wesentlichen und den hier ausschlaggebenden Elementen waren die Modalitäten in anderen Provinzen ähnlich (natürlich vollzog sich die Einbindung der munizipalen Ebene in anderer Weise). In aller Regel zahlte eine von der kaiserlichen Zentrale kontrollierte Kasse einen administrativ fixierten Preis für die gelieferten Güter, der zwar unter den Marktpreisen lag, aber sich dennoch an Marktpreisen orientierte. Sowohl naheliegende ökonomische Überlegungen als auch Quellen verschiedener Gattungen⁵³ führen darauf, daß die Anwesenheit großer Heeresverbände die Lebensmittelpreise deutlich in die Höhe trieb.

⁵⁰ Middleton 1979, a.a.O. (Anm. 47), 91ff.; Whittaker 1994, a.a.O. (Anm. 49), 107ff.; 128.

⁵¹ Whittaker 1994, a.a.O. (Anm. 49), 98ff.

⁵² Mitthof 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 33), 1,53 (nach PSI 683). ‚Zwangseinkäufe‘ waren natürlich auch ein Element der Versorgung ruhender Verbände. Aber erstens nur eines unter mehreren, zweitens waren die ziehenden Verbände in der Regel zusätzlich zu den ruhenden Verbänden zu versorgen, drittens waren die Transportprobleme viel gravierender, eben weil die Adressaten der Lieferungen sich bewegten. Die Zwangseinkäufe fanden schließlich nicht nur ‚landesweit,‘ sondern provinzübergreifend statt.

⁵³ R. Ziegler, *Kaiser, Heer und städtisches Geld* (Wien 1993), 139ff., besonders 142; Mitthof 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 33), 1, 80f.; M. Giaccherio, *Edictum Diocletiani et Collegarum de pretiis rerum venalium* (Genova 1974), 134ff.

Die Heeresleitung mußte zu einem bestimmten Grad auf den Preisauftrieb reagieren, wenn sie keine Güterflucht provozieren wollte. Da die Nachfrage der Zentrale bei größeren Truppenbewegungen intensiv und reichsweit (vgl. etwa Herodian, *Historia post Marcum* 6.2.3; 7.8) einsetzte, mußten die Folgen für die Märkte der ganzen Ökumene spürbar sein.

Es war allerdings nicht nur diese ‚fundamental reliance on cash,‘⁵⁴ die die Kosten für die kaiserliche Zentrale in Kriegszeiten in die Höhe trieb, sondern unter anderem auch das gut belegte Faktum, daß die Kopfstärke der Einheiten im Kriegsfall unter Umständen erheblich erhöht wurde. Generell fallen größere Aushebungen der Kaiserzeit in Kriegsphasen (oder unmittelbar in die Zeit nach Kriegsende, wenn Verluste auszugleichen waren).⁵⁵ Rachel Feig Vishnia⁵⁶ hat darüber hinaus in ihrer Arbeit über die *lixae*—die Schattenarmee der Legionen—darauf aufmerksam gemacht, daß marschierende Verbände häufig zahlreiche Hilfskräfte auf Kontraktbasis anwarben, die in verschiedenen Bereichen, speziell der Bewachung und sonstigen ‚Versorgung‘ Kriegsgefangener eingesetzt wurden und die die *De-facto*-Stärke der Verbände unter Umständen nahezu verdoppeln konnten. In diesem Zusammenhang kann auch die Beobachtung Michael P. Speidels angeführt werden, der zufolge im dritten Jahrhundert (in Kriegsphasen) zunehmend Söldner zur Verstärkung regulärer Verbände angeworben wurden.⁵⁷

Zur Korrelation von militärischer Situation und kaiserlicher Kassenlage

Es liegt nahe, eine Statistik der Kriege des Imperium Romanum zu betrachten, wenn man die Ursachen des ‚langsamen Zusammenbruchs‘ des augusteischen fiskalischen Systems genauer benennen möchte. Dies ist natürlich keine originelle Beobachtung; und Zusammenstellungen von Daten sind bereits in instruktiver Weise vorgelegt worden, namentlich

⁵⁴ J.P. Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War* (Leiden u.a. 1999), 238.

⁵⁵ MacMullen 1980, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 453.

⁵⁶ ‘The Shadow Army—the *lixae* and the Roman Legions’, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 139 (2002), 265ff.

⁵⁷ ‘The Rise of the Mercenaries in the Third Century’, *Roman Army Studies II* (Stuttgart 1992), 71ff.

von David R. Walker⁵⁸ (und jüngst von Yann Le Bohec).⁵⁹ Jean-Pierre Bost⁶⁰ hat allerdings darauf hingewiesen, daß sich eine vollkommen eindeutige Korrelation von Münzausstoß, Devaluation und Kriegsinintensität aus dem vorhandenen Material nicht ablesen läßt. Dies wäre auch überraschend: Es spielten zu viele Faktoren zusammen, die das Wirken eindimensionaler Kausalitätsverhältnisse verhinderten. Schon aus diesem Grund dürfen keine überzogenen Erwartungen an die Auswertung von Zahlenmaterial gestellt werden, das zudem aus einem lückenhaften Quellenmaterial gewonnen ist. Bezüglich der Auswertung dieses Materials soll hier nur im Anschluß an das oben Ausgeführte ein Interpretationsvorschlag gemacht werden. In einer umgehend noch näher zu erläuternden Tabelle habe ich einige Daten der römischen Militärgeschichte der ersten drei Jahrhunderte der römischen Kaiserzeit ausgewertet (Tabelle I). Bereits ein erster Blick auf diese Tabelle zeigt, daß die Verlegungsintensität von Truppenverbänden auch im ersten Jahrhundert n. Chr. recht hoch gewesen ist, so daß die oben gewählte Fokussierung auf Truppenbewegungen (im Kontext der Kostendynamik) fragwürdig erscheinen könnte. Nach meinem Dafürhalten ist jedoch die Auswertung der Truppenverlegungen mit der Betrachtung anderer typologischer Momente der römischen Kriege zu kombinieren, um den Sinn dieses Ansatzes richtig hervortreten zu lassen.

Das Imperium verfügte über ausreichende Ressourcen, um problemlos größere Verbände aus den jeweiligen Heeresbezirken (Britannien, Rheinprovinzen, Donauprovinzen, Anatolien und Syrien/Palästina, Ägypten) zusammenzuziehen und an einer Front zu konzentrieren. Dies war gewissermaßen der im augusteischen System einkalkulierte Normalfall einer dynamischen Aktivierung. Wenn im (systemimmanent betrachtet) günstigen Fall eine lange Zeitspanne für die logistische Vorbereitung zur Verfügung stand, wie beispielsweise für den von Domitius Corbulo an der Ostgrenze organisierten Aufmarsch, der über vier Jahre hinweg (54–58) durchgeführt wurde, stellte dies zwar eine erhebliche Belastung dar, die jedoch ohne Überstrapazierung der fiskalischen Kräfte bewältigt werden konnte. Die Regenerationsfähigkeit des fiskalischen Systems war

⁵⁸ 1978 a.a.O. (Anm. 30), 3,106ff.

⁵⁹ 'Les aspects militaires de la crise du III^e siècle', ders. u.a., Hrsgg., *L'armée romaine de Dioclétien à Valentinien I^{er}* (Lyon 2004), 10ff. (vgl. besonders die Tabelle 11f.).

⁶⁰ 'Guerre et finances, de Marc Aurèle à Maximin (161–238)', in J. Andreau, u.a., Hrsgg., *Économie antique. La guerre dans les économies antiques* (Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges 2000), 399ff.

Tabelle 1

Jahrzehnt	Jahre mit kriegsbedingten Verlegungen von Legionen zwischen Armeebezirken	Verlegungsintensität	jeweils betroffene Fronten/ Armeebezirke	logistische Vorbereitung	fiskalische Erholung ¹	nachhaltiger Ressourcengewinn	Legionsdislokationen aufgrund von Bürgerkrieg
14–20 ²	3	++	1	+++	++	0	
21–30	4	+	1	+++	+++	0	
31–40	1	+++	1	+++	(+)	0	
41–50	8	++	1	+++	+	0	
51–60	7	+++	1	+++	-	0	
61–70	10	++/+++	1:4J./3:6J. ³	+++ -	--	--	+++ (3 Jahre)
71–80	4	++	2:2J./3:2J.	+++	+++	+	+ (1J.)
81–90	8	+++	1:6J./2:2J.	+++	+/(+)	--	
91–100	6	+++	1	+++	(++)	-(+)	
101–110	6	+++	1	+++	(+++)	+++	
111–120	5	+++	1	+++	+++	-	
121–130	1	+	1	+++	+++	-	
131–140	6	+	1	+++	+++	--	
141–150	2	+	1	+++	+++	-	
151–160	2	+	1	+++	+++	-	
161–170	10	+++	1:7J./2:3J.	--	---	--	
171–180	10	+++	1:8J./2:2J.	-	---	--	++ (2J.)
181–190	0				+++		
191–200	8	+++	1:5J./2:3J.	+	--	-	+++ (3J.)
201–210	7	++	1	+++	(+)	--	
211–220	8	+++	1	+++	-(+++)	-/---	+ (2J.)
221–230	0				+++	0	
231–240	10	+++	1:5J./2:5J.	+ /---	---	--	+ (3J.)
241–250	10	+++	1:9J./2:1J.	++	--	-	
251–260	10	+++	1:1J./2:2J./3:7J.	---	---	--	+++ (4J.)
261–270	9	+++	2:7J./3:2J.	---	---	---	+++ (5J.)
271–280	8	+++	1:2J./2:4J./3:2J.	---	---	---	+++ (4J.)
281–285	3	+++	1:2J./3:1J.	+ /--	+	--	+ (1J.)

¹ Wenn die Erholungsphase erst in das Folgejahrzehnt fällt, ist dies mit Klammern (+++) ausgedrückt.

² Die Einträge für diesen Zeitraum sind zu lesen: Vier Jahre mit mittlerer Verlegungsintensität; ein Frontbereich war als Zielgebiet betroffen; die logistische Vorbereitungszeit war hoch, die anschließende Erholungsphase von mittlerer Länge. Ein nennenswerter Ressourcengewinn war nicht zu verzeichnen.

³ Lies: Eine Front war vier Jahre lang Zielgebiet von Truppenverlegungen (bzw. Herkunftsgebiet von Rückverlegungen); drei Fronten über sechs Jahre hinweg.

auf der anderen Seite erheblich: Wenn ihm nur einige Jahre der ‚Ruhe,‘ d. h. Abwesenheit von größeren Truppenverlegungen, gegönnt wurden, gewann es die finanziellen Kräfte für neue militärische Abenteuer sehr schnell zurück. Nachdem sich beispielsweise das Imperium, trotz des (angeblich von Commodus verschuldeten) finanziellen Notstands,⁶¹ vier Jahre Bürgerkrieg und anschließend einige Aggressionen⁶² gegen östliche Nachbarn geleistet hatte, genügte eine Atempause von 202–207, bevor neue große Aufmärsche (in Britannien 208–211; Rhein- und Donau 213/14 und im Nahen Osten 214–218) und erhebliche Solderhöhungen wieder als finanzierbar empfunden wurden.

Um diesem Umstand Rechnung zu tragen, ist in der tabellarischen Zusammenstellung die fiskalische Regeneration und die logistische Vorbereitung mitberücksichtigt worden. Die logistische Vorbereitung ist natürlich nicht nur unter zeitlichem Aspekt zu betrachten; wichtig ist vor allem auch, ob der Aufmarsch auf Initiative der römischen Zentrale stattfand, oder ob die Gegner das Gesetz des Handelns diktierten. Besonders schwer fiel ins Gewicht, wenn in einer Konstellation, in der bereits massiv Verbände an bestimmten Frontabschnitten konzentriert waren, Verlegungen, schlimmstenfalls in schneller Folge an weit auseinander liegende Fronten, improvisiert werden mußten. Es ist daher natürlich zu beachten, ob mehrere Kriege an mehreren Schauplätzen gleichzeitig geführt wurden und welche Regenerationspausen zwischen den Kriegsagglomerationen lagen. Natürlich ist auch von Bedeutung, ob ein Krieg erfolgreich geführt wurde oder nicht, wobei unter der hier gewählten Perspektive der fiskalische Aspekt ausschlaggebend ist. Unter systemimmanenten Gesichtspunkten waren Trajans Dakerkriege aufgrund der Eroberung des Königsschatzes und der Erschließung der transsilvanischen Erzminen ein Erfolg; die Siege Aurelians waren dagegen fiskalisch betrachtet Niederlagen für das imperiale System.

Die angefügte Tabelle gibt nur grobe Näherungswerte. Dies ist einerseits mit dem zur Verfügung stehenden Raum zu begründen: Eine akkurate Ausbreitung des Materials würde mindestens ein Buch, wenn nicht mehrere Bände in Anspruch nehmen. Andererseits existiert noch

⁶¹ Die von Cassius Dio (*Historia Romana* 73[74].5.4; vgl. 73[74].8.3) erwähnten eine Million Sesterzen, über die das ‚*basileion*‘ nach Commodus’ Tod noch verfügt habe, betreffen vermutlich nur die in Rom unmittelbar verfügbaren Gelder—und etwa nicht die Provinzialfisci, die selbstverständlich den ‚zentralen Kassen‘ zugeordnet waren.

⁶² Da Severus sich genötigt sah, die neugewonnene Provinz Mesopotamien mit zwei neuen Legionen zu sichern, dürfte es sich bei den Erfolgen der Feldzüge von 195 und 198/99 im wesentlichen um Zuschußgeschäfte gehandelt haben.

keine systematische Durcharbeitung der Quellen. Daher ist mit der rudimentären, hier gegebenen Tabelle ein Desiderat verbunden: Die Kriege des Imperiums müßten unter Auswertung aller zur Verfügung stehenden literarischen, epigraphischen, numismatischen, papyrologischen und archäologischen Quellen unter den oben genannten Gesichtspunkten (Quantität der Truppenverlegungen, fiskalische Belastung, Ergebnisse u. a.) untersucht werden, um ein präzises Bild von der fiskalischen Entwicklung des Imperiums und damit seines inneren Lebensgesetzes zu erhalten. In einer Hinsicht wäre allerdings auch eine sehr sorgfältige ‚Statistik‘ aller Voraussicht nach stark verzerrt: Der Rückgang vor allem epigraphischer und papyrologischer Quellen seit der Mitte des dritten Jahrhunderts läßt eine befriedigende Rekonstruktion der Truppenbewegungen nicht mehr zu, so daß Schätzungen ein sehr breiter Raum gewährt werden muß. Imponderabilien gibt es ohnehin in großer Zahl: Selbst die Schätzungen zu dem wahrscheinlich am besten dokumentierten Aufmarsch (im Vorfeld des ersten Dakerkriegs Trajans) differieren von ca. 100 000⁶³ bis zu „nicht unter 200 000 Mann.“⁶⁴ Die spezifischen Probleme können hier, wie gesagt, nicht diskutiert werden. Die untenstehende Tabelle hat ihr Fundament in dem *legio*-Artikel Emil Ritterlings.⁶⁵ Ergänzendes Material ist unter anderem aus Robert Saxers Studien zu den Vexillationen,⁶⁶ John Spauls⁶⁷ Arbeit zu den Auxiliarien und aus den von Yann Le Bohec edierten Bänden über die Legionen der römischen Kaiserzeit herangezogen worden.⁶⁸

Zur Erläuterung und Interpretation ist nun Folgendes zu bemerken. Die augusteische Epoche, in der das System erst etabliert wurde, ist nicht berücksichtigt worden. Die erste Spalte gibt die Jahre eines Jahrzehntes, in denen größere Truppenverlegungen stattfanden. Damit sind ausschließlich kriegsbedingte Verlegungen⁶⁹ zwischen den großen Stationierungsbezirken (Britannien, Rheinprovinzen, Donauprovinzen, Anatolien/Syrien-Palästina, Ägypten, Africa) und nicht innerhalb der

⁶³ J. Bennett, *Trajan. Optimus Princeps, A Life and Times* (London u.a. 1997), 89.

⁶⁴ E. Ritterling, 'legio', *Realencyclopädie* 12,1 (1924), 1211ff., 1282.

⁶⁵ 1924, a.a.O. (Anm. 64) und *Realencyclopädie* 12,2 (1925), 1330ff.

⁶⁶ *Untersuchungen zu den Vexillationen des römischen Kaiserheeres von Augustus bis Diokletian* (Köln u.a. 1967).

⁶⁷ *Cohors*. BAR International Series 841 (Oxford 2000).

⁶⁸ *Les légions de Rome sous le Haut-Empire*, 3 Bde. (Lyon 2000ff.).

⁶⁹ Wozu auch bloße Aufmärsche (wie etwa diejenigen, die Nero 64 n. Chr. für seine geplanten Axum- und Kaukasusfeldzüge anordnete) gerechnet worden sind, die mit der Absicht, einen Krieg zu führen, durchgeführt wurden.

genannten Bezirke gemeint. Selbstverständlich sind ‚Verlegungsjahre‘ nicht gleichzusetzen mit Kriegsjahren; dieser Umstand macht die Schätzung jedoch häufig sehr schwierig: Der Beginn eines Aufmarsches und die ‚Abwicklung‘ eines Invasionsheeres waren unspektakulär und sind daher häufig ganz unzureichend dokumentiert. In vielen Fällen sind daher nur Abwägungen möglich. In der zweiten Spalte ist versucht worden, die quantitative Intensität der Truppenbewegungen zu bewerten. Wie bereits erwähnt, ist der Spielraum für Schätzungen hier sehr groß: Die epigraphischen Belege lassen in aller Regel nur den Schluß auf Untergrenzen (bezüglich der betroffenen Einheiten oder Abteilungen von Einheiten) zu, während die antiken Autoren zu Übertreibungen zu neigen scheinen. Die Symbole versuchen eine ungefähre Einordnung zu geben. Wenn nur eine Legion (oder Vexillationen einer Legion) aus ihrem Bezugsraum verlegt wurde (wie beispielsweise 20 n. Chr. die *legio IX Hispana* aus Pannonien zur Repression des Tacfarinas-Aufstandes)⁷⁰ entspricht dies einem Pluszeichen.⁷¹ Ein Aufmarsch, für den Verbände aus mehreren Heeresabschnitten mobilisiert und zusammengefaßt wurden (wie 39 n. Chr. in den Rheinprovinzen)⁷² ist mit +++ taxiert worden. In der Spalte ‚Fronten/Armeebezirke‘ ist die Zahl der Zielgebiete größerer Truppenverlegungen angegeben worden.

Die Symbolik der drei folgenden Spalten gehorcht derselben Logik wie die Symbole des Abschnitts ‚Verlegungsintensität‘. Bei der Bewertung beispielsweise der logistischen Vorbereitung sind nicht nur die zeitliche Quantität (Anzahl der Jahre), sondern auch qualitative Umstände berücksichtigt worden. So stand für die Aufmärsche, die Nero 64 (Axum- und Kaukasus-Feldzug) befahl, zwar eine größere Planungszeit zur Verfügung, aber erstens war bereits ein großer Heeresverband an der Ostgrenze zu versorgen und (zweitens) nötigte der Jüdische Aufstand zum Umdirigieren und Improvisieren, so daß die fiskalische Gesamtbewertung insgesamt für diese Operationen negativ ausfällt (nicht zufällig beginnt mit Nero die Geschichte der Manipulationen des augusteischen Münzsystems). Bei der Beurteilung des Ressourcengewinns ist versucht worden, eventuelle Territorialgewinne und Kriegsbeute mit den Kosten der Operationen in Relation zu setzen (vgl. beispielsweise die Überlegung Anm. 62 zu Septimius Severus). Bürgerkriegsjahre, die

⁷⁰ Tacitus, *Annales* 3.9; 4.23.

⁷¹ Größere Konflikte, die im wesentlichen mit den Kräften eines Provinzexercitus bestritten wurden, sind in der Tabelle nicht verzeichnet.

⁷² Quellen: Ritterling 1924, a.a.O. (Anm. 64), 1248.

gewissermaßen eine Verdoppelung der logistischen Kosten implizierten und Verluste für das Imperium garantierten, sind in einer gesonderten Spalte geführt worden. Die Angaben der Spalten müssen miteinander in Kombination gesehen werden. Ausschlaggebend ist, über wieviel Jahre hinweg welche Verlegungsintensität (Zahl der beteiligten Verbände) herrschte und wieviel Grenzabschnitte zur (etwa) gleichen Zeit berücksichtigt werden mußten.

Wie bereits betont, befinden wir uns mit diesen Überlegungen in einem Bereich zahlreicher Konjekturen und subjektiver Einschätzungen. Die Tabelle beinhaltet im wesentlichen eine Aufforderung zur Ausarbeitung *viribus unitis*. Doch soviel läßt sich bei allen Kautelen doch aus den Daten ableiten: Es war nicht die Verlegungsintensität allein für sich genommen, die das fiskalisch-militärische System über seine Leistungsfähigkeit strapazierte, sondern eine Kombination aus verschiedenen Faktoren: Nach einer längeren Erholungsphase in hadrianisch-antoninischer Zeit war das Imperium gezwungen, in immer kürzeren Abständen Kriege an mehreren Kriegsschauplätzen zugleich zu führen. Diese Tendenz verstärkte sich dramatisch seit 231 n. Chr. Damit war eine hohe und zunehmend improvisierte Verlegungsaktivität verbunden. Improvisation mußte die Kosten erhöhen, weil logistische Vorbereitungszeiten fehlten, wodurch der Zwang, Waren durch aktive Nachfrage zu dem Verband zu ziehen, sich vergrößerte.⁷³ Dem steigenden Ausgabendruck stand gegenüber, daß ausreichende Regenerierungszeiten für die zentralen Kassen nicht mehr zur Verfügung standen. Hinzukam, daß die Kriege des dritten Jahrhunderts (nach den severischen Partherkriegen) nur noch Geld kosteten und kaum noch Gewinne brachten. Dieses Ursachengefüge zwang das fiskalische System (langsam, aber unerbittlich) in die Knie und verursachte die dauerhafte ‚Verarmung‘ der kaiserlichen Zentrale.

Die Reformen des vierten Jahrhunderts brachten noch einmal ein retardierendes Moment in die Entwicklung. Die Regularisierung der *annona*, die Verkleinerung der Legionen (d. h. die Behandlung der *vexillatio* als Normaltyp), die Schaffung des ‚spätantiken Bewegungsheeres‘ und die Erschließung und konsequente Ausschöpfung neuer Steuerquellen (etwa des *chrysargyron*) sind Ausdruck dafür, daß die Reichsleitung den Ausnahmezustand des dritten Jahrhunderts als dauerhaft akzeptieren

⁷³ Diokletian hat dies im *edictum de pretiis* anschaulich beklagt; vgl. Giaccherio 1974, a.a.O. (Anm. 53), 134ff.

mußte und entsprechend reagierte. Doch den Teufelskreis von militärischer Defensive, Verarmung der Zentrale und Legitimitätserosion konnten die aufeinander folgenden Regierungen nur noch verlangsamen, nicht mehr anhalten.

I 'MILITES' ED IL 'COMMUNE IUS PRIVATORUM'

VINCENZO GIUFFRÈ

1. Della conformazione dell'esercito romano, nei vari momenti del suo sviluppo—l'età regia anteriore alla c.d. riforma serviana, quella repubblicana sino a Mario, la post-mariana, quella del primo principato, la severiana, la post-dioclezianea, l'epoca teodosiana, ed infine quella di Giustiniano, se la si vuole includere nell'esperienza romana—conosciamo abbastanza bene i sistemi di reclutamento, i moduli di formazione dei reparti, le armi, le strategie, le tattiche, e perfino la vita castrense quotidiana. A riguardo abbiamo infatti gran copia di documenti: notizie 'letterarie', ordini di servizio, diplomi di congedo, annuari et similia; resti di armamenti e sinanche di accampamenti.

In questo Network vengono sviscerati gli 'impatti' economici, sociali, politici, religiosi e culturali delle armate romane e delle loro intraprese belliche, colmando così degli spazi della ricerca contemporanea relativamente vergini. Molto meno, invece, gli studiosi si sono interessati sinora agli ordinamenti giuridici riguardanti i militari *uti singuli*.¹

Privilegiate sono state la '*disciplina*' nell'accezione di prescrizioni disciplinari/penali e repressione delle relative infrazioni, e quindi l'amministrazione della giustizia militare (*castrensis iurisdictio* la chiama Tacito, *iudicium ducianum* la qualificherà non a caso una costituzione di Anastasio del 492). Gli è che—è stato osservato—, per un fenomeno secolare complesso e multiforme, certi dati e valori militaristici dell'antichità legati all'efficienza della disciplina (nel senso, questa volta, di osservanza degli ordini), restaurati, aggiornati ed esasperati, sono stati proiettati nelle epoche successive, sino quasi a noi, dall'unione di due miti: quello creativo napoleonico e quello speculativo del Clausewitz. Né è stata preclusiva la pur evidente aporia dell'aver giustapposto due

¹ I 'perché' di tale trascuratezza sono tratteggiati in un breve saggio ripubblicato nei miei due volumi *Lecture e ricerche sulla "res militaris"* (Napoli 1996) 1, 3ss. Rinvio agli scritti ivi raccolti anche per saperne di più in ordine a certe conclusioni, cui sono pervenuto a suo tempo e di cui mi giovo anche nell'articolare la tesi della presente relazione. Ivi, altresì, estesi ragguagli bibliografici. Nella pur non esigua letteratura dell'ultimo decennio, in tema di *exercitus* e *res militaris*, non mi risultano contributi utili allo svolgimento del discorso che segue.

esperienze del mondo romano: quella dell'esercito cittadino ovvero delle milizie di leva (tipica della *respublica*) che non prevedeva un diversificazione del trattamento del cittadino in armi e del cittadino *domi*; e quella dell'esercito professionale ovvero dei soldati di mestiere, a riguardo del quale (ed in regimi tendenti all'autocrazia com'è nel *principatus*) si formò la peculiare *iurisdictio*. Pisacane, che pure contestava i "satrapi militari" che volevano fare dell'esercito "una casta" dotata di "spirito di corpo" piuttosto che di spirito "nazionale," ebbene Carlo Pisacane non seppe far di meglio che rispolverare la banalità dei romani, "i primi guerrieri del mondo", che "furono, sono e saranno a noi ed ai posteri modello di militare "disciplina"²—un singolare primato "in bocca a un socialista", ebbe ad osservare Nello Rosselli³—. Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz, che in gioventù fu tra i pochi giusromanisti ad interessarsi della '*res militaris*' (le fonti antiche hanno remore a qualificare *ius, ius militare*, l'assetto normativo degli uomini in armi), ebbe a trattare del reato di *desertio* nell'esperienza romana. E ricordava che in una esegesi (fra l'altro, errata) di un passo di Modestino (si tratta di Dig. 49.16.3.11) si era voluto trovare il "punto di partenza" per la costruzione perfino di quell'"uscir dalle file in presenza del nemico" che l'art. 137 del vecchio Codice penale dell'esercito italiano equiparava al passaggio al nemico: costruzione che alimentò le difficoltà e le divergenze che insorsero, "in principio della guerra europea" (la prima guerra mondiale, voleva dire) nella giurisprudenza dei tribunali militari.⁴ E le conseguenze drammatiche di quest'uso delle fonti storiche non v'è chi non le abbia a mente, se ha letto, ad esempio, il saggio di Mario Silvestri *Isonzo 1917* o ha visto il film *Uomini contro* per la regia di Franco Rosi. Del resto, non è senza significato che le due uniche trattazioni complessive moderne del diritto penale militare romano—non tenendo conto della 'voce' del Taubenschlag intorno al '930 per la *Realencyclopädie*—sono di due ufficiali: un italiano, nell'800, il maggiore Michele Carcani;⁵ uno statunitense, nel '900, il colonnello C.E. Brand.⁶ Si tratta di studi ricognitivi, tutt'altro che 'critici'. Al fondo, sembra aver serpeggiato un timore, comune per

² *La disciplina degli eserciti e l'ubbidienza passiva* (1855), ora in *Opere complete* a cura di A. Romano, vol. III. *Scritti vari, inediti e rari* (Milano 1964), 50s.

³ *Carlo Pisacane nel Risorgimento italiano* (ed. Torino 1977), 98.

⁴ *Sul reato di diserzione in diritto romano* (1919), ora in *Scritti di diritto romano* vol. 2 (Napoli 1974), 5s., nt. 4.

⁵ *Dei reati, delle pene e dei giudizi militari presso i Romani* (1874, rist. Napoli Jovene 1981).

⁶ *Roman military Law* (Austin 1968).

vero anche agli studiosi 'laici': che l'analisi approfondita delle normative romane e della temperie in cui di volta in volta vennero a formarsi, avrebbe potuto indurre a criticare e mettere in crisi assetti giuridici contemporanei che invece si tende a preservare da contestazioni.

Ma non è questo che intendo sottoporre a nuova attenzione. Nel mio intervento preferisco riferirmi ad un altro aspetto della vita dei militari regolato dal *ius*, che è stato poco o punto indagato.

Almeno dal primo secolo avanti Cristo, ai *milites* vengono infatti applicati dei "*propria atque singularia iura*" (l'espressione è gaiana),⁷ che non attengono soltanto alle imposizioni disciplinari ma anche e piuttosto a molteplici aspetti della loro esistenza quotidiana, del loro essere 'privati'. In questo lasso di tempo, anzi, mentre la repressione penale del *miles* sembra che fosse stata ricondotta a quella del *civis paganus*, almeno per quanto riguarda la guarentigia della *provocatio ad populum*—così appare da una delle *leges Porciae*—, viceversa il trattamento di taluni, ma notevoli, aspetti della vita privata dell'*homo militaris* incominciò a differenziarlo dal cittadino tout court. Epperò poi nel tempo, come vedremo, alcuni di quei *iura* sperimentati per i *milites* finirono per l'essere estesi ai cittadini tutti. È, per l'appunto, su tali istituti giuridici e su tali fenomeni che mi permetto di attirare l'attenzione.

2. Gli istituti privatistici cui mi riferirò ebbero generalmente una considerazione a sé, nella elaborazione pragmatica e nella sistemazione giurisprudenziale, rispetto alle normative disciplinari/penali, nel senso che furono fatti rientrare nel materiale del *ius privatum* ed inclusi nelle relative trattazioni generali, considerandoli, anche se non sempre così etichettandoli, *ius singulare*, eccezioni. Soltanto qualche scrittore (quale Celso o Tarrutenio Paterno) intravide un complesso 'diritto dei militari' e, in opere di qualche respiro, trattò insieme le speciali regole privatistiche e quelle in ordine alle infrazioni disciplinari/penali. Uno spunto sistematico, questo, che forse venne raccolto nel Digesto giustiniano, là dove troviamo che i problemi delle conseguenze della *captivitas* e del *peculium castrense* sono trattati nei titoli che rispettivamente precedono e seguono quelle rubricato '*de re militari*', dedicato, appunto, a reati e pene propriamente militari.

⁷ È usata, invero, a riguardo del solo particolare 'testamento dei militari', quasi emblematicamente, quasi alludendo ad 'una parte per il tutto'.

I giusromanisti moderni hanno seguito l'impostazione generalizzata dei giuristi antichi, ed anch'essi trattano dei *iura* particolari dei *militēs* a proposito degli istituti privatistici rispetto ai quali ne sottolineano la natura 'eccezionale'. Una trattazione più organica è stata tentata soltanto, oltre vent'anni orsono, da una allieva di Maxime Lemosse, dell'Università di Clermont, la Jacqueline Vendrand-Voyer.⁸

3.1. Un punto di partenza della linea di tendenza potremmo individuarlo, a mio avviso, nella *rogatio Sempronia militaris* del 133 a. C. e nella *lex Sempronia militaris* del 123 a. C., che, come per altri aspetti della politica graccana, anticiparono i tempi e fors'anche i problemi reali. Per la loro valutazione, dal nostro punto di vista, non bisogna fermarsi ai contenuti. Poca cosa: riduzione del servizio militare, fissazione dell'età minima di reclutamento, costo del vestiario posto a carico della *res publica*. Neppure rilevante, nella nostra ottica, è la ricerca della finalità di tali iniziative legislative: se quella di 'cattivarsi la plebe' o piuttosto quella di aiutare a perseguire razionalmente il ripotenziamento della forza militare romana. Né, infine, importa che il senato si premurerà ben presto di abrogare quelle *leges* "*quae...rem militarem impedirent*". Resta, invece, la consapevolezza del legislatore di poter considerare gli uomini in armi come possibile oggetto di provvedimenti normativi che venissero incontro a loro specifiche esigenze.

3.2. Si ritiene da taluni⁹ che la rilevanza della "*absentia rei publicae causa*" al fine di evitare la *latitatio* in giudizio o di sovvenire alle conseguenze dannose della stessa, se l'assenza 'giustificata' non fosse stata rilevata, costituirebbe un primo intervento, escogitato dal pretore in sede giudiziale nel corso presumibilmente del primo secolo a. C., per tenere conto della situazione in cui poteva venirsi a trovare un cittadino durante il servizio militare. Senonché la previsione editale, almeno per come fu intesa dai giuristi, sembra fare riferimento a varie fattispecie di allontanamento da Roma per ragione di servizio pubblico, di tal che è difficile presumere che essa fosse mirata a salvaguardare soprattutto lo status di *miles*.

⁸ *Normes civiles et métier militaire à Rome sous le Principat* (lit. Clermont-Ferrand 1983). In edizione policopiata del 1981 (cfr. Lemosse, in *Index* 10 [1981], 337ss.), la monografia era stata 'riassunta' in *Labeo* 28 (1982), 259ss. sotto il titolo *Origine et développement du 'droit militaire romain'*.—Per una rassegna v. il mio rendiconto in *Gnomon* 61 (1984), 782ss.

⁹ Vendrand-Voyer 1983, op. cit. (n. 8), 148ss.

3.3. Altrettanto non può dirsi, invece, per la *lex Cornelia de confirmandis testamentis eorum qui in hostium potestate decesserint*, probabilmente di Silla, databile intorno all' 80 a. C. È pur vero che a morire in *potestate hostium* poteva ben essere in astratto un qualsiasi cittadino (dall'incaricato d'ambasceria al commerciante avventuroso) divenuto prigioniero del nemico. Ma è evidente che nel 90% dei casi, la *captivitas* dovesse riguardare un militare impegnato ai confini o in una campagna bellica.

Se egli fosse riuscito a tornare in patria (o nel territorio di una *civitas* alleata con Roma), come si sa, la *capitis deminutio maxima* che aveva subito perdeva rilevanza. Ridiventava automaticamente libero *ingenuus*, riacquistava (salve eccezioni) la titolarità dei propri diritti come se non li avesse mai persi, e gli atti negoziali che aveva posto in essere riviessero nei loro effetti. Se invece fosse morto in prigionia, la perdita della soggettività faceva sì che il testamento, eventualmente fatto prima, non valesse, nonché, per di più, che i suoi beni diventassero *res nullius* e che si estinguessero crediti e debiti di cui era titolare, ossia che non si aprisse neppure una successione *ab intestato*.

Una iattura. La *lex Cornelia* introdusse perciò la *fictione* che il *captivus* fosse (considerato) morto nel momento della cattura, e quindi ancora in stato di libertà, con la conseguenza che il testamento conservava validità. Quella di manifestare le ultime volontà prima di intraprendere una campagna bellica o un singolo scontro era consuetudine assai risalente (si pensi al così detto *testamentum in procinctu*, e si ricordi il racconto cesariano dei primi impatti ravvicinati con i germani).¹⁰ Forse per questo la legge Cornelia non prese in considerazione la fattispecie della successione senza testamento; ma la *fictione* venne poi estesa dall'*interpretatio prudentium* alla successione legittima.

3.4. Data la struttura familiare tipicamente romana e lo statuto giuridico in materia dei *militēs*, il ricorso al testamento, per regolare la sorte dei propri rapporti dopo la morte, era, potremmo dire, una necessità. Si rifletta qui soltanto sulla circostanza che la eventuale compagna di vita del militare ed i figli che ne aveva avuti erano, sotto il profilo giuridico, dei perfetti estranei, stante il 'divieto' di matrimonio (a maggior ragione l'acquisto della *manus* sulla *mulier*) e quindi la non assunzione della *patria potestas* sui nati dall'unione salve le speciali forme del *tollere liberos* per i militari: non a caso Antonio Silvano, *eques alae I Thracum Mauretanae*, nel

¹⁰ V. Caesar, *De bello Gallico* 1.39.4.

142 d. C. in Alessandria in Egitto, nel testamento, dovendo indicare la ‘moglie’ *Antonia Thermutha*, la qualifica come la ‘madre di suo figlio’. Né la compagna né i figli, salva eccezione, avrebbero potuto insomma partecipare alla successione *intestati militis*, sia che fosse regolata dal *ius civile* sia che si concretasse nella concessione della *bonorum possessio* secondo il *ius honorarium*.

Senonché, redigere un testamento valido era tutt’altro che agevole, per il suo formalismo esterno ed interno. Bisognava fare ricorso ad esperti. Rarissimo, e sottolineato dalle fonti, era il caso che si fosse in grado di provvedere da sé. Caduto in desuetudine, infatti, il ricorso alla forma testamentaria *in procinctu*, occorreva procedere al *testamentum per aes et libram*, un adattamento nuncupativo della già complicata *mancipatio*.

Senonché Gaio¹¹ fa presente che “da questa rigorosa osservanza nel fare testamento furono, da costituzioni dei principi, dispensati i soldati, *propter nimiam imperitiam*. Infatti, anche se non abbiano impiegato il numero legale dei testimoni, né proceduto alla vendita (*mancipatio familiae*), né nuncupato, tuttavia fanno regolarmente testamento”. In realtà le fonti (Ulpiano o, se si vuole, i compilatori giustiniane) affermano che “*militibus liberam testamenti factionem primus quidem divus Iulius Caesar concessit*”, aggiungendo “*sed ea concessio temporalis erat*”. Sicché, “*postea vero primus divus Titus dedit...*” eccetera. Dopo ancora intervennero Domiziano, Nerva, Traiano. Insomma una serie di *constitutiones* imperiali (soprattutto *mandata*) introdussero per i militari una situazione di *privilegium*, nel disporre *mortis causa*, sia sotto il profilo formale, sia sotto il profilo sostanziale, esentandoli da restrizioni e divieti.

Il *caput mandatorum* di Traiano ricordato nello squarcio delle Pandette appena citato (Dig. 29.1.1 pr.) concludeva statuendo che “sia permesso ai *commilitones* di fare testamento nel modo che vogliano, nel modo che risulti loro possibile, e sia sufficiente, per l’attribuzione dei loro beni, la *nuda voluntas...*”. Sicché era valido il testamento meramente scritto e perfino solo orale. Poteva mancare la *heredis institutio*, che per i *pagani* era invece *caput et fundamentum totius testamenti*, e perciò il testamento del militare poteva limitarsi a contenere legati ed altre disposizioni particolari a causa di morte. L’istituzione d’erede poteva avvenire a termine e sotto condizione risolutiva, di contro al principio civilistico “*semel heres, semper heres*”.

¹¹ Inst. 2.109.

Non si applicava il principio secondo cui la delazione testamentaria escludeva quella legittima. Eppure questo principio era sentito come insito "*naturaliter*" nell'ordinamento positivo *proprium Civitatis*: "*ius nostrum non patitur eundem in paganis et testato et intestato decessisse.*"¹² E quindi era ammessa la *heredis institutio ex re certa*, una sorta di contraddizione in termini rispetto alla costruzione dell'erede come colui che succede *in locum et ius del de cuius*.

Questo comportava tra l'altro che, mentre per il semplice cittadino che testava l'efficacia delle altre disposizioni era subordinata al fatto che il chiamato all'*hereditas* accettasse, ciò non era richiesto quando *testator* fosse un *miles*.

Era ammesso il concorso fra più testamenti successivi. La preterizione dei *sui heredes* non comportava la nullità del testamento. E non trovava applicazione neppure la *querela inofficiosi testamenti*, che dette la stura, come si sa, alla successione dei 'riservatari'.

Erano valide le disposizioni a favore di *peregrini* e *Latini*. Di contro alle leggi Giulia e Papia, *ex militis testamento* potevano *capere*, ed ottenere il *solidum*, i *caelibes* e gli *orbi* ("*id est qui liberos non habent*").

Non da ultimo, si noti che per dare luogo ad un valido testamento occorreva essere in possesso della capacità di testare, la c.d. *testamenti factio activa*, che spettava ai soli maschi puberi *sui iuris* (già in età medio-repubblicana tuttavia la donna fu ammessa in certi casi a far testamento). Ne era escluso quindi il *filius in potestate patris*: condizione, questa, in cui si trovavano moltissime giovani reclute. Senonché fu ammesso che il *filius familias* potesse disporre per testamento del *peculium castrense*.

La massima licenza, a riguardo degli atti *mortis causa* posti in essere da militari, è rappresentata, però, da quelle complesse disposizioni oggetto di un *rescriptum* di Diocleziano (e Massimiano) del 290 d. C. all'interrogante *Victorinus miles* (CI. 2.3.19). Il loro contenuto di patto successorio reciproco le rendeva assolutamente aberranti rispetto al *ius Romanorum* indiscusso. Ma la corte diocleziana le fece oggetto di una interpretazione innovativa sanante per ricondurle, come era suo solito, al diritto romano statuito—che esplicitamente richiamò—e ne ammise la validità ricordando per l'appunto che i militari, quali erano gli autori del patto, potevano manifestare in qualsiasi modo le loro ultime

¹² Così Pomponio, nel III libro *ad Sabinum* (Dig. 50.17.7).

volontà.¹³ Una operazione apprezzabile sotto il profilo dell'*humanitas* ma *absonans a ratione iuris*.

Il fondamento di questi privilegi è indicato dai *iurisprudentes* nell'*imperitia* dei *militēs*.¹⁴ E suol dirsi dagli storici che tale *ratio* è fondata, perché rispecchia le mutate condizioni degli eserciti tardo-repubblicani ed imperiali, i quali non sono più milizie di *cives*, bensì eserciti professionali in cui, nonostante le remore, diviene sempre più massiccia la presenza di stranieri che, militando nelle legioni (la fanteria di linea), acquistano automaticamente la *civitas* Romana (il che costituiva un residuo ossequio, ma del tutto formale, all'antica ideologia dell'esercito cittadino). Si annota poi, generalmente, che nel periodo giustiniano, mutate le condizioni del reclutamento, il *testamentum militis* venne correlato invece alle difficoltà connesse con lo svolgimento delle operazioni militari (e fu perciò consentito non durante tutto il servizio militare, ma soltanto nelle zone di operazioni).

Non siamo del tutto d'accordo. La prima escogitazione derogativa del *ius positum* in materia, quella cesariana, temporanea, sembra dovuto proprio alle difficoltà di redigere testamenti validi civilmente in zona d'operazioni.

E per quanto riguarda la *imperitia*, essa va intesa '*cum grano salis*', come giustificazione di massima. E va intesa come allusiva pure alla ignoranza ed incomprensione di molti militari, anche di area italica, di certi regimi che s'erano andati stratificando solo nell'esperienza propriamente romana, e per motivi contingenti.

Talune regole, poi, sul *testamentum militis*—come si accennava—erano ancorate a necessità profonde determinate dall'assetto familiare del *miles* e dalle particolari condizioni in cui poteva venirsi a trovare nel corso del servizio. Ad esempio, lo strappo al principio che la diseredazione dovesse essere esplicita e formale, va ricollegato alla circostanza che il *miles* ha una moglie che non è *uxor*, ha figli con cui può non essere in rapporto di *adgnatio*, ed è legato invece ad una parentela 'legittima' di origine, di cui, spesso, egli, lontano ed isolato, poteva ignorare addirit-

¹³ V.M. Amelotti, *II testamento romano I. Le forme classiche di testamento* (Firenze 1966), 93.

¹⁴ Ricorrente il *Leitmotiv* dei militari privi di tatto e di acutezza d'ingegno: lo menziona perfino Tacito (*Agricola* 9.2), benché per aver modo di gratificare Agricola, che aveva smentito "tale credenza". Gli uomini dediti alle armi sono caratterizzati da *simplicitas* ancora secondo Ulpiano (45 *ad ed. Dig.* 29.1.1 pr.).

tura la consistenza attuale. Eppure sarebbe stato l'*adgnatus proximus* o, in subordine, i *gentiles* a succedergli, *ab intestato*.

Tuttavia, la inapplicabilità del principio secondo cui *nemo pro parte testatus pro parte intestatus decedere potest* non deriva tanto da un rispetto esasperato della *voluntas testatoris*, come ingenuamente vorrebbero fare intendere le *Institutiones* giustinianee,¹⁵ ma deve essere messa in relazione ad una residua tutela dei membri della *familia* agnatizia, a cui *ab intestato* i cespiti ereditari erano destinati dal comune *civile*, *honorarium* o *novum ius*, salva l'esplicita e formale loro diseredazione. Insomma, stava bene che il militare potesse, con semplicità, destinare *mortis causa* suoi cespiti, senza vincoli formali e sostanziali, alla sua donna ed ai nati da lei, ricordandosi magari anche di qualche commilitone e del comandante del reparto; ma non stava più bene che all'istituto soltanto per una quota o addirittura *ex re certa* andassero, a danno dei membri della famiglia d'origine, anche tutti gli altri cespiti di cui il militare non avesse specificamente disposto, come sarebbe accaduto seguendo i principi successori rilevati dai giuristi. Ed ecco che quello di cui il militare non aveva disposto con il testamento veniva attribuito, secondo la vocazione *legitima*, agli *adgnati*. Un rovesciamento, questo, della regola giurisprudenziale che, a partire almeno da Aquilio Gallo, dava luogo invece all'accrescimento a favore dell'istituto. Il 'sistema', che aveva subito uno 'strappo', attraverso un altro 'strappo' alle regole, finiva per riespandersi, nei limiti del possibile.

A questo punto appaiono interessanti tre notazioni. La prima. È un comandante legato a fil doppio con le 'sue' truppe—dico: Cesare—che, *primus*, si fa interprete delle esigenze di vita dei componenti delle armate tardo-repubblicane in fatto di disposizioni d'ultima volontà, e ne impone la rilevanza per il *ius*.

Seconda notazione. Si verificò un 'braccio di ferro' tra potere imperiale e giurisprudenza a riguardo di molte delle 'concessioni' di siffatto *ius militare*. I giuristi, consci della portata sconvolgente di certe regole rispetto al *commune ius Romanorum*, tendevano a restringerne l'applicazione (ad esempio, erano molto severi per quanto riguarda i limiti temporali d'efficacia del *testamentum militis* dopo il congedo). La corte imperiale a sua volta accordava, con rescritti, quel che la *communis opinio* dei *prudentes* avrebbe negato in sede interpretativa.

¹⁵ 2.14.5.

Terza notazione. Certe novità introdotte per i militari, per esempio il superamento dei formalismi testamentari, furono poi recepite, pur secondo i tempi lunghi d'evoluzione delle istituzioni giuridiche romane, nel diritto comune. Così, Costantino, nel 339,¹⁶ sancirà finalmente anche per i pagani che “*amota erit sollemnium sermonum necessitas*”, e quindi che per istituire l'erede si può dire “*heredem facio*’, vel ‘*instituo*’, vel ‘*mando*’, vel ‘*cupio*’, vel ‘*esto*’, vel ‘*erit*’”, e simili.

3.5. L'incapacità giuridica del *filius*, conseguente alla persistente struttura arcaica della *familia*, fu mitigata, come si sa, dal *peculium*. Nel *peculium* (*profecticium*, cioè nel ‘piccolo patrimonio’ a *patre profectum*) forse già entrava a far parte quel che il figlio acquistasse durante il servizio militare. Ma quando nel periodo di crisi repubblicana i beni castrensi crebbero d'importanza (per la rilevanza della paga e delle prede belliche), si ebbe la configurazione di un *peculium* a sé stante, il *peculium castrense*, con regime particolare, che, con Augusto, contemplerà anche la facoltà di disporne per testamento,¹⁷ pure, come si diceva, senza avere la *testamenti factio activa*. Dal punto di vista dell'oggetto, il peculio castrense ricomprendeva anche le donazioni fatte al *filius* in occasione dell'arruolamento, ed i beni ottenuti mettendo a frutto quelli peculiari. Dal punto di vista soggettivo il peculio castrense fu riconosciuto anche quando, dimesso il servizio militare, si fosse divenuti veterani. Ai *filii familiarum milites* o *veterani* gradualmente, fu riconosciuta una piena capacità sul peculio castrense, con riferimento al quale potevano avere rapporti giuridici con qualsiasi persona, ivi compreso il proprio *paterfamilias*; potevano manomettere senza la di lui ingerenza gli schiavi che ne facessero parte; potevano subire l'esecuzione forzata prima che divenissero *sui iuris*.

Una posizione giuridica del tutto differenziata quindi, quella dei *milites* rispetto ai *filii familiarum* che pur svolgessero in proprio servigi ed attività produttive. Una posizione giuridica che contribuiva a connotare diversamente i *milites* rispetto alla società ‘civile’. Tanto più che dei *bona castrensia* il militare faceva spesso uso, per così dire, intracastrense: dai versamenti a casse speciali in vista di futuri bisogni per viaggio oppure di bisogni d'ordine funerari, alla contribuzione nella realizzazione di giochi o di monumenti, e così via esemplificando.

¹⁶ CI. 6.23.15 pr.-2.

¹⁷ I. 2.12 pr.

Una innovazione così profonda, quella del *peculium castrense*, che bisognò attendere l'età di Costantino affinché pure i *fili familiarum* che si procuravano guadagni durante ed a cagione della c. d. "*militia civilis*", ossia dell'impiego a corte o nell'amministrazione imperiale, potessero godere di un analogo regime d'autonomia patrimoniale: donde il *peculium quasi castrense*.¹⁸

Altro esempio, questo, di regole speciali per i militari che finirono con l'essere estese al di fuori della *militia armata*.

3.6. I *collegia militum* attestati in Africa nell'età severiana costituiscono, a loro volta, un 'quid proprium', con complesse finalità anche di tipo mutualistico e assistenziale (o addirittura, diremmo oggi, assicurativo): tali, queste finalità, che li esentavano dai generalizzati divieti d'associazionismo specie fra militari.¹⁹

3.7. Anche un'altra escogitazione, limitativa del *ius commune*, a tutela dei militari, quella intesa ad evitare loro i danni dell'*hereditas damnosa* (le cui poste attive, cioè, fossero soverchiate da quelle passive per debiti del *de cuius* e simili) funse da precedente del generale istituto del *beneficium inventarii* introdotto e minutamente regolato da Giustiniano.²⁰

Dalle Istituzioni giustinianee,²¹ che si ispirano alle trattazioni elementari di Gaio e Fiorentino, traiamo il quadro della problematica e delle sue soluzioni nel tempo. "Eredi propri e necessari sono... il figlio, la figlia, il nipote e la nipote nati dal figlio, e ulteriormente gli altri discendenti, purché fossero in potestà del morente... Si chiamano eredi propri in quanto sono eredi di casa... Necessari invece sono detti, perché comunque, vogliano o non vogliano, ... sia se non v'è testamento sia se nominati nel testamento, diventano eredi. Ad essi, però, il pretore permette, se vogliano, di astenersi dall'eredità (accorda cioè il c.d. *beneficium abstinendi*)...—Gli altri, non soggetti al potere del testatore, sono chiamati eredi estranei. Così anche i nostri discendenti non in potestà nostra, da noi istituiti eredi, appaiono eredi estranei...—Agli eredi estranei è data la *deliberandi potestas* (la facoltà di ponderare) se accettare

¹⁸ Le Istituzioni di Giustiniano (2.11.6) esplicitamente affermano che le "*antiores leges*" erano state emanate "*ad exemplum castrensis peculii*".

¹⁹ M.R. De Pascale, "*Collegia in castris*". *Associazionismo previdenziale/assicurativo nell'espe-rienza romana* (Napoli 1994).

²⁰ Nov. 1.2.

²¹ 2.19.2-6.

o meno l'eredità.—Ma se colui (*heres suus et necessarius*), che ha facoltà di astenersi, si sia immischiato nei beni ereditari, o l'*extraneus*, al quale è consentito ponderare circa l'adizione dell'eredità, abbia accettato, non ha poi facoltà di abbandonare l'eredità. (E, specifichiamo noi, risponde dunque *ultra vires*, con il suo patrimonio.)—Si fa eccezione per il minore di venticinque anni: alle persone di questa età, invero, ... se abbiano sconsideratamente preso una eredità dannosa, il pretore viene in aiuto. Il divino Adriano fece grazia anche ad un maggiorenne di venticinque anni, essendo, dopo l'adizione dell'eredità, emerso un grande passivo, che al tempo dell'accettazione dell'eredità non risultava. Ma questo il divino Adriano lo accordò a titolo di favore particolare (*speciale beneficium*).—Successivamente il divino Gordiano estese il *beneficium* ai militari.—Senonché, la nostra benevolenza rese il detto beneficio comune a tutti i soggetti al nostro imperio, e formulò una costituzione (CI. 6. 30. 22 del 531) ... per cui ... la gente ... può adire l'eredità essendo obbligata solo fino alla concorrenza del valore dei beni ereditari”.

Nella richiamata costituzione del 531 Giustiniano premetteva di essersi ispirato proprio alla vecchia ‘costituzione’ che Gordiano “*ad Platonem scripsit de militibus, qui per ignorantiam hereditatem adierunt*”, il cui contenuto riassume nel senso che i *bona* dei militari “*a creditoribus hereditariis non inquietentur*”: “*arma etenim magis, quam iura scire milites sacratissimus legislator existimavit*”.

Ancora un richiamo tradizionale alla *imperitia* del militare in materia giuridica, quando è evidente che in analoga situazione d'ignoranza poteva trovarsi anche un qualsiasi comune cittadino, e pure lui, magari un isolato villico, poteva non avere la possibilità di contattare un giureconsulto—situazione, quest'ultima, di cui si fece carico per l'appunto la corte bizantina—.

È presumibile invece che la *ratio* del rescritto gordiano, non esattamente databile, si fondasse piuttosto sulla opportunità di salvaguardare in ogni caso il patrimonio del *miles*, in un'ottica non privatistica ma di tutela dei membri dell'organismo militare.

3.8. Analoga *ratio* dovette presiedere alla estensione ai militari (forse in una fase storica molto tarda) del c.d. “*beneficium competentiae*”, cioè della possibilità di essere condannati in sede civile all'*id quod reus facere potest*, vale a dire nei limiti delle proprie capacità patrimoniali, evitando così l'esecuzione concorsuale fallimentare, la *bonorum venditio* con conseguente infamia, o, perché no, addirittura l'esecuzione personale mediante *addictio* che nel terzo secolo d. C. sembra ritornare nelle pratiche di

escussione dei debitori, in relazione forse anche ai problemi demografici, specie nel ceto servile, con conseguenti bisogni di forza-lavoro.

Come è evidente, anche nella nostra materia si verificò quel fenomeno di 'interscambio' che sarà illustrato *infra*.

3.9. Preoccupazioni per eventuali responsabilità patrimoniali personali verosimilmente presiedettero pure all'incapacità per il *miles* a fungere nei giudizi civili da *cognitor*. Questi era un particolare rappresentante processuale, che rischiava di rispondere della eventuale condanna al posto del rappresentato. Analoga incapacità affettava le donne e gli *infames* (ma il punto è controverso), sebbene, all'evidenza, per ragioni diverse.

3.10. Anche altre singolari istituzioni giuridiche non furono esclusive per i militari, ma, sorte per peculiari motivi, furono ad essi estese: come la *mulier minoris aetatis*, così l'*adulescens miles* (infraventicinquenne) era stabilmente assistito nei suoi negozi da un *curator*, con la giustificazione—ancora una volta—del poco impegno che il giovane alle armi portava e poteva portare alla gestione dei propri affari. Di nuovo la preoccupazione di fondo è, invece, la salvaguardia della sua condizione patrimoniale coincidente con l'interesse pubblico a non turbare la prestazione della *militia armata*.

Sempre in compagnia delle donne, dei minori d'età, e questa volta anche dei villici, i militari talvolta furono esentati dall'applicazione del principio che *ignorantia iuris non excusat*.

Da Marciano, giurista operante durante il regno di Severo Alessandro, apprendiamo che ai militari (anche ai veterani) era proibita la delazione fiscale, come alle donne per la loro *infirmas sexus*, ai condannati a certe pene, nonché, ma in quanto si trattava di attività non degna, assieme questa volta pure ai *clarissimi* senatori.

Anche al militare era proibito acquistare terreni nella provincia in cui prestava servizio. Non si voleva che si radicesse in un certo territorio.

In sede penale a dir così ordinaria, da Quintiliano²² apprendiamo che la *militia* costituiva una circostanza scriminante per "*qui parentes non aluerit*", che altrimenti "*vinciatur*".

Potremmo elencare privilegi fiscali, ed altri ancora. Ma *de hoc satis*.

²² *Institutio oratoria* 5.10.97.

4. I giuristi antichi—come abbiamo accennato—si posero il problema delle *rationes* a fondamento delle ‘eccezioni’ per i militari, che individuavano di solito, come abbiamo sottolineato, nella *simplicitas* che si riteneva caratterizzasse gli *homines militares*, oppure, talvolta, nella *severitas castrorum*.

Tra gli storici moderni, la Vendrand-Voyer, schematizzando, attribuisce gli statuti speciali escogitati dal pretore in sede giudiziale alla considerazione equitativa di ‘situazioni di fatto’ meritevoli di considerazione; ed a quelli escogitati dalle corti imperiali la finalità di ottenere un migliore funzionamento dell’organizzazione militare. Abbiamo riscontrato invece che le *rationes* di politica normativa furono molteplici e talvolta cangianti nel tempo.

V’è tuttavia—dobbiamo chiederci a questo punto—una ragione sostanziale, di fondo, di quelle regole che appaiono come ‘strappi’ al *commune ius*? Una possibilità di risposta è apparsa a me potersi ricercare in ciò: che la società castrense romana dette luogo a moduli di vita diversi, e (mi sia consentita l’approssimazione) più ‘avanzati’, rispetto al contesto socio-economico di volta in volta contemporaneo. Ciò è particolarmente evidente nella tarda Repubblica, e nell’età severiana.

Del resto, già Marx rilevava che “...presso gli antichi il sistema salariale si è sviluppato...anzitutto nell’esercito”, “si trova qui il primo impiego delle macchine in grande”, perfino “la divisione del lavoro all’interno di un determinato settore si compì primamente negli eserciti”.²³ Inoltre, la retribuzione regolare, in danaro, insolita nella struttura economica romana, e che nell’età di Cesare, ad esempio, sappiamo essere tutto sommato superiore a quella di altri privati impiegati a fini pubblici (la paga di un soldato semplice nell’età delle guerre civili, tenuto conto dei ‘premi’ vari, raggiungeva i 300 *denarii*, presso a poco cioè quanto riceveva uno scriba dei *duoviri* come ci informa una legge dell’età di Cesare su una colonia iberica), rendeva i *milites* dei ‘privilegiati’ che non si riconoscevano né nella condizione della massa dei mestieranti urbanizzati, né più in quella, arcaicamente autosufficiente e sempre misera ed incerta, dei lavoratori della terra. Secondo il Passerini, l’attrattiva delle paghe alte invoglierà perfino cittadini di rango equestre ad avviarsi alla ‘carriera’ di centurioni della legione.²⁴ Il Gabba parla di

²³ K. Marx – F. Engels, *Carteggio* (tr. it., ed. Roma 1950–53) 3. 94, 25 settembre 1857.

²⁴ *Legio*, in *DE*. 4 (1949–50), 596 e 599.

una "osmosi" fra "ufficialità e milizia dei ranghi".²⁵ Sicché una mentalità di mestiere si introdusse anche tra gli ufficiali. La milizia divenne una professione anche per la categoria dei *legati*.

Altrettale situazione differenziante rispetto alla vita civile, specie nell'età tardo-repubblicana, era costituita dalla strutturazione dell'esercito, che, di contro alla teorica uguaglianza dei cittadini *domi*, prevedeva ufficialmente una articolata e rigida gerarchia; e comportava a volte distinzioni invalicabili, quale la preclusione per i centurioni di accedere ai posti di *tribunus militum* e di *praefectus equitum*. Non era ammissibile, per i militari di truppa e l'ufficialità bassa, prendere parte alle decisioni, tanto meno discutere gli ordini. Sicché al militare incominciò ad apparire inconcepibile, un perditempo fuor di luogo, che nelle assemblee popolari si potesse discutere da parte di un *quivis de populo*. Soldato o ufficiale che fosse, l'*homo militaris* divenne indifferente alla tradizione della *libertas* repubblicana, ed anche verso la 'patria' stessa, dato che peraltro un Silla, Pompeo, Cesare ed altri, magari sulla base di leggi speciali, avevano conferito piuttosto largamente la *civitas* agli arruolati estranei alla cittadinanza romana.

Si aggiunga che il reclutamento delle truppe a livelli medio-inferiori, specie nelle aree rurali (si ricordi i militari "*rustici atque agrestes*" di Cicerone),²⁶ escludeva per la massa dei soldati interrelazioni con le altre fasce sociali.

Dall'altra parte—specie nel tardo Principato—gli stanziamenti prolungati fuori dei centri urbani (per lo più nei tipici accampamenti fortificati autonomi), la lunga ferma effettiva (anche oltre dieci anni), l'origine etnica generalmente omogenea per i vari reparti, la parificata condizione sociale e di trattamento, la rigida disciplina che poteva implicare la decimazione, l'intenso addestramento basato sui sistemi della 'paura' e della 'ammirazione/emulazione': ebbene tutto ciò costituiva fattori di affiatamento e coagulo, ma anche di separatezza rispetto alla società sia della città che della campagna.

Peraltro, i militari, a tutti i livelli, non riscuotevano 'simpatia' né da parte delle fasce sociali egemoni, che prestavano all'esercito solo un'ambigua attenzione; né da parte della bassa popolazione, specie italica. Il militare cercava di rendere la sua professione onorabile nel complesso

²⁵ 'Ricerche sull'esercito professionale romano da Mario ad Augusto', *Athenaeum* n.s. 29 (1951), 204.

²⁶ *Philippicae* 10.10.22.

della società, e ciò, che non gli riusciva difficile, creava 'invidia'; mentre il veteranesimo, che provocava talvolta un violento sostituirsi di nuovi ceti sociali ai preesistenti agricoltori, scatenava un diffuso fermento e conflitti fra civili e militari. Per tacere, qui, dei problemi suscitati dai fenomeni tardi della prestazione dell'annona e dell'ospitalità.

Tutto ciò—e sarebbe ben possibile estendere l'esemplificazione—fece già dell'esercito post-mariano un *corpus separatum*, dotato di 'esprit de corps'. La separatezza dei militari rispetto alla compagine sociale divenne tale che si manifestò anche a livello di vocabolario: sintomatica del quadro tracciato, tracciato per necessità in modo impressionistico, è l'espressione, ricorrente già in Sallustio,²⁷ Cicerone,²⁸ Cesare,²⁹ di *homo militaris*, che un tempo sarebbe stata inconcepibile, stante invece la consustanzialità di *civis* e *miles*. Varrone sentì addirittura l'esigenza di precisare (nientemeno) che *praetor* "in re militari... dictus qui praeiret exercitu...".³⁰ 'nell'ordinamento militare per pretore s'intende...'. Ed analoghe considerazioni potrebbero farsi per le armate severiane.

5. Concludendo, il fenomeno più interessante che emerge dallo studio delle influenze, *lato sensu* intese che l'*exercitus* romano dal 200 a. C. al 476 d. C. esercitò sulla vita civile, quanto al *ius* si sostanziò nell'anticipazione di taluni trattamenti di aspetti rilevanti della vita dei singoli—aspetti che coinvolgevano però i gangli vitali dell'ordinamento privatistico, discostandosi, ad esempio, dai principi regolatori della *patria potestas*, dell'appartenenza, della successione *mortis causa*, del formalismo negoziale—, trattamenti che furono poi estesi agli altri utenti del diritto con un lavoro secolare di matrice essenzialmente autoritativa, non in via interpretativa. Un fenomeno che si spiega con la condizione economica e sociale che acquisirono i *militēs*, o fu loro comunque riconosciuta dai consociati sul piano della psicologia collettiva.

Il diritto—come ben sappiamo—è sempre espressione (diretta o mediata) dell'aggregato umano che deve regolare. Dunque, quando nel contesto sociale si formano raggruppamenti con moduli di vita separati ed avanzati, è giocoforza che, nell'ambito del più ampio ordinamento, si creino normative adeguate alle necessità di siffatti gruppi

²⁷ Cfr. *Bellum Catilinae* 45.2 e 59.6.

²⁸ Cfr. *In Pisonem* 23.54.

²⁹ Cfr. *De bello Gallico* 1.21.4.

³⁰ *De lingua Latina* 5.87.

ma in disarmonia con il 'sistema'. Questo, poi, tende a 'riassorbire' le norme di *ius singulare*, generalizzandole non appena la restante società vi si presti. E tale—semplificando al massimo—appare per l'appunto, almeno a me, la vicenda delle norme 'speciali' per i militari nell'esperienza romana antica.

6. Talvolta in letteratura si prospetta che l'accoglimento nelle armate di elementi italici e provinciali dalle diverse culture avrebbe contribuito ad una osmosi nell'ambiente castrense di modelli di vita ed esperienze non romani: d'altra parte, la massa di *milites* diffusa nella vasta area territoriale facente capo a Roma, ovviamente in entità dislocazioni e modi diversi a seconda del momento storico dato e della politica militare, avrebbe contribuito a quel che, per brevíloquenza, e solo per intenderci, ancora possiamo qualificare come diffusione della civiltà romana. Non tocca a me dire con riferimento ad altri campi. Posso dire, però, che, a riguardo del diritto, siffatti fenomeni non trovano riscontro, in alcun momento, nelle fonti, né in quelle letterarie né in quelle materiali.

La vita castrense rimase impermeabile a mentalità ed usanze giuridiche delle comunità e nazionalità di estrazione dei militari. Ciò vale per gli arruolati "*rustici atque agrestes*" dell'esercito mariano e postmariano,³¹ come per i componenti semibarbari di reparti speciali sotto Traiano ed Adriano,³² come, ancora, per i giovani delle città italiche da cui, secondo Erodiano,³³ Settimio Severo trasse le nuove leve, e così via esemplificando. Almeno sino all'inoltrato terzo secolo: più oltre, confesso, non so andare, non avendo esteso le mie ricerche ai due secoli successivi

³¹ Cicero, *Philippicae* 10.10.22 a proposito dei centurioni.

³² Si può solo accennare qui, per dare contezza di una dimensione, che dalle iscrizioni funerarie risulta che il numero di militari italici d'ogni grado impegnati da Adriano non arrivava all'un per cento, mentre quel numero in età augustea costituiva circa il sessantacinque per cento. Non per nulla la scelta dello stesso *optimus princeps* predecessore, dico Traiano, era avvenuta tra i provinciali romanizzati o d'origine romana, e la designazione da parte di Nerva fu basata anche sulle promettenti capacità militari (poi andate deluse nella guerra partica) del discendente degli *Ulpii*. E non è da escludere che anche certe scelte adrianees in ordine alla conformazione delle milizie abbiano contribuito poi a corroborare quell'opposizione che, dopo aver taciuto per ventuno anni, alla morte del *princeps* aveva chiesto, tramite un gruppo di senatori, la sua *damnatio memoriae*. Cfr. V. Giuffrè, "*Armorum exercitio*" e "*castrorum disciplina*" secondo Adriano', in AA.VV., *Les discours d'Hadrien à l'armée d'Afrique. Exercitatio* par Y. Le Bohec (Paris 2003), 159ss. Ivi anche G. Brizzi, 'L'età di Adriano: armamento e tattiche', 131ss.

³³ 2.14.6, Cfr. spec. J.C. Mann, 'The raising of new legions during the Principate', *Hermes* 91 (1963), 483.

presi anch'essi in considerazione da questo Network. Chi veniva inserito nei quadri delle formazioni militari aspirava, anzi, a poter fruire del trattamento giuridico, privilegiato, del militare romano. Altro era il diritto di cui magari si serviva *extra castra*, altro lo statuto personale di *miles*, le cui prerogative e forme con le quali s'esprimevano qualcuno forse (e senza forse) non riusciva neppure a comprendere appieno, ma apprezzava come manifestazione di una condizione, di uno 'status' che lo differenziava dalla massa dei consociati.

A sua volta, per quanto attiene all'espansione (se ancora la si vuol qualificare così) del diritto romano nelle vaste aree dell'Impero, poco o nulla essa ebbe a che fare con la presenza, stanziale o meno, delle armate. Queste assicuravano, fondamentalmente, soltanto una qualche sicurezza e stabilità dei traffici che veicolavano forme e schemi giuridici romani. Nulla di più. Il *ius* di cui erano utenti, nella vita intracastrense, i *militēs*, appunto per essere ad essi *proprium* e *singulare*, non era comunicabile ai 'civili' con cui i militari venivano a contatto, e non interessava a costoro. D'altra parte, la composita formazione delle armate non sarebbe stata neppure idonea a far sì che la gran massa diffusa dei suoi componenti, all'esterno, si regolasse alla stregua del *ius privatum Romanorum*, spesso ignoto a molti di loro, tanto meno che lo imponesse nelle relazioni interindividuali.

Per quel che atteneva ai rapporti di credito/debito che i *militēs* intessevano con i *pagani*, alle signorie che acquistavano in loco, agli scambi che praticavano, i modelli giuridici erano quelli attuati da un qualsiasi altro cittadino che si trovasse nel luogo e nel momento dato. Quindi, salvo a doversi adattare alle normative privatistiche di quelle comunità—le *poleis* tanto *foederatae* che *stipendiariae*—considerate quasi al di là di un *limes* invisibile, essendo invece divenuti *obscura oblitterataque* i *municipiorum iura*; salvo ad applicare talvolta i *iura (privatorum) peregrinorum*; salvo ad adeguarsi a talune *consuetudines* locali; ebbene, anche il *miles*, come ogni altro appartenente all'orbe romano finiva per usare quel diritto—le cui fonti furono enumerate da Gaio in capo alle sue *Institutiones*³⁴—dalle *leges* ai *responsa prudentium*, che s'era imposto, come sempre, grazie al fenomeno, si sa, che 'l'economia fa il diritto'. Fu questo, essenzialmente, il fattore che veicolò il diritto dei romani e ne fece uno strumento d'unificazione del mondo antico. Ovviamente, si trattava di un *ius* filtrato dagli operatori giuridici periferici, quella folla

³⁴ 1.2-7.

anonima cioè di legisti, avvocati, retori, scribi e simili, che non poco contribuirono ad adattamenti e distorsioni ma anche apporti ed attualizzazioni del 'diritto dei romani'. Un sistema, di fatto, plurale, che non configurò mai, tuttavia, un 'particolarismo normativo'.³⁵

³⁵ Mi permetto di rinviare, per non ripetermi, al mio *La struttura politico-constituzionale e il territorio*, relazione introduttiva del Convegno di Copanello 2002 (in pubblicazione nei relativi atti).

DE NOUVEAUX OFFICIERS ÉQUESTRES

SÉGOLÈNE DEMOUGIN*

Ce n'est pas devant un tel aréopage que je vais revenir sur la pertinence des études sur le commandement de l'armée romaine; le pionnier en avait été E. Birley,¹ et nous sommes toujours tributaires de ses travaux. La nécessité de rassembler la documentation dans un répertoire commode et mis à la disposition de tous les spécialistes et non-spécialistes s'était fait sentir; et ce fut la tâche du regretté H. Devijver que de préparer cette *Prosopographia militiarum equestrium*,² qui compte définitivement six volumes, le dernier posthume répertoriant les unités commandées par les chevaliers romains. Pourtant depuis 1993, aucun répertoire n'a vu le jour;³ il est donc grand temps d'envisager la poursuite de l'œuvre d'H. Devijver.

Mon but est de vous présenter les premiers fruits d'une récolte abondante. Je précise immédiatement que l'exhaustivité est certes le but à atteindre; mais je ne suis pas sûre d'y être parvenue, tant la production scientifique est devenue proluxe et dispersée. On ajoutera à cela le retard pris dans la parution d'un grand nombre de revues et la difficulté à faire publier les actes de colloques.

Ces premiers résultats ne concernent que les chevaliers romains qui ont effectué les milices réglementaires, qu'ils aient parcouru tout le cycle, ou qu'ils n'aient obtenu que l'un ou l'autre grade. Les dépouillements d'H. Devijver, pour des raisons bien évidentes, s'étaient arrêtés aux années 1990 et 1991, et le volume V de la *Prosopographia Militiarum*

* Mes remerciements les plus vifs vont à G. Alföldy, qui m'a très généreusement fait parvenir la liste des officiers équestres connus par les nouveaux diplômes militaires, base d'une communication présentée à un Colloque international sur ces textes, qui s'est déroulé à Berne en octobre 2004.

¹ E. Birley, *The Roman Army, Papers* (Amsterdam 1988).

² H. Devijver, *Prosopographia Militiarum Equestrium* (= *PME*) (Louvain 1976–2001).

³ On peut signaler ici que J. Spaul, *Cohors². The Evidence for and a Short History of the Auxiliary Infantry Units of the Imperial Roman Army* (Oxford 2000), 558 a donné une liste des préfets et tribuns de cohorte qui ne figurent pas dans la *PME*. Mais on ne peut pas toujours accorder confiance à cette liste, qui voit parfois des officiers équestres là où il n'y en a pas; signalons aussi que la référence à l'anonyme de Ficulea doit être changée en *AE* 1994, 375.

Equestrium, avec les dernières notices individuelles qu'il avait rédigées, est daté de 1993. Il a donc fallu prendre la suite et aller jusqu'à l'année 2005. Comme on le sait, on tient compte, dans ce type d'enquêtes, à la fois d'éléments nouveaux qui permettent d'affiner des chronologies de carrière personnelle, ou de mieux cerner des relations familiales ou sociales, et de documents dont l'édition révèle de nouveaux noms. Les personnages que nous présenterons ici seront donc de nouveaux-venus. A cet égard, il faut insister ici sur l'extraordinaire documentation qui nous vient des nouveaux diplômes militaires, apparus sur le marché du commerce de l'art dans des conditions parfois étranges sur lesquelles on n'insistera pas ici, et qui sont heureusement soumis à la sagacité des spécialistes avant de rejoindre les coffres des collectionneurs. Ces documents sont de plus en plus nombreux : après la publication du dernier volume de *Roman Military Diplomas IV*, œuvre posthume, en 2003, de M. Roxan,⁴ plusieurs dizaines de diplômes militaires ont été livrés à la curiosité scientifique.⁵

Pour le reste de la documentation, l'on se trouve face à une grande dispersion, à laquelle nous sommes confrontés et qui impose de sonder d'autres secteurs de la recherche, comme la papyrologie, avec l'extraordinaire ensemble des Papyrus Euphrates ou des ostraka de Bu Njem. Donc il s'impose de rassembler cette documentation. Mais ici je ne pourrais qu'évoquer quelques cas, parmi les plus intéressants. Pour le moment, j'ai pu dénombrer plus de deux cents⁶ officiers équestres nouveaux. On comprendra que pour la clarté de l'exposé, j'aie réparti tous ces officiers en trois catégories : tout d'abord, les officiers connus par les diplômes militaires ; les titulaires des milices équestres connus par d'autres documents ; et enfin, les carrières militaires des nouveaux procureurs, catégorie sur laquelle, là encore, a notoirement avancé la recherche.

⁴ La publication de l'ouvrage a été confiée à P. Holder et vient de paraître sous le titre *Roman Military Diplomas V* (Londres 2006).

⁵ Outre les très nombreux articles de W. Eck, A. Pangerl, B. Pferdehirt, P. Weiss, et d'autres, on citera aussi le recueil de B. Pferdehirt, *Römische Militärdiplome und Entlassungsurkunden in der Sammlung des römisch-germanischen Zentralmuseum, RGZM 37*, 1-2 (Mayence 2004) (abrégé *Militärdiplome*).

⁶ Parmi-ceux-ci, un inédit dont je remercie vivement M. Sartre de m'avoir fait connaître l'existence ; il l'avait signalé en son temps à H. Devijver qui l'avait inséré dans la *PME V*, A, 95bis. Le texte doit être publié dans *IGLS XIII/2*, sous le n° 9820.

I

J'ai, dans mon introduction, insisté sur l'abondance des nouveaux diplômes militaires. Revenons à la présence d'officiers équestres—déjà connus, en minorité, nouveaux en majorité—dans ce type de documents, qui a suscité, tout comme celle des témoins, des premiers répertoires : G. Alföldy, une première fois en 1986, a établi une liste des officiers équestres apparaissant dans des diplômes militaires ;⁷ il vient de récidiver, en 2004, en refaisant une nouvelle liste des personnages de même rang connus depuis une vingtaine d'années.⁸ Qu'il suffise ici de rappeler les effectifs énoncés par G. Alföldy : 121 officiers connus jusqu'à 1984, 136 nouveaux depuis cette date, soit 237 au total. On comprendra donc que, pour les personnes connues par les diplômes militaires, je renvoie aux travaux du grand épigraphiste. Au panorama complet donné par G. Alföldy, on ne pourra ajouter que les données les plus récentes,⁹ et en particulier l'existence, en 131, du préfet de la *cohors I^a Flavia Musulamorum*, Iulius Ho[noratus?],¹⁰ en Maurétanie Césarienne. Personne ne niera l'intérêt de ces listes, qui nous permettent, par confrontation, d'évaluer l'implication de ces données dans la connaissance que nous avons de l'une des strates les plus intéressantes de la société romaine, car elle constitue une charnière entre deux mondes.

On doit d'ailleurs remarquer que, dans les documents publiés récemment, certains d'entre eux par hasard, ont conservé soit les noms de préfets des flottes, non seulement Ravenne et Misène, qui est hiérarchiquement la plus haut placée, mais aussi ceux des escadres fluviales, moins importantes. Ainsi, l'abondance des documents de ce type a amené la connaissance de nouveaux noms de *praefecti* des deux flottes italiennes, Misène et Ravenne.¹¹ Comme on le sait, ces fonctions ne relèvent pas de la carrière militaire *stricto sensu*, mais de la carrière

⁷ Die Truppenkommandeure in den Militärdiplomen dans *Heer und Integrationspolitik* (Passau 1985, Cologne 1986), 385–436.

⁸ 'Die Kommandeure von Hilfstruppen in den Militärdiplomen: die Fortschritte unserer Kenntnisse seit 1984' (sous presse).

⁹ Du moins, celles parvenues à ma connaissance.

¹⁰ W. Eck et A. Pangerl, 'Neue Militärdiplome für die Truppen der mauretanischen Provinzen', *ZPE* 153 (2005), 188–194.

¹¹ Cela a déjà contraint W. Eck et H. Lieb, *ZPE* 96 (1993), 75–88, à présenter une nouvelle liste de ces hauts fonctionnaires équestres ; mais il faudra en refaire une nouvelle.

procuratorienne ; et sans vouloir anticiper ce que nous dirons dans notre troisième partie, il nous semble utile de signaler ainsi l'apparition, pour les flottes italiennes, qui, en dépit de leur nature militaire, constituent l'un des échelons le plus important des procuratèles ducénaires et apportent, au III^{ème} s, à leurs détenteurs le rang de perfectissime, des noms suivants :¹²

Flotte de Ravenne

1) L. Cornelius Gratus	12 juin 100	<i>RMD</i> 3 142
2) L. Cassius Seuerus	<i>ca.</i> 197	<i>SEG</i> 1985, 829 = <i>AE</i> 1993,1382 Philippopolis
3) [-] lentius Claudianus	221	B. Pferdehirt, <i>Militärdiplome</i> , 56
4) Valerius Oc(u)latius	18 décembre 225	<i>RMD</i> 3 194 Obulco ; <i>AE</i> 1999, 1363

Flotte de Misène

1) [-]	117–138	<i>ŽPE</i> , 139 (2002) 200
2) Aelius Secundinus	30 novembre 218	<i>RMD</i> 3 192 Viminacium
3) Appius Celer	29 novembre 221	<i>RMD</i> 4 304
4) [-]orus	221	B. Pferdehirt, <i>Militärdiplome</i> , 53

L'une ou l'autre flotte italienne

1) L. Messius V[-]	117–138	<i>AE</i> 1999, 1358
2) [-]	224	<i>AE</i> 1999 1354 cf. <i>ŽPE</i> , 130 (2000) 279

¹² Pour certains des documents, le plus souvent des diplômes militaires, la localisation reste inconnue

Revenons à nos simples officiers équestres. On pourra ainsi mettre en exergue les Verseni de Pérouse. Une inscription funéraire,¹³ gravée par les soins d'un certain Versenus Aper, son frère, rendait un dernier hommage à [...] Versenus L. f. Lem. Granianus, titulaire des deux premières milices : le tribunat de la trente-deuxième cohorte des volontaires, et le tribunat légionnaire de la *XVI^a Flavia Firma*, et notable municipal.¹⁴

Un L. Versenus Aper,¹⁵ originaire d'HisPELLum puisque sa patrie est mentionnée dans son matricule (*Hispello*), apparaissait déjà dans un diplôme militaire daté du 13 décembre sans doute de l'année 156¹⁶ comme tribun de la *cohors I^a Vindelicorum milliaria*,¹⁷ puis dans une inscription de Petavonium, en Hispanie, avec le grade de préfet de l'aile *II^a Flavia Hispanorum*.¹⁸ La situation semblait tout à fait claire pour la succession des milices de l'un et l'autre personnage, Granianus étant apparemment le frère d'Aper, et avait déjà été citée par R. Syme¹⁹ quand la parution d'un autre diplôme, en 1997, vint brouiller les cartes : en effet, le nouveau texte mentionne un L. Versenus Aper, *Hispello*, préfet de l'*ala VII^a Phrygum*, dont bien des commandants sont d'ores et déjà connus.²⁰ L'unité se trouvait alors en Syrie Palestine et le diplôme a été daté de 157 ou de la première moitié de 158–158.²¹ P. Weiss a proposé une reconstruction de la carrière militaire qui comprendrait une préfecture de cohorte, le tribunat de la cohorte milliaire, la préfecture de l'*ala VII Phrygum*, suivie de celle de l'*ala II Flavia* en Tarraconaise, ce qui ferait entrer notre officier dans la série des détenteurs de deux grades dans la même milice.²² Mais d'autres préfèrent placer la présence de Versenus Aper en Espagne dans la première moitié du II^{ème} siècle.²³

¹³ *CIL* XI 1937 Perusia.

¹⁴ *PME* II, V, 72. Le personnage fut *Iuuir Hispellatium et patronus municipi Arnatum*.

¹⁵ *PME* II, V, 71.

¹⁶ P. Weiss, 'Neue Militärdiplome', *ŽPE* 117 (1997), 257 (*AE* 1997, 1768).

¹⁷ *Cohors*² 2000, op. cit. (n. 3), 288.

¹⁸ Dans son article 'Historia y prosopografía del ala II flavia Hispanorum civium Romanorum', *Hispania Antiqua* 22 (1998), A. Jimenez de Furundarena a conservé la promotion directe à la préfecture de l'aile espagnole, après une préfecture de cohorte (alors qu'il s'agit d'un tribunat), et un hypothétique tribunat légionnaire.

¹⁹ R. Syme, 'Missing Persons II', *Historia* 8 (1959), 207 = *Roman Papers* I (Oxford 1979), 456.

²⁰ *PME* VI, 29.

²¹ P. Weiss, *ŽPE* 117 (1997), 256, n° 15 (*AE* 1997, 1768).

²² S. Demougín, 'Iteratio militiae', dans G. Alföldy, B. Dobson et W. Eck, eds., *Kaiser, Heer und Gesellschaft in der Römischen Kaiserzeit* (Stuttgart 2000), 121–138.

²³ P. Le Roux, *L'armée romaine et l'organisation des provinces de la péninsule ibérique* (Paris 1983), 279. Voir l'article de Jimenez, op. cit. (n. 18).

Mon second exemple est également emprunté à cette Italie des notables qui a tant contribué à l'encadrement de l'armée romaine. Un diplôme du 20 août de l'année 127, dont la provenance exacte reste inconnue, mais qui provient vraisemblablement d'un pays balkanique, lui aussi, est apparu sur le marché des antiquités à Londres. Il est délivré à un Dace, Itaxa Stamilae filius, fantassin de la *cohors secunda Lingonum*. Cette unité, installée alors en Bretagne, était commandée, alors, par un préfet, nommé C. Hedijs Verus, dont on nous précise l'origine : il est né à Pitinum Mergens.²⁴ Il se trouve que, par un de ces hasards qui sont si souvent présents dans nos études, l'on connaissait déjà ce personnage²⁵ par une grande inscription venant de Forum Sempronii, aussi en Ombrie,²⁶ qui est intéressante à plus d'un titre. Non seulement, cette inscription honorifique comporte le cursus du personnage avec une riche carrière municipale et trois milices, précisément la préfecture de la *cohors secunda Lingonum*, et aussi le tribunat de la *legio secunda Traiana Fortis*, et la préfecture de l'*ala Indiana pia fidelis*, et la mention de la statue qui lui a été offerte ; mais encore elle nous précise dans quelles conditions s'est préparé et s'est effectué cet hommage public. Notable dans les deux cités, Pitinum Mergens et Forum Sempronii, notre chevalier accepta d'y exercer les magistratures. Pour le remercier, la seconde cité lui fit, une première fois l'offre d'une statue pédestre qu'il repoussa ; les *Forosempronienes* ne se découragèrent pas, mais pour éviter un second refus, achetèrent la statue et en prévinrent ensuite l'honoré, en lui demandant quelle inscription il voulait faire figurer sur sa base. Dans le cadre des échanges évergétiques, le chevalier ne pouvait rien faire de moins que prendre à sa charge tous les frais entraînés par l'érection de la statue.

Cependant, d'autres documents nous amènent dans les complexités de l'administration et dans les dédales de la généalogie. J'en veux pour preuve l'apparition d'un officier équestre, Q. Gaius Fulvius Falerna Proculus, qui offre une dédicace à Diana Panthea, en tant que préfet d'une troisième cohorte de citoyens romains (peut-être la *cohors III Thracum*

²⁴ J. Nollé, *ZPE* 117 (1997), 269 (*AE* 1997, 1779).

²⁵ *PME* I, V, H, 2, pour la carrière telle qu'elle était connue jusqu'à la publication du diplôme de 127.

²⁶ *CIL* XI 6123 + p. 1387.

c. R. equitata bis torquata), à Mediana, en Rhétie.²⁷ Ce commandement est à dater, d'après l'éditeur, du règne de Commode.

En 2002 est publié un diplôme militaire daté de juillet/septembre 152,²⁸ délivré à un soldat en garnison en Germanie inférieure, qui appartenait à la *cohors decima quinta Voluntariorum*, commandée par Q. Gaius [Proculus]. On connaissait d'ailleurs déjà depuis longtemps un autre Gaius, Q. Gaius Q. fil. Q. nep. Q. pron. Q. abn. Q. adn. Fal. Fulvius Proculus,²⁹ dont la généalogie développée peut surprendre, mais qui se retrouve chez d'autres grands notables du Sud de l'Italie,³⁰ et à Caiatia même.³¹

Revenons à notre Gaius Proculus, qui jouit d'une généalogie très développée : il a aussi un cursus militaire, et, en particulier, il a commandé la quinzième cohorte des volontaires, en Germanie inférieure, puis a été tribun de la légion *VIII^a Augusta*, qui se trouvait en Germanie supérieure ; de plus, ce qui démontre sa place éminente dans la cité, il a été *patronus munificentissimus*, c'est-à-dire qu'il a aussi été un grand évergète. Nous nous trouvons donc face à trois officiers équestres, que nous allons naturellement réduire, dans un premier temps, à deux personnes, proches parentes l'une de l'autre. Le premier, avec sa généalogie compliquée, a obtenu deux milices, et a peut-être arrêté là ses activités militaires ; pour le second, qui est un parfait homonyme, nous ne connaissons qu'une préfecture de cohorte en Rhétie. Donc, il faut les différencier. Mais peut-on aller plus moins, pour essayer de replacer les deux hommes dans leur contexte familial ? Il semble que l'expérience est possible. Pour cela, nous devons nous transporter aux confins de la

²⁷ Une première publication a été faite par Cl.-M. Hüssen, *Das archäologische Jahr in Bayern* (1999), 46–7 (*AE* 1999, 1182), et reprise par le même auteur dans *Germania* 79 (2001), 312 et s.

²⁸ W. Eck, D. Mc Donald, A. Pangerl, *Kölner Jahrbuch* 35 (2002), 231–236 (*AE* 2002, 1724).

²⁹ *CIL* X 4579 ; *I. Caiatia* 45. Récemment, H. Solin a republié les inscriptions de Caiatia, *Le iscrizioni antiche di Trebula, Caiatia e Cubulteria* (Caserta 1993), ouvrage abrégé, pour les textes de Caiatia en *I. Caiatia*.

³⁰ Comme, par exemple P. Oppius Gal. Marcellinus P. n., P. pron., P. abn., *splendidus eques Romanus* et père d'un sénateur, *CIL* X, 1006 (*ILS* 6484 a), dans l'*ager Compsinus*, Hirpini.

³¹ Voir le milieu équestre de Caiatia, avec L. Pacideius L. f. L. nep. L. pron. Ter. Carpius, lui aussi *splendidus eques Romanus*, *CIL*, X 4590 (*ILS* 5014.) = *I. Caiatia* 56, dont la fille avait épousé un sénateur ; et l'un des fils homonyme est aussi connu comme préfet de la cohorte *V^a Hispanorum*, en Mésie supérieure, le 8 février 161 (*RMD* I 55) ; voir aussi *CIL* X 4606 = *I. Caiatia*, 76.

Lycie, de la Pisidie, et de la Phrygie, dans une agglomération appelée Takina, où l'on a trouvé des fragments d'un dossier complet de chancellerie, bilingue, datant des années 212–213, avec un rescrit de Caracalla.³² L'empereur a été saisi par des envoyés de l'agglomération de Takina, où sont installés des colons impériaux, dont les délégués se sont transportés à Rome et ont obtenu une réponse officielle de l'empereur; authentifiée par Ofililius Theodorus, l'*a libellis*, elle est retransmise aux différents responsables administratifs, qui le font parvenir finalement aux magistrats et au peuple de Takina. Interviennent dans cette affaire non seulement le personnel de la chancellerie impériale, mais aussi des gouverneurs sénatoriaux, proconsuls, des procurateurs. Il s'agit encore une fois de lutter contre les abus de pouvoir liés à la *uehiculatio* et aux excès des soldats qui demandent l'hébergement à des communautés qui en sont parfois exemptes³³ et qui ne supportent plus leur exploitation forcée. La localisation du document fait, elle-même problème: cette plaque a été trouvée sur le territoire de Takina, en un lieu-dit situé au sud-ouest du lac de Burdur, Yarisli.³⁴ L'on se trouve dans une région où avoisinent la Phrygie, la Pisidie et la Pamphylie. Les premiers éditeurs ont considéré que Takina se trouvait dans la province d'Asie et que donc tous les officiels cités dans le document étaient, à l'un ou l'autre titre des administrateurs de cette province. Au contraire, d'autres³⁵ ont opté avec prudence pour la Lycie-Pamphylie. Donc, l'affaire dont il est question dans le texte se serait déroulée en Lycie, et que Takina devrait être placée dans cette province. En conséquence, au moins l'un des hauts personnages nommés, Gaius Tranquillus, ἀνθύπατος, était en fait le proconsul de la Lycie-Pamphylie.

³² H. French et S. Sahin, 'Ein Dokument aus Takina', *EA* 10 (1987), 125–142 (*SEG* 37 1987,1186 = *AE* 1989, 721); le texte a été republié par T. Hauken, *Petition and Response, An Epigraphic Study of Petitions to Roman Emperors 181–249* (Bergen 1998), 222 et s., n° 6.

³³ Dans le cas présent, il s'agit de préparer les tournées administratives des gouverneurs. Des documents bien connus, dans toute la partie hellénophone de l'Empire, de la fin du II^{ème} s. et des premières décennies du III^{ème} s., nous ont conservé le témoignage de conflits semblables, dont le règlement est soumis à la juridiction impériale.

³⁴ Voir en dernier lieu les considérations de T. Hauken op. cit., (n. 32).

³⁵ Cf. M. Christol et Th. Drew Bear, 'D. Fonteius Fronto, proconsul de Lycie-Pamphylie', *GRBS* 32 (1991), 47 n. 35 et aussi *CCG* IX (1998), 155 n. 50 ont estimé, avec prudence, «qu'il faut considérer qu'appartenait aussi au même ressort provincial (Lycie Pamphylie) Takina au Sud Ouest du lac de Burdur.»

C'est là où nous rejoignons nos officiers équestres, et l'identification du sénateur Gaius Tranquillus. Dans un premier temps, on a tenté de faire un rapprochement avec une très célèbre famille sénatoriale et patricienne de Vérone;³⁶ mais cette tentative devait échouer, et pour cela pour une raison simple : l'onomastique. En effet, le surnom de Tranquillus n'est pas attesté dans la *gens Gaiia* de Vérone, où l'on trouve Squilla et Gallicanus, par exemple.³⁷ Il fallait donc se tourner vers d'autres solutions ; et c'est ce qu'a fait G. Camodeca,³⁸ en observant qu'on connaissait une autre *gens Gaiia*, de rang sénatorial, à Caiatia, en Campanie. On y trouve donc Q. Gaius Q. f. Fal. Fulvius Tranquillus,³⁹ *patronus munificentissimus*, et titulaire d'une double questure. On comprendra bien alors la démarche de G. Camodeca, que je vais simplifier ici : il identifie le proconsul éventuel de la Lycie Pamphylie Gaius Tranquillus avec le sénateur de Caiatia, titulaire de deux questures, qui serait donc en 212 parvenu aux fonctions réservées aux anciens préteurs. Nous avons aussi une autre indication chronologique précieuse avec le nouveau diplôme militaire qui place l'un de nos deux officiers équestres en 152. Mais il faut aussi penser à placer une autre génération entre le tribun militaire et notre sénateur, car il s'est quand même écoulé soixante ans entre les deux personnages. Je ne veux pas faire ici de romans prosopographiques, mais simplement donner des indications. Dans ces conditions, on a le choix entre trois possibilités : ou bien le second officier, le préfet de cohorte est le père du sénateur, ou bien le tribun militaire a déjà eu un fils entré dans l'ordre sénatorial, et dont la carrière nous est inconnu ; ou bien encore, le tribun militaire a eu un fils questeur, et un petit fils, proconsul de Lycie.

³⁶ Voir en dernier lieu G. Alföldy, 'Gallicanus noster' in *Städte, Eliten und Gesellschaft in der Gallia Cisalpina* (Stuttgart 1999), 159–196.

³⁷ On ne dira rien ici des noms de Cornelius et de Cethegus, qui à l'origine constituent la nomenclature d'un fils adoptif des Gaii.

³⁸ G. Camodeca, 'Un nuovo proconsole del tempo di Caracalla e i Gavii Tranquilli di Caiatia,' *Ostraka* 3 (1994), 467–471.

³⁹ *CIL* X 4580 = *I. Caiatia* 45.

Trois généalogies possibles:

A) Q. Gaius Q. fil. Q. nep. Q. pron. Q. abn. Q. adn. Fal. Fulvius Proculus, trib. coh. 152 Q. Gaius Q. f. Fal. Fulvius Tranquillus q. Urbis, q. Narbonensis, procos. Lyciae et Pamphylicae 212	B) Q. Gaius Q. fil. Q. nep. Q. pron. Q. abn. Q. adn. Fal. Fulvius Proculus trib. coh. 152 (Q. Gaius Fulvius Tranquillus), Q. Gaius Q. f. Fal. Fulvius Tranquillus, q. Urbis, q. Narbonensis, procos. Lyciae 212 et Pamphylicae 212	C) Q. Gaius Q. fil. Q. nep. Q. pron. Q. abn. Q. adn. Fal. Fulvius Proculus trib. coh. 152 Q. Gaius Q. fil. Fal. Fulvius Tranquillus, q. Urbis, q. Narbonensis Gaius Tranquillus, procos. Lyciae et Pamphylicae

Je crois qu'il n'y a aucun doute pour ce rameau de la famille : en effet, le même terme de *patronus munificentissimus* est donné à deux personnages qui se sont acquittés d'un évergétisme similaire. En revanche, il faut essayer de placer le préfet de cohorte de la Rhétie, qui était inconnu de G. Camodeca au moment de la rédaction de son article. On a là plusieurs possibilités, qui viennent encore compliquer la situation. Ou bien on se trouve devant de très proches parents, des cousins ; les deux branches de la famille ont conservé la même nomenclature. Ou alors, il faut placer notre préfet de cohorte dans le stemma que je viens de vous présenter, étant entendu que la datation de l'autel de Mediana a été placée sous le règne de Commode : dans ces conditions, on devrait peut-être intercaler notre préfet de cohorte entre le tribun militaire et le sénateur, ce qui nous donnerait le stemma suivant :

Q. Gaius
Q. fil. Q. nep. Q. pron.
Q. abn. Q. adn. Fal.
Fulvius Proculus,
trib. coh. 152
|
Q. Gaius Fulvius
Falerna Proculus,
prae. coh.
|
Q. Gaius Q. f. Fal.
Fulvius Tranquillus),
q. Urbis,
q. Narbonensis,
procos. Lyciae
et Pamphylicae 212

Cette solution est peut-être la plus satisfaisante, dans la mesure où nous connaissons quand même assez bien, les mécanismes de la promotion de statut dans le système social romain. Ainsi, la dévotion d'un officier équestre et le don d'un petit autel dans un petit camp d'une petite province de l'Empire peut bouleverser toutes nos certitudes.⁴⁰

II

La discussion sur les Gauii nous amène tout naturellement à présenter les commandants équestres qui n'apparaissent pas dans les diplômes militaires. Là encore, nous devons déplorer l'état très lacunaire de la documentation : en effet, trop souvent nous ne disposons que de données trop simples, qui ne mentionnent qu'une seule milice, même dans le cas assez exceptionnel où l'on a retrouvé une belle série de monuments érigés par les officiers d'une même unité.⁴¹ Dans le cadre de mon article, je ne pourrais m'attarder sur ces officiers connus avec un seul grade. Mais le résultat reste quand même, pour une quinzaine d'années de publications, assez intéressant, puisque l'on dénombre⁴² une cinquantaine de personnages.⁴³

On doit tout d'abord rappeler que, dans ce cadre, il faut faire leur place à ceux des primipiles qui, entre Auguste et Claude ont accédé après leur service de centurion dans les légions aux grades équestres, et dont nous connaissons un seul exemple nouveau :⁴⁴ L. Cassius

⁴⁰ J'ajouterais qu'il n'y a pas de miracle social, ni d'émergence brutale d'une famille sénatoriale à Caiatia : en effet, comme l'a déjà remarqué G. Camodeca, on trouve à Caiatia, dès l'époque augustéenne des affranchis de la famille ; par ailleurs, G. Camodeca, op. cit. (n. 38), 471 a réussi à lire une inscription *CIL* X 4603 = *I. Caiatia* 72 qui mentionnerait deux Q. Gauii et leur mère, à la même époque.

⁴¹ On pense ici aux autels trouvés à Bölske, au sud d'Intercisa ; cf. A. Szabo et E. Toth (éds.), *Bölske. Römische Inschriften und Funde* (Budapest 2003).

⁴² Chr. Crowther, *Inscriptions of Antiochos I of Commagene and other epigraphical finds, Zeugma*. *JRA Suppl.* 51 (Portsmouth 2003), 56 n° 7 signale une inscription honorifique de Zeugma, gravée en l'honneur d'un préfet romain ; il faudra attendre la publication définitive pour être assuré de la nature de cette préfecture.

⁴³ De plus on peut s'interroger sur l'authenticité de certains documents, comme par exemple cette plaque de bronze trouvée en Bretagne et portant le nom de Marus, *trib. leg. XX*, cf. R.S.O. Tomlin et M.W.C. Hassall, *Britannia* 32 (2001) 392, n° 18 (*AE* 2001, 1297), Condercum, tenue pour authentique par P. Le Roux dans l'*AE*, l. c.

⁴⁴ Il faudra ainsi amender le tableau que j'avais présenté dans *L'ordre équestre sous les Julio-claudiens* (Rome 1988) qu'il faut augmenter des noms, déjà connus d'H. Devijver, des noms de M. Quinctius Chilo, *AE* 1990, 332, Condriano, repris dans *PME* V, Q, 1 bis et de T. Sentius Su[per], *SI* 3, 142, n° 6, cf. *PME* IV, V, 25 bis.

Corneolus.⁴⁵ Une relecture d'une inscription de Côme ferait connaître un anonyme, *euocatus ab eo* (*Tiberio Caesare*) devenu préfet de cohorte, puis tribun de vexillations; mais la reconstitution du cursus est encore à discuter.⁴⁶ Cela pose le problème de l'encadrement dans les débuts du principat, et l'impérieuse nécessité où s'est trouvé le pouvoir impérial de recourir aux services d'officiers vraiment expérimentés. Est-ce que cette solution a donné vraiment de bons résultats? Il est légitime de s'interroger, puisque ce type de promotion militaire disparaît sous le règne de Claude.

On doit aussi faire allusion ici à cet extraordinaire cursus d'un officier originaire de la colonie de Philippes, qui vient d'être publié par A. Rizakis.⁴⁷ Une première version figurait déjà au *CIL* III,⁴⁸ mais sans qu'on puisse être sûr du grade du militaire. Une seconde version, plus complète vient d'être découverte à Thessalonique;⁴⁹ le personnage, après avoir été soldat de la légion *V^a Macedonica*, passa comme sous-officier dans la cavalerie, dans l'*ala Scudulorum*. Après une période d'arrêt, où il exerça une fonction plutôt locale, il fut admis dans l'ordre équestre et parcourut les trois milices réglementaires, dans l'ordre où elles furent mises en place après le règne de Claude. Ce type de carrière n'est guère fréquent dans l'épigraphie militaire, et doit s'expliquer par des circonstances tout à fait exceptionnelles.⁵⁰

Cependant, revenons aux officiers issus vraiment de l'ordre équestre. On devra regretter, une fois de plus, que les cursus complets ne soient pas très bien représentés dans cette liste: on pourra citer ainsi, sous Hadrien Ti. Claudius Piso, ἐπάρχος τεχνειτῶν, ἐπάρχος σπείρης γ' Βρακάτης, χειλίαρχος λεγεῶνος δ' Σκυθικῆς, ἐπάρχος εἰλης ξ'

⁴⁵ *CIL* V 8845 + *ZPE* 102 (1994), 195.

⁴⁶ A. Albertini, *Atti Archeologici* (1972 [1980]), 269, n° 3 = A. Sartori, *Guida... sezione epigrafica, Raccolte Archeologiche Milano* (Milan 1994), 57, n° 917 (*AE* 1995, 653), Comum.

⁴⁷ A. Rizakis, «La carrière équestre de C. Vibius Quartus,» *MEFRA* 115 (2003, 2), 535-548.

⁴⁸ *CIL* III 647 = 7337 (*ILS* 2538), Philippes. Le personnage a été exclu de tous les répertoires prosopographiques, car on pensait qu'il n'avait pas été *praefectus*, mais *praepositus*.

⁴⁹ Cf. Rizakis 2003, op. cit. (n. 47), 540.

⁵⁰ Sur la promotion de centurion à préfet de cohorte, A. von Domaszewski, *Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres*, zweite durchgesehene Auflage von B. Dobson, (Cologne-Graz 1967), 107; voir ainsi *CIL* IX 2564, Bouianum Undecimanorum, hommage rendu à Vespasien en 75 par [-] Marcellus, ex centurion de la légion *XI^a Claudia* puis préfet de la cohorte *III^a Alpinorum*.

Φρυγῶν,⁵¹ ou P. Cutius Aburianus,⁵² au I^{er} siècle, après l'avènement de Claude, *pr(aefectus) coh(ortis) II Ituricae sag(ittariorum), tr(ibunus) coh(ortis) I Cl(audiae) Bess(orum), pr(aefectus) al(ae) ICl(audiae) Gallorum*. Il est plus difficile de trancher pour Ti. Claudius Iulianus, τρισχιλιάρχος,⁵³ qui pourrait s'être acquitté de trois milices.⁵⁴

Le résultat, comme on le voit, peut décevoir, et tient bien entendu à la nature de la documentation disponible. Nous nous heurterons d'ailleurs au même problème lorsque nous allons parler des procurateurs. L'ensemble des informations recueillies permet plus de faire l'histoire de l'armée romaine en général que celle des officiers équestres. C'est ainsi que s'est agrandie la liste des préfets de l'*ala Herculiana* d'Égypte, qui administraient aussi le district de Bérenikè, avec les noms de Claudius Lucilianus, ἐπάρχος ὀρους καὶ εἰλης Ἡρακλιανῆς, connu en 190,⁵⁵ et Aemilius Celer, ἐπάρχος ὀρους Βερεινεΐκης καὶ εἰλης Ἡρακλιανῆς, en fonctions entre 180 et 212.⁵⁶

III

Il est bien entendu, indispensable de revenir sur les rapports entre les *militiae* et le service du prince. Mais ici, je voudrais essentiellement faire état des derniers documents et des derniers travaux consacrés aux procurateurs. Les cas individuels dont je faire état ici viennent d'une banque de données qui, actuellement, a enregistré 144 procurateurs nouveaux parmi lesquels, figurent huit personnages inédits. Mais là encore, le chercheur peut être déçu : trop souvent, n'a été conservée que la mention d'une seule procuratèle ou d'une seule préfecture.⁵⁷ On

⁵¹ *Sagalassos* V 4 ; 5 ; 6.

⁵² *Epigraphica* 62 (2000), 5 (*AE* 2000, 386), Nursia.

⁵³ T. Ritti et S. Yilmaz, *MAL* (1998), 451 ; cf. *SEG* 46 (1996), 487, Hierapolis Phrygiae.

⁵⁴ Pour le sens de ces formules grecques, voir toujours H. Devijver, 'Some observations on Greek Terminologie for the *militiae equestres* in the Literary, Epigraphical and Papyrological Sources,' in *Zetesis. Album amicorum E. de Strycker* (Anvers-Utrecht 1973), 549–565 = *The Equestrian Officers of the Roman Army*, 56–72.

⁵⁵ *P. Bas.* 2, 7, l. 6 ; H. Cuvigny, « Claudius Lucilianus, préfet d'aile et de Bérénice, » in *Essays J.D. Thomas, ASP* 42 (2001), 171–174.

⁵⁶ M. Dijkstra et A.M.F.W. Verhoogt, *Berenike 1997, Report on the Excavation at Berenike*, (Leyde 1999), 209 (*SEG* 49 [1999], 2117) : il s'agit d'une inscription bilingue, en grec et en palmyrénien.

⁵⁷ C'est bien connu pour toute la documentation papyrologique.

déplorera de même que, souvent, on ne peut faire que des rapprochements onomastiques, pour des personnages différents : il en va ainsi du procureur C. Iulius Arrianus, ὁ κράτιστος ἐπίτροπος τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ, honoré à Pergé par son obligé, M. Vlpus Aurelius Nicanor qui et Theon,⁵⁸ vers 150, et l'officier T. Iulius Arrianus, Roma, qui apparaît sur un diplôme militaire du 14 septembre 151 comme tribun de la *cohors I^a Vlpia Brittonum milliaria*,⁵⁹ personnages qu'il faut naturellement dissocier.

C'est là une caractéristique de la documentation nouvelle : il est très rare que l'on puisse suivre le parcours complet d'un fonctionnaire équestre, de son service militaire (sauf pour les avocats du fisc) à la plus haute fonction qu'il ait revêtue. En ce sens, je suis au regret de constater que, sur 144 procureurs nouveaux, seuls 17 ont obtenu l'une ou l'autre des milices équestres ; et ceux qui ont suivi le cycle complet sont encore moins nombreux,⁶⁰ car nous n'en avons retrouvé que peu d'exemples, et qui souvent ne comprennent qu'une éventuelle fonction procuratorienne, comme celui d'un anonyme de Segermes.⁶¹ D'autres carrières, apparemment plus complètes, présentent d'autres difficultés.⁶²

Revenons à nos officiers équestres ordinaires. On est surpris de constater, mais ce sont les hasards de la documentation, que tous ces cursus ne sont pas de très haut niveau : certes, ils respectent en général, les étapes réglementaires, mais n'amènent pas leurs détenteurs à de très hauts postes administratifs ; les cursus réguliers sont relativement

⁵⁸ I. Perge 172.

⁵⁹ D. Isac, *AMN* 38 (2001), 49–55 (*AE* 2001, 1705), Samum.

⁶⁰ On rappellera ici le cursus de C. ? Sallius Proculus ?, *pr. coh. equit. [-], tr. coh. mill. Brittonum, pr.al. Thracum, proc. ad dilectum Maur. Caes. missus a diuo Pio, proc. Galatiae, proc. Antonini et Veri* [—] et qui s'acquitte d'un cursus municipal à Amiternum, *AE* 1983, 325, republié dans *Supplementa Italica* 9, 82, n° 31.

⁶¹ Le personnage a été ensuite ou procureur du cens en Aquitaine, ou *comes* du légat d'Aquitaine, et certainement pas légat d'Aquitaine, cf. L. Ladjimi Sebai, *Bull. Travaux INAA* 6 (1990–1991), 45–46 (*AE* 1992, 1794) = *Africa Proconsularis. Regional Studies in the Segermes Valley of Northern Tunisia* 2 (Copenhague 1995) 715 = *BACTH, Afrique du Nord* 24 (1993–1995), 165–172 ; cf. S. Demougin, *Klèma* 21 (1996), 213–222 ; W. Eck, *ΣPE* 124 (1999), 232–233.

⁶² Il en va ainsi d'un personnage figurant sur une plaque opistographe d'Alexandrie, et qui aurait pu obtenir les grades et fonctions suivants : la préfecture des ouvriers ; une préfecture d'une cohorte de volontaires ; un tribunat de cohorte ; la préfecture d'une *ala praetoria* ; au moins deux procuratèles sexagénaires ; la procuratèle centenaire du Norique, entre 180 et 211 ; cf. Fr. Kayser, « La carrière d'un procureur du royaume du Norique », *ΣPE* 122 (1998), 229–232 (*AE* 1998, 1481a) ; cf. S. Demougin et S. Lefebvre, 'Un nouveau procureur du Norique ?', *REA* 104 (2002), 223–247.

rares, et surtout, dans la documentation nouvelle, ils nous signalent surtout des personnes dont la carrière reste modeste, jusqu'aux postes sexagénaires ou centenaires. L'une des meilleures illustrations de mon propos se trouve dans un cursus tout récemment reconstruit par G. Alföldy,⁶³ celui d'un certain [M. Appuleius-]. Celui-ci qui, après avoir été admis parmi les cinq décuries de juges, a parcouru les trois milices réglementaires, à savoir une préfecture de cohorte,⁶⁴ le tribunat de la légion II Traiana fortis, puis une préfecture d'aile dont la dénomination a disparu; il a obtenu ensuite une procuratèle sexagénnaire, probablement celle de l'annone à Puteoli, [*proc(urator)*] *Aug(usti) ab ann[ona ad Pu]teolos*, avant d'être promu, toujours dans la même classe, à la préfecture d'une flotte en laquelle G. Alföldy propose de voir la *classis Alexandrina*. La grande nouveauté de cette carrière consiste en la révélation d'une procuratèle équestre inconnue à ce jour, celle de l'annone à Pouzzoles,⁶⁵ dont le titulaire aurait eu la tâche d'administrer à la fois les transports frumentaires et les installations portuaires. Dans sa reconstitution, G. Alföldy propose de dater l'ensemble du cursus du règne de Trajan et le met en parallèle avec celui d'un personnage bien connu, M. Vettius Latro.⁶⁶ La carrière connue de celui-ci, passant par la procuratèle sexagénnaire *annonae Ostiae et in portu*, culmina avec le gouvernement de la Maurétanie Césarienne, où il se trouvait en 128.⁶⁷

Cette situation pose évidemment le problème des possibilités de faire carrière pour un officier; certainement, en dehors des familles très favorisées par leurs liens avec le pouvoir central, il fallait une certaine chance et bien des appuis. De cette petite série émerge cependant un personnage marquant, C. Seruilius Diodorus, un Africain originaire de Djerba, pour lequel nous disposons d'un véritable dossier.⁶⁸ Les cinq

⁶³ G. Alföldy, 'Ein römischer Ritter aus Cossura (Pantelleria),' *ŽPE* 151 (2005), 193–213, surtout 193, n. 1 pour l'histoire de la publication de ce document.

⁶⁴ Il s'agirait de la *cohors P Vlpia Traiana Cugernorum ciuium Romanorum*.

⁶⁵ Voir le commentaire de G. Alföldy 2005, op. cit. (n. 63), 205, sur l'évolution des procuratèles équestres et affranchies à Ostie.

⁶⁶ H.-G. Pflaum, *Les carrières procuratoriennes équestres sous le Haut-Empire romain* (Paris 1960–1), 104.

⁶⁷ Au dossier de Vettius Latro, il faut désormais ajouter un diplôme militaire publié par P. Weiss, *Chiron* 32 (2002), 501–504 (*AE* 2002, 1573).

⁶⁸ D. Nonnis, *RPAA* 68 (1995–6 [1999]), 247–262 (*AE* 1998, 282), Lavinium, Latium Vetus: I (face principale): *C(aio) Seruilio Quir(ina) tribu) Diodoro, u(iro) e(gregio),/proc(uratori) (ducenario) prouinciarum Hispaniarum,/Citerioris et Superioris, item proc(uratori) (centenario) Moes(iae) inf(erioris) et regni Norici,/item proc(uratori) (sexagenario) rat(ionis) priuat(ae), praef(ecto)/alae (primae) Tungrorum Frontoniana, trib(uno) leg(ionis) (quartae decimae) Gem(inae), praef(ecto) coh(ortis) (secundae) Aurel(iae)/nouae (milliariae) equit(atae) [[Seuerianae ?]],/L(aurenti)*

textes, trouvés à Lanuvium, nous ont conservé le dossier extraordinaire, parce que complet, de la donation faite au collège local des dendrophores par C. Seruilius Diodorus pour répondre aux marques de déférence prodiguées par sa femme, Egnatia Saluiana. Les différentes pièces de ce dossier s'échelonnent du 7 septembre 227 au 18 août 228. La première inscription, la seule qui nous intéresse ici, comprend un cursus équestre⁶⁹ qui ne cache rien de son déroulement, présenté en ordre inverse. Cependant, il reste impossible de déterminer le moment exact de l'entrée de notre chevalier dans la confrérie religieuse des *Laurentes Lauinales*:⁷⁰ la mention de cette prêtrise figure ordinairement au début ou à la fin de la carrière.

Les débuts militaires sont tout à fait classiques: la préfecture d'une cohorte, la *cohors secunda Aurelia noua equitata*, peut-être *Seueriana*, stationnée en Mésie supérieure,⁷¹ est suivie du tribunat de la quatorzième légion *Gemina*, cantonnée à Carnuntum, en Pannonie supérieure.⁷² L'officier est promu enfin au commandement de l'*ala prima Tungrorum Frontoniana*, qui se trouvait alors en Dacie Porolissensis.⁷³ Contrairement à nombre de ses collègues, Seruilius Diodorus réussit à entrer dans la carrière procuratorienne, en obtenant une première fonction sexagénnaire, la procuratèle de la *ratio priuata*; comme aucun ressort italien⁷⁴ ni provincial⁷⁵ n'est indiqué, il faut affecter notre fonctionnaire à Rome,⁷⁶ où il serait le second du *procurator rationis priuatae*,⁷⁷ bien que nous connaissions

L(auinati), domo Girba ex Africa, /coniugi incomparabili, /Egnatia Saluiana/eius (uxor). II (côté droit): Dedic(atum) (ante diem septimum) Id(us) Sept(embres)/Nummio Albino et Laelio Maximo co(n)s(ulibus) (= 7 septembre 227).

⁶⁹ Le cursus a été remarquablement analysé par G. Alföldy, *Provincia Hispania Superior* (Heidelberg 2000).

⁷⁰ Cf. M.G. Granino Cecere, «Les sacerdoces publics équestres,» dans *L'ordre équestre. Histoire d'une aristocratie* (Rome 1999), 101–104; 175, n° 65.

⁷¹ *PME* VI, 104; cf. aussi Nonnis 1999, op. cit. (n. 68), 252 (*AE* 1998, 1481a).

⁷² E. Ritterling, «Legio,» in *RE* XII 2, col. 1738–9.

⁷³ *PME* VI, 38.

⁷⁴ Cf. Pflaum 1960–1, op. cit. (n. 66), 1038; *Idem*, *Les carrières procuratoriennes équestres sous le Haut-Empire romain, supplément* (Paris 1982), 110.

⁷⁵ Pflaum 1960–1, op. cit. (n. 66), 1073; 1077; 1079.

⁷⁶ Nonnis 1999, op. cit. (n. 68), 253, n. 43, pense à une direction de la *ratio priuata* en Italie; mais l'examen des titulatures de ces fonctionnaires fait repousser cette idée, car les passages en Italie sont toujours indiqués par une mention géographique.

⁷⁷ A ce propos, il faut rectifier deux références données par H.-G. Pflaum: le procurateur n° 178 bis, [-]cus Po[-], Pflaum 1960–1, op. cit. (n. 66), 449–451 et 981, s'est vu affecter du même numéro que T. Aius Sanctus, procurateur, entre autres, de la *ratio priuata*, dont la notice est présentée aux pages 1002–7.

assez mal l'organisation effective du service.⁷⁸ Passant rapidement à la classe centenaire, notre chevalier gère ensuite deux services financiers provinciaux, d'abord dans le Norique,⁷⁹ puis en Mésie inférieure. Enfin, la carrière se conclut par deux procuratèles ducénaires. La première, qui concerne l'*Hispania superior*, était totalement inconnue jusqu'ici. G. Alföldy⁸⁰ a montré que cette circonscription administrative, nouvelle mais promise à une disparition rapide, englobait les deux *conventus* de Lucus Augusti et de Bracara Augusta, autrement dit la Galice. Très curieusement, le chevalier est promu dans la péninsule ibérique qu'il ne quitte pas, pour administrer les finances de la Tarraconnaise. Nous ne sommes pas en mesure de connaître la longévité administrative de la nouvelle province : G. Alföldy a prôné une création vers 214, par analogie avec les transformations opérées en Pannonie et en Bretagne, et une disparition entre 227 et 237–8. Tous ces éléments nous permettent de placer l'activité procuratorienne de notre fonctionnaire, dans ses niveaux les plus élevés entre 214 et 227 ; quant aux débuts, on pourrait les placer vers 200, d'abord pour les milices, avant l'accession aux postes sexagénaires et centenaires. Seruilius Diodorus, né à Djerba, prit cependant sa retraite en Italie, près de Rome, où il s'était installé avec son épouse, Egnatia Saluiana. Devenu un membre de l'aristocratie locale, il ne pouvait se dérober au devoir d'évergétisme, dont il fit profiter le collège local des dendrophores, auquel furent associés ses propres affranchis.

Pour bien montrer l'importance que peuvent prendre les officiers équestres, même au III^{ème} s. où, traditionnellement, on conclut au déclin des milices, je voudrais revenir, sa pouvoir trop y insister, sur l'administration particulière des districts relevant de l'armée pour des raisons diverses liées à la sécurité de l'Empire. On sait que sur certaines frontières de l'Empire, et d'abord en Afrique, ou en Orient, l'Etat romain connut des situations parfois difficiles. Ces difficultés venaient aussi bien des peuples ou des tribus frontaliers, dont la situation n'était pas stable que d'ennemis organisés. Ainsi, au III^{ème} s., il ne fallait plus seulement sédentariser les tribus, mais encore mettre en état de défense de vastes territoires, limités ou non par des frontières naturelles. Et là nous voyons qu'administration militaire et administration civile se

⁷⁸ Voir déjà O. Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten*² (Berlin 1905), 43 et s.

⁷⁹ Cf. S. Demougin et S. Lefebvre, *REA* 104 (2002), 206–207, pour une liste des procurateurs du Norique, d'abord présidiaux, puis financiers.

⁸⁰ Alföldy 2000, op. cit. (n. 69), 17 et s.

recouper, et qu'elles sont confiées au même fonctionnaire. Je ferai là encore appel à un texte récemment publié, après avoir été découvert, avec d'autres, par hasard et d'une manière un peu rocambolesque : les *P. Euphrates* 3–4, qu'il faut dater d'entre 252 et 256, et qui concernent une affaire qui se déroule dans le district d'Appadana, non loin de Doura Europos. A propos d'une grave querelle de voisinage, il est fait appel à Iulius Proculus, dit ἐπάρχος, c'est-à-dire *praefectus*, qui occupe les fonctions de préposé à la *praetentura*. Je ne reviendrai pas ici sur des discussions sans fin sur la définition de cette *praetentura*,⁸¹ qu'il faut naturellement comprendre ici comme une zone soumise à l'administration militaire. Pour ce faire, on s'est tourné vers un officiel, en poste dans la région, ou que l'on a envoyé exprès. Cette pratique permet de mettre en valeur des personnes compétentes et capables. On connaît une petite série de ces responsables, tout d'abord en Syrie Coele même : il s'agit d'un personnage connu depuis la publication des *P. Dura*, Aurelius Rufinus, procureur impérial, qui est *praepositus praetenturae* en 221.⁸² On trouvera de même, en Bretagne, un certain Arruntius Paulinus, (ex Arrius Paulinus) *praepositus agens in praetentura*⁸³ que H. Devijver⁸⁴ ne considère pas comme un officier équestre, relevant des milices, car il ne connaît pas sa carrière antérieure. Avec un autre type d'expression, on rencontre à Gholiaia, en Tripolitaine, en 248, un Lucretius Marcellus,⁸⁵ procureur de deux Augustes, préposé à la frontière de Tripolitaine (*praepositus limitis Tripolitaniae*), le *limes* étant, dans ce cas particulier, un véritable district militaire qu'il faut à la fois fortifier et administrer. Mais chaque fois le terme de *praepositus* a été privilégié.

On sera frappé par le fait que, des trois personnages que nous venons d'évoquer, deux d'entre eux sont des procureurs impériaux, et non pas de simples officiers, et leur sont donc supérieurs. Faut-il au contraire croire que Iulius Proculus était sans doute un personnage de moindre importance, et peut-être doit-on en déduire qu'il ne s'occupait pas de toute la défense de la rive de l'Euphrate, mais juste du secteur d'Appadana. De plus, ce personnage est appelé ἐπάρχος, *praefectus*, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut. Faut-il vraiment y voir le commandant d'une unité

⁸¹ M.P. Speidel, 'The Roman road to Dunata (Jawf in Saudi Arabia) and the frontier strategy of praetensione colligare,' *Historia* 36(1987), 213–221.

⁸² *P. Dura* 64; 66.

⁸³ *RIB* 1229; 1152.

⁸⁴ *PME* V, p. 2008.

⁸⁵ H.-G. Pflaum, *Les procureurs équestres sous le Haut-Empire romain* (Paris 1950), 124. Cf. Y. Le Bohec, *RHD* 69 (1991), 307–330.

auxiliaire ? On sait qu'en 251, la célèbre *cohors XX^a Palmyrenorum*, dont nous avons conservé une partie des archives, et qui était commandée par un tribun, avait laissé la place à la cohorte *II^a Vlbia Paphlagonum equitata*, sans doute confiée à un préfet. L'un des *P. Euphrates*⁸⁶ mentionne encore, le 21 avril 241, un soldat détaché du *numerus Palmyrenorum*, unité elle aussi commandée normalement par un tribun, χειλιάρχος. Mais nous savons aussi que l'organisation de la défense de l'Empire sur l'Euphrate était sous l'autorité du *dux ripae*,⁸⁷ installé à Doura. Il faut peut-être se rallier à l'idée que celui-ci⁸⁸ déléguait une partie de son autorité à des officiers qui recevaient un commandement, non pas sur une unité précise, mais sur une zone précise, où ils exerçaient tous les pouvoirs. C'est en ce sens qu'on peut les rapprocher, sans les assimiler, des *praefecti gentis* que nous connaissons bien en Afrique. Le *dux ripae* avait donc besoin de relais ; mais, comme il ressort des papyrus de l'Euphrate, les officiers envoyés n'avaient pas seulement une « fonction de police territoriale »,⁸⁹ ils avaient véritablement à administrer, au plein sens du terme, un territoire, mais sans avoir le prestige, par exemple d'un procureur, dont ils recevaient pourtant vraisemblablement les responsabilités. On voit là la souplesse du système romain : il y a certes un cadre, mais il n'y a jamais de hiérarchie trop rigide, et l'on n'hésite jamais, dans une situation donnée, à employer les moyens nécessaires.

Comme j'ai déjà eu l'occasion de le dire ou de l'écrire, l'enquête sur les détenteurs des milices équestres nous en apprend, en général, plus sur l'armée que sur les individus eux-mêmes. Mais il faut dire aussi que la chance sourit parfois au prosopographe, qui, dans la masse des documents publiés, retrouve souvent, et avec plaisir, des personnages qu'il connaissait déjà, et qu'il apprend à mieux connaître.

⁸⁶ *P. Euphrates* 14 ; cf. D. Feissel et J. Gascou, *CRAI* 1989, 560.

⁸⁷ Voir B. Isaac, *The limits of Empire. The Roman army in the East* (Oxford 1990), 151–2.

⁸⁸ B. Isaac a fait un rapprochement avec le *praefectus ripae fluminis Euphratis*, C. Sappius Flaus, que l'on connaît d'après une inscription de Vaison la Romaine, *CIL* XII 1357 (*ILS* 2709) ; cette fonction intervient après la préfecture de *l'ala Thracum Herculaniana*, stationnée en Syrie. Mais cet officier a été en poste entre 70 et 92 ; cf. H.-G. Pflaum, *Les fastes de la province de Narbonnaise*, XXX^e Suppl. à *Gallia* (Paris 1978), 213, n° 5.

⁸⁹ Pflaum 1978, op. cit. (n. 88), 214, citant H. Seyrig, *Syria* 22 (1941), 236–240 = *Antiquités syriennes* III (Paris 1946), 180–4 (*AE* 1947, 172).

MARINES AND MARINERS IN THE ROMAN IMPERIAL FLEETS

JASPER OORTHUIJS

Since Chester Starr's 1941 book *The Roman Imperial Navy* it has become generally accepted knowledge that "the crew of each warship, regardless of its size, formed one *centuria* under its *centurio* (*classicus*) in the manner of a legionary *centuria*."¹ Boldly stating his case, Starr solved one of the most problematic peculiarities in the epigraphic habit of Roman naval troops in one great swoop. The problem referred to is the following: in roughly two thirds of the extant inscriptions *milites* of the imperial fleets stated that they belonged to some kind of warship, while the other third indicated that they belonged to a *centuria*. A small number indicated neither and a very few referred to both ship and *centuria*. Starr's statement was never challenged despite the problems that clearly exist with this theory. In what follows some of those problems will be addressed.

First of all, the consequence of Starr's theory is that we have to accept the idea that *centuriones classici* commanded a great range of troops: ship's crews ranged in size from some 50 men for a *liburna* up to 400 in *quinqueremes*.² There are however no indications of different grades of *centurio* in the fleets. Moreover, because Starr squeezes a naval and army hierarchy into one, the trierarchs and navarchs, whether captains or squadron commanders, have to be forced in somewhere. Starr himself never seems to have found a satisfying solution for that problem and its practical results. While the statement quoted above would put the *centurio* in overall command, elsewhere he suggested that the *centurio* ranked below the naval officers. Did they hold command depending on the task at hand as he stated?³

¹ Ch.G. Starr, *The Roman Imperial Navy* (Chicago 1963, 3rd ed.), 57.

² Polybius I.26.7; Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* XXXII.2; J.S. Morrison, *Greek and Roman Oared Warships* (Oxford 1996), 317.

³ Starr, op. cit. (n. 1), 42–43: "The naval *centurions* at all times ranked beneath the navarchs and trierarchs", and p. 61: "It would seem more logical that the centurion,

The epigraphic evidence for Starr's theory can hardly be called extensive. Explicit support for his theory can only be found in a single inscription in which a *gubernator* referred to a *centuria*.⁴ But it requires on the other hand that at least three inscriptions where both ship and *centuria* are named be disposed of as pedantry.⁵ For those cases and for the inscriptions where troops refer to a *centuria* followed by a ship's name or where former *centuriones* refer to a ship another solution will be proposed further down. In order to provide that, one must first understand the internal structure of the fleets.

The peculiar hierarchy at the lowest levels of Rome's *classes* has often led to claims that the rowers, sailors and marines were one amorphous mass: they would all have received military training and basically have been interchangeable.⁶ It is true that the epigraphical testimonies at first sight seem to leave little room for another conclusion. There is but one inscription in which a sailor is actually described as *nauta*.⁷ In all other cases the rank and file of naval forces is described as *classici*, *gregales* and of course as *milites*. *Manipularii* (or *manipulares*) are usually counted among these as well.⁸

By comparison to the extensive specialization found in the legions and auxilia, it is illogical to think that in the *classes* there would not even have been a differentiation between those looking after the mobility of the ship and those doing the fighting. This is all the more surprising, because it flies in the face of a long-established naval tradition, not just in the Roman, but in the Greek and Hellenistic world as well.

while at sea, should command only the small group of marines and have no other authority, and that during service of the entire crew on land the naval ranks would be generally disregarded and the centurion become chief."

⁴ CIL X 3385: D(is) M(anibus) | M(arci) Antoni Apol[loni(?)] | gubernato[ris] | centur[ia] Ar[ri(?)]. Might it be presumed that *centur(ia)* is written in a much fuller version than the usual sign for *centuria*?

⁵ Starr, op. cit. (n. 1), 63 n. 29 mentions CIL VI 3165 and IX 42. The latter may be a misreading (CIL IX p. 652). Other cases have since been published in AE 1939, 227 and AE 1978, 311.

⁶ M. Reddé, *Mare Nostrum* (Rome 1986), 523. Starr suggests military training for all (op. cit. [n. 1], 58), but finds no evidence for the group itself and emphasises his *centuria* = ship's crew theory. G. Webster, *Roman Imperial Army* (Oklahoma 1998, 3rd ed.), 166 follows Starr.

⁷ AE 1900, 185.

⁸ Starr, op. cit. (n. 1), 59. Kienast disagreed on the basis of AE 1896, 21 alone, but deplored the lack of further evidence to support his contention that *manipulares* were the decksoldiers of the Roman fleets (*Untersuchungen zu den Kriegsfлотten der Römischen Kaiserzeit* [Bonn 1966], 23 and n. 61).

Rowers and sailors on the one hand and marines, the boarding party, on the other, usually came from different property and status classes.⁹ Is it really necessary to expect Augustus to have changed that tradition radically?

At the very end of the Republican era Octavian's fleets fought Marc Antony with (probably specialized) legionaries embarked as a boarding party. These marines were certainly not part of the crew of these ships.¹⁰ Did Augustus change the situation? He was confronted with three possibilities:

⁹ L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Baltimore 1995, 2nd, revised ed.), 304–309;

¹⁰ Polybius 6.19; Livy XXIV.11; J.H. Thiel, *A History of Roman Sea-Power before the Second Punic War* (Amsterdam 1954), 196; J.H. Thiel, *Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times* (Amsterdam 1946), 12, 59, 189. Thiel theorized that some 40 marines belonged to the permanent establishment of the navies (*Studies*, 196), but based that solely on Polybius VI.19, which says that the lowest property class did naval service. Perhaps it was a reaction to bad experiences suffered or simply through long-time naval service, at the end of the civil wars, specialized marine legions begin to appear. Lucius Trebius of CIL V 938, *miles classicus* for 17 years in Augustus' service may have been one of these: L. Keppie, *Colonisation and Veteran Settlement, 47–14 BC* (Rome 1983), 31. The same goes for Gabienus in Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* VII.178. Judging by the extant evidence several *legiones classicae* must have existed as early as 43 BC. The colonies of Suessa and possibly Teanum had *Classica* in their titulare, indicating the settlement of legions with the same epithet (Appian, *Bella Civilia* IV.3; CIL X 4832; Keppie, *Colonisation* 18. Keppie points out that 'Cl' in the case of Teanum could be emended to *Classica* or *Claudia*, pp. 139–141. The latter is the emendation of the CIL: CIL X 4781, 4799. Pliny does not give *Classica* as part of the titulare of either town however: *Naturalis Historia* III.63. Dating of these colonies: Keppie, *Colonisation* 141, 143). No number is known for the legions that supposedly colonized these towns. Legio VIII colonized Teanum, but no naval service is known (Keppie, *Colonisation* 140). However, other *legiones classicae* are known by number. Caius Edusius was *centurio* of Legio XXXXI and *centurio classicus*, while Caius Cannutius and Aticius belonged to Legio XXX *Classica* (CIL XI 4654 = ILS 2231; Keppie, *Colonization* 31 and appendix n. 94. Aticius: CIL X 18 = ILS 2232 = Keppie, *Colonisation* appendix n. 76. Cannutius: AE 1997, 1416. For Legio XXX *Classica*, see E. Ritterling, Legio in *PWRE* XII, 1821. According to Ritterling, Legio XXX *Classica* is probably the same Legio XXX that settled in Beneventum). Antony too had at least one *Legio Classica*, evidenced by his legionary series of coins (Ritterling, 'Legio', 1768. Many other coins in this series carry galleys reminding of naval service). Finally, by far the most famous and only surviving imperial legion with naval service in its heritage is Legio X *Fretensis*. Both its epithet *Fretensis* (*Fretum Siculum*, the strait of Messina) and its emblems, the galley and dolphin, hark back to the days when this legion served in the war against Sextus Pompeius. See Ritterling, 'Legio', 1671, updated by E. Dabrowa, 'Legio X *Fretensis*' in Y. Le Bohec, *Les légions de Rome sous le Haut-Empire* (Paris 2000), 317–325 without any new information on the origin of this legion. See also D. Barag, 'Brick Stamp- Impressions of Legio X *Fretensis*', *Bj* 167 (1967), 244–267.

- Augustus did not change the internal structure of the fleets and planned to use legionary or auxiliary troops as marines when needed;
- Augustus incorporated specialized marines into the standing fleets as a separate, possibly higher status category of personnel;
- Augustus ensured that all rowers and sailors were also militarily trained and could instantly replace one another at whatever task they were supposed to perform.

The proposition here is that the situation during Augustus' reign is best described by the first option: the legionary troops were withdrawn from the fleet and included in the overall reorganization of legions into a new legionary establishment. This is confirmed by the make-up of the fleet in Forum Iulii. These squadrons, Tacitus states, were installed at Forum Iulii *valido cum remige*, with strong crews.¹¹ Despite the usual reservations about Tacitus' use of technical terminology, what needs to be understood here is that Tacitus is indeed describing the rowers of the fleet, not marines, nor the crews as a whole.¹² This statement may be corroborated by a small number of epitaphs from the area around modern Nice. They attest to an otherwise unknown unit, the *Cohors Nautarum* or *Nauticarum* and date to the early Julio-Claudian period. They are the following inscriptions:

CIL V 7884 = IANice 00048 = Holder¹³ n. 1904

Apolonio

Dionysio

mil(iti) co[h(ortis)] na(uticorum)

tubic(ini) h(eres) e(x) t(estamento)

¹¹ Tacitus, *Annals* IV.5. How this came to be is unclear, for it is explicitly noted in the Actium campaign histories that Antony's crews were understrength through hunger, disease and desertions (Dio L.12.7, 14.4, 15.4; Orosius VI.19; Plutarch, *Marcus Antonius* 68). For a discussion, see for instance W. Murray, 'Reconsidering the Battle of Actium—Again', in V. Gorman and E. Robinson, eds., *Oikistes. Studies in Constitutions, Colonies, and Military Power in the Ancient World Offered in Honor of A.J. Graham*. Mnemosyne Supplement 234 (Leiden 2002), 341. One may assume that the surviving crews of Antony's fleet were redistributed over a selected number of ships and/or that they were reinforced with rowers and sailors from Octavian's own fleet.

¹² Tacitus clearly uses *remiges* (and the related *remigium*) in those situations where he wants to indicate those who are responsible for moving the ship or the crew *in* it. Cf.: (propulsion) *Annals* II.6; III.1; XII.56; XIV.4; XVI.2; *Agricola* 10.5; *Germania* XLIV.2; *Histories* II.35, V.23 (crew) XIV.5; XIV.39; *Histories* III.76; V.21. For Tacitus' value for hierarchy, see M. Ducos, 'La hiérarchie militaire dans les sources littéraires', in Y. Le Bohec, ed., *La hiérarchie de l'armée romaine sous le haut-empire* (Paris 1995), 47–52.

¹³ P.A. Holder, *The Auxilia from Augustus to Trajan*. BAR International Series 70 (Oxford 1980).

CIL V 7887 = IANice 00048 = Holder n. 1902

Ti(berio) Iulio Ti(beri) Iulii F[i]rmi¹⁴

duplic(arii) coh(ortis) naut(icorum)

lib(erto) Fausto patronus

CIL V 7888 (p 931) = Holder n. 1903

Ti(berio) Iulio Vell/aconis fi[l(io)]

Glutaco

miles coh(ortis) naut(icorum)

7(centuria) Hicuris

hered(es) ex tes(tamento) h(ic) s(itus) e(st)

CIL V 7892 = IANice 00048 = Holder n. 1901

L(ucio) Nonio Quadrato co[h(ortis)] naut(icorum)

[7 (centuria)] Mum(mi) Ius(ti?) Q(uintus) Manilius et Ca[l]

ventius Rufus d(e) s(uo)

AE 1964, 249 = InAntNice-Cimiez 048 = HD003625 = Holder n. 1905

Mario Sace(?) f(ilius)

gen(te) Dareus coh(ortis)

nautic(orum) 7(centuria) Pacati h(eres) e(x) t(estamento)

h(ic) s(itus) e(st)

These tombstones, mostly lost now, were dated to the Neronian era on the basis of a derived dating of a tombstone of another unit in the area.¹⁵

The location of one of these gravestones, the unit's epithet and the eastern name of Apolonius Dionysius surely indicate a relation to the sailors of the squadron at Forum Iulii.¹⁶ In fact, if that soldier's tombstone belongs to the last decades before the birth of Christ, it is not inconceivable that Dionysius was a veteran of Antony's fleet.¹⁷ But how did this unit come to exist? Due to a lack of sources, it is debatable, but a probable solution is one that has elsewhere been suggested for the *Cohors I Classica*: when Augustus returned Gallia Narbonensis to

¹⁴ Possibly a fictitious filiation. Holder's transcription.

¹⁵ Holder, *op. cit.* (n. 13), 164.

¹⁶ Spaul, *Cohors 2*. BAR International Series 841 (Oxford 2000), 478 n. 3, suggests that the nation of Marius Sace(?), Dareus, might indicate an eastern origin too. He could have been a Phrygian. Alternatively he may have come from the French Var valley.

¹⁷ It is perhaps not insignificant that the only tombstone of a man who actually designates himself as 'nauta' is a very early one (AE 1900, 185), Lucius Boionius Zeno serving on the trireme Phryx, was undoubtedly an easterner too.

the senate's control, he may have partially disarmed it.¹⁸ Soldiers who had yet time to serve may have been transferred to an infantry unit with, it seems, a normal infantry hierarchy. The tombstone of Tiberius Iulius Glutacus obviously dates to the period after Tiberius' reign, which means that the unit stayed active during the Iulo-Claudian period, but was at some point allowed to die out. There is at least no evidence of its existence in later periods.¹⁹

Therefore it may be concluded that Augustus had a fleet in Forum Iulii which had no integral marines to serve as boarding parties.

The case of *Cohors I Classica*, which has always been connected to this early fleet, may reinforce this theory.²⁰ The connection to Forum Iulii lies in CIL XIII 923 and AE 1904, 7, both epitaphs of soldiers originating in this city.²¹ There is however no evidence for this unit ever having served in or near Forum Iulii.²² Instead, the oldest tombstones come from Eysses, Aquitania. They are the one named before and CIL XIII 924, concerning a soldier who is, judging by his *tribus*, not from Forum Iulii.²³

The purpose for which the unit was established is perhaps easier to explain. Many scholars have pointed to a single sentence in Florus

¹⁸ K. Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau* (Bern 1951), 97–98.

¹⁹ P.A. Holder, *The Roman Army in Britain* (London 1982), 119, points to CIL XVI 82, a British diploma which includes... *naut* in a fragmentary *cohors* name. The separate 'n' just before it, however, indicates a more extensive name, emended by M.G. Jarret, 'Non-Legionary Troops', *Britannia* 25 (1994), 35–77, esp. 63, to the *cohors I Menapiorum Nautarum*. See also Spaul, op. cit. (n. 16), 185.

²⁰ Kraft, op. cit. (n. 18), 97–98; Starr, op. cit. (n. 1), 188.

²¹ AE 1904, 7 = Holder, op. cit. (n. 13), no. 3143: "C(aio) Lucceio L(uci) f(ilio) Ani(ensi) veteranus cohortis I classicae et Camuriae Ter[t]iae Sertori Sertoris filia genero et filiae" (found in Forum Iulii), a veteran who may have returned to his home; CIL XIII 923 "[(Obitus) Sex(tus) Valerius Sex(t)i | f(ilius) Ani(ensi) Maxsumus(!) For[o] | Iuli mil(es) coh(ortis) I classic(ae) | 7(centuria) Petroni ann(or)um XX[3] | stipendior(um) XX[3] | h(ic) s(itus) est | C(aius) Valerius Adi[utor?] | fratri pientis[simo]."

²² The *Cohortes Classicae* served in Aquitania, Germania Inferior and Syria (Spaul, op. cit. [n. 16], 477–478), the garrison of Forum Iulii consisted of a *Cohors Ligurum*, which had been in the area for a long time ("vetus loci", Tacitus, *Historiae* II.14; see also: G.E.F. Chilver, *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus' Histories I and II* [Oxford 1979], 179). A *Cohors I Ligurum* and *Hispanorum* left many traces of its stay in the area around Nice, see Spaul, op. cit. (n. 16), 269.

²³ "Valerius Gal(lus?) | Vol(tinia?) Tutus Lu|co miles coh|ortis I class|icae an(norum) XXII | [d]ie(rum) VIII h(ic) s(itus) e(st). Kraft, op. cit. (n. 18), 98.

and Orosius concerning the operations against the Cantabri.²⁴ Both authors apparently tell of naval raids executed against the Cantabri. Aquitania would be the logical base for such operations, as is attested by Orosius. Whether the fleet from Forum Iulii had sailed around the entire peninsula to transport the troops, is debatable. However, since there is no evidence at all to help one decide, it is just as likely that the ships were built locally. Warships were not really necessary and in this case simple transports would have done. Is it then not as likely that these units were raised in Southwestern Gaul for service as *marines* with the fleet that was used against the Hispanic tribes?

The idea that this unit may have provided marines is suggested by an essential difference between the *Cohors Nautarum* and the *Cohors I Classica*: while the former probably consisted of peregrines, the latter was recruited from citizens.²⁵ Although two of the inscriptions cited for the *Cohors Nautarum* show that the soldier in question had a full *tria nomina*, this is not a definitive indication for citizenship.²⁶ One other probably does and two other tombstones do not show the *tria nomina*. No *tribus* or filiation is given. The soldiers of *Cohors I Classica* on the other hand are all citizens as is attested to by the filiation and *tribus* in even the earliest inscriptions.²⁷ In view of their higher status, and also combined with the epithet of this unit in contrast to the *Cohors Nautarum*, it is not unlikely that the troops of *Cohors I Classica* performed the task of marines, or a boarding party.²⁸

²⁴ Florus II 33.49: "nec ab Oceano quies, cum infesta classe ipsa quoque terga hostium caederentur."; Orosius VI 21.4: "tandem ab Aquitanico sinu per Oceanum incautis hostibus admoveri classem atque exponi copias iubet". Modern literature e.g. Kraft, op. cit. (n. 18), 97; D.B. Saddington, 'The Origin and Character of the Provincial Fleets of the Early Roman Empire', in V.A. Maxfield and M.J. Dobson, *Roman Frontier Studies 1989. Proceedings of the XVth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies* (Exeter 1991), 397; Reddé, op. cit. (n. 6), 350–351.

²⁵ Apart from the difference in name, location and temporal problems, this is the best indication that these two units are separate entities. Contra: Spaul, op. cit. (n. 16), 478.

²⁶ A. Mócsy, 'Die Namen der Diplomenempfänger', in W. Eck and H. Wolff, eds., *Heer und Integrationspolitik. Die römischen Militärdiplome als historische Quelle* (Cologne 1986), 462.

²⁷ For instance: CIL XIII 923: "Sex(tus) Valerius Sex(ti) | f(ilius) Ani(ensi) Maxsumus(!)", XIII 924 "Valerius: Gal(lus?) | Vol(tinia?) Tutus Lu|co" and AE 1904, 7 "C(aio) Luceio L(uci) filio Ani(ensi)". See Kraft, op. cit. (n. 18), 95.

²⁸ Mention must here be made of Kraft's theory (op. cit. [n. 18], 95) that the soldiers of *I Classica* received their citizenship from Valerius Messala Corvinus, who was in command of early operations in Aquitania. (*RE* VIII.131–158, esp. 148–153) for which he celebrated a triumph in 27 BC. Despite Augustus' later great reticence in awarding

The evidence of these early imperial auxiliary units therefore indicates that at the very beginning of his reign, Augustus did not change the Republican naval situation. And knowing the long-standing status difference between the two parts of a ship's complement, it is unlikely that he would have wanted to change it.

The obvious question now is whether this situation ever did change? An overview of the available source material is enlightening. On the question of the internal specialization one fragment of Ulpian's has often been quoted or pulled out of context. It concerns Digests XXXVII.13.1.1, usually quoted as "*In classibus omnes remiges et nautae milites sunt.*" Tempting though it may be to read that this means that all rowers and sailors were militarily trained, that would be wrong. The full paragraph runs as follows:

Item nauarchos et trierarchos classium iure militare posse testari nulla dubitatio est. in classibus omnes remiges et nautae milites sunt. Item vigiles milites sunt et iure militari eos testari posse nulla dubitatio est.²⁹

Ulpian's purpose in the chapter is to determine that those who would not be expected as such are soldiers according to military law and therefore entitled to make out their wills accordingly. He states first that for all those who serve in enemy territory (whether normally counted as soldier or not) and die there will have their wills treated as valid under military law. Ulpian then deals with naval personnel, but—and this is why it is vital to quote the whole paragraph—he is clearly implying categories by using *in classibus* and specifying which groups were involved. He could have lumped everyone together as *classici* as he did the *vigiles*. He also does not name the *centuriones classici* among the officers, for the simple reason that nobody would have any doubts as to their status. Similarly,

citizenship, this cannot be excluded for an operation this early in his reign. On the other hand, Messala had had fleet commands earlier, at Naulochus and Actium (T.R.S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* 2 [1985], 403 and 422) and Forum Iulii possibly became a *colonia* after the former battle as well (L. Keppie, 'Soldiers and Veterans at the Colony of *Forum Iulii* (Fréjus)', in Le Bohec, op. cit. [n. 12], 372). The soldiers of *I Classica* may well already have had their citizenship, either as citizens of Forum Iulii or, finally, as part of one of the *legiones Classicae* of the Civil Wars.

²⁹ "Likewise, there is no doubt that navarchs and trierarchs of the fleet can make a will according to military law. In the fleets, all the rowers and sailors count as soldiers. Likewise, *vigiles* are soldiers, and there is no doubt that they can make a will in accordance with military law."

the *Urbanici*, another unit with atypical tasks, is missing. Their military hierarchy and status, however, was undeniable.³⁰

Vegetius, an admittedly far later and not always trustworthy source, confirms this picture. He is careful to distinguish between the tasks and groups on board ship.³¹ Most importantly he describes the *milites* as wearing arms and armour in *caput* 44, having described the tasks of the rowers in the previous chapter.³² Does that mean that the armed soldiers depicted on a few naval tombstones are marines?³³ That is certainly a possibility, which could be strengthened if we could decide whether marines still held higher status and therefore were more likely to be able to pay for such elaborate and expensive memorials. It may well be that these soldiers were on detached duty from their ship (only one inscription refers to a warship, the others to a *centurio*. One mentions nothing more specific than his fleet) and performed military duties elsewhere. The same goes for the armed soldier Terentianus, serving in the Alexandrine fleet.³⁴ The only time he mentions service aboard, he is sick and lying on deck. Was he a marine or a rower? His later transfer to a legion may be related to service as a marine or due to outside influences.

What of epigraphic source material? Can we discern different groups among the hundreds of inscriptions relating to the Roman fleets? As already suggested by the discussion above, there may be a valid reason for the variation in references on tombstones.

An indication may perhaps be found in the unique rank of *sub-optio*.³⁵ It is so rare that Von Domaszewski missed it completely in his discussion, as did Dobson in his update. Reddé only mentions the rank, Starr assigns it to a shared command of the marines (together with the *optio*), while Spaul considers the existence of this rank as extra

³⁰ See H. Freis, *Die Cohortes Urbanae* (Cologne 1967), 44–45. They do figure elsewhere in texts by Ulpian in the *Digests*.

³¹ E.g.: IV.32; 38; 43–44; 45; 46.

³² By *milites* we should therefore not understand ‘matelots’ with Reddé, op. cit. (n. 6), 523.

³³ CIL III 6109 = InscrAtt 26 = AE 1999, 1485; CIL III 556a = InscrAtt 10; EE V, 208; CIL III 557 = InscrAtt 11; EE V, 201.

³⁴ P. Mich. VIII 467–468. Cf. P. Aberdeen 70.

³⁵ AE 1896, 21 = AE 1897, 51 = AE 1922, 135; AE 1961, 257 = AE 1985, 401; CIL 10, 3496; CIL 10, 3497; CIL 11, 67; CIL 11, 349 = ILS 2860; CIL 11, 3531 = ILS 2859. AE 1961, 257 is a plain list of names grouped by rank.

evidence that the *centurio* must have commanded more than just the marines aboard.³⁶

All seven inscriptions with this rank, mentioning many more than seven *suboptiones* in total, were set up by men of the *Classes Praetoriae*, judging by the fleets mentioned and/or the places where they were found. In those cases where the ship is mentioned, it concerns triremes in most cases and in one case a quadrireme. From the inscriptions, it cannot be discerned what salary level was connected with this rank. If the Q. Arruntius Valens who occurs in two separate sources is the same person, promotion to *optio* was possible and a *suboptio* therefore was not a *duplicarius*, but more likely a *sesquiplicarius* or even an *immunis*.³⁷

On a ship with 200 or more crewmen and a *centurio* in command, it would be understandable if this officer had more than one assistant. However, the larger part of those crewmen were rowers under control of the specialist naval hierarchy. The *centurio* would then only need to command the few dozen marines on board. It is unlikely that he needed more assistants to fulfil that task on the relatively small area of the ship's deck, no more than a normal *centurio* in battle needed assistance.

Two possible solutions present themselves. The *suboptio* may have been an extra assistant to the *centurio* on land, if he indeed commanded the complete crew in that case. The alternative is that the *centurio*, *optio* and *suboptio* commanded the marines only and held independent command over a group of marines aboard several ships. If so, this would be a continuance of the situation in the fleets of the Late Republic where *centuriae* of the legions detached for fleet services necessarily must have been divided across several ships.

The contract AE 1896, 21³⁸ seems to support this last option. In it, seven *classarii* of the *Classis Misenensis* are mentioned. Caius Fabullius

³⁶ Reddé, op. cit. (n. 6), 538; Starr, op. cit. (n. 1), 60; Spaul, op. cit. (n. 16), 54.

³⁷ CIL 10, 3464a; CIL 10, 3469; Starr, op. cit. (n. 1), 61. That Valens seemingly changed ships for his promotion may be significant.

³⁸ “C(aius) Fabullius Macer optio classis praetor(iae) Misenatium III(triere) | Tigride emit puerum natione Transfluminianum | nomine Abban quem Eutychen sive quo alio nomine | vocatur annorum circiter septem pretio denariorum | ducentorum et capitulario portitorio de Q(uinto) Iulio | Prisco milite classis eiusdem et triere eadem eum pue|rum sanum esse ex edicto et si quis eum puerum | partemve quam eius evicerit simplam pecuniam | sine denuntiatione recte dare stipulatus est Fabul|lius Macer spo|ndit Q(uitus) Iulius Priscus id fide sua | et auctoritate esse iussit C(aius) Iulius Antiochus mani|pularius III(triere) Virtute | eosque denarios ducentos qui s(upra) s(cripti) sunt probos recte | numeratos accepisse et habere dixit Q(uitus) Iulius Priscus | venditor a C(aio) Fabullio Macro emptore et tradedis|se(!) ei | mancipium

Macer, the buyer and an *optio*, and Quintus Iulius Priscus, a *miles* and the seller, belong to the *triere* Tigris. Gaius Iulius Antiochus, *manipularius*, and Gaius Iulius Demetrius, a *bucinator*, served on the *triere* Virtus, while the *suboptiones* Gaius Iulius Titianus and Gaius Arruntius Valens served on the Liber Pater and the Salus respectively. Finally, the *centurio* Caius Iulius Isidorus was on the *triere* Providentia.

What is immediately striking is that in this case the seven men involved serve on no less than five different ships. Interestingly, neither the *optio*, nor the *suboptiones* or the *centurio* come from the same ship. Now of course it is perfectly possible that Macer and Priscus asked crewmembers of other ships to testify to the sale, but it is at least a noteworthy coincidence that they could not find their superiors of their own ship willing to help out.

Optiones and *centuriones* of the fleets rarely figure together in inscriptions. There is in fact just one other inscription, where the *centurio* and *optio* again do not belong to the same ship.³⁹ Two inscriptions is not much to go on, but they at least seem to support the theory that the *centurio* may have been in command of a group of soldiers that was divided over several ships when serving at sea. To keep control over these smaller groups, perhaps 20–30 troops out of an assumed 80 men *centuria*, the *centurio* would have needed more than just his single *optio*. This is where the *suboptio* came in.

In this way a completely different internal hierarchy of the fleets can be reconstructed which is in fact split in two. There was one naval

s(upra) s(criptum) Eutythen bonis condicionibus | actum Seleucia Pieriae in castris in hibernis vexilla | tionis clas(sis) pr(aetoriae) Misenatium VIII Kal(endas) Iunias Q(uinto) Servilio | Pudente et A(ulo) Fufidio Pollione co(n)s(ulibus) | Q(uitus) Iulius Priscus mil(es) III(triere) Tigride vend<i=E>di C(aio) Fabullio Macro optioni | III(triere) eadem puerum meum Abbam quem et Eutythen et re|cepi pretium denarios ducentos ita ut s(upra) s(criptum) est | C(aius) Iulius Titianus(?) *suboptio* III(triere) Libero Patre et ipse rogatus pro G(aio!) Iulio Anti{h}oc(h)o manipulario III(triere) Virtute qui negavit se lit(t)eras | scire eum spondere et fide suam et auctoritate esse Abbam cuen(!) ed(!) Eutythen puerum ed(!) pretium eius denarios ducentos | ita ut s(upra) {S} scr(i)ptum est | C(aius) Arruntius Valens *suboptio* III(triere) Salute signavi | G(aius!) Iulius Isidorus |(centurio) III(triere) Providentia signavi | G(aius!) Iulius Demetrius *bucinator* pri[n]cipalis III(triere) Virtute signavi.

³⁹ I only know of one other example where they are specifically mentioned: CIL 10, 3381: “D(is) M(anibus) | C(aius) Hammonius | Fortis |(centurio) III(triere) Spe na|tione Aeg(yptus?) vix(it) | annis XXXVIII in his | mil(itavit) an(nis) XVIII C(aius) Pe/tronius Clemens opt(io?) | III(triere) Diana amico bene me|renti fecit. Clemens is in this case specifically mentioned as a friend, which may explain why the heir is not a crewmember.

hierarchy for the rowers and sailors, commanded by the trierarchs. Next to that existed a separate hierarchy, consisting of marines in a normal military hierarchy. When needed, these centuries would be divided over the ships in the squadron. This explains why some *milites* refer to both the ship and *centuria* in which they served.

When did this situation change? Literary sources combined with the evidence from a few early *diplomata* indicates such a change by the emperor Claudius. Tacitus' description of the attempted murder of Agrippina Minor mentions a trierarch and a *centurio classicus* at the same time.⁴⁰ 58 AD is then the *terminus ante quem*. Diploma CIL XVI.1 (52 AD) was issued *trierarchis et remigibus* of the fleet in Misenum.⁴¹ Chronologically, a number of diplomas follow that mention *veterani*, which is inconclusive. The change-over may be deduced from RMD IV.205, which was also formally issued to the rowers and trierarchs, but was actually granted to a *centurio*. If this was the first generation of marines in the organisation of the *classes* to qualify for *honesta missio*, then they would have started to serve in 44/45 AD, which fits precisely with Claudius army reforms.⁴² The error in the *diploma* may be due to the newness of the situation. By 86 AD, the *diploma* copyists had adapted to the new situation for in this year one finds the first *diploma* to be issued *classicis*.⁴³

The conclusion that follows, suggests itself: the *milites* that referred to a *centuria* were part of the marines of the fleets. When they referred to a ship as well, they indicated what ship they were (temporarily) attached to. That makes even more sense if one remembers that the Italic fleets especially, were not assigned to a single province. When a ship, or ships, were stationed somewhere or out on an expedition, the larger entity would have been the ships the troops served on.

⁴⁰ Tacitus, *Annals* XIV.8: “*trierarcho Herculeio et Obarito centurione classico*.”

⁴¹ Cf. CIL XVI.24 (Sept. 8, AD 79), Egypt and RMD IV.205 (Apr. 5th, AD 71), Ravenna.

⁴² C. Thomas, ‘Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms’, *Historia* LIII/4 (2004), 451.

⁴³ CIL XVI.32.

EINIGE BEMERKUNGEN¹ ZUM *STRATEGIKOS* DES ONASANDROS²

HANS MICHAEL SCHELLENBERG

Der Versuch, erfolgreiche Muster und Strukturen in der Kriegführung in Form militärischer Texte³ zu erfassen und zu systematisieren, ist seit dem vierten Jahrhundert vor unserer Zeitrechnung in Griechenland⁴ festzustellen. Über das Ende der letzten hellenistischen Staaten hinaus blieb parallel zu den aufkommenden lateinischen militärischen Texten⁵ eine griechische Tradition bestehen. Hierzu ist auch der vollständig erhaltene *Strategikos* des platonischen Philosophen Onasandros zu zählen.⁶ Inhaltlich umfasst der *Strategikos* die Aufgaben und Probleme, die

¹ Lateinische Bezeichnungen von griechischen Autoren und Werktiteln folgen dem Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, mit der Ausnahme für den *Strategikos* des Onasandros.

² Onasandros' Name ist in den Handschriften in drei Varianten überliefert: Ὀνάσανδρος, Ὀνήσανδρος oder Ὀνόσανδρος. Die übliche Schreibweise des Namens ist Ὀνόσανδρος. Vgl. Alessandro Glamberti, „Lo *Strategikōs* di Onasandro,“ in Marta Sordi, *Guerra e diritto nel mondo greco e romano* (Mailand 2002), 141f. Anders Yann Le Bohec, „Que voulait Onesandros?,“ in Yves Burnand u.a., Hg., *Claude de Lyon, Empereur Romain. Actes du Colloque Paris-Nancy-Lyon Novembre 1992* (Paris 1997), 169f. der Ὀνήσανδρος bevorzugt.

³ Eine eindeutige Definition der Textsorte, der Onasandros' Werk zugehört, gibt es nicht. Ich verwende deshalb den neutralen Begriff militärischer Text. Andere Möglichkeiten: Giusto Traina, „Polemologia,“ in Carolo Santini, *Letteratura scientifica e tecnica di Grecia e Rome* (Rom 2002), 425f. oder Burkhard Meißner, *Die technologische Fachliteratur der Antike. Struktur, Überlieferung und Wirkung technischen Wissens in der Antike (ca. 400 v. Chr.—ca. 500 n. Chr.)* (Berlin 1999). Eine Quellensammlung zum Thema bietet Brian Campbell, *Greek and Roman military writers. Selected readings* (London 2004).

⁴ Die ersten griechischen Autoren und Werke sind Xenophon: *Hipparchicus* und *De re equestri*, und Aeneas Tacticus, *Strategica*. Die ältesten derzeit bekannten militärischen Texte stammen aus dem Nahen Osten. Vermutlich aus der Zeit um 1500 vor unserer Zeitrechnung, vgl. Emmanuel Laroche, *Catalogue des Textes Hittites* (Paris 1971), Nrs. 259–262, 267 und insbesondere Nr. 284, den sogenannten Kikkuli Text.

⁵ Für die republikanische Zeit: Cato Censor und Cincius Alimentus. Unsicher ist, ob die Ankündigung des Auctor ad Herrenium 3.2 *de re militari* oder *de re administratione* schreiben zu wollen, umgesetzt wurde.

⁶ Zitiert nach der Ausgabe und Zeilenzählung von E. Korzenszky und R. Vári, *Onasandri Strategicus* (Budapest 1935), als Zusatz wird hinter der Zeilenzählung die Kapiteileinteilung der Ausgabe aus der Loeb Classical Library von The Illinois Greek Club, *Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander*, London 1928 (ND 1986) in Klammern gesetzt. Onasandros bearbeiteten William A. Oldfather, Arthur Stanley Pease und John B. Titchener.

ein idealer Befehlshaber während eines idealen Feldzuges zu Lande bewältigen muss, und er nennt die dazu notwendigen Eigenschaften, über die ein guter Befehlshaber verfügen sollte. Onasandros widmete sein Werk einem Römer, Quintus Veranius, vermutlich dem Konsul des Jahres 49 nach unserer Zeitrechnung.⁷ Die Widmung eines militärischen Textes, oder eines Textes allgemein, an eine gesellschaftlich bedeutende Persönlichkeit der römischen Führungsschicht oder an den Kaiser bot den griechischen Untertanen des Römischen Reiches die Möglichkeit, am ‚Impact of Empire‘ teilzuhaben.⁸ Welche Art der Honorierung sich Onasandros von Q. Veranius erhoffte und ob er sein Ziel erreichte, lässt sich nicht mehr feststellen.

Die äußeren Umstände seines Lebens, seine Verbundenheit mit Q. Veranius⁹ oder seine geographische Herkunft¹⁰ sind nicht näher zu bestimmen. Lediglich die *Suda* enthält einen kurzen Eintrag: Ὀνόσανδρος, φιλόσοφος Πλατωνικός. Τακτικά, Περὶ στρατηγημάτων, Ὑπομνήματα εἰς τὰς Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας.¹¹ Für den Titel von Onasandros' Werk wird dieser Eintrag, im Gegensatz zu der Subskription des Codex Mediceus-Laurentianus 55,4, 215^v, Ὀνασάνδρου στρατηγικός und der Erwähnung bei Leo VI., *Tactica* 14.112, Ὀνήσανδρος δὲ καὶ

⁷ Für den Konsul 49 Quintus Veranius (†58 Statthalter von Britannien) als Adressaten: Glamberti 2002 a.a.O. (Anm. 2), 141f.; C.J. Smith, ‚Onasander on how to be a general‘, in Michel Austin u.a., Hg., *Modus Operandi. Essays on honour of Geoffrey Rickman* (London 1998), 151f.; Le Bohec 1997 a.a.O. (Anm. 2), 169f.; Delfino Ambaglio, ‚Il tratto „sul commandante“ di Onasandro‘, *Athenaeum* 59 (1981), 353f.; Werner Peters, *Untersuchungen zu Onasander* (Düsseldorf 1972), insbesondere 113f.; Korzenszky und Vári 1935, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), XVIIIf.; Oldfather u.a., 1928 a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 343f. Anders Erich Bayer, ‚Onasandros. Die Entstehungszeit des Strategikos,‘ *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaften* (1947), 86f. Bayer hält es für wahrscheinlicher, dass der ältere Quintus Veranius der Adressat für Onasandros Strategikos ist. Abgefasst wurde der *Strategikos*, laut Bayer, zwischen 18 und 59 unserer Zeitrechnung.

⁸ Athenaeus Mechanicus, *De machinis* 3f.: Ὅσον ἐφικτὸν μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοὺς ὑπὲρ μηχανικῆς ποιούμενῳ λόγους, ὃ σεμνότετε Μάρκελλε...; Aelianus, *Tactica* Pr. 1f. Τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τακτικὴν θεωρίαν ἀπὸ τῶν Ὀμήρου χρόνων τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσαν, αὐτόκρατορ Καῖσαρ υἱὲ θεοῦ Τραιανὲ σεβαστέ...; Plutarchus, *Moralia* 172 b: Ἀρταξέρξης ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, ὃ μέγιστε αὐτόκρατορ Τραιανὲ Καῖσαρ...; Oribanius, *Halieutica* 1.1: Ἐθνεά τοι πόντοιο πολυσπερέας τε φάλαγγας παντοίων νεπόδων, πλωτὸν γένος Ἀμφιτρίτης, ἐξερῶ, γαίης ὕπατον κράτος, Ἀντωνῖνε....

⁹ Vgl. hierfür insbesondere Smith 1998, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 152f.

¹⁰ Anders Le Bohec 1997, a.a.O. (Anm. 2), 168f.

¹¹ *Suda*, O 386. Für den in dieser Zeit üblichen Gebrauch von Ὑπομνήματα εἰς τὰς Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας als Titel von Platons *Politeia* bei Onasandros vgl. die Erklärung von Heinrich Dörrie und Matthias Baltes, *Der Platonismus im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert nach Christus. Band 3 Bausteine 73–100: Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar* (Stuttgart 1993), 44, Nr. 80.4 und 202.

αὐτος στρατηγικόν συντάξας λόγον, nicht in Erwägung gezogen. Τακτικά bezeichnet allgemein einen militärischen Text,¹² dessen Autor auch *Taktikos*¹³ genannt werden kann. *Taktika* und *Taktikos* sagen in späterer Zeit nichts über den genauen Inhalt eines Werkes oder die militärische Qualifikation eines Autors aus. *Περὶ στρατηγημάτων* wird in der Bedeutung von Kriegslisten aufgefasst. Der Eintrag in der *Suda* könnte also bedeuten, dass Onasandros zwei verschiedene militärische Texte schrieb, vergleichbar mit Sextus Julius Frontinus,¹⁴ oder dass zwischen Τακτικά und *Περὶ στρατηγημάτων* ein ἦ ausgefallen ist und er nur einen militärischen Text schrieb, dessen Titel der Quelle der *Suda* nicht eindeutig überliefert wurde. *Περὶ στρατηγημάτων* könnte auch der erklärende Zusatz zu Τακτικά sein.¹⁵

Einen Lösungsansatz für dieses Problem bietet ein paralleler Wortgebrauch in der *Suda*. Aeneas Tacticus, Autor von *Strategica* aus dem vierten Jahrhundert vor unserer Zeitrechnung, schrieb laut Polybius Αἰνεΐας δὲ βουλευθεὶς διορθώσασθαι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπορίαν, ὃ τὰ περὶ τῶν Στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα συντετάγμενος...¹⁶ In der Quelle der *Suda* wurde daraus Αἰνεΐας· οὗτος ἔγραψε περὶ πυρσῶν, ὡς φησι Πολύβιος, καὶ περὶ στρατηγημάτων ὑπόμνημα.¹⁷ Eine Prüfung, ob

¹² *Suda*, D 49: Δαμόκριτος, ἱστορικός. Τακτικά ἐν βιβλίῳ β...; *Suda*, P 1956: Πολύβιος, Μακεδών, ῥήτωρ. *Περὶ* Θηβῶν, Τακτικά βιβλία γ. *Suda*, E 1923: ἐκ τῶν Τακτικῶν. Ἐπαγωγή πάλιν ἐστίν... Joannes Lydus, *De magistratibus* 1.9 übersetzt Buch eins von Paternus *De re militari* mit: Πάτερνος ὁ Ῥωμαῖος ἐν πρώτῃ Τακτικῶν...

¹³ Photius, *Lexicon* s.v. Ζυγός. Ἐν τοῖς τακτικοῖς... Xenophon wird bei Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 2.56 als ἀνὴρ τὰ τ' ἄλλα γεγονώς ἀγαθὸς καὶ διὰ καὶ φίλιππος καὶ φιλοκύνητος καὶ τακτικός, ὡς ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων δῆλον bezeichnet. Joannes Lydus, *De magistratibus* 3.33 nennt Celsus *Taktikos*: ...καὶ συγγραφήν περὶ τοῦτου μονήρη Κέλσος ὁ Ῥωμαῖος τακτικός... Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 4.15: Γεγόνασι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Ξενοκράτεις πέντε· ὃ τε τακτικός ἀρχαῖος... Allein aufgrund der Bezeichnung *Taktikos* an der Autorenschaft von Cornelius Celsus zu zweifeln, wie Christian Schulze, *Celsus* (Hildesheim 2001), 13, ist nicht nötig.

¹⁴ Der Titel des verlorenen Werkes von Frontinus wird bei Joannes Lydus, *De magistratibus* 1.47 angegeben: ...ὁ Φροντίδος ἐν τῷ. De officio militari [oder legati], ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Στρατηγίας*... Vermutlich zitiert Joannes Lydus, *De magistratibus* 3.3 ein Fragment aus *De officio militari* [oder legati]: ...ὡς ὁ Φροντίδος λέγει...

¹⁵ Herman Köchly und Wilhelm Rüstow, *Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller*, Band 2.1 (Leipzig 1853), 84f. und Oldfather u.a. 1928, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 343 vermuteten schon, dass nur ein Werk gemeint ist, dass Τακτικά eine Sammelbezeichnung für einen beliebigen militärischen Text und *Περὶ στρατηγημάτων* eine zusätzliche Erklärung des Inhaltes ist, oder dass zwischen Τακτικά und *Περὶ στρατηγημάτων* ein ἦ ausgefallen ist.

¹⁶ Polybius, *Historiae* 10.44. Polybius bespricht 10.43f. militärische Signalzeichen, zitiert hierfür Aeneas Tacticus als Beispiel und nennt später noch 10.45f. Kleoxenos und Demokleitos.

¹⁷ *Suda* A 215: Αἰνεΐας· οὗτος ἔγραψε περὶ πυρσῶν, ὡς φησι Πολύβιος, καὶ περὶ στρατηγημάτων ὑπόμνημα. Zu diesem Eintrag gehört noch *Suda* K 1726: Κλεόξεος

Περὶ στρατηγημάτων bei Onasandros' Nennung in der *Suda* nur mit „über Kriegslisten“ übersetzt werden kann oder ob andere Übersetzungen möglich sind, wurde nicht in Erwägung gezogen. Das Wort *Strategemata* hat nicht die alleinige Bedeutung von Kriegslisten¹⁸ und ist auch in der *Suda* mehrdeutig: Στρατήγημα· σόφισμα, ἢ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἡγεμονία, ἢ κατόρθωσις.¹⁹ Anstatt Τακτικά mit einem Komma von Περὶ στρατηγημάτων abzutrennen, sollte ein Doppelpunkt gesetzt werden: Ὀνάσανδρος, φιλόσοφος Πλατωνικός. Τακτικά· Περὶ στρατηγημάτων (= ἢ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἡγεμονία), Ὑπομνήματα εἰς τὰς Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας.²⁰ Der Eintrag beinhaltet damit sachlich richtige Werkinformationen, zusätzlich werden weder Aeneas Tacticus²¹ noch Onasandros²² außerhalb der *Suda* mit Werken über *Strategemata* (Kriegslisten) in Verbindung gebracht.

Nicht mehr nachvollziehbar bleibt, ob die Quelle der *Suda* Onasandros in die richtige philosophische Denkrichtung eingeordnet hat.²³ Die Zuordnung Onasandros' zur einer der philosophischen Denkrichtungen, wie etwa dem mittleren Platonismus, anhand des Wortgebrauches

καὶ Δημόκλειτος ἔγραψαν περὶ πυρσῶν· ὧν τὴν πραγματείαν ἐξειργάσατο Πολύβιος ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης, ὡς λέγει ἐν τοῖς ἱστορουμένοις.

¹⁸ Everett Lynn Wheeler, *Strategem and the vocabulary of military trickery* (Leiden 1988), 3 mit Anmerkung 8 und 9: Both *strategema* and *strategika* derive from the same family of words headed by στρατηγός (general) and its verb στρατηγέω (to be a general). Both have clear and basic military connections and both appear in the first half of the fourth century BC. As the nominative neuter plural of the adjective *strategikos*, *strategika*, when used substantively, means “the properties of a general” or „generalship“.

¹⁹ *Suda* S 1167 und s.v. Photius, *Lexicon* allerdings hier Στρατήγημα· σόφισμα, ἢ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἡγεμονία, ἢ κατόρθωσις. Vgl. Wheeler 1988, a.a.O. (Anm. 18), 18 und Anmerkung 52: Στρατήγημα· σόφισμα, ἢ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἡγεμονία, ἢ κατόρθωσις folgende Erklärung: „Trick“ appears correctly as the first and presumably the primary definition, but certainly „principle or examples of generalship“, strategem's original definition, falls under the *Suda*'s „leadership of an army“, as would *strategika*.

²⁰ Ὑπομνήματα εἰς τὰς Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας ist mehrdeutig und kann u.a. einen Kommentar zu Platons Staat bedeuten oder Kommentare zu Platons Staatsschriften. Vgl. Dörrie und Baltes 1993, a.a.O. (Anm. 11), 45 und 203f.

²¹ Vgl. Aelianus, *Tactica* 1.1f und Polybius, *Historiae* 10.44.

²² Joannes Lydus, *De magistratibus* 1.47; Leo VI, *Tactica* 14,112; Nikephorus Ouranus, Codex Constantinopolitanus Graecus 36 = F. Blass, „Die griechischen und lateinischen Handschriften im alten Serail zu Konstantinopel“, *Hermes* 23 (1888), 225. Vgl. Frank Trombley, „The Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranus and military encyclopaedism“, in Peter Binkley, Hg., *Pre-modern encyclopaedic texts*, (Leiden/Boston 1997), 271f.

²³ Dörrie und Baltes 1993, a.a.O. (Anm. 11), 202f. hegen an dem Platonismus des Onasandros Zweifel; ebenso Oldfather 1928, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 343f. Friedrich Lammert, „Griechisches Kriegswesen 1918–1938“, *Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumswissenschaften* 274 (1941), 40 stuft Onasandros ohne weitere Begründung als Peripatetiker ein.

bei der Benennung des Gegenstandes des *Strategikos*, den Onasandros beiläufig mit στρατηγικῆς δὲ περὶ θεωρίας (4, Pr. 1) erwähnt, ist aufgrund fehlender eindeutiger antiker Definitionen der verschiedenen philosophischen Denkrichtungen zur Feldherrnkunst kaum möglich.²⁴ Von den Autoren militärischer Texte ist m.E. nur Aelianus durch die mehrfache Verwendung des Begriffes *Theoria* eindeutig dem mittleren Platonismus zuzuordnen,²⁵ allerdings nicht im Zusammenhang mit der Feldherrnkunst, sondern bezüglich der Taktik.

Onasandros' *Strategikos* eignet sich aufgrund seines idealen Charakters²⁶ kaum als militärhistorische Quelle für römische oder griechische Streitkräfte. Onasandros selbst merkt an, dass er über keine militärische Erfahrung verfügt und sein *Strategikos* nur auf schriftlichen Quellen beruht.²⁷ Im Gegensatz zu seiner Ankündigung, sein Werk auf römische Erfahrung zu stützen,²⁸ verwendet er weitgehend griechische Vorlagen.²⁹

²⁴ In diese Richtung geht Pseudo-Andronicus, *De passionibus* 3.2.5: Στρατηγικὴ δὲ ἔστι θεωρητικὴ καὶ πρακτικὴ τῶν[τῶν] στρατοπέδων συμφερόντων. Vermutlich Chrysippus = Ioannes A.B. Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Stuttgart 1968, ND), 65 Nr. 267.

²⁵ Aelianus, *Tactica* Pr. 1f.: Τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τακτικὴν θεωρίαν ἀπὸ τῶν Ὀμήρου χρόνων τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσαν, αὐτόκρατορ Καῖσαρ υἱὲ θεοῦ Τραϊανὲ σεβαστέ, πολλοὶ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν συνέγραψαν οὐκ ἔχοντες, ἦν ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐπιστεύθημεν ἔξιν. Ἐμαυτὸν δὲ πείθων ἡβουλήθη τὰύτην συντάξαι τὴν... Vgl. dazu die Erwähnung bei Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 7.161: τό τε περὶ τοῦς ἀριθμοὺς μόριον[όν] τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ οὐχ ἦν ἔτυχεν οικειότητά ἐμποιεῖ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἐπάνοδον, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι τῆς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ πλάνης καὶ ἀγνοίας ἀπαλλάττει ἡμᾶς, συνεργοῦν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας γνῶσιν, πρὸς τε πολέμους εὐθετον ὑπάρχει διὰ τὴν τῶν τακτικῶν θεωρίαν. Kritischer als Aelianus äußert sich Maximus von Tyrus, *Dialexeis* 18.8 zur Bedeutung von Homer für die Taktik.

²⁶ Der *Strategikos* vermittelt ein literarisches Bild des ‚guten Feldherrn,‘ vgl. dazu Herbert Plöger, *Studien zum literarischen Feldherrnporträt römischer Autoren des 1. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Cicero, *De imperio Cn. Pompei*; Caesar, *Bellum Gallicum*; Sallust, *Bellum Iugurthinum*; Livius, *Ab urbe condita* XXI–XLV; Onasandros, *Strategikos*) (Kiel 1975).

²⁷ Onasandros, *Strategikos* 33f. (Pr. 7f.). Schon an der Eignung des Demetrius von Phalerum einen militärischen Text, laut Diogenes Laertios, *Vitae philosophorum* 5.80 Στρατηγικῶν α β, schreiben zu können, bestehen begründete Zweifel, vgl. Stephen V. Tracy, ‚Demetrius of Phalerum: Who was he and who was he not?,‘ in William W. Fortenbaugh und Eckart Schütrumpf, Hg., *Demetrius of Phalerum. Text, Translation, and Discussion* (New Brunswick 2000), 331 und 337f.

²⁸ Onasandros, *Strategikos* 39f. (Pr. 8f.).

²⁹ Für die Quellen des *Strategikos*, die aus der Zeit zwischen dem 4. und 2. Jahrhundert vor unserer Zeitrechnung stammen, vgl. den Kommentar zu Onasandros von Peters 1972, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), ergänzt durch die Arbeit von Ambaglio 1981, a.a.O. (Anm. 7). Die Anmerkungen Helmut Gugels, ‚Bemerkungen zur Darstellung von Catilinas Ende bei Sallust (Ein Beitrag zur antiken Feldherrntopik),‘ in Doris Albeitinger u.a., Hg., *Festschrift Karl Vretska* (Heidelberg 1970), 368f. zu den Quellen des *Strategikos* beruhen auf einem Irrtum. Peters Kommentar wurde weder von Ambaglio 1981, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), noch von Le Bohec 1997, a.a.O. (Anm. 2), noch von Smith 1998, a.a.O. (Anm. 7) oder Glamberti 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 2) zur Kenntnis genommen.

Er ist kein Mitglied der militärischen oder politischen Führungsschicht des Römischen Reiches, sondern ein gelehrter griechischer Privatmann und damit ohne einen direkten Einblick in die Kriegführung. Ohne diesen Einblick ist es mehr als fraglich, ob Onasandros die sachliche Richtigkeit militärischer Informationen oder ihre Anwendbarkeit einschätzen konnte. Onasandros' Selbsteinschätzung, als Philosoph³⁰ einen militärischen Text schreiben zu können, auch ohne über die dazu notwendigen Qualifikationen zu verfügen, scheint das keinen Abbruch getan zu haben.³¹ Die Kritik, die solchen Philosophen entgegengebracht wurde, spiegelt sich in der Anekdote über den Peripatetiker Phormio wider, der am Hofe des Antiochus in Ephesus Hannibal einen belehrenden Vortrag *de imperatoris officio et omni de re militari* hielt. Während alle griechischen Zuhörer begeistert waren, hatte Hannibal für diesen Vortrag lediglich Hohn und Spott übrig.³²

Überträgt man Beobachtungen in anderen militärischen Texten auf Onasandros' *Strategikos*, liegt der Verdacht nahe, dass Onasandros auch einen älteren Text wörtlich abgeschrieben haben könnte oder zumindest große Stücke aus verschiedenen militärischen Texten ohne Rücksicht auf eventuelle Sinnzusammenhänge oder widersprüchliche Meinungen direkt in seinen *Strategikos* übernommen haben könnte.³³ Ein Vergleich

³⁰ Onasandros ähnlich sind Asclepiodotus und Athenaeus Mechanicus; vgl. Lucien Poznanski, *Asclépiodote. Traité de tactique* (Paris 2002) und David Whitehead und P.H. Blyth, *Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Machines* (Περὶ μηχανημάτων) (Stuttgart 2004).

³¹ Onasandros, *Strategikos* 17f. (Pr. 4f.): Τὸ δὲ σύνταγμα θαρροῦντι μοι λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν ὡς στρατηγῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἄσκησις ἔσται παλαιῶν τε ἡγεμόνων κατὰ τὴν σεβαστὴν εἰρήνην ἀνάθημα...; 39f. (Pr. 8): οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐσχεδιασμένον ἀπολέμωι καὶ νεωτέραι γνῶμῃ τόδε περιέχει τὸ σύνταγμα, ἀλλὰ πάντα διὰ πράξεων καὶ ἀληθινῶν ἁγῶνων κεχωρηκότα μάλιστα μὲν Ῥωμαίοις.

³² Cicero, *De oratore* 2.75f. Vgl. dazu Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 4.13.58: Ἀννίβαλ ἀκούσας Στωικοῦ τινος ἐπιχειροῦντος ὅτι ὁ σοφὸς μόνος στρατηγικός ἐστιν, ἐγέλασε νομίζων ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐκτὸς τῆς δι' ἔργων ἐμπειρίας τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἐπιστήμην σχεῖν. Phormion ist unbekannt. Vgl. Anton D. Leeman u.a., *M. Tullius Cicero. De Oratore Libri III. Kommentar von Anton D. Leeman, Harm Pinkster und Hein L.W. Nelson*, 2. Band: Buch I, 166–265; Buch II, 1–98 (Heidelberg 1985), 289. Eine ähnliche Anekdote aus dem Umkreis des Hannibal und Antiochus bietet Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 5.5.

³³ Peters 1972, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 248f. Festzustellen zwischen Athenaeus Mechanicus, *De machinis* 9f. und Vitruv, *De architectura* 10.13f. die beide fast wörtlich das Werk des Agesistratus übernommen haben, während Agesistratus wiederum ältere Werke übernahm, unter anderem das des Diades. Ebenso auffällig sind die Abhängigkeiten der Taktik des Arrianus von der des Aelianus und beider zusammen von der Taktik des Asclepiodotus. Das beste Beispiel ist Vegetius' *Epitoma rei militaris*. Das deutet m.E. nicht auf eine kaum veränderte Kriegführung, sondern auf eine nicht notwendigerweise mit der Kriegführung verbundene Militärliteratur. Anders gedeutet durch Everett Lynn Wheeler, 'The legion as phalanx in the late empire (I)', in Yann Le Bohec u.a.,

des *Strategikos* mit zeitgleichen militärischen Texten³⁴ entfällt aufgrund der Quellenlage. Die *Strategemata* des Sextus Julius Frontinus sind zwar überliefert, inhaltlich aber nicht vergleichbar. Von *de re militari* des Cornelius Celsus blieben nur Fragmente übrig,³⁵ von *Strategemata* des Arztes Hermogenes aus Smyrna³⁶ und von *Strategika* des Melesermos³⁷ lediglich die Titel.

Bezeichnend für Onasandros' militärisches Denken und die Probleme, die sich bei der Rekonstruktion von römischer Militärgeschichte daraus ergeben, ist die Beziehung zwischen Xenophons *Cyropaedia* 2.3.17–20 und Onasandros' *Strategikos* 362f. (10.4).³⁸ Onasandros beschreibt ein

Hg., *L'armée Romaine de Dioclétien à Valentinien Ier* (Lyon 2004), 314: „Correspondences in the tactics of Arrian, Julius Africanus, Vegetius, Syrianus Magister, and Ps.-Maurice surely derive from doctrine, the *legionis ius* (Vegetius's phrase, 2.17), not one author's reliance on another's text.“

³⁴ Für das einzige Fragment der Konstitutionen des Augustus vgl. *Digesten*, 49,16,12.

³⁵ Schulze 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 13), 13f. Auch Celsus ist ohne militärische Erfahrung. Ein Fragment, wahrscheinlich von Cornelius Celsus, zitiert Joannes Lydus, *De magistratibus* 3.33.

³⁶ Georg Petzl, Hg., *Die Inschriften von Smyrna. Teil I: Grabinschriften, posthume Ehrungen, Grabepigramme* (Bonn 1982), Nr. 536. Hermogenes' *Strategemata* ist der einzige inschriftlich erwähnte militärische Text.

³⁷ Suda M 489: Μελήσερμος, Ἀθηναῖος, σοφιστής. Ἔγραψεν Ἐπιστολῶν ἐταιρικῶν βιβλία ἰδ, καὶ ἀγροικικῶν α, Μαγειρικῶν ἐπιστολῶν βιββλίον α, Στρατηγικῶν βιβλίον α, Συμποσιακῶν βιβλίον α.

³⁸ Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 2.3.17–20 (Marchant): Ἐκάλεσε δ' ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ὁ Κύρος καὶ ὄλην ποτὲ τάξιν σὺν τῷ ταξιάρχῳ, ἰδὼν αὐτὸν τοὺς μὲν ἡμίσεις τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῆς τάξεως ἀντιτάξαντα ἐκατέρωθεν εἰς ἐμβολήν, θώρακας μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ἔχοντας καὶ γέρρα ἐν ταῖς ἀριστεραῖς, εἰς δὲ τὰς δεξιὰς νάρθηκας παχεῖς τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν ἔδωκε, τοῖς δ' ἑτέροις εἶπεν ὅτι βάλλειν δεῖσοι ἀναιρουμένους ταῖς βόλοις. Ἐπεὶ δὲ παρεσκευασμένοι οὕτως ἔστησαν, ἐσήμηνεν αὐτοῖς μάχεσθαι. Ἐνταῦθα δὴ οἱ μὲν ἔβαλλον ταῖς βόλοις καὶ ἔστιν οἱ ἐτύγχανον καὶ θωράκων καὶ γέρρων, οἱ δὲ καὶ μηρῶν καὶ κνημίδος. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁμοῦ ἐγένοντο, οἱ τοὺς νάρθηκας ἔχοντες ἔπαιον τῶν μὲν μηρῶν, τῶν δὲ χειρῶν, τῶν δὲ κνήμας, τῶν δὲ καὶ ἐπικυπτόντων ἐπὶ βόλους ἔπαιον τοὺς τραχήλους καὶ τὰ νῶτα. Τέλος δὲ τρεψάμενοι ἐδίωκον οἱ νάρθηκοφόροι παῖοντες σὺν πολλῶι γέλωτι καὶ παιδιᾷ. Ἐν μέρει γε μὴν οἱ ἕτεροι λαβόντες πάλιν τοὺς νάρθηκας ταῦτά ἐποίησαν τοὺς ταῖς βόλοις βάλλοντας ταῦτα δ' ἀγασθεῖς ὁ Κύρος, τοῦ μὲν ταξιάρχου τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, τῶν δὲ τὴν πειθᾶ, ὅτι ἅμα μὲν ἐγμυνάζοντο, ἅμα δ' ἠϋθυμοῦντο, ἅμα δ' ἐνίκων οἱ εἰκασθέντες τῇ τῶν Περσῶν ὀπλίσει, τοῦτοις δὴ ἡσθεῖς ἐκάλεσέ τε ἐπὶ δεῖπνον αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ ἰδὼν τινὰς αὐτῶν ἐπιδεδεμένους, τὸν μὲν τινα ἀντικνημῖον, τὸν δὲ χεῖρα, ἥρῳα τί πάθοιεν. Οἱ δ' ἔλεγον ὅτι πληγέιν ταῖς βόλοις. Ὁ δὲ πάλιν ἐπῆρῳα πότερον ἐπεὶ ὁμοῦ ἐγένοντο ἢ ὅτε πρόσω ἦσαν. Οἱ δ' ἔλεγον ὅτε πρόσω ἦσαν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁμοῦ ἐγένοντο, παιδιὰν ἔφασαν εἶναι καλλίστην οἱ νάρθηκοφόροι· οἱ δὲ συγκεκομμένοι τοῖς νάρθηξιν ἀνέκραγον ὅτι οὐ σφίσι δοκοῖη παιδιὰ εἶναι τὸ ὁμόθεν παῖεσθαι· ἅμα δὲ ἐπεδείκνυσαν τῶν νάρθηκῶν τὰς πληγὰς καὶ ἐν χερσὶ καὶ ἐν τραχήλοις, ἐνίοι δὲ καὶ ἐν προσώποις. Καὶ τότε μὲν ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἐγέλων ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις. Τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ μεστὸν ἦν τὸ πεδῖον πᾶν τούτους μιμουμένων· καὶ εἰ μὴ ἄλλο τι σπουδαιότερον πράττειεν, ταύτῃ τῇ παιδιᾷ ἐχρῶντο. Onasandros, *Strategikos*, 362f. (10.4): Εἵτα διελὼν τὰ στρατεύματα πρὸς

Heer, das in zwei Teile geteilt und mit Stöcken (νάρθηκας ἢ στύρακας ἀκοντίων), Erdklumpen (βόλους) und Lederstreifen (ἱμάντων ταυρείων) bewaffnet wird, und so gegeneinander um verschiedene Geländearten (λόφους ἢ βουνούς ἢ ὄρθιους τόπους) kämpfen soll. Auf eine genaue Beschreibung, welcher Teil des Heeres wie bewaffnet werden soll oder auf welche Art und Weise die Teile des Heeres gegeneinander kämpfen sollen, verzichtet Onasandros genauso wie auf eine Beschreibung des Geländes. Der Sinn und Zweck der von Onasandros empfohlenen Vorgehensweise wird durch seine allgemein gehaltene Beschreibung nicht deutlich. Diese Stelle wird als Beleg für die Existenz von Übungsschlachten und Übungswaffen der römischen Streitkräfte zur Zeit des Onasandros herangezogen.³⁹

Die Bewaffnung eines Heeres mit Stöcken und Erdklumpen ist so ungewöhnlich, dass nur Xenophons *Cyropaedia* 2.3.17–20 als Quelle in Frage kommt.⁴⁰ In der *Cyropaedia* lässt Xenophon Kyrus beobachten, wie ein *Taxiarch* seine Soldaten in voller Rüstung mit Stöcken (νάρθηκες) und Erdklumpen (βόλοι) gegeneinander kämpfen lässt. Die mit Stöcken bewaffneten Soldaten tragen deutlich weniger Verletzungen aus diesem Kampf davon als die mit Erdklumpen bewaffneten. In der *Cyropaedia* verdeutlicht Xenophon auf diese Weise die Überlegenheit des Nahkampfes/Nahkämpfers über den Fernkampf/Fernkämpfer.⁴¹ Bei Xenophon ist diese Stelle keine ernsthafte Übung, sondern ein erzieherisches

ἀλλήλους ἀσιδήρῳ μάχῃ συναγέτω νάρθηκας ἢ στύρακας ἀκοντίων ἀναδιδούς· εἰ δὲ τινα καὶ βεβωλασμένα πεδία εἴη, βόλους τε κελεύων αἶροντας βάλλειν· ὄντων δὲ καὶ ἱμάντων ταυρείων χρήσθων ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην· δείξας δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ λόφους ἢ βουνούς ἢ ὄρθιους τόπους κελεύετω σὺν δρόμῳ καταλαμβάνεσθαι· ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήσας ἐπ' αὐτῶν τινας τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ ἀναδοὺς ἃ μικρῶι πρόσθεν ἔφην ὅπλα, τούτους ἐκβαλοῦντας ἐτέρους ἐκπεμπέτω· καὶ ἤτοι τοὺς μείναντας ἐπαινείτω καὶ μὴ ἐκπεσόντας ἢ τοὺς ἐκβαλόντας.

³⁹ Roy W. Davies, 'Fronto, Hadrian and the Roman army', in Ders., hrsg. von David Breeze und Valerie Maxfield, Hg., *Service in the Roman army* (Edinburgh 1989), 82f. Gerhard Horsmann, *Untersuchungen zur militärischen Ausbildung im republikanischen und kaiserzeitlichen Rom* (Boppard am Rhein 1991), belegt mit Onasandros Strategikos 362f. (10.4) Seite 71 Belagerungstraining, 134, 142, 144, 150, 186 römische Übungswaffen und Übungskämpfe. Vorsichtiger Philip Rance, 'Simulacra Pugnae: the literary and historical tradition of mock battles in the Roman and early Byzantine army,' *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 41 (2000), 240f.

⁴⁰ Mindestens bekannt seit Köchly und Rüstow 1853, a.a.O. (Anm. 15), 84f.; Peters 1972, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 154f.; Ambliago 1981, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 358; Rance 2000, a.a.O. (Anm. 39), 239. Vgl. Plutarchus, *Alexander* 31.1f. für eine ähnliche Begebenheit.

⁴¹ Vgl. insbesondere den Kommentar von Peters 1972, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 154f.

Spiel,⁴² die Stöcke sind keine griechische Übungswaffe und kommen in der *Cyropaedia* nur an dieser einen Stelle vor. Diesen Grundgedanken Xenophons übernimmt Onasandros oder seine Quelle und versucht, die xenophontische Fiktion durch Hinzufügung eines Kampfes um eine vage Topographie (λόφους ἢ βουνούς ἢ ὀρθίους τόπους) und eine weitere Waffe, die Lederstreifen (ιμάντων ταυτείων), in einen ernsthaften Vorschlag für eine Übungsschlacht umzuwandeln.⁴³

Ohne den Vergleich von Onasandros' *Strategikos* 362f. (10.4) mit Xenophons *Cyropaedia* 2.3.17–20 wäre der Sinn bei Onasandros kaum verständlich.⁴⁴ Der knappe Hinweis von Onasandros auf Stöcke oder die Schäfte von kurzen Wurfaffen (νάρθηκας ἢ στύρακας ἀκοντίων) wird unter anderem als Beweis für römische Übungswaffen zum Schwertkampf interpretiert.⁴⁵ Onasandros jedoch gibt keine Erklärung für die Verwendung seiner Stöcke, diese findet sich bei Xenophon: sie dienen zum Schlagen des mit Erdklumpen bewaffneten Gegners. Die Stöcke und Erdklumpen sind eine direkte Übernahme aus Xenophon und können deshalb nicht unabhängig von ihm gesehen werden. Gegen Übungsschwerter sprechen auch die Lederstreifen, die Onasandros als zusätzliche Bewaffnung empfiehlt. Sie werden als Ausrüstungsgegenstand der römischen Soldaten gedeutet, die diese Lederstreifen bei Erdarbeiten als Hilfsmittel verwendeten; die Erklärung, welchen

⁴² Nur J.K. Anderson, *Military practice in the age of Xenophon* (Berkeley 1970), 92f. hält die Stelle für eine wirkliche Beobachtung Xenophons. Dagegen spricht der Zusammenhang mit der folgenden ebenfalls fiktiven Begebenheit bei 2.3.21f. Für den spielerisch/erziehenden Charakter der Stelle 2.3.18f.: Τέλος δὲ τρεψάμενοι ἐδίωκον οἱ νάρθηκοφόροι παίοντες οὐ πολλῶι γέλωτι καὶ παιδιᾷ. Insbesondere der Schlußsatz 2.3.20 verdeutlicht, dass Xenophon keine ernste Übung im Sinn hat: καὶ τότε μὲν ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἐγέλων ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις. Τῇ δ' ὕστεραίαι μεσὸν ἦν τὸ πεδίον πᾶν τῶν τούτους μιμουμένων· καὶ αἱ μὴ ἄλλο τι σπουδαιότερον πράττοιεν, ταύτῃ τῇ παιδιᾷ ἐχρῶντο.

⁴³ Vielleicht beeinflusst durch Platon, *Leges* 828b folgend. Dort werden ebenfalls fiktive militärische Übungen beschrieben, die auch im Gelände stattfinden. Vgl. dazu Hans van Wees, *Greek warfare. Myths and realities* (London 2004), 89f. Wirklichkeitsnahe Manöver sind für das preußische Heer erst nach 1743 belegt, vgl. „Die taktische Schulung der Preußischen Armee durch König Friedrich den Großen während der Friedenszeit 1745 bis 1756,“ Heft 28, 29 und 30, in *Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften*, Herausgegeben vom Großen Generalstabe. Abteilung für Kriegsgeschichte. Fünfter Band (Heft 25–30) (Berlin 1900), 577f.

⁴⁴ Peters 1972, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 157.

⁴⁵ Für Horsmann 1991, a.a.O. (Anm. 39), 142 ist Onasandros νάρθηξ der Ersatz für ein *gladius*, stellvertretend für *clava* und *rudis*. Ohne Erwähnung und Erklärung bleiben bei Horsmann die Lederstreifen und Erdklumpen. Ebenso Rance 2000, a.a.O. (Anm. 39), 241 für „... rudis and hastae praepilatae the standard practice weapons of Roman military training.“

Zweck sie bei Onasandros erfüllen sollen, fehlt.⁴⁶ Als Beweis für die Verwendung von Lederstreifen in den römischen Streitkräften wird Flavius Josephus *Bellum Judaicum* 3.95 angeführt. Flavius Josephus zählt Lederstreifen ganz allgemein (ἱμάντα) zu den Dingen, die römische Soldaten auf dem Marsch mit sich führen.⁴⁷ Onasandros dagegen empfiehlt ihren Einsatz im Kampf (ὄντων δὲ καὶ ἱμάντων ταυρείων χρήσθων ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην) und sieht in ihnen Waffen (ὄπλα).⁴⁸ Sachlich sind die Informationen von Flavius Josephus und Onasandros nicht miteinander in Einklang zu bringen. Passend ist hier m.E. nur eine Nahkampfwaffe, die einer militärischen Übungsbewaffnung eines Heeres genauso widerspricht wie Stöcke und Erdklumpen. Lederstreifen wurden in der Antike als Boxhandschuhe verwendet. Ähnliche Stellen für Onasandros' Wortgebrauch ἱμάντων ταυρείων finden sich bei Pausanias⁴⁹ und Philostratus.⁵⁰ Leo VI, der Onasandros' *Strategikos* 850 Jahre später als eine der Hauptquellen für sein eigenes militärisches Werk verwendete, übernahm diese Stelle aus dem *Strategikos* und erweiterte sie. Verdächtig ist, dass er Onasandros' Lederstreifen nicht übernahm, während er dagegen die Stöcke und Erdklumpen beibehielt.⁵¹ Ohne sinnvollen Erklärungsversuch bleiben die Erdklumpen, die weder für Pfeile/Schleuderbleie noch für die Geschosse von Wurfmaschinen einen brauchbaren Übungsersatz abgeben.⁵²

⁴⁶ So Rance 2000, a.a.O. (Anm. 39), 241f. mit dem Verweis auf Graham Webster, *The Roman imperial army of the first and second centuries AD.* (London 1985), 130 und Abbildung III. Webster bringt Josephus, *Bellum Judaicum* 3.95 nicht mit Onasandros in Verbindung.

⁴⁷ Josephus, *Bellum Judaicum* 3.95: Τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν σπιθαμῆς οὐ πλέον ἔχει τὸ μῆκος. Φέρουσι δ' οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐπίλεκτοι πεζοὶ λόγχην καὶ ἀσπίδα, ἡ δὲ λοιπὴ φάλαγξ ξυστόν τε καὶ θυρεὸν ἐπιμήκη, πρὸς οἷς πρίονα καὶ κόφινον ἄμην τε καὶ πέλεκυν, πρὸς δὲ ἱμάντα καὶ δρέπανον καὶ ἄλυσιν, ἡμερῶν τε τριῶν ἐφόδιον.

⁴⁸ So schon Peters 1972, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 157.

⁴⁹ Pausanias, *Graeciae descriptio* 8.40.3: αἱ δὲ ἐκ βοέας ὥμης ἱμάντες λεπτοὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀρχαῖον πεπλεγμένοι δι' ἀλλήλων ἦσαν αἱ μελίσχαι.

⁵⁰ Philostratus, *De gymnastica* 10, ἀρχαία πυγμὴ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐς στροφίον οἱ τέτταρες τῶν δακτύλων ἐνεβιβάζοντο, καὶ ὑπερέβαλλον τοῦ στροφίου τοσοῦτον, ὅσον εἰ συνάγοντο, πύξ εἶναι, ξυνείχοντο δὲ ὑπὸ σειρᾶς, ἣν καθάπερ ἔρρισμα ἐβέβληντο ἐκ τοῦ πήχεος. Νυνὶ δὲ αὐτὸ μεθέστηκε, ῥινοὺς γὰρ τῶν ποτιότων βοῶν δέψοντες ἱμάντα ἐργάζονται πυκτικὸν ὄξυν καὶ προεμβάλλοντα, ὃ δὲ γε ἀντίχειρ οὐ ξυλλαμβάνει τοῖς δακτύλοις τοῦ πλήττειν ὑπὲρ συμμετρίας τῶν τραυμάτων, ὥς μὴ πᾶσα ἡ χεὶρ μάχοιτο. Ὅθεν τοὺς ἱμάντας τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκκρίνουσι τῶν σταδίων, ὀδυνηρὰς ἡγούμενοι τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν πληγὰς καὶ δυσιάτους.

⁵¹ Leo VI, *Tactica* 13.7.

⁵² So schon Peters 1972, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 156f. Anders C.M. Gilliver, *The Roman art of war* (Stroud 2001), 92: „Onasander advised that soldiers should undertake mock battles on different types of terrain to prepare them for war, charging up hills to take

Onasandros' *Strategikos* 362f. (10.4) kann m.E. nicht als Beweis für die Übungsschlachten und Waffen der römischen Streitkräfte gelten. Sein Versuch, Xenophons fiktives Spiel zu einem verwendbaren militärischen Manöver weiterzuentwickeln, führt statt zu einer Übungsschlacht zu einer „Massenprügelei“ mit Stöcken, Erdklumpen und Boxhandschuhen. Diese Stelle ist beispielhaft für Onasandros' militärisches Denken, deshalb sollten einzelne Stellen aus dem *Strategikos*, wenn überhaupt, nur nach einer eingehenden Prüfung als militärhistorischer Quellenbeleg herangezogen werden.⁵³

imaginary positions and throwing clods of earth to simulate gathering and throwing missiles.“

⁵³ Ebenso plädiert Adrian Keith Goldsworthy, *The Roman army at war 100 BC–AD 200* (Oxford 1998), 120f. für den methodisch vorsichtigen Umgang mit militärischen Texten. Ebenso thematisiert von Brian Campbell, 'Teach yourself how to be a general', *Journal of Roman Studies* 77 (1987), 13f. Selbst modernere militärische Dienstvorschriften spiegeln nicht notwendigerweise sinnvolle militärische Erfahrungen oder die Wirklichkeit des Krieges wider. Vgl. dafür Stefan Leistenschneider, *Auftragstaktik im preußisch-deutschen Heer 1871–1914* (Hamburg 2002) und Timothy Harrison Place, *Military training in the British army 1940–1944. From Dunkirk to D-Day* (London 2000). Für die stellenweise wörtliche Übernahme der *Heeresdienstvorschrift 300 Truppenführung* der Wehrmacht aus dem Jahr 1934 in das amerikanische *Field Manual 100–5 Operations* aus dem Jahr 1941 vgl. Bruce Condell und David T. Zabecki, Hg., *On the German art of war: Truppenführung* (Boulder 2001), 10.

PART THREE

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE ROMAN
IMPERIAL ARMY

L'APPROVVIGIONAMENTO DELL'ESERCITO ROMANO: MERCATO LIBERO O 'COMMERCIO AMMINISTRATO'?

ELIO LO CASCIO

La discussione sui meccanismi attraverso i quali l'esercito romano in età imperiale veniva approvvigionato continua a essere assai vivace e ha prodotto in anni recenti un'importante serie di nuovi studi, alcuni dei quali sollecitati dalla pubblicazione o ripubblicazione complessiva e sistematica di documenti di grande interesse: basti solo fare riferimento al dossier da Vindolanda e alle tavolette da Vindonissa, ai documenti dal sito di Bu Njem, in Tripolitania, che si aggiungono ai documenti papiracei da Dura Europos.¹ Questi nuovi documenti paiono consentire più sicure deduzioni circa i meccanismi concreti adottati nelle varie situazioni, anche se, com'è ovvio, restano incerti molti punti di dettaglio oltre che la possibilità di decidere sino a che punto sia legittimo generalizzare le conclusioni che se ne possono trarre. Non posso affrontare in questa sede nel suo complesso un tema di questa portata:² mi limiterò a proporre una serie di riflessioni sollecitate proprio da questi studi più recenti.

Volendo al massimo schematizzare, si può dire che, essenzialmente, siano state prospettate due contrapposte maniere di vedere il problema dell'approvvigionamento. Secondo la prima³ gli eserciti romani

¹ A.K. Bowman e J.D. Thomas, *Vindolanda: The Latin Writing-Tablets*, Britannia Monograph 4 (London 1983); A.K. Bowman e J.D. Thomas, *The Vindolanda Writing-Tablets* (Tabulae Vindolandenses II) (London 1994); A.K. Bowman e J.D. Thomas, *The Vindolanda Writing-Tablets* (Tabulae Vindolandenses), Vol. III (London 2003); cfr. A.K. Bowman, *Life and Letters on the Roman Frontier. Vindolanda and its people* (London 1994); M.A. Speidel, *Die römischen Schreibtafeln von Vindonissa* (Brugge 1996); R. Marichal, *Les ostraca de Bu Njem* (Tripoli 1992); C.B. Welles, R.O. Fink, and J.F. Gilliam, eds., *The excavations at Dura-Europos, Final Report V*, pt. 1, *The Parchments and Papyri* (New Haven 1959).

² Una presentazione sintetica, ma esaustiva dello *status quaestionis*, oltre che una disamina di quanto può emergere dalla documentazione epigrafica circa l'approvvigionamento della *legio II Augusta* in Britannia, ora in D. Nonnis e C. Ricci, 'Supplying the Roman Army: il caso della *legio II Augusta* in Britannia', in c.d.s. negli Atti del Seminario Internazionale 'Supplying Rome and the Roman Empire' (Pontignano 2004).

³ J. Remesal Rodríguez, *La annona militaris y la exportacion de aceite bético a Germania* (Madrid 1986, trad. ted. *Heeresversorgung und die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der Baetica und Germanien*, Stuttgart 1997); Id., 'Heeresversorgung im frühen Prinzipat.

sarebbero stati approvvigionati direttamente attraverso un meccanismo redistributivo con i proventi delle imposte in natura e delle rendite in natura delle proprietà pubbliche e imperiali, alcune delle quali erano localizzate in aree anche assai lontane dalle basi militari.⁴ I beni alimentari fondamentali che venivano da regioni lontane sarebbero stati trasportati per lo più dai *navicularii*, trasportatori marittimi, privati imprenditori che ne curavano su base contrattuale il trasporto per conto dell'amministrazione e che non agivano anche, necessariamente, come commercianti, *negotiatores*. Acquisti coatti a un prezzo imposto, prefissato (e dunque al di sotto di quello di mercato) o vere e proprie requisizioni (senza compenso) avrebbero fornito la quota supplementare per soddisfare i bisogni delle varie unità. La natura di questi acquisti e il loro carattere coattivo potrebbero in qualche misura dedursi dall'osservazione che Plinio fa nel suo panegirico a Traiano,⁵ prendendo lo spunto da quanto era accaduto in occasione della carestia in Egitto, quando paradossalmente a risolvere la situazione di difficoltà era valso il grano inviato in Egitto da Roma. Osserva Plinio che ormai, con l'*optimus princeps*, "emit fiscus quidquid videtur emere. Inde copiae, inde annona, de qua inter licentem vendentemque conveniat"; se ne deve dedurre che prima così non avveniva e che così l'approvvigionamento degli eserciti come quello di Roma doveva comportare forme di coa-

Eine Art, die antike Wirtschaft zu verstehen', *MBAH* 21 (2002), 69–84; Id., 'Baetica and Germania. Notes on the concept of 'provincial interdependence' in the Roman Empire', in P. Erdkamp, a cura di, *The Roman Army and the Economy* (Amsterdam 2002), 293–308; C. Carreras Monfort y P.P.A. Funari, *Britannia y el Mediterraneo. Estudio sobre el abastecimiento de aceite bético y africano* (Barcelona 1998); C. Carreras Monfort, *Economía de la Britannia romana: la importación dos alimentos* (Barcelona 2000); Id., 'The Roman military supply during the Principate. Transportation and staples', in Erdkamp, a cura di, op. cit., 70–89; P. Erdkamp, 'The Corn Supply of the Roman Armies during the Principate (27 BC–235 AD)', in Erdkamp, a cura di, 2002, op. cit. 47–69; C.R. Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire. A Social and Economic Study* (Baltimore/London 1994); un'opinione più equilibrata è espressa in Id., 'Supplying the Army. Evidence from Vindolanda', in Erdkamp, a cura di, 2002, op. cit., 204–234 (rist. in C.R. Whittaker, *Rome and its Frontiers. The Dynamics of Empire* [London/New York 2004], 88–114).

⁴ Ricorderò un solo esempio, quello del Papiro di Dura del 221 d.C., che fa riferimento alla fornitura a un distaccamento di militari—*equites e miliones*, questi ultimi forse schiavi, nella vicina Appadana—da parte di un liberto imperiale di orzo proveniente *ex praediis fiscalibus*: R.O. Fink, *Roman Military Records on Papyrus* (Ann Arbor 1971), n° 91 (P. Dura 64); vd. e.g. N. Pollard, *Soldiers, Cities and Civilians in Roman Syria* (Ann Arbor 2000), 177; Erdkamp in Id. 2002, op. cit. (n. 3), 60 n. 32.

⁵ Plinio, *Panegyricus* 29.3–5; cfr. E. Lo Cascio, *Il princeps e il suo impero. Studi di storia amministrativa e finanziaria romana* (Bari 2000), 259s.; Id., 'L'economia dell'Italia romana nella testimonianza di Plinio', in L. Castagna e E. Lefèvre, a cura di, *Plinius der Jüngere und seine Zeit* (München/Leipzig 2003), 281–302, a 299s.

zione nell'acquisto dei prodotti (osserverei tuttavia incidentalmente che il contesto del brano pliniano non pare rendere così certo che l'allusione alle *copiae* e all'*annona* debba intendersi come indicativa anche degli approvvigionamenti militari, oltre che di quelli per la città di Roma).⁶ Sulla base della documentazione fornita dalle anfore che contenevano l'olio della Betica trasportato alle installazioni militari in Germania e Britannia, José Remesal Rodríguez è arrivato a sostenere che l'ufficio centrale dell'*annona*, col suo prefetto, deve avere avuto il compito non solo di sovrintendere all'approvvigionamento granario (e più tardi oleario) della città di Roma, ma anche al rifornimento delle unità dell'esercito in tutto l'impero, e questo già dagli inizi del Principato. A suo avviso non vi sarebbe stata inizialmente alcuna specifica organizzazione dell'*annona militaris* (come quella che poi ci sarà a partire dal terzo secolo) dal momento che l'apparato burocratico dell'*annona* urbana avrebbe anche controllato la distribuzione centralizzata degli approvvigionamenti militari. Secondo questa teoria, questa particolare maniera di risolvere il problema dell'approvvigionamento delle unità militari avrebbe ridotto fortemente la quantità di moneta richiesta per il finanziamento dell'esercito, considerato anche il limitato uso di moneta che paiono rivelare i superstiti documenti egiziani relativi al pagamento del soldo e alle detrazioni operate dall'intendenza per la corresponsione delle derrate alimentari, del vestiario e di altri beni.⁷ Più in generale questa teoria attribuisce un ruolo specifico e una politica economica "interventista" allo stato: lo scenario economico che ne risulterebbe, sarebbe quello di una "gelenkte Marktwirtschaft", per usare l'espressione di Remesal.⁸

La tesi contrapposta è quella di coloro i quali ritengono, al contrario, che i rifornimenti militari sarebbero stati sostanzialmente basati su meccanismi di mercato,⁹ indotti dal potere d'acquisto comparativamente

⁶ Così, invece, già D. Van Berchem, 'L'annone militaire dans l'empire romain au III^{ème} siècle', *Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de France* 8/10 (1937), 141; Remesal Rodríguez 1986, op. cit. (n. 3), 88; L. Wierschowski, *Heer und Wirtschaft. Das römische Heer der Prinzipatszeit als Wirtschaftsfaktor* (Bonn 1984), 153; P. Le Roux, 'Le ravitaillement des armées romaines sous l'Empire', in R. Etienne, a cura di, *Du Latifundium au latifondo* (Paris 1994), 403-416, a p. 405.

⁷ Fink 1971, op. cit. (n. 4), n° 68 e 69 (P. Gen. Lat 1 recto; P. Gen. Lat. 4).

⁸ Remesal Rodríguez 1997, op. cit. (n. 3), 83.

⁹ Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 6); cfr. Id., 'Die römische Heeresversorgung im frühen Prinzipat', *MBAH* 20 (2001), 37-61 e 'Das römische Heer und die ökonomische Entwicklung Germaniens in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 1. Jahrhunderts', in *Erdkamp*, a cura di, 2002, op. cit. (n. 3), 264-292; vedi pure A. Tchernia, 'L'arrivée de l'huile

elevato dei militari. Sarebbe, peraltro, poco rilevante se gli acquisti di specifici beni siano stati effettuati dall'intendenza delle singole unità o dai singoli soldati. In alcune aree i beni alimentari di base distribuiti sarebbero innegabilmente costituiti nei proventi delle imposte e delle requisizioni, nonché delle rendite in natura delle proprietà imperiali. Ma anche in questo caso sarebbero stati coinvolti, su una base contrattuale, commercianti e uomini di affari privati. Gli studiosi che aderiscono a questa tesi ritengono che la presenza di distaccamenti militari nelle regioni di frontiera avrebbe prodotto non solo un incremento della produzione e dello scambio a livello locale e la monetarizzazione dell'economia, ma anche che avrebbe favorito lo sviluppo del commercio sulla lunga distanza. Il modello 'tasse-commerce' dell'economia imperiale romana, prospettato da Keith Hopkins,¹⁰ comporta non soltanto la crescente importanza e anzi la prevalenza delle imposte in denaro per finanziare la spesa pubblica e in particolare la spesa militare, ma anche una netta distinzione tra le cosiddette 'tax producing' e le cosiddette 'tax consuming regions,' tra le quali le regioni vicine alla frontiera avrebbero avuto una fondamentale importanza.

Le due tesi contrapposte individuano, in sostanza, due scenari radicalmente contrapposti per l'economia imperiale e propongono due contrastanti maniere di vedere il ruolo dello stato e quello del mercato, che inevitabilmente influenza anche la maniera di interpretare la documentazione disponibile. Ciò rende persino più necessario che in altri casi definire chiaramente e in modo rigoroso le concettualizzazioni e la terminologia da adottare. Farò solo un paio di esempi. Mi sembra piuttosto ambiguo voler distinguere, come si è fatto recentemente (da parte di Breeze), tra gli 'official supplies'—quelli che derivano dalle requisizioni—e gli 'unofficial supplies,' che sarebbero 'the goods transported by merchants in the hope of being able to sell them to soldiers.' Si è voluto argomentare che

de Bétique sur le *limes* germanique: Wierschowski contre Rémesal', in *Vivre, produire et échanger: reflets méditerranéens. Mélanges offerts à Bernard Liou*. Textes rassemblés par L. Rivet et M. Sciallano (Montagnac 2002), 319–324. Spunti in questo senso si rilevano, per esempio, in M. Junkelmann, *Panis Militaris: Die Ernährung des römischen Soldaten oder der Grundstoff der Macht* (Mainz 1997), part. p. 82.

¹⁰ K. Hopkins, 'Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire', *JRS* 70 (1980), 101–125; Id., 'Rome, Taxes, Rents and Trade', *Kodai* 6/7 (1995/6), 41–75 (rist. in W. Scheidel e S. Von Reden, a cura di, *The Ancient Economy* [Edinburgh 2002], 190–230); Id., 'Rents, Taxes, Trade and the City of Rome', E. Lo Cascio, a cura di, *Mercati permanenti e mercati periodici nel mondo romano* (Bari 2000), 253–273.

market forces did not govern official supplies: here regulation operated. But market forces did govern the transport of unofficial supplies, though these market forces were parasitic on the officially stimulated trade routes.¹¹

Ciò che si vuole sostenere è in effetti meramente tautologico: le forze di mercato erano quelle che determinavano, che governavano, i rifornimenti che pervenivano attraverso il mercato, mentre non governavano quei rifornimenti che non pervenivano attraverso il mercato—ma non si dice perché certi beni (nel caso in esame la ceramica o il *garum*) sarebbero stati riforniti attraverso meccanismi di mercato e altri no; in altri termini non viene detto quali siano gli ‘official supplies’ e quali siano gli ‘unofficial supplies.’ Per di più, è difficile comprendere che cosa si voglia intendere esattamente con l’espressione “parasitic on the officially stimulated trade routes”. Osserva in un altro contributo recente LeRoux:

Il est évident que le ravitaillement des armées n’obéissait pas, à proprement parler, à une logique économique, mais il n’est pas moins évident que la logique administrative qui présidait à son organisation intégrait de nombreux facteurs d’ordre économique.¹²

Mentre capisco che cosa significa la prima affermazione, mi è più difficile dare un’interpretazione concreta della seconda, perché non comprendo quali siano stati, in quest’ottica, i “nombreux facteurs d’ordre économique”. Parimenti non comprendo bene che cosa voglia dire lo stesso LeRoux, quando spiega la sua affermazione—che l’approvvigionamento degli eserciti non rispondeva a una logica economica—nel modo seguente:

J’entends simplement par là que, contrairement à ce qu’on lit parfois, la «rationalité économique» visant la rentabilité et le profit (les intérêts commerciaux ou agricoles) n’étaient pas le seuls en cause, ni toujours primordiaux, et qu’on ne peut pas confondre les comportements de l’intendance et des ses interlocuteurs avec ceux d’entrepreneurs modernes. Pour le reste, il va de soi que l’approvisionnement des garnisons, par la mobilisation des ressources et des énergies qu’il supposait, ressortait bien à ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler l’économie, comme il ne saurait être question de nier un souci d’organisation et d’efficacité minimal qu’il faut bien appeler de l’économie.¹³

¹¹ D.J. Breeze, ‘Supplying the Army,’ in G. Alföldy, B. Dobson e W. Eck, a cura di, *Kaiser, Heer und Gesellschaft in der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Stuttgart 2000), 59–64, a p. 63.

¹² LeRoux 1994, art. cit. (n. 6), 420.

¹³ Ibid., n. 87.

A parte l'ovvia considerazione secondo la quale nessuno ha mai attribuito all'intendenza comportamenti definibili come imprenditoriali (meno, ovviamente, questo è vero per quanto riguarda, per dirla con LeRoux, gli "interlocutori" dell'intendenza), devo dire che mi riesce difficile intendere che cosa sia effettivamente per LeRoux la "razionalità economica", e che cosa queste sue considerazioni abbiano a che fare con il dibattito in corso sulle modalità dell'approvvigionamento degli eserciti romani.

Più in generale ho insistito altrove sulla dubbia utilità di ricorrere alle nozioni 'polanyiane,' a mio avviso potenzialmente fuorvianti, di 'redistribuzione' o di 'commercio amministrato' per intendere i meccanismi peculiari adottati nel caso della stessa annona urbana, l'approvvigionamento di derrate alimentari per la città di Roma.¹⁴ I 'transactional modes' diversi dal mercato paiono, al più, spiegare un'assoluta minoranza delle transazioni entro l'economia romana e in ogni caso non possono essere considerati come chiavi per intenderne la specificità e per intendere il ruolo dello stato in quest'economia, a paragone di altre economie premoderne. E' certamente vero che il grano di origine contributiva (il grano delle imposte in natura e delle rendite in natura delle proprietà imperiali) costituiva una quota consistente e strutturalmente in crescita del grano che arrivava a Roma,¹⁵ ma di per sé questo fatto non può essere considerato decisivo, se il complessivo scenario in cui lo stato operava non mutava. Non si tratta solo del fatto che erano coinvolti commercianti e trasportatori marittimi privati, ma che il loro coinvolgimento non ne modificava la qualità di impresari privati.¹⁶ Persino nella Tarda Antichità, il sistema complesso attraverso il quale Roma veniva rifornita di *caro porcina*, di carne di maiale, che arrivava come imposta in natura dalle regioni dell'Italia centrale e meridionale, non comportò la sparizione di un libero mercato, così a Roma, dove la carne di maiale veniva distribuita gratuitamente e

¹⁴ E. Lo Cascio, 'Mercato libero e commercio amministrato in età tardoantica,' in C. Zaccagnini, a cura di, *Mercanti e politica nel mondo antico* (Roma 2003), 307-325; Id., 'The Role of the State in the Roman Economy—Making Use of the New Institutional Economics,' in P.F. Bang, M. Ikeguchi, H. Ziche, a cura di, *Ancient Economies, Modern Methodologies. Archaeology, Comparative History, Models and Institutions* (Bari 2006), 217-236.

¹⁵ Vd. per esempio E. Lo Cascio *L'organizzazione annonaria*, in S. Settis, a cura di, *Civiltà dei Romani, I, La città, il territorio, l'impero* (Milano 1990), 229-248.

¹⁶ E. Lo Cascio, 'Ancora sugli «Ostia's services to Rome»: collegi e corporazioni annonarie a Ostia', *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome. Antiquité* 114 (2002), 87-109.

venduta, come nelle regioni di provenienza: la procedura dell'*adaeratio*, e cioè la conversione in moneta di un'imposta in natura, comportava l'esistenza di un *forum rerum venalium*, di un mercato, e di una formazione del prezzo in esso.¹⁷

Se le nozioni 'polanyiane' di 'redistribuzione' e di 'commercio amministrato' non aiutano a comprendere gli sviluppi dell'annona urbana, a ben più forte ragione non sembrano utili nel caso dell'approvvigionamento dell'esercito. La documentazione egiziana esaminata da Wierschowski e da altri dopo di lui,¹⁸ ma soprattutto, ora, la testimonianza delle tavolette di Vindolanda mostrano come lo scenario mercantile sia stato sempre prevalente (e andrà sottolineato come l'organizzazione degli approvvigionamenti sia ciò che viene più e meglio attestato da questa documentazione, che comprende un grosso numero di conti con menzione frequente delle varie unità monetarie). E' forse banale segnalare la varietà di attori economici civili che seguivano l'esercito e che sono ricordati nelle tavolette (anche se bisogna ammettere, con gli editori, che talvolta resta incerto se l'indicazione di un mestiere o di un'attività configuri la persona in questione come un civile e non un militare). Alcuni documenti testimoniano, peraltro, con sicurezza la presenza di civili. I due documenti che gli editori giudicano più significativi al riguardo sono il conto relativo al grano di Tabula Vindolandensis 180 e la lettera o bozza di petizione di Tabula Vindolanda 344, evidentemente attribuibili alla stessa persona, che si qualifica "*hominem transmarinum et innocentem*" che tratta "*mercem*", evidentemente un civile che denuncia i maltrattamenti subiti dai militari.¹⁹ E' parimenti banale ricordare l'arco estremamente ampio e vario di beni consumati, soprattutto, ovviamente, dagli ufficiali e dalle loro famiglie, ma anche dai soldati semplici. Parecchi conti illustrano l'importanza fondamentale per la vita nei campi militari che aveva l'approvvigionamento e la distribuzione di una varietà di beni alimentari²⁰ (tra cui ad

¹⁷ E. Lo Cascio, '*Canon frumentarius, suarius, vinarius*: stato e privati nell'approvvigionamento dell'*Vrbs*', in W.V. Harris, a cura di, *The transformations of Vrbs Roma in Late Antiquity* (Portsmouth R.I. 1999), 163-182; Lo Cascio 2003, op. cit. (n. 14).

¹⁸ Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 6); C.E.P. Adams, 'Supplying the Roman Army: *O. Petr. 245*', *ŽPE* 109 (1995), 119-124; Id., 'Supplying the Roman Army. Bureaucracy in Roman Egypt', in A. Goldsworthy e I. Haynes, a cura di, *The Roman Army as a Community* (Portsmouth RI 1999), 119-126; R. Alston, *Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt. A Social History* (London/New York 1995), part. 110ss.

¹⁹ Tab. Vindol. 180, cfr. Bowman e Thomas 1994, op. cit. (n. 1), 33, 121ss.; e Tab. Vindol. 344, Bowman e Thomas 1994, 329ss.

²⁰ Cfr. la tabella in Bowman 1994, op. cit. (n. 1), 69.

esempio una varietà di tipi di carne di diversi animali: ciò che mostra, incidentalmente, il rilievo che aveva la carne nella dieta del militare). Tra i beni che erano destinati al consumo degli stessi soldati semplici c'erano persino prodotti che potremmo definire di lusso come il pepe, proveniente dalle regioni oltre i confini dell'Impero.²¹ Infine è interessante come non manchi nei documenti da Vindolanda la stessa allusione ai prezzi di mercato: l'autore di una lettera (Tabula Vindolandensis 302) pare che dia istruzioni al suo corrispondente circa l'acquisto di "*mala formonsa*," di mele di bell'aspetto, e di uova in grosse quantità, "*si ibi aequo emanantur*," se sono in vendita a un buon prezzo.²²

Mi sembra di cruciale importanza distinguere tra l'approvvigionamento di un esercito in marcia, o durante una campagna militare, e l'approvvigionamento di truppe di stanza in campi permanenti sul *limes*. Nel primo caso, il 'living off the land' e dunque il saccheggio, o il foraggiamento, o le requisizioni erano certamente di fondamentale importanza, come mette in rilievo, tra gli altri, nel suo libro Jonathan Roth:²³ va sottolineato che la documentazione che possediamo sulle requisizioni si riferisce in larghissima misura ad eserciti in marcia (e si veda in particolare la procedura della *prosecutio*, studiata in un intervento recente di Paul Erdkamp).²⁴ Ma nel secondo caso sembra che sia stato preferito un sistema di rifornimenti centrato su meccanismi di mercato, e per comprensibili ragioni. I contingenti militari erano dispersi lungo il *limes* e perciò il peso che esercitavano i singoli distaccamenti sulle aree vicine non era così forte (basti riferirsi ai calcoli che anche di recente sono stati effettuati, per varie regioni: per esempio da Nigel Pollard per la Siria).²⁵ Sarebbe stato meno economico redistribuire verso diverse localizzazioni beni che arrivavano da regioni lontane, di quanto non fosse, per esempio, nel caso di Roma, dove una forte domanda era concentrata in un solo posto. Ovviamente venivano riscossi anche tributi in natura e usati nella stessa area, come nel caso famoso riferito da Tacito, della contribuzione di *coria* imposta da Druso ai Frisii transrenani.²⁶ E certamente in Egitto, dove la tassazione in natura sembra abbia conser-

²¹ Tab. Vindol. 184, cfr. Bowman e Thomas 1994, op. cit. (n. 1), 135ss.

²² Bowman e Thomas 1994, op. cit. (n. 1), 278ss.; cfr. Bowman 1994, op. cit. (n. 1), 70.

²³ Soprattutto J. Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 BC-AD 235)* (Leiden 1998).

²⁴ Erdkamp 2002, art. cit. (n. 3), 60ss.

²⁵ Pollard 2000, op. cit. (n. 4), 171ss.

²⁶ Tacito, *Annales* 4.72.

vato la sua importanza, la domanda di cibo e foraggio per gli animali dei contingenti militari ivi stanziati era soddisfatta attraverso delle contribuzioni in natura (si veda, ad esempio, il caso di alcuni papiri della fine del II secolo ristudiati di recente da Colin Adams, che riguardano lo *strategos* Damarion e il *duplicarius* Antonius Iustinus inviato a riscuotere l'orzo la cui contribuzione era stata imposta ai vari villaggi del nomo ermopolita; è peraltro da segnalare che questi documenti attestano come le contribuzioni in natura prevedessero comunque il rimborso in denaro ai singoli contribuenti).²⁷ Certe aree non eccessivamente lontane dal *limes* potevano certo usare i proventi delle imposte in natura per rifornire i distaccamenti militari più vicini.²⁸ Per altri beni è per esempio attestata una “combination of purchase and direct production under military supervision”, com'è stato osservato a proposito della produzione della *braces*, un tipo di cereale verosimilmente usato nella produzione della birra, a Vindolanda²⁹ (non entro qui nell'assai dibattuto tema dei *prata legionis*, della loro consistenza e diffusione e delle modalità con le quali venivano sfruttati).

Infine, la documentazione archeologica che si è voluto supporre testimoniassse l'esistenza di una gestione centralizzata e diretta del rifornimento ai distaccamenti militari, può essere interpretata, ed è stata interpretata, in vari modi. Ciò che questa documentazione attesta è che talvolta, come nel caso dell'olio betico, c'erano specifici 'canali' di approvvigionamento, come possiamo definirli, non che vi fosse una sorta di 'commercio amministrato.' Non è affatto legittimo dedurre dalla presenza nei campi militari in Britannia e lungo il confine renano delle anfore Dressel 20, nelle quali veniva trasportato l'olio betico, che olio fiscale venisse portato direttamente da specifiche aree di produzione nella Betica a specifici siti militari, e per una semplice ragione: perché non c'è alcuna attestazione del fatto che sia mai stato riscosso un tributo in olio nella Betica. In effetti la testimonianza delle Dressel 20, come ha ribadito in termini chiarissimi di recente Tchernia,³⁰ può essere interpretata, e io direi deve essere interpretata, come quella che rivela normali flussi commerciali verso aree nelle quali c'era una forte

²⁷ Adams 1999, art. cit. (n. 18).

²⁸ S. Mitchell, *Anatolia I* (Oxford 1993), 250ss. per l'Anatolia che avrebbe rifornito, attraverso un complesso (anche se per molti versi ipotetico) sistema di trasporto via terra (che prevedeva che le comunità lungo le strade fornissero animali e carri), gli eserciti danubiani e quelli del *limes* orientale.

²⁹ Bowman e Thomas 1994, 33, su *Tab. Vindol.* 180 e 183.

³⁰ Tchernia 2002, art. cit. (n. 9) e letteratura ivi.

domanda di olio (e non solo ovviamente limitata all'elemento militare, ma anche ai civili ivi residenti).

Ancor meno accettabile è l'idea che l'amministrazione, che si vuole centralizzata, dei rifornimenti militari dipendesse dall'ufficio del *praefectus annonae* a Roma.³¹ Anche in questo caso non c'è alcuna testimonianza del fatto che, fra i compiti del *praefectus annonae* e del suo ufficio, vi fosse anche la supervisione dei rifornimenti per l'esercito. Quel che suggeriscono, nel loro complesso, i documenti di Vindolanda che danno informazioni su questo aspetto della vita del campo (ora riesaminati in dettaglio da Dick Whittaker)³² nonché gli stessi documenti egiziani e tripolitani è che la raccolta degli approvvigionamenti era gestita al livello della singola unità e che i soldati e anche i veterani erano di tanto in tanto coinvolti come singoli attori economici. Per un altro verso, l'esistenza di quel che è stato definito (da Jacobsen) un "Nebenhandel" e un "Folgehandel"³³ non implica che la domanda di beni essenziali, come l'olio di oliva, che veniva dagli stessi distaccamenti militari, venisse soddisfatta attraverso meccanismi redistributivi.

A mio avviso l'inaccettabilità del modello costruito da Remesal Rodríguez delle relazioni economiche tra la Betica e il *limes* renano è rivelata da quanto emerge dalla documentazione epigrafica dei cocci delle Dressel 20 trovati al Monte Testaccio. I *tituli picti* in varie posizioni e i bolli, vale a dire le varie scritte che indicano le varie persone coinvolte nella produzione, trasporto e distribuzione dell'olio e nella produzione delle anfore stesse, hanno, com'è ben noto, suscitato un vivacissimo dibattito. Sono state proposte molte diverse interpretazioni dei meccanismi operanti nella raccolta e nel trasporto dell'olio. Una delle questioni che rimane aperta è quale sia il ruolo che l'amministrazione imperiale comincia a giocare nell'età severiana, quando i nomi degli Imperatori prendono il posto, nei *tituli picti* in posizione β , dei nomi dei privati, e ancora a partire dal 217–218 d.C. in poi, quando i nomi degli Imperatori sono a loro volta rimpiazzati dalla scritta *fisci rationis patrimonii provinciae Baeticae* (e poco dopo anche dalla scritta *fisci rationis patrimonii provinciae Tarraconensis*).³⁴ Queste scritte restano sulle anfore

³¹ Remesal Rodríguez 1986, op. cit. (n. 3); Id. 2002a, art. cit. (n. 3); Id. 2002b, art. cit. (n. 3).

³² Whittaker 2002, art. cit. (n. 3).

³³ G. Jacobsen, *Primitiver Austausch oder Freier Markt? Untersuchungen zum Handel in den gallisch-germanischen Provinzen während der römischen Kaiserzeit* (St. Katharinen 1995), 183.

³⁴ Letteratura in Lo Cascio 2003, art. cit. (n. 14), 313 n. 19.

spagnole sino all'età di Gallieno, quando le anfore in questione non sono più gettate via nella zona del Testaccio. Tuttavia, già negli anni di Severo Alessandro, assieme alle anfore che portano queste scritte se ne trovano altre nelle quali ricompaiono nomi di privati. Come ho tentato di mostrare altrove,³⁵ il modo più economico di interpretare questa evoluzione piuttosto curiosa e in particolare il coinvolgimento degli Imperatori e poi del *fiscus rationis patrimonii* della provincia nella produzione e nel trasporto dell'olio betico è di supporre che—in età severiana—gli Imperatori e poi l'amministrazione imperiale siano divenuti proprietari dell'olio, *nella fase del suo trasporto dalla Betica al luogo di smercio e di consumo*. Ma ciò vuol dire pure che prima dell'età severiana l'olio spagnolo trasportato nei contenitori Dressel 20 apparteneva a *negotiatores* o *navicularii* privati, verosimilmente *anche quando quest'olio proveniva dalle proprietà imperiali*! Vale a dire che il modello che dobbiamo costruire della diffusione dell'olio spagnolo non prevede un suo controllo da parte dell'amministrazione dell'annona, ma tutt'al contrario prevede che anche la stessa amministrazione delle tenute imperiali venda l'olio prodotto da queste tenute a *negotiatores* privati.

Desidero attirare l'attenzione su un ultimo punto. Sappiamo che i soldati ricevevano il loro *stipendium* in tre o quattro rate (quadrimestrali o trimestrali), ma che questo *stipendium* non veniva loro dato nella sua interezza.³⁶ Il costo della loro sussistenza, e prima di tutto del cibo e del vestiario, veniva a gravare direttamente sull'intendenza dell'unità e le somme in questione venivano detratte dalla paga che ricevevano i soldati. L'ammontare delle detrazioni quanto meno per il cibo sembra sia stato calcolato in modo convenzionale (e certo non facendo riferimento direttamente al prezzo di mercato). Per di più una proporzione abbastanza consistente dello *stipendium* veniva depositato nel conto che ciascun soldato aveva nella cassa dell'unità e forse veniva materialmente data solo una piccola somma al singolo soldato, per permettergli di pagare per le sue spese non essenziali o per le spese dei suoi familiari e/o dei suoi dipendenti. Il sistema delle detrazioni e la notevole consistenza dei risparmi dei singoli soldati valeva a ridurre la quantità di moneta coniata richiesta entro i campi militari e attorno ai campi perché potessero svolgersi le transazioni commerciali. Questa considerazione

³⁵ Ibid. 312–317.

³⁶ Fink 1971, op. cit. (n. 4), n° 68 e 69; vedi in generale M.A. Speidel, 'Roman Army Pay Scales', *JRS* 82 (1992), 87–106; R. Alston, 'Roman Military Pay from Caesar to Diocletian', *JRS* 84 (1994), 113–123, e ulteriore letteratura ivi.

circa la minore necessità di moneta coniata determinata dal modo di pagamento dello *stipendium* viene spesso fatta; per esempio è stata di recente ripetuta da Nigel Pollard nel suo libro sulla Siria; lo stesso Pollard ritiene, forse a ragione, di poter dedurre da un luogo dioneo che le detrazioni possano essere state abolite a partire dal 218.³⁷

A ben guardare, tuttavia, l'esistenza delle detrazioni e l'alto volume del risparmio non avrebbero dovuto necessariamente avere per conseguenza una riduzione degli scambi monetari. Al contrario, il peculiare meccanismo del credito che l'esistenza dei conti attribuiti a ogni singolo soldato implica, potrebbe persino avere reso più agevoli le stesse transazioni monetarie. E in ogni caso, come mette in rilievo Pollard, le somme risparmiate e depositate nei conti dei soldati sarebbero poi state usate al momento del congedo, e con il premio di congedo stesso, dando al veterano maggiori e migliori opportunità di avviare un'attività economica.

Il fatto poi che il valore di alcune detrazioni fosse apparentemente fisso o convenzionale non mi pare che mostri che il meccanismo posto in essere con le detrazioni era redistributivo. Va osservato che lo stesso sistema delle detrazioni sarebbe stato del tutto privo di senso, se davvero avesse funzionato un meccanismo redistributivo, come mostrano, a tacer d'altro, i successivi sviluppi dell'*annona militaris* soprattutto dopo la riorganizzazione diocleziana.

³⁷ Pollard 2000, op. cit. (n. 4), 181s. e n. 52 su Cassio Dione 78.34.3.

VOM MARGINALEN GRENZRAUM ZUM KERNRAUM EUROPAS. DAS RÖMISCHE HEER ALS MOTOR DER NEUSTRUKTURIERUNG HISTORISCHER LANDSCHAFTEN UND WIRTSCHAFTSRÄUME

KARL STROBEL

Ein zentrales Phänomen in der Geschichte der römischen Provinzen in der Frühen und Hohen Kaiserzeit¹ ist die demographische, siedlungsmäßige und wirtschaftliche Neustrukturierung großer Räume Europas, deren Bedeutung vielfach die mittelalterliche und neuzeitliche Entwicklung prägte und bis in die Gegenwart wirksam ist. Klassische Beispiele hierfür sind die Rheinlande, Britannien oder die Zone zwischen Alpen und Donau. In anderen Zonen wie dem mittleren und unteren Donaauraum und in Dakien war die Neustrukturierung ebenso massiv, war dann aber oftmals großen Kontinuitätsbrüchen unterworfen. Gleiches gilt für Nordafrika.

Der Naturraum wie der historische Raum bilden einerseits die vorgegebenen Größen, in denen sich historisches Handeln und geschichtliche Entwicklungen abspielen, doch sind beide Größen zugleich dem Wandel durch historische Prozesse unterworfen. Selbstverständlich sind die grundsätzlichen Voraussetzungen des Naturraumes vom Menschen nicht veränderbar, doch können auch sie durch infrastrukturelle Maßnahmen wie Straßenbau oder Amelioration, aber auch durch Eingriffe in das ökologische Gleichgewicht verändert werden. Die wohl charakteristischsten Phänomene sind die Umwandlung in Kulturland im Rahmen der agrarischen Wirtschaftsformen mit ihren Auswirkungen auf Flora und Fauna bzw. die Rodung von Waldgebieten und der Aufbau von Siedlungsnetzen.² Dabei kann der Raum Phasen

¹ Ein Resümee jetzt in C. Lepelley (Hg.), *Rom und das Reich in der Hohen Kaiserzeit 44 v. Chr.–260 n. Chr. II. Die Regionen des Reiches* (München – Leipzig 2001).

² Vgl. etwa H. Bender und H. Wolff, Hgg., *Ländliche Besiedlung und Landwirtschaft in den Rhein-Donau-Provinzen des Römischen Reiches*, 2 Bde. (Espelkamp 1994); W. Dörfler, A. Evans, U. Nakoinz, H. Usinger, und A. Wolf, ‚Wandel der Kulturlandschaft als Ausdruck des kulturellen Wandels?‘, in A. Haffner – S. von Schnurbein, Hgg., *Kelten, Germanen, Römer im Mittelgebirgsraum zwischen Luxemburg und Thüringen* (Bonn 2000), 129–146; beispielhaft H. Kroll, ‚Zum Ackerbau in Wallendorf in vorrömischer und römischer Zeit‘, ebd.

grundlegender Neustrukturierung durchlaufen, das heißt als eine neu geformte Größe konstituiert werden, die dann die Voraussetzung für die weiteren historischen Entwicklungen erst schafft.³ Ein solcher Prozess kann dabei sehr wohl auf primär politische Entscheidungen zurückgehen, deren langfristige Folgen in dieser Weise gar nicht intendiert gewesen sind oder aber gar nicht absehbar waren.⁴ Derartige Phasen grundlegender Neustrukturierung sind keineswegs auf das Zeitalter der Industrialisierung oder auf das 20. Jahrhundert beschränkt gewesen. Gerade das Imperium Romanum in der frühen Kaiserzeit gibt dafür ein eindrucksvolles Beispiel. Man könnte dies auch in Kleinasien nachvollziehen, oder für das 1.–2. Jh. n. Chr. im Balkanraum, doch soll hier das Augenmerk auf das östliche Gallien und insbesondere auf den Raum zwischen Maas und Rhein, gelegt werden.⁵ Politisches

122–128; A. Kreuz, ‚Landwirtschaft im Umbruch? Archäobotanische Untersuchungen zu den Jahrhunderten um Christi Geburt in Hessen und Mainfranken‘, *Berichte der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission* 85 (2004), 97–292; auch F. Malrain, V. Matterne und P. Méniel, *Les paysans gaulois. III^e siècle–52 av. J.C.* (Paris 2002); V. Matterne, *Agriculture et alimentation végétale durant l'âge du Fer et l'époque gallo-romaine en France septentrionale* (Montagnac 2000).

³ Vgl. etwa R. Frei-Stolba, Hg., *Siedlung und Verkehr im Römischen Reich. Römerstraßen zur Herrschaftssicherung und Landschaftsprägung* (Bern 2004); F. Burgard und A. Haverkamp, Hgg., *Auf den Römerstraßen ins Mittelalter. Beiträge zur Verkehrsgeschichte zwischen Maas und Rhein von der Spätantike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert* (Trier 1997).

⁴ Vgl. etwa die Beiträge in *Zwischen Gallia und Germania, Frankreich und Deutschland. Konstanz und Wandel raumbestimmender Kräfte* (Trier 1987), 31ff.; auch zu einer vergleichbaren Problemlage C.-M. Hüssen, W. Irlinger und W. Zanier, Hgg., *Spätlatènezeit und frühe römische Kaiserzeit zwischen Alpenrand und Donau* (Bonn 2004). Zahlreichen belgischen, niederländischen und deutschen Kollegen danke ich für die Auskünfte über den aktuellen archäologischen Forschungsstand des Jahres 2004, auf dessen Ergebnisse ich hier im Folgenden hinweisen kann.

⁵ Vgl. etwa H. Wolff, ‚Die politisch-administrative Binnengliederung des gallisch-germanischen Raumes‘, in *Zwischen Gallia und Germania* 1987, a.a.O. (Anm. 4), 63–82; dens., ‚Civitates ohne städtischen Hauptort‘, in *Von Sacerdotium und Regnum. Festschrift E. Boshoff* (Köln-Wien-Weimar 2002), 3–10; weiter die Beiträge in G. Gottlieb, Hg., *Die Raumordnung im römischen Reich: Zur regionalen Gliederung in den gallischen Provinzen, in Raetien, Noricum und Pannonien* (München 1989); C.M. Ternes, Hg., *L'évolution des villes entre Rhin et Meuse*. BAL 26, 1997 (Luxemburg 1998); allgemein auch N. Hanel und C. Schucany, Hgg., *Colonia—Municipium—Vicus* (Oxford 1999). Zur Einwirkung auf die Strukturen jenseits der Rheinlinie etwa M. Erdrich, *Rom und die Barbaren. Das Verhältnis zwischen dem Imperium Romanum und den germanischen Stämmen vor seiner Nordwestgrenze von der späten Republik bis zum gallischen Sonderreich* (Mainz 2001). Zur Entwicklung in Gallien allgemein R. Bedon, *Les villes des trois Gaules de César à Néron dans leur contexte historique, territorial et politique* (Clemency 1999); G. Precht, Hg., *Genese, Struktur und Entwicklung römischer Städte im 1. Jh. n. Chr. in Nieder- und Obergermanien* (Mainz 2001); T. Grünewald, Hg., *Germania Inferior, Besiedlung, Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft an der Grenze der römisch-germanischen Welt*, RGA-Erg.-Bd. 28 (Berlin-New York 2001); T. Grünewald und S. Seibel, Hgg., *Kontinuität und*

Handeln der römischen Reichsführung, das zu einer solchen grundlegenden und langfristigen Neuformierung des Raumes führte, soll im Mittelpunkt dieser Ausführungen stehen. Fragen wir nach dem Motor der Umsetzung entsprechenden Planens und Handelns, so tritt uns das römische Heer als zentrales Instrument der Staatlichkeit des Imperium Romanum der Kaiserzeit entgegen. Doch geht die Wirkung des Heeres noch weit über diesen direkten Aktionsbereich hinaus. Diese Perspektiven des Handelns und der Präsenz des römischen Heeres sollen im Mittelpunkt des Beitrages stehen, wobei sich die Ausführungen aus räumlichen Gründen und mit Rücksicht auf den Beitrag von Gabriele Weiler neben einigen grundsätzlichen Betrachtungen auf die Beispiele Trier, Augusta Treverorum, und Mainz, Mogontiacum, konzentrieren werden. Ersteres zeigt die Etablierung eines neuen Civitas-Zentralortes mit dauerhafter Wirkung auf die Strukturierung des Raumes, letzteres ist das Paradebeispiel für die Entwicklung eines urbanen Zentrums aus der Präsenz des Heeres heraus.

Diesseits des Niederrheins finden wir eine solche völlige Neustrukturierung in der Zone des ehemaligen Eburonengebietes, dessen Stammestruktur von Caesar zerschlagen und dessen Bevölkerungsdichte durch den römischen Vernichtungskrieg stark reduziert worden war. Eine neue historisch-geographische und ethnische Landkarte wurde hier von römischer Seite unter Ansiedlung rechtsrheinischer germanischer Bevölkerungsgruppen, so der Tungrer, Bataver,⁶ Ubier oder Cugerner, ausgebildet.⁷ Ubische Gruppen waren offenbar schon in den 30er

Diskontinuität. Germania Inferior am Beginn und Ende der römischen Herrschaft, RGA-Erg.-Bd. 35 (Berlin – New York 2003).

⁶ Zur Ansiedlung des chattischen Teilstammes der Bataver wohl bereits im Rahmen caesarischer Politik und Errichtung ihrer besonders privilegierten Civitas wahrscheinlich zu Beginn der 30er Jahre des 1. Jh. v. Chr. vgl. N. Roymans, *Ethnic Identity and Imperial Power. The Batavians in the Early Roman Empire* (Amsterdam 2004); J. Heinrichs, 'Ubier, Chatten, Bataver. Mittel- und Niederrhein ca. 70–1 v. Chr.', in: Grünewald und Seibel 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 5), 266–344. S. ferner u. Anm. 10 und S. 230f.

⁷ Vgl. Roymans 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 196ff.; Heinrichs 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 6); R. Wolters, 'Germanische Mobilität und römische Ansiedlungspolitik: Voraussetzungen und Strukturen germanischer Siedlungsbewegungen im römischen Grenzland,' in Grünewald 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 5), 146–168; W. Eck, *Köln in römischer Zeit* (Köln 2004), 31ff. (unrichtig ist die Gleichsetzung des Dünsberges mit dem Siedlungskern der Ubier, ebenso die Annahme einer römischen Eroberung des Dünsberges), 46ff. Vgl. zu Untergermanien insgesamt die Beiträge in Grünewald 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 5), bes. H. Van Enckevort, 'Bemerkungen zum Siedlungssystem in den südöstlichen Niederlanden während der vorrömischen Eisenzeit und der Römerzeit', 336–396; Precht 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 5), bes. H. Galsterer, 'Gemeinden und Städte in Gallien und am

Jahren des 1. Jh. v. Chr. über den Rhein gekommen; ihre ursprünglichen Siedlungsräume lagen im Neuwieder Becken und um die untere bis mittlere Lahn,⁸ wo allerdings das spälatènezeitliche Oppidum des Dünsberges die ursprüngliche chattisch-batavisches Mittelpunktssiedlung, die etwa eine Generation vor der Errichtung von Waldgirmes verlassen worden war, darstellte.⁹ Die weitgehende Ansiedlung der Ubier auf dem linken Rheinufer durch Agrippa gehört jedoch erst in dessen zweiten Aufenthalt in Gallien 19/18 v. Chr.¹⁰ Die noch von den Ubiern gehaltenen Gebiete östlich des Rheins im unteren Lahnbereich wurden von Drusus den Chatten gegeben.

Im sogenannten ‚freien Germanien‘ wird die ordnungspolitische Neustrukturierung des Raumes¹¹ durch die Gründung eines städtischen Vorortes für den Volksverband der Chatten in Waldgirmes im mittleren Lahntal deutlich.¹² Die Errichtung dieser nach römischem Muster mit Forum, Basilika und Monumenten des Kaiserkultes im Aufbau befindlichen Stadt, die vermutlich als Oppidum Chattrorum bezeichnet wurde, brach im Jahre 9 n. Chr. nach einer Belegungsdauer von etwa 10 Jahren¹³ mit der Varus-Katastrophe und dem römischen Rückzug auf die Basen der linken Rheinseite ab. Wie die jüngsten

Rhein‘, 1–9. Abzulehnen sind die Thesen von J. Slofstra, ‘Batavians and Romans on the Lower Rhine. The romanisation of a frontier area’, *Archaeological Dialogues* 9 (2002), 16–38, 55–57, es seien weder reguläre Civitates eingerichtet noch eine Urbanisierung begonnen worden; vgl. auch Roymans 2004, a.a.O. 197.

⁸ Den Ubiern ist sehr wahrscheinlich das 34ha umfassende, überaus stark befestigte Oppidum Dornburg bei Limburg als Zentralsiedlung im Lahnbereich zuzuordnen. Vgl. F.-R. Herrmann, in S. Rieckhoff und J. Biel, Hgg., *Die Kelten in Deutschland* (Stuttgart 2001), 333–335; F.-R. Herrmann und A. Jackenhövel, *Die Vorgeschichte Hessens* (Stuttgart 1990), 348f.

⁹ Vgl. Roymans 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 67ff., 148; zum Dünsberg u. S. 230f.

¹⁰ Vgl. K.-H. Dietz, *DNP* 3 (1997), 72–76; R. Wiegels, *DNP* 12/1 (2002), 961–962; Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 46ff.; J. Heinrichs, *Civitas Ubiorum. Historisch-numismatische Studien zur Geschichte der Ubier und ihrer Gebiete*, Habil.-schr. Köln 1996. Verfehlt ist die Postulierung einer primär ‚ubischen‘ Münzprägung bei Heinrichs und Eck mit Bezug auf die Dünsberg-Prägungen; vgl. Roymans 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6). S. ferner o. Anm. 6.7.

¹¹ Vgl. S. von Schnurbein, *Augustus in Germanien. Neue archäologische Forschungen*, Kroon-Voordracht 24 (Amsterdam 2002).

¹² Vgl. zu Waldgirmes A. Becker und G. Rasbach, ‚Waldgirmes. Eine augusteische Stadtgründung im Lahntal‘, *Berichte der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission* 82 (2001), 591–610; diess., ‚Die spätaugusteische Stadtgründung in Lahnau-Waldgirmes‘, *Germania* 81 (2003), 147–199; A. Becker, ‚Lahnau-Waldgirmes. Eine augusteische Stadtgründung in Hessen‘, *Historia* 52 (2003), 337–350; von Schnurbein 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 11), 5ff.

¹³ Im Forumsbereich sind 4 Bauphasen des Platzes festgestellt worden; vgl. *Berichte der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission* 82 (2003), 364f.

Untersuchungen zeigen, setzte sich die Bebauung auch außerhalb der als Holz-Erde-Mauer errichteten Stadtbefestigung fort. Das Baulager der hier eingesetzten Baukolonnen des Heeres konnte ebenfalls außerhalb der Umwehrung festgestellt werden. Auch in Haltern zeichnet sich vor 9 n. Chr. ein Wandel insbesondere im Bereich des sogen. Hauptlagers von einer zentralen militärischen Basis hin zu einem administrativen Zentrum ab. Zugleich entwickelte sich hier eine bedeutende handwerkliche Produktion.¹⁴ In Anreppen konnte sehr wahrscheinlich die zeitweise Residenz des Tiberius 4–5 n. Chr. erkannt werden; das Lager diente offensichtlich als zeitweilige Statthalterresidenz.

Tacitus spielt einmal kurz auf diese „*novae coloniae*“, neuen Römerstädte, an¹⁵ und in Cassius Dio finden wir den lange umstrittenen *Locus Classicus* für die augusteische Städtegründungspolitik in dem Gebiet östlich des Rheins, dessen Organisation als Provinz spätestens seit 4–5 n. Chr. bereits im Fortschreiten begriffen war: „Ihre Truppen (i.e. der Römer) überwinterten dort und es wurde mit der Anlage von Städten begonnen, und die Barbaren selbst passten sich den neuen Sitten an, gewöhnten sich an Märkte und trafen sich zu friedlichen Zusammenkünften.“¹⁶ Diese verstärkte Provinzialisierung des militärisch und politisch durchdrungenen Raumes setzte offensichtlich bereits vor dem Beginn der großen Aufstandsbewegung 1 n. Chr.¹⁷ ein, die Tiberius in den Jahren 4–5 n. Chr. endgültig niederwarf, die militärischen Strukturen reorganisierte und die Durchringung des Landes vollendete. Mit dem großen Zangenangriff auf das Marbod-Reich mit Kern in Böhmen im Jahre 6 n. Chr. sollte dann der letzte germanische Machtfaktor beseitigt und die römische Kontrolle bis zur Sudeten/Beskiden-Linie, dem Herkynischen Wald, errichtet werden, ein Unternehmen, das dann aber kurz vor dem endgültigen Erfolg wegen des Aufstandes in Pannonien und Dalmatien abgebrochen werden musste.¹⁸

¹⁴ Vgl. B. Rudnick, *Die römischen Töpfereien von Haltern* (Mainz 2001).

¹⁵ Tacitus, *Annales* 1.59.6.

¹⁶ Cassius Dio 56.18.2. Vgl. die Beiträge in *Römische Städte nördlich der Alpen. Die Stadt—Instrument der Okkupation und der Herrschaftssicherung*, Jb. Heimat- und Altertumsverein Heidenheim 8 (1999/2000), 7–119; von Schnurbein 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 11).

¹⁷ Velleius Paterculus 2.104.2.

¹⁸ Zu den historischen Vorgängen in Germanien zusammenfassend R. Wolters, *Römische Eroberung und Herrschaftsorganisation in Gallien und Germanien* (Bochum 1990); dens., *Die Römer in Germanien* (München⁴ 2004); D. Timpe, *RGZ* 11 (1998), 210–225; Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 63ff.; mehrfach problematisch M. Gechter, „Die Militärgeschichte am Niederrhein von Caesar bis Tiberius—eine Skizze“, in Grünewald und Seibel 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 5), 145–161.

Der Aufstand 1–4/5 n. Chr. hat den Ausbau der Provinzorganisation zweifellos gehemmt, dieser wurde dann aber unter der Statthaltertschaft des P. Quinctilius Varus seit 6 n. Chr. gezielt vorangetrieben.¹⁹ Die Errichtung von städtisch strukturierten Mittelpunktssiedlungen zielte auf die Erschließung des Raumes, auf die Konzentration der Eliten in den Zentralorten, auf die Einrichtung von Strukturen der Selbstverwaltung und damit auf die Beherrschbarmachung des Raumes. Man sollte deshalb nicht von einer Urbanisierungspolitik in Sinne von Städtegründungen um der Verbreitung städtischer Siedlungsweise willen sprechen; Zentralorte als Mittelpunkte von politisch-organisatorischen Einheiten in den Provinzen waren als tragende untere Ebene für das administrative Funktionieren des Reiches, das ja über keine eigene Administration im eigentlichen Sinne verfügte, unverzichtbar. Entsprechend hatte Pompeius Bithynien und Pontus in Stadtterritorien organisiert oder Augustus das 25–24 v. Chr. annektierte kleinasiatische Reich des Amyntas, um nur diese Beispiele zu nennen. Die Dynamik der einsetzenden römischen Durchdringung zeigt sich auch in der Tatsache, dass im Sauerland bereits in großem Stil mit der Ausbeutung der Bleivorkommen begonnen wurde.²⁰

Bereits während des zweiten Aufenthaltes des Agrippa in Gallien 20–19 v. Chr. und nach dem Abschluß der Eroberung der iberischen Halbinsel hatte der Bau der strategischen Hauptstraßen von der zentralen der Rhône-Achse und dem Straßenknotenpunkt Lugdunum, dem neuen römischen Zentrum Galliens, über die Saône-Achse zum Oberrhein und über die Moselachse zum Mittelrhein (Niederrheinische Bucht), wo der Großverband der Sugambres als Hauptgegner erschien,²¹ begonnen.²² Wohl bereits 15/14 v. Chr., jedenfalls aber mit dem Jahre 13 v. Chr. setzte die Errichtung einer Reihe von zentralen militärischen

¹⁹ Vgl. auch Cassius Dio 56.18.2–3.

²⁰ Vgl. E. Riccardi und S. Genovesi, 'Un carico di piombo da Rena Maiore (Aglientu)', in *Africa Romana* 14, 2 (Sassari 2002), 1311–1321; P. Rothenhöfer, 'Geschäfte in Germanien. Zur Ausbeutung von Erzlagerstätten unter Augustus in Germanien', *ZPE* 143 (2003), 277–286; Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 75f.

²¹ Vgl. D. Timpe, 'Die Rheingrenze zwischen Caesar und Drusus', in *Monumentum Chiloniense. Studien zur augusteischen Zeit. Festschr. E. Burck* (Amsterdam 1975), 124–147.

²² Vgl. Strabo 4.6.11. Die weiteren strategischen Straßen führten von Lugdunum nach Aquitanien und zur Kanalküste bzw. verbanden Lyon mit der westlichen Narbonensis und Massilia. Das Straßennetz im Süden bis Lyon muß aber bereits in den Jahren vor 20 v. Chr. ausgebaut worden sein, da sonst die Entwicklung Lyons nicht zu erklären wäre und zudem hier strategische Logistik für die Spanischen Kriege geschaffen werden mußte.

Basisräumen und -stellungen entlang des linken Rheinufers ein, die zum einen die Endpunkte der logistischen Nachschublinien ins innere Galliens und zum Mittelmeer hin darstellten und andererseits den Endpunkten der durch die naturräumliche Gliederung gegebenen Verkehrslinien im freien Germanien gegenüberlagen. Es waren dies Mainz für die Mainlinie, Koblenz für die Lahnlinie, Bonn für die Sieg- und Aggerlinie, Neuß am Ende für die Wupper- und Ruhrlinie (Hellweg/Bergisches Land) mit der direkten Gegenstellung von Moers-Asberg, Vetera/Xanten, der Ausgangspunkt für die Drususfeldzüge 12/11 v. Chr., für die zentrale Lippelinie und Nijmegen für das Rheinmündungsgebiet, das Berkel- und Issel-Gebiet sowie Gelderland. Sie waren damit zugleich die Ausgangsbasen für die römischen Operationen östlich des Rheins, die sich auf diese vorgegebenen Kommunikationslinien zu stützen hatten, wie auch die militärische Deckung für die Wege ins innere Galliens (Mainz: Nahe/Glan/Pfälzer Pforte/Oberrheintal, Koblenz: Mosel, Bonn/Köln: Ahr/Eifelstraße/Niederrheinische Bucht, Neuß: Erft-Linie, Xanten: Niederrheinisches Tiefland/Maas-Gebiet, Nijmegen: Maas-Gebiet).²³ Erst nach dem römischen Rückzug nach der Varus-Niederlage 9 n. Chr. entwickelten sich in diesen Basisräumen festere Standortstrukturen, die nach dem von Tiberius angeordneten Abbruch der offensiven Germanienpolitik 16–17 n. Chr. zur Etablierung fester Armeegarnisonen entlang der Rheinlinie führten; jeweils zwei Legionen lagen den Hauptwegen in das freie Germanien und aus ihm heraus gegenüber, und zwar in Mainz und Vetera, in Neuß waren es schwankend 1–2 Legionen. Die zu Zentralgallien hin offene südliche obergermanische Rheinfront wurde nun durch Legionsgarnisonen in Straßburg und Vindonissa gedeckt. Der Rhein war in vorrömischer Zeit keine Scheidelinie gewesen. Die Rheinzone und der Strom waren in ihrer wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung eher marginal. Die wichtigen Handelswege verliefen über den Rhein hinweg (Salz, Eisen, Buntmetall, Sklaven). Der Strom gewann erst durch den für das römische Militär und die römische Wirtschaft charakteristischen Massengütertransport seine große Bedeutung als zentrale Kommunikationslinie.

Die Phase nach der caesarischen Eroberung war durch eine minimale römische Einflussnahme in die inneren Angelegenheiten der gallischen

²³ Vgl. K. Strobel, 'Die Legionen des Augustus. Probleme der römischen Heeresgeschichte nach dem Ende des Bürgerkrieges', in *Limes XVIII. Proceedings of the XVIIIth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies* (Oxford 2002), 51–66.

Civitates geprägt gewesen, wie auch die Intensivierung der einheimischen Prägertätigkeit gerade in der Gallia Belgica, und hier insbesondere für die Treverer, zeigt.²⁴ Römische Münzen bestimmen das Bild des Münzumschlages außerhalb der Militärzone und -basen erst in tiberischer Zeit.²⁵ Die Treverergebiete waren zum einen in den innergallischen Handel und dessen Verknüpfung mit dem Mittelmeerraum integriert, wie beispielsweise die Verbreitung der Dressel 1-Amphoren oder der Münzen des anepigraphen Silberhorizontes des Marberger Typs zeigt, auf der anderen Seite kann das Treverergebiet fast als der westlichste Teil jenes Geflechts wirtschaftlicher und kultureller Beziehungen gelten, das sich über den Mittelgebirgsraum nach Franken, Böhmen und in den Donaauraum erstreckte.²⁶ Gleiches zeigt die Münzprägung der Treverer,²⁷ welche in Gold und Potin Vorbilder der westlichen Nachbarn aufgriff (Ostgallien, Belgica), und deren anepigrapher Silberhorizont typologisch zu der Gruppe der mittel- und süddeutschen Quinare gehörte, deren Zone sich bis nach Böhmen erstreckt und der süddeutschen Oppida-Kultur zuzurechnen ist.²⁸

Während Divodurum, das römische Metz bereits das vorrömische Stammeszentrum und Oppidum der Mediomatriker gewesen war, hatte die keltische Civitas der Treverer oder besser der große Volksverband der Treverer²⁹ keinen entsprechenden Zentralort. Die Treverer zerfie-

²⁴ Vgl. C. Haselgrove, 'The significance of the Roman conquest for indigenous monetary economies in northern Gaul and southern Britain', in K. Strobel, Hg., *Forschungen zur Monetarisierung und ökonomischen Funktionalisierung von Geld in den nordwestlichen Provinzen des Imperium Romanum* (Trier 2004), 27–52; R. Loscheider, 'Fremd oder einheimisch—ein Wechselspiel von Einflüssen?', ebd. 159–179; D.G. Wigg, 'The development of the monetary economy in north Gaul in the late La Tène and early Roman period', in J. Creighton und R. Wilson, Hgg., *Roman Germany: Studies in Cultural interaction* (Oxford 1999), 99–124.

²⁵ Vgl. auch D.G. Wigg, 'Das Ende der keltischen Münzgeldwirtschaft am Mittelrhein', *Germania* 61 (1998), 377–397.

²⁶ Vgl. etwa A. Müller-Karpe, 'Grab 1445. Ein keltischer Streitwagenkrieger des 3. Jh. v. Chr.', in A. Haffner, Hg., *Gräber—Spiegel des Lebens. Zum Totenbrauchtum der Kelten und Römer am Beispiel des Treverer-Gräberfeldes Wederath-Belginum* (Mainz 1989), 141–160, bes. Karte a.a.O. 157.

²⁷ Vgl. Haselgrove 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 24); Loscheider 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 24); dens., 'Untersuchungen zum spätlatènezeitlichen Münzwesen des Trevererlandes', *Archaeologia Mosellana* 3 (1998), 61–225.

²⁸ Vgl. D.G. Wigg und J. Riederer, 'Die Chronologie der keltischen Münzprägung am Mittelrhein', in U. Peters, Hg., *Stephanos Nomismatikos. Festschrift E. Schönert-Geis* (Berlin 1998), 661–674.

²⁹ Vgl. zur Geschichte der Treverer zusammenfassend H. Heinen, *Trier und das Trevererland in römischer Zeit* (Trier 1985), 1–66; auch F. Schön, *DNP* 12/1 (2002),

len offenkundig in mehrere weitestgehend selbständige Teilstämme, wie wir dies mehrfach in der politischen Struktur der keltischen Völkerschaften finden; als Beispiel möchte ich hier nur auf die in jeweils vier Teilstämme unter je eigener politischer, jurisdiktioneller und militärischer Führung zerfallenden Großstämme der kleinasiatischen Galater, der Tolistobogier, Tektosagen und Trokmer, hinweisen, deren gemeinsame Bundesversammlung primär der Bereinigung von Konflikten zwischen den 12 Teilverbänden diente, die sich nur in Ausnahmesituationen eine gemeinsame Führung gaben.³⁰ Caesar schildert Vergleichbares für die gallischen Civitates.³¹ Die regionale Gliederung der treverischen Teilverbände spiegelt sich in den spätlatènezeitlichen Oppida,³² welche die Mittelpunkte der jeweiligen Teilverbände bildeten: Donnersberg,³³ dessen Rolle später vermindert auf Otzenhausen übergang, Martberg,³⁴

787–791; ferner C.M. Ternes, Hg., *Les secteurs ruraux de la civitas Treverorum. Recherches récentes (1975–1987)*, BAL 18, 1987 (Luxemburg 1988).

³⁰ Vgl. K. Stobel, 'Die Staatenbildung bei den kleinasiatischen Galatern', in H. Blum u. a., Hgg., *Brückenland Anatolien* (Tübingen 2002), 231–293, bes. 238ff.

³¹ Caesar, *De bello Gallico* 6.23.5: „Im Frieden gibt es keine gemeinsame Leitung der Civitas, sondern die Häuptlinge der Bezirke und Pagi (*principes regionum atque pagorum*) sprechen unter ihren Leuten Recht und bereinigen die Streitigkeiten.“

³² Vgl. auch D. Krauß und O. Nakoinz, 'Binnenkolonisation und Zentralisation. Überlegungen zur latènezeitlichen Besiedlungs- und Bevölkerungsentwicklung im Mittelgebirgsraum nördlich der Mosel', in *Les processus d'urbanisation à l'âge du Fer* (Glux-en-Glenne 2000), 127–140; S. Rieckhoff in S. Rieckhoff und J. Biel, *Die Kelten in Deutschland* (Stuttgart 2001), 254–256; H. Nortmann, 'Die eisenzeitlichen Burgwälle im Trierer Land', in A. Haffner und A. Miron, Hgg., *Studien zur Eisenzeit in Hunsrück-Eifel-Raum* (Trier 1991), 121–140.

³³ Vgl. H. Bernhard, in Rieckhoff-Biel 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 8), 320–323; zur Region insgesamt G. Lenz-Bernhard und H. Bernhard, 'Das Oberrheingebiet zwischen Caesars gallischem Krieg und der flavischen Okkupation (58 v.–73 n. Chr.). Eine siedlungsgegeschichtliche Studie', *Mitteilungen des Historischen Vereins der Pfalz* 89 (1991), 1–347. Mit einer Fläche von 240ha und einer Länge der Umwallung von 8,5km bildete das Oppidum auf dem Donnersberg eine der größten latènezeitlichen Stadtanlagen überhaupt. Es handelte sich bei dem Donnersberg-Oppidum um den Zentralort der nördlichen Pfalz und Rhein Hessens, dessen Bedeutung durch seine Münzprägung unterstrichen wird. Die Aufgabe des Oppidums erfolgte ebenso wie diejenige der spätlatènezeitlichen Flachsiedlungen der östlichen Pfalz (Mutterstadt-Horizont) früh in LtD2 vermutlich noch in vorcaesarischer Zeit.

³⁴ Vgl. H.-H. Wegner, 'Der Martberg bei Pommern an der Mosel', *Archäologie an Mittelrhein und Mosel* 12 (Koblenz 1997); dens., in Rieckhoff-Biel 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 8), 445–448; D.G. Wigg, 'Der Beitrag des Martberg zur eisenzeitlichen Numismatik', in Haffner-Schnurbein 2000, a.a.O. (Anm. 2), 485–496; M. Thoma, 'Der gallo-römische Kultbezirk auf dem Martberg bei Pommern an der Mosel (Kreis Cochem-Zell)', ebd. 447–483; D.G. Wigg-Wolf, Hg., *Koblenz: Der Martberg bei Pommern (ehem. Kreis Cochem)* I, FMRD IV 4, 1 (Mainz 2005).

Kastel an der Saar,³⁵ Wallendorf an der Sauer, das spätestens um die Mitte des 1. Jh. v. Chr. aufgegeben wurde³⁶ und Titelberg. Die relativ starke wirtschaftliche Orientierung des Treverergebietes in vorcaesarischer Zeit nach Osten und Südosten spiegelt auch die Verbreitung treverischer Prägungen.³⁷

Die Zentralortsfunktion im nordwestlichen Treverergebiet war nach den Aufgabe von Wallendorf vollständig an das 43 ha umfassende Oppidum auf dem Titelberg übergegangen, das zwischen 50 und 30 v. Chr. die dominierende Stellung in der Civitas der Treverer innehatte.³⁸ Sein Auf- und Ausbau erfolgte in der 1. Hälfte des 1. Jh. v. Chr. Der Ort war durch seine verkehrsgeographische Lage ausgezeichnet, da sich hier die traditionelle Verkehrsverbindung aus Südgallien in Richtung zum Rhein und in die Champagne verzweigte. Der öffentliche Platz und das Heiligtum sowie die zentrale Stellung in der treverischen Münzprägung nach Mitte des 1. Jh. v. Chr. weisen die Zentralortsfunktion des Ortes aus. Der Aufstand der Treverer 30–29 v. Chr. führte zur Eroberung des Platzes durch römische Truppen mit einem Brandzerstörungshorizont und zur anschließenden Präsenz römischen Militärs.³⁹ Die wieder aufgebaute Siedlung war jedoch nur mehr von geminderter Bedeutung und

³⁵ Vgl. H. Nortmann, in Rieckhoff-Biel 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 8), 388–390.

³⁶ Vgl. S. Rieckhoff, in Rieckhoff-Biel 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 8), 254f.; D. Krauß ebd. 483f.; dens., ‚Der ‚Kasselt‘ bei Wallendorf (Kr. Bitburg-Prüm). Befestigung, Siedlung und Heiligtum keltisch-römischer Zeit‘, *Trierer Zeitschrift* 59 (1996), 17–78; dens., Zur Entwicklung eines regionalen Siedlungszentrums von der Frühlatènezeit bis in spät-römische Zeit. Ausgrabungsergebnisse in Wallendorf, Kr. Bitburg-Prüm‘, in Haffner-Schnurbein 2000, a.a.O. (Anm. 2), 7–21; dens., ‚Die Genese eines gallo-römischen Heiligtums im Zentrum eines aufgelassenen Oppidums‘, ebd. 383–396.

³⁷ Vgl. die Verbreitungskarten bei Loscheider 1998, a.a.O. (Anm. 27), bes. 80f., 82–84; auch die Verbreitung der Potin-Münzen des Typs mit den struppigen Haaren/Eber ebd. 102f.

³⁸ J. Metzler, *Das treverische Oppidum auf dem Titelberg. Zur Kontinuität zwischen der spät-keltischen und früh-römischen Zeit in Nordgallien*, 2 Bde. (Luxemburg 1995); dens., Vorbericht zu den Ausgrabungen im keltisch-römischen Heiligtum auf dem Titelberg‘, in Haffner-Schnurbein 2000, a.a.O. (Anm. 2), 431–445; dens., ‚Fouilles du sanctuaire celtique et gallo-romain de l’oppidum du Titelberg‘, in M. Reddé u.a., Hgg., *La naissance de la ville dans l’antiquité* (Paris 2003), 263–269; dens. und C. Gaeng, ‚Camp militaire romain ou établissement de commerçants italiques dans l’oppidum du Titelberg?‘, *Bulletin Musée national d’histoire et d’art Luxembourg* 17 (2004), 36–37; N. Metzler-Zens, *Lamadelaide, une nécropole de l’oppidum du Titelberg* (Luxemburg 1999); J. Kaurin, ‚Oppidum du Titelberg: la nécropole orientale‘, *Bulletin Musée national d’histoire et d’art Luxembourg* 17 (2004), 38–39; F. Schön, *DNP* 12/1 (2002), 626f.

³⁹ Es ist m. E. eine unrichtige Fragestellung: Präsenz römischen Militärs oder italienischer Händler. Beides ging immer Hand in Hand. Nach der Niederschlagung der Aufstandsbewegung in der Belgica und insbesondere im Treverergebiet ist mit einer verstärkten direkten Kontrolle durch römisches Militär ohne Zweifel zu rechnen.

entwickelte sich zu einem 10–15 ha großen römischen Vicus, dessen Heiligtum die Kulttradition fortführte. Die römische Seite hat nach 29 v. Chr. ganz offenkundig die zentrale Stellung des Titelberges, die sie ohne Zweifel zuerst bewusst gefördert hatte, beseitigt und die Civitas wieder in zahlreiche Pagi, kleinere regionale Organisationseinheiten, aufgespaltet. In römischer Zeit fassen wir in der Civitas der Treverer, die allerdings gegenüber der mittleren Spätlatènezeit das Gebiet der Untermosel (Martberg-Oppidum) und große Teile der südöstlichen Gebiete mit dem zentralen Donnersberg-Oppidum eingebüßt hatte, inschriftlich bisher fünf Pagi,⁴⁰ die nun natürlich Teil der römischen verwaltungsrechtlichen Organisation der Civitas waren.

Der Titelberg selbst war verkehrsmäßig ungünstig gelegen, nachdem sich die Kommunikationslinien, insbesondere das römische Hauptstraßennetz sowie militärische Versorgung und wirtschaftliche Dynamik auf die Moselachse und zum Rhein hin ausrichteten (Wasserweg der Mosel, Eifelstraße, Moselstraße). Auch die Leistungsanforderungen an die gallischen Civitates für die Versorgung des römischen Heeres richteten sich auf die Rheingarnisonen und damit auf die dorthin führenden Transportwege aus.⁴¹ Seit dem Ende des 1. Jh. v. Chr. war für die gesamte Civitas Treverorum eine neue verkehrsmäßige, abgabemäßige und wirtschaftliche Orientierung gegeben, in welcher der Titelberg, der nun abseits der Hauptstraßen Reims-Trier und Lyon-Metz-Trier-Köln/Andernach/Mainz lag, seine überregionale Bedeutung verlieren musste. An seine Stelle trat als Straßenknotenpunkt der Vicus Orolaunum/Arlon,⁴² der auch als Pagus-Vorort fungierte. Die wichtige vorrömische Verkehrsachse, welche die Oppida Donnersberg, Otzenhausen, Kastel und Titelberg verbunden und die Mosel bereits auf einer festen Brücke überschritten hatte⁴³ sowie über den Titelberg weiter ins Remergebiet führte, fand keine direkte Nachfolge. Wie auch die Münzspektren zeigen, war das westliche und mittlere Treverergebiet vorrangig nach Westen orientiert gewesen. Der Bedeutungsverlust des Titelberges spiegelt sich auch in dem Verschwinden repräsentativer

⁴⁰ Vgl. Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 104ff.; Zum Verhältnis von Civitas und Pagus bzw. Zentralort vgl. etwa S. Rieckhoff, in Rieckhoff-Biel 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 8), 250f.; U. Nomm, *RGA*² 10 (1998), 471–473; 22 (2003), 449f.; H. Galsterer, *DNP* 9 (2000), 146f.

⁴¹ Vgl. etwa Tacitus, *Annales* 1.71.2; 2.5.3; 2.6.1 zu den Jahren 15 und 16 n. Chr.

⁴² Vgl. F. Schön, *DNP* 9 (2000), 49.

⁴³ Moselübergang von Stadtbredimus-Palzem; Dendrodaten der Hölzer 140 und 122 v. Chr.

Baustrukturen im Heiligtumsbereich um ca. 20 v. Chr., an deren Stelle dann erst wieder Mitte des 1. Jh. n. Chr. Kultbauten traten. Das relativ dichte vorrömische Wegenetz zwischen den Oppida und innerhalb der Stammesgebiete wurde durch das römische Straßennetz abgelöst, das mehrfach zu Neustrukturierungen innerhalb der gallischen Civitates führte.⁴⁴ Es ist mehrfach zu beobachten, dass die Zentralorte der gallischen Civitates entsprechend von den Plätzen der Oppida an die Straßen und Straßenkreuzungen verlegt wurden.

Wir können mit gutem Grund im Titelberg ein Zentrum des romfreundlichen Teils des treverischen Adels sehen, an dessen Spitze während des gallischen Krieges Cingetorix stand, der mit seinem Schwiegervater Indutiomarus um die Vorherrschaft im Verband der treverischen Teilstämme und ihrer Bundesversammlung rivalisierte und von Caesar 53 v. Chr. für seine Treue mit der höchsten politischen und militärischen Führungsposition, principatus atque imperium, in der Civitas belohnt wurde.⁴⁵ 51 v. Chr. kam es nochmals zu einer Erhebung von gallischen Stämmen unter Beteiligung von Teilen der Treverer, die Zuzug rechtrheinischer Verbündeter erhielten; im Jahre 50 führte Caesar eine Machtdemonstration in Form einer großen Heeresparade im Land der Treverer durch, um die Ruhe zu garantieren.⁴⁶ Charakteristisch für die Politik Caesars ist es, dass es zu keiner Beseitigung der gallischen Aristokratie kam, sondern diese vielmehr ihre Macht über Land und Leute behielt. Nur die Gegner der caesarischen Politik wurden ausgeschaltet bzw. liquidiert. ‚Ganz Gallien‘ hatte er zur Provinz gemacht, „mit Ausnahme der verbündeten und um Rom verdienten Civitates.“⁴⁷ Sie blieben formal unabhängige Staatsgebilde, die mit Rom durch völkerrechtliche Vertragsverhältnisse als *foederati* bzw. *amici et socii* verbunden waren und damit einen privilegierten Status unter der römischen Herrschaft innehatten, der sie natürlich ebenso untergeordnet waren wie die tributpflichtigen Stammesstaaten (*civitates stipendiariae*). Dies gilt natürlich auch für die Treverer, die in ihrer privilegierten Stellung wohl 30–29 v. Chr. von einer *civitas libera et foederata* zu einer *civitas foederata* herabgestuft worden waren.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Vgl. auch Heinen a.a.O. 1985, (Anm. 29), 26.

⁴⁵ Caesar, *De bello Gallico* 5.3–4; 5.57.2; 6.8.9.

⁴⁶ Caesar, *De bello Gallico* 8.45; 8.52.1.

⁴⁷ Sueton, *Julius* 25.1.

⁴⁸ Plinius, *Naturalis Historia* 4.106; vgl. hierzu auch Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 60.

Kommen wir nun zur Frage der Gründung des neuen Hauptortes der Treverer.⁴⁹ Bereits aus dem Namen Augusta Treverorum, ‚Augustus-Stadt der Treverer,‘ ist zu Recht auf die gezielte Gründung Triers als Hauptstadt der Civitas in augusteischer Zeit zu schließen, wobei schon für die Namensgebung eine Genehmigung durch den Princeps vorgelegen haben muß.⁵⁰ Als Terminus ante quem für die Gründung des Hauptortes und eines entsprechenden Handelns der Civitas als Körperschaft bzw. ihrer Repräsentanten an diesem Ort kann das Memorialmonument für die Enkel des Augustus Gaius (+ 4 n. Chr.) und Lucius Caesar (+ 2 n. Chr.) gelten.⁵¹ Als wahrscheinlicher Gründungstag der Stadt kann der 1.8. eines unbekannten Jahres erschlossen werden, wobei zu Recht auf die Bedeutung dieses Tages als Tag der Weihe des Roma et Augustus-Altars für die gallischen Provinzen in Lugdunum zu verweisen ist.⁵² An diesem Tag versammelten sich nun jährlich die Vertreter der gallischen Civitates, um ihre Loyalität zu bekunden. Wie K.P. Goethert überzeugend darlegen konnte, ist die Orientierung des Decumanus der Stadt von der Groma der Neugründung aus auf den Sonnenaufgang an den Äquinoktien ausgerichtet, also auf den Geburtstag des Augustus am 23. September.⁵³ Hierin werden der ideologische Hintergrund und die Beziehung auf Person und Kult des Augustus besonders fassbar. Bereits das älteste Straßennetz war für eine geplante städtische Siedlung nach römischem Muster ausgelegt; die Lehmfachwerkbauten der ältesten Phase wurden nach kurzer

⁴⁹ Vgl. hierzu H. Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 41ff.; K.-J. Gilles, ‚Neue Funde und Beobachtungen zu den Anfängen Triers‘, *Trierer Zeitschrift* 55 (1992), 193–232; P. Hoffmann, ‚Die Stadtentwicklung am römischen Forum in Trier‘, *Funde und Ausgrabungen in Bezirk Trier* 30 (1998), 53–68; H. Löhr, ‚Drei Landschaftsbilder zur Natur- und Kulturgeschichte der Trierer Talweite‘, ebd. 7–28; H.-P. Kuhnen, ‚Die Anfänge des römischen Trier. Alte und neue Forschungsansätze‘, in Precht 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 5), 143–156; K.P. Goethert, ‚Untersuchungen zum Gründungsschema des Stadtplans der Colonia Augusta Treverorum. Die Geburt der Stadt an der Mosel‘, *Archäologisches Korrespondenzblatt* 33 (2003), 239–257. Zum römischen Trier weiter E.M. Wightman, *Roman Trier and the Treveri* (London 1970); *Trier. Augustusstadt der Treverer* (Mainz ²1984), bes. H. Löhr 7ff.; A. Haffner 16ff.; K.-J. Gilles 20ff.; H. Cüppers 48ff.; H.-P. Kuhnen, *Das römische Trier* (Darmstadt 2001): geht im Historischen nicht über H. Heinen hinaus; ferner H. Cüppers, in *Die Römer in Rheinland-Pfalz* (Stuttgart 1990), 577–647, 647f. (Ehrang); F. Schön, *DMP* 2 (1997), 285–290.

⁵⁰ Vgl. Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 43, 46–53.

⁵¹ Vgl. Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 47ff.

⁵² Vgl. Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 46f. Goethert 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 49), 249f. stellt dies in Frage und plädiert für den 23.9., den Geburtstag des Augustus, als Gründungstag; seine Darlegungen sind jedoch keineswegs zwingend.

⁵³ Goethert 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 49).

Zeit durch Steinbauten ersetzt.⁵⁴ Das erste Straßensystem, das in der Bundsandsteinschotterung der Straßenkörper fassbar wird, wurde symmetrisch und planmäßig nach den Grundsätzen antiker Stadtplanung und Proportionslehre angelegt.⁵⁵ An der Kreuzung von *Cardo* und *Decumanus* befand sich das erste, kleinere Forum, das eine Fläche von vier rechteckigen *Insulae* einnahm. Beiderseits des *Decumanus*, der vom Straßenraster weg mit zwei leichten Knicken zur Moselbrücke führte, lagen westlich und östlich des Forums jeweils zwei rechteckige *Insulae*. Nördlich und südlich schlossen sich daran beiderseits des *Decumanus* jeweils 3×3 *Insulae* an. In flavischer Zeit wurde der Forumsbereich zu seiner späteren Größe erweitert. Die Verteilung des zeitlich dem Oberaden-Horizont (11–8 v. Chr.) zuzuordnenden Materials zeigt die rasche und flächige Besiedlung dieser Gründungsphase, deren erste Erweiterung bereits in den Haltern-Horizont (bis 9 n. Chr.) fällt; in tiberischer Zeit ist die Siedlung bereits über das ursprüngliche Straßenraster hinausgewachsen, das dann in flavischer Zeit im Sinne des regulären *Insula*-Rasters erweitert wurde.⁵⁶ Das erste, ohne Zweifel von Spezialisten aus dem Ingenieurkorps des Heeres entworfene und vermessene Straßennetz erstreckte sich zwar auf hochwasserfreie Terrassenbildungen, erforderte jedoch die Nivellierung von Geländestufen und griff im Süden bereits auf den Schwemmfächer des Altbaches sowie im Nordosten auf eine Feuchtsenke aus.⁵⁷ Das Gelände war somit keineswegs ideal für eine Stadtanlage. Zudem grenzte es im Norden an ein Altwasser und einen Altarm der Mosel, ein Gelände, das bei der Erweiterung des Stadtgebietes erst durch Aufschüttungen und aufwendige Grundierungen hergerichtet werden musste.

Die Talweite der Mosel bei Trier stellt einen verkehrsmäßig zentra-

⁵⁴ Vgl. Cüppers 1990, a.a.O. (Anm. 49); Löhr 1998, a.a.O. (Anm. 49); Goethert 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 49).

⁵⁵ Vgl. hierzu jetzt Goethert 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 49) mit Korrektur der von Löhr vorgelegten Ergebnisse.

⁵⁶ Vgl. zusammenfassend Goethert 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 49), 248, 250. Die Beiträge von Kuhnén 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 49) führen in der Frage der Stadtgründung nicht über das Bekannte hinaus.

⁵⁷ Vgl. H. Löhr, 'Drei Landschaftsbilder zur Natur- und Kulturgeschichte der Trierer Talweite', *Funde und Ausgrabungen im Bezirk Trier* 30 (1998), 7–28; dens., 'Intensivierte Bodenerosion als Folge römischer Landnutzung in der Trierer Talweite und in ihrem Umfeld', in Haffner-Schnurbein 2000, a.a.O. (Anm. 2), 175–199; dens., 'Die Mosel. Aspekte der naturgeschichtlichen Entwicklung des Trierer Mosellaufes und seiner Archäologie', in H.-P. Kuhnén, Hg., *Abgetaucht. Aufgetaucht. Flußfundstücke* (Trier 2001), 67–86; die Ergebnisse des Teilprojekts 10 Umweltgeschichte der Region Trier des SFB 522 (Universität Trier).

len Raum für das gesamte Treverergebietes dar.⁵⁸ Durch die Zuflüsse von Saar, Biewerbach, Altbach und Ruwer sowie der Kyll, an deren Linie sich der Eifel nach Norden anbot, sind wichtige Verkehrszugänge gegeben, während gleichzeitig mehrere traditionelle Moselübergänge vorhanden waren, so eine jedenfalls seit dem 2. Jh. v. Chr. benutzte Furt im heutigen Stadtgebiet. Hier kreuzte sich die vorgeschichtliche Süd-Nord-Verbindung durch Hunsrück und Eifel mit der Verkehrslinie entlang von Mosel und Saar. Die Trierer Talweite weist jedoch keine größere vorrömische Siedlung auf. Nur am Altbach bestand eine bis in die Frühlatènezeit zurückreichende kleinere Siedlung. Die Süd-Nord-Verbindung gewann erst in römischer Zeit ihre große Bedeutung. Die Wichtigkeit des Kylltales wird durch die beiden latènezeitlichen Burganlagen und Adelssitze von Ehrang und Kordel unterstrichen. In der vorcaesarischen Münzverteilung scheint östlich der Kyll eine gewisse Regionalgrenze gewesen zu sein. Offensichtlich ist der Raum um die Trierer Talweite einerseits teils als Randzone des Trevererverbandes zu sehen, dessen Mittelpunkt das Oppidum von Wallendorf bildete, zum anderen teils als Randzone des Verbandes mit Zentrum im Oppidum von Kastel. Östlich der Kyll begann vermutlich der Einflussbereich des Oppidums auf dem Martberg. Die Trierer Talweite war zwar verkehrsmäßig bedeutsam, befand sich aber offensichtlich in der politischen Gliederung des Großverbandes der Treverer in einer inneren Randständigkeit. Hinzu kommt, dass erhebliche Teile der Niederung Auen-, Überschwemmungs- und Feuchtgebiete waren.

30–29 v. Chr. hatte M. Nonius Gallus den Aufstand der Treverer, die Unterstützung von rechtsrheinischen Stämmen („Germanen“), erhalten hatten, niedergeschlagen.⁵⁹ Gegen die Moriner und weitere aufständische Civitates der Belgica war gleichzeitig C. Carrinas erfolgreich vorgegangen und hatte außerdem einen Übergang „suebischer“ Gruppen über den Rhein zurückgeschlagen.⁶⁰ Carrinas operierte offenkundig in der nördlichen Belgica. Mit den Operationen des Nonius Gallus ist zum einen die Zerstörungsschicht des Jahres 30 v. Chr. im Oppidum Titelberg zu verbinden wie auch die Errichtung des großen Militärlagers

⁵⁸ Vgl. zur geographischen Lage und zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung bis 30 v. Chr. H. Löhrr, in *Trier. Augustusstadt der Treverer* (Mainz ²1984), 9–15; A. Haffner ebd. 16–19.

⁵⁹ Cassius Dio 51.20.5; vgl. *PIR*² N 137.

⁶⁰ Cassius Dio 51.21.6; vgl. *PIR*² C 447.

auf dem Petrisberg oberhalb des späteren Stadtgebietes von Trier,⁶¹ von dem aus die gesamte Talweite der Mosel von der Mündung der Saar bis zur Mündung der Kyll überblickt und alle wichtigen Verkehrswege im Innern der Civitas mit Ausnahme ihrer Verbindungen im Westen kontrolliert werden konnten. Die Dendrodaten für das Fälldatum der erhaltenen Hölzer weisen den Baubeginn des Lagers in das Frühjahr 30 v. Chr. Das Lager auf dem Petrisberg war durch zwei Befestigungsgräben, die quer über den Bergrücken laufen, von der Hochfläche abgeriegelt und war mit einer Fläche von mindestens 250 × 600m, in der Mannschaftsbaracken, Versorgungsgebäude und Pferdeställe trotz der starken neuzeitlichen Störungen im Befund erscheinen, für die Aufnahme eines größeren Korps, wohl einer starken Legionsvexillation und Auxiliarreiterei, geeignet. Zu dem Lager gehörte mit Sicherheit auch ein Flusshafen für die Versorgung auf dem Wasserwege. Das Lager war nur eine relativ kurze Zeit belegt und dürfte spätestens im Zusammenhang der Truppenbewegungen 15/12 v. Chr. in seiner Besatzung verringert und schließlich aufgelassen worden sein. Allerdings ist m.E. mit einer ausreichenden militärischen Sicherung des überaus wichtigen Nachschubknotenpunktes und der Moselbrücke bis 8 v. Chr., dem Beginn der Einrichtung der Provinz Germania, zu rechnen.⁶² Mit dem Lager auf dem Petrisberg und der sehr wahrscheinlichen Präsenz römischen Militärs auf dem Titelberg haben wir wohl nur einen Teil der römischen Truppenstandorte zur Kontrolle der Treverer und insbesondere zur Unterbindung einer Zusammenarbeit mit rechtsrheinischen Kräften vor uns.⁶³ Eine entsprechende Truppenpräsenz ist insbesondere

⁶¹ Zu den aktuellen Ausgrabungen vgl. die Berichte in *Funde und Ausgrabungen im Bezirk Trier* 34 (2002); 35 (2003); 36 (2004); P. Dietze u.a., *Der Petrisberg in Trier* (Trier 2004).

⁶² Das in der Forschung mehrfach postulierte römische Militärlager im Südteil der Stadt ist nicht existent; hier kam es zu einer Fehlinterpretation von neuzeitlichen Befestigungsstrukturen; vgl. Goethert 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 49), 251–253.

⁶³ Vgl. auch Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 40; S. Fichtl, 'La présence militaire romaine sur les oppida dans la Gaule du nord et de l'est', in *Studien zur Archäologie der Kelten, Römer und Germanen in Mittel- und Westeuropa. Festschrift A. Haffner* (Rahden/Westfalen 1998), 153–168, bes. 164ff. Ein neu entdecktes spälatènezeitliches Oppidum von 18ha Fläche liegt auf dem Hochplateau des Bleidenberges bei Oberfell an der unteren Mosel; es erscheint nach seiner Größe dem Martberg-Oppidum eindeutig untergeordnet, hatte aber durch seine Beherrschung des Koblenzer Raumes ohne Zweifel eine große Bedeutung. Nach einer frühlatènezeitlichen Belegung wurde das Oppidum im späten 2. Jh. v. Chr. mit einem 2,5 km langen, zweiphasigen Wall befestigt. Seine Hauptphase fällt in das 1. Jh. v. Chr. und erstreckt sich noch in die Zeit nach der römischen Okkupation. Wie beim Martberg-Oppidum, zu dessen Befestigungsanlagen deutliche Parallelen bestehen, ist auch hier mit einer Aufgabe nach dem Trevereraufstand 30–29 v.

an der Untermosel und im Bereich der Mündung des Flusses, also im Raum von Koblenz, zu erwarten.

Das älteste sichere Zeugnis aus dem Trierer Stadtgebiet ist der Bau der Moselbrücke; die Hölzer für diese Pfahlrostbrücke wurden 18 und 17 v. Chr. gefällt. Der Bau der festen Moselbrücke steht ohne Zweifel mit dem von Agrippa 20–19 v. Chr. eingeleiteten Straßenbau in Gallien in einem direkten Zusammenhang. Die von Lugdunum/Lyon zum Rhein gebaute Straße hat von Metz kommend sicherlich das Militärlager auf dem Petrisberg angebunden und zu dessen Füßen die Mosel nach Norden überschritten, um dann auf der Linie über Bitburg die Eifel zu durchqueren und die Erft zu erreichen. Die erste Moselbrücke ist in ihrer Lage eindeutig auf einen Zugang zum Lager auf dem Petrisberg über dessen Nordwestflanke ausgerichtet. Die Ausrichtung der Insula-Bebauung weicht von dieser Straßenrichtung deutlich ab und muß deshalb sekundär entstanden sein. Außerdem führte die nach Norden führende Moselstraße schräg durch das Insula-Raster der Stadterweiterung zum Beginn des ursprünglichen Cardo. Der ursprüngliche Verlauf der Straße führte offenbar auf der Terrassenstufe direkt zur Moselbrücke. Auch die von Konz kommende römische Hauptstraße mündete mit einer leichten Abweichung in den ursprünglichen Cardo. Die Straßen gingen somit der Einrichtung des Straßennetzes der Stadtgründung voraus. Die Bedeutung dieses Straßenbaus⁶⁴ für die Neustrukturierung des treverischen Raumes wird auch in der frühen planmäßigen Gründung des römischen Etappenortes Dalheim wahrscheinlich um 10 v. Chr. anstelle einer kleinen spät-latènezeitlichen Vorgängersiedlung, zu der aber offenbar keine direkte Kontinuität bestand, deutlich.⁶⁵ Während die erste Trasse der römischen Hauptstraße Metz-Trier-Rheinische Bucht östlich der Mosel geführt wurde und die Saar bei Konz überschritt, ist offenkundig bereits nach 15 bzw. um 10 v. Chr. die Trasse westlich des Flusses gebaut worden, die vor der Saueremündung in die wichtige Straße Reims—Trier—Andernach/Koblenz mündete, die sicher ebenfalls in dieser Zeit angelegt wurde und

Chr. zu rechnen. Vgl. G. Brücken, 'Ein neues keltisches Oppidum an der unteren Mosel bei Oberfell, Kreis Mayen-Koblenz', *Archäologie in Rheinland-Pfalz* (2002), 45–47.

⁶⁴ Vgl. auch Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 107ff., 121ff.

⁶⁵ Vgl. J. Krier, 'Zu den Anfängen der römischen Besiedlung auf dem Petzel bei Dalheim', in *Publications de la Section Historique Institut Grand-Ducal de Luxembourg* 94 (1980), 141–194; dens., 'Das vorrömische und frühromische Dalheim (Luxemburg)', in *Trier. Augustusstadt der Treverer* (Mainz 1984), 79–86; dens., 'Neue Zeugnisse der Götterverehrung aus dem römischen Vicus Dalheim', *Hémecht* 44 (1992), 55–82. Das Fundmaterial setzt mit dem Oberaden-Horizont ein.

sich unmittelbar am nördlichen Brückenkopf der Trierer Moselbrücke mit Straße Metz-Trier-Köln kreuzte. Die Strecke Reims-Arlon-Trier besaß ohne Frage eine herausragende logistische Bedeutung für die Versorgung der Rheinarmee aus dem Inneren Galliens heraus.

Die zentrale Bedeutung von Trier für die Logistik der römischen Heere am Rhein, sowohl des unteren wie den oberen Heeres, wird dadurch dokumentiert, dass sich der Sitz des kaiserlichen Finanzprokurators der Gallia Belgica und beider Germanien, der für das Finanzwesen der Rheinheere zuständig war und zugleich an der Organisation ihrer Logistik wesentlich beteiligt war, in Trier befand.⁶⁶ Es erscheint durchaus möglich, eine entsprechende administrative Stelle für die Verwaltung der zum Rhein geführten Versorgungsgüter bereits seit 15 v. Chr. auf dem Petrisberg anzunehmen. Die Finanzverwaltung der Gallia Belgica für das an ihrer Ostflanke aufmarschierte Heer war jedenfalls schon während des Census 13–12 v. Chr. zu organisieren. Damit kommen wir aber zu der problematischen Frage des Gründungsdatums der Stadt Trier. H. Heinen hat sich mit gewichtigen Gründen für einen Gründungsakt vor 12 v. Chr., dem Zeitpunkt des Abschlusses der endgültigen Organisation der gallischen Provinzen ausgesprochen.⁶⁷ Ohne Zweifel handelte es sich, wie Heinen oder Goethert betonen, um eine bewusste, auf römischen Prinzipien der Stadtanlage basierende Neugründung, nicht um eine allmähliche Stadtwerdung. Es lag also ein entsprechender Gründungsakt der Civitas mit Zustimmung der römischen Autorität oder vielmehr wohl auf deren Anordnung hin zugrunde. Beide Forscher favorisieren das Gründungsjahr 17 v. Chr., ohne dass es hierfür aber wirkliche Argumente gibt.⁶⁸ Das Straßennetz wurde planmäßig und in einem Zug angelegt, zweifellos mit Unterstützung der römischen Administration und der Spezialisten und Arbeitskolonnen des römischen Heeres. Der Ort der Gründung wurde, wie wir mit gutem Grund betonen können, von römischer Seite unterhalb des Truppenlagers

⁶⁶ Vgl. zuletzt R. Haensch, *Capita Provinciarum* (Mainz 1997), 74, 130–133.

⁶⁷ Vgl. Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 45f., 50ff.

⁶⁸ Goethert 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 49), bes. 249f. (23.9.17 v. Chr.). Weder die Datierung des Baus der Moselbrücke noch der Verweis auf die *Ludi Saeculares* des Jahres 17 v. Chr. sind tragfähige Argumente. Die Ausrichtung auf den Geburtstag des Herrschers und damit auf die Person des Augustus, dessen Namen die Stadt tragen sollte, war ein politisch-ideologischer Akt der römischen Führung. Dieser Tag braucht aber nicht der Gründungstag der Stadt zu sein. Die inschriftlichen Werkdaten von der Porta Nigra, einem Bau der Stadtbefestigung unter Beteiligung des römischen Heeres, können nicht als Beleg gegen den 1.8., der nur für die städtische Führungsschicht ein Feiertag war, herangezogen werden.

auf dem Petrisberg festgelegt. Die gesamte Trierer Talweite und die Höhen um den Petrisberg waren ohne Zweifel bei der Anlage des Lagers beschlagnahmt und der direkten Militäradministration unterstellt worden. Das Gebiet in der Niederung musste also von römischer Seite ausdrücklich für die Gründung der Stadt an die Civitas Treverorum zurückgegeben werden, um hier deren ‚Augustusstadt‘ überhaupt errichten zu können. Es spricht alles dafür, dass diese Neuorganisation der Civitas Treverorum, welche die Gründung eines Civitashauptortes unter römischer Anleitung und Unterstützung beinhaltete, mit dem Census des Drusus den Älteren im Jahre 13 v. Chr. in Zusammenhang steht. Es ist durchaus denkbar, dass der Gründungsakt nach den entsprechenden Vorarbeiten am gleichen Tag wie die Weihung der Ara Galliarum in Lyon, also am 1.8.12 v. Chr. erfolgt ist. Die organisatorische Ordnung des ostgallischen Raumes war eine wichtige Voraussetzung für jede offensive Strategie am Rhein. Mit der Umgruppierung des römischen Heeres seit 15 v. Chr. trat die Schaffung der logistischen Infrastruktur für die Konzentration der römischen Kräfte am Rhein und für Operationen über diesen hinaus nach Osten in den Mittelpunkt. Die bisherige dezentrale Organisation der Civitas Treverorum war für die Erfassung und Verfügbarmachung ihrer Ressourcen für die Versorgung der römischen Armeen nicht geeignet. Vielmehr war die Schaffung einer zentralen Institution als Adressaten der römischen Leistungsanforderungen erforderlich, d. h. ein Gemeinderat mit leitenden Funktionären für die gesamte Civitas.⁶⁹ Eine zentral strukturierte Selbstverwaltung der Civitates mit klar verantwortlichen Gremien und Leitungspersonal war für das administrative System des Reiches geradezu unverzichtbar. Auch war ein zentraler Punkt für Stapelung, Transport und Administration der Versorgungsgüter an diesem Straßenknoten, der zugleich eine Schnittstelle mit der für den Massengütertransport so wichtigen Wasserstraße der Mosel war, im Grunde eine gebotene Lösung. Die unbehinderte Heranziehung der Ressourcen der Civitates und hier insbesondere auch der Treverer war ein wesentliches Ziel der römischen Politik.⁷⁰ Durch die Gründung des neuen Hauptortes

⁶⁹ Bei der Beendigung des sogenannten Bataveraufstandes flüchteten 70 n. Chr. 113 treverische Ratsherren (*senatores*), also offenbar der gesamte Gemeinderat in das Gebiet jenseits der Reichsgrenze; Tacitus, *Historiae* 5.19.4.

⁷⁰ Vgl. die Klage der aufständischen Treverer in der Erhebung des Iulius Florus und des Iulius Sacrovir 21 n. Chr. über die *continuatio tributorum*, die Fortdauer der Abgaben für die formal in einem Foederatenverhältnis mit Rom stehende Civitas (Tacitus, *Annales* 3.40.4).

auf ‚neutralem Grund‘ konnten Rivalitäten zwischen den treverischen Teilverbänden vermieden werden, und die römische Führung hat vermutlich aufgrund der bisherigen Erfahrungen mit der durchaus schwierigen, in sich völlig zerstrittenen Adelselite der Treverer, die sich 21 n. Chr. im Aufstand des Iulius Florus, dessen Familie bereits von Caesar das Bürgerrecht erhalten hatte,⁷¹ nochmals bestätigen sollten,⁷² bewusst an keinen der bisherigen Zentralorte angeknüpft. Die Anlage auf diesem für die Errichtung einer Stadtanlage nicht besonders geeigneten, aber durch die von Rom für das Heer geschaffenen Verkehrsstrukturen so zentralen Gelände kann nur als eine römische Entscheidung gewertet werden, die der Civitas Treverorum so vorgegeben wurde. Der Ort war auf die römische Moselbrücke, den Flusshafen und die römische Herrschaftspräsenz bezogen. Mit der Heeresversorgung sowie dem weiteren Bedarf und der Kaufkraft der Soldaten war zugleich aber auch eine wirtschaftliche Grundlage⁷³ für die Stadtgründung geschaffen, die sich aus der römischen Neustrukturierung des ostgallischen Raumes und der römischen Militärpolitik ergab. Die Rechtsstellung der Civitas und ebenso jene ihres Hauptortes blieb peregrin, zumindest bis in claudische Zeit;⁷⁴ die Bezeichnung der Stadt als Colonia bei Tacitus in der Schilderung der Ereignisse 69–70 n. Chr. kann aber nicht als ‚untypische Verwendung‘ des Begriffes abgetan werden, sondern zeigt eine Veränderung des Status vor diesem Zeitpunkt an, und zwar die Erhebung zur Colonia latinischen Rechts. Trier war wahrscheinlich eine der letzten Städte überhaupt, die in diesen Status erhoben wurden. Weder eine Usurpation des Colonia-Titels noch eine Verleihung ehrenhalber ohne jede rechtliche Folgen sind als Alternativen wirklich denkbar. Die fragmentarische Inschrift AE 1968, 321 aus Mainz nennt den absteigenden Cursus eines vornehmen Treverers aus iulisch-claudischer bis flavischer Zeit.⁷⁵ Er war Priester des provinziellen Kaiserkultes in Lyon, hatte zuvor ein Amt der Colonia Treverorum inne und war

⁷¹ Tacitus, *Annales* 3.40.1.

⁷² Tacitus, *Annales* 3.40–42.

⁷³ Zur wirtschaftlichen Orientierung des Treverergebietes vgl. auch Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 141ff.

⁷⁴ Vgl. überzeugend Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 60–66, 392.

⁷⁵ J. Krier, *Die Treverer außerhalb ihrer Civitas* (Trier 1981), 92–96 Nr. 33; vgl. Heinen 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 61ff. Das Cognomen Tiber[ianus] kann eine Namensgebung im Sinne einer Loyalitätsbekundung kurz nach dem Florus-Sacrovir-Aufstand 21 n. Chr. bedeuten. Alle vorgeschlagenen Ergänzungen der Inschrift sind mit Ausnahme der Nennung des Priesteramtes an der Ara Galliarum und der Präfektur des Rheinuferes unsicher.

als ritterlicher Offizier Praefectus ad ripam Rheni gewesen. Die in Z. 6 und 7 genannten Laufbahnstationen sind unsicher; dagegen kann in Z. 7 begründet [*in civita*]te Treve[rorum]/[—] ergänzt werden, so dass ich für Z. 6/7 vorschlagen möchte: [—]rum qua[aestori II⁶/in civita]te Treve[rorum]. Aus der Inschrift ergibt sich entgegen den bisherigen Annahmen aber keineswegs, dass Trier als Colonia latinischen Rechts und die peregrine Civitas der Treverer nebeneinander existiert hätten. Vielmehr kann sich die Laufbahn gerade über den Zeitpunkt der Statusveränderung der Civitas Treverorum hinweg erstreckt haben.

Mit der Gründung Triers hatte die römische Führung einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur Ausbildung des historischen Raumes an der Mosel geleistet, wobei die Motive weniger in einer oft zitierten Urbanisierungspolitik lagen, sondern vielmehr in der administrativen Neuorganisation des ostgallischen Raumes mit einer militärischen und logistischen Zielsetzung. Die Ausbildung dieses ostgallischen Zentralortes sollte insbesondere im späteren 3. Jh. n. Chr. respektive in der Spätantike⁷⁷ und im Mittelalter ihre volle Bedeutung entfalten und im besten Sinne raumbildend wirken. Als Partner in Produktion, Handel, Transport und Geschäftsfinanzierung der militärischen Stellen und der Administration in der Organisation der Heeresversorgung entwickelte sich eine ‘business class,’ die wir in ihren Inschriften und Grabmonumenten von der Rhone bis zur Mosel und zum Rhein, insbesondere in Lyon und im Raum von Trier, fassen können.

Mogontiacum,⁷⁸ das römische Mainz, nimmt wiederum eine eigene Sonderstellung unter den städtischen Siedlungen der Rheinzone ein. Die Errichtung der großen Militärbasis auf dem Hochplateau des Kästrich und einer zugehörigen Hafenbasis am Strom ist ohne Zweifel

⁷⁶ Alternativ wären *quaestori r(ei) p(ublicae)* oder *quaestori p(ecuniae) p(ublicae)* denkbar.

⁷⁷ Vgl. H. Heinen, *Frühchristliches Trier* (Trier 1996).

⁷⁸ Vgl. J. Oldenstein, *RGZ* 20 (2002), 144–153; R. Klein, Hg., *Die Römer und ihr Erbe. Fortschritt durch Innovation und Integration* (Mainz 2003), bes. L. Schumacher, ‘Mogontiacum. Garnison und Zivilsiedlung im Rahmen der Reichsgeschichte’, ebd. 1–28; R. Haensch, ‘Mogontiacum als „Hauptstadt“ der Provinz Germania Superior’, ebd. 71–86; O. Höckmann, ‘Mainz als römische Hafenstadt’, ebd. 87–105; ferner Haensch 1997, a.a.O. (Anm. 66), 149–153; M. Witteyer, ‘Mogontiacum—Militärbasis und Verwaltungszentrum. Der archäologische Befund’, in Mainz. *Die Geschichte der Stadt* (Mainz 1998), 1021–1058; dies., ‘Zur römischen Besiedlung von Mainz-Weisenau’, in *Provinzialrömische Forschungen. Festschrift G. Ulbert* (Espelkamp 1995), 273–288; U. Ehmig, *Die römischen Amphoren aus Mainz*, 2 Bde. (Möhnesee 2003). Der Beitrag von G. Ziethen, ‘Mogontiacum. Vom Legionslager zur Provinzhauptstadt’, in Mainz. *Die Geschichte der Stadt* (Mainz 1998), 39–70 ist in jeder Beziehung enttäuschend.

mit dem Beginn der Offensive des Drusus in Germanien zu verbinden und ab 13–12 v. Chr. anzusetzen; spätestens 10 v. Chr. war hier die Hauptbasis der südlichen Rheinfront mit einer Garnisonsstärke von zwei Legionen und Auxilien ausgebaut. Ein Dendrodatum von 17–16 v. Chr. könnte auf einen etwas früheren Beginn römischer Präsenz am Ort unmittelbar vor oder nach der Clades Lolliana hinweisen. Die Holzerde-Mauer des Doppellegionslagers wurde bereits in augusteischer Zeit mehrfach ausgebessert und dann in tiberischer Zeit völlig erneuert. Wie die neuen dendrochronologischen Daten für die Pfahlrostgründung der Pfeiler der ersten festen Rheinbrücke zeigen, wurde diese in den Jahren 25–27 n. Chr. errichtet.⁷⁹ Um das Lager entwickelte sich zuerst vor der Südwestfront die Lagersiedlung, die *canabae legionis*. Eine relativ lockere Bebauung dehnte sich dann bis zum Rhein hin aus, wobei das Gelände vielfach durch Aufschüttungen hergerichtet werden mußte. Im Bereich der ausgedehnten Hafenanlagen entstand im Gebiet des sogen. Dimesser Ortes die erste eigentliche Zivilsiedlung beim dortigen großen Frachthafen. Das Praetorium des obergermanischen Legaten bzw. Militärgouverneur und dann ab 85 n. Chr. des Provinzstatthalters lag nicht im Legionslager auf dem Kästrich,⁸⁰ sondern im Bereich zwischen Lager und Rhein, wobei m.E. wie in Köln wohl mit einer Nähe zum Fluß und zum Hafenbereich ‚Brand‘ (Kriegshafen) sowie zur direkten Fortsetzung der Via Praetoria anzunehmen ist. Neben dem großen Frachthafen im Bereich Dimesser Ort war in der Achse der Via Praetoria des Lagers auf dem Kästrich etwas stromaufwärts der römischen Rheinbrücke der Kriegshafen des 1. und 2. Jh. n. Chr. sowie der Spätantike angelegt und noch etwas weiter stromaufwärts ein zweiter, wohl primär militärischer Frachthafen, wo auch eine Werft aus augusteischer Zeit gefunden wurde; die Kaianlagen wanderten mit der Verlandung des Ufers und der Verlagerung des Flusslaufes nach Osten bzw. Nordosten.⁸¹

Frühe militärische Brückenköpfe waren in Mainz-Kastel und gegenüber von Mainz-Weisenau errichtet worden. In dem rechtsrheinischen

⁷⁹ Vgl. S. Bauer, in: www.roemisches-mainz.de/mainz/inhalt/fundberichte.html, dies., ‚Recycling in römischer Zeit: Spundbohlen einer frühromischen Brückenkonstruktion als Uferanbefestigung in der Mainzer Holzstraße‘, *Archäologie in Rheinland-Pfalz* (2003), 35–38.

⁸⁰ Vgl. entsprechend AE 1964, 148: das Praetorium „*ad hiberna leg(ionis) XXII P(rimigeniae) p(iae) f(idelis)*.“

⁸¹ Vgl. Höckmann 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 78) mit Abb. 3.

Vorfeld von Mainz, das vor Mitte des 1. Jh. v. Chr. unter der Kontrolle des Heidetränk-Oppidums gestanden hatte, wurden vermutlich um die Zeitenwende oder aber bereits im Rahmen der Politik des Tiberius 8 v. Chr. die Mattiaker,⁸² offensichtlich ein Teilverband der Chatten in einem engen Vertragsverhältnis zu Rom, angesiedelt und als Civitas organisiert; dies steht wohl mit der Neuordnung des chattischen Raumes, der in Waldgirmes einen städtischen Civitasvorort bekommen sollte, in direktem Zusammenhang. Als Vorort der Mattiaker wurde der augusteisch gegründete Vicus Mattiacum bzw. Aquae Mattiacae nahe den bereits in der 1. Hälfte des 1. Jh. n. Chr. bekannten Thermalquellen errichtet.⁸³ Die Parallele zu der Gründung der Civitasvororte am Niederrhein (Oppidum Batavorum, Oppidum Cugernorum) in der Nähe großer römischer Militärbasen ist sicher nicht zufällig.

Für die römische Militärplanung war die Gründung der Militärbasis durch die strategische Lage gegenüber der Mainmündung geradezu vorgegeben. Mainz lag hier am Ende bzw. Anfang eines der wichtigsten Verkehrswege aus dem und in das Innere Germaniens, wobei sich traditionelle Flußübergänge ober- und unterhalb der Mainmündung, die sich in entsprechenden vorgeschichtlichen Flußfunden spiegeln, befanden. Ebenso kontrollierte das wohl nur wenig nach 13–12 v. Chr. 3,5 km rheinaufwärts auf der Hochfläche errichtete zweite Militärlager Mainz-Weisenau einen alten Flußübergang. Das Lager von Mainz-Weisenau, für das nur völlig unzureichende Erkenntnisse vorhanden sind, war offensichtlich eine Bereitstellungsbasis für weitere Truppen neben dem Doppellegionslager und hatte dementsprechend bis in domitianische Zeit wechselnde Garnisonsstärken und wohl auch Lagergrößen.

Nach Süden und Südwesten dehnt sich das Hügelland Rheinhessens aus, dessen Plateau hier mit einem Steilabfall zu den Uferterrassen des Rheins abfällt, wobei sich das Flußufer gegenüber der römischen Zeit schrittweise nach Osten bzw. Nordosten verschoben hat.⁸⁴ Der Raum vom Mainz hatte vor der Gründung der römischen Militärbasis keinerlei Mittelpunkt Funktion.⁸⁵ Er war vielmehr in der Grenzzone zwischen dem südöstlichen, vom Donnersberg-Oppidum dominierten

⁸² Vgl. zu ihnen R. Wiegels, *DNP* 7 (1999), 1035f.

⁸³ Vgl. zum römischen Wiesbaden A. Becker, *RGZ* 19 (2001), 440–443; W. Cyszcz, *Wiesbaden in der Römerzeit* (Stuttgart 1994), 52ff.

⁸⁴ Vgl. die Karten bei Höckmann 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 78).

⁸⁵ Vgl. zur Vorgeschichte des Mainzer Raumes K.V. Decker, 'Die Anfänge der Mainzer Geschichte', in *Mainz. Die Geschichte der Stadt* (Mainz 1998), 1–35.

Teil der Treverer und dem Einzugsbereich des jenseits des Rheins das Rhein-Main-Gebiet dominierenden Heidetränk-Oppidums bei Oberursel-Oberstedten⁸⁶ gelegen. Das Oppidum mit einer Fläche von 130 ha ist durch seine Bedeutung als Münzprägestätte und durch seine Handwerksquartiere hervorgehoben, in denen eine arbeitsteilige Wirtschaftsweise vom Rohmaterial bis zum Fertigprodukt nachgewiesen werden konnte. In Bad Nauheim befand sich eine unbefestigte latènezeitliche Siedlung, deren Salinen zu den bedeutendsten Orten für Salzgewinnung im keltischen Raum gehörten und zweifellos durch die geradezu vorindustrielle Salzgewinnung vom 3. bis ins 1. Jh. v. Chr. eine Quelle des Reichtums der Region waren.⁸⁷ Südlich des Mains finden sich bis zum Rand des Odenwalds zahlreiche offene latènezeitliche Siedlungen, eine Ringwallanlage fehlt jedoch in diesem Raum, so dass mit einer Zugehörigkeit zum Stammesverband um das Heidetränk-Oppidum zu rechnen sein dürfte. Die Aufgabe des Heidetränk-Oppidums ist wahrscheinlich nicht ganz eine Generation vor jener des Dünsberg-Oppidums im Lahntal,⁸⁸ also nicht lange nach 50 v. Chr. anzusetzen;

⁸⁶ Vgl. F. Maier, *RGZ* 14 (1999), 157f.; dens., in Rieckhoff-Biel 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 8), 438–441; dens., *Das keltische Heidetränk-Oppidum bei Oberursel im Taunus*. Archäologische Denkmäler in Hessen 10 (Wiesbaden 21993). Der Ausbau der beiden älteren latènezeitlichen Befestigungen Altenhöfe und Goldgrube zu einem großen Oppidum erfolgte in der 2. Hälfte des 2. Jh. v. Chr. Vgl. insgesamt A. Jockenhövel, in F.-R. Herrmann und A. Jockenhövel, Hgg., *Die Vorgeschichte Hessens* (Stuttgart 1990), 244ff., bes. 270ff., 461f.

⁸⁷ Vgl. B. Kull, Hg., *Sole und Salz schreiben Geschichte. 50 Jahre Landesarchäologie, 150 Jahre archäologische Forschungen in Bad Nauheim* (Mainz 2003).

⁸⁸ Vgl. C. Schlott, *Zum Ende des spätlatènezeitlichen Oppidums auf dem Dünsberg* (Gem. Biebertal-Fellingshausen, Kreis Gießen, Hessen). Forschungen zum Dünsberg 2 (Montagnac 1999); K. Reeh, *Der Dünsberg und seine Umgebung. Eine Bestandsaufnahme*. Forschungen zum Dünsberg 1 (Montagnac 2001); J. Schulze-Forster, *Die latènezeitlichen Funde vom Dünsberg* (Diss. Marburg 2002); K.-F. Rittershofer und J. Schulze-Forster, 'Forschungen am Dünsberg I–II', *Berichte der Kommission Archäologische Landesforschung Hessen* 6 (2000/2001), 125–146; K.-F. Rittershofer, Ausgrabungen 1999 bis 2003 am keltischen Oppidum auf dem Dünsberg bei Gießen, *Berichte der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission* 85 (2004), 7–36; Grabungsberichte in www.duensberg.de; www.archaeologie-online.de/magazin/fundpunkt/2004/09/duensberg_1.phb; 2005/04/duensberg_3.phb. Vgl. auch Roymans 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), bes. 130, 148. Die keltischen und römischen Waffenfunde insbesondere im Bereich vor Tor 4 und auch Tor 5, die bisher oft mit einem Kampfgeschehen des Drususfeldzuges 10 v. Chr. verbunden wurden, erweisen sich als Teil kultischer Deponierungen. Eine gewisse Präsenz römischen Militärs auf dem Dünsberg, der nur 8 km von der Stadtgründung Waldgirmes entfernt ist und das gesamte Wetzlar-Gießener Becken sowie die Butzbacher Taunusnische beherrscht, kann m. E. zu Recht vermutet werden. Das offensichtlich nur kurzzeitig wohl in den Jahren 10–8 v. Chr. belegte Lager von Dorlar, das etwa eineinhalb Legionen Platz geboten hat, liegt zwischen Waldgirmes und dem Dünsberg, steht jedoch kaum mit einer postulierten römischen Eroberung des Dünsbergs in Beziehung. Das späte Fundgut des

die Existenz des Dünsberg-Oppidums, des ursprünglichen Zentralortes des batavisch-chattischen Verbandes, dessen Bedeutung offensichtlich seit ca. 50–40 v. Chr. bereits abgenommen hatte, reicht dagegen noch bis in die Zeit ca. 30/vor 20 v. Chr. (Ende des hessischen Latène D 2).

Die vorgeschichtlichen Siedlungen lagen auf der linksrheinischen Hochterrasse oder an deren Rand; auch die rechtsrheinische Uferzone war siedlungsleer. In der Latènezeit geht die Zahl der Siedlungsstellen im Mainzer Raum gegenüber der Urnenfelder- und Hallstattzeit stark zurück. In der ausgehenden Latènezeit ist nur die keltische Siedlung in Mainz-Bretzenheim und die spätestkeltische Siedlung in Mainz-Weisenau zu erwähnen; letztere entstand wohl erst nach 30–29 v. Chr. und wurde von dem dort angelegten Militärlager und der etwa gleichzeitig entstandenen Zivilsiedlung überbaut, die einheimische Bevölkerung ging in den neuen Siedlungsstrukturen auf. Hier können wir sehr wahrscheinlich die äußerste Randzone treverischer Siedlungen in der 2. Hälfte des 1. Jh. v. Chr. in Rheinhessen fassen; die Siedlungen und das zentrale Mars Loucetius-Heiligtum von Klein-Winternheim/Ober-Olm⁸⁹ sind mit dem wohl treverischen Teilverband der Aresaces zu verbinden. Bereits unter römischer Herrschaft, vielleicht in Verbindung mit der Neuordnung nach 30–29 v. Chr., nahm die keltische Besiedlung mit Gehöften im Raum bis zur Nahe und einer größeren Siedlung in Alzey wieder zu. Dagegen können wir im Raum Bad Kreuznach spätkeltisch-römische Siedlungskontinuität fassen.⁹⁰

Im Gegensatz zu anderen großen Legionslagern wurde die Zivilstadt des römischen Mainz nie in den Status einer autonomen Stadtgemeinde erhoben.⁹¹ Die Bewohner bezeichneten sich als Mogontienses.⁹² Die zivile Besiedlung, die sich in flavischer Zeit zwischen Kästrich und Rhein städtisch verdichtete, zerfiel in die Canabae Legionis⁹³ und eine Reihe

Dünsberg zeigt mitteldeutsche-elbgermanische Beeinflussung, die offensichtlich einen entscheidenden Faktor in der chattischen Ethnogenese darstellte.

⁸⁹ CIL XIII 7252; vgl. etwa M.J. Klein, in *Die Römer und ihr Erbe. Fortschritt durch Innovation und Integration* (Mainz 2003), 109.

⁹⁰ Vgl. das Gräberfeld von Badenheim; A. Böhme-Schönberger, 'Der keltisch-römische Bestattungsplatz von Badenheim', in *Des Lichtes beraubt* (Wiesbaden 1995), 80–86.

⁹¹ Vgl. auch Schumacher 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 78), bes. 1, 11; Witteyer 1998, a.a.O. (Anm. 78), 1040f.; ferner Haensch 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 78).

⁹² CIL XIII 11810.

⁹³ Vgl. die Weihung der Mainzer Jupitersäule durch die *canabarii* (*Römische Steinendmaler. Mainz in Römischer Zeit* (Mainz 1988), 90f.).

von Vici,⁹⁴ welche die Organisationsebene des zivilen Stadtgebietes bildeten, das ebenso wie das Umland und die Zivilsiedlung von Mainz-Weisenau stets unter der direkten Verwaltung des Militärgouverneurs bzw. des Statthalters und Kommandeurs der Garnison verblieb. Das Siedlungskonglomerat hatte wohl urbanen Charakter und stellte sich insbesondere seit dem Mauerbau unmittelbar nach 250 n. Chr., der auch die Canabae im Südwesten und Süden des Legionslagers mit einschloß, als eine ummauerte Stadtsiedlung dar, jedoch fehlten die für eine römische Stadt charakteristischen Strukturen und öffentlichen Bauten. Auch liegt der sich von verschiedenen Kernen aus verdichtenden Siedlungsstruktur keine Planung zugrunde und auch später wurden keine Maßnahmen im Sinne einer Stadtplanung ergriffen. Die Achsen des Siedlungsagglomerates waren durch die auf das Legionslager zulaufenden und von dort zu der Rheinbrücke bzw. zum Kriegshafen führenden Straßen bestimmt. Die repräsentativen Bauten standen im Zusammenhang des Heeres: Drusus-Kenotaph, Paradeplatz, Germanicus-Bogen und Bühnentheater im Kontext des Kaiserkultes, der auf dem Memorialkult für Drusus den Älteren aufbaute,⁹⁵ ebenso Thermen und Rheinbrücke. Eine eigene Organisation bildete der *conventus civium Romanorum* (als ‚Pseudo-Ordo‘), für den im 1. Jh. n. Chr. ein *curator civium Romanorum*, im 2. Jh. n. Chr. *d(ecuriones) c(ivium) R(omanorum) M(ogontiacensium)* sowie *quaestores* für die Konventskasse belegt sind.⁹⁶ Auch der jüngste Versuch, für Mainz einen städtischen Status zu erweisen, und zwar als Colonia latinischen Rechts,⁹⁷ bleibt

⁹⁴ Inschriftlich bezeugt sind der Vicus Appolinensis, Vicus Vobergensis, Vicus Salutaris, Vicus Navaliorum (sicher angrenzend an den militärischen Hafenbereich), Vicus Vic[toriae] und der Vicus Novus; CIL XIII 6722, 6723, 6776, 6688, 6689, 11827.

⁹⁵ Vgl. AE 1991, 20, Z. 26–28; Sueton, *Claudius* 1.3; Cassius Dio 55.2.3; Eutropius 7.13.1; D. Lebek, ‚Die Mainzer Ehrungen für Germanicus, den älteren Drusus und Domitian‘, *ŽPE* 78 (1989), 45–82; dens., ‚Ehrenbogen und Prinzentod 9 v. Chr.–23 n. Chr.‘, *ŽPE* 86 (1991), 47–78. Augustus hatte durch den Senat verfügen lassen, dass jährlich eine Truppenparade durchzuführen war und die gallischen Civitates dem Toten durch eine Supplicatio die Ehre zu erweisen hatten. Der Bogen für Germanicus ist in diesem Ensemble zu suchen; der Bogen in Mainz-Kastel wird heute mit gutem Grund mehrheitlich, wie vom Verfasser schon lange vorgeschlagen, als Siegesmonument Domitians interpretiert.

⁹⁶ CIL V 5747; XIII 6676, 6733, 6769, 6775, 7222; *Mainzer Zeitschrift* 83 (1988), 282f.

⁹⁷ M.Th. Raepsaet-Charlier, ‚Les institutions municipales dans les Germanies sous le Haute-Empire: bilan et questions‘, in: dies.und M. Dondin-Peyre, Hgg., *Cités, municipes, colonies. Les processus de municipalisation en Gaule et en Germanie sous le Haute-Empire*

ohne Grundlage. Die Bezeichnung als *civitas* auf einer Inschrift diokletianischer Zeit (*civitas Mog[ontiac(ensium)]*) oder als *civitas* bzw. *municipium* durch Ammianus Marcellinus⁹⁸ weisen nur auf die ummauerte Siedlung städtischen Charakters hin, jedoch nicht mehr auf einen spezifischen Rechtsstatus oder eine autonome städtische Organisation. Das römische Mainz blieb bis in die Spätantike durch seine Funktion als zentrale Truppenbasis und als logistisches Zentrum im oberen Abschnitt der Rheingrenze geprägt. Das gesamte Stadtgebiet und sein Umland blieben aufgrund der großen strategischen Bedeutung als *solum Caesaris* unter direkter kaiserlicher Verwaltung, welche der Militärkommandant und seinen Stab repräsentierten. Handwerk und Handel waren ebenfalls durch den vom Militär geprägten Markt bestimmt.

Die verkehrstechnische Lage von Mainz war hervorragend. Der Platz war durch Kommunikationslinien nach Westen, Südwesten und Süden mit dem gallischen Hinterland und der zentralen Verkehrsachse Lyon-Trier-Köln, ja auf einem fast durchgehenden Wasserweg über Rhône, Saône, Mosel und Rhein mit dem Mittelmeer verbunden. Die Rheintalstraße führte über die Burgundische Pforte ebenfalls nach Lyon. Zugleich lag Mainz am Ende der Mainlinie, der wichtigsten West-Ost-Verkehrsachse Germaniens. Wäre die Provinzbildung in Germanien erfolgreich verlaufen, so wäre zumindest ein Teil der Mainzer Garnison, wie wir zu Recht annehmen können, auf der Mainlinie nach Osten verschoben worden, wahrscheinlich in das Doppellegionslager von Marktbreit, dessen erste Phase wohl im Zuge der Unternehmungen des Domitius Ahenobarbus in der Frühphase des Haltern-Horizontes wenige Jahre vor der Zeitenwende entstand, das vermutlich unter der Statthalterschaft des M. Vinicius (1–4 n. Chr.) ausgebaut wurde und das 6 n. Chr. zweifellos eine zentrale Rolle bei dem groß angelegten Angriff auf die Markomannen in Böhmen hatte. Das 37 ha große Lager war zwar nie über längere Zeit belegt gewesen,⁹⁹ aber dennoch

romain (Paris 1999), 271–352, bes. 311ff. Vgl. allgemein H. Wolff, 'Kriterien für latini-sche und römische Städte in Gallien und Germanien und die Verfassung gallischer Stammesgemeinden', *Bonner Jahrbücher* 176 (1976), 45–121.

⁹⁸ CIL XIII 6727; Ammianus Marcellinus 15.11.8; 16.2.12.

⁹⁹ Auffallend ist die Fundarmut des Lagergeländes. Kopfbauten von Mannschafts-baracken, nicht jedoch diese selbst waren errichtet worden. Dagegen waren Principia, Praetorium, Quaestorium, ein angrenzender Wohnkomplex und Fabricae ausgebaut. Teilweise sind drei Bauphasen festzustellen. Vgl. M. Pietsch, *RGZ* 19 (2001), 329–331; dens., 'Das augusteische Truppenlager Marktbreit', *Berichte der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission* 71 (1991), 263–324.

in seinem Ausbau zu einem regulären Legionslager bereits weit fortgeschritten. Vermutlich verhinderte der pannonisch-dalmatische Aufstand die offensichtlich geplante Umgruppierung des oberen Heeres in Germanien. Dass der Raum von Mainz nicht bereits in vorrömischer Zeit angesichts seiner verkehrsmäßigen Lage eine größere Bedeutung entwickelt hat, ist sehr wahrscheinlich durch die oben angesprochene Randlage zwischen zwei latènezeitlichen Großverbänden, jenem der Treverer im Westen und einem namentlich nicht zu benennenden mit Zentrum im Heidetränk-Oppidum begründet gewesen. Der Raum von Mainz konnte auch deshalb nicht diese Bedeutung entfalten, da die keltische Wirtschaftsstruktur markt- und verbrauchsorientierte Transporte von Massengütern sowie einen logistischen Massengüterbedarf nicht kannte. Eine derartige Bevölkerungskonzentration wie in der römischen Militärbasis hatte die keltische Welt nicht gekannt. Erst durch diese neuen Anforderungen und durch die militärische Strategie des römischen Eroberungskrieges konnte sich die Bedeutung von Mainz entsprechend seiner hervorragenden verkehrsgünstigen Lage am Wasserweg von Rhein und Main entfalten und raum- und zentralortsbildend wirken.

Träger und Initiatoren der hier skizzierten Prozesse von herrschaftsbezogener Raumbildung und Raumdurchdringung waren die Entscheidungen der politischen und militärischen Führung des Imperium Romanum; ausführendes Organ war das römische Heer, das nicht nur Kampftruppen, sondern zugleich die Arbeitskolonnen, Facharbeiter und Ingenieure für öffentliche Projekte und Infrastrukturvorhaben stellte. Die den Maßnahmen zugrunde liegenden Ordnungsvorstellungen waren jene der römischen Herrschaft, wie sie sich in der späten Republik herausgebildet hatten und von Augustus in ein zugleich standardisiertes wie flexibel zu handhabendes Grundmuster übergeführt worden sind. Dabei standen zuerst die Strategien der militärischen Herrschaftssicherung und der militärischen Logistik im Vordergrund, dann jedoch auch die Grundstrukturen des notwendigen politisch-administrativen Aufbaus der Gebiete und ihrer Selbstverwaltungseinrichtungen. Durch die Eroberung Galliens war der Rhein seit 54–53 v. Chr. Grenzzone der römischen Herrschaft geworden, obwohl der Fluß in vorrömischer Zeit niemals eine Kultur- oder Völkerscheide dargestellt hatte. Ostgallien war nun die Peripherzone des Imperium Romanum. Durch die Verlegung der römischen Truppen aus dem Inneren Galliens an den Rhein, ihre Verstärkung aus anderen Teilen des Reiches und den Aufbau der großen

Militärbasen für die offensiven Feldzüge zwischen Rhein und Elbe entwickelte sich hier in kürzester Zeit eine ungeheure Konzentration von Menschen und Material, von Versorgungsbedarf und Logistik und von Kaufkraft.¹⁰⁰ Neben den Soldaten der Legionen und Auxilien bildeten sich auch neue Konzentrationen jener Personengruppen, die entweder familiär oder wirtschaftlich mit dem Heer verbunden waren, Händler, Handwerker, Gastronomie, Vergnügungsgewerbe etc. in den zivilen Lagersiedlungen. Es bildeten sich in kurzer Zeit Märkte mit hoher Kaufkraft, die zu Anziehungspunkten des Fernhandels wurden, um die Nachfrage der gut besoldeten Soldaten und Offiziere zu befriedigen.¹⁰¹ Auch Handwerksproduktion, die sich auf diese Märkte hin orientierte, entstand im gallischen Hinterland wie in der Militärzone selbst.¹⁰² Die gesamte Rheinzone hatte derartige demographische und wirtschaftliche Konzentrationen vorher nie gekannt. Mit der Gründung Kölns als künftiger Provinzhauptstadt der im Aufbau befindlichen Provinz Germania hatte die römische Politik die Entstehung eines überregional bedeutenden städtischen Zentrums am Rhein eingeleitet. Doch entscheidend für die weitere Entwicklung sollte die Niederlage des Varus 9 n. Chr. werden, die zum Rückzug auf den Rhein und schließlich in letzter Konsequenz 16–17 n. Chr. zur Aufgabe einer offensiven Germanienpolitik östlich des Rheins führte. Damit waren die großen Militärbasen und die Kette kleinerer Stützpunkte auf dem linken Rheinufer dauerhaft etabliert. Wäre es tatsächlich zur Einrichtung des römischen Germanien zwischen Rhein und Elbe unter Einschluß der östlichen Randzone Galliens und wohl auch Böhmens und Mährens gekommen, so hätte sich der Schwerpunkt des römischen Heeres ebenfalls nach Osten verlagert und vermutlich hätte die Elbe eine zentrale Bedeutung in der infrastrukturellen, wirtschaftlichen und demographischen Entwicklung Europas erlangt. Doch bleibt dies

¹⁰⁰ Vgl. etwa das Beispiel Mainz; Ehmig 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 78).

¹⁰¹ Vgl. G. Jacobsen, *Primitiver Austausch oder freier Markt? Untersuchungen zum Handel in den gallisch-germanischen Provinzen während der römischen Kaiserzeit* (St. Katharinen 1995), bes. 139ff.; K. Strobel, *Die Ökonomie des Imperium Romanum: Wirtschaftsgeschichte zwischen Primitivismus und Modernismus* (Poznań 2004). Allgemein auch H.-J. Drexhage u.a., *Die Wirtschaft des Römischen Reiches (1.–3. Jahrhundert)* (Berlin 2002).

¹⁰² Vgl. die Beiträge in M. Polfer, *Artisanat et production artisanales en milieu rural dans les provinces du nord-ouest de l'Empire romain* (Montagnac 1999); *Les artisans dans la ville antique* (Paris 2002), bes. 77ff.; M. Luijk, 'Handwerk in den Vici des Rhein-Maas-Gebietes', in K. Strobel, Hg., *Die Ökonomie des Imperium Romanum* (St. Katharinen 2002), 169–209.

natürlich Spekulation. So jedoch blieb das Rheinland die Peripherzone des Imperium Romanum, zugleich eine Militärzone, in der im 1. Jh. n. Chr. rund ein Drittel der gesamten Militärkraft des Reiches konzentriert war. Dieser Peripherraum wurde so zu einem Zentralraum des infrastrukturellen Ausbaus und der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, sowohl der regionalen wie der überregionalen, und auch des ‚internationalen‘ Fernhandels. Es entstanden Zentralorte, deren Bedeutung das Ende des Imperium Romanum in der Spätantike überlebte und die Entwicklung Europas bis in die Neuzeit prägte (Köln, Mainz, Straßburg, Trier). Vor allem aber war eine Infrastruktur entwickelt worden, welche die Rheinzone zu einer verkehrsmäßigen Zentralzone Europas machte. Dabei zeigt es sich, dass die langfristige Präsenz des Heeres und die Entscheidungen der Reichsadministration für die Entwicklung der Orte, für ihre fortdauernde Bedeutung oder ihren Niedergang, ausschlaggebend waren. Ein gutes Beispiel für die Abhängigkeit der Entfaltung eines städtischen Zentrums vom Florieren der sich dort entwickelnden Militärgesellschaft, jener Gesellschaft aus Soldatenfamilien, Angehörigen von Soldaten und dem vom Militär stimulierten Wirtschaftsleben, ist Neuß, einer der frühesten und wichtigsten römischen Stützpunkte am Rhein, der nach der Auflassung des Legionslagers zu Beginn des 2. Jh. n. Chr. zu einer Straßenstation herabsank. Mainz hätte sicher immer eine zentrale logistische und verkehrsgeographische Schlüsselstellung behalten, so dass sich beim etwaigen Abzug der Legionsgarnisonen vom Rhein nach Osten hier eine Stadt im rechtlichen Sinne und von großer wirtschaftlicher Bedeutung entwickelt hätte, die bei der auch dann zu vermutenden Teilung der Großprovinz Germanien in einen nördlichen und südlichen Sprengel wohl zur Provinzhauptstadt geworden wäre.

Das Heer war der entscheidende Wirtschaftsfaktor in den Provinzen an Rhein und Donau. Die dauerhafte Ausbildung von Zentralität war eine langfristig wirksame Folge der Ausbildung als bleibender Militär- und Grenzzone. Die Bildung dieses langfristig existierenden Peripherraumes des Imperium Romanum im Sinne einer Grenzraumbildung führte zu einer dauerhaften Neustrukturierung des mitteleuropäischen Raumes, wobei die ebenfalls gegebenen langfristigen Wirkungen auf das gallische Binnen- bzw. Hinterland natürlich nicht übersehen werden dürfen, wie das Beispiel Trier zeigt. Die wirtschaftlich und demographisch dynamische Zone verlagerte sich aus dem geographischen Zentralraum Galliens in die nach 16–17 n. Chr. dauerhaft ausgebildete Peripherzone

des Reiches, zu der gerade auch das ostgallische Trier zu zählen ist, das sich schließlich zu einem überregionalen Oberzentrum und zur kaiserlichen Hauptstadt entfaltete. Durch die römische Herrschaft und das Handeln ihrer Träger kam es zur Ausbildung eines Zentralraumes von bleibender europäischer Dimension, dessen Grundstrukturen alle folgenden Epochen prägen.

LES FOURNITURES D'ARMES AUX SOLDATS ROMAINS

PIERRE COSME

Depuis une vingtaine d'années, tout un ensemble de travaux—notamment ceux de M.C. Bishop et J.C.N. Coulston en Grande-Bretagne, mais aussi ceux de M. Feugère en France—a fait considérablement progresser nos connaissances des armes romaines. Nous disposons désormais de descriptions assez précises de la panoplie du soldat de la République jusqu'à l'Antiquité tardive.¹ Mon intention n'est pas de présenter un bilan de la classification des armes romaines que ces recherches récentes ont contribué à préciser. Mais, en m'appuyant sur ces enquêtes typologiques, et pour rester dans le cadre de ce volume, je souhaiterais plutôt essayer de préciser les modalités des fournitures d'armes aux soldats romains et de mesurer leur impact sur la vie économique de l'empire. En d'autres termes comment le soldat recevait-il ses armes et comment les activités métallurgiques du monde romain ont-elles répondu à cette demande? Or, certaines interrogations subsistent sur les circuits de distribution de cette partie de l'équipement militaire. Alors que l'approvisionnement alimentaire est relativement bien documenté,² les armes sont somme toute assez peu présentes dans nos sources, en dehors de celles qui figurent sur les bas-reliefs ou qui ont été livrées par les fouilles archéologiques. Au début du XX^e siècle, R. Cagnat a été l'un des premiers à soulever ce problème à propos de l'armée romaine d'Afrique en déplorant l'indigence des sources dans ce domaine.³ Il est vrai que cette question se pose avec une acuité particulière en Afrique.⁴ Plus récemment encore, D.J. Breeze constatait également l'absence fréquente d'armes dans les tombes militaires de Bretagne,

¹ Cf. M.C. Bishop et J.C.N. Coulston, *Roman Military Equipment from the Punic Wars to the fall of Rome* (Londres 1993) et M. Feugère, *Les armes des Romains de la République à l'Antiquité tardive* (Paris 1993).

² Cf. M. Junkelmann, *Panis militaris. Die ernährung des römischen Soldaten oder der Grundstoff der Macht* (Mayence 1997); P. Erdkamp, *Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in the Roman Republican Wars (264–30 BC)* (Amsterdam 1998) et J. Roth, *Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 BC–AD 235)* (Leyde 1999).

³ Cf. *L'armée romaine d'Afrique* (Paris 1912), 336–337.

⁴ Cf. *infra*.

mais aussi dans celles du continent.⁵ La sépulture de Chassenard, découverte en 1874 dans le département de l'Allier, représente à cet égard un cas assez exceptionnel auquel une exposition a été consacrée en 1991–1992 au Musée des Antiquités nationales de Saint-Germain en Laye.⁶

C'est sans doute pour le début et la fin de l'époque romaine que nous sommes le mieux informés sur les fournitures d'armes. En effet, dans la Rome archaïque, ne sont appelés à combattre que les citoyens suffisamment riches pour acquérir leurs propres armes. Le *census* sert justement à les distinguer des autres: les *proletarii*. Ils se fournissaient chez des artisans établis à Rome ou dans les environs immédiats. Ils pouvaient également fabriquer eux-mêmes certaines pièces de leur équipement.⁷ Dans l'Antiquité tardive, la *Notitia Dignitatum* dresse la liste de 'manufactures' d'État—quinze *fabricae* en Orient et vingt en Occident—produisant les différentes pièces de l'équipement militaire: chaque *fabrica* étant spécialisée dans la fabrication d'une partie de celui-ci, comme l'indique aussi la *Notice des Dignités*, à quelques exceptions près. Le *Code Théodosien* nous précise même le statut et les obligations de ceux qui y travaillaient: les *fabricenses*.⁸

Cependant, entre ces deux périodes de l'histoire militaires de Rome, soit pendant la phase de conquête et de contrôle d'un vaste territoire, l'armée s'est trouvée confrontée à un problème logistique sans précédent: il lui a fallu équiper des unités, devenues permanentes à partir du principat, réparties sur tout le pourtour de l'empire. On admet généralement que les effectifs militaires s'élevèrent alors à environ cent vingt-cinq mille légionnaires et autant d'auxiliaires, soit un environ deux cent cinquante mille hommes cantonnés dans les garnisons provinciales auxquels il faut ajouter la garnison de Rome, ainsi que les flottes italiennes et provinciales. On aboutit donc à un total oscillant entre trois cent cinquante mille ou quatre cent mille hommes.⁹ À partir de ce que nous connaissons de l'équipement de ces soldats, peut-on tenter d'évaluer,

⁵ Cf. 'Appendix: The Ownership of Arms in the Roman Army,' in D.J. Breeze, J. Close-Brooks et J.N. Graham Ritchie, 'Soldiers' Burials at Camelton, Stirlingshire, 1922 and 1975,' *Britannia* 7 (1976), 93–95.

⁶ Cf. Fr. Beck, H. Chew et alii, *Masques de fer, un officier romain du temps de Caligula* (Paris 1991).

⁷ Cf. Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 43–44.

⁸ Cf. *Notitia Dignitatum*, *Oriens* 11 et *Occidens* 9.

⁹ Cf. R. MacMullen, 'How Big was the Roman Imperial Army?', *Klio* 62 (1980), 451–460 et Y. Le Bohec, *L'armée romaine* (Paris 1989), 34–36.

même très approximativement, leurs besoins en armes et, au-delà, en métaux nécessaires à la fabrication de ces armes, sans oublier que les besoins en métaux de l'armée romaine ne se limitaient d'ailleurs pas aux seules fournitures d'armes ?

Première difficulté : à la différence des armées modernes caractérisées par le port de l'uniforme, le soldat romain du début du Principat ne se distinguait pas par un équipement standardisé, même si certaines représentations figurées pourraient le laisser croire. Il n'est ainsi pas du tout certain que tel ou tel type de casque ou de cuirasse ait correspondu à des missions précises. La seule distinction qui apparaisse relativement clairement dès cette époque est la différence entre l'équipement du légionnaire et de l'auxiliaire qui combattit d'abord avec ses armes traditionnelles avant de recevoir un équipement spécifique.¹⁰ Au II^e siècle, c'était encore le cas des troupes désignées sous le nom de *numeri* dont l'équipement n'était pas fourni par l'armée. Dans cet équipement militaire plutôt disparate, on peut cependant essayer d'apprécier la part d'éléments métalliques. Il s'agissait, pour les armes défensives, d'un casque en bronze ou en fer dont le poids pouvait varier entre cinq cents grammes et plus d'un kilogramme¹¹ et d'une cuirasse dont le modèle le plus lourd—la cotte de maille—atteignait de neuf à douze kilogrammes et le moins lourd—la *lorica segmentata*—pesait entre six et huit kilogrammes.¹² Quant au bouclier, seul son *umbo*, c'est-à-dire la proéminence sur la face externe du bouclier qui correspondait à l'évidement de la face interne où le soldat plaçait sa main, était métallique.¹³ En ce qui concerne les armes offensives, le glaive a vu sa lame se raccourcir progressivement d'une soixantaine à une cinquantaine de centimètres au début du Principat, puis s'allonger au point de devenir une véritable épée à l'époque sévérienne, appelée *spatha*.¹⁴ On doit encore y ajouter les

¹⁰ Cf. M.C. Bishop, 'The Distribution of Military Equipment within Roman Forts of the First Century AD,' in C. Unz, éd., *Studien zu den Militärgrenzen Roms 3* (Stuttgart 1986), 719–721 et Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 109–171.

¹¹ Cf. J. Harmand, 'L'armement défensif romain de métal dans le nord-ouest de l'empire de la conquête au V^e siècle,' in R. Chevallier, éd., *Actes du Colloque Les mines et la métallurgie en Gaule et dans les provinces voisines*, Caesarodunum 22 (Tours 1987), 189–203 et Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 83–87 et 117–123.

¹² Cf. Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 87–91 et 123–136 et Beck, Chew et alii 1991, op. cit. (note 6), 34–35.

¹³ Cf. Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 92–97 et 109–117 et Beck, Chew et alii 1991, op. cit. (note 6), 114.

¹⁴ Cf. Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 97–100 et 138–162 et Beck, Chew et alii 1991, op. cit. (note 6), 49–56.

pointes de *pilum*,¹⁵ un poignard,¹⁶ ainsi que certains éléments décoratifs tels que les plaques de ceinturon (*cingulum*) qui servait à suspendre le glaive ou celles du baudrier qui servaient à suspendre la *spatha*.¹⁷ Si l'on procédait à une estimation globale sur la base de ces seules données, on aboutirait sans nul doute à un total impressionnant.

J'ajouterai que si l'on cherche à prendre la mesure des activités induites par les fournitures d'armes, il ne faut pas seulement prendre en compte la masse métallique nécessaire, mais aussi le temps de fabrication. La cotte de mailles représentait sans doute l'élément le plus complexe de l'équipement. Sa fabrication supposait en effet l'assemblage à la main et pièce par pièce de trente mille anneaux de bronze ou de fer de trois à neuf millimètres de diamètre et de un à deux millimètres d'épaisseur. Dans ces conditions, le temps de travail nécessaire à sa réalisation pouvait atteindre deux cents heures.¹⁸ Il faut aussi s'interroger sur le coût de l'équipement militaire, qui atteignait peut-être une centaine de deniers pour un cavalier.¹⁹ Cependant, toute cette quantification de masse métallique et des heures de travail demande à être nuancée pour un certain nombre de raisons.

Il est en effet à peu certain que la durée d'utilisation des éléments les plus lourds et les plus complexes de l'équipement militaire—principalement le casque et la cuirasse—dépassait en général le temps de service d'un seul soldat, soit vingt ans pour un légionnaire, vingt-cinq pour un auxiliaire.²⁰ Sous la République, l'État commença probablement par remplacer les armes usagées ou perdues au combat. Une déduction était retenue sur le montant de la solde seulement dans ce cas-là. En effet, d'après Polybe,²¹ les recrues ne recevaient pas d'armes mais des consignes des tribuns militaires pour acquérir eux-mêmes la panoplie

¹⁵ Cf. Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 100–102 et 166–171 et Beck, Chew et alii 1991, op. cit. (note 6), 114.

¹⁶ Cf. Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 163–166 et I.R. Scott, 'First Century Daggers and the Manufacture and Supply of Weapons for the Roman Army,' in M.C. Bishop, éd., *The Production and Distribution of Roman Military Equipment. Proceedings of the Second Roman Military Equipment Research Seminar*. BAR International Series 275 (Oxford 1985), 160–213.

¹⁷ M. Feugère, 'Nouvelles observations sur les cabochons de bronze estampés du *cingulum* romain,' in Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 16), 117–141 et Beck, Chew et alii 1991, op. cit. (note 6), 57–65.

¹⁸ Cf. Beck, Chew et alii 1991, op. cit. (note 6), 34.

¹⁹ Cf. Breeze 1976, op. cit. (note 5), 94 et *infra*.

²⁰ Cf. M.C. Bishop, 'The Military *Fabrica* and the Production of Arms in the Early Principate,' in Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 16), 9.

²¹ Cf. *Histoires* 6.39.

appropriée au manipule où ils avaient été incorporés. Même à l'intérieur des manipules formant la même ligne de bataille, l'armement des légionnaires demeura donc longtemps relativement hétérogène. En revanche, les vêtements semblent avoir été fournis par l'État et avoir donc fait l'objet de retenues régulières. On peut cependant se demander si des changements ne sont pas intervenus dans ce domaine dans le courant du II^e siècle. En 123, Caius Gracchus instaura la distribution gratuite des vêtements aux légionnaires²² mais il est assez difficile de savoir exactement ce qui était compris dans ces fournitures. Ces *uestimenta* incluaient peut-être une tunique et des chaussures. Le cadet des Gracques fit-il de même pour les armes des légionnaires afin de parvenir à une relative standardisation de leur équipement? Les découvertes archéologiques témoignent effectivement d'une plus grande homogénéité de l'équipement militaire à cette époque et de coûts de production plus faibles. Les fournitures d'armes ne concernèrent peut-être que les soldats les moins riches, les autres, et notamment les officiers continuant à acheter leurs armes à des artisans italiens avant de partir en campagne. Il en allait de même pour les soldats pérégrins: alliés et auxiliaires combattaient avec leurs propres armes.

Mais les soldats qui recevaient ainsi leurs armes n'en devenaient sans doute pas propriétaires au sens plein du terme: ils devaient les restituer en fin de service et une retenue sur leur solde servait probablement de caution, selon des modalités que nous appréhendons mieux pour l'époque impériale. Les revendications des mutins de Pannonie en 14 évoquées par Tacite²³ sont en effet assez explicites:

Enimvero militiam ipsam grauem, infructuosam: denis in diem assibus animam et corpus aestimari; hinc uestem, arma, tentoria; hinc saeuitiam centurionum et uacationes munerum redimi. (trad. P. Willeumier revue par J. Hellegouarc'h, Paris 1990): Eh oui! le service en lui-même était pénible, sans profit: dix as par jour, voilà le prix qu'était estimés une âme et un corps; là-dessus, on prenait les vêtements, les armes, les tentes; là-dessus, on payait une rançon pour éviter la cruauté des centurions et obtenir des exemptions de corvées).

Cependant, les retenues sur solde pour la nourriture, le fourrage ou les vêtements sont plus souvent attestées dans notre documentation que les déductions pour les armes: celles-ci ne figurent pas sur le *P. Gen.*

²² Cf. Plutarque, *Vie de Caius Gracchus* 5.1.

²³ Cf. *Annales* 1.17.

Lat. 1 (recto) de 81 concernant probablement des légionnaires. Cela tient évidemment à ce que les soldats devaient être plus régulièrement approvisionnés en denrées alimentaires qu'en armes. En fait, le *uiaticum*, que les recrues percevaient après leur *probatio* servait à payer leur voyage jusqu'à leur première affectation, mais sans doute aussi à recevoir leurs armes. Au II^e siècle, son montant s'élevait au moins à soixante-quinze deniers—soit trois *aurei*—pour les recrues dans les flottes et dans les unités de fantassins auxiliaires, peut-être plus pour les légionnaires et les cavaliers.²⁴ Si le voyage était long, le *uiaticum* ne suffisait pas à couvrir tous les frais d'équipement. Le marin Claudius Terentianus, recruté dans la flotte d'Alexandrie puis dans une cohorte auxiliaire, écrivit ainsi à son père Claudius Tiberianus au début du II^e siècle pour lui demander de lui envoyer des vêtements et une partie de son équipement pour lui éviter d'avoir à en payer de nouveaux.²⁵ Au milieu du II^e siècle, un cavalier de l'Aile *Veterana Gallica* emprunta cinquante deniers pour payer ses armes, en s'engageant à les rembourser au versement de son premier *stipendium*, qui ne pouvait intervenir qu'aux calendes de janvier, de mai ou de septembre suivant sa *probatio*.²⁶ Ces quelques demandes émanant de recrues révèlent qu'à cette époque les marins et les auxiliaires étaient soumis aux mêmes procédures que les légionnaires en ce qui concerne les fournitures d'armes.

D.J. Breeze a bien montré comment on pouvait inférer cette utilisation du *uiaticum* et, éventuellement, du premier *stipendium* pour l'obtention des armes à partir de la documentation—un peu plus riche—concernant la fin du service.²⁷ Des *papyri* prouvent que les soldats pouvaient récupérer la somme qu'ils avaient déposée pour recevoir leurs armes s'ils rendaient celles-ci. En cas de décès, cet argent pouvait même revenir à leurs héritiers. Ces précisions chiffrées nous livrent donc des indications précieuses sur la valeur de la panoplie d'un soldat romain sous le Haut-Empire : un certain Dionysius reçut ainsi cent trois deniers en rendant ses armes vers 120–140.²⁸ Une telle somme représentait à peu près

²⁴ Cf. G.R. Watson, *The Roman Soldier* (Londres 1983), 44 ; R.W. Davies, 'Joining the Roman Army,' in D.J. Breeze et V.A. Maxfield, éd., *Service in the Roman Army* (Edimbourg 1989), 19–21 et P. Cosme, 'Le livret militaire du soldat romain,' *Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz* 4 (1993), 69.

²⁵ Cf. P. Mich. 467 et 468.

²⁶ Cf. P. Fouad 45.

²⁷ Cf. Breeze et *alii* 1976, op. cit. (note 5).

²⁸ Cf. P. Fay. 105.

l'équivalent d'une année de solde pour un fantassin auxiliaire.²⁹ Certes, Dionysius servait probablement dans la cavalerie auxiliaire puisqu'il appartenait à une turme d'une unité inconnue et son équipement était donc vraisemblablement un peu plus coûteux que celui d'un fantassin. Quoi qu'il en soit et même si cet ordre de grandeur est un peu approximatif, une telle somme n'était donc pas négligeable et on comprend l'intérêt qu'avaient les vétérans à rendre leurs armes et l'armée à les récupérer.³⁰ Tacite évoque cette procédure dans ses *Histoires*,³¹ quand il décrit les prétoriens remettant leurs armes aux tribuns de cohortes. D.J. Breeze se demande même si cette rétrocession des armes n'était pas obligatoire. Il est vrai que laisser des vétérans devenus experts dans les techniques de combat avec toutes leurs armes pouvait représenter une menace pour la sécurité intérieure de l'empire : la législation contre les déserteurs en témoigne suffisamment.³² Il vaut mieux donc considérer le numéraire versé par les recrues à leur enrôlement pour obtenir leurs armes comme une sorte de caution plutôt que comme une véritable acquisition. D'ailleurs, on a pu relever les noms de trois, quatre, voire cinq usagers successifs gravés sur des casques, des épées et d'autres pièces d'équipement militaire.³³ Il y eut certes des exceptions, notamment chez certains auxiliaires germaniques et bretons dont les coutumes ancestrales prévoyaient l'inhumation du guerrier avec ses armes. Certaines de leurs sépultures ont été retrouvées.³⁴ Dans ce cas, lui ou ses héritiers devaient avoir renoncé à récupérer la caution déposée à l'enrôlement et ils étaient devenus les véritables propriétaires de ces armes.

Ce faible taux de renouvellement des armes permis par leur réemploi n'était possible qu'en temps de paix. Il serait très hasardeux de quantifier les besoins de l'armée en temps de guerre qui introduisait trop de facteurs imprévisibles : les pertes et les dégradations d'équipements

²⁹ Cf. Breeze et alii 1976, op. cit. (note 5), 95.

³⁰ Cf. J.F. Gilliam, *The Deposita of an Auxiliary Soldier* (P. Columbia inv. 325), *Bonner Jahrbücher* 167 (1967), 233–243 ; Watson 1983, op. cit. (note 24), 104 ; J. Paddock, *Some Changes in the Manufacture and Supply of Roman Bronze Helmets under the Late Republic and Early Empire*, in Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 16), 142–143 ; Beck, Chew et alii 1991, op. cit. (note 6), 19 et Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 261–263.

³¹ Cf. Tacite, *Histoires* 2.67.

³² Cf. P. Cosme, 'Le châtement des déserteurs dans l'armée romaine,' *Revue historique de droit français et étranger* 81/3 (2003), 287–307.

³³ Cf. R. MacMullen, 'Inscriptions on Armor and the Supply of Arms in the Roman Empire,' *American Journal of Archaeology* 64 (1960), 23–40.

³⁴ Cf. *supra* note 6.

devaient sensiblement augmenter, mais inversement il était parfois possible de s'emparer de l'arsenal ennemi.³⁵ Cependant, sous le Haut-Empire, les opérations militaires furent suffisamment espacées pour maintenir le taux de renouvellement dans des proportions raisonnables (à partir du milieu du I^{er} siècle en effet, le rythme de la conquête se ralentit). D'ailleurs les préparatifs d'une offensive et les suites d'une guerre meurtrière se traduisaient avant tout par la création de nouvelles unités. Or le nombre de nouvelles légions à équiper resta lui aussi assez limité et l'on pense que la plupart des unités auxiliaires furent sans doute levées au I^{er} siècle. On a donc pu calculer que, jusqu'au règne de Septime Sévère, l'armement des nouvelles unités représentait en moyenne l'équivalent d'une nouvelle légion (soit entre cinq mille et six mille hommes) à équiper tous les dix ans.³⁶

Les modalités de production de l'armement romain ont donné lieu à des interprétations divergentes. En se fondant essentiellement sur les sources littéraires, certains historiens modernes ont d'abord postulé l'existence, principalement en Italie, de grandes 'manufactures' centralisées subvenant aux besoins de l'ensemble de l'armée.³⁷ On a aussi privilégié l'hypothèse d'une fabrication privée des armes dans de petits ateliers très dispersés géographiquement.³⁸ Les travaux récents sont désormais en mesure d'exploiter et de croiser les divers types de sources : littéraires mais aussi archéologiques, épigraphiques et papyrologiques en y incluant les *ostraca*, tablettes à écrire qui présentent l'intérêt de nous offrir un témoignage original direct.³⁹ Leur témoignage démontre que

³⁵ Cf. Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20), 9 et note 66.

³⁶ Cf. J.C. Mann, 'The Raising of New Legions During The Principate,' *Hermes* 91 (1963), 483-489 et J. Oldenstein, 'Manufacture and Supply of the Roman Army with Bronze Fittings,' in Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 16), 84.

³⁷ Cf. Cagnat 1912, op. cit. (note 3), 336-337; J.M.C. et R.R. Clarke, 'A Roman decorated helmet and other objects from Norfolk,' *Journal of Roman Studies* 38 (1948), 20-27 soutenaient l'hypothèse d'une production très centralisée. Un état de la question est présenté par Bishop et Coulston 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 183.

³⁸ Cf. H.M.D. Parker, *The Roman Legions* (Chicago 1928), 218, note 1; MacMullen 1960, op. cit. (note 33); H.R. Robinson, *The Armour of Imperial Rome* (Londres 1975), 8 et L. Wierschowski, *Heer und Wirtschaft. Das römische Heer der Prinzipatszeit als Wirtschaftsfaktor* (Bonn 1984).

³⁹ Outre les *Chartae Latinae Antiquiores* édités par A. Bruckner et R. Marichal depuis 1954, on peut désormais utiliser certains recueils thématiques tels ceux de R. Cavenaile, *Corpus Papyrorum Latinarum* (Wiesbaden 1958); H.I. Bell, V. Martin, E.G. Turnel et D. van Berchem, *The Abinnaeus Archive* (Oxford 1962); S. Daris, *Documenti per la storia dell'esercito romano in Egitto* (Milan 1964); R.O. Fink, *Roman Military Records on Papyrus* (Ann Arbor 1971); R. Marichal, *Les ostraca de Bu Njem*. Suppléments de Libya Antiqua

la question des fournitures d'armes se pose en termes plus complexes et que notre réflexion doit intégrer les différentes traditions régionales et leur évolution dans le temps.

On a pu ainsi retrouver la trace d'ateliers—appelés *fabricae*—dans les vestiges de camps occupés sous le Haut-Empire en Bretagne ainsi que dans les vallées du Rhin et du Danube. Ils ont le plus souvent la forme d'un bâtiment à cour centrale subdivisé en plusieurs salles, pourvu d'un grand réservoir d'eau alimenté par des conduites et d'un foyer. Le sol de ces bâtiments conserve parfois encore les traces des rigoles destinées à recueillir les déchets.⁴⁰ Cependant, il est aujourd'hui parfois difficile d'y distinguer les lieux de fabrication, de dépôt (appelés *armamentaria*) et de réparation des armes. Les camps recevaient-ils des armes déjà fabriquées qu'il suffisait d'emmagasiner et d'entretenir, ou bien étaient-ils simplement approvisionnés en lingots de métal à transformer, lingots dont on sait qu'ils circulaient entre les différentes régions de l'Empire?⁴¹ Le recoupement de ces vestiges archéologiques avec le témoignage des documents conservés sur papyrus ou sur tablettes peut apporter des précisions intéressantes. Un *papyrus* égyptien⁴² rend compte de l'activité d'une *fabrica* de légion (peut-être la II^e *Traiana Fortis*) mobilisant cent hommes pendant deux jours : une distinction intéressante y est opérée entre les objets fabriqués (*fabricati*) et ceux qui sont seulement terminés ou complétés (*peracti*). Deux tablettes de *Vindolanda*⁴³ dressent la liste de travailleurs employés dans une *fabrica* militaire et mentionnent des *gladiarii*, des *fabri* et des *scutarii*. Une inscription votive⁴⁴ sur une plaque de bronze de *Vindonissa* est dédiée par un fabricant de glaive (*gladiarius*). Tous ces documents font état d'activités métallurgiques pratiquées dans les camps militaires par des soldats spécialisés bénéficiant d'exemptions

7 (Tripoli 1992); P. Cugusi, *Corpus Epistularum Latinarum*. Papyrologica Florentina 23 (Florence 1992); A.K. Bowman et J.D. Thomas, *Vindolanda, the Latin Writing Tablets* (Londres 1994 et 2003).

⁴⁰ Cf. Oldenstein 1985, op. cit. (note 36), 83; Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20), 4–9; E.B. Bonis, 'Das Militärhandwerk der Legio I Adiutrix in Brigetio,' in Unz 1986, op. cit. (note 10), 301–306 et Bishop et Coulston 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 184–185.

⁴¹ Cf. J. Desanges et M. Mollat, *Les routes millénaires* (Paris/Nathan 1988), 55–64; Cl. Domergue, *Les mines de la péninsule ibérique dans l'antiquité romaine*. Collection de l'École française de Rome 127 (Rome 1990), 367–376 et 'Métaux' dans J. Leclant, éd., *Dictionnaire de l'Antiquité* (Paris 2005), 1407–1408.

⁴² Cf. P. Berl. 6765 (*Ch.LA* 10.409)

⁴³ Cf. Bowman et Thomas 1993/2003, op. cit. (note 39), n° 1 et 3.

⁴⁴ Cf. *CIL* 13.11504.

pour mieux exercer leurs compétences : les *immunes*.⁴⁵ C'était le cas, par exemple, des forgerons, les *fabri*.

Cependant, on souhaiterait aussi savoir comment ces ateliers pouvaient se procurer les matières premières nécessaires à leurs activités. L'approvisionnement en fer ne devait guère poser de problèmes car les gisements de ce minerai étaient très répandus.⁴⁶ Mais le travail du fer exigeait aussi de grandes quantités de bois. En revanche, une partie des armes romaines étaient encore fabriquée en bronze et l'étain qui entrerait dans sa composition était beaucoup plus rare.⁴⁷ À partir d'Auguste, le nord-ouest de l'Espagne et, dans une moindre mesure, l'Armorique se substituèrent progressivement à la Cornouaille pour ravitailler en lingots d'étain l'Occident romain, tandis que la partie orientale de l'Empire s'approvisionnait plutôt en Asie Mineure. Cependant, au III^e siècle, l'étain de Cornouailles occupe de nouveau la première place en Occident.⁴⁸ Ces problèmes d'approvisionnement ont d'abord été assez peu envisagés, peut-être parce que les principales recherches sur les armes romaines sont menées par des historiens et des archéologues britanniques, allemands, français dans des secteurs riches en gisements et en traditions métallurgiques : les frontières bretonnes, germaniques et danubiennes. Mais la confrontation de la carte des plus importantes implantations militaires avec celle des gisements connus des Romains et des activités métallurgiques révèle que certaines provinces n'avaient pas forcément les mêmes atouts. Le cas de l'Afrique est à cet égard particulièrement significatif : elle n'était pas dépourvue de ressources minières⁴⁹ mais toute la question est de savoir dans quelle mesure ces

⁴⁵ Cf. *Digeste* 50.6.7 ; Watson 1983, op. cit. (note 24), 76 ; Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20), 10 et Le Bohec 1989, op. cit. (note 9), 49, 53–54, 169–170.

⁴⁶ Cf. K.D. White, *Greek and Roman Technology* (Londres 1984), 238–240 ; J.P. Mohen, 'Les âges des métaux,' dans *Le grand atlas de l'archéologie*. Encyclopedia Universalis (Paris 1985), 52–53 ; M. Mangin, 'Les mines et la métallurgie du fer en Gaule romaine : travaux et recherches,' *Latomus* 47 (1988), 74–89 et Cl. Domergue, 'Fer' dans Leclant 2005, op. cit. (note 41), 904.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem* et Cl. Domergue, 'Étain' dans J. Leclant 2005, op. cit. (note 46), 848.

⁴⁸ Cf. G. Collingwood, 'Roman Britain,' dans T. Frank, éd., *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome* 3 (Baltimore 1937), 46–47 ; A. Tranoy, *La Galice romaine. Recherches sur le Nord-Ouest de la péninsule ibérique dans l'Antiquité* (Paris 1981), 96–97 et 220–223 ; Desanges et Mollat 1988, op. cit. (note 41), 55–64 ; Domergue 1990, op. cit. (note 41), 40–41, 70–71, 215–223 et 367–376 et D. Nony, 'Les provinces hispaniques,' dans Cl. Lepelletier, éd., *Rome et l'intégration de l'Empire : 44 av. J.-C. - 260 ap. J.-C. 2 : Approches régionales du Haut-Empire romain* (Paris 1998), 127–129.

⁴⁹ Cf. E. Ardaillon, Metalla, dans Ch. Daremberg et E. Saglio, *Dictionnaire des Antiquités grecques et romaines* (Paris 1904), 1851.

ressources étaient effectivement connues des Romains. En effet, les sources antiques—généralement tardives—y font très peu allusion.⁵⁰ Pline l'Ancien est, lui, muet sur l'extraction minière dans les provinces africaines. Quant aux traces matérielles d'exploitation minière ancienne, elles donnent lieu à des interprétations contradictoires entre ceux qui les attribuent aux Romains⁵¹ et ceux qui les attribuent aux Vandales ou aux Arabes en raison—je cite—“du caractère très rudimentaire des techniques qu'elles révèlent”⁵²... Cependant l'importance des ressources minières dans le Maghreb et l'ancienneté de leur exploitation sont désormais réévaluées par des études plus récentes.⁵³ L'existence d'artisans travaillant les métaux y est d'ailleurs attestée par quelques inscriptions.⁵⁴

On doit chercher la réponse à cette question dans le matériel retrouvé dans les parages des *fabricae* des camps militaires. Outre des creusets et d'autres outils on y a parfois découvert de nombreuses armes.⁵⁵ Encore faut-il interpréter convenablement ces découvertes d'armes dans le sol sur les sites militaires.⁵⁶ Pendant longtemps on les a attribués à des pertes accidentelles et involontaires. Si une telle explication est recevable quand il s'agit des plus petits éléments de l'équipement, comme des anneaux de cotte de mailles, elle paraît bien improbable pour les objets plus volumineux tels qu'un glaive ou une épée. Le cas de la cotte de mailles retrouvée enroulée dans sa housse de cuir dans la Saône est à cet égard tout à fait exceptionnel.⁵⁷ En effet, le soldat ayant déposé une caution pour recevoir son équipement, il est vraisemblable qu'il

⁵⁰ Cf. Ptolémée 4.2.17; Strabon 17.3.11; Cyprien, *Lettres* 77.3.1; Tertullien, *Apologétique* 12 et Victor de Vita, *Histoire de la persécution vandale* 5.19. Chez ces trois derniers auteurs, il s'agit pour l'essentiel d'allusions à des chrétiens condamnés aux travaux forcés dans les mines.

⁵¹ Cf. S. Gsell, Vieilles exploitations minières en Afrique du Nord, *Hesperis* 7 (1928), 1–22 et Ch. Tissot, *Géographie comparée de la province romaine d'Afrique* (Paris 1884), 254–258.

⁵² Cf. P. Petit, *Histoire générale de l'Empire Romain*, 2: *La crise de l'Empire* (Paris 1974), 119–120 et R.M. Haywood, 'Roman Africa,' dans Frank 1937, op. cit. (note 48), 4, 53.

⁵³ Cf. A. Jodin, Les gisements du cuivre du Maroc et l'archéologie des métaux, *Bulletin d'Archéologie Marocaine* 6 (1966), 11–27 et G. Souville, Témoignages sur l'Âge du Bronze au Maghreb occidental, *CRAI* (1986), 97–114.

⁵⁴ Cf. *CIL* 8.4487 et *ILA* 256.

⁵⁵ Cf. Oldenstein 1985, op. cit. (note 36), 84–85; Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20); Bishop et Coulston 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 184 et Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 31–32.

⁵⁶ Cf. Bishop 1986, op. cit. (note 10), 717.

⁵⁷ Cf. Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 31 et 127.

cherchait autant que possible à limiter les réparations et les remplacements qui lui étaient imputés.⁵⁸ On a aussi parfois expliqué la présence d'armes dans des fosses ou des puits par un geste votif de consécration à une divinité reflétant certaines croyances celtiques ou germaniques. Ce facteur a pu jouer mais surtout dans le cas de découvertes fluviales (comme ces glaives retrouvés dans la Tamise ou dans le Rhin).⁵⁹ Mais ces deux raisons ne suffisent pas à rendre compte de toutes ces trouvailles. Un examen attentif révèle que ces objets retrouvés étaient endommagés ou défectueux au moment où ils ont été abandonnés par leurs propriétaires et qu'ils sont associés dans les couches archéologiques à de nombreux résidus, scories et déchets métalliques. On peut donc supposer que cet armement, considéré comme hors d'usage, a été jeté intentionnellement dans le but de récupérer le métal pour fabriquer de nouvelles armes.⁶⁰ Cette pratique du recyclage des métaux dans les camps est confirmée par l'analyse des alliages qui entraînent dans la composition des objets retrouvés. Celle-ci révèle une grande homogénéité en dépit de la diversité d'origine des métaux. Étant donné le niveau atteint par la technologie romaine en la matière, une telle homogénéité ne peut s'expliquer que parce que chaque alliage est issu de métaux réemployés récupérés sur plusieurs objets différents.⁶¹

Sur certains sites militaires, la masse métallique destinée au recyclage atteint des proportions impressionnantes.⁶² On la retrouve alors souvent accumulée dans des fossés qui ont ensuite été comblés. Cette disposition est caractéristique des sites—camps ou forteresses—abandonnés par l'armée romaine et détruits méthodiquement pour éviter qu'ils ne tombent entre les mains de l'ennemi. Avant le départ, les responsables de l'atelier emportaient avec eux autant de réserves métalliques que

⁵⁸ Cf. *supra*.

⁵⁹ Cf. W.H. Manning, 'Iron Work Hoards in Iron Age and Roman Britain,' *Britannia* 3 (1972), 242–243; Bishop 1986, op. cit. (note 10), 717 et Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 139–143.

⁶⁰ Cf. Bishop 1986, op. cit. (note 10), 717 et note 20, 8; Bishop et Coulston 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 184.

⁶¹ R.F. Tylecote, 'The Composition of Metal Artifacts: a Guide to Provenance,' *Antiquity* 44 (1970), 19–25; J. Bayley et S. Butcher, 'Variations in Alloy Composition of Roman Brooches,' *Revue d'archéométrie, Supplément* 29 (1981), 29–36; Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20), 9 et J. Lang, 'Study of the Metallography of some Roman Swords,' *Britannia* 19 (1988), 199–216.

⁶² Cf. Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20), 7 et 17–18, qui avance le nombre de vingt chariots nécessaires au transport de la masse métallique retrouvée à Inchtuthil.

possible mais étaient quand même obligés d'en laisser une partie sur place pour ne pas trop s'encombrer.⁶³ Les possibilités offertes par le réemploi des métaux incitent à penser que l'armée romaine devait avoir les moyens de parvenir à une certaine autosuffisance, prônée par Végèce, même quand ses unités se trouvaient en garnison loin de toute mine de fer, de cuivre ou d'étain :

*Habet praeterea legio fabros tignarios, structores carpentarios ferrarios, pictores reliquosque artifices ad hibernorum aedificia fabricanda, ad machinas turres ligneas ceteraque, quibus uel expugnantur aduersariorum ciuitates uel defenduntur propriae, praeparatos, qui arma uehiucula ceteraque genera tormentorum uel noua facerent uel quassata repararent. Habebant etiam fabricas scutarias locarias arcuarias, in quibus sagittae cassides missibilia cassides omniaque armorum genera formabantur. Haec enim erat praecipua, ut quicquid exercitui necessarium uidebatur numquam deesset in castris*⁶⁴...

Cette recherche de l'autarcie caractéristique de nombreux auteurs anciens a-t-elle toujours et partout atteint son but ?

Le recyclage des armes et des outils usagés mis en évidence par M.C. Bishop ne doit pas non plus conduire à négliger la fabrication d'armes par des artisans civils dont l'existence est attestée par leur marque de fabrique sur les épées ou leur fourreau.⁶⁵ En effet, seuls des artisans établis à leur compte étaient probablement en mesure d'apposer ainsi leur 'signature' sur leurs production. Dans les *fabricae* des camps militaires, une certaine répartition des tâches ne permettait sans doute pas d'attribuer les armes réalisées à un fabricant particulier.⁶⁶ Cette contribution de l'artisanat civil privé à l'équipement en armes des soldats a sans aucun doute été très variable selon les époques, selon les régions concernées et selon les types d'armes envisagés. À l'époque républicaine, diverses solutions s'offraient aux questeurs pour acheminer les

⁶³ Cf. *ibidem* et Bishop 1986, op. cit. (note 10), 721–723.

⁶⁴ Cf. Végèce 2.11 : "En outre une légion dispose de charpentiers, de maçons, de carrossiers, de forgerons, de peintres et autres artisans pour construire les quartiers d'hiver, des machines en bois en forme de tours et d'autres encore grâce auxquelles on s'empare des cités ennemies ou l'on défend les siennes. Ces artisans étaient aptes à produire de nouvelles armes, de nouveaux chariots et d'autres sortes de machines de guerre ou à les réparer quand ils étaient endommagés. Les légions disposaient aussi de fabriques de boucliers, de cuirasses, d'arcs dans lesquelles on concevait des traits de flèche, des casques et toutes sortes d'armes. En effet la principale préoccupation, c'était de faire en sorte que tout ce qui paraissait nécessaire à l'armée ne fit jamais défaut dans le camp."

⁶⁵ Cf. *CIL* 6.1892 ; 6.1952 ; 6.9043 ; 6.16166 ; 9.3962 ; 10.3971 et 10.3986 ; Oldenstein 1985, op. cit. (note 36), 83–84 ; Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 150–151.

⁶⁶ Cf. Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20), 10.

fournitures aux armées. D'après les recherches les plus récentes, il ne faut peut-être pas surestimer le rôle des sociétés de publicains dans les fournitures aux armées.⁶⁷ Vêtements et armes auraient été aussi achetés par l'État à des fabricants privés. Leur transport aurait fait l'objet de contrats avec des naviculaires privés, sans exclure le recours à des navires réquisitionnés. L'ampleur de certaines campagnes, notamment pendant la deuxième Guerre punique, a pu également conduire à l'installation de véritables bases logistiques, comprenant des ateliers et des greniers, à proximité du théâtre des opérations militaires.⁶⁸ Il est à peu près certain que la clientèle fortunée des officiers équestres et sénatoriaux ainsi que certains centurions ont continué à se fournir en armes de qualité chez des artisans rompus aux meilleures techniques métallurgiques. Ils pouvaient aussi les acheter aux colporteurs qui se déplaçaient de camp en camp.⁶⁹

C'est aussi dans des ateliers privés de bronziers que les cavaliers pouvaient acquérir les éléments métalliques de ce que l'on appelle désormais leur 'équipement sportif'⁷⁰ (plutôt qu' 'équipement de parade'). Il s'agit de l'équipement très décoré, spécialement conçu pour les exercices de cavalerie connus sous le nom d'*Hippika Gymnasia* par un passage de la *Tactique* d'Arrien.⁷¹ Cet équipement comprenait pour l'essentiel un casque visage, un plastron très orné, des jambières et des médaillons sans doute fixés sur le bouclier. La qualité et la réputation de certains de ses artisans, notamment gaulois,⁷² étaient telles que même leur éloignement des garnisons ne les empêchait pas d'être sollicités. C'était semble-t-il le cas d'un artisan lyonnais identifié avec un armurier à partir d'une signature déchiffrée sur un fourreau d'épée.⁷³ Avec plus de certitude,

⁶⁷ Cf. Erdkamp 1998, op. cit. (note 2), 84–120 et Roth 1999, op. cit. (note 2), 230–231.

⁶⁸ Cf. Roth 1999, op. cit. (note 2), 159–161.

⁶⁹ Cf. Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20), 13 et Oldenstein 1985, op. cit. (note 36), 83.

⁷⁰ Cf. Beck, Chew et alii 1991, op. cit. (note 6), 19–37 et Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 187–204. Sur l'équipement ordinaire des cavaliers romaine, cf. M.C. Bishop, 'Cavalry equipment of the Roman army in the first century AD, dans J.C.N. Coulston, éd., *Military Equipment and the Identity of Roman Soldiers, Proceedings of the Fourth Roman Military Equipment Conference*. BAR International Series 394 (Oxford 1988), 67–195.

⁷¹ Cf. 34–44.

⁷² Cf. Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 89; M.-Th. Raepsaet-Charlier, 'Les Gaules et les Germanies', dans Lepelley 1998, op. cit. (note 48), 191–193 et A. Ferdière, *Les Gaules (Provinces des Gaules et Germanies, Provinces Alpines) II^e s. av. J.-C. – V^e s. ap. J.-C.* (Paris 2005), 246 et 252–254.

⁷³ Cf. E. Ettlinger et M. Hartmann, 'Fragmente einer Schwertscheide aus Vindonissa und ihre gegenstände vom Grossen St Bernhard,' *Gesellschaft pro Vindonissa Jahresbericht* (1984) 7–8 et 38 et Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 142.

une inscription de Monceaux-le-Comte (dans l'actuel département de la Nièvre) témoigne de l'existence d'un atelier de fabrication de cuirasses (*loricae*) chez les Éduens.⁷⁴ Il s'agissait donc d'un atelier très éloigné des troupes du *limes*, mais ses activités étaient quand même supervisées par un centurion détaché à cet effet. Certains artisans étaient généralement établis dans des régions que leurs richesses minières avaient vouées depuis longtemps au travail des métaux. Mais on a encore beaucoup de mal à estimer la capacité de production de leurs ateliers.

Une autre inscription, au nom de Quintus Nonienus Pudens sur un fourreau d'épée découvert à Strasbourg⁷⁵ est attribuée par J. Oldenstein⁷⁶ à un artisan de Rhénanie et par M. Feugère⁷⁷ à un armurier lyonnais. Tout dépend de la façon dont on interprète *ad aram* qui désigne le lieu de fabrication : faut-il y voir l'autel lyonnais de Rome et d'Auguste dont on sait qu'il était entouré d'ateliers de bronziers ou bien celui élevé chez les Ubiens en Germanie ? Si l'on retient cette dernière hypothèse, il ne s'agissait alors peut-être pas de l'héritier d'une longue tradition métallurgique, mais, plus vraisemblablement, d'un vétéran qui, après son congé, avait mis à profit l'expérience acquise dans les *fabricae* militaires pour s'établir à son compte.⁷⁸ Quoi qu'il en soit, il existait sans doute aussi des ateliers privés à proximité des troupes, car il est évident que l'on ne pouvait faire dépendre l'équipement de toute l'armée de fournisseurs très éloignés au risque d'allonger dangereusement ses lignes de communication, alors que le transport terrestre et maritime restait difficile et déconseillé pour du matériel aussi sensible.⁷⁹ De tels ateliers ne pouvaient bien sûr se développer qu'un certain temps après l'installation d'une garnison.

Cependant, c'est incontestablement dans les provinces orientales que l'artisanat civil local contribuait le plus à l'équipement de l'armée. En effet, les soldats s'y trouvaient souvent en garnison dans des villes bien pourvues en artisans qualifiés et en main d'œuvre.⁸⁰ Le savoir-faire, la réputation et l'efficacité de ces ateliers urbains sont bien attestés par les

⁷⁴ Cf. *CIL* 13.2828 (*ILS* 7047).

⁷⁵ Cf. *CIL* 13.3.2, 706 n° 197.

⁷⁶ Cf. Oldenstein 1985, op. cit. (note 36), 84.

⁷⁷ Cf. Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 141–142.

⁷⁸ Cf. Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20), 13 ; Bishop et Coulston 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 186.

⁷⁹ Cf. Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20), 16–17.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem* ; cf. M. Sartre, *L'Orient Romain. Provinces et sociétés provinciales en Méditerranée orientale d'Auguste aux Sévères : 31 avant J.-C.–235 après J.-C.* (Paris 1991), 350–351 ; Bishop et Coulston 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 186.

sources littéraires, surtout quand ils devaient subvenir à des besoins de l'armée urgents et imprévus, par exemple en période de guerres civiles. Tacite évoque ainsi dans ses *Histoires*⁸¹ les cités suffisamment bien dotées pour être sollicitées de produire des armes par Vespasien. Dion Cassius⁸² fait allusion à des armes commandées en 131 par l'armée romaine à des artisans juifs que ceux-ci auraient délibérément mal fabriquées de manière à ce qu'elles fussent refusées et qu'ils pussent s'en servir eux-mêmes. On sait moins comment ces ateliers étaient approvisionnés en matière première. Ils devaient profiter des échanges commerciaux, particulièrement développés dans ces régions, pour recevoir les lingots de métaux qu'ils ne trouvaient pas à proximité immédiate.⁸³ Mais s'ils travaillaient en symbiose étroite avec l'armée—leur principale cliente—ces armuriers avaient peut-être eux aussi la possibilité de récupérer les armes usagées (que l'on a retrouvées en moins grande quantité en Orient qu'en Occident). Il est vrai que les ventes d'armes semblent avoir fait l'objet d'un certain contrôle dans l'empire romain afin de limiter leur diffusion chez les civils et hors des frontières. Cependant, en certaines occasions de simples particuliers ont pu prendre les armes⁸⁴ et les interdictions attestées d'en exporter sont assez tardives, par exemple en direction de la Germanie libre.⁸⁵

Ces ateliers urbains étaient en fait actifs dans toutes les cités du Bassin méditerranéen et c'est probablement auprès d'armuriers de ce type que s'approvisionnait l'armée d'Espagne. En effet les armes constituaient un article d'exportation traditionnel et réputé de la péninsule ibérique, particulièrement riche en minerais de toutes sortes.⁸⁶ Cette richesse de l'Espagne lui permettait peut-être également de subvenir aux besoins de l'Afrique en y complétant la production des *fabricae* militaires.⁸⁷ En dépit de ressources naturelles inférieures à celles de l'Espagne et de l'épuise-

⁸¹ Cf. 2.82.

⁸² Cf. 69.12.2.

⁸³ Cf. Sartre 1991, op. cit. (note 80), 350–351.

⁸⁴ Cf. Tacite, *Histoires*, 3.80.

⁸⁵ Cf. *Code Théodosien* 15.15 et *Code Justinien* 4.41.2; J. Kunow, *Bemerkungen zum Export römischer Waffen in das barbarikum*, in Unz 1986, op. cit. (note 10), 740–746 et Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 261–268.

⁸⁶ Cf. Pliny l'Ancien, *Histoire Naturelle* 34.144; Martial 4.55 et *supra* note 48.

⁸⁷ Cf. *CIL* 8.2563; M. Euzennat, 'Lingots espagnols retrouvés en mer,' *Études Classiques* 3 (1968–1970), 83–98 pour une illustration du commerce des métaux entre l'Espagne et l'Afrique et M. Bouchenaki, 'Récentes recherches et études de l'Antiquité en Algérie,' *Antiquités Africaines* 15 (1980), 20–23 à propos de la *fabrica* et de l'*armamentorium* du camp de la III^e Légion Auguste à Lambèse.

ment—très relatif—de certains gisements exploités depuis longtemps, les ateliers des cités italiennes semblent toujours assez actifs puisqu'à la lecture de certaines inscriptions, ils continuent, en cas de besoin, à être sollicités par l'armée. L'inscription *CIL* 13.6763 (*ILS* 1188) de 242 évoque un tribun militaire des Légions XXX *Vlpia* et I *Minerua* envoyé à Milan pour superviser la levée de nouvelles recrues et la fabrication d'armes. Les ateliers italiens étaient donc aussi en mesure d'équiper la garnison de Rome et, plus tard, la deuxième Légion parthique établie par Septime Sévère à Albano ainsi que les flottes de Misène et de Ravenne.⁸⁸

Cette dispersion de la production n'a cependant pas empêché une certaine uniformisation progressive des produits car la diffusion des modèles était favorisée par les mutations individuelles, les déplacements des unités et des artisans. On parvient ainsi à identifier les éléments d'équipement militaire retrouvés dans certains secteurs du *limes* avec la production d'un atelier à une époque donnée (par exemple celui d'Alésia pour le harnachement des cavaliers et celui de Besançon pour certains éléments de ceinturon). On réussit également parfois à distinguer les modes successives qui ont inspiré la fabrication de certaines armes, sans que le pouvoir central ait forcément imposé des modèles précis et contraignants.⁸⁹ Quand ils étaient issus des cohortes prétoriennes, les centurions pouvaient faire connaître les derniers modèles romains dans les garnisons provinciales.

L'autarcie prônée par Végèce n'était donc apparemment pas recherchée partout systématiquement. On constate plutôt une adaptation aux ressources locales naturelles et humaines. Les *fabricae* militaires ne paraissent donc avoir joué un rôle important que dans les provinces frontalières du nord et de l'ouest de l'empire où il n'existait pas un artisanat civil privé suffisamment développé pour subvenir aux besoins de l'armée. Dans un premier temps—celui de la conquête d'Auguste à Claude—les armées y étaient arrivées déjà toutes équipées grâce à la production des ateliers italiens ou gaulois. Au fur et à mesure que les armées de conquête se transformaient en armée d'occupation—de

⁸⁸ Cf. les inscriptions du *CIL* 6 cités *supra* note 65.

⁸⁹ Cf. M.-Th. Rapsaet-Charlier, 'Germania inferior et Germania superior,' *Latomus* 32 (1973), 161; F. Millar, 'Emperors, Frontiers and Foreign Relations 31 BC to AD 378,' *Britannia* 13 (1982), 7–11; Feugère 1985, op. cit. (note 17) et op. cit. (note 1), 229; Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20), 13–15; Oldenstein 1985, op. cit. (note 36), 85–86 et E. Rabeisen, 'La production d'équipements de cavalerie au I^{er} siècle ap. J.-C. à Alésia (Alise Sainte-Reine),' *Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies* 1 (1990), 84–92.

Néron aux Flaviens—elles se trouvèrent dans l'obligation de prendre en charge l'entretien et la réparation de leur équipement, puis sa fabrication elle-même en réduisant leurs importations de Gaule ou d'Italie. Enfin dans un troisième temps—des Flaviens jusqu'au milieu du III^e siècle—les progrès du développement économique de ces provinces et du *limes* ainsi que la présence de vétérans ont favorisé la création d'ateliers civils en dehors des enceintes militaires.⁹⁰ On peut en particulier reconstituer une telle évolution dans la province de Bretagne, devenue même à son tour exportatrice d'armes.⁹¹

Si ce développement s'était poursuivi sans heurt assez longtemps, on peut supposer que ces provinces du nord et de l'ouest seraient parvenues à une situation assez comparables à celle de l'Orient avec des ateliers civils urbains (mais aussi ruraux) libérant l'armée de la fabrication des armes, même si certains historiens actuels ont aussi attribué à cette activité une utilité morale pour les soldats inoccupés pendant la mauvaise saison.⁹² Mais, dès le milieu du III^e siècle, les troubles qui agitaient le monde romain interrompirent ce processus.

Tout changea en effet à partir de cette époque et plus encore à partir de Dioclétien. Le principal facteur de changement n'est sans doute pas tant l'accroissement des effectifs⁹³—ceux-ci atteignirent peut-être quatre cent à cinq cent mille hommes mais leur montant exact donne encore lieu à des controverses entre historiens—que l'augmentation rapide du taux de renouvellement de l'armement. Les conflits devinrent en effet plus fréquents. De plus, il s'agissait le plus souvent de guerres défensives suscitant des besoins urgents et imprévus, à la différence des dernières opérations militaires conquérantes du Haut-Empire qui pouvaient être préparées à l'avance. Dans le même temps, l'armée romaine ne pouvait plus guère compter sur les ateliers civils également défaillants, ruinés par les invasions et surtout par l'inflation. En effet l'armée représentait souvent le seul débouché des armuriers qui, payés en monnaie dévaluée par leur clientèle militaire n'étaient plus en mesure d'acquérir les matiè-

⁹⁰ Cf. Oldenstein 1985, op. cit. (note 36), 86.

⁹¹ Cf. Collingwood 1937, op. cit. (note 48), 109–111 et Oldenstein 1985, op. cit. (note 36), 86.

⁹² Cf. Bishop 1985, op. cit. (note 20), 17.

⁹³ Cf. MacMullen 1985, op. cit. (note 9); A. Demandt, *Die Spätantike, Römische Geschichte von Diokletian bis Justinian 284–565 n. Chr.* (Munich 1989), 256–257; J.-M. Carrié et A. Rousselle, *L'Empire romain en mutation des Sévères à Constantin 192–337* (Paris 1999), 636–639.

res premières nécessaires à leurs activités.⁹⁴ Ce fut donc l'État romain qui s'est vu dans l'obligation au Bas-Empire d'équiper les soldats en créant de véritables arsenaux d'État, sorte de manufactures spécialisées dans la fabrication de tel ou tel type d'armes.⁹⁵ Ces manufactures sont parfois implantées à l'emplacement des anciens ateliers militaires du Haut-Empire comme à *Lauriacum* et à *Carnuntum*, ou dans les villes où le travail des métaux représentait une activité traditionnelle comme Autun en Occident ou Antioche en Orient. À la différence de certaines *fabricae* mises au jour sur les sites de certains camps militaires du Haut-Empire, on n'a pas encore pu identifier avec certitude les vestiges archéologiques de *fabricae* tardives. Plutôt que de véritables manufactures, M. Feugère émet l'hypothèse d'un réseau de petites unités artisanales travaillant dans un cadre hiérarchisé, mais de manière autonome, peut-être familiale.⁹⁶ Le *Code Théodosien* précise que les artisans qui s'y trouvaient employés étaient marqués au bras de manière à les empêcher de désertir leur poste de travail.⁹⁷ La proximité des gisements de minerais métalliques jouait sans doute un rôle plus important qu'auparavant pour déterminer l'implantation de ces *fabricae*.⁹⁸ Elles ne bénéficiaient probablement plus en effet des mêmes possibilités de récupérer les armes hors d'usage que les ateliers militaires antérieurs. D'ailleurs, les découvertes d'armes sont beaucoup moins fréquentes pour le Bas-Empire que pour le Haut-Empire.⁹⁹ Mais la présence de mines de fer n'était sans doute pas l'unique donnée à prendre en considération. Il fallait également tenir compte des possibilités de ravitaillement en bois ou en charbon, de l'existence d'une main d'œuvre suffisante, des moyens de communication avec les armées et des conditions de sécurité pour prévenir les attaques de barbares, de brigands ou d'éventuels usurpateurs.¹⁰⁰ On a ainsi observé que les *fabricae* les plus proches du front germanique ne produisaient que des armes qu'un ennemi ne pourrait pas facilement retourner contre l'armée romaine : celle de Trèves fabriquait des boucliers et des balistes

⁹⁴ Cf. S. James, 'The *fabricae*, State Arms Factories of the Late Roman Empire,' dans J.C.N. Coulston, éd., *Military Equipment and the Identity of Roman Soldiers, Proceedings of the Fourth Military Equipment Conference BAR International Series 394* (1988), 271.

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*; cf. M. Feugère, 'Armée, armement (Rome),' dans Leclant 2005, op. cit. (note 41), 230.

⁹⁶ Cf. M. Feugère, 'L'armement du Bas-Empire,' dans M. Reddé, éd., *L'armée romaine en Gaule* (Paris 1996), 271.

⁹⁷ Cf. 10.22.4 (15 décembre 398).

⁹⁸ Cf. James 1988, op. cit. (note 94), 267.

⁹⁹ Cf. Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 235.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. James 1988, op. cit. (note 94), 267-269.

dont les barbares ne savaient pas assembler les pièces détachées.¹⁰¹ Il n'est donc pas étonnant que les sites urbains aient été privilégiés. Les villes présentaient en outre l'avantage de centraliser le produit de la fiscalités en nature perçue dans les campagnes environnantes, mettant ainsi les matières premières nécessaires à la disposition des *fabricae*.¹⁰² Grâce aux *papyri* de Panopolis remontant à 298, nous savons que les retenues sur solde pour le ravitaillement militaire avaient été remplacées par des livraisons gratuites en nature en raison de l'inflation et de la dépréciation monétaire.¹⁰³ Mais faute de source, nous ne savons pas dans quelle mesure ce nouveau système aurait été étendu aux armes. Leur coût de fabrication et leur valeur stratégique justifiaient peut-être toujours l'exigence d'une caution à l'enrôlement.

Il restait cependant un problème délicat à résoudre : l'acheminement de la production de ces arsenaux urbains, situés en général le long des grandes voies de communication stratégiques, vers des troupes situées parfois à plusieurs jours de voyage en chariot. C'est précisément ce que l'armée avait cherché à éviter sous le Haut-Empire en créant ses propres ateliers. À partir du IV^e siècle, ces difficultés furent en partie résolues par le recours aux transports d'État pour convoier les armes vers leurs destinataires, recours attesté par le *Code Justinien*.¹⁰⁴ Constantin y avait également répondu en redéployant ses *milites comitatenses* à proximité ou dans de grandes villes de l'empire. Zosime a condamné cette décision, la jugeant nuisible à la défense des frontières.¹⁰⁵ Mais elle présentait l'avantage de faire mieux coïncider les implantations militaires avec les principaux centres de production agricole et artisanale du monde romain, ainsi que l'a souligné J.-M. Carrié.¹⁰⁶

On peut cependant se demander si les *fabricae* d'État ont monopolisé toute la production d'armes et mis fin à l'existence de toutes les autres structures qui existaient à l'époque précédente. *La Notice des Dignités* ne mentionne ainsi des *fabricae* produisant des flèches qu'en Occident : à *Concordia* au nord de l'Adriatique et à Mâcon. Or, les meilleurs archers se trouvaient en Orient : plutôt que de supposer d'improbables transports sur d'aussi longues distances, il est plus simple d'imaginer que

¹⁰¹ Cf. Feugère 1996, op. cit. (note 96), 269.

¹⁰² Cf. James 1988, op. cit. (note 94), 267-269.

¹⁰³ Cf. A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire 284-602* (Oxford 1964), 623 et 1257-1259 et Carrié et Rousselle 1999, op. cit. (note 93), 75.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. 11.9.7.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. 2.34.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Carrié et Rousselle 1999, op. cit. (note 93), 646.

les archers orientaux continuaient à fabriquer eux-mêmes leurs propres flèches.¹⁰⁷ D'ailleurs certains soldats *limitanei* restés cantonnés à proximité du *limes* gardèrent peut-être la possibilité de travailler dans les ateliers de leur casernement. Ils y étaient même sans doute contraints quand ils se trouvaient trop éloignés d'une *fabrica* impériale comme en Afrique, en Espagne et en Bretagne.¹⁰⁸

Reste à évaluer les conséquences de ce nouveau mode de production sur l'équipement du soldat. On constate au Bas-Empire un usage moins fréquent des cuirasses, peut-être en raison du temps nécessaire à leur fabrication, même si elles n'ont jamais été complètement abandonnées comme on l'a cru trop souvent.¹⁰⁹ Le glaive fut alors définitivement remplacé par l'épée longue—de soixante-dix à quatre-vingt-dix centimètres—dont la lame a tendance à s'élargir.¹¹⁰ L'usage du poignard semble disparaître¹¹¹ mais le soldat conserve une lance.¹¹² Cependant c'est surtout pour la fabrication du casque que les transformations sont les plus nettes. On observe ainsi une incontestable détérioration de la qualité du casque romains dont la calotte n'est plus forgée d'un seul tenant mais réalisée par l'assemblage de plusieurs pièces. Il s'agit de ce que l'on appelle le casque composite qui peut être fabriqué plus vite par une main d'œuvre moins qualifiée, même si certains ateliers continuent à produire des armes de qualité pour les cadres de l'armée. Les impératifs de rapidité de fabrication avaient ainsi pris le pas sur la qualité de l'exécution.¹¹³

À la fin de l'empire comme au début du Principat, la part des métaux réemployés dans la fabrication des armes permit sans doute de relativiser l'importance des besoins annuels des soldats en minerais extraits.¹¹⁴ Quant aux quantités de combustible nécessaire, elles étaient certes moindres pour forger de nouvelles armes à partir d'anciennes que pour réduire le minerai. Cependant une telle étude conduit aussi à s'interroger sur l'impact que la métallurgie à des fins militaires a pu

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Feugère 1996, op. cit. (note 96), 269.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Bishop et Coulston 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 188.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Harmand 1987, op. cit. (note 11), 197–199; J.C.N. Coulston, 'Late Roman Armour, 3rd–6th centuries AD,' *Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies* 1 (1990), 139–160 et Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 134–135 et 245.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 147–161, 237 et 246–247.

¹¹¹ *Ibidem*, 237.

¹¹² *Ibidem*, 236–237.

¹¹³ Cf. Harmand 1987, op. cit. (note 11), 196; James 1988, op. cit. (note 94), 271–273 et Feugère 1993, op. cit. (note 1), 120–123 et 243–245.

¹¹⁴ Cf. White, op. cit. (note 46), 216.

avoir sur la déforestation de certaines régions du monde romain, notamment en Espagne.¹¹⁵ Dans un domaine où toute tentative d'estimation quantitative demeure fort périlleuse et où il faut prendre en compte les différentes traditions régionales, la question des fournitures d'armes aux soldats romains nous rappelle le rôle central joué par l'armée dans le fonctionnement de l'économie de l'Empire, l'exploitation des matières premières et, plus généralement, dans les rapports entretenus par les Romains avec leur environnement naturel.

¹¹⁵ J.F. Healy, *Mining, Metallurgy in the Greek and Roman World* (Londres 1978), 152 et R. Meiggs, *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Oxford 1982), 380.

DINAMICHE DI INTERSCAMBIO FRA TECNOLOGIA MECCANICA MILITARE E CIVILE A ROMA

SALVATORE MARTINO

Nella nostra civiltà le attività belliche si configurano, dal punto di vista tecnologico, come una sorta di laboratorio per la messa a punto di nuove tecniche, nuove tecnologie, nuovi materiali. Gli esempi che si potrebbero addurre a sostegno di questa affermazione sono numerosissimi: basterà citare, fra quelli più recenti, il Goretex, un materiale traspirante, robusto e leggero pensato come alternativa al cuoio per gli scarponcini militari e testato durante la prima guerra del Golfo, oggi diffusissimo non solo per la fabbricazione di scarpe sportive ma anche per capi di abbigliamento. Si può considerare anche la rete telematica di Internet, originariamente nata nel 1969 come mezzo per tenere in comunicazione fra di loro le varie basi militari statunitensi sparse per il mondo. In più, è possibile affermare che la guerra funziona come un acceleratore per il miglioramento di tecniche e tecnologie già esistenti e che, dopo l'accelerazione imposta dalle finalità militari, è possibile vedere queste tecnologie, migliorate sotto tutti gli aspetti per funzionalità ed economicità, riapplicate a scopi civili e pacifici. Anche in questo caso gli esempi sono abbondanti e ognuno potrebbe facilmente indicarne molti: mi limiterò a ricordare solo i casi della dinamite e degli aeroplani. Ma anche qui sarebbe possibile allargarsi a quasi ogni aspetto della nostra civiltà, dalle fonti di energia all'organizzazione dei processi produttivi e persino ad aspetti deleteri come le droghe sintetiche e il doping.¹

A questo punto è lecito domandarsi: è possibile riscontrare queste dinamiche di interscambio fra tecnologia civile e tecnologia militare nella civiltà romana? Esistono dei manufatti tecnologici originariamente concepiti per esclusivo uso bellico e per i quali, successivamente, i Romani abbiano trovato una applicazione civile? Esistono delle tecnologie il

¹ Sull'argomento si veda E. Cecchini, *Tecnologia e arte militare* (Roma 1997). Interessanti al riguardo anche le considerazioni espresse da J. Diamond, *Armi, acciaio, malattie. Breve storia del mondo negli ultimi tredicimila anni* (trad. it. Torino 1998), 187-208.

cui sviluppo e miglioramento sia stato accelerato da finalità militari? Una prima considerazione di base riguarda il fatto che a Roma era normale, per qualunque ingegnere di buona preparazione, occuparsi di questioni sia civili che militari² e che i tecnici dell'esercito raggiungevano una elevata professionalità sfruttata nella realizzazione di acquedotti, ponti e strade:³ basti pensare a Vitruvio, che militò come costruttore e riparatore di macchine da lancio sotto Cesare ed Ottaviano,⁴ oppure a Frontino, contemporaneamente soldato e ingegnere idraulico stimato al punto da essere nominato *curator aquarum* di Roma.⁵ Gli ingegneri militari raggiungevano una elevatissima professionalità, rappresentavano il meglio del settore che la civiltà romana poteva esprimere e la loro opera veniva richiesta e sfruttata a fini civili nella realizzazione di ponti, acquedotti e strade. Tacito racconta⁶ che quando Claudio ordinò a Gn. Domizio Corbulone di interrompere le operazioni di rappresaglia contro i Cauci, costui fece scavare ai suoi uomini un canale fra la Mosa ed il Reno. Lo stesso storico riporta⁷ che, dopo la prima battaglia di Bedriaco, Vitellio inviò la *Legio XIII Gemina* a costruire degli anfiteatri a Cremona e Bologna. Plinio il Giovane, inviato come governatore in Bitinia, scrive a Traiano⁸ per richiedergli dei tecnici militari onde portare a termine un canale che colleghi al mare un lago nei pressi di Nicomedia. Una epigrafe da Bejaja in Algeria,⁹ l'antica *Saldae*, tramanda l'orgoglio per la propria competenza di un ingegnere militare, il *librator* Nonio Dato della *Legio III Augusta*, intervenuto a recuperare il traforo mal eseguito dai tecnici locali per un acquedotto.¹⁰ Insomma, i casi di tecnici militari

² A. Gara, *Tecnica e tecnologia nelle società antiche* (Roma 1994), 74–75; J.G. Landels, *Engineering in the Ancient World. New Revised edition* (London 2000), 186–198.

³ D. Hill, *A History of Engineering in Classical and Medieval Times* (London/New York 1984), 61–98; Gara 1994, op. cit. (n. 2), 59–74.

⁴ Vitruvio 1, *praefatio* 1–2. Vitruvio si rivolge ad Augusto (*“Imperator Caesar”*): dopo aver ricordato di essere stato con Giulio Cesare (*“parenti tuo fueram notus”*) e di essere stato un suo partigiano (*“eius virtutis studiosus”*), aggiunge di essere stato convocato insieme a tali Marco Aurelio, Publio Minidio e Gneo Cornelio per attendere alla fabbricazione di catapulte e balliste (*“itaque cum M. Aurelio et P. Minidio et Cn. Cornelio ad apparitionem ballistarum et scorpiorum reliquorumque tormentorum perfectionem fui praesto...”*) e di aver ricevuto onori e ricompense per il buon lavoro svolto. Da Vitruvio 8.3.24–25 sembrerebbe che egli sia stato con le forze cesariane in Africa.

⁵ Frontino, *De aquaeductis*, *Praefatio* 1–2.

⁶ Tacito, *Annales* 11.20.

⁷ Tacito, *Historiae* 2.67.

⁸ Plinio il giovane, *Epistulae* 10.41 e 42. Cfr. anche 10.61 e 62. G. Traina, *La tecnica in Grecia e a Roma* (Roma/Bari 1994), 40–41.

⁹ CIL 8.2728 = ILS 5795.

¹⁰ Traina 1994, op. cit. (n. 8), 42–43.

prestati a lavori civili attestati dalla documentazione sono numerosi¹¹ ed è facile ipotizzare che questi tecnici versassero il bagaglio di esperienza accumulato 'sui campi di battaglia' nei lavori che erano chiamati a svolgere con finalità pacifiche. In questa affermazione c'è senz'altro qualcosa di vero, eppure, da un punto di vista strettamente meccanico, andando ad analizzare qualcuno dei numerosi tipi di macchine da guerra impiegati dai Romani sembrerebbe che essi non escogitarono mai usi civili delle loro macchine (come nel caso delle varie scudature ad uso poliorcetico quali gli arieti,¹² la *sambuca*¹³ o il *pluteus*);¹⁴ solo per una tecnologia ignifuga sviluppata in ambito poliorcetico è testimoniata una applicazione civile, da parte comunque di un corpo militarmente organizzato, quello dei *vigiles*.

A costoro si attribuiscono numerosi strumenti nella lotta antincendio (pertiche, spugne, coperte, scope) sulla scorta di un testo di Ulpiano, difficile da interpretare perché spesso separato dal suo contesto. Questo passo del Digesto,¹⁵ relativo ai legati di una *domus*, stabilisce la distinzione tra l'*instrumentum domus* e la *portio domus* e, all'interno dell'*instrumentum*, distingue quello che può far parte del legato da ciò che non può farne parte. Vengono elencati due gruppi di oggetti: gli oggetti del primo gruppo sono semplicemente giustapposti, mentre quelli del secondo gruppo sono coordinati gli uni agli altri tramite congiunzioni. Qualche riga più sotto Ulpiano spiega ciò che lega tra loro questi ultimi¹⁶ e chiarifica che gli oggetti del secondo gruppo sono strumenti per la pulizia della casa, che non possono essere separati dalla casa medesima lasciata

¹¹ F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World 31 BC-AD 337* (London 1977, 2nd ed. 1992), 326 ritiene che i tecnici migliori restassero a Roma per evitare casi di diserzione ma, soprattutto, per evitare che i municipi locali risolvessero da soli i loro problemi: si trattava, in definitiva, di un altro strumento del controllo imperiale. Se così fosse, credo che il fenomeno avrebbe fatto da ostacolo al diffondersi delle esperienze e dei saperi tecnici degli ingegneri militari romani nelle province.

¹² O. Lendle, *Schildkröten. Antike Kriegsmaschinen in Poliorketischen Texten* (Wiesbaden 1975), 33-121; O. Lendle, *Texte und Untersuchungen zum Technischen Bereich der Antiken Poliorketik* (Wiesbaden 1983), 188-200.

¹³ J.G. Landels, 'Ship-shape and Sambuca-fashion,' *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 86 (1966), 69-72; E.W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery: Technical Treatises* (Oxford 1971), 72; Lendle 1983, op. cit. (n. 12), 107-113.

¹⁴ Lendle 1983, op. cit. (n. 12), 144-146.

¹⁵ *Digesta* 33, 7.12.18: «Acetum quoque, quod exstinguendi incendiū causa paratur, item centones, siphones, <perticae quoque et scalae> et formiones et spongiās et amas et scopas contineri plerique et Pegasus aiunt.»

¹⁶ *Digesta* 33, 7.12.22: «Item perticae quibus araneae detergentur, item spongiae quibus columnae pavimenta podia extergantur, scalae, quae ad lacunaria admoveantur, instrumenti sunt quia mundiorum domum reddunt.»

in eredità. Non hanno nulla a che vedere con la lotta antincendio ed è sbagliato volerli attribuire ai *vigiles* come vorrebbe Baillie Reynolds,¹⁷ secondo il quale, ad esempio, le pertiche sarebbero servite a rinforzare i muri sul punto di crollare, i *formiones* all'evacuazione dei feriti e le spugne ad umidificare i muri.¹⁸ Baillie Reynolds rimane però perplesso di fronte alle scope, la cui presenza fra l'equipaggiamento dei *vigiles* non sa spiegare. Solo dunque l'aceto, le coperte e le pompe, menzionati nel primo gruppo, hanno un rapporto con la lotta antincendio: ma i *vigiles* utilizzavano questi strumenti che, è bene sottolinearlo, la nostra fonte da come 'equipaggiamento' di una *domus* privata? Per quanto riguarda le pompe, esse erano utilizzate al di là di ogni dubbio per spegnere incendi e le testimonianze sono numerose e concordi.¹⁹ Sicuramente erano usate dai *vigiles*: due uomini qualificati come *siponarii* figurano in CIL 6.1057 e 1058.²⁰ L'epitaffio di un vigile, T. Avidio Romano, lo qualifica come *siponarius*.²¹ L'uso dell'aceto per l'estinzione del fuoco è testimoniato da numerosi autori antichi.²² L'aceto veniva usato anche nell'industria mineraria per spegnere repentinamente i fuochi accesi vicino alle rocce, al fine di spaccarle sfruttando l'improvviso raffreddamento e la conseguente rapida contrazione del volume.²³ Il suo potere refrigerante non è, in ogni caso, superiore a quello dell'acqua e nella sua composizione chimica entra dell'acido che ne diminuisce, anziché aumentarne, l'efficacia. Ma a cosa potevano mai servire i *centones* ai *vigiles*? A ripararsi dal freddo durante le interminabili ronde notturne per le strade di Roma?²⁴ Molto improbabile. La soluzione migliore a questo interrogativo è stata avanzata da Sablayrolles²⁵ ed è un bell'esempio di una tecnologia nata in ambito esclusivamente militare e convertita con vantaggio e successo ad un uso civile. I *centones* erano coperte confe-

¹⁷ P.K. Baillie Reynolds, *The Vigiles of Imperial Rome* (Oxford 1926), 96–97.

¹⁸ Per J.S. Rainbird sarebbero state delle rudimentali 'maschere antigas': cfr. R. Sablayrolles, *Libertinus miles. Les cohortes de vigiles* (Paris/Roma 1996), 359 (n. 108).

¹⁹ Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 361–369.

²⁰ Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 234.

²¹ CIL 6.2994; Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 361 (n. 116).

²² Livio 21.37; Plinio il vecchio, *Naturalis Historia* 33.71; Plutarco, *Quaestiones Convivales* 3.5.652F; Giovenale 10.153; Macrobio, *Saturnalia* 7.12; e molti altri ancora.

²³ Si veda A. Woods, 'L'industria mineraria' in J. Wachter, a cura di, *Il mondo di Roma imperiale vol. 3*, (traduzione italiana Roma/Bari 1989), 81–85; Gara 1994, op. cit. (n. 2), 50.

²⁴ Si pensi all'iscrizione di CIL, 6.3072 lasciata da una sentinella, tal Fufio Getulico, sull'*excubitorium* di Trastevere: "*Lassus sum, successorem [date].*"

²⁵ Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 359–361.

zionate da più pezzi di tessuto cuciti insieme. Questo peculiare tipo di coperta era normalmente usato per proteggere elementi combustibili delle macchine da assedio. Cesare²⁶ li utilizzò per proteggere il suo *musculus* davanti a Marsiglia. Vegezio ne parla a più riprese.²⁷ Queste notizie sull'uso ignifugo dei *centones* vanno incrociate con un passo di Vitruvio,²⁸ sempre relativo alla 'blindatura' di una scudatura d'assedio in cui si menziona paglia imbevuta d'aceto per ammortizzare i colpi delle pietre scagliate contro la macchina e, allo stesso tempo, rintuzzare i tentativi di appiccarvi il fuoco. I dati così sommariamente esposti si rischiarano alla luce di un frammento di Sisenna, storico la cui perdita è da considerarsi particolarmente grave ai fini dello studio della tecnologia militare romana poiché, a giudicare da quel che ne resta, costui sembra essere stato molto interessato alle macchine da guerra.²⁹ L'annalista scrive, riferendosi alla poppa di alcune navi da guerra che disponevano di una protezione antincendio (IV, fr. 107 Peter): "*Puppae aceto madefactis centonibus integuntur.*" Dunque, tirando le somme, era una comune tecnica poliorcetica antincendio impregnare coperte di aceto e disporle sulle parti sensibili delle macchine che si intendeva proteggere. Il potere solvente dell'aceto gli avrebbe permesso, in effetti, di penetrare meglio le pelli ed i tessuti e, pertanto, di rendere i *centones* più resistenti all'azione del fuoco. È possibile che i *vigiles* abbiano utilizzato questa tecnica nata, lo ripeto, in ambito esclusivamente militare per proteggersi individualmente dal calore del fuoco e accostarsi ad un focolaio da spegnere: un'antenata della moderna tuta d'amianto impiegata dai pompieri d'oggi. Sarebbe possibile anche ipotizzare che, invece di avvolgere gli uomini, i *centones* fossero utilizzati su delle vere e proprie scudature antincendio assemblate sul tipo della *testudo*,³⁰ destinate a proteggere gli uomini che lavoravano a stretto contatto con le fiamme. Tale utilizzo dei *centones* permetterebbe di spiegare perché la corporazione

²⁶ Cesare, *De bello civili* 2.10.6: "*Super lateres coria inducuntur ne canalibus aqua immissa lateres diluere possent. Coria autem ne rursus igni ac lapidibus corrumpantur centonibus conteguntur;*" Cfr. Lendle 1983, op. cit. (n. 12), 141-144.

²⁷ Vegezio, *De re militari* 4.14: "*Testudo... quae ne exuratur incendio coriis vel ciliciis centonibusque vestitur;*" 4.15: "*Extrinsecus autem, ne immisso concremetur incendio, crudis ac recentibus coriis vel centonibus operitur*" e, a proposito delle torri mobili: "...*et, ne tantum opus hostili concremetur incendio, diligentissime excrudis coriis vel centonibus communita.*"

²⁸ Vitruvio, 10.14.3: "*Percrudis coriis duplicibus consutis, fartis alga aut paleis in aceto maceratis, circa tegatur machina tota.*"

²⁹ Cfr. E.W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development* (Oxford 1969), 175.

³⁰ Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 360.

dei *centonarii* doveva partecipare, insieme con quella dei *fabri* e dei *dendrophoroi*, alla lotta contro l'incendio.³¹ Questo tipo di scudatura deve però eventualmente considerarsi molto più piccolo del suo parente poliorcetico. Bisogna infatti tener presente che esso, nel caso, sarebbe stato destinato a dover essere mosso rapidamente per le strette stradine di Roma, onde raggiungere celermente il luogo dell'emergenza, oppure velocemente assemblato in batteria nei pressi del focolaio: entrambe le operazioni escludono che si trattasse di una macchina grande come quelle descritte da Vitruvio³² o Ateneo Meccanico,³³ dal complicatissimo treno di rotolamento.³⁴ Ritengo maggiormente probabile tuttavia che i *centones* fossero utilizzati come una rudimentale, ma efficace, tuta antincendio.

La maggior parte della magra evidenza sulla quale può basarsi un'analisi sembrerebbe mostrare che la dinamica di interscambio fra tecnologia civile e militare a Roma sembra aver funzionato in maniera inversa a quella a noi familiare, nel senso che alcune macchine da guerra romane sono una ripresa ed un adattamento militare di soluzioni escogitate per un uso civile.

Esaminiamo il caso del *tolleno* descritto da Vegezio.³⁵ L'etimologia di questo termine è facilmente riconducibile a *tollere*, sollevare, ed infatti il nome si trova attribuito anche ad apparecchi sollevatori di ogni genere, tutti assemblati in maniera simile: una trave è imperniata orizzontalmente su un supporto verticale, con un contrappeso all'estremità opposta a quella sollevatrice.³⁶ Attraverso un sistema di funi e pulegge, il lavoro da applicare per sollevare i carichi può essere ridotto di molto

³¹ *Codex Theodosianus* 14.8.1; Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 62–64 e note 167–169.

³² Vitruvio 10.13.6 o 10.15.2–7.

³³ Ateneo meccanico 12.12–14.3 o 21.2–26.5; Lendle 1975, op. cit. n. 12, 33–76; A.W. Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification* (Oxford 1979), 51; D. Whitehead e P. Blyth, *Athenaeus Mechanicus, On Machines* (Stuttgart 2004), 98–103 e 120–134.

³⁴ Cfr. Ateneo meccanico 16.9–17.10; Vitruvio 10.14.1–2; Y. Garlan, *Recherches de poliorcétique grecque* (Paris/Roma 1974), 227–234; Lendle 1975, op. cit. (n. 12), 9–12 e 19–25; L. Callebat – P. Fleury *Vitruve, De l'architecture livre X* (Paris 1986), 254–260; Whitehead-Blyth 2004, op. cit. (n. 33), 111–114.

³⁵ Vegezio, *De re militaris* 4.21: “*Tolleno dicitur, quotiens una trabes in terram praealta defigitur, cui in summo vertice alia transversa trabes longior demissa medietate conectitur eo libramento, ut, si unum caput depresseris, aliud erigatur. In uno ergo capite cratibus sive tabulatis contextitur machina, in qua pauci collocantur armati; tunc per funes adtracto depressoque alio capite elevati inponuntur in murum.*”

³⁶ K.D. White, *Greek and Roman Technology* (London 1984), 14–15 e 73–90; Hill 1984, op. cit. (n. 3), 98–115 e 127–154; Gara 1994, op. cit. (n. 2), 130–134; Landels 2000, op. cit. (n. 2), 84–98.

(con una puleggia inferiore e due superiori, in latino *trispastos*,³⁷ esso si riduce di 1/3).³⁸ Tale semplice tipo di macchina era conosciuto in tutto il bacino del Mediterraneo da tempo immemorabile, ed ancora oggi, con il nome di *shādūf*, viene utilizzato in certe aree del Vicino Oriente, dell'Egitto e del Maghreb per sollevare l'acqua dai pozzi.³⁹ La prima volta che incontriamo un *tolleno* bellico nella documentazione letteraria antica⁴⁰ esso è appunto una gru, costruita con lo stesso schema dello *shādūf*: un dispositivo difensivo⁴¹ ideato da Archimede⁴² per sollevare la prua delle navi romane che si accostavano alle fortificazioni marittime di Siracusa,⁴³ per poi sfasciarle lasciandole ricadere sull'acqua.⁴⁴ Il *tolleno* descritto da Vegezio è anch'esso sostanzialmente identico agli

³⁷ Sul *trispastos*, come sui suoi miglioramenti (*pentaspastos* e *polyspastos*), Vitruvio 10.2.1–10. Cfr. Callebat-Fleury 1986, op. cit. (n. 34), 88–95. In latino è un *hapax*, conosciuto da questo solo passo di Vitruvio. Il termine *trispastos* designa propriamente una macchina a tripla trazione (greco Σπάω). Si trattava di una gru verticale a tre pulegge con una muffola fissa superiore a due pulegge ed una muffola inferiore a puleggia unica. La combinazione delle due muffole è un paranco. Il termine potrebbe essere tradotto in italiano come 'paranco a tre pulegge'. Similmente, il *pentaspastos* era un sistema traente a cinque pulegge con una muffola fissa superiore a tre pulegge ed una inferiore mobile a due pulegge.

³⁸ La riduzione di 1/3 è solo teorica, dovendosi considerare l'attrito delle funi: Gara 1994, op. cit. (n. 2), 131–134; Landels 2000, op. cit. (n. 2), 84–98. Chiamando T la forza di trazione applicata e P il peso del carico da sollevare, la formula di equilibrio in un sistema dove il numero *n* delle pulegge mobili è inferiore di una unità a quello delle pulegge fisse è espressa dall'equazione: $T = P / (2n + 1)$.

³⁹ Sullo *shādūf* Hill 1984, op. cit. (n. 3), 130–131; F. Russo, *Tormenta. Venti secoli di artiglierie meccaniche* (Roma 2002), 29–31.

⁴⁰ Polibio 8.6.1–4; Livio 24.34.10–11; Plutarco, *Vita Marcelli* 15. Lendle 1983, op. cit. (n. 12), 120–127.

⁴¹ Un altro *tolleno* difensivo, usato dagli Ambracioti per sollevare la testa di un ariete romano, è ricordato da Livio 38.5. Si trattava di un attrezzo appartenente alla classe delle 'mani ferree' o 'lupi', sorta di forcipi tridentati applicati all'estremità di una catena pendente da un *tolleno* con cui si cercava di agganciare, dopo averli calati dall'alto degli spalti, la massa battente degli arieti per rovesciarli o sospenderli impedendogli di colpire. In una enigmatica e frammentaria scena dell'arco di Settimio Severo forse è rappresentato un *lupus* in azione. V.Y. Garlan, *Recherches de poliorcétique grecque* (Paris/Roma 1974), 380; Lendle 1983, op. cit. (n. 12), 194–195.

⁴² Su Archimede in generale si veda C. Dollo, *Archimede: mito, tradizione, scienza* (Firenze 1992).

⁴³ Polibio 8.3–7 e 10; Livio 24.33.

⁴⁴ Lendle 1983, op. cit. (n. 12), 120–127. Una buona analisi dell'assedio di Siracusa dal punto di vista meccanico è offerta da Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 108–109. Contrariamente all'invenzione che più di tutte colpisce la fantasia dei moderni, lo specchio ustore: E. Kreyszig, 'Archimedes and the Invention of the Burning Mirrors', in Autori Vari, *Geometry, Analysis and Mechanics* (River Edge NY 1994), 140–145, non c'è ragione di dubitare sulla reale esistenza del *tolleno* archimedeo o delle mani di ferro; cfr. Garlan 1974, op. cit. (n. 41), 380 e fig. 5; Lendle 1983, op. cit. (n. 12), 194–196.

altri apparecchi indicati con lo stesso termine, con piccole differenze accidentali determinate dal fatto che era una macchina concepita come alternativa alle scale per far giungere dei soldati sulla cima della cortina muraria di una città assediata. Esso era formato da una lunga trave fissata asimmetricamente con un giunto universale alla sommità di un montante. Una squadra di serventi, manovrandola opportunamente mediante funi applicate al braccio più corto, provocava l'innalzamento e la successiva rotazione di quello più lungo, alla cui estremità era appesa una navicella in cui prendeva posto un gruppo di assalitori. In pochi istanti e con pochi semplici movimenti costoro si ritrovavano comodamente depositati tutti insieme sulla cima degli spalti.⁴⁵

Un altro utile esempio di come nel mondo antico la dinamica di interscambio fra tecnologia civile e militare operasse in senso inverso a quello per noi familiare è costituito dall'apparato propulsore delle torri mobili, le gigantesche macchine chiave di volta di tutta l'arte poliorcetica dell'antichità (e non solo) che assommavano in un'unica realizzazione meccanica i vantaggi e le possibilità delle altre macchine a disposizione degli assediati (scale, testudini, ariet) e persino alcuni della cortina muraria dei difensori, come l'altezza e l'ottimo campo di tiro per le artiglierie.⁴⁶ Ai fini di questo studio non sarà necessario analizzare nel dettaglio tutte le caratteristiche di questa macchina bellica: basterà spendere qualche parola sul sistema di propulsione impiegato per muovere delle costruzioni di enormi dimensioni e così pesanti.

Comunemente si ritiene che le torri mobili fossero trainate da un numero imprecisato di buoi o di uomini i quali, semplicemente, si sarebbero limitati a trascinarle con delle funi su per l'*agger*, il terrapieno appositamente e previamente preparato all'uopo.⁴⁷ Anche ad una sommaria analisi appare subito come questo dovesse essere un sistema del

⁴⁵ Sul *tolleno* di Vegezio Lendle 1983, op. cit. (n. 12), 117–120; Russo 2002, op. cit. (n. 39), 29–32. Bisogna comunque sottolineare che non è mai attestato nelle fonti l'utilizzo reale di una macchina del genere nell'assalto di una cortina muraria: potrebbe anche semplicemente trattarsi di una geniale invenzione rimasta sulla carta che Vegezio recupera dalle sue fonti.

⁴⁶ Sulle torri mobili in generale si veda Marsden 1971, op. cit. (n. 13), 84–90; Garlan 1974, op. cit. (n. 41), 225–234; Lendle 1983, op. cit. (n. 12), 36–106; Russo 2002, op. cit. (n. 39), 33–95.

⁴⁷ Sull'antichissima tecnica poliorcetica dei terrapieni (usata già dagli Assiri e dai Persiani) innalzanti fino al cammino di ronda delle mura investite vedi Y. Garlan, *Guerra e società nel mondo antico* (traduzione italiana Imola 1985), 178 e seguenti; ora anche Russo 2002, op. cit. (n. 39), 61–65.

tutto irrazionale di muovere una torre all'assalto delle mura, irrazionale almeno quanto il mandare dei soldati alla baionetta contro nidi di mitragliatrice protetti da filo spinato e cemento armato, confidando solo nel loro 'élan'.⁴⁸ Centinaia di buoi e migliaia di serventi, quanti ne sarebbero serviti per spostare l'enorme mole di una torre mobile, accalcantisi l'uno sull'altro in una massa compatta e terribilmente esposta al tiro dei difensori, solo parzialmente vanificato dal tiro di controbatteria che partiva dalla torre, non avrebbero avuto alcuna speranza di far giungere la macchina a contatto con le mura. Il treno di traino da essi formato si sarebbe esteso per qualche centinaio di metri, cioè pressappoco la lunghezza dell'intero *agger*, non lasciando materialmente spazio ai serventi per compiere il loro percorso. La difficoltà, anzi l'oggettiva impossibilità, non sarebbe mancata neppure nel caso che si supponessero le funi agganciate sul frontale della torre e dirette verso pulegge di rinvio applicate a picchetti posizionati alla fine dell'*agger* e alla base delle mura, di modo che i serventi avrebbero potuto compiere la loro opera posizionati dietro la torre e muovendosi nella direzione opposta a quella in cui si desiderava muovere la macchina.⁴⁹ Non sarebbe occorso molto perché, nel momento di massimo sforzo da parte degli attaccanti, un manipolo di difensori tagliasse le funi o svellesse i picchetti facendo rovinare all'indietro la torre giù per il terrapieno addosso agli sciagurati serventi e agli incolpevoli buoi, sfasciando la gigantesca costruzione e provocando un tremendo massacro.⁵⁰

Il traino da parte di buoi avveniva in realtà,⁵¹ ma solo fino al limitare del campo di tiro dei difensori: raggiunto questo limite si sarebbe

⁴⁸ Sulla dottrina tattica dell' 'élan' in generale si vedano le argute riflessioni espresse in I. Ousby, *The Road to Verdun* (London 2002), 44–52.

⁴⁹ In pratica applicando sul piano orizzontale lo stesso principio che, sul piano verticale, muove i moderni ascensori o la celebre Funicolare Centrale di Napoli, con la torre al posto della cabina e i serventi al posto del contrappeso: quando l'una sale l'altro scende.

⁵⁰ I disastri erano comunque molto frequenti: cfr. a titolo d'esempio Livio 32.17.4. Le torri potevano sfasciarsi anche per effetto del loro stesso peso, come testimoniato da Flavio Giuseppe, *De bello Judaico* 5.7.1. Neppure i meccanismi interni che ne assicuravano il moto potevano dirsi immuni dai guasti e dai conseguenti disastri: il nucleo principale del *Corpus Demetriadum*, i cosiddetti *Miracula Sancti Demetrii*, tramanda (2.210 Lemerle) che durante l'assedio avaro di Tessalonica nel 618 il 'motore' di una torre mobile costruita dai nomadi (più verosimilmente da ingegneri romei prigionieri o al servizio di costoro) andò in pezzi senza cause visibili uccidendo tutti i serventi (naturalmente il testo annovera questo evento fra gli interventi miracolosi con cui il santo patrono di Salonicco salvò la sua città).

⁵¹ Apollodoro di Damasco 164.5–8; cfr. Procopio, *De bello Gotthico* 1.22.

di necessità dovuto fornire il moto in un'altra maniera.⁵² Numerosi indizi tramandatici dalle fonti letterarie ci lasciano intendere come gli antichi avessero escogitato un sistema molto ingegnoso e funzionale per ottenere il moto di una torre mobile, un sistema *interno* alla macchina medesima.⁵³

Nel decimo libro della sua opera sull'architettura Vitruvio dedica alcuni capitoli alla descrizione di apparecchi sollevatori di vario genere, tutti funzionanti con la forza muscolare animale.⁵⁴ Si tratta di apparecchi relativamente sofisticati che, tramite pulegge, permettono di ridurre notevolmente la forza da applicare per ottenere il lavoro di sollevamento in base ad un principio fisico semplicissimo, quello delle leve.⁵⁵ In queste macchine sollevatrici la spinta di coloro che le mettevano in opera si esercitava su quello che, un po' impropriamente, viene chiamato cabestano, dal momento che questo è quel perno dotato di stanghe radiali e girevole sul piano orizzontale utilizzato dai marinai per salpare le ancore a bordo delle navi.⁵⁶ Una preziosa immagine di un apparecchio del genere descritto da Vitruvio trasmessaci dall'arte antica,⁵⁷ quella scolpita sul sarcofago degli *Haterii*, è però un po' diversa da come si è soliti ricostruire questi apparecchi a cabestano.⁵⁸ Essa

⁵² Informazioni molto preziose ed interessanti sulle fasi che precedevano l'accostamento delle torri mobili alle mura sono forniti da Flavio Giuseppe, *De bello Judaico* 5.6.4.

⁵³ Ad esempio Curzio Rufo 8.10; Ammiano Marcellino 23.4.13. Il più noto è tramandato da Cesare, *De bello Gallico* 2.30–31: il grande conquistatore racconta che, assediando una città degli Atuatici, i Romani costruirono una torre, venendo irrisi dai Galli che non credevano, vedendo a quale distanza veniva eretta la macchina, che dei piccoli ometti come quegli uomini venuti dal Sud sarebbero stati mai in grado di muoverla e farla giungere fino alle mura: ma quando videro la costruzione avanzarsi senza problemi su per l'*agger* preferirono arrendersi credendo ad un intervento divino.

⁵⁴ Vitruvio 10.2–3.

⁵⁵ Sugli apparecchi sollevatori dell'antichità si vedano Hill 1984, op. cit. (n. 3), 127–152 (solo macchine per il sollevamento idraulico con estensione del discorso anche al medioevo ed alle civiltà bizantina e islamica); Gara 1994, op. cit. (n. 2), 127–134; Landels 2000, op. cit. (n. 2), 58–98 (particolarmente pp. 84–98 per le gru).

⁵⁶ Considerando che il cabestano 'nautico' e quello 'terrestre' sono comunque identici e svolgono la stessa funzione (quella di sollevare un grave) l'uso di questo vocabolo è pienamente giustificato.

⁵⁷ Notoriamente esiste un'altra raffigurazione di gru a ruota calcatoia, quella del sarcofago di Luceio Peculiare, per la quale cfr. F. Kretzschmer, *La technique romaine* (Bruxelles 1966), 26.

⁵⁸ Cfr. però Vitruvio 10.2.7: "*Quodsi maius tympanum conlocatum aut in medio aut in una parte extrema fuerit, sine ergata* ('cabestano') *calcantes homines expeditores habere potuerunt operis effectus.*" Questo utilizzo della ruota calcatoia è menzionato da Vitruvio anche a proposito della noria a 10.4.2: "*Hominiibus calcantibus versatur;*" 10.4.3: "*Cum rota a calcantibus versabitur;*" 10.6.3: "*Ita cocleae hominibus calcantibus faciunt versationes.*"

mostra una gru che solleva una colonna. Molti particolari tecnici sono sicuramente stati omessi dallo scultore che lavorò il marmo, ma una cosa egli badò a mettere in particolare evidenza: una grande ruota calcatoia, all'interno e all'esterno della quale si affaticano numerosi uomini per girarla e ottenere la forza necessaria al sollevamento di una massiccia colonna.⁵⁹

L'utilizzo della ruota calcatoia era certamente ben noto ai Romani che la impiegavano anche per il sollevamento idraulico nelle miniere.⁶⁰ e lo stesso mulino ad acqua non viene azionato da altro che da una ruota calcatoia girata dalla forza della corrente di ruscelli e fiumi invece che dai muscoli dell'uomo.⁶¹ I vantaggi maggiori che offre la ruota calcatoia come sistema propulsivo sono quelli di poter concentrare le forze e le energie di molti uomini con un minimo ingombro e di compiere un lavoro lento ma costante: proprio quello che serve per muovere la colossale massa di una torre mobile limitandosi nell'interno del ristretto spazio del suo telaio.

Uno stringato passo di Bitone di Pergamo (II sec. a.C.) accenna esplicitamente a questo sistema propulsivo.⁶² Descrivendo la torre mobile progettata da Posidonio il macedone per Alessandro Magno⁶³ all'assedio

⁵⁹ Cfr. A. Burford, *Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society* (London 1972), figura 54; Gara 1994, op. cit. (n. 2), 131–133 e figura 7, 21; G. Traina, 'I mestieri' in A. Giardina, a cura di, *Storia di Roma dall'antichità a oggi vol. I: Roma antica* (Roma/Bari 2000), 128–131 e figura 19. W. Sackur, *Vitruv und die Poliorketiker. Vitruv und die Christlicheantike. Bautechnisches aus der Literatur des Altertums* (Berlin 1925), 51–52 interpreta questo rilievo, sulla base di Vitruvio 10.2.8, come una gru a montante singolo. Poiché però la macchina è rappresentata di profilo ritengo più probabile che la presenza di un secondo montante (il quale, come scrive Vitruvio 10.2, si unisce per la sommità al primo in modo da formare un angolo acuto il vertice del quale è il fulcro di sollevamento) sia nascosta dal primo che vi si sovrappone prospetticamente. La ruota calcatoia si trova all'esterno dell'apparecchio invece che al centro dei due montanti, conformemente ad una delle due possibilità espresse da Vitruvio 10.2.7.

⁶⁰ Sui vari rinvenimenti archeologici di ruote calcatoie ed opere ingegneristiche a queste connesse nelle miniere romane conosciute, nonché sui resti di altre macchine (come la cosiddetta 'vite di Archimede') utilizzate al medesimo scopo di sollevamento idraulico si veda Woods 1989, op. cit. (n. 23), 87–93; cfr. anche A. Wilson, 'Machines, Power and the Ancient Economy,' *Journal of Roman Studies* 92 (2002), 3–32.

⁶¹ L'osservazione è già in Vitruvio 10.5.2.

⁶² Bitone di Pergamo 55.4–5: "ἡνέχεται δὲ κατὰ τὰ μέσα τόπος ἐργατοκυλίνδριος, ὅστις τοὺς ἄξονας εὐκινητοτέρως παρέξει."

⁶³ Bitone di Pergamo 52.2. Di questo Posidonio non si sa altro, verosimilmente perché messo in ombra dagli altri due più famosi ingegneri di Alessandro, Diade e Caria, allievi di Polido di Tessaglia, capo ingegnere di Filippo II (Ateneo Meccanico 10; Vitruvio 10.13.3; Cfr. Marsden 1971, op. cit. (n. 13), 85; Whitehead-Blyth 2004, op. cit. (n. 33), 15–20 e 71–73).

di Tiro,⁶⁴ l'ingegnere ellenistico accenna ad un ἐργατοκυλίνδριος posto nel mezzo del telaio per consentire il movimento degli assi. Questo termine è un *hapax*, ma Vitruvio usa, per indicare il cabestano, il vocabolo *ergata*.⁶⁵ Il termine usato da Bitone è stato interpretato in passato come indicante una ruota calcatoia o qualcosa di simile, ma a ragione è stato fatto notare che, nel caso specifico in questione, una singola ruota calcatoia non avrebbe avuto molte possibilità di muovere la torre, a causa dello scarso numero di serventi (dovuto alle oggettive ridotte dimensioni dell'interno della ruota): meglio sarebbe interpretare il vocabolo, sulla scorta di Vitruvio, come un cabestano che, invece della ventina di uomini al massimo postulati per la ruota, avrebbe offerto spazio per centinaia di prestatori d'opera, più che sufficienti per muovere la torre di una quindicina di metri al giorno.⁶⁶

La macchina di Posidonio si situa agli albori della tecnologia poliorcetica delle torri mobili: essa non era molto alta e pesante (aveva solo due piani) ed un solo cabestano avrebbe potuto essere sufficiente a garantirne il moto. Ma la corsa al gigantismo che interessò anche altri settori della ricerca tecnica ellenistica, come quello delle costruzioni navali, si ripercosse anche sulle macchine ossidionali e presto furono erette delle torri titaniche fra le quali, esempio mai più superato, la torre realizzata da Epimaco per Demetrio Poliorcete,⁶⁷ la notissima ἐλέπολις.⁶⁸ In casi come questi i termini del problema si modificano: il

⁶⁴ Marsden 1971, op. cit. (n. 13), 84–90; Garlan 1974, op. cit. (n. 41), 228.

⁶⁵ Vitruvio impiega cinque volte questo vocabolo nel *De architectura*, all'interno del solo libro decimo: 2.7 (due volte); 2.9; 11.1; 16.12. La parola designa senza dubbio un cabestano, come si ricava dal senso logico di 10.2.7 dove apprendiamo che nell'apparecchio sollevatore descrittoci in questo luogo l'*ergata* può essere sostituito con una più funzionale e veloce ruota calcatoia (vedi *supra* n. 54). Sackur 1925, op. cit. (n. 59), 47 (n. 3) e 48 figura 22 pensa ad un argano orizzontale a manovella posizionato sul *tympanum* (sostanzialmente, una grossa puleggia di rinvio con funzione demoltiplicatoria posta tra i due montanti della gru). Ma questa interpretazione corrisponde male agli altri impieghi del termine *ergata* e Vitruvio distingue nettamente (a 10.11.1) i due tipi di accorgimenti. H. Polge, *Études de technologie rétrospective* (Auch 1967), 142 ritiene, a torto, che il cabestano non fosse conosciuto dalla tecnologia antica.

⁶⁶ Vedi Marsden 1971, op. cit. (n. 13), 88–89; Lendle 1983, op. cit. (n. 12), 46–53.

⁶⁷ Diodoro siculo 20.91.

⁶⁸ 'Distruggitrice di città.' Marsden 1971, op. cit. (n. 13), 85 suggerisce che questo soprannome sia derivato dall'aggettivo ἐλέπολις con cui è qualificata Elena nell'Agamennone di Eschilo, versi 689–690. I Romani chiamavano le torri mobili *turres ambulatoriae* (ad esempio Vegezio, *De re militaris* 2.25) o *turres mobiles* (ad esempio Livio 21.11.7; Curzio Rufo 8.10.32). In greco, il vocabolo τύρσις designa unicamente una torre in muratura, mentre il termine πύργος si applica sia alla fortificazione che alla macchina; in quest'ultimo caso è generalmente seguito dall'aggettivo φορητός: Ateneo meccanico 10.11. Callebat-Fleury 1986, op. cit. (n. 34), 243.

cabestano occupa molto spazio sul piano orizzontale e sulla pur sempre ridotta superficie del telaio di una torre mobile non se ne potrebbero inserire più di tre o quattro. Al contrario, la ruota calcatoia si sviluppa in altezza e ciò avrebbe consentito di erigerne a decine, affiancate l'una all'altra e disposte in file parallele, tutte agenti sul medesimo asse. Il principio del cabestano o della ruota calcatoia era anch'esso, come nel caso dello *shādūf* e del *tolleno*, ben conosciuto da molto tempo prima della costruzione delle prime torri da assedio ed ampiamente applicato nell'edilizia e nel sollevamento idraulico.

Non è possibile determinare con certezza quando e dove sia stata inventata la ruota calcatoia o il cabestano. Quest'ultimo sembrerebbe più antico, e non di poco. Pare abbastanza certo che uno dei primi utilizzi della ruota calcatoia sia stato nel sollevamento idraulico.⁶⁹ Drachmann,⁷⁰ discutendo dell'invenzione della vite di Archimede, sostiene con buoni argomenti che essa sia stata occasionata dalla visione del *tympanum* usato comunemente per l'irrigazione in Egitto ai tempi del filosofo siracusano. Un *tympanum* 'inverso' (cioè una ruota girata dall'acqua e non fatta girare per sollevare l'acqua) viene descritto dalla traduzione araba della *Pneumatica* di Filone di Bisanzio⁷¹ intorno al 230 a.C., ed è probabilmente un'invenzione di Ctesibio di Alessandria, il famoso ingegnere che visse e operò alla corte di Tolomeo II (283/2–246 a.C.).⁷² Filone dice che la macchina da lui descritta (*Hannāna* nel testo arabo) è simile alle ruote usate nell'irrigazione (ar. *Nū'rya*, la noria a scomparti, e non *Sāqiya*, l'apparecchio composto di un tamburo con una catena alla quale sono applicati dei recipienti per il sollevamento dell'acqua⁷³ normalmente usato nel medioevo in ambito arabo per irrigare). Tutta la traduzione araba del *corpus* attribuito a Filone è piena di aggiunte medioevali, e questo passo potrebbe essere una di queste.⁷⁴ Ma Vitruvio, nella sua descrizione di apparecchi per il sollevamento idraulico,⁷⁵ rende abbastanza chiaro il fatto che egli non sta descrivendo nuove invenzioni, ma macchine che sono già in uso da un bel po' di tempo. Hill ne conclude, basandosi anche sugli argomenti di Drachmann relativi alla vite di Archimede, che il passo di Filone è genuino e che il *tympanum*

⁶⁹ Hill 1984, op. cit. (n. 3), 127–129.

⁷⁰ A.G. Drachmann, *The Mechanical Technology of Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Copenhagen 1963), 154.

⁷¹ Filone di Bisanzio, *Pneumatica* 61.

⁷² Ateneo di Naucrati, *Deipnosophistae* 11.497d.

⁷³ Cfr. Vitruvio 10.4.4.

⁷⁴ Hill 1984, op. cit. (n. 3), 134.

⁷⁵ Vitruvio 10.4–7.

risale dunque almeno alla prima metà del III sec. a.C.⁷⁶ Il *tympanum* è chiaramente una derivazione della noria. Needham⁷⁷ suggerisce che la noria fu inventata in India, per diffondersi in Cina al principio del III sec. a.C. Se così stanno le cose, sembra ragionevole ipotizzare che la noria sia stata inventata nella valle dell'Indo alla fine del V—inizi IV sec. a.C. Drower⁷⁸ fa risalire l'uso di una catena continua di secchi e della ruota a mano al periodo neobabilonense (600 a.C. circa), ed ammette la possibilità che la ruota idraulica azionata da buoi possa essere stata introdotta in Mesopotamia dagli Achemenidi. Hill⁷⁹ pensa, per ragioni idrografiche, ad una origine siriana o iraniana della noria, ma non si pronuncia sulla data. Per quanto riguarda il cabestano, non esiste alcun elemento certo che consente di datare la sua comparsa o diffusione. White⁸⁰ sottolinea che la puleggia, elemento essenziale per il funzionamento di apparecchi sollevatori complessi, compare già in Assiria nell'VIII sec. a.C.,⁸¹ ma ciò non getta luce sulla data della comparsa delle prime gru e, men che meno, sulla comparsa dei primi cabestani, elemento indispensabile per l'applicazione corretta e vantaggiosa dello sforzo di trazione. Ma, considerando che gli Assiri conoscevano già la macina da grano girata da asini (la *mola asinaria* familiare ad ogni visitatore di Pompei), che altro non è se non un cabestano,⁸² gli elementi per la realizzazione di tale apparecchio c'erano tutti almeno a partire dall'VIII sec. a.C., e questo potrebbe essere un *terminus post quem* accettabile. White⁸³ sembra però considerare il cabestano un

⁷⁶ Cfr. anche J.W. Humphrey, J.P. Oleson e A.N. Sherwood, *Greek and Roman Technology: A Sourcebook* (New York/London 1998), 29–30.

⁷⁷ J. Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China vol. IV pt. 2* (Cambridge 1965), 361–362.

⁷⁸ M.S. Drower, 'Fornitura di acqua, irrigazione e agricoltura' in C. Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. Hall e T.I. Williams, a cura di, *Storia della tecnologia vol. I pt. 2* (traduzione italiana Torino 1966), 533 e 560.

⁷⁹ Hill 1984, op. cit. (n. 3), 140–141.

⁸⁰ White 1984, op. cit. (n. 36), 14–15.

⁸¹ Pulegge assire di gelso sono state trovate a Nimrud. La radice semitica indicante la puleggia, rimasta nell'arabo moderno, può essere letta in una tavoletta del XV sec. a.C. di Alalakh; cfr. Drower 1966, op. cit. (n. 78), 531.

⁸² Cfr. R.J. Forbes, 'Chimica, culinaria, cosmetica' in C. Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. Hall e T.I. Williams, a cura di, *Storia della tecnologia vol. I pt. 1* (traduzione italiana Torino 1966), 278–279, il quale la considera uno sviluppo delle macchine rotanti a mano diffuse in Mesopotamia dopo il 1000 a.C. Per la diffusione e l'utilizzo delle macchine a rotazione e dei mulini pompeiani in area mediterranea si vedano la serie di articoli in D. Meeks e D. Garcia, a cura di, *Techniques et Économie antiques et médiévales: le temps de l'innovation* (Paris 1997), 15–61 e 69–81.

⁸³ White 1984, op. cit. (n. 36), 50.

apparecchio diffuso esclusivamente a partire dall'età ellenistica. Va ribadito e sottolineato con forza, ad ogni buon conto, che ogni tentativo di stabilire una cronologia in questo campo poggia su elementi fragilissimi, e non può che essere largamente ipotetico e soggetto ad oscillazioni, anche cospicue.

Per quanto riguarda le torri mobili, la prima in assoluto è attribuita dai Latercoli Alessandrini⁸⁴ ad un ingegnere di Filippo II, Polido di Tessaglia, che la costruì durante l'assedio di Bisanzio del 340 a.C.⁸⁵ Se questa torre fosse stata propulsa da un sistema di ruote calcatòie, ciò lascerebbe un margine davvero molto ristretto fra la comparsa della ruota calcatòia, la sua diffusione in occidente e la sua applicazione militare. Più probabile è che anche questa torre, come quella di Posidonio,⁸⁶ fosse propulsa da un cabestano. È verosimile ipotizzare che la ruota calcatòia viaggiò al seguito dei reduci macedoni di ritorno dall'India, e solo dopo la sua applicazione come apparecchio per l'irrigazione o per l'applicazione dello sforzo traente nel sollevamento dei gravi, forse in Egitto, venne utilizzata per muovere le torri mobili, precedentemente propulse da cabestani (anche se nel mondo ellenistico l'applicazione civile e militare della ruota calcatòia sembrerebbe essere pressoché sincrona). Il nuovo mezzo, permettendo di applicare maggior forza motrice, rese possibile il movimento per le titaniche torri ellenistiche come l'elepoli di Demetrio Poliorcete.

Potrebbe però esistere una eccezione molto significativa alle dinamiche di interscambio fin qui delineate, una eccezione di tipo molto moderno. Essa proviene, e non a caso, dalle coorti dei *vigiles* che curavano il servizio antincendio della città di Roma a partire dal regno di Augusto.⁸⁷ Nel 1820 a Roma, in seguito ad alcuni lavori intrapresi all'ingresso dell'antica Villa Mattei a via Navicella, pochi metri più a sud di S. Maria in Dominica, furono rinvenute fra i resti di quella che fu poi identificata come la caserma della quinta coorte dei *vigiles*, alla quale era demandata la custodia delle *regiones* prima e seconda di Roma, due epigrafi con i ruoli di servizio di costoro, una relativa al 205

⁸⁴ *Latercula Alexandrina* 8.5–7.

⁸⁵ Cfr. Garlan 1974, op. cit. (n. 41), 228.

⁸⁶ Bitone di Pergamo 51–55.

⁸⁷ Strabone 5.3.7; Svetonio, *Augustus* 30; Cassio Dione 54.26; Paolo in *Digesta* 1.15.1. Per l'organizzazione antincendio di Roma in epoca preaugustea vedi Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 6–24.

d.C.⁸⁸ ed un'altra del 210 d.C.,⁸⁹ che contengono dei dati interessanti. La prima ha dei nomi seguiti dalle sigle OP. B., OPT. B., OP. BA.,⁹⁰ mentre la seconda ricorda un certo Publio Giulio Faustino, già presente sulla prima epigrafe come *vexillarius*, qualificato come *optio ball*. Le sigle in questione sono state interpretate⁹¹ come le abbreviazioni di *optio ballistariorum* o *ballistarum*. La qualifica implica che la coorte dei *vigiles* era equipaggiata con pezzi d'artiglieria. Ora, bisogna spiegare la funzione che avevano tali macchine in città. Alcuni esegeti le hanno interpretate come lanciapietre destinate ad abbattere da lontano e senza pericolo gli edifici in fiamme o quelli vicini all'incendio per circoscriverlo ed impedirne la diffusione,⁹² mentre altri hanno pensato che fossero utilizzate come un espediente per lanciare ingenti quantità di aceto, racchiuse in un contenitore ceramico di forma sferica destinato ad infrangersi contro il fuoco per soffocarlo.⁹³ Se così fosse, avremmo uno splendido esempio di influenza reciproca fra tecnologia civile e militare di tipo moderno, ma non tutti sono d'accordo. È stato infatti sottolineato che, all'inizio del III secolo d.C., il termine *ballista* non indica più un lanciapietre ma una lanciagiavellotti,⁹⁴ e ne è stato dedotto che queste macchine erano forse destinate a scopi di polizia e mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico.⁹⁵ Sablayrolles⁹⁶ propone, riprendendo una vecchia tesi del Kellermann, di leggere le abbreviazioni rispettivamente come *optio balnearum* o *optio balteariorum*, negando che vi fossero *ballistarii* fra i *vigiles*. Egli si basa principalmente sul fatto che ben tre *optiones* attestati contemporaneamente fra i *vigiles* farebbero pensare ad una presenza massiccia di pezzi d'artiglieria fra le coorti di costoro e, conseguentemente, ad un uso frequente e rilevante. Per contrasto, egli sottolinea, nessuna attestazione della carica di *optio ballistarum* ci è stata trasmessa per le coorti pretoriane o per le legioni, che facevano largo uso di arti-

⁸⁸ CIL 6.1057.

⁸⁹ CIL 6.1058.

⁹⁰ Per un altro caso dubbio cfr. Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 193 (n. 5).

⁹¹ A. von Domaszewski, *Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres* (Bonn 1908), 10. Cfr. CIL 6.3744 = 31075, lista del 362 d.C. di equipaggiamenti appartenenti ai *vigiles* fra i quali sono inclusi *sifones*, *falces*, *uncini* e *b[...]*. Domaszewski, *loc. cit.*, propone di integrare *b[allistae]*. Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 193 (n. 7); Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 215.

⁹² Domaszewski 1908, op. cit. (n. 91), 10.

⁹³ Baillie Reynolds 1926, op. cit. (n. 17), 97.

⁹⁴ Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 188-189.

⁹⁵ Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 194.

⁹⁶ Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 215-217.

glieria. Da queste unità viene un solo esempio di *ballistarius*.⁹⁷ Questo argomento ha poco peso: la trasmissione di dati epigrafici è casuale e deve sempre essere usata con attenzione e propriamente. Si consideri, a titolo esemplificativo, che da Vegezio⁹⁸ apprendiamo che una legione aveva cinquantacinque *carruballistae* e dieci *onagri*. La Colonna traiana mostra che almeno due uomini erano necessari per mettere in opera una *carruballista* mentre da Ammiano Marcellino⁹⁹ apprendiamo che per far funzionare un *onager* erano necessari otto o nove uomini: in sintesi, in ogni legione c'erano un minimo standard di almeno 190/200 uomini che potevano legittimamente fregiarsi del titolo di *ballistarius* (ma la cifra è certamente inferiore al vero).¹⁰⁰ Eppure, delle migliaia di uomini che nell'arco della secolare storia imperiale di Roma devono aver servito come artiglieri, la testimonianza epigrafica di uno solo si è preservata. La visione di Sablayrolles è influenzata dalle affermazioni di Marsden,¹⁰¹ secondo il quale l'artiglieria era un'arma di prestigio a Roma e, pertanto, il suo possesso ed uso era limitato alle legioni. Ciò è in parte vero,¹⁰² ma una prima obiezione che si potrebbe muovere a questa affermazione è che le attestazioni epigrafiche interpretabili nel senso di un possesso di pezzi d'artiglieria da parte dei *vigiles* risalgono

⁹⁷ *Année Épigraphique* (1935), 110. CIL 5.6632 nomina un Elio Optato *magister ballistariorum*. Per altri tre casi, meno espliciti e relativi ad *evocati ballistarum Augusti* di II e III sec. d.C., Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 194–195. Il *ballistarius legionis I Italicae* discusso da Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 192 (n. 2) si basa, in realtà, sull'errata lettura epigrafica 'βαλῆστες' per 'βάλης τεσ(σεράριος)', cioè 'Valens tesserarius'. Potrebbe essere attestata anche la qualifica di *scorpionarius*: si veda D.B. Campbell, 'Auxiliary artillery revisited', *Bönnner Jahrbücher* 186 (1986), 118 (n. 10). Sui *ballistarii* Vegezio, *De re Militaris* 2.2; Giovanni Lido, *De magistratibus populi Romani* 1.46; *Digesta* 1.6.7 (6), che li nomina fra gli *immunes* secondo Tarrutenio Paterno.

⁹⁸ Vegezio, *De re Militaris* 2.25.

⁹⁹ Ammiano Marcellino 23.4.6. Ammiano conta otto uomini per il caricamento di un *onager*, quattro per lato ad applicar forza sulle due rispettive leve poste a fianco dell'organo di caricamento del pezzo, più un capo-pezzo incaricato di far partire il colpo percuotendo il grilletto con un grosso martello. La cifra di otto uomini è chiaramente indicativa di un *contubernium* (A.K. Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War 100 BC–AD 200* [Oxford 1996], 14): ma non è chiaro se il capo-pezzo debba essere incluso nel *contubernium* o contato a parte. Cfr. Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 192.

¹⁰⁰ Vegezio, *De re Militaris* 2.25 dice che in ogni centuria un intero *contubernium* di undici uomini si occupava della *carruballista*: Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 192. Forse, nel II sec. d.C., un *contubernium* constava di dieci uomini (Vegezio 2.8 e 13). Per Marsden, *loc. cit.* il numero è troppo elevato e può giustificarsi in considerazione dei compiti accessori al funzionamento della macchina: trasporto di munizionamento, governo degli animali da tiro, manutenzione del carro e così via.

¹⁰¹ Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 184.

¹⁰² Campbell 1986, op. cit. (n. 97), 117–119.

ad un'epoca in cui quest'ultimi erano tenuti in grande favore presso la casa imperiale, per il sostegno dato a Settimio Severo contro i suoi oppositori sostenuti dai pretoriani. Una seconda obiezione, e di peso ben maggiore, è che l'eventuale efficacia ed utilità dei lanciapietre nel combattere i disastrosi incendi che potevano colpire Roma (sulle quali Sablayrolles¹⁰³ è scettico) poteva ben far passare in secondo piano considerazioni relative al prestigio associato ad una specifica arma.

Da un passo di Tacito¹⁰⁴ confrontato con uno di Svetonio¹⁰⁵ ed Orosio¹⁰⁶ si ricava che, nell'emergenza dell'incendio che devastò Roma nel 64 d.C. furono usate delle *ballistae* per circoscrivere le fiamme abbattendo gli edifici per creare una zona di sicurezza intorno ai focolai, impedendogli di appiccarsi alle case e lasciandoli estinguere per mancanza di combustibile. Tacito evidenzia esplicitamente che l'incendio poté essere domato soltanto creando una cintura di sicurezza intorno alle aree minacciate con l'abbattimento di edifici; Svetonio ed Orosio (che dipende in qualche misura dal primo) tramandano il particolare delle macchine da guerra (da intendere come macchine da lancio, non potendosi pensare ad arieti o trapani,¹⁰⁷ gli unici altri due tipi di macchine da guerra 'distruttivi' in possesso dei Romani), letto in chiave sfavorevole per Nerone. È lecito pensare che la vista di lanciapietre in azione all'interno dell'Urbe, e di un Urbe in preda ad un apocalittico e devastante incendio, dovette lasciare una spiacevole impressione nei ricordi dei sopravvissuti (che Svetonio è lesto a sfruttare nella sua biografia di un *princeps* così detestato dalla storiografia romana), almeno di quelli che non compresero la reale funzione del gesto: ma Tacito recupera il senso genuino dell'operazione dei soccorritori della città divorata dalle fiamme. Da dove provenivano i lanciapietre utilizzati in questa occasione? Erano già nell'arsenale dei *vigiles*? Sembra improbabile. Essi avrebbero potuto essere quelli della guardia pretoriana, che

¹⁰³ Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 369.

¹⁰⁴ Tacito, *Annales* 15.40.1: "*Sexto demum die apud imas Esquilias finis incendio factus, prorutis per immensum aedificiis, ut continuae violentiae campus et velut vacuum caelum occurreret.*"

¹⁰⁵ Svetonio, *Nero* 38.1: "*Nam quasi offensus (scil. Nero) deformitate veterum aedificiorum et angustiis flexurisque vicorum incendit urbem... et quaedam horrea circa domum Auream, quorum spatium maxime desiderabat, bellicis machinis labefacta atque inflammata sint, quod saxeo muro constructa erant.*"

¹⁰⁶ Orosio 7.7.5: "*Horrea quadro structa lapide magnaue illae veterum insulae, quas discurrens adire flamma non poterat, magnis machinis quondam ad externa bella praeparatis labefactatae atque inflammatae sunt.*"

¹⁰⁷ Sul trapano v. Lendle 1983, op. cit. (n. 12), 128–132 e 147–150; Whitehead-Blyth 2004, op. cit. (n. 33), 103–108.

ne era dotata almeno a partire dal principato di Claudio.¹⁰⁸ Il particolare, fornito da Orosio, che queste macchine erano state approntate *ad externa bella* potrebbe indicare però che esse fossero state prese dagli *armamentaria publica*.¹⁰⁹ Sablayrolles non ritiene¹¹⁰ che l'uso di *ballistae* avrebbe realmente avuto efficacia a causa della strettezza e tortuosità delle stradine di Roma e del cumulo di macerie che le macchine avrebbero creato, che avrebbe finito per fungere da combustibile se non asportato, senza considerare i tizzoni e le scintille che le macchine avrebbero sparso per ogni dove col rischio di propagare ulteriormente l'incendio. Ma tutte queste obiezioni non tengono conto del fatto che le *ballistae* sarebbero state evidentemente usate su edifici non ancora in fiamme¹¹¹ e ad un lanciapietre antico, come dimostrano le ricostruzioni moderne, bastano una ventina di metri appena di spazio libero avanti a sé per tirare i suoi colpi. Nel caso dell'incendio del 64 d.C., teste Tacito, l'espedito funzionò: le fiamme poterono essere domate solo dopo che fu creata un'ampia zona libera attorno ad esse abbattendo gli edifici. Essendosi trattato di una misura di emergenza dettata dalla necessità e dalla disperazione del momento, è plausibile che siano stati i pretoriani ad esserne incaricati. Essi erano i soli, a Roma, addestrati all'utilizzo di macchine da lancio. Ma avendo dato buoni frutti è ragionevole supporre che i lanciapietre furono, da allora in poi, parte integrante dell'equipaggiamento di chi di regola si occupava della lotta anti-incendio, i *vigiles*. Sablayrolles muove¹¹² un'altra obiezione all'uso di *ballistae* da parte dei *vigiles*. Perché il racconto di Svetonio raggiunga il suo scopo (quello di presentare Nerone come un mostro) è necessario che l'uso dei lanciapietre fosse inusuale per i suoi lettori, altrimenti il particolare perderebbe d'efficacia. Ma l'uso di *ballistae* era appunto inusuale nella Roma imperiale: gli incendi erano certo frequenti, ma pochissimi avranno richiesto misure così drastiche per essere domati. Ciò non esclude che i *vigiles* avevano il dovere di tenersi sempre pronti a qualunque evenienza, il che includeva addestrare personale pronto a

¹⁰⁸ Tacito, *Annales* 12.56. Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 181.

¹⁰⁹ Cicerone, *Pro Rabirio* 7; Tacito, *Historiae* 1.38 e 80; cfr. CIL 6.989, dove sono citati degli *scribae armamentarii* civili. M. Durry, *Les Cohortes prétoriennes* (Paris 1938), 115 e nota 4; Marsden 1969, op. cit. (n. 29), 175 e 184-185.

¹¹⁰ Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 367-368.

¹¹¹ La tecnica di abbattere alberi in zone non ancora raggiunte dalle fiamme in modo da creare una cintura di sicurezza attorno ai focolai è una delle più efficaci per contrastare gli incendi nei boschi al giorno d'oggi.

¹¹² Sablayrolles 1996, op. cit. (n. 18), 368-369.

maneggiare e utilizzare pezzi d'artiglieria (*ballistarii* e *optiones ballistarum*). Avere a disposizione artiglieri non implicava necessariamente andare in giro con *carruballistae* per le strade di Roma: le macchine potevano tranquillamente essere stoccate negli *armamentaria publica*. Anche al giorno d'oggi, negli arsenali delle caserme dei Vigili del Fuoco, esistono equipaggiamenti per il primo intervento contro emergenze da contaminazione chimica e nucleare senza che nessuno di noi, per fortuna, abbia mai avuto modo di vederli in funzione.

In definitiva, se anche si ammettesse che i *vigiles* usavano o potevano usare lancia-pietre nella lotta anti-incendio, questo resterebbe l'unico esempio di una realizzazione tecnica originariamente concepita ad esclusivo uso bellico per la quale i Romani seppero trovare un'applicazione civile. Ma questo esempio può servire comunque per metterci in guardia dalle generalizzazioni troppo affrettate: la sensazione che si ha a proposito delle mutue influenze fra tecnologia civile e militare e, come si è già detto, che le realizzazioni tecniche della seconda siano sempre una ripresa ed un adattamento di quelle della prima; e tuttavia questa affermazione, in ultima analisi, potrebbe dipendere esclusivamente dalla scarsità e dalla frammentarietà della documentazione in nostro possesso.

IRREGULAR LEVIES AND THE IMPACT OF THE ROMAN ARMY IN EGYPT

COLIN ADAMS

There has been considerable debate on the economic impact of the army on Roman provinces. Clearly some provinces were affected more than others; there can be no question that there was a typical Roman province. Some were wealthier than others in agricultural and other resources, some more populous than others; so it is very difficult to develop a universal picture of economic impact. It is hardly credible that the cost of the army at any time in the Roman period was spread evenly throughout the empire. Any attempt to quantify the impact of the army on provinces faces a further problem: lack of evidence. However, the papyri of Egypt provide enough information for some notion of the scale of impact to be developed, even if it falls short of providing a definitive answer.

It has been suggested that the economic impact of the army in Egypt was small. This is based on a comparison between the total estimated tax revenues for the province and the total cost of paying soldiers based there: the cost of the army, it is suggested, represented about 2% of revenue.¹ Even if these estimates are low (for they are incomplete and do not reckon the total production of the province), the cost of the army could not have been more than a third or a quarter of the tax revenues, and less than 10% of the total surplus production.² The size of the army in relation to the population of Egypt was such that this can hardly have represented a significant imposition, especially if demands were spread equitably. While certainly useful in establishing a

¹ Cf. J.M. Carrié, 'Le rôle économique de l'armée dans l'Égypte romaine', in C. Nicolet and H. van Effenterre, eds., *Armées et fiscalité dans le monde antique (Colloques nationaux du CNRS 963)* (Paris 1977), 373–393; R. Alston, *Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt* (London/New York 1995), 112–115.

² See R.S. Bagnall, *Egypt in Late Antiquity* (Princeton 1993), 172. It is not necessary here to provide, even if it were possible, a break down of figures, but consider that the estimated requirements for the AD 23 garrison of 16,000 men (c. 192,000 artabas) is minute in comparison to the estimated annual yield of grain in Egypt of 81 million artabas. But of course this was only part of the cost.

notion of scale, these estimates obscure a number of important points. First, the army's needs may have been fairly constant in every year (the same number of troops needed the same pay and supply of food and fodder for animals), but not every year was as abundant in agricultural produce as another. The effects of a poor harvest were not felt equally by different regions (*nomes*), which might directly affect the equity of tax imposition. Second, there was a range of irregular impositions not allowed for in these calculations. Third, no account is taken of the huge imposition in terms of bureaucracy (which in itself could have a significant economic impact in a number of ways) forced onto the local population, not just by regular taxation and military supply, but perhaps especially by these irregular levies.³ It is all too easy to downplay the significance of these, assuming that they were singular responses to particular crises or circumstances, but they happen often, and were probably more regular than we might think. One, at least, happened every year, the *conventus* of the prefect: a feature of all provinces. Others included tours of officials, such as *epistrategoi*, and soldiers in the normal course of their duties, and, of course, imperial visits.⁴ While I do not want to overplay their significance, it must be said that they represented a very real imposition at a local level on individuals, which must have been at once highly tangible, a considerable economic imposition on the individual, and an additional administrative burden on an already over-burdened system.

Another burden on Egypt, easily overlooked, but which was significant, was its expected contribution to imperial campaigns elsewhere, for which we have some evidence.⁵ Again, while we should not stress the regularity of these, they must have represented a significant burden both economically and bureaucratically, even assuming, as is likely, that the same administrative systems were used. A recently published papyrus from the collection of Yale University amply displays this in relation to Caracalla's campaign in Syria.⁶ This preserves a register of

³ On bureaucracy and military supply, see C.E.P. Adams, 'Supplying the Roman Army: Bureaucracy in Roman Egypt', in A. Goldsworthy and I. Haynes, eds., *The Roman Army as a Community*. Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary Series 34 (Portsmouth, R.I. 1999), 119–126.

⁴ For journeys by *epistrategoi*, see J.D. Thomas, *The Epistrategos in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt: Part 2: The Roman Epistrategos* (Opladen 1982), 57–64.

⁵ P. Oxy. 3090–3091 (AD 216–17), see also BGU 266 = W. Chr. 245 (AD 216–17), see also P. Got. 3; P. Stras. 245.

⁶ P. Yale 137 (AD 215/6).

payments in cash and kind made by individuals, and shows the real impact of such requisitions at a local level. To these foreign campaigns we must add local disturbances and incursions into Egypt, and supplies requisitioned for any imperial projects supported by soldiers such as mining and quarrying in the Eastern Desert.

There was a local impact to these exactions, and this is something, certainly with respect to the *conventus*, that became an annual burden for the same communities each year. There is some evidence from Egypt for the course of the *conventus*, and it is clear from similar evidence from Asia Minor, that governors undertook a set itinerary. What we would like to know is if the burden of providing for this and other irregular impositions was distributed equitably.

The subject of this essay is to consider some aspects of the impact of such impositions on the province of Egypt. The main source with which I am concerned is the first of two substantial papyri from the Chester Beatty library in Dublin, P. Panop. Beatty 1 and 2, which date from AD 298 and 300 respectively. Together these documents are among the longest papyri to survive from Egypt—having some 700 lines of text, preserving around 87 letters exchanged between officials in provincial government (and importantly communication with city authorities) and *programmata*, which provide important information about the dissemination of official decisions among the local population.⁷ What I want to do is to place this evidence into a wider context.

⁷ The texts have received little attention. The basic work on administrative structures in fourth century Egypt remains J. Lallemande, *L'administration civile de l'Égypte de l'avènement de Dioclétien à la création du diocèse (284–382). Contribution à l'étude des rapports entre l'Égypte et l'Empire à la fin du III^e et au IV^e siècle* (Brussels 1964), but was completed before the publication of the Panopolis papyri. The most recent book on Late Antique Egypt, Bagnall 1993, op. cit. (n. 2) is too wide in scope to consider the documents closely. R. Duncan-Jones, 'Pay and Numbers in Diocletian's Army', in *Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy* (Cambridge 1990), 105–117, tackles military pay and unit sizes in the light of a brief mention of the texts in a note of A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire 284–602*, 2 vols (Oxford 1964), II 1257–9. More recently in a series of short articles, N. Lewis has considered points of detail: N. Lewis, 'In the world of P. Panop. Beatty,' *Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists* 28 (1991), 163–78; id., 'In the World of P. Panop. Beatty: Ship Repair,' *Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists* 38 (2001), 89–96; id., 'In the World of P. Panop. Beatty 1: 'An Army Marches on its Stomach,' *Chronique d'Égypte* 78 (2004), 221–228 (which considers the appointment of liturgists in detail). For a survey of broad themes, preliminary to a major study, see C.E.P. Adams, 'Transition and Change in Diocletian's Egypt: Province and Empire in the Late Third Century', in S. Swain and M. Edwards, eds., *Approaching Late Antiquity: the Transformation from Early to Late Empire* (Oxford 2004), 82–108.

P. Panop. Beatty 1 preserves in remarkable detail a range of matters pertaining to the impending visit of Diocletian to Panopolis in the wake of the revolt of L. Domitius Domitianus in AD 297.⁸ In a letter of 13th September 298 (Thoth 16) from the *strategos* of the Panopolite nome to the president of the town council of Panopolis, Aurelius Plutogenes alias Rhodinus, he complains that despite two instructions “with regard to the supplies of the *annona* ordered to be stored up in various places in preparation for the auspiciously impending visit of our ruler, the Emperor Diocletian, the Senior Augustus”, the president has not yet appointed liturgists to oversee the process and is now reminded for the third time.⁹ A day later the *strategos* wrote again,¹⁰ and a day later (Thoth 18) sent a letter of complaint to the Procurator of the Lower Thebaid about the inefficiency and obstinance of Aurelius Plutogenes, who had refused to appoint a surveyor to oversee the requisition of ships for the Treasury.¹¹

Three points follow. First, the urgency and frequency of the communication—what real point is there in writing a follow up letter the next day and a letter of complaint to the procurator another day later? Why does the *strategos* put so much pressure on the president? It is clear that both the *strategos* and president are resident in Panopolis, which explains the verbal commands mentioned, and the delivery by hand of the letters. Second, inefficiency can perhaps be put down to more than just a general lack of interest or concern over the burdens imposed; first, the bewildering range of liturgists needed, and second the unenviable position in which the president found himself, in which he had to play a two-sided game of pleasing the *strategos* and procurator, while not alienating his fellow citizens in the process. Such a conflict of interests is part and parcel of the dynamics of administration illustrated by the Beatty texts. A common misconception about Roman Egypt is that the over-bearing bureaucracy meant that things happened—more often than not they didn’t. And third, in his final letter, the *strategos* invokes the name and authority of his superior, Aurelius Isidoros, the Procurator of the Lower Thebaid, and adds a warning: “now again I hasten to enjoin you even so to select the persons aforesaid, in order that you

⁸ See Lewis 2004, op. cit. (n. 7).

⁹ P. Panop. Beatty 1. ll. 53–9 (trans. Skeat).

¹⁰ P. Panop. Beatty 1. ll. 109–19, see Lewis 2004, op. cit. (n. 7), 224.

¹¹ P. Panop. Beatty 1. ll. 167–179.

may avoid placing yourself and me in jeopardy". This shows that the *strategos* ultimately has little influence or power over the president of the council, that he protects himself from reproach from his superiors by writing a letter of complaint to the procurator, thus covering his back and passing the buck. Officials had very little sanction to carry out threats, which became idle, and this was well-known. This is perhaps one reason for the volume and regularity of correspondence, and is one sign of a authoritarian regime struggling to maintain control.

The papyrus furnishes important information on the liturgists and their roles.¹² *Apaitatai* ('Collectors'), *Apodektai* ('Receivers') and *Diadotai* ('Distributors'), and *Epimeletai* ('Overseers'), who probably had a supervisory role and who kept accounts, were appointed in pairs. A wide range of commodities was required—meat, chaff, wine, bread, animals,¹³ vegetables, sour wine (*oxos*), lentils, barley and bedding, and we have the general term *annona*—each had its own collectors, receivers, distributors and overseers. The organisation is complicated; it suffices to say here that 60 liturgists were appointed throughout the 6 toparchies. These were administrative divisions of the Panopolite nome, and each of these had liturgists responsible for each commodity. It is interesting that the president appoints liturgists in this way against the explicit instructions of the procurator that they should be appointed with responsibility for the whole nome, rather than individual toparchies. It seems clear that the president prefers to ignore attempts to interfere with established administrative practice, to make it more centralised. A letter sent from the *strategos* to the procurator, points this out, and shows that the procurator ordered that all liturgists should work in concert for the nome as a whole. However, this is ignored, and this is interesting in itself, for it shows that the *strategos* and indeed even the procurator had no real sanction over local authorities: his position was ultimately ineffectual.¹⁴ It also suggests less interest on the part of the president in the equitable distribution of the burden, as this would cause additional administrative pressure (rather than merely using the normal procedures). Another possibility, and one that occasionally crops up in our evidence is that

¹² At P. Panop. Beatty p. 124, Skeat presents a table summarizing this, which is replicated by Lewis 2004, op. cit. (n. 7), 226–227. Lewis discusses the various liturgists and their functions.

¹³ It is likely that these were for sacrifice: Lewis 2004, op. cit. (n. 7), 227.

¹⁴ See Adams 2004, op. cit. (n. 3).

the requirements of the state were misunderstood or misinterpreted by local officials in the town councils. Sometimes this might have been deliberate, others genuine.¹⁵

Several details are absent. The first, and most important of these, is the quantity required of each commodity. As so often is the case, the most important information for us, which might enable us to estimate the size of Diocletian's entourage is missing. There are a few tantalising details—1,000 artabas of lentils and 10,000 *sextarii* of sour wine. 800 artabas of wheat, as *annona* for the soldiers stationed at Panopolis (and those in transit), were to be provided from two *toparchies* (again suggesting inequitable distribution), but this is not quite enough for us to establish the size of Diocletian's party.¹⁶ All that can be said is that, based on the figure of 10,000 *sextarii* of *oxos* mentioned above, and the fact that a normal daily ration for a soldier was 2 *sextarii*, and we assume that Diocletian must have been in Panopolis for one day or more, his military party cannot have been larger than 5000 men, and this figure gets proportionally smaller the longer he stayed (and, of course, we do not know that).¹⁷ If we assume that the size was 5000 for the sake of argument, and accept that Diocletian was in Egypt for over a year, this alone represents over a 50% increase in the number of soldiers in the province, with a concomitant increase in the cost to supply them. We must also consider that he probably did not travel with his full complement, and the remainder of his expeditionary force must have been stationed elsewhere with similar impact.

We have some details preserved of supplies set aside for the garrisons at the local forts at Psinabla and Thmoö (animal skins for the former, two months rations of 2610 Italic *modii* of barley for horses and 128 9/24 artabas and 100 artabas of wheat). These figures were studied by Duncan-Jones, who suggested that the auxiliary unit here, at least in AD 298, probably numbered 116 (based on a ration of 4 *choinikes* of barley per horse per day for two months). Rations in wheat fall short of average, but soldiers received cash as well.¹⁸

¹⁵ An example of this might be seen in P. Oxy. 1414 (AD 271–272), where arrangements for the collection of a tax known as the *anabolikon* are discussed by the council: there seems to be a lack of clarity concerning the process.

¹⁶ I. ll. 132–9. It is interesting that only two *toparchies* supply wheat.

¹⁷ Noted by Skeat, P. Panop. Beatty p. xxv. For the daily ration of 2 *sextarii*, see P. Oxy. 1920. An entourage of such size moving through Egypt is hard to imagine.

¹⁸ Duncan-Jones 1990, op. cit. (n. 7), 107–108.

Two other main points are missing. First, we have little or no details on the extensive network of additional arrangements made for the provisioning of soldiers above and beyond the appointment of liturgists. As already mentioned, we have no information about quantity. Neither do we have much evidence for the time set aside for collection, place of storage, nor the transportation of the produce, which we know, from other sources, was an important factor falling under the remit of the city council.¹⁹ It is clear from elsewhere in the papyrus that ships had been requisitioned to carry supplies, and that some were requisitioned from outside the procuratorial district (suggesting a more centralised directive). We have no details of land transport, and this would have been a considerable task, involving the use of requisitioned animals in large number. We know from other evidence that animals and their owners were appointed to transport liturgies, both in the *metropoleis* and their nomes, and it is certain that these would have shouldered the burden of transport of these supplies in addition to their normal duties.

To broaden the context, earlier imperial visits to Egypt are fairly well represented in the papyri. We have evidence for Germanicus (AD 19), Hadrian (AD 130), and Septimius Severus and Caracalla (AD 199).²⁰ We also have evidence for a projected visit to Egypt by Severus Alexander.²¹ In the light of Severus Alexander's projected visit (we have no evidence that it actually happened), we should remember that many imperial visits, although planned, never occurred, despite the necessary preparations being made. One can imagine the feelings of the local population in such an event.²² In all of this evidence we see similar features to the Panopolis texts. Liturgists are appointed to oversee the collection and delivery of provisions and animals to transport them. Existing bureaucratic structures are used, but additional commodities and liturgists were required, which must have stretched resources.

¹⁹ See, for example, P. Oxy. 1412 (c. AD 284), concerning the transport of military supplies.

²⁰ See F. Millar *The Emperor in the Roman World* (London 1992, 2nd ed.), 34 for details and references.

²¹ See W. Clarysse and J.D. Thomas, 'A Projected Visit of Severus Alexander to Egypt', *Ancient Society* 8 (1977), 195–207 (= *SB* 12, 651); P. van Minnen and J.D. Sosin, 'Imperial Pork: Preparations for a Visit of Severus Alexander and Iulia Mammaea to Egypt', *Ancient Society* 27 (1996), 171–81.

²² Millar 1992, op. cit. (n. 20), 32 cites the almost perennial plans of Tiberius to undertake journeys, which each year were aborted; cf. Suetonius, *Tiberius* 38 and Tacitus, *Annals* 1.47.3.

As far as the prefect's *conventus* is concerned, details are more difficult. Like governors of other provinces, the prefect each year held a circuit court in pre-determined locations within the province, although the exact itinerary is unclear.²³ That there was a regular itinerary in itself suggests inequitable distribution of the burden. Whatever the pattern, we have evidence for visits to Arsinoe in the Fayum, Oxyrhynchos and Thebes, and know that the *metropoleis* of many nomes in the valley would have hosted the prefect.²⁴ Just what use an official entourage, whether imperial or praefectural, would have made of existing state facilities on roads, *mansiones*, is not entirely clear, but in a well-known passage of the *Life* of Severus Alexander, the emperor posted up details of his stopping places in advance, including *mansiones*.²⁵ From the Panopolis text, we see that provisioning the *mansio* at Panopolis was an important consideration for the procurator, and it therefore may be a stopping point on the emperor's itinerary. We do not have evidence, from Egypt at least, of any imposition of the emperor or prefect lodging with local elites. It is important to remember that our evidence gives only a snapshot, limited in time and place, of official visits covering entire provinces, and often in the case of imperial visits, more than one province. Despite this limitation, the picture afforded by the Egyptian evidence, therefore, may be more generally valid.

The commodities most frequently mentioned were destined for consumption by soldiers and horses of the units accompanying the emperors' or prefect's entourage, and in the case of the Panopolis text, some for the permanent garrisons; we have no evidence for what the requirements of the imperial party itself might have been, but they are unlikely to have been restricted to basic staples. Not all emperors were as considerate as Trajan, if we are to believe the *Panegyric*, where Pliny claims that he received the same supplies as others.²⁶ This raises

²³ On the sequence of visits suggested by P. Oxy. 709 (c. AD 50), see Thomas 1982, op. cit. (n. 4), 15–29. Generally on the *conventus*, see G. Foti Talamanca, *Ricerche sul Processo nell'Egitto greco-romano i: L'organizzazione del 'Conventus' del 'Praefectus Aegypti'* (Milan 1974). For the governor's *conventus* elsewhere, see Millar 1992, op. cit. (n. 20), 28–31, primarily based on the evidence of Cicero, and A.J. Marshall, 'Governors on the Move', *Phoenix* 20 (1996), 231–246.

²⁴ SB 9617 (AD 129); BGU 2211 (c. AD 192); P. Leit 12 = SB 10, 204 (AD 210–211); P. Petaus 47–7 (AD 185), P. Oxy. 3290 (AD 258–60). For Thebes, see I. Memnon 3; 8; 13; 15; 16; 24; 40; 57; 58.

²⁵ SHA, *Severus Alexander* 45.2, cited by Millar 1992, op. cit. (n. 20), 32.

²⁶ *Panegyricus* 20, cited by Millar 1992, op. cit. (n. 20), 35.

the perplexing problem of how these supplies of perhaps more luxurious commodities were raised. We know that animals for sacrifice were requisitioned for Diocletian's visit to Panopolis. In one of the papyri relating to the projected visit of Severus Alexander, 40 pigs, each weighing 50lbs, were to be supplied for the emperor's entourage.²⁷ Collectors of meat in the Panopolis text must have gathered similar, if not larger, numbers. But emperors did not live on meat and bread alone; can anything be said about their wider requirements.

In short, no, but here, perhaps, something can be made of an important archive relating to a state official named Theophanes, who made an official journey from Hermopolis Magna in Middle Egypt to Antioch in Syria sometime in the late 320's.²⁸ The most striking feature of the accounts of Theophanes' expenditure (in cash) is the range of staple and luxury commodities he bought for his party over the course of his journey. For larger scale imperial and state processions, we have seen that large quantities of staple goods could be requisitioned in advance. Could it have been the case that members of the imperial *familia* had responsibility for buying locally available and fresh commodities during the course of the journey? If this is the case, the emperor's party (or that of a prefect) would have carried considerable quantities of cash, and it might very well have provided a welcome injection of money into the local economy. Emperors and governors were an attraction, not only for the spectacle, but also, obviously, for their judicial responsibilities. Huge numbers of petitions could be received, attracting many to the *metropoleis* who would not normally be there, which may have had some economic benefit.²⁹

Finally, we come to the issue of cost: who paid for these commodities and their transport? Our evidence for requisition, especially that relating to transport (*angaria*) often obscures the probability that payment was forthcoming. The Panopolis text makes it clear that payment came from treasury funds, and this is supported by other evidence relating to requisition in Egypt, where it is not the inconvenience caused to local inhabitants by illegal requisitions that successive prefects are concerned

²⁷ Van Minnen and Sosin 1996, op. cit. (n. 21).

²⁸ See especially P. Ryl. 627–8.

²⁹ On the large number of petitions received in the course of a prefect's visit, see P. Yale 61 (AD 209), which shows that in Arsinoe over a period of three days, the prefect Subatianus Aquila received 1804 petitions.

about, but the fact that the Treasury is being defrauded.³⁰ Commodities requisitioned at Panopolis, at least the 1,000 artabas of lentils and 10,000 sextarii of sour wine, were paid for from state funds (*apo tôn toî tameiou chrématôn*).³¹ While we should certainly bear in mind the probability that such payment may not have been immediately forthcoming (there are examples in the papyri of liturgists waiting considerable periods for payment, sometimes years), and that state funds would not cover any necessary bribes to speed up proceedings, the long-term economic impact of visits might have been less than we would expect. However, we should not downplay the pressures in the short-term, the pressure to provide commodities, or for example, to bake bread for an entourage of hundreds or perhaps thousands at short notice, or the additional administrative pressures imposed on an already overstretched bureaucracy. It is likely also that any shortfalls in provisions were met from the liturgists' own pockets. What we are looking at is an imperial economy in operation: the cost of moving armies or officials around the empire is thought to have been small (for the state), but there could be significant short-term impact on local communities.

It is necessary now to draw some conclusions. First, what is clear from our evidence is that there was a significant *local* impact caused by irregular levies, a very real imposition for the individual, villages and *metropoleis*. What the Beatty text shows is that preparations for the visit of an emperor and his military entourage were massively intensive administrative exercises, largely devolved onto the local city councils and by them onto individuals. So the real impact was in terms of bureaucracy. It is difficult to believe that the burden was spread equally. Visits could last for some time—Hadrian was in Egypt for at least 8 months, Diocletian probably most of a year. The impact might have been felt at a local level, but this was also something hitting all parts of the empire in the course of imperial visits, a governor's *adventus*, or indeed any official or soldier travelling on state business. It was probably the most tangible and real imposition provincials felt, and this affords a perspective on the numerous provincial edicts designed to stop abuses in the systems of requisition. Second, any payments forthcoming for requisitioned goods or transport may have been paid for out of state funds (so there

³⁰ C.E.P. Adams, *Land Transport in Roman Egypt: Economics and Administration in a Roman Province* (Oxford 2007), ch. 7.

³¹ P. Panop. Beatty 1. ll. 244–8.

was some notion of remuneration), but these funds were generated by tax payments. Although this means that some tax generated was reintroduced into the provincial economy, it probably did not feel like that to an individual. Payment was not always received immediately (and could be massively delayed), which could have severe consequences for individuals and force them into prolonged communication with local officials. Finally, we should not overlook the positive impact on local economies, but would these necessarily cancel out the negative?

We should not glibly gloss over these so-called 'irregular' impositions. I hope I have shown that they were more regular than usually thought, and they were arguably one of the most visible aspects of Roman rule and of the impact of the army on provinces.

PART FOUR

THE IMPACT OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL ARMY:
ITALY AND THE WEST

GOOD FOR BUSINESS. THE ROMAN ARMY AND
THE EMERGENCE OF A 'BUSINESS CLASS' IN THE
NORTHWESTERN PROVINCES OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
(1ST CENTURY BCE–3RD CENTURY CE)

KOENRAAD S. VERBOVEN

Not so long ago, suggesting that anything like a 'business class' existed in the ancient world was enough to be labelled an incurable blockhead modernist, unable to grasp the staggering consequences of using imprecise or inadequate concepts borrowed from that infamous modern-times monster called neoclassical economy, naïvely (and tastelessly) infusing it with marxist nonsense. Fortunately, today, the debate has moved beyond the discussion of which holistic models are intrinsically better to understand the 'nature' of the ancient economy to the more pragmatic approach to make as much sense as possible of the data we have, using intermediate models or relying on plain common sense.¹

From the minimalist viewpoint the influence of economic institutions and organisations on social differentiation was negligent. The embeddedness of the economy and the constraints it placed on economic activities implied that economic positions reflected social positions rather than vice versa. However, in the classification schemes used in ancient texts and inscriptions to describe social categories and to assign individuals to particular categories, occupational denominations play a central role. Thus, occupational labels are a common feature of sub-elite inscriptions and similarity of occupation is the distinctive criterion for voluntary associations throughout the Empire.

The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of the Roman army on the emergence of a 'business class' as a social category in the northwestern provinces of the Empire. Obviously this is not the place

¹ Cf. W. Scheidel and S. von Reden, eds., *The Ancient Economy* (Edinburgh 2002); C. Zaccagnini, ed., *Mercanti e politica nel mondo antico* (Roma 2003); K. Strobel and M. Luik, eds., *Die Ökonomie des Imperium Romanum. Strukturen, Modelle und Wertungen im Spannungsfeld von Modernismus und Neoprimitivismus* (St. Katharinen 2002); J. Andreau, P. Briant and R. Descat, eds., *Economie antique. Prix et formation des prix dans les économies antiques* (Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges 1997).

to engage in the theoretical debate on the concept of class, but some clarification of what is implied in the concept as used in this paper is necessary.²

I would like to venture the following definition: A socio-economic class is an aggregate of social actors who share a (partially) common social identity, signifying a distinctive³ similarity in basic dispositions, derived from their specific position in or to the social field of market exchange. The social identity of a particular 'class' is based on economic distinctions; quantitative (wealth and income), qualitative (source of wealth or income) and organisational (investment only, labour only). The objective presence of these criteria is not enough, but neither is conscious class awareness required. What matters is whether and how these criteria influence the habitus of persons, that is the set of (mostly preconceptual) dispositions determining the way people look at their world and structure their perceptions in terms of ethical judgments, utility and veracity.⁴

I'm not claiming that this is the ultimate fit-for-all-purposes definition of the concept of class but the definition allows the concept to be useful in describing, analysing and understanding social differentiation in complex societies with important institutionalised markets.⁵

Characteristic of a business class, is that its social identity hinges on the following characteristics.

- Its members are actively engaged in market exchange, from which they aim to derive pecuniary profits.
- They are personally committed and occupied in achieving this goal.
- They are willing and prone to take risks.

² See M. Savage, *Class Analysis and Social Transformation* (Oxford 2000) for this debate (esp. pp. 3–22). E. de Ste Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London 1981) provides interesting thoughts on the relevance of the concept (esp. pp. 31–111) but relies too dogmatically on 'exploitation' as the key element in class formation: "class ... is the collective social expression of the fact of exploitation, the way in which exploitation is embodied in a social structure." (p. 43). Contra see Savage loc. cit.

³ In the sense of distinguishing one class from another.

⁴ On 'habitus' see P. Bourdieu, *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique. Précédé de trois études d'ethnologie kabyle* (Paris, 2000 (= 1972)).

⁵ Note de Ste Croix op. cit. (n. 2), 42–43: "The disagreement about the best way of using the expression 'class' has been so great that anyone who attempts an analysis of any society in terms of class is entitled to establish his own criteria."

- Their patrimonies consist primarily of (economic) capital assets and liquidities. Investment in non-economic assets (status goods, political offices) remains secondary.

From this perspective, the genesis of a business class depends on the emergence of a specific habitus. Habitus originates from adaptation to a perceived reality in a socialisation process, that can be primary (education) or secondary (e.g. anticipatory socialisation). External reality is perceived as 'meaningful' and providing an organised social space for social practice, the geography of which is determined by social categories and institutions enjoying social recognition. Therefore, in order to understand habitus formation among businessmen, we need to analyse this social geography, looking for institutionalised markets, monetisation and modes of participation.

The Roman conquest profoundly changed the social geography in the northwestern provinces of the Empire by introducing new institutions and breaking or reinforcing existing institutions. Among the new institutions, the Roman army took pride of place. The military and new urban markets institutionalised market exchange at an unprecedented scale. However, the strongest new category introduced was that of 'being Roman', the ultimate formal expression of which was Roman citizenship.⁶ These three combined—army, market and Roman identity—marked the social identity of businessmen in the northwestern provinces.

Coming of the Romans—Becoming Roman

Wherever the Roman army went, a train of merchants, contractors and hangers-on followed.⁷ In literary and other texts they are called *lixae*, *negotiatores* or *mercatores*. Festus says that they followed the army *quaestus gratia*.⁸ Roth argued for a proportion of one slave/servant for every

⁶ Cf. G. Woolf, *Becoming Roman. The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul* (Cambridge 1998).

⁷ Cf. J.P. Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 BC–AD 235)* (Leiden 1999), 96–101; see also Josephus, *Bellum Iudaicum* 3.5.83.

⁸ Festus s.v. *lixa*. Strictly speaking, *lixae* were army servants; cf. K. Strobel, 'Handwerk im Heer—Handwerk im zivilen Sektor', *Klèma* 16 (1991), 21–22; J.E. Thornburn, 'Lixae and calones: Following the Roman army', *Classical Bulletin* 79 (2003), 47–61.

4 soldiers, but these were attached to the army and would themselves be in need of supplies.⁹ Livy claims that 40,000 *lixae* and *calones* (slaves) were killed after the battle at Arausio, in which presumably 80,000 soldiers perished.¹⁰ The number of merchants following the army varied, since they were attracted mainly by the spoils of war. Livy describes how the legions in Liguria had few sutlers to rely on, because of the poverty of the country.¹¹

Although sensible commanders made sure that food and other vital supplies were provided for, they relied on private contractors and merchants to cater to any further needs of the soldiers. When supply lines were stretched prices rose accordingly. In 49 the price of wheat in Caesar's camp in Spain rose to an astronomical 50 *denarii a modius*.¹²

When permanent army bases were constructed the sutlers settled in *canabae*, forming the nucleus of Roman immigrant communities.¹³ Gradually *canabae* became a familiar part of provincial life, but the integration process was slow. Until the late first century CE Roman products in northern Gaul are mostly confined to military sites.¹⁴ Their privileged contacts with Roman governors and tax farming companies, often gave carte blanche to businessmen supplying the army to abuse the indigenous population. Not surprisingly, they were among the first victims of the revolts of Florus and Sacrovir in 21 CE and of Civilis in 69 CE.¹⁵

A drastic change occurs around the turn of the first century, illustrated by the inscriptions recording *negotiatores* or communities *qui negotiantur*.¹⁶ Whereas the presence of *negotiatores* in the western rovinces in the Late Republic and under the first emperors is documented mainly in liter-

⁹ Roth 1999, op. cit. (n. 7), 113–114.

¹⁰ Livy, *Periochae* 67.

¹¹ Livy, *Ab urbe condita* 39.1.7.


¹² Caesar, *De bello civili* 1.52.

¹³ Cf. L. Wierschowski, *Heer und Wirtschaft: Das römische Heer der Prinzipatszeit als Wirtschaftsfaktor* (Bonn 1984), 123; L. Wierschowski, 'Das römische Heer und die ökonomische Entwicklung Germaniens in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 1. Jahrhunderts', in P. Erdkamp, ed., *The Roman Army and the Economy* (Amsterdam 2002), 284–288; C.R. Whittaker, 'Supplying the army. Evidence from Vindolanda', in Erdkamp 2002, op. cit., 216–217.

¹⁴ I thank Michael Erdrich for pointing this out to me.

¹⁵ Tacitus, *Annales* 3.42; *Historiae* 4.15.

¹⁶ On *negotiatores* see K. Verboven, 'Ce que *negotiani* et ses dérivés veulent dire', in J. Andreau, J. France and V. Chankowski, *Vocabulaire et expression de l'économie antique* (Bordeaux, forthcoming).



ary texts and archaeological finds, epigraphy comes to the fore in the late first century.

326 inscriptions attesting 240 individual businessmen record *negotiatores*. Almost 32% of these come from the Gallic and Germanic provinces or from Britain, compared to only 17% for Italy outside Rome, which is otherwise much better epigraphically documented. The Danube provinces and Dalmatia provide a handsome 12%. The Spanish and African provinces are virtually absent (1.84% and 2.76% respectively).¹⁷ This contrasts sharply with the general epigraphic low density patterns characteristic for the Tres Galliae, Britain and the Germanic provinces.¹⁸

Within the northwestern parts of the Empire we find a pronounced concentration in the Germanic provinces and the city of Lugdunum. Only Rome itself yields more epigraphic references (71) to *negotiatores* than Lugdunum, which provides 22 out of 23 inscriptions from Gallia

¹⁷ Cf. Verboven forthcoming, op. cit. (n. 16).

¹⁸ Cf. Woolf 1998, op. cit. (n. 6), 82–94. Number of inscriptions per km²: Gallia Narbonnensis, 6.1; Aquitania and Lugdunensis, 1.1; Belgica and Germania Inferior, 1.9; Germania Superior, 4.8.

Lugdunensis.¹⁹ Germania Inferior, with 35 inscriptions, is exceptionally well attested thanks to the 14 inscriptions honouring Nehalennia. Cologne and Mainz each furnish 12 inscriptions, rivalling the 13 inscriptions from Ostia and Portus.²⁰

Virtually all these inscriptions are second or early third century CE. All are in Latin and the names of the *negotiatores*—although often of indigenous origin—almost always follow Roman patterns (with the *tria* or *duo nomina*). Apparently, most *negotiatores* enjoyed Roman citizenship.

Gallia Belgica	11	10.58%
Gallia Lugdunensis	23	22.12%
Gallia Narbonnensis	5	4.81%
Germania Inferior	33	31.73%
Germania Superior	26	25.00%
Britannia	2	1.92%

This distribution contrasts sharply with the general distribution map of inscriptions, where Narbonnese Gaul stands out as an epigraphically rich province compared to the Tres Galliae and the Germanic provinces. More than a third of the occupational inscriptions in Gaul and the Germanic provinces come from Gallia Narbonnensis.²¹

The dominance of the Rhine area and Lugdunum is strengthened even more if we take a detailed look at inscriptions from other regions. One of the four Aquitanian inscriptions is dedicated to Mercurius Arvernus by a group of *cives Romani negotiatores*.²² The remaining inscriptions mention three *negotiatores*, among whom one *civis Treverus negotiator Britannicianus* and one person whose son became *decurio* in Lugdunum.²³ The only Sardinian inscription is a funerary inscription for a *negotians gallicanus* who died while on business in Sardinia.²⁴

Britain is badly represented. One of the two British ‘inscriptions’ is

¹⁹ E. Frézouls, ‘Les noms de métiers dans l’épigraphie de la Gaule et de la Germanie romaine’, *Klèma* 13 (1991), 66–67.

²⁰ Cf. P. Stuart and J.E. Bogaers, *Nehalennia. Römische Steindenkmäler aus der Oosterschelde bei Colijnsplaat. 2 Bd.* (Leiden 2001).

²¹ Frézouls 1991, op. cit. (n. 19) 39, 66–67.

²² CIL 13, 1522.

²³ CIL 13, 634; AE 1945, 15; cf. L. Wierschowski, *Fremde in Gallien—‘Gallier’ in der Fremde. Die epigraphisch bezeugte Mobilität in, von und nach Gallien vom 1. Bis 3. Jh. n. Chr.* (Stuttgart 2001), 437, no. 633.

²⁴ CIL 10, 7612.

in fact a writing-tablet from Vindolanda mentioning a *negotium gestum*.²⁵ However, seven businessmen attested in other regions may be identified as *negotiatores* linked to Britannia. Five of them erected inscriptions in honour of Nehalennia, one was the Trevir residing in Burdigala and another one was a *negotiator ex provincia Britannia* residing in Castellum Mattiacorum in Germania Superior.²⁶

Lugdunum shows a varied pattern, with trading links to the North and South. At least six out of twenty *negotiatores* epigraphically recorded at Lugdunum²⁷ had links with the North.²⁸

In Italy we find concentrations in Latium-Campania and the northern regions. Of the eleven *negotiatores* from Transpadana at least seven had connections with the Germanic or Gallic provinces, among whom three dealers in military cloaks (*saga*), and one *negotiator lentianus et castrensarius*.²⁹ Two of the twelve *negotiatores* from Venetia-Histria had migrated from over the Alps.³⁰

If we plot the data on a map, we see the Rhine axis emerge from the Alps to the North Sea, radiating to northern Italy and Raetia.

Obviously, these figures don't accurately reflect the actual presence or importance of businessmen. Their numbers are likely to have been considerably larger around the Mediterranean than in the northern provinces. The *navicularii marini* from Arles were undoubtedly more influential and richer than the North Sea merchants of the Nehalennia shrine or the *negotiatores salsarii* from Vindonissa. The distribution does illustrate, however, how businessmen in the northern provinces were more prone to publicly avow their business activities and how business

²⁵ AE 1994, 1137 = AE 1996, 960 = AE 1999, 971.

²⁶ P. Arisenius Marius (AE 1983, 721); C. Aurelius Verus (AE 1953, 269 = CIL 13, 08164a; AE 1983, 722); Fufidius (CIL 13, 7300); Placidus Viduci f. and/or L. Viducius Placidus (AE 1977, 512; Stuart & Bogaers 2001, op. cit. (n. 20), A 6); M. Secundinius Silvanus (ILS 4751; AE 1973, 370); Val(erius) Mar(—) (AE 1983, 720); L. Solimarius Secundinus (CIL 13, 634).

²⁷ Three of the twenty-two inscriptions from Lugdunum refer to Cn. Danius Minus (CIL 13, 1948; 2120; 2121).

²⁸ C. Apronius Raptor, *decurio* at Trier: CIL 13, 1911; AE 1904, 176 = CIL 13, 11179; Wierschowski 2001, op. cit. (n. 23), 318–319; M. Sennius Metilus, *treverus* CIL 13, 2029; Wierschowski 2001, op. cit. (n. 23), 355, no. 492; Illiomarius Aper *ex civitate Veliocassium* CIL 13, 1998; Wierschowski 2001, op. cit. (n. 23), 338–339, no. 468; Murranius Verus CIL 13, 2033, Wierschowski 2001, op. cit. (n. 23), 357–358, no. 494; Popillius CIL 13, 02023, Wierschowski 2001, op. cit. (n. 23), 353, no. 489; Victorius Regulus, AE 1982, 709 Wierschowski 2001, op. cit. (n. 23), 45–46, no. 44.

²⁹ AE 1906, 171; 2000, 632; CIL 5, 5911; 5925; 5928; 5929; 5932.

³⁰ Pais 1096 = InscrIt 10–01, 163; CIL 5, 1047.

Italy (without Rome and Ostia-Portus)	56	100%
Italia Regio 01, Latium et Campania	13	23.21%
Italia Regio 02, Apulia et Calabria	3	5.36%
Italia Regio 03, Bruttium et Lucania	1	1.79%
Italia Regio 04, Samnium	1	1.79%
Italia Regio 05, Picenum	2	3.57%
Italia Regio 06, Umbria	3	5.36%
Italia Regio 07, Etruria	5	8.93%
Italia Regio 08, Aemilia	5	8.93%
Italia Regio 10, Venetia et Histria	12	21.43%
Italia Regio 11, Transpadana	11	19.64%

activities here played a greater role in the construction of social identity.³¹ The same tendency may be seen in the grandiose funerary monuments in the Trier region that equally display pride in business activities or investments.³²

Roman inscriptions—funerary, votive or other—don't usually mention the professional activities of a deceased or a dedicator. The decision to mention these must be seen as a conscious deviation from normality. Why were businessmen in the northwestern provinces more likely to mention their occupational activities than elsewhere?

Chevallier suggested that the inclination to include reliefs referring to the deceased's occupation reflected the high esteem enjoyed by artisans and businessmen in Celtic culture. But there is little evidence to support this idea. Moreover it doesn't explain the concentration along the Rhine axis, which can hardly be considered the heartland of Celtic culture and it leaves a gap of over a century between the conquest and the emergence of the inscriptions.³³

In my opinion the inscriptions tell a different story. As noted by

³¹ A. Cristofori, *Non arma virumque. Le occupazioni nell'epigrafia del Piceno* (Bologna 2004²), 96–103 (esp. 100); J.-P. Morel, 'Élites municipales et manufacture en Italie', M. Cébeillac-Gervasoni, *Les élites municipales de l'Italie péninsulaire des Gracques à Néron* (*Actes table ronde Clermont-Ferrand 1991*) (Naples 1996), 184.

³² Cf. J. France, 'Les monuments funéraires et le « capitalisme »', in J. Andreau, J. France and S. Pittia, *Mentalités et choix économiques des Romains* (Bordeaux 2004), 149–178.

³³ R. Chevallier, 'Perspectives de recherche sur les scènes de métiers (Gaule Cisalpine et Transalpine)', in G. Colonna, ed., *Le province dell'impero. Misc. in onore di Maria Floriani Squarciapino* (Rome 1997), 47–63 (esp. pp. 52–53). Cf. J.-C. Béal, 'La dignité des artisans: les images d'artisans sur les monuments funéraires de Gaule romaine', *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* 26 (2000), *passim* (esp. pp. 165–166); Cristofori 2004, op. cit. (n. 31), 100.

Meyer and others, inscriptions signify romanisation, which in turn is a form of status expression.³⁴ This accords well with what is generally recognised as the reason why freedmen mention their occupational status in inscriptions more often than freeborn. It allowed them to display economic independence and wealth and to claim social respectability in the absence of family descent.³⁵

Likewise, businessmen in the northwestern provinces may have mentioned their business activities as a way to affirm the social status they derived from their association with the 'might and majesty' of Rome. This interpretation of course implies that businessmen as a group in the northwestern provinces were closely affiliated to Roman political and social institutions. In order to analyze the function of the armies in this respect, we will first look at their demographic impact, and then focus on the significance of military markets, monetisation, credit facilities, technology transfer and laws of obligations.

Demography

During most of the first century Germania Inferior and Superior each had 4 legions. Domitian diminished this number by 50%. The province of Britain continuously had 3 legions. Taking the view that a legion numbered 5,000 soldiers on the average we may presume that there were 40,000 legionary soldiers in the Germanic provinces during most of the first century, 20,000 in the second century, and 15,000 in Britain during the entire period. The numbers of the auxiliary units were roughly comparable. This implies a total of roughly 80,000 soldiers in the Germanic provinces in the first century and ca. 40,000 in the second, and approximately 30,000 in Roman Britain during both centuries.

Duncan-Jones estimated that approximately 120 soldiers were

³⁴ E.A. Meyer, 'Explaining the epigraphic habit in the Roman Empire: The evidence of epitaphs', *Journal of Roman Studies* 80 (1990), 74–96; R. Gordon, M. Beard, J. Reynolds and Ch. Roueché, 'Roman inscriptions 1986–1990', *Journal of Roman Studies* 83 (1993), 131–158.

³⁵ S. Joshel, *Work, Identity and Legal Status at Rome. A Study of the Occupational Inscriptions* (London 1992), 60–61, 163–166; M.L. Bonsangue, 'Aspects économiques et sociaux du monde du travail à Narbonne, d'après la documentation épigraphiques (1 s. av. J.-C.–1 s. ap. J.-C.)', *Cahiers du Centre Glotz* 13 (2002), 222; Cristofori 2004, op. cit. (n. 31), 96–103; Béal 2000, op. cit. (n. 33).

discharged per legion per year.³⁶ For the Rhine legions this implies ca. 960 veterans a year in the first century, 480 in the second, to which we should probably add about the same number of auxiliary veterans. If we take into account an average life expectancy of another 15 years, we arrive at 28,800 living veterans from the Rhine armies in the first century and 14,400 in the second century.³⁷ The same calculation for Britain works out to ca. 10,800. Many of those veterans settled in the neighbourhood of their former camps, while veterans from other armies returned and settled in Gaul or the Germanic provinces.³⁸

To analyze the demographic impact of the armies and the social networks of their soldiers and veterans, we must add close relatives, slaves and freedmen. Their numbers must be estimated in the order of hundreds of thousands of men, women and children.

Soldiers and veterans were held in great esteem, which radiated on their relatives and friends. They were or—in the case of the *auxilia*—would become Roman citizens, had social networks to fall back upon often including or indirectly stretching to influential officials, and had cash at hand. Some of them may have followed Roman consumption patterns. In networking terms, they were interesting links to cultivate, offering considerable opportunities for businessmen.

The *negotiator vestiarius* Iulius Victor, based in Augusta Vindelicum (Augsburg) in Raetia had a brother, Clemens, who was an *aquilifer* in the *legio III Italica*, stationed in Raetia.³⁹ The *negotiator purpurarius* Victorius Regulus, a native from the neighbourhood of Noviomagus Nemetac in Germania Superior, had established himself in Durocortorum (Reims), while his brother, a veteran from the *legio XXII Primigenia Pia Fidelis* (stationed in Mogontiacum), resided at Lugdunum. Together the geographic scope of the two brothers covered a good part of Belgica, Lugdunensis and Germania Superior.⁴⁰

³⁶ R. Duncan Jones, *Money and Government in the Roman Empire* (Cambridge 1994), 34.

³⁷ Average age at discharge is here assumed to be 45; Frier estimates life expectancy at 45 at 15.63 years, Coale-Demeny West Level 2, 15.54 years; cf. B.W. Frier, 'Roman life expectancy: Ulpian's Evidence', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 86 (1982), 237–245.

³⁸ Cf. Tacitus, *Annales* 14.27.1.

³⁹ CIL 3, 5816.

⁴⁰ AE 1982, 709; Wierschowski 2001, op. cit. (n. 23), 45–46, no. 44.

Market

The market as an institutional phenomenon was omnipresent in Roman society and culture; the basics of market exchange were taken for granted, legal rules and regulations were developed to support them, the production and provisionment of key-products as wine, olives, *garum*, farm equipment and textiles was largely commercialised and monetised, huge sums were involved in market exchange.⁴¹ Romanisation entailed the spread of this system by Roman *negotiatores*. Cicero's remark in his oration *Pro Fonteio* that not a single coin in (Narbonnese) Gaul changed hands unless through the books of Roman *negotiatores* testifies to the extent to which Roman businessmen dominated monetised trade.⁴² Although pre-Roman Gaul had a more complex society than once thought, markets had never existed on such a scale and had never been so thoroughly monetised.⁴³

The army played a crucial role in this process. While it is true that the army produced much of what it needed in its own workshops, at a quite early date individual soldiers and units bought large quantities of goods and services from civilians.⁴⁴ The army may have produced its own shoes, it didn't produce the leather needed to make these shoes. There is no indication that army workshops produced clothes or other textiles. The army produced its own common ceramics, but no *terra sigillata* or other better quality pottery.

In the northwestern provinces, military markets were at the start and the heart of what Woolf called the 'consumer revolution' that signified romanisation of the provinces by setting new patterns of consumption closely linked to Roman social identity.⁴⁵ Many of the products sold were typically Mediterranean, including wine, olives, *terra sigillata*, *fibulae*, weapons, food etc., that were originally not locally produced and had to be imported from the south. In first century Vindonissa *negotiatores*

⁴¹ P. Temin, 'A market economy in the early Roman Empire', *Journal of Roman Studies* 91 (2001), 169–181.

⁴² Cicero, *Pro Fonteio* 11.

⁴³ J. Drinkwater, 'Prologue and epilogue. The socio-economic effect of Rome's arrival in and departure from Gaul', in L. De Blois and J. Rich, eds., *The Transformation of Economic Life under the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, c. 200 BC–AD 476), Nottingham, July 4–7, 2001* (Amsterdam 2002), 128–140.

⁴⁴ Cf. Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 139.

⁴⁵ Cf. Woolf 1998, op. cit. (n. 6), 169–205.

salsari leguminari imported salted vegetables.⁴⁶ Gradually, however, producers and traders responded to the new opportunities offered by the military markets and local production of the same or comparable wares was organised.

At some time in the early Flavian era, the *salinatores* of the Morini and Menapii set up two honorary inscriptions for a *centurio primuspilus*, L. Lepidius Proculus *ob merita eius*. Although he was not formally co-opted as patron, Lepidus clearly had helped (or so it is claimed) the *salinatores*, who for their part, in keeping with Roman custom, honoured their benefactor.⁴⁷

Basic necessities were provided by the army. But the Vindolanda tablets show that this did not exclude the involvement of private traders. The tablets indicate that officers who were in charge employed civilian businessmen closely connected with the camp as intermediaries, instead of sending out soldiers to *villae* and production centres.⁴⁸ One tablet mentions a *homo transmarinus* (whose name is unfortunately not preserved) associated with his brother and father (?), delivering 320.5 *modii* of wheat.⁴⁹ Another tablet contains a letter written to an officer by a merchant called Octavius dealing in grain, hides and sinews.⁵⁰ A third tablet lists wooden articles (hubs, axles, spokes, planks, seats, knots, boards and benches) together with a lot of goat skins, sent by a civilian named Metto through his agent Saco to his 'brother' Advectus, who appears to have been attached to the camp.⁵¹ Elsewhere, the situation was presumably comparable. The Nervian *negotiator frumentarius* M. Liberius Victor, active in Nijmegen in the second century, probably supplied the troops here (and elsewhere?) in Germania Inferior.⁵²

⁴⁶ CIL 13, 5221 = AE 1998, 978. Cf. O. Schlippschuh, *Die Händler im römischen Kaiserreich in Gallien, Germanien und den Donauprovinzen Rätien, Noricum und Pannonien* (Amsterdam 1974), 20–21; M.A. Speidel, *Die römischen Schreibtafeln von Vindonissa. Lateinische Texte des militärischen Alltags und ihre geschichtliche Bedeutung* (Brugg 1996), 77; Whittaker 2002, op. cit. (n. 13), 219–220; Wierschowski 2002, op. cit. n. 13, 290.

⁴⁷ CIL 11, 390–391; L. Wierschowski, *Die regionale Mobilität in Gallien nach den Inschriften des 1. bis 3. Jh n. Chr.* (Stuttgart 1995), 200.

⁴⁸ Whittaker 2002, op. cit. (n. 13).

⁴⁹ Tab. Vind. 2.180 and its *verso* 2.344.

⁵⁰ Tab. Vind. 2.343; Whittaker 2002, op. cit. (n. 13), 214–215.

⁵¹ Tab. Vind. 2.309; cf. Strobel 1991, op. cit. (n. 8), 29–30.

⁵² CIL 13, 8725; cf. Wierschowski 2001, op. cit. (n. 23), 411, no. 581. Cf. also the second century *frumentarius* Victorius Ursus from the *civitas Taunensium* operating in Mogontiacum, CIL 13, 11810; cf. G. Jacobsen, *Primitiver Austausch oder freier Markt? Untersuchungen zum Handel in den gallisch-germanischen Provinzen während der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Stuttgart 1995), 145.

Wine had been imported since pre-Roman times, but never before were such quantities shipped so far. The presence of the Rhine armies sparked a demand that ultimately pushed wine production as far north as the Moselle banks.⁵³ The centre of the wine trade was Lyon, where the important *corpus vinariorum* had its seat. Here wine from Italy, Southern Gaul and Spain shipped up the Rhône was sent to the Rhine and North Sea area.

The production of beer evolved from being a home brewed beverage intended mainly for autoconsumption, to a commercial consumer product brewed by specialised breweries. Here too the army (mainly the auxiliaries) played an important role, as illustrated by the anonymous soldier from the *classis Germanica* who was active as *negotiator cervesarius artis offecturae*.⁵⁴

The trade and production of quality ceramics (mainly *terra sigillata*), was decisively influenced by the demand from the military markets. Whereas initially the army was supplied with original Italian or Mediterranean ceramics relayed at Lyon, local imitations sprang up early in the Julio-Claudian period. The distribution map of the La Graufesenque *terra sigillata*, produced close to the Mediterranean in the second half of the 1st century and enjoying a wide distribution in narbonnese Gaul and the western Mediterranean shores, shows the huge demand for these products by the Rhine and Upper Danube armies. As time went by, major production centres tended to shift northwards, first in the early and mid second century to central Gaul, after ca. 150 CE to the Rhineland. Whereas the finds are initially largely limited to military sites, from the Flavian period onwards they emerge in civilian contexts.⁵⁵

Military camps often organised their own production of bricks and tiles. Not many very specialized technical and practical skills were required, and the quintessential prerequisite condition—the availability of unskilled labour—was often more easily fulfilled by the army than by private contractors. However, in the second century civil *figlinae* emerged, which occasionally produced for the army. In 167 CE the *Legio XX Valeria Victrix* had its tiles made near Tarbock by a businessman of Veliocassian origin, A. Viduc(i)us, whose son (?) dedicated an altar

⁵³ Cf. Schlippschuh 1974, op. cit. (n. 46), 26–33.

⁵⁴ AE 1928, 138.

⁵⁵ Woolf 1998, op. cit. (n. 6), 187–189, 195–201; cf. Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 128–131; Jacobsen 1995, op. cit. (n. 52), 44.

to Nehalennia at Colijnsplaat and an *arcus* and *ianua* to a local deity associated to the *Numina Augustorum* in Eburacum.⁵⁶

In the manufacturing of textiles the *sagarii* provide a good example of how Roman military markets allowed people who produced an originally indigenous product (gallic cloaks) as well as the merchants who sold it to become important in Roman business.⁵⁷ The demand for military cloaks created a blossoming trade. Lyon, where the *corpus sagariorum* had its seat, was the central place for the *sagarii* in Gaul.

The *negotiator sagarius* Littavius (?) from the Carnutenses, resided in Lugdunum in the second half of the second century.⁵⁸ The *sagarius* C. Latinius Reginus, from the Remi likewise settled at Lugdunum somewhere in the first or early second century.⁵⁹ The *sagarius* C. Rusonius Secundus even became *sevir augustalis* at Lyon, although he appears to have resided in Vienne, where he was buried by his fellow freedman, heir and likewise *sagarius* C. Rusonius Myron.⁶⁰ Another *negotiator sagarius* from roughly the same period, who presumably started his career supplying the Rhine armies, was M. Matutinius Maximus from the Mediomatrici in Gallia Belgica, who died and was buried in Milan.⁶¹

Weaponry and costume were provided by the army and deducted from the soldier's pay. But Egyptian papyri show that soldiers who wished could buy these items privately outside the camp.⁶² The veteran C. Gentilius Victor, who established himself as *negotiator gladiarius* in Moguntiacum may have found his clientel among his former comrades.⁶³

⁵⁶ AE 1977, 512 (= AE 1983, 643) and AE 1975, 651; see V.G. Swan and R.A. Philpott, 'Legio XX Valeria Victrix and tile production at Tarbock, Merseyside', *Britannia* 31 (2000), 55–67.

⁵⁷ Cf. Schlippschuh 1974, op. cit. (n. 46), 51; see also Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 127.

⁵⁸ CIL 13, 2010; Schlippschuh 1974, op. cit. (n. 46), 49–50.

⁵⁹ CIL 13, 2008; Wierschowski 2001, op. cit. (n. 23), 345; Schlippschuh 1974, op. cit. (n. 46), 50.

⁶⁰ CIL 12, 1898.

⁶¹ CIL 5, 5929; Wierschowski 2001, op. cit. (n. 23), 64–65, no. 67; Schlippschuh 1974, op. cit. (n. 46), 50.

⁶² Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 121.

⁶³ CIL 13, 6677 (p. 107).

Monetisation

Throughout the Early Empire, army pay and expenses constituted the main gateway through which currency entered the economy.⁶⁴ Although the army made requisitions in kind and although soldiers are recorded making illegal requisitions, most of the products other than grain had to be paid for. The military market—from retail business to large official orders—was profoundly monetised. Moreover monetisation among the military went beyond the simple use of coins. The army provided a cashier service to its soldiers, making them accustomed to thinking in monetary terms even when no physical coins were at hand.

Speidel estimated the yearly import of coins to the camp at Vindonissa in the Flavian era (where a legion, a *cohors quingenaria* and a *cohors equitata* were stationed) to approximately 8.8 million sesterces.⁶⁵ Only a limited part of this money was actually paid out to the soldiers. The rest was deducted to pay for food, clothing and other commodities, which were partly imported, partly locally acquired.

By Speidel's reckoning the 8 legions stationed at the Rhine in the first century would have required ca. 49 million sesterces a year before Domitian's pay rise. The four remaining legions in the second century—after Domitian's pay rise—would still have required ca. 32 million sesterces a year. Assuming the auxiliary forces to have been of roughly the same strength but an auxiliary soldier receiving 5/6 of a legionaries pay, the cost for the auxiliary may have amounted to ca. 40 million sesterces before Domitian's pay rise and ca. 27 million in the second century.⁶⁶ According to these estimates, regular pay alone—not taking into account donatives or non-personnel related expenses (building materials, wagons, boats etc.)—would have required ca. 89 million sesterces in the first century to 59 million sesterces in the second century. The same calculation for Britain works out at ca. 34 million sesterces before Domitian's pay raise and ca. 45 million afterwards.

⁶⁴ Cf. K. Hopkins, 'Taxes and trade in the Roman Empire', *Journal of Roman Studies* 74 (1984), 101–125; cf. J. Van Heesch, 'Coins for the army', F. Vermeulen & K. Sas & W. Dhaeze (edd.), *Archaeology in Confrontation. Aspects of Roman Military Presence in the Northwest (Studies in honour of prof. em. Hugo Thoen)*, (Gent 2004), 247–258; T. Pekary, *Die Fundmünzen von Vindonissa von Hadrian bis zum Ausgang der Römerherrschaft* (Brugge 1971), 11–12; Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 140–147.

⁶⁵ Speidel 1996, op. cit. (n. 46), 76.

⁶⁶ Cf. for Germania Inferior G. Alföldy, *Die Hilfstruppen der römischen Provinz Germania Inferior* (Düsseldorf 1968), 151.

These figures are not very reliable and shouldn't be taken at face value. Levies in kind were commonly used to supply the soldiers' rations, the monetary value of which (calculated at official 'prices') was deducted from their salaries. Nevertheless, clearly huge sums in the order of tens of millions of sesterces every year were involved in supplying the northwestern armies and paying salaries and donatives.⁶⁷

The monetising effects of army presence are well documented in the Vindolanda tablets, dating mostly to only a few decades after the Claudian conquest. The tablets show a wide range of local and non-local products available for purchase against money. To a large extent, the production and trade was left to private traders. Some of the persons involved bear Roman names, others typically celtic names.⁶⁸

The soldiers provided a source of money also as moneylenders. Numerous papyri document loans extended by soldiers in Egypt.⁶⁹ Sources from the western provinces are of course much poorer, but given the relative abundance of money among the soldiery, we may assume the situation here to have been comparable. One tablet from Vindonissa from 90 CE records a loan by or to a soldier.⁷⁰

Soldiers were encouraged to save part of their pay and Egyptian papyri show that many did. Veterans investing their discharge bonus of 12,000 sesterces (for legionairs) in interest bearing loans at 6% took in an annual rent of 720 sesterces. This was well above subsistence minimum.⁷¹ It meant easy living for moderate veterans and readily available credit for consumers and entrepreneurs.

Not surprisingly, the first bankers appear in close proximity to the legions. Already in the first century a certain Sulla, son of Sennus, from the people of the Remi settled in Bonna as an *argentarius*.⁷² Whether

⁶⁷ Whittaker 2002, op. cit. (n. 13), 228–229; J. Reynolds & T. Volk, 'Gifts, curses, cult and society at Bath (Review Article)', *Britannia* 21 (1990), 388–390; J. Van Heesch 2004, op. cit. (n. 64), 247–258; K. Hopkins 1984, op. cit. (n. 64).

⁶⁸ Cf. A. Bowman & D. Thomas, *The Vindolanda Writing Tablets (Tabulae Vindolandeses II)* (London 1994), *passim*; Whittaker 2002, op. cit. (n. 13), 228–230; Pekary 1971, op. cit. (n. 64), 11–12; Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 140–147 for the impact of army units on coin circulation.

⁶⁹ Cf. Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 17–30.

⁷⁰ AE (1996) 1124 = Speidel 1996, op. cit. (n. 46), 98–99, no. 3; cf. also *ibid.* p. 80. Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 20, 38.

⁷¹ Cf. Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 89; R. MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations* (New Haven 1974), 12–13 estimated 250 drachmai as the Egyptian minimum income.

⁷² CIL 13, 8104; Wierschowski 2001, op. cit. (n. 23), 406 no. 574; J. Andreau, *La vie financière dans le monde romain. Les métiers de manieurs d'argent* (Rome 1986), 116–118.

the late second or early third century *negotiator nummularius* T. Aelius Viperinus still focused on the soldiers is less sure.⁷³

Technology transfer

No organisation in the Roman world could muster as much technical skill and resources as the Roman army, which numbered trained workmen among its ranks, ranging from engineers to blacksmiths and stone cutters.⁷⁴ A report from Vindolanda mentions 343 men at work in the *fabricae*, among whom 12 shoemakers and 18 construction workers. Presumably, at least some of these were civilians.⁷⁵ Another Vindolanda tablet mentions revenues of the camp, suggesting that camp products were occasionally sold.⁷⁶

Although skilled civilian workmen may sometimes have been recruited, most artisans in the camps presumably learned their trades in the army.⁷⁷ Many undoubtedly invested their savings and discharge bonuses in a private workshop. Constantine allowed veterans investing their discharge premium in a business enterprise to enjoy fiscal immunity.⁷⁸

The discharge bonus amounted to a considerable sum and investing it in a private enterprise boosted the average size of commercial organisations. Q. Atilius Primus made a career in the army as interpreter, climbing up to the rank of a *centurio*. He afterwards became a *negotiator* in Pannonia Superior and built up a considerable enterprise, leaving at least three freedmen and one freedwoman as heirs.⁷⁹

⁷³ CIL 13, 8353 = RSK 327 (foto Taf. 72); cf. Andreau 1986, op. cit. (n. 72), 217–218.

⁷⁴ Cf. Vegetius 2.11; O. Stoll, 'Der Transfer von Technologie in der römischen Antike', in O. Stoll, *Römisches Heer und Gesellschaft. Gesammelte Beiträge 1991–1999* (Stuttgart 2001), 395–420; O. Stoll, 'Reform der Marotte? Zur sogenannten "Bauhandwerkerreform" Kaiser Hadrians (Epitome de Caes. 14,5),' in O. Stoll 2001, op. cit., 127–394; O. Stoll, 'Römische Militärarchitekten und ihre Bedeutung für den Technologietransfer,' in O. Stoll 2001, op. cit., 300–368. Strobel 1991, op. cit. (n. 8).

⁷⁵ Tab. Vind. 2.155; cf. Tab. Vind. 2.156 for 30 construction workers and 19 lime stone burners. Whittaker 2002, op. cit. (n. 13), 207–208.

⁷⁶ Tab. Vind. 2.178. Whittaker 2002, op. cit. (n. 13), p. 223.

⁷⁷ Cf. L. Wierschowski, 'Soldaten und Veteranen der Prinzipatszeit im Handel und Transportgewerbe', *Münstersche Beiträge zur Antiken Handelsgeschichte* 1 (1982), 31–48; Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 66–68. Perhaps they sometimes worked off hours for their own account.

⁷⁸ Cod. Theod. 7.20.3; cf. Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 89.

⁷⁹ AE 1978, 00635 = AE 1988, 00938. See also Wierschowski 1982, op. cit. (n. 77),

C. Gentilius Victor, a veteran from the 22nd legion, settled as *negotiator gladiarius* in Mogontiacum, investing his discharge bonus in producing and selling swords and other arms. His business thrived. When he died (under Commodus) his testament stipulated that 8,000 sesterces were to be spent on a monument in honour of the emperor.⁸⁰ Victor may have been in charge of the *armamentarium* of the 22nd, as Ti. Iulius Agilis was at Vindonissa a century before.⁸¹

The arms industry was not the only sector undergoing changes. Military *lapidarii* were probably the first to produce inscriptions in the northwestern provinces.⁸² The veteran *ex beneficiario consulari* C. Iulius Aprilis—who dedicated a votive altar to Nehalennia in 223 CE—invested his discharge bonus in the North Sea trade between Britain and the Rhine estuary.⁸³ Vitalinius Felix, a veteran from the *legio I Minervia*, stationed at Bonn, settled at Lugdunum as *negotiator artis cretariae*.⁸⁴

Of course not all entrepreneurs following Roman ways were soldiers or veterans. Many no doubt simply imitated Roman techniques. Thus the A. Viduc(i)us we encountered before, who produced tiles for the 20th legion Valeria Victrix, was more than likely no veteran. Pottery and brick stamps found near Eburacum and elsewhere in Britain suggest that private entrepreneurs regularly worked in a ‘legionary tradition’.⁸⁵

The army thus created a technical and organisational spinn-off effect, with Roman techniques and professions emerging from the soldiery.

Roman law

Roman citizenship enjoyed by soldiers and veterans implied that the rules of the Roman law of contract—although no doubt in a simplified form—gradually received general acceptance.

A nice example is provided by the famous *emptio bovis frisica* tablet, found in Friesland, and dating most likely to the first half of the first century CE. It records the purchase of a cow by a Roman citizen

38–39. T. Kollnik, ‘Q. Atilius Primus—Interprex centurio et negotiator’, *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 30 (1978), 61–75.

⁸⁰ CIL 13, 6677 (p. 107); cf. Jacobsen 1995, op. cit. (n. 52), 145.

⁸¹ Cf. Speidel 1996, op. cit. (n. 46), 72; Vind. 34; CIL 13, 11504.

⁸² Cf. Wierschowski 1984, op. cit. (n. 13), 135–137.

⁸³ Stuart and Bogaers 2001, op. cit. (n. 20), A5.

⁸⁴ CIL 13, 1906.

⁸⁵ Cf. Swan and Philpott 2000, op. cit. (n. 56), 63–63.

Gargilius Secundus from a man named Stellus, son of Reperius. Two centurions witness the sale's agreement. A veteran soldier Lilus Duerretus, presumably of Frisian origin, was asked to write down the text for Stellus, who was apparently illiterate. The tablet explicitly notes that the right of *redhibitio* according to *ius civile* will not apply, which proves of course that the rules of *ius civile*—when soldiers or veterans were involved—were usually applicable.⁸⁶ The loan recorded in the Vindonissa tablet mentioned before, was formulated as a *stipulatio*.⁸⁷

Conclusion

The military market in the northwestern provinces was both quantitatively and qualitatively different from anything that preceded the Roman occupation. To the locals, the emerging military market was a culturally foreign phenomenon; its wares and ways, organisation and actors were thoroughly Roman—although not necessarily of Roman descent. As romanisation progressed, the market became a clearly distinct social field the northwestern provinces.

The emergence and growth of 'the' market as a distinct social field had its corollary in the emergence and growth of a business class, which originally and until deep into the first century, was prevalently of Roman nationality. As indigenous merchants and producers entered the military markets they swiftly adopted Roman ways. By the second century business in the northwestern provinces was thoroughly marketised, monetised and romanised.

⁸⁶ FIRA 137; cf. E. Slob, 'De koopakte van Tolsum', *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis* 66 (1998), 25–52.

⁸⁷ AE 1996, 1124 = Speidel 1996, op. cit. (n. 46), 98–99, no. 3.

‘MILITIA IN URBE’. THE MILITARY PRESENCE IN ROME

ALEXANDRA WILHELMINE BUSCH

The idea of Rome being a demilitarized zone has often been transferred from the Republic to the imperial period.¹ Nevertheless numerous written sources prove the presence of military and paramilitary units in the imperial city and its direct environment.² As a matter of fact, from the first to the early fourth century between ten and forty thousand soldiers roamed the streets of the empire’s capital:³

Unit	1st century	2nd century	3rd century	early 4th century
<i>Cohortes praetoriae</i>	4.500	5.000	10.000 ⁴	10.000
<i>speculatores Augusti</i>	300 (?) ⁵	300 (?)	300 (?)	300 (?)
<i>Evocati</i>	(?)	(?)	(?)	(?)

¹ M. Durry, *Les Cohortes prétoriennes* (Paris 1938), 9 describes Rome as a „ville inermis“. See also: F. Kolb, *Rom* (München 1995), 555; K. Christ, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit von Augustus bis Konstantin* (München 1988), 108f. In Republican Rome soldiers within the city limits were only allowed during the triumph or other special ceremonies. F. Fless, ‘Römische Prozessionen’, in *Thesaurus Cultus et Rituum Antiquorum I* (Los Angeles 2004), 44. The *pomerium*, as the religious border, separated the spheres of *domus* and *militiae*. J. Rüpke, *Domus militiae: Die religiöse Konstruktion des Krieges in Rom* (Stuttgart 1990), 35f., 55–57.

² Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.53.2; Tacitus, *Annales* 12.69; Herodianus 5.8.5–7; Cassius Dio 55.24–26; Historia Augusta (from now on: SHA), *Septimius Severus* 7.1. Apart from that there are thousands of sepulchral and sacral inscriptions (CIL VI 2421–3491; 32515–32899; 37189–37273) as well as the rich archaeological remains of the soldier’s accommodation in Rome. *LTUR I*, 246–256 (‘Castrum’); 292–294 (‘Cohortium Vigilum Stationes’). For the accommodation of the *Germani corporis custodes* see Suetonius, *Galba* 12.2; H. Bellen, *Die germanische Leibwache der römischen Kaiser des julisch-claudischen Hauses* (Mainz 1981), 56f., 101.

³ For an overview see J.C.N. Coulston, ‘Armed and Belted Men: The Soldiery in Imperial Rome’, in: J.C.N. Coulston and H. Dodge, eds., *Ancient Rome. The Archaeology of the Eternal City* (Oxford 2000), 76–81.

⁴ Cassius Dio 55.24.6.

⁵ About thirty *speculatores* served in a *cohors praetoria*. Durry 1938, op. cit. (n. 1), 28. Contra A. Passerini, *Le coorti pretorie* (1939), 70 n. 6.

Table (cont.)

Unit	1st century	2nd century	3rd century	early 4th century
<i>Statores</i>	500 (?)	500 (?)	500 (?)	500 (?)
<i>Germani corporis custodes</i>	500 ⁶	—	—	—
<i>Equites singulares Augusti</i>	—	(500) 1.000	(1.000) 2.000	2.000
<i>Cohortes urbanae</i>	1.500	2.000	6.000 ⁷	6.000
<i>Cohortes vigilum</i>	3.500	3.500	7.000 ⁸	7.000
<i>Classarii</i>	(?)	(?)	(?)	(?)
<i>Frumentarii</i>	—	90–100 ⁹	90–100	—
<i>speculatores legionis</i>	(?)	(?)	(?)	(?)
<i>legio II Parthica</i>	—	—	5.000–10.000	5.000–10.000
Others ¹⁰	(?)	(?)	(?)	(?)
Total	10.800+X	12.900+X	35.900+X	35.900+X

It is inevitable that these troops, as an interacting social group, had an impact on everyday life. Their high number and permanent residence established them as a core influence on Rome's cultural and social life. Their basic needs—for instance for food, housing and armoury—soon became an economic factor.¹¹ In addition, the services they carried

⁶ Bellen 1981, op. cit. (n. 2), 53ff., 101.

⁷ Cassius Di o 55.24.6.

⁸ Two inscriptions from the beginning of the third century that were found in the Villa Mattei on the Caelian hill mention 113 officers and 930 soldiers, and 109 officers and 1013 soldiers from the *cohors V vigilum*, CIL VI 1057; CIL VI 1058 (= ILS 2157).

⁹ The real strength of the *numerus* is unknown, but the existence of a '*centurio frumentariorum*' as well as the fact that a legion could send three *frumentarii* to Rome at the same time, leads to the given number. M. Reuter, *Die frumentarii*—neugeschaffene ›Geheimpolizei‹ Traians? In E. Schallmayer, ed., *Traian in Germanien*. Congress Saalburg/Bad Homburg 1999 (1999), 78.

¹⁰ The presence of other formations, that are not well-known, such as the so-called *numerus primipilarius*, the *lanciarum* the *exploratores* and the *protectores* is also proved for Rome. *Ephemeris Epigraphica* 4 (1881), 339 nr. 911–913; *Ephemeris Epigraphica* 5, 1884, 121–141, 647 f.

¹¹ Also the act of obtaining their *frumentum* created contacts between soldiers and civilians, notably the *vigiles* '*f(rumentum) p(ublicum) a(ccipit) d(ie) XXII ost(io) XII*.' See:

out for the general public and the emperor made them appear as a substantial component of urban life.¹²

In this paper the relevance of the military presence in imperial Rome will be explored from two different angles. A first part will focus on the topography and design of military camps and their perception by civilians. This approach mainly deals with the appearance and organization of military forces under urban conditions—the 'military landscape of Rome.' In the second part of the paper, the changes in the designs of sepulchral monuments will be discussed, because these archaeological remains illustrate the development in the soldiers' self-presentation and their relation to their contemporaries more than anything else. The scope of the study ranges from the beginning of the reign of Augustus in the year 27 BC to the victory of Constantine over Maxentius in the year 312 AD. Augustus was the first to install military units in the capital.¹³ He established the basis of the garrisons' structure that lasted until the dissolution of the Praetorian Guard and the *equites singulares Augusti* after the battle at the Milvian Bridge in 312 AD.¹⁴ The first permanent stationing of soldiers in Rome marked a crucial turning point between republic and principate.¹⁵ While Augustus revitalized the sacral laws of the republic,¹⁶ he ignored the regulations concerning the presence of soldiers within the *pomerium*. According to these laws, armed forces were only allowed outside the sacral centre of the city of Rome, beyond the city limits, where the *imperium militiae* began.¹⁷ To the public, the installation of troops within the *pomerium* certainly brought to mind some negative memories of the civil wars

B. Pferdehirt, 'Ein kaiserliches Reskript aus dem Jahr 248/249 n. Chr.', *Archäologisches Korrespondenzblatt* 33 (2003), 403–418; ebenda, *Römische Militärdiplome* (2004), 192ff.; E. Lo Cascio, *Il Princeps e il suo impero* (Bari 2000), 19ff.

¹² Tacitus, *Annales* 1.7; 12.69; 14.15; Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.53.2; N. Hannestad, *Roman Art and Imperial Policy* (Aarhus 1986), 193f. n. 174 ('Anaglypha Hadriani'); G.M. Koepfel, 'Die historischen Reliefs der römischen Kaiserzeit III. Stadtrömische Denkmäler unbekannter Bauzugehörigkeit aus trajanischer Zeit.' *Bonner Jahrbücher* 185 (1985), 171f.

¹³ W. Nippel, *Aufruhr und Polizei in der römischen Republik* (Stuttgart 1988), 150ff.

¹⁴ Zosimus 2.17.2; Y. Le Bohec, *L'Armée Romaine sous le Haut-Empire* (Paris 1989), 20–24; Coulston 2000, op. cit. (n. 3), 99.

¹⁵ In Republican times there was neither a regular police force, nor a formation of firemen run by the state. Strabon 5.3.7; Suetonius, *Augustus* 30; *Corpus Juris Civilis, Digesta* 1.15.1; F. Kolb, *Rom* (München 2002, 2nd ed.), 555; W. Nippel, *Public Order in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge 1995), 78–84, 90f.

¹⁶ K. Latte, 'Die augusteische Restauration', in G. Binder, ed., *Saeculum Augustum II* (Darmstadt 1988), 21–51.

¹⁷ Rüpke 1990, op. cit. (n. 1), 29.

in the late republican period.¹⁸ For obvious reasons, the emergence of a permanent military presence within the context of the restoration of the republican order must be considered highly problematic, which makes it worthwhile to closely examine the soldiers' appearance and the public's reaction to their services in the capital—*militia in Urbe*—at the beginning of the imperial period. How was the positioning of troops perceived, as an affirmation of the public order or as a threat to it? It is remarkable that there were, apart from the units in Rome and the permanent marine units at Ravenna and Misenum, no other soldiers on Italian ground.¹⁹

As to the 'military landscape' of Rome, *i.e.* the topography of military quarters, there are issues of special interest. Where were the camps located and for which reasons? In how far were they integrated into civilian districts? A first glance at a map of the military quarters of Rome shows that some of these were erected on elevated spots on the periphery, whereas most of them had no particularly exposed position (Fig. 1). Among the more elevated sites are the following. The largest and most important of the camps were the *castra praetoria*, located on the so-called *campus Viminalis*, a plateau East of the Viminal, between the *Via Nomentana* in the North and the *Via Tiburtina vetus* in the South.²⁰ The *castra peregrina* were built on one of the highest points of the Caelian Hill.²¹ Still visible today is the site of the later *castra nova equitum singularium*, which have been rediscovered underneath the basilica of San Giovanni in Laterano.²² Among the less elevated locations are the quarters of the *classarii*, in the region *Transtiberim* and near

¹⁸ A. Knepppe, *Metus temporum. Zur Bedeutung von Angst in Politik und Gesellschaft der römischen Kaiserzeit des 1. und 2. Jhs. n. Chr.* (Stuttgart 1994), 57–71.

¹⁹ Tacitus, *Annales* 4.5; Cassius Dio 55.24.1–8; C.G. Starr, *The Roman Imperial Navy 31 BC–AD 324* (Cambridge 1960), 13f.; D. Kienast, *Untersuchungen zu den Kriegsfлотten der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Bonn 1966), 48.

²⁰ Coulston 2000, op. cit. (n. 3), 82–84; E. Lissi Caronna, 'Castra Praetoria', in *LTUR I*, 251–254; U. Antonielli, 'Su l'orientamento dei "Castra Praetoria"', *Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale di Roma* 41 (1913), 31–47; C. Buzetti, 'Castra Praetoria', *Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale di Roma* 90/2 (1985), 334–335; L. Cecilia, 'Castra Praetoria', *Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale di Roma* 91 (1986/2), 366–368; P.A. Gianfrotta, 'Castra Praetoria', *Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale di Roma* 89 (1984), 380; I.A. Richmond, 'The relation of the Praetorian Camp to Aurelian's Wall of Rome', *Papers of the British School at Rome* 10 (1927), 12–22.

²¹ A.M. Colini, *Storia e topografia del Celio nell'antichità* (Rome/Vatican 1944), 240–245; C. Buzetti, 'Castra Equitum Singularium, Singulariorum', in *LTUR I*, 246–248.

²² P. Liverani, ed., *Laterano I. Scavi sotto la Basilica di S. Giovanni in Laterano. I Materiali* (Rome/Vatican 1998); Buzetti op. cit. (n. 21).




Fig. 1. Military accommodations in Rome from the first to the fourth century: 1 *Castra Praetoria*, 2 *Campus Cohortium Praetorianorum*, 3 *Horti Dolabellae*, 4 *Castra Piora Equitum Singularium*, 5 *Castra Nova Equitum Singularium*, 6 *Campus Caelimontanus*, 7 *Castra Urbana*, 8–14 *Stationes Cohortium Vigilum*, 15 *Castra Misenatium*, 16 *Castra Ravennatium*, 17 *Amphitheatrum Flavium*, 18 *Naumachia Augusti*, 19 *Castra Peregrinorum*, 20 *Palatine*, 21 *Palatium Sessorium*, 22 *Thermae Traianae*, 23 *Thermae Diocletianae*, 24 *Thermae Antoninianae*, 25 *Excubitorium Cohortium Vigilum*. © 2006 M. Bishop

the Colosseum; the *castra urbana* on the *campus Martius*; and the *stationes cohortium vigilum*, which were spread over the city and consistently built along the boundaries between the fourteen regions (Fig. 2).²³ The sites were always chosen strategically, with special regard to accessibility and functionality. This allowed the troops to control the main roads of the city and react quickly in cases of emergency. The main road of the Viminal, for example, led all the way from the *castra praetoria* through the *vicus patricius*, the *Subura*, the *Argiletum* and the *forum transitorium* to the political centre of Rome, the *forum romanum* and the Palatine (Fig. 1).

A closer examination of the map shows that—apart from some of the *stationes cohortium vigilum* and the *castra misenatum*—all camps are situated outside the Servian Wall and seem to be aligned in relation to it. On first sight this appears as a threat, as if these camps were built as fortifications to put the city under siege. However, in actual reality they came into being for differing reasons and by various causes over the course of three centuries. So the circumstances at their origin should be explored first, after which the design of the camps may be fruitfully analyzed.

Under Augustus, only the *vigiles*, a paramilitary unit serving as a fire-brigade, were accommodated in the city.²⁴ The 3500 soldiers were spread over seven *stationes* and fourteen *excubitoria* across the entire city (Fig. 2). At the same time three of the nine Pretorian cohorts took quarters in private accommodations within the city limits, while the remaining six lay outside Rome.²⁵ Nothing is known about the accommodation of the city cohorts, but it may be assumed that they were also accommodated in private places. When the Pretorians and the city cohorts were united under Tiberius' rule, their new camp was established at the Northeastern edge of the city, in a thinly populated area, which up to that time had been mostly used for burial places (Fig. 3).²⁶

²³ D. Giorgetti, 'Castra Ravennatum. Indagine sul distaccamento dei classari ravennati a Roma,' in *Corsi di cultura sull'arte ravennate e bizantina* (Ravenna 1977), 223ff.; F. Coarelli, 'Aedes Fortis Fortunae, Naumachia Augusti, Castra Ravennatum,' *Ostraka* 1 (1992), 39ff.; C. Lega, 'Castra Ravennatum,' *LTUR* 1, 292–294.

²⁴ Cassius Dio 55.26.5.; L. Homo, *Rome impériale et l'urbanisme dans l'antiquité* (Paris 1951), 124–149; R. Sablayrolles, *Libertinus miles. Les cohortes de vigiles* (Roma 1996), 250.

²⁵ Suetonius, *Augustus* 49.1.

²⁶ Suetonius, *Tiberius* 37.1; Tacitus, *Annales* 4.2 „*procul urbis incelebris*“; Plinius, *Naturalis Historia* 3.5.57 „*ad extrema tectorum*“; see also L. Haselberger, ed., *Mapping Augustan Rome*. Journal of Roman Archeology Supplement 50 (Portsmouth, Rhode Island 2002), 78.




Fig. 2. The fourteen Augustean regions of Rome with the seven *stationes cohortum vigilum*.
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


Fig. 3. Military installations in Rome under Tiberius. © 2006 M. Bishop

Existing sepulchral monuments and gravesites were either integrated in the new wall, or destroyed. Remarkable in this context is the distance between the *castra praetoria* and the cohorts' main place of work, the imperial palace on the Palatine. While the *stationes* of the *vigiles*, according to their functions and the duties, were located in central places in the densely populated city, the site selected for the *castra praetoria* was rather inefficient as to the praetorians' role as guards of the emperor. Considering the main function of the city cohorts—the maintenance of public order and the protection of people within the city—their posting to the remote *campus Viminalis* surprises as well.²⁷ Pragmatic reasons for the selection of this site, as mentioned before, may have been the strategic qualities of it, but there are additional aspects. It is striking, for example, that the *castra praetoria* were erected about 500 meters outside the Servian Wall, well behind the *agger*, which was still several meters high at this time.²⁸ The area was certainly suitable for the construction of such a large complex, but other areas within the borders of the *pomerium* were equally fit, for instance the site where, at the beginning of the fourth century, the baths of Diocletian were built. Therefore, respect for traditional sacral laws must have been of great consequence to the decision to build the *castra praetoria* on the Viminal. The emperor may have disregarded certain aspects of the republican law, but he seems to have been well aware of the negative perception that the population of Rome would have had of a large presence of armed troops within the city. The choice that was finally made demonstrated his respect for traditions, but also made the general public conscious of the presence of military forces, particularly through the daily ritual of the change of guards.²⁹

In a way similar to the *vigiles* fleet troops were in the later decades of the first century AD stationed in well-populated areas close to the soldiers' places of work. At the beginning of the second century the *castra priora equitum singularium* and *castra peregrina* marked a strong

²⁷ The seat of their commander, the *praefectus urbi*, lay a great distance away from the camp, near the Basilica Aemilia. F. Coarelli, 'Praefectura Urbana', *LTUR IV*, 159–160; A. Chastagnol, *La préfecture urbaine à Rome sous le Bas-Empire* (1960).

²⁸ T. Wiseman, 'A stroll on the rampart', in *Horti Romani*, *Bolletino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale di Roma*. Supplementi 6 (Roma 1998), 13–22; M. Andreussi, 'Murus Servii Tullii', *LTUR III*, 324–334.

²⁹ Tacitus, *Historiae* 1.38.5; Martialis 6.76.

military presence on the Caelius.³⁰ The area was at this time already occupied by wealthy private houses and baths. The *castra peregrina*, located close to the Palatine, provided accommodation for soldiers from the provinces visiting Rome on special duties.³¹ At the beginning of the reign of Septimius Severus an additional camp for the *equites singulares* was built in short distance to the older *castra* to accommodate their increased number.³² The area, situated in the Southeastern part of the city, close to the Palatium Sessorium, was far from optimal:³³ its surface showed large ground-level differences and was already occupied by two *domus* that were still in use in the second half of the second century, as their decorations show.³⁴ It must have been quite an effort to make the designated site usable. Furthermore, the selection of this site demonstrates that, 150 years after the first of the new *castra* had been erected in Rome, criteria had changed. The area of the *castra nova* had been populated before, and even if the two estates were already imperial property, which they probably were, it is interesting to wonder who lived there and who had to leave.³⁵

The erection of a new camp for the *cohortes urbanae* on the *campus Agrippae* under Aurelian about 270 AD marked the climax of this development.³⁶ At this point the cohorts, which had been stationed in the *castra praetoria* at the edge of the city for 250 years and whose number had by then grown to 6000, were transferred right to the heart of the

³⁰ Colini 1944, op. cit. (n. 21), 240–245 (*castra peregrina*), 314–317 (*castra priora equitum singularium*).

³¹ The *frumentarii* took care about the food supply. M. Reuter, 'Die frumentarii—neugeschaffene „Geheimpolizei“ Traians?', in E. Schallmayer, ed., *Traian in Germanien. Traian im Reich* (Bad Homburg 1999), 77–81.

³² M.P. Speidel, *Riding for Caesar. The Roman Emperors Horse Guards* (London 1994), 128.

³³ F. Giudobaldi, 'Sessorium', *LTUR IV*, 304–308; A. Chastagnol, *La préfecture urbaine à Rome sous le Bas-Empire* (1960).

³⁴ P. Liverani, ed., *Laterano 1. Scavi sotto la Basilica di S. Giovanni in Laterano. I Materiali* (Vaticano 1998), 11. For the wallpaintings see E.M. Moormann and S.T.A.M. Mols, 'Le pitture romane. Frammenti e resti in situ', in Liverani 1998, op. cit. (n. 22), 115–132.

³⁵ According to the literary sources the area around the Lateran was by that time already imperial property. SHA, *Vita Marci Antonini philosophi* 1.7; 5.3; 11. 10. I owe many thanks to Anthony Birley for this remark.

³⁶ For the 'campus Agrippae' see: L. Richardson, *A New Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (Baltimore/London 1992), 64; Anonymous Chronograph of AD 354: "*Hic (Aurelianus) muro urbem cinxit, templum Solis et castra in campo Agrippae dedicavit, (...)*"; G. Lugli, *Fontes ad Topographiam veteris urbis Romae I–IV* (Rome 1952), 203, nr. 5; XII–XIV (1957), 378f. nrs. 65–67; A. Nordh, *Libellus de regionibus urbis Romae*. Acta Instituti Romani Regni Sueciae III 8 (Göteborg 1949), 83.

city.³⁷ As a main reason for this transfer literary sources mention their function in controlling the meat distribution in the *Forum Suarium*.³⁸ In addition, this measure has to be interpreted in the context of an increasingly tense atmosphere, which also led to the construction of the Aurelian wall.

To summarize this first examination of the military landscape: in the early imperial period military units were stationed according to their function. Only units that had to maintain public order lived in the city, while those without such civilian functions stayed outside the city limits. Over the course of the first century and at the beginning of the second century, due to the creation of new units, more and more military facilities were built within the city. Towards the end of the second century AD, the development culminated in the establishment of a camp on top of former *domus* and the massing of military facilities in the Southeast of the city. By the third century the military camps were built directly where the troops would be needed and used, even in the middle of the city.

Design and reception of military bases

After the topographical situation of the camps their outer appearance and its reception by the general public now has to be examined. Since the only remaining outer wall of the known camps is that of the *castra praetoria*, one has to focus on this military base.³⁹ The study of the outer walls, the gates, the building materials, the original height of the walls and possible hindrances is necessary to understand how the building may have been perceived by the populace of Rome.⁴⁰

The wall of the *castra praetoria* was constructed in brick-faced *opus caementicium*. In the beginning, the wall was approximately 4,50 m high. The towers projected only a few centimeters forward (Fig. 5).

³⁷ Cassius Dio 55.24.6. The *cohortes urbanae* also took part on military campaigns and other duties, therefore it is not sure if the new camp had to provide place for all 6.000 men.


³⁸ Ulpian, *Corpus Juris Civilis, Digesta* 1.12.1.11.

³⁹ I.A. Richmond, 'The relation of the Praetorian Camp to Aurelian's Wall of Rome', *Papers of the British School at Rome* 10 (1927), 12–22.

⁴⁰ P. Zanker, 'Bild-Räume und Betrachter im kaiserzeitlichen Rom.' In A. Borbein, T. Hölscher and P. Zanker, eds., *Klassische Archäologie. Eine Einführung* (Darmstadt 2000), 205ff.



Fig. 4. Wall of the *castra praetoria*. © 2001 A. Busch



CASTRA PRAETORIA. PART OF NORTH WALL, TO THE EAST OF PORTA
PRINCIPALIS DEXTRA, AT SUCCESSIVE PERIODS

Fig. 5. Changes in the outer appearance of the *castra praetoria*—the building phases of the wall.

Apparently, the camp had the usual features of common fortifications along the borders of the empire, but the sites around the remaining walls showed no traces of ditches, which were characteristic for camps and fortresses.⁴¹ Surely the situation of a camp in the capital was different from that of a camp on the border, but while other camps in civilian settings, for instance the 'Cripplegate' fort in London, possessed ditches, this one did not.⁴² Thus the wall of the camp was at the beginning of the imperial period less fortified than other camps in civilian settings. The *castra praetoria*, as well as the *stationes* of the *vigiles* had no distinctly military character. Their walls only separated soldiers and civilians. The different building phases of the wall however show that the appearance of the camp changed in the course of time (Fig. 6).⁴³ From the first to the third century the wall was heightened until the *castra praetoria* under Aurelian were finally included into the city wall and lost their original function as an independent military installation.⁴⁴ But what made these structural changes necessary? The steady growth of the outer wall of the *castra praetoria* must have been a reaction to certain events, which called for a better defense of the base. When times became more troubled, especially in late antiquity, military camps and urban defences in the provinces were increased or established in a more appropriate height.⁴⁵ In Aurelian's Rome, this led to the construction of a new city wall, after the city had remained unfortified over several centuries.⁴⁶ Therefore the preceding increases of the *castra praetoria* are

⁴¹ A. Johnson, *Römische Kastelle des 1. und 2. Jahrhunderts n. Chr. in Britannien und in den germanischen Provinzen des Römerreiches* (Mainz 1987), 59ff.

⁴² W.F. Grimes, *The Excavation of Roman and Mediaeval London* (London 1968), 15ff., fig. 4, pl. 1–14; M. Millett, *The Romanization of Britain* (1992), 91, fig. 31. Another exception is the recently discovered military camp of Virunum. M. Doneus, Ch. Gugl and R. Jernej, 'Ein neu entdecktes römisches Militärlager in Virunum (Noricum)—erste Ergebnisse der Luftbildauswertung,' *Archäologisches Korrespondenzblatt* 33/3 (2003), 393ff.

⁴³ I.A. Richmond, 'The relation of the Praetorian Camp to Aurelian's Wall of Rome,' *Papers of the British School at Rome* 10 (1927), 12–22, pl. 6; L. Cozza, 'Mura di Roma dalla Porta Nomentana alla Tiburtina,' *Analecta Romana* 25 (1997), 8–113.

⁴⁴ Richmond 1927, op. cit. 19f.

⁴⁵ S. Johnson, *Late Roman Fortifications* (London 1983).

⁴⁶ I.A. Richmond, *The City Wall of Imperial Rome* (College Park, Maryland 1971); L. Cassanelli, G. Delfini and D. Fonti, *Le Mura di Roma* (Rome 1974); M. Todd, *The Walls of Rome* (London 1978); M. Todd, 'The Aurelian Wall of Rome and its Analogues', in B. Hobley and J. Maloney, eds., *Roman Urban Defences in the West* (London 1983), 58–67; L. Cozza, 'Osservazioni sulle mura aureliane a Roma', *Analecta Romana* 16 (1987), 25–52; L. Cozza, 'Mura di Roma dalla Porta Flaminia alla Pinciana', *Analecta Romana* 20 (1992), 93–138; L. Cozza, 'Mura di Roma della Porta Pinciana alla Salaria', *Analecta Romana* 21 (1993), 81–140; L. Cozza, 'Mura di Roma dalla Porta Nomentana




Fig. 6. Gravestones of the praetorians, the *cohortes urbanae* and the *vigiles* from the Vigna del Cinque. After: F. Piranesi, *Le Antichità Romane* I (Rome 1757) III

not to be understood as reactions to more troubled times in general, but have to be seen and evaluated in their concrete urban context. The changes in the wall's structure resemble the social changes, for instance in the relationship between the troops inside the camp and the urban population, or between the soldiers and the emperor.⁴⁷

Apart from that the camp had a special architectural meaning in Rome, since it was the first monumental building constructed with a brick facing. The relatively plain front contrasted with the more complex marble architectures in the city.⁴⁸ The brick building method, now all the more visible because of the missing plaster of the wall, represented other characteristics or qualities than extant sacral buildings, which were massive constructions, made of marble, limestone, tufa and travertine.⁴⁹ The new and very modern method had its own aesthetics and value, which corresponded very well with the function of the *castra*.⁵⁰

Having examined the decisive factors for the establishment of the camps in Rome and the architectural changes in their outer appearance, one should focus on a more abstract level of their perception: their role as landmarks and points of orientation. The military camps undoubtedly were used as points of orientation, which is proven by the delineation of the *castra Misenatium* on the *Forma Urbis*.⁵¹ It may be assumed that the other camps were marked correspondingly. Other buildings that were named on the *Forma Urbis* were all places of public, political or religious importance.⁵² On other ancient geographical depictions topographic landmarks were used in a similar way and, of course, there are

alla Tiburtina', *Analecta Romana* 25 (1997), 8–113; R. Mancini, *Le mura aureliane di Roma: atlante di un palinsesto murario* (Roma 2001).

⁴⁷ There are some ancient texts that mention such conflicts and describe what happened to the building during these events like e.g. SHA, *Maximus et Balbus* 8.4; Zosimus 2.17.2.

⁴⁸ Hannestad 1986, op. cit. (n. 12), 39ff.; P. Zanker, *Augustus und die Macht der Bilder* (Munich 1987) 85–132, 319–328.

⁴⁹ H. von Hesberg and M. Pfanner, 'Ein augusteisches Columbarium im Park der Villa Borghese', *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Institutes* 103 (1988), 479.

⁵⁰ The *cohortes* were put together in one camp to lighten/strengthen the discipline of the soldiers. Tacitus, *Annales* 4.2; Suetonius, *Tiberius* 37.1.

⁵¹ E. Rodríguez Almeida, *Forma Urbis Marmorea. Aggiornamento generale 1980* (Roma 1981), 70f., pl. 4.

⁵² Cf. F.A. Bauer, *Das Bild der Stadt Rom im Frühmittelalter. Papststiftungen im Spiegel des Liber Pontificalis von Gregor dem Dritten bis zu Leo dem Dritten*. Palilia 14 (Wiesbaden 2004), 12. Examples of other buildings: Rodríguez Almeida 1981, op. cit. (n. 51), 93f. (Amphitheatrum Flavium); 96ff. (Basilica Aemilia, Templum Castoris); 77ff. (Thermae Traiani).

modern map-makers who do likewise.⁵³ The mentioning of the camps and stations in the two regional catalogues of the late antiquity, the *Notitia Regionum Urbis Romae* and the *Curiosum Urbis Romae* underlines the meaning of the military buildings as landmarks in the urban landscape of that period.⁵⁴ The sites most likely continued to be connected with the camps for a long time even long after the *castra praetoria* and *castra nova equitum singularium* had been abandoned or destroyed.

Apart from its geographical importance, a camp obviously stood as symbol for the unit stationed in it. The destruction of the *castra nova equitum singularium*, on whose remains the basilica of S. Giovanni in Laterano was erected, as well as the destruction of the soldiers' cemetery, must be understood as a kind of collective *damnatio memoriae*.⁵⁵ By destroying buildings and monuments, the identity of a unit, which was expressed in the camp and the cemetery, was also destroyed. The close connection between a camp and its soldiers lead to an understanding of the two as synonyms, which is underlined by a line of Cassius Dio, who speaks of camp and city, meaning the Praetorians on one hand, and Rome's civil population on the other.⁵⁶ The images of the *castra praetoria* on coins lead to the same interpretation: Immediately after his accession Claudius arranged a high value coin issue, which shows the camp of the guard, whose officers had murdered his predecessor and proclaimed him the new emperor.⁵⁷ The inscription '*Imperator Receptus*' in combination with the camp may be understood both as a direct appeal to the soldiery and as an indication of strong military backing, directed at a wider urban population. The coins honoured the praetorians and were most likely used as military pay.⁵⁸ The depiction of the camp was

⁵³ O.A.W. Dilke, *Greek and Roman Maps* (London 1985), 120–122; B. Salway, 'Sea and River Travel in the Roman World', in K. Brodersen and R. Talbert, eds., *Space in the Roman World* (Münster 2004), 92ff., fig. 12 (the fragment of the so-called 'shield' from Dura Europos, around 260 AD); R. Talbert, 'Cartography and Taste in Peutinger's Roman Map', in Brodersen and Talbert 2004, op. cit. 113ff. (*Tabula Peutingeriana*, 335–366 AD); M. Piccirillo, *Madaba: le chiese e i mosaici* (Amman 1993) (the Byzantine mosaic of Madaba, 542–565 AD). For an overview see K. Brodersen, *Terra Cognita. Studien zur römischen Raumerfassung*. Spudasmata 59 (Hildesheim 1995).

⁵⁴ Nordh 1949, op. cit. (n. 36), 81, 83; Bauer 2004, op. cit. (n. 52), 12.

⁵⁵ F. Vittinghoff, *Der Staatsfeind in der römischen Kaiserzeit. Untersuchungen zur damnatio memoriae* (Berlin 1936).

⁵⁶ Cassius Dio 75.2.3.

⁵⁷ H.-M. von Kaenel, *Münzprägung und Münzbildnis des Claudius*, *Antike Münzen und geschnittene Steine* 9 (Berlin 1986), pl. 1, 22; 1, 40; 6, 466; 6, 473; 6, 478.

⁵⁸ O.J. Hekster, 'The Roman Army and Propaganda', in P. Erdkamp, ed., *A Companion to the Roman Army* (Oxford 2007, forthcoming).

replaced on another issue by the depiction of praetorian officers. The soldiers and their camp could be used to transport equal meanings.

Design of the soldiers' sepulchral monuments

In the first century simply decorated gravestones dominated the funerary monuments of the units at Rome (Fig. 6). These were usually distributed in small groups over the civilian necropolises of the city. The tombstones of the Praetorians and the city-cohorts, found in the Vigna del Cinque, are representative of these homogeneous accumulations of monuments.⁵⁹ They are of a simple shape and were in most cases only decorated with a *corona vittata* with long *lemnisci*.⁶⁰ Their form corresponds to the gravestones of the *Germani corporis custodes* (Fig. 7).⁶¹ In their modesty and simplicity they embody some uniformity and reflect similar values. The simple shape with a *corona* must have been regarded as a kind of monument suitable for different units with a diverse social and cultural background, and became a characteristic of the Rome garrison.⁶² Their formal modesty and regularity showed a clear, collective identity. The fact that the statement of the monuments was understood in an appropriate sense by ancient viewers seems to be affirmed by a document from the writings of the Roman land-surveyors. Under the '*Terminorum Diagrammata*' one finds the designation '*sepultura militaris in finem*' for rectangular stones with a semicircular top.⁶³ Since the material of the corpus covers a wide period, from early to late empire, it is significant that this form was widely understood as referring precisely

⁵⁹ C.D. Fea, *Miscellanea filologica, critica e antiquaria* II (Rom 1836), 99–119, esp. 101–107; G.B. Piranesi, *Le Antichità Romane* II (Roma 1751), Tables 50–54. Others are the so-called 'cemetery from the Milvian Bridge' and the accumulation of gravestones from the Via Cassia. A. Giuliano, ed., *Museo Nazionale Romano. Le Sculture* I, 7 (Roma 1984), 159–176, nrs. V, 28 a–w; U. Antonielli, 'Militi Urbani d'Etruria sepolti lungo la via Cassia.', *Studi Etruschi* 2 (1928), 635–642.

⁶⁰ For the meaning of *coronae* see M. Bergmann, *Die Strahlen der Herrscher* (Mainz 1998); V.A. Maxfield, *The Military Decorations of the Roman Army* (London 1981). The *lemnisci* enhanced the honour. Plinius maior, *Naturalis Historia* 21.6: „accesserunt et lemnisci, quos adici ipsarum coronarum honor erat.“

⁶¹ Bellen 1981, op. cit. (n. 2), 107–113, nrs. 7–22, pl. 3–10.

⁶² A. Busch, 'Kameraden bis in den Tod? Zur militärischen Sepulkraltopographie im kaiserzeitlichen Rom', in P. Zanker and R. Neudecker, eds., *Lebenswelten: Bilder und Räume in der römischen Stadt der Kaiserzeit*. Palilia 16 (Wiesbaden 2005), 106–108.

⁶³ F. Blume, K. Lachmann and A. Rudorff, *Die Schriften der römischen Feldmesser* I (Berlin 1848), 341f., pl. 33, fig. 275; Busch 2005, op. cit. (n. 62), 108, fig. 4.




Fig. 7. Gravestone of the *Germanus corporis custos* Indus.—Rome, Museo Nazionale Romano Inv. 125660. DAI Rome, INR 78.465

to military grave monuments. There was obviously a 'soldiers' style', which was recognizable as such to the wider population of Rome.

Considering the various possibilities people had in the capital from which to choose an adequate sepulchral monument, the uniformity and simplicity of the soldiers' gravestones in Rome are noticeable. Weapon representations, such as one known from Northern Italy, are almost missing completely, as are the representations of soldiers in full military equipment.⁶⁴ While gravestones from Northern Italy frequently show full-figured representations of soldiers in their military equipment and gravestones in the provinces even show them fighting barbarians, the early military gravestones from Rome simply do not employ such devices, quite unlike praetorian gravestones found in Italy away from Rome.⁶⁵

On one of the very scarce full-figure representations of the first century, the gravestone of Q. Iulius Galatus, clear visibility of the belt, which usually stresses military status, is avoided (Fig. 8).⁶⁶ Pictures such as battle scenes or barbarian riders, which would have been particularly suitable to refer to military abilities, do not occur.⁶⁷ In the second century a broader iconographic range came to be adopted. The gravestones of the *equites singulares* differ from the ones of the other units, always showing dining scenes and *calones* with horses.⁶⁸ The images being chosen emphasize the status of cavalrymen, but overtly military pictures are still missing. Civilian and private aspects are stressed by the canonical use of

⁶⁴ The altar of Aelius Bassus, a *custos armorum* of the *equites singulares*, is one of the only pieces that show weapons in Rome. M.P. Speidel, *Die Denkmäler der Kaiserreiter* (Bonn 1994), 112f., nr. 83. In Northern Italy these forms of representation occur regularly. See C. Franzoni, *Habitus atque habitudo militis. Monumenti funerari di militari nella Cisalpina Romana* (Rom 1987), nrs. 1–3, 6, 7, 28, 29.

⁶⁵ For the barbarian-fighter see: M. Schleiermacher, *Römische Reitergrabsteine* (Mainz 1984).

⁶⁶ ILS 2169; W. Amelung, *Die Sculpturen des Vatikanischen Museums I* (Berlin 1903), 259, nr. 128 d; A. Sablayrolles, *Libertinus miles. Les cohortes de vigiles* (Roma 1996), 219ff., 349, 354 note 89, 386 note 174, 669, nr. 273; I. Di Stefano Manzella and G.L. Gregori, eds., *Supplementa italica—Imagines. Roma (CIL, VI) 2. Musei Vaticani—Antiquarium Comunale del Celio* (Roma 2003), 64f., nr. 2300.

⁶⁷ The only exception is a gravestone of an *eques singularis*, today in the Museo Capitolino Inv. NCE 573. Schleiermacher 1984, op. cit. (n. 65), 226, nr. 103; Speidel 1994, op. cit. (n. 64), 296, nr. 540.

⁶⁸ Speidel 1994, op. cit. (n. 64), nrs. 80, 83, 86 etc.; A.W. Busch, 'Von der Provinz ins Zentrum—Bilder auf den Grabdenkmälern einer Elite-Einheit,' in P. Noelke, ed., *Romanisierung versus Resistenz und Wiederaufleben einheimischer Elemente* (Mainz 2003), 679–694.



Fig. 8. Gravestone of Q. Iulius Galatus.—Rome, Musei Vaticani, Galleria Lapidaria Inv. 7406. Forschungsarchiv für antike Plastik, Köln FA 6024/05

banquet scenes.⁶⁹ The soldiers appear as educated, integrated citizens. For almost two hundred years this limited form of self-representation for all the different types of troops in Rome did not change, indeed not until the reign of Septimius Severus. The lack of military motifs in Rome finds no parallels in any other region of the empire. These 'reduced' monuments from Rome have to be seen in the context of a time when the presence of military within the city boundaries of the *urbs* was not unproblematic. At the beginning of the imperial period the population was still traumatised by the crucial and brutal events of the late Republic.⁷⁰ Soldiers were regarded with distrust and fear. A passage in the *Panegyricus* for Trajan, where Pliny the Younger describes the soldier behaving properly, illustrates, how soldiers were normally noticed by the population.⁷¹ The stress on their good, inconspicuous behaviour shows that this represented an exception.

From the very end of the second century there was, however, a crucial change. The soldiers now appear well equipped on their monuments (Fig. 9).⁷² With the reign of Septimius Severus their position had obviously changed. With his reforms, to which among other things the increase of the soldier's salary and the right of the marriage belonged, he improved the status and conditions of the soldiers fundamentally.⁷³ The military had won a new and powerful place in society. To the displeasure of his contemporaries the emperor had not only increased the number of the soldiers of Rome's garrison, but he founded a new legion that was placed in the direct proximity of the empire's capital, just fifteen kilometres Southeast, at Albano.⁷⁴ Moreover Severus went in full military dress with his armed soldiers on to the Capitol and

⁶⁹ Banquet scenes also appear on military gravestones from the lower Rhine: P. Noelke, 'Grabreliefs mit Mahldarstellungen in den germanisch-gallischen Provinzen — soziale und religiöse Aspekte,' in P. Fasold, Th. Fischer, H. von Hesberg and M. Witteyer, eds., *Bestattungssitte und kulturelle Identität. Grabanlagen und Grabbeigaben der frühen römischen Kaiserzeit in Italien und den Nordwestprovinzen* (Köln/Bonn 1998), 416.

⁷⁰ Knepe 1994, op. cit. (n. 18), 57–71.

⁷¹ Plinius minor, *Panegyricus* 23.3; cf. Iuvenalis, *Satirae* 16.

⁷² For example the gravestone of L. Septimius Valerinus (Rom, Museo Nazionale Romano Inv. 104542). See Giuliano 1984, op. cit. (n. 59), 146ff., nr. V 20.

⁷³ Herodianus 3.8.5; G. Alföldy, 'Das Heer in der Sozialstruktur des Römischen Kaiserreiches', in G. Alföldy, B. Dobson and W. Eck, eds., *Kaiser, Heer und Gesellschaft in der Römischen Kaiserzeit* (Stuttgart 2000), 33ff.; S.E. Phang, *The Marriage of Roman Soldiers (13 B.C.–A.D. 235). Law and Family in the Imperial Army* (Leiden/Boston/Köln 2001).

⁷⁴ Herodianus 3.13.4. For the *legio II Parthica* see H.W. Benario, 'Albano and the Second Parthian Legion', *Archaeology* 25 (1972), 257–263; E. Tortorici, *Castra Albana. Forma Italiae, Regio I*, 11 (Rom 1974).



Fig. 9. Gravestone of L. Septimius Valerinus.—Rome, Museo Nazionale Romano Inv. 104542. DAI Rome, INR 72.3021

used military men against the senate.⁷⁵ The military had become more powerful and became an important element in society.

The changes described undoubtedly played an important role for the appearance and wide distribution of the new representational motif on the soldier's grave monuments particularly in Rome, but also right across the provinces.⁷⁶ A broader influence was also exerted on the development of sepulchral art, where the general interest in military themes grew during this period.⁷⁷ Soldiers could now, at the beginning of the third century, refer self-confidently their affiliation to the 'state-making' military on their graves. They showed up proudly on the monuments in their new equipment that consisted of the ring-buckle-belt and the *spatha*.⁷⁸ As Cassius Dio reports, the changes had also their negative sides. He speaks of regular collisions between soldiers and civilians, and the people being indignant about the abuse of power by the Praetorian Guard.⁷⁹ Distrust towards the guard was the consequence. The relationship between the military formations and the civilian population of Rome had obviously changed.

Summary

To sum up: Within the urban area of Rome at the beginning of the imperial era both the grave monuments of the military and the erection of military bases were treated with a certain discretion and moderation, more so than in later years. With the spreading of the 3.500 men of the *cohortes vigilum* to numerous smaller accommodations all over the entire city and the establishment of the city cohorts to maintain public order,

⁷⁵ Cassius Dio 75.1.3; 75.2.2; Herodianus 2.14.1; 3.8.7.

⁷⁶ J.C. Balty and W. van Rengen, *Apamée de Syrie. Quartiers d'hiver de la IIe légion Parthique. Monuments funéraires de la nécropole militaire* (Bruxelles 1993); M.P. Speidel, Eagle-Bearer and Trumpeter, *Bonner Jahrbücher* 176 (1976), 123ff.; J.C.N. Coulston, 'Roman Military Equipment on Third Century Tombstones', in M. Dawson, ed., *Roman Military Equipment. The Accountements of War*. BAR International Series 336 (Oxford 1987).

⁷⁷ In senatorial sepulchral art suddenly battle-scenes and triumphs reappear from the Severan period to 3rd century, e.g. the Great Ludovisi Battle sarcophagus, Rom, Museo Nazionale Romano Inv. 8574. See: H. Wrede, *Senatorische Sarkophage Roms. Der Beitrag des Senatorenstandes zur römischen Kunst der hohen und späten Kaiserzeit* (Mainz 2001).

⁷⁸ M.C. Bishop and J.C.N. Coulston, *Roman Military Equipment from the Punic Wars to the fall of Rome* (Oxford 2006); cf. Coulston 1987, op. cit. (n. 76), 141ff.; idem in the present volume.

⁷⁹ Cassius Dio 75.2.6; 77.3.

under Augustus's rule the military was solely presented as a guarantor of public order and security. Under Tiberius the largest military unit of Rome, the *cohortes praetoriae*, was concentrated in one impressive camp, which lay at the edge of the city, 'hidden' behind the *agger Servii Tullii*. In the necropolises, the soldiers' graves in smaller numbers were mixed with the people's graves.⁸⁰ Contrary to the practices in other parts of the Imperium Romanum, they were not represented explicitly as military. No military equipment or actions were depicted on gravestones.

The beginning of the second century saw a similar tendency. New camps were established in relatively sparsely settled areas at the edge of the city. Although this time also produced the first and so far only known *necropolis* solely for soldiers at the third milestone of the via Labicana, the *equites singulares Augusti* who were buried there did not choose military topics or representations in military equipment for their cemetery.⁸¹ Instead, socio-cultural and civilian aspects are emphasised on their monuments.⁸² In contrast to the earlier periods Trajan, after having reordered or reorganised the empire, had begun to emphasize the military's strength and power in service of the empire. The construction of Trajan's Forum with the depiction of his military campaigns to Dacia on Trajan's Column, illustrate this more than anything else.⁸³ In the following decades of the second century there are more examples for the growing acceptance and connection between soldiers and the general public: for instance, official reliefs of the time show soldiers acting as helpers and supporters for the well-being of the people. Reliefs like the Anaglypha Traiani and the Chatsworth relief (Fig. 10), on which soldiers are burning debt records in the city, were surely meant to demonstrate to the citizens what the emperor did for them, but it is remarkable that it was specifically the military that was doing good in the service of the emperor.⁸⁴ Summarizing the observations for the first and the earlier second centuries, the aspects of the designs of the

⁸⁰ One of the best examples is the *necropolis* along the Via Salaria, outside the Porta Pinciana.

⁸¹ Buried together with the *equites* were their slaves, their freedmen, their women and children. Speidel 1994, op. cit. (n. 64), nrs. 691–698 (*calones, servi*); 699–707 (freedmen); 708–727 (relatives); 728–743 (veterans); 744–750 (praetorians); 751–753.

⁸² Busch 2003, op. cit. (n. 68), 679ff.

⁸³ B. Fehr, 'Das Militär als Leitbild: politische und gruppenspezifische Wahrnehmung des Trajansforums und der Trajanssäule', *Hephaistos* 7/8 (1985/1986), 39–60.

⁸⁴ Hannestad 1986, op. cit. (n. 12), 193f, n. 174; Koeppel 1986, op. cit. (n. 12), 21ff., nr. 2.



Fig. 10. 'Chatsworth-Relief'.—Chatsworth, Derbyshire. Forschungsarchiv für antike Plastik Köln, FA 1035/08

grave monuments, the images depicted on the official reliefs and the topography of the camps create the impression that the driving forces were well aware of the negative elements in the late republic—and tried to avoid a negative perception of the soldiers in Rome. The fact that the history of the late republic had not been forgotten in the imperial period can be seen in Augustinus' references to the civil war, which he compared to the attacks of the Goths.⁸⁵

A clearly visible change occurs under Septimius Severus, who almost quadrupled the number of soldiers stationed directly in and around Rome. More so than before, the city appeared like a military camp.⁸⁶ The enlargement of the military force in the empire's capital at this time was just as unnecessary as the stationing of a newly founded legion within a distance of a half day's march at Albano, about 15 kilometers Southeast of Rome. Both can be surely understood in the sense of a power demonstration, since the camp of the new *legio II Parthica*, could have been established in any other place than right before the gates of the city. With the described changes in the social status of the soldiers came a change in the design of sepulchral sculptures. The troops displayed a significantly greater self-confidence on their monuments and actively demonstrated their ranks and significance. While public interest in military topics and the acceptance of the *militia in Urbe* seemed to grow on one hand, there was also an increasing number of reports about their bad behaviour on the other. Cassius Dio's writings describe how for instance the senators regarded these changes caused by the military presence and that they saw it as a threatening gesture, or even a direct menace. In the third century, the continuous conflicts between the troops and the citizens of Rome led to tense situations, like the cutting off of the *castra praetoria*'s water support, during the clashes between the populace of Rome and the soldiers in AD 238.⁸⁷ The climax of imposition was reached when the 6.000 men of the *cohortes urbanae* were placed right in the heart of the city, regardless of the traditional borders of the *pomerium*.

⁸⁵ Augustinus, *De civitate dei* 3.29.

⁸⁶ Cassius Dio 75.2.3.

⁸⁷ SHA, *Max. et Balb.* 8.4.

ROMAN MILITARY IN THE VESUVIUS AREA

SALVATORE ORTISI

With the following interim report I will outline the type and extent of the military presence in the Vesuvius-area, focussing especially on Herculaneum and Pompeii.¹ I am grateful to Stefano DeCaro, Pier-Giovanni Guzzo and Antonio D'Ambrosio as well as Mariarosaria Borriello, who gave me full assistance in the assessment of this material and the finds.

The ultimate aim of this study is not a mere antiquarian study of Roman arms and weaponry, but, on the basis of material from the cities in the Vesuvius area, to compare and contrast archaeological and historical evidence in order to assess the role of the military in a primarily civilian region of the Roman Empire. There is a significant amount of evidence—both epigraphical and iconographical—that attests the presence of regular military personnel in the Vesuvian cities. Numerous graffiti primarily indicate the presence of Praetorians and Fleet soldiers.² Honorific and dedicatory inscriptions regularly attest the presence of higher ranking officers.³ Occasionally, however, these are also attested by funerary monuments, such as the one of the Octavii near the Porta di Nocera at Pompeii (fig. 1).⁴

¹ The study of military equipment from the towns in the Vesuvius area goes back to a research project funded by the Fritz-Thyssen-Foundation which started at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich. It is now continued at the Department of Archaeology of the University of Cologne. We owe thanks to Christoph Rummel, Nottingham, for checking the English version of this contribution.

² Vgl. CIL IV 1994; 2145; 8405.

³ Turranius Proculus Gellianus: CIL X 797; G. Fiorelli, *Descrizione di Pompei* (Napoli 1875), 256.

⁴ A. D'Ambrosio and S. De Caro, eds., *Un impegno per Pompei. Fotopiano e documentazione della necropoli di porta Nocera. Studi e contributi* (Milan 1983), sheet 13 OS; *Notizie degli Scavi* (1958), 157 n. 394; H. Gabelmann, 'Römische Grabbauten in Italien und den Nordprovinzen', in U. Höckmann and A. Krug, eds., *Festschrift für Frank Brommer* (Mainz 1977), 108 pl. 33,1; P. Zanker, 'Grabreliefs römischer Freigelassener', *Jahrbuch DAI* 90 (1975), 283 fig. 15; P. Castrén, *Ordo Populusque Pompeianus*. Acta Instituti Romani Finlandiae 8 (Rome 1975), 199 n. 285,2.



Fig. 1. The monument of the Octavii near the Porta di Nola at Pompeii (from: A. D'Ambrosio and S. De Caro, eds., *Un impegno per Pompei* [Milano 1983], n. 13 OS)

Of special interest in this respect is the funerary district of the Praetorians in front of the Porta di Nola.⁵ This small cemetery, situated on a narrow and apparently public strip of land, was in use for an extended period of time. Both the funerary monuments, as well as numerous Graffiti attest the mainly occasional presence of Praetorians.

Apart from regular bases and forts, the best way to identify soldiers archaeologically is through their equipment, and especially through their weapons and armour. A general outline of the types of artefacts recovered during excavations allows a first insight in the presence of military forces in the Vesuvian cities.

⁵ St. De Caro, 'Scavi nell'area fuori Porta Nola a Pompei', *Cronache Pompeiane* 5 (1979), 85ff.

Initially, Roman military equipment must be divided into three main groups. These are: offensive equipment, defensive equipment and parade equipment. The most characteristic equipment used for offensive purposes is the short-sword, the *gladius* (fig. 2, 1). Furthermore, there is the dagger (fig. 2, 3–4) and the associated belt, the *cingulum militare* (fig. 2, 7–8). Even though the *gladius* frequently features as a stabbing weapon in gladiatorial iconography,⁶ it was primarily a military weapon. A general theory, identifying all the *gladii* found in the Vesuvian cities as gladiatorial weapons, should be considered somewhat simplistic.⁷ Indeed, these characteristic swords could only be identified as gladiatorial with some certainty if they were found in combination with clearly identifiable gladiatorial equipment such as shoulder-armour, shin guards, or typical types of helmet. *Gladii* associated with a dagger and a *cingulum*, on the other hand, do nearly certainly point towards a military context. Among the different types of spear points found, only the *pilum* was standard equipment of Roman legionaries. Simple javelins or spears with leaf-shaped points, however, can easily be interpreted as hunting-weapons—especially in the context of rural villas.

Amongst the defensive equipment, helmets and shields serve the archaeologist as primary indicators of a military presence. In view of the artefacts from the Vesuvian cities in general, and especially of the large numbers of gladiatorial helmets found at Pompeii,⁸ it is once again important to make a clear distinction between military and gladiatorial helmets. As close investigations of the artefacts show, however, there are distinct differences in shape and manufacturing techniques of the individual pieces. On this basis, military helmets can be separated from gladiatorial ones with some degree of certainty. The only shield from the Vesuvian cities that I know of, however, can hardly be compared to those found in the forts and camps of the North-West Provinces⁹ and should therefore rather be interpreted as a parade or gladiatorial shield—unless this particular type was used by the fleet at Misenum.¹⁰

⁶ A. La Regina, ed., *Sangue e Arena* (Roma 2001), 356 nn. 70–71.

⁷ G. Ulbert, 'Gladii aus Pompeji', *Germania* 47 (1969), 124f.

⁸ La Regina 2001, op. cit. (n. 6), 370–389 n. 94–121.

⁹ La Regina 2001, op. cit. (n. 6), 382 n. 107.

¹⁰ S. Ortisi, 'Pompeji und Herculaneum—Soldaten in den Vesuvstädten', *Carnuntum Jahrbuch* (2005), 145ff.; Th. Fischer, 'Ein römischer Legionarschirm des ersten Jahrhunderts n. Chr. aus dem Po bei Cremona im Römisch-Germanischen Museum zu Köln', *Kölner Jahrbuch* 37 (2004), 61ff.




Fig. 2. Military equipment from the Vesuvian cities. 1–6 scale 1:4; 7–8 scale 1:2 (silver). (Fig. 1–2; 5–8: Ortisi; 3–4: La Regina 2001, op. cit. (n. 6), 391 nrs. 127–128)

Parade equipment, characteristic of Roman cavalry units, must be treated as a special case.¹¹ In the Vesuvian cities, this equipment is represented by only a few individual artefacts. Parade swords, so-called *parazonia* (fig. 2, 2), on the other hand, have been found in significantly larger numbers.¹² In the provinces these swords are hardly ever found in contexts of a military nature. It appears likely, therefore, that they are to be associated with honorific posts of a military nature, probably the post of the *tribunus militum a populo*.

Horse-harnesses form a specific problem in this study. As Roman military units were primarily stationed along the Imperial frontiers, military equipment has been studied for a long time by archaeologists dealing with the Roman frontier provinces. As parts of horse-harness have been found in almost every Roman military fort or base, as well as in towns and villages characterised by a strong military influence, harness-fittings have long been seen as an archaeological indicator of military presence.¹³ The finds from the Vesuvian cities, however, clearly show that this traditional interpretation must be reconsidered. It appears that horse-harnesses, sometimes elaborately decorated, were generally used by higher-status households. The current focus on the frontier provinces, as caused by the traditional emphases of archaeological research, has thus produced a somewhat misleading understanding of historic developments. It appears that the use of harness-fittings was not of an exclusively military nature. On the contrary, it appears that the majority of peregrine cavalry soldiers copied the design of their horse-harnesses from the Roman upper classes—probably from their own officers.

To summarize: for the purposes of this study, all finds of weapons and armour that were used exclusively, or virtually so, by the military, are taken as archaeological indicators for a Roman military presence.

¹¹ J. Garbsch, *Römische Paraderüstungen* (München 1978); G. Waurick, in *Antike Helme. Sammlung Lipperheide und andere Bestände des Antikenmuseums Berlin*. Römisch-Germanisches Zentralmuseum Monographien 14 (Mainz 1988), 345ff.

¹² M. Feugère, *Les Armes des Romains de la République à l'Antiquité tardive* (Paris 1993), 160f. with fig. left.

¹³ M. Mackensen, 'Militärische oder zivile Verwendung rühkaiserzeitlicher Pferdegeschirranhänger aus der Provinz Africa Proconsularis und den Nordwestprovinzen', *Germania* 79 (2001), 325ff.; E. Deschler-Erb, *Ad Arma! Römisches Militär des 1. Jahrhunderts n. Chr. in Augusta Raurica*. Forschungen in Augst 28 (Augst 1999), 49ff.



Fig. 3. Soldier with *pilum* (from: Th. Fröhlich, *Lararien- und Fassadenbilder in den Vesuvstädten* [Mainz 1991], pl. 19, 2)

These are *gladii*, daggers, *cingula* and certain types of helmet. One example of a *pilum* is known from a fresco in Pompeii (fig. 3), but there are no surviving original artefacts.

In order to grasp the extent of the military presence in the cities studied, and thus the influence the soldiers may have had on the socio-economical development of these cities, the number of weapons and arms found, as well as the locations of findspots must be discussed in more detail. The documentation of artefacts together with the study of the excavation reports shows that at least 30 offensive weapons were found in the Vesuvian cities.¹⁴ Fittings and buckles of *cingula* occur

¹⁴ S. Ortisi, 'Gladii aus Pompeji, Herculaneum und Stabia', *Germania* 84 (2006), 369ff.

significantly less often.¹⁵ Fragments and parts of defensive equipment finally are relatively rare.¹⁶

To date, there are no significant remains of shields, breastplates, chain- or scalemail. Several spear-points are referred to in excavation reports—yet only a few have been preserved.¹⁷ The reason why no remains of a *pilum* have been found so far is likely to be the high level of corrosion of all iron finds in this area. Considering the fact that the significant number of elements of horse-harnesses, as well as the parade-equipment, should mainly be associated with civilian contexts, the number of ‘real’ military artefacts is small. All in all, there is evidence for only about twelve soldiers in the contexts associated with the catastrophic destruction of the Vesuvian cities. This impression is further differentiated by a closer study of the general circumstances, in which these weapons were found.

The first case study comes from Pompeii. It regards objects found in the so-called ‘caserma dei gladiatorum.’ The excavations of the *quadriporticus* behind the great theatre are documented in detailed excavation reports.¹⁸ Work was begun in 1766 and continued for two years until 1768. Initially, the investigations focussed on the rooms situated along the eastern wing of the *porticus*. These yielded several helmets, shin-guards and other items of gladiatorial armour, as well as leg-irons. In December 1767, the excavations shifted to the north-western corner of the *quadriporticus*. In one of the *sottoscala* rooms, 18 close-packed human skeletons were discovered. Among the finds associated with the bodies were significant amounts of gold jewellery and semi-precious stones, as well as two D-shaped belt buckles and 2 helmets, one pushed into the other. When work recommenced in January 1768, a round-shield was found in the immediate vicinity of the helmets. This was accompanied by a *parazonium* with a rounded pommel and an ivory hilt, as well as two

¹⁵ E. Künzl, ‘Cingula aus Campanien’, in *Actes du VI^e Colloque International sur les bronzes antiques* (Lyon 17–21 mai 1976), (Lyon 1977), 83ff.; E. Künzl, ‘Cingula di Ercolano e Pompei’, *Cronache Pompeiane* 3 (1977), 177ff.; E. Künzl, ‘Gladiusdekorationen der frühen römischen Kaiserzeit: Dynastische Legitimation, Victoria und Aurea Aetas’, *Jahrbuch RGZM* 43 (1996), 383ff. esp. 426; 433; 462 nrs. C25–27; 465 nrs. P 9–10; M. Junkelmann, *Die Reiter Roms I* (Mainz 1990), 226f. fig. 243; M.C. Bishop and J.C.N. Coulston, *Roman Military Equipment* (London 1993), 96f., fig. 59, 13.

¹⁶ H.R. Robinson, *The Armour of Imperial Rome* (London 1975), 65ff., figs. 150–151; Ortisi 2003, op. cit. (n. 10), 145–147.

¹⁷ G. Fiorelli, *Pompeianarum Antiquitatum Historia* 1 (Napoli 1860), 217.

¹⁸ Fiorelli 1860, op. cit. (n. 17), 212–217; Ortisi 2003, op. cit. (n. 10), 143.

daggers. Adjacent to these lay remains of leather with gold ornaments, several large iron knives and daggers as well as significant amounts of wood—some combined with gold- and bronze-sheets. The description of the helmets is detailed enough to allow an identification with the two pseudo-attic helmets stored in the Museo Nazionale at Naples (fig. 2, 5–6). Equally well known and published on several occasions are the round-shield and the two daggers.¹⁹ The *parazonium* mentioned in the excavation report appears to be the smaller one of two preserved *gladii* of the Pompeii type, kept in the stores of the Museo Nazionale (fig. 2, 1).

Yet there are questions regarding the interpretation of these finds. In the 19th and early 20th century, archaeologists identified the helmets and daggers, as well as the *gladii* found in the Vesuvian cities, regardless of their original find contexts as gladiatorial armour.²⁰ It is remarkable, however, that offensive equipment was only found in one single room of the entire so-called ‘caserma dei gladiatorum’. The numerous finds of gladiatorial helmets, shinguards and shoulder-plates in the eastern wing of the *quadriporticus* were never associated with any offensive armour such as stabbing or cutting swords. It is likely, therefore, that the room discussed above is to be interpreted as an armoury or guard-chamber of the gladiators’ barracks. It seems appropriate to identify the two helmets as well as the *gladius* and perhaps the two daggers with bone hilts and the belt-buckles, as the armour of at least two guards, as these are distinctly different from the remaining gladiatorial equipment, found at this site.²¹ Unfortunately, it is not possible to reconstruct whether the guards were in fact amongst the bodies found, *i.e.* whether the military equipment was found ‘on’ the soldiers using it. The helmets, in any case, were pushed into one another, and so cannot have been worn at the time of the Pompeii disaster. To my knowledge, no parallels to these pseudo-attic helmets are known. Possibly these light helmets, which appear to have been made of a metal sheet and were thus of little use for gladiatorial combat, were of a particular type used by the Fleet. On the basis of these findings one may conclude that the guardians may well have been recruited amongst the soldiers of the nearby fleet-

¹⁹ A. d’Ambrosio, P.G. Guzzo, M. Mastroroberto, eds., *Storie da un’Eruzione. Pompei, Ercolano, Oplontis* (Milano 2003), 247 n. IV, 19–21.

²⁰ J. Overbeck, *Pompeii. In seinen Gebäuden, Alterthümern und Kunstwerken* (Leipzig 1856), 152f.; A. Mau, *Pompeii in Leben und Kunst* (Leipzig 1908, 2nd ed.), 168f.

²¹ Ortisi 2003, op. cit. (n. 10) 145.

base at Misenum and detached to Pompeii for this particular purpose during an extended period.

The remains of a soldier who died in active service were uncovered in Herculaneum recently: in front of one of the rooms of the substructures under a temple precinct on the ancient beach, the skeleton of a soldier was excavated in 1982.²² The body lay on its front and wore a *gladius* on the right and a dagger on the left. It appears that the man was carrying a sack or leather pouch filled with carpenters' tools (a hammer and two chisels) on his back. This indicates that he is unlikely to have been of a higher rank than a *gregalis* or *immunis*. The contents of a purse were found beneath the straps of his apron. Amongst the coins were two *aurei*—a substantial sum of money for a simple soldier. Of further interest are the silver *cingulum* fittings which are evidently similar to the known ones from the Vesuvian cities, even though they have not yet been restored.²³ The striking similarities between these *cingula* have virtually no parallels outside the Vesuvian cities. They were probably manufactured specifically for the fleet in workshops in the Misenum area—or at least greater Campania.

The fact that this soldier was buried carrying a bag of tools is an indicator that he was on his way for a specific task, and only happened to be in Herculaneum at the time of the disaster by coincidence.

Apart from active soldiers, several veterans are attested in the Vesuvian cities. Numerous graffiti indicate their presence, but the main evidence for the presence of veterans consists of military diplomas.²⁴ They attest the honorary discharge of soldiers either from the fleet based at Misenum or from the Legions I and II adiutrices, which were recruited from fleet soldiers. All the documents date from years between AD 52 and 71.

Yet the diplomas and the graffiti are not the only source for the presence of veterans in this area. The majority of the *gladii* known from Pompeii and Herculaneum were found during the earlier excavations.

²² U. Pappalardo, *Pompeii, Herculaneum, Stabiae 1* (1983), 344ff.; J. Judge, 'On the slope of Vesuvius. A buried Roman town gives up its dead', *National Geographic* 162, 6 (1982), 687ff.; R. Gore, '2000 Years of Silence. The dead do tell tales at Vesuvius', *National Geographic* 165, 5 (1984), 557ff.; E. De Carolis, in D'Ambrosio, Guzzo, Mastroroberto 2003, op. cit. (n. 19), 137f.

²³ P.G. Guzzo, A. Wiczorek, eds., *Pompeji. Die Stunden des Untergangs. 24. August 79 n. Chr.* (Milan 2004), 70 fig. 15; Künzl 1996, op. cit. (n. 15), 462 nrs. C 25–27; Künzl 1976, op. cit. (n. 15), 83–86; Künzl 1977, op. cit. (n. 15), 177–197.

²⁴ CIL X 769, 867, 1402; XVI 7, 8 (?).

Consequently, an accurate reconstruction of their original contexts is difficult. An exception to this rule is the sword found at the Villa dei Misteri: it was found in a room of the agricultural wing of the villa.²⁵ Both this situation and the fact that it had been damaged in antiquity (only one of the fastening rings remained) suggest that it is unlikely to have belonged to a soldier in active duty. At the same time, however, its association with the agricultural wing of the villa makes it unlikely that it was part of the armour of the *patronus*. The most likely interpretation, therefore, is that it was the weapon of a veteran who was presumably employed in some way or other by the owner of this estate. Several examples from different *villae* of the Vesuvius region indicate that veterans were frequently employed as bodyguards of important and wealthy individuals. An individual wearing a *gladius* and a doctor were found in the immediate vicinity of a group of richly dressed bodies in front of the *villa marittima* at Bottaro on the mouth of the Sarno.²⁶ A similar observation could be made at the 'Villa of Livia' at Oplontis.²⁷

In both cases, only *gladii* were found. There are no indications of daggers or *cingula* in the documentation whatsoever. The presence of these swords could of course be due to the fact that active soldiers may have accompanied officers' families beyond the military sphere of a Roman army (or naval) base. The absence of any other form of military equipment (esp. *cingula*), however, does seem to favour the interpretation that the swords belonged to veterans.

There is ample epigraphical, iconographical and archaeological evidence for Roman military presence in the Vesuvian cities. Yet the relatively small number of weapons and military equipment discovered in the destruction layers of August AD 79 indicates that the actual number of military personnel in the city was relatively small—despite the close proximity of the important fleet-base at Misenum. Iconographical evidence and numerous graffiti, however, indicate that soldiers must at the very least have been frequent customers of the entertainment sector. An interesting aspect of the material found are specific pieces of equipment, which appear to have been manufactured in workshops

²⁵ A. Maiuri, *La Villa dei Misteri* (Rome 1931), 236; 237 fig. 102 (room n. 35).

²⁶ J. Matrone, *Précis historique sur les fouilles exécutées par l'ingénieur J. Matrone près de l'ancienne bourgade de la Marine de Pompéi* (Naples 1909), 7ff.

²⁷ A. D'Ambrosio, *Gli ori di Oplontis* (Napoli 1987), 30f.; D'Ambrosio, Guzzo, Mastroroberto 2003, op. cit. (n. 19), 79 Fig.

specific to this region. A significant amount of fleet soldiers, most of whom appear to have come from the Eastern half of the Empire, seem to have remained in the Gulf of Naples area after their discharge. As the evidence from the Vesuvian cities clearly shows, these veterans proceeded to play an active and significant role in the economical and social life of these urban centres.

THE FRONTIER ZONE IN BRITAIN: HADRIAN TO CARACALLA

ANTHONY R. BIRLEY

‘Frontier’ on its own is an inappropriate term for the linear barriers first erected by Hadrian:¹ the outpost forts are reminders that in Britain the empire did not stop at his Wall or, later, at the Antonine Wall. Lines of forts and towers had already existed in Germany, Britain and elsewhere close to where Hadrian built the palisade in Germany or British Wall. Still, his continuous *Annäherungshindernisse* were indeed an innovation—although this has been denied: ‘Trajan, who was so obviously uninhibited by any defensive notions of the *termini imperii* in the East, is now believed to have laid the wooden palisades along the line of the Solway Firth.’² Subsequent investigation has shown that the ‘palisade slots’ were ‘modern land-drain trenches.’³

Various motives have been suggested for Hadrian’s erection of continuous artificial barriers.⁴ As far as Britain is concerned, there had been a serious rebellion at his accession: ‘the Britons could not be kept

¹ Cf. remarks by Th. Mommsen, *Römische Kaisergeschichte*, edited from the transcript of his lectures by B. and A. Demandt (Munich 1992), 299: “Vielfach sind diese großen Befestigungsanlagen [Hadrian’s Wall and the Antonine Wall] als die Grenze des römischen Gebietes aufgefaßt worden; das ist gewiß ebenso falsch, wie wenn man in der Anlage der großen deutschen Rheinbefestigungen Wesel und Ehrenbreitstein bei Koblenz etc. die Absicht hätte sehen wollen, das linksrheinische Deutschland aufzugeben.”

² C.R. Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire. A Social and Economic Study* (Baltimore and London 1994), 47, repeated verbatim, id., in *Cambridge Ancient History*, 11² (2000), 304, citing G.D.B. Jones, ‘The Solway frontier: interim report’, *Britannia* 13 (1982), 283–298.

³ D.J. Woolliscroft and G.D.B. Jones, ‘Excavations on the Cumberland coast at Silloth, and at Fingland Rigg, 1994’, in R.J.A. Wilson and I.D. Caruana, eds., *Romans on the Solway* (Kendal 2004), 186–194, at 187–190.

⁴ A.R. Birley *Hadrian the Restless Emperor* (London 1997), 133f., stresses the symbolic nature of the new barriers. See also E. Birley, ‘Hadrianic Frontier Policy’, *Carnuntina. Römische Forschungen in Niederösterreich* III (Graz/Köln 1965), 25–33, repr., in id., *The Roman Army. Papers 1929–1986* (Amsterdam 1988), 12–20; D.J. Breeze and B. Dobson, *Hadrian’s Wall* (London 2000³), 25ff.; A.R. Birley, ‘Hadrian’s travels’, in L. de Blois et al., eds., *The Representation and Perception of Roman Imperial Power. Proceedings of the Third Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, 200 BC–AD 476), Rome, March 20–23, 2002* (Amsterdam 2003), 425–441, at 435f., 439ff.

under Roman rule' (HA, *Vita Hadriani* 5.2). Losses were heavy, Fronto later reminded Marcus Aurelius: 'When your grandfather Hadrian held imperial power, how many soldiers were killed by the Jews, how many by the Britons!' (*De bello Parthico* 2 = 221 Van den Hout). Hadrian soon sent a new governor, Q. Pompeius Falco (*consul* AD 108), from Lower Moesia, where he was legate in 117.⁵ Then reinforcements, 3000 legionaries from Upper Germany and Spain, joined the *expeditio Britannica*, probably between 119 and 122.⁶ The numbers suggest that there had been losses of this order in the legions; the auxiliaries were also affected.⁷ In 122 Hadrian came in person, *murumque... duxit, qui barbaros Romanosque divideret*, 'to divide Romans and barbarians' (HA, *Vita Hadriani* 11.2).⁸ Falco, who had presumably suppressed the revolt, was now replaced by A. Platorius Nepos (*consul* AD 119), a friend of Hadrian, who had been governing Lower Germany and brought VI Victrix from that province.⁹

Construction lasted for over ten years, with several modifications of plan. The Wall itself was at first 76 miles long, from Newcastle westwards, eventually 80 miles, from Wallsend; there was a western extension of the system southwards along the Cumberland coast for up to 40 miles, with no linear barrier, but fortlets at every mile and two signal-towers between each, matching the Wall's milecastles and turrets. There were also three outpost forts north of the western end, Bewcastle, Birrens and Netherby; two further east, Risingham and High Rochester, are not known to have been occupied under Hadrian. The most powerful single regiment on the Wall, the *ala Petriana*, the only *ala milliaria* in Britain, was based first (probably) at Carlisle, then at Stanwix, just across the River Eden. This all suggests that the direction from

⁵ *PIR*² P 602; A.R. Birley, *The Roman Government of Britain* (Oxford 2005), 114–119.

⁶ *ILS* 2726; B. Dobson, *Die Primipilares* (Bonn 1978), no. 117; *PIR*² P 823.

⁷ A.R. Birley, 'A new tombstone from Vindolanda', *Britannia* 29 (1998), 299–306.

⁸ The *HA* calls the Wall *murus*, but it seems that it was known locally as *vallum*, as on the souvenir cup naming some forts *rigore val(l)i Aeli*, 'on the line of the Aelian Wall', *Britannia* 35 (2004) 344–345; cf. *RIB* 2034, cited below at n. 42, and the *Notitia* list of officers *per lineam valli* (*ND Occ.* 40.32–49). The flat-bottomed ditch running south of the Wall, with continuous earth mounds on both sides, a Hadrianic addition to the system, was in modern times labelled 'Vallum' incorrectly: see e.g. E. Birley, *Research on Hadrian's Wall* (Kendal 1961), 116–125; J.C. Bruce, *Handbook to the Roman Wall* (13th ed. by C.M. Daniels, Newcastle 1978), 30–33 [the 14th ed., by D.J. Breeze, is forthcoming]; Breeze and Dobson, *op. cit.* (n. 4), esp. 56–59.

⁹ Birley 1997, *op. cit.* (n. 4), 123ff.; Birley 2005, *op. cit.* (n. 5) 119ff., 284f.; cf. 228f. on the uncertain whereabouts and disputed ultimate fate of IX Hispana.

which the main threat was expected—and very likely, from which the uprising of 117 had been launched—was beyond the western part of the Wall, in south west Scotland.¹⁰

That area includes Annandale, land of the Anavionenses, who had been subjected to a census, presumably involving conscription, two decades earlier.¹¹ The main western Roman road into Scotland, like the M74 motorway between Carlisle and Glasgow, ran parallel to the River Annan. There were significant settlements in this region, notably, close to Birrens, the hill-fort on Burnswark Hill. Because of its shape and prominent position—it is visible from the central sector of the Wall, over 40 kilometres away—and, particularly striking, because of the siege-camps on its north and south sides, Burnswark has often been compared with Masada. The camps, once thought to have been practice-works, surely belonged to a real second century siege, probably under Antoninus.¹² In medieval and early modern times the Anglo-Scottish border was almost continuously subject to raiding by the ‘Border Reivers’; the most troublesome part, the Western March and particularly the ‘debatable lands’, was not far from Burnswark.¹³

By contrast, beyond the eastern end of the Wall, so it seemed, the Britons were relatively pro-Roman. Yet recent discoveries suggest that enemy attack was expected there as well. The ‘Roman equivalent of barbed wire’ has been found at three separate sites in Greater Newcastle: pits into which sharp stakes would have been inserted, along the berm between Wall and ditch.¹⁴ Hence, symbolism or not, and even if the ‘over-elaborate and unnecessary structures’ of the Hadrianic *Limesanlage* in Britain can be called ‘displacement activity’,¹⁵ there had been a perceived threat.

¹⁰ Birley 1961, op. cit. (n. 8), ‘Anatomy’, 70–131, ‘Outposts’, 227–246, and ‘Conclusions’, 271–272; Bruce 1978, op. cit. (n. 8), 33–36, (Cumberland coast); Breeze and Dobson 2000, op. cit. (n. 4), 25–83; P. Bidwell, ed., *Hadrian’s Wall 1989–1999* (Carlisle and Newcastle 1999), 181–7 (Cumberland coast).

¹¹ The view that there was some Brigantian territory here, repeated in Birley 1997 (n. 4), 130, should be rejected: A.R. Birley, ‘The Anavonienses’, in N.J. Higham, ed., *Archaeology of the Roman Empire. A Tribute to the Life and works of Professor Barri Jones* (Oxford 2001), 15–24, at 16ff.

¹² D.B. Campbell, ‘The Roman siege of Burnswark’, *Britannia* 34 (2003), 19–33.

¹³ See G. MacDonald Fraser, *The Steel Bonnets. The Story of the Anglo-Scottish Border Reivers* (London 1971).

¹⁴ ‘Roman “barbed wire” on Hadrian’s Wall’, *Current Archaeology* 195 (2004), 109–113.

¹⁵ J.C. Mann, ‘The frontiers of the principate’, in *ANRW* 2.1 (1974), 508–533, at 532.

Of course, Britain cannot be viewed in isolation, and Hadrian created far longer artificial frontiers elsewhere, notably between Rhine and Danube, where work was already in progress before he came to Britain. Dendrochronology now dates to winter 119/120 and summer 120 the felling of oaks for the Upper German palisade, confirming, at last, the *HA*'s attribution of the work to Hadrian: 'In a great many places where the barbarians are separated (*dividuntur*) not by rivers but by boundary-lines (*limites*), he cut them off (*separavit*) with great stakes driven deep into the ground and fastened together in the manner of a wall-like fence' (*Vita Hadriani* 12.6).¹⁶

Platorius Nepos was replaced at latest by 127 by L. Trebius Germanus, about whom little is known. A few years later came Sex. Julius Severus (*consul* 127), but he, "the foremost among Hadrian's best generals," was soon summoned from Britain to crush the Jewish revolt (Cassius Dio 69.13.2). Cassius Dio's description implies that Britain was a still tough assignment, *ferox provincia* (Tacitus, *Agricola* 8.1).¹⁷

Shortly after Hadrian's death, his Wall was given up and southern Scotland re-occupied: "[Antoninus] ... conquered the Britons through the legate Lollius Urbicus, another wall, of turf, being built, after the removal of the barbarians" (*HA, Vita Antonini Pii* 5.4). The new Wall was built where *Agricola* had noted a possible *in ipsa Britannia terminus* (*Agricola* 23). Urbicus was in Britain in 139 and Antoninus took his second imperatorial acclamation by 1 August 142.¹⁸ Pausanias also refers to a British conflict: Pius never voluntarily waged war, but "confiscated a large part of the territory of the Brigantes in Britain because they invaded the Genunian district, of which the inhabitants were subject to Rome" (8.43). No 'Genunian' district is known in Britain: Pausanias surely confused two episodes, Urbicus' war and otherwise unrecorded fighting in Raetia between the Brigantii and their neighbours the Genauni.¹⁹ This passage throws no light on Pius' motives for reoccupying southern Scotland.

¹⁶ E. Schallmayer, 'Der Limes, Marköbel und Kaiser Hadrian. Neue wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse zum Obergermanischen-Raetischen Limes und ihre öffentlichkeitswirksame Präsentation', *Denkmalpflege & Kulturgeschichte* 2/2003 (Landesamt für Denkmalpflege Hessen, Wiesbaden), 12–21, at 14–16.

¹⁷ Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5) 125–129 (Trebius); 129–132 (Severus). The limited evidence for Hadrian's last years need not be discussed here.

¹⁸ Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 136ff. *Imp. II: RMD* 264, 394.

¹⁹ Thus, convincingly, J.G.F. Hind, 'The "Genunian" part of Britain', *Britannia* 8 (1977), 229–234; see also A.L.F. Rivet and C. Smith, *The Place-Names of Roman Britain* (London 1979), 47; W.S. Hanson and G.S. Maxwell, *Rome's North West Frontier. The Antonine Wall* (Edinburgh 1983), 62f.

The reversal of policy is remarkable. Gillam offered two explanations: "In a sense Hadrian's Wall had been a strategical failure, because the potential enemies to north and north west were out of its reach...Tactically the Wall had been so complete a success that it was decided to move the system, with modifications, bodily northwards."²⁰ Equally, one may suspect political motives: Antoninus offering a 'sop' to the *virī militares*, disgusted by Hadrian's retrenchment.²¹ Besides, like Claudius a century earlier, an emperor with no military experience needed military prestige.²² A *casus belli* was perhaps provided by an uprising in south west Scotland, leading to the siege of Burnswark mentioned above. At all events, most of the now obsolete installations of Hadrian's Wall were dismantled, and garrisons moved forward. The new Wall, being of turf and only half the length of Hadrian's Wall, was much cheaper. But it also had outposts: Camelon, Ardoch, Strageath and, at the confluence of the Almond with the Tay, Bertha, all previously occupied in the Flavian period.²³

It used to be thought that the Antonine Wall had two separate occupation periods. Hodgson has now argued convincingly that it was abandoned for good c. 158.²⁴ Hadrian's Wall was being rebuilt that year: *leg(io) VI V(ictrix) p(ia) f(idelis) ref(ecit) Ter(tullo) et Sac(erdote) co(n)s(ulibus)*.²⁵ Was rebuilding necessary because the supposedly superfluous Wall had been a convenient source of stone for new accommodation in nearby

²⁰ J.P. Gillam, 'Roman and native AD 122–197', in I.A. Richmond, ed., *Roman and Native in North Britain* (Edinburgh 1961), 60–89, at 66f.

²¹ A.R. Birley, 'Roman frontiers and Roman frontier policy: some reflections on Roman imperialism', *Transactions of the Architectural and Archaeological Society of Durham & Northumberland* 3 (1974), 13–25, at 17f.

²² Thus D.J. Breeze, 'Why did the Romans fail to conquer Scotland?', *PSAS* 118 (1988), 3–22, at 18; repr. in id. and B. Dobson, *Officers and Frontiers* (Stuttgart 1993), 365–384, at 380.

²³ D.J. Breeze, *The Northern Frontiers of Roman Britain* (London 1982), 97ff.; Hanson and Maxwell 1983, op. cit. (n. 19), 59ff.; 101ff., 159ff. (outposts). It used to be supposed that both Walls were occupied simultaneously: e.g. in the 19th century by Mommsen (n. 1), 299: 'Es war eine doppelte Enceinte'; and still by S.S. Frere, *Britannia. A History of Roman Britain* (London 1967), 156ff.; later, following B.R. Hartley, 'The Roman occupation of Scotland: the evidence of samian ware', *Britannia* 3 (1972), 1–55, at 15ff., Frere retracted this view, op. cit. (London 1987³), 131ff. Whittaker 1994, op. cit. (n. 2), 47f., and 2000, 304, it is strange, still propagates the idea that both Walls were held simultaneously, which he even writes that 'we are increasingly coming to believe'.

²⁴ N. Hodgson, 'Were there two Antonine occupations of Scotland?', *Britannia* 26 (1995), 24–49; his case is accepted by Breeze and Dobson 2000, op. cit. (n. 4), 125ff., 129ff.

²⁵ *RIB* 1389, near Heddon.

forts.²⁶ The governor in 158 was Cn. Julius Verus, previously legate of Lower Germany.²⁷ He is attested by several inscriptions, including a dedication at Newcastle by the *vexil(l)atio leg. II Aug. et leg. VI Vic. et leg. XX VV. con(t)ributi ex(er)citibus) Ger(man)icis duobus sub Iulio Vero leg. Aug. pr. pr.* The interpretation is uncertain: men *from* the British legions about to go *to* Germany; men previously sent *to* Germany returning; the British legions being reinforced by men *from* the German armies?²⁸ By apparent paradox, just when the outer *limes* in Britain was abandoned, one was being created in Upper Germany: the motives for both measures remain unclear.²⁹ The restored Hadrianic frontier line again had outposts, indeed more than before: the three at the western end were matched by three more along Dere Street, the old north road into Scotland, Risingham, High Rochester and Newstead.³⁰ This advanced zone was called a *praetentura* or *praetensio*.³¹

Julius Verus' successor is known only from the Colchester diploma, datable to 24 June 160, on which his name is incomplete, perhaps [M. Pisib]anus Lep[idus], consul 159.³² The commander of *cohors I fida Vardullorum* on the diploma, [...] Verus, is surely Trebius Verus, under whom the Vardulli dedicated an altar to Neptune at Castlecary on the Antonine Wall.³³ Perhaps they made a vow to the sea-god on the eve of withdrawal by ship, some two years before the diploma was issued: Trebius could have continued in post, at a new base.

The first governor under Marcus Aurelius, M. Statius Priscus (*consul ordinarius* 159), who had won victories in Dacia just before his consul-

²⁶ Thus M.G. Jarrett and J.C. Mann, 'Britain from Agricola to Gallienus', *Bonner Jahrbücher* 170 (1970), 178–210, at 188.

²⁷ He was in Britain by 27 February 158, *RMD* V 419, and had building done at Birrens that year, *RIB* 2110; Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 145–149.

²⁸ *RIB* 1322+*add.*; Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 146 n. 41, summarises the arguments. Add G. Alföldy, 'Die lineare Grenzziehung des vorderen Limes in Obergermanien und die Statthalterschaft des Gaius Popilius Carus Pedito', in E. Schallmayer, ed., *Limes Imperii Romani. Beiträge zum Fachkolloquium "Weltkulturerbe Limes" November 2001 in Lich-Arnsburg* (Bad Homburg v.d.H. 2004), 7–20.

²⁹ See Alföldy 2004, op. cit. (n. 28) on the 'vordere Limes'; for Britain, cf. Breeze 1988, op. cit. (n. 22), 18 (= 380); Breeze and Dobson 2000, op. cit. (n. 4), 130f. Had there been an uprising in Britain, with destruction at Birrens and a siege of Burnswark? Cf. above and n. 12.

³⁰ Breeze and Dobson 2000, op. cit. (n. 4), 132f.

³¹ See M.P. Speidel, 'The Risingham *praetensio*', *Britannia* 29 (1998) 356–359, improving *RIB* 1152, Corbridge and 1229, Risingham.

³² *CIL* XVI 130 = *RIB* II 2401.12, as interpreted by Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 150–151.

³³ *RIB* 2149.

ship, was evidently appointed in 161, but after hardly a year was summoned to deal with an eastern crisis.³⁴ This recalls Hadrian's sending Julius Severus to Judaea. Priscus may have been intended to deal with 'the threat of a British war'; instead, a new governor got the task: "Calpurnius Agricola was sent against the Britons" (HA, *Vita Marci Antonini Philos.* 8.7–8). From the context the date was autumn 161 or early 162. Polyaeus, whose work was dedicated to the emperors in 162, mentions "the Britons being defeated" (*Strategemata* 6, *pr.*). Calpurnius Agricola is attested by several inscriptions on or near Hadrian's Wall and in its hinterland.³⁵

The HA refers again to 'the threat of a British war' under Marcus, the context this time being the early 170s (*Vita Marci Antonini Philos.* 22.1). Three more governors are known in this reign. Q. Antistius Adventus (*consul c.* 167), recorded in Britain only by an inscription in the Wall hinterland, perhaps served *c.* 172–175: his career, well known from other evidence, included service in the Parthian War, a special command in the Marcomannic War, then the governorship of Lower Germany.³⁶ He or his successor had a major logistical undertaking: following the armistice in 175, the Sarmatians surrendered 8000 men, of whom 5,500 were sent to Britain (Cassius Dio 71.16.2). Did Britain need reinforcements—or was it a just convenient place to station potential trouble-makers? The next governor had held several commands during the Marcomannic War. His name is missing on the altar he dedicated at Mainz on appointment to Britain, the only evidence for his governorship. He was presumably called Caerellius, as were his children.³⁷ He cannot have served long. Several diplomas from a *constitutio* of 23 March 178 show that the governor that day was Ulpius Marcellus, who had probably arrived the previous year.³⁸

Marcellus, who had perhaps governed Lower Pannonia *c.* 175, was already attested in Britain by three inscriptions from Hadrian's Wall, two at Chesters as legate of a single emperor, the other, at Benwell, under two emperors—and by an excerpt from Cassius Dio: "[Commodus] had wars against the barbarians beyond Dacia... But

³⁴ Birley 2005, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 151–155.

³⁵ Birley 2005, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 155–157.

³⁶ *RIB* 1083, Lanchester; Birley 2005, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 157–161.

³⁷ *CIL* XIII 6806, Mainz, reinterpreted by K. Dietz, 'Zur Verwaltungsgeschichte Obergermaniens und Rätien unter Mark Aurel', *Chiron* 19 (1989), 407–447; Birley 2005 (n. 5), 161–162.

³⁸ *RMD* III 184; IV 293–4. Other, fragmentary examples are still unpublished.

the greatest war was the British one. The peoples in the island crossed the wall that separated them and the Roman legions, did much harm, and cut down a certain general, στρατηγόν τέ τινα, together with his soldiers. Commodus, being alarmed, sent Marcellus Ulpius against them" (72[73].8.1–2). An account of Marcellus' stern character and odd practices concludes: "Marcellus, being such a man as this, did the barbarians in Britain grievous damage; later, when about to be put to death because of his special excellence, he was nevertheless spared" (72.8.6). Cassius Dio's usage suggested that the στρατηγός killed in the invasion was the governor; indeed, he calls Marcellus himself στρατηγός. Further, as Marcellus was 'sent against the barbarians' by Commodus as sole emperor, it appeared that his governorship did not begin until after Marcus' death. Hence the Benwell inscription was taken to refer to a second Ulpius Marcellus. The diplomas have exploded this theory: hence, either the στρατηγός killed in the invasion was only a legionary legate, or Marcellus governed the same province twice, which is almost unparalleled.³⁹

It can surely be assumed that "the Wall separating the invaders from the Roman legions" was that of Hadrian. There was destruction in the later second century, perhaps during this invasion, at Haltonchesters, close to where Dere Street, the Roman road to Scotland, goes through the Wall, and its eastern neighbour Rudchester; also at Corbridge, where Dere Street meets the Stanegate, two miles south of the Wall.⁴⁰ Victory was claimed in 184, when Commodus became *imperator VII* and *Britannicus maximus*.⁴¹ A Carlisle dedication commemorating the defeat "of barbarians" may refer to this war. It begins *dei Herc[ulis]...in]/victi con[...]/tibus*, perhaps reflecting Commodus' Hercules cult.⁴² Further, an altar set up about six kilometres north west of Carlisle by L. Junius Victorinus Fl[av(ius)] Caelianus, *leg. Aug. of VI Victrix, ob res trans vallum*

³⁹ Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 162–170, accepting that the second Marcellus postulated in A.R. Birley, *The Fasti of Roman Britain* (Oxford 1981), 140ff., 164ff., did not exist.

⁴⁰ Breeze and Dobson 2000, op. cit. (n. 4), 134. But Frere 1987, op. cit. (n. 23), 147f., is sceptical about the dating, preferring destruction c. 197 (see below).

⁴¹ *ILS* 393–395; *BMC* IV Antoninus Pius to Commodus, pp. CLVIII, CLXXIV, CLXXX.

⁴² *RIB* 946. J.C.N. Coulston and E.J. Phillips, *Corpus Signorum Imperii Romani* I 6 (Oxford 1988), no. 474, regard a Comnodan date as 'a strong possibility'. R.S.O. Tomlin and M.W.C. Hassall, 'Inscriptions', *Britannia* 30 (1999), 375–386, at 384ff., assign it to 192. Commodus' Hercules-obsession peaked in 191–192: O.J. Hekster, *Commodus. An Emperor at the Crossroads* (Amsterdam 2002), 106–111; 117–120. But Hercules is already on a coin of early 184: *BMC* IV, Commodus, nos. 505, 525.

prosperę gestas, must be dated after the abandonment of the Antonine Wall and before the division of Britain, when the legate of VI Victrix became governor of Inferior. As Victorinus was *leg. Aug.* not *leg. Augg.* he surely served under either Antoninus Pius, *c.* 158–161, or Marcus Aurelius as sole emperor, 169–176, or Commodus.⁴³

If Marcellus served uninterruptedly, his governorship was the longest since that of Julius Agricola a century earlier. Both fought northern peoples successfully. But unlike Agricola, who handed over the province to his successor *quietam tutamque* (*Agricola* 40.3), Marcellus, evidently recalled soon after his victory, left Britain in turmoil. Perhaps in reaction to his harsh methods, the army became mutinous. A fragment of Cassius Dio describes what may be the first outbreak:⁴⁴ ‘The soldiers in Britain chose Priscus, a legionary legate, ὑποστράτηγον, as emperor; but he declined, saying: “I am no more emperor than you are soldiers”’ (72(73).9.2a = Petr. Patr., *Exc. Vat.* 122). This was clearly in 184, for the HA, although not naming Priscus, surely refers to this episode: “Commodus was called Britannicus by flatterers when the Britons even wanted to choose another emperor against him” (*Vita Commodi* 8.4). Priscus was no doubt dismissed. Without making the connection, the HA had already mentioned that the Guard Prefect Perennis “put men of equestrian rank in command of the soldiers in the British war, removing the senators,” and that this measure caused his downfall: “when this was made known through representatives of the army (*per legatos exercitus*), he was suddenly declared a public enemy and given to the soldiers to be lynched” (*Vita Commodi* 6.2). Cassius Dio’s version differs slightly: “Those⁴⁵ in Britain, after being rebuked for mutinous conduct (they did not quieten down until Pertinax quelled them), selected 1500 javelin-men and sent them to Italy” (72 (73).2²–4). When Commodus met them near Rome, they denounced Perennis for plotting to make his son emperor, and he was handed over to be lynched. It seems hardly credible that the 1500 legionaries were really sent from Britain to denounce Perennis. Perhaps they were part of a task force rounding up deserters, whose activities had reached alarming proportions in Gaul

⁴³ *RIB* 2034; Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 263f.

⁴⁴ Its position in the *Excerpta* dates the passage to between 177 and 188–189.

⁴⁵ P.A. Brunt, ‘The fall of Perennis: Dio-Xiphilinus 72.9.2’, *Classical Quarterly* 23 (1973), 172–175, pointed out that ὑπάρχοντες here, simply a synonym for ὄντες, has been mistranslated as ‘lieutenants’, i.e. legionary legates, as in the Loeb edition (vol. IX p. 89), influenced by HA, *Vita Commodi* 6.2—but there *legatos exercitus* means the 1500 “javelin-men” as “representatives of the army.”

and Spain and may even have got as far as Rome.⁴⁶ However this may be, Perennis' fall can be dated to 185, the year 'when [Commodus] was called Felix after he had killed Perennis' (HA, *Vita Commodi* 8.1).⁴⁷

With neither governor nor legionary legates in post, the only senator left in Britain was the *iuridicus*, identifiable as M. Antius Crescens Calpurnianus: he also served as *vice leg(ati)*, surely at this time, no doubt until the arrival of the new governor, Pertinax, later in 185, after the fall of Perennis.⁴⁸ The trouble continued: "The soldiers wanted to make any man whatever emperor, especially Pertinax himself... He was almost killed in a mutiny of a legion... and sought to be excused from his legateship, saying that the legions were hostile to him because he had imposed discipline." (HA, *Vita Pertinacis* 3.5–6, 8–10, 4.1; cf. Cassius Dio 72[73].9.2²; 73[74].5.1). Pertinax probably served only until c. 187.⁴⁹ His successor, who is not named (HA, *Vita Pertinacis* 4.1, *accepto successore*), was probably not the next known governor, D. Clodius Albinus, installed at latest in 192.

Albinus was named Caesar by Severus in spring 193, and remained in Britain until late 195, when the two fell out: Albinus moved to the continent and proclaimed himself Augustus.⁵⁰ The decisive battle at Lugdunum in February 197 involved 150,000 men (Cassius Dio 75[76].6.1).⁵¹ Albinus must have brought large numbers of troops from Britain. Before leaving he evidently exacted promises of good behaviour from the northern peoples—who did not keep them: Virius Lupus, Severus' new governor, "was forced to buy peace from the Maeatae for a large sum, because the Caledonians did not abide by their promises

⁴⁶ On the *bellum desertorum* (HA, *Vita Commodi* 16.2; cf. HA, *Vita Pescennii Nigri* 3.3), see the literature in G. Alföldy's commentary on *CIL* VI 41127, Rome, honouring a senator who commanded a task-force, perhaps in this war, possibly even identical with the legate Priscus. See also M. Zimmermann, *Kaiser und Ereignis: Studien zum Geschichtswerk Herodians* (Munich 1999), 85–112, for the fictitious nature of Herodian's account. L. Artorius Castus, prefect of VI Victrix, who had a special command over vexillations from two British legions, *ILS* 2770+*add.*, is often associated with these events. But, as shown by X. Lorient, 'Un mythe historiographique: l'expédition de L. Artorius Castus contre les Armoricaains', *BSNAP* (1997), 85–87, the command was *adversus Arme[nio]s* (not *Arm[orico]s*), probably under Caracalla or Severus Alexander.

⁴⁷ A. Stein, *RE* 6A1 (1936), 955; F. Grosso, *La lotta politica al tempo di Commodo* (Rome 1964), 185ff.

⁴⁸ *CIL* VI 1336 = *ILS* 1151 = *CIL* VI 41777; on the dating, Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 170–171 (where some minor details of the inscription are incorrectly given).

⁴⁹ Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 172–174.

⁵⁰ Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 174–180.

⁵¹ This is the total for *both* sides together: A.J. Graham, 'The numbers at Lugdunum', *Historia* 27 (1968), 625–630.

and were preparing to help the Maeatae, and because Severus was devoting himself to the Parthian war; and he got back a few captives" (Cassius Dio 75.5.4). The passage clearly attests Roman weakness and implies that the Maeatae had penetrated the province. Had the destruction detected at Haltonchesters, Rudchester and Corbridge (and several points further south) after all have been caused then, rather than in the early 180s?⁵²

Herodian states that Britain was divided into two provinces immediately after Albinus' defeat (3.8.2). This conflicts with all the other evidence and must be dismissed as a mistake (one of many by this author). The division took place under Caracalla, probably in 213.⁵³ Lupus is also attested as governor by the *Digest* (28.6.2.4: of Britain, not 'Lower Britain'), and by inscriptions, two at Pennine forts, restoring buildings, one datable to 197, and by another at Corbridge.⁵⁴

The passage from Cassius Dio cited above is the earliest evidence for the northern peoples being labelled 'Caledonii and Maeatae'. He elaborates later: "There are two very large peoples of the Britons [sc. of 'the hostile part', 76[77].12.5], Caledonii and Maeatae, and the names of the others have so to speak been merged into them. The Maeatae live next to the cross-wall which divides the island in two, and the Caledonians beyond them." (76[77].12.1). Although Tacitus did not refer to the Caledonii, but to 'the inhabitants of Caledonia' (*Agricola* 11.2, 25.3), meaning Scotland north of the Forth-Clyde line (10.3), Ptolemy listed the Καληδόνιοι as one of eight peoples in northern Scotland (*Geographia* 2.3.8–9). Clearly, before the end of the second century eight had 'merged' into two. For this phenomenon one may compare the Alamanni, first attested in 213.⁵⁵ By the late third and early

⁵² A.R. Birley, 'Virius Lupus', *Archaeologia Aeliana*, 4th series 50 (1972), 179–189; Frere 1987, op. cit. (n. 23), 155ff., 176f., n. 4.

⁵³ Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 333–336. See Zimmermann 1999, op. cit. (n. 46) for numerous examples of Herodian's errors. On the division of Britain he comments, at 202: 'Diese von Caracalla veranlaßte Maßnahme wird nämlich kürzerhand Septimius Severus zugeschrieben, da eine derartige Regelung nicht in das Bild paßt, das Herodian von Caracalla zeichnet.'

⁵⁴ Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 183–186.

⁵⁵ The *communis opinio* is that the Alamanni only emerged in the later third century, their naming in excerpts and summaries of Dio being supposedly Byzantine glosses. But B. Bleckmann, 'Die Alamannen im 3. Jahrhundert: althistorische Bemerkungen zur Ersterwähnungen und zur Ethnogenese', *MH* 59 (2002), 145–171, shows that this is mistaken. J.C. Mann, 'The northern frontier after AD 369', *Glasgow Archaeological Journal* 3 (1974), 34–42, at 41, compares the fusion into great confederations of continental peoples faced with Roman power with "the rise of the Pictish kingdom, ... clearly a

fourth centuries the northern Britons are *Picti* (*Panegyrici Latini Veteres* 8[5].11.4) or *Caledones aliique Picti* (6[7].7.2); and the *Laterculus Veronensis* begins its list of *gentes barbarae, quae pullulaverunt sub imperatoribus*, with *Scoti, Picti, Calidoni* (13.1–4). In the post-Roman period there were two Pictish regions, north and south of the Mounth, the earlier existence of which is implied by Ammianus Marcellinus, writing in the 390s: “the *Picti* are divided into two nations, Dicalydones and Verturiones” (27.8.4). The Dicalydones are the Caledonii; the name Verturiones is preserved in Gaelic form as the *Fortrenn* district. At first sight the Maeatae have disappeared, but in Fortrenn, near Stirling, the name survives as Dumyat, *dun*, fortress, of the Maeatae, and Myot Hill.⁵⁶

There may be an earlier record of the Picts. At or near Corbridge Q Calpurnius Concessinius, prefect of cavalry, dedicated an altar, at latest in the third century, ‘after slaughtering a band of Cori[t]onototae’.⁵⁷ The reading in a drawing of the lost stone, *Corionototarum* in the genitive, can be emended to *Cori[t]onototarum*. This could represent *Cruithen-túatha*, the Q-Celtic name for the Picts, with the addition of *-atae*, for *túath(a)* ‘people(s)’.⁵⁸ The apparent use of Q-Celtic, confined to Ireland, at such an early date, seems odd, to be sure. But it has been argued convincingly that the *Scoti* of Dal Riada did not first arrive—from Ireland—in the fifth century, but had been there since the first millennium BC. Some of them may have joined a Pictish raid.⁵⁹

The next governor after Lupus, C. Valerius Pudens, is recorded only at a Pennine fort, rebuilding a barrack in 205.⁶⁰ Pudens’ successor L. Alfenus Senecio is recorded not only in the Pennines but on the Wall and at the outpost of Risingham. It may be inferred that there was still no intention to move into Scotland again. An inscription from

reaction to the continuing presence of Rome to the south, to her continuing control of southern Scotland and to her occasional interventions north of the Highland Line.”

⁵⁶ Rivet and Smith 1979, op. cit. (n. 19), 496f. (Verturiones), 404 (Maeatae); the Maeatae also recur as *Miathi* in Adamnan, *Vita Columbae* 1.8. On the Picts, K. Forsyth, *Language in Pictland: the case against ‘non-Indo-European Pictish.’* *Studia Hameliana* 2 (Utrecht 1997), has convincingly shown that they were speakers of a variety of P-Celtic, which she calls ‘Pritenic’; for a helpful survey see S.M. Foster, *Picts, Gaels and Scots* (London 2004²).

⁵⁷ *RIB* 1142.

⁵⁸ H.M. Chadwick, *Early Scotland* (Cambridge 1949), 71f., 139; cf. for another interpretation Rivet and Smith 1979, op. cit. (n. 19), 322, 317ff.

⁵⁹ E. Campbell, ‘Were the Scots Irish?’, *Antiquity* 75 (2001), 285–292, supported by Foster 2004, op. cit. (n. 56), 9f., with further bibliography.

⁶⁰ Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 186–188.

Benwell dedicated under him to the “Victory of the Emperors,” hints that he was one of those “others through whom Severus was winning victories in Britain” while struggling for two years to defeat a bandit in Italy (Cassius Dio 76 [77].10.6).⁶¹ A legate of *legio II Augusta* who dedicated to *Victoria Aug.* at Corbridge, L. Julius Julianus, served either under Senecio or during the Severan expedition,⁶² which lasted from 208–211.⁶³

The Greek writers claim to know Severus’ motives. Cassius Dio says it was because “he wanted to get his sons away from Rome, so that they would behave better under military discipline” (76[77].11.1). Herodian is even more specific. Just when Severus was becoming displeased at his sons’ behaviour, ‘the governor of Britain’ appealed for assistance, welcome news for Severus, a lover of glory, who wanted to add a victory against the Britons to those won in east and north (3.14.12). The governor’s appeal was probably invented,⁶⁴ although there was no doubt warfare, as Cassius Dio’s report about ‘winning victories in Britain through others’ shows. Herodian’s remarks about Severus’ love of glory are also plausible enough.

Cassius Dio is unequivocal about Severus’ intentions: “wishing to subjugate the whole of it [the island], he invaded Caledonia” (76[77].13.1). Severus was accompanied by Julia Domna, Caracalla and Geta, and the Guard Prefect Aemilius Papinianus—with, no doubt, some of the Rome cohorts, part at least of the new legion II Parthica, and other troops.⁶⁵ Sex. Varius Marcellus, husband of Julia Domna’s niece Soaemias, served as procurator of Britain at this time, and Marcellus’ father-in-law, C. Julius Avitus Alexianus, was one of the emperors’ *comites*. The *classis Britannica* was probably strengthened by detachments from the Rhine and Danube fleets.⁶⁶ Coins of 208, with Severus mounted and a bridge, presumably refer to the expedition; an As or small bronze

⁶¹ Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 188–192.

⁶² Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 266.

⁶³ The sources are cited *in extenso* in Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 198–202.

⁶⁴ See Birley 1972, op. cit. (n. 52), 186ff., for parallel (invented) ‘appeals’ from governors in Herodian.

⁶⁵ For a centaur-standard assignable to this legion, found near Middleham in North Yorkshire: M.V. Taylor, ‘The Sidmouth bronze: legionary standard or tripod?’, *Antf* 24 (1944), 22–26, at 24f.; noted by N. Reed, ‘The Scottish campaigns of Septimius Severus’, *PSAS* 107 (1975–1976), 92–102, at 96 and n. 6.

⁶⁶ Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 313f. (Marcellus); 225f. (Papinian, *comites Augg.*); 320 (fleet, on *CIL* VI 1643).

medallion of Caracalla issued in 209 has a pontoon-bridge with the legend *TRAIECTVS*.⁶⁷

In preparation for the advance the fort at South Shields at the mouth of the Tyne was converted into a massive supply base and that at Cramond on the Forth was reoccupied. At Corbridge an altar was set up by the *[pr]aep(ositus) cur[am] agens horreorum tempo[r]e expeditionis felicissi(mae) Brittanicae*, surely at this time.⁶⁸ In a curious development at Vindolanda, the existing fort was dismantled and its entire area, so it seems, filled with, by calculation, up to 200 round stone huts, c. 5 m. or more in diameter. A new fort with normal barracks but an otherwise unusual plan was constructed at right angles to the old one. It is a matter of speculation who occupied the huts. The date is clearly Severan; both new fort and round huts were short-lived, being replaced by a normal fort, built over the foundations of the demolished huts, in the reign of Caracalla.⁶⁹

Marching-camps chart the progress of the expedition into north east Scotland,⁷⁰ as does the large base at Carpow on the south bank of the Tay, with main buildings of stone.⁷¹ Over 200 stamped tiles show the involvement in its construction of the legion *VI Vic(trix)B(ritannica) p(ia)*

⁶⁷ *BMC V*, Severus 269§; 351 no. 857 (AD 208); 353† (AD 209); A.S. Robertson, 'The bridges on Severan coins of AD 208 and 209', in W.S. Hanson and L.J.F. Keppie, eds., *Roman Frontier Studies 1979* (Oxford 1981), 131–140, correcting the use of numismatic evidence by Reed 1975–1976, op. cit. (n. 65).

⁶⁸ South Shields: P. Bidwell and S. Speak, *Excavations at South Shields Roman Fort I* (Newcastle 1994), 20ff. Cramond: A. and V. Rae, 'The Roman fort at Cramond, Edinburgh: excavations 1954–1966', *Britannia* 5 (1974), 163–224. Corbridge: the Severan date of Site 11, the unfinished storehouse, forum or legionary headquarters building, is accepted by Frere 1987 (n. 23), 159, but rejected by G. Simpson, 'Haltwhistle Burn, Corstopitum and the Antonine Wall: a reconsideration', *Britannia* 5 (1974), 317–339, at 327ff.; she is followed by M.J. Bishop and J.N. Dore, *Corbridge. Excavations of the Roman Fort and Town, 1947–1980* (London 1989), 139. Altar: *RIB* 1143; new granaries were built under Severus, *RIB* 1151, datable only within the period 198–209.

⁶⁹ J. Blake, *Vindolanda Excavations 2000: The Southern Defences of Stone Fort Two, with the Circular Huts and Other Features* (Greenhead 2001), 7ff.; Andrew Birley, *Vindolanda Report 2003, The Excavations of 2001 and 2002*, 1 (Bardon Mill 2003), 52ff. Lack of space prevents further discussion of the huts, for which no parallels within Roman forts can be found.

⁷⁰ J.K.S. St Joseph, 'Air reconnaissance in Britain, 1965–1968', *JRS* 59 (1969), 104–128, at 114ff.; id., 'Air reconnaissance in Roman Britain', *JRS* 63 (1973), 214–246, at 230ff.

⁷¹ R.E. Birley, 'The Roman legionary fortress at Carpow, Perthshire', *Scottish Historical Review* 42 (1963), 126–134; id., 'Excavations of a Roman fortress at Carpow, Perthshire, 1961–1962', *PSAS* 96 (1962–1963), 184–207; J.N. Dore and J.J. Wilkes, 'Excavations directed by J.D. Leach and J.J. Wilkes on the site of a Roman fortress at Carpow, Perthshire, 1964–1979', *ibid.* 129 (1999), 481–575.

ffidelis).⁷² *B(ritannica)* echoes the emperors' title *Britannicus maximus*, probably assumed on 31 March 210,⁷³ following the conclusion of a treaty with the Caledonians (Cassius Dio 76.14.3, 16.5)—which they then broke (76.15.1–2). The emblems of II Augusta are carved on a very fragmentary monumental inscription from the *porta praetoria*; the six surviving letters probably formed part of Caracalla's titulature, but not necessarily after he had become sole emperor.⁷⁴

The descriptions of the northern peoples in Cassius Dio-Xiphilinus (77[77].12.1–5) and Herodian (3.14.6–8), stressing their nakedness and other primitive features, are largely *topoi* about barbarians.⁷⁵ Both writers stress that the Romans failed to bring their opponents, who used guerrilla tactics, to pitched battle. The Carpow fortress confirms Cassius Dio's statement that Severus intended to subjugate the whole island (76[77].13.1).⁷⁶ His persistence, pressing on 'to the end of the island', carried in a covered litter because of his gout, impressed Cassius Dio (76[77].13.4), and evidently Mommsen as well, whose baffling judgement on Severus' expedition, "vielleicht die patriotische, vernünftigste Unternehmung der Kaiserzeit," is surely excessive.⁷⁷ In any case, when Severus died, at York on 4 February 211, his sons abandoned the conquests and returned to Rome (Cassius Dio 76[77].15.1–3; 77[78].1.1–6; Herodian 3.15.4–7), evidently reaching it within two months.⁷⁸

⁷² *RIB* II 2460.71–74; one example has been found at the legion's base, York, *ibid.* 75.

⁷³ M. Heil, 'On the date of the title *Britannicus Maximus* of Septimius Severus and his sons', *Britannia* 34 (2003), 268–271.

⁷⁴ R.P. Wright, 'Carpow and Caracalla', *Britannia* 5 (1974) 289–292, restoring *imp. e[st] d.n. M. Aur. Antoninus p[ro]p[ri]us f[el]ix...*, dated the inscription to 212. Hence a further campaign by Caracalla in 212 has been inferred. But even if the restoration is correct, there could have been two further stones naming Severus and Geta.

⁷⁵ Not discussed by B. Günnewig, *Das Bild der Germanen und Britannier. Untersuchungen zur Sichtweise von fremden Völkern in antiker Literatur und moderner wissenschaftlicher Forschung* (Frankfurt 1996), who does not go beyond the second century. On the ancient sources, 255ff., and their modern interpretation, 309ff., she argues justifiably enough that British scholars have ignored the 'aus der rhetorischen Tradition stammendes Element, welches den unzivilisierten Wilden dem kultivierten Bürger gegenüberstellt' (317). It need hardly be added that the northern peoples were far from primitive: see e.g. I. Armit, *Towers in the North. The Brochs of Scotland* (Stroud 2003).

⁷⁶ According to Frere 1987, op. cit. (n. 23) 161f., Severus' 'neglect to garrison the Lowlands [shows] that he was not intending a permanent occupation of Scotland.' Yet forts could have been garrisoned there later, had Caracalla not abandoned the conquests.

⁷⁷ Mommsen 1992, op. cit. (n. 1), 302.

⁷⁸ G. Alföldy, 'Nox dea fit lux! Caracallas Geburtstag', *Historiae Augustae Colloquia*, n.s. IV (1996), 9–36, convincingly argues that Caracalla was already back at Rome on

The next governor, C. Julius Marcus, was appointed at latest by Caracalla in 212. His name is preserved on a milestone of 213 from near milecastle 17 on Hadrian's Wall. He was originally recorded on numerous other inscriptions in the frontier zone, but on most his name was deleted. At least eight dedications, some with no legible trace of Marcus' name surviving, were set up in honour of Caracalla or Julia Domna or both, with the same formula, *pro pietate ac devotione communi*.⁷⁹ This unparalleled protestation of loyalty can readily be explained. The army of Britain had no doubt reacted unfavourably when the news of Geta's death, in late December 211,⁸⁰ reached it. This had been the case with II Parthica at Alba (HA, *Vita Caracallae* 2.7), which had probably been in Britain. When Caracalla wanted to kill Geta on the way back to Rome, he was prevented by the army, "for the soldiers felt great good will towards the younger brother, especially as he very closely resembled his father" (Cassius Dio 77[78].1.3). Herodian too says that Geta was more popular (4.3.2f.). At all events, Julius Marcus needed to affirm the army's and his own loyalty; he failed to convince and incurred *damnatio*.

Marcus' title *leg(atus) Aug(usti) pr(o) pr(aetore)* could have referred either to a consular governor of the undivided province or to a praetorian governor of Britannia Inferior. If his name may be restored on an inscription at London, that would show that he was governing—probably as the last to do so—a still undivided province.⁸¹ Caracalla then split Britain into two, the northerly Inferior having only one legion, VI Victrix. It may be inferred that, to justify the abandonment of the Scottish conquests, it was put about that the expedition's purpose had been punitive, and the reconstruction of Hadrian's Wall given as the real achievement: the Latin chroniclers, probably all deriving directly or indirectly from the *Kaisergeschichte*, name the building of the Wall as Severus' principal or only achievement in Britain, and know nothing of campaigns in Caledonia.⁸²

his birthday, 4 April 211, as revealed by his re-interpretation of *CIL* VI 1080, now republished as VI 40638, with his commentary.

⁷⁹ Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 203–208.

⁸⁰ Geta was murdered in late December 211: T.D. Barnes, 'Pre-Decian *Acta martyrum*', *JThS* 19 (1968), 509–531, at 523ff.

⁸¹ *RIB+add.* 8; Birley 2005, op. cit. (n. 5), 206 and n. 62, 208.

⁸² See A.R. Birley, 'Further notes on HA Severus', *Historiae Augustae Colloquia*, n.s. II (1994), 19–42, at 36ff.

RÖMISCHES MILITÄR UND DIE GRÜNDUNG NIEDERGERMANISCHER STÄDTE*

GABRIELE WEILER

Im Winter 8–7 v. Chr. war die erste Phase der römischen Okkupation Germaniens beiderseits des Rheins abgeschlossen. Deutliches Zeichen war die Rückkehr des Tiberius nach Rom und sein Triumph *ex Germania* am 1. Januar 7 v. Chr., zeitgleich mit dem Antritt seines zweiten Consulats.¹ Aus diesem bedeutenden Anlaß—immerhin der erste Triumph seit 10 Jahren—wurden Gold- und Silbermünzen mit einer eindeutigen Aussage geprägt. Ein stehender Barbar in germanischer Kleidung übergibt dem sitzenden Augustus als Zeichen der Unterwerfung ein kleines Kind als Geisel.² Zudem wurde im selben Jahr in Rom vermutlich das *pomerium* erweitert, worin sich eine Vergrößerung des Reiches ausdrückte. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt mußte man sich in der Zentrale Gedanken machen, was mit den neu gewonnenen Gebieten geschehen sollte. Velleius Paterculus berichtet, Germanien sei damals von Tiberius „zu einer beinahe tributpflichtigen Provinz“ gemacht worden.³ Rom kontrollierte damit den Raum zwischen Maas und Elbe, und genau dieser Bereich sollte nun provinzialisiert werden.

Dies setzt voraus, daß man sich für eine Hauptstadt entschied und sich Gedanken über den Aufbau einer effektiven Verwaltung machte. Dabei konnte man nicht—wie im griechischen Osten oder auch im galisch-keltischen Bereich—auf bereits bestehende urbane oder zumindest proto-urbane Zentren zurückgreifen, die als Sitze von Führungseliten und als Standorte regionaler Administration dienen und als künftige

* Meine Ausführungen sind durch das Entgegenkommen dreier Kölner Kollegen wesentlich gefördert worden. Johannes Heinrichs hat Ergebnisse wiederholt mit mir diskutiert, mir Anregungen gegeben und großzügig unpublizierte Manuskripte zur Verfügung gestellt; Werner Eck verdanke ich zahlreiche wichtige Informationen zum römischen Köln; Hans-Gerd Hellenkemper gewährte mir großzügig Einsicht in die von ihm geleitete Kölner Grabung bei Groß-St. Martin.

¹ Velleius Paterculus, *Historia Romana* 2.97; Cassius Dio 55.6.5; 8.2.

² RIC I² 201a; R. Wolters, *Tam diu Germania vincitur* (Bochum 1989), 26; 32–34.

³ Velleius Paterculus, *Historia Romana* 2.97.4: *provincia paene stipendiaria*; Peter, *HRR* 2.96.3, Aufidius Bassus: *inter Albim et Rhenum Germani omnes Tiberio Neroni dediti*.

Selbstverwaltungseinheiten nach römischen Vorstellungen funktionieren konnten.⁴ Siedlungen dieser Art waren den Germanen grundsätzlich fremd, sie mußten also von Rom erst geschaffen werden. Als Platz für eine notwendig zu konzipierende Hauptstadt der zukünftigen Provinz wählte man den Ort, an dem das *oppidum Ubiorum*, damit zugleich die neue Mittelpunktssiedlung im Gebiet der Ubier, entstehen sollte. Die Anlage der neuen Stadt folgt vom ersten Augenblick an einem rein römischen Konzept. Sie entstand in strategisch günstiger Lage am Schnittpunkt römischer Verkehrswege: der Rheinstraße parallel zum Flußverlauf und der Hauptverbindungslinie nach Westen, die den Rhein mit dem Inneren Galliens verknüpfte. Der Verlauf der Straße war vom nordgallischen Verkehrsknotenpunkt Bavai über Tongeren zum Rhein bei Köln geplant, d.h. man nutzte seit den Tälern von Nahe und Mosel die erste Möglichkeit einer Wegführung nach Westen.

Prädestiniert war gerade diese Stelle durch eine hinreichend große hochwassersichere Terrasse am Rheinufer etwa 15 Meter oberhalb des Flusses und durch die vorgelagerte Rheininsel, welche die Anlage eines geschützten Hafens mit Stapelplatz ermöglichte. Konzept und Baumaßnahmen der Fernstraße gingen auf Marcus Agrippa zurück, damit also vermutlich auch die Auswahl des Zielorts im Bereich des heutigen Köln. Verantwortlich für die Ausführung der Baumaßnahmen war der jeweilige Kommandeur der römischen Truppen am Rhein.

Im Jahr 9 n. Chr. war der Prozeß der Provinzialisierung in diesem Raum weiter fortgeschritten. Wir erfahren, daß im *oppidum Ubiorum* eine *ara Romae et Augusti*, also ein Zentrum für den Kaiserkult, bestand, und ein hochrangiger Cherusker, Segimundus, Sohn des Segestes und Schwager des Arminius, als Priester dort seinen Dienst versah.⁵ Demnach war dieser Altar in Analogie zur *ara trium Galliarum* in Lugdunum als kultischer und damit auch administrativer Mittelpunkt einer Provinz Germanien projektiert, an dem Vertreter der unterworfenen Stämme zusammen kamen. Es handelte sich somit um eine *ara Germaniae*, mit hoher Integrationsfunktion.⁶

⁴ A. Becker, 'Zur Logistik der augusteischen Germanienfeldzüge', in: P. Kneissel und V. Losemann, Hrsg., *Imperium Romanum*. Festschrift K. Christ (Stuttgart 1998), 41–50, bes. 44 zum Fehlen germanischer Zentralorte; vgl. K. Christ, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit* (4. Auflage 2002), 131.

⁵ Tacitus, *Annales* 1.57.2: *anno, quo Germaniae descivere, sacerdos apud aram Ubiorum creatus*.

⁶ Zur *ara* W. Eck, *Köln in römischer Zeit. Geschichte einer Stadt im Imperium Romanum* (Köln 2004), 85–93.

Im Jahr der Varus-Niederlage war der Provinzialisierungsprozeß also bereits relativ weit fortgeschritten. Durch die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald erhielt er jedoch einen empfindlichen Rückschlag und fand rechts des Rheins tatsächlich sein Ende, wie sich bald herausstellen sollte. Dies hat dazu geführt, daß man diesen Prozeß mißverstanden und geradezu bestritten hat, was teils noch immer geschieht. Man kann aber durch neue archäologische Befunde zeigen, daß Rom seit dem Ende der ersten Offensivphase der augusteischen Germanienkriege, also seit dem Winter 8–7 v. Chr., gezielt das Konzept einer Provinzialisierung des germanischen Raumes verfolgte, westlich und auch östlich des Rheins, vermutlich zwischen Maas und Elbe. Greifen läßt sich dieser Prozeß heute vor allem für das linksrheinische Gebiet und die dort siedelnden Völker, aber auch bereits in zwei Fällen für Regionen östlich des Rheins. Dabei tritt hervor, daß die Anlage eines Zentralorts für die Ubier, des entsprechend benannten *oppidum Ubiorum*, kein Einzel-, vielmehr ein Modellfall war. Jeweils in römischer Regie entstanden nahezu zeitgleich in verkehrsgünstiger Lage Mittelpunktssiedlungen für die Bataver, das *oppidum Batavorum* (Nijmegen),⁷ eine Siedlung für die umgesiedelten Sugambrier bzw. Cugerner bei Xanten (vermutlich *oppidum Cugernorum* oder *Cibernodurum*)⁸ und das *oppidum Ubiorum* innerhalb des heutigen Kölner Stadtgebiets für die Ubier.⁹ Voorburg (Arentsburg), das spätere *civitas*-Zentrum der Cananefaten, liefert bislang keine Spuren einer so frühen römischen Präsenz. Hier muß also eine andere Erklärung gefunden werden.¹⁰ Im westlichen Hinterland, unweit der

⁷ H. van Enckevort und J. Thijssen, 'Der Hauptort der Bataver in Nijmegen im 1. Jh. n. Chr.', in: G. Precht und N. Zieling, Hrsg., *Genese, Struktur und Entwicklung Römischer Städte im 1. Jh. n. Chr. in Nieder- und Obergermanien* (Mainz 2001), 87–110; dies., 'Nijmegen. A Roman Town in the Frontier Zone of Germania Inferior', in P. Wilson, Hrsg., *The Archaeology of Roman Towns. Studies in Honour of J.S. Wachter* (Oxford 2003), 59–72; N. Roymans, *Ethnic Identity and Imperial Power. The Batavians in the Early Roman Empire* (Amsterdam 2004).

⁸ J.E. Bogaers, 'Zum Namen des *oppidum Cugernorum*', in G. Precht und H.-J. Schalles, Hrsg., *Spurenlese Beiträge zur Geschichte des Xantener Raums* (Köln 1989), 77–80.

⁹ Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 63–102.

¹⁰ Voorburg/Arentsburg erweist sich für die vorclaudische Zeit erstaunlich befundarm. Eine Erklärung könnte möglicherweise sein, daß Bataver und Cananefaten im frühen 1. Jh. noch einen gemeinsamen Volksverband bildeten, bzw. von den Römern als eine solche Einheit betrachtet wurden. Dies hätte dann eine alleinige Zuständigkeit von Nijmegen/*oppidum Batavorum* für das ganze Gebiet begründet, damit die Anlage eines weiteren *civitas*-Hauptorts für die Cananefaten überflüssig gemacht. Erst nach der Abspaltung der Cananefaten wäre ein eigenständiger Zentralort notwendig geworden—eben Voorburg/Arentsburg (freundlicher Hinweis von Michael Erdrich, Nijmegen); anders A. Vanderhoeven, 'The earliest urbanisation in Northern Gaul.

Maas, wurde an der Fernstraße Köln—Bavai mit *Atuatuca Tungrorum* = *oppidum Tungrorum* (Tongeren) der neue Vorort der *civitas Tungrorum* geplant (*Atuatuca* = keltisch ‚Fliehbürg‘, ‚befestigter Ort‘).¹¹ Damit war der linksrheinische Bereich der neuen germanischen Provinz geordnet, aber auch östlich des Rheins fand das gleiche Konzept Anwendung. Nur sind wir hier infolge der historischen Entwicklung, welche die Provinzialisierung im Jahr 9 n. Chr. abrupt beendete, weit schlechter informiert. Römisch initiierte Mittelpunktsiedlungen, welche Völker oder Regionen erschlossen und für Rom beherrschbar machten, haben aber hier ebenso bestanden wie westlich des Rheins. Sie werden sogar von dem severischen Historiographen Cassius Dio als *poleis* erwähnt.¹² Die gleiche Information findet sich auch bei Tacitus, allerdings nicht in einer Feststellung, sondern in einer Rede, in der Arminius 15 n. Chr. seine Stammesgenossen vor neuen römischen Siedlungen, *novae coloniae* (natürlich nicht im Rechtssinn), warnt.¹³ Man hat diese Aussagen lange Zeit für eine tendenziöse Übertreibung gehalten; seit einigen Jahren weiß man aber, daß beide Historiker reale Sachverhalte schildern.¹⁴

Zwei dieser östlichen *poleis* bzw. *coloniae*, die sich zeitlich wie strukturell in die Entwicklung westlich des Rheins fügen, kennen wir derzeit. Es handelt sich zum einen um das Lager Haltern, das—wie jüngere Grabungsergebnisse belegen—in seiner Spätphase, also in den letzten Jahren vor 9 n. Chr., zunehmend zivilen Charakter angenommen hat.¹⁵ Hier wurde im ehemaligen Gebiet der 8–7 v. Chr. in den Raum

Some implications of recent research in Tongres’, in N. Roymans, Hrsg., *From the Sword to the Plough* (Amsterdam 1996), 189–260; 191f.: “The absence of early-Roman features in Voorburg, the centre of the Cananefati, the fact that the capital of the Frisiavones is still unlocated, and the shadowy existence of Cassel (capital of the Menapii) and Théroutanne (capital of the Morini) in the Augustan period lead one to suspect that the Roman urban model did not catch on well in these regions either.”

¹¹ Tongeren als römische Plansiedlung behandelt Vanderhoeven 1996, a.a.O. (Anm. 10), 189–260; s.u. Anm. 26.

¹² Cassius Dio, 56.18.1–2.

¹³ Tacitus, *Annales* 1.59.6.

¹⁴ Anders R.G. Jahn, *Der römisch-germanische Krieg 9–16 n. Chr.* (Bonn 2001), 65: die von Dio genannten *poleis* werden als bislang nicht identifizierbare germanische Dörfer oder Marktflecken interpretiert; Rom beherrschte Germanien ohne militärische Kontrolle des Territoriums nur durch konsequente Zusammenarbeit mit kooperationsbereiten Stammeseliten.

¹⁵ R. Förtsch, ‚Villa und Praetorium. Zur Luxusarchitektur in frühkaiserzeitlichen Legionslagern‘, *Kölner Jahrbücher* 28 (1995) 617ff.: Offiziershäusern in augusteischen Lagern, an repräsentativer Wohnarchitektur Italiens orientiert; Halterner Grabmonumenten, die in Holz die großen Rundmausoleen Roms nachahmen: R. Asskamp und J.-S. Kühlborn, in *Ausgrabungen und Funde Westfalen-Lippe* 4 (1986), 129ff.;

Xanten umgesiedelten Sugambrier für verbliebene Bevölkerungsreste und seitdem neu zugewanderte germanische Gruppen ein Zentralort durch Umfunktionierung eines römischen Lagers geschaffen. Bei der Bevölkerung im Lippe-Raum um Haltern handelte es sich nicht um eine *civitas*, sondern um ein relativ heterogenes Substrat, das nach aller Erwartung eine Benennung durch die Römer erfahren hat, entsprechend den umgesiedelten Sugambriern, die zu Cugernern wurden, oder den Eburonen-Resten im mittleren Maas-Gebiet, die fortan unter dem neuen Namen der *Tungri* erscheinen. Den Namen der Gruppe um Haltern kennen wir bis heute allerdings nicht. Einen vielleicht analogen Vorgang greifen wir einige Jahre später in Britannien bei der claudischen Kolonie *Camulodunum*/Colchester.¹⁶ Im ehemaligen Stammesgebiet der Trinovanten, das von den belgisch-stämmigen *Catwellauini* besetzt worden war, errichteten die Römer nach der Eroberung 43–44 n.Chr. ein Legionslager in der aufgelassenen Königsstadt. Nach Abzug der dort stationierten *legio XX Valeria Victrix* 48–49 n. Chr. bildete eben dieses Lager die Keimzelle für die vor Ort entstehende Veteranenkolonie *colonia Victricensis*, der die Funktion der künftigen Hauptstadt zugedacht war.¹⁷ Dort scheint die allmähliche Umwandlung eines Militärlagers in ein ziviles Zentrum gelungen zu sein; damit wird ein Prozeß erkennbar, der in Haltern wohl begonnen hatte, durch die Varus-Katastrophe aber ein abruptes Ende fand.

Anders verhält sich dies mit einem Verband im ehemals ubischen Gebiet. Dieses war vermutlich 11 v. Chr. *per foedus* an die Chatten gefallen. Es handelt sich dabei um Land im Raum von mittlerer Lahn, Dill und Sieg. Für die hier siedelnden Chatten entstand die zweite der bislang bekannten rechtsrheinischen Mittelpunktsiedlungen, sozusagen ein **oppidum Chattorum*, bei der modernen Ortschaft Lahnau-Waldgirmes, einige Kilometer westlich von Gießen gelegen.¹⁸ Daß es östlich des Rheins weitere ähnliche Siedlungen gab, oder daß diese, wie Tacitus andeutet, zumindest geplant waren, etwa bei den Cheruskern oder

S. Berke, in B. Trier, Hrsg., *Die römische Okkupation nördlich der Alpen zur Zeit des Augustus*. Bodenaltertümer Westfalens 26 (Münster 1991), 149ff.; Luftaufnahme bei Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 70, Abb. 27a.

¹⁶ Th. Fischer, 'Beispiele zur Entstehung römischer Städte in den Nordwestprovinzen', in Precht und Zieling, Hrsg., 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 11–16, hier 13; *Camulodunum*: J.S. Wacher, *The Towns of Roman Britain* (London, 2th ed. 1995) 112ff.

¹⁷ Die *legio XX Valeria Victrix* war bis zu den Britannienzügen im Jahr 43 im ubischen Gebiet bei Neuss stationiert.

¹⁸ Siehe Anm. 29.

den Friesen, ist eine recht naheliegende Vermutung. Es fällt immerhin auf, daß die beiden heute bekannten Zentralorte östlich des Rheins, Haltern wie Waldgirmes, in Gebieten germanischer Völker lagen, die von Rom umgesiedelt worden waren: den Ubiern, die 19/18 v. Chr. in den Raum Köln und den Sugambrenn, die Ende 8 v. Chr. in den Raum Xanten gelangt waren.¹⁹ Über die beiden rechtsrheinischen ehemaligen Siedlungsgebiete konnte Rom *de facto* und wahrscheinlich auch *de iure* verfügen, und vielleicht ist es kein Zufall, daß mit Waldgirmes und Haltern gerade hier schon früh römisch geprägte Mittelpunktsiedlungen entstanden. Man wird abwarten müssen, ob sich die gleiche Entwicklung in anderen rechtsrheinischen Räumen, in denen Rom weniger direkten Zugriff besaß, zeitgleich vollzog oder ob entsprechende Entwicklungen phasenversetzt anzunehmen sind. Neben den beiden genannten Orten fehlen jedenfalls bislang vergleichbare Befunde.

Nimmt man die heute bekannten augusteischen Gründungen im germanischen Raum westlich und östlich des Rheins zusammen, also Nijmegen, Xanten, Köln, Tongeren, Haltern und Waldgirmes, ergeben sich bei jeweils regional oder funktional bedingten Unterschieden doch auffällige Gemeinsamkeiten. Die Gründungen sind jeweils bald nach 7 v. Chr. anzusetzen, liegen verkehrsgünstig an strategisch wichtigen Punkten und knüpfen in keinem Fall an bestehende einheimische Siedlungen an, sondern entstehen buchstäblich auf dem Reißbrett, wie schon ihre orthogonale Anlage belegt. Es handelt sich also nicht um eine Serie von einzelnen Gründungen, sondern um die konsequente Umsetzung eines einheitlichen Konzepts. Dieses Konzept diene ganz den Interessen Roms. Es schuf Zentralsiedlungen, in denen wahrscheinlich die Stammeseliten als Roms Ansprechpartner zusammengezogen und durch kulturelle Einflüsse allmählich romanisiert werden sollten. Wir greifen damit bereits in augusteischer Zeit für den germanischen Raum Entwicklungen, welche Tacitus für die claudisch-neronische Zeit in Britannien konstatiert, das damals eben erst erobert worden war

¹⁹ Umsiedlung der Ubiern 19–18 v. Chr.: J. Heinrichs, 'Ubiern, Chatten, Bataver. Mittel- und Niederrhein ca. 70–1 v. Chr. anhand germanischer Münzen', in Th. Grünewald und S. Seibel, Hrsg., *Kontinuität und Diskontinuität. Germania inferior am Beginn und am Ende der römischen Herrschaft* (Berlin, New York 2003), 266–344, bes. 336f.; Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 48–55; s.u. Anm. 43–45; Sugambrenn: J. Heinrichs, 'Römische Perfidie oder germanischer Edelmut? Zur Umsiedlung protocugernischer Gruppen in den Raum Xanten 8 v. Chr.', in Th. Grünewald, Hrsg., *Germania Inferior. Besiedlung, Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft an der Grenze der römisch-germanischen Welt* (Berlin/New York 2001), 54–92.

und provinzialisiert werden sollte.²⁰ Auch die Ausgestaltung der neuen Mittelpunktorte geschah jeweils nach römischen Vorstellungen. Dies setzt voraus, daß an Planung und Durchführung der Bauten römisches Personal in nicht unerheblichem Umfang beteiligt war; einheimische Bevölkerung hätte dies nicht, oder zumindest nicht ohne römische Anleitung leisten können. Damit stellt sich unter anderem die Frage, woher die römischen Handwerker kamen, die diese neuen Städte konzipierten und bauten und in welchem Umfang dieses römische Personal letztlich eingesetzt wurde.

Hier allerdings gilt es zu differenzieren. Römische Planung lag zwar jeder der neuen Siedlungen zugrunde, die Ausführung aber geschah in stark unterschiedlicher Intensität. Die beiden Pole markieren das spätere Xanten und das spätere Köln. Während die einheimisch-cugernische Siedlung bei Xanten zunächst wenig urbanen Charakter zeigte,²¹ entwickelte sich Köln von Anfang an als rein römische Stadt mit öffentlichen Räumen und Gebäuden, analog zum benachbarten, wenig älteren Trier.²² Zwischen diesen Polen gibt es Abstufungen, wenngleich Köln im germanischen Raum sicher ein Einzelfall bleibt. Der Einsatz römischen Personals war also in Köln in größerem Umfang und langfristig notwendig, und nur in Köln waren stark spezialisierte Fachkräfte erforderlich, um Teile der Stadt mit Monumenten nach italischen Standards auszustatten.²³ Hierzu gehörten sicherlich der Bereich der *ara Germaniae*, der späteren *ara Ubiorum*, sowie der Praetorium-Komplex,

²⁰ Tacitus, *Agricola* 21; M. Streng, *Agricola. Das Vorbild römischer Statthalterschaft nach dem Urteil des Tacitus* (Bonn 1970); Romanisierung: 99–106.

²¹ Diskussion vorcoloniazeitlicher Siedlungsspuren bei S. Leih, 'Ausgewählte Siedlungsbefunde vom Areal der Colonia Ulpia Traiana', in: Precht und Zieling, Hrsg., 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 17–26; G. Precht, 'Neue Befunde zur vorcoloniazeitlichen Siedlung', in: Precht und Zieling, Hrsg., 2001, 37–56; 56, Hypothese Prechts: die frühe Anlage könnte „eine unbefestigte Zivilsiedlung mit eingegliederten Reitereinheiten“ sein.

²² H.-P. Kuhnen, 'Die Anfänge des römischen Trier—Alte und neue Forschungsansätze', in: Precht und Zieling, Hrsg., 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 143–156.

²³ Zu frühkaiserzeitlichen Architekturfragmenten in Köln sowie zur Fertigung durch Fachpersonal aus Oberitalien und der Narbonensis: H. von Hesberg, 'Bauteile der frühen Kaiserzeit in Köln—Das Oppidum Ubiorum zur Zeit des Augustus', in: A. Rieche u.a., Hrsg., *Grabung, Forschung, Präsentation*, Festschrift G. Precht (Mainz 2002), 13–36; vgl. jetzt J. Heinrichs, 'Vor dem Oppidum Ubiorum. Münzen einer Zivilsiedlung im Kölner Domareal in ihren Aufschlüssen für das augusteische Köln, die Datierung von Kalkriese und das Problem fehlender nachvaruszeitlicher Befunde östlich des Rheins', in: G.A. Lehmann und R. Wiegels, Hrsg., *Römische Präsenz und Herrschaft im Germanien der augusteischen Zeit*, Kolloquium Osnabrück 2004, Göttingen 2007, 225–320.

wahrscheinlich auch Ehrenmonumente für Mitglieder der *domus Augusta*, ferner aufwendige Grabbauten für kaiserliche Funktionäre.²⁴

Der Abstand zwischen Köln und den übrigen Zentralsiedlungen ist also nicht lediglich quantitativ zu fassen, sondern auch qualitativ. Folglich ist in Köln unbedingt mit hochqualifizierten Spezialisten zu rechnen, bis hin zu Künstlern.²⁵ Für die anderen *civitas*- Hauptorte reichte dagegen Personal aus, das in den Bereichen Planung, Vermessung und Ausführung einfacher Gebäude sowie Gewinnung und Transport hierfür erforderlicher Materialien die notwendigen Grundkenntnisse besaß. Über solches Personal verfügten die römischen Legionen. Ab 7 v. Chr. wurden sie für direkt militärische Aufgaben rechts des Rheins zunächst nicht mehr benötigt und konnten daher für die Entwicklung der neuen Provinz eingesetzt werden. Hierzu zählten neben dem Bau von Straßen, Brücken und Häfen auch die Anlage der neuen Mittelpunktsiedlungen. Römische Truppen hatten im Anschluß an die Kriege im Nordwesten Spaniens ab 19 v. Chr. im gallischen Raum die von Agrippa geplanten Fernstraßen ausgeführt und waren sicherlich im einen oder anderen Fall auch bei der Ausschmückung südgallischer Städte durch kaiserliche Munifizienz tätig geworden. Entsprechend wurden sie nun, nach Beendigung der ersten Offensivphase in Germanien, für Zwecke der Provinzialisierung des neu eroberten Raums eingesetzt. Dies soll im Folgenden für einige der genannten germanischen Zentralorte illustriert werden, wobei es nach dem Stand der bisherigen Forschung wie auch nach dem hier zur Verfügung stehenden Raum nur um Beispiele gehen kann, die allerdings stellvertretend die Entwicklung in hier nicht näher vorgestellten Orten beleuchten. Diese Beispiele sind Tongeren und Waldgirmes auf der einen, Köln auf der anderen Seite.

²⁴ von Hesberg 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 23), 13–36; Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 80–98; W. Eck und H. von Hesberg, ‚Der Rundbau eines Dispensator Augusti und andere Grabmäler der frühen Kaiserzeit in Köln. Monumente und Inschriften‘, *Kölner Jahrbücher* 36 (2003), 151–205.

²⁵ von Hesberg 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 23), 33; Heinrichs 2007, a.a.O. (Anm. 23) 277–281.

1. Atuatuca Tungrorum/*Tonger*²⁶

Die frühesten Funde in *Atuatuca Tungrorum* sind eindeutig und ausschließlich römischer Natur. Römisches Militär, vermutlich eine Vexillation mit Aufgaben im Bau-, Planungs- und Vermessungsbereich, legte diesen Ort an der Fernstraße von Bavai nach Köln an. Pfostenlöcher zeugen vom Straßenvermessungssystem; an den Straßen orientierte Gruben weisen nach Aussage der Ausgräber auf flach eingegrabene Zelte des Bauteams. Gefundene italische Sigillata (TS) und weitere dünnwandige Keramik, fast ausschließlich Importe aus der Mittelmeerwelt, entsprechen Funden des Oberaden-Horizonts. Münzen einheimischer und römischer Provenienz stützen diesen Datierungsansatz am Anfang des letzten vorchristlichen Jahrzehnts, also die Jahre ab 10 v. Chr. Hier baute römisches Militär einen neuen Zentralort für die Tungrer. Deren Führungsschicht ist in einer zweiten Auf siedlungsphase faßbar in mindestens vier ergrabenen Wohnstallhäusern augusteisch-tiberischer Zeitstellung. Eines dieser Häuser, ohne Stall, dafür aber bereits unterkellert, belegt durch ein Bauopfer und einen kleinen Münzhort die zunehmende Übernahme römischer Vorstellungen durch tungrische Eliten. Auch die in den Häusern entdeckte Keramik liefert Zeugnisse für die fortschreitende Anpassung an mediterrane Standards.²⁷

Umfangreiche Analysen der pflanzlichen Überreste sowie Untersuchungen der gefundenen Tierknochen aus verschiedenen Abfallgruben dokumentieren in Tongeren zusätzlich die zunächst unterschiedlichen Speisegewohnheiten der Legionäre und der Einheimischen, illustrieren dann aber, wie weit die traditionelle Landwirtschaft durch die Präsenz größerer Mengen zahlungskräftiger Römer beeinflußt wurde.²⁸

Öffentliche Gebäude oder etwa eine Stadtmauer können für die beiden ersten Besiedlungsphasen bislang nicht identifiziert werden. Es

²⁶ Die Anfänge Tongerens als römische Plansiedlung behandelt Vanderhoeven 1996, a.a.O. (Anm. 10), 189–260; ders., ‚Das vorflavische Tongeren: Die früheste Entwicklung der Stadt anhand von Funden und Befunden‘, in Precht und Zieling, Hrsg., 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 157–176, bes. 161–168; ders., ‚Aspekte der frühesten Romanisierung Tongerens und des zentralen Teiles der *civitas Tungrorum*‘, in: Grünwald und Seibel, Hrsg., 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 19), 119–144; speziell W. Vanvinckenroye, ‚Some reflections on Tongeren (Prov. Limburg) in the Augustan era‘, in M. Lodewijcks, Hrsg., *Archaeological and historical aspects of West-European Societies* (Leuven 1996).

²⁷ Vanderhoeven 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 161–166; 174.

²⁸ Vanderhoeven 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 166–168.

handelt sich somit noch nicht um eine Stadt nach den Kriterien Kolbs oder Kunows. Erst in der dritten Phase ab claudischer Zeit spiegeln sich die zunehmenden Romanisierungstendenzen deutlicher in Architektur und Inventar.

2. *Waldgirmes*²⁹

Der erst vor wenigen Jahren entdeckte Komplex von Waldgirmes, zwischen Dünsberg und der Lahnfahrt von Heuchelheim angelegt, wurde zunächst für ein römisches Militärlager gehalten. Genauere Untersuchungen der Funde seit 1993 ergeben heute ein ganz anderes Bild. In strategisch und verkehrstechnisch günstiger Lage wurde hier von den Römern eine Siedlung konzipiert, die in der Folgezeit als *civitas*-Hauptort der Chatten wichtige Funktionen übernehmen sollte. Das ehemals ubische, befestigte Spätlatène-*oppidum* auf dem Dünsberg, eine typische Höhensiedlung, die sich an keltischen Vorbildern orientiert hatte, war um 30 v. Chr. aufgegeben worden. In der Folgezeit übernahmen chattische Gruppen die gesamte Region und errichteten auch in der Nähe von Waldgirmes eine Siedlung, die um 10 v. Chr. im Kontext der Drususoffensiven zerstört wurde.³⁰

Eine römisch geplante Siedlung, ca. 8 km entfernt vom Dünsberg im abfallenden Gelände zur Lahn hin, umgeben von einer Holz-Erde-Mauer, wurde um die Zeitwende errichtet. Eine Auswertung der bisher etwa 270 Fundmünzen spricht für eine Datierung der neuen Siedlungsgründung bei Waldgirmes „etwas später als Haltern“.³¹ Der Dünsberg schließt die Wetterau nach Norden hin ab, beherrscht damit

²⁹ A. Becker, *Rom und die Chatten* (Darmstadt, Marburg 1992); ders. 1998, a.a.O. (Anm. 4), 41–50; ders., ‚Die Ausgrabungen in Lahnau-Waldgirmes 1999. Eine nova colonia aus der Zeit des Kaisers Augustus im Lahntal?‘, in *Denkmalpflege und Kulturgeschichte in Hessen*, Heft 2 (1999), 66ff.; ders., ‚Lahnau-Waldgirmes. Eine augusteische Stadtgründung in Hessen‘, *Historia* 52 (2003), 337–50; ders. und G. Rasbach, ‚Waldgirmes. Eine augusteische Stadtgründung im Lahntal‘, *Berichte der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission Frankfurt* 82 (2001), 591–610; dies., ‚Die spätaugusteische Stadtgründung in Lahnau-Waldgirmes‘, *Germania* 81,1 (2003), 147–199; S. von Schnurbein, ‚Augustus in Germanien. Neue archäologische Forschungen‘, *Kroon-Voordracht* 24 (Amsterdam 2002), 5–38; ders., ‚Augustus in Germania and his new “town” at Waldgirmes east of the Rhine‘, *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 16 (2003), 93–107.

³⁰ Entweder 11 v. durch die Sugambren oder 10 v. durch die Römer; Cassius Dio, 54.36.3: *foedus* Roms mit den Chatten, zwischen 9–11 v.; vgl. Cassius Dio, 55.1.2ff.

³¹ Becker 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 337f.; Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 70f. datiert die Anlage „zeitgleich mit Haltern“ zwischen 6 v.–9 n. Chr.

aber auch den weiteren Einfallsweg ins Innere Germaniens. Das neue Zentrum kontrolliert nun mit der Lahnfuhr bei Heuchelheim und über die Dill im Westen wichtige Nord-Süd-Verbindungen, und über das Lahntal einen natürlichen Wegekorrridor zwischen Rhein und Lippe. Im Mittelalter entstanden hier Gießen, Marburg und Wetzlar als Kontrollpunkte. Die römische Konzeption von Waldgirmes stellt also gewissermaßen eine ‚Zwischenlösung‘ dar. Die alten Wegekorridente sind auch durch Münzfunde hinreichend gesichert.³²

Waldgirmes wurde keinesfalls unmittelbar auf den Resten einer einheimischen Vorgängersiedlung erbaut. Zwar fanden sich ältere Münzen, datiert ab ca. 30 v. Chr., im Planiermaterial der römischen Anlage, diese gehören aber zweifellos zu einer chattischen Siedlung in unmittelbarer Nähe, die noch nicht lokalisiert ist. Eisenzeitlich-germanische Gräber unter der römischen Bebauung gehören sicher nicht zu einem direkt vorangehenden Siedlungskomplex sondern sind den Horizonten Latène A bis D1 zuzuordnen.³³ Eine gezielte Zerstörung bzw. Profanisierung dieses Bestattungsbezirks von römischer Seite her hätte man mit Sicherheit als bewußte Provokation der Eroberer aufgefaßt. Dies entsprach nicht den aktuellen Intentionen Roms. Man sollte also davon ausgehen, daß diese Siedlung vermutlich seit 11/10 v. Chr. nicht mehr existierte und die Gräber somit auch nicht mehr kenntlich waren, als die Römer den Platz aufbauten. Mehrere einheimisch-kaiserzeitliche Gräber lassen sich dagegen nach der Fundsituation südlich des Osttors im Inneren der Stadtanlage in die Zeit unmittelbar nach Aufgabe der Siedlung 9 n. Chr. datieren.

In unmittelbarer Nachbarschaft findet sich ein römisches Baulager, das die Personen, die die neue römische Mustersiedlung konzipierten und aufbauten, beherbergte. Exakte Grabungen konnten hier allerdings noch nicht ausgeführt werden.³⁴ Roms Legionäre errichteten den neuen Zentralort für die unterworfenen Chatten nach orthogonalem Plan. Es gab einen zentralen Gebäudekomplex, der eine Fläche von 54×45 m (2430 m^2) einnahm und durch einen Vorplatz von der Hauptstraße getrennt war. Das freie Areal in der Mitte war an allen

³² Z.B. Regenbogenschüsselchen der 70er und 60er Jahren des 1. Jhs v. Chr. Im übrigen folgen noch frühe Eisenbahnlinien im 19. Jh. genau dieser Wegführung (die Hinweise zur Topographie lieferte freundlicherweise Johannes Heinrichs, Köln).

³³ J. Schulze-Forster, ‚Latènezeitliche Grabgärten am Dünsberg‘, *Berichte der Kommission für Archäologische Landesforschung Hessen* 4 (1996–97), 97–117.

³⁴ Bei Becker 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 338 dagegen „Marschlager“; Abb.2.

vier Seiten von Gebäuden eingefasst, von denen das nördliche auf soliden Steinfundamenten ruhte. Auch wenn sich die Anlage, die vom Grabungsleiter als Forum bezeichnet wird, noch im Bau befand, konnte der Fachwerkbau an der Nordseite als Basilika identifiziert werden, somit als ein öffentliches, multifunktionales Gebäude (45 × 12 m). Auf der Rückseite war ein zentraler quadratischer Raum von ca. 11 m Breite angebaut; er wurde rechts und links von Apsiden flankiert, somit die Rückwand weiter untergliedert. Annex sowie Apsiden gehören zu den Standardelementen augusteischer Forumsanlagen. Als eine vergleichbare Anlage nennt S. von Schnurbein das Forum vom Feurs/*Forum Segusiavorum*.³⁵ Eine lebensgroße Reiterstatue aus vergoldeter Bronze, mit Sicherheit eine Darstellung des Augustus, sollte der Bevölkerung den Beherrscher des *Imperium Romanum* vor Augen führen. Gerade diese Statue paßt nicht in den Kontext eines kurzfristig belegten Militärlagers, sondern weist auf einen zivilen administrativen Kontext.³⁶ Sie stand wohl in prominenter Position auf dem Forumsplatz und ist durch zahlreiche mehr oder weniger große Fragmente belegt, die nach der Zerstörung zum Teil planmäßig verborgen worden sind. Ebenfalls von Bedeutung ist eine *fistula aquaria*, ein Teil einer römischen Wasserleitung. Auch dies macht in einem kurzfristig angelegten Marschlager keinen Sinn, wohl aber in einem neuen *civitas*- Hauptort für die Eliten der Chatten, die so langfristig an römische Lebensweise herangeführt werden sollten. Des weiteren fanden sich Gebäudestrukturen, die an *tabernae* erinnern und zur Straße hin vorgelagerte Portiken besaßen.³⁷

Auch Wohnhäuser mediterranen Stils, vergleichbar mit Bauten aus Haltern, glaubt man heute zu erkennen.³⁸ Die beigefundene Keramik gliedert sich in zwei Gruppen: (1.) lokal produzierte römische Gefäße, z.B. Schrägrandtöpfe der Form Ha 85 aus Töpferofen T 1; Importkeramik, hier vor allem Belgische Ware, vermutlich aus Reims; Terra Sigillata; (2.) germanische Keramik in einem vergleichsweise hohen Anteil von ca. 15–20%.

Insgesamt gesehen sind wesentliche Kriterien für die Klassifizierung der Anlage als ‚Stadt‘ erfüllt, nämlich öffentliche Räume, öffentliche

³⁵ Becker 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 344f.; Abb.3.

³⁶ Becker 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 340: annähernd 100 Fragmente; zusammenfassend Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 71f.

³⁷ Becker 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 340: Reste von Bleirohren; 341–343: Wohnbebauung und *tabernae*.

³⁸ Becker 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 341–343.

Gebäude und eine Mauer. Die neu entstandene Mittelpunktsiedlung für die Chatten stand zeitweise unter dem Schutz des ca. 1,9 km entfernten Militärlagers in Lahnau-Dorlar.³⁹ Aber die römische Zivilisation hatte auch bereits begonnen, in die umliegenden Gebiete auszustrahlen. Dies zeigen vor allem die Befunde aus der Siedlung von Niederweimar bei Marburg: Neben eindeutig einheimischen Keramikformen und ebenso eindeutig römischem Import fand sich sowohl römisch beeinflusstes wie auch nach germanischer Technik gefertigtes, aber in römischen Formen produziertes Material. Hier ist eine gegenseitige Beeinflussung zweifelsohne festzustellen.⁴⁰ Der Siedlungskern von Waldgirmes scheint Dios Einschätzung zu bestätigen, der von *poleis* spricht und damit von römisch initiierten, zukünftigen Selbstverwaltungseinheiten.⁴¹ Nach der Varus-Katastrophe des Jahres 9 n. Chr. wurde das *oppidum* im Gebiet der Chatten aufgegeben und auch zur Zeit des Germanicus nicht wieder aktiviert.

Die bislang vorgestellten Komplexe folgen einer einheitlichen Konzeption. Sie kontrollieren entweder—wie Tongeren—die Versorgungswege aus Gallien an den Rhein oder—wie Waldgirmes—die Einfallstore in das östliche Germanien, die infolge der römischen Invasion auch unbedingt unter römischer Kontrolle stehen sollten. Von vergleichbarer strategischer Bedeutung sind später Voorburg/Arentsburg, Mittelpunktsiedlung der Cananefaten, als Basis für die Überfahrt nach Britannien, Nijmegen als *civitas*- Hauptort der Bataver für die Einfallswegen in das norddeutsche Tiefland, Xanten im Gebiet der Cugerner für den Lippekorridor etc. Darüber hinaus bilden alle diese Anlagen gezielt Kristallisationspunkte römischer Kultur und Lebensweise, sollten somit als neu konzipierte Zentralorte in germanischen Stammesgebieten ihre Funktion für die künftige Zivilverwaltung und die Romanisierung erfüllen.

³⁹ S. von Schnurbein und H.-J. Köhler, 'Dorlar. Ein augusteisches Militärlager im Lahntal', *Germania* 72 (1994), 193–203.

⁴⁰ L. Fiedler u.a., 'Frühkaiserzeitliche Siedlungsfunde aus Niederweimar bei Marburg', *Germania* 80 (2002), 135ff.

⁴¹ Cassius Dio 56.18.2.

3. oppidum Ubiorum/Köln⁴²

Über die Gründungsdaten des *oppidum Ubiorum* ist viel diskutiert worden. Wählte man früher meist als Datierungsansatz die literarisch überlieferte Umsiedlung der Ubier während einer der beiden gallischen Statthalterschaften des Marcus Agrippa und damit konkret die Jahre 40–38/7 bzw. 20–18 v. Chr., kann dies heute nach umfangreichen Arbeiten und Materialvorlagen von J. Heinrichs (Köln) nicht mehr als gültig angesehen werden.⁴³ Er konnte anhand numismatischer Befunde zeigen, daß der Übergang der Ubier über den Rhein sicher in die Jahre 19/18 v. Chr. zu datieren ist, das engere Stadtgebiet von Köln davon aber zunächst nicht berührt wird.⁴⁴ Während die Ubier andere Siedlungen direkt am Rhein, wie Neuss und Köln-Blumenberg, und im fruchtbaren Hinterland, z. B. bei Nörvenich anlegten, bleibt das eigentliche Kölner Stadtareal für diese Zeit eindeutig fundleer.⁴⁵

Die Anlage des *oppidum Ubiorum*, der Mittelpunktssiedlung im Stammesgebiet der Ubier, hatte mit Sicherheit keine einheimische Vorgängersiedlung. Auch Funde aus der Zeit der Drususoffensiven fehlen vollständig. Das bislang älteste datierbare Gebäude der Stadt, das sogenannte Ubiermonument, läßt sich dendrochronologisch dem Winter 4–5 n. Chr. zuweisen und wird später als südlicher Befestigungsturm in die *colonia*zeitliche Stadtmauer mit einbezogen. Der Turm ist in eindeutig römischer Technik aus sorgfältig gearbeiteten Tuffquadern aus dem Brohlthal über einem Fundament aus *opus caementicium* errichtet. Seine ursprüngliche Funktion—vorgeschlagen wurden Grabmal bzw. Kenotaph, Hafenturm bzw. Leuchtturm, Wehrturm—ist bislang ungeklärt; zu vermuten ist am ehesten die südliche Markierung des Siedlungsareals bereits in der ältesten Umwallung.⁴⁶

Man hatte sich nach Abschluß der ersten Phase der Germanienoffensiven für die Anlage der neuen Provinzhauptstadt im Gebiet der seit langem

⁴² Umfassend bearbeitet von Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 46–126; zur augusteischen Konzeption hauptsächlich J. Heinrichs, 'Ubier,' in *Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde* Bd. 31 (Berlin, New York, 2. Auflage 2006), 356–361.

⁴³ Strabo 4.3.4; Tacitus, *Annales* 12.27.1; *Germania* 28.5; Heinrichs 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 19), 266–344; ders. 2006, a.a.O. (Anm. 42), 358f.; Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 46–55.

⁴⁴ Heinrichs 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 19), 336f.; ausführlich ders., Ubier 2006, a.a.O. (Anm. 42) 358f.

⁴⁵ Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 55f.

⁴⁶ Eck 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 80ff.

verbündeten Ubier entschieden. Eben diese neue Stadt, hochwasser-sicher auf einer Terrasse ca. 15 Meter oberhalb des Rheins in Höhe einer vorgelagerten Insel plazierte, daher als Hafen- und Stapelplatz gut geeignet, lag am Endpunkt der Fernstraße von Bavaï über Tongeren und verband diese nun mit der Uferstraße parallel zum Flußverlauf. Ein orthogonales Straßenraster, das von Anfang an öffentliche Räume für repräsentative Gebäudekomplexe direkt an der Rheinfront reservierte (*ara Germaniae*, Praetorium) sowie eine Befestigung, die zumindest teilweise in Stein aufgeführt wurde—darauf deutet das Ubiermonument und ein mögliches Pendant im Norden—lassen von Anfang an die Unterschiede zu den bislang vorgestellten *civitas*- Hauptorten erkennen.

Mit ca. 96 ha Stadtgebiet ist das *oppidum Ubiorum* zudem deutlich größer als die *civitas*- Hauptorte der anderen Stämme.⁴⁷ Kann man die Planungsphase des neuen Zentralorts, wie eingangs dargelegt, mit einiger Sicherheit in das Jahr 7 v. Chr. verlegen, bleibt weiterhin zu fragen, ab wann denn nun konkret mit dem Aufbau begonnen wurde. Neues Fundmaterial kann hier wichtige Aufschlüsse bieten.

Untersuchungen von Material aus dem Areal der ehemaligen Rheininsel haben neue Hinweise zur Präsenz römischen Militärs im frühen Köln geliefert. Dieses Material geht zurück auf Ausgrabungen des Römisch-Germanischen Museums Köln im Martins-Viertel 1973–74.⁴⁸ Während einer großflächigen Untersuchung des Gebiets um die Kirche Groß-St. Martin wurde eine durch Beschaffenheit und Farbe auffällige Schicht direkt über dem gewachsenen Boden angeschnitten. Wie Bodenuntersuchungen des Geologischen Instituts der Universität zu Köln ergaben, handelte es sich dabei um Aushub vom Grund des vor dem römischen Hafen gelegenen Rheinarms, der wahrscheinlich vertieft und so für Schifffahrt weiter nutzbar gemacht werden sollte. Dieser Aushub, der u.a. Keramik, Münzen und Metallfunde römischer Zeitstellung enthielt, wurde anschließend im Uferbereich der Rheininsel aufplaniert und diente dort vor allem zum Ausgleich von Geländeunebenheiten. Diese durch Einschlüsse von organischem Material schwarze Schicht auf 41.00 bis 41.60 Meter über NN hob sich schon optisch deutlich gegenüber ihrer Umgebung ab. Sie wurde bereits unmittelbar nach der Aufbringung mit feinen Sandschichten

⁴⁷ Außer Waldgirmes mit nachweislich 7,7 ha erlauben die anderen Orte allerdings nur Schätzungen. .

⁴⁸ Fundbericht FB 73.10–75.25.

abgedeckt, in denen sich Objekte derselben Zeitstellung finden, wie die jüngsten Scherben und Münzen in der schwarzen Schicht selbst. Dieser Schlickaushub fand sofort die besondere Aufmerksamkeit der Ausgräber. Allerdings konnte nur ein Teilabschnitt erfaßt werden, da die Schicht unter moderne Wohnbebauung zog. Die untersuchte Teilfläche ist annähernd oval und nimmt einen Raum von etwa 12×9 Metern ein; dies reicht immerhin für einen repräsentativen Eindruck, doch besitzen wir eben nur eine Teilmenge aus dem ursprünglichen Rheinaushub, der seinerseits nur einen Ausschnitt aus den zuvor in den Rhein gelangten Abfällen widerspiegelt und zudem bei der Verlagerung durchmengt wurde: Die Schichtenfolge der Sedimentierung ist damit verloren gegangen, die historische Abfolge des Materials nurmehr nach typologischen Kriterien festlegbar.

Konkret handelt es sich um meist relativ kleinteilige Fragmente von Keramik, Metall, Glas und organischem Material. Die Zusammensetzung weist mit hinreichender Klarheit auf römisches Militär unmittelbar am Rheinufer, im Areal des späteren Praetorium; von hier aus wurden die fortlaufend anfallenden Abfälle in den Rheinarm entsorgt.⁴⁹ Sie enthielten repräsentative Mengen an Arretina,⁵⁰ Belgischer Ware,⁵¹ weiterer Gebrauchs- und Baukeramik, Lampen, Münzen, Fibeln, zahlreiche Nägel, Beschlagteile, Fragmente von drei bronzenen Maßstäben, Eisenschlacken, Glasscherben und Spielsteine. Aufschlußreich ist aber auch das enthaltene organische Material: Neben Holz, Leder und Stoffresten fanden sich Nuß- und Austernschalen, Muscheln und Schnecken sowie mindestens 1255 Knochenfragmente von Groß- und Kleinsäugetern, die hauptsächlich auf Rind und Schwein in einer Relation von etwa 1 zu 2 zurückgehen. Hierin findet die generell, so auch in Tongeren, zu beobachtende Beliebtheit von Schweinefleisch bei römischen Truppen Ausdruck.⁵²

⁴⁹ Abwasserleitungen claudischen Zeit aus dem Praetorium belegen die gleiche Praxis.

⁵⁰ Unter ‚Arretina‘ wird im Folgenden gemäß der Definition von C.M. Wells in *Conspectus* (s.u.) Terra Sigillata italischer Art unabhängig vom Herstellungszentrum verstanden; E. Ettlinger u.a., Hrsg., *Conspectus formarum terrae sigillatae italico modo confectae* (Bonn, 2. Auflage 2002), 1f.

⁵¹ Unter dem Begriff „Belgische Ware“ werden der Definition von S. von Schnurbein in *Conspectus* folgend an italischen Sigillaten orientierte Terra rubra- und Terra nigra-Gefäße zusammengefaßt; *Conspectus* 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 50), 23.

⁵² Vanderhoeven 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 166–168.

Zur Datierung des Fundkomplexes, der aus den bereits dargelegten Gründen in sich nicht stratifiziert ist, lassen sich vor allem Münzen und italische Sigillaten heranziehen.⁵³ Der insgesamt abgedeckte Zeitraum reicht vom Ende der Oberaden-Phase bis in die Varus-Zeit, also von ca. 7 v. bis 9 n. Chr. Betrachtet man das Münzspektrum, so ist dieser Zeitraum nicht kontinuierlich abgedeckt, vielmehr ergeben sich zwei Teilspektren, jeweils am Anfang und am Ende der Datierungsphase. Der Zwischenraum scheint nicht präsent, wie vornehmlich gewisse Defizite im Material ausweisen, etwa das Fehlen von Atuatur-Kleinerzen und gallischen Kleinerzen, die typisch sind für das Jahrzehnt zwischen 5 v.–5 n. Chr. Es ist allerdings nicht auszuschließen, daß diese Defizite bedingt durch die Genese der schwarzen Schicht auf Zufall beruhen.⁵⁴

Demgegenüber ergibt die Keramik, die natürlich weit zahlreicher vertreten ist, ein stärker kontinuierliches Bild. Im Vergleich mit Funden aus augusteischen Lagern im gallisch-germanischen Bereich sowie einer ebenfalls als moor- oder torfähnlich beschriebenen Abfallschicht augusteischer Zeitstellung aus Mainz zeigt sich,⁵⁵ daß ein Großteil der bestimmbar italischen TS dem frühen und mittleren Haltern-Horizont entspricht, während charakteristische Gefäße aus der Spätphase des Lippe-Lagers nur in wenigen Exemplaren präsent sind.⁵⁶ Damit scheint die Arretina ihren Schwerpunkt gerade in der von den Münzen nicht

⁵³ Detaillierte Vorstellung des Materials demnächst von J. Heinrichs und G. Weiler in den *Kölner Jahrbüchern*.

⁵⁴ Heinrichs 2006, a.a.O. (Anm. 23), 274–276.

⁵⁵ P. Eschbaumer, „Arretina aus einer augusteischen Schicht in Mainz“, in *Provinzialrömische Forschungen*, Festschrift G. Ulbert (Espelkamp 1995), 301–320; das sehr homogene Mainzer Material entstammt einer Abfallschicht; datierungsrelevant sind 26 Münzen, nach Formen zuweisbare Fragmente von 87 TS-Gefäßen sowie 29 Töpferstempel; Eschbaumer nimmt an, daß der Komplex „in den Oberaden-Horizont zurück reicht und dort fest verankert ist“ (ebd. 318); für das Ende gilt: „In bestem Einklang mit der numismatischen Datierung weist die Zusammensetzung der italischen Sigillata auf eine Einbringung der Schicht um die Mitte des letzten Jahrzehnts vor der Zeitwende“ (ebd. 319).

⁵⁶ Insgesamt 5 Töpferstempel aus den Produktionen des Annius, Ateius, C. Sentius, C. Tigranus und L. Titius Thyrsus verweisen auf Etrurien, Arezzo und Lyon als Provenienz und umfassen nach OCK (Bonn, 2. Auflage 2000) einen möglichen Produktionszeitraum von 20 v. bis 10 n. Chr.; Fragmente glatter Sigillaten weisen überwiegend die Formen Ha 7/Consp. 14 (= 14 Ex.) und Ha 8/Consp. 22 (26 Ex.) sowie Ha 1/Consp. 12 (= 23 Ex.) und Ha 2/Consp. 18.2 (= 4 Ex.); dazu kleinere Fundmengen Ha 9/Consp. 22–23, Ha 10/Consp. 15.1, Ha 2/3 Consp. 18.2/19.2, einige Imitationen sowie weitere nicht eindeutig zuweisbare Scherben; Relief-Sigillaten: zwei Kelchfragmente Dragendorff 11.

abgedeckten Mittelphase um die Zeitwende aufzuweisen; klar vertreten sind aber auch der späte Oberaden-Horizont und die Varus-Zeit. Angesichts der in der schwarzen Schicht nicht mehr gegebenen Abfolge von chronologisch relevanten Sedimentschichten mahnt dieser Befund zur Vorsicht bei der Interpretation. Es ist aber wohl nicht möglich, Münzen und Keramik additiv zu kombinieren. Man sollte eher damit rechnen, daß das römische Militär, das seine Abfälle in den Rhein entsorgte, zwischen 7 v. und 9 n. Chr. nicht kontinuierlich präsent war.⁵⁷

Insgesamt zeichnen sich mit aller Vorsicht drei Teilphasen ab:

- (1) ab ca. 7 v. Chr., durch Münzen und Keramik bezeugt;
- (2) um die Zeitwende, durch Keramik bezeugt;
- (3) die Varus-Zeit, ab 7 n. Chr., durch Münzen und Keramik bezeugt.

Die beiden späteren Phasen sind jeweils auch durch Material aus dem Kölner Domareal repräsentiert, das zumindest teilweise auf römisches Militär zurückgehen könnte; die früheste Phase bleibt im Stadtgebiet bisher singulär.

Betrachtet man diesen Befund vor dem Hintergrund der allgemeinen provinzialen Entwicklung, so fügt sich die Phase 1 der schwarzen Schicht von der Rheininsel bruchlos in die auch andernorts seit Ende der drususzeitlichen Offensivphase zu konstatierende Entwicklung: Ab 7 v. Chr. wird ein generelles Modell nachvollziehbar, in römischer Regie Siedlungen als Stammesmittelpunkte zu etablieren. In dieses Modell fügt sich nun auch Köln als *civitas*-Hauptort der Ubier, und zwar ab dem frühest möglichen Zeitpunkt. Neben diese Funktion tritt von Anfang an die weitere als Standort des administrativen und kultischen Zentrums der germanischen Provinz.⁵⁸

In Köln wird ab ca. 7 v. Chr. römisches Militär nachvollziehbar, das sicherlich, wie in den anderen Stammesterritorien, ein *oppidum* für die einheimische Bevölkerung vorbereitete. Das aus der Hauptstadtfunktion herleitbare große Stadtgelände von ca. 96 ha begründet freilich einen Sonderfall. Römisches Militär muß in Köln zahlreicher und länger stationiert gewesen sein als in den anderen Orten. Es hatte die Aufgabe, das Stadtareal auszumessen, Straßen und *insulae* festzulegen, öffentliche

⁵⁷ Ausführlich Heinrichs 2006, a.a.O. (Anm. 23), 274–276; vgl. M. Gechter, ‚Die Militärgeschichte am Niederrhein von Caesar bis Tiberius—eine Skizze‘, in Grünewald und Seibel, Hrsg., 2003, a.a.O. (Anm. 19), 145–161.

⁵⁸ Heinrichs 2006, a.a.O. (Anm. 23), 278–286.

Räume zu reservieren und eine Umwallung zu errichten. Hinzu kommen in einer späteren Entwicklungsphase spezifische Aufträge, wie sie in keiner anderen Stadt im germanischen Raum anfielen: die Errichtung repräsentativer Bereiche wie der *ara Germaniae* und des Praetorium. Die in Köln bereits früh zu beobachtende Monumentalisierung, die sich in einer Reihe von Architekturfragmenten bereits spätaugusteisch-frühtriberischer Zeitstellung spiegelt, erforderte zusätzliches Fachpersonal.⁵⁹ Hierzu werden mit Sicherheit zivile Bauspezialisten aus den Nachbarprovinzen und vielleicht aus Italien selbst herangezogen worden sein.⁶⁰

Neben diesen für das *oppidum Ubiorum* bzw. für die projektierte Hauptstadt der Provinz Germanien spezifischen Tätigkeiten treten gerade in der Frühphase ab 7 v. Chr. weitere Aktivitäten, die mit der Fernstraße Köln-Tongeren-Bavai zusammenhängen: Die Trasse mußte vorbereitet, Baumaterial auf dem Rhein herangeschafft und hierfür ein Hafen aufgebaut werden. Der östlichste Teilabschnitt der Fernstraße wurde von Köln aus vorgetrieben; hierzu wurden vermutlich längere Zeit im Kölner Rheinhafen Baumaterialien entladen und nach Westen zum jeweils aktuellen Bauabschnitt transportiert. Zuständig hierfür war sicherlich unmittelbar am Hafen stationiertes römisches Militär, dessen Abfälle in der schwarzen Schicht aufgehoben sind.⁶¹

Die in Tongeren und Waldgirmes faßbare zweite Siedlungsphase, in der das römische Militär sich zurückzieht und einheimische Bevölkerung nachrückt, fällt in Köln weniger klar aus. Aufgaben, die hier zu leisten waren, ließen sich nicht in vergleichbar kurzer Zeit bewältigen. So endet die erste an den anderen Orten rein militärische Phase in Köln nicht mit einem Abzug des römischen Militärs. Konsequenz hieraus ist, daß der folgende zweite Abschnitt durch ein enges Nebeneinander von römischem Militär, Fachpersonal aus den bereits länger romanisierten Nachbarprovinzen und schließlich ubischen Eliten und Einheimischen geprägt ist. Dieser Zustand zeichnet sich in den nordwestlichen Teilen der Stadt, vor allem im Domareal und jenseits des *cardo maximus*, ab.⁶²

⁵⁹ von Hesberg 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 23); z.B. ein Säulenschaft mit 16 Kanneluren und charakteristischen Perlstab, datiert zeitgleich mit dem Ubiermonument: „Die Handwerker waren wohl aus Oberitalien oder auch Südfrankreich gekommen und hatten ihre Art der Gestaltung zu Lebzeiten beibehalten“ (ebd. 19).

⁶⁰ Heinrichs 2006, a.a.O. (Anm. 23), 277–281; 285.

⁶¹ Heinrichs 2006, a.a.O. (Anm. 23), 274–276.

⁶² Gründliche Ausgrabungen Prechts im Domareal 1968/69 dokumentieren bislang nur Vorberichte, die Abschlußpublikation wird vorbereitet; B. Liesen veröffentlichte

Hier entstehen im ersten nachchristlichen Jahrzehnt in unmittelbarer Nähe des römischen Militärs in römischer Technik über Schwellbalken errichtete Fachwerkbauten. Im Inneren der langrechteckigen Häuser, die teilweise mit Wandmalereien ausgeschmückt waren, fanden sich wenige Fragmente italischer Sigillata.⁶³ Wer aber hier im einzelnen wohnte, ob Angehörige des Militärs, zugezogenes Fachpersonal aus Italien, den gallischen oder spanischen Provinzen, Händler, Handwerker oder einheimische Bevölkerung, läßt sich nicht klären. Ethnien spiegeln sich hier weder in der Bauweise noch im Dekor oder der materiellen Hinterlassenschaft der Bewohner.

Bis hierhin reicht der Modellfall. Etwa zeitgleich, also gegen Ende des ersten Jahrzehnts n. Chr., setzt nach Maßgabe der Münzen und der TS die Aufsiedlung des westlichen Stadtareals—also der eigentlichen Wohnviertel—ein. Köln wird nun zunehmend zum Mittelpunkt des linksrheinisch-niedergermanischen Bereichs, d.h. eines Rumpfbildes der ursprünglich konzipierten Provinz zwischen Maas und Elbe. Die augusteischen Planungen werden hinfällig. Sie werden abgelöst durch neue Entwicklungen und tiefgreifende Änderungen der politisch-sozialen Struktur: Aus dem *oppidum Ubiorum* wird im Jahr 50 n. Chr. unter Claudius die erste römische Kolonie am Mittel- und Niederrhein, die *Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium*.⁶⁴

einzelne Materialkomplexe, siehe *Kölner Jahrbüchern* 1999–2003; das westlich anschließende Gebiet untersuchte Seiler 1981: S. Seiler, ‚Vorcoloniazeitliche Siedlungsspuren im Norden des römischen Köln‘, in Precht und Zieling, Hrsg., 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 123–134; vgl. M. Dodt, ‚Römische Bauten in den nördlichen *insulae* F 1 und G 1 der CCAA‘, *Kölner Jahrbücher* 35 (2002), 571–698; bes. 571–609; ausführlich zum Domareal in augusteischer Zeit jetzt Heinrichs 2006, a.a.O. (Anm. 23).

⁶³ Seiler 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 62), 123–131.

⁶⁴ Tacitus, *Annales* 12.27.1.

PART FIVE

THE IMPACT OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL ARMY:
THE EASTERN AND AFRICAN PROVINCES

THE IMPACT OF THE ROMAN ARMY IN THE PROVINCE OF JUDAEA/SYRIA PALAESTINA

HANNAH M. COTTON

The impact of empire may include such matters as culture, language, religion, the imperial cult, law, etc. The army was always involved in the transmission of all of these. However, in the case of the province of Judaea/Syria Palaestina, we should stress first and above all the antagonism, the disastrous clashes; all other forms of intercourse pale against the crude fact of the suppression twice, within the span of 70 years, of two major national and religious revolts—two great catastrophes which changed the history of this province—indeed the entire course of Jewish history.

The Romans could not have foreseen the existence of special problems here, and indeed the integration of the province of Judaea into the Imperium Romanum was not different from that of other parts of the Roman Near East. Like the rest of the Roman Near East, so far as the Romans were concerned, Judaea came already into their sphere of influence in the second century BCE, that is long before its so-to-speak ‘official’ provincialisation.¹ True, at the beginning there were fluctuations between direct Roman and dynastic native rule, but there was nothing unique about this. Identical patterns can be discerned in the case of Commagene for example, as demonstrated recently by Michael Speidel, to the extent that here too opposing factions in the native population favoured direct Roman rule or their own dynasty.² So far as the governor of Syria was concerned, there was no fundamental difference in status between Judaea as a client kingdom or as part of the province of Syria under its own prefect: the ultimate responsibility rested with the consular governor of the neighbouring province, even though the territory was administered separately or differently from

¹ I subscribe to Israel Shatzman’s view expressed in great detail in ‘The Integration of Judaea into the Roman Empire’, *Scripta Classica Israelica* 18 (1999), 49ff. Thus what happened in 63 BCE was in no way something ‘bearing on the new political reality’.

² M.A. Speidel, ‘Early Roman Rule in Commagene’, *Scripta Classica Israelica* 24 (2005), 85ff.

the rest of the province under his control.³ The *praefectus* of Judaea should be equated with these prefects of *civitates* and *gentes*, known to us solely from inscriptions in northern Spain and the lower Danube provinces, who had a few auxiliary units under their command. Special circumstances—like distrust of the local elites or some structural anomalies from the Roman perspective—called for the presence of a special functionary between the Syrian governor and the local units.⁴ There is no Josephus for these areas to flesh out the lapidary evidence of the inscriptions. And the disparate character of the evidence, epigraphic in the case of the *praefecti civitatum* or *gentium*, and literary in the case of the prefects of Judaea, seems to have blinded people to the similarity between them.

The history of Judaea as an independent province may have begun in 44 CE with the death of Agrippa I, and the provincialisation of his kingdom. This time the territory in question was much larger than in 6 CE. Furthermore, under Claudius the equestrian *procurator* as a praesidial governor makes his appearance elsewhere in the Empire. Nonetheless, whereas the title *praefectus* is epigraphically attested for Pontius Pilatus, the title *procurator* or *epitropos* is not attested in an inscription for any of the equestrians serving as so-called governors in Judaea. We cannot be sure that a praesidial *procurator* ever made his appearance here. The history of the independent province of Judaea may well begin only after the end of the revolt, unless (which is very likely) this has already taken place during the suppression of the revolt.⁵

If this is true, then it would prove that nothing short of a full scale revolt jolted the Romans into the realisation that this territory could neither be annexed to the province of Syria, nor made subordinate to the Syrian governor either as a prefecture or as a client kingdom, but had to be made into an independent province with its own governor.

³ See H.M. Cotton, 'Some Aspects of the Roman Administration of Judaea/Syria-Palaestina', in W. Eck, ed., *Lokale Autonomie und römische Ordnungsmacht in den kaiserzeitlichen Provinzen vom 1.–3. Jh.* Kolloquien des Historischen Kollegs (Munich 1999), 75ff.

⁴ E.g. the *praefecti* in Spain: *CIL* II 4616 = *ILS* 6948: *praefectus Asturiae, tribunus militum legionis secundae*; *CIL* II 3271: *praef. Gallaeciae*; on the Danube and the Alps: *CIL* V 1838/9 = *ILS* 1349: *primipilus leg. V Macedonic.*, *praef. civitatum Treballiae*, *praef. civitatum in Alpibus Maritimis*; *CIL* IX 3044 = *ILS* 2689: *pra[ef]ectus] Raetis Vindolicis valli[s] Pjoeninae et levis armatur(ae)*. On these early prefects see H. Zwicky, *Zur Verwendung des Militärs in der Verwaltung der römischen Kaiserzeit* (1944), 11ff.

⁵ Note the presence of a financial procurator, Antonius Iulianus, in Titus' war council during the siege of Jerusalem, Josephus, *Bellum Iudaicum* 6.238.

The need to keep a legion in Judaea led Vespasian to create here an altogether new kind of provincial organisation: the one-legion province, not by reduction,⁶ governed by a governor with praetorian rank in charge of the province as well as of the legion. Although the new arrangement is attested for the first time in the titulature of the third governor, the conqueror of Masada, L. Flavius Silva, we may safely assume after Werner Eck's restoration of the name and title of the second governor, Sex. Lucilius Bassus, in the inscription from Abu Gosh,⁷ that this was the arrangement from the very beginning.

But even before the outbreak of the second revolt, at an unknown date in the early second century Judaea became a consular province,⁸ with two legions as well as three cavalry *alae* and twelve cohorts at the disposal of the governor, as a military *diploma* from 139 shows⁹—and all that in what was after all an exceedingly small province.

We have come a long way as far as military force is concerned since the provincialisation of Judaea in 6 CE, when the prefect inherited the Herodian army numbering one cavalry *ala* and five infantry cohorts.¹⁰ Their names, *Kaisareis* and *Sebastenoi*, indicate that they were locally recruited amongst the non-Jewish population of Caesarea and Sebaste and their territories (Josephus, *Antiquitates Iudaicae* 20.176). At the outbreak of the Great Revolt there were Roman units stationed at various places: at Ascalon (where a cohort and an *ala* are attested, Josephus, *Bellum Iudaicum* 3.12), Kypros, above Jericho, Machaerus (*Bellum Iudaicum* 2. 484–485), Masada (*Bellum Iudaicum* 2.408), perhaps also in Samaria (*Bellum Iudaicum* 3.309) and the Great Valley (known in English as the Jezreel Valley) (Josephus, *Vita* 115). It is reasonable to assume that the presence of units in different key positions in the province was not just an emergency measure, but represents the current situation from the establishment of the province.¹¹

⁶ B.E. Thomasson, 'The One-Legion Provinces of the Roman Empire during the Principate', *Opuscula Romana* IX 7 (1973), 61ff.

⁷ W. Eck, 'Sextus Lucilius Bassus, der Eroberer von Herodium, in einer Bauinschrift von Abu Gosh', *Scripta Classica Israelica* 18 (1999), 109ff.

⁸ H.M. Cotton and W. Eck, 'Governors and their Personnel on Latin Inscriptions from Caesarea Maritima', *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities* VII 7 (2001), 215ff.

⁹ *CIL* XVI 87, 139 CE.

¹⁰ Josephus, *Antiquitates Iudaicae* 19.365; cf. *Bellum Iudaicum* 3.66.

¹¹ H.M. Cotton and J. Geiger, *Masada II: The Latin and Greek Documents* (Jerusalem 1989), 14.

After the fall of Jerusalem, Josephus tells us: "Titus decided to leave the Tenth Legion, along with some squadrons of cavalry and companies of infantry, as the local garrison."¹² The *legio X Fretensis* which had belonged to the Syrian army since at least 6 CE, and perhaps even before, participated in the subjugation of the Galilee and was part of the force employed by Titus in the siege of Jerusalem. Its presence in Jerusalem is supported by the evidence of inscriptions, coins and brick stamp impressions.

A newly published *diploma* from 90 CE identifies for us the 'squadrons of cavalry and companies of infantry' mentioned by Josephus as two *alae* and seven cohorts.¹³ They replaced the *Kaisareis* and *Sebastenoi* which were deported from the province (*Antiquitates Iudaicae* 19.366). Bearing in mind that military *diplomata* list only those units whose veterans are the subject of the constitution recorded in them, the nine units mentioned in the *diploma* from 90 CE may not have constituted the entire auxiliary force in the province of Judaea at that time. However, two considerations buttress the assumption that we probably have here the full auxiliary force in Judaea at the time. First, the *diploma* records eight quingenary units (ca. 500 soldiers each) and one milliary unit, thus roughly a force of 5,000 soldiers which is more or less what one would have expected in a one-legion province, if it is true that the size of the auxiliary in a province was more or less commensurate with that of the citizen force. Secondly, two more *diplomata* from 86 and 87 mention six and eight units respectively out of the nine units known from the *diploma* of 90.¹⁴ It is extremely unlikely that a unit which was stationed in the province at the time would not be mentioned in at least one of the three constitutions issued for this particular province in the course of the four years 86–90. As pointed out before, this entire force was doubled when the rank of the governor and of the province was raised from praetorian to consular sometime in the early years of Hadrian, if not already under Trajan: perhaps already in 117. Lusius Quietus, who had put down the Jewish revolt in the eastern provinces,

¹² *Bellum Iudaicum* 7.5.

¹³ *Ala I Thracum Mauretana, Ala Veterana Gaetulorum, Cohors I Augusta Lusitanorum, Cohors I Damascena Armeniaca, Cohors I milliaria sagittariorum, Cohors I Thracum, Cohors II, Thracum, Cohors II Cantabrorum, Cohors III Callaecorum Bracaraugustanorum*, see H.M. Cotton, W. Eck and B. Isaac, 'Titus Pomponius Bassus, Governor of Judaea and a New Military *Diploma* from 90 CE', *Israel Museum Studies in Archaeology* 2 (2003), 17–31.

¹⁴ *CIL* XVI 33 from 86 CE and an unpublished *diploma* from 87 CE.

became the first consular governor of Judaea for a short period.¹⁵ I resist the temptation to go into the causes for the ‘promotion’ of the province. This is likely to have been connected with the Jewish revolts in the diaspora in 115–117. All that needs to be said at this point is that by a process of trial and error—if one may thus describe the two revolts—the Romans discovered the unique problems presented by this province and addressed them by considerably increasing the military force stationed here.

It is important to emphasise how great these two revolts were, by any standards. For the first revolt, culminating in the siege of Jerusalem which lasted some five months, the Romans marshalled four legions, with detachments (*vexillationes*) of two others, twenty infantry cohorts, eight mounted *alae*, and 18,000 men, supplied by four dependent kings. The victory was celebrated in a magnificent triumph and in a series of monuments which partly transformed the centre of Rome. In a recent article Fergus Millar rightly emphasises that we should count as war records not only the two arches erected to Titus on top of the Veleia and in the Circus Maximus but also the two greatest monuments of the Flavian period, namely the Temple of Peace and the Colosseum.¹⁶ Thus the victory over the Jews was monumentalised; it left an indelible imprint on the architecture of the city of Rome. The *Templum Pacis*, displaying as it did among its other treasures also the spoils from the temple in Jerusalem, symbolised not merely an end to the civil wars of the long year 69, but the reestablishment of peace in the empire—thus rivalling Augustus’ celebration of his two parallel achievements in the Forum Augusti and the Temple of Mars Victor.

True, the Bar Kokhba revolt left no such monumental record on the public sphere in the city of Rome.¹⁷ However, even the ‘minimalists’ concede that in addition to the two legions of the Judean garrison, at least seven more legions in full force or represented by *vexillationes*

¹⁵ Cotton and Eck 2001, op. cit. (n. 8), 222f.

¹⁶ ‘Last Year in Jerusalem: Monuments of the Jewish War in Flavian Rome’, in J. Edmondson, S. Mason, and J. Rives, eds., *Flavius Josephus and Flavian Rome* (Oxford 2005), 101ff.

¹⁷ Although the two fragmentary inscriptions, found not far from the *Templum divi Vespasiani*, certainly justify Werner Eck’s claim that they were displayed on monuments which presented Hadrian as Vespasian’s successor in Rome’s war against its Jewish rebels, see W. Eck, ‘Hadrian, the Bar Kokhba Revolt, and the Epigraphic Transmission’, in P. Schäfer, ed., *The Bar Kokhba War Reconsidered. Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism* 100 (Tübingen 2003), 165.

took part in suppressing the revolt. There must have been more, even if not all at the same time. Given the province's size, this was a huge military force. Werner Eck's 'Roman point of view' on the Bar Kokhba revolt should leave us in no doubt as to its magnitude. Let me quote from his conclusion:¹⁸

The Bar Kokhba revolt, with its initial heavy losses in manpower, must have dealt a heavy blow to Roman power, pride, and sense of security—all the more so since the war was not restricted to Judaea itself, but spilled over the borders into Arabia and perhaps also into Syria. The extraordinary measures taken by Hadrian to put down the revolt . . . vindicate the truthfulness of this claim. . . . Hadrian accepted for the first time an imperatorial acclamation for a military victory; and no less than three senatorial generals who had contributed to this final victory and thereby to the restoration of Roman pride and self-confidence, received exceptional distinctions—the *ornamenta triumphalia*. A huge arch was erected near Tel Shalem, in the defeated province itself, probably by order of *senatus populusque Romanus*, to commemorate the victory. From the Roman perspective . . . the extraordinary measures and the exceptional distinctions bestowed on three senatorial generals prove more than anything else the gravity of the Bar Kokhba revolt, the reality of the threat.

Finally, we may recall, the name of the province was changed from Judaea to Syria Palaestina. Our familiarity with the new name may have jaded us as to the significance of the change, but Eck rightly points out that although the Romans changed provinces' names quite often, never before (or after) was an old name of a province changed as a corollary of a revolt.¹⁹ It was a kind of *damnatio memoriae*: Judaea was air-brushed out of the map of Roman provinces.

Although the change of name was not due to demographic factors, the suppression of this revolt brought with it a dramatic reduction in the size of the Jewish population in the province. Dio's numbers need not be exaggerated: "Fifty of their most important outposts and 985 of their most famous villages were razed to the ground and 580,000 men were slain in the various raids and battles, and the number of those

¹⁸ W. Eck, 'The Bar Kokhba Revolt: The Roman Point of View', *Journal of Roman Studies* 89 (1999), 89. This has become the consensus nowadays, see P. Schäfer's Preface to *The Bar Kokhba War Reconsidered* 2003, op. cit. (n. 17), xx.

¹⁹ "Judaea, derived from Iudaei, ceased to exist for the Roman government after the Bar Kokhba revolt. . . . The change of name was part of the punishment inflicted on the Jews; they were punished with the loss of a name. This is the clear message of this exceptional measure, the one and only example of such a measure in the history of the empire", Eck 1999, op. cit. (n. 18), 89.

that perished by famine, disease and fire was past finding out.”²⁰ Nor need we doubt Dio’s summing up: “nearly the whole of Judaea was made desolate.” Recent archaeological excavations and surveys conducted by the Israeli archaeologist Boaz Zissu²¹ in Judaea proper (*i.e.* the area covered by the Judaeian Hills, the Shephela and the Judaeian desert)—the very territory where an independent Jewish State survived for over three and a half years—attest major and profound destruction in the wake of the revolt. The second revolt thus had long-term repercussions on the pattern of Jewish settlement in the province—far exceeding those of the so-called Great Revolt of 66–70 CE. To the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in the first revolt, a major dislocation had now been added: Judaea proper ceased to be populated by Jews and the centre of Jewish life moved to the Galilee.

This presentation so far is quite rightly open to criticism: my association of Judaea/Syria Palaestina with the history of the Jewish people assumes a total overlap between the province and the Jewish *ethnos* who lived here. Such overlap did not exist even before the two revolts. As an aside I may point out that one of the problems encountered by the editors of the current project, the *Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaeae/Palaestinae* (CIIP), has been to define the territory from which inscriptions should be collected. During the time span covered by this multilingual corpus, that is the millenium between Alexander and Muhammad, the borders of the territory one has in mind were never static; moreover this area never coincided with any ancient Roman or Byzantine province, let alone matched the territory of any national or ethnic unit.²² Nonetheless, I am sure that it can be agreed that it is the more complex encounter between the Jewish people and the Roman army, as the spearhead of Roman government and civilisation, that is intriguing in this context, rather than the encounter between Rome and the other peoples who lived within the borders of what we may call the province of Judaea/Syria Palaestina. It can be safely assumed, although there is no definite evidence at present for it,²³ that Hadrian’s *adventus* in 130 was celebrated in the Greek cities

²⁰ Cassius Dio 69.14.3.

²¹ Boaz Zissu, ‘Rural Settlement in the Judaeian Hills and Foothills from the End of the Second Temple Period to the Bar Kokhba Revolt’, PhD thesis submitted to the Hebrew University in 2002.

²² On the *Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaeae/Palaestinae* (CIIP) see *Scripta Classica Israelica* 18 (1999), 175f.; *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 127 (1999), 307f.

²³ But see L. Di Segni, ‘A New Toponym in Southern Samaria’, *Liber Annuus* 44 (1994), 579–584; *SEG* XLIV, no. 1361; *AE* 1994, no. 1781. For a slightly revised edition see

of Judaea in a way not unlike what took place across the provincial border, in the city of Gerasa in Arabia. The city erected a triumphal arch ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας of the Emperor in accordance with the terms of the testament of one of its citizens, Flavius Agrippa. Three other statues of the emperor were raised in the city, two by the city itself (ἡ πόλις) and one by a private person—all dated by the 14th tribunician power to the year 130, and hence dedicated on the same occasion.²⁴ Parallel examples of such a reception of an emperor on the move could be adduced from all over the empire.²⁵ In sheer and significant contrast, for the Jewish people this visit spelled dire disaster; it shattered once and for all any hope of rebuilding the Temple in Jerusalem, for on this occasion Hadrian decided on the foundation of Aelia Capitolina—a pagan Roman colony on the site of Jerusalem. This act, to quote Martin Goodman's deliberately provocative formulation, was the "final solution for Jewish rebelliousness";²⁶ it served as the direct cause for a second revolt, as Dio tells us: "At Jerusalem he founded a city in place of the one which had been razed to the ground, naming it Aelia Capitolina, and instead of the temple he raised a new temple to Jupiter."²⁷ This brought on a war of no slight importance nor of brief duration for the Jews deemed it intolerable that foreign races should be settled in their city and foreign religious rites planted there." (69.12.1–2)

Nowhere is the conflict more extremely present and are the rivalling forces more sharply delineated than in the story of Masada, where

now L. Di Segni, 'The Hadrianic Inscription from Southern Samaria (?)—A Palinode', *Liber Annuus* 53 (2003) [2005], 335–340. However, as observed by P.-L. Gatier already on the occasion of the first publication ('Bulletin épigraphique', *Revue des Études Grecques* 109 [1996], 649–650, no. 486), it would be hazardous to revise our view of the relationship between the imperial power and villages in Judaea solely on the basis of an inscription found in suspicious circumstances.

²⁴ For the arch see C.B. Welles, 'The Inscriptions', in C.H. Kraehling, *Gerasa, City of the Decapolis* (New Haven 1938), no. 58 and for the others, *ibid.*, nos. 143–145; cf. W. Eck 'Vier mysteriöse Rasuren in Inschriften aus Gerasa: Zum "Schicksal" des Statthalters Haterius Nepos', in G. Paci, ed., *Ἐπιγραφαί. Miscellanea epigrafica in onore di Lidio Gasperini I* (2000), 347–362.

²⁵ Cf. H. Halfmann, *Itinera principum. Geschichte und Typologie der Kaiserreichen im römischen Reich* (Göttingen 1986), 129ff.; J. Lehen, *Adventus Principis. Untersuchungen zu Sinngehalt und Zeremoniell der Kaiserankunft in den Städten des Imperium Romanum* (Frankfurt 1997), 85ff.

²⁶ M. Goodman, 'Trajan and the Origins of the Bar Kokhba War', in Schäfer 2003, *op. cit.* (n. 17), 28; cf. M. Goodman, 'Trajan and the Origins of Roman Hostility to the Jews', *Past & Present* 82 (2004), 3ff.

²⁷ On the passage see Y. Eliav, 'Hadrian's Actions in the Jerusalem Temple Mount according to Cassius Dio and Xiphilini Manus', *JSQ* 4 (1997), 125ff.; cf. now, *idem*, *God's Mountain. The Temple Mount in Time, Place and Memory* (Baltimore 2005), 85ff.

modern historiography turned the Jewish resistance and suicide on the one hand and the Roman siege and conquest of the fortress on the other into symbols—indeed into a myth.²⁸ The *sicarii*, a group of fanatical extremists (the term would be ‘terrorists’ nowadays), banned by the Jewish rebels themselves and forced to flee from Jerusalem in 66²⁹—never to take part in the revolt again—came to represent the whole Jewish people, whereas the Roman siege has been turned into a most impressive engineering feat, one of the greatest sieges the Romans ever embarked on: the greater the siege, the more admirable the Jewish resistance and final martyrdom. Eventually Edward Luttwak, taking the Roman point of view, gave the story of Masada a respectable ‘scientific’ wrapping. In his study the siege and capture of Masada—extended to three years—became the capstone of Roman imperial strategy, the clue to Rome’s success and her long survival as a mighty world empire:

Above all, the Romans clearly realized that the dominant dimension of power was not physical but psychological—the product of others’ perceptions of Roman strength rather than the use of this strength. And this realization alone can explain the sophistication of Roman strategy at its best. The siege of Masada in AD 70–73 [sic!] reveals the exceedingly subtle workings of a long-range security policy based on deterrence. Faced with the resistance of a few hundred Jews on a mountain in the Judean desert, a place of no strategic or economic importance, the Romans could have insulated the rebels by posting a few hundred men to guard them . . . Alternatively, the Romans could have stormed the mountain fortress.³⁰

The Romans did none of these things . . . Instead, at a time when the entire Roman army had a total of only twenty-nine legions to garrison the entire empire, one legion was deployed to besiege Masada, there to reduce the fortress by great works of engineering, including a huge ramp reaching the full height of the mountain. This was a vast and seemingly irrational commitment of scarce military manpower—or was it? The

²⁸ See for example N. Ben-Yehuda, *The Masada Myth. Collective Memory and Myth-making in Israel* (Madison, Wisconsin 1995), with the review by J. Roth in *Scripta Classica Israelica* 17 (1998), 252ff.

²⁹ On the *sicarii* and Masada see H.M. Cotton and J.J. Price, ‘Who Conquered Masada in 66 CE, and who lived there until the Fortress fell?’ *Zion* 55 (1990), 449–454 (Hebrew); D.R. Schwartz, ‘Once Again: Who Captured Masada? On Doublets, Reading Against the Grain, and What Josephus Actually Wrote’, *Scripta Classica Israelica* 24 (2005), 75ff.

³⁰ E.N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third* (Baltimore/London 1976), 3f.

entire three-year operation [sic!], and the very insignificance of its objective, must have made an ominous impression on all those in the East who might otherwise have been tempted to contemplate revolt: the lesson of Masada was that the Romans would pursue rebellion even to mountain tops in remote deserts to destroy its last vestiges regardless of cost.

There it is in a nutshell. However, grave doubts begin to gather as soon as we recall that Rome maintained complete and utter silence about this great victory, which can hardly be reconciled with a desire to transmit a message to its conquered peoples. No source apart from Josephus tells us about the siege of Masada and its fall. There are no inscriptions, no decorations for Roman soldiers who participated in this great siege, nothing at all. Even in the inscriptions from the home town of the Roman general who conquered Masada, L. Flavius Silva, which recount his entire career³¹—not a word is said about the conquest of Masada. One may counter this with the observation that after the fall of Jerusalem, the destruction of the Temple and the magnificent triumphal procession of 71 mentioned above, it was no longer possible or even desirable to celebrate the fall of Masada, but it was considered more prudent to play down as much as possible the fact that some cells of resistance had remained in Judaea after the fall of Jerusalem. As for the conqueror of Masada, L. Flavius Silva Nonius Bassus became *consul ordinarius* in 81 CE. A glance at the crowded consular *Fasti* under Vespasian and Titus makes it clear that his victory did not go unrewarded.

Nonetheless, I do not believe in Luttwak's grand lesson which Rome desired to teach its subject nations. Thus we should welcome Jonathan Roth's reassessment of the siege of Masada, which cuts the siege down to its real historical dimensions.³² This notion had been adumbrated earlier by several modern historians, but their caution and comments had disappeared from the books of history.

Roth bases his conclusion that the siege could not have lasted for more than 8 weeks, perhaps merely 4 weeks, on known and verifiable facts about the military capability of the Roman army in laying siege to cities and fortresses. These facts can be substantiated by Josephus' own descriptions of the siege works in Yodfat, Gamla and Jerusalem.

³¹ M.F. Fenati, *Lucio Flavio Silva Nonio Basso e la Città di Urbisaglia* (Macerata 1995).

³² J. Roth, 'The Length of the Siege of Masada', *Scripta Classica Israelica* 14 (1995), 87ff.

We know the size of the Roman force which laid siege to Masada, both from Josephus as well as from the size and nature of the camps: the Tenth Legion numbered about 4800 soldiers and the auxiliary units about 3400—together 8200 soldiers—although I would suggest fewer since I cannot believe that the country was completely stripped of its garrison—to which one must add local militia and Jewish slaves occupied with carrying supplies for the army. One can calculate with a great deal of accuracy—checking the results against information obtained from other sources—how long it would take such a force to put together the camps, the circumvallation, the ramp and the battering ram. The Romans wanted to break down the casemate wall, not to starve the Jews into submission; they directed all their efforts to this main purpose. As Roth concludes:

A combination of Josephus' dramatic rhetoric and the striking topography of Masada (as well as perhaps the influence of politics), have misled scholars on the length of the siege of Masada. A careful analysis of the narrative account, an understanding of the parameters of Roman engineering capabilities and the recognition that the siege ramp lies on top of a sloping natural spur suggest that the siege was a relatively short one.³³

Cutting the siege down to a realistic size makes it commensurate with everything we know about the Roman army and its methods, its experience and its use of manpower. The conquest of Masada was a reaction to resistance to Roman rule on a local level; it was a lesson administered locally—not an expression of Roman grand strategy. Nor do I agree with Luttwak's view of Josephus' role: "And as if to ensure that the message was duly heard, and duly remembered, Josephus was installed in Rome where he wrote a detailed account of the siege, which was published in Greek, the acquired language of Josephus, and that of the Roman East."³⁴ The fact that the story of Masada makes the climax of the last book of the Jewish War,³⁵ that the book was written in Greek, the *lingua franca* of the Roman Near East, that it was presented to both Vespasian and Titus (Josephus, *Vita* 361), and signed by the latter's own hand (*Vita* 363)³⁶ with the order to have it published, does

³³ Roth 1999, op. cit. (n. 32), 110.

³⁴ Luttwak 1976, op. cit. (n. 30), 4.

³⁵ See S. Schwartz, 'The Composition and Publication of Josephus' *Bellum Iudaicum* Book 7,' *Harvard Theological Review* 79 (1986), 373ff.

³⁶ Cf. C.P. Jones, 'Towards a Chronology of Josephus', *Scripta Classica Israelica* 21

not turn Josephus into the spokesman of the Roman government. All that one can say is that it was a Jewish historian who *qua* Jew, and not *qua* spokesman of the Roman government, laid the foundations for the haunting and ominous myth of Masada. Subsequently, the story of Masada acquired a life of its own, but already in the *Jewish War* it seems to have risen on its creator and thwarted his original intention, or perhaps rather, it thrived on the deep divide in its author's soul: like Balaam the son of Be'or who came to curse and remained to bless, so Josephus who starts with a stark condemnation of the *sicarii*, goes on to put two noble speeches in the mouth of Eleazar Ben Yair in which he extols freedom and consecrates martyrdom—καλῶς καὶ ἐλευθέρως ἀποθανεῖν—both condemned by the same Josephus as utter folly and transgression in three other speeches, which no less than Eleazar's speech reflect the historian's convictions—only that in them his rationality has gained the upper hand. I refer to the speech he puts in the mouth of Agrippa II on the eve of the revolt³⁷—to which I shall return later—and to the one he himself delivers after the fall of Jotapata,³⁸ not to mention his speech under the walls of the besieged Jerusalem.³⁹

Even more disturbing to my mind is the view which sees in the Roman siege and conquest of Masada the key to understanding Rome's success in keeping its Empire under control. The long survival of Roman power is not to be explained merely by the use of military force—not even by the sophisticated use of such force. The Roman Empire survived for as long as it did not because it successfully put down local revolts, but because it did not have to do so: there were very few revolts. Roman rule was on the whole acceptable to its subjects, especially to the local elites. The absence of revolts is not to be explained by the exercise of force: after all, not all provinces had much of a military presence in them. Rome managed to obtain the co-operation of those subjects who at the end of the process received Roman citizenship, shared the benefits of the empire and finally came to identify with Rome's history and ideology.⁴⁰ This is not to belittle the military threat that Rome

(2002), 113f.; see now H.M. Cotton and W. Eck, 'Josephus' Roman Audience? Josephus and the Roman Elites', in Edmondson, Mason and Rives 2005, op. cit. (n. 16), 37ff.

³⁷ *Bellum Iudaicum* 2.345–404.

³⁸ *Bellum Iudaicum* 3.361–391.

³⁹ *Bellum Iudaicum* 5.362–423.

⁴⁰ Sometimes producing a magnificent fusion of local cultures and Roman government embodied in figures like the Greek historian Cassius Dio or the Greek jurist M.Cn. Licinius Rufinus, see F. Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio* (Oxford 1964), 189f.,

presented; the Roman army's efficiency, superiority and cruelty were familiar to Rome's subjects, at least in the first years after the conquest. But if Rome had to use its force in the way it used it to suppress two successive revolts in Judaea rather than merely display it, holding it out as an ever present threat, its empire would have fallen apart long before it did. The second half of the last century taught us the limits of the use of military force in keeping down hostile and rebellious populations. Rome would not have survived for hundreds of years as a world empire had its rule not been acceptable to its subjects, sometimes more than acceptable—desirable.

It is precisely the benefits which the empire offered its subjects that the Jews—not all of them, and not everywhere, of course⁴¹—in contradistinction to everyone else, seem to have remained at best indifferent to and at worst rejected out of hand. Full participation in reaping the benefits of empire held no attraction for them. This is surely the root cause of Jewish-Roman antagonism and the explanation for the fact that here in Judaea/Syria Palaestina the impact of empire for the first two hundred years was *par excellence* the impact of the Roman army and the use of brutal military force. Here and nowhere else the lesson which Luttwak speaks of had to be inculcated—twice. Thus it does not come as a surprise that the only argument which the 'Roman citizen, Flavius Josephus', puts in the mouth of yet another 'Roman citizen, Julius Agrippa', to persuade his fellow Jews in Jerusalem not to rise against Rome is, in a nutshell, that 'Rome is invincible and all opposition is futile'. As observed long ago by the late Menahem Stern in a little known article,⁴² what strikes the reader of Agrippa's speech in 66 CE (*Bellum Iudaicum* 2.345–404) is the absence of: "any expression of appreciation of the civilizing achievements of Rome or some expression of good will and awareness of aspirations and ideals common to provincials as well as rulers. The speech reflects no awareness of the benefits of the 'Imperial Peace', the renowned Pax Romana which provides security for all the inhabitants of the empire in sharp contrast

and id., 'The Greek East and Roman Law: the Dossier of M.Cn. Licinius Rufinus', *Journal of Roman Studies* 88 (1999), 90ff. = H.M. Cotton and G.M. Rogers, eds., *Rome, the Greek World, and the East II: Government, Society and Culture in the Roman Empire* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004), 435ff.

⁴¹ Surely one must not lose sight of the Jewish diaspora; there we know only of the revolts of CE 115–117.

⁴² 'Josephus and the Roman Empire as reflected in The Jewish War', in L.H. Feldman and G. Hata, eds., *Josephus, Judaism, and Christianity* (Leiden 1987), 71ff.

to earlier periods when a more or less permanent state of war prevailed over the Mediterranean basin”.

This, to continue Stern’s argument, contrasts sharply with Cerialis’s speech to the Gauls in 70 CE, as reported by Tacitus. The Roman general dissuades them from joining the Batavian revolt in 70, not because it is futile to attempt a revolt, but because they have no cause for revolt: Rome has saved them from endemic intestine war and periodic German invasions and shared with them the benefits of her empire:

Gaul always had its petty kingdoms and intestine wars, till you submitted to our authority. We, though so often provoked, have used the right of conquest to burden you only with the cost of maintaining peace. For the tranquillity of nations cannot be preserved without armies; armies cannot exist without pay; pay cannot be furnished without tribute; all else is common between us. You often command our legions. You rule these and other provinces. There is no privilege, no exclusion (*nihilseparatumclausumve*).⁴³

No such sharing and solidarity ever existed or could exist between Romans and Jews, at least in their own land. No Jew from Judaea/Syria Palaestina was to command Roman legions unless he first ceased to be a Jew (like Tiberius Alexander). The integration of the local elite into the imperial elite was possible only in the non-Jewish sector of the population of Judaea/Syria Palaestina. The hope that future excavations in the province or elsewhere in the Roman world may produce the first Roman senator to originate from one of the cities of Syria Palaestina can go no further than the Greek cities and the Roman *coloniae* of the province.⁴⁴

I would like to end on a more cheerful note, or at least by introducing a ray of light into the gloom which the hostility and intransigence inherent in the Roman-Jewish relationship have surely caused. In one of the documents from the Judean Desert, the now rightly celebrated

⁴³ Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.74: *Regna bellaque per Gallias semper fuere donec in nostrum ius concederetur. nos, quamquam totiens lacessiti, iure victoriae id solum vobis addidimus, quo pacem tueremur; nam neque quies gentium sine armis neque arma sine stipendiis neque stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt: cetera in communi sita sunt. ipsi plerumque legionibus nostris praesidentis, ipsi has aliasque provincias regitis; nihil separatum clausumve.*

⁴⁴ Cf. H.M. Cotton and W. Eck in ‘A New Inscription from Caesarea Maritima and the Local Elite of Caesarea Maritima’, in L. Rutgers, ed., *What Athens has to do with Jerusalem. Festschrift for Gideon Foerster* (Leuven 2002), 371ff.

Babatha,⁴⁵ a Jewish woman from the Roman province of Arabia who somehow got involved in the Bar Kokhba revolt, tells the Roman governor of Arabia of her fondest wish that her son “be raised in splendid style rendering thanks to *the[se] most blessed times* of the governorship of Julius Julianus.”⁴⁶ This should be taken with a grain of salt, like a similar expression used by the rhetor Tertullus in his address to Felix: “Seeing that by thee we enjoy great quietness and that very worthy deeds are done unto this nation by thy providence.”⁴⁷ Both statements hail the advent of Rome as the dawning of a new age of peace and felicity. True, both Babatha and Tertullus, in their attempts to propitiate a Roman official, may have resorted to self-congratulatory Roman propaganda, but their sincerity should not be dismissed out of hand. For the repeated petitions to the governor of Arabia in the Babatha archive—all of them answered by the governor—reveal a complete adjustment to and reconciliation with Roman rule: it is in his court that justice is expected to be administered. Furthermore, nowhere in the documents is Babatha’s confidence in the Roman governor’s accessibility seen to be unfounded or misguided.⁴⁸ How are we to reconcile this with the fierce rebellions motivated by religious and national motives against everything which the empire represented?

⁴⁵ The Greek part of the Babatha Archive is published by N. Lewis, *The Documents from the Bar Kokhba Period in the Cave of Letters: Greek Papyri* (Jerusalem 1989).

⁴⁶ *P.Yadin* 15, ll. 10–11 = ll. 26–27: ὅθεν λαμπρῶς διαθωθῆ/μου ὁ υἱὸς εὐχαριστῶν (εὐχαριστοῦντα) τοῖς μακαριωτάτοις καιροῖς ἡγεμονίας Ἰουλίου Ἰουλιανοῦ ἡγεμόνος.

⁴⁷ *Acts* 24:2: πολλῆς εἰρήνης τυγχάνοντες διὰ Σοῦ, καὶ διορθωμάτων γινομένων τῷ ἔθνει τούτῳ διὰ τῆς σῆς προνοίας.

⁴⁸ See H.M. Cotton, ‘The Guardianship of Jesus son of Babatha: Roman and Local Law in the Province of Arabia’, *Journal of Roman Studies* 83 (1993), 94ff; eadem, ‘Private International Law or Conflicts of Laws: Reflections on Roman Provincial Jurisdiction’, *Der Alltag der römischen Administration in der Hohen Kaiserzeit*, Proceedings of a Conference held at the University of Köln in honour of Werner Eck, 28–30 January 2005 (forthcoming).

JEWS AND THE ROMAN ARMY: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES¹

JONATHAN P. ROTH

Scholars, including military historians, often project the conventions of Talmudic, or even modern, Judaism back into previous periods. This is particularly true in general assumptions about Jews in the military

¹ This note contains a select bibliography, some titles of which will be cited in the following footnotes.

S. Applebaum, 'Three Roman Soldiers of Probably Jewish Origin,' in M. Rozelaar and B. Shimron, eds., *Commentationes ad antiquitatem classicam pertinentes in memoriam B. Katz* (Tel Aviv 1970).

—, 'Ein Targhuna,' in S. Applebaum, *Judaea in Hellenistic and Roman Times: Historical and Archaeological Essays* (Leiden 1989), 66–69.

B. Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns* (Cambridge 1976).

P. Bilde, *Flavius Josephus between Jerusalem and Rome* (Sheffield 1988).

M. Gichon, 'Aspects of a Roman Army in War According to the *Bellum Judaicum* of Josephus', in D. Kennedy and Ph. Freeman, eds., *The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East I*. BAR International Series 297, I (Oxford 1986), 287–310.

A. Goldsworthy, 'Community Under Pressure: The Roman Army at the Siege of Jerusalem,' in A. Goldsworthy and I. Haynes, *The Roman Army as a Community*. Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplemental Series 34 (Portsmouth RI 1999).

R. González Salinero, 'El servicio militar de los judíos en el ejército romano,' *Aquila Legionis* 4 (Madrid 2003), 45–91.

M.H. Gracey, 'The Armies of the Judaeae Client Kings,' in D. Kennedy and Ph. Freeman, eds., *The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East I*. BAR International Series 297, I (Oxford 1986).

J. Helgeland, 'Christians and the Roman Army AD 173–337,' *Church History* 43/2 (June 1974), 149–163.

B. Isaac, 'Reflections on the Roman Army in the East,' in D. Kennedy and Ph. Freeman, eds., *The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East I*. BAR International Series 297, I (Oxford 1986), 383–395.

C.P. Jones, 'Egypt and Judaea under Vespasian,' *Historia* 46.2 (1997), 249–253.

J. Lesquier, *Les institutions militaire de l'Égypte sous les Lagides* (Paris 1911).

M. Mor, 'The Roman Army in Eretz-Israel in the Years 70–132,' in D. Kennedy and Ph. Freeman, eds., *The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East I*. BAR International Series 297, I (Oxford 1986), 575–602.

J. Price, 'The Enigma of Philip ben Jakimos,' *Historia* 40.1 (1991), 77–94.

—, *Jerusalem Under Siege: The Collapse of the Jewish State 66–70 CE* (Leiden 1992).

J. Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War* (dissertation Columbia University, New York 1991).

D.B. Saddington, 'Armed forces in the New Testament,' in *New International Dictionary of Biblical Archaeology* (Michigan 1983), 68–69.

and Jewish attitudes towards the Romans. In discussing this issue, it is important to note that the meaning of the terms 'Romans' and 'Jews' is not always clear, and was used variously and loosely in antiquity as well as today. In addition, the terminology shifted over time. Much of ancient, and modern ethnic terminology refers to region or language, but not without ambiguity. When the Romans referred to Syrians, for example, they might mean the inhabitants of Syria, whether Greek, Aramaic or even Latin speaking, or they might mean anyone who spoke Syrian, even in the first century a common way of referring to Aramaic.

On the other hand, while 'Roman' could be an ethnic term, it also had a political meaning. We know of many Jews who had Roman citizenship, Herod, Paul and Josephus are only the most famous examples. Tiberius Julius Alexander was not only a citizen, but also held high rank in the military. He is often mentioned in our sources without any reference to his Jewishness, and almost certainly would have been called a Roman in some contexts. Josephus says he "did not follow in the religion of his country"² but this might reflect a doctrinal dispute rather than an objective observation. In any case, Alexander's lack of piety did not make him any less Jewish.

A Hebrew name is a good indicator of Jewishness in the pre-Christian period, but a Greek or Latin name certainly does not exclude the possibility. We know of many Jewish individuals with Greek and Latin names from the Talmud, the New Testament and inscriptions. Indeed, the Jewish catacombs in Rome, and elsewhere, are full of inscriptions with Latin names. We find many individuals in the Herodian, or Jewish royal, army who have Latin names. Examples are Rufus the commander of the Royal Cavalry,³ Volumnius a military tribune⁴ and Aebutius a decurion.⁵ The general assumption has been that they are ethnic Romans, serving in Herod's army, and this is certainly possible. It is also possible, however, and in some cases more likely, that they are Jews with Latin names. While Herod and his successors certainly used Roman officers, we should not assume that there were no Jewish ones.

I. Shatzman, 'The Integration of Judaea into the Roman Empire,' *Scripta Classica Israelica* 18 (1999), 49–84.

M.P. Speidel, 'The Roman Army in Judaea under the Procurators,' *Ancient Society* 13/14 (1982/3), 233–240.

E.G. Turner, 'Tiberius Iulius Alexander,' *Journal of Roman Studies* 44 (1954), 54–64.

² *AJ* 20.100, see Turner (1954).

³ *BJ* 2.52.

⁴ *BJ* 1.535, *AJ* 16.332.

⁵ *BJ* 4.36.

While the Jewish king was technically commander-in-chief, and sometimes actually led the army, there was a commander of all Jewish royal military forces called the *strategos*. In his discussion of the revolt of 4 BCE, Josephus mentions a general (*strategos*) being sent into the temple to negotiate with the rebels. Thackeray mused that this might be the *sagan* or Temple Captain. This position, however, was a fiction of the New Testament, as will be discussed below. Instead, the *strategos* mentioned is doubtless the commander-in-chief of Archelaus' armies,⁶ an individual named Gratus.⁷ How could Archelaus have sent a Roman into the Temple? This strongly suggests that Gratus was a Jew with a Latin name. Aequus Modius, an important, if enigmatic, figure in the Jewish Royal Army attracts attention. At first glance it seems to mean 'Fair Measure,' which might be a nickname: he could have served as a quartermaster. Alternatively, it might reflect the Roman *nomen* Modius and *cognomen* Aequus.⁸ Modius might also be a calque on a Jewish name such as Omri or Gomer. In any case, he may well have been a Jewish soldier with a Latin name. Another officer in a Jewish unit is named Sulla. It seems an unlikely *cognomen* for a Roman of the late first century, but makes sense as a nickname or *cognomen* for a Jew.⁹

Samaritans float ambiguously from Jewish to non-Jewish in both the ancient and the modern mind. As Roman soldiers, they are generally seen as non-Jews, although in fact they were virtually identical to Jews in religion, language and custom. Josephus tells us that 3,000 Samaritans in Herod's army stayed loyal during the uprising of 4 BCE and since Josephus later notes that the garrison of Judea was made up of five cohorts infantry and an *ala* or wing of cavalry, it makes sense to see these as the same force. One of these Samaritan cohorts and the cavalry *ala* are attested in inscriptions.¹⁰ Indeed, there would be no reason to think there were any non-Samaritans in the Roman garrison of Judea were it not for reference to them in the New Testament. An Italian cohort is mentioned in *Acts of the Apostles* as the unit of the first Gentile convert to Christianity, the centurion Cornelius, and the Augustan Cohort, to which belonged the centurion Julius, who escorts Paul to

⁶ Loeb *Bj* 2.9 note a (326).

⁷ *Bj* 2.58.

⁸ http://perso.wanadoo.fr/lfrancis/index1.htm?htm_/leg3cyr/legindexnom.htm

⁹ *Vita* 399–406.

¹⁰ For all the references to these units see Mor 1986, 577–578.

Rome. In an influential article, Michael Speidel showed that it was possible that these units did exist.¹¹ The Augustan cohort is attested in an inscription dating to the 80s CE.¹² This unit, however, was part of Agrippa II's army, and though as Speidel notes, it is certainly possible that a Roman unit could serve in the army of a client king, it is equally possible that this is a Herodian unit, with either a Roman officer or a Jewish (i.e. native) officer with a Latin name. Thus the existence of an Augustan cohort in the Roman garrison of Judea is far from proven.

As for the Italian cohort, Speidel claims that it is a *cohors civium Romanorum*. Speidel actually identifies a *cohors II Italica c.R.* that was in Syria as early as 63 CE, though it moved to Noricum before the Jewish War. As he argues, this unit could be the one called the *speire tes kaloumenes Italike* in the New Testament's *Acts of the Apostles*.¹³ The unit is not mentioned by Josephus nor is there epigraphical evidence for it at Caesarea or anywhere in Judea. It is possible that the unit did not exist or was a later Syrian unit displaced to a different place and earlier time. The historicity of *Acts* is a complex issue, but from a military historical perspective, the author of the work seems uninformed about the security situation in Jesus' Palestine. For example, he refers to a *strategos tou hierou* usually translated 'Captain of the Temple' although 'General of the Temple' would be more literal. This officer commands a paramilitary force that seems to act like police: in *Acts* 4.1, the 'Captain' along with the 'priests' and the Sadducees arrest Peter and John and place them under guard (*eis teresin*). In the next chapter, Peter is also arrested.¹⁴ The arrest is actually made by the high priest, and the apostle is put in prison (*desmoteron*). 'Officers' (*hyperetai*) and 'guards' (*phylakes*) find him missing, and the Captain of the Temple among others, is perplexed.

Josephus makes no mention of such an official or of any Temple Police either in his description of the Temple or in any other part of his writings.¹⁵ Given Josephus' knowledge and interests, this is a powerful argument from silence. The *Middoth*, a tractate in the *Mishnah Kedoshim*, which concerns the temple, describes these guards.¹⁶ The *Middoth*, however, suggests that this Temple Guard was a nominal one, made

¹¹ Speidel (1982/3), Saddington (1982) and Mor (1986) accept Speidel's conclusion.

¹² *AE* 1925.121, cf. *IGR* 3.1136 (Hit), Speidel (1982/3), 238.

¹³ *Acts* 10:1.

¹⁴ *Acts* 5:17ff.

¹⁵ See especially *Bj* 5.22 where one would expect such a reference.

¹⁶ *Mish. Ked.* 10.1.1–2, 9.

up only of three Priests and 21 Assistant Priests, who were stationed at various parts of the Temple as a sort of ceremonial watch. The commander does not have the quasi-military title *sagan*, who is in fact another Temple official, in charge of ritual, but is called only The Overseer of the Temple Mount (*ish har ha-bayit*). The *Middoth* gives the source for its description: Eliezar bar Jacob, who was one of the Tannaim of the Second generation (along with Gamaliel II) and was a disciple of Johannon ben Zakkai. He was probably a boy or a young man during the Jewish War.¹⁷ It is clear from his description, that the temple guards were by no means a police or security force, but only a ritual guard. Indeed, there is no indication that they were armed. It is noteworthy that Jerome translates *strategos tou hierou* as *magistratus templi*, not with a military term. The entire presentation of this religious police force is probably fictional. The way in which *Acts* completely misconstrues the Temple Guard suggests that its author was far from a eyewitness and indeed was poorly informed about the realities of first century Palestine. The same can be said of many military aspects of the New Testament. At very least we should conclude that military historians should use the New Testament with extreme caution.

If we accept that all of the forces in Judea before the Jewish War were Samaritans, it puts several incidents mentioned by Josephus in a different light. At one point, a 'Roman' soldier raised his tunic and exposes himself to a Jewish crowd in the Temple courtyard, causing a riot. If we see this soldier as a Samaritan, then this anti-Jewish act takes on a completely different significance. When the revolt first breaks out, a cohort is trapped in the Antonia fortress. The commander negotiates a surrender, but the rebels break it and massacre the soldiers. We might well view this as anti-Samaritan, not anti-Roman, act. It is noteworthy that the unit's commander, who was certainly a Roman, was humiliated, but spared.

Although little attention has been paid to it, we are actually remarkably well informed about the organization of the Herodian military forces.¹⁸ When Herod built up his army, he probably organized, trained and armed them in the Roman fashion. Josephus refers to five Roman cohorts (*speiras*) and five Jewish ones operating together.¹⁹ It is true that

¹⁷ Another Eliezar B. Jacob lived later and was a disciple of R. Akiba.

¹⁸ Contra Price (1991), 77 note 2, See Gracey (1986).

¹⁹ *Bḥ* 1.301.

Herod's bodyguard was made up of Gauls, Thracians and Germans.²⁰ These units, however, were probably relatively small, perhaps a thousand men in total at most, and in any case, we hear nothing of them after Herod's funeral. They were probably disbanded, either by Archelaus or by the Romans when they took control in 6 CE. The bulk of Herod's army was Jewish, in some sense of the word.

Like all Hellenistic forces, the mainstay of the Herodian army consisted of soldiers in military settlements. The first, and most important, of Herod's military settlement was at Sebaste, which initially consisted of 6,000 men.²¹ Jewish sources sometimes scornfully refer to them as Cuthaeans (that is, Babylonians) or even *Kittim*, but there is no reason to think that the Samaritan forces in Herodian service were pagans and not monotheists. Other military settlements were unambiguously Jewish. A unit of Babylonian Jewish horse-archers was that at Bathyra, in Batanea (Bashan). Josephus claims in *AJ* that by the time of the Jewish revolt, the Bathyran unit was as large as the rest of King Agrippa's army combined.²² There was an Idumaean settlement of 2,000 men, but we do not know of its exact location. The Idumeans were forcibly converted to Judaism by the Hasmoneans, but while we are not well-informed, there is no reason to doubt that Jewish belief and ritual was widespread among the Idumean soldiers in Herodian service. We hear of three other military settlements: at Esbonitis (Heshbon), east of the Dead Sea in Perea, an area which apparently was mainly inhabited by Jews,²³ at Gaba, north of Mount Carmel,²⁴ and at Trachonitis (Heb. Argob), located to the east of the Jordan. The latter unit was made up of 3,000 men and was probably stationed at the fort whose remains are at 'Ein Targhuna today.²⁵ According to Josephus, it was destroyed in the revolt of 10–9 BC,²⁶ but we hear again of forces from Trachonitis, specifically archers, in the revolt of 4 BC. This is significant, as it sug-

²⁰ *AJ* 16.198–199; *BJ* 1.397, 672.

²¹ *BJ* 1.403, 2.55, *AJ* 15.293, 17.266. Sebaste was a refounding of the colony of Samaria, established as a military colony by Alexander himself. It played an important role in Seleucid resistance to the Hasmoneans, and was probably destroyed by Alexander Jannaeus (*AJ* 375–378).

²² *AJ* 17.3.

²³ *AJ* 15.294.

²⁴ *AJ* 15.294, *BJ* 2.36. Its exact location is unknown.

²⁵ *AJ* 16.271, 295, Applebaum (1989), 67–68. Applebaum's suggestion that the unit, along with the Bathyran archers, was moved to Libya by Augustus, has little to recommend it.

²⁶ *AJ* 16.292.

gests that such military colonies might be reestablished when destroyed. There is the question of militia.²⁷ During the Jewish War, Simon bar Giora raises his forces, according to Josephus, first from freed slaves and the poor (*poneroi*).²⁸ Subsequently, however, he draws from the “citizen levy (*demotikon . . . oligon*) who obeyed him like a king.”²⁹ This may refer to Jewish property-owners subject to military service in the Greek hoplite style.

Jewish military units did not just defend Palestine in the Roman interest. Jewish forces took part in the Civil War, providing troops for Caesar’s Alexandrine War for example, and in Roman expeditions in the imperial period. Forces of Agrippa II took part in the Bosporan campaign and in the ill-fated invasion of the Arabian peninsula under Aelius Gallus.³⁰ We happen to know of these examples, but we should not reject the notion that the auxiliary troops of many, if not most of the Roman eastern campaigns in the Late Republic and early empire included Jewish troops fighting for Rome. It is certain that Jewish forces played a part, small but nonetheless significant, in the suppression of the Jewish Revolt of 66–70, a role that is generally completely ignored.

When the uprising threatened, the Jewish King Agrippa II sent Philip, called a ‘*strategos*’ along with a ‘hipparch’ named Darius and 2,000 cavalry, including Bathyrans to Jerusalem.³¹ It is noteworthy that the Romans seem to have relied primarily on the forces of the local client king for security. While the Herodians sent 2,000 men, the Romans had only a single cohort, 500 men, in the Holy City. Agrippa II had moved forces into the Galilee in mid-March, long before Cestius Gallus, the governor of Syria set out for Jerusalem with his legions. Agrippa is clearly acting aggressively and decisively in the Roman interests. The Jewish Royal Army, under the command of Modius Aequus, besieged Gamala in the Golan.³² They kept this strategic city blockaded for seven months, before being relieved by Roman forces. This no doubt represented the bulk of the Herodian forces, including the Babylonian archers. Another royal Jewish force was sent under a ‘decurion’ (*dekadarchos*) named Aebutius to engage Josephus’ forces at Simonia, west of Nazareth.³³

²⁷ Gracey (1986), 317.

²⁸ *BJ* 4.508.

²⁹ *BJ* 4.510.

³⁰ *AJ* 16.27ff., Strabo, *Geogr.* 16.4.22ff.

³¹ *BJ* 2.17.4.

³² *BJ* 4.11, 83.

³³ *BJ* 4.36.

Josephus gives the size of this force as 100 cavalry, 200 infantry and an unknown number of 'allies,' *symmachoi*, from Gaba. This town, of course, was the site of a Herodian military settlement, which is clearly still functioning. The 300 'regulars' certainly represent the unit stationed there, but who are these 'allies'? Josephus may be referring to other Jews in the settlement, who did not owe military service, but who volunteered to fight for their king. It is impossible to be sure, but this might be a clue to a pro-Roman feeling among some Jews. Josephus might be expected to mention such loyalty to Rome, but it might have been embarrassing, considering that he was still in rebellion at the time and fighting these very same individuals. Indeed, the story is omitted entirely in the *BJ*. In any case, Josephus' force of 2,000 was defeated at the cost of only three royal Jewish soldiers, so the Jewish Royal Army was clearly an effective force.³⁴ Josephus mentions a third pro-Roman Jewish force, the royal bodyguard, which also fought in Galilee under the command of its captain, Sulla. Josephus does not mention the size of this force, but it was probably around 500 men. The reason for this hesitancy is that Sulla's small force beat 5,000 of Josephus' men. Agrippa II's role in the rebellion was important. He held onto Western Galilee, and although most of Eastern Galilee remained in revolt, he neutralized the important base at Gamala.

Jewish Royal forces are not mentioned in any of the operations leading up to the siege of Jerusalem, but this does not mean, of course, that they were not present. Josephus does mention the presence of both high-ranking Jewish officers and Jewish Royal forces at the siege of Jerusalem.³⁵ Tiberius Julius Alexander was present, and in fact may have been the *de facto* commander of the Roman forces. Although, as noted above, his Jewishness is often denigrated or ignored, he came from the most notable Jewish family in Egypt and was certainly Jewish in the ethnic sense at least. Josephus notes that the client kings' armies, including the Jewish Royal army, made up the vanguard of Titus' army as it advanced on Jerusalem.

We cannot say exactly how the Jewish contribution to the Roman war effort was. Assuming that the Herodian army had around 3,000 to 5,000 and this might well be an underestimate, and noting that the size of the Roman deployment changed over time, from a low of about 35,000 to

³⁴ *Vita* 114–118.

³⁵ *BJ* 5.42ff.

a high of some 70,000, we see that this Jewish contribution varied from some 5% to 10% of the total Roman force. This was certainly a significant factor. If we add in the Samaritan cohorts, some 3,000 men, and call them 'Jewish' then the total might rise to as high as 20% at some points in the conflict. That these forces were present throughout the war is proven by the fact that Vespasian removed them only after the end of the conflict.³⁶ In addition, Jewish leaders such as Agrippa II and Tiberius Julius Alexander provided important guidance and advice. The latter might well have been the strategic planner of the Roman campaign.

It is true that Jews were exempted from conscription and auxiliary units could not be raised in Judea. The assumption is made that this was for religious reasons. This view is quite widely held. The first such exemption was given by the Pompeian Lentulus Crus in 49 BCE, and does seem to have been given for religious reasons.³⁷ Nevertheless, it is likely that Jews were exempted from military service, first by Julius Caesar and then by others, not primarily due to Roman sensitivity to their religion, but due to Jewish loyalty and contributions to the Caesarian cause. The freedom from conscription did not mean that Jews did not fight: rather they did so on a voluntary basis. The importance of the Jewish contribution is illustrated in the Alexandrine War, in which Caesar almost died. Jews contributed a force of 1,500 to 3,000 (depending on the source).³⁸ Caesar had only 5,000 men, so this was a very significant contribution in either case. Josephus reports that Antipater, Herod's father, was personally responsible for the taking of Pelusium.

The exemption from recruiting auxiliary forces in Judea seems to have been technically recognized, in that no cohort or *ala* is called *Judaeorum*, until the Late Empire. This does not mean, however, that these units did not have Jews in them. The Samaritan cohorts had the same religious scruples and taboos as the Jews, which shows that the exemption was based primarily on national, and not religious grounds. It also indicates that Jews could accommodate doing military service in the Roman Army. In addition, the auxiliary units stationed in the country after 70 must have begun recruiting locally, as did those in other parts of the empire. It is highly likely, therefore, that many Jews, in the

³⁶ *AJ* 19.363.

³⁷ *AJ* 14.240.

³⁸ *AJ* 14.8.1.

regional, ethnic and religious sense of the word, served in these units in the centuries they occupied the country. Indeed, the changing of the name of the province to Palaestina, may in part be due to a wish to continue to honor, technically, Caesar's exemption, without giving up local recruitment.

The exemption was not always honored. Tiberius drafted 4,000 Jews into military service to fight brigands in Sardinia.³⁹ There is no suggestion that they fought in all-Jewish units, they would have served as replacements (*supplementum*). This remained the exception of course, but simply because Jews were exempted from conscription, does not mean that they did not serve in the Roman military as volunteers. In an article published in 1970, Shimon Applebaum identified three Roman soldiers of probable Jewish origin, and argued that there were probably many others, who remain unidentified. In a recent article, Raúl González Salinero, has found scores of possible Jewish Roman soldiers.⁴⁰ Further work is necessary, both to discuss these individuals on a case-by-base basis, and indeed to search for more possible candidates.⁴¹ It is striking that scholars do not find it strange to have Christians in pagan Roman military units, and yet find it difficult to believe Jews were present.⁴²

The key issue here is the identification of Jews. Most soldiers are known only by their names, and these would not necessarily have been different. Although some Jewish names are distinct, many are not, and even this would have been hidden by the translation of names in Latin or Greek versions. Most focus has been on Jewish soldiers who spoke Aramaic or Greek. In the west, however, there would have been an increasing population of Latin speaking Jews, who would have been difficult to distinguish from non-Jewish Latin speakers. Another source of Jewish recruits that might remain escape notice would be Jewish Arabs. Soldiers with Arabic names are well-known, particularly due to the Dura-Europus rosters. Although a synagogue was found at Dura-Europus, the possibility of some of these 'Arabs' being Jews is not often considered.

Anyone with a cursory knowledge of the rise of Islam knows of the existence of Jewish tribes in Arabia. Three of these tribes, the Banu

³⁹ Tacitus, *Annales* 2.85.

⁴⁰ Applebaum (1970), González Salinero (2003).

⁴¹ For example, the Castricius, husband of Julia, who was buried in the Jewish Catacomb on the Via Appia in Rome.

⁴² Helgeland (1974).

Qaynuqa, the Banu-l Nadir and the Banu Qu'aryza, lived in Yathrib, later known as Medina. They were clearly martial and participated on both sides of Mohammed's wars, playing a key role in the Battle of Badr and other important early Muslim fights. We know of these Jewish tribes through the Koran and Hadith, but there were probably other Jewish Arab tribes around the peninsula and elsewhere. How old are these tribes? Could Judaism, like Christianity, have spread to the northern Arabian tribes as early as the late Roman period? It is not only possible, but likely. The Federate Ghassanids, who guarded Rome's southeastern frontiers for centuries, are called Christians, and indeed their leaders were. Yet the Ghassanids were a confederation (the term Saracen is probably derived from the Aramaic for confederation), and thus it is possible that Jewish Arab tribes made up part of the federate forces.

In the Fifth Century, the Christian Empire prohibited Jews from serving in the Roman military. The first of these laws may have been promulgated by Honorius in 404 CE: he removed Jews either from the military or from the *agents in rebus*, depending on the interpretation of the law.⁴³ Jerome in his Commentary on Isaiah (408–410) writes that Jews could not serve as soldiers in his day, implying that they could do so in an earlier age.⁴⁴ Whether or not Honorius had already banned Jews from the army, and found it necessary to issue a more comprehensive decree, or if he was expanding a ban to include the army, in 418 he issued the following:⁴⁵

Entrance into the military service from any other occupation is denied those who are living in the Jewish faith. Therefore any Jews who are either engaged in government service or in the imperial army are permitted the grace of completing their terms of office and of terminating their enlistments (since such persons are really more ignorant than unfriendly), but in the future the grace we have now granted a few will not be continued. We decree, moreover, that those devoted to the perversity of this Jewish nation, who are proved to have entered the armed forces, shall be deprived of their honor at once, being allowed no sufferance for past good deeds.

It is difficult to imagine that these decrees do not deal with a very real presence of Jews in the Roman military. González Salinero discusses the enigmatic Late Roman units called *Regii Emeseni Iudaei*, which, he

⁴³ *CTh.* 16.8.16; 22/4/404.

⁴⁴ Jerome, *Comm. in Es.* II.3.

⁴⁵ *CTh.* 16.8.24; 10/3/418.

argues, may well represent all-Jewish units, as well as individuals who served in the Late Roman army.⁴⁶

This talk has only touched on a number of difficult and controversial subjects. The evidence for Jewish involvement with the Roman military as allies is clear if fragmentary. Evidence for Jews serving directly in the Roman military is growing. Jews in a pre-Christian world felt quite comfortable in a military context, serving foreigners. Jews as often admired the Roman military, enough to join it in some cases, as they resented and opposed it.

⁴⁶ González Salinero (2003), 63ff.

THE IMPACT OF THE IMPOSITION OF ROMAN RULE ON NORTHERN SYRIA

WOLFGANG LIEBESCHUETZ

The Romans in Northern Syria

The establishment of Roman power, above all the Augustan peace, made a very great impact on the province of Syria. Under the Julio-Claudians Roman government was largely indirect. Large areas were ruled by client kings, or petty chieftains. Roman power was concentrated in the north, with no fewer than four legions.¹ The Roman state presumably had treaty relationships with the rulers and nomad groups, though we have little information about these treaties.² In time, the incorporation of client states led to the movement of legions, north into Mesopotamia, and south into Judaea and Arabia. Syria was left with IV Scythica at Zeugma and III Gallica at Raphanea. In the reign of Nero, Corbulo established Roman forts along the left bank of the Euphrates, and along the edge of the desert between Soura on the Euphrates and Palmyra.³

After the Persian invasions of Syria of the middle third century the emperor Diocletian systematically reorganised the Roman military presence on the desert fringe. Subsequently a continuous chain of observation posts, large and small forts, lined the desert highway from Soura to Palmyra and from Palmyra to the Red Sea. Cavalry units were stationed well behind the frontier, at strategic cross roads. Along the desert road

¹ *IGLS* 1399; L.J.F. Keppie, 'Legions in the East from Augustus to Trajan,' in P. Freeman and D. Kennedy, *The defence of the Roman and Byzantine Near East* (Oxford 1986), 411–412; J.R. Rey-Coquais, 'Syrie romaine, de Pompée à Dioclétien,' *Journal of Roman Studies* 68 (1978), 44–73.

² R.O. Sullivan, 'The dynasty of Emesa', in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2.8, 198–219 deals only with the most important of these relationships. Cf. F. Millar, *The Roman Near East* (Cambridge MS 1993), 430 on inscriptions honouring a *strategos of the nomads*, and a *strategos of the camp of the nomads*, in the Hauran.

³ Tacitus, *Annales* 15.3; M. Konrad, 'Frühkaiserliche Befestigungen an der *Strata Diocletiana*, neue Kleinfunde des 1. Jahrhunderts aus Nordsyrien', *Damaszener Mitteilungen* 9 (1996), 163ff.; Idem, *Der spätromische Limes in Syrien. Archäologische Untersuchungen an den Grenzkastellen von Sura, Tetrapyrgium, Cholle und in Resafa* (Mainz 2001), 96–116, esp. 114–115.

forts were within visible distance of each other, but the garrisons were not large.⁴ The two legionary camps may have housed 1000 men, but the small forts only between 60 and a hundred.⁵ The Diocletianic system represented a defensive structure such as that region had never had before. It was not designed to repel a major invasion—which could hardly be expected across the desert. But the troops would certainly be able to police the conflict fraught relations between nomads and settled peasants, and to protect both from incursions of marauding bands. It is unlikely that the dramatic expansion of sedentary life in the following centuries could have happened without them.

*The condition of Northern Syria when it was incorporated
into the Roman Empire*

As we have seen much of the country between the Seleucid cities, and some of the cities too, were controlled by local dynasts or leaders of tribal groups.⁶ The lands to the east of the Orontes plain, that is the limestone massif, and the lands beyond, seem to have been controlled by tribal federations.⁷ We know very little about them. They were ignored by Greek writers, and have left no written evidence of their own.

Agriculture without irrigation requires at least 250 mm of rain per year. The limit of agriculture unsupported by irrigation runs approximately sixty kilometres east of the limestone massif. Except for some natural oases, the land to the east of that line can only be exploited for grazing. But when Syria became part of the Roman Empire nomadic grazing seems to have been the dominant land-use much further west.⁸

⁴ Konrad 2001, op. cit. (n. 3), 109.

⁵ Konrad 2001, op. cit. (n. 3), 104–105: garrison of Qusair as-Saila 60–100. The Diocletianic forts at Lejjun and Udruh in Jordan are c. 242 m × 190 meters, and might have had room for 1000 or 1500 men. This may well have been the size of the North Syrian legions, cf. J. Lander and S.T. Parker, 'Legio IV *Martia* and the legionary camp at El-Lejjūn', *Byzantinische Forschungen* 8 (1982), 185–210; Udruh: A. Killick, *Udruh, Caravan City and Desert Oasis* (Romsey 1987).

⁶ Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 5.19 (81–82); 21(88–90). On Pliny's account see A.H.M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford 1971, 2nd ed.), 260–262; J.D. Grainger, *The Cities of Seleucid Syria* (Oxford 1990), 184–187; map 4 (p. 234).

⁷ Grainger 1990, op. cit. (n. 6), 234, map 4, lists from north to south: Gazetae, Gindareni (around Gindarus), Rhambaei, Tardyenses, Hylatae (around Raphanea), Samsigerami (around Emesa), cf. Jones 1971, op. cit. (n. 6), 262–263.

⁸ This also suggested by Strabo 16.2.11 (probably based on Posidonius (135–51 BC), a native of Apamea on the Orontes).

The distinction between nomads and peasants is not nearly as sharp as has formerly been believed. The pastoral and agricultural ways of life can be combined in a wide variety of ways. The two ways of life are indeed mutually dependent, each providing the other with items that it cannot produce itself.⁹ It follows that peasants and nomads can, and normally do coexist peacefully.¹⁰ On the other hand the coexistence of nomadic and sedentary ways of life does involve competition for the use of the same resources of land and water, and therefore produces many occasions for conflict. To keep the situation stable requires agreements, treaties, policing, and combined effort by both parties to prevent the intrusion, whether for grazing or for plunder, of new and unwanted migrants from the desert.¹¹

We know very little about the Syrian and Arabian nomads of the first century AD. For the later period we know more about the nomads in southern than in northern Syria.¹² But nomads were probably never very far from the sedentary areas, and some nomadic groups had a permanent sedentary base. We are told that in the mid fifth century, Simon Stylites on his column, standing in an area already dotted with villages, was nevertheless frequently visited by nomads, both by individuals and by large tribal groups with their camels.¹³ In the sixth century the Ghassanids were settled in Syria, and cooperated with the empire in keeping out other groups,¹⁴ but presumably continued their nomadic migrations.

⁹ R. Cribb, *Nomads in Archaeology* (Cambridge 1991), 23–43 discusses the integration of pastoralism and agriculture; M. Rowton, ‘Dimorphic structure and topology’, *Oriens Antiquus* 15 (1976), 17–31; Th. Brüggemann, ‘*Nundinae* als Bindeglied zwischen römischer Administration und indigener Gesellschaften im antiken Nordafrika’, in B. Streck, ed., *Segmentation und Komplementarität. Organisatorische ökonomische und kulturelle Aspekte der Interaktion von Nomaden und Sesshaften* (Halle 2004), 157–187.

¹⁰ D.F. Graf, ‘Rome and the Saracens: reassessing the nomadic menace’, in Idem, *Rome and the Arabian Frontier from the Nabataeans to the Saracens* (Aldershot 1997), no. IX.

¹¹ M. Sartre, ‘Les nomads et l’empire en Arabie’, in Idem, *Trois études sur l’Arabie romaine et byzantine* (Brussels 1982), 121–203.

¹² M.C.A. MacDonald, ‘Nomads and the Hawran in the Late Hellenistic and Roman periods’, *Syria* 70 (1993), 303–404; M. Sartre, ‘Transhumance, économie et société de montagne en Syrie du sud’, *Annales Archéologiques Arabes Syriennes* 41 (1997), 75–86; H. Zeinaddin, ‘Safaitische Inschriften aus dem Gabal al’Arab’, *Damaszener Mitteilungen* 12 (2000), 265–289; Idem, ‘Tribus et clans dans l’Hauran antique’, *Syria* 59 (1982), 77–79.

¹³ Theodoret, *Historia Religiosa* 26.13–15.

¹⁴ On the settlements of the Ghassanids see Sartre 1982, op. cit. (n. 11), 177–188.

The inscriptions of Northern Syria as evidence for rural change

The reconstruction of the social and economic development of Syria under Roman rule has so far largely depended on inscriptions, which are abundant, and an unusually high proportion of which is dated. The inscriptions of Northern Syria have been collected in IGLS.¹⁵ We are therefore in a position to date and map changes in the population of the North Syrian countryside, at least as far as these are reflected in epigraphic commemoration.

The interpretation of the epigraphic evidence however is not quite straightforward. Whether we have inscriptions from a particular ancient site depends on numerous chance accidents of survival and recovery. Whether or not inscribed monuments were erected at all was conditional on the population having adopted what ancient historians call the 'epigraphic habit'. Moreover, our period saw not only the adoption of the epigraphic habit, but also a subsequent change in its use. Under the Early Empire people putting up inscriptions were asserting their Hellenisation, that is their identification with the culture of the empire.¹⁶ But under the Later Empire inscriptions to an increasing extent displayed Christian piety. The great increase in the number of inscriptions in the fifth as compared with the fourth century was probably not only due to an increase in population, but also to deeper Christianisation. It is also possible that the plague and invasion of the mid-sixth century led to an increase in piety, which in turn produced an increase in epigraphic display. Detailed study of the impact of the army is hindered by the fact that the number of military inscriptions from northern Syria, including the military sites mentioned in the *Notitia Dignitatum*, is remarkably small.¹⁷ Funerary monuments of soldiers are much scarcer than one would expect in a well-garrisoned province.

If we assume that increases and decreases in epigraphic commemora-

¹⁵ IGLS 2 and 4, which between them have the bulk of the inscriptions from the massif, date from 1939 and 1955; I. Pena, P. Castellana and R. Fernandez, *Inventaire du Jebel Barich* (Milan 1987); Idem, *Inventaire du Jebel El A'la* (Milan 1990); Idem, *Inventaire du Jebel Wastani* (Milan 1999), up-date archaeological information about these areas, particularly of post Roman remains, but have little new epigraphy.

¹⁶ H. Cotton, 'Die Papyrusdokumente aus der jüdischen Wüste und ihr Beitrag zur Erforschung der jüdischen Geschichte des 1. und 2. Jhs. n. Chr.', *Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins* 115.2 (1999), 228–247, esp. 235–237.

¹⁷ Even excavation has produced very few inscriptions; see e.g. the excavation report Konrad 2001, op. cit. (n. 3).

tion in the countryside directly reflect the growth and decline of rural population, we must conclude that growth started slowly in the first century AD, accelerated in the second, slowed down in the third, only to resume in the fourth century and to continue at an accelerating rate to the middle of the sixth century. From then decline set in. The production of inscriptions ceased almost completely after 600.¹⁸

*The spreading of the epigraphic habit in Northern Syria and
its social implications*

a. *The cities*

The earliest inscriptions are found in the cities along the Orontes, Seleuceia,¹⁹ Antioch,²⁰ Apamea,²¹ Epiphania (Hama), Emesa²² Raphanea²³ and Salamia, and in the inland cities of Chalcis,²⁴ Beroea,²⁵ at the coastal city of Laodicea,²⁶ at Cyrrhus, situated on the route from Antioch to Zeugma on the Euphrates,²⁷ and at Palmyra, the oasis city on the edge of the Arabian desert. At Seleuceia, Antioch, and Laodicea inscriptions go back to the Hellenistic period. At Palmyra they begin in the reign of Augustus.²⁸ At Palmyra alone the epigraphic habit was not

¹⁸ See the graphs in G. Tate, *Les campagnes de la Syrie du Nord du II^e au VII^e siècle: un exemple d'expansion démographique et économique à la fin de l'antiquité* (Paris 1992), 174–176, and more understandably in the table (based on the graphs) in M. Bradley, *Seleucos-Belos: a lost Macedonian foundation in the Limestone massif of North Syria* (Burford 2002), 39.

¹⁹ Site deserted: earliest dated inscription *IGLS* 1184, of 187–175 BC.

²⁰ Continuously inhabited, one major excavation. Earliest dated inscription *IGLS* 1071 and 1071, of 212/11 and 194/3 BC.

²¹ Site deserted, major excavations. Earliest dated inscription *IGLS* 1368, of AD 134?

²² Continuously inhabited, major excavations. P.-L. Gatiér, 'Palmyre et Émèse ou Émèse sans Palmyre', *Annales Archéologiques Arabes Syriennes* 42 (1996), 431–436.

²³ Deserted since Crusades: R. Dussaud, *Topographie historique de la Syrie antique et médiévale* (Paris 1927), 98–99.

²⁴ Deserted, not excavated. Earliest dated inscription *IGLS* 280, of AD 242–243.

²⁵ Continuously inhabited.

²⁶ Continuously inhabited, not excavated. Earliest inscription *IGLS* 1261, of 174 BC.

²⁷ Deserted, a little archaeology. References in Millar 1993, op. cit. (n. 2), 229 n. 15.

²⁸ Deserted, major excavations. Earliest Palmyrene inscription 34/33BC, (from Dura, references in Millar 1993, op. cit. (n. 2), 114–115, n. 16. The earliest inscription at Palmyra itself dates from 44–43 BC; J. Cantineau et al., *Inventaire des inscriptions de Palmyre* (1930–), XI, no. 100; J. Starcky and M. Gawlikowski, *Palmyre* (Paris 1985); M. Gawlikowski, *Recueil d'inscriptions palmyréniennes provenant de fouilles syriennes et polonaises récentes à Palmyre* (Paris 1974).

entirely classical. The Palmyrenes adopted the Greek types of monument for public buildings, and honorific commemoration of the living or the dead, but often used their own local Semitic language for the inscribed text. There are also numerous Greek and bilingual inscriptions. The architecture of the city, especially that of its colonnaded streets was strongly influenced by the architecture of Greco-Roman cities, though the layout of the city, the design of its principal temple, the city's art display, and above all its religion, show many features that are neither Greek nor Roman.²⁹ Palmyra probably originated as a confederation of Arab tribes,³⁰ and has a long, very obscure pre-Roman history. The Bible (certainly wrongly) attributes its foundation to Solomon.³¹ Its transformation into something that looked very much like a Greco-Roman city was closely linked to the establishment of the Hellenistic kingdoms. A geo-physical survey combined with trial soundings has traced streets going back to Hellenistic times south of the spectacular monumental area.³² The main street is aligned with the road to Emesa. The oldest remains still visible go back to the time of Augustus. The city appears to have acquired a Greek type constitution, with council and magistrates,³³ in the Roman period.³⁴

Palmyra is situated on an oasis, "famous for the richness of its soil and for its agreeable springs".³⁵ In the years of its greatness, which is the best known part of its history, the city's leading families were active in the caravan trade across the Arabian desert.³⁶

It would appear that the peculiar geographical and political situation of Palmyra was a very important factor in the development of north eastern Syria under the early Empire. For by the reign of Tiberius

²⁹ Millar 1993, op. cit. (n. 2), 329–338.

³⁰ Aramaic was used on inscriptions, while many Palmyrene personal names and some of deities are Arabic. See M. Gawlikowski, 'The Syrian desert under the Romans', in S.E. Alcock, ed., *The Early Roman Empire in the East* (Oxford 1997), 37–54 esp. 42.

³¹ 2 *Chronicles* 8.4.

³² A. Schmidt-Colinet and Kh. al-As'ad, 'Zur Urbanistik des hellenistischen Palmyra', *Damascener Mitteilungen* 12 (2000), 61–93. We still know nothing about the site before Hellenistic times.

³³ Millar 1993, op. cit. (n. 2), 321–325.

³⁴ J.F. Matthews, 'The tax law of Palmyra', *Journal of Roman Studies* 74 (1984), 15–180, esp. 174.

³⁵ Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 5.21 (88).

³⁶ E. Will, 'Marchands et chefs de caravans à Palmyre de Syrie', *Syria* 34 (1957), 77–91; M. Gawlikowski, 'Palmyre et l'Euphrate', *Syria* 60 (1973), 53–68; J.-B. Yon, *Les notables de Palmyre* (Beirut 2002).

Palmyra was a client state of the Empire,³⁷ and subsequently the city became increasingly closely integrated into the Empire while retaining its own military capacity. Palmyrene forces played a leading part in guarding the road from the city to Soura on the Euphrates,³⁸ which was one of several routes used by the Palmyrene caravans.³⁹ Both the city's military cooperation with the Empire, and its long-distance trade depended on a good and secure road system. The need to guard the roads drew the Roman army into the steppe region, and by the reign of Vespasian Palmyra was fully integrated in the system of Roman military roads.⁴⁰ Users of the road whether soldiers, officials, or traders needed road stations where they might obtain food and water, relays of draught animals, and hospitality for the night, and also military escorts.⁴¹ It is likely that such road stations provided nuclei for the subsequent development of the steppe region, and the sedentarisation of its population.⁴²

b. *The limestone massif*

In the countryside of northern Syria the earliest inscriptions come from the limestone massif to the east of Antioch. On the two ranges north of the Antioch Beroea road, the Gebel Sim'an and the Gebel Halaqa, the earliest inscription dates from before 61 AD, and commemorates the building of part of the perimeter wall and portico of the temple of Zeus Madbachos on Gebel Sheikh Barakat. Eight inscriptions commemorate the completion of sections of this work by different individuals between 61 and 119–120 AD. The classical and monumental temple must have been built for the population of the area.⁴³ But we have no other evidence

³⁷ Millar 1993, op. cit. (n. 2), 34–35.

³⁸ Ibidem 133–135. At the same time there were Roman units at Palmyra itself, Ibidem 108; 135.

³⁹ M. Gawlikowski, 'Palmyra and its caravan trade', *Annales Archéologiques Arabes Syriennes* 42 (1996), 137–145; E. Will, 'Palmyre et la route de la soie', Ibidem 125–128.

⁴⁰ Ibidem 83–84: Roman milestone of 75 AD 27 km north of Palmyra on the road to the Euphrates, another of the same year 75 miles east of Apamea on the road to Palmyra.

⁴¹ *IGLS* 27041: count Silvinus creates an oasis and fort to assist travellers (late 4th c?).

⁴² Cf. p. 435 below. That forts were established to protect communications before there was much sedentary population to protect in the Negev seems well established. See T.E. Gini and Y. Israel, 'Recent advances in research of the Nabatean and Roman Negev', in R. Rosenthal-Heginbottom, ed., *The Nabateans in the Negev* (Haifa 2003), 9–14.

⁴³ Millar 1993, op. cit. (n. 2), 254: Temenos: 68 m × 68 m, temple: 11 m × 20 m.

about these people, how they lived or made their living. From the second century IGLS has 6 dated inscriptions from 5 locations other than that of the temple. The third century contributes 8 inscriptions, 7 of them from new locations, the fourth 14 inscriptions, including 8 from new locations, the fifth 38, including 19 from new locations. There are 21 inscriptions from the sixth century.

Apart from the inscriptions of the temple of Zeus Mabachos, the earliest inscriptions on the massif come from funerary monuments.⁴⁴ Clusters of such inscriptions have been found especially in the neighbourhood of temples.⁴⁵ Judging by the location of the earliest inscriptions, settlement on both the Gebel Sem'an and on the Gebel Barisa grew up relatively close to what was perhaps the most important road in northern Syria, the road of which one branch links Antioch to Beroea, Hierapolis and the Euphrates, and another runs south-east to Chalkis and then south-east to Palmyra. The inscriptions are always Greek. Some of the names of the individuals commemorated are Greek too, but many are Semitic. In the course of time Semitic names become rarer. The architecture of the temples as far as we can tell from the ruins was classical, and even Roman rather than Greek, but the gods, as far as we can tell, were local 'semitic' deities who have been identified with Greek gods.

Just to the south of the Gebel Sem'an, on the Gebel Barisa, the pattern of early inscriptions is very similar. Here the earliest inscription dates from 129 AD. Seven date from the second century, only one from the third, seventeen from the fourth, 19 from the fifth, and thirteen from the sixth, the majority from the first half. Here too the earliest inscriptions cluster around temples, though in the great majority of cases we do not know the name of the god worshipped.⁴⁶ Here too the earliest settlements lie on the side of the ridge most easily accessible from the great road linking Antioch to Beroea and the Euphrates. It is worth noting that Me'ez, the ancient Ikhkhénis, the most important centre on the Gebel Barisa, seems to have been laid out in the second century on a regular plan with an agora. In this it is unlike any other settlement on the massif.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Of second century inscriptions on the entire massif 23 come from tombs, 10 from temples, and 8 from reused blocks, none was on part of a house.

⁴⁵ Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18) 278, fig. 281.

⁴⁶ The exception is the temple of Zeus of the Altar (= Zeus Bomos, Zeus Madbachos) at Borg Baquirha, see Pena, Castellana and Fernandez 1987, op. cit. (n. 15), 79.

⁴⁷ G. Tchalenko, *Villages antiques de la Syrie du Nord*, 3 vols. (Paris 1953–1955) I, 280–

Further south on the Gebel Zawiye the inscriptional habit and the social developments implied by it seem to have occurred significantly later. The earliest inscription in IGLS 4 from this ridge dates from 177–178. There are only two inscriptions from the second century, and the same number from the third. Development only really gets going in the fourth century, which has produced eleven inscriptions, and in the fifth which has produced ten. The sixth century has only produced five. These villages are in the territory of Apamea, which was of course a less important centre than Antioch and the earliest inscriptions on the Gebel Zawiye have been found along the southern tip of the ridge overlooking to the west of the Chalcis-Apamea road, which was certainly much less important than the road from Antioch to Beroea.

After some very detailed examination of the remains on the massif, George Tate has devised a system of dating of buildings, which is based on a chronology of changes in building technique and style of ornament. His conclusions suggest that if we rely exclusively on epigraphic evidence, we will significantly underestimate the scale of building activity in the second and early third centuries.⁴⁸ Dating by style is of course less reliable than dating by dated inscriptions, but such as it is it fully confirms the long period of expansion from the fourth to the mid sixth century.

How did this expansion come about? It is significant that when the inscriptional evidence begins, even though the inscriptions are in Greek, the villages appear to have Semitic names. This suggests that the villages predate Hellenisation and the ‘epigraphic habit’. Some of the names commemorated on funerary monuments are Semitic too. On others the deceased has a Greek name while his father’s name is still Semitic. I am not an Arabist and cannot distinguish Arabic from Aramaic. The distinction is of course important when we try to establish the origin of the settlers. But whether the settlers came from the Aramaic west, or the Arabic east,⁴⁹ the fact that the names are not Greek shows that the area was originally populated by settlers who were not Greeks. The

281; R.M. Bradfield, *Seleucos-Belos: a lost Macedonian foundation in the Limestone massif of North Syria* (Burford 2002) has argued that the site was that of the Seleucid foundation Seleucos Belos, whose site is still uncertain though it is generally thought to have been in the valley of the Orontes.

⁴⁸ Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 277–285.

⁴⁹ R. Dussaud, *La pénétration des Arabes en Syrie avant l’Islam* (Paris 1955); H. Gaube, ‘Arabs in sixth century Syria: some archaeological observations’, in M.A. Bakhit, ed., *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bilad al Sham, 20–25 April 1974* (Amman 1984), 61–66.

individuals whose tombs or houses are inscribed in Greek therefore represent an elite, of largely Semitic origin, which has adopted Greek for its monumental display. We know practically nothing about the ordinary villagers or about their relationship to this elite.

There is indeed very little evidence about the social structure of these villages. There are a few references to estates.⁵⁰ But there is little to support the view that the Hellenised elite were great landowners, and that the bulk of the villagers were their tenants and dependants, though this may well have sometimes been the case. Both tombs and houses differ considerably in size, and in the amount and quality of their architectural ornament.⁵¹ There are no mansions comparable to the great villas in the West, but the villagers were obviously of very unequal wealth.⁵² But this by itself does not tell us anything about the structures of landowning and dependency. The very slow progress of the construction of the circuit wall and portico of the temple on Gebel Sheikh Barakat suggests that the wealthy villagers who paid for the building were wealthy only relatively to their fellow villagers.⁵³ We have no direct evidence that any of the land belonged to absentee landlords living at Antioch or Apamea,⁵⁴ though it is of course likely, that some of the land did. Debt, then as now, would drive independent peasants into dependence on absentee landlords.

Of the 30 tomb inscriptions from the massif up to 330 AD, eight are veterans of the Roman army.⁵⁵ This is a significant proportion, but

⁵⁰ See Tchalenko 1953–1955, op. cit. (n. 47) III, 9–10; Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 213 on so-called ἐποίκια at Baziher (*SEG* 20, no. 339), Ferkan (*SEG* 20, no. 342), Sekla, south of Hama (*CIL* 5.8730) and *IGLS* 1382: κώμης Μαάρχης ἐπυκίου (neighbourhood of Apamea). See also D. Feissel, 'Remarques de toponymie syrienne', *Syria* 59 (1982), 319ff.; P. Sarris, *Economy and Society in the Age of Justinian* (Cambridge 2006), passim, argues that ἐποίκια (in Egypt) were settlements of estate workers.

⁵¹ Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 292–293; Tchalenko 1953–1955, op. cit. (n. 47) II, plates LXI, LXII.

⁵² Early large houses ('villas' according to Tchalenko) at Bamuqqa (Tchalenko 1953–1955, op. cit. (n. 47) I, 312), Behyo (ibidem 352), Refade (ibidem 194), Qirqu-bize (ibidem 323), Benebil (Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 35–39). But whether these early well-built houses, which are in type very similar to less well-built smaller houses, were really the original core of the development of the limestone massif is doubtful. See Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 291–294. If they were built by landowners, these were not big landowners. Many (not those just mentioned) houses of many rooms on the massif became so only by later enlargement (Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 39–41).

⁵³ In AD 109 Gaius Valerius Procolos, a Roman citizen, gave 1986 drachmae (*IGLS* 468).

⁵⁴ Against the view of P. Horden and N. Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: a study of Mediterranean history* (Oxford 2000), 274–275.

⁵⁵ Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 291.

nothing like enough to suggest that there had been systematic settlement of veterans,⁵⁶ though it does show that veterans were included in the village elite. Out of these burials ten have at least one Latin name.⁵⁷ In addition to becoming Hellenised, members of the local elite were also adapting aspects of specifically Roman culture.

The nature of the land, irregular patches of cultivable soil, separated by areas of rocky outcrops,⁵⁸ is not suitable for organised mass settlement. Furthermore the villages on the crests and in the internal plains of the massif⁵⁹ are most easily accessible from the east.⁶⁰ These two factors make it likely that the massif was first settled by individuals, or small groups, coming from the steppe region to the east, who first built a temporary shelter on a patch of cultivable soil, and began to cultivate it. In fact the process of settlement in Antiquity may well have been very much like the process of resettlement that is taking place in our own time.⁶¹ Alternatively (or additionally) larger bands of nomads might have chosen land on the massif to make a sedentary base for their annual migrations.

This does not however appear to be the whole story. There is one very striking and widespread body of evidence that is not compatible with a theory of colonisation by squatters. In many areas the land is divided by parallel ridges of heaped-up stones. These stretch for miles in more or less straight lines, ignoring physical features.⁶² They are found on the north and east of the Gebel Sem'an,⁶³ and continue beyond the ridge across the plain of Dana.⁶⁴ They are found on the Gebel Halaqa, and in the south of the Gebel Barisa. The dividing ridges are well preserved in the north of the Gebel Zawiye, especially

⁵⁶ Pena, Castellana and Fernandez 1999, op. cit. (n. 15), 15–16 states that there was large-scale settlement of veterans in this region. The information given in that survey is insufficient to assess whether this is correct or not.

⁵⁷ Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 292.

⁵⁸ Tchalenko 1953–1955, op. cit. (n. 47) I, 184–187.

⁵⁹ See Tchalenko 1953–1955, op. cit. (n. 47) II, pls. LV, LVII (plans of plain Qatura), pls. LVIII–LX, LXIII–LXV plans of settlements. The villages around this plain have produced the earliest inscriptions in the Gebel Sim'an.

⁶⁰ Tchalenko 1953–1955, op. cit. (n. 47) I, 60–81.

⁶¹ Tchalenko 1953–1955, op. cit. (n. 47) I, 77–78; 100–102; 185–187; II, pl.

⁶² G. Tate, 'À propos des cadastres romains du nord de la Syrie', in P.N. Doukellis and L.G. Mendoni, eds., *Structures rurales et sociétés antiques* (Besançon 1994), 443–451; Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 230–239.

⁶³ See Tchalenko 1953–1955, op. cit. (n. 47) II, pl. XLVII (Telade), XLVIII, LI (Turmanin), CXXX (Seih Sliman), LXIX (aerial photograph of Seih Sliman).

⁶⁴ Tchalenko 1953–1955, op. cit. (n. 47) II, pl. LXI.

around Sinsarah and Sergilla.⁶⁵ There are none on the Gebel Ala, or in the north of the Gebel Barisa. The land-divisions of the massif seem to continue into the plain of Chalcis.⁶⁶ Similar systems have been found on the Gebel Hass⁶⁷ and the Gebel Sbeit much further east, and also around Emesa⁶⁸ in the Orontes plain, but not so far in the plain of Antioch.⁶⁹

The ridges are about 100 meters apart, sometimes less, so that they divide the landscape into very long strips of land. They are subdivided by cross-walls into field-shaped areas. The distances between walls do not appear to correspond to those of Roman centuriation. The system is certainly man-made. Moreover the divisions are so regular, and so extensive, that their construction must have involved a collective effort, and the backing, or more likely the command, of a powerful authority. The cities of Antioch and Apamea, in whose territories the villages are situated, could have organised these land divisions, more likely the imperial administration.⁷⁰ It has been suggested that much of the land was imperial property, and that the imperial administrators encouraged tenants to take up cultivation, and particularly to plant olive trees by privileging them in something like the way African tenants were privileged by the *lex Manciana*.⁷¹ Sometimes two or more systems of land division seem to have been superimposed. So the system may well have undergone considerable change in the course of its history. These systems of land division have yet to be mapped. A few photographs show villages whose street plan seems not to be related to the lines of the field divisions. Does this mean that the divisions are older than the

⁶⁵ Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 233; figs 267, 268 and 273 (Gerade).

⁶⁶ Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 234; figs. 269, 270, 271.

⁶⁷ Ibidem, figs. 274, 275.

⁶⁸ W.J. van Liere, 'Ager centuriatus of the Roman colony of Emesa (Homs)', *Annales Archéologiques de la Syrie* 8–9 (1958–59), 55–58.

⁶⁹ The foundation of Antioch itself seems to have been preceded by the setting out of a grid of rectangular land divisions: J. Leblanc and G. Poccardi, 'Étude de la permanence de traces urbains et ruraux antiques à Antioche-sur-l'Oronte', *Syria* 76 (1999), 91–110.

⁷⁰ Divisions run without break over the boundary between the territories of Apamea and Antioch. There was a large imperial estate between Bab el Hawa (on the plain of Dana) and Qasr el Banat (to the north-west of the road to Antioch (Tchalenko 1953–1955, op. cit. (n. 47) I, 393–94 on *IGLS* 528 and 530).

⁷¹ Tate 1992, op. cit. (n. 18), 298–299; Tchalenko 1953–1955, op. cit. (n. 47) I, 414–417.

villages?⁷² Once the system has been mapped, it may be possible to date the divisions and formulate theories as to when, and by whom, and for what purpose they were created.

As far as the evidence of inscriptions goes, the development of our region began to go into reverse in the middle of the sixth century, after the plague of 542 and the Persian invasion and accompanying deportations. The setting up of inscriptions seems to have ceased quite abruptly around 600. This surprising fact can be convincingly linked with the end of the Roman organisation of Syria, as a result of the Persian invasion and occupation, soon to be followed by the Arab conquest. However these events did not result in immediate depopulation. The decline of the villages, and the death of so many of them, was certainly a very gradual process. There is evidence of medieval occupation at a significant number of sites. But early Islamic architecture is conspicuously absent. The inscriptions of the seventh-tenth century are few, and mainly in Syriac.⁷³ More excavation is needed.⁷⁴

c. *The basalt hills and the desert fringe*

In the early empire, according to the Elder Pliny and Strabo the dividing line between nomads and sedentary peasants ran to the east of the territories of the cities Emesa, Raphanea, Apamea, then east of the limestone Massif, and the fertile⁷⁵ territories of the cities of Chalcis and Beroea, to the Euphrates.⁷⁶ But by the end of the fifth century the limits of agriculture had moved between fifty and a hundred kilometres further east. Cultivation now extended as far as annual rainfall allowed,⁷⁷ and in many places beyond that, on man-made oases far out in the

⁷² Tate suggests that in their present form they may only go back to a time when the villages were already abandoned, that is the 8th or 9th centuries: G. Tate, 'The Syrian countryside during the Roman era', in Alcock 1997, op. cit. (n. 30) 55–71, esp. 60.

⁷³ F.R. Trombley, 'Demographic and cultural transition in the territory of Antioch, 6th to 8th centuries', *Topoi: Orient Occident. Supplément* 5 (2004), 341–362 on p. 357 lists 18 inscriptions.

⁷⁴ J.-P. Sodini *et al.*, 'Déhès (Syrie du Nord): campagnes I–iii (1977–1978)', *Syria* 57 (1980), 1–304.

⁷⁵ Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 5.81.

⁷⁶ K. Butcher, *Roman Syria and the Near East* (London 2003), 153–155; Millar 1993, op. cit. (n. 2), 238–239 on Strabo 16.2.10; Diodorus, 33.4a.

⁷⁷ A. Poidebard and R. Mouterde, *Le "limes" de Chalcis et le route d'Antioche à Palmyre* (Beirut 1939), 14; carte II.

desert.⁷⁸ Today the whole area is covered with remains of stone-built settlements, some small, some large, with churches and monasteries, and numerous irrigation schemes.

The evidence bearing on the causes of this astonishing development is uneven. Very many sites have yielded no inscriptions at all. Inscriptions start in the second century. Their frequency increases slowly during the third and fourth centuries, but they become really abundant, and begin to cover the whole area, only in the fifth and sixth centuries.⁷⁹ Inscriptions occur in clusters, and particularly on the Gebel Hass,⁸⁰ beside the lake Gabbula,⁸¹ and on the Gebel Sbeyt.⁸² Many inscriptions have also been found in the basalt area to the east of Ma'arrat No'man, between the large settlements at Taroutia and Androna,⁸³ and further south, around the road from Apamea to Palmyra.⁸⁴ In the later fifth and early sixth century some of the settlements became small towns, with a circuit-wall, a citadel and several churches. Anasarthā, Gabbula and Sergiopolis even achieved city status and became seats of bishops.

The inscriptions have little or nothing to do with soldiers or the Roman army. They record civilian building and the burial of civilians. Recent survey work has shown that in the area beyond the 250 mm rain line many of the sites that Poidebard and Mouterde had classified as military were in fact not military at all, but farms, large or small, or even shelters of nomads. Ceramic evidence suggests that there were scarcely any sedentary settlements (other than road stations) in this zone before the fifth and sixth centuries. But in those two centuries the desert fringe came to be exploited wherever irrigation could be provided. The nature of the exploitation depended on the extent of irrigation. In natural or artificial oases agriculture was possible.⁸⁵ Some farms seem to have been designed for animal rearing, others for mixed

⁷⁸ G.M. Schwartz *et al.*, 'Excavations and survey in the Jabbul Plain, Eastern Syria: The Umm el-Marra project 1996–97', *American Journal of Archaeology* 104 (2000), 419–462.

⁷⁹ Tate 1992, *op. cit.* (n. 18), 346 for basalt area: before 300: 8, fourth century 13, fifth century 41, sixth century 88, after 600: 2.

⁸⁰ *IGLS* 270–230; 322–354.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, 259–269.

⁸² *Ibidem*, 302–321.

⁸³ *Ibidem*, 1542–1713, Androna is a *mansio* on Antonine itinerary.

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, 1841–1997.

⁸⁵ Poidebard and Mouterde 1939, *op. cit.* (n. 77), 14; plan II; also 13–16; 110–111; 112–113; 118–136; 207–208; 333–349; Butcher 2003, *op. cit.* (n. 76), 154; Y. Calvet and B. Geyer, *Barrages antiques de la Syrie* (Lyon 1992).

farming. Even on this desert fringe nomads sometimes coexisted with sedentary farmers.⁸⁶

Inscriptions suggest that the earliest settlements were linked to the road system. From the early second century Roman control was advanced east along the Euphrates as far as Sura or Callinicum.⁸⁷ The defence of that region, and of the desert flank of the Syrian provinces, was shared out between Roman forces and those of the client state of Palmyra. In addition to the needs of traders, military considerations therefore now required good communications between the cities of north-western Syria with Palmyra.⁸⁸ Not surprisingly the earliest inscriptions of the steppe region have been found in the neighbourhood of the road running across the steppe from Antioch via Chalcis to Palmyra, and among a network of roads linking Apamea, with Epiphania (Hama), Raphanea (legionary station) and Emesa, and all these cities with Palmyra. As Roman control of Mesopotamia moved east, the Romans developed military routes across the steppe.⁸⁹ While previously Roman armies had marched via Gindarus to Zeugma on the Euphrates, they now found it more practical to cross the limestone massif along the Antioch-Chalcis road, and then branching off at Literba, to reach the Euphrates via Hierapolis.⁹⁰ Subsequently, the resumed forward movement under Diocletian increased the military importance of the route through the desert from Palmyra to Sura on the Euphrates. Settlement in support of road traffic preceded, and led, settlement in the region as a whole.

⁸⁶ B. Geyer, 'Des fermes byzantines aux palais omayyades, ou l'ingénieuse mise en valeur des plaines steppiques de Chalcidique', in L. Nordiguian and J.-F. Salles, eds., *Aux origines de l'archéologie aérienne: A. Poidebard (1878–1955)* (Beirut 2000), 109–122.

⁸⁷ Millar 1993, op. cit. (n. 2), 83.

⁸⁸ A monument where the road from Apamea enters Palmyrene territory at Bir Gihar, 43 km from Palmyra, was erected by the Roman governor Creticus Silanus in 11–17 AD, repaired by Trajan in 103, and once more by Antoninus Pius in 153 AD (Poidebard and Mouterde 1939, op. cit. (n. 77), 59). Another early boundary stone marks the border between Roman and Palmyrene territory at Qasr el Hair sixty km south-south west from Palmyra on the road to Damascus (*L'Année Epigraphique* 1939 no. 180). Corbulo had already grasped the solution to basic strategical problem of operations in the steppe region: Tacitus, *Annales* 15.3: *hostilis ingressus praesidiis intercipit; et quia egena aquarum regio est, castella fontibus imposita*.

⁸⁹ P. Thomsen, 'Die römischen Meilensteine', *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins* 40 (1917) 1–103, relevant nos. 24 and 34.

⁹⁰ N. Kramer, *Gindaros, Geschichte und Archäologie einer Siedlung im nord westlichen Syrien* (Düsseldorf 2004), 340–342.

The southern steppe region has produced a remarkably large number of inscriptions from the second half of the 6th century, when the epigraphic habit on the limestone massif was already in decline. It may be that after the Persian invasion population and wealth moved into areas that had not been damaged, and were less exposed to Persian raids. But here too, inscriptions came to an abrupt end after 600, and again it is certain that the end of the epigraphic habit did not signal depopulation. Excavation has shown that the *vicus* at Qusair as-Saila was populated long after the evacuation of the fort in the 580s, and well into the Umayyad period.⁹¹ Indeed the Umayyads seem to have continued the development of the desert fringe, with a few large-scale developments.⁹²

To sum up: The location of the earliest inscriptions suggests that settlement developed around the road system, and that many, perhaps most, of the early sites were primarily road stations. The frontier troops needed civilian support. Diocletian and his immediate successors established a continuous line of major and minor forts along the *limes*, and he stationed cavalry units in a number of locations some distance behind the frontier. Even if the total number of men involved was not much over 10,000,⁹³ they will have required corn and infrastructure, and their pay will have provided purchasing power. The excavation at Qusair as-Saila (Tetrapurgium) south of Resafa, on the *limes* road to Palmyra, has shown that the civilian *vicus* was constructed and fortified at the same time as the fortress.

At the same time the increase in the number of settlements, above all in the fifth and sixth centuries, cannot be explained solely in terms of the need of the army. Late Antiquity surely saw a very considerable growth in the population of the northern Syria, as in much of the Near East. The growing population first spread into the limestone massif. As the massif became saturated, increasing numbers in search of land settled in land further east. Settlers did not come from the west only. The population of Arabia too was growing beyond the limits of what that dry land could support.⁹⁴ Overpopulation drove the great conquests

⁹¹ Konrad 2001, op. cit. (n. 3), 146 (coins). In Umayyad times a monastery occupied the interior of the abandoned fort (*ibidem* 64–67).

⁹² B. Geyer 2000, op. cit. (n. 86).

⁹³ See above n. 5.

⁹⁴ Gaube 1984, op. cit. (n. 49), 61–66.

followed by settlement in the seventh century. But over-population in Arabia had stimulated immigration into the border regions of the Roman East, and not least into the steppe of Northern Syria long before the Islamic invasion.⁹⁵

Intensification and abatement

Purcell and Horden have recently pointed out that change in the human exploitation of the countryside tends to be cyclical, with a phase of what they call intensification followed by one of abatement, and that these cycles are drawn out over many centuries.⁹⁶ As far as Syria is concerned recent surveys around Lake Gabboula have shown that cycles of this kind can be traced back as far as the third millennium BC.⁹⁷ In the basalt region, surveyed by J. Lassus, the presence of numerous tells provides similar evidence of dense occupation at the beginning of the first millennium BC.⁹⁸ The plain of Antioch too has numerous tells which were abandoned by the Hellenistic period.⁹⁹ When Alexander the Great conquered Syria in 333 BC, Northern Syria seems to have been at the nadir of a phase of abatement,¹⁰⁰ and to have had few settlements that could be described as towns, and little sedentary agriculture. A phase of intensification began with the establishment of military settlements by Seleucus Nikator after 301.¹⁰¹ Some were new foundations, others

⁹⁵ G. Tate, 'Le problème de la défense et du peuplement de la steppe au Syrie du nord entre la chute de Palmyre et le règne de Justinien', *Annales d'Archéologie Arabe Syrienne* 42 (1996), 33–37.

⁹⁶ Horden and Purcell 2000, op. cit. (n. 55) passim.

⁹⁷ G.M.S. Schwartz *et al.*, 'Elite tomb and other evidence from Tell Umm el Mara, Syria', *American Journal of Archaeology* 117 (2003), 325–361; Idem, 'Excavation and survey in the Jabbul plain, western Syria: the Umm el-Mara project', *American Journal of Archaeology* 104 (2000), 419–462. See also P.M.M.G. Akkermans and G.M. Schwartz, *The Archaeology of Syria: from complex Hunter-Gatherers to Early Urban Societies (c. 16,000–300 BC)* (Cambridge 2003), 203.

⁹⁸ J. Lassus, *Inventaire archéologique de la région au nord-est de Hama* (Damascus 1935) I, 232–233 (list of tells); illustrations in volume II.

⁹⁹ J. Cassana, 'The archaeological landscape of Late Roman Antioch', in I. Sandwell and J. Huskinson, eds., *Culture and Society in Later Roman Antioch* (Oxford 2004), 102–125; T.J. Wilkinson and J. Casana, 'The Amuq valley archaeological survey,' in K.A. Yener, ed., *The Amuq Valley project (1955–2001)* (forthcoming).

¹⁰⁰ Grainger 1990, op. cit. (n. 6), 27–28; Akkermans and Schwartz 2003, op. cit. (n. 97).

¹⁰¹ Grainger 1990, op. cit. (n. 6), 31–66.

were enlarged existing settlements.¹⁰² The royal foundations were populated largely by Greek settlers.¹⁰³ All duly developed into Greek type cities.¹⁰⁴ The official language of the kingdoms was Greek, as was the language and culture of the civic leaders. Socially ambitious individuals of local descent adopted Greek names and Greek Language.¹⁰⁵ Local gods were assimilated to deities of the Greek pantheon. The establishment of cities led to wider changes. Agriculture expanded to feed the cities.¹⁰⁶ A road system began to link the cities.¹⁰⁷ Two large artificial harbours were created at Seleuceia and Laodicea respectively.¹⁰⁸ The disturbed conditions following the break-up of the Seleucid kingdom set urbanisation and Hellenisation into reverse.

Under Roman rule intensification resumed. There was a major demographic expansion into the steppe lands as direct result of the incorporation of the area in the Roman system. The development can be mapped from the third century. Diocletian's reorganisation of the defence structure of Northern Syria greatly accelerated it. Hellenisation expanded enormously under the Romans. Sedentary agriculture and arboriculture replaced the nomadic way of life over wide areas. By AD 550 Syria was more densely populated than ever before or since, or at least until today. At this point intensification came to an end, and abatement set in.

¹⁰² Ibidem 42–45; Jones 1971, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 321; 244. The evidence is the survival to present day of the pre-Hellenic names.

¹⁰³ Jones 1971, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 242–243.

¹⁰⁴ Civic self-government see Jones 1971, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 245.

¹⁰⁵ Jones 1971, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 36–37.

¹⁰⁶ Grainger 1990, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 115–119.

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem, 104–105.

¹⁰⁸ Ibidem, 70–72.

„STÄDTE ARABIENS MIT HERRLICHEN TEMPELN...“—ODER:
VON ÄGYPTEN IN DIE PROVINZ ARABIA.

DER KULTTRANSFER EINES REGIMENTSGOTTES
NACH BOSTRA DURCH RÖMISCHES MILITÄR
UND SEINE FOLGEN*

OLIVER STOLL

Wenn man die Religion des römischen Heeres¹ in der Kaiserzeit betrachtet, so fällt als erstes die Vielfalt und Vielzahl der Kulte auf, in denen einzelne Soldaten, Gruppen oder gar Regimenter engagiert

* Das (nicht wörtliche) Titelzitat des vorliegenden Beitrages schöpft aus *oracula Sybillina* 13.64. Im vorliegenden Beitrag abgekürzt zitierte, häufiger gebrauchte Titel aus der Sekundärliteratur sind:

Belayche 2001	= N. Belayche, <i>Iudaea-Palaestina. The Pagan Cults in Roman Palestine (Second to Fourth Century)</i> . <i>Religion der Römischen Provinzen 1</i> (Tübingen 2001).
Bowersock 1983	= G. Bowersock, <i>Roman Arabia</i> (Cambridge, Mass. 1983).
Butcher 2003	= K. Butcher, <i>Roman Syria and the Near East</i> (London 2003).
Healey 2001	= J.F. Healey, <i>The Religion of the Nabataeans. A Conspectus</i> (Leiden, Boston, Köln 2001).
Isaac 1992	= B. Isaac, <i>The Limits of Empire: the Roman Army in the East</i> (Oxford 1992, 2nd ed.).
Kennedy 2000	= D. Kennedy, <i>The Roman Army in Jordan</i> (London 2000).
Kindler 1983	= A. Kindler, <i>The Coinage of Bostra</i> (Warminster 1983).
Lichtenberger 2003	= A. Lichtenberger, <i>Kulte und Kultur der Dekapolis. Untersuchungen zu numismatischen, archäologischen und epigraphischen Zeugnissen</i> (Wiesbaden 2003).
MacAdam 1986	= H.I. MacAdam, <i>Studies in the History of the Roman Province of Arabia. The Northern Sector</i> . <i>British Arch. Reports S 295</i> (Oxford 1986).
Pollard 2000	= N.D. Pollard, <i>Soldiers, Cities, & Civilians in Roman Syria</i> (Ann Arbor 2000).
Sartre 1985	= M. Sartre, <i>Bostra. Des origines à l'Islam</i> (Paris 1985).
Sartre 2001	= M. Sartre, <i>D'Alexandre à Zénobie. Histoire du Levant antique IV^e siècle av. J.C.—III^e siècle ap. J.-C.</i> (Tours 2001).
Sourdel 1952	= D. Sourdel, <i>Les Cultes du Hauran à l'Époque Romaine</i> (Paris 1952).
Stoll 2001	= O. Stoll, <i>Zwischen Integration und Abgrenzung: Die Religion des Römischen Heeres im Nahen Osten. Studien zum Verhältnis zwischen Armee und Zivilbevölkerung im römischen Syrien und den Nachbarprovinzen</i> (St. Katharinen 2001).
Stoll 2002	= O. Stoll, „Entlassungsweihungen“ aus Bostra und die <i>honesta missio</i> , <i>Jahrbuch RGZM</i> 49 (2002), 235–280.

waren. Freilich müssen im religiösen Beziehungsgeflecht zwischen Soldaten und Göttern oder göttlichen Wesen differierende Ebenen beachtet werden, auf die wir später noch kurz eingehen werden: Etwa die der offiziellen, reichsweit einheitlichen und integrativen Heeresreligion und die der Privatreligion, die der Erfüllung ganz persönlicher religiöser Bedürfnisse der Soldaten diente. Das Militär als funktional, sozial und wirtschaftlich definierte und definierbare Gruppe scheint prädestiniert, Voraussetzungen und Rahmenbedingungen von Akkulturationsprozessen zu schaffen und diese Prozesse auch für uns erkennen zu lassen. Durch die dienstliche Mobilität innerhalb der Stationierungsprovinz oder im Rahmen strategisch bedingter, provinzübergreifender Dislokationen fungieren Militärs als Kulturträger,² ein Phänomen, welches besonders im Bereich der Religionsgeschichte schon immer eine große Rolle gespielt hat, geradezu klassisch etwa bei der Frage nach den Verbreitungswegen östlicher Kulte wie dem des Mithras und des Dolichenus im Imperium.³ Das Militär ist tatsächlich ein Medium religiöser Diffu-

Stoll 2003 = O. Stoll, 'Der Gott der arabischen Legion: Zeus Ammon-Sarapis und die *legio III Cyrenaica* in der römischen Provinz Arabia', in L. Schumacher und O. Stoll, Hrsg., *Sprache und Kultur in der kaiserzeitlichen Provinz Arabia* (St. Katharinen 2003), 70–109.

Wallner 2000 = Chr. Wallner, 'Der olympische Agon von Bostra', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 129 (2000), 97–107.

Welles 1938 = C.B. Welles, 'The Inscriptions', in C.H. Kraeling, Hrsg., *Gerasa. City of the Decapolis* (New Haven 1938), 355–494.

¹ Zum System der Religion des römischen Heeres vgl. vor allem H. Ankersdorfer, *Studien zur Religion des Römischen Heeres von Augustus bis Diokletian* (Diss. Konstanz, maschinenschriftl. 1973) und Stoll 2001 passim (a.a.O., 133ff. Diskussion der relevanten Forschungsliteratur). Einen guten Überblick bietet M. Clauss, in: *RAC XIII* (Stuttgart 1986) 1073–1114 s.v. Heerwesen/ Heeresreligion.

² Zur 'definierbaren' Rolle des Militärs als Kulturträger vgl. etwa M.A. Speidel, 'Das Römische Heer als Kulturträger: Lebensweisen und Wertvorstellungen der Legionssoldaten an den Nordgrenzen des Römischen Reiches im 1. Jh. n. Chr.', in R. Frei-Stolba, H.E. Herzig (Hrsg.), *La politique édititaire dans les provinces de l'Empire romain II^{ème}–IV^{ème} siècles après J.-C. Actes du II^e colloque roumano-suisse Berne, 12–18 septembre 1993* (Berlin/Frankfurt 1995), 187–209 und Einzelbeiträge in H. v. Hesberg, Hrsg., *Das Militär als Kulturträger in römischer Zeit* (Köln 1999); Belayche 2001, 54 nennt dies treffend "[the soldiers played] a dynamic role as cultural ambassadors".

³ Vgl. beispielsweise C.M. Daniels, 'The Role of the Roman Army in the Spread and Practice of Mithraism', in J.R. Hinnells, ed., *Mithraic Studies II* (Manchester 1975), 249–274; für einen neuen Blick auf die Verbreitungswege wichtig: A. Schütte-Maischatz und E. Winter, 'Kultstätten der Mithrasmythen in Doliche', in J. Wagner, Hrsg., *Gottkönige am Euphrat. Neue Ausgrabungen und Forschungen in Kommagene* (Mainz 2000), 93–99, insbes. 98f.; vgl. jetzt auch Diess., *Doliche—Eine kommagenische Stadt und ihre Götter. Mithras und Iupiter Dolichenus*. Asia Minor Studien 52 (Bonn 2004), 66, 68, 189ff. 195ff.

sion und ein Vermittler zwischen Reichsreligion und lokalen Kulturen.⁴ Literarische Zeugnisse, Münzmaterial, vor allem aber Texte in Form von Papyri und Inschriften, lassen einzelne Personen, Personengruppen und ganze Regimenter in besonders deutlicher Weise als 'Kontaktträger' erkennen. Nicht nur im Bereich der Religion des Heeres spielt gerade diese Frage nach den Kontakten zur zivilen Gesellschaft eine zentrale Rolle: Die Grundfrage nach den Beziehungen zwischen den beiden gesellschaftlichen Großsegmenten darf—zumindest für die Militärprovinzen—als konstitutiv für ein Verständnis der Geschichte der Kaiserzeit überhaupt bezeichnet werden. Für die Provinzialreligion—und auch für das Verständnis der Religion des römischen Heeres—ist es von essentieller Bedeutung, auch lokale und regionale Prozesse der Beeinflussung und Diffusion zu 'isolieren' und zu erkennen, die im Kontakt zwischen Militär und Zivilbevölkerung zu Stande kommen: Unterhalb der Provinzebene, im Bereich bestimmter Grenzabschnitte oder an einzelnen Einsatz- und Stationierungsorten des Militärs entstehen durch die Eigenheiten der Religion des Römischen Heeres religiöse 'Subsysteme', die in der provinzwweiten Gesamtschau 'individuelle Profile' der Kultausübung einzelner Heeresgruppen erkennen lassen.

Das weitverbreitete Bild vom römischen Militär als 'geschlossener Gesellschaft',⁵ das die komplexen und vielfältigen Beziehungen zwischen Soldaten und Zivilbevölkerung verkennt, erweist sich auf dem Gebiet der Religion des Römischen Heeres, nicht nur im Nahen Osten, ohne jeden Zweifel als falsch: Die hier zu beobachtenden Phänomene des Kontaktes, kultureller Fusionsprozesse und einer Art Teilsymbiose zwischen Militär und Zivilbevölkerung können durch das künstliche soziologische Konstrukt nicht erklärt werden.⁶

Gerade im Nahen Osten bietet die häufig zu beobachtende Garnisonierung von Truppen im Bereich von Städten⁷ die Möglichkeit, die Kontakthänomene, die Kommunikation und die Reaktionen von Militär

⁴ Dazu ausführlich Stoll 2001, vor allem 176ff., speziell für den Nahen Osten ebd. 349ff.

⁵ Als Vertreter dieses soziologischen Konzeptes, angewandt auf das römische Militär, ist hier vor allem etwa N. Pollard, 'The Roman army as "total institution" in the Near East? Dura Europos as a case study', in: D.L. Kennedy, Hrsg., *The Roman Army in the Near East*, *JRA Suppl.* 18 (Ann Arbor 1996), 211–227 sowie Pollard 2000 zu nennen.

⁶ Stoll 2001, 14ff. *et passim*. Treffend sind auch die Bemerkungen bei I. Haynes, 'Military service and cultural identity in the *auxilia*', in: A. Goldsworthy und I. Haynes, Hrsg., *The Roman Army as a Community*, *Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplement Series* 34 (Portsmouth, Rhode Island 1999), 167 mit Anm. 7.

⁷ Pollard 2000, 35ff.

und Gesellschaft auf die gewünschte Weise brennpunktartig zu betrachten und damit einen Beitrag dazu zu leisten, die ohne Frage komplexen Beziehungen von Militär und Zivilbevölkerung im Bereich der Religion besser zu verstehen. Die Kulmination der Quellen in einem solchen Punkt, etwa einer strategisch bedeutsamen Garnisonsstadt wie Bostra,⁸ an der Grenze zwischen Wüste bzw. Wüstensteppe und bebaubarem Land gelegen, bietet die Möglichkeit einer exemplarischen Analyse: Die römische Metropole, wohl bereits unter Rabbel II. neue Hauptstadt im Norden des Nabatäerreiches, fungierte als Karawanen- und Handelsstadt,⁹ etwa als Durchzugspunkt für die Karawanen aus dem Wadi Sirhan, die über die Oase Dumat el-Jandal (auch Jauf oder Jawf, das antike *Dumata*) südarabische Waren in den nördlichen Mittelmeerraum transportierten, aber auch als religiöses Zentrum, beispielsweise für den Kult des Hauptgottes des nabatäischen Pantheon, Dusares.¹⁰ Auch dieser Gott, „Dusares, Gott Rabbels, der in Bostra ist“, gelangte durch

⁸ Zur Geschichte der Stadt vgl. etwa Sartre 1985, 2002.

⁹ Nicht gegen den Charakter als Karawanenstadt spricht *a priori* das Argument eines Fehlens von ‚Karawaneninschriften‘ nach dem Vorbild Palmyras, was m.E. zu Recht M. Sommer am Beispiel der ohne jeden Zweifel bedeutenden Handels- und Karawanenstadt Hatra deutlich macht: Ders., *Hatra. Geschichte und Kultur einer Karawanenstadt im römisch-parthischen Mesopotamien* (Mainz 2003), 44–46. Vgl. ähnlich auch für die Frage nach der Rolle von Dura Europos im überregionalen Handel: A. Luther, ‚Dura Europos zwischen Palmyra und den Parthern. Der politische Status der Region am mittleren Euphrat im 2. Jh. n. Chr. und die Organisation des palmyrenischen Fernhandels‘, in R. Rollinger und Chr. Ulf, Hrsg., *Commerce and Monetary Systems in the Ancient World: Means of Transmission and Cultural Interaction. Oriens et Occidens 6* (Stuttgart 2004), 329f.

¹⁰ Healey 2001, 85–107; zu Dusares als Gott von Bostra vgl. insbesondere ebd. 97f. und Sourdel 1952, 60. Handel und Kult sind ohnehin insofern nicht zu trennen, da bekanntlich zahlreiche Heiligtümer im Nahen Osten mit ihren großen Höfen nicht nur als Versammlungsort für Pilger und Gläubige dienten, sondern auch als regelrechte Marktplätze: Dazu vgl. exemplarisch K. Freyberger, *Die frühkaiserzeitlichen Heiligtümer der Karawanenstationen im hellenisierten Osten*. Damaszener Forsch. 6 (Mainz 1998), 44ff. Zu dem auch in Bostra verwirklichten architektonischen ‚Grundmuster‘ der Karawanenstationen des Ostens, nämlich der aufwendig gestalteten Säulenstraße als Hauptachse, an der mehrere Tempelbezirke liegen (auch und gerade am Endpunkt der Straße: für Bostra s. etwa auch Healey 2001, 63 und insbes. J.-M. Dentzer, ‚Les sondages de l’Arc Nabatéen et l’urbanisme de Bostra‘, *Comptes Rendus Séances Acad. Inscript.* [1986], 62–87) vgl. ebd. 26, 88; ferner allgemein Ders., ‚Handel im Schutz der Götter. Die kaiserzeitlichen Heiligtümer in der östlichen Mittelmeerwelt waren Zentren religiösen und kaufmännischen Lebens‘, *Antike Welt* 35,5 (2004), 8–18. Vgl. auch Sartre 2001, 677f. und Th. Weber, „Damaskòs Pólis Episemos“, *Damaszener Mitteilungen* 7 (1993), 159 sowie die Tabelle bei Butcher 2003, 105. Zur möglichen Rolle der Kolonnaden im Rahmen von Kultprozessionen s. etwa für Palmyra T. Kaizer, *The Religious Life of Palmyra*. Oriens et Occidens 4 (Stuttgart 2002), 200–203; zu Prozessionen im Kult der palmyrenischen Götter vgl. auch L. Dirven, *The Palmyrenes of Dura Europos. A Study of Religious Interaction in Roman Syria* (Leiden/Boston/Köln 1999), 91ff.

einen ‚Kulttransfer‘ im Zuge der politischen Veränderungen aus dem nabatäischen Süden hierher.¹¹ In verkehrsgünstiger Lage am Südrand der syrischen Lavalandschaft des Basaltplateaus Hauran, inmitten eines fruchtbaren Umlandes, besonders dem Tafelland der Nuqra-Ebene (al-Nukra), gelegen, versehen mit zahlreichen Quellen, Brunnen und großen Zisternen sowie Stauteichen, gleichermaßen Durchgangsort und Knotenpunkt von überregionalen Verkehrswegen nach Nordsyrien und zum Mittelmeer, zum Persischen Golf und dem Roten Meer hin, stellte Bostra seit der frühen Bronzezeit¹² einen Schmelztiegel unterschiedlicher kultureller und religiöser Einflüsse¹³ dar. Hier, in Bostra, der Stadt, der auch die spätantike Handelsgeographie der *Expositio totius mundi et gentium*, als größter Stadt der Arabia umfangreiche Handelskontakte mit der arabischen Halbinsel und den sasanidischen Nachbarn bescheinigt (cap.

¹¹ Sourdél 1952, 59; Sartre 1985, 56. Zu Rabbel II. und seiner Regierungszeit vgl. auch Bowersock 1983, 72ff.

¹² Zu historischen ägyptischen Quellen aus der Zeit Thutmosis III. (um 1450 v. Chr.) und aus dem Amarna-Archiv—seit dem 15. Jh. v. Chr. gehörten Bostra und andere Orte im Hauran zum ägyptischen Einflußgebiet in Syrien—vgl. Sartre 1985, 44f.; dazu, sowie auch allgemein zum Charakter der Landschaft um Bostra, siehe auch die Ausführungen und Hinweise bei G. Gerster/R.B. Wartke, *Flugbilder aus Syrien. Von der Antike bis zur Moderne* (Mainz 2003), 99ff., insbes. 102, 104.

¹³ Hier darf auch an die daher nicht zufällige Rolle der (Bischofs-)Stadt in frühchristlicher Zeit (M. Sartre, in: *RAC Suppl.* 9 (Stuttgart 2002), 98–149 s.v. Bostra, bes. S. 113ff. Die 512 n. Chr. geweihte Kathedrale der Heiligen Sergius, Bacchus und Leontius gilt als eine der bedeutendsten des Orients), als Ausgangspunkt bei der christlichen Missionierung der arabischen Stämme, oder an die für den Islam bedeutende Bahira-Episode erinnert werden: Der genannte Mönch prophezeite dem als mekkanischen Karawanenhändler durchziehenden Mohammed, den er im Gespräch auch in Prinzipien der christlichen Religion einführte, seine göttliche Sendung eben in Bostra (dazu vgl. etwa H. Bobzin, *Mohammed* [München 2000], 12, 33, 70f.; zu weiteren frühislamischen Belegen für Bostra vgl. P. Crone, *Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam* [Princeton 1987], etwa 139 mit Anm. 31, 163 mit Anm. 72). Für die Bedeutung des Ortes—die *suqs* der Stadt waren in frühislamischer Zeit berühmt—spricht auch die Überlieferung, daß über Bostra (welches unter dem Protektorat der christlichen Ghassaniden und in den folgenden islamischen Epochen, bis mindestens ins 15. Jh. n. Chr. weiter einer der bedeutendsten Umschlagplätze der aus Arabien kommenden Karawanen und Pilgerströme war) im 7. Jh. der erste Koran mittels eines Transportkamels nach Syrien gelangt sein soll. Und an der Stelle der Moschee Mabrak an-Naqa befindet sich nach der Tradition der Ort, wo dieses Kamel beim Niederknien einen tiefen Abdruck im Stein hinterlassen haben soll (etwa J. Wagner, *Syrien. Reiches Erbe einer Kulturlandschaft* (Bielefeld 1999), 53; *Dschami Mabraq an-Naqa* = Moschee des niederknienenden Kamels). Zur Kontinuität wirtschaftlicher Prosperität der Städte und ländlichen Zentren in der Arabia von der Spätantike bis mindestens in die Abassidenzeit vgl. D. Graf, ‘Town and Countryside in Roman Arabia during Late Antiquity’, in Th.S. Burns und J.W. Eadie, Hrsg., *Urban Centers and Rural Contexts in Late Antiquity* (East Lansing, Michigan 2001), 230ff.

38),¹⁴ läßt sich über mehr als drei Jahrhunderte hinweg *Kulturtransfer* und Reaktion, speziell am Beispiel der Religion während der Römischen Kaiserzeit, beobachten.

In dem hier gewählten Beispiel für einen *Kulttransfer* unter dem Einfluß des römischen Militärs, nämlich dem Transfer des Gottes Zeus-Ammon-Sarapis nach Bostra,¹⁵ werden wir einen Akkulturationsprozess erkennen können. Und zwar in dem Sinn, daß sich hier offenbar ein Wandel vollzogen hat, der aus der wechselseitigen Beeinflussung von Personen, Gruppen und Institutionen resultierte und auch Veränderungen von Werten und Bewertungen beinhaltete. Diese Modifikationen und Transformationen sind allerdings auf ziviler Seite zunächst nur für das soziale Segment der lokalen Eliten zu erkennen: Wir bedienen uns zur Verdeutlichung des angedeuteten kulturellen Prozesses einer Quellengattung, die in religionshistorischer Hinsicht und im Hinblick auf die Frage nach den Beziehungen zwischen Militär und Zivilbevölkerung bislang noch zu wenig berücksichtigt worden ist, nämlich der sogenannten ‘Greek Imperials’. Die Verantwortung für die Rückseitengestaltung dieser städtischen Münzen oblag in ihrer nicht unbeträchtlichen und höchst aussagekräftigen Vielfalt den dafür zuständigen Gremien und Exekutivbeamten der prägenden Polis, eben den lokalen Eliten. Die Bilder der Stadtprägungen sind Teil der in der römischen Kaiserzeit immer größere Bedeutung gewinnenden städtischen Selbstdarstellung—Götterbilder und die Wiedergabe von Heiligtümern haben in diesem Rahmen eine besondere Bedeutung: Es handelt sich um *die* öffentlichen Stadtkulte, die für die Identität der Stadt von besonderer Bedeutung waren.¹⁶

¹⁴ Zur Quelle vgl. jetzt auch K. Ruffing, ‘Ökonomie als Kategorie in der antiken deskriptiven Geographie. Berichtsweise und Eigenart der *expositio totius mundi et gentium*’, *Münstersche Beiträge zur Antiken Handelsgeschichte* 23,1 (2004), 88–130.

¹⁵ Dazu vgl. vor allem Stoll 2001, 349ff. und Stoll 2003.

¹⁶ Zum Zeugniswert städtischer Münzen für die Beziehungen zwischen Stadt und Garnison, nicht nur in Bostra, sondern auch in anderen Legionsstandorten und Veteranenkolonien des Nahen Osten vgl. Stoll 2001, 380ff. Außerdem vgl. auch Ders., ‘Garnison und Stadt im römischen Syrien und der Arabia: Eine Symbiose im Spiegel städtischer Münzprägungen und der Epigraphik’, in Ders., *Römisches Heer und Gesellschaft. Gesammelte Beiträge 1991–1999*. MAVORS XIII (Stuttgart 2001), 59–76. Siehe jetzt auch (vor allem zur Münzprägung der Veteranenkolonien) E. Dabrowa, ‘Les légions romaines au Proche-Orient: l’apport de la numismatique’, in: Ders., Hrsg., *Roman Military Studies* (Kraków 2001), 73–85 und Belayche 2001, 38ff. (dort allgemein zum religionshistorischen Beitrag der städtischen Prägungen am Beispiel von Iudaea-Palaestina) und ebd. 120ff. zum Beispiel Jerusalem/Aelia Capitolina. Zur religionshistorischen Dimension vgl. jetzt insbesondere auch Lichtenberger 2003, 1–4.

Manche Forscher haben die Militärprovinzen als ‘Militärgesellschaften’¹⁷ bezeichnet. Für den Nahen Osten bietet sich der spezifischere Begriff der ‘Garniskultur’ an, den ich als sprachlichen Ausdruck der Symbiose von Militär und Zivilbevölkerung für treffender halte und im Folgenden auf ein besonderes Phänomen des Mentalitätswandels anwenden möchte. Tacitus spricht mit Bezug auf Garnisonen des Nahen Ostens von dem „gewohnten Zusammenleben der Provinzialen mit den Soldaten“, dem durch die lange Dienstzeit „bekannten und vertrauten Lager“—*nota et familiaria castra* (Tacitus, *Historien* 2.80.3). Das Beispiel des Transfers des Gottes Zeus Ammon-Sarapis, das wir betrachten wollen, zeigt nachdrücklich, daß auch für die Götter der Soldaten die Stationierungsbedingungen im Nahen Osten die städtischen Gemeinwesen zu *nota et familiaria castra* werden lassen konnten.

Die ‘Religion des Römischen Heeres’ ist ein komplexes Gebilde, das im wesentlichen aus zwei Komponenten besteht: Zum einen aus der reglementierten offiziellen Heeresreligion, die den im gesamten Reich verbindlichen Kaiserkult und den Kult der Staatsgötter Roms umfaßt, zum anderen aber aus den privaten Kulte der Soldaten, die von einer Gruppe oder einzelnen Militärangehörigen ausgeübt werden konnten.¹⁸

Wenig bekannt ist bislang, daß sich bei genauerer Betrachtung der Funktion einiger Kulte eine dritte Komponente herausfiltern läßt, die der gruppen- und regimentsspezifischen Kulte, spezielle Schutzgötter etwa, die eine identitätsstiftende Funktion besitzen und sich in manchen Truppeneinheiten als regelrechte *Regimentstraditionen* über mehrere

¹⁷ Hier ist vor allem zu verweisen auf: G. Alföldy, ‘Das Heer in der Sozialstruktur des römischen Kaiserreiches’, in: Ders., *Römische Heeresgeschichte. Beiträge 1962–1985*. MAVORS III (Amsterdam 1987), 37ff. und Ders., ‘Das Heer in der Sozialstruktur des römischen Kaiserreiches’, in Ders., B. Dobson, W. Eck, Hrsg., *Kaiser, Heer und Gesellschaft in der Römischen Kaiserzeit. Gedenkschrift für E. Birley* (Stuttgart 2000), 33–57, hier besonders 46ff. Vgl. jetzt auch S. James, ‘The Community of the Soldiers: a major identity and centre of power in the Roman empire’, in P. Baker, Hrsg., *TRAC 98. Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Theoretical Roman Archaeology Conference, Leicester 1998* (Oxford 1999), 14–25, vor allem 14, 24.

¹⁸ Vgl. die Angaben in Anm. 1, wichtig ist daneben vor allem E. Birley, ‘The Religion of the Roman Army’, in *ANRW* II 16,2 (Berlin 1978), 1506–1541 = Ders., *The Roman Army. Papers 1929–1986*. MAVORS IV (Amsterdam 1988), 397–432; dann: I.P. Haynes, ‘The Romanisation of Religion in the Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army from Augustus to Septimius Severus’, *Britannia* 24 (1993), 141–157; Ders., ‘Religion in the Roman Army: Unifying aspects and regional trends’, in H. Cancik und J. Rüpke, Hrsg., *Römische Reichsreligion und Provinzialreligion* (Tübingen 1997), 113–126 sowie P. Herz, ‘Sacrifice and Sacrificial Ceremonies of the Roman Army’, in A.I. Baumgarten, Hrsg., *Sacrifice in Religious Experience* (Leiden/Boston/Köln 2002), 81–100.

Jahrhunderte hinweg nachweisen lassen.¹⁹ Eine ‚Regimentstradition‘ läßt sich dann postulieren, wenn der Einblick, den man aus dem epigraphischen Material gewinnen kann, nicht nur ‚punktuell‘ ist. Die Tradition muß also in einigem Umfang durch Soldaten ein- und desselben Regimentes und auf allen personellen Ebenen, d.h. von der Ebene des Gesamtregimentes bis zum einzelnen Militärangehörigen, belegt sein. Die Pflege eines solchen Kultes von Göttern des Heimatgebietes oder des ursprünglichen, langjährigen Stationierungsgebietes sollte sich über lange oder längere Zeit, über mehrere ‚Soldatengenerationen‘ hinweg und in aufeinanderfolgenden Stand- und Einsatzorten nachweisen lassen, wobei insbesondere Tempelbauinschriften oder solche, die von notwendig gewordenen Baumaßnahmen unterrichten, hilfreich sein können.

Mit der Annektion und ‚Eroberung‘ des Nabatäerreiches (*aera Arabiae*: 22.3.106 n. Chr.)²⁰ und der Konstituierung der *provincia Arabia* unter Kaiser Trajan, wurde Bostra Hauptstadt (ἡ Νέα Τραιανὴ Βόστρα πόλις),²¹ Sitz des Statthalters sowie Standort einer Legion, nämlich, wohl bereits von Beginn an, spätestens aber ab hadrianischer Zeit, der

¹⁹ Zu ‚Regimentstraditionen‘ vgl. die theoretische Definition und konkrete Beispiele bei Stoll 2001, 136f. 188ff. 349–379. Solche Beispiele finden sich etwa in Intercisa (*cohors I milliaria Aurelia Hemesenorum sagg. eq. c.R.* [zur ‚syrischen Gemeinde‘ vor Ort und ihrem Kultleben vgl. auch die bemerkenswerte Monographie von J. Fitz, *Les Syriens à Intercisa* (Bruxelles 1972), etwa 178, 182f. 193f.]) mit dem Gott Elagabal oder im nordafrikanischen el-Kantara und dem folgenden Stationierungsort Dimmidi/ Messad mit dem Sonnengott Malakbel und anderen palmyrenischen Göttern des dort stationierten *numerus Palmyrenorum* (Stoll 2001, 377f.). Auch in dem berühmten, oft anders gedeuteten, Tribünenfresko aus dem Tempel des Bel (= Tempel der palmyrenischen Götter) in Dura Europos vermag ich nach genauer Analyse nichts anderes zu sehen, als die Wiedergabe eines entsprechenden Kultaktes des Regimentes für die heimatlichen Regimentsgötter der 20. Palmyrenerkohorte, wohl Iarhibol, Aglibol und den helmtragende Arsu (dazu mit ausführlicher Begründung Stoll 2001, 367ff.). Vgl. auch Stoll 2003, 72f.

²⁰ Über Anlaß, Charakter und Fortgang der Ereignisse, die zur Provinzwerdung führten, gibt es eine kontroverse Forschungsliteratur: Die wichtigsten Arbeiten zitiert Sartre 2001, 610 Anm. 7. Hervorzuheben scheint mir insbesondere der kritische Beitrag von Ph. Freeman, ‚The annexation of Arabia and imperial Grand Strategy‘, in D.L. Kennedy, Hrsg., *The Roman Army in the East*, Journal of Roman Archaeology Suppl. Ser. 18 (Ann Arbor 1996), 91–118. Zusammenfassend mit weiteren Literaturhinweisen vgl. jetzt auch A. Gebhardt, *Imperiale Politik und provinzielle Entwicklung. Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Kaiser, Heer und Städten im Syrien der vorseverischen Zeit* (Berlin 2002), 87ff. Besonders erwähnenswert ist auch der Beitrag von R. Wenning, ‚Das Ende des nabatäischen Königreichs‘, in A. Invernizzi und J.-F. Salles, Hrsg., *Arabia Antiqua. Hellenistic Centres around Arabia* (Roma 1993), 81–103.

²¹ Vgl. R. Haensch, *Capita Provinciarum* (Mainz 1997), 238–244. Zur Streitfrage, ob Petra oder Bostra als erste Hauptstadt der Provinz fungierten, vgl. auch Sartre 1985, 73ff.

legio III Cyrenaica.²² Bostras Stammlegion, sogar gelegentlich die „arabische Legion“ (*legio Arabica*) genannt,²³ wird noch in der *Notitia Dignitatum* am selben Ort zu den Truppen des *dux Arabiae* gezählt (*Notitia Dignitatum*, Or. XXXVII 21). Das etwa 16,8 ha große, rechteckige Lager, das bislang kaum ergraben ist—insbesondere fehlen Erkenntnisse zur Innenbebauung—, befand sich demnach bis mindestens ins Jahr 400 n. Chr. im Norden der Stadt und war an den städtischen Mauerring angeschlossen,²⁴ der nach dem inschriftlichen Befund in seiner heutigen Form allerdings wohl weitgehend grundlegenden Baumaßnahmen der Mitte und der zweiten Hälfte des 3. Jh. n. Chr. zuzuschreiben ist.²⁵ Ein enger, schon ‚physischer‘ Bezug von Garnison und Stadt, eine räumliche Nähe also, war in jedem Fall von Beginn der Provinzgeschichte an gegeben. Das Nordttor der Stadt war sozusagen zugleich das Südtor der *castra*, oder umgekehrt; die Nord-Südachse des Legionslagers, die *via principalis*,

²² Zu dieser Legion zuletzt zusammenfassend P.-L. Gatier, ‚La Legio III Cyrenaica et l’Arabie‘, in Y. Le Bohec, Hrsg., *Les Légions de Rome sous le Haut-Empire. Actes du Congrès de Lyon (17–19 septembre 1998) II* (Lyon 2000), 341–349. Zum Standort s. a. zusammenfassend Kennedy 2000, 205f. Zur Diskussion um die ‘initial garrison’ vgl. die Literaturangaben bei Stoll 2003, 81 Anm. 46 und auch ebd. 91 Anm. 82 zu m. E. für diese Frage aussagekräftigen Münzzeugnissen.

²³ *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* (SHA), *vita Sept. Severi* 12. 6.

²⁴ Vgl. das Luftbild und den Kommentar bei D. Kennedy und D. Riley, *Rome’s Desert Frontier from the Air* (London 1990), 124f. Den lückenhaften Kenntnis- und Forschungsstand zu römischen Legionsfestungen der Prinzipatszeit im Nahen Osten faßt S.Th. Parker zusammen: Ders., ‘Roman Legionary Fortresses in the East’, in R. J. Brewer, Hrsg., *Roman Fortresses and their Legions* (Cardiff 2000), 121–138, ebd. 124 zu Bostra. Zusammenfassend zum gegenwärtigen Stand neuerer französischer Grabungen und Forschungen s. M. Lenoir, ‘Le camp de la légion IIIa Cyrenaica à Bostra. Recherches récentes’, in: Ph. Freeman und J. Bennett *et al.*, Hrsg., *Limes XVIII. Proceedings of the XVIIIth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies, Amman, Jordan* (September 2000), Band I (Oxford 2002), 175–184. Den aktuellsten Grundplan der Stadt mit Eintragungen zu Ergebnissen der Grabungen im Stadtbereich und auf dem Gebiet des Legionslagers findet man allerdings bei O. Dussart, *Le Verre en Jordanie et en Syrie du Sud* (Beyrouth 1998), 232 Abb. 23. Nach Sartre 2001, 618 Anm. 35 scheinen die Lagerthermen an den Beginn des 2. Jh. n. Chr. datierbar zu sein. Für den Zusammenschluß von Lagermauer und Stadtmauer vgl. auch die Hypothese von Belayche 2001, 122, 132 zu Aelia Capitolina und dem Lager der *legio X Fretensis*.

²⁵ Vgl. beispielsweise die Inschriften IGLSyr. XIII 9105, 9106, 9108f. Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res Gestae* 14.8.13 bezeichnet Bostra als „*civitas murorum firmitate cautissima*“. Zur Bauzeit der Stadtmauer vgl. Sartre 1985, 88–90 und H.-G. Pflaum, ‘La fortification de la ville d’Adraha d’Arabie (259–60 à 274–275) d’après des inscriptions récemment découvertes’, *Syria* 29 (1952), 307–330 mit vielen Hinweisen auf Bostra, ferner Gatier 2000, a.a.O. (Anm. 22), 345, 348f sowie Sartre 1985, 88–90. Zur wahrscheinlichen Beteiligung der Legion bei den Baumaßnahmen und allgemein s. auch M. Horster, *Bauinschriften römischer Kaiser. Untersuchungen zu Inschriftenpraxis und Bautätigkeit in Städten des westlichen Imperium Romanum in der Zeit des Prinzipats* (Stuttgart 2001), 170, 186 mit Verweis auf CIL III 100, s.a. ebd. 173f. mit Anm. 23.

ist die Verlängerung einer der wichtigsten Nord-Südachsen der Stadt, so daß beide, Stadt und Garnison, wie mit einer Nabelschnur untrennbar verbunden scheinen.²⁶

Die Anwesenheit der Legion, die neue strategische, politische und wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Stadt sowie die Einbindung in die neu ausgebaute, regionale und überregionale Infrastruktur resultierten in Blüte und Wohlstand der Stadt und des für die Versorgung effizient weiterentwickelten Umlandes.²⁷ Das Militär wirkte hier auch in anderer Hinsicht prägend, nämlich als Faktor in der Bevölkerungs- und Sozialstruktur der Gegend, etwa durch Rekrutierung und Siedlungsverhalten der ausgeschiedenen Soldaten. Bereits H.I. MacAdam konnte rund um Bostra recht viele Fundorte von Veteraneninschriften vermerken.²⁸ Bei den Veteranen des Lavalandes lassen sich aufgrund des Namensmaterials immerhin etwa 30% als einheimisch klassifizieren, die also aus der Region oder vielleicht aus dem Dorf rekrutiert worden waren, in dem sie auch epigraphisch belegt sind. Die Inschriften mit Angabe der *origo* der Soldaten und Veteranen verzeichnen Männer aus den ländlichen Gegenden der *Arabia* und des südlichen Syrien, also den, so möchte man denken, weniger hellenisierten Landstrichen der Provinz. Im dritten Jh. n. Chr. sind dies in erster Linie die Auranitis und die Trachonitis, dazu aber auch das engere Gebiet um den Legionsstandort Bostra selbst.²⁹ Veteranen der ‚arabischen Legion‘ und anderer Einheiten des *exercitus Arabicus* sind in den umliegenden regionalen Zentren auffällig präsent.³⁰

²⁶ Gelegentlich, wie in Pap. Dura 55, sind *polis* und *castra* im Nahen Osten ohnehin austauschbare Begriffe.

²⁷ Vgl. etwa allgemein L. Wierschowski, *Heer und Wirtschaft. Das römische Heer als Wirtschaftsfaktor* (Bonn 1984), 125ff., 151ff. und Pollard 2000, 171ff. Zu den landwirtschaftlichen Verhältnissen, den Ressourcen und ihrer Nutzung vgl. Butcher 2003, 161ff. und Stoll 2003, 77f.

²⁸ MacAdam 1986, 188f. Allgemein vgl. Ders., ‘Cities, Villages and Veteran Settlements: Roman Administration of the Syrian Hawran’, in Ders., *Geography, Urbanisation and Settlement in the Roman Near East* (Aldershot 2002), VIII 641–652, vor allem 646, 648. Siehe jetzt auch Stoll 2002, 245ff.

²⁹ MacAdam 1986, 189. Siehe auch J.C. Mann, *Legionary Recruitment and Veteran Settlement during the Principate* (London 1983), 58f., 61ff., 65. Zum römischen Nahen Osten vgl. insbesondere ebd. 41–44. Belege für die Bedeutung der ‚lokalen Rekrutierung‘ bei den Legionen des Nahen Ostens finden sich ebd. Taf. 25 S. 144ff. Speziell zur *III Cyrenaica* siehe vor allem ebd. 145f. mit Nachweisen.

³⁰ Explizit Veteranen der *legio III Cyrenaica* sind etwa erwähnt in: IGLSyr. XIII 9050 [Bostra]; IGLSyr. XIII 9067/68 [Bostra]; IGLSyr. XIII 9085 [Bostra]; IGLSyr. XIII 9097 [Bostra]; IGLSyr. XIII 9098 [Bostra]; IGLSyr. XIII 9169 [Bostra]; IGLSyr. XIII 9033 [Bostra]; IGR III 1265 [Mushannaf—oder *III Gallica?*]; IGR III 1173 [Nedjran]; SEG 7, 1934, 1030 [Nimreh]; SEG 7, 1934, 1173 [Orman]; IGR III 1135 [Qusayfa];

Als ökonomisch gutgestellte und rechtlich privilegierte ‚Mitbürger‘ nehmen sie unter den Notablen der Regionalzentren, als Funktionsträger und Stifter, eine ‘elitäre’ Rolle ein.³¹ Die Nähe der Massierung von Belegen für Veteranen zum Stationierungsort der *III Cyrenaica*, Bostra, das ja zugleich als Sitz des Statthalters der Einlegionsprovinz ökonomisches Zentrum der Provinz gewesen ist, dürfte in Anbetracht der verkehrsgünstigen Lage der Stadt und des näheren Umlandes sowie der gegebenen Fruchtbarkeit der Landschaft, die mit ihren vulkanischen Böden geradezu als Kornkammer des römischen und byzantinischen Nahen Ostens galt, in jedem Fall kein Zufall gewesen sein. Es liegt natürlich auch nahe, bei der Interpretation einer entsprechenden Verbreitungskarte einen stabilisierenden, sicherheitspolitisch relevanten Aspekt des Bildes und damit die Frage nach einer zumindest teilweise gelenkten Aufsiedlung durch Veteranen ins Auge zu fassen, gleichwohl eine Antwort hier nicht leicht fällt.³² Faktum ist, daß viele dieser durch

AE 1922, 134 [Salkhad]; IGR III 1193 [Shaqqa]; SEG 7, 1934, 1025 [Shaqqa]; AE 1936, 149 [Shaqra]; PAES A 7, Nr. 797 [Sûr].

³¹ Veteranen als Funktionäre: z.B. *Bouleuten*: CBFIR 726 (Bostra); AE 1999, 1670 (Kalat Fakra); *Episkopoi*: IGR III 1316 (Salkhad); IGLSyr. XIII 9112 (Bostra); *Epimeleten*: IGR III 1009 (Kefr Nabo); *Hierotamiai*: MacAdam 1986, Nr. 3–4, S. 191 (Hoyyet Hibikké); IGR III 1299 (Sahouet-el-Khudr); *Pronoeten*: IGR III 1186/1187 (Umm iz-Zetûn). Relevant sind selbstverständlich auch entsprechende Ehreninschriften für Veteranen und ‚Ehrentitel‘, wie IGR III 1298 (Hebran; Veteran als *patronus*); IGR III 1213 (Kefr Laha; *euergetai*). Zur Rolle der Veteranen im ‚Dorfleben‘ Südsyriens vgl. exemplarisch H.I. MacAdam, ‘Epigraphy and Village Life in Southern Syria during the Roman and Early Byzantine Periods’, in: Ders., *Geography, Urbanisation and Settlement in the Roman Near East* (Aldershot 2002), XII 103–115. Zu Veteranen als Stiftern vgl. die Belege bei Stoll 2002, 277 mit Anm. 265, z.B. MacAdam 1986, Nr. 3–4, S. 191 (Hoyyet Hibikké); AE 1935, 118 (Sadad); Waddington 2546a (Umm iz-Zetûn); IGR III 1186/1187 (Umm iz-Zetûn); IGR III 1294 (Hebran); CIL III 108 (Hebran); MacAdam 1986, Nr. 71 S. 211 (Mushannaf/Nela); SEG 7, 1934, 1030 (Nimreh/Nemara); IGR III 1234 (Qanawat); IGR III 1299 (Sahouet-el-Khudr); IGR III 1302 (Sahouet-el-Khudr); AE 1936, 149 (Shaqra); PAES A 7, Nr. 797 und PAES A 7, Nr. 797⁺ (Sûr).

³² Bislang gibt es eine Kartierung der entsprechenden Inschriften nur bei M. Sartre, ‘Villes et villages du Hauran (Syrie) du I^{er} au IV^e siècle’, in Ed. Frezouls, Hrsg., *Sociétés urbaines, sociétés rurales dans l’Asie Mineure et la Syrie hellénistiques et romaines* (Strasbourg 1987), 239–257, vor allem 250 Karte 5: Die Inschriftendichte ist südöstlich und nordöstlich von Bostra am höchsten. Die meisten der nördlich der Linie Bostra-Salkhad liegenden Fundorte orientieren sich an den regionalen und überregionalen Straßen und liegen in der Regel in einem Radius von nicht mehr als 30–40 km von Bostra entfernt. Die gebirgigeren Regionen des Djebel ad-Druz-Gebietes sind fast ausgespart, die Ränder der hügeligeren Zone erscheinen dagegen an ihrer Peripherie zum Tafelland hin wie eingefasst von einzelnen Fundpunkten, die sich auch hier am Straßenverlauf und den Gebirgstälern zu orientieren scheinen, wo eine intensive Kultivierung von Ackerfluren ebenfalls möglich und sinnvoll war. Das Verteilungsbild wird am ehesten gegen eine Überschätzung der strategischen Rolle—der ohnehin nicht nachweisbaren—eventuellen

Veteranen geprägten Siedlungen in der Spätantike durch die *Notitia Dignitatum* als Standorte von Militäreinheiten belegt sind.

Wie wir aus dem privaten Briefverkehr eines Legionssoldaten der *III Cyrenaica* nach Hause, in die ägyptische Heimat, wissen, gingen täglich Waren aus Pelusium am östlichen Rand des Nildeltas nach Bostra ab (*Karanis Pap. VIII* Nr. 465, 466, beide 107 n. Chr.). Das römische Ägypten war die alte Stationierungsprovinz der Legion, mit der nach wie vor offenbar gewisse Beziehungen bestanden, über die ‘normalen’ Handelsbeziehungen hinaus sind hier spezielle Transaktionen im Bereich der Heereslogistik³³ oder auch personale Bindungen zu nennen, durch ägyptische Rekruten etwa, durch dienstliche Versetzungen, durch Umstände also, wie sie uns im Briefarchiv des ägyptischen Legionärs C. Iulius Apollinarius aus Karanis entgegentreten oder auch durch die Rückkehr von Veteranen der Legion nach Ägypten, wie im Fall eines in hadrianischer Zeit rekrutierten Soldaten der Legion, der uns im Fajjum mit Frau und Familie dann als Veteran und als Stifter eines Tempels begegnet (AE 1909, 98). Von Ägypten jedenfalls brachten die Soldaten in traianischer Zeit und bei ihrer Verlegung den Gott Zeus-Ammon mit sich, den Gott der Kyrenaika, der seit dem Hellenismus mit dem eng wesensverwandten Sarapis geglichen wurde.³⁴ Einige Darstellungen des Gottes in der Arabia und den nahöstlichen Nachbarprovinzen, in Syrien und Palästina, unter anderem aber auch eine qualitätvolle 77

‘systematischen’ Veteranenansiedlung sprechen: Am östlichen Saum des Djebel ad-Druz, also in Richtung auf *el-harra* und mit Blick auf die Nomaden dieser Landschaft, fehlen die Belege, die man dann erwarten würde, ebenso, wie auch weitestgehend in der als notorische ‘Räuberhöhle’ bekannten Ledija, der antiken *Trachonitis*, die bestenfalls vereinzelte Hinweise bietet. Zu einer möglichen sicherheitspolitischen Motivation der Veteranenansiedlung allgemein vgl. etwa auch die vorsichtigen Bemerkungen bei I. Haynes, ‘The Impact of Auxiliary Recruitment on Provincial Societies from Augustus to Caracalla’, in L. de Blois, Hrsg., *Administration, Prosopography and Appointment Policies in the Roman Empire* (Amsterdam 2001), 79, oder—mit Blick auf den bekannteren und evidenten Bezug von Veteranenkolonien und Sicherheitspolitik—Isaac 1992, 311ff., 318ff. zum Nahen Osten.

³³ Vgl. etwa P. Oxy. LXIV 4434 aus dem Jahr 154 n. Chr. (E.W. Handley und U. Wartenberg, Hrsg., *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri LXIV* [London 1997], Nr. 4434): Staatsauftrag an die Wollweber von Oxyrhynchus für die Herstellung eines Kontingentes von Wintermänteln für die *legio III Cyrenaica*. Siehe auch Stoll 2003, 79f.

³⁴ Vgl. etwa J.E. Stambaugh, *Sarapis under the Early Ptolemies* (Leiden 1972), 85f. oder W. Hornbostel, *Sarapis. Studien zur Überlieferungsgeschichte, den Erscheinungsformen und Wandlungen der Gestalt eines Gottes* (Leiden 1973), 21f. mit Anm. 2 *et passim* sowie die in der folgenden Anmerkung genannte Literatur; zum Gott des Ammoneion von Siwa vgl. auch K.-P. Kuhlmann, *Das Ammoneion: Archäologie, Geschichte und Kultpraxis des Orakels von Siwa* (Mainz 1988).

cm hohe Sitzstatue aus Bostra selbst, die in sekundärer Verwendung, allerdings unweit des Legionslagers (gut 300 m entfernt), in den Zentralthermen (Khan ad-Dibs) am *cardo maximus* wiedergefunden worden ist, sind in ägyptischem Steinmaterial gearbeitet, etwa in dunkelblauem bis schwarzem Schiefer.³⁵ Auch hier darf man also von—wörtlich gemeinten—Gottesimporten ausgehen: Die Bostrener Statue, die in die Zeit um die Mitte des 2. Jhs. n.Chr. zu datieren sein dürfte, entspricht dem Typus des Sarapis-Kultbildes in Alexandria, und bei der Qualität des Stückes und der Erfahrung, die eine Bearbeitung des hier verwendeten Materials voraussetzt, darf man tatsächlich an ein Importstück aus einem ägyptischen Kunstzentrum wie Alexandria denken.³⁶ Zeus-Ammon Sarapis läßt sich von nun an auf Altären und Weihinschriften in Bostra und an vielen, auch weit entfernten Einsatzorten von Soldaten der Legion in Arabien und den angrenzenden Provinzen nachweisen.³⁷ Zwischen Bostra und Jawf etwa, dem antiken Dumata, dem Schnittpunkt wichtiger Karawanenwege am südöstlichen Ende des Wadi Sirhan und zugleich im alleräußersten Südosten der Provinz,³⁸ liegen mehr als 900 km: Von dort stammt ein Altar des 3. Jhs., der von einem Zenturio der Legion an *Iuppiter Hammon* und den arabischen Gott Sulmos gestiftet wurde (AE 2001 1979). Aus Jerusalem stammt

³⁵ Allgemein s. auch Stoll 2003, 83f. und 87 mit Anm. 69. Weitere Beispiele und Belege für ägyptische Gottheiten, besonders für ‘Sarapiden’ und oft in dem erwähnten dunklen Material, das ein Kennzeichen der alexandrinischen Kultstatue gewesen zu sein scheint, verzeichnen etwa Th. Weber, *Pella Decapolitana. Studien zur Geschichte, Architektur und bildenden Kunst einer hellenisierten Stadt des nördlichen Ostjordanlandes* (Wiesbaden 1993), 45ff. zu einem Exemplar aus Pella und ebd. 52–54 für die gesamte Dekapolis; sowie Ders., *Gadara—Umm Qes I. Gadara Decapolitana. Untersuchungen zur Topographie, Geschichte, Architektur und der Bildenden Kunst einer ‚Polis Hellenis‘ im Ostjordanland* (Wiesbaden 2002), 111 mit Anm. 839, 194f. (Sarapis), 195f. (Helios-Ammon); dort auch ebd. 34 Anm. 246, 195 zu dem Stück aus Bostra. Th. Weber, dem ich für die Informationen herzlich danke, bereitet einen Katalog der Bostrener Skulpturen vor, unter denen das Stück einen prominenten Platz einnehmen wird; zu Sarapis, Isis und Zeus Ammon vgl. auch jüngst Lichtenberger 2003, 156, 187f. 227f. 270.

³⁶ Zur Rekonstruktion der Kultstatue vgl. Hornbostel 1973, a.a.O. (wie Anm. 34), 35ff., 95ff. zur Farbigkeit und dem Material des Alexandriner Originals.

³⁷ Die entsprechenden Beispiele finden sich gesammelt und genauer kommentiert bei Stoll 2001, 365ff. und Stoll 2003, *passim*.

³⁸ Zum Fundort an der südöstlichen Wüstengrenze der Provinz und der severischen Inschrift vgl. M. Sartre, *Trois études sur l’Arabie romaine et byzantine* (Bruxelles 1982), 19–22; Bowersock 1983, 98f., ferner Isaac 1992, 126f. mit Anm. 117, insbes. aber auch M.P. Speidel, ‘The Roman Road to Dumata (Jawf in Saudi Arabia) and the Frontier Strategy of *Praetensione Colligare*’, in Ders., *Roman Army Studies II* (Stuttgart 1992), 369–378. Dazu siehe jetzt auch M. Christol und M. Lenoir, ‘Qasr el-Azraq et la reconquête de l’Orient par Aurélien’, *Syria* 78 (2001), 163–178.

eine monumentale, traianische Inschrift einer Legionsvexillation der *III Cyrenaica* an I.O.M. Sarapis (CIL III 13587).³⁹ Weitere Inschriften des 2. und 3. Jhs. kennen wir aus Gerasa (Welles 1938: 386 Nr. 23), aus Sûr bei Aere/Es Sanamein (CIL III 13604) und natürlich aus Bostra selbst (etwa IGLSyr. XIII 9010). Wichtige neue Befunde stammen aus dem an der Via Nova Traiana (von Damaskus über Bostra bis nach Aqaba am Roten Meer) gelegenen und aus der Tabula Peutingeriana und der Notitia Dignitatum als *Hauarra* bekannten und—auch für die abbasidische Geschichte—bedeutsamen Siedlungskomplex von Humayma in der Hisma.⁴⁰ Auf nabatäischen Grundlagen (der Zeit vom Beginn des 1. Jhs. v. Chr.) entstand hier neben einem bereits in traianischer Zeit angelegten Kastell, das bis ins 3. Jh. n. Chr. hinein eine Vexillation der *III Cyrenaica* beherbergte, eine umfangreiche Zivilsiedlung. Eine lateinischsprachige Altarweihe einer Vexillation der *III Cyrenaica* an Iuppiter Ammon aus dem 3. Jh., eine Votivsäule mit griechischer Inschrift an Zeus Serapis (*sic*) und ein Kultstein als Symbol des Dusares, waren hier in einem freskengeschmückten Sacellum eines lagernahen und hauptstraßenorientierten Gebäudekomplexes des *vicus* auf nabatäischen Grundmauern vereint. Auch das sonstige Kleinfundspektrum des aus Ziegelmauern errichteten Gebäudekomplexes des späten 2. und frühen 3. Jhs., wobei das kleine Heiligtum wohl mit dem Abzug der örtlichen Garnisonstruppen in diokletianischer Zeit aufgelassen wurde, enthielt bemerkenswert viele ‚Aegyptiaca‘ (Fayenceamulette, -skarabäen, -perlen). Die bereits von D. Graf⁴¹ vermutete Bedeutung des Dusares für Humayma über die nabatäische Periode hinweg ist hiermit bestätigt. Schließlich ist der Ort von den Sandsteinsteilabhängen des quellenreichen ash-Shara-Gebirges umgeben, das Dusares nach einer geläufigen

³⁹ Zu dieser Inschrift vgl. jetzt auch Belayche 2001, 124f.; ebd. 157ff. zum Kult des Gottes in Aelia Capitolina und seinem häufigen Auftreten in der Bildwelt der städtischen Münzen.

⁴⁰ Zu diesem Fundort, seiner Geschichte und den nachfolgend behandelten Befunden vgl. vor allem J.P. Oleson, M.B. Reeves, B.J. Fisher, ‘New Dedicatory Inscriptions from Humayma (Ancient Hawara), Jordan’, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 140 (2002), 103–121, vor allem ebd. 106f. zusammenfassend zum Kontext, dann 112ff. zu Altar und Säule. Zum Kastellort vgl. außerdem die interessante Luftbildaufnahme bei D. Kennedy und D. Riley, *Rome’s Desert Frontier from the Air* (London 1990), 146–148; zur Lage vgl. auch D. Graf, ‘The *Via Nova Traiana* in Arabia Petraea’, in: Ders., *Rome and the Arabian Frontier: from the Nabataeans to the Saracens* (Aldershot 1997), VI 22f. und Kennedy 2000, 182ff. sowie M. Al Khouri, ‘Catalogo dei siti archeologici del *limes arabicus* rinvenuti’, in Ders., *Il limes arabicus* (Roma 2003), 70f.

⁴¹ D. Graf, ‘The “God” of Humayma’, in Ders., *Rome and the Arabian Frontier: from the Nabataeans to the Saracens* (Aldershot 1997), VII 67–76.

Version den Namen gegeben hat: Der Gottesnamen wird als ‚Herr des Gebirgszuges von Shara‘ oder eben ‚Dushara‘ erklärt.⁴² Auffallend ist weiter aber auch hier seine enge Vergesellschaftung mit Iuppiter (oder Zeus) Ammon, eine ‚Paarung‘, die sich im übrigen auch in Jawf,⁴³ dann aber vor allem in Bostra weiter untersuchen lassen wird: Hier wird sich das Zusammenspiel der beiden Götter einmal auch im Bild fassen lassen, auf den Reversen der städtischen Münzprägeserien.

Die Belege für den ‚Importgott‘ der *legio III Cyrenaica* reichen insgesamt vom Jahr 107, der Erwähnung des Gottes in dem genannten Briefwechsel, dem Apollinarius-Archiv, in dem der Schreiber unter anderem konstatiert, Sarapis habe ihn sicher nach Bostra geleitet (*Karamis Pap. VIII* Nr. 466 Z. 18), bis in die Zeit des Kaisers Aurelian, um 275 n. Chr. Der Legionsgott—denn der als Iuppiter Ammon ‚romanisierte‘ Gott war nach dem Ausweis der Inschriften und vor allem der städtischen Münzen, auf die wir später zurückkommen, ein spezieller Schutzgott des gesamten Regiments—wird inschriftlich als *Genius Sanctus* (IGLSyr. XIII 9010) bezeichnet oder auch *Theos Patroos*, also „der von den Vätern übernommene, der heimatliche Gott“ (Welles 1938: 386 Nr. 23) und ‚*Conservator*‘, der Bewahrer der Legion (IGLSyr. XIII 9014), vielleicht auch als ‚Genius der Legion‘ (IGLSyr. XIII 9015). Er besaß einen Tempel mit einem silbernen Kultbild und eisernen Türen in der Stadt selbst, in unmittelbarer Nähe der Legionsgarnison. Dies belegt nicht nur eine Münze Elagabals (Kindler 1983: 116 zu Nr. 32–32b mit Taf. III), sondern auch die späteste Inschrift, die von der Wiedererrichtung des durch die Palmyrener 269/270 n. Chr. zerstörten Tempels in der Zeit Kaiser Aurelians berichtet (IGLSyr. XIII 9107). Nach dem Zeugnis des Malalas (12. 299. 5–9)⁴⁴ soll bei einem Einfall der Zenobia sogar der *dux* der Provinz mitsamt aller Soldaten massakriert worden sein. Anscheinend haben die Palmyrener also dabei auch das Heiligtum des

⁴² Healey 2001, 86ff. Zum Charakter der Landschaft vgl. Bowersock 1983, 8.

⁴³ Aus der Oase Jawf stammt nicht nur die Inschrift an *Iuppiter Optimus Maximus Hammon* und den *Sanctus Sulmus* (s. etwa Kennedy 2000, 208), sondern auch eine nabatäische Inschrift des Jahres 44 n. Chr. (s.a. Kennedy 2000, a.a.O.), die vom Bau bzw. der Restaurierung eines Tempels für Dusares durch einen königlichen Offizier, einen Stratopedarchen, berichtet: Zur Inschrift vgl. R. Savignac und J. Starcky, „Une inscription nabatéenne provenant de Djof“, *Revue Biblique* 64 (1957), 196–217. Zur nabatäischen Militärpräsenz vor Ort vgl. auch die Bemerkungen bei Bowersock 1983, 58, 98f., dazu noch insbesondere ebd. 154ff.

⁴⁴ Zu dieser Episode vgl. auch U. Hartmann, *Das palmyrenische Teilreich* (Stuttgart 2001), 278ff., vor allem 279–81. Vgl. auch die Bemerkungen bei T. Kaizer, *The Religious Life of Palmyra. Oriens et Occidens* 4 (Stuttgart 2002), 113.

Legionsgottes zerstört („...*templum Iovis Hammonis a Palmyrenis hostibus dirutum*...“ [IGLSyr. XIII 9107]), das wohl erst nach dem endgültigen Sieg Aurelians über die Palmyrener und der Eroberung von Palmyra wiederaufgebaut worden sein wird. Bei der endgültigen Sicherung Palmyras, nach der Niederschlagung der Usurpation des Antiochus, kommt es im Sommer 273 n. Chr. bei der Eroberung der Stadt im übrigen zu einer in der *Historia Augusta* (= SHA) überlieferten Episode, die den engen Bezug von Ammon-Tempel und Legion noch zusätzlich verdeutlicht (SHA, *vita Aureliani* 31. 5–10): Die Plünderung und Zerstörung eines palmyrenischen Haupttempels („*templum Solis*“), wohl des Beltempels (?) oder dem des Malakbel (?), erscheint geradezu als direkter Racheakt für die eben geschilderte Episode, ausgeführt durch Adlerträger, Standartenträger, *draconarii* und andere Unteroffiziere *legionis tertiae*,⁴⁵ womit ohne Zweifel die ‘arabische Legion’ gemeint ist!

Eine Reaktion der städtischen Bevölkerung auf die Anwesenheit von Legion und Gott und den täglichen Kontakt fassen wir in den Bildern der städtischen Münzprägung,⁴⁶ die in ihrer Funktion als Kleingeld auch für den reibungslosen Ablauf des Handels vor Ort diente. Die sogenannten ‘*greek imperials*’ sind eine einzigartige, durch lokale Bezüge geprägte ikonographische Quelle, die den schriftlichen Befund ergänzt und Beobachtungen zu Veränderungen im Kultleben der Städte, in Bostra sogar zu Stufen der Rezeption eines fremden Kultes zulässt.

Zu Beginn der Prägeserien in der Mitte des 2. Jhs., unter Antoninus Pius, stehen Bilder und Legenden, die Zeus Ammon als Legionsgott vorstellen (Kindler 1983: 93 zu Nr. 19, Taf. V): Sein Kopf mit den Widderhörnern und dem langen Haar ist mit der Beischrift *leg(ionis) III Cyr(enaicae)*, was durchaus als „Gott der dritten Legion“ zu lesen ist, wiedergegeben.⁴⁷ Die städtischen Eliten, die für die Konzeption

⁴⁵ Zur Authentizität der Schilderung vgl. auch die Bewertung bei E. Will, *Le sac de Palmyre*, in: Ders., *De l'Euphrate au Rhin. Aspects de l'Hellénisation et de la Romanisation du Proche-Orient* (Beyrouth 1995), 533ff., vor allem 538ff.; ausgewogen und kritisch zu den Quellen und Ereignissen: Hartmann 2001, a.a.O. (wie Anm. 44), 375ff., vor allem 399f. mit Anm. 14. Vgl. auch Stoll 2003, 87f. Zu den Haupttempeln Palmyras, insbesondere zum Tempel des Bel vgl. Kaizer 2002, a.a.O. (wie Anm. 44), 67ff., ebd. 154f. aber auch zu der im Text zitierten Passage aus der *Historia Augusta*.

⁴⁶ Zur städtischen Münzprägung Bostras vgl. Kindler 1983. Speziell zu Zeus-Ammon und den Bezügen zur Heeresreligion s. Stoll 2001, 407ff. 555 und insbesondere Stoll 2003.

⁴⁷ Vgl. auch die Kleinbronze Kindler 1983, 106 zu Nr. 6 mit Taf. I 6,6a: Der Widder auf dem Revers ist nicht nur das Begleittier des Gottes Zeus Ammon, sondern mit allergrößter Wahrscheinlichkeit auch das Fahnentier der *Legio III Cyrenaica*: Stoll

der Münzbilder zuständig waren, setzen unter Elagabal, etwa 60 Jahre später, den schon erwähnten Tempel mit dem stehenden Iuppiter Ammon-Sarapis mit Kalathos auf die Münzreverse (Kindler 1983: 116 zu Nr. 32–32b mit Taf. III). Er ist hier unter die Götter der Stadt und ihre Heiligtümer eingereiht, die die Reverse derselben Serie zieren, Tyche etwa und der alte nabatäische und nach wie vor wichtige Gott Dusares oder Dushara, der als Dushara-Ara auch als ‘der Gott in Bostra’ titulierte werden konnte (vgl. *Βοστρηνῶν Δουσάρης*) auf städtischen Münzen des späten 2. und frühen 3. Jhs.)⁴⁸ und auf Bostrener Münzen zumeist in nabatäischer Tradition als Baetylos dargestellt wird, also als anikonischer Kultstein (Suda, s.v. *Θεὸς Ἀρης* [II 713 ed. Adler 1931]).⁴⁹

Das städtische Pantheon erscheint auch unter Severus Alexander wieder, unter dem Bostra zur *colonia* erhoben worden war (*Nea Traiana Alexandriana Colonia Bostra*).⁵⁰ Die entsprechende Münzserie zeigt die Mantelbüste des Gottes Zeus Ammon-Sarapis mit Sonnenscheibe und Widderhörnern an der Schläfe neben der Stadtgöttin Tyche und Marsyas, dem Symbol städtischer Freiheit, mit der entsprechenden Reverslegende „COLONIA BOSTRA“ (Kindler 1983: 49ff. 117ff. Nr. 35–42 mit Taf. III).

Unter Philippus Arabs, um die Mitte des 3. Jhs., beginnt sich das Gottesbild zu wandeln: Der durch Kalathos und Widderhörner gekennzeichnete Gott wird nun auch durch seine Tracht zu einem Militärgott (Kindler 1983: 121 Nr. 44 mit Taf. IV), er ist im Muskelpanzer mit Schulterlaschen, Rundfibel und *paludamentum* wiedergegeben. Diese

2003, 93 mit Anm. 87. Eine Passage in den sibyllinischen Orakeln (*Oracula Sibyllina* 14. 326–328), die mit der Niederwerfung des jüdischen Aufstandes während des trajanischen Partherkrieges in Verbindung gebracht wird, kann als weitere Bestätigung dieser These dienen: Dort erscheint nämlich die Legion verschlüsselt als „der dritte große Widder aus Kyrene“ (... *τρίτατος ... κριὸς μέγας ἐκ Κυρήνης*).

⁴⁸ Zu Dusares vgl. Kindler 1983, 79ff., siehe auch Healey 2001, 85–107; speziell zu Dusares als Gott von Bostra und Assimilationen an Zeus, Helios und vor allem Dionysos vgl. ebd. 97ff. und Kindler 1983, 53f., 58ff. Siehe auch H.J.W. Drijvers, in *LIMC* III 1 (Zürich, München 1986), 670–672 s.v. Dusares. Zu Dusares als Gott des Königs und der nabatäischen Dynastie sowie als ‚Nationalgott‘ vgl. R. Wenning/H. Merklein, ‚Die Götter in der Welt der Nabatäer‘, in Th. Weber und R. Wenning, Hrsg., *Petra. Antike Felsstadt zwischen arabischer Tradition und griechischer Norm* (Mainz 1997), 107, 109f.

⁴⁹ Dazu Healey 2001, 96 und 155ff. Siehe auch G. Bowersock, ‚The Arabian Ares‘, in Ders., *Studies on the Eastern Roman Empire* (Goldbach 1994), 232f.

⁵⁰ Vgl. etwa F. Millar, ‚The Roman *Coloniae* of the Near East: a Study of Cultural Relations‘, in H. Solin und M. Kajava, Hrsg., *Roman Eastern Policy and other Studies in Roman History* (Helsinki 1990), 51f.

Darstellung ist reichsweit singulär und mit dem spezifischen Charakter des Gottes vor Ort, als Schutzgott der Legion zu erklären. Die neue bildliche Fassung des Iuppiter Ammon auf den Münzrückseiten geht einher mit einer Anthropomorphisierung⁵¹ und Bewaffnung des Gottes Dusares (Kindler 1983: 121 Nr. 43 mit Taf. III), der in derselben Münzserie unter Arabs dem Zeus Ammon an die Seite gestellt wird. In denselben Prinzipat fällt auch die Rangerhöhung der Stadt zur *Metropolis* und die Institutionalisierung der Aktia Dusaria, eines penteterischen heiligen Agon zu Ehren des Dusares nach aktischem Reglement.⁵² Städtische Münzen aus der Zeit des Arabs und dann auch der Decier reflektieren die Abhaltung der Spiele und den Stolz der *Colonia Metropolis Bostra* auf den qualitätvollen, prestigebringenden, kaiserlich autorisierten und mit dem Kaiserkult eng verwobenen Agon, der aber zugleich auch dem lokalen Dusareskult Rechnung trug (Kindler 1983: 122ff. Nr. 46, 47, 52, 55): Während auf den Prägungen unter Philippus Iunior der bindengeschmückte Kranz mit der eingeschriebenen Legende *AKTIA ΔΟΥΣΑΡΙΑ* auf den Münzrückseiten prangt, zeigen die städtischen Münzreverse der Prägungen aus dem Prinzipat der Decier mit der häufigeren Beischrift *Actia Dusaria* das Heiligtum des Gottes, den ‘high

⁵¹ Anthropomorphisierung als Ausdruck des wachsenden griechisch-römischen Kultureinflusses: vgl. etwa die Bemerkungen bei G. Bowersock, ‘The Cult and Representation of Dusares in Roman Arabia’, in Ders., *Studies on the Eastern Roman Empire* (Goldbach 1994), 245. Die anikonische Darstellung wird durch diesen Prozeß aber nicht im mindesten verdrängt. Wie weit Angleichungen, Äquivalenzen und interkulturellen Austauschprozesse im Bereich der sozio-religiösen Kultur gehen können, zeigt exemplarisch für epigraphische Formeln die feinsinnige Analyse von K. Dijkstra, *Life and Loyalty. A Study in the Socio-Religious Culture of Syria and Mesopotamia in the Graeco-Roman Period based on Epigraphical Evidence* (Leiden/New York/Köln 1995). Zu einer vereinzelt Parallele der bewaffneten Dusares-Büste auf einem Revers der severischen Zeit (geprägt 209/ 210 n. Chr., für Caracalla als Caesar): Kindler 1983, 114 Nr. 29 mit Taf. III 29–29a) und Stoll 2003, 94f.

⁵² Vgl. Kindler 1983, 45, 58, 60. Vgl. ferner Wallner 2000, 103f. und Ders., *Soldatenkaiser und Sport* (Frankfurt/Berlin 1997), 105f., 114. Zum Zusammenhang zwischen der Verleihung des Titels *μητρόπολις* und der Einrichtung eines ‘heiligen Agon’ vgl. auch die Bemerkungen bei Wallner, *Soldatenkaiser*, a.a.O., 38. Der Bau des Hippodroms in Bostra dürfte mit der Einrichtung der aktischen Spiele in Zusammenhang stehen. Allgemein zu den aktischen Spielen, die am Beginn des September (Jahrestag der Schlacht von Aktium: 2. September) begangen wurden (gymnische, musische und wahrscheinlich auch hippische Agone): M. Lämmer, ‘Die Aktischen Spiele von Nikopolis’, *Stadion* 12/13 (1986/87), 27–38. Zu Philippus Arabs und seiner Rolle für Bostra und den Nahen Osten vgl. jetzt auch Chr. Körner, *Philippus Arabs. Ein Soldatenkaiser in der Tradition des antoninisch-severischen Prinzipats* (Berlin, New York 2002), 211ff., vor allem 226f.

place' mit Plattform und drei Baetylen, umgeben von einem Blattkranz.⁵³ In Anbetracht der ‚Wallfahrer-‘ und Besucherströme und des mit dem Fest verbundenen Festmarktes wird auf diesem Wege, in Verbindung mit der Abhaltung des heiligen Agon, auf jeden Fall auch das merkantile Leben der ohnehin blühenden Stadt noch zusätzlich bereichert worden sein.⁵⁴ Die zeitgenössischen *Oracula Sibyllina* des dreizehnten Buches, aus der Mitte des 3. Jhs. stammend und mit ‚provinzialem Blickwinkel‘ auf die Ereignisse im Nahen Osten und in Ägypten orientiert,⁵⁵ reflektieren neidvoll und nicht ohne einen dunklen Blick auf den künftigen Niedergang, den unter Philippus Arabs erreichten großen Wohlstand etwa folgendermaßen (*Oracula Sybillina* 13.64–68): Die Städte Arabiens seien geschmückt mit Tempeln, Stadia, Prachtstrassen und Fora, sie glänzten vor Wohlstand, ihre Kultstatuen prunkten in Gold, Silber und Elfenbein, allen voran stünden Bostra und dann Philippopolis (die von Philippus Arabs (neu)gegründete Heimatstadt des Kaisers), Bostra also auch hier als *civitas maxima* wie in der erwähnten *Expositio totius mundi*, der Handelsgeographie des 4. Jhs. oder als „die Ruhmreiche“ (ἐρικυδής), wie die Metropolis in einer privaten Grabinschrift heißt (IGLSyr. XIII 9410).

Eine ‚Militarisierung von Göttern‘ unter dem Einfluß des römischen Militärs läßt sich auch in anderen Kulturen und Militärprovinzen, etwa im Bereich des Iuppiter Dolichenus-Kultes⁵⁶ und in Ägypten, etwa am Beispiel des Falkengottes Horus,⁵⁷ beobachten. Zudem nehmen die

⁵³ Zu diesem Münzbild bzw. dem hier wiedergegebenen *môtab* und den drei Baetyloi vgl. insbesondere die Bemerkungen bei Kindler 1983, 59f. und Sartre 2001, 924f. Immer noch lesenswert: Sourdrel 1952, 61ff.

⁵⁴ Zu den entsprechenden Prägungen vgl. außerdem auch K.W. Harl, *Civic Coins and Civic Politics in the Roman East AD 180–275* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1987), 69, 180 mit Anm. 144, ebd. 69, 181 mit Anm. 154 auch zur wirtschaftlichen Dimension der Agone. Siehe auch etwa H. Brandt, *Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft Pamphyliens und Pisidiens im Altertum* (Bonn 1992), 146f.

⁵⁵ Zu der Passage vgl. D.S. Potter, *Prophecy and History in the crisis of the Roman Empire. A historical commentary on the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle* (Oxford 1990), 171 und den Kommentar ebd. 247–252, ferner Körner 2002, a.a.O. (Anm. 52), 226–228 und M. Sartre, *L'Orient romain. Provinces et sociétés provinciales en Méditerranée orientale d'Auguste aux Sévères (31 avant J.-C.–235 après J.-C.)* (Paris 1991), 347, zur Problematik der Quelle und der Datierung vgl. Körner, a.a.O., 5–8.

⁵⁶ Klassisch: M.P. Speidel, *The Religion of Iuppiter Dolichenus in the Roman Army* (Leiden 1978), 55ff. mit Taf. XI.

⁵⁷ Entsprechende Darstellungen in Form eines lanzenbewehrten, mit Muskel- oder Schuppenpanzer sowie Feldherrnbinde und Paludamentum ausgerüsteten Horus finden sich vom ersten bis ins vierte Jh. n. Chr. Vgl. etwa die Zusammenstellung der Belege

Bilder der Götter auf den Münzen von Bostra selbstverständlich die Wiedergabe des Kaisers im Panzer auf dem Avers auf.

Die neue Sichtweise des Zeus Ammon als militärischer Schutzgott—neben dem militarisierten alten nabatäischen Hauptgott—bereitet nun den letzten Schritt der Interpretation vor (Kindler 1983: 123 Nr. 48, 125 Nr. 56 mit Taf. IV): die *CONCORDIA BOSTRENORUM*-Prägungen unter Traianus Decius und Herennius Etruscus sowie Hostilian, in denen der links stehende Gott im Panzer⁵⁸ der Tyche der Stadt die Hand reicht. In seiner Linken hält der durch Widderhörner, Sonnenscheibe und Uraei gekennzeichnete Zeus Ammon(-Sarapis) das Adlersignum seiner Legion (Kindler 1983: Taf. IV 56). Die Beischrift hebt nicht auf die Einheit der Götter ab, sondern auf die zwischen Legion und Stadtbevölkerung, die durch die Götter symbolisiert werden. Der links stehende göttliche Partner auf Prägungen des dieser Münzfassung zugrundeliegenden, vor allem in kleinasiatischen Prägungen weit verbreiteten *Homonoia*-Schemas⁵⁹ ist stets der Bedeutendere von beiden und in der Regel das Symbol der prägenden Stadt.

Hiermit wäre also dem Zeus Ammon links der Tyche ein besonderer Wert zugemessen und damit letztlich die Bedeutung der Legion und ihres Gottes für die Stadt in besonderer Weise gewürdigt. Das Bild läßt sich durchaus in dem Sinne lesen, daß Zeus Ammon nun zum Schutzgott der ganzen Stadt geworden ist, zum Garanten der städtischen Sicherheit. Nicht nur die gewachsene wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Einheit, sondern auch ein politischer Konsens ist hier zum Ausdruck gebracht, der in den Auseinandersetzungen des Imperium mit den sasanidischen Feinden im Osten des Reiches als zusätzliche Grundlage stabiler Verhältnisse angesehen worden sein dürfte. Der Gott der Legion ist also in den Jahren 249–251 auf den Münzrückseiten zu einem Gott *für* die Stadt geworden.

Nur papyrologisch belegt (P. Vindob. G 12516e [= SPP V 74] aus Hermopolis; wohl 267/68 n. Chr.) ist die Institutionalisierung eines

bei M.-O. Jentel in: *LIMC* V 1 (Zürich/München 1990), 538–542 s.v. Horos. Allgemein zu ‚bewaffneten Göttern‘ und dem Einfluß des römischen Militärs auf die Götterikonographie im ägyptischen sowie syrisch-mesopotamischen Bereich vgl. weiterführende Literatur bei Stoll 2001, 187f.; zu Ägypten vgl. insbesondere D. Frankfurter, *Religion in Roman Egypt. Assimilation and Resistance* (Princeton, New Jersey 1998), 3f., 109.

⁵⁸ Zu weiteren Reversen aus dem Prinzipat der Decier mit der Darstellung des stehenden bewaffneten Gottes mit einem Widder zu seinen Füßen vgl. Stoll 2003, 93 Anm. 87.

⁵⁹ Zu Schema und Deutung vgl. Stoll 2001, 407ff. 412ff. und Stoll 2003, 96f.

olympischen Agon (*Olympicos Agon Hieros*/ Ὀλυμπικός ἀγὼν ἱερός) in Bostra in spätvalerianischer oder gallienischer Zeit, frühestens—und am wahrscheinlichsten—also um das Ende der 50er Jahre des 3. Jhs., aber in jedem Fall noch vor 268 n. Chr. Historisch steht die Einrichtung des Agon wohl im Zusammenhang mit den Auseinandersetzungen Roms mit dem Sasaniden Shapur I. und gehört in den Rahmen kaiserlicher Maßnahmen vor Ort, nämlich u.a. der Befestigung und titularen Aufwertung der Städte des Aufmarschgebietes sowie entsprechender Truppenverschiebungen. Chr. Wallner⁶⁰ hat den Agon wohl nicht zu Unrecht als eine mögliche Hommage des oder der Kaiser an Zeus Ammon interpretiert: Da Olympische Spiele grundsätzlich zu Ehren des Zeus stattfanden, hätten Valerian oder Gallienus in einer kritischen Phase an der Ostgrenze des Reiches mit der Einrichtung der Spiele möglicherweise nicht nur lokale Traditionen stärken, sondern auch dem Patron der Legion und damit dieser selbst Ehre erweisen wollen.⁶¹ Einen möglichen Reflex dieser Bedeutungserweiterung könnte eine neugefundene, griechischsprachige Inschrift eines *aquilifer* namens Silvanus darstellen, die in Yajuz, nördlich von Amman und zwischen Philadelphia/Amman und Gerasa, aufgefunden worden ist, (SEG 49, 1999, 2103 = AE 1999, 1701) und dem Zeus Olympios galt. Der Dedicant gehörte recht wahrscheinlich der *III Cyrenaica* an, jedoch ist weder die Datierung ganz sicher (2. oder 3. Jh.?) noch kann die Möglichkeit völlig ausgeschlossen werden, daß der Zeus Olympios der Inschrift nicht ‚nur‘ der ‚alte‘ Zeus Olympios von Gerasa⁶² war. Aber bei der ständigen Truppenpräsenz der Legionäre der ‚arabischen Legion‘ in der Stadt, die wegen ihrer Funktion als Sitz des Prokurators und der Finanzverwaltung

⁶⁰ Wallner 2000, 97–107. Allgemein zur kaiserlichen Zustimmung zur Einrichtung von Agonen in den Städten der östlichen Reichshälfte vgl. Wallner 1997, a.a.O. (Anm. 52), 30ff., vor allem 32ff.; zur Politik des Valerian und des Gallienus, was die Verleihung von Agonen angeht vgl. ebd. 132ff. bzw. 173ff. Oben wurde bereits der Zusammenhang zum Kaiserkult angedeutet, jedoch ist unser Kenntnisstand für die Arabia in diesem Punkt äußerst lückenhaft vgl. zuletzt Sartre 2001, 479f. und Ders., ‚Les manifestations du culte impérial dans les provinces syriennes et en Arabie‘, in C. Evers und A. Tsingarida, Hrsg., *Rome et ses Provinces. Genèse et diffusion d'un image du pouvoir. Hommages à Jean-Charles Balty* (Brüssel 2001), 167–186. Immerhin ist durch ein Architravfragment (IGLSyr. XIII 9143), wohl aus der ersten Hälfte des 2. Jhs., in Bostra ein Tempel—oder zumindest ein monumentaler Altar—der Roma und des Augustus nachgewiesen.

⁶¹ Wallner 2000, 106 Anm. 59.

⁶² Zu diesem Gott von Gerasa vgl. etwa auch Lichtenberger 2003, 209ff., vor allem die Belege 210 Anm. 1883. Zu Zeus Sarapis in Gerasa vgl. ebd. 227f., zu Zeus Ammon ebd. 232; ebd. 265f. auch zu der neuen Inschrift aus Yajuz.

der *provincia Arabia* notwendig war,⁶³ könnte der olympische Zeus von Gerasa in den Augen der Militärs andererseits ohnehin als lokales Äquivalent des legionseigenen Zeuskultes angesehen worden sein, der ja in der Stadt ebenfalls ganz selbstverständlich durch entsprechende Denkmäler vertreten war (etwa Welles 1938: 386 Nr. 23).

Eigenartig ist die Tatsache, daß wir ab valerianischer Zeit von den Aktia Dusaria in Bostra nichts mehr erfahren: Dies könnte einfach aus dem bekannten Quellenproblem resultieren, daß die städtischen Münzmissionen Bostras mit den Deciern, also kurz nach der Mitte des 3. Jh. enden und auch Zeugnisse zur Agonistik für die zweite Hälfte des 3. Jh. n. Chr. allgemein selten sind.⁶⁴ Fanden beide Agone im Rythmus eines Jahres, aufeinanderfolgend, statt? Waren also auch hier Dusares und Zeus (Ammon-Sarapis), wie auf den Münzmissionen unter Philippus Arabs, Seite an Seite im Festkalender der Stadt vereint? Oder bedeutet das Schweigen der Quellen, daß am Ende der Gott der Legion mit seinem penteterischen, isoolympischen Fest gar an die Stelle des Dusares—der ja auch an Zeus (und Sarapis) assimiliert werden konnte⁶⁵—und dessen ebenfalls in jedem fünften Jahr stattfindenden Aktia getreten ist?⁶⁶ Das anzunehmen, wäre aufgrund der hier gezeigten Entwicklung

⁶³ Vgl. Isaac 1992, 124f.; Stoll 2003, 84 mit Anm. 55.

⁶⁴ Wallner 2000, 106f.

⁶⁵ Healey 2001, 101f., 139; vgl. auch ebd. 107ff., 137ff. zu Allat/Al-'Uzza und Isis.

⁶⁶ Hier gilt es aber deutlich zu machen, daß man auch die 'normalen' Dusaria, das ursprünglich einheimisch-nabatäische Fest des Gottes, von dem man ebenfalls relativ wenig weiß, zu berücksichtigen hätte. Wann zum Beispiel lag der genaue Festtermin dieses alten Festes? Im Frühjahr oder im Herbst? Vgl. etwa Healey 2001, 160f.: Die Festdaten zyklisch auftretender Feste im Bereich der nabatäischen Religion sind unbekannt. Frühlings- und Herbstfeste sind natürlich wahrscheinlich, wobei für Dusares die wenigen Zeugnisse auf den Monat Nisan/April als Festtermin deuten könnten, also ein Neujahrs- bzw. Frühlingsfest. Der Geburtstermin des 'jungfrauengeborenen' Gottes Dusares soll übrigens der 25. Dezember gewesen sein: vgl. P.W. Haider, in: Ders., M. Hutter, S. Kreuzer, Hrsg., *Religionsgeschichte Syriens* (Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln 1996), 177 und Healey 2001, 103f., vgl. auch Sourdel 1952, 67. Zu Dusares als Vegetationsgott: Sourdel 1952, 63f. Da die aktischen Spiele im September stattfanden, könnte aber auch ein Herbsttermin für die alten Dusaria in Betracht kommen—unter der wahrscheinlichen Voraussetzung jedenfalls, daß das kaiserliche Privileg der Verleihung des 'heiligen Agon' an Bostra sich an dem althergebrachten Termin des hier gefeierten Dusaresfestes orientiert hat und damit die Feste, die jährlichen Dusaria und die penteterischen, aktischen Dusaria, alle fünf Jahre zusammenfielen. Kindler 1983, 43f. 46, 81 referiert Meinungen, die gar glauben, auch die 'alten Dusaria' seien mindestens seit dem 2. Jh. v. Chr. bereits penteterische Feiern gewesen, die als Herbst- und Erntefest im September/Oktobre stattgefunden hätten. Der—oben im Text provokativ vermutete—Wegfall der Dusaria ist insgesamt doch eher unwahrscheinlich. Eine Überschneidung im Festkalender zwischen dem Dusaresfest und dem isoolympischen Fest ist ebenfalls relativ unwahrscheinlich, denn 'olympische Spiele' fanden im Hochsommer Juli/August,

zwar nicht völlig abwegig, ich wage es allerdings nicht ernsthaft, diese These ohne jeden eigenen Zweifel zu äußern.

Zusammenfassend läßt sich feststellen, daß wir am Beispiel des Gottes Zeus Ammon-Sarapis nicht nur den Transfer eines Kultes durch die Soldaten der *legio III Cyrenaica* von Ägypten nach Bostra aufzeigen können. Der Nachweis einer engen Beziehung des Gottes zum Regiment gelingt dort über mehr als eineinhalb Jahrhunderte hinweg, von traianischer Zeit bis in den Prinzipat des Aurelian hinein, erlaubt uns also, hier von einer 'Regimentstradition' zu sprechen. Von noch größerem Interesse aber, ist der an diesem Gott aufzeigbare kulturelle Wandelprozeß, der sich durch den Kontakt von Militär und Zivilbevölkerung in einem Garnisonsort wie Bostra ergibt. Dies wird durch die Betrachtung und Interpretation der Reverse der städtischen Münzprägung wird. Hier läßt sich die Veränderung der Einschätzung des Gottes in städtischer Sicht und der Wandel in der Rezeption des Gottes quasi 'begreifbar' machen: Zeus Ammon-Sarapis wird in Legende und Bild für die Eliten der Garnisonsstadt vom *Gott der Legion* (was er für die Soldaten immer bleibt) zum *Gott in der Stadt* und zuletzt zum *Gott für die Stadt*, zum Schutzpatron der Metropolis Bostra. Auch für die Götter der Soldaten und ihre Kulte, nicht nur für das Militär selbst, konnten die städtischen Gemeinwesen also zu *nota et familiaria castra* werden. Von einem 'lack of interaction',⁶⁷ einem Mangel an Integration und einer abgeschlossenen Gesellschaft des Militärs darf man im Hinblick auf die römischen Garnisonsorte nicht reden.

zur Zeit des Vollmondes, statt: vgl. beispielsweise S.G. Miller, 'The date of Olympic festivals', *Mitteilungen des DAI (Athen)* 90 (1975), 215–231. Zum Problem der genauen Bestimmung der Festtermine im Bereich der lokalen Festkultur des Ostens allgemein vgl. die Bemerkungen bei P. Herz, 'Herrscherverehrung und lokale Festkultur im Osten des römischen Reiches (Kaiser/Agone)', in H. Cancik und J. Rüpke, Hrsg., *Römische Reichreligion und Provinzialreligion* (Tübingen 1997), 239ff., hier S. 252–254.

⁶⁷ So Butcher 2003, 399 unter dem Einfluß der Arbeiten von Pollard, etwa Ders., 2000.

THE IMPACT OF THE LATE ROMAN ARMY IN PALAESTINA AND ARABIA*

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The aim of the present paper is to investigate the relationship between the presence of the late Roman army in certain marginal areas of the Near East bordering the desert and the economic and demographic growth of those territories. Should we assume that the presence of the army was a prerequisite condition of their development? Or, on the contrary, must we assume that indigenous peoples in those regions were able to develop agriculture independently of Roman military presence? If so, we could be forced to admit that the introduction of the army into marginal lands was dictated by the imperial wish of exploiting those territories and that the soldiers started to undertake administrative duties in areas previously neglected by the imperial government.

The subject is an important one, but it is necessary to abandon preconceived ideas and to investigate specific situations using all available evidence. Scholars who are sceptical about the possibilities of indigenous cultures to develop an efficient agriculture underline that expansion and growth in such areas were a result of the imperial presence. A different approach invites us to take into account the capability of indigenous populations to expand the cultivation in the territories in which they were living using the most ingenious devices. Most probably, the answer to our question cannot be the same for every specific case we investigate.

In the second half of the first century the Roman army, by pacifying the desert tribe of the Garamantes, provided the necessary preconditions for the development of agrarian production in the Tripolitanian predesert area where a pastoral economy was quickly superseded by agricultural practice. The agricultural growth of the area was due to efforts made by the indigenous tribe of the *Macaë*. Eventually, the predesert agrarian production became integrated into the imperial economy

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and olive oil produced in the wadis was exported in the Mediterranean. The army was not deployed in the pre-desert area until the end of the second century and consequently it did not directly influence the expansion of agriculture there. Moreover, there is no evidence of Roman colonization in the region.¹ As has been stated:

The Roman contribution to the spread of agriculture was limited to enabling native elites in the towns and of the tribes to take advantage of their traditional position in society through the exploitation of land and labour.²

However, Roman expansion in southern *Mauretania Caesariensis* along the so called *praetentura nova* during the time of Septimius Severus appears to be a typical case of colonization and exploitation of a region initiated by imperial authorities. An important inscription has revealed that *populi novi* were transferred there from *Africa Proconsularis*, an overcrowded province at that time. The deployment of the Roman army along the frontier protected the growth of the new settlements and the process has been described as a 'colonisation agricole'.³

In order to examine the impact that military units which were deployed in the marginal areas of Palestine and Arabia had on these territories I have selected two specific cases: a number of sites in the central and northern Negev and a handful of villages on the fringe of the desert in central Jordan. Recently published data enrich our knowledge of the economic and the social history of the areas under examination, and consequently we may try to understand the setting in which the army operated.

For the moment it is important to note that during the wide span of time between AD 300 and the Arab conquest there were changes in the way in which military units were deployed in the territory. Some units left their bases for other sites while others were newly introduced into the area. The patchy evidence suggests that the causes of changes in

¹ G. Barker – D. Gilbertson – B. Jones – D. Mattingly, eds., *Farming the Desert, The Unesco Libyan Valleys Archaeological Survey*. Vols. I–II (Paris/Tripoli/London 1996).

² D.J. Mattingly, *Tripolitania* (Ann Arbor 1995), 147.

³ N. Benseddik, 'Usinaza (Saneg): nouveau témoignage de l'activité de P. Aelius Peregrinus Rogatus sur la *praetentura* de Césarienne,' in A. Mastino, ed., *Atti del IX convegno di studi sull'Africa Romana* (Sassari 1992), 425–437; Ead., 'Septime Sévère, P. Aelius Peregrinus Rogatus et le *limes* de Maurétanie Césarienne,' in C. Lepelley and X. Dupuis, eds., *Frontières et limites géographiques de l'Afrique du nord antique. Hommage à Pierre Salama* (Paris 1999), 89–107.

the deployment of military units and so in the presence of the army must be found in varying imperial needs. Moreover, the economy of the sites under examination changed over time. The relations between specific indigenous economic activities and the presence of Roman armies must be evaluated on the basis of the existence of changing contexts.

The Negev, which had been part of the Roman province of Arabia since its conquest in Trajan's time, was transferred to the province of Palaestina during the time of Diocletian. However, during the fourth century, the provincial boundaries of Arabia and Palaestina underwent modifications several times and so the Negev and Southern Jordan belonged to one province after the other. At the time of Theodosius I the administrative boundaries took their definite shape, and the Negev and Southern Jordan were finally united to form a new provincial entity, Palaestina III or Salutaris.⁴

During the Nabataean and early Roman periods the Negev was crossed by the terminal section of the so-called Incense Road, leading to the important Mediterranean port of Gaza. Some caravan stations had been built by the Nabataean kings between Petra and Gaza with the aim of supporting trading activities. Oboda (Avdat) was one of the most important of these stations. Moreover, some other sites such as Sobota (Shivta) were occupied along minor lateral routes. Nessana overlooked the approach into the desert of Sinai. As far as we know such stations were inhabited by a tiny population and some agriculture started to develop in this marginal area where the annual rainfall very rarely exceeds 100 mm.⁵

⁴ Ph. Mayerson, 'P. Oxy. 3574: Eleutheropolis of the New Arabia', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 53 (1983), 251–258 = Idem, *Monks, Martyrs, Soldiers and Saracens* (Jerusalem 1994), 204–211; idem, 'Palaestina vs. Arabia in the Byzantine Sources', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 56 (1984), 223–230 = Idem 1994, op. cit., 224–231; Idem, 'Nea Arabia (P. Oxy. 3574): An Addendum to ZPE 53', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 64 (1986), 139–148 = idem 1994, op. cit., 256–258; 'Libanius and The Administration of Palestine', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 69 (1987), 251–260 = Idem 1994, op. cit., 284–293; idem, 'Justinian's Novel 103 and the Reorganization of Palestine', *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 269 (1988), 65–71 = Idem 1994, op. cit., 294–300; J. Sipilä, 'Roman Arabia and the Provincial Reorganisations of the Fourth Century', *Mediterraneo Antico* 7 (2004), 317–348; idem, 'Fluctuating Provincial Borders in Mid-4th Century Arabia and Palestine', in A. Lewin et al., eds., *The Late Roman Army in the Near East*, (Oxford, forthcoming).

⁵ See in general A. Lewin, 'Il Negev dall'età Nabatea all'epoca tardoantica', *Mediterraneo Antico* 5, 1 (2002), 319–375. For a description of the climatic zones of the Negev, see J. Shereshevski, *Byzantine Urban Settlements in the Negev Desert* (Beer Sheva

Economic and military disruptions during the third century caused the cessation of traffic along the Petra—Gaza Road. Trade stations between Petra and Oboda were abandoned sometime about the reign of Severus Alexander. However, as far as Oboda itself is concerned, archaeological and epigraphic documentation reveals that this village, although it was affected by the crisis, was able to recover quickly. In particular, an inscription from Oboda shows that the inhabitants were renovating the temple area on the acropolis just after the mid-third century.⁶

The reign of Diocletian was one of intense activity at Oboda, as is indicated by inscriptions and archaeological findings. It is interesting to note that simultaneously some of the small stations along the route were reoccupied. Moreover, on the outskirts of Oboda itself a military structure was built, a fort for an auxiliary unit of approximately 500 men. The dimension of the fort is 100 × 100 meters and it had square and rectangular towers.⁷

This military presence was paralleled by intense activity in the Arava Valley where a monumental inscription from the site of Yotvata recounts the building of a new military structure, a fort for an *ala*. The structure itself is relatively well preserved, measuring 19 × 39 m. It should be emphasized that during the same time the town of Aila on the Red Sea had become the legionary base of the legio *X Fretensis*, previously stationed at Jerusalem.⁸

Diocletian dedicated himself to re-establishing the power of the Roman Empire. He intended to revitalize commercial routes and to provide the Roman Empire with military structures and soldiers along the periphery of the Near East and along the main inner roads. As

1991), 8–17.

⁶ T. Erickson-Gini, 'The Nabataean-Roman Negev in the Third Century CE', in Lewin *et al.*, forthcoming, op.cit (n. 4). See also A. Negev, *The Architecture of Oboda. Final Report* (Jerusalem 1997).

⁷ T. Erickson-Gini, 'Nabataeans or Romans? Reconsidering the Date of the Camp at Avdat in the Light of Recent Excavations', in Ph. Freeman *et al.*, eds., *Limes XVIII. Proceedings of the XVIIIth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies* (Oxford 2002), 113–130.

⁸ Z. Meshel, 'A Fort and Inscription from the Time of Diocletian at Yotvata,' *Israel Exploration Journal* 39 (1989), 228–238; I. Roll, 'A Latin Imperial Inscription from the Time of Diocletian Found at Yotvata,' *Israel Exploration Journal* 39 (1989), 239–260; W. Eck, 'Alam Costia constituerunt: zum Verständnis einer Militärschrift aus dem südlichen Negev,' *Klio* 74 (1992), 395–400; U. Avner, G. Davies and J. Magness, 'The Roman Fort at Yotvata: Interim Report (2003),' *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 17 (2004), 405–412.

part of this policy he transferred the *legio X* to Aila in order to supervise commerce coming from the Red Sea and to tax it.⁹

However, the international commerce of the exotic goods passing through the Petra-Gaza road was never resumed on a large scale. But, as an important study has shown, Diocletian constructed a paved military road connecting Aila with the Negev. The new forts at Oboda and at Yotvata and some reoccupied minor stations between Oboda and the Aravah Valley were part of a system of military structures along this road. Milestones without inscriptions, found between Oboda and Shaar Ramon, must have been erected at that time along this new military road.¹⁰

Some surprising changes occurred in the Negev a few decades later. The fort at Oboda was abandoned approximately 20–30 years after its construction. Similarly, the smaller fort at Yotvata, heavily damaged by the earthquake of the year 363, was not rebuilt after that date. The absence of both these sites in the ducal list of Palaestina in the *Notitia Dignitatum* fits with the information drawn from the archaeological investigations. Moreover, so far scholars have not been able to find consistent proof that all the minor stations along the paved road in the Negev, where activity had been resumed at the time of Diocletian, continued to be occupied for a long time after the fourth century.¹¹

Taking all data together we would be led to admit that such a reduction of military infrastructures represented a lack of interest by the imperial authority in investing in the region. We might think that emperors were no longer willing to invest in an area that did not react positively to the presence of the army sent to support it. However, other considerations reveal that a quite different trend was at work. In particular, literary sources inform us that at the time of Constantius II Elusa had already attained the status of a city: a new *polis* had emerged in the arid lands of the Negev. This city had a theatre and a local elite interested in cultural activities.¹²

⁹ A. Lewin, 'Diocletian: Politics and *limites* in the Near East,' in Freeman *et al.* 2002, op. cit. (n. 7), 91–101. On the Negev see now T. Erickson-Gini, 'The Nabataean-Roman Negev,' in Lewin *et al.*, eds., op. cit. (n. 4), forthcoming.

¹⁰ Ch. Ben David, 'The Paved Road from Petra to the 'Arabah—Commercial Nabataean or Military Roman?,' in Lewin *et al.*, eds., op. cit. (n. 4), forthcoming.

¹¹ T. Erickson-Gini, 'The Nabataean-Roman Negev,' in Lewin *et al.*, eds., op. cit. (n. 4), forthcoming.

¹² See Ph. Mayerson, 'The City of Elusa in the Literary Sources of the Fourth-Sixth

Equally, by the time of Constantine Aila is attested as being a *polis* inhabited by wealthy councillors. Archaeological research conducted at the site of Aqaba where ancient Aila was located has revealed that from the time of Diocletian the city and its hinterland underwent their most intense development. The quantity and quality of the ceramic material found at Aqaba demonstrate how much the site benefited from the impact of the presence of the army and from the reopening of international commercial channels.¹³

The central Negev territory continued to thrive after the army had left Oboda. It is not completely clear when in the area around Oboda began the period of its most intense economic development and its demographic peak, but apparently a gradual process was already at work during the fourth century, reaching its peak in the fifth and in the sixth centuries. By this time the inhabitants of the North and Central Negev expanded agriculture to an unparalleled degree: farmsteads, villages and smaller settlements began to use hydraulic devices intensively in order to catch run-off water for the cultivation of vineyards and cereals. Wadi beds were used for cultivation and run-off water was also diverted to neighbouring terrain by way of barrages and dams. As a result the landscape underwent an important transformation: an area that had once been barren, where small road stations produced scant agricultural production, was now expanding its agricultural land to an unprecedented degree. In time sites that previously had been known as small road stations became wealthy villages adorned with churches. In Oboda also city walls were built.¹⁴

Let us return now to the subject of the present paper: the impact of the army. The *Notitia Dignitatum* reveals that around the year 400 no military unit had its base in the Central and Northern Negev

Centuries', *Israel Exploration Journal* 33 (1983), 247–253 = Idem 1994, op. cit. (n. 4), 197–203.

¹³ S.T. Parker, 'The Roman 'Aqaba Project: The 1997–1998 Campaigns', *Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan* 44 (2002), 373–394.

¹⁴ See at least among the most recent publications H. Bruins, *Desert Environment and Agriculture in the Central Negev and Kadesh-Barnea during Historical Times* (Nijkerk 1986); R. Rubin, *The Negev as a Settled Land* (Jerusalem 1990), in Hebrew; J. Shereshevski, *Byzantine Urban Settlements in the Negev Desert* (Beer-Sheva 1991); G. Avni, *Nomads, Farmers and Town Dwellers. Pastoralist-Sedentists Interaction in the Negev Highlands, Sixth-Eighth Centuries CE* (Jerusalem 1996); Y. Hirschfeld, 'Farms and Villages in Byzantine Palestine,' *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 51 (1997), 33–72; Negev 1997, op. cit. (n. 6). For the city walls at Oboda see Erickson-Gini 2002, op. cit. (n. 7), 119.

south of Beersheva—Hatzeva.¹⁵ Oboda, Sobota, Elusa, and Nessana are not mentioned in this document. That villages and farmsteads in this area were not fortified supports the idea that no serious menace was foreseen. We should accept that the Bedouin tribes of the Sinai were not thought of as a very dangerous threat to the security of the settled population. Their activity did not very much exceed common banditry. Guardsmen under the command of irenarchs controlled and patrolled the main routes around the town. Such a police force at Elusa probably was fairly well capable of coping with this problem. Letters by Libanius inform us that there was serious competition in Elusa to obtain the position of irenarch, which points to the importance and popularity of the office.¹⁶

If we accept the idea that the villages of the Negev and the city of Elusa did not perceive the existence of any serious threat coming from the Bedouins of the Sinai we can be confident that the local municipal police was able to guarantee order. In addition, we could argue that some small detachments drawn from the units stationed at Birošaba, Birsama and Menois could have succoured activities of local police forces.¹⁷

After the evacuation of the fort of Oboda in the first decades of the fourth century the presence of soldiers in the Northern and Central Negev beyond the axis Birošaba—Hatzeva is attested only in the sixth century. However, we should observe that we cannot rely upon the information provided by the so called edict of Beer Sheva and by *P. Ness.* 39. There is no proof that the latter's list of villages and cities subjected to taxation is a list of military bases. Besides a recent study of the so-called Edict of Beersheva, which comprises a recently published new fragment, has disproved the theory that all the names of the places

¹⁵ T. Erickson-Gini, 'The Nabataean-Roman Negev in the Third Century' in Lewin *et al.*, eds, *op. cit.*, (n. 4), forthcoming. For the date of the compilation of the *pars orientis* of the *Notitia* see C. Zuckerman, 'Comtes et ducs en Egypte autour de l'année 400 et la date de la *Notitia Dignitatum Orientis*', *Antiquité tardive* 6 (1998), 137–147.

¹⁶ Libanius, *Epistulae* 100; 101; 532. Similarly a municipal chief of police is attested in a late antique inscription from Petra. See *IGLS* XXI 36 with the interpretation given by the editor, M. Sartre.

¹⁷ Egyptian papyri reveals that already in the first centuries of the empire military units had been scattered in the province. See R. Alston, *Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt. A Social History* (London/New York 1995), 35–36. For late antiquity see *ND or. XXXI*; P. Pan. 2. On the *equites Mauri scutarii* stationed at Hermoupolis and Lycopolis, but mentioned as present also in the Oasis see O. Douch IV 457; P. Oasis 11.

mentioned in the edict were bases for military units. In fact, only Zoara is clearly designated as a base of soldiers and also *agrarienses* of Elusa are mentioned, *i.e.* soldiers stationed in the hinterland of this town.¹⁸

Helpful and decisive information is provided by papyrus texts, inscriptions and archaeological findings. Some inscriptions found at Sobota (Shivta) show the active presence of military personnel in the village in the sixth century AD. In particular, an inscription dated to 599 mentions that a building was erected “*epì tôn lamprotátôn priôrôn kai epì Fl. Ióánnou Stephánou bikaríou.*” Unfortunately the inscription is not in its original context and it is impossible to establish which kind of building is indicated.¹⁹ Moreover, other inscriptions show how the chiefs of the army stationed in Shivta were integrated in village life: they were involved in the building of churches and other Christian structures and buried their sons in the churches.²⁰

Papyri from Nessana reveal as well that *stratiotai*, *priores*, a *primicerius*, an *optio princeps*, and *doukikoi* in the sixth century were living in the village, which is now called *kastron Nessana*.²¹ A characteristic element of Nessana is the presence of an enclosure in the upper city, the so called citadel which must be the military fort used by the soldiers mentioned in the papyri. The structure is of 35 × 85 m. and, according to archaeological evidence, may be dated to the fifth century or later.²² The Nessana papyri disclose the existence of a community where agriculture was practised with a certain degree of success. One document, dated to the 7th century, shows that the inhabitants owned properties 12 km. away from the site itself. Moreover, in other texts

¹⁸ See L. Di Segni, ‘The Beersheba Tax Edict Reconsidered in the Light of a Newly Discovered Fragment’, *Scripta Classica Israelica* 23 (2004), 131–158. The same scholar rejects the idea that the edict must be dated in the first half of the fifth century and prefers a date in Justinian’s reign.

¹⁹ A. Negev, *The Greek Inscriptions from the Negev* (Jerusalem 1981), 65–66, n. 75. For the dating of the inscription to the year 599 see L. Di Segni, *Dated Greek Inscriptions from Palestine from the Roman and Byzantine Period* (Ph. D. Jerusalem 1997), 814–817.

²⁰ Negev 1981, *op. cit.* (n. 19), 52 n. 51; 55 n. 57; 60–61 n. 66; 65–66 n. 75; *SEG* XXXI 1429; 1435; 1444; 1453.

²¹ P. Ness. 16–30.

²² For a description of the structure see Shereshevski 1991, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 57–58, who argues that the fort was built after the North Church on the acropolis had been erected. The building was dated to the fifth century already by H. Colt, *Excavations at Nessana I* (London 1962), 31. On the contrary A. Negev, *The Architecture of Mampsis. Vol. II. The Late Roman and Byzantine Periods* (Jerusalem 1988), 2–3 unconvincingly argued that both the church and the fort were built in the first part of the fourth century.

Nessana appears as a station from which some small caravans organized their travels into the desert.²³

Another structure in the Negev resembles the one built at Nessana. It is the so called citadel of Oboda built on the acropolis, which is situated next to the religious section of the village. This structure of 61 × 39 meters should not be confused with the other fort that has been mentioned above, built in the Tetrarchic period and abandoned few decades later. Archaeologists argue that the citadel on the acropolis of Oboda can be dated to the fifth or sixth century. It is reasonable to assume that the structure was a military construction, although no military inscriptions have been found at Oboda. Both structures were surrounded by a wall that was 1,5–2 meters thick with massive square towers at the corners. The built up area of these forts was small, while the courtyard occupied most of the space. In the final stage there were twenty-seven small rooms in Nessana, and only two at Oboda.²⁴

As far as Shivta is concerned the timing and reasons for the stationing of soldiers in the village may be further investigated. In the account written by Nilus, it appears that the young son of the writer, Theodolus, was kidnapped by a Bedouin tribe while touring the Sinai during a visit with local monks. The chief of the Arab group brought his prisoner into the village of Subaita, which must be identified with Sobota, in order to find buyers for the unfortunate young man. At first nobody seemed seriously interested in him and the Arab chief, irritated by the low sums of money offered for Theodolus, took him out of the gates of the town announcing that he would have him beheaded. Eventually Theodolus' fortunes changed and he was purchased by a Christian priest and taken to Elusa.²⁵

²³ P. Ness., *passim*.

²⁴ Shereshevski 1991, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 45–47. It must be observed that at Avdat also a city wall was built, most probably in the fifth or sixth century. On the date of the erection of this structure see P. Fabian, 'Evidence of Earthquake Destruction in the Archaeological Record: The Case of Avdat,' in *Big Cities World Conference on Natural Disaster Mitigation in Conjunction with the Tenth International Seminar on Earthquake Prognostic* (Cairo 1996), 25. Negev 1988, *op. cit.* (n. 22), 2–3 again unconvincingly argued that the citadel of Oboda was built at the beginning of the fourth century. P. Ness. 39 mentions Oboda in a list of places subject to a fiscal contribution. However, it is impossible to prove that this is a list of military sites.

²⁵ See Nilus Ancyranus, *Narratio* (ed. F. Conca). For the identification of Subaita with Shivta see Y. Tsafir, L. Di Segni and Y. Green, *Tabula Imperii Romani. Iudaea. Palaestina* (Jerusalem 1994), 234.

The facts that are given in this story must be dated at the end of the fourth or the beginning of the fifth century. It cannot be proved beyond any reasonable doubt whether the *narratio* describes real events or is historical fiction. However, Philip Mayerson has rightly pointed out that “at its worst, we may consider the *narratio* a kind of historical fiction in which the author has placed his major characters . . . in a setting that is historically true.”²⁶ The story reveals that at that time Sobota was a site where Bedouins had contacts with the villagers. As we have stated above, there is no evidence indicating the presence of soldiers at this site before the sixth century. This seems to be confirmed by a passage in the *narratio* where the Arab who had kidnapped Theodolus threatens to behead him. Apparently nobody tries to intervene. This would have been unimaginable if any Roman soldiers were present in the village. Archaeological research establishes that in the fifth and sixth century Sobota and the surrounding area continued to develop.²⁷ A similar trend can be detected at Nessana and Oboda.²⁸ The overall increase of economic activities in this area must have attracted the attention of the imperial authorities who decided to dispatch soldiers to these villages.

We may assume that the soldiers stationed at Nessana, Sobota and Oboda contributed to making the main routes in the area safer. However, we should take it for certain that these forts were built simultaneously with the most intensive development of the Negev area. This historical consideration makes us doubt that the Bedouins of the Sinai had ever represented an obstacle to the tranquillity of these villages.²⁹

²⁶ Ph. Mayerson, ‘The Desert of Southern Palestine According to Byzantine Sources,’ *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 95 (1964), 160–172, esp. 161 = idem 1994, *op. cit.* (n. 4), 40–52, esp. 41. See also D. Caner, ‘Sinai Pilgrimage and Ascetic Romance: Pseudo-Nilus’ *Narrationes* in Context’, in L. Ellis and F. Kidner, eds., *Travel, Communication and Geography in Late Antiquity* (Aldershot 2004), 135–147.

²⁷ Specifically on the development of Shivta see R. Erez Edelson, ‘Settlement Distribution in the Byzantine Negev: A Case Study Comparing the Intra Settlement Area in the Negev Highlands and the Shivta Region’, in A. Lewin and P. Pellegrini, eds., *Settlements and Demography in the Near East*, (Pisa-Roma 2006), 51–57. In general on the village of Shivta see A. Segal, *The Byzantine City of Shivta (Esbeita), Negev Desert, Israel* (Oxford 1983); Shereshevski 1991, *op. cit.*, (n. 5), 61–81; Y. Hirschfeld, ‘Social Aspects of the Late-Antique Village of Shivta’, *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 16 (2003), 395–408.

²⁸ On Nessana see Shereshevski, 1991, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 49–60; D. Urman, *Nessana Excavations and Studies* (Beer Sheva 2005).

²⁹ This hypothesis has been ventured by M. Gichon in several publications. See among his most recent articles M. Gichon, ‘45 Years of Research on the Limes Palaestinae—

On the contrary, a sedentarization of Bedouins may have contributed to the positive development of the region, as several studies claim.³⁰

A question remains: Was the deployment of troops intended as part of a defensive system fit to cope with eventual attacks by Arab tribes living beyond the imperial boundaries? It is certain that a reorganization of the military apparatus in Palaestina III, which occurred during the reign of Anastasius, was prompted by an intensification of incursions of Arab tribes from outside the Roman frontiers. In all the sixth century such attacks continued led by the fearful confederation of the Lakhimids who supported the interest of the Persian empire.³¹ In whatever way this problem needs to be resolved, it is important to stress that when, in the late fifth or in the sixth century, the army was again deployed in the Negev the region had already begun its phase of large prosperity. In fact, scholars argue that the expansion of the wine production and the multiplication of the number of the sites occurred mostly since the beginning of the fifth century.³² As far as we can observe no military base was present in the Negev area in the fifth century and consequently, we are led to admit that the army was not a main factor behind such an economical development. The fact that the army was deployed at sites as Sobota and Oboda and also in the hinterland of Elusa shows that the imperial authority took up new responsibilities in a previously neglected region in which agriculture and commerce were expanding.³³ In this region soldiers acted as a vital means of interaction between people and state due to their involvement in administrative and fiscal duties, and in policing the territory.³⁴ It remains doubtful if the military presence was dictated by defensive needs against dangerous Arab tribes such as the ones who attacked Palestine at the time of Anastasius and, later, the Lakhmids. This cannot be excluded and the building of fortifications at Oboda and Nessana could support the idea.

The Findings and their Assessment in the Light of Criticism Raised (C1t–C4th),’ in Freeman *et al.* 2002, op. cit. (n. 7), 185–206.

³⁰ Avni 1996, op. cit. (n. 14).

³¹ A. Lewin, ‘Amr ibn Adi, Mavia, the Phylarchs and the Late Roman Army: Peace and War in the Near East’, in Lewin *et al.*, forthcoming, op. cit. (n. 4).

³² See n. 53.

³³ See already the important arguments by B. Isaac, ‘The Army in the Late Roman East: The Persian Wars and the Defence of the Byzantine Provinces’, in Av. Cameron, ed., *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East. III. States, Resources and Armies* (Princeton 1995), 140 = B. Isaac, *The Near East under Roman Rule* (Amsterdam 1998), 453–454.

³⁴ For a case, Egypt, where such a relation between soldiers and population is well attested see Alston 1995, op. cit. (n. 17), 81–101.

The second case presented here is Umm al-Rasas. This site must be identified with Mefa, a *phourion* mentioned in Eusebius' *Onomasticon* as located near the desert where a number of soldiers had been deployed. The *Notitia Dignitatum* attests that Mefa was the base of a unit of *equites promoti indigenae* and a structure found at the site has been identified as the unit's base. The fortress lies on top of a low hill and its dimensions are 158 × 39. According to archaeological research, it was built about AD 300. Some ceramic material from the site should be dated to the second part of the third century. Moreover, a fragmentary Latin inscription and a milestone point to the fact that some important activity at Mefa occurred at the time of the Tetrarchy. The fragmentary inscription, dated to the year 306, may recount the building of the fort while the milestone—now being published—has been dated to the Tetrarchic period. If we put all the documentation together it is hard to resist the conclusion that Diocletian and his colleagues were organizing a system of forts, connected by a peripheral route running East of the *Via Nova Traiana* along the desert, North and South of the Wadi Mujib.³⁵

The study of ceramic material seems to show a gap in the occupation of the site in the fifth century.³⁶ Consequently it should be argued that the *equites promoti indigenae* mentioned in the *Notitia Dignitatum* as the unit installed at Mefa had been transferred or disbanded some time after the compilation of the document. Mefa is mentioned in the Dialogue on the *Vita Chrysostomi* written by Palladius as a *phourion* to which a bishop was exiled in the very first years of the fifth century. A small civilian settlement had arisen near the fort and the bishop was forced to live there.³⁷ The site remained abandoned during the fifth century and apparently it was resettled as a civilian village in the sixth century when it grew to an astonishing magnitude. In the sixth century the entire area in the interior of the fort had become a village, filled with buildings, four of which were churches. In addition, the area outside the

³⁵ A. Lewin, *Kastron Mefaa, the equites promoti indigenae and the Creation of a Late Roman Frontier*, *Liber annuus* 51 (2001), 393–304. For the system south of the Wadi Mujib see S.T. Parker, *Romans and Saracens. A History of the Arabian Frontier* (Winona Lake 1986); idem, ed., *The Roman Frontier in Central Jordan. Interim Report on the Central Limes Arabicus Project 1980–1985* (Oxford 1987).

³⁶ E. Alliata, *Ceramica romana, bizantina, araba*, in M. Piccirillo and E. Alliata, eds., *Umm al-Rasas Mayfa'ah. I. Gli scavi del complesso di S. Stefano* (Jerusalem 1994), 279–282; B. Hamarneh, *Topografia cristiana ed insediamenti rurali nel territorio dell'odierna Giordania nelle epoche bizantina ed islamica V–IX sec.* (Città del Vaticano 2003), 49; 55–58; 247–248.

³⁷ P.L. Gatier, 'Romains et Saracènes: deux forteresses de l'Antiquité tardive dans des documents méconnus', *Topoi* 9 (1999), 218.

fort developed into two other distinct sections containing a total of ten churches. Almost all churches were built in the second half of the sixth century and the greater part of the village was also built at this time. No traces of a military presence have emerged from the excavations or from the epigraphic documentation. Unless new evidence comes to light we might argue that the development of the village did not have anything to do with the presence of the army. However, in two mosaics found on the floor of two of the churches the village at that time was referred to as *Kastron Mefaa*. One of the mosaics is situated within the church of Lions built in the sixth century while the other is located in the church of S. Stephan built in the eighth century, in Ummayyad times. Both show an image of the village itself, appearing as a walled town full of buildings and churches. Moreover, it had also external quarters and a kind of plaza with a column in the middle.³⁸

The impetus behind the phenomenal growth of this marginal site can be easily discerned: an important discovery has revealed two inscriptions in a mosaic of a church in the village of Nītl in the vicinity of Umm al-Rasas.³⁹ These two inscriptions mention the names of three Ghassanid phylarchs, one of whom was buried there.⁴⁰ We may readily assume that *Kastron Mefaa* was also part of an area of central Jordan on the fringe of the desert area that was inhabited by the Ghassanids. The site was resettled during the sixth century due to the presence of this powerful confederation of tribes that was federate to the Romans in the marginal area of central Jordan. It is not known to what extent the Ghassanids were the new inhabitants of *Kastron Mefaa* and whether they were the people who built the many churches there. In addition, immigration into this marginal area by settled people who had been living in other parts of the province and may have benefited from the protection offered by the presence of the Ghassanids cannot be excluded as a factor.

It is significant to note that at Nītl a probably military structure has been observed. Apparently it should be dated to the 4th century.

³⁸ M. Piccirillo, 'La chiesa dei Leoni a Umm al-Rasas—*Kastron Mefaa*', *Liber annuus* 42 (1992), 195–225; M. Piccirillo and E. Alliata 1994, op. cit. (n. 35). See also P. Baumann, *Spätantike Stifter im Heiligen Land* (Wiesbaden 1999), 98–114; 142–182.

³⁹ On the site see Hamarneh 2003, op. cit. (n. 35), 125; 266–267.

⁴⁰ M. Piccirillo, 'The Church of Saint Sergius at Nītl. A Centre of Christian Arabs in the Steppe at the Gates of Madaba,' *Liber annuus* 51 (2001), 267–284; I. Shahid, 'The Sixth-Century Complex at Nītl, Jordan. The Ghassanid Dimension,' *Liber annuus* 51 (2001), 285–292.

However, again no ceramic evidence dated to the fifth century has been found at this site.⁴¹ Clearly, Nitl underwent the same development as observed at Umm el Rasas: a military occupation in the fourth century with little civilian development of the site, a gap in the fifth century and resettlement and development into a relatively large village in the sixth century.

The fluctuations in the history of the occupation of the sites may be explained by the different political and military conditions which developed at different times in Late Antiquity. Diocletian stationed troops in some very marginal areas on the fringes of the desert that were not previously occupied. In time some units were withdrawn from the most marginal areas. This trend became quite significant in the fifth century. In this age the defense system in the marginal zones of central Jordan was probably dismantled. As has been argued above, there are no fifth century traces of occupation at Umm al-Rasas and Nitl, and the fort of Qasr el-Thuraiya—the last military installation built before the descent into the Wadi Mujib—was most probably abandoned in the fifth century.⁴² In a similar way the archaeological data seem to be compatible with an abandonment of Qasr Bshir and the military structures ancillary to El Lejjun.⁴³ Coinage found at El Lejjun itself is interrupted between 451 and 491, and traces of reoccupation re-emerge after this date, but we cannot be sure about its character. According to Parker, after the earthquake of 502 only the courtyard of the fortress shows signs of occupation, but not the barracks.⁴⁴

A recently published study argues that a more or less general abandonment of the military structures in the marginal areas of Central Jordan during the fifth century was dictated by Roman military strategy. Roman imperial government wished to relocate military manpower for other more urgent needs, which reveals its military priorities as well as its attitude to the urgency of problems arising along the frontiers of Palaestina and Arabia. Obviously it was taken for granted that such problems could be solved without the deployment of large military forces along the desert border there. The practice of redeploying military personnel away from the periphery of Palaestina and Arabia became more

⁴¹ Hamarneh 2003, *op. cit.* (n. 35), 125; 266–267. I thank Basema Hamarneh for having informed me that also after the archaeological campaign of the summer 2005 no fifth century ceramic has emerged.

⁴² Parker 1986, *op. cit.*, (n. 34), 50.

⁴³ Parker 1986, *op. cit.*, (n. 34), 53–55; 74–79.

⁴⁴ Parker 1986, *op. cit.*, (n. 34), 58–74.

visible during the time of Leo when Arab incursions seriously undermined the imperial image. The sheikh Amorkesos occupied the island of Jotabe, previously controlled by the Romans, and sacked the territory of Palaestina. Several years later on Arab tribes attacked the same province again. According to the sources, Anastasius is credited with having reinforced Roman military presence in Palaestina and the Near Eastern provinces after a period when the defenses had been neglected.⁴⁵

Justinian considered the Ghassanid phylarchate a strong confederation capable to protect the empire from the Arab allies of the Persian Empire, the Lakhmids.⁴⁶ The development of Umm al-Rasas and Nitl had something to do with the presence of the Ghassanids in the area. It is also possible that some soldiers were stationed again at Umm al-Rasas during the sixth century, which might explain why the site received the name of *kastron*, although no inscription or any other kind of evidence so far has revealed the presence of soldiers at the site, and there are no discernible military structures to be found that are similar to the ones at Nessana and Oboda. Similarly, the Petra papyri reveal that in the sixth century Sadaqa-Zadacatha and Admatha were called *castra* and that soldiers lived there.⁴⁷ As far as Sobota is concerned soldiers were surely present there, but no fort has been detected in the site.

Conclusions

During Diocletian's times the Empire took a great effort to deploy military units in the periphery of the Near Eastern provinces. The new military infrastructures signalled the presence of imperial authority and its ability to guarantee the expansion of international and local commerce. During this period agriculture had the chance to develop in some not yet fully exploited areas.

⁴⁵ See G. Fisher, 'A New Perspective on Rome's Desert Frontier', *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 336 (2004), 49–60. For the activity of Anastasius see A. Lewin, Amr ibn Adi, Mavia, in Lewin, *et al.*, eds., *op. cit.* (n. 4), forthcoming.

⁴⁶ I. Shahid, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth Century. Vol. I, parts 1–2* (Washington 1995); M. Whittow, 'Rome and the Jafnids: Writing the History of a 6th-c. Tribal Dynasty', in J.H. Humphrey, ed., *The Roman and Byzantine Near East. Vol. 2* (Portsmouth 1999), 207–224.

⁴⁷ Full documentation in Z.T. Fiema, 'The Military Presence in the Countryside of Petra in the 6th Century', in Freeman *et al.* 2002, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 133–134; Idem, 'The Byzantine Military in the Petra Papyri-A Summary', in Lewin *et al.*, eds., *op. cit.* (n. 4), forthcoming.

In Late Antiquity the Negev reached its economic and demographic peak. Bedouins intensified the process of sedentarization in the area. Military forces were withdrawn from Oboda at a quite early stage, and we are not informed about the presence of any army units in other sites in the Negev South of the axis Birošaba—Hatzeva until the sixth century. At that time the presence of the army is attested at Nessana, Sobota, Oboda, and in the countryside of Elusa. Moreover, the building of a citadel at Oboda seems to reveal the presence of the army there.

If so, we could appreciate how different the second presence of the army at Oboda must have been in respect to the earlier one. While in the beginning of the fourth century the soldiers had been deployed in a fortress outside the village, now a different solution was chosen. The old fortress was not reoccupied and the army became more integrated in the village society. The citadel was a military structure and it was used by the army, but most probably the soldiers lived in the village itself. The same goes for Nessana, where a citadel was built on the acropolis while no military structure is visible in Sobota. The consequences of military presence were different. It is logical to argue that in the fourth century the army had been introduced into the Negev as part of Diocletian's policy of supporting the commercial position of Aila.

Some scholars think that in the Negev the soldiers contributed directly to the economic development of the area.⁴⁸ However, it is a matter of doubt whether the few hundreds of soldiers who were based at Oboda and scattered over minor stations along the paved road were capable of significantly enriching the area just by their presence.

Agricultural developments in the Negev area may not so much have been the result of state intervention, but owed more to organic, internal growth.⁴⁹ Similarly, the traditionally held view that Palestine and the Negev in particular developed thanks to the influx of pilgrims, the

⁴⁸ Negev 1997, op. cit. (n. 6), 6.

⁴⁹ State intervention: R. Rubin, 'Urbanization, Settlement and Agriculture in the Negev Desert. The Impact of the Roman-Byzantine Empire on the Frontier,' *Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins* 112 (1996), 49–60; idem, 'Soldiers and Administrators: Society and Institutions in the Byzantine Negev,' *Mediterranean Historical Review* 12 (1997), 56–73; M. Haiman, 'Agriculture and Nomad-State Relations in the Negev Desert in the Byzantine and Early Islamic Periods,' *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 97 (1995), 29–53, criticized by B. Isaac, *The Near East under Roman Rule* [Amsterdam 1998], 152–153, who—following Shereshevski 1991, op. cit. [n. 5], 217–222 argues in favour of an organic growth of the Negev.

activity of monks and external investment supported by the Christian Empire does not appear to be right.⁵⁰ Such contributions were not completely insignificant, but there is a more specific factor that may explain economic growth in the area.

Recently studies by Doron Bar about human mobility in Late Roman Palestine have started to attract scholarly attention. Archaeological research revealed that some areas were abandoned while others were settled for the first time with particular intensity. The latter development is attributed by Bar to contemporary imperial legislation about fiscal exemptions and favourable terms of payment to people who would like to cultivate *agri deserti*.⁵¹ Although we do not have any specific information about these laws as to the Negev it is not impossible that peasants and landowners and even Bedouins living in the area took advantage of the opportunity offered by the law. But again, this does not mean that the imperial government organized the transfer of people from other areas to the Negev. In Late Antiquity the Negev maintained its specific Nabataean cultural identity, which indicates that its development was not due to the contribution of an external population.⁵²

The economic factors causing the prosperity of the central Negev must be found in the production of wine, which started in the fourth century. By that time the territory had become involved in a large scale production of this product, which was brought to the port of Gaza, from where it could be exported. Consequently the marginal Negev area became integrated into the Mediterranean commercial network. Scholars have convincingly argued that “the data available indicate that the large-scale export of Palestinian wine commenced between circa AD 400 and 450,”⁵³ and it seems logical to assume that it was during

⁵⁰ Among the supporters of this theory see the differently articulated opinions expressed by M. Avi Yonah, ‘The Economics of Byzantine Palestine,’ *Israel Exploration Journal* 8 (1958), 39–51; Ph. Mayerson, ‘Urbanization in Palaestina Tertia: Pilgrims and Paradoxes,’ *Cathedra* 45 (1987) = idem 1994, op. cit. (n. 4), 19–40. For criticism see Lewin 2002, op. cit. (n. 5).

⁵¹ D. Bar, ‘Frontier and Periphery in Late Antique Palestine,’ *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 44 (2004), 69–92; idem, ‘Roman Legislation as Reflected in the Settlement History of Late Antique Palestine,’ *Scripta Classica Israelica* 24 (2005), 195–206.

⁵² See Lewin 2002, op. cit. (n. 5), 343–373. However, when in 293/294 at Oboda an elegant tower near the acropolis was built, the works were organized by a master carpenter coming from Petra. See Negev 1981, op. cit. (n. 19), 26–27, with n. 13. We must assume the existence of contact and relations between the central Negev and Petra.

⁵³ See the innovative views by S. Kingsley, ‘The Economic Impact of the Palestinian Wine Trade in Late Antiquity,’ in S. Kingsley and M. Decker, eds., *Economy and Exchange*

this period that an intensification of the production of wine took place in the central Negev.

The withdrawal of the military unit at Oboda did not cause difficulties to the village's economic and demographic growth. When Roman army units returned to the Negev in the late fifth or sixth century it settled in a prosperous area that had already entered the phase of its most intense development.

The military garrison at the fort of Mefa, which had been part of a chain of military posts to the East of the Via Nova Traiana, built by Diocletian, was withdrawn during the fifth century. In the following century, it became settled again and developed into a large village. It is not certain that a new garrison was again deployed at Mefa in the sixth century. It is equally doubtful whether the village took the name *kastron* because it was known that the village had taken the place of a previous fortress. But if we assume, as we may reasonably do, that Roman soldiers were not stationed at Mefa, it is possible to argue that they were not the key factor behind the development of the site and of the nearby village of Nitl. The new political situation on the border of the Empire dictated a new development: the Ghassanids were now contributing to the protection of the Eastern provinces and eventually to the population of some of the villages at the limits of agricultural lands.⁵⁴

in the East Mediterranean during Late Antiquity (Oxford 2001), 44–68; idem, *A Sixth-Century AD Shipwreck off the Carmel Coast, Israel. Dor D and Holy Land Wine Trade* (Oxford 2002), 60–84. One should note that the dimensions of the vats and wine installations in the Negev show that wine production was not limited to local consumption. But see also P. Fabian and Y. Goren, 'A New Type of Late Roman Storage Jar from the Negev', in J.H. Humphrey, ed., *The Roman and Byzantine Near East, Vol. 3* (Portsmouth 2002), 145–153.

⁵⁴ The idea that the Ghassanids were not nomads is vigorously argued by I. Shahid, *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth Century. Vol. 2. Part I* (Washington 2002), 1–20.

L'IMPACT DE LA LEGIO IIIA AUGUSTA DANS LES PROVINCES ROMAINES D'AFRIQUE. L'ASPECT RELIGIEUX

ARBIA HILALI

Pour mettre en œuvre sa politique, l'État romain disposait de plusieurs instruments; au premier rang figuraient l'administration, provinciale et municipale, et l'armée. Le rôle de l'armée romaine impériale fut essentiel dans l'intégration des pays conquis à l'empire de Rome. Il s'agissait d'une armée préparée pour la guerre, mais confrontée à une situation de paix. L'Afrique n'a été défendue, la plupart du temps, que par une seule légion, la *III^a Augusta* stationnée au grand camp de Lambèse à partir de 128–129.¹ La vie de ses légionnaires n'a pas été souvent troublée. En effet, «les soldats avaient sans doute reçu plus de coups dans les tavernes que sur les champs de bataille» selon l'expression de G.-Ch. Picard.

Pour faire face à cette situation de paix, la légion a procédé d'abord à la délimitation de son territoire légionnaire. Ensuite, elle a aménagé son espace urbain, a installé son infrastructure routière et a créé des ouvrages hydrauliques. Enfin, elle a aménagé son espace sacré et a délimité la sphère des hommes et la sphère des dieux. Outre pour le maintien de la paix, la présence de la légion était fondamentale dans la diffusion progressive des dieux gréco-romains et des pratiques religieuses officielles romaines. Le rôle de la légion était non négligeable dans l'introduction des dieux orientaux à l'intérieur de certaines provinces africaines. Il convient d'en estimer l'importance et, peut-être, d'en marquer les limites.

Afin de souligner les traces de l'impact religieux de la *III^e* légion Auguste et de ses détachements,² j'ai pris comme échantillon d'étude, les camps légionnaires qui ont été suffisamment fouillés et pour lesquels on dispose d'une documentation épigraphique et archéologique

¹ *CIL* VIII 2534 (Lambèse).

² Je tiens à préciser pour cet article abordera essentiellement l'impact officiel, c'est-à-dire les cultes officiels et les édifices religieux publics (par opposition aux dédicaces privées).

importante, à savoir en Numidie, les camps de Lambèse (128–129), de Gemellae (126–132) et de Dimmidi (198) et en Tripolitaine, le camp de Bu Njem (198).

*Implantation d'un paysage architectural culturel romain
autour du camp de Lambèse*

L'occupation militaire romaine en Numidie au piémont de l'Aurès s'est accompagnée par un projet d'organisation de l'espace urbain à la suite de la conquête.³ Un important réseau de localités s'est mis en place rapidement durant le deuxième siècle autour de la résidence de la *III^a Augusta* à Lambèse (Verecunda, Casae, Lamsorti, Lambafundis, Lambridi, Lamiggi, Timgad).⁴ La réorganisation spatiale de ce massif aurasien présaharien a pour objectif de créer des noyaux urbains de romanisation qui permettent de formaliser la possession du sol et l'intégration des individus dans un ensemble administratif et culturel romain, destiné à affirmer et à préserver l'unité et l'homogénéité de l'Empire.⁵ Ce dispositif de romanisation sera complété par une implantation des édifices religieux gréco-romains.

Dès son installation, la *III^e* légion Auguste a défini son espace religieux. Au sein de cet espace, elle a aménagé les lieux de cultes traditionnels propres à la communauté militaire à l'intérieur du camp (le sanctuaire des *principia*, la chapelle des enseignes, la chapelle du prétoire). D'ailleurs, le camp est lui-même un phénomène religieux, il est une cité avec son panthéon religieux qui se distingue du panthéon traditionnel dans une communauté civile. Parmi les dieux honorés dans le

³ M. Tarpin, *Pagi et vici dans l'Occident romain*, CEFR 299 (Rome 2002), 245.

⁴ On n'a pas trouvé de traces archéologiques d'une organisation municipale préromaine, mais il est vraisemblable qu'il y avait une occupation humaine locale sédentaire ou semi-nomade en contact avec les transhumants saisonniers de la montagne vers les hautes plaines. S. Gsell, *Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord V* (Paris 1913), 254 : « On est au point de contact entre des régions diverses, montagnes et plaines, en des lieux où agriculteurs et éleveurs pouvaient le plus commodément échanger leurs produits, où l'autorité royale pouvait le mieux surveiller les mouvements des nomades et des montagnards, et, à l'occasion, recruter des troupes chez ces tribus guerrières. Enfin, aux grands nœuds de routes naturelles, et là où, dans une contrée desséchée, l'abondance de l'eau commandait le passage et entretenait la vie ».

⁵ Tarpin 2002, op. cit. (n. 3), 245.

cercle militaire du camp de Lambèse, on peut citer la Discipline,⁶ les Génies militaires⁷ et l'empereur divinisé.⁸

Cette délimitation de l'espace religieux dépasse le quartier général proprement dit pour s'étendre à l'extérieur. En effet, à proximité du premier camp (camp de Titus ou camp de l'est),⁹ s'est développée une agglomération civile qui va donner naissance plus tard à la cité de Lambèse. Dans cet espace, on trouve regroupés en un même lieu des éléments essentiels de la vie de la cité. L'*Asclepium* qui est situé contre le mur du camp de Titus a été construit entre 161 et 162.¹⁰ Plus à l'est se situe un complexe monumental, avec un Capitole et un temple qui pourrait être dédié au divin Carus en 284, accolé au Capitole.¹¹

⁶ 1) M. Le Glay, *CRAI* (1956), 294 (*AE* 1957, 122); H.-G. Pflaum, *Libyca* 5 (1957), 61–75; M. Speidel, *Historia* 22, 1 (1973), 125–127 (*AE* 1973, 629). L'inscription a été trouvée dans le premier camp de Lambèse, créé en 81 ap.J.-C., près d'une salle à abside qui était sans doute la chapelle des enseignes. C'est un autel d'un mètre de hauteur, en calcaire blanc, brisé dans sa partie supérieure droite. Le texte : *Disciplinae / Militari / Augustor(um), / aram, d(e)d(ic)ante / Q(uito) Anicio Fausto / co(n)s(ule), / eq(uites) sing(ulares) prae(sidis)*. a.197–201.

2) *CIL* VIII 18058 (*ILS* 3810). Autel, gros cube trouvé dans le prétoire. Le texte : *Ara / Disciplinae*.

⁷ 1) M. Le Glay, *BCTH* 1954 [1956], 166 nr 1 (*AE* 1957, 83): *Genio / [[leg(ionis) III] / Aug(ustae), f(e)l(icit)er].a II–IIIes.*

2) *CIL* VIII 2527 = 18039: *Genio leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae) P(ia)e V(indicis), / pro salute / Imp(eratorum) Caes(arum duorum) L(ucii) Septimi(i) / Seueri, Pii, Pertinacis, / Aug(usti) et M(arci) Aureli(i) An(tonini) Aug(usti), Fe[[licis, / Par(thici), Brit(annici), Ger(manici) m(a)x(im)i,]] Aug(usti) / et Iuliae Augustae, / matris Aug(usti) [[nostr(i)] / et castror(um), dedicant(e) / Q(uito) Anicio Fausto, leg(ato) Aug(ustorum duorum) pr(o) praetore, c(larissimo) u(iro), co(n)s(ule) des(ignato), / T(itus) Arranius Datus, / signifer, / ex (sestertium) III mil(libus) n(ummum) de suo / posuit. a.197–201.*

3) *ILS* 9102: *Genio (centuriae) / sac(rum). / T(itus) Teren(tius) Ma(ximus), / optio, / fecit. a.I–IIIes.*

4) *CIL* VIII 2531 (*ILS* 2443): *Geni(o) (centuriae) sac(rum). / C(aius) Seruilius / Rogatus, [o]pti[o] / dimissus, u[otum] / l(ibens) a(nimo) s(oluit). a. II–IIIes.*

5) *ILS* 9102 b: *Genio (centuriae) Aug(usto) sac(rum). / M(arcus) Magullius Rufus, uet(eranus) / leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae), u(otum) soluit / laetus libens meritu[s]. a. II–IIIes.*

⁸ R. Cagnat, *BCTH* (1907), 254 (*AE* 1908, 10 = *ILS* 9188). Base trouvée dans les environs de la porte ouest du camp. Le monument doit provenir de la cour couverte du prétoire d'où il aura été déplacé pour servir de matériaux de remploi. Le texte : *Diuo Antonino, / C(aius) Satrius C(aii) f(ilius) Fab(ia) / Crescens, Roma, eq(uo) / publ(ico), ex trecentario, p(rius) p(ilius) leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae), / dedicante / D. Fonteio Frontiniano / leg(ato) Aug(ustorum) / pro praet(ore). a.161–163.*

⁹ L. Leschi, *Revue africaine* 96 (1962), 269; *Libyca* 1 (1953), 197.

¹⁰ *CIL* VIII 2579 a + b + c = 18089 (*ILS* 3841): *Ioui Valenti, Siluano, / Aesculapio et Saluti, / Imp(erator) Caes(ar) M(arcus) Aurelius Antoninus, Aug(ustus), pon(tifex) max(imus) et / Imp(erator) Caes(ar) L(ucius) Aurelius Verus Augustus, / has aedes, per [[leg(ionem) III]] Aug(ustam) fecerunt.*

¹¹ X. Dupuis, *BCTH* 23 (1994), 89–90: *[Diuo Caro ge]nit(ori) d(ominorum) n(ostorum)*

D'autres demeures consacrés aux dieux gréco-romains ont été identifiées. En 158 un temple au dieu Neptune fut élevé près de la source d'Aïn Drinn.¹² Dès 174, cet édifice a connu un agrandissement par la construction de portiques, de piliers et de propylées.¹³ Sous la dynastie sévérienne, un temple au dieu Silvain a bénéficié de travaux de restauration accomplis par la légion.¹⁴ En 158, le légat L. Matuccius Fuscinus poursuivait les travaux d'entretien et d'agrandissement du sanctuaire d'Isis et de Serapis commencés déjà par toute une série de légats, en ajoutant un *pronaos* au sanctuaire et en l'ornant par des colonnes.¹⁵

La présence de ces temples à caractère civil n'est pas étrangère à l'armée. Le camp dérive, en effet de la forme de la ville. Végèce disait que «la légion doit porter partout avec elle ce qui semble nécessaire pour toutes les sortes de guerre, afin que, quel que soit l'endroit où elle

duorum] *Imp(eratorum duorum)* [C(aesarum duorum) M(arci) Aurel(i)] Carini, po(nt)(ificis) maximi, Germanici maximi, Persici maximi, Britannici maximi, trib(unicia) pot(estate) II, consulis II, patris patriae, proconsulis, et M(arci) Aurel(i) Numeriani, P(ii), f(felici)s, Aug(usti), pont(ificis) maximi, / Germanici maximi, Persici maximi, B(ritannici) maximi, trib(unicia) pot(estate) II, consulis, patris patriae, proconsulis, templum a solo inchoatum et consummatum] / *dedicauit* M(arcus) [Aurel]ius De[cimus], u(ir) p(erfectissimus), p(raeses) p(rovinciae) N(umidia)e, ex principe peregrinorum, deuotus numini maiestatiq(ue) eorum].

[D(ominis) n(ostris duobus) *Imp(eratoribus duobus)* C(aesaribus duobus) M(arco) Aur(elio) Carino, p(io) f(felici) Aug(usto) inu(icto), pont(ifici) maximo, Germanico maximo, Persico maximo, Britannico maximo, tr(ibunicia) pot(estate) II, consul(i) II, patri patriae, proconsuli, et M(arco) [Aur(elio) Numeriano, p(io) f(felici) Aug(usto) inu(icto), pon(t)ifici) maxi(mo), / Germanico maximo, Persico maximo, Britannico maximo, tr(ibunicia) pot(estate) II, consuli, patri patriae, proconsuli, templum a solo inchoatum et] consummatum / *dedicauit* M(arcus) Aurelius Decimus, u(ir) p(erfectissimus), p(raeses) p(rovinciae) N(umidia)e, ex principe peregrinorum, deuotus numini [maiestatiq(ue)] eorum. a.284.

¹² CIL VIII 2653 (ILS 3282), fragment près d'Aïn Drinn: [*Imp(erator) Caes(ar)*], diui Hadriani f(ilius), diui Traian(i) Parth(ici)] / [nep(os), di]ui Neruae pronepos, T(itus) Aelius / [Hadri]anus Antoninus, Aug(ustus), Pius, p(ater) p(atriciae), co(n)sul IIII, / [trib(unicia) po]t(estate) XXI, collectis fontibus et / [scaturiginibus aedem Neptuni / [a] solo fecit, / [dedicante L(ucio) Matuccio Fuscino, / le]g(ato) Aug(usti) pr(o)pr(aetore).a 158.

¹³ CIL VIII 2654: [Neptuno] Augu(sto) sacrum, / *Imp(eratori) Ca(esari) M(arco) Aurelio* A[ntoni]no, Aug(usto), Armeniac(o), Medico, Par(thico), Germanico, t(rib(unicia) pot(estate) XXVIII, im[p(eratori) VI, co(n)sul(i) III, p(atrici) p(atriciae), por]ticus et an[ta]s et propyla / cum u[estibulo]—] aten[—]leg(io) II/I Augus(ta) fecit, dedica[n]te M(arco) Aemilio [Macro] Satu[r]nino, le[g(ato) Au]g(usti) pr(o) pr(aetore), co(n)s(ule) de(signato).a 174.

¹⁴ CIL VIII 2671 = 18107: Pro salute Imperatorum Caesarum / L(ucii) Septimi(i) Seueri, Pii, Pertinacis, Aug(usti), / Arabici, Adiabenici, Parthici Maximi et / M(arci) Aureli(i) Antonini, Aug(usti), Pii, Felicis [et] / [P(ublii)] [Septimi(i) Getae, nobil(issimis) Caesaris] et / [Iuliae Augustae matris Augustorum et / [castrorum] totiusque domus diuinae, / [templum] Siluano uetustate collapsum / [legi(o) III A]ug(usta) P(ia) V(index) eorum restituit. a.198–209.

¹⁵ CIL VIII. 2630 = 18100, à l'extrémité septentrionale du plateau du temple d'Esculape: [Is]idi et [S]erapi(di), / [L(ucius) M]atuccius Fuscinus, leg(atus) Aug(usti) / [pro]p(ri)etate, aedem, cum Volteia Cornificia uxore, / [et Ma]tuccia Fuscina filia, ab antecessoribus / [suis] i[n]stitutam exaltatam et adiecto / pronaos per leg(ionem) III Aug(ustam) / [columni]s sua pecunia positis exornauit.

établira le camp, elle constitue une cité armée.»¹⁶ Certes, les soldats romains, de plus en plus séparés de la cité, ont créé leur panthéon à part, néanmoins, ils sont restés fidèles à la culture romaine. M. Lenoir le définit bien : «Création certes originale, dans sa structure d'ensemble comme dans l'organisation du <quartier général>, le camp se rattache néanmoins très directement à la tradition urbaine romaine, dont il apparaît comme une manifestation privilégiée.»¹⁷ Il faut dire aussi que les soldats dans leurs cantonnements n'étaient pas complètement isolés du monde civil. En effet, dès son implantation, il se développe à côtés du camp des *canabae*, formés par des marchands et des artisans, ou d'autres formes d'habitats groupés : les *vici*.¹⁸

A ce complexe religieux gréco-romain, viennent se joindre d'autres édifices religieux accueillant des divinités non gréco-romaines, essentiellement le temple de Jupiter *Dolichenus* et les *mithraea*. Grâce à la documentation épigraphique, on sait que Jupiter *Dolichenus* a fait sa première apparition officielle dans la légion, à Lambèse, en 125–126, date à laquelle un temple fut construit en son honneur et fut dédié par le légat Sex. Iulius Maior.¹⁹ La cité de Lambèse disposait d'un *mithraeum* qui se trouvait exactement à l'extrémité de l'avenue qui s'étend non loin du Capitole au Sud-Est du sanctuaire d'Esculape (7 dédicaces).²⁰ En respectant la tradition romaine qui consiste à intégrer les dieux du pays conquis dans le panthéon afin d'attirer leur bienveillance et de conjurer leur malédiction, la légion a rendu un culte public à la déesse Caelestis. En 202–205, le légat de la III^a Augusta, Claudius Galus a veillé à l'achèvement de la construction du temple de Caelestis

¹⁶ Végèce 2.25 : *Vt in quouis loco fixerit [legio] castra armatam faciat ciuitatem.*

¹⁷ M. Lenoir, *Le camp romain : étude d'architecture militaire, Proche-orient et Afrique du Nord*. Thèse Université Paris IV (Paris 1995), 645.

¹⁸ Y. Le Bohec, *La III^e légion Auguste* (Paris 1989), 539.

¹⁹ *CIL* VIII 2680 = 18221 (*ILS* 4311 a) : *Pro s[alute] et incolumitate / Imp(eratoris) Cae[s](aris) Traia[ni] Hadriani Augusti, / Sex(tus) Iuli[us] Maio[r], legatus ipsius pro praetore, / templ[um] I(oui) O(ptimo) M(aximo) D(olicheno) dedicauit.*

²⁰ F. Cumont, *Les mystères de Mithra* (Bruxelles 1913, 3^e éd), 140; M. Le Glay, «Le *mithraeum* de Lambèse», *CRAI* (1954), 269; M.J. Vermaseren, *Corpus inscriptionum et monumentorum religionis mithriacae* 2 (1956), 93 nr 137. R. Godet a découvert un *mithraeum* qui mesure 16, 40 sur 8,25 m. Orienté d'Ouest en Est, il a son entrée à l'Ouest; le côté Est comporte une niche. Le plan intérieur est le plan courant : une allée centrale large de plus de 3 m, flanquée de deux banquettes larges de 2 m et hautes d'environ 0.80 m. On accède à la niche du fond par un escalier de 5 marches, accolé à la banquette sud. Des traces d'enduit peint ont été relevées et plusieurs inscriptions retrouvées du côté de la niche. R. Cagnat, *BCTH* (1915), CLXVII nr 11 (*AE* 1915, 28) : *Deo in/uicto / Mithrae / sac(rum), / M(arcus) Val(erius) Ma/ximianus, / leg(atus) Aug(usti) pr(o) pr(aetore).* a. 183–185.

dont les travaux ont déjà été commencés par le légat C. Iulius Tertullus en 194.²¹

La richesse de la documentation épigraphique et archéologique découverte, particulièrement en matière religieuse (105 inscriptions entre *castra* et *civitas*), révèle que Lambèse fut aussi, outre son importance militaire et administrative, «l'un des centres les plus religieux de toute l'Afrique romaine» selon l'expression de M. Le Glay.²² Mais la légion s'est-elle contentée de diffuser son panthéon dans la région de Lambèse ou a-t-elle reproduit ce paysage religieux par l'intermédiaire de ses détachements partis en mission sur les *limites* de Numidie et de Tripolitaine?

L'impact religieux du camp de Bu Njem en Tripolitaine

Comme forteresse romaine, Bu Njem faisait partie d'une chaîne qui compte également Ghadamès-Cidamus et Gheria el-Garbia, ainsi que d'autres fortins, et s'intègre dans le dispositif d'ensemble du *limes* romain de Tripolitaine. L'arrivée d'un détachement de la III^e légion auguste dans ce site, ainsi que la fondation du camp, s'est faite le 24 janvier 201²³ et ce dernier a été occupé jusqu'en août 259–263.²⁴ Les

²¹ M. Le Glay, CRAI (1956), 300–307 (AE 1957, 123): *[Pro] salute Inuictor(um) Imper(atorum) Seueri et Antonini [[sanctissimi]/[morum] A]ug(ustorum)] et Iuliae Aug(ustae) [[P]iae, matri(s)] Au(gusti), deae Caelestis aedem, / [a Lep]ido Tertullo incohatam, p[er]fici curauit Cl(audius) Gallus, / [leg(atus)] Augustor(um) pr(o) pr(aetore), co(n)s(ul) desig(natus), [d]onatus donis militarib(us), / [ab in]iunctis Imper(atoribus), secunda Par[t]hica felicissima expedi[tio]ne eorum, praeposi[t]us uexillationum / [leg(ionum)] IIII Germanicar(um) ex[pe]ditione s(upra) s(crupta), leg(atus) / [leg(ionis)] XXII Primig(eniae), curator [ci]uitatis Thessalo/[nice]nsium, cum Flauia Silua Prisca c(larissima) f(emina) uxore et / [Fla]uio Catulo Mumatiano c(larissimo) p(uer)o et Cl(audia) Galitta c(larissima) p(uell) / fili(i)s.a 202–205.*

²² M. Le Glay, «La vie religieuse à Lambèse d'après de nouveaux documents», *Ant. Afr.* 5 (1971), 125–153.

²³ R. Rebuffat, «L'arrivée des Romains à Bu Njem (Notes et Documents V)», *Libya Antiqua* 9–10 (1972–1973), 122; AE 1976, 698: *Vexillatio leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae) P[ia]e V(indicis) S(euerianae) / quae ad castra Chol() aedific(anda) uenit, / Muciano et Fabiano co(n)s(ulibus), (ante diem) VIII Ka(lendas) febr(uarias), et / reuersa est, Antonino II et Geta Caes(are) Aug(ustis) co(n)s(ulibus) (ante diem) VII (Kalendas) Ian(uarias)*. Ce texte fournit la date d'arrivée du détachement à Bu Njem- ici appelé Chol, le 24 janvier 201. Il donne en outre la date du «retour» de la *uexillatio*, le 26 décembre 205.

²⁴ R. Rebuffat, «Bu Njem», *Encyclopédie berbère* XI, 1639; R. Rebuffat, «Gholaia (notes et documents VI)», *Libya Antiqua* 9–10 (1972–1973), 163; Lenoir 1995, op. cit. (n. 17), 257. Suite à la dissolution de la légion en 238, la même troupe a dû rester en place, prenant le nom de *uexillatio Golenis*. Le camp est commandé par un décurion

fouilles dans les thermes du camp ont permis de dégager une statue à la Fortune²⁵ et deux dédicaces offertes l'une au *Numina invicta*²⁶ et l'autre à Salus.²⁷

Le dégagement de la chapelle du prétoire a révélé la présence de deux autels érigés au Génie de Gholaiæ²⁸ et au *numen praesens*.²⁹ Enfin, la vexillation a élevé deux monuments au Génie de la *vexillatio*³⁰ et à Jupiter dans la chapelle des *principia*.³¹ D'après cette documentation archéologique et épigraphique, on constate que la vie religieuse des légionnaires était concentrée à l'intérieur des édifices du camp de Bu Njem. Les dieux vénérés par la troupe sont les dieux traditionnellement adorés dans la collectivité militaire. Les seules édifices religieuses

d'aile, ce qui signifie que la garnison avait à peu près les effectifs d'une cohorte quingénaire. Après la reconstitution de la légion en 253, on n'a pas trace de troupes légionnaires dans le camp, même si le nom de la légion est bien regravé sur les inscriptions.

²⁵ R. Rebuffat, *Libya Antiqua* 6-7 (1969-70), 140: *Fortunae / Deae sanc/tae uotum / soluimus*.

²⁶ R. Rebuffat, *Libya Antiqua* 6-7 (1969-70), 141-143: *Nu/mina Iunius Amicus (sesqui-plicarius) inu/icta / qui e(t) librarius / priorem laua/ crum ex parte resti/tuit cum omne numerum mili/ tum. a. 238-259/263*.

²⁷ IRT 918-919, plaque 1: *Quaesii multum quot memoriae tradere,/Agens prae cunctos in hac castra milites,/Votum commune proque reditu exercitus/Inter priores et futuros reddere;/Dum quaero mecum digna diuom nomina,/Inueni tandem nomen et numen deae,/Votis perennem quem dicare in hoc loco,/ Salutis igitur, quandium cultores sient./Qua potui, sanxi nomen et cunctis dedi/Veras salutis lymphas, tantis ignibus/ In istis semper harenacis collibus/ Nutantis austri, solis flammis feruidas/Tranquille ut nando delerent corpora./Ita tu qui sentis magnam facti gratiam/Aestuantis animae fucilari spiritum,/Noli pigere laudem uoce reddere/Veram qui uoluit esse te sanum tibi,/Set protestare uel salutis gratia*.

Plaque 2: *Centurio / leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae) / faciendum / curauit. a. 202-203*.

²⁸ R. Rebuffat, *Libya Antiqua* 9-10 (1972-73), 123 et 133 (AE 1976, 700): *Genio Gholaiæ, / pro salute Augg[ig](ustorum trium), / C(aius) Iu<u>lius Dignus, / [(centurio)] leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae) p(iae) u(indicis), / qui, [pr]imo die / quo ad locum / uentum est, / ubi domini n(ostri tres)) / castra fieri / iusserunt, lo/cum consecrauit, / et ex p[ro]p[ri]o. a. 201*.

²⁹ R. Rebuffat, *Libya Antiqua* 9-10 (1972-73), 123 (AE 1976, 699): *Numini / praesen/ti, Iulius / Vitalis, de/cur(io), u(otum) s(olu)it l(ibens) a(nimo). a. 238-259-263*.

³⁰ R. Rebuffat, *Libya Antiqua* 6-7 (1969-1970), 35: *[[—]] / Imp(eratore) Aug(usto) [—], / Gen(io) uexilla(tonis) / [—]. a. 201-238*.

³¹ R. Rebuffat, *Libya Antiqua* 15-16 (1978-79), 114: *I(oui) O(ptimo) M(aximo), / pro salute et inco/umitate d(ominorum) n(ostorum) / imp(eratorum duorum) [[C(aii) Iuli Veri Maxi/minii]], Pii, Felic(is), Aug(usti) / [[et C(aii) / Iuli Veri Maximi n(obilissimis) C(aesaris), / uexill(atio) / leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae) p(iae) u(indicis)], aram cerei / consecrauit M(arcus) Caecil(ius) Felix, [[(centurio) leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae) p(iae) u(indicis) / Maximiniane]], p(rae)[p(ositus) uexill(ationis), / per uexillationem leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae) p(iae) u(indicis) / et numerum conlatum fac(iendum) cur(auit). a. 236-238*.

localisés à l'extérieur du camp étaient consacrés aux dieux libyques Mars Canaphar³² et Jupiter Hammon.³³

Les soldats apportaient sans doute avec eux dans ces postes lointains le culte des divinités militaires et romaines, mais ils ne pensaient pas que leur intégrité pût être uniquement assuré par elles. Ils tenaient à vivre dans les meilleurs termes avec la divinité du lieu, inconnue d'eux, où ils tenaient garnison. Ils croyaient nécessaire d'invoquer la divinité de la région ou la divinité du lieu sous la forme de Génie, de lui témoigner leur respect et de lui demander sa protection.

En effet, le milieu géographique dicte la nature des divinités vénérées par le détachement légionnaire de Bu Njem. On est dans une zone prédesertique et la préoccupation principale était, en premier lieu, de veiller sur les légionnaires sur place et dans leur déplacements et, en deuxième lieu, de contrôler les pistes caravanières. D'ailleurs, ce n'est pas un hasard si l'un des dieux honorés est Jupiter Hammon. Ce dernier avait la vocation d'être le dieu protecteur des itinéraires.³⁴ Ce dieu, qui assure la protection des pistes caravanières, trouve bien sa place à Bu Njem, dont l'économie devait être essentiellement faite d'échanges et de transit.³⁵ Le site était une étape-clé et se place sur l'une des voies de pénétration vers Fezzan et l'Afrique transsaharienne, ainsi qu'à proximité d'une des longues pistes transversales qui, d'oasis en oasis, conduisaient jusqu'au Nil.³⁶

La *uexillatio* a non seulement intégré ces dieux libyques dans son panthéon, mais elle a aussi respecté l'architecture religieuse africaine.

³² R. Rebuffat, *Libya Antiqua* 11-12 (1974-75), 219-220: *Deo Marti Canapphari Aug(usto), / pro salute et incolumitate domini n(ostri) / Imp(eratoris) Caes(aris), diui Septimi(i) Seueri [[nepotis]], / diui magni Antonini [[filii]], / M(arci) Aureli(i) Seueri [[Alexandri]] In/uicti, Pii, Felicis, Aug(usti), pontificis / maximi, trib(uniciae) potestatis (quartum), co(n)s(ulis), / p(atris) p(atriciae), et Iuliae [[Mammeae]] Aug(ustae) matris / Aug(usti) n(ostri) et castrorum, totiusque / domus diuinae, per uexillatio/nem [[leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae) P(iae) V(indicis)]] Seuerianae, / curante T(ito) Flauio Aproniano, (centurione) / [[leg(ionis) eiusdem]], praeposito uexillationis. a.225. Le dieu est connu par ailleurs par Corippe, qui l'assimile à Mars et le décrit comme un dieu guerrier (Johannide 8, 305): *Hi Sinifere colunt, quem Mazax numina Martis accipit atque deum belli putat esse potentem.**

³³ IRT 920: *Ioui Hammon(i) / Red(uci) Aug(usto) sacr(um), / Tullius Ro/mulus, c(enturio) ex ma/[i]oriariorio, prae/[posit]us ue/[xillationis] III Aug(ustae) p(iae) u(indicis)—.a. 205. Le dieu est largement diffusé en Tripolitaine, cf. V. Brouquier-Reddé, *Temples et cultes de Tripolitaine* (Paris 1992), 311.*

³⁴ R. Rebuffat, «Les centurions de Gholai», *Africa romana* 2 (1984 [1985]), 235.

³⁵ R. Rebuffat, «Recherches en Tripolitaine du sud», *RA* (1971), 184.

³⁶ R. Rebuffat, «Deux ans de recherches dans le sud de la Tripolitaine», *CRAI* (1969), 321.

Les temples libyques étaient établis sur des points culminants à la périphérie de la ville et du camp.³⁷ Cette situation *extramuros* confirme la règle selon laquelle les sanctuaires des dieux africains s'élèvent à la limite de l'agglomération.³⁸ On se demande, avec R. Rebuffat, si ces temples étaient fréquentés exclusivement par la population locale, à qui l'armée se contentait de rappeler qu'elle leur avait construit leur temple, ou ouverts aux soldats. Dans le premier cas, les premiers se seraient bien vite adaptés à un édifice construit; dans le second cas, l'armée aurait bien vite adopté, jusque dans ses rites, un culte proprement africain.³⁹ Dans tous les cas, il y a «une claire perception de l'originalité du milieu et une très grande faculté d'adaptation», selon l'expression de P. Troussset.⁴⁰

Outre son importance militaire et stratégique, le camp de Bu Njem a-t-il contribué à la diffusion des dieux gréco-romains dans la région de la Tripolitaine? La documentation épigraphique religieuse propre aux soldats resensée dans la région de la Tripolitaine est d'environ 17 dédicaces (dont 10 à Bu Njem). Les dédicaces avaient non seulement un caractère privé et individuel (des ex-voto à Minerve à Bezeros⁴¹ ou à Jupiter Dolichenus à Lepcis Magna),⁴² mais aussi un aspect officiel et collectif (une dédicace au Génie du *castellum* de Tisavar⁴³ ou à

³⁷ Brouquier-Rédde 1992, op. cit. (n. 33), 265.

³⁸ Brouquier-Rédde 1992, op. cit. (n. 33), 251.

³⁹ R. Rebuffat, «Divinités de l'oued Kebir (Tripolitaine)», *Africa romana* 7 (1989 [1990]), 143.

⁴⁰ P. Troussset, *Recherches sur le limes tripolitanus du Chott El-Djerid à la frontière tuniso-libyenne*, (Paris 1974), 163.

⁴¹ Le capitaine Donau, *Bulletin archéologique du comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques* 1909, 36 (*AE* 1909, 152); *ILAf* 28: *Mineru(a)e Aug(ustae) sac[rum]*, / *pro salute d[omi]n[orum]* / *nostrorum Im[perato]rum L(uci) Septimi(i) [Se]ue[ri]* / et *M(arci) Aureli(i) Antonin[i]*, / *[[Brit(annici), [P]ar[th(ici)], Ger[m(anici) / max(imu)]], A(u)g(ustorum duorum) et Iul[ia]e]* / *August(a)e, m(atris) aug(ustorum duorum) [e]t [cas]trorum, Iulius Z[e]no, / optio leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae), ar[am] / posuit deae patria[e], / ex uiso, libent[e] an[i]mo, uotu[m] ex sol[ut]i.* a. 209–211.

⁴² *IRT* 292, face antérieure: *I(oui) O(ptimo) M(aximo) / Dolicheno, / pro salute et uictoria domi[norum] nostrorum Augg[ustorum] (ustorum trium)) et / [[—/—e]]t redi/tu [I]m[pp] [p]] (eratorum trium) in urbem [s]uam, / *T(itus) Flauiu[s] [.]arin[us], (centurio) leg(ionis), / u(otum) l(ibens) p(osuit)*. Flanc gauche, sous la corniche. Sur le côté droit de l'autel: *D(e)d(icatum) (ante diem) III idus Apriles*.*

⁴³ *CIL* VIII 22759; R. Cagnat, *BCTH* (Juillet 1900), CLXVIII (*AE* 1900, 127); Y. Le Bohec, *zPE* 31 (1978), 189–190 (*AE* 1978, 887): *Genio Ti/sauar Aug(usto) s(acrum), / Vlpius Pau[linus], (centurio) [[leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae)]], u(otum) s(oluit) cum / uex(illatione) cui prae[est]it), / Vibiano et Myrone / opt(ionibus).* (Sous Septime Sévère ou Caracalla).

Jupiter victorieux).⁴⁴ Les dieux orientaux Sol Yarhibôl à Aïn El Avenia⁴⁵ et Jupiter Dolichenus à Thenadassa⁴⁶ sont dus à la présence respective des unités orientales, la cohorte syrienne et la II^e cohorte des Hamiens. Cette documentation épigraphique religieuse n'atteste pas une politique officielle volontaire d'une romanisation religieuse dans la région. Cependant, il ne faut pas relativiser l'impact religieux de l'armée qui, seule, a réussi à implanter dans ces zones lointaines des cultes romains et orientaux. En outre, elle a contribué à la connaissance de certains dieux libyques non attestés par ailleurs dans les sources épigraphiques (Mars Canaphar).⁴⁷

Si une lacune de la documentation épigraphique peut expliquer en partie le faible impact religieux des détachements légionnaires en Tripolitaine, rien n'exclut la présence d'autres interprétations. En effet, la priorité de Rome dans les zones prédesertiques n'était pas de romaniser la région, mais plutôt de contrôler les routes caravanières. L'examen de la vie religieuse dans les deux camps de Gemellae et de Dimmidi dans le prédésert de Numidie pourrait confirmer la politique romaine dans les zones prédesertiques de l'Afrique.

Les camps de Dimmidi et de Gemellae sur le limes de Numidie

Les camps de Gemellae (126–132) et de Dimmidi (198) faisaient partie du système de défense du Sahara de Numidie qui avait été mis en place entre l'époque d'Hadrien (117–138) et celle de Septime Sévère

⁴⁴ *CIL* VIII 22760; R. Cagnat, *BCTH* (1900), CLXIII (Tisavar): *Iov(i) opt(imo) Max(imo) Vic(tori)*.

⁴⁵ O. Brogan et J. Reynolds, *PBSR* 38 (1960), 51 nr 1 (*AE* 1962, 304): *Soli Hierobolo, pro sa[lute] / dominorum n(ostorum) Aug[ustorum trium] Se[ueri] et Antonini e[t] Getae / e[t] Iuliae totiusq[ue] do[mus] / diuinae, per uexilla[tio] / nem leg(ionis) III A[u]g[ustae] et mil[it]es / coh[ort]is S[yro]r[um] sagit[ariorum], a solo [—].a. 209–211.*

⁴⁶ *IRT* 868 (*AE* 1950, 126): *[I(ovi)] O(ptimo) M(aximo) D(olicheno) / [pr]o salute et uictoria [dom] / inor(um) nostror(um) imp(eratorum duorum) L(ucii) Sep[timii] / Severi Pii Pert(inacis) Aug(usti), et M(arci) Aurel[i]i / Antonin(i), Aug(usti), Aug(usti) n(ostri) fil(ii), et P(ublii) / [[Septimi(i) Getae]] Aug(usti), Aug(usti) / n(ostri) fil(ii), Aug(usti) n(ostri) fratr(is), et Iuliae / Aug(ustae), matr(is) castr(orum), M(arcus) Caninius / Adiutor Faustianus, praef(ectus) / coh(ortis) II H(a)m(ionum), praep(ositus) uex(illationi) [[leg(ionis) / III]] Aug(ustae) p(iae) u(indicis), aram po[su]it et dedicauit. a. 198–211.*

⁴⁷ Brouquier-Rédde 1992, op. cit. (n. 33), 315.

(193–211).⁴⁸ Ils s'inscrivent dans la politique de conquête du désert par ces deux empereurs.⁴⁹ Confrontés à la population nomade, les Romains se contentaient en effet de la contrôler par l'occupation de ses routes caravanières et des principaux points auxquels elle pouvait s'abreuver.⁵⁰

Dans le camp de Gemellae, outre la présence de l'amphithéâtre et des thermes, la documentation épigraphique a révélé l'existence dans les *principia* de deux autels à la Discipline et à la victoire des Augustes,⁵¹ une dédicace à la Victoire⁵² et une au divin Pertinax.⁵³ Dans une *schola* au nord de la chapelle des enseignes, le détachement a élevé un autel à Mars et à Pégase.⁵⁴ A l'extérieur du camp, dans le terrain d'entraînement, deux dédicaces ont été offertes aux *Dii campestris*.⁵⁵ Dans les *principia* du Castellum Dimmidi, le légat de la légion a élevé un autel à

⁴⁸ Y. Le Bohec, «L'armée romaine en Afrique», in *l'Algérie antique*, sous la direction de C. Sintès et Y. Rebahi (2003), 94.

⁴⁹ G.-Ch. Picard, *Castellum Dimmidi* (Alger 1944), 51–53; Y. Le Bohec, *Les unités auxiliaires de l'armée romaine en Afrique proconsulaire et Numidie sous le Haut-Empire* (Paris 1989), 34–37; 123. Les détachements qui stationnaient dans ces camps sont la I^{re} aile des Pannoniens pour le camp de Gemellae et les *vexillationes* prises dans la *IIIa Augusta* , la *IIIa Gallica* et *l'ala Ia Pannoniorum* pour le camp de Dimmidi. Ce dernier fut confié aux cavaliers du *numerus* des palmyréniens sous Sévère Alexandre.

⁵⁰ Picard 1944, op. cit. (n. 49), 57.

⁵¹ 1) J. Baradez, *Libyca* 1 (1953), 157–159 (*AE* 1954, 132), couronnement de l'autel: *Ara Disciplinae*.

2) L. Leschi, *CRAI* (1949), 224 (*AE* 1950, 63): autel monumental dont l'inscription a été mutilée à gauche et en partie martelée: *[Vi]ctoriae nob[ilissimorum] pr[ae]f[ecti]cipum nostro/[rum] Valeriani et / [Gal]lie[ni] et Valeriani Caes[ar]is, / [Aug]ustorum trium,] L[ucius] Magius / [Valer]ianus, u[ir] c[on]s[ul]arissimus, / [leg]atus Aug[ustorum] n[ost]rum trium, pr[ae]f[ect]o aetore, / [aram] uouit, curante / [—] Faustino, praef[ect]o / a[lae] P[annoniorum]. a. 256–258.*

⁵² *CIL* VIII 2482 = 17976 (*ILS* 531): *Vic[tor]iae Aug[ustae], / pro sal[ute] d[omi]norum duorum n[ost]rorum / Valeriani et Gall[ieni] Aug[ustorum] duorum, uexi[llat]io mill[ia]ria leg[ionis] III Aug[ustae] re[st]itu[tae], e Raet[ia] Geme[llas] regressi, die / XI kal[endas] noue[m]bres Volusi[ano] II et Maximo / co[n]sulibus, uotum soluer[unt] / per M[arcum] Fl[auium] Valente[m] / centurionem leg[ionis] s[up]ra s[criptae], L[ucius] Volumius / Crescens, op[er]tio pri[ncipis], / M[arcus] Aurel[ius] Licinius op[er]tio, / C[aius] Geminius Victor, op[er]tio; / esculpit[is] sic et s[criptis] Donatus. a. 22 octobre 253.*

⁵³ L. Leschi, *CRAI* (1949), 223 nr 4: *Diuo / Pertinaci / patri / ala I Pannoniorum*., peu après 9 avril 193.

⁵⁴ *CIL* VIII 17977: *Marti / et Pega[so] Aug[ustis] / sac[rum]*.

⁵⁵ J. Baradez, *CRAI* (1949), 18; P. Troussset, «Le camp de Gemellae sur le limes de Numidie d'après les fouilles du colonel Baradez», *Akten des XI. internationalen Limeskongressen* (1976), 563 (*AE* 1976, 735): *[D]iis C[ampestribus], [T]it[us] Aurelius / Aurelianus / praef[ectus] eq[ui]t[us] al[ae] (primae) P[annoniorum] fecit. a. II–IIIes.*

J. Baradez, *Rev. Afi.* (1949), 18: *D[omi]s C[ampestri]bus, M[arcus] Celerini[us] Augendus, / praef[ectus] eq[ui]t[us] al[ae] / Pann[oniorum] Seuer[ianae], nu[m]inib[us] s[an]ctissimis QOS (ante diem) III / kalendas Iuni[as] fecit. a. 222–235.*

Jupiter.⁵⁶ On note aussi des dédicaces à Malagbel qui ont pour origine la présence du *numerus* des palmyréniens.⁵⁷

On constate, qu'à l'exception des dieux orientaux et des dieux militaires, la faible implantation des dieux gréco-romains dans les deux camps de Dimmidi et de Gemellae. Leur témoignage rappelle celui de Bu Njem et nous incite à penser que dans les zones prédesertiques, il n'y avait pas une volonté officielle de romaniser la région. L'objectif était plutôt économique, à savoir contrôler les pistes caravanières. Comme pour Bu Njem, les détachements de Dimmidi et Gemellae se trouvaient au point de rencontre du système saharien et du système aurasien.⁵⁸ Rome visait à contrôler la route d'El Kantara («pont» en arabe), qu'empruntait la plupart des tribus du Sahara qui rencontraient chaque hiver des montagnards transhumants, des semi-nomades des Ziban, avant de s'engager par les couloirs de l'Aurès en direction de leurs estivages constantinois⁵⁹ au Nord de l'Atlas saharien et dans les hautes plaines.⁶⁰

La documentation épigraphique et archéologique confirme un impact religieux de la légion et de ses détachements autour des camps étudiés. En effet, la construction de temples au II^e siècle à Lambèse et au III^e

⁵⁶ Picard 1944, op. cit. (n. 49), 183, nr 5 (*AE*, 1948, 211): *Ioui conserua/tori fortissi/morum / imperatorum / Seueri et Anto/nini et [[[Getae]]] / Augustorum et Iuliae Augustae / matris castro/rum et Aug[[[g(ustorum)]]] / Q(uintus) Cornelius / Valens, leg(atus) / eorum pr(o) pr(aetore) / posuit. a. 202–211. Picard 1944, op. cit. (n. 49), 184 nr 6: *I[ouii] conserua/t[ori] ffortissi/m[is] imp(eratoris)] Caes(aris) / M(arci) Aureli(i) [[Anto/nini]], Pii, Fel(ici)s, Aug(usti), et / Iu(liae) [[Soemiadi(s)]] Bassia/nae, Augustae, / matri(s) Aug(usti) n(ostri), M(arcus) Aur(elius) Gordianus, (centurio), / pr(a)ep(ositus) uex(illationis) leg(ionis) III Aug(ustae), de/uot(us) num(ini) eorum. a.218–222.**

⁵⁷ Picard 1944, op. cit. (n. 49), 187, nr 10 (*AE* 1940, 150): *D(omino?) Deo num[ini] Malagbelo], / n(umerus) Pal(myrenorum) Seue[rianorum], / morante[s] castello Dimmidi]. a.222–235. CIL., VIII 8795 = 18020; Picard 1944, op. cit. (n. 49), 186, n° 9 (*AE*, 1940, 149), face principale: *[[Alexan/dri]], Imachi, Deo num(ini) Malag(belo) A(u)gusto, / pro salute D(omini) n(ostri) Imp(eratoris) Caes(aris) M(arci) Aurel(ii) / Seueri Pii, Fel(ici)s, / Aug(usti), diui m[agni] Antoni/ni fili—].* Face latérale droite: *N(umerus) P(almyrenorum) / Seu(erianorum), / (centuria) Galtoniani; / C(aius). Modius (centurio) s(uprascriptus) / L(ucius). Rubrius Felix, / C(aius). Iulius Maximus, / C(aius). Camnius Malcus, / L(ucius). Host(ius) Florentin(us), / C(aius). Iulius Tonneus, / C(aius). Iulius T[—/—]. a.222–235.**

⁵⁸ Le Bohec 1989, op. cit. (n. 18), 370.

⁵⁹ Troussat 1974, op. cit. (n. 40), 564.

⁶⁰ Le fait que les voies de pénétration du massif aurasien soient encore aujourd'hui volontiers empruntées par les nomades et les transhumants montre leur importance. Il n'y a pas de raison de penser que ces courants commerciaux n'étaient pas vivants au moment de la présence de Rome. La précieuse mention de la *via de camellos* dans les tablettes Albertini (XX, 6) rappelle que le nomadisme n'a jamais totalement disparu de la région de Numidie.

siècle à Bu Njem correspond à l'expansion géographique des Romains en Numidie et en Tripolitaine. La légion a réussi à exporter des dieux gréco-romains auxquels une communauté civile pouvait s'identifier. La diffusion de ce panthéon est plus importante à Lambèse, puisqu'il répondait au départ aux besoins de la légion, auquel s'ajoutèrent par la suite ceux de la cité de Lambèse. L'implantation des dieux syriens et palmyréniens se révèlent grâce à la présence de la légion. Cette dernière a réussi à introduire des cultes connus jusqu'à présent seulement sur la côte africaine. (Isis et Mithra à Carthage, Lepcis Magna et Sabratha).

Cependant, cet impact religieux diffère d'une région à l'autre en fonction de divers facteurs tel que la taille et la mobilité de l'unité militaire. Le degré d'urbanisme est aussi un garant de l'intensité et de la continuité de ces cultes. En Numidie, Rome a suivi deux politiques différentes : une organisation de l'espace urbain à Lambèse, par opposition à un contrôle des routes commerciales à Bu Njem, Gemellae et Dimmidi. Par conséquent, l'impact religieux est plus marqué dans le cas où l'occupation militaire s'est accompagnée d'une création et d'une organisation de l'espace urbain, avec ce que cela comporte de création d'édifices publics (thermes, amphithéâtre et temples).

Enfin, grâce à cette tradition romaine de solliciter les dieux des ennemis, ensuite au recrutement africain dans la légion, cette dernière a pu conserver un héritage religieux local, le propager dans des zones militaires et l'exporter vers d'autres provinces de l'Empire romain.⁶¹

⁶¹ Caelestis paraît avoir été l'objet d'une dévotion particulière de la part des soldats en Afrique et en dehors de l'Afrique. Plusieurs dédicaces de soldats en garnison en Dacie, en Bretagne et en Germanie nous sont parvenues : *CIL* VII 759 (Magnaë); *ILS* 9318 (Corstopium); *CIL* XIII 6671 (Mayence); *CIL* III 993 (Apulum).

PART SIX

THE THIRD CENTURY AD

THE MILITARY FACTOR IN THE ONSET OF CRISES IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE IN THE THIRD CENTURY AD

LUKAS DE BLOIS

In this paper I would like to discuss the impact of Roman armed forces on the rise of crises in the Roman Empire in the third century AD.¹ In my view the first half of this century—and more specifically the two decades from 230 to about 250—may be characterized as a period of increasing regional troubles that ripened into a series of crises, which beset the Roman Empire in the period 251 to 284. There were great regional differences. Dacia, some neighbouring Danube lands, and the Agri Decumates, for example, had a bad time, but other territories were still relatively prosperous, in spite of fiscal pressures. In 1999 Witschel demonstrated that until the third quarter of the third century regions like Italy, Gaul, Britain, Spain, and Northern-Africa maintained their traditional infrastructures, their density of population and their prosperity.²

The traditional view is that the third century is an age of omnipresent warfare, which resulted in the rise of military power in the Roman Empire and in military demands that were an important cause of third century troubles, which affected the whole Empire.³ However,

¹ I owe thanks to Merton College, Oxford, where I prepared much of this paper during Hilary Term, 2004.

² Chr. Witschel, *Krise-Rezession-Stagnation? Der Westen des Römischen Reiches im 3. Jahrhundert n. Chr.* (Frankfurt a.M. 1999), 239–374. Cf. Chr. Witschel, ‘Re-evaluating the Roman West in the 3rd c. AD’, *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 17 (2004), 251–281. On continuous prosperity in many parts of Asia Minor and the eastern provinces see F. Millar, *The Roman Near East* (Cambridge MA/London 1993), 225–436 *passim*, and S. Mitchell, *Anatolia: Land, Men and Gods I* (Oxford 2001, 2nd ed.), 227–240. Cf. H. Brandt, *Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft Pamphyliens und Pisidiens im Altertum*. Asia Minor Studien 7 (Bonn 1992), 100; 149f.

³ On the third century crisis in the Roman empire see for example G. Alföldy, ‘The Crisis of the Third Century as Seen by Contemporaries’, *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 15 (1974), 98–103 (= idem, *Die Krise des römischen Reiches. Geschichte, Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsbetrachtung. Ausgewählte Beiträge* (Stuttgart 1989), 328–333); M. Christol, *L’empire romain du troisième siècle* (Paris 1997); Witschel 1999, op. cit. (n. 2), *passim*; Witschel 2004, op. cit. (n. 2), 251–281; J.-M. Carrié & A. Rousselle, *L’empire romain en mutation des Sévères à Constantin, 192–337* (Paris 1999); L. de Blois, ‘The Crisis of the Third Century AD in

because many crises may have had a regional character, it might be wise to regionalize the 'third century crisis', more so than has been done so far.

In a discussion about the contribution of the military factor to the onset of crises in the Roman Empire in the third century AD attention should be paid, first of all, to military misconduct and rapacity, not only in zones of actual warfare, but also along frequently used military transit routes. Military unruliness is looming large in contemporary literary sources. In all his eighty books, which he probably wrote between AD 211 and 235, Cassius Dio is virtually obsessed with the risks of military power and misconduct. Herodian, in Dio's track, regarded the greed and lack of discipline of the soldiers as the root of much evil and in his opinion these vices were growing stronger.⁴ According to Alföldy

the Roman Empire: A Modern Myth?', in L. de Blois & J. Rich, eds., *The Transformation of Economic Life under the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the Second Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire, Nottingham, July 4–7, 2001* (Amsterdam 2002), 204–217; D.S. Potter, *The Roman Empire at Bay AD 180–395* (London/New York 2004), 3–298; R.P. Duncan-Jones, 'Economic Change and the Transition to Late Antiquity', in S. Swain & M. Edwards, eds., *Approaching Late Antiquity. The Transition from Early to Late Empire* (Oxford 2004), 20–52; P. Eich, *Zur Metamorphose des politischen Systems in der römischen Kaiserzeit. Die Entstehung einer 'personalen Bürokratie' im langen dritten Jahrhundert* (Berlin 2005), and A.K. Bowman, P. Garnsey & A. Cameron, eds., *The Cambridge Ancient History XII: The Crisis of the Empire, AD 193–337* (Cambridge 2005), esp. B. Campbell, 'The Severan Dynasty', 1–27; J. Drinkwater, 'Maximinus to Diocletian and the "crisis"', 28–66; B. Campbell, 'The Army', 110–120; E. Lo Cascio, 'The Emperor and his Administration', 131–169; J. Wilkes, 'Provinces and Frontiers', 212–268; J.-M. Carrié, 'Developments in Provincial and Local Administration', 269–312; M. Corbier, 'Coinage and Taxation: The State's Point of View, AD 193–337', 327–392; M. Corbier, 'Coinage, Society and Economy', 393–439.

⁴ On Cassius Dio's life, career, political convictions, and views of the soldiery see F. Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio* (Oxford 1964), 5–27; P.M.M. Leunissen, *Konsuln und Konsulare in der Zeit von Commodus bis Severus Alexander (180–235 n. Chr.)* (Amsterdam 1989), 163; M. Hose, *Erneuerung der Vergangenheit. Die Historiker im Imperium Romanum von Florus bis Cassius Dio* (Stuttgart 1994), 356ff.; L. de Blois, 'Volk und Soldaten bei Cassius Dio', in H. Temporini & W. Haase, eds., *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II* 34,3 (Berlin/New York 1997), 2650–2676; idem, 'Emperor and Empire in the Works of Greek-speaking Authors of the Third Century AD', in H. Temporini & W. Haase, eds., *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II* 34,4 (Berlin/New York 1998), 3405f. and 3411f.; idem, 'The Perception of Emperor and Empire in Cassius Dio's Roman History', *Ancient Society* 29 (1998–1999), 275ff.; P.M. Swan, *The Augustan Succession. An Historical Commentary on Cassius Dio's Roman History, Books 55–56 (9 BC–AD 14)* (Oxford 2004), 3–17. On Herodian and his work see Alföldy 1989, op. cit. (n. 3), 240ff.; D. Roques, *Hérodien, Histoire des empereurs romains de Marc Aurèle à Gordien III (180–238 ap. J.-C.)* (Paris 1990), 1–15; H. Sidebottom, 'Herodian's Historical Methods and Understanding of History', in H. Temporini & W. Haase, eds., *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II* 34,4 (Berlin/New York 1998), 2775–2836; G. Marasco, 'Erodiano e la crisi dell'impero', *ibid.* 2837–2927; De Blois 1998, op. cit., *ibid.* 3415–3423; M. Zimmermann, 'Herodians

and Polley, Herodian died after AD 250. So he may have seen more of third century troubles than Dio had.⁵

Outright loot and plunder could seriously damage regions where wars were raging or through which armies went from one war zone to another. From 230 and indeed from 249 dangerous wars arose in the East and North. Until 253 most wars did not yet coincide, but from 253 simultaneous fighting at several frontiers became a common feature of Roman history, which forced the emperors to move frequently *vexillationes* from the legions, auxiliary units and fleet detachments from one endangered region to another, to concentrate armies which would be big enough to beat the enemies.⁶ What about the consequences? There are no elaborate, detailed third century reports about such military movements, but in the *Histories* of Tacitus there is a story which may be used as an eye-opener. In *Histories* 1.63–69 Tacitus tells us how the Vitellian armies, led by Valens and Caecina, moved through Gaul and Switzerland to Italy. They took what they needed, humiliated local notables who gave the military what they needed in a very subservient way, and destroyed communities that seemed to put up some resistance. According to Tacitus at least one of the generals, Valens, became a very rich man through forced transactions with local proprietors. Tacitus' report is highly rhetorical, but it gives us a clue. Passing armies demanded goods, food, and facilities and could easily turn into looting mobs. So local magistrates gave them what they asked and could not resist. Local notables changed into subservient slaves of passing armies and must have lost face in the eyes of their fellow citizens, whom they were supposed to protect. There are just enough indications which suggest that similar things happened in the third century. Under Caracalla, Gordian III, and Philip the Arabian, already well before the intense military activity of the period 249–284, villagers from Takina, Skaptopare and Aragoë, places in the Balkans and Asia Minor, in the neighbourhood of military transit routes, complained to the emperors telling them that military avarice and misbehaviour had brought them into misery and

Konstruktion der Geschichte und sein Blick auf das stadtrömische Volk', in idem, ed., *Geschichtsschreibung und politischer Wandel im 3. Jh. n.Chr.* (Stuttgart 1999), 119–143; Th. Hidber, 'Zeit und Erzählperspektive in Herodians Geschichtswerk', in M. Zimmermann, ed., *Geschichtsschreibung und politischer Wandel im 3. Jh. n.Chr.* (Stuttgart 1999), 145–167.

⁵ See Alföldy, *Krise* 1989, op. cit. (n. 3), 240ff.; A.R. Polley, 'The Date of Herodian's History', *Antiquité Classique* 72 (2003), 203–208.

⁶ On the history of the tumultuous years 249–271 see Christol 1997, op. cit. (n. 3), 121–158.

bankruptcy, which would ultimately lead to less tax returns from their regions.⁷ Like Valens, some commanders and officers may have fared very well. In 1992 Piet Sijpesteijn published a papyrus text about the descendants of a former third century centurion, the Aponii, who now belonged to the richest people of the Roman East.⁸

In zones of enduring or repeated actual warfare things could be worse, particularly when violence and devastation went hand-in-hand with forced recruitment of soldiers, deportation, banditry, famine and epidemics. A parallel text from the period of the emperor Marcus Aurelius, which gives a good indication about what must have happened in many regions in the third century, is P. Thmouis I from Northern Egypt, a region where, in the emperor Marcus' times, rebellion, violence and the Antonine plague caused widespread misery.⁹ In AD 167/8 the village was almost depopulated by a sequence of fatal events. Fellow villagers had gone away, in an act of *anachoresis*, to evade heavy taxation, which they could no longer bear, now that security was waning. Smaller numbers had to yield equally heavy taxes, which drove out more people. This resulted in a vicious circle. Besides, the village was ransacked by groups of rebellious *boukoloi*. The bandits were chased away by soldiers, who unfortunately killed most of the remaining villagers, whose ranks were further depleted by the plague. The few surviving villagers could no longer pay their dues, but tried to get back former fellow villagers in order to restore their carrying capacity. They were successful in finding them, but were chased away by landowners and farmers who had leased land to the runaways.

Another indication from the times of Marcus Aurelius is equally interesting. During his reign a bad situation arose in the Danube lands where the wars against Marcomans, Quadi, Iazyges and other tribes were mainly fought. Cassius Dio tells us that around AD 175, when a peace treaty was concluded with them, the Iazyges were still very

⁷ See P. Herrmann, *Hilferufe aus den römischen Provinzen. Ein Aspekt der Krise des römischen Reiches im 3. Jh. n. Chr.* (Hamburg/Göttingen 1990) and T. Hauken, *Petition and Response. An Epigraphic Study of Petitions to Roman Emperors 181–249*. Monographs from the Norwegian Institute at Athens 2 (Bergen 1998), esp. 215f. (from Euhippe); idem 1998, op. cit., 217–243 (from Takina); Herrmann 1990, op. cit., nr. 4 = Hauken 1998, op. cit., 74–139 (= CIL suppl. 12336 = IGR I 674 = Sylloge 888, from Skaptopare); Herrmann 1990, op. cit., nr. 6 = Hauken 1998, op. cit., 140–161 (= OGIS 519 = IGR IV 598, from Aragoe). See F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World* (London 1992, 2nd ed.), 646 (= SEG 37 (1987), 1186) and Eich 2005, op. cit. (n. 3), 121; 299–307.

⁸ See P.J. Sijpesteijn, 'Aponii in Egypt', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 90 (1992), 238f.

⁹ See S. Kambitsis, *Le papyrus Thmouis I, colonnes 68–160* (Paris 1985), 25–31.

strong. They had done, he continues, the Romans great harm, which was evident from the fact that the barbarians returned 100,000 captives that were still in their hands even after the many who had been sold, had died, or had escaped. To counter depopulation and an ensuing decrease of tax returns the emperor decided to settle Germanic tribesmen, for example some Naristi, in southern Germany, after in AD 180 a more definite peace treaty had been concluded with several warring tribes.¹⁰ The situation did not improve immediately, however, among other reasons because banditry was rampant. Under the emperor Commodus large bands, consisting of remaining barbarians, runaway soldiers and other drifters, were still very strong and could even besiege a Roman legion, the *Octava Augusta*, in its own camp.¹¹

About AD 260 similar things must have happened again in the Danube regions.¹² In 1.37.3 Zosimus tells us that around 260 the situation in 'Illyricum' was very bad indeed, because of barbarian invasions and the plague, which led to a depopulation of towns. Zosimus' story may be rhetorical and exaggerated, but the author must have found something in his sources. It is not very probable that his dark picture of the hinterlands of the Middle Danube *limes* in the third quarter of the third century is completely fictional.

The cost of military operations may also have afflicted the hinterlands of war zones, which had to produce extra supplies, although some of them, such as Syria, Asia Minor and the Po Valley, were doing rather well until beyond the middle of the century. Apparently heavy warfare in Mesopotamia and the Danube area did not destroy their prosperity. Obviously they had sufficient carrying capacity to produce the required surpluses and make a handsome profit as well, through trade with garrisons, merchants and non-combatants who followed the armies.¹³ Problems must have arisen earlier and quicker in thinly

¹⁰ See Cassius Dio 71.21.1.

¹¹ See Herodian 1.10. See G. Alföldy, 'Bellum desertorum', in Alföldy 1989, op. cit. (n. 3), 69–80 (= *Bonner Jahrbücher* 171 (1971), 367–376) and O.J. Hekster, *Commodus. An Emperor at the Crossroads* (Amsterdam 2002), 45 n. 32; 65–67.

¹² On the middle Danube area and Upper Moesia see A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia* (London/Boston 1974), 203; 216f.; 263ff. On Noricum see G. Alföldy, *Noricum* (London/Boston 1974), 169ff. On a decline of settlements in the Agri Decumates and in Raetia, which manifests itself in archaeological traces and findings, see Witschel 1999, op. cit. (n. 2), 207ff. Cf. Wilkes 2005, op. cit. (n. 3), 212–230 *passim*.

¹³ See publications by F. Millar, Chr. Witschel and S. Mitchell mentioned above in note 2. See Elio Lo Cascio's contribution to this volume. He argues that extra requisitions caused problems, but that trade with fixed garrisons and—I would like to add—*canabae* must have been profitable to the hinterlands of frontier zones.

populated regions without reserve capacities, where military demands repeatedly took away whole year-surpluses and more, and where forced recruitment, *anachoresis* and banditry brought about a relatively serious decrease in people who paid taxes and furnished supplies.

In times in which emperors became completely dependent on the armies for their own survival they could not economize on their military budget. They simply had to meet military necessities and demands. An important effect of heavy military expenditure may have been the debasement of the coinage. Changes in army pay and other military expenditure immediately affected the imperial budget, because—if Duncan-Jones is right—the armed forces took about three quarters of the imperial income.¹⁴ A debasement of the imperial coinage set in under Commodus, who had to adjust the coinage to the rise in prices and wages that had come about between 160 and 190, as a result of the Antonine plague, and under Septimius Severus (193–211), who had raised the pay of the soldiers by 50%. In my view he did so in order to attract good recruits in sufficient numbers in times of shrunken populations and higher prices and wages, caused by the Antonine plague, which in Egypt, for example, may have taken away 20% or more of the population.¹⁵ The debasement of the coinage may have been caused by a rising military budget, decreasing tax returns and—particularly from 253—the decentralisation and enlargement of imperial coin production.¹⁶ A lack of plate may also have contributed to the

¹⁴ See R.P. Duncan-Jones, *Money and Government in the Roman Empire* (Cambridge 1994), 47ff.

¹⁵ On the consequences of the Antonine plague see R.J. Littman & M.L. Littman, 'Galen and the Antonine Plague', *American Journal of Philology* 94 (1973), 243–255; D.W. Rathbone, 'Villages, Land and Population in Graeco-Roman Egypt', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* n.s. 36, 216 (1990), 119; R.P. Duncan-Jones, 'The Impact of the Antonine Plague', *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 9 (1996), 108–136; R.S. Bagnall, 'P.Oxy. 4527 and the Antonine Plague in Egypt. Death or Flight?', *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 13 (2000), 288–292; idem, 'The Effects of the Plague: Model and Evidence', *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 15 (2002), 114–120; W. Scheidel, 'A Model of Demographic and Economic Change in Roman Egypt after the Antonine Plague', *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 15 (2002), 97–114; Chr. Bruun, 'The Antonine Plague in Rome and Ostia', *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 16 (2003), 426–434.

¹⁶ On the debasement of the coinage in the third century AD see R.A.G. Carson, *Coins of the Roman Empire* (London/New York 1990), 61ff.; R.F. Bland, 'The Development of Gold and Silver Coin Denominations, AD 193–253', in C.E. King & D.G. Wigg, *Coin Finds and Coin Use in the Roman World. The Thirteenth Oxford Symposium on Coinage and Monetary History*, 25–27.3.1993 (Berlin 1996), 63–100; K.W. Harl, *Coinage in the Roman Economy, 300 BC to AD 700* (Baltimore/London 1996), 126–148; J.-M. Carrié & A. Rousselle, *L'empire romain en mutation. Des Sévères à Constantin, 192–337* (Paris 1999), 127ff.; Corbier 2005, op. cit. (n. 3), 330–392.

debasement of the imperial coinage.¹⁷ After the reign of Septimius Severus his son Caracalla introduced a new silver coin denomination, the *antoninianus*, which had a nominal value of two *denarii*, but contained the silver of about 1,5 *denarii*. Severus Alexander and Maximinus Thrax did no longer produce such *antoniniani* and tried to maintain the silver content and weight of their *denarii*—if we may believe the graphs of Bland¹⁸—, but from 238 the emperors had to give in to pressing needs and reverted to Caracalla's debased *antoniniani*. From the reign of Philip-pus Arabs Roman imperial silver coinage was progressively debased, until it reached a silver content of less than 2% under Claudius II, about 269. So far this did not yet result in a universal empire-wide rise in prices, if we may believe Hans Drexhage, Elio Lo Cascio and Dominic Rathbone. Silver coins had become token money. Prices only skyrocketed after the emperor Aurelian had given up the fixed relation between silver and gold coins, in this way undermining popular trust in the imperial silver coinage.¹⁹

So, were Cassius Dio and Herodian right and were the soldiers the prime cause of misery? Or was the military factor in the onset of crises a function of other factors and not the main cause of the problems? First of all, actual continuous warfare at various borders created military demands, losses and a rise of military expenditure, and so increasing military expenditure was a function of intensified warfare. However, there are other factors too: the effects of recurrent waves of plague and ensuing rises in prices and wages, the weakening of imperial authority, and the unwilling attitude of parts of the population to give the central

¹⁷ See Chr. Howgego, 'The Supply and Use of Money in the Roman World, 200 BC–AD 300', *Journal of Roman Studies* 82 (1992), 1–31. In Corbier's view the emperors' financial needs were the main reason, not a lack of precious metals; see Corbier 2005, op. cit. (n. 3), 390. Cf. Lo Cascio 2005, op. cit. (n. 3), 154f.

¹⁸ Bland 1996, op. cit. (n. 16).

¹⁹ See H.-J. Drexhage, *Preise, Mieten/Pachten, Kosten und Löhne im römischen Aegypten bis zum Regierungsantritt Diokletians* (St. Katharinen 1991); E. Lo Cascio, 'Dall' *antoninianus* al 'laureato grande': l'evoluzione monetaria del III secolo alla luce della nuova documentazione di età diocleziana', *Opus* 3 (1984), 135–201; idem, 'Dinamiche economiche e politiche fiscali fra I Severi ed Aureliano', in *Storia di Roma Einaudi* III 1 (Turin 1993), 276ff.; idem, 'How did the Romans view their Coinage and its Function?', in C.E. King & D.G. Wigg, *Coin Finds and Coin Use in the Roman World. The Thirteenth Oxford Symposium on Coinage and Monetary History*, 25.–27.3.1993 (Berlin 1996), 281; D.W. Rathbone, 'Monetisation, not Price-inflation, in Third Century AD Egypt?', in C.E. King & D.G. Wigg, eds., *Coin Finds and Coin Use in the Roman World* (Berlin 1996), 321–339; idem, 'Prices and Price-Formation in Roman Egypt', in J. Andreau et al., eds., *Economie antique: prix et formation des prix dans les économies antiques* (Saint Bertrand de Comminges 1997), 183–244.

administration what it needed. There is no certainty about the demographical damage caused by the second plague, which may have hit regions of the Roman Empire in varying intensity and in several waves during two or three decades beyond AD 250. Cyprian is referring to it in his *Ad Demetrianum*, Eusebius is speaking about it in his *Ecclesiastical History*, book 7, and Zosimus ascribes in 1.37.3 a depopulation of towns in Illyricum, as he calls it, partly to the plague.²⁰ In relatively thinly populated regions where forced recruitment, deportations and actual warfare had already diminished the number of farmers and other productive people, such as the hinterlands of the Danube border and the Agri Decumates, the effects may have been serious, and the balance between productive and non-productive military people, who were dependent on surpluses created by others, may have become precarious. A period of plague made labour scarcer and so gave labourers and farmers a better bargaining position. If they ran away from their villages, by *anachoresis*, they could heavily diminish tax-returns of their region. Even before the second plague, under Philip the Arabian, farmers living on an imperial estate at the village of Aragoë, like other villagers in other third century petitions, overtly suggested that returns might go down if the emperor would not listen to them.²¹ If such things happened, military units at neighbouring borders, which were largely dependent on surpluses generated by their hinterland, may have come into trouble and may have become prone to rebellion and usurpation, particularly if invaders had destroyed their properties in the *limes*-region, which they were allowed to own from the days of Septimius Severus. Another result must have been that hinterlands which were lying further away, at a greater distance from the border, were to bear more taxation and requisition of supplies. For example in Egypt, where under Philip the Arabian, after heavy warfare at the eastern borders, a kind of reorganization became a necessity, probably to enlarge its export of military supplies, especially food. Many years ago Peter Parsons convincingly

²⁰ See Cyprian, *Ad Demetrianum* 3–10; idem, *De mortalitate* 2 (cf. Alföldy 1989, op. cit. (n. 3), 309). See Eusebius, *Historia ecclesiastica* 7.21–22; Zosimus 1.37.3. Cf. E. Lo Cascio, 'La dissoluzione dell'impero Romano d'Occidente: la spiegazione demografica', in G. Cacciatore, et al., eds., *Filosofia e storia della cultura. Studi in onore di Fulvio Tessitore* (Naples 1997), 168ff. and Carrié & Rousselle 1999, op. cit. (n. 3), 521ff.

²¹ See Hauken 1998, op. cit. (n. 7), 35ff., esp. 41, on a text from Aga Bey Köyü (Lydia) dating from 197–211 or 244–249, and 149, on a petition from Aragoë in Phrygia. See above, note 7. Cf. Hauken 1998, op. cit. (n. 7), 173 on a text from Dagis in Moesia Inferior, from 159–160, a parallel text.

argued that the administration of Egypt was reorganized under this emperor. In the second edition of *Cambridge Ancient History* XII Alan Bowman argues that under Philip the Arabian a coherent reform was carried into effect, which mainly focused on landholdings and liturgies and implied an overhaul of the taxation system and the *annona militaris*.²² Another example: Northern Italy. A passage in Herodian's work is very interesting in this respect. In 8.2.3 he tells us that many goods found their way to the Danubian provinces through Aquileia. Is he speaking about trade and nothing else? That is not likely. Apart from the armies there cannot have been many communities in that region, which attracted large amounts of imported goods. Besides, Herodian is speaking about the year AD 238, which was preceded by the wars that Maximinus Thrax conducted against tribes in Germany, over the Alps.²³ These wars must have been serious. If there is any historicity in Herodian's highly rhetorical report, in 7.3, Maximinus had to grab all kinds of reserve money to finance them, even from temples, sanctuaries of the imperial cult included, as Ittai Gradel convincingly argued in a recently published book.²⁴ In those days Maximinus was not very popular in Italy, as events of the year 238 clearly showed. But again, Northern Italy did not enter a period of decay or crisis in those years; obviously it had sufficient carrying capacity.²⁵

²² During the later 240s the emperor Philip had to take rather strong measures to maintain Egyptian contributions at their traditional level. According to Peter Parsons, low Niles and defective inundations are to be blamed. But in my view we should add stronger state demands and more state purchases, followed by *anachoresis*, preferably to large well-protected domains. See P.J. Parsons, *Journal of Roman Studies* 57 (1967), 134ff. and idem, P.Oxy. 42, pp. 110ff., nrs. 3046–3050. See A.K. Bowman, 'Egypt from Septimius Severus to the Death of Constantine, op. cit. (n. 3), 318f.

²³ Herodian 7.2. On the fateful year AD 238 and the preceding reign of Maximinus Thrax see now K. Haegemans, *Imperial Authority and Dissent. The Roman Empire in AD 235–238* (diss. Leuven 2005). A commercial edition will be published by Peeters, Leuven, probably in 2007.

²⁴ Herodian 7.3.5–6: "After Maximinus had reduced most of the distinguished families to penury, he then began to think it was an unimportant, insignificant activity and not enough to satisfy his desire. So he turned to expropriate any money in the city being collected for food supply and cash distribution to the common people, and funds put aside for theatres and festivals. Temple dedications, statues of the gods, honorary presentations to the heroes (or: 'deified emperors?'), any ornamentation on public buildings or city decorations, or material that could be turned into coin was all melted down." See I. Gradel, *Emperor Worship and Roman Religion* (Oxford 2002), 356ff.

²⁵ On Northern Italy see Witschel 1999, op. cit. (n. 2), 255–258: only in the later third century there were signs of depression in Northern Italy, after which a phase of recovery followed in the fourth century. Cf. Witschel 2004, op. cit. (n. 2), 265.

Another factor certainly contributed to third century military unruliness, *i.e.* the erosion of imperial authority, which precluded strict attitudes towards the military. After the times of Caracalla, dynastic succession became problematic and child-emperors could not rely on a record of *res gestae*. The religiously tinged ideological compensation that Commodus and Elagabalus had sought in emphasizing protection by a favourite all-powerful deity could no longer work after the demise of Elagabalus. Severus Alexander had to return to a rather conservative religious policy.²⁶ There are visible signs of a decline of imperial authority. Under Hadrian one could still speak to rapacious military people in a rather harsh tone. In a papyrus text, PSI 446, we read:

I (*i.e.* the *praefectus Aegypti* [LdB]) am informed that without having a warrant many of the soldiers when travelling through the country requisition boats and animals and persons improperly, in some cases seizing them by force, in other obtaining them from the *strategi* through favour or obsequiousness, the result of which is that private persons are subjected to insults and abuses and the army is reproached for greed and injustice. The prefect commands never to furnish to any person without a warrant any contribution for the journey.²⁷

In the third century, emperors rather advised people who petitioned them for help to turn to their governor.²⁸ Already under Severus Alexander groups of soldiers turned against non-military men who tried to rule them in an old-fashioned disciplinary way, by real *severitas*. Cassius Dio, who had behaved in this way in Pannonia, became one of their victims. Messages went to the praetorians in Rome, who saw to it that the emperor Severus Alexander sent Dio away, outside Rome, during the period of his second consulship, which he was to hold together with the emperor himself. This was a mortal blow to Dio's prestige.²⁹

²⁶ See Hekster 2002, op. cit. (n. 11), 87–136; L. de Blois, 'Emperorship in a Period of Crisis: Changes in Emperor Worship, Imperial Ideology and Perceptions of Imperial Authority in the Roman Empire in the Third Century AD' and M. Icks, 'Priesthood and Imperial Power. The Religious Reforms of Heliogabalus, 220–222 AD', both in P. Funke, J. Hahn & L. de Blois, eds., *The Impact of Imperial Rome on Religions, Ritual and Religious Life in the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the Fifth Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, 200 BC–AD 476), Münster, June 30–July 3, 2004* (Leiden/Boston 2006).

²⁷ PSI 446 = A.S. Hunt & C.C. Edgar, *Select Papyri* II (London/Cambridge, Mass. 1956), nr. 221.

²⁸ See for example *Sylloge*³ II 888, ll.108–122 (from Skaptopare, see above note 7); *OGIS* II 519, ll. 26f. (from Aragoë, see above, note 7).

²⁹ See Cassius Dio 80.4–5.

In conclusion: the military factor was quintessential in the rise of problems and crises in the Roman Empire in the third century, but it was itself a function of coinciding developments: the intensification of actual warfare, ensuing devastations, epidemics and deportations, a change in the bargaining position of surviving productive people in war areas, who could take refuge in *anachoresis*, and a deterioration of actual imperial authority, which became visible in imperial rescripts about military misconduct and the decreasing power of cultured, unmilitary high status aristocrats, who co-operated with emperors who wanted to continue Antonine traditions.

MILITARISIERUNGS- UND DEMILITARISIERUNGSTENDENZEN IM DRITTEN JAHRHUNDERT N. CHR.

PETER EICH

In einer 1999 vorgelegten Synthese verweist Jean-Michel Carrié darauf, daß das dritte nachchristliche Jahrhundert lange Zeit in der modernen Forschung eine ungeliebte Epoche römischer Geschichte geblieben ist.¹ Diese Charakterisierung ist zweifelsohne zutreffend. Verschiedene Faktoren haben dazu beigetragen, daß das dritte Jahrhundert in den historischen Disziplinen gerade in der prägenden Phase moderner Historiographie im neunzehnten und in der ersten Hälfte des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts geringere Aufmerksamkeit oder auch pauschalere Beurteilungen erfahren hat als vorgehende Epochen. Zeitgenössische politische Entwicklungen mögen dabei eine Rolle gespielt haben. Wie neuere Studien zeigen konnten, stützten sich Befürworter der europäischen Kolonialisierung afrikanischer und asiatischer Länder häufig auf römische Konzepte und lateinisches Vokabular, um ihre Eroberungen als kulturbringende Missionen darzustellen.² Dieser Umstand mag dazu geführt haben, daß der militärische Notstand des dritten Jahrhunderts als ein *memento mori* aufgefaßt worden ist. Wichtiger für das Aufmerksamkeitsdefizit waren aber sicher die Veränderungen in der Quellenlage in diesem Zeitraum. Die Schrifttradition aus dem dritten Jahrhundert läßt quantitativ (bezüglich Inschriften und Papyri) und, zumindest in der lange Zeit dominanten Bewertung einer philologisch ausgerichteten Althistorie, auch qualitativ nach. Im folgenden wird jedoch eine andere Facette des—realen oder vermuteten—Wandels im dritten Jahrhundert im Mittelpunkt stehen, die sich bei näherer Analyse in einem hermeneutischen Zirkel sowohl als Initiator als auch als Derivat der skizzierten angenommenen politisch-kulturellen Trajektionskurve des römischen

¹ J.M. Carrié und A. Rousselle, *L'empire romain en mutation. Des Sévères à Constantin* (Paris 1999), 90.

² J. Webster und N. Cooper, Hgg., *Roman Imperialism: post-colonial Perspectives* (Leicester 1996); R. Schulz, 'Einleitung', in ders., Hg., *Aufbruch in neue Welten und neue Zeiten* (München 2003), 8ff., 14; E. Schmitt, 'Zusammenfassender Kommentar,' ebd. 109ff., 119ff.

Imperiums erweist. Die Probleme, mit denen sich das römische Reich in dieser Zeit konfrontiert sah, waren unbestreitbar zunächst und vor allem militärischer Natur. Mit diesem institutionellen Feld werden denn auch mehr als mit allen anderen Bereichen Veränderungen des Gesamtsystems der römischen Gesellschaft in Verbindung gebracht. Die römische Gesellschaft, so eine bedeutende Strömung in der Forschung, habe sich unter dem Druck innerer und äußerer Kriege militarisiert.³ Eine Reihe eindeutig negativ konnotierter Ausdrücke wird infolge dieser Grundannahme zur Charakterisierung des Imperiums dieser Epoche verwandt.⁴ Eine Studie spricht beispielsweise davon, eine Militärjunta habe im dritten Jahrhundert die Herrschaft über das Reich übernommen.⁵ Die These einer ‚Militarisierung‘ des Imperiums behauptete lange Zeit im Grunde unangefochten das Feld und fungierte als universeller Interpretations-Passepartout bei der Auseinandersetzung mit dem ‚Krisenzeitalter.‘ In den letzten Jahrzehnten stieß diese Terminologie allerdings wachsend auf Kritik.⁶ Von einzelnen Forschern wird jedoch nicht nur das ‚Militarisierungskonzept‘ im engeren Sinne abgelehnt, sondern auch die historische Dynamik, in die es sich einschreiben soll, in ihrer Bedeutung stark relativiert.⁷ Diese Fundamentalkritik ist Anlaß

³ Vgl. beispielsweise M. Christol, ‚Armée et société politique dans l’empire romain au III^e siècle ap. J.-C.‘, *Civiltà Classica e Cristiana* 9 (1988), 169ff., 190ff. (bezüglich der zweiten Hälfte des dritten Jahrhunderts); K. Christ, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit* (München, 3. Auflage 1995), 702; R. MacMullen, *Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 65; H. Teitler, *Notarii and exceptores* (Amsterdam 1985), 44; P. Cosme, *L’État romain entre éclatement et continuité* (Paris 1998), 94.

⁴ Cf. etwa A. Alföldi, ‘The Crisis of the Empire’, *Cambridge Ancient History 12: the imperial Crisis and Recovery 193–324* (Cambridge 1939), 165ff., 201; E.K. Rand, ‘The Latin Literature of the West from the Antonines to Constantine’, ebd. 571ff.; A. Calderini, ‘I Severi. La crisi dell’Impero nel III secolo’, *Storia di Roma* 7 (Bologna 1949), 127; 242; Christ 1995, a.a.O. (Anm. 3), 696ff.; J. Bleicken, *Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte des römischen Kaiserreiches* 1 (Paderborn 1978), 185; 303; Th. Heuss, *Römische Geschichte* (Paderborn, 6. Aufl. 1998), 411ff. Siehe noch die Literaturangaben bei Christol 1988, a.a.O. (Anm. 3), 169ff.

⁵ C. Brizzi, ‘Soldatenkaiser’, *Illyriciani ed altri problemi*, *Rivista storica dell’Antiquità* 8 (1978), 89ff.

⁶ Vgl. bspw. B. Palme, ‘Die *Officia* der Statthalter in der Spätantike’, *Antiquité Tardive* 7 (1999), 85ff., 101.

⁷ Vgl. vor allem D. Rathbone, ‘Monetisation, not Price-Inflation, in Third-Century AD Egypt?’, C.E. King und D.G. Wigg, Hgg., *Coin Finds and Coin Use in the Roman World* (Berlin 1996), 321ff.; Carrié und Rousselle 1999, a.a.O. (Anm. 1), 125ff. Eine eindeutige Relativierung bietet auch Chr. Witschel, *Krise—Rezession—Stagnation?* (Frankfurt 1999). Der gleichen Forschungsrichtung verpflichtet sind G.P. Burton, ‘Was there a long-term Trend to Centralisation of Authority in the Roman Empire?’, *Revue Philologique* 72 (1998), 7ff.; K. Ruffing, ‘Preise und Wertangaben aus Dura-Europos und Umgebung’, *Laverna* 13 (2002), 24ff.

genug, die These der Militarisierung von Staat und Gesellschaft einer kritischen Würdigung zu unterziehen. Zunächst ist jedoch noch eine terminologische Vorbemerkung notwendig. Wenn hier über das ‚dritte Jahrhundert‘ gehandelt wird, so ist damit nicht der Zeitraum von 201 bis 300 n. Chr. gemeint. Historische Prozesse korrespondieren bekanntlich nicht in exakter Weise mit modernen chronologischen Markierungen. Die These einer ‚Militarisierung‘ hat als Bezugshorizont den Zeitraum, in dem das Reich langfristig in die Defensive gedrängt wurde, zumindest aber nicht mehr den zeitlichen Ablauf der Ereignisse auf dem militärischen Sektor weitgehend bestimmen konnte. Die Koordinaten römischer Strategie und Politik begannen sich schon unter Marcus zu verschieben. Diese strukturpolitische Neuorientierung des Imperiums endete auch nicht einfach mit dem Rückzug Diocletians aus dem Kaiserkollegium. Die von ihm und seinen Mitherrschern eingeleiteten Restrukturierungen wie etwa die Steuerreform oder die Transformation der Provinzialadministration waren 305 nicht abgeschlossen, sondern fanden im Grunde erst mit der dauerhaften Reetablierung einer Alleinherrschaft durch Konstantin eine festere Verankerung innerhalb der politisch-administrativen Gesamtkonstruktion des Imperiums. 1994 publizierte Giovanni Arrighi⁸ seine Studie ‘The Long Twentieth Century,’ in der er die ökonomische Entwicklung der okzidentalen Welt mit einer von Fernand Braudel inspirierten Konzeptualisierung historischer Prozesse als langer Entwicklungszyklen analysierte. In Anlehnung an seinen Titel und das Konzept langer Zyklen kann der hier relevante Zeitraum vom Beginn der Alleinherrschaft Marc Aurels bis zu Konstantins Monarchie als das ‚lange dritte Jahrhundert‘ bezeichnet werden. Die Ereignisse dieser Epoche bilden das Substrat für die folgenden Ausführungen.

1. *Das Konzept der ‚Militarisierung‘ und seine Komponenten*

Den Hintergrund der These einer Militarisierung des Imperiums bilden, wie schon angesprochen, die diversen Symptome militärischer Überanstrengung des Imperiums, die im dritten Jahrhundert zu Tage traten und die sich mit fortschreitender Zeit zu dem Syndrom eines ‚imperial overstretch‘ zusammenfügten. An allen großen Fronten kam es immer wieder zu lang anhaltenden Konflikten mit äußeren Feinden, die zu

⁸ London 1994.

bedeutenden territorialen Einbußen führten.⁹ Zu den Kämpfen gegen äußere Feinde traten zahlreiche Usurpationen und, in der Folge, Bürgerkriege. Nicht nur die einzelnen Kaiser, auch das Imperium selbst kämpften zwischenzeitlich um das Überleben. Das Kernstück des Regierungshandelns jedes Herrschers dieser Zeit war daher die Aufrechterhaltung der Schlagkraft der Armee. Doch die Militarisierungsthese beschränkt sich nicht auf die pauschale Konstatierung einer permanent gewordenen militärischen Krise; sie ordnet eine größere Zahl von Detailentwicklungen, die sie als Derivate des Bedeutungszuwachses der Armee auffaßt, ihrem Hauptlemma unter. Zur Illustration sei hier auf einige solcher Entwicklungen verwiesen. So sollen der soziale Hintergrund und die Karrieren vieler Kaiser nach Severus Alexander militärisch geprägt gewesen sein.¹⁰ Dazu stellt sich, daß Angehörige provinzieller Bevölkerungsgruppen, die bis in das dritte Jahrhundert die politisch-kulturelle Distanz zum Zentrum noch nicht vollständig überwunden hatten, vermehrt für Aufgaben im Reichsdienst herangezogen wurden. Das Medium für ihre stärkere Integration in die Entscheidungseliten war eben das Heer.¹¹ Schon seit der Severerzeit ist das Entstehen einer Zweiteilung in den Karrieren römischer Funktionsträger in stärker zivil und stärker militärisch geprägte Laufbahnmuster zu beobachten.¹² Spätestens seit dem Ende dieser Dynastie läßt sich eine wachsende Entfremdung zwischen Senatoren und Soldaten vermuten; ihren Ausdruck soll diese Entfremdung in dem langsamen Ausscheiden der Senatoren aus dem aktiven Militärdienst gefunden haben.¹³ Das sogenannte Edikt des Gallienus,¹⁴ das Senatoren von wesentlichen Leitungspositionen in der Armee ausschloß, wird als ein erster Höhepunkt dieser Entwicklung gedeutet. Unter der ersten Tetrarchie fanden Sena-

⁹ Vgl. den Beitrag von A. Eich in diesem Band.

¹⁰ Siehe etwa J. Rodríguez-González, 'Las carreras militares de los emperadores romanos antes de acceder al trono', 1 und 2, *Hispania Antiqua* 19 (1995), 169ff. und 20 (1996), 367ff.

¹¹ Dies gilt speziell für den Ritterstand im dritten Jahrhundert: H.-G. Pflaum, 'Zur Reform des Kaisers Gallienus', *Historia* 25 (1976), 110ff.; L. de Blois, *The Policy of the Emperor Gallienus* (Leiden 1976), 43; R.E. Smith, 'The Army Reforms of Septimius Severus', *Historia* 21 (1972), 481ff., 494f.

¹² J.-P. Coriat, 'Les hommes nouveaux à l'époque des Sévères', *Revue historique de droit français et étranger* 56 (1978), 5ff., 23; P. Leunissen, *Konsuln und Konsulare in der Zeit von Commodus bis Alexander Severus* (Amsterdam 1989), 123.

¹³ Siehe etwa B. Malcus, 'Notes sur la révolution du système administratif romain au III^e siècle', *Opuscula Romana* 7 (1969), 213ff., 234f.; A. Chastagnol, *Le sénat romain à l'époque impériale* (Paris 1992), 203; A. Demandt, 'Der spätrömische Militäradel', *Chiron* 10 (1980), 609ff., 610f.

¹⁴ Aurelius Victor, *Caesares* 33.33.

toren dann kaum noch in militärischen oder auch zivilen Positionen im Reichsdienst Verwendung.¹⁵ Bereits unter Septimius Severus habe die Verdrängung der Senatoren aus Führungsposten durch Ritter mit einer primär militärisch geprägten Laufbahn eingesetzt.¹⁶ In der zweiten Hälfte des Jahrhunderts bildeten *equites* dann ohne Zweifel das Rückgrat der Reichsadministration. Parallel dazu sollen nicht vom Herrscher ernannte Amtsträger bereits in der Severerzeit jede Bedeutung für die Reichsverwaltung verloren haben. Alle diese Phänomene, Fakten und ihre Interpretationen, werden als Komponenten eines einheitlichen Prozesses gedeutet: Der augusteische Prinzipat sei das Produkt eines Ausgleichs zwischen den Interessen der traditionellen Elite und den Ansprüchen des Siegers im Bürgerkrieg gewesen. Obwohl die Vorrangstellung des Princeps eindeutig etabliert gewesen sei, seien der politischen Betätigung des Senats und seiner Repräsentanten und damit primär zivilen Institutionen doch beachtliche Freiräume reserviert geblieben, die als Einschränkungen der Vollmachten der Herrscher hätten fungieren können oder sollen. An die Stelle dieses sorgfältig ausbalancierten politisch-administrativen Systems soll dann im dritten Jahrhundert eine straffe, militärisch organisierte Herrschaftsform getreten sein. In der ‚Krise‘ habe die Armee unter Ausschaltung der eine Militärherrschaft temperierenden Elemente der republikanischen Tradition unmittelbar die Führung des Staates übernommen. Dies ist, explizit oder implizit, der eigentliche Kern der Militarisierungsthese.

Das oben kurz skizzierte Modell der Entwicklung des Imperiums im dritten Jahrhundert ist, wie schon angesprochen, auf unterschiedliche Kritikansätze gestoßen, die in einer anhaltenden Kontroverse allmählich die Oberhand zu gewinnen scheinen. Kritisiert wurden zunächst einzelne Details des Konglomerats, das die Militarisierungsthese ausmacht. Beispielsweise waren Senatoren wohl wesentlich länger in politisch-militärischen Führungsfunktionen aktiv, als man früher angenommen hat.¹⁷ Andere Arbeiten lehnen zwar die ‚Militarisierungsthese‘ in ihrem Kern nicht ab, wenden sich aber klar gegen die Teilen der Forschung unterliegende Vorstellung einer durch osmotische Ausbreitung entstandenen

¹⁵ M. Christol, *Essai sur l'évolution des carrières sénatoriales dans la seconde moitié du III^e siècle ap. J.-C.* (Paris 1986).

¹⁶ Coriât 1978, a.a.O. (Anm. 12), 7; M.V. Giangrieco Pessi, *Situazione economico-sociale e politica finanziaria sotto i Severi* (Neapel 1988), 14 mit weiteren Literaturangaben.

¹⁷ Vgl. etwa W. Eck, ‚Prosopographische Bemerkungen zum Militärdiplom vom 20. 12. 202 n. Chr.‘, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 139 (2002), 208ff., 209.

Omnipräsenz des militärisch induzierten Krisensyndroms.¹⁸ Einzelne Studien stellen aber, wie angesprochen, auch die oben dargelegte Gesamttenenz in Frage und verneinen, daß das Römische Reich im dritten Jahrhundert Symptome eines ‚imperial overstretch‘ aufwies. Zu solchen, die Überlieferung einseitig interpretierenden Ansätzen wird später noch mehr zu sagen sein. Signifikante Veränderungen im politisch-administrativen System hat es im dritten Jahrhundert durchaus gegeben. Eine Reihe der oben genannten Einzelentwicklungen verlieren auch bei anderer Gewichtung oder Einbettung nicht den Charakter wegweisender Transformationen. Ob solche Veränderungen jedoch mit dem Terminus ‚Militarisierung‘ richtig charakterisiert werden können, muß in der Tat fraglich bleiben. Zwei wichtige Argumente lassen sich gegen diesen Begriff und das mit ihm evozierte Modell vorbringen.

Mit der Verwendung des Terminus ‚Militarisierung‘ als Beschreibung des Wandels im dritten Jahrhundert wird der Eindruck erweckt, das Militär habe vor dieser Phase eine wesentlich geringere Bedeutung für die römische Gesellschaft und ihre Teilsysteme gehabt. Zumindest aber legt dieser Begriff die Vorstellung nahe, daß ein Analogon zu dem heutigen Konzept der Zivilgesellschaft existiert hätte. Beides ist—bezogen auf die imperiale Ebene—nicht nachweisbar und auch nicht wahrscheinlich. Das Rom der Republik war in hohem Ausmaß militärisch geprägt.¹⁹ Daß sich die Grundkoordinaten römischer ‚Staatlichkeit‘ in der Kaiserzeit wesentlich verschoben hätten, ist gleichfalls weder belegbar noch plausibel. Zwar ging die Zahl großer, also die Verlegung oder gar Neuaufstellung mehrerer Legionen implizierender Kampfeinsätze der römischen Armee in der nachaugusteischen Zeit wohl zurück, doch blieb das Imperium noch im ersten nachchristlichen Jahrhundert expansiv ausgerichtet, wie die Eroberungen Britanniens, des Dekumatenlandes oder Dakiens beweisen. Allenfalls könnte man davon sprechen, daß die fünfzig Jahre vor dem Beginn des ‚langen dritten Jahrhunderts‘ von einer Stabilisierungspolitik geprägt waren. Doch die Bedeutung des Militärs zeigte sich im Prinzipat nicht nur bei Kampfhandlungen. Der Status und die Stellung des Princeps beruhten ganz wesentlich auf seiner Position als Oberbefehlshaber der Armee.²⁰ Das politische Nahverhältnis

¹⁸ Siehe vor allem K. Strobel, *Das Imperium Romanum im ‚dritten Jahrhundert‘: Modell einer historischen Krise?*, Historia Einzelschriften 75 (Stuttgart 1993).

¹⁹ A. Eich und P. Eich, ‚War Making and State-Building: the Case of the Roman Republic‘, *Scripta Classica Israelica* 24 (2005), 1ff.

²⁰ Vgl. e.g. W. Eck, ‚Der Kaiser als Herr des Heeres‘, in J.J. Wilkes, Hg., *Documenting the Roman Army* (London 2003), 55ff.

zur Armee war ein unersetzlicher Bestandteil des Konglomerats von offiziellen Befugnissen und informellen Machtquellen, das das römische Kaisertum konstituierte.²¹ Ebenso wie die Herrscher blieb auch der politisch aktive Teil der Senatoren und Ritter mit wenigen Ausnahmen in engem Kontakt mit den Streitkräften. Doch nicht nur für die Machteliten hatte die Armee eine überragende Bedeutung. Das Imperium hatte weder in der Republik noch im Prinzipat eine eigentliche Provinzialverwaltung signifikanten Ausmaßes aufgebaut.²² Die Streitkräfte dienten als Surrogat für einen eigenständigen administrativen Apparat, auf den die Machteliten aus Kostengründen, mit Rücksicht auf die Tradition, aber auch aufgrund gesellschaftlicher Wertvorstellungen gerade in bezug auf exekutive Tätigkeiten und generell auf Lohnarbeit verzichteten.²³ Die Armee war dagegen unverzichtbar, und der Dienst in ihr war gesellschaftlich anerkannt. Die Soldaten waren den Umgang mit administrativen Dokumenten gewohnt²⁴ und in eine hierarchisch konstruierte Organisation integriert. Das Reich war also in hohem Ausmaße militarisiert, ein Zustand, an dem sich auch in den oftmals als Friedenszeiten apostrophierten Phasen des zweiten Jahrhunderts nichts änderte.²⁵ Diese Disposition der römischen Gesellschaft mag sich im dritten Jahrhundert noch weiter verstärkt haben—eine Charakterisierung dieses Prozesses mit analytischem Potential kann aus einer solchen relativen Intensivierung aber kaum mehr abgeleitet werden: Zu stark waren schon vorher die Entwicklungsbahnen vorgegeben. Ein weiteres Argument, das gegen die Verwendung des Etiketts ‚Militarisierung‘, spricht, bedarf einer ausführlicheren Explikation.

2. Demilitarisierungseffekte im dritten Jahrhundert

Es ist durchaus wahrscheinlich, daß im dritten Jahrhundert die Zahl der Administratoren mit einem primär militärischen Hintergrund anstieg, wenn auch eine Quantifizierung dieses Phänomens bedingt durch die

²¹ J. Stäcker, *Princeps und Miles* (Hildesheim u. a. 2003).

²² Vgl. Abschnitt 2.

²³ P. Eich, ‚Bürokratie in Rom? Grenzen und Nutzen eines Konzeptes in der althistorischen Forschung‘, in A. Baroni und E. Migliario, Hgg., *Amministrare un Impero. Roma e le sue province* (Trient 2007).

²⁴ K. Stauner, *Das offizielle Schriftwesens des römischen Heeres von Augustus bis Gallienus* (Bonn 2004).

²⁵ M.T. Schmitt, *Die römische Außenpolitik des 2. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.* (Stuttgart 1997), 199ff.; B. Rémy, *Antonin le Pieux* (Paris 2005), 227ff.

schlechte Überlieferungssituation nur schwer möglich ist.²⁶ Doch auch wenn man eine Militarisierung des administrativen Personals konstatieren will, die administrativen Funktionen selbst wurden nicht von einem solchen Prozeß erfaßt. Tatsächlich kann hier die gegenteilige Entwicklung festgestellt werden: Am Ende des ‚langen dritten Jahrhunderts‘ gab es im strukturellen Operationsrahmen des römischen Imperiums mehr Funktionen mit einem jedenfalls auch oder sogar nur zivilen Tätigkeitsfeld als zuvor. Die langsame Stärkung der zivilen Administration während des ‚langen dritten Jahrhunderts‘ kann daher als eine Demilitarisierung des politischen Systems der römischen Gesellschaft charakterisiert werden. Diese These gilt es zunächst durch einige Beispiele zu untermauern, bevor Schlußfolgerungen aus der so entstandenen paradoxalen Konstellation gezogen werden können.

2 v. Chr. ernannte Augustus zwei Präfekten für die bis dahin unmittelbar von ihm selbst kommandierte Garde.²⁷ Nach einem Transformationsprozeß von über dreihundert Jahren war die Prätorianerpräfektur zu dem höchsten zivilen Amt des Imperiums aufgestiegen. Die Präfektur war zunächst als rein militärische Gewalt konzipiert gewesen. Zwar war das politische Potential der Präfektur schon in tiberischer Zeit manifest geworden,²⁸ ansatzweise gefestigte Kompetenzen in der zivilen Administration entwickelte die Funktion jedoch erst später. Die Prätorianerpräfektur scheint im Laufe des Prinzipates zu einer Art Exekutive des kaiserlichen Stabes geworden und auch mit gewissen Aufsichtsrechten über diesen Stab ausgestattet worden zu sein. Ein erstes Indiz für diese Entwicklung fällt in die Zeit der Alleinherrschaft Marc Aurels; im folgenden Jahrhundert mehren sich die Hinweise auf einen solchen Prozeß.²⁹ Aus einer Offiziersstelle entstand so ein polyfunktionales Amt, dessen zivile Aufgaben so wichtig waren, daß sie schließlich unter Konstantin verselbständigt wurden. Den gleichen Wandel weist auch die Stellvertretung der Präfektur auf, die erstmals im dritten Jahr-

²⁶ Vgl. etwa A. Chastagnol, ‚La fin de l'ordre équestre: réflexions sur la prosopographie des ‚derniers‘ chevaliers romains‘, *Mélanges de l'école française à Rome. Moyen Âge* 100 (1988), 199ff.

²⁷ Cassius Dio 55.10.

²⁸ Siehe etwa M. Durry, *Les cohortes prétoriennes* (Paris 1938), 151ff.

²⁹ Siehe dazu und zum Folgenden P. Eich, *Zur Metamorphose des politischen Systems in der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Berlin 2005), 211ff. Der angesprochene Text ist CIL IX 2438 = FIRA I² 61.

hundert belegt ist.³⁰ Die *vices agentes* nahmen die Aufgaben abwesender Präfekten in Rom wahr; so kommandierten sie natürlich auch und vielleicht sogar primär die in oder bei der Hauptstadt verbleibenden Einheiten der Garde. Unter Diocletian sind solche *vices agentes* erstmals auch außerhalb Roms belegt.³¹ Das Tätigkeitsfeld der Stellvertreter neuen Typs scheint dabei primär in der zivilen Administration gelegen zu haben.³² Im vierten Jahrhundert ist der Vicariat dann ebenso wie die Präfektur ein rein ziviles Amt.³³

Ein anderer Aspekt dieser Aufgliederung des präfektoralen Zuständigkeitsbereichs verdient noch Beachtung. 320 ist zum ersten Male der *magister officiorum* bezeugt, eines der hochrangigen spätantiken Hofämter mit wichtigen Kompetenzen in der zivilen Administration.³⁴ Der Magister erhielt vermutlich unmittelbar bei der Etablierung des Amtes, die nicht präzise datiert werden kann, aber wohl in das frühe vierte Jahrhundert fällt,³⁵ wichtige Koordinierungsbefugnisse in bezug auf die zentralen Sekretariate, die *scrinia*.³⁶ Nach einer plausiblen, aber nicht verifizierbaren These wurden einige Aufgaben dieser Funktion in den Jahrzehnten zuvor von einem Tribun der Prätorianergarde wahrgenommen; eine solche Genese würde den Titel der frühen *magistri*, *magister et tribunus*, erklären.³⁷ Der Magister kommandierte auch die *scholae palatinae* und war unbestreitbar kein Funktionsträger mit ausschließlich zivilen Aufgaben. Doch wurde das Amt sicher nicht primär zu dem Zweck institutionalisiert, die neue Garde zu befehligen, sondern weil die Koordinierung der zentralen Sekretariate im frühen vierten Jahrhundert als so wichtig empfunden wurde, daß sie als eigenständiger Aufgabenbereich neu definiert werden konnte oder mußte. Der Magister war im wesentlichen ein höfischer Amtsträger und höchstens in zweiter Linie ein Offizier. Auch bei der Kreation des *magister officiorum* scheint es zu

³⁰ A. Stein, ‚Stellvertreter der Praefecti Praetorio‘, *Hermes* 60 (1925), 94ff.

³¹ P. Oxy. 12.1449; *Acta S. Marcelli* 2.2.

³² W. Kuhoff, *Diokletian und die Epoche der Tetrarchie* (Frankfurt 2001), 379f.

³³ W. Ensslin, *Pauly-Wissowa, Realenzyklopädie* 8A, 2 (Stuttgart 1958), s.v. ‚Vicarius‘, 2015ff.

³⁴ *Codex Theodosianus* 16.10.1.

³⁵ M. Clauss, *Der Magister Officiorum in der Spätantike*, *Vestigia* 32 (München 1980), 12f.

³⁶ V. Aiello, ‚I rapporti fra centro e periferia in epoca costantiniana. L'origine del *magister officiorum*‘, G. Crifò und S. Giglio, Hgg., *Atti dell' Accademia Costantiniana* 13 (Perugia 2001), 137ff.

³⁷ Siehe etwa A. Chastagnol, *L'évolution politique, sociale et économique du monde romain de Dioclétien à Julien* (Paris, 2. Auflage 1985), 199.

der Herauslösung wichtiger, eigentlich ziviler Zuständigkeiten aus dem engeren militärischen Kontext gekommen zu sein.³⁸

Die gleiche Transformationskurve wie die Prätorianerpräfektur weist auch die Statthalterschaft im dritten Jahrhundert auf. Der republikanische Gouverneur war als Imperiumsträger auch und gerade der Vertreter der römischen Militärmacht gewesen. Die militärische Kommandogewalt blieb allen Gouverneuren auch im Prinzipat zumindest potentiell erhalten, wenn sie auch bei einer Reihe von Statthaltern *de facto* weitgehend ruhte. Die prozessual verlaufende Fragmentierung der Provinzen und die langsam steigende Zahl militärischer Sonderkommandos³⁹ verringerten seit der Severerzeit die Bedeutung der militärischen Aktionssphäre im Aufgabenprofil der Statthalter. Seit der Mitte des dritten Jahrhunderts ist dann eine Fusion von Statthalterschaft und Procuratur erkennbar, die zu einem Funktionsträger neuer Prägung, dem für die spätrömische Zeit charakteristischen Typus Gouverneur mit zivilen, auch in der Finanzverwaltung angesiedelten Tätigkeiten, verblendet wurden.⁴⁰ Da eine wachsende Zahl von *praesides* und *agentes vice praesidis* die Finanzadministration in eigene Regie übernahm, gewannen die zivilen Aktivitäten im Aufgabenprofil des römischen Gouverneurs zusätzlich an Gewicht. Spätestens gegen Ende der ersten Tetrarchie wurde die militärische Leitung an den Grenzen immer öfter an *duces* übertragen.⁴¹ Zwar behielten die *praesides* in diocletianischer Zeit ihre Kommandoaufgaben noch prinzipiell bei,⁴² doch war der Trend hier wie bei den anderen angesprochenen Umstrukturierungen eindeutig: Im posttetrarchischen Imperium war die Statthalterschaft eine zivile Funktion.

Das Paradigma der Entmilitarisierungsthese ist jedoch ohne Zweifel die Umgestaltung der Statthalterstäbe, die sich in der zweiten Hälfte

³⁸ Auch die gelegentlichen Armeekommandos der Magistri (R. Delmaire, *Les institutions du Bas-Empire romain de Constantin à Justinien I: les institutions civiles palatines* [Paris 1995], 86) sind weit eher mit der permanenten Anwesenheit der Magistri am inneren Hof und dem Vertrauen der Herrscher zu Agenten ihrer unmittelbaren Umgebung zu erklären als damit, daß diese Entwicklung von vornherein in der Zuständigkeit der Funktion angelegt war.

³⁹ R.E. Smith, 'Dux, praepositus', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 36 (1979), 263ff.

⁴⁰ G. Bravo, 'El *praeses* de Diocleciano', *Hispania Antiqua* 11–12 (1981–85), 37ff., 63; A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire* (Oxford 1964), 55; De Blois 1976, a.a.O. (Anm. 11), 50.

⁴¹ Smith 1979, a.a.O. (Anm. 39); Jones 1964, a.a.O. (Anm. 40), 44; 1074 Anm. 11; Kuhoff 2001, a.a.O. (Anm. 32), 443ff.

⁴² Siehe etwa Jones 1964, a.a.O. (Anm. 40), 43.

des dritten und im frühen vierten Jahrhundert vollzog, ohne daß wir in der Lage wären, mit leidlicher Sicherheit chronologische Markierungen zu setzen; nur der Ausgangspunkt und das Endresultat dieses Prozesses sind eindeutig erkennbar. Das Imperium Romanum hatte bis in den hohen Prinzipat keine Provinzialverwaltung *sui generis*, also keine spezifisch und nur der Administration der Provinzen dienende Organisation aufgebaut. Zwei Institutionen fungierten als Ersatz einer solchen Organisation. Zum einen wurden, wie schon angesprochen, anfallende administrative Aufgaben der Armee mitübertragen. Als ‚Provinzialverwaltung‘ sollte man die detachierte Soldaten in den Stäben vor allem der Gouverneure aber nicht charakterisieren. Die militärischen Stäbe waren vermutlich primär mit der Administration der Armee selbst befaßt.⁴³ Zudem waren eine ganze Reihe von regelmäßig in den *officia* von Statthaltern eingesetzten Chargen—wie etwa die *speculatores*, *stratores* oder die *quaestionarii*—ohne dies nicht mit Verwaltungsaufgaben im engeren Sinne betraut.⁴⁴ Neben detachierte Soldaten fungierten Mitglieder der *familia Caesaris* als struktureller Ersatz für eine eigentliche Provinzialverwaltung, und zwar speziell im Herzstück jeder Verwaltung,⁴⁵ der Finanzadministration. Es ist bezeichnend für den Status von Administration in Rom, daß diese Aufgabe sozial Deklassierten übertragen wurde, deren einzige Qualifikation in ihrer Zugehörigkeit zum Haushalt des Princeps bestand, also einen rein patrimonialen Charakter trug. Zu einer wirklichen Vernetzung der unterschiedlichen, auch mit zivilen Kompetenzen ausgestatteten Zweige der Administration ist es zudem im Prinzipat wohl nicht gekommen, Bindeglied der einzelnen Segmente blieb stets nur der Kaiser.⁴⁶ Im vierten Jahrhundert dagegen wurden die Stäbe der nunmehr rein zivilen Funktionsträger wie der Statthalter, Prätorianerpräfekten und Vicare weitgehend einheitlich aus

⁴³ Vgl. etwa Stauner 2004, a.a.O. (Anm. 24), 210ff.

⁴⁴ R. Haensch, *Capita Provinciarum* (Mainz 1997), 715; 721. Typologisch eine Mittelstellung nehmen die Soldaten ein, die in *officia* von Procuratoren abgeordnet waren. Ihre Zahl scheint jedoch nicht sehr groß gewesen zu sein (Haensch a.a.O.); auch in ihrem Aufgabenprofil werden zudem wiederum armeeinterne Probleme (die Aufrechterhaltung der Verbindung) und Polizeiaktivitäten eine besondere Bedeutung gehabt haben. Die *apparitores* sollten schon wegen ihrer sehr geringen Zahl nicht als ‚Provinzialverwaltung‘ charakterisiert werden.

⁴⁵ Siehe etwa M. Mann, *Geschichte der Macht* (Frankfurt u. a. 1990), 46; G. Dallera, ‚Teoria economica e burocrazia‘, *L'educazione giuridica IV. Il pubblico funzionario* (Perugia 1981) 3, 413ff.

⁴⁶ P. Eich 2005, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 85ff.

freien Reichsbewohnern rekrutiert, die nur noch aufgrund einer der Tradition geschuldeten Fiktion mit der kämpfenden Truppe verbunden waren.⁴⁷ Den Beginn dieser Umgestaltung der *officia* festzumachen, ist wegen der schlechten Quellenlage kaum möglich, doch könnte dieser Prozeß mit den anderen von Gallienus angestoßenen Reformen korreliert haben.⁴⁸ In jedem Falle ist die Transformation der Stäbe ein klarer Beleg für den Ausbau der zivilen Strukturen, die aufgrund ihres Bedeutungszuwachses teils sozial aufgewertet, teils aus dem militärischen Kontext herausgelöst wurden und Autonomie gewannen. Die neuen *officia* vor allem der Statthalter sind ein gutes Beispiel für den angesprochenen Prozeß einer ‚Demilitarisierung‘.

3. Funktionselemente einer protobürokratischen Organisation

Kann das Paradoxon zweier konträrer Entwicklungen im imperialen politischen System: Militarisierung und Demilitarisierungstendenzen in der Administration, aufgehoben werden? Sicher bildete die Permanenz der militärischen Anspannung im dritten Jahrhundert den Hintergrund für beide Prozesse, doch greift eine Erklärung, die die Entmilitarisierungsbestrebungen unmittelbar aus der strategischen Notlage des Reichs ableiten will, offensichtlich zu kurz. Ein Blick auf eine weitere Transformation der römischen Administration im gleichen Zeitraum bietet einen interpretativen Schlüssel zu dem hier aufgezeigten, scheinbaren Widerspruch. Die folgenden Thesen können in diesem Rahmen jedoch nicht im einzelnen expliziert werden: Sie basieren in allen wesentlichen Punkten auf den Resultaten meiner Dissertation, auf die hier für eine ausführliche Diskussion des Gesamtbefundes ebenso wie für eine Kontextualisierung der Einzelzeugnisse verwiesen werden muß.⁴⁹

Trotz oder vielleicht gerade wegen der sehr intensiven Auseinandersetzung aller relevanten Forschungszweige mit dem römischen Reich besteht bis heute keine Einigkeit, wie die prinzipatszeitliche Herrschaftsform und die kaiserzeitliche Administration im Vergleich zu anderen

⁴⁷ Palme 1999, a.a.O. (Anm. 6), 100ff.

⁴⁸ H.-G. Pflaum, *Les procureurs équestres sous le Haut-Empire romain* (Paris 1950), 317ff.; J.-M. Carrié, ‚Le gouverneur romain à l’époque tardive: les directions possibles de l’enquête‘, *Antiquité Tardive* 6 (1998), 17ff., 21; Chastagnol 1988, a.a.O. (Anm. 26), 202f. Siehe noch Stauner 2004 (Anm. 24), 202ff., für die vorhergehende Entwicklung.

⁴⁹ Eich 2005, a.a.O. (Anm. 29).

Imperien einzuordnen sind. Während eine Gruppe von Forschern unbedenklich das Wortfeld ‚Bürokratie‘ zur Klassifikation römischer Phänomene heranzieht, lehnt eine andere Richtung diese Wortwahl vor allem wegen ihrer Implikationen—Kommensurabilität aller als ‚bürokratisch‘ charakterisierten politischen Systeme—strikt ab.⁵⁰ Diese Bipolarität der Einschätzungen resultiert jedoch zunächst nicht aus variierenden Deutungen der Überlieferung, die nur in seltenen Fällen bezüglich der angesprochenen Thematik einer umfassenden Analyse unterzogen wird, sondern aus oftmals unausgesprochen bleibenden terminologisch/definitorischen Unterscheidungen: Während Befürworter einer ‚bürokratischen Interpretation‘ die bloße Existenz einer Anzahl von Funktionsträgern und von Schriftlichkeit in der Administration als ein ausreichendes Fundament für ihre Charakterisierung ansehen, beruft sich die andere Seite explizit oder doch implizit auf moderne sozialwissenschaftliche Konstrukte, um die zuerst genannte These zu widerlegen. Die vage Definition von Bürokratie der ersten Forschungsrichtung muß in der Tat als höchst problematisch gelten, da sie die althistorische Forschung von der Diskussion in anderen historischen und sozialwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen abkoppelt und sie isoliert. Eine an den Definitionen moderner Sozialwissenschaftler—etwa Max Webers äußerst einflußreicher Beschäftigung mit dem Phänomen der Bürokratisierung—orientierte Analyse präjudiziert andererseits die Resultate der Untersuchung weitgehend, da ‚Bürokratie‘ in solchen Studien in der Regel als ein Phänomen der Moderne angesehen wird. Vormoderne Verwaltung wird so tendenziell hinsichtlich dieses Aspekts zu einem monolithischen Block, der durch das Fehlen bürokratischer Strukturen gekennzeichnet ist. Doch steht außer Frage, daß die moderne Verwaltungsform ‚Bürokratie‘ in ihrer Genese weit in die Zeit vor dem neunzehnten Jahrhundert hineinreicht, ohne deswegen ubiquitär gewesen zu sein, ein Schluß, den die zuerst genannte althistorische Forschungsrichtung aber zuläßt. Eine Reihe von Studien sind dem Versuch gewidmet worden, historische Vorformen von Bürokratien näher zu bestimmen und die extrapolierten Formen variablen Kategorien zuzuweisen. Ausgangspunkte oder Kriterien der Kategorisierung waren etwa das Entwicklungsstadium solcher politischer Systeme in Relation zum modern-okzidental Staat, die rechtspolitische Entwicklung, der Grad der Zentralisierung aller Subsysteme der jeweiligen Gesellschaften oder

⁵⁰ Eich 2007, a.a.O. (Anm. 23).

die Legitimitätsgeltung der ausgeübten Herrschaft.⁵¹ Einige dieser Ansätze erweisen sich nur als operationalisierbar, wenn aus dem zu analysierenden politischen System eine Vielzahl von geschlossenen Datenreihen bekannt ist, wie sie für das römische Reich nicht zur Verfügung stehen. Andere bleiben zu vage, als daß ihre Erprobung an der römischen Überlieferung heuristischen Nutzen versprechen würde.⁵² An dieser Stelle möchte ich in analytischer Reduktion zunächst einen weniger ambitionierten Ansatz wählen: ‚Bürokratie‘ bezeichnet nicht nur einen Typus eines politischen Systems, sondern zunächst eine Verwaltungsform. Für diese Verwaltungsform kennzeichnend sind nicht nur und in jedem Falle auch nicht immer die (zum Teil dynamischen) Merkmale, die zuvor knapp evoziert worden sind, sondern auch und gerade spezifische Bauformen und operative Prinzipien des administrativen Apparates im engeren Sinne. Sicher gehört Schriftlichkeit zu diesen Prinzipien, doch nicht nur deren bloße Existenz in irgendeiner beliebigen Form. Schon frühzeitig wurde Schriftlichkeit in politischen Systemen oder Untereinheiten solcher Systeme zur Dokumentation von Besitzständen genutzt. Doch in bürokratischen Systemen geht, wie vor allem Max Weber ausgeführt hat, die Verschriftlichung viel weiter und betrifft die Dokumentation auch diverser verwaltungsinterner Kommunikationsformen. Die so geübte dauerhafte Fixierung binneninstitutioneller Kommunikation hatte Weber unter dem Rubrum ‚Aktenmäßigkeit der Verwaltung‘ als ein unabdingbares Kriterium für eine bürokratische Organisation bezeichnet.⁵³ Dazu stellt sich die prozessuale Ausbildung relativ fester Kompetenzsphären in der Administration.⁵⁴ Von besonderer Wichtigkeit ist daneben nach allgemeinem Konsens das Bauprinzip ‚Hierarchie.‘ Bürokratische Organisation ist gleichbedeutend

⁵¹ F. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston 1964); W. Delany, ‘The Development and Decline of Patrimonial and Bureaucratic Administration’, *Administrative Science Quarterly* 7 (1962–3), 458ff.; S.N. Eisenstadt, *The political Systems of Empires* (New York 1969); M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, Ndr. 5. Aufl. 1985); K. Büniger, ‘War China ein patrimonialer Staat?’, *Oriens Extremus* 24 (Dezember 1977), 167ff.; P. Huang, *Civil Justice in China* (Stanford 1996).

⁵² Vgl. P. Eich, ‘Die Administratoren des römischen Ägyptens’, in R. Haensch und J. Heinrichs, Hgg., *Der Alltag der römischen Administration in der Hohen Kaiserzeit*, Köln, voraussichtlich 2007; dens. 2005, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 26ff.

⁵³ Weber 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 51), 124ff.; M.G. Morony, ‘In a City without Watchdogs the Fox is the Overseer’, in Mc.G. Gibson und R.D. Biggs, Hgg., *The Organization of Power* (Chicago 1987), 7ff.

⁵⁴ Weber 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 51), 124ff.; Eisenstadt 1969, a.a.O. (Anm. 51), 21. Zu dem hier verwendeten Kompetenzbegriff siehe Eich 2005, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 47.

mit hierarchisch konstruierter Verwaltung.⁵⁵ Solche Funktionselemente bürokratischer Organisation müssen auch in der römischen Administration nachgewiesen werden, bevor der Versuch einer spezifischeren Einordnung der imperialen Verwaltung auf einer Skala vormoderner Bürokratietypen unternommen werden kann: Andere Elemente der kurz angesprochenen Modelle protobürokratischer Entwicklungsformen sind Kovariablen, diese Funktionsprinzipien aber sicher Konstanten. Eine an diesem Punkt ansetzende Analyse der imperialen Administration—die aufgrund ihres Umfangs hier nicht nachgezeichnet werden kann—erbrachte nun für die in diesem Beitrag behandelte Thematik ein interessantes Resultat. Während im ersten Jahrhundert des Prinzipats mit seiner relativ reichen Überlieferung in der zivilen Administration keine Hierarchien des ‚bürokratischen‘ Typs—auf unterschiedlichen Kompetenzen und nicht auf sozialen Statusdifferenzierungen beruhende Unter- und Überordnungsverhältnisse—nachgewiesen werden können, auch die Zuständigkeiten in der Administration nach Ausweis unserer Quellen noch nur in geringem Maße gegeneinander abgegrenzt waren⁵⁶ und die Verschriftlichung trotz offensichtlicher Intensivierung zunächst sachlich und typologisch den republikanischen Vorbildern verpflichtet geblieben zu sein scheint,⁵⁷ mehrten sich die Belege und Indizien zumindest für eine Hierarchisierung der Verwaltung seit dem späten zweiten Jahrhundert. Mit unserer in aller Regel punktuell bleibenden Überlieferung sind Prozesse wie Verstetigung von Zuständigkeitsbereichen und Verschriftlichung binneninstitutioneller Kommunikation überhaupt nur sehr schwer nachweisbar. Immerhin verdichten sich im dritten Jahrhundert auch die Indizien für eine generellere und intensivere Applikation dieser protobürokratischen Bauprinzipien. Die Quellen suggerieren demnach einen protobürokratischen Formalisierungsprozeß in der hier behandelten Epoche. Aufgrund der schlechten Überlieferungssituation kann diese zeitliche Verteilung der Belege allein zwar

⁵⁵ H. Dreier, *Hierarchische Verwaltung im demokratischen Staat* (Tübingen 1991), 44 Anm. 35; 47; 91; C. Church, *Revolution and Red Tape* (Oxford 1981), 174; 282; H. Krüger, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Stuttgart u. a., 2. Aufl. 1966), 117ff.; Eisenstadt 1969, a.a.O. (Anm. 51), 21; Weber 1985, a.a.O. (Anm. 51), 127; 131; V. Mortara, *L'analisi delle strutture organizzative* (Bologna 1973), etwa 161.

⁵⁶ Siehe bspw. W. Eck, ‚Die Bedeutung der claudischen Regierungszeit für die administrative Entwicklung des römischen Reiches‘, in ders., *Die Verwaltung des Römischen Reiches in der Hohen Kaiserzeit II. Ausgewählte und erweiterte Beiträge* (Basel 1998), 147ff., 156, zu den zentralen Sekretariaten unter Claudius, die der älteren Forschung als Beispiele für eine frühe Ressortdifferenzierung gegolten hatten.

⁵⁷ Vgl. etwa P. Eich, *Arctos* 36 (2002), 196ff.

sicher nicht als Beweis für eine derartige Transformation im ‚langen dritten Jahrhundert‘ gewertet werden. Sie bietet aber zweifelsohne ein erstes Indiz, zumal der Befund sich in allen Gattungen von Schriftquellen widerspiegelt. Die Vermutung, im ‚langen dritten Jahrhundert‘ habe im Imperium Romanum ein protobürokratischer Formalisierungsprozeß Platz gegriffen, findet zudem zugleich eine Bestätigung und eine Erhellung durch die Einbettung der entsprechenden Belege in die beiden zu Beginn dieses Beitrags dargelegten Tendenzen dieser Epoche, den Bedeutungszuwachs der Armee und die Stärkung der zivilen Administration. Wegen der defizienten Überlieferung bedarf die weitere Untersuchung, um analytisches Potential zu entfalten, jedoch zusätzlich des Katalysators eines abstrakten Modells von Bürokratisierungsprozessen, das bisher noch nicht angesprochen worden ist.

4. *Staatswerdung, Krieg und Finanzen: der ‘Extraction-Coercion-Cycle’*

Historische Bürokratisierungsprozesse lassen sich global zu ganz verschiedenen Zeiten und bei variablen historischen Ausgangssituationen beobachten.⁵⁸ Doch das Paradigma eines solchen Prozesses ist zweifelsohne die Entstehung neuartiger Organisationsstrukturen in den werdenden Staaten des frühneuzeitlichen Europas: In diesem Vorgang ist der moderne Herrschafts- und Verwaltungstypus ‚Bürokratie‘ genetisch angelegt. Es ist sicher ein schwieriges Unterfangen, den in den einzelnen Territorien variabel verlaufenden Prozeß der Ausbildung protobürokratischer Strukturen idealtypisch in ein Modell fassen zu wollen. Dennoch können, wie weitgehend konsentiert, einzelne Züge dieser Entwicklung als durchaus typisch für fast alle betroffenen politischen Systeme aus dem historischen Material herausabstrahiert werden. Den wohl bedeutendsten Stimulus für den Auf- und Ausbau der zentralstaatlichen Administrationen bildete die konkurrenzgespeiste kollektive Politik der europäischen politischen Systeme, wachsend größere Heere aufzustellen, immer größere Kontingente auch kontinuierlich verfügbar zu haben und die diversen militärtechnischen Neuerungen der Zeit permanent mitzuvollziehen. Die fast überall neu entstehenden Verwaltungsstrukturen dienten primär dazu, die notwendigen Ressourcen für

⁵⁸ Eisenstadt 1969, a.a.O. (Anm. 51); S.E. Alcock, Hg., *Empires* (Cambridge 2001); Eich 2007, a.a.O. (Anm. 52).

die stetig wachsenden Heeresverbände (Rekruten, Waffen, Nachschub oder Geld) sowie für die Umsetzung militärtechnischer Innovationen (Geld, Baumaterialien) zu heben. Die meisten anderen Aufgaben der jeweiligen Verwaltungen waren Derivate dieser Primärfunktion.⁵⁹ Gelang es den Zentralgewalten, ihren Anspruch auf diese Ressourcen in erheblichem Umfang dauerhaft durchzusetzen und eine schlagkräftige Armee konstant einsatzbereit zu halten, konnte eben dieses polyfunktionale Instrument zur Durchsetzung weiterer Ansprüche und zur weiteren Intensivierung des Ressourcenzustroms genutzt werden. Dieser zirkuläre Prozeß, der sich in vielen erfolgreichen politischen Systemen Europas der frühen Neuzeit beobachten läßt, ist in der Forschung oftmals als 'extraction-coercion-cycle' bezeichnet worden. Diese Formel gibt die beschriebene Dynamik in den politischen Systemen der frühen Neuzeit: mehr Soldaten—mehr Ressourcen—wiederum neue Investitionen in die Armee, prägnant wieder.

Das hier skizzierte Interpretationsmodell ist sicher nicht ohne weiteres mit der Entwicklung des Imperium Romanum kompatibel: Einige Elemente der skizzierten Dynamik sind eindeutig Spezifika der europäisch-neuzeitlichen Konstellation. Dennoch lassen sich meines Erachtens zentrale Komponenten dieses historischen Bürokratisierungsprozesses aus ihrer Situationsgebundenheit herausabstrahieren: Ein solcher abstrakter Extraktions-Koerzitions-Zyklus läßt sich dann in die Koeffizienten Bedeutungszuwachs der Armee und Vergrößerung und organisatorische Stärkung der zivilen Administration zu dem Zweck, eben diese Armee zu versorgen, zergliedern. Ein solches Modell gewinnt generell an Anschlußfähigkeit; das gilt auch in bezug auf das in diesem Beitrag diskutierte Imperium Romanum. Alle drei hier behandelten Phänomene, die ‚Militarisierungstendenzen‘, der Bedeutungszuwachs ziviler Institutionen und die deutliche Zunahme von Hinweisen auf protobürokratische Funktionselemente in der Administration, sind Erscheinungen des ‚langen dritten Jahrhunderts‘. Unbestreitbar nahmen die Zahl der Konflikte und die Intensität der militärischen Auseinandersetzung in dieser Zeit gegenüber der vorhergehenden Phase zu und verharften auf einem hohen Niveau. Aus dem Anfang dieser Epoche sind Truppenzahlerhöhungen und Soldanhebungen überliefert.⁶⁰ Die Quellen

⁵⁹ Ch. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Cambridge, 2. Aufl. 1995), 15; J. Meyer, *Le poids de l'État* (Paris 1983), 91ff.; W. Reinhard, ‚Das Wachstum der Staatsgewalt‘, *Der Staat* 31 (1992), 59ff.

⁶⁰ Herodian 3.8.4f.; 4.4.7; 6.8.8; Cassius Dio 79(78).36.3f. (Boissovain III p. 444);

beinhalten auch Informationen über Ressourcenmangel der Zentrale und Versuche, die Einnahmen zu erhöhen.⁶¹ Diese Mitteilungen fügen sich gut in das Gesamtszenario der Zeit ein; nichts spricht gegen die Akkuratess dieser Nachrichten. Nach der Mitte des dritten Jahrhunderts stehen uns kaum noch literarische Quellen, Inschriften oder Papyri zur Verfügung, mittels derer die Entwicklung von Truppenstärke, Sold und Steuerquote nachgezeichnet werden könnte. Dieses Informationsvakuum wurde früher mit der Hypothese hoher Steigerungsraten gefüllt, die so nicht nur nicht belegt werden können, sondern auch als unwahrscheinlich gelten müssen.⁶² Doch wird von den neueren einschlägigen Studien nun oftmals die Balance der Plausibilität in die andere Richtung hin gestört.⁶³ Daß der Ressourcenbedarf des Imperiums im ‚langen dritten Jahrhundert‘ anstieg und dauerhaft auf hohem Niveau blieb, sollte nicht bestritten werden. Die vorhandenen literarischen Quellen bis zur Mitte des dritten Jahrhunderts und aus dem vierten Jahrhundert sind von dieser Ressourcenknappheit überzeugt, die wenigen Dokumente widersprechen dieser These nicht. Selbst wenn die Truppenzahl nach

SHA, v. Sev. 12.2. Zu den Truppenzahlerhöhungen unter Marcus und Severus siehe A.R. Birley, *Marcus Aurelius* (London, 2. Aufl. 1993), 142; E. Birley, ‘Septimius Severus and the Roman Army’, *Epigraphische Studien* 8 (1969), 63ff.

⁶¹ Cassius Dio 77(78).9.4f. (Boissevain III p. 382; doch siehe 78[79].12.2 p. 414; 78(79).12.6f. (p. 416); 28.2 (p. 436); Zosimus 1.20.2; 21.2; Aurelius Victor, *Caesares* 29.2. Zu Maximinus’ Bemühungen, die Einnahmen zu erhöhen, siehe T. Spagnuolo Vigorita, ‘I senatori nel principato di Massimino’, *Labeo* 28 (1982), 199ff. Zu P. Fayum 20 cf. etwa Cosme 1997, a.a.O. (Anm. 3), 91. Siehe auch R. MacMullen, *Roman Government’s Response to Crisis* (New Haven u. a. 1976), 136, zu einschlägigen Passagen in jüdischen Quellen der Zeit. Hierher gehört auch die im dritten Jahrhundert neu eingeführte Naturalsteuer *annona*: F. Mitthof, *Annona Militaris* (Florenz 2001). Die Absenkung des Edelmetallgehaltes in den Reichsmünzen wirkte sich in der Praxis wie eine Steuererhöhung aus: Carrié und Rousselle 1999, a.a.O. (Anm. 1), 579. Vgl. noch R. Duncan-Jones, *Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy* (Cambridge 1990), 56. Eine ausführlichere Besprechung der Überlieferung bietet Eich 2005, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), 338ff.

⁶² Vgl. etwa Witschel 1999, a.a.O. (Anm. 7), 178ff. Als Repräsentant der älteren Forschungsrichtung sei genannt A.H.M. Jones, ‘Over-Taxation and the Decline of the Roman Empire’, in ders., *The Roman Economy* (Oxford 1974), 82ff.

⁶³ Carrié und Rousselle 1999, a.a.O. (Anm. 1), 203; 607ff.; Rathbone 1996, a.a.O. (Anm. 7). Differenzierter und meines Erachtens überzeugender sind hier mehrere Beiträge von E. Lo Cascio, von denen zitiert sei: ‘Prezzi in oro e prezzi in unità di conto tra il III e il IV sec. d. C.’, in J. Andreau u. a., Hgg., *Économie antique. Prix et formation des prix dans les économies antiques* (Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges 1997), 161ff., speziell 173. Siehe auch die ausgewogene Darstellung von M. Corbier, ‘Coinage and Taxation: the State’s Point of View’, *Cambridge Ancient History 12: the Crisis of Empire 193–325* (Cambridge, 2. Aufl. 2005), 327ff., 360ff. Siehe auch die Verteidigung des Krisenkonzepts in seiner Gesamtheit von L. de Blois, ‘The Crisis of the third Century AD’ in the Roman Empire: a modern Myth?, in ders. und J. Rich, Hgg., *The Transformation of Economic Life under the Roman Empire, Proceedings of the second international Network: Impact of Empire* (Amsterdam 2002), 204ff.

Severus' Aufstockungen nicht mehr erhöht wurde, Diocletians literarisch belegte Vergrößerung der Kontingente eine Fehlmeldung ist (was nicht als sicher gelten kann)⁶⁴ und der Sold und die Steuerquote im wesentlichen konstant blieben (was beides ebenfalls nicht zu beweisen ist), so bleibt immer noch das Faktum bestehen, daß eine Armee in Kriegszeiten kostenintensiver ist als eine Armee in Friedenszeiten.⁶⁵ Es ist sicher sinnvoll, an dieser Stelle ein Caveat auszusprechen. Der ‚Erfolg‘ der europäischen politischen Systeme der frühen Neuzeit hing *inter alia* davon ab, ob es ihnen gelang, einen aktiven Extraktions-Koerzitions-Zyklus in Gang zu setzen. Ob das Imperium Romanum des dritten Jahrhunderts seine Einnahmen dauerhaft steigern konnte, bleibt aufgrund der Überlieferungssituation unklar. In jedem Fall wird man mit regionalen Differenzierungen im imperialen Leistungskatalog rechnen müssen: Die Belastung der Reichsbewohner wird je nach dem, ob sie in Konfliktzonen mit hoher Truppenpräsenz oder in Binnenprovinzen, die sich eines ungestörten Friedens erfreuten, lebten, erheblich divergiert haben. Weite Teile des Reichs waren zudem von Subsistenzwirtschaft geprägt, eine Intensivierung der Ressourcenabschöpfung war hier ohnedies nur bedingt möglich. Den Machteliten standen zu Beginn des langen dritten Jahrhunderts auch nicht die Instrumente zur Verfügung, um flächendeckend höhere Abgabenquoten wirkungsvoll durchsetzen zu können. In dieser Ausgangslage wird man die Erklärung für die in dem vorliegenden Beitrag beschriebenen Phänomene suchen müssen: Der Bedeutungszuwachs der Armee korrelierte mit dem Ausbau der zivilen Administration, die protobürokratisch formalisiert wurde, um die Streitkräfte effektiver mit Ressourcen versorgen zu können. Eine Spielart des Extraktions-Koerzitions-Zyklus entstand. Wie erfolgreich der Versuch war, mit einer neuen Administrationsstruktur zusätzliche Machtmittel zu organisieren, sei dahingestellt. Daß jedoch zumindest versucht wurde, einen solchen Zyklus zu etablieren, scheint mir die sinnvollste Interpretation des Gesamtbefundes darzustellen. Dieser ‘extraction-coercition-cycle’ wurde im späten zweiten Jahrhundert initiiert oder doch eindeutig akzeleriert. Der kaiserliche Stab wurde hierarchisch gegliedert, die Aufgaben der einzelnen Funktionen wurden tendenziell stärker gegeneinander abgegrenzt. Unter den Severern war

⁶⁴ Vgl. bspw. M. Whitby, ‘Emperors and Armies, 235–395,’ in S. Swain und M. Edwards, Hgg., *Approaching Late Antiquity* (Oxford 2004), 156ff., 159f.

⁶⁵ B. Meißner, ‘Über Zweck und Anlaß von Diokletians Preisedikt’, *Historia* 49 (2000), 79ff.

diese Phase vermutlich abgeschlossen; noch blieb die Hierarchisierung aber im wesentlichen auf den kaiserlichen Stab: die ritterliche Administration, beschränkt. Die weitere Intensivierung der militärischen Konflikte führten nach der Mitte des Jahrhunderts zu einer Reorganisation der gesamten Provinzialadministration inklusive der senatorischen Domänen, deren Zahl jetzt jedoch ständig zurückging. Zivile Institutionen wurden auf- und ausgebaut oder in ihrer Bedeutung gestärkt und in einen gemeinsamen, pyramidal konstruierten Rahmen: den kaiserlichen Stab, eingefügt. Bezeichnenderweise waren alle hier besprochenen neu entstehenden zivilen Strukturen jedenfalls in ihrer endgültigen Ausprägung, wie sie uns jeweils im vierten Jahrhundert entgegentritt, mit der Kollektion oder Akkumulation kriegsnotwendiger Machtmittel (Gelder, Nahrungsmittel, Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten) befaßt.

Die hier besprochenen Entwicklungslinien des imperialen politischen Systems: die sogenannte ‚Militarisierung‘, die hier als ‚Demilitarisierung‘ bezeichneten Phänomene und die protobürokratischen Formalisierungstendenzen innerhalb der Administration, standen also in Korrelation miteinander. Alle drei Prozesse sind nicht einfach genetisch induzierte Fortbildungen frühkaiserzeitlicher Anlagen, die sich zwingend aus der Konstruktion des Prinzipates ergaben: Sie sind Ausdruck einer substantiellen Transformation des politischen Systems des Imperiums. Dem stehenden Heer der Kombattanten wurde in der militärischen ‚Krise‘ ein ebenso permanenter Apparat ziviler Funktionsträger zugeordnet. Dieser Prozeß ist sicher sowohl mit ‚Militarisierung‘ wie auch mit ‚Demilitarisierung‘ nicht richtig oder jedenfalls nicht erschöpfend charakterisiert. Die Veränderungen waren tiefgreifender: Als Folge intensiver militärischer Anstrengungen wandelte sich das Imperium im späten Prinzipat zu einer in vielfacher Hinsicht typischen historischen Bürokratie.

ART, CULTURE AND SERVICE:
THE DEPICTION OF SOLDIERS ON
FUNERARY MONUMENTS OF THE 3RD CENTURY AD

JON COULSTON

By far the most numerous depictions of soldiers in Roman art are to be found sculpted on the state 'propaganda' monuments of the 1st to 4th centuries AD, whether still standing, as in the cases of the Column of Trajan and the Arch of Severus in Rome, or represented by *disiecta membra*, as with the fragments of the Columns of Theodosius and Arcadius in Istanbul.¹ However, these works were the products of metropolitan workshops and of sculptors whose first priority might not necessarily have been to accurately reproduce the contemporary appearance of soldiers.² At the very least, the sheer scale of these sculptural projects enforced some degree of stylisation and simplification going beyond the

¹ Trajan's Column involved the sculpting of 2,640 human figures on its helical frieze, 1,732 of which are Roman soldiers. See J.C.N. Coulston, *All the Emperor's Men: Roman Soldiers and Barbarians on Trajan's Column* (Oxford forthcoming). Later columns eschewed the same numbers, simplifying detail and scenery in favour of visibility from a distance. The frieze of the Column of Marcus Aurelius bore approximately 1,766 figures (E. Petersen, A. von Domaszewski and G. Calderini, *Die Marcus-Säule auf der Piazza Colonna in Rom* (Munich 1896)). The Arch of Severus in the Forum Romanum has figural representations on its 'siege' panels (485), its triumphal friezes (124) and on its pedestals (65) of which a total of 461 are soldiers (R. Brilliant, *The Arch of Septimius Severus in the Forum Romanum*. *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* 29 (Roma 1967); G.M. Koepfel, 'Die historischen Reliefs der römischen Kaiserzeit VII. Der Bogen des Septimius Severus, die Decennalienbasis und der Konstantinsbogen', *Bonner Jahrbücher* 190 (1990), 12–31).

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² Although it is important to be aware that Trajan's Column did represent a new concern to reproduce contemporary military figures, albeit with a range of Hellenizing elements. See J.C.N. Coulston, 'The value of Trajan's Column as a source for Roman military equipment', in C. van Driel-Murray, ed., *Roman Military Equipment: the Sources of Evidence, Proceedings of the Fifth Roman Military Equipment Conference* (Oxford 1989), 31–44; Coulston forthcoming, *op. cit.* (n. 1).

long-established artistic conventions of depicting battle and triumph.

Fortunately, there is another Roman iconographic source in the form of the very numerous figural funerary monuments privately erected in honour of individual soldiers. These cover a wide chronological range from the later 1st century BC to the later 4th century AD. They were erected in Rome, Italy and the wider provinces, especially along the imperial frontiers. They depict almost all branches of military service, citizen and non-citizen, infantry and cavalry, *praetoriani* and *legionarii*, *auxilarii* and *classarii*, *milites* and *veterani*. The vast majority commemorate ranks from *centurio* downwards. By their nature as private dedications, and despite their own elements of stylisation and genericisation, these depictions do allow the modern observer to move closer to Roman soldiers, both as a distinct body within or on the fringes of Roman society, and as individuals proudly advertising service and achievement.

Within this chronologically and geographically widespread genre, there is one class which stands out as particularly rich and informative. These are the 3rd century monuments, sometimes referred to as 'ring-buckle gravestones.' Not all display the characteristic belt-buckle form, and not all comprise gravestones, strictly speaking, but include standing *stelae*, funerary altars, sarcophagi and painted 'mummy' portraits. To these may be added non-funerary soldiers on other 3rd century sculptures, floor mosaics, wall paintings, *dipinti* and graffiti.³ However, together

³ For example, a figure with a ring-buckle belt and broad baldric appears on the well known ship relief from Palmyra, Syria. See M.A.R. Colledge, *The Art of Palmyra* (London 1976), Pl. 103; K. Tanabe, *Sculptures of Palmyra I* (Tokyo 1986), No. 430. Various frescoes found at Dura-Europos (Syria) and Castellum Dimmidi (Algeria) depict auxiliary soldiers in full colour. See S. James, *The Excavations at Dura-Europos conducted by Yale University and the French Academy of Inscriptions and Letters, 1928 to 1937. Final Report VII. The Arms and Armour and other Military Equipment* (London 2004), Pl. 1–4; C. Picard, *Castellum Dimmidi* (Paris 1949), Fig. 15–6. A graffito depicting a soldier with a long-sword, a large round chape and a broad baldric was found at Bu Ngem, Libya. See R. Rebuffat, 'Note sur le camp romain de Gholaia (Bu Ngem)', *Libyan Studies* 20 (1989), Fig. 5. To these may be added the 'seepage' of 3rd century military equipment into divine iconography, mainly belt and sword details, but sometimes also helmet and shield features. See for example E.J. Phillips, *Corpus Signorum Imperii Romani, Great Britain I.1, Corbridge. Hadrian's Wall East of the North Tyne* (Oxford 1977), No. 194; J.C.N. Coulston, 'A fragmentary altar to Jupiter from Wallsend', *Archaeologia Aeliana* ser. 5, 11 (1983), 309–313; S.R. Tufi, *CSIR, Great Britain I.3, Yorkshire* (Oxford 1983), No. 10; R.P. Wright and E.J. Phillips, *Roman Inscribed and Sculptured Stones in Carlisle Museum* (Carlisle 1975), No. 238; M. Henig, *CSIR, Great Britain I.7, Roman Sculpture from the Cotswold Region, with Devon and Cornwall* (Oxford 1993), No. 60; E. Éspérandieu, *Recueil général des bas-reliefs, statues et bustes de la Gaule romaine* (Paris 1907–1981), No. 4541, 5564, 7641; P. Filtzinger, *Limesmuseum Aalen* (Stuttgart 1971), Fig. 5; G. Piccottini, *CSIR, Österreich II.1, Die Rundskulpturen von Virunum*

they may be used to study contemporary military dress and equipment in conjunction with documentary and artefactual sources. Whilst taking these considerations into account, it is the purpose of the present paper to go further by viewing the 3rd century AD group alongside the corpus of military funerary figures from the whole Roman period, thus allowing some holistic observations to be made about Roman military funerary practice and the presentation of Roman soldiers in death.

Third century, 'ring-buckle gravestones' were until fairly recently largely ignored in the English specialist literature, despite a significant number actually being found in Britain.⁴ In contrast, they have always been well recognised along the northern continental Roman frontiers, notably through the pioneering iconographic work of Uhl⁵ and the artefactual studies of Oldenstein.⁶ Three features of these particular monuments will be specifically investigated here: the military equipment, which is often depicted with great care to practical and accurate detail; the selective distribution of examples, as compared with earlier figural military gravestone types; and the political and cultural implications of the form and distribution of the funerary practice.

(Wien 1968), No. 21; L. Barkóczi, *Brigetio*, Dissertations Pannonicae ser. 2, 22 (Budapest 1944), Pl. LIX.6, LXV.2. See S. Von Schnurbein, 'Merkur als Soldat? Zur Gürtelmode des 3. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.', in W. Cyszcz, ed., *Provinzialrömische Forschungen. Festschrift für Günter Ulbert zum 65. Geburtstag* (Espelkamp 1995), 139–148.

⁴ Ignored by many general works on the Roman army, and by some specific studies, notably A.S. Anderson, *Roman Military Tombstones* (Aylesbury 1984). British examples: I.A. Richmond and R.P. Wright, *Catalogue of the Roman Inscribed and Sculptured Stones in the Grosvenor Museum, Chester* (Chester, 1955), No. 37, 125–126(?) (Chester); B.W. Cunliffe and M.G. Fulford, *CSIR, Great Britain I.2, Bath and the Rest of Wessex* (Oxford 1982), No. 47 (Bath); J.C.N. Coulston and E.J. Phillips, *CSIR, Great Britain I.6, Hadrian's Wall West of the North Tyne, and Carlisle* (Oxford 1988), No. 193 (Chesters); R.J. Brewer, *CSIR, Great Britain I.5, Wales* (Oxford, 1986), No. 19(?) (Caerleon); R.G. Collingwood and R.P. Wright, *The Roman Inscriptions of Britain I, Inscriptions on Stone* (Oxford 1965), No. 17; J. Wachter, *The Towns of Roman Britain* (London 1995), Fig. 36 (London). To these should be added Wright and Phillips 1975, op. cit. (n. 3), No. 226; J.C.N. Coulston, 'Two representations of 3rd century AD equipment from Cumbria', *Arma* 3.1 (1991), 2–5 (Brougham).

⁵ H.-J. Uhl, *Waffen und Uniform des römischen Heeres der Prinzipatsepoche nach den Grabreliefs Noricum und Pannoniens*. Unpublished PhD thesis (Wien 1969).

⁶ J. Oldenstein, 'Zur Ausrüstung römischer Auxiliareinheiten. Studien zu Beschlägen und Zierat an der Ausrüstung der römischen Auxiliareinheiten des obergermanisch-raetischen Limesgebietes aus dem zweiten und dritten Jahrhunderts n. Chr.', *Bericht der römisch-germanischen Kommission* 57 (1976), 49–284.

'Ring-buckle gravestones': dress and equipment

The type of military representation takes its name from its most characteristic feature, a ring-buckle which fastens a broad waist-belt. This is the lineal descendant of the 1st century AD waist-belts for sword and/or dagger suspension with a long multi-strap 'apron'.⁷ The latter was shortened in the Flavian period and disappeared by the later 2nd century. The ring buckle belt was wrapped around the wearer's body and, once it had been passed through the ring-buckle and fastened with a stud, it was then looped up under the belt at the wearer's right side, before hanging down alongside the right leg. The belt-end was frequently bifurcated and bore a pair of metallic terminals. This whole assemblage required a considerable length of leather, approximately 2.0–2.3 m. (90 in.), tailored and fastened to the individual's needs. The belt-end was not functional but for display. Indeed, unless a *pugio* was worn (these continue in the artefactual record, but are seldom depicted on 3rd century gravestones⁸) the whole belt served only to hold up the tunic hem in proper military fashion. The sword, long or short and worn from the late 2nd century on the soldier's left side, was suspended from a wide baldric which had its own purely decorative hanging strap-end with terminal metalwork, again delineated with care in the more detailed gravestone sculptures.⁹

The earliest diagnostic representation of a ring buckle belt may be on an altar from Eining (Germany), dated by consular nomenclature to AD 211.¹⁰ However, bifurcated belt-terminals were already a late 2nd century feature, as is suggested by the Lyon grave assemblage (a narrow 'VTERE FELIX' belt rather than a broad ring buckle belt here),¹¹ and it may be that the ring buckle also appeared in the Late Antonine period.¹² The end of its use is suggested by a lack of securely dateable

⁷ M.C. Bishop and J.C.N. Coulston, *Roman Military Equipment from the Punic Wars to the Fall of Rome* (Oxford 2006, 2nd edition), 106–109, 182–184.

⁸ Although see F. Wagner, *CSIR Deutschland I.1, Raetia und Noricum* (Bonn 1973), No. 29. For 3rd century *pugiones* see Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), 164, Fig. 104.

⁹ For 3rd century belts and bladed weapons see Oldenstein 1976, op. cit. (n. 6); Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), 154–63, 182–84.

¹⁰ Wagner 1973, op. cit. (n. 8), No. 477. However, S. von Schnurbein has cast serious doubt on the buckle identification: Von Schnurbein 1995, op. cit. (n. 3), n. 4.

¹¹ Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), 163, Fig. 101.

¹² It might be postulated that mounted troops were the first to develop left-side, broad baldric suspension for the *spathae* they had been using since the 1st century. A parallel

Tetrarchic ring buckle iconography. Undoubted ring buckles have been found *in situ* in funerary contexts, for example in graves at Regensburg (Germany) and Intercisa (Hungary),¹³ but they are generally less flat and broad of body than those depicted on gravestones. It is very likely that the size and shape of buckles was exaggerated by sculptors to give this characteristic item of military attire an emphasised prominence to catch the viewer's eye. This is what is seen in 1st–2nd century military representations, where attention is drawn to belt(s), apron and sword by applying a great deal of decorative detail, as on the 1st century Rhenish 'standing soldier' *stelae*,¹⁴ by exaggerating the size of the sword, especially the pommel, as on 'rider' *stelae*,¹⁵ and/or by arranging the 1st–2nd century *paenula* specifically to reveal these features.¹⁶

The *stelae* and other funerary representations continue some of the formulaic representation of soldiers seen in earlier centuries. The deceased may stand leaning on one or more shafted weapons, generally spears, occasionally short, light javelins or *lanceae*, but almost never *pila* outside Rome. The traditional form of legionary heavy javelins is largely confined to praetorian iconography in Rome.¹⁷ Many soldiers carry a shield or lean on a grounded shield. Boards are predominantly oval,¹⁸ the characteristic curved rectangular legionary shield not being represented in the iconography, despite its continued presence in the artefactual record. The shield might be entirely absent and be replaced

might be drawn with sword-suspension methods employed by European troopers in the 17th century: J. Tincey, *Soldiers of the English Civil War* (2). *Cavalry* (London 1990), 29.

¹³ S. von Schnurbein, *Das römische Gräberfeld von Regensburg* (Kallmünz 1977), 88.

¹⁴ For example Éspérandieu 1907–1981, op. cit. (n. 3), No. 5495, 5790, 5797, 5835, 5840, 5850, 5853, 6125, 6136–37, 8534; C. Franzoni, *Habitus atque habitudo militis. Monumenti funerari di militari nella Cisalpina Romana* (Roma 1987), No. 24; M.C. Bishop, 'The early imperial 'apron'', *Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies* 3 (1992), Fig. 1–12.

¹⁵ Notably Éspérandieu 1907–1981, op. cit. (n. 3), No. 6435; M. Schleiermacher, *Römische Reitergrabsteine. Die kaiserzeitlichen Reliefs des triumphierenden Reiters* (Bonn 1984), No. 17.

¹⁶ E.g. A. Hofmann, *Römische Militärgrabsteine der Donauländer* (Wien 1905), Fig. 45, 48–9, 54–5; Éspérandieu 1907–1981, op. cit. (n. 3), No. 5798, 5840, 5853, 6207, 6252–53, 6575.

¹⁷ J.C.N. Coulston, '“Armed and belted men”: the soldiery in imperial Rome', in J.C.N. Coulston and H. Dodge, eds., *Ancient Rome: the Archaeology of the Eternal City*. Oxford University Committee for Archaeology Monograph 54 (Oxford, 2000), 96–97. For a *pilum* carried by a *beneficiarius* on a funerary altar from Apamea, Syria, see J.-C. Balty, 'Apamea in Syria in the second and third centuries AD', *Journal of Roman Studies* 78 (1988), Pl. XIV.1. For artefactual finds see Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), 150.

¹⁸ Corresponding with the dishd, oval shields from Dura-Europos. See James 2004, op. cit. (n. 3), 176–182; Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), 179.

in the soldier's hand by a *fustis*.¹⁹ Alternatively, the man may hold a *rotulus* in his left hand and either be twirling his belt-strap in his right, or pouring a libation on an altar or *thymiaterion* by his side. Sometimes the long, dome-headed 3rd century version of the centurion's *vitis*,²⁰ a military standard of some kind,²¹ or a musical instrument²² is figured to visually denote the soldier's rank. Very occasionally a helmet is carried or set by the man's feet, rarely is one worn.²³ Well sculpted examples correspond with the 'Heddernheim' helmet type which spread into use

¹⁹ M.P. Speidel, 'The *fustis* as a soldier's weapon', *Antiquités Africaines* 29 (1993), 137–149.

²⁰ H. Gabelmann, *Die Werkstattgruppen der oberitalischer Sarkophage* (Bonn 1973), No. 112; Richmond and Wright 1955, op. cit. (n. 4), No. 37; C. Bossert-Radtke, *CSIR, Schweiz, III. Die figürlichen Rundskulpturen und Reliefs aus Augst und Kaiseraugst* (Augst 1992), No. 65; Barkóczi 1944, op. cit. (n. 3), Pl. XXIV.1; E. Pfuhl and H. Möbius, *Die ostgriechischen Grabreliefs* (Mainz 1977), No. 302–303.

²¹ Franzoni 1987, op. cit. (n. 14), No. 5; Coulston and Phillips 1988, op. cit. (n. 4), No. 193; L. Eckhart, *CSIR, Österreich III.2. Die Skulpturen des Stadtgebietes von Lauriacum* (Wien 1976), No. 86; H. and H. Polenz, *Das römische Budapest. Neue Ausgrabungen und Funde in Aquincum* (Münster 1986), Fig. 28; Barkóczi 1944, op. cit. (n. 3), Pl. XXIV.1; L. Barkóczi, G. Erdélyi, E. Ferencszi, F. Fülepi, J. Nemerskéri, M.R. Alföldi and K. Sagi, *Intercisa I (Dunapentele-Sztalinvaros). Geschichte der Stadt in der Römerzeit* (Budapest 1954), Pl. XXXVII.3; E. Maróti, *Die römischen Steindenkmäler von Szentendre-Ulcisia Castra* (Szentendre 2003), No. 54; M.P. Speidel, 'Eagle-bearer and trumpeter. The eagle-standard and trumpets of the Roman legions illustrated by three tomb-stones found at Byzantion', *Bonner Jahrbücher* 176 (1976), Fig. 1; Pfuhl and Möbius 1977, op. cit. (n. 20), No. 307; J.-C. Balty and W. van Rengen, *Apamea in Syria. The Winter quarters of Legio II Parthica* (Bruxelles 1992), Pl. 18; O. Stoll, 'Die Adler im 'Kafig'. Zu einer Aquilifer-Grabstele aus Apamea in Syrien', in O. Stoll, *Römischer Heer und Gesellschaft. Gesammelte Beiträge 1991–1999*. MAVORS 13 (Stuttgart 2001), 13–46; A. Bernand, *Alexandria la Grande* (Paris 1966), Fig. 14; L. Castiglione, 'Kunst und Gesellschaft im römischen Ägypten', *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 15 (1968), Pl. V.

²² Hofmann 1905, op. cit. (n. 16), Fig. 56, 59; Speidel 1976, op. cit. (n. 21), Fig. 2, 9; Pfuhl and Möbius 1977, op. cit. (n. 20), No. 308; R. Meucci, 'Lo strumento del bucinatore A. Surus e il cod. Pal. Lat. 909 di Vegezio', *Bonner Jahrbücher* 187 (1987), 259–272.

²³ A. Naumann, *CSIR, Österreich I.1. Die Skulpturen des Stadtgebietes von Vindobona* (Wien 1967), No. 27; M.L. Krüger, *CSIR, Österreich I.3. Die Skulpturen des Stadtgebietes von Carnuntum* 1 (Wien 1970), No. 320; Eckhart 1976, op. cit. (n. 21), No. 86; Barkóczi 1944, op. cit. (n. 3), Pl. VII.3, L.3; Richmond and Wright 1955, op. cit. (n. 4), No. 65; Pfuhl and Möbius 1977, op. cit. (n. 20), No. 308; Coulston and Phillips 1988, op. cit. (n. 4), No. 400; J.C.N. Coulston, 'Later Roman armour, 3rd–6th centuries AD', *Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies* 1 (1990), Fig. 1. To these may be added a helmeted figure from Linz (Austria) which has now been convincingly redated from the 4th to the 3rd centuries AD. See T. Fischer, 'Zu einer römischen Soldatendarstellung aus Lentia/Linz an der Donau', in K. Kuzmová, K. Pieta and J. Rajtár, eds., *Zwischen Rom und dem Barbaricum. Festschrift für Titus Kolník zum 70. Geburtstag* (Nitra 2002), 89–96.

by both infantry and cavalry in the 3rd century.²⁴ Apart from helmet and shield, the soldier is almost always shown without armour. This implies nothing about the use and weight of body and limb armour in the 3rd century. Indeed, there are indications that armour became more extensive in its coverage during this period.²⁵ The iconography simply continued the long existing tradition of showing men as they were normally seen outside the contexts of guard duty, review, training exercise and battle.

What the 3rd century pictorial record does show is a cultural shift away from traditional Mediterranean clothing styles, as represented on Trajan's Column and in 1st–2nd century funerary art, towards either northern European or Levantine fashions: from short-sleeved tunics and bare legs to long-sleeved tunics and long trousers.²⁶ In terms of arms and armour, a continuous development of belt and baldric forms can be traced through the 1st to 4th century, but, most significantly, the equipment which distinguished the appearance and roles of legionary citizen troops from those of auxiliary *peregrini*, the '*lorica segmentata*', the curved rectangular shield and the *pilum*, effectively disappear from the iconography.²⁷

Third century figural gravestones and other funerary monuments have a peculiar distribution and marked concentrations across the Roman Empire.²⁸ There are approximately 115 examples overall,

²⁴ H.R. Robinson, *Armour of Imperial Rome* (London 1975), Pl. 256–294; M. Feugère, *Casques Antiques* (Paris 1994), 117–120; Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), 173–178.

²⁵ Coulston 1990, op. cit. (n. 23), 139–60; Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), 170–173.

²⁶ Colledge 1976, op. cit. (n. 3), 48–51, 66–80, 98–100, 145–46; James 2004, op. cit. (n. 3), 246–47; G. Sumner, *Roman Military Clothing 2, AD 200–400* (Oxford, 2003); Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), 184. Long sleeves and long trousers are already worn by eastern(?) troops on the Column of Marcus Aurelius (Petersen et al. 1896, op. cit. (n. 1), Scenes XII, XV, XXVIII, XXXIX, LXXVIII).

²⁷ The '*lorica segmentata*' is last seen in sculpture on the Arch of Severus, Forum Romanum, Rome, and on the Arch of Severus at Lepcis Magna (Brilliant 1967, op. cit. [n. 1], Pl. 46, 65, Fig. 98). Isolated finds of fittings may eventually take the armour form up to the later 3rd century (Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), 171–173). The latest evidence for curved rectangular shields comes from mid 3rd century Dura-Europos. See James 2004, op. cit. (n. 3), 182–184; Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), 180–182. Whilst the *pilum* is last seen on praetorian gravestones in Rome where it may have been a ceremonial survival (above, n. 17), *pilum*-like heavy javelins survived into the 4th century on the evidence of Vegetius, *Epitome rei militaris* I.20, II.15 (Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), 200).

²⁸ Collected by Ubl 1969, op. cit. (n. 5); J.C.N. Coulston, 'Roman military equipment

with the most occurring in Pannonia (25–8)²⁹ and in Rome (23).³⁰ The area around Byzantion has 10, perhaps mainly representing deaths of soldiers marching back and forth between the eastern and Danubian fronts.³¹ Legionary troops are best represented in the corpus. Apamea,

on 3rd century AD tombstones', in M. Dawson, ed., *Roman Military Equipment: the Accomplishments of War* (Oxford 1987), 141–156; P. Noelke, 'Ein neuer Soldatengrabstein aus Köln', in C. Unz, ed., *Studien zu den Militärgrenzen Roms III* (Stuttgart 1986), 213–225. Whilst they are comparatively plentiful in Britain (n. 4, above), and on the Upper and Middle Danube (n. 29, below), only four 3rd century representations of soldiers occur along the Rhine: a gravestone at Köln (Noelke 1986); a mausoleum(?) relief (Landesmuseum Mainz, Inv. No. S1082, pers. obs.) and a relief on the side of an altar. See H. Cuppers, ed., *Die Römer in Rheinland-Pfalz* (Stuttgart 1990), Fig. 116 from Mainz; and a gravestone at Strasbourg (Éspérandieu 1907–1981, op. cit. (n. 3), No. 5507). They are equally scarce along the Lower Danube, just one relief occurring at Rusé in Bulgaria (pers. comm. Dr A. Poulter). Two funerary statues have been found at Alba Iulia (Alba Iulia Museum, pers. obs.) and two at Colonia Ulpia Sarmizegethusa (D. Alicu, C. Pop and V. Wollmann, *Figural Monuments from Sarmizegethusa*, Sarmizegethusa. Monograph 2, British Archaeological Reports, International Series 55 (Oxford 1979), No. 295, 297) in Dacia north of the Danube, and there are two statues in the Archaeological Museum, Sofia (pers. obs.). Examples also occur in Macedonia, well back from the frontier, at Thessalonike (incorporated in the east walls, pers. obs.), Laskárovo (M. Alexandrescu-Vianu, 'Les stèles funéraires de la Macédoine romaine', *Dacia* n.s. 19 (1975), No. 43, Fig. 2.2) and Veria (Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), Fig. 111.2).

²⁹ Bossert-Radtke 1992, op. cit. (n. 20), No. 65; Wagner 1973, op. cit. (n. 8), No. 29, 31, 34, 350, 371; Hofmann 1905, op. cit. (n. 16), Fig. 56–9, 75, 97; H. Ubl, *CSIR, Österreich I.6. Die Skulpturen des Stadtgebietes von Aelium Cetium* (Wien 1979), No. 16; A.S. Burger, *CSIR, Ungarn VII. Die Skulpturen des Stadtgebietes von Sopianae und des Gebietes zwischen der Drau und der Limesstrecke Lussonium-Altinum* (Budapest 1991), No. 25, 33; Maróti 2003, op. cit. (n. 21), No. 54; Barkóczi 1944, op. cit. (n. 3), Pl. V.2, VII.3, X.2–3, XX.2, XXIII.1, XXIV.1, L.3; Polenz 1986, op. cit. (n. 21), Fig. 28; Barkóczi et al. 1954, op. cit. (n. 21), No. 32, 42, 130, 135, 220, 228; L. Barkóczi, 'Beiträge zur Steinbearbeitung in Pannonien am Ende des 3. Und zu Beginn des 4. Jahrhunderts', *Folia Archaeologica* 24 (1973), Fig. 1, 4, 14, 25; L. Barkóczi, 'Römerzeitliche Steindenkmäler aus dem dritten Jahrhundert im Komitat Fejér', *Alba Regia* 22 (1985), Fig. Pl. II, VI.

³⁰ P. von Bienkowski, 'Zur Tracht des römischen Heeres in der Spätromischen Kaiserzeit', *Jahrbuch des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts* 19–20 (1919), Fig. 117–119; M. Durry, *Les Cohortes Prétorienes* (Paris, 1938), Pl. X.B; L. Rocchetti, 'Su una stela del periodo tetrarchico', *Annuario Scuola Archeologia di Atene* 29–30 (1967–68), Fig. 1–2, 5–7; L. de Lachenal, B. Palma and M. Sapelli, eds., *Museo Nazionale Romano, Le Sculture I.7.i. Catalogo delle sculture esposte nel giardino dei cinquantio* (Roma 1984), No. V.20; S. Panciera, ed., *La Collezione Epigraphica dei Musei Capitolini. Inediti, revisioni, contributi al riordino* 6 (Roma 1987), Pl. XVIII–IX; G. Gasco, 'Inscriptions de la ville de Rome et autres inscriptions italiennes conservées aux musées d'Aix-en-Provence, Carpentras, Avignon et Marseilles', *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'École française de Rome, Antiquité* (1988), No. 2; M.P. Speidel, 'Neckarschwaben (Suebi Nigrensens)', *Archäologisches Korrespondenzblatt* 20 (1990), 201–207; id., *Die Denkmäler der Kaiserreiter equites singulares Augusti* (Köln 1994), No. 535; E. Casamassima and R. Rubinstein, *Antiquarian Drawings from Dosio's Roman Workshop*. Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale de Firenze, N.A. 1159 (Milan 1993), No. 37a, 53, 56; Coulston 2000, op. cit. (n. 17), Fig. 5.3, 5.5, 5.17; Bishop and Coulston 2006, op. cit. (n. 7), Fig. 94.2, 4.

³¹ Speidel 1976, op. cit. (n. 21); Pfuhl and Möbius 1977, op. cit. (n. 20), No. 303–305,

as already mentioned, has a massive collection of 54 grave altars erected for *II Parthica* soldiers during that legion's repeated presence in the east during Severan campaigns. The environs of the legionary fortress at Nikopolis, near Alexandria in Egypt, has yielded up to 22 gravestones, mostly associated with the long-resident *legio II Traiana fortis*.³² Apart from those in the Greco-Roman Museum at Alexandria, others are scattered, in the usual manner of Egyptian antiquities, around the museums of Britain, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Poland.³³ All may be classed as standing soldier gravestones, with the exception of one rider *stela*, which has a well preserved paint scheme.³⁴ Britannia has a scattering of 10–12 ring buckle style representations as indigenous finds.³⁵

Elsewhere they are markedly absent. Perhaps this is unsurprising for regions with comparatively few troops permanently present, as might

307–318. Similarly Aquileia, in its strategically pivotal position at the head of the Adriatic and close to the Alps, has a group of mainly Tetrarchic figural gravestones, but also with one ring-buckle *stela* (*Museo Archeologico di Aquileia*, *Cataloghi dei Musei e Gallerie d'Italia* (Roma 1972), No. 348–355; Franzoni 1987, op. cit. (n. 14), No. 12–21).

³² G. Botti, *Catalogue des Monuments exposés au Musée Gréco-Romaine d'Alexandrie* (Alexandria 1900), No. 93–94; E. Breccia, *Alexandria ad Aegyptum* (Bergamo 1914), Fig. 41; G. Susini and R. Pincelli, *Museo Civico, Bologna. Il Lapidario* (Bologna 1960), Pl. XIX; Bernard 1966, op. cit. (n. 21), Fig. 13–15; Castiglione 1968, op. cit. (n. 21), Pl. V.1–2; A. Sadurska, *Corpus Signorum Imperii Romani, Poland I.1. Les portraits romains dans les collections polonaises* (Warszawa 1972), No. 55; K. Parlasca, 'Römisch-ägyptische Grabreliefs. Der aktuelle Stand eines Forschungsprojekts', in G. Pugliese Carratelli, G. del Re, N. Bonacasa and A. Etman, eds., *Roma e l'Egitto nell'antichità Classica. Atti del I Congresso Internazionale Italo-Egiziano* (Roma 1992), Fig. 4; A. Casanovas, ed., *Scripta Manent. La Memòria Escrita dels Romans* (Barcelona 2002), No. 131; H. Riad, Y.H. Shehata and Y. El-Gheriana, *Alexandria. An Archaeological Guide to the City and the Graeco-Roman Museum* (Cairo n.d.), Fig. 15. One mechanism which might account for this relatively isolated concentration may be the direct influence of troops, notably elements of *legio II Parthica*, present during Caracalla's visit to Alexandria (AD 215–16) and its associated military action (Dio 78.22–23; Herodian 4.9). See C. Bruun, 'Pericula Alexandrina: the adventures of a recently discovered centurion of *legio II Parthica*', *Arctos* 29 (1995), 9–27.

³³ Some finds were made by British forces at the Battle of Alexandria (March 21st, 1801), during which fighting raged through the standing ruins of Nikopolis. See W. Jackson, *The Pomp of Yesterday. The Defence of India and the Suez Canal, 1798–1918* (London 1995), 23–25 and Map 3. These included the Severan inscription listing veterans of *legio II Traiana* (R.P. Wright, 'New readings of a Severan inscription from Nicopolis, near Alexandria', *Journal of Roman Studies* 32 [1942], 33–38). The second time British forces were engaged in this theatre (1807) was perhaps less conducive to antiquities collection, a campaign not unconnected with the capture (1806) and the loss (1808) of Capri as a British possession (T. Pocock, *Stopping Napoleon. War and Intrigue in the Mediterranean* (London 2004), 20–22).

³⁴ The writer is very grateful to Dr Katelijjn Vandorpe, University of Leuven, for images and additional information about these gravestones. Dependent on funding, a proposed joint project between the Universities of St Andrews (Scotland) and Leuven (Belgium) will continue work on the corpus started by the late H. Devijver.

³⁵ See n. 4, above.

be assumed for much of the Hispaniae, Galliae, Asiatic provinces and North Africa. Conversely, there was no shortage of troops in the Germaniae and Moesiae, but 3rd century figural gravestones are only present in these regions as isolated instances. This comparative absence may not be ascribed to regionally variant equipment practices. Indeed, the panoply seen on the gravestones seems to have been ubiquitous across the 3rd century empire, as is demonstrated not just by the gravestone figures but by the artefacts. Those studied by Oldenstein on the Upper German-Raetian frontier would not be out of place amongst those from Dura-Europos.³⁶

Outside Rome, with its group of 'standing soldier' gravestones of praetorians, the majority of representations are of legionary soldiers. For auxiliary cavalry there continued to be the 'rider' type of *stela*, and banquet gravestones featuring a *calo* with a horse on long-reins, or a *calo* standing between horses remained in currency from earlier centuries.³⁷ Indeed, in Rome *calo* scenes form the largest single type-group anywhere in the empire and at any time (89).³⁸ Ring buckles appear most frequently and prominently on the midribs of standing soldiers; sometimes they are shown worn by *calones*; sometimes by cavalrymen on horseback.³⁹ These are mostly seen on gravestones, but at Apamea Syriae soldiers of *legio II Parthica* displayed a marked preference for grave-altars, as distinguished from cavalrymen who had *stelae* erected contemporaneously at the same site.⁴⁰ Ring buckles also appear frequently worn by soldiers on 3rd century 'lion hunt' sarcophagi,⁴¹ and, less happily, by captured or submissive Roman emperors and soldiers on Sassanid Persian rock reliefs.⁴²

³⁶ James 2004, op. cit. (n. 3), 240–241.

³⁷ See n. 55, below.

³⁸ Speidel 1994, op. cit. (n. 30), No. 110–113, 127, 133–134, 137–138, 157–158, 164, 170, 189–190, 201–202, 205–208 etc. See A.W. Busch, 'Von der Provinz zum Zentrum—Bilder auf den Grabdenkmälern einer Elite-Einheit,' in P. Noelke, ed., *Romanisierung versus Resistenz und Wiederaufleben einheimischer Elemente. Kolloquium Köln 2001* (Mainz 2001), 679–694.

³⁹ Speidel 1994, op. cit. (n. 30), No. 570, 598, 682.

⁴⁰ Balty 1992, op. cit. (n. 21), Pl. 20, 22, 24–26.

⁴¹ B. Andreae, *The Art of Rome* (London 1977), Pl. 582–595; G. Koch and H. Sichtermann, *Römische Sarkophage* (München 1982), Pl. 79–92. S. von Schnurbein 1995, op. cit. (n. 3), 142–143, Fig. 2 is less convinced by a military identification, but the present author is persuaded by the context and other accompanying figures.

⁴² Together with diagnostic 3rd century sword and scabbard fittings: G. Herrmann, *The Sasanian Rock Reliefs at Bishapur* 1 (Berlin 1980), III, Fig. 4, Pl. 4, 6, 41–47; G. Herrmann,

Private figural military monuments: time and space

In order to set the ring buckle depictions within a broader context it is necessary to review the whole corpus of Roman figural funerary representations.⁴³ A collection of exclusively funerary representations of soldiers has been made, confined in the first instance to actual standing gravestones, but including other classes of monument for consideration. Occasionally figures of soldiers appear on larger mausolea, but in the style of gravestones, as with the group of cavalrymen on the Arlon monument (Gallia Belgica).⁴⁴ Grave-markers in the form of altars instead of *stelae* were favoured by some 1st–3rd century praetorians and 2nd century *equites singulares Augusti* in Rome,⁴⁵ as by the 3rd century *legionarii* at Apamea. Standing soldiers representing the deceased and/or relatives appear on Pannonian sarcophagi (rather different from

The Sasanian Rock Reliefs at Bishapur 3 (Berlin, 1983), I, Fig. 1, Pl. 1, 5–6; II, Pl. 9, 12–13; G. Herrmann and D.N. Mackenzie, *The Sasanian Rock Reliefs at Naqsh-e Rostam, Naqsh-e Rostam* 6 (Berlin 1989), Fig. 1, Pl. 1–3, 6, 10–11.

⁴³ This was touched upon in J.C.N. Coulston, 'Military identity and personal self-identity in the Roman army', in L. de Ligt, E.A. Hemelrijk and H.W. Singor, eds., *Roman Rule and Civic Life: Local and Regional Perspectives. Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, 200 BC–AD 476)*, Leiden, June 25–28, 2003 (Amsterdam 2004), 135–152. Now the writer has a much clearer and more nuanced picture of the whole figural gravestone genre. The method of collection has been study of the major regional and museum catalogues, notably Hofmann 1905, op. cit. (n. 16); Éspérandieu 1907–1981, op. cit. (n. 3); A. Schöber, *Die römische Grabsteine von Noricum und Pannonien* (Wien 1923); S. Ferri, *Arte Romana sul Danubio* (Milano 1933); Barkóczi 1944, op. cit. (n. 3); Barkóczi *et al.* 1954, op. cit. (n. 21); Pfuhl and Möbius 1977, op. cit. (n. 20); N. Benseddik, *Les troupes auxiliaires de l'armée romaine en Mauretanie Césarienne sous le Haut-Empire* (Algiers 1979); Schleiermacher 1984, op. cit. (n. 15); Franzoni 1987, op. cit. (n. 14); S.R. Tufi, *Militari romani sul Reno* (Roma 1988); Speidel 1994, op. cit. (n. 30); and in the *Corpus Signorum Imperii Romani* series. This has led to extensive fieldwork, which in turn has uncovered numerous unpublished items. For the record, the modern countries within the former Roman Empire which have not yet been visited are Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Morocco, Algeria, and the Ukraine. Monuments of men above the rank of *centurio* are not directly considered in the present discussion. For these see H. Devijver, *The Equestrian Officers of the Roman Army* (Amsterdam 1989), 416–448; H. Devijver and F. van Wouterghem, 'The funerary monuments of equestrian officers of the Late Republic and Early Empire in Italy 50 BC–100 AD', *Ancient Society* 21 (1990), 59–98.

⁴⁴ Éspérandieu 1907–1981, op. cit. (n. 3), No. 4022; H. Gabelmann, 'Römische Grabmonumente mit Reiterkampfszenen im Rheingebiet', *Bonner Jahrbücher* 173 (1973), 132–200.

⁴⁵ De Lachenal *et al.* 1984, op. cit. (n. 30), No. V. 20; Speidel 1994, op. cit. (n. 30), No. 80, 83–6, 90; Coulston 2000, op. cit. (n. 17), Fig. 5.18.

the generic hunt scenes of lion-hunt sarcophagi in Rome).⁴⁶ Sometimes soldiers were carved on the *tondo*/medallion monuments of the Upper Danube region,⁴⁷ or on the ends of the 'caisson' stones characteristic of Africa and Numidia.⁴⁸ Soldiers appear as funerary statues in Pannonia and Dacia,⁴⁹ and even amongst 1st to 4th century mummy-portraits from Egypt.⁵⁰

Gravestones may first be defined by type of representation. Full-figure or half-figure examples may be brought together as 'standing soldiers'.⁵¹ Cavalrymen appear on 'rider' gravestones, including in this instance both the archetypal horseman-riding-down-barbarian,⁵² and the boar-hunt, 'Danubian Rider' scenes.⁵³ *Calo* and horse panels might be further divided between those showing long-rein 'lunging' behind one horse,⁵⁴ and the man leading one horse or standing between two

⁴⁶ Hofmann 1905, op. cit. (n. 16), Fig. 59; Barkóczi 1944, op. cit. (n. 3), Pl. XX.2, XXIII.1, XXIV.1; Barkóczi *et al.* 1954, op. cit. (n. 21), Pl. LI.1, 2; Maróti 2003, op. cit. (n. 21), No. 54.

⁴⁷ Hofmann 1905, op. cit. (n. 16), Fig. 29; Schöber 1923, op. cit. (n. 43), No. 336–337, 351.

⁴⁸ J. Baradéz, 'Fouilles de Tipasa', *Libya* 2 (1954), Fig. 13–14; Benseddik 1979, op. cit. (n. 43), Fig. 27.

⁴⁹ Barkóczi *et al.* 1954, op. cit. (n. 21), Pl. LXXI.4–5; D. Alicu, C. Pop and V. Wollmann, *Figural Monuments from Sarmizegethusa*, Sarmizegethusa Monograph 2, British Archaeological Reports, International Series 55 (Oxford 1979), No. 295, 297.

⁵⁰ S. Walker and M. Bierbrier, *Ancient Faces. Mummy Portraits from Roman Egypt* (London 1997), No. 87–88; *Das Museum für altägyptische Kunst in Luxor* (Mainz 1981), No. 290.

⁵¹ See H. Gabelmann, 'Die Typen der römischen Grabstelen am Rhein', *Bonner Jahrbücher* 172 (1972), 65–140; Tufi 1988, op. cit. (n. 43).

⁵² Conveniently, but not exhaustively collected by Schleiermacher 1984, op. cit. (n. 15). See M. Mackintosh, 'The sources of the horseman and fallen enemy motif on the tombstones of the western Roman empire', *Journal of the British Archaeological Association* 139 (1986), 1–21.

⁵³ These are not so much derived from cultic motifs, where rider-gods commonly trample human figures under their horses' hooves (D. Tudor, *Corpus Monumentorum Religionis Equitum Danuviorum* I. *The Monuments*. Études préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l'empire romain 13.1 (Leiden, 1969), No. 1–3, 6, 9, 16–20, 23–3 etc., although see No. 90), but from eastern Hellenistic funerary models featuring all or some of horseman, dog, cave with emerging boar, and tree with entwined serpent (G. Bordenache, 'Temi e motivi della plastica funeraria di età Romana nella Moesia Inferior', *Dacia* n.s. 9 (1965), Fig. 10–2, 17–8, 20, 26; Pfuhl and Möbius 1977, op. cit. (n. 20), No. 1402–1403, 1408, 1410, 1412–1413). Cf. M. Speidel, *Die Equites Singulares Augusti. Begleittruppe der römischen Kaiser des zweiten und dritten Jahrhunderts* (Bonn 1965), 79–83; id. 1994, op. cit. (n. 30), No. 109, 136, 258, 363, 525, 541, 543–544, 579, 584(?), 591–600, 604, 682.

⁵⁴ Espérandieu 1907–1981, op. cit. (n. 3), No. 5838, 6448, 6454–6455, 6460, 6463, 6465, 6589.

led horses.⁵⁵ The former may have had Rhenish origins whilst the latter may have been a specifically Danubian motif, and both spread to Rome and elsewhere.⁵⁶ These may be further defined by date based on the evidence of location (finds from Hadrian's Wall or Dacia must be after the 1st century AD), form of depiction and types of equipment (e.g. 1st century belt decoration; Tetrarchic Pannonian headwear), epigraphic considerations (consular date, unit title histories, personal names etc.), and artistic style (scene genres, decorative comparanda etc.). Often this involves pieces which cannot be tied down directly to one century.

Thus an approximate total of 620 gravestone representations date from the Late Republic to the 4th century AD. Adding the other classes of funerary iconography forms a corpus of approximately 742 items.⁵⁷ Although this figure is not as large as for the extraordinary corpus of 5th–4th century BC Attic grave *stelai*,⁵⁸ it is considerable by any pre-Early Modern standard. Moreover, the individual Roman pieces are vastly more varied and informative in composition and content than the Greek items.

⁵⁵ E.g. Hofmann 1905, op. cit. (n. 16), Fig. 18, 25, 42–46, 63–64; Schöber 1923, op. cit. (n. 43), No. 54, 58, 190, 192, 255, 259; Barkóczy 1944, op. cit. (n. 3), PL. VI.3; Barkóczy *et al.* 1954, op. cit. (n. 21), Pl. XXXV.2, XXXVI.1, LXI.5.

⁵⁶ Busch 2001, op. cit. (n. 38).

⁵⁷ These figures represent bare minima based on what the writer has collected from publications and through independent fieldwork. With the best will and industry in the world they cannot possibly be exhaustive for the simple reasons that not all publications have been obtained, many unpublished items lurk within and without museum collections, and new pieces are discovered every year. In 2005 a gravestone of an armed and armoured *classarius* was found at Classe, Italy (http://archeobo.arti.beniculturali.it/comunicati/stampa/stele_clasen.htm; viewed 25.01.06). A cavalry gravestone found at Lancaster, England, depicts a horseman carrying the severed head of the barbarian below (<http://www.10000things.org.uk/cityoflancaster.htm>; viewed 25.01.06). The latter is relevant to an earlier discussion in this *Impact of Empire* series (J.C.N. Coulston, 'Overcoming the barbarian. Depictions of Rome's enemies in Trajanic Monumental art', in L. de Blois, P. Erdkamp, O. Hekster, G. de Kleijn and S. Mols, eds., *The Representation and Perception of Roman Imperial Power. Proceedings of the Third Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire [Roman Empire, 200 BC–AD 476], Rome, March 20–23, 2002* (Amsterdam 2003), 404–408). See also G.D. Stiebel, 'Scalping in Roman Palestine—"minime Romanum sacrum"?', *Scripta Classica Israelica* 24 (2005), 151–162).

⁵⁸ 2361 examples considered by R. Osborne, 'Law, the democratic citizen and the representation of women in classical Athens', *Past and Present* 155 (1997), 3–33 = R. Osborne, ed., *Studies in Ancient Greek and Roman Society* (Cambridge 2004), 38–60, based on C.W. Clairmont, *Classical Attic Tombstones* (Kilchberg 1993). It would be interesting to be able to compare the total of full-size, knightly, stone effigies known from the area of the former Roman Empire, for the 12th–15th centuries AD.

Overall the gravestones break down into 264 standing soldier type (SS); 236 rider type (R); 123 *calo* and horse reliefs (CH). The overall difference in numbers between standing soldier and rider gravestones is not proportionally very large, whilst the number of *calo* and horse *stelae* is surprisingly high, and this is due to the figures from Rome (two-thirds of the overall total).

For standing soldier reliefs the numbers break down chronologically as follows: 136 for the 1st–2nd centuries (SS1–2); 115 for the 3rd century (SS3); 14 for the 4th century (SS4). Again, the comparative numbers of 1st–2nd and 3rd century standing soldier gravestones seems well balanced (presence or absence of a *paenula* is a useful quick-reference dating feature), but in fact the second figure is spread over half the time of the first, and adjusting them would give comparative figures of 136 and 230 (or 68 and 115). One should in addition perhaps include the grave-altars from Apamea, but also those from Rome and elsewhere, plus funerary statues. Thus: 136 + 8; 115 + 56 (altars) + 7 (statues) or 72:178. Although these figures might be offset by high survival rates in large cemeteries and long-standing antiquarian collections in Rome, plus the increased size of the 3rd century army, still the suggestion is of a higher rate of erection in the 3rd century. The small, ‘long’ 4th century total, from the Tetrarchy onwards, is indicative of the general downturn in sculpture and epigraphy.

For rider gravestones the numbers break down chronologically as follows: 139 for the 1st–2nd centuries (R1–2); 22 for the 2nd–3rd century (R2–3); 60 for the 3rd century (R3); 4 for the 3rd–4th century (R3–4); and 11 for the 4th century (R4). Rider gravestones are less easy to date definitively, hence the wide overlaps, but if the R2/3 category is evenly split, this gives an approximate 2:1 ratio, predictable if the class of *stela* was erected at an even rate over three centuries.

For *calo* and horse reliefs the numbers break down chronologically as follows: 9 for the 1st century (CH1); 37 for the 2nd century (CH2); 18 for the 1st–2nd centuries (CH1–2); 22 for the 3rd century (CH3); and 37 for the 2nd–3rd centuries (CH2–3). The 123-strong *calo* and horse group is inflated and dominated by Rome (89), and to a lesser extent by the Germaniae (13) and Pannonia (16). On balance it seems that the type originated in the Rhineland and enjoyed a slightly later and stylistically separate development on the Danube, spreading to Rome from both regions in the 2nd century.

If we now examine gravestones sorted by type and by province/location we see the following distributions:

Roma

SS1-2	10
SS3	13
SSH3	10
R	34
CH	89

Britannia

SS1-2	17
SS3	10-12
R	19

Germania Inferior

SS1	20
SS1-2	5
SSH1	1
SS3	2
R1	39
R1-2	1
CH1	8

Germania Superior

SS1	12
SS1-2	3
SS3	1
R1	2
R1-2	12
CH1	1
CH1-2	4

Pannonia

SS1-2	15
SS3	24
SSH3	1
SS2-3	3
R1	4
R2	6
R1-2	17
R3	3
CH1-2	7
CH2-3	6
CH3	3

Rome has a high 3rd century representation, commensurate with the Severan expansion of military formations in the city, but also reflecting the Danubian shift in praetorian recruitment.⁵⁹ A high cavalry-linked contingent reflects the provincial recruitment of *equites singulares Augusti*.⁶⁰ In Britain troops favoured standing soldier stones, well represented over two and a half centuries (rather than three, with a late, half-century start after AD 43), but there was also a strong and continuing rider gravestone tradition, brought over in AD 43 from the Rhineland, and reflecting the self-regard of auxiliary cavalry.⁶¹ Likewise in the Rhineland standing soldier *stelae* had an early, particularly pre-Flavian currency, and the auxiliary cavalry were even more prominent than in Britain.⁶² Lastly, in Pannonia, 3rd century standing soldiers predominated, but in the earlier period rider gravestones were strongly represented.⁶³

'Ring buckle gravestones': concentrations and implications

Any study of gravestones comes with the customary series of health warnings. In the Roman corpus there are obvious biases towards wealth and rank, statistics skewed by patterns of survival, collectability and modern recording.⁶⁴ Above all it must be realised that these gravestones, however arresting and immediate they are in presenting the images of deceased soldiers, probably represent a small proportion of those which were originally sculpted and erected. Some 740 images certainly constitute a tiny sample of the bare minimum of five and a quarter million Roman soldiers who served over 350 years.⁶⁵ The fortuitous discovery of

⁵⁹ A. Passerini, *Le Coorti Pretorie* (Rome 1939), 171–183; Coulston 2000, op. cit. (n. 17), 91, 99.

⁶⁰ Speidel 1965, op. cit. (n. 53), 16–21; M.P. Speidel, *Riding for Caesar. The Roman Emperors' Horse Guard* (London 1994), 38–41, 81–86.

⁶¹ Continuing through to the 3rd century (Schleiermacher 1984, op. cit. (n. 15), No. 68, 71, 73, 80, 82–83).

⁶² Schleiermacher 1984, op. cit. (n. 15), No. 4–48, 51–52.

⁶³ Schleiermacher 1984, op. cit. (n. 15), No. 84, 87, 98, 111–115, 127–134.

⁶⁴ In general see W. Scheidel, *Measuring Age, Sex and Death in the Roman Empire. Explorations in Roman Demography*. *Journal of Roman Archaeology* Supplement 21 (Ann Arbor 1996), 97–138; G. Oliver, 'An introduction to the epigraphy of death: funerary inscriptions as evidence', in G.J. Oliver, ed., *The Epigraphy of Death. Studies in the History and Society of Greece and Rome* (Liverpool 2000), 1–19.

⁶⁵ The most approximate and hasty of calculations: average of 30 *legiones* (exaggerated to cover guard and fleet units and army growth) of 5000 men, doubled (to include *auxilia*), multiplied by the period (350 years) divided by length of service (arbitrary 20

stelae and grave altars at Apamea demonstrates this nicely. Finds made at just one site constitute almost 10% of the whole corpus!

The exercise in statistical study already introduced is limited in very many ways, but it is still possible to tentatively explore some factors generating the crudely delineated patterns.

Elsewhere it has been suggested that the praetorians in Rome sought to emphasise their identity as an alien and sometimes alienated community through their funerary art.⁶⁶ This was not so much an issue whilst the *cohortes praetoriae* were predominantly recruited from Italians, but the influx of provincial *legionarii* for the Guard post AD 193 injected a new demographic element which may have felt culturally intimidated by the metropolis. There were undoubted tensions between *praetoriani* and the *plebs sordidus* which perennially erupted in major rioting.⁶⁷ Funerary inscriptions tend to emphasise Danubian birth, whilst Danubian forms of gravestone iconography came to prominence. From the early 2nd century the *equites singulares Augusti* were already in a similar position, socially as well as culturally apart from the urban population, and at times equally at odds with the masses.⁶⁸ During the Julio-Claudian period the *corporis custodes Germanici* adopted the same form and decoration for their gravestones as used by the praetorians, a striking form of acculturation perhaps designed to make a statement about competitive status within the bodyguard formations.⁶⁹ Might not an element of competition be reflected in the 3rd century gravestones? The most splendid figural examples indeed were put up for *singulares*, most of the praetorian instances being much smaller stones. After AD 212 theoretically the two bodies of troops possessed similar citizen status, but this would not have lessened competition. Perhaps it even heightened it?

years), or $(30 \times 5000) \times (350/20) = 5,250,000$. The real number of individuals passing through the formations would have been much larger, reflecting deaths in service.

⁶⁶ Coulston 2000, op. cit. (n. 17), 96. See K. Hopkins, *Death and Renewal* (Cambridge 1983), 213–214; D. Noy, *Foreigners at Rome. Citizens and Strangers* (London 2000), 218–220; A.W. Busch, 'Kamaraden bis in den Tod? Zur militärischen Sepulkraltopographie im kaiserzeitlichen Rom', in P. Zanker, R. Neudecker and V. Kockel, eds., *Lebenswelten, Bilder, Räume. Symposium Rom, 2002*, Palilia 13 (forthcoming).

⁶⁷ Dio 74.16; Herodian 7.11–12; SHA, *Maximus et Balbinus* 10.4–8. See J. Curran, *Pagan City and Christian Capital. Rome in the Fourth Century* (Oxford 2000), 26–35.

⁶⁸ Dio 73.13; Herodian 1.12.6–9.

⁶⁹ H. Bellen, *Die Leibwache der römischen Kaiser des julisch-claudischen Hauses* (Wiesbaden 1981), 62–63, Pl. IV–X; A. Giuliano, ed., *Museo Nazionale Romano. Le Sculture I.7.1. Catalogo delle sculture esposte nel giardino cinquecento* (Roma 1984), No. IV.29a–d; Coulston 2000, op. cit. (n. 17), 96, Fig. 5.4.

Both formations were quite capable of fighting on opposite sides during rioting, spectacularly from Commodus' principate onwards.

On the frontiers there will have been other, less well documented rivalries. Certainly *legionarii* resented and despised the easy lives of over-paid and under-worked *praetoriani*,⁷⁰ but what about relations between *legionarii* and *auxilarii*? The very fine group of Julio-Claudian *stelae* at Bad Kreuznach entirely represents auxiliary *milites gregarii*, yet exactly the same care was taken with prominent swords, daggers and belts as on legionary gravestones at nearby Koblenz and Mainz.⁷¹ Were the deceased and/or their heirs claiming equality of honour and status with citizen troops?

Rider gravestones may be viewed in a similar light. In the 1st century AD they were the reserve of wealthy cavalymen, non-citizens for the most part, but often with elevated status within their own societies and cultures. Some Rhenish tribal rider-élites were buried with their horses and/or military attire, and used their equipment in votive ritual.⁷² Thracian rider-élites were buried with their horses and equipment in steppe nomad style *kurgans*.⁷³ Less wealthy, yet status conscious cavalymen, and their heirs, used figural rider gravestones to advertise mounted dominance, large and richly carved *stelae* distinguishing the men from

⁷⁰ Notably Tacitus, *Historiae* 2.21.

⁷¹ Bad Kreuznach: Éspérandieu 1907–1981, op. cit. (n. 3), No. 6125, 6136–6137. Mainz & Koblenz: *ibid.*, No. 5790, 5797, 5835, 5853, 8534. See V. Hope, 'Inscriptions and sculpture: the construction of identity in the military tombstones of Roman Mainz,' in G.J. Oliver, ed., *The Epigraphy of Death. Studies in the History and Society of Greece and Rome* (Liverpool 2000), 155–185. The close links between the unusually prominent *cohors mill. I Hemesenorum sag. eq. c.R.* at Intercisa and nearby legions, especially *legio II Adiutrix* at Aquincum are also reflected in the use in common of 3rd century figural sarcophagi (J. Fitz, *Les Syriens à Intercisa* (Bruxelles 1972), 160; see n. 46, above).

⁷² H.L.H. van Enkevort and W.J.H. Willems, 'Roman cavalry helmets in ritual hoards from the Kops Plateau at Nijmegen, the Netherlands', *Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies* 5 (1994), 125–154; J.A. Waasdorp, *Van Romeinse Soldaten en Cananefaten* (Den Haag, 1999); C. van Driel-Murray, 'Wapentuig voor Hercules', in N. Roymans and T. Derks, eds., *De tempel van Empel* (s'Hertogenbosch 1994), 92–107. In general see C. van Driel-Murray, 'Ethnic soldiers: the experience of the Lower Rhine tribes', in T. Grünwald and S. Seibel, ed., *Kontinuität und Diskontinuität. Germania inferior am Beginn und am Ende der römischen Herrschaft* (Berlin 2003), 200–217.

⁷³ E.g. I. Velkov, 'Neue Grabhügel aus Bulgarien', *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Archéologie Bulgare* 5 (1928–1929), 13–55; A.M. Mansel, 'Grabhügelforschung in Ostthracien', *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Archéologie Bulgare* 12 (1938), 154–189; H. Bujukliev, *La Nécropole Tumulaire de Catalka, Région de Stara Zagora* (Sofia 1986), elements of the rite being transferred away from the Danube region, cf. S. Abdul-Hak, 'Rapport préliminaire sur les objets provenant de la nécropole romaine située à proximité de Nawa (Hauran)', *Les Annales Archéologiques de Syrie* 4–5 (1954–1955), 163–188.

citizen legionaries and lower status auxiliary infantry. In all periods the horse has been used as a symbol of power and social standing, and sometimes even praetorian and legionary cavalrymen adopted the 'triumphal rider' motif to distinguish themselves from their *commilitones* on foot.⁷⁴ Thus in some respects these patrons of rider gravestones were on the frontier, literally, between native elite status and Roman cultural/funerary practice.

In the 3rd century the *Constitutio Antoniniana* widened citizenship, or at least confirmed demographic trends long since underway, and the theoretical status of different formations converged. As has already been observed, in the same period the forms of military equipment which had traditionally distinguished legionary from auxiliary battlefield roles lost their prominence, meaning that all troops could take on a similarly wide series of functions. Although it is clear that legionary *vexillationes* were detached from parent legions throughout the Principate, as the period progressed the rump legions became more sedentary, and in the 3rd century *vexillationes* of one or two cohorts travelled the empire, sometimes never to return to their parent formations.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, auxiliary regiments developed new skills in construction and manufacture, once the preserve of the old large legions packed with technicians.⁷⁶ Thus legionary service was increasingly indistinguishable from auxiliary activities, a background against which there may actually have been a need to advertise legionary identity as a continuing, high *kudos* status.

Inscriptions which celebrate Concordia between legionary *vexillationes* may be interpreted by cynics as patching up relations after a quarrel, a sort of post bar-fight scenario.⁷⁷ On the other hand, they may be seen as marking celebrations of mutual identity, re-affirmations of status and legionary brotherhood in a world of isolation from parent legions, of *arriviste* auxiliaries and of increasingly threatening barbarians. Renewed emphasis on legionary emblems seems to be part of

⁷⁴ *Equites praetoriani*: Coulston 2000, op. cit. (n. 17), Fig. 5.3. *Equites legionis*: Schleiermacher 1984, op. cit. (n. 15), No. 4, 70, 86, 98, 107, 114, 120.

⁷⁵ R. Saxon, *Untersuchungen zu den Vexillationen des römischen Kaiserheeres von Augustus bis Diokletian* (Köln 1967). Cf. *RIB* 334 (Caerleon).

⁷⁶ In Britain auxiliaries were already stamping tiles from the Trajanic-Hadrianic period (*RIB* 2469, 2472) and eastern auxiliaries were first building in stone at Carvoran from the time of Hadrian (*RIB* 1808, 1810, 1818, 1820, linked with 1778).

⁷⁷ For example *RIB* 1125 (Corbridge); M.W.C. Hassall and R.S.O. Tomlin, 'Roman Britain in 1988 II. Inscriptions', *Britannia* 20 (1989), No. 4–5 (Carlisle). See discussion in R.S.O. Tomlin, 'A Roman altar from Carlisle Castle', *Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmoreland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society* 89 (1989), 86–88.

this process and their potency was still great enough for a Carausius in the late 3rd century to place such totems on numismatic appeals to the troops.⁷⁸ There are many examples in more recent armies where social cachet has been a potent force denoting status and fostering *élan* in formations, yet without their having distinctive military equipment for a specific battlefield role. The French kings' *Maison du Roi*, Napoléon's *Garde Impériale*, or the Guard regiments of the Victorian British army are cases in point.⁷⁹ Of course their uniforms, insignia and standards identified them to the professional observer, as did shield-blazons, crests and standards in the Roman context.⁸⁰ Stripped as they were of their integral cavalry, archers, light infantry and artillery, the legions of the Late Roman army still formed many of the 'senior' units, as shown by listings in the *Notitia Dignitatum*.⁸¹

Thus the legionary domination of the 3rd century standing soldier genre may be observed as one method of maintaining and advertising superior status within a larger and more homogenous army. Likewise, the use of imperial portraiture traits on 'private' gravestones⁸² perhaps

⁷⁸ J. Casey, *Carausius and Allectus: the British Usurpers* (London 1994), 92–96.

⁷⁹ A nice case in point is provided by the Battle of the Alma (September 20th, 1854) when the Grenadier Guards rejected an offer for a lower status formation to advance with them and support their open flank, despite dire tactical need, purely as a mark of their own precedence. As Kinglake described it: "Around these two standards General Codrington rallied such men as he could gather, and made them open out and form line two deep. The body thus formed numbered about 300 men, and General Codrington wished to place it on the left of the Grenadiers, in order to fill a part of the chasm at that moment lying quite open in the centre of the Brigade of Guards. But it occurred to him—for he was himself a Guardsman, and he knew the feelings of the corps—that to place soldiers of the line abreast of the Grenadiers, and in the room of the broken regiment, might give pain to a battalion of the Guards: so he went to the Grenadiers to know if they would like troops to come up to fill the empty space. The answer was a proud one. It was also a rash answer . . . However, the answer was 'No!' and the Grenadiers, with their left flank stark open, but in beautiful order, contentedly marched up the slope" (A.W. Kinglake, *The Invasion of the Crimea. Its Origin and an Account of its Progress down to the Death of Lord Raglan* (Edinburgh/London, 1901), 3, 221–222).

⁸⁰ Coulston 2004, op. cit. (n. 43), 137–138, 146–147.

⁸¹ Generally ordered after the cavalry *vexillationes* but before the *auxilia palatinae* in the field armies, and above the old *auxilia* in the lists of frontier troops (*Notitia Dignitatum*, *Oriens* V.41–47, VI.41–47, VII.38–47, VIII.33–53, IX.30–38, XXVIII.14–19, XXIX.7–8, XXXI.31–39, XXXII.30–31, XXXIII.28, XXXIV.30, XXXV.24, XXXVI.29–30, XXXVII.21–22, XXXVIII.13–16, XL.29–36, XLII.30–39; *Occidens* V.141–156, XXXII.44–48, XXXIII.51–57, XXXIV.25–27, 37–41, XXXV.17–22, XL.18, XLII.26).

⁸² Cf. E.J. Phillips, 'The gravestone of M. Favonius Facilis at Colchester', *Britannia* 6 (1975), 104 (Claudius); Speidel 1990, op. cit. (n. 30), 202, Pl. 23 (Caracalla).

denoted not so much loyalty to one particular emperor (although Caracalla was the soldiers' emperor *par excellence*!), so much as solidarity with an army identity and ethos of service. However, this was not the entire picture, otherwise why did not all legionary installations in all provinces have halos of 3rd century figural gravestones around them? The answer comes from the other dominant variable, differences in regional funerary practice. The Rhenish army did not erect *stelae* at this time, whilst the Pannonian army did. Recruitment of *Illyriciani* spread the practice to Rome, where it was amplified for specific local cultural reasons, and outwards again with movements of troops to take part in major imperial campaigns. Danubian *stelae* are also distinguished by a marked emphasis on family members within a hierarchy, children and not just a female partner frequently appearing as groups on 3rd century tombstones, the soldiers carefully distinguished from other males by their equipment.⁸³ Does this show some sociological trend at work in this region? Perhaps the spread of the ring buckle panoply, most likely initiated in the Upper/Middle Danube zone together with other technical innovations, was, like the funerary practice, a feature of the Illyrian military 'renaissance.' When the Rhineland forces were strategically and numerically dominant this was the golden age of Rhenish figural gravestones. Likewise, the predominance of the Danubians went hand in hand with the outburst of 3rd century figural gravestones.⁸⁴

⁸³ For example Hofmann 1905, op. cit. (n. 16), Fig. 58; Schöber 1923, op. cit. (n. 43), No. 154, 158, 198, 216, 239, 261; Barkóczi 1944, op. cit. (n. 3), Pl. VII.2, X; id. 1973, op. cit. (n. 29), Fig. 1, 3–4; id. 1985, op. cit. (n. 29), Pl. II, VI, VII.1, X.2; Barkóczi *et al.* 1954, op. cit. (n. 21), Pl. XXXVII.1.

⁸⁴ For further discussions of military identity, especially in the contexts of funerary art and military equipment, see V.M. Hope, 'Words and pictures: the interpretation of Romano-British tombstones', *Britannia* 28 (1997), 246–258; id. 2000, op. cit. (n. 71); V.M. Hope, *Constructing Identity: the Roman Funerary Monuments of Aquileia, Mainz and Nîmes*. British Archaeological Reports International Series 960 (Oxford 2001); S. James, 'The community of the soldiers: a major identity and centre of power in the Roman empire,' in P. Baker, S. Jundi and R. Witcher, eds., *TRAC 98. Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Theoretical Roman Archaeology Conference, Leicester, 1998* (Oxford 1999), 14–25; J. Obmann, 'Waffen—Stauszeichen oder alltäglicher Gebrauchsgegenstand?,' in H. von Hesberg, ed., *Das Militär als Kulturträger in römischer Zeit* (Köln 1999), 189–200; A. Gardner, 'Identities in the Late Roman Army: material and textual perspectives,' in G. Fincham, G. Harrison, R. Holland and L. Revell, eds., *TRAC 2000. Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Theoretical Roman Archaeology Conference* (Oxford 2001), 35–47; O. Stoll, "'De honore certabant et dignitate". Truppe und Selbstidentifikation in der Armee der römischen Kaiserzeit', in O. Stoll, *Römisches Heer und Gesellschaft. Gesammelte Beiträge 1991–1999* (Stuttgart 2001), 106–136; G. Alföldy, 'Kaiser, Heer und soziale Mobilität im römischen Reich', in A. Chaniotis and P. Ducrey, eds., *Army and Power in the Ancient World* (Stuttgart 2002), 123–150; Coulston 2004, op. cit. (n. 43).



Fig. 1. Third century gravestone of an unknown *praetorianus*. Museo Nazionale delle Terme, Rome, Italy. Photograph: Museo Nazionale.



Fig. 2. Third century gravestone of *praetorianus* L. Septimius Valerinus. Museo Nazionale delle Terme, Rome, Italy. Photo: J.C.N. Coulston.



Fig. 3. Third century gravestone of *eques singularis Augusti* Ulpianus Victorinus. Musei Vaticani, Rome, Italy. Photograph: Musei Vaticani.



Fig. 4. Third century gravestone of *eques singularis Augusti* Aurelius Dizala. Musei Vaticani, Rome, Italy. Photograph: J.C.N. Coulston.



Fig. 5. Third century gravestone of an unknown *equus singularis Augusti*.
Museo Archeologico, Salò, Italy. Photograph: J.C.N. Coulston.



Fig. 6. Third century gravestone of an unknown soldier. Roman Baths Museum, Bath, England. Photograph: J.C.N. Coulston.



Fig. 7. Third century sarcophagus, detail of *signifer* figure. Aquincum Museum, Hungary. Photograph: J.C.N. Coulston.



Fig. 8. Third century gravestone of M. Aurelius Avitianus, *legio II Adiutrix*. Aquincum Museum, Hungary. Photograph: J.C.N. Coulston.



Fig. 9. Third century gravestone of Iulius Aufidius, *legio XVI Flavia firma*.
Veria Museum, Greece. Photograph: J.C.N. Coulston.



Fig. 10. Third century gravestone of Aurelius Ingenuus, *tesserarius* in *legio II Parthica*. Apamea/Qalaat al-Mudiq, caravanserai museum, Syria. Photograph: M.C. Bishop.



Fig. 11. Third century gravestone of Aurelius Alexander, *legio II Traiana fortis*. Greco-Roman Museum, Alexandria, Egypt. Photograph: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.



Fig. 12. Third century gravestone of Aurelius Sabius, *legio II Traiana fortis*. Greco-Roman Museum, Alexandria, Egypt. Photograph: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.

VIRTUS PROBI: PAYMENTS FOR THE BATTLE CAVALRY DURING THE RULE OF PROBUS (A.D. 277–278)*

FERNANDO LÓPEZ SÁNCHEZ

With the exception of the military crisis beginning in 406,¹ the worst military crisis that the Roman Empire ever suffered was the one that started in 260 with the capture in the East of Valentinian by Shapur. With all the frontiers under threat, the decreasing trust of the army in the ruling dynasty led to a *de facto* division into three regions: the Gallias, the Italian-Danubian axis and the Eastern part of the Empire. The re-unification of the Empire from the centre could only be achieved in 274, after many efforts by Aurelian. Within this context, it is not surprising that, both in the past and present, the main interest of historians has focused on understanding the means by which the central Empire that governed from Italy could at the same time cope with external attacks and carry out the re-conquest of the Empire. Within this process of re-unification, special attention has been given to the *battle cavalry*, a special cavalry unit presumably based in Milan and sent to different regions according to the orders given by the different central emperors. And yet the existence of a cavalry stationed in Milan and ready to act under direct order of the emperor does not seem to have been an exclusive prerogative of the central Empire of Italy. The Gallic emperors, too, in the years 260–274, seem to have had a battle cavalry, similar to that formed in the north of Italy.²

The real agent in the recovery of the Gallias for the central Empire, the emperor Aurelian, had since 274 been very conscious of the need

* I am indebted to Dominique Hollard for his advice and comments and to the research group *Urbs* of Zaragoza.

¹ All dates are AD unless otherwise stated.

² F. López Sánchez, 'La série légionnaire de Victorin et ses emblèmes *ad hoc*', in D. Hollard, ed., *L'armée et la monnaie. Actes de la journée d'études du 10 décembre 2005 à la Monnaie de Paris*. Recherches et Travaux de la Société d'Études Numismatiques et Archéologiques (= SÉNA) 1 (Paris 2006), 37–49.

to tackle rather than ignore the internal problems of Gaul. Although his premature death prevented him from becoming the emperor of the Gallias, the nucleus of the *battle cavalry* that, without any doubt, was based in Lyon in 274, was used by Probus in the years 277–278. The series *Virtus Probi* issued in Lyon to commemorate the personal actions of Probus in the Rhine area reflects the fact that Probus acted during these years not so much as a commander of the central Empire but equally as an emperor of the Gallic region. In this paper, in four different sections, I'll attempt to demonstrate the way in which Probus, from Lyon, wanted to identify himself with Gallia, even though he was a central emperor.

The first section of this paper, *The meaning of the coin legend Equites*, aims to show that *Equites* was not a legend applied to the whole body of the cavalry in the monetary series of the third century. The Roman engravers had various ways of linking a monetary series to a particular cavalry unit and to a specific event. *Equites* was a legend only used in the years 268 or 276–277 and was linked to an invading military corps under the ultimate command of a *magister equitum*, and not of a Roman emperor. It is therefore unsurprising that Probus used this coin legend only in Italy in 276–277 rather than during his personal leadership in the operations in Gaul in 277–278. The second and third parts of this article, *Virtus Postumi and the defence of Gaul by a local emperor* and *Virtus Probi and the defence of Gaul on behalf of a central emperor*, attempt to clarify why Probus decided to strike the 5th monetary series of P. Bastien in Lyon in the years 277–8. In those years, Probus wanted to present himself in Gaul not as merely a central emperor that had arrived in a Gallic frontier territory, but as a sovereign genuinely worried about the region. The final section of this study, *The Gallic battle cavalry of Probus*, concludes that Probus inherited from Aurelian a *battle cavalry* based in Lyon.

The meaning of the coin legend Equites

As L. de Blois has pointed out, the battle cavalry of the central Empire (Italy and the Danube) had its headquarters in Milan between 260 and

285,³ and so the allusive legends to cavalry are very explicit in the series of coins minted by Aureolus on behalf of Postumus in the town in the years 267–268.⁴ On these coins, Aureolus celebrates a compact cavalry that he shows to be under his control (*Fides (A)Equit*),⁵ and which he used in the service of Postumus (*Concord. (A) Equit*)⁶ to obtain power in Italy (*Virtus (A)Equit*).⁷ *Fides* or *Concordia* are represented by their respective divinities, and *Virtus* is mainly represented by Mars marching with a helmet, spear and shield (Fig. 2), but other examples also show *Romulo Conditor*⁸ (Fig. 1) and Hercules in relation to *Virtus*⁹ (Fig. 3).



Fig. 1. Aureolus, *Virtus Aequit.*, Mediolanum, AD 267, Schulzki, op. cit. (n. 5) pl. 12, n. 108

³ L. de Blois, *The Policy of the Emperor Gallienus* (Leiden 1976), 29: "Soldiers in Milan were mainly in the cavalry." See also 28.

⁴ De Blois 1976, op. cit. (n. 3) 27 and notes 17–21; A. Alföldi, 'Zur Kenntnis der römischen Soldatenkaiser: I. Der usurpator Aureolus und die kavalleriereform des Gallienus,' in *Studien zur Geschichte der Weltkrise des dritten Jahrhunderts n. Chr.* (Darmstadt 1967), 1–16 is still important.

⁵ H.-J. Schulzki, *Die Antoninianprägung der gallischen Kaiser von Postumus bis Tetricus. Typenkatalog der regulären und nachgeprägten Münzen.* Antiquitas 3 (Bonn 1996), 49–51, nn. 15–19a, pl. 2–3.

⁶ Schulzki 1996, op. cit. (n. 5), 47–48, nn. 4–8, pl. 1.

⁷ On the coin legends *Virtus Aequit* of Milan in 267, see Schulzki 1996, op. cit. (n. 5), 67–68, nn. 106–114, pl. 12–13. On the issuing see G. Elmer, *Die Münzprägung der gallischen Kaiser in Köln, Trier und Mailand*, (Berlin 1941), 55–56, nn. 600–617 and 619. N. 620 reads *Pax Equitum*.

⁸ N. Méthy, 'Romulus Conditor: un type monétaire mal connu,' *Annali* 48 (2001), 157–184. Romulus is, in any case, the son of Mars, Ovidius *Fasti* 3.59; Vergilius, *Aeneid* 1.276–277; 6.778–779; Servius, *Commentaries to Vergil's Aeneid* 6.778.

⁹ Significantly *Fides* and *Virtus*, two of Aureolus' coin legends, are linked with two of the most frequent legends on Gallienus' coinage. See De Blois 1976, op. cit. (n. 3), 101–102. The third legend on the Milanese series of Aureolus, *Concordia*, substitutes the third most frequent one on Gallienus' coins, *Victoria*, because of the circumstantial alliance between Aureolus himself and Postumus.



Fig. 2. Aureolus, *Virtus Equit.*, Mediolanum, AD 267, Schulzki, op. cit. (n. 5) pl. 13, n. 110



Fig. 3. Aureolus, *Virtus Equitum*, Mediolanum, AD 267/268, Schulzki, op. cit. (n. 5) pl. 13, n. 112

The legend *Equites* does not often appear on the coins of the period, even though considerable cavalry forces were used at the time. Although there is a lack of clear references to *Equites*, numismatists and historians should consider that legends such as *Virtus* and others associated with Mars are sometimes related to Imperial cavalry forces. The second series of coins minted by Claudius II¹⁰ in Milan is a paradigmatic example of this association. The main types,¹¹ *Virtus Aug(usti)* and *Marti Pacifero*,¹² were in fact minted to commemorate the victory of the Milanese cavalry¹³ over the Alamanni near Lake Garda.¹⁴

¹⁰ The first series minted by Claudius II at Milan was a *donativum* to commemorate the victory at Lake Garda. It was composed exclusively of gold, with legends alluding to the event: *Concordia Exercitus*, *Pax Exerc(itus)*, *Spes Publica* and *Victoria Aug*. A contemporary issue in Rome relates the victory to the prosperity and eternity of the *Urbs* and some of its tutelary gods: *Salus Aug*, *Felicitas Aug*, *Victoria Aug*, *Adventus Aug*, *Liberalitas Aug*, *Concord Exercit(us)* or divinities linked to the *Urbs* such as *Iovi Statori*, *Aeternitas Aug*, *Apollis Cons*. See H. Huvelin, 'L'atelier de Rome sous Claude II le Gothique (aurei, deniers, quinaires et moyens bronzes)', *Numismatica ed Antichità Classica* 13 (1984), 199–213.

¹¹ Apart from the *Victoria* with two captives that reappears in Siscia briefly after and one *denarius* with the legend *Fides Militum*, Huvelin 1984, op. cit. (n. 10), 206.

¹² H. Huvelin, 'La victoire du lac de Garde de Claude II', *Numismatica e Antichità Classica* 11 (1982), 263–269, esp. 263–265.

¹³ H. Huvelin, 'L'atelier de Milan sous Claude II. La première émission de monnaies d'or', *Numismatica e Antichità Classica* 15 (1986), 197–209. On p. 197 he says: «Atelier militaire, il semble avoir joui d'une organisation bien structurée et avoir assez rapidement acquis un certain nombre de règles.»

¹⁴ According to Huvelin, the Milanese series must have been distributed at the end

A similar phenomenon occurs in another Milanese example portrayed in a series minted by Aurelian at the beginning of 271, in close association with Siscia. In that year, both mints show that Aurelian's rise to the throne was declared via an agreement between commanders of the same rank (*Virtus Militum*). With the death of Claudius II, power passed to Aurelian, the remaining living commander of the Imperial cavalry (*Virtus Aug.*)¹⁵ This is why both figures are depicted with laurels on their heads, the wreaths being an exclusive attribute of emperors.¹⁶ Nevertheless, Milan is not shown in this minted series as the real military and cavalry base of Aurelian's army; the iconography of the series shows that the city of Siscia was the true cavalry base of the emperor.

In Siscia, there was not only—as in Milan—a direct agreement between two emperors, one alive and the other dead¹⁷ (Fig. 4). In this series *Virtus Militum* does not represent Claudius II on the left in all types, but *Mars-Virtus* is perfectly characterised with his helmet¹⁸ (Fig. 5).



Fig. 4. Aurelianus, *Virtus Militum*, Mediolanum, AD 271, Göbl, op. cit. (n. 16) Tafelband, pl. 7, n. 51a, 3(2)



Fig. 5. Aurelianus, *Virtus Militum*, Siscia, AD 271, Göbl, op. cit. (n. 16) Tafelband, pl. 89, n. 186b, 3(1)

of the summer. Huvelin 1982, op. cit. (n. 12). See also H. Mattingly, 'The legionary coins of Victorinus,' in *International Numismatic Congress, London June 30–July 3, 1936* (London 1938), 214–218, esp. 217.

¹⁵ *Virtus Augusti* must be associated with battle cavalry, according to P. Bastien, *Le buste monétaire des empereurs romains* 2. Numismatique Romaine, Essais, Recherches et Documents 19 (Bonn 1996), 482–483. See also 547–549.

¹⁶ R. Göbl, *Die Münzprägung des Kaisers Aurelian (270/275)*. Veröffentlichungen der numismatischen Kommission 29, Tafelband (Vienna 1993), pl. 7, n. 50, 51.

¹⁷ Göbl 1993, op. cit. (n. 16) n. 185, pl. 89.

¹⁸ Göbl 1993, op. cit. (n. 16) n. 186, pl. 89.

Aurelian is therefore particularly considered as Claudius's successor in Milan, the gateway to Rome,¹⁹ whilst in Siscia the new emperor is considered above all to be the representative of the army, due to his link with Mars. At the beginning of 271, this army was mainly composed of cavalrymen.

Both Claudius II and Aurelian were emperors who concentrated a significant part of their cavalry forces in Milan in the years 268 and 271. These forces were fairly similar to those gathered by Aureolus in 267–268. However, *Equiti* (or *Aequiti*) is only used again as a coin legend in Ticinum²⁰ and in Rome²¹ in the year 276–277, where it is associated with the first coins minted by Probus in Italy.

From these examples it is clear that *Equites* was not the only coin legend used by Roman engravers to indicate the presence of a cavalry force in a city at a particular time. *Equites* is simply an indicator of the gathering of a body of cavalrymen ready to act imminently as an invasion force related to Gaul. The legend *Virtus*, by contrast, associated with Claudius and Aurelian, is also linked to cavalry action but with an 'internal' meaning, Italian in this case. It is therefore possible that when Probus adopted the obverse with a helmet²² and the words *Virtus Probi* in 277–278—the fifth series of P. Bastien—he wanted to portray the action of his army in a more superior manner than if he had used the term *Equites*. *Equites* in Ticinum and Rome in 276–277 has connotations related to invasion, whilst *Virtus Probi* in 277–278 in Lyon has more localised, Gallic features.

¹⁹ Milan at this time was not only a frontier town, but also the gateway to Rome. The legend *Augusta in pace* applied to Salonina by this mint between 262–3 and 267 is very clear in this regard. Related to these topics, F. López Sánchez, 'Du masculin dans le féminin. Séverine (274–275) et l'image monétaire des emperatrices au III^e siècle a.J.-C.', in Y. Perrin and Th. Petit, eds., *Iconographie impériale, iconographie royale, iconographie des élites dans le monde gréco-romain (III^e av. J.-C.–III^e ap. J.-C.)*. Travaux du centre de recherche en histoire de l'Université de Saint-Étienne 1 (St. Etienne 2004), 249–265.

²⁰ The location of Ticinum presented obvious advantages from a strategic point of view as noted by M.H. Crawford, 'La Zecca di Ticinum', in *Storia di Pavia I (l'età antica)* (Pavia 1984), 249–254, esp. 251. The opening of the mint at Ticinum at the beginning of 274 to substitute that of Milan was clearly closely related to the invasion of Gaul; for more information, see E. Banzi, *I miliani come fonte topografica e storica. L'esempio della XI regio (transpadana) e delle Alpi Cottiae*. Coll. De l'École Française de Rome 254 (Roma 1999), 14: 'il tratto della via „per le Gallie“ compreso tra Ticinum ed Augusta Taurinorum è riportato sugli *Itineraria*.'"

²¹ K. Pink, 'Der Aufbau der römischen Münzprägung in der Kaiserzeit 6/1 Probus', *Numismatische Zeitschrift* 73 (1949), 13–74, esp. 71; G. Vitucci, *L'imperatore Probo* (Roma 1952), 3 and note 1 for the primary bibliographical sources on *Aequiti-Equiti* in Ticinum and Rome and the movements of cavalry troops.

²² Bastien 1993, op. cit. (n. 15), 206: «Le monnayage de Probus est extrêmement riche en bustes portant le casque impérial.»

Virtus Postumi and the defence of Gaul by a local emperor

The association of Probus with the coin legend *Virtus Probi Aug* (Fig. 6) has a direct precedent in Postumus' emissions carrying the legend *Virtus Postumi Aug* (mid 260) (Fig. 7).²³ Although K. Kraft considers the helmet simply as a mark of the Imperial *Virtus*,²⁴ it is its adoption by Gallienus and Postumus in the monetary portraits²⁵ that correspond in the words of P. Bastien to "une nouvelle marque de souveraineté".²⁶ As N. Méthy points out, "Mars apparaît toujours portant un casque, ce qui n'est pas le cas des autres divinités ou héros, même si associés à lui fortement",²⁷ and there was some intention by those Augustans



Fig. 6. Probus, *Virtus Probi Aug*/*Tempor. Felici*, Lugdunum, 5^{ème} émission, AD 277/8 Bastien, 1976, op. cit. (n. 50), pl. 26, n. 210c



Fig. 7. Postumus, *Virtus Postumi Aug*, Cologne, end AD 260, Elmer, op. cit. (n. 7) pl. 3, n. 9

²³ Elmer 1941, op. cit. (n. 7), 41, pl. 3; n. 9 and 10 for the reverses, n. 14 for the obverse.

²⁴ K. Kraft, *Der Helm des römischen Kaisers, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur antiken Geldgeschichte und Numismatik* 1 (Darmstadt 1978), 134–136; Bastien 1993, op. cit. (n. 15), 1, 202.

²⁵ Bastien 1993, op. cit. (n. 15), 1, 201: «Le casque n'apparaît sur le buste monétaire impérial que sous les règnes de Gallien et de Postume.»

²⁶ Ibidem, 203.

²⁷ Méthy 2001, op. cit. (n. 8), 174. Hence, Romulus, the son of Mars always appears with his head uncovered. In the case of *Virtus*, *Honos* or *Roma*, they wear a helmet, but only because they are close to Mars (Méthy 2001, 158). On *Virtus* and *Honos*, M. Bieber, *Virtus Romana*, *Studia et Documenta Antiqua* 13 (Munich 1973); W. Eisenhut, 'Honos und Virtus,' *American Journal of Archaeology* 49 (1945), 25–34; J. Rufus Fears, 'The Cult of Virtues and Roman Imperial Ideology,' *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt* II 17, 2 (1981), 827–948, esp. 845 and 889.

who wore helmets to identify themselves with a deity, which could be no other than Mars.

In ancient Italy, Mars was always the patron of *Ver Sacrum*, the majority of armed young men that operated far away from their bases. Most mercenaries that operated on a best wage basis outside their own country were devoted to Mars. Thus, the famous Mamertini—*Mamers* means Mars in the Oscan language—that came to trigger the Second Punic War, represent Mars to a massive degree on their coins.²⁸ To give one more example, the field of Mars was found significantly outside the Roman *pomerium*, and it was here where, during archaic times and during *Equus October*, a horse was sacrificed to the god to symbolise a military expedition to foreign lands. Some significant Roman-Campanian coins from the third century BC associate Mars in a very graphic way on the obverse with a horse on the reverse²⁹ (Fig. 8).

When they adopted the helmet as a new imperial attribute from 260 onwards, both Gallienus and Postumus could be considered, as in Republican Rome, defenders of the frontier, associated directly with their god, Mars. Moreover, the inscription at Augsburg of the governor of Raetia, M. Simplicinius Genialis, which celebrates the victory over the Alamanni and the Iuthungi, confirms that the invasion of these Barbarians in 260 was used to Postumus's advantage to take control of Gaul.³⁰ From 260 onwards, Postumus wanted to prove himself a worthy and effective defender of Gaul.



Fig. 8. RRC II, op. cit. (n. 29) Campania, 241–226 BC, pl. 1, fig. 12, n. 25/1

²⁸ G. Tagliamonte, *I figli di Marte. Mobilità, mercenari e mercenariato italici in Magna Grecia e Sicilia*, Tyrrhenica 3 (Roma 1994), 248–254 and pl. 24.

²⁹ M.H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage* (Cambridge 1974), 141–143 (241–226 BC), nn. 25–27/2 (vol. 1), pl. 1 (vol. 2).

³⁰ L. Bakker, 'Raetien unter Postumus. Das Siegesdenkmal einer Juthungenschlacht im Jahre 260 n. Chr. Aus Augsburg,' *Germania* (1993), 369–386; See also H. Lavagne, «Une nouvelle inscription d'Augusbourg et les causes de l'usurpation de Postume,» *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* (1994), 431–446; P. Le Roux, «Armées, rhétorique et politique dans l'Empire gallo-romain. À propos de l'inscription d'Augusbourg,» *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 115 (1997), 281–290.

This association, however, between Postumus and a helmeted Mars does not invalidate Postumus' special preference for Hercules (Fig. 9), and neither does it belie the frequent association with the god in several military series of his rule.³¹ Both express two fundamental qualities that a good emperor must have: to be able to govern at home and to undertake military action abroad (*domi militiaeque*). Postumus, from the beginning, refused to limit himself to being a mere frontier general. On the contrary, during his whole reign, he followed the path of a true emperor, worried about Gaul and about his civil life, in the same way in which a central emperor would behave in Rome and Italy. The unusual presence of Hercules on the coins of Postumus has to be understood in this way, as J. Drinkwater has done: as the expression of his relationship to a founding civil aspect of *romanitas*. Hercules, although a peripatetic hero, also re-founded Rome when he defeated the monster Cacus. This continued association with Mars on Postumus' coins was undoubtedly made with the aim of displaying the latter's total condition as a civil emperor and not a simple general devoted to the frontiers.³²

This symbiotic duality, military as well as civil, is present throughout the rule of Postumus, and it is even proclaimed in the series of coins where Hercules does not have any role at all. Hence, the *antoniniani* *Mars Victor*³³ (Fig. 10) and *Virtuti Augusti*³⁴ of Postumus that at the end



Fig. 9. Postumus, *Herculi Deusoniensi*, middle AD 262, Elmer, op. cit. (n. 7) pl. 5, n. 4

³¹ Including that of Aureolus in Milan, where *Romulo Conditori* could be a more direct reference to the emperor himself as son of Mars.

³² J.F. Drinkwater, *The Gallic Empire. Separatism and Continuity in the North-Western provinces of the Roman Empire AD 260–274* (Stuttgart 1987), 263: “(…) in the magnificent ‘Twelve Labours of Hercules’ series (..) seems reasonable to suppose that such a figure (Hercules as ‘ideal ruler’) would have appealed at least as much to civilians as to soldiers; it may be that Postumus, while continuing to recognise and advertise the importance of military power, was anxious to foster civilian support for his regime.

³³ Elmer 1941, op. cit. (n. 7), 50, n. 389, pl. 6.3.

³⁴ Elmer 1941, op. cit. (n. 7), 50, n. 390, pl. 6.6.



Fig. 10. Postumus, *Mars Victor*, AD 263/264, Elmer, op. cit. (n. 7) pl. 6, n. 3



Fig. 11. Postumus, *Iovi Conservat*, AD 263/264, Elmer, op. cit. (n. 7) pl. 6, n. 1

of 263 and beginning of 264 are associated with the campaigns against the Franks and Alamans³⁵ are linked with *Iovi Conservatori* in the same series³⁶ (Fig. 11). Thus in the same series there is emphasis on both the frontier war and the security of Gaul associated with Jupiter.

Virtus Probi and the defence of Gaul on behalf of a central emperor

The importance given to the Mars-Hercules dichotomy by Postumus is not shared by all emperors of the third century AD. Others emphasise the association of the emperor with Mercury, as was the case in the coming to Italy of Gallienus in 264³⁷ (Fig. 12) or of Aurelian in 271–2³⁸ (Fig. 13). The representations of both emperors with spear and shield

³⁵ Drinkwater 1987, op. cit. (n. 32), 30.

³⁶ Elmer 1941, op. cit. (n. 7), 50, n. 388, pl. 6. 1.

³⁷ P. Bastien and C. Arnold-Biucchi, 'Busto monetale come Mercurio (Gallieno, Aureliano)', *Rivista Italiana di Numismatica* 84 (1983), 73–85, on p. 84: "Pensiamo però che in quell'epoca non si può considerare Mercurio unicamente come dio della merx: l'anarchia e la guerra che colpivano una gran parte dell'impero non dovevano certo giovare al commercio... pensiamo che si debba piuttosto seguire l'interpretazione d'Ovidio che chiama il dio *pacifer et arbiter*. Si tratta dunque di un messaggio di pace rivolto a un ambiente che, come sappiamo, non era devoto all'imperatore."

³⁸ Ibidem, 85: "In queste brevi emissioni che coincidono forse con il ritorno d'Oriente dell'imperatore... il significato del busto come Hermes potrebbe essere lo stesso di quello che proponiamo per Gallieno: l'intervento di Hermes come pacificatore e mediatore in una situazione politica particolarmente difficile."



Fig. 12. Gallienus, *Virtus Gallieni Augusti*, AD 264, *RIN* 84–85, op. cit. (n. 37), pl. 1, fig. 1



Fig. 13. Aurelianus, *Virtus Militum*, Siscia AD 271/2, Göbl, op. cit. (n. 16), pl. 1, fig 8

are rare, but even rarer are their busts with a helmet. The relative decreasing role of Hercules can be understood when considering that the hero, when re-founding Rome after destroying the monster Cacus, also indicated the frontiers and the dangerous situation of Rome. Gallienus, Aurelian or any other central emperor of the second half of the third century knew that his top priority was the defence of Italy, heart of the Empire, which had to be safe and not in any sense a frontier. Hercules could reconcile himself with a Romanization of the frontier such as Gaul, but not with Italy. This same consideration is sufficient to explain the rarity of monetary associations with Mars, essentially the god of frontiers, by the central emperors.

Gallienus was an emperor who, though circumstances had turned him into a good general, always aimed to act as a civil, Italian emperor.³⁹ The same can be said about Aurelian, an emperor who always wanted to govern in an *Urbs* that never completely accepted him. His stay in

³⁹ Even after 260, Gallienus struck many series of coins of a civil character, in Rome as in other mints, and only in a very limited sense can he be considered as a purely military emperor. The global interpretation of J.-P. Bost, *L'empereur Gallien et son temps* (automne 253–automne 268), *Historiens et Géographes* 369 (2000), 51–60, is very interesting.

Rome started badly when he was rebuffed by a Senate involved in the rebellion of workers at the mints.⁴⁰ It was not until 274, once he had defeated Zenobia in the East, that Aurelian came to be accepted by the governing circles of the *Urbs*. This acceptance was compounded by his marriage to Ulpia Severina.⁴¹ In accordance with his wish to integrate into the civil circles of Rome, the coins of Aurelian only reflect a few exceptional busts and very few truly military reverses. The predominant motif is a coinage that repeats time after time the scenes of the *dextrarum iunctio* between Aurelian and Mars or Jupiter. This is a reflection of the wish of Aurelian to be considered as an emperor able to govern in the military as well as in the civil sphere.

Claudius II, acting as emperor between Gallienus and Aurelian, did not associate himself with Mars on his coins. He considered that fighting was under control on the essential frontiers of the Roman world, that is, Italy and its defensive corridor along the Danube. The battle at Lake Garda in the Po valley or the Gothic wars that followed, were primarily aimed at securing Italy from a direct invasion. In this sense, Claudius did not consider himself a frontier emperor but a defender of Italy. The good relations of the emperor with the Senate,⁴² evident from the vast amount of *Divo Claudio* coinage in Rome after his death, are proof of the Italian preferences of this emperor-soldier.⁴³

Only at one specific moment Gallienus seems to behave differently to how a central emperor would be expected to. This was in the Rhine area between 256 and 259, when Gallienus adopted coin legends that make direct reference to the use of mobile troops inserted in his *comitatus*—*Gallieno cum exercitu suo*.⁴⁴ The iconography in a number of obverses in these years displays a bust characterised by spear and shield, while

⁴⁰ Some senators were executed, Eutrop. 9.14 and SHA, *Vita Aureliani* 21.5–6; for their involvement in the rebellion, Zosimus 1.49.2; See also V. Cubelli, *Aureliano imperatore: la rivolta dei monetieri e la cosiddetta riforma monetaria* (Florence 1992), 47: «La rivolte stessa, ideata o strumentalizzata dal Senato, appare così più comprensibile,» and 49: «La rivolta dei monetieri rappresenta a mio avviso il più concreto tentativo di opposizione del Senato.»

⁴¹ López Sánchez 2004, op. cit. (n. 19), 254.

⁴² Cubelli 1992, op. cit. (n. 40), 48, note 101: «I rapporti tra il Senato e Claudio II dovevano essere stratti.» In this sense also Orosius 7.23.1: (*scil. Claudius*) *voluntate senatus sumpsit imperium*. His figure is viewed with sympathy in the *Historia Augusta*, as observed by M.A. Levi et al., *Storia romana dalle origini al 476 d. C.* (Milan 1986), 404.

⁴³ Cubelli 1992, op. cit. (n. 40), 48.

⁴⁴ Elmer 1941, op. cit. (n. 7), 18, n. 1, first series for Valerian with Gallienus on the reverse and the legend *Gallieno cum exer(citus) suo*; The same is true for Gallienus' first emission, with the shorter legend *Imp/C(um) E(xercitu) S(uo)*.

on the reverse there is an emphasis on *Virtus* and Mars. However, the most complete of all the emissions of the period, *Virtus Gallieni*⁴⁵ (Figs. 14, 15), summarises perfectly the different vision that a central emperor could possess of his mission in the Rhine area, in relation to Italy or to the Danube. Although these coins directly precede the series *Virtus Postumi* or *Virtus Probi*, their reverses depict an emperor displaced towards the frontier of civilization, rather than within it.

On the basis of this evidence, it can be said that the biggest difference between Gallienus and a Gallic emperor such as Postumus is that the former considered Gaul a distant frontier territory, while the latter emphasized his determination to defend Gaul as a central territory. Protective equipment belonging to cavalry of the third century AD found at the *limes* often showed a relationship between Mars, characterised as *Mars Ultor*, and Hercules in complementary roles⁴⁶ (Figs. 20, 21). It is for this reason that Postumus linked Hercules with Mars, a symbiosis to represent the danger that the Roman state was experiencing in its Gallic region, which does not occur on the coins of Gallienus.



Fig. 14. Gallien, *Virtus Gallieni Aug*, AD 257–258, Elmer, op. cit. (n. 7) pl. 2, n. 2



Fig. 15. Gallien, *Virtus Gallieni Aug*, AD 259–260, Elmer, op. cit. (n. 7) pl. 2, n. 6

⁴⁵ Elmer 1941, op. cit. (n. 7), 23–25; pl. 2, n. 2, 6, but see also n. 4, 5, 8.

⁴⁶ See M. Junkelman, *Reiter wie Statuen aus Erz* (Mainz am Rhein 1996), 15, 68–9 (figs. 136, 137, 140), 70–71 (figs. 141–145), 73 (figs. 149, 150), 74–75 (figs. 151–154), 76–77 (155–159, 78 (figs. 161–2), 80–1 (figs. 168, 169), 82–3 (figs. 170–1769).

It is in this context that the series *Virtus Probi* in 277–278 has to be understood. During that year Probus celebrated in Lyon those campaigns far beyond the Rhine, understanding the need to adopt Gallic traits in order to triumph in the region. After the terrible bloody battles that the Rhenish legions suffered at Chalons-sur-Marne in 274, strongly remembered even a generation later,⁴⁷ Aurelian replaced the Gallic emperors in taking over the defence of Gaul.

Aurelian had well understood the need to identify the central Empire with Gaul and his benevolent treatment of the defeated Tetricus is a magnificent example of this,⁴⁸ and the invasions of Gaul by the Barbarians after the death of Aurelian confirmed once more the need for an emperor in the region.⁴⁹ The confusing news regarding the uprising of Proculus or Saturninus should be interpreted as an attempt by the defeated Rhenish legions to structure the defence of the North.⁵⁰ The importance of Probus's stay in Gaul and the adoption of certain typically Gallic traits on the obverses of the *Virtus Probi* series prove that this emperor wanted to behave also like a Gallic emperor.

The Gallic battle cavalry of Probus

The obverse *Virtus Probi* of the year 277–278 has to be regarded as that of a central emperor who acted effectively as equally a Gallic

⁴⁷ On the massacre of Rhenish troops, *Panegirici Latini* 8 (5) 4.3; Aurelius Victor, *De caesaribus* 35.3.

⁴⁸ Tetricus was named by Aurelian *corrector Lucaniae*, Eutropius, 9.13.2; Aurelius Victor, *De caesaribus* 35.5; *Epitome de caesaribus* 35.7; SHA, *Vita Aureliani* 39.1. See A. Watson, *Aurelian and the Third Century* (London/ New York 1999), 96: "The inscriptions of Tetricus' reign, and indeed of his predecessors, were not systematically defaced. The numismatic evidence supports the inference that there was no official *damnation memoriae* . . . Aurelian did not de-monetize and recall the coinage of Tetricus . . . Avoiding a condemnation of the regime as such . . . (Aurelian) ensured the maximum of continuity and the minimum of disruption." See also p. 95.

⁴⁹ The death of Victorinus produced the same effect in AD 271; see Drinkwater 1987, op. cit. (n. 32), 40: "The killing of Victorinus seems to have encouraged the barbarians to attack."

⁵⁰ The association between Proculus and the Franks seems to demonstrate that the centre of the rebellion of this 'usurper' was the Rhine rather than Lyon, as some authors have suggested. See Watson 1999, op. cit. (n. 48), 97. Proculus rebelled in Cologne, Eutropius 9.17.1; *Epitome de caesaribus* 37.2; SHA, *Vita Probi* 18.5. See P. Bastien, *Le monnayage de l'atelier de Lyon. De la réouverture de l'atelier par Aurélien à la mort de Carin (fin 274-mi-285)*, Numismatique Romaine 9 (Wetteren 1976), 18; For Saturninus see S. Estiot, <Le tyran Saturninus: le dossier numismatique,> *HA Colloquium Perusinum VIII* (Bari 2002), 219–241.

emperor. The reverse of this series, in accordance with the norm in the series of Postumus, or indeed of Aureolus, presents a variety of types perfectly calculated. For Probus, as for Postumus, it is the defence of Gaul along with prosperity that are the two aspects emphasized in this monetary series.

The third series of Probus in Lyon, classified as such by P. Bastien, shows four different coin legends. Two of them express peaceful legends, while the remaining two tend towards a clearly military theme. Four workshops share the workload, with a notable balance in the proportion of specimens studied for three of them.⁵¹ The first workshop only produced the legend *Temporum Felicitas*, which are the 31 coins catalogued by P. Bastien, while *Laetitia Augusti* was issued only by the fourth, with 29 specimens in the sample. The second and third *officinae* concentrated on military themes, *Fides Militum* and *Mars Victor* being minted indiscriminately, with seven and 35 specimens respectively for those two coin legends.

The proportion of military coin legends in comparison to more peaceful ones is constantly maintained in the fourth, fifth and sixth series of P. Bastien, in spite of the doubling of the number of legends (eight in the fourth series, seven in the fifth and sixth). The military legends praise either the fidelity of the army (*Fides Militum*, with a dramatically increased proportion) (Fig. 16) or its aggressiveness (*Mars Victor*) (18). Most peaceful legends revolve around *Tempor(um) Felicitas* (Fig. 17), *Abundantia* (Fig. 19), and other minor themes linked with the arrival of Probus.

This distribution of coin legends and types, divided around two clear themes and subdivided into four smaller ones, starts at Lyon with Tacitus and Florian and continues after the death of Carus and Carinus.⁵² It does not seem that the military movements in the region or the presence or absence of the emperor were of great consequence to the regularity of these proportions. One possible hypothesis to explain this rigorous structure of types and production according to the different workshops, points to a re-distribution of each type according to the sections of different armies. Thus, *Abundantia Aug* could be conceived as devoted to administrative or logistical tasks, while *Mars Victor* could be

⁵¹ Everything seems very structured and rational, as Bastien 1976, op. cit. (n. 50) points out. The workshops produce the same number of coins consistently in all the series.

⁵² Bastien 1976, op. cit. (n. 50), Tacitus in 46–47, Florian in 50; Probus in 62–64; Carus and his family in 78–80.



Fig. 16. Probus, *Fides Militum*, Lugdunum, Bastien 1976, op. cit. (n. 50), AD 277, 4^{ème} émission pl. 23, n. 193a



Fig. 17. Probus, *Tempor. Felici*, Lugdunum, Bastien 1976, op. cit. (n. 50) 4^{ème} émission, pl. 23, n. 188k



Fig. 18. Probus, *Mars Victor*, Lugdunum, Bastien 1976, op. cit. (n. 50) 4^{ème} émission, pl. 23, n. 190c



Fig. 19. Probus, *Abundantia Aug*, Lugdunum, Bastien 1976, op. cit. (n. 50) 4^{ème} émission, pl. 24, 195a



Fig. 20. Carus, *Virtus Cari Aug/Victoria Augg*, Lugdunum, Bastien 1976, op. cit. (n. 50), AD 282, 3^{ème} émission, pl. 49, n. 475c



Fig. 21. Horse armour, 2nd–3rd century AD, Gäuboden Museum, Junkelmann, op. cit. (n. 46), 80, fig 168



Fig. 22. Horse armour, 2nd–3rd century AD, Munchen Prähistorische Staatssammlung, Junkelmann, op. cit. (n. 46), 81, fig. 169

related to groups more involved in combat. However, *Abundantia Aug* is not particularly linked to rearguard locations in the known sites; on the contrary, there is a marked mix of types in the monetary discoveries that have been catalogued.⁵³

The conclusion that this points to is that the different coin legends form a whole, as in the case of the mintage of Postumus in Gaul and Aureolus in Milan. *Virtus* and *Fides* refer to the direct military activity of the army in Gaul, and *Laetitia Aug*, *Temporum Felicitas*, or *Abundantia Aug* to the new era of prosperity that the presence of the central army secures.⁵⁴

An Italian battle cavalry did not come to Gaul for the first time with Probus from Ticinum or Rome, as these were simply bases where cavalry forces about to intervene in Gaul in 276–277 were gathered. Another cavalry force, however, was based at Lyon from 274. The opening of the mint at Lyon in 274 was a consequence of the installation of this permanent cavalry body by Aurelian. The reason for this was to avoid the unreliable⁵⁵ Trier or Cologne,⁵⁶ as well as to connect Italy with southern Gaul more easily.⁵⁷ Hence, from 274 onwards, the city of Lyon with its mint was transformed into a kind of Gallic Milan.

By adopting distinguishing traits on his coinage, the helmet and the formula *Virtus Probi Aug*, Probus was indicating that his battle cavalry was not located in a place where it was ready to intervene (*Equites*) and neither did he establish a temporary peripatetic court in the interior of the Empire. On the contrary, Probus' army in 277–278 was

⁵³ D. Hollard, 'Le trésor de Rouilly-Sacey (Aube)', *Trésors monétaires* 9 (Paris 1987), 53–91, esp. 60, with a map depicting how the monetary treasures that were hidden during the reign of Probus were concentrated around the Rhône valley and north of the Loire. See also Idem, 'La pénurie de l'argent monnayé au III^e s. après J.-C.: l'apport des monnaies des sites', *Cahiers Numismatiques* 124 (1995), 23–31.

⁵⁴ *Pax* in the Roman world had a far more positive connotation than our equivalent. To the Romans, peace meant "world empire with security from outside interference, law and order within", F.J. Biermann, "Augustus and the Pax Augusta", *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 72 (1941), 28–29, cited by Ch.G. Starr, *The Roman Empire 27 BC–AD 476. A study in survival* (Oxford 1982), 16.

⁵⁵ As J.F. White, *Restorer of the World. The Roman Emperor Aurelian* (Staplehurst, Kent 2005) rightly points out, "the reason that Tetricus did not change sides earlier was that he wanted to undermine the resistance of the Rhine legions" (114).

⁵⁶ Watson 1999, op. cit. (n. 48), 96, 135 and note 39.

⁵⁷ S. Estiot, *Monnaies de l'empire romain. D'Aurelien à Florian (270–276 après J.-C.)* XII.1, 1 (Paris/Strasbourg 2004), 67. Rome and Lyon are two mints that are closely connected, adopting the same traits (avoiding, for example, the sign XXI in the exergus of the *aureliani*); See also Watson 1999, op. cit. (n. 48), 93; Drinkwater 1987, op. cit. (n. 32), 36 and 120.

involved in a battle outside the Roman world (helmet and appeal to bravery—*Virtus*—of the emperor). It must therefore be understood that the *antoniniani* (or *aureliani*) of Lyon in 277–278 constitute the continuation of the cavalry series *Equites* of Rome and Ticinum; they are the payback to a true battle cavalry based at Lyon and reinforced on this occasion with contingents from Italy.⁵⁸

Probus was not, however, the last of the central emperors to adopt Gallic traits and to order the battle cavalry into action in Gaul. The third issue of Carus at Lyon from November–December 282 is very similar to the fifth one of Probus in 277–278, with a very significant presence of legends such as *Virtus Cari*, and the emperor wearing a crowned helmet⁵⁹ (Fig. 20). As Bastien points out, this series was partially a *donativum* in character, since it commemorated the rise to Caesarship of Carinus in October 282.⁶⁰ The fundamental meaning of the third issue of Carus in Lyon has to be considered, however, a reflection of the mobilization from Lyon and against the Barbarians of the battle cavalry billeted in the town since 274 and active with Probus in 277–278. The naming of Carinus as Caesar on behalf of Carus can only be seen as the recognition of Gaul's need to have an emperor in its territory, and with him its own battle cavalry.

Conclusion

The experience of the 'Gallic empire' did not end in 274 with the deposition of the last of its emperors. After the re-conquest of the Gallias, Aurelian knew perfectly well that the region had to be defended with great care in the future. Tacitus and Florianus, Aurelian's successors, were too busy in the East in 275 to worry about the West. However, the first task of the emperor Probus was precisely to consolidate the Gallias and to fight against the Franks and the Alamans in the Rhine region in 277–278. The extraordinary 5th monetary series of Bastien in Lyon

⁵⁸ A sign that the *antoniniani* issued at Lyon were meant for elite troops is that their discovery in Gaul is extremely limited; S. Estiot, 'Le troisième siècle et la monnaie: crise et mutations,' in J.-L. Fiches, ed., *Le III^e siècle en Gaule Narbonnaise. Données régionales sur la crise de l'Empire, Aix-en-Provence, La Baume 15–16 September 1995* (Sophia-Antipolis 1996), 3–70, esp. 59 and note 57, 'l'approvisionnement en *aureliani* frais (fut) strictement limité par le pouvoir central' (61).

⁵⁹ Bastien 1976, op. cit. (n. 50), 66–68, pl. 49.

⁶⁰ Ibidem, 66.

therefore confirms that Probus took the defence of Gaul very seriously, and that a very careful iconography was adopted to commemorate the personal actions of the emperor beyond the Rhine.

As opposed to the *Equites* coins, which were dependent on an important but secondary commander (a *magister equitum*), the battle cavalries depended directly on the emperor. The central emperors starting with Gallienus had a battle cavalry in the north of Italy, but the Gallic emperors also had these forces. With the aim of not losing the Gallic region at the same time as he controlled Italy, Aurelian stationed a battle cavalry at Lyon in the year 274. The 5th series of Bastien is a good source of evidence of the existence of such a force at Lyon and of its effective use by a central emperor in the year 277–278. Other monetary series such as that of Carus in the year 282 seem to prove that other emperors alien to Gaul used it, with the same enthusiasm, when it was necessary.

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