

MUSLIM MODERNITY IN POSTCOLONIAL NIGERIA

ISLAM IN AFRICA

Brill's "Islam in Africa" is designed to present the results of scholarly research into the many aspects of the history and present-day features of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa. The series will take up issues of religious and intellectual traditions, social significance and organization, and other aspects of the Islamic presence in Africa. It includes monographs, collaborative volumes and reference works by researchers from all relevant disciplines.

EDITORS

JOHN HUNWICK
KNUT VIKØR

VOLUME 1



MUSLIM MODERNITY IN POSTCOLONIAL NIGERIA

*A Study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation
and Reinstatement of Tradition*

BY

OUSMANE KANE



BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON
2003

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kane, Ousmane

Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria : a study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition / by Ousmane Kane.

p. cm. -- (Islam in Africa : v. 1)

Revised English version of the author's thesis (Ph. D.)--Université de Paris, 1993.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 9004125884 (hb. : alk. paper)

J. Yan Izala (Organization) 2. Islam and politics--Nigeria. 3. Islam--Nigeria--Societies, etc. 4. Sufis--Nigeria--Political activity. 5. Nigeria--Politics and government--1984. I. Title II. Series.

BP64.N49 K36 2002

306.6'9765'0966978--dc21

2002033277

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Kane, Ousmane:

Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria : a study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition –
Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2003

(Islam in Africa; Vol. 1)

ISBN 90 04 12588 4

ISSN 0928-5520

ISBN 90 04 12588 4

© Copyright 2003 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

*Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers, MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.*

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

To the memory of my father Al-Hajj Oumar Kane

Si donner un sens à la vie peut-être considéré, en fonction d'une croyance en l'au delà comme un acte religieux, vouloir organiser la société en fonction de cette croyance est une démarche politique. Rémy Leveau.
«Les mouvements islamiques» *Pouvoirs*, 62, 1992.

CONTENTS

Abbreviations	x
Acknowledgments	xi
Orthography	xv
Glossary	xvii
Introduction Normative versus alternative modernity	1
Chapter One Agents and Aspects of Social Change in Twentieth-Century Nigeria	29
Chapter Two Kano in the Nigerian Context	53
Chapter Three The Fragmentation of Sacred Authority	69
Chapter Four The Social Base of the Yan Izala	104
Chapter Five Worldview and Recruitment Patterns of the Yan Izala	123
Chapter Six Counter-Reform Movements	149
Chapter Seven The Politics of Muslim-Christian Confrontation in Nigeria	178
Chapter Eight The Domestication of Izala	207
Conclusion	227
Bibliography	253
Appendices	
1: English translation of the pamphlet: <i>Hujojin da suka hana bi dan tarika salla</i>	271
Index	277

ABBREVIATIONS

ABU	Ahmadu Bello University
ACRA	Advisory Council on Religious Affairs
ATC/ABU	Arabic Teachers' College/Ahmadu Bello University
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CCN	Christian Council of Nigeria
CEAN/IEP	Centre d'Etude d'Afrique Noire/Institut d'Etudes Politiques
EHESS	Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
FCS	Fellowship of Christian Students
ITN	Islamic Trust of Nigeria
<i>JIBWIS</i>	<i>Jama'at Izalat al-Bi'a wa Iqamat al-Sunna</i>
<i>JNI</i>	<i>Jama'at Nasr al-Islam</i>
MSS	Muslim Students' Society
NCA	Northern Christian Association
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
NEPU	Northern Element Progressive Union
NNA	Nigerian National Alliance
NPC	Northern People's Congress
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NRC	National Republican Convention
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Languages
UIMSS	University of Ibadan, Muslim Students' Society
UMBC	United Middle Belt Congress
UPGA	United Progressive Grand Alliance
UPN	Unity Party of Nigeria

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is based on a doctoral dissertation submitted in French, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Ph.D. at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris in May 1993. I would like to particularly acknowledge the constant support of Professor Remy Leveau who supervised my graduate studies and introduced me to social science scholarship and to the study of the modern Islamic world. Without his kindness, patience, and support, I would not have completed this research.

The preparation of a revised English version was made possible by a ten-month fellowship awarded me by the Department of African Languages and Cultures of the School of African and Oriental Studies of the University of London, and a generous grant from the Leverhulme Trust Foundation. I am extremely grateful to these two institutions. Professor Louis Brenner's assistance was crucial in this stage. He read several drafts of this book, and offered valuable suggestions regarding the organization of the material, most of which I gladly incorporated. He also edited most chapters of this book, to make sure that my Gallic style would be understandable to an English audience. In addition, I am most grateful to him and his wife Nancy Brenner for their hospitality, friendship and moral support throughout my stay in London. Others who edited the book include Marvel Kay Mansfield at Yale University, Jo Caruso of Columbia University and John Sekora.

Other colleagues at the SOAS were also supportive, including Graham Furniss, David Appeleyard, Phil Jagger, and Malami Buba. Many other people were useful in the different stages of the preparation of the original thesis and the book. These include Dr. Christian Coulon, who received me many times in Bordeaux, devoted much time, and shared research material with me. From Professor Murray Last, I learned a great deal during the periods we met in Kano and my numerous visits in London and his visits in Paris. Despite reservations on his part regarding some of my interpretations, he has been very helpful and saved me from many erroneous interpretations. I also benefited a lot from the wide erudition and kindness of Professor Guy Nicolas, who received me any time I requested and

helped me better understand Nigerian politics. Many others have been extremely helpful, including Gilles Kepel, Jean Leca, James Piscatori, René Otayek, Jean-Louis Triaud, John Hunwick, Muhammad Sani Umar, Dale Eickelman, Mamadou Diouf, Ebrima Sall, James Scott, Mahmood Mamdani, Suzanne H. Rudolph, Jibrin Ibrahim, Peter Clark, Donal Cruise O'Brien, Jamil Abun-Nasr, Roman Loimeier, Stefan Reichmut, John Paden, Mervyn Hiskett, Nicole Richard.

Ahmad Kani provided accomodation in Sokoto. Sabo Bako, besides providing accomodation during my trips to Zaria, very generously shared critical research material with me. It was through Professor Sani Zahradeen that I was admitted as a research associate at Bayero University Kano. Other Nigerian colleagues in Bayero were also very supportive, including Abdulla U. Adamu M.D. Suleyman, Asmau Garba Said, Zainab Kebir, Mallam Habibu Sani (who taught me Hausa), Ibrahim Muazzam, Abubacar Mustafa, Munzali Jibril, Ibrahim Muhammad, Attahiru Jega, Auwalu Anwar, Kawu Auwalu, Ibrahim Ado Kurawa, Sule Bello, Siraj Abdulkarim, Usman Bugage.

Many religious leaders kindly received me and spent time with me. Several of them passed away since, including the late Alhaji Uba Ringim in whose *zawiya* I was accomodated during my first trip, the late Shaykh Abubacar Gumi, late Shaykh Sani Kafanga, late Shehu Maihula, late Shaykh Nasiru Kabara, Shaykh Mudi Salga, Shaykh Aminudeen Abubacar, late Shaykh Ismail Idriss, Shaykh Usman Muhammad Imam, Alhadji Abdulkarim Daiyyabu. Important research material was collected during the fall semesters of 1994 and 1995 in Kansas University, while I was a visiting professor. Heartfelt thanks are offered to Arthur Drayton, Leonardo Villalon, Ken Lawrence, Deborah Gerner, Phil Schrodt, and Beverly Mack for their friendly support.

During field work, I was assisted by Nasiru Yahaya Ringim, Muhammad Ghazali Yusuf, Kabiru Sidi Ali, all of whom spent considerable time, helping me collect and interpret materials. I am extremely grateful to them. At different stages of this research, other institutions provided financial support, including the American Academy of Arts and Sciences through a grant from the Mac Arthur Foundation, the Institute of Political Studies of Paris, the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, the British Academy, and the Senegalese Ministry of Education.

Many others have been extremely helpful, and I apologize if I have omitted their names in these acknowledgments. Many Yan Izala

with whom I spent time during the *majalis* have been very kind to me, and I am grateful to them.

My former employer the Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis granted several research leaves, which enabled me to devote full time to the preparation of this book. Many of my colleagues have been supportive. I offer them heartfelt thanks. During the academic year 2000–2001 spent in Yale, discussions with my friend and fellow agrarian fellow Donald Moore of the University of California at Berkeley helped me better conceptualize issues of modernity.

I am also grateful to the Rockefeller Foundation for awarding a one month-fellowship in November-December 1999 in its Study Center at Bellagio, Lake Como (Northern Italy) where, under idyllic circumstances, I was given the opportunity to revise the draft completed in London. No words of thanks could do justice to the unflinching support of my wife Elisabeth Kane throughout the years that I conducted the research, and after. I would also like to thank my parents and my uncles Al-hajj Abdallah Niasse, Muhammad al-Amin Niasse and Muhammad al-Mahi Niasse for their constant support. My uncle Moustapha Niasse, who sent me to France for higher education deserves a special word of thanks.

I would also like to express my deep appreciation of the extremely useful critiques of Brill's anonymous reader, which led to major revisions of the book. In addition, I would like to thank most particularly my editors at Brill Academic Publishers, Trudy Kamperveen and Tanja Cowall, for their encouragement, suggestions and patience. Needless to say, responsibility for errors of fact or interpretation lie only on me.

Portions of chapter three have been published as "Les mouvements religieux et le champ politique au Nigéria septentrional: le cas du réformisme musulman à Kano," *Islam et Sociétés au Sud du Sahara*, 4, 1990, pp. 7–24; "Un pluralisme en quête de démocratie," in François Constantin; Christian Coulon (eds.), *Religion et transition démocratique en Afrique*. Paris, Karthala, 1997, pp. 51–79, «Le réformisme musulman au Nigéria du nord,» in Ousmane Kane; Jean-Louis Triaud (eds.) *Islam et islamisme au Sud du Sahara*, Paris, Karthala, 1998. Portions of chapter 6 have been published as "La polémique contre le soufisme et les ordres soufis en Afrique de l'Ouest post-coloniale," in Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtk (eds.), *Islamic Mysticism Contested. Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics*. Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1999, pp. 324–340. Portions of chapter 5 and 8 has been published as "Izala.

The Rise of Muslim Reformism in Nigeria,” in Martin Marty and Scott Appelby (eds.), *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements*. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 490–512. I thank these publishers for their permission to reprint these chapters.

This book is dedicated to the memory of my father, Al-hajj Oumar Kane.

ORTHOGRAPHY

This book draws on materials of many types and in many languages. Many concepts and proper names are presented here in their original languages. A simplified system of transliteration is used to express them in English. All non-English words are italicised and, for the names of persons and places, I have followed the standardized orthography most of the time. For Arabic and Hausa words, I usually omit all diacritics. Hamza is transliterated as ' and 'ayn as '.

GLOSSARY

<i>aʕami</i>	Hausa words written in Arabic script (Hausa)
<i>alarama</i> pl. <i>alaramomi</i>	cleric specialized exclusively in teaching memorisation of the Koran (Hausa)
<i>alkali</i>	Islamic judge (Hausa)
<i>almajiri</i> pl. <i>almajirai</i>	Koranic student (Hausa)
<i>al-minbar</i>	pulpit (Arabic)
<i>al-salaf</i>	the venerable forefathers (Arabic)
<i>ʕarif bi'llah</i>	a Sufi disciple who has achieved spiritual fulfilment (Arabic)
<i>bandiri</i>	drum (Hausa)
<i>bara</i> pl. <i>barori</i>	slave (Hausa)
<i>barde</i>	title of nobility (Hausa)
<i>birni</i>	walled city (Hausa)
<i>ciroma</i>	title of nobility (Hausa)
<i>da'wa</i>	Islamic missionary activity (Arabic)
<i>dagaci</i>	village head, or head of a quarter in the city of Kano (Hausa)
<i>dajjal</i>	charlatan, demagogue (Arabic)
<i>dan birni</i>	native of Kano's walled city (Hausa)
<i>dan Kano/bakano</i> pl. <i>Kanawa</i>	native(s) of Kano (Hausa)
<i>dan rimi</i>	guardian of the emir's arsenal in pre-colonial Kano (Hausa)
<i>dan zamani:</i>	modern person, a negative connotation in Hausa (Hausa)
<i>daraja</i>	grade, rank (Arabic)
<i>darika</i> pl. <i>dariku</i>	Sufi order (Hausa)
<i>dhakir</i>	he who performs the recitation of names of God (Arabic)
<i>fadl</i>	merit (Arabic)
<i>fana</i> or <i>wasl</i> or <i>wusul</i>	extinction of the aspirant in the divine totality (Arabic)
<i>fatake</i> or <i>Yan kolli</i>	itinerant traders (Hausa)
<i>fiqh</i>	Islamic jurisprudence (Arabic)
<i>galadima</i>	title of nobility (Hausa)

<i>gandu</i>	field (Hausa)
<i>gardi</i> pl. <i>gardawa</i>	advanced Koranic student who may teach younger students (Hausa)
<i>gari</i> pl. <i>garuruwa</i>	town(s) (Hausa)
<i>gunduma</i> pl. <i>gundumomi</i>	largest territorial unit in the precolonial Kano emirate (Hausa)
<i>hadra</i>	collective meeting for reciting Sufi litanies (Arabic)
<i>hakimi</i> pl. <i>hakimai</i>	head of the <i>gunduma</i> in the precolonial period, district head in the colonial and postcolonial period (Hausa)
<i>hadith</i>	traditions of Prophet Muhammad
<i>halak</i>	eternal damnation (Arabic)
<i>hijab</i>	veil (Arabic)
<i>ijaza</i> pl. <i>ijazat</i>	permission to initiate or transmit exoteric or esoteric knowledge (Arabic)
<i>iman</i>	faith (Arabic)
<i>‘ilm al-hadith</i>	science of traditions (Arabic)
<i>islamiyya</i> or <i>nizamiyya schools</i>	modernized Islamic schools
<i>kafiri</i> pl. <i>kafirai</i>	unbeliever(s) (Hausa)
<i>karatu</i>	study, search for knowledge (Hausa)
<i>kawye</i> pl. <i>kawiyuka</i>	village(s) (Hausa)
<i>kolo</i> pl. <i>kulawa</i>	Koranic student(s) between 5 and 7 years old (Hausa)
<i>kufi</i>	unbelief (Arabic)
<i>kulle</i>	seclusion of women (a custom in urban Hausa society) (Hausa)
<i>kunya</i>	modesty (Hausa)
<i>labura</i> pl. <i>laburori</i>	laborers (Hausa)
<i>laya</i>	amulet (Hausa)
<i>maaji</i>	title of nobility (Hausa)
<i>madaki</i>	title of nobility (Hausa)
<i>mai gida</i>	head of household (Hausa)
<i>mai unguwa</i> pl. <i>masu ungwanni</i>	head of ward (Hausa)
<i>majlis</i> pl. <i>majalis</i>	place of worship and study in Northern Nigeria, local cell of Izala
<i>majlisi</i> pl. <i>majlisai</i>	— (Hausa)
<i>makama</i>	title of nobility (Hausa)
<i>makarantar allo</i>	Koranic school (Hausa)

<i>makarantar boko</i>	public school (Hausa)
<i>makarantar ilimi</i>	school for the study of Islamic sciences (Hausa)
<i>malam</i> pl. <i>malamai</i>	Muslim clerics (Hausa)
<i>manoma</i>	peasant (Hausa)
<i>masu aiki da hannu</i>	artisans, craftworkers (Hausa)
<i>masu arziki</i>	well-to-do people (Hausa)
<i>masu waa'azi</i>	professional preachers (Hausa)
<i>mizya</i>	virtue (Arabic)
<i>murabbi</i>	spiritual master (Arabic)
<i>murid</i>	aspirant, disciple, member of a Sufi order (Arabic)
<i>qadi</i> pl. <i>qudat</i>	Islamic judge (Arabic)
<i>rashin hada da mace</i>	prohibition of intergender socializing (Hausa)
<i>rubutun sha</i>	philtre made by washing verses of the Koran (Hausa)
<i>sakkwatawa</i>	native of Sokoto (pl.) sing. Basakkwaci (Hausa)
<i>Salafi</i> movement	Founded in the Middle East at the turn of the nineteenth century, this movement aimed at purifying the religion by the return to Islam as practiced by the Salaf (venerable forefathers). Its most famous proponents were Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida
<i>salat al-fatihi</i>	prayer of the opener, a Tijani litany
<i>sallama</i>	slave who determined the emir's agenda in pre-colonial Kano (Hausa)
<i>sanad</i> pl. <i>asnad</i>	chain of transmission of initiation in Sufi Islam (Arabic)
<i>silsila</i> pl. <i>salasil</i>	—
<i>sarki</i>	king (Hausa)
<i>sarkin bayi</i>	title of nobility (Hausa)
<i>sarkin musulmi</i>	commander of the faithful, refers to the sultan of Sokoto (Hausa)
<i>shamaki</i>	slave responsible for slaves and horses of the palace in precolonial Kano (Hausa)
<i>shaqa</i>	damnation (Arabic)
<i>shari'a</i>	Islamic law (Arabic)
<i>shirk al-'ada</i>	associationism by belief in popular superstitions (Arabic)
<i>shirk al-adab</i>	associationism by excessive veneration (Arabic)
<i>shirk al-'ibada</i>	associationism in worship (Arabic)

<i>shirk al-ilm</i>	associationism in knowledge (Arabic)
<i>shirk al-tasarruf</i>	associationism by assuming that some people have extraordinary powers (Arabic)
<i>sira</i>	biography of the prophet Muhammad (Arabic)
<i>ta'wil</i>	hermeneutics (Arabic)
<i>tajiri</i> pl. <i>tajirai</i>	wealthy merchants (Hausa)
<i>tajwid</i>	art of the psalmody of the Holy Koran (Arabic)
<i>takfir</i>	declaring other Muslims unbelievers (Arabic)
<i>talaka</i> pl. <i>talakawa</i>	commoners, poor people (Hausa)
<i>talla</i>	practice of peddling goods by young women (Hausa)
<i>tarayya</i>	associationism (Hausa)
<i>tarbiya</i>	spiritual training (Hausa and Arabic)
<i>taron Kano</i> or <i>tara ta Kano</i>	council of nine members, chosen from main Fulani clans; advised the emir in precolonial Kano (Hausa)
<i>tawba</i>	repentance (Arabic)
<i>tawhid</i>	oneness of God (Arabic)
<i>titibiri</i> or <i>koso</i>	Koranic students between 8 and 14 years (Hausa)
<i>tsangaya</i> pl. <i>tsangayoyi</i>	rural Koranic school (Hausa)
<i>turaki</i>	title of nobility (Hausa)
<i>wa'azi</i>	Islamic missionary activity (Hausa)
<i>wahhabi</i>	reformer, sympathizer of Izala
<i>waje</i> or <i>wajen Birni</i>	the area in metropolitan Kano located outside the walled city (Hausa)
<i>wali</i> pl. <i>waliyyai</i>	friend of God, contested notion used by Sufis to designate Sufi saints and by other Muslims to refer to all pious believers (Hausa)
<i>wambai</i>	title of nobility (Hausa)
<i>waziri</i>	second most important native authority title holder in the Sokoto caliphate (Hausa)
<i>wird</i>	litany recited by members of Sufi orders (Arabic)
<i>yan Fagge</i>	inhabitants of Fagge (Hausa)

<i>yan shi'an shiawa</i> or <i>yan system</i>	literally shiites, Islamists who advocate the establishment of an Islamic state (Hausa)
<i>yan tebur</i>	petty traders (Hausa)
<i>yan uwa</i>	free members of the family (Hausa)
<i>zawiya</i>	Sufi lodge (Hausa)
<i>zakiri</i> pl. <i>zakirai</i>	member of Sufi orders who perform recitation of names of God (Hausa)
<i>ziyara</i>	pious visit, usually to a Sufi shaykh (Hausa/Arabi)

INTRODUCTION

NORMATIVE VERSUS ALTERNATIVE MODERNITY

Not equal are those believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of God with their goods and their persons. God hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than to those who sit (at home). Unto all (in faith) hath God promised good: But those who strive and fight hath He distinguished above those who sit (at home) by a special reward (Koran, 4–95).¹

To outline the argument of this book, a personal note will be much in order. As a discussant in a panel on Islam in Africa convened by David Robinson at the 1995 meeting of the African Studies Association of North America held in Orlando, Florida, I was invited to comment on contemporary West African Islamic movements. With regard to Islamic movements of “reform”² I argued that in postcolonial West Africa, they attempted to promote modernity. At the end of the presentation, a scholar who I presume is a non-Muslim from Nigeria, requested the floor for comments. As it turned out, she was very shocked by my statement linking Islamic reformers to modernity. What words she used to voice her disagreement, I do not remember exactly, but they were very much like: “How dare you say that members of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition (Yan Izala in Hausa)³ promote modernity? They pay no respect to the Nigerian national anthem. They burn the Nigerian flag. They attack women who dress in a western fashion, etc.”

This person’s reaction did not shake my conviction. I assumed

¹ Abdallah Yusuf Ali, *The Glorious Kuran* (translation and commentary), Beyrouit, Dar al-fikr, nd., pp. 210–11.

² For a definition of reform, see below.

³ Indifferently, I refer to the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition as the Yan Izala movement, Izala, the Izala movement, the movement, the Society. Yan Izala means in Hausa language members of the Izala movement. I also refer to them indifferently as Izala followers, Izala members, Izala sympathisers, reformers, reformists. While they would not mind being called Yan Izala, they usually refer to themselves as *ahl al-sunna*, an expression which means in Arabic language followers of the way of life (Sunna) of the holy Prophet Muhammad.

that, like many non-Muslim Nigerians, she operated more on the basis of misconceptions and biases shaped by her own cultural and perhaps religious background than on any actual understanding of the agenda of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition. I maintained that members of the Society had a modernising agenda and I attempted to provide further evidence to support my argument. As could be expected, my argument was rejected altogether, and very quickly our exchange became a dialogue of the deaf. At that juncture, another member of the panel, Louis Brenner, who had seen the research on which this book is based grow over the years, intervened and said: "What Ousmane means is that they mediate social change." Very true! The Yan Izala, as I hope to demonstrate in this book, attempted to mediate social change. In the process, I argue, they aimed to articulate an ideology of modernity.⁴ Because my counterpart, like many proponents of normative modernity, believed that "everything modern belongs to one Enlightenment package"⁵ she would accept that the Yan Izala "mediated social change," but not that they promoted modernity. I would like to argue here that, unless we see the Western trajectory to modernity, and particularly to cultural modernity⁶ as one of many, we will not make any significant headway in understanding modernity in its diversity and complexity. By the way, what is modernity and to what does the word "modern" refer? The word modern, which is derived from the latin word *modo* refers to what is current as distinguished from earlier times.⁷ As a conceptual model, however, modern does not only refer to what is current. In contempo-

⁴ A number of Islamicists have suggested that an important segment of the constituency of contemporary Islamic movements are the products of the modern world. See for example John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1987, (first ed. 1984), pp. 51–54; Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1992, p. 3; 37; Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam. Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*, New Haven, London, Yale University Press, 1990 (first ed. 1985), pp. 11–12, 37; Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 38, Gilles Kepel, *The Revenge of God. The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994, p. 4.

⁵ See Charles Taylor, "Two theories of modernity," in Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (ed.), *Alternative Modernities*, Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2001, p. 180,

⁶ For a definition of cultural modernity, see below.

⁷ See Lawrence E. Cahoone, *From Modernism to Postmodernism*, Cambridge Mass., Blackwell, 1996, p. 11.

rary Western intellectual discussion, modernity refers to a civilisation, which developed in Europe and North America during the last few centuries, reaching its peak during the twentieth century.⁸ It is characterised by unprecedented scientific and technological progress, which translated into a significant improvement of material living standards.⁹ Of equal importance are the accompanying philosophical trends that emerged during the European Enlightenment, advocating freedom for the individual to act and live as she/he sees fit, as long as she/he does not alienate other people's freedom and rights. Thus, unlike aristocratic and feudal societies based on rigid stratification in which power and privileges are bestowed by birth to some individuals exclusively, in modern societies, at least conceptually, merit, instead of birth, is supposed to determine success.

The formation of modernity involved several processes, each of these processes brought about radical transformations affecting human, social and societal existence in modern societies. These processes affected different spheres, including the economic, political, social and cultural spheres.¹⁰ The different processes were autonomous to some extent, each having its own temporal pace, but they were also interconnected.¹¹ It is appropriate here to discuss these different processes of economic, political, cultural, and social modernity, and the way they interrelate.

Economic modernity refers to the birth of a market economy where individuals control their own labour power. In principle, in a market economy, economic actors may sell their labour power, working in exchange for a salary. They may also be self-employed. Such an economy is different from a feudal economy where people do not have a control over their own body, either because they are slaves or serfs working for feudal lords. Economic modernity negates a condition of servitude and is based on free labour. The formation of economic modernity is therefore related to that of social modernity because both patterns of modernity imply freedom to use one's

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ My theoretical discussion on the formation of political social, economic and cultural modernity in the West relies on Stuart Hall, "Introduction," in Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, Kenneth Thompson, *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies*, Cambridge Mass., Blackwell, 1996, p. 10 sq.

¹¹ Stuart Hall, "Introduction," *op. cit.*, p. 7.

labour force. The monetarisation of the economy constitutes a fundamental aspect of economic modernity.

As for political modernity, its most important aspect is the emergence of the modern nation state as a form of political community. Born in the ruins of feudal Western Europe, the nation state has experienced profound transformations during the last two centuries.¹² In addition, it succeeded in transforming its populations into “governable subjects”, a phenomenon that Michel Foucault calls “governmentality.”¹³ To do so, the nation state took a number of steps including the establishment of compulsory education, the prison, the police, the recording of civil status, etc. For the most part, the nation state ultimately succeeded in creating a sense of belonging to the state (the idea of citizenship) among its citizens. The modern nation state, which imposed itself upon the whole world during the twentieth century, differs from premodern states, among other things, in the immense resources that it controls, its sophisticated bureaucracy, and its extractive and redistributive functions.¹⁴ Finally, the modern state is in principle a sovereign state in the sense that, unlike feudal political communities, it is not accountable to any higher authority.¹⁵

Social modernity is characterised by a social order in which individuals are free and have equal rights and duties, including the right to control their lives and bodies. The formation of social modernity marks an emancipation of groups and individuals from premodern social orders where serfdom or slavery prevailed, making it possible for some individuals to control the labour force or bodies of other individuals.

Cultural modernity, at least in the West, is marked by the progress in the faith in scientific reason, and a concomitant decline in a belief in religious explanations of the origin, development and future of the universe. German sociologist Max Weber describes this process as that of a “disenchantment of the world.”¹⁶ This disenchantment manifests itself when people challenged the narratives through which

¹² See David Held, “The Development of the Modern State,” in Stuart Hall et al., *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–87.

¹³ Michel Foucault, *Power*, New York, The New Press, 1994, James D. Faubion (ed.), (Robert Hurley et al. translated), p. 20.

¹⁴ See Anthony McGrew, “The State in Advanced Capitalist Societies,” in Stuart Hall et al., *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies*, *op. cit.*, 240–79, p. 248.

¹⁵ David Held, “The Development of the Modern State,” *op. cit.*, p. 70.

¹⁶ See Robert Boccock, “The Cultural Formations of Modern Societies,” in Stuart Hall et al., *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies*, *op. cit.*, 149–82, p. 175.

the Catholic Church has explained world mysteries. As a result, the beliefs in saints and miracles, which were an important dimension of social life in premodern European societies, experienced a decline. Enlightenment philosophers encouraged the spirit of “scientific” investigation and questioned a number of established dogmas and practices in medieval Christianity.¹⁷ The impact of their teaching was a massive abandonment of religious practices in many parts of Western Europe.

Stuart Hall summarises modernity as a conceptual model with the following features:

A political sphere dominated by secular forms of political power and authority and conceptions of sovereignty and legitimacy, operating within defined territorial boundaries, which are characteristic of the large complex structures of the modern nation state (. . .) A monetarized exchange economy, based on the large-scale production and consumption of commodities for the market, extensive ownership of private property and the accumulation of capital on a systematic, long term basis (. . .) The decline of a traditional social order, with its fixed social hierarchies and overlapping allegiances (. . .) The decline of the religious world-view typical of traditional societies and the rise of a secular and materialist culture.¹⁸

Alongside this normative perspective that emphasizes the centrality of the West in the formation of modernity, there are alternative approaches to modernity. Worthy of note are some perspectives in postcolonial studies. Postcolonial studies¹⁹ refer to a significant body of literature, mainly in English, produced in the former colonies that, among other eurocentric master narratives, challenged the notion that the West is the governing center of modernity.²⁰ Dipesh Chakrabarty, for instance, argues persuasively that: “Europe’s acquisition of the adjective ‘modern’ for itself is an integral part of the story of European imperialism within global history”.²¹ European

¹⁷ See Peter Hamilton, “The Enlightenment and the Birth of Social Sciences,” in Stuart Hall et al., *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies, op. cit.*, pp. 20–54, p. 24.

¹⁸ See Stuart Hall, “Introduction,” *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁹ See Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, “General Introduction,” in Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (eds.), *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, London and New York, Routledge, 1995.

²⁰ See Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, “On Alternative Modernities,” in Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, (ed.), *Alternative Modernities, op. cit.*, p. 14.

²¹ See Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincialising Europe*, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 43.

imperialism, whose role in the process of modernity is undeniable, need not be always understood as a coherent project, from its inception to its implementation, and by which European nations conquered, controlled and transformed former colonies. Such a conception does not take into account that the colonized people were political agents. Imperialism must be understood as a process of intense interactions of give-and-take between colonizers and colonized. Imperialists and colonized peoples sometimes collaborated, sometimes conflicted. The configuration of the modern world is, to a large extent, the result of their interactions.

The colonial state, which Europeans established either in Africa or Asia, was not a monolith. The different entities that made that colonial state did not always have the same vision. Many of their decisions were improvised. More important, the colonial state did not have the material and coercive resources to implement its agenda. It sought collaborators, took into account what they might or might not accept. The colonial state also evaluated the extent to which it could implement its project of transforming colonized societies. Therefore, it can be argued that the colonised were, to some extent, partners of the elaboration and implementation of the colonial project, and not only subjects submitted to it. The fact that the colonized exercised agency²² (as non sovereign subjects of course)²³ contributed to modifying the colonial project.²⁴ In addition, not only the colonized were transformed during the colonial encounter. The nature of the colonial relation—which must be understood as a field of interactions—was such that European nations were influenced and underwent transformations during the colonial relation. I contend that the notion of modernity that was born in the West and exported to the rest must be transcended and that an alternative approach to a modernity, whose contours were to a large extent shaped by the colonial relation, be refocused on.

²² On the ability of the Subaltern to exercise agency, see the remarkable rethinking of the concept of hegemony in James Scott, *Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985, conclusion.

²³ See Donald Moore, "The Ethnic Spatial Fix: Geographical Imaginaries and the Routes of Identity in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands," paper presented at the Agrarian Studies Colloquium, Yale University, 13 April 2001, *passim*.

²⁴ See Shubra Gururani, "Forest of Meanings and Memory: Cultural Politics of Gender and Place in Uttarakhand Himalayas, India," paper presented at the Agrarian Studies Colloquium, Yale University, 30 March 2001, *passim*.

The study of the formation of modernity in the Muslim World may take as a point of departure the transformations provoked by the colonial encounter. An abundant anthropological literature deals with how the formations of economic, social, political and cultural modernity interrelate. I would like to address this literature in the next section in order to situate the formation of cultural modernity as evidenced by the rise of the Izala movement in the broader framework of modernity in the Islamic world.

Contribution of the Study

This book aims to contribute to the debate on the formation of modernity in Muslim societies, with particular reference to Sub-Saharan Africa. It investigates the elective affinities between social and religious change. Many scholarly works have documented how social change paved the way for the rise of new Islamic movements concerned with *objectification*. According to James Piscatori and Dale Eickelman,²⁵ “objectification is the process by which basic questions come to the fore in the consciousness of large numbers of believers: “What is my religion?” “Why is it important to my life?” “How do my beliefs guide my conduct?” Piscatori and Eickelman argue that these “objective questions are *modern queries*²⁶ that increasingly shape the discourse and practice of Muslims in all social classes, even as some legitimise their actions and beliefs by asserting that they advocate a return to purportedly authentic traditions.”²⁷

There are two implications of *objectification* in the twentieth-century Muslim world which I will discuss in this book. One is the concern for reforming religion and society, and another is islamizing the state. I call reform movements those Islamic movements that attempt to reform social and religious practices whereas those movements that attempt to capture political power and establish the rule of God, I call them Islamist movements. This is not to say that reform movements are not engaged in political struggle.²⁸ Rather, the priority of reform movements is to reform social and religious practices, whereas

²⁵ See Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

²⁶ Emphasis mine.

²⁷ See Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

²⁸ See conclusion.

Islamist movements believe that the rule of God must be established first, and then, the reform of religion and society will follow.

Lansine Kaba rightly argues that “the idea of reform stems from a concern for one’s religion and reaction against established dogma and practices, which are seen as having departed from orthodoxy. Reformism implies a firm belief both in the validity of orthodox doctrine as a model for the current situation and in the assumption that the problems facing Muslim communities at present are due either to a misunderstanding of the Islamic doctrine or to society’s refusal to conform to the true Koranic principles.”²⁹

Algeria provides a fascinating case of “what happens to faith when its vehicle alters” to use Clifford Geertz’s phrase.³⁰ More than any other Muslim country, argues anthropologist Ernest Gellner, nineteenth-century Algeria depended heavily on Muslim holy men,³¹ and, more than any other country, had swung violently against them and welcomed the reformers.³² The explanation for such a violent rejection of a form of religion that had been venerated by the majority of people, it has been argued, lies in the specific social, cultural, and political conditions of that country during the twentieth century.³³ According to Ernest Gellner, the Sufi orders were becoming more and more redundant for a new category of people. “The major and obvious function of maraboutism, Gellner argues, was to serve an illiterate tribal population in anarchic conditions, providing mediation in cases of feud, organising festivals, which are at the same time markets, guaranteeing frontiers, witnessing collective oaths, and offering a personal incarnation of the sacred for tribesmen who have neither access to nor a penchant for learning.”³⁴ Such was the context of Algeria prior to the consolidation of French colonial rule. The latter,

²⁹ See Lansine Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya, Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 21.

³⁰ See Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed. Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 2.

³¹ For a more detailed discussion of the functions of the Sufi orders, see among others Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969 and Emile Dermenghem, *Le culte des Saints dans l’Islam maghrébin*, Paris, Gallimard, 1954.

³² Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 160.

³³ See Ali Merad, *Le réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940 Essai d’histoire religieuse et sociale*, Paris, Mouton & Co., 1967, pp. 53–54; Ernest Gellner, p. 155.

³⁴ See Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

however, was a generator of major social and cultural change in Algerian society, especially during World War I and thereafter.

Before World War I, the various geographical units that formed Algeria maintained little contact with each other. Just as in South Africa under apartheid, the French colonial state imposed restrictions on the geographical mobility of the Algerian people. After World War I, as Ali Merad³⁵ documents, a massive rural urban migration took place, which, in due course, led to the rise of an urban working and middle class somewhat emancipated from communal ties. Some of those who left rural Algeria migrated to Europe to fight against the Germans in World War I. Others migrated from rural to urban areas within Algeria. The years of drought during the 1920s as well as the general impoverishment caused by the war accelerated the urban drift. This massive transfer of population had far-reaching consequences for the Algerian Islamic community. Many of the Algerian migrants who returned home after several years in Europe did not attempt to adjust to local Algerian customs. Rather, they set up households governed by a great deal of individualism. Thus, they did not readily accept the moral tutelage of the Sufi Shaykhs, known as *marabouts*. The value placed on personal savings that they had acquired in Europe led them to feel less inclined to support the *marabouts* or even the charitable works of the Sufi lodges (*zawiya* in Arabic). Ali Merad strongly argues that the *marabouts* of the 1920s had lost the support of the younger generation of Algerian youth coming back from France.³⁶

Emancipation from tribal and communal ties also affected many Algerians who migrated from rural to urban areas. Because they faced the same challenges, including the search for emancipation from French colonial rule, Algerians from different tribes, who otherwise could have lived their entire lives without knowing much about their neighbours, came closer to each other. Some of them emerged as spokesmen, not for a tribe or a region, but for a larger national community.³⁷ Among these were the reformers who emerged as spokesmen of a “universal reformed Islam,” rejecting in the process pre-existing maraboutism (Sufi Islam).³⁸

³⁵ See Ali Merad, *Le réformisme musulman en Algérie . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ See Ali Merad, *Le réformisme musulman en Algérie . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–42.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

In a comparative study of religious change in two Muslim countries, Morocco and Indonesia (the latter is a home for over 200 million Muslims, thus the largest single Muslim population in the world), anthropologist Clifford Geertz argues that in both countries:

If colonialism created the conditions in which an oppositional, identity-preserving, willed Islam could and did flourish, scripturalism—the turn toward the Koran, the Hadith, and the Shari‘a, together with various standard commentaries upon them, as the only acceptable bases of religious authority—provided the content of such an Islam.

In Indonesia, Geertz argues, the majority of the people practiced a syncretic Islam until the end of the nineteenth century.³⁹

According to Clifford Geertz, the generators of social and religious change in Indonesia were increased technological progress, which favoured greater geographical mobility and the establishment of a new school system, which paved the way for the growth of the internal market system.⁴⁰ Geertz also argues that the number of Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca increased from 2,000 in 1850 to 50,000 in 1926. The most earnest of the pilgrims built Islamic boarding schools to “instruct young men in what they took to be the true and neglected teaching of the Prophet.”⁴¹ Finally, there was “an *elective affinity* [. . .] between itinerant, small scale, catch-as-catch-can trading and an assortment of informal, independent, freely accessible, virtually costless religious hostels scattered broadly over the countryside.”⁴²

In his *North for the Trade*,⁴³ John Waterbury discusses social change and more specifically the transition from rural to urban life as it affected the person whose biography forms the substance of the book: a Berber merchant to whom he gave the pseudonym Hajj Ibrahim. Born in the Anti-Atlas Mountains, Hajj Ibrahim moved to settle in Casablanca. Later on, he became a wholesaler. In this process, Hajj Ibrahim adopted the *salafi* ideology, (reformed Islam) which seemed

³⁹ See Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed*, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ See Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 67. For a case study of the rise of scripturalist Islam in a limited context, Modjokuto, see also Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1960, pp. 133 sq.

⁴² See Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed*, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–68.

⁴³ John Waterbury, *North for the Trade*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972, particularly pp. 147–73.

more in line with life in the largest Moroccan city. The interest of this book lies in the fact that it is more than a biography of a single person, for there were many Hajj Ibrahims in twentieth-century urban Morocco.

In the conclusion of his study devoted to the Hamidiyya Shaziliyya, which he claims was “the only one of the Sufi orders which has not been rendered clearly redundant by the process of social change in Egypt,”⁴⁴ Michael Gilsenan shows how economic and social change paved the way for the decline of the Sufi orders in Egypt. Until the nineteenth century, according to Gilsenan, “material culture and modes of cultivation were unchanged, technology continued simple, social differentiation was minimal, and intellectual life in general ossified in the calcium of grammar and Koranic exegesis. The Orders were woven into this stable, indeed static, social world.”⁴⁵ Gilsenan shows also that urbanisation was a decisive factor in the process of social change. Although only 11.5 percent of the Egyptian population in 1881 lived in towns with more than 20,000 persons, the urban population increased considerably during the first half of the twentieth century.⁴⁶ The process of urban transformation was even more dramatic in larger cities such as Cairo and Alexandria, where 40 percent of the population had moved from rural areas by 1960.⁴⁷ Urbanisation was accompanied by the secularisation of education. From 324,000 pupils in 1913, the number of children enrolled in formal schools increased to 1,900,000 in 1951, and the university population, almost non-existent in 1913 grew to 4100 students.⁴⁸ Then, Gilsenan shows that the Sufi orders, which had played an important role in earlier religious education, were relegated to the background by these developments. The rising lower middle, and middle class were attracted by other organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan Al-Banna or by political parties.⁴⁹

In Oman, Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori have documented how the expansion of higher education and mass communication

⁴⁴ Michael Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 191.

⁴⁵ See Michael Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt*, *op. cit.*, p. 191 *sq.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

altered the religious consciousness of a younger generation of Omanis. They write that

A much more conscious sense of tradition had begun to emerge, inspired by the growing cohort of young Omanis who had received a secondary or postsecondary school education, and who, with the increasing ease of transportation and the expansion of networks of youth met through schooling, military service, and employment began to question what it meant to be Muslim.⁵⁰

Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori mention that one of Oman's first generation of village schoolteachers observed of the Northern Oman interior that, "people here do not know Islam, they pray and sacrifice, but they do not know why."⁵¹ And Eickelman and Piscatori add that before the mid-1970s such patterns of thinking and behaviour would have been almost incomprehensible.⁵²

In the scholarship relating to Islam and social change, geographic mobility and the development of mass education rank among the main factors considered to pave the way for the "transformation of the relation of Muslim, particularly Muslim educated urban youth to sacred authority" as James Piscatori and Dale Eickelman argue.

Unlike in the Middle East, Sufi Islam has remained mainstream in West Africa, both before and during the postcolonial period. An important number of scholarly works have been devoted to the position of the Sufi orders in West African society.⁵³ Yet, as significant as the Sufi orders are in Sub-Saharan Africa social life, they do not cover the whole Islamic field. The reform movements, although not as popular as the Sufi orders, are also part of the religious landscape. Their study has remained a somewhat neglected theme. One notable

⁵⁰ See Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–39.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Among others, see Donal Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal. The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971; *Saints and Politicians. Essay on the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975; Christian Coulon, *Le marabout et le prince*, Paris, Pedone, 1981; Lucy Behrman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970; Leonardo Villalon, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal, Disciples and Citizens in Fatick*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, Donal Cruise O'Brien and Christian Coulon (eds.), *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988; Louis Brenner, *West African Sufi, The Religious Heritage and Spiritual Search of Cerno Bokar Salif Tall*, London, C. Hurst and Co., 1984; John N. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*, London and Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973.

exception is the work of Lansine Kaba devoted to the study of two reform movements that emerged in French West Africa by the end of colonial rule: the Shubbanu and the Union culturelle musulmane which Kaba calls “wahhabi.” Like Geertz in Indonesia, Lansine Kaba discusses how the impact of pilgrimage, the establishment of new schools, the emergence of new social classes created by new economic opportunities, and the rise of individualism paved the way for the spread of the Wahhabiyya⁵⁴ in some urban parts of Ivory Coast, French Sudan, and Guinea.

This book aims to contribute to this broad literature on Islam and social change. More specifically, in light of rapid socioeconomic change and change of religious identities in Northern Nigeria, particularly during the last three decades, I try to investigate elective affinities, to use a Weberian phrase, without assuming a causal link. Indeed, many of the above-mentioned authors do not imply a direct causality between social change and the rise of new Islamic attitudes and beliefs. With regard to Egypt, Gilsenan has argued that

It is not enough to talk of urbanisation, population growth, the expansion of the *sans terre*, and the marginal classes, the diminution of the agricultural sphere and so forth. Such transformations, after all, might equally have led to a traditionalist retrenchment, even a revival of the *turuq*.⁵⁵

It has not been otherwise because, according to Gilsenan the “Sufi orders had no response to the political and social changes in the society.”⁵⁶ Similarly, Lansine Kaba makes it clear in his discussion of the rise of the Shubbanu al-muslimin, that “the correlation between socioeconomic change and religious change is not as direct as the preceding remarks [relating to socioeconomic change] may lead one to think. Change in the structure of the economy and the means of transportation, although its effects are ultimately felt in many aspects of life, does not necessarily lead to the growth of new religious rituals and sects.”⁵⁷

Another variant of *objectification* emerged in the Muslim world in

⁵⁴ Wahabiyya refers to a movement that advocates the same ideology as the Society for the Removal of Innovation. See chapter five for a discussion of the worldviews of the Society.

⁵⁵ See Michael Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt*, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ See Lansine Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya*, *op. cit.*, pp. 72–73.

the postcolonial period: “Islamism”. This leads me to the second field of scholarship to which this book aims to contribute.

Islamism

Much as it paved the way for the rise of reform movements, social change coincided with a new phenomenon called “Islamism”⁵⁸ or “radical Islam,”⁵⁹ or “political Islam”⁶⁰ The roots of Islamism as an ideology can be traced to the thought and modes of organisation of two movements: the Society of the Muslim Brothers⁶¹ founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 in Egypt and the Jamaat-i-islami⁶² founded by Abu ‘Ala Maududi in 1941 in British India. Worthy of note is the fact that by the end of European colonial rule, with the notable exception of the two above-mentioned associations, there were few Islamist movements with large followings in the Muslim world. Such ideologies as panarabism, Marxism, liberalism, nationalism, had a stronger appeal to educated people. However, during the 1970s, the number of Islamist movements increased considerably. Several such groups appeared in Egypt, including the Jihad group, which became known throughout the world, when one of its members assassinated President Anwar al-Sadat.⁶³ A more dramatic case is the Islamic Salvation Front⁶⁴ created in Algeria. This movement has been the most serious threat that the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale, the ruling party, has faced since independence. Its fight against the

⁵⁸ The most comprehensive survey of this phenomenon in the whole Muslim world is Gilles Kepel, *Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002.

⁵⁹ For more on the growth of Islamist thought and ideology, see Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam, op. cit.*; Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam, op. cit.*

⁶⁰ See Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam, op. cit.*

⁶¹ Founded in 1929 with an initial 4 branches, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood had 2,000 branches and between 300,000 and 600,000 members, with another half million sympathizers in 1948. R.P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969 provides a fascinating study of the thought, history, and organization of the Society of the Muslim Brothers.

⁶² See Mumtaz Ahmad, “Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia,” in R. Scott Appleby and Martin Marty, (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 457–530.

⁶³ See Gilles Kepel, *The Prophet and Pharaoh. Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, London, Al-Saqi Books, 1985, p. 191.

⁶⁴ See Ahmed Raoudja, *Les Frères et la Mosquée*, Paris, Karthala, 1990, Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, London, Hurst, 2000.

Algerian state has caused more deaths than any other conflict in postcolonial North Africa. In Jordan, the Muslim Brothers are an important actor in Jordanian politics.⁶⁵ Even more successful than these movements, are the regimes of the Ayatollah in Iran and that of Taleban in Afghanistan. They succeeded, in these two countries, in overthrowing states that were secular, internationally recognised, backed by an army, and, in the case of Iran enjoyed the support of powerful Western nations.

Olivier Roy argues that Islamists are like the *Salafi* in that they preach the return to the fundamentals of Islam—the Koran and the Sunna—but they go further in arguing the necessity of an Islamic State.⁶⁶ However, this assumption that Islamists tend to be Salafi-oriented is only partially correct, for there are many “Islamists” who combine a strong Sufi commitment with an asserted political agenda of fighting to establish an Islamic state. These include Hasan al-Banna⁶⁷ and Abdessalam Yassine,⁶⁸ one of the principal Islamist leaders in Morocco.

According to Olivier Roy, two issues divide fundamentalists (also called Salafi) and Islamists. The first issue is that “Islamists generally tend to favour the education of women and their participation in social and political life.”⁶⁹ The second is that “they insist less on the application of the shari‘a as the key to the Islamisation of society.”⁷⁰ This distinction is not helpful. Evidence from many Islamist movements, including Nigeria, suggests the reverse. Indeed, fundamentalists have been in the forefront in the fight for the education of women and Islamists make the implementation of the shari‘a the main item in their agenda.

What are the factors explaining the rise of Islamism? One common denominator in countries experiencing the rise of Islamism such as

⁶⁵ Beverly Miltons-Edwards, “A Temporary Alliance with the Crown Islamic Response in Jordan,” in James Piscatori (ed.), *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*, Chicago, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991, pp. 88–108, p. 92.

⁶⁶ See Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1992.

⁶⁷ See R.P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 2.

⁶⁸ See François Burgat and William Dowell, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, Austin, The Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, being a revised and expanded version of François Burgat, *L'Islamisme au Maghreb, La voie du Sud*. Paris, Karthala, 1989 (trans. William Dowell), p. 14.

⁶⁹ See Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

Algeria, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan⁷¹ is rapid and massive urban transformation. This is indeed true for Nigeria, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

Another important factor in the rise of Islamism has been the influence of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran led by the late Ayatollah Khomeini. This revolution created the conviction in the Muslim world, and to some extent in the Third World, that it was possible to create a state that was independent from the western and the eastern blocs that were dominating the world. The Islamic revolution in Iran had a great impact in the Muslim world, particularly in the early 1980s. Muslims from different doctrinal affiliations converted to Islamism. In sub-Saharan Africa, which has been neglected in the study of Islamism, there were people from Sufi backgrounds—(this contradicts the idea that Islamism is based on Salafism)—who were fascinated by the Islamic revolution and who believed that establishing an Islamic state would be a panacea. These people were visible in the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state.

Anti-western attitudes are also a common theme of Islamism. One can argue that anti-western attitudes were the legacy of nationalist⁷² and socialist ideologies that some of the Islamists endorsed earlier in their careers before they converted to Islamism. They condemn both neocolonialism and the Western economic and political domination of much of the third world. In that respect, Islamism has some elements of third-world nationalism.⁷³

The lack of democracy in most of the countries in which Islamism prospered is also a notable fact.⁷⁴ In his study of “radical Islam” in the Middle East, particularly Egypt and Syria, Emmanuel Sivan has rightly argued that the rise of “radical Islam” was the result of the crackdown on Muslim militants during the 1950s and 1960s by the

⁷¹ See Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

⁷² Some scholars have argued that “reformism” or “scripturalism” was particularly appealing because many Muslim countries were fighting for independence, Lansine Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya . . . op. cit.*, p. 15, Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed*, *op. cit.*, Ali Merad, *Le réformisme musulman en Algérie*, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

⁷³ See Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 4; François Burgat and William Dowell, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, *op. cit.*, The sub-title of the French edition which translates in English “The Voice of the South” conveys the idea of third-world nationalism.

⁷⁴ See François Burgat and William Dowell, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 4; Ahmed Rouadja, *Les Frères et la Mosquée*, *op. cit.*, p. 8; Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam . . . , op. cit.*, p. x.

repressive, praetorian states of Egypt and Syria. The crackdown, it can be argued, had two effects. For some people, it gave the conviction that recourse to violence to create an Islamic state was doomed to failure and would invite further repression on the part of the state. The Islamists who thought along those lines tended to become politically moderate. However, and this aspect is discussed in great length by Emmanuel Sivan,⁷⁵ others who had experienced the harsh conditions of Egyptian and Syrian prisons and seen their comrades tortured or killed, lost all hope of peacefully achieving the goal of Islamising the state and society. This experience led to their complete radicalisation. The rapid urban growth in some Middle Eastern countries, particularly Egypt, which had not been “matched by the economic opportunities or hope for rising social mobility; which was available to earlier generations,”⁷⁶ created potential constituencies for Islamic radicalism among urban youth. The latter “whose social mobility was blocked, and expectations frustrated” advocated, as Sivan demonstrates “a comeback to a puritanical and egalitarian way of life, reducing the social gap by taking from the rich and giving to the poor, lowering the overall level of expectations, and thus limiting tensions and bitterness”.⁷⁷

Worthy of note is that, although a substantial body of literature has been published over the last twenty years on Islamism in the Middle East, little scholarly attention has been devoted to Islamism in sub-Saharan Africa. Although not the main focus of this book, the discussion of the growth of Islamism in Nigeria, the country with the largest Muslim population of sub-Saharan Africa will also be one of its contributions.

Islam and social change in Nigeria

Finally, this book aims also to contribute to and update the literature on Islam and social change in Northern Nigeria. There have been many excellent studies by social scientists of Islam in Kano. One of these is the pioneering work of political scientist John Paden,

⁷⁵ See Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam, op. cit., passim*.

⁷⁶ See Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics, op. cit.*, p. 117.

⁷⁷ See Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam, op. cit.*, p. 126.

published thirty years ago.⁷⁸ In *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* John Paden provides a detailed analytical account of the growth and interactions between Sufi orders in twentieth-century Northern Nigeria and their orientation towards community and authority. However, as sound as Paden's book is, its understanding of "ethnicity" and the relations between ethnic groups was somewhat essentialist and influenced by the colonial and missionary construction of ethnicity. This has remained the main weakness of the work. Ethnic identities have not been as rigid as assumed in John Paden's study.⁷⁹

Another important work on Islam in Northern Nigeria, which has never been published, is Ibrahim Tahir's "Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano, 1907–1974."⁸⁰ Like John Paden, anthropologist Ibrahim Tahir starts his study with a thorough analysis of the economic transformations in Kano during European colonial rule, and discusses the extent to which they altered the social stratification of the society of Kano. He concludes that the colonial economy provided new opportunities to an emerging class of entrepreneurs who first took control of the economy and then the political system. Like John Paden, Ibrahim Tahir devotes careful attention to the study of the interaction between different religious movements, mainly the Sufi orders, and their ethics from a Weberian perspective. That is to say, Ibrahim Tahir, is interested in how their ethics induced social and economic transformations.

Unlike these two works that focused on Islam in Kano, the research of Father Matthew Kukah⁸¹ deals more broadly with Northern Nigeria. Covering the evolution of the latter from colonial rule to the Babangida administration (1985–1993), Father Kukah's book is very well documented. Father Kukah interviewed key actors in the politics of Northern Nigeria, and collected first-hand material on more recent

⁷⁸ See John N. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*, London and Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973.

⁷⁹ See, for instance, Okwudiba Nnoli, "Ethnic and Regional Balancing in Nigerian Federalism" in J. Isawa Elaigwu and R.A. Akindele (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1960–1995*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 212–43, which provides many examples of change in the boundaries of ethnic groups in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa.

⁸⁰ See Ibrahim Tahir, "Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1907–1974 The Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society," Ph.D. diss. in social anthropology, Cambridge University, 1971.

⁸¹ Matthew Hassan Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*. Ibadan, Oweri, Kaduna, Lagos, 1993, rep. 1994.

developments about religion and politics. As a Roman Catholic priest, he claims insight into the dynamics of Christianity in Nigeria. However, F. Kukah devotes most of his attention to larger issues and does not discuss specifically the sociology of any Islamic movement in detail. Moreover, Father Kukah who belongs to the ethnic group known as *kataf*, writes from the perspective of a Roman Catholic priest from a minority ethnic background of southern Zaria (Kachia local government), who resented the perceived Islamic domination of Northern Nigeria. The terms “Hausa-Fulani hegemony” or “Northern hegemony” used by Father Kukah throughout his book are misleading, for they largely play down class struggle, which is an important aspect of social life. If hegemony is understood as domination based largely on consent as opposed to coercion, it does not help us to understand that traditional rulers have often been challenged in Northern Nigeria, not only by minority Christian groups but also by people who are Muslim “Hausa/Fulani”. Similarly, the use of the concept Hausa-Fulani hegemony does not take into account the fact that many northerners have strong business connections and common political interests with other political/economic entrepreneurs in the south of the country. For example, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), which ruled the country throughout the Second Republic, was backed by much of the national establishment, regardless of ethnic and/or religious affiliation.⁸²

These above-mentioned works are important contributions to the religious and political sociology of Islam in Northern Nigeria. However, they do not address the rise of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition. Although some of the changes that paved the way to reform were underway when Tahir and Paden completed their works (and indeed, some were addressed by them, for instance, change in social stratification), yet the impact and full implications of these changes, as discussed in this book, were not manifest.

One other important study investigates the ways in which social change restructured the religious field in Northern Nigeria. In *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*⁸³ Roman Loimeir explores

⁸² For a sociological study of the NPN, see Jibrin Ibrahim, *L'accès à l'Etat: Classes sociales, élites, factions, une étude du National Party of Nigeria*, Ph.D. in political science, CEAN IEP de Bordeaux, 1991.

⁸³ See Roman Loimeir, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1997.

the formation of political modernity and the struggle of Muslims in general including Sufi orders, to preserve their interests within the Nigerian federation, covering the period from 1930 to 1990. The ethnographic material on which this book is based focuses on the Izala movement in the city of Kano, from its rise in the late 1970s to its domestication in the early 1990s. However, unlike Roman Loimeir's work, which focuses on the religious and political elites, this work devotes considerable attention to the *modus operandi* of the Yan Izala at the microlevel in Kano. Finally, even though Roman Loimeir's material confirms the same findings as my work, the notion that Izala is a vehicle of modernity is only implicit in his work. Roman Loimeier does not theorize this specific aspect in any significant way.

This study aims to provide an analytical account of the restructuring of the religious field in Kano⁸⁴ in particular, as the result of radical social changes that occurred particularly in the 1970s. In the process, I hope to provide a study of the largest single Islamic reform movement in West Africa, that is, the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition.

Theoretical framework

My theoretical discussion of the struggle of Muslim power is informed by field theory. The concept of field is part of a theoretical paradigm developed by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. It is based on the proposition that social actors operate in several spheres of social life. A field, also referred to as a game or a market, is one of these spheres of activity⁸⁵ (for example, economic, religious, political, legal, artistic, etc.). The things that benefit those who act in a field, to follow Bourdieu, are the resources of that field. Bourdieu qualifies

⁸⁴ By Kano or Urban Kano, it is meant the city of Kano. Whenever I refer to the State of Kano or the Emirate of Kano, I mention it explicitly.

⁸⁵ Among the many works of Pierre Bourdieu dealing with the study of fields, see "Genèse et structure du champ religieux," *Revue française de sociologie*, (12), 1971, pp. 295–334; *Les règles de l'art. Genèse et structure du champ littéraire*, Paris, Seuil, 1992; "Le champ scientifique," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, (2–3), 1976, pp. 88–104; "La représentation politique. Eléments pour une théorie du champ politique," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, (36–37), Feb.-March 1987, pp. 3–24; "La force du droit. Eléments pour une sociologie du champ juridique," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, (64), 1986, pp. 3–19.

these resources as different kinds of capital. The structure of capital and the various kinds of capital vary from one field to another.

I would agree with Bourdieu that capital and its value in a field are not necessarily economic or material. Bourdieu's use of the metaphor of "capital" to encompass nonmaterial wealth is based on the observation that the things of value in a field can be intangible and that economic capital can even be inoperable in a field. An example of nonmaterial capital is symbolic capital, which Bourdieu describes as the "degree of accumulated prestige, celebrity, consecration or honour [possessed by someone and] founded on a dialectic of knowledge and recognition."⁸⁶ Symbolic capital can be more valuable than economic capital, which Bourdieu illustrates in his study of matrimonial strategies in Kabilia (Algeria):

The decision to buy a second yoke of oxen after the harvest, on the grounds that they are needed for treading the grain, which is a way of making it known that the crop has been plentiful, only to have to sell them again for lack of fodder before the autumn ploughing, when they would technically be necessary, seems economically aberrant only if one forgets all the material and symbolic profit accruing from this (albeit fictitious) enhancement of the family's symbolic capital in the late summer period when marriages are negotiated.⁸⁷

The decision to buy the second yoke of oxen during the period in which marriages are negotiated, or the use of symbolic capital for success in the field of marriage, illustrates Bourdieu's propositions that symbolic capital is of value and that capital can be converted from one kind to another. Money becomes oxen, which enhances prestige, which attracts a partner for marriage.

Central to field theory are the definitions of such concepts as accumulation and conversion of capital, as well as the identification of main kinds of capital. By accumulation of capital, it is meant here the process through which social actors (or players) go in order to obtain a given sort of capital. By conversion, it is meant the act of spending one sort of capital and getting in return another sort.

There are five sorts of capital which are of significance in the socioreligious field of Northern Nigeria: non formally certified cultural

⁸⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993, p. 7, *In Other Words, Essays towards a Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990, pp. 22, 111.

⁸⁷ See Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1990, p. 120.

capital, formally certified cultural capital, economic capital, symbolic capital and social capital.

1. Non formally certified cultural capital refers to the religious expertise, which has been present in sub-Saharan Africa for a long time. It includes a combination of both exoteric religious knowledge (Koran, Islamic law, Islamic exegesis) and esoteric sciences (Sufism, the art of talisman and charm making). This capital is not based on the possession of a university degree, thus it is not formally certified. It tends to be the prerogative of traditional religious authorities who, in Northern Nigeria for the most part, are the *shaykhs* of the Sufi orders. This kind of capital can also be called ancient religious capital.

2. Formally certified cultural capital is based on expertise in exoteric religious knowledge, with an emphasis on Wahhabi theology,⁸⁸ but it equally includes knowledge of the Koran (the mastery of the art of its recitation, knowledge of its conventional exegesis and Islamic jurisprudence) as well as knowledge of some secular subject matters (foreign languages, history, geography, mathematics, etc.). More importantly, formally certified cultural capital requires the possession of a degree delivered by a university or another formal institution of learning. I will show in chapters three and four that all religious entrepreneurs of the Society, unlike the Sufi *shaykhs*, held a degree of some sort from a university. Their capital can thus be labelled as formally certified cultural capital or new religious capital.

3. Economic capital refers to material wealth in the most common sense of the word and in Northern Nigeria, for the events I describe, was possessed most importantly by economic entrepreneurs, as well as the wealthy in general.

4. Symbolic capital refers here to the status of a fighter for the cause of “true Islam” whatever that means. The Koranic verse appearing at the beginning of the introduction, which states that “God hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons” conveys this idea of symbolic capital. The more one fights with one’s “goods” or “one’s” “person”, the more one accumulates symbolic capital.

To accumulate symbolic capital, the religious entrepreneurs of the Society had to undergo a long process in the acquisition of formally certified cultural capital, with an emphasis on a legalistic conception

⁸⁸ See below, chapter five.

of religion, and to fight “with their persons” for the reinstatement of a socioreligious order based on it. As will be discussed below, these actors will take the risk of advocating the ideology of reform in a hostile environment and accumulate symbolic capital in the recognition of their status as Islamic authorities by the Muslim community at large, or at least an important segment of it.

Political and economic entrepreneurs acquired symbolic capital by fighting “with their goods,” to use the Koranic metaphor. That is to say, they spent their money to sponsor Islamic religious activities or to build mosques or to support Yan Izala preachers. The more money they spent, the more symbolic capital they accumulated.

5. Social capital, according to Bourdieu, “is what ordinary language calls ‘connections.’” By formalizing this concept, Bourdieu argues, one “acquires the means of analysing the logic whereby this particular kind of capital is accumulated, transmitted and reproduced, the means of understanding how it turns into economic capital and, conversely, what work is required to convert economic capital into social capital, the means of grasping the function of institutions such as social clubs or quite simply the family.”⁸⁹ In this study, social capital refers to the constituencies (supporters, clients disciples, etc.) that a religious, economic, or political entrepreneur can recruit in the larger society. In the conclusion, I come back to the discussion of field theory and its relevance to understanding the struggle for power in the religious and social field of Northern Nigeria.

Sources and methods

My primary research interest in Northern Nigeria was to conduct a study of the Ibrahim Niassa’s branch of the Tijaniyya. I made a number of field trips to Northern Nigeria in 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1990 and 1991. During the first field trip, which I conducted in December of 1985, I was able to witness the growth of the Society. I returned to the field for three months in 1988 and began to develop an interest in a study of the Society. During my trips in 1985 and 1988, I was based at the Sufi *zawiya* of the Alhaji Uba Ringim, a prominent member of the Tijaniyya Sufi order in Kano. When I

⁸⁹ See Pierre Bourdieu, *Sociology in Questions*, London, Sage Publications, 1993, reprinted in 1995, pp. 32–33.

changed my research interest to the Society and because of strained relations between the latter and the Sufi orders, I decided to move to Bayero University, Kano, which was a more appropriate site for the study of new religious movements, including the Society. I established contacts with many scholars and with leaders of Islamic groups in Kano and other cities of Northern Nigeria. Because I was a practising Muslim and dressed in traditional Northern Nigerian Muslim clothes, I was able to enter easily enough the religious circles of the university. Had this not been so, it would have been more difficult for me to be accepted by the groups that I was studying. I knew some Hausa before starting my fieldwork. But I took Hausa classes while in Northern Nigeria, and gained the fluency in the Hausa language, which would allow me to communicate. Coming from a background of Arabic and Islamic Studies, I had no problem communicating with most Islamic leaders in Arabic. My linguistic competence and expertise in Islamic studies in general allowed me to communicate easily with the Yan Izala, all of whom were fascinated by the Arabic language. I participated in trips to the countryside during which preaching groups of the Society tried to recruit followers, although I was not myself involved in any proselytising.

I returned to Northern Nigeria again for six months in 1989. During this third trip, I was based again in Bayero University, Kano. I established a geographic survey of the places of worship of the Society in Kano. Within the walled city of Kano, places of worship of the Society were mostly informal⁹⁰ and known as *majlis*. I chose one of these *majlis* based in a quarter known as Gidan Rijija within the walled city, where I prayed very often and made many friends among members of the Society, who were attending this *majlis*. I was introduced to them as a researcher in Islamic studies. I had long informal discussions with many of them, which gave me an idea of their social background and experiences. At the end of every day, I took notes about what I was told or had observed. By the end of my 1989 trip, I had collected enough material as a participant observer. I then started to conduct formal interviews. I collected information about all the people whose life stories I discuss in any detail in this book, leaders and grassroots members alike. I had two aims in conducting formal interviews. One was to ask specific

⁹⁰ See below, chapter three.

questions about the itineraries of the interviewed persons, that I could not figure out in informal discussion and observation. The second was to give them a voice in this study. For, I saw myself as an outsider who tries to explain other people's religious experience from a social science perspective. As Stuart Hall rightly argues: "Social science explanations reflect to some degree the point of view of the author who is trying to make sense of things. They do not carry the impersonal guarantee of inevitability and truth."⁹¹ This work does not claim to make an exception, as I am aware that my account of the Society is bound to be influenced, at least to some extent, by biases of some sorts.

When I tried to conduct formal interviews, some were reluctant to be interviewed, and in some cases, refused. The lesson that I learned conducting research in Northern Nigeria is that the researcher, if accepted by the community he is studying, can learn a lot as a participant observer.

In addition to being a participant observer, and conducting formal interviews, I have collected and consulted a number of unpublished B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. dissertations, some of which were very informative and served as a foundation for this work. I collected pamphlets in Arabic and Hausa languages, as well as audiocassette and videocassette recordings of events, some of which I did not attend. But these recordings gave me an idea of events, which I have not witnessed. I have conducted fieldwork until 1991, but have taken into account the literature pertaining to the topic until the late 1990s.

Plan of the study

The two introductory chapters of the book provide a broad overview of twentieth-century Nigeria. They focus on social, political and economic transformation, particularly during the postcolonial period. Chapter one discusses the structures and processes of modernity in Nigeria during the twentieth century. More specifically, I address the ways in which colonial rule induced economic transformations that led to the formation of economic modernity. I also discuss how the abolition of slavery, and the expansion of colonial and postcolonial

⁹¹ See Stuart Hall, "Introduction," *op. cit.*, p. 14.

economy paved the way for social mobility for many groups and thus ushered in social modernity. I also address the construction of the modern Nigerian nation state, i.e., the formation of political modernity. The expansion of monotheistic religions such as Islam is also addressed as part of the process of the formation of cultural modernity.

In chapter two, I address the issue of social change in Kano. I focus on the transformation of the precolonial political and social structures in order to draw attention to the change in social stratification. I also discuss the changes that the educational system underwent and the ways in which it led to the rise of new intellectuals trained in modern schools where they earned degrees. Social change in Nigeria brought about by British colonial rule during the first half of the twentieth century and accelerated by the diffusion of oil wealth during the 1970s profoundly altered the sociology of Northern Nigeria, and Nigeria in general, and helped pave the way for the rise of new Islamic movements. Unlike the remaining chapters of the book, the first two are largely based on secondary sources.

Chapter three discusses the emergence of new discourses, which competed with Sufi discourse, and the rise of new Islamic movements in the religious field of Kano. Discourse is employed here, in the Foucauldian sense, as a group of statements which provides a particular kind of knowledge about a question.⁹² Until the 1960s, Sufi orders largely dominated the Northern Nigerian religious sphere. During the 1970s, a number of new religious movements appeared, including the Society. The rise of these new religious movements articulating new discourses on Islam and the tensions, which accompanied it are discussed in detail for Kano.

Chapter four examines the membership of the Society and their various motivations and levels of involvement. I distinguish between the leadership and the following. As far as the leadership is concerned, it is formed by a religious establishment, which articulates the religious doctrine of the Society and a political leadership, which provides protection and financial support. The larger following of the Society include people of various motivations and levels of involvement.

Chapter five discusses the worldviews and the modes of recruitment and maintenance of allegiance within the Society. As far as the worldviews are concerned, I show that the discourse of the Society

⁹² See Michel Foucault, *L'archéologie du savoir*, Paris, Gallimard, 1969, *passim*.


is made up of a group of statements that aimed at emancipating the Yan Izala from traditional institutions and beliefs, which have curtailed their perceived autonomy. I also discuss the strategies of the Society to retain members and attract new members.

Chapter six analyses how religious beliefs and practices in the larger society of Kano were modified as a result of Yan Izala's advocacy of reform. Some Sufi leaders that were loosing their constituencies to the Society tried to rearticulate their creeds and reform some of their religious practices in order to retain members who were attracted by the agenda of the Society.

Chapter seven focuses on the politics of Muslim/Christian relations. I analyse the debates over secularism and Shari'a in Nigeria during the 1980s and early 1990s. I also discuss the religious riots that occurred during the same period, with particular reference to Northern Nigeria. I will argue that the rise of Christian ecumenicalism in Northern Nigeria led to the easing of tensions within the Muslim community.

The last chapter discusses the attempts by the military, which feared that religious movements would destabilize the country, to domesticate these movements. I situate the domestication of the Society, which provoked its break up, within the broader framework of the attempts by the military to control all social movements of importance, including unions and religious organizations.

In the conclusion, I discuss two sets of issues addressed in this introduction. One is Bourdieu's field theory as a useful theoretical framework to discuss the struggle for influence among Muslims in Northern Nigeria. The second set of issues discussed, which is a summary of the argument of the book, is how the emergence of the Society relates to the process of formation of economic, political, social and cultural modernity. Finally, I draw some comparative implications of this study.



Map 1. Nigeria showing states (2002)

CHAPTER ONE

AGENTS AND ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NIGERIA

Among the events that laid the foundations of the Nigerian state, the amalgamation by Lord Frederick Lugard of the British protectorates of Southern Nigeria¹ and Northern Nigeria in 1914 is no doubt the most significant. By unifying these two entities, he created the embryo of what would be one of the most powerful postcolonial African countries. Each of the two protectorates comprised more than one nation during the precolonial period. In the protectorate of Northern Nigeria, several polities existed before colonial rule. The northeastern part hosted the Kanem-Borno Empire,² which had been ruled by the Saifawa dynasty for centuries. Kanem-Borno was the most important centre of Islamic culture in the central Sudan from the medieval period until the beginning of the nineteenth century. It lost its pre-eminence when Usman Dan Fodio and his community waged a holy war (*jihad*) at the beginning of the nineteenth century.³ The *jihad* led to the establishment of an empire called the

¹ The protectorate of Southern Nigeria has not always been a unified colony. It was composed of several British territories that had undergone gradual federation in the course of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. For more on that, see G.N. Uzoigwe, "Evolution of the Nigerian State 1900–1914," in J. Isawa Elaigwu and G.N. Uzoigwe (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1900–1960*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 1–38.

² Because the seat of power moved from Kanem to Borno during the fourteenth century, A. Mahadi argues that it is appropriate to speak of a Kanem-Borno Empire only from the ninth century to the fourteenth century. From the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century, it is more appropriate to refer to this area as the Borno-Kanem Empire. See Abdullahi Mahadi, "The Kanem-Borno Empire," in J. Isawa Elaigwu and Erim O. Erim (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism. Pre-colonial Antecedents*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 55–81, p. 78.

³ For a history of the nineteenth-century *jihad*, see Murray Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate*, London, Longmans, 1967. On the relationship between the Sokoto Caliphate and Borno, see M. Last, "The Sokoto Caliphate and Borno," in J.F. Ade Ajayi (ed.), *Africa in the Nineteenth Century Until the 1880s. General History of Africa*, Paris, Unesco, 1989, pp. 555–99; Louis Brenner, "The Jihad Debate between Sokoto and Borno: Historical Analysis of Islamic Political Discourse in Nigeria," in J.F. Ade

Sokoto Caliphate, which was composed of emirates and subemirates, many of which had been built on the sites of previous Hausa states. The Sokoto Caliphate, argues L. Brenner, became the most powerful economic and political system of the central Sudan during the nineteenth century.⁴ The *jihad* and the caliphate contributed profoundly to Islamising Northern Nigeria, and their legacy is still felt in that region.

In its southern part, known as the Middle Belt, precolonial Northern Nigeria also included many smaller predominantly pagan societies. Although some of these societies were centralised (the Nupe, the Bachama, and the Jukun for instance), others were acephalous (the Mumuye and the Tiv).⁵ Some 200 ethno-linguistic groups⁶ were found in the Middle Belt, which held roughly one-third of the population of Northern Nigeria at the time of independence from European colonial domination. Within the system of territorial administration based on provinces, the Middle Belt covered the provinces of Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, Niger, Ilorin, Kabba, and the south of the regions of Zaria and Bauchi.⁷ Geographically, it covered 46% of the territory of the defunct Northern region.⁸

Ajayi and J.D.Y. Peel, *People and Empires in African History*, London, Longmans, 1992, pp. 21–43.

⁴ See Louis Brenner, “The Jihad Debate between Sokoto and Borno: Historical Analysis of Islamic Political Discourse in Nigeria,” *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁵ See A.L. Dalli, “The Middle Belt Communities of Northern Nigeria,” in J. Isawa Elaigwu and Erim O. Erim, (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism. Precolonial Antecedents*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 177–97, *passim*.

⁶ For more information on the tribes in the Middle Belt, see Oliver S.M. Temple, *Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Northern Nigeria*, London and Liverpool, Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1965. This is a compilation by the colonial state of all the tribes living in the Middle Belt, as well as an assessment of the number of their members. See also C.K. Meek, *The Northern Tribes. Studies in Northern Nigeria*, London, Paul Kegan, 1931, 2 vols.; *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria. An Ethnographic Account of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria Together with a Report on the 1921 Decennial Census*, London, Oxford University Press, 1925, 2 vols. More than a simple census, the work of anthropologist C.K. Meek is a study of the political organisation of the people of Northern Nigeria.

⁷ See Richard Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties. Power in an Emergent African Nation*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 344–45. A.L. Dalli conceives the present day Middle Belt as comprising parts of present-day Bauchi, Adamawa, and Kaduna State and the whole of Taraba, Benue, Plateau, Kwara, Niger, and Kogi States with a landmass of 160,000 square miles. See A.L. Dalli, “The Middle Belt Communities of Northern Nigeria,” *op. cit.*, p. 178.

⁸ See Louis J. Cantori, Jr., “The Political Implications of Islam in the Middle Belt of Northern Nigeria,” master’s thesis, department of political science, The University of Chicago, 1962, p. 5.

Brought under British tutelage during the second part of the nineteenth century, the protectorate of Southern Nigeria consisted also of several cultural zones. Predominant in the southeast were speakers of the Igbo language who, like some tribes of the Middle Belt, lived in essentially stateless conditions.⁹ Igboland covered 41,000 square kilometres and had a population of 9,246,413, in 1963,¹⁰ which was 17% of Nigeria's population at that time. The Igbo are predominantly Christian.

Speakers of Yoruba populate, for the most part, the southwestern part of Nigeria. Interestingly, before the nineteenth century, it was the Hausa who called some of their southern Oyo neighbours Yar'ba.¹¹ The Yoruba did not collectively identify themselves as Yoruba; they referred to themselves by the names of their different groups, such as Oyo, Ekiti, Ondo, Ijesha, Ijebu, Igbomina, Egba, Egbado, Yaba and Bunu.¹² Moreover, during the nineteenth century, a number of Yoruba city-states waged internecine wars for control of the Atlantic slave trade. The emergence of distinct Yoruba ethnicity is a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1963, the Yoruba made up 20% of Nigeria's population.¹³ Yorubaland is roughly 40% Muslim, 40% Christian and 20% traditional religions.¹⁴

Colonial rule brought these different communities together into one political unit, creating fundamental changes, which were social, economic, political and religious as well. Among the changes brought about by colonial rule that led to the formation of social modernity in Nigeria, I will address the following in the next four sections of

⁹ See Robin Horton, "Stateless Societies in the History of West Africa," in J.F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.) *History of West Africa*, London, Longman, 1985, pp. 87-128, p. 90.

¹⁰ See A. Ikechukwu Okpoko, "The Igbo State Systems," in J. Isawa Elaigwu and Erim O. Erim, (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism. Pre-colonial Antecedents*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 82-111, p. 82.

¹¹ See G.O. Oguntomisin, "The Yoruba Kingdoms," in J. Isawa Elaigwu and Erim O. Erim, (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism. Pre-colonial Antecedents*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 25-54, p. 48.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ For the distribution of the predominant ethnic groups, I rely on the estimates of Crawford Young in his *Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1976, p. 292.

¹⁴ David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflicts, British Imperial Control and Political cleavages in Yorubaland," in Peter B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 285-316, p. 285.

this chapter: the abolition of slavery at the advent of European colonial rule, the spectacular growth of the two largest world religions i.e., Islam and Christianity, the turbulent construction of the postcolonial Nigerian nation-state, and the diffusion of the oil wealth, which led to the neglect of rural Nigeria.

The Abolition of the Slavery

Slavery has been important factor in the political and economic development not only of Northern Nigeria, but the whole of the Sahelo-Sudanese region, and beyond.¹⁵ Two types of slavery existed in Africa: subsistence slavery and merchant slavery. Both are old institutions. However the phenomenon of merchant slavery developed significantly with the expansion of the trade across the Sahara, known as the Trans-Saharan trade, which supplied Arab markets with African slaves. There are accounts of this trade that go back to the seventh century.¹⁶ By the ninth century, the trade across the Sahara has become a notable one. During the thousand years or so that it lasted, it involved the trade of a significant population of slaves, among other commodities. However, in no sense, can it be compared with the transatlantic slave trade, which started from the sixteenth century. The transatlantic slave trade, carried on by Europeans, was of a much larger scale. This is evidenced by the fact that the black population of southern parts of North Africa is made of some hundreds of thousands people, whereas the number of descendants of slaves in the Americas exceed a hundred million.¹⁷ The Europeans, however, were also instrumental in the abolition of the slave trade. Nineteenth-century Europe was engrossed in debate over the legitimacy of slavery. Western nations, already under pressure from humanitarian lobbies, began to ban slave trading as it became economically less viable. Great Britain banned officially the slave trade in 1807 and then abolished slavery entirely in its plantation colonies in 1833.¹⁸

¹⁵ See Claude Meillassoux, *The Anthropology of Slavery*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 66.

¹⁶ See Claude Meillassoux, *The Anthropology of Slavery*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

¹⁷ See Samir Amin, "Preface," in Boubacar Barry, *Le royaume du Walo. Le Sénégal avant la conquête*, Paris, François Maspero, 1972, pp. 7–31, p. 15.

¹⁸ See Bill Freund, *The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society Since 1800*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984, pp. 59–60.

It was followed in this move by France, the Dutch and Scandinavian colonies, the South America republics, the United States, Spanish Cuba, and, finally the Brazil Empire.¹⁹ While the slave trade was being abolished, the European powers sought to promote, in its place, legitimate economic activities such as farming, with the effect that the years 1800 to 1870 in African history have become labelled the period of legitimate trade. However, the attempt to ban the slave trade did not succeed overnight, because much of African social structure depended heavily on slavery, which continued into the twentieth century.

Nineteenth-century Northern Nigeria was one of the largest slaving states in the world, and the largest in Africa. According to Paul Lovejoy and Jan Hogendorn, there were, at the time of the colonial conquest, perhaps more than 2.5 millions slaves in the Sokoto Caliphate,²⁰ or one-quarter of its total population. Others estimate that nearly half the population of the Sokoto Caliphate were slaves.²¹ By comparison, the United States had four million slaves during the same period. From present day Burkina Faso in West Africa to the Republic of Cameroon in Central Africa, the thirty emirates and subemirates that made up the caliphate practised slave raiding intensively.²² Upon British occupation of Northern Nigeria, Lord Lugard banned slave raiding and declared in 1902 that all sons of slaves would be free. Slavery underwent a process of gradual disappearance, which led in due course to a large-scale emancipation in Northern Nigeria.

Another aspect of change in colonial Nigeria is no doubt religious change, which was marked, first and foremost, by the replacement of the traditional African religions, by Islam and Christianity.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ See Paul E. Lovejoy and Jan S. Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery. The Course of Abolition in Northern Nigeria, 1897-1936*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 1.

²¹ See Lamont Dehaven King, "State and Ethnicity in Precolonial Northern Nigeria," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vols. 3-4, 2001, pp. 339-59, p. 354.

²² See Paul E. Lovejoy and Jan S. Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery. The Course of Abolition in Northern Nigeria, 1897-1936*, *op. cit.*

The Spectacular Growth of Islam and Christianity

In sub-Saharan Africa in general and in Nigeria in particular, colonial rule brought about a period of rapid religious change in favour of the two major world religions—Islam and Christianity. Conversion to both took place at an unprecedented pace during colonial rule, to the extent that in 1963, Muslims represented 47.2% of the population, Christians 34% and the followers of traditional religions only 18.2%.²³

Islam had been introduced into sub-Saharan Africa some ten centuries earlier. However, with regard to West Africa, Mervyn Hiskett argues that:

In spite of the inevitable disruption caused by the conquests and the process of occupation, there is little doubt that Islam spread in West Africa more rapidly and more widely during less than a century of colonial occupation than it had done during the preceding nine centuries.²⁴

A number of factors have been cited to explain this rapid expansion of Islam. M. Hiskett mentions in particular: the absence of warfare and slave raiding; the building of roads and railways; the introduction of modern means of communication, which helped propagate Islamic ideas; the implementation of Islamic law, which was easier to understand for colonial officials in non-Islamic areas; a bias against Christianity, which many potential converts saw as the white man's religion; the proselytising of local Muslim troops from the colonial army; and finally the use of Muslim literates as intermediaries between the colonial state and the population.²⁵

In Northern Nigeria, 50% of the population of the Sokoto Caliphate was Muslim at the beginning of colonial rule.²⁶ According to the official 1952 census, 73% of Northern Nigeria's population was Muslim. The Muslim population experienced a 50% increase in

²³ Based on the national census of 1963 quoted in A.I. Doi, *Islam in Nigeria*, Zaria, Gaskiya, 1984, p. 81. However, data on the religious distribution of the population in Nigeria tend to be highly controversial.

²⁴ See Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, London, Longman, 1984, p. 281.

²⁵ See Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 281–82.

²⁶ See E.P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," in *Ogbu Kalu (ed.), Christianity in West Africa. The Nigerian Story*, Ibadan, Daystar Press, 1978, pp. 1–237, p. 13.

approximately half a century.²⁷ It is worthy to note that sub-Saharan Africa, down to the equator, experienced roughly the same pace of conversion to Islam during colonial rule.

In Nigeria, the colonial state played a role in Islam's expansion. When Lord Frederick Lugard proclaimed the protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1900, he pledged not to interfere in the religious affairs of the Muslims. This decision had far-reaching consequences for the future of Muslim-Christian relations, particularly in Northern Nigeria. Faithful to Lugard's pledge, the early generations of colonial officials prohibited Christian missions from operating in some areas of Northern Nigeria. In 1922, Sir Hugh Clifford, then governor of the colony of Nigeria, divided the north into three zones.²⁸

The first zone consisted of emirates, whose leader was Muslim, as was the majority of the population. In these regions, the colonial state, fearing that it might be accused of violating Lugard's pledge of noninterference, had for some time prohibited Christian missions from proselytising non-Muslim populations. This zone corresponded roughly to the Sudanic Belt, and its population was 90% Muslim.²⁹ A notable exception is Dr. Walter Miller of the Church Missionary Society who was allowed to operate a station in the city of Zaria.³⁰ Dr. Miller established a school in Zaria, which for a while was the only mission school in the region. In the late 1920s, the Church Missionary society moved to Wusasa, not far from the city of Zaria. The educational efforts which Dr. Miller initiated in Wusasa developed into Saint-Paul Secondary school, which became a leading secondary school in Northern Nigeria.³¹

The second zone was mostly populated by adherents of African religions, but was under the authority of a Muslim emir. The former Province of Adamawa belonged to one such zone. Because the colonial state had restricted the activities of Christian missions in this second zone, it became the scene of much religious turbulence, as will be discussed further.³²

In the third zone, according to Sir Hugh Clifford's classification,

²⁷ See E.P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, p. 206.

²⁸ See E.P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, p. 74.

²⁹ See Louis J. Cantori, Jr., "The Political Implications of Islam in the Middle Belt of Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, p. 21.

³⁰ See E.P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, pp. 101-2

³¹ See E.P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, p. 137.

³² See chapter seven.

chiefs and the majority of the population were pagans.³³ In this region, the Christian missions enjoyed much freedom to operate.³⁴ This zone, which corresponded roughly to the Middle Belt of Nigeria, experienced a rapid conversion to Christianity during colonial rule, and consequently a spectacular growth in literacy, for Christian missions were in the forefront in providing formal education to local populations.³⁵

As far as education was concerned, according to E. Crampton, the colonial state had limited resources³⁶ at the moment of the proclamation of the protectorate of Northern Nigeria. It directed much of these resources in the emirates to educate and train the sons of traditional ruling families to staff the administrations of the native authorities. At this point, the majority of Christians (as well as Muslims and adherents of traditional religions) did not have access to formal education.³⁷ In reaction to this, Christian missions, whom the colonial state encouraged to invest in non-Muslim areas, began to create schools, particularly after the Second World War. These schools became training grounds for the intellectual, commercial and military elites, who would, in due course, be in the forefront of the nationalist movement.³⁸

Among those involved in the creation of schools, the Inter-Varsity Fellowship of Britain created primary schools. The Roman Catholic Mission built many secondary schools, including the famous Saint John's College in the city of Kaduna, which trained people for the general certificate of education, advanced level. In the whole country, this development favoured Christians in the field of formal education, so much so that at independence in Northern Nigeria, two-

³³ See E.P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, p. 74.

³⁴ See E.P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, p. 74.

³⁵ See Ibrahim James, *Studies in the History, Politics, and Cultures of Southern Kaduna Peoples Groups*, Jos, Ladsomas Press Ltd., 1997, pp. 130-49.

³⁶ See E.P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, p. 101. This assumption, however, is contested by Marxist historians of Northern Nigeria, particularly of the Zaria school, who argue that there were more prisons than schools in Northern Nigeria, because the priority of the colonial state was to exploit and repress rather than to educate. See Mahmud Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate and Neighbouring States. 1817-1914. A Reinterpretation of Colonial Sources," Ph.D. diss. in history, Ahmadu Bello University, 1979. I owe this reference to Dr. Abubcar Siddique Mohamed.

³⁷ See E.P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, p. 119.

³⁸ See Michael Crowder, *The Story of Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

thirds of the population of secondary schools consisted of Christians.³⁹ Also, not surprisingly, when the northern universities were created, from the 1960s onwards, (and in Ahmadu Bello University notably) the majority of the population of students, faculty, and administration were, by far, Christian.

The emergence of a Christian elite also modified the religious composition of the army. During World War II, the Nigerian colonial army needed qualified staff. Christians were favoured during the recruitment process, so much so that by the end of World War II, they constituted the majority of the army, which is a change from the prewar era. This came about partly because Christians were educated.⁴⁰ However, another reason is the colonial divide-and-rule policy, which aimed at creating an army dominated by Christians to balance the numerical superiority of Muslims in Northern Nigeria.⁴¹

With the rise of Christian elites, movements emerged that asserted the interests of Christian minority ethnic groups. These movements, as shall be discussed in chapter six, represented groups from the Middle Belt, and more particularly groups from that part of the Middle Belt known as Southern Zaria.⁴² Resentment against Hausa Fulani dominance in the north was strong among these groups for several reasons, including the fact that the Middle Belt had remained a reservoir for slave raiding for the Muslim emirates of Northern Nigeria throughout the nineteenth century. To escape slave raiding, these non-Muslim populations entrenched themselves in the hills of the Middle Belt. Only with the consolidation of colonial rule, were they completely subjugated.⁴³ Teachers, students, civil servants, policemen and soldiers from these groups have been in the forefront of the movement against what became known as “the oppression of Christians.”

During the postcolonial period, D.S. Gilliland argues, Christianity increased dramatically in the Middle Belt. First, because the “handing

³⁹ See E.P.T. Crampton, “Christianity in Northern Nigeria,” *op. cit.*, p. 110 *sq.*

⁴⁰ See Rubin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military. A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960–1967*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 181.

⁴¹ I am grateful to Dr. Abubacar Siddique Muhammad for drawing my attention to this aspect of colonial strategy.

⁴² For a detailed study of Southern Zaria and its ethnic groups, see Ibrahim James, *Studies in the History, Politics, and Cultures of Southern Kaduna Peoples Groups*, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

⁴³ See Ibrahim James, *Studies in the History, Politics, and Cultures of Southern Kaduna Peoples Groups*, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

over of mission institutions and administrations of Churches to nationals [...] brought a sense of ownership and freedom to the minority Christian groups"⁴⁴ but also, many inhabitants of the Middle Belt who had converted to Islam during the Bello conversion campaigns of the 1960s,⁴⁵ returned to Christianity.⁴⁶ Since then, according to Gilliland, there has been a clear pattern of conversion to Christianity from minority groups in Plateau, Benue, Gongola, and large parts of Kaduna state.⁴⁷

As colonial rule came to an end in Africa after World War II, nationalist movements struggled both for emancipation and to occupy positions of power. The struggle in Nigeria was far from united.

*Decolonisation and Political Fragmentation*⁴⁸

During the period of transition to independence, three main political parties emerged in Nigeria. Each of them very quickly identified with one of the three major regions: the western, the eastern and the northern, and thus to one of the three main ethnic groups: the Yoruba, the Igbo, and the Hausa Fulani.⁴⁹ The most powerful party of the western region was the Action Group led by Obafemi Awolowo. It was supported by many educated Yoruba and was in favour of a federal system in which the different units would enjoy a great deal of autonomy. The Action Group supported such a federal arrangement, according to McCaskie,⁵⁰ because the western region

⁴⁴ See Dean S. Gilliland, *African Religion Meets Islam. Religious Change in Northern Nigeria*, Lanham, New York, London, University Press of America, 1986, p. 171.

⁴⁵ On these campaigns, see John Naber Paden, *Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto*, Zaria, Hudahuda Publishing Company, 1986, pp. 566–569.

⁴⁶ Ibrahim Ado Kurawa has drawn my attention to the fact that D. Gilliland was a missionary who earned his Ph.D. in a seminary. Therefore, his statement that Christians who converted to Islam during the Bello campaigns of the 1960s, have been converting back to Christianity needs to be independently confirmed.

⁴⁷ See D.S. Gilliland, *African Religion Meets Islam . . . op. cit.*, p. 171.

⁴⁸ For this section on decolonisation and political fragmentation, I rely mostly on T.C. McCaskie, "Recent History [of Nigeria]," *Africa South of Sahara*, 1988, pp. 754–67, p. 754.

⁴⁹ Okwudiba Nnoli shows convincingly that it was the privileged classes that effectively dominated the so-called ethnic parties and benefited the most in this competition for the control of the national wealth. See Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*, Enugu, Fourth Dimensions Publishers, 1978, p. 176 sq.

⁵⁰ See T.C. McCaskie, "Recent History [of Nigeria]" *op. cit.*, p. 754 sq.

was the base of the cocoa industry, which was booming after the Second World War, and did not want its wealth to be used to subsidise less wealthy regions.

The dominant party of the eastern region was the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), founded by Herbert Macaulay in 1944. At his death in 1947, Nnamdi Azikiwe took over the leadership of the NCNC, which, by the end of the 1950s was dominated by the Igbo. The NCNC was in favour of a centralised system that would allocate resources to the regions according to their needs. This desire was influenced by the demographic structure of the eastern region, which was too densely populated to develop a successful agrarian economy. Its well-being depended heavily on remittances from Igbo (or eastern) communities scattered throughout the federation. The NCNC favoured a centralised system that would enable eastern communities to obtain land and jobs in other parts of the federation. This policy was somewhat reversed when oil fields were discovered in the east in the 1950s turning the poorest region into the richest. Subsequently, NCNC was less enthusiastic in its push for a centralised system.⁵¹

The dominant party in Northern Nigeria was the Northern People's Congress (NPC), whose leader was Ahmadu Bello. Like the other parties, it tended to be ethnic based, controlled by the Hausa-Fulani, and the Kanuri to a lesser extent, which are the majority ethnic groups of the far north of Nigeria. At the moment of the creation of a federal structure of three regions, the NPC took control of a region twice as large as the two other regions together, with a population amounting to half of the national population. This, as Guy Nicolas argues, was not a coincidence:

For the British in dividing the territory, wanted to set the new emancipation trends of the south against the north, whose mobilisation they favoured around the Hausa language, local Islam, and where, thanks to the upholding of traditions, they ensured the continuity and domination of the aristocracy throughout colonial rule.⁵²

In 1954, the British succeeded in forging a compromise between these conflicting parties through the creation of a federation of three

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² See Guy Nicolas, "Le Nord est destiné à jouer un rôle majeur" *Le Monde*, 18-19 December 1981, p. 1 (my translation).

regions (eastern, western and northern). The regions were granted a good deal of autonomy, while the federal government was given responsibility in matters such as “défence, the police force, national trade, custom duties, finance and banking.”⁵³ The Eastern region and the Western region were granted self-government in 1956 and the Northern region in 1959. That same year, federal elections were held, but none of the three dominant parties of the country had an absolute majority. The NPC, however, had a relative majority and formed an alliance with the NCNC. Abubacar Tafawa Balewa, a prominent member of the NPC, was the prime minister, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of the NCNC the governor general, replacing the British governor general. On October 3, 1960, Nigeria became an independent constitutional monarchy.⁵⁴ On October 3, 1963, three years later, it became a republic, with Dr. Azikiwe, as president and Sir Abubacar Tafawa Balewa as prime minister.

Excluded from federal office by the NPC/NCNC alliance, the Action Group experienced a serious crisis.⁵⁵ Its leader Awolowo attempted to dismiss Samuel Akintola, the West regional prime minister, and have one of his protégés appointed premier of the western region. A possible reading of this crisis⁵⁶ was that Awolowo was an Ijebu Yoruba whereas Akintola was an Ogbomosho Yoruba. The conflict split the Action Group into two groups, a pro-Awolowo faction and a pro-Akintola faction. The latter renamed itself the United People’s Party and allied with the NCNC, which took advantage of the crisis within the Action Group to encourage non-Yoruba ethnic minorities of the western region to claim a region of their own.⁵⁷ In 1962, a referendum was held and the region of the Midwest was carved out of the former western region, which turned Nigeria into a federation of four regions (northern, eastern, western, and midwestern). Throughout the federation, ethnic minorities claimed a state of their own. In the Middle Belt, where there had been claims for the cre-

⁵³ See T.C. McCaskie, “Recent History [of Nigeria]” *op. cit.*, p. 754 *sq.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ On the idea that ancestral cities are the primary political cleavage in Yorubaland, see David Laitin, “Hegemony and Religious Conflicts, British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland,” *op. cit.*, pp. 285–316; *Hegemony and Religious Culture. Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1986, *passim*.

⁵⁷ See See T.C. McCaskie, “Recent History [of Nigeria]” *op. cit.*, p. 754 *sq.*

ation of a Middle Belt state even before independence, irredentism reached its peak. Between September and October 1960, some 50 thousand members of the Tiv ethnic group attacked the native authorities and tax collectors, burned some 30,000 houses belonging to mostly Tiv members of the Northern People's Congress, and destroyed half a million pounds worth of property.⁵⁸ In 1964, a yearlong crisis broke out, which was put down by the Federal army.⁵⁹

In that same year, the ruling NPC/NCNC alliance split and two new alliances emerged. On the one hand, the NPC and the Nigerian National Democratic Party (the former pro-Akintola faction of the Action Group) formed an alliance called the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). The second alliance was composed of the NCNC, the pro-Awolowo faction of the Action Group (whose leaders were in prison), the Northern Elements Progressive Union led by Aminu Kano, and the United Middle Belt Congress led by Joseph Tarka. This was called the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).⁶⁰

In 1964, national elections were held. The UPGA boycotted them, and mass fraud took place. Officially, the NNA won the election. However, in the western region, both the pro-Akintola and pro-Awolowo factions claimed victory and attempted to form a government. The resulting confrontation led to the murder of 2,000 people. At the federal level, Abubacar Tafawa Balewa formed a government.

Later, in March 1965, an election was held in the eastern region and won by the UPGA. Thus the UPGA took control of the eastern region, but the federal government was already controlled by the Nigerian National Alliance. The exclusion of the NCNC from federal office was a source of great frustration in the eastern region. Moreover, the army was divided along the same lines as the nation. At the time, 50% of Nigerian officers trained in the Sandhurst Military Academy in Britain were Igbo.⁶¹ In January 1966, a group of predominantly Igbo and some Yoruba army officers carried out a coup

⁵⁸ See M.J. Dent, "A Minority Party. The UMBC" in John P. Mackintosh (ed.) *Nigerian Government and Politics. Prelude to the Revolution*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 461-507, p. 463.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Oyeleye Oyediran, "Background to Military Rule" in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.), *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule*, Lagos, The Macmillan Press, 1979, p. 17.

⁶¹ Rubin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military. A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-1967*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

d'état in Nigeria, which caused the death of the majority of the leaders of the NNA.⁶² Among the assassinated were Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sir Abubacar Tafawa Balewa, and Dr. Akintola. The plotters also murdered a number of highly placed army officers from the north, Christian and Muslims alike. Igbo high officers, however, were spared. Although the stated intention of the coup makers was to rescue the country from tribal politics, many have read the 1966 coup as the expression of Igbo frustration arising from their exclusion from federal office.⁶³ Following the coup, the federal cabinet informed the country that a dissident faction of the army had kidnapped the federal prime minister, but the majority of the military remained loyal to the federal government. The cabinet handed over power to the commander-in-chief of the army, Major General Aguiyi Ironsi.⁶⁴

Upon assuming the office of head of state, General Ironsi, an Igbo, arrested several of the juniors officers involved in the coup. However, he also suspended the federal government and parliament, the premierships of the regional governments, and the executive councils of the four regions. He appointed four military governors accountable to the federal government to rule the regions. He abolished the regions and replaced them with 24 provinces. The national military government was given the power to issue laws binding on the whole nation. The civil service was unified under the National Public Service Commission, and all of the pre-existing political parties and cultural and ethnic unions were banned. These measures of centralisation of power weakened the regions and worried many Nigerians particularly because most of General Ironsi's advisors were Igbo.⁶⁵ The politics of promotion within the military also blatantly favoured the Igbo. This led a number of officers from the north to organise a coup and assassinate General Ironsi and the military governor of the western region on July 29, 1966. In addition, Igbo soldiers were slaughtered en masse in barracks throughout the federation by fellow soldiers. Eastern communities—Igbo and other ethnic minorities of the eastern region also came under attack in Northern Nigeria.

Under these circumstances, the dominant faction of the army

⁶² See Rubin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military. A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960–1967*, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

⁶³ See T.C. McCaskie, "Recent History [of Nigeria]" *op. cit.*, p. 754 *sq.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

handed over power to Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, the chief of army staff. A member of a Northern ethnic minority and a Christian, Yakubu Gowon was in a better position to rule the country than a member of one of the dominant ethnic groups, at least during this period of highly politicised ethnic identities. Yakubu Gowon abolished all measures of centralisation to ease tension in the country. He also announced a plan to break up the federation into twelve states.⁶⁶

In the meantime, the insecurity that prevailed in the north led many easterners who remained there to return to their region. The majority of those who did not return were massacred by northern troops in September and October 1966.⁶⁷ In reaction to the massacres and federal plans to dismantle the regions, Lt. Colonel Odemeju Ojukwu, the military governor of the eastern region, expelled all noneasterners from his region.⁶⁸ On July 1, 1967, he proclaimed the Republic of Biafra. The rest of the federation denied recognition to the newly proclaimed republic, and a deadly civil war ensued, which was fed by the rivalries of the superpowers. In 1970, the civil war ended with the defeat of the secessionists and the unification of the country under Yakubu Gowon's presidency.⁶⁹ A new era started during which the country, in a relatively short period of time, would witness even greater social transformation in favour of urban centres and to the detriment of the rural areas. Instrumental in that transformation was the oil boom.

Oil boom and Urban Bias in Postcolonial Nigeria

At the moment of independence, agriculture provided the highest share of GDP and employed 80% of the labour force in Nigeria. It also provided the largest share of revenue to the state and export revenue to the nation.⁷⁰ With a 2% annual growth rate during the

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ For more details, see John Naber Paden, *Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto*, *op. cit.*, p. 678.

⁷⁰ See Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos and *First Report on Third National Plan* quoted in Dupe Olatunbosum, *Nigeria's Neglected Rural Majority*, Ibadan, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 93; Billy Dudley, *An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics*, Hong Kong, Macmillan Publishers, 1982, p. 24.

First Republic (1960–66), agricultural production kept up with population growth.⁷¹ However, its share in GDP declined from 62.3% in 1960–61, to 54.4% in 1966.⁷²

During the civil war, there was a slowdown in all sectors of the economy.⁷³ The oil sector, which had experienced an annual 38% growth between 1960 and 1966, declined to 8% during the war.⁷⁴ The Biafran secession paralysed production from 1967 to 1970. The annual growth of the industrial sector declined from 16% to 4% and that of the agricultural sector from 2% to 1%. Capital investments dropped from 550 million *nairas* in 1966 to 465 millions *nairas* in 1969, an annual decline of 3%.⁷⁵ As the war ended and the 1970s began, Nigeria reached a turning point in its economic history marked by the diffusion of oil wealth and the decline of agriculture and the rural world, both of which induced profound change in the country.

Indeed, the rise of the price of oil in international markets in the 1970s brought about considerable change in all major oil-producing countries. The income derived from oil by OPEC members was \$US 13.5 billion in 1972. In 1980, it jumped to \$US 274.91 billion. That same year, Nigeria had the third highest oil income of all the OPEC members with \$US 23.41 billion, behind Saudi Arabia (\$US 102.21 billion) and Iraq (\$US 26.1 billion). Thanks to oil wealth, the Nigerian economy experienced a strong recovery during the 1970s. Real GDP rose at a rate of 8% between 1970 and 1975. During the same period, investments experienced a real growth rate of 38%. This growth was due both to the expansion of the oil sector and huge projects by the state, whose resources multiplied dramatically as a result of the increasing price of oil.⁷⁶

Alongside these economic transformations, political developments were also leading to a stronger federal government. In July of 1975, General Murtala Muhammad, a native of Kano, overthrew the regime

⁷¹ See Federal Office of Statistics, *National Accounts of Nigeria 1960–1961 to 1975–1976* quoted in Akin Iyawemi, “The Military and the Economy,” in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.), *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule*, Lagos, The Macmillan Press, 1979.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ For a discussion of the Nigerian economy during the war, see Akin Iyawemi, “The Military and the Economy,” *op. cit.*, pp. 52–55.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ See Akin Iyawemi, “The Military and the economy,” *op. cit.*, p. 55.

of General Yakubu Gowon. General Murtala Muhammad, following in General Gowon's path, acted to break the nation into smaller states and move the federal capital to contain separatist inclinations. To that effect, the Justice Akinola Aguda Commission was set up to find an adequate site to host the federal capital. After conducting an inquiry throughout the country, the commission suggested Abuja, located in the Middle Belt of the country, and peopled by minority ethnic groups. The proposal was adopted, and Abuja is now the federal capital of Nigeria.

General Murtala Muhammad was assassinated in February of 1976. His successor, General Olesgun Obasanjo⁷⁷ implemented the project conceived by General Murtala Muhammad to further break up the Nigerian federation from the twelve-state federal structure created by former head of state Yakubu Gowon to a nineteen-state structure. General Obasanjo also continued the process of transferring the federal capital to Abuja. These changes further strengthened the federal government while weakening the states.

In addition, international economic developments of the 1970s contributed to strengthen the federal government. The oil boom made huge amounts of money available to the Nigerian state for two reasons. On the one hand, Nigeria was a major oil-exporting country, and its revenues increased dramatically as a result of the increase in the price of oil. On the other hand, Nigeria contracted loans from international financial markets desperate to place the oil-fed oceans of funds available in the mid-1970s. As a result, the Nigerian federal government launched a large-scale investment program. The federal budget grew from \$US 3 billion during the Second National Development Plan (1970–74) to \$US 45 billion during the Third National Development Plan (1975–80).

The various schemes for revenue allocation adopted in the 1970s all attributed the lion's share of the country's resources to the federal government. For instance, in 1976–1977, more than three-fourths of the revenues of the federation was allocated to the federal government and less than one-fourth to the states.⁷⁸ In 1979, a new revenue allocation formula was adopted by the Okigbo Commission.

⁷⁷ The first military head of state to hand over power to an elected civilian president, Obasanjo was elected president of the Nigerian Federation in 1998.

⁷⁸ See Daniel Bach and Mouftaou Laleye, "Vie politique et construction de l'état," in *Le Nigéria contemporain op. cit.*, p. 109.

The share of the federal government was reduced from the initial 75% to 55%, which was still quite significant given the rate of growth in revenues at this time. State revenues were increased from 24.5% in 1976–1977 to 30% in 1979. Of the remaining revenue, 8% was allocated to the local governments, which had been created since 1976 in the drive towards decentralisation.⁷⁹ Although this reallocation of government revenue increased the lot of the states somewhat, by the end of 1970s, it was clear that the states had surrendered much of their earlier autonomy. In contrast to the days of the First Republic, when there had been four large regions with their own sources of income, Nigeria consisted in 1976 of nineteen states heavily dependent on the allocation of federal revenue.

Another development with far reaching consequences in contemporary Nigerian politics was the huge increase in military spending. During the First Republic, military expenses amounted to 25 million *nairas*, and the army had 11,000 soldiers. By the end of the civil war (1970), there were 250,000 soldiers. Between 1970 and 1974, in the immediate postcivil war period, military spending increased fourfold. In 1975, the defence budget represented 7.6% of real GNP. The ratio was higher than that of many developed countries, including France and Canada, whose military budgets represented respectively 3.1% and 1.8% in 1971.⁸⁰ This level of military spending, which did not seem justified by any threat, internal or external, diverted crucial resources from economic and social development and strengthened the trend towards praetorianism. Since independence, Nigeria has been ruled by a civilian regime for only twelve years. The ruling military regimes have been characterised by a high degree of instability. Leaving aside the unsuccessful coups attempts, some of which the public may not be aware, there have been seven changes of military administration (two in 1966, one in 1976, one in 1983, one in 1985, one in 1993 and one in 1998).⁸¹

⁷⁹ See J.C. Nwafor, "Local government," in *Nigeria in Maps, op. cit.*, in K.M. Barbour et al. (eds.), *Nigeria in Maps*, London, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto, Hodder and Stoughton, 1982, pp. 40–41, p. 40. As discussed further, one of the immediate implications of this new development in Northern Nigeria and Kano, in particular, was the reduction of the institutional powers of former district heads (*hakimai*) and the empowerment of new groups, which further altered the social and political structures.

⁸⁰ See Akin Iwayemi, "The Military and the economy," *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁸¹ This trend towards praetorian rule is not specific to Nigeria. In Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton,

After the civil war, the gap between urban and rural areas widened noticeably, partly because a significant part of rural manpower was drafted into the army during the war, and also because huge sums were spent to fund the war effort and later rebuild the destroyed areas of the country. In addition, the Sahelian drought of 1968–1973 hit rural Nigeria very hard. In 1973, the most difficult year of the drought, the fall in agricultural production was estimated between 25% and 40%. More than 300,000 cattle died, thousands were prematurely slaughtered.⁸² Also, adding to the misfortunes of the Nigerian peasants, a large earnings gap between urban and rural dwellers and high inflation developed as a result of the distribution of oil revenue and investment policies, which discriminated against rural areas.

This is well illustrated by the Udoji Award. Responding to demands for salary increases at the beginning of the oil boom, the Udoji Award made substantial, retroactive salary increases in 1975. This doubled the money supply in one year and stimulated both food demand and inflation. To ensure an adequate urban supply and limit the demand on salary increases, the Gowon administration made incentives to importation⁸³ by reducing considerably the custom duties on cereals. As a result, American wheat and rice from Thailand were sold in Lagos two times cheaper than Nigerian wheat

Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 255 *sq.*, this author shows that a number of Arab countries had made huge military expenses in the 1950s and 1960s. These expenses could be arguably justified in part by the Arab-Israeli conflict. But Halpern argues that the army was an instrument of social mobility for the middle classes. Amos Perlmutter, *Political Roles and Military Rulers*, London, Frank Cass, 1981, p. 18, denies this middle-class connection. The army in Nigeria is not necessarily the instrument for the promotion of the middle class, but it tends to be a class in its own right, with its own interests, that are not always compatible with those of the larger population. In that respect, it is worth recalling an anecdote told me by a Nigerian colleague who went to a military academy as an external examiner. He asked one of the students why he had joined this military school, and the student answered because he wanted to become a minister!

Kukah and Falola, it must be noted, argue that the root of the instability lies in the fact that for minorities, the army remains the only means of access to supreme political power, because, unlike Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo, they cannot mobilise ethnic constituencies. See Matthew Hassan Kukah and Toyin Falola, *Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion. Islam and Politics in Nigeria*, Avebury, Brookfield, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney, 1996, pp. 226–28.

⁸² See Tayo Lambo, *Nigerian Economy. A Textbook of Applied Economy*, Ibadan, Ivan Brothers, 1987, pp. 32–33.

⁸³ See Johnny Egg, “La nouvelle insertion de l’agriculture nigérienne dans le marché mondial,” in Daniel Bach (ed.), *Le Nigéria un pouvoir en puissance*, Paris, Karthala, 1989, pp. 169–92, pp. 185–86.

and rice.⁸⁴ Importation of food items increased considerably. Cereals importation reached 2.4 million of tons in 1981, making Nigeria the largest cereal-importing country of sub-Saharan Africa.⁸⁵ This policy of easy importation, according to Egg: “favoured the split between urban markets supplied from external sources and rural markets whose prices were higher than that of the cities. Rising agro-industries turned away from domestic production.”⁸⁶

Another sign of the neglect of rural areas was heavy infrastructure investment. The construction of roads, airports, schools, and universities focused on cities. The purchasing power of many urban dwellers increased, whereas opportunities to make a decent living decreased for the rural poor. All the requirements of a massive urban drift were fulfilled.⁸⁷ The annual rate of growth of the Nigerian population was assessed at 2% in the 1960s. Thanks to a decrease in the mortality rate due to improving health conditions, the growth rate of the population was between 2.5% and 3.1% during the 1970s. However, during the same period, there were large differences in growth rates for rural and urban populations. Between 1970 and 1975, the rural population of Nigeria grew 1.6%, whereas the urban population grew 7.8% (more than twice the growth rate of the total population). In some regions, like Kano, the urban growth rate was higher.⁸⁸

Although agriculture had been, from the colonial period, the driving force of growth, its share of GNP dropped from 53.1% in 1968 to 20% in 1980 and its share of export revenues from 62% to 2.6%. Even if the agriculture sector still provided jobs for the majority of the population, the percentage of labour power involved in agriculture dropped from 80% in the 1960s to 54% in the 1980s.

The state’s reaction to the decline in agricultural production begins with the Second National Plan (1970–1974). The agricultural poli-

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* (my translation from French).

⁸⁷ However, this is not to suggest that there was no urban drift before the oil boom. There was indeed, in Nigeria, as well as in other countries of the Gulf of Guinea, an urban drift since the 1950s with the expansion of the manufacturing sector. See Philippe Hugon, “Les stratégies comparées des pays africains du Golfe de Guinée à l’épreuve du contre-choc pétrolier,” *Revue Tiers Monde*, 30, (120), Oct-Dec. 1989, pp. 755–78, p. 754. However, this was negligible in scale, compared to the one induced in the 1970s by the oil boom.

⁸⁸ Paul Lubeck, *Islam and Urban Labor in Northern Nigeria*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 47.

cies of this plan focused on increasing food production through the use of farm loans, fertilizers and irrigation. Within this framework the River Basin Projects and Agricultural Development Projects were conceived. In addition, the margin of profit taken from agricultural producers by the marketing boards, which acted as a wholesaler for cash crops, was reduced.

Beginning with the Third National Development Plan (1975–1980), with the devastating effects of drought and increasing food importation adding to the problem, the Nigerian state devoted 7% of planned expenses to agricultural projects.⁸⁹ This was an expense fourteen times greater than that allocated to agriculture in the Second National Development Plan.⁹⁰ The Third Plan included three river basin irrigation projects: the South Lake Irrigation Project located in Borno State, the Kano River Project in Kano State, and the Sokoto Rima Basin Project in Sokoto State.⁹¹ In addition, it was during this plan that the marketing boards were replaced by seven national commodity boards. These boards were themselves abolished in October 1986, as part of the state's policy of deregulation.

During the implementation of the Third Plan (1975–80), one billion *nairas* were allocated to these three projects, whose objectives were to develop large-scale mechanised agriculture. Funded by the federal government, these projects entailed heavy investment in capital to enable cultivation during the dry season. However, these projects did not relieve the rural poor, many of whom had their farmlands expropriated without being compensated or relocated. A case in point is Bakalori, which is in the region of the Sokoto Rima Basin Development Project, where, in 1980, one-third of expropriated peasants were not relocated.⁹²

The agricultural development projects funded either by the federal government or by the states with sponsorship of the World Bank represented another pattern of state intervention in the agricultural sector. Although the rationale for these projects was to meet the needs of the small farmers, strong evidence suggests that they benefited

⁸⁹ Johny Egg, "La nouvelle insertion de l'agriculture nigérienne dans le marché mondial"; *op. cit.*, p. 171.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ These states no longer cover these surfaces of the 1970s because subsequent geopolitical reconfigurations entailed carving out new states in their surface.

⁹² See Tina Wallace, "Agricultural Projects and Land in Northern Nigeria," *Review of African Political Economy*, (17), 1980, pp. 59–70, p. 61.

more the so-called “new breed” farmers who had better access to credit and benefited from generous tax incentives.⁹³

Yet another agricultural development project implemented to relieve the rural poor was “Operation Feed the Nation.” Its stated objective was to promote food self-sufficiency through the mobilisation of manpower and the use of fertilisers, seeds, and pesticides. Operation Feed the Nation, however, became a method for the Obasanjo administration to appease the urban population, including students, who were protesting against government austerity measures, more than a benefit for the rural population or the nation’s food supply.⁹⁴

In the summer of 1976, students were recruited to supervise peasants under Operation Feed the Nation. In the first year of the project, two-thirds of the budget served to pay the wages of students, while the yield of their contribution was meaningless.⁹⁵ According to Forrest, for most of them, participation in Feed the Nation amounted to paid holidays.⁹⁶ In Kano specifically, Feed the Nation benefited the “oligarchy” that has controlled the economy since independence.⁹⁷ This oligarchy invested in large agricultural farms, or strengthened their agricultural activities in order to have access to available credits. The conclusion to be drawn from state intervention to improve Nigerian agriculture is that it favoured wealthier farmers with strong political connections and urban people in general, while worsening the conditions of the rural poor.⁹⁸

⁹³ See Abdul Raufu Mustapha, “Structural Adjustment and Agrarian Change in Nigeria,” in Adebayo O. Olukoshi (ed.), *The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*, London, Ibadan, Heinemann, James Currey, Heinemann Educational Books Nigeria, Heinemann, 1993, pp. 112–28, p. 113.

⁹⁴ See Ibrahim Lawal Bashir, “The politics of industrialisation in Kano 1950–1980,” Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1983, p. 171; Abdul Raufu Mustapha, “Structural Adjustment and Agrarian Change in Nigeria,” *op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁹⁵ See Tom Forrest, “Agricultural Policies in Nigeria 1900–1978,” *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ See “The politics of industrialisation in Kano”, *op. cit.*, In this study of the industrialisation of Kano, I.L. Bashir discusses, among other things, the rise of an oligarchy that had enriched itself within the framework of the colonial economy by purchasing cash crops at a price lower than that of the foreign firms and later the marketing boards. They also made significant profits in reselling finished products in rural markets. During the 1950s, they had accumulated enough to diversify their investments. During the postcolonial period, this oligarchy, Bashir argues, dominated completely the economy of Kano. Dan Asabe provides also a biography of most of the members of that oligarchy. See Umar Abdulkarim Dan Asabe, “Comparative Biographies of Selected Leaders of the Kano Commercial Establishment,” M.A. diss. in history, Bayero University Kano, 1987.

⁹⁸ Many scholars, although not all, agree that the efforts of the government largely


The neglect of rural areas by governments is not a phenomenon specific to Nigeria or even Africa. It has been a feature of many third-world nations. The concept of urban bias first appeared in the seminal work of Michael Lipton,⁹⁹ which has profoundly influenced a whole generation of African scholars and scholars of African political economy.¹⁰⁰ In the third world, the most powerful groups, according to Lipton, are found in big cities and more precisely in the capitals. They tend to be educated, well organised, and their leaders are close to the corridors of power. Therefore, they are in a good position to influence decision makers to adopt and implement economic policies that favour them. If they do not succeed peacefully in influencing governments, they use more coercive means such as strikes and demonstrations. Unlike these urban dwellers, peasants and particularly poor peasants, who are poorly educated and scattered over a very wide space with little sense of organisation have less means of influencing the state with the result that economic policies have been, in general, detrimental to their interests during the postcolonial period.

I have discussed in this chapter some agents and aspects of social change in colonial and postcolonial Nigeria, notably the abolition of slavery, the growth of the two main world religions, Islam and Christianity, the construction of Nigerian postcolonial State, and the oil boom and the neglect of rural areas. I have argued that they are part of the process of the formation of modernity in Nigeria. Social change operated at the national level, as well as at the level of Northern Nigeria. The focus of the next chapter will be change in colonial and postcolonial Northern Nigeria, and more specifically Kano.

compounded the situation. See, for instance, Abdul Raufu Mustapha, "Structural Adjustment and Agrarian Change in Nigeria", *op. cit.*

⁹⁹ See Michael Lipton, *Why Poor People Remain Poor. Urban Bias in World Development*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976. For a summary of the argument of Lipton's book, see Michael Lofchie, "The New Political Economy of Africa," in David Apter; Carl Rosberg, *Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 145-83, p. 154.

¹⁰⁰ See for instance, Robert Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa. The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981; World Bank, *Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa. An Agenda for Action*, Washington, World Bank, 1981 (known as the Berg Report). As far as Northern Nigeria in general and Kano in particular are concerned, a remarkable study of urban bias is Ibrahim Lawal Bashir, "The politics of industrialisation in Kano, industries," *op. cit.*



Map 2. Kano state showing the local government areas (2002)

CHAPTER TWO

KANO IN THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT

The discussion of the precolonial political, social and educational structures of Kano¹ and their gradual change will be the focus of this chapter. Although these structures underwent radical transformation, as will be evident throughout this study, they remain meaningful to the understanding of the politics of postcolonial Northern Nigeria. As far as political structures are concerned, a good illustration of this is provided by the sociological study of leadership in postcolonial Kano by Omar Farouq Ibrahim,² who demonstrates how instrumental traditional ruling families are in the recruitment of political leadership. According to his study, 94.7% of those who occupied key positions in key institutions during the First Republic, whether local or federal, were children of traditional ruling families, notably members of the family or clients of the emir, his advisors, district heads, judges, the *ulama* and slaves of the court, village heads, ward heads, and other holders of traditional titles of nobility.³ I will first discuss the transformation of emirate political and social structures

¹ A number of important studies have been accomplished on the history of precolonial and colonial Kano. The most comprehensive and recently published is Michael Garfield Smith, *Government in Kano 1350-1950*, Boulder, Westview, 1997. Others include Ibrahim Halil Said, "Revolution and Reaction, The Fulani Jihad in Kano and its Aftermath, 1807-1919," Ph.D. diss. in history, University of Michigan, 1978; Abdulahi Mahadi, "The State and the Economy, the Sarauta System and its Role in Shaping the Society and Economy in Kano with Particular Reference to the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century," Ph.D. diss. in history, Ahmadu Bello University, 1982; Bawuro Barkindo (ed.), *Kano and Some of Her Neighbors*, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1989; Bawuro Barkindo (ed.), *Studies in the History of Kano*, Ibadan, Heinemann Educational Books, 1983; Sule Bello, "State and Economy in Kano, 1894-1960, A Study of Colonial Domination," Ph.D. diss. in history, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1982; Mansur I. Mukhtar, "The Impact of British Colonial Domination on the Social and Economic Structure of the Society of Kano 1903-1950," M.A. diss., history department, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, 1983.

² See Omar Farouq Ibrahim, "The Fabric of Rule, A Study of Traditional Ruling Families in the Politics of Kano State, Nigeria, 1960-1980," Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Brunswick, NJ, (U.M.I. Dissertation Service), 1988, *passim*.

³ *Ibid.*

during colonial rule. Next, I will address the change in the Islamic educational system, and then conclude with the discussion of how change is perceived at the local level.

The Transformation of Emirate Political and Social Structures

Before the *jihad* waged by Usman Dan Fodio and his community in the early nineteenth century in Hausaland, the kingdom of Kano, known in Hausa as Kasar Kano, was one of the most powerful Hausa states.⁴ Other Hausa states include Zazau,⁵ Daura,⁶ Katsina.⁷ After the *jihad* led by Usman Dan Fodio, Kano became one of the thirteen emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. It was ruled by an emir (Sarkin Kano in Hausa), chosen from the clan of the Sullubawa,⁸ one of the main Fulani clans that took part in the nineteenth-century *jihad*. Other main Fulani clans include Yolawa, the largest and most influential, Mundubawa, Jobawa and Dambazawa.⁹ In Kano, as in any other emirate, the appointment of new emirs was the responsibility of emir-making councils, but they had to be confirmed by the Sultan of Sokoto¹⁰ (Arabic, *amir al-muminin*—Hausa, *sarkin musulmi*). The emir, however, enjoyed a great degree of autonomy in managing his emirate. He was advised by a council (*Taron Kano*)¹¹

⁴ See "Introduction," in Bawuro Barkindo (ed.), *Kano and Some of Her Neighbours*, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1989, pp. ix–xv, p. ix.

⁵ See Michael Garfield Smith, *Government in Zazzau*, London, Oxford University Press, 1960.

⁶ See Michael Garfield Smith, *The Affairs of Daura, History and Change in a Hausa State 1800–1958*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1978.

⁷ Yusufu Bala Usman, *The Transformation of Katsina*, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1981.

⁸ For the discussion of the transformations of political structures at the level of Kano, I rely mostly on Mansur I. Mukhtar, "The Impact of British Colonial Domination on the Social and Economic Structure of the Society of Kano 1903–1950," *op. cit.*

⁹ See John Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

¹⁰ See Abdullahi Mahadi, "From the Hausa Kingdoms to the Sokoto Caliphate," in J. Isawa Elaigwa and Erim O. Erim (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism: Pre-colonial Antecedents*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 216–40, p. 230.

¹¹ As a state institution, this council whose name, according to M.G. Smith, is *Tara ta Kano*, was established during the reign of Muhammad Rumfa (1463–99). Founder of the dynasty of Rumfawa, M. Rumfa, who created a number of administrative offices, made a decisive contribution to the political and administrative development of precolonial Kano. See Michael Garfield Smith, *Government in Kano*, *op. cit.*, p. 132 sq.

of nine members chosen from the main Fulani clans. According to M. Mukhtar, *Taron Kano* was not a law-making body but rather an advisory council. The real power rested in the administration of the emir's palace. This administration was controlled by three persons, who, although of slave status, were nevertheless key elements in the emiral political system. They were the *dan rimi*, *shamaki* and *sallama*.¹² The *dan rimi* was the guardian of the emiral arsenal, the *shamaki* was responsible for the slaves and horses of the palace, and the *sallama* was a sort of "chief of protocol" in the sense that he determined the emir's agenda. Because relatives had fomented plots against the emir at some point after the nineteenth-century *jihad*, M. Mukhtar argues, Kano emirs no longer trusted their relatives. Thus, they vested much of the responsibilities of the administration of the palace to loyal slaves.¹³

The nobility was in charge of the administration of other parts of the Emirate of Kano and also enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy in the management of their areas of jurisdiction.¹⁴ In the early twentieth century, the largest geographical unit within the emirate was the *gunduma* (pl. *gundumomi*). At the head of each *gunduma*, which was a second tier of government, there was a *hakimi* (district head).¹⁵ In general, *gundumomi* were subdivided into *garuruwa* (small towns), *kawyuka* (sing. *kawya*: villages) and *tsangayoyi* (sing. *tsangaya*: hamlets). At the head of each of these territorial units, which represented a third tier of government, the *hakimi* appointed a chief (*dagaci*, pl. *dagatai*). These holders of traditional nobility titles formed the class of *sarakuna* (rulers), and the rest of the population formed the class of *talakawa* (commoners).¹⁶

After declaring Northern Nigeria a British protectorate in 1903, Lord Frederick Lugard, appointed Abbas emir of Kano in replacement of Aliyu. The implication of this decision was that the sultan of Sokoto was no longer involved in the process of appointment of

¹² On the privileged position of these slaves in Kano politics, see Michael Garfield Smith, *Government in Kano 1350–1950*, *op. cit.*, p. 48; 328.

¹³ See Mansur Mukhtar, "The Impact of British Colonial Domination on the Social and Economic Structure of the Society of Kano 1903–1950," *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁴ See Abdullahi Mahadi, "From the Hausa Kingdoms to the Sokoto Caliphate," *op. cit.*, pp. 226–27.

¹⁵ See Mansur Mukhtar, "The Impact of British Colonial Domination on the Social and Economic Structure of the Society of Kano 1903–1950," *op. cit.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

emirs. In addition, the colonial state reduced considerably the powers and privileges of the sultan of Sokoto, who henceforth, had power only in Birnin Sokoto (Sokoto metropolis) and its vicinity. The colonial administration also forbade the emirs from creating armies and dissolved their personal guard.¹⁷

Mansur Mukhtar also explains that after dismantling the power of the emir in Kano, the colonial state reformed the territorial administration. In 1909, the walled city of Kano was divided into wards and subwards headed by ward-heads (*mai ungwa*, pl. *masu ungwanni*).¹⁸ From 1925, the *masu ungwanni* were accountable to the Galadima, who was in charge of city affairs. The Galadima headed thirteen departments created by the colonial administration—prison, health, police, construction, markets, wards, *Sabon gari*, education, medicine, veterinary medicine, study, printing, water and electricity and roads.¹⁹

Mukhtar shows also that territorial administration reform was not limited to *Birnin Kano* only. In 1917, *gundumomi* were dismantled and replaced by 24 districts headed by district heads (*hakimai*) paid for and supervised by the colonial administration. The colonial administration replaced the assembly (*Taron Kano*) with an emirate council, whose members were the *waziri*, the *madaki*, the *galadima* and the *maaji*. Unlike *Taron Kano*, which was only a consultative body, the emirate council held judicial and executive powers.²⁰ The *waziri* supervised legal matters, the *madaki* was in charge of district affairs, the *galadima* was responsible for the city of Kano, and the *maaji* for the treasury of the native authorities.²¹ These different measures resulted in restricting the powers of emirs and put an end to the powers of the slaves in Kano politics.²²

Under the last Hausa ruler, Mohamman Alwali II (1781–1807), the population of the state of Kano, according to M.G. Smith, would exceed 400,000 souls, and the number of residents in the walled city would be 30,000 people during the rainy season, and some 40,000

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ See Mansur Mukhtar, "The Impact of British Colonial Domination on the Social and Economic Structure of the Society of Kano 1903–1950, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

²² *Ibid.*

during the dry season (November to May).²³ According to estimates by Mansur Mukhtar, based on colonial archives, some three to four million people lived in the Emirate of Kano on the eve of the colonial conquest of Northern Nigeria. Of these, sixty to ninety thousand people lived within the walled city of Kano (*Birnin Kano*). The majority of the inhabitants of the emirate lived in towns, villages, and hamlets. Each household, according to M. Mukhtar, had a head (*mai gida*), members (*yan gida*), servants (*barori*) and slaves (*baye*).

The land of Kano was very rich and permitted the cultivation of a variety of crops, including cereals, fruits, and vegetables.²⁴ Agriculture was a very important activity in the economy of the Emirate of Kano. Each family had its field (*gandu*) that belonged to the whole family and was cultivated by all members of the family.²⁵ However, individual male members of each family could own a piece of land of their own, which they could cultivate at the end of afternoons and on Thursdays and Fridays. There also were other activities, such as various crafts, trade and the breeding of stock. The craft production of Kano had long been the most prosperous of the central Sudan. Built by Sarki Muhammad Rumfa in the fifteenth century, the Kurmi market to be found within the city walls was located on one of the main axes of the transsaharan trade.

The abolition of slavery in 1902 by Frederick Lugard²⁶ affected the economy and society of the Emirate of Kano. It diminished considerably the economic power of the *sarakuna* (aristocrats) as well as radically altered the social structure of Kano. Given the fact that one-third of the population of the Emirate of Kano were said to be slaves in 1897,²⁷ just a few years before the colonial conquest, the abolition of slavery had no doubt a profound impact in Kano society during the colonial period. Many descendants of slaves would gradually achieve social mobility.

The expansion of the colonial economy favoured the emergence of new social classes. During the 1960s, argues John Paden, most social classes could be reduced to five categories: the *sarakuna*, the wealthy merchants; (*tajirai* or *masu arziki*), whose annual income

²³ See Michael Garfield Smith, *Government in Kano 1350–1950*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

²⁴ See Mansur Mukhtar, “*The Impact of British Colonial . . .*,” *op. cit.*, p. 85.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ See chapter one, above.

²⁷ See Michael Garfield Smith, *Government in Kano*, *op. cit.*, p. 453.

exceeded £ 10,000; the educated senior service personnel whose annual income exceeded £ 720; middle-class traders (*yan kasuwa*) with between £ 1,000 and £ 10,000; and commoners whose annual income was less than £ 500. This last category included farmers (*manoma*), petty traders (*yan tebur*), craft workers (*masu aiki da hannu*), blacksmiths (*makera*), factory workers (*masu aiki a gidajen sana'a*), construction workers (*magina*), labourers (*laburori*), and beggars (*musakai*).²⁸

The rise of wealthy merchants was one of the most remarkable consequences of the expansion of the colonial economy, and in turn impacted the political sociology of power in Northern Nigeria. Ibrahim Tahir demonstrates how wealthy merchants acquired their economic power during the first half of the twentieth century, which opened avenues of political power in the 1950s. As Northern Nigeria was granted self-government by Britain and a regional government as well as a Northern assembly were created, new durable structures of authority were emerging, which, in due course, relegated native authorities to the background. The wealthy merchants of Kano, who contributed significantly to the funding of the Northern People's Congress, were pre-eminent in the newly created Northern assembly and instrumental in political change in Kano. Through a process that Ibrahim Tahir compares to a "pattern of bourgeois revolution in an Islamic society," these merchants succeeded in having Emir Sanusi (d. 1991) deposed and replaced by Muhammad Inuwa in 1963. He died the same year and was replaced by Ado Bayero, who is still the emir of Kano.

Another aspect of change in postcolonial Northern Nigeria was the radical reform to which the native authorities were subjected, and which led to the confiscation of much of their institutional powers. Among the measures taken to confiscate the judicial power of native authorities, one of the most significant was the abolition of the emirate courts throughout the northern region in 1967 by the military governor of Northern Nigeria, Hasan Usman Katsina. The process of confiscation of the power of native authorities was pursued after the break-up of the former federal structures based on the regions and the creation of states. Indeed, with the creation of Kano State in 1967, executive power was transferred from the native authorities to Audo Bako—the military governor of the newly created Kano

²⁸ See John Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano, op. cit.*, pp. 25–26.

State. Within the military government, a commissioner was entrusted with the effective administration of judicial affairs. The former *alkali* courts were transformed into area courts, and the emir's court was abolished.²⁹

At the lower level of territorial administration, the power of native authorities was also reduced after the First Republic, as evidenced by the creation of local governments. Headed by a chairman, local governments had elected members, a budget of their own, as well as large legal competence in the administration of the local government. Although the emir of Kano still appoints *hakimai* (district heads), these are paid by and dependent on local government councils. However, in spite of all these measures of confiscation of the power of native authorities, including judicial powers, it must be recalled that the emir and the authorities appointed by him (*hakimai, dagatai, masu ungwanni*) are still informally invited to settle disputes arising within the community, including between rival religious groups.

Educational change

As in many other parts of the Muslim world, Northern Nigeria had witnessed the growth of literacy in Arabic language during the process of Islamic expansion. The first region in Nigeria to be exposed to Arabic and Islamic influence was the northeastern part known as Kanem Borno.³⁰ Islam was introduced in Kanem Borno following the conversion of Mai Humai Julme in the 11th century.³¹ By the 16th century, Islam had become an important factor in the intellectual and political development in Kanem Borno. Arabic was the vehicle of administration and learning.³² From that period, scholarly communities flourished in Kanem Borno, which had established ties with North Africa. As a result, a two-tier system of Islamic education emerged. As Mervyn Hiskett argues,³³ this system, which was particularly developed in Mamluk Egypt, also existed elsewhere in

²⁹ See Paden, *Religion and Political Culture*, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

³⁰ See chapter one.

³¹ See Salah M. Hasan, *Art and Islamic Literacy among the Hausa of Northern Nigeria*, Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter, 1992, p. 22.

³² Salah M. Hasan, *Art and Islamic Literacy among the Hausa of Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

³³ See Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 16–17.

the Islamic world and must have influenced the growth of a similar system in the west and central Sudan, and Northern Nigeria in particular.

In Northern Nigeria, the system is organised as follows. At the lower level, there are primary schools dedicated to teaching the memorisation of the Koran and writing in the Arabic script. Called *kuttab* pl. *katatib* in Arabic, these schools are referred to locally as *makaranta allo*. They can be either urban/sedentary (*makaranta*) or rural/nomad (*tsangaya*, from the Hausa word for hamlet). The *tsangaya* offers exclusively courses on memorising the Koran and writing in Arabic script. It is headed by an *alarama* (pl. *alaramomi*), a Muslim cleric who has memorised the Koran and is able to rewrite it entirely. The *alarama* also knows the number of occurrences of rare words in the Koran. However, he need not know the meanings of the Koran, nor other Islamic subject matters.

Several age groups can be distinguished among students of *tsangayoyi*. The youngest whose ages range between 5 and 7 years are called *kolo* (pl. *kulawa*). They learn how to pronounce the Arabic alphabet and how to read. The second age group is *titibiri* or *koso* who range between 8 and 14 years. Usually, they learn most of the Koran at this stage. Finally, there are *gardi* (pl. *gardawa*). Aged 25 or above, a *gardi* may become an independent student to whom an *alarama* would surrender a small number of pupils to teach on his behalf. The *gardi* might move to another area where he might be treated like an *alarama*. However, given that he has not yet fully mastered the Koran, he would pledge his allegiance to another *alarama*, although the larger population would consider and call him *alarama*. During the dry season, *gardawa* become *yan ci rani*, i.e., seasonal migrants in urban areas where they can make a living.

At the higher level, there are *makaranta ilmi*, which are the equivalent of the *madaris* in the Middle East. The *makarantan ilmi* tend to be based in urban areas. They offer courses in different Islamic subjects for students who have already memorised all or part of the Koran. In Kano, among the clientele of the *makarantan ilmi*, are adults who attend courses during their leisure hours to improve their knowledge of religion, which in itself is highly valued in Hausaland. Indeed, the ambition of many people is to accumulate wealth and knowledge at the same time.

Larger cities in Northern Nigeria tended to specialise in one specific field of Islamic knowledge. Borno specialised in teaching the

memorisation of the Koran, Zaria and Katsina in Arabic grammar, Sokoto in the study of *tasawwuf* (Islamic mysticism), and Kano in the study of Islamic jurisprudence, according to the Maliki School of Law.³⁴

After the colonial conquest, the colonial state attempted to modernise the system to train clerks for the administration of the native authorities. However, these attempts were somewhat limited until the Second World War. The economic expansion of the postworld war period, as well as the commitment of the colonial state to develop the colonies required an expansion of the colonial bureaucracy. In 1945, only 75 permanent local senior civil servants worked in the Nigerian administration, whereas the number of expatriates was around 1,300.³⁵ By 1948, 3,786 senior civil servants were needed, nearly one-third of whom (1,245) were yet to be recruited, and only 225 posts were filled by Africans.³⁶ Since the nationalists made a strong case against the recruitment of more expatriates, the colonial state set up a commission headed by Sir Hugh Foot, Chief Secretary of the government to find the means to promote Nigerians in the civil service.³⁷ The commission suggested that senior civil posts be filled by qualified Nigerian candidates.³⁸ It further recommended the awarding of scholarships and provision of courses to train Nigerians, who would fill as many positions as possible.³⁹ Those who were fighting for positions and promotions in the colonial administration, argues Nnoli, started mobilising ethnic loyalties, and consequently, the civil service began to be regionalized before the implementation of the constitutional conference of 1954.⁴⁰

During this period of intense ethnic and regional competition, Nigerians from the south were better qualified to fill these positions than their countrymen of the north, because there were many more formal schools in the south than in the north. To give an idea of the gap between the north and the south,⁴¹ as far as access to for-

³⁴ See Alhaji Bala Suleiman, "The Role of Shahuci and School for Arabic Studies in the Development of Legal Education in Nigeria to 1967," Bayero University Kano, History Department, master's thesis, 1990, pp. 150–52.

³⁵ See Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, op. cit.*, p. 187.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁴¹ All figures mentioned in this paragraph are provided by Mark Bray, *Universal Primary Education in Nigeria*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 17.

mal education was concerned, we may note that in 1906, there was one primary school in Northern Nigeria compared to 126 in the south. Two decades later in 1926, there were 125 primary schools in the north compared to 3,828 in the south and 5,210 pupils compared to 138,249 in the south. At that period, there was no secondary school in the whole of Northern Nigeria, whereas there were eighteen such schools in the south, enrolling 518 pupils. At the moment that talks of Nigerianisation began, there were 1,110 primary schools enrolling 70,962 pupils in Northern Nigeria and there were 4,984 primary schools (five times as many) enrolling 538,391 pupils (seven times as many) in the south. There were three secondary schools enrolling 251 students in the north compared to 43 schools and 9,657 pupils in the south.

The fact that their southern counterparts were better educated than they were was a matter of serious concern for Northern Nigerians. They preferred recruiting expatriates, whose presence was considered temporary, for civil service positions, rather than their southern counterparts, whom they feared would settle in permanently.⁴² The northern regional government proclaimed the “northernisation” of the civil service—it ruled that any position in the civil service that a northerner could fill, would not be given to a nonnortherner, and that no southerner would be appointed to any position in the civil service without prior consultation of the regional executive committee. When the northernisation policy was proclaimed in 1954, there was no northerner in the high civil service. Five years later in October 1959, only one senior civil servant from the south was working in the northern civil service. Between 1954 and 1958, some 2,148 southerners were removed from office in the north.⁴³ The other regions, as Nnoli notes, did not need to adopt any policy to promote their natives. They achieved, de facto, easternisation and westernisation, because they had enough qualified natives to fill vacant positions.⁴⁴

At the end of colonial rule, it became crucial to train larger numbers of qualified northerners and to expand upon the small number of formal secondary schools in Northern Nigeria. During that period, one such school was the School for Arabic Studies of Kano (SAS).

⁴² See Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*

⁴³ For a more detailed discussion of this question, see Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnic politics in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, pp. 191–92.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

Founded by Emir Abdullahi Bayero in 1934 as Northern Province Law School, the School for Arabic Studies was run by the Native Authorities. With the postwar expansion of the colonial economy, the school was placed under the control of the colonial administration, which diversified its offerings by opening new areas of study, such as a teacher training program and a higher Islamic studies program to train teachers of Arabic.⁴⁵ By the end of colonial rule, the school had become well-known because it had trained a number of Muslim elites who occupied key positions in the northern civil service, as well as many prominent Muslim intellectuals, such as Shaykh Abubacar Gumi.⁴⁶

In 1976, ten years after the collapse of the First Republic, the government of General Yakubu Gowon launched the Universal Primary Education Programme, which was the most ambitious education programme that any African country had ever conceived. In 1974, 5 million pupils were enrolled in primary schools throughout the Nigerian Federation, in 1977, the number of primary school enrolments was 9.5 million. In other words, the population of primary-school pupils in Nigeria was larger than the total population of any other single West African country.⁴⁷ This was a major agent for change in Nigerian society, as was the modernisation of Islamic education.

During the nationalist agitation of the post-World War II period, a number of educated Muslims were attempting to modernise the Islamic education system in Northern Nigeria. The populist Malam Aminu Kano (d. 1984), who had been successively the leader of the Northern Element Progressive Union (during the first Republic) and the People Redemption Party (during the Second Republic) spearheaded such attempts. He argued that using modern teaching methods would not only speed the process of memorisation of the Koran, but also enable the teaching of Arabic to young Koranic pupils. He opened a formal Islamic school, henceforth called *Islamiyya* school in

⁴⁵ See Alhaji Bala Suleiman, "The Role of Shahuci and School for Arabic Studies in the Development," *op. cit.*

⁴⁶ See the biography of Shaykh Gumi below.

⁴⁷ Mark Bray, *Universal Primary Education in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, 1981, p. 1. That official figures of enrolments had been exaggerated on purpose by the individual states of the Federation to have more federal funds must not be ruled out. However, all observers would agree that formal education was indeed available to northerners from all social background from the late 1970s.

1950, which enrolled 30 pupils in the first year. Compared to traditional Koranic schools, his method proved very efficient,⁴⁸ so that a number of similar schools were created throughout Northern Nigeria. Since Aminu Kano's Northern Element Progressive Union was an anti-establishment party, which openly criticised the despotism of the native authorities, the success of this new brand of schools worried the political establishment. Consequently, the native authorities hired thugs to destroy these schools during the elections of 1951.⁴⁹

The desire to modernise *Koranic* education, however, did not die with the disappearance of first generation of *Islamiyya* schools. In the early 1960s, Ahmadu Bello, the premier of Northern Nigeria, undertook to modernise Islamic education and set up a commission to that effect. After visiting a number of Arabic countries to learn more about the organisation of teaching, the commission made a number of recommendations, including the creation of different classes for pupils and the introduction of secular subject matters alongside pure Islamic education.⁵⁰ From that period, the government started sponsoring the traditional educational system. The traditional *Koranic* and Islamic schools that so requested, were provided teachers who could teach nonreligious subjects. In addition, traditional schools were also provided subsidies to expand their premises. The study of Hausa language in the Latin script, English, and arithmetic was encouraged in the new schools named *madrassa islamiyya nizamiyya* (organized Islamic schools), as opposed to *madrassa islamiyya ahliyya* (indigenous Islamic schools). One could argue that this policy also aimed to make owners of traditional schools more dependent on the government and to diminish the influence of the Sufi orders in the unified Northern Nigeria that Ahmadu Bello wanted to build.

These attempts to modernise Islamic education and create bridges between formal and Islamic education did not disappear with Ahmadu Bello's death. Renamed the Islamic Education Bureau in 1982, the centre created during Ahmadu Bello's lifetime (Cibiyar Fanoni Musulmi) is still committed to promoting Islamic education, helping former *Koranic* students integrate the official educational system, and having

⁴⁸ See Dahiru Yahaya, "Kano Intellectual History: Mapping the Intellectual Landscape," in Bawuro Barkindo (ed.), *Kano and Some of Her Neighbors*, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1989, 17-29, p. 24.

⁴⁹ Mark Bray, *Universal Primary Education in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

access to the “national cake,” as its director told me.⁵¹ In the mid-1980s, this centre was running thirty junior Arabic secondary schools and eight senior Arabic secondary schools built by the ministry of education of Kano.

The promotion of Arabic and Islamic education also benefited from the cultural policies of some Arabic countries, for example, Egypt particularly during the 1960s and Saudi Arabia especially after the oil boom. In reaction to the panarabic nationalist policy advocated by former Egyptian President Nasser, late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia launched, in the 1960s, a pan-Islamist policy⁵² aimed at promoting ties between different Muslim countries under the leadership of Saudi Arabia. For that purpose, the World Muslim League was created, which attempted to promote relations between Muslims in different parts of the world. Several prominent West African Islamic figures were among the founding members of this organisation, including Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse of Senegal (d. 1975), Ahmadu Bello the former premier of Northern Nigeria and Shaykh Abubacar Gumi (d. 1991). Both Ahmadu Bello and Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse have occupied the position of vice-president in the World Muslim League.

Even after the decline of Nasserism, Saudi Arabia maintained and strengthened this policy in the Muslim world. There are many reasons for this. After the Iranian revolution, the Islamic regime of Iran was engaged in an active pan-Islamist policy and in denouncing the regimes of the Gulf countries, which they accused of being corrupt and which had been allied with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. In addition, unlike the 1960s, when Saudi Arabia’s resources were limited, under the oil boom, Saudi Arabia had become very wealthy and extremely generous. According to Fuad al-Farsy,⁵³ Saudi Arabian

⁵¹ Interview in Kano, 1989.

⁵² See James Piscatori, “Ideological politics in Saudi Arabia,” in J. Piscatori (ed.), *Islam in the Political Process*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 59; Sulayman Nyang, “Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy toward Africa,” *Horn of Africa* (5), 2, 1982, pp. 3–17.

⁵³ Fouad Al Farsy, *Modernity and Tradition. The Sa’udi Equation*, London and New York, Kegan Paul International, 1990, p. 295. However, there is another possible reading of Saudi Arabian aid policy, *i.e.*, that it was an instrument of the anti-Communist policy of the Western powers in the Third World. As such, it benefited also some non-Muslim countries. See Alain Gresh, “L’Arabie saoudite en Afrique non arabe, puissance islamique ou relais de l’occident,” *Politique africaine*, (10), June 1983, pp. 55–74; René Otayek, “Arabie saoudite Afrique, Eléments pour l’analyse de la politique extérieure d’un panislamisme conservateur,” *Série Travaux et Documents* 5, 1983, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, *Coll 4° 3995* (5).

aid to Third World countries amounted to 6% of its aggregate GNP. In Africa, 96% of Saudi aid had been awarded to Muslim countries until the beginning of the 1980s.⁵⁴ It is difficult to quantify the aid, which was provided by many official institutions and nongovernmental organisations, but there is little doubt that it contributed greatly to promoting Arabic and Islamic education in sub-Saharan Africa. Besides the above-mentioned World Muslim League, several other governmental or nongovernmental Saudi Islamic charities sponsored Arabic and Islamic education in Africa.⁵⁵ Notable among them are the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and the International Federation of Arab and Islamic Schools.⁵⁶ Through the intermediary of these different organisations, subsidies were accorded not only to associations, schools, and Muslim religious leaders all over West Africa but also in Europe, Asia, and the United States.⁵⁷ Scholarships were awarded to Africans to study in Saudi Arabia. At the beginning of the 1980s, two thousand African students pursued their studies in Saudi Arabia.⁵⁸ Thousands of copies of the *Koran* and abundant *wahhabi* theological literature were distributed in Northern Nigeria.

Part of the subsidies was transmitted to the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam,⁵⁹ which founded a number of schools, including in remote areas. Many of these schools were run by Muslim missionaries, some of whom were Nigerian. Others were Egyptian and Pakistani or of other Muslim nationalities and were well-versed in wahhabi literature and committed to spreading that vision of Islam.

This period of rural-urban migration during the oil boom witnessed an increase in both the demographic pressure on the city of Kano and the demand for housing. A boom in the building industry ensued, which provided jobs for many rural workers. Urban Kano absorbed many surrounding villages during its expansion, notably the villages of Kumbotso in the south, Ungogo in the north, and Dawakin Kudu in the west. According to the 1963 census, Urban Kano's population was 300,000 inhabitants. Its growth rate was uneven during the following decades, but many observers believed that it exceeded 10%

⁵⁴ See Sulayman Nyang, "Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy toward Africa," *Horn of Africa* (5), 2, 1982, pp. 3-17, p. 13.

⁵⁵ See Sulayman Nyang, "Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy," *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ See below a discussion of the JNI.

during the peak of the oil boom. Paul Lubeck suggests a growth rate between 6% and 8% between 1963 and 1983 and estimates the population of metropolitan Kano between 1.1 million and 1.4 million in 1980.⁶⁰ Many were coming to the cities in the hope of receiving formal education, which provided opportunities for social mobility. Some, as will be evidenced in the biographies discussed below, who would have access to formal education in these new schools would also find the message of Muslim reformers quite appealing.

Thus, Kano society underwent significant change. Many people nurtured aspirations for social mobility and for emancipation from the traditional order. Many decided that they, and not their family or community, should decide what they should believe in, how they should practice their faith and how they should organise their lives. In this sense, I argue that the context was ripe for the rise of greater individual freedom in Kano society. Among the advocates of this aspiration, Muslim reformers, I argue, were second to none. Although few of them would agree that they were spokesmen for individualism, their discourse, as will be shown throughout, aimed to liberate the individual from the grip of the community. Their discourse was shocking to many people still attached to tradition, as the following very eloquent testimony indicates:

Before, neither radio nor television existed. Members of a household would listen only to the *mai gida* (head of the household) regardless of whether he tells the truth or he lies. But now, because they keep listening to what the radio and television broadcast about the emancipation of women even secluded women are being contaminated. Seclusion (*kulle*) and the prohibition of socialising between men and women (*rashin hade da mace*) are parts of our traditions. But those who attend the European school (*boko*) question these traditions. Nowadays, women are employed and work with men in the same premises with all the risks inherent to such mixing. This is the evil of westernisation. Before, virtually all disputes were settled by the *imam* (Muslim cleric who leads the ritual prayer). When the bone of contention was serious to the extent that the *imam* was not in a position to help settle it, then the ward head (*mai ungwā*) is asked to do so. But today, people would hurry to complain to the police station or refer any matter to the court. Before, young women would go out only when accompanied by old ladies. But today, it is very common to see them going out

⁶⁰ See Paul Lubeck, *Islam and Urban Labor in Northern Nigeria. The Making of a Muslim Working Class*, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

alone. All these are the making of the Yan Izala. Before, younger people respected older people, but today they no longer have any respect for older because they are poor. Before, everybody, the wealthy and the poor lived together. But today, if a person gets rich, it becomes difficult to see him. If one wants to pay a visit to a rich relative, he is told that he is sleeping. Where are the good manners of yesteryears? Before, when a son of a neighbour saw us carrying heavy stuff, very quickly he would come to help us carry it and would refuse that we reward him, other than by praying for him. Now, only grudgingly would he help, and, without compensation in return, you may trust that he would not help you again. Before, neighbours accepted willingly that we send their children to buy groceries for us. Today the first question that a neighbour would ask a son who had been sent to run an errand is how much he was given in return. If no money was given, the neighbour would forbid his son to help us in the future. Today, money is superior to everything. The rich are the pious, the saints (*wali*). [. . .] Religion belongs now to the wealthy. Today, no *imam* would start leading the prayer before the arrival of the person who had funded the building of the mosque. Does not the Koran say that (4-103): "Believers should perform the prayer at the prescribed time". Why are deputy *imams* appointed? To make sure that the prayer is never delayed, of course! Today, people wait for the arrival of the wealthy before starting the prayer.⁶¹

This interview illustrates how senior people at the local level perceive cultural change, including changes in social stratification, patterns of behaviour and orientation towards religion. It also illustrates the impact of mass media like radio and television, and the effect of the wealth of the "nouveaux riches" on patterns of social relations. This interview also gives a name to the "mediators of change." "All this is the making of Izala" the interviewee says. To a discussion of how these mediators of change arose in Nigerian society advocating a new vision of religion, I now turn.

⁶¹ Interview with J.H. in Kano, 1989.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FRAGMENTATION OF SACRED AUTHORITY¹

In sub-Saharan Africa, Sufi orders were closely associated with the expansion of Islam and therefore have enjoyed great respect among Muslims for some time. According to Mervyn Hiskett, “Sufism has been in Sudanic Islam from 1450, while certain of its ideas may well have been circulating at an earlier date.”² In discussing the religious and political similarities of the nineteenth-century *jihads* in West Africa, Hiskett quoted five: the presence of mixed Islam, which ultimately frustrated the earlier Muslim reformers and led them to conduct warfare to re-establish “pristine Islam”; the dissemination of Islamic literacy in southern areas of the western Sudan, the setting up of characteristically Muslim cities; the strengthening of the Islamic political and social institutions over the populations subject to them; and the strengthening of the hold of the Sufi orders.³ Many splinter groups appeared during the centuries of gradual Islamic expansion in sub-Saharan Africa. Some of them reinterpreted earlier messages, but did so very much within the Sufi tradition. However, in the wake of the social changes discussed in the previous two chapters, a rising generation of young religious entrepreneurs started to advocate interpretations of Islam that not only differed from, but, on some occasions, challenged or rejected the existing mainstream Sufi Islamic discourse. This process is discussed in the following sections with particular reference to Kano and to some extent Northern Nigeria. More specifically, I will address the emergence of the Muslim Students’ Society, the rise of the Da‘wa Group of Nigeria of Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar, the prominent role of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi in the rise of the Society for the Removal of Innovation, the implantation of the Society in Kano, moderate and radical advocates of an Islamic state in Nigeria and finally the millenarian movement led by

¹ The phrase is from James Piscator and Dale Eickelman, *Muslim Politics*, *op. cit.*, pp. 131–35.

² See Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, *op. cit.*, 1984, p. 258.

³ See Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 141–43.

Maitatsine. The chronological construction of this chapter is based on the appearance of these movements in Kano, not in Northern Nigeria in general. In other words, I discuss the rise of splinter groups within the Muslim Students' Society before that of the Yan Izala in Kano. The reason is that these movements were created in Kano before the Society gained a foothold there, even though the existence of the Society in Northern Nigeria predates these splinter groups.

Up until the 1950s,⁴ the Islamic field of Northern Nigeria and Kano, in particular, was dominated by two Sufi brotherhoods: the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya.⁵ The earliest traces of affiliation to the Tijaniyya in Northern Nigeria date back to the nineteenth century, when Shaykh Umar Tall, known also as Umar al-Futi, on his way from Mecca, sojourned seven years in the Sokoto Caliphate (1831–1837). Shaykh Umar Tall, was the guest of Muhammadu Bello, the son and successor of Usman Dan Fodio. Shaykh Umar Tall became a close friend to Muhammad Bello and married Bello's daughter.⁶ During his stay, Shaykh Umar Tall also initiated many people to the Tijaniyya throughout the Sokoto Caliphate. When Muhammad Bello died in 1837, Shaykh Umar Tall claimed to have been designated by him to be his successor but was not accepted as such. Shaykh Umar Tall also claimed that Muhammad Bello⁷ had converted to the Tijaniyya Sufi order. The Tijaniyya was presented by Shaykh Umar Tall in his writings as exclusive and superior to all other Sufi orders and, indeed, as abrogating them. This exclusive claim to superiority contrasted with prior conditions, under which no Sufi order had claimed to abrogate other orders.

To acknowledge Muhammad Bello's conversion, whether true or not, would require the Sokoto religious establishment to reject the

⁴ Several authors provide detailed accounts of the spread of Islam or the Sufi orders in Northern Nigeria, including Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa, op. cit., passim*.

⁵ For a detailed discussion of the spread of Sufi orders in twentieth-century Northern Nigeria and particularly the rise of competing branches in Kano, see John Naber Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano, op. cit., 1973, passim*, Anwar Auwalu, "Struggle for Influence and Identity, The ulama in Kano, 1937–1987," M.A. diss., department of history, University of Maiduguri, 1989, *passim*. A more recent and well documented study of the Sufi orders in Kano is Roman Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria, op. cit.*

⁶ According to Murray Last, one of the highest authorities on the Sokoto Caliphate, Bello did not convert to the Tijaniyya, however he had incited the youth to do so (personal communication).

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

legacy of 'Abd al-Qadir Jilani, Usman Dan Fodio and Muhammad Bello, which was found unacceptable. As a result, the politico-religious establishment of Sokoto hardened their positions as *qadiri* and made the Qadiriyya the official Sufi order of the Sokoto Caliphate.⁸ Later, however, some rulers of the Sokoto Caliphate affiliated with the Tijaniyya. One such ruler was Emir Abbas of Kano, who joined the Tijaniyya during World War I.

A dramatic development in the religious sphere of Northern Nigeria occurred after World War II, when the Senegalese leader, Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse (1900–1975) met the Emir of Kano, Abdullahi Bayero, (d. 1954) during a pilgrimage to Mecca and persuaded him that he was the spiritual successor to Ahmad al-Tijani, the founder of the Tijaniyya. Emir Abdullahi Bayero renewed his affiliation to the Tijaniyya with Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse, who subsequently visited Kano where he developed a substantial following (henceforth referred to as Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya) from the late 1940s to the early 1950s. Since the 1960s, the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya⁹ has been the largest Sufi

⁸ See Louis Brenner, "Muslim thought in Eighteenth-Century West Africa. The Case of Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio," in Nehemia Levtzion, and John O. Voll, J. (eds.), *Eighteenth-Century Renewal and Reform in Islam*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1987, pp. 39–67.

⁹ For the spread of the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya in Northern Nigeria, see J. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*, *op. cit.*, *passim*. For its spread in southern Nigeria, see J. Paden, *ibid.* With regard to the spread of the Niasse Tijaniyya in other African countries, see Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 287–88; "The Community of Grace and Its Opponents the Rejecters: A Debate About Theology and Mysticism in Muslim West Africa with Special Reference to Its Hausa Expression," *African Language Studies* 17, 99–140; Christopher Gray, "The Rise of the Niassène Tijaniyya; 1875 to the Present," in Ousmane Kane and Jean-Louis Triaud (eds.), *Islam et islamismes au Sud du Sahara*, Paris, Karthala, 1998, pp. 59–82; Ahmed Rufai Mohammed, "The Influence of the Niasse Tijaniyya in the Niger-Benue Confluence Area of Nigeria," in L. Brenner (ed.), *Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*, London, Hurst and Company, 1993, pp. 116–34; Awad Sidi al-Karsani, "The Tijaniyya Order in the Western Sudan: A case study of Three Centers, al-Fasher, al-Nahud and Khursi," Ph.D. diss., department of political science, University of Khartoum, 1985; Ousmane Kane, "Muslim Missionaries and African States," in Susanne R. Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds.), *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, Boulder, Westview, 1996, pp. 47–62; "Shaykh Al-Islam Al-Hajj Ibrahim Niasse," in David Robinson and Jean-Louis Triaud (eds.), *Le temps des marabouts. Itinéraires et stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale française v. 1880–1960*. Paris, Karthala, 1997, pp. 299–316, "Muhammad Niasse (1881–1959) et sa réplique contre le pamphlet anti-tijani de Ibn Mayaba," in Jean-Louis Triaud and David Robinson (eds.), *La Tijaniyya. Une confrérie musulmane à la conquête de l'Afrique*, Paris, Karthala, 2000, pp. 219–36; Rüdiger Seeseman, "The History of the Tijaniyya and the Issue of Tarbiya in Darfur (Sudan)," in Jean-Louis Triaud and David Robinson (eds.), *La Tijaniyya. Une confrérie musulmane à la conquête de l'Afrique*, *op. cit.*, pp. 393–437.

branch in Kano, outnumbering both the Tijaniyya Umariyya and the Qadiriyya. Many new Sufi lodges (*zawaya*) were established in which Tijani disciples congregated every day to recite collectively the rituals of the Tijaniyya. Instrumental in the spread of the Ibrahimiyya in Kano was a group of *ulama* known as Salgawa, including Malam Tijani Usman Zangon Barebare (d. 1970), Malam Abubakar Atiq (d. 1974), Malam Shehu Maihula (d. 1988), Malam Sani Kafanga (d. 1989) and Malam Mudi Salga (b. 1932–). The spread of Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya was accompanied by the introduction of some special characteristics: the initiation to *tarbiya* (spiritual training) and praying with one's arms crossed on the chest (*qabd*), in contrast to the majority of local Muslims who pray with their arms alongside their body (*sadl*). Much like the earlier Tijaniyya, the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya made new claims—for instance, the special status claimed for Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse within the Tijaniyya.

The popularity and status of the Qadiriyya date from the nineteenth-century *jihād* of Usman Dan Fodio, to whom the Prophet and 'Abd al-Qadir Jilani appeared in a dream in which they girded him with the sword of truth and ordered him to wage a *jihād* in Hausaland.¹⁰ Both the leaders of the nineteenth-century *jihād* and the political leadership of the emirates, which constituted the Sokoto Caliphate established by the *jihād*, adopted the Qadiriyya. The leadership of the emirates are still members of the Qadiriyya, with the notable exception of Kano. In the 1960s, following the dramatic success of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse's popularised Tijaniyya and seemingly as a reaction to it, Shaykh Nasiru Kabara (d. 1996) founded his own branch of the Qadiriyya (henceforth referred to as Qadiriyya Nasiriyya) in Kano. Whereas the earlier Tijaniyya of Umarian inspiration and the Qadiriyya of Dan Fodio's inspiration were both elitist,¹¹ Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya and Qadiriyya Nasiriyya were open to grass roots participation, especially youth and women, which partly accounts for their success.

Prior to the dramatic changes affecting the social fabric of Nigeria in the 1970s, Islamic movements such as Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya might have been classified as communal groups in which membership

¹⁰ See Mervyn Hiskett, *The Sword of Truth: The Life and Times of the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1994, 2nd edition, *passim*.

¹¹ This is discussed by P.H.G. Scott, "A survey of Islam in Northern Nigeria," Nigerian National Archives Kaduna, Zarprof n°c 68 A, p. 3; Ibrahim Tahir, *Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1907-1974 . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

tends to be based on birth as opposed to associational groups in which affiliation tends to be voluntary.¹² With the generalization of formal education, particularly universal primary education, pupils and students began to join voluntary associations, including religious ones. The Muslim Students' Society is one of the earliest religious associations to recruit a nationwide following. As it turned out, most Islamist and reformist groups in Kano were to a large extent splinter groups of the Muslim Students' Society.

The Muslim Students' Society (MSS)

This movement was founded by young Yoruba Muslims who felt oppressed because of their religious affiliation. This state of affairs culminated in the Anglican Synod decision to expel all Muslim students attending Christian schools, probably some time in 1954.¹³ Although, not all Muslim pupils were ultimately expelled, Yoruba Muslims from then on abstained from publicly professing their faith or practising it or even using their Muslim names in the Christian schools they were attending. Under these circumstances, forty Muslim students from seven different secondary schools, one of them a Muslim school, represented their Muslim schoolmates at a meeting that resulted in the establishment of the MSS on April 17, 1954.¹⁴ Three years later, in 1957, the MSS had set up local sections in schools throughout the western region and also at the University of Ibadan, the first university to be created in Nigeria.¹⁵ Although the MSS in Yorubaland was originally a movement of self-assertion, it became in due course a radical Islamist movement in Northern Nigeria.

Among the consequences of the generalisation of formal education was the multiplication by tenfold of the student population and, thus, a substantial increase in the potential constituency of student movements. However, the mere increase of a student population socialised

¹² German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies is particularly associated with this idea, which he developed (but not invented). See in general his *Community and Association*, (translated and supplemented by Charles P. Loomis), London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955.

¹³ See Abu Bakir Tajudeen, *The Muslim Student's Society Thirty Years After*, Ibadan, Islamic Book Center of UIMSS, 1984, p. 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

in new values and nurturing aspirations of a different kind than their parents may not have resulted in the assertion of Islamic identities as was the case in Northern Nigeria, had the national and international contexts not been conducive to such a development.

Domestically, Nigeria was experiencing an economic crisis in the late 1970s. To tackle it, the government of General Olesegun Obasanjo adopted a package of austerity measures that included decreasing funding for higher education. The National University Commission increased threefold the cost of meals and lodging in Nigerian universities between 1976 and 1978.¹⁶ The combination of the crisis and the measures taken to meet it provided ample ingredients for trouble in institutions of higher learning, particularly those in which the Muslim Students' Society (to which all Muslim students are presumed to be members) was well established.

To the impact of the economic crisis one may add that of the first *Shari'a* debate, which occurred in 1977 and 1978. This was a debate of the Constitutional Assembly set up during the transition to the Second Republic regarding the status of Islamic law in the constitution, which generated a great deal of controversy in Nigeria. The division within the Constituent Assembly between opponents and advocates of a federal *Shari'a* court of appeal¹⁷ very much reflected the country's mood. Islamist militants of Kano rallied around the Muslim Students' Society to campaign both in Kano and other major cities of Nigeria against the Nigerian secular state.

In addition, a significant international event in the late 1970s fuelled Islamic militancy in Nigeria. This event was the Islamic revolution, which overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran. In most Muslim countries, and arguably in the Third World in general, the Islamic revolution had dramatic effects. One could argue that it was the first contemporary revolution not subservient to either the West or the Soviet Union. Moreover, as J. Esposito rightly argues: "it became tangible corroboration for those who sought explanations for the failure of their government that less dependence on outside forces,

¹⁶ See M.D. Suleiman, "Shiaism and the Islamic movement in Nigeria," in Ousmane Kane and Jean-Louis Triaud (eds.), *Islam et islamismes au Sud du Sahara*, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–95, p. 185 *sq.*

¹⁷ See David Laitin, "The *Shari'a* Debate and the Origins of Nigeria's Second Republic," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 20, 3, 1982, pp. 411–30.

greater self-reliance and reaffirmation of Islam offered an alternative".¹⁸ The combination of the implementation of austerity measures, the *Shari'a* debate and the effect of the Islamic revolution was influential in the rise of Islamism in Nigeria in the late 1970s.

During this period, a young student named Aminudeen Abubakar emerged at the forefront of the Islamic militant movement led by the Muslim Students' Society in Kano. Because of his crucial contribution to the struggle for control of religious authority in Kano, it is appropriate to discuss the story of Aminudeen Abubakar.

Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar and the Rise of Da'wa Group of Nigeria

Born around 1947 in Sheshe quarters not far from Kasuwar Kurmi,¹⁹ Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar completed his *Koranic* studies in 1961, he entered the Judicial School Shahuci in Kano for training in Islamic jurisprudence. He was part of former *Koranic* pupils to receive formal education in a modernised school (as opposed to those who only attended the traditional *Koranic* schools). The training offered by the school consisted mainly of courses in Islamic law with special reference to Maliki jurisprudence based on the following classics: *Al-muqaddima al-'izziyya* by Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhili (d. 1258)²⁰ *Al-muqaddima al-'ashmawiyya* (Introduction of al-'Ashmawi) by 'Abd al-Bari al-Rifa'i al-'Ashmawi (xvi century),²¹ *Al-Risala* (the Epistle) by 'Abd Allah b. Abi Zayd 'Abd al-Rahman al-Qayrawani (d. 996). It also included some study of theology, books of *hadith* such as *Arba'una ahadith* (Forty *hadiths*) of Imam Nawawi.²² Until the mid-1960s, alongside his studies and to further improve his mastery of Arabic, he attended courses offered by the Egyptian-sponsored Arabic Cultural Centre of Kano. He also spent time in the Arabic quarters of Kantin Kwari, which

¹⁸ See J. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 162.

¹⁹ Interview with Shaykh Aminudeen in Kano in 1989. See also Yusuf Ishaq Maitama, "The Biography of Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar," N.C.E., Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, ATC/ABU Kano, not dated.

²⁰ See Carl Brockelman, *Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur*, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1937-42, volume i, p. 449.

²¹ See Carl Brockelman, *Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur*, Supplementbanden, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1937-42, volume ii, p. 435.

²² On his biography, see A.R. Gibb, H.J.H. Kramers (eds.), *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

was the residence of many Arab merchants, including some coming from the Middle East for business purposes.²³

Upon the completion of his studies in Judicial School Shahuci, in 1967, he joined the higher Islamic studies section of the School for Arabic Studies (SAS) in Kano. In 1970, he graduated from the School for Arabic Studies and got his first appointment as a teacher in the small town of Bichi in Kano state. He returned to Kano in 1971 to join the school Ma'had al-din established by the Qadiriyya leader, Shaykh Nasiru Kabara. He was admitted the same year to the department of Arabic and Islamic studies of Abdullahi Bayero College (later, Bayero University Kano). Studies in that section were certified by a diploma of Arabic and Islamic Studies, not by a university degree. He obtained the diploma in 1974. He then taught for a year in Dawakin Tofa, local government in Kano State and enrolled again in Bayero University for a Bachelor of Arts, which he obtained in 1979.

During the course of his studies at Bayero College, he acted as deputy *imam* of the Friday mosque based in the college. He translated religious sermons delivered by occasional Arab visitors into Hausa and also taught fellow students and nonstudents eager to further their religious knowledge. These classes consisted mainly of translating into Hausa and commenting upon the religious classics that constituted conventional Islamic knowledge.

Thanks to an Egyptian businessman and cleric named Shaykh Bahjat, whom he knew in the Arabic quarter, Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar became familiar with the political thought of the Society of the Muslim Brothers.²⁴ He read such authors as Sa'īd Hawa and Hasan al-Banna (killed by the secret police of King Faruq of Egypt in 1949) and Sayyid Qutb (hanged by Egyptian President Nasser in 1966). He began to teach some of the classics of the Muslim Brothers in the mosque²⁵ and comment on articles in a magazine entitled

²³ Interview with Muhammad Ghazali Yusuf, a close associate of Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar, Kano, 1989.

²⁴ See R.P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers, op. cit., passim*.

²⁵ The books of the Muslim Brothers that he taught included Hasan al-Banna, *Al-Ma'thurāt*; Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'alim fi al-tariq* (Signposts on the Road), Sa'īd Hawa, *Jund Allah* (Soldiers of God); *Al-Rasul* (The Prophet); *Tarbiyatuna al-ruhiyya* (Our spiritual education); *Majmu'at al-Rasa'il li al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, (Collection of letters of the martyr Imam Hasan al-Banna), which includes sermons and speeches delivered on different occasions by Hasan Al-Banna. Information provided by

Da'wa, published by the Jordan Muslim Brothers. The title of this magazine would be the inspiration for the name of the Islamic organisation that he later founded.

From 1975, along with his active participation in the activities of the Kano section of the Muslim Students' Society, Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar began the establishment of his own mosque, close to his house at Suleyman Crescent Road in Kano, with the erection of a wooden structure. This mosque very quickly became the base for his preaching activities.

At the end of the 1970s, Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar and his clientele were in the forefront of the demonstration against the secular state in Kano and in other cities of Northern Nigeria, notably Katsina. His discourse was very similar to that of Islamists in other parts of the Muslim World and focused on the demand to dismantle the secular Nigerian state and establish an Islamic state. However, although he had an Islamist agenda, Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar had some sympathy for the Sufi orders. He had been educated by Shaykh Kamaludeen of the Qadiriyya and, as mentioned earlier, had attended Malam Nasiru Kabara's school. He strongly expressed his disapproval of members of the rising Izala movement, who charged the Sufi orders with heresy. Although he was not a member of any Sufi order, he believed that members of Sufi orders, in reciting *adhkar*, aimed at purifying the soul.

In 1979, Shakh Aminudeen Abubakar was sent to the headquarters of Jama'at Nasr al-Islam in Kaduna to do his national service.²⁶ From this point, a gradual shift occurred in his discourse and orientation toward the Sufi orders. During his short stay in Kaduna, Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar became a disciple of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi (although they ultimately became rivals) and, through Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, gained access to critical external connections that would provide him opportunities for considerable social mobility. More specifically, through the recommendation of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi,²⁷ he estab-

Muhammad Ghazali Yusuf, a close associate of Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar, interview in Kano, 1989.

²⁶ After the civil war, the Gowon-led federal government had ruled that all Nigerians must do a civil service elsewhere than the state of which they were natives. This, it was assumed would expose them to the way of life of other Nigerian communities and instill in the Nigerian youth a sense of belonging to a larger community.

²⁷ Recorded interview with the late Shaykh Abubakar Gumi in Nigeria, 1989.

lished contacts with the Dar al-Ifta, a prominent religious body of Saudi Arabia, led by Shaykh Ben Baz²⁸ and the Koweiti Ministry of Religious Endowments.²⁹ These two institutions later provided funds for the building of a big educational centre in Kano, which would become the headquarters of the Da'wa group.³⁰

In the course of his national service, and under the influence of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, he abandoned his call for the immediate establishment of an Islamic state and began to advocate reformation of Islamic social and religious practices in Northern Nigeria as a means of ultimately creating an Islamic social order. Illustrative of this new orientation were his numerous articles published during the year of his national service in the Hausa daily *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo*.³¹ At the end of his one-year national service, he was appointed to the School of Arabic Studies Kano and, in 1982, became the vice-principal of the School of Higher Islamic Studies Shahuci. In 1983, he became vice-principal of Gwale Arabic Teacher's College.

In the meantime, the Islamic revolution that overthrew the Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran was gaining considerable influence among Muslims in Northern Nigeria. Through its local embassy, Iran sponsored radical Islamic politico-religious activities, including funding Islamic magazines and sending many Nigerians to Iran for training. The investment gradually produced a return. The appeal of Islamism and the Iranian revolution in Nigeria during the late 1970s and early 1980s was second to none, particularly among young Muslim students and school pupils.

It is widely believed that this success led to a local countermove by another Islamic power and rival of Iran, Saudi Arabia, to curb Iranian influence and sponsor its own conception of Islamic puritanism. For that purpose, Saudi Arabian religious bodies, particularly the Dar al-Ifta of Saudi Arabia, provided assistance to some local religious entrepreneurs. Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar was one

²⁸ See Gilles Kepel, *Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

²⁹ See Roman Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-50.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ See articles of Shaykh Aminudeen published on Fridays in *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo* from March to September 1979 under the title *Fahimtar Musulunci na ga Alkaw'ani, Hadisi da haduwar malamai nagari* (The understanding of Islam based on the Koran, the tradition of the Prophet and orthodox learned men). I am grateful to Shaykh Aminudeen for providing copies of many of these articles.

such beneficiary who started advocating religious reformation. He thus became an active supporter of Saudi religious bodies and started to criticise the Iranian Islamic revolution. A split occurred within the Muslim Students' Society in 1982 when, delivering a Friday sermon, Aminudeen openly criticised Ayatollah Khomeiny, who was held in high esteem by Muslim youth in Nigeria:

Those who label me a Wahhabi are right, those who say I am a supporter of Izala are right. I have come to understand that Iran is not a Muslim country and that Ayatollah Khomeiny is a demagogue (*dajjal* in Arabic).³²

Following that move, the MSS did not cease to exist, and many young Muslims still strongly identify with it. However, most of its influential activists, who had led the Islamist student movement in Kano in the late 1970s, tended to split into two tendencies. On the one hand, there was Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar and the Da'wa Group of Nigeria. Just like the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition created in 1978, this tendency advocated eradicating "innovation" and the reformation of religious and social practices. The other tendency rallied around another organization: Umma. Umma was led by educated young Muslims, many of whom had visited Iran in the aftermath of the revolution. Notable among them were Dr. Abubakar Mustafa (a university professor), Muzamil Sani Hanga (a lawyer) and Muhammad Said (a lecturer).

In the wake of becoming part of the Kano establishment, in the early 1980s, Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar gradually adopted a relatively moderate stance towards the Sufi orders. He also strengthened his relations with Saudi religious authorities and made regular trips to Saudi Arabia. He translated into Hausa *al-usul al-thalatha wa adillatuha* (the three foundations and their proofs) of Shaykh Muhammad Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhab,³³ which was published by the Dar al-Ifa Saudi Arabia. His privileged connections with Saudi Arabia, it is believed, turned him into an important economic actor and brought him closer to some members of the business community in Kano.

³² Interview with Muhammad Ghazali Yusuf, a close associate of Shaykh Aminudeen, Kano, 1989.

³³ See Aminudeen Abubakar, *Alif-Badin Musulunci wallafar Shaykh Muhammad Ben Abdulwahab* (The Three Foundations and Their Proofs of Shaykh Abdulwahab) Riyadh, Presidency of Islamic Research, IFTA and Propagation, 1404 H.

Like Shaykh Gumi, he is said to have been in a position to recommend economic entrepreneurs for obtaining visas at the Saudi consulate and, likewise, to introduce Kano businessmen to partners in Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Gulf. On the other hand, having given up radical political demands, he made up with the political authorities. Local political authorities started to invite him to the launching of social welfare projects (including the provision of basic education for women, highlighting the ill-effects of divorce and the benefits of the respect of the social order) so that Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar would support these projects with Islamic religious references.³⁴

In addition, he began to present a weekly religious program on Kano television. The activist Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar, who had demonstrated in major cities of Northern Nigeria for the immediate establishment of an Islamic state, and who was closely monitored by the police, had become part of the establishment and greatly moderated his views.

Shaykh Aminudeen's audience consisted of persons from different social backgrounds including civil servants and businessmen. These attended the Da'wa group's mosque to say their prayers and listen to the sermons and lectures on Koranic exegesis that Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar would deliver every day after the prayer of Maghrib at dusk. For the well-to-do people who were Shaykh Aminudeen followers, Da'wa symbolised a kind of modernity that the Sufi orders could not provide. Da'wa's headquarters (where its mosque and school were located) was situated at Suleiman Crescent Road in Nassarawa ward, an area outside the walled city, whose inhabitants tended from 1980 onwards to be mostly middle-class people.

³⁴ See Aminudeen Abubakar, "*Sakin aure da abin da yake haifarwa wajen wargaza Zaman Iyali*," (the risks of the family dispersion that divorce may provoke), lecture delivered at the Fagge Youth Hall on the invitation of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Youth and Sports of Kano State, *Muhimanci ilimin mata ga rayuwar al umma* (the importance of women's education in the life of the Muslim community) lecture delivered on 30 January 1988, at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria; "*Muhimancin kyawawan dabi'u ga ma'aikaci*," (the benefits of the respect of the social order), lecture delivered on the occasion of a seminar convened by the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development, Kazaure, Dambatta Zonal education, 16 April 1985.

There was also a section of Shaykh Aminudeen's clientele of relatively low social extraction. Towards the mid-1980s, many of these started to distance themselves from him. They could not bear the "wealthy", who attended the centre in Mercedes Benz cars and looked down upon them, who were neither committed reformers nor unflinching supporters of the Da'wa group but who were partly motivated by the search for business partners, the proximity and comfort of the mosque.

Another group of Shaykh Aminudeen's constituency (made up of his early companions in misfortune) also distanced themselves from him and eventually became autonomous entrepreneurs, primarily because of the way in which he monopolised control of the Da'wa group.³⁵ Indeed, Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar became the only spokesman for the Da'wa group; he was solely responsible for fund-raising and the management of funds generated by the school and the only one to deliver sermons. The organisation's magazine *Al-manar* published only religious sermons by Shaykh Aminudeen. Asked if the Da'wa organization had sections in other parts of Nigeria, Shaykh Aminudeen responded that:

"The Da'wa group is not a structured political organisation with branches. All those who listen to my sermons are members of the Da'wa Group. The Prophet Muhammad did not create an organisation with branches."³⁶

Other leaders of Izala to whom I spoke about the Shaykh told me that they shared the same worldviews, but had not been able to cooperate with him because of his exclusiveness. Because of this, a number of his companions gradually distanced themselves from him to join other religious entrepreneurs who had been advocating reform from the early 1970s and trying to create a branch of the Society since the late 1970s. It is this process that I will examine in the next section, relating it to the action of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi (1922–92) and situating it within the larger framework of the expansion of reformism in Northern Nigeria.

³⁵ Interview with Muhammad Ghazali Yusuf Kano, a close associate of Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar, Kano, 1989.

³⁶ Recorded interview with the author in Kano in 1989.

Shaykh Abubakar Gumi and the Rise of Izala in Northern Nigeria

It is appropriate to begin the discussion of the rise of Izala with the contribution to that process of the late Shaykh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi³⁷ who, one could indeed argue, was one of the most charismatic anti-Sufi reformist figures in twentieth-century West Africa and whose contribution to the rise of the reform movement in Northern Nigeria is second to none.

Born in 1922, at Gumi, in Sokoto State, Shaykh Gumi was the son of an Islamic judge (*alkali*). He studied the Koran at home and afterwards attended the Sokoto Central Primary School (1935–1937), the Sokoto Middle School (1937–1942), and the Kano Law school, which later became the School for Arabic Studies (1943–1947). After working a few years, he went to the Sudan to attend Bukht al-Rida Institute (1953–1955) where he obtained the Higher Diploma in Arabic Studies—a qualification which was by no means inconsequential in the context of Northern Nigeria of the time. On his return from the Sudan, he was sent to Saudi Arabia by the federal government of Nigeria as a pilgrim officer. During that assignment he established solid contacts with the political and religious authorities of Saudi-Arabia. On the strength of these links, coupled with the economic assistance that he procured from Saudi religious authorities, he became an indefatigable advocate of religious and social reform along wahhabi lines.³⁸

Appointed grand *qadi* (supreme judge) of Northern Nigeria in 1962 and based in Kaduna, the capital of the former northern region of Nigeria, he commenced his reformist actions by criticising different aspects of the Sufi orders during the *Koranic* exegesis he led at the Sultan Bello Mosque and the now Radio Nigeria at Kaduna. In

³⁷ Interviews with the late Shaykh Gumi, Kaduna in 1989 and 1990. See also Muhammad Sani Umar, "Sufism and Anti-sufism in Nigeria," M.A. thesis in Islamic Studies; Bayero University Kano, 1988, p. 240; Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria. The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*, Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 1998, pp. 117–29; Roman Loimeir, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, 173–97.

³⁸ From the name of Muhammad Ibn Hanbal (780–855), a famous Muslim theologian who declared war against the so-called intrusion of foreign influences in Islam. Inspired by his thoughts, later generations of Muslim thinkers, known as Neo-Hanbalis, had condemned especially the Sufi orders, popular Islam and the cult of saints. Notable among them are Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292–1350), and Muhammad Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhab (1703–1787).

addition to being the grand *qadi* of Northern Nigeria, Gumi was the advisor of Ahmadu Bello (who did not know Arabic) in religious matters. Ahmadu Bello had undertaken to unify Northern Nigeria and made Islam the central element of his unification policy, a policy that was also aimed at ensuring that the northern region would have a privileged position in the Nigerian federation.

As part of his campaign for unification, Ahmadu Bello created a religious association, *Jama'at Nasr al-Islam* (JNI) (Society for the Victory of Islam).³⁹ JNI, which engaged in an active conversion campaign both in the north and south of Nigeria, benefited from Saudi financing. King Faisal provided a grant of £100,000 sterling between 1962 and 1965,⁴⁰ and in 1966, Shaykh Sabbah, the ruler of Kuwait, gave a donation of close to £ 2,000,000 for the proselytising efforts of Ahmadu Bello.⁴¹

Ahadu Bello also fought to employ the Sufi factor in his campaign for unification. He created a religious community, which he called the Usmaniyya, from the name of his ancestor, Usman Dan Fodio, in an attempt to transcend the profound social and political divisions caused by the competition between Sufi orders in Northern Nigeria. Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, as Ahmadu Bello's religious advisor, was required to compromise his anti-Sufi stance and even to compose a *wird* (a collection of litanies), which in many respects was identical to those of the Sufi orders.⁴²

With the assassination of Ahmadu Bello during the coup d'état of 1966, the constraints holding Shaykh Abubakar Gumi in check relaxed, and he resumed his campaign for reform and his attacks against traditional Islam, of which the Sufi leadership were the most ardent defenders. The restructuring of political power following the coup permitted Shaykh Abubakar Gumi to continue to exert his religious influence.

When the Igbo General Ironsi took power, he appointed Major Hassan Usman Katsina, a Muslim northerner military governor of

³⁹ The JNI is dealt with in greater detail in chapter 6.

⁴⁰ See John Naber Paden, *Ahadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto. Values and Leadership in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 561. For a more detailed discussion of the JNI, see chapter 6.

⁴¹ See John Naber Paden, *Ahadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto. . . ., op. cit.*, p. 578.

⁴² See Abubakar Gumi, *Al-wird al-'adhim min al-ahadith wa al-Qur'an a-karim*, (The great collection of litanies made of verses of the precious Koran and traditions) Kaduna, undated.

the north to ease the trauma that had been felt throughout the northern region following the coup. However, persons who accepted important posts in the new military dispensation were viewed by many as accomplices in the coup. Hassan Usman Katsina therefore tried to win the support of persons who had been close to Ahmadu Bello to clear himself from suspicion of complicity. Shaykh Abubakar Gumi was able to take advantage of this situation to gain the same access to the media he had enjoyed before the coup, both print and electronic media, in order to further his proselytising. During the early 1970s, the preaching of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi was transmitted by radio and television and published in the Hausa weekly *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo*.⁴³

In 1972, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi published an extremely anti-Sufi book in which he zealously set out to demonstrate the totally heterodox nature of the two most popular Sufi orders (the *Tijaniyya* and *Qadiriyya*).⁴⁴ It seems clear that the timing of this publication had been motivated by the strong opposition of the Kano *ulama* to Shaykh Gumi's growing personal ambitions. In 1969, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi had sought a reconciliation with the Kano *ulama*⁴⁵ in order to build a broader base for his participation in Nigerian politics. He convinced the emir of Kano, Ado Bayero, to intervene on his behalf to try to convince the *ulama* of the necessity for all northern Muslims to unite so that the region might regain the political power it had during the First Republic. He expressed regret for his past attacks and pledged not to resume them in future. However, the *ulama* suspected ulterior motives and, following due deliberation, they rejected his offer for reconciliation. This in turn led to the publication of *Al-'aqida al-sahiha al-sahiha bi-muwafaqat al-shari'a*, (The right faith according to the *shari'a*),⁴⁶ which triggered an unprecedented polemic between Shaykh Abubakar Gumi and the leaders of the Sufi orders. Both Malam Nasiru Kabara and Malam Sani Kafanga counter-attacked with equally polemical rejoinders in which they argued for

⁴³ See Muhammad Sani Umar, *Sufism And Anti-Sufism in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

⁴⁴ See Abubakar Gumi, *Al-'aqida al-sahiha bi muwafaqat al-shari'a*, Bayrut, Dar al-'arabi li al-tiba'a wa al-nashr wa al-tawzi', 1972. For a detailed discussion see Roman Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-96.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ See Roman Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 178 *sq.*

the preeminent nature of Sufism, and also denounced the opportunism of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi.⁴⁷

This drift to extremist positions also led to a factional split in JNI. On one side, a pro-Gumi faction was supported by many middle-class people, including businessmen and northern educated intellectuals, particularly civil servants. On the other was a pro-Sufi faction dominated by certain influential northern *ulama*.⁴⁸

Following charges of heresy levelled at the Sufi orders, some radical Sufi disciples attempted in 1978 to kill Shaykh Abubakar Gumi and Shaykh Ismail Idriss, one of Gumi's leading disciples. It was against this background that reformers formally created the *Jam'at izalat al-bid'a wa iqamat al-sunna* (Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of the Tradition)⁴⁹ as a movement committed to pursue their work should they be murdered.⁵⁰ From the date of its creation, the national administrative headquarters of the Society was located in Jos. It was controlled by a committee of *ulama*, composed of a number of professional preachers and headed at the national level by Shaykh Ismail Idriss. Charged with the responsibility for proselytising, the committee was supported by a first-aid group.

A second important body within the Society was the Committee of Patrons, which provided financial assistance to support the organisation of various religious activities as well as the building of schools and mosques identified with the Society. This committee was also responsible for obtaining official permission for open-air preaching. It was the patrons who originally conceived of the idea, which they were prepared to support financially, to create a formal organisation dedicated to reform. But it is arguable that the creation of such a movement was identified with their own interests, *i.e.*, building up

⁴⁷ See Nasiru Kabara, *Kūtab al-nasiha al-sariha fi al-radd 'ala al-aqidat al-sahiha*, (The Frank Advice. A Rejoinder to the Right Faith) Kano, Zawiya Kabara, 1972; Sani Kafanga, *Al-minah al-hamuda fi al-radd 'ala fasid al-'aqida* (*The Praiseworthy Gift. A Rejoinder to the One Who Corrupts the Faith*), Bayrut, not dated. For further on these works, see Roman Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, pp. 197–206.

⁴⁸ For a discussion of the split of the JNI, see below, chapter 6.

⁴⁹ The name of the organisation was inspired by the title of a work of Usman Dan Fodio, *Ihya al-sunna wa ikhmad al-bid'a* (Revivifying the Sunna and Destroying Innovation).

⁵⁰ This is the account of the creation of the movement provided me by Abbas Isa Lawyer, a leading Izala activist in Zaria, (interview in fall of 1990 in Zaria).

religiopolitical constituencies that ultimately would place the patrons in positions of authority in the society.

Religion is a powerful instrument of mobilisation in Northern Nigeria, which is why ambitious politicians associate themselves with popular religious movements, and indeed why local notables supported the creation of the Society. Although one cannot reduce the support of such persons to simple political manipulation because conviction is an important element of their engagement, it is nevertheless true that support for a religious movement can bring a politician political rewards, all the more so because religious leaders mediate between the politicians and the larger society.

The pledge by the military to hand over power to civilians in 1979 led to heightened inter-and intra-party competition and an intensification of contacts between politicians, local notables, and religious leaders. An example of political and economic entrepreneurs who supported the Society, expecting political rewards in return, is provided by the president of the National Committee of Patrons of Izala, Alhaji Musa Mai Gandu. He was the district head of Bukuru, a successful economic entrepreneur and an ambitious political entrepreneur. Successively he had been an active member of the Northern People's Congress during the First Republic and of the National Party of Nigeria during the Second Republic.

Another example is provided by Muhammad Habid gado-da-masu (d. 2001), the vice-president of the National Committee of Patrons. He gave the following reasons for supporting Izala:

Having heard of Shaykh Ismail Idriss in the late 1970s, I travelled to Jos to meet him. I saw him and asked him a number of questions about the Sufi orders. As he was answering satisfactorily to my queries, I realised that Shaykh Idriss is the kind of religious leader I would get along with and from whom I can learn. I came to know Sufi religious [heretic] works I never heard of before.⁵¹

But, I assume that Muhammad Habib gado-da-masu nursed political as well as religious motivations. During the preparation for the handing over of power by the military to the civilians, Muhammad Habib, who had already made known his political ambitions, distanced himself from the Tijaniyya of which he was a member and

⁵¹ Interview with Muhammad Habib, Kano, September 1990.

supported the creation of Izala in the hope that this would enable him to broaden his political base.⁵²

Beyond the search for a political clientele, by joining the Society, these men, who were also businessmen, had a path of access to the national and international networks of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi. The spiritual leader of the Society, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi was in a position to introduce or recommend Nigerian businessmen to Saudi commercial partners and decision makers.

After the establishment of its national headquarters in Jos, some professional preachers who had joined the Society were invited to create local branches of the movement in their home cities and village and dedicate themselves to religious and social reform, including the denunciation of traditional Islam and the Sufi orders. In the early 1980s, the Society very quickly gained support in some important urban centres of Northern Nigeria such as Jos, Kaduna, Bauchi and Zaria. However, in older cities where traditional Islam was firmly rooted, although some aspects of the reform agenda were welcomed by some people, it took much longer for the Society to become well established. Kano was one such place.

The Laborious Process of Implantation of Izala in Kano

The first effort to set up a branch of the Society in Kano can be traced to Shaykh L. Suleyman,⁵³ a former preacher of the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam. He too was trained by Shaykh Abubakar Gumi. In 1978, Shaykh L. Suleyman, with several other Kano people, including Alhaji Ali Birnin Kudu, Malam Saidu Hadeja, Alhaji Ado Kano, Lawal Abubakar Kano, and A. Hamid, imam of the mosque at Bayero University Kano, received permission from the National Committee of *ulama* of the Society to set up a Kano branch. A meeting was subsequently convened in the house of Muhammad Habib gado-da-masu to set up the formal structures of the local branch, which mirrored those at the national level: a committee of patrons chaired by Alhaji Ali Birnin Kudu (d. 1988) with Alhaji Ado as a deputy-chairman, and Adamu Saidu as secretary; a committee of *ulama*

⁵² See the biography of Muhammad Habib in chapter four.

⁵³ For a biography of Shaykh L. Suleyman, see chapter four.

headed by Shaykh L Suleyman, whose obstinacy in advocating reform despite all hardships had won him the nickname of “*mai turnugu*” (which means in Hausa “nothing daunts him”); and a first-aid group led by Malam Isa Muhammad. The local section benefited from the political protection of Muhammad Habib gado-da-masu.

Setting up a formal organisation was one thing, however, but successfully calling for reform in Kano was quite another. The inhabitants of the *Birnin Kano* (the walled city) were, in general, deeply attached to the Sufi orders. The first attempts to carry out open-air preaching advocating the “abandonment of local Islamic practices and return to pristine Islam” (which included labelling venerated saints such as Ahmad al-Tijani and ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani as infidels) were ruthlessly suppressed. On May 27, 1980, while members of the local committee of *ulama* attempted to preach within the walled city, they were attacked by partisans of the Sufi orders, and one preacher of the Society perished during the clash.⁵⁴ Following this incident, the preachers of the Society tended to avoid open-air preaching within the walled city and to operate in the suburbs outside the city wall (*wajen birni*), notably in Fagge or Brigade wards.

In the late 1970s, a road haulage contractor named Muhammad Ilyas who lived in Brigade ward and was committed to the reform agenda of the Society undertook to unite and protect all advocates of Islamic reform along Yan Izala lines in Kano. He succeeded to bring together dozens of sympathisers (who refused to pray in non-Izala mosques for reasons discussed below). This first group of the Yan Izala started to attend a mosque located not far from Muhammad Ilyas’s house, where they performed the five daily prayers. This was one of the first mosques identified with the Society where sympathisers would congregate.

Following the Maitatsine uprisings of December 1980, in Kano (discussed below), there was a period of violent revenge and settling of scores. Many sympathisers of the Society were lynched. Traditional authorities, such as *masu ungwanni* (ward heads) and *dagatai* (village heads) and *hakimai* (district heads) are believed to have recruited thugs entrusted with the task of killing all those who were identified as disciples of Maitatsine. Many sympathisers of the Society were also

⁵⁴ Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Report of Tribunal of Enquiry on Kano Disturbances*, Lagos, Federal Government Press 1981, p. 75.

killed at this time. Tracked down by the killers for allegedly having denounced the recitation of the *salat al-fatih*,⁵⁵ the *imam* of the above-mentioned first Yan Izala mosque in Fagge feared he might be murdered. To save his life, he publicly rejected the reformist ideology and provided the thugs with a list of all committed Izala members. Attendance in his mosque fell dramatically as a result, and his former constituency began to gather in the house of Muhammad Ilyas to say the five daily prayers. Some of them who feared persecution took up residence there. Their number amounted to approximately thirty people.⁵⁶

To put an end to the persecution that they were suffering, Muhammad Ilyas approached the pro-Gumi faction of the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam (of which all the emirs were officially members) and asked permission to set up a local branch of the JNI to be based in his house.⁵⁷ Permission was granted, and, on the basis of his being the representative of the JNI, Muhammad Ilyas set up loudspeakers in his house to air the prayers recited according to the art of intonation of the *Koran* (*tajwid*). It is appropriate to recall that intonation of the *Koran* according to the art of recitation tended to be a distinct feature of reformers during the 1970s.⁵⁸ Immediately, the *dagaci* (village head) of Brigade, informally vested with local, policing responsibilities, denounced him to the Emir of Kano for causing unrest. Muhammad Ilyas was summoned to the emir's palace on the charge of abusing other Muslims and trying to create a new religion. The emir enjoined him to remove the loudspeakers and abstain from criticising others' beliefs. He complied with the emir's injunctions for a short while and then re-installed the loudspeakers and resumed airing the prayers. Summoned back to the emir for a second time, he received similar injunctions but resumed airing the prayers again after a short break. Summoned a third time to the emir's palace, he stated that he would not cease practising his faith

⁵⁵ A detailed discussion of the polemic around the *salat al-fatih* follows in chapters 5 and 6.

⁵⁶ Interview with Muhammad Ilyas, Kano, 1989.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Locally, many people would recite the *Koran* without respecting the strict rules of *tajwid* as set up by the schools of recitation, or without pronouncing correctly Arabic. The situation had changed since and there are non reformist schools that offer courses in *tajwid*, including that of Malam Manzo Arze in Kano. For more on that school, see chapter 6.

as he thought he should, regardless of any hardship or persecution he might suffer. Then the emir ruled that he and his party should be left free to practice their religion as they saw fit, provided that they did not abuse other Muslims.

After 1985, the implantation of Izala mosques outside the walled city followed pretty much the same pattern starting with the setting up of loudspeakers to air prayers, followed by complaints of supporters of traditional Islam, and the stubbornness of the committed advocates of reform. The emir would then grant them the freedom of religious practice, while issuing at the same time a warning that they not foment unrest.

The implantation of Izala mosques within the *Birmi*, however, was quite another story. To the best of the author's knowledge and certainly until 1991, all attempts to build mosques within the walled city failed because opponents would destroy the buildings even before completion. As a result, Izala places of worship tended to be provisional and informal. Mats would be unfolded before prayers or study sessions and rolled up immediately after to avoid persecution.

Even though the overall number of disciples of the Sufi orders in the *Waje* was larger than that of the Society, the number of reformers outside the *Birmi* increased during the 1980s. It was particularly in Brigade and Fagge that Izala found much of its following.

Originally the terminus of a trade route, Fagge was inhabited primarily by itinerant traders (*Fatake* or *Yan koli* in Hausa) who settled there and sold their goods in the Kurmi market. Fagge experienced several waves of migration after the construction of the railway at the beginning of colonial rule and also following the expansion of light industry during the postindependence period. The peoples involved in this immigration included Hausa, Fulani, Nupe, Tuareg (the first settlers) and a small number of Yoruba. The tradition of radicalism and irredentism of the *Yan Fagge* towards the *Yan Birmi* is, in part, accounted for by the way the inhabitants of the old city (*Yan Birmi*) perceive inhabitants of Fagge (*Yan Fagge*). The *Yan Fagge* are considered *Kanawa* (*Kano people*) in the broad sense of the word as opposed to outsiders. However, they are perceived as second-class Kano citizens. If, for instance, a political choice⁵⁹ were to be made

⁵⁹ To further illustrate this point, it is worth mentioning that there were two candidates short-listed in the competition for the position of vice-chancellor at Bayero University, Kano in the early 1990s. One from Birnin Kano, the other from Fagge.

between a *Dan Fagge* and an outsider, then the Kano people might support the *Dan Fagge*, seen in this instance as a *Dan Kano*. But, if a political choice were to be made between a *Dan Birni* and a *Dan Fagge*, there is little likelihood of the *Dan Fagge* being favoured. Thus, the inhabitants of Fagge face a dilemma of identity. Some of them have been *Kanawa* for several generations and are cut off from their linguistic and cultural roots, although they have not been fully integrated socially into Kano. This, I will argue, accounts for the fact that some of them have adopted a distinct Fagge identity. The Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya, for instance, was welcomed in Fagge in the 1950s and 1960s while it was challenged in the *Birni*. Hence, in the 1980s, it is not surprising that the vision of religion represented by reformed Islam (Izala), rejected by the *Birni*, might be accepted by some people in Fagge (*mutatis mutandis*). Instead of remaining “second-class *Kanawa*”, they become “first-class Muslims.”

From the time when Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar and other religious entrepreneurs began to advocate reform, a number of wealthy merchants in Fagge, who had been disciples of local Sufi leaders, rejected Sufism and began to champion Izala. They also contributed to the construction of mosques and schools run by Izala preachers.

In this context, from the mid-1980s, a number of Aminudeen’s former companions who had distanced themselves from him for reasons pertaining to his management of the Da’wa group, started to conduct preaching and study sessions under the banner of Izala. They led prayers and offered religious courses along reformist lines within the *majalis* (informal places of worship and study) of Izala that mushroomed from the 1980s, particularly outside the *Birni* as well as at Izala Central Mosque in Fagge.

By the late 1980s, a new development took place. A number of wealthy people, some of whom had formerly attended Shaykh

The federal government was vested with the authority to choose one of them as vice-chancellor. A few years before the election, there had been talks of the candidate from Fagge (at that point the deputy vice-chancellor) becoming vice-chancellor. A colleague from Kano told me that this was not likely to happen because traditional authorities have a very strong lobbying power on the federal government and would make it clear to the latter that they did not want a “foreigner” as a vice-chancellor in “their university.” Whether the traditional authorities were consulted in this case or not can’t be ascertained, for obvious reasons, but the colleague was right. It was the candidate from the *Birni* who ultimately was appointed vice-chancellor.

Aminudeen's Da'wa centre, built their own mosques within their homes or in the vicinity. They retained young clerics who either held a diploma in Islamic studies or possessed a sound knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence and were supporters of reformist ideas. They would pay these clerics a regular salary to lead the prayers and teach them *Koran* and courses on *hadith*, *fiqh* and other disciplines of reform. In this way, the wealthy strengthened their position and prestige in Kano society.

As the Society gradually gained new supporters, a new pattern of relationship between businessmen and clerics emerged. Traditional religious authorities were generally wealthy and had large followings as well as religious prestige (because they were believed to be endowed by God with supernatural powers).⁶⁰ The businessmen who interacted with them, having only wealth, were overshadowed by them. In the new situation, it is the businessman who recruits the cleric. So financially, the cleric depends on him. In addition, unlike the Sufi Shaykh, the cleric is not supposed to have any extraordinary powers. So, spiritually, he is assumed to be the equal of the businessman. For Izala, all pious Muslims are equal before God. None is endowed with supernatural power. Finally, for the businessman, the support for new style clerics is cheaper in strict economic terms. Under these circumstances, identification with the new version of Islam was very attractive to many economic entrepreneurs as will be demonstrated in greater detail in the next chapter. Now, let us turn to a discussion of another Muslim faction.

Moderate and Radical Islamists

The term Islamist here refers to Muslims who advocate the dismantling of the secular state and its replacement by a political system based on *shari'a*. Of course, it is important to stress that the reformists also wish to see the Islamic state established. However, their most urgent concern is the eradication of innovation and the encouragement of people to follow the *Sunna* of the Prophet; the Islamic State would follow by virtue of the people imitating the *Sunna* of the Prophet.

⁶⁰ See chapter 5 below.

In Nigeria, advocates for an Islamic state were a serious challenge to many. Among them, the grand *qadis* played a predominant role in domesticating Islamists, which can best be understood within the larger context of the evolution of Islamic law in Northern Nigeria. Before British colonial conquest, the Sokoto Caliphate and Borno were governed by Islamic law. After the establishment of colonial rule, the colonial administration strove to replace Islamic law with positive law. When he enjoined the emirs to renounce enforcing bodily punishment, Lord Frederick Lugard took the first step of this process, which culminated in the adoption of the Native Justice Ordinance in 1933. On the eve of independence, the last remnants of Islamic penal law were abolished.⁶¹ The only exception related to matters of personal status (e.g., marriage, divorce and succession).

During the First Republic (1960–1966), native jurisdictions had competence to deal with civil and penal affairs, and the High Regional Court of Appeal was vested with the authority to hear appellate cases. Litigation relating to Muslim personal law was handled by a *Shari'a* Court of Appeal based on Islamic law according to the Maliki school as practised in the region. A Resolution Court was to settle conflicting competence between the High Regional Court and the *Shari'a* Court of Appeal. Finally, the Federal Supreme Court had competence to handle appellate cases against *Shari'a* court of Appeal judgements contested on the ground of noncompliance with the federal constitution. That system died with the collapse of the First Republic. During the first military interregnum, all the states had their own court of appeal, but these heard cases relating exclusively to personal status.⁶²

The so-called *Shari'a* debate, mentioned earlier, generated a great deal of controversy in the late 1970s. However, the federal military government ruled that no Islamic federal court of appeal should be created, but all states that expressed the wish could have courts of first instance and *Shari'a* appeal courts. If a judgement by any such court should be contested as unconstitutional, the Federal Court of

⁶¹ See Umaru Birai, "Islamic Tajdid and the Political Process in Nigeria," in Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms and the State. Remaking Politics, Economics and Militance*, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1993, pp. 184–203, p. 193.

⁶² See Abdurrahman Doi, "Etude sur la situation du droit islamique au Nigéria," Travaux et documents CEAN, Bordeaux, 1988, p. 15.

Appeal in the second instance and the Federal Supreme Court in the last instance would decide on its constitutionality.⁶³

Although they favoured the establishment of a federal *Shari'a* court that would extend the field of their competence and strengthen their authority, the *grand qadis* were prepared to accept these conditions. Such was not the case of the Islamists who were inspired by the Iranian revolution, frustrated by austerity measures taken by the Obasanjo government, and finally angered by the dramatic success of militant Christian movements in northern institutions of higher learning.⁶⁴

Islamic judges by training, the *grand qadis* were quite aware that there were boundaries that demands for *Shari'a* could not overstep. They knew that neither the implementation of the *Shari'a* nor the creation of an Islamic state in Muslim Northern Nigeria seemed feasible. However, the inclusion of a section in the federal constitution governing the status of Islamic law, which was the most that the military would concede, would not satisfy the Islamists, who preferred to imitate the Iranian model. Suspected by the military of supporting Islamist activities, the *grand qadis* faced a dilemma: either, they could dissociate themselves from the demands for *Shari'a* and risk losing part of their authority in society or support the Islamist agenda and risk being sacked. They adopted a compromise strategy, which provided an outlet for the milder Islamist demands. With the help of the political authorities, the *grand qadis* sponsored rather peaceful Islamic activities, such as the teaching of Koran, *fiqh*, *hadith*, organising seminars, etc. They also supported a number of new organisations, of which they also served as members of the Boards of Trustees. The *grand qadi* of Maiduguri created the Light of Islam Association (LISA) and distributed a number of free copies of the *Koran*. The *grand qadi* of Kano supported the establishment of two Islamic organisations, Umma based in Sharada ward in Kano, and the Islamic Trust of Nigeria, with its headquarters in Zaria.

Because of the presence of two universities and a number of other institutions of higher learning and high schools in these cities, the Kano-Zaria axis was a zone of Islamist militancy, par excellence.

⁶³ See Umaru Birai, "Islamic Tajdid and the Political Process in Nigeria", *op. cit.*, pp. 23–24.

⁶⁴ For the successes of charismatic and Pentecostal movements in Northern Nigeria, see Mathews Ojo, "The contextual significance of the charismatic movements in independent Nigeria," *Africa*, 58, (2), 1988, p. 175.

The clientele of Umma included a large number of students. It offered Arabic courses for all ages, seminars and also holiday courses. The Islamic Trust of Nigeria (ITN), founded in 1980, developed a research centre and a school and also offered courses for housewives and holiday courses. It also developed a program of rural training and established a number of rural schools, which were staffed by teachers recruited on the spot and paid by the ITN to teach Islamic education. The *grand qadis* also created a somewhat pro-establishment Council of *ulama* in which they co-opted many moderate Islamists. Nevertheless, domestication of the Islamist movement was only partial because the more radical elements would not be satisfied by less than an Islamic state.

By the late 1980s, although disenchantment with the Iranian revolution was emerging in many parts of the Muslim world, this did not affect the hard-core members of the Northern Nigerian Islamist movement. Easily recognisable by the turbans they usually wore, these radicals called themselves brothers, perhaps with reference to the Muslim Brothers, although their opponents labelled them *Yan Shi'a* (Shiites in Hausa) or *Yan System* (advocates of an [Islamic political] system). Until the mid-1990s, they refused to make any concession with the secular state, which they characterized as a *kufr*-oriented-system (a system geared towards unbelief). The most charismatic figure of this radical and somewhat loosely organised group is Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. El-Zakzaky graduated in economics, in 1979, from Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. Having sojourned in Iran after the Islamic revolution, he is said to have encouraged the youth to refuse to attend schools and to abstain from working in any public or private institution whatsoever as long as Nigeria remained a secular state. He also led several campaigns of civil disobedience. In May 1979, El-Zakzaky and his group attacked members of the Club of Palm Wine Drinkers of Ahmadu Bello University Zaria because they drank alcohol. They have also been charged with burning the office of the vice-chancellor and the Senior Staff Club of the same university on May 18, 1979. Expelled from the university for lack of discipline, El-Zakzaky increased his activist campaigns. On May 7, 1980, he organised ten bus loads of students to circulate all day through Zaria city in a demonstration against the state based on the slogans "Down with the Nigerian Constitution"⁶⁵ and "Islam Only."

⁶⁵ The "Muslim radicals" to whom the scholar mentioned at the very beginning

Again in 1980, he circulated throughout Nigeria a pamphlet in Hausa entitled “*Fadakarwa ga Musulmin Nigeria*” (Appeal to the Nigerian Muslims) in which he severely criticised the Nigerian constitution as anti-Islamic and called upon Muslims to rise against the Nigerian Federal Government.⁶⁶

In 1981, he spearheaded another campaign of civil disobedience in the state of Sokoto. Charged with burning the constitution of Nigeria and inciting students to be disrespectful to the constitution, he was jailed for the first time. Released after serving his first term, he was again arrested and jailed following the Kafanchan crisis of 1987.⁶⁷

In 1989, a group of Brothers launched a campaign against *The Standard*, a Plateau State daily newspaper based in Jos, for publishing caricatures ridiculing the Prophet Muhammad. On 28 March 1991, a group of Brothers, allegedly acting on El-Zakzaky’s instructions, sacked the office of the *Daily Time* in Katsina in retaliation, the Brothers argued, for publishing insults to the morality of the Prophet Muhammad.⁶⁸ Many such examples could be cited. Thanks to the jail sentences that he served, El-Zakzaky established himself as the undisputed leader of this faction in Northern Nigeria and, one could even argue, in Nigeria. In Kano, the leader of the Brothers is Aminu Baba Dan Agundi, son of the former District Head of Gwarzo, Baba Dan Agundi.

In addition to the Iranian revolution, another source of inspiration for the Brothers, at least until the early 1990s, was the *jihad* of the Afghan Mujahidines. Many students among those who were attracted by the program of the Brothers began to lose interest in their studies and devote much of their time to praying, fasting, reading the Holy Koran, and proselytising within and outside university campuses. The students, who were haunted by the symbolism of martyrdom as a pre-requisite for the Islamic state displayed posters

of the book was referring as burners of the Nigerian flag are most likely the Brothers. In general, the Yan Izala’s protest is directed not so much against the secular state as the Sufi orders and the larger Islamic community.

⁶⁶ See Kano State Government, *The Views and Comments of the Kano State Government on the Report of the Kano Disturbances Tribunal of Enquiry*, 1981, pp. 146–47.

⁶⁷ In the late 1990s, El-Zakzaky was again serving a jail sentence.

⁶⁸ See *The African Guardian*, April 1991, p. 20 sq.; see also Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*, op. cit., pp. 194–99 for a more detailed analytical account.

of Afghan or Iranian martyrs, which they had obtained from the cultural services of the Iranian embassy. They were supplied on a regular basis with pro-Iranian magazines such as *The Teheran Times*, *Revolution Review*, *Echo of Islam*, *International Crescent* and *Al Muhajjaba* . . . published in Iran, Britain or Nigeria. They were conversant with the writings of the Egyptian Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) and Abdullahi Dan Fodio (d. 1829) a leading nineteenth-century intellectual in Hausaland.⁶⁹

The Brothers, it can be argued, have a somewhat millenarian reading of the following prophetic *hadith* announcing the cyclical arrival of a reformer: "God will send to this community at the end of every century a reformer to regenerate his religion."⁷⁰ Thus, they believe in the imminent outbreak of a *jihad* identical to that of Usman Dan Fodio.

However, the Brothers have resorted to violence only exceptionally. On some occasions, their political positions have won them sympathy among the youth, including the advocates of reformism along Izala lines. As mentioned earlier, most of the Brothers tend to be students or secondary schools pupils. In the early 1990s, the Kano Brothers were based in Sharada ward, and only Muslims of their persuasion were welcomed into their circles. Surprising as it may seem, however, neither the moderate nor the radical Islamists are Shiites as far as the observance of doctrine is concerned. Such Shiite rituals as the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein are not observed. However, Islamists in Northern Nigeria have tended to regularly celebrate the anniversary of the outbreak of the Islamic revolution in Iran.

The reformers and Islamists discussed above were not the only challenge to the religious and political establishment of Kano. In the 1980s, another group of militants, with a much more millenarian orientation, emerged to challenge both the religious and political authorities and, indeed, the larger community. I refer to the the dis-

⁶⁹ See Ahmed Kani, *The Intellectual Origin of the Sokoto Jihad*, Ibadan, Imam Publications, 1405 H, and Shehu Umar Abdullahi, *On the Search for a Viable Political Culture*, Kaduna, NNN Commercial Printing Department, 1984. A somewhat radical Islamic militant and professor in the department of Islamic Studies of Bayero University Kano, Abdullahi gives a revolutionary interpretation of the nineteenth-century *jihad*, which he strives to spread in his courses and seminars.

⁷⁰ See Wensinck 1, p. 324 a, *Mishkat al-masabih* 1, 82, n. 247 compilation of Abu Dawud quoted in Ali Merad, *Le réformisme musulman en Algérie*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

ciples of Maitatsine known as *Yan tatsine* in Hausa. Given the large-scale violence associated with the ultimate suppression of the *Yan tatsine* riots and that the evidence gathered has been produced by sources against the *Yan tatsine*, and, although a detailed study of the *Yan tatsine* is beyond the scope of this study, I shall nevertheless present newly gathered evidence that sheds more light on the very complex *Yan tatsine* phenomenon and amends interpretations of it advanced by other authors.

Millenarian Islam in Post-oil Boom Kano

Before entering into any discussion of the movement led by Maitatsine,⁷¹ it is appropriate to recall that millenarianism refers to a tradition found in Jewish apocalyptic scriptures and revelations to Saint John. It is based on the belief that Christ will come back to earth in the guise of a warrior to vanquish the devil and set up a kingdom in which he will rule a thousand years before the resurrection.⁷² Sociologically, a millenarian movement designates a particular kind of salvation religion.⁷³ Millenarian movements project a collective vision of salvation in that the faithful should benefit from salvation as community; salvation is this-worldly in that it must take place on earth, it is imminent in that it should occur soon; total in that it will completely transform life on earth and miraculous in that it will be accomplished by or with the help of supernatural agents.⁷⁴

To a large extent, these features of millenarianism are found within the *Yan tatsine* movement, which led to the violent riots that erupted in the cities of Northern Nigeria during the first half of the 1980s. The most deadly of the riots occurred in Kano between the 18th and 29th of December, in 1980. According to official sources, by the end of the mayhem, the number of people killed was 4,177, whereas unofficial sources estimate casualties at double this figure. A second riot occurred in Bulumkutu (Borno State) between the 26th

⁷¹ Information about the *Yan tatsine* riots was provided by a reliable witness of the events.

⁷² See Yonina Talmon, "Millenarian movements," *Archives européennes de sociologie*, (7), 2, 1966, pp. 159–200, p. 159.

⁷³ See Norman Cohn, *Les fanatiques de l'apocalypse*, Paris, Payot, 1983, p. 9.

⁷⁴ See Yonina Talmon, "Millenarian movements," *op. cit.*, p. 159.

and 29th of October, in 1982, which claimed the lives of 350 people, including 15 policemen. On October 26th some disciples of Maitatsine who had survived the Bulumkutu riot headed for Rigasa village on the outskirts of Kaduna city. The village head of Rigasa, who suspected them to be members of the outlawed sect, reported their presence to the police. They were arrested, brought before the Area Court of Rigasa, but later freed for lack of evidence of their involvement in any unlawful activity. They subsequently returned to Rigasa. However, *Yan tatsine* from neighbouring villages soon joined this initial group. On 29 October, the police of Kaduna, in a state of alert after the Bulumkutu riots, were informed of the growing number of suspected *Yan tatsine* in Rigasa. A police patrol undertook a visit to the scene and called upon the *Yan tatsine* to surrender. The latter, who numbered 500 men and were armed with rifles, swords, cutlasses, clubs and spears, assaulted the policemen. Outnumbered by the rioters, the police retreated. Two policemen were killed, including the assistant commissioner of police of Kaduna State. Encouraged by their triumph over the policemen, the rioters reportedly started to set fire to houses in Rigasa and kill their occupants. The civil population, at that juncture, decided to take charge of its own defence. At the end of the riot, 53 people were dead and 117 were arrested by the police forces.

Again, between 27 February and 5 March 1984, another riot, believed to have been instigated by *Yan tatsine*, broke out in Jimeta-Yola (Gongola State) and claimed hundreds of victims. The following year, on 26 April 1985, a fifth riot took place in Pantami ward in Gombe city. Its suppression was as deadly as that of Yola had been.

Paul Lubeck and Guy Nicholas emphasized socioeconomic factors in their analysis of the *Yan tatsine*. To summarise a somewhat sophisticated argument, Lubeck⁷⁵ identifies the social base of the *Yan tatsine* as *gardawa* or *almajirai*. According to Lubeck, the pattern of migration and the nature of *almajirai* activities were very much suited to the colonial urban economy and the ecological conditions in Hausaland. Alongside their studies, *Koranic* students would grow crops during the rainy season and migrate to urban areas where they could

⁷⁵ See Paul Lubeck, "Islamic Protest under semi industrial capitalism: *Yan Tatsine* explained," *Africa*, 55 (4), 1985, pp. 369-89.

work during the dry season. This pattern of movement enabled them to conserve stocks of grains left in rural areas while earning a living and studying during the longer dry season in urban areas. With the postcolonial decline of the rural economy, many of them were forced to settle in the cities where the decline of craft industries made it difficult to find paid work. Hence, they antagonised all those who possessed the goods of which they were deprived.

Likewise, Guy Nicholas, traces the roots of the riots to the economic and social transformations precipitated by the petroleum boom, the pattern of consumption and behaviour it induced and the frustrations it caused those who did not benefit from the new prosperity. He concludes that:

Unable to orient their revolt towards revolutionary or populist trends, these people are tempted to deviate in the direction of imaginary outcomes that situate hope beyond a purifying transgression. Under similar circumstances, the emergence of a charismatic individual with strong leadership capacities may raise high expectations. Such may have been one of the factors accounting for Maitatsine's appeal.⁷⁶

A second interpretation has been proposed by the late Mervyn Hiskett who invokes communal tensions to explain the *Yan tatsine* riots.⁷⁷ Considering the inadequate knowledge of the Hausa language by the *Yan tatsine*, including Maitatsine himself, and accepting uncritically the accusations of cannibalism levelled against the *Yan tatsine*, Hiskett argues that the majority of those who were involved in the outbreak of the Kano riots were not Hausa but mainly a mixture of Zabarmawa, Dakarkaris, and other natives of Plateau and Gongola States, non-Hausa seasonal migrants (*Yan ci rani*). He also contends that only a few *almajirai* and some deranged *gardawa* joined the rioters.⁷⁸ Unlike the Hausa *almajirai* or *gardawa* who are well-versed in Islamic studies, the *Yan ci rani*, according to Hiskett, were considered ordinary migrants. Even though nothing prevented them from studying, they usually did not try to acquire knowledge. Their motivation was first and foremost anti-Hausa and anti-intellectual, according to Hiskett, who concludes that economic factors had not been determinant.

⁷⁶ See Guy Nicolas, "Guerre sainte à Kano," *Politique Africaine*, 1, (4), Nov. 1981, pp. 47–68, p. 61 (translation mine).

⁷⁷ See Mervyn Hiskett, "The Maitatsine riots in Kano, 1980. An assessment," *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 17, (3), 1987, pp. 209–23.

⁷⁸ See Mervyn Hiskett, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

It seems to me that both interpretations lack precision regarding the social base of the *Yan tatsine*, which can best be understood in the context of the modus operandi of the rural Islamic school (*tsangaya*), which I discussed in chapter two. In Northern Nigeria and many other parts of West Africa for that matter, parents surrendered their children to the care of *alarama* (head of the *tsangaya*) who raised them, taught them the *Koran* and inculcated in them religious values. Children studying with an *alarama*, in principle, lived with him until they had memorized the *Koran*. It must be noted that, from the 1970s, *alarama*'s clientele tended to be from rural origin because in urban areas, the majority of children tended to enrol in expanding Islamiyya schools. Newly enrolled children in a *tsangaya* were taken far away from their homes by the *alarama*. Tradition presumes that remoteness, suffering and frustration are necessary conditions for acquiring knowledge. As Murray Last rightly maintains:⁷⁹

Hausa culture presumes that poverty and hardship are a necessary part of character-building and appropriate for the young. Just as there is a hungry season in the annual farming cycle, so too the young are expected to go hungry even when the work load is at the hardest, the harvest, and fatness of middle age, will come in due time, if the work is done well.

The following Hausa sayings are very illustrative of how deeply those beliefs are rooted in popular consciousness: *Karatu sai da bakunta* (One can not acquire knowledge if one does not leave home). *Karatu sai da karanchin abinci* (One must experience hunger in order to acquire knowledge).⁸⁰

Maitatsine was a very famous *alarama* who had settled in Yan Awaki ward, in Kano in the 1940s. His reputation was based on the belief that he was able to provide *rubutun sha* (a kind of sacred water), which enabled a person who drank it to quickly memorise

⁷⁹ See Murray Last, "The power of youth, youth of power," paper presented at the International conference, *La Jeunesse en Afrique. Encadrement et rôle dans la société contemporaine. Héritages, mutations, avenir*. Centre d'études africaines, Paris, 6-8 December 1990, pp. 11-12.

⁸⁰ See Isa A. Aba, "Bara by Some Almajirai in Kano City in the Twentieth Century, Critical Assessment," in Bawuro Barkindo (ed.), *Studies in the History of Kano*, Ibadan, Heinemann Educational Books, 1983, pp. 193-206, p. 196; Suleyman Jami'u, "Socio-economic factors behind the religious disturbances in Nigeria. A case study of Maitatsine syndrome," Master's diss. in Islamic Studies, Bayero University Kano, 1986, p. 100.

the Koran. Most of the *gardawa* going to Kano were advised by fellow *gardawa* to approach Maitatsine, either to learn the Koran quickly or to acquire supernatural powers. Indeed, many *gardawa* would seek spiritual power and a following, and would ally with the devil to acquire it. Little evidence supports Hiskett's argument that only a few deranged *almajirai* or *gardawa* were involved in the Kano riots because *gardawa* are too pious to indulge in obscure practices.

I would agree with Lubeck that during the late 1970s, the Nigerian rural world declined to the extent that many *almajirai*, who normally remained in urban areas only for the duration of the dry season, now tended to settle there. Those conditions paved the way for a considerable increase of Maitatsine's constituency of *almajirai*. Most of the *gardawa* arriving in Kano were informed of the presence of an *alarama* with considerable supernatural powers and would go to Yan Awaki quarters to pay allegiance to Maitatsine and stay with him.

A large portion of Maitatsine's constituency was composed of *gardawa* who supported him unconditionally. They were real luddites, who rejected the material culture of modern urban life: watches, bicycles, cars, radios, modern medicine. An *almajiri* would rather allow a wound to fester for several months, indeed die from it, than seek care in the "hospital of *kuffar*" (infidels).

Another factor that exacerbated tensions between the *Yan tansine* and the larger community was the attempt to regulate the *spiritual economy* in the late 1970s. On the initiative of the then Chief of Army Staff, Shehu Musa Yaraduwa, four high Muslim authorities met to settle the conflict between reformers and partisans of Sufi Islam, which had generated so much tension in Northern Nigeria. These authorities were Shaykh Abubakar Gumi for the reformers, Nasiru Kabara for the Qadiriyya and Ismail Khalifa and Shaykh Sharif Ibrahim Salih for the Tijaniyya. The meeting lasted three days and ended with the solemn signing of an agreement in the presence of the then Sultan of Sokoto, Abubakar III, in his palace.⁸¹

The most important point of the agreement was an instruction that, henceforth, preaching permits issued by emirs would be required for conducting any preaching whatsoever. Any cleric who wished to

⁸¹ For the complete text of the agreement, see Sokoto Emirate Council document ref. n° EMC/S175/Vol./126. The author is grateful to Ismail Khalifa for supplying a copy of the document.

preach would be required to take an exam, which would certify his sound knowledge of the Islamic sciences, including knowledge of the Koran, exegesis, jurisprudence and Arabic grammar. Clerics of the *almajiri* system were de facto ruled out, because they specialised solely in the memorisation of the Koran, without even understanding its meaning and had no training in the other religious sciences. Although Izala and Sufi clerics could easily obtain preaching permits, it was a different story for the *almajirai*. This contributed significantly to their marginalization and the creation of tensions between them and other Muslims, whom they began to attack and anathematize.

Abubakar Rimi, the then governor of Kano, was believed by some to have been a member of another division of Maitatsine's constituency, which was composed of very honourable persons who relied on his supernatural powers in their own search for power and influence. As the *Yan tatsine* began to disrupt the public order (including unlawfully occupying private homes), Governor Rimi called upon Maitatsine and his followers to leave the city. Maitatsine refused to comply, and the police were obliged to intervene. The *Yan tatsine*, who believed they would be able to defeat the police or would go to paradise if they died, assaulted the police and indeed defeated them in December 1980. The inhabitants of Yan Awaki quarter fled and left the area to the *Yan tatsine*. After some delay, the federal army intervened and crushed the rioters in 24 hours with the extensive loss of life described above.

In this chapter, I have tried to describe the rise of new religious groups and the subsequent fragmentation of sacred authority. Among these new groups, the reformers exerted the most profound influence. As I shall document, the reformers provided religious justification for the emancipation of their clientele from social obligations and the domination of the elders. In short, they will become effective *mediators of social change*.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SOCIAL BASE OF THE YAN IZALA

As discussed in the introduction, many scholars have argued that members of contemporary Islamic movements tend to be products of the modern world—urban-based with modern education. The Yan Izala movement and most of the contemporary Islamic movements in Northern Nigeria discussed earlier are no exception. The following description of the social base of the Yan Izala movement in Kano reflects to a considerable extent its constituency at the local level throughout Northern Nigeria and perhaps nationally.

Employing the degree and nature of involvement in the movement's activities as criteria of classification, I shall distinguish between two segments within the membership. First, there is the leadership. They are actively engaged in spreading the worldview and socioreligious ideologies of the movement, either by the time they devote (the religious subsegment of the leadership) or the material assistance that they provide to that effect (the patrons). The second segment or sympathisers are actors persuaded by the interpretation of Islam that the Yan Izala movement advocates. In their great majority, they do not have the expertise of the preachers, nor do they provide the kind of material support that the patrons contribute. The analysis of the social background of the membership of the Society that follows is illustrated by brief biographies.

The Religious Subsegment of the Leadership

This subsegment of the leadership is made of *ulama* who also call themselves preachers (*masu waazi*) in Hausa. They have a solid expertise in Islamic religious science acquired in modern schools in general and devote much of their time to teaching, preaching, and advocating the movement's ideology. Given their central role in recruiting new converts, they deserve particular attention.

I present here four biographies of preachers, who have not been chosen randomly, but are very representative of the religious leadership.

The first biography is that of Usman M. Imam the vice president of the committee of *ulama* in Jos. The second is that of Shaykh L. Sulayman who had been, until 1988, one of the spearheads of the Society and the coordinator of its religious activities in the Brigade Zone in Kano. The third biography is that of A. Hamid, Imam of the Bayero University Friday mosque and chairman of the Kano committee of *ulama* of the Yan Izala movement. He has been active in the Bayero University zone. The fourth portrait is that of Malam J. Katsina, a leading activist of the Society, particularly in the Fagge zone in Kano.

A consideration of their pedigrees will shed light on the common denominators that are present in their careers and illustrate that most of them tend to have a similar social background and itinerary.

Usman M. Imam

Usman M. Imam was the vice president of the National Committee of Ulama of the Society at the beginning of the 1990s. He was born in 1948 in a village situated in Kano State where he also commenced his Koranic education. Later he studied religious sciences especially grammar and jurisprudence and was initiated into Arabic language and poetry. In 1964, he settled at Soba, a village near Zaria, where he stayed until 1965. Then he went back to Kano and stayed with a clerk in a village called Nata'ala to study religious sciences. He married in 1965, and in 1966, returned to his village, Faskammagi. In 1967, his father sent him to Kano where he continued his studies in religious sciences until 1968. In his youth, his time was shared between the search for knowledge during the dry season and work on the farm during the rainy season.

At the death of his father in 1969, he went to stay with his brother in Jos, a city in Northern Nigeria. There, he was admitted into a school called Madarasat Jama'at Nasr al-Islam, which depended on the JNI. He was groomed by Shaykh Muslim Khan, a Muslim scholar from Pakistan who was paid by the World Islamic League to teach in that school. Having gone through Shaykh Khan's teachings, he found the reform ideology appealing. Later he passed the Junior Secondary Examinations and went to Gombe Teachers College in Bauchi State where he studied from 1970 to 1979. He returned to live in the city of Jos and at the same time taught in Bauchi State between 1981 and 1982. He obtained the higher Islamic studies

certificate. Between 1980 and 1985, he studied at Bayero University, Kano. On completion, he was admitted into the University of Maiduguri in a department of Arabic, Islamic Studies and Hausa Studies, where he obtained a degree known as diploma and returned to Jos.

‘Each time I listen to Shaykh Gumi’s criticisms levelled against the Sufi orders,’ he confided in me,¹ ‘I asked Shaykh Muslim Khan if the criticisms were founded and he will respond in the affirmative. I started to study the books of theology, *Fath al majid* and *Kitab al Tawhid*² from Shaykh Muslim Khan. Moreover Shaykh Ismail Idriss who would become the chairman of the committee of ulama of the Society at the national level gave religious talks where he equally denounced the heterodoxy of the Sufi orders. I introduced myself to him and followed his courses in Arabic and theology (*tawhid*). Then in 1978, I was a member of the constituent committee of the Society. In 1979, Shaykh Ismail Idriss constructed a school called Islamiyya primary school and made me the head.’

Shaykh L. Sulayman

Shaykh L. Sulayman was born around 1938 in Mai Ruwa, a village in Funtua Local Government (Kaduna State) in Northern Nigeria. A son and grandson of *imams*, he started studying the Koran in his village. When he was ten years old—around 1948, his father sent him to the city of Guru in Borno State, Northern Nigeria where the *ulama* are famous for their training in the memorisation of the Koran. For ten years, Shaykh L. Sulayman studied the Koran and farmed during the rainy season. He travelled to different places in the dry season, like the *almajirai*. By the time he had reached the age of twenty, he had memorised the Koran and had returned to his native village to undertake studies in the Islamic sciences. After a year spent there, he moved to Kano city. To make a living, he manufactured and sold traditional hats (*hula* pl. *huluna*). After seven years of residence in Kano, around 1965, he moved back to the village of Mai Ruwa to teach the memorisation of the Koran, Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and Koranic exegesis (*tafsir*). A year later, in 1966, he went to Kaduna city where he resided until 1974 in Shaykh Abubakar Gumi’s house, which, it must be noted, was very accessible to students. Like many other former preachers of the Society,

¹ Interview with U.M.I., Jos and Kano, September 1990.

² For further on that, see next chapter.

he studied with Shaykh Abubakar Gumi until he was awarded a preaching certificate of the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam and then moved back to Kano to preach. He settled in 1974 in the Brigade ward in the city of Kano, teaching during the daytime and preaching in the evenings. Having started to preach on Shaykh Abubakar Gumi's behalf, he clashed with other Muslims over the ideas he was trying to propagate. He then renounced attending the community's mosque and built his own mosque in 1978. Gradually, a number of petty traders (*yan kasuwa*) expressed their loyalty to him and started attending his mosque and providing him with material support. In 1979, he was admitted to a school named Government Arabic Teachers, College Gwale in Kano city, where he earned a degree the "Higher Islamic Studies Certificate" in 1984.

A. Hamid

Born around 1922, in Maiduguri, Borno State, A. Hamid is a member of the Shuwa Arab ethnic group. The Shuwa Arabs constitute an estimated 20% of the population of Borno State, Northern Nigeria. Based essentially in the arid zones of the northeast of Borno and in the fertile lands around Lake Chad, they constitute the majority of the Nigerian herdsmen population.³ The drought of the 1970s decimated their cattle and led to a considerable decline in their living standards, forcing perhaps 500,000 of them to migrate.⁴ Many of them settled in the major urban centres and particularly in Kano and Kaduna, but some as far away as Lagos in the south of the country.

Such was the background of A. Hamid who memorised the Koran in 1935, but never pursued any further training in the Islamic sciences. Nor did he have access to formal education for many years. In constant migration to seek better pastures and escape the heavy taxation imposed on their cattle, the Shuwa Arabs are among the most disadvantaged Nigerians as far as formal education is concerned.

I lived a good part of my lifetime without any rudimentary religious knowledge, not even knowing how to perform ablutions for prayers, contenting myself with reciting the Koran only.⁵

³ See Muhammad Hassan Tom, "The Plight of One Million Nigerian Arabs," *Hotline*, (76), June 1991, p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Interview with A. Hamid in Arabic (translation mine), Kano, summer of 1988.

In about 1968, he enrolled in the “Provincial Arabic Courses” in Maiduguri and started to receive training in Islamic studies. For one year, he was initiated in Arabic grammar, Islamic jurisprudence, and the science of traditions (*ʿilm al-hadith*). In 1969, he succeeded in qualifying in examination for teaching Arabic to beginners and subsequently got an appointment as a teacher in the city of Maiduguri. After teaching a year and a half, he gained entrance to the Department of Higher Islamic Studies of the School of Arabic Studies of Kano where, in addition to furthering his religious studies, he studied mathematics, English, and Hausa. Upon completion of his studies, he entered Bayero University, Kano to prepare his “diploma” in Islamic studies, which he obtained in 1977. By then, he was 55 years old. In 1979, he was appointed imam of the Bayero University main mosque. He joined the clientele of preachers of Shaykh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi and was awarded the preaching certificate of the JNI by him. He rejected the Tijaniyya to which he had been affiliated prior to that, joined the Society, and became one of the leaders of the Society in Kano. Throughout the month of Ramadan of 1989, the author attended the sermons that he gave at the Bayero mosque during which A. Hamid missed no opportunity to denounce Sufi Islam and declare the local Sufi orders and their leaders infidels:

It is not me who is declaring them infidels. It is the Holy Koran which says: he who does not judge by which Allah has revealed, such are the unbelievers (Koran, 5-43), he who does not judge by which Allah has revealed, such are the unjust (Koran, 5-44), he who does not judge by which Allah had revealed, such are the evildoers (Koran, 5-47).⁶

A. Hamid was so aggressive in denouncing the Sufi orders in his preaching that the academic authorities suspended him from his functions as Friday imam in 1989, most probably for the interest of a peaceful coexistence between the Muslim communities of different doctrinal persuasions operating within the university.

J. Katsina

J. Katsina was born in Daura, Katsina State around 1962. In 1969, he became a Koranic student (*almajiri*) and travelled in different parts

⁶ Interview with the author in Arabic (translation mine), August 1988.

of the country with his teacher (*malam*) until 1975. They went to Tagwayen kuka, a small village in Northern Nigeria, then he went to the city of Gombe in former Bauchi State, and even spent some time in the neighbouring Niger Republic. By 1979, when he settled in Kano, he had already memorised the Koran. He began to deepen his religious knowledge by spending time with some *malams* there, many of whom took advantage of his Koranic expertise to ask him to manufacture charms, amulets, and sacred water (*rubutun sha*) for their clientele. By the end of 1980, he had already learned some basic books on Islamic studies, including *al-Akhdari*,⁷ *Ashmawiyya*,⁸ *Al-muqaddima al-'izziyya* by Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhili⁹ and the *Arba'una ahadith* (Forty *hadiths*) of imam al-Nawawi¹⁰ and had begun to study modern Arabic from textbooks for beginners. In 1982, he began to attend the Masallaci Adult Evening Classes to study Arabic and English in Kano. After two years, he was able to sustain a conversation in Arabic. From 1983, he attended classes at the Egyptian Cultural Centre of Kano, where a graduate of Al-Azhar University, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Ali al-Mustafa, offered courses on Koranic exegesis, *tafsir* and the art of the psalmody of the Koran *tajwid*:

When I told Shaykh Mustafa that I knew the Holy Koran by heart, he encouraged me to learn the art of psalmody of the Koran (*tajwid*) a word, which I never heard before. During one year, he taught me every evening the art of reciting the Koran until I had mastered it completely. He then encouraged me to enter a governmental school.¹¹

In 1987, J. Katsina won the competition in Koranic recitation organised by the University of Sokoto to select Nigerian representatives for the annual international competition held in Saudi Arabia. J. Katsina came in fifth at the international contest. On his return from Saudi Arabia, he became quite visible due to his committed involvement with the Izala reformist agenda. In 1989, he obtained a scholarship to continue his studies in the Islamic University of Madina in Saudi Arabia.

⁷ 'Abd Al-Rahman b. Muhammad al-Saghir al-Akhdari al-Buntyusi al-Maliki (d. 1585) *Mukhtasar fi 'l-'ibadat 'ala madhhab al-imam Malik*, See GAL II, 83, S II, 96.

⁸ See chapter three.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Interview with J. Katsina in Arabic (translation mine), Kano, September 1989.

Having presented four short biographies of preachers in Kano, let me now identify their common denominator to draw some conclusions about the sociology of the religious leadership of the Society.

The common denominator is that all four are settlers (as opposed to natives) where they were based. Usman M. Imam (from Kano) is a recent immigrant in Jos. So are Shaykh L. Suleyman (from Kaduna), J. Katsina (from Daura) and A. Hamid (from Maiduguri). All lived and operated outside the *Birni* (walled city), respectively in Brigade, Fagge and Bayero University (old campus) zones. A geographic survey I carried out in the beginning of the 1990s of the implantation of the Society in Kano revealed that it was in these three zones (Fagge, Brigade, Bayero University) that the reformers had the widest support. A good number of the Yan Izala in Kano tended to be settlers or sons of settlers. I would venture the hypothesis that, in addition to the search for emancipation from the traditional order, it was the inability of these settlers to fully integrate into existing communities that accounted for the appeal of the Society to them.

In spite of their determining role in the spread of reformist ideology, the preachers would not have carried as much weight as they did without the protection of “the patrons”, as they call them.

The Patrons

Three biographies will be considered here—Muhammad Habib gado-damasu, A.K. Daiyyabu, and Malam Lawan—all are prominent sponsors of the Society in Kano.

Muhammad Habib gado-da-masu

The son of M. Sarki Dawakin Yari, Muhammad Habib gado-damasu was born into a traditional ruling family in 1930. After teaching for a while in Shahuci Provincial School in Kano, his father was appointed headmaster of the Dambatta elementary school in Dambatta, where Muhammad Habib was born. When he was seven years old, Muhammad Habib entered the Dambatta Elementary School. He went on to Judicial School Shahuci, where he studied between 1943 and 1947. He was subsequently admitted to the School of Arabic Studies in Kano, from which he obtained his General Certificate of Education, ordinary level. In April 1950, he obtained his first

appointment at the Native Authorities Printing Press. Sometime in the early 1950s, after the appointment of his father as district head of Gwarzo, he moved to that city and worked as a junior scribe in the native authorities. In 1954, his father died, and he moved back to Kano to work at the central administration of the native authorities. In 1955, with the boom of the manufacturing sector, he was transferred to the administration of cooperative societies set up by the Native Authorities. His position consisted mainly in training northerners to create their own companies. In 1965, he became the Native Authorities' paymaster. In 1973, he was appointed district head of *Waje* in Kano, making him the representative of the emir in the following wards: Sabon Gari, Tudun Wada, Fagge, Brigade, Gama, Gama Kori, Gama Tudu and Kantin Kwari. In 1978, he was transferred to Gwaran as district head. Then, he was dismissed from the Native Authorities for reasons unknown to me:

I was initiated into the Tijaniyya in 1948. I observed all its rituals in all sincerity for years until the day I read the *Riyad al-salihin*, sometime in the early 1950s. When commenting on the Koranic verse: *Inna Allah wa mala'ikatahu yusalluna 'ala al-nabi'* (God and his angels pray for the Prophet . . .) Imam al-Nawawi, the author, argued that when this verse was revealed, the companions of the Prophet asked the latter how they should pray for him. At that moment, Angel Gabriel descended from the sky to reveal to the Prophet how prayer for him should be performed. The *Riyad al-salihin* quoted thirteen prayers for the Prophet recommended by the latter. I was quite intrigued that the *salat al-fatih*, better than the Koran according to the Tijaniyya, was not mentioned among the prayers that the Prophet recommended. This cast serious doubt in my mind about the orthodoxy of the Tijaniyya. From then, I would practice *Tijani* rituals only once in a while, in my leisure hours. Then, I heard the sermons of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi aired on the radio and published in *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo* in which he drew attention to heterodox beliefs contained in the books exposing the doctrines of the Sufi orders. He particularly warned against reciting the *salat al-fatih*, which contradicted the teachings of orthodox Islam. As I started carrying out investigations on the origins of the Sufi orders, I discovered that their Islam was completely heterodox, not only that, but they were enemies of Islam. The Koran says that: *man qatala mu'minan muta'ammidan, jaza'uhu jahannam*. (He who kills a believer on purpose, his retribution is Hell fire). The Tijanis said that he who killed seventy believers and recites the *salat al-fatih* once is redeemed from his sins. They further said that he who recites the *salat al-fatih* once has the reward of a hundred thousand people having worshipped the Almighty God a hundred thousand years. They also said that he who recites the *salat al-fatih* once has a reward equal to that of seventy

messengers of God, including Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. That is why myself and a bunch of people have realised that the Tijaniyya was a new religion. The only reason why people join the Tijaniyya is that it promises salvation, including to people who have committed all the sins in the world. He who affiliates with the Sufi orders is guaranteed to be saved. Another reason why our people join the Sufi orders is their love of wealth. The Sufi orders pretend that their leaders hold the keys of enrichment and impoverishment. All those who want to get rich without making efforts become members of the Sufi orders. At some point, paradise was being sold to the people. Badges with the effigy of Sufi leaders were stuck on the shroud of the dead persons with the promise that they would go to paradise without accounting for their deeds on the day of judgement.¹²

Two stages need to be distinguished to understand properly Muhammad Habib's itinerary. The first stage dates back to the early 1950s when he began to have doubts about the orthodoxy of some Tijani beliefs, although he did not reject them. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, he was affiliated with the Tijaniyya, which was a very popular social movement in Kano

However, when Muhammad Habib became district head in the 1970 of an area of Kano city known as Waje and located outside the walled city, he became very supportive of the Society. Part of the reasons may be that the Society was very popular in the area of Waje, which fell under his authority as a traditional ruler. As mentioned earlier, he financially supported preachers and followers of the Society very actively. Also, whenever members of the Society had problems with the political authorities in connection with their preaching, he would intervene on their behalf.

*A.K. Daiyyabu*¹³

In his own words, "born at Zage Quarters in the old city of Kano in 1945, A.K. Daiyyabu is the son of Malam A. Daiyyaby who was a well-known merchant who traded in leather and skins, crocodiles, Iquana, and snakes. Also, in the history of yoghurt processing in Kano, Malam Daiyyabu would be placed among the pioneers. As

¹² Interview with Muhammad Habib gado-da-masu carried out in Hausa in Kano, October 1990 (translation mine).

¹³ Based on a written autobiography, which A. Daiyyabu kindly provided to the author and other material collected in the field.

was common with Muslims, A.K. Daiyyabu started his education attending a Koranic school and later studied some Arabic and Islamic subject matters. He also attended Kano Teachers College, now Advanced Teachers' College, and was among its first graduates. Between 1965 and 1967, he served as a teacher in Tudun Wada, Jarkasa, and Gwammaja primary Schools, all in Kano. Starting as a primary school teacher, he rose to the post of headmaster. His contact with the business world, other than at his family level, started at the CFAO General Import Nigeria Limited, Kano where he worked as a salesman rising to sales manager and a head of department, from 1968 to 1972. A.K. Daiyyabu established his own business company, A.K.D. & Company, Nigeria Limited in 1973, which gained membership in the Kano Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture. A.K. Daiyyabu, as the chairman, attends and represents the company at the regular meetings of the Chamber. A.K. Daiyyabu was first elected as vice-president in 1979, later deputy-president and, in 1982 and 1983, as the president of the chamber. In those capacities, he had toured all the states of the Nigerian federation and visited many parts of Europe, the United States of America, the Middle East, and the Far East, leading, in most cases, important trade missions under the auspices of the chamber. A.K. Daiyyabu had been a director of the Kano State Urban Development Board and the Arewa Hotels Development, Limited. He was a member of the Justice Layiola Commission of the Kano State Public Utility Committee. A.K. Daiyyabu has also been the chairman of the Nigeria Association of Care and Resettlement of Offends (NACRO) in Kano State and has served in the seven-member study group on industrial policy appointed by the federal military government in August 1984."

Also, as I was told by other sources, A.K. Daiyyabu was also a former member of the People Redemption Party of Malam Aminu, Kano in the very early stages of the Second Republic (late 1970s) and was very close to Abubakar Rimi, the then governor of Kano State. He then affiliated with the National Party of Nigeria of former President Shehu Shagari. Access to a position of leadership turned out to be difficult for him in the NPN,¹⁴ and he abandoned

¹⁴ Jibrin Ibrahim has documented the extent to which access to the state proved difficult for many political entrepreneurs. See Jibrin Ibrahim, *L'accès à l'Etat: Classes*

the NPN for the UPN of Obafemi Awolowo. Under the banner of the latter, he contested the 1983 gubernatorial elections in Kano, but was badly beaten by Sabo Bakin Zuwo.

In the late 1980s, he became visible as a protector of the Yan Izala. In 1986 and 1987, he succeeded in being appointed temporary chairman of the Society in Kano, replacing Shaykh L. Suleyman. In 1988, the Kano Committee of Ulama elected him as chairman. His election was sanctioned by the National Council of Ulama based in Jos.

Malam Lawan

Born in Kano in the 1930s, Malam Lawan is quite a successful businessman trading in spare parts for cars. He was a former disciple of the Tijaniyya and had supported Tijani local leaders for years. Moreover, he had visited the mother *zawiya* of the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya in Kaolack-Senegal and, for many years entertained visitors from Kaolack. Having lived within the *Birni* for years, he moved to the major commercial road located at Fagge, perhaps during the late 1970s–early 1980s. In the 1980s, he adopted the ideology of the Society. The mosque he built in the vicinity of his house became the third major mosque attended by supporters of the movement in Kano, especially the businessmen of Fagge (the two others are Bayero University's mosque and another main Yan Izala mosque in Fagge). The businessmen of Fagge attend his mosque to perform the five daily prayers and audit courses on various religious subjects offered there by the members of the religious leadership of the Society.¹⁵

My guess is that Malam Lawan must have been grappling with the thorny contradiction of managing a business while, at the same time, trying to satisfy heavy social obligations, not the least of which was to support financially his Sufi masters. Rejecting the Tijaniyya and adopting Izala liberated him from these heavy social and financial obligations. However, worthy of note is the fact that he had to move from the *Birni* to openly support Izala. If my supposition about the economic rationality of Malam Lawan's conversion to reform Islam

sociales, elites, factions, une étude du National Party of Nigeria, Ph.D. diss. in political science, CEAN IEP de Bordeaux, 1991.

¹⁵ Information concerning him was provided by members of the Tijaniyya and besides that, the author attended his mosque for a while during his field work.

is correct, it can explain the fact that so many businessmen are joining Izala in major urban areas of Northern Nigeria.

A common denominator in the itineraries of these three patrons of the Society in Kano is that all three wanted to be emancipated from the domination of the Sufi orders and to distance themselves from social and financial obligations to better manage their own businesses. Also, the search for a clientele was a major concern for all economic and political entrepreneurs. Because the Society effectively appealed to the urban youth, joining it and sponsoring its activities was a good means for building a following.

One obvious conclusion that can be drawn about the sociology of the leadership of the Society is that patrons tend to come from privileged backgrounds, whereas preachers tend to come from lower social backgrounds. Consequently, joining the Society does not have the same meaning for the two different segments of the leadership. To use Weberian categories, conversion corresponded to "demands for compensation" for the religious leadership, whereas for the patrons, it was motivated by "demands for legitimisation." The patrons, who already had a privileged social position sought to enhance their authority and their power of material and symbolic domination. Such a possibility was limited by their membership in Sufi orders, which placed them under the tutelage of Sufi leaders.

The Sympathisers

The Society recruited sympathisers from different backgrounds, who attended the preaching sermons (*waazi*) and courses (*darasi*) offered by the *ulama* of the Society. Sympathisers accepted to be led only by the Izala *ulama* in the daily prayers, the Friday prayers and the major Islamic festivals. Students, faculty, and other administrative staff make up the most significant part of the Izala following attending Bayero University mosque, whereas the mosques of Brigade and Fagge are heavily attended by artisans, traders, and middle men. Brief biographies of these different categories are presented below, starting with the students.

Some Student Sympathisers

This category of sympathisers constitutes a significant component of Izala's following. Three biographies are presented: G. Sabo b. 1966, A. Jamil b. 1964, B. Salisu b. 1965.

G. Sabo

Born in the rural village of Garko, Wudil Local Government Area in 1966, G. Sabo was orphaned shortly after his birth. He was subsequently cared for by his uncle. From 1971, he entered Garko Central Primary School, and, at the same time pursued Koranic studies in a local *makarantan allo* (Koranic school).¹⁶

Almost all the population of Garko was affiliated with the Tijaniyya order, including my late parents. Thus, during my youth, although I, and for that matter young people of my age, were not formally affiliated with the Tijaniyya, we were very much influenced by the Sufi orders. During my first year in secondary school, I heard of Izala for the first time. Our school teachers warned us against listening to adepts of Izala because 'they were all doomed to damnation'. We were told that they had no respect for their elders and relatives, that they would assault people without any reason. We were even told that some Izala chaps went as far as giving their mothers boxes of milk (in compensation for having nursed them) and their fathers cola nuts (representing part of the dowry offered to marry their mother) and a ram (slaughtered the day of the celebration of their birth) and then said to them: here is the reimbursement of the expenses you incurred for us. After that, they would change their names. So, we started hating them in earnest, so much so that we would call any mate with whom we lost out temper "dan Izala" (disciple of Izala).

In 1978, G. Sabo began his secondary education in Government Secondary School, Wudil, sponsored by Wudil Local Government. From that period, he spent his holidays either in Garko or in the city of Gombe. In Gombe, he would help his brother, who was a farmer and ran a small business at the same time. There he made his first encounter with Izala.

Before I left for Gombe, I was particularly warned against the Yan Izala. There, I found separate mosques for the Yan Izala and the Yan *tariqa* (followers of Sufi orders). At the beginning, I only attended mosques of the Yan *tariqa*. My brother, with whom I lived, used to

¹⁶ Interview in Kano carried out in English, Fall 1989.

be a disciple of the Tijaniyya. When he went to Gombe, he became a member of Izala. [...] Of course, on the weekly Muslim Friday prayers, each of the Yan Izala and Yan Tariqa prayed in their separate Friday mosques. One day in 1981, I intended to go to the Yan *tariqa* mosque to pray, but an acquaintance dragged me into the Izala Friday mosque. For the first time of my life, I was led in prayer by an Izala imam. I was fascinated by their devotion and the imam's mastery of the art of recitation of the Holy Koran. Not long after that, I attended a session of exegesis of the Holy Koran in an Izala mosque. From that moment, I really felt like acquiring further knowledge of Islam. Although, I continued to pray mainly in Yan *tariqa*'s mosques, I would attend, on some occasions, courses offered by the Izala people. From then, I started to doubt and I prayed the Almighty God to show me the right path.

By 1983, G. Sabo had completed his secondary education in Wudil. He applied for admission to the School of Social and Rural Development, Rano in Kano State but was denied admission. He moved to Gombe, where he spent a year and was exposed to further Izala influence.

From 1984, I stayed a year in Gombe. I attended regularly the Jama'at Izalat al-Bid'a wa Iqamat al-Sunna Islamiyya School to improve my knowledge of the Koran. After the year spent in Gombe, I was admitted to the School of Preliminary Studies in Kano in 1984. While studying in Kano—where I stayed with a brother of mine, a civil servant based in the Nassarawa quarter and Izala member himself—I would still spend my holidays either in Garko or in Gombe. In the latter, I kept attending the same Izala Islamiyya school. I thus learnt the book of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi: *Radd al-adhhan ila ma'ani al-qur'an* as well as the *Riyad al-salihin* of Imam Nawawi.¹⁷ Between 1986 and 1988, I attended Bayero University, Kano and studied education and Islamic Studies. I took private courses on the art of psalmody of the Holy Koran [...]. I became a dedicated Izala follower. However, in my village Garko, the number of Izala disciples is very low, at any rate, not more than 5 percent of the population, virtually all of whom have received formal education and are civil servants and live in other cities.

The most important finding of this short biography, which is exemplified both by G. Sabo's own itinerary and that of his two brothers is the strong urban bias of Izala recruitment. Until 1990, only some 5% of the population of the village of Garko had con-

¹⁷ See chapter five for further comments on these books.

verted to Izala. Most of them, including Sabo's two brothers, lived outside Garko and visited only during holidays. It is arguable that the conversion to Izala of the brother (who was a member of the civil service) followed from his being introduced to the educated, urban milieu to which the Society appeals. Izala affiliation would also have favoured the economic success of the farmer/businessman brother who was based in Gombe. A large proportion of the Gombe population were Izala supporters among whom strong ties of mutual support had developed because of the deep hostilities expressed against them by Izala's opponents. These ties facilitated the assimilation of the many new residents of the town who joined the movement.

There is not much evidence to support the allegations that Izala sympathisers abused or disowned their parents. A very small minority of them might have adopted such an extremist stance towards their relatives, but most of them would have treated their parents with respect, abiding by the relevant Koranic injunctions. It is true they refused to genuflect before their elders and parents, as was expected according to local customs. This refusal was the cause of considerable tension, and might be the source of the charge that Izala followers changed their names. It is certainly possible that some extremist Izala supporters who bore the names of Sufi saints such as Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani or Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani may have repudiated their names, but no such instance was documented during my field work.

A. Jamil

Of Fulani origin, A. Jamil was born in Jahun, Kano State in 1964. He soon moved to Kumo, Bauchi State with his father, an itinerant trader, where he lived until he was 10 years old. In 1974, he was sent by his father to Gagidba, not far from Azare, Bauchi State, where he lived with an uncle for three years, helping with the farming. In 1977, his father sent him to Jatan where he studied the Holy Koran and farmed for his teacher for seven years. When he returned to Kumo, he joined his brothers to trade in cola nuts purchased locally and peddled in neighbouring villages. It was on such tours that he met the proselytising reformers.

In 1982, Ismail Idriss and Usman Dangungu were conducting preaching activities in Kumo (Bauchi State). It was they who encouraged us to follow the Sunna and to pursue further studies. In Bauchi State, Izala started spreading from Kumo. Before the rise of Izala in that

zone, most of the people were disciples of the Sufi orders of the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya.

At the age of 24, he returned to Jahun where he worked in a petrol station and attended a *makaranta ilmi* (traditional Islamic school) for a year. He studied the following books (*al-Akhdari*, *al-Ashmawi*, *al-Izziyya* and *al-Risala* of Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani):

I used to hear some brothers and friends from Jahun—who were attending the School of Arabic Studies of Kano—speaking fluently in Arabic. I felt like learning more Arabic. I took the admission test to the SAS. That year, I was the only one from Jahun to succeed. Altogether, 150 candidates were selected in Kano State. When I arrived in Kano, I lived in Unguwar Gini. There, I joined the Izala movement and become one of the organisers of the activities of the Izala *majlis* of Gidan Rijjiya.¹⁸

Significantly, A. Jamil came in contact with Izala at an earlier stage of his life (in 1982, when he met Izala preachers in Kumo) when he was sensitive to the message Izala was conveying to the youth about the crucial importance of knowledge, particularly religious knowledge. But, like G. Sabo, it was difficult for him to openly identify with Izala in either Jahun or Jatan. In Kano, he received financial support from the Islamic Foundation from 1985, which allowed him to be somewhat independent. There, he enjoyed more autonomy and could openly identify with Izala.

From the 1970s, particularly, many young people who came from rural areas or other urban centres to Kano for their studies received financial sponsorship of some sort, often from their local government. As discussed earlier, the federal military government, in an attempt to decentralise and rationalise territorial administration, had created and allocated budgets to the local governments, which enabled them to offer support to students. This type of sponsorship helped to undermine traditional social control and liberate many young people from the traditional sphere of influence.

Also, as in the case of G. Sabo, A. Jamil's fascination for knowledge—particularly in Arabic—accounted very much for his interest in Izala. Like many other young people who joined the Society, attendance at an Izala *majlis* provided both access to Islamic knowl-

¹⁸ Interview with A. Jamil, October 1990. I attended regularly the *majlis* of Gidan Rijjiya during my field work and developed very friendly relations with the Izala chaps who used to pray or study in the *majlis*.

edge and the prospect of deepening ones religious piety, a valuable asset in the context of the declining moral standards in urban areas.

Of course, Izala activists were not the only actors in the religious sphere to encourage education and offer courses in religious studies, but a large proportion of their efforts and activities was geared towards education,¹⁹ through which they gained prestige and social ascension. This pattern is also exemplified by the next student's biography.

B. Salisu

Born in Nahuchi, in former Ringim Local Government, Kano State, B. Salisu, studied the Koran from a young age. By 1984, when he had completed his Koranic studies in Ringim, he moved to Borno State to attend Irshad Islamiyya School, Maiduguri, where he studied for two years. In 1986, he was admitted to the Arabic Teachers' College section of the School of Arabic Studies of Kano and awarded a scholarship by the local government of Ringim. In Kano, he resided at Kofar Nassarawa ward and started attending the Izala *majlis* there. He quickly adopted the Izala's doctrines and joined the organisers of Izala's activities.

There are several common factors in the itineraries of these three students: institutional sponsorship of their studies, socialisation in Izala urban networks, and attendance at an Izala *majlis*. Both B. Salisu and A. Jamil attended the School of Arabic Studies in Kano. Indeed many leading Izala activists had attended this school, starting from Shaykh Abubakar Gumi.

A Petty Trader

Artisans and petty traders are another important category of Izala sympathisers. They generally attend the Izala mosque in Brigade and Fagge. Only one biography will be presented to illustrate this social category, but this biography illustrates much about patterns of social and economic change and the conflict between different tendencies within the Izala movement.

¹⁹ This is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter dealing with their world-views and techniques of recruitment.

Malam Zakari

Born in 1944 in Katsina, Malam Zakari was a commercial middleman and then a taxi driver. From his earliest childhood, he longed for formal education, because some friends were attending a modern school. However, his relatives denied him permission to enrol, and instead, he was sent to a Koranic school in Katsina, where his father, a tailor, tried also to initiate him into his craft. At the age of fourteen, he resolved to leave Katsina to study. His parents refused to help him, but an aunt gave him the minimum required for a Koranic student: a blanket, a mat on which he could sleep, and a bowl to beg for food. He went to Malam Madori, a small village in the local government of Ringim to study with a Koranic teacher but stayed there barely one year. In 1959, when he was fifteen, he moved to Kano city. In Kano, he lived and studied with a Koranic teacher based at Kofar Mazugal ward. He worked as a goods handler to support himself. However, this *malam*, like many others, took advantage of the ability of his pupil to write Arabic and made him assist in the manufacturing of charms of different sorts for his clientele. Realising after a few years that he would not learn much from this kind of *malam*, he moved in 1964 to Niamey, the capital of neighbouring Niger. He worked there for nine years and married a woman from Katsina. When he returned to Kano in 1974, his parents had divorced, and his mother was living there. He lived with her in Brigade ward, although he never forgave her for not having supported his studies and for having once opposed the idea of his marrying on the grounds that the woman was an Izala sympathiser. Although his mother was initiated to none of the Sufi orders, she was attached to the traditions that Izala denounced.

He subsequently moved to Kurna, another ward in Kano, where he met a *malam* who encouraged him to study further. But because this *malam* wanted him to write charms, he distanced himself from him. For his main concern was to acquire knowledge not to write or wear charms. From the mid-1970s, the country was very prosperous, thanks to the diffusion of the oil wealth. Malam Zakari became a dealer, buying rice and corn from wholesalers and reselling it retail in the market. He made a half a *naira* for each bag sold. Very industrious and hard working, he made a lot of money, built several houses in Brigade, and settled in one of them. He contributed generously to the building of mosques and dedicated his leisure time to the study of the Holy Koran until he had memorised it.

With the oil glut and the implementation by the Nigerian government of the structural adjustment program to tackle the economic crisis that hit the country in the 1980s, the *naira* was devalued and prices of goods sky-rocketed. The price of a bag of rice jumped from 12.71 to 385 *nairas*, and his business collapsed. By the early 1990s, he had to use his personal car as a taxi on the Kano-Katsina route to make a living and support his three wives and 10 young children.

I used to study with Shaykh L. Suleyman but, although I rewarded him generously, he would not attend regularly the scheduled study sessions. I parted from him and started attending the main Izala mosque at Fagge. But I was exasperated by the behaviour of some imams who were reciting very long prayers, just to show off their mastery of the Koran. The *zuhr* prayer lasted one half an hour sometimes. As a driver, I cannot afford spending so much time praying. I stopped attending that mosque and I enrolled in the evening classes offered at the 'Ali b. Abi Talib School by the Islamic Foundation.

These different biographies illustrate that Izala is a complex organisation, supported by so many different people with various motivations and different levels of commitment.

In this chapter, I have studied the social base of the Society and argued that it recruits from different socioeconomic categories. I have distinguished between the leadership and the sympathisers. The leadership is made of two segments. On the one hand, there are religious entrepreneurs and on the other hand political/economic entrepreneurs. Religious entrepreneurs possess what I have called formally certified cultural capital whereas political/economic entrepreneurs possess economic capital. Each of these two categories, as I show in the conclusion, converted capital from one kind to the other and enhanced their positions in the Northern Nigerian society through advocating reform.

As far as the sympathisers are concerned, I have presented biographies of students and also a petty trader. These support the Yan Izala movement but are not part of its decision-making bodies. Leadership and sympathizers are largely the products of the modern world. Their biographies provide strong evidence that, despite their name, *iqamat al-sunna*, "the reinstatement of tradition," the agenda of the Yan Izala is by no means to re-traditionalise society. Rather, their aim is to modernise, to make sense of, to *mediate social change*. These are objectives that are very much reflected in their world-views, and their selective appropriation and specific interpretation of the Islamic heritage.

CHAPTER FIVE

WORLDVIEW AND RECRUITMENT PATTERNS OF THE YAN IZALA

After the formal establishment of the Society in 1978, the acquisition of a position of authority in society became more crucial than ever for its leadership. With this aim in mind, the religious segment of the Society leadership developed strategies designed to propagate their views with the ultimate objective of undermining the credibility of the religious establishment and recruiting new followers from their constituencies. This endeavour required that they select from the Islamic tradition those materials that best suited their own agenda to use as references for writing treatises and pamphlets that could support their preaching. The following analysis of this process is divided into three sections: the sources from which they drew their preaching, a presentation of the most recurrent concepts and ideas in their proselytisation, as well as their modes of recruitment and maintenance of allegiance.

Sources of Inspiration in the Yan Izala Proselytisation

A broad distinction can be made between two categories of sources of inspiration for the Society's proselytization, based on the origin of the source as external or local. External sources are much used when referring to such subjects as *tawhid* (theology) and *hadith* (tradition) and *sira* (biographies of the Prophet). Local sources can be written in either Arabic or Hausa and divided into three subcategories: translations or exegeses of the Koran in Hausa, biographies discrediting leading Sufi personalities; and nonbiographical pamphlets of different sorts.

External Sources

The major theological text used is *the Kitab al-tawhid* by Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab, on which many more recent commentaries have

been written. In Kano as well as other parts of Northern Nigeria, the preaching groups of the Society use the commentaries more than the *Kitab al-tawhid* (Treatise on the Oneness of God) itself. Perhaps this is because the commentaries are more expansive and elaborate in further detail certain points made in the *Kitab* and thus give the preachers the impression of being more authoritative than the *Kitab* itself. Among these commentaries, two written by descendants of Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab are widely used in Northern Nigeria. They are *Fath al-majid: Sharh kitab al-tawhid* (Victory of the Glorious. A Commentary on the *Kitab al-tawhid*) by Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan Al al-Shaykh and *Taysir al-'aziz al-hamid fi sharh kitab al-tawhid* (Facilitation of the Mighty and Praiseworthy in the Commentary of *Kitab al-tawhid*) by Suleyman b. 'Abd Allah b. Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab.

Besides these treatises, destined for adults or persons with some degree of sophistication in Arabic and Islamic studies, there are others written for children, including the *Muqarrarat al-tawhid wa al-fiqh* (Fundamentals of Theology and Jurisprudence),¹ which is comprised of three booklets that draw inspiration from the *Kitab al-tawhid*. Although less sophisticated, they nevertheless embody some of the concepts used by the Yan Izala in their proselytisation, as shown in the following citation.

If you are asked what is your religion, you should answer that Islam is my religion. Islam is based on two series of commandments. Number one, to order people to worship God, who has no partner, and to call people to follow religion (*da'wa*) and to proclaim as an unbeliever (*takfir*) whoever ceases to do it. Number two, to warn people against attributing partners to God (*shirk*) [. . .] and to proclaim as an unbeliever [*takfir*] whoever practices associationism (*shirk*).²

It can justifiably be argued that these principles are not specific to Izala and that most Islamic movements operate along those lines. However, given the strong tendency of Islamic movements of Wahhabi persuasion to label those they consider to be unbelievers, *kuffar*, and because of the context of Sufi/Reformer confrontation in Northern Nigeria in the last two decades, I would argue that the practice of

¹ See Mamlakat al-'arabiyya al sa'udiyya, wizarat al-ma'arif, *Muqarrar al-tawhid wa al-fiqh*, s.l. (Fundamentals of Theology and Jurisprudence), Dar al-za'yidi li al-tiba'a wa al-nashr, 1981, book I, II & III.

² See *Ibid.*, book III, p. 6, my translation.

takfir is currently more prevalent in Northern Nigeria than elsewhere in West Africa.

That Wahhabi theology is very prompt to *takfir* appears clearly in the following summary of the main points of Wahhabi creed:

1. All objects of worship other than Allah are false, and all who worship such are deserving of death.
2. The bulk of mankind are not monotheists since they endeavour to win God's favour by visiting the tombs of saints, their practice therefore resembles what is recorded in the Koran of the Meccan *mushrikun*.
3. It is polytheism (*shirk*) to introduce the name of a prophet saint or angel in a prayer.
4. It is *shirk* to seek intercession from any other than Allah.
5. It is *shirk* to make vows to any other being.
6. It involves unbelief (*kufir*) to profess knowledge not based on the Koran, the Sunna, or the necessary inferences of the reason.
7. It involves unbelief and heresy (*ilhad*) to deny *Qadar* in all acts.
8. It involves unbelief to interpret the Koran by *ta'wil*.³

The two concepts—associationism (*shirk*) and proclaiming others as unbelievers (*takfir*)—provided the Izala religious entrepreneurs and their sympathizers a religious justification for opposing the domination of the traditional order by which they felt oppressed.

In the field of *hadith*, considerable use is made of the *Riyad al-salihin min kalam Sayyid al-mursalin* compiled by Imam al-Nawawi.⁴ This famous treatise of *hadith*, which deals with the most trivial acts of daily life, is used by the Jama'at al-Tabligh in their proselytisation. It thus reflects the influence of the Jama'at al-Tabligh, on the Izala movement. However, despite this influence, members of the Izala movement do not consider themselves *Tablighi*. Rather, they identify themselves as *ahl al-sunna* (followers of the *Sunna*) or Yan Izala, which means advocates of the eradication of innovation (*bid'a*). It is important to note, in this respect, that Jama'at al-Tabligh,⁵ found its way

³ See D.S. Margoliouth, "Wahhabiyya," in H.A.R. Gibb., J.H. Kramers (eds.) *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1974, p. 618.

⁴ See Abu Zakariya Yahya al-Nawawi, *Riyad al-salihin min kalam Sayyid al-mursalin*, Bayrut, Mu'assassa al-tiba'a wa al-taswir al-iliktruniyya, 1985. For further information on the *Riyad*, see Gilles Kepel, *Les banlieues de l'islam. Naissance d'une religion en France*, Paris, Seuil 1987, pp. 202-04.

⁵ The Jama'at al-tabligh was founded in Colonial India by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, presumably not to fight against the colonial domination, but to teach the orthodox Islam to Mewati Moslems. For the founder of the organisation, the state of weakness in which Mewati Muslims found themselves was due to the fact they did not follow the true Islam. Thus, his aim was to bring them to the right path. See Shaheen Hussein Azmi, "The Tabligh movement in Canada, its development and future prospects," paper presented at the workshop organised by the Joint

to Nigeria through Yorubaland, and many of its adepts in Northern, as well as Southern, Nigeria are Yoruba or Indian-Pakistani Muslims.⁶ The mutual contempt between Hausa and Yoruba—both of whom would be reluctant to be led in prayers by the other—accounts partly for the fact that Tablighi practices are borrowed in Hausaland without an identification with the movement from which these practices are derived. Indeed, besides the use of *Riyad al-salihin*, undertaking preaching tours in the countryside is another mark of the influence of the Tablighi on the Yan Izala. In Kano, it is worthy to note that the headquarters of the Jama'at al-Tabligh is based in Sabon gari, which is largely inhabited by southern populations, including Yoruba, Igbo, and others. Although there are also Hausa and other northern populations living in the Sabon gari, natives of Kano would be reluctant to attend this ward.

The third important classic text for teaching and proselytizing is *Nur al-yaqin fi sirat sayyid al-mursalin*⁷ (Light of conviction in the biography of the chief of all messengers), of Shaykh Muhammad al-Khudari. This elementary biography of the Prophet is a compilation of classics of *sira* texts. Unlike most of the treatises of theology used by preachers/teachers of the Society, the *Nur al-yaqin* and the *Riyad al-salihin* are not anti-Sufi pamphlets *per se*. On the contrary and paradoxically, there is evidence of Sufi influence in Imam al-Nawawi's writings.⁸ Moreover, although the *Riyad al-salihin* does not explicitly mention Sufism, Imam al-Nawawi includes *hadith(s)* that relate miracles accomplished by the *awliya* (*karamat al-awliya*), which of course, the preachers of the Society deny completely.⁹ But, it is noteworthy that the *Riyad al-salihin* was not part of the offerings on *hadith* in traditional

Committee for the Comparative Study of Muslim Societies of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies on Jama'at al-Tabligh, London, 7–8 June 1991, p. 3.

⁶ See Arshad Masood, "Tablighi Jama'at, a case study of Nigeria," paper presented at the workshop organised by the Joint Committee for the Comparative Study of Muslim Societies of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies on Jama'at al-Tabligh, London, 7–8 June 1991, p. 25.

⁷ Muhammad al-Khudari, *Nur al-yaqin fi sirat sayyid al-mursalin*, (the Light of conviction in the biography of the chief of all messengers) Bayrut, Dar Maktabat al-hayat, 1977.

⁸ For instance his *Kutab al-adhkar* (Book of adhkar) and his *Bustan al-'arifin fi ma'rifat al-zuhd wa al-tasawwuf* (Gardens of gnostics in the knowledge of asceticism and Sufism) mentioned in H.A.R. Gibb.; J.H. Kramers (eds.) *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, p. 445.

⁹ See below the analysis of the notion of *wali* pl. *awliya*.

Islamic schools in Northern Nigeria. Perhaps, this is the explanation for its utilisation by the Izala preachers, and illustrates the heterogeneity of the doctrinal corpus of the Izala preachers.

Local Sources

A leading author of local texts used by Izala preachers was the late Shaykh Abubakar Gumi. Besides the many articles that he wrote in Hausa in the Nigerian newspaper *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo*, as well as religious sermons broadcast on the radio and television throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, Shaykh Gumi is the author of a bulky exegesis of the Koran¹⁰ (*Radd al-adhhan 'ila ma'ani al-qur'an* [The Intelligent Reply Concerning the Meanings of the Koran] and a translation of the Koran in Hausa (*Tarjamar ma'anonin alkur'ani maigirma zuwa harshen hausa* [Translation of the Meaning of the Holy Koran in Hausa Language]). However, the latter is more than a simple translation, for one finds in it such polemical comments as the following:

All the Sufi orders must be banned because they divide people into different sects. The followers of a given Sufi order believe that the beliefs and practices of the order to which they are affiliated are better than that of the others. Thus, they would not agree to meet the disciples of another order at the time of the recitation of their litanies [*wurdi* in Hausa, *wird* in Arabic]. Moreover, the *wird* and practices of the Sufi orders include innovations contrary to Islam.¹¹

During the period in which I conducted fieldwork (1985–1991), the *majalis* of Kano tended to use the *Fath al-majid* or *Taysir al-'aziz al-hamid* for theology and the *Riyad al-salihin* for *hadith* more than the works of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi. One reason was that Saudi religious and cultural networks distributed free of charge copies of the Koran and other religious books produced in Saudi Arabia, which were therefore accessible to many. Another reason may be rivalry within the leadership of the reform movement itself. Ambitious preachers, who were attempting to create a following of their own, might want to distance themselves a bit from Shaykh Gumi's influence. This was

¹⁰ See Abubakar Gumi, *Radd al-adhhan ila ma'ani al-qur'an*, [The Intelligent Reply Concerning the Meanings of the Koran] Bayrut, Dar al-'arabi li al-tiba'at wa al-nashr wa al-tawzi', 1979.

¹¹ See Abubakar Gumi, *Tarjamar ma'anonin alkur'ani maigirma zuwa harshen hausa*, Bayrut, Dar al-'arabi, 1979, p. 882.

the case with Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar when he started becoming a leading reformer in Kano from the early 1980s. Finally, a greater fascination for the Arab authors, in general, must also be a factor accounting for the wider use of Arabic authors.

Partly biographical works that fall into the second category seem to aim primarily at discrediting the leaders of the Sufi orders by any and all means. Two biographies written by Tahir Maigari effectively illustrate this tendency: *Al-Shaykh Ibrahim Niyas al-Singhali hayatuhu wa arau'uhu wa ta'alimuhu* (The life, Opinions and Teachings of the Senegalese Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse) and *Al-tuhfa al-saniyya fi tawdih al-tariqa al-tijaniya* about the life and teachings of Ahmad al-Tijani, the founder of the Tijaniyya himself.¹² Both of these books are highly polemical. The first is based on a master's thesis the publication of which was sponsored by the Islamic University of Madina, following the recommendation of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi. It deals specifically with Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse's branch of the Tijaniyya, but very much from an anti-Tijani perspective. Among other things, Tahir Maigari sets out to demonstrate in this book that there are neo-platonic and Ismaili influences in the doctrines of the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya.¹³ Of course, the influence of anything can be found anywhere (for instance many elements of the Islamic ritual of pilgrimage existed in pre-Islamic Arabia but were given Islamic significance), but what is important in Maigari's case is how his own agenda, aimed to discredit Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse and Sufism in general, influenced his selection of sources and his interpretation.

In the second book, which includes a biography of Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani, Tahir Maigari provides copious quotations from the work of Professor Jamil Abun-Nasr, a classic Western academic study on

¹² See Muhammad al-Tahir Maigari, *Al-tuhfa al-saniyya bi tawdih al-tariqa al-tijaniyya* (The Sublime Gift in explaining the Tijaniyya Sufi Order), Madina, al-jami'a al-islamiyya, 1981.

¹³ See Muhammad al-Tahir Maigari, *Al-Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse al-Singhali hayatuhu wa arau'uhu wa ta'alimuhu*, Bayrut, Dar al-'arabi li al-tiba'a wa al-nashr wa al-tawzi', 1979. This book generated a great deal of Tijani/Reformist polemics and aroused rejoinders from the Tijani followers and counter rejoinders from Maigari. For a more detailed discussion of these debates, see my "La vie, les idées et les enseignements du cheikh Ibrahim Niasse du Sénégal de Tahir Maigari," *Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara*, (3), 1989, pp. 294–95. For a short biography of T. Maigari, see John Hunwick, *Arabic Literature of Africa, volume 2, The Writings of Central Sudanic Africa*, Leiden, N.Y., Köln, E.J. Brill, 1995, pp. 555–56.

the Tijaniyya.¹⁴ From this work, informed to a certain extent by an anti-Tijani perspective and based largely on sources supplied to the author by the Algerian reformers,¹⁵ Maigari selects what is least favourable to the Tijaniyya and invokes the authority of Jamil Abun-Nasr's scholarship to strengthen his claims. Maigari mentions among other things that Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani had been arrested, whipped and imprisoned by the Turks for forging money, and, after settling in Morocco, kept promising Paradise to all his disciples who, in turn, supplied him with food, etc. In this pamphlet, Tahir Maigari echoes the proselytization of the north African reformers against the Tijaniyya. Not only, does he attempt to prove that the Tijaniyya is a religion that is completely different and separate from Islam, but he also wants to depict its founder as a person of little morality.

The third category of materials used for inspiration in proselytization of the Yan Izala includes many polemical pamphlets, three of which circulated widely in Kano and other parts of Northern Nigeria during the period of my fieldwork. The first is the already mentioned pamphlet whose publication by Shaykh Abubakar Gumi was a landmark in reformist proselytization—*Al-'aqida al-sahiha bi-muwafaqat al-shari'a*. The polemics triggered by the appearance of this book have already been discussed in chapter three. Nevertheless, it is useful to quote here Abubakar Gumi's argument that the whole prereformist "spiritual economy"¹⁶ could be reduced to different kinds of magic, some of which is exposed below:

The second type of [magic] consists of invoking earthly spirits (*jinn*) and trying to communicate with them through magical practices such as taking steam or smoke baths nude, [. . .] many people practice it today [. . .]. The fourth kind relates to the practice of *karamites* (*sic*) and to their ignorant and naive worshippers, who believe it licit to create *hadith*(s) and attribute them to the Prophet, in order to frighten people or incite them to long for something. These are part of those to whom the Prophet refers when he said that: "every body who attributes to me words I have not uttered, will go to Hell" [. . .]. The followers of the Sufi orders belong to that category [. . .]. In the sixth type of magic, the magician claims to know the supreme name of God

¹⁴ See Jamil Abun-Nasr, *The Tijaniyya, A Sufi Order in the Modern World*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965.

¹⁵ Personal communication of Professor Abun-Nasr.

¹⁶ The term is borrowed from Leonardo Villalon, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal. Disciples and Citizens in Fatick*, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

(*ism allah al-a'dham*) and that *jinn*s obey him blindly and submit to him to a large extent. If the person who hears such words is credulous or foolishly prepared to believe what he is told, he will believe it [. . .]. Fright (*khawf*) and reverential fear (*raja*) will take over the control of his senses. This practice which enables one to manipulate the feeble-minded is called *tunbula*. Physiognomy enables one to distinguish the feeble-minded from the lucid. If the magician masters physiognomy, he can identify those that he can cause to submit to his power from the other that he won't be able to manipulate. To all those different forms of magic, there are potential clients whom the corrupt *ulama* exploit and deceive, and from whom they extract money totally unduly, in the name of religion.¹⁷

Shaykh Gumi denounces as exploitation what had otherwise been accepted as a service in exchange for which the payment of an honorarium was considered by many to be legitimate. These passages illustrate an attempt to rationalise something, which, by its very essence and nature, belongs to the realm of the nonrational.

The second polemical pamphlet is *the Risalat al-da'i ila al-sunna al-zajir 'an al-bid'a* (The Epistle advocating tradition and preventing from innovation) by 'Abd al-Samad al-Kathini.¹⁸ The Ghanaian author of this pamphlet has been a member of the Tijaniyya for thirty years. Like Tahir Maigari, he had been appointed *muqaddam* prior to his rejection of the Tijaniyya. Whereas Maigari could claim a measure of scholarship, at least in his first book, Al-Kathini is first and foremost a propagandist. His discourse is highly polemical. He too accuses Tijanis of having no morality, and some of his accusations qualify as slanderous, for example, when he claims that some Tijani meetings end in orgiastic and even incestuous practices. Although no credit whatsoever should be given to such statements, some reformist religious entrepreneurs nevertheless use them as part of their anti-Tijani proselytization along with anything else that can be used to discredit the Sufi orders.

The last pamphlet to be discussed here is *Hujjojin da suka hana bin dan tariqa salla daga alkur'ani da hadisi manzo Allah*,¹⁹ which was written

¹⁷ See Abubakar Mahmud Gumi, *Al-'aqida al-sahiha bi muwafaqat al-shari'a*, Bayrut, Dar al-'arabi li al-tiba'a wa al-nashr wa al-tawzi', 1971, pp. 31–34. (my translation).

¹⁸ See 'Abd al-Samad al-Kathini, *Risalat al da'i ila al-sunna wa al-zajir 'an al-bid'a*, Bayrut, Dar al-'arabi li al-tiba'a wa al-nashr wa al-tawzi', 1978.

¹⁹ See in appendices, the translation of the pamphlet of Ibrahim Muhammad Gana, *Hujjojin da suka hana bin dan tariqa salla daga alkur'ani da hadisi manzo Allah*

in Hausa Ajami and is thus accessible to a wider audience. It has been reproduced often and is distributed at important religious events organised by Izala preachers, nationally as well as locally. Because it summarises many of the criticisms levelled against the Sufi orders, as well as the main recurring concepts in Izala preaching, I will deal with it in greater detail.

*Evidence from the Koran and the Tradition of the Prophet that it is
Illicit to be Led in Prayer by Followers of the Sufi Orders*

Four essential points of reformist discourse appear in Gana's pamphlet. First is the issue of unitarianism (*tawhid*) as opposed to associationism (*shirk*). Second is the denunciation of Sufi guarantees to their followers of happiness in this world and salvation in the hereafter. Central to this point are the polemics surrounding the tijani prayer, the *salat al-fatih*. Third is an advocacy for egalitarianism in religion and in society in general. Fourth is an attempt to restrict adherents of reformed Islam in their interactions with the larger community.

1. The concept of *shirk* is far from simple. In the Koran, the word (*shirk*) associationism—or *mushrik* (associationist)—is normally used to refer to Arab polytheists. However, with the elaboration of Islamic thought and dogma throughout the centuries, the semantic field of the word was enlarged to the extent that some Muslims have accused other Muslims, who hold different views, of committing *shirk*. In Wahhabi theology, which informs the religious doctrine of the Nigerian reformers and embraces some of the most extremist doctrinal positions, five kinds of *shirk* are distinguished,²⁰ most of which are included in one way or another in the pamphlet *Hujjojin*. The first is *shirk al-'ilm* (associationism in knowledge), which is the accusation levelled against those who claim to know the mysteries of the unseen (*ghayb*), such as adherents of the Sufi orders, but includes all those who believe in divination, astrology, interpretations of dreams, etc. The second is called *shirk al-tasarruf* (the assumption that any one except

([Evidence from the Koran and the Tradition of the Prophet that is illicit to be led in prayer by disciples of the Sufi orders].

²⁰ In the discussion of the Wahhabi conception, I rely on W. Bjorkman, "Shirk," in H.A.R. Gibb and J.H. Kramers (eds.), *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, *op. cit.*

God has power). All those who attribute supernatural powers to human beings, including Muslims who believe that saints can directly influence positively or negatively their destiny are guilty of this kind of associationism. The third type of associationism is *shirk al-ʿibada* (associationism in worship), which includes veneration of the shrines of holy men by circumambulation, prostration, giving offerings, fasting, making pilgrimage to the shrines, etc. The fourth type is *shirk al-ʿada*, associationism by belief in popular superstitions such as theurgy, divinatory practices. Finally, there is *shirk fi al-adab*, an associationism by excessive veneration, which consists of swearing in the name of the Prophet or any other holy person.

Islam as it has been practised in Northern Nigeria for centuries has incorporated many of these features. It is widely believed that some holy men know what ordinary men do not know, that they have the power, through their blessing, to give success to their followers in this world, and, likewise, that their curse is capable of harming their opponents, and consequently that they deserve to be venerated and given offerings. As indicated in the discussion of the Maitatsine case, belief in divinatory practices is also a trait of popular culture. Swearing in the name of some holy men, although forbidden by learned religious people, still frequently occurs. One sees that the local social and religious field is a very fertile ground for accusations of *shirk* in the Wahhabi and the Yan Izala sense of the word, as well as its corollary, *i.e.*, proclaiming someone an unbeliever or *takfir*.

2. The rejection of some claims of the Sufi orders regarding the salvation of their followers is another point of contention raised in the pamphlet *Hujjojin*. The claim that joining a Sufi order could guarantee worldly success and salvation to its followers—which accounts partly for the spread of the Sufi orders in sub-Saharan Africa—became their Achille's heel when the reformist proselytization was launched. This was particularly true of the Tijaniyya. In this pamphlet, the Tijaniyya is explicitly attacked and not the Qadiriyya. There are two possible explanations of this. First, the Tijaniyya has a larger following than the Qadiriyya. Thus, the more it is discredited, the larger the potential constituency from which the Yan Izala could recruit. The second reason is that the nineteenth-century jihad flag-bearers—indeed highly venerated by Muslims of all persuasions, including reformers,—practised the Qadiriyya.

There are four Tijani books from which the author of the pamphlet drew examples of beliefs that he considers contrary to the

Islamic creed.²¹ Notable among them are the *Jawahir al-ma'ani wa bulugh al-amani fi fayd Ahmad al-Tijani* believed to have been dictated to 'Ali Harazim by Ahmad al-Tijani himself and the *Kiṭab Rimah hizb al-rahim 'ala nuhur hizb al-rajim* written by Umar Tall known as Umar al-Futi. According to *Kiṭab Rimah*, affiliation with the Tijaniyya guarantees salvation to the affiliate, his parents, his wife (or wives) and his children without their having to account on Doomsday.²² Central to this Tijani belief regarding salvation is the litany named *salat al-fatih*, which states as follows:

O God, bless our master Muhammad, who opened what had been closed, and who is the seal of what had gone before; he who makes the Truth victorious by the Truth, the guide to Thy straight path, and bless his household as is the due of his immense position and grandeur.²³

It is important to note that the *salat al-fatih* originated not with Ahmad al-Tijani, but with Shaykh Muhammad al-Bakri (1492–1545). However, according to Tijani beliefs, it is the Prophet himself who subsequently communicated its merits to Ahmad al-Tijani, not in dream but when he was awake (*yaqazatan wa la manaman*). On this regard, the *Jawahir al-ma'ani* attributes the following statements to Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani:

And [the Prophet] instructed me to resume [the recitation of] the *salat al-fatih*. I asked him, peace be upon him, what are its merits? He first told me that one recitation of the *salat al-fatih* is equal in reward to the recitation of the Koran six times. And then, he added that one recitation of *salat al-fatih* is equal to all the praises to God made in the universe, to all the commemorations of God (*dhikr*), to all the supplications, lesser or greater, and to the recitation of the Koran six thousand times.²⁴

²¹ They are 'Ali Harazim Barrada, *Jawahir al-ma'ani wa bulugh al-amani fi fayd Ahmad al-Tijani*, Shaykh Al-Nazifi, *Munyat al-murid fi adab wa awrad al-tariqa al-tijaniyya*, Dar al-fikr, n.d., Muhammad b. Tayyib b. Muhammad al-Sufyani, *Kiṭab al-ifada al-ahmadiyya li murid al-sa'ada al-abadiiyya*, Umar Tall, *Rimah hizb al-rahim 'ala nuhur hizb al-rajim*.

²² See the analysis of Said Boushina, "Les mérites de la Tijaniyya d'après 'Rimah' d'al-Hajj Umar," *Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara*, (3), 1989, pp. 253–59.

²³ Translation of Jamil Abun-Nasr, *The Tijaniyya, a Sufi Order in the Modern World*, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

²⁴ Quoted in Ibrahim Salih b. Yunus Al-Husayni, *Al-takfir akhtar al-bid'a tuhaddidu al-salam wa al-wahda bayna al-muslimin fi Nijeriya* (Proclaiming other Muslims infidels is the worst innovation threatening peace and unity among Muslims), *al-Qahira, Markaz maktabat wa matba'a Mustafa al-Babi al-halabi wa awladuhu*, 1982, p. 87 (translation is mine).

These kinds of Tijani statements had been attacked earlier by many, including members of the Salafi movement. For example, Rashid Rida accused the founder of the Tijaniyya of having led astray “thousands and millions of the people of Africa, especially in Algeria”.²⁵ Another prominent Algerian Salafi leader, Muhammad al-Bashir Ibrahim, declared after denouncing Tijani promises of the kind illustrated above:

What greater annulment than this of the Koran can there be? And what more serious undermining of the rites of Islam can there be? And what more effective inducement for neglecting these rites can equal this assertion from this *dajjal* [false prophet]. O God! We know from what you have taught us that al-Tijani’s religion is not one with that of Muhammad bin Abdullah.²⁶

The polemic²⁷ surrounding Tijani claims about the promised rewards for the *salat al-fatih* therefore has a long history. However, no other doctrine of any other Sufi order in Northern Nigerian and, indeed in West Africa has generated this much controversy over the last three decades. During the many sermons that I attended during my fieldwork, there was not one in which the reformists did not denounce the *salat al-fatih* as contrary to the teaching of Islam. Likewise, the recorded cassettes of Izala preaching almost always deal at some point with the issue of the *salat al-fatih*.

3. An attempt to promote an egalitarian vision of religion and society is also reflected in this pamphlet in its effort to redefine the concept of *wali* pl. *awliya*. This word (and words deriving from the root) appears many times in the Koran. It is a polysemic word and may mean a supporter, a protector, a friend etc. However, in the context of Sufism, its meaning became restricted to specific Sufi figures to whom are attributed extraordinary and saintly powers.²⁸ There are many theories relating to saints *stricto sensu* including one by Hudjwiri which argues that:

²⁵ Quoted in Jamil Abun-Nasr, *The Tijaniyya, a Sufi Order in the Modern World*, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ The doctrinal polemics against Sufism itself has lasted over thirteen centuries. For more on that, see Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke (eds.), *Islamic Mysticism Contested. Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics*, Leiden, Boston, Köln, E.J. Brill, 1999, *passim*.

²⁸ See H.A.R. Gibb; J.H. Kramers (eds.), *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 629.

4000 live hidden in the World and are themselves unconscious of their state. Others know one another and act together. These are in ascending order of merit: the *akhyar* to the number of 300, the *abdal*, 40, the *awlad*, 4, the *nuqaba*, 3 and the Pole, *qutb* or *ghawth* who is unique. A number of mystics have been given the title of Pole [. . .]. Not only has he influence with God and can 'bind and loose', but he also has the gift of miracles (*karamat*). He can transform himself, transport himself to a distance, speak diverse tongues, revive the dead; he can produce various phenomena, often mentioned today in psychic studies: thought-reading, telepathy, prophecy; he can raise himself from the ground (levitation), or summon objects from a distance. He can make a dry stick put forth leaves, check a flood, control rains and springs etc. Hudjwiri goes even farther and attributes to the saints 'the government of the universe'. It is by their blessing (*baraka*) and by their purity that plants come up again in the spring. Their spiritual influence gives victory in battles.²⁹

Ideas consonant with this description were dominant in sub-Saharan African Islam prior to the rise of reformism. The author of the pamphlet *Hujjojin* attacks the restricted Sufi definitions of the term in favour of a broader one to which he refers implicitly. 'Abd Samad al-Kathini, in his above-mentioned pamphlet, *Risalat al-da'i* makes the same point explicitly by saying that the word *wilaya* has several meanings in Arabic, but that Koran 10-62 states that "the awliya of God [. . .] are the believers who fear God (*al-ladhina amanu wa kanu yattaqun*). He rejects "the claim of Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani that those who are initiated into his order are *awliya* of God."

This argument is not new. The Muslim medieval school of thought of the Mu'tazila contested that so-called *awliya* could perform miracles and argued much earlier that any pious Muslim is a *wali*.³⁰ Reformist advocacy of this interpretation shows how carefully they selected from the Islamic classical tradition to break away from the dominant local religious and social order. By arguing that every pious Muslim is a *wali*, a very egalitarian vision of religion can be introduced into a context dominated by a more elitist vision of Islam and society. This religious egalitarianism accounts for Izala's appeal among many social categories: urban youth and intellectuals, migrants and other relatively marginalised groups for whom "the possibility of following more closely the fundamentals of religion" than the majority of

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

the natives of the city of Kano can give a sense of belonging and importance.

4. Finally, the pamphlet attempts to sharply isolate followers of Izala from the larger community. This is evidenced by its title, which literally translates “Evidence from the Koran and the Tradition of the Prophet that it is Illicit to be Led in Prayer by Followers of the Sufi Orders.” By invoking Koran 9–28, which says that “associationists are *najas* (ritual pollution),” it is implied that merely being in contact with Sufis renders one impure to perform ritual acts. In the same vein, the meat of animals slaughtered by Sufis is said to be unsuitable to eat for “a true Muslim.” I would like to suggest that this discourse goes beyond the search for a clientele. It is a strategy among the most radical disciples of Izala, such as immigrants to Kano, who feel rejected by the larger community and seek to construct their own separate community. From what I discovered during fieldwork, this attempt was not completely successful. Although virtually every Izala disciple refused to be led in prayer by those whom they labelled associationists, many of them did not observe such stringent dietary restrictions nor break all ties with other Sufis or with Muslims in general.

The preceding discussion demonstrates clearly that the Society aims to fundamentally reform religious beliefs and practices. However, the Society’s agenda also aims to reform social customs. One item of the social agenda is their call for the reduction of the high cost of celebrating social events, such as the naming ceremony for newborn babies celebrated a week after their birth, wedding ceremonies, death rituals, etc. The relatively high cost of such celebrations has a social significance. It is a traditional mechanism for the transfer of wealth from the better off to the needy and other people with no stable source of income. Traditional Muslim clerics are included in this category. Many of them, although not all, do not have a salary or a prosperous business to support themselves or their families. They earn a livelihood by performing the religious component of the above-mentioned ceremonies, but also by writing charms of different sorts for their clientele who pay them in return. More than any other category, these clerics came under heavy attack from the preachers of the Society who accused them of exploiting the credulous, as shown in Abubakar Gumi’s work mentioned above. Older women whose main activity is to organise these ceremonies are not spared by the preachers of the Society, as is reflected in this interview with Shyakh L Suleyman:

Before the Yan Izala started preaching, in every wedding celebration money was paid to the clerics who performed the celebration (*kudin malamai*), to the head of the ward (*kudin mai unguwa*), to the singer (*kudin na maroka*), to the father of the bride (*kudi na riga uba*), to the grandmother (*kudin na mazam baya*). When someone passed away, alms had to be given in his behalf (*sadakokin mutuwa*), and again three days after (*sadaka uku*); and then seven days after (*sadaka bakwai*) and then 40 days after (*sadaka arba'in*) and again one year after (*sadaka shekara*). And for each of these occasions, clerics who officiated were paid honoraria for their prayers. When a newborn baby is named a week after his birth, the cleric who officiates is paid (*kudin liman*), those who accompany him to the celebration also are paid (*kudin malamai*). Old ladies who bath the newborn baby are paid (*kudi unguwa zoma*), so are those who shave the baby and cut the umbilical cord (*kudin manzamai*), and also singers who come to sing (*kudi na maroka*).³¹

It is important to note that most of these ceremonies occur frequently in Northern Nigeria. Weddings are frequent since polygamy is allowed by Islam, and birth celebrations are also quite frequent, since the majority of people oppose family planning.³² Also, death occurs more often than in economically better off countries. Thus, the expenses of such events are a heavy burden for people. In contrast to the traditional order, preachers of the Society celebrate naming and wedding ceremonies as well as death rituals without asking for any money in return. This wins them the sympathy of many educated, as well as less educated people. Some people who do not entirely espouse their reformist agenda might nevertheless ask them on occasions to perform such rituals. This part of the Izala agenda is quite appealing to some urban groups, who have a greater individualist orientation, and who are unwilling to share in the same way that their parents did. All those who join the Yan Izala or espouse its ideology are in a comfortable position to reject these "innovations contrary to religion." But this is not to say that their more individualistic orientation means that they would not contribute money to community or social services. Indeed, many are willing to help brothers and friends in need. If a fellow dan Izala passes away, members collect money to support the family of the deceased and financially contribute to the building of schools and mosques and the organisation of preaching activities. However, these kinds of expenses

³¹ Interview with Shaykh L. Sulayman, Kano, September 1990.

³² See in chapter eight, the discussion of the campaign against family planning.

probably seem more rational and useful to them than spending money to support clerics, the village ward, or old women who incarnate a system from which the Yan Izala would like to distance themselves.

This leads me to a discussion of the Society's rejection of *kunya*, the maintenance of a certain respectful distance between "social superiors" and "social inferiors." An older brother, a father, a husband, a patron, an uncle, a father-in-law, a teacher, would be considered one's social superior. Anybody who dares to shake hands with such a superior offends him in an intolerable way. Instead, genuflecting is supposed to be the correct posture for greeting such persons. Izala preachers argue that this tradition opposes the teachings of Islam and that genuflecting is suitable only in praying.

Likewise, in the mosque, "social inferiors" are not supposed to pray in the same row as their "superiors," but rather to pray one row behind them. This also is anti-Islamic according to the preachers of the Society. In these condemnations, the egalitarian agenda of the Society appears clearly. Implicit is the idea that not only is everybody equal before God, but everybody should be equal in society, and nobody should deserve excessive veneration.

As an illustration of the reformist egalitarian tendency, I want to mention here that when I was received by the late Sheikh Abubakar Gumi in his house in Kaduna, I was quite struck by his egalitarian tendencies. In his living room, all the visitors were sitting in armchairs, including young people and people from apparently modest origin. Everybody shook hands with him as a way of greeting. It would never occur to any member of a Sufi order to shake hands with a Sufi *shaykh* or to sit in an armchair in the same room with a *shaykh*. This egalitarian tendency, no doubt, accounts for a good part of the appeal of the reformers to the urban middle class, intellectuals and youth.

Significant also is the fact that Shaykh Abubakar Gumi lived in Kaduna, a new, cosmopolitan city where the defunct northern administration was based and where many civil servants have served, own houses, and have settled in, some opting to stay there after retirement. The kind of urban culture that prevailed in Kaduna was quite different from that of older cities like Kano. In *Birnin Kano*, many people were attached to traditions, including those pertaining to the respect of the elders. The condemnation of these traditions aroused a great deal of hostility and, indeed, violent reactions from the people whose authority preachers of the Society attempted to undermine.

Those who refused to defer to “social superiors” in the manner they expected were labelled *Yan zamani*, which expresses the idea of being contaminated by a “perverse modernity.” However, even though the majority of the inhabitants of Kano do not challenge this tradition of “respectful distance” towards their “social superiors” because they fear being treated as *dan Izala* or *dan zamani*, many do believe that genuflecting to greet is no longer appropriate. This shows that the impact of the reformist discourse went far beyond the effective constituency that they had recruited.

Promoting the education of women is another characteristic of the Society, at least in the context of Northern Nigeria. Of course, efforts towards women’s education can be traced to an earlier period. As early as the nineteenth century, Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio had advocated that women should be educated. One of his daughters, Nana Asma’u was a very educated cleric and teacher. In spite of the harsh conditions, including frequent warfare, in which she lived, and although she was a mother and a wife, with all the duties pertaining to these positions, she wrote many works in Hausa, Fulfulde, and Arabic.³³ More contemporary religious movements also encouraged the education of women, including the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya in which women occupy important positions in the hierarchy of the order and also teach religion as men would. However, there is a tradition of seclusion of women in urban Hausaland—women’s labour in rural areas is too important for them to be secluded—which resisted, to a considerable extent, efforts of the many nineteenth- and twentieth-century Sufi reformers to educate women.

According to the Hausa tradition, married women should be secluded in the home (*kulle*). Only exceptionally can they go out to pay a visit to their family, and then only at night and only when accompanied by old women who can keep an eye on them. However, this tradition seems to be specific to the Muslims of Northern Nigeria. In none of the other predominantly Muslim West African countries does seclusion exist in such a significant way. Many local beliefs strengthen this idea of seclusion of women. For example, a woman who steps over the doors of her house without permission commits

³³ See Jean Boyd, *The Caliph’s Sister Nana Asma’u 1793–1865. Teacher, Poet and Islamic Leader*, London, Frank Cass, 1989; Beverly Mack and Jean Boyd, *Collected Works of Nana Asma’u, daughter of Usman dan Fodiyo, (1797–1864)*, East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1997.

a sin, which can provoke a drought or lead seven thousand of her relatives to hell fire.³⁴ Izala women adepts as well as western-educated women are in the forefront in challenging seclusion and promoting the education of women.

Many of the Yan Izala with whom I talked invoked the Koranic verse: "Oh ye who believe protect yourselves and your families from fires in which men and stones will be combustible!"³⁵ Without religious knowledge, they argued, one is destined to end up in hell. Therefore women must study their religion. The Society claims to have established 2,843 schools throughout the country, in which 1,600,000 housewives are studying.³⁶ Besides building these formal schools, women whose knowledge of the Koran and other Islamic topics is sufficient, offer courses in their own homes to other women adepts of the Society. These figures relating to the number of schools and pupils can not be independently confirmed, and, like most movements operating in the context of a struggle for pre-eminence, the Yan Izala would be expected to inflate their membership figures and exaggerate the extent of their achievements. But, there is little doubt that female enrolments in schools of the Society run into the thousands, if not the hundreds of thousands. In Kano, these schools have been built with sparse financial resources, mainly contributions from members. Many teachers of the Koran and other religious topics in these schools are fellow members of the Society and are not paid. It is noteworthy without the benefit of any significant funding from abroad. Funding from abroad seemed to have been directed to the better connected reformist leaders such as Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar and others. The Izala National Council of *ulama* raised much of its funds locally. Many of the informal *majalis* definitely did not receive any funding from abroad. The National Committee of *ulama* of the Society has nevertheless succeeded in

³⁴ See Abdulkadir Dangambo, "Hausa Wa'azi verse from ca. 1800 to ca. 1970, A Critical Study of Form, Language and Style," Ph.D. dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1980, p. 293.

³⁵ Koran 6-66.

³⁶ See "Hira ta musamman da kungiyar Jama'atu ta yi de manema labaru kan aikace—aikace, nasarori da tsaren tsaren kungiyar (Interview of the Chairman of the National Committee of Patrons," *Amana*, August 1991, p. 14. As active as the Yan Izala are in this field, the Da'wa Group of Kano whose enrolments of housewives at the Da'wa Centre based at Suleyman Crescent Road-Nassarawa,—reaching 2,000 in the early 1990s many of whom in evening classes—was the highest of any single other women's religious school of the state of Kano.

building two senior secondary schools, which deliver certificates recognised by the state and are managed by the committee of *ulama*.

Izala preachers also challenged the practice of women peddling goods (*talla*). This practice consists in selling fruits, vegetables, cola nuts, fried peanuts, etc. It was related to matrimonial practices specific to Hausaland. When a young woman gets married, her parents endow her, as a dowry, with furniture and kitchen utensils, which can serve to decorate her room. What strikes the visitor to such rooms are the rows of stacked bowls nicely decorated and placed in the cupboards, which give some life to a room in which a woman would stay much of her married life. To make their own contributions to the expense that their parents would incur at the time of their marriage, many young women practiced *talla*, in their leisure hours. However, this practice has also been abused. For example, younger women have been seduced and become pregnant, which is the "worst disgrace" that can befall a Hausa Muslim family. Yan Izala condemned *talla* with vigour, on the grounds that the little money that these young girls would make was not worth exposing themselves to such risks. As compensation, members of the Izala movement do not impose any dowry whatsoever on the women they marry. Indeed a spouse can join the marital home on the very day that the religious marriage is celebrated without bringing any dowry. It goes without saying that the case against *talla* was made before the rise of Izala. In any case, women from well-to-do families do not practice it. Likewise, there are also many partisans of the traditional order as well as relatively educated families whose offspring do not indulge in *talla*. For their part, the political authorities also undertook campaigns to advise against this practice. However, the Society has also made a case against *talla*. In response to this campaign, many people have ceased sending their daughters to peddle, while others ensure that their daughters are accompanied by a brother who can keep an eye on them.

According to Hausa traditions, a married woman should not pronounce the name of her husband but, as a mark of respect, should address him as *maigida* (head of the household). This practice began to be abandoned with the progress of western education, since many western-educated people did not respect it. Here again, Izala advocates that these superstitions be abandoned as contrary to the traditions of the Prophet.

However, there are limits to Izala's agenda for emancipating

women, and Izala preachers certainly do not go as far as some western-educated Muslim women in advocating emancipation. Women members of Izala are against any form of intergender socializing that is not necessitated by education. Unlike most non-Izala women who hide only their hair with a sort of scarf when they go out, women members of Izala wear a veil (*hijab*) covering their head, neck, and ears. Even more modest and austere in their clothing are women members of the radical Islamist “Brothers” (sisters?). Male members always wear robes and cover their heads with turbans, whereas female members, not only wear a veil, but also long black robes, trailing on the floor, and prevent others from seeing the shape of their bodies. Izala male members may wear traditional dress, but also western-style clothes such as trousers, shirts, etc.

Many reformers also oppose the idea of women occupying key positions in the state. One opponent is the Shaykh Abubakar Gumi who, when interviewed by *Quality Magazine* in 1987 is reported to have said that: “There are things that women should do. Things that are suitable for them like teaching children. They can be clerks or they can be in their own homes and those things that keep them isolated from men. They can be very useful but to make them mix with men like Europeans is not acceptable.”³⁷ And asked if he envisions Nigeria being headed by a woman, he answered that “I don’t hope to see a Nigerian woman leading me when I am alive”³⁸—a wish that God has fulfilled!

In the preceding analysis, I have shown that in many respects the agenda of Izala overlaps with that of other westernised Muslims as shown in the case made for the education of women, against using young women to peddle goods and for egalitarianism in society and in religion. Both categories—Yan Izala and Yan Zamani (secularised westernised Muslims)—want to promote a set of common values. However, westernised modern Muslims do so in the name of “modernity” and under the implicit influence of the legacy of postenlightenment Europe, whereas Izala people claim that they feel duty-bound to reinstate the tradition of the Prophet. Each is the product of and tries to mediate social change, but each has a different ideological justification for change.

Let me now discuss the modus operandi of the Society, *i.e.*, the

³⁷ See *Quality Magazine*, October 1987, 1, (5), 1987, p. 38.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

modes of recruitment and maintaining allegiance at the national and local levels.

Recruitment Patterns of the Yan Izala

It should be said from the outset that the religious proselytization that gives expression to Izala's worldview is the exclusive task of no single category of its membership. Regardless of their role or level of commitment, Yan Izala, in every way possible, try to convince nonaffiliates that it is their interpretation of Islam that is truly in line with the teachings of the Prophet of Islam. However, it is the professional preachers (*masu waazi*) more than any other category of members who devote their time and energy to preaching, teaching, organising debates with their opponents, and conceiving strategies to spread their views.

The Study Sessions (majalis)

Teaching has proved to be an effective way of recruiting a following and maintaining membership. In an earlier chapter, I have alluded to people in search of knowledge who joined the Society because it met those specific expectations. The courses offered (*darasi* in Hausa, *dars* in Arabic) by the movement could be taught in several contexts: formal schools belonging to the Society, informal mosque/schools (*majalis*), main mosques, etc. In *Islamiyya* schools affiliated to the Society, courses in theology along Izala lines are central to the curriculum. Pupils enrolled in such schools are inculcated into Izala's theology from an early age. It is worthy of note that in some places in Zaria and Jos, there are children enrolled in these schools whose parents are not necessarily Izala followers. However, staunch adherents to the Sufi orders would not send their children to such schools or would withdraw them quickly if they had evidence of the exposure of their children to Izala's influence.

In the city of Kano, until the early 1990s, informal courses offered in *majalis* were very common among Izala groups. An old institution—certainly predating the rise of Izala,—the term *majlisi* in Hausa (*majlis* in Arabic) refers to the practice of congregating to listen to a sermon. By extension, it can also mean a place where Muslims meet to pray or to study. Izala operated two such kinds of *majalis*. Within

the walled city (*Birnin Kano*), where, as mentioned earlier, all attempts by Yan Izala to build mosques or schools were unsuccessful because of the hostility of the majority of the population, the *majalis* are informal and exist only for the duration of the prayers or the study sessions. However, in Fagge and Brigade, where the Society has built mosques, the courses offered are also called *majlisi*. In whatever way they are constituted, informally or permanently, *majlis* sessions are not simply discreet, private sessions. They are well-advertised by Izala preachers. For example, sessions for teaching the art of Koranic recitation (*tajwid*) are broadcast over loudspeakers, thus arousing the hostility of conservatives who oppose any change to prevailing liturgical arrangements, while at the same time fascinating many others who are attracted to the sessions to learn how to recite the Koran “properly” and also to learn more about Islam. Of course, non Izala Muslims have their own way of reciting the Koran, but their Arabic pronunciation, in general, is guided by local standards, whereas all Yan Izala, without exception, are taught to master the Arabic *tajwid* as well as to correctly pronounce Arabic.

The timing of the sessions—between the two Muslim daily prayers of *maghrib* (sunset) and *isha* (night) coincides precisely with the time when the Tijani Sufis congregate to recite their daily ritual of *wazifa*. In the Kano *majalis* that I attended during fieldwork, study sessions were organised as follows: one weekly study session of theology based on either the study of *Fath al-majid* or *Taysir al-‘aziz al-hamid* or both, although *Fath al-majid* was preferred; one weekly session of *hadith* based on the study of the *Riyad al-salihin*; and finally, one weekly session of the study of the biography of the Prophet, based on the *Nur al-yaqin* and aimed to provide a model for Yan Izala behaviour and ethics. Study sessions of *tajwid* used to be organised in larger *majalis*, such as the Fagge mosque or the Beyrouth Road mosque of Malam Lawan, although not as regularly as *tawhid*, *hadith*, and *sira*.

With the exception of courses on *tajwid*, which focus on pronunciation and the art of chanting, the teaching of other courses consists of reading a passage in Arabic and then translating it into Hausa and commenting upon it, which allows the teacher to cover several topics. At the *majlis* of Gidan Rijjiya, which I attended regularly during my field trips, I noticed that some students, after reading some of these books several times, occasionally taught the session for the regular teacher, if for some reason the latter could not make the class or was delayed.

The Preaching Sessions

The organisation of preaching sessions is closely tied to the administrative structure of Izala. It is therefore useful to introduce the former by a presentation of the latter. At the formal creation of Izala in 1978, an attempt was made to gradually set up a highly centralised organisation in which the levels of organisations would conform to the system of territorial administration. In other words, the three committees (*ulama*, patrons, and first-aid), which already existed at the national level, would be established at state, local government, and community levels, if possible. The lowest level of organisation is that of the *section*. The section does not correspond to any specific tier of government. It is made of several small-cells *majlisai*, most of which operate somewhat autonomously with their own funding but in conformity with the philosophy of the Society and participating in its activities. Although these structures function quite efficiently at the national and state levels, they tend to be loose at the levels of local government and section because they do not necessarily have the means to form effective committees or support their activities logistically. Thus, the committee of *ulama* travels as widely and frequently as possible in the country coordinating the efforts of all Izala religious entrepreneurs, integrating them into the hierarchy of the organisation, and supporting their organisational efforts. One such opportunity for coordinating individual efforts is offered by the organisation of preaching sessions.

The preaching sessions are convened by the committee of *ulama*, which decides on timing and location. It is this committee that raises funds for the functioning of the Society, builds schools, and trains preachers until they obtain an official preaching permit. Generally, the committee tries to cover much of the federation at least once per year. The committee of patrons, which is very often composed of businessmen, politicians, and top civil servants provides some of the logistical support for the preaching (cars, loudspeakers, gasoline, etc.). It also applies, on behalf of the Society, for official authorisation for preaching sessions from the public authorities. It was the intervention of the patrons that secured official recognition for the Society in 1985. The first-aid group takes care of setting up tents, loudspeakers, and observation of cars, and also monitors the space where the preaching sessions are conducted in order to prevent saboteurs from destroying property or preventing the meetings from taking place.

Two preaching sessions are organised monthly at the national level in one of the large cities of the country, although there will be emphasis on the far north, which is predominantly Muslim and where they are more likely to recruit or maintain membership. Representatives from all the states and local governments at least attend these sessions. But many members, including those having only a nominal affiliation with the Society travel to listen to the preaching. Those who are unable to attend might nevertheless purchase a recording of the proceedings, which are generally reproduced in large numbers and made available for sale, often on the next day. During the open-air preaching sessions, which are broadcast on powerful loudspeakers, the floor is turned over to the professional preachers, generally the members of the national and state committees of the *ulama*. After thanking the public authorities for granting permission to conduct the preaching and acknowledging the presence of important personalities who are members of the Society, the preachers deliver their sermons. Most of these preaching sessions revolve around pretty much the same themes: abandoning innovation and returning to tradition. The more moderate preachers try to provide evidence that Islam, as it has been practised in the country, contradicts the teachings of the Prophet to which they advocate a return. The more hot-tempered preachers focus much of their sermons on labelling as infidels venerated Sufi saints of the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya and the local saints.

Up until the early 1990s, these kinds of preaching sessions often led to violent clashes between Yan Izala and Sufis, which resulted in breaking up the meeting. In June 1989, I witnessed the first attempt to organise a national preaching session in *Birnin Kano*. The first speaker said in Hausa: “*Ga Izala a Kano, An dade ana ta adua kada Allah ya kawo Izala a Kano*” (Finally Izala had made it in Kano. People have been praying for a long time that God never brings Izala to Kano). However, the success was short-lived. Charges of heresy levelled against the Sufi orders by one of the preachers led to a clash between members of the Qadiriyya and Yan Izala. Police intervened with tear gas to stop the fighting, and many people were injured.

In addition to the two annual preaching sessions that attract thousands of people, the committees of *ulama* of each state, each local government, and each section also organise a monthly session within their state, local government, or section. Alongside these more formal and regular sessions, autonomous religious entrepreneurs who

identify with the Society might also organise sessions in their *majalis*. Within the "broad" preaching corpus, which I have already discussed, preachers at the different levels are free to choose the themes that they want to discuss.

Cassettes as a Means of Proselytization

Although of recent invention, audio-cassettes have proven to be an effective medium of religious proselytization in the Islamic world. The proselytising of Muslim missionaries in Europe or North America, the preaching of the blind Egyptian Muslim Brother Kishk, the pre-revolutionary campaign of Imam Khomeiny are good illustrations of how efficacious this medium is. For example, Yann Richard has shown that only a few hours after they were delivered, sermons of Ayatollah Khomeiny were reproduced and distributed to the most remote villages of Iran.³⁹

In Nigeria also, the reformers use cassettes very often to spread their message. The diffusion of the oil wealth and the strong overvaluation of the Nigerian currency during the peak years of the oil boom have enabled many, including the relatively underprivileged, to own a radio cassette. This development has facilitated the diffusion of reformist ideas in a way from which Sufi orders never benefited. Among other reasons for the wide circulation of the cassettes is that they create income-generating activities for the many persons involved in their manufacture and sale. At the same time that they are active propagandists for their movement, the cassette sellers make money by selling cassettes containing the preaching sessions conducted by the committee of *ulama* of the Society. One very frequently sees those sellers airing the recordings with loudspeakers at Friday mosques, gas stations, and markets. Since 1989, some sellers have started filming the preaching sessions and making available videocassettes. However, only the most important preaching sessions were recorded, and not all members from the grassroots possess a videocassette player. Nevertheless, cassettes are a very effective means of spreading ideology.

³⁹ See Yann Richard, "Clercs et intellectuels dans la République islamique d'Iran," in Gilles Kepel and Yann Richard (eds), *Intellectuels et militants de l'Islam contemporain*, Paris, Seuil, 1990, pp. 29-69, p. 38.

Debates

Although very little formal contact exists between Izala preachers and Sufi *Shaykhs*, there have been some public debates in which Sufis have defended the orthodoxy of their views. Less frequent in Kano than Zaria, Jos and Kaduna, these debates often were the result of a public challenge to Sufi *Shaykhs* to justify one or another of their beliefs or their rituals. Because of the simplicity of their rituals, the Yan Izala seem to have the advantage in such debates. According to Abbas Isa Lawyer, a very radical Izala preacher of Zaria,⁴⁰ most debates that were organised led to the ridiculing of the Zaria Sufi *Shaykhs*. So much so, that they are now unwilling to participate in such public debates.

Most of the proselytization of the Yan Izala is directed towards Muslims and against Sufis. This results from the Yan Izala objective to emancipate Muslims from a traditional Islamic order. However, on some occasions, the Yan Izala employ material for the purpose of anti-Christian proselytization. The Gospel of Barnabas, considered a forgery by Christians, is among these as are many pamphlets, audio-cassettes, and videocassettes produced by the South African Muslim preacher, Ahmad Deedat, who argues against Christian doctrines.

As I have shown throughout this chapter, the constitution of a preaching corpus and the development of recruitment strategies were aimed at several objectives. These objectives included discrediting the main rivals of the Izala religious entrepreneurs, whether Sufi or otherwise; defining a new Islamic identity patterned on the "Prophetic model" and striving to promulgate it in their society; and presenting themselves as the mediators of that knowledge that enables one to become a true Muslim.

⁴⁰ Interview in Zaria in 1990.

CHAPTER SIX

COUNTERREFORM MOVEMENTS

In the religious sociology of Christianity, the term “counterreformation” refers to the attempts by the Catholic Church to stop the spread of Protestantism from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I use the term counterreform to describe the reactions of the traditional religious and social order in Northern Nigeria, in general, and Kano in particular, to the rise of Muslim reformism, and more particularly the Izala movement. As discussed in the earlier chapters, the arrival of the Yan Izala threatened first and foremost the hegemony of the Sufi orders, which were the major target of this reform movement. However, the discourse of emancipation of which Izala preachers were the flag bearers also questioned the status of all “social superiors” who were thus alienated from the reform movements and mobilised various means of pressure to oppose potential sympathisers with the movement.

Early reactions of the Sufis against the rise of the Yan Izala tended toward violence. They rallied round some militant movements to counter the progress of Izala. However, this strategy failed to stop Izala’s progress, particularly in urban areas. Sufi leaders then opted for accommodation with the reformers, while devoting much effort to modernising their methods of teaching to keep up with Izala’s innovations. In addition, some of the most “audacious” Sufi leaders went to great lengths to rearticulate Sufi doctrines and, in the process, questioned some doctrines that had formerly been taken for granted. Others condemned explicitly some of the practices challenged by the reformers. The rise of the Society therefore led to notable changes in religious representations and practices in Northern Nigeria. Change was more extensive in relatively new cities such as Jos and Kaduna, but was also significant in older cities, where leaders fiercely resisted Izala’s views. The extent to which prevailing religious beliefs and practices were modified as a result of Izala’s criticism is the theme of this chapter. More specifically, I will discuss the transformation in the pattern of conflict from intra-Sufi rivalry to Sufi/anti-Sufi

opposition. To do that, I will break the chronology to readdress earlier efforts of reform led by the JNI and the opposition of the Fityan al-Islam organization. Then, I will address the rise of the Jundullahi movement, and finally the rearticulation of Sufi creeds and Sufi liturgical reform.

Resistance to Izala's Appeal

Change in the pattern of conflicts and oppositions within the Islamic religious field is one of the major developments that can be directly related to the rise of the reformist tendency. Before the rise of Izala, major religious conflicts involved opposition between different Sufi orders or different branches of the same order. With some notable exceptions, these conflicts were more doctrinal than physical. In general, Sufism and affiliation with a Sufi order was accepted as the highest form of Islamic orthodoxy and purity. Reformist preachers, from Shaykh Abubakar Gumi in the 1960s, to Izala preachers in the late 1970s rejected Sufism altogether and, indeed, denounced the Sufi orders as heterodox. These attacks fostered unity among the Sufi orders to better protect their common Sufi heritage and identity.

From Sufi/Sufi Opposition to Sufi/anti-Sufi Opposition

According to Louis Brenner, the early Sufi orders were neither exclusive nor a base of social or political organisation.¹ What Sufism meant for the flag bearers of the Sokoto *jihad* is somewhat different from the significance it would acquire later. L. Brenner argues that:

For Shaykh Usman, *tasawwuf* [Sufism] was the religious science by means of which one sought internal purification: the acquisition of praiseworthy qualities and the elimination of blameworthy ones. The *turuq*, with their supererogatory prayers and spiritual exercises, provided a specific method for pursuing this quest. Through the *salasil* (sing.

¹ See Louis Brenner: "Concepts of *tariqa* in West Africa. The Case of the Qadiriyya", in Christian Coulon and Donal Cruise O'Brien (eds.), *Brotherhood and Charisma in African Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 32–52.

silsila) and *asnad* (sing. *sanad*) of the *turuq* (Sufi orders), one established spiritual contact with the deceased *awliya* (sing. *wali*), and with the Prophet himself, who thereby lent their personal blessings and support to one's efforts.²

Although Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio and his community (*jama'a*) identified with Sufism and the teachings of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, during the lifetime of Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio and his successor, Muhammad Bello, there was no claim to exclusivity for any *qadiri* affiliation. This, Louis Brenner argues, is a later development that can be interpreted as a reaction against Umar Tall's proselytization in favour of the Tijaniyya in Sokoto.

The impact of this politicisation on the membership in Sufi orders was limited, however, by the fact that, although identification with and respect for Sufi orders was widespread, initiation to Sufism remained very much an elite affair until the mid-twentieth century. Then the spread of the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya started, which was accompanied by aggressive proselytisation and mass conversion. This led, during the 1950s and 1960s, to clashes between members of the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya and members of different branches of the Qadiriyya, the Usmaniyya in Sokoto and the Nasiriyya based in Kano.³

In the 1950s, in order to stop the advance of the Tijaniyya, which he seems to have perceived as a challenge to his authority, the then Sultan of Sokoto, Abubakar III, ordered the destruction of some Tijani mosques and *zawiyas* in Sokoto. He also ruled that no further Tijani *zawiyas* be built there. Finally, he prohibited the Kano Tijani *ulama* from paying pious visits (*ziyara*), to Sokoto, which were occasions for them to collect financial contributions from their disciples to support the activities of the Tijaniyya.⁴ This measure effectively cut off the Tijani *ulama* of Kano from their quite substantial following in the then Province of Sokoto, which created a serious bone of contention between the Kano Tijani *ulama* and the Sokoto native authorities.⁵ Subsequent developments further aggravated the opposition.

² See Louis Brenner, "Muslim thought in Eighteenth-Century West Africa. The Case of Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio," in N. Levtzion and J.O. Voll (eds.), *Eighteenth Century Renewal and Reform in Islam*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1987, pp. 39-67, p. 56.

³ See John N. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-4.

⁴ See Ibrahim Tahir, "Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1907-1974," *op. cit.*, *passim*.

⁵ On Tijaniyya/Qadiriyya conflicts, see Y.A. Quadri, "Qadiriyya and Tijaniyyah

The most important of these developments was the creation of the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam in 1962. The JNI was open to all Muslims and aimed to promote Islamic literature in Nigerian languages, build mosques, and support institutions of learning. The State House was chosen as the headquarters of the JNI in the 1960s. The JNI ran a journal, *Nur al-Islam* (The Light of Islam), and established a number of different bodies, including one charged with the publication of the manuscripts of the nineteenth-century jihadists and entrusted with the task of editing and diffusing the writings of Usman Dan Fodio, Muhammadu Bello, and Abdullahi Dan Fodio.⁶

The birth of the JNI was a landmark in the rise of Muslim reformism in Northern Nigeria, because it favoured those who attended formal schools as opposed to traditional Islamic schools. It also favoured Sokoto over Kano people. The JNI was not a reformist movement, *per se*; rather it was a movement seeking to unify Muslims in the north and transcend their differences, which JNI policy claimed to be minor, such as those arising from affiliation in different Sufi orders. All emirs in Northern Nigeria were also members of the JNI. However, certain reformers, and particularly Shaykh Abubakar M. Gumi, were central to running the organisation. The JNI had quite an appeal to the rising Muslim middle class of bureaucrats, military officers, intellectuals and businessmen based in Kaduna.⁷

Among the motivations for the creation of the JNI, was Ahmadu Bello's desire to transfer the spiritual centre of power from Sokoto to Kaduna.⁸ Indeed, although Ahmadu Bello was himself a descendant of Usman Dan Fodio and a holder of a traditional title (Sardauna of Sokoto), the supreme religious authority lay in Sokoto and was vested in the Sultan Abubakar III. Ahmadu Bello had contested the sultanship in 1938, but the British Resident⁹ had imposed Abubakar

Relations in Nigeria in the 20th Century," *Orita Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies* 6 (1), June 1984 pp. 15–30, p. 19; Anwar Auwalu, "Struggle for Influence and Identity, The *ulama* in Kano, 1937–1987," M.A. diss. in history, University of Maiduguri; John Naber Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano, op. cit., passim*.

⁶ See Auwalu Anwar, "Struggle for Influence and Identity, The *ulama* in Kano, 1937–1987," *op. cit.*, for a more detailed survey of the different bodies of the JNI.

⁷ In *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria, op. cit.*, p. 105; pp. 122–35, Roman Loimeier describes how this Muslim middle class, later named Kaduna Mafia, sought to conserve its position of influence in Nigeria by claiming the legacy of Ahmadu Bello after the assassination of the latter.

⁸ I am grateful to Murray Last for this suggestion.

⁹ In the discussion of aspects of political change that affected Africa under colonial

III as sultan, despite the fact that the council of kingmakers preferred Ahmadu Bello.¹⁰ By creating the JNI, a modernised organisation, and locating it in Kaduna, Ahmadu Bello was attempting to wrest spiritual authority from Sokoto and transform himself into a leader who could appeal to several sources of legitimacy. To further bypass the Sultan, Ahmadu Bello created a Council of *Malams* (learned men) to be consulted on all Islamic religious matters such as sighting the moon at the beginning and end of the Muslim month of Ramadan, for which the sultan was traditionally responsible.¹¹

Finally, it can be argued that Ahmadu Bello was attempting to construct an Islamic ideology that could unify all of Northern Nigeria in the interregional struggle that had characterised the Nigerian First Republic (1960–66). Rivalries among the Sufi orders and their different branches hindered the achievement of that objective. Turning certain *ulama* of Northern Nigeria into salaried staff of the JNI was one step toward achieving these objectives.¹² Finally, this modern Islamic organisation would be in a position to compete with Christian missions, notably the Church Missionary Society.¹³ The success of these missions, particularly in the Middle Belt, had undermined the project

rule, French anthropologist Georges Balandier mentions among others the depoliticisation of pre-existing political systems. See Georges Balandier, *Political Anthropology*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books 1972, p. 160. Worthy of note is that, in the specific case of Northern Nigeria, the power of king-making bodies was dramatically reduced and the colonial state usually imposed its choice in such instances. At independence, the postcolonial state, which inherited the colonial state, took over that role. A further illustration is provided by the fact that when the same Abubakar III died in 1989, the Supreme Military Council, headed by General Babangida, imposed Ibrahim Dasuki as sultan amidst a mayhem of protest of the Sokoto people who favoured Maccido the son of Abubakar III. Furthermore, Sani Abacha (military head of the Nigerian State 1992–1998) sacked Ibrahim Dasuki in 1996 and had him replaced by Sultan Maccido. Although the reasons for the sacking of Dasuki had not yet been adequately investigated, it seems that the opposition of a son of Dasuki (Sambo) to Sani Abacha had been central to that development.

¹⁰ See John N. Paden, *Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto. Values and Leadership in Nigeria*, Zaria, Hudahuda Publishing Company, 1986, p. 112.

¹¹ See Billy Dudley, *Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria*, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1968, p. 230.

¹² Making the religious establishment economically dependent and using them for a modernising agenda was also the strategy of former President Nasser of Egypt. See Gilles Kepel, "Intellectuels et militants de l'islam contemporain," in Gilles Kepel and Yann Richard (eds.), *Intellectuels et Militants de l'Islam contemporain*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹³ See Edmund P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, pp. 18 *sq.*

of a Muslim north, which was the core of Ahmadu Bello's strategy and pan-Islamic policy.

As vice-president of the World Muslim League, Ahmadu Bello was expected to contribute to the spread of Islam, and he committed himself to that task. In his view, a sophisticated organisation like the JNI would prove better able to proselytise than the Sufi orders. However, the JNI did not succeed in uniting Muslims, let alone controlling the *ulama* of Kano, regardless of the order of affiliation. First, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi dominated the JNI, and his advocacy for a legalistic and anti-Sufi Islam alienated the Kano *ulama*. In addition, JNI represented the aspirations of a new generation of educated middle class, many of whom were anxious to distance themselves from the Sufi orders.

Another reason for the reluctance of the Kano *ulama* to actively commit to the mission of the JNI was that most important positions within the JNI were given to Sokoto people. The sultan was appointed president, a symbolic appointment of course. Shaykh Abubakar Gumi was effectively in charge of day-to-day management. Finally, the Wazir of Sokoto, Junaid (1905–1997), the second most important Native Authority title holder after the sultan, served as moderator of the debates within the JNI. He also chaired the committee charged with editing and publishing the manuscripts of the jihadists, mentioned above.

The creation of the JNI led to the formation of two blocs. The first bloc, in which Abubakar Gumi was a leading figure, had reformist leanings. It appealed to and was supported by the urban intellectual, political and economic elite. It came to lead the religious reformation movement as well as the drive towards emancipation from the traditional order. The second bloc was represented by a movement named Fityan Al-Islam (Young Muslim Congress of Nigeria). Of course, Fityan Al-Islam was not set up exclusively to oppose the JNI although, over time, it mobilised both leaders and followers of the Sufi orders in opposition to Shaykh Gumi and the reformers.

Fityan al-Islam was created in 1963 at a time when the Kano business community started developing international connections, greatly facilitated by the development of improved communication systems. It was in this context that Shaykh Mudi Salga, a leading figure of the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya and a businessman in Kano, undertook a long business trip, which took him to many European and Arab countries. On his return from this trip, he was interviewed

by the editor of the *Northern Star*, a newspaper of Northern Nigeria at that time.¹⁴ Asked what impressed him most during his long journey, he answered that he was “particularly struck to see that Muslims in all the world are awake and conscious that the enemies of Islam gathered all sorts of weapons to harm Islam and the Muslims. For that reason, Muslims are setting up Islamic societies everywhere, including in European countries.”¹⁵

The editor of the *Northern Star* reported that Shaykh Mudi Salga intended to form an Islamic party in the very near future. The news spread like wildfire. A number of people approached Shaykh Mudi Salga to inquire if the information was accurate. Although he explained to people precisely what he had said, he was nevertheless encouraged to create such an organisation, which became Fityan al-Islam. According to Muhammad al-Nasir Adam, the aims of Fityan Al-Islam at its creation were the following:

- to prevent the devastating spread of the pernicious doctrine of the Pakistani Ahmad Ghulam, which was poisoning Nigeria.¹⁶
- to fight against the activities of the Wahhabis,¹⁷ who are attempting to spread their vicious creed [. . .], inciting people to label as *kuffar* (sing. *kafir*) the *awliya*, such as Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio or Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani or Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, [. . .] and those who believe in the oneness of God and that Prophet Muhammad is his Prophet, as well as those who pray for the Prophet and implore his intercession.”¹⁸

When it was created, the Fityan al-Islam enjoyed support from many of the most influential Kano *ulama*. These included Malam Tijani Usman Zangon Barebare, Shaykh Abubakar Atiq, Malam Sani

¹⁴ See John N. Paden, *Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, Values and Leadership in Nigeria, op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁵ See Muhammad al-Nasir Adam, *Munazzamat Fityan Fi Nijeria Fi Sinniha ‘ishrin* (The Young Muslim Congress of Nigeria Twenty Years After its Creation), Kano, p. 6. I am grateful to the author for supplying me with this document reporting the major achievements of Fityan al-Islam in its first twenty years.

¹⁶ The movement incriminated here is the Ahmadiyya, which was very instrumental in “modernising Islam among the Yoruba”. For more information on the Ahmadiyya in West Africa in general and Nigeria in particular, see Humphrey Fisher, *Ahmadiyya. A Study in Contemporary Islam on the West African Coast*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963.

¹⁷ For more on the Wahhabi activities although in a different context in West Africa, see Lansine Kaba, *The Wahabiyya. Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa, op. cit., passim*.

¹⁸ See Muhammad al-Nasir Adam, *Munazzamat Fityan Fi Nijeria Fi Sinniha ‘ishrin op. cit.*, p. 5.

Kafanga, Malam Usman Maihula, and Malam Faruq Salga, who were leading figures of Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya, and Malam Nasiru Kabara and Malam Abubakar Ramadan Tudun Nufawa who were leaders of the Kano Qadiriyya. Shaykh Mudi Salga became (and still remains) the president of the Fityan al-Islam, and Malam Zubayr ‘Abd al-Qasim was secretary general. Thus, from its creation, Fityan al-Islam became an organisation for Kano Sufis who wanted to maintain their position in society and oppose the reformist, Sokoto-based, western-educated, biased JNl. In other words, Fityan al-Islam became a faction in the “struggle for influence and identity” as Anwar Auwalu put it.¹⁹

Another development that further aggravated the opposition between the two blocs also took place in 1963—the deposition of the emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi. Muhammad Sanusi had been appointed emir in 1953 after his father Abdullahi Bayero died. He was a staunch follower of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse. Emir Sanusi, who must have joined the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya during his father’s lifetime, was very sincere in his relationship with Shaykh Niasse. He was also aware of the large following of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse throughout Nigeria, particularly in Northern Nigeria. He identified with Niasse more closely than his father (whose relationship with Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse was more of a private one) and he invited Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse to perform the pilgrimage with him every year between 1953 and 1962.²⁰

It was in this context that Ahmadu Bello ordered an investigation into the finances of the Kano Native Authorities and, using the excuse of mismanagement, arranged for the deposition of Emir Sanusi. There were many reasons behind this deposition, but there is no doubt that the broadening of Emir Sanusi’s political base, as well as the interference of a Senegalese Shaykh into Nigerian politics, caused Ahmad Bello to fear for his own political influence and encouraged him to undertake the move.

With the deposition of Emir Sanusi, Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse revealed his own political acumen by appointing Emir Sanusi as his *khalifa* (representative) for the whole of Nigeria and inviting his disciples to support him. From the time of the deposition of Emir Sanusi until

¹⁹ See Anwar Auwalu, “Struggle for Influence and Identity, The *ulama* in Kano, 1937–1987,” *op. cit.*

²⁰ See J. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*, *op. cit.*

the end of the First Republic, Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse did not come to Nigeria, although he would certainly have been denied permission had he attempted to do so. The deposition of Emir Sanusi was resented by the Kanawa—both elites and grassroots—for reasons dealing partly with an old rivalry between Kano and Sokoto.²¹ Most of them actively supported the Fityan al-Islam, whose existence had put an end to two decades of strong doctrinal polemics between the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya in Kano.²²

The deposition of Sanusi also had implications for party politics, leading to the creation of the Kano People's Party in 1963 to defend Kano's interests.²³ Furthermore, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) of Malam Aminu Kano, which had been persecuted throughout the 1950s by the dominant party in the north (the Northern People's Congress) and by the Native Authorities, made an alliance with the pro-Emir Sanusi faction of the Northern People's Congress to voice their discontent over Emir Sanusi's deposition.²⁴ Following the federal elections of 1964, Malam Aminu Kano created the Kano State Movement, which continued to defend Kano identity and specificity, vis-à-vis the Sokoto/Kaduna quest for hegemony. Following the dismantling by General Yakubu Gowon of the former regional geopolitical structure in 1967, Nigeria became a federation of 12 states, including Kano, which the people of Kano had been longing for.²⁵ The Northern Region under the much resented domination of Sokoto was also dismantled.

However, Fityan al-Islam continued to exist and undertook to develop effective means for defending the Sufi orders and their vision of Islam as well as their contribution to the spread of Islam and the well-being of Muslims. Much like the pro-Shaykh Gumi faction of the JNl and later the Izala movement, Fityan al-Islam built schools and sent out preachers to proselytise. Based in Kano, Fityan al-Islam set up branches throughout the country, but they concentrated on the north and most particularly on the zones where the impact of Izala was being felt: Kaduna, Zaria and Plateau. By 1988, Fityan al-Islam had set up altogether 1,173 sections all over the country

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

and was running 2,262 schools of various kinds. Some of these schools were built by the Fityan al-Islam itself with funds collected from members or well-to-do sympathisers; others, already in existence, became affiliated with Fityan al-Islam. The Fityan al-Islam organisation operates one high school and a number of primary schools in the city of Kano, although these schools vary considerably in type. Whereas some are very modern and are equipped with the same infrastructure found in other governmental schools, others use the buildings of the public schools only in the evenings, outside normal school hours. In remote villages, the school may consist of only a hut with one teacher paid by Fityan al-Islam. In 1988, the total number of pupils enrolled in Fityan al-Islam schools was reported to be 254,922, which is probably an accurate census.

Non-Fityan al-Islam Sufi-run schools also exist. Worthy of note in Kano are the Ma'had al-din of Malam Nasiru Kabara and the primary and secondary schools of Malam Harun Rashid Fagge and the late Malam Manzon Arze. Malam Manzon's school had been enlarged, thanks to a generous financial contribution of Sani Mashal, a Kano businessman, who is not a member of the Tijaniyya, but a personal friend and disciple of the late Malam Manzo.²⁶ In 1988, each of these three schools had an enrolment of several hundred pupils and offered secular as well as religious education. In the religious studies curriculum, Sufi teachings held an important position.²⁷

In addition to the educational networks of Fityan al-Islam, many leading personalities of the Sufi orders have introduced contemporary methods of teaching into their schools, which also offer secular courses such as mathematics, languages such as Hausa in the roman script, English etc., alongside religious education. Of course, this process was part of the general expansion of formal education supported by the public authorities, who have provided funding to traditional Koranic schools to help modernise their educational methods since the time of the First Republic (1960–66). But there is no doubt that the expansion of the Yan Izala in Northern Nigeria from the late 1970s—and their use of new methods of teaching and

²⁶ Interview with Sanusi Manzo, son of Malam Manzo, Kano, 1988.

²⁷ As far as the Tijani schools are concerned, one can note the following books: Al-Shaykh al-Nazifi, *Al-yaqutat al-farida fi al-tariqa al-tijaniyya*, Tunis, Dar al-Qur'an al-Karim, undated or *Munyat al-murid fi adab wa awrad al-tariqa al-tijaniyya*, Dar al-fkr, undated.

proselytising—have been a crucial factor in causing Sufi-based schools to modernise their pedagogy. One of the reasons why some Sufi leaders were reluctant to modernise their schools earlier was that they did not want to depend too much on the government, for fear that they might lose their credibility vis-à-vis their clientele. In general, in West Africa, the more distant from the secular political authorities, the more respected the Islamic authorities. Islamic leaders who are too supportive of state authority are generally considered to have sold out.²⁸

Like Izala, Fityan al-Islam has expended much effort on the building of mosques and schools and the training of preachers. By 1988, the number of mosques either built or restored, but in any case managed by Fityan al-Islam was 2,924. With regard to the construction of schools, the far north is privileged with 257 schools in former Kano State, 240 in former Kaduna State, 329 in Katsina State, 247 in Plateau State and 192 in Sokoto State. The average enrolment is approximately 20,000 pupils in these states where Izala's presence is the strongest.

In Yorubaland, Fityan al-Islam's presence is felt much less. The distribution of its educational network is roughly as follows: 20 schools enrolling 5,378 pupils in Oyo State and 26 schools with 9,947 pupils in Ogun State. The explanation for this must be, on the one hand, the presence in Yorubaland of preexisting "modern" Islamic organisations (Ansarud-deen, Nuwa'irud-din, Ahmadiyya, etc.) with efficient educational networks and, on the other hand, the relatively more peaceful state of religious cohabitation in Yorubaland. David Laitin²⁹ had argued that, in spite of the fact that Yoruba Christians tend to enjoy a higher socioeconomic status and are more represented in government than their Muslim counterparts, religion is not the primary source for political cleavage in Yorubaland. Although, the situation may have changed since Laitin conducted field research there, and because there are some radical Muslim groups, there certainly

²⁸ A very relevant discussion of how far the religious leaders would engage in collaboration with the state is discussed in the Senegalese case for instance by L. Villalon, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal*, *op. cit.* and Christian Coulon, *Le Marabout et le Prince*, *op. cit.*

²⁹ See David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflicts, British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Peter B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, (eds.), *Bringing the State Back in*, N.Y. Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 285–316.

is nothing like the Northern Nigerian Sufi/reformist confrontation documented in this book.

In the former Eastern Region, partly because of the low number of Muslims, Fityan al-Islam's activities are really insignificant. In the former Bendel State, Fityan al-Islam runs only one school enrolling 20 pupils, in Imo State one school with 35 pupils, in Anambra State one school with 15 pupils, and finally one school with 45 pupils in Cross River State.

Finally, Fityan al-Islam also invested in the training of professional preachers (*masu waazi*) entrusted with the task of converting non-Muslims, but also of defending the Sufi creed against the attacks of the reformists. In 1988, the overall number of professional preachers operating under the banner of Fityan al-Islam was 1,015. Their distribution followed pretty much the pattern of the distribution of mosques and schools in the country. For instance in former Plateau State (bastion of Shaykh Ismail Idriss and the Izala national council of *ulama*) there were 172 Fityan al-Islam resident preachers. In former Kaduna State, a stronghold of the late Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, there were 125 preachers, whereas in the former Ogun State, there were only 15 resident preachers, and in the former Oyo State only 8 preachers.³⁰

Like the Society, Fityan al-Islam also operates a first-aid group. According to Fityan al-Islam sources, the number of first-aid workers was 50,000 in 1988. They are trained in Kaduna and receive an elementary first-aid certificate. The first-aid group of Fityan al-Islam was created in 1978, that is in the very first year the Society for the Removal of Innovation was created. Its mission was to provide first aid to ill persons, and evacuate road accident victims to hospital after providing them with first aid. Even if each of the 1,173 sections of Fityan al-Islam is supposed to have its own first-aid group, in all likelihood, the first-aid groups are better equipped in big urban centres than in remote villages.

Moreover, like the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam, Fityan al-Islam operates a committee whose mission is to provide assistance to Nigerian

³⁰ These figures are provided by the report in Hausa language released on the occasion of the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Young Muslim Congress of Nigeria. See Muhammad al-Nasir Adam, *Shekara ishrin da biyar da kafuwar kungiyar samari musulmin Nigeria* (Fityan al-islam twenty-five years after), Kano, Hukumar Ilmi Ta kungiyar Ta kasa Baki daya, 1988, pp. 14-15.

pilgrims to Mecca from their departure until their return to Nigeria. The large number of pilgrims made pilgrimage an issue for all the religious movements that wanted to prove their credibility. During the peak of the oil boom (late 1970s to early 1980s) as many as one hundred thousand Nigerian Muslims made the pilgrimage to Mecca each year.³¹ In 1977, the number of Nigerian pilgrims, who were the second largest delegation to Mecca of any country, was 106,000 pilgrims.³² The members of the pilgrimage committee escort future pilgrims to centres of vaccination and help them carry their luggage to the big airports, particularly the Kano airport, where most chartered flights to Mecca take off. The committee sent members to the holy cities to help pilgrims on the spot. Altogether Fityan al-Islam has sent 792 delegates to Mecca between 1970 and 1988. They served as interpreters for the pilgrims, many of whom did not speak Arabic. They also teach them how to perform the rituals of the pilgrimage. The first-aid workers provide first-aid care to pilgrims, should they feel ill during the pilgrimage.

John Paden and Ibrahim Tahir have documented well the extent to which the spread of the Tijaniyya in Kano and its countryside was facilitated by the capacity of this Sufi order to provide hospitality to travelling Hausa merchants.³³ The *zawiyas* that were created performed a religious function, but they also provided lodging to merchants travelling back and forth from rural to urban areas in the 1950s and 1960s. However, it has been argued that the idea of offering formal education, medical care, and first-aid assistance may well have been adopted in imitation of the Christian missions or other Yoruba Islamic organisations, which adopted the methods of the missions to attract the urban youth, and educated population.³⁴

³¹ See Roman Loimeier, "Das Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme", Zum Versuch, den Hajj in Nigeria zu organisieren," *Africa Spectrum*, (23), 1988, pp. 201-14, p. 201.

³² Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria. The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular ideologies*, Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 1998, p. 173.

³³ Indeed the *zawiya* has performed many functions throughout the Muslim World for centuries, although to a lesser extent from European colonial rule on. For more on that, I refer to my "Zawiya," in John L. Esposito (eds.), *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, vol. 4, pp. 370-73. On the Tijaniyya ibrahimiyya *zawiyas* in West Africa, see my "Muslim Missionaries and African States," in Susanne Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds.), *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, Boulder, Westview, 1996, pp. 47-62.

³⁴ James Makinde had made that argument in his "Islam en Pays Yoruba: religion et politique," Ph.D. diss. in political science, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux, 1989.

The organisational responses of Fityan al-Islam to the challenge of reformism from JNl and later from Izala were accompanied by other reactions that were somewhat less peaceful.

The Hostile Reaction to the Rise of Izala: the Jundullahi Movement

From the late 1970s, the Sufi-Izala confrontation became quite severe. The Yan Izala were attacked for criticising Sufi Islam. Influential Yan Izala compelled some *imams* to reject their *tariqa* affiliation, and, if they refused to do so, they were dismissed and replaced by *imams* of reformist persuasion.³⁵

Immediately after the creation of the Society, a number of Islamic organisations were created in response to the reformist challenge. In Ilorin, an organisation named Jama'at al-sufiyya Ilorin, including both Tijanis and Qadiris was created with the support of the emir of Ilorin. In Kaduna, two similar organisations were formed: *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna* (Association of the Followers of Sunna) with interestingly the same name and objectives as Izala, defending the tradition of Prophet Muhammad; and *Kungiyar Dakarun Dan Fodio*.³⁶ These movements combined efforts to oppose Izala.

However, it was in Kano that the fiercest reaction against the Society was organised through the creation of the Jundullahi movement in 1980 under the leadership of Kamaluddeen Na Ma'aji. The stated aims of the Jundullahi movement were to protect the dignity of the Prophet and the Sunna, defend the Muslim community, promote discipline and education within the Islamic community, build Islamic schools, and, last but not least, defend the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya against their detractors. It used its printing press based in Kano to print posters discrediting Izala followers, one of which deserves discussion. The poster in question contained two pictures, the first showing a monster with human body and hands and the tail of an animal, and the second depicting a similar monster being persecuted inside a grave by some reptiles. According to the Islamic tradition of the region, even before Doomsday, both the elected and

³⁵ See Yasir Anjola Quadri, "A study of Izalah, a contemporary anti-Sufi organisation in Nigeria," *ORITA The Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies*, 17, (2), December 1985, pp. 95-108.

³⁶ See Yasir Anjola Quadri: "A study of the Izala, . . ." p. 102.

the damned would start enjoying their future reward or retribution in their grave. The story narrated of an Izala member suffering in his grave is very much shaped by this belief. The posters were displayed prominently in many areas of Kano during the peak of the Jundullahi movement activity in the early 1980s. They carried the following caption:

- 1) If you argue that the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, is only a man like all others [. . .] that he eats and drinks like everybody, that he is in no sense superior to anybody,
- 2) [that] who ever seeks the intercession (*tawasulli* in Hausa, *tawasul* in Arabic) of the Prophet, a *wali*, a righteous (*mutumin kirki* in Hausa), has committed associationism [. . .],
- 3) If you are a member of the party that persecutes the Muslims who perform *dhikr* (recitation of the name of God) or who repent (*istighfari* in Hausa, *istighfar* in Arabic) or who prevent them from doing so,
- 4) If you are one of the cursed ones who state that the marriage of their parents is void because the *salat al-fatih* was recited during its celebration,
- 5) If you are among the cursed ones who label the disciples of the Sufi orders or the saints associationists, or if you insult the Tijanis who perform the ritual of the *wazifa*,
- 6) If you are among the libertines who label those who genuflect to greet their “elders” infidels (*kafiri* in Hausa, *Kafir* pl. *Kuffar* in Arabic) for instance a son genuflecting to greet his father, a woman her husband, a subject his chief, if you say this is associationism [. . .],
- 7) If you are among the satans who bring trouble to the authorities of Nigeria, and particularly those of Northern Nigeria,
- 8) If you are among the damned who insult the servants of God among the prophets, the saints, (*waliyyan Allah*), the righteous (*salihai* in Hausa, *salihin* in Arabic), and indeed our Muslim Native Authorities (*sarakuna*),

If you are part of those, and if you do not repent, you may see from this world, what shall be your fate in your grave.³⁷

A second poster shows many people fleeing upon the arrival of a monster with a human body and the head of a horse, meant to represent a follower of Izala at the day of judgement. Both posters were aimed at dissuading people, especially youth, from joining Izala.

The Jundullahi did not content itself with depicting the reformers as potentially damned. It organised a number of attacks against Izala followers to prevent them from conducting preaching activities,

³⁷ Translated from Hausa by the author.

particularly in Kano. When Kamaluddeen Adamu Na ma'aji, the founder of the movement died in 1981, another disciple of the Tijaniyya, Malam Lawal Ma'azu, from Zangon Barebare ward, took over the direction of the movement. But the Jundullahi movement declined after the death of its founder and by the end of the 1980s enjoyed only a nominal existence. The explanation for this decline may be that as Izala spread, many opponents started accommodating it as part of the landscape and, thus, were reluctant to physically confront Izala preachers, although there are still many radicals on both sides who would not resist physical confrontation.

In chapter 3, I discussed how the traditional authorities, such as the village, district, and wards heads, complained about Izala activities on many occasions to the emir who summoned Izala preachers to the palace to hear them plead their case. Like the traditional religious authorities, these local authorities, who were quite hostile to Izala,³⁸ also used their connections with the state to stop Izala's preaching. The following story illustrates these attempts.

In 1979, Ismail Idriss was invited to speak on a religious program broadcast by the official television station of Kano state. As could be expected, he roundly criticised the Sufi orders, after which he was arrested and detained, although he was subsequently freed after Shaykh Gumi interceded on his behalf. I was told by Muhammad Habib gado-da-masu, an Izala patron, that Ismail Idriss had been arrested by order of the then inspector general of police, Muhammad Dikko Yusuf (known as M.D. Yusuf), a fervent disciple of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse, who has performed at least one pilgrimage to Kaolack every year for over thirty years. It is also worth noting that during the same period, the commissioner of police of Kano State (Dam Madami) was also a disciple of the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya. Moreover, the late Abubakar Gumi claimed that in the late 1970s, some Sufi radicals attempted to assassinate him, but they were not arrested because the same inspector general of police, Muhammad Dikko Yusuf, refused to pursue the suspects.³⁹ Whether M.D. Yusuf ordered

³⁸ In contrast, the parallel authorities *i.e.*, the representatives of the state tended to have some sympathy at least towards some aspects of the Izala agenda, but some of them tended to disapprove some radical methods, and, for that reason, the reformism of Aminudeen's *Da'wa* group was more appealing to them.

³⁹ Interview with the author in Kaduna, September 1988. It is worth recalling that, according to Izala preachers, their organization was created in reaction to this attempt.

the arrest of Ismail Idriss or failed to arrest those who attempted to murder Shaykh Abubakar Gumi could not be verified. But there is no doubt whatsoever that the majority of the representatives of the traditional religious and political orders used whatever influence they could muster to hinder the progress of Izala.

The divisions between Yan Izala and their opponents ramified throughout Muslim society. Many partisans of the pre-established religious and social order summoned their dependants and demanded that they choose clearly their camp. In other words, before the spread of Izala, it was not uncommon for a person to belong to a family affiliated with a Sufi order and still not participate actively in Sufi religious activities. But, with the spread of the Society, those nominal members who did not participate in *tariqa* rituals became suspects. Thus, many people who had had only a nominal affiliation to Sufi orders prior to the rise of Izala started participating actively in *tariqa* activities. These led some observers to believe that the Sufi orders had regained influence with the appearance of Izala. Likewise, those who abstained from genuflecting when greeting social superiors were systematically accused of being Yan Izala. Also, many young people who let their beards grow aroused suspicion and were exposed to sanctions.

The sanctions were of many different kinds. To cite just a few, some people dissolved the marriages of their daughters when their sons-in-law refused to show them the respect they felt they were due, that is, to genuflect when greeting them. Upon receiving a request for a daughter's hand in marriage, the parents of the girl would undertake an investigation of the family's origin and morality, but also the doctrinal persuasion of the suitor. In very many cases, young men whose "Izala-ness" was proved were refused permission to marry. Many people still refuse to consider marrying their daughter to an Izala follower.

The hostility of some was not necessarily due to opposition to the entire Izala agenda but to the radicalism of some preachers, which in some instances, was considered quite shocking. One such example is alluded to in the caption of the Jundullahi poster discussed above: the recitation of the *tijani* litany *salat al-fatih* during the celebration of marriages. Indeed, although some Izala preachers simply questioned the promise of reward owed to the recitor of this prayer, others condemned it totally and argued that all marriages during which the *salat al-fatih* was recited were void and that children born

in those marriages were illegitimate in the view of Muslim law. Many people found this argument unacceptable, particularly since,—and here is the irony—the *salat al-fatih* had definitely been recited in most, if not all, Muslim marriages, including non Sufi, celebrated at least until the polemics started in the early 1970s.

Another sanction against Izala followers was the boycotting of, and in some cases the destruction of, Izala businesses. In the same vein, some Izala sympathisers lost business connections with more powerful non-Izala patrons, for whom they refused to genuflect. As a result of these pressures, the Yan Izala became much more unified and created strong relations of mutual aid and solidarity to face the challenge. In Bayrouth Road (a famous business ward in Kano), many businessmen are said to be united by strong religious, professional, and social ties.

In reaction to the marriage restrictions, Izala followers started organising their own networks and matrimonial strategies. Malam Ilyas, one of the first patrons of Izala in Brigade (see chapter 3), personally took on the task of finding cheaper wives for Yan Izala (in terms of the expenses incurred for marriage) among the daughters of other Yan Izala or among those who were willing to marry their daughters to Izala sympathisers. However, the powerful sympathisers of Izala within the state apparatus are unlikely to have faced the same problems in finding wives as the less well-off members. These personalities often might not identify themselves openly as staunch followers of Izala; many people in Kano, or for that matter other parts of Northern Nigeria, hid their sympathy towards Izala, even if they had given up reciting the *salat al-fatih*, and began to contribute financially to Izala activities. Thus, I argue that the impact of the Society in Kano extends well beyond its visible constituency and public activities such as attending study or preaching sessions organised by the Izala preachers.

During the 1980s, it appeared that neither the boycotts nor the persecution could stop Izala. Thus, some Sufi leaders opted for strategies of accommodation and began making concessions to the reformist movement, either by rearticulating the religious creed of their order or by criticising some popular practices that had been tolerated before.

The Rearticulation of the Sufi Creeds

As already argued, the polemics surrounding Sufism and the Sufi orders is an old one. Sufis and legalistic Muslims have been arguing for centuries; these debates, while new in Northern Nigeria, are not new in the Muslim world. In the 1930s, Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse defended the Tijaniyya in the following terms:

The detractors argue that the *salat al-fatih* is superior to the Koran [. . .] This is a lie forged against Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani. For Shaykh Tijani says in the *Jawahir al-ma'ani* that 'the Koran is superior to all the *adhkar* and all the prayers.' This is brighter than the light of the sun. But if the person who recites, regardless of whether he knows the meaning or not, disobeys constantly the commandments of God, then the recitation of the Koran is not the best thing for him to do. On the contrary, the more he sins and reads the Koran, the more he is cursed. For the sinner, praying for the Prophet, peace be upon him, is much better than reading the Koran. Because whoever prays once for the Prophet, God prays ten times for him, and all the universe prays ten times for him. Thus, he obtains the everlasting bliss (*al-sa'ada al-'abadiyya*). All the promises made by God are fulfilled, whether in favour of the obedient, or the disobedient. The being for whom God and his angels pray enjoys bliss. The [disobedient] are doomed to damnation (*al-halak*) and to affliction (*al-shaqa'*), when reading the Koran and to bliss when praying for the Prophet. The detractors also argue that the recitation of the *salat al-fatih* has such or such reward. But I state that this is a virtue (*mizya*) of the *salat al-fatih*, this does not mean superiority [to the Koran].⁴⁰

From this passage, it appears that sinners who recite the Koran are cursed by the Koran itself (the *hadith* that supports this claim is: *rubba qari'in wa al-Qur'an yal'anuhu* (some reciters of the Koran are cursed by the Koran itself). Thus, it is more beneficial to them to pray for the Prophet because praying for the Prophet will always be rewarded. The second point of justification in Shaykh Ibrahim's line of argument is that virtue (*mizya*) should not be taken to mean superiority.

In the context of the polemics in Northern Nigeria, Shaykh Sharif Ibrahim Salih developed a somewhat different and more nuanced position with regard to the *salat al-fatih*. A leading *Tijani* figure in

⁴⁰ See Ibrahim Niasse, *Al-rihla al-hijaziyya al-'ula*, Kano, al-maktabat al-amiriyya, not dated, my translation.

West Africa, Shaykh Sharif Ibrahim Salih⁴¹ was born in Adidibe near Dikwa on July 3, 1939 and belonged to the ethnic group of the Shuwa Arab. He memorised the Koran in Dikwa and studied all the major Islamic sciences with a number of Tijani Shaykhs in Northern Nigeria, including Shaykh Abul Fath of Maiduguri and Abubakar Atiq Sanka and Tijani Usman Zangon Barebare in Kano. Unlike most of his Sufi masters in Northern Nigeria, he also studied in Madina, Saudi Arabia (where he was awarded diplomas and given *ijazat* in the Tijaniyya) and then in Egypt where he also received a diploma on Islamic sciences. According to J. Hunwick, he also received a full *ijaza* and renewal of the Tijani *awrad* from Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse.⁴² A teacher and a scholar of great learning, Shaykh Sharif Ibrahim Salih had written a great deal on language, creed, history, etc. in Arabic. John Hunwick lists ninety-three of his works.⁴³ Because of his great learning, he has held the Borno College chair of Legal and Islamic Studies since its foundation in 1982. Very close to the political establishment, Shaykh Sharif Salih was invited to give ramadan *tafsir* sessions (Koranic exegesis) in the residence of the Nigerian Muslim heads of state. He is also a member of the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, an official body created to monitor Islam in the country. His concern, I presume, has been to rearticulate Tijani doctrines in a way that is acceptable to the new generation of educated Muslims. In other words, he wants to present a Sufi Islam free from an excessive veneration of saints and guarantees of salvation, on which are based Tijani claims to abrogate all Sufi orders.

Shaykh Sharif Ibrahim Salih has attempted a reinterpretation of the Tijani creeds, which I analyse here. In his book entitled *Al-takfir*,⁴⁴ Shaykh Salih quotes a sentence attributed to Ahmad al-Tijani that is often invoked by the Tijanis to clear the founder from the criticisms of his detractors or from the claims made by other Tijanis, which

⁴¹ His full name is Ibrahim b. Muhammad al-Salih b. Yunus b. Muhammad Al-Awwal b. Ibrahim b. Yunus b. Muhammad al-Makki b. 'Amr al-Nawwi al-Husayni. For a short biography and a discussion of his works, see John Hunwick, *Arabic Literature of Africa, volume 2, The Writings of Central Sudanic Africa*, pp. 407–15.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 408.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 407–15.

⁴⁴ Ibrahim Salih b. Yunus Al-Husayni, *Al-takfir akhtar al-bid'a tuhaddidu al-salam wa al-wahda bayna al-muslimin fi Nijeriya* (Proclaiming other Muslims infidels is the worst innovation threatening peace and unity among Muslims.) al-Qahira, Markaz maktaba wa matba'a Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi wa awladuhu, 1982, p. 87 (author's translation).

the founder would not endorse: "If you hear of any statement which I am reported to have made, compare it with the Revelation; accept what is in line with it [the Revelation], and reject what contradicts it." Shaykh Salih goes on to incriminate some publishing houses.

In most Tijani books, one finds statements that many people believe to be exaggerations, especially with regard to the reward for recitation of the *salat al-fatih*. Because they have published books by honourable Sufis without submitting the manuscripts to the careful control and editing of the people of the Sufi orders, some publishing houses have contributed to the spread of the ideas attributed wrongly to the Sufi orders. But it was not only the books of the Sufi masters that were victims of such a calamity. The collections of *ahadith* (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) were also. The books of the Tijani Sufi order and particularly the *Jawahir al-ma'ani* have also been affected by such a disaster. This has led a great number of people to criticise the leaders of the Tijaniyya, some acting in good faith, but others using religion to achieve doubtful ambitions. The worst controversy generated by such exaggerations is the one pertaining to the reward for recitation of the *salat al-fatih li-ma ughliq* (the prayer of the opener of what had been closed).

In the *Jawahir al-ma'ani*, vol. p. 135, one reads the following:

'With regard to the merit (*fadl*) of the *salat al-fatih*, I have heard our Shaykh, may God be pleased with him, saying the following: 'I was reciting the prayer of the opener of what had been closed' on my way back from the pilgrimage to Mecca, on my way to Tlemsen, when I had a vision of the merit (*fadl*) of the prayer of the opener of what had been closed. It was that one recitation of this prayer was equal to six hundred thousand prayers, as reported in the *Wirdat al-juyub*. The author of the *Wirdat al-juyub* reported that the Egyptian pole (*qutb*) al-Shaykh Muhammad Al-Bakri al-Siddiqi, who first communicated the prayer, said that he authorised anybody who had recited this prayer only once without going to paradise, to blame him before God on the day of Judgement. I kept reciting it until the day I left Tlemsen to go to Abu Samghun. I had a vision of a prayer whose recitation had a reward equal to seventy thousand recitations of the *dala'il al-khayrat*. It was the following: 'O God, bless our master Muhammad and his family with a prayer equal to the prayers of all those who worship you and spread on them blessings equal to the blessings that you spread on all those who worship you.' Then, I stopped reciting the *salat al-fatih* in order to recite this new prayer, because of all its merits. Then, the Prophet ordered me to resume reciting the *salat al-fatih*. I then asked him, peace be upon him, what are its merits? He first told me that one recitation of it is equal to six recitations of the Koran. *He then told me that one single recitation*

*of this prayer is equal in reward to all invocations of God ever made in the universe (du'ā waqa'a fi al-kawn), to all mentions of the Lord's name, to all supplications lesser or greater and to six thousand recitations of the Koran*⁴⁵

These statements deserve further elaboration. First, Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani is reported to have started reciting the *salat al-fatih*, on the basis of the utterances attributed to Shaykh Muhammad al-Bakri al-Siddiqi al-Misri in the *Wirdat al-Wujub*. He then gave up this prayer in favour of another, which he believed was better. Finally he resumed reciting it, following a vision he had of the Prophet, peace be upon him, who told him to come back to the recitation of the *salat al-fatih*, which was better. It is appropriate at this juncture to draw attention to the fact that the wide spread statements according to which one recitation of the *salat al-fatih* is equal to that of the Koran or to six recitations of the Koran are totally without foundation. They are denied by other statements of the *Jawahir al-ma'ani*, vol. 1, p. 69. Reporting the words of the best of human beings [*i.e.*, the Prophet Muhammad], peace be upon him, Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani said the following:

'He who recites the supreme name of God, (*ism Allah al-ʿzam*) gets as a reward, seven thousand residences in paradise and in each residence there will be seven thousand times every thing that is found in earth (virgins, palaces, rivers etc. [. . .]) He has a reward equal to six thousand recitations of the *salat al-fatih*. He has the reward of the introductory *surat* of the Koran (*al-fatihah*). He has the reward of the recitation of the Koran.'

If we compare these statements on the *salat al-fatih* to the statements made above, a clear contradiction appears. For, if the recitation of the supreme name of God, which is superior to that of the *salat al-fatih*, is equal to only one recitation of the Koran, then how can it be that the reward for recitation of the virtuous *salat al-fatih* is equal to six, or six thousand recitations of the Koran? There is no doubt that only one of these two statements is true [. . .] The compiler of the *Jawahir al-ma'ani* had reiterated textually the utterances of Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani with no mention of the recitation of the Koran. This proves that the explanatory sentence,⁴⁶ which follows the words of Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani, as well as the precision with which the sentence ends, are not statements of Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani. Either they are mistakes made by the copiers or a plot hatched with the complicity of publishing houses with the aim of forgery or slander. This has already happened with the *al-sirr al-rabbani fi karamat al-Shaykh al-Tijani* (the divine secret in the miracles of al-Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani) written by enemies of the Shaykh. The sons of the latter burned copies of the

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, italics mine. The author comments on these italicised sentences a bit further on.

⁴⁶ See the italicised sentence above.

book and dissociated themselves from it [. . .] No frequent reader would deny that alterations to books, either through omissions or additions on purpose or otherwise, are a frequent phenomenon, particularly since the number of publishing houses and printing presses increases constantly.⁴⁷

To the best of my knowledge, the questioning of an established Tijani belief, at least by a leading member of the Tijani establishment, such as Shaykh Sharif Salih, is an unprecedented effort at doctrinal clarification. This is because the *salat al-fatih* is central to representations of the Tijaniyya, as well as to the claim of the Tijaniyya to be superior to all other Sufi orders. It is appropriate to note that Shaykh Sharif Salih is the secretary general of the league of *ulama* of Morocco and Nigeria⁴⁸ and is collaborating with other Moroccan *ulama* in preparing critical editions of "altered Sufi books".⁴⁹

Shaykh Sharif Salih has also reinterpreted another central Tijani creed regarding the guarantee of salvation for Tijani followers.

The obligation to announce the good and the hope that God will answer our prayers are two principles of Orthodox Muslims (*ahl al-sunna wa al-jama'a*). The announcement by Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani, based on what he received from Mustafa [*i.e.*, Prophet Muhammad], although in some instances, has been described as a guarantee [of salvation], is not a guarantee, but just an announcement [of good news to come]. It is a guarantee linked to many conditions, the most important of which is to die in the faith and to repent (*tawba*).⁵⁰

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 88–89. (translation mine).

⁴⁸ In 1985 a major conference on the Tijaniyya was organised in Fez—where the main *zawiya* of the Tijaniyya is based—by the Moroccan minister of religious affairs. Hundreds of leaders of African Sufi orders were invited to the conference. Afterwards, a number of associations were created, such as the Association of Ulama of Morocco and Senegal and the Association of Ulama of Morocco and Nigeria. Following the conference, generous sums of money were also freed up by Morocco to finance the black African Sufi orders. This conference, which brought together all the leaders of the black African Tijaniyya, was organised precisely at the moment when most of the African states had come out in support of self-determination for Western Sahara. It seems that the late king of Morocco Hasan II attempted to use the West African Sufi leaders to persuade black African diplomats to favour his annexation of Western Sahara.

⁴⁹ I owe this information to Dr. Roman Loimeier.

⁵⁰ See Ibrahim Salih b. Yunus Al-Husayni, *Al-mughir 'ala shubuhāt ahl al-ahwa wa akadhīb al-munkir 'ala kitab al-takfir* (The assailant against the specious arguments of dissenters and lies of detractors of Al-Takfir, Bayrut), Mu'assassa Fu'ad li al-tajlid, 1986, p. 143, translated from Arabic by the author.

Finally, belief in the capacity of saints to intercede in favour of their disciples so that their prayers will be answered and in the capacity of the same saints to harm their opponents, has led some disciples of the orders to consider their saints, at least implicitly, superior to the companions of the Prophet. Shaykh Sharif Salih also refuted this popular belief.

Because of some widespread statements found in books written by some disciples of Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani, opponents argued that the Shaykh [Ahmad al-Tijani] claimed to be superior to the companions of the Prophet, the very ones whose righteousness is mentioned in the Koran and the Sunna. This is not true [. . .] None can claim the status and privileges that God has exclusively bestowed upon the companions. The latter know better than anybody every useful science, and they understand it better than all their epigones. Thus, they enjoy a higher position than [. . .] anybody else.⁵¹

It is worth noting that Sufis do not always explicitly claim that the founder of their order, for example Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani, is superior to the companions of the Prophet, but the claim is often implicit, since they do believe that the founder is the second most important Islamic figure after the Prophet Muhammad. But even this implicit claim is rejected by Shaykh Sharif Salih. The doctrinal rearticulations of Shaykh Sharif Salih seem to have been major concessions made in reaction to the reformist attacks. They certainly are not accepted unanimously by the disciples of the Tijaniyya in all of Nigeria or West Africa. Moreover, many Tijani leaders criticised this effort by Shaykh Sharif Salih to rearticulate their doctrine, although his reinterpretations were welcomed by a certain clientele of “modern Muslims,” who remained attached to Sufi Islam but were critical of certain doctrinal points.

Sufi Liturgical Reform

In Northern Nigeria including Kano, Sufi leaders introduced certain modifications into ritual practices in response to criticism. One ritual that came under particular attack was the *hadra*, collectively recited every Friday between the end of the afternoon and sunset.

⁵¹ See Ibrahim Salih b. Yunus Al-Husayni, *Al-takfir, op. cit.* (translation mine).

It is one of the three most important Tijani rituals; the other two are the *lazim* (recited individually twice a day after the prayers of the early morning (*fajr*) and midafternoon (*‘asr*)), and the *wazifa* (recited collectively once everyday usually after the Maghrib prayer). The *hadra* is almost as important as the Friday prayer judging by the regular attendance it attracts. It also follows a somewhat similar pattern of organisation to the Friday prayer; the disciples congregate in the largest *zawiya*(s) in the same way that people meet on Friday in the largest mosques.

In Kano, there are three big *zawiya*(s) with quite large attendances: the mosque of Alhaji Uba Ringim in Kofar Nassarawa, that of Alhaji Isyaka Rabi, and that of Shaykh Muhammad Salga. Frequently during the performance of the *hadra*, some disciples go into a trance, with their bodies rocking in cadence with the rhythm of the psalmody. Although performed more discreetly in the *zawiya*(s), the *hadra* of Tijani Koranic schools was less discreet. Led by an adult, the reciting crowd (*zakiri*, pl. *zakirai*³² in Hausa) moves in a circle while repeating the first portion of the first Muslim's creed *la ilaha illa Allah* (there is no God but Allah).

The Qadiriyya performs a similar form of *dhikr*. Shaykh Nasiru Kabara introduced the beating of the drum (*bandiri* in Hausa) to accompany ritual performing in his own branch of the Qadiriyya. Thus, just like young Tijani *zakirai*, many disciples of the Qadiriyya Nasiriyya also go into a trance when reciting Qadiri rituals. These rituals were denounced with vigour by the reformers, who accused the Sufi orders of having introduced chants and dances into religious rituals. Both the Qadiris and the Tijanis responded to this attack. Malam Usman Qalansawi (Shehu Maihula) one of the leading Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya leaders in Kano, publicly denounced the entering into trance and movement during ritual at the *zawiya* of Alhaji Uba Ringim. He argued that nobody is supposed to rock in cadence with the rhythm of the ritual psalmody. The practice has still not disappeared, but it has declined and is now banned in some *zawiya*(s). The beating of drums continues in Kano. However, following the attacks of the reformers, the drums have been eliminated in the second largest *qadiri zawiya* in Kano, that of Mallam Abubakar

³² From the Arabic *dhakir* (he who repeats the Lord's name, the term appears in the Koran in the masculine plural—Koran, 11–114 and 33–35 and feminine plural form 33–35).

Garba Tudun Nufawa, the deputy of Malam Nasiru Kabara. This was possible through the mediation of Malam Karami, the eldest son of Malam Abubakar Garba. After the completion of his graduate studies in Egypt, where he is believed to have been exposed to reformist ideas along Izala lines, Malam Karami managed to stop the beating of drums during ritual performance in his father's *zawiya*. However, he did not openly criticise the practice of drum beating. Rather, he began to modernise his father's school, which was attached to the *zawiya*, through the introduction of courses in Islamic studies at different levels. These courses attracted a large clientele and were scheduled precisely at the times ritual recitations with drum beating usually took place. The occupation of the space by students prevented the rituals from taking place and, consequently, drum beating was abandoned in that *zawiya*. Malam Karami, who many people believe is a reformist, provides an interesting example of reform (or counterreform) from within. The abandonment of drum beating in the second largest Qadiriyya *zawiya* in Kano was quite a concession to the reformists.

The propaganda of the reformists has also led to the performing of the ritual of *tarbiya* with greater discretion, at least in Kano. Spiritual education (*tarbiya*) is well known in Sufi circles. The general idea is to educate the soul in order to have it purified, this being a stage in the quest for the knowledge of the divine. In that general sense, *tarbiya* is at the very foundation of Sufism and quite common among the Sufi orders. However, the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya claimed that *tarbiya* could be completed more quickly because of the special position of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse, the mediator of the grace of the Tijaniyya (*sahib al-fayda al-tijaniyya*). The term *fayda* is indeed found in early Tijani literature. However, according to Mervyn Hiskett, the concept was interpreted by Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse to mean "mass salvation,"⁵³ and Hiskett explains that Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse's methods . . .

⁵³ See Ibrahim Niasse, *Al-rihla al-hijaziyya al-ula* (First trip to the Hijaz), Kano, al-maktaba al-amiriyya, n.d. See also Mervyn Hiskett, *The Development of Islam in West Africa, op. cit.*, p. 287; "The community of grace and its opponents the rejectors: A debate about theology and mysticism in Muslim West Africa with special reference to its Hausa expression," *African Language Studies*, (17), 1980, pp. 99-140, which provides a discussion of the concept, as well the polemics between partisans of the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya and their opponents in Northern Ghana.

brought to millions of ordinary believers the possibility of spiritual experiences and development previously restricted to the few who were willing to undergo traditional Sufi disciplines [. . .] he developed *tarbiya* (Sufi initiation) in such a way that it was made readily understandable to simple people who were without any background in Arabic learning [. . .] he thus took the process of popularising Sufism, already a characteristic of the Tijaniyya, a stage further.⁵⁴

Indeed, in Nigeria as elsewhere in Africa, the *muqaddam(s)* of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse initiated many people to *tarbiya*, regardless of age, gender, or level of literacy, even while the aspirant was exercising a professional activity. Any member who sincerely wished to be initiated was asked to recite at specific times certain litanies. After a period of a few weeks, sometimes less, depending on the strength of the aspirant's desire (*shawq*), the aspirant reached spiritual realisation. Several terms are used to refer to the end of this experience. They include the concept of *wusul*, (realisation of pursued aim), *wasl* union between the aspirant and God, and *fana'* (the extinction of the aspirant being in divine totality). There is also *kashf*—uncovering. During this period of ecstasy, the aspirant identifies himself with divine totality, pronounces the ecstatic phrases (*shathiya* pl. *shathiyat*), a celebrated example of which is that of the Persian Sufi, Mansur al-Hallaj (858–922), executed for saying: “*ana al-Haqq*” (I am the truth *i.e.*, God). This state of ecstasy,⁵⁵ in the strict sense of the *tarbiya* process is not supposed to last forever. The aspirant, under the direction of his spiritual guide, must “put feet back on earth.” But he will live from then on, strengthened by his spiritual experience, to become a gnostic *'arif bi-Allah*. All these mystical representations and practices are very old in Islam, as is their condemnation by partisans of legalist Islam, notably the so-called neo-*hanbalites*.

Elsewhere in Africa, wherever Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse had followers, the practice of *tarbiya* was also attacked and banned following the inadequate behaviour of some young people claiming to be his disciples.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

⁵⁵ This provides a vivid illustration of North African Islamic influence. Similar practices are described by Emile Dermenghem in his *Culte des Saints dans l'Islam maghrébin*, Paris, Gallimard, 1954, pp. 29–30.

⁵⁶ For example, The Union des Musulmans du Togo, a somewhat pro-establishment Islamic organisation managed to have the practice of *tarbiya* banned, at least publicly, in Togo because of some unacceptable behaviour by some people

In the specific case of Northern Nigeria, the practice of *tarbiya* has been criticised by Shaykh Abubakar Gumi as unorthodox from the 1960s. The practice has nevertheless been maintained and accounts in part for the appeal of the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya. During my fieldwork, I was struck by the fact that it did not seem to be much practised in Kano, or if it was practised, it was done so with great discretion. In contrast, the practice is very popular in Senegal, where people from many different backgrounds who join the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya receive this initiation. As a result of discretion in the practice of *tarbiya* in Northern Nigeria, there tends to be a great convergence between Tijanis who identify with Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse and other Tijanis. They pray in the same mosques and recite *tijani* rituals such as the *hadra* and the *wazifa* together. Earlier, Shaykh Niasse's disciples called themselves *Yan faila*, to differentiate themselves from other Tijanis (*faila* being the Hausa version of the *fayda* discussed above), but now, all Tijanis tend to be called *Yan Tijaniyya* (disciples of the Tijaniyya). The spread of Izala has thus led to the redefinition of religious identities⁵⁷ and the bipolarisation of the Islamic field. All the Sufis tend to be commonly referred to as *Yan tariqa* and the reformers as *Yan Izala*. The number of *Yan ba ruwana* (those who do not take a position in the polemics) has tended to decline.

To conclude this chapter, it should be pointed out that the rise of reformism is more significant in Northern Nigeria than anywhere else in West Africa and has led to significant changes in religious representation. It does not follow, however, that Sufism is disappearing. Izala's ideology appeals to urban people, many of whom have been uprooted, and it also attracts people with greater individualistic aspirations, such as salaried workers, students migrating from rural to urban areas, civil servants, and businessmen. It is easier for these urban migrants to renounce traditional loyalties than for those remaining in rural areas. This is not to argue that Izala has no disciples in rural areas, because it certainly does, but it has much greater difficulty recruiting clientele in rural areas than in urban areas.

From the late 1980s, a new development in the Nigerian political

who claimed to be followers of the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya. See Raymond Delval, *Les musulmans au Togo*, Paris, Publications orientalistes de France, 1980 pp. 243–44.

⁵⁷ See Muhammad Sani Umar: "From Sufism to Anti-Sufism," in Louis Brenner (ed.), *Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*, London, C. Hurst, 1993.

landscape was the accentuation of the confrontation between Muslims and Christians. This had a double consequence on the evolution of the Muslim reformist movement. It occasionally led to easing antagonisms between Muslims, at least Muslim leaders, in very much the same way that the rise of the Society forced the Sufis to unite. Many Muslim leaders joined together to face the perceived Christian threat and vice versa. A second consequence has been the greater politicisation of religion.⁵⁸ There is strong evidence, to be discussed in chapter eight, that the military, as a centripetal force, has acted to defuse religious tensions. In this context, Izala's leadership was domesticated. Before the discussion of that process of domestication, it is appropriate to examine the politics of Muslim/Christian relations in Nigeria, particularly from the 1980s.

⁵⁸ This has been argued by many, including Iheanyi M. Enwerem, *A Dangerous Awakening. The Politicisation of Religion in Nigeria*, Ibadan, Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique, 1995, *passim*; Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria, The Parameters of the 1987 Crisis in Kaduna State," *Review of African Political Economy*, 1989, pp. 65–82, p. 66; Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria. The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular ideologies*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE POLITICS OF MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN CONFRONTATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

During the 1980s, Nigeria witnessed rising tensions and deadly confrontations between Muslims and Christians. These confrontations affected previous patterns of conflict and cooperation both between and within Muslim and Christian communities. Indeed, in many instances, intrareligious conflicts receded, and Christians and Muslims joined hands to face the “common enemy.” To understand properly the communal riots that occurred in Nigeria in the last two decades, it is necessary to discuss the events leading up to them. The growth of Pentecostal and charismatic movements, the campaigns of the Christian Association of Nigeria (new version) and the OIC debate rank among the most important factors that have contributed to heightening tensions between Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s. First, I will discuss these events and then address the many riots that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s before offering in the conclusion of this chapter a framework of interpretation of these riots.

*The Growth of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements*¹

The Pentecostal denominations “resulted from a movement taking its root from Los Angeles, California, USA about 1906, with emphasis on baptism of the Holy Spirit as the first Christian experience and as a second blessing after conversion.”² As a result of the resurgence of the Pentecostal spirit among Protestants, another “world-wide movement began in the 1960s in the USA in the Churches,

¹ For the rise of Pentecostals and charismatic movements, I rely on Matthew Ojo, “The Growth of Campus Christianity and Charismatic Movements in Western Nigerian,” Ph.D. diss., SOAS, University of London, 1987, *passim*.

² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

which came to be called charismatic.”³ Matthew Ojo argues that the expansion of the education system paved the way for the emergence of “a distinctive form of spirituality in interdenominational organisations” in Nigeria, which he labels campus Christianity.⁴ According to Ojo, campus Christianity started in Yorubaland, which hosted a great number of institutions of higher learning, including University College of Ibadan, later University of Ibadan. As documented by Ojo, from Western Nigeria, these Pentecostal movements mushroomed in other parts of the country including Northern Nigeria.

In Northern Nigeria specifically, the Fellowship of Christian Students, the Deeper Christian Life Ministry, and the Christian Student Movement were very instrumental in instilling the Pentecostal spirit, particularly in universities and secondary schools. Their clientele consisted of administrators, lecturers, and students. The 1960s and 1970s were periods of growth for these organizations, and from the early 1970s, their success went beyond university campuses, although it remained concentrated in urban areas according to Ojo. The high percentage of Christians in most Nigerian universities, including universities located in predominantly Muslim areas, such as Ahmadu Bello University, made the latter a favourable terrain for the rise of these movements.

The success of these movements has had far reaching political consequences in Nigeria. First and foremost, the new evangelicals preached a purer form of religion and mostly denounced established churches in much the same way Izala had attacked the Sufi orders. A good example of their message is the following extract from a sermon of a Deeper Life Christian minister:

This is Deeper Life Fellowship where God works miracles and where prayers are answered. We are glad that you are worshipping with us today, and not in any of those dead places. There are many dead people who go to those dead churches, sit on dead pews and listen to dead messages from dead ministers and go home totally dead, or even if they were half-dead when they went to those churches, they come out totally dead.⁵

The aggressive proselytising of Pentecostal and charismatic movements worked particularly well among urban Christian youth. In

³ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 342.

Northern Nigeria, these movements attracted many Christians from the Middle Belt including minority ethnic groups from Southern Zaria, to whom I alluded in chapter one. For these people, the immediate postcolonial period was one of rising social mobility made possible by education. Furthermore, political developments in the 1980s had contributed, as Matthew Kukah has demonstrated,⁶ to empower many of them. At some point in General Babangida's rule, members of these minorities occupied key political positions at the federal and local levels. Some of them used their political influence to curtail the power of predominantly Hausa/Fulani Muslim traditional authorities in the north. Matthew Kukah pointed out that Air Commodore Muazu succeeded in making a man from Southern Zaria the first non-Muslim managing director of the powerful New Nigerian Newspapers Ltd., Col Yohanna Madakim, former governor of the Gongola State dismissed the powerful emir of Muri, and, finally, Brigadier Y.Y. Kure, a member of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (from southern Kaduna State) helped install a non-Muslim as the new traditional ruler, ending the dominance of Hausa Muslims in traditional authority.⁷

Another factor of empowerment of communities of the Middle Belt at the local level was the dramatic increase in the number of local governments during the failed transition to the Third Republic. Members of the local government councils were to be elected democratically. In many parts of the middle Belt, non-Hausa Christians, who formed the majority of many local government electoral bodies, voted massively along religious lines. As a consequence, they came to control a number of local government councils and took over political power at the local level.

All these developments combined to strengthen northern minorities' self-confidence. Those who belonged to Pentecostal and charismatic movements believed that they had a mission to save lost souls and were determined to proselytise, even in "protected Muslim areas." At the same time, radical Muslims were determined not to allow them to operate in areas considered to be Muslim bastions.

Alongside the success of Pentecostal and evangelical movements, there were other domestic factors that promoted growing ecumenism

⁶ See Matthew Hassan Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

⁷ *Ibid.*

among Christians. The Christian Association of Nigeria exemplifies this better than any other Christian movement in the history of the Nigerian nation.

The Rise of the Christian Association of Nigeria

As discussed in chapter one, during the administration of General Yakubu Gowon, a project of free education from primary schools to university was implemented. In the process, mission schools (as well as hospitals) that ranked among the best in Nigeria were taken over by the federal government.⁸ Many Nigerians, regardless of religious affiliation, welcomed the measures, which were essentially intended to offer formal education to all Nigerians. However, as it turned out, the clergy and other owners of private Christian schools feared that, if they lost these schools, their influence in society would be reduced. Moreover, after failing to reach an agreement with official authorities with regard to financial compensation,⁹ they attacked the takeover on religious grounds. Immediately after the meeting with government officials in Lagos to sign the take over of their schools by the Nigerian Federal Government, the church representatives headed for the Catholic Secretariat of Lagos to create the Christian Association of Nigeria.¹⁰ Jibrin Ibrahim points out that this association was unique in the history of Nigerian Christianity. Other Christian ecumenical associations existed before the creation of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). Of these, two are worth mention: the Northern Christian Association (NCA) founded in 1964 and headed by Jolly Tanko Yusuf, a former commissioner of Benue Province in the government of the Northern Region and a stalwart of the Northern People's Congress¹¹ and the Christian Council of

⁸ See Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 76.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ See Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 76; Matthew Hassan Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

¹¹ Worthy of note is that the NCA was also patronised by Ahmadu Bello. Therefore, although it defended the interests of northern Christians, it did not aim at confronting Muslims. Moreover, some people believe that the NPC was involved in its formation, with the aim of weakening radical Christians. See Matthew Hassan Kukah; Toyin Falola, *Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion. Islam and Politics in Nigeria*, Avebury, Brookfield, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney, 1996, pp. 54-55, 238.

Nigeria (CCN), of which only Protestant churches were members (both Catholic and African Aladura churches were excluded). The newly created Christian Association of Nigeria¹² (CAN) included all Christians, regardless of their denomination. From its creation, CAN sought to preserve the specific interests of the owners of private schools taken over by the Gowon administration. Over time, however, a number of other groups with different motives joined or sponsored CAN actively. A number of Christian political entrepreneurs also supported CAN, some of whom happened to have been members of the National Party of Nigeria, which was discredited for having misused and depleted the wealth of the country during the Second Republic. Because their political base was somewhat eroded, these people supported CAN as a means to build an alternative base, in very much the same way that some Muslim political entrepreneurs used Islamic organisations and issues to strengthen their own political base. One such Christian political entrepreneur was Jolly Tanko Yusuf. He was arrested and detained following his participation in a protest march organised by Northern CAN after the December 1989 reshuffle of the federal cabinet of Babangida. The march was organised on the grounds that the newly composed cabinet was filled with Muslims, and that there was gross discrimination against Christians.¹³

Finally, other northern Christians from minority groups used CAN as a means of creating a bridge between northern and southern Christians in the struggle for political power. One of the founders of the northern branch of the Christian Association of Nigeria argued that:

Many Christians would seem to have come to the conclusion that since religion has been a major factor in determining the staying power of the Muslims, it has become imperative for Christians now to use religion for achieving their socio-political activity and the place of religion in

¹² It must be noted, though, that after the collapse of the First Republic and the dismantling of the Northern Region, the former Northern Christian Association (CAN) changed its name to Christian Association of Nigeria, while remaining an association of Christians from the north. In 1976, the same name, CAN, was adopted as the name of the national ecumenical association known as CAN today. See Iheanyi M. Enwerem, O.P., *A Dangerous Awakening. The Politicisation of Religion in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 77; Matthew Hassan Kukah, Toyin Falola, *Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion. Islam and Politics in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

¹³ See Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria. The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular ideologies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–12.

the political process is being redefined as a means of dealing with these new realities.¹⁴

He further argued that it was only in 1985 that a branch of CAN was founded in Northern Nigeria, because of the many problems of Christians over land for churches.¹⁵ This branch went quickly to the forefront of the fight to promote Christian rights and interests. Defending the secular nature of the state against attempts at further Islamisation was a serious concern for Nigerian Christians, particularly northerners.

The Debates over the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Religious Neutrality of the State

The end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s were marked by hot controversies between Christians and Muslims. These controversies started with the Shari'a debate in the Constitutional Assembly of 1977-78,¹⁶ and culminated in the so-called Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) debate. The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (*Munazzamat al-Mu'tamar al-Islami* in Arabic) was created in 1969 by heads of State of a number of Muslim countries following the attempt of an Australian-born-Jew to burn the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Nigeria started sending representative delegations as observers to meetings of the newly created organisation. It maintained this status until the OIC summit held in Fez (Morocco) in January 1986. Head of state, General Babangida, sent a delegation to Fez, which, interestingly enough, was headed by the then minister of petroleum, Alhaji Rilwan Lukman, a Muslim, who allegedly signed the agreement upgrading Nigerian status in the organisation from that of observer to full member.¹⁷ A number of high Nigerian officials were not informed of the move, including the chief of general

¹⁴ See Matthew Hassan Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. x, Introduction

¹⁵ See M.H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

¹⁶ For more on that question, see M.H. Kukah, chapter 4, "The Political Implications of the Shari'a Question", pp. 115-44; "An Assessment of the Intellectual Response of the Nigerian Ulama to the Shari'a Debate Since Independence," *Islam et Sociétés au Sud du Sahara*, (7) 1993, pp. 35-55.

¹⁷ See J.A. Kayode Makinde, "L'islam en pays yoruba, religion et politique," *op. cit.*, pp. 604-41.

staff, the foreign minister, the minister of internal affairs, and the minister of information, all of whom were Christians.¹⁸ Announced by Agence France Presse, the move generated protests from Nigerian Christian communities who felt that the principle of secularism and state neutrality had been violated and that the state was in the process of being Islamised.

There are two hypotheses with regard to who took the initiative to apply for Nigeria's full membership in the OIC. According to the first hypothesis, Nigeria had applied during the Second Republic under the Shagari administration and Babangida only assented to a decision taken by a previous head of state. The second hypothesis states that Babangida himself took the initiative to join the OIC, without consulting some high officials within the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). He did so to alleviate the fears of the northern Muslim establishment, which had a number of reasons to suspect Babangida of antinorthern Muslim bias. First, he had overthrown a government close to the northern establishment. The two key figures of that previous administration, Generals Bukhari and Idiagbon, were both northern Muslims. Other Muslims held key positions in the Armed Forces Ruling Council and the government during General Bukhari's tenure in office.

In addition, a number of key positions were held by Christians in the first administration of General Bagangida, including the Chief of General Staff, Ebitu Ukiwe; the Defence Minister, Domkat Bali; the Naval Chief Augustus Aikhomu; the Inspector General of Police, Etim Imyang; the External Affairs Minister, Bolaji Akinyemi; and the Internal Affairs Minister, John Shagaya.¹⁹ Furthermore, General Babangida is believed to be Yoruba. His full name is Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. Badamasi is a corrupt form of the Yoruba name Gbadamosi. Finally, the mother of Maryam Babangida (the former president's wife) is a Christian from the south of the country. Given the tradition of suspicion and fear of domination among members of the three main ethnic groups in Nigeria, these facts were more than enough to justify, if not the hostility of the northern Muslim establishment, at least its suspicion of the administration and the president. It is reasonable to assume that, in these circumstances,

¹⁸ See Matthew H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

¹⁹ See Sanusi Lamido, "Talk back on Religion's Time Bomb," *African Concord*, 26 October 1990, p. 41.

Babangida meant to reassure the northern Muslim establishment by applying for full membership in the OIC a few months after coming to office.

During the whole of 1986, the newspapers, which tended to be divided into pro-Muslim and pro-Christian camps, covered the OIC affair in great length. The *Guardian* and the *Nigerian Tribune* defended the Christian position and criticised the initiative, whereas a number of Muslim newspapers backed the initiative. Each camp gave very convincing arguments to support its claim. The main religious organisations, CAN for the Christians, and the JNI, the Council of *Ulama*, and the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs for the Muslims, elevated the OIC question to the status of a national debate. CAN argued that Nigeria must withdraw from the OIC. The JNI argued that, if Nigeria withdraws from the OIC on the grounds that it favoured Muslims, then it would only be fair that it breaks diplomatic relations with the Vatican, which is a Christian state. Christian organisations conducted a nation-wide campaign to denounce what they felt was an Islamisation of the country. During this campaign, a spokesman of the youth wing of CAN argued the following:

One significant thing, which Nigeria's illegal admission into the OIC has done is to awake Christians at all levels to the hostile religious and socio-political atmosphere in which they live and which threatens to suffocate their faith. The OIC issue crystallised not just the Islamic challenge per se, but also the long standing governmental complicity to the cause of forcible Islamisation of Nigeria. It came as a rude shock to many to discover that certain persons could go as far as subverting the highest level of the machinery of government for parochial ends.²⁰

As might be expected, Muslims held a completely different view. Many of them rejected the idea that the secular state is religiously neutral. Muslim scholars were in the forefront of this counter campaign to defend the move. They published articles, made press releases and gave lectures to defend their position. The following is quoted from a lecture given by Aliyu Dawuda, a scholar and Muslim activist at Bayero University of Kano. The topic of the lecture was the falsity of Nigeria's secular claims.

²⁰ See Jacob Tsado, "Towards Christian mobilisation and vigilance. The role of Youth Christian Association of Nigeria (Youth CAN)," *Today's Challenge*, 3, 1987, pp. 20-21.

Any attempt to impose secularism on Nigeria or on any other country having a predominantly Muslim population is nothing short of injustice. This is because it is a Christian dogma, a Christian concept and a Christian worldview, which is parochial in nature, that is being superimposed on them. The principle of secularism, wherever it is practiced, is nothing short of the practicalisation (*sic*) of the Biblical statement which says: 'Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's'; this is contained in the Bible—Matthew, 22:21 and Mark, 12:17. Therefore, right from the onset, secularism is not religiously neutral, it is a Christian concept, a Biblical dogma, reflecting the parochial nature of the Christian worldview. The principle and practice of secularism, in other words, is Islamically obnoxious, seriously revolting, and totally unacceptable because it is fundamentally based on what our Creator and Lord, Allah (may he be glorified) considers as the greatest crime which He never forgives once a person dies committing it—that is *shirk*. For there is absolutely no doubt about the fact that *shirk* is clearly involved in the statement which says: "Give unto Caesar's what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's, because the Authority, Power, Sovereignty of Allah, may he be glorified, have been clearly dichotomised, one half is given to some nonentity called Caesar and the remaining half is left to Allah, may he be glorified. Therefore, even if a so-called secular country does not observe Saturday, which is a Jewish day of rest and religious services in a week, and Sunday, a Christian day of rest and church services in a week, both of which the so-called secular Nigeria religiously and fanatically observes, the fact that secularism itself as a concept is fundamentally based on a Christian dogma, a Christian worldview, as it is clearly enshrined in their Bible, is a clear testimony to the fact that a secular state wherever it is, is in fact, a Christian state, because it is governed by the principles and practices of a Biblical statement: 'Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's' Matthew, 22:21 and Mark 12:17.²¹

There were Nigerians of Muslim background who disagreed with Nigeria becoming a full member of the OIC. These included a group of Marxists at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, who saw the act of joining as an attempt, on the part of General Babangida, to manipulate religious sentiments for purely political ends.²² General Babangida reacted to the controversy by setting up a committee, whose membership was comprised of leading Christian and Muslim

²¹ See Aliyu Dawuda, "The Falsity of Nigeria's Secular Claims," Muslim Corpers Lecture Series. I am grateful to A. Dawuda for supplying me with a copy of the text of the lecture.

²² See Yusuf Bala Usman, "Our Stand on the OIC," *New Nigerian*, 3/2/86 quoted by M.H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, 231.

figures, including the Shaykh Abubakar Gumi and Archbishop Okogie. The first meeting was held in Abuja on 21 March 1986 and chaired by Colonel John Shagaya. In spite of the fact that its members failed to reach an agreement, General Babangida decided to make it a permanent body, called the Advisory Council on Religious Affairs (ACRA). However, because of internal disagreement between members, ACRA held few meetings and was not able even to elect a chairman. Moreover, its members were accused of having been bought off by the federal government, and it lost all credibility.²³ In 1991, in response to the controversy on the religious neutrality of the state generated by the OIC debate, Nigeria renounced its status as a full member of the OIC.

I was able, during my fieldwork between 1986 and 1991, to observe the intensity of the Muslim/Christian polemics. Muslim groups extended the debate to the issue of the falsification of Christian "scriptures." A gospel, known as the gospel of Barnabas, was circulated by Muslim groups. It was declared a forgery by the Church and held the same view of Jesus as Muslims. This gospel denied the dogma of the trinity and announced the arrival of another prophet after Jesus, which the Muslims claimed was the Prophet Muhammad. Produced locally, this gospel was used by Muslim preachers to argue against Christians.

In the same vein, many pamphlets by the South African Muslim preacher Ahmed Deedat had been translated into Hausa by the Islamic Propagation Bureau. The translation was sponsored by National Republican Convention presidential candidate, Bashir Tofa in the June 12, 1993 cancelled elections. English and Hausa versions of these pamphlets circulated widely in Northern Nigeria during this period, while the Yan Izala organised trips to the rural parts of Kano, Kaduna and Katsina in order to, among other purposes, convert the Christian population to Islam. In an expedition, of which I was a part, Izala preachers counted the number of churches and felt very concerned that conversion to Christianity was taking place on a large scale in Northern Nigeria. In fact, the targeted Christian population had converted to Christianity long ago and were somewhat discreet in their practice of it. After the Kafanchan crisis (discussed

²³ For more on the ACRA, see Matthew H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, pp. 233–34; Matthew Hassan Kukah and Toyin Falola, *Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion. Islam and Politics in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

below), they started displaying crosses in front of their churches, some of which were modest huts. This gave the Yan Izala preachers the impression that conversion to Christianity was taking place on a large scale.²⁴

Another development that contributed equally to fuelling Muslim/Christian tensions at the national level in Nigeria was the debate of the Constituent Assembly convened during the transition to the Third Republic (1988–89). This Assembly generated much tension and debate among its members over whether *Shari'a* should be included in the constitution.²⁵ Unlike the Second Republic Constituent Assembly convened in 1977–1978, however, which dealt with the issue of an Islamic court of appeal (as discussed in chapter three) no final agreement was reached at this meeting, nor did the military attempt to coerce members of the assembly to reach an agreement as they did in the earlier assembly.

The *Shari'a* and OIC debates were focal points for intense religious debate in Nigeria. This debate together with the growing influence of Christians of the Middle Belt were the background against which deadly confrontations occurred in Kano, Kafanchan, Jalingo, Zangon Kataf, and Tafawa Balewa in Northern Nigeria. It may also be noted that no such massive confrontations occurred in the south during this period.

The Anglican Fagge Church Riot in Kano (1982)

In postcolonial history, Kano, which seems so peaceful to a visitor in a normal period, has witnessed several periods of deadly communal strife, including the worst of the Igbo pogroms, which occurred in 1966, and the Maitatsine riots in 1980. However, these earlier confrontations were not predominantly Christian-Muslim confrontations, unlike the events to be discussed below.

In 1982, two leading figures of Christianity visited Nigeria. The first was Pope John Paul II, in February; the second was Archbishop Runcie of the Anglican Church, in April. During his visit, the latter

²⁴ I am grateful to Professor Murray Last for explaining that the Christian population had been there for a long while, but because of a hostile environment did not want to display signs of their affiliation to Christianity.

²⁵ See above chapter 3.

laid the foundation for the building of a bigger church on the premises of the older Anglican Church located in Fagge ward.²⁶ In October, a group of Muslim activists, including members of the Muslim Students' Society, went to the site to protest against the building of the church, arguing that it was too close to the Fagge central mosque. However, church members informed the police of the protest and they provided protection. The protesters then headed for the Sabon Gari ward, occupied predominantly by non-Muslim natives of the south, where they are said to have burned eight churches and destroyed other properties.²⁷ In the aftermath of the riot, the state government of Kano set up a committee to investigate its causes. The committee included Muslims and Christians, although Muslim members were predominant. According to M. Kukah, the committee concluded that "the riots were caused by many factors [. . .] the visits of the Pope and Archbishop Runcie had created anxiety among the Muslims [. . .] the ceremony of the laying of the foundation stone by Archbishop Runcie [. . .] touched the feelings of Nigerian Muslims in general, the people of Kano included [. . .] The committee also recommended that "whenever a new church or mosque is going to be built in areas already settled, the opinion or the consent of the community in the vicinity of the proposed site must be sought. This should be done by public announcement of the proposed building through advertisement in the newspapers and other means. People are free to indicate their response either for or against. . . ."²⁸ M. Kukah adds that the two Christian members of the committee, Reverends Victor Musa and James Sofa, disagreed with some of the conclusions of the committee and submitted their own minority report in which they voiced the grievances of the Christians. They asked the government to review the whole question of the "discrimination that

²⁶ See Matthew H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

²⁷ For more on these riots, see Peter Clark, "The Maitatsine Movement in Northern Nigeria in Historical and Current Perspective," in Rosalind I.J. Hackett (ed.), *New Religious Movements in Nigeria*, Queenston Ontario, 1987, pp. 96-116, pp. 94-95; Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria, The Parameters of the 1987 Crisis in Kaduna State," *op. cit.*, p. 66; Matthew H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-60.

²⁸ See Report of the *Committee Appointed To Investigate Into Religious Disturbances of 30th October, 1982*, Government Printing Press, Kano, 1983, p. 13 quoted in M.H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-60.

Christians were subjected to in Kano State, ranging from exclusion from the media, denial of land for the erection of places of worship, airing of programmes that denigrated Christianity by the state media, demand for the return of church schools taken over by the state without compensation, creation of a forum to foster understanding, and funding for the instruction of Christian children in state schools".²⁹

The Kafanchan Crisis (1987)

Kafanchan is located in Jema'a local government, Kaduna State, about 300 kilometres south of Kaduna City. Kafanchan witnessed a crisis in 1987 with far reaching consequences for the whole of Nigeria. Unlike Kano State, whose population is predominantly Muslim, Kafanchan's population is predominantly made up of Christians belonging mainly to the ethnic groups: Kagoma, Ninzom, Ayyu, Gwantu, Numana and Godo-godo.³⁰ However their traditional native authorities are Hausa-Fulani Muslims.

Although many scholars have investigated the Kafanchan crisis,³¹ it is quite difficult to find an account of the facts with which Muslim and Christian Nigerians would agree. Even scholarly accounts are suspected of being biased. Implicit in the accounts of Jibrin Ibrahim, a Marxist from a Christian background, Reverend Father Matthew Hassan Kukah and Toyin Falola, also a Christian, is the idea that Muslim fundamentalists provoked the crisis. On the other hand, scholars from a Muslim background, such as Bashir Isyaku, see CAN and other Christian activists as the villains. Unlike Father Kukah and J. Ibrahim, Bashir Isyaku³² traces the origin of the crisis to a religious week organised by the Muslim Students' Society branch of the College of Education, Kafanchan. The event was called "Dan

²⁹ See *The Committee Appointed To Investigate Into the Religious Disturbances of 30th October, 1982, Views of the Minority Members*, Kano Government Printer, 1983 quoted in M.H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

³⁰ See Bashir Isyaku, *The Kafanchan Carnage*, Nigeria, n.p. 1991, p. 1.

³¹ See Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria, The Parameters of the 1987 Crisis in Kaduna State," *op. cit.*, p. 66; Matthew H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-60; Matthew H. Kukah and Toyin Falola: *Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion. Islam and Politics in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 145 sq., Jarlath Walsh, *Religious Riots in Nigeria*, pp. 6-8; Bashir Isyaku, *The Kafanchan Carnage*, Nigeria, n.p., 1991.

³² See Bashir Isyaku, *The Kafanchan Carnage*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

Fodio Week” and was scheduled from February 27 to March 1, 1987. According to Isyaku, the Fellowship of Christian Students (FCS) of the same school, in collaboration with their patrons among the lecturers and the Christian Association of Nigeria stalwarts conspired to neutralise the event.³³

Interestingly enough, neither J. Ibrahim nor M. Kukah mentions this “Dan Fodio Week” in their otherwise well-documented analyses of the crisis. Both locate the roots of the crisis in the convening of an evangelical crusade by the Fellowship of Christian Students, a Protestant movement, on March 5, 1987, at the campus. The organisers of the event were said to have displayed, in front of the college, a caption that read “Welcome to Jesus Campus.” Members of the Muslim Students’ Society complained to the college authority and the latter ruled that the banner be removed. Although the organisers of the event complied with that order, tension was in the air. Then, on March 6, 1987, Rev. Abubakar Bako, a Muslim convert to Christianity, was invited as a guest speaker for the crusade. Bashir Isyaku, who is the only one to discuss the impact of Bako’s speech in detail, reported that Bako quoted, among others, the following verses of the Koran:

“[God] show us the Straight path, the path of those whom you have favoured, not the path of those who earn your anger” (Koran 1, 6–7) and “And remember when Allah said, O Jesus I will raise thee to myself and cleanse thee of those who disbelieve. I will make those who follow you superior to those who disbelieve, and unto me you will all return and I will judge between you in the matters wherein you dispute. As for those who disbelieve, Allah will chastise them with heavy chastisement, here on earth and in the hereafter. But as for those who believe, Allah will reward them in full for Allah loveth no wrongdoer (Koran 55–57).

From this Koranic vision of Jesus, Rev. Bako concluded that the Koran itself testifies that only Christians follow the right path.³⁴ Aisha Garba, a female member of the Muslim Students’ Society intervened at that juncture. According to her own account, she just protested Bako’s interpretation of the Koran, but according to members of the Fellowship of Christian Students, she physically attacked the preacher and seized the microphone.³⁵ Other members of the Muslim Students’

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ See Bashir Isyaku, *The Kafanchan Carnage, op. cit.*, pp. 25–26.

³⁵ See Jibrin Ibrahim, “The Politics of Religion . . .,” *op. cit.*, p. 67.

Society got involved in the argument, and skirmishes ensued between members of FCS and the MSS. Although some students were wounded in the process, the school authorities succeeded in re-establishing order that same day. But, Muslim students, who were a minority, are said to have fled the campus. However, on the same day, praying mats and copies of the Koran and other Islamic literature in the college's mosque were burned, as well as in the mosque of the neighbouring Teacher's College, according to Isyaku.³⁶ In response to all this, the college was closed down. Next, according to Kukah,³⁷ "the attempts by the school authorities to manage the crisis were frustrated by the intransigence of some of the Muslims students who erected a barricade around the school area and terrorised many passers-by."

On Saturday, March 9, what started as an argument between students escalated to violent confrontation. The larger, predominantly non-Muslim, population of Kafanchan which resented what they perceived as "Hausa-Fulani Muslim economic and political domination" attacked their Muslim neighbours and inflicted on them heavy casualties. According to official sources, when the police restored order on March 10, some twelve people, mainly Muslims, had been killed, and houses and other property had been destroyed.³⁸ Bashir Isyaku, who expresses the Muslim perspective, argues that the number of people killed runs into hundreds and that it was a

Pre-planned genocide for even policemen, who under normal circumstances would have probably defended victims of civil violence, were this time either confused into firing tear gas on the Muslims to add salt into the injury or deliberately evaded their responsibility or both.³⁹

After visiting the scenes, the then military governor of Kaduna State made an appeal for calm and pledged on behalf of the government that all the culprits would be found and dealt with. He then headed for Lagos to attend a Council of State meeting.⁴⁰ In the meantime,

³⁶ See Bashir Isyaku, *The Kafanchan Carnage*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

³⁷ Hassan Matthew Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

³⁸ See Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 67, J. Warlash, *Religious Riots in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

³⁹ See Bashir Isyaku, *The Kafanchan Carnage*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁴⁰ See Matthew H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

reports of the crisis reached other Muslims further north of the country. They organised to retaliate against Christians, starting in Zaria. In less than twenty-four hours, the turbulence spread to the major cities of the far north, including Katsina, Funtua, Zaria, Kankia, Daura, Kaduna and Malumfashi. Northern Nigeria hosted, for several days, a massive conflagration. According to the findings of the committee set up to investigate the crisis, when the police took control of the situation, nineteen people had been killed and 152 churches, five mosques and 95 beer parlours had been damaged.⁴¹

It is interesting that neither side, in these events, believed that they happened spontaneously. Rev. Abubakar Bako stated the following to explain the crisis:

My observation is that this crisis was carefully planned and was to be executed by the Muslims after having been fully prepared by the lecturers on *jihad* two weeks before this. However, the Kafanchan incident seemed to have triggered off the *jihad* earlier than planned. I am further convinced of this because the Zaria *jihad* still started on 'target' though using the Kafanchan issue as an excuse for carrying out what they had already planned. I strongly believe that the government was aware of the impending crisis before it erupted, especially in Zaria in general and on Ahmadu Bello University (main) campus in particular. Since the Muslim students have been preparing for this for long, at least it came into the open when last year (1986) arms were discovered in the mosque, and the media carried the news. This year towards the end of January, the same set of people—aliens imported (I understand of Arab origin) were arrested by the enforcement agents for illegally occupying the central mosque on campus, and planning to foment trouble.⁴²

Likewise the Muslims believe that this was part of an International Christian conspiracy against the Muslims, as evidenced in the following analysis by Dr. Omar Bello the secretary general of the Council of Ulama:

The Kafanchan Massacre followed a definite pattern which betrays its premeditated and orchestrated nature. First, there was a vicious attack on the integrity of the messenger of Allah Muhammad, peace and blessing of Allah be upon him, by a Christian priest. Muslim students present at the scene predictably protested, because it is the duty of

⁴¹ See Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 67.

⁴² See Abubakar Bako's testimony before the Donli Commission in *Religious Riots 87, A catalogue of Events*; Kaduna, CAN Kaduna Publicity Committee, 1987.

every Muslim to defend the honour of the messenger of Allah. This was followed by the desecration of the mosques and profaning of the Sacred Koran by burning and vandalism in a manner suggesting extreme and pathological hatred of Islam and its sacred symbols. Then the Christians, to complete their insult and provocation, went ahead and in a cold-blooded manner, murdered at least fifteen Muslims, the majority of them students, who dedicated themselves solely to the study and memorisation of the Koran, in addition to indiscriminate destruction of Muslim property. The bodies of most of the murdered Muslims were also set on fire, in utter disregard of human conscience and decency. All this was done without due regard for the consequences it might bring on the corporate existence of Nigeria and in defiance of Muslim feelings and sensibilities. The whole of this tragic drama has all the characteristics of an attempt by the caucus of the so-called northern Christians to set Nigeria on fire and destroy its corporate existence. The keen historian may easily discern in the pattern of this frontal attack on Islam reminiscences of the crusades. When the crusaders captured Jerusalem in 1099, they desecrated the Sacred Mosque, and according to Steven Rumcinan: 'rushed through the streets and into the houses and mosques killing all that they met, men, women, and children alike.' [. . .] Many centuries have passed since the days of the crusades, yet very little has the Christian attitude towards Muslims changed.⁴³

Muslims in general denounced the way that officials handled the crisis. First, they accused the police of having sided with the "Christian aggressors." Second, they believed that the committee set up to investigate the case, which was chaired by Mrs. Hansine N. Donli, Kaduna State's Attorney General and Commissioner of Justice, was doomed to be biased because the chair person was Christian and the daughter of a Reverend. Finally, they also condemned the deliberations of the Karibi-White Tribunal, which judged the case. This is evidenced by another statement from the same Omar Bello:

The Security and Law enforcement agencies were deployed to find out the truth, and nothing but the truth, of the matter. But a different picture emerged at the end of the day; the security agencies, like the Nigerian army, are at war with Islam. The following facts speak for themselves:

(a) These agencies arrested hundreds of Muslims, many of them children under the age of ten, and most at the insistence of a Christian clique with which they have entered into conspiracy to undermine the

⁴³ See Omar Bello, "The Council of Ulama of Nigeria," *New Nigerian*, 18 June 87, p. 10.

Muslim community. Most of the arrests were made of malice and without reliable evidence or authorities.

(b) These agencies, in alliance with the judiciary, affected the escape of the prime mover of the entire crisis: Reverend Bako. Since then, the police and the special investigation panel have not found it necessary to tell the nation why they let Reverend Bako escape the arm of justice, or why they have not been forthcoming in finding the root cause, and the other prime movers of the carnage in Kafanchan

(c) The security agencies have fabricated reports on Islamic organizations, especially the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria, in order to blackmail these organizations and individuals and damage their credibility. This, of course, is but part of an organised psychological warfare against Islam by Christians who have managed to infiltrate these agencies and are manipulating the machinery of the state to fight Islam. To lie is in itself a great evil, but to lie against highly respectable organizations and Muslim leaders of impeccable records in the name of the state is not only evil, but immoral, and it represents the ultimate betrayal of the nation.

(d) The Special Investigation Panel (SIP), more than two-thirds of whom are Christians, have, instead of looking for the truth, used all available means to cover up the crimes in Kafanchan, to sever the obvious and incontrovertible links between the Kafanchan massacre and the events in Kaduna, Zaria, and other places . . .⁴⁴

The federal government denied that the riots had a religious base. On March 16, 1987, President Babangida argued that the riots were

carefully planned and masterminded by evil men with sinister motives, who saw the incident in Kafanchan as an opportunity to subvert the federal military government and the Nigerian nation. . . . What we are dealing with therefore is not just a religious crisis but the civilian equivalent of an attempted coup d'état organised against the federal government and the Nigerian nation.⁴⁵

That mutual suspicion prevailed during the crisis might explain that Christians and Muslims suspected each other of conspiracy, but the official reading of the events as a civilian coup attempt seems rather puzzling. However, it would seem in retrospect that this kind of interpretation fitted in perfectly with Babangida's agenda of "permanent transition." This major crisis, as well as subsequent ones, could perfectly have provided justification for the delay of the return to civilian rule.

⁴⁴ See Omar Bello, "The Council of Ulama of Nigeria," *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁴⁵ See Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria. The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular ideologies*, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

The Tafawa Balewa riots (1991)

Located in the district of Lere, in Bauchi State, eighty kilometres away from Bauchi, the state capital, the town called Tafawa Balewa was traditionally part of the Bauchi Emirate, which had been conquered during the nineteenth century by Yakubu, a companion in arms of Usman Dan Fodio.⁴⁶ Therefore, partly as a result of the indirect rule policy, which strengthened the native authorities, the emir of Bauchi is a Fulani Muslim. It was he who appointed district heads for all districts of the emirate, including the district of Lere, which is predominantly inhabited by Sayawa, who are Christian in their majority. Although represented in the emirate council, the Sayawa of Lere have had only two district heads of their own ethnic group.⁴⁷ They have long resented the appointment of people belonging to the family of the emir to the head of their district and have been lobbying for the appointment of a fellow Sayawa as district head of Lere for a long time. The emirate authorities have refused to satisfy their request on the grounds that appointing a Sayawa as a district head would incite people of other districts to make similar claims and ultimately undermine the emir's privilege to appoint district heads of his choice.⁴⁸

In 1977, the emir of Bauchi, Adamu Jumba, had decided to turn Lere into an emirate. Knowing that only Fulani could be appointed emirs, the Sayawa opposed the move and, instead, demanded that Lere becomes a chiefdom in which leadership would be vested with the natives. The candidate for the emir position sent to Lere was assassinated. Following that incident, Lere remained a district at the head of which was Muhammad Lulu, a member of the family of the emir of Bauchi.⁴⁹

Lere had been hostile to Hausa-Fulani domination from the time of the First Republic. Ethnic tensions were also reflected in the voting habits of the district of Lere. The former Federal Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa is a native of the town of Tafawa Balewa. In spite of this, during the First Republic, the local Council of Tafawa

⁴⁶ See E.P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁴⁷ See Chris Uroh, "Genesis of Bauchi Massacre," *Newswatch*, 20 May 1991, pp. 23-24, p. 23.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

Balewa had voted in favour of the Action Group, the party of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, instead of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa's party, the Northern People's Congress. The ethno-political cleavages have remained since.⁵⁰

During the failed transition to the Third Republic, a period in which only two parties were registered by the national electoral commission, the majority of the Sayawa supported the Social Democratic Party, whereas Hausa-Fulani tended to be supporters of the National Republican Convention. The first step towards the return to civilian rule was represented by the local government elections of 1990, in which the Social Democratic party had a stunning victory in Lere, which boosted the self-confidence of the Sayawa. As a result, they demanded that their candidate, who had been elected chairman of the local government, dismiss the district head, Muhammad Lulu. This was technically impossible, for District Heads are appointed by the emir. This is the background against which the Tafawa Balewa Bauchi riots occurred.⁵¹

There are two accounts of the immediate precipitant of the riots. According to the *Weekend Concord*, an incident that happened on Saturday, April 20 at the Kasua market in Tafawa Balewa triggered the violence. A ten-year-old Fulani boy had bought *suya* (roasted beef) from a Christian Basayi (an indigenous of the town). Another sixteen-year-old Fulani boy criticised him for buying "meat from a *kafir* (infidel)," and argued that the meat was either dog or pork. The boy dropped the *suya*. The *suya* seller got very angry and started arguing against the "rebel Hausa boy." At that moment, a group of Christians who had witnessed the drama joined their fellow Christian and shouted at the boy. A group of Muslim men arrived in the scene and sided with the boy. Then, physical confrontation ensued in which four Christians were wounded. Other Christians in the market interfered and destroyed the wares of Muslims.

On early Sunday morning, Mr. Habila Bako Lumana, the chairman of the local government council and Muhammadu Lulu, the district head, succeeded in pacifying the Muslims, and Mr. Habila pledged to pay reparations for the destroyed wares. Order was re-established for the rest of Sunday. But, given the mutual suspicion,

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ On the discussion of this section, I rely partly on Dayo Amotoso, *Tell*, June 1991, pp. 10-16.

it was not long before both Muslims and Christians, particularly the youth, were armed with cudgels, knives, bows, and arrows. Confrontation resumed on Monday, and Christians inflicted heavy casualties on Muslims. The violence spread with amazing speed to other local governments, including Dass, Ningi, and Darazo. Then a truck carrying the corpses of Muslims slaughtered in Tafawa Balewa to the morgue of a hospital in Bauchi arrived on Monday, April 22, at about 5 p.m. According to hospital sources, workers, patients, and visitors watching the truck discharge its contents decided to retaliate and started attacking non-Muslims.

In disagreement with the above description, the weekly magazine, *Tell*, ascribes the immediate cause of the riots to the attempt of a group of young Sayawa Christians to slaughter a pig in a the Muslim section of the common abattoir. A group of Muslims protested this act as a desecration of their section of the abattoir. Fighting followed, during which a number of Muslims were killed. Then, a process of retaliation started, similar to what had happened in Kafanchan, although on a smaller scale. Houses were destroyed, and churches were burned. By Wednesday, April 24, the death toll was believed to be at least six hundred people,⁵² thousands were injured, and much looting took place. In the aftermath of the crisis, the federal government set up a committee of enquiry known as the Babalakin Commission, named after Justice B.O. Babalakin, a supreme court judge.⁵³ This, however, did not alleviate the anger of the families of the victims, particularly the local Christian community, who experienced, on a large scale, the loss of places of worship much property and many lives.

The Bonnke Riots in Kano (1991)

In October of 1991, another serious riot occurred in Kano that claimed many lives and caused the destruction of millions of *nairas* worth of property. At the root of this conflict was the announcement by the local section of the Christian Association of Nigeria of

⁵² See "Bauchi Riots! N 1 Suya Caused it," *Weekend Concord*, Saturday, May 4 1991, pp. 1; 9; 18.

⁵³ See Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria. The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular ideologies*, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

a crusade by German Evangelist Reinhard Bonnke to be held at the race course. During the weeks preceding the crusade, I observed very aggressive proselytisation by Christian evangelicals in Kano. Big posters were displayed in several cities of Northern Nigeria advertising the event. Tracts in A'jami (Hausa written in Arabic script) were distributed in Kano and elsewhere by the organisers of the crusade. Reinhard Bonnke, it was said, would give back sight to the blind, heal lepers, and other physically handicapped people. Some of the captions read "Capturing Kano for Christ."⁵⁴ All the Muslim leaders were opposed to the event and were indeed very worried by the arrival of Bonnke. They argued that this event would bring unrest in Kano, where the majority of the population are Muslims. This was particularly the case since the Nigerian government had denied in early 1991 an entrance visa to South African Muslim preacher Ahmed Deedat, who was invited by the Muslim Forum to visit Kano. Muslim leaders also argued that some Muslims had asked for the use of Kano's race course as a venue for the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet (*al-mawlid al-nabawi*), but had not been authorised to do so.⁵⁵

Fearing that the use of the race course for Bonnke's crusade would generate unrest, the authorities withdrew permission and asked CAN to find another venue. But the event had already been well advertised and there was a great deal of anxiety among Muslims, who believed that Christian evangelicals wanted by any means to Christianise Nigeria. The crusade was supposed to start on Tuesday, October 15, 1991. One day before, huge crowds of Muslims, led by leading Muslim activists, gathered in front of the palace of the emir to perform a special prayer known as the fear prayer (*salat al-khawf*). They requested a meeting with the emir of Kano, who sent Alhaji Abbas Sanusi as his spokesman instead. The leaders of the Muslim crowd voiced their fear over the proposed crusade and asked the emir to do everything possible to prevent its taking place. The emir's emissary informed them that the emir was committed to contacting the proper authorities to prevent the event from taking place, and he also invited them to remain calm.

There are two accounts of what followed. In Kano, during the

⁵⁴ See Jarlath Walsh, *Religious Riots in Nigeria, Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian—Muslim Relations*, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, 1993, p. 13.

⁵⁵ See Jarlath Walsh, *Religious Riots in Nigeria, op. cit.*, pp. 11–14.

riots, I heard that the protest march had broken up and the majority of the people involved had gone home. But, a small group met a beer lorry and, viewing it as sign of growing corruption in Kano, attacked it, thereby starting the riot. Jarlath Walsh has it that the crowd of protesters and its leaders did not believe the assurances of the emir's emissary and decided to head for Sabon Gari to attack the Christian communities there. En route, they met the beer lorry and convinced themselves that introducing beer into Kano (which was prohibited) was a plan to de-Islamise the city.⁵⁶ Which account is accurate is not very clear. But this much we do know. A group of people went to Sabon Gari, looted many businesses, set fire to a number of churches and businesses belonging to Christians and killed many people. At that point, many Christians in the city procured weapons to protect themselves. The following day, rioters and looters attempted to attack Sabon Gari again.⁵⁷ This time the Christian population had become organised. They inflicted heavy losses on the attackers. During the same day, many churches and mosques were burned, and a number of businesses belonging to Igbo (who are predominantly Christian) and to Hausa (who are predominantly Muslim) were looted. The commercial ward of Kantin Kwari, one of the most prosperous in Kano, was also severely damaged.

Although this riot started as a Christian-Muslim confrontation, it unleashed other animosities as well, and one can distinguish more than one motive among its participants. There were fanatics among Muslims and Christians who burned places of worship, as well as looting and killing. The looters themselves belonged to all ethnic groups and to both religions and often looted without regard for the religion or ethnic group of the business owners. In other words, in all likelihood, there were Christian Igbo who looted other Christian Igbo, as well as Hausa-Muslims who pillaged businesses of other Hausa-Muslims. Also, according to witnesses, some Igbo, in addition to retaliating against Muslims, also attacked Christians from the ethnic minorities of Southern Zaria, who are predominantly based in the Brigade ward of Kano. The Igbo are known to be very industrious and tend to own successful businesses in Northern Nigeria, particularly in the areas of auto parts, building materials and textiles.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Even though they are Christian, they look unfavourably on Christian proselytisation in predominantly Muslim areas, like Kano, because they know that, should religious activism escalate to riots, they would be the big losers. On the other hand, Southern Zaria Christians tend to be civil servants and students who would not risk massive loss of property in the event of riot.

At the end of the disturbance, the casualties were large. According to government figures, only 8 persons were killed, but witnesses in Kano claimed that up to 200 people were killed and CAN, according to J. Walsh, claimed that up to 2,000 people were killed by Wednesday 16 September, and that 22,000 people took refuge in Bukavu army barracks and Bompai police station. A commission was set up to investigate the riots, but, as far as I am aware, no findings have yet been published.

*The Jalingo Riots (1992)*⁵⁹

Like Tafawa Balewa and Kafanchan, Jalingo is located in the part of the Middle Belt where traditional ruling families are Hausa-Fulani, although the majority of the population are not. Just like Tafawa Balewa, traditional rulers of Hausa-Fulani origin supported the National Republican Convention, whereas non Hausa-Fulani (here Jukun and Mumuye) mostly supported the Social Democratic party. Like Kafanchan and Tafawa Balewa, non-Hausa natives are predominantly Christians or followers of African traditional religions.

When the Babangida administration decided to increase the number of states to 30 in 1990, former Gongola State was divided into Adamawa State with Yola as its capital, and Taraba State, with Jalingo as its capital. During the gubernatorial elections, a Mumuye reverend, Jolly Nyame, who ran for office under the banner of the SDP was elected. His election altered the balance of power in the newly created Taraba State, and the Hausa-Fulani traditional rulers resented his election, and political tension was in the air.⁶⁰ This tension was aggravated by statements made about Christians in a symposium held in the Government Science Secondary School in Jalingo during the first week of March 1992.⁶¹

⁵⁹ The account of the Jalingo riots is based mainly of J. Walsh's account.

⁶⁰ See Jarlath Walsh, *Religious Riots in Nigeria, op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

On Tuesday March 10, Christian students of the college argued with Muslim students, whom they accused of wasting too much of the precious water for ablution. By Thursday, March 12, Christian and Muslim students were fighting over the issue. The following morning, female Christian students were said to have prevented female Muslim students from joining the Muslim males for the morning prayer. Fighting ensued, in which two students were killed, and the school mosque as well as other buildings were seriously damaged. As in the Kafanchan crisis, violence quickly spread outside the school premises. Despite efforts made by Governor Jolly Nyame and Muslim religious leaders to contain the violence, it soon escalated and spread throughout the town. It is believed that some Fulani supporters of the NRC wanted to take advantage of the tensions to destabilise the government of Taraba State and Governor Nyame. Muslim youth attacked motor parks and houses in Jalingo and destroyed many stores as well as houses. Christians retaliated by burning seven mosques.

On March 13, some Mumuye, who believed that this was an attempt to topple their government, attacked Muslim Fulani from neighbouring villages. Officially, the death toll was 30 people, and a hundred buildings (including churches and mosques) and fifty cars were destroyed.⁶² No information about how the case was handled by the political authorities is available to the author.

The Zangon Kataf riots (1992)

The town of Zangon Kataf is similar to Tafawa Balewa and Kafanchan in many respects. Located in Kaduna State, Zangon Kataf was a center on a cattle route prior to the nineteenth-century *jihād*. It is populated mainly by Kataf, but there are also other ethnic groups, including Kajje, Ikulu, Kamantan, and Hausa.⁶³ Hausa-Fulani are Muslims in their majority, whereas the smaller groups who form the majority locally are Christians. Like similar parts of the Middle Belt, rulers of Hausa-Fulani origin were at the head of this area, although the majority of the population were not Hausa.⁶⁴ Also, as in Kafanchan,

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁶³ See Alhaji Musa Barau Aliyu, "Our Own Story," *African Concord*, 15 June 1992, pp. 20–21.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

Hausa tended to control economic activities. During colonial rule, Hausa-Fulani political domination was strengthened by the colonial state. This led to a series of rebellions by the Kataf, including those of 1922 and 1946. The Kataf wanted their district to become a chiefdom headed by a Kataf. This request had never been granted. However, to diffuse the tensions, the native authorities from Zaria appointed a Kataf native as district head in 1987. From that point the Hausa lost political power, but they remained successful in business, mainly because they controlled the established market places.⁶⁵

During the local government elections of 1991, a native Kataf was elected chairman of the local government authority. Encouraged by this new political development, some Kataf tried to relocate the market place to their side of the town, a project, which they had nurtured from earlier times, but had not achieved. On the date of the relocation, February 6, 1992, clashes occurred between Hausa, who resisted the move, and Kataf. According to the *New Nigerian*, of March 30, 1992, some 84 people were killed and 233 wounded. But this was negligible compared to subsequent developments. Although order was re-established, relations in the community remained strained and fearful. Some three months later, on May 15, 1992, there was another outburst of violence. Who started the violence and for what reasons remain unclear; but it lasted from Friday, May 15 to Thursday, May 21. It led to the massive killing of Hausa in Zangon Kataf. The death of 3,000 people, mainly Hausa-Fulani, is suggested by Muslim sources. As in the Tafawa Balewa-Bauchi and Kafanchan riots, when the Muslims in Kaduna saw the corpses of the Muslims killed in Zangon Kataf, they attacked Christians in the city. The latter retaliated. Mosques and churches were burned, and the final death toll was in the region of 4,000 to 4,500, Muslims in the majority.⁶⁶

A tribunal headed by Justice B.O. Akadigbo was set up to react to the rioting. In the aftermath of the event, the local government council was dissolved and a number of Kataf civil servants sacked.⁶⁷ One retired general, Zamani Lekwot, was accused and arrested for having supplied sophisticated weapons to the Kataf to kill Hausa-Fulani. He was sentenced to death by the tribunal. Later on, the

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ See Mathew H. Kukah and Toyin Falola, *Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion*, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

death sentence was commuted to a short prison term. He was released in December, 1995.⁶⁸ It seems that many retired soldiers in the Zangon Kataf area, who were jobless and who resented Hausa-Fulani prosperity had been involved in this crisis, which needs to be further investigated.

Understanding Interreligious Tensions in Nigeria

Whereas during the First Republic, struggle for political power tended to some extent to be based on ethnicity, religion has tended in the 1980s to be a basis for mobilisation and the struggle for power. Several factors explain this.

First, northern Christian minorities who had been educated by the missions had acquired a strong political awareness and were determined to question the pre-existing social and political order, which they believed favoured northern Muslims. Many members of these ethnic groups had been empowered over time, thanks in particular to military rule. Christians became dominant in the army and the police, and some Christians from the Middle Belt, who occupied high positions in the army, started supporting the struggle of their people for emancipation. Colonel Yohanna Madaki, former military governor of Gongola State, who sacked the emir of Muri, had led the struggle of the Kajje (to which he belongs) for a chieftdom. Likewise, retired Major General Zamani Lekwot, who was arrested after the Zangon Kataf riots, had also led his fellow Kataf in demanding a chieftdom.⁶⁹ These minority leaders who had been influential during the Babangida administration to the extent that they are referred to as the Langtang Mafia,⁷⁰ had boosted the confidence of their people, which incited them to make further claims for power.

The second important factor was the rise of the Christian Association of Nigeria, which had inculcated a strong ecumenicalism in Nigerian Christians in the 1980s. Its northern branch tried to promote unity between northern Christians and southern Christians in the struggle

⁶⁸ See Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria. The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular ideologies*, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

⁶⁹ See Alhaji Musa Barau Aliyu, "Our Own Story," *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁷⁰ See Mathew Hassan Kukah, Toyin Falola, *Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion*, *op. cit.*

for power. On some occasions, such as during the OIC debate, a degree of unity among Christians or Muslims was achieved. Moreover, many Christians felt that since they outnumbered Muslims, it was only fair that they have a greater share of power and influence. These have been quite vocal in the country.

Third, the success of Pentecostals, whose aggressive proselytising further fuelled Islamic radicalism, was another important factor for tensions between Christians and Muslims. Pentecostals, Ruth Marshall argues, had taken up the task of demonising Islam, both because they believed that Muslim northerners monopolised power and practiced bad government, and because they wanted to win the nation for Christ.⁷¹ Thus, Marshall concludes: "Mission activity in the north has become one of the main activities of southern churches, and although non-believers everywhere are targets for the 'invading army' [of Pentecostals], Muslims have special status in conversion drives."⁷²

Fourth, is the highly politicised leadership of JNI and CAN. Late Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, former leader of the JNI, and Archbishop Anthony Olubunmi Okogie,⁷³ the president of CAN, were both extremely politicised religious leaders. Neither thought that religion should be limited to only spiritual matters. In spite of the fragmentation of authority within Islam as well as within Christianity, each claimed to be the spokesman of their fellow believers and adopted radical points of view that fuelled tensions between Christians and Muslims, particularly during the many crises the country experienced in the 1980s.

Last but not least was the feeling of people of the southern part of the Middle Belt of socioeconomic deprivation.⁷⁴ In Southern Zaria, as H. Kukah documents, there were areas without state industry, which could have provided jobs or stimulated economic growth; some towns were not linked to the national electricity grid; no television signals reached any part of Southern Zaria, even twenty years after

⁷¹ See Ruth Marshall, "'God Is Not a Democrat' Pentecostalism and Democratisation in Nigeria," in Terence Ranger and Olufemi Vaughan (eds.), *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa. Essays in Honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene*, Oxford, (in Association with St Anthony's College), 1993, pp. 239–60, p. 258.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ As far as Archbishop Anthony Okogie is concerned, see Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria. The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 129–36.

⁷⁴ See Mathew H. Kukah and Toyin Falola, *Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

the installation of television in Kaduna city; there also was a lack of roads, health centres and water in many areas, in spite of all the wealth of the country during the petroleum era.⁷⁵

In spite of the fact that the military has ruled Nigeria for much of its existence as a nation, the military is accepted as legitimate in Nigeria, only to the extent that it commits itself to fighting corruption, re-establishing discipline, and works toward handing over power to civilians. When former Head of State Yakubu Gowon decided in 1975 to postpone indefinitely the transition to civilian government, he became unpopular and was toppled by General Murtala Muhammad. This is evidence that a military government cannot remain in power in Nigeria without a pledge to hand over power to a democratically elected government. The annulment of the results of the elections of June 12, 1993, won by late M.K. Abiola, provides strong evidence that General Bagangida did not intend to hand over power to civilians. One way of implementing his agenda of "permanent transition," it could be argued in retrospect, was to fragment civil society, in other words, to control powerful social movements and to use their leaders and conflicts in order to legitimise "delayed transition." M. Kukah documents that the federal government, under Bagangida, broke all organised opposition in many unions by sponsoring rival factions in all elections. This was true of the powerful Nigerian Labour Congress, the Academic Staff Union of Universities, the Students Union, and the Nigerian Bar Association. He then concludes that, "government-sponsored candidates, backed by federal might, have won the elections. From there, the organisations either became pro-government, or they remained locked in internal feuds."⁷⁶

By no means was this true for the unions only. To a great extent, the domestication of religious organisations and certainly of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition was also part of the military's agenda.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ See Matthew H. Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE DOMESTICATION OF IZALA

The first years after the creation of the Izala movement coincided with several political regimes in Nigeria: the military government of General Olesegun Obasanjo (1978–1979), the short-lived Second Republic, presided over by Shehu Shagari as head of the Nigerian state (1979–1983), and the beginning of the military government under General Bukhari's leadership (1983–1985). The period from 1979 to 1985 was one of great religious turbulence, due only partly to the spread of Izala. The religious violence generated by the Maitatsine riots was unprecedented in the recent history of Northern Nigeria. In reaction to the riots, the Nigerian political authorities restricted the activities of all religious movements, whose numbers had been multiplying during the military period, between 1966 to 1979, arguably to fill a political gap created in the public space by the ban of party politics. In this chapter, I will address the process of domestication that led to the break up of the Society.

Religious Conflicts and Repression

Permission to conduct open-air preaching, a favourite recruitment strategy of the Society, was often denied between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, and the applications of Izala to the federal ministry of interior for official recognition were unsuccessful until 1985. Wounded by these measures that restricted their activities, Izala preachers (both members of the organised committees of *ulama* and autonomous preachers) believed that there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the political authorities to persecute them, brought about by the political influence of opponents among the Sufi establishment and other opponents of Izala, in general. In fact, there were additional reasons why Izala preachers were suppressed during this period. One was the government's concern to maintain peace and security and that the Yan Izala were generally perceived to be troublemakers. This made it difficult for them to obtain clearance for

conducting their activities. Another was the personal religious persuasion of successive heads of state. President Shehu Shagari and General Bukhari were both members of traditional ruling families with some Sufi connections and tended to be biased against Izala. Finally, perhaps the most influential patron of Izala, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, fell into disfavour with the Bukhari administration for reasons to be discussed below.

In January 1984, a few weeks after his re-election for a second term as president of the republic, Shehu Shagari was overthrown in a coup d'état by General Bukhari. Like the deceased General Murtala Muhammad who had been respected by many of his countrymen, General Bukhari made a commitment to fight corruption and restore discipline in Nigeria. With the overthrow of the Shagari administration and the arrival of General Bukhari in power, the constraints restricting the Izala preachers were further intensified. In the aftermath of the riots of Jimeta-Yola discussed in chapter three, General Bukhari made a speech, which was transcribed and communicated to all the village heads in the country. He implicitly endorsed many of the criticisms levelled against Izala preachers. For example, he insisted that young people should obey their parents. Given that the clientele of Izala consisted mainly of young people, there is no doubt, that it was they who were targeted in this speech.

We are aware of your strained blood relationships, a son and his parents are not on good terms. I don't claim knowledge as such; I am not qualified to remind you that God has commanded obedience to parents, to Him—God and his Prophet. God has commanded children to comply with parent's instructions except if they ordered them to worship something other than God . . . I am sure you are all aware that Prophet Abraham was hawking (selling) idols carved by his father in obedience to him. Therefore, I urge you, if you go back to your homes, to preach/instruct your followers to go and seek their parents' forgiveness.¹

Although there appeared to be no obvious connection between the Jimeta-Yola riots and Izala, this speech seems, if not to suggest one, at least to charge Yan Izala with lack of discipline. Moreover, in the same speech, General Bukhari forbade the building of new Friday

¹ Head of the Military Government and Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces, Major General Muhammadu Bukhari's message, June 13, 1984; a three-page speech delivered by General Bukhari and addressed to village heads, p. 2.

mosques without the permission of the emirate authorities,² many of whom opposed Izala. During the 1980s, Izala preachers tried to impose, wherever they could, *imams* who would be sympathetic to their cause and tried to build many new mosques where they could pray separately from non Izala-Muslims. The construction of new mosques was a priority for Yan Izala. General Bukhari also proclaimed in this speech that any future authorisation for preaching would have to be obtained in the preacher's emirate of origin as well as in any other emirate where he might wish to preach.³

The Bukhari regime also took a number of measures to punish illicit financial gain. The Nigerian currency (*naira*) was modified, and new bank notes were issued by the Central Bank. Only persons able to demonstrate that money in their possession had been acquired legally were given valid new notes in exchange for the old ones. This was a clever way of identifying and penalising possessors of ill-gotten money, but it did not work equitably, and some honest people lost money in the process. However, many members of the National Party of Nigeria of President Shehu Shagari, suspected of having misappropriated public funds, were detained to await trial. The campaign was not limited to Nigerian territory. An attempt was made in Britain to kidnap Mohammad Dikko, a former minister of Shehu Shagari. M. Dikko, who was accused of having embezzled large amounts of public funds, was granted asylum in Britain. The attempt, however, failed, and the incident led to strained relations between the Bukhari administration and Great Britain.

Loyal to his friends in the now defunct National Party of Nigeria, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi attempted to marshal popular support in their favour. In the process, he declared that it was illicit Islamically to detain people whose guilt could not be established. This meant that the Bukhari administration had no right to keep the arrested

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.* Thus, obtaining clearance to preach became problematic for the Izala preachers. Before the Shagari administration, Izala preachers could rely on the support of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi and the pro-Gumi faction of the JNl in obtaining preaching permits. Shaykh Gumi was very influential during the Second Republic because of his own support for the ruling party, National Party of Nigeria. For example, during the electoral campaign of 1983, Shaykh Gumi called on Muslims to allow their wife's registration and proclaimed publicly that "politics are more important than prayer." This was an obvious call to register and vote massively for the National Party of Nigeria. See Roman Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

members of the National Party of Nigeria in custody. These statements caused Shaykh Abubakar Gumi to gain the enmity of the Bukhari administration and made Izala preachers more vulnerable to the restrictive measures of the political authorities.

During most of the 1980s, emirate authorities refused permission to Izala preachers to preach within the walls of Kano's old city and in other Sufi strongholds. Izala was further restricted because, until the mid-1980s those responsible for security matters, both in Kano State and at the federal level, were devout members of the *Tijaniyya*. An expression of Izala frustration during this period is found in a sermon made by the Izala chairman of the committee of *ulama*, Shaykh Ismail Idriss.

Nowhere in the world is religion being fought like in Nigeria, particularly under the two regimes of Shagari and Bukhari. No regime ever appeared fighting against the religion of Allah like those of Shagari and Bukhari. Why would Allah leave them? Is it because Allah is afraid of them? Whoever wishes to rule the servants of Allah without worshipping Allah will never be successful at all. No calamity is worse than fighting the religion of Allah. There are two regimes in Nigeria, which Allah forever will not forgive, the Shagari and the Bukhari regimes; why? Because these two regimes were always practising tyranny, oppression, and blocking the way of Allah.⁴

Even Shaykh Abubakar Gumi's position as part of the National Party of Nigeria political establishment during the Second Republic did not relieve restrictions on some Izala preaching groups by political authorities in this period. Sufi orders enjoyed stronger political connections than the reformists, in general. In addition, there were a number of somewhat autonomous reformist preaching groups who were not controlled by the Izala hierarchy and who operated freely. These were even more vulnerable to repression.

From 1985, the pattern of religious conflict at the national level tended to be more characterised by Muslim/Christian than by Muslim/Muslim confrontation. There are several reasons for this. In 1985, General Bukhari's government was toppled by General Ibrahim B. Babangida, whose administration was more favourable to the reformers. In that same year, Izala was granted official recognition.

⁴ Sermon delivered in Hausa by Ismail Idriss at Keffi-Plateau State and transcribed and translated by Mohammed Sani Umar. See his "Sufism and Anti-Sufism in Nigeria," M.A. in Islamic Studies, Bayero University Kano, 1988, p. 214.

From that period, in spite of the fact that radical independent preaching groups continued to denounce “innovations,” the tensions between the leadership of the reform movement and the Sufi orders were somewhat eased, compared to the situation that had prevailed during the late 1970s and the first half the 1980s. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the Jundullahi movement had begun to run out of steam following the death of its leader, Kamaludeen N., in the early 1980s. Also, many partisans of traditionalism, after fierce resistance, had begun to come to terms with the idea that the Society could not be eradicated and that, perhaps, not all Yan Izala were aggressive, and even that some of their claims might have some foundation. They began to develop a willingness to strive for peaceful coexistence, though not necessarily a favourable sentiment.

Furthermore, the native authorities, whose influence was based on the level of popular sympathy they could mobilise, were becoming aware that the Society was developing a base of support. The emirs began to enter into a tacit agreement with Izala leaders, according to which Izala preachers would abstain from fomenting unrest and criticising native authorities. In exchange, the emirs would instruct their representatives—*hakimai* (district heads), *dagatai* (village heads) and *masu ungwanni* (ward heads) to let them practice their religion as they thought fit.

At the same time as these developments within the northern Muslim community, and the growing consensus between, both native and military authorities and the Izala hierarchy, the confrontation between Muslims and Christians began to harden,⁵ particularly in the north. Any outbreak of major conflict between Christians and Muslims caused Muslim factions to unite and forget, at least temporarily, their doctrinal divisions to fight the common enemy. Two notable examples of ecumenical gatherings occurred during this period.

The first was the huge meeting organised in the aftermath of the 1987 Kafanchan crisis discussed in chapter seven. More than two million Muslims are said to have participated in this meeting, which was aimed at voicing Muslim anger at the aggression against Muslims in Kafanchan. Many representatives of the Muslim establishment

⁵ See Jibrin Ibrahim, “Religion and Political Turbulence in Nigeria. The Parameters of the Kafanchan Crisis,” *op. cit.*, *passim*.

were present, including Shaykh Tahir Bauchi a leading *muqaddam* of the Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya in Nigeria, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi and Malam Nasiru Kabara. On the Christian side, the Christian Association of Nigeria was also involved in mobilising Christians to denounce the intolerance of Muslims.

The second gathering was occasioned by the visit paid by Malam Nasiru Kabara to Shaykh Abubakar Gumi in Kaduna in 1990. On this occasion, some of the most radical Izala preachers who had vehemently attacked the Sufi orders were part of the procession that escorted Malam Nasiru Kabara from Kano to Kaduna to visit Shaykh Abubakar Gumi. An absolutely unprecedented event took place. Both Yan Izala and Sufis prayed together in the Sultan Bello mosque. Having observed closely the hostile interactions between the two blocs from mid-1985, I must admit that I was struck that such a reconciliation could take place at this point, given that the antagonism between the two blocs was quite sharp. However, if situated in the context of other political events that took place in that same year, this development becomes less puzzling.

In April 1990, a coup attempt aimed to overthrow the military government of General Babangida had failed. This coup d'état, financed by a millionaire from the former Bendel State, was led by Major Gideon Orkar. It is appropriate to quote and discuss here an extract of the statement that he made immediately after the coup.

We wish to emphasise that this is not just another coup, but a well-conceived, planned and executed revolution by the marginalized oppressed and enslaved people of the Middle Belt and south, with a view of freeing ourselves and our children, yet unborn, from external slavery and colonisation by a clique of this country [. . .] Our history is replete with numerous and uncounted instances of callous and insensitive, dominative and oppressive intrigues by those who think it is their birth right to dominate till eternity, the political and economic privileges of this great country to the exclusion of the people of the Middle Belt and the south. [. . .] Even though they contribute very little economically to the well being of Nigerians, they have, over the years, sat and presided over the supposedly national wealth, the rights of the men of the Middle Belt and southern parts of this country, while people from those parts of the country have been completely deprived from benefiting from the resources given to them by God [. . .] In the light of the above, in the recognition of their formative aristocratic factor and the overall problem of the Nigerian state or states, a temporary decision to excise the following states, namely, Sokoto, Borno, Katsina, Kano and Bauchi comes into effect immediately. . . . All citizens

of the five states already mentioned are temporarily suspended from all public and private offices in the Middle Belt and southern part of this country . . . They are also required to move back to their various states within one week from today.⁶

This statement contains remarks that contribute to an understanding of the reconciliation. It goes without saying that the “*clique of this country . . . which sat and presided over, the supposedly national wealth . . . [and] think it is their birth right to dominate till eternity, the political and economic privileges of this great country*”⁷ are the northerners and, more precisely, the northern political establishment, itself close to the native authorities. The five states declared excised from the federation (the states of the far north) are indeed the heart of Islamic Northern Nigeria. Secondly, the coup attempt took place after the head of state, General Babangida sacked the defence minister and number two of his administration, General Bali, who was a Christian. Following that move, the Christian Association of Nigeria led a protest campaign throughout the country to impress upon the Christians that this measure was part of a crusade directed against them by the Muslims and urged Christians to unite to face that threat. Indeed, given the frustration of some Christians that there had not been a Christian head of state since 1979, some people might have adopted a crusade mentality, including the financier of the failed coup attempt and its organiser, Gideon Orkar. Thus, the plotters thought that the coup would succeed in splitting the military—which they believed had an important number of Christians in key positions. If that were to happen, given the strength of Christianity in the Middle Belt and the south, the plotters believed that Christians in the military would unite on the basis of their religious affiliation. However, this calculation was not as sophisticated as it appeared. For one thing, the break up of the Nigerian federation would definitely create more problems than it would solve. Writing in the 1970s, Nigerian historian, J.F. Ade Ajayi, in discussing the Biafran secession, made a remarkable point regarding the strength of the ties uniting Nigeria:

The eastern leaders were not the first group of people in Nigeria to threaten secession and ignore the strength of the historical and economic bonds that held the country together. The north had threat-

⁶ See *Today*, 29 April–5 May 1990, p. 5.

⁷ Emphasis added.

ened secession in 1953 and again in July 1966. The west threatened to secede in 1954 over the position of Lagos. In each case, as the full implications of secession were considered, the leaders moved back from the brink. The eastern leaders were alienated by the killings of May-October 1966 and, lured by the vision of oil revenues; they were the first to attempt to carry out the threat of secession. Faced with that, other groups in Nigeria sank their differences and rallied to defend the existence of the federation. [...] It became obvious that the problems that would arise from the break-up of Nigeria were more serious than the problems of keeping the country together. The links that bind the country seem frail and fragile enough, but each time there is any danger of ignoring them, their significance suddenly becomes obvious.⁸

A prophetic warning! The majority of the Nigerians do not want to have the federation broken down into smaller units. The Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba make up only two-thirds of the federation.⁹ The remaining one-third is made up of so-called ethnic minorities. Assuming that ethnicity still remains a relevant basis for political cleavages, which is true to only a limited extent, these minorities would feel safer within the present federation than within a smaller territorial unit dominated by one of the three major ethnic groups. Moreover, despite the ethnic factor in Nigerian politics during the First and Second Republic, many Nigerians especially in the military, but also in the business world and academia, are attached to the unity of the country. Moreover, the military has proven to be a cohesive factor in Nigeria, which accounts for the fact that most Christians in the military failed to back the plotters.

Although unsuccessful, the attempt to excise the far north from the federation seems to have been taken very seriously by the northern political establishment, who were unfavourable to the dismantling of the federation, partly because the economic ties between the north and the south are very solid ones. Most of the oil reserves, as well as the industries that constitute the economic nerve of the country, are based in the southern part of the country. This could be argued to be one of the reasons why many religious leaders with strong economic bases, including Isyaka Rabi, a billionaire and

⁸ See J.F. Ade Ajayi "Recent History [of Nigeria]," *Africa South of the Sahara*, 1979-1980, pp. 733-40, pp. 737-38. I owe this reference to Dr. Abubakar Siddike Muhammad.

⁹ See Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

Tijani leader in Kano, Abdulkarim Daiyyabu, Muzammil Sani Hanga and Bashir Tofa, the former presidential candidate, organised the reconciliation between the late Shaykh Abubakar Gumi and the late Malam Nasiru Kabara.

Another event also seems to have influenced the reconciliation. It was rumoured that the failed coup plotters had drawn up a list of northern personalities to be assassinated, including, notably, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi. Whether that rumour was well-founded or not, one fact is certain: the spectre of the 1966 coup d'état had reappeared in 1990 and contributed to catalysing Muslim leaders to unite. Certainly, this is not the first time northern leaders have attempted to reconcile their differences. The history of the region is marked by a will to unite, a will dictated by economic and political imperatives. Many attempts at reconciliation between the leaders have been undertaken in the past although these have not stopped renewed antagonisms. However, the recent reconciliation seems durable for two reasons. In the first instance, the preachers of Izala have been able to negotiate their social recognition. They have now become members of the religious establishment. Most of the Izala preachers I interviewed, including those extremely hostile to Sufi orders, welcomed the reconciliation. A Hamid, the *imam* of the central mosque of Bayero University, Kano and chairman of the Izala Committee of *ulama* of the same city, who preoccupied himself in the past few years with denouncing the Sufis, called on Muslims to unite during a conference he organised at the end of August 1990.¹⁰ Of course, there were radicals from both the Sufi and Izala camps who were opposed to the idea of reconciliation. But nevertheless, a step was made towards a lasting unity.

In the second instance, the sectarian strife that culminated in the *Shari'a* debate and the sectarian riots discussed in chapter 7 made the military administration sensitive to the fact that religion was becoming a primary divisive force in the country. For that reason, the Babangida administration (1985–1993) attempted to contain religious activism. In exchange for their open support of the Babangida administration, Muslim religious leaders were given substantial amounts of money by the federal government in 1990. Many unconfirmed rumours circulated about the amounts of money distributed. Also,

¹⁰ See *The Pen*, 13, (2), 31 Aug. 1990, p. 16.

many Islamic leaders were given Peugeot 504 station wagons, which exposed them to criticism even from some of their disciples.

There is further evidence to support the hypothesis that the Babangida administration brought Muslim religious leaders under the state's wing. During 1991, there was talk of the renewal of diplomatic relations between Israel and Nigeria. Like many other African countries, Nigeria had broken its diplomatic ties with Israel in solidarity with the Arabs after the setback of the Arab armies in 1966. Although there was much popular opposition to this normalisation, most of the northern Islamic leaders were rather favourable to the idea. A disciple of the Qadiriyya, whom I interviewed in Kano in 1991 told me the following:

Most religious leaders received from the federal military government cars and a lot of money, it seems. This negatively affected their reputation in Kano. Nigeria is preparing to nominate one of its nationals for the position of the secretary general of the United Nations. It is also seeking debt forgiveness from financial institutions. That is why the government is trying to re-establish diplomatic ties with Israel, as the West wishes. Interviewed by the press, many Muslim leaders have argued that there is nothing wrong with this. Some have quoted Koranic verses to legitimate this decision. Shaykh Abubakar Gumi's position was ambiguous. Malam Nasiru Kabara, however, openly expressed his disagreement with that decision.¹¹

There is further evidence to suggest close relationships between the Islamic leaders of Northern Nigeria and the Babangida administration. For example, Shaykh Abubakar Gumi told the author¹² that he was on excellent terms with the former head of state, Ibrahim Babangida, and the latter provided him with financial support for the conduct of his religious activities. He also claimed that General Babangida, personally funded the publication of his commentary of the Koran (*Radd al-adhhan ila ma'ani al-qur'an*).¹³

Subsequent developments, including the annulment of the results of the elections of June 12, 1993, which apparently had been won by the Yoruba Muslim millionaire, M.K. Abiola, proved that Babangida never intended to hand over power to the civilians.¹⁴ Thus, it could

¹¹ Interview in Hausa, (my translation).

¹² Interview in Arabic, Kaduna in November 1988.

¹³ For more on the *Radd al-adhhan*, see the chapter 5.

¹⁴ In 1993, Babangida was forced by other generals to relinquish power in favour of a transition government led by Ernest Shonekan. That government was toppled

be argued that by distributing money, General Babangida was broadening his support in order to remain in power. Certainly, this may be the case, but this does not contradict the hypothesis that he was also seeking to control religious movements, for which I would like to provide further evidence that sheds light on the split in the Izala movement in 1991.

The Break Up of the Society

Unlike the leaders of the Sufi orders, who tend to have an independent economic resource base, Izala preachers, at least in Kano, tend to be financially dependent on their patrons. This is true of J. Katsina, one of the leading Kano preachers, whose biography has been discussed earlier.¹⁵ He and his family were accommodated and fed by a patron, Sani Kabara, until he was awarded a scholarship to go to Saudi Arabia to study. This dependence makes such persons easier to manipulate by their patrons or the state. Ultimately, this state of affairs led to the break up of the Izala movement, as the following evidence demonstrates.

In Kano, one patron tried to turn the preachers into an *institutional channel for the negotiation of relations with the state*.¹⁶ The political authorities also tried to infiltrate the movement through the intermediary of new "patrons." Indeed, after the official recognition of the movement in 1985, the number of patrons increased to include people who had not been known for their activism in earlier more adverse times. One such patron in Kano was A.K. Daiyyabu. After the recognition of Izala and the increase of its clientele, A.K.

four months later during the fall of 1993 by General Sani Abacha. Crawford Young has suggested, and I endorse his statement, that the Nigerian military had conceived a new principle of statecraft, which he called "permanent transition." See C. Young, "Permanent Transition and Changing Conjunctures. Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria in a Comparative Perspective," in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young (eds.), *Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria*, Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 1997, pp. 65-82.

¹⁵ See chapter 4.

¹⁶ I borrow the expression from Leonardo Villalon. See Leonardo Villalon, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal. Disciples and Citizens in Fatick*, *op. cit.*, p. 238. In the study of Senegalese Islam, Leonardo Villalon had cautiously suggested that Islamic organizations set up after the Islamic revival were set up as institutional channels of the relations for the negotiations of state/marabout relations.

Daiyyabu,¹⁷ who may have been somewhat sympathetic to the movement before but certainly was not in the forefront, became very visible in organising Izala activities. He very quickly relegated Izala preachers of Kano to leading prayers and teaching religious sciences. This process of taking over control of the movement culminated in 1988, when he succeeded in ousting Shaykh L. Suleyman,¹⁸ one of the first advocates of Izala in Kano and becoming the chairman of the organisation. The national committee of *ulama* agreed to endorse the appointment, but subsequent developments suggest that they must have done so grudgingly.

A clever political entrepreneur, A.K. Daiyyabu was aware that, to have access to the state, one needed to present oneself as the spokesman of a community. After his appointment as chairman of the Izala organisation in Kano, A.K. Daiyyabu moved the administrative headquarters of the organisation from the Fagge Izala main mosque to his own office in Beyrouth Road. After that, he started issuing letters (discussed below) to the different authorities using the letterhead of the Izala movement.

The announcement of a new population policy to be implemented in the country by the federal government gave A.K. Daiyyabu the opportunity to present himself publicly as the spokesman for the Society in Kano. The enforcement of this policy was a consequence of the intervention of international financing agencies. Following the oil glut of the early 1980s, Nigeria faced serious financial and social problems, and the question of taking a loan from the International Monetary Fund became central. The federal government negotiated with international financing agencies, which proposed that a structural adjustment programme be implemented in exchange for the rescheduling of the Nigerian debt. The Bukhari administration refused a number of austerity measures proposed by the IMF, but nevertheless, adopted a number of measures to improve the economy, while continuing to negotiate with the IMF. When General Babangida took over in 1985, he first refused a loan from financing agencies, but ended up complying with their wishes and implementing the structural adjustment program. From the Paris Club and the London Club, he obtained the rescheduling of the Nigerian debt, as well as a \$20 million loan from the World Bank.

¹⁷ See his biography in chapter four.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

The structural adjustment programme (SAP) had several dimensions, including a population policy aimed at curtailing the population growth of Nigeria. By and large, Muslims in Northern Nigeria opposed the population policy. A.K. Daiyyabu seized the opportunity to voice Izala's disapproval of the policy. A huge Izala meeting was organised in Kano in which many Kano sympathisers of the movement were present. A.K. Daiyyabu turned this meeting into a one-man show, giving barely a few minutes to the *ulama* to express their views. He brought in television reporters to cover the event and, while the *ulama* spoke in Hausa and Arabic, A.K. Daiyyabu gave his talk in English and discussed very specialised themes. An analysis of the main lines of A.K. Daiyyabu's speech clearly reveals that it was targetted neither to the religious leaders of the Society, nor to the majority of the sympathisers who were present at the meeting. A.K. Daiyyabu condemned vigorously federal policy, which he argued was an attempt to obliterate Islamic identity.

We have called this gathering today to say that we in the Jama'at Izalat al-bid'a wa iqamat al-sunna unequivocally condemn the population policy being imposed on us by the federal military government of Nigeria. This condemnation is not due to any dogma but due to our informed conclusion that the whole program is a deliberate attempt to obliterate the Islamic identity of the Muslim community in Nigeria by striking at the very root of that community—the family . . .¹⁹

Then, rejecting the official reasons invoked to implement this policy, he argued the following:

According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, the national average population density in Nigeria is 104 people per square kilometres 104/km² (see Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indication 1970–1985 table 1). Comparable data for the Netherlands are 348/km², Britain, 227/km², Japan 318/km². Yet none of these countries is implementing a policy of population control. On the contrary, people are encouraged to keep large families through the payment of social benefits to people with many children. In these countries, millions of people live on family benefits, which are accorded in proportion to the number of children one has.²⁰

¹⁹ See A.K. Daiyyabu, "A Paper on the Real Objective of the Population Policy in Nigeria as Viewed by the Jama'at Izalat al-bid'a wa iqamat al-sunna Kano State Branch," delivered at Malam Aminu Kano Community Commercial College, 3 June 1989, p. 2.

²⁰ See A.K. Daiyyabu, "A Paper on the Real Objective of the Population Policy . . ." *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5.

He also argued that the instruments of the implementation were likely to corrupt the customs of Muslim women:

The two instruments of policy which Nigerian authorities have elaborated to implement the population programme are: sex education and birth control. [...] it is difficult to cite even one example of a country in the world where sex education has been successfully used as an instrument of population control. [...] The next step in the plan, which is yet to be announced is that a law will be made in Nigeria forbidding the marriage of girls under eighteen years. Between the age of twelve years (that is the average age of entry into secondary schools in Nigeria) and eighteen years when a girl will be legally free to marry we have six years. With the dosage of sexual drilling which our children are supposed to be exposed to in secondary schools, six years is more than enough time to sufficiently corrupt their minds such that even after attaining the age of eighteen years, they will have lost interest in any matrimonial life.²¹

He finally concluded his conference by issuing a stern warning to the federal government:

We are therefore informing the federal government that Muslim parents will not be discouraged from sending their children to school (if that is part of the objective). Neither will Muslim children be taught sex education. We finally therefore call on the federal and state governments to expedite action in terminating any plans towards implementing this obnoxious policy. If however the government fails to yield to our demands for justice, Muslims will be forced to find a convenient solution and for whatever follows afterwards, the Nigerian government should know they are entirely responsible.²²

During 1989 and 1990, A.K. Daiyyabu virtually ran the movement single-handedly. The Izala *ulama* of Kano, I assume, were frustrated by the way he relegated them to the background. Nevertheless, they did not openly voice their discontent. This was because there were several litigations between Izala followers and their opponents, yet to be heard by the courts, and the general atmosphere was still somewhat hostile to Izala. This situation tended to play down the internal disagreements within the movement. The incident of Getzo-Gwarzo in 1987 led to one such litigation. On that occasion, Izala preach-

²¹ See A.K. Daiyyabu, "A Paper on the Real Objective of the Population Policy . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 13.

²² See A.K. Daiyyabu, *ibid.*

ing groups who had gone to conduct preaching sessions in Getzo Gwarzo, Kano State, were attacked and wounded, their cars destroyed, and one of the preachers killed. One week later, on the occasion of another preaching session in Kano State, Izala preachers were again attacked, and some of their cars were destroyed. Another incident occurred in Kano city in June 1989 when members of the Qadiriyya attacked Izala preachers. I was present at that meeting, where there was a great deal of destruction and many people were wounded, in spite of intervention by the police.

A.K. Daiyyabu wrote letters to the emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero, denouncing these persecutions. He also wrote a letter to the military governor of Kano State criticizing the emir, and advocated a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Your excellency, we believe that these attacks on our persons and properties are engineered by one Shaykh Nasiru Kabara of Kabara Quarters, Kano City, whom we believe uses religion for his own selfish interest for there is nowhere in the Holy Koran and *hadiths* where it is spelt out that drum-beating and singing in mosques or cemeteries is part of Islam. Muslims all over the world know this quite rightly and therefore we must educate our youth that all those are innovations and not instructions of our Prophet (peace be upon him.) or his companions. And according to Koran and hadith doing such in the name of Islam brings about the anger of Allah and punishment [. . .] In order to achieve an amicable solution, a lasting one for that matter, we advice that in the name of peace and prosperity for Kano State, a special meeting should be convened comprising of the governor with his commissioners and director generals, the emir with his councillors, Shaykh Nasiru Kabara with his group and my humble self and my officials in the Jibwis²³ for each to prove his case based on the Holy Koran and *hadith* instead of irrational and emotional confrontations, which do not and never will stand up to the truth.²⁴

A copy of this letter was sent to virtually all religious authorities and all those who were responsible for the security of the country. It left little doubt about A.K. Daiyyabu's will to present himself as the spokesman of the Izala movement in Kano, if not nationwide. From these elements, it appears that A.K. Daiyyabu, whose sincere reformist

²³ Abbreviation for Jama'at Izalat al-bid'a wa iqamat al-sunna (JIBWIS).

²⁴ See A.K. Daiyyabu, Maintenance of Law and Order at Public Gatherings, letter dated 21 June 1989 to the Military Governor of Kano State. I am grateful to the author for supplying me with a copy of this letter and other material.

conviction need not be doubted, attempted at the same time to use Izala as a “channel of negotiation with the state.”

The second type of infiltration intended to control the Society was done by patrons of the movement who were part of the state apparatus. It is such infiltration, which, I assume, led to the dismissal of A.K. Daiyyabu by the National Committee of *ulama* of the Society. In 1990, A.B. Mamman was the Federal Minister of Interior, responsible for all security services. He provided substantial support to the National Committee of *ulama*, in exchange for which, it was apparently agreed, that officials of the movement hostile to the Babangida administration would be dismissed. Consequently, the chairman of the Izala section of Borno State, among others, was dismissed in June 1990. In June 1990, while A.K. Daiyyabu was in London, Shaykh Ismail Idriss came to Kano and delivered a talk from which the following passage is extracted.

It has come to my notice that here in Kano some young people are calling and parading themselves as the ‘youth wing of Izala’. [. . .] We don’t have any wing whatsoever in Izala [. . .] this group of people are not true members of Izala; rather they are merely Shiites. Again, I have noted with dismay the circulation of publications here in Kano whose contents appeared to be antigovernment. The authors of these publications claim that they have been sanctioned by Izala. But, I want you to understand one thing. As far as the constitution of Izala is concerned, nobody has the right to issue any publication whatsoever without the approval of the National Committee of *Ulama* of Izala. Also, for your own information, this committee of *ulama* is the highest policy making body, and even the heart of the Izala movement. In other words, this committee does not receive any directive from anybody, rather, it does issue commands and directives. These directives must be obeyed by every member willingly. Let me explain something to you. Izala is not a political party that could be capitalised upon for the achievement of personal ambition or selfish interests. Izala is a purely religious organisation whose main objectives is to promote the cause of Islam by reinstating pure tradition. Now let me issue a stern warning. From now on, we will not hesitate to dismiss any person who infringes the established regulations of the movement. In addition we will dissociate ourselves from any unauthorised publication, telling the world that it is not from the Izala movement.²⁵

²⁵ Lecture delivered in Hausa by Shaykh Ismail Idriss on 6 June 1990, (translation mine).

It is significant that Shaykh Idriss made this visit to Kano while A.K. Daiyyabu was in London. Moreover, he convened the meeting, not at the administrative headquarter, i.e., A.K. Daiyyabu's office, but at the Izala main mosque at Fagge, which was the earlier base of the movement and the centre of religious activities. Furthermore, there is absolutely no doubt that the person being criticized in this speech is A.K. Daiyyabu, although his name is not mentioned. The sentence "Izala is not a political party that could be capitalized upon for the achievement of political ambition" is directed against A.K. Daiyyabu, an opinion shared by many *ulama* who saw A.K. Daiyyabu as an ambitious political entrepreneur trying to mobilize them for his own political agenda. Following that speech, A.K. Daiyyabu, like other antigovernmental Izala activists, was sacked from the movement by Ismail Idriss.

There are many clues that lead one to believe the committee of *ulama* had been infiltrated and to some extent controlled by government agents, through the minister of internal affairs. First, Shaykh Ismail Idriss stated that the committee of *ulama* was "the highest policy-making body of the movement and that it does not receive any directive from anybody, rather, it issues commands and directives [and] these directives must be obeyed by every member willingly." Obviously, the patrons, although not responsible for the running of day-to-day activities, were associated with decision making before this new dispensation and also provided protection to the movement. But, from what Shaykh Ismail Idriss said, it seems they were now excluded from the decision-making process. Second, Shaykh Idriss who "had noted with dismay the circulation of publications [...] in Kano, whose content appeared to be antigovernment," warned that the Izala *ulama* "will dissociate themselves from any unauthorised publication" and will not "hesitate to dismiss any person who infringes the regulations of the movement." This is clearly a progovernment stance. Third, A.K. Daiyyabu is implicitly accused of being a *shūte*. In the Northern Nigerian context, the term *shūte* has no doctrinal connotation. It characterizes the young Muslim activists discussed in chapter three who were fascinated by the Iranian revolution. This accusation is directed against people who are considered anarchist and irresponsible, with heterodox religious beliefs, involved in antigovernment activities.

Most antigovernment officials of the movement were labelled *shūtes* and sacked during that period. These moves, combined with the fact

that A.B. Mamman was one of the patrons of the movement, provide very strong evidence that, by the early 1990s, the national committee of *ulama* was being manipulated by the political authorities.

What is original in the new dispensation is that the committee of *ulama*, which had been dependent on its patrons, no longer accepted to be influenced by them. This suggests that they enjoyed more powerful protection. Having been instrumental in the formal creation of the movement, the committee of patrons decided to react to this new move to hijack the Society. They were backed in this decision by other *ulama*, who were opposed to Shaykh Ismail Idriss.

At the national level, a struggle ensued between two factions. One was led by Shaykh Ismail Idriss and backed by most of the *ulama* based in Jos, and the second was led by Musa Mai Gandu, the national chairman of the committee of patrons, and backed by other *ulama* opposed to Shaykh Ismail Idriss, such as Rabi'u Daura, the chairman of the *ulama* of Kaduna State. The Mai Gandu faction was not antigovernmental as such, but it wished to enjoy some autonomy in running the activities of the Society. On the other hand, this faction was aware that it could lay itself open to attack if it accused the *ulama* of taking progovernment positions. It thus decided to question the sources of Shaykh Ismail Idriss's wealth, which was judged to be too much for a preacher. In June 1991, the Mai-Gandu faction suspended the leading Izala figures of Jos, whom they accused of having embezzled funds:

For reasons of dishonesty inconsistent with offices of religious leadership the chairman of the national committee of *ulama* [Ismail Idriss], his deputy [Usman Muhammad Imam] and the chairman of the national first aid group are dismissed.²⁶

The Mai Gandu faction also dissolved all committees of the movement with the view to replacing them with a caretaker committee headed by Rabi'u Daura, former president of the committee of *ulama* of Kaduna State. The caretaker committee was supposed to take care of day-to-day affairs of the organization during the summer of 1991.

Shaykh Ismail Idriss's faction, for their part, rejected that decision

²⁶ See *Hira ta musammam da kungiyar jama'atu ta yi de manema labaru kan aikace aikace, nasarori da tsare-tsaren kungiyar* (interview of Musa Mai Gandu) *Amana*, August 1991, p. 14, (my translation).

and in turn dismissed the other faction from the Society. In the summer of 1991, these two factions unleashed campaigns to discredit each other. The extremists among them engaged in physical confrontation. The officials of the Society had not anticipated such conflict and did not know how to handle it, and the conflict could not be settled internally. But, interestingly enough, both factions had access to the state-controlled radio in Kaduna to speak in the name of the Society. Whether the Jos people did embezzle funds is difficult to establish. But, they clearly had advantages compared to others, since they controlled the national resources of the Society and had the opportunity to take advantage of their position. Be that as it may, the scandal tarnished the reputation of the leadership of the Society and the Society in general.

In conclusion, I would like to recapitulate the main stages in the evolution of the influence of reformist movements in Northern Nigeria by distinguishing three phases. The first phase corresponded with the beginning of the training of the first intellectuals in formal schools as opposed to Koranic schools. During this period, the Jama'at al Nasr al-Islam was the structure on which reformists depended to transmit their message. The preachers trained within the movement served as transmission lines for reformist doctrine. The new intellectual, military, economic and political elites constituted a large part of the clientele of the reformist movement because it expressed many of their aspirations.

The second phase, which started at the end of the 1970s, corresponded with a period of considerable geographical and professional mobility in Nigeria, a more rapid communication of ideas, thanks to the development of mass media, telecommunications and the generalization of formal education, and the reinforcement of contacts with the Muslim world, especially Saudi Arabia. On this favourable ground, and thanks to the unrivalled zeal of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi and to the Izala preachers, reformist ideas had a profound impact on the urban youth of Northern Nigeria. During this period the patrons who were associated with the Society provided considerable financial support in exchange for which the *ulama* gave them greater respectability. Furthermore, these patrons influenced decision making in the Society. This phase of the diffusion of the Society was characterized by the vehement opposition of the Yan Izala to traditional forms of Islam in Northern Nigeria, especially Sufism. It came to a close with a reciprocal acceptance and a considerable

reduction of antagonisms between reformists and partisans of traditional Islam.

The more recent final phase corresponded with the drive by the federal military government to infiltrate the Society as part of its more global strategy to control all religious movements. It is in the course of this phase that the fight for effective control of the leadership of the Society led to its break-up and the emergence of two factions, one of which seemed to be too close to, if not subservient to, the ministry of internal affairs.

CONCLUSION

Whoever works righteously, man or woman, and has faith, We shall assuredly give him/her to live a good life, and We will bestow upon them their reward according to the best of what they used to do (Koran 16–97)

In the introduction, I presented briefly Bourdieu's field theory and argued that it is relevant in making sense of the game constructed and played by members of the Society and other actors in the religious and social field of Northern Nigeria. I would like to return to that theoretical discussion before summarizing my argument and drawing broader implications of this study.

Accumulating and Converting Capital

As discussed in the introduction, field theory is based on the proposition that social actors operate in several fields of social life. A field known also as a "game" is one of these spheres of activities. Those who act in a field may obtain certain resources available in that field, known as capital. I have identified five kinds of capital: symbolic capital, economic capital, social capital, formally certified cultural capital, nonformally certified cultural capital.¹

An assumption of Bourdieu's field theory is that, in each field, one finds a struggle between the "newcomers" and the "established dominant actors." The strategy of each category of players (or their game) is determined by the quantity and the types of capital they possess (e.g., money, followers, prestige, knowledge, etc.). In all fields, established dominant actors controlling diverse sorts and substantial volumes of capital will tend to be very conservative in order to preserve the structure of the field—understood as "the state of power relations among the agents and institutions engaged in the struggle [. . .] to defend the monopoly and keep out competition."²

¹ See introduction.

² See Pierre Bourdieu, *Questions de sociologie*, Paris, Minuit, 1984, pp. 113–21.

On the other hand, newcomers possessing little economic and social capital, for example, but a fair volume of a formally certified cultural capital (as is the case with religious entrepreneurs advocating reform) or some economic capital but not enough symbolic capital (as is the case of economic/political entrepreneurs) are likely to attempt to undermine the structure of the socioreligious field, or to restructure the field as Bourdieu would say.

In Nigeria's social and religious fields, there are several categories of "newcomers" involved in the activities of the Yan Izala. These include:

- the new generation of religious entrepreneurs who possess a decent amount of formally certified cultural capital but little economic and social capital;
- the rising middle class of economic and administrative elites, to whom social and economic change in the 1970s gave opportunity for social mobility, but in a setting still symbolically dominated by traditional native authorities and Sufi orders;
- urban youth, in general, in which one finds marginalized people who were once looked down upon and who now search for a more egalitarian vision of society and religion;
- women, who tended to be restricted to the domestic sphere by the tradition of seclusion, particularly in urban Hausa society, found Izala's ideology and the promise of education and work outside the home appealing.

All these categories of newcomers combined their efforts in attempting to restructure the social and religious field of Northern Nigeria. They strove to undermine the ideological bases for the domination of traditional religious and political authorities and, in the process, accumulated symbolic capital. Symbolic capital in itself is very valuable, and actors may invest their time, money and energy to acquire it. However, it can also be converted to other kinds of capital more crucial in certain circumstances.

How can capital be converted from one category to another especially in reference to the different categories of entrepreneurs whose short biographies were offered earlier? In chapter four, I described the pedigrees of four leading religious entrepreneurs of the Society, Malam U. Muhammad Imam, A. Hamid, Shaykh L. Sulayman, and J. Katsina. In the case of the last three, all were based in Kano, but had migrated from other parts of Northern Nigeria and felt marginalized. They all attended formal schools and pursued Arabic and Islamic studies. In this process they accumulated formally certified

cultural capital. After the acquisition of this crucial capital, they acted to convert it into other forms of capital, including symbolic, economic and social. In advocating the reform of religious and social practices that purportedly contradicted Islamic teaching, they sought to achieve the status of “fighter for the faith”³ and thus to accumulate symbolic capital. They then converted symbolic capital into economic capital. For example, J. Katsina and his family were provided accommodation and fed by businessman S. Kabara. Shaykh L. Suleyman was being provided financial support by Malam Zakari, as well as by other petty traders who attended his courses in Brigade. Malam A. Hamid was a salaried *imam* in Bayero, but he was also supported by other well-to-do members of the Society. All three preachers were able to convert formally certified cultural capital into symbolic capital (the prestige of being those who fight in the path of God and to whom the greatest reward is promised) and economic capital (a more or less decent source of income). In addition, many people came to attend their sermons, and they established close relationships with most of them—to the extent that they became part of their network. This development of connections among people who attended their sermons converted symbolic capital into social capital. In effect, the Izala preachers first accumulated formally certified cultural capital and, in their struggle to denounce the traditional order and the Sufis, converted this to symbolic capital (their status as fighters in the path of God), which they then converted into social capital (a network of followers) and economic capital (financial support).

In chapter four, I also discussed the experiences of two economic/political entrepreneurs, Muhammad Habib gado-da-masu and A.K. Daiyyabu, and one economic entrepreneur, Malam Lawan. They provide a good illustration of the segment of Izala leadership that is constituted by people who are more or less economically well. These economic and political entrepreneurs provided financial support for Izala preaching activities, as well as for Izala preachers. In doing this, they performed the financial *jihad* mentioned by the Koran and, consequently, converted economic capital into symbolic capital by acquiring the status of defenders of the faith.

Political and economic entrepreneurs also accumulated social capital

³ See introduction for an operationalization of symbolic capital.

by supporting the Society. As argued throughout the book, the Society appealed primarily to urban youth. Urban youth tend to be attracted to anti-establishment ideology. This is not specific to Nigeria. However, Nigeria was ruled by the military for most of the last three decades during which party politics was banned. In this environment, religious assembly provided a fertile ground for challenging established authority both political and religious. In Northern Nigeria, in particular, Islamic ideologies of reform, as advocated by the many groups discussed earlier, provided an anti-establishment ideology for the youth. Among those groups, the Society was definitely the most vocal and successful throughout the 1980s. In a period of rapid urban transformation, the increase of the urban youth population was quite significant. Moreover, urban youth tended to defend any cause they could adopt very actively. Therefore, it is understandable that some economic and political entrepreneurs would identify themselves with a cause (the Society's reform agenda) that would make them heroes in the eyes of the urban youth.⁴ The more sympathy they won from this active and highly motivated group, the more social capital they would accumulate.

Thus, by economically supporting the Society, economic and political entrepreneurs converted economic capital into symbolic capital and social capital. This act of conversion, and the resulting possession of significant quantities of these three kinds of capital endowed entrepreneurs with a very significant increase in power in the field in which they acted, in comparison with a strategy based simply on the use or preservation of material wealth.

Most of those who played the Society's card (often taking considerable risk) got a return on their investment in the form of converted capital and the rewards they reaped from its use. However, let me note that Bourdieu refutes those forms of game or rational actor theory that suggest that prior to action, individuals weigh the pros and cons of their different strategies.⁵ This leads me to the discussion of the concept of habitus, which is another key concept in Bourdieu's theory. This concept is an old one and is found as far back as Aristotle. It has been made operational by Bourdieu to refer

⁴ See for instance my discussion of Muhammad Habib gado-da-maso who, as a traditional ruler, supported an ideology, which is very popular in his domain of jurisdiction, chapter three.

⁵ See Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

to dispositions that incline actors to act or react in certain ways.⁶ Practices, according to Bourdieu, are not so much the product of a conscious calculation as much as the product of the encounter between a habitus and a field, which are to a varying degree compatible with one another.⁷ Thus, I would like to emphasize that it is not argued here that most Yan Izala made conscious calculations concerning how much they could win in joining or supporting the Society. Their action is structured to a large extent by their habitus. Bourdieu further defines this concept as:

A system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor.⁸

To say that the Yan Izala articulated an egalitarian view of society and religion or that they converted capital from one kind to another, is not to say they were entirely engaged in a worldly enterprise. The Yan Izala are often presented by their adversaries as people with little sincerity, hungry for power and purchased by the Saudi Arabian religious authorities to spread a subversive religious vision. These cliches may not do justice to the sincerity and aspirations of the Yan Izala whom I met during my stays in Nigeria. Like all Muslims, these are men and women who nourish the full range of human desires—material, moral and spiritual. In a world that curtails their autonomy and blocks their aspirations, they strive with the means at their disposal to affirm and consolidate their existence in the world. Islam in its legalistic version provides them with a vision of, and the ingredients for emancipation, which includes the whole of their existence. Therefore, as the Koranic verse mentioned in the introduction of this conclusion clearly shows, accumulating and converting capitals, for the Yan Izala, becomes part of the promise from the

⁶ See Editor's introduction in Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1981, reedition, 1997, p. 17.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ See Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

Koran that: "Whoever works righteously, man or woman We shall assuredly give him/her to live a goodly life." Or put in another way, whoever accumulates symbolic capital will be able to convert it to other forms of capital and assuredly have "a goodly life."

Summary of the Argument

In this book, I have attempted to explain the significance of the emergence of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and the Reinstatement of Tradition. Its members advocate that they want to eradicate innovations and reestablish the tradition of Prophet Muhammad. In other words, the Yan Izala advocates a return to the seventh century. I argue that, instead, the emergence of the Society is closely associated with the formation of modernity in Northern Nigerian society. Furthermore, I argue that the Society articulates an ideology that aims at emancipating subaltern groups from certain traditional values and institutions.

The Society appeared in Northern Nigeria in the late 1970s, but its impact was felt in neighboring countries such as Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. I have situated the rise of the Society in the context of profound transformations that affected Nigerian society, particularly in the 1970s. A number of changes brought about by the diffusion of oil wealth affected many individuals and communities in Northern Nigeria in particular. Remarkable among these changes was the creation of new states. At the end of the First Republic, the Nigerian federation consisted of four regions. In 1967, it included twelve states, and, in 1978, nineteen states.⁹ The federal government redistributed some of the oil revenue to the population through the budget that it allocated to the states. To give an idea of the redistribution of oil wealth to the states, it must be recalled that in 1988, out of the 21 states that formed the Nigerian federation, only two had domestic resources higher than the financial allocation from the federal government—Lagos state and Imo State, which respectively derived 75% and 54% of their revenues from local taxes. The other nineteen states depended on the federal government for the largest

⁹ The number of states increased to twenty-one in 1987, thirty and the federal capital in 1991, and thirty-six in 1996.

share of their incomes. The predominantly Muslim states of the far north depended heavily on federal revenues. Bauchi State had only 13.4% of its revenues from local taxes, Sokoto State 15.2%, Gongola State 16.8%, Niger State 17.4, Kano State 26.6% and Kaduna State 23.7%.¹⁰

The creation of new states was accompanied by the substantial improvement of infrastructure. For instance, in the administrative headquarters of the new states, existing airports were enlarged. Kano's airport became one of the largest international airports in West Africa and a major point of departure for Muslim pilgrims in passage to Mecca. Landing fields in the capitals of other northern states were also expanded to become airports, as required by their status as administrative headquarters of the newly created states such as Maiduguri, the capital of Borno, Yola, the capital of the former Gongola State and Katsina, the capital of Katsina State. Roads were also improved in the north. New highways were built, including the Kano-Kaduna highway.

The creation of new capitals induced an unprecedented boom in the construction industry as well. New administrative buildings, schools, and houses were built. Coinciding with the decline of the rural world, this construction boom was fed by and encouraged the migration of many rural people to the cities looking for employment or access to formal education as a means of achieving social mobility. Most secondary schools and all universities were based in urban areas in Northern Nigeria. Young people migrated from rural to urban areas in Northern Nigeria to further their studies or to find a job and better living conditions.

The creation of new states and, later on, of local governments provided employment to many university graduates and led to a considerable expansion of the state bureaucracy. In a very short period, young people who had left their village and communal life, secured positions as civil servants and were accommodated in apartments or houses provided by the government. Many economic entrepreneurs became wealthy in relatively short periods of time, thanks to the diffusion of oil wealth and the tremendous new opportunities in the

¹⁰ See Jean Philippe, "Le fédéralisme et la question économique," *Politique africaine*, 32, Dec. 1988, pp. 31-43, p. 38.

cities.¹¹ Many people also made huge amounts of money through dubious means. This included activity in the black market for foreign exchange, which was so large that even state institutions, including the Central Bank turned to it for their own needs. Established businessmen in the formal market were also attracted in this informal sector. During the peak of the oil boom, there were many such informal foreign exchange markets operating openly. In Kano, one such market was located in front of the headquarters of the now defunct West African Pilgrim Association, which had been created by the millionaire Mahmud Dantata. Many Nigerians were upset by this large-scale corruption and denounced it. The Muslim reform movements such as the Society and Christian revivalist movements such as the Pentecostals also deplored corruption.¹²

With regard to formal education, the north had been less privileged than other regions of the country at the moment of independence. The diffusion of oil wealth, however, provided more educational opportunities for northerners. The number of primary, secondary and professional schools increased considerably. So did the number of institutions of higher learning. At the moment of independence, Nigeria had two universities. By 2002, Nigeria had sixteen federal universities, eight state universities, twenty federal colleges of education, thirty-eight state colleges of education, two private colleges of education, five federal universities of technology, three state universities of technology and three private universities.¹³ Very few other African countries, if any, have invested this much in education in such a short period of time. Under the post oil boom dispensation, all the states had their own universities. The following universities were created in the north in the 1970s: Bayero University Kano, Usman Dan Fodio University, the University of Ilorin, the University of Bauchi and the University of Maiduguri.

In addition, many state governments or universities also funded their natives or graduates to attend universities in Britain, the United

¹¹ See the biography of Malam Zakari in chapter four. It provides a good illustration of the opportunities to make money during the oil boom.

¹² Not much has been written about the Pentecostals in Nigeria. I owe the information to Ruth Marshall. (personal communication, London, 1997).

¹³ For a list of institutions of higher learning in Nigeria in 2002 (federal colleges of education, federal universities, universities of agriculture, state universities, see <http://www.nigeriangalleria.com/learning/education/htm>, website visited on May 20, 2002.

States and France and recruited qualified foreign scholars, including European, American, South Asian and Sudanese to teach in Nigerian universities. While formal education had been available only to the offspring of traditional ruling families before, thanks to the wealth available in the 1970s and after, a whole generation of northerners, including from low social extraction, have received a high level of education, either at home or in foreign institutions of higher learning. Women were included among those who had access to formal education, whereas in the past, urban Muslim women in the north had little choice beyond marriage and seclusion from the larger society. A number of schools were created for women, including teachers college and schools for vocational training. Women also came to occupy positions in government.

The growth of mass media was another factor leading to an increase in the level of political awareness in Northern Nigeria. The states of the north were equipped with television. A number of magazines and newspapers were also created. Unlike in many francophone African countries, there were many newspapers in local languages in Northern Nigeria, including *Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo*, *Al-Kalami*, *Amana* etc. With the appreciation in the value of the Nigerian currency during the 1970s until well into the mid-1980s, most urban dwellers could afford to buy radios, televisions and tape recorders.

All of these transformations were part of an emerging modernity in Nigeria that involved several interrelated processes affecting the social, economic, political and cultural spheres.

An essential feature of political modernity in Nigeria is the formation of the nation state. As part of this process, a huge government bureaucracy was created. This phenomenon was not specific to Nigeria, but true for other parts of Africa as well.¹⁴ In Nigeria, however, the many geopolitical transformations following the collapse of the First Republic (1960–1966) led to the creation of many states and local governments. As a result, the number of civil servants increased significantly. It is during that period that a number of Muslim civil servants who had already acquired social mobility, began to find the Society's egalitarian discourse appealing. Some of them

¹⁴ See Leonardo Villalon, "The African State at the End of the Twentieth Century: Parameters of the Critical Juncture," in Leonardo Villalon and Phillip Huxtable (eds.), *The African State at a Critical Juncture*, Boulder & London, Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 13.

provided financial support to the Society, others limited themselves to attending its sermons and classes. Others espoused some of the ideas of the Society but did not openly identify with the Society itself. As demonstrated in the discussion of the Society's worldviews,¹⁵ the Yan Izala did not challenge the secular nature of the Nigerian state because civil servants, who were part of the state apparatus, constituted an important segment of its constituency. The recent implementation of Muslim criminal law in twelve states of Northern Nigeria, supported by most segments of the Northern Nigerian population, including the Yan Izala, might lead some to conclude the opposite, however. Although the discussion of these very complex developments in Nigerian politics is beyond the scope of this study, I will just respond to such an objection that those who support the implementation of criminal law do not advocate that the Nigerian federal state be governed by *Shari'a*, but that its implementation be limited to Muslims in the northern states.

Citizenship or the sense of belonging to a modern nation state is no doubt another aspect of political modernity. The Yan Izala perceived themselves as citizens of the Nigerian nation state. They never questioned the fact that they were citizens of Nigeria. It is true that like other Muslims, the Yan Izala had, on some occasions, defended "Islamic causes." For instance in the early 1980s, when the PLO was fighting in Lebanon with Tsahal, (the Israeli army), a number of Nigerian Muslims including Yan Izala, named their new born children Yaser after the Palestinian leader of the PLO, Yaser Arafat. In the early 1990s after the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi army, an international coalition was formed to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. In response, the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, who is a secular leader, urged the entire Muslim world to wage a *jihad* against the infidels (the United States and other members of the coalition). At that moment, many newborn babies in Northern Nigeria were named after Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Ten years later, when the United States accused Usama Bin Laden to have masterminded the attacks against the World Trade Center and started bombing Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban and al-Qa'ida organization, many newborn babies were also named after Usama Bin Laden. However, solidarity with "Islamic causes" does not mean that Islam is a polit-

¹⁵ See chapter five.

ical reference that supersedes the sense of belonging to the Nigerian nation. Unlike the Nigerian Brothers,¹⁶ the Yan Izala do not advocate that the nation state as a form of political association be replaced by a political entity named Umma (the nation of Islam). In addition to identifying themselves with the federal state, the Yan Izala see themselves as citizens of a state within the federation and as belonging to a local government within a state. In addition, as I have shown, the structural organization of the Society parallels in many respects the administrative organization of the Nigerian federation. Most important decision-making bodies of the Society exist at the federal, state, and local government levels. This means that the development of the Society itself is to some extent a product of the formation of political modernity in Nigeria.

Another dimension of modernity is the economic one. Dramatic changes affected the economic sphere during and after European colonial rule that ushered in an economic modernity. Aspects of the formation of economic modernity include the growing importance of the urban economy and the emergence of a class of entrepreneurs during the colonial era. However, the number, as well as the amount of wealth, acquired by economic entrepreneurs in colonial Nigeria were insignificant compared to that of the economic entrepreneurs of the postcolonial period. The diffusion of oil wealth provided tremendous new opportunities and paved the way for a huge class of economic entrepreneurs, ranging from petty traders (Yan Kasuwa in Hausa) to prosperous economic businessmen operating in the import/export sector (*tajirai* in Hausa). These “nouveaux riches” who had just acquired social mobility felt that some traditional values and institutions hampered their economic goals and curtailed their autonomy. Some of them did not want to indulge in costly traditional practices of wealth redistribution. They also aspired to more egalitarianism in religion and society. Many of them found the discourse of the Society quite appealing and supported it.

The formation of social modernity is another aspect. Northern Nigerian society was a stratified society in the precolonial era, divided into rulers known as *sarakuna* and commoners known as *talakawa*. The number of slaves or descendants of slaves was also very significant.¹⁷ Gradually, social mobility was possible for many subal-

¹⁶ See chapter three.

¹⁷ See M.G. Smith, *Government in Kano, op. cit.*, p. 453.

tern people. Some became prosperous economic entrepreneurs, others became civil servants, still others became influential in the military. Many of these new groups were uncomfortable with the status that had been assigned to them in the traditional setting. For these subalterns, the discourse of the Society had a strong appeal. The Society advocated that all believers are equal; only piety can make the difference between individuals. Such a statement is not only relevant for the hereafter, it can also be very relevant in a society that used to be so stratified and that had undergone so many dramatic transformations.

The formation of cultural modernity in most Western societies is associated with a measure of disenchantment of the world. In other words, it has meant a decline in the practice of religion. In Northern Nigeria, however, the formation of modernity has not led to the decline in the practice of religion, but, as shown in chapter three, to greater religious pluralism. This is true for both Islam and Christianity. As far as Christianity is concerned, greater pluralism is evidenced by the success of Pentecostal and Charismatic movements that are challenging the established Protestant and Catholic churches.¹⁸ As far as Islam is concerned, Islamist and reform movements provide more evidence of greater pluralism. The Society had not only attracted former members of Sufi orders, it had also carved a niche in social spaces like high schools, institutions of higher education, the civil service, and the business world.

In their practice of religion, the Yan Izala place emphasis on the acquisition of exoteric knowledge. In other words, they devote themselves to learning the art of the psalmody of the Koran, theology, and other Islamic sciences more than the average followers of the Sufi orders. This does not mean that the Sufi orders have no interest in knowledge. On the contrary, many Sufi *shaykhs* have written in a more scholarly manner than the preachers of the Society. Moreover, the growth of literacy in the region is primarily associated with the educational efforts of Sufi orders. In Northern Nigeria, Sufi *shaykhs* such as Ibrahim Salih,¹⁹ Shaykh Sani Kafanga,²⁰ Shaykh Nasiru Kabara²¹ to name a few, are prominent scholars.

¹⁸ See chapter seven.

¹⁹ See chapter six.

²⁰ See John Hunwick (comp.), *Arabic Literature of Africa . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 304–307.

²¹ See John Hunwick (comp.), *Arabic Literature of Africa . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 321–339.

Sufi *shaykhs*, however, combine esoteric and exoteric knowledge. They provide responses to the expectations of a large and diverse clientele. To those who are interested in the acquisition of exoteric knowledge, they provide education in various Islamic sciences. To those who are interested in esoteric knowledge, they provide spiritual initiation. To those interested in healing and success and who believe that Sufi *shaykhs* had supernatural powers, Sufi *shaykhs* provide talismans and charms. To those seeking mediators of the divine grace, Sufi *shaykhs* act as mediators of that grace. Before the rise of the Society, this versatility made Sufi *shaykhs* very popular, but after the rise of Izala, Sufi *shaykhs* were increasingly accused of encouraging heterodox beliefs and practices.

Izala preachers devoted their time and energy to oral preaching. Their sermons were recorded on audiocassettes and videocassettes and circulated widely. Their impact in urban areas was great. A limited number of Yan Izala preachers also wrote pamphlets. For the most part, Yan Izala preachers relied heavily on writings of a Wahhabi persuasion. They made no significant effort to do *ijtihad*. Their discourse was limited to a few statements advocating an egalitarian societal order.

Comparative Implications

In this final section, I would like to address some implications of the evidence from Northern Nigeria presented here for the debate on Islam and modernity in West Africa in particular, and in the Muslim world in general, as well as some insights for theories on globalization, modernization, and the sociology of religion.

In a comprehensive survey of Islam in the modern world, John Voll argues that:

Secularism has long been assumed to be an inherent part of the process of modernization. If this means simply that traditional religious concepts will be less important in a modernized society, it is valid. If, however, this assumption means that religion will no longer be a vital force in the political and social life of modernized people, it is clearly not valid²²

²² See John O. Voll, *Islam. Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, Syracuse N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1994, p. 289.

The Nigerian experience of Islamic reform as a vehicle of modernity does corroborate Voll's argument. A question worth asking though is the extent to which the Nigerian experience gives a sense of broader trends in the region. In that respect, a comparison with another West African country, Senegal is instructive.

Like Northern Nigeria, Senegal, at the end of European colonial rule, had a Muslim population composed of an overwhelming majority of Sufi affiliates. The Senegalese experience, however, suggests that the assumption that traditional religious concepts will be less important in a modernized society must not be taken for granted. In Senegal, Sufi orders have become prominent since the early colonial period. As a consequence of the collapse of the social and political orders in Senegal during the colonial conquest, most inhabitants rallied around Sufi *shaykhs*. The French colonial masters quickly realized that Sufi *shaykhs* could be allies in the colonial exploitation of Senegal. They sealed with Sufi *shaykhs* a pact,²³ in many respects, similar to the pact that Lord Frederick Lugard sealed with the political establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. In other words, they adopted a form of indirect rule whereby Sufi *shaykhs* would be their intermediaries with the population, a great majority of which were affiliates in Sufi orders. The French colonial state gave Senegalese Sufi orders freedom to practice their religion as they saw fit, and even to proselytize. In addition, the French encouraged Sufi *shaykhs* to cultivate peanuts. Sufi *shaykhs* made the best of the opportunities provided by the colonial political economy to become very powerful economic actors. In addition, unlike Northern Nigeria where the precolonial political aristocracy was maintained, in Senegal, the precolonial kingdoms were largely dismantled. Therefore, Sufi *shaykhs* filled the vacuum in colonial Senegal. During the whole colonial period, Senegalese Sufi orders remained allies of the French colonial state. During the postcolonial period, the Senegalese state has maintained the same relation with Sufi orders as its colonial predecessor. In exchange, Sufi *shaykhs* have encouraged their disciples to

²³ For a study of this process, see David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation, Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania 1880–1920*, Athens and Oxford, James Currey and Ohio University Press, 2000; Mamadou Diouf, *Histoire du Sénégal: le modèle islamo-wolof et ses périphéries*, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001; David Robinson and Jean-Louis Triaud, *Le Temps des marabouts. Itinéraires et stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale v. 1880–1960*, Paris, Karthala, 1997.

abide by laws, to engage in the cultivation of cash crops and to pay taxes. This state/Sufi collaboration was to a large extent a factor of political stability of Senegal compared to other African states. With regard to religious reform, it is notable that in Senegal, Sufi discourses have not been challenged in any significant way. On the contrary, Sufi orders recruit in the traditional and the modern sector. The Senegalese public and domestic spheres are largely shaped by Sufi beliefs and influence. Pictures of Sufi *shaykhs* are found in houses and businesses of most Senegalese people. Urban and rural, educated and poorly educated believe in Sufi saints. Most Senegalese singers have made a number of songs praising Sufi *shaykhs*. There is a small community of reformers articulating a mild discourse of reform in Senegal, but in no sense have Senegalese reformers been a challenge to Sufi orders. Sufi orders provide to a considerable extent, the cultural ingredients through which Senegalese people understand their universe.

What is true for Senegalese in Senegal is equally true for Senegalese communities abroad. In Europe and the United States, one finds hundred of thousands of Senegalese people. Among them, followers of Sufi orders figure prominently. The most visible such order is the Muridiyya.²⁴ An emerging literature on migrant communities and their link with home communities suggests that Senegalese Sufi communities are among the most prominent and well organized West African communities. Thus, much of so-called traditional concepts, notably the practice of Sufi Islam, the veneration of saints, are still relevant not only in modern Senegal, but also among Senegalese migrant communities in the West. Senegal is not an exception. To the best of my knowledge, with the possible exception of Mali where Wahhabi influences are said to be stronger, in most of West Africa, Sufi discourses remain meaningful for millions of Muslims and have

²⁴ See Donald Cruise O'Brien., "Charisma comes to town," in Christian Coulon; Donald Cruise O'Brien, (eds.) *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 135–55; Victoria Ebin, "A la recherche de nouveaux poisons,"; *Stratégies commerciales mourides par temps de crise*, "Politique africaine," (45), March 1992, pp. 86–99, Donald Carter, *States of Grace: Senegalese in Italy and the New European Immigration*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997; Mourtala Mboup, *Les Sénégalais d'Italie. Émigrés, agents du changement social*, Paris, L'harmattan, 2000; Paul Stoller, *Money Has No Smell. The Africanization of New York City*, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 2002; Cheikh Anta Mbacké Babou, "Brotherhood Solidarity, Education and Migration: The Role of the Dahiras Among the Murid Muslim Community of New York," *African Affairs*, (101), 2002, pp. 151–70.

never been challenged in the same way that the Society has tried to do in Nigeria. Senegal has never been under military rule and remains one of the few African countries to have operated a quasi democratic system throughout the postcolonial period.

In contrast, Nigeria has been under military rule for most of the postcolonial period. Thus, religion came to fill a vacuum in Nigeria created by the absence of party politics. The Society was much more than just a religious organization. It was a political movement of emancipation, articulating a discourse of liberation.

Shaykh Aminudeen Abubakar said that the organization “Da‘wa” which he established was not a political organization.²⁵ Likewise, Shaykh Ismail Idris said that:

Izala is not a political party that could be capitalised upon for the achievement of personal ambition. Izala is a purely religious organisation whose main objectives is to promote the cause of Islam by reinstating tradition.²⁶

I hope that my discussion of the accumulation and conversion of capitals provides evidence that the Society could indeed be capitalized upon for the achievement of all sorts of ambitions, individual and collective, for this world and the hereafter. The last thing that a smart leader of a religious organization would do, particularly in a context of military rule where party politics are simply banned, is to say that his organization is a political party. The Society does not claim to be a political party, but it is indeed a political organization of the most sophisticated type. The Society has visionaries who could articulate its ideology. It has full time members committed to disseminating its ideology, as well as sponsors who provided logistical support. It has all sorts of committees established at the national, state and local government levels. It organises rallies in order to spread its worldviews in the larger society, retain and attract members. It has a project of reorganizing society according to its worldviews. As Remy Leveau states: “if giving a meaning to one’s life according to a belief in the hereafter can be considered as a religious act, striving to organize society in conformity with that belief is a political perspective.”²⁷ The Yan Izala are indeed interested in

²⁵ See chapter three.

²⁶ See chapter eight.

²⁷ Remy Leveau, “Les mouvements islamiques,” *Pouvoirs*, 62, 1992, pp. 45–58, p. 45.

giving a meaning to their life, according to their belief in the hereafter, which nobody would disagree would be a religious behaviour. Yet, they are also striving to reorganise society according to their belief. Therefore, their project is a political project.

The fact that they claim to imitate the example of the Prophet Muhammad is further evidence that there is more to their project than just religion. The Prophet Muhammad believed in the revelation sent to him. He acted in accordance with the revelation. After the revelation, he spent much of the rest of his life worshipping God. If he had contented himself to praying, fasting, and meditation (as similar people known as *hunafa* did in pre-Islamic Arabian society), his project would have remained purely spiritual. However, he went beyond individual worship to attempt to establish the rule of God in Mecca. This turned his initially purely spiritual project into a spiritual/political project, which caused him to alienate the Meccan religious and political establishment. *Mutatis mutandis*, if the Yan Izala had contented themselves to individual worship, their action would not have had a strong impact in Northern Nigerian society as it did. Let me illustrate this concretely by discussing who, according to the Yan Izala, qualifies to lead prayer. The Yan Izala argue that “no Muslim should be led in prayer by an ‘infidel’.”²⁸ In other words, the Yan Izala must not be led by members of Sufi orders and most other nonaffiliated Muslims. This was not just a theoretical statement. As I have shown, it was a fundamental principle which governed the interaction between the Yan Izala and adherents of Sufi Islam in Northern Nigeria. This principle was translated into a struggle to take over the control of mosques (and resources accruing from them)²⁹ wherever possible in Nigeria. Indeed, in mosques where the Yan Izala succeeded in establishing themselves, they forced *imams* (prayer leaders) to adopt their perspective in religion. When the latter refused, they were simply sacked and replaced by Yan Izala *imams*. If this is not a political struggle, then the concept is not useful in accounting for “who gets what, when, how” as defined by Harold D. Lasswell.³⁰ Reinstating the *Sunna* (tradition), which Ismail

²⁸ See chapter five.

²⁹ See above my discussion of the conversion of capital.

³⁰ See Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, New York. The World Publishing Co., 1963, *passim*.

Idris says is a purely religious ideal, is as much a political project as was establishing the *Sunna* in seventh century Arabia.

The experience of the Society thus corroborates François Burgat's point that:

Islamist discourse, under the guise of a religious discourse, could be the vehicle of completely profane demands, that are not only economic or social, but more and more often democratic.³¹

This leads me to the discussion of the role of Islamic societies in the struggle for democratisation. Had I said at the African studies meeting in Orlando³² that Muslim reformers participated in the struggle for democratisation then the scholar with whom I argued would have been further outraged. Yet, I argue that reformers participated in the struggle to expand the democratic space. In postcolonial Northern Nigeria, the struggle for democracy had two dimensions.

One dimension was to fight against undemocratic rule, which was exemplified by military rulers. The latter enjoyed so much power that they took all possible opportunities to capture it or delay its handing over to civilians. Many reformers were against autocratic rule, either military or civilian, particularly when rulers restricted their ability to practice their religion as they saw fit.³³ Indeed, they condemned autocratic rule using Islamic idioms. In other words, they would say that such policies or such rulers were against Islam, against religion. Advocates of liberal democracy would, I am sure, agree that it is antidemocratic to restrict freedom of association.

The second dimension of the struggle for the "expansion of the democratic space"³⁴ is directed towards the larger society. The Yan

³¹ See François Burgat, "De l'islamisme au postislamisme, vie et mort d'un concept," *Esprit*, 277, August-September 2001, 82-92. This article is part of a special issue of the journal *Esprit* titled "A la recherche du monde musulman." Most contributors of the issue were very critical of the Islamist decline hypothesis. They argue that, in fact, Islamism, as a strong commitment to the values of Islam, which provide a framework for social and political life in the Muslim World, had never experienced any significant decline. What had changed rather, is the language of French scholars of Islam, the most prominent of whom are G. Kepel and Olivier Roy. Other contributions include Olivier Mangin, "Islamisme, néfondamentalisme, postislamisme: vraie ou fausse guerre des mots," pp. 78-81, Alain Roussillon, "Les islamologues dans l'impasse," pp. 93-115, Olivier Roy, "Les islamologues ont-ils inventé l'islamisme?" pp. 116-36.

³² See the beginning of the introduction.

³³ See chapter eight.

³⁴ See Jibrin Ibrahim, (ed.), *Expanding Democratic Space in Nigeria*, Dakar, Codesria, 1997, *passim*.

Izala advocated that it is not Islamic to genuflect to greet elders, it is not Islamic to excessively venerate religious leaders. Advocates of liberal democracy would certainly not disagree with them on these specific issues. Therefore, the Society's political project aimed indeed at expanding the democratic space in Nigeria. As Jibrin Ibrahim states:

The expansion of democratic space must not only focus on institutional and structural processes, but also on the empowerment of all marginalized groups. This includes ways of transforming their political, economic, social, psychological and legal conditions of powerlessness.³⁵

Jibrin Ibrahim adds that: "The expansion of democratic space develops on the basis of the empowerment of citizens as well as groups in society, be they ethnic, religious, regional or clans."³⁶ One of the main goals of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition was to empower marginalized groups in Northern Nigeria.

In the context of the broader Islamic world, a number of reform movements have appeared during the twentieth century; including Muhammadiyah in Indonesia, the Association of *ulama* in Algeria, the Shubannu movement in West Africa etc. Studies of these movements have shown that their emergence and action are part of the process of a search for modernity.³⁷ Indeed, the leaders as well as many adherents of these movements are products of the modern world. They are urban dwellers. Many are middle class. The majority of them have received some form of modern education. The emphasis in their discourse and practice on the individual is central. A question worth asking is what did it mean for them to be individualistic? Are they individualistic in the same sense that the philosophers of the European Enlightenment meant? In other words, do they advocate "that the individual is the starting point for all knowledge and action, and that individual reason cannot be subjected to a higher authority?"³⁸ The answer is no. Rather, individualism means that how one understands one's religion, how one behaves towards

³⁵ See Jibrin Ibrahim, "Introduction," in Jibrin Ibrahim (ed.), *Expanding Democratic Space in Nigeria*, *op. cit.*, 16.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18.

³⁷ See introduction.

³⁸ Stuart Hall, "Introduction," in Stuart Hall et al., *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

community, what use one makes of one's earning should not be decided by the community, but by the individual himself. To a large extent, this behavior characterizes the modern subject.

Advocates of Islamic reform in Northern Nigeria invoke the Koran and the Sunna of the Prophet to legitimize their discourse and practices. The Koran, as well as other religious texts, however, is not always immediately readable. The Koran itself says that there are signs that are clear and others that are ambiguous (Koran 3–7). This ambiguity allows for different kinds of interpretations, including some conflicting ones. Regarding the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, its scope is larger and allows for even more conflicting interpretations. Both the Koran and tradition are fundamental references in the life of Muslims. They remain, however, very broad references. It is my contention that how they are interpreted can seldom be separated from worldly concerns and struggle for survival and for symbolic, social, and economic capital. In the particular context of Northern Nigerian society in the 1980s, reformers interpreted the Koran and the *Hadith*, largely, but not only, for an emancipating cause.

I must emphasize, however, that individualism, as far as the Society and similar religious movements are concerned, does not mean that community is not necessary. Aspects of community and solidarity are emphasized. Community prayer is an important aspect of the ideology of the Yan Izala. The Yan Izala gave alms. They paid the statutory Muslim tithe (*zakat*). However, they worked out a balance between duties vis-à-vis the community and an individual's right to privacy. The Yan Izala advocate a return to the seventh century. They, in fact, are negotiating an entry into the 21st century, but as people for whom religion is a fundamental reference. Islamic discourses provide them the ingredients for a form of modernity, whose contours were not quite the same as a normative Western modernity. This form of modernity, I would argue, is an alternative modernity.

Had disciples of Maitatsine³⁹ said that they wanted to return to the seventh century, I would buy their argument. Everything in their discourse and practices suggested that they were luddites opposed to modern technology. However, I would not buy that argument for the Yan Izala because they are quite aware of the advantages of

³⁹ See chapter three.

technological progress and make use of it. Audio and videocassettes served as the best vehicle for their message of emancipation.

An insight into the literature on modernity in the Muslim world, largely confirmed by the Northern Nigerian experience, is that the formation of social, economic and political modernity does not necessarily lead to the disenchantment of the world. Religious beliefs and practices remain meaningful in the formation of modernity.⁴⁰ Furthermore, religion reinterpreted provides ingredients for liberating socially oppressed groups within a given society. In the context of the economic and social development of Nigerian society, this is no doubt the case of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition.

The findings of this research also confirm another insight in the literature on modernity and Muslim society as it relates to globalization. It is that the revival of religion is, at least partly, a reaction to the threat posed to local identity⁴¹ by "the intensification of global interconnectedness."⁴² John Voll argues that:

The giant structures of modern and modernizing societies are too large to provide a satisfying identity for many individuals. The globalization of politics, economic, and culture opened up visions for some of universalized groups that could appeal to human hopes for unity but the actual forms and structures for this vision were inadequate. The large structures created by modernism were neither effectively universal enough nor intimate enough to meet the desires of many throughout the world. In response, there was a revival of interest in and growing attachment to ethnic and religious traditions which could appeal to universal ideals while providing authentic intimacy in a community⁴³

Subtle accounts of globalization do suggest that it involves contradictory processes.⁴⁴ For instance, tensions between processes of universalisation and particularization and between homogenization and differentiation are particularly relevant for this discussion.⁴⁵ Regarding tension between process of universalization versus particularization,

⁴⁰ See the discussion in the introduction.

⁴¹ See, for example, a discussion of "Revivalist responses to the modern" in John O. Voll, *Islam. Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, *op. cit.*, p. 292 sq.

⁴² See Anthony McGew, "A Global Society," in Stuart Hall et al., *Modernity, An Introduction to Modern Societies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 466–503, p. 467 sq.

⁴³ John O. Voll, *Islam. Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

⁴⁴ See Anthony McGew, "A Global Society," *op. cit.*, p. 467.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Anthony McGew argues that in the same way that globalization universalizes aspects of modern social life (. . .), it simultaneously encourages particularization by relativizing both “locale” and “place” so that an intensification (or manufacturing) of uniqueness (or difference) is thereby fostered.⁴⁶ Concerning contradictions between homogenization and differentiation, McGew observes that “in as much as globalization brings about an essential ‘sameness’, to the surface of appearance of institutions of modern social life in the globe (...), it also involves the assimilation and re-articulation of the global in relation to local circumstances.”⁴⁷ Religious revival is one result or response to these tensions of late modernity worldwide.

Another aspect of globalization to which religious revival is a reaction is antineocolonial nationalism. In the introduction, I have argued that antiwestern nationalism was a factor in the rise of movements for religious or political reform⁴⁸ in the Muslim world. Most of these movements were active in the fight for the liberation from colonial domination. After the end of formal Western colonial domination, antiwestern nationalism did not recede in Muslim societies for the following reasons. First, Western powers were still interfering in the politics of the Muslim world, and these forms of neocolonial domination generated as much resentment as direct political control did during the colonial period. Second, Western nations continued to dominate the global economy, which favored powerful nations. Third, the West dominates the media. The perception of a world reconfigured as one global village under Western domination further exacerbates antiwestern nationalism. Religion can provide the ingredients for a Third World/Muslim nationalism. In affirming their attachment to religion, or in this case in attempting to regenerate religion, some social groups aim at resisting against this homogenization/westernisation.

Two schools of thought provide frameworks for the study of contemporary Islamic movements.⁴⁹ One school focuses on the radical aspects of Islamism and attempts to build a comprehensive framework of analysis. The other school interprets Islamism largely as an

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ As far as the Society is concerned, see in chapter eight, for instance, the address of A.K. Daiyyabu opposing family planning, birth control, sex education etc.

⁴⁹ See François Burgat, “De l’islamisme au postislamisme,” *vie et mort d’un concept*, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

expression of national identity and refusal to accept the Western economic, political and cultural domination of the world. While the first school argues that Islamist movements have failed because they had not succeeded in capturing political power or because they provide no credible alternative, the second school contends that contemporary Islamic movements actually have not failed because they remain meaningful in most Muslim societies.

Gilles Kepel's analysis belongs to the first category. It is the most comprehensive study of Islamist movements ever published, although Sub-Saharan Africa is virtually absent in its coverage. Kepel's analysis is based on the idea that Islamists recruit from two constituencies: the disaffected urban poor and the pious middle class. The former is frustrated by the lack of social mobility, whereas the latter is alienated from the power structures. Kepel argues that frustration is a decisive factor in the appeal of Islamism. Following Kepel's analysis, Islamist movements remain cohesive in the absence of repression. In the case of a crackdown, Islamist movements split along class lines. The disaffected urban poor, who have nothing to lose, opt for a radical strategy that may sometime imply withdrawal from the field of legal opposition and even guerrilla warfare. The pious middle class usually does not embark on such radical options because it has a lot more to lose by going underground. Therefore, the middle class dissociates itself from religious parties that have recourse to violence. This leads to a split in the movement. Alienation and frustration, according to Kepel, explain the appeal of Islamism. However, alienation and frustration are only one part of the story. The other part is that Islam remains one fundamental (although not exclusive) existential reference to many modern Muslims regardless of class, gender, race, nationality.

The splintering of some Islamic movements such as the Society for the Removal of Innovation, or the failure to capture political power as has been the case of many Islamist movements in other parts of the Muslim World, does not mean that the appeal of religion itself has declined in Muslim societies. It does not mean that Muslims are no longer interested in the fact that their life, in its public and domestic spheres, should be governed according to Islamic principles.

Proponents of the second school of thought, with whom this research resonates, argue that capturing political power was never an objective for some segments of the membership of Islamic organizations. More important objectives included the protection of Islamic

local identity, whatever that means, in a global public sphere largely controlled by Western media.

This research also has implications for the sociology of religion. Above all, it invalidates the Weberian assumptions that patterns of religious mobilization coincide with social classes.⁵⁰ The Society recruited across the social spectrum: students, civil servants, economic/political entrepreneurs and religious entrepreneurs, and even other marginalized groups. These various people joining the Society had different motivations and different interests. In that respect, the Society can be compared to other contemporary Islamic movements.

Hasan al-Banna classified the members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,⁵¹ which he founded, into different categories according to their level of commitment. He distinguished between the assistant (*musa'id* in Arabic), the affiliated member (*muntasib*), the active member (*amil*) and, at the top, the combatants (*mujahid*), who constituted the secret apparatus (*al-jihaz al-sirri*) of the movement and carried out military operations.⁵² Similarly, the Jama'at Islamic founded by Abu 'Ala al-Mawdudi, one of the most powerful contemporary Islamic movements of the Indian subcontinent, distinguished between three types of members. First, there were the full members (*rukn* in Urdu)—the unflinching supporters of the movement. A small minority, they have the privilege to vote for and be elected to key positions in the organization. Second, the associate members (*karkun*) are involved in the activities of the organization and aspire to full membership, but can neither elect nor be elected to any position whatsoever. Finally, the third category consists of sympathizers (*muttafiq*) who make up the majority of the members of the movement.⁵³ One of the conclusions to be drawn from these comparisons is that Islamic movements are complex. To be understood properly, their membership should be carefully examined regarding their various motivations and levels of involvement.

The experience of the Yan Izala shows that repression does not necessarily lead to a split in the organization. Most pious middle

⁵⁰ Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1964, *passim*.

⁵¹ See introduction.

⁵² See R.P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁵³ See Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia," in Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Observed*, University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 457–530, pp. 490–91.

class people who defended the Society remained loyal to the organization and made use of their resources and influence to protect members when they were persecuted. It is true that the Yan Izala were never driven to any serious challenging of state authorities as members of the Muslim Brothers were in Egypt,⁵⁴ or members of the GIA in Algeria.⁵⁵

Most of the Society's membership is also urban based. This is not to suggest that modern attitudes are limited to the urban world. Such a dichotomy would not allow us to account for ties linking the rural and the urban world and explain how these ties act to undermine social cohesion in the rural world. The seasonal migration of rural people to urban areas persists. Conversely, many urbanised rural people still return to the rural world occasionally. These rural/urban linkages (rural people going to the cities during the dry season and urbanized rural people returning to the village several times a year) introduce new ideas, new aspirations, and new patterns of behaviour into the rural world. Nevertheless, given the stronger mechanisms of social control in the rural areas, the adoption of new worldviews that openly challenge collective consciousness is still less likely than in the urban world. In most cities, a change of identity is more commonplace. Pablo Deiro's description of the context and clientele of recruiting Protestant evangelicals in predominantly Catholic Latin America bears striking similarities with the northern Nigerian case

This migration changed the balance of Latin America's population in these years from rural to urban: from 1950 to 1980, the share of the population living in urban areas doubled from 30 per cent to approximately 60 per cent. Religious patterns were dramatically affected by industrialization and the corresponding migration to the cities (. . .) The weakening of traditional social controls, the sense of confusion and helplessness in the anonymity of city life, the shock of new social values sometimes accompanying the adaptation to industrial work, the absence of familiar community loyalties and of the encompassing paternalism still characteristic of rural employment: all these conditions favored the growth of acute crisis of personal identity for the migrants. Under such conditions, the exchange of old religious values to new ones was and remains, likely to occur. Evangelical proselytism has taken advantage of these circumstances.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See R.P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, *op. cit.*

⁵⁵ See Martinez Luis, *The Algerian Civil War*, London, Hurst, 2000, *passim*.

⁵⁶ See Pablo Deiros "Protestant Fundamentalism in Latin America," in Martin

Another finding of this research is the important role played by religious organizations in providing a framework for social interaction in a modern world. This finding invalidates an assumption of modernization theory that states that modern forms of political solidarity, such as those based on class, are likely to replace traditional forms of mobilization, such as those based on religion and ethnicity. This assumption is largely falsified by the abundant evidence on religious movements in the modern world in general. The most comprehensive study is the Fundamentalism Project. Funded by the MacArthur Foundation and sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, this project attracted many students of religion, and has resulted in several volumes of thousands of pages,⁵⁷ showing that religion remains a fundamental social aspect in public and private life in the late modern world. This is as true for monotheistic religions such as Islam, Christianity and Judaism, as it is for non-monotheistic religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism, etc.

Marty, and R. Scott Appleby, (eds.) *Fundamentalisms Observed*, University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 142-96.

⁵⁷ See Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Observed*, *op. cit.*; *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking politics, economics, and Militance*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1993; *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family and Education*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1993, *Accounting for Fundamentalisms. The Dynamic Character of Movements*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1994; *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1995.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Works

- Abun-Nasr, Jamil, *The Tijaniyya, A Sufi Order in the Modern World*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Ahmad, Mumtaz, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia" in Martin Marty, R. Scott Appleby, (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 457–530.
- Al-Farsy, Fouad, *Modernity and Tradition. The Sa'udi Equation*, London and New York, Kegan Paul International, 1990.
- Ali, Abdallah Yusuf, *The Glorious Kuran* (translation and commentary), Beyrou, Dar al-fikr, n.d.
- Al-Karsani, Awad S., "The Tijaniyya Order in the Western Sudan, A Case Study of Three Centers, Al Fasher, An-Nahud and Khursi." Ph.D. diss. in political science, University of Khartoum, 1985.
- Amin, Samir, "Preface," in Boubacar Barry, *Le royaume du Walo. Le Sénégal avant la conquête*, Paris, François Maspero, 1972, pp. 7–31.
- Amselle, Jean-Loup, *Les négociants de la savanne*, Paris, Anthropos, 1977.
- Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, (eds.), *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, London and New York, Routledge, 1995.
- Azmi, Shaheen Hussein, "The Tabligh movement in Canada, its development and future prospects," paper delivered at the workshop organised by the Joint Committee for the Comparative Studies of Muslim Societies of the Social Science Research Council et the American Council of Learned Societies on Tablighi Jamaat, London, 7–8 June 1991.
- Babou, Cheikh Anta Mbacké, "Brotherhood Solidarity, Education and Migration: The Role of the Dahiras Among the Murid Muslim Community of New York," *African Affairs*, (101), 2002, pp. 151–70.
- Badic, Bertrand, *Culture et politique*, Paris, Economica, 1983.
- , *Les deux Etats*, Paris, Fayard, 1986.
- Balandier, Gorges, *Political Anthropology* (translated from the French by A.M. Sheridan Smith), New York, Pantheon Book, 1970.
- Bates, Robert, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa. The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981.
- Bayart, Jean-François, "Les églises africaines et la politique du ventre, le partage du gâteau ecclésial," *Politique africaine*, (35), Oct. 87, pp. 3–26.
- , *L'Etat en Afrique la politique du ventre*, Paris, Fayard, 1989.
- Behrman, Lucy, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Bocock, Robert, "The Cultural Formations of Modern Societies," in Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, Kenneth Thompson, *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies*, Cambridge Mass., Blackwell, 1996, pp. 149–82.
- Botiveau, Bernard, "Droit islamique, Du politique à l'anthropologique," *Droit et Société*, (15), 1990, pp. 161–74.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, "Genèse et structure du champ religieux," *Revue française de sociologie*, (12), 1971, pp. 295–334.
- , "La force du droit. Eléments pour une sociologie du champ juridique," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, (64), 1986, pp. 3–19.

- , "La production de la croyance, contribution à une économie des biens symboliques," *Actes de la recherche en science sociale*, (13), 1977, pp. 3–43.
- , "La représentation politique. Eléments pour une théorie du champ politique," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, (36–37), February-March 1987, pp. 3–24.
- , "Le champ scientifique," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, (2–3), 1976, pp. 88–104.
- , *Language and Symbolic Power*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1981, reprint. 1997.
- , *Le sens pratique*, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1980.
- , *Les règles de l'art. Genèse et structure du champ littéraire*, Paris, Seuil, 1992.
- , *Questions de sociologie*, Paris, Minuit, 1984.
- , *Sociology in Questions*, London, Sage Publications, 1993, reprint. 1995.
- , *The field of Cultural Production*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993.
- , *The Logic of Practice*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1990.
- Bousbina, Said, "Les mérites de la Tijaniyya d'après 'Rimah' d'al Hajj Umar," *Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara*, (3), 1989, pp. 253–59.
- Bradford, G. Martin, "les Tidjanis et leurs adversaires, développements récents au Ghana et au Togo," in A. Popovic, and G. Veinstein, (eds.), *Les ordres mystiques dans l'Islam*, Paris, Editions de l'EHESS, 1986, pp. 283–91.
- Brenner, Louis, "Concepts of Tariqa in West Africa. The Case of the Qadiriyya," in Christian Coulon, and Donal Cruise O'Brien, (eds.), *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 33–52.
- , *Réflexions sur le savoir islamique en Afrique de l'Ouest*, Bordeaux, Centre d'Etude d'Afrique noire, 1985.
- , *West African Sufi, The Religious Heritage and Spiritual Search of Cerno Bokar Salif Tall*, London, C. Hurst and Co., 1984.
- Brockelman, Carl, *Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur*, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1937–42.
- Brown, Kenneth, "The discrediting of a Sufi Movement in Tunisia," in Ernest Gellner, (ed.), *Islamic Dilemmas, Reformers, Nationalists and Industrialization*, Berlin, New York, Amsterdam, Mouton Publishers, 1985, pp. 146–67.
- Burgat, François, "De l'islamisme au postislamisme, vie et mort d'un concept," *Esprit*, 277, August-September 2001, 82–92.
- , *L'Islamisme au Maghreb, La voie du Sud*, Paris, Karthala, 1989.
- Cahoone, Lawrence E., *From Modernism to Postmodernism*, Cambridge Mass., Blackwell, 1996.
- Carter, Donald, *States of Grace: Senegalese in Italy and the New European Immigration*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh, *Provincialising Europe*, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Charnay, Jean Paul, "Préalables épistémologiques à une sociologie religieuse de l'islam," *Archives des sciences sociales des religions*, (37), 1974, pp. 79–86.
- Cohn, Norman, *The Pursuit of Millennium. Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*, London, Temple Smith, 1957, reprinted 1970.
- Coulon, Christian, "Vers une sociologie des confréries en Afrique orientale," in François Constantin, (eds.), *Les voies de l'islam en Afrique orientale*, Paris, Karthala, 1987, pp. 111–33.
- , "Woman, Islam, and Baraka," in Christian Coulon, and Donal Cruise O'Brien, (eds.) *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 113–33.
- , *Le marabout et le prince*, Paris, Pedone, 1981.
- , *Les musulmans et le pouvoir en Afrique noire*, Paris, Karthala, 1983.
- Creevey, L.E., "Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Sénégal Today," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23, (4), 1985, pp. 715–21.
- Cruise O'Brien, Donal and Christian Coulon, (eds.), *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988.

- Cruise O'Brien, Donal, "Charisma comes to town," in Christian Coulon, and Donal Cruise O'Brien, (eds.), *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 135–55.
- , *Saints; Politicians. Essay on the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- , *The Mourides of Senegal. The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Dale Eickelman; James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Daly Metcalf, Barbara, *Islamic Revival in British India, Deoband, 1860–1900*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982.
- De Jong Frederick; Bernd Radtke (eds.), *Islamic Mysticism Contested. Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics*, Leiden, Boston, Köln, E.J. Brill, 1999.
- Deiros, Pablo, "Protestant Fundamentalism in Latin America," in Martin Marty, and R. Scott Appleby, (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Observed*, University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 142–96.
- Delumeau, Jean, "Réforme catholique," *Encyclopaedia Universalis*, 1990, vol. XIX, pp. 675–77.
- Delval, Raymond, *Les musulmans au Togo*, Paris, Publications orientalistes de France, 1980.
- Depont, Octave and Xavier Coppolani, *Les confréries religieuses musulmanes*, Alger, Jourdan, 1887.
- Dermenghem, Emile, *Le culte des saints dans l'islam maghrébin*, Paris, Gallimard, 1954.
- Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, "On Alternative Modernities," in Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (ed.), *Alternative Modernities*, Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2001.
- Diop, Moustapha, "Immigration et religion, les musulmans négro-africains en France", *Migrations Sociétés*, 1, (5–6), oct-déc. 1989, pp. 45–57.
- Diouf Mamadou, *Histoire du Sénégal: le modèle islamo-wolof et ses périphéries*, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001.
- Durkheim, Emile, *De la division du travail social*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1986.
- , *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1985.
- Ebin, Victoria, "A la recherche de nouveaux 'poissons'. Stratégies commerciales mourides par temps de crise," *Politique africaine*, (45), March 1992, pp. 86–99.
- Eickelman, Dale, *Knowledge and Power in Morocco. The Education of a Twentieth-Century Notable*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985.
- , *Moroccan Islam. Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center*, Austin and London, University of Texas Press, 1976.
- Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.
- Esposito, John L., *Islam and Politics*, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1987, (first ed. 1984).
- , *Islam. The Straight Path*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Evans-Pritchard, E.E., *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1949.
- Fisher, Humphrey, *Ahmediyya. A Study in Contemporary Islam on the West African Coast*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Fisher, Humphrey and Nehemia Levtzion, (eds.), *Rural and Urban Islam in West Africa*, London, Boulder, 1987.
- Fletcher, Joseph "Les Voies" (turuq) soufies en Chine," in A. Popovic, and Gilles Venstein, (eds.), *Les ordres mystiques dans l'Islam. Chemeniments et situation actuelle*, Paris, Editions de l'EHESS, 1985.
- Foucault Michel, *L'archéologie du savoir*, Paris, Gallimard, 1969.
- , *Power*, James D. Faubion (ed.), (Robert Hurley and al translated), New York, The New Press, 1994.

- Freund, Bill, *The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society Since 1800*, Bloomington, Indiana UP, 1984.
- Froelich, Jean Claude, "Le réformisme de l'islam en Afrique Noire de l'Ouest," *Revue de Défense nationale*, January 1961, pp. 77-91.
- Gaborieau, Marc, "A Nineteenth-Century Indian Wahhabi Tract Against the Cult of Muslim Saints Al-Balagh al-Mubin" in Christian W. Troll, (ed.), *Muslim Shrines in India. Their Character, History and Significance*, Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 198-239
- Gardet, Louis, *Les Hommes de l'islam*, Paris, Edition Complexe, 1977.
- Geertz, Clifford, "Internal Conversion in Contemporary Bali," in William A. Lessa, Evon Z. Vogt, (eds.), *Reader in Comparative Religion. An Anthropological Approach*, New York, Hagerstown, Philadelphia, San Francisco, London, Harper and Row, Publishers, 1979, pp. 444-54.
- , *Local Knowledge. Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology*, New York, Basic Books Inc., 1983.
- , *The Religion of Java*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- , *The Social History of an Indonesian Town*, Cambridge Massachussets, The MIT Press, 1965.
- , *Islam Observed. Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*, Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, 1968.
- Gellner, Ernest (ed.), *Islamic Dilemmas, Reformers, Nationalists and Industrialization. The Southern Shore of the Mediterranean*, Berlin, New York, Amsterdam, Mouton Publishers, 1985.
- , *Muslim Society*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Gibb, H.A.R., and J.H. Kramers, (eds.), *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Leiden, Brill, 1974.
- Gilsenan, Michael, *Recognising Islam*, London, Croom Helm, 1982.
- , *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt. An Essay in the Sociology of Religion*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973.
- Gray, Christopher, "The Rise of the Niassene Tijaniyya, 1875 to the Present," *Islam et sociétés au sud de Sahara* (2), 1988, pp. 34-60.
- Gresh, Alain, "L'Arabie saoudite en Afrique non arabe, puissance islamique ou relais de l'occident," *Politique africaine*, (10), June 1983, pp. 55-74.
- Gururani, Shubra, "Forest of Meanings and Memory: Cultural Politics of Gender and Place in Uttarakhand Himalayas, India," paper presented at the Agrarian Studies Colloquium, Yale University, 30 March 2001.
- Gwarzo, Hassan Ibrahim, "The Life and Teachings of al-Maghili with particular reference to the Saharan Jewish Community," Ph.D. diss. in Arabic and Islamic Studies, SOAS, 1972.
- Hall, Stuart, "Introduction," in Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, Kenneth Thompson, *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies*, Cambridge Mass., Blackwell, 1996.
- Halpern, Manfred, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Hamilton, Peter, "The Enlightenment and the Birth of Social Sciences," in Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, Kenneth Thompson, *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies*, Cambridge Mass., Blackwell, 1996, pp. 20-54.
- Held, David, "The Development of the Modern State," in Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, Kenneth Thompson, *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies*, Cambridge Mass., Blackwell, 1996.
- Hiskett, Mervyn, "The Community Of Grace and its Opponents the Rejectors, A Debate about Theology and Mysticism in Muslim West Africa with Special Reference to its Hausa Expression," *African Language Studies*, (17), 1980, pp. 99-140.
- , *The Development of Islam in West Africa*, London and New York, Longman, 1984.

- Horton, Robin, "Stateless Societies in the History of West Africa," in J.F. Ade Ajayi; Michael Crowder (eds.), *History of West Africa*, London, Longman, 1985.
- Hugon, Philippe, "Les stratégies comparées des pays africains du golfe de Guinée à l'épreuve du contre-choc pétrolier," *Revue tiers monde*, 30, (120), 1989, pp. 755-78.
- Kaba, Lansine, *The Wahabiyya. Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1974.
- Kane, Ousmane, "Muslim Missionaries and African States," in Susanne H. Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds.), *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, Boulder, Westview, 1996, pp. 47-62.
- , "Zawiya," in John L. Esposito (eds.), *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, vol. 4, pp. 370-73.
- Kepel, Gilles, *Jihad. Expansion et déclin de l'islamisme*, Paris, Gallimard, 2000.
- , *Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam*, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 2002.
- , *Le Prophète et Pharaon. Les mouvements islamistes dans l'Égypte contemporaine*, Paris, La découverte, 1983.
- , *The Revenge of God. The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994.
- Kepel, Gilles; Rémy Leveau, (eds.), *Les musulmans dans la société française*, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1988.
- Kepel, Gilles; Yann Richard, (eds.), *Intellectuels et militants de l'Islam contemporain*, Paris, Seuil, 1990.
- Lasswell, Harold D., *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, New York, The World Publishing Co., 1963.
- Leca, Jean, "L'économie contre la culture dans l'explication des dynamiques politiques," *Bulletin du CEDEJ*, (23), 1988, pp. 15-60.
- Leveau, Rémy, "Les mouvements islamiques," *Pouvoirs*, (62), 1992, pp. 45-58.
- , "The 'Islamic Presence in France,'" in Tomas Geerholm, and Yngve Georg Lithman (eds.), *The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe*, London, Mansell, 1988.
- , *Le Fellah marocain, défenseur du trône*, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1985, 2nd edition.
- Lewis, Bernard, *Le langage politique de l'islam*, Paris, Gallimard, 1988.
- Lipton, Michael, *Why Poor People Remain Poor. Urban Bias in World Development*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Lofchie, Michael, "The New Political Economy of Africa," in David Apter; Carl Rosberg, *Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 145-83.
- Loublot de Bayle, Jean-Louis, *Introduction aux méthodes des sciences sociales*, Paris, Privat, 1978.
- Magassouba, Moriba, *L'islam au Sénégal demain les mollahs*, Paris, Karthala, 1985.
- Mardin, Sherif, "La religion dans la Turquie moderne," *Revue internationale des sciences sociales*, 29, (2), 1977, pp. 303-22.
- Margoliouth, D.S., "Wahhabiyya" in H.A.R. Gibb., J.H. Kramers (eds.), *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1974.
- Martinez Luis, *The Algerian Civil War*, London, Hurst, 2000.
- Marty, Martin; R. Scott Appleby, (eds.), *Accounting for Fundamentalisms*, University of Chicago Press, 1994.
- (eds.), *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family and Education*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1993.
- (eds.), *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1993.
- (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1995.
- (eds.), *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Marty, Paul, *Etudes sur l'islam au Sénégal*, Paris, Leroux, 1917.

- Mbembe, Achille, *Afriques indociles, Christianisme, pouvoir et Etat en Afrique post-coloniale*, Paris, Karthala, 1988.
- Mboup, Mourtala, *Les Sénégalais d'Italie. Émigrés, agents du changement social*, Paris, L'harmattan, 2000.
- McGrew, Anthony, "A Global Society," in Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, Kenneth Thompson, *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies*, Cambridge Mass., Blackwell, 1996, pp. 466–503.
- Meillassoux Claude, *The Anthropology of Slavery. The Womb of Iron and Gold* (translated by Alide Danois), Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Merad, Ali, *Le réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940. Essai d'histoire religieuse et sociale*, Paris, Mouton & Co., 1967.
- Meslin, Michel, *Pour une science des religions*, Paris, Seuil, 1973.
- Miltons-Edwards, Beverly, "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown. Islamic Response in Jordan," in James Piscatori (ed.), *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*, Chicago, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991, pp. 88–108.
- Mitchell, R.P., *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Moore, Donald, "The Ethnic Spatial Fix: Geographical Imaginaries and the Routes of Identity in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands," paper presented at the Agrarian Studies Colloquium, Yale University, April 13, 2001.
- Mulhman, Wilhem, *Messianismes révolutionnaires du Tiers-Monde*, Paris, Gallimard, 1961.
- Nicolas, Guy, *Dynamique de l'Islam au sud du Sahara*, Paris, Publications Orientalistes de France, 1981.
- Norman Cohn, *Les fanatiques de l'apocalypse*, Paris, Payot, 1983.
- Nyang, Sulayman, "Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy toward Africa," *Horn of Africa*, (5), 2, 1982, 3–17.
- Olivier, Mangin, "Islamisme, néfondamentalisme, postislamisme: vraie ou fausse guerre des mots," *Esprit*, 277, August-September 2001, pp. 78–81.
- Otayek, René, "Arabie saoudite Afrique. Eléments pour l'analyse de la politique extérieure d'un panislamisme conservateur," *Série Travaux et Documents* 5, 1983. *I.E.P. de Paris Coll 4° 3995* (5).
- , "Muslim Charisma in Burkina Faso," in Donal Cruise O'Brien, and Christian Coulon, (eds.), *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 91–112.
- Pandey, Gyanendra, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*, Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Peacock, James L., *Muslim Puritans, Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1978.
- Perlmutter, Amos, *Political Roles and Military Rulers*, London, Frank Cass, 1981.
- Piscatori, James (ed.), *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*, Chicago, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991.
- , "Ideological Politics in Saudi Arabia," in James Piscatori, (ed.), *Islam in the Political Process*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- , "Religious Transnationalism and World Order," paper presented at the workshop on Transnational da'wa organized by the Joint Committee for the Comparative Studies of Muslim Societies of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, Machynlleth (Wales), 11–12 October 1992.
- , *Islam in a World of Nation-States*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Richard, Yann, "Clercs et intellectuels dans la République islamique d'Iran," in Gilles Kepel, Yann Richard, (eds.), *Intellectuels et militants de l'Islam contemporain*, Paris, Seuil, 1990.
- Rinn, Louis Marie, *Marabouts et Khouan, études sur l'Islam en Algérie*, Alger, Jourdan, 1884.
- Robinson, David; Jean-Louis Triaud, (eds.), *Le temps des marabouts. Itinéraires et stratégies*

- islamiques islamiques en Afrique occidentale française v. 1880–1960*. Paris, Karthala, 1997.
- Robinson, David, *Paths of Accommodation, Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania 1880–1920*, Athens and Oxford, James Currey and Ohio University Press, 2000.
- Rouadja, Ahmed, *Les frères et la mosquée*, Paris, Karthala, 1990.
- Roussillon, Alain, "Les islamologues dans l'impasse," *Esprit*, 277, August-September 2001, 93–115.
- Roy, Olivier, *L'Afghanistan. Islam et modernité politique*, Paris, Seuil, 1985.
- , *L'échec de l'islam politique*, Paris, Seuil, 1992.
- , *The Failure of Political Islam*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1992.
- , "Les islamologues ont-ils inventé l'islamisme," *Esprit*, 277, August-September 2001, pp. 116–136.
- Rudolph, Susanne H.; James Piscatori (eds.), *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, Boulder, Westview, 1997.
- Scott, James C., *Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985.
- Seeseman, Rüdiger, "The History of the Tijaniyya and the Issue of Tarbiya in Darfur (Sudan)," in Jean-Louis Triaud, David Robinson (eds.), *La Tijaniyya. Une confrérie musulmane à la conquête de l'Afrique*, Paris, Karthala, 2000, pp. 393–437.
- Sivan Emmanuel, *Radical Islam. Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*, New Haven, London, Yale University Press, 1990 (first ed. 1985).
- Smith, Donald Eugene, *Religion, Politics and Social Change in the Third World*, New York, The Free Press, 1971.
- Stoller, Paul, *Money Has No Smell. The Africanization of New York City*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2002.
- Suret-canalé, Jean, *Conséquences sociales et contexte de la traite négrière*, Paris, Présence africaine, 1964.
- Talmon, Yonina, "Millenarian movements," *Archives européennes de sociologie*, (7), 2, 1966, pp. 159–200.
- Taylor, Charles, "Two theories of modernity," in Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (ed.), *Alternative Modernities*, Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2001.
- Tonnies, Ferdinand, *Community and Association*, (Translated and supplemented by Charles P. Loomis), London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955.
- Tozy, Mohamed, "Champ et contre-champ politico-religieux au Maroc," Ph.D. diss. in political science, Université de Provence, 1984.
- Triaud Jean-Louis, "Biographie d'un propagandiste wahhabi originaire du Mali: Abd al-Rahman b. Yusuf al-Ifriqi al-Fatawi (1908–1957)," in O. Carre, and P. Dumont (eds.), *Les radicalismes islamiques*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1985.
- , "Enquête sur une confrérie, redécouvrir la Sanusiyya," *La transmission du savoir dans le Monde musulman périphérique*, (12), March 1992.
- , "Takfir et Jihad, Un débat sur les fondements de la légitimité en Afrique de l'Ouest au XIX^e siècle," *Modes populaires d'action politique*, (3), September 1984, pp. 84–92.
- , "Khalwa and the Career of Sainthood. An interpretative Essay," in Donal Cruise O'Brien, and Christian Coulon, (eds.), *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Triaud, Jean-Louis; David Robinson, (eds.), *La Tijaniyya. Une confrérie musulmane à la conquête de l'Afrique*, Paris, Karthala, 2000.
- Troll, Christian W. (ed.), *Muslim Shrines in India*, Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, 1989.
- Van Haarem, W.T.; H.L. Van Der Laan, "L'ajustement structurel et les offices de commercialisation des produits agricoles," *Politique africaine*, (40), Dec. 1990, pp. 120–24.

- Villalon, Leonardo; Huxtable Phillip (eds.), *The African State at a Critical Juncture*. Boulder & London, Lynne Rienner, 1998.
- Villalon, Leonardo, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal, Disciples and Citizens in Fatick*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Voll, John O., *Islam. Continuity and Change in the Modern World*, Syracuse N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1994.
- Waterbury, John, *Le commandeur des croyants. La monarchie marocaine et son élite*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1975.
- , *North for the Trade*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972.
- Weber, Max, *Le savant et le politique*, Paris, Plon, 1959.
- , *L'éthique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme*, Paris, Plon, 1964.
- , *The Sociology of Religion*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1964.
- World Bank, *Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa. An Agenda for Action*, Washington, W.B., 1981.
- Young, Crawford, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1976.

Works on Nigeria

- Aba, Isa A., "Bara by some almajirai in Kano City in the twentieth century, critical assessment," in Barkindo, Bawuro (ed.), *Studies in the History of Kano*, Ibadan, Heinemann Educational Books, 1983, pp. 193–206.
- Abdullahi, Shehu Umar, *On the Search for a Viable Political Culture*, Kaduna, NNN Commercial Printing Department, 1984.
- Ade Ajayi, J.F., "Recent History [of Nigeria]," *Africa South of the Sahara*, 1979–1980, pp. 733–740.
- Al-Hajj, M.A., "The Mahdist Tradition in Northern Nigeria," Ph.D. diss. in history, Ahmadu Bello University, 1973.
- Aminu, D.M. and Takur A.S., *University Education in Nigeria*, New Delhi, National Publishing House, 1981.
- Asif, Folarin Ahmed, "The Qadiriyyah and its impact in Nigeria," Ph.D. diss. in Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan, 1986.
- Auwalu, Anwar, "Struggle for Influence and Identity, The Ulama in Kano, 1937–1987," M.A. diss., department of history, University of Maiduguri, 1989.
- Bach, Daniel, "Les effets pervers du fédéralisme nigérian," *Politique africaine* (32), Dec. 1988, pp. 22–30.
- (ed.), *Le Nigéria: un pouvoir en puissance*, Paris, Karthala, 1989.
- (ed.), *Le Nigéria contemporain*, Paris, Editions du CNRS, 1986.
- Bach, Daniel; Laleye Mouftaou, "Vie politique et construction de l'Etat," in Daniel Bach, (ed.), *Le Nigéria contemporain*, Paris, Editions du CNRS, 1986, pp. 77–117.
- Bala Usman, Yusufu, *The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria*, Kaduna, Vanguard Printers and Publishers, 1987.
- , *The Transformation of Katsina*, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1981.
- Barkindo, Bawuro (ed.), *Kano and Some of Her Neighbors*, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1989.
- , *Studies in the History of Kano*, Ibadan, Heinemann Educational Books, 1983.
- Bashir, Ibrahim Lawal, "The Politics of Industrialisation in Kano, Industries, Incentives and Indigenous Entrepreneurs, 1950–1980," Ph.D. diss., Boston University, Graduate School, 1983.
- Beckett, Paul A.; Crawford Young (eds.), *Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria*, Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 1997.
- Bello, Omar, "The Council of Ulama of Nigeria," *New Nigerian*, 18 June 87, p. 10.

- Bello, Sule, "State and Economy in Kano. 1894–1960, A Study of Colonial Domination," Ph.D. diss. in history, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1982.
- Birai, Umaru, "Islamic Tajdid and the Political Process in Nigeria," in Martin Marty, and R. Scott Appleby, (eds.), *Fundamentalisms and the State, Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 184–203.
- Bray, Mark, *Universal Primary Education in Nigeria*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.
- Brenner, Louis, "Muslim thought in Eighteenth-Century West Africa. The Case of Shaykh Usman Dan Fodio," in N. Levtzion, and J.O. Voll, (eds.), *Eighteenth Century Renewal and Reform in Islam*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1987, pp. 39–67.
- , "The Jihad Debate between Sokoto and Borno, Historical Analysis of Islamic Political Discourse in Nigeria," in J.F. Ade Ajayi, and J.D.Y. Peel, (eds.), *People and Empires in African History*, London, Longmans, 1992, pp. 21–43.
- Cantor, Louis Jr., "The Political Implications of Islam in the Middle Belt of Northern Nigeria," master's thesis, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, 1962.
- Chamberlin, John, "The Development of Islamic Education City, Nigeria with Emphasis on Legal Education in the 19th and 20th Centuries," Ph.D. diss. in history, Columbia University, 1975.
- Christelow, Allan, "The Yan Tatsine Disturbances in Kano. A Search for Perspective," *The Muslim World*, 77, (1), January 1986, pp. 1–15.
- Christian Association of Nigeria, *Leadership in Nigeria*, Kaduna, CAN Kaduna Publicity Committee, n.d.
- , *Religious Riots 87, A Catalogue of Events*, Kaduna, CAN Kaduna Publicity Committee, 1987.
- , *The Sharia, Implications for Christians*, Ibadan, Dept. of the National Youthcan, 1986.
- Clark, Peter, "The Maitatsine Movement in Northern Nigeria in Historical and Current Perspective," in Rosalind I.J. Hackett, (ed.), *New Religious Movements in Nigeria*, Queenston, Ontario, 1987, pp. 96–116.
- , "Les itinéraires politiques de l'islam au nord-Nigéria," in Jean-François Bayart (dir.) *Religion et modernité politique en Afrique noire: Dieu pour tous et chacun pour soi*, Paris, Karthala, 1993, pp. 19–62.
- Coulon, Christian, "Les nouveaux ulama et la résurgence islamique au nord-Nigéria," *Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara*, (1), 1987, pp. 27–48.
- Crampton, E.P.T., "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," in Ogbu Kalu (ed.), *Christianity in West Africa. The Nigerian Story*, Ibadan, Daystar Press, 1978, pp. 1–237.
- Daiyyabu A.K., "A paper on the Real Objective of the Population Policy in Nigeria as Viewed by the Jama'at Izalat al-bid'a wa iqamat al-sunna Kano State Branch," delivered at Malam Aminu Kano Community Commercial College, 3 June 1989.
- , Maintenance of Law and Order at Public Gatherings, letter dated 21 June 1989 to the Military Governor of Kano State.
- Dalli, A.L., "The Middle Belt Communities of Northern Nigeria," in Elaigwu J. Isawa and Erim O. Erim (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism. Precolonial Antecedents*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 177–97.
- Dan Asabe, Umar Abdulkarim, "Comparative Biographies of Selected Leaders of the Kano Commercial Establishment," M.A. diss. in history, Bayero University Kano, 1987.
- Dandare, Hamidou, "Izala religious movement in Sokoto Metropolis," B.A. thesis in history, University of Sokoto, n.d.
- Dangambo, Abdulkadir, "Hausa waazi verse from ca. 1800 to ca. 1970, A Critical Study of Form, Language and Style," Ph.D. diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, 1980.
- Dawuda, Aliyu, "The Falsity of Nigeria's Secular Claims," Kano, Muslim Corpers Lecture Series, 1989.

- Dayo, Amotso, "Fear of the Unknown," *Tell*, June 1991, pp. 10–16.
- Dent, M.J., "Corrective Government, Military Rule in Perspective," in Keith, Panter-Brick (ed.), *Soldiers and Oil. The Political Transformation of Nigeria*, London, Frank Cass, 1978, pp. 101–37.
- , "A Minority Pary. The UMBC" in John P. Mackintosh (ed.), *Nigerian Government and Politics. Prelude to the Revolution*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 461–507.
- Doi, A.I., *Islam in Nigeria*, Zaria, Gaskiya, 1984.
- Doi, Abdurrahman, "Etude sur la situation du droit islamique au Nigéria," Travaux et documents CEAN, Bordeaux, 1988.
- Dudley, Billy, *An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics*, Hong Kong, Macmillan Publishers, 1982.
- , *Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria*, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1968.
- Egg, Johnny and Philippe Jean, "Structures et politiques économiques," in Daniel Bach, (ed.), *Le Nigéria contemporain*, Paris, Editions du CNRS, 1986.
- Egg, Johnny, "La nouvelle insertion de l'agriculture nigériane dans le marché mondial," in Daniel Bach, (ed.), *Le Nigéria: un pouvoir en puissance*, Paris, Karthala, 1989, pp. 169–92.
- Elaigwu, J. Isawa; R.A. Akindele, (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1960–1995*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996.
- Elaigwu, J. Isawa; Erim O. Erim (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism. Pre-colonial Antecedents*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996.
- Elaigwu, J. Isawa; G.N. Uzoigwe, (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1900–1960*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996.
- Enwerem, Iheanyi M., *A Dangerous Awakening. The Politicisation of Religion in Nigeria*, Ibadan, Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique, 1995.
- Falola, Toyin, *Violence in Nigeria. The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*, Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 1998.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Report of Tribunal of Enquiry on Kano Disturbances*, Lagos, Federal Government Press, 1981.
- Forest, Tom, "Agricultural Policies in Nigeria 1900–1978," in Oculi, Ockello (ed.), *Rural Underdevelopment in Nigeria 1900–1980*, Zaria, Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, 1985, pp. 1–18.
- Frishman, Allan, "The Spatial Growth and Residential Location of Pattern of Kano, Nigeria," Ph.D. diss. in Economics, Northwestern University, 1977.
- Funtua, Saidu Abubacar, "Jama'at Izalatil Bid'a wa Iqamat al Sunna Society in Nigeria," Kano, ATC A.B.U., 1979–1980.
- Gbadamosi, T.G.O., *The Growth of Islam among the Yoruba 1841–1908*, London, Longman, 1978.
- Gilliland, Dean S., *African Religion Meets Islam. Religious Change in Northern Nigeria*, Lanham, New York, London, University Press of America, 1986.
- Gugler, Joseph; William Flanagan, *Urbanisation and Social Change in West Africa*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- Hasan Salah M., *Art and Islamic Literacy among the Hausa of Northern Nigeria*, Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter, 1992.
- Hill, Polly, *Population, Prosperity and Poverty. Rural Kano 1900–1970*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- , *Rural Hausa. A Village and a Setting*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- Hiskett, Mervyn, "The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980, An Assessment," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 17, (3), 1987, pp. 209–23.
- , *The Sword of Truth: The life and times of the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1994.
- Hunwick, John (comp.), *Arabic Literature of Africa. The Writings of Central Sudanic Africa*, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1995,

- , "Songhay, Borno and the Hausa States, 1450–1600," in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, (eds.), *History of West Africa*, New York, Longman, 1971, 1985, Vol. I, pp. 323–371.
- Iagbemi, E.A., "Historical Development I, Precolonial and Colonial Nigeria," in K.M. Barbour, J.S. Oguntoyinbo, J.O.C. Onyemelukwe, and J.C. Nwafor, (eds.), *Nigeria in Maps*, London, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto, Hodder and Stoughton, 1982.
- Ibrahim, Jibrin (ed.), *Expanding Democratic Space in Nigeria*, Dakar, Codesria, 1997.
- , "L'accès à l'Etat: Classes sociales, elites, factions, une étude du National Party of Nigeria," Ph.D. diss. Political Science, CEAN IEP de Bordeaux, 1991.
- , "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria, The Parameters of the 1987 Crisis in Kaduna State," *Review of African Political Economy*, 1989, pp. 65–82.
- Ibrahim, Omar Farouk, *The Fabric of Rule, A Study of Traditional Ruling Families in the Politics of Kano State, Nigeria, 1960–1980*, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, 1988 (UM Dissertation Service).
- Iyawemi, Akin, "The Military and the Economy," in Oyediran, Oyeleye (ed.), *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule*, Lagos, The Macmillan Press, 1979.
- James, Ibrahim, *Studies in the History, Politics, and Cultures of Southern Kaduna Peoples Groups*, Jos, Ladsomas Press Ltd., 1997.
- Jamiu, Sulcyman, "Socio-economic Factors behind the Religious Disturbances in Nigeria, A Case Study of Maitatsine Syndrome," Master diss. in Islamic Studies, Bayero University Kano, 1986.
- Jega, Attahiru, *Nigerian Academics under Military Rule*, Stockholm, University of Stockholm, Department of Political Science, 1994.
- Joseph, Richard A., *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Kalu, Ogbu (ed.), *Christianity in West Africa. The Nigerian Story*, Ibadan, Daystar Press, 1978.
- Kane, Ousmane; Jean-Louis Triaud, (eds.), *Islam et islamismes au Sud du Sahara*, Paris, Karthala, 1998.
- Kane, Ousmane, "La confrérie Tijaniyya ibrahimiyya de Kano et ses liens avec la zawiya-mère de Kaolack," *Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara*, 3, 1989, pp. 27–40.
- , "Les mouvements religieux et le champ politique au Nigéria septentrional: le cas du réformisme musulman à Kano," *Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara*, 4, 1990, pp. 7–24.
- , "Shaykh Al-Islam al-Hajj Ibrahim Niase," in David Robinson and Jean-Louis (eds.), *Le Temps des marabouts. Itinéraires et stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale française v. 1880–1960*, Paris, Karthala, 1997, pp. 299–316.
- , "The Rise of Muslim Reformism in Nigeria: Izala. The Society for the Removal of Heresy and Reinstatement of Tradition," in Martin Marty, and Scott R. Appleby, (eds.), *Accounting for Fundamentalisms*, University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 490–512.
- Kani, Ahmed, *The Intellectual Origin of the Sokoto Jihad*, Ibadan, Imam Publications, 1984.
- Kano State Government, *The Views and Comments of the Kano State Government on the Report of the Kano Disturbances Tribunal of Enquiry*, Kano, n.p., 1981.
- Khalid, S., "Izala Movement and Religious Reform in Northern Nigeria, A Case Study of Sokoto," B.A. thesis in Islamic Studies, University of Sokoto, 1985.
- King, Lamont Dehaven, "State and Ethnicity in Precolonial Northern Nigeria," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. 3, 4, 2001, pp. 339–59.
- Kukah, Hassan Matthew, "An assessment of the Intellectual Response of the Nigerian Ulama to the Sharia Debate Since Independence," *Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara*, (7), pp. 35–55.
- , *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, Ibadan, Oweri, Kaduna, Lagos, 1993.

- Kukah, Matthew H. and Toyin Falola, *Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion. Islam and Politics in Nigeria*, Avebury, Brookfield, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney, 1996.
- Laitin, David, "Hegemony and Religious Conflicts, British Imperial Control and Political Cleavages in Yorubaland," in Peter B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, (eds.), *Bringing the State back in*, N.Y. Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 285-316.
- , "The *Shari'a* Debate and the Origins of Nigeria's Second Republic," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 20, 3, 1982, pp. 411-30.
- Lambo, Tayo, *Nigerian Economy. A Textbook of Applied Economy*, Ibadan, Ivan Brothers, 1987.
- Lamido, Sanusi, "Talk Back on Religion's Time Bomb," *African Concord*, 26 October 1990, p. 4.
- Last, Murray, "The Power of Youth, Youth of Power," paper delivered at the conference "La jeunesse en Afrique. Encadrement et rôle dans la société contemporaine. Héritages, mutations, avenir," Centre d'études africaines, Paris, 6-8 December 1990.
- , "The Sokoto Caliphate and Borno," in Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s in J.F. Ade Ajayi, (ed.), *General History of Africa*, Paris, Unesco, 1989, pp. 555-599.
- , Religion and State in Northern Nigeria, forthcoming.
- , *The Sokoto Caliphate*, London, Longmans, 1967.
- Lawal, Ahmed, "Islamic Foundation," National Certificate of Education, Advanced Teacher's College/A.B.U., Kano 1978-79.
- Lawson, Julie, "Nigerian Historiography and the Sokoto Jihads," Master diss. in History, S.O.A.S., University of London, 1989.
- Loimeier, Roman, "Das 'Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme', Zum Versuch, den Hajj in Nigeria zu Organisieren," *Africa Spectrum*, (23), 1988, pp. 201-14.
- , *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1997.
- Lovejoy, Paul E.; Jan S. Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery. The Course of Abolition in Northern Nigeria, 1897-1936*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 1.
- Lovejoy, Paul E., *Caravans of Kola, The Hausa Kola Trade, 1700-1900*, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1980.
- Lubeck, Paul, "Islamic Protest under Semi-Industrial Capitalism Yan Tatsine explained," *Africa*, 55, (4), 1985, pp. 369-389.
- , *Islam and Urban Labour in Northern Nigeria. The Making of a Muslim Working Class*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Luckham, Rubin, *The Nigerian Military. A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-1967*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- Mabogunje, Akin L., *Urbanization in Nigeria*, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1968.
- Mahadi, Abdulahi, "The Military and Economic Nerve of the Sokoto Caliphate. The Examination of the Position of Kano within the Caliphate," in Barkindo, Bawuro (ed.), *Kano and Some of her Neighbours*, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1989.
- , "The State and the Economy, the Sarauta System and its Role in Shaping the Society and Economy in Kano with Particular Reference to the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century," Ph.D. diss. in history, Ahmadu Bello University, 1982.
- , "From the Hausa Kingdoms to the Sokoto Caliphate," in J. Isawa Elaigwa and Erim O. Erim (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism: Pre-colonial Antecedents*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 216-40.
- , "The Kanem-Borno Empire," in J. Isawa Elaigwa and Erim O. Erim (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism. Pre-colonial Antecedents*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 55-81.

- Maitama, Yusuf Ishaq, "The Biography of Sheikh Aminudeen Abubacar," N.C.E., Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, A.T.C./A.B.U. Kano, non dated.
- Makinde, Kayode J.A., "L'islam en pays yoruba, religion et politique," Ph.D. diss. in political science, CEAN IEP de Bordeaux, 1989.
- Marshall, Ruth, "'God Is Not a Democrat' Pentecostalism and Democratisation in Nigeria," in Terence Ranger and Olufemi Vaughan (eds.), *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa. Essays in Honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene*, Oxford, M. (in Association with St Anthony's College), 1993, pp. 239–60
- Masood, Arshad, "Tablighi Jama'at, A Case Study of Nigeria," paper delivered at the workshop organised by the Joint Committee for the Comparative Studies of Muslim Societies of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies on Tablighi Jama'at, London, 7–8 June 1990.
- McCaskie, T.C., "Recent History [Nigeria]," *Africa South of Sahara*, 1988, pp. 754–67.
- Meek, C.K., *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria. An Ethnographic Account of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria Together with a Report on the 1921 Decennial Census*, London, Oxford University Press, 1925, 2 vols.
- , *The Northern Tribes. Studies in Northern Nigeria*, London, Paul Kegan, 1931, 2 vols.
- Minna, Mahmud, "Bello and the Tijaniyya. Some Light About the Conversion Controversy," *Kano Studies*, 2, (3), pp. 1–18.
- Mohammad, Ahmed Rufai, "The Influence of the Niasse Tijaniyya in the Niger-Benue Confluence Area of Nigeria," in Louis Brenner, (ed.), *Contemporary Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa, Social Transformation and Muslim Identity*, London, C. Hurst & Co., 1993, pp. 116–34.
- Muhammad, Shehu, "Abubacar Gumi as a mujaddid in Nigeria in the 20th century," B.A. thesis in Islamic Studies, 1976.
- Mukhtar, Mansur Ibrahim, "The Impact of British Colonial Domination on the Social and Economic Structure of the Society of Kano 1903–1950," M.A. diss. in history, Ahmadu Bello University, 1983.
- Mustapha, Abdul Raufu, "Structural Adjustment and Agrarian Change in Nigeria," in Adebayo O. Olukoshi, (ed.), *The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*, London, Ibadan, Heinemann, James Currey, Heinemann Educational Books Nigeria, Heinemann, 1993, pp. 112–28.
- Nicolas, Guy, "Guerre sainte à Kano," *Politique africaine*, 1 (4), nov., 1981, pp. 47–68.
- , "Le Nigéria, nouvelle puissance régionale africaine," *Afrique contemporaine*, (157), Dec. 1990, pp. 3–22.
- , "Le Nord est destiné à jouer un rôle majeur," *Le Monde*, 18–19 December 1981, pp. 1, 6, 7.
- , "Dynamique agonistique d'une nation à polarisation variable," *Cultures et conflits* (1) Winter 1991, pp. 114–50.
- , "Dynamique géopolitique de la Fédération nigérienne," *Hérodote*, (46), 4, 1987, pp. 23–67
- , "La réduction "religieuse" des visions du monde traditionnelles et ses effets politiques contemporains. Le cas du Nigéria," paper for the conference Religion et histoire en Afrique au sud du Sahara, Paris, Centre de recherches, 15–17 May 1991.
- , "Le Nigéria, pôle de restructuration géopolitique ou ligne de front entre chrétiens et musulmans?" *Hérodote*, (65–66), 1992, pp. 233–63.
- , "L'islam au sud du Sahara," *Cahiers de l'Orient*, (27), 3, 1992, pp. 125–42.
- Nizard, Alfred, "Le recensement au Nigéria," *Populations et sociétés*, (272), October 92, pp. 1–3.
- Nnoli, Okwudiba, *Ethnic politics in Nigeria*, Enugu, Fourth Dimensions Publishers, 1978.
- , "Ethnic and Regional Balancing in Nigerian Federalism," in Elaiwu J. Isawa and Akindele R.A. (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1960–1995*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 212–43.

- Nwafor, J.C., "Local government," in K.M. Barbour, J.S. Oguntoyinbo, J.O.C. Onyemelukwe, and J.C. Nwafor, (eds), *Nigeria in Maps*, London, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto, Hodder and Stoughton, 1982, pp. 40-41.
- Ogunnika, Olu, "Inter-ethnic Tension Management and Control in a Nigerian City," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 1, (4), Summer 1988, pp. 519-37.
- Oguntomisin, G.O., "The Yoruba kingdoms," in Elaigwu J. Isawa and Erim O. Erim, (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism. Pre-colonial Antecedents*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 25-54.
- Ojo, Mathews, "The Contextual Significance of the Charismatic Movements in Independent Nigeria," *Africa*, 58, (2), 1988.
- Ojo, Matthew, "The Growth of Campus Christianity and Charismatic Movements in Western Nigerian," Ph.D. diss., SOAS, University of London, 1987.
- Okpoko, A. Ikechukwu, "The Ibo State Systems," in Elaigwu J. Isawa and Erim O. Erim, (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism. Pre-colonial Antecedents*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996, pp. 82-111.
- Olatunbosum, Dupe, *Nigeria's Neglected Rural Majority*, Ibadan, Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Olukoshi, Adebayo Olorunimbe, "The Multinational Corporation and Industrialisation in Nigeria, A Case Study of Kano, C. 1903-1985," Ph.D. diss., Department of Politics, The University of Leeds, September 1986.
- (ed.), *The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria*, London, Ibadan, Heinemann, James Currey, Heinemann Educational Books Nigeria, Heinemann, 1993.
- Othman, Shehu, "Nigeria, power for profit-class, corporatism, and factionalism," in Donal Cruise O'Brien, John Dunn, and Richard Rathbone, *Contemporary West African States*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 113-44.
- Oyediran, Oyeleye, *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule*, Lagos, The Macmillan Press, 1979.
- Paden, John Naber, "The Influence of the Religious Elites on Political Culture and Community Integration in Kano Nigeria," Ph.D. diss., Department of Government, Harvard University Cambridge, 1968.
- , *Ahmadu Bello, Sardauwa of Sokoto. Values and Leadership in Nigeria*, Zaria, Hudahuda Publishing Company, 1986.
- , *Religion and Political Culture in Kano*, London, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973.
- Philippe, Jean, "Le fédéralisme et la question économique," *Politique africaine*, (32), Dec. 88, pp. 31-43.
- Quadri, Y.A., "Ibrahim Niass (1902-75)—The Tijaniyyah Shaykh," *Islam and the Modern Age*, 16, (2), 1985, pp. 109-20.
- , "Qadiriyya and Tijaniyyah Relations in Nigeria in the 20th Century," *Orita Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies* 6, (1), June 1984, pp. 15-30.
- Quadri, Yasir Anjola, "A Study of the Izalah, a Contemporary Anti-Sufi Organisation in Nigeria," *ORITA The Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies*, 17, (2), December 1985, pp. 95-108.
- , "The Tijaniyyah in Nigeria. A Case Study," Ph.D. diss. in Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan, 1981.
- Quality Magazine*, October 1987, 1, (5), 1987, p. 38.
- Saeed, Asmau Garba, "The Biography of Shaykh Said b. Hayat. The Exiled Royal Prince 1923-1959," B.A. thesis in history, Bayero University Kano, 1983.
- Said, Ibrahim Halil, "Revolution and Reaction, The Fulani Jihad in Kano and its Aftermath, 1807-1919," Ph.D. diss. in history, University of Michigan, 1978.
- Sanusi, M.S., "Conflicts and Controversies Among the Muslim Ummah. A Case Study of Kaura Namoda Town," B.A. thesis. in Islamic Studies University of Sokoto, 1987.
- Shenton, Robert, *The Development of Capitalism in Northern Nigeria*, London, James Currey, 1986.

- Sklar, Richard, *Nigerian Political Parties. Power in an Emergent African Nation*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Smith, Mary, *Baba of Karo, a Woman of the Moslem Hausa*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.
- Smith, Michael Garfield, *Government in Kano 1350-1950*, Boulder, Westview, 1997.
- , *Government in Zazzau*, London, Oxford University Press, 1960.
- , *The Affairs of Daura, History and Change in a Hausa State 1800-1958*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1978.
- Soumon, Elisée, "Histoire et historiographie," in Daniel Bach, (ed.), *Le Nigéria contemporain*, Paris, Editions du CNRS, 1986, pp. 45-64.
- Suleiman, Alhaji Bala, "The Role of Shahuci and School for Arabic Studies in the Development of Legal Education in Nigeria to 1967," Master thesis, Bayero University Kano, History Department, 1990.
- Suleiman, M.D., "Shi'ism and the Islamic Movement in Nigeria," *Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara*, (7), pp. 5-16; reprinted in Ousmane Kane and Jean-Louis Triaud (eds.) *Islam et islamismes au sud du Sahara*, Paris, Karthala, 1998, pp. 183-95.
- Tahir, Ibrahim, "Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1907-1974 The Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society," Ph.D. diss. in anthropology, Cambridge, University, 1971.
- Tajudeen, Abu Bakir, *The Muslim Student's Society Thirty Years After*, Ibadan, Islamic Book Center of UIMSS 1984.
- Tasie, G.O.M., *Christian Missionary Enterprise in the Niger Delta 1864-1918*, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1978.
- Temple, Oliver S.M., *Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Northern Nigeria*, London and Liverpool, Frank Cass. & Co. Ltd., 1965.
- Tom, Muhammad Hassan, "The Plight of One Million Nigerian Arabs," *Hotline*, (76), June 1991.
- Tukur, Mahmud, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate and Neighbouring States. 1817-1914. A Reinterpretation of Colonial Sources," Ph.D. diss. in history, Ahmadu Bello University, 1979.
- Umar, Muhammad Sani, "Islamic Revivalism Today, The Case of the Jama'atu Izalat al-Bid'a Wa Iqamat al Sunna," B.A. thesis, University of Jos, 1983.
- , "Sufism and Anti-Sufism in Nigeria," M.A. thesis in Islamic Studies, Bayero University Kano, 1988.
- Uroh, Chris, "Genesis of Bauchi Massacre," *Newswatch*, 20 May 1991, 23-24, p. 23.
- Uzoigwe, G.N., "Evolution of the Nigerian State 1900-1914," in J. Isawa Elaigwu, and G.N. Uzoigwe, (eds.), *Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1900-1960*, Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996.
- Vaughan, Olufemi, "Les chefs traditionnels face au pouvoir politique," *Politique africaine* (32), Dec. 1988, 44-56.
- Wallace, Tina, "Agricultural Projects and Land in Northern Nigeria," *Review of African Political Economy*, (17), 1980, pp. 59-70.
- Walsh, Jarlath, *Religious Riots in Nigeria, Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, 1993.
- Watts, Michael, "Islamic Modernities Citizenship, Civil Society and Islamism in a Nigerian City," *Public Culture*, 8, 1996, 251-89.
- Whitaker, Jr., C.S., *The Politics of Tradition, Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Yahaya, Dahiru, "Kano Intellectual History: Mapping the Intellectual Landscape," in Bawuro Barkindo (ed.), *Kano and Some of Her Neighbors*, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1989, 17-29.
- Yahaya, Shehu, "State intervention and industrial development in Nigeria, A Kano case study," Ph.D. diss., Department of Economics, University of Sussex, 1989.
- Young, Crawford, "Permanent Transition and Changing Conjunctures. Dilemmas

of Democracy in Nigeria in a Comparative Perspective," in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young (eds.), *Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria*, Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 1997, pp. 65–82.

Sources in Arabic and Hausa

- Abubacar, Aminudeen, *Alif-Badin Musulunci wallafar Sheikh Muhammad Ben Abdulwahab*, (The three foundations and their proofs of Shaykh Abdulwahhab), Riyad, Presidency of Islamic Research, IFTA and Propagation, 1404H.
- , "Muhimanci ilimin mata ga rayuwar al-umma," (Importance of educating women in the life of Muslim community), lecture delivered on 30 January at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria.
- , "Sakin aure da abin da yake haifarwa wajen wargaza Zaman Iyali" (The risks of the family dispersion that divorce may provoke), lecture delivered at the Fagge Youth Hall on the invitation of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Youth and Sports of Kano State, 1985.
- , "Muhimancin kyawawan dabi'u ga ma'aikaci," lecture delivered on the occasion of a seminar convened by the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development, Kazaure, Dambatta Zonal education, 16 April 1985.
- Adam, Muhammad al-Nasir, "Munazzamat Fityan al-islam fi Nijeria fi sinniha 'ishrin," (Fityan al-Islam organization in his twentieth year) Kano, n.p., n.d.
- Gumbi, Sanusi, *Tarikhin Shaykh Abubakar Gumi* (Biography of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi) Kaduna, n.p., 1986.
- Adam, Muhammad al-Nasir, *Shekara ishrin da biyar da kafuwar kungiyar samarin muslim Nigeria* (Fityan al-Islam organization in his twenty-fifth year Kano), Hukumar Ilmi Ta kungiyar Ta kasa Baki daya, 1988.
- Al al-Shaykh, Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan, *Fathal-majid, sharh kitab al-tawhid* (the Victory of the Glorious in the elucidation of Kitab al-tawhid) Bayrut, Dar al-ihya al-turath al 'arabi, 1957.
- Al-'Alawi, al-Hajj 'Abdallah, *Indhar wa ifada ila ba'i'i dimihi bi-shahada*, (Warning and helping he who traded his religion for a degree), al-Qahira, n.p., 1979.
- Al-Banna, Hasan, *Al-ma'thurat*, al-Qahira, Dar al-shihab, n.d.
- Al-Husayni, Ibrahim Salih b. Yunus, *Al-takfir akhtar al-bid'a tuhaddidu al-salam wa al-wahda bayna al-muslimin fi Nijeriya* (Proclaiming other Muslims infidels is the worst innovation threatening peace and unity among Muslims), al-Qahira, Markaz maktaba wa matba'a Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi wa awladuhu, 1982.
- Al-Husayni, Ibrahim Salih b. Yunus, *Al-mughir 'ala shubuhah ahl al-ahwa wa akadhib al-munkir 'ala kitab al-takfir* (The assailant against the specious arguments of dissenters and lies of detractors of Al-Takfir), Bayrut Bayrut, Mu'assassa Fu'ad li al-tajlid, 1986.
- Al-Kathini, 'Abd al-Samad, *Risalat Al-da'i ila al-sunna wa al-zajir 'an al-bid'a* (The Epistle advocating tradition and preventing from innovation), Bayrut, Dar al-'arabi li al-tiba'a wa al-nashr wa al-tawzi', 1978.
- Niasse, Ibrahim, *Al-rihla al-hijaziyya al-ula* (First Trip to the Hijaz) Kano, al-maktabat al-amiriyya, n.d.
- , *Al-rihla al-kanawiyya* (Trip to Kano) Kano, al-maktabat al-amiriyya, n.d.
- Al-Khudari, Muhammad, *Nur al-yaqin fi sirat sayyid al-mursalin*, (Light of conviction in the biography of the chief of all messengers), Bayrut, Dar maktaba al-hayat, 1977.
- Al-Muritani, Muhammad b. al-Shaykh 'Abdallah, *Al-radd bi al-hadith wa al-quran 'ala ma fi kitab Maigari al-Nyei min al-zawr wa al-buhtan* (The Rejoinder based on the hadith and the Koran to the lies and slanders in the book of Nigerian Maigari) Kano, Zawiya ahl al-faida al-tjaniyya, 1989.

- Al-Nawawi, Abi Zakariya Yahya, *Riyad al-salihin min kalam sayyid al-mursalin* (Garden of the Righteous), Bayrut, Mu'assassa al-tiba'a wa al-taswir al-ilikruniyya, 1985.
- Al-Nazifi, al-Shaykh, *Munyat al-murid fi adab wa awrad al-tariqa al-tijaniyya* (The Good Manners and the Litanies of the Tijaniyya that the aspirant desires) Dar al-fikr, n.d.
- Al-Wahhab, Sulayman b. 'Abdallah b. Muhammad b. 'Abd, *Taysir al-'aziz al-hamid fi sharh kitab al-tawhid* (Facilitation of the Mighty and Praiseworthy in the Commentary of Kitab al-tawhid) n.p. n.d.
- Amana, "Hira ta musamman da kungiyar Jama'atu ta yi da manema labaru kan aikace-aikace, nasarori da tsaren tsaren kungiyar," (Interview of the president of the Committee of patrons of the Society for the Removal of Heresy and Reinstatement of Sunna) *Amana*, August 1991, p. 14.
- Gumi, Abubacar Mahmud, *Al-'aqida al-sahiha bi-muwafaqat al-shari'a* (The right faith according the *Shari'a*), Bayrut, n.p., 1972.
- Gumi, Abubacar, *Radd al-adhhan ila ma'ani al-Qur'an*, Bayrut (The Intelligent Reply concerning the Meanings of the Koran) Dar al-'arabi li al-tiba'a wa al-nashr wa al-tawzi', 1979.
- , *Tajamar ma'anonin alkur'ani maigirma zuwa harshen hausa* (Translation of the meaning of the Holy Koran in Hausa language), Bayrut, Dar al-'arabi, 1979.
- Maigari, Muhammad al-Tahir, *Al Shaykh Ibrahim Niyas al-Singhali, hayatuhu wa ara'uhu wa ta'alimuhu*, (The Life, Opinions and Teachings of the Senegalese Shaykh Ibrahim Niase), Bayrut, Dar al-'arabi li al-tiba'a wa al-nashr wa al-tawzi', 1979.
- , *Al-tuhfa al-saniyya bi tawdih al-tariqa al-tijaniyya* (The Sublime Gift in Explaining the Tijaniyya Sufi Order), Madina, al-jami'a al-islamiyya, 1981.
- Mamlaka al-'arabiyya al-sa'udiyya, Wizarat al-ma'arif, *Muqarrar al-tawhid wa al-fiqh* (Fundamentals of Theology and Jurisprudence), Dar al-zayidi li al-tiba'a wa al-nashr, 1981, pamphlets I, II and III.
- Sylla, 'Abd al-Qadir, *Al-muslimun fi al-Sinighal, ma'alim al-hadir wa afaq al-mustaqbal* (The Muslims in Senegal, Signs for the Present and Horizons for Future) Qatar, al-Wahda, 1986.

Archival Materials

- Nigerian National Archives Kaduna, "Race Relations in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Hiskett Report," Nigerian National Archives Kaduna Zar. Prof., C. 2425, 1954, pp. 1-4.
- , "Moslem Movements in Nigeria," Zarprof n° C. 68, pp. 3-4.
- , "Muhammadanism," Zarproof, n° C2425, pp. 29-65.
- , "Tijani missionaries in Nigeria," Zar Proof, n° C. 4013 B. pp. 30-59.
- , "A Survey of Islam in Northern Nigeria," by P.H.G. Scott., Zarprof n° C. 68 A.
- Sokoto Emirate Council document ref. n° EMC/S175/Vol./126.

Website

<http://www.nigeriangalleria.com/learning/education/htm,websitebb>

APPENDICES

TRANSLATION OF HUJJOJIN PAMPHLET

Evidence from the Koran and the Tradition of the Prophet that it is illicit to be led in prayer by followers of the Sufi order

The disciples of the Sufi orders do not believe in God. Indeed, they claim to have something better than the Koran, that is the *salat al-fatih*. According to them, reciting the *salat al-fatih* is equal to reciting the Koran six thousand times in reward (consult their book *Jawahir al-ma'ani* vol. 1, p. 136.). They also say that if you affiliate with a Sufi order, you are superior to everyone, to the Prophet, peace be upon him, and even to God because he can't harm you (see their book *Rimah*, vol. 1, p. 212, published in the margins of *Jawahir al-ma'ani*. They also say that it is Ahmad al-Tijani who impoverishes and enriches (consult their book *Munyat al-murid*, p. 17).

Furthermore, they say that one recitation of the *salat al-fatih* is better than all the acts of worship of the *djinns*, human beings and angels (consult their book *Jawahir al-ma'ani* vol. 1, p. 138.). They also say that one recitation of the *salat al-fatih* is equal in reward to 600,000 revelations of the Koran. They also say if an affiliate of their order commits 70 murders, he will go to Paradise (see their book *Munyat al-murid*, p. 48.).

They also say that it is licit for the shaykh(s) [of the Sufi orders] to commit adultery, to drink alcohol and to commit murders (consult *Jawahir al-ma'ani*, vol. 1, p. 161). They also say that the hair (*sic*) of an adept of an order is more valuable than the companions of the Prophet (consult their book *al-ifada al-ahmadiyya*, p. 40.). Also Ahmad al-Tijani said that whoever sees him on a Friday or a Thursday will go to Paradise without accounting at the Day of Judgement (see their book *Jawahir al-ma'ani*, vol. 1, p. 133.). The disciples of the Sufi orders have incriminated the Prophet. They claim that he hid Sufism from his companions, who were not initiated in it, and that he waited 1,150 years, was resurrected from his tomb in Medina and went to Fez in order to initiate Ahmad al-Tijani to the Sufi path. (consult their book *Jawahir al-ma'ani*, p. 52.). Ahmad al-Tijani was born in 1150 of Hegire in a Berber town called 'Ayn Madi. [. . .] (Consult *Jawahir al-ma'ani*, p. 31.). Anyone who believes


in the content of *Jawahir al-ma'ani* is an apostate, not to mention those who observe the teachings [of the Sufi orders]. May God save us from this, Amen!

The evidence from the Koran and the Tradition of the Prophet that it is not licit to be led in prayer by the followers of the Sufi orders is the following: the Prophet did not practice *tariqa*, his companions did not practice *tariqa*, the generation of Muslims that followed them did not practice *tariqa*, and the generation which followed them did not practice *tariqa*. The Prophet said that we must reject anything that was created after his lifetime and that of the following two generations of Muslims because it is an innovation. God does not approve the prayers, the fasting and the pilgrimage of innovators. Furthermore, the innovator is an apostate; he went astray, (see the tradition number 40 in chapter 7 of the collection of hadith(s) by Ibn Majah). This tradition establishes clearly that it is illicit to be led in prayer by innovators or to eat the meat of animals they slaughter because they perform the rituals of *lazim* and *wazifa* of the Tijaniyya Sufi order in the name of Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani. They are doing *shirk*, in associating someone with God in their cult. This is evidenced by the Glorious Koran (*surat* of *jins*, verse 17). As everybody knows, the Prophet Muhammad was sent to prescribe prayer, fasting, giving *zakat*, and the performance of pilgrimage. But none of these pillars of faith should be performed in the name of the Prophet, peace be upon him, whereas Tijani followers perform the *wazifa* rituals in the name of Ahmad al-Tijani.

Among the evidence based on the Koran and the Tradition that it is not licit to be led in prayer by a follower of a Sufi order, is God's injunction that nobody should be the disciple of any human being, any angel, any *djinn* and no ritual whatsoever should be performed in their name because this amounts to giving them precedence over God. God has said that whoever does that has become an unbeliever. This is evidenced in the Koran (*surat Al-Imran*, verse 80). Only God deserves to be worshipped, only Him. This is evidenced by the Koran (*surat al-nisa*, verse 35). There are friends of God (*waliyyai*) who fear God, but nobody knows them, except God. Whoever claims to know them is guilty of associationism (*tarayya* in Hausa), because he claims knowledge of the unknown (*ghayb*). This is evidenced by the Koran (*surat al-najm*, verse 32).

Associationists (I mean, by that, those who associate other people with God) are impure. This is evidenced by the Koran (*surat al-tawba*,

verse 27, p. 239). Furthermore, in the Koran, (*surat al-ahzab*, verse 39, p. 548), God says that Muhammad is the seal of the prophets. There will be no Prophet after him. God has also warned Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, that, should he add any thing to the Revelation that is not part of it, God will punish him. This is evidenced by the Koran, (*surat al-Haqqa*, verse 43). See also the book *Rimah* published in the margins of *Jawahir al-ma'ani*, p. 89, in which Ahmad al-Tijani says that the Prophet has revealed to him a prayer known as *Jawharat al-kamal* and whoever recites it twelve times will be redeemed by this prayer on behalf of the prophet. He has a reward equal to that of the visitor at the shrine of the Prophet, or the visitor of the tombs of all the friends of God (*waliyyai*), all the righteous since the beginning until the end of the world. In other words, we need not perform the pilgrimage. Consult the Tijani book entitled *al-iftada al-ahmadiyya li murid al-sa'ada al-abadiyya*, 195, in which Ahmad al-Tijani says that the Prophet forbade him to recite God's name, while ordering him to recite the prayer of the opener of what has been *closed* (*salat al-fatih*). Consult what Ibn 'Arabi said in his treatise *al-hadiyya al-hadiyya* (the giving gift) *about wahdat al-wujud* (unity of being). They form one entity: God is the slave and the slave is God. Ibn Arabi means that God is the human being and the human being is God. May God make Islam and the Muslims triumph and may he vilify associationism and associationists and may he also destroy the enemies of religion.



Map 3. Map of Kano Municipal showing the Diffusion of Izala (based on author's field work 1991)

INDEX

- Abbas Isa Lawyer, 148
‘Abd al-Qadir Jilani, 71, 72, 88, 118, 151, 155
‘Abd al-Samad Al-Kathini, 135
Abdullahi Dan Fodio, 97, 152
Abiola, MK, 206, 216
Abubakar Atiq, 72, 155
Abubakar Bako, Reverend, 191–93, 195
Abubakar Garba Tudun Nufawa, 174
Abubakar Mustafa, 79
Abubakar Rimi, Governor, 102, 103, 113
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa Prime Minister, 40, 41, 42, 196
Abun-Nasr, Jamil, 128
Academic Staff Union of Universities, 206
Accumulation of capital, 21, 22, 23
Action Group, 38, 40, 197
Adamawa province, 30, 35
Ade Ajayi, JF, 213–14
Advisory Council on Religious Affairs, 187
Afgan Mujahidines, 96
Agricultural development projects, 49–50
Ahmad al-Tijani Shaykh, 71, 118, 133, 135, 169, 170
Ahmad Deedat, 148, 187
Ahmad Ghulam, 155
Ahmadiyya, 159
Ahmadu Bello, 39, 64, 65, 83, 152, 153, 154, 156
Ahmadu Bello University, 37, 95, 179, 186, 193
Alakali courts, 59
Alarama, 60, 101
Al-Aqida al-sahihā bi-muwafaqat al-Shari‘a, 92–94, 129
Algeria, 8–9, 14, 15, 21, 245
Ali Birnin Kudu, 87
Aliyu Dawuda, 185
Almajirai, 100, 102, 103
Al-Mughir, Kitāb, 171
Al-Takfir, Kitāb, 168
Alternative modernity, 1, 5, 6, 246
Aminu Baba Dan Agundi, 96
Aminu Kano, 63, 64
Aminudeen Abubakar, Shaykh, 69, 75–80, 91, 128, 140
Anambra State, 160
Anglican Fagge Church riot, 188–190
Ansarud-deen Islamic Organization, 159
Anwar Auwalu, 156
Arabic Cultural Centre of Kano
Argument of the book (outline of 1–7), (summary of 232–239)
Armed Forces Ruling Council, 184
Ayatollah Khomeini, 16, 79, 147
Babangida Ibrahim, General, 180, 182, 184, 185, 186, 195, 204, 210, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218
Bachama, 30
Bali Domkat, General, 213
Bandiri, 173
Bashir Iyaku, 190, 191, 192
Bashir Tofa, 215
Bauchi, 87, 118
Bayero University Kano, 108, 115, 117, 185, 215, 234
Bello, Omar, 193–195
Ben Baz, Shaykh, 78
Bendel State, 160, 212
Beyrouth Road, 166
Biafran secession, 43, 44
Bid‘a, 125, 130
Birni/Birnin Kano, 56, 88, 90, 138
Bonnke riots in Kano, 198–201
Borno (colonial and postcolonial), 60, 233
Bourdieu, Pierre, 20–23, 27, 227–31
Break up of Izala, 217–26
Brenner, Louis, 1, 30, 150, 151
Brigade ward in Kano, 88, 110, 111, 115, 144, 166
Buhari Muhammadu, General, 184, 207, 208, 209, 210, 218
Bulumkutu riots, 98
Burgat, François, 244
Burkina Faso, 33

- Cassettes as a means of proselytizing, 147
 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, 5
 Charismatic movements, 179
 Christian Association of Nigeria, 178, 181–83, 198, 199, 201, 204, 212, 213
 Christian Council of Nigeria, 181
 Christian missions, 35, 36
 Christian Student Movement, 179
 Christianity, 34–38
 Church Missionary Society, 35, 153
Cibiyar Fanoni Musulmi, 64 (see also Islamic Education Bureau)
 Civil war in Nigeria, 43, 47
 Colonial rule, 31, 36, 63
 Colonial state, 6
 Committee of Patrons of Izala (national), 85, 145, 218
 Committee of *ulama* of Izala (national), 85, 87, 140, 141, 145, 147, 210, 222, 223
 Committee of *ulama* of Izala in Kano, 105
 Constituent assembly, 189
 Conversion of capital, 21, 23
 Council of Malams, 153
 Counterreformation (defined), 149
 Coup attempt of April 1990, 212–14
 Coup d'état of 1966, 41–42, 46
 Cross River State, 160
 Cultural modernity, 4–5, 7, 27, 238–239

Da'wa, 124
Da'wa Group of Nigeria, 65, 79, 80, 81, 91, 92
Dagaci/dagatai, 55, 211
Daily Time, 96
 Daiyyabu, A.K., 110, 112–14, 217–24, 229
Dala'il al-khayrat, 169
 Dan Madami, 164
Dan rimi, 55
Dar al-Ifta of Saudi Arabia, 78
 Decolonisation, 38
 Deeper Christian Life Ministry, 179
 Democratization, 244
 Disenchantment of the world, 4, 238
 Dumbuzawa Fulani clan of, 54

 Economic capital, 21, 22, 227
 Economic modernity, 3–4, 25, 237
 Economic/political entrepreneurs, 110–115, 228–31
 Education of women, 139–40
 Egypt, 11, 14, 17, 59, 168, 174
 Eickelman, Dale, 7, 11, 12
 Eketi, 31
 El-Zakzaky, Ibrahim, 95–96
 Emir Abbas of Kano, 55, 71
 Emir Abdullahi Bayero of Kano, 71
 Emir Ado Bayero of Kano, 58, 84, 89, 90, 221
 Emir Aliyu of Kano, 55
 Emir Muhammad Inuwa of Kano, 58, 156
 Emir Muhammad Sanusi of Kano, 156
 Enlightenment, 2, 3, 5, 245
 Esposito, Louis, 74

 Fagge ward, 89, 90, 91, 110, 111, 144, 189
 Federation of Arab and Islamic Schools, 66
 Fellowship of Christian Students Kafanchan, 191
 Field theory, 20, 27, 227–32
 First Republic, 40–43, 46, 53, 59, 63, 84, 86, 93, 153, 157, 196, 204, 232, 235
 First-aid assistance to Nigerian pilgrims, 161
 First-aid group of Izala, 85
 Fityan al-Islam Organization/Young Muslim Congress of Nigeria, 150, 154–62
 Formally certified cultural capital, 22, 227
 Foucault, Michel, 4, 26
 Fragmentation of authority, 103
 Fundamentalism project, 252

Galadima, 56
Gardawa, 60, 100, 102
Gari, 55
Gaskiya Ta fi Kwabo, 78, 84, 111, 235
 Geertz Clifford, 10
 Gellner, Ernest, 8, 9
 Getzo-Gwarzo incident, 220
 Gidan Rijya, 119, 144
 Gideon Orkar, 212–13
 Gilsonan, Michael, 11, 13
 Globalization, 247–48
 Gombe, 116, 117
 Gongola State, 100, 233
 Gospel of Barnabas, 148, 187

- Gowon Yakubu, General, 43, 45, 47, 63, 157, 206
- Grand *qadis* of Northern Nigeria, 94
- Gumi, Abubakar, Shaykh, 63, 65, 69, 78, 81, 82–87, 91, 106, 107, 126, 127, 129, 136, 137, 142, 150, 152, 154, 157, 160, 164, 165, 176, 187, 205, 208, 209, 210, 212, 215, 216, 225
- Gunduma/gundumomi*, 55, 56
- Gwale Arabic Teacher's College, 78
- Hakimi/hakimai*, 55, 59, 88, 211
- Hamid A., 86, 107–8, 215, 228, 229
- Hamidiyya shaziliyya, 11
- Harun Rashid Fagge Malam, 158
- Hasan al-Banna, 14, 250
- Herbert Macaulay, 39
- Hijab*, 142
- Hiskett Mervyn, 34, 59, 69, 100
- Hugh Clifford, 35
- Hujajin da suka hana bin dan tarika salla*, 130, 131, 132, 135, 273–75
- Hunwick, John, 168
- Ibrahim, Jibrin, 181, 190, 191, 245
- Ibrahim Niase, Shaykh, 65, 71, 128, 156, 164, 167, 174, 175, 176
- Ibrahim Salih, Shaykh Sharif, 102, 168–172, 238
- Igbo language, 31,
- Igbo (massacres of), 42, 43
- Igboland, 31, 41, 42
- Ilorin province, 30
- Individualism, 13, 67, 10, 245
- Inter-Varsity Fellowship, 36
- Iran (Islamic revolution of 15, 16, 79), 65, 74, 78, 223
- Ironsi, Aguiyi, General, 42, 83
- Islamic Education Bureau (see also *Cibiyar Fanoni Musulmi*), 64
- Islamic education, (two-tier system) of, 59
- Islamic Propagation Bureau, 187
- Islamic Trust of Nigeria, 95
- Islamism, 7, 14–17, 78,
- Islamists in Nigeria, 92–98,
- Islamiyya* schools, 63, 64, 143
- Isma'il Idriss, Shaykh, 85, 86, 118, 160, 222, 223, 224, 243–244
- Isma'il Khalifa, 102
- Iyaka Rabi'u, 173, 214
- Izala (see *Jama'at izalat al-bid'a wa iqamat al-sunna*)
- Jalingo (riots of), 188, 201–202
- Jama'at ahl al-sunna*, 162
- Jama'at al-sufiyya* Ilorin, 162
- Jama'at al-Tabligh*, 125
- Jama'at izalat al-bid'a wa iqamat al-sunna*/Izala/Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition) 1, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 68, 69, 77, 81, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 104, 105, 109, 110, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 131, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 157, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 166, 207, 208, 209, 210, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 229, 230, 232, 238, 239, 242, 247, 250, 251
- Jama'at Nasr al-Islam* (JNI), 77, 83, 85, 89, 105, 107, 108, 150, 152–157, 160, 162, 185, 205, 225
- Jawahir al-ma'ani wa bulugh al-amani fi fayd al-Shaykh Ahmad al-Tyani*, 133, 167, 169, 170
- Jihad in nineteenth-century Northern Nigeria, 29, 30, 54, 55, 72, 97, 132, 150
- Jimeta-Yola, (riots of, 208)
- Jobawa, (fulani clan of, 54)
- Jolly Tanko Yusuf, 181, 182
- Jos, 87, 149
- Jukun, 30
- Jundullahi movement, 150, 162–63, 211
- Kaba, Lansine, 8, 13
- Kabara Sani, 217, 229
- Kabba province, 30
- Kaduna State, 36, 87, 149, 152, 157, 159, 160, 187, 192, 212, 233
- Kafanchan, 96, 187, 188, 190–195, 201, 202, 203, 211
- Kafir/kuffar, 163
- Kamaludeen Namaaji, 77, 211
- Kanem Borno, 29, 59
- Kano Emirate, (changing social stratification, 54–59)
- Kano People's Party, 157
- Kano State Movement, 157
- Kantin Kwari, 75, 111
- Karibi-White Tribunal, 194
- Katsina, 96, 187
- Katsina Hasan Usman, Major General, 83, 84

- Katsina J., 105, 108, 217, 228–29
 Kepel, Gilles, 249
 King Faycal of Saudi Arabia, 65
 Kiskh ‘Abd al-Hamid, Shaykh, 147
Kitab al-tawhid, 123
Kolo/kulawa, 60
Kudi na maroka, 137
Kudi na riga uba, 137
Kudi unguwa zoma, 137
Kudin luman, 137
Kudin mai unguwa, 137
Kudin malamai, 137
Kudin manzanai, 137
Kudin na maroka, 137
Kudin na mazam baya, 137
 Kukah Hasan Matthew Reverend
 Father, 18, 19, 180, 189, 190, 191,
 192, 205, 206
Kulle, 67, 139
 Kungiyar awliya, 162
 Kungiyar Dakarun Dan Fodio, 162
Kunya, 138
- Lasswell, Harold, 243
 Last, Murray, 70, 101
 Latin, David, 159
 Lawal Ma’azu, Malam, 164
 League of *Ulama* of Morocco and
 Nigeria, 171
 Leveau, Rémy, 242
 Light of Islam Association, 94
 Local governments, 46, 59
 Loimeier, Roman, 19–20
 Lubeck, Paul, 67, 99, 102
 Lugard Frederick Lord, 29, 35, 55, 57,
 240
- Maaji*, 56
Madaki, 56
 Mai Humai Julme, ruler of Borno, 59,
 Maitatsine, 70, 88, 98–103, 132, 207,
 246
Majlis/majalis as informal places of
 worship, 24, 90–91, 147
Makarantan albo, 60
Makarantan ilmi, 60
 Malam Karami, 174
 Malam Zakari, 121–122, 229
 Manzon Arze, Malam, 158
 Marshall, Ruth, 205
 Masallaci Adult Evening Classes, 109
Masu ungwanni, 56, 88, 211
Masu waazi, 143, 160
 Mawdudi Abu ‘Ala, 14
- McCaskie, T., 38, 39,
 Merad, Ali, 9
 Middle Belt, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 40,
 41, 45, 153, 180, 188, 204, 205,
 213
 Midwest region, 40
 Millenarian islam, 97 (see also
 Maitatsine)
 Modernity, 1, 2, 3, 142
 Modernization of Islamic education, 63
 Moore, Donald, 6, n. 23
 Morocco, 11
 Mu‘taliza, 135
 Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 79,
 123, 124
 Muhammad al-Bakri al-Siddiqi, 169
 Muhammad al-Bashir Ibrahim, 134
 Muhammad al-Nasir Adam, 155
 Muhammad Alwali II, 56
 Muhammad Bello, 70, 151
 Muhammad Habib gado-da-masu, 86,
 87, 110–12, 230
 Muhammad Ilyas, 88, 89, 166
 Mukhtar, Mansur, 54, 55, 56, 57
 Mundubawa fulani clan of, 54
 Murtala Muhammad General, 44, 45,
 206, 208
 Musa Mai Gandu, 86, 224
 Musa Yar’aduwa, Shehu, 102
 Muslim Brothers in Jordan, 15
 Muslim Brothers of Nigeria (see also
 Islamists in Nigeria, 142, 223, 235
 Muslim Khan Shaykh, 105
 Muslim Students’ Society, 69, 73, 74,
 75, 79, 190, 191, 192
 Muzammil Sani Hanga, 79, 215
- Najas*, 136
 Namdi Azikiwe Dr., 39, 40
 Nana Asma’u, 139
 Naser Gamal Abdel, 65
 Nasiru Kabara Shaykh, 84, 102, 212,
 215, 221, 238
 Nation state as a sovereign state, 4
 National Council of Nigeria and the
 Cameroons (NCNC), 40
 National Party of Nigeria (NPN), 19,
 113, 209, 210
 National Republican Convention, 201
 Native authorities, 111
 Nawa’irud-deen Islamic Organization,
 159
 Nicolas, Guy, 99, 100
 Nigerian Bar Association, 206

- Nigerian Labor Congress, 206
 Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) 41, 42
 Nigerianization policy, 62
 Nnoli Okwudiba, 61
 Non formally certified cultural capital, 21–22, 227
 Normative modernity, 1, 5, 246
 Northern Christian Association, 181
 Northern Element Progressive Union, 63
 Northern Nigeria, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 40, 35, 37, 39, 43, 51, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 70, 71, 72, 72, 78, 81, 83, 86, 87, 94, 97, 98, 102, 104, 124, 125, 127, 132, 134, 137, 139, 149, 152, 153, 158, 160, 163, 166, 167, 168, 172, 176, 179, 180, 183, 187, 188, 193, 200, 207, 213, 216, 225, 228, 235, 237, 238, 239, 240, 243, 244, 246
 Northern People Congress, 39, 58, 157, 181
 Northern Province Law School, 63
 Northern Star newspaper, 155
 Northernisation policy, 62
 Nupe, 30
 Nur al-Islam (journal of the JNI, 152),

 Obafemi Awolowo, Chief, 38, 40, 114
 Obasanjo Olesegun, General, 45, 74
 administration of, 50, 207
 Objectification, 7, 13–14
 Ogun State, 159, 160
 Oil boom, 43–51
 Ojo, Matthew, 179
 Ojukwu Odemeju Lt. Colonel, 43
 Okigbo Commission, 45
 Okogie Anthony Archbishop, 187, 205
 Oman, 11–12
 Operation Feed the Nation, 50
 Organization of Islamic Conference, 183–86, 188, 205
 Oyo State, 160
 Oyo, precolonial, 31

 Paden, John, 18, 57, 161
 Pentecostal movements, 178, 179, 205
 People Redemption Party, 63, 64, 113
 Pilgrimage to Mecca, 161
 Piscatori, James 7, 11, 12
 Plateau province, 30
 Plateau State, 100, 157, 160

 Political Islam (see islamism)
 Political modernity, 4, 5, 235–237
 Pope John Paul II, 188
 Preaching sessions of the Yan Izala, 145–47
 Prophet Muhammad, 129, 142, 162, 167, 169, 172, 199, 242, 243

Qabd, 72
Qadar, 125
 Qadiriyya nasiriyya, 72, 151
 Qadiriyya, 70, 72, 84, 102, 132, 146, 173, 174, 216
Qutb, 135

 Rabi'u Daura, 224
 Radical Islam, (see islamism)
 Radio Nigeria Kaduna, 82
 Rashid Rida, 134
 Recruitment patterns of the Yan Izala, 143–48
 Reform movements (defined), 7
 Religious entrepreneurs, 228–230
Risalat al-da' i ila sunna al-zajir an al-bid'a, 135
 River Basin Projects, 49
Riyadh al-salihin of Imam al-Nawawi, 126, 127, 144
 Robinson, David, 1
 Roman Catholic mission, 36
 Roy, Olivier, 15
Rubutun sha, 101
 Rural areas (neglect of 48, 51)

Sadaka araba'in, 137
Sadaka bakwai, 137
Sadaka uku, 137
Sadakokin mutuwa, 137
 Saddam Hussein, 236
Saali, 72
 Saidu Hadeja, 87
 Saint-John's College, 36
Salafi, 10, 15
Salat al-fatih, 89, 111, 131, 133, 163, 165, 165, 167–71
 Salga Mudi Shaykh, 72, 154
 Sallama, 55
 Samuel Akintola, 40
 Sani Kafanga, Malam, 84, 155–156, 238
 Sani Mashal, 158
 Sarakuna, 55, 57
 Saudi Arabia, 65, 65, 109, 225
 Sayyid Qutb, 97

- School of Arabic Studies, 62
 Scott, James, 6 n. 22
 Second Republic, 63, 188, 214
 Second World War, 36, 37
 Senegal, 240–242
 Shagari Shehu Head of State, 113, 207, 208
 Shagaya John, 184
 Shamaki, 55
 Sharada ward, 97
Shari'a, 84
Shirk, 124, 125, 131, 132, 186
Silsila/pl. salasil, 150
Sira, 144
 Sivan, Emanuel, 16, 17
 Slavery, 25, 32–33, 57
 Slaves, 53, 56
 Smith, Michael Garfield, 56
 Social capital, 22, 23, 227
 Social Democratic Party, 201
 Social modernity, 4, 25, 27, 31, 237–238
 Society for the Removal of (Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition)
 see Jama'at izalat al-bid'a wa iqamat al-sunna
 Sokoto Caliphate, 30, 33, 34, 71, 72, 240
 Sokoto Province, 151
 Sokoto State, 96, 151, 157
 Southern Nigeria, 29, 126
 Southern Zaria, 37, 180, 201, 205
 Stuart Hall, 3, 5, 25
 Sufi liturgical reform, 172–176
 Suleyman L. Shaykh, 87, 106–07, 136, 228, 229
 Sultan Abubakar III, 102, 151, 152–153, 154
 Sultan Bello Mosque, 82, 212
 Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, 185
 Symbolic capital, 21, 22, 23, 227
 Tafawa Balewa, (riots of), 188, 196–198, 203
 Tahir Bauchi, Shaykh, 212
 Tahir Maigari, 128, 129, 130
 Tahir, Ibrahim, 18, 161
Tajiri/tajirai, 57
Tajwid, 109, 144
takfir, 124
Talakawa, 55
 Taleban, 15, 236
Talla, 141
Tarbiya, 72, 174–76
 Taron Kano, 54, 55
Tasawwuf, 61, 69, 150
Tawwasulli, intercession, 163
Tawhid, 144
 Tijani Usman Zangon Barebare, Malam, 72, 155
 Tijaniyya, 70, 84, 102, 108, 111, 112, 114, 117, 119, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 144, 146, 150, 151, 158, 161, 162, 163, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 210
 Tijaniyya ibrahimiyya, 71, 72, 91, 128, 138, 151, 154, 173, 174, 176, 212
 Titibiri, 60
 Tiv, 30, 41
 Traditional ruling families, 53
 Tsangaya, 55
 Uba Ringim Alhaji, 173
 Umar Tall/Umar al-Futi Tall, 70, 133, 150, 151
 Umma Organization, 79, 95
 Union culturelle musulmane, 13,
 United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), 41
 United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), 41
 Universal Primary Education, 63
 University of Bauchi, 234
 University of Ibadan, 73, 179
 University of Ilorin, 234
 University of Maiduguri, 234
 Usama Bin Laden, 236
 Usman Dan Fodio, 29, 70, 72, 97, 139, 150, 151, 152, 155, 196
 Usman Dan Fodio University, 234
 Usman Maihula Malam, 72, 156, 173
 Usman Muhammad Imam, 105–6, 228
 Usmaniyya, 83, 151
 Villalon, Leonardo, 217
 Voll, John, 239, 247
 Wahhabi/Wahabiyya, 13, 66, 125, 131, 132, 241
Waje/Wajen Birni or, 88, 90
Wali/awliya, 134, 135, 151, 155
Waliyan Allah, 163
 Walled city of Kano (see Birni/Birnin Kano)
 Walsh J., 201, 202
 Walter Miller, Dr., 35

- Waterbury, John, 10
 Wazifa, 163, 176
 Wazir Junaid of Sokoto, 154
 Waziri, 56
 Western Nigeria, 40, 179
 World Assembly of Muslim Youth, 66
 World Muslim League, 65, 105

 Yan Awaki ward, 101
 Yan Izala 1, 2, 20, 23, 24, 27, 104,
 114, 115, 116, 117, 122, 123, 125,
 126, 129, 132, 137, 138, 140, 143,
 145, 149, 158, 165, 166, 207, 208,
 228, 231, 232, 236, 237, 242, 243,
 244–245, 46, 250
 Yan Tatsine, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103,
 246

 Yan zamani, 139, 142
 Yaser Arafat, 236
 Yolawa, fulani clan of, 54
 Yoruba, 31, 38
 Yorubaland, 159, 179
 Young Muslim Congress of Nigeria
 (see Fityan al-islam)
 Yusuf, MD as Inspector General of
 Police, 164

 Zabarmawa, 100
 Zamani Lekwot, General, 203, 204
 Zangon Kataf (riots of), 188, 202–204
 Zaria, 35, 87, 148, 157, 193
Zawiya, 161
 Ziyara, 151
 Zubayr ‘Abd al-Qasim Malam, 156