ARISTOTLE'S *ETHICS* IN THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE
(CA. 1300-1650)

EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

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ARISTOTLE'S *ETHICS* IN THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE (CA. 1300-1650)

The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education

BY

DAVID A. LINES

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To my parents

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PREFACE

This work takes its premise from the fact that the Renaissance cannot be properly understood without acknowledging and studying the impact of Aristotelianism. Anyone who takes the trouble to leaf through Charles H. Lohr's repertory of Latin commentaries on Aristotle[1] will soon be disabused of the notion that the Renaissance was "the age of Plato." Indeed, there was such a bustle of activity in translating, editing, and commenting on Aristotle during this period, that producing an exhaustive inventory of such works would require all the tools of modern scholarship and has yet to be accomplished.[2] The project would take inordinately long if it were to consider vernacular works in addition to those in Latin. This study shows that, for Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* alone, one can count over 160 Latin commentaries and translations produced in Italy during the period 1300–1650.

The point of this book, however, is not so much to confirm the popularity of Aristotle's works in general, or even just of his *Ethics*, during the Renaissance. The idea for the book sprang from the observation that the *Ethics* was an important teaching text for both humanists and scholastics, and that interpretations of the work might therefore offer an unusual window onto their theories and practices of education. In particular, it seemed that studying the work's reception over a long period of time would allow one to observe specific changes in the Renaissance approach to teaching virtue. With this focus in mind, this study concentrates both on the interpretation of specific doctrinal points advanced in the *Ethics* and relevant to how virtue can be taught and acquired, and on the methodology employed by teachers who were commenting on the text.

In Italy, as elsewhere, this commenting and teaching activity took place mainly in the universities and is therefore transmitted in Latin. This required deferring to another occasion a study of the works produced on the *Ethics* outside of the universities and in the vernacular. Several such works are of remarkable interest, so it required

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[1] Lohr, RLAC.

[2] Its results are due to appear in the *CTC*.

a feat of discipline to keep them from intruding on the discussion here. But, in the end, I believe that their exclusion is well justified: in contrast to the works privileged here, they commonly address a very different kind of audience and are written in a different context. I hope to be able to write on them at a later date.

As one might expect, these university commentaries do not make for easy or even (necessarily) enjoyable reading. Thus, sitting down to examine them requires a rather different approach from that with which one reads Erasmus or Montaigne. Indeed, only a very few of the works discussed in this book were bestsellers. But the exercise of reading and trying to understand them is all the more important because it offers the opportunity to study how the vast majority of university students (and even, in the fifteenth century, other interested hearers) would have been taught one of the standard textbooks from classical antiquity. Would they have detected the differences between a humanist and a scholastic teacher? Did they try to influence the teaching to suit their own needs and tastes? Did they become better persons by following the course on ethics? Were they also given a grasp of the ancient philosophical context? How did the ethics course itself change, during the Renaissance period, and what does this say about the institutions in which it was taught?

These are questions that are followed here in particular for the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, since it is from the early fifteenth century, in Italy, that the production of commentaries tied to the university context allows an examination of the ethics teaching that took place there. Nonetheless, especially on points of doctrine these interpretations were heavily influenced by medieval commentaries (notably those by Eustratius, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas) produced in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It was therefore necessary to examine these works and ask to what extent they functioned as interpretative models for the Italians writing in the fourteenth century and later. The effort required by such an undertaking was entirely worthwhile, saving me on several occasions from concluding that the Italians were advancing original interpretations. I am more than ever convinced that Renaissance historians will have to continue this task of working across traditional (and largely constructed) chronological boundaries. In the case of this study these boundaries make even less sense than usual, since one can consider the period 1200–1650 as a single cultural unit, in the Latin West, of interaction with Aristotle (both within and outside the universities).

Already these comments will have revealed how deeply this work is indebted to Paul Oskar Kristeller and Charles B. Schmitt, who have contributed so much to a contextualized study of Renaissance thought. But I am also grateful to the many others who either prepared me for this study or encouraged my pursuit of it in different (but always generous) ways.

John M. Headley first introduced me to Kristeller's works, expanding my vision beyond those of Garin with which I had become familiar during my years at the Liceo Classico in Italy. In patient and gentle fashion, Ronald G. Witt nudged me toward the field of Renaissance intellectual history. Both at Harvard (where this work was first conceived as a doctoral thesis for the History Department) and even after the end of my studies there, James Hankins has proved a steady guide and supporter, but thankfully a sharp critic as well. He has had the patience to wade through two drafts of this book and is responsible for its improvement in a myriad of large and small ways. Jill Kraye, at the Warburg Institute in London, offered her comments on the dissertation draft and has patiently answered countless queries. Much of what I know about Renaissance moral philosophy I first learned from her. I am also grateful to Luca Bianchi for having read the entire dissertation, pointed out mistakes, and made helpful suggestions.

My research years in Florence were made pleasant by the support of Gian Carlo Garfagnini, who was a helpful and engaging host and has remained a friend. J. M. M. H. Thijssen and my former colleagues at the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Natural Philosophy in Nijmegen (the Netherlands) brightened rainy days by their dedicated enthusiasm for exploring the Aristotelian tradition; I am thankful to them (especially Christoph Lüthy, Olaf Pluta, Cees Leijenhorst, and Carla Rita Palmerino) for broadening my horizons and tolerating my intrusion. Eckhard Kessler and his circle at the Seminar für Geistesgeschichte und Philosophie der Renaissance (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich) have not only put up with my presence, but have offered a congenial atmosphere for the discussion of issues close to the theme of this book. In particular, I should thank Heinrich C. Kuhn for having so efficiently provided me with needed software, books, and microfilms; Daniel A. Di Liscia for having helped me with the printing and deciphering of microfilms; and Sabrina Ebbersmeyer for making me rethink my conclusions on several points.

Paul F. Grendler and Ronald Witt provided detailed comments on an early draft of Chapter 2, while Christoph Flüeler saved me from many errors in Chapters 1, 2, and 4 and supplied me with much other help and encouragement. Charles H. Lohr read an early version of Chapter 5 and has generously, throughout the years, provided me with printouts of his database of Aristotle commentaries. I owe a special debt to Luca Boschetto for his expert advice on many issues relevant to Appendix A and on archival research in general, as well as for his loyal and unselfish friendship. He has always made me look forward in a special way to returning to Florence.

It would be hard to express my debt of gratitude to the many other friends and scholars with whom I have been able to discuss the topic of this book across the years and who have been helpful on a number of points of perspective and interpretation. Here I remember especially Concetta Bianca, Robert Black, Christopher S. Celenza, Jonathan Davies, Vincenzo Fera, Eckhard Kessler, Claudio Leonardi, Alessandra Mita, and Steven Ozment. Marianne Pade and her husband, Johann Ramminger, went well beyond the obligations of friendship and proofread large portions of the manuscript. I owe a great deal to their attentive eye.

I am thankful to Harvard University for the wonderful environment it provided (especially through Widener Library) for the early phases of the project and for the generous financial support it offered. My research was further assisted by a Frances A. Yates fellowship at the Warburg Institute in London, a William J. Fulbright fellowship, a fellowship from the Fondazione Ezio Franceschini in Florence, and a postdoc fellowship from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, grant 200–22–295). Special mention should be made of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Germany, which gave me the time and support necessary to completely rewrite the dissertation and further expand its range of topics, especially in relationship to the complicated situation in Rome. Further support, from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, was critical to comparing the Italian situation with that in Paris and to turning this book into a completed product.

I am also thankful to the staff of several libraries and archives in which this research was carried out. Special mention should be made of Diana Tura at the Archivio di Stato in Bologna and of Emilia Veronese Ceseracciu at the Antico Archivio dell'Università in Padua; but I am also thankful to the staffs of the Biblioteche Nazionali in

Florence, Rome, and Naples; of the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Biblioteca Marciana, Biblioteca dell'Archiginnasio and Biblioteca Universitaria (Bologna), Biblioteca Universitaria (Padua), Biblioteche Comunali of Ferrara and Siena, Biblioteca Laurenziana and Biblioteca Riccardiana (Florence), Biblioteca Vaticana, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, and the Archivio dell'Università Pontificia Gregoriana. In Germany, I received special assistance from the collections in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich and in the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel. The Rare Book staff at the University of Pennsylvania Library and the Newberry Library in Chicago were also exceedingly helpful.

The editors of this series have patiently supported the publication of this book. I am especially grateful to Jürgen Miethke for his substantive and informed suggestions, as well as to Brill's anonymous reader for the detailed commentary offered.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge some of my deepest personal debts: to my parents (to whom this book is dedicated) for giving me an abiding interest in the complexity of interpreting texts and for reminding me of the importance of eternal values; and to my wife Grace and my children Asher, Stefan, and Nadine for putting up with my frequent absences and long working hours, especially in the weeks leading up to the manuscript's completion. I hope that the resulting book at least honors the concerted support that has accompanied its preparation over the past six years. *Solo Deo gloria.*

D.A.L.
Munich
November 11, 2001 (St. Martin's day)

NOTE TO THE READER

Unless otherwise indicated, English translations of Aristotle are from Aristotle 1984.

In my transcriptions from the Latin, I have usually modernized the punctuation and standardized the spelling. The only exception is when I cite from published documents (e.g., statutes) or modern editions. In the latter case, the spelling and punctuation of the editor have been retained.

The *lemmata* of Aristotle's text to which commentators refer are set in italics. The only exception occurs in Ch. 5, where, to avoid confusion with variant readings in Tignosi's commentary, they are indicated by quotation marks.

Most (but not all) of the teachings of the Florentine *studium* were transferred to Pisa in 1473; thus, when referring to the Florentine university for the period including that after 1473, I make use of the double name Florence–Pisa.

Some parts of this book represent reworkings of previously published articles. In particular, early versions of § 2.2 and Appendix A appeared in Lines 1996; § 4.2 first appeared in Lines 1999a; § 5.2 and § 5.3 are a reelaboration of Lines 1999b.

ABBREVIATIONS

Libraries and Archives

AAU = Padua, Antico Archivio dell'Università.
APUG = Archivio della Pontificia Università Gregoriana.
ARSI = Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu.
ASB = Archivio di Stato di Bologna.
ASF = Archivio di Stato di Firenze.
ASPg = Archivio di Stato di Perugia.
ASPi = Archivio di Stato di Pisa.
ASPv = Archivio di Stato di Pavia.
ASR = Archivio di Stato di Roma.
ASV = Archivio Segreto Vaticano.
AUF = Archivio Universitario di Ferrara.
AUP = Archivio dell'Università di Perugia.
BArch. = Biblioteca dell'Archiginnasio.
BAV = Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana.
BN = Bibliothèque Nationale.
BNC = Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale.
BSB = Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek.
BU = Biblioteca Universitaria.
HAB = Herzog August Bibliothek.
SB = Stadtbibliothek.
UB = Universitätsbibliothek.

Works

Abbondanza = R. Abbondanza, "Gli atti degli Ufficiali dello Studio fiorentino, dal maggio al settembre 1388," *Archivio storico italiano*, 117 (1959): 85–110.
ABI = *Archivio biografico degli italiani*, microfiche collection, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1997).
ACUP = *Auctarium chartularii universitatis parisiensis*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1894–1964).
AHDLMA = *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge.*
AL Codices = *Aristoteles latinus, Codices*, ed. G. Lacombe, 2 vols., I: *pars prima* (Rome, 1938); II: *pars secunda* (Cambridge, 1955).
AL Suppl. = *Aristoteles latinus, Codices: supplementum alterum*, ed. L.M. Paluello (Bruges-Paris, 1961).
Alegambe = P. Alegambe, *Bibliotheca scriptorum Societatis Iesu* (Antwerp, 1643).
Allacci = L. Allacci (Allatius), *Apes urbanae, sive de viris illustribus qui ab anno MDCXXX per totum MDCXXXII Romae adsuerunt, ac typis aliquid evulgarunt* (Rome, 1633).
Annales minorum = L. Wadding *et al., Annales minorum seu trium ordinum a S. Francisco institutorum*, 7 vols. (Lyon, 1635–48).
Argelati = F. Argelati, *Bibliotheca scriptorum mediolanensium*, 4 vols. (Milan, 1745).
Aristotle, *EN lat.* = Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea*, ed. R.-A. Gauthier, *Aristoteles latinus* XXVI.1–3 in five fascicules (Leiden-Brussels, 1972–74): fasc. 1: *Praefatio* (Leiden-Brussels, 1974); fasc. 2: *Translatio Antiquissima librorum II–III sive "Ethica Vetus" et translationis antiquioris quae supersunt, sive "Ethica nova," "Hoferiana," "Borghesiana"* (Leiden-Brussels, 1972); fasc. 3: *Translatio Roberti Grosseteste Linconiensis sive "Liber*

Ethicorum," A. Recensio pura (Leiden-Brussels, 1972); fasc. 4: *Translatio Roberti Grosseteste Linconiensis sive "Liber Ethicorum," B. Recensio ab anonymo recognita* (Leiden-Brussels, 1973); fasc. 5: *Indices verborum* (Leiden-Brussels, 1973).

Ascanelli = P. Ascanelli, *I fascicoli personali dei lettori artisti della assunteria di studio all'Archivio di Stato di Bologna (Archivio dell'Università). Studio documentario e biobibliografico*, Collana di monografie di "Romagna Medica," 25 (Forlì, 1968).

Baldini = U. Baldini, Appendix II ("I professori di matematica e filosofia nel Collegio Romano, 1553–1632, e la documentazione manoscritta della loro attività") in idem, *Legem impone subactis. Studi su filosofia e scienza dei Gesuiti in Italia 1540–1632* (Rome, 1992), pp. 569–71.

Barile = E. Barile, ed., *Rotuli artistarum (1430–1815)*. Unpublished typescript kept at the Antico Archivio dell'Università in Padua.

Baron, *Schriften* = H. Baron, *Leonardo Bruni Aretino. Humanistisch-philosophische Schriften mit einer Chronologie seiner Werke und Briefe*, Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters und der Renaissance, I (Leipzig, 1928; rpt. Wiesbaden, 1969).

Barsanti = D. Barsanti, "I docenti e le cattedre dal 1543 al 1737," in *Storia dell'Università di Pisa*, 2 vols. (Pisa, 1993), II, pp. 505–66.

BBK = *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*, ed. F. W. Bautz, 13 vols. and 4 supplement vols. at present (Herzberg, 1970–).

BiblCarm = *Bibliotheca carmelitana*, ed. C. de Villiers and S. Stephano, 2 vols. (Orléans, 1752); new ed., G. Wessels (Rome, 1927).

BPhM = *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale.*

Bronzino = *Notitia doctorum, sive catalogus doctorum qui in collegiis philosophiae et medicinae Bononiae laureati fuerunt ab anno 1480 usque ad annum 1800*, ed. G. Bronzino, Universitatis Bononiensis Monumenta, IV (Milan, 1962).

Bruni, *Ep.* = *Leonardo Bruni Arretini Epistolarum libri VIII ad fidem codicum mss. suppleti, et castigati . . .*, ed. L. Mehus (Florence, 1741).

CALMA = *Compendium Auctorum Latinorum Medii Aevi*, ed. M. Lapidge, 2 vols. to date (Florence, 2000–).

Cat. mss. filos. = *Catalogo di manoscritti filosofici nelle biblioteche italiane*, 10 vols. to date (Florence, 1980–).

Ceruti = *Inventario Ceruti dei manoscritti della Biblioteca Ambrosiana* (Trezzano, 1975).

Chines = L. Chines, ed., *I lettori di retorica e le* humanae litterae *allo Studio di Bologna nei secoli XV e XVI* (Bologna, 1992).

CHLMPh = *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, and E. Stump (Cambridge, 1982).

CHRPh = *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. C. B. Schmitt with Q. Skinner, E. Kessler, with the assistance of J. Kraye (Cambridge, 1988).

Codices Thomae = *Codices manuscripti operum Thomae de Aquino*, 3 vols. to date; I: *Autographa et Bibliothecae A–F*, ed. H. F. Dondaine and H. V. Shooner (Rome, 1967); II: *Bibliothecae Gdansk-Münster*, ed. H. V. Shooner (Rome, 1973); III: *Bibliothecae Namur-Paris*, ed. H. V. Shooner (Montreal, 1985).

Conte = E. Conte, ed., *I maestri della Sapienza di Roma dal 1514 al 1787. I rotuli e altre fonti*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1990).

Copenhaver and Schmitt = B. P. Copenhaver and C. B. Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy* (Oxford, 1992).

Cosenza = M. E. Cosenza, *Biographical and Bibliographical Dictionary of the Italian Humanists and of the World of Classical Scholarship in Italy, 1300–1800*, 6 vols. (Boston, 1962–67).

Cranz and Schmitt = F. E. Cranz, *A Bibliography of Aristotle Editions 1501–1600*, 2nd ed. with addenda and revisions by C. B. Schmitt, Bibliotheca Bibliographica Aureliana, XXXVIII (Baden-Baden, 1984).

Cristiani = A. Cristiani, ed., *I lettori di Medicina allo Studio di Bologna nei secoli XV e XVI* (Bologna, 1990).

CTC = *Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum: Medieval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries*, ed. P. O. Kristeller *et al.*, 7 vols. to date (Washington, 1960–).

CUP = *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, 4 vols. (Paris, 1889–97).

Dallari = U. Dallari, *I rotuli dei lettori legisti e artisti dello Studio di Bologna dal 1384 al 1799*, 4 vols. (Bologna, 1888–1924).

Davies = J. Davies, *Florence and Its University During the Early Renaissance*, Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, VIII (Leiden, 1998).

DBI = *Dizionario biografico degli italiani* (Rome, 1960–).

DCLI = *Dizionario critico della letteratura italiana*, ed. V. Branca, 2nd ed., 4 vols. (Turin, 1986).

Del Gratta = R. Del Gratta, "I docenti e le cattedre dal 1406 al 1543" in *Storia dell'Università di Pisa* (Pisa, 1993), II, pp. 481–502.

DSB = *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, 16 vols. (New York, 1970–80).

Edizioni italiane = *Le edizioni italiane del XVI secolo. Censimento nazionale*, 2nd ed., 3 vols. to date (Rome, 1990–).

ER = *Encyclopedia of the Renaissance*, gen. ed. P. F. Grendler, 6 vols. (New York, 1999).

Fabroni = A. Fabroni, *Historia Academiae Pisanae* (Pisa, 1791; rpt. Bologna, 1971).

Facciolati = J. Facciolati, *Fasti Gymnasii Patavini* (Padua, 1757).

Fantuzzi = G. Fantuzzi, *Notizie degli scrittori bolognesi*, 9 vols. (Bologna, 1781–94; facsimile ed. in 4 vols., Bologna, 1965).

Fejér = J. Fejér, *Defuncti primi saeculi Societatis Jesu, 1540–1640*, Pars I: *Assistentia Italiae et Germaniae (cum Gallia usque ad 1607)*; Pars II: *Assistentia Hispaniae, Lusitaniae et—ab anno 1608—Galliae* (Rome, 1982).

Ferrari = L. Ferrari, *Onomasticon: repertorio biobibliografico degli scrittori italiani dal 1501 al 1850* (Milan, 1947).

Fossier = F. Fossier, "La Bibliothèque Farnèse. Étude des manuscrits latins et en langue vernaculaire," in *Le Palais Farnèse*, III. 2 (Rome, 1982), pp. 87–487.

Frati = L. Frati, *Indice dei codici latini conservati nella R. Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna*, Studi italiani di filologia classica XVI–XVII (Florence, 1909).

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IBNH = *Index Bio-Bibliographicus Notorum Hominum, Pars C*, 114 vols. to date (Osnabrück, 1976–).

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INTRODUCTION

The Renaissance was a period of intense controversy on the issue of education. From Francis Petrarch's ironically self-deprecating treatise *On His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others* to the later criticisms of contemporary education by Juan Luis Vives and Francis Bacon, one of the recurring themes was the need to reform curricular practices and structures. Proposals and counter-proposals were voiced in numerous letters, treatises, and sermons. Humanists emphasized the importance of studying rhetoric and classical literature. Scholastics responded by defending the centrality of the philosophical curriculum and of Aristotle, on which it was based. Regulars (followers of a religious rule) and theologians reminded both sides that the study of God and the Scriptures remained the queen of the sciences. In the sixteenth century, religious controversies both complicated and intensified pedagogical debates; Protestants and Catholics increasingly sought ways to redirect the educational practices of their day to religious and even apologetic ends. A furious polemic broke out all over Europe on pedagogical order and its relationship to epistemological method. By the mid-seventeenth century, both the humanist and scholastic programs of education seemed largely discredited; pedagogy, like philosophy, needed to be recast upon new foundations.

Many of the debates referred to above were concerned, in one way or another, with the issue of moral education. In turn, teaching virtue was closely related to ethics and moral philosophy in general. The importance of moral philosophy for Renaissance thinkers is a fact familiar to students of Italian humanism, whether through the emphasis of Eugenio Garin and Hans Baron on "civic humanism"[1] or Paul O. Kristeller's inclusion of moral philosophy among the *studia humanitatis* (the program of studies pursued by the humanists).[2]

[1] See, for example, Baron 1955 and 1988; Garin 1952. For a recent evaluation of the "Baron thesis," see Hankins 1995.

[2] Kristeller 1956b; Kristeller describes a program mainly encompassing grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy, but one should remember that the humanists' interests actually were (or, in any case, became) much broader than that, reaching into areas such as philosophy, medicine, and law.

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Aside from general histories of ethics,[3] three main interpretative approaches have been taken to the topic. Some scholars have tried to connect Renaissance moral thought with broader developments in humanist education or philosophy;[4] others have examined the development of specific themes (e.g., friendship) in Renaissance moral philosophy;[5] yet others have studied the reception and interpretation of a specific author or work important for ethics in the Middle Ages and Renaissance.[6] In the latter case, concentrating on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* has been especially fruitful for understanding which ethical problems were discussed and how they were solved in a broad range of different contexts.[7]

This book takes as its subject Renaissance commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics* written in the Italian universities. All over Europe the *Ethics* was, from the thirteenth century on, the standard textbook used in the university course on moral philosophy.[8] It was above all in this work that university teachers and commentators would discuss issues of educational theory. (For example, what is virtue, and how can it be acquired? Is it the result of parental teaching or of strong deterrents established by the state? Should the young be allowed to hear lectures on moral philosophy? And when should ethics be taught in the curricular sequence?) The *Ethics* commentaries therefore offer the possibility to study developments in pedagogical thought over the course of around five centuries. Furthermore, since many of these commentaries were redacted in connection with classroom lectures, they also offer insights into educational practice. Both from the angles of theory and practice, a study of ethics teaching seemed therefore potentially rewarding. It promised to show, for example, whether ethics continued to be considered a practical discipline in the Renaissance as it had in the Middle Ages, and whether the human-

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[3] The best general accounts of Western ethics are Sidgwick 1886, Dittrich 1926–32, Camps 1989, and *Encyclopedia of Ethics*. See especially the discussion in MacIntyre 1995.

[4] For example, Kristeller 1965, Rice 1958, Garin 1994, Poppi 1997b.

[5] See, for example, Wieland 1982b, Potts 1982, and Luscombe 1982. Also see the articles in Vickers 1985. On friendship, see Langer 1994.

[6] For example, Gualdo Rosa 1984. For studies more directly concerned with Aristotle's *Politics* and *Economics*, see Flüeler 1992 and Soudek 1958, 1968, and 1976.

[7] See especially Kraye 1988 and 1998.

[8] By contrast, the *Politics* and the *Economics* were not often taught, especially in Italy; see below, § 2.2.

ists contributed in any special way to its development within the universities. Furthermore, how ethics was taught in the universities is a barely examined subject,[9] even though the universities were among the important centers in which the Renaissance discussions on education took place. Indeed, one of the points of this book is that pedagogical discussions and developments took place as much within the Renaissance universities as outside them.[10]

Such a claim may seem implausible, since the Renaissance universities have been judged severely, especially for their cultural conservatism. Until recently, for example, the narrative of seventeenth-century thought emphasized the originality of thinkers such as Descartes and Spinoza, noted that they and the experimental scientists mainly worked alone or in associations of their own making, and depicted the universities of the time as either repressively conservative or, at best, indifferent spectators of the changes occurring around them. According to this view, the universities failed to contribute in any meaningful way to the new philosophical movement or to the "Scientific Revolution": in both of these cases they were latecomers and not initiators. Overly committed to Aristotle, universities lost the intellectual curiosity of the Oxford Calculators and, with it, the ear of their contemporaries. A study of university philosophy thus seemed to hold little promise: it was thought that currents outside the university played the major rôle in sparking new ideas, and that the system against which the new thinkers reacted could scarcely have been a fertile one.[11] Indeed, university teaching was alleged to have concentrated on pointless questions and to have been, for content and style, an ossified and unimaginative continuation of scholasticism in Thomas Aquinas' time. In the case of moral philosophy, it was argued that professors from other fields or, better yet, from outside

[9] Schmitt 1979a and Lines 1996 are among the few studies on the subject for Italy.

[10] It is a historiographical oddity that Aristotelianism is often thought to have been confined to the universities, whereas educational changes supposedly took place outside of them. Both views are mistaken. The first is challenged most cogently in Imbach 1989 and the works of his students, and I hope to make a contribution later on by studying the reception of the *Ethics* in Italy outside of the universities and in the vernacular. In the present work, the emphasis is on correcting the second misconception.

[11] See, for example, Garin 1967; Koyré 1966.

the universities were far more original than those responsible for teaching the subject.[12]

Largely thanks to the seminal studies of Charles B. Schmitt and Charles H. Lohr in the 1980s,[13] this picture is now falling into disfavor. Schmitt's investigations pointed, not only to the variety of approaches possible within Renaissance university philosophy, but to university innovations in fields such as medicine, botany, and mathematics. Furthermore, these much maligned universities provided a training to many of those involved in the "Scientific Revolution" as well as an educated audience to the experimental scientists working outside of them.[14] The case of Oxford shows that the universities could be far less resistant to the new philosophical currents than their critics claimed.[15] In Florence, the university was an important catalyst of cultural change.[16] And recent research shows that natural philosophy was a more diverse and developing field in the universities than is commonly thought.[17]

Lohr's special contribution concerns the development of Aristotelianism in medieval and Renaissance Europe. His repertory of Renaissance commentaries on Aristotle, for example, attests to a robust and growing Aristotelianism between 1500 and 1650. Commentaries and textbooks on Aristotelian philosophy written during this period outnumbered those written in the entire previous millennium,[18] and until 1650 students all over Europe could still hear lectures on Aristotle's natural philosophy, including his *Physics*. This teaching was not necessarily a tired rehearsal of commonly-held opinions: new solutions could be explored and discussed even within the Aristotelian framework for physics and cosmology.[19] Furthermore, within certain branches of philosophy, such as the Jesuit course on metaphysics, there was

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[12] Poppi 1976.

[13] Schmitt 1983a; Lohr, RLAC.

[14] See the good summary in Porter 1996.

[15] Feingold 1997.

[16] Davies, Ch. 6.

[17] Lines 2002a. Recent years have seen a renewed interest in the Renaissance universities; some of the newer studies are *A History of the University in Europe*, Nauert 1990, *European Universities*, Black 1996b, Davies, Lines 2001c, and Grendler (forthcoming, a monograph on the Italian universities). For a synthetic overview of the universities in the Renaissance and of recent scholarship, see Grendler 1999d and 2000.

[18] Lohr, RLAC, p. xiii.

[19] Camerota and Helbing 2000.

room for discussing Aristotelian concepts in even more original ways.[20] The vitality of Renaissance Aristotelianism—and, in particular, of university Aristotelianism—is further proved by its continuing influence, even on the "new philosophers." Descartes, Hobbes, and the young Leibniz are just three outstanding examples.[21] It is this liveliness of Renaissance Aristotelianism that has led to the flourishing of studies in this field in recent years.[22]

Aside from the vibrancy of cultural life in the universities, one should also recall the growing contacts between the universities and the humanists, who were outsiders only initially.[23] In the first place, budding humanists can often be found studying at the universities. For example, the future chancellor of Florence, Leonardo Bruni, may have abandoned his studies of law in the *studium* there to follow the Greek teaching of Chrysoloras; but he remembered (with evident satisfaction) his university studies in moral philosophy.[24] Leon Battista Alberti is known to have studied at the university in Bologna, and Gasparino Barzizza at that in Padua. The universities were in any case important for the humanists professionally, since it was there that they could learn the skills necessary to become notaries. More importantly, however, already in the fifteenth century humanists increasingly became part of the universities' teaching staff. Whether in Florence, Bologna, Padua, or Pavia, the Ufficiali dello Studio (university authorities drawn from the citizenry, sometimes former students of humanist teachers) were eager to attract them. On most occasions, the humanists were more than eager to accept or, like Filelfo, almost begged for a post. The fact that the humanists were obviously anxious for professional advancement does not vitiate the argument. The fact remains that the universities did not (indeed,

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[20] Lohr 1988b. Also see Grant 1994 and Wallace 1994.

[21] See Des Chene 1996, Leijenhorst 2001, Mercer 1999. See also the overview in Ariew 1998.

[22] Besides the studies mentioned in the notes above, see *Aristotelismus und Renaissance*; *New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought*; Iorio 1991; *Method and Order, Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*; Perfetti 2000; *Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum; Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy; The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy*; and *Paduan Aristotelianism in Early Modern Philosophy*. On Renaissance Aristotelianism the classic study is Schmitt 1983a (but see also Kristeller 1955 and 1993b). Useful recent overview articles (with bibliography) include Kraye 1993, Mahoney and South 1998, and Wallace 1999.

[23] On such contacts in Florence, see Davies, pp. 108 ff.

[24] See below, Ch. 5, n. 9.

could not) insulate themselves from outside influences, and that the humanists were not opposed in principle to working within them.

One may ask, however, what changes the humanists brought about in the universities. In Italy, the faculty of Arts and Medicine had two main career tracks. The first was represented by the philosophers, who often aspired to (and eventually passed on to) teaching medicine, which was more prestigious and better paid.[25] The second was for rhetoricians and teachers of classical literature. The two tracks were kept strictly separate: instances of rhetoricians teaching philosophy are extremely rare.[26] One might wonder, therefore, whether the humanists were merely tolerated within the universities (since they did not directly compete with the philosophers), or whether they also exercised an active influence on other fields. The studies by Schmitt and others indicate that the humanists did, in fact, affect the cultural life of the universities in important ways. For example, they provided new translations of textbooks, written in classicizing Latin. They increased the knowledge of texts in the Greek original and tried to purge them from corruptions. They even encouraged teaching on the Greek text, preferred expositions of the text to posing and solving questions, and relied increasingly on ancient rather than medieval commentators. Their influence on philosophy resulted, seemingly, in "humanist Aristotelianism."[27]

In this study, I show that the recent findings for university philosophy in general are also true in the specific case of moral philosophy. Like physics, ethics was not a static subject in the universities, stunted in its development because of being based on Aristotle. Nor did the activity of translating and commenting on Aristotle's *Ethics* (the standard university textbook for moral philosophy) fall off as the Renaissance advanced. Around 170 works on the *Ethics* were written in Italy between ca. 1300 and 1650; only around sixty of these were completed before 1500.[28] Furthermore, these works display a sur-

[25] Teachers of astrology and mathematics also fell into this grouping, but did not necessarily go on to teach medicine.

[26] The most famous case, of course, is Angelo Poliziano; see Appendix A, no. 113.

[27] For an informed overview of the subject, see Kraye 1993, pp. 19–26 and 37–42, correcting the common misconception that the humanists preferred Plato to Aristotle.

[28] See Appendix C below.

prising variety of literary forms and approaches to the work, reflecting what Schmitt described as multiple Renaissance Aristotelianisms.[29]

These and other findings discussed in this work should be seen within the context of four specific issues relevant to Renaissance scholarship. They are, respectively, (1) the innovativeness of humanist educational practices, (2) the humanist reading of classical texts and the past, (3) the nature of humanism and humanist Aristotelianism, and (4) the developments in moral theory and questions of method in the Renaissance.

Humanist and scholastic education

Although humanist education has received its fair share of scholarly attention,[30] there is good reason to reexamine the subject, as indeed several scholars have been doing lately.[31] First of all, not all of the subjects within the *studia humanitatis* have been given sufficient attention. In the specific case of moral philosophy, it is often stated that the humanist schools taught the subject through commonplaces and *exempla* drawn from the classical authors.[32] However, this common view has recently come under attack;[33] what is certain is that, throughout the Renaissance, moral philosophy continued to be taught in the universities, as a branch of philosophy. Second, since the assumption is often made that humanists worked outside of (and mostly in opposition to) the universities of the time, we know little about how they taught there. For example, were they free to teach as they wished, or did the universities place severe constraints on their choice of methods? Finally, a weakness of classic works in the field such as those of Woodward and Garin is that they often fail to distinguish

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[29] The term "Renaissance Aristotelianisms" is described in Schmitt 1983, pp. 10–33 and is further developed in Copenhaver and Schmitt, pp. 60–76. The concept was used at least as early as 1965 by Kristeller (Kristeller 1993b). For a survey of the forms of Aristotelian literature, see Schmitt 1983, pp. 34–63.

[30] Some representative studies are: Saitta 1928, Sciacca 1949, Ghersi 1950, Kristeller 1956b, and McKeon 1972.

[31] Gehl 1989 and 1993, Grendler 1989 and 1990, Witt 1995a, Black 2001, and *Education and Society in Renaissance Italy*. Some recent bibliographical surveys are cited in Black 2001, p. 12, n. 1.

[32] Grendler 1989, pp. 263–64.

[33] Black 2001.

between programs and practices.[34] The humanists are at pains in their programmatic statements to highlight the differences between themselves and the scholastics. However, it is possible to view their vilification of competing educators as a rhetorical strategy in the struggle to establish their own literary culture. Were the humanists actually different from the scholastics in practice?

On the innovativeness of the humanist model of education there has recently been an acrimonious debate.[35] Already in the years immediately following the Second World War, the leading scholar of Italian humanism, Eugenio Garin, championed the view that the humanists had offered the West a new pedagogical approach.[36] In contrast with the technical and elitist educational model of the scholastics, which depended so much on rote memorization and on authorities rather than sources, the humanists based their curriculum on the liberal arts and especially on a renewed appropriation of the classical tradition. They experienced this tradition directly through its writings.[37] Armed with a true understanding of the past and therefore of themselves, and freed from the utilitarian (i.e., religious and theological) ends that had characterized medieval education, the humanists used their contact with the ancients as a starting point for their own journey of discovery and human development.[38] Thus,

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[34] See Woodward 1906 and 1897; Garin 1976 and 1985.

[35] The controversy has been described in detail and with admirable skill in Black 1991 and 2001, Ch. 1. Thus, only the main contours of the discussion are outlined here.

[36] Garin 1947, 1949, and especially 1976.

[37] Garin 1976, p. 6: "a scritti destinati a imprimere nella memoria, in genere con l'aiuto del ritmo, formule da applicare meccanicamente, si sostituiscono scritti fondati su opere di alto livello scientifico, o compilati direttamente sulle fonti. Dall'altro, ci si propone con chiara consapevolezza di mettere al più presto possibile i giovani in contatto con le fonti stesse, ossia con gli 'autori classici.'" See also *ibid.*, p. 60: in the medieval curriculum, "non si legge il libro della natura, ma il libro al posto della natura; non il corpo umano, ma il Canone di Avicenna; non la lingua degli uomini, ma Prisciano; non il mondo, ma Aristotele; non il cielo, ma Tolomeo."

[38] Garin 1976, pp. 74–75: in the Middle Ages, "gli antichi si leggono per trovare in essi conferma o preannuncio di quell'unica Verità ch'è la nostra verità; per trarne qualche argomento che può essere utilizzato ancora nei nostri discorsi, come la colonna strappata da un tempio sorregge l'arco di una cattedrale. Gli uomini del '400 piangono sulle rovine, e se riescono a restaurare un monumento o una statua, febbrilmente ne ricercano la forma originaria. . . . La cultura non consiste nel ricevere, passivamente, qualcosa di già trovato, di definitivo; consiste nel divenire capaci di agire, di trovare, di conoscere, perché la condizione umana è ricerca, operosità perenne, non possesso definitivo. . . . Non si cercherà in Aristotele la verità, ma un

Garin takes Pier Paolo Vergerio as an example of the new kind of humanist teacher: one who tries to encourage dialogue and discussion, critical doubt, hesitance to accept blindly things that are unclear and insufficiently proved.[39] But the humanist educational model did not only aim, according to Garin, to make students think for themselves, free from past prejudices: another main goal was that of character formation. A study of classical models (presumably including literature, philosophy, and noble actions) would arouse in students a desire to emulate the glorious deeds of the past.[40] As a consequence, they would become men of action (in contrast with the medieval ideal of contemplation), ready to take their place as free citizens in human society.

Although Garin's passionate and eloquent defense of the humanist program was closely tied to his own philosophical position and to the cultural climate of post-war Italy,[41] his account of humanist education found many adherents. In Europe, it is commonly regarded as the equivalent of the standard model in physics.[42] The Anglo-Saxon world was partially immunized against Garin's views by the works of Kristeller (see below). Nonetheless, Paul Grendler's wide-ranging study of the Italian educational system during the Renaissance largely reflects Garin's position.[43] And numerous other studies on Italian education, including this one, have certainly drawn inspiration from Garin. It was only in 1982 that a detailed criticism of Garin's model was offered in a joint article written by Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, centered on the teaching of Guarino da Verona (1374–1460).[44] Since their argument is directly relevant to this book, it needs to be referred to here.[45]

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nobile modo di cercarla; la strada d'Aristotele non è più la nostra, ma vedere com'egli l'ha trovata ci aiuterà a trovare la nostra."

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 88: "alla rigorosa tecnica della filosofia, intenta a offrire determinate nozioni, opponeva una disinteressata rappresentazione di realtà esemplari, ideali, e nello stesso tempo capaci di commuovere e suscitare amore e desiderio di imitazione." Garin sees the humanist defense of ancient poetry not as an aesthetic ideal, but as an opposition between a bookish way of studying it and one aiming at the "formazione del carattere mediante l'imitazione di sublimi modelli . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 89).

[41] Black 2001, pp. 17–21.

[42] See below, pp. 214–15, for example, for its influence on Mario Sensi. But most of the Italian scholars in the field are followers of the Garin school.

[43] Grendler 1989. See the comments in Black 2001, p. 21 and especially idem 1991, *passim*.

[44] Reprinted in Grafton and Jardine 1986, Ch. 1.

[45] A fuller description and discussion can be found in Black 2001, Ch. 1.

Basing themselves on schoolbooks surviving from Guarino's teaching in Ferrara, Grafton and Jardine have tried to establish to what extent this humanist teacher's practices conformed to his advertised goal of producing fine statesmen, or at least active citizens.[46] After describing at some length the three phases of Guarino's program (elementary, grammar, and rhetoric), they conclude that something rather different from the "regimented note-taking, rote-learning, repetition and imitation" characteristic of Guarino's school would have been necessary to bring about the fulfillment of his and the other humanists' ideals.[47] Even at the most advanced stage of study (i.e., training in formal rhetoric), a student in Guarino's school was not, according to the authors, given the tools to meet the humanist ideal of making "that life-giving contact with the ancient world, understood in all its historical vitality, that would enable him to be an active citizen in his own time."[48] Rather,

> the rhetoric course was simply a more elaborate introduction to the same sorts of material that had occupied the student of grammar . . . It is as if the teacher had on his desk a beautiful completed jigsaw puzzle—the text. Instead of calling up his students to look at the puzzle, he takes it apart, piece by piece. He holds each piece up, and explains its significance carefully and at length.[49]

Thus, Grafton and Jardine reject Garin's view that the humanist educators were interested in "historico-critical understanding of the cultural tradition" or "the mastery of a critical understanding of the human condition itself."[50] If anything, they say, Guarino's school promoted thoughtless imitation and docility rather than a critical attitude.[51] The inescapable conclusion is that humanist education delivered much less than it advertised. In particular, Grafton and Jardine question the validity of the humanists' claim that good morals are associated with the best models of classical eloquence. And they implicitly challenge the notion that a humanist education is more likely than a scholastic one to develop either character formation or critical thinking.

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[46] For a sketch of Guarino's career, see Grendler 1989, pp. 126–29.
[47] Grafton and Jardine 1986, p. 22.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[50] Cf. Garin 1949, p. 7.
[51] Grafton and Jardine 1986, p. 25.

Although I share some of the conclusions and methodological strategies of Grafton and Jardine's study, some points should be made about their analysis of Guarino's school.[52] First, the repetition, imitation, and regimentation that they note are indispensable aspects of learning the classical languages. Especially at the more elementary level, and in the absence of modern tools such as grammars, dictionaries, and reference works, these characteristics should be expected. It may be, therefore, that Guarino's school does not say very much, especially about how humanists taught the classical texts at the higher levels and in the universities. Second, Grafton and Jardine place on Guarino too heavy a burden of proof; it does not seem safe to generalize from one example alone. Surely it would have been helpful to take into account the teaching of other educators such as Vittorino da Feltre and Gasparino Barzizza, or better yet the large crowd of lesser humanist teachers. Finally, the practices of Guarino's school are not placed within a historical perspective. The authors do not ask, for example, in what ways Guarino's methods depart from those of medieval teachers of grammar and rhetoric. Thus, they assume that that there really were significant differences between the humanist and scholastic pedagogical methods. Where they depart from common opinion is in their evaluation of the two systems of education.

The need for broader-based analyses and for historical context has now been addressed by Robert Black, who for many years has studied Italian (and especially Tuscan) schoolbooks as witnesses to humanist influence on primary and secondary education.[53] His most recent work examines some 324 manuscripts relevant to the teaching of Latin grammar all over Italy between the twelfth and the fifteenth century.[54] Black concentrates specifically on student glosses of manuscript textbooks, something he says represents the upper limit of what they would have understood in classroom discussions. Black demonstrates that the humanists worked well within the confines of the traditional medieval curriculum up to the end of the fifteenth

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[52] Grafton and Jardine have been criticized from many quarters, including in Grendler 1989, pp. 407–10 and Witt 2000, pp. 505–07. A more appreciative evaluation is in Black 2001, pp. 28 ff.

[53] See Black 1987, 1996a, and 1996b, pp. 99–177. Black's earlier work (including Black 1991a) provoked some controversy; see Grendler 1991, Black 1991b.

[54] Black 2001. Grendler 1989 too, of course, gives a broad survey of the Italian educational system, but does not focus nearly as closely on the classroom practices as witnessed by the manuscript tradition. A similar problem applies to Gehl 1993.

century. It was not until then that the humanists began to be successful in removing some of the older textbooks from the grammar curriculum. Furthermore, the method of teaching grammar employed by teachers throughout the period changed remarkably little. The approach Black describes is mainly philological and surprisingly recalls the teaching of Guarino as reported by Grafton and Jardine above. Even more significantly, this method of reading and teaching texts was used, not only in connection with literary texts, but also when explaining a philosophical work such as Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*.[55] Black thus argues:

> The conclusion is that the glossing and teaching of these authors throughout the middle ages and Renaissance in the Italian schoolroom was overwhelmingly philological; the few moral or philosophical glosses are invariably lost in a vast sea of philological detail.[56]

The implication is that humanist grammar teaching, like that current in the late-medieval period, was remarkably free from moral content.[57] It was somehow expected that a study of the Latin language itself would form good morals: "because it was taken for granted that Latin was a moral discipline, teachers did not have to inculcate moral lessons in the classroom."[58]

The causes for this phenomenon are related, according to Black, to the rise of the universities. With the redistribution of the traditional liberal arts curriculum between universities and lower schools,[59] the exploration of moral subjects was assigned to the higher studies. Grammar was therefore freed of its function as a subject used both for the study of language and the inculcation of morals.[60] Thus, Black does not exclude the possibility that humanists teaching classical texts in the university rhetoric courses may have taught moral content (we shall see later that they in fact understood themselves to be doing so). However, Black does argue that, at least at the lower level, there was much more continuity between the late-medieval and humanist teaching of grammar than is usually supposed. On important points,

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[55] Black 2001, Ch. 5; idem 2000.
[56] Black 2001, p. 9.
[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–28.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[59] On this development, see pp. 65–66 below.
[60] Black 2001, pp. 29 ff. and 328 ff.

therefore, Black's thesis can be seen to support Grafton and Jardine's position.

In turn, it should be noted that the emphasis placed by Black as well as Grafton and Jardine on continuity is more consistent with Kristeller's thesis than Garin's view of humanist innovativeness.[61] Kristeller would not agree that the humanists' educational practices were hardly different from those of their competitors. He points, for example, to the humanists' emphasis on rhetoric and the *studia humanitatis*, and—in the specific case of moral philosophy—to a shift in alliances whereby humanist educators associated the subject with rhetoric rather than with natural philosophy.[62] However, Kristeller attributes the differences between scholastic and humanist curricula more to taste and professional considerations than to different philosophical asssumptions or goals. Whereas, for Cesare Vasoli as for Garin, shared philosophical views led humanists to their distinctive method, Kristeller doubts that humanists as a whole took a common position on issues such as the active versus the contemplative life, or that changes in humanist education were due to a new vision of life or to new premisses.[63] Likewise, while acknowledging the changes brought about by the humanists, Kristeller does not think that the humanist method represented a sudden rupture with the past.[64]

The present study argues that, in the case of moral education, humanist method can indeed be distinguished from that of the scholastics. Although, when they teach or comment on Aristotle's *Ethics*, the humanists cannot completely free themselves from past methods or interpretations, they do seem to be addressing different concerns and a different audience than their scholastic predecessors and contemporaries. This is true both of the fifteenth-century humanists and of the humanist giant of the sixteenth century, Pier Vettori. The aims and audience of the humanists can fruitfully be understood in relationship to the institutional context of ethics teaching, especially in Florence.[65]

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[61] Black even makes the connection explicitly; see Black 2001, p. 368.
[62] Kristeller 1985a.
[63] Vasoli 1988, Kristeller 1985.
[64] Kristeller 1956b.
[65] See below, especially Ch. 5 and § 6.3.

Reading of classical texts and of the past

For both the scholastic and humanist educators, classroom teaching was largely concerned with the reading and interpretation of texts. Thus, their educational practices are closely related to their approach to classical texts and their understanding of the past. This is another area that has recently been the topic of a growing debate.

Again, Garin's position may serve as a useful starting point. As we have seen, Garin places a strong emphasis on the humanists' disinterested efforts to understand the past. Although at times he is cautious about the humanists' success, especially in the area of philology, the stress falls on the humanist "discovery" of the ancient world and on the differences between their historico-philological way of commenting texts and the scholastic doctrinal reading.[66] Especially pertinent here is Garin's view of the significance of John Argyropoulos' teaching of the *Ethics* in Florence (1457–1458) and of Donato Acciaiuoli's commentary based on the Byzantine scholar's lectures.[67] Emphasizing the convergence, in Argyropoulos' lectures, of a "rara perizia filologica con una superiore conoscenza storica," Garin sees Argyropoulos as a turning point for the Florentine understanding of ancient texts. Through him, the Florentines were able, not only to view the past in its authenticity (Argyropoulos could evoke the very ring of Aristotle's words for his contemporaries), but to grasp the unity of ancient thought through a reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle.[68] Schmitt too repeatedly indicated Acciaiuoli's commentary as one of the first applications of humanist methodology in philosophy.[69] Furthermore, fol-

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[66] Garin 1976, pp. 92–93: "Il restauro dell'antico come tale, ossia il recupero del senso delle diversità umane, delle effettive dimensioni storiche, fu la 'scoperta' dell'antico fatta dagli umanisti, la loro scoperta dell'uomo come individualità storicamente concreta e determinabile. Questo non vuol dire, s'intende, che la loro filologia e la loro storia fossero subito felici di esatti risultati; o che essi riuscissero, d'un tratto, a liberarsi di tutti i residui d'un metodo annoso. Quel che è certo, è che si mossero in questa direzione, che vollero fare questo, sia sul terreno linguistico che su quello critico, e più propriamente storico. . . . Scoprire significava per Bruni dare alla pagina il significato che l'autore le aveva dato, che gli antichi le avevano trovato; non più ridurla a noi, e falsificarne i termini in una problematica non sua—ma ritrovarla in sé, nella sua autenticità. A un'interpretazione dottrinale . . . si oppone un commento che vorrebbe essere storico-filologico."

[67] On Argyropoulos' teaching, see Appendix A, no. 111. On Acciaiuoli's commentary, see Appendix C, no. 38.

[68] Garin 1987, pp. 240–44; idem 1994, pp. 102–06. Also see, for Garin's view of the humanists and history, Garin 1987, pp. 63–84.

[69] See, for example, Schmitt 1985, p. 42.

lowing Garin's lead, other scholars have described a contemporary of Argyropoulos, Niccolò Tignosi, as having had—despite his handicap of not knowing Greek—a program of "historical understanding of Aristotelian thought" and the aim to "understand historically the [ancient] thinkers in the original meaning of their doctrines" even before Argyropoulos arrived in Florence.[70]

Nowadays, Garin's views concerning Acciaiuoli's commentary are rejected by leading scholars.[71] But his general picture of the humanist ideals and achievements with regard to ancient texts continues to find a following. For example, Grendler, Vasoli, and numerous others still emphasize the freshness of the humanists' approach. Lately, however, other historians have echoed the findings of Remigio Sabbadini (a great student of philology from the beginning of the twentieth century) and Kristeller. Not only Black and Grafton, but also other scholars such as Jill Kraye, James Hankins, Vincenzo Fera, and Luca Bianchi (although within different contexts) note the continuities between the humanist reading of texts and earlier methods, at least until the end of the fifteenth century.

In the area of textual criticism, for example, Sabbadini does grant that the Italian humanists had some success. But he also observes that the humanist personality got in the way, even in straightforward matters such as the transcription of manuscripts, and that "the humanists, regardless of the current to which they belonged, were (some more, some less) amateurish in their textual criticism."[72] Hankins argues that, although modern scholars most readily associate the humanists with imitative and critical methods of reading, Italian humanists in fact read the classics in ways remarkably typical of the Middle Ages, mixing the old with the new.[73] Grafton depicts "generations of Renaissance scholars building around their texts a vast wedding cake of interpretation, with ancient, medieval and modern ingredients richly mingled in the hope of disguising the awkward pagan features and apparent errors of the texts."[74] For her part, Kraye has shown that the humanists were divided on the issue of

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[70] Sensi, pp. 391, 411. See also below, § 5.3.2.

[71] See Bianchi 1990a and Kraye 1995, pp. 99–101; also see below, § 5.3.2.

[72] Sabbadini 1922, pp. 56 and 60: "gli umanisti, a qualunque indirizzo appartenessero, furono nella critica del testo, qual più qual meno, orecchianti."

[73] Hankins 1990, *passim*.

[74] Grafton 1985, p. 627.

the relationship of philosophy with eloquence and philology; those who did not hold that philosophical texts should be interpreted with elegance or philological acumen found themselves subscribing to an older, even scholastic point of view.[75]

The mixture of old and new in the humanists' approach to the past can be illustrated through their translation activity. Although much research remains to be done in this field,[76] we do know that the fifteenth-century humanists were not as accurate or disinterested in their translations as has been supposed. Coluccio Salutati's advice to Antonio Loschi to pay attention to *res* instead of *verba* (in his revision of Leonzio Pilato's translation of Homer) is already an indication of how things will go. As Sabbadini puts it, "We are therefore warned: to translate means continually to improve a text's aesthetic appeal and especially to modify it, delete from it, and add to it."[77] Hankins deals an additional blow to the image of the humanists as critical readers of the past by arguing that the Quattrocento humanists did not quite know what to make of Plato, partly because they did not know how to read him:

> There is little or no attempt to reconstruct Plato's position or arguments on a given question, little or no attempt to fathom the coherence and philosophical economy of his doctrines, little or no attempt to read the dialogues historically, as the best evidence for what Plato taught.[78]

Thus, the humanists' commitment to educate and edify often led them to bowdlerize or censor or change altogether controversial passages in Plato's writings.

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[75] Kraye 1996.

[76] Only a few years ago, Kristeller pointed out that "There are many high-sounding generalizations on the matter in the handbooks, but we are not yet able to say with precision which works of Hippocrates or Galen were known during the Middle Ages and how many of them were known only during the Renaissance, or how the various medieval and humanist translations of the same Greek texts differ from one another in method, accuracy, and clarity" (Kristeller 1988a, p. 13). This observation remains true even after Reynolds and Wilson 1991, which ignores the transmission of scientific and philosophical texts, and despite the long-standing researches promoted by the *Aristoteles Latinus* project and the *Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum*, as well as the *Catalogo di manoscritti filosofici*. Charles Lohr is now preparing, on the basis of data accumulated by Charles Schmitt, a repertory of Renaissance translations of Aristotle.

[77] Sabbadini 1922, p. 26: "Siamo dunque avvisati: tradurre significa abbellire abbellire abbellire e sopratutto mutare togliere aggiungere."

[78] Hankins 1990, I, p. 363.

Likewise, schoolbooks and commentaries offer important clues as to the humanists' reading of the classics.[79] Grafton has argued from evidence of the humanists' pedagogical practices that the humanists' "commitment to a strictly historical approach" has been grossly overstated, and that, in fact, historical and allegorical interpretations of the classics often came from the same humanist pen (e.g., Francis Bacon, Petrarch, Coluccio Salutati, Isaac Casaubon, Joseph Justus Scaliger, Erasmus).[80] As we have seen, Black's recent study of Italian schoolbooks describes an activity of glossing Latin authors that retained many of the same philological emphases between 1200 and 1500.[81] The studies of fifteenth-century commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics* by Bianchi, Kraye, Field, and Kessler point to similar conclusions. Luca Bianchi, for example, emphasizes the persisting presence, in Acciaiuoli's commentary,[82] of scholastic methods and commentators in Acciaiuoli's work.[83] In a notable shift of position, Kraye rejects Argyropoulos and Acciaiuoli as the turning-point in the application of humanist methodology to the *Ethics*; she instead proposes Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples' 1497 commentary[84] as the first "predominantly humanist exposition of the *Ethics*" to have reached print.[85] She also observes that Tignosi's contemporaries saw his method of interpreting the *Ethics* as "creeping humanism," and does not think that his approach really deserves to be described as humanist.[86] Arthur Field has similar

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[79] Kristeller remarks that "The method used by the humanists and their commentaries . . . is an important task for future research, for which we lack even the basic premises at this time" (Kristeller 1988a, pp. 8–9).

[80] Grafton 1985, pp. 631–639. This view is confirmed, at least for Salutati, by Brown and Kallendorf 1987.

[81] Black 2001.

[82] Acciaiuoli 1478; see Appendix C, no. 38.

[83] Bianchi 1990a, p. 39: ". . . questi passi confermano al di là di ogni dubbio un'impressione ricavabile dalla lettura dell'intera opera: che la terminologia, gli strumenti concettuali, i principi filosofici più largamente impiegati siano di derivazione scolastica." Bianchi notes especially the influence of Eustratius, Albert, and Thomas. On the continuing presence of Thomas in Italian *Ethics* commentaries, see below, pp. 179–80 and Lines (forthcoming).

[84] See D'Étaples 1535.

[85] Kraye 1995, p. 104. Note that this is a revision of Kraye's earlier view (Kraye 1988, p. 328) that "humanists like Donato Acciaiuoli and Raffaele Maffei, while not entirely shunning scholastic argumentation and terminology, attempted to produce a clear exposition of Aristotle's text written in an elegant Latin style, concentrating more on philological than logical analysis and citing classical rather than medieval authorities."

[86] Kraye 1995, pp. 101–02.

reservations about Tignosi's commentary,[87] which he thinks must have been "monumentally boring" for his contemporaries and which in any case points to his limitations from a humanist perspective.[88] Recently, Eckhard Kessler has seconded Kraye's view on Lefèvre, who in his view gave a new direction to the interpretation of Aristotle at the end of the fifteenth century.[89]

Although some of the studies just mentioned do not give as much credit as they should to Angelo Poliziano's approach to classical texts, they largely confirm Grafton's thesis, that it was not until the late fifteenth century (with Poliziano) that a real historical and philological approach to the classics began to take shape in Europe.[90] However, Grafton takes the point further, arguing that the rising success of philological method had little to do with a disinterested reading of the past. Besides the fact that the humanist method was not really new (it was based on Hellenistic models), it is hard—indeed, impossible—to make neat distinctions between critically minded humanists and their more traditional myth-making contemporaries. As it appears, the humanists themselves were, to a surprising extent, involved in an attempt to falsify the past.[91]

Grafton's position cannot be discussed in detail here, and in any case others have done so better than I could.[92] However, one of the implications of the present study is that, at least up to 1600, the Renaissance understanding of classical philosophy was limited and falsed in several ways. Indeed, it is questionable whether, in the course of this period, the humanists ever achieved (or even attempted) a direct, unprejudiced contact with the authentic culture of antiquity, as argued by Garin. One of the most vivid illustrations of humanist (mis)reading of the past is the Plato-Aristotle controversy and the

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[87] See Appendix C, no. 40 and the discussion in Ch. 5 below.

[88] Field 1988, p. 155: "More importantly, Tignosi's commentary, except to the most ardent Peripatetic, must have been monumentally boring. Even though the text of Aristotle itself forced Tignosi to look at a variety of circumstances, he continuously, and tediously, returned to the same arguments in the same way. There is indeed salt in the commentary, but none of it is rhetorical; the piling up of unrelated and, by humanist standards, indecorous *exempla* demonstrates rather the breadth than the depth of Tignosi's knowledge." See also *ibid.*, p. 154.

[89] Kessler 1999.

[90] Grafton 1977 and idem 1983, Ch. 1.

[91] Grafton 1990.

[92] See the stimulating response in Hankins 1991b.

attempts made to reconcile the teachings of the two philosophers.[93] This was no attempt to understand the past dispassionately or even historically. Nonetheless, I argue that it is also impossible to deny the real critical advances accomplished, for example, by Francesco Piccolomini and Ottaviano Ferrari in the late sixteenth century.

Humanism and humanist Aristotelianism

As noted above, Garin and his followers tend to consider the humanists as a cultural group who mainly worked outside of the universities and were united by common philosophical ideas. Garin's anti-clerical and anti-scholastic humanists have been aptly described as "Gramscian intellectuals whose historical consciousness places them in critical opposition to hegemonic traditions."[94] Kristeller, instead, has insisted on the professional features uniting this (otherwise disparate) collection of figures. They were, he says, mainly professional rhetoricians, usually serving as teachers, notaries, or lawyers; they shared few assumptions, except for the importance of the *studia humanitatis* and perhaps a belief in the dignity of man. Their contrasts with the scholastics were mainly due to professional rivalries.[95]

In spite of the differences between these two descriptions (and the bad blood created through them between both their proponents and their disciples), what seems notable is the static picture they have offered of the humanist movement.[96] The result may have been unintended, but the emphasis on shared ideals or on a shared cultural and educational program has sometimes obscured the variety of humanism as well as its development.[97] An indication of the problem is the use so often made of the expression "humanist education." The use of such a label often assumes that there was a substantial uniformity among humanist pedagogical ideals or practices. This was not always the case, as can be easily verified either

[93] On this topic, see Poppi and below, pp. 281–84.
[94] Hankins 1991, p. 511.
[95] The classic statement of the thesis is in Kristeller 1956b. For northern Europe, and especially Germany, Rummel 1995 emphasizes instead the seriousness of the contrasts between humanists and scholastics.
[96] See, on Kristeller, Witt 2000, pp. 2–3.
[97] For the stages in the development of early humanism, now see Witt 2000.

by comparing theories of contemporary humanist educators (for example, Pier Paolo Vergerio and Vittorino da Feltre)[98] or by noting diachronic inconsistencies. The various definitions given of the *studia humanitatis* is another pertinent example.[99]

A similar difficulty applies to the expression "humanist Aristotelianism." Some time ago, Schmitt described the main features of this method as: attention to philological analysis, a "historicizing" attitude, a tendency to use classical rather than medieval sources, a taste for citations from poetry and history, and a rejection of *quaestiones*.[100] Recently, Kraye has offered a more modest description, emphasizing eloquent Latin translations, philological attention to the Greek text, and reliance on ancient Greek commentaries.[101] She rightly drops from the previous listing the suggestion that humanists generally disdained *quaestiones* or philosophical issues. She also recognizes that humanists were not in agreement as to the proper style to use in philosophical exposition. Still, it remains true that most discussions of humanist Aristotelianism have focused almost exclusively on the formal and stylistic features of the commentaries in question. Thus, we hear that Lefèvre's work, according to later witnesses, freed philosophy from dependence on other commentators, paving the way for a *simplex interpretatio* that avoided *quaestiones* and *dubitationes*.[102] In their place, Lefèvre provided brief explanatory notes on specific terms, quotations from classical poetry, and *exempla* from ancient history. He retained the scholastic literal commentary, but wrote it in humanist Latin. He falls short of being entirely representative of a full-grown humanist methodology only by not attending very much to philological problems (a feature of later commentaries, such as those by Pier Vettori and Marc-Antoine Muret).[103]

I propose to reconsider the current notions of humanism and humanist Aristotelianism. In particular, I believe that it is possible to describe an evolving humanist methodology that takes into account both the fifteenth-century application of rhetoric to the *Ethics* by

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[98] Good introductions to Vergerio are Robey 1980 and McManamon 1996; on Vittorino, see at least Vasoli 1981 and the other essays in Nella 1981 and Müller 1984.

[99] Kohl 1992.

[100] Schmitt 1985, pp. 39–55.

[101] Kraye 1996, pp. 144 ff.

[102] Kraye 1995, pp. 104–05, n. 34.

[103] Kraye 1995, pp. 105, 114–17.

Tignosi and Acciaiuoli, and the application of grammar and philology to the same text by Angelo Poliziano and Pier Vettori. Furthermore, it seems that one should also take into account the variety within the humanism of any particular generation, for example the differences of approach between Vettori and Muret. And an examination of *Ethics* commentaries outside of Florence suggests that humanist Aristotelianism may possibly have been only a minority position in Renaissance Italy. Perhaps its significance should be reevaluated altogether. When one considers the sundering of the fifteenth-century ideal of wisdom and eloquence that occurred in Florence due to the rise of the philological method, one is also tempted to ask whether the rise of philology had other, broader effects.

Theory and method

In their discussion of moral philosophy, medieval commentators disagreed on a number of issues, such as the rôles of divine grace, nature, and habit in the generation of virtue; the relationship between the theological and moral virtues; what virtues are most important; how virtue relates to the aim of human life; and how training in virtue should take place.[104] In Renaissance Italy, as in Europe at large, even more divisive controversies surrounded moral philosophy and its teaching.[105] After 1400, for example, the series of new translations and commentaries on the *Ethics*[106] sparked a heated debate over whose translation should be used as a textbook in the universities. The question went much deeper than philological correctness or niceties of language, having more to do with how the subject should be taught, and who could presume to teach it.[107] Was it really proper, for example, for Bruni to dismiss the technical philosophical vocabulary that had developed over the past two or three centuries? Could anyone but a professional philosopher presume to

[104] On several of these themes, see Gauthier 1970a, pp. 111–46 and Wieland 1982a.

[105] See Kraye 1988 for an excellent survey, on various points, of moral philosophy in Renaissance Europe. Kraye 1998 does the same for the seventeenth century. For a synthetic overview, see Kraye 1999a.

[106] See below, § 1.4.2 and § 4.2.2.

[107] See, on this point, Hankins 2001 and idem (forthcoming).

interpret a philosophical text correctly? There were also philosophical problems involved: was "the good," as Aristotle viewed it, to be rendered "the supreme good" (*summum bonum*) as in Bruni's translation, or simply "the good" (*bonum*) as in Grosseteste's?[108] This issue provided the grounds for heated confrontation between those who clung to an other-worldly definition of "good" and "happiness," and those more interested in concentrating on a strictly human good, as advocated by Aristotle. Thus, the issue was closely related to the debate over the superiority of the active or the contemplative life.

Remarkably little has been written on the doctrinal issues in Italian *Ethics* commentaries, and on the point of educational theory in particular. But the examples considered in this book suggest that it is impossible to identify, in the universities of the Italian Renaissance, a majority stance on virtue and how it should be taught. What is, for example, the subject of moral philosophy: virtuous actions or man inasmuch as he is capable of becoming happy (*felicitabilis*)? To what extent is virtue connected with reason? Who is really responsible for moral education, and how does the process take place? To these and other questions, the Italian interpreters deliver a bewildering array of different answers, largely depending on their own general philosophical outlook and on the commentators on whom they choose to rely most heavily.

What seems especially noteworthy, however, is the emergence of debates on methodological issues of common interest. These include the Plato–Aristotle controversy and the connected discussions of method and order in education (and especially in moral education).[109] Some of the themes touched upon in these discussions are whether all subjects can be taught according to the same procedure, or whether they need to be discussed following preestablished ontological or epistemological patterns. The whole debate is far richer than might seem at first sight. It is connected, not only to interesting epistemological and pedagogical questions, but to fundamental questions of authority. Once it had been decided that Aristotle had not, in his writings, adopted the best possible order of presentation, it was not a far step to begin questioning his method of inquiry as well.

Furthermore, a methodological question that is rarely discussed openly, but which seems continually to lurk in the background, is

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[108] Hankins 2001, pp. 142–43 and *passim*.
[109] See especially below, § 7.3.3.

the relationship between ethics and other disciplines. I argue that, especially in sixteenth-century Italy, the *Ethics* was used as a springboard for the study of Greek language, but also for logical and theological teaching. It seems that ethics was never really able, at least during the period considered here, to free itself from its awkward position of instability within the university curriculum, in order to emerge as an independent subject in its own right.

This study was based on the examination of well over 230 manuscripts containing commentaries and translations of Aristotle's *Ethics*, numerous printed editions of these and similar works, and detailed archival research on the universities of Pavia, Padua, Bologna, Florence–Pisa, and Rome (including the Collegio Romano) over the past six years. My attempt has been to relate, as much as possible, the educational theories and practices reflected by the commentaries to their relevant institutional contexts.

The original plan was to reach only until around 1600, mainly because around that time one observes a change in the assignment of moral philosophy teaching in many Italian universities (it is increasingly taught by clerics). Nonetheless, in order to facilitate comparisons with the data in Lohr's repertory of Renaissance Aristotle commentaries,[110] I have pushed my exploration of commentaries up to 1650. In certain instances I have been able to do the same for the institutional context. By so doing, one can also take into account the (disastrous) effects of the Thirty Years' War on the Italian universities. The disruptions caused by the war made for a notable decline in the number of northern European students attending Italian universities.

The purpose of this work is not to offer a survey of what great Renaissance thinkers thought about virtue and its teaching, or of what they thought about Aristotle's views on such matters. Rather, the driving concern is to understand how most professors at the universities taught the subject of ethics or how they thought it should be taught. The state of the surviving documentation has largely determined which figures are discussed in this book and which ones not. For example, although it would be wonderful to know more about how Poliziano or Pomponazzi taught the *Ethics*, for the first we have

[110] Lohr, RLAC.

only a prolusion and a handful of sparsely annotated manuscripts, whereas for the ethics teaching by Pomponazzi nothing, to my knowledge, survives.[111] But that is perhaps just as well, since second-rank figures are often more representative of their professions.

It was not possible to cover here all the centers in which the *Ethics* was studied in Italy. In particular, an unfortunate omission is Pavia (although its institutional context is discussed). This was due to the fact that only the commentary by Ottaviano Ferrari and a couple of prolusions by Cesare Rovida are known to me from there.[112] I hope to offer a more broad-based discussion of these and other commentaries related to Pavia and Milan at a later date.

The first part of this book offers an overview of the reception of Aristotle's *Ethics* from ancient times up through the Renaissance, as well as a survey of its teaching in the Italian universities. (The latter is placed within the context of northern European teaching of the *Ethics*.) Thereafter, the book proceeds in a fairly chronological fashion. Chapter 3 studies how key aspects of Aristotle's moral theory were understood by the medieval interpreters, especially in northern Europe.[113] Chapter 4 provides a survey of the forms of the Italian commentary literature on the *Ethics* up to 1500. In Chapter 5, I examine how Aristotle's *Ethics* was studied and taught in Florence, which was the main Italian center for interpreting the *Ethics* in the fifteenth century. The special focus is on the commentary by Niccolò Tignosi and the application of rhetoric to moral philosophy.

The last part of this book examines the university interaction with the *Ethics* during the period 1500–1650. A survey of the main literary genres used in this connection and their development (Chapter 6) concludes with a discussion of the model of philological interpretation offered by the Florentine humanist Pier Vettori (§ 6.3), which heavily depended on the example of Poliziano. Thereafter, attention is given to other centers. The context in Padua (Chapter 7) is especially studied through the *Ethics* commentary of Francesco Piccolomini. The interpretation of the *Ethics* in Bologna (Chapter 8) is examined

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[111] For Poliziano's works on the *Ethics* see Appendix C, no. 48; for Pomponazzi's teaching, see Appendix A, no. 78.

[112] See Appendix C, nos. 97 and 110–11.

[113] A brief overview of Aristotle's thought concerning moral education is offered in § 1.5.

through the examples of Claudio Betti and other minor figures such as Camillo Baldi and Agostino Galesio. The chapter on Rome (Chapter 9) considers first the Roman *studium*, in which Marc-Antoine Muret is the major figure studied; next, the teaching of the *Ethics* and its interpretation in the Jesuit Collegio Romano is examined through a number of minor works as well as through the commentary of Tarquinio Galluzzi.

The Appendices are sometimes especially relevant to specific chapters. Appendix A, for example, gives a listing of all teachers of Aristotelian moral philosophy known to me (up to ca. 1650) in the universities of Bologna, Florence–Pisa, Padua, Pavia, and Rome, including the Collegio Romano. It can be thought of as a complement to Chapter 2, but—since it is organized by university—is also pertinent to the chapters on the specific university contexts. Appendix B lists the major medieval commentaries influential in Italy; it is connected in a special way with Chapter 3. Appendix D contains the transcription of the letter by Basilio Paravicino entreating Pope Gregory XIII, in 1573, to introduce the teaching of moral philosophy in the Roman *studium*. It is therefore connected especially with § 9.1.

Appendices C and E, on the other hand, are relevant to the book as a whole. Appendix C offers a chronological listing of all the Latin *Ethics* commentaries and translations known to me to be connected with Italy up to 1650. It also includes several works (sometimes anonymous ones) whose connection with Italy could not yet be established with certainty. Appendix E is a critical edition of Antonio Possevino's observations, at the end of the sixteenth century, on various *Ethics* commentaries in Italy and Europe.

As the field of moral philosophy slowly becomes accepted as an integral part of any serious examination of the history of thought in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, I hope that these Appendices will contribute to a firmer documentary basis on which to base future investigations.

PART I

PROLEGOMENA

CHAPTER ONE

ARISTOTLE'S *ETHICS*: AUTHORSHIP, *NACHLEBEN*, DOCTRINE

1.1 *Aristotle's Writings on Moral Philosophy*

Modern scholars distinguish three phases in the career of Aristotle (384–322 B.C.). During a first sojourn in Athens (367–347), Aristotle studied under Plato and took part in the activities of his Academy. Then, following Plato's death and Aristotle's unsuccessful bid to lead the Academy, came the years of wandering, mainly spent in Asia Minor (in particular, in Assos and Mytilene) and in Macedonia, where King Philip entrusted him with the education of his son Alexander. Finally, Aristotle returned to Athens (334–322), where he established the Lyceum and stayed until shortly before his death. Unfortunately, although these periodizations are well established (their current formulation is due to Düring),[1] it is still a matter of dispute how Aristotle's philosophical production is tied to his biography.

For some thirty years after it was first published in 1923, the dominant position was that developed by Werner Jaeger,[2] whose thesis continued to find supporters into the 1970s. Jaeger, who had the inspiration of considering the *development* of Aristotle's thought, organized the chronology of Aristotle's writings on the basis of a fairly straightforward principle: on the assumption that, until Plato's death, Aristotle remained faithful to his master and only later progressively moved to his own distinctive positions. Thus, Jaeger placed Aristotle's dialogues and works such as the *Protrepticus* and *On Justice* (both of which concern ethics and have Platonic overtones) during the time of Aristotle's first sojourn in Athens. He also suggested that, during

[1] Düring 1966. Recent synthetic accounts of Aristotle and ancient Aristotelianism, with bibliography, include Frede 1996 and Gottschalk 1996b.

[2] Revised edition in Jaeger 1955. A description of Aristotelian scholarship during this period is offered in Chroust 1968. A recent reevaluation of Jaeger's work is offered in *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered*. For a recent discussion of the problem of Aristotle's development, see *Aristotle's Philosophical Development*.

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his years of wandering, Aristotle penned the first versions of his works on metaphysics, ethics, politics, physics, and cosmology. In particular, according to Jaeger, Aristotle wrote the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) in parallel with *Metaphysics* Λ; both works display a strong emphasis on serving God, who is notably absent in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*), a later work. Indeed, the *EN* was written at the time of Aristotle's second sojourn in Athens, when he was head of the Lyceum. It was during this *Meisterzeit* that Aristotle composed his remaining works—antiquarian and zoological, the *De Anima*, the *Parva naturalia*—and completed the *Metaphysics*.[3]

Although he accepted Jaeger's basic premise, in 1970 a French Dominican and influential scholar of Aristotelianism proposed a slightly rearranged order of composition.[4] For the first ("idealist") phase René-Antoine Gauthier remains fairly close to Jaeger.[5] For example, Gauthier lists few of the surviving philosophical works as belonging to this early period and argues that Aristotle still held, at this stage, the Platonic view of the Absolute Good as the foundation of ethics. The main evidence for this is the *Protrepticus*, only portions of which survive and whose recovery we owe to diligent scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[6] Another moral work attributed by Gauthier to this youthful period is the dialogue *On Justice*, now lost but apparently examining justice and friendship in connection with the different parts of the soul.[7]

Of special interest here are the writings that Gauthier attributes to the second ("instrumentalist" or "biological") and to the third ("hylomorphic") phases. For Gauthier, the instrumentalist phase corresponds to the years of wandering but also extends to the first five years of the second sojourn in Athens. The *EE* and *EN* were writ-

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[3] For this paragraph, see Flashar 1983, pp. 177 and 181–82. The problems with Jaeger's position are made very clear in Dirlmeier 1968.

[4] A table illustrates this in Gauthier 1970a, pp. 62–63. The phases and their labels are taken from Nuyens 1948.

[5] Gauthier 1970a, pp. 10–29.

[6] Gauthier 1970a, pp. 15–20 and 28–29. On the process of recovery, see Chroust 1965. The work's first edition was in Walzer 1934, pp. 21–65; see also the editions in Ross 1955, pp. 26–56 and Düring 1961, pp. 400–33. Easily accessible English translations are in Ross 1952, pp. 27–56, Düring 1961, Chroust 1964, and Aristotle 1984, pp. 2404–16. In German translation, see Gigon 1961. For the history of the work's interpretation, see Berti 1962, pp. 453–543, Gauthier 1970a, pp. 13–20, and Düring 1979.

[7] Gauthier 1970a, p. 21 and n. 53.

ten during this intermediate period, in which Aristotle had not yet applied the doctrine of hylomorphism to the human soul. Thus, the body is seen as the instrument of the soul, and Aristotle has trouble identifying the necessity of the relationship between the two. Indeed, according to Gauthier, Aristotle at this stage does not believe in the immortality of the soul, something that becomes clear to him only in the third phase, when he writes the *De anima* and several of the *Parva naturalia.*

By placing the initial writing of the *EE* and *EN* in the same phase of intellectual development, Gauthier downplays their differences and emphasizes that they both have a this-worldly kind of *phronesis* in view. At the same time, however, he recognizes the differences between the two works (written at a distance of over ten years from each other) and assigns their writing to different places and occasions. The *EE* was penned in Assos and Mytilene (ca. 325), whereas the *EN* was delivered in Athens, toward the start of Aristotle's second sojourn there (ca. 335).[8] All of the *Politics* was also written during the second period, but here again partly in Asia Minor (Books VII–VIII, II–III) and partly in Athens (Books IV–VI and I). As for the *Magna Moralia* (*MM*), Gauthier does not much credit the work's association with Aristotle. He emphasizes the work's lateness (ca. the end of the second century B.C.) and accepts the conclusions of Donini,[9] according to whom this work has its own ethical system, which—while borrowing in places from Aristotle—is also distinct from it in terms of emphasis, organization, and ideas.[10] Gauthier explains the *MM*'s relative disorganization and various of its themes as the result of its polemical stance and the work's function as a refutation of Stoic ethics.

In contrast with Jaeger's and Gauthier's assumptions was the thesis advanced by Düring in 1966.[11] Düring based his chronology on a fundamentally different premise, that Aristotle could hardly have waited until Plato's death (when he was 38 years old) before becoming "Aristotle." Already during his first sojourn in Athens, Aristotle was an original thinker and demonstrated this through his philosophical production. On the basis of a new analysis of Aristotle's

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[8] Gauthier 1970a, pp. 30–54, especially 50–54.
[9] Donini 1963.
[10] See the resume in Gauthier 1970a, pp. 93–98.
[11] Düring 1966.

arguments, as well as a rigorous philological study of the text, Düring redistributed Aristotle's writings among the three periods mentioned above. One of his emphases was that these phases should be understood more in the sense of a maturation of Aristotle's thought than of a discontinuous pattern of enchantment–disenchantment with Plato's philosophy (for example, the Ideas).

Since Aristotle was already "Aristotle" during his studies with Plato, Düring attributes to this period a much larger share of Aristotle's philosophical production than heretofore. To the works accepted by Gauthier for this period, for example, he adds the *Analytics*, the *Physics* (except for Book VIII), *De caelo*, *De generatione et corruptione*, several books of the *Metaphysics*, the *Poetics*, and most of the *Rhetoric*. Importantly for our purposes, the original redactions of the *MM* and the *EE* are assigned to this period.[12] The final redactions of the *MM* and part of the *Politics* (Books I, VII–VIII) fall instead during the period of wandering. The *EN* and the remaining books of the *Politics* are dated to the second sojourn in Athens.

A separate problem is represented by the *Economics*,[13] a work that was accepted as genuinely Aristotelian during the Middle Ages and Renaissance and which was regularly considered—together with ethics and politics—as one of the three branches of moral philosophy. The date of the work remains controversial: some scholars place the writing of Books I and II as early as the last quarter of the fourth century B.C.,[14] whereas others date it to the first or second century B.C.[15] At least twenty-eight Greek manuscripts testify to the tradition of the first two books.[16] The Greek text of Book III has been lost and survives only in Latin translation. It seems that it can only be generally dated to the Hellenistic era.[17]

Düring's approach—with some qualifications—is the accepted one today,[18] yet several questions remain unanswered and are perhaps

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[12] See Düring in *RE suppl.*, XI, pp. 281 ff. See also Cooper 1973 and the response in Rowe 1975.

[13] Greek edition in Aristotle 1887b; new critical edition of Book I (with German translation) in Victor 1983, pp. 87–106.

[14] Aristotle 1968, pp. xii–xiii; Laurenti 1968, p. 57; Victor 1983, pp. 167–75. All of these favor the attribution to a student of Aristotle.

[15] Niebuhr 1828; Aristotle 1887b, pp. ix ff.; Flashar 1983, p. 292.

[16] Aristotle 1968, pp. xiii–xiv; Victor 1983, pp. 15–17 lists twenty-seven manuscripts for Book I.

[17] Aristotle 1968, pp. xviii–xxi.

[18] For a brief but lucid and up-to-date survey of Aristotle's writings and their

unanswerable. For example, the exact relationship of the three works on ethics (the *MM*, *EE*, and *EN*) continues to be unclear.[19] Even allowing for the likely spuriousness of the *MM*,[20] problems remain with the other two works. Is the *EE* really a warm-up for the *EN*?[21] To which of the two works did the three "common books" (*EE* IV–VI; *EN* V–VII) originally belong?[22] Did Eudemus and Nicomachus play any rôle in the editing of the two *Ethics*, or were they merely addressees or dedicatees?[23]

Matters are further complicated by the *form* of the surviving works. Both the development of Aristotle's thought since the *EE* (which entails, for example, the reelaboration especially of the common books) and the editorial process are doubtless responsible for many of the doublets, misplaced asides, and even contradictory accounts (especially the two discussions of pleasure, *EN* VII.12–15 and X.1–5) that make the *EN* hard to follow. Furthermore, it should be remembered that we do not have here polished works designed for reading by a broad public, but notes for lectures to Aristotle's students.[24] These notes may have gone through several revisions already at Aristotle's hands; part of their difficulty also lies in the previous knowledge that they assume. One can take comfort, however, in the fact that the text is not nearly in such a parlous state as that of the *Metaphysics*.[25]

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history, see Johansen 1998, pp. 271–76. For a more detailed description, see Flashar 1983, pp. 177–82, 190–93 (with a full bibliography; pp. 181–82 on Düring). Specifically on Aristotle's works of moral philosophy, *ibid.*, pp. 242–44 and 299–303. Kenny 1978 is one of the few not to accept Düring's view on the relationship between the *EE* and *EN*.

[19] Useful comments on this problem may be found in Dirlmeier 1962, pp. 109–18; idem 1958, pp. 93–97; Bodéüs 1973.

[20] On the *Magna Moralia* see especially Dirlmeier 1958 and 1970.

[21] On the development of the *Ethics* see, among others, Stark 1972.

[22] On this question, see Harlfinger 1971, pp. 38–50; also see Kenny 1978.

[23] On this issue, Gauthier favors the view that Eudemus and Nicomachus played an editorial role; see Gauthier 1970a, pp. 82–87. It does not seem necessary to suppose, however, on the ground that Nicomachus was a small child when Aristotle died, that the work could not have been *dedicated* to him, if he was already born.

[24] Aristotle often makes a distinction between two classes of his writings, the *exoterikoi logoi* and the *akroamatikoi logoi*. Modern scholars agree that the exoteric writings were destined for an outside public, whereas the acroamatic writings (such as lecture notes) were less polished and restricted to Aristotle's students. On this issue, see especially Bos 1989. For a good introduction to Aristotle's writings and their fate, see Guthrie 1981, Ch. 3.

[25] Gauthier 1970a, pp. 63–87.

Whatever the revisions undergone by the *EN* and *EE* through Aristotle's own initiative (and, quite likely, through editorial interventions shortly after his death),[26] they and Aristotle's other works may have received further modifications in the first century B.C. [27] It was during this period—possibly in Rome or Athens—that the little-known Andronicus of Rhodes edited and published Aristotle's (acroamatic) writings, including the works on moral philosophy. It seems that he was responsible for grouping Aristotle's works thematically and for placing them in their present sequence. Unfortunately, the book in which Andronicus justified and described his activity as an editor of Aristotle's writings has not survived, therefore the exact extent of any editorial interventions he may have made is not clear. Nonetheless, Andronicus' edition (with its implicit recommendation of the proper order in which to read philosophy) was doubtless important for the *Nachleben* of Aristotle's works; how important is still a matter of debate.[28]

The *EN*, *EE*, and *MM* continue to raise interest today, and it is mind-numbing to observe the number of editions, translations, and commentaries dedicated to these works in the twentieth century alone. The analytical school of philosophy can be credited with a large share of this activity of interpretation. Less encouraging, however, is the fact that we still lack a dependable critical edition of the most important of these works, the *EN*. Bywater's edition,[29] which is the one most often used in the scholarly world today, has serious shortcomings, only one of which is the extremely small number of manuscripts on which it is based (six out of over 100 surviving manuscripts). It seems that the most trustworthy edition to date remains the nineteenth-century one of Susemihl.[30]

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[26] On this see Gauthier 1970a, pp. 82–87.

[27] The dating remains controversial; for a detailed discussion, see Gottschalk 1987, pp. 1095–97; cf. Moraux, I, pp. 45–58.

[28] See Moraux, I, pp. 58–94; Düring 1968, pp. 257–60; the most detailed accounts are Gottschalk 1987, pp. 1089–1100 and Barnes 1997, especially pp. 21–44. Barnes is sharply critical of the common exaggeration of Andronicus' achievement. A recent synthesis can be found in Gottschalk 1996c.

[29] Aristotle 1894.

[30] Aristotle 1887a; for a critical discussion of editions of the *EN*, see Gauthier 1970a, pp. 301–14. The manuscripts of the *EN* are listed in Wartelle 1963 and Argyropoulos and Caras 1980. Recently, a new edition of the *EE* has appeared in Aristotle 1991.

It is now time to offer a brief survey of how the *EN* was received up through the Renaissance.[31] The concluding part of this chapter (§ 1.5) studies the work's doctrinal perspective on the issue of moral education.

1.2 Nachleben *(I): The Hellenistic Era*

Aside from the edition of Aristotle's works made in the first century B.C. by Andronicus of Rhodes (see above, § 1.1), little is known about the reception of the *Ethics* up to ca. 200 A.D.[32] Scholars may have exaggerated in their claim that Aristotle's writings suffered from general neglect between his death (322) and the Andronicean edition of his works. However, there is agreement that they were surely far less widely read than the writings of Plato.[33] Nonetheless, authors such as Antiochus of Ascalon,[34] Cicero,[35] and Arius Didymus († after 9 B.C.) did have an interest in Aristotle's writings, and especially in his moral philosophy. Didymus wrote a compendium of Aristotle's *Ethics* which has been transmitted to us via an anthology composed by Johannes Stobaeus (fifth century). Despite some changes of emphasis, Didymus' work remains fairly close to the teachings of the Stagirite. Notably, this work is not only a compendium, but also a systematization (in fact, an ethical doxography) that bears similarities to Cicero's *De finibus* and was apparently written for a broad audience.[36] The coexistence of Aristotle's writings and of summaries/systematizations

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[31] The most recent sketch of the reception of the *Ethics* during this time period dates to 30 years ago, with Gauthier's weighty historical introduction (Gauthier 1970a, pp. 91–240). Since then, however, scholarship has made remarkable advances in almost all the periods and geographical areas considered by Gauthier. Increasing attention is now also given to Jewish philosophy, which Gauthier did not discuss. For the period from the Hellenistic era through the thirteenth century, the following can be no more than a description of the current state of research. The material on the Renaissance derives more directly from my own findings. In general, on Aristotle's influence, see *Aristoteles, Werk und Wirkung* and Lohr 1996.

[32] See the bibliography in *RHPh*, II, pp. 179–80; Wehrli 1983; Gottschalk 1996a.

[33] Barnes 1997, *passim* and p. 45.

[34] Annas 1993, pp. 415–25.

[35] Barnes 1997, pp. 44–50, 57–59.

[36] Gottschalk 1987, pp. 1125–30; the most comprehensive study is Hahm 1990 with bibliography. See also Gauthier 1970a, pp. 98–99; Moraux, I, pp. 316–434; Fortenbaugh 1983.

should not be too surprising,[37] since this tends to be a common feature of the Aristotelian tradition.

Other compendia dating to this period are the pseudo-Aristotelian *Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν* and the *Περὶ παθῶν*. The first is a short work that lists only a limited number (eight) of the virtues discussed by Aristotle, contrasts them with their opposites, and gives examples of behavior predicated on each.[38] The *Περὶ παθῶν* (a work falsely attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes) is structured in two sections. The first presents doctrines associated with the school of Chrysippus. The second section—a reworking of the *Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν*—offers a listing of the emotions that are permissible to a wise man.[39] Both of these works are characterized by a number of Stoic elements, although these do not necessarily overshadow the Aristotelian structure. However, in neither case is one given anything like a clear view of Aristotle's ethical thought as a whole.[40]

At the beginning of the second century A.D., the example of Aspasius shows that the *Ethics* was at least the object of attention in Athens. Whereas Aspasius' other commentaries on Aristotle's works have been lost, his comments on *EN* I–IV, part of VII, and on VIII have survived.[41] As we shall see, this work, which appears to be the oldest extant commentary on the *EN*[42] (or indeed on any Aristotelian work) made its way only partially into the Latin tradition, in particular through Book VIII. However, it is arguably the most valuable source for knowing how the *EN* was understood in the ancient world. It remains fairly close to the text, although from time to time it makes some use of Stoic terms (not necessarily, however, indicat-

[37] As it apparently seems to Gottschalk 1987, p. 1129.

[38] Gottschalk 1987, pp. 1129–30. The work takes only six pages in German translation; see the translation and full commentary in Schmidt 1965, who however has nothing to say about the work's *Nachleben*. The work was included in the Aldine 1552 edition of Aristotle (vol. 5) and was also published in Heinsius 1617. See also Schmitt 1979a and Kraye 1981, pp. 132–33.

[39] Gottschalk 1987, pp. 1130–31. Critical edition and Latin translation in Pseudo-Andronicus 1977. For notes on the work's reception in the Latin West, see Kraye 1981, p. 132.

[40] The eclectic nature of the two works and a brief overview of their contents are noted in Kraye 1981, pp. 131–32.

[41] Greek edition in Aspasius 1889; see Gauthier 1970a, p. 100; Moraux, II, pp. 249–93; Kenny 1978, pp. 29–36; Gottschalk 1987, pp. 1156–58; Mercken 1990a, pp. 438–41; and the essays in *Aspasius*. For bibliography, see *RHPh*, II, p. 181 and *Aspasius*, pp. 191–94.

[42] As indicated in the subtitle to *Aspasius*.

ing agreement with the Stoics).[43] In spite of its inclination toward paraphrase, there are also indications of interest in the philological aspects of the text and in the resolution of philosophical problems posed by it.[44]

A treatise on the *Ethics* formerly attributed to Nicolaus of Damascus, and surviving only in an Arabic translation,[45] is possibly even earlier than the Aspasius commentary. Although the work refers to Plotinus and other figures from later antiquity, a central portion of the treatise may date from a much earlier (although still post-Christian) period.[46] Like that of Aspasius, this work too is closer to being a paraphrase than a commentary. It has been argued, however, that—contrary to Aspasius—it is based more on the *EE* than on the *EN*.[47]

Probably in the first or second quarter of the second century A.D., Adrastus of Aphrodisias wrote a work *On Historical and Literary Questions* whose sixth book treated the *EN*. The work has been lost, but—as the title indicates—it seems to have concentrated on the literary and historical aspects of Aristotle's work rather than on its philosophical ones.[48] It was apparently used by the anonymous compiler of the scholia on Books II–V of the *EN*, a work that seems datable toward the end of the second century A.D. and which, like the work of Adrastus, includes the discussion of literary and historical matter.[49] This work, however, is not limited to such illustrative material: it is a collection of *scholia* or selective "explanatory notes" (rather than a commentary in the proper sense of the word) in which the author tries to clarify Aristotle's arguments or compares Aristotle's views with those of other philosophers or schools. In addition to drawing on Adrastus, the *scholia* also make use of Aspasius' commentary and other sources.[50]

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[43] Moraux, II, p. 269.

[44] Becchi 1994, especially pp. 5370–74.

[45] Aristotle 1979, pp. 394–431.

[46] Peters 1968, p. 53.

[47] Kenny 1978, pp. 22–24.

[48] Moraux, II, pp. 323–30; Gottschalk 1987, p. 1155; Dirlmeier 1958, p. 102.

[49] Edition in Eustratius *et al.* 1892, pp. 123–255. See Moraux, II, pp. 323–30, especially p. 324, n. 115 and p. 325, n. 117. Cf. Gauthier 1970a, pp. 100–01, where Gauthier speculates that the anonymous scholia might be as late as the sixth century.

[50] Mercken 1990a, pp. 419–20. For a description of the scholia on the individual books, see Mercken, *ibid.*, pp. 422–29. Kenny 1978, p. 37 argues for Adrastus as the author of the anonymous scholia, but his view is not generally accepted.

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. ca. 200 A.D.) wrote—or perhaps, inspired—a treatise on *Ethical Problems: School-Discussion Problems and Solutions on Ethics* (30 questions, forming the fourth book of the *Quaestiones*) in which several passages of the *EN* are discussed.[51] The *terminus ad quem* for this work is the fifth century, since it is cited by Philoponus. However, it is usually considered either a writing of Alexander himself or of someone from his school and is especially noteworthy because it is the only extant commentary on the *EN* of any importance between the second and the eleventh centuries.[52] Some of the main topics treated concern virtue, responsibility, and especially pleasure.[53] Sharples notes that, in contrast to earlier works on the *Ethics*, this one does not concentrate on a doxographical approach (a systematic treatment of particular moral problems), but also includes other types of discussion: for example, examinations of certain texts that might seem especially difficult; summaries either of Aristotle's doctrine on particular issues or of particular passages; and the presentation of arguments in support of specific Aristotelian views. Even in the case of the summaries, however, Alexander is not simply concerned with condensing the conclusions, but with outlining the arguments leading to them.[54]

Interest in Aristotle's ethical *œuvre* went well beyond followers of his school. Platonists such as Atticus (second century A.D.) also took an interest in it, even though his attitude toward Aristotle and his *Ethics* may have been mainly polemical.[55] Furthermore, Porphyry (a student of Plotinus, third century) also wrote on the *Ethics*. Although the Greek original has been lost, part of his work (apparently divided in twelve books) survives thanks to an Arabic translation from 910 A.D. and to some other works in Arabic.[56]

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[51] Edition in Alexander of Aphrodisias 1887, pp. 117–63. I use the title and subtitle in Sharples 1990, which in addition to an English translation provides an introduction and commentary. See, on this work, Madigan 1987. Also see *RHPh*, II, pp. 182–86. For a full bibliography both on Alexander and on this work, see Sharples 1987, pp. 1226–43 and 1190–91.

[52] Sharples 1990, p. 1.

[53] See Madigan 1987.

[54] Sharples 1987, p. 11094; idem 1990, pp. 3–6.

[55] Moreschini 1987, pp. 480–82.

[56] Walzer 1963, p. 240; Peters 1968, p. 52; Gauthier 1970a, pp. 101, 108–10; Kenny 1978, p. 38; Badawi 1987, pp. 98–99. The "twelve books" may have been the ten of the *EN* plus the two of the *MM*. The translator was Ishaq ibn Hunayn. The fragments are given in English translation in Porphyry 1993, pp. 161–63.

1.3 Nachleben *(II): Byzantines, Arabs, and Jews*

1.3.1 *The Later Greek Tradition*

The Byzantines were well acquainted with Aristotle's works and were especially active in interpreting Aristotle's *Ethics* from the tenth to the twelfth centuries. The best surviving Greek manuscript of the *EN* (the K^b in Florence, BLaur., LXXXIII, 11) dates from this period (tenth century), as do the most influential commentaries.[57]

Eustratius of Nicaea (ca. 1050–ca. 1120) wrote a commentary on *EN* I and VI, possibly at the behest of princess Anna Comnena.[58] A theologian of some influence and holder of the metropolitan see of Nicaea (until his condemnation for heresy relieved him of his office and banned him from theological activities in 1117), Eustratius' downfall was in part connected with his propensity for applying dialectics to theological issues. His philosophical commentaries show a similar weakness for the application of Aristotelian logic. In fact, one of the striking characteristics of his commentaries on *EN* I and VI is his habit of outlining Aristotle's arguments as formal syllogisms. Another hallmark of Eustratius' style is his routine attempt to defend Plato against Aristotle. However, at the same time Christian considerations play a large part in his work, sometimes leading to a correction of Plato's views from a Christian perspective. Thus, Mercken has convincingly described Eustratius' philosophy as "Christian Neoplatonism."[59]

Michael of Ephesus (fl. first half of the twelfth century) wrote various commentaries on Aristotle (including the *Analytics, Topics, Rhetoric,* and *Physics*), several of which have been lost (in particular, the *Physics* and *Topics*). However, among the surviving works we have his commentary on *EN* V, IX, and X[60] as well as a fragment of his commentary on the *Politics*. Michael's work is a combination of both

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[57] On the Byzantine commentaries, in general see Schleiermacher 1838, Rose 1871, Gauthier 1970a, pp. 100–105, 121; Mercken 1990a; bibliography in Benakis 1987.

[58] Greek edition in Eustratius *et al.* 1892; cf. Gauthier 1970a, pp. 104–05; Lloyd 1987, Mercken 1990a, pp. 410–19; Kazhdan 1991.

[59] Mercken 1990a, p. 416.

[60] Greek edition in Eustratius *et al.* 1892 (*EN* VIII–IX) and Michael of Ephesus 1901 (*EN* V). See Gauthier 1970a, pp. 102–03, but better in Mercken 1990a, pp. 429–36. Also see Ebbesen 1981, Kazhdan and Tkacz 1991.

philosophical and textual commentary, with a constant attempt to stay close to Aristotle and clarify his text, something he accomplishes partly by elucidating Aristotle's arguments and by reference to parallel passages. For his purposes, he borrows freely from the anonymous scholia on Book V. Also characteristic of Michael is that he is less interested than Eustratius in defending Plato against Aristotle. Mercken cautions that "Michael's Aristotelianism is never a militant one,"[61] and that one should not contrast him too starkly with Eustratius, the Neoplatonist. The contrast may be justified, however, on another front, for Michael does not seem to be driven by Eustratius' concerns to reconcile Christianity and Aristotle. For him, theology and philosophy remain separate issues, and one finds few references in his writings to figures taken from the Scriptures or from the history of the Church.

Finally, an anonymous commentary on *EN* VII should possibly be dated between the end of the twelfth or the beginning of the thirteenth century.[62] This work is poorly written, full of misunderstandings of Aristotle's text, and altogether unrewarding. However, it managed to make its way into an influential collection of Greek commentaries on the *EN* compiled in Constantinople sometime before Robert Grosseteste translated them into Latin around 1253.[63]

Something should be said about this collection of Greek commentaries, which in translation (and, later, in the original) was to have a great success in the Latin West. The original composition was as follows:

- Books I and VI by Eustratius of Nicaea
- Books II–V by an anonymous (second-century?) commentator (see § 1.2.1)
- Book VII by an anonymous (twelfth/thirteenth-century?) commentator (see preceding paragraph)
- Book VIII by Aspasius (see § 1.2)
- Books V, IX, and X by Michael of Ephesus

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[61] Mercken 1990a, p. 434. Michael's reluctance to attack Plato is further illustrated on pp. 435–36.

[62] Edition in Eustratius *et al.* 1892. On the work, see Gauthier 1970a, p. 105; Mercken 1990a, pp. 437–38.

[63] On the Latin version of this commentary, see below, Appendix B, no. 6.

This is the composite commentary as it was translated by Grosseteste. It often went under the name of Eustratius, since it started with his comments. The Greek manuscripts also include a variant version, in which the anonymous scholia on Books II–V are replaced by Aspasius (Books II–IV) and Alexander of Aphrodisias' *Capita moralia*.[64] However, this version does not appear to have been known in the Middle Ages and Renaissance in a Latin translation.

Less influential in the West were two other works on the *Ethics*. George Pachymerius (1242–ca. 1310) covers the *EN* (but without Book VI) in the eleventh book of a twelve-book paraphrase of Aristotle.[65] Furthermore, the Renaissance saw the publication of a Greek paraphrase of the *EN*. This work, first printed by Daniel Heinsius in 1617, is not attributable to Andronicus of Rhodes, as Heinsius later thought,[66] although it could date from the Hellenistic era. One manuscript attributes the work to a certain Heliodorus of Prusa, but nothing is known about this author, and the name may have been invented by the well-known forger Constantinos Paleokappas from the sixteenth century. The work survives in at least twenty-five manuscripts, and from one of these we know that the work must be earlier than 1366; it does not seem to have been rendered in Latin translation until Heinsius' publication.[67]

1.3.2 *The Arabs*

In addition to the the paraphrase formerly attributed to Nicolaus of Damascus and to the Arabic translation of Porphyry's commentary on the *EN*,[68] several other works based on the *EN* have come to us from the Muslim world.[69] For example, a translation of the *EN* seems

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[64] Mercken 1990a, pp. 407–09.

[65] Paris, BN, grec 1930, ff. 195v–223v, and Latin translation in Pachymerius 1560 (*Ethics* on pp. 294–337); see Gauthier 1970a, pp. 105–06; Benakis 1991, p. 50. In general on Pachymerius see *ODB*, III, p. 1550 (A. M. Talbot).

[66] Heinsius 1617, edition in Heliodorus 1889.

[67] Oehler 1969, p. 279; Gauthier 1970a, pp. 106–07, with bibliography; Moraux, I, pp. 136–38; Sharples 1990, p. 101, n. 44; Benakis 1991, p. 49. See also Kraye 1981, p. 133 and n. 22.

[68] For these works, see above, pp. 37–38.

[69] A synthetic overview of Arabic translations of Aristotle is Drossaart Lulofs 1968; see also Walzer 1963 and Peters 1968. More recently, on the reception of Aristotle in the Arab world, see Badawi 1987 and Kennedy-Day 1998. For the bibliography, see Daiber 1999. In some cases, modern scholars have ignored the

attributable to Ishaq ibn Hunayn († 910/911) and was possibly followed quickly by others. A fragment (Books VII–X) of one of these translations survives in a manuscript dated June 18, 1232.[70] Furthermore, we know that al-Fārābī († 950) wrote at least an introduction to the *EN*, if not a commentary. This work has not been preserved, but we do have al-Fārābī's introduction to his lectures on logic. This work, the *Liber excitationis ad viam felicitatis*, survives in both Arabic and Latin.[71] Its first part is a brief and free summary of the *EN*.[72]

From the early eleventh century, the works of Avicenna and Miskawaih are relevant here. Avicenna, or Ibn Sina (980–1037) wrote—among numerous other treatises—a work on metaphysics. Book X of this work discusses practical philosophy and its dependence on metaphysics.[73] This work was to exercise a profound influence in the Latin West, especially before the reception of Aristotle's *Politics*.[74] Also significant was a treatise by Miskawaih († 1030), entitled *Tahdīb al-Akhlāk wa-Ta'thīr al A'rāk*. In this work, Porphyry has a visible presence, leading the writer to emphasize the Platonic elements of the *EN*. The work had a significant success among the Muslims partly because it was approved by al-Ghazālī (1058–1111).[75]

The most important work for our purposes was the influential middle commentary/paraphrase of Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198), finished in 1177 and translated into Latin by Hermannus Alemannus († 1272) in Toledo around 1240.[76] Although the original Arabic version does not survive (the work is known only through Latin and Hebrew translations),[77] the effort it took Averroes to obtain a copy of the last six books of the *EN* (as well as the *Politics*) is highly suggestive of what tended to be emphasized at the time in the reading and study of the work.[78] The Muslims also translated various pseudo-

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influence of Aristotle's moral philosophy on the Arabs. Surprisingly, von Zimmermann 1986 has no article dedicated to Aristotle's works on ethics.

[70] Gauthier 1970a, p. 108. Edition, together with Books I–VI, in Aristotle 1979, pp. 1–387.

[71] For bibliography and other information see Daiber 1999, II, p. 144 and Flüeler, *Medieval Translations*, no. 983.

[72] Peters 1968, p. 53; Gauthier 1970a, p. 109; edition in al-Farabi 1940.

[73] Avicenna 1977–83.

[74] Flüeler 1992, I, pp. 10–12.

[75] Walzer 1963, pp. 239–43; Gauthier 1970a, pp. 109–10. In general, on the Latin translations from the Arabic, see Daiber 1990 and 1999.

[76] See below, Appendix B, no. 5.

[77] The work was translated into Latin and Hebrew; see Peters 1968, p. 53.

[78] Gauthier 1970a, pp. 110–11; Flüeler 1992, I, p. 10. For bibliography on Averroes and other Arabic philosophers see Daiber 1999.

Aristotelian works, including the *Summa Alexandrinorum*[79] and the *Economics*,[80] but did not translate his *Politics*.

1.3.3 *The Jews*

The Muslim works on the *Ethics* were important not only for scholars of the Latin West, but also for the Jews. In fact, the Jews produced no translation of the whole Aristotelian *corpus* (at least not between 1100–1500), and most of the individual works they did translate survive only in very few copies (exceptions are the *Metereology*, the *Economics*, and, as we shall see, the *EN*).[81] They preferred to read Aristotle through the Muslim commentaries, especially those of Ibn Rushd (Averroes).[82] An example is the work of Shem Tob Ibn Falaquera (ca. 1225–after 1290), active in North-Western Spain, who wrote *Shelmut ha-ma'asim* (*The Perfection of Actions*). The first six chapters of the work depend on the *EN* and the *Summa Alexandrinorum* and give a summary of the *Ethics*.[83] Falaquera bases his treatment of individual topics on compendia (whether in Greek or Arabic). He makes only occasional references to the text of the *EN*, although the latter is known to him through the Arabic translations.[84]

The first real translation of the *EN* into Hebrew[85] was the work of Samuel ben Judah (ca. 1294–after 1340) from Marseille. A prolific

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[79] This *Summa Alexandrinorum* was apparently written before the first half of the eleventh century and has the strange feature of repeating, after *EN* VI, the matter contained in Books IV and V. It was translated into Latin by Hermannus Alemannus in 1243/44. See Peters 1968, pp. 52–53; Gauthier 1970a, pp. 108–09. The Arabic version is edited in Aristotle 1979, pp. 436–45; for the Latin, see Fowler 1982, Appendix 14. Also see D'Alverny 1982.

[80] Badawi 1987, p. 99; Victor 1983, pp. 66–73 (where a German translation is given).

[81] See Berman 1978.

[82] Zonta 1996, p. 152.

[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 204–07.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 211: "In genere, infatti, Falaquera preferisce impostare la trattazione di un determinato argomento sulla base di un compendio, sia esso di origine greca (come la *Summa Alexandrinorum*) o araba (come i *Compendi* di Averroè), integrandola con riferimenti saltuari, a scopo chiarificatore, al testo completo dell'opera di riferimento (l'*Etica nicomachea*), o almeno ad una sua parafrasi *ad sensum* (quali sono, appunto, i *Commenti medi*) . . . Il testo delle opere di Aristotele è noto a Falaquera attraverso le parafrasi di Averroè; risulta tuttavia una sua conoscenza diretta degli scritti zoologici, dell'*Etica nicomachea* e del *De anima* (citato nel *Moreh hamoreh*) attraverso le traduzioni arabe medievali."

[85] In general, on medieval Jewish translations, see the still fundamental Steinschneider 1893, as well as Rothschild 1989, Sermoneta 1990, Ivry 1990, and Tamani 1990.

translator into Hebrew from the Arabic, with a particular emphasis on works of logic and moral philosophy, Samuel translated Averroes' middle commentary on the *Ethics* (along with its paraphrase of the *EN*) around 1320–1322.[86] The late date of this translation—and, in general, of works connected with Aristotle's *Ethics*—is probably attributable to the religious implications of discussing morals from a purely human and philosophical point of view.[87] By 1332, however, a Jewish father was already recommending the study of Aristotle's *Ethics* to his son.[88]

Whereas Jewish philosophical works initially depended heavily on Arabic translations and commentaries, after 1400 the situation began to change. This was a period of Jewish "humanism" in which various Jewish authors attempted to interpret Aristotle more independently. However, Jewish scholars of the time did not turn to the Greek text for a better understanding of Aristotle, but to Latin translations.[89] The first of these new interpreters, and one who gives unusually abundant information not only about his technique of translation, but about its motivation, is Meir Alguádez, in Spain. Around 1400 Alguádez translated the *EN* into Hebrew from Grosseteste's thirteenth-century Latin translation (in its revised form, *recensio recognita*).[90] Alguádez had admiring words for the Latin translation.[91] His description of the three branches of moral philosophy[92] suggests that he had also absorbed the Latin commentary tradition (itself dependent on Aspasius and Eustratius).

The appeal to the Latin translations of the *Ethics* underwent a further development with Baruch ibn Ya'ish (active either in Spain or Italy), who around 1480 translated into Hebrew two recent Latin retranslations of the *EN*, by Leonardo Bruni and John Argyropoulos.[93]

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[86] See the edition in Berman 1981. On this translator, see Berman 1967. On the influence of Averroes' commentary, see especially Berman 1978.

[87] Zonta 1996, pp. 245–47.

[88] See the program of study recommended by Joseph ibn Kaspi, a Jewish philosopher active in Languedoc, translated into French in Touati 1973, pp. 36–37 and reproduced in *Former, enseigner, éduquer*, I, pp. 128–29.

[89] Zonta 1996, pp. 114–15.

[90] On Grosseteste's translation and its revision, see below, § 1.4.1 and Appendix B, nos. 3–4.

[91] Zonta 1996, pp. 72, 83–85, 114.

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 83. Alguádez notes that the *Ethics* treats individual morals; the *Economics*, household government; and the *Politics*, the government of the city.

[93] On these translations see Appendix C, nos. 26 and 37.

Around 1485 Baruch wrote a commentary on the *EN*, based on his translation of Bruni's translation.[94]

The use of Latin works on the *Ethics* is also demonstrated by the work of Eli ben Yosef Habillo, active in Aragon in 1465–1477, who translated into Hebrew several Latin Aristotle commentaries, including Johannes Versoris' *Questions on the Ethics*.[95] Nonetheless, there was apparently no definitive switch from Arabic to Latin works: an anonymous Hebrew translation of al-Fārābī's compendium on the *EN* (in a metacommentary on Averroes) seems to be datable to the first half of the fifteenth century. Even though it may have been done from the Latin,[96] it suggests a continued influence of works from the Muslim world.

1.4 Nachleben *(III): The Latin West*

1.4.1 *The Initial Reception, ca. 1100–1400*

In the Latin West, the recovery of Aristotle occurred considerably later than in the Muslim and Byzantine worlds. Latin interpreters were therefore able to build upon the accomplishments in both Greek and Arabic from the previous centuries. However, some of Aristotle's works were known during the early Middle Ages. Thanks to the translation activity of Boethius (ca. 480–ca. 526), all of Aristotle's *Organon* (with the possible exception of the *Posterior Analytics*) was made available; therefore, access was given to the *Categories*, the *De interpretatione*, the *Prior Analytics*, and the *Topics* and *Elenchi*.[97] Of these works, however, only the *Categories*, the *De interpretatione* and (fragmentarily) the *Topics* were known at the beginning of the twelfth century.[98]

In the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a burst of translation activity from the Greek and the Arabic gave the Latin West nearly all of Aristotle's works (and several spurious ones besides).[99]

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[94] Zonta 1996, pp. 115, 157, 258, 271–74.
[95] *Ibid.*, pp. 270–71.
[96] *Ibid.*, p. 258.
[97] Ebbesen 1987; Minio-Paluello 1972, pp. 328–35; also see Dod 1982.
[98] Minio-Paluello 1972, pp. 425–41; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 357–76.
[99] For an overview, see Dod 1982, pp. 45–79. Classics on the thirteenth-century reception and interpretation of Aristotle are the works by Étienne Gilson, Anneliese Maïer, Martin Grabmann, Ezio Franceschini, and F. van Steenberghen. See also the essays in *CHLMPh.*

In particular, translations were made of the *EN* and *MM*, as well as of the *Politics* and of the (pseudo-Aristotelian) *Economics*.[100] During this period, however, the *EE* was known only fragmentarily, through a work called *De bona fortuna*. This work is a hybrid of *MM* II.8 and *EE* VII.14 (1246b37–1248b11) and had a respectable success: not only does it survive in some 150 manuscripts,[101] but we know of some commentaries based on this work.[102] However, it was not until the fifteenth century that the *EE* became fully available.[103]

The *EN* was translated in four stages.[104] The earliest version (*Ethica vetus*, forty-eight MSS), from the twelfth century, covered only Books II and III.[105] A later translation (*Ethica nova*, forty MSS) may have covered all ten books, but only Book I and fragments of Books II–X survive.[106] Gauthier is inclined to assign this translation to Michael Scot, whose main career consisted of translating works from the Hebrew and Arabic. He dates the translation to around 1215–1220.[107]

Both the attribution and the dating of these two translations, however, have been given a completely new perspective by the recent work of Durling, Bossier, and Vuillemin-Diem.[108] Durling was the first to argue that Burgundione da Pisa—noted mainly as a translator of biblical, homiletical, theological, juridical, and medical texts[109]—

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[100] Much work remains to be done on the medieval translations of these works. Of the volumes on Aristotle's moral philosophy planned for the *Aristoteles latinus*, only those on the *EN* and the *Politics* (in the *translatio imperfecta*) have appeared. Christoph Flüeler is preparing an edition of the *Economics*. We still await volumes on the *MM* and *EE* (fragments).

[101] Another fragmentary thirteenth-century translation of the *EE* survives in only three manuscripts (Dirlmeier 1962, pp. 119–20).

[102] For example, the *Quaestiones in librum de bona fortuna* by Jean de Jandun († 1328); see Lohr, *Traditio* (1970): 214. But see also the commentary by Francesco da Milano mentioned below, Appendix C, no. 34.

[103] On fifteenth-century translations of the *EE*, see below, pp. 50, 52–53.

[104] Dod 1982 and especially Gauthier 1974.

[105] See below, Appendix B, no. 1.

[106] See below, Appendix B, no. 2.

[107] Gauthier 1974, pp. CXLII–CXLVII. Gauthier considers the Ethica Borghesiana and the Ethica Hoferiana to represent fragments of this translation (*ibid.*, pp. CX–CXXXIII). On the other hand, he considers the variant end of Book I (reported in Vatican, BAV, Borgh. 108, f. 262r–v) and the end of Book III (contained *ibid.*, f. 282v and in other sixteen MSS) to represent parts of a (fragmentary?) translation by Hermannus Alemannus from the Arabic, possibly from ca. 1240–44 (Gauthier 1974, pp. CXLVII–CLI; Aristotle, *EN* lat., fasc. 2, pp. 125–31; cf. *AL Codices*, I, pp. 67–68, 156–57).

[108] See Durling 1994, Bossier 1997, and Vuillemin-Diem 1997.

[109] See Classen 1974.

was also responsible for the *translatio vetus* of an Aristotelian text: namely, the *De generatione et corruptione.* Although he did not address the question of other possible translations attributable to Burgundione, Bossier and Vuillemin-Diem have done so. They have concentrated on the well known link between the early translation of the *De generatione* and that of the *Ethics.* Bossier's detailed analysis concludes: (1) that the translator of the *Ethica vetus* and the *Ethica nova* are the same person; (2) that this person is Burgundione de Pisa; and (3) that these works should be placed toward the beginning of Burgundione's translation activity and should be dated no later than 1150.[110] This view has been put forward so recently that scholarly response to it has only just begun. It may well, however, become the new canonical way of understanding the earliest translations of the *EN.*

There is more agreement on the third and fourth translations of the *EN.* In 1246–1247, Robert Grosseteste in Oxford provided another full translation (*Liber Ethicorum, recensio pura,* thirty-six MSS), of which a variant (*editio minor,* twenty-seven MSS) exists.[111] Grosseteste's translation was revised (*recensio recognita,* at least 217 MSS) around 1260–1270 by yet another scholar, perhaps William of Moerbeke.[112] Thus, Grosseteste's translation, whether in the original or revised form, survives in at least 280 MSS. It was the standard base text for lectures and commentaries on the *EN* until, in the fifteenth century, it was partly displaced by the new translations of Leonardo Bruni and John Argyropoulos (see below, § 1.4.2). However, both in Venice and in Paris, Grosseteste's translation continued to be printed (sometimes together with the competing translations) even in the sixteenth century. Not counting reprints, Gauthier lists thirteen different editions between 1476 and 1519.[113] Its last sixteenth-century printing came in 1542.[114] Furthermore, Grosseteste provided the standard translation (which he accompanied by *notulae*) of the Greek commentators on the *Ethics.*[115] It was not displaced until Feliciano's translation in 1541.[116]

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[110] See especially Bossier 1997, p. 102.

[111] See Appendix B, no. 3, which also includes bibliography on Grosseteste.

[112] See Appendix B, no. 4. Gauthier does not favor the attribution to Moerbeke (Gauthier 1974 pp. CCXXXIX–CCXLV); for arguments on the other side, see Brams 1994. A useful overview of Moerbeke's translating activity is furnished in Brams 1990.

[113] Gauthier 1974, pp. CLXIX–CLXX.

[114] Cranz and Schmitt, p. 172.

[115] See Appendix B, nos. 6 and 10.

[116] Feliciano 1541; see Appendix C, no. 65.

The *MM* was first translated into Latin by Bortolomeo da Messina (in the court of King Manfred of Sicily) around 1258–1266,[117] long after the *EN* had started to circulate. It survives in some fifty-six manuscripts, and it is not clear whether two of them preserve a newer translation.[118] In spite of the fair diffusion of this short work, I have been unable to locate any commentaries on it before the sixteenth century.[119] The fact is extremely surprising and requires further investigation.[120]

Before completing this section, a word should be said about the *Economics* and the *Politics*, since these works formed—together with the *Ethics*—the medieval and Renaissance corpus of moral philosophy and were occasionally the object of lecture courses in moral philosophy in the universities (less so in Italy, see § 2.2.2). The *Politics* was the first of these works to be translated; the *translatio imperfecta* (covering Books I–II) seems to have been in circulation by 1260; the *translatio perfecta*, by William of Moerbeke, was finished in 1265 or, at the latest, by 1267/68.[121] The Latin translation survives in over 100 manuscripts.[122]

The (pseudo-) Aristotelian *Economics* was translated three (or possibly four) times in the thirteenth century. The oldest translation is the *translatio vetus* (fifteen MSS); a partial revision, possibly by William of Moerbeke, survives in a single manuscript. The most popular translation was that by Durandus de Alvernia (datable to 1295, eighty-nine MSS), which covers only the first and third books of the *Economics*. It is unclear whether the significant variants in this translation—

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[117] *AL Codices*, I, pp. 71–72 and 159–60; Dirlmeier 1958, pp. 111–12.

[118] The manuscripts are listed in Pannier 1988; cf. Dirlmeier 1958, p. 111.

[119] To my knowledge, the first commentary on the *MM* was prepared by Vitus Amerbach (1503–1557); it was published in Basel (see Amerbach 1554). On Amerbach, see Lohr, RLAC, p. 13.

[120] The reception of minor pseudo-Aristotelian works such as the *Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν* (*De virtutibus et vitiis*) and the *Summa Alexandrinorum* (a compendium of the *EN* translated into Latin from the Arabic by Hermannus Alemannus, ca. 1243) cannot be discussed here. For some pointers, see Pseudo-Andronicus 1977; Mansion 1964, pp. 90–91; above, n. 79; and cf. *AL Codices*, I, pp. 73–74. Concerning the reception of the pseudo-Andronican *Περὶ παθῶν*, whose two sections circulated as the *De passionibus Andronici Peripatetici* and *De laudabilibus bonis* or *De virtute* respectively, see Kraye 1981, pp. 132–33. On both the *Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν* and the *Περὶ παθῶν* see also above, p. 36.

[121] Bossier 1989 and Flüeler 1992, pp. 15–29.

[122] Michaud-Quantin 1961; Dod 1982, p. 78; Schneider 1987.

which became the standard textbook for university lectures—point to yet another translation.[123]

From this sketch, it is clear that the *EN* was the most popular of Aristotle's works on moral philosophy in the later Middle Ages. Not only is the number of manuscripts containing the work an important witness (368 MSS vs. 100 for the *Politics* and 105 for the *Economics*), but the number of commentaries points toward the same conclusion. I know of at least 240 works on the *EN* in the late Middle Ages; this is more than double the number of surviving commentaries on the *Politics* (115 works) or *Economics* (ninety-seven works).[124] In Italy the dominance of the *EN* was even more pronounced, since the course in moral philosophy usually concentrated exclusively on the *Ethics*. And the popularity of the *Ethics* is further confirmed by works such as Brunetto Latini's *Trésor*, a compendium of the *EN*, which also circulated separately in Italian and Spanish translations.[125]

1.4.2 *The Impact of Humanism, ca. 1400–1650*

During the fifteenth century, Italy was the European center for Latin translations of Aristotle's moral philosophy.[126] The first such retranslation known was due to Leonardo Bruni, chancellor of Florence, who in 1416/17 provided a new version of the *EN* (at least 246 MSS).[127] This was followed by fresh translations of the *Economics* in 1420 (256 MSS) and of the *Politics* in 1436 (121 MSS).[128] These works had a broad diffusion, not only in manuscript copies, but also in numerous printed editions during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. We know of at least thirteen printed editions of Bruni's translation of the *EN* in the sixteenth century, forty-nine of his *Economics*, and forty-eight of his *Politics*.[129]

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[123] Flüeler 1998b and forthcoming.

[124] The data on the commentaries of the *Politics* and *Economics* are taken from Flüeler 1992, II, *passim*.

[125] On Latini, see especially *DCLI*, II, pp. 546–48 (M. Pazzaglia).

[126] The translations of Aristotle's works after 1400 (not addressed by the *Aristoteles latinus* project) are far less studied than those for the previous period. The following will have to serve as a provisional sketch. For useful information, see Garin 1951a.

[127] Appendix C, no. 26.

[128] Hankins 1997, *ad indicem*. Of the latter two works, most of the scholarly attention has been focused on the *Economics*; see Goldbrunner 1968; Soudek 1958, 1968, and 1976; and Jackson 1992.

[129] Cranz and Schmitt, pp. 172, 185, and 216; see Appendix C, no. 26.

The originality of these translations should not be overstated;[130] nonetheless, they are emblematic of the intense interest in the *Ethics* on the part of fifteenth-century Florentines and other cultural figures active in Florence.[131] For example, Roberto de' Rossi may have authored a translation of the *EN*; the work, however, does not survive, and it is possible that he made only an oral paraphrases of the work (or none at all).[132] The case of Giannozzo Manetti (1396–1459), however, is clearer. A Florentine merchant and political figure who was also active in Rome and Naples, Manetti translated the *EN*, *EE*, and *MM*; since these translations are dedicated to Alfonso king of Aragon († 1458), they were probably written during the 1450s, when Manetti was residing in the king's court in Naples.[133] A bit earlier, an Augustinian Hermit active in Bologna and Tuscany, Andrea Biglia (ca. 1395–1435) authored a retranslation of the *EN* which seems to survive in a single manuscript copy.[134] Nothing seems to be known about a certain Severino, who provided a retranslation of *EN* I, probably toward the end of the fifteenth century.[135]

The most successful of the fifteenth-century (and, indeed, of the sixteenth-century) translations of the *EN* was that by John Argyropoulos (1415–1487), a Byzantine émigré whose teaching career in Italy embraced Florence, Milan, and Rome. In February 1457, Argyropoulos started teaching the *Ethics* at the *studium* in Florence.[136] Although he lectured on Bruni's version of the text, he may have started on his own retranslation of the *EN* during this period. Three redactions of this translation are known: an undated one surviving in a single manuscript, one dedicated to Cosimo de' Medici (and therefore from before 1464) surviving in at least four manuscripts, and a final ver-

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[130] Bruni's translation of the *Ethics*, for example, was often printed together with Thomas' commentary on the same work (see Gauthier 1969, pp. 51*–56*), and his translation of the *Economics* is little more than a revision of previous translations (see Garin 1951b, p. 64, n. 3).

[131] The Florentine leadership in this field in fifteenth-century Italy is examined below, pp. 181–84.

[132] Garin 1951a, pp. 59 ff. A few of Rossi's writings, including the dedicatory letter to his translation of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, have been published in Manetti 1951.

[133] For the literature and the manuscripts of Manetti's *EN* translation, see Appendix C, no. 31. Manetti's translations of the *EE* and *MM* are discussed below.

[134] See Appendix C, no. 27.

[135] See Appendix C, no. 59.

[136] The prolusions to Argyropoulos' course are in Argyropoulos 1970a and 1970b; see Appendix C, nos. 35 and 36.

sion dedicated to Pope Sixtus IV.[137] The latter redaction, completed by 1478, was the most popular one. It was printed at least seven times in the fifteenth century, and at least eighty-one times in the sixteenth century. It also continued to be printed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This printing success was partly due to the fact that Argyropoulos' translation was one of the three (along with Bruni's and the older medieval translation) to be included in the *Decem librorum Moralium Aristotelis, tres conversiones*, a work that was printed repeatedly in Paris between 1497 and 1542.[138] Second, many commentaries on the *EN* were based on Argyropoulos' translation, which therefore was reproduced together with the commentaries. This was the case, among others, for the commentaries by Donato Acciaiuoli and Lefèvre d'Étaples.[139]

The success of Argyropoulos' translation did not, however, discourage others from undertaking new translations of the *Ethics*. For the sixteenth century alone we know of at least twenty such attempts, most of which took place in France. No detailed comparative study has been made of these translations, and for most of them we even lack individual analyses. Nonetheless, some of the most famous of these works were those by Joachim Périon (first edition, 1540), Jacques Louis d'Estrebay (1549), Nicolas de Grouchy (1552), and Denys Lambin (1558),[140] whose translation went through at least three redactions. Among the Italians, one of the most successful translations was that by Giovanni Bernardo Feliciano (first edition, 1541), who retranslated, not only Aristotle's *EN*, but the Greek commentaries as well.[141] Shortly afterwards, in 1547, followed a translation of the *EN* by Bernardino Trebazio, but it was printed only once.[142] In addition to the translations into Latin there was also an explosion of translations

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[137] On Argyropoulos' translation, see below, Appendix C, no. 36.

[138] See, for example, Aristotle 1497.

[139] On Acciaiuoli's commentary see Appendix C, no. 38. For the printings of Lefèvre's commentary with Aristotle's translation, see Appendix C, no. 37. Even the medieval translation that sometimes accompanied Thomas' *Sententia* was contaminated by Argyropoulos' translation (Gauthier 1971b, p. vi).

[140] On these authors, see Gauthier 1970a, pp. 174–77. Stimulating comments on several of these figures can be found in Kraye (forthcoming).

[141] See Appendix C, nos. 65 and 66. For a negative judgment of Feliciano's translation of the Greek commentators, see especially Gauthier 1970a, p. 173 and Mercken 1990a, p. 410.

[142] See Appendix C, no. 69.

into the vernacular during the sixteenth century; these, however, cannot be discussed here.[143]

As commentators of the *Ethics* became more knowledgeable of Greek, they increasingly accompanied their commentaries with their own Latin translations. Examples of this trend in sixteenth-century Italy are the commentaries by Claudio Betti,[144] Francesco Benci,[145] and Antonio Riccoboni.[146] Even one of the most accomplished translations of the *EN* during the sixteenth century, by Pier Vettori, was not published separately, but provided together with his commentary on the work.[147] This tendency continued throughout the first half of the seventeenth century. The best examples are the commentaries with translation by Vittorio Venturelli,[148] Camillo Baldi,[149] and the Jesuit Tarquinio Galluzzi.[150]

As mentioned above, it is only in the fifteenth century that the Latin West is given a full translation of the *EE*. This accomplishment occurred in the 1450s thanks to Gregorio Tifernate and Giannozzo Manetti, who presumably worked independently of one another. Tifernate (1414–1466) prepared his translation for Pope Nicholas V. It was completed around 1453 and survives in at least two manuscripts.[151] Manetti's translation survives in three manuscripts[152] and was dedicated instead—like his other translations—to King Alfonso of Aragon. Neither of these works appears to have been printed. Another, anonymous translation, apparently based on the Greek text of the Aldine 1498 edition, first appeared in the Basel edition of Aristotle's works printed in 1538. This translation was reprinted at

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[143] For a brief overview, see Gauthier 1970a, pp. 178–79.

[144] See Appendix C, nos. 87–88.

[145] Appendix C, nos. 98–99.

[146] Appendix C, nos. 107–08.

[147] Appendix C, nos. 93–94.

[148] Appendix C, nos. 133–34.

[149] Appendix C, nos. 140–41.

[150] Appendix C, nos. 154–55.

[151] Florence, BLaur., Plut. LXXIX, 15 (s. XV); Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2096 (A.D. 1453–1455), ff. 413v–465v. Harlfinger 1971, p. 24 mentions only the Florentine manuscript, as does Garin 1951a, p. 73. On the Vatican manuscript, see Kristeller, *Iter*, II, p. 311; *ibid.*, VI, p. 329 (with bibliography); Leonardi 1987, pp. 152–58. On Tifernate's translating activity, see Garin 1951a, pp. 72–74.

[152] Manetti's translation of the *EE* survives in Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 223 (s. XV), ff. 47–127; Pal. lat. 1021 (s. XV), ff. 50–121v (see Harlfinger 1971, p. 24); and Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Library, ms. 92 (s. XV) (see Kristeller, *Iter*, V, p. 240).

least another twenty-one times during the sixteenth century;[153] it appears to have been one of the main means of access to the *EE* in the high Renaissance. Interested readers could have also found the work in the Greek text (printed seven times in the sixteenth century).[154]

Tifernate and Manetti were also responsible for retranslations of the *MM*. However, their works were never printed (and, to my knowledge, have not been studied).[155] Another fifteenth-century translation of this work, by Giorgio Valla (ca. 1430–1499), enjoyed instead a resounding success: the work was printed twice in the fifteenth century (Venice 1488 and 1496) and at least thirty-six times in the course of the sixteenth century.[156] It was thus a far more successful work than the translation by Gérard Roussel (Girardus Ruffus Vacariensis, † 1550), a student of Lefèvre d'Étaples whose text was used by Josse Clichtove for his commentary between 1516 and 1522.[157] It was also better known than the translations by Vitus Amerbach (1503–1557, active in Wittenberg and Ingolstadt)[158] and Nicasius Ellebodius (Helbault, 1535–1577, active in Padua). The latter's translation was not printed and had a very limited manuscript circulation.[159]

Before the fifteenth century, the *De virtutibus et vitiis* had only a limited diffusion in the Latin West. In the fifteenth century, however, a number of Greek manuscripts containing the work arrived in Italy. Thereafter, the work was at times appended to manuscripts of the *EN*. On other occasions it was transmitted as part of the *Sententiae* of Stobaeus. Finally, it was sometimes included in the *Περὶ παθῶν*, a work misattributed to Andronicus of Rhodes.[160] By 1608,

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[153] Harlfinger 1971, pp. 24–25.

[154] Some readers of Leonardo Bruni's enormously popular *Isagogicon moralis disciplinae* thought they were reading at least a compendium of the *EE*, possibly because printers themselves confused the two works (James Hankins, personal communication).

[155] Tifernate's translation of the *MM* can be found in Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2096 (A.D. 1453–1455), ff. 369v–413r. I know of three copies of Manetti's translation of the *MM*: Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 223 (s. XV), ff. 1–46; Pal. lat. 1021 (s. XV), ff. 1r–49v; and Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Library, ms. 92 (s. XV) (see Kristeller, *Iter*, V, p. 240).

[156] Cranz and Schmitt, p. 179.

[157] Ruffus 1522. The work, which goes under various titles, received at least three editions: s.l.a. (post 1516); Paris 1522; Paris 1537. See Lohr, RLAC, p. 94; cf. Cranz and Schmitt, p. 179.

[158] Amerbach 1554; see Cranz and Schmitt, p. 179: only two editions.

[159] Wagner 1973; Lohr, RLAC, p. 134. So far only one manuscript is known: Milan, BAmbr., D.291.inf., ff. 119r–151v. On Ellebodius see also below, Appendix C, at no. 73.

[160] On this work, see above, n. 120.

at least fourteen different translations of the work had been carried out.[161] The first was by Ciriaco d'Ancona. In the sixteenth century came another seven Latin translations and one Italian one. There were two further translations in the early seventeenth century. The Greek text was first printed in 1529 (in Paris), so some time after the *editio princeps* of Aristotle's works in Greek (Venice, 1495–1498). After the Basel edition of Aristotle's *Opera* (1539) the work appears consistently in all the important subsequent editions of the Greek text.[162]

As we shall see, the increasing availability of the *EE* and *MM* posed a challenge for the commentators of the *EN*, since they were forced to consider all three of these ethical works and sometimes rose to the challenge of ironing out their differences. Nonetheless, the *EN* remained the standard textbook used in the universities. Since the main interest of this book is to study how Aristotle's conception of moral education was understood and modified in the universities of late-medieval and Renaissance Italy, the following section offers a brief sketch of Aristotle's theory of moral education as presented in the *EN*.

1.5 *Aristotle on Moral Education*

How does one become good, in Aristotle's view?[163] Aristotle begins from the assumption that there are two kinds of people, and that therefore two different approaches are necessary for promoting virtue in a polity:

> Now if arguments were in themselves enough to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such

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[161] Listed in Schmitt 1979a, pp. 109–11.

[162] This paragraph is based on Schmitt 1979a, pp. 103–11.

[163] Classic and recent examinations of this and related topics are too numerous to be listed here. For a bibliographical overview, see Gauthier 1970b, pp. 917–40 (annotated); *Articles on Aristotle*, pp. 219–33 and *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, pp. 357–72. A more selective bibliography is given in Crisp 1999, pp. 141–43. For general considerations on Aristotelianism and ethics, see van Steenberghen 1971, and Ritter and Romberg 1972. Useful collections of essays on the *Ethics* may be found in *Articles on Aristotle; Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*; Anton and Preus 1991, and Sherman 1999. Directly relevant are also Lambert 1976 and Sherman 1982. An excellent monograph on this topic is Verbeke 1990a.

> rewards should have been provided; but as things are, while they seem to have power to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among the young, and to make a character which is gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by excellence, they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness. For these do not by nature obey the sense of shame, but only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of punishment . . .[164]

Since most people do what is good only under compulsion, it is necessary to have laws that will dissuade them from evil behavior. Thus, those who are of inferior nature to the virtuous and disobey will be corrected as beasts of burden are; those for whom there is no remedy must instead be banished (X.9; 1180a1–13). Aristotle's scarce patience with those who live by their passions (and therefore have no experience or idea of what is truly noble) is clear. He knows that outward conformity to what is just, motivated by fear of the law, is not the same as an inner delight in what is good; but he nevertheless sees the possibility that good and well-enforced laws may at least provide order, if not virtue.

We may be forgiven if Aristotle's comments on the function of the law in *EN* X.9 seem to be an afterthought. Throughout the *EN*, Aristotle's concern has been, not with the passionate, who are kept in check only by fear of punishment, but with those who are already pursuing what is good. Indeed, Aristotle does not even countenance the possibility that those unpractised in virtue should hear lessons on moral philosophy: the latter require experience of life and the ability to judge about what is being discussed. Since the end of such teaching is not knowledge but action, those who are still living by their passions are unprofitable hearers, especially if they have no desire to practice virtue. The young are excluded by definition, partly because they cannot easily understand the methodological difference between ethics (which concerns the specific and uncertain) and science in the strong sense (I.3, 1094b28–1095a11; X.9). Furthermore, whereas their inferiors must be governed by fear, those on the way to virtue are aided by their sense of shame (X.9, 1179b10–11), aptly described by Burnyeat as "the semivirtue of the learner."[165] Again, while the others must receive their training at the hands of the law,

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[164] Aristotle 1984, p. 1864 (*EN* X.9, 1179b4–10).
[165] Burnyeat 1980, p. 78.

those on the way toward virtue are rather spurred on by teaching and exhortation (X.9, 1180a6–8). The laws of the state have, for them, the more palatable function of sustaining their yearnings for virtue rather than of forcing upon them a form of submission.

If not by the law, however, how are these "lovers of what is noble" to know what is noble in the first place? And how do they actually become good? Aristotle describes a process that involves, in various ways, nature, teaching, and habituation. Some people are good by nature and hardly need anyone to tell them what is good. But these are the "truly fortunate," and Aristotle does not focus on them (X.9, 1179b20–22). He is more interested in the rôles of teaching and habituation. Contrary to our expectations, however, teaching does not precede, but rather follows practice:

> . . . argument and teaching, we may suspect, are not powerful with all men, but the soul of the student must first have been cultivated by means of habits for noble joy and noble hatred, like earth which is to nourish seed. For he who lives as passion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, nor understand it if it does; and how can we persuade such a one to change his ways? (X.9, 1179b23–28)

In Book II Aristotle discusses at length the rôle of habit or disposition. He compares the moral excellences to skill in the arts: both are acquired and developed in the same way—through practice: "by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly" (II.1, 1103b14–17). Later, however, we hear that, because practice is so fundamental (and because pleasure has grown familiar to us from infancy), it is of crucial importance that we form the proper habits "from our very youth" (II.2, 1105a1–2; II.1, 1103b24–26).[166] There is therefore some room for instruction before habits are formed, but the teaching is not really of a formal kind—it seems rather to consist in a good upbringing. The crucial passage concerning this early stage is in Book I, where Aristotle discusses how to determine "what is the highest of all goods achievable by action" (I.4, 1095a15–16). Where must one begin?

> While we must begin with what is familiar, things are so in two ways—some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must

[166] The Greek has *ἐκ νεῶν*; cf. 1104b11–12.

> begin with things familiar to us. Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the facts [*τὸ ὅτι*, "the that"] are the starting-point, and if they are sufficiently plain to him, he will not need the reason [*τὸ διότι*, "the because"] as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting-points. And as for him who has neither ["the that" nor "the because"],[167] let him hear the words of Hesiod:
>
> Far best is he who knows all things himself;
> Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
> But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
> Another's wisdom, is a useless wight. (I.4, 1095b1–12)

Aristotle therefore distinguishes two possible starting points—the facts and the reason behind them—and shows that the former are the true starting points. What the "facts" are has been variously interpreted to refer to happiness or to virtue. The latter seems to be the case, although here again we must choose between definitions. Burnyeat is probably right to define the "facts" as "correct ideas about what actions are noble and just." But, as Burnyeat observes, it is not a matter of knowing specific rules or of forming, through experience and induction, a general concept of "noble" and "just"; rather, it is a matter of "knowing of specific actions that they are noble or just in specific circumstances."[168] Otherwise, Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Ideas (I.6) would be pointless.

According to Aristotle, a proper upbringing is key to gaining this specific knowledge or starting point. This is so, partly because we do not know what is noble and just without being told. Beyond that, it has to do with Aristotle's view of virtue as concerned with pleasures and pains. Since virtue consists, to a large extent, in taking pleasure and feeling pain in the proper things and to the proper degree, and since our natural propensity for pleasure often gets in the way of correct judgment, "we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education" (II.3, 1104b11–14). Furthermore, a training of this sort also possesses a specific cognitive dimension in the sense of making personal the knowledge received: "You need . . . to be

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[167] Reading with Burnyeat 1980, p. 71.
[168] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

guided in your conduct so that by doing the things you are told are noble and just you will discover that what you have been told is *true.* What you may begin by taking on trust you can come to know for yourself."[169]

This is by no means to have arrived at the goal of virtuous living; it is only the start. For even the virtuous actions resulting from a good upbringing—however internalized and made second nature—are not complete. They cannot be defined as "virtuous" in the full sense, for Aristotle sees virtue as going well beyond the formal aspect of conformity to a standard or law. The excellences are different from the arts in this respect. It is not enough, for example, to be temperate in one's eating, but one must be so for the right reasons and in the right conditions. Aristotle argues: "The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does [the excellences]; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character" (II.4, 1105a30–b1). Certainly, a good upbringing and personal practice are meant to instill some amount of proper knowledge, choice, and habit (so skillfully intertwined in this visionary tapestry of virtue) in the cooperative youth, but none of these is fully developed. He knows what actions are noble and just, but he does not yet know *why* they are so.

Taking delight in the good for its own sake cannot really be expected at this stage. Not even the virtues have yet been acquired, for a youth still lacks practical wisdom. The task of providing the necessary information (and motivation) to arrive at this more perfect stage is entrusted, therefore, to a second level of education. This is precisely what the *Nicomachean Ethics* wants to accomplish for the person who is already on the path toward virtue. Through an expla-

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[169] *Ibid.*, p. 74. Other interpreters see the mechanism of learning virtue by doing virtuous acts in a slightly different light; see Broadie 1991, pp. 103–10, especially p. 109: "Learning that there are things which one is expected to do even when all concerned are aware that one does not feel like doing them is perhaps the only way we have of learning from scratch that there are things worth doing and aiming for which are not immediately pleasant. . . . We do not need to know why the enjoined things are good, and we may be incapable of understanding the reasons. We learn by practice that they are good, because by our practice we accept that the authority who says so means it; we also thereby learn that these things are good in a way which belongs to a world beyond the world of impulse, since their claim overrides what we feel like; and from this we know that the things which we immediately felt like doing could never be good in that way."

nation of what makes the virtues good and how they fit into a flourishing life, Aristotle motivates the prepared student for higher virtuous action—thus Aristotle's frequent insistence on ethics as a *practical* science.[170]

Book VI offers some insights as to where the second educational phase fits in within a general program of studies. Starting from a distinction between sciences (concerned exclusively with universals) and practical wisdom (which must consider both the universals and the particulars, VI.7, 1141b8–22), Aristotle explains the common notion that a young man can become a geometrician or mathematician, but not a man of practical wisdom: "The cause is that such wisdom is not concerned with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is length of time that gives experience; indeed one might ask this question too, why a boy may become a mathematician, but not a wise man or a natural scientist" (VI.8, 1142a13–17). Aristotle argues that youth works against real knowledge, in physics and metaphysics, because the first principles must derive from experience (VI.8, 1142a17–21).[171] Although Aristotle does not specify in what order moral philosophy, natural philosophy, and metaphysics should be learned,[172] we at least know that moral philosophy is to be studied after mathematics and geometry, and that the requirement of experience (as in the case of natural philosophy and metaphysics) makes it senseless for young men to study ethics. The comments at the end of Book I on the parts of the soul suggest that Aristotle wishes his student to have already some basic knowledge of psychology;[173] and a full understanding of the *Ethics* requires an understanding of the *Metaphysics*;[174] so it is clear that Aristotle considers ethics an advanced subject.

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[170] Cf. Burnyeat 1980, pp. 74, 81. Burnyeat's contention (p. 71 ff.) that this second stage is equivalent to discovering the "reason" (or "because," *διότι*) of 1095b2–13 may seem odd, since Aristotle says specifically that "if the facts are sufficiently plain to him, he will *not* need the reason as well" (emphasis mine). However, Aristotle seems to be referring to the beginning stage of moral education. Elsewhere he states that those who only know that something is so, but do not know why, are inferior to those who do also know the cause (cf. *Metaphysics* A.1, 981a27–29).

[171] For the relationship of natural science, mathematics, and theology, cf. *Metaphysics* Λ.7, 1064b1.

[172] The relative dignity of the subjects is, of course, a separate issue.

[173] On the concept of the soul underlying Aristotle's *EN*, see Verbeke 1990a, Ch. 9.

[174] See on this subject Irwin 1980 and Verbeke 1990a, Ch. 10.

When ethics should be studied is a subject discussed especially in *EN* I.3. There, Aristotle discusses the requirements of time and experience if one is to be an appropriate hearer of ethics. This passage, as we shall see, gave rise to amusing hermeneutical gymnastics during the Renaissance, since Aristotle argues that the immature (*ὁ νέος*) has no business studying the subject. However, Aristotle is clearly not referring only to the emotionally immature (an older person who is not mature in this way is also disqualified), but also to the young in years, who not only tend to lack self-control, but also have had no first-hand experience of political affairs and possibly have little appreciation for the methodological peculiarities of ethics. What age does Aristotle therefore have in mind? The term *νέος* in classical Greek could apply, with some flexibility, to "children, youth, and . . . men at least as old as 30,"[175] and Aristotle himself at times seems to use the terms *παῖς* (child) and *νέος* interchangeably (*EN* VI.8, 1142a11–21). But from *Rhetoric* II.12–14 we learn that Aristotle sees three phases of life: youth, the prime of life, and old age. Aristotle considers the body to be mature between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; mental maturity, however, comes later, around age forty-nine (*ibid.*, 1390b 9–10). It would therefore seem that Aristotle's ideal of education is compatible with that of Plato, who thought that those under thirty are too young to study dialectic (*Republic* VII, 539a–540c), whereas at the age of fifty those who have had political experience are old enough "to turn upward the vision of their souls and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all, . . . devoting the greater part of their time to the study of philosophy."[176] So Aristotle seems to have considered this stage of maturity the ideal time in which to hear moral philosophy.[177]

How does Aristotle propose that those who are well prepared be educated in virtue? In a sense, the *EN* is itself the answer—Aristotle apparently senses the need to provide a solid theoretical base which will in turn help men develop their moral and intellectual excellences. But Aristotle also refers (X.9) to other specific means of encouraging their desire to be good. Words or arguments (*λόγοι*) must have their part; while ineffective for those who are not pre-

[175] Liddell and Scott 1940, article *νέος*, p. 1169.
[176] *Republic* VII, 540a, trans. Plato 1961, p. 771.
[177] Also see Gauthier 1970a, p. 16, n. 33.

pared, they do deeply appeal to the sense of shame of the others; thus reproof is also envisioned (X.9, 1179b20–31).

Aristotle is concerned that moral education be aimed at more than reason alone: indeed, both reason and appetite should jointly aim at the noble (III.12). Therefore, the unreasoned emotive responses of properly trained youth are not superseded but integrated by mature reflection on virtue. Even at the advanced stage, moral development is not a matter of reason or knowledge alone,[178] but also a matter of integrating the pleasant with the noble and the advantageous (II.3, 1104b30–35). Aristotle's position must therefore be seen in contrast with that of Socrates, who identified virtue with knowledge and thus denied the possibility that a truly knowledgeable man could be akratic (VI.13, 1144b17–19; VII.2, 1145b22–1146a9).[179]

This point deserves some comment. Aristotle defines virtue as "a state (ἕξις) concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it" (II.6, 1106b36–1107a2). In a sense, this definition only perfects the description of virtue as a ἕξις offered in Plato's writings.[180] However, Aristotle tries to distance himself from Socrates and Plato by distinguishing the moral from the intellectual virtues, and by emphasizing that the moral virtues derive not from teaching, but from practice.[181] If this is the case, is teaching unnecessary? No, because the exercise of virtue involves realizing, not only the end at which one should aim (the particular noble action), but the means whereby to attain it (VI.12, 1144a6–23). The latter is a function of prudence, which includes knowledge both of particular facts and of general principles (VI.7, 1141b20–25). Knowledge of the particular does indeed require experience (VI.8, 1142a12–24), which Aristotle assumes to develop naturally over time (VI.11, 1143b6–17), just as correctness in deliberation or the ability to judge correctly might (VI.9–10). But prudence nonetheless remains

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[178] Burnyeat notes that mature morality "must in large matter continue to be . . . a matter of responses deriving from sources other than reflective reason" (Burnyeat 1980, p. 80). Also see Kosman 1980 and Verbeke 1990a, Ch. 7.

[179] Cf. also the comments in Burnyeat 1980, pp. 70, 87–88; for Socrates and akrasia, see especially Plato's *Protagoras*, 351b ff.

[180] *Cratylus*, 415d; *Republic* IX, 591b; X, 618d; *Sophist*, 247a; *Laws* VII, 790e–791b; IX, 870c.

[181] Gauthier 1970a, p. 105; on Aristotle and "ethical intellectualism" see especially Verbeke 1990a, Ch. 5.

a kind of *knowledge* and has to do also with the universal—i.e., with what is good for man in general (VI.7, 1141b8–20). As such, it is doubtless part of man's activity of contemplation, discussed in Book X. There is therefore no reason why the universal component cannot be taught.[182] Because of its hybrid character, however (it includes both the contingent and the necessary), moral philosophy cannot properly be called a science. Its object is the particular (free human action), and its aim is action. Consequently, its method must be something other than the dialectical and the scientific, including in its purview both experience and the rectification of the passions (I.4, 1095b2–4).[183]

Aristotle's discussion of method is offered in three different instances in Book I: in I.3 (1094b11–1095a11), I.4 (1095a31–b13), and I.7 (1098a26–b8). In the first passage, Aristotle states that mathematical precision should not be expected in ethics, since the actions with which ethics is concerned "exhibit much variety and fluctuation." He then turns to the proper hearer of lectures on ethics. Observing that "each man judges well the things he knows," Aristotle disqualifies the young from hearing the subject, since they are "inexperienced in the actions that occur in life," which constitute this discipline's very subject.[184] In the second passage, Aristotle praises Plato for having asked, "Are we on the way from or to the first principles?" Or, put in slightly different terms, the question is whether one needs to start from what is generally familiar or from what is familiar *to us*. Aristotle opts for the latter. In the last passage, Aristotle warns against looking for the same kind of precision in all subject-matters. Although the first principles are the starting point in any investigation, how we arrive at them varies: "of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others

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[182] Cf. Gauthier 1970a, pp. 24, 564–66.

[183] See Verbeke 1990a, pp. 226–30; cf. Gauthier 1970a, pp. 23–25. On the practical aim of Aristotelian ethics, see especially Nussbaum 1994, Ch. 2.

[184] "Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action" (*EN* I.3, 1094b28–1095a5).

too in other ways. But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the natural way," that is, in the way appropriate to it.

Clearly there are close parallels among these passages, and Gauthier carries further the views of Ramsauer and Susemihl that at least the second passage is a doublet of the first, occurring just a few lines after it. In fact, Gauthier proposes that the three passages are successive redactions of Aristotle's argument: I.4 is the oldest redaction, I.7 is the intermediate one, and I.3 is the definitive version.[185] Gauthier thus manages, by philological means, to resolve a problem that troubled several interpreters of the *EN* in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, namely, the relationship between I.3 and I.4. Zabarella, for example, wondered whether Aristotle was referring in the one passage to the method of discovery in ethics and in the other to the method of exposition.[186]

Aristotle's view of the method of ethics is further clarified by his comments on who is responsible for moral training. For the preliminary stage, when upbringing is to bring about good habits, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of compulsive power. Thus, he suggests that a father's authority is not sufficient to bring about good behavior, whereas that of the law is (X.9, 1180a14–24). Aristotle then notes that almost everywhere (except for the Spartan state), each man lives as he wishes, imposing his laws on his family. This, however, is not as it should be: rather, "it is best that there should be a public and proper care for such matters" (1180a29–30).[187] This observation does not receive the full elaboration it deserves, but we do at least learn that, for Aristotle, the state should provide for (preferably individual) education (1180b1–13),[188] and that teachers should have "the universal knowledge of what is good for every one or for people of a certain kind" (1180b14–15). Having this universal knowledge apparently has to do with developing an ability to make laws: "And surely he who wants to make men, whether many or few, better by his care must try to become capable of legislating, if it is through laws that we can become good. For to get anyone

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[185] Gauthier 1970b, pp. 23 ff.

[186] See below, § 7.3. On this topic also see Barnes 1980 and Bolton 1991.

[187] See Verbeke 1990a, pp. 16–18.

[188] From *Politics* VIII.1, 1337a10–32 we learn that education should be public, the same for all, and apparently universal (i.e., for all male freedmen). Aristotle insists on the good example of the Spartans, who "make education the business of the state." Further comments on education are given in the rest of Book VIII.

whatever—anyone who is put before us—into the right condition is not for the first chance comer . . ." (1180b24–27).[189] In this case, as in that of the true learner, experience is essential: one cannot discern which laws are good and which ones not without having had political experience. Aristotle therefore reproves the sophists who wish to teach politics, but have no experience of it, to the point of confusing the subject with rhetoric (1181a13–1181b11).

Aristotle's comments on the method of moral education must have seemed as abstract to his commentators as they do to us. For in the *Ethics* Aristotle gives none of the detail offered in *Politics* VIII, where we discover that the method Aristotle has in mind for the formation of character in youth is the study of music (VIII.5–7), and that education is not addressed to everyone—as might appear—but only to the sons of freedmen.[190] Furthermore, Aristotle leaves us with several unanswered questions. We especially want to know, for example, what it is—since it is not nature—that makes some children take to the habits of virtue that are proposed to them, so that they take pleasure in them, want to practice them regularly, and eventually become fit to learn more about them. What is lacking in the children who do not follow this course? Aristotle assumes that most children will have to be restrained (or trained) through law; did he not believe his proposed method of education to be equally effective for all? Or did he have doubts about the possibility of finding enough fit teachers who were trained in law and knew how to heal the souls of those entrusted to their care? And what did Aristotle think about the teaching of moral philosophy at the higher level? How should those teachers be trained, and what should their students have studied? Several of these questions, as we shall see, vexed Aristotle's interpreters as much as they do us.

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[189] Aristotle does not, I think, assume here that men become good in the strong sense through laws, but only refers to the ability of good laws to impose at least outward conformity to virtue (cf. his comments earlier in X.9).

[190] See *Politics* VIII.5, 1339a30–1339b10; cf. Plato, *Republic* VI. For a summary of Aristotle's educational program, see Verbeke 1990a, pp. 18–20.

CHAPTER TWO

THE *ETHICS* IN THE UNIVERSITIES

In order to understand the context in which university commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics* were written, this chapter studies how moral philosophy was taught in the Italian universities. The main topics treated concern the beginnings of moral philosophy teaching in the Italian universities, which parts of it were emphasized, who its audience was, and at what point it was studied during the philosophy program. On what books was moral philosophy based, and how did teachers go about teaching their material? Before addressing the Italian situation, however, § 2.1 offers a brief sketch of ethics teaching in Paris, which often served as a curricular model for the Arts program in the Italian universities.[1] This sketch is complemented by references to Oxford University and the universities of central Europe. Only a few introductory comments are necessary on the structure of the philosophical curriculum in the medieval universities.

Up to the twelfth century, medieval education was based on the teaching of the seven liberal arts, already established in late antiquity and divided into two successive stages: the *trivium* (grammar, logic, rhetoric) and the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy). With the rise of the universities, however, there emerged a considerable debate as to the proper division (and teaching) of the sciences. This discussion reached fever pitch in the first half of the thirteenth century and interested the *quadrivium* in a special way. Eventually the consensus was reached to replace the system of the seven liberal arts with another two-tiered system, of introductory subjects (grammar and rhetoric) and philosophy. The latter was divided into speculative (metaphysics, mathematics, natural philosophy) and practical (moral philosophy). Logic often fell outside of this division, since it was considered an introductory subject and a necessary tool for studying the others; indeed, often it was not considered to be

[1] Kibre 1978a.

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"philosophy" in the proper sense at all.[2] What is especially significant here is that ethics became, in the thirteenth century, a philosophical subject.[3]

This curricular development was closely tied to the recovery of Aristotle's works in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (see § 1.4.1), for scholars were suddenly confronted with a body of knowledge that could not be contained in the traditional categories. A new system of learning was established. In all the universities, the Arts curriculum came to be based on Priscian (for grammar) and Aristotle (for philosophy), even though the confrontation between theologians and the pagan philosopher sometimes led to partial bans against teaching his works.[4] Aristotle continued to be the foundation of the Arts curriculum until well into the seventeenth century, when Cartesianism, along with the recent discoveries in cosmology and other scientific fields, increasingly questioned the authority of the Aristotelian system.[5]

University moral philosophy was also based on Aristotle, in particular on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the (pseudo-Aristotelian) *Economics*, and the *Politics*.[6] Together, these were considered the three branches of moral philosophy.[7] Pride of place, however, went to the *Ethics*, which was the first work of moral philosophy to have been translated (see § 1.4.1) and was always taught before the other two branches. This mattered because a teacher might simply run out of time to treat the other parts of moral philosophy as well. In any case, the

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[2] On the divisions of philosophy during this period see especially Lafleur 1988, van Steenberghen 1994, and L. Baur's comments in Dominicus Gundissalinus 1903, pp. 316–97. On the liberal arts and their relationship with philosophy in the high and late Middle Ages, see Weisheipl 1965 and 1969, the other essays in *Arts libéraux et philosophie*; and, more recently, the essays in Scientia *und* Ars. Specifically relevant to the place of moral philosophy in the division of the sciences are the comments in Flüeler 1992, I, pp. 1–15.

[3] Wieland 1981 and 1997. For the status of ethics before this development, see Delhaye 1948 and 1949.

[4] The most famous case is the prohibition of 1277 in Paris, on which there is by now an over-rich literature. For two recent and different treatments of the general problem, see Thijssen 1998 and Bianchi 1999; see also the essays in *Was ist Philosophie?*

[5] On the progressive displacement of Aristotle in the French universities, see especially Brockliss 1981 and 1987.

[6] For a listing of medieval commentaries (and lectures) on the *Economics* and *Politics* see Flüeler 1992.

[7] Sometimes rhetoric was accorded a place among the subjects of moral philosophy. See, for example, the plan of studies by Pierre Dubois (a. 1309) in Thorndike 1971, p. 144 (138–49). See also Siraisi 1976.

statutes for Paris from 1366 and 1452 (see below) lay special stress on *Ethics* teaching when referring to moral philosophy. Thus, while the discussion that follows relates in general to the teaching of moral philosophy in the universities, the *Ethics* is the specific focus.

2.1 *Paris*

In Paris and the universities that modeled themselves after it (including Oxford), the Arts curriculum was considered preparatory to Law, Medicine, and Theology. Partly because of the peculiar origins of the University of Paris, the faculties of Civil Law and Medicine were not especially strong there, whereas that of Theology was. Thus, a close relationship developed in Paris between Arts and Theology, illustrated by the fact that many of the teachers in the Arts faculty were doctoral students in Theology. The close association that developed in Italy between Arts and Medicine (see below) was completely absent in the northern universities.[8] This situation affected the teaching of moral philosophy in Paris and Oxford, where a special relationship developed between moral philosophy on the one hand, and metaphysics and theology on the other. As we shall see, in Italy the stonger tie in the medieval universities was between natural and moral philosophy. Before examining the situation in Italy, however, it is useful to discuss the beginnings of ethics teaching in the northern universities and describe how the subject was taught there.[9]

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[8] Kibre 1978a and 1978b.

[9] My internal division of the subject into two parts ("Place in the Curriculum" and "Teaching Method") follows the organization in Father Weisheipl's excellent study of the Arts curriculum in Oxford (Weisheipl 1964). The scholarly literature on the universities during the medieval and early modern periods is immense. Recent works especially relevant to the curricular structure and pedagogical practices in the universities between 1200 and 1700 are the following: Verger 1992, Maierù 1994, Methuen 1998, Freedman 1999; and the essays in *The Cultural Context; Rebirth; Luoghi e metodi; Filosofi e teologi; La filosofia nelle università; Manuels; L'enseignement des disciplines; Vocabulaire des écoles; Vocabulary of Teaching and Research; Philosophy and Learning; History of the University in Europe*, I and II; *Università dell'Europa*, V and VI; *Transfert des savoirs; Artisten und Philosophen; Centres of Learning*; and *Universities and Schooling*. Still useful are older works such as Rashdall 1936 and *Arts libéraux et philosophie*.

2.1.1 *Place in the Curriculum*

As noted above (§ 1.4.1), a section of the *EN* (Books II–III, the so-called *Ethica vetus*) was first translated, probably around 1150, by Burgundione da Pisa. The first firm evidence of ethics teaching in Paris dates, however, from 1215.[10] In that year the papal legate, Robert of Courçon, allowed lectures on various subjects, including optional ("*si placet*") feast-day lectures on the *Ethics*. Aristotle's metaphysics and natural philosophy, by contrast, were specifically banned; they were probably not taught again until the 1230s or 1240s.[11] This fact explains why, until around 1240, Parisian writings center on logic, grammar, and ethics.[12]

The *Ethics* is again mentioned in the 1255 statutes.[13] This document—basically a course calendar—allots six weeks to the study of the *Ethics* (the first "four" books) if read by itself, twelve if read concurrently with another text. An anonymous crib of *quaestiones* for examination candidates in Paris (datable to the 1230s or 1240s) confirms that the *Ethics* was indeed taught between 1215 and 1255. This "student guide" lists the questions and expected answers for various Arts subjects. Most of it covers logic (60 columns) and grammar (23 columns), but the *Ethics* figures as well, with five columns (more than for the *Metaphysics* and *Physics* combined).[14] Furthermore, several commentaries and tables on the *Ethics* have survived from

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[10] *CUP*, I, no. 20 (English translation in Thorndike 1971, pp. 27–30). Alexander Neckham's list (ca. 1200–1210?) of books (which students should read or on which they should hear lectures), does not include the *Ethics*; see Dod 1982, p. 70; Haskins 1927, pp. 356–76.

[11] See Dod 1982, pp. 70–71; Rashdall 1936, I, pp. 440–41; Grabmann 1916, pp. 205, 214–17. When exactly the teaching of natural philosophy and metaphysics resumed depends in part on when one dates and how one interprets the anonymous student guide referred to in n. 14 below.

[12] Van Steenberghen 1991, p. 130. For a brief discussion of Parisian commentaries on the *Ethics* in the first half of the thirteenth century, see Gauthier 1971b, pp. xv–xvii; cf. idem 1969, pp. 236*–46*.

[13] *CUP*, I, no. 246 (March 19, 1255; English translation in Thorndike 1971, pp. 64–66).

[14] Barcelona, Archives of the Crown of Aragon, ms. Ripoll 109, ff. 134r–158v (ethics, ff. 135v–137r). The work is discussed in Dod 1982, p. 72; Grabmann 1934 and 1940; van Steenberghen 1991, pp. 118–32; Lohr 1982, pp. 84–86. But see especially, for this and other thirteenth-century guides, Lafleur 1994 and 1995, *L'enseignement de la philosophie* (cf. Lafleur 1988), and Lewry 1982. A provisional edition of this guide was distributed by Lafleur in 1992; a definitive edition is forthcoming.

the first half of the thirteenth century, and many of these works seem to be connected with the university.[15]

After the completion of Grosseteste's translation of the *EN* in 1246–1247, the *Ethics* was studied even more intensively in Paris.[16] For the second half of the thirteenth century, Thomas' commentary should especially be mentioned.[17] During the fourteenth century, the most important *Ethics* commentaries continued to be written by men with close connections with Paris: Walter Burley, Albert of Saxony, and especially Jean Buridan are only some of the more famous names.[18] In the second half of the fourteenth and in the first half of the fifteenth century, these works had a remarkable fortune in the new universities of central Europe, such as Prague, Cracow, and Vienna.[19] The exact nature and significance of this influence, however, remain to studied.

For Oxford, the first statutory mention of the *Ethics* dates from the early fourteenth century, when bachelors are required to hear the *Ethics* and the *Politics*.[20] Clearer references to the place of the *Ethics* among other subjects come only in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[21] However, it is hard to believe that the university where Grosseteste taught ignored the subject in the thirteenth century. Indeed, surviving *Ethics* commentaries coming out of Oxford are at least as early as 1278/79.[22]

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[15] On thirteenth-century French commentaries there is a fair literature, although work still needs to be done; see especially Gauthier 1947–49, idem 1975, Glorieux 1971, Lottin 1942–60, Pelzer 1964, and the numerous studies by Grabmann. More recently, see especially Wieland 1981 and 1997; Celano 1986a and 1986b; and Kent 1995. The three commentaries discussed by Lottin, and datable to the first half of the thirteenth century in Paris, are: Avranches, SB, cod. 232, ff. 90r–125v; Paris, BN, lat. 3804 A, ff. 152r–159r, 241r–247v; Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. G.4.853, ff. 1r–77v. For more recent discussions, see especially Grabmann 1940 and van Steenberghen 1991, pp. 128–29. See also the *Tabula* (before 1250) in Pisa, Bib. Sem., cod. 124, discussed in Grabmann 1939, pp. 126 ff.

[16] Grosseteste's translation was not the first complete one of the *Ethics*, but it was (in its revised form, probably due to William of Moerbeke) the most successful one; see above, pp. 46–47.

[17] On Thomas' commentary see Appendix B, no. 11.

[18] See Appendix B, nos. 15–17.

[19] Michael 1992.

[20] *SA*, p. 33. For Cambridge, there is a statute from 1390 requiring the reading of all of the books of the *Ethics* (Leader 1988, p. 33 and Luscombe 1996, p. 344).

[21] *SA*, pp. 234–35; 389–90. There is earlier evidence, however, for Cambridge, where in 1390 bachelors are to hear all the books of the *Ethics* in a regular course; see Leader 1988, p. 95 and Luscombe 1996, p. 344.

[22] With the commentary by Robertus de Cruce; see Luscombe 1996, p. 341 and

It seems therefore clear that the *Ethics* was taught in Paris at the latest by the first half of the thirteenth century; in Oxford, certainly by the end of the thirteenth century.[23] However, this does not tell us much about when the subject was to be taught within the educational curriculum, whether it was considered an advanced or elementary course, whether it was taught *ordinarie* (that is, as a full-fledged morning lecture course, required for the degree) or *extraordinarie*,[24] or who taught it.

The situation for thirteenth-century Paris is not altogether clear. Many uncertainties remain as to how the university documents, as well as contemporary writings on the ideal ladder of studies, should be interpreted. In particular, it is not certain at what point in the curriculum the *Ethics* was to be studied.[25] The curricular ladders proposed by Robert Kilwardby, Albert the Great, and Thomas, for example, do not agree as to the place of ethics.[26] Nonetheless, the student guide referred to above and the 1255 statutes suggest, first of all, that ethics was a required subject for the degree (otherwise, it is hard to see why examinations should have been held on it). Second, by 1255 ethics seems to be a regular (and not a feast-day) subject. The six to twelve weeks allotted to ethics would otherwise have been insufficient to cover the first four books. This does not establish whether ethics was an ordinary or extraordinary subject,

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Lohr, *Traditio* (1973): 99–100. To Luscombe's list of *EN* commentaries associated with Oxford (*ibid.*, pp. 341–43) should be added: Guillelmus Slade († 1415), *Quaestiones Ethicorum, Libri X* (Lohr, *Traditio* [1968]: 209). It is uncertain whether the *Conclusiones libri Ethicorum* (Lohr, *Traditio* [1973]: 146) are attributable to Simon de Faversham († ca. 1306). There are also two anonymous commentaries in Oxford, Oriel 33 and Balliol 173 (a): see Hauréau 1973–74, IV, p. 220r. A study of the Oxford commentaries from Robert Grosseteste to John Case remains a desideratum.

[23] Luscombe 1996, p. 341: ". . . Aristotle's moral philosophy was introduced into teaching before the end of the thirteenth century and *quaestiones* on the *Ethics* were discussed in the Arts Faculty in Oxford before the end of the thirteenth century."

[24] On the use of these and other technical expressions in the thirteenth-century universities, see Weijers 1987 (pp. 306–15 for "ordinary" and "extraordinary").

[25] Basing himself on Isaac 1953, p. 83, Gauthier affirms that "L'éthique était expliquée à la faculté des arts [de Paris] en première année" (Gauthier 1970a, p. 131 note). However, Isaac assumes that the 1255 statutes list the books in order of learning, hardly an acceptable view.

[26] For Kilwardby, see the *De ortu et divisione philosophiae*, discussed in van Steenberghen 1991, pp. 118–20 (ethics comes after the *scientia sermocinalis* and before metaphysics, mathematics, physics, and the mechanical arts). Albert suggests that ethics be taught at the end of the philosophical curriculum, right after metaphysics, whereas Thomas places it right before metaphysics. See below, pp. 132–34.

but more important is the fact that it was to be taught daily and not just on holidays.

The first firm statutory evidence for the place of moral philosophy in the Parisian curricular ladder dates from June 5, 1366.[27] By that date, candidates for the license—an intermediate step between the bachelor's and the master's—were to have read natural philosophy and metaphysics in addition to their former requirements.[28] Those presenting themselves for the master's degree were also required to have studied moral philosophy (in particular, most of the *Ethics*) and the *Metheora*.[29] The requirement of following a course in ethics for the master's degree was apparently already in use by 1350, for by then bachelors presenting themselves for the license had to swear that they had heard at least the first four books of the *Ethics*.[30] Candidates for the master's had to have heard most of the work.[31] As we shall see, this requirement continued at least up to 1452.[32]

Unfortunately, the 1366 statutes do not say whether ethics was to be taught on feast days or as a regular course. Albert of Saxony's teaching in the 1350s suggests that feast-day teaching was in view.[33]

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[27] *CUP*, III, no. 1319 (English translation in Thorndike 1971, pp. 244–47). See Grabmann 1934 and 1940; van Steenberghen 1991.

[28] Since metaphysics was required before the course in moral philosophy, it seems that Albert's ideas about the relationship between these two subjects were followed, and not the views of Thomas or Kilwardby.

[29] *CUP*, III, no. 1319, p. 145: "Item quod nullus admittatur ad licentiam in dicta facultate, nec in examine Beate Marie, nec in examine Sancte Genovefe, nisi ultra predictos libros audiverit Parisius vel in alio studio generali librum Physicorum, de Generatione et Corruptione, de Celo et Mundo, Parva naturalia, videlicet libros de Sensu et Sensato, de Sompno et Vigilia, de Memoria et Reminiscentia, de Longitudine et Brevitate vite, librum Metaphysice, vel quod actu audiat eundem, et quod aliquos libros mathematicos audiverit.

Item quod nullus de cetero admittatur ad magisterium in artibus, nisi predictos libros audiverit, nec non libros morales, specialiter librum Ethicorum pro majori parte, et librum Metheororum, saltem tres primos libros, omni dispensatione interdicta."

[30] Since *EN* III was sometimes considered to be two books around this time (for example, according to Albert of Saxony), the requirement may have been equivalent to reading *EN* I–III.

[31] *CUP*, II, no. 1185, p. 678, heading "Ista sunt iuramenta que habent prestare bachalarii examinandi in Sancta Genovefa in camera": "Item, quod audivistis librum Ethiquorum (!) ad minus quattuor libros.—(Non dispensatur. Sed licet sufficiat audivisse quatuor libros pro licentia, tamen pro magisterio oportet audivisse majorem partem.)" The date of these requirements is uncertain; it can only be placed sometime after 1252 and before 1366; the phrase *Non dispensatur* . . . is a later addition (*ibid.*, pp. 679–80).

[32] See below, n. 49.

[33] In 1356 Albert of Saxony asked for authorization to read books of morals of

Also, by 1379 the four student nations took turns in choosing a *lector Ethicorum* to teach the subject on feast days for the space of two years.[34] It is unclear whether a parallel (and regular) teaching of the subject took place as well. The facts could perhaps be established most clearly from an examination of dated lectures on the *Ethics*, which remains a desideratum. Nonetheless, even if the subject came to be taught on feast days in Paris by the late-fourteenth century, it was still required for the degree.[35] Indeed, fifteenth-century sources indicate that candidates for the license had to present a document, signed by the *lector Ethicorum*, certifying that they had attended the ethics course.[36] This *Ethics* teaching continued, with some interruptions, into the sixteenth century.

A study of the documents for Paris shows that the ethics reader was (like most other Arts teachers) nearly always a theology student, in between the stages of bachelor and master.[37] In 1454 it was even proposed that he should first have disputed *de quodlibetis*.[38] Regulars (i.e., members of religious orders, followers of a religious rule or *regula*), however, were not allowed to teach in the Arts faculty.[39]

It is not clear how much one should read into the involvement of theology students and masters in the teaching of ethics in Paris. On the one hand, this may be seen as a natural occurrence, since

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his choosing on feast days, following the sermon. Two years later he asked to do the same for the *Politics* (Thurot 1850, p. 79).

[34] See the appointment of Dominicus Parvus de Varennis (*CUP*, III, no. 1433). This practice was also followed in other universities. The 1495 statutes for Caen refer to it, although by then it had been replaced by teaching within the colleges (a situation parallel to developments in Paris). The main reason seems to be that in Caen, as in Paris, the election of the well-paid ethics teacher occasioned jealousies and violence. The new statutes for Caen make provision for a public lecturer on the *Ethics*, but he is elected for one year only and given a more modest salary. His feast-day teaching is to be complemented by teaching within the colleges by the individual masters. He is to cover five books of the *Ethics*, so that all ten books are covered in a two-year cycle (Thorndike 1971, pp. 369–70).

[35] Cf. Michael 1985, pp. 867–68; idem 1992, p. 141 (Michael maintains that, up to the fifteenth century, the *Ethics* in Paris was always read as an extraordinary subject and was not required for the degree; the last point is evidently not the case).

[36] Thurot 1850, pp. 80–81.

[37] See *ACUP*, III, col. 797 (June 1, 1492): Aegidius Delfus apparently resigns his position as *lector Ethicorum* because he has just been awarded his master's in theology.

[38] This proposal is in *ACUP*, V.1, col. 635 (Oct. 24, 1454); for its reception, see col. 637 (Nov. 16, 1454); it was not passed.

[39] Rashdall 1936, I, pp. 392–93.

many students in theology supported themselves by teaching in the Arts faculty. On the other hand, the controversies that characterized the teaching of moral philosophy in thirteenth-century Paris[40] may have led to an increasing involvement of the theologians in ethics teaching.[41] In fact, as Bianchi and others have pointed out, the condemnation of 1277 may have intensified and complicated the links between philosophy and theology rather than separating the two, as some have supposed.[42] Second, even the officials of the Arts faculty in Paris could, when they found it convenient, play up the close relationship between moral philosophy and theology.[43] This was, after all, not so difficult, for theology, like ethics, was a practical science. Even though ethics was inferior to it, the two subjects remained complementary to each other.[44] It is telling that not even Buridan—one of the few Artists to teach the *Ethics* in Paris—could resist the temptation to discuss a number of questions bordering on theology in his commentary.[45] However that may be, the involvement of theologians in the teaching of ethics probably made for a fairly mature staff.[46] As we shall see, this was not necessarily the case in Italy, especially in Pavia and Padua.

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[40] An introduction to some of the issues is provided in Grabmann 1941; Leff 1975, pp. 187–237; Hissette 1977; Celano 1986a and 1986b; and Bianchi 1990b and 1999.

[41] See Wieland 1982, p. 666 on the theologians' increasing rôle in commenting on the *Ethics* in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

[42] Bianchi 1990b.

[43] *CUP*, I, no. 515 (a. 1283/84), p. 606: "Facultas etiam artistarum pro ejus morali parte in moribus non tantum instruit, sed habituat intellectum; dixit enim philosophus, quod moralis scientia non est speculationis gratia: non enim ut sciamus, set ut boni fiamus. Set quantum est, ex ipsa metaphisica instruitur intellectus in universali cognitione Dei, et cujuslibet substantie separate. Per primum istorum, animus hominis habituatur in moribus seu virtutibus, quod proficit ad theologiam que meretur nomen sapientiae, quoniam sicut actus precedit potentiam, sic mores et virtutes via sunt ad sapientiam. Per secundum istorum, ducitur intellectus hominis in cognitionem Dei universalem; in quibus duobus per theologiam, inter ceteras facultates suppremam, speciali informatur notitia et habitu."

[44] Cf. below, pp. 376–83 for the Jesuits' views on the relationship of ethics and theology in the sixteenth century.

[45] On Buridan's commentary, see below, p. 154 and Appendix B, no. 17.

[46] Masters of theology were supposed to be at least thirty-five years old. In other universities, even if the teachers were not theology students, they were at least not fresh graduates. The 1495 statutes for the Arts faculty at Caen, for example, require ethics teachers to be at least bachelors in one of the higher faculties and to have taught for at least two years (Thorndike 1971, p. 369).

Formally, little changed with the reform of Cardinal d'Estouteville (Totavillaeus) in 1452.[47] The most obvious development is that all the Arts books listed are now required to be read before the license, instead of making a distinction—as the statues of 1366 had done—between some (like the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*) to be read before the license and others (like the *Ethics*) to be read afterwards.[48] More significantly, however, d'Estouteville places an unusual stress on the study of moral philosophy (in particular on reading the greater part of the *Ethics*).[49] Although the requirements listed for moral philosophy do little more than confirm the 1366 statutes, d'Estouteville is especially concerned that candidates for the license have reached an acceptable standard *in metaphysicis et moralibus.*

The central European universities

The new universities founded in central Europe after 1350 complement what we know about the University of Paris. The fourteenth- and fifteenth-century statutes of these universities—founded on the Parisian model—suggest far more clearly, however, that ethics was not only required for the degree, but an ordinary subject as well (at least if the statutes for Heidelberg, Erfurt, and Vienna are representative of the situation in other nearby universities). These universities often allotted nine months to its teaching, and also required

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[47] *CUP*, IV, no. 2690; Du Boulay V, pp. 562 ff.; Renaudet 1953, pp. 28–29.

[48] Thurot 1850, pp. 51–52.

[49] *CUP*, IV, no. 2690 (June 1, 1452), pp. 728–29: "Item sequens approbamus statutum, quod scolares, priusquam admittantur ad determinandum, audiant Veterem Artem totam, librum Thopicorum potissime quoad quatuor libros, et libros Elencorum, Priorum et Posteriorum complete, etiam librum de Anima in toto, vel in parte. . . . Item illud statutum innovamus, quod nullus admittatur ad licentiam in dicta facultate, nec in examine beate Marie, nec in examine beate Genovefe, nisi ultra predictos libros audierit Parisius, vel in alio studio generali, librum Phisicorum, de Generatione et corruptione, de Celo et mundo, Parva Naturalia; videlicet libros de Sensu et Sensato, de Sompno et Vigilia, de Memoria et Reminiscentia, de Longitudine et Brevitate vite, librum Metaphysice, vel quod actu audiat eundem, et quod aliquos libros mathematicales audiverit; quodque audiverit libros Morales, specialiter librum Ethicorum quantum ad majorem partem. Ad hoc autem statutum quod pernecessarium est, adicimus precipientes, ut predicti libri audiantur non cursim et trascurrendo, sed studiose et graviter. Specialius autem monemus magistros, ut non permittant suos scholares vel bachalarios ad temptamen exhiberi, nisi sciverint ipsos sufficienter in predictis esse instructos. Specialius autem mandamus quatenus ipsi scolares diligentius insistant metaphysicalibus libris et Moralibus addiscendis; alioquin in temptamine volumus et mandamus illos, ut merentur, repelli."

study of the *Politics* and *Economics*.[50] The requirement was often to have studied at least the first six books of the *Ethics*.[51]

Of particular interest is the situation in fifteenth-century Vienna. There, many of the surviving commentaries cover only the first five books of the *Ethics*, a phenomenon that remains to be explained. Furthermore, the *Metaphysics* and the *Ethics* were often taught by Arts regents who specialized in logic, technical subjects, or natural philosophy. Thus, ethics was apparently not a specialist subject. The teachers of ethics in Vienna also tended to be fairly mature. In the early fifteenth century, the *Ethics* was the book taught most often by the most senior regents—in their tenth year or above.[52]

Oxford

In Oxford, moral philosophy seems to have been a requirement for the M.A., following the license, at least in the early part of the fourteenth century.[53] Thus there too, as in Paris, moral philosophy was one of the higher subjects of study. In fourteenth-century Oxford, ethics was a regular subject whose study was to last around four months.[54] Approximately the same length of study is required in the fifteenth century, for three terms—or over eighteen weeks—are dedicated to the work, which is to be read in its entirety.[55] Since, in Oxford, metaphysics *follows* moral philosophy (Table 1), the order of these two subjects is possibly inverted with respect to the Paris statutes of 1366.[56]

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[50] See Michael 1992, p. 141; idem 1985, p. 808 n. 5 and pp. 863–69.

[51] Michael 1985, p. 868, n. 24.

[52] Kren 1987.

[53] A statute from the early fourteenth century indicates that bachelors in Arts about to incept as masters were to have heard lectures on the *Ethics*; see *SA*, p. 33; Weisheipl 1964, pp. 168–76. Fletcher 1984, p. 385 speculates that the statute was written before 1313.

[54] Versus, for example, six weeks for the *Politics* and *De animalibus*, one term each for *Metereologica* and *De caelo et mundo*; see *SA*, pp. 33–34; Fletcher 1984, p. 385. The statutes are from the mid(?)-fourteenth century.

[55] Weisheipl 1969, p. 211: "A term was computed as consisting of 30 *dies legibiles* or slightly more than six weeks within full term"; cf. *SA*, p. 234.

[56] It is also possible, however, that the two subjects are meant to be read in parallel. The fifteenth-century statutes for Oxford may be compared with those for the sixteenth century. On the latter, see *SA*, pp. 389–90.

Table 1 Oxford statutes, 1431

Subject	Length	Books
Grammar	1 term	Priscian (major and minor)
Rhetoric	3 terms	Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, or Boethius, *Topica* (Bk. 4), or (Ps.-) Cicero, *Rhetorica nova (ad Herennium)*, or Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, or the poetry of Virgil
Logic	3 terms	Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, or *Analytica priora*, or *Topica*, or Boethius, *Topica* (Bks. 1–3)
Arithmetic	1 term	Boethius
Music	1 term	Boethius
Geometry	2 terms	Euclid or "Alicen Vitulonemve in perspectivam"
Astronomy	2 terms	*Theorica planetarum*, or Ptolemy's *Almagest*
Nat. phil.	3 terms	*Physics*, or *De caelo et mundo*, or *De proprietatibus elementorum*, or *Meteora*, or *De vegetabilibus et plantis*, or *De anima*, or *De animalibus*
Moral phil.	3 terms	Aristotle's *Ethics* or *Politics* or *Economics*
Metaphysics	3 terms	Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

Rashdall 1936, pp. 153–56; *SA*, pp. 234–35, 33.

At Oxford, the regents in the Faculty of Arts likely to be teaching ethics were the same who taught logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics. Thus ethics was not assigned to a specific lecturer as in Paris.[57] (Oxford did not envisage having individual lecturers for each of the philosophical subjects until 1564.)[58] Also, in Oxford the regulars were not discouraged from teaching as in Paris. By 1438 the regulars at Oxford were allowed to lecture on moral philosophy in

[57] A statute from the beginning of the fifteenth century (1407 or earlier) indicates that the same regents were expected to teach all of these subjects (*SA*, pp. 192–93).

[58] *SA*, p. 389 (a. 1564–1565): "Artium earum, quas liberales dicimus, similiter et triplicis philosophiae, naturae scilicet, et morum, et eius quae supra naturam est, singuli lectores sunto." Already by 1549, however, Oxford distinguished between a lecturer in dialectics and rhetoric and a lecturer in philosophy (*SA*, pp. 344, 358 [year 1549]): a *dialectices et rethorices prelector* taught Aristotle's *Analytics, Elenchi*, or *Topics*, Cicero, Quintilian, or Hermogenes; the lecturer in philosophy taught Aristotle's *Problemata, De animalibus, Moralia, Politica*, and Pliny or Plato.

the public schools *extraordinarie* and *cursorie*, for two years, in view of incepting in theology.[59]

2.1.2 *Teaching Method*

In the universities of northern Europe, ethics teaching—like that of other philosophical subjects—was imparted through lectures and disputations. For Paris, lectures on the *Ethics* are clearly assumed already in Robert of Courçon's 1215 instructions. The first clear evidence of disputations comes from the College of Cambrai: around 1254, those who determined as bachelors were required to begin by arguing a question about morals. In 1348, the students of the same college had to discuss, every Saturday, a question of ethics.[60]

The commentary tradition confirms the combined approach of lectures and questions in teaching the *Ethics*.[61] In the early thirteenth-century Parisian commentaries, for example, the exposition of the text is followed by questions on psychological and moral problems arising from the text.[62] Later Parisian commentaries, such as Jean Buridan's, occasionally concentrate on the questions, omitting the *expositio litterae* altogether.[63] Similar cases may also be found for Oxford, where the commentary evidence[64] suggests a development from paraphrases to *explicatio textus* to *quaestiones*.[65] Likewise, works on the *Ethics* from central Europe consist largely of questions, many of them closely related to Buridan's commentary. By the end of the fifteenth century, however, the practice of holding disputations on moral philosophy famously earned the scorn of Lefèvre d'Étaples (Jacobus Faber Stapulensis) in Paris; he wrote his own commentary proclaiming that he was abandoning the use of irrelevant questions and arguments, since these are not conducive to learning virtue.[66]

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[59] *SA*, p. 258; Fletcher 1984, p. 377n.

[60] Thurot 1850, p. 79.

[61] For the various forms of the northern European commentaries on the *Ethics*, see below, § 4.1.1.

[62] Lottin 1942–1960; van Steenberghen 1991, p. 128.

[63] In the case of Buridan, however, it is possible that the *expositio* has simply not been preserved; see Flüeler 1998a.

[64] See n. 22 above.

[65] Callus 1943 pp. 37–53; van Steenberghen 1991, p. 165.

[66] For example, "... quantae potui brevitati studui ... Quaestionum et argumentationum (nisi doctrinalium quae in litera continentur) viam non tenui, quod mores non longa verborum disceptatione, sed sana intelligentia et recta educatione

How much of the *Ethics* was covered in university teaching varied considerably over time and from place to place. Although all of the *Ethics* was by then already available in translation, Parisian commentaries from the 1230s limited themselves to the first three books. As we have seen, in 1255 only the first "four" (i.e., three?) books were required in Paris, even though, by then, Grosseteste's translation had also become available.[67] By 1350 candidates for the M.A. were to have heard most of the books. This provision was repeated in d'Estouteville's instructions in 1452. Oxford's mid-fourteenth-century statutes prescribe that the *Ethics* be read in their entirety (*complete*).[68] Likewise, at Toulouse in 1309 teachers were expected to cover all ten books.[69]

It is not clear whether these statutes and requirements were fully observed. As mentioned above, the central European universities usually required only the first six books,[70] but whether they were following Paris on this point remains an unresolved question. Many of the surviving commentaries discuss only a part of the *Ethics*, frequently stopping at Book V or VI if not before.[71] By so doing, they concentrated on the principles of ethics offered in the first two books of the *Ethics* and on the description of the eleven virtues (including Justice) in Books III–V.

The *Nicomachean Ethics* (in Grosseteste's and, later, in Moerbeke's translation) was the standard textbook for the moral philosophy course in the universities. Nonetheless, at times the course would also cover the *Economics* and the *Politics*. In Oxford, in fact, the 1451 statutes allow the substitution of the *Ethics* by one of the other two books, possibly on a rotating basis.[72] However, at the present state of research it seems impossible to say whether and to what extent these books

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(ut vult Plato, pariter et Aristoteles) parentur, et quod plerunque contra agendorum propositiones ac regulas, contentiosos excogitare nodos plus obesse quam prodesse soleat auditoribus" (D'Étaples 1535, f. 2r).

[67] See above, p. 71 and n. 30.

[68] *SA*, p. 33.

[69] Weisheipl 1964, p. 175.

[70] See Michael 1985, p. 868, n. 24.

[71] In Vienna, for example, Andreas de Schärding, a professor there from 1441, wrote *Quaestiones super V libros Ethicorum*. Andreas Wall de Walczhaym wrote *Quaestiones quinque librorum Ethicorum* (Lohr, *Traditio* [1967]: 359–60).

[72] *SA*, pp. XCIV–XCV, 234–35; Leff 1975, pp. 146 ff.; Rashdall 1936, I, pp. 153–56.

were actually taught in Oxford or in Paris. Luscombe observes that very few commentaries on the *Politics* have survived for late-medieval England.[73]

It also remains an open question to what extent authors other than Aristotle were taught in the northern European course on moral philosophy. Although the statutes for fifteenth-century Oxford suggest that the course on moral philosophy could also be based on Plato, Boethius, Cicero, and Seneca,[74] it is doubtful whether these authors were ever taught as part of the course on moral philosophy. Indeed, Aristotle was considered the main authority in moral philosophy far into the sixteenth century.[75] The high position enjoyed by Aristotle's works does not mean, of course, that he was considered an *auctoritas* in some infallible sense.[76] But it is notable that Stoic ethics, for example, was not officially taught in the universities until the seventeenth century.[77]

In conclusion, outside Italy moral philosophy found a place in the university curriculum at a fairly early date. It was usually taught on a regular basis and was among the more advanced philosophical subjects. It was also required for the degree, and it was important enough for a number of substantial commentaries to be written on it.[78] Since, in Paris, both the commentators and the teachers of ethics tended to be theologians, a close relationship was sustained between theology and moral philosophy.

The teachers of the course—whether theology students (as in Paris) or senior Arts regents (as in Vienna)—were, like the students, fairly mature. They did not shy away from posing philosophical questions, and it became something of a fad, especially in central Europe, to approach the *Ethics* through disputations—even though this meant covering the work only partially. That the scholastic method of teaching was applied to the *Ethics* is not especially surprising. Nonetheless,

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[73] Luscombe 1996, p. 349: "With a total of three commentaries on the *Politics* it can hardly be said that much interest was shown in England in teaching the text to students."

[74] Leader 1984, pp. 32–35; for Plato, see also statutes for 1564–1565 (*SA*, pp. 389–90).

[75] On Aristotelianism and humanism in Oxford, see McConica 1979.

[76] See Lohr 1982 and Bianchi 1994.

[77] On the revival of Stoicism in the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see most recently Kraye 1999b, pp. 458–61.

[78] See especially § 4.1 below.

it is striking to compare the commentaries in northern and central Europe with those in Italy, where hardly any *quaestiones* on the *Ethics* are to be found. As we shall see, the institutional context of ethics teaching in Italy was partly responsible for this phenomenon and also made for other contrasts between the practices there and elsewhere in Europe.

2.2 *The Italian Universities*

In contrast with Paris, the Italian universities tended to be centers for the study of law and medicine rather than theology. Indeed, theology was not an important subject there and often did not even have its own faculty. Furthermore, in Italy there was not an independent Arts faculty, but a single faculty of Arts and Medicine.[79] This faculty included teachings in grammar and rhetoric, philosophy (mainly logic and natural philosophy), astrology and mathematics, and medicine and surgery. Occasionally, theology teachings too would be listed among those for Arts and Medicine.

The special concern of this section is the teaching of moral philosophy (and especially ethics) within the context of the faculty of Arts and Medicine. This topic is discussed mainly for the universities of Bologna, Florence–Pisa,[80] Padua, Pavia, and Rome (including the Jesuit Collegio Romano). Although these universities were chosen because they offer the richest documentation on the topic, one should caution against making absolute generalizations based on this sampling. The teaching of moral philosophy in centers such as Perugia, Naples, Siena, and Ferrara remains to be studied in detail and could well alter the contours of the sketch drawn here. Nonetheless, it seems useful to examine at least some of the Italian universities comparatively.[81]

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[79] Valuable insights into the distinctive features of the Italian Arts curriculum versus that of the northern European universities are offered in Kibre 1978a, Kristeller 1996a and 1996b, and U. Baldini 1998, pp. 627–36.

[80] The double name is due to the fact that most subject of the Florentine *studium* were moved to Pisa in 1473.

[81] On the need for comparative work in general on the Italian universities, see Denley 1981.

2.2.1 *Place in the Curriculum*

The Beginnings

The university statutes alone might lead one to conclude that moral philosophy arrived extremely late in the Italian universities: the statutes for Florence are the first to mention the subject, in 1387.[82] For Bologna, the earliest statutory evidence comes in 1405, when books to be read outside the regular course of study are listed; among them are the *Ethics*, the *Politics* or *Rhetoric*, and the *Economics*.[83] Padua's statutes first mention moral philosophy in 1465, among the instructions for electing teachers.[84] In Pavia's statutes, one finds no references to moral philosophy at all, but admittedly the statutes through 1643 also make no reference to other books to be studied.[85] Records of teaching appointments, however (sometimes in the form of rolls or *rotuli*), enable one to reach further back in time. The first instance dates from 1365–1366, when the Ufficiali dello Studio in Florence appoint Francesco da Conegliano to teach moral philosophy.[86] Records

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[82] The *doctorandi in scientia medicinae* are to have heard the books required also in Paris and Bologna, including four books of the *Ethics* (Gherardi, pp. 77–78, Rub. LXVIIII, *Quantum doctorandus debeat studuisse*). Also, in addition to five professors of medicine, two of (natural) philosophy, two in logic, one in surgery, one in notary art, and one in rhetoric, additional teachers could be elected, with the following salaries: "unum Canonistam ad lecturam Sexti cum salario LX florenorum auri, unum Legistam ad lecturam Voluminis cum salario LX florenorum auri, unum in Phylosophia cum salario florenorum quinquaginta auri, unum in Astrologia cum salario florenorum L auri: quorum quactuor sic eligendorum volunt eisdem et cuilibet eorum salarium suum predictum dare de pecunia Comunis Florentie . . . Volumusque quod dictorum quactuor electiones et cuiusque eorum fiant tantum per unum annum, et sic de anno in annum." Later it becomes clear that the philosophy in question (in the additional elęction) is moral philosophy; in these elections the rector is to have two votes, as opposed to one in other cases. And there is a definite order of election: "Si vero medicus, tunc in electione Phylosophie moralis vel Astrologie habeat duas voces pro qualibet, in aliis duabus habeat unam tantum pro qualibet. Addentes etiam, quod primo fiat electio Sexti, deinde Voluminis, tertio electio Phylosophie moralis, quarto electio Astrologie" (Gherardi, p. 50).

[83] Malagola 1888, p. 252 (also, in English translation, in Thorndike 1971, pp. 277–78).

[84] *Statuta Patavini Gymnasii*, Liber II, rub. IV ("Quo ordine lecturae suffragationem experiantur"), p. 68 discusses the order of elections: higher teachings of medicine, then philosophy, logic, and rhetoric. Specifically, students of medicine and philosophy were to make elections to metaphysics, moral philosophy, astrology; students of philosophy were responsible for elections to ordinary philosophy and extraordinary philosophy.

[85] Franchi 1925, *passim*.

[86] See Appendix A, no. 92.

for Bologna first mention Pietro da Varignana, who was hired to teach the subject in 1379–1380 along with medicine.[87] In Pavia's rolls, the first clear case of moral philosophy teaching comes in 1386–1387, when Pietro Sarzana and Bonifacio Bottigella are appointed to teach ethics.[88] Padua's records do not mention a lecturer on the *Ethics* until Gasparino Barzizza, in 1407.[89]

Other documentary evidence suggests, however, that moral philosophy was already taught in the first half of the fourteenth century. A bull of Pope John XXII (February 18, 1321) directed to the *studium* of Perugia mentions the study of moral philosophy as a requirement for doctoral candidates in Arts, but it offers a significant loophole,[90] and we have no way of ascertaining whether the bull's directive was actually enforced. Perugia's records[91] do not mention moral philosophy again until the roll for 1601.[92] For the early fourteenth century a firmer attestation of the teaching of moral philosophy comes from Bologna, where around 1326 Guglielmo de' Corvi

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[87] See Appendix A, no. 2.

[88] See Appendix A, nos. 199 and 200.

[89] See Appendix A, no. 124.

[90] According to the bull, candidates for a doctorate in Arts must have studied for four or five years, hearing "in grammatica Priscianum maiorem et minorem, et in Dialectica logicam novam et veterem Aristotelis, ac in Phylosophia librum de anima, et saltem quatuor libros Ethicorum, et tam in hiis, quam in ceteris aliis liberalibus artibus illos alios libros audiverint, qui in Parisiensi studio per promovendos in dicta facultate artium consueverunt audiri . . ." However, the bishop could provide dispensations from hearing the *Ethics* and some other books, since it was unlikely that anyone had heard them all (Bolle, Brevi e Diplomi, sec. XIV, in Rossi, doc. 33, n. 28). These provisions for the *Ethics* were repeated in Perugia's 1457 statutes; see Padelletti 1872, p. 104.

[91] For Perugia the most important sources are: Bini 1816; Rossi, which covers from the beginnings to 1389; Padelletti 1872, Cecchini 1961, Nicolini 1961; and especially Ermini 1971. Apart from the lost *rotuli*, the records for Perugia are among the most complete for the Italian universities.

[92] AUP, P.I, D.I. The surviving rolls for 1437–1438, 1438–1439, 1443–1444, and 1461–1462 published in Nicolini 1961, pp. 158–59, and those of 1567–1571 in P.I, D.I (ff. 1A–1D) do not mention moral philosophy. My sampling of the registers of the Conservatori della Moneta for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (ASPg, no. 29, ff. 35r–35v; no. 74, ff. 9r–9v) likewise yielded no mention of moral philosophy. The statutes of 1306 require that there be "iiij doctores in iure civili, duo doctores in iure canonico, unus magister in medicinalibus, unus magister in logicalibus, et unus magister in grammaticalibus" (Rossi, doc. 3). Note the absence of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy goes again unmentioned in 1315, in 1342, in 1366, and in 1389 (Rossi, docs. 20, 65, 148, 240). It is true that rhetoric is not mentioned either, but it does finally appear later in 1389, when mag. Cristiano Nantii is appointed to teach rhetoric and *auctores* for three years at 70 gold fl., vs. 30 fl. for teachers of grammar (Rossi, doc. 242, 1 April 1389).

set up a college whose students were specifically to receive instruction in metaphysics and natural and moral philosophy.[93]

Actual writings on moral philosophy indicate that the subject was taught in Italy at least by the late thirteenth century. In the 1290s, Giacomo da Pistoia held a disputation on happiness in Bologna.[94] His arguments are based on Aristotle's *Ethics*. Bartolomeo da Varignana, who by 1292 taught medicine in Bologna, authored a commentary on the (pseudo-) Aristotelian *Economics*. The surviving manuscript is possibly a redaction of lectures he gave on the work.[95] Guido Vernani da Rimini is a third figure who taught moral philosophy in Bologna at an early date. A Dominican who taught twice in Bologna's *studium* between 1310 and 1324, Guido authored a *Summa de virtutibus* of which two redactions survive: one addressed to his fellow friars and the second possibly to the laity.[96] In addition, Guido also wrote a commentary on the *Politics* between 1324 and 1330.[97]

However, in none of these instances can moral philosophy be described as a regular (or even required) course. Indeed, it is only at the end of the fourteenth century that moral philosophy appears with some regularity in the university documents. This makes for a startling contrast with Paris, where lectures on the *Ethics* are already mentioned in 1215.[98] Some allowance must doubtless be made for gaps in the documentation for the Italian universities.[99] And, as Alfonso Maierù points out, extraordinary subjects were not initially recorded,[100] a consideration that would apply *a fortiori* to moral philo-

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[93] See Guerrini 1922 (which reports the statutes and Guglielmo's will) and the comments in Siraisi 1981, pp. 53–54.

[94] On this obscure master see Appendix C, no. 1. Because of Giacomo's designation as *magister*, Kristeller 1993a argues that he probably held his disputation at the university.

[95] Venice, Padri Redentoristi, Chiesa della Fava, ms. 3 (olim 445), ff. 33–50; see especially Siraisi 1976; eadem 1981, pp. 87–88; Flüeler 1992, II, pp. 7–8. For a sketch of Bartolomeo da Varagnana, see Siraisi 1981, pp. 45–49. See also below, Appendix A, no. 1.

[96] On Guido Vernani see Appendix C, nos. 7 and 8.

[97] Flüeler 1992, II, p. 22.

[98] See above, n. 10.

[99] As mentioned above, Perugia's teaching rolls survive only fragmentarily before 1600. Those for Ferrara do not survive at all (although the teachings there can partly be reconstructed from Raspadori 1991). There are significant gaps in the documentation for Rome (see especially Conte 1990), and the rolls for Siena have only partly been published (*Lo Studio di Siena*, pp. 397–416, gives the rolls for 1531–1541). The rolls for Padua have not yet been published (cf. Barile).

[100] Maierù 1994, p. 54.

sophy, since it was a feast-day subject. However, one wonders whether other, institutional factors may have been behind this late appearance.

One possibility is that, in Italy, moral philosophy was not initially taught in the universities, but rather in the *studia* of the religious orders. Not enough is known, unfortunately, about the relationships running between universities and religious *studia*,[101] but it is clear that the two enjoyed a close relationship.[102] For example, Arts students, who often met in conventual settings during the earlier days, could have availed themselves of the teaching of the regulars and of their libraries.[103] The Dominican *studium* of Santa Caterina in Pisa, for example, offered teaching in logic and philosophy already from 1272 and by the end of the thirteenth century owned at least two copies of Albert the Great's commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics*.[104] If developments in France were at all followed elsewhere, the Dominicans in Italy should have studied the *Ethics* intensively by the early fourteenth century. In 1327, the Dominican provincial chapter of Limoges ordered the study of logic and rhetoric for two years, followed by three years of study in natural and moral philosophy; the *Ethics* was to be read during each of the last three years and to be covered in its entirety.[105] Indeed, we know that Galvano Fiamma read moral

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[101] Further studies could be done, following the example of Marangon 1978.

[102] Some notices in Verger 1978.

[103] In Bologna, the church of San Francesco was the gathering point for students in the Arts. On the connection between the University of Bologna and the local *studia* of the regulars, see the evidence from course *sermones* in Fioravanti 1992, p. 171. Siraisi remarks, "When and how scholars at Bologna first participated in the great intellectual revolution of the thirteenth century, namely the reception of the *libri naturales* (and *morales*) of Aristotle as basic textbooks in the schools, remains largely unknown. . . . It is probable, however, that the *studia* of the various orders of friars played an important part in introducing the 'new Aristotle' and scholastic method to the schools of Bologna" (Siraisi 1981, p. 7). Also see Piana 1970, *passim*.

[104] Fioravanti 1993, pp. 260–61.

[105] "Quare moralis philosophia admodum est utilis et necessaria et divine scientie multum accommoda et propinqua, volumus quod pro secunda lectione, anno quolibet, habeatur sub modo et forma infra scriptis, videlicet quod, primo anno legatur liber Phisicorum principaliter, secondario vero liber Ethicorum et de Celo et mundo; secundo vero anno pro principali lectione, liber Mathematice, pro secundo liber Ethicorum et Metrice; anno tercio liber de Anima, de Sensu et Sensato, de Memoria et de Reminiscentia pro principali <lectione>, pro secunda liber Ethicorum et de Generatione. Et legantur omnia integraliter et perfecte" (Toulouse, BV 490, f. 453r; quoted in Douais 1884, pp. 71–72). In 1330, the chapter of Toulouse at Montaubon established a separate *studium moralis philosophiae*, appointing two lectors, who were to read for a two-year program that included the *Ethics* and other works. In the first year, they were to read mainly the *Ethics* and secondarily the *Magna Moralia*, *Economics*, and *Liber de causis*; in the second year, mainly the *Politics* and sec-

philosophy in the Dominican convent of Milan in 1315.[106] And a Dominican active in Florence, Remigio de' Girolami († 1319), may have written his prologue on the *Ethics* in connection with a course on the subject.[107] Although there is no firm evidence for a regular teaching of moral philosophy among the Dominicans,[108] it does seem remarkable that so many of the fourteenth-century works produced on the *Ethics* in Italy were authored by Dominicans.[109] In addition to Guido Vernani and Remigio de' Girolami, those involved included Corrado da Ascoli, Emiliano da Spoleto, Bartolomeo da Santo Concordio, and Guido Guezzi.[110]

Other orders too had an interest in the *Ethics*. The Franciscans encouraged the teaching of philosophy, presumably not neglecting moral philosophy.[111] Furthermore, in 1310 Henry of Friemar lectured on the *Ethics* in Paris, where he was *magister regens* and professor of theology in the *studium* of the Augustinians.[112] In 1416–1417 an Augustinian Hermit, Agostino Favaroni da Roma, delivered lectures on the *Ethics* at the university of Florence.[113] And a fourteenth-century

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ondarily the *Rhetoric* (Toulouse, BV 490, f. 459v; see Douais 1884, p. 72). Further evidence of the Dominican study of the *Ethics* is Albert the Great's lecturing on the subject in the Dominican *studium* of Cologne, ca. 1248–1252; see Dunbabin 1963.

[106] "Cum . . . hoc anno studium philosophiae moralis in ordine sit introductum" (cf. Airaghi 1984, pp. 357–58).

[107] See Appendix C, no. 4. Panella 1981, p. 70 is more cautious than Davis 1978 on the connection of the prologue with teaching.

[108] Alfonso Maierù observes that it is not known in what capacity Galvano did his reading, nor for how long he taught. He also notes that in Santa Maria Novella, in Florence, there was a reader of physics and one of metaphysics, but no reader of ethics (cf. Orlandi 1955, II, p. 520). He concludes that any teaching of the *Ethics* among the Dominicans seems irregular at best (Alfonso Maierù, private communication, January 12, 1997).

[109] On Dominican literary production during this period, see Antonelli 1982.

[110] On these figures and their works see Appendix C, nos. 5, 11, 12, and 15. On the interpretation of the *Ethics* by Dominicans and other regulars in fourteenth-century Italy, see below, pp. 171–73.

[111] The Franciscans recognized the importance of philosophical training; thus, the General Chapter in Naples (1370) determined: "Item, quod nullus Frater possit mitti ad Studium Generale theologiae, nisi prius audiat Loycam tribus completis annis et Phylosophiam duobus" (Abate 1929, p. 170, n. 6). Roest observes: "The many cautionary warnings against the pursuit of pagan learning notwithstanding, the study of philosophy soon became more than a marginal affair in Franciscan circles" (Roest 2000, p. 140). Although Roest (p. 142) refers to the importance of moral philosophy for the Franciscans, however, he does not give an analysis of its place in the Franciscan curriculum. For a recent introduction to Franciscan moral thought, see Poppi 1996. Good comments on the context are provided in Bologna 1982.

[112] For Henry of Friemar's commentary, see Appendix B, no. 13.

[113] On Favaroni see Appendix C, no. 25.

manuscript of the *Ethics* from the Benedictine monastery of Monte Uliveto follows the title with: "Qui liber ad divinam scientiam ac philosophiam refertur moraliter exponendo."[114] The interest in the *Ethics* among the friars might help explain the relatively frequent appearance of Augustinians, Franciscans, and Dominicans on the university rolls for moral philosophy, at least in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[115]

All considered, how important was moral philosophy in Italy before the late fourteenth century? In the universities it was surely one of the marginal subjects, not subject to examination and barely worth recording. Its status in the *studia* of the regulars is hard to discern, but its study was probably favored (when at all) because of the perceived links between ethics and theology.[116] Compared with Paris, Oxford, and the universities of central Europe, few works on the *Ethics* survive for thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Italy.[117] Taken together, the evidence points to moral philosophy as a subject that *could* be taught in the Italian universities, but was probably left to a lecturer's personal initiative or interest. This led to haphazard offerings and to a modest literary production. However, as we shall see, other aspects of the institutional context also conspired to make of moral philosophy a subject with little clout—not only through the fourteenth century, but also up to the seventeenth.

Time of Study

It is hard to tell at what point moral philosophy was to be heard during one's course of study. According to the 1388 statutes for Florence, a doctor in Medicine was to have read all the books of medicine studied in Paris or Bologna and be sufficiently instructed (i.e., for seven years) in logic and philosophy; in particular, he was to have studied dialectic, the old and new logic, and four books of the *Ethics*.[118] However, when the *Ethics* was to be heard is not specified.

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[114] Siena, BCom. Intronati L.III.17 (s. XIV). I owe my information on the manuscript's provenance to Dottoressa De Benedictis of the same library.

[115] See Lines 1996, Chart A.

[116] Remigio de' Girolami, following Thomas, recommended a ladder of studies that placed moral philosophy after natural philosophy and before metaphysics; the subordination to theology is clear. See his *Sermo nonus* in Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. G.4.936 (s. XIV), f. 290v.

[117] See below, § 4.2.1.

[118] Gherardi, p. 77: "quod si studuerint per quinque vel quactuor annos, de

As we have seen, in Perugia the requirements for doctoral candidates in the Arts were similarly vague (at least in 1321).[119] And none of the surviving lists of degree requirements (Table 2) mentions moral philosophy until the late sixteenth century.[120] This fact suggests two possibilities: either the requirement of hearing the *Ethics* quickly fell into disuse, or it continued to be required, but no specific place in the curriculum was assigned to it.

Table 2 Arts requirements in fifteenth-century Italy

Bologna Arts requirements, 1405
Year 1: *Physicorum, De generatione et corruptione,* Bk. 1; Extraordinary: *De generatione et corruptione,* Bk. 2; *De somno et vigilia, De physionomia.*
Year 2: *De coelo et mundo, Meteorologica, De sensu et sensato*; Extraordinary: *De mundo, De memoria et reminiscentia, De respiratione, De morte et vita.*
Year 3: *De anima, Metaphysica* (Proemium, Bks. 1, 2, 5–10, 12); Extraordinary: *Metaphysica* (Bk. 4), *De longitudine et brevitate vitae, De causa motus animalium.*
Malagola 1888, p. 274 ff.
Ferrara Arts requirements, 1474–89
Year 1: *De anima* (except errors in Bk. 1), *De generatione et corruptione*; Extraordinary: *Physica.*
Year 2: *De coelo et mundo, Liber methaurorum, De anima, De generatione et corruptione.*
Year 3: *Physica, Liber Methaurorum*; Extraordinary: *De coelo et mundo.*
Caputo 1990, p. 119, Stat. XLVI.

The question of when the subject was heard is less idle than might appear. In the medieval and Renaissance period, there were precise theories about the "right" ordering of the rungs on the ladder of learning. Whether moral philosophy was to be studied before or after

quibus saltem duobus audiverint in aliquo Studio generali, ita tamen quod in Dialectica, Loyca nova et veteri Aristotilis studuerint, ut predicitur; et libros quactuor Eticorum."

[119] See above, n. 90 and Maierù 1989.

[120] The first case is the Jesuit Collegio Romano; see below, § 9.2.1.

metaphysics, for example, depended on whose classification of the sciences one followed.[121] If we knew when the *Ethics* was to be studied, we might have a better idea of whose classification was followed in the Italian universities, and of the relative standing of moral philosophy among the other subjects. An examination of the indirect evidence, however, suggests that there was not much agreement, at least in Quattrocento Florence, about when moral philosophy should be studied. For example, Argyropoulos wanted moral philosophy to be studied after logic but before natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics.[122] Niccolò Tignosi, following Thomas, believed that the proper sequence was logic, mathematics, natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.[123] Toward the end of the century, Poliziano placed moral philosophy at the very beginning of the philosophical curriculum, even before logic.[124] His position was also shared, outside of the university, by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.[125] As we shall see, these uncertainties about the place of moral philosophy in the curriculum—actually tied to a larger debate on the classification of knowledge[126]—continued into and throughout the sixteenth century.

The disagreements about the place of ethics in the curriculum may explain the course's status as a feast-day subject. The first university to make moral philosophy an "ordinary" subject[127] was Florence–Pisa, between 1548 and 1556 (see below). In Bologna the *Ethics* became a subject for ordinary teaching only in 1562.[128] In "La

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[121] See above, n. 26.

[122] Field 1988, pp. 114–15; Argyropoulos 1970a, p. 16.

[123] Tignosi, *Commenta in libros Ethicorum*, in Florence, BLaur., Plut. LXXVI, 48 (s. XV), f. 112v.

[124] Poliziano 1986, p. 18; cf. idem 1553, p. 462.

[125] Pico 1990, p. 18: "Multiplex profecto, patres, in nobis discordia; gravia et intestina domi habemus et plus quàm civilia bella. Quae si noluerimus, si illam affectaverimus pacem, quae in sublime ita nos tollat ut inter excelsos Domini statuamur, sola in nobis compescet prorsus et sedabit philosophia moralis primum, si noster homo ab hostibus inducias tantum quaesierit, multiplicis bruti effrenes excursiones et leonis iurgia, iras animosque contundet. . . . Sedabit dialectica rationis turbas inter orationum pugnantias et syllogismorum captiones anxie tumultuantis. Sedabit naturalis philosophia opinionis lites et dissidia, quae inquietam hinc inde animam vexant, distrahunt et lacerant."

[126] On the debate, see Mikkeli 2000.

[127] An "ordinary" subject was one taught on a daily basis to a specific student audience by a senior lecturer. It was usually required for the degree.

[128] Dallari, II, p. 156.

Sapienza" (the university in Rome), moral philosophy is taught regularly, in the evenings, in 1566 and especially after 1586;[129] it is taught regularly in the mornings after 1652.[130] The Collegio Romano, after lengthy hesitations, decided in 1591 to teach ethics on a daily basis, in the afternoons.[131] By 1603 moral philosophy had attained ordinary status in Ferrara.[132] But it continued to be taught on holidays in Pavia until at least 1539,[133] in Perugia until 1625,[134] and in Padua until at least 1700.[135]

In Paris too, as we have seen, the *Ethics* was for a long time taught on holidays. But in Italy the audience appears to be younger. Prolusions to courses on the *Ethics*, for example, regularly address the city and university officials as *viri*, and the students as *iuvenes* or *adolescentes*. More tellingly, Italian teachers of the *Ethics* regularly assure their students that Aristotle does not wish to exclude the young in age from lectures on moral philosophy.[136] Finally, lectures on the *Ethics* and commentaries redacted in connection with the course seem directed toward beginners. Luca Bianchi remarks, for example, that in Florence Argyropoulos would digress from his discussion of the text to offer simple lessons on logical, mathematical, or metaphysical matters.[137] This fits in well with the Greek émigré's understanding

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[129] Marc-Antoine Muret is appointed *in philosophia morali et candidioribus litteris* in 1566 (Conte, I, p. 41 and below, Appendix A, no. 267). The first record of Lelio Pellegrini's teaching (moral philosophy alone) is in 1587, *hora vespertina* (Conte, I, p. 127 and below, Appendix A, no. 268).

[130] Conte 1990, I, p. 315.

[131] *MP*, V, p. 284.

[132] AUF, Colloc. Misc. 1603–1759, fasc. 87–88–89 (cf. roll for 1603 and the 1614 statutes in Borsetti 1735, I, pp. 255–63).

[133] With Francesco Torelli (Appendix A, no. 262). After that, there is a long gap in the documentation.

[134] The subject is listed as *diebus festivis* from 1601 to 1617; in 1618 it is listed as *hora 19* and placed right after *philosophia de mane* (whereas earlier it was placed among the subjects given in "tempo di vacanza," right after theology; AUP, P.I, D.I, f. 110r). In 1623, moral philosophy, while retaining its placement after *philosophia de mane*, is listed *in diebus Iovis vacantibus* (*ibid.*, f. 138r). The pay listed is 28 scudi, down from the 35 to 37 scudi offered in previous years. The subject is listed as extraordinary *de mane, hora 20* in 1625, with a salary of 45 scudi (*ibid.*, f. 150v; cf. also f. 219v for 1630; Ermini 1971, I, p. 236).

[135] There were, however, exceptions: the rolls for Padua list Francesco Robortello *ad philosophiam moralem ordinariam et politicam* in 1564 (see Appendix A, no. 194).

[136] This point is illustrated in many of the commentaries discussed in the following chapters.

[137] "Non mancano . . . frequenti incisi e lunghe digressioni; spesso si ha addirittura l'impressione che taluni passi aristotelici costituiscano il pretesto per lezioncine

of ethics as one of the more elementary subjects. Interestingly, since the students following the course were often quite young, university officials were sometimes tempted to assign its teaching to senior students or recent graduates.[138] This might partly have been a cost-cutting measure, but it further confirms that moral philosophy was not considered very important.

Was Florence an exception to all this? During the fifteenth century, ethics seems to have remained a feast-day subject there. It is true that, for many years, the appointment records do not specify when moral philosophy should be taught. But we do know that, around 1431–1433, when Filelfo was teaching rhetoric *extraordinarie*, he was teaching moral philosophy *diebus festivis*.[139] Oliviero Senese also taught the subject on feast days in 1498–1500.[140] Furthermore, if moral philosophy was indeed taught as an ordinary subject in the Florentine *studium*, one would expect it to be listed among the subjects required for examination in 1478, after the *studium* had been transferred to Pisa; however, it is not.[141] It does seem that Florence did not make a practice of having inexperienced teachers tackle the subject, as was so often the case in Padua and Pavia.[142] But the sequence of Argyropoulos' teaching[143] makes it unlikely that moral philosophy was considered an advanced subject there. Moral philosophy seems more clearly to have attained an ordinary status in Florence–Pisa around 1548. In that year, Pier Vettori was charged with the teaching of the subject in addition to Latin and Greek. In 1556, Ciriaco Strozzi was appointed, no longer simply to Greek, but

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di logica, matematica o metafisica. . . . Tutto ciò sembra confermare le buone capacità didattiche dell'Argiropulo, ma lascia anche intuire quale fosse il livello di preparazione del suo uditorio" (Bianchi 1990a, p. 39).

[138] Pavia several times assigned this teaching to recent graduates (e.g., Guiniforte Barzizza, 1425–1426, Nicolò da Cremona, 1425–1426, Achille Visconti, 1446–1447; Appendix A, nos. 207, 208, and 215). But the most notorious case is that of Padua (see below, p. 93).

[139] For Filelfo's teaching, see Appendix A, no. 105.

[140] For the teaching of Oliviero Senese, see Appendix A, no. 114.

[141] Doctoral exams were envisioned for medicine, dialectic, natural philosophy, grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic and music, or astrology, but there was no provision for an exam in moral philosophy (Fabroni, I, pp. 456–57).

[142] See below, pp. 92–93.

[143] For the program of Argyropoulos' teaching, see Field 1983, p. 41 and n. 58. Garin argues that, in contrast with his proposed order of lecturing, Argyropoulos began with the *Ethics* (Garin 1987, p. 245). But the order of studies recorded by Acciaiuoli (and quoted by Garin) suggests that the Byzantine philosopher followed his plan.

to "Philosophia moralis graeca et alia."[144] However, these changes did not necessarily lead to a more regular teaching of moral philosophy, at least not in Florence–Pisa.[145]

Funding and Staffing

Further indications of the status of moral philosophy in the Arts curriculum can be gleaned by examining the staffing patterns and payment records for the Italian *studia.*[146] Such documentation is much richer for Italy than for Paris and Oxford, since Italian university professors were paid by city funds, records for which were meticulously kept. Professors in northern Europe, instead, usually lived from student and exam fees (and later from college endowments), for which few records survive.[147] Since staffing and payments would seem to be good indications of university priorities, it is worthwhile giving the topic some detailed consideration.[148]

The funding of moral philosophy in Pavia and Padua is the simplest to describe. Between 1408 and 1426, Pavia usually pays teachers of the subject between fl. 30 and fl. 60 per year.[149] After 1439 the average salary tends to fall toward a new standard (by 1467) of around fl. 12.[150] Until at least 1498, with Ippolito Verri,[151] there are no significant changes, and thereafter the documents are mostly remiss about recording payments (or indeed, the subject) until 1597. In that year a professor of theology, Don Germano Rovigno, receives, in

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[144] For Vettori and Strozzi, see Appendix A, nos. 117 and 118.

[145] If we are to trust the university records, Strozzi's successor in Pisa, Pietro Angèli, taught the *Ethics* only twice (books unspecified) and the *Politics* but once, between 1565 and 1575 (see Appendix A, no. 119).

[146] Cf. Lines 1996, pp. 153–66 and 189–93. For a more general view, Lines 2002a and Zannini 1999. Appendix A, below, furnishes the documentation chronologically, by *studium.*

[147] Post 1932.

[148] Although payments were actually made to individual professors, it is not entirely baseless to consider how much the disciplines themselves fetched. See, for example, the 1451 budget for Florence (Gherardi, p. 262, reproduced in Lines 1996, p. 156, n. 85) and the 1254 document of Alfonso X in favor of the University of Salamanca (edited in French translation in *Former, enseigner, éduquer,* I, pp. 57–58). Furthermore, it appears that, within the Arts, the budget was allocated with remarkable consistency over time (Lines 2002a, 2001b).

[149] The patterns described in this and the following paragraphs may be followed by consulting Appendix A, below. Unless otherwise specified, the salaries are per year.

[150] See the teaching of Guido da Parigi (Appendix A, no. 222).

[151] For Verri's teaching see Appendix A, no. 258.

addition to L. 250 for theology, an extra L. 50 for teaching moral philosophy.[152] The latter is the lowest Arts payment for the year. Logic does considerably better, since it is paid, on the average, L. 100.[153]

For Padua the fifteenth-century payment records are very fragmentary. We know only that Gasparino Barzizza received fl. 100 for his teaching (perhaps a joint appointment?) in 1407, whereas an Augustinian, Giovanni Battista, received fl. 15 (the year's lowest recorded salary) in 1430.[154] From 1509 to 1560, the standard salary for moral philosophy in Padua is fl. 15, again almost always the lowest salary recorded. The first strong suggestion of change comes in 1580, when Giason de Nores is paid fl. 200.[155] The increase in salary is fairly consistent through the end of the century (the subject is paid between fl. 150 and fl. 250). Nonetheless, it should be remembered that the sixteenth century witnessed strong inflationary pressures that may have led to this increase in salary. Indeed, compared with the other Arts subjects ethics fetched only a small percentage of the budget.[156] Both in Padua and Pavia, therefore, moral philosophy is paid very poorly. The slight improvements seen in the fourth quarter of the sixteenth century seem to be largely illusory.

Pavia and Padua staff the moral philosophy course according to a similar, although not identical, pattern. The main difference is that Pavia tends to assign two teachers per year to the subject in the fifteenth century (after 1441). Only in the sixteenth century does one usually find single appointments there. Padua, instead, only rarely has more than one ethics instructor per year in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[157] The parallels between the staffing patterns at

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[152] For Rovigno's teaching see Appendix A, no. 263.

[153] ASPv, Fondo Università, Notaio Griffi, cart. 20, pages not numbered.

[154] For the teaching of Gasparino Barzizza and Giovanni Battista see Appendix A, nos. 124 and 125.

[155] For the teaching of de Nores see Appendix A, no. 195. Before him, Francesco Robortello had taught the subject (ca. 1562–1567), receiving fl. 400 in 1562 (Appendix A, no. 194). However, Robortello's high pay may have been due to his status as "Professore di Lettere Greche e Latine."

[156] To give an example, in 1594–1595 the teacher of ethics (Giovanni Belloni) received fl. 150; the subject thus received 3.7% of the payments in the Arts. The ranking of the other subjects was as follows: (1) natural philosophy, 41.5%; (2) theology, metaphysics, and logic, tied at 18.1% each; (3) rhetoric, 13.8%; and (4) astrology and mathematics, 4.5%.

[157] This seems to have occurred only in 1496, 1500, 1502, 1532, 1552, and 1554. See Appendix A. Thus, although Padua paid its instructors slightly better than Pavia (fl. 15 vs. fl. 12; possibly the result of inflation or cost-of-living differentials), Pavia

the two universities are more numerous. Neither university, for example, usually assigns the subject to teachers of high standing. And, in the rare cases in which the teachers' names are familiar to scholars, almost none of those appointed is at the height of his career.[158] Padua, for example, routinely assigned the ethics course to fresh Arts graduates (some obtained their degree on the same day they started teaching). Most of them did not continue in a university career; the lectureship in moral philosophy seems mainly to have served as a temporary expedient for graduates seeking a position in public service.[159] The university administration was conscious of the problem and repeatedly attempted to remedy it by legislation. After 1465, the course was to be assigned to professors of theoretical medicine or philosophy.[160] However, these instructions were not followed. Subsequent records testify that, until the appointment of Robortello, the practice of assigning one-year contracts to inexperienced graduates continued. The situation was much the same in Pavia, where ethics teaching tended to be a one-time occurrence. Again, this often makes it impossible to trace an ethics teacher's previous or subsequent academic career. In the few cases in which moral philosophy *is* part of an academic career, this teaching tends to occur toward the beginning, at times even before logic.[161]

The staffing practices in Pavia and Padua contrast remarkably with those in Bologna and Florence. There one finds names that even non-specialists might recognize, including Pietro Pomponazzi, Francesco Filelfo, Carlo Marsuppini, John Argyropoulos, Chalcondyles, Angelo Poliziano, Pier Vettori, and Ciriaco Strozzi. Predictably, these men use their fame to extract large salaries (sometimes egregiously

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paid the course itself better. This does not make much of a difference, however, in the ranking of subject by salary: in 1497–1498, when Pavia has two teachers of ethics, moral philosophy is still the most poorly paid subject (ASPv, Fondo Università di Pavia, Notaio Griffi, cart. 22: Rotuli studii ticinensis, ff. 216v–220r).

[158] This is true, for example, of Lauro Quirini, Ermolao Barbaro, Agostino Nifo, and Daniele Barbaro in Padua (see Appendix A, nos. 130, 131, 137, and 168).

[159] Poppi, p. 107 and Appendix A, below.

[160] "Ad lecturam vero philosophiae moralis proponatur aut deputetur aliquis ex doctoribus ordinariis theoricae medicinae vel philosophiae ordinariae, sicut eius lecturae dignitas requirit. Declarantes tamen quod primo sequenti rotulo, videlicet praesentis anni 1465, unus ex doctoribus artium, vel scholaris artium et medicinae iuxta consuetudinem observatam hucusque eligi possit: eo autem tempore transacto, praesens statutum ad litteram observetur in omnibus" (*Statuta Patavini Gymnasii*, Lib. II, rub. V, pp. 69–70).

[161] See, for example, Olivio da Bosinasio (Appendix A, no. 212).

so) from the universities that recruit them. Those most sought-after often receive repeated invitations from other universities. However, the scale of this star system has sometimes been exaggerated by scholars. Several of those named stayed at a single university throughout their teaching careers.[162]

Judging rises in salaries for Florence is hard because, especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, moral philosophy is so often taught in combination with other subjects (after 1543, especially rhetoric, but until then, often natural philosophy). Nonetheless, the payment records for fifteenth-century Florence–Pisa strongly suggest that the subject was more prestigious there than in Padua and Pavia. The payments given Agostino Favaroni, Marco Paolo di Verona, Andrea Biglia, and Oliviero Senese refer to independent ethics teaching.[163] When averaged out, these appointments represent around 6.8% of the expenses in Arts and Medicine, and around 11% of those in Arts alone. In Padua, by contrast, it is hard to find instances before 1562 in which moral philosophy is paid more than 1.5% of the Arts budget.

Other factors point to a similar conclusion. The experience and standing of the ethics instructors, the consistency with which the subject is recorded, and even the continued teaching of moral philosophy not only in Pisa (where the *studium*'s main subjects were transferred in 1473) but also in Florence,[164] suggest that the story told by the payments is not misleading. Indeed, it is significant that the famed professors mentioned above did not lecture on the *Ethics* only early on in their career. Poliziano and Strozzi, for example, taught moral philosophy in their later years.[165] Such a situation is utterly unimaginable for pre-1562 Padua.

Many of the teachers of moral philosophy in Florence–Pisa are rhetoricians. However, it should be stressed (since there has been a great deal of misunderstanding on this point) that ethics is consist-

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[162] In many cases we lack reliable career data for the professors at the Italian universities. For the teachers of natural philosophy in Bologna, see Lines 2001b. For teachers of Arts and Medicine in general at the Italian universities, see Lines 2001a.

[163] See Appendix A, nos. 101–03 and 105.

[164] In the sixteenth century, for example, Francesco Cattani and Pier Vettori teach ethics in Florence; Ciriaco Strozzi and Pietro Angèli (da Barga) teach the subject in Pisa (Appendix A, nos. 115 and 117–19).

[165] For Poliziano's teaching see Appendix A, no. 113.

ently assigned to such teachers only after the reopening of the *studium* in 1543. During the fifteenth century, the subject is taught almost indiscriminately by rhetoricians or natural philosophers (e.g., Chalcondyles and Poliziano, but also Favaroni, Argyropoulos, and Oliviero Senese). It is true that, with respect to the fourteenth century, this is already a development. (Most ethics appointments before 1400 are made *ad philosophiam naturalem et moralem.*) But it is no accident that the 1451 budget for Florence's *studium* still lumps together natural and moral philosophy.[166] Furthermore, the influence of the sixteenth-century Florentine model of studying the *Ethics* philologically[167] should not be exaggerated, since this pattern was not necessarily followed in other Italian universities.[168]

One further aspect to be noted about the teaching staff for moral philosophy in Florence–Pisa concerns the presence of the regulars. This is only a point for the fifteenth century, since one finds no regulars teaching the subject in the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. It is remarkable, however, that almost one third of the fifteenth-century appointments (nine of twenty-five) are assigned to friars. Of these, almost all go to Augustinian Hermits; the remaining one goes to a Dominican. This point reinforces what is known already of the convent of Santo Spirito as a place of intense interest in the *Ethics*,[169] a subject that awaits a fuller examination. It is also notable that, compared with the regulars' teaching of other subjects in the Arts, the Augustinian Hermits are so strikingly over-represented in ethics teaching.[170] However that may be, the involvement of regulars in the teaching of moral philosophy is a further element distinguishing the teaching of the subject in Florence from that in the universities of Padua and Pavia. In many ways, the involvement of the regulars in Florence recalls a similar situation in Bologna. However, while the regulars have a prominent rôle both in Bologna and Florence

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[166] Gherardi, p. 262; Lines 1996, p. 156, n. 85.

[167] For more on this Florentine model, see below, § 6.3.

[168] See Part III of this book.

[169] Della Torre 1902, pp. 185–90, 200–02; Arbesmann 1965b.

[170] There are some sixty-one recorded appointments of regulars to teach Arts subjects (thus, not theology) in Florence–Pisa in the fifteenth century. Of these, twenty-six (42%) go to Augustininan Hermits. This result is consistent with an analysis, not of individual appointments, but of staff: some fifteen regulars teach Arts subjects during the same period; of these, only six are Augustinian Hermits (there are four Dominicans, three Franciscans, one Carmelite, and one from Camaldoli). See Lines 2001a.

as teachers of moral philosophy, the patterns at the two universities are not identical.[171] In particular, Dominicans and (increasingly) Franciscans are much more active in teaching the subject in Bologna than in Florence.

In Bologna (as in Florence), the teachers of moral philosophy tend to be more mature than elsewhere. This is largely the result of the requirement (usually observed) that teachers spend three years lecturing on logic before moving on to other subjects. However, here again the patterns encountered for Florence cannot be indiscriminately applied to Bologna. This is particularly apparent in the nature of joint appointments and the interests of moral philosophy teachers. For example, in Bologna one finds numerous joint appointments between natural and moral philosophy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, just as in Florence. However, there are also many joint appointments between medicine and moral philosophy, an association that seems peculiar to Bologna and that reaches back at least to the time of Bartolomeo da Varignana.[172] Furthermore, during the first half of the fifteenth century there are only a couple instances of joint appointments in rhetoric and moral philosophy. These become somewhat more frequent in the 1460s, with the teaching of Andronico Callisto.[173] But a formal tie between the two subjects is never institutionalized in Bologna as in Florence—after the teaching of Callisto, the only major recorded instance of a rhetorician teaching moral philosophy comes in 1520–1527, with the teaching of Giulio Valeriano Bonomi.[174]

In Bologna, it is more common for moral philosophy to be associated with other philosophical branches or to be taught alone. For example, one finds a series of joint appointments of ethics with metaphysics in 1507–1512 and with natural philosophy in 1514–1521

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[171] In the surviving documents for fifteenth-century Bologna there are fourteen appointments of regulars to moral philosophy. Only six of these, however, go to Augustinian Hermits, and of the seven staff members, only two belong to that order. Furthermore, in Bologna the appointments of regulars make up only around 7% of the total fifteenth-century appointments in moral philosophy. Also, whereas in Bologna too, as in Florence, one finds no records of regulars teaching moral philosophy in the university during the fourteenth century, things are slightly different for the sixteenth century, when one finds regulars teaching the subject through 1513–1514 (often in joint appointments with metaphysics).

[172] See, for example, Siraisi 1976.

[173] For Callisto's teaching see Appendix A, no. 61.

[174] For Bonomi's teaching see Appendix A, no. 80.

(Pietro Pomponazzi).[175] In the second half of the sixteenth century, several specialists in logic or natural philosophy teach the subject.[176] Also striking, however, is the number of occasions on which moral philosophy is taught as an independent subject. Except for the period 1507–1528, after 1469 there are remarkably few joint appointments of moral philosophy with other subjects. Already in the period 1435–1468 these have decreased significantly (to ca. 26% of total appointments in moral philosophy, compared with 82% in 1407–1434). This pattern is due mainly to Innocenzo Toschi, Annibale Malpigli, and Tommaso Marinasi, who dedicate their teaching careers (it is not clear why) to logic and moral philosophy.[177] This is all the more unusual, since teachers in the Arts faculty were usually anxious to move as quickly as possible up the career ladder to natural philosophy and, better yet, medicine, which tended to be far better paid than logic and moral philosophy.[178]

The teaching of ethics in Bologna changes, however, between the last quarters of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. In the first case, between two and three teachers are assigned to the subject each year. As we have seen, they tend to be specialists in the subject and teach it for long stretches of time. The average salary is a bit higher than for logic (L. 93 vs. L. 72), but on the whole moral philosophy accounts for the lowest expenditure, in the Arts (8.3%) as in Arts and Medicine (3.3%). At the end of the sixteenth century, moral philosophy is almost always taught by only one teacher per year. Although the subject is never taught jointly with others, it is no longer taught by specialists. Ethics tends to be taught for a few years by professors of logic or natural philosophy, who then return to their main area of interest. The average salary is much higher than before: ca. L. 617 per year instead of L. 93. However, this increment is apparently related to the inflationary spiral of the sixteenth century: as a proportion of the other subjects, moral philosophy

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[175] For Pomponazzi's teaching see Appendix A, no. 78.

[176] See, for example, the teaching of Claudio Betti and Agostino Galesio (Appendix A, nos. 81 and 85).

[177] On the careers of Toschi, Malpigli, and Marinasi see Appendix A, nos. 45, 60, and 65.

[178] In 1469–1505, for example, the average salary for logic was L. 72; for ethics, L. 93. During the same period, natural philosophy averaged L. 166 and medicine L. 256. On careerism in Bologna, especially in the sixteenth century, see Lines 2001b.

again represents the smallest item, whether in Arts (3.6%) or in Arts and Medicine (2%). Thus, its share is even smaller than earlier. It is telling that theology and metaphysics (heretofore insignificant) have a larger budget share (4.7% of the Arts and 2.5% of Arts and Medicine).

One should remember, however, that interpreting budget percentages is problematic,[179] and that salary figures are only part of the picture. All considered, it seems that moral philosophy became more important than earlier in late sixteenth-century Bologna. Although it may seem to be a step backward to employ only one ethics teacher rather than two or three, this strategy might have had any of a number of causes, including the desire to have a more unified teaching of the subject or to pay one lecturer decently rather than paying several lecturers small amounts.[180] Furthermore, in 1562 moral philosophy becomes an ordinary subject in Bologna.[181] Although the reasons behind this development are not clear, one of the implications of this change in status is that ethics is taught by senior professors, and not by junior faculty as had formerly been the case. Also, moral philosophy continues to be taught regularly in Bologna (unlike in Florence–Pisa), often for several years in a row by the same professor. Finally, the great flowering of Bolognese commentaries on the *Ethics* starts in the second half of the sixteenth century (see § 8.2.2).

Comparable developments may be observed in the Roman *studium*, where the second half of the sixteenth century sees the ethics teaching, for example, of Marc-Antoine Muret. There too moral philosophy becomes an ordinary subject, ethics teaching is offered by the same professor for several contiguous years, and one starts finding commentaries on the *Ethics* (see § 9.1). By the 1590s, the Jesuit Collegio Romano starts a regular program of ethics teaching which likewise spawns a number of commentaries and disputations (see § 9.2).

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[179] In the specific case of Bologna, drawing conclusions from the sixteenth-century salaries is especially hard because ethics teaching does not necessarily take place toward the beginning of a professor's career, as is the case earlier. Thus, when Claudio Betti switches from natural philosophy to moral philosophy in 1562, he can hardly be given a cut in pay (see Lines 2001b, Appendix, no. 166 and below, Appendix A, no. 81). The situation is similar for other professors in late sixteenth-century Bologna.

[180] Changes in staffing could also be related to fluctuations in the student population; but this is hard to track for specific courses.

[181] This occurrence is related to Claudio Betti's teaching; see Appendix A, no. 81.

As a minor subject in the Italian universities, ethics was more than others exposed to the (sometimes tempestuous) winds of local practice. Thus, a variety of different approaches was taken to the subject.[182] Nonetheless, it does seem that moral philosophy gained a higher standing in several universities during the second half of the sixteenth century. This change seems to have occurred at some point between 1548 (Florence–Pisa) and ca. 1562 (Padua, Bologna, and Rome). Although funding and staffing figures do not necessarily reflect this development, one should also consider other elements of the general context. For example, the staff called upon to teach the subject, the change (at least in some places) from feast-day to ordinary teaching, the higher number of surviving commentaries (see § 6.1), and even the controversies occasioned by the subject (see § 6.2) all suggest that something was afoot. Perhaps the nature of the change should not be overstated, for moral philosophy's rise in status was modest and not necessarily lasting.[183] Furthermore, at the moment there is no conclusive evidence as to what occasioned it. However, both the institutional status of moral philosophy and the way in which the subject was taught clearly underwent developments.

2.2.2 *Teaching Method*

Lectures and Questions

The university statutes do not often refer to moral philosophy, thus it is hard to know how it was to be taught. However, since moral philosophy was a subject mostly taught on feast days, it is likely that teaching it in the Italian universities involved lectures alone, without questions or disputations.[184] This is partly confirmed through the

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[182] On the difficulty of making generalizations about minor subjects, see Schmitt 1982.

[183] It is true that in Padua, for example, rises in payments come after years in which moral philosophy was the lowest paid of all subjects, even below the salary of third-level teachers of logic (who were often fresh graduates, as were the teachers of ethics). Even when salaries improved, however, Giason de Nores lacked the status of his colleague Antonio Riccoboni, who was paid almost twice as much for his teaching in rhetoric. Furthermore, with the assignment of moral philosophy to clerics toward the end of the century in Padua, the effort to reform the ethics course appears to wane.

[184] Students giving feast-day lectures in late fifteenth-century Pisa were only expected to hold one or more disputations per year (Verde, II, p. 613).

commentary evidence, for up to 1600 we know of few *Ethics* commentaries that proceed by *quaestiones*.[185] The large number of commentaries and questions that took Jean Buridan as their model in central Europe finds no parallel in Italy, although Buridan is not unknown there.[186] Furthermore, although there is evidence that *disputationes circulares*[187] were occasionally held on Aristotle's *Politics* and *Economics*,[188] this does not seem to have been the case for the *Ethics*.[189]

Textbooks and Coverage

Until the fifteenth century, lectures on the *Ethics* and related commentaries were based either on Grosseteste's translation (from 1246–1247) or on its later revision (probably by Moerbeke).[190] The study of translations used after 1416/17, when Leonardo Bruni completed his new version of the text,[191] is still in its infancy and requires examining each commentary for its base text. However, Bruni's text certainly was used by several commentators and in university teaching,[192] in spite of the controversies that surrounded it. It is not yet clear how often the translation of Argyropoulos was followed,[193] but it seems significant that Agostino Valier's teaching of moral philosophy in Venice (ca. 1558) was based on Argyropoulos' translation "in

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[185] One of the very few is the lost commentary by Michele Aiguani (see Appendix C, no. 17).

[186] On the *fortuna* of Buridan's *Ethics* commentary in Italy see Lines (forthcoming).

[187] The *disputationes circulares* were to take place for one hour's time after each lecture, at least from the opening of the academic year until Christmas vacation (*Statuta almi Pisani studii*, p. 48, Cap. XLV).

[188] Maierù 1994, p. 64 and note. Giovanni da Legnano († 1383) was apparently behind the establishment of a "circulus Politicorum" and a "circulus Yconomice"; cf. Flüeler 1992, II, pp. 29–30. On Giovanni da Legnano, see Imbach and Nienhaus, p. 489.

[189] Matsen 1994 refers to student disputations in Bologna in the following subjects: medicine, logic, rhetoric, astronomy, theology, and philosophy; not once does he mention moral philosophy. According to Salterini 1997, pp. 157–58, there are philosophical disputations (in ASB, Riformatori dello Studio, no. 59, Tesi e dispute di scolari e dottori–Artisti [1510–1571]) relative to Bologna that include topics in moral philosophy; but it seems that these only start in 1559.

[190] See Appendix B, nos. 3 and 4.

[191] On Bruni's translation see Appendix C, no. 26.

[192] For example, the commentaries by Tignosi (Appendix C, no. 40), Ficino (no. 32), and Becchi (no. 33) and the lectures by Filelfo (no. 28) and Argyropoulos (cf. nos. 35–36) are based on Bruni's translation. See also Hankins 1994, p. 158; idem 1997, *passim*.

[193] On Argyropoulos' translation see Appendix C, no. 37.

order not to depart from common custom."[194] Although a number of other retranslations of the *Ethics* was also produced in Renaissance Italy,[195] none enjoyed the fortune of Argyropoulos' translation, which often travelled together with French and Italian commentaries and deserves a specific study.

The gradual acceptance of these new texts did not, however, necessarily herald a new method of commenting on the *Ethics*. One set of marginalia on Bruni's text[196] is really a series of *quaestiones* addressed in the most traditional manner, with material taken from Thomas, Albert the Great, Burley, and Eustratius. Several copies of Bruni's translation were decorated with Thomas' commentary,[197] and on several occasions Thomas' commentary was printed together with Bruni's text.[198] Furthermore, the medieval translation (by Grosseteste/Moerbeke) did not suddenly disappear from the bookshelves or the classroom: it continued to be copied, printed, and commented upon.[199] Significantly, the *tres conversiones* edition of the *Ethics* (with the translations by Argyropoulos, Bruni, and the *liber Ethicorum*), was printed not only in Paris, but also several times in Venice.[200] Throughout the fifteenth century, not even the commentaries by Italian humanists give much attention to philological problems.[201]

The main exception to this latter point seems to be offered by the teaching of Angelo Poliziano (1454–1494). Although Poliziano did not, to our knowledge, author a commentary on the *Ethics*, his teaching of the *Ethics* in the Florentine *studium* (at least 1490–1491) is attested to both by his prolusion to the course[202] and by some

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[194] See below, Appendix C, no. 90.

[195] See above, § 1.4.2.

[196] Anonymous, Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2102 (A.D. 1452), ff. 1r–165r. On the manuscript, see Leonardi 1987, pp. 173–75; Lines 1997, p. 309.

[197] See Gauthier 1969, *passim* (especially pp. 19*–30*). But there are also other such manuscripts, e.g., Vatican, BAV, Pal. lat. 1015 (s. XV), ff. 6v–129r (cf. Hankins 1997, p. 193) and Vat. lat. 3003 (s. XV ex.), ff. 4v–124r (see Lines 1997, p. 310). Bruni's translation of the *Politics* also had a similar fate; see Cranz and Schmitt.

[198] Gauthier 1969, pp. 51*–56*.

[199] E.g., Bologna, BU 2252 (s. XV), ff. 1r–109v (see Frati, p. 447, no. 1119; Gauthier 1969, p. 20*).

[200] See Appendix C, no. 37.

[201] See below, Ch. 5. Examples are the commentary by Acciaiuoli (Acciaiuoli 1478; Appendix C, no. 38) and the compendium of Ermolao Barbaro (Barbaro 1544; Appendix C, no. 44).

[202] Poliziano 1553; see Appendix C, no. 48.

manuscripts annotated by his students.[203] Whereas the prolusion is of no use whatsoever in discerning the method followed by Poliziano in his teaching, the annotations are far more helpful. They show that Poliziano compared the translations of Bruni and Argyropoulos with the Greek text and corrected them both on various points. Furthermore, if the tenor of the annotations is to be believed, Poliziano did not give much attention to philosophical issues in his teaching, but concentrated instead on points of philological interest.[204] Thus, his declared intention of interpreting Aristotle's logic as a *grammaticus*[205] was applied to the *Ethics* as well.

The case of Poliziano's teaching raises two complex issues. The first has to do with the practice of teaching the *Ethics* in Greek in Renaissance Italy. Poliziano was a skilled Hellenist and obviously studied the *Ethics* in Greek; had he wanted to, he could also have lectured on the *Ethics* in the original, as he apparently did in his other courses. However, it is not really clear that he did so. The two annotated manuscripts referred to above carry Bruni's translation of the *Ethics*, not the Greek text. Should one imagine Poliziano juggling a Greek manuscript plus two more manuscripts with the translations by Bruni and Argyropoulos during his lectures, while his students followed along in Bruni's translation? Or should one draw a parallel with the teaching of the Greek émigré Argyropoulos (in Florence, 1457–1458), who knew the work in the original, but who lectured on it in Bruni's translation?[206] The answer is complicated by other known examples of fifteenth-century Hellenists who lectured on the *Ethics*. Filelfo, for example, probably based himself on Bruni's

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[203] See note in Appendix C, no. 48.

[204] See Hankins (forthcoming): "As these notes suggest, Poliziano's reading of Aristotle's *Ethics* is primarily philological and literary; the notes explain the literal meaning of the text; they give alternative translations as well as cross references to literary works (including Dante, Homer, and many Greek and Roman authors); they summarize, indicate *notabilia*, and excerpt important *sententiae*. Only occasionally do they venture into philosophical territory . . ."

[205] Poliziano 1986, pp. 16–19.

[206] The point is confirmed by two manuscripts. Florence, BNC, Naz. II.I.104 (s. XV), 206 ff., which contains Acciaiuoli's autograph notes from Argyropoulos' lectures, shows that Argyropoulos lectured on Bruni's translation, with which he often took issue (Field 1988, p. 209, n. 24 and Bianchi 1990a, p. 32, n. 32). Bologna, BU 2703 (s. XV) contains the notes of Benedetto Colucci on a copy of Bruni's translation; these too were taken in connection with Argyropoulos' lectures in Florence (Hankins 2001, p. 150, n. 25). For Argyropoulos' teaching in Florence see Appendix A, no. 111.

translation for his Florentine teaching of the work.[207] Ermolao Barbaro based his annotations and compendium of the work (written in parallel with his teaching of the subject in Padua) on the medieval translation, although a later colophon on a Greek manuscript shows that he studied the Greek text as well.[208] Finally, Nicolò Leoniceno (who probably lectured on the *Ethics* in Ferrara around 1488) clearly based his teaching on Bruni's text.[209]

The most likely hypothesis seems to be that Poliziano indeed lectured on the Greek text, possibly complemented by a Latin translation in which he noted the different interpretations by Bruni and Argyropoulos. If true, then Poliziano was a forerunner of the sixteenth-century *Ethics* teachers who lectured on the Greek text. These included not only two of the most important Hellenists of the century (Pier Vettori and Marc-Antoine Muret), but also Francesco Benci, Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano, and Ottaviano Ferrari. One must be careful, however, not to exaggerate the abilities of Italian students to follow such lectures. Not only did Muret have to bow to student pressure and provide a translation so they could follow his lectures on Book V,[210] but several of the teachers mentioned above included not only the Greek text in their commentaries, but a Latin translation as well. As with modern bilingual editions, students were probably tempted to read only the more familiar version, and in any case the number of students competent to read the *Ethics* in Greek was probably never more than a mere handful.[211] Furthermore, one should remember that we know of only five or six (of over forty) commentaries that are based on the Greek in sixteenth-century Italy. One could argue, of course, that owning the Aldine Greek edition of Aristotle's works would have been prohibitively expensive for most students,[212] and that this considerably limited Greek teaching. On

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[207] The matter cannot be determined with certainty (cf. Hankins 2001, p. 139), but given that ethics was a feast-day subject then, it is most unlikely that Filelfo would have lectured from the Greek text. For Filelfo's teaching in Florence see Appendix A, no. 105.

[208] On Barbaro's teaching in Padua see Appendix A, no. 131; for the *Compendium*, see Appendix C, no. 44.

[209] For Leoniceno's lectures see Appendix C, no. 47.

[210] On Muret's teaching see below, pp. 331–40.

[211] On the latter point, see especially Schmitt 1983b and the other studies referred to in Lines 1996, p. 157, n. 92.

[212] I am grateful to Kristian Jensen of the British Library for this information.

the other hand, affordable copies of single works could have been printed in response to sufficient demand.

But Poliziano's teaching also raises another important issue—i.e., how much and which parts of the *Ethics* lecturers on the work covered or were required to cover. Poliziano's own testimony indicates that, in 1490–1491, he lectured only on Books III and V of the *Ethics*.[213] Within the Florentine context, this seems to be a very modest coverage of the work. All of the other lectures and commentaries stemming from Florence in the second half of the fifteenth century cover all of the *Ethics*, as Argyropoulos did in less than two years.[214] In this sense, teachers in Florence (perhaps encouraged by their students) seem to have gone beyond the requirements of the statutes, which specified that students should have read at least the first four books.[215]

However, the range of Poliziano's coverage seems to have less in common with fifteenth-century Florentine practice than with what we know about sixteenth-century reading patterns. In the mid-sixteenth century, for example, Ciriaco Strozzi tried to cover most of the *Ethics* in his teaching in Pisa, but he had to spread this teaching out over the course of several years.[216] The same is true of Muret, who covered only two or three books of the *Ethics* per year when he was teaching moral philosophy in Rome in 1563–1567.[217] The lectures of Claudio Betti in Bologna (1570 and 1579) also suggest a limitation to two or three books of the *Ethics* per year,[218] and the obligations of later teachers in Bologna seem to have been even narrower. The rolls for Bologna (after 1591) indicate that teachers there were not required to read much more than one book of the *Ethics* per year, although what was covered (in what was apparently a six-year cycle) was fairly complete: *De felicitate in Universum, De attinentibus ad virtutes morales, De virtutibus moralibus, De iustitia et iure, De virtutibus contemplativis*, and *De amicitia* (substantially the greater part of the

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[213] See Appendix A, no. 113.

[214] See the commentaries by Tignosi (Appendix C, no. 40) and Becchi (no. 33). In his teaching of the *Ethics* in Padua, Ermolao Barbaro too covered all of the books (see below, Ch. 7, n. 10).

[215] Gherardi, p. 78. The requirements were similar in Perugia (Ermini 1971, p. 114), but it is, of course, very uncertain whether or not they were actually observed.

[216] See Appendix C, no. 76 and Appendix A, no. 118.

[217] Muret's progress is best judged by his prolusions; see Appendix C, no. 84.

[218] For Betti's lectures see Appendix C, no. 87 and below, § 8.3.

EN).[219] The Bolognese situation is comparable with that in Padua. The rolls there indicate that, in the late sixteenth century, even well-qualified professionals were not expected to cover more than one book of the *Ethics* per year. Usually they were assigned either Book I or II; more rarely they were called upon to teach Books III or X, and perhaps Book VI.[220]

These examples suggest that, as time went by, ethics teaching became more intensive and focused in most Italian universities. In many cases, this development seems to be correlated with a shift in the status of moral philosophy from a feast-day reading to a regular subject. However, Padua represents a large exception to this pattern, and it is doubtful whether one can establish a causal connection between the two events. It is more likely that the coverage of the *Ethics* was affected by changing goals, assumptions, or methodologies.

In the case of Poliziano and of other Italian philologists, a slow and laborious reading of the text would seem to be the obvious result of their methodology. A concentration on linguistic, literary, and even historical problems intrinsically makes for slow reading, especially when students have only a limited grasp of the language. But the example of Betti in Bologna shows that the same effect was achieved when one concentrated, not on a text's philological aspects, but on its syllogistic and logical structures.[221] Also, since the *Ethics* became an important work for sixteenth-century discussions of pedagogical method, teaching it could require giving close attention to related methodological issues, again something that required time. Antonio Bernardi, for example, spent twenty lectures discussing introductory and methodological matters before starting his commentary on Book I. Even then, he did not get very far into the text.[222] The Jesuit approach to the text potentially made for an even slower reading, depending on the number of philosophical and theological questions one chose to raise on specific passages.[223]

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[219] See especially the teaching of Melchiorre Zoppio (Appendix A, no. 87).

[220] Appendix A, nos 195–97 (Giason de Nores, Niccolò Colonio, Giovanni Belloni). Cf. ASPi, Università, G. 77, f. 60r; this undated document, which seems to pertain to the end of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century, says that in Padua the first, second, and sixth books of the *Ethics* were to be read.

[221] On this aspect of Betti's lectures, see especially below, § 8.3.1.

[222] For Bernardi's lectures see Appendix C, no. 67.

[223] The Jesuit approach to the *Ethics* is discussed below, § 9.2.2.

What these different approaches seem to have in common is a relative disinterest in the actual philosophical content of the *Ethics* and in providing a general overview of the work's moral doctrine (features of the course that are still discernible in the fifteenth century).[224] Students in Bologna, for example, could not be expected to follow a cycle of lectures that lasted six years. In such a situation, what books of the *Ethics* students heard was doubtless less important than the methodological training they received, whether in Greek, logic, theology, or other subjects. It should also be noted, however, that moral philosophy was not the only field to be affected by such focused reading. The examples of Pietro Pomponazzi and Francesco Piccolomini show that a parallel development took place in the teaching of the *Physics*;[225] by the end of the sixteenth century, the Jesuit Antonio Possevino complained that Italian students of the *Physics* often heard only Books I, II, VIII, and parts of Books III and IV.[226]

Little is known about other texts used as complements to (or replacements for) the *Ethics* in the moral philosophy course. For the period up to 1650, I have found no sure instances in which the *Eudemian Ethics*, the *Magna Moralia*, or the *De virtutibus* were taught in the Italian universities. However, with the exception of Ermolao Barbaro's teaching in Padua, it is only in the sixteenth century that one hears of several cases in which the *Politics* is lectured upon publicly.[227] Francesco Robortello lectured on the *Politics* in Venice (1550–1551) and then again as part of his course on moral philosophy in Padua (from 1562).[228] Niccolò Colonio and Giovanni Belloni were also instructed to teach the *Politics* in Padua.[229] In Pisa, Ciriaco Strozzi

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[224] See especially below, Ch. 5.

[225] For Pomponazzi, see Lohr, RLAC, pp. 349–54; for Piccolomini, see *ibid.*, pp. 333–36.

[226] Possevino 1593, pp. 109–10, cited in Lines 2002a, n. 2.

[227] For Barbaro, see Appendix A, no. 131 and Ch. 7, n. 11 (where he seems to imply that he taught, not only the *Ethics* and the *Politics*, but the *Economics* as well). Acciaiuoli wrote a commentary on the *Politics*, but it does not seem to be associated with any lectures (Staico 1996), and Argyropoulos does not seem to have taught the work. A commentary on the *Politics* by Becchi dates from 1476 and survives in a single manuscript: Florence, BLaur., Aedil. 154 (A.D. 1480), ff. 1ra–109vb (Flüeler 1992, II, p. 23; Staico 1996). Becchi also wrote a commentary on the *Economics* (Flüeler 1992, II, pp. 22–23). It is not certain whether either of these works is related to lectures.

[228] For Robortello's teaching in Venice, see Poppi, p. 114; for his teaching in Padua, see below, Appendix A, no. 194.

[229] See Appendix A, nos. 196 and 197. In 1553 and again in 1571, the professor

and his successor Pietro Angèli occasionally taught the *Ethics* and the *Politics*.[230] Muret taught the *Politics* in the Roman *studium*, at least in 1577–1578.[231] In other educational institutions, however (such as the Collegio Romano), teaching of the *Politics* was not at all envisaged.

Whereas the *Economics* may have been associated with university teaching at an early date (by the beginning of the fourteenth century),[232] little is known about its subsequent teaching. If it was taught at all in the fifteenth century, this happened on very rare occasions.[233] In the sixteenth century, Muret is one of very few who seem to have taught the work.[234]

As noted above, during the sixteenth century several (although by no means all) of the professors of moral philosophy in Italy were also professors of literature or of Greek and Latin. It should be recalled that these teachers, as well as some of their predecessors, sometimes saw themselves as teaching moral philosophy even when they were discussing Latin (or Greek) texts that were part of the rhetoric curriculum.[235] This was understandably the case for works such as Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes*, but less obviously so for other texts as well. For example, the rhetorician Filippo Beroaldo, Sr. discussed Horace and Virgil's *Georgics* in connection with happiness and moral philosophy in the course of his teaching in Bologna.[236] And it seems at least possible that Marsuppini's teaching of ethics in Florence was based on Latin texts by Cicero or Seneca (or Greek ones by Isocrates or Plutarch) rather than Aristotle.[237] This whole subject deserves further attention. It may even be that a study of Renaissance commentaries on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* would considerably

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of natural (!) philosophy in the school of the chancery in Venice was instructed to teach also the *Ethics, Economics*, or *Politics* each Friday and Saturday (Dejob 1881, pp. 464–65).

[230] See Appendix A, nos. 116 and 119.

[231] For Muret, see Appendix A, no. 267.

[232] On Bartolomeo da Varignana see above, Ch. 2, n. 95 and below, Appendix A, no. 1.

[233] Fioravanti 1995, for example, argues that Ugo Benzi's commentary is related to his teaching of the subject (cf. below, Appendix A, no. 17). It is not clear whether Guglielmo Becchi's commentary (see above, n. 227) is related to a course.

[234] Muret's teaching of the *Economics* probably took place right before his teaching of the *Politics*; see Appendix A, no. 267.

[235] In the university documents, rhetoric is sometimes considered to be one of the *libri morales*; see Siraisi 1976 and eadem 1981, p. 73.

[236] See below, p. 299.

[237] See Appendix A, no. 106 for Marsuppini's teaching in Florence.

help in rounding out the picture offered here. Here I can only hope to have provided an overview of the context in which the *Ethics* was discussed in the universities of Renaissance Italy. The story of how the *Ethics* was interpreted on the point of moral education is told in the following chapters.

PART II

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE *ETHICS* TO 1500

CHAPTER THREE

THE MEDIEVAL INHERITANCE

In a letter of 1404 to the Sienese professor Francesco Casini, the Florentine chancellor Coluccio Salutati expressed appreciation for the addressee's commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (of which, however, he had read only a small part) and baldly stated that Casini had outdone the Greek commentaries of Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus as well as the Latin ones of Albert the Great, Albert of Saxony, Gerard of Odo, Walter Burley, Jean Buridan, and Henry of Friemar. Not only that, but Casini had even outdistanced Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome.[1] Thus Salutati offers (although in a backhanded way, and mostly with an eye to rhetorical effect) a listing of the *Ethics* commentators probably most appreciated in his time. A century and a half later, Bernardo Segni had his own catalogue of commentators to praise: "Sonci Comenti d'eccellentissimi huomini, imprima d'Eustratio greco, dipoi di S. Tommaso, del Burleo, et di Donato Acciaiuoli, o vogliam dir dell'Argiropolo . . ."[2] These remarks, praising medieval interpretations of the *Ethics*, confirm Kristeller's observation that the humanists could hardly have rejected the medieval cultural heritage completely (or even generally), and even when selective rejection occurred, it required at least knowing what was being rejected. Thus, Thomas' thought remained remarkably influential

[1] Salutati, *Ep.*, IV, 1, pp. 37–39: "De scripto vero tuo quod in Ethicis compilasti, si respondent ultima primis, indubitatam audeo ferre sententiam, nichil umquam clarius, nichil copiosius, nichil verius super his quod in manus venerit scriptum esse. Neque enim Eustrachium, Ephesium Michaelem et Albertum Magnum commentatores solum exsuperas, sed Alberto, Gerardo, Gualtero de Burlei disputatorique tuo Iohanni Buridani, Henrico Theutono ordinis heremitarum, subtilissimo et copiosissimo questionum enucleatori; cuius scripta nescio si vidisti; per illa quidem, que duobus illis tuis quaternulis legi, nullam prorsus doctoris huius mentionem facis; nec istis tantum, sed Aquinati Thome Romanoque simul Egidio, longissimis spaciis antecellis, ut tibi cunctisque tecum habende sint gratie Deo, qui te quod scriberes inspiravit et quod perficeres adeo eleganter adiuvit." This letter was brought to my attention by Bianchi 1990a, pp. 53–54. See also Gilbert 1971, especially pp. 217–20. To my knowledge, Francesco Casini's commentary has not been found. On Casini, see Appendix C, no. 24.

[2] Segni 1550, p. 14.

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during the Italian Renaissance, not only for its general philosophical approach and conclusions, but also for those specific to moral philosophy.[3]

An examination of Renaissance commentaries on the *Ethics* confirms that, for writers in Latin as in Italian, the medieval interpretative tradition of the *Ethics* remained something to be reckoned with, even when they disdained to reveal how heavily their own interpretations depended on those of their predecessors.[4] Thus, this chapter asks how the medieval commentators interpreted Aristotle on the point of moral education: Is there general agreement among the interpreters, from Albert the Great to Jean Buridan, about how moral philosophy should be taught or learned? Furthermore, how did the views of the Greek and Arabic commentators affect the discussion of this issue in the Latin West?[5] In answering the latter question, this chapter relies heavily on the interpretations of the Greek commentators (Eustratius *et al.*) and Averroes.[6]

Among the Latins, the first-rank commentaries were those of Albert the Great (1200–1280), Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Walter Burley (1275–1346), Gerard of Odo (1290–1349), Albert of Saxony († 1390), and Jean Buridan († after 1358). Although it is a very different work from the commentaries just named, the *De regimine principum* of Giles of Rome (1245–1316) also contains important borrowings from the *Ethics* and is therefore studied here.[7]

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[3] On the general influence of Thomas Aquinas in the Renaissance, see at least Cranz 1978, O'Malley 1974, Camporeale 1976, McNair 1994, Gray 1965, and Kristeller 1992a. On the specific influence of his *Ethics* commentary in Italy, see Lines (forthcoming).

[4] See, for example, the dependence of Acciaiuoli's commentary (Acciaiuoli 1478) on Eustratius and Albert the Great, discussed in Bianchi 1990a, pp. 44 ff. And see Segni's observation: "È certamente degno il Comento fatto da Donato Acciaiuoli Cittadino nobilissimo, et virtuosissimo di grandissima lode; perché in lui si racchiude tutto il buono d'Eustratio, et di S. Tommaso . . ." (Segni 1550, p. 15).

[5] In general, on the interpretation of Aristotle and its cultural significance in the Middle Ages, helpful comments are given in Lohr 1976 and 1982.

[6] For the Greek commentators and Averroes see above, § 1.4.1 and § 1.4.2 as well as Appendix B, nos. 6 and 5. In the case of Eustratius and the other Greek commentators, I have relied not only on Eustratius *et al.* 1973 and 1991, but (for Books V–VI, not yet edited) on Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. I.5.21 (s. XIII/XIV), which also includes notes by Grosseteste.

[7] A description of the approach(es) to the *Ethics* in the commentaries examined in this chapter is offered below, § 4.1.1. For a general overview of medieval commentaries on the *Ethics* see Wieland 1982.

Of special importance for this chapter, because of their influence in late-medieval and Renaissance Italy,[8] are the works of three of the Latin interpreters just mentioned (in addition, of course, to Eustratius and Averroes). Albert the Great, a Dominican, read the *Ethics* in the *studium* of his order in Cologne, around 1248–1252. His lectures,[9] which include both a literal commentary and a discussion of philosophical questions, were published from the notes of his student Thomas Aquinas.[10] In addition, Albert later provided a paraphrase of the *Ethics*,[11] a work arguably even more influential than his lectures. Thomas, also a Dominican, was professor of theology in Paris when he wrote his *Sententia libri Ethicorum* (ca. 1271–1272?).[12] This commentary tends to remain close to the text (it is a literal exposition) and does not pause to address questions; both its style and philosophical viewpoint enjoyed resounding success. Finally, Giles of Rome wrote a remarkably well-received mirror for princes;[13] although this work is not a commentary and depends on several other Aristotelian works in addition to the *Ethics*, it is very rich on the topic of virtue and education and therefore deserves to be referred to here.

Excellent studies already exist on several of the individual commentators and their understanding of moral philosophy (see Appendix B); I shall not therefore attempt a description of their philosophical positions, even just for ethics. A more germane concern here is whether there was a common medieval tradition on the teaching of virtue that served as a reference point for the Renaissance commentators. This inquiry concentrates on the following questions: What is the relationship of virtue and moral philosophy? What is the proper audience for moral philosophy? How should moral philosophy be taught, and who should teach it? As we shall see, these were questions that caused a great deal of debate among Renaissance interpreters as well.

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[8] For the Italian *fortuna* of several commentators named, see below, § 4.1.2.

[9] Albert 1968–1972; see Appendix B, no. 7.

[10] For the influence of this work on Thomas and his commentary, see especially Gauthier 1969, pp. 235*–46* and idem 1971b, pp. xvii–xviii.

[11] Albert 1651 and 1891; see Appendix B, no. 8.

[12] Thomas Aquinas 1969; see Appendix B, no. 11.

[13] Giles of Rome 1502; see Appendix B, no. 12.

3.1 *Virtue and Moral Philosophy*

How one teaches moral philosophy seems to depend, in the first instance, on how one understands the process of acquiring virtue, which in turn depends on one's definition of virtue. This section therefore discusses the relationship of virtue with moral philosophy.

3.1.1 *Nature and Acquisition of Virtue*

Definition of Virtue

Starting from the premise that virtue can only be a passion, a faculty, or a habit, Aristotle proceeds by elimination and identifies the *genus* of virtue as a habit or state (*EN* II.5). Three short passages in Book II are especially relevant for a more refined definition of virtue. In the translation of Grosseteste/Moerbeke,[14] used by the medieval commentators, they read:

> [1] Si utique hoc in omnibus ita habet, et hominis virtus erit utique habitus, ex quo bonus homo fit, et a quo bene suum opus reddit (II.5, 1106a21–23).
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> [2] Virtus autem circa passiones et operaciones est. In quibus quidem superhabundancia viciosa est et defectus vituperatus [*recensio pura*: vituperatur], medium autem laudatur et dirigitur (II.5, 1106b25–27).
>
> [3] Est ergo virtus habitus electivus in medietate existens que ad nos determinata racione; et ut utique, sapiens [*recensio pura* adds: seu prudens] determinabit (II.6, 1107a1–2).[15]

The anonymous Greek commentator has nothing special to say about the first passage and is completely silent about the second. This silence may be viewed as a reluctance to admit that virtue may be

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[14] Throughout, I use the *recensio recognita* (Aristotle, *EN lat.*, fasc. 4) rather than the *recensio pura* (*ibid.*, fasc. 3), since the latter survives in only a few manuscripts. On the translations of the *EN* available in medieval times, see above, § 1.4.1 and Aristotle, *EN lat.*, fasc. 1.

[15] I offer a translation: [1] "Therefore, if this is true in every case, the excellence of man will also be a habit, by which man becomes good and which makes him do his work well." [2] "Now virtue concerns passions and actions, in which there is some vicious excess and blame-worthy defect, but in which the intermediate is praised and attained." [3] "Virtue, then, is a a habit concerned with choice, lying in a mean—relative to us—determined by reason, and especially as the wise man would determine it."

related to the passions. Indeed, in his comments on the third passage, the commentator emphasizes the distinction between virtue and the passions, even a passion like *verecundia* which cannot be faulted.[16] Likewise, on an earlier passage the commentator notes: "Indeed, according to some people the virtues are impassibilities of sorts and states of rest."[17] This view does violence to Aristotle's argument that an essential component of virtue is to *feel* the passions properly.[18]

Albert is less embarrassed on this point; his commentary on passage [2] explicitly accepts that virtue concerns passions and actions. He points out that justice concerns the latter, whereas temperance and fortitude concern the former.[19] Albert shows how well he understands Aristotle especially in his interpretation of passage [1], where he discusses virtue as that which makes good the person who possesses or exercises it. Thus, in his view the virtue under discussion is not only the fully developed kind exercised in accordance with reason, but also the incipient, formative kind which the legislator wishes to instill in others. Albert emphasizes that only virtue (or the virtues) can generate goodness; thus he seems to be thinking in terms of specific virtuous acts enforceable by law.[20]

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[16] "Simul autem et dividit ipsam [*sc.* virtutem] a quibusdam quidem dictis passionibus, quae quidem sunt in medietate, non tamen duarum malitiarum. Verecundia enim et quaecumque tales passiones, ut et ipse ostendet, laudabiles quidem et in medietate, neque autem virtutes neque mediae malitiarum" (Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. II, p. 219).

[17] "Secundum quosdam enim virtutes impassibilitates quaedam sunt et quietes" (*ibid.*, p. 213). The passage in question says, "in respect of the passions, we are said to be moved, but in respect of the excellences and the vices we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way" (II.4, 1106a5–6, "Adhuc autem secundum passiones quidem moveri dicimur, secundum virtutes autem vel malicias non moveri, set disponi qualiter").

[18] "For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence" (II.6, 1106b18–23). In the commentator's defense, the Greek uses no verb (or noun) where the translator here uses "to feel."

[19] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. II, lec. VI, p. 123, ll. 24 ff.: "Exponit autem conclusionem, quia hoc intelligendum est de virtutibus *moralibus*, quae sunt *circa operationes* quantum ad iustitiam *et passiones* quantum ad temperantiam et fortitudinem . . ."

[20] *Ibid.*, lec. V, p. 116, ll. 51–60: "Si igitur per virtutes non fieret aliquis bonus, numquam posset fieri bonus, et sic frustraretur intentio legislatoris, qui intendit cives bonos facere; quod est inconveniens. Ergo virtus per hoc fuit diffinienda, quod facit bonum habentem vel operantem. Praeterea, ipse supra dixit, quod bene virtutis est

Thomas points out that the goodness generated by the exercise of virtue is not goodness in the full sense, but in the formal sense, much as, because of whiteness, something is referred to as being white.[21] He departs from Albert, however, when he discusses which virtues specifically govern the passions and actions of passage [2]. Thomas concludes that *rectitudo* and *laus* are connected with virtue on this point; the first is opposed to the passions, the second instead to censure.[22] On passage [3] Thomas comments more fully than the other two commentators, and it is worthwhile noting how he breaks down Aristotle's definition of virtue: (a) *habitus* is the genus of virtue; (b) *electivus* describes the operation of moral virtue, or "actus virtutis moralis"; (c) *existens in medietate quae ad nos* pertains to the object or end of such operation; and (d) *determinata ratione* has to do with the "causa bonitatis in ratione." The specific action of (b) is determined with reference to (c), through the use of (d).[23] Thomas is the first of the commentators examined here to note that the wise man, referred to as the model for exercising the reason in question, is not the one who knows the highest cause of the universe—as the translation *sapiens* might lead one to suppose—but rather the man of practical wisdom.[24]

In conclusion, these and other medieval commentators agree with Aristotle's definition of virtue as a *habitus* and sometimes happily repeat the wording of his definition.[25] They are not, however, equally

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in operante; ergo diffinitio virtutis est bonitas operantis, et sic fuit ponendum in eius diffinitione, quod facit bonum operantem vel habentem."

[21] Thomas 1969, Lib. II, lec. VI, p. 94, ll. 34–39: "... sequitur quod virtus hominis erit habitus quidam ... ex quo homo fit bonus formaliter loquendo sicut albedine fit aliquid album, et per quem aliquis bene operatur."

[22] *Ibid.*, ll. 185–89: "Haec autem duo ad virtutem pertinent, scilicet rectitudo, quae opponitur perversitati vitiosae, et laus, quae opponitur vituperio ..."

[23] On the various kinds of explanations of virtue in Thomas, see Forment 1995.

[24] Thomas 1969, Lib. II, lec. VII, pp. 98–99, ll. 67–75: "Verum quia contingit rationem esse et rectam et erroneam, oportet virtutem secundum rationem rectam operari, ut supra suppositum est, et ad hoc explicandum subdit: 'et ut utique sapiens determinabit,' scilicet medium; sapiens autem hic dicitur non ille qui est sapiens simpliciter quasi cognoscens altissimam causam totius universi, sed prudens qui est sapiens rerum humanarum, ut infra in VI dicetur ..." Where the *recensio recognita* translates *sapiens*, the Greek has φρόνιμος.

[25] E.g., Gerard 1482, Prologue, f. 20v: "Ex hiis igitur satis apparet quod virtus habita habentem facit bonum, ut cum Aristotele 2. ethicorum possumus veraciter dicere quod hominis virtus est habitus ex quo bonus homo fit et a quo bonum opus suum reddit." A bit more interesting is his definition, "Virtus est habitus determinate electivus operis omnino conformis ad operandi debitum per prudentialem rationem ostensum" (*ibid.*, Lib. II, lec. VI, q. 20, f. 81v).

in agreement on the rôle of the various parts of the soul in generating and exercising virtue. On this topic there is a broad divergence of opinion: some commentators stress the importance of the emotions, others of the will, and others still of the intellect. These views owe their differences partly to different understandings of where virtue resides. In turn, the location of virtue has implications for how it is acquired.

Location of Moral Virtue

At the end of Book I, Aristotle discusses the parts of the soul, dividing the irrational part of the soul into a nutritive faculty and "a desiring element [that] in a sense shares in [reason]" (*EN* I.13, 1102b32 ff.). Conversely—and this is where things get tricky—Aristotle also divides the rational part of the soul into two elements: the one, rational in the strict sense; the other, subservient to it (I.13, 1103a1–3). Aristotle then affirms, "Excellence too is distinguished into kinds according to this difference, for we say that some excellences are intellectual and others moral, philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral" (I.13, 1103a4–7). Aristotle thus sees the two kinds of virtue as reflecting a particular division of the soul; but which one—that between rational and irrational, or that between the subdivisions of the rational soul? Furthermore, what exactly is the higher part of the appetitive soul? Could it be the same as the lower part of the rational soul, which also is said to "obey" or "heed"? Does either one of these correspond to what we would call the will or the emotions?[26]

Thomas believes that Aristotle's division of virtue corresponds to the rational/irrational (first-level) distinction in the soul. Thus he sees moral virtue as residing in the higher part of the appetitive element ("in appetitu qui participat rationem"). Thomas does not identify this higher part with the emotions, which are seen as movements within the sensitive appetite (although they actually involve the entire person), but rather associates it with the will.[27] Still, Thomas gives the emotions an important rôle in the activity of virtue. Emotions, much

[26] On the theory of the soul and its relationship to ethics, the fundamental study is Lottin 1942–1960.

[27] Thomas 1969, Lib. I, lec. III; Lib. III, lecs. XI–XIII. On the rôle of the will, see also Thomas' comments in *Summa Theologica*, Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4 and q. 56, a. 2 and a. 5.

like the higher part of the appetitive soul, are in-between powers, belonging to both body and soul. Like Aristotle, Thomas does not think they are necessarily obstacles to the exercise of virtue: he sees them as morally neutral, but needing the guidance of the will and reason, for they are nonetheless powerful. In some instances, the emotions can hamper the exercise of virtue, especially when they cloud the judgment.[28] But it is also possible for them to play a positive rôle, for example by making a good seem more attractive because of its connection with pleasure. Likewise, the emotions can also be helpful *after* the act of virtue has been performed: they can increase the value of a particular act or confirm the actor's commitment to it. Thus the emotions, viewed not as an overpowering of reason but as any physiological/psychological change, "can be in a virtuous person, insofar as they are subordinate to reason."[29] So reason exercises a rule over the emotions, but not a despotic one.

Buridan is less sympathetic than Thomas to a positive rôle of the emotions. This is doubtless due in part to Buridan's heavy dependence on Seneca (to whom he refers by name more than anyone else)[30] and to his emphasis on the will and its freedom.[31] But the fact remains that one finds hardly any positive references to the emotions in Buridan's commentary: he emphasizes Aristotle's view that the young are not proper hearers of the *Ethics* because they follow their passions, points out the dangers of the will becoming perverted, and discusses the need for pleasure and the emotions to be repressed by the will.[32]

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[28] For example, Thomas 1969, Lib. VI, lec. IV, p. 346, ll. 131–39: "... quando autem est vehemens delectatio vel tristitia, apparet homini quod illud sit optimum per quod sequitur delectationem et fugit tristitiam, et ita, corrupto iudicio rationis, non apparet homini verus finis, qui est principium prudentiae circa operabilia existentis, nec appetit ipsum, neque etiam videtur sibi quod oporteat omnia eligere et operari propter verum finem, sed magis propter delectabile."

[29] Thomas, *Summa*, Ia IIae, q. 24, a. 2. The main source for this paragraph is Barad 1995, who observes (p. 651): "The rule of reason within the individual himself over his emotions is a political rule: each emotion contains within itself its own freedom, its own power of resistance, and it is the rôle of virtue to overcome this resistance, although never in such a way as to suppress the power itself."

[30] Walsh 1966, pp. 26–27.

[31] On the freedom of the will, an example is Buridan 1637, Lib. II, q. 6. Also see Monohan 1953, Korolec 1976, and Sylla 1995, p. 593.

[32] Two examples will suffice. Every perfect virtue requires two habits besides prudence: "unus, firmans et determinans appetitum ad faciliter sustinendum tristitias corporales, et refugiendum voluptates et ocia, et ad reprimendum impetum aliarum passionum, quae possent appetitum movere ad rebellandum rationi; et ille habitus

Buridan, like Thomas, places moral virtue in the upper part of the irrational soul, explicitly associating this with the will. However, he arrives at this decision only after agonizing about the possible participation of the sensitive appetite in moral virtue. This indecision could be due to a desire to include the emotions somehow, even by giving them a very minor rôle. Buridan's main reason for placing more emphasis on the will seems to be that humans share the emotions with the animals.[33]

Eustratius instead takes an intellectualist (and Platonizing) approach toward moral virtue, declaring its operation to be "secundum rectam rationem." Thus he sees no problem with Socrates' definition of the virtues as *prudentiae* or *scientiae*.[34] But Eustratius does not therefore see all virtues as located in the intellect. Rather, the intellectual virtues (*sapientia, intellectus, prudentia*) are in reason; the moral ones (*liberalitas, sobrietas*, etc.) in the irascible and concupiscible part of the soul (i.e., in the higher part of the nutritive soul). Since Eustratius divides the soul into nutritive, appetitive, and rational, moral virtue is actually placed lower in his scheme than in those of Thomas and Buridan. However, it makes sense that it therefore stands more in need of the guidance of reason.[35]

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generatur ex assuetudine sustinendi et refutandi et reprimendi dictas passiones. Alius firmans et determinans appetitum ad amorem honesti, qui generatur ex multis actibus amandi honestum" (Buridan 1637, Lib. VI, q. 21, p. 563). Buridan also states (Lib. II, q. 4, p. 99): "Verbi gratia, quod electio in voluntate sit per optime consona rationi, tamen forte appetitus sensitivus ad oppositum passionatus, etsi ex toto rebellare non possit, tamen cum tristitia multotiens obediet rationi, propter quod non erit eius operatio perfecta, consona rationi."

[33] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, q. 22: "Utrum virtutes morales sint in appetitu sensitivo subjective, vel in voluntate? Arguitur quod in voluntate" (p. 77). Buridan likes both positions. He opts for having a *virtus appetitus sensitivi* and *virtus voluntatis* (p. 80); decides that "utraque harum virtutum potest dici virtus moralis, inquantum utraque ex more generatur, scilicet ex assuefactione operandi opera virtuosa; hoc dicamus, quod virtus voluntatis dici debet virtus hominis, secundum quod homo, magis quam virtus appetitus sensitivi . . . Sciendum est tamen, quod cum voluntas sit potentia superior, et homini propria, quod secundum eam primo et principaliter homo dicitur bonus, et non secundum appetitum sensitivum, ideo sequitur quod in ea consistit virtus, saltem moralis, hominis secundum quod homo" (pp. 81–82); cf. Lib. II, q. 10, "Utrum virtutes morales sint impassibilitates." Buridan's strong voluntaristic views raise questions about the extent of Ockham's influence on medieval commentators on the *Ethics*; see Wieland 1982, pp. 667–68; Lambertini 1997, pp. 329–32. Cf. McGrade 1990.

[34] Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. I.5.21, Lib. VI, f. 142r: ". . . non incongrue Socrates prudentias vel scientias notabat virtutes . . ."

[35] Eustratius solves the problem of Aristotle's contradictory descriptions of the soul (two parts here versus the three in the *De anima*) by referring the partly-appetitive

Eustratius' view of the relationship of virtue with *ratio* is strongly criticized by Gerard of Odo (and later by Buridan), who argues that, according to Aristotle, moral virtue is neither *recta ratio* nor *secundum rectam rationem*, but rather *cum recta ratione*.[36] Unsurprisingly, Gerard (a Franciscan) combats intellectualist views of virtue so the affections and the will can have their proper place. Nonetheless, Gerard does not see reason as being irrelevant to virtue: although virtue must be possessed in order to make someone good, hearing or knowing about it can be a stimulus toward becoming good.[37]

Acquisition of Moral Virtue

The Greek commentators do not, as one might expect, see the acquisition of virtue as an automatic process deriving from an academic or abstract learning context. Michael of Ephesus realizes, for example, that *sermones* (covering the semantic range, in English, of "arguments, teaching, and advice") are not sufficient in and of themselves to accomplish the required task of spurring any young man on to virtue. In matters relating to virtue, Michael says, words can encour-

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and partly-rational subdivisions to one part (the appetite), which includes the *sensitivum* and the *phantasticum*; thus, the appetitive part is in between the nutritive and rational souls (Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. I, pp. 190–93). Giles of Rome uses and modifies Eustratius' scheme. He divides the appetite into *intellectivus* and *sensitivus*, and the latter again into concupiscible and irascible. He places prudence in the rational soul, justice in the intellective part of the appetitive soul (i.e., in the will), and temperance and courage respectively in the concupiscible and irascible subparts of the *sensitivus*. The other eight virtues also end up in the *sensitivus* (Giles of Rome 1502, II, 1, caps. ii–iii). On Giles' view of prudence and its function, see Lambertini 1992.

[36] Gerard 1482, Lib. II, lec. II, f. 68r. Buridan adds: "prudentia non est formaliter recta ratio, id est, recta ratiocinatio, sicut nec virtus moralis est formaliter recta electio: immo prudentia est habitus determinans intellectum ad ratiocinandum prompte et firmiter de agibilibus; sed non dico quod talis habitus sit necessarius ad recte ratiocinandum . . ." (Buridan 1637, Lib. II, q. 4, p. 101). Eustratius could easily have defended his expression "secundum rectam rationem" by appealing to II.2, 1103b 31–33, where Aristotle says, "Now, that we must act *according to right reason* is a common principle and must be assumed . . ." (cf. I.3, 1095a 9–11). Gerard, however, was depending on Averroes: "Et propter hoc dicimus nos quod ipsa [virtus] non est ratio recta, tamen est habitus excellens cum recta ratione et ratio recta coniugata est ei prudentiae. Et Socrates iam putabat quod omnes virtutes essent scientiae. Nos autem dicimus quod sunt cum ratione" (Florence, BNC, Conv. sopp. G.4.354, Lib. VI, f. 44v).

[37] Gerard 1482, Prologue, f. 20r: "Ipsa namque virtus habita habentem facit bonum; cognita vero, licet non habita, cognoscentem inducit ad bonum." Cf. Buridan's comments on intellectual knowledge and interior, true knowledge (Buridan 1637, Lib. VI, q. 17, p. 546).

age but not persuade; of utmost importance is the upbringing one has received, since this can make one receptive to virtue. Here Michael probably refers to the education children should receive at the hands of tutors (*legispositivi* experienced in distinguishing good from bad laws). This possibility, however, is not open to all. So Michael commends another, more accessible path—i.e., the Aristotelian idea of habituating oneself to experiencing pleasure and pain in the proper things. This is all the more necessary because God's gift of being virtuous by nature is not at our beck and call.[38]

There is thus a clear element of personal effort involved even in the initial stage of acquiring virtue, the one that is to prepare us to receive teaching about virtue just as the earth is prepared to receive seed. At one point Eustratius even says that some virtues are generated by our toil to possess them.[39] But this does not rule out the presence of God's grace in the process itself. Eustratius, whose commentary is deeply colored by religious considerations, does not think of God's intervention merely as a factor that gives encouragement, but as an indispensable element for the success of our efforts.[40] According to Eustratius, man finds himself on a spiritual journey that has, as its end, union with God. First, however, one must pass through the stages of moderation of the passions, of their mortification, and of participation with God. Of these rungs, ethics represents the first; it especially requires divine aid if one is not to remain satisfied with a human sort of virtue.[41]

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[38] Eustratius *et al.* 1991, Lib. X, p. 452: "Sermones enim soli et per dictos ipsos cognitio sola neque felices neque politicos neque speculativos perficere possunt, sed omnimode debiles sunt et impotentes. Provocare quidem enim ad actiones liberales seu liberos et bene nutritos et reductos iuvenum possunt." Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 455–56: "Hoc quidem igitur discere virtutum naturas et communicationes ipsarum et differentias, adhuc et possidere consuetudine, in nobis vere est et nostrae voluntatis et electionis, hoc autem scilicet natura fieri temperatos, iustos, prudentes, non nostrum sed donum Dei optimum et pretiosissimum. *Quod quidem igitur naturae non* nostrum, donum autem divinum; assuefacere autem nosmet ipsos delectari quibus oportet et tristari, nostrum. Et potest talis consuetudo bonos facere nos. *Sermo autem et doctrina non in omnibus*, ut dictum est, *potest*, sed in praeparatis *consuetudinibus*, hoc est praeaptatis a studiosa ductione."

[39] Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Prologue, p. 6: "Sed quoniam quidem virtutes labore possideri natae sunt, oportuit prius aliquantulum scire de fine et quod ex labore futurum bonum . . ."

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 148: "Et sic simus utique felices et beati. Haec autem omnia nobis non utique umquam advenient, nisi Deum habeamus propitium et coadiutorem nobis in disciplinis et exercitationibus et operationibus et directionibus."

[41] Eustratius *et al.* 1973, pp. 12*–13*.

For Albert, nature plays a large rôle (*pace* Aristotle) in furnishing the virtues, which are therefore innate in us. However, Albert sees the virtues as reaching their perfection through habituation: virtue, after all, resides in the *potentiae* of which they are the perfection. Since virtue is acquired by repeatedly performing specific good actions, it may also be forfeited through actions contrary to these.[42]

Thomas' comments in Book II on acquiring virtue do little more than repeat Aristotle. In his *Summa*, however, he cites Peter Lombard's definition of virtue: "Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur." Thomas says that this definition would work equally well for acquired as for infused virtues if one removed the last clause. Surely God is the efficient cause of infused virtues, but the other virtues come from God only indirectly; Thomas ties them more closely to human effort.[43]

Gerard of Odo carefully distinguishes between three kinds of virtue: intellectual, moral, and *virtus motiva*. The formation of intellectual virtue requires experience (*experimentum*) and a long period of time, since it is acquired by teaching, whereas moral virtue is produced *ex more*. Thus, one and the same action can involve all three kinds of virtue—intellectual, in that it is known; *motiva*, in that it is exercised; moral, in that it is willed and desired. Experience therefore plays a dominant part in generating intellectual virtue; *consuetudo* is directly connected with moral virtue, although experience can also play a (secondary) rôle.[44]

Buridan accepts Aristotle's view that virtue is generated by habit, but does not accept his emphasis on virtuous actions in the forma-

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[42] Michaud-Quantin 1966, especially Ch. 15 and pp. 169–71. Albert's comments at the end of Book X emphasize the rôle of the stars in giving us virtue at birth; see Wieland 1981, pp. 229–38.

[43] Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4.

[44] Gerard 1482, Lib. II, lec. I, f. 64v: ". . . omnis virtus intellectualis indiget experimento et tempore longo, ut hic dicitur, quare generationem habet et augmentum ex doctrina. Virtus vero moralis fit et generatur ex more." Cf. *ibid.*, f. 65r: ". . . et sic apparet quod in virtute intellectiva et in virtute motiva et in virtute appetitiva possunt diversi habitus generari circa eandem operationem, sed differenter, quia in virtute intellectiva secundum quod illa operatio est cognita; in motiva autem corporali secundum quod est exercitata; in appetitiva vero secundum quod est electa et desiderata. Et sic apparet quod experientia per se pertinet ad generationem virtutis intellectualis et non consuetudo, quia aeque bene generatur scientia per experimentum in operibus naturae sicut in operibus nostris; consuetudo vero per se generat moralem habitum, experientia vero concurrit ad illam per accidens."

tion of this habit. He describes a complicated chain process in which the will, the sensitive appetite, the bodily members, and external things depend on one another's cooperation for producing an action. He concludes that virtue is generated, not so much by external actions, but by the inner promptings of the will. He does not deny that the repetition of a good action can create a praiseworthy disposition, but argues that this disposition can be blocked by the sensitive appetite. The will, instead, is completely free, so the repeated willingness to do something (even when there is no possibility of carrying it out) creates a firmer disposition.[45]

Also on the acquisition of virtue, therefore, the main medieval commentators are not in agreement. Although all recognize that a degree of personal effort is involved, some emphasize divine grace, others the aid of nature, others the repetition of specific actions, and others still the direction of the will. The Renaissance commentators were thus confronted with many conflicting opinions on this issue.

3.1.2 *Moral Philosophy*

Having examined the nature and acquisition of virtue, we must next discuss the relationship of virtue and moral philosophy. More specifically, How exactly is virtue related to the subject, aim, and method of ethics? Is ethics mainly concerned with "metaethics" (as we would say today) or with its practical applications?

Aim and Subject

Unlike some modern interpreters, who think that for Aristotle the subject of moral philosophy determines its aim and method,[46] Eustratius starts with the purpose of ethics and moves on to its domain of application and methodology. Eustratius sees the aim of ethics (or better, of the *Ethics*) as an eminently practical one—personal betterment.[47] Aristotle offers his teachings so that we may evaluate our actions and words and live faultlessly. Living faultlessly, according to Eustratius, consists mainly in ruling the passions and living by reason,[48]

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[45] Buridan 1637, Lib. II, qq. 4–6, especially q. 6, pp. 103–06.

[46] See, for example, Gauthier 1970b, p. 23.

[47] On this whole subject and the end of man in thirteenth-century Latin commentaries, see Celano 1986b and Lanza 1998.

[48] Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Prologue, p. 5: "... de moralibus virtutibus omnibus

and the *Ethics* provides the necessary foundation for a contemplative life of impassibility that unites us with God. None of the speculative sciences can offer the same *impassibilitas*, although they too contribute through truth (*veritas*) to attaining the *primum bonum*.[49] The subject of ethics is determined, therefore, by its genus as one of the three practical sciences, whose subject is the practical good (*practicum bonum*). Although ethics does have a strong connection with the contemplative life, by preparing the soul for it, its main sphere is nonetheless action. It also differs from the other practical sciences (economics and politics), by its focus on *individual* betterment rather than on the household or the state. Eustratius is aided in this distinction by his preoccupation with life as an individual spiritual journey; the same concern, however, makes it harder for him to see the links with economics and politics. For example, ethics does not seem to have much to do with the formation of a just state through the betterment of its citizens, and politics does not require the exercise of prudence.[50]

Thomas essentially elaborates on Eustratius' view while at the same time giving it a firmer philosophical grounding. Thomas begins by emphasizing that the subject of moral philosophy are human actions proceeding from the will according to the ordering of reason.[51] His

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docere proponit et artificiose tradere de ipsis, ut traditis regulis utentes et his operationes simul et sermones mensurantes bene et inculpabiliter quantum contingit propriam vitam et deducamus et dirigamus." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 2: ". . . ethicae quidem subiectum est secundum unum hominem melioratio, ut et bonus et optimus fiat sequens ea quae tradita sunt in morali negotio, prudenter vivens et propriam rationem habens, irae et concupiscentiae dominans et mensuram motibus earum imponens et nequaquam concedens eis ut contingit ferri ut in tali quis habitu constituatur, ut de omni quod operatur paratus sit rationem reddere rectam . . ."

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 58: "Tertiam autem ait vitam et supremam scilicet speculativam, quae est sine passionibus et universaliter omnem irrationalem abnegans operationem. Non enim physiologicam hic ait contemplativam vel mathematicam vel theologicam sed eam quae per mundationem a passionum sorde ad contemplationem festinat, quae rescindens materiam et carnalem hanc nebulam et velamen Deo et divinis per impassibilitatem coniungitur." *Ibid.*, p. 11: "duo sunt fines hominis per quos ad primum bonum refertur, unus videlicet impassibilitas . . ., alter autem veritas . . ., quorum hic quidem practicus, ille vero theoricus est."

[50] There are significant parallels between Eustratius' view of the purpose of moral philosophy and that of Giles of Rome. The latter has in view eternal happiness (Giles 1502, I, 1, cap. iii, f. 5r) and makes specific reference to the four steps of virtue explained by Macrobius and Plotinus (*ibid.*, cap. xxxiii, ff. 13v–14r). Moral philosophy has a *persuasive* function toward these (*ibid.*, cap. i, f. 4r). Giles sees the subject as "quomodo [principes] debeant se habere et qualiter debeant suis subditis imperare" (*ibid.*, cap. i, f. 4v).

[51] Thomas 1969, Lib. I, p. 4, ll. 39–45: "Sic igitur moralis philosophiae . . . proprium est considerare operationes humanas secundum quod sunt ordinatae ad

strong insistence on the actions themselves provides him, unlike Eustratius, with a link to economics and politics. Indeed, whereas ethics is concerned with the actions of the individual, the other two branches concern actions of broader groups. Thus the *Ethics*, *Economics*, and *Politics* are presented as works that deal with increasingly broader spheres of human activity and that should therefore be studied in sequence. The goal is to arrive at the *Politics*, which in Thomas' view is the crowning part of moral philosophy. Thomas is much less explicit, however, about the aim of moral philosophy; presumably it consists in *perfecting* human actions. Although good human actions require an ordered will, they also require knowledge, for they take place according to an ordered reason as well.[52]

It is hard to overstate the importance of this view of moral philosophy and the astounding influence Eustratius and Thomas exercised on later interpreters. At least through the sixteenth century, commentators repeatedly echoed their view that the *Ethics* concerns the good of the individual man, the *Economics* that of the family, and the *Politics* that of the state. It is also important to remember, however, that a different view of the matter was taken by commentators such as Albert the Great, Jean Buridan, and Gerard of Odo, and that their position too had its followers.

On the one hand, Albert defines the subject of the *Ethics* as happiness (*felicitas*) and says that the virtues are discussed by Aristotle inasmuch as they relate to this topic.[53] On the other hand, he states that the subject is that which may be chosen—i.e., what concerns human actions and flows out of the deliberations of the will. On first examination, it may seem that Albert does not want to commit himself to either position, and that the two cannot be true at the same time. However, as is illustrated by Albert's description of the subject matter as *disciplina hominis* (and not *disciplina unius hominis*) at the beginning of the Prologue, Albert does hold a coherent position, and one that departs from the authority of "the Commentator"

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invicem et ad finem. Dico autem operationes humanas, quae procedunt a voluntate hominis secundum ordinem rationis . . ." See also his comments in *Summa Theologica*, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 1.

[52] Thomas, *Summa*, Ia IIae, q. 55, a. 4: "Scire praeexigitur ad virtutem moralem, inquantum virtus moralis operatur secundum rationem rectam."

[53] On Albert's treatment of the aim and subject of ethics, in relationship to Pseudo-Peckham, see Wieland 1981, p. 104.

(Eustratius).[54] The most important aspect of Albert's view (apparently borrowed from Averroes) is that the *Ethics* does not concern the well-being of the individual. Even though ethics is a practical science, having as its purpose that of becoming good (*ut boni fiamus*),[55] its end is not that of making *individuals* good, but that of furnishing the principles of virtue, which are then applied by economics and politics to making people good.[56] The distinction is crucial, leading among other things to viewing ethics as the principal branch of moral philosophy to which the other two are subordinated.[57]

Gerard of Odo too can be seen as following this view. Gerard distinguishes between *materia* and *subiectum*. Whereas the first concerns the human good or human action, the second instead concerns man as having free will.[58] He emphasizes, however, that man *in general* is here in view, not the single individual.[59] Significantly,

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[54] Albert 1968–1972, Prologue, p. 3, ll. 61–64: ". . . ita etiam dicimus, quod felicitas est subiectum huius scientiae, de qua principaliter intenditur, et alia propter ipsam determinantur sicut virtutes." *Ibid.*, p. 3, ll. 69–73: "Possumus tamen aliter dicere secundum praedeterminata, quod eligibile, quod est circa operationes humanas, egrediens a voluntate deliberante, est subiectum huius scientiae, de quo determinatur in qualibet parte eius, et hic dicitur mos humanus." As Albert notes, Eustratius saw the subject as being the human good, whereas the aim was happiness: ". . . in Commento dicitur, quod tres tradidit scientias de moribus hominum, scilicet moralem, oeconomicam et politicam vel legis positivam, et sicut istae tres diversificantur in tractatibus, sic differunt in finibus, quia moralis finis est felicitas, oeconomicae divitiae, civilis rei publicae tranquillitas; differunt etiam in materia, quia primae humanum bonum, secundae domus, tertiae civitas . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 2, ll. 51–58).

[55] *Ibid.*, Prologue, p. 4, ll. 16–22; on ethics as a practical science among thirteenth-century interpreters, see Wieland 1981, especially pp. 105–18 (pp. 116–18 on Albert and Thomas).

[56] Albert 1968–1972, Prologue, p. 2, l. 66–p. 3, l. 16: "Dicendum, quod haec est scientia unius generis subiecti, sub qua continentur plures partes sicut sub naturali. Tres autem sunt partes huius secundum Commentatorem Arabum sic differentes, quod in morali traduntur principia moralia—unde etiam intitulatur secundum ipsum 'De principiis moralium'—in aliis autem duabus traditur exercitium morum secundum usum illorum principiorum in specialibus casibus; propter quod etiam dicuntur 'Magna Moralia Aristotelis', quia magna volumina sunt. Sic ergo hic traduntur principia, quibus illae utuntur; quarum una docet, qualiter convivendum sit domesticis, altera, qualiter convivendum sit civibus. Et sic planum est, quod reducuntur ad unam scientiam communem, ex quo ex eisdem principiis procedunt. Sed Commentator Graecus aliter vult, quod istae partes uniantur in una ratione subiecti, quia quaelibet earum considerat mores hominis. Sed homo dupliciter potest considerari: vel secundum se vel in comparatione ad alterum, et in comparatione ad alterum dupliciter."

[57] See below, p. 146.

[58] Gerard 1482, Lib. I, qq. 1–2, f. 21r.

[59] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, q. 4, f. 23r.

Gerard's comments are received and elaborated by Buridan. Denying that the subject of moral philosophy is the human good, or God, or happiness, or the virtues, or human actions, Buridan offers an alternative definition: ". . . videtur mihi, quod homo in ordine ad ea quae sibi conveniunt, ut est liber, vel homo ut est felicitabilis, hoc est quantum ad ea quae sibi conveniunt ad ducendum felicem vitam, est subiectum proprium in hac scientia."[60] Thus Buridan emphasizes that ethics considers man in general, indifferently speaking—every-man—and not what one person in particular should do.[61]

Whereas the commentators are generally in agreement, therefore, about the practical aim of ethics, on its subject there is more difference of opinion: Is the subject man (whether individually or generically or under a particular aspect), or human actions inasmuch as they are willed, or the human good, or virtue? On this point as well the Italian commentators found no settled opinion.

Method

Closely connected with the subject of moral philosophy is its method.[62] Eustratius summarizes Aristotle's arguments on this point by a syllogism: Men's views concerning what is good and just differ and err; it is not possible to give sure teachings or sure reasons about things different and erroneous; therefore, it is not possible to give sure teachings or sure reasons about what is good and just.[63] Since moral philosophy has to do with variable conceptions and with actions, one cannot expect the same kind of certitude as in other fields of inquiry—one does not syllogize from what is necessary or demonstrate what is necessary. Knowledge comes to us by induction, sense, habit, and experience; thus one should not expect the moral virtues (which are known by habit) to be discovered by any other means.[64]

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[60] Buridan 1637, Lib. I, q. 3, p. 11; cf. *ibid.*, q. 6, p. 19: "Ethica considerat de unoquoque homine secundum quod est felicitabilis vel meliorabilis, quemcumque gradum indifferenter obtineat in communitate domestica, vel civili."

[61] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, q. 6, p. 20; cf. Francesco Piccolomini (below, pp. 269–72).

[62] Cf. *EN* I.3 and I.4 discussed above, pp. 62–63. On various views of the proper method of ethics before 1250, see Wieland 1981, pp. 124 ff.

[63] Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. I, p. 34: "Quae apud homines sunt bona et iusta differentia et erronea sunt. De differentibus et erroneis non est tradere sermones certos seu rationes certas. De humanis igitur bonis et iustis non est tradere sermones certos seu rationes certas."

[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 37–38 and 127.

The variable object of ethics is one of the main reasons advanced by Albert for arguing that ethics is not a science in the strict sense. Indeed, this conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the method of ethics is not demonstrative (it proceeds *ex probabilibus*), but rather persuasive and thus insufficient to effect virtuous behavior without the coercive strength of the legislative arm.[65] Albert uses the nature of moral philosophy as an argument on two fronts. First, against Plato's approach to ethics, since Plato "spoke about ethics not morally, but almost mathematically." Because of his belief in divine, mathematical, and sensible forms, Plato thought that something separate was the cause of things' being good. Albert would have been better pleased had Plato understood what was the efficient cause of all things, i.e. God.[66]

Second, Albert states that, because Aristotle did not mean to discuss in the *Ethics* the supreme good (*summum bonum*) in the absolute sense, but the good of all things "quae operantur civiliter," a clear distinction must be made between ethics and metaphysics. In fact, he dismisses as out of place the questions usually posed by other *Ethics* commentators regarding the *summum bonum*. Likewise, considerations about *beatitudo* are out of place in Book I, for Aristotle does not have heavenly happiness in mind but confines himself, as is proper in philosophy, to earthly and civic matters.[67] Albert's reluctance to mix ethics with metaphysics is again clear in his insistence that the discussion in ethics of the *quia* does not necessitate—as is usually the case—the existence of another science superior to it that demonstrates the *propter quid*. Ethics can discuss both the *quia* and the *propter quid*, but in the latter case must base its arguments on principles internal to itself.[68]

Thomas agrees with Albert that, since ethics discusses the individual and composite, its principles should conform to its subject

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[65] Albert 1968–1972, Prologue, q. 1 and q. 5; Lib. I, lec. II, p. 13, ll. 20–27.

[66] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, lec. III, p. 15, ll. 48–49; p. 16, ll. 17–20.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 14, ll. 59–62: "... non sunt ad propositum omnes quaestiones quae consueverunt hic fieri de summo bono absolute, quae magis pertinent ad primum philosophum."

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 19, ll. 29–37: "... hic enim, quod finis hominis sit talis felicitas, non posset demonstrari propter quid nisi ex natura eius differenti ab aliis; et hoc iterum oportet accipere per comparationem eius ad primum principium; consideratio autem de principio intellectualis animae pertinet ad primum philosophum. Et ideo eius est tantum dicere propter quid in hac scientia et non alicuius particularis, neque alterius neque istius."

matter. He does not, however, feel compelled to argue against Plato's ethical method; indeed his wording (showing the truth "grosse" means "applicare universalia principia et simplicia ad singularia et composita") indicates more than a little sympathy for Plato's approach. Otherwise, Thomas does not discuss the method of ethics at length. Many commentators followed him, however, in contrasting the synthetic method (*modus compositus* or *compositivus*) proper to ethics with the analytic method (*modus resolutorius* or *resolutivus*) of the speculative sciences. In the first, one proceeds from knowledge of the end and moves toward that of the first principles; in the second, one moves in the opposite direction.[69] Thomas argues that the method of ethics is therefore inventive, as in dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics.[70] This view was of great moment for Renaissance commentators.

Buridan demonstrates that the subject of moral philosophy can affect its methodology. He argues that prudence is not so much concerned with our own actions (which could be considered just as contingent as the object of the *Meteora*), but rather with universals—more precisely, with questions of the type "What would someone do, to whom such and such a case happened?" Thus, in a certain sense, our deliberations belong to science.[71]

The nature of ethics, and especially its method, has implications for a number of issues: the proper audience for the subject, how the subject should be taught, and who should be involved in teaching it. We examine each of these in turn.

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[69] Thomas 1969, Lib. I, lec. III, sec. 35. This distinction was not original with Thomas: Albert had already discussed it (but not specifically in connection with ethics) in his commentary on Book VI (Albert 1968–1972, Lib. VI, lec. XII, p. 473). In turn, the distinction between three orders—*resolutivus, compositivus, definitivus*—goes back to Galen. On Thomas' application of synthesis and analysis to the sciences, his view of dialectic as the proper method of ethics, and the differences of his views from those of Pseudo-Peckham, see Wieland 1981, pp. 120–23.

[70] See Wieland 1981, p. 121: "... Synthese hier nicht ein deduktives Verfahren meint, sondern eine jenem Vernunftsprozeß entsprechende Methode, der in der Regel zu wahren Urteilen kommt, ohne allerdings über die streng wissenschaftlich notwendige Genauigkeit zu verfügen. Dieser Bereich, den Thomas den 'inventiven' Teil der Logik nennt, umfaßt die Topik oder Dialektik, die Rhetorik und die Poetik."

[71] Buridan 1637, Lib. VI, q. 17, p. 544.

3.2 *Proper Audience of Ethics*

3.2.1 *Requirements*

Aristotle himself makes an explicit connection between the nature of ethics and who should hear the subject (*EN* I.3, resumed in I.4). The connection seems to be on three levels: (1) since ethics is uncertain in nature, it can be grasped only by those who have been educated (*πεπαιδευμένοι*, or *disciplinati*) to look only for as much precision as a particular subject allows; (2) since ethics must be thoughtfully considered and judged, but the opportunity to do so depends on having had experience of life, it is not appropriate for young people; (3) since the goal of ethics is not knowledge but action, its hearers must be emotionally mature. In I.4, a further requirement is that (4) lectures about what is noble and just be heard only by those who are familiar with such matters through their good upbringing. As we have seen above,[72] Aristotle therefore thinks that ethics is a subject for mature men, probably around the age of fifty.

Eustratius not only enthusiastically embraces Aristotle's set of prerequisites, but liberally adds to them. On point (1), for example, he interprets Aristotle's *disciplinati* as adults (*viri*, not a necessary inference) and adds that only those experienced in life and discussion will look for the certitude appropriate to a given subject.[73] Eustratius thus conflates points (1) and (2) and does not think *disciplinati* refers to formal education. Instead, Eustratius insists on the need for hearers to know how to control their passions and waxes eloquent on the poor preparation of *iuvenes* in this regard.[74] Eustratius again avoids discussion of education or upbringing (which the Greek *ἦχθαι καλῶς*

[72] See p. 60.

[73] Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. I, p. 38: "Deinde et regulam quamdam tradit usque ad quantum in his quae dicuntur expetendum certitudinem in eo quod dicit *disciplinati* esse viri, id est multam experientiam in sermonibus et rebus habentis, *in tantum* secundum unumquodque subiectum quaerere certitudinem, *in quantum natura rei recipit.* Si igitur talis est disciplinatus, indisciplinatus utique erit qui huic operatur e converso."

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 42–43: ". . . homo . . . indiget tempore et ea quae ex sermonibus disciplina et instructione ut dispergatur ipsi gravedo passibilitatis et dividatur ignorantiae velamen, ut cognoscat quod melius est et praeponat peiori et irrationabilem quidem avertat vitam, praeeligat autem eam quae cum ratione et recto iudicio est; quod et difficile est et violentia non pauca indiget propter praeassuefieri peioribus et didicisse iam esse simpliciter ei quod est bene esse praeponere et non aliud nosse bonum quam curare carnem."

would seem to require) in I.4, wishing to concentrate instead on the abilities of someone who is *bonis et iustis assuefactus operationibus* to distinguish and choose between moral options.[75]

Albert, like Eustratius, says little about the rôles of education and upbringing in *EN* I.3 and I.4; in fact, he explains the requirement that the listener be *bene ductus* regarding the good and the just as meaning that he should be *ductibilis*.[76] Albert emphasizes more strongly the requirement of age and maturity: the young and *vitiosi* are not proper hearers of the subject, for political science has a practical end. Furthermore, as Victorinus says, "natura facit habilem, ars potentem, usus facilem."[77] And, since a science or demonstration *quia* begins from that which is known to us (*ex consuetudinibus nobis notis*), one must have first-hand knowledge of such matters in order to be "ductibilis . . . ad principia moralium."[78]

Thomas remains closer to Aristotle than either Eustratius or Albert by specifying that young people are not appropriate hearers of moral science because they lack both of its ends—i.e., *cognitio* and *actio*.[79] His subsequent observation that a child cannot attain happiness because he does not have full use of his reason[80] indicates the greater importance Thomas attributes to the intellectual requirement of hearing the *Ethics*.

Of all the medieval commentators, Giles of Rome is perhaps the most original when it comes to the audience of moral philosophy. First of all, he turns on its head the usual order of determining the audience by the method, preferring to explain the method on the basis of the subject matter, end, and audience. Second, although he directs his *De regimine* to princes, he clearly states that "the whole people should be taught by this book." Although not all can be princes or kings, whoever becomes prince or king must be worthy of that position; but the people cannot judge correctly in this matter unless they give attention to the book's contents. Also, the people must know how to be good subjects. Because of the audience, Giles says, moral philosophy's way of proceeding is "figuralis et grossus."[81]

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[75] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[76] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. I, lec. III, p. 18.
[77] *Ibid.*, lec. II, p. 13, ll. 39 ff.
[78] *Ibid.*, lec. III, p. 18.
[79] Thomas 1969, Lib. I, lec. III, sec. 40.
[80] *Ibid.*, lec. XIV, sec. 176.
[81] Giles 1502, I, 1, cap. i, ff. 4r–v: "Tertia via sumitur ex parte auditoris qui

3.2.2 *Preparation*

How the requirements mentioned by Aristotle are to be fulfilled receives different answers and emphases among the various commentators. Their views are treated, in this section, according to the requirements listed by Aristotle.

Education

As we have seen, Eustratius declines to discuss the rôle of education in his comments on *EN* I.3 and I.4. Even in VI.7 (which, as we shall see, becomes the *locus classicus* for discussions of the proper educational curriculum), Eustratius does not go much beyond agreeing with Aristotle that a boy (*puer*) can be a mathematician, but not *sapiens vel physicus*. Although Eustratius does imply that the proper ladder of studies places natural philosophy and divinity (including metaphysics) after mathematics, there is no discussion of where moral philosophy fits in the general scheme, or indeed of the usefulness of hearing formal lectures on the *Ethics*.[82]

Albert instead discusses at length the relationship of metaphysics, natural philosophy, and mathematics.[83] He argues that the right order is to proceed from mathematics to metaphysics through natural philosophy,[84] but does not explicitly pronounce himself as to moral philosophy's place. This is perhaps why scholars have disagreed about Albert's views on this point.[85] There are, however, at least three pas-

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erudiendus est in hac arte; nam licet intitulatus sit hic liber de eruditione principum, totus tamen populus erudiendus est per ipsum. Quamvis enim non quilibet possit esse rex vel princeps; quilibet tamen summo opere studere debet ut talis sit quod dignus sit regere et principari, quod esse non potest nisi sciantur et observentur quae in hoc opere sunt dicenda. Totus ergo populus auditor quodammodo est huius artis, sed pauci sunt vigentes acumine intellectus . . .; auditor ergo moralis negocii est simplex et grossus, ut ostenditur primo Rethoricae. . . . Cum igitur totus populus subtilia comprehendere non possit, incedendum est in morali negocio figuraliter et grosse. Immo quia secundum philosophum in Politicis quae oportet dominum scire praecipere, haec oportet subditum scire facere; si per hunc librum instruuntur principes quomodo debeant se habere et qualiter debeant suis subditis imperare, oportet doctrinam hanc extendere se usque ad populum, ut sciat qualiter debeat suis principibus obedire et quia hoc fieri non potest . . . nisi per rationes superficiales et sensibiles, oportet modum procedendi in hoc opere esse grossum et figuralem."

[82] Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. I.5.21, Lib. VI, f. 128ra.

[83] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. VI, lec. IX–XII.

[84] *Ibid.*, lec. XII, pp. 463–66.

[85] Weisheipl 1965 thinks that Albert places moral philosophy before metaphysics, but Ashley says the opposite: see Ashley 1980, p. 101.

sages that give strong indications as to Albert's position. The introductory comments to Book VI present ethics as the perfect combination of the practical and the contemplative[86] and thus suggest that ethics is the science to be studied last. The position of moral philosophy at the end of the philosophical curriculum is reinforced in Albert's comments at the end of Book X[87] and by the opening comments to his *Ethics* paraphrase:

> All other sciences perfect the knower in regard to knowing in some respect, but none of them perfect him in regard to existing as good and worthy, so that he should actually be good and worthy. This is why, as Apuleius says, the ancient philosophers, after mastering all other science, completed their lives in its study. This is also why Avicenna says this science is the last part of divine science which gives it its ultimate perfection; hence he made the last part of his first philosophy to be moral science.[88]

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[86] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. VI, lec. I, p. 391, ll. 16–26: "Et inde est, quod philosophia dividitur in practicam et theoreticam, ut dicit Ptolemaeus: Non est perfecta scientia, quae non habet practicam cum speculativa admixtam. Est enim practicum, ut dicit Avicenna, dupliciter, scilicet quod est operativum simpliciter et quod est sciens rationem, per quam operatur. Sed specialiter haec scientia in utroque perficit, quia includit in se finem utriusque, scilicet felicitatem civilem, quae est finis practicae, et felicitatem contemplativam, quae est finis contemplationis."

[87] According to Albert, at the end of the *Ethics* Aristotle passes to the *Politics* "*ut philosophia*, quae est *circa humana, perficiatur ad potentiam*, idest secundum potentiam nostram, vel: *ut tota philosophia perficiatur ad potentiam*, quae est *circa humana*, idest ad doctrinam humanorum, quia haec est ultima pars philosophiae et completa ea completur tota philosophia" (*ibid.*, Lib. X, lec. IX, p. 794, ll. 39–44).

[88] Albert 1891, Lib. I, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 2a–b, translation from Ashley 1980, p. 101 note. The full Latin text reads: "Cum igitur omnes scientiae aliae hoc modo sint de bonis et honorabilibus, quia sunt de his quae per denominationem et informationem bona et honorabilia dicta sunt, sola autem moralis sit de bono et honorabili per essentiam dicti, cuius ipsa substantia est bonitas et honestas, constat moralem alias omnes scientias excellere in bono et in honorabili. . . . Ad singulas autem videtur esse adminiculum, eo quod singulas redigit ad facilitatem. Ad hoc etiam facit, quod aliae omnes scientiae ad quaedam perficiunt cognoscendo tantum. Nulla autem secundum bonum et honestum perficit scientem secundum esse, ita scilicet quod ipse bonus et honestus sit. Hanc autem praerogativam sola habet moralis, quod sui possessorem secundum esse perficit boni et honesti. Haec autem est causa, ut dicit Apuleius, quod antiqui Philosophi omnibus aliis scientiis decursis, in ista vitam finierunt. Haec etiam est causa, quod Avicenna hanc scientiam dicit esse ultimam partem scientiae divinae quae ultimam addit perfectionem: propter quod et ipse ultimam partem primae philosophiae suae facit esse moralem." The reference is to Avicenna's treatment of the *Metaphysics*, which is followed by a ninth and last book on moral philosophy (Avicenna 1977–1983; cf. Flüeler 1992, I, pp. 10–12). Still to be explained is an apparent contradiction between Albert's exaltation of metaphysics and of moral philosophy. In Albert 1968–1972, Lib. VI, lec. IX he argues that Aristotle discusses *sapientia* last because, from the perspective of those contemplating,

If this interpretation of Albert's position is correct, then one can see strong parallels with the stance taken by Robert Kilwardby.[89]

Only with Thomas does one finally find a clear and ordered description of the proper curriculum to be followed and of the place of moral philosophy. In comments that will often be repeated word for word,[90] Thomas explains that boys must first learn logic, then mathematics, natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and only then metaphysics and theology. He justifies this sequence by the cumulative nature of the requirements of each subject. Placing logic first has to do with its methodological importance for the other parts of philosophy. But mathematics does not require experience, whereas natural philosophy does, so they should be studied in succession. Moral philosophy requires, in addition to experience, a soul free from passions, so it must be studied after natural philosophy but before metaphysics and theology, which also have specific requirements of the intellect.[91] Thomas therefore disagrees with Albert as to when ethics should be studied in relationship to metaphysics: Albert wants ethics to be the crowning part of one's study; Thomas considers it important to study metaphysics and theology last.[92]

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the things *prima in natura* come last, and thus many spent the last years of their lives studying metaphysics.

[89] In his *De ortu et divisione scientiarum*, perhaps written in Paris around 1240, Kilwardby views ethics as independent of and not subordinate to metaphysics, but metaphysics seems to follow ethics in his ladder of learning. The two disciplines consider the same subject, but from different angles: ". . . ethica etiam eidem non subalternatur, eo quod licet metaphysica habeat considerare spiritus creatos et eorum naturam, mores tamen et operationes voluntarias secundum quod sunt ad virtutem et a virtute non considerat; et si etiam voluntates consideret, non excedit in eis terminos naturae" (Kilwardby, quoted in Wieland 1981, p. 93, n. 171; see Weisheipl 1965 and van Steenberghen 1991, pp. 118–20).

[90] See, for example, Burley 1521, Lib. VI, f. 109 H–I.

[91] Thomas 1969, Lib. VI, lec. VII, pp. 358–59, ll. 202–13: "Erit ergo hic congruus ordo addiscendi, ut primo quidem pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia logica docet modum totius philosophiae; secundo autem instruendi sunt in mathematicis, quae nec experientia indigent nec imaginationem transcendunt; tertio autem in naturalibus, quae, etsi non excedunt sensum et imaginationem, requirunt tamen experientiam; quarto autem in moralibus, quae requirunt et experientiam et animum a passionibus liberum, ut in primo habitum est; quinto autem in sapientialibus et divinis, quae transcendunt imaginationem et requirunt validum intellectum." See also Ashley and Conway 1959.

[92] In this connection, an important difference of interpretation should be noticed, at the end of Book X, between Albert and Thomas. Whereas Albert had said that Aristotle then went on to consider politics so that his teaching of philosophy would be complete, "quia haec [*sc.* philosophia quae est circa humana] est ultima pars philosophiae et completa ea completur tota philosophia" (Albert 1968–1972, Lib. X,

Whereas Albert and Thomas—in spite of their differences—both see moral philosophy as an advanced subject, Gerard of Odo and Giles of Rome do not. Since Gerard sees moral virtue as being better than any intellectual virtue,[93] one might expect that he considers the study of ethics as the crowning part of science, much like Albert. Instead, ethics appears rather further down in his ladder of studies: it comes after logic, grammar, rhetoric, and mathematics, but before the "sapientiale studium"—presumably natural philosophy, metaphysics, and theology.[94] Gerard's educational scheme, which he attributes to Hugh of St. Victor, thus reveals a longing for the twelfth-century's approach to ethics, when it was not yet a philosophical discipline.

More than any other medieval commentator, Giles of Rome discusses how the requirement of education should be met.[95] The ladder of learning described by Giles begins with the elements of faith,[96] continues through the liberal arts, and reaches its culmination in natural philosophy, metaphysics, and theology. There is no question that theology is the highest science and that its practitioners are most worthy of honor. Giles considers moral science useful and necessary for sons of freedmen and nobles, but never says how it compares in dignity with the other subjects. When he discusses the minimum requirements for kings and princes, however, we are told that, in addition to being established in faith, they should study grammar, rhetoric, and especially *moralia.* Music is also a required subject, but Giles insists on the importance of their studying moral science early

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lec. XIX, p. 794, ll. 43–44), Thomas interprets Aristotle's comment "ut tota philosophia perficiatur ad potentiam" as meaning that he had *written* this part last ("scientiam operativam, quae est circa humana, quam secundum hoc ultimo tradidisse videtur"), not that it should be *studied* last (Thomas 1969, Lib. X, lec. XVI, p. 607, ll. 173–79).

[93] The argument is that it makes man better absolutely, and not just a better metaphysician, doctor, or student of geometry (Gerard 1482, Lib. II, lec. VI, q. 18, f. 80v).

[94] *Ibid.*, Lib. VI, lec. IX, f. 253r.

[95] Giles 1502, II, 2, cap. vii, f. 48r: "Licet deceret omnes homines cognoscere litteras ut, per eas prudentiores effecti, magis possent illicita praecavere. Videntur tamen aliqui licitam excusationem habere si non insudant studio litterarum. Huiusmodi autem sunt pauperes non habentes necessaria vitae qui, si retrahuntur a liberalibus disciplinis ut quaerant sibi necessaria vitae, videntur excusabiles esse. Nobiles autem et maxime reges et principes in divitiis et in possessionibus abundantes, omnino reprehensibiles existunt, si non sic solicitantur erga regiminem filiorum, ut etiam ab ipsa infantia tradantur liberalibus disciplinis."

[96] *Ibid.*, cap. v.

on, even if they must remain ignorant of the other sciences; thus, they will at least learn how to rule and instill virtue in their subjects.[97] Giles even specifies what their education should emphasize during three developmental phases of seven years each. Thus, from birth to age seven, he prescribes food, recreation, and exercise.[98] From age seven to fourteen, the will should be perfected, without neglecting the body or the intellect. Care should be taken to control children's defective tendencies, but they should also begin the study of grammar, logic, and music, and can study other sciences.[99] From age fourteen on, more strenuous exercises and further control of pride and lust should be emphasized, but this is also the period in which the moral sciences should be studied.[100] Giles encourages the teaching of ethics in this later stage because *iuvenes* and *insecutores passionum* are not appropriate hearers of the subject.[101]

Time and Experience

Eustratius devotes most of his attention to the requirement of time and experience, which may seem the one least amenable to personal preparation and which in *EN* I.3 is more closely linked with a critical apprehension of ethics than with moral development.[102] However, Aristotle discusses the rôle of experience for both the moral and the intellectual virtues, and *EN* VI establishes a link between time and prudence. Since Eustratius somewhat confuses prudence with the development of good habits, his comments link time and experience

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[97] *Ibid.*, cap. viii.

[98] *Ibid.*, cap. xv.

[99] *Ibid.*, cap. xvi, f. 53r: ". . . addiscere possunt non solum grammaticam . . . vel dialecticam . . . vel practicam musicae . . ., sed possunt instrui in illis scientiis ad quas sciendas oportet recurrere ad intellectum rerum et per quarum cognitionem possumus fieri sapientes et providi."

[100] *Ibid.*, cap. xvii.

[101] *Ibid.*, cap. xvii, f. 53v: "Nam, si volunt vivere vita politica et militari, potissime studere debent in moralibus scientiis, quia per eos scire poterunt quomodo se et alios debeant gubernare. Moralium autem scientiarum iuvenis et insecutor passionum non est sufficiens auditor."

[102] The point was grasped by the anonymous Greek commentator: "Tempore enim et experientia indigent intellectuales, et maxime prudentia. Neque enim unius alicuius experientia per unam praeparationem fit. Quare consequens ad experientiam apposuit hoc scilicet *tempore*. Non enim hoc a moralibus ipsae differunt sed eo quod praedictum est, scilicet eo quod est *plurimum ex doctrina* habere *et generationem et augmentum*, quia tempore et morales indigent, etsi non tanto quanto quae per doctrinam et experientiam accipiuntur" (Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. II, p. 198).

more directly with emotional maturity and moral development than with the formation of sound judgment. More insightful is Eustratius' statement that time is a necessary but not sufficient condition for attaining maturity: indeed, time should be spent is a particular way. In this connection, Eustratius emphasizes the rôle of human communication in the maturation process; seeing what others do and hearing what they say are indispensable aspects of one's development and upbringing.[103] But Eustratius does not have in mind only the delicate instruments of instruction and persuasion. The tendency to vice is so strong that it requires a remedy equal to the task. This can easily (and should) take the form of reproofs, taunts, and blows.[104] As Michael of Ephesus observed, persuasion is effective only with those who are *liberales* in the sense of having been raised well and of being now "bene suasibiles . . . et facile mobiles ad eas quae secundum virtutem actiones."[105]

Albert gives special emphasis to the necessity of time and experience in his comments on Book VI.8, where Aristotle explains why a young person can become a mathematician, but not prudent. Young people, Albert argues, suffer from a lack of experience (*defectum experimenti*). Furthermore, they lack time and good memory, both of which bring experience to good effect. Albert does not wish to give *iuvenes* a restrictive temporal connotation, however; twice he specifies that by *iuvenes* Aristotle means those who have not studied the sciences for long.[106] Albert does not explain here what the necessary *experimentum* is. From the context of Lib. VI. lecs. XI–XII, however, it seems that it has to do at least partly with learning. Thus a connection is established with the requirement of education. However, as we shall see, Albert does not therefore exclude a rôle for punishment.

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[103] Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. I.5.21, Lib. VI, f. 128ra.

[104] Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. I, p. 43: "Et propter hoc non solum persuasionibus et admonitionibus sed et conviciis multotiens et opprobriis et contumeliis indigent ut a facili et levi recedentes vita virtutis laboriosum praehonorent" (cf. *ibid.*, p. 191).

[105] Eustratius *et al.* 1991, Lib. X, p. 454.

[106] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. VI, lec. XI, p. 470, ll. 57–61: ". . . quamvis habeant optimum ingenium ad accipiendum, tamen quia umidum male retentivum est, non habent memoriam bonam, ex qua perficitur experimentum, ut dicitur in principio Metaphysicae." See *ibid.*, ll. 65–69: "Vel potest dici, quod loquitur non tantum, quantum ad iuvenem aetate, sed quantum ad processum temporis in scientiis, quia posteriores iuvantur a dictis priorum et sic perspicacius possunt invenire verum . . ." (cf. also *ibid.*, Lib. VI, lec. XII, p. 474, ll. 1–6).

Thomas sees experience as essential for fulfilling the requirement of knowledge before hearing ethics.[107] All our knowledge derives from the senses, and it is from sensing something several times that experience is created. Therefore, intellectual virtue requires experience over a long period of time.[108] This is why people who are experienced and old and prudent must be listened to even when they do not present arguments for their statements about actions.[109] Thomas does not try to circumvent Aristotle's requirement of age by redefining *iuvenes*, as Albert does. He observes in Book I that Aristotle is discussing the *iuvenes aetate.*[110]

Emotional Maturity

Hearing ethics, Aristotle admonishes, would be useless without a desire to practice its teachings, and this requires emotional maturity. But there is a strong temptation in ethics, as in religion, to discuss what is good without the least intention of practicing it. So Michael of Ephesus understands that one must already be practicing virtue and possess a disposition toward it for words to have an effect. If this is true at the level of elementary training in what is right,[111] it would seem to be all the more true for hearing lectures on moral philosophy. Eustratius, however, argues that the *pravi* are not necessarily (as Aristotle says) useless hears of the subject. He hopes that they still have some light of reason and will be able to recognize the seriousness of their condition when confronted with the good. They may then be motivated to pursue the good.[112]

For Albert, young people can more easily overcome the obstacle of their emotional immaturity than that of inexperience, for they can

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[107] Thomas 1969, Lib. I, lec. III, p. 12, ll. 117–20: ". . . iuvenis non habet notitiam eorum quae pertinent ad scientiam moralem, quae maxime cognoscuntur per experientiam . . ."

[108] *Ibid.*, Lib. II, lec. I, pp. 76–77, ll. 41–56.

[109] *Ibid.*, Lib. VI, lec. IX, p. 368, ll. 230–39: ". . . inde est quod oportet attendere his quae opinantur et enunciant circa operabilia homines experti et senes et prudentes, quamvis non inducant demonstrationes, non minus quam ipsis demonstrationibus, sed etiam magis. Huiusmodi enim homines, propter hoc quod habent ex experientia visum, id est rectum iudicium de operabilibus, vident principia operabilium; principia autem sunt certiora conclusionibus demonstrationum."

[110] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, lec. III, p. 12, ll. 150–60.

[111] Eustratius *et al.* 1991, Lib. X, pp. 453–57.

[112] Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. I, pp. 45–46.

at least control their impulses and passions,[113] whereas lack of experience can be overcome only through time. One indication of the importance of becoming emotionally mature is Albert's description of the *liberales iuvenes*, who are for Aristotle the ones whom words have power to move toward good action. Albert describes these young people as those who have freed themselves from their passions and love the good in and of itself.[114] Albert also comments on the rôle of punishment in controlling the passions. To the question, whether punishment can make someone *studiosus*, Albert answers that one cannot speak of an automatic process of learning to be good, since an essential component of virtue is that it be undertaken with pleasure. However, he sees punishment as a possible means for learning to abstain from evil actions and start performing good ones.[115]

In comparison with Albert, Thomas gives very little prominence to the rôle of emotional maturity, at least in terms of freeing oneself from passions.[116] Burley, instead, has more to say about this subject: he notes that the *conveniens auditor* of moral philosophy can refer either to the one who can easily attain the aim of moral science, or to anyone without distinction who—either with ease or with difficulty—can attain its end. Burley argues that, although the incontinent are doubtless excluded from hearing lectures on moral philosophy if one takes the first definition, those who are curable may be included in the second one. Thus he concludes that the proper hearer is the person who satisfies all his desires according to reason.[117] This view

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[113] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. VI, lec. XI, p. 470.

[114] *Ibid.*, Lib. X, lec. XVII, p. 778, ll. 40–49; cf. Ross' translation: "generous-minded" (1179b7).

[115] *Ibid.*, Lib. X, lec. XVII, p. 780, l. 90–p. 781, l. 4: "Dicendum, quod poenae faciunt aliquem studiosum, non quod per se et immediate transmutent animam inducendo habitum, sed quia retrahunt a malo opere, et sic, secundum quod tollitur consuetudo mali operis et consuescit bona facere, tandem placebit sibi illud quod consueverit, et ex talibus operibus, quando placere incipient, generabitur habitus."

[116] Thomas' lack of emphasis on this point may be due to two factors: first, his belief (contrary to Aristotle) that not all moral virtues have to do with pleasures and pains (Thomas 1969, Lib. II, lec. III); second, his strong criticisms of Cicero, Seneca, and the Stoics in general (*ibid.*, lecs. VIII–IX).

[117] The two options are described thus: ". . . illum qui faciliter potest attingere finem scientiae moralis" and "quemcumque indifferenter qui potest attingere finem scientiae moralis, sive faciliter sive cum difficultate" (Burley 1521, Lib. I, f. 5 E–F). The definition of the *conveniens auditor* is: "qui secundum rationem omnia sua desideria implet . . ." (*ibid.*, f. 5 K).

seems to do justice to the element of pleasure which is, according to Aristotle, connected with the exercise of virtue.

Good Upbringing

More than once, Aristotle praises the rôle of a good upbringing as discussed by Plato. Michael of Ephesus recognizes the need for early guidance (*intellectus*) if one is to become a good and happy citizen, and discusses the need for good laws.[118] But he emphasizes the scholastic aspect of a good upbringing: a cycle of studies, he thinks, will have its own influence on developing virtue. (In this he does not really differ from Aristotle, but it is not so clear in *EN* X.9 that actual schooling is contemplated.) Michael of Ephesus offers a more original contribution by insisting on a tailored educational program (if a child's limit is to learn 30 verses of Homer he should not be forced to go beyond that) and on the need to push every child to his own limit. Furthermore, Michael argues that it is imperative that the "ethically challenged" be cared for along with the others.[119]

By contrast, the Latin commentators are disappointing in their descriptions of a good upbringing. Albert approves of Plato's method of determining the aptitudes of children (*Timaeus* 19a). The state will be benefited when each one does that for which he is gifted. Learning is not just for oneself, but also for others.[120] Gerard has only about 14 lines on how to bring up children well. His main emphasis is that virtue should be made to seem delectable, and vice the opposite,[121] but he says nothing about how this should be done. Thomas recognizes that children need teaching and exercise,[122] but then discusses more enthusiastically the subject of good laws.[123] As we shall see, the Latin commentators also neglect the issue of *who* should do the upbringing, at least in their *Ethics* commentaries. (Other commentaries, such as those on the *Politics*, might tell a different story.)

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[118] Eustratius *et al.* 1991, Lib. X, pp. 457 ff.

[119] Eustratius *et al.* 1991, Lib. X, p. 467: "Male natus (et ineptus), congrue curatus, veniet utique ad certitudinem et perfectionem quantae est naturae ipsius capax. Si autem non sortiatur conveniente cura, non utique sortietur tali certitudine vel perfectione. Oportet ergo uniuscuiusque naturam cognoscere et inducere proprium ipsi."

[120] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. I, lec. II, p. 11, ll. 37–47.

[121] Gerard 1482, Lib. II, lec. II, f. 69r.

[122] Thomas 1969, Lib. X, lec. XIV.

[123] *Ibid.*

We may wonder whether there was already a strong consensus on these questions (for example, assigning the responsibility to the family or to the church), whether the issue was made moot by a strong sense of fatalism, or whether considerations of audience acted as a deterrent (the topic was probably not immediately relevant to students). What is certain is that overlooking the problem of upbringing downplays the view that moral education occurs in stages (of which a proper upbringing is the first). If this is the case, one might expect a stronger emphasis on formal education.

Indeed, as we have seen, the Latin commentators tend to emphasize this point more strongly than Eustratius. However, whereas Albert and Thomas see ethics as an advanced subject, Gerard of Odo and Giles of Rome have hesitations about this, probably because of the immediately practical aim they assign to ethics. Likewise, differences are clear on the requirement of time and experience. For some, what counts is not really age, but acquaintance with the sciences (Albert); for others, there is a more or less direct relationship between age and prudence (Thomas); for yet others, the emphasis is on how time is spent (Eustratius). On the question of emotional maturity, Eustratius is followed by Albert and Burley: both hope that even the young and passionate can control themselves enough to respond to lectures on ethics.

3.3 *Method of Teaching Ethics*

A second consequence deriving from the nature and method of ethics is how it should be taught. This teaching seems to be at least one level beyond the good upbringing (mentioned in *EN* I.4) through which one comes into possession of starting points. These same *principia* are nonetheless the raw materials from which moral philosophy must begin. One naturally asks, therefore, how moral philosophy teaching is useful if its hearers are already good.[124] What does moral philosophy contribute?

[124] For a modern treatment of this subject, see Nussbaum 1994.

3.3.1 *Usefulness*

Eustratius, like other medieval commentators, sees the possibility that moral philosophy will be both useless for the *pravi* and superfluous for the *boni*. In both cases, however, he argues for a real usefulness of moral philosophy. For example, those who do what is good only through habit are given a standard by which to measure their actions. Thus their own good disposition is strengthened by the confirmation it receives through teaching. Eustratius also offers an alternative explanation: many seek the good and avoid evil in a more or less instinctive way, without really knowing the difference between the two or how they can on their own know and follow what is best. Teaching about ethics provides them with an ability (*ars*) and a direction for making the right choices. As for the *pravi*, hearing the *Ethics* benefits them because they are confronted with what is good and therefore have the possibility of escaping from their condition.[125]

Albert sees a chain of causality in connection with good actions:

> Performing good actions is impossible without moral virtue; but moral virtue is impossible without prudence, which is instilled through the teaching of ethics. Therefore, it is impossible to perform good actions without moral teaching, although a (single) good action might be possible.[126]

Teaching the *Ethics* thus enables its hearers to acquire prudence, without which true virtue cannot be exercised. This is the import of Albert's comment that, even though the listeners of the subject supposedly already follow the *desideria rationis*, they are not already perfect, since they are not *potentes arte et usu faciles*.[127] Albert agrees with Eustratius that the incontinent can *understand* teachings about ethics, but does not go so far as to say that they can *act* upon them. Their defect lies precisely in the minor proposition that leads to the conclusion.[128]

Thomas gives a very prominent place to *intellectus* in his commentary, explaining for example that it is the intellectual virtue that

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[125] Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. I, pp. 45–46.

[126] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. X, lec. XVII, p. 778, ll. 1–6: "... bene operari non potest esse sine virtute morali, virtus autem moralis non potest esse sine prudentia, quae instruitur per doctrinam de moribus, et ideo bene operari non potest esse sine doctrina morali, quamvis posset esse bona operatio."

[127] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, Lec. II, p. 13.

[128] *Ibid.*, Lib. X, lec. XVII, q. 4.

brings about true happiness.[129] It so happens that prudence is responsible for perfecting the *intellectus*.[130] Although Thomas does not explicitly say that this is the point of greatest usefulness for practicing virtue and acquiring prudence through teaching, his discussion of contemplative happiness points in this direction.

The usefulness of hearing the *Ethics* thus receives different emphases among the medieval commentators. Since these divergences are connected with different views of ethics as a science or an art, this point is considered next.

3.3.2 *Science or Art?*

As we have seen,[131] Eustratius defends Socrates' view of virtue as knowledge. Does this mean that ethics should be taught as a science? Not necessarily. Eustratius sees ethics as a part of politics,[132] which he is careful to classify not as a theoretical science, but as a practical one.[133] Furthermore, he recognizes the uncertain nature of ethics.[134] Finally, he emphasizes with Aristotle the difference between *sapientia* and *prudentia*.[135] So it would seem that, according to Eustratius, ethics is in some ways a science because of its required knowledge of universal principles, but in many ways an art because of the variableness of its object and the diversity of its realm of application.

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[129] Happiness consists "in operatione speculativae virtutis"; but "speculativa operatio est intellectus secundum propriam virtutem eius, scilicet secundum sapientiam principaliter, quae comprehendit intellectum et scientiam" (Thomas 1969, Lib. X, lec. X, p. 583, ll. 73–76).

[130] *Ibid.*, Lib. VI, lec. IX, p. 368, ll. 228–30: "... enim dictum est supra quod intellectus qui est principiorum operabilium, consequitur experientiam et aetates et perficitur per prudentiam."

[131] Above, p. 119.

[132] Eustratius bases himself on an ambiguous use of πολιτική in *EN* I.2, 1094a30. The issue of which science is meant here receives attention from almost all commentators, and a full examination would make for an interesting study. On Melanchthon's correction of Eustratius' error, see Gauthier 1970a, pp. 167–68.

[133] Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. I, pp. 46–47: "Confestim quidem prooemia incipiens praesentis negotii de humano bono quaesivit, perscrutans si est aliquod summum omnium ab hominibus operabilium bonorum ad quod reliqua referuntur et quae est potentia cuius finis hoc est. Et quoniam quidem est, ostendit sufficienter quantum secundum subiectam materiam, et quoniam politica (id est civilis) est cuius finis hoc est, et quoniam maxime architectonica est operativarum scientiarum et potentiarum, velut omnibus praestans et omnibus praecipiens et imperans, ut et finis ipsius contineat fines aliarum."

[134] *Ibid.*, pp. 54 ff.

[135] Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. I.5.21, Lib. VI, f. 124rb–va.

Albert sees prudence as an intellectual virtue because of its subject ("perfectio mentis sive rationalis per essentiam") and its origin ("generatur experimento et tempore"),[136] but says it shares its object of action with the moral virtues ("prudentia est ratio eligibilium ad opus"). In this way prudence is closely related to art.[137] It differs from (natural) science in at least two ways. First, it is closer to *sapientia* in that it prepares the soul for wisdom by removing the impediments to contemplation; thus it is more useful than physics, although less certain.[138] Second, its aim is not knowledge but action; moral philosophy is therefore a *practical* science.[139] Albert is explicit about the fact that prudence is fallible, although he locates its failures in the act of knowing the particular to which the general should be applied, rather than vice versa.[140] Albert saves Socrates' view of virtue as knowledge and science by redefining science for the purpose, not as a *habitus demonstrativus*, but as a *certitudinalis cognitio operabilium.*[141] The technique of the *distinctio* is used to argue that both Socrates and Aristotle were right in a certain sense.

Thomas too distinguishes ethics from both science and art. Science is a *habitus demonstrativus circa necessaria*; thus it has certitude and can be taught.[142] Art, instead, can be of two kinds: a product-oriented and mechanical sort (*habitus cum ratione factivus*) and an active one. Prudence is a *habitus cum vera ratione activus . . . circa bona et mala ipsius hominis.*[143] Whereas art and science reside exclusively in reason, and may therefore be forgotten, prudence requires the participation of the appetites and cannot therefore be overcome by forgetfulness.[144]

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[136] Perhaps a slip for "experimento et doctrina," as he says intellectual virtues are generated in Albert 1968–1972, Lib. VI, lec. IV, p. 417, ll. 1–5.

[137] *Ibid.*, Lib. VI, lec. I, p. 394, ll. 32–40.

[138] *Ibid.*, lec. IV, p. 417, ll. 63–79.

[139] *Ibid.*, Lib. X, lec. XIX, p. 789, ll. 19–29: "Dicendum, quod ratio scientiae convenit diversis habitibus secundum prius et posterius; verissime enim dicuntur scientiae illae in quibus quaeritur scire propter seipsum, sicut naturalis, metaphysica et mathematica, et post hoc in illis in quibus quaeritur scire ut adminiculans, sicut in dialectica, sed minimum habent de ratione scientiae, in quibus non quaeritur scire sicut finis, scilicet propter scire, sed propter operari; unde non dicuntur simpliciter scientiae, sed scientiae practicae, et de talibus scientiis est politica."

[140] *Ibid.*, Lib. VI, lec. VII.

[141] In the major, not the minor proposition; *ibid.*, Lib. VII, lec. II, p. 522, ll. 43–63.

[142] Thomas 1969, Lib. VI, lec. III, pp. 340–41, ll. 47–85.

[143] *Ibid.*, lec. IV, p. 346, ll. 77–79.

[144] *Ibid.*, p. 347, ll. 178–96. Thomas also bases his distinction between science and art on the different order with respect to reason; cf. Lib. I, lec. I.

Thomas, like Albert, realizes that prudence can go wrong; but he does not bother with Albert's complicated distinction between a major and minor proposition. Instead he says that the judgment of reason is corrupted when another, false end (e.g., pleasure) is pursued instead of the true one. Thus, prudence can go wrong, not only about the *means* of attaining the right end, but about the end itself.[145]

Buridan too, like Albert and Thomas, sees ethics as a practical science; however, it is so in a different way. Whereas Thomas, for example, sees ethics as indirectly practical (it provides the premisses for moral action, but does not immediately determine moral action), Buridan identifies prudence and *doctrina* in ethics. Thus, the freedom of the will, referred to earlier, is coupled with another kind of freedom, that of the life of knowledge.[146]

Ethics and Other Subjects

Something of ethics' status as science or art can be seen in its relationship with other subjects. For example, Eustratius sees politics (of which ethics is a part) as able to determine the mode of operation and extent of rhetoric.[147] But, since politics actually has a preeminent position over all the arts,[148] presumably ethics also occupies

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[145] *Ibid.*, Lib. VI, lec. IV, p. 346, ll. 131–42: "... quando autem est vehemens delectatio vel tristitia, apparet homini quod illud sit optimum per quod sequitur delectationem et fugit tristitiam, et ita, corrupto iudicio rationis, non apparet homini verus finis, qui est principium prudentiae circa operabilia existentis, nec appetit ipsum, neque etiam videtur sibi quod oporteat omnia eligere et operari propter verum finem, sed magis propter delectabile. Quaelibet enim malitia, id est habitus vitiosus, corrumpit principium, in quantum corrumpit rectam existimationem de fine, hanc autem corruptionem maxime prohibet temperantia." Cf. also Wieland 1981, p. 118.

[146] Buridan 1637, Lib. VI, q. 17; see Wieland 1982, p. 668; Korolec 1975, pp. 56 ff. Lambertini 1997, p. 329 observes: "... la libertà del volere così interpretata si affianca, nel suo commento all' *Etica Nicomachea*, a un'altra libertà, ancora più alta, che—se così si può dire—coincide con la felicità possibile all'uomo in questa vita. Ma l'acquisizione di questa felicità—sostiene Buridano ancora confrontandosi criticamente con Scoto—è la vita della conoscenza, l'unica che è autenticamente fine a se stessa, e quindi autenticamente libera. Si comprende così perché per Buridano la libertà di scelta della volontà sia finalizzata a quest'altra libertà, che è tutt'uno con la compiuta realizzazione del fine della propria esistenza."

[147] Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. I, p. 28: "Politici enim est determinare duci exercitus qualiter utendum exercitu, et rhetori qualiter et usque quo sermonibus in consiliis et iudiciis et contionibus, et oeconomico qualiter utique bene et iuste et salubriter domum et ipsi in ea cohabitantes disponet..."

[148] *Ibid.*, p. 16: "Propositum est hic ostendere politicam esse omnibus supereminentem artibus et principalem et dominam omnium quae in humanis communicationibus

such a superior position, although it is clearly inferior to theology, which is the *ars artium* and *scientia scientiarum.*[149] The fact that Michael of Ephesus does not mention ethics in connection either with the arts or the sciences reinforces the suggestion that ethics is intermediary and should be taught as such.[150] Unfortunately, however, the Greek commentators do not say much on this point, although they do agree with Aristotle that the sophists were wrong to think that they could teach ethics and politics through rhetoric (*EN* X.9).

Contrary to Eustratius, Albert sees politics as a part of ethics. Prudence and politics may have the same object, but they differ in manner, prudence having more to do with directive reason, and politics more to do with action. Thus, prudence disposes and politics executes.[151] Since politics is subordinated to ethics, it must receive from the latter its *propter quid.* Aristotle's remarks that politics is *principalissima* (*EN* I.1) must therefore be understood only in comparison with the mechanical arts, and not with ethics.[152] Albert has politics and economics depend on the principles set forth within the *Ethics* and says that the proper sequence of study is therefore ethics, politics, and economics.[153] For Albert, rhetoric has very little to do with moral philosophy: it is, along with dialectic, a *modus scientiarum*, whereas ethics is a *scientia practica.*[154]

Thomas disagrees with Albert about the relationship of ethics and politics. Although he argues that prudence properly belongs to ethics, his view of the importance of communities leads him to give politics and economics a higher place than ethics, and to consider *legis-positiva* as the highest part of politics.[155] Thus Thomas can freely

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sunt adinventionum, ut architectonicam praestantem omnibus et omnibus praecipientem . . ." Grosseteste echoes Eustratius' position in a note: "Principaliter autem et politica dicitur virtus et potentia. Subiacent enim ipsi oeconomica et ethica et militaris et rhetorica et consimiles. Politicus enim homo quasi rex sit. Omnia habet sub propria potestate subiacentia" (*ibid.*, p. 26).

[149] Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. I.5.21, Lib. VI, f. 123vb.

[150] Eustratius *et al.* 1991, Lib. X, pp. 472–73: "Ut enim grammatici et medici et musici fimus a scientibus, sic et legis positivi erimus utique *a politicis. Vel non simile videtur in politica* et reliquis scientiis et potenciis? 'Potentias' vocabant veteres conantes artes ad contraria, puta rhetoricam, dialecticam, 'scientias' autem eas quae non tales, puta arithmeticam, geometriam, physicam."

[151] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. VI, lec. XI, p. 467, ll. 78–86.

[152] *Ibid.*, Lib. X, lec. XIX, q. 2, pp. 789–90.

[153] *Ibid.*, Prologue, pp. 2–3; Lib. X, lec. XIX, q. 4, pp. 790–91.

[154] *Ibid.*, Lib. VI, lec. IX, p. 457; Lib. X, lec. XIX, q. 5, p. 791.

[155] Thomas 1969, Lib. VI, lec. VII, p. 357, ll. 96–102: ". . . quia totum principalius est parte et per consequens civitas quam domus et domus quam unus homo,

discuss politics as the architectonic science, and says that under it fall arts such as economics and rhetoric (cf. *EN* I.2). But he is specific about the very limited preeminence of politics. Although it may dispose that geometry be taught, it cannot give orders about the conclusions of geometry. And, although it is called *principalissima*, it is so only within the sphere of the practical or active sciences; divine science must retain its place as the head of all others.[156] In relation to wisdom, for example, prudence does not say what people should think about divine matters, but rather shows how men may come to wisdom.[157] Politics can sometimes use rhetoric to good effect, but the two should not be confused.[158]

Buridan disagrees with Thomas about the subordination of ethics to politics (his hierarchy is ethics, economics, politics),[159] although he agrees with him about the preeminence of the *legispositiva* in politics.[160] He offers especially stimulating comments on two fronts: the relationship of moral philosophy with a kind of moral dialectic, and its relationship with law. In the first case, Buridan argues that, just as the speculative sciences need another one (logic) that indicates how the subject should be taught and expressed, so it is with moral philosophy. Such a *logica moralis* or *dialectica moralis* (to be found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*) is necessitated by the fact that moral philosophy must not only investigate the truth, but must also dispose the appetite not to resist the intellect.[161] In his comments about

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oportet quod prudentia politica sit principalior quam yconomica et haec quam illa quae est sui ipsius directiva; unde et legispositiva est principalior inter partes politicae et simpliciter praecipua circa omnia agibilia humana."

[156] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, lec. II; cf. Lib. VI, lec. VI.

[157] *Ibid.*, Lib. VI, lec. XI.

[158] *Ibid.*, Lib. X, lec. XIV–XV.

[159] Buridan 1637, Prologue, p. 3.

[160] *Ibid.*, Lib. VI, q. 18, p. 551.

[161] *Ibid.*, Prologue, p. 2: "Ipsa autem scientia, seu philosophia moralis, duas habet partes primas, unam principalem, aliam adminiculativam seu instrumentalem. Sicut enim in speculativis, haec quidem scientia naturam rerum docet, videlicet Metaphysica, Physica, et Mathematica, illa vero modum docendi et dicendi subministrat, scilicet Logica, sic in moralibus oportet hanc quidem docere moralem vitam, hanc autem illi modum docendi subministrare. Prima ergo et principalis pars, scilicet quae docet bene vivere ad salutem, traditur in libris Ethicorum, Oeconomicorum et Politicorum. Secunda vero pars quae hunc modum docendi docet, traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poetriae. Unde scientia dictorum duorum librorum vere et proprie dicenda est non Logica simpliciter, neque moralis scientia simpliciter, sed Logica moralis. . . . Propter quod duplici Logica, seu Dialectica indigemus: una quidem quae simpliciter docet modum inveniendi dubiam veritatem, et illam vocamus Logicam simpliciter, vel Dialecticam; et alia contracta, quae docet modum, quo simul et dubium et

prudence, Buridan says much more explicitly than the other commentators that the habit derived from teachings contained in books of laws, decrees, and so forth pertains to prudence just like that derived from teachings in the books on morals.[162]

In these comments, Buridan was not altogether original. Averroes, for example, had pointed out that the *prudens* should be "cognitor logicae particularis."[163] Giles of Rome had emphasized the need for rhetoric (a "grossa dialectica") in moral philosophy.[164] And Gerard of Odo had classified law as a moral science.[165] It should be noted, however, that Buridan does not confuse rhetoric with moral philosophy, although he recognizes the importance of both. This may partly explain why he views ethics very much as a science, unconcerned with pleasures and pains or with the emotions.

From the relationship of ethics with other subjects and from the method of ethics we can make some inferences about how moral philosophy should be taught. Buridan and Giles of Rome, for example, might stress the need for using rhetoric. But unfortunately the commentators are not specific about what pedagogical approaches might be most effective for teaching the subject. The method of ethics itself is not necessarily a guide to how it should be taught. But perhaps the commentators found it obvious that the subject be taught through

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verum invenitur, et appetitus sic afficitur et disponitur, ut determinet, vel non impediat intellectum ad concedendum conclusum; et haec vocatur Dialectica moralis, quae subest Dialecticae simpliciter, sicut et subalternata . . ."

[162] *Ibid.*, Lib. VI, q. 17, p. 545: "Ulterius videtur mihi satis notum, quod in libris Legum vel decretorum et in libris Moralibus multae scribuntur propositiones de quolibet praedictorum generum . . . videtur mihi quod habitus acquisitus ex doctrina librorum Legum, Decretorum, et universaliter librorum Moralium pertinet ad prudentiam." See Wieland 1982, p. 667.

[163] Averroes 1562–1574, Lib. I, f. 1v.

[164] Giles 1502, II, 2, cap. viii, f. 48v: "Est autem rethorica, ut innuit philosophus in Rethoricis suis, quasi quaedam grossa dialectica. Nam sicut fiendae sunt rationes subtiles in scientiis naturalibus et in aliis scientiis speculabilibus, sic fiendae sunt rationes grossae in scientiis moralibus, quae tractant de agibilibus. Quare sicut necessaria fuit dialectica quae docet modum arguendi subtilem et violentiorem, sic necessaria fuit rethorica quae est quaedam grossa dialectica docens modum arguendi grossum et figuralem."

[165] Gerard 1482, Lib. I, q. 3, f. 22v: ". . . scientia iuris est moralis, non tamen tradita in libris moralibus philosophorum nisi quantum ad eius principia. Cuius ratio est quia non potest tradi per modum scientiae quia, secundum veritatem, quod continetur in lege praecipiente vel prohibente non est scientia . . . leges magis pertinent ad prudentiam quam ad scientiam; prudentia namque praeceptiva est sicut lex, scientia vero non."

Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and thought that they were already offering a pedagogical model through their commentaries.

Certitude

As we have seen, the medieval commentators agree in principle that ethics is neither a science nor an art. A consequence of this view is that ethics does not have the certainty of other fields of inquiry. Thomas, for example, contrasts the inductive method of mathematics with the *modus compositus* whereby ethics is learned.[166] Albert and Buridan argue against those who would attribute to ethics the same certitude as in natural science. But in no case does the probabilistic nature of their inquiry lead them to skeptical views. The reasons for this are briefly referred to at the end of this chapter. In the meantime, a last question that needs to be addressed concerns who the medieval commentators thought was best qualified to teach moral philosophy.

3.4 *Teachers of Ethics*

The description of ethics as a science or an art, and its relationship to other subjects, is connected with the issue of who should teach it. One wonders, for example, whether the natural philosopher, the theologian, the lawyer, or the rhetorician is best suited to this task. Or should there, instead, be someone who specializes in the subject and becomes an exclusive teacher of ethics? Second, one wonders about the qualities necessary for a good teacher of ethics.

3.4.1 *Qualifications*

Michael of Ephesus remarks that a father ought to raise his children as well as he can and fulfill the function of a lawgiver within his family. Nonetheless, he thinks that the principal task of teaching virtue to children is best entrusted to someone outside the family (namely, the state), and it is significant that the function of family lawgiver is envisaged only should the state fail to fulfill this obligation.[167] Indeed,

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[166] Thomas 1969, Lib. I, lec. III, sec. 35; lec. IV; lec. XI.

[167] Eustratius *et al.* 1991, Lib. X, p. 463: "Neglecta autem communi cura vel in

the head of a family lacks what the state has—the power to coerce. So it is best to give children over to the tutelage of a teacher, referred to as *legispositivus*. The *legispositivus* is someone who through study and long experience knows which laws are good and which ones are bad, just as a doctor knows the difference between disease and health. He is apparently the one who assesses a child's inclination to specific disciplines, and up to what point various subjects should be studied.[168] This point, of course, recalls the function of politics in *EN* I.2. One wonders, however: Is the *legispositivus* only the general pedagogue responsible for encouraging children to follow at least a semblance of virtue, or is he also the one who teaches moral philosophy? Or might he even be the legislator arranging a system of education? The answer seems to be the former, as is shown by the comments, referred to earlier, of Michael of Ephesus.

As for the requirement of a good upbringing, the Latin commentators add very little to Aristotle's already spare comments on teaching. Albert emphasizes two qualifications: the *legispositivus* must be someone who has knowledge of both the universal and the particular, and he must have practical experience of political matters.[169] A father's authority, according to Albert, is not sufficient for raising children properly.[170] Thomas, on the other hand, stresses that the function of making good laws need not occur only at the state level: a *pater familias* can do the job as well, provided that he possesses the necessary quality—i.e., *idoneitas, qua possit condere rectas leges.*[171] In fact, it is possible that a father will be obeyed more readily than anyone appointed by the state, since parents can be obeyed out of love. However, Thomas too sees the function of parents as secondary, being important only when the state does not do its job. Like Albert,

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non poni hoc agentes leges vel poni quidem, despici autem negligentia principum civitatis, convenit prompte unumquemque habere curam suorum puerorum et amicorum ut boni et honesti fiant. Hoc enim ostendit per hoc scilicet *ad virtutem conferre.* Confert autem *ad virtutem* et cooperatur, bona ponens sub visum et docens quoniam hoc quidem nocet propter hoc, hoc autem utile est, et si non videatur, propter hoc. Et cum his *ad virtutem* cooperatur qui dat habens non habent, quibus indiget in eam quae virtutis et moralis et rationalis possessionem."

[168] Eustratius *et al.* 1991, Lib. X, pp. 468–70.

[169] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. X, lec. XIX, p. 791, l. 82–p. 792, l. 7; cf. Lib. X, lec. XVIII, q. 6, pp. 786–87.

[170] *Ibid.*, Lib. X, lec. XVIII, p. 787, ll. 37–43.

[171] Thomas 1969, Lib. X, lec. XV, p. 602.

Thomas also emphasizes the need for the *legispositivus* to combine study and experience.[172]

Burley lists three conditions for being a good *legispositivus*: knowledge of political science itself, experience of political affairs, and a position of authority to establish laws and have them observed.[173] However, he actually views the family as a more natural locus of education than the state. The word of the king can indeed provide the fear necessary for children to behave; but that of the father can be more effective because of love.[174]

3.4.2 *Qualities*

Since teachers are usually assumed to be more knowledgeable, experienced, and mature than their students, one can suppose that those who teach children will necessarily have met (or be well on their way toward meeting) the requirements Aristotle had thought necessary for people to study ethics. In particular, they must have knowledge of both the universal and the particular (i.e., they must be prudent). In turn, this means being, as we have seen, emotionally mature—able to take delight in the proper things so as to teach others to take delight in the same. Aristotle, however, dwells almost exclusively on the necessity of preparation by experience and says little about the personal qualities necessary for one to be a *legispositivus*. The commentators follow him in paying scarce attention to this topic.

Although Michael of Ephesus does not discuss explicitly who the teacher of ethics should be, he at least describes one important quality of the general *legispositivus*: he must be able to determine what is good for each child and assign to each tasks that match his abilities. Is this conceivably also a quality of the teacher of ethics? Probably not; after all, teaching ethics is part of a theoretical activity, and there is no reason for theory to be adjusted to abilities. Albert follows Michael of Ephesus in discussing, although not at so much length, the ability to direct children individually toward the subjects for which they have the greatest natural aptitude.[175]

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[172] *Ibid.*, Lib. X, lec. XVI, pp. 605–06.
[173] Burley 1521, Lib. X, f. 187 I–K.
[174] *Ibid.*, f. 186 G.
[175] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. X, lec. XVIII, p. 786, ll. 31–38: "Sed philosophi

One important quality Thomas mentions is the ability to distribute both praise and blame at the appropriate moments, so that young people can be trained to take pleasure and pain in the appropriate objects.[176] This quality is probably connected with the epideictic aspect of rhetoric, which itself concerns praise and blame. Thus, we are given an insight into how rhetoric should be used, in Thomas' view, to promote virtue.[177]

Giles of Rome is one of the very few to consider in detail what the *legispositivi* should be like. He lists various qualities which should characterize a king, depending on his relationship with various others.[178] But how do kings become prudent to begin with? Giles starts from the assumption that rest and quietness helps the soul become prudent, for it facilitates reflection. Next, Giles specifies what should be the objects of reflection.[179] But it becomes clear from this list that the common people are no longer under consideration. This suggests that they are unable to become prudent or *legispositivi*, and that this function can only be effectively exercised by a king and his appointees.

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considerant leges secundum ordinem ad felicitatem secundum omnes actus virtutum, et ideo talibus legibus diriguntur etiam nutritiones puerorum, secundum quod docet Plato, quod puerorum opera attendenda et dandi sunt illis studiis quibus per se ipsos applicant, quia in his magis proficient." Note that these theories of education largely dispel the myth that attention to the children's individual inclinations only surfaces with Renaissance pedagogical models.

[176] Thomas 1969, Lib. II, lec. III, p. 84, ll. 66–68: ". . . et ideo instructores iuvenum cum bene faciunt applaudunt eis, cum autem male agunt increpant eos."

[177] Cf. Eustratius' comments about how the *irrationales impetus* are to be kept under control. Eustratius mentions three ways: *suasio, increpatio, deprecatio*: "Haec enim differentes sunt modi ad eam quae a deterioribus ad meliora conversionem conferentes. Suasio quidem enim est doctrinalis quaedam admonitio passibilitatis animarum directiva. Increpatio autem potestativa quaedam obiurgatio terrens eum qui praeter rationem appetit ad excisionem impetus. Deprecatio autem sermo caritative prolatus et molliter reducens ab irrationalium passionum dominatione" (Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. I, p. 191).

[178] Giles 1502, II, 1, cap. viii, f. 25v: "Ratione bonorum ad quae dirigit oportet regem esse memorem et providum. Propter modum secundum quem dirigit, oportet ipsum esse intelligentem et rationabilem. Ratione propriae personae qui alios est dirigens oportet quod sit solers et docilis. Ratione vero gentis quam dirigit congruit quod sit expertus et cautus."

[179] "Anima in sedendo et quiescendo fit prudens." Thus kings "maiorem partem vitae suae debent expendere in cogitando quae possunt esse regno proficua." I.e., they must think about "tempora retroacta," then "futura bona quae possunt esse proficua regno," "recogitare bonas consuetudines et bonas leges," then, "excogitare . . . quomodo per huiusmodi bonas leges et consuetudines debite regnum regat eligendo ex eis debitas conclusiones agibilium" (*ibid.*, II, 1, cap. ix, f. 26r).

Who is qualified to teach ethics appears therefore to be one of the least interesting questions to the medieval commentators. They tend to remain generic about the issue, only occasionally venturing out beyond Aristotle. However, even within the confines of a topic handled rather unimaginatively, there are differences of emphasis, with Burley for example holding against all the others that the family is indeed where moral education should take place.

3.5 *Related Themes*

Besides the topics discussed so far in this chapter, three specific issues also addressed by medieval *Ethics* commentaries should be mentioned: the independence of moral philosophy from theology, the debate concerning Plato versus Aristotle, and the commentators' attitude toward certitude.

3.5.1 *Moral Philosophy and Theology*

Eustratius, as we have seen, identified metaphysics with theology and considered moral philosophy a step in the preparation of the soul for heavenly bliss. Thus, ethics could not really be an independent subject. In the thirteenth century, however, ethics did become an independent philosophical subject in the Latin West. It is true that the theoretical sciences were often thought to be superior, and ethics was taught within the context of (or in view of) metaphysics.[180] Nonetheless, the Latin commentators were often far less eager than Eustratius to identify metaphysics with theology and on several occasions remarked on the boundaries separating ethics from theology.

Albert the Great is the most representative figure in this interpretative tradition. He was able to separate clearly and consistently the earthly and heavenly aspects of becoming good, and to argue cogently that Aristotle was concerned solely with the earthly and the human. When questions bordering on theology arose in his commentary, he tended to dismiss them as belonging to another science and tried to press on. This procedure made it easy to accept Aristotle without necessarily adjusting him to a Procrustean bed. It was not

[180] Wieland 1981, *passim.*

a case of "double truth," but of the coexistence of different doctrinal provisions for different aspects of life. Albert seems to have reasoned as follows: "If it is the case that the true Christian ideal is the contemplative life, we must all nonetheless also deal with the active life. Thus, Aristotle's teachings have their own practicality." Even the passages in which Aristotle mentioned God could be treated by Albert as clear but also generic reminders that all things ultimately come from above.

An example of this distinction between ethics and theology is Albert's view of how man becomes good. Although he does not deny that divine influence may play a rôle in the generation of virtue he does not emphasize this possibility. Rather, he dwells at length on the influence of the stars and of nature. As Buridan (following Albert) points out, it does not seem necessary to ask whether the virtues arise in us because of a specific action on God's part—that, he says, is for the theologians to debate.[181]

The distinction between ethics and theology, which Albert at times tries to emphasize by answering questions both *philosophice* and *theologice*, is nonetheless hard to maintain, both for him and for his followers. At various points, he is not able to resist the lure of certain theological issues or to give solutions that depend rather on Christian faith. Thus, it should not be too surprising that, toward the end of his commentary, Buridan admits that he has treated his subject rather more theologically than intended.[182] Thomas' inclusion of ethical discussions in his *Summa Theologica* (especially in the Ia IIae and IIa IIae) hardly strengthened the idea that ethics had its own sphere. Furthermore, as we have seen in Chapter 2, theology students were often charged with teaching ethics, as well as other Arts subjects, in Paris. And perhaps the fact that most of the commentators considered here were regulars (and that, of those remaining, only Albert

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[181] Buridan 1637, Lib. I, q. 17, p. 64: "Utrum autem sint aliquae virtutes nobis divinitus infusae, sicut dicunt Theologi, non est praesentis perscrutationis. Nam sicut dicit Albertus, primo de Generatione, Quid ad nos de Dei miraculis, cum de natura loquimur? Nos autem (sicut et Aristoteles in hoc libro) philosophice loquimur de felicitate, secundum quod est nobis acquisitum in hac vita, secundum naturae et conditionis humanae communem cursum."

[182] *Ibid.*, Lib. X, q. 5, p. 883: "Aliquis forte diceret mihi, tu proposueras loqui secundum philosophos, cum tamen non loqueris nisi theologice, philosophi enim naturaliter procedentes non posuerunt mandata divina. Et ego dico, quod primo omnes philosophi magni morales qui neque fuerunt Iudei neque Christiani dixerunt intellectum humanum esse Deum, vel quoddam divinum . . ."

of Saxony and Buridan did not receive degrees in theology) led to the continued interplay between ethics and theology. In any case it should be emphasized that, even for Albert the Great, the two sciences were *distinct*, but not therefore *separate*: philosophy and theology were viewed as complementary, and it would have been hard (as the Parisian condemnation of 1277 illustrates) for the two to be considered in strict isolation. Especially after Thomas, assimilating the *Ethics* became a matter of harmonizing Aristotle's teachings with those of Christianity, not just of letting Aristotle's teachings apply to this life and reserving those of Christianity to the life to come. On the whole, the medieval approach to ethics on this issue came therefore to reflect Thomas' position rather than Albert's.

3.5.2 *Aristotle vs. Plato and the Stoics*

Before the fifteenth-century translations of Plato, few in the Latin West dared to suggest that Plato was as useful as (or even more so than) Aristotle. Far too little of Plato's work was known directly to deliver such an opinion.[183] Therefore, of the commentators discussed in this chapter, Eustratius and the other Greek writers were the only ones who could critique Aristotle on the basis of direct knowledge of Plato. The Latin commentators do follow Eustratius on some points (Albert, for example, repeats his view that Aristotle misrepresented Plato's theory of Ideas),[184] but they do not do so systematically. Rather, as we have seen, Albert openly criticizes Plato's method in moral philosophy.[185] He also disagrees with Plato's understanding of the intellect, agreeing with Aristotle that it must be immanent.[186]

Similarly, medieval commentators do not show a predilection for the writings of Cicero, Seneca, and other Stoicizing Roman authors,

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[183] Only the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and parts of the *Timaeus* and *Parmenides* were then available in Latin. On Plato's fortune in the Middle Ages, see especially Klibanski 1939, Faes de Mottoni 1969, Gersh 1986.

[184] Albert 1968–1972, Lib. I, lec. V.

[185] Speaking of Plato, Albert says: "qui locutus est de moribus non moraliter, sed quasi mathematice" (*ibid.*, lec. III, p. 15, ll. 48–49). Instead of seeing ideas as "rationes in mente divina," Plato saw divine, mathematical, and sensible forms; he saw something separate that was the cause of things' being good, "Unde patet falsa commendatio eorum qui dicunt Platonem in hoc bene dixisse; non enim intelligit, quod sit omnium causa effective sicut deus; hoc enim verum esset" (*ibid.*, p. 16, ll. 17–20).

[186] *Ibid.*, Lib. X, lec. XI, p. 749. See Henle 1956; Gaul 1912 collects the passages in which Albert discusses Plato.

although they feel free to quote from them when it suits their purposes. Thomas is perhaps the most vocal critic of the Stoic position, opposing for example the Stoic views on the four cardinal virtues.[187] Buridan instead, while castigating the Stoics on some points, follows the Platonic/Stoic moral tradition antedating the translation of Aristotle's *corpus*. He quotes abundantly from Seneca and Cicero, offering for consideration, for example, their tripartite division of prudence.[188] As in the case of Plato, however, the medieval interpreters were handicapped by their incomplete knowledge of Cicero's works, which were to be so influential among the humanists.

3.5.3 *Consequences and Certitude*

The overwhelming dominance of Aristotle's writings and the views (mentioned above, § 3.5.1) many held on the relationship of ethics and theology were both underpinnings for the medieval position on certitude. It was commonly assumed that certitude in ethics was possible in spite of the fact that ethics was not a science in the strict sense of the word. In fact, skepticism seems out of the question for all of the medieval authors examined. Among the various reasons that could be offered for this position, the medieval view of *synderesis* doubtless plays a rôle.[189] Here, however, I shall limit myself to discussing two other points.

First, one must remember the incompleteness with which philosophical viewpoints different from Aristotle's were known and understood in the late-medieval period. It cannot be said that the medieval interpreters thought that the ancients agreed on the subject of ethics.[190] Even a reading of Aristotle would have reminded them of the controversies on ethics in the classical period. However, as noted above, Plato and the Stoics were directly accessible only in part. In spite of strong currents of indirect influence, they did not represent a

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[187] Thomas 1969, Lib. II, lec. VIII.

[188] Buridan 1637, Lib. VI, q. 18, p. 551; cf. Walsh 1966.

[189] On *synderesis* see especially Lottin 1942–1960, II, pp. 103–349; also see Rhonheimer 1994, pp. 427–30.

[190] Eustratius' Platonism, for example, does not blind him to the differences between Plato and Aristotle in metaphysics. He criticizes Aristotle severely for misrepresenting Plato's theory of the Ideas (Eustratius *et al.* 1973, Lib. I, pp. 94 ff.). Albert also knows that the Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics differ in their definitions of the good (Albert 1968–1972, Lib. I, lec. IV, p. 21, ll. 14–15). As we have seen, the commentary by Thomas is one of many that regularly castigate Stoic positions.

threat to the Aristotelian system. Epicureanism was even less known, and in any case the prejudices against it were so strong that it would be a long time before it received a fair hearing. All of this led to perceiving the variety of ancient ethical views less keenly (and doubtless to taking them less seriously) than would later be the case.

Second, the Christian framework that sustained ethical discussions during this period played a crucial rôle. For both Eustratius and Thomas, spiritual and theological ends granted stability to the conclusions of ethics. Furthermore, as we have seen in Albert and Buridan, the best intentions still made it hard consistently to demarcate moral philosophy from theology. Christian teachings were still accepted as overruling disagreements among the unenlightened pagans.

It is worth noting that this function of Christian doctrine as a reconciler (or, at times, a suppressor and denier) of differences, especially those relevant in some way to the domain of faith, was hardly a preserve of the Middle Ages. The interpretation of Plato in fifteenth-century Italy, for example, was strongly molded by what pious ears wished to hear.[191] Francesco Piccolomini, in 1584, had religious motives for contrasting the moral theory of the Stoics in his *Ethics* commentary.[192] With the splintering of Latin Christendom during the Reformation period, the enterprise of correcting (or redressing) pagan error through a single standard of Christian "truth" became of course ever more difficult, but this did not prevent numerous scholars from attempting it from the perspective of their particular confessional commitments. The increasing availability of Plato's works and of works from other traditions complicated the project, but it remained a project in which many scholars believed for much longer than seems possible today. In the long run, however, the increasing variety of interpretations of Aristotle's work and the ever more obvious problems with his text eroded and challenged the certainty of the medieval worldview.

[191] See especially Hankins 1990.
[192] See Kraye 2002.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE COMMENTARY LITERATURE TO 1500: A SURVEY

4.1 *Parisian Models*

The commentaries discussed in Chapter 3 were potential models for the Italian Renaissance ones, not only because of their conclusions regarding the teaching of ethics, but also because of their interpretative approach(es) to Aristotle's text. As we have seen, medieval interpreters of the *Ethics* differed significantly in their conclusions about the teaching of moral philosophy. They are a reminder that Aristotelianism was not a monolithic movement during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[1] The multiplication of divergences during the Renaissance (leading to Charles Schmitt's insistence on "Renaissance Aristotelianisms") was only an acceleration of this tendency and not a new development.[2] Still, there were also numerous points of convergence among the medieval commentators: the definition of virtue, the view of ethics as a practical science, its classification (especially by professors at the higher level) among the more advanced subjects, a realistic view of the audience's moral preparation, a relative disinterest in moral training at the elementary level. Associated with these assumptions was the common practice of teaching ethics as a philosophical subject.[3] This section asks whether one can note similar common features, amounting to a "tradition," in these commentators' approach to Aristotle's *Ethics*. In answer to this question, this section proposes a typology of the principal *Ethics* commentaries and notes which models were most widely followed in Italy. Section 4.2, instead, surveys the Italian commentaries on the *Ethics* through 1500.

[1] See on this point see Kristeller 1993b, especially p. 344; Jordan 1998.
[2] See Kristeller 1955; Lohr 1982. On Aristotelianisms in the Renaissance, see Kristeller 1993b, pp. 346 ff.; Schmitt 1983, pp. 10–33.
[3] See Wieland 1981.

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4.1.1 *Formal Aspects*

Although the typical method of scholastic teaching consisted of *lectio* and *disputatio*,[4] the medieval commentaries on the *Ethics* confront us with a much broader array of interpretative strategies. This is partly due to the fact that these commentaries are not necessarily connected with university teaching. Indeed, many of those under consideration here may have been written for personal use or in connection with teaching in conventual settings.[5] To understand them, therefore, it is useful to have in view not only the university context (see § 2.1), but also the genres of the philosophical commentary in the thirteenth century.

Three principal commentary genres may be distinguished: the paraphrase, the literal commentary, and the commentary by *quaestiones*. Following the example of Averroes and Avicenna, many early commentaries took the form of paraphrases of Aristotle's text. This was a special feature of Albert the Great's cultural project to provide his contemporaries with a broad knowledge of Aristotle's findings. It also made it possible to explore issues not covered by Aristotle or to supplement books left unfinished by the Stagirite. The literal commentary (also called *expositio* or *sententia*), instead, was more closely tied to the classroom *lectio*.[6] Its prologue tended to place a work in its philosophical and literary context (e.g., discussing its subject and which branch of philosophy was under consideration), to consider its usefulness and the author's intention, and any other matters thought necessary for an understanding of the text.[7] The text itself was then minutely divided into its parts (*divisio textus*), a technique that was applied to the work as a whole as well as to ever smaller subdivisions. Explanation of the text proceeded phrase by phrase and sometimes word for word. It clarified philosophical concepts, the

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[4] On the scholastic method of teaching, see at least Grabmann 1909 and 1939; Chenu 1964; *Filosofi e teologi*; Minnis and Scott 1988; Lawn 1993; Maierù 1994; and Schulthess and Imbach 1996, pp. 147–59. On specific terminologies, see *Vocabulaire des écoles* and *Vocabulary of Research and Teaching*.

[5] The most likely exceptions are the works of Albert of Saxony and Buridan's *Quaestiones*; see below.

[6] This is not the place to treat the matter in detail, but it should be observed that student notes (*reportationes*) taken at the lectures reflect classroom practice more closely than the commentaries that were an outgrowth of a teacher's lectures. The latter were usually revised in view of publication.

[7] For a recent treatment of medieval prologues, see *Les prologues médiévaux*.

structure of specific arguments, the meaning of unfamiliar words or figures. It considered the implications of the philosopher's doctrine, also for issues of current interest. It made cross-references to other works by the author, solving apparent contradictions and reporting the interpretations of other commentators. Finally, there was the commentary proceeding by questions, which reflected the *disputatio.* Although disputations were originally integral parts of classroom teaching, complementing the *lectio* and clarifying remaining doubts, they evolved into independent exercises as well, which might take place in the classroom (after the lecture), at the moment of demonstrating one's preparation for a degree, or even outside of the university context altogether. Many scholars see a historical development among these commentary forms: the paraphrase commentary and the literal commentary gave birth, around 1240–1250, to a mixed form that included *quaestiones*; shortly thereafter (1260–1270), the questions also came to be treated separately, without however superseding the other commentary forms.[8]

The commentaries on the *Ethics* may also be described according to the commentary genres listed above. Literal commentaries include especially Thomas' *Sententia* (ca. 1271–1272?),[9] which is a straightforward exposition of the text in which the *divisio textus* has a prominent rôle. This direct approach had already been exemplified by the Greek commentaries, but Thomas does away with certain features such as Eustratius' fastidious (and annoying) reconstruction of syllogisms, apostrophes to Aristotle, and moralizing comments. Another work that may be classified as a literal commentary is Albert of Saxony's *Expositio* (ca. 1356), which—while attempting a clarification of the *Ethics*—makes heavy use of *conclusiones.*[10] Albert the Great's *Lectura* or *Super Ethica* (1248–1252)[11] belongs instead to the mixed or hybrid type of commentary: after a substantial prologue, which places the *Ethics* within its philosophical context and discusses the work's subject, end, and usefulness, every lecture follows a similar procedure. First, the passage to be treated is quoted; then follows the *divisio textus*, includ-

[8] Bianchi 1997, pp. 49–51; Ebbesen 1993; Grabmann 1939. Flüeler 1999.

[9] See Appendix B, no. 11.

[10] Heidingsfelder 1927, pp. 71–86. See below, Appendix B, no. 16. Albert's commentary depends on the models provided by Thomas and Burley (for the latter's commentary, see below). Note that the *Sententia* formerly attributed to Buridan is probably a ghost; see Flüeler 1998a.

[11] See Appendix B, no. 7.

ing a general summary of what Aristotle says in each division. The most substantial part is that dedicated to questions, often presented with reasons both *pro* and *contra*. Albert then gives his solution to each of the questions, summarizes once again the particular passage (at times outlining the relevant syllogisms), and finally moves on to the next passage or lecture. Of the commentaries under consideration here, those of Henry of Friemar (1310 or earlier) and Gerard of Odo (before 1329?) are the closest to the model of Albert's *Lectura*.[12] Walter Burley's *Expositiones* (1334–1341)[13] may be placed somewhere in between the model of Albert's *Lectura* and Thomas' *Sententia*. Although formally it is a literal commentary, Burley does present *dubia* and *quaestiones* in his work. These are embedded in the exposition, and Burley gives his answers (or those of other commentators) before proceeding in his exposition.

In addition to the genres discussed immediately above, there are other works on the *Ethics* that distance themselves considerably from the model of the classroom *lectio*. Albert the Great's *Ethica* (1263–1267),[14] for example, is a paraphrase commentary, much like Averroes' *Liber minorum moralium*.[15] As will be discussed later (§ 4.2) this was a genre that enjoyed a great popularity, especially in Italy. Buridan's *Quaestiones* (ca. 1340–1360)[16] are remarkable for examining, sequentially, philosophical problems that arise throughout the *Ethics* (except for the last part of Book X; the work is incomplete after Book X, Q. 5) and for spawning a series of questions "secundum Buridanum" in the universities of central Europe. Different yet from all these commentaries is Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum*,[17] a mirror for princes that makes abundant use, not only of the *Ethics* and the *Politics*, but also of other Aristotelian works, including the *Rhetoric*.[18] The work is a reminder that Aristotle's *Ethics* is also discussed in many genres that do not properly fall under the category "commentaries."[19]

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[12] For Henry of Friemar see Appendix B, no. 13; for Gerard Odo, *ibid.*, no. 14.
[13] See Appendix B, no. 15.
[14] See Appendix B, no. 8.
[15] See Appendix B, no. 5.
[16] See Appendix B, no. 17.
[17] See Appendix B, no. 12.
[18] See especially Lambertini 1991a for a description of the Aristotelian sources.
[19] No mention has been made here, for example, of *tabulae* or *florilegia*, which were popular ways of reducing Aristotle's teachings to a series of easy-to-memorize sentences. On these and other genres used to interpret the *Ethics* in Italy, see below, § 4.2.

For reasons that remain obscure, the *Ethics* commentaries do not seem to have followed the general line of commentary development described above. Instead of evolving from paraphrase to literal exposition to hybrid commentary and finally to questions commentary, works on the *Ethics* followed a trajectory of their own. For example, Albert the Great first delivered his *lectura* (hybrid commentary); he wrote his paraphrase only several years later. Thomas' *Sententia* came after both of these works. The background of this development remains to be studied and may be related to the context in which the works were written.

Remarkably, most of the commentaries mentioned above were not written in connection with university lectures. Thomas probably wrote his *Sententia* for personal use.[20] Burley wrote his commentary long after his sojourn at the University of Paris. Albert's *Lectura* is connected with teaching, but this took place in the Dominican *studium* of Cologne, where Thomas heard and edited his lectures. Henry of Friemar's *Sententia* probably derives from his lectures on the *Ethics* in 1310, when he was *magister regens* and professor of theology in the *studium* of the Augustinians in Paris. Gerard of Odo's teaching is also connected with the *studia* of the regulars, in this case with the Franciscans. The only two commentators considered here whose works stem with some certainty from the university classroom are Albert of Saxony and Jean Buridan. The interpretations originating from conventual settings seem to have been especially influential in the Italian universities.

4.1.2 *Diffusion*

Most of the works discussed above circulated not only in northern and central Europe, but in Italy as well. Around the year 1400 Coluccio Salutati in Florence was acquainted with the Greek *Ethics* commentaries (in Grosseteste's translation) of Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus as well as the Latin interpretations of Albert the Great, Albert of Saxony, Gerard of Odo, Walter Burley, Jean Buridan, and even Henry of Friemar. He of course knew Thomas Aquinas and

[20] Gauthier (1971b, p. xxiv, idem 1969, pp. 242, 245–46) argues that the work was written as a preparation for the second part of the *Summa Theologiae* and that it is not connected with a teaching context.

Giles of Rome.[21] Toward the end of the century, a library catalogue from Santa Maria Novella, the Dominican convent in Florence, shows that by 1489 the collection included two copies of Thomas' *Sententia* (one with and one without Aristotle's text), Albert's *Super Ethica*, Buridan's commentary, two copies (in Latin translation) of the Greek commentators, Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum*, and at least two other copies of the *Ethics*, one of which in Bruni's translation.[22]

One wonders, however, whether these lists were representative of the commentators generally appreciated in Italy at the time. Furthermore, were the commentaries most often read elsewhere in Europe read as enthusiastically in Italy? And how did the availability of some commentaries rather than others, in Italy, affect the teaching of moral philosophy? Here we can only attempt an initial response to these questions, based on the manuscript diffusion in Italy of the authors in question[23] and on the commentators referred to by name in Italian commentaries.

Salutati spoke of Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus from direct knowledge: he owned and annotated their commentary, translated by Robert Grosseteste, and this manuscript still survives.[24] Nor was he the only Italian to appreciate Eustratius: Leonardo Bruni annotated the same manuscript,[25] and Petrarch annotated another manuscript with Eustratius' commentary.[26] Furthermore, of some twenty-two surviving manuscripts of the Greek commentaries in Latin translation, nearly one third belongs to Italian libraries.[27] Other copies have

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[21] See above, Ch. 3, n. 1.

[22] Orlandi 1952, p. 42. One of the commentaries of Eustratius is described as authored by "Eustathius" (apparently Eustatius of Arras, a Franciscan active in Paris in the thirteenth century). The work is to be identified, however, with the commentary of Eustratius (Lohr, *Traditio* [1967]: 406).

[23] A more accurate gauge would be, of course, to examine the manuscripts' origin and provenance. Given the high number of manuscripts involved, however, such a study is being deferred to another occasion.

[24] Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. I.5.21. See Lohr, *Traditio* (1973): 105; De la Mare 1973, pp. 32 (n. 4), 34–35 (Pl. IX, b and e); E. Franceschini 1976, II, p. 463, n. 150; Ullman 1963, pp. 135, 170, 239, 278; *AL Codices*, II, p. 965. Salutati's early acquaintance with Eustratius is confirmed in a letter from 1392/94 in Salutati, *Ep.*, III, p. 31. A letter from 1400 shows that he owned a complete copy of Eustratius (Salutati, *Ep.*, III, p. 391).

[25] Hankins (forthcoming).

[26] Paris, BN, lat. 6458 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–291v; see de Nolhac 1907, II, pp. 148–51; *AL Codices*, I, no. 584; *ibid.*, II, p. 1279; *AL Suppl.*, p. 92.

[27] See Appendix B, no. 6.

been lost, but are recorded in possession lists of libraries or individuals. Palla Strozzi, for example, owned a copy in Padua.[28] The manuscript diffusion and library records, however, give only a small idea of Eustratius' enormous popularity among early and late commentators of the *Ethics* in Italy. "Eustratius" was easily the commentator most often referred to,[29] and had the advantage of being quotable not only directly, but also through the commentaries of Albert and Thomas. Many anonymous marginalia on *Ethics* manuscripts in Italy depend heavily on Eustratius' commentary. Furthermore, an Italian (Giovanni Bernardo Feliciano) was responsible for retranslating the Greek commentators in the mid-sixteenth century; five of the eleven printed editions of the work were produced in Italy.[30]

Of Albert the Great's two works on the *Ethics*, most surviving manuscripts are of his paraphrase (twenty-five complete and fragmentary manuscripts, seven of which are in Italy).[31] The *Lectura* or *Super Ethica* survives in only seven complete manuscripts and six incomplete manuscripts (including glosses taken from Albert). Only one of the complete manuscripts is in Italy, as are three of the incomplete manuscripts.[32] However, the frequent references to Albert's *Lectura* in Italian commentaries lead one to suspect that it was far more influential than the number of manuscripts presently known might suggest. Several passages in Donato Acciaiuoli's commentary, for example, are very close to the *Lectura*.[33] Furthermore, in 1520 and again in 1525, his work on the *Ethics* was printed in Venice.[34] Thus, there seems to be no great mismatch between Albert's *fortuna* in Italy and in northern Europe.

Thomas completes the trio of commentators on the *Ethics* most often praised and depended upon in Italy. His *Sententia* survives in around 100 manuscripts, and we know of at least another thirty manuscripts bearing annotations from this commentary.[35] Many of

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[28] For Palla Strozzi's library, see Fiocco 1964, p. 309.

[29] For an example, see Acciaiuoli 1478 and the observations in Bianchi 1990a, pp. 47–51. Eustratius was often assumed to be the author of the composite Greek commentaries.

[30] See Appendix C, no. 65.

[31] See Appendix B, no. 8.

[32] See Appendix B, no. 7.

[33] Acciaiuoli 1478, notice in Bianchi 1990a, pp. 44–46.

[34] Albertus 1520. It is not clear from the title whether this work is the *lectura* or the paraphrase.

[35] See Appendix B, no. 11; Gauthier 1970a, pp. 120–24.

the manuscripts are in Italian libraries, and some of them belonged to eminent Italians.[36] Furthermore, there are manuscripts now elsewhere bearing indications of ownership by Italians,[37] and at times we know of Italian ownership through possession lists, even when the manuscripts themselves do not survive.[38] It is noteworthy that numerous manuscripts date from the fifteenth century. The *Sententia* was printed at least thirteen times up to 1660 (nine times in Italy) and counts as the most-often printed of the medieval *Ethics* commentaries. Thus, Thomas' *fortuna* did not necessarily decline with the rise of humanism. His continued popularity in Italy was probably due, among other factors, to his omission of *quaestiones* and to his Italian origin, which fit in with the humanist emphasis on the Italian tradition.[39]

Judging from the manuscript tradition, Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum* was one of the most successful works across Europe, but it is not yet clear how many of its 350 or more manuscripts are related to Italy.[40] It is significant, however, that five of the six printed editions between 1473 and 1607 were produced in Italy.

The commentaries by Gerard of Odo and Walter Burley seem to have been of middling importance in Italy. Nearly half of the seventeen manuscripts of Gerard's *Sententia* are in Italy, and the only two printed editions made of the commentary were produced there.[41] The work is not usually well represented in annotations of Italian manuscripts I have seen. More manuscripts of Burley's *Expositio* survive (twenty-six, ten of which in Italy), and his work was printed more often as well: it received four editions, all of them in Italy.[42] Furthermore, references to him are found far more often in Italian *Ethics* manuscripts than is the case for Gerard. Since both works proceeded by *lectio* and *quaestiones*, some factor other than the format must have been responsible for the preference given to the English scholar. One possibility is that the *propositiones notabiles* often included

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[36] For example, Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 212 (s. XV) and Urb. lat. 1366 (s. XIV) belonged to Federico II of Urbino (Thomas 1969, p. 14*).

[37] E.g., Paris, BN, lat. 6457 (s. XIII/XIV); Thomas 1969, p. 9*.

[38] Thomas 1969, pp. 31*–36*.

[39] On the continuing influence of Thomas' *Ethics* commentary in the Italian Renaissance, see also Lines (forthcoming).

[40] See Appendix B, no. 12. The project of establishing a comprehensive manuscript inventory is still in process; see *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia.*

[41] See Appendix B, no. 14.

[42] See Appendix B, no. 15.

in his commentary appealed to the Italians. Several manuscripts, in fact, contain only the *propositiones notabiles*, without the commentary.[43]

It is still hard to judge the Italian reception of Alexander of Saxony and Henry of Friemar. Italian libraries have only six out of twenty-four manuscripts of Albert of Saxony's *Expositio*,[44] and only six of twenty manuscripts of Henry of Friemar's *Sententia*.[45] Neither work was ever printed, and references to them in glosses are extremely rare.

The diffusion of Buridan's *Quaestiones* merits more space than can be given it here.[46] The popularity of this work, which survives in over 100 manuscripts throughout Europe,[47] does not compare poorly with that of Thomas' commentary. Indeed, were one to count marginalia and the many moral questions "secundum Buridanum," the number of manuscripts might well exceed that of Thomas' *Sententia*. Nonetheless, the reception of Buridan's moral philosophy in Italy does not begin to compare with the enthusiasm for his natural philosophy there,[48] nor with the study of his moral philosophy in the universities of France and central Europe.[49] Various copies (nearly a fifth of the surviving manuscripts) of the *Quaestiones* can be found in Italy today, and the commentary by Niccolò Tignosi (ca. 1460) shows that he knew the work.[50] Nonetheless, around 1400 Salutati was unable to secure a complete copy of the *Quaestiones*,[51] none of the five editions of the work was produced in Italy, and (most tellingly) hardly any of the Italian commentators on the *Ethics* refer to Buridan by name. This suggests that, even though he may have been known and even used in Italy, it was considered in bad taste to refer to him openly. In this sense, Buridan's Italian reception contrasts sharply with that accorded to interpreters such as Eustratius and Thomas.

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[43] This is clear from the listing in Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 185–86.

[44] See Appendix B, no. 16.

[45] See Appendix B, no. 13.

[46] The topic is treated more fully in Lines (forthcoming).

[47] See Appendix B, no. 17.

[48] On this see also Garin 1958 and Federici Vescovini 1976, p. 25: it is significant that, whereas there was a great interest in Florence, ca. 1396–1400, in Buridan's works on physics, psychology, and logic, the same cannot be said for his moral philosophy.

[49] Michael 1992, pp. 148–51.

[50] See below, especially § 5.2, and Appendix C, no. 40.

[51] Salutati, *Ep.*, III, pp. 391–92: "Questiones optimi Buridani, ultra duas questiones noni libri, licet Parisius super hoc scripserim, nunquam potui reperire; dicuntque peritiores eum ulterius non processisse."

4.2 *Italian Commentaries before 1500*

Strikingly, the northern European commentaries did not have to contend with a firmly rooted local tradition of interpreting the *Ethics* when they made their way to Italy. Aristotle's work had of course been reduced to compendia and extracts in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Italy, but it was not until around 1400 that it became the object of substantial commentaries there.[52] Thus, whereas northern Europe received its first full commentary on the *Ethics* around 1248–1252, thanks to Albert the Great, in Italy commentaries on this work date from around 150 years later, with a full maturation coming only in the second half of the fifteenth century. As a preliminary step to studying these interpretations in further detail, this section offers a survey of the Latin works on the *Ethics* written in Italy before 1500.

Not all interpretative forms could be considered here. In particular, I have not included in my survey letters, treatises, tables, and dialogues that discuss or are based on the *Ethics*, nor have I listed the numerous annotated copies of the work.[53] I have focused instead mainly on three genres: compendia (by which I mean abridgements of Aristotle's text with little or no interpretation), extracts (collections of *conclusiones* and *auctoritates*), and commentaries proper (expositions of the text, with or without questions). The translations were already discussed briefly above (§ 1.4.2). Although there is a fair number of prolusions,[54] typically these works are not very valuable except as a sign of the rising practice of teaching the *Ethics* in the universities. A chronological listing of these and other works may be found in Appendix C below.

4.2.1 *Early Works*

Only eleven surviving works represent with any certainty the Italian interpretation of the *Ethics* before 1400. Compendia and extracts

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[52] This assumes, of course, that a large number of commentaries has not disappeared. On this possibility, see A. Maier 1964 and 1977.

[53] Several annotated manuscripts are listed in Lines 1997, pp. 307–12.

[54] Prolusions were academic orations delivered at the beginning of an academic year. In the presence both of the students and of city (or *studium*) officials, teachers would introduce the subject on which they planned to teach and try to impress their audience with their learning.

make up the great majority of these works; prologues, *lecturae*, and *quaestiones disputatae* are represented by only one or two works each.[55] When one also takes lost works into account, the balance does not change significantly: we know of only two lost commentaries,[56] and one cannot be sure that Guido Guezzi's *Commentarium* was actually an exposition, since there is sometimes a considerable slippage between the title of a work and its literary genre.[57] The (fourteenth-century?) annotations, presumably by Magister Petrus and written in the margins of a manuscript from the Badia Fiorentina, do not amount to a real commentary.[58] Francesco da Digna's commentary appears to be a ghost.[59] Another likely ghost is the section on moral philosophy in the *Compilatio super totam philosophiam naturalem et moralem* by Giacomo d'Alessandria; although the dedication announces such a section,[60] I have been unable to trace any manuscripts that contain it.

In addition to these works, there are others whose connection with Italy is uncertain or even doubtful. Here again, compendia and extracts form the great majority.[61] A fragment of a commentary *Super*

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[55] *Compendia*: anonymous (Assisi, BCom. 584; Appendix C, no. 2), Corrado da Ascoli (no. 5), Guido Vernani da Rimini's *Summa* (no. 7), Bartolomeo da Pisa (no. 12), and Pietro dall'Aquila (no. 13). *Extracts* (including *conclusiones* and *auctoritates*): Geremia da Montagnone (no. 3), Paolo Nicoletto Veneto (no. 16), and Giovanni da Casale (no. 23). *Prologues*: Remigio Fiorentino (no. 4). *Lecturae*: Guido Vernani (no. 8). *Quaestiones*: Giacomo da Pistoia (no. 1). The questions in New York, Columbia University Library, Plimpton manuscript 17 (no. 21) occupy only one folio.

[56] The lost works are Guido Guezzi's *Commentarium* and Michele Aiguani's *Quaestiones* (Appendix C, nos. 15 and 17). It is unclear whether Francesco Casini's commentary (no. 24) is from the fourteenth century or from the beginning of the fifteenth. For convenience's sake, I group it with the fifteenth-century works.

[57] See, for example, the case of Petrus de Corveheda's *Sententia* (Appendix C, no. 9), which is in fact a compendium. A striking illustration of the slippage between title and genre of a work is offered by Fauser's listing of the various titles given to each of Albert the Great's works on the *Ethics* (Fauser 1982).

[58] See Appendix C, no. 18. Nothing seems to be known about this master, and whether he may be identifiable with the owner of the codex, one Petrus de Landelberg.

[59] For Francesco da Digna, see Appendix C, no. 166.

[60] Lohr, *Traditio* (1970): 136, reports part of the dedication as follows: "Serenissimo principi domino Roberto Jerusalem et Siciliae Regi frater Jacobus de Alexandria ordinis minorum reverentiam et in eo qui est fons sapientiae . . . vestris itaque votis, quae mihi censeo reputanda praecepta, me coaptare desiderans, libros naturales, metaphysicales necnon et morales distinctis capitulis conatus sum ad evidentiam clariorem reducere . . ." On Giacomo d'Alessandria's *Compilatio*, see Appendix C, no. 167.

[61] The uncertain works include Petrus de Corveheda's compendium and *Auctoritates notabiles* (Appendix C, nos. 9 and 10), the extracts by Emiliano da Spoleto (no. 11), and two anonymous extracts: Modena, BEst., Fondo Est. 14 (no. 19) and Milan,

Ethica nova (Lib. I), in a fourteenth-century Neapolitan manuscript, was scribed by an Italian hand,[62] but the work is not clearly Italian. Likewise, a fourteenth-century (and anonymous) set of questions cannot with certainty be associated with Italy.[63]

It thus seems that compendia and extracts were the most common ways of approaching Aristotle's *Ethics* in fourteenth-century Italy. Indeed, they represent over half of the surviving works. Furthermore, more manuscripts of compendia and extracts survive than of any other genre (see below).

A few observations are appropriate for those works on the *Ethics* that probably had the greatest diffusion, also outside of Italy. Judging from the number of surviving manuscripts, the only works to have enjoyed a fair circulation were Guido Vernani's *Summa de virtutibus* and Geremia da Montagnone's *Compendium moralium notabilium.* Their diffusion (respectively, fourteen and over fifty-seven manuscripts) greatly outdistances that of the next most popular work, Bartolomeo da Santo Concordio's *Compendium* (four manuscripts).[64]

Guido Vernani da Rimini († ca. 1345), a Dominican who also wrote theological works, already in the fifteenth century was called "Moralium peritorum . . . primicerius" and indicated as the model followed by Corrado d'Ascoli and many others.[65] His *Summa de virtutibus* (referred to by some scholars as *Sententia libri Ethicorum*)[66] survives—either entirely or partially—in fourteen manuscripts now scattered all over Europe.[67] The *Summa* was probably written around 1324–1330, after Guido's teaching in the Dominican *studium* of Bologna. The work is possibly addressed to the laity;[68] it is not clear whether it should be associated with any kind of teaching context.

BNC, AD.IX.20 (no. 20). The doubtful works include the anonymous compendium in Vatican, Pal. lat. 1024 (no. 6).

[62] Naples, BNC, VIII.G.8, ff. 4ra–9vb (Appendix C, no. 14).

[63] In Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 829; see Appendix C, no. 22. The *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum breves et utiles* in Milan, BAmbr., M.56.sup. (s. XIV), ff. 1r–68v turn out to be the work of Johannes Dedecus (cf. Lines 1999a, p. 279, no. 41).

[64] Guido Vernani's *Summa* is described in Appendix C, no. 7; for Geremia da Montagnone's *Compendium*, see *ibid.*, no. 3; for Bartolomeo's *Compendium*, see *ibid.*, no. 12.

[65] See Gauthier 1969, p. 37* and n. 99.

[66] But note that all of the manuscripts listed in Gauthier 1969, pp. 38*–39* refer to the work as *Summa de virtutibus.*

[67] Cf. the diffusion of his commentary on the *Politics*, of which three manuscripts survive: two in Italy and one in Spain (Flüeler 1992, II, p. 22).

[68] Gauthier 1969, pp. 37*–43*. See also Cheneval 1995, pp. 117–50.

We only know that Guido penned the *Summa* before going on to treat Aristotle's natural philosophy.

In spite of the possible confusion generated by the modern title, Guido's work is clearly a compendium. However, even the full title (*Summa de virtutibus secundum Aristotelis sententiam in libro Ethicorum*) should not mislead, for the *Summa* is not so much a synthesis of what Aristotle says, but of Thomas Aquinas' commentary on the *Ethics*. Guido manages this compression of Thomas' *Sententia* mainly by omitting Thomas' arguments and distinctions, while at the same time retaining the wording of many of his conclusions and observations.[69] From this point of view, one may see a parallel with another work by Guido, the *Liber de virtutibus quae ad vitam verae militiae requiruntur*, which also depends heavily on Thomas, although in this case on his moral exposition in the *Summa Theologica* Ia IIae and IIa IIae.[70] These summaries doubtless appealed to their readers by offering a first means of approaching Aristotle's *Ethics* without having to deal with the complex philosophical problems that appealed to some schoolmen.

A very different work is Geremia da Montagnone's *Compendium moralium notabilium*, probably written shortly before 1310[71] and partly based on Aristotle's *Ethics*. It enjoyed a great *fortuna* especially in the fifteenth century (many of the manuscripts date from this period), was copied by humanists, and was eventually printed (in 1505). Since its author was an early humanist, the *Compendium* holds a special interest as a possible forerunner of humanist Aristotelianism. Unfortunately, a reading of the work is disappointing from this point of view. Indeed, the work is not a continuous summary of Aristotle and other writers, as the title might suggest, but rather a topically-arranged collection of extracts and sentences. Geremia provides no special interpretation of Aristotle, limiting himself to quotations from his works (especially the *Ethics*, *Magna Moralia*, and *Rhetoric*) whenever such quotations seem appropriate to the moral topic under discussion.

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[69] See Gauthier 1969, p. 41*: "At certe, . . . certum est opus fratris Guidonis e Thomae *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* totum pendere et nihil esse nisi huius epitomen, haud spernendam quidem, nam, omnibus quae ad Aristotelis verba explananda spectant omissis, ne sententiarum perpetuitatem interrumpat nec a doctrina mentem legentis distrahat, cui liber Aristotelis forsitan praesto non esset, omissisque omnibus subtilibus rationibus et argumentis, moralem doctrinam Aristotelis a Thoma digestam tradit, ipsis doctoris verbis saepius retentis."

[70] Gauthier 1969, pp. 37* and 41*.

[71] Ullmann 1955, pp. 81–115.

Strictly speaking, the *Compendium* is actually closer in genre to medieval *florilegia* than to the other extracts listed in Appendix C.[72] Although Aristotle is the author most often quoted (Ullman counts 733 quotations), the work also quotes profusely from the Scriptures, classical authors (Plato's *Meno*, Isocrates, Cicero, Seneca, Valerius Maximus, Virgil, Catullus, Statius), early and late Church Fathers, and medieval authors, giving these quotations in chronological order under various moral headings. The disposition of the topics is such that the quotations could easily be used for rhetorical purposes, in sermons and other writings. This was perhaps Geremia's main intent and the secret of the work's appeal.

The moral topics listed by Geremia have much in common with the twelfth-century *Collectaneum Sedulii Scotti*.[73] The authors from whom he quotes are also staples of medieval *florilegia*, except for the addition of Catullus. Indeed, other than the use of this poet, the main innovative aspect of the *Compendium* seems to be Geremia's distinction of classical from medieval authors in his application of distinctive descriptive labels (e.g., *poetae* vs. *versilogi*).[74]

Two main difficulties—the paucity of Italian interpretations of the *Ethics* and the uncertain connection of some works with Italy—make any generalizations about the early Italian works on the *Ethics* tentative at best. Nonetheless, a few founded observations are possible.

First, these works are overwhelmingly connected with the *studia* of the mendicant orders. The authorship of these works already points in this direction, for of the fifteen known writers on the *Ethics* before 1400 (including for the moment those whose association with Italy is uncertain or even doubtful), five belonged to the Dominican order (Bartolomeo da Santo Concordio, Corrado da Ascoli, Guido Vernani, Remigio Fiorentino, Giovanni da Casale, Emiliano da Spoleto), two to the Franciscan order (Giacomo d'Alessandria, Pietro d'Aquila), and one to the Augustinian Hermits (Paolo Nicoletto Veneto). The authors of presumably lost commentaries were also regulars: Guido Guezzi was a Dominican, and Michele Aiguani a Carmelite. Francesco da Digna, author of a ghost commentary, was a Franciscan. The

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[72] On *florilegia* see at least Grabmann 1939, pp. 156–88; Schmitt 1983a, pp. 53–54; idem 1987; Hamesse 1974; eadem 1994; eadem (forthcoming).

[73] Olsen 1980, especially pp. 144–45.

[74] Weiss 1949, pp. 15–50; Ullmann 1955, pp. 81–82.

status of Giacomo da Pistoia and Petrus de Corveheda remains unclear. Geremia da Montagnone is the only certain layman.

Furthermore, many manuscripts of the *Ethics* come to us from conventual settings. Examples are the anonymous *Liber Aristotelis Ethicorum abbreviatus*[75] and the (previously mentioned) annotations by magister Petrus.[76] A note after the title in a Sienese manuscript ("Qui liber ad divinam scientiam ac philosophiam refertur moraliter exponendo")[77] suggests that, at least in some conventual settings, moral philosophy was studied because of its association with theology or metaphysics. Of course, the *Ethics* also received attention outside of the mendicant *studia* in fourteenth-century Italy: a sizeable number of works on the *Ethics* circulated, for example, in the vernacular.[78] However, an overwhelming proportion of works and manuscripts on the *Ethics* was written by regulars (many of them teachers in the *studia* of their orders)[79] and kept by Dominican, Franciscan, and Augustinian convents.

The overwhelming association of Italian works on the *Ethics* with the religious orders should be contrasted with the almost complete absence of comparable works connected with the universities before the fifteenth century. The only such work seems to be Giacomo da Pistoia's question on happiness,[80] which was probably debated in the Arts faculty of Bologna in the 1290s.[81] What teaching of the *Ethics* took place in Italy before 1400 mainly took place in conventual set-

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[75] Assisi, BCom. 584; see Appendix C, no. 2.

[76] Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. A.5.2769 from the Badia Fiorentina (see Appendix C, no. 18). Although the manuscript and its annotations may not have been written in Florence, the paternity of the annotations does not affect the provenance of the manuscript.

[77] Siena, BCom. Intronati L.III.17 (s. XIV), f. 1r. The manuscript comes from the Benedictine monastery of Monte Uliveto.

[78] Examples are Brunetto Latini's *Tesoretto*, Dante's *Convivio*.

[79] Examples of regulars who taught in their orders include Guido Vernani and Remigio de' Girolami. Paolo Nicoletto wrote his *compendium* during his studies in the Augustinian *studium* of Padua (see Appendix C, no. 16).

[80] For Giacomo da Pistoia's *Quaestio de feliciate* see Appendix C, no. 1.

[81] It is not known whether Remigio de' Girolami's Prologue (Appendix C, no. 4) should be associated with a teaching context, but in any case this teaching would have taken place in the Dominican *studium* of Santa Maria Novella in Florence. On the prologue's relationship to teaching, see Panella 1981, p. 70. One interesting *Ethics* manuscript with lecture indications bears the note: "Iste liber fuit ad usum fratris Thedaldi de Casa quem vivens assignavit armario fratrum minorum florentini conventus 1406" (Florence, BLaur., Plut. XII Sin. Cod. 7 [s. XIV], f. 1r).

tings, and even there it was probably no regular affair.[82] This makes for a striking contrast with northern and central Europe—we still have numerous thirteenth- and fourteenth-century manuscripts connected with university teaching of the *Ethics* in Paris, Oxford, Leipzig, and Cracow, even though several of the main *Ethics* commentators outside of Italy were regulars. In Italy no commentaries on the *Ethics* can be associated with university teaching before 1416, when Agostino Favaroni taught the subject in the Florentine *studium*.[83] This fact confirms the impression conveyed by the university documentation that ethics teaching came late to the Italian universities compared especially with northern Europe (see § 2.2.1).

Another feature of fourteenth-century Italian works on the *Ethics* is their dependence on Thomas. Of the seven attributed works whose base commentary can be identified, four rely on Thomas very heavily and almost exclusively.[84] Bartolomeo da Santo Concordio seems to be the only one to base himself mostly on other commentators (indeed, his work is a summary of Giles of Rome). The impression of Thomas' overriding influence in Italy is reinforced through an examination of anonymous annotations of the *Ethics*. In a group of some twenty annotated manuscripts for which we have reliable information, the base commentary can be discerned in all but three cases. Thomas turns out to be the exclusive source in six cases,[85] the primary source in five cases,[86] and one of the main sources in five more cases.[87] In the remaining manuscript, Walter Burley is perhaps the

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[82] See above, Ch. 2, n. 108.

[83] On Favaroni's commentary, see below, § 4.2.2 and Appendix C, no. 24. On his teaching in Florence, see Appendix A, no. 101.

[84] See the works by Giacomo da Pistoia, Corrado d'Ascoli, and Guido Vernani's *Lectura* and *Summa*. Paolo Nicoletto Veneto relies on Thomas as well as on Eustratius and Albert the Great for his *compendium*.

[85] *Florence, BLaur., Plut. XIII Sin. Cod. 6 (s. XIII), ff. 77r–124v; *Cod. 11 (s. XIII), ff. 103r–179r; Vatican, BAV, Ottob. lat. 2214 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–88v; *Pal. lat. 1012 (s. XIV/XV), ff. 1r–57v; Pal. lat. 1017 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–79r; Urb. lat. 1325 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–97v (especially 1ra–18rb). I mark with an asterisk manuscripts I have seen; for the others I rely on the descriptions in Gauthier 1969.

[86] *Bologna, BU 2252 (s. XIV), 109 ff.; Poppi, BCom. 14 (s. XIV in.), ff. 2v–64v; Siena, BCom. Intr. H.VI.1 (s. XIV ex.), ff. 1r–86v; H.VI.4 (s. XIV), ff. 1ra–4vb; Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2996 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–58v (especially 11v–18r, 24v–25v).

[87] *Parma, BPalat., Fondo Parm. Palat. 65 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–84v; *Siena, BCom. Intronati L.III.17 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–96v; *Vatican, BAV, Ottob. lat. 2524 (s. XIV), ff. 101r–140v; *Pal. lat. 1020 (s. XIV), ff. 2r–118v; and Vat. lat. 2995 (s. XIV), ff. 6ra–63rb.

main source.[88] These observations confirm the popularity of Thomas' *Sententia* in Italy and, at the same time, the relative lack of influence of Jean Buridan's *Quaestiones*, which were the latest fashion in the universities of central Europe in the second half of the fourteenth century (see above, § 4.1.2). The fact that Dominicans figure largely among the Italian interpreters of the *Ethics* provides an additional explanation for the success of Thomas' *Sententia* there.

Finally, the commentaries before 1400 point to no single geographical center in which the *Ethics* was studied with special intensity in Italy. With some certainty we can associate the Italian commentators with the following centers: Bologna (Giacomo da Pistoia, Guido Vernani da Rimini), Florence (Remigio de' Girolami), Padua (Geremia da Montagnone, Paolo Nicoletto Veneto), and Lower Lombardy (Corrado da Ascoli). Florence does not yet seem especially important, as it will be instead in the fifteenth century.[89]

We may conclude that, in fourteenth-century Italy, the main approach to Aristotle's *Ethics* was through summaries and extracts. There was little or no fresh interpretation of Aristotle's text, which was read mostly through Thomas' *Sententia*. The guiding motives seem to have been (1) gaining an overview of and introduction to the *Ethics*, and (2) gleaning quotations useful for life (but also, doubtless, for one's own writings). One can really speak only of a single moderately successful Italian interpretation, Guido Vernani's *Summa*, since Geremia da Montagnone's extracts are no interpretation at all. This makes somewhat surprising the leading rôle Italy—and especially Florence—would come to play during the fifteenth century.

4.2.2 *The Fifteenth Century*

As noted earlier,[90] Italy became the international center for new Latin translations of Aristotle's *Ethics* during the fifteenth century. Italy's contribution to new ways of approaching this work in teaching and commentaries is less well-known and will be discussed later.[91] Here it should be noted that Italy's leadership in European discussions of the *Ethics* seems to have coincided with (and, to some extent,

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[88] *Bologna, BU 2295 (s. XIV), ff. 62r–106v (cf. Frati, p. 456, no. 1150).
[89] See below, pp. 181–84.
[90] See above, § 1.4.2.
[91] See especially Ch. 5.

to have come about through) several significant transformations in its earlier approach to this work. First, there is an evolution from compendia and extracts to other, more sophisticated forms of interpretation. Second, the study of the *Ethics* in Latin is no longer the near-monopoly of regulars and conventual settings. Third, Thomas continues to be influential, but increasingly the voices of other past commentators are also heard. Fourth, one city (Florence) suddenly emerges as the main center for the Italian interpretations of the work. Finally, humanist influence can be perceived both in new translations of the *Ethics* and in the work's interpretation. These are not the only changes, but for our purposes they seem to be the most relevant.

Evolution of Commentary Genres

The interpretative approaches to the *Ethics* that are so dominant in fourteenth-century Italy continue to survive and flourish in the fifteenth century. However, compendia and extracts yield pride of place to commentaries, prolusions, letters, treatises, and dialogues. In particular, one notices a reversal between the relative prominence of compendia and commentaries: counting lost works (but not ghosts), we know of at least ten fifteenth-century commentaries, versus only six compendia.[92] Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the reading and use of compendia and extracts fell off in Italy after 1400. As noted earlier, Geremia da Montagnone's extracts were greatly

[92] The surviving fifteenth-century *compendia* are by Donato Acciaiuoli (Appendix C, no. 39), Giovanni Battista Cambio (no. 43), Ermolao Barbaro, Jr. (no. 44), Ludovico da Ferrara (no. 52), and Girolamo Savonarola (no. 53). Domenico di Fiandra's compendium (no. 45) has not survived. There are anonymous *extracts* (possibly connected with Italy) in Pavia, BU, Aldini 557 and Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 207 (Appendix C, nos. 55 and 57). The six surviving *commentaries* are by Agostino Favaroni da Roma (no. 25), Marsilio Ficino (no. 32), Guglielmo Becchi (no. 33), Donato Acciaiuoli (no. 38), Niccolò Tignosi (no. 40), and Nicolò Leoniceno (no. 47). The commentaries by Francesco Casini (no. 24), Lorenzo Pisano (no. 41), Angelo Catone da Benevento (no. 46), and Francesco Nanni (no. 54) have not been found. It seems likely that two anonymous commentaries (Sydney, Univ. of Sydney Lib., Nicholson 15 and Oxford, Bodl. lib., lat. class. c. 9) should be associated with Italy (nos. 42 and 56). Francesco da Milano's commentary (no. 34) has been lost, but it is not clear whether it was associated with Italy. The commentaries ascribed to Giovanni Becchetti (no. 168), Ludovico Valenza (no. 169), and Cristoforo Landino (no. 170) appear to be ghosts. The anonymous *Lectiones in Ethicam et Politicam* in Genoa, BU, F.VII.9 are actually by Buridan (cf. Lines 1999a, p. 279, no. 40). Note that no questions seem to survive for the fifteenth century.

appreciated at least until the beginning of the sixteenth century, and it seems fair to suppose that this was also the case for other fourteenth-century compendia. Furthermore, the fact that humanist teachers encouraged their students to keep commonplace books, with useful (and edifying) quotations from the ancient authors, could actually argue for a more intensive use of extracts than ever, even though these collections were not usually published as separate works. Also, as we shall see, several humanist moral works could be described (regardless of their literary genre) as summaries of the *Ethics* (duly complemented, of course, by references to the moral doctrine of other ancient writers). Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that the fifteenth century was primarily the period of the commentary's development in Italy. Helpfully, many of these works are attributed, which makes it possible to determine where they were written.

Before discussing the commentaries in further detail, something should be said about the letter-treatises, dialogues, and other works referred to above that also discussed the *Ethics* in fifteenth-century Italy. One of the most obvious evidences of the popularity of such works is the diffusion of Leonardo Bruni's *Isagogicon moralis disciplinae.* This dialogue (based on Cicero's *De finibus* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*) survives in some 181 manuscripts and received at least thirty-one printings during the sixteenth century.[93] Other well-received works include Francesco Filelfo's treatise *De morali disciplina libri quinque* (ca. 1475),[94] Cristoforo Landino's *Disputationes Camaldulenses* (1475),[95] and Giovanni Nesi's dialogue *De moribus* (1484).[96] These works—and the numerous others that made use of the *Ethics* in the Quattrocento—cannot be discussed in detail here,[97] but they testify to the extraordinary Italian interest in the *Ethics* during this period.

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[93] Cranz and Schmitt, pp. 171–72; Hankins 1997, *passim.* Hankins describes the *Isagogicon* as "hardly more than a pastiche of Cicero and Aristotle" (*The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni*, p. 259). For an introduction to the work and an English translation, see *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni*, pp. 257–59, 267–82. On Bruni's translations of the *Ethics*, *Politics*, and *Economics* see above, § 1.4.2.

[94] Edited by Francesco Robortello and first printed in 1552; see Filelfo 1552. The main study is Kraye 1981; see also Poppi, pp. 117–18.

[95] Modern edition in Landino 1980. A recent study of this work is McNair 1994. Jill Kraye is preparing a translation for the I Tatti Renaissance Library.

[96] Nesi's work is contained in Florence, BLaur., Plut. LXXVII, 24 (s. XV). See Bonfanti 1971, Shaw 1972, Vasoli 1972, and Kraye 1988, p. 329.

[97] A useful overview is given in Garin 1951b; see also Kraye 1988, *passim.*

Interestingly, there is a parallel rise, during the fifteenth century, between the production of these works, usually associated with humanist circles, and the more traditional commentary genre. Most of these commentaries originated in a university teaching context.[98] That is to say, most of the authors held university posts, and in several cases the commentaries are the outgrowth of the university ethics course. The earliest surviving commentary connected to university teaching of the *Ethics* is that by Agostino Favaroni, an Augustinian Hermit who taught moral philosophy in the Florentine *studium* at least in 1416–1417 and again in 1418–1419.[99] The commentary by Donato Acciaiuoli is also connected with a university ethics course—this time by the famed Byzantine émigré John Argyropoulos (1457–1458).[100] In other cases, such as those of Niccolò Tignosi and Guglielmo Becchi, there is no conclusive evidence for associating the commentaries with courses on the *Ethics*, but we do know that both figures were university teachers.[101] It seems that, in the fifteenth century, the universities became increasingly important centers for the study of Aristotle's moral philosophy. A confirmation of this point can be found in the large number of prolusions to university courses on the *Ethics* that survive for fifteenth-century Italy.[102]

The rise in both university-related and more literarily imaginative works making use of the *Ethics* might be taken, in a sense, as a sign of the continuing side-by-side development of scholasticism and humanism in fifteenth-century Italy, and in particular in Florence. Thus, both a theologian such as Favaroni and a man of letters such as Nesi could be interested in the same work. However, it especially makes sense to view both the humanist and the university activity

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[98] One should also consider, however, the lost commentaries of Angelo Catone da Benevento and Francesco Nanni, which were probably *not* an outgrowth of university teaching.

[99] For Favaroni's commentary, see Appendix C, no. 25. For his teaching in Florence, see Appendix A, no. 101.

[100] For Accaiuoli's commentary, see Appendix C, no. 38. For Argyropoulos' teaching, see Appendix A, no. 111.

[101] For Tignosi's commentary, see Appendix C, no. 40 and § 5.2. For Becchi's commentary, see Appendix C, no. 33.

[102] Fifteenth-century prolusions surely connected with Italy include the works by Francesco Filelfo (Appendix C, no. 28), Pietro Perleone da Rimini (no. 29), Giacomo Pisauro (no. 30), John Argyropoulos (nos. 35–36), Angelo Poliziano (no. 48), Girolamo Avanzo (no. 49), and Benedetto Brugnoli da Verona (no. 50). The anonymous prolusion (no. 51) in Florence, BRicc. 3022 also seems likely to be an Italian work.

in connection with the *Ethics* as twin sides of the same phenomenon. In fifteenth-century Florence scholastics were not circumscribed to the university or to the *studia* of the religious orders, while the humanists operated outside of them.[103] As we have seen from the institutional context,[104] the *Ethics* might be taught in the university by a rhetorician such as Filelfo or by a staunch Thomist such as Oliviero Senese. Tellingly, the scholastically trained Argyropoulos attracted a humanist audience that included Acciaiuoli. And, as we shall see, Tignosi directed his commentary to a humanist audience as well.[105] There was thus an intense and productive relationship between humanists and the university, culminating of course in the teaching of Angelo Poliziano toward the end of the century. Given the character of many of the commentaries written on the *Ethics* in fifteenth-century Florence, it seems justifiable to attribute them too (as much as the translations, dialogues, and other works mentioned above) to a surge of humanist interest in Aristotle's moral and political thought. The humanists were not forced to confine their discussions to private circles or dinner parties; the university was open to them as well, and they seized the opportunity to pursue their interests there. Thus, both informal gatherings of friends (often called "academies")[106] and the university took on increasing importance, probably to the relative detriment to the *studia* of the regulars.

In connection with this apparent shift of centers, it is telling that, of some twenty-seven known translators and commentators of the *Ethics* in fifteenth-century Italy, only a third were regulars.[107] Among them, the Dominicans were still active: commentators belonging to that order included Savonarola, Ludovico da Ferrara, and Domenico di Fiandra. However, the Augustinian Hermits were also well represented, with Biglia, Favaroni, and Becchi. We know of only one Franciscan: Francesco Nanni. This data is interesting, not only because it confirms that the *Ethics* was increasingly studied outside of the circles of the regulars, as suggested above, but because it testifies to an increasing variety of perspectives among the regulars themselves. In

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[103] Davies.

[104] See above, pp. 94–95.

[105] See below, § 5.2 and § 5.3.

[106] On fifteenth-century academies see especially Hankins 1991a and Bianca (forthcoming).

[107] See Appendix C.

contrast with the fourteenth century, in which almost all of the Italian works on the *Ethics* are dominated by Thomistic views and an almost exclusive concern with his *Sententia*, during the fifteenth century there seems to have been more room for other approaches as well.

Thomism and Other Currents

Indeed, although Thomism (and—in our special case—Thomas' *Sententia* on the *Ethics*) continued in the fifteenth century to exert considerable influence on Italian philosophical discussions, increasingly other voices began to make themselves heard. The fact of continued Thomistic influence will come as no surprise after Kristeller's studies in this field.[108] In the specific case of the *Ethics*, it is worth recalling that Acciaiuoli's commentary owed much of its success to its reliance upon Thomas' *Sententia*, whose form as a literal commentary Acciaiuoli followed.[109] More than that, when one reads the autograph draft of Acciaiuoli's commentary, one is struck by the number of references to Saint Thomas in the margins.[110] Unsurprisingly, the Dominican commentators also made constant references to the *Sententia*. Perhaps the point that needs more strongly to be made here is that this Thomistic presence was not so over-riding as to silence the voices of other medieval commentators. In fact, one may think of the fifteenth century as the time in which several commentators, who had already received a good hearing elsewhere, started to be heard in Italy as well. This seems to have been especially the case for the Byzantines Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus, as well as for Averroes, Albert the Great, and Burley.[111]

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[108] Kristeller 1992a.

[109] Bianchi 1990a, pp. 35–36. Acciaiuoli's commentary is also praised by Francesco Verino Secondo: "In questa attiva Filosofia si affaticorono molto et molto, quanto al sapere et a l'operare bene, il sapientissimo Socrate, l'Epiteto stoico tanto admirato per la sua bontà et per il valore delle sue ragioni. Di questa ce ne lasciorono più libri il Divin Platone et massimamente della Civile et della legale, et quanto alla Morale Aristotile ne scrisse più opere, ma la più perfetta et con più ordine scritta fu quella, la quale si contiene ne' X libri dell'Ethica a Nicomacho suo figliuolo comentati in lingua greca così bene da Eustrazio et da altri innominati espositori, et tra' latini dal nostro dottissimo et nobilissimo compatriota messer Donato Acciaioli" (quoted in Del Fante 1980, p. 407, n. 90).

[110] See Florence, BNC, Naz. II.I.104; often one reads in the margins "S.T." ("Sanctus Thomas"), followed by snippets from his commentary.

[111] An example (among many) of the continuing influence of Averroes in the Renaissance is offered by Cranz 1976. See also Schmitt 1979b, idem 1983, pp. 46–48.

The fact is seen most clearly in the commentaries by Favaroni, Tignosi, and Acciaiuoli. Favaroni's commentary makes numerous references to Eustratius, (Ps.-) Dionysius, Albert, Augustine, and Ambrose.[112] Also, in the dedication to his commentary on the *Ethics*, Tignosi praises not only Thomas, but also Eustratius, Averroes, and Albert the Great.[113] Likewise, Acciaiuoli's commentary draws freely, not only on Thomas, but also on Eustratius, Burley, and Albert the Great.[114] Numerous fifteenth-century marginalia on the *Ethics* also confirm this growing acquaintance with other commentators,[115] and it was probably this increasing familiarity with the northern European tradition and with the Greek commentators that would later work in favor of the positive reception accorded Italian commentaries—and especially that of Acciaiuoli—elsewhere in Europe.

It is important to note, however, that the fifteenth century really saw only the beginnings of a pluralization in moral doctrine, and that it was only in the sixteenth century that it really blossomed.[116] Tignosi's commentary, for example, shows that a favorite fifteenth-century strategy was to attempt a reconciliation of other commentators with Thomas, rather than letting them speak on their own terms.[117] Furthermore, commentators such as Acciaiuoli probably found a great deal of compatibility between Thomas and their own philosophical inclinations, partly because Thomas' metaphysics was so deeply colored by Platonic doctrine. However, since Thomas was appreciated by both Tignosi and Acciaiuoli (who had very different attitudes toward Plato), it was surely not his Platonism alone that attracted their attention.

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[112] On Favaroni's commentary, see Appendix C, no. 25.

[113] See p. 193, n. 36. However, the range of authorities used by Tignosi is considerably broader than those whom he names. On Tignosi see below, § 5.2 and Appendix C, no. 40.

[114] Bianchi 1990a, pp. 43–51; see, for Acciaiuoli's commentary, Appendix C, no. 38.

[115] For example, Siena, BCom. Intronati H.VI.1 (s. XIV ex.), ff. 1r–86v contains marginalia taken from Thomas, but also from Albert, Eustratius, Buridan, and Burley (cf, *AL Codices*, II, no. 1561; *AL Suppl.*, p. 149; Gauthier 1969, pp. 26*–27*). Florence, BNC, Naz. II.IV.159 (s. XIV), 112 ff. contains dense marginal notes, especially on *EN* III–X, drawing heavily upon Burley and Albert the Great (cf. *AL Codices*, II, no. 1394).

[116] See below, pp. 229–30.

[117] See Lines (forthcoming).

Florentine Leadership

The lion's share of Italian commentaries and other works on the *Ethics* during the fifteenth century (and into the first half of the sixteenth) was written in Florence or by Florentines residing elsewhere.[118] Paduan fifteenth-century works on the *Ethics* are represented only by the compendium of Ermolao Barbaro and the prolusion of Girolamo Avanzo,[119] in addition to an exchange of letters between Lauro Quirini (a young Venetian nobleman) and Leonardo Bruni.[120] Several individuals active in Bologna were interested in the *Ethics* as well. Two Dominicans (Battista de' Giudici and Francesco da Bologna) and a university professor (Niccolò Fava), for example, all studied Bruni's translation of the *Ethics* (see § 8.2.1), and Giovanni Toscanella scribed a manuscript of the *EN*, possibly in Bruni's translation.[121] Nonetheless, no *Ethics* commentaries connected with fifteenth-century Bologna are known. Furthermore, the only fifteenth-century commentary (partly) connected with Rome is the lost work of Angelo Catone da Benevento.[122] And, although works such as Uberto Decembrio's *De morali philosophia*,[123] Filelfo's *De morali disciplina*, and an oration by Antonio da Rodi[124] were written in Milan–Pavia, no commentaries on the *Ethics* seem to have originated there. Finally, for Naples we know only of the ethical treatises by Giovanni Pontano (1426/29–1503), which are based not only on Aristotle, but also on Plato, Cicero, and other writers.[125] By contrast, all of the fifteenth-century commentaries

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[118] Giannozzo Manetti, for example, apparently authored his translation of the *EN* in Naples; see Appendix C, no. 31.

[119] For Barbaro's compendium, see Appendix C, no. 44; for Avanzo's prolusion, see no. 49.

[120] On this exchange, see below, § 7.1.

[121] On the manuscript copied by Toscanella see A. Franceschini 1976, p. 92, no. 180. Toscanella supposedly taught poetry, rhetoric, history, and moral philosophy in Bologna, but we do not know in connection with which course his generic *praelectio* (Müllner, pp. 192–97) was given. Lapo da Castiglionchio's prolusion to a course on moral philosophy (Müllner, pp. 139–42) does not specify the intended teaching text, and in any case Lapo did not teach (Celenza 1999, p. 7).

[122] On Angelo's commentary, written partly in Paris but finished in Rome, see Appendix C, no. 46.

[123] See Hankins 1990, I, p. 106n.

[124] See Müllner, pp. 167–73.

[125] The treatises bear titles such as *De liberalitate, De beneficentia, De magnificentia* and went through several editions in the early sixteenth century. Some have recently been reedited; see Pontano 1965 and 1969. On Pontano see especially Tateo 1972; *DCLI*, III, pp. 503–08 (F. Arnaldi, L. Monti Saba); and *ER*, V, pp. 118–20 (J. H. Bentley).

that have survived are connected with Florence, as is a majority of the compendia. So Florence was not only, as mentioned above (§ 1.4.2), the Italian center for retranslations of the *Ethics*, but for commentaries on the work as well.

There is no clear-cut explanation for this intense and wide-ranging interest in Aristotle's moral philosophy in Florence (see § 5.1). What does seem certain is that the teaching that took place in Florence during the first half of the fifteenth century created a new generation of students who had an intense interest in Aristotle's *Ethics*, wanted easy access to the text, and wanted it taught in a particular way. In turn, this led to some some real innovations in the treatment of the work, at least when compared with the Italian tradition before 1400. Commentaries on the *Ethics* were no longer exceedingly few in number, unconnected with the university teaching context, and based almost exclusively on Thomas. The laity played an increasingly significant rôle in the interpretation of this work. Commentaries came to be based on new, classicizing translations. By the end of the fifteenth century, it became thinkable to teach the work in Greek and examine the *Ethics* philologically.

Several of the changes in the treatment of the *Ethics* are closely associated with the work's humanistically oriented audience. For example, whatever the merits or flaws of Bruni's translation (1416/17),[126] its spurning of technical philosophical terms was meant to appeal to an audience more interested in an elegant classical style than in the jargon necessary to consider detailed philosophical problems.[127] The commentaries by Becchi (1456) and Tignosi (ca. 1460) also show signs of the audience's influence. Both works are addressed to humanist audiences and are based (without apology and apparently without subsequent controversy) on Bruni's new translation. Both commentaries cover the *Ethics* in its entirety and offer a fairly straightforward (i.e., literal) exposition of the text. Both interact with the medieval commentators, but are reluctant to do so openly. In all of these respects, they differ markedly from Favaroni's 1416 commentary, which was based on Moerbeke's translation, concluded its

[126] See Appendix C, no. 26.

[127] See Hankins, "The New Language," in *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni*, pp. 201–12. This does not of course mean, as some have suggested, that the humanists were per se uninterested in philosophy. On the relationship of good style and philosophy, see Kraye 1996; *Penser entre les lignes*; Hankins 2001, idem (forthcoming).

discussion of the *Ethics* with Book II, made numerous references to other commentators, and included questions on philosophical topics.[128] This is not to say that the expectations of the humanist listeners produced one single interpretative approach to the *Ethics*. Nonetheless, all of the surviving Florentine commentaries for the second half of the fifteenth century seem to testify to an increasing desire to present non-professional hearers of philosophy with a "clear" exposition of the text. This is apparently one of the reasons behind the rhetorical strategies employed by Tignosi's and Acciaiuoli's commentaries.[129]

The innovations in the fifteenth-century Italian commentaries should not be overstated. In fact, many traditional features remained. For example, the form of the literal commentary was nothing new; there was little or no attempt to write commentaries in a classicizing style; the commentators drawn upon had long been known in northern Europe; the emphasis on the practical aim of ethical study would have surprised no one. Nonetheless, some subtle changes did take place. Although compendia continued to be produced (albeit less often than before), it became increasingly hard to distinguish between them and other interpretative genres. The Dominican Ludovico da Ferrara, for example, was uncertain whether he had produced a compendium or rather a paraphrase. Since he had aimed mainly at brevity, he decided to call his work a compendium.[130] One might also ask whether Becchi's commentary should not be described as a paraphrase or compendium, given its condensed treatment of the text. Another change was that prologues or introductions to the *Ethics* commentaries began to model themselves after the Neoplatonic introductions to philosophical works, and especially after the set of topics which, according to Ammonius son of Hermeias, should constitute the typical *accessus ad auctores*.[131] The most notable change, however, seems to have been a broadening of authorship and especially of audience, which required clarifying Aristotle's text as much as possible.

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[128] On these commentaries see especially below, § 5.1.

[129] On all of this see below, § 5.3.3.

[130] Cf. Ludovico da Ferrara's explicit statement, in the prologue to his *compendium*: "Nihil mihi videor detraxisse nisi forte intermiserim repetitum aliquid. Nihil quoque addidisse me credo nisi compulsus fuerim intercisas quandoque sententias pauculis verbis supplere. Quo sit ut nesciam an compendium an parafrasim fecerim. Sed tamen, quia brevitati magis studuerim, compendium appellavi" (see below, Appendix C, no. 52; quoted from Chicago, Newberry Library, 99.1, f. 2v).

[131] I hope to discuss this phenomenon in a forthcoming paper.

This was achieved in the first instance through new translations, but also through commentaries, paraphrases, and compendia exhibiting an application (however limited) of humanist rhetorical techniques.[132] Lefèvre d'Étaples would, toward the end of the fifteenth century, give a further rhetorical turn to humanist interpretations of the *Ethics* by avoiding *quaestiones* altogether, replacing them with explanatory notes. He would write his comments in humanist Latin, although he still did not give philological analysis much weight. He would initiate a wave of new translations and commentaries that affected not only France, but also Germany, England, Spain, and other parts of Europe.[133]

However, although the changes that came about in fifteenth-century Italy were perhaps modest, they were also pregnant. Lefèvre's experimentations would have been less thinkable without the examples of Bruni, Argyropoulos, and other innovative translators. Also, it is significant that Lefèvre followed several of the techniques already exemplified by Tignosi and Acciaiuoli.[134] Thus, although northern European interpretations came to outpace the Italian ones at least for number and diffusion, the changes in fifteenth-century Italy were central to the new popularity of the *Ethics*. Furthermore, while Lefèvre made use of the rhetorical approach to the *Ethics* developed in Italy, the Italians had already gone beyond that stage to the application of grammar and philology to the same text (as shown by Poliziano's teaching).[135] For several sixteenth-century interpreters, such as Pier Vettori, this proved to be one of the most interesting ways of approaching classical texts.[136] But I am running ahead of myself. It will be best to pause here and consider in detail the fifteenth-century Florentine model, and in particular its application of rhetoric to moral philosophy.

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[132] Again, the comments of Ludovico da Ferrara are significant. In the prologue to his *Compendium* (see below, Appendix C, no. 52) he states: "Ea propter tuo iussu hos decem Ethicorum Aristotelis libros conatus sum clariori stilo intelligendos praestare omnemque eorum sententiam ut facilior esset per capita suo ordine distinxi" (Chicago, Newberry Library, 99.1, f. 2v).

[133] Kraye 1995, pp. 104–05; Kessler 1999.

[134] I am preparing for publication a paper on this subject.

[135] For Poliziano's teaching see above, pp. 101–04.

[136] See below, § 6.3.

CHAPTER FIVE

FLORENCE

As we have seen (§ 4.2.2), in the fifteenth century Florence was doubtless the most active center in Italy for the study of Aristotle's *Ethics*. Outside of the university, one finds at least three (often overlapping) groups deeply engaged with this work of Aristotle: members of the religious orders ("regulars"), a group of outstanding cultural figures (such as Leonardo Bruni, Giannozzo Manetti, and Marsilio Ficino) who re-translated, commented upon, and annotated the work, and finally a broad public that avidly read Aristotle's *Ethics* either in Latin or in the vernacular.[1] Of course, the situation was not altogether new: even before 1400, one can find a similar set of figures involved in the reading and study of Aristotle's *Ethics*. For example, Remigio de' Girolami, who taught in the Dominican convent of Santa Maria Novella, has left us a prologue on the *Ethics*; Florentines such as Dante, Petrarch, and Coluccio Salutati studied this work of Aristotle with great interest; and the Florentine libraries have left us a sizeable number of manuscripts containing various versions of a vernacular translation.[2] Despite these indications of interest, however, no Latin works on the *Ethics* survive for Florence (with the exception of Remigio's *Prologue*) for the period before 1400, and indeed the evidence suggests that, at the end of the fourteenth century, the Florentines were not especially advanced in their understanding of Aristotle's moral philosophy. It is noteworthy, for example, that

[1] For evidence of the regulars' interest in the *Ethics*, see the commentaries by Agostino Favaroni and Guglielmo Becchi (discussed below; see also Appendix C, nos. 25 and 33), as well as the presence of the *Ethics* in the library of Santa Maria Novella in Florence (see above, Ch. 4, n. 22). Many more examples could be given. On the Florentine translations, see above, § 1.4.2. On the annotations by Ficino, see Appendix C, no. 32.

[2] For Remigio's *Prologue* see below, Appendix C, no. 4. Dante's *Convivio* may be viewed as a loose commentary on the *Ethics*. For the annotations by Petrarch, Salutati, and Bruni on Eustratius' *Ethics* commentary, see above, Ch. 4, nn. 24–26. The vernacular versions of the *Ethics* have not been studied in depth. On the translation circulating under the name of Taddeo Alderotti, see the summary of the *status quaestionis* in Siraisi 1981, pp. 77–82.

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Salutati had trouble securing a complete copy of Jean Buridan's *Questions on the Ethics*,[3] which was a work well known in northern Europe and arguably the single most important commentary on the *Ethics* from the fourteenth century.

5.1 *The Institutional Context*

Since no works connected with the Florentine *studium* survive, it is hard to know how the *Ethics* was taught there in the fourteenth century, as it certainly was by 1365–1366, when Francesco da Conegliano was appointed to teach the subject.[4] However, a study of the (meagre) material available suggests that moral philosophy was a feast-day subject, was usually taught by professors of logic, natural philosophy, or medicine (often in addition to their main teaching responsibilities), and was often paid little or not at all.[5] The fragmentary state of the documentation does not allow one to judge the regularity with which moral philosophy (usually based on the *Nicomachean Ethics*) was taught. In the last decade of the century, however, often two or even three teachers are assigned to the subject simultaneously, and one finds the subject covered nearly every year from 1388 to 1397. This pattern should probably be understood in connection with the university statutes of 1387, which specified that doctoral candidates in Arts and Medicine were to have heard the same books required in Paris and Bologna, including four books of the *Ethics*.[6]

The large gaps in the university documentation between 1397 and 1413 make it impossible to know whether anyone was teaching moral philosophy then. This fact is especially unfortunate because these seem to have been the very years in which the Florentines became increasingly familiar with the *Ethics*. It was probably as a result of his sojourn in Florence during this period that Pier Paolo Vergerio

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[3] See above, p. 166.

[4] See below, Appendix A, no. 92.

[5] In 1366–1367, Francesco da Conegliano is offered only fl. 10 to teach the *Ethics* in addition to the fl. 90 he is offered to teach natural philosophy (Appendix A, no. 92). The fl. 25 paid for moral philosophy to Niccolò da Venezia and Galileo Galilei in 1395–1396 (Appendix A, nos. 96 and 97) represents the lowest salary in Arts and Medicine with the sole exception of grammar. The teaching of Alessandro da Sant'Elpidio, Bartolomeo da Gubbio, and Tommaso da Firenze was not paid at all (Appendix A, nos. 93, 98, and 99).

[6] See above, Ch. 2, n. 118.

became acquainted with Aristotle in Greek,[7] and Salutati—who probably first read the *Ethics* after 1390—was then pursuing his reading of *Ethics* commentaries and corresponding with Francesco Casini about the latter's interpretation in progress.[8] Furthermore, these were important formative years for Leonardo Bruni, who played a crucial rôle in disseminating Aristotle's moral philosophy among a broad public, in Italy and beyond, and who in the 1390s may have heard the *Ethics* in the Florentine *studium*.[9]

We do know that, in the last decade of the fourteenth century, both Giovanni Malpaghini and the Byzantine émigré Emanuel Chrysoloras taught in Florence. Malpaghini, who as a rhetorician had a great influence on the generation of humanists that included Bruni and Vergerio, taught in the Florentine *studium* at least from 1394 to 1417 (with a gap between 1407 and 1412, when the *studium* was closed). His 1397 appointment was to read rhetoric as well as a historian, a writer on morals, or a poet. However, he did not leave behind any philosophical writings, and it is unlikely that he would have taught Greek or philosophy.[10] On the teaching of Chrysoloras we have very few details except for the fact that he taught Greek literature and learning (*graecae litterae et doctrina*) during his sojourn in Florence from February 2, 1397 to March 10, 1400.[11] Bruni later

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[7] A possibility also envisaged by Robey 1980.

[8] On Salutati's interest in the *Ethics* see (in addition to above, Ch. 4, n. 24) Witt 1983, p. 299, n. 104, who observes "after 1390 and especially from the time of the *De nobilitate legum et medicine* citations and references to the *Nicomachean Ethics* are legion in [Salutati's] correspondence." For Salutati's correspondence with Casini, see above, Ch. 3, n. 1. On Casini and his commentary see Appendix C, no. 24.

[9] "Quasi vero Aristoteles ipse ab studio nostro fuerit alienus, cuius libros in adolescentia sic audivimus, ut etiam publice de his disputationes ex ordine studiorum substineremus. Biennio certe toto ab optimis illius disciplinae magistris incredibili aviditate imbuti sumus" (Bruni, *Ep.*, IV.20). See the comments in Baron 1977, especially p. 613 (Baron seems to assume that Bruni would have heard these lectures before his study in law, but—as we have seen—moral philosophy did not occupy a specific place, as in a graduated curriculum). For the teachers of the *Ethics* in the Florentine *studium* in the 1390s, see Appendix A, nos. 94–99. As Concetta Bianca points out to me in a private communication, it is also possible that Bruni was referring, in his letter, to Arezzo, if the addressee Iohannino (Giovanni Tortelli or Giovanni Aretino) was also from Arezzo. However, we do not seem to have any information on moral philosophy teaching in Arezzo during these years (see Black 1996b).

[10] On Malpaghini, see Witt 1995b, especially pp. 183–86 for his teaching in the *studium*. Also see Witt 2000, pp. 338–51.

[11] For Chrysoloras' appointment, see Davies, p. 15, nn. 45–46 (Davies emphasizes that Chrysoloras' teaching, while funded with public money, took place *in civitate*,

recalled his abandonment of civil law to pursue the study of "poets and philosophers and orators" under Chrysoloras,[12] but we have no evidence that the *Ethics* was among the subjects taught.

In spite of the scanty evidence, some modern scholars have attributed to Chrysoloras an influence well beyond that of furnishing his students with the necessary linguistic tools for their future endeavors.[13] The efforts to study in detail the contribution of this Greek scholar is understandable, since the significance of his teaching was recognized in numerous fifteenth-century accounts.[14] Unfortunately, the facts do not allow much room for informed speculation. It may be significant, however, that the revival of eloquence that took place in Florence under Malpaghini and Chrysoloras was somehow contemporary with the interest accorded by the Florentines to the *Ethics* and the *Politics*. It is not hard to see that a study of Cicero's letters and especially his orations, combined with a rising sense of civic humanism, may have acted as a catalyst to reexamining the works of Aristotle, who was after all the preeminent political philosopher of the ancient world. Furthermore, the link between oratory and virtue—a characteristic of Quattrocento humanism that had its roots in the example of Brunetto Latini[15]—could have led naturally to giving further attention to works of moral philosophy, including (but of course not limited to) Aristotle's *Ethics*.

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actually in his home) and Gherardi, p. 370 (14 March 1397). Cf. Cammelli 1941a, pp. 43–98; Garin 1983, pp. 35 ff.; and Weiss 1977. On Chrysoloras' teaching of Lucian, see Berti 1987 (who gives the dates of his sojourn on p. 3) and see his statement, *ibid.*: "Non abbiamo alcuna precisa informazione del curriculum dello studio, degli strumenti didattici, dei metodi dell'insegnamento, dell'applicazione dei discepoli." On Chrysoloras see also *CHRPh*, pp. 813–14 and *ER*, I, pp. 448–50 (J. Monfasani). I wish to thank Concetta Bianca for valuable information on Chrysoloras and his teaching in Florence.

[12] "Retulit autem graecam disciplinam ad nos Chrysoloras Bisantius, vir domi nobilis ac litterarum graecarum peritissimus. . . . Ego per id tempus Juri Civili operam dabam, non rudis tamen ceterorum studiorum. Nam et natura flagrabam disciplinarum amore et dialecticis ac rhetoribus non segnem operam impenderam. Itaque in adventu Chrysolorae anceps equidem factus sum, cum et studium Juris deserere flagitiosum ducerem et tantam occasionem litterarum graecarum ediscendarum praetermittere scelus quodammodo arbitrarer, saepiusque ipse ad me iuvenili motu inquiebam: Tu cum tibi liceat Homerum et Platonem et Demosthenem ceterosque poetas et philosophos et oratores, de quibus tanta ac tam mirabilia circumferunt, intueri atque una colloqui, ac eorum mirabili disciplina imbui, te ipsum deseres atque destitues?" (Bruni 1926, pp. 431–32).

[13] See the criticisms in Witt 2000, p. 343, n. 14.

[14] For a sampling, see Witt 2000, pp. 342–43.

[15] On this point, see Witt 2000, pp. 201–06 and Ch. 8.

Whatever the origins of the intensified Florentine interest in the *Ethics*, during the fifteenth century moral philosophy continued to be taught in the *studium* with fair regularity, if with occasional gaps. In some respects, the ethics teaching provided during the first half of the fifteenth century[16] resembles that offered before 1400: as far as can be judged, it continued to be a feast-day subject and to be added on to the duties of professors in other fields. The case of single appointments to moral philosophy seems confined to the period 1416–1420, with the teaching of Agostino Favaroni, Marco Paolo da Verona, and Andrea Biglia[17] and in any case may not be very significant, since even they were specialists in other fields. The presence of several regulars (especially Augustianian Hermits) as teachers of moral philosophy should come as no surprise, for the schools of the religious orders had a long tradition of teaching moral philosophy and doubtless offered such teaching in Florence before (and of course still after) moral philosophy began to be taught in the university.[18] Furthermore, the Augustinian convent of Santo Spirito in Florence is known to have been an active cultural center in the early fifteenth century.[19]

A significant development, however, is the increasing involvement of humanists in the teaching of moral philosophy in the university. For example, in the 1430s Carlo Marsuppini and Francesco Filelfo taught ethics as well as rhetoric;[20] the same is true of Chalcondyles and Angelo Poliziano after 1473.[21] This point should not be overstated, for the fifteenth-century records also list several instances of joint appointments between natural and moral philosophy; in no sense is it possible to discern a humanist "take-over" of ethics teaching already in the fifteenth century.[22] Nonetheless, it seems true to

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[16] For the period ca. 1448–1473 an analysis is not possible; some lists of professors survive (Park 1980, pp. 309–30 and especially Davies, Appendix IV, pp. 173–200), but the subjects taught are not indicated.

[17] Appendix A, nos. 101–03.

[18] An example is Remigio de' Girolami, O.P., referred to above. On the relationship of the teaching in the university to that in the schools of the orders, see above, § 2.2.1.

[19] See above, Ch. 2, n. 169.

[20] Appendix A, nos. 105, 106.

[21] Appendix A, nos. 112, 113.

[22] See above, § 2.2.1. One should note, however, that in some cases the teachers of natural and moral philosophy had humanist interests. A case in point is Biglia, who was even active as a translator of several Greek works including Plutarch and Aristotle's *Ethics* (for bibliography, see Appendix C, no. 27).

say that, after 1400, a variety of circumstances helped to create a new context in which the teaching of the *Ethics* took place as well as a different audience eager to hear the subject.[23] These changes become especially clear in the second half of the century, with the commentaries by Niccolò Tignosi and Donato Acciaiuoli, discussed later in this chapter. First, however, it will be useful to say something about two other Florentine *Ethics* commentaries, written by Agostino Favaroni da Roma and Guglielmo Becchi Fiorentino.[24]

Both Favaroni and Becchi were Augustinian Hermits who taught in the Florentine *studium.* Their works, written 40 years apart (respectively in 1416 and 1456), reflect different approaches and interpretative strategies, which seem partly attributable to a difference in their audiences. For example, the first commentary is based on the medieval (Grosseteste/Moerbeke) translation (the *Liber Ethicorum*); the second, on Bruni's. The first covers only the first two books; the second, all ten. The first winds its way slowly through the text, giving the *lectio*, but also stopping for *quaestiones, dubia*, and *considerationes*; the second proceeds quickly and straightforwardly, almost in paraphrase fashion. The first relies explicitly on Eustratius, Pseudo-Dionysius, Albert the Great, Augustine, and Ambrose (more hiddenly, also on Thomas); the second's base commentary is much more difficult to discern. The first has nothing of the subordination of dialectic to rhetoric (or even to grammar) that supposedly characterizes humanist works; the order of studies mentioned repeats Thomas Aquinas and ignores rhetoric altogether.[25] The second has no time to enter into considerations of this sort—in 128 folios it covers all ten books, with little comment at all on educational issues.

It would be unfair to attribute the differences between the two commentaries to a single factor, but it is telling that Becchi's commentary is explicitly directed to a humanist audience. Indeed, at the end of his work he declared,

> We have written down these few things on these Aristotelian books without bothering about those that are not suitable in a commentary. And I have done this, especially so as to gratify those who, being dedicated to humane studies (*humanis studiis dediti*), do not wish for a great number of philosophical questions (*dubia*), or a variety of opinions, or

[23] See also above, pp. 182–84.
[24] See Appendix C, nos. 25 and 33.
[25] Florence, BLaur., Plut XIII. Sin. 1 (s. XV), ff. 10r, 27r.

> puzzling problems, but only seek a pure and clear understanding of the philosopher. This is what, I believe, a reading of this work will give them.[26]

This is not necessarily to say that Becchi was a humanist (like Favaroni, Becchi held a degree in theology and was associated with the Bolognese *studium* of the Augustinians); but it may well be that he taught (or wrote) in a way that he hoped would suit his humanist audience—he covered all ten books, used a modern and elegant translation, avoided philosophical questions as much as possible, favored a "clear" exposition of the text, and even went on to write on the *Economics* (1467) and the *Politics* (1476).[27] Thus, especially four factors—a broader coverage of Aristotle's moral works, a different approach to *auctoritates*, a more direct (but still not philological) explanation of the text, and a newer base text—would seem to be connected in some way with the expectations of students in Florence after 1450. These main characteristics are confirmed by all the surviving Florentine commentaries from the second half of the fifteenth century, as well as by Ficino's extensive notes on the *Ethics*.[28] It is true that the breadth of coverage did not necessarily lead to an in-depth analysis of Aristotle's text. However, it is also likely that this approach to Aristotle coincided with a particular ambition, felt by the students, with regard to their material. More specifically, a non-professional audience probably desired either introductions and overviews (such as Becchi offered), or non-technical explanations of particular philosophical issues. Tignosi's commentary is a good example of the latter case.

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[26] Florence, BLaur., Aed. 153 (s. XV), f. 128: "Haec pauca super libris his Aristotelis, omissis aliis, quae Commento non congruunt, exaravimus; atque id maxime, ut illis morem gererem, qui humanis studiis dediti, non dubiorum multitudinem, non rerum varietatem, non difficultatum perplexitatem, sed philosophi sinceram et claram intelligentiam habere perquirunt, quam, ut arbitror, haec cum legerint, adsequentur. Florentiae, MCCCCLV [= 1456 modern style], die IX Feb." The date is misprinted as 1465 in Garin 1994, p. 71, n. 2.

[27] See Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 195–96 and Flüeler 1992, II, pp. 22–23. It is not clear whether these latter works were written in connection with a teaching context, but the opening of the commentary on the *Economics* makes favorable mention of Bruni. On the question of Becchi's humanism and his commentary on the *Politics*, see especially Staico 1996.

[28] Florence, BRicc. 135; see Appendix C, no. 32. A close study of Ficino's notes remains a desideratum.

5.2 *Niccolò Tignosi's Commentary*

Niccolò del messer Giacomo da Foligno (or Niccolò Tignosi) is best known as a physician and teacher of medicine in Florence and Pisa between 1438 and his death in 1474.[29] At some point he may have taught Marsilio Ficino; but, as mentioned earlier, the records for the Florentine *studium* between 1450 and 1473 are seriously faulty,[30] and to my knowledge we have no secure documentation to support this conjecture, at least in the case of the *Ethics*.[31] It is also not altogether certain that Tignosi taught moral philosophy and that his commentary is connected with public lectures. The four surviving copies of the commentary[32] are addressed to readers; the fact, however, is inconclusive, for lectures were often redacted for a broader reading public after they had been delivered.

5.2.1 *Formal Considerations*

Whether or not Tignosi's commentary was the outgrowth of teaching, it remains worthy of consideration here for several reasons. First, it was in any case authored by a university professor, and thus falls squarely within the scope of this book. Second, it explicitly apologizes for its lack of elegance—which suggests that elegance was an expectation of the readers.[33] Traditionally, elegance was not what was sought for in philosophical commentaries, and Tignosi himself, as we shall see, found it unnecessary in a commentary; it appears therefore that Tignosi (much like Becchi) had in mind an audience

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[29] See Appendix A, no. 110.

[30] Tignosi's name seems to appear only for the year 1450, without specification of subject; see Davies, p. 194.

[31] A cursory examination of Ficino's notes on the *Ethics* (see above, n. 28) suggests that its interpretative approach is very different from Tignosi's, with a different *divisio textus*. See also Field 1988, pp. 140–41; cf. Della Torre 1902, p. 499 and Kristeller 1987, pp. 84 and 145.

[32] Tignosi's commentary was never printed. The manuscripts are listed below, in Appendix C, no. 40. Unless otherwise indicated, my quotations are from Florence, BLaur., Plut. LXXVI, 49 (indicated as *L*), the dedication copy to Piero de' Medici. I have collated this manuscript with Perugia, BCom. Aug., L, 79 (whose variants are indicated as *P*). *Lemmata* are indicated by quotation marks.

[33] The earliest surviving prologue to the commentary states: "Quisquis has glosulas lecturus es, quoniam elegantes minimum conscriptae sunt, praecor latio conveniens pone supercilium. Non enim omnia possumus omnes" (Florence, BNC, Gino Capponi 314, f. 1r).

of humanists, and of uneven academic level at that.[34] Thus, Tignosi's commentary allows us to compare the techniques of two different, nearly contemporary commentaries addressed to roughly the same audience in Florence.[35] Third, Tignosi's commentary is of interest because—more than any other surviving commentary from fifteenth-century Italy—it gives considerable attention to the issue of teaching virtue. Before considering, therefore, the controversy created by Tignosi's commentary and what it tells us about the audience of the *Ethics*, something must be said about the commentary's interpretative strategies and of Tignosi's understanding of Aristotle's moral doctrine.

Like Becchi's work, Tignosi's commentary reflects the four characteristics mentioned above—it covers all ten books, does not openly engage with its sources, explains the text fairly directly, and is based on Bruni's translation. Some of these characteristics are handled in a strikingly similar way. In both cases, for example, Bruni's text is not just quoted in *lemmata*, but is an integral part of the syntactical structure of the commentary and is almost always quoted in its completeness. At the same time, there are of course some differences in the handling of these specifics. Tignosi praises, in his dedication, Eustratius, Averroes, Albert the Great, and Thomas.[36] His commentary in fact does not mention them (Augustine is the authority most often explicitly quoted), but he depends very heavily on Averroes and Albert, whereas Becchi's work is more heavily indebted to Eustratius and Thomas.[37] Also, Tignosi's commentary is far more attentive than Becchi's to the discussion of philosophical problems. Toward the end of Book I, for example, Tignosi digresses (ff. 19r–21r)

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[34] "Rudiores" and "eruditiores" appear to be alike the intended audience; see *ibid.*

[35] The dating of Tignosi's commentary is not agreed upon. Based on internal evidence, Field places it between 1458 and 1461 (Field 1988, p. 141); Kraye instead dates it to between 1461 and 1464 (Kraye 1995, p. 101).

[36] F. 1ra–b : "Plures viri clarissimi libros istos commentati sunt: Eustratius, Averroes, Albertus et sanctus Thomas, quorum palma est. At novo labore fuit opus ut haec nova translatio, quam Leonardus arretinus vir nostri temporis doctus et orator summus ediderat, nequamquam scrineis aut pluteis truderetur."

[37] For example, Becchi repeats almost verbatim Eustratius' observation that Aristotle did not say that "talis [i.e., ars principalis] est civilis, sed apparet . . ." (Florence, BLaur., Aed. 153, f. 1v; cf. Eustratius *et al.* 1973, p. 26). Unfortunately, this manuscript lacks the first folio, thus we have lost the preface and any mention Becchi may have made of other commentators.

to discuss whether the supreme good consists in the *habitus* of virtue or in its operation. Scattered throughout the commentary are *dubia* of various sorts, delicately phrased but occasionally addressed in the typical scholastic manner (two sides presented, then a *solutio* given).[38]

It would be hard, however, to describe Tignosi's commentary as typically scholastic. It is so, perhaps, in the best sense of being a serious philosophical examination of the text; as a consequence, it not only employs *dubia*, but makes (occasionally forced) use of *distinctiones*. If Tignosi wrote his commentary after Becchi's, he did not take to heart Becchi's objection to presenting *dubia* and to solving perplexing problems.[39] Tignosi's commentary, however, represents a remarkable innovation in ways that Becchi's does not. Becchi's approach at least stood in a medieval interpretative tradition (the paraphrases of Averroes and Albert; the literal commentary of Thomas), even though his motivation was purportedly to help the followers of the *studia humanitatis*. Tignosi departed from the models available to him by avoiding *quaestiones* and making the *dubia* more of an integral part of the text; by almost completely neglecting the *divisio textus*; by introducing syllogisms to explain Aristotle's arguments only rarely, and even then not formally;[40] by his occasional use of the original Greek rather than of Latinized Greek forms;[41] by his abundant use of historical examples, taken from the classics but also from contemporary events; and by his references to poets and poetry. We shall later see which of these aspects provoked resistance and from whom, and what they tell us about methods of teaching in Tignosi's time. First, we shall examine Tignosi's interpretation of Aristotle on the point of teaching virtue.

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[38] Some examples of the phrasing of the dubia are: "Videbitur . . . Respondetur uno modo" (f. 4v); "Sed forte dubium est . . ." (f. 3v); "Si petatur an . . . dicitur quod . . ." (f. 5v); "Forte quis diceret . . . his tamen obiectionibus facile respondet intelligens" (f. 12r); "Posset quaeri . . ." (f. 31r).

[39] See above, n. 26.

[40] For example, he does not clearly proceed from the major and minor premisses to the conclusion, as Albert often does; rather, he often skips from the major proposition to the conclusion. An example: "Et <Aristoteles> arguit sic, operatio secundum virtutem melior est ipsa virtute; ergo felicitas convenientius ponitur in operatione secundum ipsam virtutem. Non enim potest haberi virtutis operatio sine virtute . . ." (ff. 18v–19r).

[41] For example, ff. 6v, 11r, 17v, 30r, 114r.

5.2.2 *Doctrinal Aspects*

Virtue and Moral Philosophy

Observing that moral philosophy tries to perfect man and make him prudent, especially in regard to his actions and passions, Tignosi sides with those who think that the proper subject of moral philosophy concerns whatever is appropriate to make man happy, or man inasmuch as he may be made happy. He explicitly rejects past interpretations according to which the subject is the human good, or what is *honestum*, or happiness itself, or the virtues, or even human action. The subject is man himself inasmuch as he may attain to human happiness.[42] This is not a case of humanist influence upon Tignosi; he depends here upon Gerard of Odo and Buridan, who had said much the same thing.[43] However, it is clear that, whatever Tignosi's understanding of the exact subject of ethics, its aim remains the same as that of all other medieval commentators at least since Albert—practice. For, while Aristotle's *Ethics* was indeed understood as providing the theoretical foundation for good behavior, without the aim of practical implementation its study was considered useless.[44] Before he can discuss the matter further, however, Tignosi must explain what virtue is, where it is located, and how it is acquired.

Like earlier commentators, Tignosi has no trouble with Aristotle's definition of virtue as a *habitus electivus*.[45] He fills out this definition by explaining that virtue can be of three sorts: although Aristotle usually has in mind the third, relative to the action of the will, sometimes he uses *virtus* in the sense of an inclination.[46] However, Tignosi

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[42] "Verum felicitas est quae trahit homines ad virtuose vivendum, quae finis in scientiis practicis, qualis ethica est, rationem habet moventis principii, quo fit *quod* [not in *P*, f. 5v] neque bonum humanum neque bonum honestum neque felicitas neque virtutes neque conveniens homini operatio debet poni subiectum philosophiae moralis, si de subiecto loquamur proprie. Consideratur tamen in libro ethicorum de homine ut solus habeat quae sibi debentur ad capiendam felicitatem. . . . Constat igitur hominem ut dictum est moralis scientiae subiectum esse" (Lib. I, f. 5ra).

[43] See above, pp. 126–27. For Buridan's view of *homo felicitabilis* as the subject of ethics, see also Pluta 1991, pp. 863–69.

[44] Wieland 1981. See also above, § 3.1.2.

[45] "Secundo volumine superioris operis habitum est quod virtus est habitus electivus in mediocritate consistens quo ad nos ratione terminata et ut sapiens terminaret" (Lib. VI, f. 101v).

[46] "Virtus large sumpta est omnis dispositio rei conveniens ex natura sua, quomodo sanitas est virtus in corpore . . . Interdum capitur pro inclinatione quadam

reinterprets Aristotle's statement that moral virtue concerns pains and pleasures (*voluptates et dolores*) to mean, not that pains and pleasures are the object of virtue (each virtue has its own object—for example, courage, that which is fearsome; liberality, money), but that delight, pain, and so forth follow upon a particular action, as the *consequences* of virtue.[47] In these comments, Tignosi remains close to Thomas' interpretation and wording.[48]

Tignosi discusses the location of virtue at length. After briefly referring to a five-fold division of the soul (to be found in Giles of Rome),[49] Tignosi centers his attention especially on the sensitive appetite and the rational appetite. Tignosi views the sensitive appetite as subservient to the rational appetite, which is in turn subservient to reason. The rational appetite he conceives of as the will, and that is where the moral virtues really reside, although some like to assign their place to the sensitive appetite.[50] It is, in fact, the intellective or rational appetite that inclines one toward what the intellect has judged to be good or otherwise.[51] No matter how exactly one views the will

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quomodo in ferrum virtus imprimitur a magnete . . . et sic inclinationem appetitus humani sensitivi ad bonum dicimus esse virtutem. Tertio modo ut dicit habitum inclinantem et habilitantem in actum laude dignum et isto modo est habitus electivus ut infra dicetur // et in voluntate consistit et de hac virtute morali loquimur in proposito" (Lib. I, ff. 28vb–29ra).

[47] "Virtus in genere quattuor concernit, scilicet obiectum circa quod operatur, ut fortitudo circa terribile, liberalitas circa pecunias; circumstantias inter quas operatur, de quibus infra in tertio; et *actus quos operatur; et* [*P*, f. 43r: added in the margin] quarto illa quae sequuntur actus, ut voluptas vel molestia sive gaudium vel dolor . . ." (Lib. II, f. 32vb); ". . . circa omne quod contingit ratione moderari vel ordinari contingit esse virtutem moralem . . . Et quamvis virtus sit sine passione animum perturbante, tamen non est sine passionibus quae appetitum sensitivum concitant . . ." (Lib. II, f. 33vb).

[48] Thomas 1969, Lib. II, lec. III, p. 267.

[49] See Giles of Rome 1502, II, cap. ii.

[50] "Partes animae sunt quinque, scilicet vegetativa, appetitiva secundum locum motivam, sensitiva et intellectiva, et iterum appetitiva duplex, scilicet sensitiva et rationalis. Pars intellectiva dicitur rationalis quoniam in seipsa rationem formaliter habet. Appetitiva vero sensitiva in irascibilem dividitur et concupiscibilem, et dicitur rationalis non principaliter sed quia nata est oboedire iudicio rationis. Non tamen cogitur a ratione quamvis nata sit illi oboedire" (Lib. I, f. 28ra); ". . . virtutes morales dicuntur principalius in voluntate fundari, et ob hanc causam dividitur appetitus in sensitivum et rationalem, et rationalis appetitus est voluntas . . . Ex quo sequitur quod homo bene ordinatus secundum appetitum sensitivum facilius actum virtuosum potest elicere" (Lib. I, f. 28va).

[51] "Appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio in rem sensatam mediante iudicio sensus de illius bonitate vel improbitate. Appetitus vero intellectivus, qui proprio nomine voluntas dicitur, inclinatur ad rem intellectam mediante iudicio intellectus iudicantis an bona sit vel mala" (Lib. I, f. 2va).

and its rôle in performing virtuous acts, Tignosi concludes that the virtues really reside in this higher element of the appetitive soul, which somehow also partakes of reason. (Thus he considers the appetitive element that partakes of reason, and the intellective element that partakes of the appetite as being the same in Aristotle's scheme.) In so doing, Tignosi seems to side with Thomas' view that the moral virtues are located in the will.[52] However, in a nod to Giles of Rome, he also allows that courage and temperance reside respectively in the irascible and concupiscible parts of the sensitive appetite.[53] Thus, Tignosi seems to be attempting a reconciliation between the Dominican and the Augustinian Hermit, even though he does not name either of them. Furthermore, in his discussion Tignosi opposes, again without naming him, Gerard of Odo's view that virtue is only *cum recta ratione* and not also *secundum rectam rationem.*[54] He does not, however, agree with Socrates that virtue is prudence; thus he avoids an intellectualist view of virtue.[55]

Tignosi's point that *virtus* can be understood in three different ways leads him, in Book II, to consider three different possibilities for its generation and its relation to the various parts of the soul. For example, he insists that the *virtus* generated by repeated acts, ordered by the will, is not *virtus* in the sense of a *habitus electivus*, but in the sense of a *habitus inclinans ad ea quae sunt consona rectae rationi* (Lib. II, f. 34v). Also, his emphasis on the rôle of the will leads him to avoid giving exclusive importance to nature or teaching in the development of virtue. Tignosi does not oppose the idea that we are born with the seeds of intellectual and moral virtue, and that these make it easier

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[52] See above, § 3.3.1.

[53] Giles of Rome 1502, II, caps. ii–iii. See above, Ch. 3, n. 35.

[54] Gerard of Odo 1482, Lib. II, lec. II, f. 68r.

[55] "Proprie ergo loquendo cum virtus et prudentia necessario sint in eodem homine, oportet quod virtus non sit solum secundum rectam rationem sed *quod* [not in *P*, f. 164r] sit cum recta ratione; non est ergo virtus idem quod prudentia, ut *dixit* [not in *P*, f. 164r] Socrates, nec virtus est solum secundum rectam rationem ut alii dixerunt; sed est secundum *rectam* [not in *P*, f. 164r] rationem et cum ratione . . . quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium consona // *recto* [*P*, f. 164r: *recta*] appetitui, ideo ut ea in intellectu adgeneretur requiritur conformitas inter intellectum et appetitum; nam sicut virtus moralis dicit conformitatem ad rectam rationem, *sic* [*P*, f. 164r: *sicut*] prudentia importat conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Et non solum determinat aliquid ad agendum sed dirigit circa operationem inveniendo medium et modum quibus acquiritur finis, et hoc in ordine ad appetitum ut appetitus rectificetur. Quapropter non generatur prudentia in intellectu nisi simul generetur virtus in voluntate" (Lib. VI, f. 119rb–va).

to acquire virtue (Lib. II, f. 32v); nor does he deny the influence of the stars (Lib. X, f. 195r). Likewise, he does not think that teaching is useless; however, *contra* Socrates, he does not think it sufficient, especially in the case of the great majority, who can only be restrained by fear of punishment. Thus he concludes that nature, teaching, and habituation are all in some way necessary for acquiring virtue.[56]

As has already been illustrated, Tignosi's views on acquiring virtue are hardly original. Often he attempts a reconciliation of the major commentators, and at points his commentary is little more than a paraphrase of what others have said. Even in their derivativeness, however, Tignosi's comments are interesting for their subtle emphases. Tignosi does not limit himself, for example, to saying that those who do not heed teaching should be governed by law; he expresses himself in very strong terms, saying that they must be punished with an iron rod. This sort of people he refers to disparagingly as the *vulgus*, and Tignosi doubts that they can ever be "rehabilitated," as we might say today.[57] Second, Tignosi argues that those who are habituated in the wrong way are responsible for their own condition. This is true on the one hand because they could have resisted such habituation in the first place, since the will is completely free.[58] It is also true because the fundamental notions of virtue are accessible to all, so that ignorance is not a valid excuse. The latter point is especially notable because of Tignosi's description of what notions are impor-

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[56] "Aliqui forsan verbis credunt, at verba vulgus nunquam compellerent qui timore penae et non virtutis amore timet improba facere. . . . Qui per antiquatam consuetudinem mali sunt, mutari non possunt verbis, sed opus est castigare in virga ferrea et timore compellere et frenare. . . . 'Alii consuetudine' et exercitio ut in secundo huius dicebatur. 'Alii doctrina' cum pedagogi et parentes bonos mores pueros instruunt. Haec quidem tria forsitan aliqualiter vera sunt. Naturalis dispositio facit ad virtutem ut in sexto dicebatur. Quidam enim mox a nativitate videntur fortes. . . . Attamen virtus haec naturalis est imperfecta ut ibidem dictum est, quo vero perficiatur opus quod superveniat perfectus rationis usus. Et ob hoc doctrina requiritur quae sufficeret si in solo intellectu vel in sola ratione virtus existeret, secundum opinionem Socratis ponentis virtutem esse scientiam. Sed quoniam ad virtutem requiritur rectitudo appetitus, necessaria est consuetudo per quam firmetur appetitus ad bonum" (Lib. X, f. 195ra–b).

[57] Cf. note immediately above.

[58] "Unde apparet multos esse impotentes ad bonos fieri, [*P*, f. 70r adds: *quamquam velint esse boni, igitur id non esse in potestate nostra. Ad primum dicitur quod non potest suapte bonus fieri,*] tamen haec impotentia est voluntaria; nam, sicut delictum commissum ab ebrio iniuriante voluntarium est, quoniam ebriari fuit voluntarium, ita haec impotentia est voluntaria, quoniam malis actibus assuefieri, unde pravitas habituata est, fuit voluntarium" (Lib. III, f. 54ra).

tant for moral virtue, and of how they are available to us. The necessary notions are, Tignosi thinks, human action, the human end, human status, and human ability. In turn, these come to us from a good nature, sufficient liberty, a good education, and correct teaching. It is not clear whether Tignosi wants to establish a one-to-one correspondence between the items in the first and second series, but his emphasis on *libertas* and *civiliter vivere* seems to be an innovation in the interpretation of Aristotle on this point.[59]

Proper Audience

When it comes to the proper audience of moral philosophy, Tignosi points out that those who hear the subject must have some basic knowledge of what is to be discussed. He agrees with Aristotle that experience is a necessary factor, and he emphasizes the importance of emotional maturity, for which a good upbringing is deemed essential.

Tignosi maintains that education too is a necessary requirement for those who hear moral philosophy. However, he adds that it is sufficient for the hearers to know what is being asked and to what science it belongs.[60] Does Tignosi therefore see moral philosophy as a subject for beginners? It is hard to tell. In Book VI (following Thomas) Tignosi says that moral philosophy is to be studied after natural philosophy and before metaphysics (f. 112v). Therefore, his

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[59] "Quattuor sunt necessaria ad virtutem acquirendam et fugiendam pravitatem, scilicet natura idonea, libertas sufficiens, educatio non mala, et sana doctrina. Per primam redditur homo capax principiorum malorum per quem homo cunctos actus suos intelligit vel intelligentem audit. Libertas sufficit quando homo potest civiliter vivere et humana opera experiri, quod necessarium videtur ad habendam notitiam virtutis. Educatio mala imbuit his quae de mente non possunt evelli, ut in graecis pluries patuit. Sed in diebus nostris in consilio florentino convicti, tamen ad patriam remeantes, ad vomitum, id est primam heresim, reversi sunt, quoniam in illa fuerant educati. Sana doctrina [*P*, f. 69r adds: *in*] his necessaria est qui sunt imbuendi, quoniam non parum refert sic vel alio modo si a pueritia instruamur. Ex quibus quattuor habitis habetur omnis notitia quae ad moralem requiritur, scilicet notitia operationis humanae, finis humani, *status humani* [not in *P*] et potestatis // humanae. Et cum haec omnia commode possint haberi, hinc est quod nemo per ignorantiam nunc dicendam excusatur, nec per talem ignorantiam culpa caret. Propterea puniendus est" (Lib. III, f. 53rb–53va).

[60] "Et intendens quod iuvenis non sit sufficiens, praemittit primo quod nemo bene iudicat nisi de cognitis, ut patet. Oportet quidem auditorem circa dicenda aliqualiter erudiri, quoniam si nihil de [*P*, f. 8v adds: *his* canc.] illis noverit, non modo non iudicabit sed nec addiscet. Sat est tamen volentem addiscere si cognoscat quid queritur et ad quam scientiam illud declarare pertineat . . ." (Lib. I, f. 7rb).

comments in Book I seem aimed only at explaining what hearers of moral philosophy need to know already about that subject. Furthermore, Tignosi's commentary, with its involved explanations about the nature of the soul, could be an illustration of his assumptions concerning his audience. If this were true, however, one would need to explain his very elementary descriptions of the three kinds of rhetoric and of the nature of the syllogism.[61] Two explanations offer themselves. One is that the passages on psychology, rhetoric, and logic are part of an interpretive approach that tends to use the text as an excuse to display the commentator's learning and furnish the reader with at least some of the rudiments of the arts.[62] The other, more likely, possibility is that Tignosi does not have an especially learned audience in mind. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive and could point to a feast-day audience (if Tignosi taught the *Ethics*) that included hearers of different levels and ages. So there is no real reason to question the sincerity of Tignosi's ladder of sciences because of the method of his own commentary.

Tignosi agrees with Aristotle that experience is also a requirement for hearers of moral philosophy. However, he does not insist on direct experience of civil and moral affairs. He offers two other possibilities for gaining the necessary first principles of this science—either personal habituation or belief in what others have to say.[63] Tignosi still considers time to be an indispensable aspect of this experience (he speaks of *assuetudo longa* and the adverse effect of *brevitas temporis* on f. 8v), but it is not clear how long a long period is, and when exactly one can be considered ready to hear moral philosophy.

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[61] Tignosi briefly outlines the types of rhetoric on ff. 23v (Lib. I) and 197v (Lib. X). He says about the syllogism: "Syllogismus vero est oratio, ut dicitur in logica, in qua quibusdam positis et concessis necesse est aliud evenire; nam quilibet habet in antecedente propositiones duas quarum altera est universalis, ex quibus sequitur tertia quae dicitur conclusio . . ." (Lib. VI, f. 105va).

[62] Some of these features are illustrated under the "doctrinal reading" rubric in Hankins 1990, I, pp. 18–20.

[63] "Et declarans qui insufficiens est auditor, dixit 'ex quo fit,' id est sequitur, 'ut iuvenis, etc.,' quoniam non trite cognoscit nec operatur et paucam rerum civilium, quae contingentes sunt, habet experientiam, nam principia huius scientiae vix ab eo creduntur, quae sumuntur via sensus, memoriae et experientiae. Verum licet non habeat de moralibus notitiam evidentem, tamen de illis habere potest credulitatem acquisitam per assuetudinem vel auctoritatem monentium [*P*, f. 8v adds: *ut in decimo dicitur*]" (Lib. I, f. 7rb).

Whereas someone who lacks experience is, for Tignosi, an unqualified hearer of moral philosophy, a person who lacks maturity is a completely useless one. A follower of his passions will scarcely take to heart the teaching on moderating them. Therefore, Tignosi says, only hearers who are not moved by fear, desire, and similar passions are truly ideal hearers. In explaining this requirement, Tignosi does not say that young people are therefore excluded by definition from hearing moral philosophy, but that they need special help from friends, relatives, and others if they are to exercise reason and thus overcome their impulses.[64] It is therefore important that young people be brought up well, so as to be well disposed toward the virtues.

Tignosi does not really elaborate on what constitutes a good upbringing in Book I. He does, however, give an idea of what we should be taught *not to do* (burp, lie, get drunk, and so forth), specifics that are completely absent in most other commentaries. And he shows that knowledge of morals begins with these elementary matters, which we come to know through custom (*assuetudo*). He also indicates that this training is indispensable for going on in virtue (Lib. I, f. 8ra–b).

Method of Ethics

The issue of who can hear the *Ethics* is closely tied, according to Aristotle (*EN* I.3 and I.4), to the question of the method of ethics, for its hearers must understand how this branch of philosophy proceeds, what it can or cannot claim, and what its starting points are. Playing on this theme and on Aristotle's differentiation between knowing the ὅτι (in Latin, *quia*) and the διότι (or *propter quid*), Tignosi discusses two different methods of knowledge. (In the sixteenth century these are usually referred to respectively as the *methodus compositiva* and *resolutiva*.) The method *propter quid* proceeds from what is generally or naturally known, from causes and principles, and works its way to the effects; it is the method proper to the speculative sciences and in particular to metaphysics. The second method (*quia*)

[64] "Is ergo idoneus est auditor quoniam timore, molestia, voluptate, concupiscentia, hiisque similibus non movetur. Indigent iuvenes auxilio magno, quoniam in ipsis passionum impetus fortior est quam iudicium rationis; auxilium autem est ex monitionibus amicorum, repraehensione parentum et suasione rerum quae sunt agendae; non parum refert [*P*, f. 9r adds: *habere*] socios et magistros probos . . ." (f. 7va).

starts from what is known *to us* and proceeds in the opposite direction—i.e., from the effects to the causes or the principles; Tignosi correctly observes that the latter is, according to Aristotle, the method proper to ethics. The question, however (which continues to challenge interpreters to this day),[65] is what exactly constitutes this *quia* or starting point according to Aristotle. Tignosi states that the *quia* is the habituation (*assuetudo*) by which we have become used to exercising virtue, just as physical exercise prepares the body for gymnastics; thus, the moral education one receives as a child becomes doubly important, for without it one would not go on to inquire into its causes or to study ethics.[66] Once one has this starting point,

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[65] See, for example, Burnyeat 1980 and above, pp. 56–57.

[66] "'Nec vero'—Modorum sciendi alius procedit a causa *infectum* [*P*, f. 9v: *in effectum*], alius ab effectibus in suas causas. Siquidem iubet magistratus prudentibus, hi vero populo, populus legum latoribus, et hi legum promulgatoribus qui praecipiunt satellitibus qui iussa exequuntur, certum est hunc processum a superioribus emanasse et per causas continue subditas in effectum evasisse [*P*, f. 9v adds: *et per causas continue subditas* canc.] qui modus est procedendi a causa in effectum; cognoscentes igitur primo elementa per quae fiunt ossa et nervii et caro et corpus, ultimo quoniam est hic homo, puta Socrates vel Plato, a causis procedunt. Sic pictor primo mensurat deinde delineat, postea colorem inducit, ultimo determinat quae figura sit quam intendit. Cum vero cognoverimus hac nostra tempestate Bizantium esse deletum, quod Turci coeperint *illud quod* [*P*, f. 9v: *illam quam*] prius obsederant propter inimicitias quas invicem gerebant, ab effectu in causas procedit ista cognitio, nam ultimo deletur, sed primitus inimicitia affuit. Primus igitur modus dicitur a notis simpliciter, a notis naturae, a causis, a principiis, et propter quid.

Secundus vero modus dicitur a notis nobis, sive a cognitis prius a nostris sensibus sive cognitio nostra et ab effectu in causas, sive a principiatis ad principia, et cognitio quia. Differunt ergo hi sermones qui sunt a principiis ab his qui sunt ad principia, nam qui sunt a principiis procedunt per causas *in* [*P*, f. 9v: *ad*] effectus, alii vero ab effectibus in causas. In omni tamen scientia 'incipiendum est a notis' quae ducunt nos in notitiam incognitorum; et cum variae sint materiae, ut supra dicebatur, *contingit non omnia eodem modo cognosci sed haec quae cognoscuntur*; [missing in *P*, f. 9v] 'bifariam' fiunt nota et tangens modos antea dictos dixit 'alia quidem nobis nota sunt,' scilicet effectus et principiata quae sub sensibus cadunt; 'alia vero simpliciter,' id est, secundum naturam quae incipit a causis operari, et ideo dicitur causas esse sibi notiores, et quamvis in speculativis et causas infallentes habentibus, cognitio qua incipimus a causis sit perfectior, 'tamen nos' morales 'debemus fortasse incipere ab his quae sunt nota nobis' [not a lemma in *P*, f. 10r]; si quis moratus non est, morum notitiam non habens non potest in hac scientia recte proficere. 'Itaque oportet esse bene institutum moribus qui sit sufficienter auditurus de honestate, iustitia, et omni civili ratione'—Nobis quidem pueris existentibus nequamquam desit instructio a parentibus, nutrice, pedagogo, vel quovis alio digno. Nam secundum mores civitatis imbuti facilius cognoscemus an recte doceamur; quis doceri non potest quod eructare in convivio est turpe, furari est iniustum, esse mendacem est probrissimum, ebriari, scortari, flagitiosum? Unde apparet quod cognitio de moribus incipit a notis nobis per assuetudinem. Nam si nullam haberemus de moribus cognitionem profecto numquam moveremur ad moralia *perdiscenda* [*P*, f. 10r: *perdiscendium*].

however, the principle one seeks (i.e., the final cause, which in this case is happiness) is not hard to find, whether by oneself or through someone else's help. It is not, however, necessary to become embroiled in discussions of the *propter quid*, which would be the method of metaphysics and lead one to talk about God, who is ultimately the final cause beyond happiness. These observations lead Tignosi to confirm that only those who have been habituated in the right way and are open to reason (so as to understand the principles) are proper hearers of ethics.[67]

It should therefore be noted that Tignosi, like the commentators before him, has no illusions that moral philosophy is a science in the strong sense, and he is thus free to note the variability of its

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'Nam principium'—Cognitio moralis ab effectibus incipit et ab his quae sub nostro sensu cadunt. Dixit, 'nam principium est quia'; cognitio nostra sensitiva quae iam per experientiam et assuetudinem habita est, ut concupiscentiae per abstinentiam removentur et per exercitium habilitatur corpus ad gymnasticam et qui plagas ferre sunt consueti atrocius vadunt *in* [corrected from *ad*] hostes quoniam sicut molles non timent. Consuetudo enim laborum perpessione dolorem efficit faciliorem, itaque illi qui formam rerum publicarum dederunt corpora iuvenum formari *labore* [inserted in *P*] voluerunt. . . . Multum igitur facit assuetudo bene vivendi et cognitio rerum particularium quae servari debent imprimit quidem in sensus unde notitia pervenit ad mentem. 'Et si hoc principium' quomodo dicitur quia 'sufficienter constet, nihil' id est non 'erit opus propter quid' sive cognitione illa qua incipientes a causis propter rationes infallibiles ducimur in effectum. Oportet igitur auditorem huius scientiae ab ipsis cunabulis moratis actibus bene assuefieri, nam haec assuetudo est principium quia, cum per illam facile disponamur ad hanc scientiam capessendam" (Lib. I, ff. 7vb–8rb).

[67] "'Sed qui ita institutus est aut iam habet principia' necessaria ut 'addiscat' ex se 'aut' ab alio doctus 'faciliter capiet.' Potest hic textuts aliter introduci. Cum sola quaestio sit de causa finali quam quisque concedit felicitatem esse quam dubitamus quid est et principium finale, oportet quod ex posterioribus declaretur, sic dicendum est, 'nam principium,' hoc scilicet felicitas sive finis, 'est,' id est declaratur sive habetur, 'quia,' id est per demonstrationem quae a notis nobis sive ab effectibus procedit. 'Et si hoc,' id est, si propter hunc modum procedendi illa felicitas 'sufficienter constet' manifesta est, 'nihil est opus propter quid.' Secundum quem modum magis *speculamur* [*P*, f. 10v: *specularemur*] quam praesens negotium requirat, nam per causas procedere metaphysici est qui de substantia et quidditate ultimi finis per causas priores inquirit, *ad quod* [*P*, 10v: *ac*] de Deo forte prius loquendum qui beatitudinis humanae causa est. 'Cui vero neutrum istorum adsit,' puta nec instructus est unde ex se ipso non acquiret et propter perversam naturam aut ineptam et depravatam nequamquam faciliter capiet nam castigata remordet, 'is audiat Esiodum' poetam. Constat igitur habentem principia ex assuescentia longa in bonis *actibus* [*P: factibus*, corrected to *actibus*] et propter facilem naturam ad susceptionem principiorum promptum et submittentem se rationi idoneum esse auditorem huius disciplinae. Si vero graviter sufferat monitiones et *ad* [inserted in *P*] usus otiose concurrat et propter temporis brevitatem inexpertus aut forte sequax *affectibus* [*P*, f. 10v: *affectatibus*] perversus electionem bonorum spernit, rem moralem numquam addiscet" (Lib. I, f. 8rb–va).

object. Tignosi gives no indication that it would be better for moral philosophy to be founded on firmer principles, nor does he express a longing for the ethical method of Plato which might be more "scientific." The variability of human customs is not a matter of desperation, but of curiosity, and does not invalidate the possibility of finding good ways in which to order one's own life and that of the state. Likewise, although he recognizes that there are both universal and particular components to prudence, he wishes to insist on the latter. As a *recta ratio agibilium*, prudence considers especially the realm of specific actions (Lib. VI, ff. 110v, 111r) and as such cannot be compared with the speculative sciences.

Method of Teaching

Tignosi thus understands prudence and all other sciences to be subject to *sapientia* (by which he means metaphysics), just as members of the body are subject to the head. Following Aristotle, Tignosi argues that this must be the case because, although *civilis* and *prudentia* may be the most important aspects of man, they are not so absolutely; furthermore, as we have seen, there is the fact of the variability of prudence's objects (Lib. VI, f. 109v). The order of the subjects of moral philosophy, however, seems clear but contradictory.

In Book I, Tignosi sees the *ars civilis* (i.e., politics) as that which allows or disallows certain subjects within the city and has other arts under it. As usual, *civilis* orders the use or presence of these arts; with respect to the subjects, however, it does not order their conclusions. For example, politics may encourage the development of philosophy, but does not order philosophers to hold to a particular position on the motion of the heavens.[68] Nor does it teach what is good; one of its main functions seems to be that of clearing the way

[68] In regard to the arts, the *civilis* "non solum quales sed quousque [*P* adds: *artes*] disponit, permittit, vel prohibet . . . speculativis vero praecipit usum, sed non determinationem; vult et suadet homines philosophari, verum si caelo motus continuus inest vel luna suo dierum numero eclipsetur *phylosophum* [*P* has: *phylosophium*] sic vel aliter disseruisse non praecipit, nec quod geometra de triangulo monstret aliter quam conveniat. Et quantum ad hoc theologi et canonistae suis legibus supponuntur, pars enim sunt societatis civilis; similiter qui leges ipsas promulgantur, quarum interpretes fiunt, quibus sat constat civilem humanis omnibus dominari; an vero praesideat sapientiae in Sexto videbitur, unam ut videor conditionem scientiae civilis apposuit, scilicet quod suis subditis praecipit quid debeat operari, quemadmodum equestris illi quae frenos facit" (Lib. I, f. 5va).

for the exercise of speculation.[69] Ethics, instead, does teach what the *summum bonum* is, for the city as for the wise man. Economics and politics derive their definitions of the good from ethics, and thus depend upon and are subject to ethics; all three, at least in principle, are concerned with the same good, but have different functions in relation to it.[70]

It would thus seem that, for Tignosi, politics is subject to ethics according to the teachings of Albert the Great, Gerard of Odo, and Buridan.[71] Book VI, however, presents a different picture. Here Tignosi depends heavily upon Thomas in his arguments that there are various kinds of prudence (that of the individual, of the family, and of the city), of which the principal is the *civilis*, which he divides into *legispositiva* (proper to those who write the laws) and *civilis* (proper to judges). All these prudences have the same habit in that they aim to reach the *summum bonum* or *finis ultimus* or *felicitas*; but the *legispositiva* is clearly the architectonic one, and Tignosi describes the prudences as differing inasmuch as the city is superior to the family, which in turn is superior to the individual (f. 111r–v). Furthermore, in Book X Tignosi maintains that at least a part of politics is such that it is not subject to any other science, and that rhetoric falls under it.[72]

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[69] "Et si petatur an ipsa doceat quid est illud bonum, dicitur quod non. Sed *bene docet illud in speculatione consistere, unde* [*P*, f. 6v: these words erased] satis est ordinasse quod humana studia in vitia non labantur nec aliquod impedimentum ab ipsis oriatur et sibi invicem sint auxilio" (Lib. I, f. 5vb).

[70] "Collige summatim ethicam describere summum bonum quid sit, quae et quot sint virtutum species, et *quae* [not in *P*, f. 6v] indifferenter deceant homines ut illud summum bonum adipiscantur formaliter vel secundum gradum propinquum ut unicuique possibile est. Et summum bonum quod docet duplex est, scilicet politicum de quo in hoc Primo, et illud quod sapientis est in Decimo. Economica et Politica quid sit hoc summum bonum ab Ethica supponentes, intendunt quomodo per diversos hominum gradus in communi sive pro societate possint virtutes et bonum procurari, salvari atque distribui quo societas vel familiaris vel civilis rectissime gubernetur, unde patet ethicam ambabus caeteris esse priorem, illasque sibi subalternari, quoniam quae dicta sunt in ethica praesupponunt" (Lib. I, ff. 5vb–6ra). "Patet igitur idem esse bonum quod ethica considerat et politica. In prima scimus quid est et elementa traduntur civilis disciplinae; politica id esse praesupponit et salvare procurat. . . . Hoc dictum, scilicet quod idem sit bonum ab utraque consideratum, non consonat iis quae dicuntur in Decimo, ubi videtur alia esse felicitas politica, alia quae in contemplatione est . . ." (Lib. I, f. 6ra–b).

[71] See above, pp. 125–27, 145–48.

[72] "At politica statutam et firmam habet partem quam exequi dignam non credit, nec est instrumentum alicuius scientiae; at rhetorica instrumentum est et politicae subicitur, ut in prooemio huius declaratur" (Lib. X, f. 197va).

This confusion not only confirms Tignosi's (largely unconvincing) efforts to reconcile rather different positions, but makes it hard to know whether Tignosi really thought politics or ethics to be superior. Furthermore, the ideal sequence of ethics, economics, and politics in Tignosi's view remains unclear. Whether he holds to the Albertian or to the Thomistic position, economics and politics would follow upon ethics. However, Albert had argued that discussion of the *Politics* should immediately follow upon an examination of the *Ethics*, whereas Thomas wanted the *Economics* to be discussed in between. Whatever the sequence, Tignosi appears to have no difficulty with the fact that the uncertain nature of the subject forces a pedagogical approach that is also not certain.[73]

5.3 *Responses to Tignosi's Commentary*

5.3.1 *Coeval Controversies*

Fortunately for us, Tignosi's commentary was not met with silence (as was the case, it seems, with Becchi's work). Although we do not have the letters or tracts written by Tignosi's opponents, we at least have his response to them. This treatise can be used to help us understand what Tignosi's contemporaries found innovative or difficult in Tignosi's commentary. We might also hazard a guess about what had become acceptable in Florence by the early 1460s.

Before August 1464, Tignosi saw himself forced to defend his commentary against various detractors.[74] His response was penned, apparently, with the intent to demonstrate that his comments were correct and had all followed Aristotle's intention. As proof, Tignosi reports that he took his explanations from the best-known commentators,

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[73] "Siquidem tanta fiat certitudo, quanta secundum materiam declarandam sufficiens est, sat erit discipulo et docenti" (Lib. I, f. 6rb); "Non oportet doctorem tradere scientiam moralem per demonstrationes omnino certas quoniam habet causas fallibiles et variatas, ut supra dicebatur" (*ibid.*, f. 6vb); "Quemadmodum doctores decet secundum subiectam materiam rationes adducere, sic tales habuisse satis sit addiscenti" (*ibid.*, f. 7ra).

[74] For the *terminus ante quem* see Sensi, p. 389. The full title of the treatise is *Nicolai Fulginatis ad Cosmam Medicem in illos qui mea in Aristotelis commentaria criminantur opusculum.* It survives in Florence, BLaur., Plut. XLVIII, 37 and Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. C.8.1800. Sensi gives an edition of the work, basing himself mostly on the Laurenziana manuscript, *ibid.*, pp. 466–82. I follow his edition.

wishing to bring them before the public.[75] It is noteworthy that the whole preface to Tignosi's *Opusculum* is dedicated to defending the trustworthiness of his conclusions; nothing is said about the controversial nature of his method. Nonetheless, most of the defense treatise is dedicated to this very issue. Although it may come as a surprise, Tignosi must answer criticisms from both the scholastic and humanist camps, as well as from some other, less easily identifiable, groups.[76]

The first part of Tignosi's defense ("In eos qui antiquitati nituntur" or "To those who rely on antiquity") responds to those who objected to Tignosi's failure to follow *antiquissima grammatica atque rhetorica* in his commentary. He defends himself, that is, against humanists who objected to the inelegant Latin style of his commentary. Here Tignosi provides some valuable observations on the responsibility of a commentator (*offitium commentatoris*).[77] This brief section insists first of all that a commentator's chief responsibility is to make the text under consideration as clear as possible, and to provide enjoyable reading to the first-comer and the expert alike. One of the key phrases in this passage is Tignosi's insistence on *faciliter edoceri*: commenting is not a matter of making the text obscure through the use of obsolete words, but of opening it up to the gaze of the beholder. Thus, one of an interpreter's main functions is that of distinguishing the text's parts, rightly and openly.[78] After conceding this premise, however, Tignosi argues that *res* are more important than *verba* in a commentary. Although humanists such as Leonardo Bruni, Poggio Bracciolini, and Carlo Marsuppini may be viewed as *glossatores* who combined elegance with *recta declaratio*, Tignosi maintains that elegance of style is not necessary in a commentary. The main function of a commentary is, rather, to explain the meaning and teach what may not be clear.[79] Thus Tignosi makes fun of those who cling to the most

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[75] Sensi, pp. 466–67: ". . . probaturus quae scripserim esse verissima et iuxta mentem Philosophi singulas sententias ordinasse. Sumpsi cunctas expositiones ex auctoribus qui clarissimi sunt, qui, si quando fuerit opus, in medium afferentur."

[76] This is a point worth emphasizing, since the treatise has usually been presented as a response to the scholastics alone.

[77] The value of the section is especially noted in Garin 1994, pp. 107–08.

[78] Sensi, p. 469: "Decet igitur primum glosatorem partes recte, aperteque distinguere, ne quae lectionibus digne sunt onerosus inculcet. Nam quae amplissima dicta sunt non solum ab his qui primitus habuerint iocunde leguntur, verum eruditissimi perlibenter, etsi non addiscendi saltem ea delectandi gratia contemplantur."

[79] *Ibid.*, pp. 470–71: "Sin vero elegantiam cum recta declaratione glosator ipse coniungeret, qua saltem Leonardus Arretinus, vel Florentinus Poggius et Carolus

ancient usage and who wish to take the men of that time as their examples. He therefore subtly disagrees with the anachronistic attitude of those who take the language and men of the Latin golden age as their models.[80] In philosophy, he argues, verbal eloquence is worth little. The true proof of a commentary is whether it explains the text well.

From this point of view, Tignosi's comments do not—as some have argued—reflect the conviction that it is necessary to take a philological approach to philosophical texts;[81] rather, his stance seems close to certain criticisms directed by the scholastic Alfonso of Cartagena against Bruni's translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[82] Alfonso insisted that school textbooks be true; he perceived the danger that moral doctrine would be subordinated to rhetoric. Defending the older translation, he declared, "Our translation is not then to be attacked because it is inconsistent with the usual diction of orators, even the best orators; it is rather to be inquired whether it conforms to the exact nature of the objects and a strict propriety of words."[83] Tignosi adopted Bruni's translation, but not—it would seem—because of its elegance. The essential was, for him, the degree to which a translation or commentary made clear Aristotle's thought. Since there was considerable debate, in the fifteenth century, as to whether the

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Marsuppinus nostris temporibus utebantur in inficias eo minime quin ingenii clarioris maior indoles appareret et orationi maior inesset integritas. Nihil tamen accusandus glosator est dummodo veras sententias declararit, quoniam opus non est elegantiam cum expositione connectere, sed altera sufficit glosatori, ea scilicet qua gravius declaretur sententia, si quae discenda sunt, non prorsus inculte, nec penitus depresse disseruit, modo doceat quae latebant."

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 468: "'Antiquissimos sectemur,' aiunt, 'quorum exempla velut speculum intueamur et vitam nobis ac vivum simulachrum preponamus. Quis enim ferat ardentissimam nostrorum temporum cupiditatem, quando instar loquentium puerorum lingua balbutiente metiri volumus, quae illi antiquissimi sapuerunt. Ipsorum ergo scientias, orationes, tropos, celebresque sermones et scribendi caracteres imitemur'"; *ibid.*, p. 470: "Stultissimum quidem opinor eos imitari velle quorum memoria fumus et famula est facta."

[81] Cf. Garin 1994, p. 107: ". . . Niccolò Tignosi da Foligno . . . polemizzò aspramente contro i metodi tradizionali, mostrandosi già tutto convertito alle esigenze della nuova filologia fiorita in Firenze nei circoli che avevano sostenuto l'Argiropulo."

[82] On Alfonso (1384–1456), now see *CALMA*, I.2 (2000), pp. 184–85 (M. Morrás).

[83] Birkenmajer 1920, p. 175: "Non ergo ex eo translatio nostra mordenda est, quod oratorum etiam summorum usitatis verbis discordet, sed in hoc examinanda est, an simplicitatem rerum et restrictam proprietatem verborum observet." The English translation is from *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni*, p. 206. For more on Alfonso and the controversy provoked by Bruni's translation, see Hankins 2001 and idem (fortcoming). On Alfonso, see also Vasoli 1993.

elegance of Bruni's translation clarified or obscured Aristotle's arguments, it is even possible that Tignosi chose Bruni's translation as a concession to his audience.

One must be careful, however, not to exaggerate the distance between Tignosi and the humanists. For example, Tignosi was not opposed in principle to the humanists' stylistic elegance: the Latin of his *Opusculum* is itself fairly polished. However, Tignosi simply did not find such elegance appropriate or necessary in a commentary, and his point of view should be seen in the context of the fifteenth-century disagreements—even among humanists—over the application of classical style to philosophical discourse.[84] Coluccio Salutati and Poggio Bracciolini had already taken opposite positions on the issue.[85] Later in the century, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Ermolao Barbaro would again not see eye to eye; a fine summary of Pico's position is that "while eloquence was fine in its place . . . it was not essential in works of philosophy written to demonstrate, rather than embellish, the truth."[86]

It is also noteworthy that Tignosi accepts some of the humanists' basic educational premises. There is an unusual insistence, in this section, on the need to make things as clear as possible to the reader: "[commentatoris] proprium est apte, aperte, distincte ac recte singula propalasse." We hear about the need to "clare disserere," to "siquid sub textu iacet in medium aperiri," to make sure that the reader not only reads and understands, but is also taught.[87]

Undeniably, Tignosi's view that a commentary should make things clear to the reader was hardly new; insistence on this point dates back at least to the twelfth century, and one might ask what else, after all, a commentary should do. However, the goal of *faciliter edoceri* indicates that the audience for moral philosophy is not limited to university students on their way to examining the problems of metaphysics (although Tignosi thinks that may be ideal); it is not a professional audience that is in view. Tignosi's teaching is directed, rather, to beginners as well as to the deeply learned, and it has room

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[84] On the debate, see Kraye 1996 and *Penser entre les lignes*.

[85] See Salutati, *Ep.*, IV, nos. XVIIII (17-XII-1405) and XXII (26-III-1406) and the analysis in Witt 2000, pp. 400–02.

[86] Kraye 1996, p. 145. The issue continued, of course, to exercise scholars in the sixteenth century too; in addition to Kraye's fine essay, see also Fazzo 1999 for Ottaviano Ferrari (1508–1586) in Pavia and Milan, and Ch. 6 below.

[87] For these quotations, see Sensi, pp. 469–70.

for distinguished amateurs such as Piero and Cosimo de' Medici (the dedicatees, respectively, of the commentary and *Opusculum*). For their benefit, it is necessary for explanations to be as straightforward as possible. Whereas earlier university documents had emphasized the need to *utiliter edoceri*,[88] this concern is now complemented by the desire to reach a much broader audience. Tignosi does not mean, of course, by *faciliter edoceri* that all of Aristotle's doctrine should be presented to a reader without his making any effort; but he does object to those who make almost a game of hiding the truth.

This is Tignosi's principal subject in the following section, "Adversus eos qui genus humanitatis non sapiunt" ("Against those who do not appreciate the character of liberal studies"). Here Tignosi responds to the objections of those scholastics who thought that his commentary was written, not for the learned or intelligent, but for those whose minds were rotting in laziness: rhetoricians, orators, and any others dedicated to the *studia humanitatis*.[89] By appealing to the examples of Cicero and some contemporaries (Manetti, Palmieri, Acciaiuoli, Rinuccini), Tignosi contends that not all rhetoricians and orators are stupid; he further praises their habit of teaching their subjects in a clear manner.[90] Thus, Tignosi condemns the use of syllogisms, sophismata, *enigmata*, and *sybillina carmina*, which according to his opponents make a reader sweat (as he should) to extract the nuggets of truth from a text. That model of education is an elitist one, reinforced through the use of a highly technical and convoluted language that excludes newcomers and rewards insiders. Tignosi instead wishes to make his material accessible to the learned as well as those who are merely interested.

Here again a *caveat* is necessary. For Tignosi does not object absolutely to the use of *viae syllogisticae* in philosophy. In fact, he thinks that they are useful and necessary in the natural and meta-

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[88] The title of Spagnesi 1979 (*Utiliter edoceri*) is significant.

[89] Sensi, p. 471: "Cum a comentis meis haec ipsorum sit exclusa sententia non intelligentibus et eruditis ea tractanda predicant, sed his quorum in desidia et otio marcescit ingenium, quales rhetores et oratores nominant et ceteros qui studiis humanitatis, rebusque civilibus annituntur."

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 471: "Contempnunt etiam gravissimum illum hominem Manettum Iannotium qui suo tempore oratores inter doctissimos habebatur; ut Matteum Palmerium lacerant, ac de Donato Acciarolo et Alemanno Rinuccino clam et strictis dentibus obloquuntur, quod suas disciplinas aperte, disserteque nullis vexatas sophisticis proferant et demonstrent."

physical sciences, and his own commentaries on the *De anima* and *Posterior Analytics* have been described as typically "scholastic" from this perspective.[91] Instead, Tignosi presents an interesting and unusual application of Aristotle's principle that the subject should determine the method ("secundum subiectam materiam recte loquitur"). The four kinds of arguments envisioned by Aristotle are syllogism, induction, example, and enthymeme. The first two pertain to those matters in which truth must be extracted forcibly; but the latter two pertain to rhetoric and moral philosophy. In these studies, it is enough to grasp the truth almost figuratively; they are sciences that do not require methods foreign to themselves.[92] Thus, Tignosi justifies his avoidance of syllogistic procedures as a matter determined by the nature of his text, and not as a snub directed toward his hearers. His defense indicates a sensitivity to the particular philosophical genre with which Tignosi was dealing, and a willingness to adapt his exposition accordingly.

Tignosi was not, however, willing to adapt his commentary to his audience's lowest common denominator. His section "Contra eos qui terminorum ignorantia reprehendunt" ("Against those whose criticisms are based on an ignorance of terminology") deals with the criticisms of those who found Tignosi's work too difficult. These critics, to whom Tignosi refers as *scola vulgaris*, and who apparently had difficulty with anything that was even slightly ornamented (including Horace and Juvenal) or that did not use words near enough to the vernacular, reproved Tignosi for not being *clear enough.* Indeed, in their view, "those dedicated to literary studies should teach and expound everything with clarity; if any of them should present his [subject] unclearly, untruthfully, or shrowded in a false mist, he should be condemned to perpetual silence."[93] Tignosi responds that *tractatio litterarum* requires that those who approach it be prepared in two ways. First, they must be dedicated, for knowledge does not

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[91] See *ibid.*, pp. 386 ff. Cf. Lohr, *Traditio* (1972): 306 (the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* is not mentioned).

[92] Sensi, p. 472: "Sed in rhetoricis atque moralibus, omniumque civili negotio qui planissimi sunt argumentationis modi, scilicet enthimemate utimur et exemplo, quoniam hae scientiae instrumentis non indigent alienis. . . . In hac enim, veluti per figuram, nobis sufficit apprehendere veritatem."

[93] *Ibid.*, p. 473: "[S]tudiis litterarum dediti clara omnia deberent discere et predicare, quorum si quis quicquam obscurius aut in mendacio vel ficto velamine protulisset poenam haberet ut perpetuo silentio frueretur."

come immediately and requires experience, time, leisure, and effort (*experientia, tempus, otium, et labor*). Second, it requires acquaintance with the terminology used to explain a particular science. Without a knowledge of the standard terms, any hope of understanding the explanation will be disappointed.[94]

This section is especially interesting because it presents criticisms from a group that apparently had some knowledge of Latin and presumably some sympathy for the *umanisti*, but found large areas of literature and philosophy beyond their tastes and abilities. Tignosi must remind them of the effort involved in understanding particular styles and subjects. He does not bow to their ignorance, nor does he fall into the trap exemplified by Bruni of doing away with a specific and technical philosophical vocabulary. Tignosi in fact emphasizes that he has used the commonplace terminology (*trita termina*) in his exposition of moral philosophy because each discipline has its own technical vocabulary which its students should know. It is also interesting because Tignosi refers to moral philosophy as a part (or subpart) of *tractatio litterarum*, thus underlining its close relationship with rhetoric, already made clear through his reference to the kinds of arguments moral philosophy employs. Indeed, Tignosi himself appears as a *studiis litterarum deditus*, charged with not having been clear enough.

Tignosi's self-perception as a humanist is reinforced by his section "Inimici poetarum refelluntur" ("A rebuttal of those who oppose poets").[95] Here Tignosi deals with those who criticize his references to the poets and his use of historical examples. The first are supposed to be harmful, since poets are among the basest elements of society and easily excite the minds of the crowd; the second are useless for understanding the philosophers' inspired descriptions of exalted matters.[96] Tignosi, however, justifies his methodology by appealing to

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[94] *Ibid.*, p. 474: "Secundum esse perhibent ut terminis assuescat quibus illam scientiam tradere sunt soliti auctores. Habet enim unaquaeque locutiones sibi proprias et dedicatas, troposque conformes quos cuiusque ignorantis labor erit in cassum et vana penitus reperietur intentio."

[95] Given as "Inimici poetam refelluntur" in *ibid.*, p. 479, but see the alternate reading in n. 56.

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 479: "Est quidem philosophorum res divina, tantaeque gravitatis, quod studentium contemplationem exsuperat. At poetarum infima est conditio popularisque suasio, qua parte indeviam facile mentes hominum concitantur. Historia vero nihil utilitatis affert ad recte contemplandum res altissimas, quas philosophi, velut afflati divino numine, descripserunt."

the examples of Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophers. He is explicit about his intention to follow in their steps ("Ego vero secuturus istorum vestigia, puto"). Thus, Tignosi's technique is explained, at least in part, by the humanists' oft-repeated desire to imitate the style of the ancients. To my knowledge, this was the first time in Florence (and indeed in Europe) that such a desire was explicitly applied to the exposition of Aristotle's *Ethics*. Although Leonardo Bruni's translation of the *Ethics* into Ciceronian Latin was partly motivated by a desire to communicate the (supposed) eloquence of Aristotle's Greek,[97] he did not go so far as to offer a commentary styled on Aristotle's references to poetry and historical examples.

Although Tignosi did not say so explicitly, one suspects that his techniques were meant, not only to appeal to humanist sensibilities, but also to buttress Aristotle's persuasive appeal. A century earlier, Petrarch had compared Aristotle's *Ethics* unfavorably with the writings of Cicero and other Latin moralists. He declared:

> I have read all of Aristotle's books if I am not mistaken. Some of them I have also heard commented on. . . . Sometimes I have perhaps become more learned through them when I went home, but not better, not so good as I ought to be; and I often complained to myself, occasionally to others too, that by no facts was the promise fulfilled which the philosopher makes at the beginning of the first book of his *Ethics*, namely, that "we learn this part of philosophy not with the purpose of gaining knowledge but of becoming better." I see virtue, and all that is peculiar to vice as well as to virtue, egregiously defined and distinguished by him and treated with penetrating insight. When I learn all this, I know a little bit more than I knew before, but mind and will remain the same as they were, and I myself remain the same. It is one thing to know, another to love; one thing to understand, another to will. He teaches what virtue is, I do not deny that; but his lesson lacks the words that sting and set afire and urge toward love of virtue and hatred of vice or, at any rate, does not have enough of such power. He who looks for that will find it in our Latin writers, especially in Cicero and Seneca, and, what may be astonishing to hear, in Horace, a poet somewhat rough in style but most pleasing in his maxims.[98]

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[97] See, for example, Hankins 2001, pp. 141–42.

[98] Translation from Petrarch 1948, pp. 105–06. Cf. Petrarch 1975, II, pp. 1106–08: "Omnes morales, nisi fallor, Aristotelis libros legi, quosdam enim audivi, et antequam hec tanta detegeretur ignorantia, intelligere aliquid visus eram, doctiorque his forsitan nonnumquam, sed non—qua decuit—melior factus ad me redii, et sepe mecum et quandoque cum aliis questus sum illud rebus non impleri, quod in primo

Bruni had tried to rectify this perceived fault in Aristotle's writings by making him eloquent. Tignosi, who was doubtful of the merits of stylistic eloquence when dealing with Aristotle and who in any case was not translating but commenting, turned instead to poetry and history. Doubtless he imagined that these would provide Aristotle's text with the persuasive and edifying power whose absence Petrarch had lamented. Readers of his commentary could thus count on receiving, at the same time, instruction about the nature of virtue and encouragement to pursue it. Thus, rhetoric was firmly associated with moral philosophy, reflecting a new understanding of how the latter might represent a *scientia practica.*

5.3.2 *Modern Interpretations*

Tignosi's peculiar mixture of old and new contributes to the difficulty of judging his work even today. In particular, scholars who have not neglected Tignosi altogether have interpreted his commentary and *Opusculum* in two very different ways. According to Mario Sensi, these works reflect three aspects of Tignosi's new method: an effort to grasp the original meaning of Aristotle's arguments, to interpret Plato and Aristotle historically, and to explain the text clearly. By the first, Sensi means that Tignosi attempted a direct approach to Aristotle's text, without the intermediary function of other interpreters. He recognizes, however, that Tignosi's effort did not meet with success on this occasion, given his limited knowledge of Greek: he was forced to depend on the same interpreters to whom he objected.[99] Tignosi was instead more successful in understanding Plato and Aristotle historically, in the purity of their original thought.[100] This feature is evident

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Ethicorum philosophus idem ipse prefatus est, eam scilicet philosophie partem disci, non ut sciamus, sed ut boni fiamus. Video nempe virtutem ab illo egregie deffiniri et distingui tractarique acriter, et que cuique sunt propria, seu vitio, seu virtuti. Que cum didici, scio plusculum quam sciebam; idem tamen est animus qui fuerat, voluntasque eadem, idem ego. Aliud est enim scire atque aliud amare, aliud intelligere atque aliud velle. Docet ille, non infitior, quid est virtus; at stimulos ac verborum faces, quibus ad amorem virtutis vitiique odium mens urgetur atque incenditur, lectio illa vel non habet, vel paucissimos habet. Quos qui querit, apud nostros, precipue Ciceronem atque Anneum, inveniet, et, quod quis mirabitur, apud Flaccum, poetam quidem stilo hispidum, sed sententiis periocundum."

[99] Sensi, pp. 388, 391.

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 391: "C'è qui tutto un programma, tutta una vita, quella che il Tignosi spese sulla cattedra per attuare un'esigenza che maturò ancor prima che l'Argiropulo

from Tignosi's commentaries on the *Ethics* and the *Posterior Analytics* as well as in his treatise *De ideis*. Sensi, however, does not mean by this "sforzo di intendere storicamente, sia Platone, sia Aristotele," an effort to study how Plato's thought influenced Aristotle's, or how both philosophers were affected by historical circumstances. He refers instead to Tignosi's desire to determine whether Plato or Aristotle's view of the Ideas is more valid, and to his conclusion that Plato's Ideas were valuable explanations for certain problems in physics.[101] Third, Sensi emphasizes Tignosi's attempt to produce a *clear* exposition of Aristotle's text. Thus, Tignosi aimed for a direct clarification of Aristotle's thought that avoided stringing together the conclusions of previous commentators;[102] he made use of historical *exempla* and of classical poetry, of the enthymeme rather than the syllogism, and even referred to Ciceronian style in the *Opusculum*.[103] Taken together, these characteristics make of Tignosi a "figlio genuino dell'Umanesimo"[104] and bring him close to the position of Argyropoulos, the great innovator in the Florentines' method of studying philosophical texts, including the *Ethics*.[105]

Jill Kraye, instead, delivers a very different judgment about the scholar from Foligno. Tignosi's method of interpreting the *Ethics* is not considered an example of true humanist method, although it moves in that direction. On the humanist side, she notes the use of classical poetry and historical *exempla*; on the scholastic, his use of Thomas Aquinas, Averroes, and Albert the Great. All considered, Tignosi emerges as a bolder user of humanist method than the "humanists" Argyropoulos and Acciaiuoli, whose commentary[106] she describes as "essentially scholastic," given its non-Ciceronian style, use of syllogisms rather than classical *exempla*, addressing of *quaestiones*

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venisse a Firenze, la comprensione storica del pensiero aristotelico . . ."; *ibid.*, p. 422: ". . . fu un commentatore che ebbe come principale scopo la comprensione storica dei pensatori nell'effettivo significato che le loro dottrine ebbero. . . ."

[101] *Ibid.*, p. 404.

[102] *Ibid.*, p. 388, Sensi says, ". . . più che cucire le disparate sentenze dei commentatori, assai spesso egli preferisce chiarire direttamente il pensiero aristotelico, largamente ricorrendo all'esemplificazione storica e usando come autorità gli stessi poeti classici."

[103] *Ibid.*, pp. 390–93.

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 390.

[105] This view Sensi holds in common with Garin and Berti: see Garin 1987, pp. 240–44; Garin 1994, pp. 102–06; Berti 1967.

[106] Acciaiuoli 1478; see Appendix C, no. 38.

and *dubia*, reliance on medieval authorities, and lack of philological discussions.[107] Indeed, Argyropoulos and Acciaiuoli were not willing to challenge the traditional approach to philosophical texts practiced in the Florentine *studium*. Tignosi's efforts, instead, were recognized by other philosophers in the *studium* as evidence of "creeping humanism," which in turn led to the controversy addressed by the *Opusculum*.[108] Thus, Kraye inverts the judgment of Garin and his followers on the relative humanism of the commentaries of Tignosi and Acciaiuoli, and even on Argyropoulos as a turning point in the application of humanist methodology to the interpretation of the *Ethics*.

Both of these evaluations have their merits, and I shall not discuss them in any detail here.[109] However, a couple points deserve to be made. The first concerns the myth that fifteenth-century humanism was chiefly concerned with approaching classical texts directly or simply for the purpose of hearing what the ancients had to say. Although this has become somewhat of a commonplace, especially among the followers of the Garin school, it is worth noting that already the humanists' translation activity (which one would expect to be among the most faithful to the original text) is hardly promising in this respect, even in the case of one of their favorite authors, Plato.[110] Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly clear that the humanists' use of the classics was highly interested, affected (as one's view of the past always is) by personal and utilitarian considerations.[111] The case of Tignosi suggests a further point: that humanism did not (or at least not yet) attempt to oppose or dispense with the scholastic commentary tradition; in fact, rather than emphasizing a "direct" reading of Aristotle's text, independent from the judgments of past commentators, Tignosi proudly states that his commentary is based on a reading of good authors and their opinions.[112] At the beginning of the *Opusculum* he freely admits "Sumpsi cunctas expositiones ex auctoribus qui clarissimi sunt,"[113] which reinforces the statement in the preface of his commentary, praising Eustratius, Averroes, Albert the Great, and

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[107] Kraye 1995, pp. 100–02.
[108] Kraye 1995, p. 101.
[109] For a fuller examination, see Lines 1999b, pp. 161–66.
[110] See, for example, Hankins 1990. Also see above, p. 16.
[111] See especially Grafton 1991, Ch. 2. Also see above, pp. 14–19.
[112] Tignosi says, "lectis bonis sententiis et bonis item auctoribus, omnis mea comentatio contexta est" (Sensi, p. 480).
[113] *Ibid.*, p. 467.

Thomas.[114] Nor was Tignosi simply pandering to scholastic tastes by mentioning these authors. As is clear from his treatment of the philosophical issues in the text (above, § 5.2.2), Tignosi really did make constant reference to the views of the most eminent scholastic interpreters. Tignosi used his own judgment, of course; his is not simply a patchwork of what had been said before. However, his is no attempt to be profoundly original.

A second point concerns the enduring question: How should a work's humanist character be assessed? For example, should one concentrate on formal and stylistic aspects, or are the author's outlook and ideals more important? Or should one consider both together? No answer will be provided here to this dilemma, which is problematic in view of the opposing definitions of humanism offered by Garin and Kristeller. However, it is worth noting where some answers to this question lead. For example, some time ago Charles Schmitt described the characteristics of humanist Aristotelianism as: attention to philological analysis, a "historicizing" attitude, a tendency to use classical rather than medieval sources, a taste for citations from poetry and history, and a rejection of *quaestiones*.[115] An application of these criteria to Tignosi's commentary (and, for that matter, to any other commentary written before the sixteenth-century achievements in philology and historical outlook) will of necessity turn up a half-breed work, falling neither in the humanist nor in the scholastic camp. Are such monsters a product of historical necessity, given that change is usually smooth and not discrete, or is the pure breed of a humanist commentary a fictional notion?

5.3.3 *Tignosi, Donato Acciaiuoli, and Humanist Method*

This question will receive a fuller answer in the Conclusion, but for now I will make two suggestions. The first is that an element largely ignored by most discussions of methodology to date has been that of audience. As pointed out above, two notable characteristics of Tignosi's commentary are his application of rhetorical techniques to his exposition of the *Ethics* and his pursuit of the ideal of clarity. Tignosi's numerous references to the poets and to historical examples

[114] See above, n. 36.
[115] Schmitt 1985, pp. 39–55.

was certainly an innovation in explaining Aristotle's *Ethics* and may be viewed as a humanist strategy. However, a different way of looking at Tignosi's commentary is to ask, not how much of a humanist Tignosi was, or to what extent his commentary reflects humanist methodology, but whether it might not reflect the needs and interests of a humanistically oriented audience. Seen from this perspective, Tignosi's application of rhetorical techniques may be considered in tandem with his ideal of clarity and *faciliter edoceri*: he had a humanist audience in mind, and this required both that he offer a substantial but (inasmuch as possible) non-technical explanation of Aristotle's philosophy, and that he sweeten it (in a gesture of *captatio benevolentiae*) with numerous references to the works and history of classical times.

The importance of the audience is clear not only from Tignosi's work and from Becchi's commentary referred to above, but also from the near-contemporary commentary by Donato Acciaiuoli.[116] This work was also directed to a humanist audience and contains several parallels with that of Tignosi. Acciaiuoli's commentary, associated with lectures delivered by the Greek émigré John Argyropoulos in the Florentine *studium* in 1457–1458,[117] was first published in Florence in 1478.[118] In spite of divergences in philosophical perspective, in style, and in translation used (Acciaiuoli's work is based on Argyropoulos' new translation), there are also significant points in common between the works by Tignosi and Acciaiuoli. For example, neither is written in Ciceronian Latin, both make extensive use of medieval philosophers, both include scholastic terminology, and both make use of *quaestiones* and *dubia*.[119] Furthermore, both make marked (albeit different) use of rhetorical techniques and try to offer a *clear* exposition of Aristotle's text.[120] This ideal of clarity resulted, on the one hand, in the use of new translations,[121] and on the other in the com-

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[116] See Appendix C, no 38. In spite of its enormous publishing success and its connections with Argyropoulos' lectures in the Florentine *studium*, I do not examine Acciaiuoli's commentary in detail here because it does not have much to say on the issue of moral education.

[117] On Argyropoulos' teaching, see Appendix A, no. 111.

[118] The extent to which the commentary reflects Argyropoulos' actual teaching is discussed by Field 1988, pp. 210 ff. and Bianchi 1990a, p. 33, nn. 9–10.

[119] For Acciaiuoli's use of traditional authors and techniques, see Bianchi 1990a.

[120] In fact, although Acciaiuoli's style is no model of Augustan prose, its clarity earned Vespasiano da Bisticci's praise. See Bianchi 1990a, p. 35.

[121] Since Tignosi did not have to defend himself for having used Bruni's trans-

mentators' practice of providing explanations about even fairly elementary subjects with which their audience may not have been familiar.[122] It did not, however, result in a real philological examination of Aristotle's text (as it later would with Angelo Poliziano and Pier Vettori; see § 6.3), nor in abandoning all technical philosophical terms.

If we ask why the interpretation of Aristotle did not achieve this philological and philosophically non-technical character already with Tignosi and Acciaiuoli, two answers offer themselves. The first is that the commentators themselves were unwilling or unable to do so. Tignosi in fact was limited by his small knowledge of Greek; he would not have been able to give a philological analysis of Aristotle's text even had he wanted to. Argyropoulos was, of course, a skilled Hellenist, but when Acciaiuoli's commentary was printed it was accompanied by Argyropoulos' new translation. Thus, although Argyropoulos had criticized and corrected Bruni's translation on various points during his lectures,[123] the new translation largely obviated the need to discuss those same issues in the commentary. Neither interpreter, however, seemed willing to dispense altogether with the technical philosophical vocabulary developed in the schools. In part this may have derived from their own training, in part it was the result of a conviction that philosophy could not dispense with its own technical vocabulary if it really was to be understood. But one can also answer the question from a different angle; for, if one considers the audience, it will be clear that it would not have been able to follow complicated philological analyses; and one can infer from the works by Tignosi and Acciaiuoli that at least some of the *studiis litterarum dediti* would not have appreciated a purely philological approach, since they were also interested in philosophical problems, despite their lack of preparation in its technical aspects.

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lation of the *Ethics*, It would seem that, in less than fifty years, Bruni's translation had affirmed itself even among the conservatives at Florence, who faulted Tignosi for many things, but not for this. Argyropoulos' new translation of the work (between 1457 and 1463) met with resistance upon its first appearance, just like Bruni's had. However, this time the opposition came from humanists such as George of Trebizond, scandalized that Bruni should be criticised in Florence itself; for the controversy, see Hankins 2001, pp. 137, 145–47. On Argyropoulos' translation (which needs to be studied more in depth), see below, Appendix C, no. 37.

[122] For the case of Argyropoulos, see above, Ch. 2, n. 137.

[123] See above, Ch. 2, n. 206.

The audience, therefore, is an important element to keep in mind when discussing "humanist commentaries" and can potentially function as a link between the non-philological commentaries of the fifteenth century and the philological ones of the sixteenth. In both cases, a humanist audience appreciated the application of rhetorical (and later grammatical) techniques to a philosophical text, even though they may not have agreed on the extent to which philosophical analysis should continue to be applied.

If this was so, a second conclusion becomes increasingly plausible: that humanist methodology changed over time, partly in response to the different desires and needs of the audience. There is, after all, no reason to suppose that the humanists' ideals and approach to philosophical texts remained static during the course of the Renaissance. Already in the fifteenth century there was a variety of positions among the humanists with regard to the relationship between philosophy and philology.[124] Even if there was a "majoritarian" consensus, it seems likely that this could have undergone some diachronic developments, especially in the wake of Poliziano's philological achievements at the end of the fifteenth century. Neither Kristeller's nor Garin's definition of humanism allows for the fuzziness and change involved in this view, but perhaps this could be a way to make use of the virtues of both definitions, when they seem to apply. All of this, however, may become clearer after surveying the commentary literature after 1500 (§ 6.1 and § 6.2) and discussing Pier Vettori's philological commentary (§ 6.3).

[124] Kraye 1996 and *Penser entre les lignes*.

PART III

THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY AND BEYOND

CHAPTER SIX

THE COMMENTARY LITERATURE, CA. 1500–1650

As we have seen (§ 1.4.2), already in the fifteenth century Florence's production of new translations of the *Ethics* made it the international leader in this field. And its commentaries too offered innovative models of interpreting Aristotle's moral philosophy (Chapter 5). During the sixteenth century Florence continued to enjoy a high reputation for scholarly achievement, especially for works of philological erudition. Its skill in this area was applied not only to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, but also to other classical texts. Even so, Florence's position of leadership in the interpretation of the *Ethics* was not nearly so dominant in the sixteenth century as in the fifteenth. Especially after 1550, writers in Pavia, Padua, Bologna, and Rome increasingly seize the initiative in discussing Aristotle's moral philosophy. Although the commentaries and approaches flowing out of Florence remain an indispensable reference point, and although Florence's example of combining Aristotelian with Platonic philosophy is also influential in the sixteenth century, competing understandings and practices of teaching moral philosophy are also discernible.

It is not yet clear whether one might, for sixteenth-century Italy, properly speak of distinct "schools" of teaching virtue, associated with the various university centers. Nonetheless, both the commentaries discussed in Part III of this book and the university records discussed in § 2.2 suggest that the sixteenth-century Italian universities witnessed an increasing variety of approaches to the *Ethics*. Thus, the first section of this chapter discusses the variety of forms one observes in the sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century treatments of Aristotle's *Ethics*. The following section describes some of the themes and issues that become increasingly important. The chapter concludes with an examination of the sixteenth-century Florentine model, with special reference to the work of Pier Vettori.

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6.1 *Developments after 1500*

6.1.1 *General Observations*

One of the most striking aspects of the Italian literary production on the *Ethics* between 1500 and 1650 is its dramatic increase compared with the earlier period. As shown in Appendix C, Italian translations and commentaries on the *Ethics* number almost sixty up to 1500, but over 100 in 1500–1650. This acceleration is observable in almost every literary genre. Whereas for the fifteenth century, for example, five translations of the *Ethics* survive, for the period 1500–1650 we have at least eight translations, despite the continued popularity of Argyropoulos' translation and the numerous retranslations of the *Ethics* undertaken in France.[1] Likewise, other interpretations of the *Ethics* multiply after 1500. Six compendia are known for the fifteenth century, versus ten for the sixteenth century[2] and several others for the early seventeenth century.[3] The eighteen or more prolusions and introductions datable after 1500 represent at least a doubling with respect to the fifteenth century.[4] Especially between 1550 and 1650,

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[1] For the fifteenth-century Italian and sixteenth-century French translations, see above, § 1.4.2. The post-1500 translations produced in Italy are by Giovanni Bernardo Feliciano (Appendix C, no. 65), Bernardino Trebazio (no. 69), Claudio Betti (no. 88), Pier Vettori (no. 94), Francesco Benci, S.J. (no. 99), Antonio Riccoboni (no. 108), Camillo Baldi (no. 141), and Tarquinio Galluzzi, S.J. (no. 155). The works by Paolo Beni, S.J. (no. 115) and Vittorio Venturelli (no. 134) may have made use of existing translations. It is not certain whether the anonymous translation (no. 118) in Rome, BVallicel., R.56 item 6 should be connected with Italy. A stimulating article relevant to this chapter, with interesting (albeit general) observations on the development of the sixteenth-century commentary literature, is Ceard 1981.

[2] The fifteenth-century compendia are listed above, Ch. 4, n. 92. The sixteenth-century compendia are by Raffaele Maffei (Appendix C, no. 60), Crisostomo Javelli, O.P. (no. 63), Celio Calcagnini (no. 64), Giulio Inghirami (no. 71), Giberto da Correggio (no. 91), Nicasius Helbault (no. 73), Francesco Verino Secondo (no. 103), and Genesio Malfante (no. 117). Two anonymous works (nos. 119 and 120), most likely connected with Italy, are found in Vatican, BAV, Boncomp. K. 13. Another anonymous work (no. 70) in Vatican, BAV, Pal. lat. 1041 is not clearly connected with Italy.

[3] The seventeenth-century compendia include the works by Domenico Bandiera (Appendix C, no. 149) and Agostino Galesio (nos. 137–39). The latter wrote four compendia on Aristotle's moral philosophy, some of which might however be considered different redactions of the same work; see below, pp. 301–07.

[4] A listing of the fifteenth-century prolusions is given above, Ch. 4, n. 102. Attributed prolusions and introductions after 1500 are by Francesco Cattani da Diacceto (Appendix C, no. 61), Francesco Zini (no. 68), Ciriaco Strozzi (no. 76), Antonio Montecatini (no. 79), Marc-Antoine Muret (no. 84), Giuseppe Valdanio

in Italy there is a remarkable rise in questions and disputations on the *Ethics*, a phenomenon probably due especially to Jesuit influence.[5] By contrast, no questions on the *Ethics* seem to have been written in fifteenth-century Italy. Most striking of all, however, is the increased number of commentaries on the *Ethics*. Six commentaries survive for fifteenth-century Italy.[6] By contrast, at least seventeen attributable commentaries survive for sixteenth-century Italy,[7] and another seven for the first half of the seventeenth century.[8] At least three further seventeenth-century works are philosophical textbooks.[9] The imbalance persists when one considers lost commentaries. Whereas for the fifteenth century we know of four such works connected with Italy,[10] we know of eight lost commentaries for the period 1500–1650.[11]

(no. 85), Ludovico Beccadelli (no. 89), Giason de Nores (no. 95), Lelio Pellegrini (no. 100), Nicolò Colonio (no. 105), Cesare Rovida (nos. 110–11), Ottavio Magnanini (nos. 130–32), Giovanni Antonio Monasangue (no. 145), and Flavio Querenghi (no. 158). Other such works probably connected with Italy are the anonymous prolusion (no. 77) in Florence, BNC, Rinuccini, filza 16; the Roman prolusion (no. 127) in Vatican, BAV, Boncomp. K. 13; and the oration (no. 128) in Philadelphia, Univ. of Penn. Lib., lat. 239. I have not yet been able to establish the connection of another prolusion (no. 129) in Novara.

[5] The post-1500 questions and disputations are by Giason de Nores (Appendix C, no. 96), Giovanni Antonio Mazzarelli, S.J. (no. 109), Cesare del Bosco (no. 113), Francesco Levera (no. 148), Domenico Bandiera (no. 150), Iacopo Filippo Camola (no. 156), and Paganino Gaudenzi (no. 160). Anonymous works of this kind whose connection with Italy is likely are listed in Appendix C, nos. 81, 162, and 163.

[6] See above, Ch. 4, n. 92.

[7] The surviving, attributed sixteenth-century commentaries are by Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano (Appendix C, no. 67), Ciriaco Strozzi (no. 75), Benedetto Varchi (no. 82), Marc-Antoine Muret (no. 83), Claudio Betti (no. 87), Agostino Valier (no. 90), Francesco Piccolomini (no. 92), Pier Vettori (no. 93), Ottaviano Ferrari (no. 97), Francesco Benci, S.J. (no. 98), Lelio Pellegrini (no. 101), Felice Accoramboni (no. 102), Giovanni Ambrosio Barbarara, O.P. (no. 106), Antonio Riccoboni (no. 107), Pomponio Torelli (no. 112), Paolo Beni, S.J. (no. 114), and Ulisse Aldrovandi (no. 116).

[8] The surviving, attributed commentaries for the first half of the seventeenth century are by Vittorio Venturelli (Appendix C, no. 133), Camillo Baldi (no. 140), Ottavio Farnese (no. 142), Atanasio Bufera, S.J. (no. 143), Vincenzo Serughi (no. 152), Giovanni Tommaso Gilioli (no. 153), and Tarquinio Galluzzi, S.J. (no. 154).

[9] The philosophical textbooks in question are by Francesco Pavone, S.J. (Appendix C, no. 144), Cosimo Alamanni, S.J. (no. 146) and John Punch, O.F.M. (no. 159). In the last two cases, the works on moral philosophy are specific sections dedicated to the topic within general philosophical textbooks.

[10] The lost fifteenth-century commentaries are by Francesco Casini (Appendix C, no. 24), Lorenzo Pisano (no. 41), Angelo Catone da Benevento (no. 46) and Francesco Nanni, O.F.M. (no. 54).

[11] The lost commentaries for 1500–1650 are by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (Appendix C, no. 62), Francesco Verino Primo (no. 72), Pier Paolo Giannerino, O.P. (no. 74),

The only genre for which very few works survive concerns extracts. So far, the only known extracts for the sixteenth century include a manuscript work by Flaminio Nobili (a professor in Pisa), a printed work by Giuseppe Valdanio, and an anonymous manuscript work possibly connected with Italy.[12] However, not much attention has been given to extracts as a literary genre in the Renaissance, and more works are likely to be found. In this case, there would be parallels with the use of extracts at least in Germany. As late as 1598 Owen Günther (a professor of moral philosophy in Germany) published a work with extracts from the *Ethics*.[13] At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Bartholomaeus Keckermann (a professor in Danzig) was encouraging his students to write commonplace books with *loci communes* taken from Aristotle and other authors.[14]

As noted earlier,[15] one of the remarkable developments concerning works on the *Ethics* authored after 1400 is their increasing connection with the universities, rather than with the *studia* of the mendicant orders. This trend continues in the sixteenth century and beyond as well. Of the eight translators of the *Ethics* mentioned above,[16] for example, all but two (Feliciano and Trebazio) taught at higher-level institutions, including at the Collegio Romano. The same is true of the commentators on the *Ethics* after 1500—around three fourths of them were university professors. By contrast, commentaries and other works on the *Ethics* by regulars become increasingly rare. A notable (and very successful) exception is the compendium by the Dominican Crisostomo Javelli.[17] Only twice do we hear of Cistercians or Carmelites being involved in interpreting the work.[18] The only Franciscan seems to have been John Punch, author of a

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Francesco Verino Secondo (no. 104), Marsilio Vasquez, O. Cist. (no. 135), Giulio Cesare Lagalla (no. 147), Antonio Querenghi (no. 157), and Giovanni Battista Formento (no. 164).

[12] On the extracts by Flaminio Nobili, see Appendix C, no. 80. The extracts by Giuseppe Valdanio (no. 86) are a small work, easy to overlook. The anonymous extracts (no. 121) are found in Milan, BAmbr., D.452.Inf.

[13] Günther 1598.

[14] Keckermann 1607b.

[15] Above, pp. 177–78.

[16] See n. 1 above.

[17] For Javelli's compendium see Appendix C, no. 63. The commentary apparently written by the Dominican Pier Paolo Giannerino seem to have been lost; see Appendix C, no. 74.

[18] The Carmelite is Giovanni Battista Formento, whereas the Cistercian is Marsilio Vasquez; but both their works are lost (see Appendix C, nos. 164 and 135).

massive philosophical textbook also containing a section on ethics from 1649 on.[19] Surprisingly, Augustinians do not seem to have authored works on the *Ethics* after 1500.

The Jesuits, by contrast, are the only group among the regulars to interact intensively with the *Ethics*. The largest of all the printed *Ethics* commentaries produced in Italy (and probably anywhere else) was the result of years of labor by Tarquinio Galluzzi (1574–1649), a Jesuit active in Rome.[20] The Jesuits in Italy also contributed at least another three commentaries[21] and two philosophical textbooks.[22] Several disputations on the *Ethics* seem to have been produced within Jesuit contexts.[23] Furthermore, the Jesuits provided two of the eight translations of the *Ethics* produced after 1500.[24] By any standard, this represents a significant proportion of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century production, especially when one considers that by 1593 the Jesuits could make use of an official textbook on the *Ethics* produced by the diligent scholars of their order in Coimbra (Portugal)[25] and that they started studying the *Ethics* regularly only in the 1590s, mainly in their Collegio Romano.[26]

During the the sixteenth century, one notices a multiplication of centers in which the *Ethics* was studied in Italy. At the end of the fifteenth century, when Angelo Poliziano was teaching the subject, Florence was still without competitors. But relatively few works on the *Ethics* were produced in Florence after 1500. Although both Pier Vettori and Ciriaco Strozzi actively dealt with the Greek text, only one sixteenth-century Latin translation of the *Ethics* came out of the *studium* at Florence–Pisa.[27] Francesco Verino Secondo wrote—but did

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[19] For the textbook by Punch see Appendix C, no. 159.

[20] For Galluzzi's work see below, § 9.2.2 and Appendix C, no. 154.

[21] The Jesuit commentaries include the works by Francesco Benci (Appendix C, no. 98), Paolo Beni (no. 114), and Atanasio Bufera (no. 143). For the Jesuit interpretation of the *Ethics* see also below, § 9.2.

[22] By Francesco Pavone and Cosimo Alamanni; see Appendix C, nos. 144 and 146.

[23] See especially the works by Giovanni Antonio Mazzarelli (Appendix C, no. 109), Cesare del Bosco (no. 113), and the two anonymous disputations (nos. 162 and 163) in manuscripts found in Naples.

[24] See the works by Francesco Benci and Tarquinio Galluzzi (Appendix C, nos. 99 and 155).

[25] Coimbra 1593.

[26] On the teaching of moral philosophy in the Collegio Romano see below, § 9.2.1.

[27] For Vettori's translation, see Appendix C, no. 94.

not publish—a compendium.[28] The only known prolusions were authored by Francesco Diacceto and Ciriaco Strozzi.[29] The only surviving commentaries are those by Benedetto Varchi, Ciriaco Strozzi, and Pier Vettori. Even if one considers the lost commentaries by Francesco Verino Primo and Francesco Verino Secondo, the Florentine commentary production is not very large.[30] This is especially true when one considers other universities (such as Bologna and Padua), which could boast a comparable—or even more intense—commentary activity. Thus, while it is true that some of the figures teaching moral philosophy in Florence–Pisa (especially Vettori and Strozzi) were of high standing and of wide renown, after 1500 Florence lost its preeminence in interpreting the *Ethics*. However, it still remained an important scholarly center, especially for its approach to the classical texts (see below, § 6.3).

After 1540 Rome emerges as the most active Italian center for interpreting the *Ethics*. Rome could boast at least three different contexts of ethics teaching (the university, the Collegio Romano, and the papal court),[31] and most of the surviving works are connected with the first two contexts. At least five questions or disputations,[32] ten commentaries,[33] and three prolusions[34] can be associated with Rome during this period. Thus, the proportion of works on the *Ethics* produced in Rome is by far the highest of any single Italian center.

The reasons for this rise in interest are not yet altogether clear and are discussed in Chapter 9. But it is likely that, in Counter-

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[28] The compendium by Verino Secondo is listed in Appendix C, no. 103.

[29] The prolusion by Diacceto is listed in Appendix C, no. 61; that by Strozzi, in no. 76.

[30] The Florentine commentaries are listed in Appendix C, nos. 82 (Varchi), 75 (Strozzi), 93 (Vettori), 72 (Francesco Verino Primo), and 104 (Francesco Verino Secondo).

[31] The academies (in Rome and elsewhere) probably represented another context, but the situation there would require a separate study.

[32] The questions or disputations are by Giovanni Antonio Mazzarelli (Appendix C, no. 109), Cesare del Bosco (no. 113), Francesco Levera (no. 148), Domenico Bandiera (no. 150), and Iacopo Filippo Camola (no. 156).

[33] In addition to the lost works by Giovanni Genesio Sepulveda (Appendix C, no. 62) and Giulio Cesare Lagalla (no. 147), commentaries produced in Rome include those by Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano (no. 67), Marc-Antoine Muret (no. 83), Francesco Benci, S.J. (no. 98), Lelio Pellegrini (no. 101), Vittorio Venturelli (no. 133), Atanasio Bufera, S.J. (no. 143), Tarquinio Galluzzi, S.J. (no. 154), and John Punch, O.F.M. (no. 159).

[34] The prolusions are by Muret (Appendix C, no. 84), Pellegrini (no. 100), and an anonymous Jesuit (no. 127).

Reformation Italy, the concerns with doctrinal orthodoxy and with the reform of morals led to a twin emphasis on the teaching of theology and of moral philosophy. This would help explain why the production of *Ethics* commentaries in Italy became largely dominated by the Jesuits, and why, in the 1590s, universities such as Padua and Pavia start to assign the teaching of moral philosophy to clerics.

The development of multiple centers concerned with the *Ethics* in sixteenth-century Italy finds a parallel in the multiplication of authorities and sources used in interpreting Aristotle. We have seen that, during the fifteenth century, Italian commentators no longer relied almost exclusively on Thomas in their *Ethics* commentaries, but increasingly referred to other interpreters such as Eustratius, Albert the Great, and Gerard of Odo.[35] After 1500 Eustratius and Thomas still continue to be read and used, especially in Jesuit circles, and one could argue that even in the sixteenth century they still play the leading rôle. However, they soon become two voices among many. Other scholastic authors such as Burley and sometimes Buridan become a more familiar presence in the Italian commentaries. The comments of Averroes, who was avidly studied in the sixteenth century and whose *Opera omnia* went through several monumental editions, color interpretations of the *Ethics* even more strongly than heretofore. Increasingly, Aristotle commentaries rely on Plato and on various representatives of the Neoplatonic tradition (such as Themistius and Simplicius).[36] References to Cicero and other Latin (or Greek) moralists become almost mandatory. Finally, there seems to be a new sense that the views of contemporaries, and not only of past thinkers, are worthy of consideration and should therefore be discussed. Ottaviano Ferrari, for example, has no hesitation in discussing the opinions of Achillini and Budé. Several commentators refer to (and usually oppose) the philosophical views of Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano. Often, when interpretations turn on the understanding of a particular Greek term or expression, commentators refer to the various contemporary translations and critique them. Although earlier commentaries had also at times engaged with the positions of contemporaries, usually they had done so less openly and less acrimoniously. One can think of the fifteenth-century criticisms of

[35] See above, pp. 179–80.

[36] This practice was doubtless partly connected with the discussion of method; see below, § 6.2.

Bruni's translation as the camel's head of sixteenth-century debates that eventually revealed the full range of disagreements among philosophers (whether ancient or modern). A similar impression of disunity is offered when one considers the variety of approaches taken within the individual interpretative genres.

6.1.2 *Literary Genres*

Translations

During the sixteenth century, lectures on the *Ethics* were occasionally based on the original Greek text.[37] However, most students were not equipped for such an undertaking.[38] Thus, it was not unusual for the Greek text (when provided at all) to be accompanied by a Latin translation in several of the post-1500 commentaries. The clearest examples of this practice are the commentaries by Vettori and Galluzzi, in which snippets of text are offered in Greek and Latin, followed by commentary on the passage in question.[39]

Again, the commentaries by Vettori and Galluzzi illustrate another feature of the newer interpretations of the *Ethics*—the fact that these translations are rarely published as independent works. Indeed they are usually provided only as the base text for the commentary in question.[40] One wonders whether this practice, which is common also in several sixteenth-century translations of the *Ethics* produced in France, reflects a growing awareness of translations as an implicit form of interpretation. In this case, it would make sense for them to need the clarification and support offered by a commentary. What

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[37] Examples are Muret in Rome and Ferrari in Pavia; see Appendix C, nos. 83 and 97.

[38] It is significant that the Leoniceno, for example, based his *Ethics* lectures on Bruni's Latin translation, and not on the original; see Appendix C, no. 47. Even Muret had to bow to the difficulties encountered by his students in Rome. He provided them with a Latin translation so they could follow his lectures on *EN* V; see below, p. 333, n. 51.

[39] For the commentaries by Vettori and Galluzzi, see Appendix C, nos. 93 and 154. It is interesting to compare this practice with some sixteenth-century editions of medieval commentaries, in which snippets of the *Ethics* are offered in two different translations (e.g., by Argyropoulos and Grosseteste; see Burley 1521).

[40] This phenomenon should be seen in contrast both with the broad independent diffusion of Grosseteste's translation in the Middle Ages and with the numerous *tres conversiones* editions of the *Ethics*, which included as separate works the translations by Grosseteste, Bruni, and Argyropoulos (see Appendix C, no. 37).

is certain is that, even when a translation was published independently (as was the case with Lambin),[41] the author usually felt obliged to add a series of notes justifying his translation. All of this was doubtless partly the result of the philological advances made in Italy and in France during the sixteenth century.[42]

Surprisingly, the most successful of the translations produced in Italy was not that by Vettori (which was printed only once and in any case came off the press rather late, in 1584),[43] but that by Giovanni Bernardo Feliciano, first published in Venice in 1541.[44] Feliciano's translation circulated both independently and as the base text for other commentaries—e.g., the Greek commentaries (which he retranslated)[45] and Averroes.[46] Counting these occurrences, his translation went through at least ten printings by 1560. Furthermore, Italian commentators often based their interpretations on Feliciano's text, even into the seventeenth century.[47] Notably, Feliciano is one of only two Italian translators of the *Ethics* into Latin mentioned by Possevino for the sixteenth century.[48] The other translations, by contrast, had little diffusion, partly because only a handful of the commentaries that used them as a base text were printed.[49]

Compendia

As in the early Renaissance, so too after 1500 compendia and paraphrases abridging the *Ethics* continue to enjoy a following in Italy. There is, however, a great variation in coverage: some works (such

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[41] Lambin 1558.

[42] For a useful overview, see Grafton 1983. For an excellent study of French and Italian philological advances concerning the *Ethics* in the sixteenth century, see Kraye (forthcoming).

[43] For Vettori's translation see Appendix C, no. 94.

[44] For Feliciano's translation see Appendix C, no. 65.

[45] For Feliciano's translation of the Greek commentaries, see Appendix C, no. 66.

[46] See Appendix C, no. 65.

[47] The main commentaries making use of Feliciano's translation seem to be those of Agostino Valier (Appendix C, no. 90), Ottavio Farnese (no. 142), Francesco Piccolomini (no. 92), and Paolo Beni (no. 114).

[48] Possevino 1603, p. 76: "Laborarunt in libris Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum vertendis Ioannes Argiropylus Byzantius, Leonardus Aretinus, Bernardus Felicianus, Petrus Victorius, Ioachimus Perionius, Dionysius Lambinus, quorum ille notationes, hic scholia suis versionibus addiderunt; Lambini autem versio omnibus praestat, et hi quidem Latine, cum alia versio extet Italica, quam Gabriel Cesanus fecerat."

[49] An example is Benci's translation (Appendix C, no. 99), which merits a closer study.

as that by Giberto da Correggio)[50] cover only a few chapters, whereas others (such as Calcagnini's *Paraphrasis*)[51] stop already with the first or second book. Others yet cover all of the *Ethics*.[52] In rare instances, the attempt is made to cover all of Aristotle's moral philosophy, from the *Ethics* through the *Politics* to the *Economics*.[53]

Of particular interest is the work by Helbault (1535–1577),[54] who also made retranslations of the *Magna Moralia* and the *Economics* (the latter with annotations) in Padua around 1568.[55] Written at the Paduan *studium* between 1562 and 1571, after his studies in Louvain and in the Collegio Romano, Helbault's compendium is one of the few to reorganize Aristotle's text, placing the section on friendship before that on justice and ending, not with a discussion of contemplation, but with pleasure. A scrambling of this kind is what one would usually expect of a philosophical textbook, but it is uncertain whether Helbault had that kind of an aim in mind. It is also unclear whether this curious redistribution of Aristotle's books has anything to do with possible contacts between Helbaut and Francesco Piccolomini, who was already teaching natural philosophy in Padua during this time and whose commentary also scrambles the order of the *Ethics*.[56] It is, of course, entirely possible that Helbault wrote his compendium for his own personal use (it survives in a single manuscript). In this case, one should probably not make too much of his rearrangement, which may simply reflect his effort to make better sense of the sequence of topics in the *Ethics*.

Although sixteenth-century Italy already had a surfeit of treatises discussing individual virtues (and, in particular, honor),[57] some of the

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[50] For Giberto da Corregio's compendium see Appendix C, no. 91.

[51] For Calcagnini's work see Appendix C, no. 64.

[52] See the works by Javelli (Appendix C, no. 63), Maffei (no 60), and Verino Secondo (no. 103).

[53] See Malfante (Appendix C, no. 117). It is significant, however, that this work was not written in connection with university teaching; it seems rather to be an educational treatise loosely based on Aristotle.

[54] On Helbault and his compendium see Appendix C, no. 73.

[55] See Wagner 1973.

[56] Helbault studied philosophy and medicine in Padua starting in 1562 (Lohr, RLAC, p. 133). For the format of Piccolomini's commentary see below, § 7.3.1. It is less likely that Helbault's scheme derives from his studies at the Collegio Romano, since the Jesuits were usually instructed to skip the section on friendship (see below, p. 357, n. 164), and anyway moral philosophy was not a focus of the curriculum when Helbault was there between 1555 and 1558 (see below, pp. 351–53).

[57] See, for example, the treatises by Flaminio Nobili, some of which are listed in Lohr, RLAC, p. 287.

compendia produced there focused specifically on the moral virtues described by Aristotle in *EN* III–V. One of the most notable examples is Galesio's compendium, in its various redactions.[58] But the Jesuits also seem to have had a special interest in the individual moral virtues. Indeed, one of the features of the philosophical textbooks (very close in genre to compendia) by Francesco Pavone and Cosimo Alamanni is a detailed discussion of the various virtues.[59] In typical Thomistic fashion, these textbooks rearrange the eleven virtues discussed by Aristotle (plus a number of additional ones) under the four cardinal ones. They also generally scramble the structure of the *Ethics* while at the same time trying to condense its doctrine. But these textbooks are also fascinating because their genre hovers uncertainly not only between textbook and compendium, but also between compendium and disputation. Indeed, their thoroughgoing attempt to reconcile Thomas and Aristotle often leads to an imitation of the style of the *Summa Theologiae*, complete with questions, articles, objections, and responses.

Commentaries and Other Genres

The philosophical textbook increasingly became the genre of choice for explaining philosophical matters in sixteenth- and in seventeenth-century Europe.[60] Connected with the same phenomenon was the rising popularity of systematizations, of which Francesco Piccolomini's *Universa philosophia de moribus* is the most important example in sixteenth-century Italy.[61] Nonetheless, the time-honored technique of examining Aristotle's text sequentially was by no means obsolete, and it is a testimony to the form's flexibility and necessity that it is still with us today. Most of the commentaries listed in Appendix C are in fact sequential expositions of the *Ethics*. Compared with the fifteenth century, however, later commentaries seem to have evolved in several ways. Developments already referred to above include the range of authorities used and an increasing (though by no means

[58] See below, pp. 301–07.

[59] For the textbooks by Pavone and Alamanni, see Appendix C, nos. 144 and 146.

[60] See Schmitt 1988, Kusukawa 1999.

[61] For Piccolomini's commentary see Appendix C, no. 92 and the discussion in § 7.3.

common) reliance on the Greek text. Here the emphasis will be on the commentaries' coverage of and approach to the text.[62]

During the fifteenth century, it had been common for commentaries to cover all ten books of the *Ethics*, often as the result of one or two years of teaching the work. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, this tendency encounters a serious obstacle in the rising sophistication expected of a commentary's analysis. Although there are still several examples of commentaries that cover all or most of the *EN*,[63] it is also true that these examples are rare, the result of many years of intensive labor. It is far more common to encounter commentaries—such as those by Baldi, Benci, and Bernardi—that do not progress very far into the text. (Indeed, none of these works reaches beyond Book III.) This phenomenon seems to be tied to teaching practices: what we can deduce from the teaching of Strozzi (in Pisa), Betti (in Bologna), and Muret (in Rome) is that the average rate of coverage was something like one or two books of the *Ethics* per year.[64] It therefore took several years to teach the *Ethics* in its entirety. When a professor was appointed for a single year, the tendency was to concentrate on the first two (or two and a half) books of the *Ethics*, which offer the most extensive discussion of happiness and the principles involved in ethics.

Why was the *Ethics* subjected to such an intensive reading? The answer, I think, lies in an increasing emphasis on methodological reading—not only in moral philosophy, but in natural philosophy as well.[65] As we shall see, what precisely this meant could vary considerably from one university to the next. In some contexts, teachers and students were expected to apply their knowledge of the classical languages to the text they were reading, with an attention to the philological detail. Whereas familiarity with the content of a philosophical work could still be had within a few months, a philological reading was guaranteed to make for a slow and laborious treatment of the *Ethics*, which was often now a regular subject and could therefore be examined more leisurely.

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[62] See above, § 2.2.2 for more detailed comments on both Greek teaching and coverage of the *Ethics* in university teaching.

[63] For example, the works by Ferrari, Muret, Vettori, Pellegrini, and Galluzzi. See Appendix C, nos. 97, 83, 93, 101, and 154).

[64] For the teaching of Strozzi, Betti, and Muret see Appendix A, nos. 118, 81, and 267.

[65] Again, see above, § 2.2.2.

This is not to suggest that the Florentine model of philological reading of the *Ethics* was generally adopted elsewhere (see § 6.3). Indeed, the following chapters will show that there is a wide variety of emphases, methodologies, and aims in explaining Aristotle's text in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italy. However, if it is true that the *Ethics* was not valued in Italy primarily for its philosophical content, this would help explain some apparent oddities in the Italian approach to the *Ethics*. For example, one of the surprises—given the success of Ramism in sixteenth-century Europe—is the near-absence in Italy of dichotomous tables outlining the *Ethics*, as had been exemplified in Theodor Zwinger's work.[66] The only comparable work I know for Italy are the *Tabulae interrogatoriae* by de Nores.[67] Since Zwinger's tables and approach in general were known in Italy during the second half of the sixteenth century,[68] a likely explanation for their scarce success there is that Italian interpreters were interested in other issues and approaches.

6.2 *Themes and Issues*

Developments in interpreting the *Ethics* can be observed, not only in the evolution of the philosophical literature, but also in the problems and themes that the commentaries discuss. One of the main questions Aristotle's commentators had to address in the sixteenth century was that of method. Since Galen had distinguished four types of investigative method and three types of order in presentation, the question arose as to which of these was appropriate to the various branches of philosophy, and to moral philosophy in particular. As the controversy in Padua shows (§ 7.2), the discussion was not so much about investigative method, but about the proper pedagogical order to use. Was one to follow the order of nature, or the order that was easiest for students to understand? Although these questions had also been discussed earlier and even elsewhere in Europe,[69] they reached fever pitch in Italy in the second half of the sixteenth

[66] Zwinger 1566; see the comments by Kraye 1995, pp. 109–11 and Schmitt 1983, p. 56.
[67] See Appendix C, no. 96.
[68] See Appendix E and below, pp. 322–23.
[69] See Lines 2002b.

century.[70] The discussion of these issues was partly encouraged by the fact that several of the philosophers involved were also doctors of medicine and therefore knew Galen well. An important rôle was also played by the renewed popularity of one of Aristotle's works, the *De partibus animalium*, which discussed the issue of *paedia*.[71]

These discussions about method were closely related to what one might call a growing "pluralization" in philosophy. As mentioned above (§ 6.1), Thomas was no longer necessarily considered the main philosophical authority, and interpreters felt increasingly free to refer to the opinions of other thinkers as well. But, for a growing number of commentators, it was not just a matter of what authorities one used while interpreting Aristotle; rather, it became increasingly a question whether one should not consider Plato's philosophical system superior, or how one might hope to reconcile the views of the two major philosophers of antiquity. This change of perspective was partly the result of the enormously successful work of Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), who in 1484 and 1496 published his translations of and commentaries on the Platonic corpus and gave the Latin West its first opportunity to read Plato's writings in their entirety.[72]

Throughout the Latin Middle Ages the influence of Platonism had mainly been indirect, coming via philosophers of late antiquity with Platonic or Neoplatonic leanings (e.g., Augustine, Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius). Of Plato's dialogues, only two were fully available in Latin translation.[73] Even with these handicaps, Platonism had succeeded in coloring the interpretation of various Aristotelian passages and even in influencing entire branches of philosophy.[74] But the situation after Ficino was completely different. Suddenly, commentators of Aristotle were confronted with a body of philosophical reflection that—because of its breadth, elegance, and novelty—simply could not be ignored. Furthermore, since Plato discussed metaphysical and ethical issues that were also dear to Aristotle, comparisons and confrontations were inevitable. Specifically, the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Florentine debates about the possible reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle, and of their respective rôles in the teaching of ethics,

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[70] See, for example, Zabarella 1597, F. Piccolomini 1583, Accoramboni 1590.
[71] See Kessler 1997, *Aristotle's Animals*, Perfetti 2000.
[72] Hankins 1990, pp. 300–18.
[73] See above, Ch. 3, n. 183.
[74] Thomas' metaphysics, for example, is deeply influenced by the Platonic tradition.

reverberated throughout Italy and Europe, at times leading to conclusions different from Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's conciliatory attitude.[75]

In turn, the debate about Plato and Aristotle was complicated by religious considerations. Both the Protestant and the Catholic Reformations looked to the ethical works of antiquity for ammunition and defense in the doctrinal disputes of the time. Heightened awareness of theological issues could lead to preference for Plato or Aristotle (depending on which was viewed as being more compatible with Christianity) or to intensified efforts to reconcile the two philosophers with one another and the Christian faith. A notable confirmation of this fact can be found in the writings of Francesco Verino Secondo (1524–1591), and especially in his comments on the university in Pisa.[76] For example, Verino suggests that the reader of moral philosophy should base his lectures on both Aristotle and Plato. (Aristotle's *Ethics* should be covered in the course of four years.) Even though Verino does not think that Aristotle and Plato should be made to agree in everything, he proposes a structured comparison between the teachings of the two philosophers.[77] Furthermore, Verino insists on the need to compare the principles on moral philosophy gleaned from Plato and Aristotle with Christian teachings, which should also, presumably, function as a corrective to their pagan doctrines when necessary.[78]

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[75] On the methodological problem posed for ethics by the reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle see especially Poppi. On stances toward Plato and Aristotle in the Renaissance, see especially *Platon et Aristote à la Renaissance.* On Platonic ethics in the Renaissance, see Kraye 1988, pp. 349–59. For the seventeenth century, see eadem 1998, pp. 1290–93.

[76] For a useful introduction and summary, see Verde 1983. On Verino, see Lohr, RLAC, p. 477 and below, Appendix C, at no. 103.

[77] "Quando gli corre il primo del'Ethica, e' leggesse lo Alcibiade primo o vero della natura umana et della instituzione de' gran Prencipi, quale fu quella de' Re de' persi, quivi raccolta. Quando gli toccha a leggere il quinto libro dove si tratta della Giustizia, et egli leggesse i libri delle leggi o più presto ne facesse un raccolto, riducendo quelle della fortezza ad essa fortezza et quelle della temperanza alla temperanza, et così facesse dell'altre, come io haveva già in animo di fare se alla lettura di Platone io fusse stato aiutato e favorito; et per seguire più oltre, quando questo lettore fussi a leggere quei libri ne' quali Aristotile tratta dell'amicizia così bene et copiosamente et egli leggesse il Lyside, dove Platone disputa ancor esso di questa scambievole benevolenza. Così, quando egli espone quella parte dell'Ethica, dove si parla del piacere et del sommo bene, egli insieme discorresse sopra il Filebo, dove similmente et del piacere et della suprema felicità si disputa." (Del Fante 1980, p. 410).

[78] "Sarebbe ben fatto che il lettore dell'attiva Filosofia insieme ancora esponesse

Although the debate about Plato and Aristotle was not necessarily guided and resolved by theological considerations, Italian commentaries on the *Ethics* do display an increasing concern with the refutation of "error." Thus, they sometimes target Italian secular Aristotelians with Averroistic leanings or northern Protestants denying the merit of works and man's ability to become virtuous on his own.[79] The cumulative effect seems to be a resistance, not only of "heresy," but of any developments toward a secularized ethics.

Religious considerations also had a rôle in containing the revival of other ethical systems, in particular Stoicism and Epicureanism.[80] Throughout the sixteenth century, it is regular practice for the commentators of the *Ethics* to castigate the representatives and supporters of these philosophical strands, especially on the grounds that the doctrines involved are dangerous to the faith. It is no accident that Francesco Piccolomini's work, which has a strong religious orientation, does not attempt to incorporate elements of Stoicism or Epicureanism; when these schools are evoked, it is only to contrast them and deny their arguments.[81] Not even the early seventeenth-century commentaries produced in Italy reveal as yet an opening toward these other schools of thought. In this respect, developments in Italy do not follow those current elsewhere in Europe.[82]

6.3 *Pier Vettori and the Florentine Model*

Before discussing, in the following chapters, the teaching of the *Ethics* and the views on moral education in selected Italian universities,

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Platone, et si osservasse nello eleggere così fatto lettore che e' possedesse prima bene la Filosofia di Aristotile, il quale procede con ordine et con più forti dimostrazioni. Di poi che detto lettore havesse con dilegenza veduto et riscontro un luogo con l'altro e facesse questa professione di confrontarlo primieramente con le Verità Cattoliche; secondariamente con la Dottrina di Aristotile, per quanto è possibile, et terzo nelle notizie appartenenti al Medico, con la Medicina, accioché e' fusse utili a gl'uditori come Theologi, come Filosofi peripatetici et come Medici, et insieme si vedesse come Platone è giovevolissimo ad ogni verità o sopra humana o humana o del'arte" (Del Fante 1980, p. 407, n. 91).

[79] Segni 1550, Javelli 1568.

[80] On the revival of these currents, respectively at the end of the sixteenth and in the middle of the seventeenth centuries, see Kraye 1999b; cf. eadem 1998 and 1988, pp. 360–86.

[81] Kraye 2001.

[82] Kraye 1998.

something should be said about the sixteenth-century Florentine model of interpreting the *Ethics*, especially as reflected by Pier Vettori's commentary. Although this work contains little philosophical discussion of virtue and how it should be taught, its approach to the *Ethics* was (like the author himself) hardly to be ignored in the Italian cultural landscape. Furthermore, this work raises an important question: Can Florence's example be considered paradigmatic for Italy when it comes to interpreting the *Ethics*? The following chapters will show that there was much more variety in approaching this work than one might expect.

When Vettori (1499–1585) published his *Ethics* commentary in 1584,[83] he had just concluded his public career, which he had spent in the study and teaching of Greek and Latin. A former pupil of Marcello Virgilio Adriani and Andrea Dazzi (for the classical languages) and of Francesco Verino Primo (for philosophy),[84] he was almost forty years old in 1538, when he was appointed by Duke Cosimo I to teach Latin at the *studium* in Florence. By then, Vettori could already be proud of notable philological achievements, especially with regard to Cicero, whose collected works he had edited and newly published in 1537. In 1543 Vettori also became professor of Greek language and literature and continued his teaching until 1583.[85] In the course of his teaching, the Florentine scholar not only published a corrected Greek text of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (1547) and *Politics* (1552), but also commented on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1548) and *Poetics* (1560). Furthermore, he edited, translated, and commented on a large number of other classical works. One of Vettori's most significant achievements was his *Variarum lectiones* (1553; enlarged edition in 1582), which collected a number of his philological observations. His interests, however, were wide-ranging, and not focused exclusively on classical literature. In particular, he was fond of Boccaccio's *Decameron* and of the works of Niccolò Machiavelli, whose study he furthered and whose publication he encouraged.[86]

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[83] Vettori 1584; see Appendix C, no. 93.

[84] On Verino Primo and his lost commentary on the *Ethics*, see Appendix C, no. 72.

[85] For studies on Vettori and his biography see Appendix C, at no. 93. Vettori appears on the rolls of the Pisan *studium* (for teachings in Florence) only until 1581–1582 (Morale e lingua greca, fl. 300), but for the next few years the teachers in Florence are not listed. See ASPi, Università, II° versamento, G.77, ff. 198r–200r, new pag. and Appendix A, no. 117.

[86] This sketch is based on M. Pecoraro's helpful article in *DCLI* IV, pp. 419–22.

In his commentary, Vettori gave snippets of the Greek text of the *Ethics* that he had already published in 1547,[87] but he also provided his own Latin translation, followed by several lines of explanation for each passage under consideration. Typically, Vettori's interpretative procedure is first to paraphrase Aristotle's text, often referring to specific Greek words and discussing their usage in classical Greek. Next he places Aristotle's points into a broader context, sometimes by referring to discussions of similar topics in the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia* or to other classical authors such as Cicero. As Jill Kraye has pointed out, Vettori's explanations also examine stylistic features in the text, solve variant readings, refer to historical examples, and quote classical poets.[88] He also writes, as one might expect of such a humanist, in a highly polished classical style.

Vettori's acuteness and philological skill have been widely recognized, and his commentary is known to scholars as one of the greatest sixteenth-century achievements in classical philology.[89] However, two points about his commentary seem especially germane here. The first is that Vettori's concern with Aristotle's *text* is accompanied by a comparative disinterest in its philosophical *problems*. For example, in *EN* I.13 Aristotle discusses the various parts of the soul, in order to prepare his discussion of the acquisition of virtue in Book II. This passage represented a *locus classicus* for Aristotle's commentators, who in Italy as elsewhere discussed the differences between this partition of the soul and that found in the *De anima* and debated—*inter alia*—about the rôle of the will in producing virtuous actions. In his treatment of this last chapter of Book I, Vettori does note very briefly that Aristotle's account of the soul here is one of which he did not approve in the *De anima*, but he does not attempt in any way to reconcile the two views or to determine which one is correct. Vettori is equally unwilling to debate whether or not the inferior appetite that somehow partakes of reason should be identified with the will. He simply states that it is common knowledge (*notum est*) that the will, anger, and concupiscence reside in this particular part of the soul.[90] He then proceeds with his textual observations.

See also, for Vettori and classical scholarship in the sixteenth century, Reynolds and Wilson 1991, Ch. 5 and especially Grafton 1983 and 1991.

[87] Kraye 1995, p. 114.

[88] Kraye 1995, pp. 114–15.

[89] See Pfeiffer 1976, pp. 135–36; Grafton 1983, *passim*.

[90] Vettori 1583, p. 68. Vettori's reference to Aristotle's different partition of the

Vettori's reluctance to treat philosophical issues philosophically is perhaps one of the reasons why he refers so rarely to other commentators' interpretations of specific passages, unless to clarify the meaning of a particular practice referred to by Aristotle, or of a particular term.[91] Vettori's explicit avoidance of *multae et difficiles quaestiones* in his commentary also seems to confirm his main interest in clarifying and illustrating Aristotle's *verba* rather than addressing its philosophical *res*. It is noteworthy that, although Vettori praises the *doctissimae elucubrationes* of Thomas' commentary,[92] the distance between the two works is as great as that between commentaries on philosophical and literary texts.

Although it was by no means the first philological treatment of the *Ethics*, Vettori's work represents at the same time the fullest and the earliest philological commentary on the *Ethics* to have reached print. It may seem implausible that one has to wait until 1584 to find a philological commentary on the *Ethics* come off the press. After all, Leonardo Bruni had finished his retranslation of the *Ethics* already by 1417,[93] and the fifteenth century had seen other skillful translations of the work by able Hellenists such as Giannozzo Manetti and John Argyropoulos.[94] Furthermore, Poliziano's teaching of the

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soul in the *De anima* is on p. 65. Vettori treats this last chapter of Book I on pp. 62–70.

[91] Vettori, for example, complains on p. 64 that other commentators did not understand Aristotle's reference to a specialist in healing the eyes on 1102b19–20. On the same page he generically praises some past commentators for having explained what Aristotle meant by *exoterikoi logoi* (*exoterici sermones*, an expression that had caused much difficulty for medieval interpreters); however, Vettori does not explain the expression.

[92] After pointing out that Aristotle considered inappropriate to ethics an overly subtle approach, Vettori maintains that several interpreters went against Aristotle's wishes by inserting numerous and difficult questions, which besides being obscure contribute little or nothing to training in ethics and in fact disturb more than they help. He praises instead the example of St. Thomas, who inserted few or no such questions in his own exposition: "Utilis autem valde, vel potius necessaria fuit haec praeceptio: cum multi in hoc labantur ac peccent, ut fortasse etiam non nulli fecerunt eorum, qui studio ac labore suo declarare hos libros voluerunt; inseruerunt enim huc multas et difficiles quaestiones, quae ut obscurae sunt, ita etiam saepe aliquando nihil, aut parum faciunt ad hanc de moribus disciplinam, potiusque perturbant, quam iuvent. . . . Argumento huius rei esse potest, quod D. Thomas sapientissimus vir, nullas, aut paucas admodum huiuscemodi in suas doctissimas elucubrationes in hos libros inseruit" (p. 7).

[93] On Bruni's translation see Appendix C, no. 26.

[94] On the translations by Manetti and Argyropoulos see Appendix C, nos. 31 and 37.

Ethics in Florence points to a philological approach to the work.[95] But the studies by Rotondò, Bianchi, and Kraye[96] have shown that no commentary published before that of Vettori really treats the *Ethics* philologically. Donato Acciaiuoli's commentary (first redacted in 1463–1464)[97] can no longer be considered the first application of philological methodology to the *Ethics*.[98] And, although the commentary by the Frenchman Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples[99] was important for delivering philosophy from countless *quaestiones* and *dubia*, it too did not go very far in the direction of philological analysis.[100] Denys Lambin may seem to be a better candidate, but his philological annotations on the *Ethics*, published in 1558, were not part of a commentary.[101] Finally, the commentary by Vettori's archrival Muret—an outgrowth of his lectures in Rome in 1563–1567—did give considerable (although not exclusive) attention to philological issues. However, it was not printed until considerably later, in 1602.[102]

Perhaps this lateness in the application of philology to the *Ethics* should not be overemphasized. Before Poliziano, philology was immature;[103] time, experimentations, and even controversies[104] were obviously necessary before standards could be erected and then agreed upon. A series of stages can be observed along this long winding path from Poliziano to Vettori; among them are both Vettori's teaching in Florence and Muret's in Rome, not to speak of coeval developments in France.[105] Two points, however, seem especially relevant here: the changing institutional context of the *Ethics* in the university of Florence–Pisa and the new understanding and use of the *Ethics*

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[95] See above, pp. 101–04.

[96] Rotondò 1958, especially his statement (p. 255): "una filologia sul testo di Aristotele . . . nel '400 in fondo non ci fu e ci fu soltanto tardi, con Pietro Vettori"; Bianchi 1990a; Kraye 1995. See above, § 5.3.3.

[97] On Acciaiuoli's commentary see Appendix C, no. 38; see especially the autograph in Florence, BNC, II.I.104 (s. XV), 206 ff.

[98] As was suggested by Garin 1987, pp. 240–44; idem 1994, pp. 102–06; Schmitt 1985, p. 42; and even Kraye 1988, p. 328.

[99] D'Étaples 1535 (first published in 1497).

[100] Kraye 1995, p. 104.

[101] On Lambin 1558 see Kraye 1995, p. 111.

[102] For Muret see Appendix C, no. 83 and the discussion below, pp. 331–40.

[103] See especially Grafton 1977 and 1983.

[104] The sixteenth-century controversies are described in rich human detail in Kraye (forthcoming).

[105] See, on these various stages, Kraye (forthcoming).

itself. As will become clear, these factors also played a rôle in Vettori's relative avoidance of philosophical argument in his commentary.

Vettori's treatment of the *Ethics* as a work of literature is doubtless connected with a change in the teaching of the *Ethics* at the university of Florence–Pisa. Traditionally the *Ethics* had been considered a work of moral philosophy, and as a branch of philosophy it had often been taught, in Florence as elsewhere in Italy, by natural philosophers.[106] Not surprisingly, then, teaching appointments were often made to *philosophia naturalis et moralis*. During the fifteenth century, Florence saw a gradual weakening of this connection between ethics and natural philosophy. Starting with Andrea Biglia's teaching in 1422–1423,[107] it was not uncommon for ethics to be taught by professors of rhetoric. Still, the connection with rhetoric was not at all stable during the fifteenth century: the teaching of ethics was divided almost equally between rhetoricians and natural philosophers. One has only to recall names such as Simone Venturini, Guglielmo Becchi, John Argyropoulos, Oliviero Senese, Chalcondyles, and Poliziano to appreciate the very different backgrounds of ethics teachers in fifteenth-century Florence.[108] The institutional context during the early sixteenth century, until the temporary closure of the Florentine–Pisan *studium* in 1525, has barely been studied. However, in each of the nine years for which the teaching of moral philosophy is recorded, ethics is combined with one or another branch of philosophy.[109] The great change came in 1543, when the *studium* reopened.[110] In that year, in Florence, Pier Vettori was charged with the teaching of ethics in addition to that of Latin and Greek.[111] A similar change occurred in Pisa in 1556, when Ciriaco Strozzi's appointment to

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[106] See above, § 2.2.1.

[107] On Biglia, see Appendix A, no. 103 and Appendix C, no. 27.

[108] See Lines 1996, pp. 169–71 and above, p. 95. For details on these teachers, see Appendix A. On Florence's encouragement of both scholastic and humanist studies, especially during the first half of the Quattrocento, see Vasoli 1986.

[109] See the teachings of Francesco Cattani and Raffaele Franceschi (Celatone) in Appendix A, nos. 115 and 116. Specifically, Diacceto was to teach either *philosophia ordinaria* or *ethica* in 1502–1503; in 1503–1504, he was to teach moral and Platonic philosophy. Celatone taught logic and moral philosophy in 1509–1511; from 1518 to 1523 he taught moral philosophy along with *philosophia extraordinaria*.

[110] An especially useful study for the period after 1543 in Pisa is Schmitt 1983b.

[111] Lohr, RLAC, p. 482. But the university rolls do not list him as teaching "Morale e greca" until 1578–1579; see Appendix A, no. 117. (ASPi, Università, II° versamento, G.77, ff. 188r–190r, new pag.).

Greek became "Philosophia moralis graeca et alia."[112] The examples of Pietro Angèli da Barga and Domenico Mancini show that this pattern was followed until the end of the sixteenth century.[113] It is hard, of course, to know whether the folding of ethics into the course on Greek and Latin merely symbolized or instead encouraged the treatment of this text as a work of literature. However, Vettori's approach seems to be well in line with the new classification of this work in Florence–Pisa.

This change in classification was apparently accompanied by a change in the audience of the *Ethics*.[114] Whereas, during the fifteenth century, the *Ethics* was almost always a feast-day subject in Florence, with Vettori and Strozzi it gained the status of a regular and "ordinary" course.[115] This change had several consequences. From a strictly methodological viewpoint, it meant that teachers could expect their audience to have a particular preparation (in this case, knowledge of Latin and Greek); they were not addressing a general audience of interested persons whose level of preparation might be highly variable. Furthermore, turning the moral philosophy teaching into an ordinary course had the advantage of greatly increasing the time available, and in turn this made possible the level of philological analysis that Vettori prized. Indeed, an ordinary course would meet roughly twice as often per week as a feast-day course.[116] Furthermore, Strozzi's teaching suggests that it was also possible to spread the *Ethics* course out over several years.[117] This made close attention to philological points of detail even more feasible. However, whereas

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[112] ASPi, Università, II° versamento, G.77, f. 144r (new pag.); cf. Barsanti 1993, p. 565 and below, Appendix A, no. 118.

[113] On the teaching of Angèli and Mancini see Appendix A, nos. 119 and 121.

[114] For a fuller examination of this phenomenon, see Lines 1999b.

[115] On the distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" courses in the medieval universities see especially Weijers 1987, pp. 306–15. Note, however, that Weijer's descriptions are not necessarily valid for the Renaissance period. During the Renaissance, in the Italian universities, the expression "ordinary" usually refers to a course taught by a senior lecturer on regular *dies legibiles* to enrolled students, who take the course in partial fulfillment of their degree requirements. In the sixteenth century, it is increasingly common for ordinary subjects to be taught in the afternoons rather than in the mornings.

[116] Feast-day courses would usually meet on Thursdays and Sundays, plus occasional holidays. The ordinary courses would meet on the other days.

[117] From Strozzi's prolusions and the teaching records for Pisa, it seems that Strozzi may have taken from 1556 to 1561 to cover the ten books of the *Ethics*. For the prolusions, see Appendix A, no. 76.

this change made it easier for teachers like Vettori to indulge in their philological analyses and still be followed by their students, it apparently led to no heightened expectation of the students' preparation in philosophy.[118]

In addition to the changed institutional context in which the teaching of the *Ethics* took place in Florence–Pisa, one should also bear in mind the shifting interests, between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, of commentators approaching the work. As we have seen in Chapter 5, for commentators such as Tignosi and Acciaiuoli the *Ethics* was a work with a practical purpose—it taught, that is, how to be happy and virtuous. Both of these commentators seem to have thought that at least two components were therefore necessary in their explanations of the work: a clear exposition of the philosophical issues in the text plus rhetorical strategies designed to encourage the hearers and readers toward the exercise of virtue. In comparison, the use of close philological analysis was unimportant, and probably would have remained so even had it not been beyond Tignosi's and Acciaiuoli's abilities.[119] Vettori's approach, instead, represents a definite break with the fine balance of this Florentine tradition. His kinship is much more with Angelo Poliziano, who with Lorenzo Valla may rightfully be considered the father of early modern philology and was not embarrassed to state his desire (indeed, his right) to interpret philosophical texts as a *grammaticus*.[120]

Although Vettori's preface includes the usual platitudes about the practical purpose of the *Ethics*,[121] it is impossible to mistake his work for anything but the product of the most serious scholarship. It is so, however, in a rather different sense than would have been recognizable by Tignosi and Acciaiuoli. It is not just that philology has made huge advances in the intervening century, but that the ideal of concurrently addressing the mind (through philosophical explanation) and the spirit (through exhortation) seems no longer to be

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[118] Lines 1996, pp. 152–53.

[119] See above, pp. 218–19.

[120] Poliziano 1986, pp. 16–19.

[121] Vettori 1584, Preface, [p. ix]: "Cum igitur aliquid ita me profecisse putarem, volui experiri, an possem in eo declarando studiosis bonarum artium adolescentibus aliquid prodesse, sanctissimaque hac disciplina ipsos instruere, in quo plurimum temporis consumpsi. Cum vidissem autem auctam non nihil esse in me facultatem hanc, ausus sum, crescente cotidie desiderio in me excolendi optima ingenia et omnem vitii labem e pectoribus eorum delendi, labores, quos sustinuissem in conatu hoc meo, publicarem."

in view, and is perhaps no longer attainable. Like Tignosi and Acciaiuoli, Vettori too makes references to classical *exempla* and quotes from classical poetry. However, his goal is fundamentally different. Vettori does not really strive to provide edifying examples from history and literature, but to explain the meaning of terms and syntactical constructions used by Aristotle, or to identify the individuals and customs alluded to. Thus, the *Ethics* becomes, for Vettori, an object for scholarly consideration that is largely separate from issues of a practical nature. It is especially in its orientation toward an academic audience and emphasis on scholarly erudition that Vettori's commentary represents a break with the fifteenth-century Italian tradition. It is also in this sense that his work can be considered emblematic of sixteenth-century Italian interpretations of the *Ethics*. As we shall see in the following chapters of this book, few commentaries in post-1500 Italy follow the Florentine model of examining the *Ethics* philologically. However, nearly all of them reflect the same concern one sees in Vettori's commentary for treating the *Ethics* as a work chiefly of methodological or scholarly interest. This involved abandoning the emphasis on both theory and practice that Aristotle had tried so hard to achieve in his work, and that had been one of the most notable characteristics of his fifteenth-century commentators in Florence.[122] That was, however, the price one had to pay for academic specialization.

[122] Cf. Tateo 1996, p. 480: "Le figure dell'umanista retore e ideologo e dell'umanista filologo e grammatico si andavano in realtà definendo in una loro autonomia e in qualche modo dissociando, collegandosi con aspetti diversi dello studioso delle *humanae litterae* che spesso in àmbito quattrocentesco erono fusi o convivevano."

CHAPTER SEVEN

PADUA

7.1 *The Fifteenth-Century Background: Ermolao Barbaro and Lauro Quirini*

As described above (§ 2.2.1), in Padua moral philosophy was for a long time the cinderella of the university subjects. Its salary of fl. 15 per year was the lowest in the faculty of Arts and Medicine, it was the only subject to be assigned one-year (or at most, two-year) contracts, and its teachers were almost always fresh graduates, most of whom apparently needed a temporary situation before going on into civil service with the Venetian republic. Indeed, many of them are never mentioned again in the university documents.[1] In vivid contrast with the practice elsewhere, regulars (members of religious orders) are hardly ever called upon to teach moral philosophy.[2] Furthermore, whereas in Florence and Bologna the subject had already gained ordinary status by the mid-sixteenth century, in Padua it continued to be taught in the afternoons of feast days.[3]

Despite the fact that noted figures such as Gasparino Barzizza (1407), Lauro Quirini (1452), Ermolao Barbaro (1474), and Agostino Nifo (1494–1496) taught the subject in the fifteenth century,[4] no real commentaries have been left to us as a result of this teaching;[5] it is therefore hard to say what the actual teaching practices were in

[1] An exception is Frigimelica Frigimelica. Appointed to moral philosophy in 1518, he went on to teach *sophistaria* (a branch of logic) in 1519, then progressed to *philosophia extraordinaria* in 1522, to *medicina theorica extraordinaria* in 1526, to *medicina theorica ordinaria* (2° loco) in 1532, and finally to *medicina practica ordinaria* (2° loco) in 1539. See Appendix A, no. 149.

[2] The only recorded case seems to be that of the Augustinian Giovanni Battista in 1430 (Appendix A, no. 125).

[3] See Poppi, pp. 106–08. A synthetic sketch of the Paduan *studium* in the Renaissance is offered in Grendler 1999c.

[4] On these and other Paduan figures, see Nardi 1958 and Poppi, especially pp. 108–12. Also see Appendix A, nos. 124, 130, 131, and 137.

[5] Florimonte 1554 has no academic pretensions or flavor. It is a vernacular work which purports to be an eye-witness report of Nifo's conversations with the Prince of Salerno.

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fifteenth-century Padua. Little, for example, can be inferred from Barbaro's *Compendium ethicorum librorum*, an outgrowth of his lectures in 1474–1475[6] but published only in 1544.[7] Fortunately, we know a bit more through Barbaro's annotations on a fourteenth-century manuscript containing the Latin versions of the *Ethics* (in Grosseteste/Moerbeke's translation), the *Politics* (in William of Moerbeke's translation), the pseudo-Aristotelian *Economics* (in the *versio Durandi*), and Boethius' *Consolatio Philosophiae*.[8] Barbaro writes annotations throughout the texts of the *Ethics* and the *Politics*,[9] but of special relevance is his note at the end of the *Politics*, f. 176v:

> I lectured on the eight books of the *Politics* in the University of Padua, finishing this work on February 20, 1476. Even more amazingly, we completed this task of interpretation in three months and 18 days, thanks to God's help. Last year I interpreted the same author's ten books of the *Ethics*, a work which no one before me had completed.[10]

Two inferences can be made from this note and from the manuscript in which it is written. First, since Barbaro boasts that he was the first at the University of Padua to have taught the *Ethics* in its entirety,[11] it seems that the practice in Padua was to read the work only partially. Before the 1570s, however, we lack evidence as to what exactly was covered.[12] It may be that Barbaro's compendium, by stopping at the end of Book VI, indicates what was usually taught, but that is hardly the only conceivable explanation. Second, it seems

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[6] The editor, Daniele Barbaro, suggests that his grandfather's paraphrase was written during his lecture course on the same subject; possibly, Barbaro summarized respective sections of Aristotle's *Ethics* after he had taught on them: "Libellum hunc Hermolaus Barbarus patruus meus magnus dum Patavi publice Aristotelis Ethicem profiteretur authoris ipsius mentem, atque ordinem sequutus in compendium redegit" (Barbaro 1544, f. 2v).

[7] See Appendix C, no. 44.

[8] New York, Columbia Univ. Library, Plimpton ms. 17; for a detailed listing of the contents see Kristeller 1956a, pp. 344–45.

[9] For their distribution, Kristeller 1956a, p. 348, n. 39.

[10] For the Latin original, see Appendix A, no. 131.

[11] Barbaro's coverage of all the books is confirmed in a letter to Arnoldo di Bost, in which he claims, "Libros omnes Aristotelis morales in Academia patavina biennium perlegi, quamquam anni ex illo decem et amplius acti sunt" (Barbaro 1943, I, p. 92, dated Kal. Juniis, 1485). However, this statement could also be taken to mean that Barbaro taught all of Aristotle's works on moral philosophy—i.e., including the *Economics* and the *Politics*.

[12] The specification of books to be read starts only in 1579, with Giason de Nores (Appendix A, no. 195).

that Barbaro, despite his humanist allegiances and ambitious program to retranslate all the works of Aristotle,[13] lectured on the medieval version of the text, although later, in connection with another (private?) series of lectures, he annotated and perhaps taught from the Greek text as well.[14] Thus, the Paduans were far slower than their Florentine counterparts in using the new translations of the *Ethics* as texts for university teaching. As noted above,[15] John Argyropoulos, Guglielmo Becchi, and Niccolò Tignosi used Bruni's translation for their lectures already in the 1450s.

It would be unfair, however, to blame Barbaro for the intellectual constraints to which his teaching was subject in the university. He was barely twenty years old at the time, still a law student, and could hardly have opposed the university authorities even had he wished to do so. It is true that, in several respects, his teaching and its product—the *Compendium*—do not seem especially innovative. For example, Barbaro's annotations on the Grosseteste/Moerbeke translation[16] make reference mainly to the commentaries of Eustratius and Thomas Aquinas,[17] but not to the older Greek interpreters.[18] As for the *Compendium*, this short work (40 folios in the Venice 1544 edition, *octavo* format) gives no space to quotations from poetry or to historical examples and seems generally conventional.[19] Nor is there anything special in the five brief questions that Barbaro poses and answers at the end of the work[20] (ff. 39–40), although they are not treated in a convoluted scholastic style.

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[13] Barbaro 1943, I, p. 92 and II, p. 38; also see Branca 1964 and Poppi, p. 110.

[14] The Greek manuscript carries the following colophon: "I finished teaching dialectic in its entirety, together with ethics, on March 7, 1473 with frequent interruptions due to many events. I absolved my duties in the period from the vigil of the feast of St. Martin (i.e., November 10) to March 7. Then I taught again, resuming on the feast of St. Martin (i.e., November 11) with the exception of book 7 . . ." For the Latin original, see Appendix A, no. 131.

[15] See above, pp. 190–91 and *passim*.

[16] At least from what can be gathered from the discussion in Kristeller 1956a, pp. 348–53.

[17] On the commentaries by Eustratius and Thomas, see Appendix B, nos. 6 and 11.

[18] Barbaro's choice of commentators probably had to do with his taste for literal exposition (Thomas) and his strong desire to reconcile Aristotle and Plato (Eustratius).

[19] Kraye 1995, pp. 102–04.

[20] On the respective rôles of prudence and wisdom in obtaining happiness, on the relationship between prudence and virtues, on the interconnection of the virtues, and on the respective dignity of prudence and wisdom.

Nonetheless, some of Barbaro's achievements should be noted. Barbaro, who was to become a central figure in the cultural renewal of the Veneto before his death in 1494,[21] could rightfully be proud of having covered not only all the books of the *Ethics*, but the *Politics* (and perhaps the *Economics*) besides. This was a rare feat in the Italian universities, where the *Politics* was seldom taught.[22] Furthermore, his annotations on the medieval translation show that he had at least read the work critically, comparing it both with the Greek text (in several manuscripts) and with Bruni's translation.[23] Later, when introducing a series of private lectures on Aristotle, he emphasized the need for a direct reading of Aristotle's text, complemented especially by the interpretations of the Greek commentators.[24] And the *Compendium*, though hardly new in format,[25] seems notable not only for its succinctness, but also for its clarity. The last point is especially striking when one reads Barbaro's summary of complex passages such as *EN* I.4 and I.13.[26] Thus, although Barbaro did not (and, likely, was not allowed to) lecture on the *Ethics* using a new translation, in other respects his teaching can be associated with the humanist effort, in Florence, not only to broaden the public's acquaintance with Aristotle's moral philosophy, but also to present Aristotle's thought as clearly as possible.[27] In this case, the fact that the moral philosophy course was to be given on feast days may again, as in Florence, have led to drawing a diverse audience with broadly humanist interests. Another parallel with the situation in Florence emerges from Barbaro's (private?) teaching of the *Ethics* in 1484–1485, for he declares that he has taught the subject together with dialectic.[28] The examples of Argyropoulos and Poliziano in Florence show that other scholars too favored teaching the *Ethics* at the beginning of the philosophical curriculum, immediately before or right after logic.[29] Thus,

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[21] See, for example, Poppi, pp. 109–10; Branca 1973 and 1980.
[22] See above, pp. 106–07.
[23] Kristeller 1956a, pp. 349–50.
[24] Barbaro 1943, I, pp. 91–93 and II, pp. 107–09.
[25] On *Ethics* compendia in Italy, see Lines 1999a, especially pp. 249–57 and above, pp. 167–69.
[26] Respectively, Barbaro 1544, ff. 5v and 9r; these passage treat problems of method and of psychology.
[27] On the situation in fifteenth-century Florence, see above, § 5.3.3.
[28] See n. 14 above.
[29] See above, p. 88.

it is possible to place Ermolao's teaching in the context of broader fifteenth-century initiatives in the realm of moral education.

In Padua, however, that of Barbaro was a lone achievement. Padua's self-identification as an old and glorious university with a strong tradition in natural philosophy doubtless did much to suffocate innovative instincts. However, if Barbaro's example was not followed in Padua for a long time it was also because, for knowledge of Greek, the Paduan *studium* was a cultural backwater at least until the end of the fifteenth century, when Niccolò Leonico Tomeo[30] started teaching there. Although there were isolated cases of teaching on the Greek text before then, a series of philosophy professors with good credentials in Greek language was not appointed until after 1517, when the university reopened after the troubles of Cambrai.[31]

In any case, the Paduan tradition in moral philosophy was not strong. Not many early interpretations of the *Ethics* can be associated with Padua with any certainty, but those that can were no harbingers of novelty. As noted earlier,[32] Geremia da Montagnone's *Compendium moralium notabilium* (before 1310) and Paolo Nicoletto Veneto's *Conclusiones Ethicorum* (ca. 1387)[33] are the only ones known before the fifteenth century; neither work is especially remarkable or associated with university teaching. The evidence for the fifteenth century is equally scarce. In addition to Ermolao Barbaro's annotations on the Plimpton manuscript (mentioned above), the annotations of his grandfather Francesco on the same manuscript survive. These indicate an interest in the historical, moral, and political issues of the *Ethics* rather than in the philosophical and philological aspects

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[30] On Tomeo, see Lohr, RLAC, pp. 452–54; this figure is not to be confused with Nicolò Leoniceno, on whom see below, Appendix C, no. 47.

[31] On the state of Greek studies in Padua see Poppi, pp. 140–41, n. 29; Garin 1966, II, pp. 535–40; and Schmitt 1983b. In spite of the Aldine edition of Aristotle's works in Greek (Venice, 1495–1498), Schmitt observes that "the establishment in 1497 of the famous Paduan chair to teach Aristotle from the Greek text was perhaps more the product of wishful thinking than of taking advantage of a genuine pedagogical opportunity. It was at Paris, near the middle of the sixteenth century, that the teaching of philosophy in Greek . . . became a reality with implications for more than a handful of students" (Schmitt 1983a, p. 37). Schmitt refers to the appointment as Royal reader in Paris of Francesco Vicomercato (or Vimercati) of Milan (1542). An earlier occurrence (Pierre Danès, 1530–1534) has been noted in Bianchi 1995, pp. 220–22. On the teaching of the *Ethics* from the Greek in Italy, see above, pp. 102 ff.

[32] Above, p. 174.

[33] See below, Appendix C, nos. 3 and 16.

that increasingly captivated Ermolao.[34] To my knowledge, the only other fifteenth-century work on the *Ethics* that can be associated with Padua is a prolusion by Girolamo Avanzo. The work is a byproduct of Avanzo's course on moral philosophy given in 1494–1495.[35] A better window onto ethical discussions in fifteenth-century Padua is offered by a controversy that took place in the early 1440s between Lauro Quirini, a young Venetian nobleman then living in Florence, and Leonardo Bruni, chancellor of Florence and one of the best known humanists of the time.

The controversy can be reconstructed only from Bruni's response to the youngster (then in his twenties) and from a short passage in Vespasiano da Bisticci's *Lives*.[36] Bruni's letter indicates that there were four areas of disagreement between the two men: (1) whether the will or the intellect is superior, (2) whether or not the virtues are means, (3) whether virtues come to us by nature or habituation, and (4) whether the virtues are necessarily connected.[37] The second and last points are tired repetitions of well-trod problems considered in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and are marginal to the problem of teaching virtue.[38] More interesting (although still hardly novel)[39] are the first and third points. Bruni concentrates on the first, refuting Quirini's reproach of Aristotle for having (supposedly) identified happiness with the contemplative life. Quirini had apparently critiqued this view on two counts: that the contemplative life necessitates human goods or power; and that human knowledge is small and uncertain. Quirini had then argued that the will is superior to the intellect.

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[34] Kristeller 1956a, especially pp. 347–48. Kristeller remarks (p. 348): "Le glosse di Francesco quindi rivelano semplicemente una lettura attenta del testo latino medievale di Aristotele, senza intenzioni filosofiche o critiche, ma con semplici interessi storici, morali e politici."

[35] Avanzo 1495; see Appendix A, no. 136 and Appendix C, no. 49.

[36] Vespasiano da Bisticci (1970–76), II, pp. 65–67.

[37] The respective arguments are discussed in *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni*, pp. 264–67. The text of Bruni's letter to Quirini is translated *ibid.*, pp. 293–99. For the Latin version, see Bruni, *Ep.*, IX, p. 2 and Luiso 1980, IX, p. 3. On Quirini in general see *Lauro Quirini umanista* and relative bibliography.

[38] They are useful, however, for indicating how low the level of discussion of philosophical issues of this kind could be among Paduan (and Florentine) humanists at the time.

[39] As Bruni also recognized: "Scripsisti michi nuper proponens quaestiones aliquas a me rogans, ut illis responderem. Erant vero quaestiones satis pervulgatae, atque communes . . ." (Bruni, *Ep.*, IX, p. 144).

Quirini's critiques are apparently based on Franciscan and skeptical arguments (the latter especially shock Bruni), which make appeal to Augustine and Boethius. His conclusion about the superiority of the will is closely tied to the positions of Scotus and Ockham.[40] However, Quirini's arguments for the superiority of the will do not guide his view of the acquisition of virtue, for he is doubtful as to whether virtue comes by nature or instead by habituation (he would rather emphasize the first, in the form of astrological influences). Bruni is able to respond with Aristotle's teaching in *EN* II.1, which Quirini either did not know or, more likely, found unconvincing.[41] In particular, Bruni insists that the training and effort one puts into becoming virtuous is far more important than the disposition toward virtue that one has received at birth.

The debate between Quirini and Bruni is, of course, no safe indication of how the Venetian eventually taught the *Ethics* in Venice (in 1449) and in Padua (in 1452),[42] since with age he may have modified his positions. It is also hard to know whether they reflect any teaching Quirini may have received before arriving in Florence. Furthermore, it is unclear whether Quirini's (qualified) preference for Aristotle above Plato[43] is representative of the intellectual climate in Padua, for Ermolao Barbaro adopted instead a conciliatory stance, close to that of Pico della Mirandola. As we shall see, however, the Paduans generally did not go to the lengths of the Florentines in arguing that Plato and Aristotle could be perfectly reconciled. And it is certainly of interest that Franciscan and Augustinian approaches to moral philosophy made themselves felt in Padua, and that some attempt was made to integrate these with Scotist and Occamist views. It remains unclear whether Quirini's emphasis on astrological influences reflects a common position in Padua. If so, it might have suggested the uselessness of studying moral theory and recommended its treatment as a very minor subject.

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[40] See *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni*, pp. 387–88.

[41] The issue of the rôle of nature in acquiring virtue has, as we have seen with Tignosi (see above, pp. 197–99), strong connections with the question of man's freedom. On the relationship of fate and freedom in the Renaissance, see especially Poppi 1997a.

[42] On Quirini's teaching, see Appendix A, no. 130.

[43] Monfasani 1976, p. 204. This preference, however, is somewhat belied by the controversy with Bruni, in which he takes positions clearly contrary to Aristotle's.

7.2 *The Controversy between Jacopo Zabarella and Francesco Piccolomini*

In the second half of the sixteenth century, Padua—at the height of its international renown[44]—experienced a renewal of sorts in its teaching of moral philosophy.[45] This development is evident both from the institutional context and from the commentary literature. For example, Francesco Robortello (taught 1562–1567) is the first in a line of experienced teachers who are hired for more than one year to teach moral philosophy (often both the *Ethics* and the *Politics*) and are paid considerably better than before.[46] The interests of the teachers become clearer; as Poppi has observed, many of the professors of moral philosophy from the second half of the sixteenth century have backgrounds in rhetoric.[47] And, as a percentage of the budget for Arts (as for Arts and Medicine), moral philosophy increases its share about five-fold.[48]

Furthermore, there is a remarkable acceleration in the production of works on Aristotle's moral philosophy. Already in 1547, Francesco Zini published the prolusion to his *Ethics* course, which many had been unable to attend to due a torrential rain.[49] Robortello himself left a prologue on the *Politics* dating from 1550, when he lectured on the work in Venice, and published Francesco Filelfo's *De morali disciplina*.[50] Robortello's successor in Padua, Giason de Nores (taught 1577–1590), also wrote on moral philosophy.[51] And Niccolò Colonio

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[44] For a brief description and bibliography, see Schmitt 1984b.

[45] On the figures and works discussed in this paragraph see especially Poppi, pp. 110–12.

[46] On Robortello, see Appendix A, no. 194.

[47] Poppi, p. 106. One should, however, treat with caution Poppi's statement that the moral philosophy course was "quasi un prolungamento della cattedra di retorica, secondo la concezione antica e medievale della poesia e dell'oratoria viste in funzione protettrice alla virtù e all'amore della 'polis'" (*ibid.*).

[48] In the period 1517–1521, moral philosophy in Padua represents 0.47% of the budget in Arts and Medicine (1% of Arts alone); during the last 20 years of the century, moral philosophy has instead 2.65% of the budget in Arts and Medicine (5.5% of that in Arts). The teacher of moral philosophy now sometimes earns more than do some other teachers, even in natural philosophy and medicine.

[49] Zini 1547. On Zini, see Appendix A, no. 138 and Appendix C, no. 68.

[50] Robortello 1552 and Filelfo 1552 were published together, in a volume also containing an *Averrois paraphrasis in libris de Republica Platonis*; see Bozza 1949, p. 34.

[51] Nores 1584. On de Nores see Appendix A, no. 195 and Appendix C, nos. 95–96.

(taught 1591–1592) published a prolusion related to his teaching.[52] Because of these developments and the changes in institutional context described above, the late sixteenth century may be viewed as the period in which the Paduan university finally established a specialized and productive teaching in moral philosophy.

Nonetheless, the magnitude and significance of this change should not be exaggerated. There was a gap in ethics teaching for at least 10 years (1566–1577) after Robortello's death. When the teaching resumed, it was again confined to feast days, and the teaching requirements were modest. Not only was the usual teaching assignment only one book of the *Ethics* each year, but often teachers did not venture beyond Book III.[53] Furthermore, even though ethics now enjoyed a better remuneration and was no longer the preserve of recent graduates, it remained, together with astrology, among the most poorly paid (and staffed) subjects. Nor did the renewal last long: by 1594, starting with Giovanni Belloni (taught 1594–1624),[54] ethics teaching was assigned exclusively to clerics, who taught for long stretches of time but rarely published on moral philosophy.[55]

The reasons behind the renewal effort and its collapse are unfortunately not known. Most likely it simply proved impossible to reform the course properly after decades of neglect: since at least the 1540s, disappointment with the uselessness and inadequacy of the course in moral philosophy had been voiced by several Paduans, and most of the best work on the *Ethics* in the sixteenth century was written, either by men unconnected with the university, or by teachers of other courses.[56] The best examples are Alessandro Piccolomini (1508–1579, a Sienese who studied philosophy in Padua and wrote in

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[52] Colonio 1591. On Colonio see Appendix A, no. 196 and Appendix C, no. 105. A commentary attributed to Colonio has not been found, to my knowledge; cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 96.

[53] See, for example, the books to be read by Giason de Nores in Appendix A, no. 195.

[54] On Belloni see Appendix A, no. 197.

[55] An exception is Flavio Querenghi; see below, Appendix C, no. 158.

[56] Poppi, p. 111 notes "l'incapacità di un discorso approfondito e autonomo circa i problemi etico-politici a livello di un insegnamento accademico così mal strutturato e regolamentato com'era a Padova. . . . La decennale interruzione dalla morte del Robortello all'avvento del de Nores (1567–1577) è indicativa di tale sentimento di inutilità e della necessità di un suo profondo rinnovamento statutario e contenutistico. In realtà, le opere migliori dei moralisti padovani del Cinquecento provengono da circoli extra-accademici o da docenti di altre discipline . . ." On the success of the *Ethics* outside the universities in Italy, see Schmitt 1979, pp. 93–95.

Italian),[57] Antonio Riccoboni (1541–1599, a professor of rhetoric in Padua),[58] and Francesco Piccolomini (a distant relative of Alessandro and professor of philosophy in Padua). The latter's enormously successful *Universa philosophia de moribus*, described by Father Poppi as "l'opera più consistente nella teorizzazione dell'etica durante tutto il Rinascimento italiano,"[59] repays careful attention for its perspective on the teaching of virtue. Before studying this work, however, it is instructive to examine the circumstances surrounding its writing.

Francesco Piccolomini (1523–1607), who had studied and earned his doctorate in Arts and Medicine at Siena in 1546, went on to teach philosophy in Siena, Macerata, and Perugia before embarking on his teaching career in Padua (1560–1598). There Piccolomini held, from 1565, the first ordinary chair of natural philosophy (until 1571 in concurrence with Federico Pendasio, with whom he had a controversy on the doctrine of the soul) and produced many considerable commentaries on Aristotle's natural philosophy, including the *Physics, De caelo, De generatione et corruptione*, and *De anima*.[60] Piccolomini never did, to our knowledge, teach moral philosophy in the university,[61] thus it is not surprising that the *Universa philosophia* (first published in Venice, 1583)[62] supposedly grew out of a vacation period. Indeed, Piccolomini states that he wished to pace the meadows of moral philosophy together with Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics, prompted by memories of a plague that had six years earlier afflicted the cities of the Veneto.[63] Piccolomini further emphasizes the non-

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[57] A. Piccolomini 1542 (see Poppi, p. 113 and *passim*). The statement in Lohr, RLAC, p. 329 that Alessandro taught moral philosophy in Padua in 1539 (cf. Gauthier 1970, p. 180) is not supported by the archival records: see below, Appendix A.

[58] Riccoboni 1596; see Appendix C, no. 107.

[59] Poppi, p. 124. On Piccolomini and the *Universa philosophia*, see below, Appendix C, no. 92.

[60] For Piccolomini's biography and writings see A. Baldini 1980b and Lohr, RLAC, pp. 331–42.

[61] The *Praelectiones ethicae sive in librum De moribus* referred to by Lohr, RLAC, pp. 341–42 (in Milan, BAmbr. D.413.inf. [s. XVI], ff. 5r–74r) seem to be a trial run for the Introduction to the *Universa philosophia*. See A. Baldini 1980a, p. 163, n. 4.

[62] In 1594 Piccolomini brought out a second edition, with only minor changes. My references are to the first edition. For other editions, see Appendix C, no. 92.

[63] F. Piccolomini 1583, f. ii v: "Cum igitur in praeclara Patavina Academia, iam viginti tres integros annos, eam philosophiae partem explicaverim, quae contemplationi est dicata. . . . Ex animo autem meo huic honorificae servituti dicato (dum per ferias a gravioribus contemplationis studiis mihi vacare licuit, et recreationis loco, per viridia, salutariaque Morum prata, una cum Academicis, Peripateticis, et

academic character of his work by dedicating it to the Senate of Venice and explaining that its ten levels (*gradus*) reflect an ascending order of nobility in Venetian offices and institutions, from the commoners and *impuberes adolescentes* of the first step to the magistrates and laws of the last.[64] Piccolomini's adulatory statements and protestations of modesty, however, should not be taken at face value. Although its structure and content may in fact have something to do with concerns, in the Veneto, for political and academic order,[65] the work's erudition and complexity (nearly 600 folio pages of dense argumentation) belie its origin as a relief of summertime boredom.

Piccolomini was, in fact, responding to one of his colleagues in Padua, Giacomo Zabarella (1533–1589), best known today for his works on logic and his theory of the *regressus*.[66] In what was to be a heated and prolonged controversy, the two professors especially debated a pedagogical issue: how moral philosophy and other philosophical subjects should be taught. For example, should the *Ethics* be taught by first presenting the subject's end and then explaining how to attain it (as Aristotle did, starting from a description of happiness), or are other approaches possible? In particular, might it not also be possible to adopt the contrary order, starting from a definition of the subject and gradually moving to other considerations, including the end? To a modern reader an argument over such matters might seem silly and frivolous:[67] western ideals of education make much of the need to adapt one's teaching to the specific audience, regardless of the structures through which specific bodies of knowledge have

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Stoicis spaciari) hae de ingenuorum animorum Civili institutione prodiere meditationes, sumpta praesertim occasione ab ea populari calamitate, quae ante sex annos, ob infestissimam pestem, Venetias, Patavium, variasque praeclaras urbes miserrime afflixit; ut, si quam ex contemplationis fontibus, pro leniendis humanis miseriis, salutarem acquam mihi datum esset haurire, opera experirer."

[64] For an outline of the work's steps, see below, n. 93.

[65] As argued by Jardine 1997, pp. 188–91. But see also the interesting suggestion in A. Baldini, 1980a, p. 174.

[66] On Zabarella and the problem of method see: Edwards 1960, pp. 160 ff.; Randall 1961, pp. 61 ff.; Gilbert 1963, pp. 173–76; Crescini 1965 and 1972; Poppi 1970a, 1972, and 1991; Bottin 1972; Jardine 1976; Risse 1983; Schmitt 1984b; Copenhaver and Schmitt, pp. 117–21; Mikkeli 1992, Ch. 4; and the essays in *Method and Order*. In general, see *DCLI*, IV, pp. 472–74 (V. Zaccaria); Lohr, RLAC, pp. 497–503, and *ER*, VI, pp. 337–39 (W. A. Wallace).

[67] As indeed it seemed to Jacopo Facciolati, the historian of the University of Padua who commented with contempt on this dispute: Facciolati, p. 220. See the quotation and brief comments in Jardine 1997, pp. 192–93.

been transmitted. Yet the heated discussion on pedagogical method carried on by Zabarella, Piccolomini, and numerous other philosophers of their time[68] indicates that such a view is not self-evident and is historically conditioned. Furthermore, it is a reminder that, at the end of the sixteenth century, there was still no fundamental agreement about certain issues central to education, and especially moral education. But to understand the problems themselves, the controversy must be studied more closely.[69]

The starting point must be Zabarella's *Opera logica* (first printed in 1578), to which the *Universa philosophia*, published five years later, was a reply. Despite its failure to mention Zabarella by name, more than half of the chapters of Piccolomini's Introduction (caps. XIV–XXXII) are dedicated to the question of the proper order in teaching. Zabarella soon responded with his *De doctrinae ordine apologia* (first published in 1584), and Piccolomini attempted to settle the dispute, when his adversary was long since dead, with his *Comes politicus* (1594).[70] As Zabarella pointed out, the differences between the two men centered especially on three issues: which order should be observed in teaching, what is meant by such an order, and whether such an order is single or multiple.[71] The first two points are of special interest here.

Zabarella's treatises *De natura logicae* and *De methodis*, published as part of his *Opera logica*, are both relevant for understanding his views on ethics and its relationship with other subjects.[72] In the first trea-

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[68] Although the discussion of the *ordo docendi* accelerated in the wake of the debate that took place in Padua, it should be remembered that scholars such as Jacob Schegk and Simone Simoni had been involved in a similar controversy earlier in Germany (see Simoni 1566 and 1570; Schegk 1568 and 1573; Risse 1964, *ad indicem*; Petersen 1921, *ad indicem*), and that Zabarella and Piccolomini were hardly the first to debate these issues in Italy; see A. Baldini 1980a, p. 173, n. 45. Unfortunately, most of the scholarly attention in the past forty years has gone to the question of scientific methodology rather than to the one of pedagogical method, which, as admitted even in Edwards 1960, pp. 160–70, was actually the more hotly debated. There is at present no overview of the late-Renaissance views of *paedia*, as observed also in Jardine 1997, p. 208; on its discussion in relation to Aristotle's *De animalibus* see Perfetti 2000, *passim* (cf. Kessler 1997).

[69] The debate in Padua has been described by, among others, Ragnisco 1885–86; Nardi 1958, p. 426; Poppi, pp. 119 ff.; A. Baldini 1980a, pp. 173–74; Jardine 1997; Lines 1997, pp. 222–31. Also see the literature on Zabarella cited above, n. 66.

[70] F. Piccolomini 1594.

[71] "Nostra haec controversia ad tria capita redigi videtur, quae ordinate considerandae sunt; unum est, quis ordo definiendus proponatur, deinde quid sit, demum quotuplex sit" (Zabarella 1597b, cap. II, col. 4).

[72] A lucid summary of Zabarella's thinking on ethical method in these two works is Poppi 1997c.

tise, Zabarella examines the functions of logic, concluding that, when understood as *logica docens* (versus *logica utens*), logic is neither a science nor an art, but an instrument, and that it is such both for speculative and for active philosophy (although it is only a secondary instrument in the latter case). In particular, logic is relevant to ethics in that it helps distinguish between the true and the false in ethical teaching.[73] Zabarella insists at some length on the importance of using logic when handling ethical matters (although he does not go to the extreme of advocating a special kind of logic for ethics, as Jean Buridan had done),[74] and he contrasts the usefulness of logic with the irrelevance of rhetoric and poetry.[75] Rhetoric and poetry, after all, are not connected with moral teaching (since they contribute nothing either to understanding ethics or to acting upon it) but with the *ars civilis* inasmuch as it exercises a persuasive function toward becoming virtuous.[76]

These comments of Zabarella are significant for the sixteenth-century debate over the teaching of ethics in general and for its connection (or lack of it) with rhetoric and poetry. Here there was no conflict with Piccolomini.[77] More directly relevant to the contrast

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[73] Zabarella 1597c, Lib. I, caps. XI–XIII.

[74] See above, pp. 147–48.

[75] Zabarella 1597c, Lib. II, cap. XIV, col. 80: "Si moralem spectemus, ad eam hae duae facultates [rhetorica et poetica] nulla ratione utiles sunt, neque enim ad cognitionem moralis disciplinae conducunt, neque ad actionem, quae sequi cognitionem illam debet. . . . Doctrinam igitur et cognitionem moralis disciplinae spectando, ea nullo alio eget instrumento logico, quam arte sophistica et Dialectica, et modo quodam etiam Demonstrativa; arte Rhetorica certe non eget, neque Poetica, ut omnibus sana mente praeditis per se manifestum esse puto. Sed neque ad bene agendum his egemus . . ."

[76] *Ibid.*, Lib. II, cap. XV, cols. 82–83: "Sunt igitur Rhetorica atque Poetica facultates instrumentales, quibus homo civilis ad agendum utitur, id est ad cives bonos efficiendos, cum hoc tamen discrimine, quod arte Rhetorica per semetipsum utitur, Poetica vero per alios; ipse enim artificiosa oratione persuadet civibus ut boni sint. . . . Poetica vero arte per alios utitur, non per se; nam orator quidem esse debet, si sit optime gubernaturus, non tamen poeta . . ."

[77] Piccolomini has scathing things to say about philologists and even discourages Cosimo de' Medici (the Grand duke of Tuscany) from studying poetics (A. Baldini 1980a, pp. 166 and 170). See also Piccolomini's statement: "Experientia enim constat, viros quidem sapientes et probos, quos multos novi, cuncta congruenter excipere; nonnullos vero, ob depravatam animi constitutionem, omnia recta iudicare obliqua; quosdam, vel ob immoderatam loquacitatem, vel ob cognitionem tantum adumbratam, de quovis suo arbitratu loqui; alios demum ob exuperantem *philautian*, sua tantum magnifacere, aliena despicere et vilipendere; *philautia* enim ambitionis est mater, ex qua invidia prodit, quam sequitur aliorum contemptio, ex quorum conspiratione Philosophia in Philologiam permutatur, quo nihil perniciosius salutari sapientiae accidere posse existimo" (F. Piccolomini 1594, f. 3r).

between the two professors, however, is Zabarella's statement that, since the *Nicomachean Ethics* is written according to the analytic order (*ordo resolutivus*), all the disciplines whose end is action should be explained in the same way.[78] This point becomes clearer in the *De methodis*, where Zabarella explains—in contrast with Galen—that in teaching only two orders are possible: either the synthetic (*compositivus*) or the analytic (*resolutivus*). The first proceeds from first principles to the end, or from the simple to the complex, and is the order appropriate for teaching speculative philosophy. In the case of practical philosophy, however, teaching needs to follow the reverse order, which is *a notione finis*; since its purpose is to explain the means necessary to reach a specific end, the end (in the case of ethics, *felicitas*) must be known at the outset for the teaching to be at all meaningful. Furthermore, the order of teaching in the practical arts needs to be contrary to that by which the arts themselves are generated and operate; since the latter is synthetic, Zabarella's conclusion is confirmed.[79]

A remarkable illustration of Zabarella's views is his interpretation of *EN* I.3 and I.4,[80] passages that were also of great interest to Piccolomini. In chapter 3, Aristotle states that mathematical precision should not be expected in ethics, since the actions with which moral philosophy is concerned "exhibit much variety and fluctuation." He then turns to the proper hearer of lectures on ethics. Observing that "each man judges well the things he knows," Aristotle disqualifies the young from hearing the subject, since they are "inexperienced in the actions that occur in life," which constitute this discipline's very subject. In chapter 4, Aristotle praises Plato for having asked, "Are we on the way from or to the first principles?" Or, put in slightly different terms, the question is whether one needs to start from what is *generally* familiar or from what is familiar *to us*. Aristotle opts for the latter, emphasizing that:

> Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the facts are the starting-point, and if they are sufficiently plain to him, he will not need

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[78] Zabarella 1597c, Lib. II, cap. VII, col. 67.

[79] Zabarella 1597d, Lib. II, cap. IX, cols. 190–91; cf. *ibid.*, Lib. II, cap. XV, cols. 212–13.

[80] On these passages see the discussion on pp. 62–63 above.

> the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting-points. (1095b3–7)

The relationship between chapters 3 and 4 is puzzling to Zabarella, who wonders why Aristotle bothers repeating himself. His solution is that, whereas chapter 3 concerns the investigative method of ethics, chapter 4 discusses the pedagogical order. Both are *a notioribus nobis*, that is, *a notis secundum cognitionem distinctam.* This kind of distinct knowledge, in turn, may or may not coincide with what is better known according to nature (*notiora secundum naturam*), but it is surely related to our psychological makeup and to how we learn most easily.[81] Thus, Zabarella can offer the dictum which neatly sums up his views: "ordinem doctrinae, non a rerum natura, sed a nostra meliore vel faciliore cognitione sumendum esse."[82]

Piccolomini offers a rather different interpretation of *EN* I.4: leaning on the views of eminent commentators such as Eustratius, Thomas, Acciaiuoli, and Vimercati, he claims that Aristotle was not discussing pedagogical method at all when he spoke of proceeding *a notioribus nobis*; rather, he was trying to describe the investigative process (*via cognitionis*).[83] Furthermore, Piccolomini attempts to undermine Zabarella's arguments by arguing for an incompatibility between the method *a notis secundum naturam* and that *a notioribus nobis*.[84] And, while Piccolomini readily concedes that Aristotle had used the analytic order in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he insists that this was caused by his intent to show his readers how he had come to his conclusions; Aristotle did not mean to provide a model for moral *exposition*, but for moral *inquiry*.[85]

It is this very distinction between the method of inquiry and the order of teaching that is one of the major sticking points between

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[81] Zabarella 1597b, Lib. I, cap. IV, cols. 8–9; *ibid.*, cap. VI, cols. 22–25.

[82] *Ibid.*, Lib. I, cap. III, cols. 6–7.

[83] F. Piccolomini 1583, Introductio, cap. XIX, pp. 23–24: "Haec omnia, ut etiam versus Hesiodi qui referuntur, tam aperte conveniunt methodo et ab ordine dissident, ut nihil clarius dici possit; recta enim iuvenum educatio, congruensque assuetudo, nequaquam ordini, sed solum facili apprehensioni et assensioni conducunt. Constat itaque de methodo Aristotelem loqui, dum ait a nobis notioribus ad notiora natura esse progrediendum. Et quicunque locum illum exponunt de ordine, simul Aristoteli, rationi, et sibimet apertissime adversantur . . ."

[84] I believe that Piccolomini misrepresents Zabarella's position on this point.

[85] F. Piccolomini 1594, f. 3v: "Consilium autem Aristotelis in scientia de Moribus, tanquam principalis authoris fuit, nedum explicare, verum insuper modum patefaceret inventionis partium eius Philosophiae, rationemque tradere necessitatis earum."

Zabarella and Piccolomini. They both agree that ethical inquiry must proceed by deduction from an understanding of the end (thus, inquiry is analytical). But Piccolomini cannot bring himself to admit that the order of teaching—in ethics as in other practical subjects—should follow this order of apprehension. First of all, Piccolomini says, it is not necessarily true that the arts and the sciences should be communicated according to different orders; whereas Plato and Avicenna used the synthetic order, Aristotle used the analytic order. Therefore, it is possible to use either order in teaching.[86] However, this does not mean that one can use whichever order he happens to like: the choice is determined, not according to how we learn most easily (although this consideration may apply in other contexts, such as during investigation), but according to the *natura rerum*.[87] Thus, it is the very nature of things that must be considered and followed.[88] However, Piccolomini (confusingly) argues, nature's order (*ordo naturae*) is not necessarily such that it must always be followed; given Piccolomini's specific purposes, he sees no harm in using mostly the synthetic order in communicating the things relevant to civil science, even though (as he admits) Aristotle's order was different.[89]

The fundamental question embedded in this discussion is the following: Is the order of teaching a particular discipline necessary or contingent? Zabarella argues for the former: both in discovery and

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[86] F. Piccolomini 1583, Introductio, cap. XX, p. 26: ". . . in tradendis disciplinis nos uti posse utroque ordine: disciplinae enim vel per dialogum traduntur, vel explicantur sermone auscultatorio; dum id fit per dialogum, ut apud Platonem, id verum est, quod magna ex parte simul indagatur natura rei, et patefit ordo indagandi illam; at si sermo fuerit auscultatorius, tunc frequenter indagatur primo a nobis natura rei per resolutionem, traditur autem aliis et explicatur per compositionem . . ."

[87] F. Piccolomini 1594, Pars V, f. 12r: "Ordo disciplinarum, et via addiscendi, cum aliqua ex parte consimilia sint, differunt tamen inter se; et differentiarum una haec est, ut via addiscendi petatur ex nostro cognoscendi modo, ordo vero ex natura rerum de quibus agitur . . ."

[88] F. Piccolomini 1583, Introductio, cap. XXII, p. 28: "Praeterea, si in rerum natura hic duplex ordo reperitur, nos, qui naturam aemulamur, ab ea non recedentes valemus in scientiis utrumque servare. Similiter etiam datum nobis est artem utroque ordinis genere tradere . . ."

[89] *Ibid.*, cap. XXXII, p. 39: "Ordo ab Aristotele servatus, ut eius instituto inserviebat, optimus apparuit; ego tamen cupiens cuncta ad civilem scientiam pertinentia in capita redigere, eorum ostendere connexionem, et quo ordine quasi gradus a nobis percurri debeant ostendere, aliquantum ab eius ordine recessi; ac, ut exactior consurgeret notitia, ordoque generationis in nobis cum civilium habituum, tum attinentium ad eos lucidior pateret magis ordine compositivo sum usus. Agam namque primo de materia, in qua versantur morales virtutes . . ."

in teaching, one should follow the synthetic order in the sciences and the analytic order in the arts.[90] Although initially this position may appear too rigid, Zabarella astutely assumes a correspondence between these two different orders and our epistemological processes. Thus, Zabarella's main concern is that the student will find it as easy as possible to understand his subject. He lays down his ground rules with this consideration in mind. According to Zabarella, following instead the order of nature (as advocated by Piccolomini) does not always help the learning process.

By making a sharp distinction between the method of discovery and the order of teaching, Piccolomini instead embraces a contingent view of pedagogical method. The result, according to Zabarella, is a moral philosophy that has little to do with that of Aristotle: not only is the order different, but many of the conclusions are contrary to those of Aristotle, and the Sienese has added and subtracted at will.[91] Piccolomini responds that his intention differs from that of Aristotle: wishing to teach others, Piccolomini sees his duty as that of starting out from first principles (*a primis principiis*). Had he—like Aristotle—begun by discussing the supreme good, he would not have been able to do so in depth or with clarity, and would later have had to repeat himself (as Aristotle in fact did). In such a case it is better, according to Piccolomini, to begin with the simpler matters and progress toward the end or goal.[92]

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[90] Zabarella 1597d, lib. II, cap. XV, col. 213; *De doctrinae ordine apologia*, Lib. I, cap. V, col. 12: ". . . secundum opinionem nostram cognitionis ordo invariabilis est, quando enim adest ratio ordinandi sumpta a nostra cognitione, non est alius ordo servandus, quia si alius servetur, non est rectus ordo . . ."

[91] Zabarella 1597b, cap. XIII, col. 56: ". . . attamen relicta civili Aristotelis philosophia, aliam ipse propriam tradidit, et ordine illi contrariam et sententiis rebusque ipsis ab ea maxime discrepantem, quum et plurima in ea tractentur, quorum Aristoteles nullam facere mentionem voluit, et multa etiam praetermittantur, quae Aristoteles tamquam necessaria diligentissime pertractavit, adeo ut et mancam et redundantem esse necesse sit vel Aristotelis, vel huius clarissimi viri civilem philosophiam."

[92] F. Piccolomini 1594, Pars I, f. 4r: "Dum itaque aliquis lectores instituere cupit, ut institutionis ordinem servet, et sine repetitione in uno eodemque gradu summum bonum explicet, cum id in primo gradu efficere non valeat, et in posteriore aptissime assequatur, non debet ullo pacto id primo sibi explicandum proponere, sed a principiis ordiri, indeque compositionis ordine progredi ad caetera; ita enim progressio ad finem, et cunctorum connexio optime refulgebit."

7.3 *Piccolomini's* Universa Philosophia de Moribus

7.3.1 *Formal Considerations*

An examination of the *Universa philosophia* confirms Zabarella's judgment about the work's formal distance from that of Aristotle. Already the structure is telling, for the introduction is followed immediately by a discussion of the object of virtue, whereas the end of virtue is reserved for Step Nine. The tenth and last step is essentially a summary of the *Politics*.[93] Piccolomini does not, however, simply scramble the order of Aristotle's books. Although there are numerous references to the *Ethics*, the succession of the chapters within each book is no orderly explanation of Aristotle's text, nor even of the topics discussed by the Stagirite. The sequence is determined entirely by the issues Piccolomini wishes to treat and by the arguments considered necessary to prove his points (or refute those of others). Thus, there is no *divisio textus*, and Piccolomini's quotations from Aristotle are haphazard, making it hard to tell whether Piccolomini is using a particular translation. Piccolomini's intent, in fact, seems to be not so much to explain Aristotle, but to set forth his own philosophical views, although it is true that the latter are by and large Aristotelian.[94]

A good example of Piccolomini's way of proceeding is his treatment of the *summum bonum* issue at the beginning of Step Nine. Piccolomini first gives the various names by which the Greeks designated what the Latins called *summum bonum.* (The names are given in the original, and Piccolomini notes the semantic distinctions, say,

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[93] The basic outline of the books is as follows (the 1594 edition has some interesting changes in wording):

Introductio ad decem gradus, universam civilem philosophiam includens;
Gradus primus: De materie virtutum, hoc est de animi perturbationibus;
Gradus secundus: De principiis virtutum;
Gradus Tertius: De semivirtute et viis ad virtutem;
Gradus Quartus: De virtute morali;
Gradus Quintus: De virtute mentis et rationis;
Gradus Sextus: De virtute heroica;
Gradus Septimus: De fructu quodam virtutis eiusque usu, nempe de amicitia;
Gradus Octavus: De instrumentis virtutum et summi boni, quae naturae et fortunae munera dicuntur;
Gradus Nonus: De summo bono;
Gradus Decimus: De virtute per urbes et respublicas effundenda, summoque bono propagando.

[94] See Poppi, pp. 119–21.

between *εὐδαιμονία* and other terms.) Next, Piccolomini illustrates various senses in which the term *summum bonum* might be used, or various possible divisions of the subject. After listing a number of views held by ancient and medieval philosophers, along with their supporting arguments, Piccolomini gives his own opinion, usually based on reason and on named authorities. Finally, Piccolomini considers possible objections and the reasons supporting contrary viewpoints. He rebuts these, often through a subtle use of *distinctiones*, and then goes on to the next topic or subtopic.

Piccolomini's *Universa philosophia* cannot therefore be considered a commentary on Aristotle in the sense of an exposition of the text. A better description is possible by appealing to Charles Schmitt's label "Systematizations and Textbooks."[95] Indeed, Piccolomini's work is part of a late sixteenth-century development in which many interpreters prefer to prepare school manuals on the various philosophical branches rather than providing sequential commentaries on Aristotle's works.[96] However, this is not to say that Piccolomini's *Universa philosophia* idly followed the example of others. For example, differently from John Case's work on the *Ethics* listed by Schmitt under this heading,[97] Piccolomini's employs neither Ramist tables nor concise objections and answers. Rather, it is notable for its verbosity and extremely detailed argumentation, while also including a wealth of useful information on previous commentators of Aristotle's works. Since Piccolomini's work could not have been meant to be used in the classroom, and since it reorders the *Nicomachean Ethics* according to its specific concerns, the tag "systematization" probably fits it best. From the point of view of the present discussion, it is fortunate that such a format allows Piccolomini to treat the theoretical issues underpinning moral philosophy, as well as the ideal method of moral education. After examining Piccolomini's views on both of these points, a few considerations will be offered on Piccolomini's method.

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[95] Schmitt 1983a, p. 128.
[96] See above, p. 233.
[97] Case 1594; see Schmitt 1983a, pp. 56–57; Schmitt 1988.

7.3.2 *Doctrinal Views*

Virtue and Moral Philosophy

Piccolomini's starting point is the object of virtue, which he treats fully in Step I. There he describes the emotions or appetites (*perturbationes*), which are in the sensitive appetite, as the object of moral virtue. Of these passions Piccolomini offers a definition which (he says) agrees with Aristotle,[98] then proceeds to defend it against views proposed especially by the Stoics. The most systematic discussion of virtue, however, is in Step IV, where Piccolomini gives an orderly presentation of what virtue is, where it is located, and how it is acquired.

After distinguishing four kinds of virtues (*virtutes physicae, morales, rationales, et divinae*), Piccolomini concentrates on the second group and lists various definitions of moral virtue, taken from Eudoxus and Epicurus, Plato and Socrates, Alcinous, Plotinus, Aristotle, and the Stoics.[99] In the end, Piccolomini refers to Aristotle's discussion in *EN* II.6, from which he gathers the following definition: "Virtus itaque est habitus, per quem congruens modus imponitur perturbationibus; qui modus medium est nobis acommodatum, quod recta ratione ad prudentiam pertinente statuitur."[100] Not satisfied, however, because Aristotle's definition does not take into account the external causes, Piccolomini suggests another definition, which he says does not violate Aristotle's intention: "Virtus moralis est habitus appetitionis sensuum, natus praeeligere; in ea mediocritate, quae ad nos refertur, quaeque a prudentiae habitu definitur, collocatus; comparatus more, ut civili felicitate fruamur."[101]

In this definition several points are noteworthy. First, although Aristotle already refers to virtue as a ἕξις προαιρετική, Piccolomini wishes to emphasize the power of choice connected with the exer-

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[98] F. Piccolomini 1583, Gr. I, cap. V, p. 44: "Perturbatio est motio appetentis sensuum facultatis, necnon spirituum cordis ab obiecto, quod per vim imaginandi vel iucundum nobis vel molestum apparet, pro molestia vitanda, fruendaque iucunditate."

[99] *Ibid.*, Gr. IV, caps. II–III.

[100] *Ibid.*, Gr. IV, cap. IV, p. 170.

[101] *Ibid.* Cf. Aristotle (1107a1–2): "Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices . . ."

cise of virtue. Thus, he dedicates numerous chapters to the issue of the freedom of the will (a hotly debated issue during the sixteenth century, and not only between Luther and Erasmus).[102] Second, Piccolomini departs from Aristotle by inserting the final clause "ut civili felicitate fruamur," thus placing a special emphasis on the connection between moral virtue and the civic life, something on which he insists throughout his work. This point has to do with Piccolomini's views on the relationship between the *Ethics* and the *Politics* (examined below). Finally, Piccolomini is anxious to show that there is no serious divergence between the definitions given by Aristotle and Plato, even though he has admitted that Aristotle's definition is the better one.[103]

Piccolomini had earlier identified the sensitive appetite as the location of the *perturbationes*: although it is true that the intellect and the will do have some function in causing motion, they are only remote causes, whereas the sensitive appetite is the proximate cause.[104] Thus, Piccolomini opposes the arguments of the Stoics (who saw the passions as taking place in the judgment) and especially of Augustine and Scotus (who placed both the passions and—consequently—moral virtue in the will).[105] Instead, Piccolomini locates the virtues (including justice) in the sensitive appetite partaking of reason.[106]

Piccolomini assigns a rôle to nature, teaching, and habituation in becoming good. Nature undoubtedly leads to our being more or less

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[102] See especially Gr. II, caps. XXIX–XLII. For an introduction to the topic, see Poppi 1997a.

[103] Piccolomini argues that "Nec propterea Plato damnandus est, nam ei disputanti cum Sophista fuit satis illum redarguere; praesertim tamen Aristoteles Platonem carpit, quatenus virtutem mulieris ab ea viri non secernebat; qua de re alius occurret disserendi locus" (Gr. IV, cap. IV, p. 171). Earlier, however, Piccolomini had conceded: "Ex libris de Republica Platonis, virtutis universe sumptae haec definitio colligitur: Virtus est habitus animae, quo potentia naturalis eius quam optime suum opus exercet. Haec definitio est similis illi, quam dedit Aristoteles . . . inquiens: Virtus ea est, quae perficit id cuius est virtus, et opus eius; et rectius traditur ab Aristotele, quia manifestatur non unum, sed duplex officium virtutis; primum est perficere id, cuius est virtus; alterum perficere opus eius" (*ibid.*, cap. III, p. 169). On Piccolomini's use of Aristotle and Plato see below.

[104] *Ibid.*, Gr. I, cap. VIII, p. 48; cf. cap. IX.

[105] *Ibid.*, Gr. IV, cap. IX, p. 178: "Constat itaque Aristotelem voluntatem redegisse ad partem ex se ratione praeditam; virtutes autem morales tribuisse parti, quae ex se est expers rationis, est tamen nata obtemperare rationi, et per hanc partem denotasse appetitum sensuum; et res apud Aristotelem adeo est conspicua, ut mirum sit viros doctissimos tam aperte esse hallucinatos."

[106] *Ibid.*, cap. XIII, pp. 182–83. On Piccolomini's psychology, see Poppi, p. 131.

strongly inclined toward virtue or vice, so that matters such as nobility, physionomy, and the right time to conceive children are not without their importance. Teaching and discipline are also relevant, both in the sense of being admonished by relatives and friends, and in the sense of receiving proper direction through the principles communicated by speculative philosophy and civil science. The most immediate and proper cause, of course, is *mos et assuetudo*.[107]

Piccolomini, however, does not just repeat the old argument that all three elements have some function in making people virtuous—he immediately offers more detail. In this discussion, the rôle of nature disappears completely, whereas that of *mos et assuetudo* is supplemented by the theory of the interconnection of the virtues (i.e., that that the presence of one virtue produces the others). Also, Piccolomini shows that the highest cause of good in us is speculative philosophy (*inspectrix philosophia*): its study—which encompasses mathematics, natural philosophy, and especially metaphysics—prepares man to follow the good by offering him a vision of the good in the first place. Thus Plato, Alexander, Simplicius, and Averroes were right to say that this philosophy prepares the way for good morals.[108] Piccolomini therefore comes close to stating, with Socrates, that knowledge is the beginning of virtue.

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[107] *Ibid.*, cap. XVII, p. 187.

[108] Piccolomini supports this view through seven reasons, which are of help in clarifying his position: "Pro dictorum tamen exactiore notitia considerandum est, tribus modis virtutes in more positas posse in nobis gigni: Primo proprie, et proxime, et id fit more et assuetudine. Secundo per connexionem et consecutionem ex actione propria alterius virtutis ei iunctae, cum enim morales virtutes sint complicatae, nec una consistere valeat sine reliquis, ob eam connexionem per actiones proprias unius altera producitur. Tertio produci possunt modo eminenti, per principia priora, per inspectricem nempe philosophiam, per quam cum mens verum intueatur, valet nos dirigere in attinentibus ad bonum; nam rectam mentis constitutionem in homine per naturam recte affecto, sequitur congruens dispositio appetitionum sensus. Propterea recte Plato in sexto de Republica et post Platonem Alexander, Simplicius, et Averroes in prooemio Physicorum, asseruerunt inspectricem Philosophiam parere probos mores, et iure optimo profecto; eius enim septem possunt assignari conspicuae rationes. Prima est, quia ipsemet contemplationis actus animum a corpore revocat, purioremque reddit. Altera, quia philosophia civilis ab inspectrice sua principia recipit. Tertia, quia per inspectricem philosophiam intuemur leges providentiae, fati, et naturae; quibus qui obtemperant, probi redduntur. Quarta, quia in Dei et naturae operibus impressa inspicimus conspicua virtutum exempla, ad quorum imitationem dum nosmetipsos conformamus, probitate decoramur. Quinta, quia cognoscentes naturam et conditiones rerum, percipimus quanti unumquodque facere teneamur; qui autem unumquodque tanti facit, quanti fieri debet, congruenter est affectus. Sexto, quia nos ipsos, hoc est mentem, noscimus,

A vision of the good, however, is also communicated by moral philosophy (*scientia civilis*), whose aim is the *summum bonum* or *felicitas*.[109] It follows that the subject of this branch of philosophy is that by which the *summum bonum* may be attained. Consequently, Piccolomini offers the following definition of the subject: "subiectum civilis scientiae est humana actio, ex hominis libertate prodiens, ut in ea honestum, et quod decet, natum est refulgere."[110] Since the subject and aim must be different, Piccolomini is able to refute the view that the subject is the *summum bonum* itself (as held by the Stoics, Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano, Albert the Great, Gerard of Odo, and Ficino); he also dislikes the view that the subject is man himself (Albert, Thomas). Although Piccolomini's definition is taken in part from Averroes, Averroes' view ("Subiectum civilis scientiae sunt res voluntariae, quae dum fiunt, ex nostro arbitrio pendent; quarum principia sunt voluntas et praeelectio")[111] is not quite correct because human freedom includes, not only what is just, but what is unjust, and infelicity as well as happiness; but the *civilis scientia* considers only what is blessed and just; thus, Averroes' definition needs to be revised to include only these aspects.[112]

Granted that human actions, directed to good ends, are the subject of moral philosophy, the question is then which kinds of actions should receive special consideration. Piccolomini argues that, in the case of *civilis scientia*, public action and the public good should be considered principal.[113] Aristotle's teaching on these public aspects is contained in the *Politics*, whereas its domestic aspects are the subject of the *Economics*.

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cuius praestantiam intuentes, eam actionibus nostris ducem praeficimus, sensuumque appetitiones ei subiicimus. Septimo, quia noscimus cuncta manare a Deo, cunctaque esse Dei, et propterea teneri nos ipsos, cunctaque nostra retribuere Deo. Ab his modo quodam regio et eminente in nobis insignes virtutes producuntur. Ex his constat virtutes in more positas et per naturam, et per doctrinam, et per assuetudinem in nobis gigni" (*ibid.*, Gr. IV, cap. XVII, p. 187).

[109] *Ibid.*, Introductio, cap. III, p. 4.

[110] *Ibid.*, cap. IV, p. 6.

[111] From his *Paraphrase* of Plato's *Republic*; quoted by Piccolomini *ibid.*, cap. II, p. 3.

[112] *Ibid.*, cap. III, p. 5: ". . . nedum enim actiones probae, verum etiam improbae, et nedum vita beata, verum etiam misera, libertati nostrae subiicitur; in civili autem scientia minime ex principali instituto vita misera, et actiones improbae considerantur, sed solum vita beata, et actiones probae, ut conspicuum est."

[113] *Ibid.*, cap. IV, p. 6.

It does not, however, follow that the *Ethics* considers the private sphere, in the sense of concentrating on the individual. Rather, the *Ethics* considers human actions only in the universal or generic sense, without reference to the perfection of the single members of the community. The function of the *Politics* and the *Economics* is therefore to treat these actions in detail (respectively, as producers of the public and domestic good).[114] To support his view, Piccolomini offers the following definition of civil science: "Civilis scientia est philosophia humanas actiones componens ex naturae interna commotione, sapientisque animi foecunditate orta, ut in omni vitae gradu honestum attingamus, summoque civili bono pro facultate fruamur."[115]

Piccolomini's redefinition of civil science is motivated by a desire to show the connections and unity among the three works of Aristotle: it is not that that they address three different kinds of good, which require three different kinds of treatment, or that there are three kinds of action leading to a tripartite division of civil science. The views of Eustratius and Thomas on this matter have influenced all Latin interpreters, blinding them to the fact that the subject is one, and therefore has common principles, a common end, and common dispositions. Since Aristotle thought of his subject in these terms, the introduction at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is not, in fact, a premise to the *Ethics* specifically, but to the whole of civil philosophy, including the *Politics* and the *Economics*.[116] In this context, Piccolomini opposes the view of Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano, who held that the *Ethics* teaches the whole of civil philosophy, whereas

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[114] *Ibid.*, cap. V, p. 7: "Subiectum totius civilis scientiae est humana actio, ut in ea natum est refulgere honestum et quod decet, cum universe, tum in parte considerata. Subiectum librorum, qui inscribuntur Moralia Nicomachia, sunt huiusmodi humanae actiones solum universe consideratae, et quatenus homines per eas absolute viri probi redduntur. Subiectum librorum de Republica sunt humanae actiones, ut in eis natum est refulgere id quod decet, pro recte formanda et conservanda Republica vel, quod idem est, sunt humanae actiones, ut ex eis publicum bonum natum est consurgere. Subiectum librorum de cura familiari sunt humanae actiones, ut ex eis domesticum bonum consurgere natum est."

[115] *Ibid.*, cap. VI, p. 8.

[116] *Ibid.*, cap. VII, pp. 8–9: "Praeterea disciplina una debet habere unum commune subiectum; subiectum commune habet principia communia communesque affectiones, quae primo declarari debent; cum itaque civilis sit disciplina una, necesse est ut sit praedita communibus principiis, communi fine commnunibusque affectionibus primo declarandis. . . . Apertissime eo in loco Philosophus proponit declaranda quae sunt communia omni generi civilis vitae, non autem propria unius . . . ideo Aristoteles, tertio de Republica caput 12, affirmat per easdem res et virum probum et civitatem probam constitui . . ."

the *Politics* is an addition made only to correct man's depravity.[117] He also contests the view according to which the *Ethics* discusses the common subject of civil philosophy (i.e., virtue), whose use is described in the other two works.[118]

Piccolomini's own view is that civil philosophy has, as do other arts and sciences, two parts. The *Ethics* represents the theoretical part, which explains the principles and foundational concepts pertaining to civil philosophy. The *Politics* instead is practical: it offers specific precepts and laws pertaining to specific societal conditions and shows what is appropriate to each. Thus, it is not true that the *Ethics* concerns the individual and the *Politics* the state: after all, the *Politics* discusses the state's responsibility to perfect both the individual and the city. Also, it is not necessary to consider the *Economics* as forming a third division of civil philosophy, for it is rather an appendix to the *Politics*.[119]

From this division, Piccolomini deduces that the natural sequence is to pass from the *Ethics* through the *Politics* to the *Economics*.[120] The common Latin opinion that one should study the *Politics* after the other two works is based on a false view of the subject matter.[121] Equally misguided is the notion that one should begin with the *Politics* and continue to the *Economics* and the *Ethics*.[122] The passage from

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[117] *Ibid.*, cap. VII, pp. 9–10; on Bernardi see below, Appendix C, no. 67.

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 10. Piccolomini does not say who held this view; he only says, "est tertia opinio quorundam . . ." Piccolomini possibly had Claudio Betti in mind; see below, p. 321.

[119] *Ibid.*, cap. VIII, p. 11: ". . . ita civilem scientiam in partes duas principes distribuendam censeo; quarum prima, quae tanquam Theorica est, tradit nobis principia, fundamenta, et semina universae philosophiae civilis, facultateque includit universam civilem philosophiam; altera, quae magis practica est, descendit ad ordines, ad praecepta propria, et leges divisimque ea explicat, quae competunt unicuique gradui et conditioni hominum. . . . In libris de moribus non descendit, vel ad unius, vel ad plurium, vel ad omnium institutionem, sed praecepta communia tradit conducentia institutioni singulorum vitae generum . . . quia homines singuli et familiae sunt partes Reipublicae propterea qui totum format, tenetur etiam singulas eius partes recte formare. . . . [Aristoteles] asseruit munus esse legislatoris, accurate decernere pertinentia ad puerorum et iuvenum institutionem; et in primo de Republica agitur de attinentibus ad familias et de partibus earum, indicans curam familiarem non esse disciplinam re vera distinctam, sed partem considerationis de Republica vel appendicem eius." On this point see Poppi, pp. 119–21. For other sixteenth- and seventeenth-century philosophers who held similar views, see Kraye 1988, p. 305, especially nn. 16–17.

[120] *Ibid.*, Introductio, cap. X, p. 12.

[121] *Ibid.*, cap. XXX, p. 37.

[122] *Ibid.*, cap. XXIX [misprinted XXVIII], pp. 36–37. Unfortunately, Piccolomini does not mention who held this view.

theory to practice, common in all other disciplines, should not be abandoned when dealing with civil philosophy.[123]

Finally, the division of civil philosophy into theoretical and practical raises the question of which part is superior. The Latins have consistently held, says Piccolomini, that the *Politics* is superior to the *Ethics*, for it treats a higher and more general good. But Piccolomini turns this judgment on its head, arguing instead for the superiority of the *Ethics*, since the theoretical component is always superior to the practical one in the arts and sciences, just as an architect is superior to the actual brick layers.[124] Piccolomini goes on to show that the *Ethics* provides indispensable knowledge for the discipline of law. Those who try to study or exercise jurisprudence without regard to the *Ethics* are bound to fail and in any case deceive themselves as to the subject with which they are dealing.[125]

Moral Education

In discussing who can properly and profitably hear matters pertaining to civil science, Piccolomini refers to all four requirements mentioned by Aristotle (education, time and experience, emotional maturity, and good upbringing), but especially emphasizes the need for edu-

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[123] On various conceptions in Padua of the relationship of the *Ethics* and the *Politics*, see Poppi, pp. 122–24. For a broader perspective, see Kraye 1988, p. 305.

[124] *Ibid.*, cap. IX, p. 12: "Communis opinio latinorum est libros de Republica longe antecellere, quia bonum eo est praestantius quo est communius, ut dicitur in prooemio libri Moralium Nicomachorum. . . . Confirmatur efficaci ratione, quoniam inter partes civilis Philosophiae ratio ferendarum legum principatum obtinet, ut dixit Plato in libro de Regno, et affirmavit Aristoteles in sexto moralium. . . . Hanc opinionem longe a vero abesse censeo, nam pars ea de moribus longe praestat et domina est . . ."

[125] The conclusions Piccolomini offers are relevant (*ibid.*, cap. X, p. 13): ". . . colligo primo, pertinentia ad civilem scientiam praesertim et maxime in libris de moribus explicari. . . . Colligo secundo, in libris de moribus non bonum singulorum hominum, sed praesertim bonum publicum explicari. . . . Colligo tertio, rationem ferendarum legum praesertim elici ex scientia de moribus. Ratio est, quia pro recte ferendis legibus duo maxime sunt necessaria, primum, ut cognoscamus principia unde maneant et finem quo tendunt leges; alterum, ut distincte noscamus regionem, conditiones hominum, et loca vicina . . . quorum duorum primum obtinet principatum et est regula et mensura caeterorum. Id primum in libris de moribus traditur et confirmatur, quia leges nihil aliud sunt, nisi praecepta Iustitiae, et sunt foetus Prudentiae. . . . Colligo quarto, eos errare qui iuri civili navant operam nec primo accurate addiscunt pertinentia ad virtutes et summum bonum. Hi versantur in rivulis, neglecto fonte, et ambulant sine praenotione finis in quem tendunt. Colligo quinto, eos, qui legibus incumbunt neglecta disciplina morali, minime versari in civili philosophia, vere enim civilis philosophia est pars eius theorica . . ."

cation and good upbringing. Several times, in fact, he mentions that the ideal hearer of this subject must be well educated and morally trained (*bene educatus, beneque moratus*).[126] These two requirements, however, are not easily separable. In fact, Piccolomini's definition of a proper education (which he also calls *paedia*)[127] emphasizes both habituation and teaching.[128] In order to understand the place and function of ethics, it is useful briefly to consider Piccolomini's general views on education.

In a manner strongly reminiscent of Giles of Rome, Piccolomini outlines an upbringing consisting of three stages, respectively concerning the body, the appetites, and the mind. He insists on the interrelations of these three (e.g., the body's health can affect the functioning of the mind), but treats them separately. He admits that divine grace and knowledge of God's revelation, which especially perfect the mind, should also be discussed, but leaves these kinds of considerations to the theologians.[129]

The details of the body must be given close attention, starting with the circumstances of conception: that is, the union must be a legitimate one and the woman *nobilis*, in this case indicating both social and moral status. The child must receive proper and adequate amounts of air, food, and exercise, as well as verbal stimuli. Furthermore, Piccolomini recommends gymnastics, especially wrestling and jumping. These concerns, however, are not ends to themselves: Piccolomini subscribes to conventional theories that the temperature of the body has a relationship with (although not a necessary effect on) human morals. By regulating the body temperature so as to avoid extremes of heat or cold, the development of good morals should take place more easily.[130]

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[126] E.g., "Quocirca qui de rebus Civilibus utiliter auditurus est, eum oportet bene educatum, beneque moratum esse . . ." (Gr. I, cap. XIX, p. 23).

[127] For Piccolomini's understanding of *paedia*, see especially Gr. V, caps. XII–XIV.

[128] *Ibid.*, Gr. X, cap. XXXI, p. 590: "Recta institutionis forma (quae eadem et disciplinarum disciplina, vera paedia, vitaeque magistra dici potest) quamvis ad alia extendatur, praesertim tamen et proprie est congruens morum iuventutis conformatio, a recta prudentiae ratione per assuetudinem accomodataque praecepta prodiens, ad honestam felicemque vitam perducens."

[129] *Ibid.*, cap. XXXIII, p. 592.

[130] *Ibid.*: "Quamvis enim mores non necessario sequantur corporis temperaturam, frequenter tamen ei maxime sunt consentanei, et sine ea postremam perfectionem assequi cumulate non valent." Piccolomini derives several of his concerns from Averroes.

The appetites, instead, are regulated by the laws of civil philosophy. The prospect of rewards and punishments, Piccolomini notes, is something we use even with beasts; when necessary, blows are also appropriate. The same is true with children.[131] Piccolomini says that the desire for honor and fear of dishonor are especially good incentives for lifting us up to higher things. But the appetites are also disciplined through other means. Music and astronomy, for example, encourage harmony in the soul. Furthermore, stories (*fabulae*), histories, and poems, whenever they conform to what is right and just, may be employed, as well as appropriate pictures, statues, and sculptures. Although Piccolomini does not encourage the *exercise* of the arts, the fact that they reflect nature might lead to reflection on (and imitation of) natural proportions.[132]

As for the mind, its training is entrusted to the *disciplinae rationales*, which can be distributed into three groups: the first, which includes grammar, logic, rhetoric, and the like, *prepares* the soul (*animus*) of the young person; the second (theoretical and moral philosophy) *forms* the accomplished man; the third consists of *artes nobiles et ingenuae*, which are characteristically *the preserve of* the accomplished man. The latter class includes subjects such as knowledge of the secrets of nature (literally *magia physica*, which includes the arts of healing and distilling, as well as agriculture), the arts of painting and sculpture, architecture, astrology, and so forth. Piccolomini does not, however, have in mind the actual exercise of these arts (such as pushing a plow or handling a chisel), but only the knowledge of the principles pertaining to a particular art. Thus, Piccolomini recommends the study, after philosophy, of the theoretical principles governing the arts; at

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[131] *Ibid.*, p. 593: "Magistra huius institutionis est civilis philosophia, quae prudentiam formans, singulis appetitionibus Leges praescribit. . . . Dux huius rectae institutionis est opinio recta, instrumenta vero praemium et poena; his utimur, dum fraenare cupimus feras, verberibus enim, et cibo praesertim, eas cicures mansuetasque reddimus; id ipsum facimus in puerorum institutione." See also Gr. V, cap. XXXIII.

[132] *Ibid.*: "Propterea non iniuria a veteribus pictura et sculptura inter arts ingenuas numeratae sunt; non quidem, ut in earum efficiendis operibus vir ingenuus laboret, sed ut rectas operum rationes ex natura depromptas recte iudicet, ad earumque imitationem perturbationes componat. Nam (ut in libro de Philosophia nos recte monet Plato) artes, quae ingenuos decent viros, intelligentiae ratione, non manuum ministerio perficiuntur." Piccolomini relies here partly on Plato (for his view of music and astronomy), and partly on Aristotle, Giles of Rome, and the humanists (in his encouragement of poetry and the visual arts).

the same time, he places some arts (such as music and astronomy) before the *trivium*, in a sequence entirely foreign to the traditional ladder of the liberal arts, but more or less faithful to the views of Plato and Aristotle.[133]

To whom does Piccolomini direct this educational program? Piccolomini has both boys and girls in mind. However, he does not go so far as to suggest (with Plato) that they be brought up in the same way. In fact, Piccolomini is forced to argue that Plato had considered his comments on this particular issue (and also on the community of wives) as posited only *in idea*, not as something really practicable except in conditions apart from real life. Piccolomini cannot hide his dismay about what would happen should Plato's proposal actually be implemented: the mixture of men and women in public assemblies, in the judiciary, and in war would cause formidable confusion. Thus, it is best for girls and boys to be educated separately, in a manner convenient to their respective nature and condition.[134] Like many educators of his time, Piccolomini therefore thinks of men and women as having different functions in life, for which they could best be fitted through separate training. It is not necessary to suppose that he based his opinion on a presumed "natural inferiority" of women. However, it is true that girls and women are not the main topic here, nor are they clearly part of the intended audience.

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[133] *Ibid.*, Gr. V, cap. LII, p. 322: "Tertio et postremo loco inveniuntur disciplinae et artes quae virum ingenuitate formatum decent. Huiusmodi sunt artes illae quae fructus sunt inspectricis philosophiae, qualis est magia physica, ad quam redigitur ars medendi, ars distillandi, agricultura; quae dum consideratur ut magia physica, ingenua est, non quidem ut in aranda terra laboremus, sed ut noscamus vires naturae rectamque eius rationem et cognoscentes aliis praecipere valeamus. Insuper ars pingendi statuasque efficiendi ingenuitatis aliquid includunt, non quod in statuis ex marmore conficiendis laborare debeamus (nimium enim id est laboriosum et corpus reddit minus aptum ad officia virtutum) sed sat est rectam eius rationem et mensuras cognoscere. . . . Similiter etiam usus musicae. . . . Similiter architectura, ars navalis, artes nonnullae divinatrices, ut astrologia, physionomia et similes, dum eis non perperam utimur, ingenuae sunt. Tres itaque sunt gradus ingenuarum disciplinarum, quorum medius non artis sed philosophiae nomine honestari meretur; duo alii gradus artis nomine designantur et nuncupantur ingenuis, dum eis congruenter utimur." Cf. Gr. X, cap. XXXIII, p. 593.

[134] *Ibid.*, Gr. X, cap. XXXII, pp. 591–92: "Et proculdubio ea confusio mulierum et virorum in civili congressu, in magistratibus, in bello, longe maius detrimentum nata est afferre quam emolumentum. . . . Colligamus itaque, et foeminas et mares accurate esse instituendos, non quidem communibus, sed propriis distinctisque educationibus, eorum naturae et conditioni accommodatis."

The education Piccolomini proposes is surely focused in another sense as well: he has in view only the members of the noble classes. To be more exact, he designs his program of education for the young men of Venetian noble families. Piccolomini wishes to prepare public officials for the maritime Republic and justifies the concentration of educational efforts on this group on the basis of the principle of expected worth: noble men deserve a more attentive (*accuratior*) education than others because they are the City's hope; furthermore, they are the best parts of the Republic, and should be especially cultivated because it is easy to pass from extremes of excellence to extremes of baseness. The fact that they are already naturally inclined to what is of good report is no reason for ignoring their upbringing.[135]

More surprising is Piccolomini's suggestion that the moral education he describes is especially relevant to the Italians. After showing that, through proper training and education, man is delivered from his natural proclivity toward evil and becomes truly free and master of himself,[136] he observes that the Italians especially need moral training: their geographical position places them in the middle of other nations, so that they have nothing they can really call their own. Rather, they receive all too freely the customs and attitudes of those around them, and their *ingenium* makes them especially susceptible to sharp variations of virtue.[137]

Piccolomini offers no comments as to who, in the Republic, should be entrusted with the task of education. It is not clear, for example, who should be in charge of the proper exercise and nutrition of children, or for that matter of their education in music and other matters. But Piccolomini does have a strong sense of the distinctions to be made in education. Just as girls and boys should not be trained alike, so it is for children and young people of different ages and of different social extractions. Children of nobles are naturally the ones most apt to respond to a *recta institutio*, since they understand that

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[135] *Ibid.*, Gr. VIII, cap. XIX, p. 412; Gr. X, cap. XXXI.

[136] *Ibid.*, Gr. X, cap. XXX, p. 589.

[137] *Ibid.*, cap. XXXI, p. 590: "Facta mox inter nationes comparatione, Itali maxime omnium egent recta institutione. Caeterae enim nationes moribus quibusdam propriis, sibi natura modo quodam insertis, praeditae inspiciuntur; soli Itali, tanquam extremarum nationum medii, nihil sibi proprium habere videntur, sed ad omnia faciles, habitus omnes ne dum indumentorum corporis, verum etiam formarum animi recipere apti sunt, et quia maxime valent ingenio, ideo inter eos optimi et deterrimi inveniuntur."

their future political rôle requires a particular kind of training. And an education is likely to be most successful with those of more tender age, since they are still ready to be taught and have not yet acquired too many bad habits.[138] Presumably an understanding of differences among children is therefore a requirement for those who teach them, but in this there is little that is new.[139] Nor is Piccolomini's explicit emphasis on the children of the higher classes unusual in the educational treatises of sixteenth-century Italy.

One of Piccolomini's specific concerns is where moral philosophy should be placed in the curricular ladder. He takes it for granted that logic should be learned before moral philosophy and disagrees with unspecified supporters of the opposite opinion. After all, the simpler subjects should be approached first.[140] The relationship of moral with speculative philosophy is instead thornier, partly because many eminent interpreters (including Simplicius and Acciaiuoli) argued that moral philosophy should be learned first. As Piccolomini points out, there are excellent reasons for this opinion; he gives a long list of the main arguments.[141] Piccolomini, however, has his own arsenal of authorities: Zeno, Chrysippus, Archedemus, Eudemus, Diogenes Laertius, Boethius, Sidonius, Themistius, Averroes, and Philoponus (to mention a few!) maintain that speculative philosophy should be studied before the civil. Three main arguments support this conclusion: first, since the *civilis* derives its principles from and presupposes many of the teachings of speculative philosophy, it would be foolhardy to place it first. Second, just as, in the human soul, knowledge precedes and governs desire, so it is in philosophy: the theoretical part should come first. Third, since a young person is not a proper

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[138] *Ibid.*,: "Facta insuper comparatione inter aetates, proculdubio pueritiae et adolescentiae maxime congruit; ea enim est aetas nuda, recens, mollis, facile nata recipere et servare primas formas . . ."

[139] Michael of Ephesus had said much the same thing; see above, p. 140.

[140] Piccolomini possibly has Poliziano in mind when he says: ". . . nonnulli enim dixere philosophiae civili priusquam logicae esse incumbendum; aiebant enim primo recte formandos esse mores, mox ad reliqua progrediendum, ut recte ea iudicare, illisque uti valeremus; quam sententiam [Ammonius et Simplicius] in prooemio Praedicamentorum retulerunt, et reiecerunt, concedentes componendos quidem primo esse puerorum mores, id tamen non debere fieri disciplina aliqua methodo tradita, sed familiari institutione et educatione" (Gr. I, cap. XXV [misprinted XXIIII], p. 31).

[141] They are: *ex facilitate et modo explicandi, ex indigentia et necessitate, ex fine, ex dignitate, ex definitione philosophiae*, and *ex ordine partium animae* (the appetite should be taken care of before the intellect); see Gr. I, cap. XXV, pp. 31–32.

hearer of moral philosophy, he should surely not learn it as his first subject.

Here Piccolomini encounters a difficulty. Aristotle had said (*EN* VI.7) that a young person can, without training, be a mathematician, but that the case is different for learning physics and moral philosophy. Aristotle had not, however, clarified whether natural or moral philosophy should come first. Piccolomini resolves the problem by arguing that natural philosophy, as a theoretical subject, follows best upon the heels of mathematics, which is likewise theoretical. Besides, if the principal part of prudence (i.e., civil science) is that whereby laws are formed, one can hardly expect young people to be able to exercise this function.[142] Unsurprisingly, Piccolomini also puts to good use Plato's teaching that the *scientia civilis* should be learned last; the *Ethics* and the *Politics* should be studied (and taught) in direct succession, right after contemplative philosophy.[143]

Piccolomini is well aware of Plato and Aristotle's view of knowledge as an activity related to rest and quietness. Many commentators (e.g., Simplicius) had argued from this connection that moral philosophy should be studied before speculative philosophy, so that the passions could be put in order before proceeding to what was most important: the undisturbed activity of the intellect. Piccolomini is unwilling to go along with this judgment, partly because, when all is told, he sees action as more valuable than contemplation. But he does agree that the passions must be governed if any focused contemplation is to take place. Rather than assigning this function to moral philosophy, however, Piccolomini emphasizes the importance of a good upbringing; thus he is able to postpone the learning of moral philosophy without affecting the understanding of theoretical philosophy.[144]

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[142] *Ibid.*, Gr. I, cap. XXVI, pp. 32–34.

[143] *Ibid.*, pp. 33–34.

[144] *Ibid.*, cap. XXVII, pp. 34–35: "Quod etiam scientiae in contemplatione positae exposcant domesticam hanc morum compositionem, satis constat; hoc patefacere Plato in Cratilo et Aristoteles in 7 Physicorum dum considerarunt scire, graece ἐπίζασθαι, ab ipso stare et requiescere fuisse deductum; sedatis enim animi perturbationibus consurgit sapientia. Ita affirmavit Simplicius in prooemio Praedicamentorum hanc morum compositionem etiam esse necessariam pro disciplinis organicis, ut eis recte utamur; ideo ait non primo esse legendos libros Civiles, sed primo recte componendos esse mores educatione, assuetudine domesticisque adhortationibus: propterea consuevere veteres proponere pueris carmina, praecepta brevesque sententias Pythagorae, Philolai Crotoniatae, et aliorum similium."

However, the exact age at which Piccolomini envisages the study of moral philosophy remains unclear. From his ordering of the sciences, we can infer that Piccolomini probably has in mind an age of around twenty-one (often the age of doctoral candidates in the Arts) for students of the *Ethics* and the *Politics*. By this point, the young men would have had the maximum possible amount of time to gain experience of life and master their passions. Furthermore, since they were likely, shortly after their degree, to step into public office, there would be a direct continuity between the teachings they received and political experience. More than most, therefore, Piccolomini tries to follow Aristotle's advice that the young not be allowed to hear the *Ethics*. Even so, Aristotle's requirement of previous political experience cannot be made to agree with the structure of the university curriculum.

7.3.3 *Approach and Methodology*

A few reflections are now in order on the approach Piccolomini uses in his handling of the *Ethics*.

Philolosophy vs. Philology

Piccolomini is no stranger to the Greek language. He makes many references to Aristotle's Greek text and has a special interest in understanding the Greek commentators' interpretations of Aristotle. However, contrary to his contemporary Pier Vettori in Florence (see above, § 6.3), Piccolomini's interests are never purely philological: there is a striking contrast between the Florentine's patient reconstruction of Aristotle's text and thought,[145] and the attempt by the Sienese to prove philosophical points by adducing as many reasons and authorities as possible. Doubtless several of the differences can be attributed to the fact that Piccolomini's work, as mentioned above, is not a literal commentary. Furthermore, Piccolomini's disdain for rhetoric leads him to shun the use of historical examples or quotations from poetry. In and of itself, the latter point need not create an anti-philological work. (Barbaro's *Compendium* lacks these references as well.)[146] The real trouble is that Piccolomini does not seem primarily

[145] Vettori 1584 (see Appendix C, no. 93).
[146] Barbaro 1544 (see Appendix C, no. 44).

interested in clarifying Aristotle's text. His work's barrage of *rationes, confutationes,* and *auctoritates* are the armament of a scholastic who is trying to prove the superiority of his positions.

This is not to say, of course, that Piccolomini is uninterested in the writings of the past. In fact, one of the surprising things about his work is that he depends much less than one might expect on reason and formal syllogisms to reach his conclusions. Rather, he prefers to prove his interpretations by referring to other corroborating texts, especially from Aristotle and Plato (see below), but also from the Hellenistic, medieval, and contemporary interpreters (e.g., Galen, Alexander, Averroes, Thomas, Scotus).[147] It is not important to Piccolomini that these texts do not necessarily concern moral philosophy specifically—he freely draws from the works most familiar to him through his university teaching on Aristotle's natural philosophy.

Three further features of Piccolomini's method are especially noteworthy. First, Piccolomini makes a sustained effort to understand Aristotle by subjecting the Greek text to close analysis and by comparing his interpretations with those of the Greek commentators. This was one of the increasing trademarks of sixteenth-century scholarship and arguably one of its most important contributions. Other Paduans, such as Zabarella, were equally skilled in Greek and knowledgeable of the early commentary tradition.

On a second point of method Piccolomini is more original. Like other sixteenth-century interpreters, Piccolomini too tries to reconcile what Aristotle says in the *Nicomachean Ethics* with parallel passages from the *Magna Moralia* or (more rarely) the *Eudemian Ethics.* Nonetheless, when these works clearly seem to disagree, he attributes the fact to developments within Aristotle's thought, assuming that he wrote the works during different periods of his lifetime. Thus Piccolomini anticipates, by over three centuries, Werner Jaeger's intuition that Aristotle may have changed his views over time.[148] The potential implications of such a view are extraordinary; one has only to think of the effect of source criticism on biblical studies in the twentieth century. The idea that a given corpus of writings was

[147] Piccolomini likes to parade his knowledge of these interpreters. Curiously, however, he is not very forthcoming about his main sources, which are A. Piccolomini 1542 and Zwinger 1566. A discussion of Piccolomini's sources must be deferred to another occasion.

[148] See Jaeger 1955 and above, pp. 29–30.

affected by historical circumstance had the potential of dispensing, at a stroke, with the scholastic impulse to make its parts agree. This was obviously not a conclusion that Piccolomini chose to draw; nonetheless, the premise was significant, even though he may not have fully realized its implications.

Finally, Piccolomini's attitude toward potential skepticism is noteworthy. As observed above, Piccolomini makes constant references to the positions of past commentators, whom he regularly ranges on opposite sides of specific philosophical questions. His use of these authorities is not a slavish one: he does not necessarily feel obliged to follow them, and in any case he finds such a variety of positions that following them blindly would have been an impossible task. Thus, he is able to say clearly that on a certain point Thomas was wrong whereas Averroes was right, or to refute an argument of Galen by appealing to another by Simplicius. Or, more rarely, he is able to take his own stance against all present and past interpreters. What is somewhat surprising (in light of later philosophical developments) is that the divergent opinions among philosophers give no skeptical coloring to Piccolomini's view of ethics. It seems, however, that on many occasions—such as when he discusses the opinions of the Stoics—other philosophical positions are reported mainly because they provide a convenient target.[149] Like Zabarella (but for different reasons), he is confident about his interpretations and conclusions. A careful enough collation of the various positions on the same issue—coupled with an eye to the best commentators and a knowledge of the Greek text—will presumably guide the interpreter to the truth, provided that he does not misuse the tools of logic.

This insistence on a single and knowable truth is a constant feature of Piccolomini's approach. It is instructive to see it at work in three different fields: in his reconciliation of Plato with Aristotle, in his emphasis on the relationship between philosophy and faith, and in his view of ethics as theory.

Plato vs. Aristotle

Piccolomini shows a deep appreciation for both of the great teachers of antiquity. He points out that both are necessary, and that each is eminent in his own way. Whereas Aristotle used a particular

[149] On Piccolomini's use of Stoicism in this manner see Kraye 2002.

way of teaching especially useful for communicating specific knowledge, Plato used the dialogue so as to stir up his listeners and encourage retention of his sayings. Thus, the two Greek philosophers followed different roads in their pilgrimage toward wisdom: one traveled the way of *doctrina, disciplina, et auscultatio*; the other, that of *inventio, excitatio, et reminiscentia.* It would be foolish to exalt the one above the other—both ways of teaching are necessary and are appropriate to different purposes. Doing without one or the other would be like depriving oneself of an eye. Providence found it good to give humanity first Plato's way of teaching, so that the Sophists might be refuted and souls might be ordered aright; Aristotle's method followed, and found souls already purified, stirred up, and prepared to receive his teachings.[150] Presumably, Piccolomini therefore approves an approach to moral philosophy that first, through Plato, presents the problems in an attractive way, then gives detailed teaching through Aristotle.[151] However, in spite of his views on the complementarity between Plato and Aristotle, when they disagree Piccolomini does not seem comfortable with letting the differences stand.[152]

Some scholars have argued that, contrary to the practice in Florence, the Paduan writers did not usually attempt a perfect reconciliation between Aristotle and Plato.[153] Piccolomini himself lends support to this position by condemning those who would try a total reconciliation between the two, not realizing that there is beauty and usefulness in leaving their approaches distinct. He stops to name a number of his contemporaries (at Padua and elsewhere) whom he sees as having rightly chosen to respect both philosophers, but not to mix them together.[154] Later, in his discussion of the *summum bonum*,

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[150] F. Piccolomini 1583, Gr. V, cap. XXIII, pp. 273–74.

[151] On the other hand, see Tiepolo 1576, written by one of Piccolomini's students, which recommends first a study of Aristotle's conception of the sciences before approaching the study of Plato (Poppi, p. 134).

[152] On Piccolomini's handling of the issue of reconciliation, see especially Poppi, pp. 124–32; A. Baldini 1980a, pp. 163–66.

[153] "A Padova generalmente non si giunse a tale concordismo ad oltranza, anzi si nota un costante atteggiamento critico nei confronti di tale violenta forzatura di due sistemi con ispirazioni talvolta lontane e opposte; tuttavia, si può dire che è in quella medesima direzione di un possibile accordo che si muovono i nostri professori del Cinquecento" (Poppi, p. 116).

[154] F. Piccolomini 1583, Gr. V, cap. XXIII, pp. 274–75: ". . . quique eos [Platonem et Aristotelem] omni ex parte conciliare nituntur, cum eorum viae sint distinctae, omnia evertunt, confundunt, eis adversantur, et genera duo progrediendi utilissima et distincta inutiliter permiscendo evertunt. Propterea alii via regia ad sapientiam

Piccolomini argues that Plato's and Aristotle's views on the subject cannot be made to agree, and again rebukes those who think Plato and Aristotle come to the same conclusions on all matters. Nonetheless, Piccolomini looks for points of agreement between the two philosophers even on this specific issue,[155] and a careful reading of the *Universa philosophia* makes it clear that Piccolomini does not keep faith with his stated purpose of keeping the two philosophers separate.[156]

Piccolomini's attempts to make Plato and Aristotle agree are mainly based on two strategies, borrowed from the Stoics and Simplicius. The first is to suggest that Aristotle and Plato disagree on matters only *in verbis* and not *in sententia.* A typical case is whether civil science concerns action or instead a combination of action and contemplation. Piccolomini concludes that both Aristotle and Plato were right: they were simply discussing different aspects of the problem.[157] Piccolomini handles in a similar way the differences between Plato and Aristotle as to whether virtue is prudence.[158] Piccolomini's second strategy is to press the philosophers' teachings into a convenient

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progressi sunt . . . [a long list of names follows]. Hi non Aristotelem sprevere, nec neglexere Platonem; sed utrumque humanae sapientiae parentem sibi familiarem reddidere; ab utroque semina, spiritus formamque sapientiae sumpsere, quibus elati, illustrati, et formati, se sibi, urbi, et orbi salutares, splendidissimos, et admirabiles reddidere."

[155] *Ibid.*, Gr. IX, cap. XXI, pp. 504–05: "Consentiunt tamen, quia ambo primum principium unum statuunt, illudque summum bonum affirmant, ac esse censent externum scopum, et obiectum summi nostri boni, cui nitendum nobis est pro facultate reddi similes, eius tamen incomparabilem foecunditatem per omnia natam effundi et propagari, Plato appellat nomine ideae boni, quo nomine Aristoteles utendum non censuit."

[156] Poppi too concedes that Piccolomini, "nonostante il riconoscimento esplicito di una piena autonomia critica tra i due pensatori e la condanna decisa e ripetuta del concordismo, declina alla fine lui pure verso un atteggiamento di conciliazione . . ." (Poppi, p. 130; see also A. Baldini 1980a, p. 165).

[157] F. Piccolomini 1583, Introductio, cap. VI, p. 8: "Est tamen controversia inter Platonem et Aristotelem. Nam Aristoteles civilem dicit absolute in actione versari; Plato vero in Libro de Regno scientiam late sumptam dividit in cognoscentem et agentem, per agentem tamen efficientem intelligit: mox cognoscentem ait vel versari in solo iudicio, ut mathematicam; vel cum iudicio imperare, et talem esse asserit civilem scientiam; quam praesertim in contemplatione ait esse positam, quia Rex non viribus corporis valere debet, sed mente et intelligentia. Verum lis haec potius in verbis quam in sententia est posita. Aristoteles ultimum finem inspiciens, ab eo absolutam deprompsit denominationem; Plato consideravit connexionem cum sapientia, ac id quod principatum obtinens iudicat, imperat, dirigit legesque condit; haec autem ex contemplatione et cognitione prodeunt; sic itaque varia ratione, et agens, et contemplans dici potest."

[158] *Ibid.*, Gr. IV, cap. XVIII, p. 188.

or acceptable mould, even when this entails misrepresenting their positions. As mentioned above, he tries to save Plato's views on the community of wives and coeducational education by supposing that these were not actual proposals, but the fruit of Plato's imaginations of what life would be like in a very different world, free of human constraints and perversions.[159] Although on occasion he corrects Aristotle's teachings (too closely connected with our earthly and mortal life), on others Aristotle emerges as a champion for the immortality of the soul.[160]

Virtue and Christianity

Piccolomini's sense of the stability of truth is further illustrated by his emphasis on the Christian faith. Piccolomini seems anxious to retain a dimension of moral virtue that connects it with the future life. Thus, he approvingly reports the Academics' distribution of moral virtues into *politicae, purgatrices, animi purgati, et exemplares.*[161] He sees a need to modify this scheme, espoused by Eustratius and Thomas, only in small details.[162] Furthermore, Piccolomini does not delegate the discussion of theological virtues to another science, but shows in detail how they differ from the moral ones and laments the earthly limits of Aristotle's perspective; he even notes that theologians offer a better solution than the Peripatetics to the question of how the golden mean can be attained.[163] Piccolomini delivers his most explicit statements about the rôle of divine grace when discussing the intellectual virtues, and especially prudence.[164]

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[159] *Ibid.*, Gr. X, cap. XXV, p. 583 and cap. XXXII, pp. 591–92. Attempts to save Plato's reputation by distorting his views or bowdlerizing his works were common in the Italian Renaissance; see Hankins 1990.

[160] See, for example, *ibid.*, Gr. IX, cap. XLVI, p. 538. See A. Baldini 1980a, p. 167, n. 18 on the accuracy of Piccolomini's representations of Aristotle's doctrines and arguments.

[161] Cf. Macrobius' commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis*, I.8.

[162] F. Piccolomini 1583, Gr. IV, cap. XIX, pp. 190–91.

[163] *Ibid.*, cap. XXXVI, pp. 214–15; *ibid.*, IV, cap. V, p. 173. Elsewhere, however, Piccolomini channels his discussions away from theology: for example, on freedom he comments, "De qua a viris sapientia et religione illustribus multa latissime dicta fuere; propterea ego, illis praetermissis, quae a Theologis sapientissime perpenduntur, ne in alienam provinciam videar imprudenter irruere, ea sola perpendam, quae a Philosopho, et praesertim Peripatetico dici posse videntur" (Gr. II, cap. XXIX, p. 123).

[164] *Ibid.*, Gr. V, cap. I, p. 237: "Cum enim universae virtutis parens sit Deus, ea pro facultate parentem quaerens in eo solo requiescit, a quo vitam, spiritum, praemium, postremamque recipit perfectionem; ideo qui per gradus virtutis progreditur, ad Deum elevatur." Also cf. *ibid.*, Gr. V, cap. XXXI, p. 291.

There is not much new in these emphases and viewpoints. The parallels between Piccolomini and Counter-Reformation Catholicism have been observed by others.[165] Certainly, what we know about ethics teaching among the Jesuits in Italy (see § 9.2) confirms the close association between moral philosophy and theology in the post-Tridentine climate. Also, concordist views of pagan ethics and Christianity were nothing new in Renaissance Europe.[166] However, these strategies should not be seen in isolation, but as aspects of an attempt, on Piccolomini's part, to buttress the trustworthiness of his positions.

Ethics as Theory

Finally, in Piccolomini's views on the nature of ethics one can see a further illustration of his emphasis on certitude. Significantly, Piccolomini has little to say about Aristotle's statement (*EN* I.3) that one should not expect certainty in the area of ethics. In fact, Piccolomini's declared desire to treat the *Ethics* according to the synthetic order, usually reserved for the discussion of speculative philosophy, hardly seems accidental when one considers the relationship the Sienese establishes between the *Ethics* (which provides the principles and theoretical foundations of civil science) and the *Politics* (which discusses the applications of these principles). It is true that Piccolomini does not go to the length of arguing that the *inventive* method of ethics is analytical (i.e., from first principles), which would have entailed giving ethics a sure foundation, perhaps based on mathematical or geometrical axioms (as Spinoza attempted to do a century later). Nonetheless, Piccolomini's work is surely a further step in the direction, taken in sixteenth-century Italy, toward de-emphasizing the immediately practical aspects of Aristotle's *Ethics*. A view that considers the *Ethics* to be a theoretical work does not necessarily deny it practical usefulness altogether, but such usefulness in this case is connected more with furnishing politics with its necessary conceptual instruments than with perfecting the individual man. In fact, Piccolomini relieves the *Ethics* from its traditional function of forming the character of its students (or readers), assigning this responsibility instead entirely to the *Politics* in its practical application.[167]

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[165] A. Baldini 1980a, p. 166.

[166] See especially Kraye 1988, pp. 342–48.

[167] Poppi, p. 115 emphasizes instead the practicality of Piccolomini's work; but he too must admit the "i problemi della vita concreta della società del tempo . . . [sono] soverchiati dall'impegno erudito e attenuati dalla ripresa dei temi obbligati dell'Etica

There is, finally, a sweet irony in Piccolomini's insistence on his right to explain the *Ethics* according to the synthetic order. For in fact, not even he can bring it off, and in the *Universa philosophia* he senses an impelling need to remind his readers, at the very start, of the end of man and his status in the world. Thus, the work's Introduction begins by evoking eight different voices encouraging man to recall his near-divine condition and his responsibility to live up to his status as a child of God. Since the good is the end of human existence, man must pursue it and see his moral perfection as an essential part of the process. In language reminiscent of Pico's *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, Piccolomini exalts man's position as preserver of his integrity and maker (*faber*) of his perfection.[168] The fact that Piccolomini recalls these concepts at the beginning—and not only at the end[169] as the *ordo compositivus* would require—points to the difficulty in carrying out Piccolomini's project. It is also emblematic of the numerous contradictions and flaws in his work.[170]

In spite of its blemishes, the *Universa philosophia* has much to say

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aristotelica, piegata sino al possibile verso una composizione con le più certificanti dottrine della rivelazione cristiana."

[168] F. Piccolomini 1583, Introductio, cap. I, p. 2: "His viribus tu insignis homo, quasi mortalis Deus munitus, cum sis Proles robustisssima, iure optimo libertate donaris, in tuaque facultate derelinqueris. Propterea summopere gloriari vales, si tuo labore, studio, cura et diligentia perficeris, cum eaque perfectione vere tua, praesertim tibi auctori que Deo placere debes; cum sis tuae integritatis minister, tuaeque perfectionis faber, et de te solo conqueri, quamque segnitiem ac socordiam damnare debes, si eam non fueris assecutus. Tu enim munere Artium incommoda omnia corporis declinare, opere contemplationis Thebanam inscitiae Sphyngem diluere, auxilio Civilis scientiae infestissima vitiorum monstra prosternere vales." On all this, see Poppi, pp. 119–20. On concepts of man in the Renaissance, see Kraye 1988, pp. 306–16.

[169] A similar insistence on man's purpose and condition is found in the last chapter of the *Universa philosophia*, which lists sixteen points that young people should keep in mind (in fact, memorize) so as to behave properly. The first concerns our formation by and for the supreme good; the second, our condition as children of God, whom we should therefore imitate (Gr. X, cap. XXXIV, p. 596).

[170] For example, despite its theoretical slant and stabs at originality, the *Universa philosophia* gleans heavily from the fields of others, especially from Alessandro Piccolomini (A. Piccolomini 1542); see A. Baldini 1980a; Lines 2002b. Furthermore, the work is overly dense and complex, and is too tied to its underlying program of concordism. On this point, it is worth citing an authoritative view: "L'opera pretende di razionalizzare e ordinare in maniera originale principi, contenuti, modalità e fine dell'agire morale, ma si riduce ad un tentativo di inserimento di temi stoici, agostiniani, scolastici e soprattutto platonici e neoplatonici nell'impianto teorico dell'*Etica nicomachea*" (A. Baldini, 1980a, pp. 163–64). Baldini also notes Piccolomini's "carenza di spessore teoretico" and "la scarsa originalità e la tortuosità delle sue opere" (*ibid.*, p. 165; other criticisms on p. 175).

on the issue of moral education, and it offers interesting interpretations on several passages of the *Ethics*. This is one reason why it became such a successful work, both in Italy and in northern Europe.[171] For example, Felice Accoramboni derived a great deal of the material for his commentary from Piccolomini, although he failed (like Piccolomini himself) to acknowledge his debt and did not agree with him on the place of moral philosophy in the ideal ladder of studies.[172] The same is true of Agostino Galesio in Bologna.[173] In the seventeenth century, Tarquinio Galluzzi, a Jesuit teacher in Rome, produced a massive *Ethics* commentary which is hardly anything but a (rearranged) digest of the *Universa philosophia*.[174] Again, the debt to Piccolomini went unrecognized. Finally, the cases of Michael Piccart in Altdorf and Bartholomeus Keckermann in Danzig (as well as the large number of northern European editions of the *Universa philosophia*) show that Piccolomini was of great interest to both Lutherans and Calvinists in Germany.[175] If the *Universa philosophia* itself depended heavily on other works, this was no impediment and may actually have aided its success.

What, in the end, does the *Universa philosophia* suggest about the teaching of moral philosophy in Padua? Poppi sees the work, written by a professor of natural philosophy, as a symbol of the superficiality and lack of structure of the ethics course in Padua: teachers from other courses or even thinkers from outside the universities were more successful in analyzing ethical and political problems.[176] One might also point to Zabarella as one of those teachers from other courses who meditated deeply on the *Ethics* and its method. Furthermore, our discussion of Barbaro's *Compendium*[177] suggests that the humanist was far freer to introduce innovations in his private teaching than in his university teaching.

Surely, the institutional context of the Paduan course on moral philosophy was, for a long time, not conducive to treating the subject very seriously. And the situation changed for the better only during a period of about thirty years between the appointment of

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[171] On the work's diffusion in Germany, see Kuhn 2002 and Lines 2002b.
[172] Accoramboni 1590; see below, Appendix C, no. 102.
[173] See below, pp. 323–24.
[174] Galluzzi 1632–1645; see below, Appendix C, no. 154.
[175] Piccart 1605, Keckermann 1607a, 1607b, 1608; see Lines 2002b.
[176] Poppi, p. 111, cited above, n. 56.
[177] See above, pp. 248–51.

Robortello and the teaching of Colonio. Still, three points seem worthy of emphasis. First, developments are observable even in such a minor course. In fact, it possible to distinguish three different phases in its teaching (1407–1561, 1562–1592, and after 1594), which correspond respectively to the subject's assignment to fresh graduates, experienced teachers, and clerics. This is a reminder that philosophy in Padua, even when not at its best, did experience changes in relationship to the intellectual, cultural, and religious climate.

Second, a comparison with teaching practices at other Italian universities points to the idiosyncrasies of the teaching of ethics in Padua and shows that, there as elsewhere, the course was captive to internal academic politics and local traditions. The examples of both Piccolomini and Zabarella suggest that the Florentine method of philological interpretation of the *Ethics* was not necessarily favored in Padua. The fact that Robortello and the teachers of ethics who suceeded him tended to be rhetoricians by background may, in fact, have been one of the reasons for their ultimate failure to reform the course. Perhaps the Paduans preferred an approach to the *Ethics* that emphasized the philosophical issues posed by the text.

Finally, even though most of the *Ethics* teachers in Padua were not especially innovative, this did not prevent other university teachers from thinking hard about the work's problems and sharing their findings, whether through private teaching (as Piccolomini may have done) or publication.[178] Although the wrong people may have been chosen at Padua to teach the moral philosophy course, it seems clear that ethics was a concern that deeply involved some of the most famous teachers in the university. Furthermore, the debates between Zabarella and Piccolomini, which reverberated throughout Europe, are not only notable for their learnedness, but for their differences in position and for the different ways in which they interweave humanism, concordism, and Counter-Reformation currents. All of this points to moral philosophy as a very live point of interest in the Paduan *studium* of the sixteenth century. It was not a dead subject, although the ethics course was feeble. And the differences in approaching and handling it are once again a testimony to the surprising range of possibilities involved in interpreting one and the same author, Aristotle.

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[178] In any case, the official assignment of Zabarella to logic did not prevent him from discussing ethical matters even in books related to this teaching.

CHAPTER EIGHT

BOLOGNA

One of the two oldest universities in Europe, Bologna was especially known internationally for its faculty of Law, but it was also a famous center for the study of medicine rivalled only by Padua. This has justified a number of studies on the medical school of Bologna, in which famous physicians from Taddeo Alderotti († 1295) to Girolamo Cardano (1501–1576) were active.[1] Furthermore, although Paris undoubtedly remained the main Catholic center for the study of theology, Bologna also had a College of Theology authorized to grant degrees, and it too has received some scholarly attention.[2] Arts teaching, which (contrary to the practice in northern Europe) was not independent but part of the combined faculty of Arts and Medicine, has on the whole gotten short schrift.[3] This is especially true of philosophy teaching; only of late have mounting efforts been made to examine the teaching of natural philosophy in sixteenth-century Bologna or to describe in detail the formation of a botanical garden and a museum of natural history during the lifetime of Ulisse Aldrovandi (1522–1605).[4] University moral philosophy has been almost completely ignored.

This oversight is regrettable both because there is a rich wealth of sources on Bolognese Arts teaching available to the archivally inclined,[5] and because philosophy was far from being a sclerotic field

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[1] See especially Siraisi 1981, 1990, and 1997. For a (not entirely satisfactory) listing of the teachers of medicine in Bologna ca. 1400–1550, see Cristiani. Recent studies on the university in Bologna (with bibliographical references) include Grendler 1999a and 1999b.

[2] See, for example, Ehrle 1932. A privilege of Pope Boniface IX (28–X–1392) concerning the Faculty of Theology in Bologna can be found in ASB, Riformatori dello Studio, no. 2, fasc. 39 (see Salterini 1997, p. 5).

[3] An exception is represented by the famous rhetoricians who taught at the university there. See, for example, the essays in *Sapere e/è potere.*

[4] Examples are Matsen 1985 and 1994, Lines 2001b, and Findlen 1994. On the whole, logic has probably received more attention than natural philosophy; see *L'insegnamento della logica a Bologna.*

[5] See the inventories relative to the Bolognese *studium* in Cencetti 1938 and Salterini 1997.

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whose dependence on Aristotle inhibited change. Indeed, one could say that Bologna's university life matched the richness and complexity of its cultural life.[6] In the sixteenth century, for example, the Bolognese *studium* seems increasingly willing to increase the funding for natural philosophy vis-à-vis medicine; furthermore, developments in the career ladder point to a growing specialization of natural philosophy professors and to changes in the cycle of books to be read in the courses on natural philosophy. Even though one cannot point to revolutionary changes such as the introduction of experimental science, on the whole university natural philosophy in Bologna (as elsewhere in Europe) emerges as far more vibrant than once thought.[7] Thus the question is whether the dynamism observable in natural philosophy (by far the most important of the philosophical branches) was matched in Bologna by changes in the teaching of moral philosophy, which was by comparison a minor subject and probably came near the bottom on the *studium*'s list of priorities. If there were any changes, can one speak of a Bolognese school of moral philosophy, or of a common consensus as to how the subject should be taught? And how does the Bolognese situation compare with our findings for other Italian universities?

After a brief sketch of the institutional context, this chapter examines the Bolognese works connected with the study and teaching of Aristotle's *Ethics*. The focus is on the unpublished lectures of Claudio Betti (second half of the sixteenth century), but attention is also given to the interpretations of Agostino Galesio and Camillo Baldi, from the beginning of the seventeenth century.

8.1 *The Institutional Context*

A translation of Aristotle's *Ethics* into the vernacular by Taddeo Alderotti († 1295) and a commentary on the (pseudo-) Aristotelian *Economics* by Bartolomeo da Varignana († ca. 1318) suggest that, from an early date, some Bolognese professors—especially professors of

[6] A fine study of the literary culture of Bologna and the surrounding region during 1430–1630 is Anselmi *et al.* 1988.

[7] Lines 2001b and 2002a. For indications of the current reevaluation of the relationship between science and the Renaissance universities, see especially Porter 1996, Camerota and Helbing 2000, and the essays in Lines 2001c.

medicine—had a particular interest in Aristotle's moral philosophy.[8] Furthermore, as explained below (§ 8.2.1), during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries several scholars active in Bologna penned works on the *Ethics*.[9] Nonetheless, the first documentary evidence for a steady teaching of moral philosophy in the Bolognese *studium* comes only in 1379, with Pietro da Varignana's appointment to teach the subject along with medicine.[10] Thereafter the subject is recorded quite regularly, so that around ninety teachers of moral philosophy are known for Bologna up to around 1620—considerably more, for example, than for Florence–Pisa. Although over half (fifty-five) of these professors teach moral philosophy for only one or two years, in many cases we are fairly well informed about their academic careers.[11] Unlike the situation in Padua, therefore, something can be said about who they are and the place of moral philosophy in their *Laufbahn.*

As might be expected, given the Bolognese tradition in this matter, moral philosophy is taught fairly often by professors of medicine.[12] In contrast with Pavia, there are very few cases of the subject's being combined with astrology.[13] There are also not many instances of theologians teaching moral philosophy,[14] and the number of regulars (members of religious orders) teaching the subject is surprisingly low when compared with Florence: only eleven cases are documented for Bologna, and in several of these instances moral philosophy is taught jointly with metaphysics (a short-lived occurrence).[15] But especially surprising, when compared with the practice in Florence, is the fact that so few rhetoricians teach moral philosophy in Bologna: we know only of Francesco Filelfo, Lianoro de'

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[8] On Alderotti see Siraisi 1981, pp. 77–82; for Bartolomeo da Varignana, see Appendix A below, no. 1. For general context on philosophy in fourteenth-century Bologna, see A. Maier 1967.

[9] In particular, Giacomo da Pistoia (Appendix C, no. 1), Guido Vernani (no. 7), and Michele Aiguani (no. 17).

[10] See Appendix A below, no. 2.

[11] Details are given in Appendix A.

[12] Some examples are, in addition to Bartolomeo da Varignana (Appendix A, no. 1) and Pietro da Varignana (no. 2): Ugo Benzi (no. 17), Baverio Bonetti (no. 41), Bernardo Garzoni (no. 44).

[13] I have only found two: Guglielmo di Argeli (Appendix A, no. 3) and Giacomo d'Alemagna (no. 4).

[14] The cases I have found are: Fernando da Cordova (Appendix A, no. 9), Andrea Biglia, O.E.S.A. (no. 30), Gaspare di San Giovanni, O.P. (no. 31), Filippo da Bagnacavallo, O.F.M. (no. 74), Angelo da Arezzo, O. Serv. (no. 75), and Girolamo Gaggio (no. 76).

[15] See Appendix A, nos. 30, 31, 46, 55, 56, 59, 69, 74, 75, 76, and 77.

Lianori, Andronico Callisto, and Giulio Valeriano Bonomi.[16] Evaluating this phenomenon requires caution, since we know of some rhetoricians in Bologna who considered themselves to be lecturing on moral philosophy even though they were officially on the rolls for rhetoric.[17] Furthermore, one should not necessarily conclude that philosophy teaching was therefore not affected by humanist interests.[18] Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that in Bologna moral philosophy is mostly taught as a passing part of a professor's career, and by teachers of philosophy who have absolved the initial two- or three-year requirement to teach logic and are on their way toward gaining positions in medicine.[19] It is also notable that, differently from universities such as Padua, it is not uncommon to find two or even three professors appointed simultaneously to teach moral philosophy. This is especially the case in the fifteenth century.

After a hiatus between 1528 and 1562,[20] moral philosophy reappears on the university rolls for Bologna with the appointment of Claudio Betti.[21] Its teaching attests to a transformation on various levels. First of all, in line with a trend toward specialization in philosophy teaching in Bologna during the second half of the sixteenth century,[22] hardly any of the ethics teachers are on a career path toward medicine, although they hold doctorates in both Arts and Medicine.[23] And none is a theologian or a rhetorician. This suggests that moral philosophy is firmly considered a philosophical subject, to be taught in combination or alternation with logic and natural

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[16] For the teaching of Filelfo, de' Lianori, Callisto, and Bonomi, see Appendix A, nos. 35, 52, 61, and 80.

[17] For example, Lapo da Castiglionchio, Jr. delivered a *Praelectio in philosophia morali* in 1436 (see Müllner, pp. 139–42; Celenza 1999, p. 7). For the cases of Codro and Filippo Beroaldo Sr., see below, p. 299.

[18] An example is the teaching of moral philosophy by Andrea Biglia, a humanist albeit not chiefly a rhetorician; see Appendix A, no. 30.

[19] Before 1528 a partial departure from this pattern is represented by a handful of professors who, in the second half of the fifteenth century, spend a substantial part of their teaching career concentrating on moral philosophy rather than going on to teach medicine. Tommaso Marinasi (Appendix A, no. 65), Andronico di Parma (no. 70), and Bartolomeo dalle Rode (no. 72) are the main figures involved. Unfortunately, no written memory of their teaching seems to have survived.

[20] The reasons for this hiatus are not clear; it possibly has something to do with the previous teacher's lack of success in attracting students to the course. For Bonomi's self-testimony concerning this failure, see Appendix A, no. 80.

[21] Betti's teaching is described in Appendix A, no. 81.

[22] See Lines 2001b.

[23] The exception is Gian Battista Montacheti; see Appendix A, no. 82.

philosophy. Second, moral philosophy is no longer a matter of only passing interest: professors do not teach it for just one or two years. The bare minimum seems to be three years,[24] but the norm is to teach moral philosophy for five or more years. In turn, these long-term teaching commitments coincide with the production of commentaries on the *Ethics*—the first substantial evidence of how moral philosophy was taught in Bologna.

Furthermore, this is also the period in which the rolls start to specify what is to be read in the moral philosophy course. The practice starts in the years of Melchiorre Zoppio's teaching (1592–1603).[25] It would seem from this evidence that the *Ethics* is to be covered in a six-year cycle which, starting from a discussion of happiness in general, passes to an examination of the moral virtues (split into two years: *de attinentibus ad virtutes morales* and *de virtutibus moralibus*), of justice, of the contemplative virtues, and of friendship.[26]

Finally, another notable change is that, after 1562, moral philosophy is taught by only one teacher per year. In the absence of documentary evidence, it is not possible to offer any definitive explanation for this phenomenon. Significantly, however, the ethics teachers' salaries receive a measurable boost. Moral philosophy had never accounted for a large proportion of the Bolognese budget in Arts and Medicine;[27] it came, in fact, always near the bottom percentagewise, along with metaphysics and theology. Nonetheless, in the late sixteenth century the teacher of moral philosophy did not (as formerly) have to share the allocations for his field with anyone else. Thus, his average salary was several times higher than those in metaphysics and theology. Indeed, in the last quarter of the sixteenth century an ethics teacher could boast more than double the average salary of a professor of logic, a subject that accounted for 3.7% of the budget of Arts and Medicine versus 2% for moral philosophy.[28] This fact is probably best explained by a staffing difference between the two subjects: ethics teaching was usually assigned to

[24] With Gaspare Melara; see Appendix A, no. 83.

[25] For Zoppio see Appendix A, no. 87.

[26] The first firm evidence I have found for this cycle dates from 1591–1592, when the rolls begin specifying the topics to be taught in the moral philosophy course; see Dallari, II, p. 242.

[27] The high point seems to have been around 3.3% between 1469 and 1505; see Lines 2002a, Table 2-A.

[28] See Lines, *ibid.*

established professors of logic and natural philosophy, for whom a salary cut would have been unacceptable. Logic, on the contrary, was still mainly a subject for fresh graduates.

Taken together, these factors seem to point toward some significant developments. In particular, the staff for moral philosophy was not only better paid, but more senior, more philosophically-minded, and more dedicated in the second half of the sixteenth century than earlier. It is hard to say whether these were the results of a conscious strategy on the part of the university authorities to revive the teaching of moral philosophy in Bologna.[29] But it is no accident that the bulk of the evidence for the study of the *Ethics* in Bologna dates from this period, and it will become clear that the institutional context had a tangible effect on how the *Ethics* was treated. Before examining this evidence in detail, however, the earlier study of the *Ethics* in Bologna also deserves to be mentioned.

8.2 *The Interpretative Background*

8.2.1 *Before 1500*

A survey of the Bolognese production on moral philosophy testifies, first of all, to an early interest especially in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and in the (pseudo-) Aristotelian *Economics*. In addition to the works of Taddeo Alderotti and Bartolomeo da Varignana mentioned above,[30] we know, for example, of a *Quaestio de felicitate* by the fairly obscure Giacomo da Pistoia, who possibly disputed this question (after the Parisian fashion and based on the *Nicomachean Ethics*) in Bologna in the 1290s.[31] Furthermore, Guido Vernani, who taught in the *studium* of the Dominican order in Bologna between 1310 and 1324, in the period 1324–1330 authored two works on the *Ethics* as well as a commentary on the *Politics*; predictably, they depend heavily on St. Thomas.[32] Unfortunately, the questions on the *Ethics* attributed to the fourteenth-century Carmelite Michele Aiguani (a teacher of the-

[29] None of the university documents I have examined thus far offers any discussion of the issue.

[30] See p. 290.

[31] On Giacomo da Pistoia see below, Appendix C, no. 1.

[32] On Guido Vernani see below, Appendix C, nos. 7–8 and above, pp. 169–70. For the *Politics* commentaries, see Flüeler 1992, II, p. 22.

ology in the Bolognese *studium*) have not been found.[33] Beyond these works, there are some annotations in a beautiful fourteenth-century manuscript of the *Ethics*;[34] these suggest that the first four books were considered of special interest and display a familiarity not only with Thomas but also with Albert the Great and Jean Buridan.

While these works show that Aristotle's moral philosophy was known and studied in Bologna during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, they do not, however, offer any clear evidence as to how the *Ethics* was treated in the university. It is not certain, for example, that Bartolomeo da Varignana's work on the *Economics* is really connected with university classroom teaching.[35] Indeed, it is not altogether clear that moral philosophy was taught in the university during this early period; Arts students desiring to follow a course on the *Ethics* may have been directed to hear the teaching offered by the regulars in their own quarters.[36]

Other fifteenth-century works written in Bologna are more clearly connected with the university context.[37] The theologian Battista de' Giudici da Finali († 1484),[38] who taught in the Dominican convent of Bologna around 1460, later wrote an apology (*Apologia traductionis antique libri ethicorum Aristotelis contra invectivam traductionemque Leonardi Aretini*)[39] for the older Latin translation of the *EN* against the retranslation (ca. 1417) by the chancellor of Florence, Leonardo Bruni († 1444).[40] In this work, datable to around 1481/1484, the bishop of Ventimiglia chastises Bruni for lacking appropriate professional credentials, i.e.

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[33] On Michele Aiguani see Appendix C, no. 17.

[34] Bologna, BU 2252 (s. XIV), 109 ff.; see *AL Codices*, II, no. 1283; Gauthier 1969, p. 20*; *Codices Thomae*, no. 309.

[35] Siraisi suggests that Bartolomeo's work is "most likely a written redaction of lectures he gave in the faculty of arts and medicine at Bologna. . . . It does not necessarily follow that the study of the *Economics* was, in Bartolomeo's day or thereafter, an essential part of the curriculum in arts and medicine. It seems more likely that individual masters enjoyed some liberty to introduce occasional courses upon works of particular interest to themselves or their students, whether or not these works were among those required for examination" (Siraisi 1981, pp. 86–87). It is also possible, however, that Bartolomeo taught the *Economics* privately. I know only of rare instances in Italy of the *Economics* being taught as part of a university course.

[36] See above, p. 84.

[37] The commentary by Ugo Benzi on the (pseudo-) Aristotelian *Economics* is not discussed here, partly because its connection with Bologna remains, to my mind, questionable. See Appendix A, no. 17.

[38] For bibliography, see Hankins 2001, p. 150, n. 17.

[39] In Bologna, BU 1639 (s. XV), ff. 3v–8v. On this work see Grabmann 1926, Hankins 2001, pp. 137–38 and idem (forthcoming); cf. Frati, p. 371, no. 856.

[40] On Bruni's translation see below, Appendix C, no. 26.

for presuming to translate and comment on Aristotle despite his ignorance of dialectic and philosophy. Thus, Battista treats the *Ethics* as a philosophical work, requiring a specialized professional terminology and preparation. Furthermore, according to Battista, literary elegance is not appropriate to the interpretation of philosophical texts; Bruni had therefore erred in giving Aristotle a fluent Ciceronian rendering. On both of these points, Battista's viewpoint coincides with that of Niccolò Tignosi in Florence a few years earlier.[41] Contrary to Tignosi, however, Battista would disapprove of using Bruni's translation as a textbook. Furthermore, he differs both from Tignosi and from former participants in the controversy sparked by Bruni's translation by adding criticisms of literary nature to the customary arsenal of philosophical objections—thus he tries to meet Bruni on his own ground.[42] It is also noteworthy that the theologian freely admits that he has taken up the reading of the *Ethics* in order to overcome summertime boredom and that he had no previous direct acquaintance with this work.[43] Although that of summertime leisure is surely a literary *topos*, it seems unlikely that the author would have admitted his ignorance of the *Ethics* if it was widely considered to be "required reading" for cultured persons or even for university students. This represents a further indication that Aristotle's moral philosophy was not considered a topic of great importance in Bologna around the middle of the fifteenth century.

The case of Battista is particularly relevant here because he was one of several in Bologna for whom Bruni's translation was hard to accept. Already earlier (after 1450?) criticisms against Bruni's translation had been voiced by Francesco da Bologna (like Battista, a reader in the Dominican convent of Bologna) in his marginal annotations to Bruni's preface to his translation of the *Ethics*.[44] Furthermore, Niccolò Fava († 1439), a famous teacher of philosophy and medicine in the Bolognese *studium*,[45] took an interest in Bruni's translation. When Francesco Filelfo, a Greek émigré, was teaching in Bologna

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[41] See above, pp. 207 ff.

[42] Hankins (forthcoming).

[43] Bologna, BU 1639 (s. XV), f. 3r: "Cum nuper vacarem his theologicis studiis quibus ante dare operam consueram, Ethicorum Aristotelis libros, quos usque ad id tempus nunquam legissem, ad depellendas alias molestias aestivo tempore videre ociosus institui."

[44] The glosses, in Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, G III 16 (s. XV), ff. 1r–2v, have been edited and studied in Hankins 2001, pp. 152–55 and 144–45.

[45] See below, Appendix A, no. 19.

(1427–1428),[46] Fava seized the opportunity to quiz him on the meaning of *τἀγαθόν* in the opening lines of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: was the medieval translation correct ("bene ostenderunt bonum esse quod omnia appetunt") or should one rather follow Bruni's version ("bene ostenderunt summum bonum quod omnia appetunt")?[47] In other words, was Aristotle really talking about God as being the final end of all things, or was this an interpretation superimposed on the text by Bruni? Filelfo was unhappy with both translations, but managed to be diplomatic about Bruni's;[48] unfortunately, this does not tell us whether Filelfo, who among other subjects may have been lecturing on the *Ethics* in 1428, actually used Bruni's translation or not for his teaching.[49] But it does say something about the concerns of the philosophers at the *studium* of Bologna and their hesitancy to embrace Bruni's translation. Because of this reluctance to follow Bruni's methodology and the fact that most of the teachers of moral philosophy in Bologna were philosophers, it seems likely that Bruni's translation was adopted for teaching there only late, if at all. From this standpoint, Bologna would have been conservative with respect to Florence during the fifteenth century.[50]

Since other evidence as to the study of the *Ethics* at the University of Bologna is scanty, a series of marginal annotations on the *Ethics* and the *Politics* by Ugolino Pisano is particularly precious.[51] Ugolino, a loquacious but otherwise obscure figure, informs us that he studied civil and canon law in Bologna and that he obtained his license in these subjects in March 1437; his doctorate was awarded to him two months later. Ugolino's numerous annotations, which cover the *Ethics* and the *Politics* in their entirety, are dated; we therefore know that his study of the *Ethics* was finished on August 12, 1435 and that

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[46] See below, Appendix A, no. 35.

[47] We do not have a copy of Fava's inquiry, but we do have the letters written by Filelfo in response to it (see Hankins 2001, pp. 156–59) and from which Fava's concerns can be easily reconstructed. Neither Fava nor Filelfo explicitly attribute the second reading to Bruni, but there was hardly any need to.

[48] Hankins 2001, pp. 135–36.

[49] For Filelfo's Bolognese teaching see below, Appendix A, no. 35.

[50] The Florentine commentaries and lectures on the *Ethics* from the second half of the fifteenth century are all—with the exception of Acciaiuoli's commentary—based on Bruni's translation.

[51] The manuscript containing them is Milan, BAmbr., F.141.sup. (s. XIV), ff. 1r–68r; cf. *AL Codices*, II, no. 1444; *AL Suppl.*, p. 144; Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 299 with bibliography; cf. Gauthier 1970a, p. 151, n. 198.

of the *Politics* on January 13, 1437. Both works are in Moerbeke's translation, in a fourteenth-century manuscript.

Even though Ugolino was a student in Bologna when he wrote his annotations, we have no sure evidence that his glosses are related to university teaching. They could be the result of private study or even of teaching in one of the religious convents in Bologna.[52] Still, the case of Ugolino is interesting because it is a reminder that Arts students were not necessarily the only ones interested in Aristotle's moral philosophy: doubtless students of law and perhaps of medicine too were also among the audience. Furthermore, if the text annotated by Ugolino was the same as the teaching text (or at least as the most commonly used text at the university), this would confirm that Bruni's translation had not yet managed to make its way into the curriculum there. This, however, does not mean that it was completely ignored, for one of Ugolino's annotations (f. 3r) compares Bruni's translation of *τἀγαθόν* ("summum bonum") with the older translation. Thus, even though not necessarily embraced, Bruni's translation was still perceived as an interpretation to be reckoned with. Should Ugolino's annotations really be related to classroom teaching, this would be interesting because they bear witness to an extensive coverage of both the *Ethics* and the *Politics*. This would be one of the few evidences for the teaching of the *Politics* in the Italian universities.[53]

8.2.2 *After 1500*

Around the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century, much of the evidence about the *Ethics* in Bologna concerns rhetoricians active there. This dovetails well with what is known about the period 1480–1530 as one of great literary flourishing in Bologna[54] and with the teaching of moral philosophy by the rhetorician Bonomi at the start of the sixteenth century.[55] We know, for example, of the interest in Bruni's translation of the *Ethics* on the part of Benedetto Colucci da Pistoia, a member of Marsilio Ficino's

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[52] A gap in the documents for Arts and Medicine in 1434–1438 makes it impossible to determine whether anyone was teaching moral philosophy in the university then.

[53] It seems, from a prolusion, that Francesco Filelfo lectured on the *Politics* in 1470 (Florence, BNC, Naz. II.IX.14; see Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 115). However, Filelfo was teaching in Milan, not at the *studium* in Pavia. Guglielmo Becchi, in Florence, also lectured on the *Politics* (see Staico 1996, pp. 1301–11, 1319–20).

[54] See especially Anselmi *et al.* 1988, pp. 523–25.

[55] On Bonomi, see Appendix A, no. 80.

circle in Florence who taught grammar in Florence before teaching rhetoric and poetry in the Bolognese *studium* in 1482–1505.[56] A manuscript with Colucci's annotations on the *Ethics* (dating from the young notary's attendance of John Argyropoulos' lectures in Florence in 1457) has already been studied.[57] Of special interest are his copious notes on Books III–V; the rest of the *Ethics* and even the *Economics* are comparatively clean, possibly because Colucci attended Argyropoulos' lectures only for a few months.

The study of Aristotle's moral philosophy by Antonio Cortesi Urceo (Codro, 1446–1500) is also well documented. Codro, who taught rhetoric in Bologna in 1482–1500, not only annotated a copy of Aristotle's *Ethics* in Bruni's translation,[58] but also made numerous references to the *Ethics* in the prolusions to his courses in rhetoric. Of special relevance are his *Sermones* VI, XII, and XIV.[59] *Sermo* XIV (*In laudem virtutis*) draws heavily, for example, on *EN* I and II; *Sermo* XII depends on Books IIIb–V; and *Sermo* VI makes substantial use of Book VI.

Other rhetoricians in Bologna busied themselves with moral philosophy in a more general way. Filippo Beroaldo, Sr. (1453–1505)—who taught in Bologna ca. 1472–1474, 1479–1505—discussed Horace, Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* and even Virgil's *Georgics* in connection with happiness and moral philosophy,[60] although he did not necessarily center his discussion on Aristotle's *Ethics*. For his part, Romolo Amaseo (1489–1522), one of the most sought-after teachers of his time,[61] mentioned moral philosophy in his oration *De ratione et ordine*

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[56] On Colucci, see Cosenza, II, pp. 1049–51; Hankins 1991, pp. 445, 466; Chines, pp. 10–11. His teaching of grammar in Florence is documented in Verde, II, pp. 120–23; IV.1, pp. 93–95 and idem 1974, pp. 284–87. For Benedetto's teaching in Bologna, see Dallari, *ad indicem*.

[57] Bologna, BU 2703 (s. XV); see Field 1988, p. 56n; Hankins 2001, pp. 150–51, n. 25; idem (forthcoming), especially Appendix I; cf. Frati, p. 525, no. 1425.

[58] Rome, BVallicell., C. 83 (s. XV). See *Iter*, II, p. 131; Lines 1997, p. 310; also Hankins 1997, p. 164, no. 2242.

[59] In Codro 1506. For a discussion of Codro's orations see especially Poppi 1990, pp. 51–63 (also in idem 1997, pp. 158–75); on Codro in general, see Malagola 1878, Raimondi 1950, *DBI*, XXIX, pp. 773–78 (L. Gualdo Rosa) and Chines, no. 14 (with bibliography).

[60] Beroaldo 1497 and 1499. On these orations, see Poppi 1990, pp. 41–50. On Beroaldo, see Montalbani, pp. 197–99; *DBI*, IX, pp. 382–84 (M. Gilmore), *DCLI* I, pp. 288–90 (G. Gardenal), and most recently Chines, pp. 11–16. Also see Garin 1994, pp. 359–87 and Anselmi 1988, *passim*.

[61] Amaseo was professor of rhetoric in the Bolognese *studium*, ca. 1512–1544 (with a spell in Padua, ca. 1520–1523). Useful information on him is given in *DBI*, II, pp. 660–66 (R. Avesani) and Chines, pp. 4–5.

studiorum.[62] In this work, Amaseo describes the proper order of studies as beginning with Latin and Greek, then progressing to history, geography, military and architectural arts; thereafter follows training in rhetoric and dialectic, after which one should pass to natural philosophy and mathematics. Curiously, moral philosophy is placed at the very end, before the options of law and theology.[63] It is striking that Amaseo says nothing about moral philosophy as a preparation for medicine, nor about combining rhetoric with moral philosophy. As with many such pedagogical programs, however, it is hard to know how much is based on reality and how much remains personal preference. Certainly, Amaseo's inclusion of geography and of the military and architectural arts does not support the possibility that he was describing a current university curriculum.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, the professors of philosophy seem to be the main university group interested in the *Ethics* in Bologna. The chief representatives of this group are Claudio Betti, Agostino Galesio, and Camillo Baldi. But others too, such as the famed naturalist Ulisse Aldrovandi, were involved in the study of the *Ethics*. At some point, this man of remarkably broad interests even took the trouble to transcribe Donato Acciaiuoli's commentary (first printed in 1478), which he paraphrased in places.[64] Aldrovandi's manuscript is especially interesting because, as in Betti's lectures, there is a sustained effort to outline the syllogisms of the text. A study of this work and of its relationship to Aldrovandi's other philosophical interests would doubtless shed further light on Bologna's cultural climate during the second half of the sixteenth century. Since Aldrovandi is not known to have taught the *Ethics*, however, such a study will have to be deferred to another occasion. The focus here will be on interpretations of the *Ethics* by Bolognese professors known to have taught moral philosophy there. Although they are later, the works by Galesio and Baldi are treated before the lectures by Betti, since they can be described more briefly.

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[62] The oration is in Bologna, BU 4221 (s. XVI), ff. 1r–18r. It appears to be unpublished.

[63] *Ibid.*, ff. 14v–17v.

[64] Aldrovandi's manuscript is in Bologna, BU, Aldrov., ms. 59 (s. XVI), 223 ff. It is mentioned in Lines 1997, p. 316. For Aldrovandi's career, see Lines 2001b, no. 170 and Findlen 1994, *passim*. On Acciaiuoli's commentary see below, Appendix C, no. 38.

Agostino Galesio

After obtaining his doctorate in Arts and Medicine (1567), Galesio started his teaching career in Bologna in 1568–1569. He taught logic for four years before going on to teach natural philosophy in 1572–1575. After an absence of some ten years, in which he taught in Perugia and elsewhere, he returned to Bologna. There the Senate appointed him, in 1586, to teach moral philosophy, and he is listed on the *studium*'s rolls for this subject until 1592.[65] His later career (which included a period of teaching in Pisa, 1614–1619) concentrated on the teaching of logic and natural philosophy, and his commentaries on both of these philosophical branches survive.[66] Galesio continued his teaching of these subjects right up to his death in February 1621.[67] I have found no documentary basis for Mazzetti's statement that he taught *lettere umane* in 1603.[68]

It is not altogether clear which books of the *Ethics* Galesio taught in the Bolognese *studium*. The rolls specify the subject of his teaching only in 1591–1592, when he is to teach Book V (on Justice). Since the *Ethics* was usually covered over a six-year cycle in Bologna during this period, it seems likely that Galesio covered all of the *EN* during his six-year appointment to teach the subject. Possibly connected with this teaching is the *Notanda excellentis philosophi D. Augustini Gallesii in libros Ethicorum Aristotelis duos.*[69] This work, surviving in a single manuscript,[70] is similar in format to a fascicle on the *Posterior Analytics*, bearing the same shelfmark as this one and also authored by Galesio.[71] Although the pieces are not dated and their connection with the Bolognese *studium* cannot be established beyond doubt (they could instead be related to private teaching, or even to teaching in a different *studium*), they are nonetheless precious documents, testifying both to Galesio's interests and to his methodology. My examination suggests that the work on the *Ethics* is a recopied version

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[65] Fantuzzi, IV, p. 23 states that Galesio taught moral philosophy until his death. This, however, is not confirmed by the university records, although it is possible that Galesio continued to teach moral philosophy privately.

[66] See Lohr, RLAC, p. 157.

[67] On Galesio's career, see Appendix A, no. 85 and Lines 2001b, no. 179.

[68] Mazzetti, no. 1331.

[69] See Appendix C, no. 136.

[70] Bologna, BU 723, fasc. II (s. XVII, chart., 4°), 46 ff.

[71] According to Fantuzzi, IV, p. 24, this work (in Bologna, BU 723, fasc. I) bears a note at the end: "Ex ore Galesii accepit et scripsit quidam auditor." However, I have not been able to find it.

of Galesio's lectures, either by Galesio himself or by a student. It is written very clearly, with hardly any erasures or corrections.

In 46 folios, the *Notanda in libros Ethicorum* covers the first two books of the *Ethics*, which is examined in a Latin translation. After a few brief introductory comments on the definition of moral philosophy, its subject matter, and its division, Galesio proceeds to examine each chapter or section in turn. At the beginning of each division, Galesio offers (often through graphs) an outline of the contents of that section, followed by a short paraphrase with explanatory comments. At the end of each section, an Appendix sums up the most memorable statements made by Aristotle in the text just examined, or gives a few additional explanations.[72]

This work's conciseness does not leave much space for philosophical discussion. On the subject of education, for example, Galesio holds that the young should not hear the *Ethics*; however, we are not offered a detailed justification for his viewpoint.[73] Nonetheless, even in its general limitation to the bare essentials (statement of positions without argumentation), the work offers some insights into Galesio's views. In his discussion of the subject of moral philosophy, for example, Galesio holds that the *Ethics* concerns man in general, inasmuch as he is capable of being happy.[74] Thus, Galesio implicitly disagrees with the traditional opinion that the *Ethics* concerns the individual man; indeed, he seems to side with Francesco Piccolomini's view of the *Ethics* as providing a set of general moral principles foundational to the *Economics* and the *Politics*.[75] Galesio's attention to the Paduan debate between Jacopo Zabarella and Francesco Piccolomini is also suggested by his reference to the problem of method and order.[76]

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[72] E.g., f. 20v: "Felicitas omnium humanarum rerum est optima."

[73] F. 9r: "Iuvenis disciplinae moralis non est idoneus auditor quippe qui humanarum actionum est imperitus, item quia perturbationes et passiones persequitur."

[74] F. 3v: "Subiectum sive materia subiecta philosophiae activae est homo, quatenus activae felicitatis capax est. Talis aut[em] homo considerari potest vel absolute, quatenus ubi nullis legibus constrictus, aut privatis aliquibus . . . vel qua homo familiaris . . . vel qua civilis . . ." Cf. f. 4r: "Dividitur autem philosophia activa in Aethicam, Oeconomicam et Politicam sive Civilem. Aethica considerat de felicitate hominis absolute. Oeconomica de felicitate hominis familiam regentis. Civilis vero de felicitate hominis civilis."

[75] See above, pp. 270–71.

[76] F. 10v: "Methodus et via in tradenda atque investiganda doctrina felicitatis erit a notioribus nobis. Appendix. Duplex est via pertractandi unamquamquam rem, cuius altera progreditur a principiis ad principiata, quae naturalis dicitur. Altera vero a principiatis effectibusque ad ipsa principia et causas quas nobis insita et innata censetur, quae quoad nos dicitur."

The *Notanda* suggests that Galesio may have limited himself, in his teaching, to offering a summary paraphrase of the work. This would accord well with Galesio's view of the *Ethics* as a fairly elementary subject (to be taught right after logic and dialectic)[77] and would be consistent with what we know about Baldi's teaching as well (see below). Although such a straightforward and unproblematized teaching of the text may not seem especially remarkable, it should be seen in contrast with the teaching approaches to the *Ethics* observable in other Italian universities at the time and even with that of Claudio Betti.

Galesio also wrote two other works on moral philosophy. His *Tractatus de Fortitudine, Prudentia, Iustitia* is in fact a collection of four different manuscripts bound together in Bologna, BU 722.[78] (The fourth manuscript repeats a fragment of the third treatise on Justice, a work which is also contained in Bologna, BU 1991.) One of the most notable characteristics of these treatises, dedicated to and apparently commissioned by Cardinal Francesco Sforza,[79] is the use of watercolors in the emblem tradition to illustrate specific points about the virtues in question. The treatise on Prudence, for example, makes constant use of such watercolors in chapter 12;[80] both manuscripts on Justice also have watercolors, although not always the same ones or in the same order. Neither the works nor the manuscripts are dated; one can only infer from the dedication that the works must have been written after 1583 (and, of course, before Galesio's death in 1621).

It is worth noting Galesio's procedure in these works, which I shall illustrate from his treatise on Justice (in Bologna, BU 1991). Divided in ten chapters and covering 519 pages (plus a detailed index), in many ways the *De iustitia* appears to be a typical scholastic treatise. Indeed, the first six chapters discuss the nature of justice

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[77] Vatican, BAV, Barb. lat. 314 (s. XVII), f. 11v: "Hisce ergo praemisssis ad rem propositam iam manus conferentes, breviter et resolute dicimus, quod quemadmodum philosophiam moralem addiscendam esse statuimus post disciplinarum instrumentalium (quae sunt logica et dialectica) ne dum sermocinalium perceptionem . . ."

[78] On this work, already signalled in Fantuzzi, IV, p. 24, see below, Appendix C, no. 137.

[79] Sforza became cardinal in 1583 and died in 1624; see *ABI*, II 575, 205 (Argenteri). The colophon to *De iustitia* reads: "Et haec sunt, quae tradenda pro virili nostra indicavimus ad faciliorem intellectionem doctrinae peripatheticae de iustitia explicatae per universum V librum Ethicorum, in gratiam illustrissimi et excellentissimi cardinalis Sfortiae, principis iustissimi, id ipsum nobis imperantis. Authore Augustino Gallesio" (Bologna, BU 1991, p. 519).

[80] Bologna, BU 722, ff. 163r–178v.

and distinguish it in its various kinds according to standard scholastic procedure.[81] Chapter 8 reports a series of twelve main questions (plus five accessory ones) that are usually posed in discussing Justice, several of them taken from good scholastic authors such as Jean Buridan and Gerard of Odo. And there are references throughout to the opinions of other commentators and philosophical authorities. Chapters 7 and 9, however, reserve some interesting surprises. Chapter 7 (*Quae dicta sunt a plerisque illustribus philosophis de iustitia, iusto, iure et contrariis*) is dedicated to listing opinions on Justice taken from ancient and modern authors. It goes well beyond Aristotle and presents gems taken from (among others) Plato, Xenophon, Lucian, Demosthenes, St. Augustine, Euripides, and Virgil. Furthermore, even in the case of Aristotle the sources are broader than usual, since Galesio uses not only the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but also the *Eudemian Ethics*, the *Magna Moralia*, and the *Politics*. Chapter 9 (*Quibus iustitia hieroglyfice significari soleat*) employs the watercolors in the emblem tradition referred to above—truly a most unusual feature in a philosophical treatise. Two further methodological features that should be noted are Galesio's extreme fondness for dichotomous tables and his frequent quotations from (and references to) classical authors, especially historians. The mixture of these various elements makes for a slightly odd effect: the treatise falls somewhere between the scholastic, humanist, and popular genres, apparently trying to incorporate the best from each while keeping up with the times through techniques such as the use of tables.[82] It is much less an exposition of the text (which is cited in Latin translation) than a systematic examination of the problems arising out of it.

Galesio also wrote a *Compendium* on moral philosophy, which survives in two very different redactions. One of these is a six-volume work preserved in a series of Vatican Boncompagni manuscripts and (less completely) in several Neapolitan manuscripts.[83] One of the most formidable interpretations of all time (over 800 folios just for the *Ethics*, plus around 750 folios for the *Politics* in the Naples manuscripts), this "compendium" is distributed in 46 chapters covering

[81] The titles of the chapters are indicative: (1) *De quo agendum et qua methodo procedendum*, (2) *Quot modis assumatur iustitiae nomen et de quo sit sermo*, (3) *Quid sit iustitia*, (4) *Quomodo in species dividatur iustitia et quae sit unaquaequae*, (5) *Quae a iustitia perivationem habeat et quid ac quale unumquodque sit*, and (6) *De iustitiae, iusto et iuri oppositis*.

[82] On the use of tables modeled on Theodor Zwinger see below, p. 323.

[83] See, for this work and the manuscripts, Appendix C, no. 139.

four main sections.[84] The longest part is that specifically discussing the content of ethics, and in particular the virtues. After covering, in chapters 9–19, the eleven Aristotelian moral virtues, Galesio treats other minor virtues in chapters 20–28;[85] he then goes on to discuss (chapters 29–34) intellectual virtue and (chapter 35) friendship.

Many of the observations made above concerning Galesio's method in the *Tractatus de Fortitudine, Prudentia, Iustitia* could be repeated for the first redaction of the *Compendium.* Indeed, it is possible that the individual works in the *Tractatus* are actually expansions of the corresponding sections in the *Compendium.* There are, however, some interesting differences between the two works. First, in the *Compendium* Galesio typically concludes each chapter by listing a series of questions usually raised on the topic just examined; there is usually one set of questions posed by the philosophers and another set posed by the theologians. The last set seems to have no counterpart in the works of the *Tractatus.* Second, that of the emblems seems to have been an evolving affair. In the Naples manuscripts, spaces are usually left blank, presumably for drawings, but are not filled in.[86] The Boncompagni manuscripts, instead, include drawings, but they are not colored. The Bologna manuscript of the *Tractatus* is the only one to have the watercolors, and thus presumably represents one of the the later stages in the first redaction's elaboration. Finally, there is a curious feature in the structure of the *Compendium*: the work, which starts by discussing happiness, concludes its examination of the *Ethics* with Friendship before continuing on to the final section on civil society. It hardly seems coincidental that this structure mirrors the six-year cycle for teaching the *Ethics* apparently in use at Bologna during Galesio's time. However, since the *Economics* and the *Politics* were not usually taught in the Italian universities, I would argue for a possible influence of the Bolognese structure of teaching on Galesio's treatment rather than for the *Compendium* as a work related to the

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[84] The first section (Vatican, BAV, Boncompagni, K.1, ff. 3–14) is introductory; after it follows *De principiis moralis philosophiae* (*ibid.*, ff. 15–124), then *De subiecto tractationis moralis philosophiae* (essentially the remaining bulk of the work), and finally, in the last two volumes, *De civili societate.*

[85] The discussion of the minor virtues occcurs according to the following sequence: chapter (20) *De virtutibus moralibus minus principaliter*, (21) *De verecundia*, (22) *De aemulatione*, (23) *De laetitia*, (24) *De tristitia*, (25) *De misericordia*, (26) *De indignatione*, (27) *De hilaritate*, and (28) *De heroica virtute.*

[86] An exception is represented by Naples, BNC, IV.H.138, which—apparently like IV.H.139 (see Fossier, pp. 210–11)—does include watercolors.

classroom. In any case, the freedom with which Galesio treats Aristotle's text (not only in the sequence of the topics, but within the individual topics themselves) suggests that Galesio learned from Francesco Piccolomini a valuable lesson: an interpreter should not be the slave of the text he is teaching.

The second redaction of the *Compendium* is dedicated to Cardinal Maffeo Barberini (later Pope Urban VIII), papal legate in Bologna. The work, datable to around 1611–1614,[87] survives in a single manuscript and is divided in two parts: Book I (ff. 1r–46v) treats the *Ethics*, whereas Book II (ff. 48r–137r) concerns the *Politics* and other Aristotelian works. In turn, Book I is divided into eleven sections, the first nine of which (ff. 1r–29v) discuss general introductory issues such as *Quid sit moralis philosophia* (Section V, ff. 4r–5v) and *Philosophiae moralis divisio* (Section VI, ff. 5v–8r). These chapters are full of interesting comments in which Galesio displays his full grasp of the philosophical issues involved and acquaintance with the commentary tradition. He treats, for example, the question of whether moral philosophy is a science (f. 16r–v) and shows that its practical aim makes it impossible for it to be considered a science in the strict sense of the word.[88] In his discussion of the proper division of moral philosophy he propends, again like Francesco Piccolomini (but without naming him),[89] for a two-fold division: the *Ethics* provides a discussion of the theoretical principles, whose application is then the concern of the *Politics* and *Economics*.[90] He has interesting comments to make about the proper educational curriculum and about the place

[87] The work bears the title *Compendium moralis philosophiae sub titulo De homine civili pars una, auctore Augustino Gallesio bononiensi philosophiam naturalem de sero publice professante in priori loco descripto* and is found in Vatican, BAV, Barb. lat. 314 (s. XVII), 137 ff. On the work, see Appendix C, no. 138.

[88] Cf. his comments on this in Bologna, BU 723, f. 1r: "... philosophia activa est sapientiae studium in rebus optimis exercendis ordinatum ... docens homines secundum prudentiam recte agere."

[89] On Piccolomini's views, see above, § 7.3.2. Galesio also follows him in considering the proper order of study to be *Ethics*, *Politics*, and *Economics*.

[90] Vatican, BAV, Barb. lat. 314, f. 7v: "Ethica vero est ea moralis philosophiae pars, in qua tractatur de felicitate humana et principiis atque differentiis ad eandem spectantibus, quatenus acquiri potest ab uno quoque homine nato ad convivendum, in quacumque societate humana, quare ad conversandum cum personis cuiusque conditionis. Politica autem est ea philosophiae moralis pars, in qua tractatur de regimine, seu administratione cuiusque humanae societatis, sive ad unam aliquam privatam domum attineat (hinc oeconomica) sive ad plures domos, eiusdem tamen familiae, quae in una vico attenditur (hinc colonia) sive ad plures vicos simul unitas, unde Civitas consurgere dicitur."

of moral philosophy before contemplative philosophy.[91] However, the most striking feature of Galesio's accomplishment lies in the numerous (and high-quality) watercolors, in the emblem book tradition, of the various virtues, contained in Sections XI and XII of Book I. Significantly, the sections are entitled respectively *Quibus imaginibus hieroglyphice ab Aegyptiis sapientibus et Graecis antiquioribus, necnon Hebreis philosophia moralis representaretur* (ff. 30r–39r) and *Quibus imaginibus moralis philosophia hieroglyphice a nobis commode significari possit* (ff. 39r–43r). Book II also makes use of this device, although this time the subject is not so much moral philosophy, but the *homo civilis.*

It is not known to me whether Galesio was attempting, in this way, to present the cardinal with a coffee-table book, or whether the illustrations were part of a conscious pedagogical strategy on Galesio's part. Doubtless the illustrations had such a prominent place because of the work's character as a present to the cardinal. Nonetheless, it seems significant that such an unusual work was prepared by a university professor in Bologna. Even though the high rank of the dedicatee may have influenced Galesio's presentation of the material (as in the case of the *Tractatus*), the *Compendium* shows that Galesio was able to work both within the academic context and outside of it, thus displaying the remarkable kind of flexibility that one usually associates with the humanists. It also seems important that Galesio explicitly presented his *Compendium* to the cardinal as written by him while a professor of natural philosophy in Bologna (*auctore Augustino Gallesio bononiensi philosophiam naturalem de sero publice professante in priori loco descripto*). This is a reminder that natural philosophers were proud, in Bologna, to declare their interest in moral philosophy and considered it to be part of their field of expertise even when they were not specifically teaching the subject in the *studium.* It may be that they did a great deal more private teaching of the subject than we at present suspect. Nonetheless, there seems to have been a strong sense that moral philosophy should hang together with logic and natural philosophy, and not (as in Florence) with rhetoric. This consideration should be remembered when studying the treatments of the *Ethics* on the part of Baldi and Betti as well.

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[91] In Sectio VIII *De moralis philosophiae lectionis ordine* (ff. 9r–13r, especially ff. 11v–12r).

Camillo Baldi

Of Bolognese family, Camillo Baldi (1550–1637) obtained his doctorate in Arts and Medicine in Bologna on February 4, 1572 and started his teaching in 1576.[92] After the customary three years of logic, Baldi taught *philosophia extraordinaria* until 1586, when he was appointed as *prothologicus* for the years 1586–1590. He returned to teaching natural philosophy in 1590, retaining this post (but advancing from morning to afternoon teaching) until 1636, shortly before his death.[93]

Nowhere in the university documents does Baldi appear as a teacher of moral philosophy. Nonetheless, Baldi's *Ethics* commentary is clearly related to a teaching context: at the end of Book I the author declares that he began his exposition on November 10, 1612 and finished it on February 20, 1613.[94] Even though Baldi, who was actively involved in the Bolognese Accademia de' Gelati, may have given his lectures there rather than in the *studium*, it is significant that the rolls for 1612–1613 do not list anyone yet for the subject of moral philosophy. More than likely, Baldi was assigned this responsibility at the last minute, in addition to (or in replacement of) his planned teaching on the *Parva naturalia*. As we shall see in the case of Claudio Betti, it was not unusual for actual teaching to diverge from the official assignments. Furthermore, the dates of Baldi's teaching,[95] the fact that the university program for moral philosophy in 1612–1613 called for discussing *De felicitate in universali* (the very topic of Baldi's teaching), and the language in which Baldi taught (Latin) strongly suggest a university context.[96]

It took Baldi around three months to cover the first book of the *Ethics* in his teaching, and it seems likely that it would have taken

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[92] This Camillo Baldi should not be confused with his homonym, a Servite, who taught philosophy at least in Siena, ca. 1629; cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 29; the mss. listed in *Cat. mss. filos.*, IX, p. 20, are probably by Baldi the Servite.

[93] See Appendix A, no. 90.

[94] Bologna, BU 2318 (s. XVII), f. 156v: "Haec est ad laudem Dei omnipresentis et etiam Virginis Mariae Christi Dei Matris; perfeci die 20 februarii anni 1613 cum libri huius explicationem die 10 Novembris anni 1612 incepissem, quibus commentationibus si quid boni unquam apparverit, id . . . Dei optimi benignitati tribuendum est . . ." On the commentary see below, Appendix C, no. 140.

[95] It is true that the academic year usually began with the feastday of St. Luke (October 18), but Baldi may have started a bit later than usual. There seems to be no good reason why his teaching in the Accademia should have started more or less at the same time as that of the university.

[96] The only difficulty is that the deliberations of the Senate for 1612–1613 (in ASB, Senato, Partiti, no. 15) do not refer to any changes in Baldi's teaching.

him the rest of the academic year to cover Books II and III, on which he also lectured. This fits in well with what is known about the Bolognese practice of teaching Aristotle's *Ethics* in a six-year sequence (see above, § 8.1). Although some of the books were to be studied for a whole academic year (such as Book V on Justice), the program required a broader coverage of two or three books in other years, so as to finish all ten books within the time of the cycle. It also seems significant that Baldi's commentary is based on a new (as yet unidentified) translation,[97] conceivably the work of Baldi himself. Although this may point to a familiarity, on Baldi's part, with the Greek, the more important point is that the *Ethics* continues to be taught in Bologna based on a Latin translation, and not on the Greek text. It is not clear whether the teachers of moral philosophy in Bologna ever lectured on the Greek text of the *Ethics* (as Marc-Antoine Muret, Pier Vettori, and Ottaviano Ferrari did respectively in Rome, Florence, and Pavia).[98] From this point of view, the teaching in Bologna had something in common with the practice in Padua.

Baldi's work is more important as a possible window into classroom practice in Bologna than as an interpretation of the *Ethics*. In fact, as commentaries go, that of Baldi is not especially noteworthy. Baldi's main purpose, as he goes through Aristotle's work chapter by chapter, seems to be merely that of paraphrasing Aristotle and repeating the salient points of the text, but not really in much detail and certainly without much originality.[99] However, as with Galesio, one should stress that there is more to this technique than meets the eye. As is shown by the short *annotationes* and *dubitationes* that follow every chapter, Baldi is interested primarily in the philosophical aspects of Aristotle's text and seizes the opportunity to explore the topic at hand a bit more deeply. Thus, his emphasis does not fall on the literary or philological aspects of the text as would have been the case in Florence. However, he does not therefore subject his students to a detailed examination of each philosophical problem in typical scholastic style. Like Galesio, he provides a summary of

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[97] See Appendix C, no. 141.

[98] On the teaching of the *Ethics* in Greek in Italy, also see above, pp. 102 ff.

[99] For example, on f. 2v Baldi repeats the common division of *Ethics*, *Economics*, and *Politics*, which concern respectively the *perfectio unius hominis*, the perfection of the family, and that of the city. He adds: "Huius item (?) facultatis subiectum est homo quatenus est activus hoc est natus vivere et operari secundum rationem, cuius perfectionem quaerit civilis sive activa haec facultas; finis est hominis bonum . . ."

Aristotle's points with some occasional (but modest) elaboration. It is interesting to contrast the approach of Galesio and Baldi with that of their predecessor Betti.

8.3 *Claudio Betti*

Claudio Betti (1520–1589), of Modena, was the first to teach moral philosophy in Bologna after the long silence on this subject in the university records during 1528–1562. In 1562, when he was first appointed to moral philosophy,[100] Betti was already a senior lecturer, for he had taught in the Bolognese *studium* since 1545. He would teach moral philosophy on several other occasions (often in addition to natural philosophy) until at least 1579. In 1562–1567, however, he was assigned only to moral philosophy.[101] A teacher of notable fame and an author of numerous Aristotelian commentaries (most of which remain unstudied),[102] Betti's reputation rested in a special way on his mastery of logic; his main work on this topic (the *De recta discurrendi ratione institutio brevissima*, also known as *De syllogismo*) was first printed in 1568, sold well, and was reissued in 1590.[103] At the same time, however, Betti was also remembered for his teaching of moral philosophy, and even produced a work on this subject in Italian.[104] But Betti's most interesting contribution to the field of moral philosophy—at least from the perspective of this study—are his Latin lectures on the *Ethics*, which apparently were never printed.

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[100] On the appointment of Claudio Betti to moral philosophy in 1562, there is a a *Senato consulto* dated October 29, 1562 in ASB, Senato, Partiti, no. 8, f. 15v: "Item ad ornamentum et utilitatem huius almi Bononiensis Gymnasii pertinere existimantes ut in eo publice legatur lectura philosophiae moralis, quemadmodum etiam in aliis studiis fieri consuevit; et ad huiusmodi munus valde aptum et idoneum censentes excellentissimum D. Claudium Bettum, qui alacri animo provinciam suscipere se exhibuit; eum propterea per suffragia XXIV a lectura ordinaria philosophiae naturalis, ad quam descriptus est, amoveri, et ad supradictam lecturam philosophiae moralis transferri, et in Albo sive Rotulo praesenti et futuris describi mandarunt et statuerunt. Reservato tamen ipsi D. Claudio, loco pristino philosophiae naturalis, casu quo a praedicta lectura philosophiae moralis removeri contingeret. Contrariis VI."

[101] See below, Appendix A, no. 81.

[102] For Betti's teaching in natural philosophy and production in the field, see Lines 2001b, no. 166.

[103] Betti 1590. See Fantuzzi, II, pp. 164–65; *DBI*, IX, pp. 713–14 (G. Stabile); Risse, II, pp. 166, 206.

[104] See Betti 1567; Fantuzzi, II, p. 165.

8.3.1 *Formal Aspects*

Discussion of Betti's lectures is complicated both by their dates and by the manuscript tradition. There are four surviving manuscripts, which together reflect Betti's teaching in August through October or November 1570 and during 1579–1580.[105] All of the manuscripts appear to be student notebooks and are thus at times rather hard to decipher. As these are the only manuscripts known to contain Betti's comments on the *Ethics*, we have no record of Betti's teaching on Books VI–X, nor do we know whether Betti ever lectured on them. However, we are fortunate to have what we have: student notebooks on the *Ethics* are extremely rare for Italy; to my knowledge, no other works of this kind survive.[106]

The number and dating of the lectures are of considerable interest. In the 1570 lecture course, Betti delivered forty-eight lectures on Book I (from August 1 to September 19) and thirty-two lectures on Book II (September 20 to October 21).[107] This suggests that the *Ethics* was being taught on a daily basis, for Betti could hardly have delivered so many lectures had he taught only on holidays. Indeed, Betti seems to have taught on every possible day, including holidays. Furthermore, Betti states that he has just finished lecturing on the *De anima*.[108] This kind of progression is sensible, since so much of Aristotle's thinking

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[105] The manuscripts are listed in Appendix C, no. 87. Here it may be noted that Bologna, BArch., B 3427 (*Primi libri moralium Aristotelis lectiones Domino Claudio Betto legente collectae*) is undated but seems to correspond to Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 2 (a. 1570). The Archiginnasio manuscript is more complete than the Biblioteca Universitaria manuscript, since it goes through Book III (rather than Book II) and was even meant to continue to Book IV (see f. 113v, which at the bottom of the page has the catchword "Lib. 4. Moralium Aristotelis"). However, it is badly damaged and mostly illegible. The manuscripts relative to 1579–1580 are Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 1 (covering Books I–III) and probably also Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 3 (covering Books IV–V). The assignment of the latter manuscript to 1579–1580 is conjectural, since the notes are not dated, but I have assigned it to the later date on paleographical grounds and because the number of lectures dedicated to each book seems to fit better with Betti's practice in BU 289, X, vol. 1. I have based my observations for Books I–III mostly on BU 289, X, vol. 1, collating its readings where possible with the other manuscripts. Furthermore, note that the shelfmarks for the Bologna, BU manuscripts given in Frati 1909 (i.e., BU 289, XI, XII, XIII) do not correspond to the current ones.

[106] Donato Acciaiuoli's notes on the *Ethics* are not necessarily directly *reportationes* of Argyropoulos' lectures; see Bianchi 1990a, pp. 32 ff.

[107] The Archiginnasio manuscript does not divide the text into lectures.

[108] Bologna, BArch., B 3427, f. 2r: "Cum hactenus de anima, adiuvante deo, cum Aristotele tractaverimus, non alienum existimavi, si interpretandam artem proponerem, quae docet, quomodo vitia ab animis expellantur . . ."

about virtue depends on his theory of the soul. However, both the dating of the lectures and Betti's reference to his previous teaching pose problems, if Betti's teaching took place within the university. The teaching roll for 1569–1570 appoints Betti only to the teaching of *philosophia ordinaria de sero*, and specifically to teaching the *De generatione et corruptione*. Nothing is said there either of the *De anima* or of the *Ethics*.[109] Furthermore, according to the rolls, in 1569–1570 and 1570–1571 the teaching of moral philosophy was assigned to Gian Battista Mantacheti, who was in fact paid for his teaching and apparently did not absent himself.[110] Why should Betti have been covering the course as well? And who was behind the decision to follow up the course on the *De anima* with one on the *Ethics*?

The same kinds of problems apply to the second set of notes from Betti's lectures, which presumably started in October 1579.[111] This time, Book I receives thirty-three lectures; Book II, only sixteen; and Book III, twenty-one. Judging from the pace at which the first book was covered (and assuming that the beginning of the lectures coincided with the opening of the academic year on October 18), Betti was again teaching practically every day. But again, someone else is listed in the rolls as teaching moral philosophy (this time, Antonio Gaggio), and he too is paid regularly, without being fined for absences.[112] During the preceding academic year, Betti really has, according to the rolls, taught the *De anima*, but the notes this time make no explicit reference to that course.

While discrepancies between the rolls and actual teaching can often be explained by last-minute changes (which the rolls, like present-day university course catalogs, did not reflect), it is harder to account for Betti's teaching of moral philosophy while others were appointed to the same subject. Furthermore, one would expect the deliberations of the Senate to authorize changes in Betti's assignments (they do not). The best hypothesis is probably that Betti was giving his *Ethics* teaching privately rather than in the *studium*. This would explain the unusual dates of Betti's first set of lectures as well as his teaching both on holidays and on *dies legibiles*. Furthermore,

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[109] Dallari, II, p. 176.

[110] See Appendix A, below, no. 82.

[111] The lectures on Book I were finished on November 16, 1579; see Bologna, BU 289, X.1, f. 112r. No dates are given for the other lectures.

[112] See Appendix A, no. 84.

it is possible that Betti taught the *De anima* privately in 1569–1570 and decided to teach the *Ethics* immediately afterward.

A problem of a different kind is represented by the difference in the number of lectures between the first and second sets of notes: in 1579, Betti gave only forty-nine lectures on Books I and II; in 1570, the same material had been covered in eighty lectures. It is not clear whether Betti was simply more pressed for time during the second set of lectures, but what is striking is that Betti appears to have considerably reworked his material in 1579: it was not simply a matter of presenting it in larger chunks. There is, for example, an interesting discussion of method in the second set of lectures that is not to be found in the earlier notes. Thus, it seems that Betti was not one of those who offered the same stale teaching time and again.

The student notebooks offer several clues concerning Betti's method of exposition. Although Betti's lectures are based on a Latin translation (yet to be identified and possibly by Betti himself),[113] Betti is familiar with Greek and uses his expertise to critique translations of the *Ethics* at points where Aristotle's meaning seems to have been missed. This becomes a special feature on issues such as the *τἀγαθόν* passage at the beginning of the *Ethics*, and Betti's students dutifully transcribe Greek terms into their notebook. Greek is not often used, however, for philological purposes; it is rather used as a shorthand for concepts more synthetically expressed by the Greek than the Latin. And it is the concepts (or, more precisely, the connections between them) that represent Betti's main interest. As he goes through the *Ethics* chapter by chapter, Betti is especially concerned to explain the sequence of Aristotle's arguments and the reasons for his conclusions.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Betti's approach to Aristotle's text is, indeed, his overwhelming use of syllogisms. The *divisio textus* is unimportant by comparison: Betti spends most of his time showing how Aristotle's conclusions depend on the major premise, and is most careful to show where the minor premise occurs in the text. Sometimes Betti even uses double syllogisms: having demonstrated one conclusion, he immediately uses that as the major premise for another one, so that his commentary could be described as a collection of conclusions with their motivations.

The various manuscripts substantially agree in reflecting this approach. There are, however, differences in arranging the material:

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[113] See Appendix C, no. 88.

in BU 289, X, vol. 1 (a. 1579) the syllogisms are given as part of the exposition of the relevant passage; in BU 289, X, vol. 2 (a. 1570) they tend, instead, to be collected at the end of each section. It is unclear whether this placement represents distinct preferences on the part of the students, or a development in Betti's approach to the material. A second difference is that, in the earlier manuscript, many passages are outlined in syllogisms proceeding both by *resolutio* and by *compositio*. This seems to be a strategy for reaching conclusions based on either syllogistic method.[114]

The pervasive presence of these tropological figures gives the impression of a text used to teach logic rather than ethics. Like the commentaries of Giulio Pace (1550–1635) some years later,[115] Betti's work demonstrates a conviction that all arts and sciences use logical precepts; thus, he emphasizes this aspect of Aristotle's *Ethics*. However, he uses none of the philological ingenuity and attention to historical detail that characterize Pace's work,[116] or for that matter Pier Vettori's.[117] Nor does he care to place his interpretation of the *Ethics* within the context of long-standing disagreements on points of detail in the commentary tradition. For example, Betti gives scant attention to how Thomas or Buridan have explained the *Ethics*: his apparent goal is only to show his students how one proposition leads to the other. There is barely any explanation of the classical figures referred to by Aristotle or of the philosophical doctrines and systems with which he takes issue.

Uninspiring as the work may seem from the formal standpoint, it is nonetheless original, at least for Italy. No Italian commentary I have seen proceeds with the logical determination evidenced by Betti's. Niccolò Tignosi's work, examined above (§ 5.2), used syllogisms occasionally, but they were informal ones, and were certainly not used as a replacement for commentary. Even Donato Acciaiuoli's commentary,[118] which follows more frequently Eustratius' example in its use of syllogisms, does not come anywhere close to this extreme. It appears that we have an Italian parallel to the Ramist tables that were to enjoy such a success in northern Europe toward the end of the sixteenth century. Yet, whereas the function of those tables was

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[114] See, for example, Lib. II, f. 213r.
[115] See, for example, Pace 1584.
[116] On Pace, see Schmitt 1983, pp. 43–44 and Lohr, RLAC, pp. 296–97.
[117] On Vettori, see above, § 6.3.
[118] Acciaiuoli 1478; see Appendix C, no. 38.

to grasp the outline of Aristotle's points and more easily remember his conclusions, Betti's practice of dividing Aristotle's text into a series of syllogisms seems aimed at using the text as an example for training in Aristotle's *Organon*; at the same time, Betti seems aware that he is teaching ethics, and not logic.[119]

What has been said so far about Betti's approach should not, however, give the impression that his work is a *disinterested* outlining of Aristotle's text, unconnected with a particular vision of ethics or of how it should be taught. In fact, to ignore Betti's assumptions would be seriously to misrepresent his method and to misperceive his place in the discussions about method that were so important in the sixteenth century. We turn, therefore, to his philosophical views.

8.3.2 *Doctrinal Issues*

Virtue and Moral Philosophy

On the nature of virtue, Betti has nothing really new to say: he describes moral virtues as *habitus operativi* that make one good if connected with good actions, and wicked if connected with evil ones.[120] He agrees with Aristotle that virtue concerns the passions.[121] As to the location of virtue, he remarks that the higher part of the irrational soul and the lower part of the rational soul are the same part (*appetitus*) considered from different points of view;[122] however, he has little more to say. Betti is likewise terse on the acquisition of virtue, saying only that nature has no part in generating moral virtue,[123]

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[119] He comments on Aristotle's purpose (Bologna, BU 289, X.1, f. 3v): ". . . intentio, quae fuit privatae felicitatis tradere cognitionem, ex cuius assecutione possemus esse felices. Causa intentionis fuit necessitas, de qua dixi, et utilitas, de qua dicemus. Utilitas maxima est, nam ex cognitione boni, quae in hoc opere traditur, aditus maximus patet ad privatam felicitatem, et ad summum bonum privatum et ad probitatem."

[120] Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 1 (all references, unless otherwise indicated, are to this manuscript, containing the 1579 lectures), Lib. II, lec. II, ff. 120r–v: "Virtutes morales sunt habitus operativi qui ex operationibus bonis fiunt boni et ex malis mali."

[121] Lib. II, lec. V, f. 131r: "Virtus moralis est circa voluptates, et tristitias corporearum voluptatum; temperantia et fortitudo sunt virtutes morales; igitur, temperantia et fortitudo sunt circa voluptates et tristitias corporearum voluptatum."

[122] Lib. I, lec. XXXIII, f. 110r: "Divisit hic Aristoteles animam in potentiam rationalem et in potentiam irrationalem, et irrationalem in vegetativam et appetitivam; nunc vult discendere ad rationalem, et declarat quod appetitivus continetur etiam sub rationale, sed prius monstrat quod appetitivus suadetur aliquanto a rationale . . ."

[123] Lib. II, lec. V, f. 130r: "Primo ostendit quod natura non sit causa efficiens

and attributing all merit to the repetition of actions. Teaching goes unmentioned, except possibly in relation to intellectual virtue.[124] Since we lack a commentary on Books VI and X, we do not know what exactly Betti thought of the relationship of virtue to knowledge or to the training of youth.

Betti has more to say on the aim, subject, and method of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He begins his introduction by referring to two kinds of principles (internal and external) by which the work can be discussed. Showing a marked penchant for discussing Aristotle's work by means of Aristotelian categories, Betti first discusses the external principles—i.e., the efficient and the final causes of the work. Aristotle is the efficient cause; the final cause (what we might call the aim) is double: knowledge of one's own happiness or of what is supremely good for oneself, and the production of that happiness. The first is the proximate end; the latter, the ultimate one.[125] It is hard to say whether there is a loosening here of the concept of ethics as a *scientia practica*. Certainly the ultimate end is something practical, although Betti does not dwell on this aspect. But there is no clarification of how one passes from a stage of cognition of happiness to one of achievement and fruition.

The internal principles are two: matter and form. The *materia* or subject-matter is individual happiness or, if one prefers, man himself inasmuch as he can attain to it. (Happiness itself is divided, unoriginally, into its two aspects of active and contemplative.)[126] The

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virtutis; secundo, operationes et actiones secundum virtutem esse causam efficientem; tertio passiones harum actionum enumeravit, quae quinque fuerunt . . ."

[124] Lib. II, lec. I, ff. 114v–115r; Betti refers to the need for *disciplina*, whose meaning in this context is not clearly related to teaching.

[125] Lib. I, lec. I, f. 1r–v: ". . . igitur exordiens dico quod cum principia sint in duplici discrimine, alia intrinseca alia extrinseca, intrinseca sunt duo, scilicet materia et forma, quae intrinseca dicuntur, quia sunt de essentia ipsius rei et simul cum ipsa re complicata. Externa ite<m> sunt duo, scilicet effectus (?) et finis, quae dicuntur externa quia non sunt de essentia ipsius rei et sunt extra rem ipsam. Efficiens causa est Aristoteles Stagirita, Peripateticorum facile princeps, de cuius vita nunc esset agendum . . . Brevitatis causa tamen illam missam facimus. Causa finalis est primo privatae felicitatis cognitio, seu cognitio summi boni privati, secundo et ultimo effectio ipsius hominis foelicis (nam huius operi duplex est finis, ut omnium, quae post se relinquant opus, scilicet finis proximus et finis remotus)." Cf. Bologna, BArch. B, 3427, f. 2r: "Nam duo sunt fines, unus cognitionis, alter assecutionis. . . . Qui finis est effectio hominis foelicis . . . Finis igitur ultimus scientiae moralis est consecutio summi boni, summum autem boni cognitio finis proximus."

[126] Lib. I, lec. I, ff. 1v–2r: "Materia propria est duplex, alia dicitur materia propria ex qua, alia materia propria circa quam. Materia propria ex qua sunt rationes et communicationes . . . ex quibus praesens opus constituitur. . . . et hoc [*sc.* subiec-

form instead is described according to the order of Aristotle's teaching, and this is where Betti becomes more interesting for our purposes. In fact, Betti reports approvingly Galen's division of the three orders of the sciences (*resolutivus, compositivus, definitivus*) and concludes that in the *Ethics* Aristotle uses the synthetic order (*ordo compositivus*).

After our discussion of the issue of order in Padua,[127] this viewpoint does not seem especially surprising, except for Betti's reluctance to eliminate the *ordo definitivus*, as the Paduans had done. But matters are altogether different when one examines what Betti means by the *ordo compositivus*. Indeed, Betti states that the synthetic order is the one that starts from the principles and proceeds toward the end. He reasons that the principles are the private good, whereas one wishes to arrive ultimately at the public good (via the domestic one). Although unnamed others have described Aristotle's order as being analytic (*resolutivus*), those who take such a view consider the structure of the *Ethics* only, whereas they should consider the whole of Aristotle's active philosophy if they really want to understand his order.[128] Furthermore, in considering whether Aristotle's moral philosophy follows the *ordo doctrinae*, the *ordo methodi* (i.e., the method of inquiry), or the *ordo naturae*, Betti concludes that it follows the natural order, which leads one to take care first of oneself, then of the household, and lastly of the state.[129] Betti thus shows an interest in considering Aristotle's practical philosophy as a whole, and not just

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tum] primo est felicitas ipsa privata, quae duplex est, contemplativa et activa; activam primo contemplatur Aristoteles; secundo autem subiectum formale est ipse homo, quatenus susceptivus est felicitatis privatae, et summi boni privati."

[127] See above, § 7.2.

[128] Lib. I, lec. I, f. 2r–v: "... dicendum cum Galeno medico in exordio Artis medicinalis, quod ordines scientifici sunt tres, scilicet resolutivus, compositivus, et definitivus; ordo resolutivus est cum inquirentes a fine progredimur ad principia, compositivus cum incipientes a principia progredimur ad finem, definitivus cum progredientes per definitionem tradimus doctrinam ut fecit Galenus libro citato. Aristoteles autem nulli libro hoc fecit, neque praeter hoc est alius ordo scientialis quicquid semient quidam de demonstrativo, et de resolutivo (?), quia tales non sunt ordines scientiales. Ordo itaque scientialis huius operis est compositivus, nam si consideremus unum hoc opus philosophiae activae videbimus quod Aristoteles a principiis ad finem tendit; primo enim agit de bono privato quod quisque primo appetit; secundo de bono domestico, quod secundo quaerimus; tertio et ultimo de bono publico, quod ultimo quaerimus. Quidam tamen dixerunt Aristotelem servare ordinem resolutivum, hoc fortasse ducti, quia vident Aristotelem in libris ethicorum primo agere de felicitate, postea de virtute in genere, et ultimo devenire ad virtutes speciales, sed oportet considerare ordinem scientialem totius operis philosophiae activae. Et haec de principiis internis."

[129] Bologna, BArch. B, 3427, f. 2v.

as confined to the *Ethics*. Furthermore, he seems to favor an ethics built on the law of nature.

Betti better clarifies his thoughts on method and its connection with his own approach in his description of Aristotle's *modus doctrinae* as being *dialecticus*. He elaborates on this definition: the Aristotelian method in the *Ethics* is *dialecticus et contingentibus constans ex syllogismis dialecticis*; it is thus opposed to a method that is *necessarius constans ex rationibus necessariis et ex demonstrationibus*.[130] The major premise used by Betti to prove this point is that matters pertaining to the state's good are extremely unstable and subject to error.[131] This appears to be Betti's major justification for making such a recourse to syllogisms in his teaching, although he nowhere makes an apology for the fact. Perhaps Betti thinks that, given the instability of the subject, too many errors would be committed without the help of a science demonstrating which conclusions are valid.

Proper Audience and Teachers

Betti therefore argues that ethics is not an exact science like natural philosophy, but is rather *contingens*. This consideration (not, in itself, new) leads him directly into a discussion of who can teach and learn the subject. In his only explicit statement about teachers, Betti states: "Doctor moralis est ille, qui debet acquiescere rationibus figuratis et contingentibus . . ."[132] Thus, what Aristotle has described as a prerequisite for students of ethics is also applied—rather obviously—to its teachers. Unfortunately, however, Betti does not much elaborate on the ideal characteristics or training of ethics teachers, preferring to concentrate his attention on the proper audience.

Just as teachers must adjust their approach to the subject because of its contingent nature, so also should students;[133] indeed, students must

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[130] Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 1, Lib. I, lec. V, f. 13v.

[131] Lib. I, lec. V, f. 14v: ". . . bona et iusta civilia videantur potius lege et institutione quadam esse, quam natura, et talis est ratio: Bona et iusta civilia habent maximam instabilitatem et errorem . . ."

[132] Lib. I, lec. V, f. 15v.

[133] Lib. I, lec. V, f. 15v: "Quoniam modus doctrinae duobus modis consideratum vel respectu docentis, vel respectu addiscentis, postquam qualis debeat esse modus doctrinae civilis respectu docentis docuit Aristoteles et dixit quod debet esse contingens, nunc docet qualis esse debeat respectu adiscentis, et dicit quod pariter debet esse contingens; ponit autem talem conclusionem, quod disciplinatus in moralibus debet recipere modum disciplinae pro subiecta materia, quam conclusionem probat tali ratione . . ."

learn to expect the proper amount of certitude from any given subject. But Betti gives more detail than this, also offering his view of the proper educational ladder and of the place occupied by moral philosophy.

Moral philosophy, Betti thinks, should be the second branch of philosophy taught, and should therefore come immediately after natural philosophy. The reason is that moral philosophy presupposes many of the concepts taught in that other branch of philosophy.[134] This is not just a theoretical position that Betti takes, for we know that he actually did teach the *Ethics* immediately after the *De anima.*[135] It is hard to know whether this view of learning was shared by other teachers of moral philosophy in Bologna or whether Betti derives it uncritically from others, such as Thomas or some of Betti's contemporaries. There is some evidence, however, that both may have been true. Although the institutional context may not comfort the idea that moral philosophy was considered an advanced subject (see Chapter 2), the former Bolognese professor Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano, while giving lectures on the *Ethics* in Rome in 1547, had argued that moral philosophy is subject to natural philosophy.[136] Presumably, such a view entailed that the *Ethics* should be taught after natural philosophy. It does not appear, however, that this was a common view among the Italians, except perhaps at the Collegio Romano.[137]

Consistently with his view of the ladder of studies, Betti insists that the audience of moral philosophy should meet the Aristotelian prerequisites of time and experience of life. Thus, Betti argues that the requirement of being *eruditus circa singulum* has reference to experiential knowledge of private actions or of what may be done. Therefore, young people are not appropriate hearers of moral philosophy.[138] Although Betti's argument is not equally convincing to

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[134] Lib. I, lec. II, f. 4r: "Dico itaque quoad ordinem lectionis quod si nos consideremus totam philosophiam moralem simul, quod secundum locum sibi vendicat, nam philosophia moralis legenda est statim post philosophiam naturalem; nam isti libri multa supponunt declarata in libris philosophiae naturalis . . ."

[135] Bologna, BArch. B, 3427, f. 2r: "Cum hactenus de anima, adiuvante Deo, cum Aristotele tractaverimus, non alienum existimavi, si interpretandam artem proponerem quae docet, quo vitia ab animis expellantur, quae pars est activae philosophiae, quae pars moralis dicitur." Whether this sequence was deliberate or accidental, however, remains to be seen.

[136] Vatican, Ottob. lat. 1914, f. 106v: "Itaque, concludo quod ista civilis facultas subiicitur philosophiae naturali, quia docet dirigere affectus animi." On this lecture commentary, see Appendix C, no. 67.

[137] See below, § 9.2.1.

[138] Bologna, BU 289, X, vol. 1, Lib. I, lec. VI, ff. 16v–17r: "Primo itaque probat

all of his students, Betti argues that whether the hearers are young of age or morally inexperienced makes no difference to the appropriateness of their hearing the subject.[139]

Rather than being immature then (whether in character or age), a student of the *Ethics* must order his desires and actions according to reason.[140] Betti is not explicit about how this should happen. He agrees with Aristotle that the place of honor should go to those who do what is good out of habit; those who do what is good because of the instruction (*praecepta*) they receive can only claim second place.[141] But how one develops the habit itself of doing good is never explained. Thus, in Betti the connection between upbringing and the practice of virtue remains vague. Nor does Betti make clear how to move from the *knowledge* conferred by ethical teaching to the *attainment* of the good. A bit clearer are Betti's views concerning how ethics should be taught.

Method of Teaching

Betti is aware that ethics is both a science and an art in Aristotle's view. In fact, he is able to construct two different syllogisms (using, respectively, the middle terms *Moralis facultas est ars* and *Moralis est scientia*) to prove (1) that moral philosophy, like other arts, has an end, and that (2) there is an end specific to ethics.[142] Betti insists on

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quod iuvenis non est bonus auditor moralium duplici ratione, sed antequam ponat primam rationem probat duas conclusiones, quarum una facit ad propositum, altera vero nequaquam. Prima est quod qui eruditus est circa singulum bene iudicat singulum, secunda est quod qui eruditus est circa omnia, bene de omnibus iudicat. . . . Qui eruditus est circa singulum agibile est is, qui solus bene iudicat, id est intelligit singulum, hoc est privatum agibile, et privatam actionem."

[139] Here the student recording Betti's lectures in BU 289, vol. 1 has an interesting aside, wishing to prove that actually there is some difference between the young in age and the young in morals, ff. 18v–19r: "Qui moribus iuvenes sunt, sunt ii, a quibus nihil differt iuvenes secundum aetatem quoad non esse proprius auditor moralis. Haec est expositio Betti, sed quia haec non maioris ratio, sed eiusdem conclusionis est, ego huius textus aliam expositionem excogitavi, quae est, quod Aristoteles per verba illa 'Non enim a tempore defectio' occurrat tacitae obiectioni, per illa vero, 'Talibus enim inutile' probet illam conclusionem 'Differt autem nihil etc.' Obiectio sit talis: Iuvenis aetate et iuvenis moribus sunt, in quibus accidit defectio, et qui deficiunt supra a vita honorata et a virtutibus propter aetatem et tempus, et quem iuvenis aetate minoris aetatis est, quam iuvenis moribus; at illi, in quibus accidit defectio aliqua propter aetatem et quorum alter est minoris aetatis alio differunt invicem; igitur iuvenis aetate et iuvenis moribus differunt invicem."

[140] Lib. I, lec. VI, f. 20r.

[141] Lib. I, lec. VIII, f. 25v.

[142] Lib. I, lec. III, ff. 5v–7v. An example of these syllogisms is on f. 5v: "Omnes

this hybrid character of moral philosophy in the following lecture, in which he states that one end of the arts is the good itself—in fact, the supreme good (*summum bonum*). This good, however, is not proper to all the arts in the same way: it is especially the concern of the most architectonic science, which is actually politics (*civilis facultas*). Therefore, politics is the science described by Aristotle in *EN* I.2 as subordinating to itself the other arts and sciences, specifying which ones should be present in the city and what each citizen should learn.[143] It is not clear, however, whether Betti takes the *civilis* to refer to the whole of moral philosophy (as Piccolomini would do) or only to the specific branch of politics.

Betti's comments raise the question of the relationship of the *Ethics* to the *Politics*: which of the two is superior, and in what order should they be studied? Betti thinks that the *Ethics* and the *Economics* should be read before the *Politics*, for he cannot see how anyone can attain to political happiness without having experienced happiness first in the private and domestic spheres.[144] Thus, Betti sees Aristotle's works of moral philosophy as concerning progressively broader spheres, as in a series of concentric circles. Like Thomas, Betti seems especially concerned with the importance of getting to the *Politics*; in fact, he considers the *Politics* as the real end toward which Aristotle's moral philosophy tends.[145] The last branch of moral philosophy therefore seems to be also the most important for Betti, although we do not know that he ever taught the *Politics*.

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scientiae habent proprium finem; Moralis est scientia; igitur Moralis habet proprium finem . . ."

[143] Lib I, lec. IV, ff. 10v–11r: "Cum Aristoteles dixit perquirendum esse cuius disciplinae sit ille finis, nunc dicit cuius sit et dicit quod est scientiae maxime architectonicae, quae est ipsa civilis, id est politica; quod autem finis artium qui est bonum et optimum et summum bonum sit politicae Aristoteles probat tali ratione: Finis artium qui est bonum et optimum, et summum bonum est finis scientiae maxime architectonicae; finis qui est scientiae maxime architectonicae est finis politicae; igitur, finis artium, qui est bonum et optimum, et summum bonum, est finis politicae. . . . Civilis est ars quae ordinat et disponit quae artes et scientiae debeant esse in civitate et quas artes debeat unusquisque addiscere; talis facultas est maxime architectonica; igitur, civilis facultas est maxime architectonica."

[144] Lib. I, lec. II, f. 4r: ". . . si vero hos decem libros respectu alienis philosophiae moralis operum consideremus, primo loco legendi sunt, nam sine felicitate propria nullus neque domesticam, neque civilem assequi potest."

[145] Lib. I, lec. I, f. 2v: ". . . si consideremus universum hoc opus philosophiae activae, videbimus quod Aristoteles a principiis ad finem tendit; primo enim agit de bono privato quod quisque primo appetit; secundo de bono domestico, quod secundo quaerimus; tertio et ultimo de bono publico, quod ultimo quaerimus."

Notabilia

Like other commentators of his time, Betti also feels obliged to make some references to Plato throughout his work. Significantly, however, Betti makes no mention of Plato except for places in which Aristotle himself does. He does not, apparently, feel compelled to take sides in the raging disputes of his time over the superiority of the one or the other philosopher. This would seem to explain the fact that he neither defends nor attacks Plato. When Aristotle, for example, criticizes Plato's Ideas (*EN* I.6), Betti gives only a very brief summary of Plato's position, just long enough to give the reader an impression of what Aristotle must have found objectionable.[146] Furthermore, Betti does not attempt to reconcile Aristotle's teachings with those of Plato; throughout the work, Plato remains very much in the background. This is undoubtedly why Francesco Piccolomini fails to mention Betti in his catalogue of contemporary philosophers who (correctly, in his view) took account of both Aristotle and Plato.[147]

Betti is likewise silent on the question of the relationship of moral philosophy with theology, or even with moral and spiritual betterment. Whether on the subject of the *summum bonum* or on other issues bordering on theology, Betti remains focused on his intent to illustrate how Aristotle builds his arguments, and how the one follows upon the other.

Both in his approach to the *Ethics* and on key interpretative points, Betti seems, in many ways, to stand outside of the sixteenth-century Italian tradition. As has been observed, Betti's definitions of the analytic and synthetic orders would not have been recognized in Padua, his ideas about the place of ethics in the curriculum were shared by few others, and his approach to Aristotle's text was neither the philological one favored in Florence nor the problematized one characteristic of Francesco Piccolomini's *Universa philosophia.* Although Betti may in a sense come close to the early practice, in the Collegio Romano, of associating ethics and logic,[148] his aims seem to be secular and far removed from those of the Jesuits.

There are, however, good reasons for the surprises sprung by Betti's commentary, and I believe these have much to do with French

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[146] See Lib. I, lec. VII, ff. 22v–23r and lecs. X–XI.
[147] F. Piccolomini 1583, p. 273.
[148] See below, pp. 350–52.

(or French-influenced) models available to Betti. The more one studies the interpretation of the *Ethics* in France during the sixteenth century, the more one suspects that Betti had those examples in mind when giving his lectures. Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples may have been one of the authors read by Betti and appreciated by him for outlining Aristotle's arguments (something that Eustratius too had done).[149] However, in both Lefèvre and Eustratius, Betti would have found Aristotle's moral philosophy too much subordinated to (or at least strongly colored by) religious considerations. It is more likely that Betti read and approved two other works: the *Ethics* commentary by the Frenchman Omer Talon (1520?–1562), which was first published in 1550 and reflects the strong influence of Peter Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée, 1515–1572),[150] and particularly the preface to and tables on the *Ethics* by Theodor Zwinger (1553–1588), a Protestant who taught moral philosophy in Strasbourg and Basel, and whose work was first published around 1566.[151] Zwinger had studied in Paris and was a friend of Ramus, so it is not surprising that he too, like Talon, heavily emphasized the need to clarify the logical structure of Aristotle's arguments. But this is not Betti's only borrowing from Zwinger. There are also numerous parallels between the comments on method and order in Zwinger and in Betti; these suggest an influence of the former on the latter, something that will have to be the object of a separate study. What is clear is that Zwinger, despite his Protestant allegiances, was known in Italy;[152] a connection between the two writers should therefore not be excluded.

Perhaps it was this "foreign" influence, plus the fact that Betti's lectures were never given to the press, that contributed to the work's being ignored or forgotten. Although there are ideas in Francesco Piccolomini's commentary, for example, that recall some of those advanced by Betti, Piccolomini never mentions Betti by name (not that he names his sources anyway), and it is also possible that Piccolomini's ideas come from a common source (or via former students of Betti) rather than from Betti directly. In fact, it is remarkable that Betti's lectures seem generally unknown in sixteenth-century

[149] See D'Étaples 1535.

[150] Talon 1575. On Ramus, see especially Lohr, RLAC, pp. 374–76 and two recent works: Oldrini 1997 and *The Influence of Peter Ramus*.

[151] Zwinger 1566.

[152] See, for example, the comments of Antonio Possevino in the document edited in Appendix E, below.

Italy: I have found no references to him in any of the Latin commentaries examined so far. This suggests that Betti was better known as a logician than as a moral philosopher, and rightly so. As his methodology shows, Betti was more concerned with the application of logic to ethics than in the contents of ethics itself. As it turned out, this approach was to find widespread acceptance throughout Europe, as scholars rode the wave of Ramus. In Italy it found for the *Ethics* only a lonely representative, whose work was soon forgotten in the wake of greater men. But that one work testifies—like the works of Agostino Galesio—to the flexibility that was possible in approaching Aristotelian works, even on the part of professors at Italy's oldest university. The works by Betti, Galesio, and Baldi also point to the difficulty of identifying a local school of moral thought or even a common approach to Aristotle's *Ethics* in Bologna. Many varieties of Aristotelianism may thus be observed within the same institutional context, which did not necessarily impose on teachers a specific (or even necessarily a conservative) pedagogical method. It might be objected, of course, that at least the commentaries by Betti and Galesio arise more likely out of private contexts than out of university teaching. While this is true, it in no way lessens the freedom and creativity that these university professors exercised with respect to Aristotle's work.

CHAPTER NINE

ROME

In addition to Florence, Bologna, and Padua, Rome was another important (indeed, perhaps the preeminent) center of interpretation of the *Ethics* in sixteenth-century Italy. It was in the university there ("La Sapienza") that the ethics teaching of Marc-Antoine Muret (mainly 1563–1567) and Lelio Pellegrini (1586–1602) took place.[1] Moral philosophy was also taught in the Collegio Romano, a Jesuit institution of higher learning which started offering courses in 1551. There, Tarquinio Galluzzi (1574–1649) produced what was possibly the most monumental commentary on the *Ethics* of all time.[2] Furthermore, the papal court was a third context in which ethics teaching took place in Rome; Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano and the Jesuit Francesco Benci both delivered lectures on the *Ethics* there.[3] The latter context, however, will have to be examined on another occasion. This chapter focuses on the university in Rome and on the Collegio Romano.

9.1 *The University in Rome ("La Sapienza")*

9.1.1 *The Institutional Context*

During the fifteenth century, the Roman *studium* does not seem to have benefited much from the cultural revival experienced by Rome under the leadership of popes such as Eugene IV and Nicholas V.[4] Humanist initiatives may have increasingly found a home in the Eternal City, which competed well with (and in some instances surpassed) established centers such as Florence and Venice; but there is not much indication that the Roman *studium* was a central focus of the popes'

[1] On the teaching of Muret and Pellegrini, see Appendix A, nos. 267 and 268.
[2] On Galluzzi's commentary, see Appendix C, no. 154.
[3] On the commentaries by Bernardi and Benci, see Appendix C, nos. 67 and 98.
[4] See most recently, on this Roman renaissance, the essays in *Rome Reborn.*

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cultural endeavors. Indeed, although the surviving evidence is scant, it has been argued that funding designated for the university was often diverted to other ends, and that irregular or unpaid salaries and administrative inefficiency did much to hamper the university's growth.[5] The presence in Rome of famous teachers such as Francesco Filelfo and John Argyropoulos should therefore not mislead.

Many of the same problems continued during the sixteenth century, and the *studium* was further shaken by dramatic events such as the city's occupation by Imperial troops in 1527.[6] The *studium* could not have enjoyed a great prestige in the Arts around the mid-sixteenth century, when the Jesuits established their Collegio Romano and drew large audiences. In fact, in these early years the Jesuits liked to remark on the listlessness of the Roman university.[7] Nonetheless, it does seem to have experienced a period of renewal starting in the 1560s (before falling into decline toward the beginning of the seventeenth century),[8] and this new cultural momentum affected moral philosophy as well as other branches of learning.

The first recorded instance of moral philosophy teaching in the documents for sixteenth-century Rome comes in 1514, with the appointments of Damiano and of Paolo Giovio.[9] After that the subject is not recorded until the second half of the sixteenth century, with the teaching of moral philosophy by the Frenchman and classical scholar Marc-Antoine Muret (1563–1567).[10] The gap may have something to do with the very incomplete state of the university documentation.[11] However, it is clear that, with Muret, moral philosophy is taught on a daily basis, in the evenings.[12]

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[5] Chambers 1976. The state of the university documentation is discussed especially in Conte 1992 and Adorni 1992. The first surviving roll dates to 1514. The standard history of the university in Rome remains Renazzi. See, in addition, Lee 1978, Ch. 5; Grafton and Jardine 1986, Ch. 3; and the essays in *Roma e lo Studium Urbis*.

[6] On the cultural consequences of the sack of Rome, see Chastel 1983.

[7] Ioannes de Polanco wrote to Ioannes Pelletier: "Si reputa molto freddo il studio de la Sapientia, che ci era prima in Roma, al paragone di questo, et quasi una cosa inutile . . ." (*MP*, I, p. 458, dated 21-IX-1555).

[8] On the decline, see the comments in Conte 1992, pp. 193 ff.

[9] See below, Appendix A, nos. 265 and 266.

[10] See below, Appendix A, no. 267.

[11] Conte 1990 lists professors for only six years in the first half of the sixteenth century and twenty-one years in the second half. Some of the teachings and payments for 1481–1483 are listed in Lee 1978, pp. 248–54 (cf. Chambers 1976, pp. 88–103).

[12] See, for example, Muret's appointment in 1566, *In philosophia morali et candidioribus litteris*, which is to take place *de sero, hora XX* (Conte 1990, p. 41).

After Muret's teaching, the records again fall silent about moral philosophy.[13] It does not reappear on the rolls until 1587, with the appointment of Lelio Pellegrini, who taught the *Ethics* and the *Politics* from around 1586 until his death in early 1602.[14] From this time on, moral philosophy is recorded much more regularly and continuously. It is taught by Luca Valerio (ca. 1602 to 1618, also teaching mathematics),[15] Ippolito Strada (1619–1623),[16] Domenico Bandiera (1623–1633),[17] Francesco Rogerio (1633–1636),[18] and Iacopo Filippo Camola (1637–1667).[19]

During this second period, one of the most notable features of ethics teaching in Rome is specialization. Teachers are hired for fairly long periods of time and (with the exception of Valerio) exclusively teach moral philosophy. Not only do they not teach other subjects in combination or alternation with the *Ethics*, but moral philosophy is, in most cases, the only subject they profess in the Roman *studium*. Such a practice suggests an increasing specialization in the teaching of the subject, much as was happening at the same time in the Collegio Romano. Furthermore, it seems to lead to an intensive examination of the *Ethics* over several years. Muret had already tried to cover at least the first nine books over the course of four years. Pellegrini's commentary, which seems to be associated with his teaching, covers all ten books.[20] The specification of the books required for Luca Valerio's teaching suggests that usually only one book was

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[13] Cf. Conte 1990, p. 1081, who lists Silvio Antoniano as teaching *philosophia moralis et candidiores litterae* between 1567 and 1571; in fact, he is always appointed in the documents to the *politiorum litterarum lectio*.

[14] See below, Appendix A, no. 268. Although there is a gap in the listing of professors between 1583 and 1586, the starting date of Pellegrini's teaching can be deduced from Pellegrini's dedicatory letter (in Pellegrini 1600, pp. i–ii; see Appendix C, no. 100), addressed to Pope Clement VIII. Pellegrini states: "Sum enim, etsi in re non magna, Sanctitatis tuae operarius; utque nobiliora de me loquar, quintumdecimum iam facio stipendium in Romano Gymnasio, professor eius philosophiae partis, quae in agendo posita, morum disciplinam, et Reipublicae administrandae facultatem complectitur" (f. ir–v). Pellegrini's death is referred to in ASR, Università, Busta 86, f. 52r, where Pellegrini's heirs (apparently two older, unmarried daughters and two younger sons), request the Easter payment of his salary. The document is datable to early 1602.

[15] See below, Appendix A, no. 269. The roll for 1602–1603 does not survive. However, it seems almost certain that Valerio's joint teaching started that year.

[16] See below, Appendix A, no. 270.

[17] See below, Appendix A, no. 271 and Appendix C, nos. 149–51.

[18] See below, Appendix A, no. 273.

[19] See below, Appendix A, no. 275.

[20] For both Muret's and Pellegrini's coverage, see below.

required to be covered per year.[21] Documents from 1624 to 1631 indicate that this was also the case later on, possibly with the intent of covering the work in a 10-year cycle.[22]

The fact that moral philosophy is a regular subject, and not just one taught on feast days, also testifies to increasing specialization. (Ethics is taught during the evenings until 1652, when it becomes instead one of the subjects designated for morning teaching).[23] Feast-day teaching might have attracted a large public of uneven preparation and interests. By scheduling moral philosophy as a regular course, however, the authorities of the *studium* may have been reflecting the conviction of many teachers that the subject required some preparation, especially in Greek.

Finally, the specialist teaching of the *Ethics* also presents us with a problem. In the absence of detailed biographical evidence or of surviving lectures, it is often hard to know what a teacher's background was and how he approached the text in the classroom. One would like to know, for example, whether the teachers' main interests were really in moral philosophy, or rather in other subjects such as theology, natural philosophy, and rhetoric. None of the figures mentioned thus far belonged, so far as is known, to a religious order. But that is no safe indication of interests or methodology. As will be seen later on, Pellegrini strongly emphasized the links between moral philosophy and theology.

For the sake of completeness, a third stage in the institutional development of moral philosophy should be mentioned. After the end of Iacopo Filippo Camola's teaching in 1667, the post in moral philosophy fell into the hands of the Franciscans. The first in this line was Giacomo Pevicino (Jacobus Pevicinus), who shared with some others the lowest salary in the university (20 *scudi* per trimester).[24] The Franciscan order came to regard the course as its own prerogative. Indeed, in 1693 they requested the pope to assign the chair to them permanently. It is not clear why they were so eager to be

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[21] See below, Appendix A, no. 269.

[22] The best sources for studying which books were to be read are the *calendari* in ASR, Università, Busta 213 and in ASV, Misc., Arm. IV–V, 23. Unfortunately, Conte prefers to rely, whenever possible, on other documentation which does not provide these details (see Conte 1990).

[23] Conte 1990, p. 315.

[24] ASR, Cimeli, no. 58.

assigned this teaching. The university, however, was clearly happy to accept such a cut-rate offer.[25]

As mentioned above, Pellegrini appears to mark a turning point in the subject's teaching in the Roman *studium*—indeed, the beginning of its second institutional stage. It is only with his appointment that moral philosophy starts appearing regularly on the rolls, after a long period (as Pellegrini informs us) of neglect.[26] Pellegrini himself suggests that Pope Sixtus V was the person behind the initiative to restore the teaching of ethics and politics in Rome.[27] This testimony is of considerable interest, for Sixtus V (reigned 1585–1590) is not known in the literature for having taking any such initiative.[28] However, it accords well with two aspects of the pope's known activities: first, a strong concern for the restoration of morality (a project on which Sixtus V embarked immediately and with eye-catching measures), and, second, an interest in the Roman *studium*. Although the latter is a poorly known aspect of the pope's work,[29] it is notable that, in his bull *Immensa aeterni Dei* (January 22, 1588), Sixtus V confirmed the Church's interests in the university's activities: one of the fifteen committees of the reorganized College of Cardinals continued the function of overseeing the affairs of the Roman university.[30] Furthermore, Sixtus V gave a further push toward change in the Roman *studium*

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[25] ASR, Università, Busta 75, ff. 48r–49; Innocent XII declined to rule on the matter, deferring judgment to the Collegio degli Avvocati Concistoriali. The latter approved the request, which fixed the salary at 60 *scudi* per year.

[26] Indeed, both Renazzi and the documents published there do not even mention moral philosophy before the sixteenth century. However, Pellegrini may have in mind the period after Muret's teaching of the subject.

[27] Pellegrini 1587, f. 93r: he refers to the pope, who "nobile istud Ethicae atque Politicae studium, quo regendi orbis ratio continetur, diu, nec sine magna Urbis iactura intermissum restituit, neque passus est, in hac Musarum sede eam potissimum desiderari disciplinam, cuius (?) beneficio in bene constitutas civitates Musae receptae sunt, et magno semper in honore habitae."

[28] For example, an early biography of Sixtus V (from 1635 in Rome, BNC, 1667) does not refer to the pope's relationships with the university in Rome, much less to any promotion of moral philosophy. Modern studies are completely silent on the pope's influence on the university curriculum or teaching. Most recently, see *Enciclopedia dei papi*, III, pp. 202–22 (S. Giordano), with full bibliography.

[29] The most important comments are to be found in Renazzi, III, pp. 1–20.

[30] A modern edition of the bull can be found in del Re 1970, pp. 505–21 (especially pp. 513–14). Renazzi argues persuasively that the *Congregatio Studii Romae* was no innovation on the part of Sixtus V, but was introduced already by Pope Julius III by 1552 (Renazzi, II, pp. 132–34). Indeed, various deliberations of this congregation from the 1560s and 1570s can be found in ASV, Misc., Arm. XI, 93.

by assigning its rectorship to the Collegio degli Avvocati Concistoriali.[31]

If, in the midst of all this hubub, Sixtus V also had time to encourage the regular teaching of ethics, then he must have had more of a sense of the subject's importance than his predecessor Gregory XIII (reigned 1572–1585).[32] In October 1573, in fact, the papal physician Basilio Paravicino wrote a letter to his employer/patient urging upon him the establishment of a chair in Aristotelian moral philosophy in the Roman *studium.* Some of the physician's arguments emphasize the closeness between moral doctrine and Christianity, the importance for the Christian of being adorned with virtues, the practice in almost all other famous universities of reading the *Ethics,* and the importance of having a special teaching dedicated to this subject, explored so masterfully by Aristotle.[33] Unfortunately, at the moment we are not in a position to know whether the letter referred to a project being considered by the pope and his advisers. Also, we do not have the response (if any) with which Pope Gregory met his physician's request. The documentation on the teachers in the Roman *studium* is defective between 1571 and 1574, so it is unclear whether Gregory XIII in fact appointed someone to teach the subject. Nor does any papal bull on the subject appear to have survived. Evidence from the following years[34] suggests that moral philosophy was not taught on a regular basis: during this period, the only recorded instances of the subject's being taught (before Pellegrini started teaching in 1586) involve Muret. Furthermore, it should be remembered that Gregory XIII was considerably more involved in the promotion of the Jesuits' Collegio Romano (later renamed, in his honor, the Università Gregoriana) than in the Roman *studium.*

All considered, the popes seem to have had some interest in the fate of ethics in the Roman *studium.*[35] However, this interest was

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[31] Unsurprisingly, a power struggle followed between the two committees charged with the university's oversight. The Avvocati Concistoriali steadily gained the upper hand. See Renazzi, III, pp. 15–18; del Re 1970, pp. 21–25 and 174–75. On the Avvocati Concistoriali also see Adorni 1992.

[32] On Gregory XIII, see especially *Enciclopedia dei papi,* III, pp. 180–202 (A. Borromeo), with full bibliography.

[33] The text is in Appendix D below.

[34] Conte 1990, pp. 85 ff.

[35] This may have been one of the reasons for the interest of Pope Pius IV in hiring Muret to teach moral philosophy, although he was probably more interested in obtaining the services of a famous teacher than in the specific subject he would be teaching. See Dejob 1881, pp. 167–68. A confirmation of the involvement of Pope Pius IV in Muret's appointment is offered in Muret 1774, I, p. 75 (Oratio

highly variable, depending on who was at the Church's helm. Furthermore, the institutional context suggests that moral philosophy was of little importance in the Roman *studium* until late in the sixteenth century. Thus, Rome was even further behind than the other universities discussed in the chapters above: there, ethics teaching was not necessarily an "ordinary" subject, but was at least taught regularly. The extent to which the popes were really responsible for the regular teaching of the subject in Rome, starting with Pellegrini, remains for the moment a matter of speculation.

9.1.2 *Commentaries*

More might be known about moral philosophy in Rome had the *Enarratio in Ethicam* by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda survived.[36] This work, written in Rome in 1524, would be a precious witness to the subject's interpretation there at the time. It would be especially helpful because, for the first half of the sixteenth century, the only surviving work on the *Ethics* possibly connected with Rome is the fragment of a paraphrase of the *Ethics* authored by a certain Giberto da Correggio, of whom next to nothing is known.[37]

Most of the other works connected with ethics teaching in the Roman university fall in the second half of the sixteenth century. The most important of the surviving sixteenth-century works are doubtless those of Muret and Pellegrini.[38] But this section also briefly discusses the commentary by Vittorio Venturelli, written while he was studying in Rome in 1603.[39]

Marc-Antoine Muret

After studying law and doing some teaching in France, Marc-Antoine Muret (1526–1585) fled from Toulouse, where he had been accused of heresy and sodomy, and came to Italy in 1554.[40] After spending

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IX, March 1565): "Superiori anno, cum injunctum mihi Pontificis auctoritate munus obire inciperem, multa dixi de laudibus philosophiae . . ."

[36] On Sepúlveda see below, Appendix C, no. 62.

[37] On Corregia see below, Appendix C, no. 91.

[38] Paolo Beni's commentary seems to be related to Milan around 1592. See below, Appendix C, no. 114.

[39] Another work, by Giulio Cesare Lagalla, apparently included material on the *Ethics* but does not seem to have survived (see Appendix C, no. 147). Lagalla, however, does not seem to have taught moral philosophy in Rome (see Conte 1990, p. 936).

[40] See Dejob 1881, Ch. 3.

time mainly in Venice, Padua, and Ferrara, in 1563 Muret was invited to the University in Rome. He was appointed to teach moral philosophy with the fairly modest yearly salary of 100 *scudi.*[41] Nonetheless, Muret stayed on; his teaching in law, philosophy, and the humanities earned him both fame and a decent salary (700 scudi by 1582–1583).[42] From this position, Muret—by then one of the best known Hellenists and orators of his time—continued his altercations with Pier Vettori, the great Florentine classicist.[43]

Muret's surviving course prolusions show that he taught Aristotle's *Ethics* for four years before going on to teach other subjects. The general prolusion was held at the opening of the academic year in 1563; in November 1564 Muret continued the course from the moral virtues in Book III; by March 1565 Muret could continue with Book V. It seems that the only part of the *Ethics* Muret covered in the 1565–1566 academic year was Book VI, for in November 1566 he started lecturing on Book VII. At some point in the following months he gave a prolusion on Books VIII and IX, but it is not clear how much of them he covered, if at all.[44] Judging from Muret's published commentary, after Book VI and especially Book VII he covered the text only lightly and cursorily; however, a comparison with the autograph shows that the editor only published Muret's *scholia* to these books, written in the margins of the Greek text.[45]

After 1567, Muret mainly taught law and the humanities in the Roman *studium.*[46] However, he also taught some works of Aristotle:

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[41] Conte 1990, p. 35; Silvio Antoniano, who was teaching letters at the same time, received 200 *scudi.*

[42] For Muret's teaching in Rome, see Appendix A, no. 267.

[43] On Vettori, see above, § 6.3. On the conflict between Muret and Vettori see especially Grafton 1983, *passim* and Kraye (forthcoming).

[44] For the dates of the various prolusions, see Appendix C, no. 84. Dejob 1881, p. 167, n. 1 correctly reports that Muret wrote, in his lecture notes, "Incoepi explicare hos libros Romae XVI die mensis novembris anno MDLXIII."

[45] Admittedly, more substantial material on these books remains to be discovered, but it is worthwhile noting that, starting with Book V, Muret seems to have abandoned his practice of writing his commentary in the blank pages which he had interleaved with those of the Greek text. Perhaps realizing that these did not offer enough space, Muret wrote his comments on these books separately. See, for example, his comments on *EN* VI in Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 11591, ff. 41r–54v.

[46] Cf. Anonymous 1774, pp. 1139–40: "Ab anno igitur 1563 usque ad annum 1567 libros Aristotelis de moribus docuit (quorum etiam quintum, ut in calce huius primi Tomi habetur, latine interpretatus est) tanta dicendi facundia, tantaque hominum frequentia, quantae nemini hominum antea obtigerant. Quatuor subinde annis, ad jus civilem tradendum, ab iisdem rei litterariae moderatoribus translatus, non vulgari via (ut ex eius orationibus videre est) jurisconsultorum confusas spinosasque

the *Rhetoric* in 1576[47] and the *Politics* (preceded by the *Economics*)[48] in 1577–1578.[49] In 1583–1584, Muret even went back to teaching the *Ethics*,[50] but not for long, since he retired in 1584 and died a year later.

With the exception of the *Economics* and of Book V of the *Ethics*,[51] Muret lectures on Aristotle's moral philosophy from the Greek text.[52] Muret's *Ethics* commentary allows one to see him at work. He bases his lectures on the Greek text provided by Pier Vettori (in the Florence 1560 Giunta edition, although he also knew and annotated the 1547 edition) and liberally sprinkles his discussion of individual passages with the Greek original, sometimes emended according to his own conjectures. When he refers to works by other Greek writers, he often cites them at length, again in the original. Muret's comments display (as one would expect) a strong philological bent, leading to an examination of variant readings and of competing translations of specific passages.[53] Thus, as was the case in Florence (see above, § 6.3), Muret's teaching would have been of a specialized nature, geared toward those who already possessed (or at least wanted) a good grasp of Greek. All of this may have discouraged the audience for his lectures, which at the beginning had been fairly large.[54]

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concertationes ordine digessit, judicio composuit, sermone adornavit, certissimo ad litterarum utilitatem documento. . . . Reliquos vitae annos, id est ad annum aetatis usque sexagesimum primum, in humaniorum litterarum disciplina Romae consumpsit."

[47] See Oratio VIII and Oratio IX in Muret 1774, I, pp. 304–12 and 312–19.

[48] Muret commented on Book I of the *Economics*; the work, including a translation by a certain Jacobus Ludovicus, is in Muret 1602, pp. 543–68. The commentary appears to have been written as part of Muret's teaching program and was surely written before going on to the *Politics*; see *ibid.*, p. 555: "His igitur paucis diebus hoc fragmentum oeconomicorum Aristotelis interpretabimur, deinde cum primum licebit, institutam politicorum interpretationem persequemur." On p. 556, Muret comments without disagreeing on Aristotle's statement that economics should be treated before politics, on the basis that "quae ortu priora sunt, prius etiam tractari debent."

[49] See Vol. II, Oratio XII in Muret 1774, I, pp. 329–36. The commentary on this work survives in Rome, BNC, 71.2.D.32–33. It is based on the Greek Giunta 1552 edition of the work.

[50] See Vol. I, Oratio XX, *Repetiturus libros Aristotelis de moribus* (Appendix C, no. 84).

[51] Muret wrote a Latin translation of the latter, which apparently dates to 1553, when he taught the work in Paris (see Dejob 1881, p. 20; Frotscher 1834, p. 18). However, Muret seems to have used the same text in his Roman teaching in 1565.

[52] This practice was not, however, entirely welcomed by the students, and after he had lectured for a year on the *Politics* in this manner Muret's patron, Cardinal Ippolito de' Medici, strongly suggested that he switch to something easier, such as Sallust. See Dejob 1881, p. 255.

[53] For examples, see Kraye 1995, p. 116, n. 79 and p. 117, n. 80.

[54] See his letter to Paolo Sacrato (Lib. III, *Ep.* XIII, 18 Kal. Feb. 1564 in Muret

However, in spite of a few disappointments,[55] Muret was simply providing what was becoming increasingly common in courses on Greek and Latin literature around the middle of the sixteenth century. His wide reading in classical literature is put on display through his numerous references to and quotations from Greek and Latin poets and other writers.

Were Muret's achievement to stop here, there would be little more to say, except that—like his contemporary and archrival Vettori—he was a skilled Hellenist and philologist, at home in the classics, and that he probably demanded of his students more familiarity with the Greek language than was usual elsewhere.[56] What is notable about Muret's commentary, however, is that it reflects the author's philosophical interests as well as his philological and literary ones. Whereas Vettori's commentary treats the *Ethics* almost exclusively from the literary and linguistic point of view, consistently skirting the discussion of standard philosophical problems,[57] Muret's does much more. As a self-declared follower of a different approach, one that emphasized both wisdom and eloquence,[58] Muret thought it important to discuss the philosophical issues in the *Ethics*, and not only points of philological and literary detail. Thus, Muret's commentary includes a rich examination of Aristotle's moral thought in general and of the issues that concern us here in particular. It helped that Muret, who had a long-standing concern for pedagogical issues,

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1741, p. 659): "Quod ad te scripsit Laelius, magnum quotidie non adolescentium modo, sed omnium aetatum atque ordinum multitudinem ad me audiendum ventitare, sane verissimum est, idque, ut verum fatear, ipsi mihi permirum videri solet. Nam et Romae rarum id est, et ego in me nihil sentio, quo tanta hominum studia excitentur." See also Sacrato's letter, *ibid.*, p. 767 (Appendix, Ep. IV).

[55] Muret himself, toward the end of his teaching, complained about the declining willingness of his students to study Greek and follow his Greek teaching. An amusing passage is found in Vol. II, Oratio XII, *Explicaturus libros Aristotelis de Republica, habita Romae pridie non. Novembris, MDLXXVII* (in Muret 1774, I, pp. 329–36): ". . . Graecam inquam lingua, omnis elegantiae magistra, omnium ingenuarum ac liberalium artium parens, altrix, conservatrix, ita iam iacet ac fordet, ut, qui eam docent, soli prope in scholis relinquantur. Stulti adulescentes Latinae linguae vix primis elementis utcumque perceptis, Graeca ne salutata quidem, aut statim valere iussa ad iurisprudentiam, aut ad medendi artem properant, illic tantum gloriae, illic divitiarum certissimam spem propositam dictitantes" (p. 334).

[56] Vettori's commentary, for example, provides not only the Greek text, but also a Latin translation for the benefit of students and readers (see Appendix C, no. 93).

[57] See above, § 6.3.

[58] On Muret's views concerning the necessity of teaching eloquence and wisdom together, see his *De philosophiae et eloquentiae conjunctione* (Vol. I, Oratio IV in Muret 1774, I, pp. 31–46).

thought of himself as a philosopher, at least in connection with his lectures on the *Ethics*.[59]

This union of wisdom and eloquence is already reflected in the formal garb of Muret's commentary. At the beginning of each chapter, Muret usually gives a fairly detailed overview of Aristotle's thesis and argument. He then proceeds, phrase by phrase and sometimes word by word, to examine the text in detail. In this part he gives his proposed emendations to the Greek text, criticizes others on particular points of translation,[60] cites parallel passages in other Aristotelian works (including the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia*), and sometimes clarifies the argument by recasting it in the form of a formal syllogism. Frequently he makes recourse to the works of other writers from antiquity, whether philosophers or poets, Greek or Latin; for example, there are numerous quotations from Plato, Simplicius, Cicero, Terence, and Horace. Occasionally the writings of the Church Fathers are referred to as well. Past commentators on the *Ethics* are named less often than one would expect; the range is mostly limited to the Greek commentaries, Thomas, Burley, and Acciaiuoli.

In addition to this close examination of the text (whose treatment is very similar to that of *scholia*), Muret occasionally offers *ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις* (i.e., *quaestiones et solutiones*). In these sections, Muret examines in further detail specific problems arising from the text, for example the meaning of *ἐξοτερικοί* and *ἀκροαματικοί λόγοι*.[61] One should not, however, judge the work's engagement with philosophical issues on the basis of these *ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις* alone; frequently Muret's *scholia* deftly combine philological, literary, and philosophical concerns.[62] Much of the discussion of *EN* VI.1, for example, is an exploration of Aristotle's division of the soul.[63]

Although Muret does not have particularly notable things to say about moral education in his discussion of *EN* II, VI, and X, his discussion of Book I is rewarding in several ways. After agreeing

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[59] See especially Muret 1602, pp. 87–88.

[60] The translations most often cited are the *translatio vetus* (i.e., the *Liber Ethicorum* by Grosseteste/Moerbeke), as well as those by Bruni, Argyropoulos, Lambin, Périon, and Feliciano. Muret does not always disapprove of these, but Lambin comes in for particularly severe treatment.

[61] Muret 1602, pp. 157–59. The consensus of modern scholars is that the esoteric and acroamatic writings represent, respectively, works Aristotle addressed to the broad public and to his circle of students; see Bos 1989.

[62] Kraye 1995, pp. 116–17.

[63] Muret 1602, pp. 448–58.

with Aristotle's statement in *EN* I.3 that the method of teaching should vary according to the subject-matter (something that seems to have reference to the difference between teaching speculative and practical subjects),[64] he makes the familiar point that stable and sure things should be discussed in a manner appropriate to them. Ethics, however, does not belong to this category: a number of examples from ancient history emphasizes the variety of what was then considered good and acceptable (*honestum*); therefore, it is sufficient if ethics be explained *crasse et populariter*.[65]

These remarks point in the direction of Muret's discussion of *EN* I.4, where he states that there are (only) two orders of presentation; the first proceeds from principles to causes, whereas the second follows the reverse method.[66] After observing that, whether in matters of inquiry or of presentation, one should start with what is clearer and easier to understand, Muret follows Aristotle in the distinction between things that are such in an absolute sense, and instead those that are such only relative to us.[67] Thus, whereas principles, according to Aristotle, are clearer in and of themselves than their effects, the simple is clearer than the concrete and composite, and causes are clearer than their effects, *for us* the opposite is true.[68] The conclusion is that the discussion of moral philosophy, as that of the arts in general,[69] should proceed from events to their causes and from the composite to the simple. Significantly, Muret stresses that, in this case, one should not follow the order of nature, but that which is more appropriate to our understanding.[70] In the cases, instead, in

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[64] *Ibid.*, p. 25: "Haec est prooemii secunda pars, qua, ut antea dixi, significat, quam disputandi rationem secuturus sit in his libris, quod ut melius percipi possit, intelligendum est, non unum esse simplicem docendi modum, sed ipsum quoque pro earum rerum, quae docentur, dissimilitudine variari."

[65] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 54: "Non est autem nobis, inquit, ignorandum duas esse inter se differentes disserendi vias, interdum enim a principiis ad ea, quae ex ipsis afficiuntur, proficiscimur, interdum autem ab effectis ad principia ipsa progredimur."

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 56: "Ac primum hoc ponit: in rebus aut exquirendis aut tractandis et explicandis, ab iis, quae perspicua et ad intelligendum facilia sunt, ordiendum esse. Talia autem duobus modis dicuntur: alia enim nobis clariora sunt, alia simpliciter et suapte natura. Fortassis igitur nobis quidem ab iis, quae nobis clara et perspicua sunt, exordiendum est."

[68] *Ibid.*

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 54: "Quod autem hoc loco docetur, non est proprium philosophiae moralis, sed generale quoddam praeceptum ad omnes artes ex aequo pertinens."

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 57: "Quocirca tunc ab iis, quae per se minus clara et perspicua sunt, sed clariora et priora nobis, ad ea, quae natura clariora et priora, id est, ab eventis ad causas, a compositis ad simplicia progredimur, et ordinem non rerum naturae, sed imbecillitati nostrae consentaneum et convenientem tenemus."

which the matters clearer to us and those that are such in and of themselves coincide (e.g., mathematics), there is no question as to what the starting point should be.[71]

Muret's comments about the proper order in ethics and in the practical arts are significant on two fronts. For example, from the philosophical viewpoint, they insist that investigation and presentation should follow the same order. Furthermore, the whole discussion assumes that there are really only two orders of presentation possible, whereas Galen's view (often followed uncritically until the second half of the sixteenth century) had envisaged three orders. Muret's statements are interesting in and of themselves, but also because they constitute an anticipation, by ten years, of the views expressed by Giacomo Zabarella in his *De methodis* and other works.[72] Given that, before his teaching appointment in Rome, Muret had also spent some time in Padua, it is not impossible that he had met Zabarella, who was a few years younger. However, Zabarella would have barely been at the beginning of his academic career then;[73] if there was a friendship between the two men (who however do not seem to have corresponded), it is more likely that Zabarella was influenced by Muret than the reverse.

Also interesting are Muret's comments on the appropriate hearer of the *Ethics*. This discussion is notable mainly for the way in which Muret attempts to circumvent Aristotle's clear opinion that the young should not hear the subject. Muret finds himself in a difficult position because, although he wants to give Aristotle his due, he would also find it a pity for his course to lose a numerous and diligent audience, mainly made up of adolescents.[74] Muret's way out of the

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[71] *Ibid.*, p. 58: "Summa igitur eius, quod hic ab Aristotele docetur, haec est: in cuiuslibet tractatione ordiendum esse a clarioribus. Sed quoniam alia dicuntur clariora simpliciter, alia nobis, distinctius explicat sententiam suam, dicens incipiendum esse nobis ab iis, quae nobis sunt clariora. Quare ubi eadem erunt natura clariora et nobis, ab iis principium ducendum erit, quemadmodum mathematici faciunt. Sin alia natura et per se clariora sint, alia nobis ab iis, quae nobis clariora sunt, ad ea quae per se et natura talia, proficisci oportebit."

[72] See above, pp. 258–63.

[73] He received his *doctor artium* in 1553 (Lohr, RLAC, p. 497).

[74] Muret 1602, p. 35: "Ancipiti hodie et periculoso ac lubrico versamur in loco. Nam cum Aristoteles ab auditione huius philosophiae uno verbo adolescentes arcere ac summovere videatur, vix videmur vitare posse unum de duobus incommodis, quin aut summi magistri auctoritatem non tanti facere iudicemur, quanti eam fieri ab omnibus par est; aut quasi ver tollamus ex anno, ita omnem florentem aetatem ab his disputationibus removere atque ablegare cogamur. Sed et temerarii essemus, si Aristoteli auderemus refragari, et barbari plane atque inhumani, si lectissimorum adolescentum coronam, a quo tanto studio auditorium hoc celebrari ac frequentari

impasse relies first on a mix of philological and historical observations; for example, he remarks that the range of the term *νέος* in Greek is fairly broad, so that Aristotle might indeed want to exclude those up to the age of 30. However, he observes, Aristotle himself had studied under Socrates (who taught nothing except moral philosophy) at the age of 17, so he concludes that the hearers, while needing to be a bit older than 14, can very well still be adolescents.[75]

Muret accompanies this sort of argument with an interpretative sleight of hand. He argues that Aristotle's chief concern in excluding young people from hearing the *Ethics* is their emotional immaturity and corresponding immaturity of judgment. These weaknesses do not allow one to judge whether the teaching being imparted is true. Since, however, Aristotle himself points out that immaturity is not necessarily a matter of physical age, there is no impediment to including mature young people among the hearers of the subject.[76] In this case, Muret fails in a striking way to acknowledge that "mature young people" is an oxymoron for Aristotle, and that the requirement of political experience would in any case exclude them.

Muret's reluctance to place ethics teaching among the higher order of studies may be related to his apparent assumption that ethics is preparatory to rhetoric. Indeed, in his introductory comments to the *Ethics*, Muret suggests that knowledge of this work is useful because it is necessary for a study of rhetoric, law, and theology.[77] A bit later, we learn that Muret disagrees both with those who thought that students should start their studies with physics, and with those

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videmus, abscedere, et tanta susceptum alacritate huius philosophiae studium in ipso quasi vestibulo deserere iuberemus. Quare mediam quandam viam tenebimus: ut et Aristoteli tribuamus, quantum debemus, hoc est, quantum plurimum possumus, et incitemus potius vestra studia quam retardemus; neque quicquam eorum, quae hic ab Aristotele dicuntur, ad vos hinc aut excludendos aut amovendos pertinere doceamus."

[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 37–38.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 41: "Non igitur simpliciter negat Aristoteles idoneos esse auditores huius philosophiae, sed tantum negat eos tales auditores esse, ut ea, quae hic traduntur, perfecte percipere et de illis iudicare possint. . . . ita nos non quidem omnes adolescentes, sed eos tantum, qui aut natura pravi sunt, aut mala educatione ac consuetudine depravati, a philosophiae tractatione excludendos esse censemus."

[77] *Prolegomena* in Rome, BNC, 71.2.D.12, f. 2r: "Utilitas satis percipi potest ex his quae heri (!) diximus, ad quae illud addo, huius philosophiae cognitionem necessariam esse ad tres praestantissimas facultates: ad eloquentiam quae est huius . . . et dialectic<ae> quasi quoddam *paraphues*, ad Ius civile, quod huius *hupayelthon* (?) est et ad theologiam, nam ni<si> ita esset, nunquam D. Thomas in Summa Theologiae ea prope omnia pertractasset quae de virtutibus in his libris disputantur."

who thought ethics should be the first subject taught. Instead, agreeing with Andronicus of Rhodes, Muret argues that logic should be at the beginning of the curriculum. After that, it does not much seem to matter whether one first studies physics or ethics.[78]

A similar kind of ambiguity is observable in Muret's undated oration on the proper order of studies.[79] There Muret states his preference for a program that trains children first in Latin, Greek, and rhetoric; he then suggests spending, at the age of eighteen, two years in the study of logic and dialectic. He lists three options for later studies: those wishing to become physicians and doctors of medicine should study physics; those wishing to become lawyers, ethics and politics; and those wishing to become theologians, both subjects.[80] Surprisingly, Muret does not state that Arts students should be taught moral philosophy. But perhaps he does not think that—apart from the classical languages and logic—particular preliminary studies are as important as emotional maturity.

Three further aspects of Muret's commentary deserve mention here. The first concerns Muret's stance toward the Aristotle–Plato issue, which dominated so much of the sixteenth-century philosophical literature. Like Francesco Piccolomini,[81] Muret too dislikes the attempts by some to achieve a perfect reconciliation of the two philosophers on the assumption that they did not really disagree in philosophical substance (*res*) but only in their way of expressing themselves (*verba*).[82] Thus, Muret seems to take a position opposite from that characteristic of the Florentines. Nonetheless, Muret is more successful than Piccolomini at distinguishing Plato and Aristotle's thought throughout his commentary, even though several times he does find himself relying on some Neoplatonic interpreters, and

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[78] *Ibid.*, f. 2v: "Nunc de ordine, de quo variae fuerunt sententiae veterum. Nam Boethus Sidonius (Strabonis sodalis) censebat philosophari volentibus a physicis incipiendum esse . . . Quidam alii ab ethicis, quòd ante omnia formandi sint mores. Andronicus Rhodius Boethi magister a logicis, tanquam ab instrumento sine quo caetera tractari non possunt, cui assentior; postea autem non multum interesse physica an ethica praecedant an etiam utraque eodem tempore discantur. Nam Boethi quidem opinio manifesto falsa videtur, cum constit ea quae tractantur a physicis multo obscuriora esse, quàm quae a dialecticis aut a politicis."

[79] Vol. II, Oratio XXIII, *De via ac ratione tradendarum disciplinarum* (Muret 1774, vol. I, pp. 416–29). See also Dejob 1881, pp. 331–34.

[80] Muret 1774, vol. I, p. 420.

[81] See above, pp. 281–84.

[82] Muret 1602, pp. 81–83.

especially on Simplicius.[83] Muret's attitude toward other philosophers (especially the Stoics and Epicureans) is more conventional: he brings up their opinions mainly in order to demolish them.

A second point of interest is Muret's attitude toward theology. We have already seen that Muret thought that theologians should study moral philosophy. It is not therefore surprising that Muret occasionally addresses theological issues in his commentary, such as whether God is the end of all things.[84] When he comes to discussing *EN* I.11, furthermore, Muret becomes involved in a long discussion on the immortality of the soul, affirming that Aristotle believed in it, even though he may have expressed himself otherwise when speaking from a strictly natural viewpoint (*φυσικῶς*).[85] In all of these discussions Muret adheres closely to Catholic positions, something doubtless encouraged in part by his close ties with the papal court and the Jesuits, and also by past accusations, in France, of heresy. Of course, Muret's emphases may have also been due to personal conviction, but it is worth noting that Muret was something of an opportunist, which makes it hard to tell where he really stood.

Finally, in his *Prolegomena* Muret briefly discusses the question of whether the *Ethics* belongs to the field of ethics or (as some others think) to politics. Muret resolves this *dubium* clearly in favor of the first option: even though the whole of moral philosophy is in some sense *πολιτική*, all the ancient interpreters agree that the *Ethics* (together with the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia*) discusses the morals of individuals.[86] Muret, however, does not go deeper into the relationship between the *Ethics* and the *Politics*, which was one of the common debates of his day.

Lelio Pellegrini

In 1600 Lelio Pellegrini, *doctor artium et sacrae theologiae* and professor, since 1586, of ethics and politics in the Roman *studium*, published his commentary on the *Ethics*.[87] It was accompanied by a dedicatory

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[83] Significantly, Muret starts his *Prolegomena* by referring to Simplicius and Ammonius (Rome, BNC, 71.2.D.12, f. 2r): "Praestantissimi quique Aristotelis scriptorum interpretes, nominatim Simplicius et Ammonius, sex quaedam capita tradiderunt, quae in cuiusque libri principio tractare oporteret, antequam ad exponenda ipsa philosophi verba perveniretur."

[84] Muret 1602, p. 16.

[85] *Ibid.*, pp. 148–54.

[86] Rome, BNC, 71.2.D.12, f. 2r–v.

[87] See Appendix A, no. 268 and Appendix C, no. 101. Little is known about

letter to Pope Clement VIII and a preface addressed to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Cosimo II de' Medici. This work, written for the benefit of Pellegrini's students, had been preceded in 1587 by the prolusion to his *Ethics* course[88] and in 1598 by a treatise on the passions of the soul.[89] Pellegrini intended to write other ethical works as well, including a commentary on the *Politics*.[90] It is not clear, however, whether these works were ever written.

Pellegrini's 1587 prolusion is a moving piece, encouraging those interested in theology, law, natural philosophy, and rhetoric to pursue the study of moral philosophy. The emphasis falls on the close relationship between moral philosophy and theology. Indeed, Pellegrini insists that ethics is an ideal preparation for the latter subject.[91] However, the fact that Pellegrini also refers to the subject's significance for students of natural philosophy and rhetoric suggests either a more optimistic view of its usefulness, compared with Muret, or an attempt to attract a broad and large audience. Especially interesting are Pellegrini's stated views on the place of moral philosophy in the order of studies, for he clearly argues that the study of moral philosophy should precede that of physics. Pellegrini repeats the Neoplatonic argument that ethics should be the first branch of philosophy studied

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Pellegrini; Renazzi (III, p. 30) relates: "Nel Pontificato di Sisto fu destinato a spiegar nelle sudette Scuole l'Etica di Aristotele Lelio Pellegrini di Sonnino, Castello della Campagna di Roma sui confini del Regno di Napoli, quell'istesso, che ne recitò l'orazione funebre. . . . Ma egli più oratore, che Filosofo non pensò ad innovare cosa alcuna, e seguì constantemente insegnando i precetti del Filosofo Stagirita. L'eloquenza, di cui era fornito, gli attrasse continuo concorso di Discepoli, e gli diè campo di perorare in pubblico spesse volte."

[88] See Appendix C, no. 100.

[89] Pellegrini 1598.

[90] Pellegrini 1600, f. 1r–v: "Sum enim, etsi in re non magna, Sanctitatis tuae operarius; utque nobiliora de me loquar, quintumdecimum iam facio stipendium in Romano Gymnasio, professor eius philosophiae partis, quae in agendo posita, morum disciplinam, et Reipublicae administrandae facultatem complectitur. Quo in munere ita me hactenus gessi, ut non in schola tantum docendo, sed et privatim scribendo prosuerim auditoribus meis. Edidi antea commentarium de affectionibus animi noscendis et emendandis; curiosum sane opus et, ni fallor, amoenum. Illum proxime sequitur iste de moribus, quem alii de nobilitate, de honore, de rebus secundis et adversis, ac demum copiosa in libros Politicorum Aristotelis enarratio consequentur, si ipse vita, si caeli benignitate fruar, si per liberalitatem tuam, qua hactenus sustentor, P.B. togatam hanc militiam prosequi licebit, a qua nec honorariam desidero missionem, etsi sextusdecimus instet annus, quo milites interdum sacramento soluti exautorabantur."

[91] Pellegrini 1587, f. 91v: "Quotusquisque enim vestrum est qui non intelligat, quantum eius cognitio ad illam Sacrae Theologiae portionem conferat, quae de vitiis, de virtutibus, de fine, de felicitate, de actibus humanis, de libera hominis voluntate accuratas et difficillimas texit disputationes?"

so that, with one's mind purged and settled from distracting passions, one can dedicate one's attention to the teachings of philosophy.[92]

The *De affectionibus animi noscendis* is not clearly connected with Pellegrini's teaching, although he is listed on the titlepage as *philosophiae civilis in Romano Gymnasio professor* and declares that the work is an outgrowth of his consideration of the *Ethics*.[93] This work is an examination of fifteen affections or passions of the soul, the first eleven of which are taken from Thomas' catalogue.[94] In this systematic treatment of the passions, Aristotle is not the only source: Pellegrini depends on the whole classical tradition (in both prose and poetry), as well as on doctors of the church (e.g., Augustine and Thomas) and more recent writers. His pattern is to discuss what a specific passion is, its causes and effects, and (when appropriate) what the best remedies are. One can easily see a parallel between this work and the Coimbra *Ethics* commentary, as well as other commentaries coming out of the Collegio Romano at the end of the sixteenth century.[95] However, Pellegrini points out that his discussion is relevant, not only to theologians, but also to rhetoricians, lawyers, natural philosophers, and followers of other fields of study.[96]

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[92] Pellegrini states that moral philosophy should be preferred to the other branches, "sive ordinem sciendi spectet, sive disciplinae utilitatem. Nam et huic prius incumbendum esse quam Physicis, ut pacatiori mente naturae arcana tractentur, vetus fuit Peripateticorum sententia, et cum universa Philosophiae planities tota frugifera sit et fructuosa, certe ea pars, quae circa mores excolendos et res tum publicas tum privatas constituendas occupatur, multo uberior est atque feracior" (Pellegrini 1587, f. 91v).

[93] Pellegrini 1598, Prooemium (pages not numbered): "Haec me cogitatio impulit, ut brevem hunc commentarium, de agnoscendis et emendandis affectionibus animi, ex meis in libros ad Nicomachum lucubrationibus conficerem, quasi telum ad frangendam eius modi luem (!) aptissimum . . ."

[94] Pellegrini 1598, pp. 24–25: "Ego vero cum D. Thoma undecim praecipuas affectiones constituo: amorem, odium, desiderium, fugam seu adversationem, gaudium seu delectationem, tristitiam; hasque in parte concupiscente; in irascente autem spem, desperationem, timorem, audaciam et iram. . . . His adiungo alias minus praecipuas, vel quod simplices non sunt, vel quod parum distant a praedictis, verecundiam scilicet, impudentiam, aemulationem, contemptum dignitatis, misericordiam seu miserationem, indignationem, invidentiam, perversam laetitiam. Neque vero affectiones omnes numerandas suscepimus . . ." The actual order followed in the work is the following: a general introduction, then De amore, De desiderio, De gaudio et voluptate, De odio et malevolentia, De aversatione seu mali fuga, De tristitia et dolore, De misericordia, De invidia, De verecundia, De indignatione, De aemulatione, De spe, confidentia, disperatione, De timore, De audacia, De ira.

[95] See below, § 9.2.2 and 9.2.3.

[96] Pellegrini 1598, pp. 41–42.

Pellegrini's commentary on the *Ethics*, which covers all ten books in 380 pages, is not very noteworthy for its content. For example, Pellegrini observes that Aristotle begins his discussion of the subject from the purpose or end, but does not ask whether this is also the proper way to teach the subject.[97] Furthermore, Pellegrini has nothing especially insightful to say about the process of training people in virtue. However, on two points Pellegrini's interpretation is especially relevant here. In his discussion of *EN* I.3, Pellegrini agrees with Aristotle that the young should not hear ethics or politics.[98] At first his interpretation would seem to be the opposite of Muret's, since he concedes Aristotle's point that time and experience are necessary prerequisites to hearing these subjects. However, Pellegrini too, like Muret, knows how to make the text serve his own purposes: rather than having the text refer to *iuvenes*, he shifts the focus to the *pueri*. Thus he is able to make the passage agree with his earlier declaration that ethics should be the first branch of philosophy studied.[99] Furthermore, it is notable that, in his discussion of the five intellectual habits listed by Aristotle in *EN* VI.3 (art, science, prudence, wisdom, and intelligence), Pellegrini feels compelled to ask why Aristotle did not include faith among them. This issue had been discussed by Albert,[100] but not by Thomas, who noted only that *suspicio* and *opinio* were not mentioned because they are not intellectual virtues.[101] But it is a point typical of Pellegrini's commentary that theological references are frequent.[102] Doubtless this had something

[97] Pellegrini 1600, p. 4: "Disputationem de moribus a fine exorditur Aristoteles, quoniam quem locum prima principia, ex quibus deducuntur conclusiones, tenent in scientiis, quae veritatem venantur, eundem ultimus finis obtinet in iis, quae actionem respiciunt, qualis haec est scientia de moribus. Ut enim in mathematicis ab hoc principio 'a puncto in punctum licet lineam ducere' sit progressus ad demonstrationes illius artis; ita in his, quae rebus agendis occupantur, facultatibus, proposito fine, in quem omnes tendunt humanae functiones, devenitur ad actiones, quae sunt gratia finis, et quemadmodum a principiis quasi manuducimur ad assensum praebendum conclusioni, sic beneficio finis, ante cogniti moventisque appetitum, descendimus ad agendum et operandum."

[98] On the importance of this point for Aristotle, see above, p. 60.

[99] Pellegrini says: "*Cum usu careat et experimento*: experimentum temporis diuturnitate acquiritur, et a singularibus tantum capitur, eaque natura est singularium, ut experientia magis quam ulla ratione percipiantur. Ideo pueri, etsi mathematici esse possunt ob vim phantasiae, prudentes tamen esse non possunt, quod ob temporis defectum illis experientia desit" (Pellegrini 1600, pp. 11–12).

[100] Albert the Great 1968–1972, II, pp. 416 ff.

[101] Thomas 1969, Lib. VI, lec. 3, p. 340, ll. 20–30.

[102] See, for example, the discussion of *summum bonum* in Pellegrini 1600, pp. 3–4.

to do with Pellegrini's training as a theologian. As we shall see, it is an aspect that Pellegrini's commentary has in common with those of several of his contemporaries working in Rome.

Pellegrini's method is a bit more unusual. His *De moribus libri X* is essentially a combination of two kinds of commentary: paraphrase (each chapter of the *Ethics* is given a summary based on Denys Lambin's translation)[103] and scholia (also provided for each passage). Although neither genre was new, combining them was not so common. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe what Pellegrini achieves through this combined approach. In the paraphrase, Pellegrini distinguishes Aristotle's text from his own additions through a typographical stratagem: the text is set in roman type, whereas his own interpolations are in italic. Since the two are intermingled, this makes for a seamless reading between the logic of Aristotle's arguments and the commentary. The scholia are, as one might expect, short explanations of particular words or phrases (sometimes referred to in the Greek), with crossreferences to other Aristotelian passages or, more often, to other writers of Greek and Latin antiquity. Thus, the names of Plato, Plutarch, Cicero, and the Greek and Latin poets appear quite often. There are also scattered references to Neoplatonic writers, to Averroes and Eustratius, and more rarely to recent commentators (especially Francesco Patrizi, whose opinions are regularly opposed). Pellegrini makes a boast, in his dedicatory letter to Clement VIII, of his use of historical examples,[104] and these are in fact numerous throughout the work. They seem to be limited to the classical period and are a sign of humanist fashion.

More important, however, is why Pellegrini proceeded as he did. He implies in his preface that Aristotle, though a great thinker, was not especially clear in his writing, at least of this work. Pellegrini therefore takes the liberty of writing a paraphrase that adds, deletes, or alters according to what seems more likely to improve the understanding of Aristotle's text. He takes as his model Themistius and is not apologetic for following this particular method.[105] As for his use

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[103] See Lambin 1558.

[104] Pellegrini 1600, p. i: "Offero Sanctitati tuae libros Aristotelis de Moribus, uberiore paraphrasi, exemplis ab historia petitis, et rerum subtiliorum disputationibus non paucis a me illustratos . . ."

[105] *Ibid.*, pp. iii–iv: "Meum vero fuit in hoc suscepto labore consilium, ut quae Aristoteles docte et acute, sed more suo plerunque obscure et implicate scripsit, aperirem ac enodarem, nulla lectoris molestia, minime interrupto orationis filo. . . .

of scholia and *dubitationes*, Pellegrini states that he did not want to follow the models of Buridan, Burley, or even Thomas. He wished to restrict himself to a discussion of only a few issues, susceptible of being treated with brevity. For this procedure he offers two main reasons: first, Aristotle himself said that ethics should not be treated with an emphasis on demonstrations (not appropriate to this branch of philosophy); second, he is writing for an in-between audience, not very learned but also not ignorant of the liberal arts.[106]

It would not be surprising if Pellegrini were making veiled reference to Francesco Piccolomini in his preface and comparing the Sienese's work with that of old-fashioned scholastics. Pellegrini would doubtless have had little patience with Piccolomini's long-winded discussions of all kinds of (not necessarily relevant) philosophical issues, and with his laborious presentation of differing philosophical positions. He seems to prize instead a straightforward reading of the text, and Piccolomini's approach—which scrambles the order of Aristotle's work—would probably, in his eyes, only generate confusion. Indeed, it is remarkable that, to a significant extent, Pellegrini keeps his promise of offering a continuous reading of the *Ethics*. Only rarely does he stop to discuss at greater length particular philosophical and especially philological topics.[107]

Quae vero sunt Aristotelis ab iis, quae nos addidimus, characteres diversi distinguunt. Nec referenda magistri sententia fuimus admodum in verbis religiosi. Addidimus, detraximus, immutavimus paraphrastice, ut aiunt, eadem usi licentia, quam Themistius in eodem explanando se sumpsisse scribit. Nam si tenebris Aristotelis lucem allaturi, eiusdem verbis alligari voluissemus, easdem porro tenebras legentibus reliquissemus."

[106] *Ibid.*, p. iv: "Satis habuimus mentem, atque sensum illius retinuisse, nec ordinem ullatenus immutasse, quin iuxta vulgatam partitionem libris per capita divisis, Aristotelis perpetuo vestigiis inhaesisse; additis ad singula capitula scholiis quibusdam et dubitationibus, quae ad contextus explanationem requirebantur. Qua in re illud maxime spectavimus, ne supervacaneis difficultatibus, et quas moralis disciplina non admittit, paginas impleremus, quasi laudem a magno codice quaesituri. Hoc enim tum nobis, qui brevitate et facilitate summopere delectamur, perarduum fuisset, tum alios a lectione retardasset. Habentur Buridani, Burlaei aliique eiusdem farinae molitores non pauci, qui in istos de moribus libros subtiles et ad tenuissimum elimatas quaestiones ediderunt. Sed et a S. Thoma, ubi de functionibus humanis deque virtutibus et vitiis disputat, in eundem usum multa faciliter, acute, graviterque conscripta sunt, quibus moralium subtilitatum esuritor animus expleri et satiari queat. At hoc praeter propositum fuerit Aristotelis, qui non semel in his libris philosophiam de moribus ait nec requirere, nec pati exquisitam nimis elaboratamque rerum, quae sub actionem cadunt, tractationem, ac materiam, quae illi subiicitur, eiusmodi esse, ut non admitteret, ferretve demonstrationes. . . . Sed nos ut non liberalium artium plane rudibus et imperitis scribimus, sic neque scientissimis."

[107] One of the more interesting is the *Digressio de libris exotericis et acroamaticis* at the end of Book I, pp. 59–64.

Vittorio Venturelli

Finally, brief mention should be made of the *Ethics* commentary by Vittorio Venturelli. The *Expositio Victorii Venturelli in omnes libros moralium Aristotelis anno 1603 dum Romae studiis operam dabat*[108] does not clearly indicate whether the author studied in the "Sapienza" or in the Collegio Romano. Nonetheless, Venturelli is not listed among the students of the Collegio Romano, and the order of his studies does not seem compatible with the graduated curriculum there.[109] After studying the *De anima* in 1602, Venturelli moved on to the *Ethics* (1603) and then finished the *Parva naturalia* (1604). Thus it seems that Venturelli, a native of Urbino born in 1584, read philosophy in the Roman *studium* from 1600/01 to 1604.[110] According to a modern biographer, Venturelli then earned his doctorate in theology in the Collegio Romano[111] before returning to Urbino, where he was involved in various cultural activities. Later in life he returned to Rome, where he taught theology in a religious convent, was rector of S. Lorenzo a' Monti, and, after 1657, took care of the collection of ducal manuscripts from Urbino housed in the Vatican library.[112]

As its title indicates, Venturelli's commentary on the *Ethics* was meant to cover all ten books. In fact, it stops with *EN* VIII.8. The heading for VIII.9 is followed by several blank pages and no colophon. It is possible that Venturelli's enthusiasm for the work had flagged by this point, but it is more likely that the rest of the commentary has been lost. Also missing is the section from *EN* IV.6 to the end of Book V. Again, one of the quires has disappeared.

For every chapter, Venturelli provides a brief but intelligent summary of two to three pages based on a (still unidentified) Latin transla-

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[108] In Gubbio, Archivio di Stato, Armanni II.F.17 (A.D. 1603), 109 ff. See Appendix C, no. 133.

[109] See especially Gubbio, Archivio di Stato, Armanni II.F.18 (s. XVII), which includes commentaries by Venturelli on the *De anima* (started in 1602 and finished on 21-IV-1602) and the *Parva naturalia* (finished on 17-III-1604). Cf. Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 11; not in Lohr, RLAC.

[110] The inscription to Gubbio, Archivio di Stato, Armanni II.F.18 reads "Ista expositio fuit incepta anno Domini 1602, anno aetatis meae 18°." The colophon to the commentary on the *Parva naturalia* in this manuscript reads "Finis expositionis Parvorum Naturalium Victorii Venturelli Urbinatensis die decimoseptimo Martii 1604, Romae."

[111] This part of the story seems baseless, since Venturelli is not recorded among the students of the Collegio Romano.

[112] *Degli uomini illustri*, pp. 117–18.

tion. In comparison with his commentary on the *De anima*—which provides an introduction, full *lemmata*, and a discussion of philosophical questions—this work on the *Ethics* is closer to being a paraphrase. Venturelli does not even make overt reference to past commentators on the *Ethics*. His objective seems to be that of clarifying Aristotle's arguments and deducing some conclusions. In his discussion of *EN* I.3, for example, Venturelli shows that Aristotle's exclusion of young people from hearing ethics is based on two considerations—that they lack experience and that they follow their passions.[113] (Venturelli seems to agree with Aristotle's position.) Earlier in the chapter, he notes that Aristotle's view of the sciences leads to two conclusions related to the method that should be followed in them.[114] However, Venturelli limits himself to stating these arguments and conclusions. He does not subject them to criticism or attempt to place them within current philosophical debates. For example, he observes that, according to Aristotle, the correct starting point—especially in ethics—is represented by that which is known *to us*.[115] But his does not lead into a discussion of the contemporary debate on method and order.

Despite the fact that Venturelli was a student in Rome at the time, it is unlikely that this paraphrase commentary is related to the teaching of ethics in the Roman *studium*. Luca Valerio was in all likelihood teaching the *Ethics* in 1602–1603, and certainly so in 1603–1604.[116] But several factors suggest that Venturelli's is not a *reportatio* of his teaching. First, the work is described in the title as an *Expositio Victorii Venturelli*. It is unlikely that the genitive is one of possession and not of authorship. Second, the practice in the Roman

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[113] Gubbio, Archivio di Stato, Armanni II.F.17, f. 5r: "Quum iuvenes non sunt apti auditores huius scientiae, duplici ratione; prima est, quum sunt inexpertes, et ideo difficile credunt illis, quae tractantur in hac scientia; secunda ratio est, quum sequuntur affectus sensuum, et quae docet sensus, non . . . [one word unclear] rectam vivendi normam, et ideo non possunt pervenire ad ipsum finem propositum, qui est actio, et non cognitio; nam cum in moralibus bene vivere doceatur et bene agere, illi qui sensus sequuuntur non sunt apti ad hanc audiendam scientiam, quum totum appetitum sequuntur . . ."

[114] *Ibid.*, f. 4r: "Igitur duae conclusiones. Prima: modus procedendi debet conformari scientiae. Secunda: non in omni scientia et arte eodem modo procedendum est . . . cum res morales adeo variae sint, ita ut de illis certa quidem ratio et prima non possit afferri, ideo non modo (?) demonstrativo, sed probabili procedendum est."

[115] *Ibid.*, f. 5r: ". . . at concludit philosophus quaestionem, a notis nobis incohandum est praecipue in hac morali scientia . . ."

[116] See Appendix A, no. 269.

studium was, as we have seen (§ 9.1.1), to read only one book of the *Ethics* per year. Thus, students who wanted an overview of the work were obliged to do so on their own. Venturelli's young age (he was only nineteen in 1603) may seem to argue against his authorship of the commentary. But it seems likely that Venturelli helped himself by consulting some published commentaries.

The commentaries by Muret, Pellegrini, and Venturelli testify to diverse ways of teaching the *Ethics* and of writing on the work in the Roman *studium*. The commentaries by Muret and Pellegrini both treat ethics as an introductory subject, but they seem to have very different expectations about the audience's preparation, especially in Greek. Furthermore, while both works emphasize the relationship of ethics with theology, they do so to a different extent. They also vary in their treatment of philosophical issues and in their use of humanist techniques. Even from the perspective of genre there are significant contrasts among the three works considered here. All of this suggests that it is hard to identify a "Roman school" of interpretation of the *Ethics* in the same sense as one may speak of a "Florentine school." Our examination of the Collegio Romano in the next section will indicate whether the same is true there.

9.2 *The Collegio Romano*

Although Jesuit philosophy has awakened increasing scholarly interest in past years,[117] most of this research has concentrated on logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, which constituted the pillars of the Jesuit philosophical curriculum. Moral philosophy has received little attention,[118] and it will soon be clear why. But it is also surprising that, in comparison with Jesuit pedagogy[119] and the Jesuit teaching of the humanities,[120] relatively little is known about the *prac-*

[117] See, for example, *Les jésuits à la Renaissance*, U. Baldini 1998, Blum 1988a, 1988b, and 1998, Lohr 1988b. Especially notable are Ulrich G. Leinsle's contributions, for example Leinsle 1999 on Dillingen.

[118] A fortunate exception is Knebel 2000.

[119] The literature on this topic is too large to be cited here. Useful introductions are Lundberg 1966, O'Malley 1993, and Giard 1995. In general, on Counter-Reformation education, see Brizzi 1982.

[120] See, for example, Codina Mir 1968, Scaglione 1986, Brizzi 1981 and 1984, and Fois 1991.

tices of philosophy teaching in the Jesuit order.[121] Furthermore, although something is known about the history and administrative structure of the Collegio Romano,[122] on the whole studies of the philosophy taught there are sparse.[123] Given that the Collegio Romano was the mother of all the other Jesuit colleges across Europe,[124] this fact is all the more surprising.

The state of the documentation is partly responsible for the present gaps in scholarship. Since the head of the Collegio Romano could easily discuss problems face to face with the general of his order, there is less archival material available for the Collegio Romano than for distant colleges such as Perugia. Nonetheless, given the paucity of secondary studies relevant to the theme of this section, archival documents and primary texts have been of critical importance in this study. These can provide at least an initial overview of ethics teaching in the Collegio Romano.[125] After examining the institutional context, this section provides an analysis of the commentary literature as well. Both of these topics are studied up to the mid-seventeenth century.

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[121] Blum 1999 is helpful in this regard for Péter Pázmány, active in Graz.

[122] Rinaldi 1914, Tacchi Venturi 1950–1951. The standard work on the Collegio Romano is still García Villoslada 1954.

[123] See Scaduto 1974, pp. 282–304, Wallace 1984 and 1992, Henrici 1991, and U. Baldini 1992.

[124] Although it was not the first Jesuit college founded, the Collegio Romano's example was taken as a model in founding other colleges. This does not, however, mean that there was not also a fair degree of regional variation, as the responses to the various redactions of the *Ratio studiorum* show.

[125] Most of the early histories and documents on the Jesuits ignore the topic of the Collegio Romano's philosophical studies. The following sketch makes use mainly of three kinds of sources: first, early first-hand histories of the Jesuits and of the Collegio Romano (especially useful for up to 1576; these include Polanco, *Vita Ignatii Loiolae*, which covers the years 1537–1556; *Polanci Complementa*, which covers 1541–1576; and idem, *Ephemerides Romanae*, which covers 1553–1561; Lainez, *Epistolae*, which covers 1535–1565; Nadal 1898–1908 and idem 1883); second, the archival series *Catalogi breves et triennales* (in ARSI, Provincia Romana), which, for the period after 1570, provides reliable lists of instructors for the Collegio Romano and information on their careers (cf. other lists such as Ipparaguirre and Baldini); and third, Lukács' rich collection *Monumenta Paedagogica* (*MP*). Furthermore, the Archivio Pontificio dell'Università Gregoriana (APUG) and the Fondo Gesuitico of the Biblioteca Nazionale in Rome preserve many lectures and commentaries by Jesuits that can be used to reconstruct their teaching careers and their approach to texts. Several of the works relevant to the teaching of Aristotle are listed in Lohr, RLAC. A useful survey of some of the important sources for studying the Jesuits during this period is Gilardi 1995.

9.2.1 *The Institutional Context*

The Jesuit curriculum foresaw three main educational stages: the humanities (usually divided into five grades), the arts (philosophy and mathematics), and theology.[126] When it started offering classes in 1551, the Collegio Romano began with the lower subjects (i.e., grammar and rhetoric). Two years later, however, it was ready to launch into its teaching of philosophy and even theology. At this stage, the three-year philosophy program—followed by another half year to incept—closely followed the model experienced by the early Jesuits in the Collège de Montaigu and Collège de Ste. Barbe in Paris. Thus, there were three teachers—Giovanni Roger for dialectics, Guy Roillet for logic and ethics, and Baldassare Torres for physics—delegated respectively to teach the first, second, and third years of the philosophy course.[127] Possibly there was also a professor of metaphysics,[128] but he is not named. In any case, ethics teaching in the Collegio Romano is not a specialized subject, since it is taught by the professor of logic; it is taught fairly early in the curriculum (probably in the first half of the second year), to logic students;[129] and it is apparently a regular course, taught every day.

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[126] For a description of the development of the Jesuit curriculum in the sixteenth century, very helpful is Hengst 1981, pp. 55–79.

[127] Polanco, *Chronicon* (*MP*, I, pp. 550–51, Appendix I): "Tres artium cursus simul inchoati fuerunt, primus a primordiis dialectices, alter a solidioribus logicae Aristotelis et ethicae partibus, tertius a physicis, ut qui inaequaliter in litteris profecerant, suo profectui convenientes lectiones quisque haberet. Theologia scholastica et Scriptura Sacra praelegi coepta est et adhibitae exercitationes scholasticae, quae in universitatibus, in quibus florent litterae, probari maxime solent. Doctor Olave ex partibus Divi Thomae primam inchoavit, quam anter meridiem enarrabat . . . Primum philosophicum cursum Magister Ioannes Rogerius ab ipsis dialecticae primordis, secundum P. Guido Royletius, tertium D. Balthasar Turrianus susceperunt . . ." Cf. Polanco's letter to *Sociis in Hispania versantibus* (Rome, 12/13-VIII-1553; *Monumenta Ignatiana*, V, p. 321): "En el collegio nuestro prosíguense hasta aora los studios de las lenguas . . . y así cada año se començará un curso y se acabará otro, si Dios será servido, donde se leerán la lógica y phísica y metaphísica, y lo moral de Aristotíl, y de las mathemáticas lo que bastará y lo más sólido y útil para el fin que se pretiende. Tanbién se començará un curso de theología, que durará 4 años, y de dos en dos se comencará un curso nuevo . . ."

[128] Ignatius of Loyola, letter to Comes de Melito (Rome, 21-VII-1554; *Monumenta Ignatiana*, VII, p. 258): "El collegio nuestro, començado el 5 I, va de día en día aumentándose en el número y fuco de nuestros scholares . . . Ay otro professor de rhetórica y cosas más graves de humanidad; otro de griego, otro de habráico, otro de lógica, otro de philosophía natural, otro de metaphísica. Leynse también mathemáticas y philosophía moral cada día, y dos lectiones de theología scholástica, y una de la sacra scrittura por tres diversos lectores . . ."

[129] There is a difficulty in interpreting the documents on this point. Polanco's

These characteristics of the ethics course as well as the general structure of the philosophy curriculum accord well with the views expressed in 1552/53 by one of the Jesuit fathers—in all likelihood Martino de Olave, superintendent of the Collegio Romano from 1552 to 1556.[130] Olave thought that the philosophy curriculum should be covered in 3 years. The first year should be dedicated to the more elementary parts of logic. The first half of the second year should cover the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* as well as Aristotle's *Ethics* (taught in the evenings). The second half of the same year should be given over to the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. In the third year, students should hear, in the first half, the *De anima*, Thomas' *De ente et essentia*, and Aristotle's *Politics*; in the second half, Aristotle's *De generatione, Parva naturalia*, and—in the evenings—the *De coelo* and *Metheora*.[131] Although it is impossible to say with absolute certainty, it is likely that Olave's model was followed in the Collegio Romano during the years of his superintendence.

After Guy Roillet's teaching of logic and the *Ethics* in 1553–1554,[132] the documents are silent for several years about moral philosophy teaching. The Jesuit *Constitutiones* (1553–1554) endorsed and indeed required the teaching of moral philosophy.[133] A letter by Polanco implies that it was at least meant to be taught.[134] Disputations that

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Chronicon (see n. 127, above) describes a three-step teaching of dialectic, logic, and natural philosophy (without mentioning metaphysics). On the other hand, Ignatius' letter to Comes de Melito of July 1554 (see n. 128 above) mentions teachers of logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics (thus, dialectic is not mentioned). The simplest way of reconciling these descriptions is to assume that, in July 1554, Ignatius is talking about the teachers for the next academic year; in this case, he forgot to mention dialectics and did not make clear that natural philosophy and metaphysics, though taught by different professors, were taught in the same year. The other option is to assume that the early curriculum of the Collegio Romano may have shifted back and forth between two models: dialectic–logic–natural philosophy (possibly including metaphysics); and logic–natural philosophy–metaphysics.

[130] See García Villoslada 1954, pp. 36–37.

[131] <P. Martino de Olave, S.J.>, *Ordo lectionum et exercitationum in universitatibus Societatis Jesu* (*MP*, I, p. 166 [163–83]).

[132] See also Appendix A, no. 277.

[133] *MP*, I, p. 283: "Tractabitur logica, phisica, metaphysica, moralis scientia, et etiam mathematicae, quatenus tamen ad finem nobis propositum conveniunt."

[134] *Polanci complementa*, I, p. 119 (107–21; Epist. 40, ineunte anno 1555): "Nel collegio della Compagnia . . . Si leggono insieme tre corsi de arti, per tre diversi auditori, et gli essercita in repetitioni et dispute, usando particolar diligenza che tutti facciano profitto nelle lettere. . . . si termina tutto il corso delle arti; nelle quali si trattano diligentemente le summule, la logica tutta d'Aristotele, et la philosophia morale et naturale, et quello che è necessario delle mathematiche."

included sections on moral philosophy continued to be held, for example in 1554[135] and at the end of 1555.[136] An interesting publication with such disputations survives from 1557.[137] But evidence as to actual teaching is lacking. There is, however, no good reason to suppose that ethics was dropped from the program of study. The fact that it was usually covered by the teacher of logic might explain why it is not mentioned explicitly.

Ethics next appears in the documents in 1557, when Teodorico Canisio is appointed to teach logic but instructed not to include ethics in his course.[138] This separation of ethics from logic was apparently due to the initiative of Girolamo Nadal, Olave's successor as superintendent of the Collegio Romano (1557–1561).[139] Nadal was disturbed at the practice of teaching the *Ethics* and *Metaphysics* to students of logic.[140] Although it is not quite clear whether (and to whom) moral philosophy was taught during Nadal's tenure, it is useful to recall Nadal's views of the ideal philosophical *iter*. In 1552/1553, Nadal proposed that the philosophy curriculum (logic, natural and moral philosophy, and metaphysics) be covered in 4 years. Ethics was to be heard by students of natural philosophy and metaphysics (although students of rhetoric and logic could also hear it if they wished to).[141] However, it was not supposed to be a regular course: it was to be taught on Sundays and other holidays, by one of the professors of the other branches of philosophy.[142] Nadal had expressed

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[135] Polanco, *Chronicon* (*MP*, I, p. 573); also Nadal 1898–1908, I, p. 271 (269–73; letter 68 of 21-XI-1554).

[136] Ignatius of Loyola, *Epistola quadrimestris* (Romae sub fine anni 1555; *Monumenta Ignatiana*, X, p. 442).

[137] See Anonymous 1557 (in Munich, BSB, Ph.u. 644 L). This work discusses ethics after metaphysics, and thus seems likely to reflect Nadal's educational philosophy. On the *Ethics* there are seventeen assertions (3 pages), basically covering all ten books. I am grateful to Joseph Freedman for bringing this work to my attention.

[138] *MP*, II, p. 423 (July 1557): "Delli tre artisti, [Teodorico] Canisio leggerà solo la logica, lassando l'ethica . . ."

[139] See García Villoslada 1959, pp. 38–39.

[140] Polanco, *Ephemerides*, II, p. 606 (7-VII-1557): "Constituit R. P. Natalis consulto R. P.re vicario, ut iis qui hactenus audierunt metaphysicam legerentur Aristotelis Topica et Elenchi, dolens quod cum tanta turbatione disciplinarum, dialecticis hactenus praelecta esset in collegio ethica et metaphysica."

[141] It is worth recalling that, according to Thomas Aquinas, the *Ethics* were to be studied after natural philosophy and before metaphysics, which was in fact the order of study in Paris at least between 1366 and 1452; see *CUP*, III, no. 1319 and above, p. 134.

[142] Hieronymus Nadal, *De studiis generalis dispositione et ordine*, or *Annotationes in Constitutiones* (*MP*, I, pp. 143–44): "In philosophia, hoc est: logica, philosophia naturali,

similar views in the founding documents of the Jesuit college of Messina (the *Constitutiones Collegii Messianensis*) in 1548.[143]

Thus, there were differences of opinion among the Jesuits in Rome as to the proper place of ethics in the graduated philosophical curriculum. These differences of opinion led to differences in practice. Whereas Olave placed ethics in the second year of study as a regular course, Nadal wanted it to be heard by more mature students as a feast-day subject. It should be stressed, however, that according to both views ethics was not an independent subject: it was always taught by one of the other professors.

This situation changed (or rather, was meant to change) in 1562–1563. The documents report as the main news for 1563 the Collegio Romano's appointment of teachers in moral philosophy and *casi di coscienza*.[144] Moral philosophy was assigned to Achille Gagliardi, later to have a prominent rôle in the Society, especially as a theologian.[145] The novelty was not so much that the subject was taught (as we have seen, ethics had been taught earlier), but that it was now a separate course assigned to an independent professor. In other words, ethics now received specialized teaching. Although this was a rather late development compared to other European universities,[146] for the Jesuits it seems to have represented something significant. Also notable is the *audience* specified for this new course: Gagliardi's teaching was to be directed to the third-year students of metaphysics. This may be seen as a vindication of Nadal's views, which were also

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morali ac metaphysica sunto 4 classes, ac quattuor annis absolvatur totius philosophiae (ut vulgo aiunt) cursus. Et ut primum de morali philosophia dicatur, Ethica Nicomachia Aristotelis enarrentur singulis diebus festis ac dominicis in una tantum classe, quae lectio propria erit philosophorum naturalium ac metaphysicorum, etiamsi et rethores et logici alioqui eam audire possent. Huius lectionis erit hora commodior a prandio. Professor huius lectionis deligetur ex quattuor classicis a Rectore academiae."

[143] "Philosophus semper erit diligentissimus. . . . Omnibus diebus dominicis et festis enarrabit Ethicam Aristotelis ad Nicomachum, et suis iubebit repetere, atque ante lectionem de praecedenti disputare" (*MP*, I, p. 25).

[144] Sacchinus 1620, p. 268 (a. 1563): "Romanum Collegium, gymnasiumque auctum est duabus disciplinis, quaestionum Conscientiae et Philosophiae de moribus ex Aristotele. Haec initio coepta est anni ab Achille Gagliardo iis explicari, qui tertium annum philosophiam in rerum contemplatione positam audiebant. Illa extremo anno in solenni studiorum repetitione promiscue eis, qui sacerdotium vel gererent vel expeterent."

[145] On Gagliardi see Appendix A, no. 278.

[146] In Marburg, for example, a specialized position in ethics had existed since 1534; see Freedman 1985, p. 122 and nn. 77–78. Paris had already had *Ethics* readers before 1392, although by the early sixteenth century this practice was probably suspended; see Thurot 1850, pp. 79–80 and above, p. 72.

shared by one of the more influential (and controversial) Jesuits in Rome—Benedetto Perera—already by 1561/1562. In that year, Perera opined that the philosophy curriculum should last three-and-a-half years (and not three) in order to make more room for metaphysics and ethics. He added that, during the third year, students should be able to hear an "extraordinary" course (i.e., an elective not subject to examination) on the *Ethics* by a separate professor.[147]

Perera's proposals seem to have been offered in response to an invitation, by the officials of the Collegio Romano, to evaluate the philosophy teaching taking place in the Jesuit college, some ten years after its onset.[148] Thus, it is possible that the decision to create a separate position in ethics stemmed from a general rethinking of the college's curriculum. I have found no other evidence as to what might have motivated the creation of this chair in ethics, unless perhaps it had something to do with the simultaneous creation of a position in *casi di coscienza.*

Both ethics and *casi di coscienza* initially met with cheering success, and observers remarked on the large audiences they attracted.[149] But the attempt to create a chair in moral philosophy in the Collegio Romano proved abortive. Although Gagliardi apparently read the *Ethics* well, the subject was later remembered as having been poorly attended.[150] This negative experience probably referred to the teach-

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[147] Benedetto Perera, *De modo legendi cursum philosophiae* (*MP*, II, p. 669): "Nelle università famose della Compagnia dovria essere una lettione straordinaria, oltre li tre corsi, per quelli del terzo anno, d'Ethica, del quarto, della *Meteora* o delli *Parvi naturali*; la quale dovria leggere un maestro d'authorità straordinario, il quale potria essere quello che ha finito il corso l'anno inanzi." This view is confirmed by Perera's commentary on the *Physics*, first published in 1562, in which the author argues that moral philosophy depends on natural philosophy and cannot be understood unless one has at least studied mathematics and the material relative to the soul. See Perera 1585, Bk. I, Cap. IV, pp. 12–14. On Perera (1525–1610) and his interpretation of Aristotle, see Lohr, RLAC, pp. 313–20 and Scaduto 1974, pp. 283–86.

[148] Other leading Jesuits were apparently invited to comment as well. Although the request from the college's officials does not survive, several responses do. They are published in *MP*, II, mon. 62–67.

[149] *Polanci Complementa*, I, p. 365 (30 Junii 1563, Epist. 80): "Quello che vi si pottrà dir delle schole, oltre l'ordinario, serà che nel principio di quest'anno un novo professore cominciò a leggere l'ethica d'Aristotele. La quale, oltra li nostri filosofi del 3.° anno, odano ancora molti forestieri."

[150] One of the responses to the 1586 *Ratio* suggested that a former attempt to introduce the teaching of the *Ethics* in the Collegio Romano (one can only imagine that Gagliardi's teaching in 1563 is referred to) was abandoned because of a lack of audience interest. See *MP*, VI, p. 265 (Comments of the Neapolitan province on the *Ratio* of 1586): "Pater autem Maiorius affirmat, se vidisse hiusmodi lectionem

ing of the subject after 1562–1563. In 1564, a contemporary account of the Collegio Romano still lists moral philosophy among the subjects taught there.[151] But, during that same year, Jacobus Ledesma was wondering aloud whether its teaching should be continued, and if so by whom.[152] Moral philosophy was soon dropped from the curriculum[153] and did not reappear in the Collegio Romano until 1593.

The circumstances of this disappearance are fascinating. In 1566 the *Gubernatio Collegii Romani* confirmed the three-and-a-half year Arts curriculum and specified that moral philosophy was to be taught to the students of the third year. Surprisingly, moral philosophy does not include only Aristotle's *Ethics*, but also the *Politics* and the *Economics* (in that order). However, a marginal—and unfortunately undated—annotation says: "This course was formerly held, but it is not held now."[154] The *Gubernatio* thus suggests that discontinuing the teaching of moral philosophy was not an action deliberately planned by the Collegio Romano's officials, for example out of skepticism about the subject's usefulness. Apparently, it was the result of *force majeur*. The

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aliquando inchoatam in Collegio Romano, deinde ob inopiam auditorum omissam. Itaque nollet eam introduci. Si tamen introducatur, nullo modo disputationes ut mox dicitur § 16."

[151] Anonymous, *Breve informatione circa l'ordine delli studii, et come si spende il tempo nel Collegio della Compagnia di Giesù in Roma* (*MP*, III, p. 369, a. 1564): "Di più c'è un lettore d'humanità, un altro di retorica, due di greco, uno di hebraico, uno di matematica, quattro di logica e filosofia naturale et morale, tre di teologia ordinarii et un altro di controversie certi giorni la settimana."

[152] Jacobus Ledesma, *Quaedam circa studia et mores Collegii Romani data R.P. Generali* (*MP*, II, p. 489).

[153] Rome, ARSI, Rom. 150a (*Origine del Collegio Romano e i suoi progressi, 1551–1743*, typescript taken from APUG 142), p. 11: "1563. In quest'anno si posero in Collegio due altre Cattedre, la Filosofia morale, e la Casistica: e alla Casistica vi concorreva tal numero di sacerdoti e anche di parochi, che arrivava al numero di 200. La Filosofia morale vacò poi per molto tempo. Si pose ancora la Cattedra della Lingua Arabica, e ancor questa è vacata per un pezzo."

[154] The *Gubernatio* stated (*MP*, II, p. 176): "41. Facultates quas docemus sunt grammatica, rhetorica, dialectica, philosophia naturalis et moralis, mathematicae disciplinae, theologia scholastica et positiva, tum etiam officia christianae disciplinae quos vocant casus conscientiae; lectiones autem multo plures, cum unus magister plures lectiones doceat." *Ibid.*, p. 179: "Sunt tres artium magistri, primi anni dialectici, secundi et tertii philosophi ac metaphisici. Sed tamen singulis annis cursus artium unus incipitur et alter finitur. Durat autem cursus per tres annos cum dimidio et sequenti alio anno sustinent actus aliquot et repetunt cursum ad suscipiendam lauream magisterii." In the section on moral philosophy (*ibid.*, p. 180), we read: "Circa philosophiam moralem / 59. Docetur Ethica Aristotelis, Politica et Oeconomia. Audiunt tantum philosophi tertii anni." A later marginal note specifies: "Haec lectio aliquando fuit habita; in praesenti non habetur."

real problems must have started around 1563, since after that date (and for the next 30 years) no one is listed in the Collegio's documents as teaching moral philosophy.

The documents offer no clear explanation as to *why* the moral philosophy course was discontinued. They only suggest that the course was affected by a lack of students. But this fact is itself significant, especially when one recalls that Marc-Antoine Muret was teaching moral philosophy in the Roman *studium* in 1563–1567.[155] Muret attracted a large audience, and it seems likely that the numerous outside students who had attended Gagliardi's course in the Collegio Romano flocked instead to hear Muret in the "Sapienza." Among these students were brilliant minds such as Francesco Benci, who was one of Muret's favorite pupils and later joined the Jesuits.[156] Thus the Jesuits, who were becoming used to competing successfully against established universities,[157] experienced a temporary setback on this occasion. The disappointment was serious enough that Perera—formerly the champion of ethics teaching in the Collegio Romano[158]—later became skeptical about the possibility of teaching the subject successfully there.[159] A letter from Paris (1582/1584) implies that there was no regular effort at that time to teach the *Ethics* in the Italian Jesuit colleges.[160]

The abandonment of moral philosophy in the Collegio Romano occurred despite the subject's continued mention in the Jesuit study plans of the second half of the sixteenth century.[161] The *Ratio studiorum*

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[155] See Appendix A, no. 267 and above, pp. 000–000.

[156] For Benci's studies under Muret, see his *Aristotelis de Moribus ad Nicomachum libri decem* (Appendix C, no. 98), ff. 85v–86r. Several letters between Muret and Benci survive; see Muret 1741, *passim.*

[157] See, for example, Fabrini 1941, Brizzi 1998.

[158] See above, n. 147.

[159] See *MP*, VI, p. 261 (*Iudicia patrum, in provinciis S.I. deputatorum, de ratione studiorum [1586] tractatu, qui inscribitur, "De studio Philosophiae"*): "De philosophia morali introducenda: Placet ut inducatur, ubi cum dignitate et commode fieri potest. P. Benedicto [Perera] et P. Parrae, quia ea lectio nusquam posset cum dignitate continuari, potius videtur non esse introducenda, etiamsi in praesens alicubi posset digne praelegi. Disputationes in ethicis nulli probantur, cum haberi non possint sine magno incommodo disputationum philosophicarum, nec magnus inde speretur fructus."

[160] Alfonso Carillo, appendix to the letter to Claudio Acquaviva (Paris, 28-V-1584, *Quae ad studia superiora conferre possunt in Gallia, ad annum 1582* in *MP*, VII, p. 584): "Quare praescribendum illis esset, ut vel ethicorum libros non explicarent, ut in Italia fit; vel ut solum textum Aristotelis paucis paraphrastico modo traderent."

[161] For its place in the *Constitutiones* of 1553/54 and the *Gubernatio* of 1566 see above, nn. 133 and 154.

of 1565–1572, for example, mandates the teaching of the *Ethics* (in parallel with the *Metaphysics*), even though its endorsement of the subject is rather tepid and it does not go into much detail as to what should be covered and how. After describing exactly which books of the *Metaphysics* should be read under different circumstances, one reads, almost as an afterthought, "Ex ethicis etiam aliqua praelegenda sunt."[162] Furthermore, at this time the exam for the license did not cover the *Ethics* (it dealt "de tota dialectica, physica, naturali philosophia et metaphysica"). There may not have been enough incentive to have an ethics course, even though the *responsiones* involved in the exercises for the license did include material taken from *scientia moralis*.[163]

The contrast with the *Ratio* of 1586, whose instructions about the *Ethics* course are so detailed and interesting, is striking.[164] This newer

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[162] *Ratio studiorum, 1565–1572: De artibus liberalibus studiis* (A.D. 1570, *MP*, II, p. 256). See also *ibid.*, p. 254: "Tractanda autem sunt logica, physica, metaphysica, moralis scientia, et etiam mathematicae quatenus etiam ad finem nobis propositum conveniunt." A recent synoptical article on the Jesuit *Ratio* is Donnelly 1999.

[163] *Ibid.*, p. 263.

[164] *Ratio studiorum 1586* (*MP*, V, pp. 102–03): "Optandum est, ut philosophia moralis, quam in nostris scholis tractari iubent Constitutiones introducatur in ea collegia, in quibus tamquam seminariis instituuntur nostri superioribus facultatibus. Huius enim scientiae explicatio et a multis etiam nobilibus expetitur, et cum fundamenta iaciat moralis theologiae, multarum rerum onere levare potest theologos professores, et prodest audituris ius civile, et adiumento est nostris, si qui post auditam philosophiam docturi sunt litteras humaniores, in quibus attinguntur crebro nonnulla, quae ad quaestiones pertinent. Tandem hac lectione dum caremus, mancas et mutilas habemus academias. {Ea vero facultas, cum philosophiae pars sit, philosophis videtur praelegenda; et quidem anno tertio eadem hora, qua in secundo mathematicam audiunt. Neque vero tribus lectionibus metaphysicos nimium gravari putandum est. Nam et totidem audiuntur tam a physicis quam a theologis, cum praesertim ea lectio contenta sit tribus horae quadrantibus, et quartus tribuatur repetitioni, vel modicae intermissioni, antequam altera lectio succedat. Porro curandum est, ut non a lectore cursus philosophici ethica praelegantur, ne trium lectionum oneri succumbat. Ut autem uno anno possint octo libri *Ethicorum* (nam octavus et nonus compendio percurrendi essent) absolvi, satis erit sic singula capita Aristotelis exponere, ut cuiusque capitis sententia breviter comprehensa, annotentur mox et expendantur quaedam sententiae celebriores; tum paucae quaestiunculae tractentur ex solis principiis Aristotelis, iis omnino praetermissis, quae ex revelatis veritatibus pendent. Quin potius de iis disseratur fusius, quae vix attingit theologus, ut de passionibus, de habitibus, de virtutibus in genere, et aliis huiusmodi. Atque haec omnia maiore quadam exornentur elegantia sermonis et cognitione antiquitatis, apophtegmatum, adagiorum, sententiarum ex philosophis aut poetis et aliis id genus. Habeat et professor *Ethicorum* privatas semel in mense theses ac disputationes per horam suae lectioni praestitutam, et in menstruis philosophorum disputationibus metaphysicae auditor ponat duas etiam tresve theses ex *Ethicis*; adversus quas disputabitur mane et vespere duabus extremis semihoris, praeside lectore *Ethicorum*."} The variant on the section in curly brackets above is interesting (*MP*, V, p. 108; a. 1586 B): "Intelligat autem philosophiae moralis professor sui instituti non esse,

Ratio suggests teaching moral philosophy in the colleges with higher faculties (many Jesuit colleges only covered the humanities). But the reason given is telling: moral philosophy usefully lays the groundwork for moral theology and can ease the burden of professors teaching scholastic theology. At the same time, ethics is clearly considered a branch of philosophy and is not to step over its boundaries and address theological questions. It should be read to philosophers in the third year, after lunch (however, it is apparently heard also by those studying physics and theology); it is not to be taught by their teacher of philosophy (i.e., metaphysics), lest he be burdened with three courses; it is to be taught for 45 minutes, plus 15 minutes of repetition, for one semester. Only eight books of the *Ethics* are to be covered, mostly cursorily, and with stress on those questions in Thomas' *Summa* that the theologians usually do not have time to cover—i.e., *de passionibus, de habitibus, de virtutibus in genere,* etc. Also (and more controversially),[165] this *Ratio* specifies that the ethics course should be taught with elegance, with a number of *adagia* and *sententiae* taken from philosophers and poets. Philosophical disputations, lasting two-and-a-half hours, are to include the *Ethics* during the last half hour.[166] Nonetheless, it should be noted that, although the *Ratio* of 1586 aims to introduce the teaching of ethics into the colleges that teach the higher subjects, this is not presented as a requirement, but as an elective ("optandum est").

The *Ratio* of 1591 repeats several of the directives of the 1586 redaction. Again, ethics teaching should not stray into theology, and the course is to last one semester. However, new features are introduced as well. For example, ethics teaching does not occur in parallel with metaphysics, but takes place after the third year, unless

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in theologicas quaestiones, praesertim quae a Spiritu Sancto revelatae sunt, digredi, sed breviter, docte et graviter praecipua capita scientiae moralis, quae in decem libris Ethicorum Aristotelis habentur, explicare per horam quotidie, idque semestri tempore. Auditores habebit eos philosophos, qui post triennium auditae philosophiae repetendae eiusque actibus celebrandis vacant per sex menses, nisi ubi moris est, ut a philosophici cursu professore et in ipsomet cursu ethica praelegantur. Absoluta lectione iubeat eam per quadrantem saltem repeti in scholis iuxta morem aliorum philosophorum. Binas etiam per hebdomadam domi repetitiones habeat duobus semper adversus ea quae repetita fuerint argumentantibus; bis etiam singulis mensibus per sesquihoram iisdem de rebus disputetur in schola."

[165] See the responses to this *Ratio* in *MP*, VI, *passim.*

[166] In practice, the disputation in moral philosophy was apparently taken over by the teacher of metaphysics, so the teacher of the *Ethics* would not have to be present for the whole length of the exercises.

local custom dictates otherwise.[167] Furthermore, the ethics course is now clearly a daily affair, to go on for an hour each day and not just on feast days.[168] Some aspects of these instructions, however, were opposed in Italy. The *Deputatio Italica* wanted the time cut to half an hour, but they proposed that the course last longer, until July 8 (the same time as other minor subjects). Furthermore, they did not like the idea of having it taught after the course in metaphysics: they wanted the two to run in parallel, with ethics being offered some time after metaphysics *vespertina.*[169]

The definitive *Ratio*, issued in 1599, holds little new; again, the teacher of ethics is reminded that his subject is not theology, but philosophy; the course is to be taught for 45 or 30 minutes for one semester; the rules return to those of 1586, when the subject is to be read to the students of metaphysics in the third year (although allowance is made for different local customs). Repetitions are to take place every two weeks, and the students of metaphysics are to include some points of ethics in their disputations.[170] Thus, the status of moral philosophy as an ordinary and advanced subject seems to be

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[167] *MP*, V, p. 235 (*Ratio* of 1591, reg. 40): "Constituat praepositus provincialis et philosophiae moralis professorem, qui semestri tempore libros *Ethicorum* Aristotelis explicet iis philosophis, qui post triennium (nisi ubi moris esset, ut a philosophici cursus professore, et in ipsomet cursu ethica praelegantur) repetendae philosophiae, eiusque actibus celebrandis vacant per sex menses."

[168] *MP*, V, p. 284 (*Ratio* of 1591, *Regulae professoris philosophiae moralis*):

"1. Intelligat sui instituti nequaquam esse in theologicas quaestiones, praesertim quae a Spiritu Sancto revelatae sunt, digredi; sed breviter, docte et graviter praecipua capita scientiae moralis, quae in decem libris Ethicorum Aristotelis habentur, explicari per horam quotidie, idque semestri tempore.

2. Auditores habebit eos philosophos, qui post triennium auditae philosophiae repetendae, eiusque actibus celebrandis vacant per sex menses, nisi ubi moris est, ut a philosophici cursus professore et in ipsomet cursu ethica praelegantur.

3. Absoluta lectione iubeat eam per quadrantem saltem repeti in scholis iuxta morem aliorum philosophorum. Binas etiam per hebdomadam domi repetitiones habeat duobus semper adversus ea quae repetita fuerint argumentantibus; bis etiam singulis mensibus per sesquihoram iisdem de rebus disputetur in schola."

[169] *MP*, VII, p. 135 (*Petitiones deputationis italicae*, a. 1594): "De philosophia morali placuit, ut ea lectio non habetur post cursum, sed in ipso cursu; idque in classe metaphysicae, ut olim fiebat. Nam alioqui nullas ea lectio auditores habebit. Placuit etiam, ut doceatur per dimidiam horam tantum; post lectionem videlicet metaphysicae vespertinae. Sic enim minus molestia erit, cum non auferat metaphysicis tempus, nisi breve, et quod alias in repetitione consumendum fuisset. Placuit denique, ut ea lectio continuetur usque ad octavum diem iulii, ut continuari solent aliae lectiones minus principales, mathematica, hebraica et similes. Alioqui enim nimis parum moralis doctrina explicari poterit." On the 1591 *Ratio* see also below, p. 365.

[170] *MP*, V, pp. 401–02 (*Ratio studiorum* of 1599: *Regulae professoris philosophiae moralis*):

"*Officium*—1. Intelligat, sui instituti nequaquam esse ad theologicas quaestiones

assured. Imposing the rules of this *Ratio* on the various Jesuit provinces was no quick and simple task: colleges in France and Germany had to deal with students used to a more compressed and differently structured philosophical curriculum. Implementing the directives in Italy and the Collegio Romano was less problematic, partly because the general of the order was in Rome, and partly because ethics teaching had resumed there already several years earlier.

Starting in December 1593, in fact, teachers of ethics are again mentioned for the Collegio Romano.[171] This first reference is rather vague, but we know that in 1595–1596 Giovanni Mazzarelli taught the subject.[172] He was followed by a series of teachers, some of whom began producing commentaries or disputations associated with their teaching (see below). Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that, from the 1590s, ethics teaching enters a new phase in the Collegio Romano. A third phase of ethics teaching there seems to start with the appointment of Tarquinio Galluzzi in 1617. This is a period in which teachers are assigned to teaching the *Ethics* for several continuous years. Such a practice probably encouraged Galluzzi to write his large *Ethics* commentary.[173]

It is not clear whether the reintroduction of ethics teaching in the Collegio Romano was somehow related to the 1591 *Ratio* or to a curious letter by Perera to the general of the order in 1593. In this

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digredi, sed progrediendo in textu breviter, docte et graviter praecipua capita scientiae moralis, quae in decem libris *Ethicorum* Aristotelis habentur, explicare. [Other copies have: "habentur, explicare per horam quotidie; idque semestri illo tempore, quod datur philosophiae repetendae eiusque actibus celebrandis . . ."; in another case, a *caveat* added for universities in which a professor of philosophy is to teach ethics, see *ibid.*, VII, p. 78.]

Tempus huius lectionis—2. Ubi ab ipsomet philosophici cursus professore ethica praelegi non solent, exponat, qui ethica tradit, metaphysicis graviores huius scientiae quaestiones; idque per tre quadrantes quotidie, aut semihoram.

Repetitio—3. Ethicae repetitiones saltem decimoquinto quoque die habeantur, quo tempore rector statuerit; etiam si ob eam causam una esset metaphisicae repetitio praetermittenda. // (p. 402)

Conclusiones—4. Cum metaphysicae auditores vel domi privatas, vel in schola menstruas habent disputationes, propositionem aliquam ethicam conclusionibus semper adiungat; adversus quam per quadrantem metaphysicus disputet, qui argumentatur."

[171] Rome, ARSI, Rom. 53 I (*Catalogi breves et triennales, 1571–1597*), ff. 168r–v: the *Catalogus Provinciae Romanae* dated December 1593 (thus possibly with reference to the academic year 1593–1594) states: "Praeceptores denique 20, nempe grammaticae sex; humaniorum litterarum unus; rethoricae et linguae graecae duo; haebraicae linguae unus; mathematicae item unus; ethicae unus; philosophiae tres; scholasticae theologiae duo; sacrae scripturae unus et casuum conscientiae unus."

[172] See Appendix A, no. 280.

[173] See below, pp. 374–76 and Appendix C, no. 154.

letter, Perera proposed that a stratagem be found to have some Jesuits who were about to graduate stay longer in Rome, since this would contribute to their formation. One of his suggestions was that some of these fresh graduates be assigned to mathematics, philosophy, or ethics teaching.[174] A study of the teachers assigned to the *Ethics* starting in 1595 suggests that, for some of them, moral philosophy was indeed the first subject they taught. However, the teaching patterns starting in the 1590s require closer attention.

A puzzling aspect of ethics teaching from the 1590s on is how hard it is to make generalizations about it. Contrary to Achille Gagliardi's example,[175] all of these teachers of ethics hold a doctorate in theology, and this shows that the provision that teachers of philosophy should have their doctorate applied to them as well. Nonetheless, it is hard to establish a "typical" pattern that applies to ethics teaching. Gagliardi taught ethics before progressing to logic and other branches of philosophy. Clearly, this was also the case for Nori and Soprani.[176] But in several cases teachers switched from humanities to ethics teaching (e.g., Nori, Ugurgeri, Galluzzi), whether or not they then moved on to other philosophical branches. Also, there are numerous cases (illustrated by the careers of Mazzarelli, Mangili, Baldelli, Bufera, Piccolomini, and Ferrantino) of ethics being taught *after* teaching experience in the other philosophical branches.[177] In a couple of cases (Benci and Galluzzi), the *Ethics* is taught by rhetoricians.[178] One can only conclude that ethics has no fixed place in the teaching career of professors of the Collegio Romano. It thus has a different status from the canonical philosophical subjects, which were always

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[174] Benedetto Perera, letter to the general of the order (*MP*, VII, pp. 126–27): "Per potere il Collegio Romano sempre mai tener un buon numero di quelli ch'han finito il corso di teologia, per poterli perfetionar più e consumar nelli studi, e servirsene nei suoi bisogni, converrebbe che vi fusse qualche necessità di ritenerli a Roma; perché senza questa necessità, difficilmente e rare volte questo si potrà effettuare, sì come fin hora. La necessità saria questa: Che sette al manco di loro sempre restassero nel Collegio, destinati a varii ministerii litterarii. Uno di loro fusse destinato a legger matematica, et per un anno avanti si preparasse ed esercitasse bene in quello studio. Il secondo fusse destinato a leggere il corso dopo un anno; il terzo a leggere l'etica. Poi altri ad agiutar li mastri di filosofia del secondo e terz'anno . . ."

[175] See Appendix A, no. 278.

[176] For these and the other professors mentioned here, see Appendix A, nos. 279–90.

[177] Philosophy teachers who had already taught the three-year cycle would usually teach ethics *before* starting another cycle. It is not clear whether this should be related to Perera's proposal from 1561; see above, n. 147.

[178] Benci, however, apparently taught ethics in the papal court, not in the Collegio Romano.

taught in a pre-determined order and spawned so many disputations on *universa philosophia*—i.e., logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics.[179]

Finally, it took a long time for ethics teaching to become a specialized affair in the Collegio Romano. Although it was supposed to have attained this status with Gagliardi, in fact it was not until Galluzzi and Ferrantini that it was actually taught for several successive years by the same professor. Perhaps this helps explain why we have so few works on the *Ethics* from the Collegio Romano. Not counting Benci's commentary (which, while written in Rome, does not seem to be connected with the Collegio Romano), that of Galluzzi is really the only substantial one to have survived (see § 9.2.2). Even when this specialization occurred, however, it is not easy to say whether it was taken over by philosophers or by rhetoricians: Galluzzi taught rhetoric for 10 years before teaching ethics; Ferrantino was more experienced as a teacher of philosophy. An examination of the works on the *Ethics* associated with the Collegio Romano can, however, shed light on the subject.

9.2.2 *Commentaries*

During the period up to 1650, only five works (two of which are anonymous) seem to be connected with the teaching of the *Ethics* in the Collegio Romano. Before discussing these, however, it may be useful quickly to make reference to the Coimbra commentary on the *Ethics* and to the commentary by the Jesuit Francesco Benci, even though the latter's ethics teaching probably did not take place in the Collegio Romano. These two works provide a context in which the other works can be discussed.

As the number of Jesuit colleges multiplied during the second half of the sixteenth century (not only in Europe, but also in far-away places such as India and Brasil), the Jesuit leadership came to appreciate the difficulty of guaranteeing the quality and consistency of its teaching across the board. It therefore commissioned a group of scholars at Coimbra in Portugal to draft a series of textbook commentaries on the various branches of philosophy.[180] The *In libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum, aliquot conimbricensis cursus disputa-*

[179] There are numerous examples of such works in Lohr, RLAC, *passim*.

[180] For an overview and an introduction to the literature, see Lohr, RLAC, pp. 98–99.

tiones, first published in 1593 at Lisbon and Lyon, was the third such volume to be printed. The result of the efforts of Emmanuel de Goes, the commentary was reprinted numerous times under slightly different titles up to at least 1631.[181] Since, like the other textbooks, it was officially commissioned and approved by the Jesuit leadership, one may suppose that it represented the canonical way to study the *Ethics* among the Jesuits and also in the Collegio Romano.

The work is divided into nine disputations, according to the following outline:

Disputatio I. De Bono
Disputatio II. De Fine
Disputatio III. De Felicitate[182]
Disputatio IV. De tribus principiis humanorum actuum, voluntate, intellectu, et appetitu
Disputatio V. De bonitate et malitia humanarum actionum in genere
Disputatio VI. De affectibus animi, qui passiones vocantur
Disputatio VII. De virtutibus in commune
Disputatio VIII. De prudentia
Disputatio IX. De reliquis virtutibus moralibus

Even just this outline shows that the work in question is not so much a commentary on Aristotle as a textbook that reorganizes the material in the *Ethics*. Thus, it skips topics (such as friendship) that are not considered relevant, and makes much of the rest fit a pre-established blueprint. The virtues discussed in Disputations VIII and IX are not the eleven described by Aristotle in *EN* III–V, but the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance). Contrary to the practice in most other Coimbra commentaries, Aristotle's text is not provided, and there are no extensive quotations from it in the work.

Most of the themes are discussed with reference to Aristotle, Plato, and other ancient philosophers (including Cicero). But the lion's share is played by the Scriptures and medieval theologians—especially Thomas and Augustine, but also Gabriel Biel, Scotus, Ockham, and so forth. References to other commentaries on the *Ethics* (even by Albert the Great and Thomas) are rare in the extreme. Questions are often settled by direct appeal to Thomas' *Summa Theologica* or to the Bible.

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[181] See Lohr, RLAC, 99; Kraye 1997, pp. 80–81.
[182] For an excerpt in English translation, see Kraye 1997, pp. 81–87.

Significantly, there are many points in common between the topics considered in this Coimbra commentary and those discussed in Thomas' Ia IIae and IIa IIae. As a result, there is considerable overlap between the points discussed in this textbook and the topics that were to be covered in the scholastic theology course (based on Thomas' *Summa*) according to the instructions of 1565–1572.[183] The relationship between the ethics course and scholastic theology will be discussed more in detail below (§ 9.2.3). Here, however, it may be noted that the Coimbra commentary gives the impression that the *Ethics* should be covered as an introduction to theology.

A very different impression is conveyed by the commentary of Francesco Benci (1544–1584). Benci's lengthy and autograph commentary[184] is most likely associated with teaching in the papal court rather than in the Collegio Romano.[185] Nonetheless, the work is notable in several respects. First, it is the only real exposition of the *Ethics* that can be associated with a Jesuit from the Collegio Romano in the sixteenth century. Second, it considers the *Ethics* in detail and in relation to the philosophical controversies of the time. Third, it is a rare example of a Jesuit commentary on the *Ethics* penned by a rhetorician. In fact, Benci's teaching in the Collegio Romano seems always to have been on rhetoric.

Benci's studies and career largely took place in Rome. In the 1560s, Benci pursued his studies in the Roman *studium*, reading not only humanities and philosophy, but civil law as well. It was during this period (in fact, he says, at the age of nineteen)[186] that he first attended Marc-Antoine Muret's lectures. Thus, he must have heard him lecture on the *Ethics* between 1563 and 1567.[187] In 1570 he entered the Jesuit order. After teaching eloquence in Siena and Perugia, he returned to Rome. In the Collegio Romano he taught rhetoric at least in 1583–1584, and probably also in 1585–1590.[188]

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[183] *Ratio studiorum (1565–1572)*: De sacrae theologiae studiis (*MP*, II, pp. 265–87).

[184] Rome, APUG, 1170, 525 ff. On Benci and his commentary see below, Appendix C, no. 98.

[185] None of the Jesuit *catalogi* ever describe Benci as having taught moral philosophy. Moreover, the numerous references to the audience as being made up of *patres* suggests the connection with the papal court. From this standpoint, a parallel may be drawn between Benci's commentary and that by Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano (Appendix C, no. 67).

[186] In Rome, APUG, 1170, ff. 85v–86r, Benci refers to M. Antonius Muretus, "quem undevicesimum iam annum audivi eum hos libros interpretari."

[187] On Muret's teaching see Appendix A, no. 267 and above, pp. 331–40.

[188] Lohr, RLAC, p. 38; Ipparaguirre.

It was during this period that he took part in drafting the 1586 version of the *Ratio studiorum*,[189] a document whose suggested approach to the *Ethics* met with raised eyebrows and resistance.[190]

Benci's commentary covers only the first two books of the *Ethics*. It consists of forty-two lectures on Book I and fifteen on Book II, so its relation to actual teaching is clear. The work is undated, but can safely be placed somewhere between 1584 and Benci's death ten years later. The *terminus post quem* is provided by the references to Francesco Piccolomini's *Ethics* commentary.[191] Another clue as to the work's dating is the 1586 *Ratio* referred to above. Some of the suggestions found there as to how the *Ethics* should be taught seem to be taken straight from Benci, especially when they recommend ornamenting the teaching of the *Ethics* with classical quotations, *adagia*, and so forth.[192] This section drew fire especially from the Provincia Aquitaniae, whose representatives found this way of proceeding too dry and unphilosophical.[193] Since the next edition of the *Ratio* (1591) did not repeat these suggestions, presumably support for Benci's approach was then in decline. Thus, one might propose the period ca. 1585–1590 as the likely time of composition.

The marks of a rhetorician are found all over the page in Benci's work. The commentary is based on the Greek text, although a Latin translation—presumably Benci's own[194]—is offered as well. The text is laid out in snippets followed by commentary, a method that Benci may have borrowed from Vettori and that became increasingly popular in the sixteenth century. Interspersed throughout the commentary one finds lengthy (and sometime cumbersome) quotations from classical poets, historians, and other writers. The commentary even

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[189] *MP*, VII, mon. 62, notes. On the 1586 *Ratio* see above, pp. 357–58.

[190] See above, p. 359 and below, n. 193.

[191] F. Piccolomini 1583; see Appendix C, no. 92 and above, § 7.3.

[192] *MP*, V, p. 102 (*Ratio studiorum*, 1586): "Atque haec omnia maiore quadam exornentur elegantia sermonis et cognitione antiquitatis, apophtegmatum, adagiorum, sententiarum ex philosophis aut poetis et aliis id genus."

[193] *MP*, VI, pp. 289–90 (Provincia Aquitaniae, response to the *Ratio* of 1586): "Item eadem pagina lin. 14a n. 13° cuncti iudicarunt, nimis ieiunum, et parum philosophicum esse illum modum, qui praescribitur praelegendi Ethica et exornandi moralem philosophiam coacervatione apophtegmatum, adagiorum, sententiarum, etc. Unde praetermittendae omnino videntur lineae tres illae, scilicet 14a, 15a et 16a, ne nostri philosophi cernentes hanc libertatem sibi relinqui, latius devagentur atque excurrant. Adde, quod non omnes id praestare valebunt. Quare praestat, ut haec medio quodam modo pertractentur inter oratorium, seu poëticum, et theologicum per breves quaestiones ac dubia et responsa, more philosophico . . ."

[194] See Appendix C, no. 99.

opens with a quotation from Virgil. Furthermore, the work combines the philosophical and philological approaches to the *Ethics* according to the model offered by Benci's teacher Muret.[195]

Benci is clearly not reluctant to treat philosophical problems and to refer to the opinions of past commentators. On f. 500v, for example, he begins a discussion of the soul and its passions. Here, as elsewhere, he refers to Burley, Donato (Acciaiuoli), F. Piccolomini, Thomas, Buridan, Lambin, and Eustratius. He is not shy about complementing their perspectives by quotations from the Scriptures and the Church Fathers. Other issues discussed include the proper order of teaching the *Ethics*, which had become a hot topic after the controversies between Giacomo Zabarella and Francesco Piccolomini in Padua.[196] Benci also considers the place of moral philosophy in the educational curriculum. On this point, however, he is not original—he simply echoes Thomas' view that one should start with logic and mathematics, and then proceed to physics, ethics, and metaphysics.[197]

The Coimbra textbook and Benci's commentary thus provide examples of two different models available to Jesuit writers on the *Ethics* in Rome. Both works are heavily involved with the philosophical issues discussed by Aristotle. But the first is clearly oriented toward theology, whereas the second (while generally faithful to Thomistic views and mindful of the authority of the Scriptures and the Church Fathers) emphasizes the ties with rhetoric and philology. The following brief analysis of works on the *Ethics* connected with the Collegio Romano will show which approach was favored there.

The Anonymous Preface

The first work apparently connected with ethics teaching in the Collegio Romano is an anonymous prolusion entitled *Praefatio in explicationes Ethicorum Nicomachiorum anni nostri tertii.*[198] Although it is undated and fairly short, this piece is interesting as a possible indication of what the Jesuits in Rome wanted to accomplish through the *Ethics*. The

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[195] For Muret's commentary see Appendix C, no. 83.

[196] Rome, APUG, 1170, ff. 49r–53v. For a discussion of the controversy between Zabarella and Piccolomini, see above, § 7.2.

[197] *Ibid.*, f. 46r–v.

[198] Vatican, BAV, Boncompagni, K.13, ff. 4r–13v; see Appendix C, no. 127. Although the context in which the prolusion was given is not indicated, the other miscellaneous contents of this manuscript (partially described in Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 412) are related to Italy, and the oration itself seems closely related to Rome (see below). It is hard to imagine that the prolusion was given in a university context.

fact that it is specified as being delivered "anni nostri tertii" suggests that it is connected with a third-year audience at the Collegio Romano.

Interestingly, in this work the author seems obliged to defend the teaching of the *Ethics* against unnamed opponents:

> Postridie accedemus ad explicationem contextus Aristotelis, quem virum profecto non iam solum ut praestantissimum summumque Philosophum admirari, suspicereque debemus, sed ut pium etiam amare atque colere, cum in maximis etiam dogmatis tanto prope accidat ad ea, quae religione nostra sancita sunt ac decreta, unde mirari etiam valde oportet, inveniri aliquos, qui existiment, munus hoc huius partis Philosophiae in hac schola explicandae inutiliter fuisse institutum, ob idque etiam abrogari debere, cum luce meridiana clarius sit, nullam ex humanis scientiis esse, quae aut ad mores formandos, aut ad civitates recte instituendas, aut ad oratoriam facultatem augendam atque ornandam, aut ad iuris civilis rationem totam patefaciendam stabiliendamque tantum conferre possit, quantum haec una ad ista omnia confert. (f. 13r–v)

The description of these opponents is significant: they "consider that the duty of explaining this branch of philosophy in this school was instituted needlessly, and should therefore be repealed." This suggests that the oration was delivered either before 1564 (when ethics ceased to be taught in the Collegio Romano) or after its reintroduction ca. 1593. It also indicates that the fate of ethics teaching in the Jesuit college was probably affected by the resistance voiced by at least some of its faculty. It seems that this resistance was based on a perceived opposition between Aristotle's teachings and those of Christianity.

Since the author—as it seems—had to deal with a hostile (or at least unconvinced) audience, throughout the preface he attempts to show that there is no opposition between Aristotle's idea of happiness and the Christian one. Aristotle, after all, has only earthly happiness in view, whereas the Christian has a much higher ideal. Thus, Aristotle's views are discussed in relation to biblical statements such as "Beatus vir, qui non ambulavit in consilio impiorum . . ." (Psalm 1) and Jesus' statement "Beati pauperes spiritu" (Matthew 5). This concordism between Aristotle's *Ethics* and Christian teachings is the prolusion's most notable feature. Other aspects of the work—especially its description of Rome as the author's *patria* and its numerous references to Horace and other poets—point to Giovanni Antonio Mazzarelli, discussed below, as the possible author. Were this to be confirmed, it would show that moral philosophy struggled to be accepted in the Collegio Romano even after numerous editions of the *Ratio studiorum* had affirmed the need to teach it.

Giovanni Antonio Mazzarelli

After teaching grammar for four years and philosophy for three years in the Collegio Romano, Mazzarelli (1558–1624), who had done his studies in the Collegio Romano, spent a period in Perugia.[199] However, in 1595–1596 he was back in Rome, where he taught moral philosophy and was simultaneously the *confessarius primae congregationis.* The fact that he held such an appointment in addition to his teaching is significant, because other like occurrences suggest that there was a tendency to assign the teaching of moral philosophy to staff that did not already have other heavy responsibilities. Mazzarelli also taught moral philosophy in Rome on later occasions (at least in 1599–1600 and probably in 1600–1601, 1602–1603), but was not a constant presence in the Collegio Romano. The records show him returning to Rome every few years after teaching assignments at least in the colleges of Perugia, Naples, Recanati, Mantua, and Florence. In August 1611 he is described as having taught natural and moral philosophy for 11 years.[200] This does not tell us how many years he spent teaching each subject, but by 1606 he had spent four years teaching ethics in the Collegio Romano.[201]

Mazzarelli's *Disputationes in Ethicam*[202] mainly addresses the first four virtues treated by Aristotle in *EN* III.6 through IV.1 (fortitude, temperance, liberality, and *magnificentia*). There is little here that is relevant to the topic of this book. Mazzarelli does ask, at the beginning, why Aristotle treats fortitude before temperance, but does not become involved in any lengthy discussion about the proper order to follow in treating the virtues or ethics in general. More interesting for Mazzarelli are questions that sit on the fence between philosophy and theology—for example, whether suicide is legitimate (f. 217v and following), where the virtues are located (f. 234v and following), and whether celibacy and virginity are against nature (f. 267r and following). Surprisingly, the topic of fortitude is prefaced by a discussion of the immortality of the soul (f. 203v and following).

The impression of the work's hybrid nature is reinforced by an examination of the authorities it uses. In his exposition of Aristotle's text, as in the questions that follow each chapter, Mazzarelli relies

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[199] On his teaching career, see Appendix A, no. 280.
[200] Rome, ARSI, Rom. 54 (*Catalogi triennales provinciae romanae, 1600–1611*), f. 284r.
[201] *Ibid.*, f. 221r.
[202] Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 600, ff. 199r–300v; see Appendix C, no. 109.

heavily on both *theologi et philosophi.* As in the Coimbra commentary,[203] the authority to which he appeals most often is Thomas (especially the *Summa*). But he also depends on a wide variety of other authors: Greek and Latin poets and prose writers (including Sophocles, Xenophon, Horace, and Cicero), Church Fathers, medieval theologians (including Ockham and Scotus) and philosophers (including Buridan), but also more recent interpreters of Aristotle (Pomponazzi, Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano, Francesco Piccolomini). This great mixture of different authors again finds a parallel in the Coimbra commentary.

On several points, however, Mazzarelli's work departs from its model. Most notably, this really is a commentary on Aristotle's text, which is referred to by *lemma* in a Latin translation. Mazzarelli uses a combined approach of exposition and questions, with the intent of clarifying Aristotle's meaning. Also, Mazzarelli examines the *Ethics* sequentially and does not scramble Aristotle's order (as the Coimbra textbook does in its discussion of the four cardinal virtues). Nonetheless, the commentary's theological orientation and its avoidance of philological discussion show that the work is closer in spirit to the Coimbra textbook than to Benci's commentary.

Anonymous Disputations

The most interesting work for our purposes is an anonymous series of *Disputationes* on moral philosophy, datable to 1598–1599.[204] The disputations are probably related to the teaching of Giovanni Girolamo Soprani, who taught moral philosophy in the Collegio Romano in that same year. Although they are probably the work of Cesare da Bosco (a third-year student) rather than his teacher, it may help to

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[203] Coimbra 1593.

[204] Rome, APUG, Fondo Curia 211 (s. XVI/XVII), ff. 305r–350r; see Appendix C, no. 113. The manuscript containing this work includes, before this one, two other (also anonymous) works, respectively commentaries on the *De anima* (ff. 3r–186v) and the *Metaphysics* (ff. 192r–301v). These two works are possibly identifiable with lectures by Andreas Eudaemon Johannes: they are followed by a printed sheet containing the propositions publicly defended in natural philosophy and metaphysics (July 1599) by one Caesar à Bosco under Andreas Eudaemon Johannes in the Collegio Romano. If these lectures can indeed be dated to 1598–1599, and if the following disputations on moral philosophy are from the same year (they are at least in the same hand), then the disputations are likely to be connected with the teaching of Soprani. (Note that the Jesuits, while favoring the teaching of the *De anima, Metaphysics*, and *Ethics* in the third year, wanted the *Ethics* to be taught by a separate professor.)

say something about Soprani's background. Little is known about Cesare da Bosco himself at this point in his life.[205]

Born in Genoa, Soprani (1572–1629) entered the Roman College on March 25, 1592, after having studied philosophy outside of the Order. By April 1595 he was in his first year of theology studies in the Collegio; he seems to have completed his course of study in 1597–1598. Moral philosophy appears to have been his first teaching appointment, in 1598–1599, when he was simultaneously *confessor primae congregationis* and *praefectus academiae superioris*. His responsibilities during 1599–1600 are not known, except that he did not teach ethics (Mazzarelli was appointed to that subject). He is found teaching logic in 1601–1602, probably physics in 1602–1603, and certainly metaphysics in 1603–1604. He then went on to teach theology and the Scriptures, but must have taught ethics for another two years before 1611. He officially joined the Order on August 15, 1607 and apparently spent most of his years in Rome.[206]

The work, articulated in two disputations, mainly considers two philosophical points—the nature of moral philosophy and Aristotle's teaching on happiness.[207] In the first chapter, for example, the author

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[205] The main source is Sommervogel, I, 1828; see Appendix C, at no. 113.

[206] See Appendix A, no. 281.

[207] The outline of the work is as follows:

Disputatio prima, De constitutione philosophiae moralis (f. 305r)
— Caput primum, De natura philosophiae moralis in universum (f. 305r)
— Caput secundum, Confirmantur ea quae dicta sunt de analogia medicae facultatis (f. 308r)
— Caput tertium, De partibus philosophiae moralis et earum inter se dispositione (f. 312r)
• Dubitatio prima, Unde desumatur ratio huius distributionis (f. 312r)
• Dubitatio secunda, Quae cui ex his partibus sit praeponenda (f. 315v)
• Dubitatio tertia, Quae sint, quae in unaquaque ex his partibus tradantur (f. 316r)

Disputatio secunda, De felicitate humana (f. 317v)
— Caput primum, Proponitur sententia Aristotelis de humana felicitate (f. 317v)
• In qua operatione consistat hominis felicitas (f. 318v)
• [An sentire et vivere imperfectius sit quam ratiocinari] (f. 319r)
— Caput secundum, Examinatur scientia Aristotelis de felicitate (f. 321v)
• Dubitatio prima, An uniuscuiusque rei perfectio quae operationem habent, consistat in illius operatione, ut vult Aristoteles (f. 321v)
– De qua perfectione verum sit, quod in operatione consistat (f. 324r)
• Caput secundum (= Dubitatio secunda), An bonum, cuius signum est honor, debeat esse tantum bonum virtutis, an vero etiam possit esse quodlibet aliud genus bonorum (f. 331v)
– An, et quomodo sit signum beneficentiae honor (f. 335r)

(ff. 305v–308r) makes an elaborate effort to prove (following Aristotle) that the end considered by moral philosophy is the ultimate good of mankind. Thus, he often pauses to demonstrate the major or minor premiss and to show how these lead to the stated conclusion.[208] He proves, for example, that *moralis scientia* is superior to all the other arts.[209] Later in the same chapter (f. 307r), he offers his views on the subject of moral philosophy: "Dico igitur secundo obiectum moralis scientiae esse hominum ipsum, secundum quod per operationes proprias hominis, ut homo est, potest consequi felicitatem suam." He then provides arguments supporting each of the three main parts of his statement.

Unsurprisingly, the author follows well-worn scholastic procedure throughout. The purpose is thus not the discovery or presentation of new truths or unusual viewpoints connected with moral philosophy, but rather the explanation of the reasons supporting more or less established conclusions. This leads to a strong emphasis on the syllogisms that prove particular conclusions. But the work also employs scholastic method by relying on the common opinion of learned men.[210] In this connection, one notes references to the same broad spectrum of authors (intermingled *pêle mêle*) as seen in Mazzarelli: classical writers, Church Fathers, doctors of the church, medieval philosophical interpreters such as Thomas and Buridan, plus a

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– An verbum opinionis cuius signum dixit esse honorem Arristoteles intelligatur de opinione quae sit in honorante, an in honorato (f. 336r)
– An excellentia honoris pendenda sit potius ex bono cui defertur an ex dignitate illorum, a quibus defertur (f. 337v)

[208] Rome, APUG, Fondo Curia 211, f. 305v: "Ille debet esse ordo finium inter se qui et artium est, ut scilicet finis is sit praestabilior, qui ab arte illa respicitur, quae aliis praestat. Sed philosophia moralis omnibus aliis artibus imperat, et praeest, igitur finis illius erit omnium aliarum artium nobilissimus et praestantissimus, sed finis nobilissimus et praestantissimus, quo aliarum omnes alii fines respiciunt, et diriguntur, aliud non est, quam summum hominis bonum, igitur moralis philosophia summum hominis bonum, et felicitatem consequendam sibi proponit."

[209] *Ibid.*, f. 306r: "Ratione vero probatur ista nostra propositio hoc modo. Nam esse debet aliqua ars, quae aliis omnibus imperet, et utatur, sed hoc non potest esse, nisi summum et supremum hominis bonum appetat et inquirat, igitur aliqua ars erit, quae supremum hominis bonum finem habeat. Haec nos vocamus philosophiam moralem, igitur moralis philosophia supremum hominis bonum investigat et quaerit."

[210] *Ibid.*, f. 305v: "Quod autem moralis scientia sit maxime princeps facultas, et caeteris omnibus artibus excellat, probat tum consensu omnium qui per moralem philosophiam nihil aliud intelligunt, tum inductione . . ." Also see f. 308v, where the author supports the point of a parallel between moral philosophy and medicine by a long list of the ancient authorities who held this opinion.

considerable number of references to sixteenth-century authors such as Francesco Patrizi, Antonio Possevino, Alessandro Piccolomini, and Antonio Bernardi.

On occasion, the elaborate explanations offered seem overwrought. Thus, in the first disputation (Chapter 2), the long discussion of the parallels between moral philosophy and medicine may seem only tedious and fairly self-evident (the virtues, for example, are likened to health). However, the author does have a purpose, which is to confirm, by way of analogy, his previous position. Thus, he discusses why health is the end of medicine, whereas the end of moral philosophy is not the virtues but rather happiness.[211] This, in turn, enables him further to refine the previous definition of the subject of moral philosophy.[212]

Of interest, however, are also the philosophical positions taken in this work. For our purposes, some of the more relevant ones are those connected with the first disputation. There is not much new on offer. In Chapter 3 one finds the standard division of moral philosophy into ethics (*monastica*), economics, and politics,[213] as well as the common motivation for this distinction.[214] Chapter 4 discusses which of these parts of moral philosophy should be studied first. Again, there are few surprises, for the author follows Thomas' view and arguments (the proper sequence is ethics, followed by economics and politics).[215] A bit more interesting is the discussion, in Chapter 3, of what the individual parts of moral philosophy should teach. The author states that the main purpose of ethics is to discuss both the things that are an obstacle to, and those that contribute to, the achievement of the end of happiness. Thus, both vices and virtues

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[211] *Ibid.*, f. 311r.

[212] *Ibid.*, f. 311v: "Rursus, ut in medicina non latissime consideratur homo ut sanabilis, sed praecise, . . . sic et in philosophia non simpliciter homo felicitabilis, sed secundum quod per operationes proprias felicitabilis."

[213] *Ibid.*, f. 312r.

[214] *Ibid.*, ff. 312v–315v. Man can be considered as an individual or as a social animal; but in the latter case his relationship is either to the family or to a broader political sphere, and so forth.

[215] *Ibid.*, f. 316r: "Dico tertio Oeconomicam tractationem praecedere Politicam tum secundum se tum ordine doctrinae ut voluit Divus Thomas, Albertus, Egidius a Corduba in prooemio Ethicorum, quamvis contrarium sentiant Almeciantinus in prooemio in Politica, Alexander Picolomineus institutionum moralium liber primo, Franciscus Patritius lib. 11 discussionum peripateticorum. Probatur tum quia domestica societas sopponitur a societate civili, ut docet Philosophus Oeconomicorum capitulo primo et secundo, tum etiam quia impossibile est, ut tradit idem Philosophus, esse aliquem bonum rectorem civitatis qui prius non fuerit bonus Oeconomicus . . ."

should be discussed, and in that order, just as medicine discusses diseases before discussing health.[216] In addition, the writer reports the proper subjects to address when discussing economics and politics.[217]

The second disputation is dedicated to the topic of happiness, and especially to the question of the location of *felicitas*. The author makes clear that, according to Aristotle, happiness consists in perfect action (*operatio*). True happiness is proper to the rational soul. Furthermore, the action leading to happiness must be conjoined with virtue in order to achieve its end.[218] Up to this point, the discussion seems fairly circumscribed to philosophical considerations. However, the question if the rational is indeed superior to the vegetative and sensitive (ff. 319r–321v) soon leads in a different direction. The author asks on what basis comparisons of this kind can be made, and whether Aristotle's position is correct. Suddenly the discussion takes a theological turn with a disquisition on levels of perfection, God, and the good. In the end, however (Chapter 2, *dub.* 1) Aristotle's views are confirmed by distinguishing between a *perfectio totalis et formalis* and a *perfectio partialis et integrans* (f. 324r).

The rest of this work (ff. 325v–350r) is dedicated to a discussion of honor, and whether happiness is to be found in it. Aristotle had answered this question in the negative; the author of the disputations, however, wishes to investigate whether Aristotle was right. A long and rich examination provides an overview of many of the Italian sixteenth-century writings on honor. The author concludes that, while happiness may not be located in honor, honor is nonetheless connected with many of the virtues. Furthermore, honor is important because it provides an incentive for virtuous action. Thus, honor is viewed as an important means of creating virtuous citizens. This is an interesting application of the Jesuit pedagogical practice of offering prizes to its best students. It contrasts with Niccolò Tignosi's stress, in the fifteenth century, on the state's *corrective* function.[219]

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[216] *Ibid.*, f. 316v: "Ex hoc fit, ut in prima parte philosophiae moralis tantum tractari dicant illa, quae impediunt consequtionem finis ultimi et illa quae positivae conferunt ad consequtionem eiusdem finis. Pars prima est de vitiis, secunda de virtutibus. Tractatio autem de vitiis praecedere debet . . ."

[217] *Ibid.*, ff. 316v–317r.

[218] *Ibid.*, f. 319r: "Dico quarto, postea, a qua elicitur operatio in qua hominis felicitas consistit, debet esse virtute informata . . ."

[219] See above, Ch. 5, n. 57.

Tarquinio Galluzzi

For the first half of the seventeenth-century, only two works on the *Ethics*, connected with the Collegio Romano, survive. The first, by Atanasio Bufera (1581–1617), merits only a passing mention.[220] His *Quattuor cardinalium virtutum explanatio* was apparently written in connection with his ethics teaching in the Collegio Romano in 1615–1616.[221] As the title indicates, it is not much more than a discussion of the cardinal virtues, without attention to questions of pedagogy or philosophical method. It might be considered a discussion of the last two sections of the Coimbra commentary. Of greater interest is the commentary by Tarquinio Galluzzi (1574–1649), which for sheer size is the most imposing production on the *Ethics* in the period before 1650. The *In Aristotelis libros quinque priores [et posteriores] moralium ad Nicomachum nova interpretatio, commentarii, quaestiones*, published in Paris in two volumes (1632 and 1645), occupies well over 1900 folio pages in double-column format.[222]

After his studies in rhetoric, philosophy, and theology in the Collegio Romano, Galluzzi taught grammar there at least in 1597–1598 and rhetoric in 1606–1617. He taught moral philosophy at least in 1617–1620 and was from 1621 *praefectus studiorum inferiorum.* It is unclear how often, in this latter position, he also taught the *Ethics*, but doubtless the fact that he was free from more onerous teaching responsibilities enabled him to complete his monumental commentary.

Galluzzi's work is a commentary in the true sense of the word, similar in numerous ways to that of Benci. This is not altogether surprising, since Galluzzi was a rhetorician by training, and even left behind commentaries on the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*.[223] Like Benci, Galluzzi provides both the Greek text and a new Latin translation. These are printed, in snippets, in parallel columns and followed by commentary. Furthermore, although Galluzzi puts his classical training to good use (he quotes from Greek and Roman authors, writes in classical Latin, and inquires into the meaning of the Greek text), his focus is not exclusively philological. Rather, he wishes also to wrestle with the philosophical issues raised by his text, in the tradition exem-plified by Benci and Muret.

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[220] Vatican, BAV, Barb. lat. 264 (A.D. 1616), ff. 84r–132v. See Appendix C, no. 143.

[221] See Appendix A, no. 286.

[222] See below, Appendix C, no. 154.

[223] See Lohr, RLAC, p. 161; idem 1993, p. 164.

Galluzzi's work may be described as a sequential commentary on Aristotle's text, with an emphasis on its doctrinal aspects and their reception among the commentators. In interpreting each passage, Galluzzi consistently reports the opinions of others on the same specific issue. His range is not great: he mainly refers to Eustratius, Thomas, Burley, Buridan, Lefèvre, and Lambin. Of these, his sympathies clearly lie with Thomas. Nonetheless, the work is useful for gaining an overview of particular debates in medieval and Renaissance philosophy.

However, one gradually realizes how often Galluzzi fails to name the commentator on whom in fact he relies most heavily: Francesco Piccolomini. In his discussion of the relationship of the *Ethics, Politics*, and *Economics*, Galluzzi argues that the *Ethics* provides the theoretical foundation for the other two (as opposed to being dedicated to the morals of the individual).[224] In his description of an ideal educational program he distinguishes three stages, which respectively prepare, form, and adorn the soul.[225] In his arguments for moral philosophy as an advanced subject, Galluzzi maintains that the arts and natural philosophy should be studied first.[226] These are just three occasions among many on which Piccolomini is not mentioned. In other passages as well Galluzzi betrays a rather unoriginal mind, and given the fact that his commentary was printed only once, one doubts that it encountered much success. Surely he could not have expected it to be used in the classroom; it was simply too bulky and detailed. Still, in spite of its unoriginality, Galluzzi's work—one of the last

[224] Galluzzi 1632, Lib. I, Caput II, Quaestio IV, pp. 86–89.

[225] *Ibid.*, Lib. II, Caput I, q. 5, p. 321: "Formatur vero et instituitur beneficio disciplinarum, quae rationales appellantur, dividique possunt in gradus omnino tres, quorum unus sit earum, quae iuvenis animum parant; secundus earum, quae paratum formant; tertius earum, quae formatum deceant ornentque. Parant enim grammatica, logica, rhetorica, quae ceterarum praecursoriae sunt; format philosophia; ornant mathematica, musica, arithmetica, medicina, pictura, aliaeque huiusmodi, de quibus ex parte iam diximus."

[226] *Ibid.*, Prol., pp. 5–6: "Nemo quippe est qui cognitionis atque intelligentiae disciplinas nolit esse morali Philosophiae veluti praecursorias, et illi ipsi qui eas otiosas atque inutiles dicunt, id etiam contendunt ac volunt, iis tamen esse praeparandum animum, ut huius doctrinae status accipere queat et pretium operae facere. Nam quemadmodum illa prima ratio literaturae, qua pueris elementa tradimus, non docet liberales artes, sed iis percipiendis aperit, ac praeparat locum; sic ipsa rerum naturalium scientia at artium studia variarum non perducunt quidem animum ad virtutem, sed virtutibus inserendis expediunt ac muniunt viam. Quid igitur est quod mihi creare periculum et discipulos a tam probabili studio intervertere possit ad se? Proponit hunc nobis in itinere scopulum naufragiis et piraticis infamem insidiis Aristoteles, cum adolescentes minus idoneos esse ait Philosophiae moralis auditores, adeoque tamquam profanos arcere videtur eos ad huius doctrinae templo, qui mihi traditi sunt in disciplinam."

examples of the sustained Latin commentary on the *Ethics* in Europe—shows that at least Benci's work was not completely without following in the Collegio Romano.

This brief overview of Jesuit works on the *Ethics* from the Collegio Romano offers an idea of the variety of approaches that were taken (and indeed allowed) when dealing with this work. The differences between the defensive stance of the anonymous *Praefatio* and Galluzzi's commentary, in which the worth of studying the *Ethics* is taken for granted, are notable. The works just examined seem to point to three different kinds of possible models for interpreting the *Ethics*: Mazzarelli and Bufera show a special concern for the discussion of individual virtues; the anonymous *Disputationes* indicate an orientation toward the theoretical issues involved in moral philosophy; Benci's and Galluzzi's works stand in the tradition of the philosophical commentary, but they combine examinations of philosophical problems with their philological interests. Remarkably, none of these works quite matches the approach of the Coimbra commentary, with its combined attention to theoretical issues and to individual practical virtues. One is tempted to ask: Does any one of these works represent the canonical approach to the *Ethics* in the Collegio Romano? Or might one say that, although there was a main tradition of interpretation that studied Aristotle's *Ethics* in close relationship to Thomas' *Summa*, it was also possible to take other approaches, which did not ignore the religious issues altogether, but placed them very much in the background? This point is considered in the following section.

9.2.3 *Theology and Moral Philosophy*

As we have seen, ethics in the Collegio Romano was originally taught in the second year to students of logic. Later, under Nadal, it was instead directed to third-year and other advanced students, for example students of theology. One wonders whether this arrangement, confirmed by the *Ratio* of 1565–1572,[227] already had to do with a view of moral philosophy as intimately connected with and preparatory to theology. That might, after all, have been a good reason for

[227] *Ratio studiorum, 1565–1572: De artibus liberalibus studiis* (*MP*, II, p. 256): "Ex metaphysicis, quamvis cum prooemio operis explicatio quinti, septimi, octavi, noni et duodecimi libri, si tempus suppeteret, utilis futura iudicetur, si tamen temporis angustiis intercludetur magister, cum prooemio primi, libros quintum, septimum et duodecimum sibi plene esse enarrandos intelligat. Ex ethicis etiam aliqua praelegenda sunt."

placing it in the last year of the Arts curriculum, right before instruction in theology.

Direct evidence of any such connection is scarce. For example, when Nadal and Perera place ethics among the higher subjects of the Arts curriculum, they say nothing about a special relationship between ethics and theology, and Nadal's wish that it be taught on feast days suggests that it was neither a major subject nor a prelude to a major subject. The same is true of the *Ratio* of 1565–1572, where ethics is mentioned but not emphasized. It seems entirely possible that the place of ethics, in these schemes, is determined by considerations internal to philosophy, such as progression from matters that do not require experience to those that do, or from *philosophia realis* to *philosophia practica*.[228] Furthermore, Nadal's dissatisfaction with the previous practice, in the Collegio Romano, of teaching ethics and metaphysics to students of logic is not explicitly linked to his views on the teaching of theology.

However, it is also true that Jesuit moral philosophy cannot always be neatly distinguished from theology.[229] For the Jesuits, the Arts were to be taught inasmuch as they prepared the way for theology, which was the goal of the Jesuit educational curriculum.[230] More specifically, however, the teaching of scholastic theology was based on Thomas' *Summa*, which especially in its second part discusses issues in moral philosophy. Thus, in the Ia IIae, qq. 55–70 discuss the nature of virtue and its various types; in the IIa IIae, qq. 47–56 are dedicated to prudence, qq. 57–122 to justice, qq. 123–140 to fortitude, and qq. 141–170 to temperance. Although Thomas' emphasis is on the Christian framework in which virtue should be understood, and the various virtues are discussed mostly in relation to Christian concerns (e.g., the treatment of justice prompts questions on religion, devotion, prayer, etc.), references to Aristotle's conception of virtue were almost unavoidable, for him as for his commentators.

This interest of the theologians in Aristotle is confirmed by several *Summa* commentaries related to the teaching of scholastic theology in the Collegio Romano. For example, when Francisco Toledo (taught theology 1562–1568) discusses the question of *beatitudo* (Ia

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[228] For the latter, see for example Javelli 1568, p. 3.

[229] This is strikingly demonstrated by Knebel 2000. See also Theiner 1970.

[230] See the *Constitutiones* (*MP*, I, p. 283): "Tractabitur logica, phisica, metaphysica, moralis scientia, et etiam mathematicae, quatenus tamen ad finem nobis propositum conveniunt."

IIae, q. 3), he pauses to make reference to *EN* VI and X.[231] The same is true of the *Summa* commentaries of Francisco Suárez (taught 1580–1585) and Agostino Giustiniani (taught 1582–1590).[232] The latter, in fact, gives close attention to the questions on virtue (qq. 55–70) in the Ia IIae, which prompts at least an abridged discussion of Aristotle's moral philosophy.

Conversely, examples from Jesuit colleges outside of Italy suggest that discussions of Aristotle's *Ethics* might lead into Thomas' *Summa.* A noteworthy case is that of Nicolaus Gaudanus, who in 1551 began to teach the *Ethics* in Ingolstadt in alternation with the Pauline epistles. Gaudanus gave a special theological bent to his ethics teaching, and because of the subject's popularity was able to attract numerous students to the Jesuits' teaching of theology.[233] This theological bent to ethics teaching was, however, exactly the complaint of Alfonso Carillo, who in 1582 had taken part in a visitation of the Jesuit college in Paris. It seems that in Paris, where the practice was to teach Aristotle's *Ethics* to students of logic, ethics teachers would seize the opportunity to air various questions concerning Thomas' Ia IIae, for example on beatitude, sin, free will, and so forth.[234] By this time, however, this way of proceeding was unacceptable, since it made nonsense of the Jesuits' graduated curriculum. Later editions

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[231] Francisco Toledo, *Lectiones in Ia IIae S. Thomae* (a. 1567), in Rome, APUG, 371 (s. XVI), ff. 17r–23r.

[232] For example, Francisco Suárez, *De actibus humanis* (Oct. 1581) in Rome, APUG, Fondo Curia 210 (s. XVI); Agostino Giustiniani, *Commentarius in primam Secundae S. Thomae* in Rome, APUG, Fondo Curia 427 (a. 1585–1586, autograph).

[233] Polanco, *Chronicon* (*Vita Ignatii*, II, p. 256): "Ethicae lectio, quam in gratiam theologorum praeter morem veterem P. Nicolaus Gaudanus praelegebat, satis felicem habuit progressum, adeo ut iuris professores suos discipulos ad lectionem illam audiendam mitterent; tam autem diligens erat P. Nicolaus in suo munere obeundo, ut quo tempore alii feriati erant a publicis lectionibus, nunquam ille ne diebus quidem canicularibus a lectionibus cessaret; immo tunc auditorium solito frequentius habuit. Sic autem ethicam Aristotelis interpretabatur, ut versari in theologicis videretur."

[234] Alfonso Carillo, appendix to letter to Claudio Acquaviva (Paris, 28-V-1584, *MP*, VII, p. 584): "Anno dialectices solent exponi Moralia Aristotelis et vere incipiunt praeceptores integram primam secundae tradere, et omnes theologicas quaestiones agitare de lumine gloriae, de beatitudine, de peccato; videlicet ratio ipsius is aliqua re positiva, an vero privativa consistat; qua ratione Deus cum voluntate concurrat; de libero arbitrio, et alias similes. Hic autem maximus et nulla ratione ferendus abusus est. Nam neque auditores rudes et plane in philosophia novi harum quaestionum capaces sunt. Et si id permittatur, necessarium erit ut theologus 1.am 2.ae D. Thomae non interpretatur. Quare praescribendum illis esset, ut vel ethicorum libros non explicarent, ut in Italia fit; vel ut solum textum Aristotelis paucis paraphrastico modo traderent. Id enim tantum posset ab illis desiderari, qui ad iurisprudentiam se volunt conferre."

of the *Ratio studiorum* insisted on the ethics teacher's obligation not to stray into theological matters. Since this instruction continued to be repeated, however, it is doubtful that it was actually observed.

An Italian example from the early seventeenth century suggests, in fact, that it was not. In 1617 a Jesuit by the name of Francesco Pavone (1569–1637) published a work entitled *Summa ethicae, sive commentarius in libros Ethicorum Aristotelis (Summa ethicae, sive introductio in Aristotelis et theologorum doctrinam moralem).* Already the prologue of this work (relevant sections of which are cited in Appendix C)[235] shows that ethics was considered important, for the Jesuits, in view of theology, and not really as an independent subject.

The message delivered by the Jesuit plans of study was confusing. For example, the 1586 *Ratio* indeed emphasized that teachers of theology and ethics should not invade each others' areas of competence. But at the same time it encouraged the introduction of moral philosophy so as to lighten the burden of those teaching scholastic theology (the ambition was to contain that subject within four years of study) and praised ethics for "laying the foundations of moral theology."[236] Furthermore, it specified that several questions in Thomas' Ia IIae should not be discussed in the theology course, since they could just as well be dealt with in the ethics course.[237] The view that ethics was preparatory to theology was also common outside of Rome. For example, in 1579 the Jesuits in Ingolstadt were discussing the strategic advantages of taking over the teaching of the *Ethics* as a first step toward having control of all the Arts teaching there. One of their considerations was that ethics "makes its hearers well-disposed toward and instructed in the study of theology." Furthermore, the study of ethics would anyway not be a waste of time for the theology students, since "almost all of Thomas' Ia IIae, and a great part of the IIa IIae, are concerned with moral issues."[238] One can understand,

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[235] See Appendix C, no. 144.

[236] 1586 *Ratio studiorum* (*MP*, V, p. 102): "Optandum est, ut philosophia moralis, quam in nostris scholis tractari iubent Constitutiones introducatur in ea collegia, in quibus tamquam seminariis instituuntur nostri superioribus facultatibus. Huius enim scientiae explicatio et a multis etiam nobilibus expetitur, et cum fundamenta iaciat moralis theologiae, multarum rerum onere levare potest theologos professores, et prodest audituris ius civile, et adiumento est nostris, si qui post auditam philosophiam docturi sunt litteras humaniores, in quibus attinguntur crebro nonnulla, quae ad quaestiones pertinent."

[237] See *MP*, V, pp. 59 ff.

[238] *Rationes propter quas videtur lectio moralis Ingolstadii a nostris suscipienda si offeratur,*

therefore, that it was a fine balancing act to emphasize both that the two subjects were closely related, and that they should be taught separately.

Keeping the two subjects separate was difficult, not only because they treated closely related topics, but because they also had similar functions. For example, lecturing in 1581 on the first five questions of Thomas' Ia IIae (on the *finis hominis* and *beatitudo*), Suárez insists that scholastic theology, like moral philosophy, is a practical science whose purpose is man's moral betterment.[239] Giustiniani expresses similar views,[240] and one finds in the Jesuit pedagogical documents numerous references to theology's main end as that of forming the good morals of its students.[241]

This similarity of topics and of functions between ethics and scholastic theology must have been the main stumbling block to introducing ethics as an independent subject in the Collegio Romano. On the one hand, one can see how students might have considered the study of Aristotle's *Ethics* superfluous, since they were already receiving a condensed version of it in their study of Thomas' *Summa.* Thus, there does not seem to have been great student enthusiasm when lectures on the *Ethics* were offered. On the other hand, lectures on the *Ethics* probably raised the thorny issue of how to reconcile

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February 1579 (*MP,* IV, pp. 777–78, mon. 191): "Secundo. Reddit auditores affectos ad theologiae studium et instructos. . . . [Sexto.] Neque vero timendum videtur ne nostris oneri sit futura haec lectio, quin potius utilitati erit et exercitio, cum probabile sit numquam hic defuturos qui commode et utiliter possint in hoc munere versari. Utpote quod non minima eis occasio erit proficiendi in studio theologico, cum prima secundae D. Thomae fere tota, ut magna etiam pars secundae in moralibus consumatur."

[239] "Secunda causa est quia haec doctrina non solum est speculativa sed etiam practica et moralis, quod enim Aristoteles 1° Ethicorum c. 3 et libro secundo cap. 2. de philosophia morali dixit, in hanc etiam partem Theologiae . . . [one word unclear] subiectum (?) tamen non esse tantum propter cognitionem sed etiam propter actionem et ut boni efficiamur; ad doctrinam autem moralem maxime est necessaria homini cognitio sui ipsius et actionum suarum non autem aliarum creaturarum nisi quatenus huic morali doctrinae asservire potest" (Rome, APUG, Fondo Curia 210, f. 1v). Note that, although Suárez's commentaries on Thomas have been published, one really needs to examine the manuscripts, since much was omitted in the posthumous printed version. On this and further manuscripts, see Öry 1959.

[240] See, for example, the preface to his *Commentarius in primam Secundae S. Thomae* in Rome, APUG 422 (autograph), ff. 1r–2r.

[241] E.g., P. Giovanni Maldonado, *De ratione theologiae docendae* (Paris, 1573; *MP,* IV, pp. 189–90): "Finis autem theologiae scholasticae est religionem defendere, haereses refutare, bonos mores formare, pravos corrigere, de divino deque ecclesiastico iure consulentibus dare responsa, concionari, confessiones audire."

Aristotelian and Christian ethics. This was a concern that preoccupied many Italian (and not only Italian) interpreters in the sixteenth century.[242] As can also be seen by works in the vernacular, such as that of Bernardo Segni,[243] this was a period of intense defensiveness for orthodox Catholics, who had to defend their interpretation of Aristotle both against the Protestant Reformers and against others (such as Pomponazzi) within the Catholic Church. As we have seen, the anonymous *Praefatio* and the works of Mazzarelli and Bufera point to the constant effort interpreters had to exert to assure their audience of the compatibility between the two systems.

This concern can also be seen in an unpublished document of the time that considers the Jesuit method of education. This document, probably datable to the papacy of Gregory XIII (1572–1585), insists on the usefulness of reading the work of the Dominican Crisostomo Javelli (1470/72–1538). Javelli's work is said to be especially helpful in connection with instruction in moral philosophy, since it establishes a concordance between Christianity and the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato.[244] Indeed, the popularity of Javelli among the Jesuits can be taken as emblematic. Already in various proposals on the philosophy curriculum (ca. 1562) his questions on the *Physics, De anima,* and *Metaphysics* are warmly recommended.[245] And Javelli is again praised toward the end of the century by the Jesuit Antonio Possevino.[246] Possevino further demonstrates that the issue is still alive for the Jesuits by quoting Agostino Valier (1531–1606) at length on the need to compare pagan philosophy with Christian doctrine.[247]

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[242] For an overview, see Kraye 1988, pp. 342–48.

[243] Segni 1550.

[244] "Quod si quis libros de finibus bonorum et malorum explanabit, ac de virtutibus moralibus, aut de Politicis et Economicis aget, utilissimum eis erit, ut versent die nocteque librum eundem [i.e., liber Theologiae peripateticae Platonicae et Christianae], quem diximus utilissimum Chrisostomi Javelli, nam in illo cum ea omnia quae tractantur Aristoteles et Plato perspicue et facillime conferantur in christiana doctrina maximum momentum habent ad edificandam pietatem et veram eruditionem disseminandam in animis auditorum" (Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 12159, f. 108v). On Javelli and his work on the *Ethics* see below, Appendix C, no. 63.

[245] See especially *MP*, II, mon. 62 (by Toledo), p. 438; mon. 63 (by Mariana), p. 444; mon. 67 (by Perera), p. 458.

[246] He describes him as: "Chrysostomus Iavellus, qui Universam moralem Philosophiam sic disposuit, atque exposuit, ut Peripateticam et Platonicam cum Christiana conferens, perspicuam lucem attulerit dispiciendi verum" (Possevino, see Appendix E below).

[247] Valier is quoted as saying: "Si veritatis . . . studiosi, si indagatores pulcherrimarum rerum sumus, cur nobis non debet esse iucundum, ea, quae a philosophia

He also emphasizes a pronouncement of the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517)[248] that testifies to the Catholic Church's nervousness with respect to philosophy. Nor was pagan philosophy the only object of distrust in the period of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. There was a general pressure to replace pagan works (including Virgil) with Christian substitutes, or at least to rid the works of the pagans of their most offensive passages.

Whereas the above may give some indication as to why Aristotle's *Ethics* was not regularly taught in the Collegio Romano for the better part of the sixteenth century, it does not of course explain why it suddenly made its late and long-lasting appearance in the early 1590s. A possible reconstruction of events is the following. By the early 1590s it became clear that theology could be covered most effectively within its allotted time frame of four years if other teachers took care of the issues that were not, properly speaking, theological—i.e., those related to controversies, cases of conscience, and ethics.[249] This was one incentive for reestablishing a separate course on ethics. Furthermore, by 1593 a textbook on the *Ethics* prepared by the Jesuits in Coimbra finally became available. The textbook's structural similarities with Thomas' *Summa* and its use of authorities

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didicimus, sacrorum librorum testimonio, et sanctissimorum hominum rationibus et auctoritate confirmare? Quod si quid repugnet verissimae scientiae Theologiae, quid potest esse tam necessarium, quam illud ipsum cognoscere et aliis explicare, ne diutius in errore maneant? Sed nos miseros, nobis ipsis stulte nimium tribuentes, pudet philosophantes rationibus, quae in sacris litteris sunt, uti; non esse perturbandas scientias dicimus; studium eorum, qui id faciunt, aliquando irridemus, quasi nos iuvet errare, et labi, admirantes nonnullorum hominum acutas sententias. An inutile potest esse, cum praeceptis de moribus Platonis, Xenophontis, Aristotelis, Plutarchi, Ciceronis, conferre ea, quae Salomon, Paulus, Basilius in Ethicis, Ambrosius in libris de Officiis, Thomas multis in libris, et sanctissimi alii multi homines tradiderunt? Cur si possumus, non utile putamus, metallorum, stirpium, animalium, aliquam cognitionem petere e sacris litteris, quarum auctoritate, Aristotelis sententia aut confirmetur, aut refellatur? Tantum abest, ut non pauci qui philosophantur, haec studia coniungant, ut indignum putent philosopho, non defendere, mundum esse ingenitum, animos mortales, Deum non curare res humanas. Quos si quis rationibus a philosophia illis quidem sumptis, sed uberius ab optimis viris Theologis explicatis, perversas eorum sententias conetur evellere, scilicet admirabiles Philosophi rident: dicunt se esse philosophos, veritatem philosophicam se defendere, non licere sacra miscere profanis, Philosophis cum Theologis non esse disputandum. O ignobile et miserabile philosophiae studium, si eo erudiuntur ad impias sententias defendendas homines; si dicunt Theologiam verissimarum sententiarum matrem, et veram recte intelligendi et beate vivendi magistram contemnere?" (Possevino 1593, p. 57). On Valier see below, Appendix C, no. 90.

[248] Possevino 1593, pp. 71–72.

[249] See the *Rationes studiorum* for 1586 and 1591.

show that the ethics course was not necessarily independent from theology, but it was an encouragement to the teaching of ethics nonetheless. Furthermore, it was at this time that having the Collegio's recent graduates teach the course on ethics was one of the stratagems devised to keep them longer at the Roman College. Given the present state of the documentation, this can be only a hypothetical reconstruction of what happened. It seems, however, that these various factors combined to turn the ethics into a regular feature of Jesuit teaching in the late sixteenth century.

In the final analysis, however, moral philosophy was certainly not a central feature of the Jesuit philosophical curriculum, and the case of the Collegio Romano shows the hesitancies and reluctance with which the subject was admitted. One very bulky commentary was produced, and together with that of Benci it shows that the Jesuits were not adverse to following the philological–philosophical orientation of Muret. But works of any originality (except perhaps that by Benci) are not to be found, perhaps because the *Ethics* was mostly captive to theological considerations, a field in which originality is not commonly seen as a virtue.

CONCLUSION

This study has pointed to a remarkable variety in the teaching and interpretation of Aristotle's *Ethics* in the universities of Renaissance Italy. Universities differed in assigning the teaching of moral philosophy to fresh graduates or established scholars, in paying it very little or just decently, in staffing it well or poorly, in granting its teachers long-term contracts or year-by-year appointments. Whether ethics was taught by logicians, natural philosophers, rhetoricians, or theologians was largely, it seems, a matter of convenience and local tradition. There were also significant variations in the subject's audience, since in some universities ethics became an ordinary subject, but in others it continued to be taught on feast days. Furthermore, although the textbook was everywhere the same, teachers differed in lecturing or not on the Greek text, in the Latin translation they used, in their coverage of the work, and in the approach they took to it. During the sixteenth century, some interpreters chose to emphasize the philological aspects of the *Ethics*, whereas others taught the work with philosophical, logical, methodological, or even theological considerations in mind. There was little agreement at any point in time on the numerous and complex issues of pedagogical theory discussed in the *Ethics*.

As Schmitt suggested some time ago, strong variations in the teaching of a particular subject often indicate that the subject in question was a minor one, easily affected by local conditions.[1] Furthermore, Schmitt argued that the *Nicomachean Ethics* was not so central to the educational system of the universities in Italy as it was in post-Lutheran Germany, in the Iberian peninsula, and in Catholic northern Europe.[2] On these points this study agrees. In terms of status (as indicated by data such as funding and staffing) moral philosophy was doubtless among the more modest subjects in the universities; in its own faculty of Arts and Medicine it came far behind medicine, natural philosophy, and rhetoric. All of this was probably connected with the awkwardly unclear place occupied by moral philosophy in the Italian university curriculum. Yet this very instability seems

[1] Schmitt 1982, pp. 301–02.
[2] Schmitt 1979, p. 94.

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somehow to have contributed to a rising interest in (and production of commentaries on) the *Ethics*, by professors from an increasingly broad spectrum of backgrounds. In turn, this breadth of interest was partly responsible for the variety of approaches referred to above. Furthermore, it should be noted that university moral philosophy was not a static subject; even within specific local contexts, various developments can be observed in the teaching of ethics in Renaissance Italy. Besides being interesting in and of themselves, these also point to larger changes in the universities and in the cultural climate of the time.

If we consider, for example, the various approaches taken to the *Ethics* in Florence, we might say that humanist commentaries underwent an evolution between the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. In their interpretations, Tignosi and Acciaiuoli applied rhetorical strategies designed to heighten the text's appeal and practicality. At the same time, they also discussed (without apology) philosophical problems arising from the text, even complex questions such as the divisions of the soul. Starting with Angelo Poliziano and the application of grammar to philosophical texts, however, this union of eloquence and wisdom was sundered.[3] Pier Vettori's commentary demonstrates that, in the hands of a grammarian (what we would today call a philologist), the *Ethics* was no longer treated philosophically or even—except perhaps in the accompanying translation—rhetorically. Rather, the *Ethics* became a text like any other, to be studied (preferably in the original) and carefully analyzed, in the interests of better understanding the Greek language and history.

A further development in Florence concerns the issue of style. Whereas Tignosi did not consider stylistic elegance necessary in a commentary,[4] Acciaiuoli obviously did. His commentary may not be written in Ciceronian Latin, but it is surely far more polished than Tignosi's. Yet, not even this was good enough for later humanists. Vettori, for example, found stylistic considerations of such importance that he dismissed Acciaiuoli's style as "barbarous."[5] The point should not be exaggerated, since humanists continued to disagree in

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[3] Grafton (1991, Ch. 2) argues that the effect of Poliziano's rigorous method was to remove the study of the classics from the needs and concerns of civic life. Furthermore, "when he set ancient works back into their historical context Poliziano eliminated whatever contemporary relevance they might have had" and denied any moral function to the study of the classics (pp. 72–73).

[4] Sensi, pp. 470–71.

[5] See Vettori's letter from around 1546 in Martinelli 1979, p. 179.

the sixteenth century about the application of stylistic considerations to philosophical texts.[6] In Florence, however, ideals on this point seem to have changed between the times of Acciaiuoli and Vettori—most likely in response to the influence of Poliziano and Marcello Virgilio Adriani. This growing concentration on stylistic issues may be taken as a symbol of what increasingly captivated the Florentine humanists and their audience as they studied the *Ethics*.

This evolution in humanist expectations and methodology calls for a reconsideration of what is meant by "humanist Aristotelianism." It does not, for example, necessarily seem true that Vettori's method was that of a humanist whereas previous approaches were not (or at least not fully so). Furthermore, it is clear that humanists contemporary to Vettori (such as Muret) did not necessarily adopt his exclusive attention to philological matters. Indeed, it is hard to identify a standard humanist methodology, since its emphases changed over time and from place to place.[7] Sometimes (as with Tignosi and Acciaiuoli) the stress of a humanist commentary falls on philosophical issues. At other times, philological considerations are paramount (as in Vettori). More rarely, the two emphases are combined (as in Muret's teaching). Some commentaries are written in classicizing style, but others not. Every commentary depends on its own special blend of Greek and Latin authorities. Some commentaries are intent on promoting a specific theological or philosophical viewpoint; others leave these considerations aside altogether. Some commentaries refer constantly to the Greek text, whereas others do not. The choice of Latin translation is also highly variable.[8] As we have seen, the *Ethics* is not even, in the same way, a promoter of virtue for its various interpreters.

How to define humanist Aristotelianism is not a mere semantic quibble. The widespread identification of humanism with philological method has affected where historians place the *Wendepunkt* in the transition away from scholastic Aristotelianism, and it makes for some difference of perspective whether one considers this to take place with Argyropoulos, Tignosi, Lefèvre, Poliziano, or Vettori. Furthermore, the concentration of scholarship on the literary features of Aristotelian commentaries has given the unfortunate impression that the humanist

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[6] Kraye 1996.

[7] Kraye 1996 and *Penser entre les lignes*.

[8] For a survey of different approaches to the *Ethics* in the Renaissance, see Kraye 1995.

contribution was almost exclusively aesthetic (classicizing translations or commentaries) or scholarly (a reliable Greek text). Although it seems impossible to identify a specific common position taken by the humanists on matters of ethical doctrine or even moral education (at least from the perspective of *Ethics* commentaries), Tignosi's commentary and apology show that noteworthy ideals, connected with the expectations of the audience, could lurk behind the strategies employed in these interpretations. Furthermore, humanists such as Muret were also willing to discuss the ideas presented in the *Ethics* and could have interesting things to say on the issues involved in moral education.

We are already familiar with the concept of multiple Aristotelianisms in the Renaissance.[9] We also know that, already in the fifteenth century, there were serious divergences of opinion—even among the humanists—as to the relationship between philosophy on the one hand and rhetoric or philology on the other.[10] From here it seems but a small step to admit that humanist approaches to Aristotle may have changed over time. If the idea of applying philology to classical texts was barely and ineptly practiced in fifteenth-century Florence, it would no longer be so in the sixteenth century. Indeed, in the end the largely grammatical and philological concerns of humanists like Poliziano would win the upper hand there.

In the case of the *Ethics*, this development occurred only at the cost of revising the long-standing treatment of Aristotle's *Ethics* as a practical science. A branch of philosophy that had already been viewed as a *scientia practica* in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries[11] continued to be so in the fifteenth. It is simply not true that, already in the fifteenth century, humanists necessarily rejected the current classification of ethics as a branch of philosophy.[12] Although humanists may have looked to literary texts for moral edification (but that is another matter), both Tignosi and Acciaiuoli were interested in the philosophical aspects of Aristotle's text, which they then communicated to others using rhetorical stratagems aimed at promoting the practice of virtue. As it developed its sixteenth-century orientation toward philological study, humanism was not able to maintain this alliance

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[9] See Schmitt 1983, pp. 10–33.
[10] See most recently Jill Kraye's excellent contribution, Kraye 1996.
[11] Wieland 1981, McGrade 1990.
[12] Cf. Wieland 1981, pp. 3–4.

of wisdom and eloquence. The *Nicomachean Ethics* would become a philosophical text examined with a philological method, rather than a philosophical text meant both to be understood philosophically and embraced as a guide to life. As textual criticism matured, the humanists' expositions of the *Ethics* became less an invitation to pursue virtue than an archeological expedition or, in the worst case, an excuse for displaying their knowledge of Greek and classical literature.

One should not, however, judge the sixteenth-century Italian humanists too harshly. First of all, the humanists were not alone in developing the *Nicomachean Ethics* into an academic textbook with little relevance for the practical issues of life. Whether it was being used by the Jesuits as an introduction to the theology course, by Betti in Bologna as an illustration of syllogistic procedure, by Zabarella and Piccolomini in Padua as a proof-text in controversies over the order of learning, or by Muret in Rome as a demonstration of his learning and of the superiority of the French over the Italian tradition, university moral philosophy seems everywhere to have developed into an academic subject (although not necessarily an academic *discipline*). The specialization of the various disciplines and the increasing pluralization characteristic of the sixteenth century, as well as the mounting uncertainties about whom one could really trust as a guide to virtue (see below), all contributed to replacing the earlier view of ethics as a *scientia practica* with a more utilitarian approach.

Second, humanists affected the teaching of moral philosophy in a number of helpful ways: they provided better translations, encouraged the learning of Greek, laid the foundations for textual and source criticism, and recovered a vast body of classical philosophical literature with which to compare Aristotle's writings. Furthermore, they insisted on the need for clarity in explaining philosophical texts, and (unlike the scholastics) on the right of those uninitiated in the technical aspects of philosophy to derive benefit from it. Although the use of rhetorical strategies to foster virtue seems not to have survived (functionally, that is) in sixteenth-century *Ethics* commentaries, their encouragement of a close encounter with Aristotle's text did. In this connection, it is worth noting a deliberation of Florence's Ufficiali dello Studio in 1499: teachers of ordinary philosophy were reminded to teach the commentaries on Aristotle's works only after having taught the text itself.[13] One may well think of this as an effect

[13] The text, dated 25–X–1499 and taken from ASF, Ufficiali dello Studio, no. 6, f. 57r–v is published in Verde, IV, p. 1339.

of humanist methodology on the teaching of Aristotle in the university.

But it is also important to recall that philology was not simply a discipline for pedants, who immersed themselves in the study of ancient texts and whose scholarship had no real cultural relevance. Especially in a period in which Greek texts were infested by a crowd of corrupt readings, these philologists sought to establish reliable texts, which in turn affected how the ancients were read (whether in the original or in translations based on the original). Furthermore, as Jill Kraye has noted,[14] the problems encountered in textual emendation and the numerous contradictions and editorial interventions uncovered by such scholarship were quite possibly just as important a factor in the eventual demise of Aristotle's authority as the growing philosophical pluralization that characterized the Renaissance.

This is not, however, to say that the growing skills in philological analysis necessarily translated into a historical understanding of classical texts. Indeed, Renaissance *Ethics* commentaries point to various cultural limitations of the time, and one of the most striking is their understanding and use of classical philosophy, something that can be observed closely in the Plato–Aristotle controversy. As Lohr has argued, the arrival of Georgius Gemistus Pletho in Florence in 1438 inaugurated a new era in Renaissance Aristotelianism—one in which the teachings of Plato and Aristotle were increasingly compared.[15] Although there were certainly instances in which the superiority of the one or the other philosopher was stubbornly upheld, university teachers and other commentators most often made recourse to the technique of reconciliation. The attempt to harmonize Aristotle's teachings with those of Plato can be seen already in Acciaiuoli's commentary and is, as we have seen, a feature of many other commentaries as well. But the attempts to reconcile the two philosophical systems were unhistorical in a striking way. Not only was the consideration of Plato and Aristotle largely guided by religious or ideological, rather than historical or scholarly, aims, but it inevitably led to distorting both of the systems in order to make them agree with one another and Christianity. It is therefore all the more curious that, in Garin's view, reading classical texts "for what the authors really meant" and reconciling them (for example, in the case of Plato's Ideas) are not recognized as incongruous activities.

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[14] See Kraye (forthcoming).
[15] Lohr 1999.

Ironically, it was one of the most egregious harmonizers of Plato and Aristotle who actually started the critical examination of Aristotle's thought in the late sixteenth century. Although Francesco Piccolomini upbraided (among others) those who sought to reconcile completely the teachings of the two competing philosophers,[16] he himself attempted much more reconciliation that he admitted. Nonetheless, Piccolomini's *Universa philosophia de moribus* is a notable work, especially for the view it communicates of Aristotle's intellectual development. Until Piccolomini's time, it had often been a source of confusion that three works on ethics were attributed to Aristotle (the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Eudemian Ethics*, and the *Magna Moralia*). However, most commentators had simply tried to reconcile the doctrinal statements of these works when they differed. Piccolomini's insight was that the contradictions among these works might be attributable to developments in Aristotle's thought.[17] It was not until the twentieth century that a similar hypothesis (although in relation to all of Aristotle's works) was voiced by Werner Jaeger.[18]

Piccolomini's insight points, simultaneously, to the crude grasp of classical philosophy during the period up to Piccolomini, and to a significant contribution he himself made. The mix of old and new continued in the work of Piccolomini himself, and no claim is made here for Piccolomini as the harbinger of a new age in classical scholarship. But it should also be noted that the comingling of traditional and innovative elements does not mean that one should consign the critical advances made during the Renaissance to the rubbish bin of history.[19] Nor should one necessarily look to the philologists for them.[20]

In spite of their unhistorical character, the Renaissance debates on the superiority of Plato or Aristotle were culturally significant. They were doubtless a contributing factor to the pluralization of

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[16] F. Piccolomini 1583; see the discussion above, pp. 280–81.

[17] See above, pp. 29–31.

[18] Jaeger 1955.

[19] Cf. Grafton 1990.

[20] Like other fields, Renaissance scholarship has been strongly affected by the party loyalties of its interpreters. Two specific consequences are relevant here. On the one hand, admirers of humanism have often downplayed innovations in the field of university philosophy and have favored an interpretation identifying the Renaissance with humanism. On the other hand, students of philosophy have dismissed the humanist contributions as a matter of pedantry and frivolous concern with style. The challenge is to recognize the contributions of both fields, which often fed off of one another.

philosophical discourse—a long process that led to Aristotle's eventual loss of status as "the Philosopher" and to his becoming one voice among many. It was not until the seventeenth century that Stoic and Epicurean currents achieved some respectability and acceptance among European thinkers.[21] Nonetheless, consequences of this pluralization can be observed already in the sixteenth century and earlier. In the late sixteenth century, a teacher of ethics and literature in Pisa, Pier Angèli (Barga), expressed serious doubts about moral philosophy, maintaining that it had given rise to so many conflicting opinions that it could not be trusted. He concluded that history and poetry are superior to ethics, more useful for the development of virtue.[22] This view, if shared by his contemporaries, may have been behind the progressive neglect of moral philosophy in the Pisan *studium.*

The debates about pedagogical method and order were also significant in Aristotle's eventual loss of authority. In the early fifteenth century, Bruni had tried to counter the notion that Aristotle's works were not well written and therefore should not be used as the basis of study. The preface to his translation of the *Ethics* in fact describes Aristotle as a golden fount of eloquence.[23] By the end of the sixteenth century, Francesco Piccolomini put forward the opinion that Aristotle's *Ethics* reflected his method of inquiry rather than an ideal pedagogical sequence, and that the order of the text could therefore be improved upon.[24] This can be seen as part of a larger development, in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Europe, in which the teaching of the *Ethics* increasingly came to be based on systematizations and textbooks rather than on the text itself. This development was connected, in turn, with a growing realization that, in the original, Aristotle's texts were no more eloquent than classroom notes. It seems likely that a growing uncomfortableness with Aristotle's style and order of presentation[25] eventually led to questioning his methodology as well, and thus cleared the path for the new directions taken in early modern philosophy.

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[21] Kraye 1998 and 1999b.

[22] See the *Oratio Petri Angelii Bargaei in Pisano Gymnasio* in Florence, BNC, Magl. VIII, 46, ff. 313r–317v.

[23] Baron, *Schriften*, pp. 76–81.

[24] See above, pp. 261–65.

[25] A striking example is that of Francesco Pavone in Appendix C, no. 144.

It is significant that all three of the developments referred to above (the changes within humanism, the Plato–Aristotle debate, and the discussion on method and order) took place, to a large extent, in the Renaissance universities. This fact is a reminder that no barriers existed between humanism and the universities, and that the universities were able to accommodate a broad variety of opinions and approaches. Furthermore, university teachers seem to have enjoyed a considerable amount of freedom as to how they interpreted and taught even a standard textbook such as Aristotle's *Ethics*. All of this contradicts the traditional historiographical view that Renaissance university culture was monolithic, static, and sterile—a context in which the dominant scholasticism demanded conformity and choked off fruitful inquiry.[26]

The practical implications of the *Ethics* came to be overlooked in the universities of Renaissance Italy, and this may be seen as an unfortunate loss. But it was also an inevitable result of the changes taking place in the Arts curriculum. In the sixteenth century, a progressive specialization took place within the various Arts subjects. Professors of philosophy, for example, increasingly remained within philosophy rather than going on to teach medicine; typically they came to focus their attention on either logic or natural philosophy.[27] A similar development occurred in Greek and Latin letters; there, professors tended (in the case of Florence) to concentrate exclusively on the philological aspects of the text. Because of its unclear place in the curriculum, moral philosophy got lost in the shuffle: it continued to be taught, but the interests of its teachers (typically specialists in other subjects) remain paramount when they approach the *Ethics*. Nonetheless, this event should be seen as the result of institutional developments rather than the triumph of traditional forces.

Finally, it seems notable that the university course in moral philosophy was open to outside influences in Italy. The issue of method and order had already been hotly debated in northern Europe by Simone Simoni, Schegk, and others. The university debates on Plato and Aristotle were influenced by similar discussions taking place outside the *studium*. The approach taken to the *Ethics* by Betti in Bologna and Giason de Nores in Padua seems modeled on the tables of

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[26] Scholasticism has been, in any case, too often caricatured as pointless quibbling about unimportant matters. Grafton and Jardine have done well to point out the merits of this educational system (Grafton and Jardine 1986).

[27] For stimulating comments on the medieval model of philosophy (neither specialized nor autonomous) see Marenbon 1990.

Theodor Zwinger.[28] Francesco Piccolomini derived several of his ideas from Alessandro Piccolomini,[29] who had written his commentary in the vernacular. The place of moral philosophy in the Collegio Romano was borrowed from Paris. These are only a few examples, but they suggest a vitality and openness in the Renaissance universities that are not usually conceded. In turn, this vitality is a reminder that Renaissance Aristotelianism was not a declining philosophical perspective, engaged in a rear-guard defense against Platonism and humanism. Indeed, it has been argued that Aristotelianism was of such importance as to dictate the developments of Platonism and humanism, movements that may actually be seen as aspects of an Aristotelianism that was constantly reinventing itself.[30]

The universities were not research institutions in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. This development would not occur in the West until the late nineteenth century.[31] They were, rather, teaching institutions, whose function included not only the communication of accepted knowledge, but the socialization of its students in view of their future professional careers.[32] As such, the universities tended (as they still do) to be culturally conservative. Its staff would probably not have been proud to list innovativeness among its accomplishments. Nonetheless, this did not necessarily make for conformity or stasis. Indeed, institutional and pedagogical developments did take place, although the old and the new often continued to coexist side by side.[33] The problem of moral education was not addressed in the same way or even from the same assumptions, but it was recognized as an issue and debated.

The active rôle played by the universities in the educational debates of the time should be a starting point for a new evaluation of major cultural structures and institutions during the Renaissance. We already know a great deal about humanist schools, circles, and "academies," all of which contributed significantly to forming some of the outstanding scholars and cultural figures of the period, as well as to

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[28] Zwinger 1566.
[29] A. Piccolomini 1542.
[30] Kessler 1990.
[31] Reuben 1996.
[32] Otterspeer 2001.
[33] An illustration of the continued mixture of old and new is Aristotle 1562–1574. In particular, the new translation of the *Ethics* by Giovanni Bernardo Feliciano is accompanied there (III, pp. 1–161) by Averroes' commentary.

enriching both Neolatin and vernacular literature. Far less studied are the interactions of humanists with traditional institutions such as the universities, and the contribution of these established centers of learning to the cultural climate of their time. "New" institutions, currents, and approaches are doubtless more eye-catching, especially to a scholarship overly concerned with originality and innovativeness. But it would be a historical anomaly if the "new" had not been strongly influenced by and mixed with the "old." In any case, it seems notable that the center of gravity in Renaissance cultural life did not shift away from the universities as clearly as some have suggested, and that scholasticism remained more complex and even intellectually open than its critics cared to admit.[34]

[34] Cf. Kristeller's intuition (already in 1965, when the study of this topic was still in its infancy) that "Renaissance Aristotelianism, though challenged by a number of opponents, . . . was a rich and powerful movement, supported to the end not merely by institutional inertia, as is often said, but by a large number of competent, acute, and productive teachers and writers" (Kristeller 1993b, p. 347).

APPENDIX A

TEACHERS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE ITALIAN UNIVERSITIES

The following is a listing of all the teachers known to me to have taught moral philosophy in the universities of Bologna, Florence–Pisa, Padua, Pavia, Rome, and the Collegio Romano up to at least (and usually well beyond) 1600. I have given their teachings in chronological order and, when possible, their salaries (which are always per year, unless otherwise specified). Whenever possible, both the Latin and the vernacular forms of names have been given. When the documents use only one of these forms and the other is not known or certain, I use the form found in the documents. The heading *Sources* offers documentation for the teaching of moral philosophy only; all archival sources named have been personally inspected. Items appearing under the heading *Lit.* include major studies, pointers to the bibliographical literature, and biographical information beyond the bare teaching records. (When a teacher has authored a work on the *Ethics*, the biobibliographical data is deferred to Appendix C.) This appendix supersedes the listing offered in Lines 1996, pp. 172–88. Further information about individual teachers and their appointments can be found in Lines 2001a.

*Bologna**

—*Table of abbreviated sources*:

Condotta, bollette = ASB, Ufficio per la condotta degli stipendiari, Libri delle bollette.
Riformatori, Quartironi = ASB, Riformatori dello Studio, Quartironi degli Stipendi.
Senato, Partiti = ASB, Senato, Partiti.
Tesoreria = ASB, Tesoreria e Controllatore di Tesoreria.

1. Bartholomaeus de Varignana († after 1321): taught medicine (ca. 1292–1311) and the pseudo-Aristotelian *Economics*.

Sources: Alidosi 1623a, p. 24; Siraisi 1976; Flüeler 1992, II, pp. 7–8; Lines 1996, p. 172.

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* For the period 1341–1620, I was unable to find documentation for the faculty of Arts and Medicine relative to the following years: 1353–1355, 1359–1364, 1366–1370, 1371–1375, 1377–1378, 1382–1383, 1389–1392, 1399–1400, 1421–1422, 1430–1431, 1434–1438, 1441–1443, 1445–1447, 1449–1451, 1457–1458.

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Lit.: Orlandi, p. 70; Lohr, *Traditio* (1974): 126; idem 1988, p. 32; Siraisi 1981, pp. 45–49; Lambertini 1991a; *ABI*, I 979, 159–61 (Jöcher, Mazzetti).

2. Petrus de Varignana († 8-IV-1407): taught *physica in nonis extraordinaria* and *philosophia moralis* (1379–80, L. 100). Also taught natural philosophy (1376–77) and medicine (ca. 1380–82, 1384–89, 1392–93, 1395–96, 1398–99, 1400–01, 1403–04, still on the roll for 1407–08).

Sources: Condotta, bollette, no. 9 bis, ff. 142r (23-XII-1379, paid L. 50), 143r (26-VI-1380, paid L. 50; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 6). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, pp. 155–56; Mazzetti, no. 3076; Cristiani, no. 344; Lines 2001b, no. 9.

Lit.: Orlandi, p. 234; Fantuzzi, VIII, pp. 157–58; *ABI*, I 979, 169–70 (Jöcher, Mazzetti).

3. Guillelmus de Argille (Guglielmo detto Ghilino di Francesco di Argeli): taught *philosophia moralis* and *astrologia* (1384–86; L. 25 for moral philosophy and L. 50 for astrology in 1384–85; L. 65 for both in 1385–86, when he replaced Petrus de Forlivio for moral philosophy). Also taught logic (1379–81), natural philosophy (1383–84), and medicine (1386–89, 1392–93).

Sources: Condotta, bollette, no. 31, f. 158v (a. 1384–85, paid L. 32, s. 10 for 6 months on 22-XII-1385; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 11); Dallari, I, pp. 4–5 (roll with salaries, 26-X-1384). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, pp. 85–86 (has Guillelmus teaching until 1394); Lines 1996, p. 172; idem 2001b, no. 12.

4. Jacobus de Alamania (Giacomo d'Alemagna): taught *astrologia et ars metrica* plus *philosophia moralis* (1385–86, L. 50 for astrology and L. 15 for moral philosophy).

Sources: Condotta, bollette, no. 31, f. 158r (paid L. 32, s. 10 for 6 months on 22-XII-1385; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 11). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 29; Lines 1996, p. 173.

5. Johannes de Imola (Giovanni di M. Bertolo da Imola): taught *logica* and *philosophia moralis* (1387–88, L. 50 for logic and L. 25 for moral philosophy; replaced Antonius Cremisoni de Padua for moral philosophy), *philosophia moralis* (1388–89, L. 25, replacing Antonius de Conigliano *per mensem* in natural philosophy), *philosophia moralis* and *medicina in nonis* (1392–93, L. 50 each for moral philosophy and medicine). Also taught logic (1383–84, 1385–86), logic and philosophy (1386–87), and medicine (1394–96).

Sources: Condotta, bollette, no. 48, f. 157r–v (a. 1387–88; cf. *ibid.*, no. 40, ff. 158v [28-II-1388] and 159r [3-II-1388]; Dallari, IV, p. 14); Dallari, I, p. 7 (undated elections for 1388–89 with salaries); Condotta, bollette, no. 58, f. 47r–v (a. 1392–93, received two payments of L. 50 each; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 17). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 29; Mazzetti, no. 1541; Lines 1996, p. 173; idem 2001b, no. 16.

6. Nicolaus de Tarvisio, Sr. (Niccolò Trevigi): taught *philosophia moralis* (1388–89, *sine salario*).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 7 (undated elections with salaries). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 55; Lines 1996, p. 173.

7. Jacobus de la Turre de Forlivio, Jr. (Giacomo della Torre da Forlì, 1360/62–1414): taught *philosophia moralis* and *medicina in nonis* (1392–93, L. 195; 1394–96, L. 50 for moral philosophy and L. 250 for medicine). Also taught natural philosophy (1384–86), logic and natural philosophy (1398–99, but probably did not teach), natural philosophy (1400–01). Also taught medicine in Padua (1400–02), then in Ferrara (1402–04), Siena (1404), and Padua (1407–14). Appointed to teach medicine in Florence in 1388–89 at fl. auri 100 (initially assigned to teach *philosophia naturalis et moralis*), but not clear that he actually taught (see Abbondanza, pp. 90, 102).

Sources: Condotta, bollette, no. 58, f. 47r (a. 1392–93; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 17); *ibid.*, no. 61, ff. 113v and 114v (a. 1394–95, paid on 8-I-1395 and 20-V-[1395], *stanziamenti* unspecified); *ibid.*, no. 65, ff. 121r, 122r (a. 1395–96; received both *stanziamenti* of L. 25 each for moral philosophy, but only one, of L. 125, for medicine; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 19). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 29; Mazzetti, no. 1002; Pesenti, pp. 103–04; Lines 1996, p. 173; idem 2001b, no. 17.

Lit.: Lohr, *Traditio* (1970): 141; idem 1988, p. 118; Pesenti, pp. 103–12; Imbach and Nienhaus, p. 474.

Note: On 4-V-1388 called *Artium doctor et in Medicina licentiatus* (Abbondanza, p. 90).

8. Petrus de Alboinis de Mantua (Pietro da Mantova, † 1400): taught *philosophia naturalis* and *philosophia moralis* (1394–95, L. 100 for natural philosophy and L. 50 for moral philosophy), *philosophia moralis* (1395–97; L. 50 in 1395–96 [described as a one-year appointment] and L. 70 in 1396–97), *philosophia naturalis et moralis* (1398–99, L. 200). Also taught natural philosophy (1392–93).

Sources: Condotta, bollette, no. 61, f. 113r–v (a. 1394–95, paid on 8-I-1395 and 20-V-[1395], *stanziamenti* unspecified); *ibid.*, no. 65, f. 121r (a. 1395–96, two payments of L. 25 each; the date of the first is unspecified, whereas the second was given on 5-IV-[1396]; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 19); Tesoreria, no. 26, f. 22v (a. 1396–97, registering only the second payment, of L. 35; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 22); *ibid.*, no. 27, f. 21r (a. 1398–99, paid L. 100 for 6 months, date not specified; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 23). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 60; Mazzetti, no. 2450; Lines 1996, p. 173; idem 2001b, no. 26.

Lit.: Lohr, *Traditio* (1974): 143; idem 1988, pp. 195–96; Imbach and Nienhaus, p. 539.

9. Fernandus de Corduba, Sr. (Fernando da Cordova), *bacalarius in sacra theologia de collegio domini Sabinetiis* (?): taught *philosophia moralis* (1394–95, L. 50).

Sources: Condotta, bollette, no. 61, f. 113v (the date of the first payment is not specified; the second payment was given on 20-V-[1395?]; the *stanziamenti* are not specified). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 22.

Note: This individual is not to be confused with the Fernandus Cordubensis mentioned in Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 407 and idem 1988, p. 57.

10. Johannes de Buchis (Giovanni Bocchi): taught *philosophia moralis* (1394–95, L. 50). Also taught medicine (1398–99, 1400–01, 1403–11, 1412–13, 1414–21, 1424–30, 1431–34).

Sources: Condotta, bollette, no. 61, f. 113v (the date of the first payment is not specified; the second payment was given on 20-V-[1395?]; the *stanziamenti* are not specified). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 87; Cristiani, no. 66.

11. Garcilius de Metis (Garcoglio o Gregorio Metti), *artium et medicinae doctor*: taught *philosophia moralis* (1394–95, L. 50).

Sources: Condotta, bollette, no. 61, f. 113v (the date of the first payment is not specified; the second payment was given on 20-V-[1395?]; the *stanziamenti* are not specified). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 30 (states that he taught *medicina practica de sero*, after moral philosophy, until 1403).

12. Urbanus de Galisano (Urbano da Galisano): taught *philosophia moralis* (1394–95, L. 50).

Sources: Condotta, bollette, no. 61, f. 113v (the date of the first payment is not specified; the second payment was given on 20-V-[1395?]; the *stanziamenti* are not specified). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 180.

13. Raynerius de Sicilia (Riniero di Sicilia): taught *philosophia moralis* (1395–96, L. 50, one-year appointment).

Sources: Condotta, bollette, no. 65, f. 121r (received two payments of L. 25 each; the date of the first is unspecified; the second was given on 5-IV-[1396]; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 19). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 74.

14. Dominicus de Raigosa (Domenico di Raigosia, † 1427): taught *philosophia moralis* (1396–97, L. 40). Also taught logic (1394/95), astrology (1395–96), medicine (1398–99, 1400–02, ca. 1414–21, 1426–27); in Siena, taught medicine at least XII-1424 to IV-1425.

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 26, f. 22v (records only the second payment, of L. 20 for 6 months; the date is not specified; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 22). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 47; Cristiani, no. 292.

Lit.: *DBI*, XL (1991), pp. 663–64 (P. Morpurgo).

15. Petrus de Peluxiis (Pietro Pelosi): appointed to *philosophia moralis* (1398–99), but not found in the Tesoreria payments.

Sources: Dallari, IV, p. 23 (payments, a. 1399; cf. Tesoreria, no. 27, f. 21v). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 60 (states that he taught moral philosophy until 1400); Mazzetti, no. 2450; Lines 1996, p. 173.

16. Johannes magistri Guidoti (Guidotti) de Nobilibus de Bononia (Giovanni Guidotto de' Nobili, † 19-VII-1424): taught *philosophia moralis* (1400–02, L. 70). Also taught logic (1396–97), logic and natural philosophy (1398–99), medicine (1403–10, 1411–13, 1415–19, but probably absent in 1415–16), and an unspecified subject (1419–21). Also taught in Florence (1415–16).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 32, fasc. I, p. 2 (a. 1400–01); *ibid.*, p. 4 (a. 1401–02). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 88; Mazzetti, no. 1733; Cristiani, no. 163; Lines 2001b, no. 30.

Lit.: Orlandi, p. 145.

17. Ugo Bentius de Senis (Ugo Benzi, 1376–1439): doctorate in Medicine in Pavia on 17-X-1396; in Bologna, possibly taught the (pseudo-) Aristotelian *Economics*, ca. 1402. Also taught logic and philosophy (1403–04), natural philosophy or medicine (1404–05), and medicine (1408–12, 1423–25) there. Also taught logic in Pavia (ca. 1396–1402) and medicine in Siena (ca. 1405–09), Parma (1412–15), Siena (ca. 1416–21), Florence (1421–23), Pavia (1425–29), Padua (1429–31), and Ferrara (1431–39).

Sources: Fioravanti 1995. Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 82; Mazzetti, no. 414; Cristiani, no. 341; Lines 1996, p. 173; idem 2001b, no. 33.

Lit.: *DBI,* VIII (1966), pp. 720–23 (unsigned); Lockwood 1951; Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 241–42; idem 1988, pp. 112–13; Pesenti, pp. 53–58; Flüeler 1992, II, pp. 25–26.

Note: Fioravanti argues that Benzi's commentary on the (pseudo-) Aristotelian *Economics* (edited in his article, pp. 135–52) belongs to his first period of teaching in Bologna. However, it is not certain that the work was written in Bologna, nor is it clearly connected with a teaching setting; the archival documents for Bologna never mention Benzi as teaching moral philosophy. It is clearer (see Fioravanti, n. 1) that Benzi taught the *Nicomachean Ethics*, basing himself on Bruni's translation (and thus after 1416–17); again, however, it is not certain where this activity took place.

18. Balthassar de Cesena (Baldassarre da Cesena): taught *philosophia naturalis* and *philosophia moralis* (1405–06, L. 75 for natural philosophy and L. 50 for moral philosophy). Also taught natural philosophy (1404–05) and perhaps natural philosophy and metaphysics (1406–07).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 33, f. 280r (15-VII-1406, paid L. 125); Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 32, fasc. II, p. 2 (cf. Dallari, IV, p. 28). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 13 (mentions only natural philosphy); Mazzetti, no. 282 (lists only philosophy, for 1404 and 1405); Lines 1996, p. 173; idem 2001b, no. 35.

19. Nicolaus de Faba, Sr. (Niccolò Fava, † 14-VIII-1439): doctorate in 1404 (?); taught *philosophia naturalis* and *philosophia moralis* (1406–09, paid L. 150 for natural philosophy and L. 50 for moral philosophy; ca. 1410–20 [subject unspecified in 1413–15], in 1411–15 at L. 200; in 1415–20 at L. 300), *medicina de mane* and *philosophia moralis extraordinaria diebus festivis* (1438–39, L. 800). Also taught logic (1404–05), logic and astrology (1405–06), natural philosophy (1408–10, 1420–21), medicine (1422–30; 1431–33), and medicine and natural philosophy (1433–34).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 32, fasc. II, p. 4 (a. 1406–07; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 30); *ibid.*, p. 6 (1407–08; cf. Dallari, I, p. 9); Tesoreria, no. 39, f. 106v (paid in one lump sum for 1408–09 on 31-XII-1410); Dallari, IV, p. 32 (a. 1410–11, from payments, a. 1411, possibly referring instead to 1411–12); Tesoreria, no. 43, f. 58r and *ibid.*, no. 48, f. 151v (a. 1411–12, paid L. 100 respectively on 24-XII-1411 and 22-IX-1412; cf. Dallari, IV, pp. 32–33); *ibid.*, no. 53, f. 63r (a. 1412–13, paid L. 50 on 23-V-1413 *pro parte sui salarii*; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 34); *ibid.*, no. 56, f. 97r (a. 1413–14, paid L. 200 on 9-X-1414); *ibid.*, no. 56, f. 128v (paid L. 90 *pro parte sui salarii* on 28-II-1415) and no. 57, f. 114r (paid L. 60 *pro parte sui salarii* on 30-X-1415); *ibid.*, no. 64, f. 320r (a. 1415–16 from payments dated 5-I-1416; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 36; Zaoli 1912, p. 141); Zaoli 1912, p. 143 (a. 1416–17 from payments dated kal. Jan. 1417; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 38); idem, p. 147 (a. 1417–18; cf. Tesoreria, no. 70, ff. 190r–195v; Dallari, IV, p. 40); idem, p. 147 (a. 1418–19; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 41); idem, p. 149 (a. 1419–20; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 43); Comune–Governo, Riformatori dello Stato di Libertà, Libri mandatorum, no. 392, f. 21v (a. 1438–39, payments from 20-I-1439; cf. Dallari, I, p. 12). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 147; Mazzetti, no. 1177; Zaoli 1912, pp. 157–58; Cristiani, no. 106; Lines 1996, p. 173; idem 2001b, no. 36.

Lit.: Montalbani, pp. 174–75; Orlandi, p. 215; Fantuzzi, III, pp. 306–10; Zaoli 1912, pp. 157–58; *DBI*, XLV (1995), pp. 420–22 (M. Muccillo).

Note: According to Alidosi, Fava "era tenuto il maggior filosofo d'Italia." For Fava's interest in Aristotle's *Ethics*, see also the two letters written to him in 1428 by Francesco Filelfo, now reedited in Hankins 2001, pp. 156–59.

20. Augustinus de Codio (Agostino Codio): taught *philosophia moralis* and *philosophia naturalis* (1406–09, 1410–12; L. 50 for moral philosophy and L. 150 for natural philosophy in 1406–08). Also taught natural philosophy (1405–06, 1409–10).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 32, fasc. II, p. 4 (a. 1406–07; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 30); *ibid.*, p. 6 (a. 1407–08; cf. Dallari, I, p. 9); Tesoreria, no. 39, f. 106v (payment for 1408–09 on 31-XII-1410); Dallari, IV, p. 32 (a. 1410–11, from payments, a. 1411, possibly referring instead to 1411–12);

Tesoreria, no. 43, f. 58v; *ibid.*, no. 42, f. 84v; *ibid.*, no. 48, f. 151v (a. 1411–12, given two payments of L. 100, the first on 24-XII-1411; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 34). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 4 (who identifies Agostino Codio with Agostino da Urbino); Mazzetti, no. 882 (who follows Alidosi); Lines 1996, p. 173; idem 2001b, no. 38.

21. Augustinus de Urbino: appointed to *philosophia naturalis et moralis (lectura universitatis)* (1407–08), but not mentioned in the payments.

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 9 (undated roll; but cf. Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 32, fasc. II, pp. 5–6). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 4 (who conflates Agostino Codio and Agostino da Urbino); Mazzetti, no. 882 (who follows Alidosi); Lines 1996, p. 173.

22. Feraldus de Imola (Ferraldo da Imola): doctorate in Arts by 1410; taught *philosophia naturalis et moralis* (1410–13, L. 50 in 1411–12). Also taught an unspecified subject (1413–16) and medicine (1429–30).

Sources: Dallari, IV, p. 32 (a. 1410–11, from payments, a. 1411, possibly referring instead to 1411–12); Tesoreria, no. 43, f. 58v; *ibid.*, no. 42, f. 89v; *ibid.*, no. 48, f. 151v (a. 1411–12, given two payments of L. 25 on 31-XII-1411 and 11-X-1412; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 32–33, 34); *ibid.*, no. 56, f. 85r (on 18-VIII-1414, paid L. 50 *pro parte sui salarii anni proximi preteriti*, i.e. for 1412–13). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 22; Mazzetti, no. 1202 (places his teaching in 1411–31); Lines 1996, p. 173; idem 2001b, no. 40.

Note: In 1410–11, Feraldus is described as *artium doctor*.

23. Nicolaus de Astis de Forlivio (Niccolò Asti da Forlì): taught *lectura utriusque philosophiae* (1408–09, 1412–13, 1415–17, L. 200). Also taught either logic or medicine (1404–05), logic (1405–06, 1407–08), an unspecified subject (1413–15), and natural philosophy (1417–18).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 39, f. 106v (a. 1408–09, paid on 31-XII-1410; cf. Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 32, fasc. II, pp. 7–8); *ibid.*, no. 53, ff. 63r, 96r (a. 1412–13, paid L. 50 on 23-V-1413 and L. 100 on 10-XI-1413, both *pro parte sui salarii*; cf. Dallari, IV, pp. 33–35); *ibid.*, no. 56, f. 128r (a. 1414–15, L. 40 on 28-II-1415) and *ibid.*, no. 57, f. 110r (L. 40 on 15-X-1415); Zaoli 1912, p. 141 (a. 1415–16, payments from 5-I-1416; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 36); idem, p. 143 (a. 1416–17, payments from kal. Jan. 1417; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 38). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 55; Mazzetti, no. 242; Lines 1996, p. 173; idem 2001b, no. 37.

24. Nicolaus de Bagnocavallo (Nicolò da Bagnacavallo): taught *lectura utriusque philosophiae* (1415–17; L. 60 in 1415–16 and L. 49, s. 19 in 1416–17). Also taught medicine (1417–19).

Sources: Zaoli 1912, p. 141 (a. 1415–16, payments from 5-I-1416; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 36); idem, p. 143 (a. 1416–17, payments from kal. Jan. 1417; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 38). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 55; Mazzetti, no. 2230 (lists him as teaching, 1411–20); Cristiani, no. 243; Lines 1996, p. 173; idem 2001b, no. 42.

25. Philippus de Naro de Sicilia (Filippo Naro di Sicilia): taught *lectura utriusque philosophiae (lectura universitatis)* (1416–17, paid L. 45, s. 5).

Sources: Zaoli 1912, p. 143 (payments from kal. Jan. 1417; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 38). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 22; Lines 1996, p. 173.

26. Petrus de Ricardis de Cento (Pietro da Cento): taught *philosophia moralis* (1418–19, paid L. 70), *lectura utriusque philosophiae* (1419–20, paid L. 70). Also taught logic (1415–16), astrology and metaphysics (1416–17), astrology (1417–18), and medicine (1420–21).

Sources: Zaoli 1912, p. 147 (a. 1418–19; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 42); idem, p. 149 (a. 1419–20; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 43). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 157; Mazzetti, no. 2617 (places his teaching in 1416–24); Cristiani, no. 296; Lines 1996, p. 173; idem 2001b, no. 43.

27. Johannes de Arimino (Giovanni da Rimini), *rector universitatis artistarum et medicorum*: taught *philosophia naturalis et moralis (lectura universitatis)* (1418–19, paid L. 100).

Sources: Dallari, IV, p. 42 (payments, a. 1419; cf. Zaoli 1912, p. 147). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 31; Lines 1996, p. 174.

Note: It is doubtful that this is the same individual who teaches *philosophia naturalis* in Florence (1439, fl. 15) and is called *bachalarius, OFM in Sancta Cruce* (Gherardi, p. 445). It is more likely that this teacher is to be identified with Giovanni Marco da Rimini († 23-II-1474), a famous physician who served the Malatesta family and left behind a detailed inventory of his library; see especially Baader 1977 and Vandi 1997.

28. Johannes Franciscus de Curialtis de Tausignano (Giovanni Curialti da Tossignano, † 1444): taught *philosophia moralis* (1420–21, L. 50). Also taught logic (1415–17), natural philosophy (1417–18), and medicine (1424–30, 1431–34, 1438–41, 1443–44).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 79, f. 280r (on 19-II-1421 paid L. 25 for the first half of his salary; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 45). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 89; Mazzetti, no. 962 (places his teaching in 1416–44); Cristiani, no. 95; Lines 1996, p. 174; idem 2001b, no. 44.

Note: Originally from Imola, the family established itself in Bologna in 1378 and acquired citizenship. Johannes is listed in the College of medical doctors from 1415.

29. Andreas de Tamaraciis (Andrea Tamarazzi): taught *philosophia moralis* (1420–21, L. 50). Also taught philosophy (1419–20) and medicine (1424–29, 1432–34).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 79, f. 280r (on 19-II-1421 paid L. 25 for the first half of his salary; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 45). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 4; Cristiani, no. 328; Lines 1996, p. 174; idem 2001b, no. 47.

30. Andreas Pieri (de Billis) de Mediolano, O.E.S.A. (Andrea Biglia, ca. 1395–1435): doctorate in Arts in 1423 and in Theology in 1425; taught *philosophia moralis* (1424–25, paid L. 100), *philosophia naturalis diebus ordinariis* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1425–28, L. 100 in 1425–27; received L. 60 *pro parte sui salarii* in 1427–28). Biglia also taught moral philosophy in Florence (1419–23; cf. below, no. 103) and theology in Siena (1429–35).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 82, ff. 300r, 308r (a. 1424–25, payments of L. 15 on 24-XII-1424, L. 20 on 18-I, L. 25 on 23-IV, and L. 40 on 19-IX-1425; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 48); *ibid.*, ff. 347r, 355v (a. 1425–26, payments of L. 30 on 24-XII-1425 and 28-III-1426, and L. 40 on 13-IX-1426; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 50); *ibid.*, ff. 391v, 402v (a. 1426–27, payments of L. 12 on 10-I-1427, L. 10 on 17-IV, L. 30 on 17-VII, and L. 48 on 18-IX; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 53; Zaoli 1920, p. 228); *ibid.*, ff. 407v, 417v (a. 1427–28, partial payments of L. 20 on 4-II-1428 and L. 40 on 15-V; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 55; Zaoli 1920, p. 232). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 4; Arbesmann 1965a, p. 160; Schnaubelt 1993, pp. 118–29; Lines 1996, p. 174; idem 2001b, no. 51.

Note: Wrote a translation of the *Ethics*; see Appendix C, no. 27.

31. Guaspar de Sancto Johanne in Persiceto, O.P. (Gaspare Sighicelli da San Giovanni in Persiceto, † 10-IX-1457): doctorate in Arts on 31-X-1420 and in Theology before 12-X-1440; taught *philosophia naturalis diebus ordinariis* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1425–27, L. 100 in 1425–26 and L. 101 s. 5 in 1426–27), *philosophia naturalis et moralis* (1444–45), *philosophia ordinaria* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1447–48). Also taught logic (1419–20), an unspecified subject (1420–21), natural philosophy (1424–25, 1429–30 [?]), medicine (1431–32), and natural philosophy (1432–33, 1443–44). Probably taught natural philosophy in Florence, ca. 1427–31.

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 82, ff. 347r, 355v (a. 1425–26, payments of L. 30 on 24-XII-1425, 13-I and 8-III-1426, and L. 10 on 13-IX-1426; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 50); *ibid.*, ff. 391v, 402v (a. 1426–27, payments of L. 21 s. 5 on 10-I-1427, and L. 40 on 12-III and 21-V; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 53; Zaoli 1920, p. 228); Dallari, I, p. 21 (roll, 26-IX-1444); *ibid.*, p. 24 (roll, 9-X-1447). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 89; Mazzetti, no. 1397 (lists him as teaching in 1443–47); Lines 1996, p. 174; idem 2001b, no. 46.

Lit.: Montalbani, p. 78; Fantuzzi, IV, pp. 100–02; Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 153; idem 1988, p. 63; Kaeppeli, II, pp. 12–13.

Note: This Guaspar may be identifiable with the Guaspar de Bononia who taught natural philosophy in Florence ca. 1427–31 despite being still bound to Bologna and having agreed to teach in Siena. See Gherardi, pp. 411–13 and Park, pp. 285–87.

32. Johannes de Fornacibus de Venetiis (Giovanni Fornaci): doctorate in Arts in Padua on 25-VI-1421 and in Medicine there on 12-VII-1431; in Bologna, taught *philosophia naturalis diebus ordinariis* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1425–28, L. 100 in 1425–26 and 1426–27; no payment listed for

1427–28). Also taught logic (1423, 1424–25) and medicine (1453–57) there. In Padua, taught logic (1422), natural philosophy (1436–37), and medicine (1448–54).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 82, ff. 347r, 356r (a. 1425–26, payments of L. 30 on 24-XII-1425 and 28-III-1426, and L. 40 on 13-IX-1426; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 50); *ibid.*, ff. 391v, 402v (a. 1426–27, payments of L. 20 on 10-I-1427, L. 25 on 6-V, and L. 55 on 23-VIII; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 53; Zaoli 1920, p. 228); *ibid.*, f. 418r (a. 1427–28, no indication of salary and perhaps did not teach; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 55; Zaoli 1920, p. 232). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 32; Mazzetti, no. 1252; Pesenti, p. 117; Lines 1996, p. 174; idem 2001b, no. 50.

Lit.: Pesenti, pp. 117–18.

33. Nicolaus de Tollentino (Nicolò da Tolentino): taught *medicina in nonis (lectura universitatis)* and *philosophia naturalis et moralis (lectura universitatis)* (1426–27, L. 124). Also taught an unspecified subject (1425–26).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 82, ff. 391r, 400r, 402v (a. 1426–27, paid for both subjects together on 3-V-1428; cf. Dallari, IV, pp. 52–53; Zaoli 1920, p. 228). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 55; Cristiani, no. 241; Lines 1996, p. 174.

Note: In 1426–27, Nicolaus is described as *rector artistarum.*

34. Jordanus de Principibus de Alamania (Giordano Prencipi d'Alemagna): taught *philosophia naturalis et moralis* (1427–29). Also taught logic (1425–27) and natural philosophy (1429–30).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 82, ff. 407v, 417v (a. 1427–28, partial payments of L. 20 on 4-II-1428 and L. 40 on 26-V; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 55; Zaoli 1920, p. 232); *ibid.*, no. 86, f. 316r (a. 1428–29, without indication of payment; cf. Zaoli 1920, p. 235; Dallari, IV, p. 57). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 32; Mazzetti, no. 2561 (following Alidosi, lists him as teaching, 1425–36); Lines 1996, p. 174; idem 2001b, no. 52.

35. Franciscus Philelphus (Francesco Filelfo, 1389–1481): taught *litterae graecae, rhetorica*, and possibly moral philosophy (1427–28; payment of L. 100 registered, but Filelfo was apparently paid a total of 450 ducati aurei). Also taught poetry and rhetoric (Jan.–June 1439). Also taught moral philosophy in Florence (see below, no. 105) and in Pavia–Milan from 1439.

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 82, ff. 407v, 420v (paid on 18-V-1428; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 56; Zaoli 1920, pp. 231–233). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, pp. 22–24; Gualdo Rosa 1986, p. 276, n. 3; Chines, no. 201.

Lit.: See below, Appendix C, no. 27.

Note: In 1428 Filelfo wrote two letters to Niccolò Fava on the proper interpretation of τἀγαθόν in the opening lines of the *Ethics*. See Hankins 2001, pp. 156–59 for an edition.

36. Johannes de Nursia (Giovanni da Norsia): taught *philosophia moralis et naturalis* (1428–29, salary not specified). Also taught logic (1425–26).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 86, f. 316r (without indication of payment; cf. Zaoli 1920, p. 235; Dallari, IV, p. 57). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 32; Mazzetti, no. 1551 (lists him as teaching, 1425–29); Lines 1996, p. 174; idem 2001b, no. 53.

37. Nicolaus de Johannittis (Nicolò Giovannetti): taught *philosophia moralis et naturalis* (1428–29), *philosophia moralis* (1429–30, paid L. 34, probably as a partial payment), *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1432–34, L. 100). Also taught logic (1427–28), natural philosophy (1431–32), and medicine (1438–41).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 86, f. 316r (a. 1428–29, without indication of payment; cf. Zaoli 1920, p. 235; Dallari, IV, p. 57); *ibid.*, no. 91, f. 318r (a. 1429–30, paid L. 34 on 10-I-1430; cf. Zaoli 1920, p. 238; Dallari, IV, p. 59); *ibid.*, no. 95, f. 351r (a. 1432–33, two payments of L. 50 each on 24-XII-1432 and 17-VI-1433; cf. Zaoli 1920, p. 244; Dallari, IV, p. 63); *ibid.*, f. 394v (a. 1433–34, received his salary in one lump sum on 8-II-1434; cf. Dallari, IV, p. 65). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 147; Mazzetti, no. 1516; Cristiani, no. 191; Lines 1996, p. 174; idem 2001b, no. 54.

38. Johannes de Sicilia (Giovanni da Sicilia): taught *philosophia moralis et naturalis* (1428–29).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 86, f. 316r (a. 1428–29, without indication of payment; cf. Zaoli 1920, p. 235; Dallari, IV, p. 57). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 32; Mazzetti, no. 1558; Lines 1996, p. 174; idem 2001b, no. 55.

Note: It is unclear whether this is the same person who taught logic in Padua (1436–37). He does, however, seem to be a different individual from the one teaching *medicina* and *chirurgia* in Bologna in 1482–85. A Johannes de Riccio Siculus, O.P. (Lohr, *Traditio* [1971]: 275; Kaeppeli, II, 534) authored, around 1430–34, a commentary on the *Politics* (not the *Ethics*) preserved in Florence; see Lines 1999a, p. 282 (not mentioned in Staico 1996).

39. Ludovicus de Cesena (Ludovico da Cesena): taught *philosophia moralis et naturalis (lectura universitatis)* (1428–29).

Sources: Tesoreria, no. 86, f. 316r (a. 1428–29, without indication of payment; cf. Zaoli 1920, p. 235; Dallari, IV, p. 57). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 50; Mazzetti, no. 1855; Lines 1996, p. 174.

40. Aegidius de Carpo (Egidio da Carpi): taught *philosophia moralis extraordinaria diebus festivis* (1439–41, 1443–45).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 13 (roll, 10-X-1439); *ibid.*, p. 15 (roll, 13-X-1440); *ibid.*, p. 18 (roll, 9-IX-1443); *ibid.*, p. 21 (roll, 26-IX-1444). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 21; Lines 1996, p. 174.

Note: This figure should be distinguished from the other Aegidius de Carpo who taught grammar in Bologna slightly earlier (1427–30; see Chines, no. 81), but may be the same as the Aegidius mentioned as teaching moral philosophy in Padua in 1436 (see below, no. 127).

41. Baverius de Bonittis de Imola (Baverio Bonetti, ca. 1405–1480): taught *medicina in nonis* and *philosophia moralis extraordinaria diebus festivis* (1440–41). Also taught logic (1429–30, 1431–32), natural philosophy and logic (1432–33), natural philosophy (1433–34), and medicine (1438–40, 1455–57, 1458–81). Baverio also taught philosophy in Florence (1435–36) and medicine in Siena (between 1443 and 1447). He served as physician to Pope Nicholas V from 1447 until the pope's death in 1455.

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 15 (roll, 13-X-1440). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 29; Mazzetti, no. 364; Cristiani, no. 64; Lines 1996, p. 174; idem 2001b, no. 59.

Lit.: Montalbani, pp. 36–37; Orlandi, p. 71; Fantuzzi, I, pp. 392–96.

42. Nicolaus de Saviis (Nicolò di Giacomo Savi, † 1499): taught *philosophia moralis* (1443–44). Also taught medicine (1444–45, 1447–49), logic (1479–82), natural philosophy (1482–88), and medicine (1488–99).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 18 (roll, 9-IX-1443). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 148; Mazzetti, no. 2812; Cristiani, no. 310; Lines 1996, p. 174; idem 2001b, no. 76.

Lit.: Orlandi, p. 217; Fantuzzi, VII, p. 330.

43. Balthassar de Johanittis (Baldassare Giovannetti, † 1485): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1444–45, *additus vigore mandati*). Also taught logic (1443–44) and medicine (1447–49, 1451–57, 1458–86, but because of death did not serve the last year).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 21 (roll, 26-IX-1444). Alidosi 1623a, p. 30; Cristiani, no. 189; Lines 1996, p. 175.

44. Bernardus de Garzonibus (Bernardo Garzoni, † 1456): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* and *medicina practica extraordinaria de sero* (1447–49). Also taught medicine (1425–30, 1431–34, 1438–41, 1443–45, 1455–56). In 1448 Garzoni went to Rome for a few years to serve as physician to Pope Nicholas V. There he died of plague.

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 24 (roll, 9-X-1447); *ibid.*, pp. 26–27 (roll, 5-X-1448). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 29; Cristiani, no. 139; Lines 1996, p. 175.

Lit.: Fantuzzi, IV, pp. 75–77.

45. Innocentius de Tuschis de Bononia (Innocenzo Toschi): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1447–48, 1451–53, 1461–62, 1466–74, 1475–76 [but apparently did not teach during this last year]; appointed to read *liber ethicorum* in 1466–67; L. 25 in 1466–68; L. 40 in 1468–69; L. 50 in 1469–76). Also taught logic (1438–40), natural philosophy (1443–44), logic (1444–45,

1448–49), law (1453–58), law and natural philosophy (1458–59), natural philosophy (1459–61), logic (1462–63, 1464–66), natural philosophy (1474–75).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 24 (roll, 9-X-1447); *ibid.*, p. 31 (roll, 20-X-1451); *ibid.*, p. 34 (roll, 30-VIII-1452); *ibid.*, p. 59 (roll, 15-X-1461); Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. II bis (a. 1466–67, paid L. 12 and L. 13; cf. Dallari I, p. 73); *ibid.*, docs. II, II ter (a. 1467–68, in April paid L. 6, s. 19, d. 7; cf. Dallari, I, p. 76); *ibid.*, doc. III (a. 1468–69, payments of L. 10 and L. 6 in July and November 1469; cf. Dallari, I, p. 79); *ibid.*, docs. IV and V (a. 1469–70, payments of L. 14, L. 11 s. 10, L. 19 and L. 5 s. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 81); *ibid.*, doc. V (a. 1470–71, payments of L. 6 s. 10, L. 6 s. 15, L. 6 s. 10, and L. 23 s. 15; cf. Dallari, I, p. 84); *ibid.*, doc. VI (a. 1471–72, payments of L. 8, L. 6, L. 10, and L. 21; cf. Dallari, I, p. 87); *ibid.*, doc. VII (a. 1472–73, payments of L. 7 s. 10, L. 7, L. 7, and L. 15; cf. Dallari, I, p. 90); *ibid.*, doc. VIII (a. 1473–74, payments of L. 5, L. 3 s. 15, L. 8, and L. 10 s. 15 [*punctatus* s. 5 (?)]; cf. Dallari, I, p. 93); *ibid.*, doc. X (a. 1475–76, not paid, since he did not teach; cf. Dallari, I, p. 99). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 127; Mazzetti, nos. 1750, 3003, and 3004; Lines 1996, pp. 175–76 (Innocentius de Bononia and Innocentius de Tuschis); idem 2001b, no. 69.

Note: Mazzetti, probably mistakenly, distinguishes three figures: one teaching philosophy up to 1453; a second teaching law, 1454–59; and a third teaching philosophy, 1458–76.

46. Dominicus de Sancta Victoria, O.E.S.A. (Domenico da Santa Vittoria): taught *philosophia ordinaria* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1451–53). Also taught natural philosophy (1438–39, 1443–45, 1447–49).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 31 (roll, 20-X-1451); *ibid.*, p. 34 (roll, 30-VIII-1452). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 19; Mazzetti, no. 1080 (has him teaching in 1438–52, except for 1439 and 1440); Lines 1996, p. 175; idem 2001b, no. 64.

47. Marsilius de Johanittis (Marsilio di Giovannetti): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 23-XII-1445; taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1451–57, 1458–61). Also taught logic (1447–49) and medicine (1461–66).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 31 (roll, 20-X-1451); *ibid.*, p. 34 (roll, 30-VIII-1452); *ibid.*, p. 37 (undated roll for 1453–54); *ibid.*, p. 40 (undated roll for 1454–55); *ibid.*, p. 43 (undated roll for 1455–56); *ibid.*, p. 46 (undated roll for 1456–57); *ibid.*, p. 51 (undated roll for 1458–59); *ibid.*, p. 54 (roll, 18-IX-1459); *ibid.*, p. 56 (roll, 7-X-1460). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 140; Piana 1972, pp. 196–98; Cristiani, no. 190; Lines 1996, p. 175.

48. Franciscus de Sancto Arcangelo (Francesco da Sant'Arcangelo): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1453–55). Also taught mathematics (1451–52) and natural philosophy (1452–53).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 37 (undated roll for 1453–54); *ibid.*, p. 40 (undated roll for 1454–55). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 58; Mazzetti, no. 1268; Lines 1996, p. 175; idem 2001b, no. 90.

Note: This figure should be distinguished from the one appointed in 1478–79 to teach *philosophia (lectura universitatis)* in Dallari, I, p. 108.

49. Dominicus de Refrigeriis (de Frigeriis), Sr. (Domenico di Refrigeri): taught *medicina ordinaria de mane* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1455–56, 1461–62). Also taught logic (1443–45), natural philosophy (1447–49), and medicine (1451–55, 1456–57, 1458–61, 1469–77).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 43 (undated roll for 1455–56); *ibid.*, p. 59 (roll, 15-X-1461). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 47 (conflates him with Dominicus Jr.); Mazzetti, no. 2603; Cristiani, no. 293; Lines 1996, p. 175; idem 2001b, no. 77.

Lit.: Orlandi, p. 102.

50. Albertinus de Chizolis de Cremona (Albertino da Cremona, † 9-X-1474): taught *medicina in nonis* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1455–56). Also taught natural philosophy (1453–55). Later taught in Ferrara, then medicine in Pisa (1473–74).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 43 (undated roll). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 5; Mazzetti, no. 45; Cristiani, no. 7; Lines 1996, p. 175; idem 2001b, no. 93.

Lit.: Tiraboschi, VI.2, p. 711; Verde, II, pp. 8–13 (with bibliography).

51. Ludovicus de Florentia (Ludovico da Firenze): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1455–56). Also taught natural philosophy (1453–55).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 43 (undated roll). Cf. Mazzetti, no. 1856; Lines 1996, p. 175; idem 2001b, no. 94.

52. Lianorus de Lianoris (Lianoro de' Lianori, ca. 1425–1478): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* and *litterae graecae* (1455–56, L. 400). Also taught Greek letters (1456–57, 1458–59). After 1459, Lianorus was mainly active as an ambassador and official for the papacy.

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 43 (undated roll). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 128; Chines, no. 142; Lines 1996, p. 175.

Lit.: Fantuzzi, V, pp. 54–57; Cosenza, III, p. 1983.

53. Hieronymus de Ranutiis (Girolamo Ranuzzi, † 20-XI-1496): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1455–56). Also taught logic (1456–57, 1458–60) and medicine (1460–65, 1466–97).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 43 (undated roll). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, pp. 91–92; Cristiani, no. 291; Lines 1996, p. 175.

Lit.: Montalbani, p. 92; Orlandi, pp. 177–78; Fantuzzi, VII, pp. 169–70.

54. Philippus de Saviis de Bononia (Filippo Savi): taught *medicina in nonis* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1456–57). Also taught logic (1447–49), natural philosophy (1451–52), and medicine (1452–56, 1458–78).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 46 (undated roll). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, pp. 57–58; Mazzetti, no. 2810; Cristiani, no. 311; Lines 1996, p. 175; idem 2001b, no. 81.

55. Jacobus Peregrini, O. Carm. (Giacomo Pellegrini): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1456–57, *dummodo legat in scolis consuetis artistarum*).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 46 (undated roll). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 175.

56. Antonius de Pinarolo, O. Sancti Francisci (Antonio Pinarolo): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1458–59).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 51 (undated roll). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 6; Lines 1996, p. 176.

Note: A certain "Antonius è Pinarolo Pedemontanus, celebris Doctor, Episcopus Fanensis in Piceno" is known to have died in 1496 (*Annales minorum*, VII, p. 375, no. 16).

57. Johannes Justus de Candia (Giovanni Giusti di Candia): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1458–59).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 51 (undated roll). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 35; Lines 1996, p. 176.

58. Franciscus Bartholomaei de Faciis (Francesco Facci di Castel San Pietro): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1459–61). Also taught logic (1461–62).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 54 (roll, 18-IX-1459); *ibid.*, p. 56 (roll, 7-X-1460). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 58; Lines 1996, p. 176.

Note: This individual might possibly be the son of the famous Bartolomeo Facio († ca. 1457), on whom see *DBI*, XLIV (1994), pp. 113–21 (P. Viti).

59. Tadeus de Garganellis, O. Serv. (Taddeo Garganelli, ca. 1430–ca. 1469): doctorate in Theology on 29-I-1456; taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1461–62). Also taught natural philosophy (1455–57, 1458–59). On 10-IX-1459, Tadeus was appointed *generalis Cruciferorum*.

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 59 (roll, 15-X-1461). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 173; Mazzetti, no. 1380. Lines 1996, p. 176; idem 2001b, no. 97.

Lit.: *DBI*, LII (1999), pp. 290–92 (S. Giordano).

60. Hannibal de Malpiglis (Annibale Malpigli Padovano): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1461–63, 1464–65, 1466–71 [but not in the payments, 1466–67, 1468–69, 1470–71], 1472–74 [but not paid in 1473–74 and possibly did not teach]; L. 50 from 1467–68 on). Also taught logic (1459–61, 1465–66).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 59 (roll, 15-X-1461); *ibid.*, p. 62 (roll, 8-X-1462); *ibid.*, p. 67 (roll, 10-X-1464; cf. Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. I, only a payment of L. 12 registered); *ibid.*, p. 73 (roll, 18-X-1466; not in Riformatori,

Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. II bis); *ibid.*, p. 76 (roll, 16-X-1467; name not legible in Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. II ter); *ibid.*, p. 79 (roll, X-1468; not in Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. III); Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, docs. IV–V (a. 1469–70, payments of L. 14, L. 11 s. 10, L. 19, and L. 5 s. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 81); Dallari, I, p. 84 (roll, 13-VII-1470; not in Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. V); Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. VII (a. 1472–73, payments of L. 7 s. 10, L. 7, L. 7, and L. 15; cf. Dallari, I, p. 90); *ibid.*, doc. VIII (a. 1473–74, not paid; fined L. 28 s. 15, L. 13, L. 26, and L. 10 s. 15; cf. Dallari, I, p. 93). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 6; Lines 1996, p. 176.

61. Andronicus Callistus Constantinopolitanus (Andronico Callisto, † before 1487): taught *litterae graecae* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1462–66). Also taught Greek letters (1458–59), unspecified subject (1466–67). After his period in Bologna, Callisto sojourned in Rome until 1471, then replaced John Argyropoulos in Florence from September 1471 until 1474 for philosophy.

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 62 (roll, 8-X-1462); *ibid.*, pp. 64, 65 (roll, 25-VIII-1463); *ibid.*, p. 67 (roll, 10-X-1464); *ibid.*, p. 70 (roll, 9-X-1465). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 6; Chines, no. 7; Lines 1996, p. 176; Davies, pp. 114–15.

Lit.: Cammelli 1942; *DBI*, III (1961), p. 162 (E. Bigi); I. Maïer 1966, pp. 30–31; Verde, I, p. 220; IV.1, pp. 95–96; Field 1988, pp. 56–57, 107–26. See also Monfasani 1985 and Todd 1994 (especially p. 70, n. 11, with other references to the secondary literature).

62. Petrus de Azzoguidis (Pietro Azzoguidi, † 3-IX-1478): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1462–63, 1465–68 [but not in the payments, 1466–67], 1469–71 [but not in the payments, 1470–71], 1476–78; L. 60 in 1465–66, L. 100 in 1476–78; appointed to read *liber ethicorum* in 1466–67). Also taught logic (1459–62), medicine (1463–65, 1468–69).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 62 (roll, 8-X-1462); *ibid.*, p. 70 (roll, 9-X-1465; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. II); *ibid.*, p. 73 (roll, 18-X-1466; not in Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. II bis); Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. II ter (a. 1467–68; paid L. 16 s. 15 in April 1468, but fined L. 1 s. 15 *per difetto di due lezioni*; cf. Dallari, I, p. 76); *ibid.*, docs. IV–V (a. 1469–70; payments of L. 16, L. 14, L. 22, and L. 8; cf. Dallari, I, p. 81); Dallari, I, p. 84 (roll, 7-X-1470; not in Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. V); Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. XI (a. 1476–77, payments of L. 11, L. 10, L. 15, and L. 30; cf. Dallari, I, p. 102); *ibid.*, doc. XII (a. 1477–78, payments of L. 12, L. 12, L. 14, and L. 25; cf. Dallari, I, p. 104). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 157; Cristiani, no. 36; Lines 1996, p. 176.

Lit.: Orlandi, p. 231; Fantuzzi, I, p. 309.

63. Johannes de Cristanis de Verona (Giovanni Cristiani da Verona): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1462–63). Also taught logic (1461–62) and medicine (1463–64).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 62 (roll, 8-X-1462). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 36; Cristiani, no. 94; Lines 1996, p. 176.

64. Andreas de Criscimbenis (Andrea Crescimbeni, † 1499): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 29-XII-1458; taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1463–64). Also taught logic (1461–62), natural philosophy (1462–63, 1464–77), and medicine (1477–1499).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 64 (roll, 25-VIII-1463). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 6; Mazzetti, no. 934; Cristiani, no. 93; Lines 1996, p. 176; idem 2001b, no. 105.

Lit.: Ascanelli, pp. 114–15.

65. Thomas de Marinasiis (Tommaso Marinasi): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1464–66, 1472–73, 1474–89; promised L. 50 in 1465–66 and later). Also taught logic (1460–64, 1466–72, 1473–74).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 67 (roll, 10-X-1464; received L. 6 on 10-XII-1465; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. I); Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. II (a. 1465–66, promised L. 50; cf. Dallari, I, p. 70); *ibid.*, doc. VII (a. 1472–73, payments of L. 7 s. 10, L. 7, L. 7, and L. 15; cf. Dallari, I, p. 90); *ibid.*, doc. IX (a. 1474–75, payments of L. 6, L. 6, L. 6 s. 15 [*punctatus* L. 2 s. 5], and L. 16 s. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 96); *ibid.*, doc. X (a. 1475–76, payments of L. 5 s. 10, L. 6 s. 10, L. 7 s. 10, and L. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 99); *ibid.*, doc. XI (a. 1476–77, payments of L. 5 s. 10, L. 5, L. 7 s. 10, and L. 15; cf. Dallari, I, p. 102); *ibid.*, doc. XII (a. 1477–78, payments of L. 6, L. 6, L. 7, and L. 31; cf. Dallari, I, p. 104); *ibid.*, doc. XIII (a. 1478–79, payments of L. 7 s. 10, L. 3 s. 10, L. 6, and L. 31; cf. Dallari, I, p. 107); *ibid.*, doc. XIV (a. 1479–80, only a last payment of L. 14 survives; cf. Dallari, I, p. 110); *ibid.*, doc. XV (a. 1480–81, payments of L. 7, L. 6 s. 10, L. 7 s. 10, and L. 26 s. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 113); *ibid.*, doc. XVI (a. 1481–82, payments of L. 6 s. 10, L. 7, L. 10, and L. 26 s. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 115); *ibid.*, doc. XVII (a. 1482–83, payments of L. 8, L. 7, L. 8, and L. 27; cf. Dallari, I, p. 118); *ibid.*, doc. XVIII (a. 1483–84, payments of L. 6 s. 10, L. 6 s. 10, L. 6, and L. 29 s. 15 [*punctatus* L. 1 s. 5]; cf. Dallari, I, p. 121); *ibid.*, doc. XIX (a. 1484–85, four recorded payments of L. 12 s. 10 each; cf. Dallari, I, p. 124); *ibid.*, doc. XX (a. 1485–86, four recorded payments of L. 12 s. 10 each; cf. Dallari, I, p. 128); *ibid.*, doc. XXI (a. 1486–87, three recorded payments of L. 11, plus a last one of L. 17; cf. Dallari, I, p. 131); *ibid.*, doc. XXII (a. 1487–88, payments of L. 11, L. 10, L. 11, and L. 3; cf. Dallari, I, p. 134); *ibid.*, doc. XXIII (a. 1488–89, payments of L. 6 s. 10, L. 7 s. 10, L. 10, and L. 26; cf. Dallari, I, p. 137). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 78; Lines 1996, pp. 176–77.

66. Rodoricus de Sancta Helena Hispanus (Rodorico da Sant'Elena Spagnolo): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1471–72, salary not specified). Also taught *philosophia (lectura universitatis)* (1470–71).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. VI (payments of L. 8, L. —, L. 10, and L. 27; cf. Dallari, I, p. 87). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 74; Mazzetti, no. 2669; Lines 1996, p. 177.

67. Petrus de Aragonia Hispanus (Pietro d'Aragona): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1471–72, salary not specified).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. VI (payments of L. 8, L. —, L. 10, and L. 27; cf. Dallari, I, p. 87). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 177.

68. Matthaeus Federicus de Brixia (Matteo da Brescia): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1474–75, promised L. 150). Also taught astronomy (1462–63), natural philosophy (1463–64), astronomy (1471–74), and natural philosophy (1475–78).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. IX (payments of L. 18, L. 18, L. 27, and L. 49 s. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 96). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, pp. 53–54; Mazzetti, no. 2047; Lines 1996, p. 177; idem 2001b, no. 107.

69. Franciscus de Montilio, O. Sti. Aug. (Francesco da Montilio): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1477–78, promised L. 25).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. XII (payments of L. —, L. 3, L. 3 s. 10, and L. 18 s. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 104). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 25; Lines 1996, p. 177.

70. Andromicus (Andromacus) de Milanis (de Gratis, de Parma) (Andromaco di Garati, † before 15-II-1505): doctorate in Arts and Medicine in 1449; in theology, on 8-VI-1458; in law, in 1488; taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1478–96; L. 150 in 1478–87; L. 100 in 1487–89; L. 200 in 1489–95; L. 100 in 1495–96). Also taught logic (1451–53) and natural philosophy (1455–57, 1458–63, 1465–66).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. XIII (a. 1478–79, payments of L. —, L. 10 s. 10, L. 18, and L. 52 s. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 107); *ibid.*, doc. XIV (a. 1479–80, only the last payment, of L. 42, survives; cf. Dallari, I, p. 110); *ibid.*, doc. XV (a. 1480–81, payments of L. 21, L. 19 s. 10, L. 22 s. 10, and L. 72; cf. Dallari, I, p. 113); *ibid.*, doc. XVI (a. 1481–82, payments of L. 19 s. 10, L. 21, L. 30, and L. 67 s. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 115); *ibid.*, doc. XVII (a. 1482–83, payments of L. 19 s. 10 [*punctatus* L. 4 s. 10], L. 21, L. 24, and L. 81; cf. Dallari, I, p. 118); *ibid.*, doc. XVIII (a. 1483–84, payments of L. 19 s. 10 [plus L. 4 s. 10 to compensate for a fine in the first payments of 1482–83], L. 19 s. 10, L. 18, and L. 93; cf. Dallari, I, p. 121); *ibid.*, doc. XIX (a. 1484–85, four recorded payments of L. 37 s. 10 each; cf. Dallari, I, p. 124); *ibid.*, doc. XX (a. 1485–86, four recorded payments of L. 37 s. 10 each; cf. Dallari, I, p. 128); *ibid.*, doc. XXI (a. 1486–87, three recorded payments of L. 33, plus a last one of L.

12; cf. Dallari, I, p. 131); *ibid.*, doc. XXII (a. 1487–88, payments of L. 22, L. 20, L. 22, and L. 8; received an extra L. 16 in February 1489 to help complete his salary; cf. Dallari, I, p. 134); *ibid.*, doc. XXIII (a. 1488–89, payments of L. — [*punctatus* L. 54], L. — [*punctatus* L. 27 s. 10], L. 7 s. 10 [*punctatus* L. 12 s. 10], and L. 52; cf. Dallari, I, p. 137); *ibid.*, doc. XXIV (a. 1489–90, payments of L. 32, L. 28, L. 32, and L. 102; L. 6 added on 4-II-1491; cf. Dallari, I, p. 140); *ibid.*, doc. XXV (a. 1490–91, payments of L. 20, L. 22, L. 26, and L. 90; cf. Dallari, I, p. 143); *ibid.*, doc. XXVI (a. 1491–92, payments of L. 24, L. 28, L. 28, and L. 104; cf. Dallari, I, p. 147); *ibid.*, doc. XXVII (a. 1492–93, first three payments of L. 20, L. 28, and L. 82; cf. Dallari, I, p. 150); *ibid.*, doc. XXVIII (a. 1493–94, payments of L. 30, L. 24, L. 32, and L. 112; cf. Dallari, I, p. 153); *ibid.*, doc. XXIX (a. 1494–95, payments of L. 20, L. 22, L. 24, and L. 100; cf. Dallari, I, p. 157); *ibid.*, doc. XXX (a. 1495–96, payments of L. 10, L. 12, L. 13, and L. 52; cf. Dallari, I, p. 160). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 5; Mazzetti, no. 2113; Lines 1996, p. 177; idem 2001b, no. 91.

Lit.: Montalbani, p. 16; Orlandi, p. 52; Fantuzzi, VI, pp. 294–99.

71. Jacobus de Tironibus de Placentia (Giacomo Tirroni): doctorate in Arts on 14-V-1477 and in Medicine on 1-IV-1480; taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1484–85, L. 50). Also taught medicine (1477–78), logic (1480–84), and medicine (1485–86).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. XIX (four payments of L. 12 s. 10 each; cf. Dallari, I, p. 124). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 93 (who confuses him with Jacobus de Burgo); Cristiani, no. 334; Lines 1996, p. 177.

72. Bartholomaeus de Rotis (Bartolomeo dalle Rode; priest, rector of St. Lucia): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1489–1506; first year without salary, but thereafter L. 50*). Also taught logic (1458–62, 1468–71).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. XXIV (a. 1489–90, *non est tassatus*; cf. Dallari, I, p. 140); *ibid.*, doc. XXV (a. 1490–91, payments of L. 5, L. 4 s. 15 [*punctatus* s. 15], L. 6 s. 10, and L. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 143); *ibid.*, doc. XXVI (a. 1491–92, payments of L. 5, L. 5, L. 5, and L. —; cf. Dallari, I, p. 147); *ibid.*, doc. XXVII (a. 1492–93, three payments of L. 5 each; cf. Dallari, I, p. 150); *ibid.*, doc. XXVIII (a. 1493–94, payments of L. 7 s. 10, L. 6, L. 8, and L. 5; cf. Dallari, I, p. 153); *ibid.*, doc. XXIX (a. 1494–95, payments of L. 4 s. 5 [*punctatus* s. 15], L. 5 s. 10, L. 6, and L. 7; cf. Dallari, I, p. 157); *ibid.*, doc. XXX (a. 1495–96, payments of L. 5, L. 6, L. 6 s. 10, and L. 5; cf. Dallari, I, p. 160); *ibid.*, doc. XXXI (a. 1496–97, payments of L. 4, L. 5, L. 5, and L. 7; cf. Dallari, I, p. 163); *ibid.*, cart. 34, doc. I (a. 1497–98, payments of L. 4, L. — [*punctatus*], L. — [*punctatus*], and L. 5 [*punctatus* L. 3]; cf. Dallari, I, p. 167); *ibid.*, doc. II (a. 1498–99, payments of L. 4 s. 10 [*punctatus* s. 15], L. 5, s. 5 [*punctatus*

* I have no explanation for the fact that the actual payments, during the last part of the fifteenth century and the first part of the sixteenth, are so often only a fraction of the promised salary, for Bartolomeo as for many other teachers.

s. 15], L. 6, and L. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 170); *ibid.*, doc. III (a. 1499–1500, payments of L. 6, L. 4, L. 5, and L. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 174); *ibid.*, doc. IV (a. 1500–01, payments of L. 4, L. 3, L. 4, and L. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 175); *ibid.*, doc. V (a. 1501–02, payments of L. 5, L. 5, L. 5, and L. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 178); *ibid.*, doc. VI (a. 1502–03, payments of L. 5, L. 5, L. 5, and L. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 181); *ibid.*, doc. VII (a. 1503–04, payments of L. 5, L. 4, L. 4, and L. 2 s. 10; cf. Dallari, I, p. 185); *ibid.*, doc. VIII (a. 1504–05, payments of L. 3, L. 4, L. 4, and L. 20; cf. Dallari, I, p. 188); Dallari, I, p. 191 (roll, 3-X-1505; no payment records survive for this year). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 30; Lines 1996, p. 177.

73. Petrus Maria de Sassuno (Pier Maria Sassoni): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 26-VI-1492; taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1496–1505, promised L. 100). Also taught logic (1492–96) and medicine (1505–12).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 4; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 33, doc. XXXI (a. 1496–97, payments of L. 8, L. 10, L. 10, and L. 14; cf. Dallari, I, p. 163); *ibid.*, cart. 34, doc. I (a. 1497–98, payments of L. 8, L. 10, L. 10, and L. 16; cf. Dallari, I, p. 167); *ibid.*, doc. II (a. 1498–99, payments of L. 10, L. 12, L. 12, and L. 20; cf. Dallari, I, p. 170); *ibid.*, doc. III (a. 1499–1500, payments of L. 12, L. 8, L. 10, and L. 20; cf. Dallari, I, p. 174); *ibid.*, doc. IV (a. 1500–01, payments of L. 8, L. 6, L. 8, and L. 20; cf. Dallari, I, p. 175); *ibid.*, doc. V (a. 1501–02, payments of L. 10, L. 10, L. 10, and L. 20; cf. Dallari, I, p. 178); *ibid.*, doc. VI (a. 1502–93, payments of L. 10, L. 10, L. 10, and L. 20; cf. Dallari, I, p. 181); *ibid.*, doc. VII (a. 1503–04, payments of L. 10, L. 8, L. 8, and L. 19; cf. Dallari, I, p. 185); *ibid.*, doc. VIII (a. 1504–05, payments of L. 6, L. 8, L. 8, and L. 20; cf. Dallari, I, p. 188). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, pp. 157–58; Cristiani, no. 308; Lines 1996, p. 177.

74. Philippus (Porcatius) de Bagnocavallo, O.F.M. (Filippo Porcacci da Bagnocavallo, † 1511): taught *metaphysica* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1507–10, promised L. 300). Also taught *metaphysica* (1506–07).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 34, doc. X (a. 1507–08, payments of L. 30, L. 15, and L. 24; cf. Dallari, I, p. 198); *ibid.*, doc. XI (a. 1508–09, received a December 1509 payment of L. 138; cf. Dallari, I, pp. 201, 202); *ibid.*, doc. XII (a. 1509–10, received a payment of L. 30 in March 1510; cf. Dallari, I, p. 205). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 25; Mazzetti, p. 251; Lines 1996, p. 177.

Lit.: Sbaralea, II, pp. 383–84; *ABI*, I 804, 390 (Di Crollalanza).

75. Angelus Aretinus, O. Serv. (Angelo da Arezzo): appointed to teach *metaphyisca* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1507–08, promised L. 100, but was not paid and perhaps did not teach). Also taught *metaphysica* (1506–07).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 198 (roll, 22-IX-1507; cf. Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 34, doc. X: payments of L. — [*punctatus* L. 27], L. — [*non legit*], and L. — [*punctatus* L. 27]). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, p. 7; Lines 1996, p. 177.

76. Hieronymus Gadius (de Gaggio), O.F.M. (Geronimo Capazzelli o Capacelli da Gaggio, † 3-XI-1529): doctorate in Theology on 27-II-1506; taught *metaphysica* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1510–12, promised L. 100 in 1511–12). Also taught metaphysics alone (1512–30; but died before completing his last year of teaching).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 209 (roll, 3-X-1510; no payments survive for this year); Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 34, doc. XIII (a. 1511–12, payments of L. 10 in August and L. 10 in October; cf. Dallari, I, p. 212). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, pp. 98–99; Lines 1996, p. 177.

Lit.: Montalbani, p. 88; Orlandi, p. 175; Fantuzzi, IV, p. 14; Sbaralea, I, p. 365.

77. Albertus Fantinus de Bononia, O.F.M. (Alberto Fantini): doctorate in Theology on 6-VI-1502; taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1512–14, but does not appear in the payments and perhaps did not teach).

Sources: Dallari, I, p. 215 (roll, 9-IX-1512; not in Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 35, doc. I); *ibid.*, II, p. 5 (roll, 3-X-1513; not in Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 35, doc. II). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 10; Lines 1996, p. 178.

Lit.: Sbaralea, I, p. 7; *CALMA*, p. 113.

78. Petrus Pomponatius de Mantua (Pietro Pomponazzi detto il Peretto, 1462–1525): doctorate in Medicine in Padua by 1496; in Bologna, taught *philosophia ordinaria de sero* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1514–21; L. 900 in 1514–15; L. 1400 in 1515–19; L. 2100 in 1519–21). Also taught natural philosophy alone there (1511–14, 1521–25). Pomponazzi also taught in Padua (1488–96), at the court of Prince Alberto Pio in Carpi (1496–99), again in Padua (1499–1509), and in Ferrara (1509).

Sources: Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 35, doc. III (a. 1514–15, four payments of L. 225 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 8); *ibid.*, doc. IV (a. 1515–16, four payments of L. 350 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 11); *ibid.*, doc. V (a. 1516–17, four payments of L. 350 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 15); *ibid.*, doc. VI (a. 1517–18, four payments of L. 350 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 18); *ibid.*, doc. VII (a. 1518–19, four payments of L. 350 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 21); *ibid.*, doc. VIII (a. 1519–20, four payments of L. 525 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 25); *ibid.*, doc. IX (a. 1520–21, four payments of L. 525 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 28); Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 35, docs. III (a. 1514–15), VIII (a. 1519–20). Cf. Alidosi 1623b, pp. 63–64; Mazzetti, no. 2516; Lines 1996, p. 178; idem 2001b, no. 141.

Lit.: Tiraboschi, VII, p. 614; Lohr, RLAC, pp. 347–62; *CHRPh*, pp. 833–34; *DCLI*, III, pp. 496–503 (G. Santinello); *REPh*, VII, pp. 529–33 (M. L. Pine). Nardi 1965, Poppi 1970b, Pagnoni Sturlese 1977, Pine 1986, Olivieri 1990, Copenhaver and Schmitt, pp. 103–12, Kristeller 1996c, Kraye 1999c.

79. Johannes Baptista de Milanis (Gian Battista Milani): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 19-X-1507; taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1515–17, L. 200).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 10; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 35, doc. IV (a. 1515–16, four payments of L. 50 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 11); *ibid.*, doc. V (a. 1516–17, four payments of L. 50 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 15). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 178.

80. Julius Valerianus (Giulio Valeriano Bonomi): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 21-VII-1514; also doctorate in Theology (?); taught *rhetorica et poesia de mane* and *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1520–28, promised L. 100 in 1524–25). Also taught rhetoric (1507–14), logic and rhetoric (1514–15), and rhetoric (1515–20).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 13; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 35, doc. IX (a. 1520–21, four payments of L. 25 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 28); *ibid.*, doc. X (a. 1521–22, four payments of L. 25 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 32); *ibid.*, doc. XI (a. 1522–23, four payments of L. 25 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 35); *ibid.*, doc. XII (a. 1523–24, four payments of L. 25 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 39); *ibid.*, doc. XIII (a. 1524–25, four payments of L. 25 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 42); *ibid.*, doc. XIV (a. 1525–26, three payments of L. 25 each but nothing in the second term; cf. Dallari, II, p. 46); *ibid.*, doc. XV (a. 1526–27, three payments of L. 25 each but nothing in the third term; cf. Dallari, II, p. 49); *ibid.*, doc. XVI (a. 1527–28, four payments of L. 25; Dallari, II, p. 52). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 98; Chines, no. 262; Lines 1996, p. 178.

Lit.: Orlandi, p. 182; Fantuzzi, II, pp. 308–09.

Note: Bonomi's lectures in moral philosophy attracted few students. Of considerable interest is the author's statement, in the prologue to Bonomi 1525 and quoted in Fantuzzi, that: "Quare cum per septennium ultra decennium humaniora studia fuissem in Alma Studiorum Matre Bononia professus, posthaec Palladia Corona et Lauro Philosophica quamvis indigne decoratus, ad hanc philosophiam prae caeteris me contuli, eamque iam per quinquennium publice legens suscitare studui, sed frustra."

[Moral philosophy is not recorded between 1528 and 1562]

81. Claudius Bettus (Claudio Betti, † 4-I-1589): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 25-VIII-1545; taught *philosophia moralis ordinaria de mane (in tertiis)* (1562–63, L. 300), *philosophia moralis ordinaria (post tertiam)* (1563–67, L. 300), *philosophia ordinaria de sero* (and *philosophia moralis*) (1569–70, L. 400), *philosophia ordinaria de mane* (and *philosophia moralis*) (1579–80, L. 700). Also taught logic (1545–50) and natural philosophy (1550–62, 1567–69, 1570–79, 1580–89).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 37; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 37, docs. I–IV (a. 1562–63, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Senato, Partiti, no. 8, f. 15v; Dallari, II, p. 156); *ibid.*, docs. V–VIII (a. 1563–64, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 159); *ibid.*, docs. IX–XII (a. 1564–65, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 161); *ibid.*, docs. XIII–XVI (a. 1565–66, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 164); *ibid.*, docs. XVII–XIX (a. 1566–67, three surviving payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 167);

ibid., docs. XXVIII–XXXI (a. 1569–70, four payments of L. 100 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 176); *ibid.*, docs. LXVII–LXX (a. 1579–80; cf. Dallari, II, p. 203). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, pp. 41–42; Mazzetti, no. 464; Lines 1996, p. 178; idem 2001b, no. 166.

Lit.: Orlandi, p. 88; Fantuzzi, II, pp. 163–66; Ferrari, p. 109; *DBI*, IX (1967), pp. 713–14 (G. Stabile); Lohr, RLAC, pp. 42–43.

Note: For Betti's teaching of and commentary on the *Ethics*, see above, § 8.3 and below, Appendix C, no. 87.

82. Johannes Baptista Mantechitus (de Maltachetis) (Giovan Battista Mantacheti, † 15-II-1573): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 23-XII-1558; taught *philosophia moralis ordinaria (post tertiam)* (1567–73, L. 200 in 1567–68; L. 300 in 1568–73). Also taught logic (1559–62) and medicine (1562–67).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 56; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 37, docs. XX–XXIII (a. 1567–68, four payments of L. 50 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 170); *ibid.*, docs. XXIV–XXVII (a. 1568–69, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 173); *ibid.*, docs. XXVIII–XXXI (a. 1569–70, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 176); *ibid.*, docs. XXXII–XXXV (a. 1570–71, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 179); *ibid.*, docs. XXXVI–XXXIX (a. 1571–72, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 182); *ibid.*, docs. XL–XLIII (a. 1572–73, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 185). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 110; Lines 1996, p. 178.

Note: A disputation of his from 24-X-1559 survives in Riformatori, no. 59 (Tesi e dispute di scolari e dottori, Artisti), doc. 12 (see Salterini 1997, p. 157).

83. Gaspar Melarius (Petramellaria) (Gaspare Melara o Melari, b. ca. 1544, † 2-I-1576): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 19-XII-1568; taught *philosophia moralis ordinaria* (1573–76, L. 200). Also taught logic (1569–73).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 71; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 37, docs. XLIV–XLVI (a. 1573–74, three surviving payments of L. 50 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 187); *ibid.*, docs. XLVII–L (a. 1574–75, four payments of L. 50 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 190); *ibid.*, docs. LI–LIV (a. 1575–76, four payments of L. 50 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 193). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 111; Lines 1996, pp. 178–79.

84. Antonius Gaggius Mantuanus (Antonio Gaggio, † 3-XII-1584): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 7-II-1561; taught *philosophia moralis ordinaria (post tertiam* or *quarta hora matutina)* (1576–85, L. 300 in 1576–81; L. 600 in 1581–84; not paid in 1584–85 and probably did not teach then). Also taught logic (1562–67) and natural philosophy (1567–76).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 60; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 37, docs. LV–LVIII (a. 1576–77, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 195); *ibid.*, docs. LIX–LXII (a. 1577–78, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 198); *ibid.*, docs. LXIII–LXVI (a. 1578–79, four payments of L. 75 each;

cf. Dallari, II, p. 201); *ibid.*, docs. LXVII–LXX (a. 1579–80, four payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 203); *ibid.*, docs. LXXI–LXXIII (a. 1580–81, three surviving payments of L. 75 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 206); *ibid.*, docs. LXXIV–LXXVII (a. 1581–82, three payments of L. 150 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 209); *ibid.*, doc. LXXVIII (a. 1582–83, one surviving payment, on 31-III-1583, of L. 150; cf. Dallari, II, p. 212); *ibid.*, cart. 38, docs. I–III (a. 1583–84, three surviving payments of L. 150 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 215); Dallari, II p. 218 (roll, 3-X-1584; not in Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 38, docs. IV–V). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 14; Mazzetti, no. 1322; Lines 1996, p. 179; idem 2001b, no. 176.

Lit.: Fantuzzi, IV, pp. 15–16; Ferrari, p. 330.

85. Augustinus Galesius (Agostino Galesio o Gallesio, † 7-II-1621): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 22-XII-1567; taught *philosophia moralis (quarta hora matutina)* (1586–92, L. 800 in 1586–88; salary increased to L. 1025 halfway through 1588–89 and until 1590–91; L. 1200 in 1591–92; appointed to read *quintus liber de iustitia et iure* in 1591–92). Also taught logic (1568–72), natural philosophy (1572–75), logic (1592–98), natural philosophy (1598–1613, 1619–21). Galesio supposedly taught in Perugia, then in Pisa (ca. 1575–85), but I have found no evidence for the latter teaching; he did, however, teach philosophy in Pisa in 1614–19.

Sources: Bronzino, p. 70; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 38, docs. IX–XII (a. 1586–87, four payments of L. 200 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 224); *ibid.*, docs. XIII–XV (a. 1587–88, three surviving payments of L. 200 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 227); *ibid.*, docs. XVI–XIX (a. 1588–89, two payments of L. 200 each and two of L. 256 s. 5 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 231); *ibid.*, docs. XX–XXIII (a. 1589–90, four payments of L. 256 s. 5 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 234); *ibid.*, docs. XXIV–XXVII (a. 1590–91, four payments of L. 256 s. 5 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 238); *ibid.*, docs. XXVIII–XXXI (a. 1591–92, four payments of L. 300 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 242). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, pp. 15–16; Fabroni, II, pp. 377–80; Mazzetti, no. 1331 (lists him as reading *lettere umane* in 1603); Lohr, RLAC, p. 157; Barsanti, p. 519; Lines 1996, p. 179; idem 2001b, no. 179.

Lit.: Orlandi, p. 39; Fantuzzi, IV, pp. 22–24; Ferrari, p. 333; Lohr, RLAC, p. 157; Ascanelli, pp. 186–89.

Note: Galesio's appointment to moral philosophy by the Senate on 16-IX-1586 states: "Item ad lecturam philosophiae moralis vacantem per obitum eximii philosophi D. Antonii Gaggi, eligerunt et deputaverunt per suffragium XXVI eximium philosophum et civem bononiensem D. Augustinum Galesium cum stipendio annuo librarum octingentarum solvendarum per ordinarias distributiones DD. Doctorum" (Senato, Partiti, no. 11, f. 136v). A disputation *Ex sermocinalibus, ex activis, ex contemplativis* (from 1565 or 1566) survives in Riformatori, no. 59 (Tesi e dispute di scolari e dottori, Artisti), doc. 17 (see Salterini 1997, p. 157). Galesio also wrote compendia of the *Ethics*; see below, Appendix C, nos. 136–139.

86. Lucius Rossius (Roscius) (Lucio Rossi, † 15-I-1592): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 5-V-1574; taught *philosophia moralis (quarta hora matutina)* (1587–92, *extraordinarie* in 1587–88; L. 100 in 1587–88; L. 200, raised to L. 380 halfway through 1588–89 and until 1590–91; in 1591–92, appointed to teach *quintus liber de iustitia et iure*). Also taught logic (1578–81).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 79; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 38, docs. XIII–XV (a. 1587–88, three surviving payments of L. 25 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 227); *ibid.*, docs. XVI–XIX (a. 1588–89, two payments of L. 50 and two of L. 95 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 231); *ibid.*, docs. XX–XXIII (a. 1589–90, four payments of L. 95 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 234); *ibid.*, docs. XXIV–XXVII (a. 1590–91, four payments of L. 95 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 238); Dallari, II, p. 242 (roll, 3-X-1591; no payment listed in Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 38, docs. XXVIII–XXXI). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 134.

87. Melchior Zoppius (Marchion o Melchiorre Zoppio, † 1634): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 22-IX-1579; taught *philosophia moralis (quarta hora matutina)* (1592–93, *de virtutibus contemplativis*; 1593–94, *de amicitia*; 1594–95, *de felicitate in universali*; 1595–96, *de attinentibus ad virtutes morales*; 1596–97, *de virtutibus moralibus*; 1597–98, *de iustitia*; 1598–99, *de virtutibus contemplativis*; 1599–1600, *de amicitia*; 1600–01, *de felicitate in universali*; 1601–02, *de attinentibus ad virtutes morales*; 1602–03, *de virtutibus moralibus*; L. 800 in 1592–98; salary raised to L. 1000 partway through 1598–99 and until 1602–03). Also taught logic (1581–91) and natural philosophy (1591–92, 1604–34). Also taught logic in Macerata at the beginning of his career.

Sources: Bronzino, p. 86; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 38, docs. XXXII–XXXV (a. 1592–93, four payments of L. 200 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 245); *ibid.*, docs. XXXVI–XXXIX (a. 1593–94, four payments of L. 200 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 249); *ibid.*, docs. XL–XLIII (a. 1594–95, four payments of L. 200 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 253); *ibid.*, docs. XLIV–XLVII (a. 1595–96, four payments of L. 200 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 256); *ibid.*, docs. XLVIII–LI (a. 1596–97, four payments of L. 200 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 259); *ibid.*, docs. LII–LV (a. 1597–98, four payments of L. 200 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 262); *ibid.*, docs. LVI–LIX (a. 1598–99, one payment of L. 200 and three of L. 250 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 264); *ibid.*, docs. LX–LXII (a. 1599–1600, three surviving payments of L. 250 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 268); *ibid.*, docs. LXIII–LXVI (a. 1600–01, four payments of L. 250 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 271); *ibid.*, docs. LXVII–LXX (a. 1601–02, four payments of L. 250 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 275); *ibid.*, docs. LXXI–LXXIV (a. 1602–03, four payments of L. 250 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 278). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, pp. 142–43; Mazzetti, no. 3210; Lines 2001b, no. 192.

Lit.: Montalbani, pp. 166–67; Orlandi, p. 211; Fantuzzi, VIII, pp. 303–08 (p. 304: "Tutta la vita del nostro Zoppio fu impiegata nell'insegnare dalla Cattedra la Filosofia Morale . . ."); Ferrari, p. 706; Ascanelli, pp. 607–10.

Note: Orlandi cites various works of logic and natural and moral philosophy; Fantuzzi refers to a work entitled *La filosofia intiera speculativa e morale. Parafrasi d'Aristotele.* Cf. Risse (no mention).

88. Antonius Gandulphus (Antonio Gandolfo o Gandolfi, † 1627): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 7-III-1589; taught *philosophia moralis (quarta hora matutina)* (1604–05, *de virtutibus contemplativis*; 1605–06, *de amicitia*; 1606–07, *de felicitate in universali*; 1607–08, *de attinentibus ad virtutes morales*; L. 200 throughout). Also taught logic (1596–1603) and letters (1608–1627).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 97; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 38, docs. LXXIX–LXXXII (a. 1604–05, four payments of L. 50 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 285); *ibid.*, docs. LXXXIII–LXXXVI (a. 1605–06, four payments of L. 50 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 289); *ibid.*, docs. LXXXVII–XC (a. 1606–07, four payments of L. 50 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 292); *ibid.*, XCI–XCIV (a. 1607–08, four payments of L. 50 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 296). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, p. 19; Ascanelli, pp. 203–04; Mazzetti, *sub voce.*

89. Caesar Pendasius (Cesare Pendasio): doctorate in Arts on 30-I-1601; taught *philosophia moralis (quarta hora matutina)* (1609–10, *de iustitia et iure*; 1610–11, *de virtutibus contemplativis*; 1611–12, *de amicitia*; L. 1000 in 1609–11 and L. 1100 in 1611–12). Also taught logic (1604–07) and natural philosophy (1607–09, 1612–29).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 107; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 38, docs. XCIX–CII (a. 1609–10, four payments of L. 250 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 304); *ibid.*, docs. CIII–CVI (a. 1610–11, four payments of L. 250 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 307); *ibid.*, docs. CVII–CX (a. 1611–12, four payments of L. 275 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 311). Cf. Mazzetti, *sub voce.*

90. Camillus Baldi (Camillo Baldi, 1550–1637): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 4-II-1572; taught *philosophia moralis* (1612–13). Also taught logic (1576–79), natural philosophy (1579–8), logic (1586–90), and again natural philosophy (1590–1636).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 75; Bologna, BU 2318, f. 156v ("... cum libri huius explicationem die 10 Novembris anni 1612 incepissem..."; cf. Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 39, docs. I–IV [a. 1612–13], L. 1650, subject not specified; Dallari, II, p. 315 [teacher of moral philosophy not specified]). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, pp. 44–45; Mazzetti, no. 287 (states that he was appointed to *medicina theorica* in 1576, and *Umanità* in 1603); Lohr, RLAC, p. 29; Lines 2001b, no 187.

Lit.: See below, Appendix C, nos. 140 and 141 (authored a translation and commentary on the *Ethics*).

91. Johannes Elephantucius (Giovanni Fantuzzi, † 1648): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 16-XII-1604; taught *philosophia moralis (quarta hora matutina)* (1614–15, *de virtutibus moralibus*; 1615–16, *de iustitia et iure*; 1616–17, *de virtutibus contemplativis*; 1617–18, *de amicitia*; 1618–19, *de felicitate in universum*; 1619–20, *de attinentibus ad virtutes morales*; 1620–21, *de virtutibus moralibus*; 1621–22, *de iustitia et iure*; L. 300, raised to L. 500 partway through 1614–15 and until 1619–20; salary raised to L. 600 in 1620–21 and until 1621–22).

Also taught logic (1607–10), medicine (1610–12), and natural philosophy (1612–14, 1622–49).

Sources: Bronzino, p. 110; Riformatori, Quartironi, cart. 39, docs. IX–XII (a. 1614–15, first payment of L. 75; three remaining payments of L. 125 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 322); *ibid.*, docs. XIII–XVI (a. 1615–16, four payments of L. 125 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 326); *ibid.*, docs. XVII–XX (a. 1616–17, four payments of L. 125 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 330); *ibid.*, docs. XXI–XXIV (a. 1617–18, four payments of L. 125 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 334); *ibid.*, docs. XXV–XXVIII (a. 1618–19, four payments of L. 125 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 338); *ibid.*, docs. XXIX–XXXII (a. 1619–20, four payments of L. 125 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 342); *ibid.*, docs. XXXIII–XXXVI (a. 1620–21, first payment of L. 125 and remaining three payments of L. 150 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 346); *ibid.*, docs. XXXVII–XL (a. 1621–22, four payments of L. 150 each; cf. Dallari, II, p. 351). Cf. Alidosi 1623a, pp. 121–22 (doctorate on 20-XII).

Lit.: Ferrari, p. 295; *IBNH*, LXVIII (1994), p. 336.

Florence–Pisa

—*Table of abbreviated sources*:

ASPi, G.77 = ASPi, Università, II° versamento, G.77.
Bigazzi 109 = Florence, BMoreniana, ms. Bigazzi 109 (a. 1506–1543).
Corte d'Appello, ms. 3 = Florence, BNC, Corte d'Appello, ms. 3 (a. 1543–1568).

92. Franciscus de Conegliano (Francesco da Conegliano): *doctor Medicinae* by 1364; taught *philosophia in nonis* and *ethica diebus festivis* (1365–66, 1367–68, fl. aur. 90; elected at fl. aur. 100 for 1366–67 including fl. 10 for ethics, but declines to teach ethics and accepts a cut in salary), *philosophia* and *ethica (quodlibet) diebus festivis* (1368–69, fl. 90), *philosophia* and *ethica magna diebus festivis* (1369–70, fl. 100). Also taught an unspecified subject (1361–62), logic and philosophy (1362–63), philosophy (1363–64), medicine and philosophy (1364–65), and philosophy (1366–67).

Sources: Park, pp. 260 (a. 1365–66), 261 (a. 1366–67), 262 (a. 1367–68), 263 (a. 1368–69), 264 (a. 1369–70); Gherardi, pp. 332 (a. 1362–63); 299, 304, 312 (1364–65); 315, 319, 321, 324 (a. 1366–67); 326, 331 (a. 1367–68); 335, 339 (a. 1368–69). Cf. Lines 1996, pp. 167–68.

93. Alexander de Sancto Elpidio (Alessandro da Sant'Elpidio): taught *philosophia moralis (lectura universitatis)* (1388–89).

Sources: Abbondanza, p. 98 (3-VI-1388; election and acceptance, but no surviving payments). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 168.

Lit.: *ABI*, I 28, 326–33 (Casati, Jöcher, Vecchietti).

Note: Alessandro apparently took part in reforming the statutes for the Florentine *studium* (Gherardi, pp. 4, 12).

94. Johannes Baldi de Faventia (Giovanni Baldi da Faenza, † 1424): doctorate in Medicine on 20-X-1391; taught *philosophia naturalis et moralis* (1391–92, paid fl. aur. 95 in three *stanziamenti*), *medicina in nonis* and *philosophia naturalis et moralis* (1392–93; 1394–95, fl. aur. 100; 1395–96, fl. aur. 120), *medicina in nonis* and *philosophia moralis in festis* (1396–97, fl. aur. 90). Also taught medicine (1397–1403, 1414–15, 1416–20, 1421–22), an unspecified subject (1422–23), medicine and surgery (1423–24). Also taught philosophy in Bologna, ca. 1385–89.

Sources: Davies, pp. 27n, 157; Spagnesi, pp. 120, 127, 132 (a. 1391–92, *stanziamenti* of fl. aur. 30 [23-XII-1391], fl. aur. 17.5 [13-III-1392] and fl. aur. 47.5 [2-VII-1392]); 154 (elections, 17-IX-1392); 203, 216 (a. 1394–95, *stanziamenti* of fl. aur. 50 each on 22-III-1395, 13-VIII-1395); 222, 241–42, 244, 262 (a. 1395–96; election, 19-VIII-1395; payments of fl. 60 each on 11-II-1396 and on 17-VIII-1396; initially appointed only to medicine and moral philosophy at fl. 100, his salary is raised because of teaching natural philosophy as well); 258 (election, 17-VIII-1396 and acceptance on 28-VIII). Cf. Park, *ad indicem*; Gherardi, *ad indicem*; Lines 2001b, no. 19.

95. Bartolus ser Petri de Plumbino (Bartolo da Piombino), *artium doctor*: taught *philosophia moralis* and *logica* (1393–94, promised fl. aur. 30, but paid fl. 15). Also taught logic (1391–92) and natural philosophy (1392–93).

Sources: Spagnesi, pp. 184, 196 (received fl. 7.5 *pro parte solutionis ultimorum sex mensium* on 19-XII-1394 and another fl. 7.5 *pro parte solutionis ultimorum sex mensium et integra solutione et plenaria satisfactione sui salarii dicti anni 1393* on 22-III-1395). Cf. Gherardi, p. 361; Lines, 1996, p. 168.

96. Nicolaus ser Nicolai de Venetiis (Niccolò da Venezia): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1393–94, 1395–96, fl. 25).

Sources: Spagnesi, pp. 182, 194 (received fl. 6.25 on 19-XII-1394 and 8-III-1395 *pro parte eius salarii ultimorum sex mensium . . .*); 222, 238, 263 (election, 19-VIII-1395; paid fl. 12.5 on 11-II-1396; the *stanziamento* for 17-VIII-1396 is blank). Cf. Lines, 1996, p. 168.

97. Galileus Johannis Galilei (Galileo Galilei): taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1395–96, fl. 25). Also elected to teach medicine (1402–03).

Sources: Spagnesi, pp. 240, 263 (paid fl. 12.5 on 11-II-1396; his *stanziamento* of 17-VIII-1396 is left blank). Cf. Gherardi, p. 377; Lines, 1996, p. 168; Davies, *ad indicem* (states that Galileo taught for at least 5 years).

98. Bartholomaeus magistri Ludovici de Eugubio (Bartolomeo da Gubbio): taught *philosophia moralis* (1396–97, *sine salario*). Also elected to teach medicine (1402–03).

Sources: Spagnesi, p. 258 (elections of 17-VIII-1396). Cf. Gherardi, pp. 376–77; Lines, 1996, p. 168.

99. Thommasus Donati de Florentia (Tommaso di maestro Donato da Firenze): doctorate in Arts and Medicine on 31-VIII-1402; taught *philosophia moralis* (1396–97, *sine salario*). Also elected to teach medicine (1402–03).

Sources: Davies, p. 158; Spagnesi, p. 258 (elections of 17-VIII-1396). Cf. Gherardi, pp. 376–77; Lines, 1996, p. 168.

[Only fragmentary documentation survives for the University of Florence, ca. 1397–1413.]

100. Antonius ms. Johannis Rosselli de Aretio (Antonio Roselli): taught *philosophia naturalis et moralis* (1414–15, fl. 120). Also taught an unspecified subject (1415–17) and medicine (1418–21, 1429–33, 1439–40).

Sources: Park, p. 273. Cf. Park, *ad indicem*; Lines, 1996, p. 168; Davies, *ad indicem*.

Note: This figure is not to be confused with Ms. Antonio del ms. Rosello Roselli da Arezzo, a jurist teaching in Florence during the same years.

101. Augustinus Favaroni de Roma, O.E.S.A. (Agostino Favaroni, 1360–1443): taught *philosophia moralis* (1416–17, 1418–19, fl. 100). Also taught an unspecified subject (1415–16). Possibly the same as the Agostino appointed to theology for 1435–36.

Sources: Park, pp. 275 (a. 1416–17), 277 (a. 1418–19). Cf. Gherardi, p. 442; Lines, 1996, p. 169.

Note: Favaroni's lectures on the *Ethics* from 1416 survive; see below, Appendix C, no. 25.

102. Marcus Paulus magistri Paulini de Verona (Marco Paolo da Verona): taught *philosophia moralis* (1417–18).

Sources: Park, p. 276. Cf. Lines, 1996, p. 169.

103. Andreas Pieri (de Billis) de Mediolano, O.E.S.A. (Andrea Biglia, ca. 1395–1435): taught *philosophia moralis* (1419–20, fl. 50), *philosophia naturalis et moralis* (1420–21, fl. 30; 1421–22, fl. 35), *philosophia moralis, poesia et rhetorica* (1422–23, fl. 30). Also taught natural and moral philosophy in Bologna (1424–28), then taught in Siena (1429–35).

Sources: Park, pp. 278 (a. 1419–20), 279 (a. 1420–21), 280 (a. 1421–22, 1422–23); Gherardi, p. 402 (a. 1422–23). Cf. Lines, 1996, p. 169; idem 2001b, no. 51.

Note: For Biglia's Bolognese career, see above, no. 30. For literature and his translation of the *Ethics*, see Appendix C, no. 27.

104. Hieronymus Laurentii de Neapoli, O.E.S.A. (Girolamo da Lorenzo da Napoli): taught *philosophia naturalis et moralis* (1431–32, fl. 60). Also taught an unspecified subject (1428–29) and natural philosophy (1429–31, 1432–33, 1434–36).

Sources: Park, p. 288 (a. 1431–32); Gherardi, p. 414 (elections, 23-X-1431). Cf. Park, *ad indicem*; Gherardi, *ad indicem*; Lines, 1996, p. 169; Davies, p. 30n.

Lit.: Della Torre 1902, pp. 201–02.

105. Franciscus Philelphus (Francesco Filelfo, 1398–1481): taught *rhetorica et poesia ordinaria* and *Dante et philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1431–34, fl. 350). Also taught an unspecified subject (1428–29), rhetoric and poetry (1429–31), appointed to philosophy and Greek letters for 1481–82, but died before taking up the post. Also taught in Bologna (1427–28) and Milan.

Sources: Park, pp. 280 (a. 1431–32), 290 (a. 1432–33, 1433–34); Gherardi, pp. 413–15 (elections, 23-X-1431; Filelfo not mentioned), 424 (elections, 17-XI-1432; Filelfo listed only for rhetoric and poetry, at a salary of fl. 225); Verde, I, p. 315 (roll, 31-VII-1481); II, p. 222 (*condotta*, 23-III-1481). Cf. Park, *ad indicem*; Gherardi, *ad indicem*; Field 1983, pp. 35–37; Lines, 1996, p. 169; Davies, pp. 83–85, 110–12 and *ad indicem*. For Filelfo's teaching in Bologna, see above, no. 35.

Note: Filelfo's opening lecture for his course on the *Ethics* is preserved; for it and the literature, see Appendix C, no. 28.

106. Carolus ms. Gregorii de Aretio (Carlo Marsuppini, 1398–1453): taught *poesia, rhetorica, philosophia, lectura graeca et ethica* (1431–32, fl. 140), *poesia, rhetorica, lectura graeca et ethica* (1434–35, fl. 150). Also taught poetry, possibly along with rhetoric (1435–37); received a payment in February 1451.

Sources: Park, p. 288 (a. 1431–32), 291 (a. 1434–35); Gherardi, pp. 414 (elections, 23-X-1431); 440–41 (elections, 5-X-1435). Cf. Park, *ad indicem*; Field 1983, pp. 32–33; Lines, 1996, p. 169; Davies, p. 112, n. 28; p. 178.

Lit.: Cosenza, I, pp. 268–71; Field 1983, p. 49, nn. 5–9.

107. Simon de Venturinis, O.P. (Simone Venturini): taught *philosophia ordinaria* and *ethica* (1438–39, fl. 30 for the first and fl. 15 for the second).

Sources: Park, p. 296. Cf. Lines 1996, p. 169.

108. Taddaeus Johannis, *sacerdos* (Taddeo di Giovanni da Firenze, prete): taught *logica ordinaria, ethica, politica moralis,* and *philosophia* (1439–40, fl. 30). Also taught logic (1438–39).

Sources: Park, p. 297. Cf. Park, p. 296; Lines 1996, p. 169.

109. Guillelmus Becchius Florentinus, O.E.S.A. (Guglielmo Becchi, 1411–1491?): taught Aristotle's *Ethics* (1455–56) and possibly also the *Economics*

and *Politics*. Also taught logic (1438–39), theology (1440), philosophy (1441–42, 1445–46), subject unspecified (1449–51), and received payments for unspecified years in October 1454, February 1459, and July 1460. Was bishop of Fiesole, 1470–80.

Sources: For Becchi's lectures on the *Ethics*, see Appendix C, no. 33. Cf. Gherardi, p. 461; Park, *ad indicem*; Lines 1996, p. 169; Davies, pp. 95n, 189.

Lit.: See Appendix C, no. 33.

110. Nicolaus Tignosius Fulginas (Niccolò Tignosi, † 1474): probably taught the *Ethics*, ca. 1460. Also elected to teach medicine (1438–40, 1444–46); subject unspecified (1451–52). Also paid in June and October 1450 and taught medicine and philosophy in Pisa in 1473–74. Taught logic in Bologna, at least 1426–27.

Sources: Gherardi, pp. 444, 461; Kristeller 1937, p. LIV; Park, pp. 295, 297, 302, 303; Verde, II, pp. 504–05; Davies, p. 195. Cf. Field 1988, p. 140.

Note: For the literature and Tignosi's commentary on the *Ethics*, see Appendix C, no. 40 and above, § 5.2.

111. Johannes Argyropoulos (1415–1487): doctorate in Arts in Padua in 1444; taught *philosophia moralis* (Feb. 1457–ca. Oct. 1458, fl. 350; lectured on all ten books of the *Ethics* and possibly—but for this the evidence is not persuasive—on the *Politics* and *Economics*). Also taught dialectics (probably at home, in concurrence with the course on the *Ethics*), natural philosophy, and metaphysics (1457–71, but surviving payments go only through 1468); taught again from May 1, 1477 to April 1481. Also taught in Rome (1471–77).

Sources: Di Fonzo 1986, pp. 172–73; Gherardi, pp. 467, 489, 492, 271; Verde, II, pp. 316–21; IV.1, pp. 273–74; Verde 1974; Davies, pp. 121, 186–88 (paid L. 466, s. 13, d. 4 on 28-VI-1457; idem on 7-VIII-1458). Cf. I. Maïer 1966, p. 25, n. 27; Seigel 1969; Field 1983, pp. 35, 41–47; idem 1988, pp. 107–26; Lines 1996, pp. 169–70; Hankins (forthcoming).

Note: For the literature on Argyropoulos and his works on the *Ethics* see Appendix C, at nos. 35–37.

[N.B.: In 1473, most of the *studium*'s teachings were transferred to Pisa]

112. Demetrius Atheniensis (Chalcondyles, 1423–1511): in Florence, taught *philosophia moralis Aristotelis* and *lectura graeca* (1482–86, fl. 200); invited to teach *philosophia moralis graece et latine* (1500–01, fl. 300), but *non venit*. Also taught rhetoric (ca. 1475–81), philosophy and Greek letters (1481–82), philosophy in Greek (1486–89), rhetoric (1489–91).

Sources: Verde, I, p. 318 (roll, 5-VI-1482); *ibid.*, V, pp. 148–57 (a. 1482–83, *terzerie* of fl. 66.13.4 each); *ibid.*, I, p. 321 (roll, 18-VI-1483); *ibid.*, V, pp. 161–174 (a. 1483–84, *terzerie* as above); *ibid.*, I, p. 324 (roll, 29-VII-1484);

ibid., V, pp. 175–187 (a. 1484–85, *terzerie* as above); *ibid.*, I, p. 327 (roll, 27-VII-1485, subject not specified); *ibid.*, V, pp. 190–202 (a. 1485–86, *terzerie* as above); *ibid.*, I, p. 374 (roll, 26-IX-1500). Cf. I. Maïer 1966, pp. 31–34; Verde, II, pp. 178–79; Del Gratta, p. 482 (lists only the abortive 1500–01 invitation); Lines 1996, p. 170.

Lit.: Verde, II, p. 178; Geanakoplos 1976, pp. 231–65; Hunt 1990–98.

113. Angelus Politianus (Angelo Poliziano di Montepulciano, b. 1454, † 29-IX-1494): in Florence, taught the *Ethics* (1490–91, probably also 1491–92, fl. 450). Also taught rhetoric (ca. 1480–94), including dialectic.

Sources: Prolusion on the *Ethics* first printed in 1491; annotations on the *Ethics* from 1491–92. See Verde, I, p. 345 (roll, July 1491); *ibid.*, IV.2, pp. 945–53; *ibid.*, V, pp. 277–88; Cesarini Martinelli 1996, pp. 476–78 (quotes from Paris, BN graec. 3069, f. 120v: "Excerpsi hoc residuum librorum Dionis 1491 mai mensis 18 hora 15. Reliquos adhuc libros non sum nactus, in Manto autem sunt priores. In Sancti Pauli Florentiae ego Politianus, quo anno Suetonium et Ethica Aristotelis interpretabar, hoc est tertium et quintum librum de iustitia."). Cf. I. Maïer 1966; Verde, II, pp. 26–29; Lines 1996, pp. 170–71; Cesarini Martinelli 1996.

Note: For the literature and Poliziano's prolusion to his course on the *Ethics*, see Appendix C, no. 48.

114. Oliverius Michaelis de Senis (Oliviero Senese): in Florence, taught *una philosophia quam volet* (1491–93, *sine salario*), *philosophia moralis* (1497–98, fl. 40, started teaching in April 1498), *philosophia ordinaria et philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1498–1500, fl. 80; starting in 1499, taught in Pisa). Also taught logic in Pisa (1501–03).

Sources: Verde, II, pp. 520–23; IV, p. 1018 (a. 1491–92); *ibid.*, I, p. 365 (undated roll from 1497); *ibid.*, IV, pp. 1305–09 and V, pp. 351–64 (a. 1497–98); *ibid.*, I, p. 369 (roll, 22-X-1498); *ibid.*, V, pp. 365–82 (a. 1498–99); *ibid.*, I, p. 371 (roll, 15-VII-[1499]); *ibid.*, IV, pp. 1372, 1375, 1384–91 and V, pp. 383–95 (a. 1499–1500). Cf. Fabroni, I, pp. 321–22; Del Gratta, p. 489.

Lit.: Verde, IV, *passim.*

115. Franciscus Cataneus de Diacceto (Francesco Cattani da Diacceto, 1466–1522): in Florence, taught *philosophia ordinaria de mane* (1502–03, fl. 200, told to read "*De coelo et mundo* aut *Ethicam* vel aliam lecturam philosophiae moralis ad satisfactionem scolarium"), *philosophia moralis et philosophia platonica* (1503–04, fl. 200). Invited to teach philosophy in 1501–02, but did not accept; taught *philosophia ordinaria* also in 1516–21.

Sources: Verde, I, p. 381 (roll, 5-X-1502); *ibid.*, IV, pp. 1460–63; *ibid.*, V, pp. 427–38; Bigazzi 109, ff. 1r–2v (a. 1503–04). Cf. Fabroni, I, pp. 323–24 (who has Diacceto teaching moral philosophy in 1499); Kristeller 1956c; Verde, II, pp. 218–23; Lohr, RLAC, p. 86; Lines 1996, p. 171.

Note: Diacceto's prolusion to his moral philosophy course (a. 1502) survives; see below, Appendix C, no. 61 for it and the literature.

116. Raphael Donati de Franceschis (alias Celatone) de Aretio (Raffaele Franceschi): in Pisa, taught *logica et philosophia moralis* (1509–11, fl. 50), *philosophia extraordinaria et philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1518–23, fl. 70 for natural philosophy and fl. 20 for moral philosophy in 1518–20; fl. 90 for natural philosophy and fl. 30 for moral philosophy in 1520–23). Also taught natural philosophy alone (1515–18, 1523–26).

Sources: Bigazzi 109, ff. 20v (a. 1509–10, *terzerie* of fl. 16, s. 13, d. 4), 23r–24v (a. 1510–11, *terzerie* unvaried); ASF, Studio fiorentino e pisano, n. 8, ff. 133v–134r (roll, 20-X-1518), 134r–135r (27-X-1518), 69r (a. 1518–19), 136r–v (roll, 6-VII-1519), 138v (roll, 11-X-1520), and 98r (a. 1520–21, 3-year appointment). Cf. Del Gratta, p. 485.

[*Studio* in Pisa closed, ca. 1525–1543]

117. Petrus Victorius (Pier Vettori, 1499–1585): in Florence, taught *ethica et litterae graecae* (at least 1578–79, 1580–82, fl. 300). Also taught Latin literature from 1538, Greek literature from 1543, moral philosophy (?) from 1548, unspecified subjects (1556–66), Greek letters (1566–72), Greek and Latin letters (1575–76). Retired from teaching in 1583.

Sources: ASPi, G.77, ff. 188r–190r new pagination (roll, 1578–79), 193r–195r new pagination (roll, 1580–81), 195v–197v new pagination (roll, 1581–82). Cf. Lohr, RLAC, pp. 482–83; Lines 1996, p. 171.

Note: The archival documentation is patchy, since it does not always list the professors teaching in Florence. For Vettori's work on the *Ethics*, see Appendix C, nos. 93 and 94 and above, § 6.3.

118. Ciriacus Strottius (Ciriaco Strozzi, 1504/05–1565): in Pisa, taught *philosophia moralis graeca et alia* (1556–66, fl. 300). Also taught Greek letters in Bologna (1535–36) and in Pisa (1543–56; in 1556, this chair was renamed *philosophia moralis graeca et alia*).

Sources: Corte d'Appello, ms. 3, ff. 32r (undated *stanziamenti*, a. 1556–57), 34r (*stanziamenti*, 14-X-1558), 35v (*stanziamenti*, 24-X-1559), 37v (*stanziamenti*, 29-X-1560), 39v (*stanziamenti*, 31-X-1561), 41v (*stanziamenti*, 16-X-1562), 44v (*stanziamenti*, 5-X-1563), 46v (*stanziamenti*, 24-X-1564), 48v (*stanziamenti*, 20-XI-1565), 50v (*stanziamenti*, 29-XI-1566). Cf. Fabroni, II, pp. 418–22; Barsanti, pp. 535, 565; Lines 1996, p. 171.

Note: For Strozzi's prolusions to the *Ethics*, see Appendix C, nos. 75 and 76 (with bibliography).

119. Petrus Angelius Bargaeus (Pietro Angèli da Barga, 1517–1596): in Pisa, taught *graeca, ethica, politica et alia, hora 17* (1565–66, fl. 300, taking over the teaching of Ciriaco Strozzi), *graeca et latina humanitas* and *ethica et*

politca graeca (1566–67, fl. 300, "leget librum Ethicorum"), *litterae humanae et ethica* (1567–68, fl. 400), *ethica et litterae graecae* and *litterae latinae* (1568–69, teaching "Liber Ethicorum . . ."), *ethica et litterae graecae de mane* and *litterae latinae de sero* (1569–70, fl. 400), *politica et graeca mane* and *latina de sero* (1570–71, fl. 330, teaching "Politica Aristotelis . . ."), *ethica et litterae graecae de sero* and *litterae latinae de sero* (1571–72), *litterae graecae et ethica* in Florence (1590–92, fl. 300). Also taught Greek and Latin letters in 1549–82 (but apparently half-time in 1574–86, and in 1579–80 not at all) and was paid in 1588–96 (but apparently did not teach, 1586–92). Also taught in Reggio Emilia (1546–49).

Sources: ASPi, G.77, f. 159v (a. 1565–66); *ibid.*, f. 163v (a. 1566–67); Corte d'Appello, ms. 3, f. 54v (stanziamenti, 26-XI-1568); ASPi, G.77, ff. 164r–166r, new pag. (roll, 1568–69), 166v–168r, new pag. (roll, 1569–70); ASPi, Università, I° versamento, 173, f. 11v (payments, 30-X-1570); ASPi, G.77, ff. 168v–170r new pag. (roll, 1570–71); ASPi, Università, I° versamento, 174, f. 14r (payments, 30-X-1571); ASPi, G.77, ff. 170v–172v new pag. (roll, 1571–72), 216v new pag. (roll, 1590–91), 218v new pag. (roll, 1591–92). Cf. Fabroni, II, pp. 422–33, 471; Manacorda 1903; Ferrari, p. 32; *DBI*, III (1961), pp. 201–04 (A. Asor-Rosa); Barsanti, pp. 506, 565–66; Lines 1996, pp. 171–72.

120. Rodericus Fonseca Portughensis (Rodrigo Fonseca, † 1622): taught *logica et ethica Aristotelis* (1577–78, fl. 40 for logic + fl. 30 for moral philosophy). Also taught logic (1575–77), natural philosophy (1581–84), medicine (1584–1615). Then taught in Padua and practiced in Venice until his death.

Sources: ASPi, G.77, ff. 185v–187v new pag. (roll). Cf. Fabroni, II, pp. 285–88 (no mention of ethics teaching); Barsanti, p. 519.

121. Dominicus Mancinius Cortonensis (Domenico Mancini, † 1595): taught *graeca et latina* (1583–84, fl. 400, appointed to read "Ethica Aristotelis et Pindarus," replacing Pietro Angeli da Barga). Also taught *graeca et latina* in 1581–83, 1584–86, 1588–92.

Sources: ASPi, G.77, ff. 200v–202v new pag. (roll). Cf. Fabroni, II, pp. 434–36; Barsanti, p. 524; Lines 1996, p. 172.

122. Curtius Cintoletta, *canonicus* (Curzio Cintoletta, † 1632): taught *philosophia moralis* (1607–31).

Sources: Fabroni, II, pp. 375–76; Ferrari, p. 212; Barsanti, pp. 513, 562.

123. Michael Castellius (Michele Castelli): taught *philosophia moralis* (1632–first semester 1634–35).

Sources: Fabroni, III, pp. 126–27; Barsanti, pp. 512, 562.

Note: Fabroni quotes the opinion of the *provveditore* Sommaja on this Spaniard: ". . . cominciò a leggere filosofia morale con sc. 120 e l'ha letta molto bene

con buon metodo, dottrina e lingua, nondimeno ha avuto pochi scolari, perché questa e simili, sebbene letture belle e utili sono a torto poco stimate a Pisa e in molti altri studii ancora."

*Padua**

124. Gaspar de Barziziis (Gasparino Barzizza, 1360–1431): doctorate in Pavia in 1392; taught *philosophia moralis* (12-IX-1407, fl. 100). Also taught grammar and rhetoric (1407–31; offered a five-year contract in 1430).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, f. 310r (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Maiocchi, *ad indicem*; Lines 1996, p. 179.

Lit.: Witt 2000, pp. 462–66 and *passim*; Black 2001, *ad indicem.*

125. Fr. Johannes Baptista, O.E.S.A. (or O. Sti. Aug.): taught *philosophia moralis et logica* (1430–31, duc. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138); Barile, from Padua, BU 1675, II, p. 449. Cf. Facciolati, I, p. 119; Lines 1996, p. 179.

126. Venantius de Camareno (Venanzio da Camerino), *artium doctor*: taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1434–36; unconfirmed candidate for 1436–37).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138); ms. 673, ff. 8r–v (a. 1434–35); ms. 674, ff. 3r–v (a. 1435–36); ms. 674, ff. 30r–31r (July 1436, elections). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 179.

127. Aegidius de Carpo (Egidio da Carpi), *artium doctor*: listed as a candidate for *philosophia moralis* and *rhetorica* (1436–37).

Sources: AAU, ms. 674, ff. 30r–31r (elections, July 1436) but not mentioned in ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v. Cf. Lines 1996, p. 179.

Note: Probably did not teach. He is indicated as *salariatus Bononiae,* is not listed as *approbatus*, and, next to his appointment in rhetoric, is the note *absit.* See above, no. 40.

128. Vincentius de Monforte, *scolaris utriusque facultatis*: taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1436–37, *approbatus ab omnibus*).

Sources: AAU, ms. 674, ff. 30r–31r (elections, July 1436); not in ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v. Cf. Lines 1996, p. 179.

129. Vicusurbanus de Sernano, *artium doctor*: taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* and *logica* (1436–37, *approbatus ab omnibus*).

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* Note that, for fifteenth-century Padua, reliable listings of teachers survive only for the years 1430 and 1434–37.

Sources: AAU, ms. 674, ff. 30r–31r (elections, July 1436); not in ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v. Cf. Lines 1996, p. 179.

130. Laurus Quirinus (Lauro Quirini, ca. 1420–1475/79): taught *philosophia moralis* and *rhetorica* (1452, fl. 40).

Sources: Voigt 1960, I, pp. 424–25; *Lauro Quirini umanista*, p. 13. Cf. Poppi, p. 109; Lines 1996, p. 179.

Lit.: Cosenza, IV, p. 2988; *Lauro Quirini umanista.*

Note: Quirini also taught the *Ethics* in Venice in 1449 (Voigt).

131. Hermolaus Barbarus, Jr. (Ermolao Barbaro, 1453/54–1493): taught *philosophia moralis* (ca. 1474–76, both *Ethics* and *Politics*; perhaps also other years—see below, nos. 132 and 133), *philosophia moralis* and *dialectica* (1483, perhaps privately).

Sources: New York, Columbia Univ. Library, Plimpton ms. 17, f. 176v ("Libros politicorum octo praelegi in gymnasio patavino totumque opus perfeci X kalendas martias MCCCCLXXVI quodque magis mireris tribus mensibus et diebus XVIII completa est interpretatio a nobis duce deo quo etiam auctore superiore anno X libros ethicorum opus a nullo ante me perfectum fueram interpretatus"; cited in Kristeller 1956a, p. 346); AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (27-I-1477; Poppi, p. 138); Venice, BMarc. Gr., IV, 53 (= 936), colophon ("Perlegi universam Dialecticam cum Ethica nonis martii MCCCCLXXXIII, intermissam saepe propter multa quae incurrebant, absolvi hoc spatio, scilicet a vigilia S. Martini ad nonas Martii. Item perlegi denuo. Transtuli ad Martini festum [11 November] exceptis libro 7 . . ."; see Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 252). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 180.

Note: For the literature and Barbaro's compendium on the *Ethics*, see above, § 7.1 and Appendix C, no. 44.

132. Petrus de Roccabonella (Pietro da Roccabonella, † 1491): doctorate in Arts, 1-VII-1449; in Medicine, 1459; taught *philosophia moralis* (1481, replacing Ermolao Barbaro). Also taught philosophy (1450–59), medicine (1459–63, 1465–66), philosophy (1466–75), medicine (1475–91).

Sources: Pesenti 1984, pp. 174–75 (with bibliography); Ghezzo 1990, *ad indicem*. Cf. Facciolati, II, pp. 105, 129–30.

133. Nicolettus Vernias Theatinus (Nicoletto Vernia, † 1499): doctorate in Arts on 30-V-1458; in Medicine on 29-XII-1496; taught *philosophia moralis* (1481, replacing Ermolao Barbaro). Also taught natural philosophy (1465–99).

Sources: Nardi 1958, *passim*; Pesenti 1984, p. 174; Ghezzo 1990, no. 504.

Lit.: Lohr, *Traditio* (1972): 308–09; idem 1988a, pp. 184–85; *CHRPh*, p. 839; *REPh*, IX, pp. 596–99 (E. P. Mahoney); Nardi 1958, pp. 95–126 and the studies by Mahoney, many of which are mentioned in Mahoney 1997.

134. Lorenzo Tosa dagli Orzi Novi: doctorate in Medicine, 1493; taught *philosophia moralis* (1487). Was also rector in 1484.

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 180.

Note: Perhaps the same individual as in no. 135.

135. Laurentius Torta ex Urceis Majoribus: taught *philosophia moralis* 1493).

Source: Facciolati, I, p. 120. Cf. Lines 1996, p. 180.

Note: Perhaps the same individual as in no. 134.

136. Hieronymus Avantius (Girolamo Avanzo, veronese): doctorate in Arts, 29-VII-1494; taught *philosophia moralis* (1494–95).

Sources: Nardi 1958, pp. 159–61.

Note: Avanzo's prolusion survives. See Appendix C, no. 49.

137. Augustinus Niphus Suessanus (Agostino Nifo, 1469/70–1538): doctorate in Arts, ca. 1490/91; taught *philosophia moralis* (1494–96). Also taught natural philosophy (1492–99). Later taught in Naples, Rome, Pisa, Salerno.

Sources: Nardi 1958, p. 161, Gauthier 1970a, pp. 151–52; Poppi, p. 110 and n. 28. Cf. Facciolati, I, pp. 109–10; Lines 1996, p. 180.

Lit.: Lohr, RLAC, pp. 282–87; *CHRPh*, p. 828; *REPh*, VI, pp. 867–72 (E. P. Mahoney); *ER*, IV, pp. 320–21 (J. B. South). Pattin 1991; Mahoney 1997, pp. 143–54 (with bibliography); Godman 1998, pp. 250–55.

138. Venanzio Tosco, cesenate: taught *philosophia moralis* (1496, *con lo stipendio ch'è solito darsi*).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Facciolati, I, p. 120; Lines 1996, p. 180.

139. Giovanni Andrea Ursinico Lusa, trevisano: taught *philosophia moralis* (1496, *col solito stipendio*).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Facciolati, I, p. 120; Lines 1996, p. 180.

140. Paolo Silvio, vicentino: doctorate in Arts, 21-XII-1498; taught *philosophia moralis* (1498).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 180.

141. Petrus Ghelinus Vicentinus (Pietro Ghelino, vicentino): taught *philosophia moralis* (1498).

Source: Facciolati, I, p. 120. Cf. Lines 1996, p. 180.

142. Ludovicus Gavatius (Giovanni Lodovico Gavazio, bresciano): doctorate in Arts, 26-X-1500; taught *philosophia moralis* (1500).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Facciolati, I, p. 120; Lines 1996, p. 180.

143. Jacobus de Troia (Giacomo Filippo, figlio di Antonio da Troia, dalle Pellinegre): taught *philosophia moralis* (14-XI-1500).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Facciolati, I, p. 120; Lines 1996, p. 180.

144. Marco Faella, veronese: doctorate in Arts, 30-X-1501; taught *philosophia moralis* (30-X-1501).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Facciolati, I, p. 120; Lines 1996, p. 180.

145. Bartholomaeus Livius (Bartolomeo Livio, cremonese): doctorate in Arts, 17-XI-1502; taught *philosophia moralis* (17-XI-1502).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Facciolati, I, p. 120; Lines 1996, p. 180.

146. Onofrio Bonafede, di Ancona: taught *philosophia moralis* (10-XII-1502).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Facciolati, I, p. 120; Lines 1996, p. 180.

147. Girolamo Avogari: taught *philosophia moralis* (1503).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Facciolati, I, p. 120; Lines 1996, p. 180.

148. Johannes de Parma Veronensis (Giovanni Parma, veronese): appointed to teach *philosophia moralis* (1509, fl. 15, but studies suspended because of the war of Cambrai).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Facciolati, I, p. 120; Lines 1996, p. 180.

149. Franciscus Frigimelega (Francesco Frigimelica, padovano, ca. 1490–1558): doctorate in Arts and Medicine in 1518; taught *philosophia moralis* (1518–19, fl. 15). Also taught logic (from 1519), natural philosophy (from 1522), and medicine (from 1526 to ca. 1545).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (2-VIII-1518; Poppi, p. 138); ms. 651, ff. 10r–13r (elections, 24-VIII-1518). Cf. Facciolati, I, p. 120; II, p. 313; Vedova, I, pp. 426–33; Lines 1996, pp. 180–81.

150. Rugerius Claudius Neapolitanus (Rugiero Claudio, napoletano): taught *philosophia moralis* (1519–20, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 1r (elections); ms. 651, ff. 26r–27v (payments); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (30-XII-1519; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

151. Dominicus Busius de Carmignolo (Domenico Busio, da Carmignolo): taught *philosophia moralis* (1520–21, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, ff. 26r–27v, 34r–35v (payments, 1521), 37r–38r (roll); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (30-XI-1520; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

152. Antonius Marinus Tarvisinus (Antonio Marini, trevisano): taught *philosophia moralis* (1521–23, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, ff. 34r–35v, 42r–43r (a. 1521–22); 48r–49r (a. 1522–23); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (30-XI-1521; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

153. Palamede Gualdio, da Castrotauro: taught *philosophia moralis* (1523–24, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, ff. 48r–49r; ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (20-XII-1523; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

154. Ludovicus de Sancto Bonifacio Veronensis (Ludovico da S. Bonifazio, veronese): taught *philosophia moralis* (1524–25, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 2r (roll); ms. 651, f. 55r (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (30-XI-1524; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

155. Hieronymus Adornus de Papia (Girolamo Adorno, di Pavia): taught *philosophia moralis* (1525–26, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 3r (roll); ms. 651, f. 60r–v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (30-XI-1525; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

156. Hieronymus Rivola Bergomiensis (Girolamo Rivola, da Bergamo): taught *philosophia moralis* (1526–27, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, ff. 64r–65r (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1526; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

157. Priscianus Carduccius de Lecce (Prisciano Carduccio, da Lezze): taught *philosophia moralis* (1527–29, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, ff. 68r–69v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (30-XI-1527; Poppi, p. 138); ms. 651, ff. 72r–73v (bollettino, 1528–29); cf. ms. 242, f. 4r (incomplete roll, no mention). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

158. Paulus Crassi (de Crassis) Patavinus (Paolo Crasso, padovano, † 1575): doctorate in Medicine in 1529; taught *philosophia moralis* (1529–30, fl. 15). Also taught medicine (ca. 1533–1575?).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, ff. 76r–v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (7-XI-1529; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Vedova, I, pp. 300–03; Lines 1996, p. 181.

159. Tommasus Secundus de Cyprio (Tommaso Secondo, da Cipro): taught *philosophia moralis* (1530–31, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 6r (roll); ms. 651, ff. 86r–87v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (2-XII-1530; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

160. Johannes Antonius Sicus (Giovanni Antonio Secco, da Crema): taught *philosophia moralis* (1531–32, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 5r (roll); ms. 651, ff. 86r–87v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1531; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

161. Benedetto Cocciano, bresciano: taught *philosophia moralis* (1531–32, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (15-I-1532; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

Note: Possibly replaced Giovanni Secco, above.

162. Marcus de Canali (Marco Canale, veneziano): taught *philosophia moralis* (1532–33, fl. 15). Also taught *sophistaria* (1531–32).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 7r (roll, 29-X-1532); ms. 651, ff. 112r–v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (24-XI-1532; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

163. Hieronymus Amaltheus de Opitergo (Girolamo Amalteo, da Oderzo): taught *philosophia moralis* (1533–34, fl. 15). Also taught medicine (Avicenna, 1532–33).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 8r (roll); ms. 651, ff. 120r–v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (22-XI-1533; Poppi, p. 138). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

Note: Francesco Patrizi, in the dedication to his *Discussionum peripateticarum* (1571), makes reference to having followed, indirectly, the lectures on *Ethics* by Amalteo. But this Amalteo must have been someone else, since Patrizi was born in 1529.

164. Johannes Marionibus Bergamascus (Giovanni Marinoni, bergamasco): taught *philosophia moralis* (1534–35, fl. 15). Was rector in 1533–34.

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, f. 121r–v (roll); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (23-IX-1534; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

165. Franciscus Perusinus de Montelupono (Francesco Perusini, da Montelupon): taught *philosophia moralis* (1535–36, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 9r (roll); ms. 651, f. 127r (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1535; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

166. Matthaeus Durastantius (Matteo Durastante): taught *philosophia moralis* (1536–37, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, f. 134r–v; ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1536; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

167. Alessandro Zerla, di Crema: possibly taught *philosophia moralis* (1537–38), but more likely was replaced by Daniele Barbaro.

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 139); cf. Barile, payment records (not mentioned). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 181.

Note: According to Poppi, other sources list Daniele Barbaro, below, for this year.

168. Daniel Barbarus (Daniele Barbaro, 1514–1570): taught *philosophia moralis* (1537–38, fl. 15).

Sources: Poppi, p. 139; AAU, ms. 668, f. 320r (Poppi, p. 110 and n. 30). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

Note: AAU, ms. 668 lists Alessandro Zerla for this year, but it appears that Barbaro actually taught. Poppi cites the above document in AAU, ms. 668 as follows: "Al Magnifico Daniel Barbaro deputato alla lettura de filosofia morale dell'anno 1537, come per fede del Nodaro della Università de gli Artisti de dì 6. dic. presente appar, et per aver letto ordinariamente secondo el solito alla detta lettura, come per fede del Bidello generale di detta Università appar, delibera per suo salario de mesi 12, principiarono adì primo novembre 1537 et fino tutto ottobre 1538, in ragion de fior. 15 all'anno ducati 75." Barbaro published the *Compendium* on the *Ethics* of his uncle Ermolao (see Barbaro 1544 and Appendix C, no. 44).

Lit.: Lohr, RLAC, pp. 32–22.

169. Aloysius (Johannes Baptista Luisus?) de Sancto Severino (Aloviso [Giovanni Battista Luigi?], da S. Severino): taught *philosophia moralis* (1538–39, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, f. 138r–v (roll); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1538; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

Note: The records cited by Poppi apparently refer to this person as Giovanni Battista Luigi.

170. Franciscus Zanalius Brixiensis (Francesco Zenalio, bresciano): taught *philosophia moralis* (1539–40, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 10r (roll, 20-X-1539); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1539; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

171. Johannes Butironius Veronensis (Giovanni Butironi, veronese): taught *philosophia moralis* (1540–41).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 11r (roll, 19-X-1540); ms. 651, f. 144r–v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1540; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

172. Hieronymus Fritius de Atria, Romanus (Girolamo Frigio o Frizio, romano): taught *philosophia moralis* (1541–42, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 12r (roll, 22-X-1541); ms. 651, f. 153r–v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1541; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

173. Johannes Baptista Vachelius (Giovanni Battista Vaccelli, bresciano): taught *philosophia moralis* (1542–43). Also taught Avicenna (1541–42).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1542; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

174. Balthassar Aldus Veronensis (Baldassare Aldo, veronese): taught *philosophia moralis* (1543–44, fl. 15; *leget librum Ethicorum*).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 14r (roll); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1543; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

175. Franciscus Squarsia Pedemontanus (Francesco Squarcia, piemontese): taught *philosophia moralis* (1544–45, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 17r (roll, 22-X-1544); ms. 651, ff. 169r–170r (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1544; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

176. Johannes Baptista de Ellectis de Aprusio (Giovanni Battista Eletti, o Alati, d'Abruzzo): taught *philosophia moralis* (1545–46, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 18r (roll, 3-XI-1545); ms. 651, f. 172r–v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1545; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

177. Franciscus Crolla Pedemontanus (Francesco Crolla, o Orola, piemontese): taught *philosophia moralis* (1546–47, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 19r (undated roll); ms. 651, f. 177r–v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1546; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

178. Franciscus Zinius (Francesco Zini, veronese): taught *philosophia moralis* (1547–48, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1547; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

Note: For Zini's prolusion to his course on moral philosophy from this year, see below, Appendix C, no. 68.

179. Sigismondo Geloo, della Pannonia: taught *philosophia moralis* (1548–49, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (1-XI-1548; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

180. Nicolaus Tonda sive Londa (Nicolò Tonda o Londa): taught *philosophia moralis* (1549–50, fl. 15, *leget librum Ethicorum*).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 20r (roll, XI-1549); ms. 651, f. 180r–182r (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

181. Petrus Viola Vicentinus (Pietro Viola, vicentino): taught *philosophia moralis* (1550–51, fl. 15). Also taught logic (1551–52).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, ff. 186r–187r (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Facciolati, II, p. 302; Lines 1996, p. 182.

182. Paulus Pollus Mantuanus (Paolo Poli, o Pili, mantovano): taught *philosophia moralis* (1551–52, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, f. 193r–v (roll; Barile); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (3-XI-1551; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

Note: Possibly replaced in May 1552 by Camillo di Monte Badio, below.

183. Camillus de Monte Bodio (Badio) Marchianus (Camillo di Monte Badio, dalla Marca): taught *philosophia moralis* (1551–52, fl. 15). Also taught *sophistaria* (1552–53).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (4-V-1552; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

Note: Possibly replaced Paolo Poli (above) from May 1552.

184. Bernardinus Crippa Mediolanensis (Bernardino Crippa, da Milano): doctorate ca. XI-1552; taught *philosophia moralis* (1552–53, with note: *non levar bollette fin che non mostra esser conventato*; apparently appointed on 27-XI-1552). Also taught logic (1553–54). Also taught natural philosophy in Bologna, 1561–64.

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, f. 199r–v (3-XI-1552, Barile); cf. ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (not mentioned). Cf. Lines 2001b, no. 175.

Lit.: Lohr, RLAC, p. 118.

185. Johannes Carnarius Flamengus (Giovanni Carnario, fiammingo): taught *philosophia moralis* (1553–54, fl. 15 or fl. 25).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 21r (roll, 28-XI-1553); ms. 651, f. 210v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (5-XI-1553; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

186. Stanislaus Versarius Polonus (Stanislao Versorio, polacco): appointed to teach *philosophia moralis* (1554–55, fl. 15; does not appear in the payments and probably did not teach).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, f. 211r–v (roll, Barile: *Evangelista de Bolis de Cesena loco spect. d. Stanislai Versarii Poloni*), ff. 216r–v (bollettino, no mention); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

187. Evangelista de Bolis de Cesena (Vangelista Vola, cesenate): taught *philosophia moralis* (1554–55, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, f. 211r–v (roll, Barile: *Evangelista de Bolis de Cesena loco spect. d. Stanislai Versarii Poloni*), ff. 216r–v (bollettino); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (29-X-1554; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

188. Leontius Calearius Vicentinus (Leontio Calierio, vicentino): taught *philosophia moralis* (1555–56, fl. 15, *Leget I Ethicorum Aristotelis*).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, ff. 219r–220r (roll, Barile); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (18-VII-1555; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

189. Cristoforo Baraballo da Monteregale, piemontese: taught *philosophia moralis* (1556–57, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (3-VIII-1556; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 182.

190. Rochus Lucinus de Monteflorum Marchae Anconitanae (Rocco Lucio da Montefiore, della Marca Anconitana): taught *philosophia moralis* (1557–58, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, ff. 22r, 23r (rolls, undated and 28-X-1557); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (9-XI-1557; Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 183.

191. Giovanni Battista Beruzio, o Betuzio, da Salò: taught *philosophia moralis* (1558–59, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 183.

Note: This appointment is not verifiable in the rolls or payments, which do not survive for this year.

192. Isidoro Piccinardi, da Cremona: taught *philosophia moralis* (1559–60, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 183.

Note: This appointment is not verifiable in the rolls or payments, which do not survive for this year.

193. Hieronymus Spinarolus (Girolamo Spinarolo, siciliano): taught *philosophia moralis* (1560–61, fl. 15).

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, f. 238r–v (roll); ms. 668, ff. 310r–313v (Poppi, p. 139). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 183.

194. Franciscus Robortellus Utinensis (Francesco Robortello da Udine, † 18-III-1567): taught *philosophia moralis ordinaria et politica et ordinaria rhetoricae et poeticae* (1562–63, 1564–66, fl. 400). Also taught an unspecified subject in 1561–62 (fl. 400). Taught rhetoric in Padua from 1552. Also taught in Bologna and other Italian universities.

Sources: AAU, ms. 651, f. 238r–v (a. 1561–62); f. 241[a]r–v (roll, 18-X-1562, Barile); ms. 242, f. 24r (roll, 1564–65), ms. 651, f. 248r–v (bollettino, 30-VIII-1565); ms. 651, ff. 249r–250r (roll for 1565–66, Barile). Cf. Poppi, p. 139, n. 15; Lines 1996, p. 183.

Note: Cf. Robortello 1552. Edited Francesco Filelfo's *De morali disciplina* (Filelfo 1552).

Lit.: Bozza 1949, pp. 34–35; Lohr, RLAC, p. 388; *CHRPh*, p. 835; Poppi 1997d, pp. 37–38, 45–47, 56–57.

195. Jason de Nores Cyprius (Giason de Nores, † 31-XII-1590): taught *philosophia moralis* (1577–78, hired at fl. 200 per year, "per anni quattro di fermo, et doi di rispetto"; 1579–80, fl. 200, *Leget tractatum de virtutibus moralibus incipiendo a Fortitudine*; 1583–84, *Leget I librum Ethicorum Aristotelis*; 1584–85, fl. 250, *Leget Aethicam Aristotelis*; 1585–86, *Leget tractatum de virtutibus moralibus et primum de Fortitudine*; 1586–87, *Leget I librum Ethicorum Aristotelis*; 1589–90, fl. 250, *Leget I Ethicorum Aristotelis*; 1590–91, *Aggredietur I et II librum Ethicorum Aristotelis*, teaching interrupted by death).

Sources: AAU, ms. 668, f. 322r (22-VI-1577; Poppi, p. 139, n. 16); ms. 242, f. 37r (roll, 1579–80) and ms. 651, f. 286r–v (bollettino, VIII-1580); ms. 651, ff. 292r–293v (roll, 2-XI-1583; Barile); ms. 651, ff. 301r–302r (roll, 1584–85; Barile) and f. 300r–v (payments, 1584–85); ms. 651, f. 304r–v (roll, 3-XI-1585; Barile); ms. 651, f. 308r–v (roll, 1-XI-1586; Barile); ms. 651, f. 311r–v (roll, 30-X-1589; Barile) and 316r–v (payments, 11-VIII-1590); ms. 651, f. 317r–v (roll, 1590–91; Barile). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 183.

Note: De Nores also wrote on moral philosophy (see Appendix C, nos. 95 and 96, with bibliography). Of interest is the wording of his appointment to moral philosophy, cited in Poppi, p. 139, n. 16: "Essendo la philosophia moral tanto utile alla vita civile prudentemente fecero li maggiori nostri nel instituire nel studio nostro di Padova un lettore che havesse ad insegnare così fruttuosa parte della Philosophia alli nostri giovani, acciochè non solo in se stessi fossero boni, et virtuosi, ma potessero anche . . . [*lacuna* in the text] et splendore alla Repubblica nostra. Perchè essendosi da certo tempo in qua tralasciato di leggere nel detto Studio questa lettione, è molto al proposito proveder che da persona versata in quella parte di studii sia letta, come s'intende essere Domino Jason Noros Cypriotto, che al presente se ritrova in Padova la prefata lettione della philosophia moral. Con stipendio de fiorini ducento all'anno per anni quattro di fermo, et doi di rispetto, à beneplacito della Signoria Nostra. Quare. Datum die XXII Junii, Indictione 5ª, 1577."

196. Nicolaus Colonius (Nicolò Colonio da Bergamo, † 1602): taught *philosophia moralis hora I^a post meridiem in diebus festivis* (1591–92, *Leget I librum Aethicorum*; hired at fl. 200 "per anni quattro di fermo et due di rispetto").

Sources: AAU, ms. 678, f. 3r–v (roll, 3-XI-1591; Barile); ms. 668, f. 352r (Poppi, pp. 139–40, n. 17). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 183.

Note: The prolusion to Colonio's course is listed in Appendix C, no. 105 (cf. *ibid.*, no. 172). Colonio is *noviter conductus* in 1591–92, after the death of de Nores. In spite of his multi-year contract, he was mostly absent after 1592 (see the letter of appointment for Giovanni Belloni, below). The text of Colonio's appointment is provided by Poppi (p. 140, n. 17): "Paschalis Ciconea Dei Gratia Dux Venetiarum—Vaccando per morte di D. Giason de Nores la lettura della filosofia moral nello Studio nostro di Padova, et dovendosegli proveder di lettore, havutasi ottima informatione della dottrina di D. Nicolò Colonio, versatissimo in questa professione, nella quale ha anco scritto con molta sua laude diverse compositioni et etiam diverse in ogni arte et scientia liberale, l'andarà parte ch'el detto Colonio sia condotto a legger nello Studio nostro di Padova la predetta lettione della filosofia moral con stipendio di fiorini ducento all'anno, per anni quattro di fermo et due di rispetto, et il rispetto sia a beneplacito della Signoria Nostra, dovendosi principiare la presente condotta al principio dello studio venturo. Quare.—Data in nostro Ducali Palatio, die 4 Feb., indic. 5^a 1591."

197. Johannes Bellonus Canonicus Patavinus (Giovanni Belloni, canonico padovano): taught *philosophia moralis hora prima pomeridiana diebus festivis* (1594–1624; 1594–95, fl. 150, hired "per anni quattro di fermo et due di rispetto," *Leget librum primum ethicorum*; 1595–96; 1597–98, *[Leget] secundum Ethicorum*; 1598–99, *Leget librum decimum Ethicorum*; 1599–1600, fl. 150, *Leget librum primum Ethicorum Aristotelis*; 1603–04, *Leget librum Politicorum*; 1604–05, *Leget secundum et tertium librum Ethicorum*; etc.).

Sources: AAU, ms. 242, f. 40r (roll, 3-XI-1594), ms. 651, f. 342r–v (ultima decembris 1595), and ms. 668, f. 327r (Poppi, p. 140, n. 18); Milan, BAmbr., D.172.inf., ff. 45, 50 (roll, 1595–96; Barile); ms. 242, f. 41r–v (roll, 1597–98); ms. 242, f. 43r–v (roll, 4-XI-1598); ms. 242, ff. 45r–v (roll, 4-XI-1599) and ms. 651, f. 360r–v (payments, 1599–1600); ms. 651, f. 375r (a. 1603–04); ms. 242, f. 47v (a. 1604–05). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 183.

Note: Poppi (p. 140, n. 18) transcribes Belloni's letter of appointment in AAU, ms. 668, f. 327r as follows: "Paschalis Ciconea Dei gratia Dux Venetiarum.—Vacca nel studio nostro di Padova la lettura di filosofia moral per la longa assenza di N. Nicolò Colonio, che ultimamente la leggeva, et havendosi buona valutazione (?) per dottrina et bontà della persona di D. Zuanne Belloni canonico di Padova, il quale s'offerisce a tal servitio, à a proposito valersi di questo soggetto. Però l'andarà parte che il detto D. Zuanne Belloni sia condotto a leggere nel predetto Studio nostro la lettione predetta di filosofia morale con stipendio di fiorini cento cinquanta all'anno

per anni quattro di fermo et due di rispetto, il qual rispetto sia a beneplacito della Signoria Nostra. Quare. Data in nostro Ducali Palatio die 4. junii, ind. 7ª, 1594."

198. Flavius Quaerengus (Flavio Querenghi, 1581–1647): taught *philosophia moralis* (1624–47).

Source: AAU, ms. 668, ff. 313v–314v (Poppi, pp. 137–38); Veronese Ceseracciu 1976–77.

Note: See Appendix C, no. 158.

Pavia

—*Table of abbreviated sources**

Notaio Griffi, cart. 20 = ASPv, Fondo Università di Pavia, Notaio Griffi, cart. 20: "Ruoli e Tabelle dei Professori" (original, ca. 1406–1601).
Notaio Griffi, cart. 22 = ASPv, Fondo Università di Pavia, Notaio Griffi, cart. 22: "Rotuli studii ticinensis" (2 vols, s. XVIII, covering ca. 1373–1540).

199. Petrus de Sarzana (Pietro Pazzi di Sarzana): license in logic and philosophy (14-IV-1383); taught *philosophia moralis* (= *philosophia naturalis*?) and *astrologia* (ca. 1383–91; in 1386–87, L. 14, s. 8).

Sources: Maiocchi, I, p. 85, no. 182 (14-IV-1383); *ibid.*, p. 119, no. 252 (a. 1387); *ibid.*, p. 131, no. 272 (8-VIII-1387). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 147 (*ad lecturam philosophiae et astrologiae*, 1386–87, 1391); Lines 1996, pp. 183–84.

Note: More than likely, the appointment to moral philosophy in 1386–87 is either a scribal error or an error of transcription; see the request for an increase in salary from August 1387.

200. Bonifatius de Buttigellis, O.E.S.A. (Bonifacio Bottigella, † 22-X-1404): *magister in sacra pagina* by 21-XI-1374; taught *theologia* and *philosophia moralis* (1386–87, L. 13, s. 6, d. 8/month; 1390–91, same salary). Subject for 1389 not specified.

Sources: Maiocchi, I, p. 27, no. 33 (21-XI-1374); *ibid.*, p. 117, no. 252 (a. 1387); *ibid.*, p. 184, no. 366 (a. 1391). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 185 (theology in 1373–74, theology and ethics in 1386–87 and 1391).

201. Johannes de Serravalle, O.F.M. Conv. (Giovanni Bertoldi): appointed to teach *philosophia moralis* (1387–88).

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* Also consulted Fondo Università di Pavia, Notaio Griffi, cart. 21: "Rotuli lectorum" (by Giacomo Parodi, covering 1387–1699).

Sources: Maiocchi, I, p. 128, no. 266 (appointment, 2-VII-1387). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 154; Lines 1996, p. 183.

Lit.: *ABI*, II 58, 100–102; II S 10, 11 (Brizi, Caputo, *Enciclopedia biografica*).

202. Blasius Pelacanus (de Pelacanis) de Parma (Biagio Pellacani, † 1416): doctorate in philosophy and logic in 1374; taught *mathematica* and *philosophia naturalis et moralis* (1388–89, L. 53, s. 6, d. 8/month; 1390–91, 1392–94, same salary), *philosophia moralis, naturalis, et astrologia* (1399–1400, L. 23, s. 13, d. 4/month), *philosophia moralis, astrologia et mathematica* (1403–06; fl. 200 in 1405–06), *philosophia moralis et astrologia* (1407–08, L. 26, s. 13, d. 4/month). Taught an unspecified subject in 1376–77; conferred degrees by 1377; taught mathematics and philosophy (1394–95). Also taught in Bologna (1379–82, 1387–88) and Padua (1384–87).

Sources: Maiocchi, I, p. 154, doc. 305 (payments, a. 1389; cf. *ibid.*, doc. 311 [payments, 1-VIII-1389, does not appear]); *ibid.*, p. 186, doc. 366 (payments, a. 1391; cf. *ibid.*, docs. 332, 342, 350, 365, 369, 377, 384, 412); *ibid.*, p. 225, doc. 430 (payments, a. 1393); *ibid.*, p. 228, doc. 432 (payments, a. 1394); *ibid.*, p. 421, doc. 751 (payments, a. 1399–1400); *ibid.*, II, p. 40, no. 57 (a. 1403); *ibid.*, p. 68, no. 109 (roll, 10-X-1404); *ibid.*, p. 84, no. 140 (roll, 23-II-1406); *ibid.*, p. 98, no. 166 (payments, a. 1407–08). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 147 (lists logic and philosophy, 1374–75); Lines 1996, p. 184; idem 2001b, no. 10.

Lit.: *ABI*, I 756, 69–115; II 452, 281 (Affò, Codignola, Janelli, Jöcher/Adelung); Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 381–83; idem 1988a, pp. 35–38; *CHRPh*, p. 809; Imbach and Nienhaus, p. 400; Federici Vescovini 1979; eadem and Baroncelli 1992.

203. Philippus de Barziis, O.F.M. (Filippo Barzi da Pavia): taught *sacra pagina et philosophia moralis* (1392–93, L. 13, s. 6, d. 8/terz.; 1393–94, L. 13, s. 6, d. 8/month). Paid in 1397 although he was not teaching; taught an unspecified subject in 1399–1400.

Sources: Maiocchi, I, p. 220, doc. 430 (payments, a. 1393); *ibid.*, p. 227, doc. 432 (payments, a. 1394). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 186 (theology and moral philosophy in 1393 and 1398; theology in 1399).

204. Bartholomaeus de Caziis, O.P. (Bartolomeo Caccia da Milano): taught *theologia et philosophia moralis* (1404–05, fl. 30/year). Taught theology (1405–07, contract revoked in April 1407).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, p. 68, no. 109 (roll, 10-X-1404); *ibid.*, p. 71, no. 117 (6-XI-1404). Cf. Kaeppeli, I, p. 146.

205. Christophorus de Ghiringhellis (Cristoforo Ghiringhelli da Brescia): taught *philosophia moralis et astrologia* (spring 1408, fl. 60/year). Also taught logic and philosophy (1408–10, 1412–13), medicine (1413–14, 1415–17, 1418–20, 1421–22).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, p. 98, no. 166 (a. 1407–08). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 105 (philosophy in 1406–07 in place of Pellacani; *logica et philosophia*, 1408; substituted in 1413–14 by Alberto da Vercelli; *medicina de nonis* in 1415–16, 1421–22); Lines 1996, p. 184.

206. Gerardus (Bernardus) de Berneriis (de Bernerio) (Girardo Berneri da Alessandria): doctorate in Medicine in 1420; taught *philosophia moralis* (1418–20, fl. 40), *medicina extraordinaria practica et philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1430–33, fl. 150 for medicine and fl. 50 for ethics; 1433–34, fl. 250; 1435–36, fl. 300; unclear whether he also taught ethics in 1439–40 and 1441–42). Also taught logic (1414–17) and medicine (1439–40, 1441–42).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, p. 167, no. 254 (roll, 4-X-1418); *ibid.*, p. 185, no. 272 (roll, 18-X-1419); *ibid.*, p. 191, no. 286 (a. 1420); *ibid.*, p. 281, no. 415 (roll, 24-XI-1430); *ibid.*, p. 292, no. 431 (roll, 29-XI-1431); *ibid.*, p. 304, no. 451 (roll, 16-X-1432); *ibid.*, p. 317, no. 466 (roll, 24-XI-1433); *ibid.*, p. 355, no. 497 (roll, 29-X-1435). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 107; Lines 1996, p. 184.

207. Guinifortus de Barziziis de Pergamo (Guiniforte Barzizza): doctorate in Arts, March 1422; taught *philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1425–27, *prout requirit Universitas Iuristarum Studii papiensis. Provisionem salarii nobis reservamus*), *oratoria et philosophia moralis in civitate nostra Mediolani* (from 1434, in 1441 assured his payment although he has ceased teaching).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, p. 221, no. 338 (roll, 11-X-1425); *ibid.*, pp. 230–31, no. 353 (roll, 11-X-1426); *ibid.*, p. 333, no. 479 (30-XI-1434); *ibid.*, p. 440, no. 578 (13-XII-1441). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 155 (moral philosophy in 1425, 1426–27; in Milan in 1434–47 without obligation to teach); Lines 1996, p. 184.

Note: Guniforto was the son of Gasparino Barzizza.

208. Nicolaus de Cremona (Nicola Azzi): license and doctorate in Arts in 1423; license and doctorate in Medicine in 1425; taught *philosophia moralis* and *logica* (1425–27, 1428–29, fl. 30 per subject). Also taught logic (1427–28) and an unspecified subject (1429–30).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, p. 210, no. 318 (a. 1423); *ibid.*, p. 222, no. 338 (roll, 11-X-1425); *ibid.*, pp. 225–26, no. 345 (a. 1425); *ibid.*, pp. 231–32, no. 353 (roll, 18-X-1426); *ibid.*, p. 247, no. 378 (roll, 15-X-1428). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 155; Lines 1996, p. 184.

Note: Possibly also taught moral philosophy in 1427–28; see no. 209.

209. Nicolaus de Parma (Nicolò da Parma): taught *philosophia moralis* (1427–28, fl. 30).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 20, pages not numbered; Maiocchi, II, p. 240, no. 367 (roll, 15-X-1427).

Note: Possibly this is a scribal error for Nicolaus de Cremona (see no. 208), who was teaching moral philosophy and logic during these years.

210. Antonius de Beaquis (Antonio Beaqui da Milano): taught *philosophia moralis* (1439–40, fl. 30).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, p. 395, no. 522 (roll, a. 1439). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 157; Lines 1996, p. 184.

211. Johannes Matheus de Ferrariis (Giovanni Matteo Ferrari da Grado, da Pavia, ca. 1392–1472): taught *medicina practica extraordinaria* and *philosophia moralis* (1441–42, fl. 180 for both subjects together). Also taught logic (1432–34, 1435–36), medicine (at least 1439–40, 1443–47, 1448–49).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, pp. 432–433, no. 564 (roll, a. 1441); *ibid.*, p. 436, no. 570 (7-XI-1441). Cf. *Memorie*, I, pp. 156, 111; Lines 1996, p. 184.

Lit.: *IBNH*, LXX, p. 414; *ABI*, s.v. (Brambilla, Corte, Jöcher, Sangiorgio).

212. Olivius de Boxinasio (de Bosinassio) (Olivio da Bosinasio o Gosinasio da Milano): taught *philosophia moralis* (1441–42, fl. 20). Also taught logic (1443–44, 1445–46), natural philosophy (1444–45), and medicine (1446–47).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, p. 433, no. 564 (roll, a. 1441). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 114; Lines 1996, p. 184.

213. Fr. Henricus de Sicilia, O.P. (Enrico da Sicilia): doctorate in Arts by 1442; doctorate in Theology in 1445; taught *philosophia moralis* and *philosophia extraordinaria* (1443–44, 1445–46, fl. 20 for moral philosophy and fl. 30 for natural philosophy) Also taught logic (1442–43), natural philosophy (1444–45) and theology (a. 1447).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, p. 447, no. 586 (12-VI-1442); *ibid.*, p. 470, no. 611 (roll, a. 1443–44); *ibid.*, p. 485, no. 627 (roll, a. 1445–46); *ibid.*, p. 551. Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 188; Lines 1996, p. 185.

Note: Not to be confused with a homonymous teacher in Bologna around this time.

214. Fr. Franciscus de Manganis (de Janua, de Savona), O.F.M. Conv. (Francesco Màngani da Pavia, † 24-I-1469): doctorate in Theology in Padua (1434); taught *philosophia moralis* and *theologia* (1446–47, fl. 40 for moral philosophy and fl. 50 for theology), *philosophia moralis in festis* (1455, fl. 15). Also taught theology (at least 1444–45, 1447–49, and 1467–68).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, pp. 495–496, no. 640 (a. 1446–47); Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, ff. 140v–143r (a. 1455). Cf. *Memorie*, I, pp. 188–89 (identifies him with Pope Sixtus IV, † 1484); Lines 1996, p. 185.

Lit.: *Enciclopedia dei papi*, II, p. 701; Di Fonzo 1986, pp. 32–43 (226–237); *ABI* I 601, 325 (Verzellino).

Note: Cf. below, no. 223.

215. Achilles de Vicecomitibus (Achille Visconti): still a student in 1444; taught *philosophia moralis et rhetorica in festis* (1446–48, fl. 20), *rhetorica omni die et philosophia moralis diebus festivis* (1448–49, fl. 70).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, p. 496, no. 640 (roll, a. 1446–47); *ibid.*, p. 520, no. 668 (a. 1447–48); *ibid.*, p. 528, no. 676 (a. 1448–49). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 158; Lines 1996, p. 185.

216. Balthasar Rasinus (Baldassare Rasini da Milano): student of law in 1425; joined the College of Jurists in 1438; taught *philosophia moralis et rhetorica* (1447–48, no salary indicated). Also taught law (ca. 1427–29) and rhetoric (at least 1435–49).

Sources: Maiocchi, II, p. 528, no. 676. Cf. *Memorie*, I, pp. 155 and 42; Lines 1996, p. 185.

217. Antonius de Mediolano, O. Carm. (Antonio da Milano, † 1480): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* and *theologia* (1455, fl. 15; 1456). Also taught theology (ca. 1464–80).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, ff. 140v–143r (roll, a. 1455); *ibid.*, ff. 143r–144r (roll, a. 1456). Cf. *Memorie*, I, pp. 189, 162; Lines 1996, p. 185.

218. Franciscus de Curte (Francesco Corti da Pavia): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1456, fl. 20). Also taught natural philosophy (various years from 1467 to 1482) and medicine (1482–83).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, ff. 143r–144r (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 159; Lines 1996, p. 185.

219. Johannes Antonius de Bassinis (Giovanni Antonio Bassini): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1456, fl. 12). Also taught natural philosophy (1467–68, 1469–70, 1472–73).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, ff. 143r–144r (roll). *Memorie*, I, p. 149; Lines 1996, p. 185.

220. Guido Parisiensis, O.E.S.A. (Guido da Parigi): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1467–68, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, ff. 150r–152v (roll). *Memorie*, I, p. 159; Lines 1996, p. 185.

221. Johannes Christophorus de Novaria (Giovanni Cristoforo da Novara): student in Arts and Medicine in 1444; taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1464–65, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, ff. 145r–147r (roll); Maiocchi, II, p. 477 (a. 1444). *Memorie*, I, p. 160; Lines 1996, p. 186.

Note: Possibly the same as Christophorus de Novaria (below, no. 225).

222. Nicolaus de Podio Januensis (Nicolò Podio da Genova): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1464–65, fl. 20).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, ff. 145r–147r (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 160; Lines 1996, p. 186.

223. Johannes Franciscus de Mangano (Gian Francesco Màngani): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1467–68, fl. 20).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 152r (roll). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 186.

Note: Possibly the same as Francesco Mangani (see above, no. 214).

224. Philippus de Varianis: taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1467–68, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 152r (roll). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 186.

225. Christophorus de Novaria: taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1467–68, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 152r (roll). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 186.

Note: Possibly the same as Johannes Christophorus de Novaria (above, no. 221).

226. Giovanni Battista Bernareggi (Bernardigio): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1469–70, no salary listed).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 153v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 160; Lines 1996, p. 186.

227. Crespino Moralli (= Morelli?): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1469–70, no salary listed).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 153v (roll). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 186.

228. Antonius de Aquila (Antonio Aquila da Pavia): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1472–73, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 157r (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 161; Lines 1996, p. 186.

229. Theodorus de Guaineriis (Teodoro Guaineri da Pavia): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1472–73, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 157r (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 161; Lines 1996, p. 186.

230. Damianus de Navis (Damiano Nava da Milano): appointed to *philosophia moralis in festis* (1479–80, fl. 12, but was replaced by Bernardo da Valenza).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 167r (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 162; Lines 1996, p. 186.

231. Bernardinus de Annibaldis de Valentia (Bernardo Annibaldi da Valenza): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1479–80, fl. 12, replacing Damiano Nava).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 167r (roll); Verde, I, p. 387 (roll from ASF, Studio Fiorentino e Pisano, no. 7, f. 63v). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 162; Lines 1996, p. 186.

232. Laurentius Ceronus (Cervius?): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1479–80, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 167r (roll); Verde, I, p. 387 (roll from ASF, Studio Fiorentino e Pisano, no. 7, f. 63v). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 186.

233. Baptista de Baldizonibus (Battista Baldizzoni): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1480–82, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 170r (roll, a. 1480–81); *ibid.*, f. 173r (roll, a. 1481–82). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 162 (a. 1481); Lines 1996, p. 186.

234. Johannes Petrus Lanida Cassalensis (Giovanni Pietro Lanida da Casale): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1480–82, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 170r (roll, a. 1480–81); *ibid.*, f. 173r (roll, a. 1481–82). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 162 (a. 1481); Lines 1996, p. 186.

235. Fr. Johannes de Ponte Stura, O.F.M.: taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1482).

Sources: Verde, I, p. 392.

236. Antonius de Mantua: taught *philosophia extraordinaria in nonis* and *philosophia moralis in festis* (1482–83, fl. 25 for natural philosophy).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, ff. 174r–177r (roll); Verde, I, p. 392 (a. 1482). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 186.

237. Nicolaus Antiquarii (Nicolò Antiquarii da Milano): appointed to *philosophia moralis in festis* (1482–83), but replaced by Paulus de Marliano.

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, ff. 174r–177r (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 163; Lines 1996, p. 186.

238. Paulus de Marliano: taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1482–83, fl. 12, replacing Nicolò Antiquarii).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, ff. 174r–177r (roll). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 186.

239. Johannes Baptista Frara (Giovanni Battista Frara): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1485–86, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 181v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 163; Lines 1996, p. 186.

240. Hieronymus de Pedracinis (Girolamo Pedrazzini da Milano): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1485–86, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 181v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 163; Lines 1996, p. 187.

241. Raynaldus de Busti (Rainoldo Busti da Milano): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1488–89, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 191v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 164; Lines 1996, p. 187.

242. Johannes Franciscus de Carpanis (Giovanni Francesco Carpani da Milano): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1488–89, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 191v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 164 (a. 1489); Lines 1996, p. 187.

243. Angelus de Pasqualibus (Angelo Pasquali): taught (?) *philosophia moralis in festis* (1488–89). Also taught natural philosophy in 1489–90.

Sources: *Memorie*, I, p. 164; but cf. Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 189v–192r (roll, a. 1488–89), where he is listed for *philosophia naturalis extraordinaria de nonis*. Cf. Lines 1996, p. 187.

244. Baptista de Arluno (Battista Arluno da Milano): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1489–90, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 195v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 165 (a. 1490); Lines 1996, p. 187.

245. Bernardinus de Levanto (Bernardino Levanto Ultramontano): appointed to *philosophia moralis in festis* (1489–90, but *non venit*).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 195v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 165 (a. 1490); Lines 1996, p. 187.

Note: Replaced by Marco Cassoni (below, no. 246).

246. Marcus de Cassonio (Marco Cassoni): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1489–90, fl. 12, *loco magistri Bernardini de Levanto*).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 195v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 165 (a. 1490); Lines 1996, p. 187.

Note: Replaced Bernardino Levanto (above, no. 245).

247. Philippus de Medicis (Fillippo Medici da Pavia): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1491–92, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 199v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 166 (a. 1492); Lines 1996, p. 187.

248. Johannes Antonius Datarius Placentinus (Giovanni Antonio Dataro da Piacenza): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1491–92, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 199v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 121 (moral philosophy in 1492, *medicina extraordinaria de nonis primus*, 1496 and 1498); Lines 1996, p. 187.

249. Paulus de Varisio: taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1493–94, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 202v (roll). Cf. Lines 1996, p. 187; *ABI* I 979, 79 (Jöcher/Adelung).

250. Boninus Bichus Astensis (Bonino Bicco da Asti): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1493–94, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 202v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 166; Lines 1996, p. 187.

251. Franciscus de Fanalis (Francesco Fanali da Pavia): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1494–95, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 206v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 166; Lines 1996, p. 187.

252. Georgius de Gassate (Giorgio Gessate o Glessate da Milano): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1494–95, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 206v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 166; Lines 1996, p. 187.

253. Gaspar de Ligotiis (Gaspare Ligotti da Monza): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1495–96, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 210r (roll). *Memorie*, I, p. 167; Lines 1996, p. 187.

254. Hieronymus de Zardinis (Girolamo Giardini): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1495–96, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 210r (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 167; Lines 1996, p. 187.

255. Georgius de Fondulis (Giorgio Fonduli da Cremona): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1496–97).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 214v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 168; Lines 1996, p. 187.

256. Antonius de Laude (Antonio da Lodi): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1496–97).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 214v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 168; Lines 1996, p. 187.

257. Scipio de Vegiis (Scipione Veggio da Pavia): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1497–98, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 219v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 168 (a. 1498; made Senator in 1529); Lines 1996, p. 187.

Note: Possibly to be identified with the famous medical doctor who served as ducal physician and died in 1535; see *ABI* I 982, 315–22 (Corte, Sangiorgio).

258. Hyppolitus de Verris (Ippolito Verri da Monza): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1497–98, fl. 12).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 219v (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 168; Lines 1996, p. 187.

[Gap in the rolls]

259. R. P. Mag. Franciscus de Alio (Francesco Alio): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1521, 1536).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. iii v (roll, a. 1521), f. viii r–v (roll, a. 1536). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 169; Lines 1996, p. 187.

260. Julius de Ferrariis de Placentia (Giulio Ferrari da Piacenza): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1536). Also taught logic in 1537 and 1548?

Sources: *Memorie*, I, p. 170; Lines 1996, p. 187.

261. Johannes Franciscus Dugnanus (Giovanni Francesco Dugnano di Milano): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1538–39). Taught medicine (1539–40).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. 270r (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 170; Lines 1996, p. 187.

262. Franciscus Taurellus Novarensis (Francesco Torelli da Novara): taught *philosophia moralis in festis* (1539–40, fl. 25).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 22, f. xii r (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 171; Lines 1996, p. 188.

[Gap, 1540–1597, for moral philosophy]

263. Don Germanus Rovinus, Vallombrosanus (Germano Rovigno o Rovino da Pratovecchio, † 1602): taught *philosophia moralis* and *theologia* (1597–98, L. 250 for theology and L. 50 for moral philosophy, the latter *triennio*; taught at least until 1600). Taught metaphysics (1586–94) and theology (at least 1594–97).

Sources: Notaio Griffi, cart. 20, pp. not numbered (roll). Cf. *Memorie*, I, p. 192; Lines 1996, p. 188.

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264. Lucas de Fulgineo (Luca da Foligno): taught *philosophia moralis* (1481–82, perhaps 1483–84).

Sources: Chambers 1976, p. 89 (paid Rom. fl. 10 on 25-IV-1482), p. 95 (paid Rom. fl. 20 on 2-X-1483).

265. Damianus: taught *philosophia moralis* (1514).

Sources: Conte, I, p. 4.

266. Paulus Iovius (Paolo Giovio, 1483–1552): taught *philosophia moralis* (1514, fl. 130).

Sources: Conte, I, p. 4.

Lit.: *ABI* I 491, 343–74; 538, 352–55; II 286, 25–35; *DCLI*, II, pp. 390–92 (G. G. Ferrero); *ER*, III, p. 68 (T. C. Price Zimmermann). Price Zimmermann 1995.

Note: Giovio was a medical doctor, initially active in Como and Milan, but after ca. 1512 present in Rome.

267. Marcus Antonius Muretus (Marc-Antoine Muret, † 4-VI-1585): taught *philosophia moralis* (1563–66, paid 100 scudi), *philosophia moralis* and *candidiores litterae, de sero* (1566–67, scudi 100), *rhetorica de sero* (1572–84, including the *Economics* and *Politics* in 1577–78; in 1578–79, advised to interrupt the teaching of the *Politics*, reads instead Sallust, *De coniuratione Catilinae*; in 1583–84 reads Aristotle's *Ethics*). Also taught Pandects (1567–72).

Sources: Conte, I, p. 35 (a. 1563); *ibid.*, p. 41 (a. 1566). Cf. Dejob 1881, *passim*; Conte, II, p. 946; Sharrat 1991.

Note: For Muret's prolusions to his moral philosophy course and their dating, see below, Appendix C, no. 84 (no. 83 for his commentary). Also see the discussion above, pp. 331–40.

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* Documentation for the university in Rome survives only fragmentarily, especially before 1539; see above, Ch. 9, n. 11.

268. Laelius Peregrinus (Lelio Pellegrini, † early 1602): taught *philosophia moralis de sero* (ca. 1586–1602, promised 100 scudi in 1587 and 250 scudi in 1601).

Sources: Conte, I, p. 127 (a. 1587); *ibid.*, p. 131 (a. 1592); *ibid.*, p. 136 (a. 1593); *ibid.*, p. 141 (a. 1594); *ibid.*, p. 146 (a. 1595); *ibid.*, p. 150 (a. 1599); *ibid.*, p. 154 (a. 1601). Cf. Conte, II, p. 938.

Note: See above, pp. 340–45 and below, Appendix C, nos. 100 and 101.

269. Lucas Valerius (Luca Valerio da Roma, † 16/17-I-1618): taught *lingua graeca de sero* and *mathematica diebus festivis* (1601–02, promised 150 scudi), *mathematica de sero* and *philosophia moralis de sero* (1602–03 [?], 1603–15, the whole period at 310 scudi; supposed to teach *Liber I Ethicorum* in 1603–04, *Liber II* in 1604–05, *Liber III* in 1605–06, *Liber III* [! printing error?] in 1607–08, *Liber V* in 1608–09, *Liber VII* in 1613–14; 1617–18). Also taught mathematics, apparently without moral philosophy (1615–17).

Sources: ASV, Misc. Arm. IV–V, 23, f. 48r (a. 1603–04; cf. Conte, I, p. 157); *ibid.*, f. 49r (a. 1604–05); *ibid.*, f. 50r (a. 1605–06; cf. Conte, I, p. 162); Conte, I, p. 165 (a. 1606); ASV, Misc. Arm. IV–V, 23, f. 51r (a. 1607–08); *ibid.*, f. 52r (a. 1608–09); *ibid.*, f. 56r (1609–10; cf. Conte, I, p. 179); Conte, I, p. 174 (a. 1612); ASV, Misc. Arm. IV–V, 23, f. 53r (a. 1613–14); Conte, I, p. 184 (a. 1617). Cf. Conte, II, pp. 941–42.

Lit.: *ABI*, I 974, 324–329 (Jöcher, Minieri Riccio 2, Righi); *DSB*, XIII, pp. 560–61 (P. Strømholm).

Note: See ASR, Università, Busta 89, f. 95r, in which Valerio wrote Cardinal Aldobrandino, requesting the chair vacated by Pellegrini: "... la supplica humilmente a fargli grazia che s'eseguisca l'intentione che V.S. Illustrissima haveva, ch'egli fusse provisto della lettura dell'Ethica, la quale dovesse leggere alternatamente con la Matematica, et niuna di quelle ne' giorni delle feste et delle vacanze. Et oltre a ciò, ad assegnarli tra tutte due le letture trecento scudi di provisione..." The request was approved on May 10, 1602. Valerio's death on January 16, 1618 is attested in a document signed by Ippolito Strada in ASR, Università, Busta 86, f. 58r.

270. Hyppolitus Strada (Ippolito Strada da Roma, † ca. 1623): *philosophia moralis de sero* (1619–23, 60 scudi in 1619–20 and 65 scudi in 1622–23; initially appointed for 1623–24, but since Dominicus Bandiera taught that year, may have died in the interim; possibly started teaching in 1617–18, replacing Valerio; instructed to teach *Liber V Ethicorum* in 1620–21 and *Liber VII* in 1622–23).

Sources: Conte, I, p. 187 (a. 1619); ASV, Misc. Arm. IV–V, 23, f. 57r (a. 1620–21); Conte, I, p. 191 (a. 1621); ASR, Università, b. 213 (a. 1622; cf. Conte, I, p. 193). Cf. Conte, II, p. 910.

271. Dominicus Bandiera Mutinensis (Domenico Bandiera da Modena): taught *philosophia moralis de sero* (1623–32, promised 65 scudi in 1623–24 and 100 scudi in 1631–32; listed as teaching *Liber II Moralium Aristotelis ad Nicomachum* in 1624–25, *Liber III* in 1625–26, *Liber IV* in 1626–27, *Liber V* in 1627–28, *Liber VI* in 1628–29, *Liber I* [! misprint?] in 1629–30, *Liber VIII* in 1630–31, *Liber VIII* [! misprint?] in 1631–32), *philosophia moralis* (1632–33).

Sources: Conte, I, p. 197 (a. 1623); ASV, Misc. Arm. IV–V, 23, f. 58r (a. 1624; cf. Conte, I, p. 202); ASR, Università, b. 213 (a. 1625, cf. Conte, I, p. 207; a. 1626, cf. Conte, I, p. 211; a. 1627, cf. Conte, I, p. 215); ASV, Misc. Arm. IV–V, 23, f. 62r (a. 1628–29; cf. Conte, I, p. 220); *ibid.*, f. 63r (a. 1629–30; cf. Conte, I, p. 225); *ibid.*, f. 64r (a. 1630–31; cf. Conte, I, p. 230); *ibid.*, f. 65r (a. 1631–32; cf. Conte, I, p. 233); Conte, I, p. 237 (a. 1632). Cf. Conte, II, p. 888.

Note: Also see below, Appendix C, nos. 149–151.

272. Andreas Argolus a Taliacotio: taught *philosophia moralis* (a. 1626, instructed to teach *Lib. 4. Moralium ad Nicomachum*). Also taught mathematics, 1622–24.

Source: Conte, I, p. 211. Cf. Conte, II, p. 861.

273. Franciscus Rogerius (Francesco Rogerio da Roma): taught *philosophia moralis (tertia hora vespertina)* (1633–37, promised 110 scudi in 1636–37, listed as reading *Liber I Ethicorum* in 1633–34, *Liber II* in 1634–35, and *Liber III* in 1635–36).

Sources: Conte, I, p. 241 (a. 1633); *ibid.*, p. 244 (a. 1634); *ibid.*, p. 247 (a. 1635); *ibid.*, p. 250 (a. 1636; cf. ASR, Università, b. 213). Cf. Conte, II, p. 900.

Lit.: Allacci, p. 111; Jöcher, III, 2183.

274. Canachius Rossius ex Neapoli de Romania: taught *lingua graeca (secunda hora matutina)* (1634–35, was to read "Aetica Aristotelis"). Also taught Greek letters, 1631–43.

Source: Conte, I, p. 243. Cf. Conte, II, p. 879.

275. Jacobus Philippus Camola (Iacopo Filippo Camola da Roma, b. 1599): taught *philosophia moralis de sero (tertia hora vespertina)* (1637–52, 100 scudi in 1637–38, 120 scudi in 1639–40, 130 scudi in 1640–41; instructed to teach *de passionibus animi* in 1641–42; *de medio virtutis moralis* in 1642–43; *de perturbationibus animi* in 1643–44; *in libro ethicorum* in 1644–45; *de principiis actuum humanorum* in 1646–47; *in libro Ethicorum de virtutibus* in 1649–50), *philosophia moralis de mane* (1652–67; 160 scudi in 1653–54; 180 scudi in 1658–59; instructed to teach *in Ethica Aristotelis, de principiis honestarum actionum* in 1652–53; *in Ethica Aristotelis, de medio virtutis moralis* in 1654–55; *libellus Ethicorum*

Aristotelis de connexionibus virtutum moralium in 1657–58; *liber Ethicorum de virtutibus moralibus in genere* in 1659–60; *liber Ethicorum de principiis honestarum actionum* in 1660–61; *liber quintus Ethicorum Aristotelis* in 1662–63; *liber sextus Ethicorum Aristotelis* in 1663–64; *liber octavus Ethicorum Aristotelis* in 1665–66; *liber nonus Ethicorum Aristotelis* in 1666–67).

Sources: ASR, Università, b. 213 (a. 1637, cf. Conte, I, p. 255; a. 1638, cf. Conte, I, p. 260; a. 1639, cf. Conte, I, p. 264; a. 1640, cf. Conte, I, p. 269; a. 1641, cf. Conte, I, p. 274; a. 1642, cf. Conte, I, p. 278; a. 1643, cf. Conte, I, p. 282; a. 1644, cf. Conte, I, p. 286; a. 1645, cf. Conte, I, p. 290; a. 1646, cf. Conte, I, p. 295; a. 1647, cf. Conte, I, p. 298; a. 1648, cf. Conte, I, p. 303; a. 1649, cf. Conte, I, p. 307; a. 1650, cf. Conte, I, p. 309); ASV, Misc. Arm. IV, 23, f. 71r (a. 1651, cf. Conte, I, p. 312); Conte, I, p. 315 (a. 1652); *ibid.*, p. 318 (a. 1653); *ibid.*, p. 321 (a. 1654); *ibid.*, p. 326 (a. 1655); *ibid.*, p. 331 (a. 1656); *ibid.*, p. 335 (a. 1657); *ibid.*, p. 341 (1658; cf. ASR, Università, b. 70, ff. 98r–99r; Università, b. 213); *ibid.*, p. 345 (a. 1659); *ibid.*, p. 349 (a. 1660); *ibid.*, p. 354 (a. 1661); *ibid.*, p. 356 (a. 1662); *ibid.*, p. 360 (a. 1663); *ibid.*, p. 366 (a. 1664); *ibid.*, p. 369 (a. 1665); *ibid.*, p. 372 (a. 1666). Cf. Conte, II, p. 913.

Note: See below, Appendix C, no. 154.

276. R. P. Jacobus Pevicinus, O.F.M. Reg. (Giacomo Pevicino, † 1689): taught *philosophia moralis de mane* (1667–69, at a salary of 60 scudi; instructed to teach *liber primus Ethicorum Aristotelis* in 1668–69).

Sources: ASR, Università, b. 26, "Summarium," pp. 5–7 (a. 1667–68, Easter *terzeria* of 20 scudi; cf. Conte, I, p. 379); Conte, I, p. 383 (a. 1668). Cf. Conte, II, p. 913;

Lit.: *ABI*, II 451, 412–13 (Zazo).

Rome (Collegio Romano)

277. Guido Roiletus (Guy Roillet, † 21-V-1570): taught *logica* and *ethica* (1553–54).

Sources: Fejér, I, p. 214; Polanco, *Chronicon* (*MP* I, pp. 550–51). Cf. Iparraguirre, p. 329; Scaduto 1974, p. 282, n. 17; U. Baldini 1992b, p. 569.

278. Achilles Gagliardus, S.J. (Achille Gagliardi, 1537–1607): taught *ethica* (1562–63). Also taught logic (1563–64), physics (1564–65), metaphysics (1565–66), scholastic theology (1566–67, 1576–?).

Sources: Fejér, I, p. 98; Sacchino 1620, p. 268 (a. 1563, "Romanum Collegium, gymnasiumque auctum est duabus disciplinis, quaestionum Conscientiae et Philosophiae de moribus ex Aristotele. Haec initio coepta est anni ab Achille Gagliardo iis explicari, qui tertium annum philosophiam in rerum contemplatione positam audiebant. Illa extremo anno in solenni studiorum repetitione promiscue eis, qui sacerdotium vel gererent vel expeterent."); *Lainii*

monumenta, VI, pp. 670–71 (4-II-1563: "El Mro. Acchile [Gagliardi] nos persuadimos, que como lee bien la éthica, leería el curso de las artes con buen successo y satisfación."). Cf. Iparraguirre, *passim*; Wallace 1984, p. 7; U. Baldini 1992b, p. 569.

Lit.: Sommervogel, III, 1095–99; Vedova, I, pp. 440–41; Ferrari, p. 330; *DBI*, LI (1998), pp. 258–64 (G. Brunelli).

279. Alexander Norius Florentinus (Alessandro Nori, 1567–1620): admitted to the College, 27-IX-1584; taught *ethica* (probably 1593–94; surely in 1596–98, simultaneously *praefectus Academiae superioris*; 1605–06 and perhaps other years). Also taught 2 years of humanities, logic (1599–1600), and metaphysics (X-1602). By October 1603, he has taught Philosophy for 3 years and is Rector in Ancona. Also taught in the college of Siena (1611); back in Rome by 1616–17; *consultor et confessor* there (1617–18).

Sources: Rome, ARSI, Rom. 53 I, f. 168r–v (Catalogus Provinciae Romanae, December 1593: "Praeceptores denique 20, nempe Grammaticus sex; Humaniorum litterarum unus; Rethoricae et linguae graecae duo; Haebraicae linguae unus; Mathematicae item unus; Ethicae unus . . ."); *ibid.*, II, f. 223r (Catalogus Provinciae Romanae, Feb. 1597); *ibid.*, f. 262v (Catalogus Provinciae Romanae, 3-VI-1597: "P. Alexander Norius florentinus natus 23. Februarii 1567, Admissus 27 Septembris 1584, studuit philosophiae et quattuor annis Theologiae. Docuit Humanitatem annis 2; nunc Ethicam annum secundum egit trium annorum. Praefectus Academiae superioris."); *ibid.*, f. 293v (Catalogus Provinciae Romanae . . . ultimo Decembris 1597); *ibid.*, Rom. 79, f. 212v (XII-1605). Cf. Iparaguirre, p. 334, U. Baldini 1992b, p. 570.

Lit.: Ferrari, p. 494.

280. Johannes Antonius Mazzarellus Romanus, S.J. (Giovanni Antonio Mazzarelli, 1558–1624): *professus quattuor votorum* (11-XI-1596); taught *ethica* (1595–96 and 1599–1600, simultaneously *confessarius primae congregationis*; two further years, probably between 1600 and 1605). Apparently did not teach other subjects in the Collegio Romano. Also taught in Messina (3 years, period uncertain), Perugia (1596–98), Naples (1598–99), Mantua (1 year), Recanati (August 1606), and Florence (at least 1611, 1615).

Sources: Rome, ARSI, Rom. 53 II, f. 217r–v (Catalogus Provinciae Romanae confectus mense Julii anni 1596); Rom. 54, ff. 1r (a. 1600), 221r (Primus catalogus Collegii Recanatensis, VIII-1606: "Docuit grammaticam annos 4, Philosophiam Messinae annos 3, in almo collegio Perusino 2, Ethica Romano 4, Logica Neapoli 1 [?], Mantua 1. Nunc rector Recineti . . .). Cf. Iparraguirre, p. 334.

Note: Wrote on the *Ethics*; see below, Appendix C, no. 109.

281. Johannes Hieronymus Sopranus Genuensis, S.J. (Giovanni Girolamo Soprani, 1572–1629): entered the Roman College on 25-III-1592, having studied Philosophy outside the order, and completed his theology studies

in 1598; *professus 4 votorum*, 15-VIII-1607; taught *ethica* (1598–99 and simultaneously *confessor primae Congregationis* and *praefectus Academiae superioris*; also, by 1611, taught another two years). Also taught logic (1601–02), probably physics (1602–03), and metaphysics (1603–04), then Scriptures and theology (ca. 1606–16?).

Sources: Fejér, I, p. 238; Rome, ARSI, Rom. 53, II, f. 354v (Catalogus Provinciae Rome . . . 6-I-1599), f. 359r; Rom. 54, f. 255r (Catalogus personarum Romani Collegii, 1611: Hieronymus Sopranus, "Docuit moralem philosophiam annos 3, Theologiam annos 5, Scripturas annos 4."). Cf. Iparraguirre, *passim*; U. Baldini 1982b, p. 570.

Lit.: Alegambe, p. 250; Sommervogel, VII, 1387–88; idem, IX, 857; Allacci, p. 161; *ABI*, I 921, 199–206 (Jöcher, Grillo, etc.), II 586, 332; Ferrari, p. 634.

Note: The disputations on the *Ethics* by Cesare del Bosco may be connected with his teaching in 1598–99; see Appendix C, no. 113.

282. Fulvius Ugurgerius (Fulvio Ugurgeri † Rome, 3-VIII-1603): entered the College on 24-X-1587; studied theology (and philosophy?) in the Collegio Romano, where he finished in 1598–99; taught *ethica* (at least 1601–02 and 1602–03, when he died). Also taught 3 or 4 years of grammar in S. Andrea (in 1600, was teaching his third year).

Sources: Fejér, I, p. 256; Rome, ARSI, Rom. 79, f. 69r (a. 1602, ineunte?), f. 143v (April 1603, name and subject erased). Cf. Ipparaguirre, p. 334.

283. Nicolaus Baldellus, S.J. (Nicolò Baldelli, 1573–1655): admitted to the College, 1589; *professus*, 1609; taught *ethica* (1603–04, in 1604–05 perhaps also taught logic). Possibly taught the 3-year philosophy cycle, 1600–03. Also taught logic (1605–06), metaphysics (1609–10), scholastic theology (1617–18). According to Mazzuchelli, he read philosophy for 10 years, moral theology for 6, theologia scholastica for 4. Was also in Perugia.

Sources: Rome, ARSI, Rom. 79, f. 177r (a. 1604 ineunte); Rom. 110, f. 23v (Nov. 1604). Cf. Ipparaguirre, p. 334 and *passim*; U. Baldini 1992b, pp. 570–71 and p. 581, n. 45.

Lit.: Alegambe, p. 348; Sommervogel, I, 827; idem, VIII, 1732; idem, XII, 939; *ABI*, I 95, 365–67 (Jöcher, Mazzuchelli); Ferrari, p. 65; Baldini, pp. 570 and 581 n. 45.

284. Darius Tamburellus (Dario Tamburelli, 1570–1618): taught *ethica* (1609–10). In 1610 apparently taught the *Metereologia* in the Collegio Romano, according to a ms. mentioned by Sommervogel; in 1617–18, *professor rerum spiritualium, admonitor, et confessor.*

Sources: Rome, ARSI, Rom. 110, f. 40v (Nov. 1610). Cf. Iparaguirre, p. 334.

Lit.: Alegambe, p. 89; Sommervogel, VII, 1827; idem, IX, 872; idem, XII, 284; *ABI*, I 938, 343 (Jöcher); *DBI*, XLV (1995), pp. 128–31 (D. Busolini); Risse, VIII, p. 862;

Note: Apparently had a hand in the commentary published by Ottavio Farnese (Appendix C, no. 141).

285. Antonius Mangilius Bergomas, S.J. (Antonio Mangili, 1576–1644): admitted to the College on 30-III-1594; joined the order on 1-I-1615; taught *ethica* (1611–12). Also taught philosophy and theology in Bergamo for 6 years, then 16 years in Rome (starting ca. 1609; including *casus* ca. 1616–20, theology in 1620–25).

Sources: Rome, ARSI, Rom. 54, f. 255r (Catalogus personarum Romani Collegii, 1611: "Docuit philosophiam annos 3, Moralem annum ineuntem."); *ibid.*, Rom. 55, f. 10r (Jan. 1616: 39 years old, "Admissus 30 Martii 1594 [Sommervogel says 1595], Professus 4 votorum 1 Januarii 1615, Docuit Philosophiam annos 6, Ethicam annum 1."); *ibid.*, f. 109r (a. 1619, described as having taught philosophy for 6 years, ethics for 1 year, and *casus* for 3 years). Cf. Iparraguirre, *passim*; Baldini, pp. 571 and 581, n. 49.

Lit.: Jöcher, III, p. 111; Sommervogel, V, 478; Lohr, RLAC, p. 243.

286. Athanasius Bufera Romanus (Atanasio Bufera, b. ca. 1581; † Rome, 12-X-1617): admitted to the College, 18-III-1601; finished theology studies by 1609; taught *ethica* (1615–16, simultaneously *praefectus studiorum in Seminario Romano*). Seems to have taught philosophy in the Collegio Firmano, ca. 1608–11.

Sources: Fejér, I, p. 37; Rome, ARSI, Rom. 55, f. 9v (Jan. 1616: 35 yrs old, "Admissus 18 Martii 1601, . . . docuit philosophiam annos 3, nunc Ethicam anno 4°."); *ibid.*, Rom. 79, f. 242v (a. 1616: "magister Ethicorum et Praefectus studiorum in Seminario Romano"). Cf. Iparraguirre, p. 334; Lohr, RLAC, p. 65.

Note: Wrote *In Ethicam* (a. 1616). See below, Appendix C, no. 143.

287. Ignatius Angelucius Belforensis (Ignazio Angelucci, 1585–1653): admitted to the College, 31-X-1601; probably finished studies in theology ca. 1613; taught *ethica* (1616–17). Apparently did not teach other philosophical subjects in the Collegio Romano.

Sources: Rome, ARSI, Rom. 110, f. 57r (a. 1616). Cf. Iparraguirre, p. 334.

Lit.: Sommervogel, I, 389–90; idem, VII, 1654; idem, XII, 66; *ABI*, I 53, 18–21 (Jöcher, Mazzuchelli, Vecchietti); Ferrari, p. 34.

288. Tarquinius Gallutius Sabinus, S.J. (Tarquinio Galluzzi, 1574–1649): finished theology studies ca. 1605; *professus 4 votorum*, 30-XI-1610; taught *ethica* (at least 1617–20, 1624–25). Started teaching grammar in 1597–98. Taught rhetoric ca. 1606–17. From 1621, *praefectus studiorum inferiorum*. Apparently did not teach the philosophical triennium.

Sources: Fejér, II, p. 173; Rome, ARSI, Rom. 110, f. 67v (a. 1617 for 1617–18); *ibid.*, f. 80v (1618–19, subject unspecified); *ibid.*, f. 93v (a. 1620);

Rom. 55, f. 109r (a. 1619); Rom. 56, f. 14r (a. 1625: "Docuit grammaticam . . . annos 3, Rhetoricam 12, concionatus est, legit moralem, praefectus studiorum inferiorum"). Cf. Iparraguirre, pp. 334–35.

Note: Wrote a monumental commentary on the *Ethics*. See Appendix C, no. 154.

289. Franciscus Piccolomineus Senensis, Jr., S.J. (Francesco Piccolomini, Jr., 1583/4–1651): admitted to the College, 26-II-1600; *professus 4 votorum* on 14-V-1617; taught *ethica* (1621–23). Also taught humanities for 1 year by 1619, logic (1615–16), physics (1616–17), logic (1618–19; Baldini), physics (1619–20; Baldini); metaphysics (1620–21), scholastic theology (1623–26). Rector (1632–35).

Sources: Rome, ARSI, Rom. 55, f. 233r (a. 1622: had taught humanities for one year and philosophy for 6; "nunc Moralem anno primo"); Rom. 56, f. 12v (a. 1625, "docuit . . . moralem et nunc theologiam 3 [annos]"); Rom. 110, f. 101v (a. 1622–23). Cf. Iparraguirre, p. 334 and *passim*; Baldini, pp. 571 and 581–2, n. 53.

Lit.: Alegambe, p. 130; Sommervogel, VI, 699–700; idem, XII, 660; *ABI*, I 780, 198 (Jöcher); Ferrari, p. 537; LThK^2 VIII, pp. 492–93; Lohr, RLAC, pp. 330–31; Polgár III.2, p. 665.

290. Hieronymus Ferrantinus Anconitanus, S.J. (Girolamo Ferrantino, 1576–1655): admitted to the College, 11-X-1594; *professus 4 votorum*, 14-V-1617; taught *ethica* (1625–26, 1627–35). Also taught rhetoric, philosophy, theology; rector of the College of the Maronites.

Sources: Rome, ARSI, Rom. 110, f. 80v (a. 1618, subject not specified); *ibid.*, f. 132v (a. 1625–26, *professor Moralis* and *praefectus Congregationis*); *ibid.*, f. 150 (a. 1627–28, again teaching ethics and *praefectus primae Congregationis*); *ibid.*, f. 163r (a. 1628–29); *ibid.*, f. 179r (a. 1629–30), etc.; Rom. 56, f. 152v (a. 1628: "Annorum 51, admissus 11 Oct. 1594, professus 4 votorum 14 Maii 1617, Docuit Humanitatem annos 3, Philosophiam 9, Ethicam 3, Mathematicam 1, Theologiam 1."). Cf. Iparraguirre, p. 334 and *passim*; Baldini, p. 571.

Lit.: Jöcher II, p. 571; Sommervogel III, 666; idem, XII, 1061; Vecchietti IV, p. 113; Lohr, RLAC, p. 146.

APPENDIX B

MEDIEVAL TRANSLATIONS OF THE *ETHICS*; SELECTED COMMENTARIES

The following appendix lists (in chronological order) the major translations and commentaries on the *Ethics* from the medieval period, with an emphasis on their diffusion in Italy (thus the listings of manuscripts in Italian libraries). I have marked with an asterisk (*) manuscripts or printed editions I have examined. The main literature listing the manuscripts and printed editions I have placed under *Source(s)*. The category *Studies* lists works that specifically examine the work in question. Repertories, general bio-bibliographical works, and major studies are listed immediately after the author's name. For the commentaries I have modernized the spelling in the *incipits* and *explicits* in order to facilitate comparisons with Lohr's data. As elsewhere, the *lemmata* referring to Aristotle's text are italicized.

I. *Translations*

Burgundius Pisanus († 1193)

Classen 1974; Verbeke 1990b; Durling 1994; studies cited in Bossier 1997; Imbach and Nienhaus, p. 404.

1. *Ethica vetus* (= *EN* II–III, from ca. 1150?).

Text inc.: Duplici autem virtute existente, hac quidem intellectuali, hac vero consuetudinali [vel morali], ea quidem que intellectualis, multum ex doctrina habet, et generacionem et augmentum, et ideo experimento indiget et tempore. Ea autem que consuetudinalis, ex assuetudine fit.
MSS: Forty-eight manuscripts.

Ed.: Aristotle, *EN lat.*, fasc. 2.

Sources and studies: Aristotle, *EN lat.*, fasc. 1–2; Bossier 1997, Vuillemin-Diem 1997. See above, pp. 46–47.

2. *Ethica nova* (= *EN* I–X, from ca. 1150?).

Text inc.: Omnis ars et omnis doctrina, similiter autem et operacio et proheresis, boni alicuius optatrix esse videtur. Ideoque optime enunciant bonum, quod omnia optant. Differentia autem quedam videtur esse finium; hii quidem enim sunt actus, hii autem circa hos opus aliquod.

MSS: Forty manuscripts.

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Ed.: Aristotle, *EN lat.*, fasc. 2.

Sources and studies: Aristotle, *EN lat.*, fasc. 1–2; Bossier 1997, Vuillemin-Diem 1997. See above, pp. 46–47.

Robertus Grosseteste († 1253)

Callus 1955; Gauthier 1970a, pp. 120–24 and idem 1974, p. CLII ff.; Lohr, *Traditio* (1973): 100–07; *CHLMPhh*, pp. 883–84; Imbach and Nienhaus, pp. 436–37. Some important recent studies are McEvoy 1982 and 1994; Southern 1992.

3. *Liber Ethicorum (recensio pura)* (1246–47).

Text inc.: Omnis ars et omnis doctrina, similiter autem et actus et eleccio, bonum quoddam appetere videtur. Ideo bene enunciaverunt bonum, quod omnia appetunt. Differencia vero quedam videtur esse finium. Hii quidem enim sunt operaciones, hii vero preter has opera quedam.

Lib. II inc.: Duplici autem virtute existente, hac quidem intellectuali, hac autem morali, ea quidem que intellectualis, plurimum ex doctrina habet et generacionem et augmentum. Ideo experimento indiget et tempore. Moralis vero ex more fit. Unde et nomen habuit, parum declinans a more. Ex quo et manifestum quoniam neque una moralium virtutum, natura nobis infit. Nullum enim natura existencium, aliter assuefit. Puta lapis natura deorsum latus, non utique assuefiet sursum ferri, neque si decies milies assuescat quis eum sursum iaciens, neque ignis deorsum, neque aliud aliquod eorum que aliter innata sunt, aliter utique assuefiet. Neque igitur natura neque preter naturam infiunt virtutes, set innatis quidem nobis suscipere eas, perfectis autem, per consuetudinem.

Text exp.: Consideratis igitur hiis, forte utique magis conspiciemus et qualis politia optima et qualiter unaqueque ordinata et quibus legibus et consuetudinibus utens. Dicamus igitur incipientes.

MSS: Sixty-three manuscripts.

Ed.: Aristotle, *EN lat.*, fasc. 3.

Sources and studies: Troilo 1932; Dunbabin 1972; Gauthier 1974; Aristotle, *EN lat.*, fasc. 3.

Anonymous (= Guillelmus de Moerbeke? [ca. 1215–ca. 1286])

Brams and Vanhamel 1989; Brams 1990 and 1994; Imbach and Nienhaus, pp. 447–48.

4. *Liber Ethicorum (recensio recognita)* (ca. 1260–70).

Text inc.: Omnis ars et omnis doctrina, similiter autem et actus et eleccio, bonum quoddam appetere videtur. Ideo bene enunciaverunt bonum quod omnia appetunt. Differencia vero quedam videtur finium. Hii quidem enim sunt operaciones, hii vero preter has opera quedam.

Lib. II inc.: Duplici autem virtute existente, hac quidem intellectuali, hac autem morali, ea quidem que intellectualis plurimum ex doctrina habet et generacionem et augmentum. Ideo experimento indiget et tempore. Moralis vero ex more fit. Unde et nomen habuit parum declinans a more. Ex quo et manifestum quoniam neque una moralium virtutum natura nobis insit. Nullum enim natura existencium aliter assuescit; puta lapis natura deorsum latus non utique assuescet sursum ferri, neque si decies milies assuescat quis eum sursum iaciens, neque ignis deorsum, neque aliud aliquod eorum que aliter innata sunt, aliter utique assuescet. Neque igitur natura neque preter naturam infiunt virtutes, set innatis quidem nobis suscipere eas, perfectis autem per assuetudinem.

Text exp.: Consideratis enim hiis forte utique magis conspiciemus, et qualis politia optima, et qualiter unaqueque ordinata, et quibus legibus et consuetudinibus utens. Dicamus igitur incipientes.

MSS: At least 217 manuscripts.

Edd.: At least eleven sixteenth-century editions; cf. below, Appendix C, no. 37, redaction C, *tres conversiones*; Aristotle, *EN lat.*, fasc. 4; Cranz and Schmitt, p. 172.

Sources and studies: Gauthier 1974 (questions Moerbeke's authorship); Aristotle, *EN lat.*, fasc. 4; Brams 1990, 1994 (argues for Moerbeke's authorship).

II. *Commentaries*

Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126–1198)

Gauthier 1970a, pp. 114–15; Korolec 1992; Druart 1994; Daiber 1999, II, pp. 238 ff.

5. *Liber minorum moralium (Liber Nicomachiae)* (s. XII, tr. Hermannus Alemannus, 1240).

Text inc.: (Dixit Aristoteles) Quoniam omnis ars et omnis scientia et omnis actio et omnis electio rei est alicuius, per unamquanque quidem earum bonum aliquod intendi et desiderari videtur, et est finis intentus per illam artem, aut scientiam aut actionem aut electionem; et cum sint fines istarum cunctarum hoc quod omnia appetunt, et sint fines earum omnium bonum, manifestum est quod omnia appetunt bonum. Et propterea bene dixit qui descripsit bonum per hoc quod ipsum est quod omnia appetunt.

Text exp.: *Incipiamus ergo et dicamus.* Et hic explicit sermo in hac parte huius scientiae et est ea quae habet se in scientia civili habitudine notitie quid est sanitas et egritudo in arte medicine; et illa quam promisit est pars quae habet se in hac scientia habitudine effective sanitatis et destructive egritudinis in medicina, ut est in libro eius qui nominatur de regimine vitae et nondum pervenit ad nos qui sumus in hac insula. . . . Et ego complevi eius translationem ex Arabico in Latinum tertio die iovis mensis Iunii, anno ab

incarnatione Domini Mcclx [thus printed ed.] apud urbem Toletanam, in capella sanctae trinitatis, unde sit benedictum nomen Domini, qui est trinus et unus.

MSS: Ten manuscripts. In Italy: Florence, BNC, Conv. Soppr. G.4.354 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–73v; Florence, BLaur., Plut. LXXIX, 18 (s. XIV), ff. 30r–90v; Gadd., Plut. LXXXIX, Sup. 49 (s. XIII), ff. 1r–43v; Naples, BNC, VIII.G.11 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–4r (in marginibus ad Librum Ethicorum); Turin, BN e Universitaria, E IV 35 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–76v; Vatican, BAV, Borgh. 57 (s. XIII), ff. 1r–55r (*De largitate*); Borgh. 108 (s. XIII), ff. 285r–289; Urb. lat. 221 (s. XV), ff. 188r–242r.

Edd.: Venice 1483, 1489, 1496, 1501, 1507, 1516, 1550–52, 1560, *1562 (vol. III, ff. 1r–160v, rpt. Franfurt a. M., 1962), 1575; Pavia 1521; Lyon 1530, 1542, 1548.

Source(s): Cranz and Schmitt, *ad indicem*; Korolec 1992; Flüeler, *Medieval Translations*, sub voce; Risse, IV.

Studies: Korolec 1992.

Eustratius de Nicaea († 1120) *et al.*

Mercken 1990a.

6. *Commentus Eustratii super libris Ethicorum* (s. XII; tr. Robertus Grosseteste, ca. 1253)

Prol. inc.: Philosophia in duas partes divisa, dico autem in theoricam et practicam, circa utrasque Aristoteles studuit et negotia de ambabus exposuit, pertranseuntium hominum animas arte et doctrina instruens secundum congruum unicuique subiecto. . . .

Text inc.: *Omnis ars et omnis doctrina* [. . .]—Consuete Aristoteles universale praeordinat et in presenti doctrina. Plerumque enim propria incipiens negotia hoc faciens invenitur. Et enim in Demonstrativa . . .

Text exp.: . . . id est amorem hominum pro nobis, et amicorum omnino optimus et doctor iste venerabilissimus mihi et mea quidem sint igni cibus, quae autem illius in semper animabus bonum amantibus et deiformissimis.

MSS: Twenty-two manuscripts. In Italy: *Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. I.5.21 (s. XIII), ff. 1r–227v (with annotations by Coluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni); *Florence, BLaur., Plut. LXXIX, 13 (s. XIII), ff. 1r–376v; Montepradone (Ascoli Piceno), Bib. del Convento di S. Maria delle Grazie o di S. Giacomo, cod. 15 (s. XIV in.), ff. 1r–166r; Naples, BNC, VIII. G.4 (s. XIII med.), ff. 1r–227v; *Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 222 (A.D. 1481), ff. 2r–223r; Vat. lat. 2171 (s. XIII ex.), ff. 1r–211v; *Venice, BMarc., Lat. VI, 122 (=3215) (s. XIII), ff. 1r–204v.

Ed.: Eustratius *et al.* 1973–.

Sources and studies: Mercken 1990a; see above, Ch. 3.

Albertus Magnus, O.P. (1200–1280)

Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 338–45; idem 1988a, pp. 6–17; *CHLMPh*, pp. 855–56; Imbach and Nienhaus, pp. 370–71; Anzulewicz 1999 for a recent update and references to older bibliographical surveys; *CALMA*, I.2 (2000), pp. 121–32 (L. Lanza). Dunbabin 1963; Michaud-Quantin 1966; *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences*; Fauser 1982; *Albert le Grand et sa réception*; Dreyer 1998.

Note: It is uncertain whether Albert 1520 (also printed in 1525) corresponds to no. 7 or no. 8.

7. *[Lectura] super Ethica* (1250–52).

Prol. inc.: Ptolomaeus in Almagesto: "Disciplina hominis sui intellectus socius est et apud homines intercessor." Circa moralem scientiam tria hic tanguntur: materia, finis, utilitas. Materia ibi: disciplina, quia, sicut dicit Basilius, disciplina est eruditio morum. . . . utrum de moribus possit esse scientia vel non. Quod non, videtur . . . utrum disciplina moralis sit una. Quod non, videtur . . .

Liber primus inc.: Titulus talis est: Liber moralium Aristotelis Stagiritae ad Nicomachum. In quo tangitur materia ibi: *moralium*; et in Graeco habetur *ethicorum*, et est aequivocum in Graeco . . .

Liber I, lectio I inc.: *Omnis ars et omnis doctrina* . . .—Dividitur autem in duas partes. Primo tradit scientiam moralem, secundo [ultimo capitulo X libri] determinat de morali per comparationem ad alias duas partes ostendens, quod ista non sufficit . . . Prima dividitur in duas. Quia cum in consideratione huius scientiae veniat perfectio moralis et contemplativa, primo determinat de morali, secundo de contemplativa, in VI libro, ibi: *Quia autem exsistimus*. Prima dividitur in duas. Primo determinat de felicitate morali, secundo de virtute morali, in II libro, ibi: *Duplici*.

Text exp.: . . . imperfectionem illorum qui permittunt doctrinam sine operibus et hoc non mutatur.

MSS: See Fauser 1982, pp. 179–83 (listing eleven MSS). *Add*: Prague, Státní Knihovna, 1953 (X. F. 27) (s. XV), 89 ff. (Anonymous, *Expositio librorum Ethicorum Aristotelis secundum Albertum Magnum*). In Italian libraries: Naples, Archivio di Stato, Museo 26 (s. XIII), ff. 75ra–171vb (ms. no longer survives, but copy in Albertus Magnus Institut, Bonn); Naples, BNC, VIII.G.8 (s. XIV), ff. 1ra–2vb, 12ra–71vb; Vatican, BAV, Chigi E.VII.225 (s. XIII), ff. 1r–95r (excerpts); Vat. lat. 722 (s. XIII/XIV), ff. 1ra–105rb.

Ed.: Albert 1968–72. See note above.

Source(s): Fauser 1982, pp. 179–83; Korolec 1977, p. 76.

Studies: Mercken 1990b, Tiné 1995; see *CALMA*, I.2 (2000), p. 124, no. 24.

8. *Ethica* [paraphrase] (1263–67).

Text inc.: Cum omnis scientia sit de numero bonorum et honorabilium, tamen quando una comparetur ad alteram, una alia melior est . . .

Lib. I, Tr. 1, c. 1 inc.: Cum igitur omnes scientiae aliae hoc modo sint de bonis et honorabilibus, quia sunt de his quae per denominationem et informationem bona et honorabilia dicta sunt, sola autem moralis sit de bono et honorabili per essentiam dicti, cuius ipsa substantia est bonitas et honestas, constat moralem alias omnes scientias excellere in bono et in honorabili.

Text exp.: . . . facientes principium dicamus incipientes.

MSS: See Fauser 1982, pp. 174–78 (listing twenty-two MSS). *Add*: Sion, Bib. Chapitre, 109 (s. XV), ff. 118r–207v; Bib. Chapitre, 110 (s. XV), ff. 1r–16v, part of Bk. V (*inc.* In hoc quinto libro Moralium de iustitia est determinandum); *Vatican, BAV, Pal. lat. 1028 (s. XIV), 202 ff. In Italian libraries: Florence, BLaur., Plut. LXXIX, 16 (s. XIV), ff. 1ra–173ra; Florence, BNC, Naz. II.I.117 (s. XIII ex.), ff. 306ra–435rb; Rome, BAng. 103 (A.8.15) (s. XV), ff. 9ra–246vb; Vatican, BAV, Chigi E.VIII.255 (s. XIV in.), ff. 5ra–129ra; Urb. lat. 191 (167) (s. XV), ff. 9ra–246vb; Venice, BMarc. lat. VI, 19 (= 2487) (s. XIV), ff. 1ra–177va. Excerpts in Italian libraries: Florence, BNC, Conv. Soppr. A.5.2769 (s. XIII), ff. 1r–47r; Siena, BCom. Intronati, H.VI.6 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–75v; Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 722 (s. XIII/XIV), f. 211r.

Edd.: Albert 1651 (Jammy); Albert 1891 (Borgnet). See note above.

Source(s): Fauser 1982, pp. 174–78; Lohr 1994, *passim.*

Studies: Bertelloni 1996; see *CALMA*, I.2 (2000), p. 124, no. 25.

Robertus Grosseteste (1168–1253)

Cf. bibliography above, at no. 3.

9. *Sententia libri Ethicorum (Summa in Ethica Nicomachea)* (ca. 1253).

Text inc.: Primum capitulum de eo quod est aliquis finis perfectissimus omnium bonorum operabilium . . .

Text exp.: . . . et qualiter ordinata et quibus legibus et consuetudinibus utens.

MSS: Twelve manuscripts. In Italian libraries: Florence, BLaur., Plut. VI.D.5 (s. XIII), ff. 119r–141v; Naples, BNC, VIII.G.4 (s. XIII), ff. 1r–9r; Siena, BCom. Intronati, H.VI.1 (s. XIV), ff. 76ra–86ra; Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 1325 (s. XIV), ff. 1ra–97vb.

Edd.: Venice 1483 (with Averroes, *In Ethica*); Lyon 1542.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1973): 104.

10. *Notulae in Ethica et in Commentatores Graecos in eadem* (ca. 1253?).

Text inc.: Politeia dicitur a polis, quod est civitas. Pro quo translatores ponunt hoc nomen urbanitas . . . (*nota 1 supra introductione Eustratii*).

– Nostris vocant primam philosophiam metaphysicam . . . (*nota 1 post principium Ethicorum*).

MSS: Twelve manuscripts. In Italian libraries: *Florence, BLaur., Plut. LXXIX, 13 (s. XIII), ff. 1r–376v; *BNC, Conv. Sopp. I.5.21 (s. XIII), ff. 1r–227v; Montepradone (Ascoli Piceno), Bib. del Convento di S. Maria delle Grazie o di S. Giacomo, cod. 15 (s. XIV in.), ff. 1r–166r; Naples, BNC, VIII.G.4 (s. XIII), ff. 9v–227v; *VIII.G.11 (s. XIII/XIV); Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2171 (s. XIII), ff. 1r–221v.

Ed.: Venice 1519 (Lincolniensis [= Walter Burley], *In Ethica*, with citations of many *notulae*).

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1973): 104–05.

Studies: Thomson 1933.

Thomas de Aquino, O.P. (1225–1274)

Lohr, *Traditio* (1973): 159–72; idem 1988a, pp. 237–48; *CHLMPh*, pp. 886–87; Imbach and Nienhaus, p. 593. Weisheipl 1983; Kluxen 1980; *The Ethics of St. Thomas*; McInerny 1992.

Note: Thomas also authored a *Tabula Ethicorum*; see Thomas Aquinas 1971.

11. *Sententia libri Ethicorum* (1270–72?).

Text inc.: *Omnis ars et omnis doctrina . . .*—Sicut Philosophus dicit in principio Metaphysicae, sapientis est ordinare. Cuius ratio est quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cuius proprium est cognoscere ordinem . . .

Text exp.: Sed ante omnia haec ponit quaedam principia politicae, in libro I, a quibus dicit se incepturum. Quod quidem est continuatio ad librum Politicae et terminatio summae totius libri Ethicorum.

MSS: Eighty-six complete manuscripts, plus nine fragmentary MSS, forty-three lost MSS, and over thirty MSS with annotations from Thomas. Twenty-five of the complete MSS are in Italy.

Edd.: Barcelona 1478, Vicenza 1482, Venice 1505, 1519, 1531, 1539, 1563, Rome 1570, Venice 1593–94, Venice 1595, Antwerp 1612, Paris 1644, Paris 1660, . . ., Thomas Aquinas 1969.

Source(s): Gauthier 1969; *Codices Thomae.*

Studies: Papadis 1980, Rhonheimer 1994.

Aegidius Romanus, O.E.S.A. (Giles of Rome, 1245–1316)

Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 327–37; idem 1988a, pp. 2–5; *CHLMPh*, p. 861; Imbach and Nienhaus, pp. 366–67; *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia; CALMA*, I.1 (2000), pp. 63–73 (L. Lanza).

12. *De regimine principum* (1299 or earlier).

Ded. inc.: Ex regia ac sanctissima prosapia oriundo suo domino speciali domino Philippo primogenito et haeredi praeclarissimi viri domini Philippi dei gratia illustrissimi regis Francorum, suus devotus frater Aegidius romanus ordinis fratrum heremitarum sancti Augustini cum recommendatione seipsum et ad omnia famulatum.

Text inc. (Cap. 1): Oportet ut latitudo sermonis in unaquaque re sit secundum exigentia illius rei, et non magis neque minus ut vult philosophus vii Methaphysica. Si ergo de regimine principum sive regum intendimus artem et notitiam tradere ut non fiant ulteriores sermones quam praesens opus requirat primo videndum est quis sit modus procedendi in hac arte. Sciendum ergo quod in toto morali negotio modus procedendi secundum philosophum est figuralis et grossus.

MSS: Over 350 manuscripts.

Edd.: Augsburg 1473, Rome 1482, Venice 1498 and *1502 (Florence, BNC, Magl. 1.5.220), Rome 1556 and 1607, . . ., *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia.*

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 332–34; *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia.*

Studies: Lambertini 1991b and 1992; see *CALMA*, I.1 (2000), p. 70, no. 66.

Henricus de Frimaria de Alemannia, O.E.S.A. (ca. 1245–1320)

Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 221–22; idem 1988a, p. 100; Gutierrez 1984, *ad indicem*; Imbach and Nienhaus, p. 459.

13. *Sententia totius libri Ethicorum* (1310 or earlier).

Ded. inc.: Ex nobili prosapia oriundo domino Hannibaldo de Ceccano canonico Attrebatensi frater Henricus de Alemannia ordinis fratrum eremitarum S. Augustini se ad eius beneplacitum semper promptum. Sicut dicit Valerius Maximus libro septimo, "Quadam necessitate nobiles constringuntur ne ab antiquorum suorum probitate degenerent . . ."/. . . quanto profundius quaeritur tanto gloriosius invenitur.

Prol. inc.: Bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Quod secundum Philosophum tertio Ethicorum (Rhetoricorum) ad hoc libris prooemia praemittuntur, ut in eis detur aliqualis praegustatio dicendorum . . .

Q. 1: Utrum de virtutibus possit esse scientia?

Lib. II inc.: Duplici autem virtute existente etc.—Postquam philosophus determinavit quaedam quorum cognitio praeexigitur . . .

Text exp.: . . . propter inimicitiam vel propter amorem sui ipsius sed solum gratia veritatis. In quo terminatur sententia totius libri Ethicorum completa A.D. 1310 ipso largiente complementum, qui est perfecta consummatio beatorum cui sit honor et gloria nunc et in aevum.

MSS: Twenty-one manuscripts. In Italian libraries: *Bologna, BU 1572 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–230r; *Palermo, BCom., 2 Qq F 150 (s. XV), 117 ff. (anon., inc. mutilus); Vatican, BAV, Ross. lat. 724 (X 104) (s. XIV/XV); Urb. lat. 1488 (A.D. 1438), 339 ff.; Vat. lat. 2169 (s. XIV/XV), ff. 7r–284v; 2173 (s. XIV), ff. 25r–34v (excerpts).

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 221–22; Gauthier 1970a, p. 134, n. 147.

Gerardus Odonis, O.F.M. (1290–1349)

Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 163–65; idem 1988a, p. 67; *CHLMPh*, p. 861; Imbach and Nienhaus, p. 430.

14. *Sententia et expositio cum quaestionibus super libros Ethicorum Aristotelis* (ante 1329?).

Prol. inc.: Quid est virtus scrutamur ut boni efficiamur, ait Aristoteles (Philosophus) secundo Ethicorum. Ipsa namque virtus habita habentem facit bonum. Cognita vero licet non habita cognoscentem inducit ad bonum. Virtus quippe habita rectificat habentis intentionem et rationem electionem et conversationem. Dubia certificat, difficilia facilitat; conformis est naturae, conformis rationis; ratione procurat bona, conservat ea, honorem vitae presentis excedit . . .

Text inc.: Omnis ars et omnis doctrina—Huic libro praemittitur prooemium et ibi subditur tractatus (Huic libro suo Aristoteles praemittit prooemium et ibi subdit tractatum): *Dicamus autem resumentes.* In prooemio philosophus autem reddit auditorem primo benevolum proponens ei scientiae finem et fructum, secundo docilem . . .

– (q.1): Utrum bonum humanum seu operatio humana sit subiectum primum in hac scientia?

Lib. II, inc.: Multiplici autem existente virtute. Postquam philosophus in primo libro determinavit de fine virtutis, hic in secundo determinat de generatione et multiplici conditione et ratione virtutis.

Text exp.: . . . et ita factum est, ut ubi incipit Liber Politicorum explicit liber Ethicorum, cuius expositionem et sententiam aliqualiter consummavimus, praestante Domino qui operatur omnia in omnibus, cui est honor et gloria in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

MSS: Seventeen manuscripts. In Italian libraries: Assisi, BCom. 285 (s. XIV), ff. 1–133; *Florence, BLaur., Plut. XIII, sin. 3 (s. XIV), 262 ff.; Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. I.3.25 (s. XV); Padua, BAnton., XVIII 389 (s. XV), 175ff.; *Subiaco, Bib. Abbazia, XXIV (s. XV), 248 ff. (anon., but commentary on Lib. III–X seems largely taken from Gerard); Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 1369 (s. XIV/XV), ff. 291v–295 (Utrum omnia bonum appetant tamquam finem . . ./. . . quia amici similiter ut amici maxime appetunt convivere. Expliciunt questiones fratris Giraldi); Vat. lat. 2168 (A.D. 1439), 264 ff.; Pal. lat. 1027 (s. ?), 317 ff.

Edd.: *Brescia 1482 (Florence, BNC, C.1.11), Venice 1500.

Source(s): Gauthier 1970a, p. 135, n. 149; Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 164.

Studies: Walsh 1975, Kent 1984 and 1995.

Gualterus Burlaeus (Walter Burley, ca. 1275–1344/45)

Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 171–87; idem 1988a, pp. 71–75; *CHLMPh*, pp. 888–89; Imbach and Nienhaus, p. 437–38; Heidingsfelder 1927, pp. 87–99.

15. *Expositio super libros Ethicorum* (1334–41).

Prol. inc.: Reverendo in Christo patri et domino Ricardo divina disponente clementia Dunelmensis sedis episcopo Gualterus de Burley sacrae paginae inter ceteros floridae universitatis doctores minimus, professor humilis vestrae dominationis servitor, in via salutem et gratiam et in termino gloriam sempiternam.

– Et si multorum scriptorum in disciplina morali commendatarios vestra sollicitudo studiosa perlegerit . . . Intendo autem in hoc opere in principio cuiuslibet libri ponere quaestiones principales motas et determinatas in illo libro, et in fine cuiuslibet libri ponam propositiones notabiliores libri quae communius locum habent in conversatione hominum et convictu, et post propositiones notabiles ponam conclusiones ut per hoc possit facilius intentionem totius libri memoriter retinere. In exponendo vero textum dividam quemlibet librum in tractatus, et tractatus in capitula, et capitula in partes, et partes in particulas, faciendo illas divisiones secundum diversitatem sententiae et non secundum quantitatem lecturae quemadmodum plurimi diviserunt.

Text inc.: Omnis ars et omnis doctrina. Scientia moralis quae est de actionibus voluntariis ut dicit Averroes in prologo super octavum Physicorum habet tres partes principales. Prima est de operationibus unius hominis secundum se, et haec pars vocatur monastica. Secunda est de operationibus multitudinis domesticae, et haec pars vocatur oeconomica. Tertia pars est de operationibus multitudinis civilis, et haec pars vocatur politica. Prima pars, scilicet quae est de operationibus unius hominis secundum se traditur in libro ethicorum . . .

– Liber primus continet quattuor tractatus. In primo principaliter solvitur haec quaestio: An est felicitas, seu an est ultimus finis humanorum.

– *Omnis ars.* Istud est primum capitulum primi tractatus scilicet prooemii in quo ostenditur quod in rebus humanis est aliquis finis intentus . . .

Text exp.: Ad nihil est utile leges ponere nisi obediatur legibus. Ad rationem inductam dicendum quod ad politicum artificialem qui non est expertus non pertinet legem instituere sed requiritur quod sit expertus, et quod habeat virtutem coactivam sicut habent reges et quidam alii principes. Et in hoc finitur breviter et modo facili id quod de libro Ethicorum intellexi.

MSS: Twenty-six manuscripts. In Italian libraries: Florence, BLaur., Fesul. 168 (s. XIV), ff. 169r–238v; Milan, BAmbr., H.184 inf. (s. XV) item 3 (ascr., *Conclusiones seu tituli eorum quae tractantur in libros X Ethicorum Aristotelis*); J.98.sup. (s. XV), ff. 105r–108r (*Conclusiones seu tituli . . .*); J.115.sup. (s. XV), ff. 11r–24v (*Conclusiones seu tituli . . .*); Naples, BNC, VIII.G.26 (s. ?); Padua, BU 1452 (s. XV), item 1; Rome, BAngelica 1254 (s. XV), ff. 1–65 (mut. in fine); Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 1369 (s. XIV/XV), ff. 4–253, 288–291; Venice, BMarc., lat. VI, 88 (s. XIV), ff. 1–247; Verona, Bib. Capit., CCXXXV (197).

Edd.: Venice 1481, 1500, 1519 (attributed to Robert Grosseteste), *1521 (BSB, 2 A.gr.b. 392).

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 185–86.

Studies: Heidingsfelder 1927, pp. 87–99.

Albertus de Saxonia († 1390)

Heidingsfelder 1927, pp. 1–51; Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 348–52; idem 1988a, pp. 17–19; *CHLMPh*, p. 856; Imbach and Nienhaus, pp. 371–72; Berger 1995, 1996, 1998; *CALMA*, I.2 (2000), pp. 136–40 (S. Polidori). Biard 1991.

16. *Expositio libri Ethicorum* (1350s).

Prol. inc.: Iuxta sententias antiquorum expositorum qui libros Aristotelis morales, scilicet Ethicorum, Oeconomicorum et Politicorum, prolixe commentaverunt, sententias dictorum librorum, deo favente, brevius compilabo, non sicut ipsi expositione litterae vacaturus, sed prout littera sonat vel ex ea elici potest conclusivam sententiam elicimus . . .

Text inc.: *Omnis ars et omnis doctrina.* Iste est liber Ethicorum Aristotelis in quo determinatur de his quae pertinent ad regimen unius, propter quod scientia huius libri vocata est monastica qui dividitur in decem libros partiales . . .

Text exp.: . . . de quo determinatur in tertio tractatu.

MSS: Twenty-four manuscripts. In Italian libraries: Florence, BRicc. 745 (N. II.26) (s. XIV/XV), ff. 179r–181v (anon. frag.); Milan, BAmbr., G.47.inf. (s. XV), ff. 8r–118v; *Padua, BU 1474 (s. XV), 48 ff.; Vatican, BAV, Pal. lat. 1030 (s. XIV), ff. 191v–295r, 307r–319r (without prologue); Vat. lat. 6384 (s. XV), ff. 1r–61v; Venice, BMarc., Zan. lat. 262 (= 1984) (A.D. 1394), ff. 16ra–83va.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 351–52.

Studies: Heidingsfelder 1927; see *CALMA*, I.2 (2000), p. 137, no. 5.

Note: Albert of Saxony also wrote a *Conclusiones libri Ethicorum* (see Quinto 1992). Heidingsfelder (p. 138) argues that the *Expositio* is connected with Albert's teaching in Paris.

Johannes Buridanus (ca. 1300–post 1358)

Lohr, *Traditio* (1970): 161–83; idem 1988a, pp. 125–32; *CHLMPh*, pp. 865–66; Imbach and Nienhaus, pp. 480–81; Michael 1985.

17. *Quaestiones in decem libros Ethicorum ad Nicomachum* (ca. 1340–60).

Prol. inc.: Bonitatis et nobilitatis excellentiam philosophiae moralis extollit Aristoteles secundo Ethicorum, cum dicit eam non esse contemplationis gratia. *Non enim*, inquit, *ut sciamus quid est virtus scrutamur, sed ut boni efficiamur, quia nullum esset utique proficuum eius.* Haec autem verba non possunt intelligi . . .

Lib. I, q. 1 inc.: Quaeritur igitur primo circa primum librum Ethicorum, utrum de virtutibus sit scientia. Et arguitur quod non, quia si sciatur virtus, oportet quod hoc sit (scitur) per humanos actus, quia ex eis causatur. Res autem causata . . .

Lib. II, q. 1 inc.: . . . utrum virtutes morales insint vel infiant nobis a natura. Arguitur quod sic, quia dicitur sexto huius . . .

Exp. 1 (quaestiones brevae): . . . ergo operationes propriae domino, scilicet animae, cuiusmodi sunt actus intelligendi et volendi, sunt nobiliores quam operationes coniunctae, scilicet sensus vel appetitus sensitivi.

Exp. 2 (quaestiones longae): (Consequenter) quaeritur sexto: In quo actu intellectus consistat humana felicitas, an in simplici an (vel) in complexo. Et si in simplici, (tunc) in quo simplici? Et sic de complexo. Et an in actu directo vel (in) reflexo?

MSS: Over 100 authentic manuscripts, not counting works "secundum Buridanum" and including the additional ones mentioned here. *Add*: Basel, UB, A.X.44 (s. XIV), f. 12v; F.I.30 (s. XIV), ff. 2r–v, 65r–85r; F.VI.25 (s. XV), f. 1v; Budapest, Országos, Széchényi Konyvtár (National Széchényi Library), Clmae 483; Erfurt, SB, Ampl. F. 367 (s. XIV), ff. 74ra–90va; Fribourg, Franziskanerkloster, 61 (s. ?); *Genoa, BU, F.VII.9 (s. XV, French hand), ff. 92r–120v (explicit mutilus in quaestione *Utrum ad felicitatem requiratur virtus . . .*); Segovia, Archivo de la Catedral, Vit. 28 (s. XV); Trier, SB, 718/273 (s. XV); Vienna, Bibliothek des Schottenklosters (ad Scotos), cod. lat., 273 (278) (A.D. 1389), ff. 10ra–291ra; Wrocław, BU, IV.F.2 (s. XIV). In Italian libraries: *Bologna, BU 366 (A.D. 1395), ff. 1ra–182rb (written in Italy; belonged to Giovanni Garzoni in the fifteenth century); Florence, BNC, Naz. II.I.81 (s. XV), 2 vols., ff. 1r–210, 1r–171v (annotated by Donato Acciaiuoli); Genoa ms. above; Milan, BAmbr., E.86.inf. (A.D. 1467), ff. 1ra–261ra; Padua, BU 1472 (A.D. 1407), item 1, ff. 1ra–158vb (connected with the Univ. of Padua and owned by Pico della Mirandola and Cardinal Domenico Grimani); Rome, BAngel. 557 (F.3.9) (A.D. 1406), 229 ff. (written in Italy); Vatican, BAV, Chigi A.VI.189 (A.D. 1431), ff. 236r–342v (excerpts of questions, I, q. 2–IX, q. 10; Italian provenance); Pal. lat. 1019 (s. XIV/XV), 351 ff.; Pal. lat. 1025 (s. XV), ff. 1ra–168vb (belonged to

Magister Johannes Ambrosii from Günzburg, on the Faculty of Arts in Heidelberg); Ross. lat. 785 (s. XV), ff. 1ra–247rb (written in Italy); Urb. lat. 198 (A.D. 1363), 199ff (oldest ms. of the *Quaestiones*, written in Paris; belonged to Federico da Montefeltro); Urb. lat. 1367 (s. XIV/XV), 224 ff. (belonged to Federico da Montefeltro); Vat. lat. 2165 (s. XIV/XV), 287 ff.; Vat. lat. 2166 (A.D. 1388), 255 ff.; Vat. lat. 2169 (s. XIV/XV), ff. 1r–6v (Lib. I, qq. 16–20, anon.); Vat. lat. 3018 (ante A.D. 1473), ff. 1r–206r (IV, qq. 1–20; VI, q. 1–IX, q. 11, copied in Rome [?] in 1473); Vat. lat. 4557 (s. XV [3–4]), ff. 1r–158v (V, qq. 1–29 and X, qq. 1–6; cursive humanist hand); Venice, BMarc., Zan. lat. 103 (s. ?); Zan. lat. 262 (= 1984) (A.D. 1395), ff. 90–357 (written in Ferrara?).

Edd.: Paris 1489 (rpt. Frankfurt a. M. 1968), Paris 1496, 1513, 1518, *Oxford 1637.

Sources: Michael 1985 and 1992; Lines (forthcoming).

Studies: Walsh 1975; Korolec 1975 and 1976; Markowski 1984; Krieger 1986; Sylla 1995.

Note: Buridan's authorship of a *Sententia* on the *Ethics* is now questioned; see Flüeler 1998a. The date of the oldest known manuscript of the *Quaestiones* (Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 198), is 1363, but at least some scholars date the work to the 1330s (e.g., Lambertini 1997, p. 313).

APPENDIX C

LATIN WORKS ON THE *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS* IN ITALY TO CA. 1650

The following appendix lists (in chronological order) Latin translations, compendia, extracts, commentaries, prolusions, and a few other interpretative genres written on Aristotle's *Ethics* in Italy, from the late thirteenth century to around 1650. I have marked with an asterisk (*) manuscripts or printed editions I have examined. The main literature listing the manuscripts and printed editions I have placed under *Source(s)*. The category *Studies* lists works that specifically examine the work in question. Repertories, general bio-bibliographical works, and major studies are listed immediately after the author's name. I have tried to give a specific manuscript's codicological information whenever it appears to be a work's single representative. I have modernized the spelling in the *incipits* and *explicits* in order to facilitate comparisons with Lohr's repertories (cf. Lohr, *Traditio* and Lohr, RLAC).

XIV Century and Earlier

Before 1351

Jacobus de Pistorio (Giacomo da Pistoia, fl. ca. 1290?)

LMA; Kristeller 1993a; Imbach and Nienhaus 1996, p. 476; *DBI*, LIV (2000), pp. 231–33 (A. Ottaviani).

1. *Quaestio de felicitate.*

Prol. inc.: Viro bene nato et mihi delecto et prae aliis amico carissimo (*Cortona MS*: praeclaro) Guidoni domini Cavalcantis de Cavalcantibus de Florentia magister Jacobus . . .

Text inc.: Quoniam homo omnes suos actus et electiones taliter ordinare debet ut ad beatitudinem et ultimam felicitatem pervenire possit, oportet non latere volentes recte vivere, quid sit ultima felicitas hominis et in quo consistit . . .

Text exp.: Quid autem sit felicitas ultima, qui modus conveniens perveniendi ad ipsam et quomodo rationes contrarium probantes dissolvantur dictum sit hoc modo. / Amen. Explicit tractatus de summa felicitate humana et in quo consistat Magistri Jacobi de Pistorio scriptus p (!) Bononiae.

MSS: Stuttgart, Würt. LB, Theol. Quarto 204 (s. XIII), ff. 92v–98v; Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2172 (s. XIII), ff. 53r–55r; Cortona, BCom. e dell'Accademia della Crusca 110 (s. XIV ex.), ff. 195–96.

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Ed.: Kristeller 1993a, pp. 521–35.

Source(s): Kristeller 1993a; idem, *Iter* I, pp. 48–49; Lines 1999a, p. 274, no. 19.

Studies: Kristeller 1993a; Bottin 1989.

Note: Jacobus disputed this question, probably in the Arts faculty, in Bologna around the end of the thirteenth century.

2. Anonymous, *Liber Aristotelis Ethicorum abbreviatus* (compendium, before 1300?).

Text inc.: Sciendum quod secundum philosophum, ethicorum primo, operationes (*Cenci*: opiniones) humanae diversificantur ex parte principii et ex parte finis.

MS: *Assisi, BCom. 584 (s. XIII/XIV, memb., mm. 190 x 130, 2 cols., 38 lines), ff. 49r–52r.

Source(s): Marchesi 1904, p. 113 (extracts *ibid.*, 145–46); Cenci 1981, I, p. 210 n. 130; Lines 1999a, p. 267, no. 1.

Note: This abridgement is a fragmentary work, breaking off during Aristotle's discussion of *magnificentia* in Book III. The work occupies little more than three folios of an eight-folio quire. According to Marchesi, it was scribed in Umbria (XIII century).

Hieremias de Montagnone (Geremia da Montagnone, fl. s. XIII/XIV)

Paduan humanist. Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 239; idem 1988, p. 111; *DBI*, LIII (1999), pp. 400–03 (G. Milan).

3. *Compendium moralium notabilium* (extracts, ca. 1310).

Text inc.: Utillimum et quasi necessarium fore existimandum est ad moralium notabilium scientiam atque memoriam facilius habendam . . .

Text exp.: in opere scripturae authentice prius edita sunt.

MSS: Over fifty-seven manuscripts.

Ed.: Venice 1505.

Source(s): Weiss 1949, pp. 29–30; Ullman 1955, pp. 108–11; Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 239; Kristeller, *Iter, passim*; Lines 1999a, p. 271, no. 10.

Studies: Weiss 1949, pp. 15–50; Ullman 1955, pp. 81–115; see above, pp. 170–71.

Remigius Florentinus, O.P. (Remigio de' Girolami, † 1319)

Resident in the convent of Santa Maria Novella in Florence and reader there. Kaeppeli, III, pp. 297–302; IV, pp. 259–60; Murray 1978, pp. 256–57; Panella 1979 and 1981; Lohr 1988a, pp. 210–11; Imbach and Nienhaus 1996, pp. 564–65.

4. *Prologus super libros ethicorum.*

Text inc.: *Videtur igitur philosophia admirabiles delectationes habere, puritate cum firmitate*—X ethicorum cap. 8 philosophus . . . per quattuor nobis aperte insinuat propter quae philosophiam maxime debemus appetere et desiderare.

Text exp.: Philosophia autem est de genere incomplexorum. Haec autem duplici via possit (?) cognosci.

MS: *Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. G.4.936 (s. XIV), ff. 344v–345r.

Source(s): Davis 1965 and 1978; Panella 1981, p. 70; Lines 1999a, p. 275, no. 20.

Conradus de Asculo, O.P. (Corrado da Ascoli, † 1330)

Provincial for his order in Lower Lombardy. Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 394; idem 1988a, p. 50.

5. *Compendium Ethicorum.*

Prol. inc.: Sicut dicit philosophus, Natura humana multipliciter est ancilla.

Text inc.: Incipit prooemium in quo sunt tria capitula. Primum est de necessitate finis et ordine finium et intentione philosophi.

—Omnis . . . [one word unclear] habitus humanus sive sit habitus intellectus speculativi ut doctrina sive intellectus practici ut ars sive sit electio finis sive persecutio [*in margine:* vel executio] finis . . .

Lib. II inc.: *Duplici autem*—Duplici igitur existente virtute, una quidem intellectualis quae respicitur intellectum ut sapientia, altera vero moralis quae respicitur appetitum . . .

Text exp.: Sed futuram felicitatem quam divina gratia revelante cognoscimus mediari (?) caritate quae est virtutum initia (!) in praesenti e lumine gloriae in futuro mentem elevante ad divinam essentiam videndam attingemus ipso prestante qui est benedictus per omnia saecula saeculorum. Amen.

Coloph. (Padua ms.): Explicit compendium Ethicorum secundum fratrem Conradum esculanum ordinis praedicatoris (= praedicatorum ?).

MSS: *Padua, BU 1574 (s. XIV, acephalous), ff. 1r–29v; *Philadelphia, Univ. of Penn. Lib., ms. codex 767 (olim lat. 50) (s. XIV), 110 ff.; cf. *Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2996 (s. XIII/XIV), ff. 1r–58v (extracts in marginalia). *Olim* Bologna, Bib. del convento di S. Domenico 166; Treviso, Bib. del convento di S. Nicolò; Venice, Bib. del convento di SS. Giovanni e Paolo 452.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 394; Gauthier 1969, pp. 43*–45*; Lines 1999a, p. 268, no. 3 (with literature).

Studies: Gauthier 1969, pp. 43*–45*.

Note: The Padua ms. is acephalous and comes from the convent of S. Francesco in Padua. The work is strongly dependent on Thomas' *Sententia.*

6. Anonymous, *Expositio libri Ethicorum* (compendium, A.D. 1329?).

Text inc.: *Omnis ars*—Dicit quod omnis ars et omnis doctrina sive actus et electio quoddam bonum appetere videtur.

Text exp.: Et his consideratis conspiciemus qualis sit optima politia et qualiter debeat esse ordinata et quibus legibus et consuetudinibus utatur. A quorum omnium tractatu dicit se incepturum. Et sic terminat liber Ethicorum continuando librum istum ad librum Politicae, cum dicit: *Dicamus igitur incipientes.*

Coloph.: Explicit expositio libri ethicorum. Deo gratias. Scripta Anno Domini MCCCXXIX.

MS: Vatican, BAV, Pal. lat. 1024 (A.D. 1329, memb., mm. 157 × 117), ff. 83r–211v.

Source(s): Gauthier 1969, p. 46*; idem 1971a, pp. B9–10; *Codices Thomae*, no. 3508; Lines 1999a, p. 280, no. 44.

Note: Given the English hand, this work's connection with Italy is doubtful. According to Gauthier, this is a compendium of Thomas' *Sententia.* It covers all ten books of the *Ethics* and is preceded (ff. 1r–62r) by a *Tabula Ethicorum* taken from St. Thomas.

Guido Vernani de Arimino, O.P. (Guido Vernani da Rimini, † ca. 1345)

Teacher (ca. 1310–20) in the Dominican convent in Bologna and author of political and theological treatises. Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 191–92; Gauthier 1969, pp. 37*–43*; *CHLMPh*, pp. 862–63; Lohr 1988a, p. 76; Imbach and Nienhaus, p. 441. Cheneval 1995, pp. 117–50.

7. *Summa de virtutibus secundum Aristotelis sententiam in libro Ethicorum* (*Summa moralium*) (ca. 1324–30).

Prol. 1 inc.: Universis moralem philosophiam scire volentibus et secundum eam desiderantibus formare vitam frater Guido Ariminensis ordinis fratrum praedicatorum finem verum ad quem omnes homines desiderant pervenire . . .

Prol. 2 inc.: Quoniam homo naturaliter est animal sociale utpote multis indigens ad suam vitam . . .

Distinctio Ia (De uno ultimo fine): Sed quia finis in moralibus habet rationem principii, ut infra dicetur in 7°, ideo primo dicendum est de humano fine, scilicet de felicitate in communi . . .

Cap. I (Quod est unus ultimus finis omnium humanorum): Quantum igitur ad primum, sciendum est quod duo sunt principia actuum humanorum . . .

Text exp.: quibus consideratis magis conspicere poterimus quae sit optima politia et qualiter debeat esse ordinata et quibus legibus et consuetudinibus debet uti. Et sic moralis philosophia erit integra et perfecta.

MSS: See Lohr and Gauthier (14 MSS); among others, *Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 1172 (s. XIV), ff. 3v–90r.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 191–92; Gauthier 1969, pp. 37*–43* (incipits); Lines 1999a, pp. 268–69, no. 4.

Studies: Grabmann 1949, pp. 84–89 (with titles of distinctions); Gauthier 1969, pp. 37*–43* (includes extracts and bibliographical references); Cheneval 1995, pp. 118 ff.

Note: Gauthier proposes that this work was addressed to a lay audience in Bologna and distinguishes Vat. lat. 1172 from the *lectura* recorded in Vat. lat. 2996 (below, no. 8). Cheneval (p. 118) agrees with Gauthier: "Die Aristoteleskommentare Vernanis zur praktischen Philosophie, mögen sie auch philosophisch wenig originell sein, verdienen Aufmerksamkeit, weil sie das universitäre Unternehmen der Aristoteleskommentierung an philosophische Laien herantragen und in dieselbe philosophische Diskussionskultur gehören, wie die Dantekommentare und die *Reprobatio*."

8. *<Lectura> super librum Ethicorum.*

MS: *Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2996 (A.D. 1350?, memb, mm. 294 × 210), ff. 11v–18r; 24v–25v.

Source(s): Gauthier 1969, pp. 37*–43*; Lines 1999a, p. 274, no. 18; cf. Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 191–92.

Studies: Gauthier 1969, pp. 37*–43*.

Note: Gauthier argues that this MS contains notes taken in connection with Guido's lectures in the Dominican convent of Bologna.

Petrus de Corveheda (fl. ca. 1336)

Probably a Frenchman, but nothing seems to be known about him.

9. *Sententia declarata super librum Ethicorum* (compendium, ca. 1336).

Ep. ded.: Cum bonum alicuius amici sibi soli non sit proprium immo bonum amici cuilibet amico communicetur, philosopho in ethicis attestante, ideo qui . . .

Div.: Moralis scientia tres habet partes principales, scilicet monostica (!) in qua determinatur de regimine unius et haec traditur in hoc libro ethicorum . . .

Text inc.: *Omnis ars et omnis doctrina etc.*—Hic incipit primus liber ethicorum in quo sunt novem capitula, prooemium pro uno capitulo numerando, in quo primo capitulo scilicet in prooemio . . .

Text exp.: dicamus igitur incipientes de istis determinare scilicet in libro primo Politicorum in quo sicut dictum est per dicta (= predicta?) per ordinem perscrutantur. Et in hoc terminetur sententia decima et ultimi libri ethicorum.

MSS: Bordeaux, BV 169 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–99r (*exp.* ad felicitatem ordinantur et eius gratia acquiruntur. Omnipotens laudetur, quoniam finis huius operis habetur. Amen.); *Florence, BLaur., S. Marco 452 (s. XIV), ff. 1ra–43ra; Vatican, Urb. lat. 222 (A.D. 1481), ff. 224r–294v (table, ff. 223r–v).

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1972): 350; Lines 1999a, pp. 280–81, no. 45.

Note: This work depends on Thomas, but it is doubtful whether it should be connected with Italy; the Florentine manuscript is of French origin. In spite of its title, the work is not a commentary.

10. *Auctoritates notabiles libri Ethicorum* (extracts, ca. 1336).

Prol. inc.: Quia secundum philosophi sententiam in libro de memoria et reminiscentia verborum excogitatorum multiplicitas actum memorandi inpedit et offuscat et per oppositum . . ./ . . . dicta famosa seu auctoritates notabiles compilando volui per ordinem coadunare libros et capitula ut certius potui prosequendo.

Text inc.: In primo libro sunt novem capitula: primum capitulum incipit in principio in quo sunt 16 notabiles auctoritates scilicet illae quae sequuntur: Omnia bonum appetunt . . .

Text exp.: opera recte de operibus iudicant. Ille qui sine habitu legali iudicat dato quod recte iudicet a casu recte iudicat. Et in hoc terminentur auctoritates decimi libri ethicorum quae sunt numero 91 et per consequens totius libri quae sunt numero 534.

MSS: *Florence, BLaur., S. Marco 452 (s. XIV), ff. 43ra–48vb; Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 222 (A.D. 1481), ff. 295r–303v.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1972): 350; Lines 1999a, p. 281, no. 46.

Note: Like the work above, no. 9, this one's connection with Italy is also uncertain or doubtful.

Milianus (Aemilianus) de Spoleto, O.P. (Emiliano da Spoleto, fl. 1311–41)

Lector for his order, especially in central Italy. Lohr, *Traditio* (1971): 351; Kaeppeli, III, p. 137; *CTC*, V (1984), p. 331.

11. *Extractiones de libro Ethicorum secundum ordinem alphabeti.*

MS: Admont, SB, 580 (s. XIV), ff. 66r–74v.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1971): 351; Lines 1999a, p. 278, no. 35.

Note: This work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

Bartholomaeus de Sancto Concordio de Pisa, O.P. (Bartolomeo da San Concordio da Pisa, 1260–1347)

Pisan grammarian, also author of an *Orthographia.* Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 377; *DBI,* VI (1964), pp. 768–70 (C. Segre); Kaeppeli, II, pp. 157 ff.; *LMA* I (1980), p. 1497; Lohr 1988, p. 32; *LThK*^{3} II (1994), p. 44; Witt 2000, pp. 187–89; Black 2001, pp. 164–65, 161 n. 713.

12. *Compendium moralis philosophiae ex libro Aegidii De regimine principum abbreviatum.*

Prooem. inc.: Libellus iste continet quaedam, quae assumpta sunt de quodam libro qui dicitur de regimine principum magis quidem secundum sententiam quam secundum verba propter prolixitatem vitandam.

Text inc.: Sententia Philosophi est . . . (*cf. Florentine MS:* Hanc scientiam faciliter . . .)

Text exp.: . . . nobis vero ad praesens praedicta sufficiant.

MSS: *Florence, BLaur., Ashb. 176 (s. XIV in.), ff. 3r–39r; Munich, Bayr. Nat. Museum, 929 (s. XIV), ff. 141r–159v (? anon.); Palermo, BNC, I D 1 (s. XV), ff. 111r–135v (*inc.* Sententia est politicorum quod quaedam regna sunt); Paris, BN lat. 6466 (s. XV), ff. 1–36; Wertheim a. M., Evang. Kirchenb. 672 (s. XV), item 5.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 377; Lines 1999a, pp. 267–68, no. 2.

Note: Rather than the *Ethics,* this work abridges Aegidius Romanus, *De regimine principum.*

Petrus (de Tornaparte) de Aquila (Scotellus), O.F.M. (Pietro da Aquila, ca. 1275–1361)

Active in Italy in various ecclesiastical offices. Lohr, *Traditio* (1972): 346; *BBK* VII (1994), pp. 333–34; Imbach and Nienhaus 1996, p. 542.

13. *Expositio libri Ethicorum* (compendium).

Prol. inc.: Anima nascitur sicut tabula rasa, ut patet tertio De anima, perficitur tamen scientiis et doctrinis et virtutibus. Virtus vero duplex est, scilicet intellectualis et moralis, ut secundo Ethicorum patet.

Text inc.: Omnis ars et doctrina—Primus liber ethicorum habet 16 capitula. In primo ponit prooemium in quo ostendit quid est determinandius (!) de ultimo fine hominum qui est felicitas

Text exp.: et tum continuando librum ad librum politicorum, dicit quod relinquitur tractare de ista politia et legum positivo in libro politicorum. Terminatur totus liber Ethicorum.

MSS: Fribourg, Franziskanerkloster 54 (A.D. 1462), ff. 135v–167v (anon., *Capitula libri Ethicorum; inc.* Primus liber Ethicorum tria capitula); Liège, BU 240 C (= 649, 652, 662) (A.D. 1384?), IV, ff. 177ra–192va (anon., *Expositiones*

breves super libris decem Ethicorum compilatae et scriptae Pragae; prol. Testante principe philosophorum Aristotele tertio De anima, anima nascitur tamquam tabula rasa, perficitur tamen scientiis et virtutibus . . .); *Perugia, BCom. Aug. 654 (I.49) (s. XIV, chart., small quarto), ff. 4r–79r (*inc.* as above; *coloph.* Expositio brevis libri ethicorum secundum fratrem Petrum de Aquila ordinis minorum explicit. Deo gratias. / Ego frater Heminghus Andree cognomine Nyslingh [?]); Prague, Státní Knihovna, 2362 (XIII. F. 24) (s. XIV), ff. 1–24v.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1972): 346; Lines 1999a, pp. 276–77, no. 30.

Note: The author was active in France as well as Italy. In paraphrase fashion, Scotellus sums up the content of all ten books of the *Ethics*, without naming other commentators. The work's connection with Italy is not certain, but appears likely.

14. Anonymous, <*Super Ethica nova (ex lib. I)*>.

MS: *Naples, BNC, VIII.G.8 (s. XIV, Italian hand, memb., 300 × 230 mm, 2 cols.), ff. 4ra–9vb (seen in microfilm).

Source(s): Gauthier 1969, pp. 22*–23*; *Codices Thomae* no. 1948 with bibliography; Lines 1999a, p. 278, no. 36.

Note: In spite of the Italian hand, it is uncertain whether this is a copy of an earlier (perhaps Parisian) commentary.

1351–1400

Guido de Guetiis, O.P. (Guido Guezzi, fl. ca. 1380)

15. <*Commentarium in Ethicam*> (lost).

Source(s): Montalbani, p. 83 (based on Seraphinus Razzius in *Historiae Dominicanorum*); Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 189; Lines 1999a, p. 276, no. 26; Quétif 1719–21, I, pp. 687–88 ("scripsit Commentarium in Aristotelis Ethica. Archetypum in Biblioteca Bononiensi auctoris ipsius manu scriptum servabatur adhuc aetate Leandri [= Leander Albertus, *De viris illustribus ordinis praedicatorum*], et adhuc exstare verisimile est. In fine sui commentarii monet auctor se non suo illud ingenium concinasse, sed Dei auxilio et plurium sanctorum quos ibidem enumerat intercessione, quae viri pietatem indicant, et opus probant non philosophicum tantum sed et theologicum."); Orlandi, pp. 184–85 (says that this ms. is to be found in the library of San Domenico in Bologna and refers to other commentaries on the *Politics* and the *De anima*). See also Meyer 1933, p. 107; Gauthier 1969, p. 44* n. 139; Kaeppeli, II, p. 74.

Paulus Nicolettus Venetus, O.E.S.A. (Paolo Nicoletto Veneto, 1369–1429)

Professor in Padua (ca. 1408–20) and Siena. Lohr, *Traditio* (1972): 314–20; idem 1988a, pp. 187–89; *CHLMPh*, p. 875; *CHRPh*, p. 830; Imbach and Nienhaus 1996, pp. 535–36; Lines 2001a. Conti 1996.

16. *Conclusiones Ethicorum* (extracts, ca. 1387?).

Text inc.: Omnis ars—Cupiens moralis philosophiae notitiam tradere iuxta documenta Aristotelis caeterorumque approbata commenta conclusiones cum suis probationibus . . .

—*Conclusio prima:* Omnis ars et omnis doctrina, similiter autem et actus et electio bonum quoddam appetere videntur.

Text exp: ultimam felicitatem humanam in operatione sapientiae de qua in sextu huius determinavit. Amen.

Coloph. (Vatican ms.): Expliciunt conclusiones morales Aristotelis sententialiter contentae in suis decem libris Ethicorum quas collegit invicem frater Paulus de Venetiis dum esset baccalaureus conventus Paduae ordinis fratrum Eremitarum sancti Augustini.

MSS: *Naples, BNC, VIII.G.52 (s. XV, chart., 2 cols.), ff. 1r–44r; *Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2125 (s. XV, chart., folio, 2 cols., 61 lines), ff. 1r–65v.

Source(s): Cf. Gutierrez 1966, p. 197, no. 2413 (for the Naples ms., mentions only an anonymous commentary on the *Politics*); Lohr, *Traditio* (1972): 319; Lines 1999a, pp. 271–72, no. 12 and p. 278, no. 37.

Studies: Gauthier 1970a, pp. 138–39.

Note: This work, written during Paul of Venice's studies in Padua (cf. colophon in Vatican ms.), is largely dependent upon and drawn from Thomas' *Sententia.*

Michael Aiguani de Bononia, O. Carm. (Michele Aiguani, † 16-XI-1400)

Professor of theology in Bologna. Fantuzzi, I, pp. 76–90; *DBI*, I (1960), p. 522 (L. Saggi); Lohr, *Traditio* (1971): 345; idem 1988a, p. 172; Lines 2001a.

17. <*Quaestiones super librum Ethicorum*> (lost).

Source(s): Montalbani, pp. 167–68 (*In ethicam Aristotelis lib. I*); Fantuzzi, I, p. 89 (*In Ethicam Aristotelis Lib. IV*), Johannes Grossi in Xiberta 1931, 43: 356; Lohr, *Traditio* (1971): 345; Lines 1999a, p. 276, no. 29.

Dating Uncertain

Magister Petrus (Landelberg?) (fl. s. XIV?)

18. <*Ethica cum commento magistri Petri*>.

MS: *Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. A.5.2769 (s. XIII/XIV, memb., 4°, mm. 196 x 250, longis lineis, 34 ll/p), ff. 1r–47r.

Source(s): Indice dei manoscritti scelti, p. 16; *AL Codices*, II, no. 1397; *AL Suppl.*, p. 140; Kristeller, *Iter* I, p. 112; Soudek 1958, pp. 265, 267.

Note: The commentary is in the form of thick marginal annotations. The manuscript comes from the Badia Fiorentina. Its owner was Petrus Landelberg (see f. 66v: "Liber magistri Petri Landelberg"), but it is unclear whether the annotations should be attributed to him as well.

19. Anonymous, <*Conclusiones de libris Ethicorum*>.

Text inc.: Quaedam conclusiones de primo libro Ethicorum. Quod est dare aliquem ultimum finem . . .

MS: *Modena, BEst., Fondo Estense 14 (α. F. 1, 27) (s. XIV, memb., mm. 215 × 180, 2 cols.), ff. 82r–86v.

Source(s): AL Codices no. 1468; Lines 1999a, p. 277, no. 32.

Note: This work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

20. Anonymous, <*Quaedam auctoritates extractae a X libris ethicorum moralis philosophiae*>.

Text inc.: Sicut una yrundo non facit ver nec modicum tempus, sic una dies nec modicum tempus facit hominem felicem.

Text exp.: oportet bonos provocare ad virtutes per primum, malos autem ad poenam insanabiles tateliter (= totaliter?) destinare.

MS: *Milan, BNC, AD.IX.20 (s. XIV/XV), ff. 99v–102r (seen in microfilm).

Source(s): Lines 1999a, p. 277, no. 31.

Note: The manuscript also contains a work on the *Politics*; cf. Flüeler 1992 (no mention). The work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

21. Anonymous, <*Quaestiones in Ethicam*>.

MS: New York, Columbia Univ. Library, Plimpton 17 (s. XIV, Italian hand, memb., mm. 290 × 200, longis lineis), f. 4.

Source(s): AL Codices, no. 17; Kristeller 1956a; *AL Suppl.*, no. 17; Kristeller, *Iter* V, p. 303 (detailed description, with bibliography); Lines 1999a, p. 274, no. 17.

22. Anonymous, <*Quaestiones nonnullae in Aristotelis librum I Ethicorum Nicomacheorum*>.

Text inc.: Prima veritas libri ethicorum est quod omnia ad hominem pertinentia sunt ordinata ad aliquem finem . . . *(Q. 1)* Utrum possimus aliquo modo cognoscere singularia (f. 80v) . . . *(Q. 2)* Ad videndum autem de ideis, primo videndum est quid est idea (f. 81r) . . . *(Q. 3)* Ad videndum de bono, primo videndum est quid est bonum (f. 81v).

MS: Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 829 (s. XIV, chart., mm. 245 × 168), ff. 80r–81v.

Source(s): Pelzer 1931, p. 191; Lines 1999a, pp. 279–80, no. 43.

Note: The manuscript's conncection with Italy is uncertain.

Johannes de Casale, O.P. (Giovanni da Casale, fl. s. XIV)

Lector for his order in Italy and Cambridge. Lohr, *Traditio* (1974): 138–39; Imbach and Nienhaus 1996, pp. 481–82.

23. *Conclusiones testuales librorum ethicorum.*

MS: *Siena, BCom. Intronati, L.XI.13 (s. XV, chart., quarto, longis lineis), ff. 23r–57v.

Text inc.: Prima conclusio: Quod omnis operatio . . . tam intellectus quam voluntatis tendit in bonum quoddam.

Text exp.: . . . esse edocere. Decimus liber ethicorum explicit.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, II, p. 158 (excerpt); Lines 1999a, p. 271, no. 11; cf. Lohr, *Traditio* (1974): 138–39 (this work not mentioned).

XV Century

1401–1450

Franciscus Casinius (Francesco Casini, ca. 1340–ca. 1410)

Teacher of philosophy in Florence (ca. 1363–66), but also of medicine in Perugia (ca. 1386) and Bologna (1394); also in service to the Malatesta in the Marche. Salutati, *Ep.* IV.1, p. 30, n. 1; Lines 2001a.

24. <*In Ethicis*> (commentary, ca. 1404; lost?).

Source(s): Salutati, *Ep.* IV.1, pp. 37–39; Bianchi 1990a, pp. 53–54; Lines 1999a, p. 275, no. 24.

Note: It is not certain that Casini actually finished the commentary. Salutati's remarks (*Ep.* IV, pp. 26 ff.) indicate that he had read only two *quaternuli* of the work. At the time of writing to Salutati, Casini was apparently trying to obtain a teaching appointment in Florence; instead, he ended up in Rome (Renazzi, I, pp. 107 ff.).

Augustinus Favaroni de Roma, O.E.S.A. (Agostino Favaroni, 1360–1443)

Teacher in Bologna and of the *Ethics* in Florence (1416–17, 1418–19); see Appendix A, no. 101. Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 371–72; Gutierrez 1983, *ad indicem; DBI*, XLV (1995), pp. 447–51 (D. Gionta); Lines 1999a, p. 272, no. 13; idem 2001a.

25. *Commentum . . . super primo et secundo ethicorum Aristotelis* (1416).

Text inc.: *Omnis ars*—Beatus Augustinus octavo libro De civitate Dei refert . . .

Text exp.: quae reservantur multum peritis.

MSS: *Florence, BLaur., Plut. XIII Sin. Cod. 1 (A.D. 1416), 88 ff. (Lib. I); *Cod. 2 (s. XV), 86 ff. (Lib. II).

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 371–72; Lines 1999a, p. 272, no. 13.

Studies: Gauthier 1970a, p. 139; see above, pp. 190–91.

Note: The commentary is connected with lectures Favaroni gave in 1416 in the Florentine *studium*. Favaroni probably received his degree of *magister* in theology in Bologna in 1392; he was already reading the *Sentences* there as a bachelor in 1388–89.

Leonardus Bruni Aretinus (Leonardo Bruni, 1387–1444)

Humanist and chancellor of Florence. Lohr, *Traditio* (1971): 316–20; idem 1988a, p. 160; *CHRPh*, p. 810; *DCLI*, I, pp. 410–15 (P. Rigo); Imbach and Nienhaus, pp. 403–04; *CTC*, VII, p. 111; *REPh*, I, pp. 301–06 (J. Hankins). Gerl 1981; *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni*; *Leonardo Bruni cancelliere*; Copenhaver and Schmitt, pp. 76–84; Hankins 1994, 1995, 1997, and 2001; Witt 2000, Ch. 9.

26. <*Ethica Nicomachea per Leonardum Bruni Aretinum*> (translation, 1416/17).

Dedicatee: Pope Martin V.

Prol. inc.: Non novum esse constat beatissime pater sed iam inde ab antiquis frequenter usitatum ut qui litterarum studiis insudant homines laborum suorum opera ad principes scribant . . .

Text inc.: Omnis ars omnisque doctrina similiter autem et actus et electio bonum quoddam appetere videntur. Quapropter bene ostenderunt summum bonum quod omnia appetunt. Videtur autem inter fines differentia quaedam. Alii namque sunt operationes. Alii praeter eas opera aliqua.

Lib. II inc.: Cum vero duplex sit virtus, alia intellectiva alia moralis, intellectiva quidem plurimum ex doctrina generationem habet atque augmentum, quapropter experientia indiget et tempore.

Text exp.: His enim visis forte magis intelligemus quis reipublicae status sit optimus et quomodo unaquaque res publica constituta et quibus legibus et moribus.

MSS: 246 manuscripts.

Edd. (sixteenth-century only): Venice 1501, Paris 1505, Venice 1507, Paris 1510, 1516, Pavia 1521, Paris 1526, 1527, Lyon 1530, Paris 1535, Freiburg i.B. 1541, Lyon 1542, Paris 1542. The preface to the translation is edited

in Baron, *Schriften*, pp. 76–81 (English translation in *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni*, pp. 213–17).

Source(s): Hankins 1997 and Cranz and Schmitt, *ad indicem*. Cf. Gauthier 1969, I, pp. 51*–54*.

Studies: Troilo 1932; Garin 1951a, pp. 62 ff.; Hankins 1994 (with bibliography), idem 2001 and forthcoming.

Andreas Pieri (de Billis) de Mediolano, O.E.S.A. (Andrea Biglia, ca. 1395–1435)

Professor of moral philosophy in Florence (1419–23) and Bologna (1424–28) before moving to Siena; see Appendix A, nos. 30 and 103. Argelati, cols. 159–61 and 1952; Sabbadini 1906; Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 358; idem 1988, p. 22; *DBI*, X (1968), pp. 413–15 (unsigned); Müllner, pp. 64–70 and xxv–xxvi; Lines 2001a. Arbesmann 1965a; Schnaubelt 1977 and 1993; Gutierrez 1983, pp. 164–66; Kristeller 1992b, p. 131; Witt 2000, pp. 489–93.

27. Translation of the *EN*.

MSS: Budapest, Magyar Tudományos Académia Könyvtára 4° 46 (cf. Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2078, f. 1r).

Source(s): Schnaubelt 1993, p. 136 (giving the title *Ethicorum Aristotelis, libri X*). Cf. Schnaubelt 1977, p. 182, item S 58.

Franciscus Philelphus (Francesco Filelfo, 1398–1481)

Humanist with teaching career in Bologna, Florence (moral philosophy in 1431–34), Rome, and Milan; see Appendix A, nos. 35 and 105. *CHRPh*, pp. 817–18; *DCLI*, II, pp. 243–45 (R. Weiss); *DBI*, XLVII (1997), pp. 613–26 (P. Viti); *ER*, II, pp. 362–64 (D. Robin); Lines 2001a. Kraye 1981; eadem 1997, pp. 234–37 (L. Deitz); *Francesco Filelfo*; Robin 1991.

28. *In principio lectionis Ethicorum* (prolusion, 30-XII-1431/32).

Text inc.: Cum egregiam et perillustrem moralis sapientiae vim ipse mecum splendoremque considero, viri clarissimi . . .

Text exp.: . . . iam felicibus auspiciis in aciem descendamus.

MSS: Florence, BLaur., Plut. LXXXIX sup. 27 (s. XV), ff. 129r–130v; BRicc. 1200, ff. 147r–v and (repeated) 150v–151r; also BLaur., Plut. XC sup. 24, ff. 7–8; Lucca, Bib. Govern., 1394 (s. XV), f. 188v.

Source and ed.: Müllner, pp. 158–60 (for dating, see *ibid.*, p. 147).

Note: Filelfo also wrote a treatise on moral philosophy (Filelfo 1552).

Petrus Perleonis Ariminensis (Pietro Perleone da Rimini, fl. s. XV)

Student of Francesco Filelfo in Florence. Müllner, p. xxxix.

29. *Oratio <super Ethicam Aristotelis>* (Florence, ca. 1432).

Text inc.: Cum meam imbecillitatem ingenii animique vires ipse mecum considerarem, viri praestantissimi atque suavissimi condiscipuli, numquam mihi persuadere potuissem clarissimum doctorem nostrum omni quidem virtute praeditum in tanto mihi tamque amplissimo loco iussurum, ut aliquid ad orandum aggrederer.

Text exp.: . . . omni denique cura vestram hanc apud omnes exspectationem superare conamini. Quod si fecerimus, cum alia commoda atque emolumenta tum etiam—et non obscuro nec vario sermone, sed et clarissima et viva et una omnium voce—immortalem nobis gloriam comparabimus.

Ed.: Müllner, pp. 145–46.

Note: In this oration, Pietro addresses his fellow-students.

Jacobus Pisaurus (Giacomo Pisauro, fl. s. XV)

30. *Oratio in Ethicorum Aristotelis initio in studio . . . habita.*

Text inc.: Multum diuque mecum ipse animo verti, praestantissimi viri peritissimique iuvenes quid hic potius in luce a mortalibus eligendum esse.

MSS: *Florence, BRicc., 1200 (s. XV), ff. 142r–143r; *Florence, BNC, Magl. VIII, 1440 (s. XV), ff. 81r–82r.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 135 (descr.).

Jannottius Manettus (Giannozzo Manetti, 1396–1459)

Florentine humanist with active political career and long sojourns in Rome and Naples. *CHRPh*, pp. 825–26; Wittschier 1968, pp. 19–26; Dröge 1998.

31. Translation of the *EN* (ca. 1455–59).

Text inc.: Omnis ars omnisque doctrina similiter autem et actus et electio bonum quoddam appetere videntur. Quocirca bene enuntiaverunt ipsum bonum quod omnia appetunt. Videtur autem inter fines differentia quaedam. Alii namque sunt operationes, alii vero praeter eas opera aliqua sed quorum fines sunt aliqui praeter actiones.

Lib. II inc.: Cum vero duplex sit virtus alia intellectiva alia moralis, intellectiva plurimum ex doctrina habet generationem atque augmentum.

Text exp.: . . . his enim visis ac consideratis forte magis (?) cognoscemus quis rei publice status sit optimus et quemadmodum unaquaeque res publica instituta et quibus legibus et moribus usa (?) fuerit.

MSS: *Vatican, BAV, Pal. lat. 1021 (s. XV), ff. 122r–(298r); Urb. lat. 223 (s. XV), ff. 129–(234).

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, II (1967), pp. 397, 594; Stornajolo, I, pp. 216–17; Garin 1951a, pp. 71–72.

Studies: Garin 1951a, pp. 71–72; idem 1951b, pp. 328–29.

1451–1500

Marsilius Ficinus (Marsilio Ficino, 1433–1499)

Well known translator of Plato, active in Florence. Lohr, *Traditio* (1971): 322–23; idem 1988a, pp. 163–64; *CHRPh*, p. 817; *REPh*, III, pp. 653–59 (J. Hankins). Lenzi 1979, Kristeller 1987 and 1988b, Hankins 1991a, Allen 1998, Vasoli 1999, *Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno*.

32. Marginalia commentary on the *EN* (1455).

MS: *Florence, BRicc., 135 (A.D. 1455, chart., small 4°), ff. 1r–138r.

Note: The commentary is written in the margins of Bruni's translation of the *Ethics*.

Guillelmus Becchius Florentinus, O.E.S.A. (Guglielmo Becchi, 1411–1491?)

Active in his order and in the university, especially in Florence (teaches moral philosophy in 1455–56); see Appendix A, no. 109. *DBI*, VII (1965), pp. 493–94 (C. Natali); Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 195–96; idem 1988a, p. 77; Field 1983, p. 53, n. 38; Gutierrez 1983, *ad indicem*; Kristeller 1992b, p. 129; Lines 2001a. Staico 1996, pp. 1301–11, 1319–20.

33. *Commentum super X libris Ethicorum* (by 1456).

Text inc. aceph.: . . . differentiam finium tradit dicens quod quia homo secundum haec omnia . . .

Text exp.: Haec pauca super libris his Aristotelis, omissis aliis, quae Commento non congruunt, exaravimus; atque id maxime, ut illis morem gererem, qui humanis studiis dediti, non dubiorum multitudinem, non rerum varietatem, non difficultatum perplexitatem, sed philosophi sinceram et claram intelligentiam habere perquirunt, quam, ut arbitror, haec cum legerint, adsequentur. Florentiae, MCCCCLV [= 1456], die IX Feb.

MS: *Florence, BLaur., Aed. 153 (9 Feb. 1456), 128 ff. (acephalous).

Source(s): Bandini 1791, I, p. 455; Garin 1994, p. 71n; Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 195; Lines 1999a, p. 273, no. 15.

Studies: Lines 1999b, pp. 260 ff.; see above, pp. 190–91.

Note: Becchi also wrote commentaries on the *Economics* (a. 1467) and the *Politics* (a. 1476); see Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 195–96 and Staico 1996.

Franciscus de Mediolano (Francesco da Milano, fl. s. XV?)

34. <*Commentum in libros Ethicorum*> (by 1457; lost).

MS: Olim Salamanca; cf. Salamanca, BU 211, f. 12r.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1974): 134.

Note: The manuscript included commentaries on the *Economics* and *De bona fortuna*. The part on the *Ethics* contained a *Liber Ethicorum secundum tres translationes*; donated by Juan de Segovia, A.D. 1457. The work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

Johannes Argyropoulos (Johnn Argyropoulos, ca. 1415–1487)

Byzantine émigré with studies in Padua; professor in Florence (moral philosophy in 1457 and 1458), where he sojourns in 1457–71 and 1477–81, and at the university in Rome (1471–77); see Appendix A, no. 111. Cosenza, I, pp. 295–308; Müllner, pp. xviii–xix; Lohr, *Traditio* (1970): 153; idem 1988a, pp. 122–23; *CHRPh*, p. 808; Lines 2001a. Cammelli 1941b; Monfasani 1976, pp. 375–78; Schmitt 1983a, pp. 69–72; Field 1988, Ch. 5; Copenhaver and Schmitt, pp. 138–40; Jardin 1999.

35. *Praefatio in primo Ethicae Aristotelis* (Florence, 4 Feb. 1456 = 1457).

Text inc.: Estne ullus vestrum, insignes atque ornatissimi viri . . .

Ed. and source: Müllner, pp. 4–18.

36. *Praefatio in sexto libro Ethicorum* (Florence, 1 Feb. 1457 = 1458).

Text inc.: Nisi molestum vobis esse putarem, insignes atque ornatissimi viri . . .

Ed. and source: Müllner, pp. 19–30.

37. *Opus de moribus ad Nicomachum, Ioanne Argyropylo interprete* (translation).

—*Redaction A*

Text inc.: Omnis ars omnisque via ratioque docendi . . .

MS: Florence, BLaur., Acquisti e Doni 428 (s. XV), 109 ff.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 105 (descr.).

—*Redaction B* (dedicated to Cosimo de' Medici, before 1464).

Ded. inc.: Si ea mihi servanda sunt erga te quae iam olim institui, sapientissime Cosme . . . / . . . non enim universa quae volumus nostra sub potestate sunt collocata. Vale.

Text inc.: Omnis ars omnisque doctrina atque actus itidem et electio bonum quoddam appetere videtur . . .

Text exp.: His enim perspectis magis forte percipiemus, quaenam sit res publica optima et quomodo quaeque disposita quibusve legibus utens ac moribus erit optime constituta. Haec itaque aggredientes deinceps dicamus.

MSS: *Florence, BRicc. 115 (s. XV); Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2098 (s. XV), 148 ff.; Vat. lat. 4533 (s. XV); Urb. lat. 184 (s. XV), ff. 205–295.

Ed. of dedication: Brown 1961, pp. 219–21.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 185 (descr.); II, pp. 311, 328; Cataldi Palau 1988, pp. 312–13; Leonardi 1987, pp. 160–62; Stornajolo, I, p. 184.

—*Redaction C* (dedicated to Pope Sixtus IV, reigned 1471–84).

Text inc.: Omnis ars, omnisque doctrina, atque actus, itidem et electio, bonum quoddam appetere videtur. Quapropter bene veteres bonum ipsum id esse dixerunt, quod omnia appetunt. Finium autem differentia quaedam esse videtur: quidam enim sunt operationes, quidam praeter has ipsas opera quaedam.

Text exp.: His enim perspectis magis fortasse perceperimus, quaenam sit respublica optima, et quomodo unaquaeque disposita, quibusve legibus utens, ac moribus bene fuerint consituta. Dicamus igitur, hinc initio sumpto.

MS: Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 2105 (A.D. 1471–84), 104 ff.

Edd. (note that, when the translation is accompanied by a commentary, this is indicated by a § and the name of the commentator follows in parentheses; a † indicates that the work appears as part of the *Decem librorum Moralium Aristotelis, tres conversiones*, a work including the translations by Grosseteste, Bruni, and Argyropoulos): §*Florence 1478 (Acciaiuoli, Florence, BNC, Inc. Magl. C.1.10), Florence 1480 (?), Paris 1488, Rome 1492, Paris 1493, Pictavis ca. 1496, †Paris 1497 (Lefèvre), Liptzk 1501, Venice 1503, Paris 1503, Liptzk 1504, §Paris 1504 (Lefèvre), Venice 1504, †§Paris 1505 (Lefèvre), Venice 1505, Venice 1506, §Paris 1506 (Delphus), Venice 1507, Cologne 1508, Paris 1509, †§Paris 1510 (Lefèvre), §Paris 1510 (Delphus), §Paris 1510 (Delphus), Liptzk 1511, §Lyon (?) 1512 (Crab), §Paris 1514 (Crab), §Paris 1514 (Lefèvre), †§Paris 1516 (Lefèvre), Lyon 1516, §Lyon 1517 (Crab, Delphus), §Paris 1517 (Silvester), Deventer 1517 (Lib. I), Venice 1518 (ed. L. Olchinensis), §Paris 1522 (Lefèvre), §Paris 1522 (Delphus), †§Paris 1526 (Lefèvre), †§Paris 1527 (Lefèvre), §Paris 1529 (Lefèvre), §Paris 1530 (Major), §Paris 1530 (Lefèvre), §Paris 1535 (Lefèvre), §Lyon 1535 (Lefèvre), §Lyon 1535 (Lefèvre), §Venice 1535 (Acciaiuoli), †§Paris 1535 (Lefèvre), Paris 1536, Basel 1538 (*Opera Omnia*), §Paris 1539 (Lefèvre), †§Freiburg 1541 (Lefèvre), §Paris 1541 (Acciaiuoli), †§Paris 1542 (Lefèvre), §Paris 1542 (Acciaiuoli), Basel 1542 (*Opera Omnia*), Paris 1542, Lyon 1543, §Lyon 1544 (Acciaiuoli), Lyon 1546, Lyon 1547, Basel 1548 (*Opera Omnia*), Lyon 1549, Lyon 1551, Toulouse 1552, §Paris 1552 (Lefèvre), §Lyon 1553 (Acciaiuoli, ed. A. Francinus), §Lyon 1554 (id.), Salamanca 1555, §Paris 1555 (Acciaiuoli), Lyon 1556, Lyon 1558, §Lyon 1559 (Acciaiuoli, ed. Francinus), §Lyon 1560 (id.), §Paris 1560 (id.), §Lyon 1561 (id.), Lyon 1561,

Lyon 1561 (*Opera Omnia*), Lyon 1563 (id.), Lyon 1563 (id.), §Venice 1565 (Acciaiuoli), §Lyon 1567 (Acciaiuoli, ed. Francinus), §Venice 1576 (Acciaiuoli, Maffei, with Lambin), Lyon 1578 (*Opera Omnia*), Cologne 1579, Lyon 1581 (*Opera Omnia*), Cologne 1583, §Lyon 1588 (Acciaiuoli, ed. Francinus), §Geneva 1588 (id.), §Lyon 1592 (id.), §Lyon 1598 (Acciaiuoli), §Salamanca 1675 (Aguirre), §Rome 1698 (Aguirre), §Campidonia 1723 (Aguirre), §Madrid 1772 (Acciaiuoli).

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, II (1967), p. 311; Leonardi 1987, pp. 182–83; Cranz and Schmitt, p. 172; Risse, IV.

Studies: Frati 1917; Garin 1951a, pp. 82–86; Brown 1961, *passim*; Lee 1978, pp. 171–73.

Donatus Acciaiolus (Donato Acciaiuoli, 1429–1478)

Humanist active in Florence and student of John Argyropoulos. Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 400–01; idem 1988a, p. 53; *CHRPh*, p. 806; Bianchi 1990a, p. 29 n. 1. Garin 1987, pp. 199–268; Field 1988, Ch. 8; Staico 1996, pp. 1279–1301.

38. *Expositio super libros Ethicorum* (1457–78).

Prol. 1 inc.: Cum post interitum quorundam doctissimorum hominum studia florentina magna ex parte remissa viderentur, venit in hanc urbem Argyropylus . . .

Prol. 2 inc.: Philosophiam ut memoriae proditum est prisci philosophi variis modis diffiniere . . .

Text inc.: *Omnis ars omnisque doctrina.*—Aristoteles philosophus in hoc Ethicorum sive moralium libro de felicitate humana considerans, docere intendit ea omnia quibus homo quoad fieri potest felix evadat.

—Dividitur hic primus liber in quattuor tractatus. In primo inquirit utrum felicitas sit et utrum homo possit eam acquirere.

Text exp.: Quis erit doctor? An illi qui versantur in republica an sophistae et rhetores. At neutri istorum sunt sufficientes. Quid igitur est agendum? Dicit ergo cum haec fuerint neglecta a maioribus nostris oportet ut nos aggrediamur hoc opus et huius facultatis tradamus doctrinam ut activa philosophia ex omni parte perficiatur, et hoc pacto Decimo huic et ultimo ethicorum finem imponit.

MSS: Fifteen manuscripts, including (not mentioned by Lohr): Florence, BRicc. 837 (s. XV), f. 13v (extract from Bk. III); New York, Columbia Univ. Lib., Lodge Coll. 9 (s. XV), ff. (1)–58; Vatican, BAV, Reg. lat. 1134 (s. XV).

Edd.: *Florence 1478 (Florence, BNC, Inc. Magl. C.1.10), Paris 1504, Venice 1535, Paris 1541 and 1542, Lyon 1544, 1553, and 1554, Paris 1555, Lyon 1559 and 1560, Paris 1560, Lyon 1561, Venice 1565 and 1566, Lyon 1567, Venice 1576, Lyon 1588, Geneva 1588, Lyon 1592, Lyon 1598.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 400–01; Kristeller, *Iter*, V, p. 206 (descr.); *ibid.*, II, p. 401; *ibid.*, V, p. 301; Cranz and Schmitt, *ad indicem*; Bianchi 1990a, pp. 31 n. 6 and 32 n. 8; Lines 1999a, pp. 272–73, no. 14.

Studies: Garin 1951b, pp. 331 ff.; Field 1988, pp. 207 ff.; Bianchi 1990a; Kraye 1988, pp. 328–29; eadem 1995, pp. 99–101; eadem 1997, pp. 47–58 (J. Kraye, introduction and selected English translation); Lines 1997, pp. 206–10; idem 2000, *passim*; above, pp. 217–19.

Note: The work is based on Argyropoulos' translation. Acciaiuoli also wrote commentaries on the *Economics* and the *Politics*; for the latter, see especially Field 1988, pp. 226–29 and Staico 1996.

39. *Epilogus libri Ethicorum* (by 1478).

Text inc.: Expositis omnibus iis quae in hoc libro moralium declaratione indigere videbantur, nunc non inutile esse arbitramur ad hoc ut magis menti inhereat ordo philosophi, capita rerum quae singulis libris continentur summatim repetere. Primum cum sententia huius philosophi homo non habeat perfectionem innatam ut ab initio diximus, sed egregias potentias habeat . . .

Text exp.: Talem enim architectum appellare philosophus solet et eius facultatem architecturam veluti praestantiorem caeteris activis facultatibus ut antea vidimus. Et hic sit finis decimi et ultimi libri Ethicorum.

MSS and edd: See no. 38 above (the *Epilogus* usually follows the commentary). Among other manuscripts, in New York, Columbia Univ. Lib., Lodge Coll. 9 (s. XV), ff. 52–58. In the Florence 1478 ed., ff. 258r–263r.

Source(s): Lines 1999a, p. 269, no. 5; cf. Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 400–01 and Kristeller, *Iter*, V, p. 301.

Nicolaus Tignosius Fulginas (Niccolò Tignosi da Foligno, 1402–1474)

Student of Paul of Venice. Professor of medicine, especially active in Florence (ca. 1438–74); see Appendix A, no. 110. Lohr, *Traditio* (1972): 306; idem 1988a, p. 183; Verde, IV.1, pp. 90–92; Lines 2001a. Thorndike 1929, pp. 161–79, 308–63; Rotondò 1958; Barale Hennemann 1974, pp. 34–111; Sensi; Field 1988, pp. 138–58; Davies, pp. 120–21; Lines 1999b.

40. *Commenta in Ethicorum libros* (ca. 1460).

Text inc.: *Omnis ars*—Acturus philosophus de ultimo fine hominis et hic cum iam probaturus esset . . .

Text exp.: . . . intellectus quam (?) partem animae principaliorem esse nequaquam dubitandum est et eum immunem ab omni materia ad imaginem et suam similitudinem Dominus fecit quando talem spiritum vitae insufflavit in hominem; is igitur qui est trinus et unus sit benedictus in saecula. Amen.

MS: *Florence, BLaur., Plut. LXXVI, 48 (s. XV), 233 ff.; *Plut. LXXVI, 49 (s. XV), 198 ff. (source of incipits; *Prooem. inc.*: Neque argentum neque

aurum praestantissime Petre [= Piero de' Medici]); *Florence, BNC, Gino Capponi 314 (s. XV, now missing books V and X), 205 ff.; *Perugia, BCom. Aug., L, 79 (s. XV), 279 ff.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1972): 306; Barale Hennemann 1974, p. 218 n. 40; Field 1988, pp. 140–41 n. 44; Lines 1999a, pp. 273–74, no. 16.

Studies: Sensi; Field 1988, pp. 138–50; Kraye 1995, pp. 101–02; Lines 1999b; idem 2000, pp. 35 ff.; above, § 5.2 and 5.3.

Laurentius Pisanus (Lorenzo Pisano, ca. 1391–1465)

Cultural figure active in Florence during the first half of the fifteenth century, where he lectured on Dante. Field 1988, pp. 158–74.

41. <*Commentarium in Ethicam*> (lost).

Source(s): Field 1988, p. 281.

42. Anonymous, <*Commentum in Ethicam*> (frag.).

MS: Sydney, Univ. of Sydney Lib., Nicholson 15 (A.D. 1464 = 1465).

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, III, p. 4; Lines 1999a, p. 279, no. 39.

Note: The first part of the MS, containing Bruni's *Historiae florentini populi*, was scribed in 1464 (= 1465) by Amerigo Corsino (1442–1501). However, it is uncertain whether the commentary is connected with Italy.

Johannes Baptista Cambius (Giovanni Battista Cambio, fl. 1472)

Lohr, *Traditio* (1974): 141–42.

43. *Commentariola seu capita potius in libros Ethicorum* (compendium, 1472).

Text inc.: Aristoteles in prooemio sui libri Ethicorum trifariam illud partitur . . .

Text exp.: . . . et terminatio sententiae totius libri ethicorum. Amen. Finis.

Coloph.: Ex transcriptione Johannis de Certaldo [= Giovanni Boccaccio] supra Ethicorum libros per sanctum Thomam Aquinatem expositos ego J. B. Cambius commentariolum breviter seu solummodo capita colligens, caetera vero omisi sub A.D. 1472 idibus Iulii. Deo gratias. Amen.

MS: *Florence, BRicc. 3048 (A.D. 1472), ff. 107r–185r.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 225; Gauthier 1969, p. 48*; Lohr, *Traditio* (1974): 141–42; Lines 1999a, p. 270, no. 8.

Studies: Gauthier 1969, p. 48*.

Note: Abridgement of Thomas' *Sententia*, based on Bruni's translation.

Hermolaus Barbarus, Junior (Ermolao Barbaro, Jr., 1454–1493)

Humanist active in Padua and teacher of moral philosophy at the university there in 1474–76; see Appendix A, no. 131. Kristeller 1956a, p. 342, n. 14; *DBI*, VI (1964), pp. 96–99 (E. Bigi); Cosenza, I, pp. 405–12; Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 236–37; idem 1988a, p. 108; *CHRPh*, pp 808–09; *DCLI*, I, pp. 194–99 (E. Branca); Lines 2001a. Branca 1964 and 1980.

44. *Compendium ethicorum librorum* (1474–75).

Prol. inc.: Cum neque ex tua dignitate sit praelectionibus meis interesse . . . / . . . Patavii pridie kal. decembris 1474.

Text inc.: Sensus primi capitis quod incipit, *Omnis ars.* Rerum humanarum omnium finem aliquem esse praestitutum oportet . . .

Text exp.: Ita sapientia superior est quam prudentia, quia sapientia potioris partis est virtus quam sit prudentia. Finis.

Edd. (a cross indicates editions that accompany the translation by Joachim Périon): †Basel 1540, *Venice 1544, ff. 4r–40v (Florence, BNC, Rin. B 87), †Basel 1545, Paris 1546, †Basel 1552, †Basel 1555, Paris 1555 and 1558, †Lyon 1548, †Lyon 1556, †Heidelberg 1562.

Source(s): Kristeller 1956a, p. 343, n. 18; Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 237; Cranz and Schmitt, *ad indicem*; Lines 1999a, pp. 269–70, no. 6.

Studies: Kristeller 1956a; Poppi, pp. 109–10; Kraye 1988, pp. 327–28; eadem 1995, pp. 102–04; see above, pp. 248–52.

Note: This work is based on Moerbeke's translation and covers only Books I–VI. The dated dedications to each book indicate that Book I was written *pridie Kal. Decembris*, MCCCLXXIIII; Book VI is dated *X Kalendarum Maias* MCCCCLXXV. For Barbaro's teaching of moral philosophy in the Paduan *studium*, see above, Appendix A, no. 131. On Daniele Barbaro, the nephew of Ermolao who published this work, see Lohr, RLAC, pp. 32–33 and above, Appendix A, no. 168.

Dominicus de Flandria, O.P. (Domenico di Fiandra or Beaudouin Lottin, † 1479)

Professor active in the university of Florence–Pisa and disliked by some students, partly because of his strong Thomistic leanings. Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 400; idem 1988a, p. 53; Kaeppeli, I, pp. 315–18; Verde, III, pp. 190–91; IV, pp. 88–90; Imbach and Nienhaus 1996, pp. 413–14; Lines 2001a. Verde 1976, Krause 1990.

45. *Summa philosophiae moralis* (compendium, lost).

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 400; Lines 1999a, p. 275, no. 23.

Angelus Cato de Benevento (ca. 1440–1495)

Self-described philosopher and medical doctor, archbishop of Beneventum. Cosenza, II, p. 949; *DBI*, XXII (1979): 396–99 (A. De Ferrari).

46. *Super decem morales Aristotelis libros* (written 1487–93; lost).

Source(s): Gauthier 1970a, p. 152 n. 203; De Marinis 1952, p. 228 n. 3: "Super decem morales Aristotelis libros doctissimus Angelus egregie conscripsit commentaria, quae Parisiis die 7a julii 1487 incepta, Romae absolvit mense augusto 1493, ut ipse eodem in opere indigitavit"; Lines 1999a, p. 275, no. 21.

Nicolaus Leonicenus (Nicolò Leoniceno, 1428–1524)

Famous professor especially active in Ferrara. *CTC*, III, p. 72; Lohr, RLAC, pp. 219–20; Lines 2001a. Mugnai Carrara 1991, pp. 13–102; Godman 1998, *ad indicem.*

47. *Collectanea in Ethicis Aristotelis et Meteoris . . . a domino Nicolao Leoniceno philosopho utriusque linguae excellentisssimo ferrariis* (ca. 1488?).

Prol. inc.: Tota philosophia, magnifice rector, doctores celeberrimi . . .

Text inc.: *Omnis ars*—Ut fabrilis, quae factivae sunt . . .

MS: *Bologna, BArchig., B 3475 (s. XV/XVI, chart.), ff. 1r–69v.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 17 (descr.); cf. Mugnai Carrara 1991, pp. 31, 83.

Note: These are lectures on the *Ethics*, going only through Book V and probably delivered in Ferrara. The base text is Bruni's translation of the *Ethics*, which Leoniceno at times criticizes. The scribe was Pontico Virunio. Leoniceno is not to be confused with Nicolò Leonico Tomeo.

Angelus Politianus (Angelo Poliziano, 1454–1494)

Leading humanist and professor at the university in Florence (taught moral philosophy at least in 1490–91); see Appendix A, no. 113. Lohr, *Traditio* (1969): 362; idem 1988a, p. 24; *CTC*, I, pp. 132–34; *ibid.*, IV, p. 272; *CHRPh*, p. 833; *DCLI*, III, pp. 478–89 (E. Bigi); Lines 2001a. Garin 1994, pp. 335–63; Branca 1983; Grafton 1991, Ch. 2; Cesarini Martinelli 1996, p. 463, n. 1; Kraye 1997, pp. 192–99 (J. Kraye); Godman 1998, Chs. 1–3; *Agnolo Poliziano.*

48. *Panepistemon: Praelectio in Ethicen Aristotelis* (ca. 1491).

Text inc.: Qui libros aliquos enarrare Aristotelis ingrediuntur consuevere a principio statim philosophiam ipsam velut in membra partiri, quod et Themistium facere videmus et Simplicium et Ammonium et alios item peripateticos veteres.

Text exp.: merito silentii nos admoneat. Dixi.

Edd.: Florence 1491, 1496; Venice 1497, 1498, 1502, 1508; Paris 1512, 1519; Nürnberg 1532, etc. Partial modern edition in Brancacci 1993.

Source(s): Risse, IV, p. 15 and *passim*; *VD 16*, P3999; cf. Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 362.

Studies: I. Maïer 1960; Brancacci 1993.

Note: An earlier (Treviso 1483) printing of the *Praelectio* seems to be a ghost (cf. Lohr). Poliziano also annotated some manuscripts of the *Ethics* in Bruni's translation; for the annotations on Florence, BLaur., Strozzi 54 and Plut. LXXIX, 11 see Hankins 1994, p. 173 and idem (forthcoming), *passim* and Appendix II.

Hieronymus Avantius (Girolamo Avanzo Veronese, fl. ca. 1494)

Teacher of moral philosophy in Padua in 1494–95; see Appendix A, no. 136. Cosenza, I, pp. 349–50; De Nava 1993; Lines 2001a.

49. *De laudibus philosophiae moralis oratio et gratiarum actio ad Marcum Gazzonum et M. Antonium maurocenum* (1494).

Ed.: Venice 1495.

Source(s): Nardi 1958, pp. 159–61.

Note: This prolusion was delivered in connection with Avanzo's course on moral philosophy in Padua.

Benedictus Brugnoli Veronensis (Benedetto Brugnoli Veronese, 1427–1502)

Teacher of Greek and Latin in Venice. Cosenza, IV, pp. 2964–65; *DBI*, XIV (1972), pp. 501–03 (E. Mioni).

50. *Oratio super Ethicis Aristotelis* (1494).

Text inc.: Neque ipse ex me . . .

Text exp.: Septimo Idus Augusti explevi MCCCCLXXXXIIII (f. 180v).

Coloph.: Oratio Benedicti Brugnoli Veronensis utriusque lingue peritissimi super ethicis Aristotelis.

MS: Belluno, Seminario Gregoriano, BLolliana, 22 (s. XV), ff. 151r–180v.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, II, pp. 495–496 (descr.).

51. Anonymous, *Lectura super libros Ethicorum Aristotelis* (prolusion, 1495 or earlier).

Text inc.: Cogitanti mihi saepenumero . . .

MSS: Leipzig, UB 1454 (s. XV); Florence, BRicc. 3022 (olim 3193) (s. XV), ff. 28–29.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 524 (excerpt with bib.); cf. *ibid.*, I, p. 225.

Note: Datable to 1495 or earlier. The work's connection with Italy is not certain.

Ludovicus de Ferraria, O.P. (Ludovico da Ferrara, † 1496)

Active in central and northern Italy and procurator of his order in 1491–96. Lohr, *Traditio* (1971): 321; Kaeppeli, III, pp. 92–94; Imbach and Nienhaus 1996, p. 511.

52. *Compendium Ethicorum Aristotelis.*

Ded.: Reverendissimo in Christo patri et domino Domino Oliverio Carafe episcopo sabiniensi, cardinali neapolitano, protectori ordinis praedicatorum, frater Ludovicus de Ferraria, sacre theologie professor et eiusdem ordinis predicatorum salutem dicit.

Prol. inc.: Ethicorum liber ab Aristotele editus, reverendissime domine, mihi tradere videtur quicquam ad humanam vitam bene instituendam possit pertinere . . .

Text inc.: Bonum interpretamur esse quod omnia appetunt. Nam non est aliud quam finis, finis autem est terminus appetitus.

Text exp.: Et denique quis sit optimus status rei publicae, et quomodo unaque res publica sit instituta.

MSS: *Chicago, Newberry Lib. 99.1 (s. XV ex.), ff. 1r–75v; *Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 9823 (s. XV), ff. 1r–73v (without dedication).

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, II, p. 347; *ibid.*, V, p. 246; Saenger 1989, pp. 191–92; Etzkorn 1996, p. 236; cf. Lines 1999a, p. 271, no. 9 and Lohr, *Traditio* (1971): 321.

Note: This work may be the same as the lost *Commentaria in Ethicam* referred to in Lohr. The work was written (or at least dedicated) after 1483, when Carafa became cardinal.

Hieronymus Savonarola, O.P. (Girolamo Savonarola, † 1498)

Mainly active in Florence, in the convent of S. Marco. Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 240; idem 1988a, pp. 111–12; *DCLI*, IV, pp. 108–12 (G. Belloni); Savonarola 1988. Weinstein 1970; Godman 1998, Ch. 2.

53. *Compendium philosophiae moralis ad Aristotelis et S. Thomae mentem.*

Text inc.: *Homini convenit agere propter finem*—Actionum enim quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae dicuntur humanae, quae sunt hominis inquantum homo . . .

Text exp.: dominus constitutus hominum, ab eo petens auxilium et sapientiam ad gubernandum, et ipsum imitando in regimine, ut ipse in omnibus honoretur, qui est solus beatus et potens rex regum et dominus dominantium, cui est honor et imperium sempiternum. Amen.

MSS: See Savonarola 1988 and especially Vatican, BAV, Chigi E.IV.126 (s. XV, autog., breaks off in Bk. IX).

Edd.: *Venice 1534, 1542; Wittenberg 1596; *Savonarola 1988, II.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1968): 240; Savonarola 1988; Lines 1999a, p. 270, no. 7.

Note: Books I–VIII are based on Aristotle's *Ethics*, Book IX on the *Economics*, and Book X on the *Politics*.

Franciscus Sampson Nanis, O.F.M. (Francesco Nani or Nanni, † 1499)

Mainly active in Tuscany. *Annales minorum*, VII, *ad indicem*; Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 412; idem 1988a, p. 61; Cenci 1992.

54. <*Commentaria in Ethicam*> (lost).

Source(s): Wadding 1650, I, p. 93; Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 412 (relying on Wadding); Lines 1999a, pp. 275–76, no. 25.

Dating Uncertain

55. Anonymous, *Compilatio ethicorum, hoc est florum scientiarum moralium Aristotelis philosophorum philosophi.*

MS: Pavia, BU, Aldini 557 (s. XV, memb., mm. 320 x 230, longis lineis), ff. 1r–67v.

Source(s): *AL Codices* no. 1499; Lines 1999a, pp. 277–78, no. 33.

Note: The MS is not listed in Hamesse 1974. The work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

56. Anonymous, *Recollectiones super primo libro Ethicorum Aristotelis* (fragm.).

Text inc.: Quamvis lumen rationis naturale minime sufficiat . . .

Coloph.: Expliciunt recollectiones super primo libro Ethicorum Aristotelis.

MS: Oxford, Bod., lat. class. c.9 (s. XV, 2 cols.), ff. 80v–81v.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, IV, p. 252; Lines 1999a, p. 279, no. 42.

Note: The work appears to be sandwiched between two *recollectiones* on Virgil: the first on the *Bucolics* and the second on the *Georgics*. The first piece, dated 23-XII-1378, is apparently linked to lectures given by Benedetto da Imola in Ferrara. The second is linked either to lectures by the same in Venice (but this attribution has been erased), or to lectures by a Cyone (Simone?) da Monte Pulciano in Ferrara. It is uncertain whether the part on the *Ethics* has anything to do with either teacher or with Italy.

57. Anonymous, *Conclusiones et propositiones librorum Ethicorum cum declaratione testuum dubiorum.*

Text inc.: In primo libro ethicorum Aristoteles ultimum finem humanum nobis proponit atque eum diligenter describit et designat . . .

Text exp.: Iudicantes sine habitu de rebus civilibus bene iudicant fortuito.

MS: *Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 207 (s. XV ex., memb., mm. 323 × 211, longis lineis), ff. 118r–217v.

Source(s): Grabmann 1939, pp. 174–76; Gauthier 1969, p. 49*; Lines 1999a, p. 278, no. 34.

Note: Based on Moerbeke's and Argyropoulos' translations, this work considers some lines of text at a time, while adding short explanations from Thomas and Acciaiuoli. The work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

58. Anonymous, *Ad libros Aristotelis ad Nicomacum (!), Tractatus de involuntario.*

MS: *Rome, BCasanat., 797 (D.IV.32) (s. XV, chart., quarto, longis lineis), ff. 211r–254v.

Note: A series of seven questions on the problem of the voluntary and unvoluntary. The manuscript contains other anonymous commentaries, such as on the *De sphaera* and *Metheora.* The work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

Severinus (fl. s. XV/XVI)

59. *Ethica Nicomachea* (translation, s. XV ex.?).

Text inc.: Omnis ars omnisque ratio et via omnis insuper actio et electio . . .

MS: Livorno, Bib. Labronica, Armadio CXII, Palchetto 3, n. 26 (s. XV/XVI), ff. 236r–246v.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I (1963), p. 250.

Note: I have not been able to identify this author. According to Kristeller, the translation goes only through Book I.

XVI Century

1501–1550

Raphael Maffeius Volaterranus, Sr. (Raffaele Maffei, Sr., 1451–1522)

Cultural personality active especially in Volterra and Rome. *CTC*, II, p. 144; Lohr, RLAC, pp. 234–35.

60. *Argumenta in libros decem Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum* (compendium, 1506 or earlier).

Text inc.: Omnis ars omnisque doctrina, actio quoque et electio, bonum aliquod ut finem appetere videntur. Finium autem aliqui sunt artes, aliqui praeter artes opera quaedam restantia. Quorum vero restant opera, ea sunt artibus potiora, ut medicinae sanitas, et militaris victoria.

Text exp.: hoc autem postea voluptas velut umbra solem subsequitur. Haec ex Plethone Platonico.

Edd.: As Lib. XXXVI of the *Commentariorum Urbanorum . . . octo et triginta libri* in Rome 1506, Paris 1511, Paris 1515, Paris 1526, Basel 1530, Basel 1544, Lyon 1552, Basel 1559, n.p. 1603; as a separate edition, in *Venice 1542 (with Feliciano's translation) and *Venice 1576 (Vatican, BAV, Barberini J.IV.82, with the translations of Argyropoulos and Lambin).

Sources: Lohr, RLAC, pp. 234–35; Risse, IV.

Studies: Kraye 1988, pp. 303, 328.

Note: The 1542 edition is apparently attached to the translation of Feliciano (see below, no. 65); that of 1576, to the translations by Argyropoulos (see above, no. 37) and Denys Lambin; see Risse.

Franciscus Cataneus Diacetius (Francesco Cattani da Diacceto, 1466– 1522)

Platonist, professor of philosophy in Florence at least 1502–04 and 1516–21 (moral philosophy envisaged in 1502–04); see Appendix A, no. 115. *DBI*, XXII (1979), pp. 507–09 (P. O. Kristeller); Verde, II, p. 218; Lohr, RLAC, p. 86; Lines 2001a. Kristeller 1956c; Kraye 1997, pp. 156–65 (L. Deitz).

61. *Praefatio in Aristotelis de Moribus* (ca. 1510?).

Text inc.: Pervetustus mos est, in celeberrimis conviviis . . .

Text exp.: Habemus Aristotelem strenuum ducem, qui in libro de Moribus ad Nicomachum (quem nos praesenti anno sumus enarraturi) locuplentissime exquisitissimeque sternit munitque viam qua nobis ad superos gradiendum est.

MSS: Florence, BNC, Naz. II.I.379 (s. XVI), ff. 96v–100r; Naz. II.IV.34 (s. XVI), ff. 282r–286v; Vatican, BAV, Ross. lat. 423 (s. XVI), ff. 17v–24r

Ed.: *Basel 1563 (*Opera omnia*), pp. 319–23 (Florence, BNC, Rin. C 242).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 86.

Johannes Genesius Sepulveda (Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, 1490–1573)

Famous Spanish cultural figure active in Rome during the first quarter of the sixteenth century. Losada 1948; Lohr, RLAC, pp. 419–20; *ER*, III, pp. 55–57 (K. Elliott van Liere).

62. *Enarratio in Ethicam* (ca. 1524, lost).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, pp. 419–20; Paz y Meliá 1907, pp. 280–84; Losada 1948, pp. 522–36.

Note: The work was apparently written while Sepulveda was in Rome, around 1524.

Chrysostomus Javelli, O.P. (Crisostomo Javelli, 1470–1538)

Theologian active in Bologna and Piacenza; opponent of Pomponazzi. Lohr, RLAC, pp. 202–04; *CHRPh*, p. 822.

63. *Epitome in X libros Ethicorum* (ca. 1532?).

Prol. inc.: Postquam per epitomata digesta et ordinata fuerunt a me quae scripsit Aristoteles in VIII libris De physica auscultatione, in quatuor libris de Coelo, in duobus de Generatione et Corruptione, in tribus Meteororum relicto quarto, in tribus libris de Anima, in Parvis naturalibus, in tota sua Metaphysica, decrevi hac mea maturiori ac senili aetate epitomatice resolvere totalem eiusdem sententiam et intentionem in scientia morali, quam partitus est in ethicam, politicam et oeconomiam.

Text exp.: Et hic terminatur ordinatio nostra per epitomata in decem libris Ethicorum Aristotelis cum divino subsidio et Deo optimo in quo solo felicitamur, sit honor et gloria aeterna; praestetque nobis gratiam et virtutem eodem modo ordinandi quae in octo libris Politicorum continentur et sic habes Crescenti fili id quod tandiu exoptavi. Vale studiosus et felix. /Finis.

Edd.: In Javelli's *Opera Omnia* (also called *Totius rationalis, naturalis, divinae ac moralis philosophiae compendium*): *Lyon 1568, II, pp. 3–153 (BSB, 2.Ph.u. 33–2); Lyon 1580.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 204; Quétif, II, p. 105.

Note: The work was probably written in Cremona, between 1532 and 1534.

Caelius Calcagninus (Celio Calcagnini, 1479–1541)

Professor in Ferrara. Ferrari, p. 163; Cosenza, I, pp. 763–65; *DCLI*, I, pp. 265 ff. (G. Santangelo).

64. *Paraphrasis in primum librum Ethicorum Aristotelis* . . . (Compendium/paraphrase; lost?).

Text inc.: Non ea solum quae a deo protinus rerum omnium authore proficiscuntur . . .

Ed.: Basel 1544 (?).

Source(s): Gauthier 1970a, p. 161; mentioned by Possevino, *Bibliotheca selecta*. Not in Risse or in *VD16*.

Johannes Bernardus Felicianus (Giovanni Bernardo Feliciano, fl. ca. 1541)

Cultural figure especially known for his translations of Aristotle and his commentators; mainly active in Venice, and perhaps professor in Pavia. Cosenza, II, pp. 1372–73; *CTC*, I, pp. 90–91; *ibid.*, IV, p. 166.

65. *Ethica Nicomachea . . . Bernardo Feliciano interprete* (translation, ante 1541).

Text inc.: Omnis ars, omnisque discendi via, actio item, atque electio bonum quoddam expetere videtur. Quapropter bene id esse bonum ipsum asseruerunt quod omnia expetunt. Finium vero quaedam videtur esse differentia.

Text exp.: quibusque legibus et moribus utens, magis perspicere poterimus. Sumpto igitur hinc initio dicamus.

Edd. (a cross indicates that Feliciano's work accompanies his translation and edition of the Greek commentaries in no. 66 below; a § indicates that Feliciano's translation accompanies the commentary of Averroes): †Venice 1541, †*Basel 1542 (Florence, BRicc. D.IV.10321), Venice 1542 (with Maffei), Paris 1543, Louvain 1548, Louvain 1549, §Venice 1550, Paris 1550 (with Strebaeus), Louvain 1560, §Venice 1560, [Lyon] 1561, §Venice 1562, Venice 1572 (*Opera Omnia*), §Venice 1575, Venice 1576 (*Opera Omnia*), Lyon 1579 (*Opera Omnia*), Venice 1584/85 (*Opera Omnia*), Geneva 1597 (*Opera Omnia*).

Source(s): Risse, IV; Cranz and Schmitt, p. 172.

Studies: Gauthier 1970a, p. 173.

Note: Feliciano's work is also included in his translation of Averroes' commentary on the *Ethics* (in numerous other editions) and accompanies the commentary of Ludovicus Strebaeus (see Lohr, RLAC, p. 439).

66. Translation of the Greek commentaries (ante 1541).

Edd.: Venice 1541, Basel 1542, Paris 1543, Venice 1589, Helmstedt 1662.

Source(s): Mercken 1990a, p. 410.

Studies: Gauthier 1970a, p. 173; Mercken 1990a, p. 410. Mercken notes that Feliciano mainly keeps the composition of the commentary translated by Grosseteste, but excludes the anonymous scholia on Book V and adds some parts of Aspasius; also, he includes a mixture of Aspasius and the anonymous scholia on Books II–IV. For the Greek commentaries as translated formerly by Grosseteste, see above, Appendix B, no. 6.

Antonius Bernardi Mirandolanus (Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano, 1502–1565)

Professor of philosophy in Bologna (1533–40), then mainly in Rome, where he also taught ethics in the papal palace (1547). Bernardi also wrote a dialogue on honor, in Italian (Bernardi 1553). Tiraboschi, I, pp. 236 ff.; Cosenza, I, p. 540; Lohr, RLAC, p. 41; Lines 2001a.

67. *Lectiones in I librum Ethicorum* (1547).

Prol. inc.: Etsi me non latet, ornatissimi viri, illud in more consuetudineque positum esse, ut qui primum ad aliquam artem . . .

Text inc.: Cum igitur propositum nobis sit interpretari eos libros, qui ab Aristotele inscribuntur Libri Ethicorum . . .

Lectio XX inc.: *Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος* . . .—In hac lectione aggreditur expositionem textus, et primo quaerit cur Aristoteles posuerit illam primam propositionem . . .

Text exp.: Quibus resolutis dico revertendo ad textum Aristotelis quod istud *ἀγαθόν* est in generali, quia omnis facultas appetit aliquod bonum et istud bonum dividitur ut facultates, nam particulares facultates appetunt bonum particulare, nam aliud est bonum medicinae, aliud militaris.

MSS: *Bologna, BArchig., B 3485 (s. XVI, chart.), 50 ff. (19 lectures); Fermo, BC, 80 (4 CA 2/80) (s. XVI?), ff. 127–143 (7 lectures); *Vatican, BAV, Ottob. lat. 1914 (A.D. 1547), 146 ff. (32 lectures, *prol.* Cum me non latet . . .); *Urb. lat. 1414 (A.D. 1547), 293 ff. (38 lectures; source of incipits).

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 17; Lohr, RLAC, pp. 41, 64; Stornajolo, III, pp. 315–16.

Note: The lectures were delivered in the papal palace in 1547. They are based on the Greek text.

Franciscus Zinius (Zini, fl. ca. 1547)

Teacher of moral philosophy in Padua in 1547–48; see Appendix A, no. 178. Lines 2001a.

68. *De philosophiae laudibus oratio quam habuit in gymnasio Patavino cum publicum philosophiae moralis interpretandae munus apprehenderetur, idibus novembris* (1547).

Prol. inc.: Si claro poetae Antimacho convocatis auditoribus legenti poema suum . . .

Text inc.: Utinam mihi adolescenti, ex hoc amplissimo loco, de re divina potius quam humana, apud homines sapientissimos verba facturo . . .

Text exp.: . . . labores felicissimi revertamur. Quod facile consequemur, si divinis philosophiae monitis et praeceptis obtemperabimus. Dixi.

Ed.: *Venice 1547, pp. 3–13 (Padua, BU, Ba 139.22).

Source(s): Poppi, pp. 110–11.

Note: Connected with lectures given at the university in Padua.

Bernardinus Trebatius (Bernardino Trebazio, † 1548)

ABI I 962, 15–25 (Angiolgabriello, Jöcher).

69. *Aristotelis Philosophiae Moralis ad Nicomachum, Bernardino Trebatio . . . interprete* (translation).

Ed.: Venice 1547 (the date is sometimes misprinted as 1567).

Source(s): *Edizioni italiane*, I, p. 226, no. 2890; Risse, IV.

Note: Not seen. Trebazio, according to his epitaph, also translated the *Politics* and the *Rhetoric*.

70. Anonymous, *Epitome philosophiae moralis* (compendium, s. XVI in.?).

Prol. inc.: Quaestiones praeambulares tres: Quotuplex sit philosophia moralis, Qualis sit scientia philosophiae moralis, Quod sit subiectum attributionis et materia, quam potissime philosophia consideret moralis.

—Solutiones earum: 1. Philosophia totuplex est, quotuplex hominum conditio; hominis autem conditio triplex est: civilis, domestica et solitaria . . .

—Monastica . . . docet in agendis esse prudentem, in contemplandis sapientem, tum active quam contemplative esse felicem.

Text inc.: Processus primi libri Ethicorum. Produxit dux Deus etiam omnia genera . . .

MS: *Vatican, BAV, Pal. lat. 1041 (s. XVI), ff. 197r–227r.

Sources(s): Cf. Lohr, RLAC, pp. 153–54.

Note: The ms. includes sundry *adnotationes* on books of natural philosophy and epitomes on the *De anima*, moral philosophy (including the *Economics* and *Politics*), and *Metaphysics*. The annotations to the *De sphaera* are attributed to Nicolaus Francus Vimacuus and are dated 1512. Another part of the manuscript is dated 1537. This work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

Julius Inghiranus (Giulio Inghirami) (fl. s. XVI in.?)

Kristeller 1992b, pp. 141–42.

71. <*Compendium Ethicorum*>.

MS: Volterra, BCom. Guarnacciana, 5328 (XLVI.4.4) (s. XVI in.), ff. 214r–293v.

Source(s): Cat. mss. filos., II (1981), p. 208, no. 3; Lohr, RLAC, p. 196; Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 292 (excerpt).

Franciscus Verinus Primus (Francesco de' Vieri, Sr., † 1551)

Professor of logic and natural philosophy in Pisa (1497–1525). *ABI* I 992, 125–30 (Brocchi, Inghirami, Negri, Zambrini); Lohr, RLAC, pp. 476–77; Lines 2001a.

72. <*Commentaria in X libros Ethicorum*> (lost).

Source(s): Negri 1722, p. 225 (apparently the commentary still survived at the time of his writing); Lohr, RLAC, p. 476 (relying on Negri).

1551–1600

Nicasius Ellebodius (Helbault, van Ellebaudt) (1535–1577)

Student in Louvain, the Collegio Romano, and Padua (the latter from 1562); later a practicing physician and diplomat in Pressburg. Lohr, RLAC, pp. 133–34; *CTC*, VI, p. 66. Wagner 1973.

73. <*In librum Ethicorum*> (compendium, written in Padua after 1562?).

Text inc.: Philosophiae moralis finis est beatitudo. Non enim contemplatio quaeritur in hac scientia sed actio. Beatitudo autem actio est et beate vivere agere est. Nam beatitudo est usus et exercitatio virtutum et beatus est qui omnium virtutum muneribus fungitur.

Text exp.: Est autem voluptas operatio habitus naturae congruentis non impedita.

MS: *Milan, BAmbr., S.78.sup (s. XVI), ff. 224r–232r.

Source(s): Wagner 1973, p. 29; Lohr, RLAC, p. 134.

Note: The work covers most of the *Ethics*, with the following major alterations: (a) it places the section on friendship immediately before that on justice, and (b) it ends with pleasure, thus omitting the discussion of contemplation.

Petrus Paulus Giannerinus, O.P. (Pier Paolo Giannerino, 1496–ca. 1558)

Theologian active in the Roman province of his order. Quétif, II, pp. 166 ff.; Lohr, RLAC, p. 167; *DBI*, LIV (2000), pp. 446–48 (N. Pastina).

74. <*Super libros Ethicorum*> (lost?).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 167.

Ciriacus Strottius (Ciriaco Strozzi, 1504/05–1565)

Professor of Greek letters in Bologna (1535–36) and in Pisa (1543–65); his chair included moral philosophy from 1556; see Appendix A, no. 118. Ferrari, p. 644; Bozza 1949, p. 40; Lines 2001a.

75. <*Lectiones in Ethicam Aristotelis*>.

MS: *ASF, Carte Strozz., ser. III.153 (s. XVI), ff. 88r–93v (possibly a fragmentary commentary on *EN* V).

76. *<Orationes sive introductiones in aliquot Aristotelis De moribus libros>* (1556–61?).

Lib. III b inc.: Quum post R. Jan. expedita tertii huius de moribus parte illa, in qua de electione agebatur, ad naturam et vim fortitudinis explicandam vocaret nos Aristoteles . . . (Ambr. ms., ff. 10r–12v)

Lib. V inc.: Commodius fecissent Iuris ordinandi et profitendi magistri . . . (Ambr. ms., ff. 3r–6r; a. 1558)

Lib. VI inc.: Quod non (?) universe (?), quae Deus Optimus Maximus benignitate . . . (ASF, ff. 86r–87r, 115r)

Lib. VII inc.: Etsi satis, cum humanitati quaquidem (?) virtute omnibus sui ordinis hominibus praestitit Aristoteles . . . (ASF, ff. 68r–71v; III Kal. Martii Pisis)

Lib. VIII inc.: Mille navibus centuriae bellatorum . . . (Ambr. ms., ff. 7r–9v)

Lib. X inc.: At simias ad ludendum et risum excitandum homines comparant . . . (Ambr. ms., ff. 14r, 13r–17v; a. 1560–61?)

MSS: *Milan, BAmbr., R.98.sup. (s. XVI); *ASF, Carte Strozz., ser. III.153 (s. XVI).

Ed.: *Paris 1599 (Paris, BN Mitterand, X-3425).

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 69 (descr.); Risse, IV, p. 215.

Note: See below, no. 77.

77. Anonymous (= Ciriacus Strottius?), *Praefatio in libros Ethicorum* (I–IIIa).

Text inc.: Quum in introitu ingressionis nostrae de philosophia universa disseruimus . . .

Text exp.: Haec ea sunt quae a principio huius de moribus institutionis usque ad dimidiatum librum tertium nos docere voluit Aristoteles . . .

MS: *Florence, BNC, Rinuccini, filza 16 (s. XVI/XVII), 8 ff.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 167 (descr.); cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 482.

Note: See the *praelectiones* by Strozzi above, no. 76.

78. Anonymous, *<In Ethica Aristotelis>* (s. XVI mid.?).

Prol. 1 inc.: Quae hoc loco de morali philosophia in genere intelligenda sunt, in tres partes dividi possunt, prima de eius origine, secunda de difinitione, tertia de divisione.

Prol. 2 inc.: <In> hoc libro agit Aristoteles de fine ultimo, de certitudine moralis philosophiae, de eius auditore . . .

Text inc.: Omnis ars—Ut notat Eustratius, familiarium est Aristotelis auspicari ab aliqua propositione generali facultatem aliquam.

MS: *Florence, BNC, Naz. II.V.158 (s. XVI, chart.), ff. 1r–9v.

Note: This is a fragmentary commentary on the *Ethics*, covering Book I, 1–9. It is Platonizing in approach and heavily dependent on Eustratius and Thomas. Because of the references to the translations of Périon and Lambin, it must have been written after 1558.

Antonius Montecatini (Antonio Montecatini, 1537–1599)

Professor of philosophy in Ferrara from 1563 to his death. Ferrari, p. 474; *ABI*, I 670, 45–64 (Conti, Jöcher, Ughi); Nardi 1958, pp. 421–23; Lohr, RLAC, pp. 270–71; Lines 2001a.

79. *Antonii Montecatini Ferrariensis praelectio in libros de moribus ad Nicomachum, quam ipse publice habuit in gymnasio Ferrariensi anno Domini MDLXVIII (!) id. Nov.*

Text inc.: Quaecunque ab optimo rerum opifice . . . pro me respondisse velim . . .

Ed.: Venice 1561.

Source(s): *Università e cultura*, pp. 254, 256; Schmitt 1983a, p. 143. Cf. Risse (not mentioned).

Flaminius Nobilis (de Nobilibus) (Flaminio Nobili, 1533–1591)

Professor of philosophy in Pisa, 1559–71; also wrote other works of moral philosophy (e.g., Nobili 1563). Nardi 1958, p. 420, nn. 125–126; Lohr, RLAC, pp. 287–88; Barsanti, p. 516; Lines 2001a.

80. *Propositiones ex libris Ethicorum Aristotelis* (extracts, ca. 1560–71?).

Prol. inc.: Aristoteles in libris moralibus docet unum esse quaerendum in rebus humanis finem . . .

Text inc.: Omnis ars, omnisque doctrina, omnis actio et omne institutum ad bonum aliquod refertur. / Summum bonum est, quo omnia referuntur.

Text exp.: quae vere domina est, sensum imperare facit.

MS: *Milan, BAmbr., S.84.sup. (s. XVI, chart.), ff. 11r–41r.

Source(s): Ceruti, V, pp. 56–57; Rivolta 1933, no. 164; Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 313; cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 287 (not mentioned).

Note: This work covers only Books I–V and was probably written while Nobili was teaching at the university in Florence–Pisa (ca. 1560–71).

81. Anonymous (= Flaminius de Nobilibus?), <*Quaestiones de amicitia*>.

Text inc.: An amicitia possit reperiri inter plures. Videtur quod non. Primo Aristoteles octavo Ethicorum capite primo ita divitibus probat . . .

MS: *Vatican, BAV, Fondo Boncompagni, K.13 (s. XVI), ff. 53r–79v.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 412.

Note: Possibly attributable to Flaminio Nobili; the preceding work in the manuscript is by him and, like this one, switches from Latin to Italian.

82. Anonymous (= ? Benedetto Varchi, 1503–1565), <*Commentum in librum primum Ethicorum Aristotelis*>.

Text inc.: Cum academia haec, inflamati Adolescentes vosque ceteri nobilissimi viri, non minus ad publicam studiosorum omnium utilitatem quam ad privatum commodum et exercitationem cuiusque nostrum inventa atque constituta sit, factum est, ut cum ego eum Aristotelis librum qui graece *Ethikon Nikomakeion* latine *De vita et moribus ad Nicomachum* titulum habet, patrio sermone et vernacula lingua mea, hoc est florentino idiomate, quemadmodum primo constitutum fuerat, interpretari aggressus essem, factum est inquam, ut priore consilio, ut fit, commutato, inter hosce inflammandos adolescentes multa opinionum dissensio cohorta sit . . .

MS: *Florence, BNC, Rinuccini, filza 10 (s. XVI), item 38, ff. 511r–518v; cf. item 7, f. 195v ss.

Source(s): Cf. Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 167 (descr.).

Note: This work is in all likelihood by Varchi, whose writings this manuscript and others in the same series mainly contain. Only this Latin prologue survives. It appears that Varchi's initial decision to discuss the *Ethics* in the vernacular (carried out in filza 10, item 4) was not well received by his students. Becchi's vernacular commentary closely follows Acciaiuoli and Eustratius, and doubtless that was the intention in the Latin version as well. On Varchi, see *DCLI*, IV, pp. 382–85 (B. T. Sozzi); *ER*, VI, pp. 215–16 (M. T. Ward).

Marcus Antonius Muretus (Marc-Antoine Muret, 1526–1585)

Professor of moral philosophy (mainly 1563–67), law, and rhetoric in the university of Rome, from 1563 until 1584; see Appendix A, no. 267. *CTC*, I, pp. 142–43; *CHRPh*, p. 827; Lohr, RLAC, pp. 277–78; Lines 2001a. Dejob 1881; de Nolhac 1883; Sharrat 1991.

83. *Commentarii in Aristotelis X libros Ethicorum ad Nicomachum* . . . (1563–67).

Prol. inc.: Praestantissimi quique Aristotelis scriptorum interpretes, nominatim Simplicius et Ammonius, sex quaedam capita tradiderunt, quae in cuiusque libri principio tractare oporteret, antequam ad exponenda ipsa philosophi verba perveniretur. Quorum nos auctoritatem secuti, ea hodierno die, quantum vires ferent, distincte dilucideque tractabimus. (from autograph commentary; see note below)

Text inc.: *Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος . . .*—Finis est, qui impellit ad agendum: quique omnibus in rebus initio considerandus est. Quare praeclare, ut solet, Aristoteles huius doctrinae, qua humanae actiones diriguntur, principium a fine bonorum omniun ducendum putavit.

Text exp.: sed ne satis quidem proprie dicimus voluptatem gigni, aut quempiam voluptatem commoveri.

MSS: Muret's annotations in printed editions (see note below); *Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 11591 (s. XVI), ff. 41r–54v (Lib. VI), f. 57r (beginning of Lib. VII), ff. 69r–101v (Lib. V).

Edd.: *Ingolstadt 1602, pp. 1–542 (BSB A.gr.b. 873); *Opera Omnia* (Verona 1727–30, V, pp. 1–420; Leiden 1789, III, pp. 137–466).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, pp. 277–78 (*edd.*).

Studies: Kraye 1995, pp. 116–17; eadem (forthcoming); see above, pp. 331–40.

Note: Muret's lectured on the Greek text of the *Ethics*. He annotated two different Greek editions: Florence: Giunta, 1547 (in *Rome, BNC, 68.9.D.2) and Florence: Giunta, 1560 (in *Rome, BNC, 68.9.D.4). Of greater importance, however, is the rediscovery of Muret's autograph commentary, interleaved with the Greek text of the Giunta, 1560 edition in another copy of the same library (*Rome, BNC, 71.2.D.12). Although on first inspection the autograph seems roughly to correspond to the 1602 printed edition (but a fuller examination will need to confirm this), the prologue reported above is entirely omitted there. Furthermore, Vat. lat. 11591 contains Muret's autograph commentary on Books V, VI and beginning of Book VII. I plan further study of and publication on these recent findings.

84. <*Praelectiones in varios libros Ethicorum*>.

—Lib. I: *De moralis philosophiae laudibus* (XVI. Kal. Decembris, anno 1563; *inc.* Veteri consuetudine receptum est . . .; *edd.* Leipzig 1834, Lib. I, Oratio VII; Hanover 1774, I, pp. 65–75).

—Lib. IIIb: *De moralis philosophiae necessitate* (VII. Id. Novemb. 1564; *inc.* Superiori anno, cum injunctum mihi Pontificis auctoritate munus obire inciperem . . .; *edd.* Leipzig 1834, Lib. I, Oratio VIII; Hanover 1774, I, pp. 75–85).

— Lib. V: *De iustitiae laudibus* (postridie non. Martii 1565; *inc.* Quod principio me, cum hos libros explicare ingrederer, dicere meministis . . .; *edd.* Leipzig 1834, Lib. I, Oratio IX; Hanover 1774, I, pp. 85–95).

—Lib. VI: *De sui cognitione deque omnibus humani animi facultatibus* (IV. Id. Novembris 1565; *inc.* Croesum olim Lydorum Regem opulentissimum . . .; *edd.* Leipzig 1834, Lib. I, Oratio X; Hanover 1774, I, pp. 96–109).

—Lib. VIII–IX: *In Aristotelis libros De amicitia* (no date; unpublished; *inc.* Si ullum tempus fuit, cum hae quotidianae disputationes meae, aut voluptatem vobis aliquam, aut fructum attulerint, Auditores . . .).

—Lib. I: *Repetiturus libros Aristotelis de moribus* (pridie Non. Novembris 1583; *inc.* Primum quidem Deum immortalem veneror . . .; *edd.* Hanover 1774, I, pp. 394–405, Lib. II, Oratio XVII; cf. Leipzig 1741, Lib. I, Ep. XXIII).

MSS: *Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 11591 (s. XVI), ff. 36–39 (*In sextum Ethicorum*), ff. 103–106 (*In quintum Ethicorum*); *Vat. lat. 11593 (s. XVI), ff. 164r–166v (*In octavum Ethicorum*); Barb. lat. 2006 (s. XVII), ff. 45r–46v (*In libros de amicitia*).

Edd.: Venice 1571, Cologne 1581, Venice 1583, Lyon 1583, Venice 1586, Lyon 1586, Paris 1588, Lyon 1591, Ingolstadt 1595 and 1597, Venice 1598, Lyon 1599, *Leipzig 1741 (ed. J. E. Kappius), *Hanover 1774 (ed. J. E. Kappius), *Leipzig 1834 (ed. K. H. Frotscher, rpt. Geneva 1971).

Source(s): Risse, IV, *passim.*

Note: Muret also wrote a translation of Book V of the *Ethics*, which went through numerous editions (see Risse). However, it is not listed here because it was apparently written when Muret was in Paris.

Josephus Valdanius (Giuseppe Valdanio, fl. ca. 1567)

Professor of moral philosophy in Brescia. Ferrari, p. 676; Lohr, RLAC, p. 469.

85. *De philosophiae moralis usu, in Aristotelis libros de moribus ad Nicomachum praefatio* (pridie nonas Januarii 1565).

Text inc.: Dum mecum ipse reputo, Amplissimi Viri, tum oblati mihi a vobis negotii magnitudinem, tum mearum virium imbecillitatem, non possum non vereri, ne longe maius quàm ut ferre valeam hoc onus futurum sit.

Text exp.: Quamobrem nos ex morali philosophia multo sane uberiorem fructum consequi possumus, quàm illi olim potuerint, qui solo naturali lumine praediti, Christianae veritatis expertes fuerunt. Illi enim omni suo conatu huius tantum vitae felicitatem, imperfectam sane, fugacem et caducam adipisci poterant, nobis vero divino concessu ac beneficio datum est, ut non hanc solum, sed alteram etiam illam perfectam, stabilem, ac sempiternam in caelis consequamur.

Ed.: *Brescia 1567, ff. 2r–15r (BSB, Ph.u. 514).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 469; Risse, IV, p. 144.

86. *Definitiones quaedam ex Aristotelis libris de moribus ad Nicomachum excerptae* (ca. 1565).

Text inc.: Felicitas est summum hominis bonum, quod scilicet propter se, non ob aliud quicquam expetitur, ac per se sufficit ad vitam optime degendam, rerum omnium finis, quae in actione versantur.

Text exp.: . . . quanto mens toti et composito antecellit, tanto eius actio eis actionibus praestat, quae aliis virtutibus consentaneae sunt. Libro decimo capite septimo et octavo.

Ed.: *Brescia 1567, ff. 17r–23v (BSB, Ph.u. 514).

Claudius Bettus (Claudio Betti, † 4-I-1589)

Professor of logic, natural philosophy, and moral philosophy in Bologna (1545–89); see above, Appendix A, no. 81. Montalbani, p. 53; Fantuzzi, II, pp. 163–66; Lohr, RLAC, pp. 42–43; Lines 2001a. For his treatise on moral philosophy in Italian, see Betti 1567.

87. *In libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum lectiones* (1570, 1579; Lib. I–V).

Prol. inc.: Cun hactenus de anima, adiuvante Deo, cum Aristotele tractaverimus, non alienum existimavi . . .

Text inc.: *Omnis ars, omnisque methodus*—Explicatis iis, ex quorum cognitione in absolutam cognitionem primo moralium omnium, secundo primae partis moralis devenimus nec non et tertio primi libri, reliquum est ut opus aggrediamur . . .

MSS: *Bologna, BArch., B3427 (A.D. 1570), 113 ff. (Lib. I–III); *BU 298. X, vol. 2 (A.D. 1570, chart., folio), 364 ff. (Lib. I–II); *BU 298. X, vol. 1 (A.D. 1579), 259 ff. (Lib. I–III; *prol. inc.* Cum sese nobis declaranda offerat haec facultas activa . . .; *text inc. Omnis ars, et omnis methodus* . . .—Expeditis iis, ex quorum cognitione, in absolutam cognitionem eorum, quae in hoc opere tradebantur devenire poteramus . . .); *BU 298. X, vol. 3 (A.D. 1579), 195 ff. (Lib. IV–V).

Source(s): Cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 43; Frati, p. 189, no. 196.

Studies: See above, § 8.3.

88. Translation, base text for commentary above.

Text inc.: Omnis ars et omnis methodus, actioque et praeelectio bonum appetere videtur. Propterea bene asseruerunt . . . Differentia vero finium quaedam videtur.

MSS: Same as for commentary in no. 87.

Ludovicus Beccatellus (Ludovico Beccadelli, 1501–1572)

Took active part in the Council of Trent from 1545. Bishop of Ravello (1555), then archbishop of Ragusa (1555–64). Orlandi, p. 191; Fantuzzi, II, pp. 5–27; *ABI* I, 123, 308–324 (Jöcher, Mazzuchelli, Lancetti, Gliubich, Casati); Lohr, RLAC, p. 37.

89. *Prolegomena in Aristotelis Moralia* (by 1572).

Text inc.: Semper ea virtutis Mari Illustrissimi vis fuit, ut umbra eius vix agnita etiam ab ea alienos ad se tamen amandum provocaverit.

Text exp.: Quam partem legum, scilicet, ferendarum, cum antiqui praetermiserunt, illam philosophia, ut humana perficiet, aggressa est docere.

MS: Parma, BPalat., 974/8 (s. XVI, chart.), ff. 1r–48v.

Source(s): *Cat. mss. filosofici*, II, pp. 161–62 (*incipit/explicit*); Lohr, RLAC, p. 37.

Augustinus Valerius (Agostino Valier, 1531–1606)

Professor of moral philosophy in Venice (1558); later bishop of Verona (1565) and cardinal (1585). Lohr, RLAC, p. 470; Puliafito 1990, p. 153, n. 1.

90. *Lectiones in Aristotelis philosophiam moralem* (Lib. I–III).

Prol. 1 inc.: Aggrediamur philosophiam explicare de vita et moribus decreto senatus . . .

Prol. 2 inc.: Paucis verbis explicanda est inscriptio huius operis . . .

Text inc.: *Omnis ars . . .*—Diximus scopum esse in hoc opere hominem moribus recte instituere . . . (*exp. mut.*)

MSS: *Milan, BAmbr., D.443.inf. (s. XVI, chart.), ff. 45r–49r (Praefatio), 1r–22v (Lib. I–III); Udine, BC Manin, 1308 (157) (A.D. 1574); Venice, BMarc., Lat. XIV, 233 (= 4680) (s. XVI), item 9.

Edd.: The prologues were published in Valier 1577, ff. 26v–33r, 36r–39v.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 470; Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 299; *ibid.*, II, p. 206; *ibid.*, VI, p. 34.

Note: The pieces are clearly connected with a teaching context in Venice. Valier plans to follow the translation of Argyropoulos (Milan ms., f. 49r: "Delegi Argiropoli versionem, ne a communi sententia recederem . . .") and praises the commentaries of Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus, Thomas, Acciaiuoli, Averroes, and (rather less warmly) Burley. Lefèvre does not get much special mention, since he did not add much to Eustratius (*ibid.*).

Gibertus Corregius (de Corregia) (Giberto da Corregio fl. ca. 1530–80?)

91. *Paraphrasis Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum* (compendium paraphrase, *EN* I.1–6).

Prol. inc.: Cum totius civilis philosophiae subiectum sit civitas, id est ii, qui urbem incolunt, quatenus eos felicitatis compotes fieri docet . . .

Text inc.: Finis, qui propter se expetitur, et ob quem cetera omnia quaeruntur, summum bonum est, atque Felicitas, quod tribus his iactis fundamentis patebit . . .

Text exp.: . . . reponendae sunt, quod nemo unquam sapiens ipsas summum bonum esse iudicavit.

MS: *Rome, BVallic., B.110 (s. XVI), ff. 1r–38r.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, II, p. 131 (descr.); Lohr, RLAC, p. 104.

Note: The author is practically unknown; someone by that name takes part in the dialogue in Bernardi 1553.

Franciscus Carolus Piccolomineus (Francesco Piccolomini, 1523–1607)

Professor of natural philosophy in Padua (1560–1601). Lohr, RLAC, pp. 331–42; *CHRPh*, p. 831; Ragnisco 1885–86; Baldini 1980b; Jardine 1997; Lines 2001a.

92. *Universa philosophia de moribus a Francisco Piccolomineo Senense philosophiam in academia patavina e prima sede interpretante, nunc primum in decem gradus redacta et explicata, amplissimo serenissimoque Senatui Veneto dicata* (by 1583).

Introd. inc.: Heus homo, nobilissima creatura, cur in vitae cursu constitutus dormis et stertis?

Gradus primus inc.: Tam familiares humano generi sunt animi perturbationes, adeoque cum eius vita sunt complicatae, ut in omni hominum gradu et conditione inveniantur . . .

Text exp.: . . . cum ita conformatus ab eo ducaris, qui sui essentia est Lux, Veritas, et Rectum, in cuius Gloriam si spiritum hunc restituere mihi datum esset, libentissime exclamarem: vita et philosophia, valete, valete.

MS: Cf. *Milan, BAmbr., D.413.inf. (s. XVI, chart.), 84 ff. (*Praelectiones ethicae sive in librum De moribus*).

Edd.: Venice 1583, 1594 (rev. ed.), Frankfurt 1595, Geneva 1596, Frankfurt 1601, 1611, and 1627.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, pp. 341–342; Baldini 1980a, p. 167, n. 19 (editions).

Studies: Poppi 1976, Baldini 1980a, Jardine 1997; Kraye 1997, pp. 68–79 (J. Kraye, including a selection in English translation); see above, § 7.2 and 7.3.

Note: The Ambrosiana ms. covers Lib. I, 1–7 and seems to be a warm-up for the printed *Introductio*. The reference by Lohr to Vatican, BAV, Chigi A.I.15 (s. XVI) is incorrect.

Petrus Victorius (Pier Vettori, 1499–1585)

Professor of Latin (1538), then also of Greek (1543), and of moral philosophy (1548?) in Florence, until 1584 (see Appendix A, no. 117); published an important edition of the Greek text of the *Ethics* in 1547. *CTC*, II, p. 439; *ibid.*, IV, p. 235; Bozza 1949, pp. 49–50; *DCLI*, IV, pp. 419–22 (M. Pecoraro); Lohr, RLAC, pp. 482–83; *CHRPh*, pp. 839–40; Lines 2001a. Grafton 1983, *passim*.

93. *Commentarii in X libros De moribus ad Nicomachum.*

Ded. inc.: Vere laetus, faustusque mihi fuit dies ille, quo tu serenissimi Princeps [Franciscus Mariae dux Urbinatium] Florentiam venisti . . .

Prol. inc.: Ut reliquas duas philosophiae partes diligenter persecutus est, litterisque copiose mandavit Aristoteles . . .

Text inc.: *Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος . . ./ Omnis ars . . .*—Quid sit finis operis, quod modo conficiendum suscepit, et huius de moribus discipline, quae, ut singulos mortales instruit, vitamque eorum perpolit, ita universam civitatem ornare, atque excolere in animo habet . . .

Text exp.: . . . quae sit optima respublica, quomodoque singulae legibus instructae, ornataeque, et quibus ut legibus, ita etiam institutis probari debeant.

Ed.: Florence 1584.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 483.

Studies: Kraye 1995, pp. 114–15; eadem 1998, p. 328; eadem (forthcoming); Lines 2000, *passim*; see above, § 6.3.

94. Translation, base text for commentary above.

Text inc.: Omnis ars atque omnis ratio ac via, similiterque actio et electio bonum aliquod appetere videtur. Quapropter bene enuntiarunt summum bonum esse id, quod omnia appetunt. Differentia autem quaedam perspicitur esse finium; quidam enim sunt muneris functiones, alii praeter ipsas opera quaedam.

Text exp.: cum autem haec diligenter cognita fuerint, fortasse melius intelligere poterimus, et qualis respublica est optima, et quomodo unaquaeque ipsarum instituta, et quibus legibus et institutis utens. Dicamus igitur hinc initio ducto.

Ed.: As above, no. 93.

Jason de Nores (Giason de Nores, 1530–1590)

Professor of moral philosophy in Padua (1577–90); see Appendix A, no. 195. Lohr, RLAC, pp. 289–90; Lines 2001a.

95. *De constitutione partium universae humanae et civilis philosophiae, quam Aristoteles sapienter conscripsit . . . Jasonis Denores praefatio, cum in gymnasio patavino primum librum Moralium interpretaturus esset, publice habita* (by 1584).

Prol. inc.: Humanae et civilis philosophiae inventores primum omnium considerandum proposuerunt . . .

Text inc.: Eorum quae considerari debent loco praefationis in philosophia humana activa et civili ante legitimam pertractationem . . .

Text exp.: . . . politica de re familiari seu de legibus familiaribus.

MS: *Milan, BAmbr., D.481.inf. (s. XVI), ff. 6r–13r.

Edd.: Padua 1584, Antwerp 1597.

Source(s): Poppi, pp. 114, 139; Lohr, RLAC, p. 290.

Studies: Poppi 1997d, *ad indicem*; Bozza 1949, pp. 55–56.

96. *<Tabulae interrogatoriae in Ethicam, Oeconomiam et Politicam Aristotelis>.*

MSS: *Milan, BAmbr., Q.120.sup. (s. XVI, chart.), ff. 305r–336r; *R.107.sup. (s. XVI, chart.), ff. 270r–276r.

Source(s): Poppi, pp. 114, 139; Lohr, RLAC, p. 290.

Note: The work bears some similarities to de Nores 1584.

Octavianus Ferrarius (Ottaviano Ferrari, 1518–1586)

Professor of natural philosophy in Pavia (at least 1548–58 and 1573–83) and at the Collegio Canobiano in Milan. Fazzo 1999; Lines 2001a; cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 147.

97. *Lectiones in X libros Ethicorum.*

Prol. inc.: Quoniam Aristotelis libros de Moribus ad Nicomachum, quos interpretari proposuimus, activae philosophiae partem esse video . . .

Text inc.: *Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος . . .*—In hoc loco possunt fieri duo propositiones . . .

Text exp.: Nunc reliquum est, ut qua diligentia libros de Moribus ad Nicomachum exponemus, ea de Politicis libros nostro more interpretemur.

MSS: *Milan, BAmbr., D.382.inf. (s. XVI), 130 ff. (lib. I–IV), *D.383.inf. (s. XVI), 122 ff. (lib. V–VIII), *D.384.inf. (s. XVI), 194 ff. (lib. IX–X), *Suss.D.13 (s. XVI), 241 ff. (lib. V–VII), *Suss.F.42 (s. XVI), 375 ff. (lib. VIII–X).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 147 (some ms. references).

Franciscus Bencius, S.J. (Francesco Benci, 1542–1594)

Student of Muret, and teacher of rhetoric in the Collegio Romano. Ribadeneira 1609, p. 17; Ferrari, p. 93; Fejér, I, p. 20; *ABI* I 134, 262–72; II 50, 154 (Jöcher, Mazzuchelli, Narducci, Casati, Caputo); Ipparaguirre, *passim*; Lohr, RLAC, p. 38; *CTC*, VII, p. 291; Kluyskens 1974; Lines 2001a.

98. *Aristotelis de Moribus ad Nicomachum libri decem* (Lib. I–II, ca. 1585–90?).

Prol. 1 inc.: Urbem natura loci marique munitam . . .

Prol. 2 inc.: Sex quaerenda esse, ante cuiuslibet explicationem libri, ut quique fuerunt praestantissimi interpretes scriptorum Aristotelis, ita maxime tradiderunt, Philoponus . . .

Text inc.: *Omnis ars omnisque doctrina . . .*—Quoniam ea pars philosophiae, quae virtutis continet, et officii, et bene vivendi disciplinam, ad actionem dirigitur, propterea enim traditur . . .

Text exp.: . . . cap. VII primo magni moral. c. XXIII.

MS: *Rome, APUG 1170 (s. XVII), 525 ff.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, II, p. 136 (excerpt); Lohr, RLAC, p. 38.

Studies: See above, pp. 364–66.

Note: More than likely, these lectures (42 on Book I, and 15 on Book II) were delivered in the papal palace in Rome. They were written after the appearance of Francesco Piccolomini's commentary, to which they refer.

99. Translation (Lib. I–II), base text for commentary above.

Text inc.: Omnis ars omnisque doctrina nec non et actio et consilium bonum aliquod appetere videtur.

MS: As above, no. 98.

Laelius Peregrinus Somniatus (Lelio Pellegrini, † 1602)

Professor of moral philosophy in "La Sapienza" in Rome (ca. 1586–1602); see above, Appendix A, no. 268. Jöcher III, p. 1380; Jöcher, Suppl. V, p. 1881; Renazzi, III, p. 30; Lohr, RLAC, p. 311; Lines 2001a.

100. *De utilitate moralis philosophiae, cum Ethicorum Aristotelis explicationem aggrederetur, anno 1587* (prolusion).

Text inc.: Quod saepe a Deo immortali precatus sum, Patres Amplissimi, caeterique Auditores ornatissimi, ut litterarios labores meos ea tandem vivendi ratio consequeretur, qua Romanae iuventuti studiorum meorum fructus, quantulacumque ea fuerint, impartiri possim . . .

Text exp.: Vos Romani iuvenes toto praesentis anni de cursu testes eritis fidei, operae, et diligentiae meae, cuius ut hodierno etiam die experimentum aliquod edatur, ad ipsam contextus Aristotelici explanationem descendamus.

Ed.: *Rome 1587, ff. 91r–93v (Florence, BNC, Misc. CVIII.B13).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 311.

101. *De moribus libri X, iis, qui Aristotelis ad Nicomachum inscribuntur, ordine perpetuo atque sententia respondentes . . .* (commentary).

Ded. inc.: Offero Sanctitati tuae [Clemens VIII] libros Aristotelis de Moribus, uberiore paraphrasi, exemplis ab historia petitis . . . (Vatican exemplar; cf. Florence exemplar: Cum superioribus annis post iacturam longissimi temporis quaererem in aula vivendi conditionem . . .)

Prol. inc.: Libri de moribus, olim ab Aristotele ad Nicomachum filium puellum sane, sed ingeniosum scripti . . .

Text inc.: Omnis ars omnisque docendi via, itemque actio et electio bonum aliquod appetit.—Seu vere sit, seu appareat, et videatur bonum. Artis porro nomine habitus eos accipimus, qui motu ac ministerio artium utuntur ad opus.

Text exp.: . . . et quo tempore illos magistros esse decebat, vix fierent discipuli.

Edd.: *Rome 1600 (Florence, BNC, 5.5.62 and Vatican, BAV, Barberini L.IV.68).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 311; Cranz and Schmitt, 108.782A.

Studies: See above, pp. 340–45.

Felix Accorambonius (Accorombonius) (Felice Accoramboni, fl. s. XVI [2])

Studied in Padua ca. 1540. Described by Jöcher as a professor in Rome, but not in Conte. *ABI* I 4, 266-70; II 2, 71 (Jöcher, Mazzuchelli, Jöcher Suppl., Vecchietti, Caputo); *DBI*, I (1960), p. 111 (F. Cagnetti); Lohr, RLAC, p. 4.

102. *In libros Ethicorum Annotationes sive in Moralia* (Lib. I–X), in his *Interpretatio obscuriorum locorum et sententiarum omnium operum Aristotelis . . . (= Vera mens Aristotelis; Eruditissima in omnia Aristotelis opera explanatio).*

Prol. inc.: Si recte voluerimus intelligere hunc librum Moralium, opus erit prius videre cur a philosopho de moribus sit agendum . . .

Text inc.: *Omnis ars, omnisque methodus, similiter et actio et electio . . .*—Dixit Eustathius (!), quod Aristoteles incipit ab hac sententia, et universali propositione, quia consuevit libros ordiri a communibus sententiis, quas Graeci vocant axiomata.

Text exp.: Qui vero carent experientia solum sciunt iudicare universaliter an bene vel male canant, vel aliud quid efficiant, an vero huic cantilenae conveniat haec vel illa harmonia seu consonantia ignorant.

Edd.: *Rome 1590 (Wolfenbüttel, HAB, 48.7 Quod. 2°), Rome 1600, 1603, 1604.

Source(s): Cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 4.

Franciscus Verinus Secundus (Francesco de' Vieri, 1524–1591)

Professor of philosophy in the university of Pisa (ca. 1553–90). Negri 1722, pp. 225–27; *ABI* I 992, 131–37; II 661, 46–50 (Brocchi, Cavalli, Inghirami, Negri); Lohr, RLAC, p. 477; Barsanti, p. 538; Kraye 1997, pp. 166–76 (J. Monfasani); Lines 2001a.

103. *Epilogus decem librorum Aristotelis de moribus.*

Text inc.: In decem libris de moribus, materia subiecta, circa quam versamus (versamur?), operae ipsius intellectus, sunt actiones humanae . . .

Text exp.: Haec illa sunt, quae habet Aristoteles in Libris Ethicorum, . . . erga te mei specimen aliquod praebere (?) possum.

MSS: *Florence, BNC, Magl. VIII, 46 (s. XVI/XVII), ff. 327r–332v; Magl. VII, 1207 (s. XVI), ff. 103–114.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, pp. 117, 124 (excerpt); *ibid.*, V, p. 575; Lohr, RLAC, p. 477.

104. *Expositio et questiones super primum Ethicorum* (lost?).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 477.

Nicolaus Colonius (Nicolò Colonio, † 1602)

Professor of moral philosophy in Padua; see above, Appendix A, no. 196. Poppi, *passim*; Lohr, RLAC, p. 96; Lines 2001a.

105. *Disputatio de veritate quam pronuntiavit in praefatione de politica scientia* (prolusion).

Ed.: Padua 1591 (6 ff.).

Source(s): Poppi 1997d, p. 21, n. 17; cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 96.

Studies: Poppi 1997d, pp. 49, 58–59.

Note: This is probably the "lost" work referred to below, no. 172.

Johannes Ambrosius Barbavarius, O.P. († after 1594)

Professor of theology in Turin and then *professor publicus* in Padua (1561–73). Lohr, RLAC, p. 33.

106. *<Annotationes in Ethicam, I.1–8>*.

Text inc.: *Omnis ars, omnisque doctrina, omnis actus, omnisque electio . . .*—Philosophiam, quae de moribus est interpretaturis, dicendum in primis quid sit philosophia in comuni, et quae eius partes.

Exp.: . . . alii denique etiam bonorum externorum copiam annectendam censuerunt.

MS: *Milan, BAmbr., D.373.inf. (s. XVI, chart.), ff. 141r–157v.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 33.

Note: The author gives the *lemmata* of the text, which he then follows by a short discussion. Much of the material is taken from Averroes and Thomas. I have not been able to identify the base text.

Antonius Riccobonus (Antonio Riccoboni, 1541–1599)

Professor of rhetoric in Padua (ca. 1574–99). Lohr, RLAC, pp. 384–86; *CTC*, IV, p. 244; *DCLI*, IV, pp. 607–09 (M. Pecoraro); Lines 2001a.

107. *Commentarii in X libros Ethicorum (In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum commentarii).*

Prol. inc.: Liber primus Ethicorum Aristotelis dividitur in novem partes. . . .

Text inc.: Primo loco, ut probet bonum expeti ab omnibus, nominat philosophus quattuor, artem, methodum (quam alii docendi, vel discendi rationem, alii doctrinam, alii scientiam appellant) actionem, et praelectionem . . .

Edd.: Padua 1593 (Lib. III–V, *Ethicorum ad Nicomachum tota illa pars quae est de principiis actionum humanarum et de singulis virtutibus moralibus*), *Frankfurt 1596 (Florence, BNC, 4.C.4.84), Hanau 1610.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 384; Cranz and Schmitt, *ad indicem.*

108. Translation, base text for commentary in no. 107.

Text inc.: Omnis ars et omnis docendi ratio, similiter autem et actio et praelectio appetere bonum aliquod videtur. Itaque egregie definiverunt bonum, quod omnia appetunt. Differentia vero aliqua esse finium apparet, quod alii quidem actus, alii vero praeter ipsos opera quaedam sunt.

Edd.: Padua 1595 (Lib. VIII, *Doctrina de amicitia*), Frankfurt 1596, Hanau 1610.

Johannes Antonius Mazzarellus, S.J. (Giovanni Antonio Mazzarelli, 1558–1624)

Professor in the Collegio Romano (where he also taught ethics) and in various other Jesuit Colleges in Italy; see Appendix A, no. 280. Alegambe, p. 218; Sommervogel, V, 836–7; Jöcher, III, pp. 338–39; Fejér, I, p. 161; Lines 2001a.

109. <*Disputationes in Ethicam, libri III et IV*> (1590s?).

Prol. inc.: Hactenus de virtute morali in universum nunc philosophus de partibus eiusdem virtutis singillatim disputare aggreditur quae sit natura cuiusque partis . . .

Text inc.: *Ac primum dicamus de Fortitudine*—Disputationis initium facit philosophus a Fortitudine, an quod fortitudo in rebus dificillimis versatur . . .

Text exp.: quae intemperantia maxime probrosa esse plura videte apud Mirandulanum librum 9 singulorum certaminum. Sec. 8, S. Thomae 2, 2ae, q. 31.

MS: *Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 600 (s. XVI/XVII, chart., mm. 129 × 97), ff. 199r–300v (new foliation).

Source(s): Stornajolo, II, pp. 125–126.

Note: The work covers *EN* III.6–IV. See above, pp. 368–69.

Caesar Rovidius (Cesare Rovida, † 1594)

Professor of natural philosophy in Pavia (ca. 1575–92). Lohr, RLAC, pp. 391–94; Lines 2001a.

110. *Praefatio in librum I Ethicorum* (prolusion).

Text inc.: Mirari satis aliquando non poteram, auditores humanissimi, cur homines, quos lucri cupidos . . .

Text exp. mut.: allaturum cognovi. Eligimus . . .

MS: *Milan, BAmbr., S.133.inf./I (s. XVI, autograph), 6 ff.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 394.

111. *Praefatio in librum II Ethicorum* (prolusion).

Text inc.: Omnem artem finem aliquem propositum . . . (*text exp. mut.*).

MS.: *Milan, BAmbr., S.133.inf./H (s. XVI), 2 ff.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 394.

Pomponius Taurellus (Pomponio Torelli, 1539–1608)

After studies in Padua and France, was a member of the Accademia degl'Innominati and went on diplomatic missions for Ottavio Farnese (see below, no. 142). *ABI*, I 956, 438–40; II 627, 222–23 (Janelli, Imperiatori, Caputo); Lohr, RLAC, p. 464.

112. *Lucubrationes super VIII libros Ethicorum.*

MS: Parma, BPalatina Parm., 1316 (s. XVI).

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, II, p. 43 (excerpt); Lohr, RLAC, p. 464.

Caesar a Bosco (Cesare del Bosco, 1576–1659)

Philosophy student in the Collegio Romano at the time of writing; later a member of the Jesuit order and teacher of philosophy and theology in the Collegio Romano and Palermo. *ABI* I 190, 265–66 (Mazzuchelli, Mongitore); Sommervogel, I, 1828; Ferrari, p. 257; *IBNH*, XXI (1981), p. 11303.

113. <*Disputationes de philosophia morali*> (1599).

Text inc.: Antequam separatim singularium disciplinae moralis partium connexionem consideremus, ipsam generaliter moralis disciplinae naturam, ut integra et absoluta quaedam scientia est investiganda nobis est et statuenda.

Text exp.: Ex his autem virtutibus quae respiciunt honorem, ut aliis debent (?) impendi nulla est, quae pro obiecto finali (?) habeat ipsas actiones externas, sed potius respicit pro obiecto iustum, quod appellare possumus

honorificum, secundum quod per varias actiones est faciendum. Atque haec de honore dicta sufficiant.

MS: *Rome, APUG, Fondo Curia 211 (A.D. 1599), ff. 305r–350r.

Studies: See above, pp. 369–73.

Note: The disputation was probably delivered under Giovanni Soprani, who taught ethics in the Collegio Romano in 1599, when the other contents of this ms. were written (see Appendix A, no. 281).

Paulus Beni, S.J. (Paolo Beni, 1552–1625)

Although he later abandoned the order, Beni was teaching in the order's college in Milan when he delivered these lectures. Diffley 1988, *ER*, I, pp. 203–04 (G. Casagrande); Lines 2001a; cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 39.

114. *<In Aristotelis libros de moribus ad Nicomachum commentarii>* (1592).

MS: *Vatican, ASV, Arch. Beni II, mss. 89 and 90 (s. XVI/XVII).

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 308; Diffley 1988, pp. 35, 110.

Note: Diffley treats the redaction in ms. 89 as earlier than the one in ms. 90. Both are in a disorganized state.

115. Fragmentary translation of Lib. I–II.

MS: Vatican, ASV, Arch. Beni II, ms. 89 (s. XVI/XVII).

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 308.

Lit.: Diffley attributes the translation to Riccoboni and Feliciano. The *fondo* description says Beni provided his own translation for Lib. I–II.

Ulysses Aldrovandi (Ulisse Aldrovandi, 1522–1605)

Professor and naturalist teaching in Bologna (1554–1600). Montalbani, pp. 233–35; Fantuzzi, I, pp. 165–90; Ferrari, p. 17; *DBI*, II (1960), 118–24 (G. Montalenti); *CTC*, IV, p. 100; Findlen 1994, *passim*; Lines 2001b, no. 170; idem 2001a.

116. *Commentationes in Ethicam.*

Prol. inc.: Philosophia moralis considerat operationes humanas, quae sunt ordinatae ad finem, et quae prodedunt a voluntate hominis secundum ordinem rationis . . .

MS: *Bologna, BU, Aldrov., ms. 59 (s. XVI, chart.), ff. 210–223; 65–200.

Note: This is a complete commentary, in which the author tends to stop to outline the text through syllogisms. It is mostly a copy and paraphrase of Acciaiuoli's commentary.

Dating Uncertain

Genesius Malfantius (Genesio Malfante, fl. ca. 1553–86)

Little is known about this figure, who seems to have graduated from Bologna in 1553 (taught rhetoric, *lectura universitatis*, there in 1553–54). He also wrote other works of moral philosophy; see Malfante 1586a and 1586b. *ABI* I 594, 229 (Soprani); Dallari, II, p. 131; Lohr, RLAC, p. 242; Risse, IV; Lines 2001a.

117. *Civilis philosophiae compendium in quo quidquid in libris Ethicorum, Politicorum, et Oeconomicorum disseruit Aristoteles, dilucide perstringitur . . .*

Prol. inc.: De morali institutione/ Cum ea sit philosophiae praestantia, nemo ut eam satis pro dignitate laudare possit . . .

Text inc.: Cum igitur nobis in animo sit ea omnia docere, quibus homo in hac vita probis ita moribus, ac virtutibus instruatur, ut felicitatem consequatur civilem . . .

Text exp.: Sed iam de virtutibus, et iis omnibus, quibus humana seu civilis felicitas ex Aristotelis sententia comparari possit, et de prima parte civilis Philosophiae satis.

Edd.: Genoa 1586; *Padua 1587, ff. 1r–32r (Florence, BNC, 20.D.3.90).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 242; *ABI* I 594, 229 (Soprani); Risse, IV.

Note: In the Padua edition, the work reaches to f. 76r, including the compendia on the *Economics* and the *Politics*. The work is perhaps best described as a moral treatise loosely based on Aristotle's writings.

118. Anonymous, <*Liber primus Ethicorum*> (fragmentary translation).

Text inc.: Omnis ars, et omnis doctrina, et omnis actus humanus, et electio videtur appetere aliquod bonum tanquam finem sibi convenientem, et ideo antiqui Philosophi bene enuntiaverunt, et difiniverunt, bonum dicentes, quod bonum est illud, quod omnia appetunt.

Text exp.: Amplius autem tale bonum agere debet in vita perfecta atque per totam vitam, nam una irundo non facit ver, nec una dies, ita etiam una dies ac parum tempus non faciunt hominem beatum et felicem. (*EN* I.7, 1098a19)

MS: *Rome, BVallicel., R.56 item 6 (s. XVI), ff. 160r–169r.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, II, p. 130.

Note: This work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

119. Anonymous, <*Compendium Ethicorum Aristotelis*>.

Text inc.: Summum hominis bonum, seu humana felicitas ex doctrina Aristotelis est duplex: activa et contemplativa. . . .

Text exp.: Haec ambae felicitas elevat hominem supra hominem, et competit homini quatenus est intellectus, cum illum tandem beatum (?) constituit.

MS: *Vatican, BAV, Boncompagni K.13 (s. XVI), ff. 86r–94v.

Source(s): Cf. Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 412.

Note: A very rapid survey of all ten books of the *Ethics*, probably for personal use. Connection with Italy is uncertain.

120. Anonymous, <*Compendium Ethicorum Aristotelis in primos tres libros*>.

Text inc.: Cum omnis ars, omnisque doctrina, actus et electio bonum appetant et homo (?) arte doctrinaque instituat item eligat et agat, ipsum quoque hominem bonum appetere necesse est . . .

Text exp.: . . . ut si pauper velit sumptuose vestiri et comedere.

MS: *Vatican, BAV, Boncompagni K.13 (s. XVI), ff. 191r–200v.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 412.

Note: A compendium covering only the first three books of the *Ethics*; connection with Italy is uncertain.

121. Anonymous, <*Excerpta moralia, philosophica et politica*>.

MS: Milan, BAmbr., D.452.inf. (s. XVI, chart.).

Source(s): Ceruti, I, pp. 630–31.

Note: The work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

122. Anonymous, *Sextus liber Aristotelis de moribus.*

Prol. inc.: Cum Aristoteles in tradenda scientia virtutum quae in moribus sitae collocataeque sunt, docuisset eos qui has consequi vero . . .

Text inc.: Postquam in rebus quae a nobis superius traditae sunt diximus, eos, qui virtutibus ornati esse volunt, oportere maxima cupiditate medium indagare . . .

Text exp. mut.: . . . enim in illa est agere et non agere.

MS: *Florence, BNC, Magl. XXI, 110 (s. XVI ex.), ff. 1r–15v.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 120 (excerpt).

Note: The work seems likely to be connected with Italy.

123. Anonymous, *In librum sextum Aristotelis Peripateticorum principis De moralibus ad Nicomacum explicatio.*

Prol. inc.: Ratio connexionis huius libri . . . [3 words unclear] afferri potest prima sumere ex descriptione summi boni . . .

Text inc.: In hoc capitulo duo examinanda sunt . . .

MS: *Florence, BNC, Magl. XXI, 45 (s. XVI/XVII, 4°), 8 ff. not numbered.

Note: This fragmentary commentary, which refers to Philoponus in the preface, proceeds by proving (*probatur* . . .) various points and gives the opinions of the commentators (especially Eustratius, Thomas, Buridan, Gerard of Odo, and Acciaiuoli). The work's connection with Italy seems likely.

124. Anonymous, *Expositio in X libros de moribus.*

Prol. inc.: Antequam ad explicandam Philosophi sententiam accedamur, nonnulla accipienda sunt quae nedum faciliorem aditum parant, immo necessaria sunt ad ea percipienda de quibusque Philosophus est verba facturus.

MS: London, BL, 10762 (s. XVI), ff. 237r–266r (*exp. mut.*).

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, IV, p. 91; *incipit* and description, communication of Jill Kraye.

Note: The work is in 24 lectures. Although the manuscript's other contents are works by Federico Pendasio, it is not clear whether this one should also be attributed to him.

125. Anonymous, <*In Ethicam Aristotelis*> (Lib. IV.4–9).

Text inc.: De animi magnitudine vel magnanimitate iam verba fecit Aristoteles. Nunc de virtute quadam semonem habet.

Text exp.: Patet igitur nihil Alexandrum afferre, quod vere (?) ea, quae de verecundia dicit Aristoteles, diluat.

MS: Milan, BAmbr., A.155.inf. (s. XVI, chart., mm. 290 × 195), ff. 95r–111r.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 279; *Cat. mss. filos.*, VI, p. 115; cf. Ceruti, I, p. 84.

Note: Fragmentary commentary based on the Greek text, connection with Italy uncertain. The same manuscript contains (ff. 1r–94r) lectures on the Greek text of the *Politics*. Both works seem to make numerous references to Alexander of Aphrodisias and may be connected with one Ludovicus de Trino, to whom another work in this volume is attributed (cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 464).

126. Anonymous, <*Lectiones in Ethicam*> (Lib. VI).

Text inc.: Virtutes animi nostri illiusque partis tractavimus . . .

Text exp.: . . . et primis, haec ex falsis procedit.

MS: *Milan, BAmbr. S.84.sup. (s. XVI, chart.), ff. 43r–57v.

Source(s): Ceruti, V, pp. 56–57; Rivolta, no. 164; Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 313.

Note: This manuscript contains lectures 67–70 (on Book VI) of a much larger series of lectures. Seems to be part of a major commentary. The work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

127. Anonymous, *Praefatio in explicationes Ethicorum Nicomachorum anni nostri tertii* (prolusion).

Text inc.: Quod facere solent, auditores, plerique eorum, qui antiquorum libros explanant, ut quot annis ante explanationes suas praefationis loco argumentum aliquod dicendo tractant . . .

Text exp.: ex abundantia amoris erga Patriam meam eum mihi nunc accidisse. Dixi.

MS.: *Vatican, BAV, Fondo Boncompagni, K.13 (s. XVI), ff. 4r–13v.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 412.

Studies: See above, pp. 366–67.

Note: Most likely associated with teaching in the Collegio Romano, this prolusion defends the importance of studying moral philosophy and insists on the compatibility between Aristotle and Christian morals.

128. Anonymous, <*Praelectio in Ethicam*>.

MS: *Philadelphia, Univ. of Penn. Lib., lat. 239 (s. XVI ex., chart., cm. 29 × 21), 12 ff.

Text inc.: Expositurus (= At positurus?) pulcherrimum atque in primi vitae nostrae utile (?) Aristotelis librum de moribus ad Nicomachum filium, antequam ad verba proprius explicanda aggrediar, quaedam prius quoad per me fieri potuerit brevius et clarius percurram, eorumque greci prolegomena, hoc est prefata vocant . . .

Text exp.: in eo conscribendo contemplamur, ut eo animadverso alacriores ad eius lectionem aggrediamur.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, V, p. 370 (excerpt); see Hirsch 1965, p. 16.

Note: A prolusion of great interest, delivering a (rare) favorable judgment of Antonio Bernardi Mirandolano, and apparently depending on Zabarella for its view of proper learning (not necessarily according to the order of nature; cf. Francesco Piccolomini). Proposes the following curricular ladder: grammar, logic, rhetoric; then, *philosophia civilis* (ethics, economics, politics), mathematics, natural philosophy, and metaphysics.

XVII Century (to ca. 1650)

129. Anonymous, *<In moralia Aristotelis ad Nicomachum prolegomena>* (1601).

Prol. inc.: Agit Aristoteles in hoc opere de ultimo fine . . .

Text exp.: . . . bona instrumenta sunt felicitatis vel quia ex Simplicio 2a fig. T. 67.

MS: Novara, Bib. Capitolare di Santa Maria, B 15 (A.D. 1601, chart.), ff. 272r–323v.

Source(s): Cat. mss. filos., VII, pp. 23–24.

Note: The work is structured in three treatises (*De bono, De fine, De felicitate*), preceded by a prologue. The rest of the manuscript includes commentaries related to the Jesuit Collegio Braidense in Milan. Thus, the work's connection with Italy seems likely.

Ottavius Magnanini (1574–1652)

Professor of moral philosophy in Ferrara. *ABI* I 589, 383–89; II 343, 111 (Sorbelli, Tiraboschi, Ughi); Ferrari, p. 426; Lines 2001a.

130. *De laudibus philosophiae moralis oratio Octavii Magnanini habita in publico gymnasio Ferrariensi* (1601).

Text inc.: Quemadmodum ego maxima admiratione . . .

Text exp.: . . . semper memori mente persolvam.

MS: Ferrara, BAriostea, I, 175 (s. XVII in.), ff. 279r–286r (A.D. 1601).

Source(s): *Università e cultura*, pp. 258–60.

131. *<Oratio> habita in gymnasio publico, dum explicationem caput (!) 6. lib. 3 de moribus aggrederer* (1610).

Text inc.: Tam magna in rebus omnibus . . .

Text exp.: . . . benigne, et diligenter me audiatis.

MS: Ferrara, BAriostea, I, 175 (s. XVII in.), ff. 249r–253v (A.D. 1610).

Source(s): As above.

132. *<Oratio> de temperantiae laudibus habita in publico gymnasio* (1613).

Text inc.: Nefas est, Auditores praestantissimi . . .

Text exp.: . . . enixe imploro, et exposco.

MS: Ferrara, BAriostea, I, 175 (s. XVII in.), ff. 260r–268r (A.D. 1613).

Source(s): As above.

Victorius Venturellus (Vittorio Venturelli, b. 1584)

Student in Rome (most likely at "La Sapienza") in 1603, when the commentary was written. Later was active in the cultural life of his native Urbino and in Rome (Vatican library). *Degli uomini illustri di Urbino*, pp. 117–18; Ferrari, p. 684.

133. *Expositio Victorii Venturelli in omnes libros moralium Aristotelis anno 1603 dum Romae studiis operam dabat* (Lib. I–VIII.8).

Text inc.: In primo capitulo Aristoteles intendit probare in rerum natura aliquem finem esse . . .

MS: *Gubbio, Archivio di Stato, Armanni II.F.17 (A.D. 1603, chart., quarto), 109 ff.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, VI, p. 11 (descr.).

Studies: See above, pp. 346–48.

Note: The work does not seem to be related to classroom lectures, although Venturelli was a student in Rome at the time.

134. Translation, base text for commentary above.

Text inc.: Omnis ars, omnis via diciendi, omnis actio, omnis electio appetit aliquid bonum . . .

MS: As above, no. 133.

Marsilius Vasquez, O. Cist. († 1611)

Teacher of philosophy and theology in his order and in the universities of Florence and Ferrara. Lohr, RLAC, p. 472; Lines 2001a.

135. <*In Ethicam commentarium*> (lost).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 472.

Augustinus Galesius (Agostino Galesio, † 1621)

Professor of logic, natural philosophy, and moral philosophy in Bologna (1568–1621), with interruptions for teaching appointments elsewhere (1575–85) and in Pisa (1614–19); see Appendix A, no. 85. Montalbani, pp. 25–26; Fantuzzi, IV, pp. 22–24; Lohr, RLAC, p. 157; Lines 2001a; idem 2001b, no. 179.

136. *Notanda excellentis philosophi D. Augustini Gallesii in libros Ethicorum* (Lib. I–II).

Text inc.: Si sane difinitionem nominis philosophiae activae tradere velimus, dicemus quod philosophia activa est sapientiae studium in rebus optimis exercendis ordinatum.

Text exp.: Mediocris habitus in omnibus est laudabilis.

MS: *Bologna, BU 723, fasc. II (s. XVII, chart., 4°), 46 ff.

Source(s): Frati, p. 255, no. 422; Lohr, RLAC, p. 157.

Studies: See above, pp. 301–03.

137. *Tractatus de Fortitudine, Prudentia, Iustitia cum emblemmatibus* (between 1583 and 1621).

Dedicatee: Cardinal Francesco Sforza.

Text inc.: De homine sub ratione, qua Civilis ponitur, pro brevi Moralis Philosophiae compendio . . .

Text exp.: et propriam felicitatem comparat, dum a doctrina scientiae moralis non recedens virtutibus ornatus secundum ipsas operationes.

MSS: *Bologna, BU 722 (s. XVI) on Lib. V; *Bologna, BU 1991 (s. XVI), 519 ff.

Source(s): Frati, p. 255, no. 421; *ibid.*, p. 418, no. 1020.

Studies: See above, pp. 303–04.

Note: This compendium paraphrase is notable for its use of watercolors to illustrate its subject matter.

138. *Compendium moralis philosophiae sub titulo De homine civili pars una, auctore Augustino Gallesio bononiensi philosophiam naturalem de sero publice professante in priori loco descripto* (ca. 1611–13).

Dedicatee: Cardinal Maffeo Barberini (later Pope Urban VIII).

Text inc.: De homine sub ratione, qua Civilis ponitur, pro brevi Moralis Philosophiae compendio . . .

Text exp.: . . . et propriam felicitatem comparat, dum a doctrina scientiae moralis non recedens virtutibus ornatus secundum ipsas operationes.

Coloph.: Et haec a nobis hactenus sint dicta, pro prioris libri compendii philosophiae moralis absolutione, cuius sane, pro ingenii nostri rinviati, iam fuse tractata, mox brevibus ad memoriam revocata, ut ipsorum determinatam doctrinam, quisque paucis facile recognoscere, et minimo cum labore, memoriae comendare valeat, et in promptu habeat.

MS: *Vatican, BAV, Barb. lat. 314 (s. XVI/XVII), ff. 1r–47r.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 157.

Studies: See above, pp. 306–07.

Note: Book II of this work (ff. 48r–137r) concerns the *Politics* and other Aristotelian works. The work might be considered a fair-copy abridgement of no. 139 below and contains watercolor illustrations, as in nos. 137 and 139.

139. *Philosophiae moralis compendium, confectum ab Augustino Gallesio Bononiensi, in quattuor sectiones divisum*

Text inc.: De iis, breviter tractaturus, quae spectant at notitiam eius partis philosophiae, quae, ut plurimum, Moralis nuncupatur . . .

MSS: *Vatican, BAV, Fondo Boncompagni, K.1–6 (s. XVI/XVII); *Naples, BNC, VIII.G.19 (s. XVII in., chart.), 142 ff. (Sec. 3, caps. IX–XVI mid.); *IV.H.135 (s. XVII in., chart.), 219 ff. (Sec. 3, caps. XVI mid.–XXVIII); *IV.H.136 (s. XVII in., chart.), 369 ff. (Sec. 3, caps. XXIX–XXXV); *IV.H.137 (s. XVII in., chart.), 368 ff. (Sec. 4 on politics, caps. XXXVI–XL); *IV.H.138 (s. XVII in., chart.), 397 ff. (Sec. 4 on politics, caps. XLV–XLVI). Cf. Naples, BNC, IV.H.139 (s. XVII in.), 1021 pp. (Fossier, pp. 210–11) containing political works.

Source(s): Fossier, *passim*; Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 412; VI, pp. 105, 409.

Studies: See the discussion above, pp. 304–06.

Note: This is a 6- or 7-volume work on moral philosophy requiring further study; some parts contain watercolor illustrations, as in nos. 137–138 above.

Camillus Baldi (Baldus) (Camillo Baldi, 1550–1637)

Professor of logic and natural philosophy in Bologna (1576–1636), also active in the Accademia de' Gelati. Author of other works on moral philosophy (see Baldi 1623, 1624, and 1629). Montalbani, p. 45; Orlandi, pp. 76–77; Fantuzzi, II, pp. 325–28; Ferrari, p. 65; Thornidke 1925–58, VIII, pp. 449–52; *DBI*, V (1963), pp. 465–67 (Tronti, uncritically following Fantuzzi); Lohr, RLAC, p. 29; Lines 2001b, no. 187; idem 2001a.

140. *In Ethicam* (Lib. I–III).

Prol. inc.: [Unreadable].

Text inc.: Activa philosophia ea est, quae hominis felicitatem ac bonum meditatur ac procurat . . .

Text exp.: Et tot de libro tertio dicta sint.

MSS: *Bologna, BU 2318 (A.D. 1612–13, chart., folio, 315 × 220 mm, longis lineis), 351 ff. (olim Bologna, Bibl. S. Salvatore); cf. Siena, BCom. Intronati, G.VI.37 (s. XVII).

Source(s): Frati, p. 458, no. 1161; Kristeller, *Iter*, II, p. 152 (excerpt); cf. Lohr, RLAC, p. 29.

Studies: See above, pp. 308–10.

Note: The short discussion of each chapter is followed by *Annotationes* and then *Dubitationes*. Manuscript Bologna, BU 4120 (s. XVI), referred to by Lohr, was not found.

141. Translation, base text for commentary above.

Text inc.: Omnis ars, omnis doctrina et omnis actio atque electio sibi proponit aliquod bonum, quod consequit . . .

MS: As above, no. 140.

Octavius Farnesius (Ottavio Farnese, 1598–1643)

Nobleman from Parma. *DBI*, XLV (1995), pp. 128–31 (D. Busolini).

142. *De morali philosophia*, in his *Quaestiones definitae ex triplici Philosophia, Rationali, naturali, morali, disputatae ab Octavio Farnesio Serenissimi Ducis Parmae filio ad Paulum V, P.O.M.* (1613).

Dedicatee: Pope Paul V.

Prol. inc.: Hic ego me ad me ipsum revoco, ut, vel mihi, vel aliis bonus sim.

Text inc.: Dicitur philosophia moralis, quia de moribus est, a Graecis Ethica dicta sunt, eadem nominis ethymologia.

Text exp.: Porro haec vicinitas et aptitudo fit per Dei gratiam ex virtutum a Deo inditarum, fidei maxime, Spei, et Charitatis studio, ex contemptu bonorum exteriorum, quae quamvis non necessario removenda sint ad acquisitionem beatitatis, sapientius tamen removentur, quia cum sint bona usus ancipitis, saepius in malum vergunt, quam in bonum./ Laus Deo, Beataeque Deiparae, ac S. Francisco Tutelari.

Edd.: *Parma 1613, pp. 323–74 (BSB, Diss. 2° / 67).

Source(s): *DBI*, XLV (1995), pp. 128–31 (D. Busolini); Risse, VIII, p. 862.

Note: Written in Parma, possibly (according to Busolini) with the help of Dario Tamburelli, S.J., who at the time was one of Farnese's teachers. The work is strongly dependent on Thomas.

Athanasius Buffera, S.J. (Atanasio Bufera, ca. 1581–1617)

In 1616, Bufera taught ethics in the Collegio Romano, so this work is probably connected with his lectures. See above, Appendix A, no. 286; Ipparaguirre, p. 334; Lines 2001a.

143. *Quattuor cardinalium virtutum explanatio* (lectures, 1616).

MS: *Vatican, BAV, Barb. lat. 264 (A.D. 1616, chart., 4°, longis lineis), ff. 84r–132v.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, pp. 46, 65.

Note: Both the names of Buffera and Paolo Bombino (1575–1648) appear on the title page. In ninety-two lectures, the work discusses *Prudentia* and *Fortitudo*; incomplete? See p. 374 above.

Franciscus Pavonius, S.J. (Francesco Pavone, 1569–1637)

Professor of humanities, philosophy, and Hebrew and Scriptures in the order; prolific writer, also in moral philosophy (see Pavone 1630). Sommervogel, VI, 390–95; Lohr, RLAC, p. 304.

144. *Summa ethicae, sive commentarius in libros Ethicorum Aristotelis (Summa ethicae, sive introductio in Aristotelis et theologorum doctrinam moralem)* (1617 or earlier).

Prol. inc.: Praecipuum nobis est praecipua doctrinae moralis loca percurrere, ac nosse volentibus brevi summa proponere. Usus erit huius nostri laboris philosophiae candidatis, ut speramus, non iniucundus. Nam qui volunt in philosophia insistere, eamque perfectam ediscere, debent in Ethicam incumbere, quae inter praecipuas eius doctrinae partes numeratur, quòd de hominis felicitate disputet et actione ac mediis ad eam consequendam. Quibus vero animus est ad nobiliora sacrae theologiae studia progredi, iis opus est ethica ad theologiam moralem percipiendam, ut necessariae sunt aliae naturalis philosophiae partes et ad moralia et ad caetera quae in theologia disputantur, intelligenda. Putamus ergo fore non ingratam philosophiae candidatis hanc moralis philosophiae summam, hanc Isagogen ad moralem theologiam. Sed veteranis etiam tum philosophis tum theologis hoc opusculum offerimus. Haurient fortasse animo non pauculam voluptatem, cum animadverterint sibi compendio proponi et Aristotelis, et S. Thomae doctrinam moralem, et praecipua, de quibus in ethicis disputari a professoribus solet . . .

—Tota summa disputationibus tribus dividitur. In prima de ipsa morali doctrina disputatur; in secunda de eius praecipuo obiecto, qui est hominis finis ac felicitas; in tertia de virtutibus, quae sunt media ad felicitatem. . . .

—Methodum eligimus, quae brevitati ac perspicuitati visa est aptissima. Primum igitur, licet haec summa sit introductio in Aristotelis doctrinam moralem, non servamus ordinem quem ille in suis moralibus servat, quia visum nobis est brevitati ac perspicuitati magis consultum, si eo, qui supra propositus est, ordine disputationes texeremus. Quanquam Indicem Aristotelicum apponimus, quo facimus haec nostra Nicomachiis moralibus respondere. . . . Hortamur etiam atque etiam lectorem, ut serio animum eo advertat, ut Ethicorum cognitione utatur ad inveniendum modum, quo virtutes consequi possit et felicitatem activam in hac vita, ut ita viam sibi paret ad aeternam felicitatem, qua beati perfruuntur in coelo, porro si quid inter legendum hanc summam repererit boni, Dio tribuat auctori bonorum . . .

Text inc.: (Disputatio Prima, De natura ethicae) Ad hanc disputationem attinent deffinitiones rerum, quae faciunt ad doctrinam moralem intelligendam . . .

—(*Q. 1, De definitionibus quae faciunt ad doctrinae moralis naturam intelligendam*) Ea disciplina proprie activa philosophia dicenda est, quòd hominis actiones speculetur et dirigat . . .

Epilog. inc.: Haec de Ethicae natura, fine hominis ac virtutibus moralibus disputavimus ex principiis lumine naturali notis et secundum Peripateticam

doctrinam. Is autem disputationis nostris finis fuit ut morales Aristotelis ad Nichomachum libri brevi ac plano compendio explicarentur et introducerentur tyrones ad eam sacrae theologiae partem, quae de moribus est. . . .

Edd.: Naples 1617, Lyon 1620, Mainz 1621, Oxford 1633 and *1668 (BSB, Film R 361–470; 12°, 320 pp.).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 304; Risse, IV.

Johannes Antonius Monasangue (fl. ca. 1618?)

145. Orations on various ethical subjects, including friendship (ca. 1618).

MS: Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 1224 (A.D. 1618); cf. Urb. lat. 1240

Source(s): Stornajolo, III, pp. 226–27.

Cosmas Alamanni, S.J. (Cosimo Alamanni, 1559–1634)

Professor of philosophy and theology in his order, especially in Brera near Milan. Sommervogel, I, 113–14; *ABI* I 17, 404–07 (Jöcher, Mazzuchelli); Lohr, RLAC, p. 8.

146. *Summa totius philosophiae e D. Thomae Aquinatis doctrina. Tertia pars <De philosophia morali>* (philosophical textbook).

Prol. inc.: Quoniam ordo congruus addiscendi est ut primo quidem pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia logica docet modum totius philosophiae; secundo mathematicis, quae nec experientia indigent, nec imaginationem transcendunt; tertio autem naturalibus, quae etsi non excedunt sensum et imaginationem, requirunt tamen experientiam; quarto in moralibus, quae requirunt experientiam et animum a passionibus liberum. Ideo post considerationem eorum quae ad philosophiam naturalem pertinent, sequitur consideratio eorum circa quae versatur philosophia moralis.

Text inc.: (*Q. 1, De philosophia moralis qualis et ad quae se extendat*) Et ut intentio nostra debito ordine procedat, necessarium est primo investigare de ipsa philosophia morali qualis sit et ad quae se extendat.

Text exp.: sed sicut virtus divina seu heroica raro in bonis invenitur, ita bestialitas raro in malis. Et sic cum laude Dei finimus philosophiam moralem, qui sit benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

Edd.: Ticino-Pavia, 1618–1622/34 (5 vols., without section on ethics); *Paris 1639 (BSB 2 Ph.u. 2 m, 6 vols.), Paris 1885 (6 vols.).

Note: The Paris 1639 edition examines 23 questions on moral philosophy in Part III (110 pp.). The goal appears to be to systematize Thomas Aquinas' thought on the subject.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 8; Risse, I.

Julius Caesar Lagalla (Giulio Cesare Lagalla, 1571–1623)

Professor of logic and natural philosophy in "La Sapienza," Rome (1594–1623). Allacci 1644; Jöcher, Suppl., III, p. 1051; Lohr, RLAC, p. 214; Conte, II, p. 936; Gallo 1986 and1988; Lines 2001a.

147. *De philosophia naturali, supernaturali et ethica iuxta dogmata Aristotelis et antiquorum* (lost).

Source(s): Allacci 1644.

Franciscus Levera Romanus (fl. ca. 1628–59?)

Learned figure active in Rome (but not teaching in the university) in the seventeenth century. Allacci 1633, p. 107; Jöcher, *Suppl.*, III, 1710–11; Ferrari, p. 408.

148. *Animadversiones singulares in libros Politicorum, Ethicorum, et Oeconomicorum Aristotelis* (lost?).

Ed.: Rome 1659 (3 vols.).

Source(s): Allacci 1633, p. 107; Jöcher, *Suppl.*, III, 1710–11. Not in Risse, IV.

Domenicus Bandiera de Mutina (Domenico Bandiera da Modena, fl. ca. 1630)

Apostolic protonotary and professor of moral philosophy in "La Sapienza," Rome (1623–32); see above, Appendix A, no. 271. *ABI* I 101, 189–91 (Mazzuchelli, Tiraboschi, Jöcher); Ferrari, p. 69; Lines 2001a.

149. *De hominis activa vita, seu moralis disciplinae compendium.*

Ed.: Rome 1630.

Source(s): Risse, IV, p. 276.

150. *Utrum nobis optandum sit ut amici nostri ad supremos opum ac dignitatum gradus evehantur . . . cum octavum librum Aristotelis de moribus explicaret.*

Ed.: Rome 1631.

Source(s): Risse, IV, p. 278.

151. *Super adagio veteri "Veritas odium parit"; Problema ethicum ad Lib. IV Moralium Aristotelis.*

Ed.: Rome 1631.

Source(s): Allacci 1633, p. 82.

Vincentius Serughi de Forlivio (Vincenzo Serughi da Forlì, fl. 1632)

152. *Philosophia moralis universa respondens singulis X libris Ethicis Aristotelis . . .*

Dedicatee: Aloysius Cardinal Capponianus Sanctae Ravennatis Ecclesiae archiepiscopus.

Text inc.: Felicitas seu beatitudo humana summum illud est hominis bonum, quo nihil melius, nihil excellentius appetere homo potest.

Text exp.: . . . ita ad practicam concurrit doctrina moralis, quam cum iam digesserimus, non est cur summatim proponamus, nisi forte repetitionem facientes in epilogo, fecit eam et Aristoteles.

MS: *Rome, APUG, Fondo Curia 1573 (A.D. 1632, chart., 268 × 205 mm.), 222 ff.

Note: The work was written in Ravenna in 1632. It is divided into 215 chapters, plus three chapters of Epilogue.

Johannes Thomae Gilioli Perusinus (Giovanni Tommaso Gilioli or Giglioli, 1575–1631)

Professor of philosophy active in Perugia and Padua; member of the Accademia della Crusca. Jöcher, III, p. 998; *IBNH*, LXXXVI (1997), p. 40; Lines 2001a.

153. *In Ethicam Aristotelis, Adnotationes et Quaestiones* (Lib. I–X).

Text inc.: Primo supponendum est nobis, hanc philosophiam, de qua acturi sumus, non esse speculativam, sed practicam, quia non est inventa gratia sciendi, sed gratia acquirendi virtutes . . .

Text exp.: Cognoscere itaque naturaliter, quatenus non separandum a mondo sensibili et mobili, sed considerantur adiuncta et copulata. Haec entia motui caelesti et magnitudini sensibili.

Coloph.: Aethicorum Aristotelis cum expositione per illustrem et excellentissimum Dominum Ioannem Thomae Gilioli, Perusini Collegii lectoris praestantissimi. Finis.

MS: *Padua, BU 975 (A.D. 1632, chart., 4°), 453 ff.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, II, p. 15 (excerpt).

Tarquinius Gallutius, S.J. (Tarquinio Galluzzi, 1574–1649)

Professor of grammar, rhetoric, and moral philosophy in the Collegio Romano (1597–1625) and administrator there (see Appendix A, no. 288). Alegambe, p. 429; Allacci 1633, pp. 237–38; Sommervogel, III, 1141–44; idem, IX, 381; idem, XI, 1729; idem, XII, 471; Jöcher, II, p. 843; Ferrari, p. 335; *Enc. Catt.*, V, pp. 1913–14; *ABI* I 451, 429–30 (Caputo 2, Eckstein);

Lohr, RLAC, p. 161; idem 1993, p. 164; *IBNH*, LXXX (1996), p. 431; *DBI*, LI (1998), pp. 773–74 (M. Belardini); Polgár III.2, p. 9; Lines 2001a.

154. *In Aristotelis libros quinque priores moralium ad Nicomachum nova interpretatio, commentarii, quaestiones* (vol. I); *In Aristotelis libros quinque posteriores* . . . (vol. II).

Dedicatees: Urban VIII (vol. I) and Cardinal Barberini (vol. II).

Ded. inc.: Beatissime Pater [Urban VIII], primus hic Aristotelis de beatitudine liber, haud incurioris a me lucubrationibus exploratus . . .

Prol. 1 inc.: Hactenus in Rhetorum campo versati . . .

Prol. 2 inc.: Fortitudinem, quae anno superiore me nativiter exercuit, excipit ex illo principalium virtutum ordine quadripartito consequens temperantia . . .

Prol. 3 inc.: In Platone tam magno doctrinae interioris . . .

Text inc.: Demonstraturus Aristoteles in rebus humanis, hoc est in iis, quae geruntur ab hominem, aliquem esse finem, quo referantur omnia . . .

Edd.: *Paris 1632 (vol. 1, 1011 pp.; Munich, UB, Magazin 2° A.gr. 570); Paris 1645 (vol. 2, 829 pp.).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 161; Risse, IV, pp. 281, 301.

Studies: Kraye 1998, p. 1281; above, pp. 374–76.

Note: This is a monumental scholastic commentary on the *Ethics*, proceeding orderly through the text, citing authorities, and borrowing freely from Francesco Piccolomini's *Universa philosophia*. It is based both on the Greek text and on a Latin translation (see below).

155. Translation, base text for commentary above.

Text inc.: Omnis ars, omnisque doctrina, similiterque actio et electio bonum quoddam appetere videtur. Itaque praeclare definierunt, bonum id esse, quod omnia expetunt.

Edd.: As above.

Jacobus Philippus Camola Romanus (Iacopo Filippo Camola, 1599–ca. 1667)

Professor of moral philosophy in "La Sapienza" in Rome (1637–67); see Appendix A, no. 275. Apparently also wrote *Super duello lucubrationes duae* and many works on moral philosophy ("de morali philosophia libelli quamplurimi"). *ABI*, I 233, 310–13 (*Bibliografia romana*); Ferrari, p. 168; Lines 2001a.

156. *Disputationes ad moralem doctrinam pertinentes* (apparently including *De felicitate*, *De medio virtutis morali*, etc.) (by 1633).

Source(s): Allacci 1633, pp. 260–61.

Antonius Quaerengus Patavinus (Antonio Querenghi da Padova, 1546–1633)

Important cultural figure active in Padua, associated with the Accademia de' Ricovrati. He was the uncle of Flavio Querenghi, below. Allacci, p. 45; Jöcher, III, p. 1833; idem, *Suppl.*, VI, p. 1125; *ABI*, I 821, 253–70; II 491, 106 (D. Calvi, Caputo 2, Jöcher/Adelung, Vedova); Ferrari, p. 561; Cosenza, IV, pp. 2977–78. Bolzoni 1980, Motta 1994 and 1997.

157. *De unica totius Politicae disciplinae methodo et Averrois vera sententia in explicatione subiectae materiae librorum ad Nicomachum.*

Source(s): Allacci, p. 45; Motta 1994.

Flavius Quaerengus (Flavio Querenghi, 1581–1647)

Professor of moral philosophy in Padua (1624–47) and nephew of Antonio Querenghi, above; see Appendix A, no. 198. Published other works on moral philosophy (see Querenghi 1639 and 1644). Jöcher, III, 1833–34; *ABI*, I 821, 271–77 (D. Calvi, Jöcher/Adelung, Vedova); Ferrari, p. 561; Cosenza, IV, p. 1981; Lohr, RLAC, p. 371; Lines 2001a. Veronese Ceseracciu 1976–77; Stecca 1996, pp. 75–115 (especially p. 75, n. 1), 117–38.

158. *Introductio in philosophiam moralem Aristotelis.*

Ed.: Padua and Florence 1641.

Source(s): Risse, IV, p. 295.

Studies: See especially Veronese Ceseracciu 1976–77.

Johannes Poncius, O.F.M. (John Punch, 1599–1661)

159. *Integer philosophiae cursus ad mentem Scoti: Tractatus de scientia morali* (philosophical textbook, by 1649).

Prol. inc.: Scientiam moralem, seu doctrinam illam de actionibus moralibus, hoc est bonis et malis, quam Graeco vocabulo Ethicam appellant, nemo est, qui non facile fateatur, maximae esse utilitatis, iucunditatis ac dignitatis . . . Quia vero si omnia, quae ad hanc scientiam per se spectant, proponenda essent, nimis longus esset tractatus, complecteretur enim maximam partem earum difficultatum, quae in prima secundae et secunda secundae partis Theologiae, ut a Divo Thoma tradita est, examinantur, et quia etiam in ipsa Theologia ab omnibus explicari solent, principaliores tantum et generaliores examinabo quaestiones.

Text inc.: (*Disputatio XXIII, De felicitate hominis*) Cum, ut dixi, felicitas secundum me huius scientiae adequatum obiectum sit, merito ab eius consideratione auspicor hunc tractatum, et quia ipsa felicitas summum bonum hominis est et ultimus finis, prius de natura boni et finis aliqua praemittenda videbantur.

—(*Q. 1, Quid sit bonum?*) Omissis variis acceptionibus boni, secundum quas varie etiam describi posset, de eo ut ad hunc tractatum particulariter spectat agendum.

Text exp.: . . . sed et illis etiam nihil liceret, quando fuga ipsius posset cedere in praeiudicium Reipublicae ut facile posset contingere. (Disp. XXIX)

Edd.: Paris 1640, Rome 1642–45 (but both without the section on *scientia moralis*), *Paris 1649 (pp. 307–72; BSB, 2 Ph.u. 61), Paris 1656, Lyon 1659 and 1672.

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 362; Risse, I.

Note: The section relative to moral philosophy was added starting with the 1649 edition. Disputations XXIII–XXIX respectively concern: *De felicitate hominis, De actibus bonis, De actu malo et indifferenti, De virtutibus moralibus*, and *De legibus*. The section on moral philosophy is placed after logic and before physics. The work was begun in Rome and completed in Paris.

Paganinus Gaudentius (Paganino Gaudenzi, 1595–1649)

Professor of rhetoric and other subjects in Pisa (at least 1628–49) and prolific writer. Barsanti, p. 520; Lohr, RLAC, pp. 163–64; *DBI*, LII (1999), pp. 676–78 (G. Brunelli).

160. *An in contemplatione sit ponenda felicitas ob assiduitatem, ut putat Aristoteles?*

Text inc.: Moralium libro X cap. VII Aristoteles, ut ostendat in contemplatione, non in actione, positam esse felicitatem . . .

Text exp.: . . . ut perfecte beata sit, qua re non agit Aristoteles.

MS: Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 1519 (s. XVII, mm. 206 × 134), 11 ff. (autog.).

Source(s): Stornajolo, III, p. 390.

161. <*Varia in philosophiam moralis Aristotelis*>.

MS: Vatican, BAV, Urb. lat. 1599 (s. XVII).

Source(s): Stornajolo, III, pp. 465–471.

162. Anonymous (Jesuit?), *In librum primum moralium ad Nicomacum quaestiones.*

Prol. inc.: Liberat me a prooemio his quaestionibus praefigendo Aristotelis, qui huius libri tria capita prima vult esse prooemium quoddam totius Ethicae deinceps tradendae . . .

Text inc.: (*Q. 1, De bono ac fine generatim*) Praemittitur haec consideratio boni et finis . . .

—(*Art. 1, An bonum recte definitum sit, illud quod omnia appetunt*) Ita bonum definiverunt antiqui philosophi . . .

Text exp.: . . . sed operatio tantum propria vere mutare potest felicitatem.

MS: *Naples, BNC, VIII.G.47 (s. XVI/XVII).

Note: The work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

163. Anonymous (Jesuit?), *Disputatio tertia in secundum librum Ethicorum.*

Prol. inc.: Hactenus de felicitate quae finis est . . .

Text inc.: (*Q. 1, De causa formali virtutis et vitii. Art. 1, Utrum virtus recte definiat . . .*) Videtur quod non bene . . .

Text exp.: . . . et ideo non valet obiectio.

MS: *Naples, BNC, V.H.293 (s. XVI/XVII, chart.), folios not numbered.

Note: The piece contains only four articles; its connection with Italy is uncertain.

Johannes Baptista Formentus, O. Carm. (Gian Battista Formento, 1621–1685)

Vicar general of the order since 1661. Lohr, RLAC, p. 152.

164. *In philosophiam moralem Aristotelis* (lost?).

Source(s): Lohr, RLAC, p. 152.

165. Anonymous, *<In librum II Moralium Aristotelis ad Nicomachum>.*

Text inc.: Omissis hiis que ad ultimum hominis finem seu naturalem ipsius felicitatem . . .

Text exp.: . . . ab aliquo volitam per voluntatem actualem et de praesenti.

MS: Palermo, BCom., 2 Qq B 12 (s. XVII, chart.), ff. 163r–177v.

Source(s): *Cat. mss. filos.*, VII, p. 38.

Note: The work's connection with Italy is uncertain.

Likely Ghosts

Before 1500

Franciscus de Mayronis de Digna, O.F.M. (Francesco da Digna, † ca. 1323)

Master of theology and associated, after 1324, with the court of Pope John XXII in Avignon. Cosenza, III, pp. 2249–50; *ibid.*, V, pp. 1144–45; Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 409–10.

166. *<In Ethicam>*.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1967): 410.

Note: It is doubtful that Franciscus ever wrote an Ethics commentary. See his *Moralia* or *Liber de virtutibus moralis, intellectualibus, cardinalibus et theologicis.*

Jacobus de Blanchis (de Albis) de Alexandria, O.F.M. (Giacomo Bianchi da Alessandria, fl. XIV [1])

Associate of Robert, king of Sicily. *DBI*, X (1968), pp. 101–03 (F. Federici Vescovini); Lohr, *Traditio* (1970): 136–38; idem 1988a, p. 116; Imbach and Nienhaus 1996, p. 473.

167. *Compilatio super totam philosophiam naturalem et moralem (Opusculum per conclusiones in omnes libros Aristotelis. Abbreviationes et auctoritates).*

Source(s): Grabmann 1939, pp. 71–84; Lohr, *Traditio* (1970): 136–38; Lines 1999a, p. 276, no. 27.

Note: No MSS of the portion dealing with moral philosophy appear to have survived.

Johannes Becchetti de Fabriano, O.E.S.A. (Giovanni Becchetti da Fabriano, † 1420)

Lohr, *Traditio* (1970): 156.

168. *<Libri X in Ethicam>*.

Source(s): Lohr, *Traditio* (1970): 156; Lines 1999a, p. 276, no. 28.

Ludovicus Valentiae (Ludovico Valenza, † 1496)

Taught in Ferrara and Padua; mainly theologian. *ABI* I 974, 45–47 (Ughi); Lohr, *Traditio* (1971): 321.

169. *<Commentaria super librum Ethicorum Aristotelis>*.

Source(s): Raspadori 1991, p. 281.

Christophorus Landini (Cristoforo Landino, † 1498)

Important humanist active in Florence and a teacher in the *studium* there. Lohr, *Traditio* (1974): 131; idem 1988a, pp. 48–49; *CHRPh*, p. 823; *DCLI*, II, pp. 528–31 (R. Cardini); *ER*, III, pp. 378–80 (C. Kallendorf); Lines 2001a. Verde, II, pp. 174–77; IV.1, pp. 96–99, 411–14 and *passim*; Field 1983, *passim*; Godman 1998, *ad indicem.*

170. *<Commentaria in Ethicam>*.

Source(s): Bandini 1747–51, II, p. 201; Lohr, *Traditio* (1974): 131 (relying on Bandini); Lines 1999a, p. 275, no. 22.

After 1500

Ulysses Aldrovandi (Ulisse Aldrovandi, 1522–1605)

171. *<Praelectiones in decem libros Ethicorum>*.

Source(s): Alidosi 1623a, p. 187; cf. Fantuzzi, I, pp. 178–90 (no mention).

Note: Probably the same as the *Ethics* commentary above, no. 116.

Nicolaus Colonius (Nicolò Colonio, † 1602)

172. *<In Ethicam>*.

Source(s): Jöcher, I, 2020; Lohr, RLAC, p. 96.

Note: The work referred to is almost certainly his *Disputatio de veritate.*; see above, no. 105.

Works eliminated

Anonymous, *<Abbreviatio Aristotelis Ethicae>*.

Text inc.: Omnis ars et omnis incessus et omnis [. . .]versalis propositi sollicitudo . . .

MS: Venice, BMarc., Zan. lat. 479 (= 1914) (s. XIV), ff. 119ra–130vb.

Source(s): Aegidii Romani Opera, I/11, pp. 282–89; Lines 1999a, p. 281.

Note: According to the authors, this manuscript is of Italian origin. However, it seems to be the same as the *Summa Alexandrina.* Cf. Marchesi 1904, pp. xli–lxxxvi, 105–13; Gauthier 1974, pp. cxlix–cli.

Anonymous, *<Lectiones in Ethicam>*.

MS: *Genoa, BU, F.VII.9 (s. XV), ff. 92r–120v.

Source(s): Kristeller, *Iter*, I, p. 242 (extract); cf. Michael 1985 (no mention); Lines 1999a, p. 279, no. 40.

Note: The work in the second half of this manuscript corresponds to Buridan's commentary on the *Ethics.*

Anonymous, *Expositio litteralis cum questionibus.*

Prol. inc.: Quoniam homo naturaliter est animal sociabile, utpote multis indigens ad suam necessitatem vitae . . .

Text inc.: Istud est primum capitulum libri Ethicorum in quo ostenditur quod unus sit finis omnium <rerum> humanarum, pro quo sciendum quod duo sunt principia actuum humanorum, scilicet intellectus et appetitus . . .

Text exp.: Haec enim littera continuatur illi et ita factum est ubi incipit liber Politicorum explicit Ethicorum. Cuius expositionem et summam aliqualiter assimilavimus praestante Deo qui operat omnia in omnibus, cui et honor et gloria in saecula saeculorum amen.

MS: *Subiaco, BAbbaz. XXIV (s. XV, chart., mm. 380 × 280, 2 cols. except for ff. 1–12), ff. 1r–248r.

Source(s): *AL Codices*, no. 1569; *AL Suppl.*, p. 149; Gauthier 1969, p. 39*; Lines 1999a, p. 279, no. 38.

Note: The commentary on Lib. I–II is by Guido Vernani; on the following books, anonymous, but probably not an original commentary. It is perhaps based on Gerard of Odo. Base text: Bruni (Lib. I–V) and Grosseteste (Lib. VI–X).

Augustinus Triumphus de Ancona, O.E.S.A. († 1328), <*In Ethicam*>.

MS: *Florence, BNC, Conv. Sopp. G.4.354 (s. XIV), ff. 1r–73v.

Source(s): Lines 1999a, pp. 281–82; cf. Lohr, *Traditio* (1971): 374.

Note: The work (olim BLaur., Plut. XII. Sin. Cod. 10) is Averroes' middle commentary and is unrelated to Augustinus Triumphus. Cf. *AL Suppl.*, no. 2153; Korolec 1992, esp. p. 64 (the shelfmark is misprinted as G.4.345).

Johannes de Riccio, O.P. (fl. ca. 1430), <*In Ethicam*> (ca. 1430–35).

MS: *Florence, BLaur., Plut. LXXVII cod. 19 (XV), 186 ff.

Source(s): Lines 1999a, p. 282; cf. Gauthier 1970a, p. 146n; Lohr, *Traditio* (1971): 275.

Note: Gauthier depends on *DHGE*, XII, 221 and 239–40. Contrary to what was thought, however, this work is based not on the *Ethics* but on the *Politics*. Cf. Flüeler 1992 (no mention).

APPENDIX D

LETTER OF BASILIUS PARAVICINUS TO POPE GREGORY XIII*

Vatican, BAV, Vat. lat. 6416, f. 349r–v (a. 1573)
Epistola Basilii Paravicini Novocomensis Medici Palatini, ad sanctissimum dominum nostrum Gregorium Pontificem Maximum, ut in Romano gymnasio inter caeteros bonarum artium professores instituatur, qui Aristotelis libros de moribus interpretetur, cum magna inde utilitas oriatur./

Non me praeterit, Beatissime Pater, non esse vel prudentiae vel ingenii mei, quae res novi quam in me sint exiguae, proferre sententiam de aliqua re meam, praesertim non rogatus, apud Beatitudinem tuam, quae et natura omnium hominum sapientissima et experientia prudentissima ab omnibus semper est habita, consilium vero illi dare velle, non solum imprudentiae, sed certe impudentiae atque inurbanitatis etiam summae esse arbitror. Verumtamen, quoniam intellectus humanus est ex sua natura imperfectus, non solum in prima intelligendi operatione verum etiam in secunda, a qua humanae actiones proficiscuntur, quia quanto plura singularia (?) intellectus, quem practicum appellant, intelligit, tanto quidem perfectior evadit, fierique omnino nequit, ut idem intellectus eodem temporis puncto in maximorum negotiorum administratione res omnes comprehendat, quas comprehendi necesse est, quae sunt prope infinitae, fit, ut qui maximarum rerum gubernationem suscipit, in quibus idem intellectus opus est, ut variis in actionibus sese exerceat, quamvis longe sapientissimus et prudentissimus ille sit, viris tamen prudentibus peritisque egeat, qui ei opportuna proponant negotia, ut deinde ille prudentiae suae auxilio, qua utrumque intellectum regit, ea eligat, quae muneri suo magis expedire videbuntur, taleque officii genus non consilium, sed notatio et animadversio nuncupari debet, quod quidem prudentes probique viri in bonam accipiunt partem, et praesertim, cum ab eo proficiscitur, cuius finis plane bonus et laudabilis est.

Ego igitur, qui maximas Beatitudinis tuae virtutes, quae eam ad supremum Pontificatus gradum evexerunt, semper admiratus sum, cum audirem illam Academiae Romanae professores in meliorem formam, ut quotannis hoc tempore fieri solet, esse redacturam, impulsus antiqua mea in virtutem propensione, cum ipse in familiarium Beatitudinis tuae numerum lectus essem, ut Pontificiae familiae me pars aliqua medico uteretur, quem gradum cardinalis Comensis, patroni mei unici, et beneficentissimae Beatitudinis tuae studiosissimi et cupidissimi, gratia et commendatione sum consequutus,

* On this work see above, p. 330.

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Beatitudini tuae in memoriam revocare omnino decrevi, ut si moralium facultatum professorem in eadem Accademia institueres, qui doctrinam illam doceret, certe arbitror, eam et ampliorem existimationem apud homines, et maiorem gratiam apud Deum relaturam, quam si professores cuiuslibet eximiae utilisque alterius facultatis retinendos curaret. Ut enim morum probitas, quae ex tali doctrina acquiritur, non solum quamlibet virtutem penes divinum conspectum excellit, verum etiam omnium illarum lucem obscuriorem reddit, ac plane omnis virtus absque morum probitate nullius momenti videtur esse censenda, ita haec doctrina, qua talem morum integritatem adipiscimur, qualibet alia eruditione superior existimari debet. Nulla enim ex omnibus naturalibus facultatibus talis est, quae tam proxime (MS: proximae) accedat ad christianam perfectionem quam moralis haec, de qua loquimur, disciplina. Si enim homo scientiae naturalis divinaeque opere, quae alias speculativas facultates valde antecellunt, non solum ad naturalium divinorumque effectuum perfectam cognitionem devenerit, verum etiam illorum substantiam essentiamque exquisite cognoverit, tum ex hac cognitione perfectaque intelligentia nullam ulteriorem perfectionem acquirat, quod utique fieret, si eorum effectus, immo magis si eorum (?) substantias procrearet; iterum in sua prima intelligendi operatione acquiescit neque unquam ad secundam, quae quidem operatio est, transgreditur. Hinc evenit, ut contemplativae virtutes tantae existimationis esse non debeant, ut de activis vere dici potest, quae tantae sunt dignitatis et praestantiae, ut postquam quispiam studiorum suorum labore harum virtutum intelligentiam perfecte adeptus est, rectaque ratione ductus, in harum scientiarum sola cognitione non acquiescens, maxima cum voluptate et delectatione ad earundem virtutum operationem transgreditur, quarum cognitionem iam acquisivit, atque ita fit, ut ex fortitudinis cognitione fortis fiat, quemadmodum et ex temperantia temperatus, ex iustitia iustus, et ex prudentiae cognitione prudens evadit atque in qualibet alia virtute morali operandi habitum tandem acquirit. Et liceat theologorum // (f. 349v) schola contemplativam virtutem activa digniorem praestantioremque esse arbitretur, tamen si res recte intelligatur, palam fiet, hic nullam omnino inter nos esse discrepantiam, ut me aliis in litteris declaraturum profiteor, ne praeter epistolae legem longius vagari cogar, quae quidem cognitio homines non modo caeteris hominibus excellentiores, verum etiam Deo gratiores reddit.

Cum igitur haec facultas nobis tantum dignitatis atque utilitatis afferat, certe arbitror Beatitudinem tuam quam primum decreturam, ut denuo Romae instituatur quemadmodum alias nuper quam a maioribus factitatum (?) est, et ut in praesentia in celeberrimis totius mundi gymnasiis fieri solet, ut quemadmodum Roma, quae totius orbis, si dignitatem spectemus, caput est, et piorum sanctorumque pontificum exemplo optimam pie recteque vivendi rationem semper conservavit atque conservat, ita et nunc fiat, ut ex hac lectione optimorum morum doctrina non deficiat. Et licet hoc sub catholicorum virorum (?) disciplina fieri possit, dum quotidie sacri doctores, uti solent, in publicis concionibus divinum verbum pronunciant, quo piis auditoribus persuadeant ut vitia vitantes virtutes consequantur, tamen cum Aristotelis disciplina tam miro ordine sit composita, ut universalis philosophorum

schola affirmat in primisque D. Thomas. Quamobrem <quia> in omnibus fere celebrioribus gymnasiis Aristotelis libri de moribus semper expositi sunt, spero fore, ut et hoc vetus institutum observans decernat Beatitudo tua ut hoc Aristotelis vere aureum opus publice explicetur; ac licet Aristoteles a legibus per sacram ecclesiam constitutis multum discrepet, tamen si eius doctrinae modus in moralium disciplinarum institutione, et finis ad quem dirigitur, a viris utriusque doctrinae peritis diligenter consideretur, facile perspicietur eum fortasse a vera sacrorum theologorum sententia (quantum ad mores attinet) multum non aberasse, prout intellectus humani vires imbecillae patiuntur, quam quidem rem satis diffuse pertractavi, dum ad Cardinalis Sirleti fratrem conscriberem.

Quamobrem his ego atque aliis certe praestantioribus rationibus, quae Beatitudini tuae pro singulari illius prudentia succurrent, confido fore, ut veluti inde ab ipso initio Pontificatus sui hominibus significatum et prope promissum est, nostra haec tempora longe clariora et illustriora reddantur, ob sapientissimas et divinissimas actiones Beatitudinis tuae. Neque vero aliquid puto contra hanc sententiam meam posse obiici, quod Beatitudini tuae possit ullo modo probari, ad quam pertinet ut cum sit in tam magno et excelso loco, ut puta supra omnes homines constituta, non esse suum putet, liberalitatis tantum, quae in dando vel accipiendo damno vel utili consistit, sed multo magis ipsius magnificentiae rationem habere, in qua id unum spectatur, nempe impensae magnitudo, ut quod pecunia faciendum est, honorificum, pulchrum et laudabile fiat. Illud etiam certo mihi persuades futurum, ut postquam hac in re pro mea sententia decretum sit, is huic provinciae opportunus eligatur, qui praeter doctrinam, in qua necesse est eum esse valde peritum, bonis sit ipse et sanctis moribus ornatus, cum nemo sit, qui nesciat quam difficile sit, non integros vitae doctores docere alios bonos mores, quod quidem in aliarum scientiarum disciplinis aequius fortasse ferri posset.

Hae sunt rationes, Pater sanctissime, quas Beatitudini tuae preponendas esse existimavi, postquam intellexi hanc etiam rem apud Sanctitatem tuam pertractari, non, ut ei consilium darem, sed tantum, ut proponerem id, quod mihi hac in re in mentem veniebat. Reliquum est ut Beatitudinis tuae sanctissimos pedes humiliter ac devote deosculatus, illi longissimam et felicissimam vitam praecer. Romae XVIII octobris, MDLXXIII (18–X–1573).

APPENDIX E

ANTONIO POSSEVINO ON INTERPRETERS OF THE *ETHICS*

Antonius Possevinus Mantuanus, *Bibliotheca selecta de ratione studiorum, recognita novissime ab eodem et aucta et in duos tomos distributa* (Rome 1593 seen in BSB, 2 H.lit.u. 7; the 2nd edition, Venice 1603, was seen in BSB, 2 Enc. 20 k). This edition is based on the 1603 edition. I signal with *A* variants from the 1593 edition. I indicate in italics differences between the two editions.

Tom. 2, Lib. XII (*De philosophia*), Cap. 22:

p. 76: Laborarunt in libris Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum vertendis Ioannes Argiropylus Byzantius, Leonardus Aretinus, Bernardus Felicianus, Petrus Victorius, Ioachimus Perionius, Dionysius Lambinus, quorum ille notationes, hic scholia suis versionibus addiderunt; Lambini autem versio omnibus praestat, et hi quidem Latine, cum alia versio extet Italica, quam Gabriel Cesanus fecerat.

Introductiones autem, Epitomes, et Paraphrases, vel in Ethicorum omnes libros, vel in eorum partem edidere varii. E Graecis, Eustratius Nicaenus Episcopus, et *Aspasius Michael Ephesius*,[1] Georgius Pachimerius, et alii nonnulli, e quorum imperfectis Commentariis opus unum Latinum contexuit, locosque Poetarum mutilatos in integrum restituit Ioannes Bernardus Felicianus. Ad Graecos vero etiam spectant Quaestiones morales Alexandri Aphrodisaei, et characteres sive notae morales Theophrasti Graece et Latine innominato Interprete editae. Ex iis vero qui Latine scripserunt Boetius, Averroes, S. Thomas Aquinas, Albertus, Donatus Acciaiolus *qui S. Thomae vestigiis insistit*,[2] Chrysostomus Iavellus, qui Universam moralem Philosophiam sic disposuit, atque exposuit, ut Peripateticam et Platonicam cum Christiana conferens, perspicuam lucem attulerit dispiciendi verum; ac Beatitudinis, virtutumque tum moralium, tum intellectualium facem omnibus, qui boni, veri, et morales philosophi esse cupiunt, praetulerit; Id quod etiam *facit*[3] in Oeconomicis, atque Politicis, cui item adiecit librum de Regimine Principum.

Franciscus Picolhomineus Decem gradus moralis Philosophiae *edidit*.[4] Augustinus autem Valerius Cardinalis Veronae, cum ei libro, quo de recte formando Philosophiae studio, praefationes quasdam adiecisset, eximiam adtexuit, qua moralis Philosophiae ortum, ac partitionem exposuit; quanquam et Polydorus Vergilius alio id egerat modo, cum scriberet, quis primus Ethicen invenisset; sed ante hos Iacobus Faber Stapulensis, cui adtexuit

[1] *A*: Aspasius, Michael Ephesius.
[2] *A*: Sancti Thomae vestigiis insistens.
[3] *A*: fecit.
[4] *A*: fecit.

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Iodocus Clicthoveus adnotationes, Hermolaus Barbarus, Caelius Calcagninus, Georgius Forestus, Antonius Bernardus Mirandulanus libris de Eversione singularis certaminis, *quamvis ubi de animae immortalitate agit hoc eodem in opere, indigna non solum Episcopo, verum etiam homine scribat, quippe qui Philosophi personam tantum induens, a vera tamen Philosophia deflectens, detorquet argumenta ad mortalitatem animae propugnandam. Ceterum in Ethica scripsere item*[5] Petrus Victorius, Philippus Mocenicus Archiepiscopus Nicosiensis Cypri, libro de universalibus Institutionibus ad hominum perfectionem, quatenus industria parari potest; Nam in prima parte quintae contemplationis, quae humanorum actuum directricem Philosophiam constituit, ea explicantur, quae ad voluntatis actus recte restituendos conducunt, simulque demonstrantur omnium moralium virtutum, ac vitiorum fundamenta, species, differentiae, causae, progressus, ac fructus.

Iam quae Commentaria in eosdem libros Aristotelis *ediderunt*[6] Ioannes Buridana, Gerardus Odo, Petrus de Spira, Henricus de Vicmaria, Michael Angrianus, Stephanus Hocst, Ioannes Maior, non ita versantur ab omnibus, quod eam redoleant scriptionem, quam elegantiora ingenia haud facile admittunt. Almain quoque librum de quaestionibus moralibus scripsit.

Ex iis denique, qui moralem Philosophiam Aristotelis Italice interpretati sunt fuere praecipui: Alexander Picolhomineus, Felix Filiucius, et Ioannes Baptista frater meus dialogis de Honore *emendatis*.[7]

Ad Moralem autem Philosophiam intelligendam iuvant, quicunque de moribus lucubrationes edidere, Graeci, Latinique tum prisci, tum recentiores, si Catholici et approbati fuerint. Aristoteles item ipse duobus aliis libris, qui Magna Moralia dicuntur, et septem aliis, qui ad Eudemum scripti sunt; quamvis quartus, quintus, et sextus prorsus iidem sunt, qui quintus, sextus, et septimus Nicomachiorum. Denique libello de virtutibus, qui postea adnectitur (cuiuscunque ille sit) quem Alexander Chamillardus vertit: Et ubi Aristoteles in Rethoricis ad Theodecten de Natura affectuum egit. Plutarchus // (77) variis opusculis, tum de moribus, quos Latinos fecit Arnoldus Arlenius. Epicteti item Stoici dogmatum libri quattuor Graece ab Ariano conscripti, et Commentariis a Simplicio illustrati, ac cuius Epicteti defensionem Angelus Politianus suscepit, sed praesertim Basilii Magni Moralia, quamvis haec Christianam perfectionem spectent, sine qua Moralis Philosophia manca et mutila est. Quidquid item Plato, et ante eum Socrates, deinde Cicero de Officiis, sed melius Ambrosius Mediolanensis et vir Sanctus, uti et Lactantius, et Isidorus, et Seneca variis Epistolis (nam liber de Moribus Senecae falso tributus est) ac denique omnium optime atque absolutissime S. Thomas secunda parte secundae: Gulielmus item Parisiensis tum ubi agit de Virtutibus, tum in tractatu de Moribus, *quos omnes ante D. Thomam conscripsit*.[8]

Porro si extarent Aristotelis Commentarii, quorum mentionem Laertius facit *τακτικῶν καὶ μεθοδικῶν ὀκτώ* et rursus *μεθοδικῶν* non fuisset, cur alii

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[5] *A*: missing.
[6] *A*: scripserunt.
[7] *A*: missing.
[8] *A*: missing.

laborassent in tabulis moralium Aristotelis vel novis conficiendis, vel aliunde conquirendis: quae tamen fateor magnopere commodant, si cum illis contextus coniungatur. Vere enim est haec linearis illa artificii Logici demonstratio ex suis deducta principiis, quam fortassis Aristoteles *διαγραφή* (?) appellat, alibi *ὑποτύποσιν* saepe, alias *τύπον* fortassis etiam *διαίρεσιν* (?) speciei nomine ad genus traducto. Laertius certe in catalogo librorum Aristotelis meminit *διαιρέσεον*, XVII librorum; item *διαιρετικῶν* libri unius, et rursus *διαιρετική*[9] unius; item *ἐντομήματων διαιρέσεων*, unius.[10]

Quin etiam evulgarunt, sed averso ingenio in eadem, Audomarus Talaeus in primum librum explicationes, et Petrus Ramus; ii quidem Aristotelis contextum interim dividentes; sed qua praesertim Ramus acerbitate erat adversus non solum Peripateticam, verum etiam Catholicam veritatem, mirum non est, si non interpres, sed actor adversus Aristotelem suorum laborum operam lusit, cui etiam propter haeresim Calvinianam vita denique adempta est.

Editum est autem Francofurti, ante triennium Ioannis Casi Oxoniensis Speculum quaestionum moralium, in universam Aristotelis Ethicen. De quo libro, neque meum est iudicium ferre, cum otium non fuerit totius attente perlegendi; id autem potissimum expectandum sit ab iis, quibus a Sede Apostolica Romana Inquisitionis delata est facultas im permittendos, aut purgandos libros. Quod tamen facit, ut cupiam, ut diligenter examinetur, duplex causa est; Altera, quod is Auctor viro alieno a fide Catholica librum dicaverit, eos etiam laudaverit, quos sanguinem Catholicum fudisse scimus; altera, quod in peroratione operis, quam in fine libri dicat lectori, fatetur ingenue, quattuor classes auctorum in suis hisce lucubrationibus se esse secutum. Primam, in qua ponit S. Thomam, Eustratium, et Boetium. Secundam, in qua Fabrum, Buridanum, et Boreum. Tertiam, in qua Odonem, Burleum, et suum (inquit) Donatum. Quartam, in qua Ioannem de Celaia, Ioannem Scotum, et quem amarum nomine, sed subtilem ingenio nominat Gilbertum Crab. Quos nequis miretur, cur evolverit, subdit, non in verborum

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[9] *A*: *διαιρετικοῦ*.

[10] *A*, p. 123, has here: Utiles autem ad intelligenda Aristotelis Ethica essent Tabulae perpetuae Theodori Zwingeri, si examinatae prius essent et approbatae, quae (ut ille inquit) commentariorum loco esse possunt, quae quidem in lucem prodierunt Basileae, anno huius saeculi sexagesimosexto. Etsi vero praefationem satis longam texit, qua Ethica Aristotelis conferens cum Christianis, conatur fidei Christianae veritatem, beatudinemque extollere, interimque etiam permiscet aliqua de caelitum auditione, quorum videlicet charitas cum (?) cunquam exciderit, preces item vel nostras audiant, vel ipsi quoque pro nobis fundant ad Deum, reverenterque loquitur de S. Thoma, atque Martyribus; aliqua sunt tamen, quae munda non sunt, neque adeo catholice scripta. Quippe homo natus inter haereticos, licet postea in Catholicis Italiae Academiis versatus, nescitur an errores illorum omnino deposuerit, quamobrem praefatio illa delenda est.

Ceterum quod ad tabulas spectat, quoniam augustiores sunt, ordinemque et methodum non solum compositivam, vel resolutivam, verum etiam definitivam continent, non immerito distincta dici possunt commentaria, quae facilem reddant Aristotelis contextum, eo magis, quod hunc ex Petri Victorii, Adriani Turnebi, et Dionysii Lambini castigationibus et versione eiusdem Lambini afferat.

sono, sed in rerum sensu veram consistere sapientiam, at sapientiam (ait) profecto tenuerunt isti, ac paulo post, "Multi" (inquit) "hodie cum audiunt nomen Thomae, supercilia statim contrahunt, et distorquent labia, sed si isti serio unam, vel alteram quaestionem in illo sine praeiudicata sententia legerint, detracta palea purissimum granum, sublata scoria aurum splendidissimum forsan se invenisse dixerint. Ex illo igitur, et aliis, asserit summam omnium quaestionem in Ethicis se contraxisse, et ut gemmarium rudiore lima, ne rubigo appareret dictionis, perpolivisse." *Ceterum sciat lector Ioannem istum Casum librum edidisse, qui Sphaera civitatis, sive de administratione civitatum inscriptus est, qui quidem in novissimo Indice Clementis VIII. Pontificis Maximi prohibitus est, donec emendetur.*

Sed et in libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum aliquos Conimbricensis Cursus Disputationes accepimus iam tertio in Germania, et quidem correctiores Coloniae Agrippinae editas. Quae sane medullam Disciplinae moralis continent, eamque eleganti stylo, ac perspicue ob oculos ponunt.[11]

[11] *A*: missing.

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