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Ibn al-Jawzī's Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt

A CRITICAL EDITION OF THE ARABIC TEXT WITH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

MERLIN SWARTZ

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For

Sondra and Souhil,
Daryl and Wanda,
Kenton and Amy

whose imagination, optimism and love
have been a perpetual source of
inspiration and hope

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PREFACE

As I have tried to indicate in the title of this study, Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* occupies center stage from beginning to end. *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*, which might be rendered *Scriptural Texts Concerning the Divine Attributes*, is not just another medieval work on the divine attributes, but an impassioned critique of anthropomorphic ways of conceiving the divine attributes, written by Ibn al-Jawzī sometime between 1180 and 1190. Although *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* focuses on what its author regards as anthropomorphist patterns of thought common in traditionalist circles, the principal focus of the work is medieval Ḥanbalism, and especially "anthropomorphic" conceptions of God championed by leading intellectuals within the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad. Since Ibn al-Jawzī was himself a member of the Ḥanbalī school and since the object of his often scathing criticism was the Ḥanbalī school, *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* provides an interesting window on medieval Ḥanbalism and, indirectly, on medieval traditionalist Islam more generally. As an intra-Ḥanbalī polemic, *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* reveals more clearly than any other work of the period the intellectual fault-lines within medieval Ḥanbalism. By exposing these fault-lines, the work throws new light on social and intellectual tensions within the school and reveals the considerable diversity that characterized Ḥanbalism throughout much of the Middle Ages.

Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt is significant, also, in that it provides incontrovertible evidence of the extent to which *kalām* (theology of the dialectical, rationalist sort) had penetrated the Ḥanbalī school by the 12th century. In the work Ibn al-Jawzī makes extensive use of *kalām*, drawing on its technical language and crafting his arguments against anthropomorphism on the basis of dialectical methods that had been developed within the great theological schools of medieval Islam, especially within Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism. The rationalist temper of the work effectively calls into question the older, orientalist assessment of Ibn al-Jawzī as a die-hard traditionalist; indeed, in my view, it effectively exposes that assessment as a caricature. *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* is significant, finally, in that it preserves, albeit in a sometimes fragmentary form, material now apparently lost. Thanks to Ibn al-Jawzī's

habit of quoting, sometimes at length, from works that are no longer extant we have a significantly better understanding of at least some of these sources.

For these reasons, among others, the publication of this hitherto unpublished work seemed to me eminently justified. In addition to a critical edition of the Arabic text of *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*, this study also includes a translation of the work in its entirety, along with an introduction in which I attempt to place the work and its author, Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 1201), in their proper historical contexts in so far as these can be delineated on the basis of 12th and early 13th century sources. Finally, I have included an appendix in which I present a translation of the *Risāla* of Abū'l-Faḍl al-ʿAlthī, a younger contemporary of Ibn al-Jawzī, also a Ḥanbalī, who in his *Risāla* offers a sharply-worded rejoinder directed at Ibn al-Jawzī, accusing him, in effect, of having abandoned the historic principles of the Ḥanbalī school through his embrace of *kalām* and a metaphorical mode of exegesis (*taʾwīl*) in dealing with scriptural texts (that is, from the Quran and the Sayings of the Prophet) having to do with the divine attributes. Background information pertinent to this intra-Ḥanbalī debate is provided in notes to my translation of both *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* and the *Risāla* of al-ʿAlthī. I have tried not to overload the notes, though I may not always have been successful.

I came across the manuscript of *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*, or *KAS*, as I shall call it, some years ago while working in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul on a quite different project. Since the title page of the manuscript carried Ibn al-Jawzī's name, the authorship of the work was never in serious doubt, but even though I had worked on Ibn al-Jawzī already some years by then, I had never before seen this particular title listed among the works of Ibn al-Jawzī, either in the voluminous medieval biographical literature or in modern biobibliographical works on medieval Arabic, particularly C. Brockelmann's *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur*. Upon perusing the manuscript of *KAS*, I recognized certain similarities between it and another of Ibn al-Jawzī's works, his *Dafʿ Shubah at-Tashbīh*. A comparison of the two texts soon made it clear that *KAS* was a much longer version of *Dafʿ Shubah at-Tashbīh*. In contrast to the latter, *KAS* contains a lengthy prolegomenon in which Ibn al-Jawzī elaborates the theological, legal, and hermeneutical principles on which he will base his exposé of anthropomorphism. But beyond this, Ibn al-Jawzī's treatment of exegetical and hermeneutical questions in *KAS* is considerably more detailed and thorough. As a result of

my initial comparison I came to the conclusion that *Daf^c Shubah at-Tashbīh* is either an abridgement of *KAS* or the latter an expanded version of the former. We still do not know, and may never know, which of these two works was written first. My comparative study of the two works reinforced my sense of the importance of *KAS* and its potential as a source for the reconstruction of important aspects of the intellectual history of medieval Islam.

I wish to thank Professors Hans Daiber and David Pingree for agreeing to include this work in their important series *Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science*, a project that has contributed significantly to our understanding of medieval Islam's remarkable intellectual odyssey. Special thanks also to Trudy Kamperveen, editor of Middle East and Islamic Studies at Brill, for her interest in my work, and for her prompt and efficient response to all matters pertaining to the publication of this work. Her professionalism has been magnificent.

This work would not have been possible had it not been for the encouragement received from a great many people over the years I have been working on this project; I regret not being able to mention all of them here. I do want to thank two of my colleagues at Boston University, Herbert Mason and Robert Neville, for their support of this project and for their confidence in my ability to bring it to completion despite the fact that it took more time than anyone anticipated when I first began working on it. Their friendship and loyal support have meant more to me than I can adequately express. I owe a special word of thanks to my colleague, Diana Lobel, to Professors Michael Feener and David Reisman, and to Dr Anthony Tuft, each of whom read through the work in its entirety at the penultimate stage of its completion, and made numerous and valuable suggestions, enabling me to correct more than a few errors and in general to improve the quality of the work. I also wish to thank Dr. Fawzi Abdulrazak, who assisted me in many ways, particularly in the design of the notes to the Arabic text, and in refining my translation of al-^cAlthī's *Risāla*. Ray Hart and John Clayton, suucessive chairmen of my department, gave me encouragement and supported my work in numerous intangible, but important, ways—for which I am immensely grateful.

I am especially indebted to my friend and mentor, George Makdisi. He took the time to read through all of the numerous and sometimes lengthy quotations from Ibn ^cAqīl in *KAS*, reviewed my translation, and helped me

to understand the nuances and technical meanings of Ibn ʿAqīl's difficult, and often compact, Arabic style. But George Makdisi's contributions extend well beyond this. It was he who first introduced me to medieval Ḥanbalism, who encouraged my work on Ibn al-Jawzī and who, together with Henri Laoust, laid the foundations for the modern critical study of medieval Ḥanbalism. His numerous books and articles bearing on medieval Islamic culture, more generally, have deepened and enriched our understanding of medieval Islam and its place in the history of civilization. Without his friendship and support, this work in its present form would not have been possible.

I must also thank Paul Peachey and J. Lawrence Burkholder who, during a crucial stage in my post-graduate education, helped to broaden my intellectual horizons in ways that have continued to inspire me and give my work direction. My thanks also to Gordon Kaufman, through whose books and articles I have come to understand in a new way that theological reflection is a work of the human imagination and, as such, is to be judged by the very same criteria by which we judge human intellectual activity in general. This view of theology as a work of the creative imagination is one that Ibn al-Jawzī, I think, would have endorsed, at least partially, if the question had been presented to him in these terms. What Ibn al-Jawzī almost certainly could not have embraced, given the constraints of his time, is Kaufman's insistence that theology, if it is to realize its fullest potential, must free itself from the stranglehold of traditional orientations and loyalties so as to be free to make the whole of human history and human experience the object of its reflection.

Finally, I owe to my wife Hilda enduring gratitude for her patience, her boundless support, and her faith in the value of this project. She saw to it that I had the time and the space in which to do my work, and in the final stages read the whole of the work and pondered it with me. Without her contribution this work would have been beyond my reach.

Merlin Swartz
Bedford, Massachusetts
June 30, 2001

ABBREVIATIONS[1]

Abū Shāma:	*adh-Dhayl ar-Rawḍatayn.*
Ambivalences:	"Les Ambivalences d'un sermonnaire Ḥanbalite...", A. Hartmann.
Asmāʾ :	*Kitāb al-Asmāʾ waʾṣ-Ṣifāt*, Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī.
Attributs divins:	*Le problème des attributs divins*, M. Allard.
BA :	*Bāz al-Ashhab*, Ibn al-Jawzī.
Bayhaqī:	*Kitāb al-Asmāʾ*, Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī.
BEO:	*Bulletin d'études orientales*
BSOAS:	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, London
Dhayl:	*Dhayl ʿalā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, Ibn Rajab.
DST:	*Dafʿ Shubhat at-Tashbīh*, Ibn al-Jawzī.
EI^2:	*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edition.
ER:	*Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York, c1987)
GAL:	*Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur* (2 vols.) and Supplement (3 vols.), Brockelmann
GAS :	*Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums*, F. Sezgin (9 vols.)
Ḥilya:	*Ḥilyat al-Awliyāʾ*, Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣbahānī.ʾ
Ḥuffāẓ:	*Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāẓ*, Dhahabī.
Ibn Khuzayma:	*Kitāb at-Tawḥīd.*
Ibn ʿAqīl:	*Ibn ʿAqīl et la résurgence de l'Islām traditionaliste* (1963), George Makdisi
Ibn ʿAqīl (1997):	*Ibn ʿAqil: Religion and Culture in Classical Islam* (1997), G. Makdisi
Image:	*Dieu à l'image de l'homme: les anthropomorphismes de la sunna et leur interprétation par les théologiens*, Gimaret, D.
IJMES:	*International Journal of Middle East Studies*
IOS:	*Israel Oriental Studies.*
JA:	*Journal Asiatique*
JRAS:	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*

[1] For the full details on the above titles, see the Bibliography at the end of this work.

KAS:	*Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*, Ibn al-Jawzī
Kaz.:	Kazimirski, *Dictionnaire Arabe-Français*, 2 vols.
KDM:	*Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ wa'l-Matrūkīn*, Ibn al-Jawzī
KQ:	*Kitāb al-Quṣṣās wa'l-Mudhakkirīn*, Ibn al-Jawzī (Beirut 1971)
La doctrine:	*La doctrine d'al-Ashʿarī*, D. Gimaret.
Lane:	Lane, *Arabic Lexicon*, 8 vols.
Lecomte:	*Le traité des divergences du Ḥadiṯ d'Ibn Qutayba*, trans. Gerard Lecomte.
Les traditions:	*Les traditions islamique* (vols. I and II, by O. Houdas and W. Marçais; vols. III and IV, by O. Houdas)
Lisān :	*Lisān al-ʿArab*, Ibn Manẓūr, 15 vols. (Beirut 1968)
Manāqib or *Manāqib Aḥmad:*	*Manāqib Aḥmad b. Hanbal*, Ibn al-Jawzī
Maqālāt:	*Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn*, Abūl-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī
Marāṣid:	*Marāṣid al-Iṭṭilāʿ ʿalā Asmāʾ al-Amkina*, Ṣafī'd-Dīn
Mawḍūʿāt:	*Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, Ibn al-Jawzī
MIDEO:	*Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales du Caire*
al-Mundhirī:	*at-Takmilat li-Wafayāt an-Naqala*, al-Mundhirī.
Muʿtamad:	*Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, Abū Yaʿlā
Muntaẓam:	*Kitāb al-Muntaẓam*, Ibn al-Jawzī
Mushkil:	*Mushkil al-Ḥadīth wa Bayānuhu*, Ibn Fūrak
Musnad:	*al-Musnad*, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal
Muḥīṭ:	*Muḥīṭ al-Muḥīṭ*, al-Bustānī
Mīzān:	*Mīzān al-Iʿtidāl*, Dhahabī
MZ:	*Mirʾāt az-Zamān*, Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī
Proofs:	*Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy*, H. A. Davidson.
REI:	*Revue des études Islamiques*
RHR:	*Revue de l'histoire des religions*
RSO:	*Rivista degli studi orientali*
S:	*Surah*
Ṣafwa:	*Ṣafwat aṣ-Ṣafwa*, Ibn al-Jawzī.
SEI:	*Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*

Shadharāt:	*Shadharāt adh-Dhahab fī Akhbār Man Dhahab,* Ibn al-ʿImād
SI:	*Studia Islamica*
Ṣayd:	*Ṣayd al-Khāṭir,* Ibn al-Jawzī
Ṭabaqāt:	*aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā*, Ibn Saʿd
Ṭabaqāt:	*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila,* Ibn Abī Yaʿlā
Tafsīr:	*Jāmiʿ al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, Abū Jaʿfar aṭ-Ṭabarī
Tahdhīb:	*Kitāb Tahdhīb at-Tahdhīb*, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī
Talbīs:	*Talbīs Iblīs*, Ibn al-Jawzī
Talkhīṣ:	*Talkhīṣ al-Bayān fī Majāzāt al-Qurʾān,* Raḍī
Tawḥīd:	*Kitāb at-Tawḥīd,* Ibn Khuzayma
Taʾwīl:	*Taʾwīl Mushkil al-Qurʾān*, Ibn Qutayba.
TB:	*Tārīkh Baghdād,* Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb
TH:	*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, Ibn Abī Yaʿlā
Wafāʾ:	*Kitāb al-Wafāʾ bi Aḥwāl al-Muṣṭafā*, Ibn al-Jawzī
Wright:	Wright, *Arabic Grammar* (2 vols.)
Zād:	*Zād al-Masīr fī ʻIlm at-Tafsīr,* Ibn al-Jawzī
ZDMG:	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Wiesbaden

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مشكل: مشكل الحديث وبيانه لابن فورك (بيروت ١٤٠٥)
ميزان: ميزان الاعتدال في نقد الرجال للذهبيّ (بيروت ١٣٨٢
م: مجلّد
س: سطر

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

IBN AL-JAWZĪ: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

What follows is a somewhat selective account of the life of Ibn al-Jawzī, a man who, though frequently controversial, played an important role in the religious, intellectual, and political life of Baghdad during much of the 6th/12th century. The selective nature of the account presented here is dictated, in part, by the nature of our sources on the century and the man. While the sources do make it possible to sketch out certain facets and periods of his life in a fair amount of detail, other aspects and phases of his life are passed over largely in silence. His family and his interaction with it are rarely mentioned.[1] His increasingly troubled relationship with the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad from the early 570s on (from ca. 1174) to the very last years of his life is alluded to only in a passing fashion and is, consequently, rather poorly understood by historians.[2] For the important task of tracing the development of his thought we have precious little solid information to go on. Prolific though he was, only a handful of his works can at present be dated and, in most cases, only approximate dates can be assigned. A great deal of work remains to be done by way of placing his writings within a chronological framework—obviously indispensable to an understanding of his thought and the trajectory of its development.

While we may lament the gaps in our sources, and the partial and fragmentary portrait of the man offered by those sources, we do have to acknowledge

[1] We do know that his relationship with his oldest surviving son, Abū'l-Qāsim, was to become an increasingly troubled one, but we are left to speculate as to what the causes might have been (see especially his *Laftat al-Kabid ilā Naṣīḥat al-Walad*, a short autobiographical work addressed to Abū'l-Qāsim as a kind of open letter). Information bearing on family dynamics would help us to understand an important aspect of his life better.

[2] The first signs of trouble in his relationship with the school come from Ibn al-Jawzī himself (*MZ*, 326, 14-16); some of his own comments made in passing leave one with the impression that jealousy was a factor (*Muntaẓam*, X, 253, 8). Clearly, his grandson (Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī), to whom he later confided some of his thoughts on the matter, believed that there was more than jealousy involved, but he does not say what. In the next section of this study I hope to suggest what some of the more substantive factors might have been.

that the task of reconstructing the life of Ibn al-Jawzī has been rendered easier by virtue of the fact that we have from his own pen an autobiographical work written when he was in his late sixties[3]—his *Laftat al-Kabid ilā Naṣīḥat al-Walad*—which, though relatively brief, is revealing and does throw some light on his own mental state, the development of his thought, and matters relating to family life. We are also fortunate in having another work from his pen—his *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*—which, though not strictly autobiographical, contains a number of passages of an autobiographical nature.[4] Finally, we are fortunate in that Ibn al-Jawzī's principal historical work, his *Kitāb al-Muntaẓam* and particularly volume X, contains information that is crucial to an understanding of his professional life and his political involvements up to the year 574/1178.[5]

Nonetheless, despite our good fortune in these respects, there are still too many unanswered—and at present probably unanswerable—questions to be able to write a fleshed-out, balanced and reliable account of the life of this complex, mercurial figure.[6] What follows is a contribution to that effort, but it should be kept in mind that the account of his life given here was conceived and written with a specific purpose in mind, *viz.*, to sketch out

[3] It could hardly have been written much before 580/1184, but certainly no later than that date. See my *Kitāb al-Quṣṣāṣ*, 45, n. 1, for the evidence in support of this dating. Cf., also A. Hartmann, "Ambivalences", 60 and n. 67; and ʿAlwajī, *Muʾallafāt Ibn al-Jawzī* (1992), 194-195.

[4] On the problems of dating this work, see D. Reig, *La pensée vigile*, 14. A fair portion of the work appears to have been composed in the late 560s and early 570s (roughly between 1170 and 1180).

[5] Ibn al-Jawzī had plans to continue the *Muntaẓam* beyond 574/1178, but those plans never materialized. Some of the information that he collected for this purpose eventually fell into the hands of Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, who later incorporated at least parts of it into his *Mirʾāt az-Zamān* for the period from 575/1179 to 590/1193.

[6] Biographical accounts of Ibn al-Jawzī are to be found in the introduction to Nājiya Ibrāhīm's edition of Ibn al-Jawzī's *al-Miṣbāḥ al-Muḍīʾ fī Khilāfat al-Mustaḍīʾ* (Baghdad, 1976), vol. I, 19-39; and in S. Leder's *Ibn al-Ǧauzī und seine Kompilation wider die Leidenschaft, der Traditionalist in gelehrter Überlieferung und originärer Lehre* (Beirut, 1984). 15-42. The most detailed treatment of Ibn al-Jawzī's life and work to date is to be found in Ḥasan al-Ḥakīm's *Ibn al-Jawzī* (Baghdad, 1988). For biographical studies that focus more specifically on Ibn al-Jawzī's career as a preacher, see A. Hartmann's, "Les Ambivalences d'un sermonnaire Ḥanbalite: Ibn al-Ǧawzī (m. en 597/1201), sa carrière et son ouvrage autographe, le *Kitāb al-Ḥawātīm*." *Annales Islamologique*, 22 (1986), 51-115; and my introduction to Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb al-Quṣṣāṣ* (Beirut, 1971), 15-38.

the biographical setting within which to place, understand, and assess his *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*.

His Family Roots And Early Years

Abū'l-Faraj ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī b. al-Jawzī al-Baghdādī was born into a relatively small but well-to-do family of Baghdad,[7] sometime between 508/1114 and 510/1116.[8] His paternal family, which prided itself in a lineage that could be traced back to the beginnings of Islam,[9] had concentrated its best energies on the pursuit of material gain[10] and, much to Ibn al-Jawzī's chagrin, had shown little interest in religious and intellectual matters.[11] Ibn

[7] According to Abū Shāma, he was born in East Baghdad, in a quarter known as Darb Ḥabīb (*adh-Dhayl ʿalā'r-Rawḍatayn*, 21, 14) which was located in the vicinity of the Muʿallā canal (Yāqūt, *Muʿjam al-Buldān*, II, 216/1).

[8] The two most detailed, and in many ways most important, biographical sources on Ibn al-Jawzī are the *Mir'āt az-Zamān* of Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī (especially, 481-503) and Ibn Rajab's *Dhayl ʿalā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila* (I, 399-433). For a fuller listing of sources on him, see Mundhirī's *Takmila*, I, 394, n. 1. In addition to the twenty-eight titles listed there, mention should also be made of several works of an autobiographical or quasi-autobiographical character referred to above, *viz.*, Ibn al-Jawzī's *Laftat al-Kabid ilā Naṣīḥat al-Walad* and also, though of lesser importance, his *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*. Finally, Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb Muntaẓam* (especially vols. IX and X) is a rich source of information on his life up to the year 574/1178.

[9] According to the standard biographical works of the period, Ibn al-Jawzī's family on its paternal side descended from Abū Bakr, the first of the *Rāshidūn* caliphs.

[10] For references to the family's business interests, see *Laftat al-Kabid*, 37, 3-4, and 57, 18-19; *MZ*, 481, 16-17; *Dhayl*, I, 401, 1; Dhahabī, *Ta'rīkh al-Islam*, XLII, 291, 11-12; and *Bidāya*, XIII, 32, 3-4.—According to Dimyāṭī, his father's business, which involved the crafting and sale of copperware (*MZ*, 481, 16-17; *Dhayl*, I, 401, 1; and *Bidāya*, XIII, 32, 3-4), was located in the Nahr al-Qallā'īn quarter of West Baghdad (*Mustafād*, 155, 3).

[11] In his *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* he makes the point in typically Jawzian style: "I reflected on my [state] in relation to that of my paternal relatives who had spent their lives in the acquisition of material possessions while I had spent my childhood and youth seeking after knowledge. I came to the conclusion that what they had secured for themselves had not eluded me except that I would have had to regret having acquired it.... I realized that my life in this world was better than theirs and my standing among the people higher than theirs, and that what I had acquired in the way of a knowledge of things religious could not be matched [by material possessions]" (315, 13-17).

al-Jawzī himself points out in several of his writings that he was the first member of his family in many generations to pursue a career in the religious sciences.[12] He obviously took some pride in the fact that he had broken with an established family tradition and had taken up the challenge of intellectual and scholarly pursuits. This attitude toward tradition and the past informed much of his own self-understanding and self-image. Even though he would probably have been reticent to apply the term to himself, at least in public, he did in fact see himself as an *innovator*, as one who had broken with the past in a variety of ways.[13] *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* is but one example of an attitude and orientation that informed much of what he wrote and thought.[14] It is a mind-set whose origins can be traced to the early stages of his life.

Although Ibn al-Jawzī sometimes leaves the impression[15] that his family roots were Arab, the facts preserved in our sources indicate that his family past was a good deal more complex. To be sure he was Arab on his father's side; that, however, was not the case on his mother's. She was half Turk and half Persian. Both sides of her family had produced a line of respected, even distinguished, scholars.[16] Both had long been associated with the Shāfiʿite school of law and, at least on the Turkish side, some members of the family had been Ashʿarite. His maternal uncle, Abū'l-Faḍl b. Nāṣir, for example, had been both a Shāfiʿite and an Ashʿarite prior to his conversion to Ḥanbalism.[17] It is interesting and perhaps significant that two women on the maternal side of the family, his grandmother, Rābiʿa, and his great aunt,

[12] *Laftat al-Kabid*, 57, 18-19.

[13] See *KAS* §§ 18-22, for his critique of *taqlīd*.

[14] This oppositional stance *vis-à-vis* the past, including religious tradition, informed a great deal of what Ibn al-Jawzī wrote and also may help to explain the prominence of the polemical in his writing. In the case of *KAS*, he saw himself as a breaker of icons that had come to be sacrosanct for too many Ḥanbalīs.

[15] Perhaps inadvertently.

[16] Her maternal grandfather, Abū Ḥakīm al-Khabrī (d. 489/1095), had been a distinguished specialist in Shāfiʿite law and had authored an important work (no longer extant) that reportedly dealt with questions of inheritance law. He had also cultivated an interest in the linguistic sciences and literary criticism, and had authored a series of commentaries on major poetic anthologies including the *Ḥamāsa* (*Muntaẓam*, IX, 99-100; *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfiʿīya*, V, 62-63; and *Bidāya*, XII, 163).

[17] See *Dhayl*, I, 225-226; *Kāmil*, XI, 202; Dhahabī, *Ḥuffāẓ*, IV, 83 (cf., *Shadharāt*, IV, 156). According to Dhahabī, his conversion to Ḥanbalism occurred in the year 493/1099 when he would have been in his mid-twenties (*Ḥuffāẓ*, IV, 84).

Fāṭima, had achieved academic distinction as experts in the field of *ḥadīth* studies. In his *Mashyakha,* Ibn al-Jawzī reports that Fāṭima had been one of his own teachers in the subject.[18] Although this kind of involvement by women in academic affairs was not unheard of in medieval Islam, it was not a commonplace.

Ibn al-Jawzī's Lineage[19]



Ibn al-Jawzī was thus heir to three distinct cultural and linguistic traditions: Arabic, Turkish and Persian. Although it is still not possible to determine

[18] *Mashyakhat Ibn al-Jawzī* (Beirut 1400/1980), 199-201. His studies under her began in Jumādā II 520/June 1126 and continued for at least several years. She died on the 5th of Rajab 534/February 25, 1140 (Cf., *Muntaẓam*, X, 88; and *Lubāb*, I, 418).—It is also worth noting that one of Ibn al-Jawzī's sisters, Fāṭima Bint Abī'l-Fāʾiz (d. 605/1208), went on to become a prominent scholar in the field of *ḥadīth* studies (*MZ*, 540, 563 [Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī gives her name as Bint al-Aʿazz, but this appears to be a defective reading]; Mundhirī, II, 150-151; and Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, XLIII, 186).

[19] The tree is of course incomplete even for the brief period it covers. Very few of the women members of the lineage are mentioned by name in the sources. Wherever possible I have noted them, but the tree is largely made up of males. It should also be noted that the relative ages of Ibn al-Jawzī and his siblings as indicated above are approximations based on indirect indications provided by the sources.

the relative degrees to which these various traditions shaped Ibn al-Jawzī's own outlook and intellectual interests, it is nonetheless important to keep the cultural and religious diversity of his past in mind. It is doubtful that he knew either Persian or Turkish,[20] but there can be no doubt that the various threads that made up his past did enter into the making of the young man and were continuing influences in his life. It is clear, in any case, that the most important religious and intellectual influences that shaped the young Ibn al-Jawzī were a legacy inherited from the mother's side of his family.

His Formal Education

Ibn al-Jawzī's formal education began shortly after his father's death in 514/1120 when his family enrolled him in a *maktab* at the age of five or six.[21] The curriculum of the *maktab* at the elementary level consisted of reading, writing and the memorization of texts selected from the Quran, the *ḥadīth*, and Arabic literature, especially poetry. At the intermediate and advanced levels of the *maktab* curriculum students were introduced to the disciplines of Quranic and *ḥadīth* studies in a somewhat more rigorous way along with some instruction in grammar and literature. For those gifted in the arts of language, a branch of rhetoric (*ʿilm al-waʿẓ*) designed to prepare young men to become preachers was also available.[22] Having discovered at an early age his own gifts in this area, Ibn al-Jawzī was eager to avail himself of this opportunity.[23]

[20] If he did, no mention is made of it in the biographical literature. This, to be sure, is an argument from silence, but it is still worth noting if we keep in mind the nature of the evidence.

[21] In his *Lafta* he says that he was "six" when he entered the *maktab* (35-35). On the *maktab* and its curriculum, see Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 20-21. On its later evolution, see *EI*^{2}, VI, 196-197.

[22] Precisely when Ibn al-Jawzī began to study *ʿilm al-waʿẓ* is not known, but it is clear that he was deeply involved in it already by his early teens, for he was delivering homilies in public as early as 520/1126. He could not have been much more than twelve at the time (cf., *Muntaẓam*, IX, 259-260; *MZ*, 117-118; and *Bidāya*, XII, 210).

[23] In a number of his writings he speaks of the excitement and satisfaction he derived from his studies. It was for him a time of exploration and rapidly expanding intellectual horizons (*Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 59, 18-60, 1; 316,5-8, 10; *Laftat al-Kabid*, 21, 35-36 and 47; etc.). In his *Laftat al-Kabid*, written many years later, Ibn al-Jawzī relates that when his part of his father's estate was apportioned to him (consisting of "twenty dīnārs and two

Following his elementary studies, Ibn Nāṣir, by then a leading figure within the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad, assumed responsibility for his spiritual and intellectual formation. Although Ibn al-Jawzī did study under Ibn Nāṣir, especially in the field of *ḥadīth*, the role played by Ibn Nāṣir was in some ways that of a father and a spiritual advisor, particularly during his earlier years, but in many ways Ibn Nāṣir continued to be a counselor and also a close friend until his death in 550/1155.[24] As Ibn al-Jawzī himself reports, Ibn Nāṣir played an active role in deciding what he studied and with whom, and provided him assistance with his studies on the side.[25] Ibn al-Jawzī's relationship to Ibn Nāṣir underscores again the importance of his attachment to the maternal side of his family.

Ibn al-Jawzī's completion of the *maktab* curriculum cannot be dated precisely, but it must have been by the early 520s, for by 525/1130 he had begun the advanced phase of his education—one that now included jurisprudence and more rigorous and systematic instruction in the disciplines of Quranic and *ḥadīth* studies.[26]

His education in the discipline of *ḥadīth* embraced the usual range of subjects, including the memorization of vast amounts of textual material along with the mastery of historical and especially biographical information pertaining to *ḥadīth* transmitters. Among his more important teachers in the

houses [*dārayn*]") he sold the houses and used the entire proceeds to purchase books on the religious sciences (*kutub min al-ʿilm*) (48, 3-6).

[24] Aside from the fact that Ibn Nāṣir was a maternal uncle, it is perhaps not insignificant that he too had lost his father at a very early age (Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, I, 225, 8).

[25] Ibn al-Jawzī himself describes the role of Ibn Nāṣir, especially during his early years, in a number of his writings, of which the more important are the *Muntaẓam*, X, 163, 2-4; *Laftat al-Kabid*, 36, 6-9; *Mashyakha*, 53, 1-5 and 129, 4-7; and *Manāqib Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal*, 531, 2-6. In the *Manāqib*, he writes: "[Ibn Nāṣir] was the one whom God appointed for the purpose of grounding me in the religious sciences. He exerted much energy on my behalf and introduced me to the leading scholars of *ḥadīth* (*mashāyakh*) and had me study the *Musnad* of Aḥmad...as well as other collections of reliable traditions (*ʿawālī*). At that time I did not fully understand what learning was all about because of my age. He used to correct all the material [I took down from my various teachers]. I continued to work under his direction for thirty years, and profited from him in a way that I never profited from anyone else" (*Manāqib Aḥmad*, 531, 2-6). In his *Mashyakha* he adds: "Most of what I learned in the science of *ḥadīth* I received from him" (129, 6-7).

[26] Instruction in jurisprudence ordinarily, though not always, took place within the confines of the *madrasa*; instruction in *ḥadīth*, Quran studies and *waʿẓ* was done within the context of mosque-schools.

field of *ḥadīth* were Abū's-Saʿādāt al-Mutawakkilī (441-521/1049-1127),[27] Ibn al-Ḥusayn (432-525/1040-1130),[28] Abū Bakr al-Anṣārī (442-535/1050-1140),[29] Abū Manṣūr al-Qazzāz (d. 535/1140),[30] Abū'l-Qāsim as-Samarqandī (454-536/1062-1141),[31] Abū Naṣr al-Hamadhānī (d. 536/1141),[32] Abū Manṣūr b. Khayrūn (452-539/1060-1144),[33] Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Maghribī (d. 541/1146),[34]

[27] One of the students of Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb. On the 3rd of Jumādā I, 520 Ibn al-Jawzī received an *ijāza* from Abū's-Saʿādāt "in his own handwriting" in Jāmiʿ al-Qaṣr, authorizing him to transmit materials from Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb, author of the great *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*. For notices on him, see *Mashyakha*, 65-67; *Muntaẓam*, X, 7; *MZ*, 126; and *Shadharāt*, IV, 64.

[28] One of the most celebrated traditionists of his time and Ibn al-Jawzī's most important teacher of *ḥadīth* during the early period of his studies. He is the very first of his teachers listed in the *Mashyakha* (53-54). Under him Ibn al-Jawzī studied the *Musnad* of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, the *Ghaylānīyāt* of Abū Bakr b. Ghaylān (d. 322), and part of a collection of *ḥadīth* put into book-form by Abū Bakr al-Muzakkī (d. 363). For biographical details see *Muntaẓam*, X, 24; Samʿānī, *Anṣāb*, fol. 526a; and *Bidāya*, XII, 218.

[29] Known also as Abū Bakr Qāḍī'l-Māristān. He was a Ḥanbalī of extraordinarily broad interests. In addition to mastering the religious sciences, he studied arithmetic, algebra, and geometry. He also knew Greek and is credited with a commentary on the tenth book of Euclid (cf., Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, I, 761; and G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 237, n. 1). In addition to his work as a *ḥadīth* expert, he was celebrated for his knowledge of inheritance law. For notices on him, see *Muntaẓam*, X, 92-94; *Dhayl*, I, 192-198; *MZ*, 178-179; and *Bidāya*, XII, 233.

[30] He was another of the students of Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb and belonged to a family that produced several generations of renowned traditionists. Under Abū Manṣūr, Ibn al-Jawzī studied the celebrated *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*. For notices on him, see *Muntaẓam*, X, 90; *Mashyakha*, 116-118; *MZ*, 178; and *Shadharāt*, IV, 106.

[31] An expert in Shāfiʿite *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Ibn al-Jawzī reports that he was attending Abū'l-Qāsim's lectures in *ḥadīth* as early as 525 (*Mashyakha*, 82, 15-16). For more on him, see *Muntaẓam*, X, 98-99; *MZ*, 181; *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfiʿīya*, VII, 46; and *Bidāya*, XII, 234.

[32] A Sufi and the director of the Ribāṭ Bahrūz, an important Sufi center located in East Baghdad near the Niẓāmīya (cf., Jawād, *Dalīl Khāriṭat Baghdād*, 147ff.). It was there that Ibn al-Jawzī studied under Abū Naṣr (cf., *Muntaẓam*, X, 99-100; and *Mashyakha*, 162).

[33] Ibn al-Jawzī reports that he received an *ijāza* from him on the 28th of Rabiʿ I, 534/Nov. 22, 1139, though the title for which Ibn al-Jawzī received authorization is not specified (*Mashyakha*, 81-82). It might well have been an *ijāza* for Abū Manṣūr's *Kitāb al-Miftāḥ fī'l-ʿAshr* (cf., Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāya*, II, 192), a work on variant readings of the Quran that followed the "system of ten", which Ibn al-Jawzī is known to have adopted. For notices on him, see *Muntaẓam*, X, 115; and *Shadharāt*, IV, 125.

[34] An Andalusian whose penchant for exploration reportedly took him as far east as China. It was apparently on his return that he stopped off in Baghdad where he studied

Abū'l-Fatḥ al-Karūkhī (462-548/1069-1153),[35] Abū'l-Waqt as-Sijzī (d. 553/1158),[36] Saʿd Allāh b. Muḥammad (d. 557/1161),[37] and most important of all, Ibn Nāṣir (d. 550/1155). In the course of his study of *ḥadīth* he was introduced to *jarḥ wa taʿdīl*, a subdiscipline within the larger field of *ḥadīth* studies that focused on the critical analysis of *ḥadīth* reports, including both *isnāds* (chains of transmission) and *matns* (reports that formed the core of *ḥadīth*).[38] This subdiscipline caught Ibn al-Jawzī's attention, perhaps, in part, because it had been one of Ibn Nāṣir's passions and the focus of a bitter controversy that took place between Ibn Nāṣir and the Shāfiʿite Abū Saʿd as-Samʿānī,[39] but also undoubtedly because Ibn al-Jawzī came to see

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under a number of scholars including Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī. Ibn al-Jawzī's studies under him were carried out in the late 520s (*Mashyakha*, 150-152). See also *Muntaẓam*, X, 121; *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfiʿīya*, VII, 90; and *Bidāya*, XII, 238.

[35] Ibn al-Jawzī studied the *Jāmiʿ* of Tirmidhī and the *Manāqib Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal* of Abū Ismāʿīl al-Anṣārī under him. This latter work together with the *Manāqib* of Ibn Nāṣir formed an important source for Ibn al-Jawzī's own work by the same title (cf., *Muntaẓam*, X, 154-155; *Mashyakha*, 87-88; and *Shadharāt*, IV, 148).

[36] A Sufi traditionist who received his education in *ḥadīth* under the Ḥanbalī Sufi Abū Ismāʿīl al-Anṣārī and Abū'l-Ḥasan ad-Dāwūdī (d. 497/1103). Under Abū'l-Waqt, Ibn al-Jawzī studied the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Bukhārī, the *Musnad* of Dārimī, and an abridgement of the *Musnad* of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd. For notices on him, see *Muntaẓam*, X, 182-183; *Bidāya*, XII, 256; and *Shadharāt*, IV, 166.

[37] Little is known of him except that Ibn al-Jawzī studied the *Kitāb as-Sunna* of al-Lalakāʾī (d. 418/1027) under him and most likely also the *Ṣaḥīh* of Muslim, for Ibn al-Jawzī states in his *Mashyakha* that Abū'l-Barakāt was among the most reliable transmitters of Muslim in his day (193, 2). See *Muntaẓam*, X, 204; and *Mashyakha*, 191-193.

[38] See his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* (I, 106), where he underscores the importance of *matn*-analysis. There he insists that a tradition may be disqualified solely on the basis of a defective *matn*. He puts it thus: "In a tradition of this sort (i.e., one that is suspect), one should not assign undue value to the *isnād*, for an absurd text *(mustaḥīl)*, even if it comes from reliable transmitters, is to be rejected and ascribed to an error on their part. It is obvious that if a group of reliable transmitters were in agreement on the merits of a certain text and reported, e.g., that a camel passed through the eye of a needle, their reputation as reliable transmitters should not influence one's judgment regarding the merits of the text for they reported what is clearly impossible." And he follows with what for him is a fundamental principle: "Any tradition whose *matn* contravenes the canons of reason *(maʿqūl)* or is in conflict with the canonical sources *(uṣūl)* is [to be regarded as] a fabrication *(mawḍūʿ)* and it is not necessary to give it any further consideration."

[39] Most likely the debate took place sometime between 535/1140 and 550/1155. For Ibn al-Jawzī's view of the controversy, see *Muntaẓam*, X, 224 and 225.

the critical study of *ḥadīths* as an indispensable part of establishing questions of reliability that arose so often in the field of *ḥadīth* studies. While Ibn al-Jawzī wrote on all aspects of *ḥadīth* studies, he made his most important contribution to the field in the area of *jarḥ wa taʿdīl*. Among the works he later "published" on the subject was his well known, though controversial, *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, but also his *ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ wa'l-Matrūkīn*, and *Kitāb Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*.[40] *Ḥadīth* studies remained a subject of intense interest to the very end of his life. His application of the methods of *jarḥ wa taʿdīl* also, however, earned him severe reproach from the conservative wing of the Ḥanbalī school.[41]

Ibn al-Jawzī's formal study of the Quran was carried out under the direction of a series of teachers, the most important of whom were Abū'l-Qāsim b. Ḥabbār (d. 531/1136),[42] Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Khayyāṭ (d. 534/1139),[43] Abū Muḥammad al-Muqriʾ (d. 541/1146),[44] and Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 593/1196).[45] Although less is known of his education in this field, it did include the study of variant readings (*qirāʾāt*) according to the "system of ten",[46] Quranic exegesis (*tafsīr*), and the literary "analysis" of Quranic narrative. The very last of his studies on the Quran, those done under the direction of al-Bāqillānī, were carried out when he was in his eighties,

[40] For information on these works, all of which have been published, see the bibliography.

[41] This is quite clear from al-ʿAlthī's *Risāla* (for the text, see Ibn Rajab's *Dhayl*, II, 205, 18-211,1). For a translation of the *Risāla*, see the *Appendix*. For Ibn Qudāma's criticisms of Ibn al-Jawzī's approach to the *ḥadīth*, see *Dhayl*, I, 414, 21-415-2 (cf., Laoust, H. "Le Ḥanbalisme sous le caliphat de Baghdad (241/855-656/1258)", *REI*, 27 [1959], 116). For others who voiced criticisms in this area, see Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, XLII, 301ff.

[42] For notices on him see *Muntaẓam*, X, 71; and Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat an-Nihāya*, II, 335.

[43] See *Muntaẓam*, X, 104; and Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat an-Nihāya*, I, 264.

[44] The most important notices on him are in *Muntaẓam*, X, 122; *Dhayl*, I, 209-212; and Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat an-Nihāya*, I, 434-435. Cf., also *MZ*, 193-194; *Bidāya*, XII, 238; *Shadharāt*, IV, 128-129; and Ibn al-Jawzī's *Manāqib Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal*, 530.

[45] One of the most distinguished authorities in the field of Quranic readings in his time. He studied and taught in both Wasit and Baghdad. For more on him, see al-Mundhirī, *Takmila*, I, 277-278; *MZ*, 453-454; Abū Shāma, *Dhayl*, 12; and Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat an-Nihāya*, I, 460-461. It is interesting that Ibn al-Jawzī and his son Yūsuf studied together under al-Bāqillānī in Wasit. Yūsuf could hardly have been more than twelve or thirteen at the time. Ibn al-Jawzī was still in Wasit when al-Bāqillānī died.

[46] *Takmila*, I, 278; and Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghāyat an-Nihāya*, I,

while he was living in Wasit under difficult conditions, to say the least.

His studies in *fiqh* were begun in 525/1130, at about the age of fifteen, under the direction of Ibn Zāghūnī, a well known Ḥanbalī authority. With the death of the latter in 527/1131,[47] Ibn al-Jawzī transferred to Abū Bakr ad-Dīnawarī, and on his death in 532/1137[48] he continued under Abū Ḥakīm an-Nahrawānī, a prominent Ḥanbalī authority on *fiqh* and the holder of two professorships in the field of jurisprudence.[49] Ibn al-Jawzī must have been one of Abū Ḥakīm's better students; not only did he serve as the latter's assistant (*muʿīd*), but when Abū Ḥakīm died in 556/1160 Ibn al-Jawzī was appointed to the chair of jurisprudence in the two *madrasas* where Abū Ḥakīm had taught until his death. Ibn al-Jawzī's close relationship to the *vizier*, Ibn Hubayra, may well have been a factor in his appointment to these two highly desirable positions. Over the next several decades Ibn al-Jawzī was appointed to a number of distinguished chairs in *fiqh* in other *madrasas*. By 574/1178 he was teaching jurisprudence in five different *madrasas*.[50] Although Ibn al-Jawzī "published" a number of treatises in the field of law,[51] his legal works never attracted the attention his writings in

[47] For biographical details, see *Muntaẓam*, X, 30-31, *Mashyakha*, 79-81; *Dhayl*, I, 180-184; *Bidāya*, XII, 220; and *Shadharāt*, IV, 80-81. He was one of the three Ḥanbalīs whose theological views come under severe criticism in *KAS*. See notes to the Translation §37, for a fuller treatment of this important figure along with a fuller listing of sources on him.

[48] See *Muntaẓam*, X, 73; *Dhayl*, I, 190-191; *Bidāya*, XII, 228; and *Shadharāt*, IV, 98-99.

[49] His legal expertise included Ḥanbalī law (*madhhab*), comparative law (*khilāf*), inheritance law (*farāʾiḍ*) and the art of legal disputation (*jadal,munāẓara*) (Dimyātī, *Mustafād*, 155, 8-10). For most of his professional career, Abū Ḥakīm taught in a *madrasa* which he himself had built in the Bāb al-Azaj quarter of East Baghdad. During the last year of his life, Ibn Shamḥal(?), a wealthy merchant, constructed a *madrasa* in the Maʾmūnīya quarter of East Baghdad and several months before Abū Ḥakīm's death had the latter installed as its *mudarris*. His installation took place on the 21st of Rabīʿ II, 556/April 19, 1161 but he only held the position for several months, since he died on the 13th of Jumāda II that same year/ June 9, 1161. For additional details, see *Muntaẓam*, X, 201-202; *MZ*, 236; *Mashyakha*, 184-186; *Manāqib*, 532; and *Dhayl*, I, 239-241.

[50] Cf., *Muntaẓam*, X, 284, 17-18; and *Dhayl*, I, 408, 409, 14-15. In the same connection Ibn al-Jawzī reports that by this time he had authored "one hundred and thirty works (*muṣannafāt*)" (*Muntaẓam*, X, 284, 17-18).

[51] A discipline he regarded as the most fundamental of the religious sciences (in his *Lafta*, he tells his son Abū'l-Qāsim: والفقه أصل العلوم [34, 3]). The list of his works in *fiqh*

other fields did, especially those having to do with *ḥadīth*, *waʿẓ* and *uṣūl ad-dīn*.[52]

His Spiritual Quest

Ibn al-Jawzī's pursuit of an education in the standard religious disciplines was part of a larger, equally intense, spiritual quest. It is difficult at this distance to know what drove that quest, but it did bring him into contact with both asceticism (*zuhd*) and mysticism (*taṣawwuf*). Although his practice of the ascetic and mystical life lost some of its intensity with the passing of time, both left an indelible mark on him. From his practice of asceticism he came to appreciate the values of the simple life grounded in discipline and self denial. This comes out clearly in his *Laftat al-Kabid*.[53] During the years that followed his encounter with asceticism he produced a number of works commending the spirit and the practical values of asceticism, among them *Ṣafwat aṣ-Ṣafwa*,[54] *Dhamm al-Hawā*,[55] and *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*,[56] as well as a series of biographical works celebrating the ascetic ideal as he saw it

given by Ibn Rajab contains eleven titles that can be identified as works in law (*Dhayl*, I, 418, 16-22); Sibṭ places the number at eighteen (*MZ*, 485). Some of these titles were undoubtedly short works on specific legal questions.

[52] Alongside the various religious disciplines that were part of his academic regimen, he also studied grammar, philology and the *belles-lettres* under ʿAlī b. al-Jawālīqī (d. 540/1145), a leading Ḥanbalī scholar who occupied the chair of Arabic studies at the Niẓāmīya (Dimyāṭī, *Mustafād*, 155, 10). For notices on him, see *Muntaẓam*, X, 118; *Dhayl*, I, 204; Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VII, 197-199; and Ibn al-Anbārī's *Nuzhat al-Alibbā*, 473-478.

[53] E.g., *Lafta*, 37, 1ff.

[54] A major work consisting of 4 volumes. No serious study has yet been done on this work, to the best of my knowledge.

[55] See Leder's *Ibn al-Ǧauzi und seine Kompilation wider die Leidenschaft, der Traditionalist in gelehrter Überlieferung und originärer Lehre* (Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1884) for an excellent in-depth study of *Dhamm al-Hawā* within the context of Ibn al-Jawzī's life and thought.

[56] For an interesting study of the work, see, D. Reig, "Le *Ṣayd al-Ḫāṭir* d' Abū l-Faraǧ ibn al-Ǧawzī", *SI*, 34 (1971), 89-123. For a translation of portions of the work, see Reig, La *Pensée vigile: Sayd al-Khâtir par Ibn al-Jawzî* (Paris: Sindbad,1986), 331 pages. Suffice it to say here that *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* is an immensely important work for an understanding of Ibn al-Jawzī the man, his views on a wide range of subjects and, since it was written over a period of some twenty years, reflects the movement of his thought under the increasing influence of Ibn ʿAqīl.

exemplified in the lives of people like Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawīya, Ibrāhīm b. Adham, Bishr al-Ḥāfī, Fuḍayl b. ʿIyāḍ, and others.[57]

Though somewhat less is known of Ibn al-Jawzī's involvement with Sufism, it is clear that he came into contact with its teachings at an early age. Some of his first teachers were Sufis, among them Abū'l-Qāsim al-ʿAlawī (d. 527/1132), Abū'l-Waqt as-Sijzī (d. 553/1158), Abū Bakr al-ʿĀmirī (d. 530/1135), and Aḥmad b. Maʿālī (d. 554/1159). From these and undoubtedly others he was introduced to the writings of the great Sufi masters.[58] A careful reading of his early life along with several of his better known works shows that Ibn al-Jawzī considered himself a *Sufi*.[59] In spite of his attraction to Sufism, however, he was troubled by some of the more "extreme" forms of mystical piety, and went on to write a number of works in which he subjected this kind of Sufism to criticism. His specific criticisms can be found in a number of his works, particularly his *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, *Dhamm al-Hawā*, *Ṣafwat aṣ-Ṣafwa*, *Talbīs Iblīs*, et cetera. His *Kitāb fī Dhamm ʿAbd al-Qādir* undoubtedly belongs to this list.[60] Although he differed with Ibn ʿAqīl over the matter of al-Ḥallāj,[61] in general the position he adopted with respect to Sufism was close to that of Ibn ʿAqīl: a deep respect, even admiration, for Sufism in its more disciplined forms along with a distrust of mysticism in its more radical and popular forms. His criticism of its later, less controlled, expressions ought not be taken as a criticism of Sufism as such. It is significant that after his return to Baghdad in 595/1198, Ibn al-Jawzī asked his Sufi friend and confidant, Ibn Sukayna, to initiate his youngest son, Yūsuf, into Sufism and requested that he be given a Sufi

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[57] For more on these titles, see the bibliography of the present study, and especially ʿAlwajī, *Muʾallafāt Ibn al-Jawzī* (1992), 144, 222-231.

[58] He was well acquainted with the *Ḥilyat al-Awliyāʾ* of Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣbahānī (d. 430/1038); though he was critical of certain features of the work, he deeply admired it and went on to produce a four-volume abridgment entitled *Ṣafwat aṣ-Ṣafwa* in which he updates the *Ḥilya* by including notices on a number of mystics and ascetics who lived after Abū Nuʿaym. One of the most recent notices included in the *Ṣafwa* is that of Abū'l-Barakāt al-Anmāṭī (d. 535/1140), a man under whom Ibn al-Jawzī studied *ḥadīth* (*Mashyakha*, 85-86).

[59] As G. Makdisi has shown, the evidence is unequivocal (G. Makdisi, "The Ḥanbalī School and Sufism", *Humaniora Islamica*, II [1974], 61-72, especially 69-71).

[60] *Dhayl*, I, 420, 14. This work, which was once thought to be lost, is apparently exant (cf., ʿAlwajī, *Muʾallafāt*, 178-179).

[61] *EI*^{2}, III, 699-700.

cloak (*khirqa*) as a symbol of his new life as a Sufi.[62] The ceremony of initiation and investiture took place in Ibn al-Jawzī's own home in the Qaṭuftā quarter of West Baghdad.[63] It was entirely natural that on Ibn al-Jawzī's death the family should confer on Ibn Sukayna the honor of preparing the corpse for burial.[64]

His Professional Life and Achievements

Ibn al-Jawzī's professional life, or at least its more public phase, began in the mid 540's (ca. 1150-1152) during the *vizirate* of Ibn Hubayra,[65] and came to an end in 590/1193 with his arrest and exile to Wasit. During the middle decades of his life, Ibn al-Jawzī's activities took several forms: he preached on a more or less regular basis from some of the most prestigious pulpits of Baghdad, among them Jāmiᶜ al-Manṣūr (the leading cathedral mosque of West Baghdad) and the Jāmiᶜ al-Qaṣr (the Palace Mosque located on the East Bank). He was active as a teacher of *ḥadīth*, *fiqh* and *waᶜẓ*, training younger scholars in these fields. His reputation as a scholar is indicated by the frequency with which *ijāzas* were requested.[66] There is no

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[62] Yūsuf, or Muḥyīʾd-Dīn, as he was often known, would have been approximately eighteen at the time.

[63] The Qaṭuftā quarter was located near the tomb of Maᶜrūf al-Karkhī (*Muᶜjam al-Buldān*, IV, 384/1).

[64] See *MZ*, 500; and *Dhayl*, I, 428. On Ibn Sukayna, one of the best known and most respected Sufis of Baghdad at the time, see *Takmila*, II, 201-202; Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, XLIII, 252-256 (cf., Dhahabī, *Mukhtaṣar*, 263); and the lengthy notice in Ibn Najjār's *Dhayl ᶜalā Taʾrīkh Baghdad* (I, 354-371). On his relationship to Ibn al-Jawzī and his role in the ceremony of initiation for Muḥyīʾd-Dīn, see the account given by Abū Shāma in his *Dhayl*, 70, 18-20. Virtually all of the notices on Ibn Sukayna report that he had been especially close to Ibn al-Jawzī's uncle Ibn Nāṣir and had studied under him (cf., Dhahabī, *Ibid*, 254, 13-15). It is clear that Ibn Sukayna had long been associated with the circle in which Ibn al-Jawzī moved for many years.

[65] A Ḥanbalī activist who was elevated to the post of vizier in 544/1149 by the caliph al-Muqtafī (reigned 530-555/1135-1160), and who included Ibn al-Jawzī and other Ḥanbalīs in the circle of his unofficial advisers. On Ibn al-Jawzī's relationship with him, see my introduction to *Kitāb al-Quṣṣāṣ*, 27-30. For a more in-depth study, see Herbert Mason's *Two Statesmen of Medieval Islam*, 13-66; and G. Makdisi's art. on him in *EI*^{2}, III, 802-803.

[66] The *ijāza*, which carried with it the authority to teach a particular text, conferred distinction on its recipient and indicated progress in the mastery of a discipline and, in cases of distinguished works, added significantly to the recipient's credentials. As G. Vajda

way to know how many *ijāzas* he issued over the course of his life as an active scholar; however, judging by the frequency with which they are mentioned in the biographical literature they must have been in the dozens, if not more. When the noted Andalusian *ʿālim*, Ibn Jubayr, came to Baghdad in 588/1192, he left several months later with an *ijāza* from Ibn al-Jawzī.[67]

During the years between 540/1145 and 590/1193 Ibn al-Jawzī was active writing books and tracts in a range of disciplines: history, biography, the Quran, tradition, jurisprudence, theology,[68] and *waʿẓ* (preaching). The Jawzian corpus also included several works on medicine (*ṭibb*), at least one of which is extant and has recently been published,[69] and several volumes of poetry[70] along with several works that can best be classified as literature of a more profane sort (*adab*).[71] He was, without doubt, one of the most prolific writers of his century.[72] Ibn al-Jawzī wrote no works on *kalām* (rational theology),[73] properly so-called, that is, manuals of the sort authored

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rightly points out, the practice of granting *ijāzas* was not limited to the field of *ḥadīṯ;* it was used widely in *fiqh* and *tafsīr* as well as works of a historical, mystical and theological nature (*EI*^{2}, III, 1020-1021). For more on the historical evolution of this institution see the article by G. Vajda.

[67] Cf., Nājiya A. A. Ibrāhīm, *al-Miṣbāḥ*, I, 36; for references to other eminent scholars who received *ijāzas* from Ibn al-Jawzī, see Ḥakīm, *Ibn al-Jawzī*, 94-99.

[68] Theology of the sort that went under the rubric of *uṣūl ad-dīn* and had to do with the foundational religious principles on which religious belief rested.

[69] His writings in this area remain to be studied, but it is perhaps a question of *ṭibb nabawī* ("prophetic medicine") or, more likely, a traditional kind of medicine influenced by Hellenistic medicine. For more on these two traditions of medieval medicine, see the article by E. Savage-Smith, "*Ṭibb*", *EI*^{2}, X, 453-460. See ʿAlwajī, *Muʾallafāt Ibn al-Jawzī*, 280, for a list of his works on medicine. Not all of those listed by ʿAlwajī in this category, however, are actually works of medicine.

[70] ʿAlwajī, *Ibid*, 281.

[71] See e.g., his *Kitāb al-Adhkiyāʾ* (Beirut and Damascus, 1985); and his *Akhbār al-Ḥamqā wa'l-Mughaffalīn* (Beirut 1985), etc. Works of this class, often humorous in character, reveal the lighter side of the man. He obviously enjoyed a good laugh.

[72] For details on the Jawzian corpus, see *Muʾallafāt Ibn al-Jawzī* (Kuwait, 1992) by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-ʿAlwajī, an Iraqi scholar who has devoted many years to a study of the writings of Ibn al-Jawzī.

[73] Referring to *kalām* as "rational theology" is admittedly an oversimplification. It is sometimes also referred to as dialectic or dialectical theology on account of the method it employs, but this too is not an entirely satisfactory designation. For a fuller account of the discipline and methodology of *kalām*, see Frank, R. M. "The Science of *Kalām*," *Arabic*

by the 11th century Ḥanbalī, Abū Yaʿlā, but he did write a number of works that might be called *kalām*-style works, that is, works that make use of the terminology and methods of argumentation employed by the authors of the classical works on *kalām*. What I have termed Ibn al-Jawzī's *kalām*-style works are generally classified by medieval bibliographers under the rubric of *uṣūl ad-dīn*. Ibn Rajab, for example, lists thirteen titles under this heading.[74] There can be no doubt that Ibn al-Jawzī was genuinely interested in *kalām*, but it is also a discipline regarding which he had certain reservations. His ambivalence had to do with at least two things: 1) he regarded the traditional, systematic manuals on *kalām* as pretentious, not only because they attempted to include within their purview the entire gamut of religious beliefs but, more seriously, because they presumed to have within their grasp more or less definitive answers to questions that were, in Ibn al-Jawzī's view, beyond the competence of reason, even at its best, to adjudicate. As we shall see later, Ibn al-Jawzī had a quite robust faith in the power of reason, but he also knew that reason had its limits. Although the *mutakallimūn*[75] acknowledged this point at the level of theory, they did not observe it sufficiently in practice. 2) Secondly, the specialists on *kalām* too often carried on their discourse in public or quasi-public settings where lay persons were exposed to the questions and style of reasoning used by them. Ibn al-Jawzī insisted that such persons are simply not equipped to deal with the technical terminology and the methods of argumentation used in this discipline; discourse on *kalām* in such a setting can only serve to undermine the faith of ordinary believers.[76]

During the period he was actively engaged in teaching and writing, he also devoted considerable time to the study of Islam's religious and intellectual history. Indeed, for Ibn al-Jawzī study and reflection are essential preconditions for the writing of books—certainly if one is to write books capable of

Sciences and Philosophy, II (1992), 7-37; J. van Ess, The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology," *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture* (Wiesbaden, 1970), 21-50; van Ess, "Early Development of *Kalam*," *Studies on the First Century of Islamic Society* (Urbana: 1982), 109-123; and A. I. Sabra, "Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islamic Theology," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, IX (1994), 1-42.

[74] *Dhayl*, I, 418, 4-9. That *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* does not appear in any of these lists raises questions that will be taken up in the next chapter.

[75] Experts on *kalām* and *uṣūl ad-dīn*.

[76] Ibn al-Jawzī reiterates this point repeatedly in *KAS*.

challenging their readers. His formal education gave him direct exposure to the Quran and the *ḥadīth* along with the commentary literature on these two sets of texts. In many ways, his work during these years built on—and was a continuation of—the work done during the years of his formal training. His reading covered the entire spectrum of the medieval curriculum with the exception of philosophy, mathematics, and some of the natural sciences.

That he read works on *kalām* we can be sure, though we can be less certain of the extent of his reading in this field. We do know that he was well acquainted with Ḥanbalī works of this genre such as, for example, the *Muʿtamad* of Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1065),[77] the *Irshād fī ʿUṣūl ad-Dīn* [78] and the *Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*[79] of Ibn ʿAqīl (d.513/1119), et cetera. As his *Manāqib Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal* demonstrates, he was thoroughly grounded in the history of Ḥanbalī thought. His knowledge, however, was not limited to Ḥanbalī sources. Among the non-Ḥanbalī works he read, and admired, were the writings of Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī (d. 398/1007),[80] the works of Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066),[81] Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015),[82] ʿAbd

[77] We are fortunate in having a critical edition of this work done some years ago now by W. Haddad and published under the title *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn* (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1974). Haddad's introduction, though brief, does describe the work's historical and intellectual *sitz im leben*. Abū Yaʿlā may well have been the first Ḥanbalī to write a work on *kalām* from a Ḥanbalī perspective. There were Ḥanbalī's who criticized Abū Yaʿlā for having essentially abdicated the "true" Ḥanbalī position by daring to meddle in *kalām* at all. For more on Abū Yaʿlā, see notes to the translation of *KAS* §37.

[78] The work, whose full title was *al-Irshād fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, is lost. For more on the work, see G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 513-514.

[79] Parts of which deal with questions of *kalām*. *Al-Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* is fortunately extant and is now in the process of being published. The first two volumes have appeared and the third is scheduled to come out shortly.

[80] Although there is some uncertainty as to his theological affiliation, there are grounds on which to believe that he was at least influenced by Ashʿarite thought, if not himself an Ashʿarite. For more on him, see notes to *KAS* §27.

[81] See especially the notices on him in *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfiʿīya*, IV, 8-16; and *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 242 (cf., also *GAL*, I, 363). For a fuller account of his place within the history of Ashʿarite thought, see Allard, *Attributs divins*, 342-372. For a general assessment of his work as a traditionist, Robson's article in *EI*^{2} (I, 1130) is useful.

[82] Although Ibn Fūrak is not cited by name in *KAS*, it is clear that Ibn al-Jawzī was acquainted with his writings, especially his *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth*, and possibly other of his writings. For notices on him, see *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfiʿīya*, IV, 127-135; and *Shadharāt*, III, 181-182 (see also *GAS*, I, 610-611, where additional sources are given). On his place

al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037),[83] and al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111),[84] all of whom, with the possible exception of al-Khaṭṭābī, were members of the Ashᶜarite school. Ibn al-Jawzī was acquainted with the views of the eminent Ashᶜarite theologian al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1078) partly through the writings of Ibn ᶜAqīl,[85] but also, in part, from his own reading of works such as al-Juwaynī's *ash-Shāmil fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*.[86] He may also have had some exposure to the writings of al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), but it is difficult to document. Whether he knew of the writings of Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) is not known; it certainly cannot be ruled out though it appears unlikely. It is clear from *KAS* that he was acquainted with the views of Ibn Kullāb and the Kullābīya.[87] Beyond this, little more at present can be said regarding his knowledge of the literature produced by Ashᶜarites and the closely related Kullābīya. Though he had a high regard for the writings of the early Ḥanafīs, his knowledge of the closely related Māturīdīya is unclear.

Even less is known of his firsthand knowledge of Muᶜtazilī works on *kalām*. He would have been introduced to Muᶜtazilī thought through the writings of Ibn ᶜAqīl, especially his *Kitāb al-Funūn*. The only Muᶜtazilī

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within the history of Ashᶜarism, see Allard, *Attributs divins*, 326-329; and *EI*², III, 766-767.

[83] For sources on him, see *GAL*, I, 385, and Suppl. I, 666. For an assessment of his contributions to Ashᶜarism, see Allard, *Attributs divins*, 312-342; and Tritton's article on him in *EI*², I, 909.

[84] Ibn al-Jawzī was acquainted with at least some of the writings of al-Ghazzālī; he refers frequently to his *Iḥyāʾ ᶜUlūm ad-Dīn* from which he occasionally quotes, though he is frequently critical of the work (particularly for what Ibn al-Jawzī regards as a tendency to rely too much on discredited *ḥadīths*) and went on to make a revision and abridgement of the work under the title of *Minhāj al-Qāsidīn* (for more on this work, see A. Hartmann, "Ambivalences", 103, n. 123). I have not attempted a systematic survey of references to al-Ghazzālī in the writings of Ibn al-Jawzī, but I have come across a number (e.g., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 453, 6ff.; 569, 10-11; etc.).—For an interesting and informative discussion of al-Ghazzālī's significance within the history of medieval *kalām*, see R. Frank, *al-Ghazālī and the Ashᶜarite School* (1994).

[85] See *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (158, 6f.) where Ibn ᶜAqīl is the source of Ibn al-Jawzī's information on al-Juwaynī. In this passage he refers to al-Juwaynī's contention that God's knowledge is limited to universals (*jumal al-ashyāʾ*) and cannot, by the nature of things, be extended to particulars (*tafāṣīl*).

[86] See, e.g., the reference to the *Shāmil* in *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (570, 2ff.) where he quotes at length from the work.

[87] On Ibn Kullāb and the Kullābīya, see the excellent article by J. van Ess, *EI*² (Supplement), 391-392.

works cited by Ibn al-Jawzī that I have identified so far are the *Maqālāt* of Abū'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d.319/931), the *Kitāb al-Ārā' wa'd-Diyānāt* of Nawbakhtī (d.307/920),[88] and possibly the commentary of az-Zamakhshārī (d. 538/1143). He had a special interest in the views of early Muʿtazilīs such as Abū ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd (d. 144/762), Abū'l-Hudhayl (d. 226/841), Thumāma (d. 213/828), Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 217/833), and the inimitable Ibn Rāwandī (d. ca. 250/864), whose views held great fascination for Ibn al-Jawzī despite the sharp criticisms he levels against the man. One of the longest biographical notices in the entire *Muntaẓam* is devoted to Ibn Rāwandī.[89] Ibn al-Jawzī's interest in the Muʿtazila was not limited to the early period, however. If one peruses Ibn al-Jawzī's *Muntaẓam*, one can scarcely fail to note the substantial, and sometimes lengthy, notices devoted to Muʿtazilī thinkers.[90] It seems unlikely that he was acquainted with the works of al-Jubbā'ī (d. 303/915) and ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024) or the later generations of Muʿtazilīs, though again that should not be ruled out.

Among the writings that helped to shape the views of Ibn al-Jawzī and give direction to its evolution, none were more important than those of Ibn ʿAqīl, to whom we have already referred. Ibn al-Jawzī's interest in Ibn ʿAqīl[91] was probably first sparked through conversations with his maternal uncle, Ibn Nāṣir.[92] It is most likely, however, that Ibn al-Jawzī's knowledge of Ibn ʿAqīl's thought developed gradually over a period of years, as a result of which he came increasingly to find the views of Ibn ʿAqīl persuasive. The earliest of Ibn al-Jawzī's writings that can be dated with confidence, his *Dhamm al-Hawā*—written between 560/1164 and 566/1170—reflects the influence of Ibn ʿAqīl.[93] The thought of Ibn ʿAqīl continued to be reflected

[88] See *Talbīs*, 82-85.

[89] Ibn al-Jawzī did not shrink from voicing his reservations regarding some of the views he held (for more on Ibn Rāwandī, see *KAS*, e.g., §§27-29, and notes).

[90] The notice he devotes to Ibn Burhān (d. 456/1063) is rather typical of his treatment of Muʿtazilīs and does reflect intense interest in the theological challenges (for non-Muʿtazilīs) posed by Muʿtazilī views (*Muntaẓam*, VIII, 236-237).

[91] Ibn al-Jawzī was only four or five at the time of Ibn ʿAqīl's death in 513/1119 and probably had never met him. For more on Ibn ʿAqīl, see notes to the Translation §21.

[92] Ibn Nāṣir had studied under Ibn ʿAqīl and was acquainted with his writings. Given the role Ibn Nāṣir played in the formative period of Ibn al-Jawzī's life, it is most likely through him that Ibn al-Jawzī first became acquainted with the writings of Ibn ʿAqīl.

[93] As S. Leder shows, *Dhamm al-Hawā* could not have been written later than 566/1070

increasingly in his later writings, among them *Talbīs Iblīs*, *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, *Dafᶜ Shubah at-Tashbīh*, and *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*, to name a few. Almost certainly the *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl* belongs to this list.[94] As his interest in Ibn ᶜAqīl grew, Ibn al-Jawzī made a serious effort to acquire for himself copies of Ibn ᶜAqīl's writings. He possessed the original of Ibn ᶜAqīl's controversial work on al-Ḥallāj.[95] We also know that he owned a set of Ibn ᶜAqīl's *Kitāb al-Funūn* (which, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, consisted of one hundred and fifty volumes); he must have found it unwieldy, because he later made an abridgment of the work in ten volumes under the title of *Muntakhab al-Funūn*.[96] He also commissioned a copy of Ibn ᶜAqīl's *al-Wāḍiḥ* for his own library. Only one copy of this four-volume work is extant today; Ibn al-Jawzī's signature, plus the notations which are found at the beginning of volumes one and three indicate that this is the very copy that was once a part of Ibn al-Jawzī's personal library.[97] The sole surviving volume of *Kitāb al-Funūn* once belonged to Ibn al-Jawzī.[98] Although not much of the ᶜAqīlian corpus has survived, the bulk of what has come down to us we owe to Ibn al-Jawzī.

Apart from Ibn Nāṣir (and perhaps Ibn Hubayra), Ibn ᶜAqīl was the single most important influence in his thought, especially that of the mature Ibn al-Jawzī. He did, of course, differ with Ibn ᶜAqīl, even on important questions, but when he parted company with Ibn ᶜAqīl he always did so with the utmost respect.[99] On the most critical issues of the day, Ibn

and possibly as early as 560/1164 (*Ibn al-Ǧauzi und seine Kompilation wider die Leidenschaft*, 43-44). On the influence of Ibn ᶜAqīl as reflected in *Dhamm al-Hawā*, see Leder, *Ibid*, 241-245.

[94] For more on the *Minhāj*, see the following section of the *Introduction*.

[95] In his account of the events of 461/1068, Ibn al-Jawzī reports the following: "In his youth [Ibn ᶜAqīl] had written a short treatise (*juzʾ*) in which he praised al-Ḥallāj. In this work, which I have in Ibn ᶜAqīl's own hand, he interprets the teachings of al-Ḥallāj metaphorically, explains the mysteries [of which al-Ḥallāj spoke] and offers a justification" (*Muntaẓam*, VIII, 254, 10-12). The treatise bore the title *Juzʾ fī Naṣr al-Ḥallāj* (cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ᶜAqīl*, 517).

[96] *MZ*, 84, 5-8; and *Dhayl*, I, 420-421.

[97] *Al-Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, 13-16, 20 and 24 (the English *Introduction*); 4-6 (Arabic *Introduction*).

[98] Makdisi, *Ibn ᶜAqīl's Notebooks: Kitāb al-Funūn*, esp., xxxvi-xxxvii.

[99] Ibn Rajab captures fairly accurately his attitude toward Ibn ᶜAqīl when he writes of Ibn al-Jawzī: وكان معظمًا لأبي الوفاء بن عقيل، يتابعه في أكثر ما يجد في كلامه وإن كان قد ردّ

al-Jawzī saw eye-to-eye with Ibn ʿAqīl: both insisted on the primacy of reason; both maintained that whenever a literal interpretation of the divine attributes leads to an anthropomorphic representation of God, metaphorical interpretation is mandatory; both rejected the doctrine of the beatific vision in its traditional form, for since God is a non-corporeal being He cannot be an object of vision. Both were critical of *kalām,* not because *kalām* made use of reason, but rather because, at the hands of the dogmatic theologians (*mutakallimūn*), *kalām* made claims that were "excessive".

Ibn al-Jawzī not only valued Ibn ʿAqīl as a thinker, as we have seen; he had the deepest regard for him as a person, for his intellectual honesty and his willingness to take positions that were in opposition to the dominant currents within the Ḥanbalī school of his day. Both as a thinker and as a person he was a source of inspiration and a model to be emulated.

Exile, Rehabilitation and Death

For reasons that will be examined in more detail in the following section of the *Introduction*, Ibn al-Jawzī became progressively alienated from the Ḥanbalī school during the 570s and the 580s (from ca. 1174 to ca. 1193). The causes were many and complex: there were bitter personal rivalries, complicated inter- and intra-family dynamics, competing political interests and, above all, divergent religious and intellectual allegiances. For Ibn al-Jawzī the principal, though not the only, issues at stake were theological,

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عليه في بعض المسائل (He had a very high regard for Ibn ʿAqīl and agreed with most of what he found in his writings, though he did sometimes differ with him) (*Dhayl*, I, 414, 17-18). In the last chapter of his *Manāqib Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal,* Ibn al-Jawzī devotes a notice to Ibn ʿAqīl where he speaks of him in the following terms: "He was a giant in the field of *uṣūl* and *furūʿ* (the foundational principles of law and their application). He had a pleasant disposition (*khāṭir ʿāṭir*), a penetrating intellect and a subtle intelligence. He dominated his peers in legal disputation (*munāẓara*) and produced some immensely important works. Those who study his writings carefully and read what he has to say in [works like] his *Kitāb al-Funūn*...will begin to appreciate the measure of the man" (*Manāqib*, 526-527; cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 47). In chapter 13 of his *Kitāb al-Adhkiyāʾ*, Ibn al-Jawzī devotes brief notices to those best known for their quick and penetrating intelligence among the *ʿulamāʾ* from early Islam to his own time. Among the handful of names included in this chapter are Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, Shāfiʿī, Ṭabarī and Ibn ʿAqīl. That Ibn ʿAqīl is the only one from the 11th and 12th centuries to find a place among such luminaries is eloquent testimony to the kind of regard Ibn al-Jawzī had for the man.

and, judging from both the tone and substance of al-ᶜAlthī's *Risāla*, this was also the case for his critics.[100] It is clear from the *Risāla* that Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*[101] had become a lightning-rod, as it were, for Ḥanbalī anger. It is impossible, however, at this stage to say which of these factors[102] eventually tipped the scales of fortune against Ibn al-Jawzī. But in 590/1194,[103] thanks to the efforts of a coalition made up of Ibn al-Jawzī's Ḥanbalī opponents led by Rukn ad-Dīn ᶜAbd as-Salām[104] and a Shīᶜite *vizier*, Ibn al-Qaṣṣāb,[105] he was arrested while working in his library at the *Madrasa ash-Shāṭiʾīya*,[106] and forcibly taken to Wasit under the cover of darkness;

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[100] See Appendix for a translation of al-ᶜAlthī's *Risāla*; note esp., §§ 8-11, though there are references to this point scattered throughout the *Risāla* (see Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, II, 205-211, for the Arabic text of the *Risāla*). For Ibn Qudāma's criticisms of Ibn al-Jawzī, see *Dhayl*, I, 414, 21-15-2 (cf., Laoust, H. "Le Ḥanbalisme sous le caliphat de Baghdad (241/855-656/1258)", *REI*, 27 [1959], 116). For others who voiced criticisms in this area, see Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, XLII, 301ff.

[101] For more on the *Risāla* and its relationship to *KAS*, see the *Appendix*.

[102] It was most likely a result of the interplay of a variety of factors. Sibṭ, an eye-witness to the events, notes that people had widely differing explanations for what happened (*MZ*, 440).

[103] Only Dhahabī reports that the arrest occurred in the month of Shawwāl 590/September 1194 (*Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, XLI, 95, 10-12).

[104] A grandson of the legendary Ḥanbalī mystic, ᶜAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 561/1165).

[105] On him, see the comments of Sibṭ (*MZ*, 438, 6-8) and Dhahabī (*Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, XLII, 250, 116-18). Neither was an unbiased reporter, of course. Ibn Qaṣṣāb was a Shīᶜite, as we have noted, and his appointment to the vizirate marked the return of Shīᶜites to the power-politics of Baghdad at the highest level—from which they had been excluded early in the caliphate of al-Mustaḍīʾ (reigned from 566 to 575/1170-1179).

[106] The *madrasa* also had residential quarters where he lived with his family. On this *madrasa* and its history, see A. Hartmann, "Ambivalences", 67-69.—For the most detailed account of the events leading up to Ibn al-Jawzī's arrest in 590, see A. Hartmann, "Ambivalences", 67ff., and notes. Among contemporary sources, the most riveting account comes from Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, who was present in his grandfather's study (located in the *sirdāb* of the *madrasa*), when suddenly burly men forced their way into the study. He was seized and the library put under seal. Sibṭ also reports that Ibn al-Jawzī's family was treated rudely and expelled from the residence by the men who had come to arrest his grandfather. How the family survived and under what circumstances Sibṭ, who otherwise gives us the most detailed account of the event and its aftermath, does not say. For the most important accounts of the arrest and what followed, see *MZ*, 438-439; Abū Shāma, *Dhayl*, 6, 13ff.; Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, I, 426; *Bidāya*, XIII, 11, 5-8; and Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, XLI, 95.

there he was placed under house arrest.[107] Almost over night a reputation that had been so meticulously and successfully constructed had come crashing down, it seemed. It was an enormous humiliation for a very proud and self-confident man. Despite his age, however, and the primitive conditions under which he was forced to live in Wasit,[108] he managed somehow to survive. Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, who was an eye-witness to his grandfather's arrest and who paid an occasional visit to Wasit, reports that he spent a good part of each day in Wasit reciting the Quran and poetry to himself.[109] Although the recitation of the Quran bouyed his spirit, Sibṭ tells us that when his grandfather came to the surah of Yūsuf (no. 12) in the course of his recitation, he had to skip over it because the surah reminded him of his own son Yūsuf, from whom he was now separated. The pain was almost more than he could bear.[110] Sibṭ also reports that during the years in Wasit he composed several volumes of poetry. If one is permitted to read between the lines of Sibṭ's account, it was the Quran and poetry, it seems, that helped him deal with the emotional pain of humiliation and the anger that welled up within him at what had seemed to him to be a miscarriage of justice. Although he lived alone, he was allowed to receive members of his family on occasion—and undoubtedly others to whom he had been close—and to continue his studies. Dhahabī reports that during his stay in Wasit he read the *Irshād*[111] of Qazwīnī under the direction of Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī and

[107] As we have seen, the leading Ḥanbalī actor on the side against Ibn al-Jawzī was Rukn ad-Dīn ʿAbd as-Salām, a grandson of the well known Ḥanbalī Sufi, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 561/1165). He was among the party that made the arrest; he was also one of those who accompanied Ibn al-Jawzī to Wasit that very same night and saw to it that he was placed under house arrest in Wasit (for Sibṭ's assessment of ʿAbd as-Salām, see *MZ*, 571, 11-21; according to Sibṭ he died a very troubled man).—What is perhaps most startling of all is the role played by Ibn al-Jawzī's eldest son, Abū'l-Qāsim, who worked quietly behind the scenes with ʿAbd as-Salām. Apparently the relationship between Ibn al-Jawzī and Abū'l-Qāsim had been a troubled one dating back as far as 580/1184. Ibn al-Jawzī himself alludes to it in his *Laftat al-Kabid* (21ff.), as we have already seen. For Dhahabī's comments on him, see *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, XLII, 295, 12-15.

[108] Having for many years depended on the women of the family to look after his needs, he was now completely on his own. Sibṭ reports that he was not allowed to visit the public bath in the entire five years he was in Wasit.

[109] *MZ*, 482, 22.

[110] MZ, 439, 8-10. Cf., also Abū Shāma, *Dhayl*, 6, 13-15; and *Bidāya*, XIII, 11, 5-6.

[111] ʿUmar ʿAbd as-Salām Tadmurī, editor of *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, gives the title as *al-Irshād*

continued his work on Quranic exegesis.[112] There can be no doubt that these were difficult years. Despite the humiliation that he had suffered and the hardships under which he lived, there is no sign of his ever having recanted the views against which his Ḥanbalī colleagues had so vigorously protested.

Finally in the month of Rajab 595/April 1199, near the end of his fifth year in Wasit, the caliph an-Nāṣir issued an order releasing him from detention and giving him permission to return to Baghdad. Had it not been for the persistent efforts of his son, Yūsuf, and the caliph's mother, Zumurrud, Ibn al-Jawzī might well have remained in Wasit until his death. He was reportedly given a hero's welcome on his arrival in Baghdad.

The last years of his life in Baghdad appear to have been quiet ones. By then he was in his late eighties, and his health was fragile both as a result of his age and the hardship he had endured while in Wasit. Two years after his return, following the delivery of a homily before a large crowd at the mausoleum of Zumurrud, on the 7th of Ramaḍān 597 (June 12, 1201) he fell seriously ill. On the 13th of Ramaḍān (June 17) his condition worsened; as the day progressed he became delirious,[113] and during the evening hours he quietly slipped away. The day following his death, after Ibn Sukayna and Ḍiyā'd-Dīn b. al-Khayr had completed the ritual washing of the body,[114] he was buried in the cemetery of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal amidst a vast throng of people who had come out to mourn his death and to express their condolences.[115] Sibṭ reports that sometime before his death, his grandfather had requested that the following lines be engraved on his tombstone:

O Thou generous forgiver of one
  Whose offenses are many,
The offender comes pleading
  For the forgiveness of his misdeeds.

fī Maᶜrifat ᶜUlamāᵓ al-Ḥadīth by Abū Yaᶜlā al-Qazwīnī (d. 446/1054).

[112] Dhahabī, *Taᵓrīkh al-Islām*, XLII, 131-133; and *Takmila*, I, 277-278.

[113] Rābiᶜa, one of Ibn al-Jawzī's older daughters and Sibṭ's mother, was at his bedside during the last hours and later reported to Sibṭ that he kept asking: "What shall I do with the peacocks....?" Sibṭ does not elaborate on the context of the question—if indeed, there was a context. Perhaps it is no more than an indication of the confused condition into which he had lapsed (*MZ*, 500, 3-4. Cf., also Dhahabī, *Taᵓrīkh al-Islam*, XLII, 297, 13-14; and *Dhayl*, I, 428, 19-20).

[114] *MZ*, 500, 4-5; I have not been able so far to identify Ḍiyā'd-Dīn.

[115] *MZ*, 500, 5-15; *Dhayl*, I, 328-329; and Dhahabī, *Taᵓrīkh al-Islām*, XLII, 297-298.

I am now a sojourner, and the recompense due
Such a one is that he be treated generously.[116]

Two days later he was followed by his beloved wife Khātūn Bint ʿAbd Allāh, the mother of Yūsuf.[117]

Ibn al-Jawzī the Man

It is hazardous to attempt to sketch in a brief space a portrait of a man as complex as Ibn al-Jawzī, and to do so in a way that is balanced and faithful to the sources. He was a man who elicited widely divergent reactions. There were those who were devoted to him and prepared to defend him against his detractors, but there were others, as we have seen, who were bitterly opposed to him and were prepared to go to almost any length to rid Baghdad of his influence and even his presence. These conflicting, even contradictory, views of the man are reflected in our primary sources. He was both praised and pilloried. Ibn Rajab, however, does a reasonably good job of trying to present as objectively as possible both points of view in his biographical notice. Indeed, it has to be said that most of our biographical sources make a conscientious effort to present both sides of an obviously controversial figure.

In reflecting on the portraits presented in the sources, I have found myself pulled in two quite different directions in an effort to assess the person and character of this polarizing figure. It does seem to me, however, that the most reliable approach is to attempt to integrate both perspectives, in so far

[116] The text as given by Sibṭ (*MZ*, 502, 1-4) reads:

وأوصى جدّي أن يُكتَب على قبره
يا كثيرَ العفو عمّن كثُر الذنبُ لديه
جاءك المذنبُ يرجُو الصفحَ عن جُرمٍ يديه
أنا ضيفٌ وجزاءُ الضيفِ إحسانٌ إليه

For other citations of the text of the epitaph, with variant readings, see Dhahabī, *Siyar*, XV, 492, 8-10; *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, XLII, 297, 1-3; *Dhayl*, I, 430, 17-19; and *Bidāya*, XIII, 33, 7-8.

[117] Sibṭ reports that "people believed [her death] to have been one of [Ibn al-Jawzī's] *karamāt* (miracles) because she had been so attached to him while he was still alive" (*MZ*, 501, 23-24).

as possible, into a unified portrait of the man.[118] As Daniel Reig notes, he had a "temperérament combatif,"[119] and could be severely critical of those who differed with him or those who threatened to steal the limelight, as happened on more than one occasion.[120] He was a compulsive, driven man, by nature competitive, and capable of conniving to undercut opponents and tarnish their public persona. All of these judgments are to be found in the medieval biographical and chronicle literature. They are repeated too frequently to be able to conveniently sweep them under the rug.[121]

It is precisely this negative portrayal of Ibn al-Jawzī, found in the sources, that was picked up and highlighted by Western orientalists of the 19th and 20th centuries. One finds the negative portrait amply represented in the writings of I. Goldziher, for example, but he is far from being alone.[122] The negative image was further amplified and reinforced by the publication—in installments between 1935 and 1948—of a partial translation of Ibn al-Jawzī's *Talbīs Iblīs* by David Margoliouth.[123] In the portions of *Talbīs* selected for translation, Ibn al-Jawzī often comes across as a doggedly conservative, even fanatic, Ḥanbalī and virulently anti-Sufi. The general image of Ibn al-Jawzī reflected in orientalist literature, if anything, represents an intensification of the negative image found in medieval sources. Fanaticism is a charge that is repeatedly laid at the feet of Ibn al-Jawzī by Western orientalists. The fact that the charge is so often repeated in scholarly literature is itself interesting. Of all the charges levelled against Ibn al-Jawzī in our primary

[118] The problem with the two opposing medieval perspectives on him is that each represents an overly simplified image, and to that extent eliminates elements of the picture that do not fit its own view of the man.

[119] D. Reig, "Le *Ṣayd al-Ḫāṭir* d'Abū l-Farağ ibn al-Ğawzi", *SI*, 34 (1971), 89-123. See also the introduction to his translation of the work under the title *La pensée vigile: Sayd al-Khātir* (Paris 1986), 331 pages.

[120] His competition with ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 561/1165) and his sons is a case in point.

[121] We have to accept as fact that Ibn al-Jawzī was a man who had his faults—and serious faults at that.

[122] For his historical survey of Ḥanbalism, see his "Zur Geschichte der ḥanbalitischen Bewegungen", *ZDMG*, 52 (1908), 1-28 (*Gesammelte Schriften*, V, 135-162). For specific references, see *Muhammedanische Studien*, II, 154, and index.

[123] Margoliouth, D. "'The Devil's Delusions' by Ibn al-Jawzi", *Islamic Culture*, Vol., IX (1935), 1-21. For the complete reference, see Bibliography.

sources, fanaticism is not one of them.[124] The portrait of the man that emerges from Margoliouth's selective translation of *Talbīs Iblīs*, however, is based, to a large extent, it seems to me, on a misreading of the work taken as a whole, and the aims of its author. As G. Makdisi and others have pointed out, *Talbīs* is not in fact an anti-Sufi tirade. A careful reading of the *entire* work will make that quite clear.[125] It is an admittedly hard-hitting work, but Sufis are not the only ones criticized; virtually no religious or scholarly class escapes critical comment.

It is perhaps somewhat unfortunate, given the nature of the work, that the *Talbīs* was the first of Ibn al-Jawzī's writings to be translated into a Western language. One wonders what would have been the result if, for example, *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, an equally important but quite different work, had been the first of his writings to appear in translation.[126] It is quite likely that the image of Ibn al-Jawzī would have been rather different from the one that has become part of the received wisdom.

But if the sources do contain criticisms of the man, they also make it clear that this does not exhaust the historical Ibn al-Jawzī. Far from being the strident, fanatic, reactionary Ḥanbalī he has sometimes been made out to be in Western scholarship, it is clear that he represented precisely the most progressive wing of the school, a man with a breadth of outlook that seems not to have been characteristic of most 12th-century Ḥanbalīs, a man who had a good grasp of medieval intellectual history and who himself was significantly influenced by Ashʿarism, Muʿtazilism and other intellectual currents including the Kullābīya and quite possibly the Māturīdīya.

The negative image conveyed by medieval sources was in part a result of

[124] Ibn Athīr does accuse him of a blanket and uncritical defense of Ḥanbalīs no matter what they believed, but then Ibn Athīr wrote from a distance, was dependent on second-hand sources, and apparently did not know of the feuding that went on in the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad between its various factions. For one of Ibn Athīr's severest criticisms of Ibn al-Jawzī, see *Kāmil*, XI, 333, 14-15.

[125] See especially, G. Makdisi, "The Ḥanbalī School and Sufism", *Humaniora Islamica*, II [1974], 61-72, especially 69-71.

[126] In contrast to *Talbīs Iblīs*, *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* is a quieter, more reflective work, one in which Ibn al-Jawzī shows himself capable of introspection—at times bordering on self-criticism—and revealing even a capacity for doubt. This is not the man reflected in the pages of *Talbīs Iblīs*. The persons reflected in *Talbīs* and *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* were two sides of one and the same individual.

Ibn al-Jawzī's tendency to say exactly what he thought without worrying too much about the consequences. It may have been the result of a naiveté on his part, or merely an insensitivity, or perhaps a combination of the two. Whatever the reason, he stepped on some toes and in the process made enemies, sometimes perhaps unnecessarily. Our sources leave no doubt that he was a gifted, even brilliant, orator, an admirable prose stylist, and a man with a vast knowledge of the history of Arabic literature and Muslim thought—a knowledge amply reflected in his many writings. Our sources also make it clear that, while he could be harsh toward, and dismissive of, his critics, he was also capable of genuine sympathy,[127] even a man capable of a kind of vicarious identification with the unfortunates of medieval society. It is not entirely surprising that he devoted an entire work to the Abyssinian and Sudanese slaves present in Baghdad in his day; from this work and from scattered references in other writings it is clear that he was personally pained by the humiliation and mistreatment that was the lot of these proud, intelligent people.[128] From his homilies and from his autobiographical works one gets closest perhaps to the inner thoughts of the man; one senses in him a fondness for animals along with a rather intense fascination with nature and its wonders.[129] He was a man of immense curiosity, and of a lively imagination coupled with a certain kind of intellectual modesty.[130] He repeatedly takes to task what he regarded as the overweening arrogance of the *mutakallimūn* (professional theologians), the *falāsifa* (peri-

[127] As one can see from his *Laftat al-Kabid*, and the autobiographical portions of his *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*. Neither of these works has yet been rendered into English.

[128] Sibṭ gives the title as *Tanwīr al-Gabash fī Faḍl as-Sūdān wa 'l-Ḥabash* (for more on the work and a list of the manuscripts of the work that are extant, see al-ʿAlwajī, *Muʾallafāt Ibn al-Jawzī*, 115-116). For some interesting observations on the work, see E. van Donzel, "Ibn al-Jawzī on Ethiopians in Baghdad" in *The Islamic World from Classical to Modern Times: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lewis*, ed. by C. E. Bosworth, C. Isawi, R. Savory and A. L. Udovitch (Princeton, Darwin Press, 1989), 113-120.

[129] For more on the homily and the insights it affords into Ibn al-Jawzī's attitude toward nature, see my "Arabic Rhetoric and the Art of the Homily in Medieval Islam", in *Religion and Culture in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge 1999), 36-65.—Nature is, for Ibn al-Jawzī, the realm par excellence of signs. As Reig puts it, speaking of *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, "God wishes to be discovered, and this is why nature is constellated by signs—is why it echoes the call: 'Everything enunciates clearly that it has a Creator'" (*Studia Islamica*, 34 (1971), 109.

[130] He was often, at the same time, accused of arrogance and an excessively high opinion of himself.

patetic philosophers), and the traditionalist *ʿulamāʾ*—these latter for their willingness, too often, to play fast and loose with the sources in order to provide textual support for a partisan point of view.[131]

It should also be noted in this context that he was not by nature a systematic thinker. He was capable of thinking systematically, to be sure, but it required special effort on his part. His natural gifts and tendencies lay more in the sphere of rhetoric and narrative. The works that he seemed to have written with the greatest amount of ease were narrative and historical in nature. His chronicles,[132] his numerous biographical works,[133] and his books of stories all belong to a narrative genre in which he was at home and wrote with ease. It is especially in these latter that we encounter a man possessed of a lively and finely honed sense of humor.[134]

This is not the place nor the time to attempt a full portrait of the man—too much work remains to be done for that to be possible—but it is important in reading *KAS* to have some sense of the many sides of his person, the complexity of his character, his capacity for quiet, sensitive reflection coupled with a certain unpredictability, and a defensive, irascible side. The strength of his character is perhaps most clearly evident in his ability to endure public humiliation and isolation in Wasit for five full years, and to come through it unbroken and apparently unbowed. He returned to Baghdad as strongly committed to his theological views as ever, it would seem.[135]

The image of the man projected in the writings of orientalists, while not entirely wrong, is one-sided and based far too much on an uncritical and

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[131] This was arrogance run amok, in his view. He was particularly offended by the way in which members of his own school distorted the record in their defense of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya. His anger was directed especially toward ʿAbd al-Mughīth b. Zuhayr (d. 583/1187) whom he regarded as the leader of this tendency within the Ḥanbalī school. Ibn al-Jawzī devoted an entire work to this specific question entitled *ar-Radd ʿalā'l-Mutaʿaṣṣib al-ʿAnīd al-Māniʿ min Dhamm Yazīd* (for more on this work, see ʿAlwajī, *Muʾallafāt Ibn al-Jawzī*, 132-133). See notes to §32 of the Translation for more on this particular intra-Ḥanbalī conflict.

[132] Especially his *Kitāb Muntaẓam*.

[133] Referred to earlier when discussing his early spiritual quest.

[134] His *Kitāb al-Adhkiyāʾ*, and his *Akhbār al-Ḥamqā wa'l-Mughaffalīn*.

[135] In contrast to Ibn ʿAqīl, who became increasingly more conservative in his later years, Ibn al-Jawzī remained unflinching in the defense of his eclectic brand of Ḥanbalism.

impressionistic reading of the sources. For a variety of complex reasons, that image has persisted, undoubtedly in part because it seems to confirm our image of Islam, especially in its traditionalist, Ḥanbalī form. That image may in the end, however, say as much or more about us than it says about Ibn al-Jawzī or medieval Ḥanbalism.[136]

[136] For an interesting example of image-construction of more recent vintage, see Mary Beard's *The Invention of Jane Harrison*, published in a series entitled *Revealing Antiquity*, edited by G.W. Bowersock. Note especially the remarks of Bowersock in the forward to the work (vii-x).

CHAPTER TWO

AUTHORSHIP AND DATE OF COMPOSITION

There can be little doubt regarding the Jawzian authorship of *KAS*. Ibn al-Jawzī's name is recorded on the title page of the Ṣehid Ali Paṣa manuscript as the author of the work. The stylistic features of the work, its structure and content, all point unmistakably to a Jawzian authorship. Despite the fact that the title of the work as given in the Ṣehid Ali Paṣa manuscript appears nowhere in the various lists of Ibn al-Jawzī's writings preserved in medieval sources, two shorter versions of the work are extant,[1] and both are identified in medieval sources as works of Ibn al-Jawzī. If *KAS* bears all of the marks of a Jawzian authorship, why does the title appear nowhere in medieval sources, including the various lists of Ibn al-Jawzī's works, compiled by medieval bibliographers? With the information presently available, there can be no final answer to this question, but one seemingly viable possibility does exist, *viz.*, that the work which has come down to us under the title of *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* was known to medieval historians, and probably to Ibn al-Jawzī himself, under a different title.

Fortunately, Ibn al-Jawzī incorporates reports and bits of information in several of his works that suggest a tentative answer to the question. Although the contents of *KAS* bear on a number of questions, including that of the divine attributes, these are not in and of themselves the principal concern of the work. The primary focus of the work, its central concern, is to provide a compelling critique of anthropomorphic conceptions of God, especially those prevalent within Ḥanbalī circles in Baghdad and championed by some of the leading scholars of the school in the 11th and 12th centuries. Indeed, three Ḥanbalīs are singled out as the principal culprits: Ibn Ḥāmid (d.

[1] Actually it is a question of a single abridgment of *KAS* that has come down to us under two distinctly different titles: *Daf^c Shubah at-Tashbīh bi-Akuff at-Tanzīh* and *al-Bāz al-Ashhab al-Munqaḍḍ ᶜalā Mukhālifī'l-Madhhab*. The manuscripts that have come down to us under these two titles are one and the same work. This is a fairly common phenomenon among the works of Ibn al-Jawzī. Both titles are to be found in several medieval indexes of Ibn al-Jawzī's works (*Mirᵓāt az-Zamān*, 485, 3, 13; and *Dhayl*, I, 417, 8; 420, 4). Copies of the two titles are also well represented among extant works of Ibn al-Jawzī. The relationship of these two titles to *KAS* is a question that will be addressed below.

403/1013), Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1066), and Ibn Zāghūnī (d. 525/1132).[2] Ibn al-Jawzī regarded them largely responsible for the degree to which anthropomorphic views of God had taken root and flourished within the school.[3] The issue of anthropomorphism is the single most important thread running through the work.[4]

In his *Talbīs Iblīs*[5] Ibn al-Jawzī devotes a section to the problem of anthropomorphic conceptions of God. In the course of his discussion, which could only be brief given the nature and purpose of *Talbīs Iblīs*, Ibn al-Jawzī calls the reader's attention to his *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl ilā ʿIlm al-Uṣūl*, where, he says, the issue of anthropomorphism is taken up more fully. The reference to this latter work occurs in the middle of a longer passage, which is worth quoting at length:

> Among those who rely on sense experience [as a source of knowledge of God] there are those who say: He is on the throne in His essence (*bi-dhātihi*) in the sense of being in contact (*mumāssa*) with it,[6] that when He descends [from His Throne, that descent] entails movement from place to place (*intiqāl*). They maintain that His essence has limits (*nihāya*), and that it

[2] In his notice on Ibn Qudāma (Muwaffaq ad-Dīn), Ibn Rajab reports that Ibn al-Jawzī had also accused the Ḥanbalī Sufi, ʿAbd Allāh al-Anṣārī (d. 481/1088), of *tashbīh* in one of his writings (*Dhayl*, II, 146).

[3] Ibn al-Jawzī insists repeatedly in *KAS* that Aḥmad, the founder of the school, was himself keenly aware of the problem of anthropomorphism and even, on occasion, adopted a metaphorical interpretation of a prophetic saying rather than run the risk of accepting a view that might be construed as anthropomorphic (cf., *KAS* §36, e.g.). In keeping with this position, Aḥmad categorically rejected *taqlīd* in regard to matters of theology (*uṣūl ad-dīn* [*KAS* §20]).

[4] For a brief discussion of the idea of anthropomorphism adopted by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS*, see notes to the Translation §1.

[5] Perhaps the best known of Ibn al-Jawzī's works in the West. However, despite the attention *Talbīs* has received from orientalists and others, the work on the whole has been poorly understood. Far from being an attack on Sufism, as has so often been alleged, *Talbīs* is rather a critique of medieval Islamic culture, more generally, by a contemporary observer. There are few aspects of that culture, especially religious aspects, that escape Ibn al-Jawzī's attention. Virtually every academic discipline is examined critically. Ibn al-Jawzī was one of the most probing and perceptive observers of his days. This is not to say that he was always objective or fair in his criticisms. It was, in part, this propensity for critical reflection that won Ibn al-Jawzī more than his share of enemies.

[6] Cf., *KAS* §52.

has measure (*misāḥa*) and extent (*miqdār*).[7] As proof that He is [located in a particular place, *viz.*] on His Throne, they cite the words of the Prophet: "God descends to the lowest heavens...."[8] They insist that one who descends must do so from above.[9] And so they construe His descent in terms of sense experience, *viz.*, the kind of descent by which 'bodies' (*ajsām*)[10] are described. These anthropomorphists (*mushabbiha*) are persons who describe the divine attributes in terms required by sense experience. I have already discussed the majority of their beliefs in my book entitled *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl ilā ʿIlm al-Uṣūl*. Not infrequently these *mushabbiha* suppose that the vision of God (*ruʾyat al-Ḥaqq*) on the day of resurrection will be like the seeing of [finite] individuals (*ashkhāṣ*) [in this life],[11] and they represent Him as a person (*shakhṣ*) whose beauty exceeds all beauty....[12] They learn from a prophetic saying that [God] will invite His servant, the believer, to come near Him, and they imagine that nearness to be like one person sitting beside another....[13] Among such people are those who say that God has a face [and that it is an attribute] added to His essence on the basis of the Quranic verse "And the face of your Lord will remain."[14] They attribute to Him a hand and a finger on the basis of the prophetic saying: "He will place the heavens on a finger...."[15] On the basis of other texts, they assign

[7] See e.g., *KAS* §53, last line.

[8] *KAS* §33, no. 7; §132, etc.

[9] See *KAS* §§53-55, and elsewhere.

[10] On the technical sense of the term, see §7 of the text of *KAS* and notes to the Translation.

[11] See *KAS* §§202-204. Although Ibn al-Jawzī nowhere says so explicitly in *KAS*, it is clear that he rejected the notion of a literal vision of God in the hereafter. It may be that Ibn al-Jawzī, like Ibn ʿAqīl, his spiritual mentor, had difficulty deciding what position to take on this highly explosive question (cf., G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 147). It is clear, however, that he ultimately rejected the notion as it had been construed in traditionalist circles, for since God is not a body he cannot be an object of vision, taken literally. In *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, on the other hand, he defends the traditional Sunnī position (618, 11-13). The precise relationship of these two works remains to be determined. The fact that *KAS* and *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* were addressed to different audiences may be part of the explanation. *KAS* was clearly directed to members of the *ʿulamāʾ* class whereas *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, it would seem, was intended for a wider readership. It may also be that *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* represents an earlier stage of this thinking.

[12] Cf., *KAS* §§33, 72, 183 and 184.

[13] Cf., *KAS* §55.

[14] S. 55: 27.

[15] Cf., *KAS* §§33, 143-146.

> to Him a foot, et cetera.[16] All of this they extrapolate from an understanding based on sense experience. The correct approach is to recite the verses of the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet without interpretation and without discussion (*min ghayr tafsīr wa lā kalām fīhi*).[17]

What Ibn al-Jawzī says about the content of *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl ilā ʿIlm al-Uṣūl* in the above passage could be taken equally well as a summary of the content of the Ṣehid Ali Paşa manuscript of *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*. There is nothing in the above passage that does not square with the contents of *KAS*. The possibility that these are alternate titles for one and the same work is further suggested by another reference to *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl*, this one in Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*. In the chapter on *tawḥīd*, Ibn al-Jawzī cites a rather lengthy tradition bearing on the Prophet's ascension (*miʿrāj*) and concludes that it must be an apocryphal tradition given its anthropomorphic references to God. Ibn al-Jawzī then cites the famous tradition of Wajj and comments as follows:

> One of the *mushabbiha* (anthropomorphists) heard this tradition [concerning the *miʿrāj*] together with the following words of the Prophet: "The last time God trampled [the idolaters] under foot was at Wajj." Because of the anthropomorphist character of his thinking he imagined that these words referred to a trampling involving [a literal] foot (*qadam*). The reference here, however, [is to be understood metaphorically] and has to do with a battle between the Muslims and the *mushrikīn*[18] at a place near Ṭāʾif known as Wajj. I have devoted a full commentary to this tradition in my book entitled *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl ilā ʿIlm al-Uṣūl*.[19]

A rather lengthy discussion of this *ḥadīth* is found in *KAS* §§164-168. In his commentary there Ibn al-Jawzī takes up an extended discussion of the problems posed by this tradition and offers what he believes to be the

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[16] *KAS* §§33, 46, 113, etc.

[17] *Talbīs Iblīs*, 87, 5-19. Ibn al-Jawzī insists repeatedly on the principle of *imrār* in *KAS*, i. e., that scripture is to be allowed to stand as it is, i. e., without explanation or interpretation. For Ibn al-Jawzī, this is the only acceptable procedure when it is a question of instructing the masses (*ʿawāmm*). As we shall see, when it is a matter of discussions among the *ʿulamāʾ*, and especially when the subject of discussion is the divine attributes, Ibn al-Jawzī does permit interpretation (even metaphorical interpretation or *taʾwīl*) of scripture.

[18] Arabs who still adhered to the pagan traditions of their ancestors.

[19] *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* (Medina 1966), I, 114, 4-7; (Riyāḍ 1997), I, 162-163.

proper interpretation. This is precisely what one would expect from his comments in *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*.[20]

These two references to *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl*—in *Talbīs* and *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*—are suggestive indications, though not in themselves final proof, that *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* is the same work, or a version of that work, that also circulated under the title of *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl*. If it is a question of a single work and if *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl* is the original title, how is one to explain the appearance of an alternate title? Unfortunately, on the basis of our present documentation, it is not possible to give a fully satisfactory answer to this question. What can be said is that this sort of phenomenon was not uncommon in the history of medieval Arabic literature. We have already noted that several of Ibn al-Jawzī's works have come down to us under two or more titles. The only way to settle the question once and for all is to compare manuscripts of the two works. According to ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-ʿAlwajī, a manuscript bearing the title *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl ilā ʿIlm al-Uṣūl* has survived and was, at one time, in the possession of the National Museum in Baghdad.[21] Unfortunately, I have not so far been able to gain access to this work so as to carry out the detailed comparison of the two manuscripts necessary to determine whether these two titles represent two different works or are alternate titles for one and the same text. Since such a comparison is not now possible and may not be for some time to come, I have chosen to go ahead with the publication of *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* based on the manuscript in the Şehid Ali Paşa collection in Istanbul. Though I suspect that the two titles refer to one and the same work, or perhaps two versions of the same work, a final resolution of this question will, unfortunately, have to be put off for the time being.

Assuming for the moment that the two titles do, in fact, refer to the same work, that assumption, along with the references to *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl* in *Talbīs Iblīs* and *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, may be of some value in establishing a *terminus ante quem* for the composition of *KAS*. If *Talbīs Iblīs* was written

[20] Since both *DST* and the *Minhāj* are identified in a number of medieval sources as belonging to the science of *uṣūl ad-dīn*, this would indicate that both *KAS* and the *Minhāj* were seen as falling into the same disciplinary category (*Fihrist Kutubihi*, 202; *Mirʾāt az-Zamān*, 485; and *Dhayl*, I, 417).

[21] Its present location is somewhat of a question. Cf., ʿAlwajī, *Muʾallafāt Ibn al-Jawzī* (Kuwait 1992), 239 (no. 516); cf., also the first edition of this work (Baghdad 1965), 187 (no. 464).

sometime between 575/1179 and 580/1184, as I have argued elsewhere,[22] it follows that *KAS* could not have been written after that date. This kind of argument, however, has only limited value, since it is based on the premise that the works in question circulated in a single version or edition. We know that, in at least several instances, works of Ibn al-Jawzī were issued in more than one edition, each under a separate title. In view of this phenomenon, references to titles such as we find in *Talbīs Iblīs* and *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* lose some of their value as evidence bearing on the question of date.[23] Consequently, in the case of *KAS*, more weight will have to be attached to circumstantial evidence in attempting to fix the date of the work.

It is clear from the numerous and rather negative references to contemporary Ḥanbalīs in *KAS* that the latter was almost certainly written at a time when the author's relations with the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad were strained, perhaps even close to the breaking point. Consequently, if Ibn al-Jawzī's relations with the school can be charted chronologically on the basis of information gleaned from other, and especially contemporary, works it may be possible to establish at least a tentative *terminus post quem* for the composition of the work on the basis of such information. The historical sources of the period taken as a whole suggest that Ibn al-Jawzī's relationship with the Ḥanbalī school remained good during the first half of his life—that is, up until the late 560s. He had studied under some of the leading Ḥanbalī scholars of Baghdad during his formative years, roughly between 520/1126 and 550/1155. Ibn Zāghūnī, a major pillar of the school, had been one of his more important teachers in *waʿẓ*, *fiqh*, and *ḥadīth*. In *ḥadīth* studies,

[22] M. Swartz, *Ibn al-Jawzī's Kitāb al-Quṣṣāṣ*, 45 (cf., D. Margoliouth, "The Devil's Delusions", *Islamic Culture*, IX [1935], no. 1, p. 3).

[23] The problem is illustrated by two of Ibn al-Jawzī's works, his *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya fī'l-Aḥādīth al-Wāhiya* and his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, each of which refers to the other (see page 17 of the former and page 35 of the latter). This kind of mutual referencing can only be explained on the assumption that one or the other of these works, or perhaps both, was later reissued in a new, updated, edition. As the context of these two references makes clear, it could not have been a question of simply inserting a title into one or the other of these works, for in both cases the titles appear in contexts that were composed with the titles in mind. The same kind of mutual referencing occurs in *Kitāb al-Quṣṣāṣ* (§219) and *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* (p. 45). There may well be other examples of this sort of phenomenon. What it does demonstrate is the difficulty of using title references as an indication of relative date.

especially *jarḥ wa taᶜdīl*,[24] he was deeply indebted to Ibn Nāṣir (d. 550/1155). His studies in jurisprudence were begun under Abū Bakr ad-Dīnawarī (d. 532/1138) and completed under Abū Ḥakīm an-Nahrawānī (d. 556/1161). Ibn al-Jawzī succeeded Abū Ḥakīm as professor of law in the two *madrasas* where the latter had taught until his death. From 544 to 560 (1149-1164), Ibn al-Jawzī was closely allied with Ibn Hubayra, the most influential and politically powerful Ḥanbalī of the period. Not only did Ibn Hubayra serve as *vizier* from 544/1149 to 560/1164, he played a significant role within the Ḥanbalī school. Because of the special relationship between the two men, and because of Ibn al-Jawzī's professional and academic achievements, he was to become the most visible and articulate spokesman for both the school and the political cause with which Ibn Hubayra was involved. His various achievements and connections made it possible for Ibn al-Jawzī to play a prominent role in combatting theological influences emanating from the East, especially Ashᶜarism, but also to some extent Muᶜtazilism.[25] He was also involved in combatting a home-grown brand of Shīᶜism that had long established itself in West Baghdad. In all of these capacities he served the interests of the Ḥanbalī school well. There is no evidence indicating that Ibn al-Jawzī's relations with the school were in any way troubled during this period. In 570/1174 Banafsha, one of the most influential women of the ᶜAbbāsid Court, made one of her residences in the Bāb al-Azaj district of East Baghdad into a *madrasa* for Ḥanbalīs, established a charitable trust (*waqf*) to provide for its support, and named Ibn al-Jawzī as its resident professor of jurisprudence (*mudarris*).[26] The following year she had a plaque placed over the entrance to the *madrasa* publicly identifying Ibn al-Jawzī as its *mudarris*. That same year the caliph al-Mustaḍīʾ issued a

[24] A subdiscipline within the field of *ḥadīth* studies concerned with the critical analysis of *isnāds* (chains of transmission) and *matns* (the saying or event reported). For more on this specialized field, see the section on "formal education" of the preceding section of the Introduction; also *EI*², II, 462.

[25] Incidents involving Ashᶜarites are reported for the years 538/1143 (*Muntaẓam*, X, 106-108), 555/1160 (*Muntaẓam*, X, 194; Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt as-Shāfiᶜīya*, VI, 104), 561/1165 (*Muntaẓam*, X, 218; *Mirʾāt az-Zamān*, 262), and 567/1171 (*Mirʾāt az-Zamān*, 292; *Muntaẓam*, X, 239; Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 389-391). The year 567/1171 is the last such incident reported in the *Muntaẓam* or by Sibṭ in his *Mirʾāt az-Zamān*. Others occurred before 538/1143; indeed, such incidents occurred fairly frequently dating back to the previous century (cf., G. Makdisi, *Ibn ᶜAqīl*, 340-384).

[26] *Muntaẓam*, X, 252-253 (cf., Ibn Sāʿī, *Nisāʾ al-Khulafāʾ*, 111).

decree granting Ibn al-Jawzī special powers to identify and prosecute persons guilty of harboring "heretical" views. According to the text of the decree preserved in the *Muntaẓam*, Ibn al-Jawzī was invested with the power (1) to search and raze the houses of heretics, (2) to humiliate them in public, and (3) to have them committed to prison if the nature of the heretical views in question warranted such action.[27]

Although Ibn al-Jawzī's influence continued to grow during the early 570s, it was also during the same period that reports of tension within the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad, particularly between Ibn al-Jawzī and the school, began to appear in the chronicles covering the period. Some of the tension was undoubtedly a result of jealousy on the part of fellow Ḥanbalīs at Ibn al-Jawzī's extraordinary professional success and the recognition of that success by members of the caliphal family, not to mention the caliph himself. His frustrations with the school and the bitter internal rivalries led Ibn al-Jawzī some years later to remark to his grandson, Yūsuf b. Qizoghlū, better known as Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī,[28] as follows: "If it had not been for Aḥmad and Ibn Hubayra, I would have left the school, for had I been a Ḥanafī or a Shāfiʿī, members of the school (*al-qawm*) would have carried me on their shoulders."[29] Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī reported this statement in his

[27] *Muntaẓam*, X, 259.

[28] Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī does not say how this statement came to him, but it is likely that he heard it directly from his grandfather with whom he lived until his grandfather's death in 597/1201. Since Sibṭ was only 8 or 9 at the time of his grandfather's arrest and exile to Wasit in 590/1194, it seems probable that the comment regarding the Ḥanbalī school was something he heard from his grandfather after his return to Baghdad in 595/1199. Sibṭ was close to his grandfather and seems to have regarded him more as a father. The fact that Sibṭ reports his comment in connection with the events of 570/1174 would suggest that Ibn al-Jawzī himself had placed it in that context when he made the comment to Sibṭ. Soon after his grandfather's death, Sibṭ moved to Damascus and lived there until his death in 654/1256. Among his contemporaries Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī was known primarily as a preacher; but he also devoted himself to scholarship and left behind an important history, his *Mirʾāt az-Zamān*, particularly valuable for the 12th and early 13th centuries. For more on Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, see C. Cahen's art. on him in *EI*^{2}, III, 572-573; *GAL*, I, 347, and Suppl. I, 589.

[29] وكان جدّي يقول: والله لو لا أحمد والوزير ابن هبيرة لانتقلتُ عن المذهب فإنّي لو كنت حنفيًّا أو شافعيًّا لحملني القوم على رؤوسهم (*MZ*, 326, 14-16). See MacKay, "Patronage and Power," *SI*, 34 (1971), 44-45, where a somewhat different interpretation of Ibn al-Jawzī's statement is given. MacKay, who takes these words as reflecting a waning of the fortunes of the Ḥanbalī school, either misreads the Arabic text or assumes an emended reading. I see no reason for an emendation.

account of the events of 570/1174. As noted above, the frustration reflected in this statement was in part a response to jealousy and the hostility directed toward him. But there was more to it than that. Partially responsible for Ibn al-Jawzī's growing alienation was an evolution in his own thinking regarding a number of important questions, especially those of a theological nature.[30]

During the 550s and the 560s (ca. 1155-1175), as we have seen, Ibn al-Jawzī had been involved in a series of public efforts to curb the influence of Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilites within Baghdad and Iraq in general. Part of the motivation behind his opposition to Ashʿarism and Muʿtazilism was, however, political. Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilites tended to be allied with the Saljuq sultans and opposed to the efforts of the ʿAbbāsid caliphs of Baghdad to reassert their authority and power.[31] As a committed supporter of the ʿAbbāsid family, Ibn al-Jawzī's hostility to Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilites was, therefore, at least partially political in nature. But with the success of the ʿAbbāsids from the 550s on, culminating in the expulsion of powerful Turkish *amīrs* by al-Mustaḍīʾ in 569/1173, Ibn al-Jawzī seems to have taken a more relaxed view of Ashʿarism and Muʿtazilism; this, in turn, enabled him to come to understand these theological schools increasingly in the light of their intrinsic intellectual claims. In the process he came to see the persuasiveness of some of their views, especially as it related to the question of the divine attributes and the issue of anthropomorphism.[32] From the late 560s on to the end of his life there is not a single reference in the chronicles

[30] It might be argued that what, from a certain distance, appears to have been an evolution in his thinking may not have been so much a change or development in his thinking as it was a tendency on his part to become progressively less reticent in expressing what he believed in his heart of hearts to be true. With his growing influence and the support he enjoyed among members of the ʿAbbasid court, he may simply have felt less need to be cautious about what he thought on important matters such as the *ṣifāt* (divine attributes) and the question of exegetical method, especially the use of *taʾwīl*. All of this, however, is hypothetical since there is no hard evidence to support it.

[31] G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl et la résurgence de l'Islam traditionaliste*, 327-375; W. Madelung, "The Two Factions of Sunnism: Ḥanafism and Shāfiʿism," *Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran*, 26-38, esp., 33; Wensinck, *SEI*, 47.

[32] This increasing openness to other theological perspectives would have been encouraged and reinforced by his growing acquaintance with the writings of Ibn ʿAqīl. Added to this was his exposure to the works of Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī, Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, and also, though to a lesser extent, the writings of Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣbahānī, Ibn Fūrak, ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, and almost certainly others less easily identified because they are not cited explicitly in the writings of Ibn al-Jawzī.

to Ibn al-Jawzī's public opposition to Ashᶜarism or to Ashᶜarites.[33] Something of a change had taken place in Ibn al-Jawzī's thinking on theological questions. When precisely this change began, what sparked it, and how long it took to reach maturity, are questions for which there are no clear answers—at least not yet. But it is almost certain that some of the tensions within the Ḥanbalī school reported from the 570s on to the end of the century were partly a reflection of Ibn al-Jawzī's own intellectual sojourn and his changing attitudes towards Ashᶜarism and Muᶜtazilism. Ibn al-Jawzī's reputation came increasingly to be identified with *taʾwīl*—metaphorical exegesis—a position that earned him growing animosity within the school. The writings of younger Ḥanbalī contemporaries, especially Abū'l-Faḍl al-ᶜAlthī[34] and Ibn Qudāma,[35] reflect the increasingly hostile attitude harbored against Ibn al-Jawzī within the Ḥanbalī school. This hostility toward him continued to fester during the 570s and 580s (ca. 1174 to ca. 1193), and it is not surprising that fellow Ḥanbalīs were to play a crucial—though not the only—role in Ibn al-Jawzī's arrest and banishment to Wasit in 590/1194. Despite the opposition he faced within the school from the early 570s on, Ibn al-Jawzī considered himself a Ḥanbalī. The frustrations he expressed to his grandson in connection with the events of 570 were not, however, part of a passing temper tantrum, for in the 590s when he made the statement to Sibṭ

[33] The same might be said for Muᶜtazilism and Muᶜtazilites, but by the latter half of the 12th century they were a relatively insignificant feature of Baghdad's intellectual landscape.

[34] Ibn Rajab gives his name as Isḥāq b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ghānim Abū'l-Faḍl al-ᶜAlthī and reports that he died in 634/1236 (H. Laoust and A. Hartmann read the *nisba* as al-ᶜUlthī, though I have found no evidence in support of this reading in the sources). In addition to the substantial notice devoted to al-ᶜAlthī in Ibn Rajab's *Dhayl ᶜalā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila* (II, 205-211), see also the following: Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh al-Islam*, XLVI, 181-182 (cf. also his *Mukhtaṣar*, 143); al-Mundhirī, *at-Takmila*, III, 441; and *Shadharāt*, V, 163. Cf., also Laoust, "Le ḥanbalisme", *REI* (1959), 120; and A. Hartmann, *an-Nāsir li-Dīn Allāh* (Berlin 1975), 192-193, also index (under alᶜUlthī). The author of numerous polemical tracts (*rasāʾil kathīra*), he was known to his contemporaries as a staunch traditionalist and an outspoken critic of tendencies he regarded as deviating from the strict interpretation of Ḥanbalism.

[35] Muwaffaq ad-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ᶜAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Qudāma al-Maqdisi (541/1147-620/ 1223), whose *Dhamm at-Taʾwīl* was directed against views identical to those championed by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS*, and may well have been composed with Ibn al-Jawzī in mind. For more on his anti-*kalām*, anti-*taʾwīl* stance, see G. Makdisi, *Ibn Qudāma's Censure of Speculative Theology* (London 1962). For additional sources on him see the art. by G. Makdisi in *EI*^{2}, III, 842-843; and Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, II, 133-149.

he apparently still believed these sentiments valid. His devotion to the school in the years following 570 was devotion to an ideal—*viz.*, what he believed to be the teachings of Aḥmad—not to the Ḥanbalī school of his day which, he believed, had strayed from the principles laid down by Aḥmad and the founding generation of Ḥanbalīs, and adhered to by a long line of Ḥanbalīs dating back to Aḥmad.

KAS is a reflection of Ibn al-Jawzī's intellectual evolution and expresses his mature views on such questions as the divine attributes and proper exegetical method. On the basis of what we know of the trajectory of his intellectual evolution, *KAS* could not have been written before the early 570s. But how much later it could have been written is difficult to say.[36] Certainly it was written before 590/1193, the year he went into exile. In all likelihood it was written some years before, when he was younger and intellectually more vigorous. By the time of his banishment to Wasit in 590/1194 he was approaching his 80th birthday. Taking into account the nature of *KAS*, the intensity of the passion it exudes, the sharpness of its argumentation and the boldness with which Ibn al-Jawzī confronts his intellectual enemies within the Ḥanbalī school, I am inclined to place its composition somewhere in the late 570s or the early 580s (from ca. 1182 to 1189).[37] Because of his close ties to the caliphal court and the support he received from highly placed men and women of state, Ibn al-Jawzī could say what was on his mind without fear of reprisal.

This general dating of *KAS* is supported, somewhat indirectly, by another contemporary source, *viz.*, the *Risāla* of Abū'l-Faḍl al-ʿAlthī. The *Risāla*, written sometime between 585 and 590 (or perhaps 597), was an attack on Ibn al-Jawzī, and more specifically, on the views advanced in *KAS*, especially his defense of *raʾy* (personal opinion), *ijtihād* (independent reasoning), and *taʾwīl* (metaphorical exegesis), his use of a *kalām*-style method of argumentation, and in general his "crypto-Muʿtazilism." Although none of the writings of Ibn al-Jawzī, apart from his *al-Kashf li-Mushkil aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥ*,[38] are referred to directly in the *Risāla*, it is fairly certain that it was an attack directed specifically against *KAS* and was written certainly before 597/1201, for it is

[36] We must certainly allow for the possibility that *KAS* may be a later, somewhat modified, version of *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl*.

[37] This of course is still speculative, but the circumstantial evidence in support of it seems to me convincing.

[38] *Dhayl*, II, 208, 7 (trans. §8).

clear from the numerous uses of direct address by al-ʿAlthī that Ibn al-Jawzī was still alive.[39] Indeed, it seems likely that the *Risāla* was written sometime before 590 when Ibn al-Jawzī was exiled to Wasit, for it contains no reference to the infamy Ibn al-Jawzī suffered as a result. It is difficult to imagine that al-ʿAlthī would not at least have alluded to it, since it was such a crushing blow to Ibn al-Jawzī—a public embarrassment for him and, for al-ʿAlthī, an occasion for celebration.[40] In the *Risāla* he demands that Ibn al-Jawzī recant his views and return to the teaching of the *salaf* which, according to al-ʿAlthī, he had so vigorously and so publicly embraced in his youth.[41] It is clear that at the time of the writing of the *Risāla*, Ibn al-Jawzī was still leading an active life but also that he was well on in years.[42] This, together with the fact that al-ʿAlthī was still a very young man, makes it seem unlikely that he could, or would, have written the *Risāla* much before the late 580s when he would probably have been in his early thirties.[43] If we make the additional assumption that the *Risāla* was written soon after the publication of *KAS*, we may conclude, provisionally of course, that *KAS* was written sometime during the 580s, perhaps between 580/1184 and 588/1192.

Although this line of reasoning is certainly not conclusive, taken together with the arguments advanced above, we may conclude tentatively that *KAS*

[39] See, e.g., p. 206, 7 (*Dhayl*, II): "And you O ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān, it is continuously being reported concerning you...." or p. 210, 23: "Come to your senses, you wretched man, before death overtakes you! Rectify your words and your deeds for the appointed time has drawn near!" Direct address is used throughout the *Risāla*. There can be no doubt that it was composed when Ibn al-Jawzī was still living and was addressed to him directly. Although the *Risāla* was addressed as a personal communication to Ibn al-Jawzī, copies of the *Risāla* did circulate at least in scholarly circles and must have been copied for the benefit of later generations. A copy had obviously fallen into the hands of Ibn Rajab, an 8th-century Ḥanbalī scholar.

[40] Al-ʿAlthī would almost certainly have hailed it as a triumph for the traditionalist cause over that of rationalizing "crypto-Muʿtazilīs" within the school.

[41] *Dhayl*, II, 210, 23-211, 1.

[42] There are repeated references to the fact that Ibn al-Jawzī was advanced in years at the time of the writing of the *Risāla* (cf. , e.g., *Dhayl*, II, 210, 23).

[43] None of the biographical or historical sources of the period give the date of al-ʿAlthī's birth, though all of them report that he died in Rabīʿ I, 634 (November 1236). If we assume that he lived to the mature age of 70, he would have been born in the mid-560s, i. e., ca. 564/1168 or 565/1169. In that case he could hardly have been more than thirty or perhaps less in 590.

was written sometime in the 580s (between 1185 and 1192) and represents the views of the mature Ibn al-Jawzī, a man who, according to al-ʿAlthī, had abandoned the traditionalist views of his youth for the flimsy, speculative doctrines of the *mutakallimūn*.[44] Given the turn Ibn al-Jawzī's thought had apparently taken, one can understand why al-ʿAlthī and other Ḥanbalīs would have seen Ibn al-Jawzī as a renegade, even a traitor, and why they had insisted that he recant his "pernicious" views. It is clear that Ibn al-Jawzī never went back on the views that he defended in *KAS*.[45] The fact that Ibn al-Jawzī had not been forced to renounce his rationalizing thought might suggest that the more conservative wing of the Ḥanbalī school had lost some of its clout by the later decades of the 12th century. A century earlier when Ibn ʿAqīl, another Ḥanbalī, had faced similar demands, he had no choice but to recant precisely because of the strength of the forces arrayed against him. He was apparently fortunate to have escaped with his life.[46]

[44] See Ibn Rajab's *Dhayl*, II, 207, 19-22 (trans. §7), where al-ʿAlthī accuses Ibn al-Jawzī of having abandoned the true doctrine of his youth. He writes: "It is amazing that one who subscribed to the doctrine of the *salaf* and who disapproved of delving into dialectic (*kalām*) should [turn around and] take up the study of what he originally disapproved, saying: 'When we use such and such an expression, it actually means thus and so.'" A few lines later al-ʿAlthī pointedly puts the question to Ibn al-Jawzī: "How can you go back on your [original] pledge and teaching by [citing] the statements of so and so among the moderns [in support of your views]?" At several different places in the *Risāla*, al-ʿAlthī singles out al-Khaṭṭābī and Ibn ʿAqīl as two of the moderns who had influenced Ibn al-Jawzī to move in the direction of *taʾwīl* and *kalām*.

[45] If he had, it would surely have been reported.

[46] G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 28-43.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ARGUMENT OF *KITĀB AKHBĀR AṢ-ṢIFĀT*

Here I shall attempt to delineate what seem to me to be the essential elements of the argument developed by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS*.[1] Because the argument is multifaceted, and nuanced, and because it takes numerous twists and turns, the reader will need to consult the text of the work itself for the details.[2] It should always be kept in mind in following the argument of the work that Ibn al-Jawzī was not a professional theologian (*mutakallim*); to the extent that he was a "theologian," he was largely self-made.[3] What he knew of the theological tradition, as developed within the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite schools, was acquired through reading[4] and perhaps, to some

[1] I have chosen to follow a somewhat different order in the presentation of these elements than that found in *KAS*. I trust that none of the elements essential to the argument have been sacrificed as a result of my rearrangement.

[2] How persuasive or compelling that argument is will have to be left to the reader to judge. For the assessment of some of Ibn al-Jawzī's contemporaries on the question of his competence in *kalām*, see *Dhayl*, I, 414-16-20; and *Shadharāt*, IV, 331, 6-12; and the following note.

[3] A number of his contemporaries noted his limitations in this discipline, among them Ibn al-Qādisī, who is quoted by Ibn Rajab as saying that "[Ibn al-Jawzī] was not skilled in unravelling the complex arguments of the *mutakallimūn*" and that he often relied on Ibn ʿAqīl for guidance in such matters (*Dhayl*, 414, 16-20). Ibn al-Qādisī was undoubtedly right, in the main, though he may have overstated the matter a bit. On the question of his reliance on Ibn ʿAqīl, that too is true, but an important distinction must be made: as regards Ibn ʿAqīl, we must differentiate between the early and the late Ibn ʿAqīl, i.e., the Ibn ʿAqīl prior to his recantation (465/1072) and the Ibn ʿAqīl in the years between the recantation and his death (513/1119). If Ibn ʿAqīl's *Rasāʾil fī'l-Qurʾān* represents the later Ibn ʿAqīl, as G. Makdisi argues (*BEO*, 24 [1971], 55ff.), we can only conclude that he had adopted an essentially traditionalist view during his later years. The views taken over by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS* and elsewhere are those of the early Ibn ʿAqīl. There is a very considerable distance between the positions outlined in the *Rasāʾil* of Ibn ʿAqīl and those set forth in *KAS*. Moreover, Ibn al-Jawzī held to those views to the very end of his life, in contrast to Ibn ʿAqīl.

[4] The question of the sources from which he drew his knowledge of Muʿtazilism is admittedly complicated. He cites no works by Muʿtazilī authors in *KAS*. One can be sure that he derived some of his knowledge of Muʿtazilism (and undoubtedly Ashʿarism also)

extent, also through discussions with those closest to him.[5]

Above all, Ibn al-Jawzī was a preacher, a master of the literary and rhetorical arts, and that fact is reflected both in the content of the argument developed in *KAS* and the manner of its presentation. The excesses of *KAS*, if one can call them that, are in large measure a function of a rhetorical style developed by Ibn al-Jawzī over many years as a preacher and composer of homilies. It is this, in part, that sets *KAS* apart from such works as Ibn Fūrak's *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth* or the *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ waʾṣ-Ṣifāt* of Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, both of which were inspired by the same theological concern, *viz.*, that of mounting a vigorous defense of the idea of divine "transcendence" against anthropomorphizing tendencies within traditionalist Islam.[6] But neither Ibn Fūrak nor al-Bayhaqī came to the task of analysis and construction (in the service of theology) with the experience and the aptitude of an accomplished and, indeed, feted preacher.

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from the writings of Ibn ʿAqīl. In the course of his discussion of the Muʿtazila in *Talbīs* (82-85), Ibn al-Jawzī cites three sources, two of which were the works of Muʿtazilīs: the *Kitāb al-Ārāʾ waʾd-Diyānāt* of Abū Muḥammad an-Nawbakhtī (d. ca. 920), the Imāmī theologian who sought to integrate Muʿtazilite thought into a Shīʿite framework; and the *Kitāb al-Maqālāt* of Abū'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d. 931), a disciple of the Baghdādī historian of Muʿtazilism, al-Khayyāṭ (cf., *Muntaẓam*, VI, 238, and *GAS*, I, 622-623; *Talbīs*, 83, 173). The third source cited in *Talbīs* (83) is Abū Yaʿlā's *Kitāb al-Muqtabas*, apparently a theological anthology which is no longer extant. It is worth emphasizing that his knowledge of Muʿtazilism was in part, and perhaps to a large extent, drawn from primary sources. We also know from the *Muntaẓam* that Ibn al-Jawzī was personally acquainted with at least several Muʿtazilī theologians in Baghdad and undoubtedly drew some of his information on the school from conversation with them. His lengthy notice on Ibn Burhān (d. 456/1064), even though critical, is reflective of Ibn al-Jawzī's intense interest in Muʿtazilism and the theological issues posed by Muʿtazilī thought (*Muntaẓam*, VIII, 236-237; cf., also *Muntaẓam*, VII, 193-197).

[5] He almost certainly learned a good deal about Ashʿarism through his maternal uncle, Abū'l-Faḍl b. Nāṣir, who had once been a member of the Ashʿarite school (*Dhayl*, I, 225-226).

[6] I have placed the term transcendence here within quotation marks primarily to differentiate it from the way in which the term is commonly used today in Western works on theology. For a delineation of the concept of transcendence as it appears in *KAS* and much of the literature produced by medieval Muslim theologians, see what follows. Suffice it to say here, the idea of transcendence as it appears in the works of the medieval *mutakallimūn* is rooted in an atomistic ontology, apart from which it loses much of its force.

Reason (ʿaql) and Revelation (naql)

For Ibn al-Jawzī, our knowledge of God derives from two sources and only two: reason (*ʿaql*)[7] and revelation (*naql*).[8] The knowledge derived from these two sources may overlap at certain points, but, on the whole, what each tells us is quite different. For Ibn al-Jawzī, the knowledge obtained through reason is more foundational in character in that it constitutes the necessary starting point from which the quest for God must begin if it is to be successful.[9] In the larger picture, revelation too is essential, but it cannot do its work, so to speak, until reason has laid the groundwork and prepared the way. The principal function of revelation is to fill in the picture whose form and contours have been mapped out and at least partially filled in by reason. In brief, the task of revelation is to add to and complete the work begun by reason. It is through reason that the existence of God and His necessary attributes are established. Revelation itself makes no attempt to demonstrate God's existence on the basis of logical principles because that does not lie within its power or purview. There is no credible or compelling reason to listen to the "voice" of revelation—to accept it as an authoritative

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[7] Ibn al-Jawzī frequently uses the terms *naẓar* and *istidlāl* to refer to the reasoning process. Reason, in turn, draws from two sources: 1) from itself, i.e, through logical analysis and reflection, and 2) from the observation of nature and human experience in society.

[8] The term *naql* (literally, a transmission or report) was adopted by the *ʿulamāʾ* to refer to scripture in the broadest sense, i.e., including both the Quran and the teaching of the Prophet. According to Ibn al-Jawzī, knowledge of God is derived from two sources, and only two, *viz.*, reason (*ʿaql*) and revelation or scripture (*naql*). Sense experience and the language of sense experience are excluded as potential sources, for they are powerless, by themselves, to tell us anything about God, since He is, in His very essence, an incorporeal being and, therefore, not available to the senses in any respect. If the term "transcendent" is used to qualify Ibn al-Jawzī's God, that term can only refer to the non-corporeal nature of the divine being. As we shall see in more detail below, transcendence does not mean that God is totally other; for Ibn al-Jawzī it means only that He is not among the objects available to sense perception. Ibn al-Jawzī has no difficulty referring to God as knowing, seeing, hearing, etc. (cf., Gimaret, *EI*^{2}, VII, 788b; and *Maqālāt*, 155-156; also W. M. Watt, "Some Muslim Discussions of Anthropomorphism," 9, 8-12).

[9] §§2-6, 16, 167 (and note). There are numerous references to reason and its function scattered throughout *KAS*. This was standard procedure for the Muʿtazila as it was for many Ashʿarites. Cf., R. Frank, "The Science of *Kalām*," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, II (1992), 16-17.

text—until God's existence has been demonstrated on the basis of the peremptory evidence (*adilla qaṭᶜīya*) of reason.[10]

It is essentially on the basis of the argument from contingency (*ḥudūth*) that Ibn al-Jawzī, following the tradition of medieval *kalām*, attempts to prove God's existence.[11] Since the world exists[12] and since the evidence points to the fact that it is temporal,[13] it follows that the world must have a cause other than itself; and if the world as a whole is contingent, so also must the elements or parts of which it is made.[14] It might be argued that the immediate cause of the world is also caused and that the cause of this latter too is caused, but this kind of reasoning leads only to the insuperable problem of an infinite regression of causes (*tasalsul*).[15] The only plausible conclusion to be drawn is that the world—both as a whole and in all of its parts—is the result of a cause that is itself uncaused. On the basis of the argument from contingency, it is possible to assert that God exists, that He

[10] §§11, 14, 33/3, 148, etc.

[11] §§4-6, 9-11. The argument from contingency is supplemented by what might be called the argument from change or what Gimaret calls the argument from "metamorphoses" (*La doctrine*, 230-234; see *KAS*, the latter half of §5).

[12] For Ibn al-Jawzī, again following definitions developed by the *mutakallimūn*, the world (*ᶜālam*) is the realm of "bodily" existence. The elements that make up the world are three and only three: bodies (*ajsām*), atoms (*jawāhir*) and accidents (*aᶜrāḍ*), although it must be noted that atoms (apart from the *basāʾiṭ* [*KAS* §9]) and accidents do not exist apart from, or outside of, bodies. Bodies are defined as composite entities consisting of aggregations of atoms in which a certain number of accidents reside. The number of atoms and their arrangement determine the internal structure and density of bodies; accidents determine such things as size, shape, weight, color, smell, whether a body is living or inanimate, moving or at rest, in contact with other bodies or separate from them, etc. All material objects fall into the category of bodies as defined by Ibn al-Jawzī. The other important attribute of bodies is that they must have a cause which brings them into being and determines their composition (the number and arrangement of their atoms along with the accidents that define them). In the words of Ibn al-Jawzī, everybody must have a composer. That is a non-negotiable element in Ibn al-Jawzī's definition of bodies. For additional details, see §§5-7, 9, 29, 44, as well as other references scattered throughout *KAS*.

[13] One of the bits of evidence indicating that the world is temporal is the fact that it is a composite entity. In the logic of *kalām*, everything composite must by definition have a composer.

[14] As Watt points out, the argument from contingency is a method of proof developed by the early Muᶜtazila (W. M. Watt, "Some Muslim Discussions of Anthropomorphism," 7, 28-33).

[15] Cf., §6.

is the uncaused cause of all that is, and that since He is himself uncaused He is necessarily eternal. Moreover, on the basis of what is sometimes known as the argument from "mutual interference" (*tamānuᶜ*),[16] Ibn al-Jawzī concludes that the cause of the universe must be one.[17] Finally, it can be shown on the basis of the argument from contingency that God is not a "body,"[18] for a body is by definition composite, *viz.*, an aggregation of atoms qualified by a certain number of accidents; if He were a body, He would necessarily require a cause for His composition, that is, He would require a composer. If God is not a body, none of the attributes of bodies can be applied to Him: He does not—indeed, cannot—occupy space (*taḥayyuz*); He is beyond change (*taghayyur*), movement (*taḥarruk*, *intiqāl*), rest (*sukūn*), and the other conditions that govern the relations of bodies: contact (*mumāssa*, *mubāshara*), conjunction (*ijtimāᶜ*), separation (*infiṣāl*), difference (*tabayyun*), and so forth.

To recapitulate, on the basis of reason alone it is possible to show that God exists, that He is the eternal uncaused cause of all that is, that He is One, and that He is transcendent in the sense that He is beyond the world of material forms, beyond all bodily attributes, and beyond the conditions that govern the relations of bodies in space (movement, rest, contact, et cetera), and, finally, beyond time. In short, the God discovered through, and established by, reason is, in His essence, outside the cosmos,[19] that is to say, outside the categories of time[20] and space, in every respect except perhaps in a metaphorical

[16] This argument, cited frequently in works on *kalām*, was traced by medieval theologians not to Greek sources, but to the Quran itself, and especially S. 23: 91 ("God has not taken to himself a son, nor is there any god with Him; for then each god would have...risen up against others." Cf., also S. 21: 22). For al-Ashᶜarī's use of the argument, see his *Lumaᶜ* §8. See also H. Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy* (New York 1987), 166-167, where the argument and its place in medieval *kalām* is discussed in greater detail.

[17] Cf., §10, where Ibn al-Jawzī briefly alludes to the argument. While the idea of God's Oneness, in the sense of having no equal, is important to Ibn al-Jawzī, much more important to the argument developed in *KAS* is the idea of internal oneness, the notion that God is not made up of parts (*tabᶜīḍ*) and therefore cannot be a body.

[18] Cf., §§7, 137, 237. Cf., also §9 where it is said, following a similar line of reasoning, that God cannot be an atom "for [all] atoms are identical to each other *(tamāthul)* and occupy space (*taḥayyuz*)."

[19] See e.g., §55.

[20] See §57 where the point is made more explicitly than perhaps anywhere else in *KAS*.

sense.[21] While Ibn al-Jawzī comes down on the side of otherness in describing God, that otherness is not absolute. This much is apparent from the fact that His existence and primary attributes can be established through the inferential and deductive powers of reason. The final definition of God's otherness, however, will have to await a consideration of revelation.

Moreover, the task of establishing God's existence and His necessary attributes through reason is not a one-time undertaking; it must be replicated in the experience of every individual.[22] No one can establish God's existence and His necessary attributes for another human being. To believe in God's existence on the basis of someone else's effort is to ground one's belief in authority. This is not true belief, however, for judgments based on authority are deficient in that they lack certitude. They fall into the category of judgments based on "hearsay" or "reports" (*akhbār*).[23] This is to a large extent why Ibn al-Jawzī rejects *taqlīd* (the authority of tradition) in such matters—and why he devotes a substantial part of chapter I to a detailed explanation of the reasons why, in matters pertaining to God's existence and His necessary attributes, *taqlīd* is unacceptable.[24] To proceed on the basis of *taqlīd* is, in effect, to proceed on the basis of presumption (*ẓann/maẓnūn*). This is not acceptable in matters pertaining to God's existence.[25] Every human being must exert himself to the fullest in exercising the powers of reason (*ʿaql, ijtihād*) with which he has been endowed.[26]

[21] Ibn al-Jawzī will allow that God is present in a metaphorical sense, *viz.* through His knowledge but only in this sense.

[22] In the words of Ibn al-Jawzī, it is *ʿalā kulli makhlūq* ("[a responsibility incumbent] on every creature" [§20]).

[23] Cf., §§14, 18-22.

[24] The concept of *maʿrifa* or *ʿilm* (knowledge) is central to Ibn al-Jawzī's critique of *taqlīd* (cf., also the last part of §37 of *KAS* where Ibn al-Jawzī states quite explicitly that *maʿrifatAllāh* and *taqlīd* are incompatible: "...especially in matters pertaining to the knowledge of God *taqlīd* is not permissible"). On the concept of "knowing" (vs. *taqlīd*) and its place in the argument of the work, see notes to the Translation §20.

[25] Cf., §§18-22. Ibn al-Jawzī rejected *taqlīd* not only in the sphere of *uṣūl ad-dīn* (the principles upon which religion is based), but also in the field of *uṣūl al-fiqh* (juridical principles). He did allow for a measure of *taqlīd* in the realm of positive law (*furūʿ al-fiqh*).

[26] How far Ibn al-Jawzī was prepared to push this point is difficult to say—i.e., solely on the basis of the evidence from *KAS*. He knew, e.g., that children below a certain age were not capable of using reason except at the most elementary level; he also knew that not all adults share equally in the powers of reason, and he certainly knew that there are those

Revelation (naql)

Despite its power and its centrality to the quest for God, reason (*ʿaql*) is limited in what it can do. It can establish God's existence and identify those attributes (*ṣifāt*) that are necessary to His being as the eternal uncaused cause, but it cannot tell us what God expects of us or delineate the values and principles by which human conduct in this life is to be judged.[27] That kind of knowledge can only be acquired by recourse to the revealed text of scripture: the Quran and the Sunna. Indeed, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, the primary function of revelation is to provide human beings with a knowledge of those principles (*aḥkām*) and commands (*awāmir*) that ought to govern the conduct of individuals and their relationship to each other (*muʿāmalāt*) in this life.[28]

Revelation, however, is indispensable in another respect: it adds to what can be known of God through reason, and in doing so makes possible a fuller, richer, more adequate understanding of God. Thus it is only through the Quran and the Sunna that we can know, for example, that He is living, that He knows, wills, hears, sees, speaks, and that He possesses the power (*qudra*) to act.[29] These attributes, sometimes referred to as the *ṣifāt khabarīya* (scriptural attributes), are perfectly in accord with what can be known of God through reason.

Revelation does present a problem, however, in that it ascribes to God a host of "additional" attributes, some of which do appear to conflict with the

individuals—the mentally handicapped, e.g.—who are unable to participate in the rational effort to establish God's existence.

[27] To put it in another way, reason can disclose the existence of God as the Creator; it cannot disclose his existence as Legislator.

[28] Here Ibn al-Jawzī clearly differs with the Muʿtazila, who held that through observation and rational reflection human beings can arrive at a knowledge of those principles that ought to guide human conduct—a knowledge sufficient to satisfy the demands of God. In the Muʿtazilī view human beings are responsible to God for their conduct independently of revelation. Sunnīs, by contrast, insisted that human responsibility before God is contingent on revelation. See Reinhart, *Before Revelation: the Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought* (Albany 1995) for the arguments pro and con on this question.

[29] §71; cf., also §85. It might be argued that it is possible to establish the attribute of *qudra* through reason, for in establishing God as the cause of the world, the act of creation is also established.

non-corporeal nature of God's being as established through reason.[30] As reason makes clear, God cannot be a body, for all bodies are by definition composite and hence temporal in origin; all bodies require a composer. The apparent conflict between the language of reason and that of revelation poses two sets of questions: How is the anthropomorphic language of scripture to be squared with the language of reason, and how is the presence of such language in scripture to be explained? Secondly, if the language of the Quran is God's speech (as Ibn al-Jawzī took it to be), how are its anthropomorphic expressions to be construed? Although the challenge posed by the anthropomorphisms of the *ḥadīth* is less daunting, the problem is still real, for the language of the Prophet is also "inspired" language; like the Prophet himself, it too is in some sense *maᶜṣūm* (sacrosanct).[31]

Although such questions were not commonly addressed by Ḥanbalī thinkers, they were at the center of debates that went on within the great theological schools of medieval Islam, especially among the Muᶜtazila and the Ashᶜarites, but also in some of the lesser schools such as the Kullābīya. Nor were these questions unique to Sunnī thinkers. For Ibn al-Jawzī these are serious questions.

The Language of Scripture

To answer the question of why it is that scripture contains anthropomorphic expressions and images, Ibn al-Jawzī has recourse to elements of a theory of language which he cobbles together in an interesting, though perhaps less than satisfactory, fashion. Essentially, language, as Ibn al-Jawzī understands it, is a product of sense experience in such a way that words and expressions reflect human experience at its most basic, its most primitive, level. All of this follows from the fact that language is in some fundamental sense a human construction.[32] Language, however, is a multilayered, multidimen-

[30] Some of these belong to the category of the *awṣāf* referred to in *KAS* §33/1.

[31] For a rapid survey, along with a provocative discussion, of the problem of anthropomorphism from approximately the 8th to the 10th centuries, see J. van Ess, *The Youthful God: Anthropomorphism in Early Islam* (1988), 1-20.

[32] Ibn al-Jawzī does not say this in so many words, but it must, I think, be inferred from what he says about the nature of language.

sional phenomenon. At its highest level it is capable of the kind of abstraction and manipulation that make possible the various proofs for the existence of God. Between these two levels,[33] judging from the scattered comments made by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS*, is the language of imagination (*takhyīl*), a language that makes use of mental images (*taṣawwurāt*) drawn from sense experience, but a language that is under the influence of reason. This imaginal language is, in effect, a language pulled in two directions, perhaps one might even say, it is a hybrid language. The language that occupies this intermediate sphere is the kind of language on which poetry and refined prose draw. It is also the language of dream experiences as well as those forms of expression that have moved beyond sense experience but have not attained the status of abstraction.[34]

Ibn al-Jawzī does not attempt a classification of the language of scripture in terms of these categories, but he does readily concede that much of the language of the Quran and the *ḥadīth* is language of the simpler sort—language still closely linked to sense experience, and necessarily so—because it is the language of the great masses of human beings.[35] For the most part, it is the only kind of language they can grasp. Since scripture aims to communicate its message to the widest possible audience, it has no choice but to draw on the more elemental forms of language—those closest to the experience of ordinary people. This explains why, for example, God is so frequently portrayed in scripture as a corporeal being: as one who has a face, eyes, hands, ears, and so forth; a being who moves from place to place, and who, at every moment in time, occupies a particular place.[36] According to Ibn al-Jawzī, scripture uses such language for the benefit of ordinary human beings in order to underscore the reality of God's existence in the most

[33] That is, between the level of sense experience and the level at which reason is operative.

[34] Cf., §§ 74, 75, 76 and 79 where the subject is broached in connection with the imaginal creations of the dream experience.

[35] See §34 where Ibn al-Jawzī defends this view of the language of scripture. He alludes to this way of thinking of language frequently in the pages that follow (cf., for example §§123, 167, 216, 225 and 233); unfortunately, nothing essentially new is added to the position outlined in §34.

[36] He is said, e.g., to be seated on a throne located above the heavens.

concrete, vivid, compelling way possible and, in so doing, to dispel uncertainty and doubt.[37]

By understanding the anthropomorphic language of scripture in this way, Ibn al-Jawzī is treading dangerously close to the limits of traditionalist orthodoxy, if not transgressing those limits, for in suggesting that the language of scripture—the language of both the Prophet and that of the Quran itself—is a concession to the needs of the masses, Ibn al-Jawzī borders on suggesting that the language of scripture is historically conditioned.[38] What happens to the doctrine of the Quran as the eternal, unchanging, unconditioned word of God when it is suggested that its language represents an attempt to accommodate the needs of ordinary, uneducated human beings? Was Ibn al-Jawzī aware of the theological implications of the position he sets forth so confidently?[39] Occasionally in *KAS*, one has the impression that Ibn al-Jawzī is mouthing words (and expressing views) formulated by others. Not so here. The notion that the language of scripture is a language adapted to the needs of the common people was clearly his own,[40] a view

[37] See §34 where the issue is addressed. Ibn al-Jawzī reiterates this point frequently in chaps. II and III.

[38] See §§34 and 59, among others. Heinrichs alludes to this problem in his discussion of Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ's treatment of *majāz* in his *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ insists that in the Quran God addressed humankind in clear Arabic speech, and that in doing so He made use of idioms current in the speech of the Arabs. "Here al-Jaṣṣāṣ (Heinrichs writes) comes dangerously close to saying that God is not creative in his *majāz* expressions, using only prefabricated elements already existing in the language" ("Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary Theory," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, 7 [1991-92], 268-269). We may assume that al-Jaṣṣāṣ, who was a Muʿtazilī in theology and a Ḥanafī in jurisprudence, is here reflecting a view that was shared by other Muʿtazilīs (see also Heinrichs, "'*Takhyīl*' and Its Traditions" in *Gott is schön und Er lebt die Schönheit*, p. 233, where Zamakhsharī, in a discussion of the meaning of *amāna* (trust) in connection with S. 33:72, insists that the term *amāna* along with the reference to the heavens and the earth be taken as a figurative expression, and then he adds: "[Figurative] expressions like this are common in the language of the Arabs and the Koran came down exactly according to their ways and molds [or patterns of thought]"). The fact that Ibn al-Jawzī not only adopts this view but defends it vigorously and repeatedly in *KAS* is certainly significant.

[39] There is nothing in *KAS* to suggest that he saw this view of language as in any way problematic theologically.

[40] Not in the sense that the idea was original with him, but rather in the sense that he was fully convinced of its truth.

that he held with some conviction. He alludes to it repeatedly in *KAS*.[41] And it is not difficult to see why, for it is a reflection of the experiences of a man who, in composing homilies for a popular audience, must have spent a good deal of time and energy searching for expressions and images—for a language—that would resonate with ordinary believers. As a preacher and author of numerous homiletical anthologies, Ibn al-Jawzī had first hand experience of the difficulties involved in crafting a language that could speak effectively to audiences made up, for the most part, of uneducated people—persons steeped in what he called the language of sense experience.

Ta'wīl in the Service of Reason

Given the presence of anthropomorphisms in the Quran and the *ḥadīth*, how are such expressions to be construed? Is such language used merely to emphasize the reality of God's existence, or do the anthropomorphic expressions of scripture carry a meaning that goes beyond merely reinforcing the fact of God's existence? For Ibn al-Jawzī the answer to the latter question is clearly, yes.[42] If that is so, how or by what means is the meaning of such a language to be deciphered? A literalistic approach cannot possibly be the answer, because it merely accents the "materialist," corporeal aspect of scriptural anthropomorphisms since, for Ibn al-Jawzī, literalism by definition takes sense experience as its frame of reference. If the anthropomorphisms of scripture were to be taken at face value the inevitable result would be a God conceived in corporeal, this-worldly terms. For Ibn al-Jawzī such language taken literally, in effect, reduces God to the status of an idol.[43]

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[41] Cf., §34.

[42] See W.M. Watt's comments on *ta'wīl* in his "Some Muslim Discussions of Anthropomorphism," 2-3 and 9.

[43] Admittedly, Ibn al-Jawzī does not say this in so many words, but it is certainly present by implication. Indeed, it is precisely this understanding of anthropomorphism that is behind the emotional intensity of his denunciation of *tashbīh/tajsīm* (on the meaning of these terms for Ibn al-Jawzī, see notes to the Translation §1). By ascribing to God corporeal features He is, in effect, reduced to the status of an idol. For Ibn al-Jawzī idols are not only objects in the external world; they can also exist within the mind as mental constructs or images, particularly when God is conceived as possessing corporeal features. Indeed, idols understood in the traditional sense are (for Ibn al-Jawzī) nothing less than externalizations of mental images. These latter represent the necessary first phase in a process that ends in

Much of *KAS* is a diatribe against the literal approach to scripture championed by some members of the Ḥanbalī school; the language used to express his displeasure is severe and unforgiving. He does not hesitate to characterize fellow Ḥanbalīs who construe scripture in this way as having placed themselves beyond the pale of Islam.[44]

Ibn al-Jawzī's response to the hermeneutic challenge posed by scripture is straightforward. Since it is through reason that we first "encounter" God, it is reason that must be our guide in deciphering the meaning of scripture, in particular the intention behind its anthropomorphic expressions, the *akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt*.[45] For Ibn al-Jawzī it was a given that there can be no conflict between the God discovered by reason and the God of scripture.[46] Whatever method of exegesis one employs, the result must be an affirmation of the oneness and transcendence of God. In short, it must point to a God who is infinite and eternal, *viz.*, a God who is beyond all forms of contingent being.

For Ibn al-Jawzī, it is *taʾwīl* that offers the best hope for resolving the dilemma posed by the anthropomorphisms of scripture. In general, for Ibn al-Jawzī *taʾwīl* is a mode of exegesis in which language is construed tropically or metaphorically. Although he nowhere explains how it is that *taʾwīl* makes this transcending of language in its elemental, primal form possible, his reasoning seems to be as follows: in contrast to a literalistic interpretation of language which assumes that language has only one level of meaning,

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the creation of idols as objects in the external world. Mental images are more subtle, less easily recognized for what they are, but they are no less idols. What Ibn al-Jawzī denounces as anthropomorphisms in *KAS* are (for him) idols in their subjective, internal, mental form. This understanding of the connection between idolatry in its objective and subjective forms helps to explain the passion so often displayed in the denunciation of anthropomorphism in *KAS*. Although Ibn al-Jawzī nowhere spells out these connections, it is clear that he understands them. I would contend that it is impossible to understand *KAS* without keeping these connections clearly in mind. They also explain his passionate commitment to *taʾwīl* (and his opposition to literalistic exegesis), for it is only by construing the *akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt* as *majāzāt* (instances of figurative language) that one can avoid the dangers of *tashbīh/tajsīm* (cf., §34).

[44] See, e.g., §244, last line.

[45] §167, etc.

[46] His position was and remained that of Ibn ʿAqīl as the latter expresses it in his *Kitāb al-Funūn:* نقول: إنّ العقل مطابق للشرع وإنّه لا يرد الشرع إلا بما يوافق العقل (we maintain that reason is in agreement with revelation and there is nothing in revelation that does not agree with reason [509, 8-9. Cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 88]).

viz., what might be called the surface (*ẓāhir*) meaning of the text, *taʾwīl* insists that language sometimes admits of at least two levels of meaning, the obvious, literal meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) and a tropic or metaphorical sense (*majāz*). The kind of *taʾwīl* practiced by Ibn al-Jawzī seeks to move from the one to the other, that is, from the literal or surface meaning to the tropic. Language, including the language of scripture, does not always have multiple levels of meaning. It is a question of the intention of the language used. The first task of the exegete is to determine the intention behind a particular expression or text, that is to decide when *taʾwīl* is warranted and when not.

For Ibn al-Jawzī, there are two ways to decide the answer to the question. The first is to consult the context for clues that suggest or point, whether subtly or overtly, to the presence of a metaphorical sense. This kind of analysis is, strictly speaking, linguistic and literary in nature. The second approach might be called theological and takes as its starting point the nature of God as disclosed through reason. Since reason shows conclusively that God is the uncaused, eternal, non-corporeal One, those references in scripture that might on the surface suggest otherwise must be deemed necessarily to have a metaphorical sense and therefore to be construed by means of *taʾwīl*. But to conclude that a particular text must be construed metaphorically does not answer the question as to which one, among the various possible metaphorical meanings, is intended. In the end that can only be determined through lingistic/literary analysis.

Ibn al-Jawzī takes the need for linguistic/literary analysis seriously, as can be seen from the amount of space devoted to it in chapters II and III of *KAS*. It can fairly be said that the bulk of these two chapters is taken up with textual analysis, including considerations of a philological, grammatical, semantic, and literary nature. The function of the theological approach is largely negative: it provides protection against construing scripture in any way that might conflict with the God discovered through reason. It is only through the often tedious process of textual analysis that the precise and correct meaning of a given text can be determined. Here Ibn al-Jawzī turns to the work of the experts on language (grammarians, philologists and lexicographers), to literary criticism, exegesis,[47] and poetics for guidance in

[47] Especially, the many commentaries on the Quran and the various *ḥadīth* collections. In the case of the *ḥadīth*, Ibn al-Jawzī also drew on the substantial literature in the field of *jarḥ wa-taʿdīl* (the critical analysis of *ḥadīth*) in addition to the commentary literature.

determining the precise meaning called for by a particular text. This is why much of the analysis in *KAS* is based on the writings of men like Abū ʿUbayda, Ibn Qutayba, Thaʿlab, al-Farrāʾ, Ibn al-Anbārī, al-Khaṭṭābī, al-Bayhaqī, and others.[48] His discussion of the anthropomorphic expressions in the Quran (chap. II) and the *ḥadīth* (chap. III) provide detailed evidence as to how Ibn al-Jawzī uses the scholarly tools available to him. It is only through careful analysis that one is led to the intended meaning of the text. If *taʾwīl* is not disciplined into submission to the findings of the experts, it can become an excuse for arbitrary, fanciful interpretations.[49] This is not to say, of course, that the exegesis carried out in *KAS* is free of subjectivity. To demand that would be to expect the impossible.

The Hermeneutic Objectives of KAS

The hermeneutic objective of *KAS* is twofold: one constructive, the other critical. *KAS* is constructive in that it seeks to uncover the true meaning of scripture for the benefit of educated, honest seekers of the truth. It is critical (which here means polemical) in that it seeks to expose the indefensible anthropomorphizing arguments and conclusions promulgated in the writings of a number of fellow Ḥanbalīs. Indeed, the polemical purpose of the work is its principal purpose, as Ibn al-Jawzī makes clear early in chapter I.[50] He had become convinced that, on the question of the divine attributes, the Ḥanbalī school had lost its way, largely as a result of the influence of three prominent Ḥanbalīs whose writings defended anthropomorphic interpretations of the *akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt*.[51]

Ibn al-Jawzī's specific objectives in attacking some of the most influential names within the school were several: On one level, *KAS* is part of an attempt to reform the theological outlook of the school by convincing fellow Ḥanbalīs that their literalistic, anthropomorphic approach to scripture is indefensible, a negation of the legacy of Aḥmad and the school at its best.

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[48] See, e.g., §§39, 46, etc.

[49] Ibn al-Jawzī repeatedly calls attention to the dangers that are implicit in *taʾwīl* (see, e.g., §167).

[50] See especially §§14, 30, 33 and 37.

[51] Above all, Ibn Ḥāmid (d. 403/1012), Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1065) and Ibn Zāghūnī (d. 527/1132).

Although the principal targets of his attacks (Ibn Ḥāmid, Abū Yaʿlā and Ibn Zāghūnī)[52] were no longer living—Ibn Zāghūnī, the youngest of the three, had been dead for nearly a half century by the time *KAS* was written—their writings were still in circulation and still being read, still continuing to shape the outlook of younger Ḥanbalīs. By focusing the spotlight of critical reflection on their writings, by attacking the "materialistic" assumptions on which their exegesis was based, Ibn al-Jawzī was attempting to dampen their influence and point his contemporaries in a different direction—one more in line with the demands of both reason and scripture, but also one more in line with what Ibn al-Jawzī believed to be the founding principles of the school itself. At this level, *KAS* was part of an attempt to rehabilitate the school and so restore it to its founding principles by calling attention to the erroneous doctrines and methods that had found their way into the school in the course of the 11th century under the aegis of a misguided literalism.[53]

Judging from references scattered throughout *KAS*, particularly at the end of chapter I and again at the end of chapter III, Ibn al-Jawzī was also concerned about his own reputation within the school and perhaps also within the larger Sunnī community.[54] He puts it quite pointedly at the end of the work where he says, in effect, that if he had not taken a stand and called for a return to the non-anthropomorphist principles on which the school was founded, his contemporaries would have every right to conclude that he himself condoned the doctrines of the anthropomorphizers. From comments such as these it is possible to conclude that Ibn al-Jawzī was seeking to establish his own reputation within the school (and perhaps beyond) as a defender of what he believed to be the doctrine taught by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal himself—an enlightened traditionalism.[55]

[52] For more on Ibn Ḥāmid, see notes to §14 of the Translation; for Abū Yaʿlā, and Ibn Zāghūni, see notes to §30.

[53] More precisely, from the last third of the 10th century (Ibn Ḥāmid, the earliest Ḥanbalī to draw Ibn al-Jawzī's criticism, must have been born sometime in the 950s) to the early part of the 12th century (Ibn Zāghūnī, the last Ḥanbalī critiqued in *KAS*, died in 1132). The bulk of the "damage" to the school had been done during the 5th/11th century, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, largely as a result of Abū Yaʿlā's influence.

[54] §§37 and 245.

[55] G. Makdisi uses the expression to characterize the outlook of Ibn ʿAqīl (Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 16). I believe it applies equally to the position defended by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS* and elsewhere.

KAS may well have been the most thoroughgoing attack on anthropomorphic conceptions of God to come out of medieval Islam.[56] It was certainly the most forceful statement on the subject to be produced within the Ḥanbalī school during the Middle Ages.[57] While *KAS* may be unique among the writings produced by medieval Ḥanbalīs, it does have to be remembered, however, that Ibn al-Jawzī was not alone among Ḥanbalīs in defending a non-anthropomorphic conception of God based on *ta'wīl*. Though less daring in some respects, Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) had argued for an openness to other theological orientations and to the use of *ta'wīl* in dealing with the question of the divine attributes. Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī (d.488/1095), an older contemporary of Ibn ʿAqīl, produced a major Ḥanbalī creed (*ʿaqīda*) in which he defended a non-literalist approach to the *akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt*.[58] Abū'l-Ḥusayn b. al-Munādī (d. 335/947), a second-generation Ḥanbalī, had called for the use of *ta'wīl* in dealing with texts bearing on the divine attributes; his writings clearly reflect the influence of *kalām* within the Ḥanbalī school and that at a surprisingly early date.[59]

There may well have been other defenders of *ta'wīl* within the school not recorded in our sources. One of the claims made repeatedly in *KAS* is that anthropomorphist ideas had been introduced into the school only after the time of Aḥmad. To be sure, this was an argument developed in the heat of internecine debate within the school; nonetheless there does appear to be some justification for Ibn al-Jawzī's contention. As we have seen, there is

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[56] Cf., Gimaret, *Image*, 53-56.

[57] So far as can be determined based on what we currently know of the theological literature produced during the Islamic Middle Ages.

[58] *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 263-290.

[59] See *KAS* §125 where Ibn al-Jawzī quotes a passage from one of Ibn al-Munādī's works that reveals the influence of *kalām*; it reads as follows: "Describing the *hawā'* (empty space) as being above or below Him is abhorrent to the learned (*ahl al-ʿilm*) because it implies containment [within space] and posits something like a receptacle (*wiʿā'*) for Him who is not like [other] beings (*ashyā'*). We are in agreement that no part of creation is above the Almighty in any sense, and that He neither indwells things nor is separate from them. If He were present in things He would be part of them, and if He were distinct from them He would be separated from them. Agreement amongst us on this point is widespread (*sic.*)—more so, than on the matter of the 'objectionable', [i.e., the literal,] interpretation. The metaphorical interpretation (*ta'wīl*) [of this tradition], however, is the most reliable." Ibn al-Munādī was a contemporary of Barbahārī and Aḥmad's son ʿAbd Allāh. For more on the term *hawā'*, see notes to Translation §125.

evidence for the existence of a theologically informed non-anthropomorphist tradition within the school reaching as far back as the latter half of the 10th century. No less an authority than Ibn Taymīya believed that, in fact, it went all the way back to Aḥmad himself; according to him, Aḥmad was one of the few *salaf* to have recourse to the notion of *majāz* in the interpretation of the Quran.[60]

Ibn al-Jawzī, a Ḥanbalī Eclectic

If Ibn al-Jawzī's own theological stance was in many ways shaped by the non-anthropomorphist tradition within medieval Ḥanbalism, it is clear that he also drew on theological sources outside the school in the formulation of his position. Indeed, in theological matters Ibn al-Jawzī's position as articulated in *KAS* can best be described as eclectic. He was clearly influenced by Ashᶜarism, particularly the later more sophisticated Ashᶜarism of men like al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015), al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1038), and perhaps also al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085/6). Despite his criticism of the Muᶜtazila,[61] they too played a role—and apparently a significant one—in shaping the views set forth in *KAS*.[62] Ashᶜarite influence can most readily be seen in Ibn al-Jawzī's insistence on a distinction between the *ṣifāt* and the *awṣāf*,[63] but also to some extent in his understanding of the mutually interdependent relationship between reason and revelation, and his stand on the question of the divine attributes. Muᶜtazilism's contribution to Ibn al-Jawzī's thought can be seen in his emphasis on the importance of reason *vis-à-vis* revelation, but Muᶜtazilism's influence is most evident in his approach to exegetical questions—especially in his reliance on the linguistic sciences (grammar, philology, and lexicography),[64] and on literary criticism in dealing with the anthropomorphic expressions found in the Quran and

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[60] *Kitāb al-Īmān* (Beirut, 1392/1972), 83-85; see also W. Heinrichs, "On the Genesis of the *Ḥaqīqa/Majāz* Dichotomy," *SI*, 59 (1984), 115-117.

[61] See his extended comments in *KAS* §§27-29.

[62] The fact of Muᶜtazilī influence was recognized by his Ḥanbalī critics: among the sharpest of his critics were al-ᶜAlthī (*Dhayl*, II, 205-210), and Ibn Taymīya (Makdisi, *Ibn ᶜAqīl*, 508). Although Ibn al-Jawzī is not mentioned by Ibn Qudāma in his *Dhamm at-Taʾwīl*, it seems likely Ibn Qudāma had him in mind when he blasted Ḥanbalīs who use *taʾwīl*.

[63] See especially *KAS* §33.

[64] Some of those on whom he relied—men like al-Farrāʾ—were Muᶜtazilī in orientation.

the Sunna and, above all, in his consistent preference for *taʾwīl*.[65] Some Ashʿarites did make use of *taʾwīl*, to be sure, but in general they were more reticent in their attitude toward *taʾwīl* and some were quite deeply suspicious of it.[66] Further, Muʿtazilī influences can be seen in the specific interpretations he adopted in dealing with the anthropomorphisms of scripture and, finally, in his stand on the question of *ruʾya* (the vision of God in the hereafter). The logic of the position developed in *KAS* seems clearly to rule out the possibility of a literal vision of God in the afterlife—exactly as the Muʿtazila had argued.[67]

Despite the role played by Ashʿarism and Muʿtazilism in the shaping of his thought, Ibn al-Jawzī was a devoted Ḥanbalī, a defender of what he believed to be the doctrine of Aḥmad. Given the intensity of his loyalty to the school, and especially to Aḥmad, it is not surprising that he devoted a major work to the life and teaching of Aḥmad, the last part of which is a biographical sketch of the school's history from its inception up to the middle of the 12th century.[68] Beyond his attachment to the theological

[65] G. Makdisi, *Censure*, XV-XVI. It is significant that it was the Muʿtazila who first introduced the distinction between the figurative and the literal (or proper, veridical) senses of the text of the Quran (i.e., between the *majāz* and the *ḥaqīqa* of the Quran), sometime in the course of the latter part of the 9th century and the first half of the 10th; according to W. Heinrichs, they did so specifically in order to deal with the anthropomorphisms of the Quran (Heinrichs, "On the Genesis of the *Ḥaqīqa-Majāz* Dichotomy," *SI*, 59 [1984], 116-117, 132-139; see also his "Contacts between Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary Theory in Islam: The Case of *Majāz*," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, 7 [1991-92], 253-284). Not only were the Muʿtazilites the first to work out the distinction between *majāz* as tropical language and *ḥaqīqa* as a literal interpretation, they were apparently the first to introduce the idea of tropical language as a method of interpretation, which they indicated by the term *majāz* and later the term *taʾwīl*. As Heinrichs notes, those who practiced this kind of interpretation were "mostly...of a Muʿtazilite persuasion" ("Contacts between Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary Theory in Islam...," 256, n. 9). Ashʿarites who later adopted this mode of exegesis, even though on a limited basis, did so under the tutelage of the Muʿtazilites. There is no mystery why the Muʿtazilites came to be seen as the masters of this kind of interpretation, and it is not surprising that when others (Ashʿarites, Ḥanbalīs, etc.) adopted *taʿwīl* they were often accused of having caved in to Muʿtazilī influence.

[66] According to W. M. Watt, even Ashʿarites like al-Juwaynī were cautious in their use of *taʾwīl* (cf., Watt, "Some Muslim Discussions of Anthropomorphism," 8, 19-23).

[67] See §§202-203; cf., also §§75-76. This seems in line with the position taken by Ibn ʿAqīl (cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 147).

[68] *Manāqib al-Imām Aḥmad*, ed. Muḥammad Amīn al-Khānjī (Cairo 1349/1930). The

legacy of early Ḥanbalism, as he understood that legacy, Ibn al-Jawzī was a thoroughgoing Ḥanbalī both in his juridical views and in his political philosophy. He was unwavering in his support of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate to the very end of his life. Ḥanbalī activism, above all its commitment to the reform and renewal of the community, left a deep mark on both his psyche and practical agenda. It seems clear, judging from the last part of chapter I and the final paragraph of chapter III, that the writing of *KAS* was driven, in large measure, by a strong reformist agenda. As Ibn al-Jawzī himself points out both in *KAS* and elsewhere, he could have given up on the Ḥanbalī school of his day as a lost cause, but that would have meant turning his back on the teaching of Aḥmad and handing the school over to its most reactionary elements without a struggle—something he simply could not bring himself to do.[69] If the writing of *KAS* was an act of loyalty to Aḥmad, it was also part of an attempt to save the school of his day by defending what he believed to have been its founding principles.

In his characterization of Ibn ʿAqīl, George Makdisi refers to him as "a rare combination of Muʿtazilī rationalism and Shāfiʿī traditionalism."[70] This might also be applied to the position embraced by Ibn al-Jawzī. I would suggest, however, that in the case of Ibn al-Jawzī, rationalism is taken further; he is, in short, less equivocal in his defense of the rationalist stance. It is thanks to the work of reason that revelation can assert its authority. He does nonetheless concede that rationalism by itself will not do. It requires to be informed and corrected by a transcendent source, one not conditioned by temporality.

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last biographical entry in the work is devoted to Abūʾl-ʿAlāʾ al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. al-Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār, who died in 569/1173-74 (p. 532). Since the appearance of this edition in 1930, the work has been edited and published a number of times.

[69] See §§37 and 245; also Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, *Mirʾāt az-Zamān*, 326 (cf., *Muntaẓam*, X, 253).

[70] Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 16.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE MANUSCRIPT: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

The manuscript used for the preparation of the critical edition of *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* is preserved in the Şehid Ali Paşa collection (# 1561) of the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul. It is, so far as is known, the only surviving copy of the work.[1] Despite repeated efforts, over a number of years, to locate other copies of the work, these efforts have not so far been successful. It is entirely possible that our work originally circulated under another title. We do know that some of Ibn al-Jawzī's works did circulate under several titles.[2] All efforts to identify alternate titles of *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* have proven inconclusive.

The name of the copyist of the Istanbul manuscript is not given, though the colophon does indicate that the copying of the manuscript was completed on the 17th of Rajab 890 (30 July 1485), presumably in Damascus. In the colophon, the copyist states that the copy (*nuskha*) from which he made our manuscript descended from one produced earlier by a certain Nūr ad-Dīn ʿAlī b. Jamāl ad-Dīn b. ʿAbd Allāh, who is identified as a Shāfiʿite from Damascus. I have not so far been able to identify this Nūr ad-Dīn from the biographical sources available to me, but the colophon does state that he was a student (*talmīdh*) of a certain Shams ad-Dīn, a Shāfiʿite *muḥaddith* also from Damascus.[3] The copyist notes finally in the colophon that his original was made from a copy of the manuscript produced by Nūr ad-Dīn. Although it cannot be proven conclusively, it seems likely that the various copies referred to in the colophon were all made in Damascus. If this is true we may conclude that *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* had attracted a fair amount of interest among the scholars of Damascus, particularly among Shāfiʿites.

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[1] Neither the title of the work nor the Istanbul manuscript is listed in Brockelmann.

[2] One example of this turns out in fact to be an abridgment of *Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*, which was widely known under two separate titles: *Dafʿ ash-Shubhat at-Tashbīh* and *al-Bāz al-Ashhab* (cf., *GAL*, Suppl. I, 918, no. 29). A comparison of the manuscripts bearing these two titles shows them to be identical. The only difference is in the titles.

[3] Too little of his name is given to make an identification possible.

General Features

The Şehid Ali Paşa manuscript consists of 42 folios, including a title page and a page containing the colophon. The manuscript is protected by a heavy leather binding that measures 14 by 17.5mm. The paper on which the text was written is of a heavy, light brown sort with a smooth, almost glossy surface. On the cover page (between the binding and the title page) في الكلام is written in the upper right-hand corner indicating that someone who had read the work considered it to be a treatise on *kalām*. Folios generally consist of 21 lines each 8.5mm in length.[4] At the bottom of the verso of each folio the first word or phrase of the recto of the following folio is given. The presence of these catch words is significant because they provide evidence that the folios have been kept in the proper order and that the manuscript is complete. On the whole, the manuscript is in good condition. There are scattered wormholes here and there, and there is a slight blurring of the ink on several folios,[5] but the damage caused is not sufficient to significantly interfere with decipherment of the text.

The manuscript is written in a clear cursive script and is the work of a single hand. This applies also to the marginal notations, most of which consist of corrections of one sort or another. Vowels, which in some cases appear to have been added by a later hand, are used sparingly. Diacritical points, on the other hand, are used fairly generously, though it is not uncommon for words to be partially or even wholly unpointed. Maintaining an even margin was clearly important to the copyist. If the space at the end of the line was insufficient, the word was divided with the last part of the word appearing at the beginning of the following line.[6] Occasionally, however, the last part of a word at the end of a line will be written in the space above the first part of the word[7] or far out in the left margin.[8] The conjunctive و is commonly placed at the end of lines. Marks of punctuation are rare; indeed, the only mark used for this purpose is the dotted circle. Ordinarily it is used to indicate the end of a section, though occasionally it serves

[4] The only exception to this is fol. 10a and 10b which consist of 20 lines.

[5] E.g., folios 1b and 5a.

[6] This phenomenon is fairly common in our manuscript; see, e.g., folios 6a, 10-11; 6b, 2-3; 10a, 7-8; 20a, 7-8, 14-15; 25a, 14-15, and 16-17.

[7] See folios 2a, line 11; 2b, line 13 and 18; and 34b, line 13.

[8] See folios 3a, line 17; and 11a, line 12, for examples of the latter.

merely to fill empty space, in which case it is repeated one or more times.[9] The bulk of the manuscript was copied with a heavy black ink; however, red ink was used fairly frequently, though for no single purpose. Sometimes it is used to highlight key words or phrases, sometimes to call attention to the name of a person, and sometimes to mark out the titles of sections or subsections.[10]

Orthography

The orthography of the manuscript is marked by a notable lack of consistency, particularly in the use of the *alif mamdūda*, the *alif maqṣūra*, the *otiose alif*, and the *hamza*. The *alif mamdūda* is normally omitted in proper names and set expressions of a pious nature, though this is not always the case. The *alif maqṣūra* is sometimes written with a regular *alif*,[11] while at other times it is written with a *yā'* over two diacritical points.[12] In the case of the word *ibn*, the *alif* is frequently omitted even when it appears at the beginning of a line or when it is the first element in a proper name. Perhaps the greatest inconsistency is to be seen in the use or non-use of the *hamza*. Frequently it is omitted following the long *alif*, in which case the *alif* is often written with a *madda*. Thus, for example, جآ is used for جاء, هولآ for هؤلاء, علمآ for علماء, et cetera. Frequently, too, the *hamza* is omitted in the medial or final position of verbs when the *hamza* carries a *fatḥa* or a *ḍamma*. Ordinarily a *hamza kaṣra* is written by a *yā'* as in قايل for قائل, or حايط for حائط. In addition to the above features of the manuscript's orthography, the د and the ر are virtually indistinguishable. Quite frequently the ة and pronoun suffix ه are attached to the ر at the end of words. Although the orthography of the manuscript is characterized by a certain lack of consistency, the orthography is hardly arbitrary, and, in any case, the inconsistencies present no serious problem for the reader.

[9] The dotted circle first appears on fol. 24a, line 9. In the remaining folios it is used fairly frequently (see e.g., folios 25a, 19; 26b, 17; 27b, 21; 28b, 3; 32b, 4; etc.).

[10] These are found on every single folio of the manuscript.

[11] E.g., fol. 15a, line 1, where تناها is written for تناهى.

[12] Examples abound: see e.g., fol. 1b, lines 9, 11, 12 and 14 (where it is a question of تعالى written as تعالي) or fol. 12b, lines 1 (معني for معنى), and line 12 (علي for على), etc.

Marginal Features

The manuscript contains abundant evidence of having been collated by the copyist on its completion. Corrections and additions are placed in the margins and normally followed by the Arabic صح (sometimes abbreviated to ص) indicating that the reading of the margin is correct. The point in the text where the correction or addition given in the margin is to be inserted is indicated by a line curved to the right or left depending on the margin used for the correction. There are nineteen such corrections noted in the margins of the manuscript. The majority of these consist of a word or two omitted by the copyist in the course of transcribing the work. Occasionally, however, there are longer corrections usually having to do with an entire line or more skipped by the copyist. If the copyist caught the mistake immediately, he simply crossed out the error and proceeded with the work of copying.[13]

It is clear from all of this that the copyist made a fairly consistent effort to produce a reliable copy of the original. Judging from the care reflected in the corrections, we can be certain that we have a reasonably accurate transcription of the original. There are relatively few grammatical errors in the manuscript. Some of these were caught by the copyist and corrected in the margin. Occasionally the copyist recognized his error immediately, in which case he simply crossed out the error and proceeded. Those that were not corrected are noted in the critical apparatus of the Arabic text.

In addition to the corrections noted in the margins, there are a few marginal notes added by later hands. Most of these are observations or clarifications having to do with a point raised in the text of the work. Marginal comments of this sort are preceded, in some cases, by the letter *nūn*, an abbreviation for *bayān* (clarification, explanation). Such notations are relatively rare, however.[14]

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[13] Examples are found on folios 3b, line12; 19a, line 14; 19b, lines10 and 15 (where مهدي is crossed out and replaced by مهني for مهنّا); and 24a, line 16.

[14] The first of these is found at the top of fol. 3a; the second in the right margin of fol. 23b; and the third in the left margin of fol. 24a.

The Critical Edition and Translation

In the process of editing the Arabic text, a number of changes have been made. Errors of grammar and spelling have been corrected with proper notation of the changes in the critical apparatus. Every effort has been made to standardize the orthography and to bring it into line with current usage. Compound numbers have been written separately. In connection with a small group of words, an older orthography has been replaced by the current spelling; thus, for example, صلوة and زكوة have been replaced by صلاة and زكاة.

Vowel markings have been added to indicate passive forms of the verb, as well as to less common proper names and other words whose reading might not be immediately evident. On the whole, however, I have tried to keep vowel marks to a minimum except in the case of quotations from the Quran and to indicate the passive voice of verbs. A number of abbreviations have been added: عن مَن , عن ما , من مَن, and من ما have been changed to عمّن, عمّا, ممّن, and ممّا, respectively. Finally, a certain amount of punctuation has been added to facilitate the reading of the text. Citations from the Quran are indicated by decorative brackets ﴿ ﴾ and those from the *ḥadīth* by quotation marks« ». Additions to the text are indicated by the use of square brackets [ ].[15]

Since I have had to work with a *unicum* in the preparation of the critical edition, every effort has been made to locate parallel passages in other works which might serve as a basis for a better understanding and reading of our manuscript. References to some of the more important sources used in this effort are to be found in the critical apparatus, frequently supplemented in the notes to the translation. Normally, variant readings discovered in these sources have been reproduced in the critical apparatus, though in some cases these have been used as a basis for emending the text of the manuscript with proper indication of such in the apparatus.

The content of the notes to the Arabic text have been dictated in part by

[15] The reader will note that the *shadda* has been consistently omitted from the particle لا. I regret this omission. Unfortunately, the software used for the preparation of the critical edition of the Arabic text will not allow a *shadda* over a *lām* followed by an *alif*. I trust this omission will cause no serious problems for the reader.

the limitations of the software used to prepare the critical edition.[16] Since the fonts available to me do not permit the deleting of diacritical points, I have frequently resorted to the more cumbersome method of indicating the absence of diacritical points in the manuscript by means of short explanatory phrases, hence my use of such expressions as بدون نقط (when all the letters in a given word are devoid of diacritical points) and غير منقوطة (when only certain letters in a word are absent diacritics). Thus, for example, I have used such expressions as الياء غير منقوطة or, in the case where two letters in a given word are missing points, such expressions as الباء والجيم غير منقوطتين. The practice will, I trust , be clear to readers of the Arabic text.

In the translation I have tried to avoid a literal or word-for-word rendering of the text, aiming instead to capture the meaning and the spirit of the Arabic to the best of my ability and to express these as accurately as possible in current or standard English idiom. The fact that Ibn al-Jawzī was a man of deep and passionate feeling and allowed this intensity to spill over into his language does not make the task of rendering his Arabic any easier. I have tried to avoid lapsing into a paraphrastic rendering of the text, though given my determination to avoid a literal translation I may at times have come close to the boundary separating the two, or perhaps even crossed it. My aim, however, has been to stick to the meaning of the Arabic. Whether these goals have been achieved in some measure will be for the reader to decide. The translations of the various Quranic verses cited in the work are generally my own, though I have frequently consulted various modern translations in English, German and French, along with the commentary literature in Arabic.

[16] For those interested, I have used the Nisus Writer (6.0.1) in conjunction with the Apple Language Kit for Arabic. The problem has to do with the fonts used in the Language Kit. On the whole I have found the Nisus Writer to be eminently useful for the creation of critical editions. David Reisman of Yale and Wellesley College is presently working on a set of fonts that will make it possible to write Arabic without diacritical points for the Geeza font.



Folio 1a (Title Page)



بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

قال الشيخ الامام جمال الدين ابو الفرج عبد الرحمن بن علي بن محمد بن علي رحمه الله الحمد لله على التوفيق لاسلم نهج وارقم طريق اما بعد فنعم علينا بالعقل الصادق الصديق ومعرفة النقل فنسئل الله بعد الله في فهمه عريقه فحببنا بذلها فاخرجنا الى السعة من المضيق محمدا افرعه مثمرا واصله وريق وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد النبي الوالد الشفيق وعلى اله ومن صحبه واتبع كتابه التحقيق وصلاة تجمع لنا الرضا يوم الجمع والتفريق

فصل اول ما وجب على العبد معرفة الله تعالى وهي حاصله بالعقل واجمعه بالنقل فاذا وجبت وجب النظر والاستدلال وقد امر الله عز وجل بذلك فقال تعالى قل انظروا ماذا في السموات والارض وقال تعالى اولم ينظروا في ملكوت السموات والارض وما خلق الله من شيء وقال تعالى قل سيروا في الارض فانظروا الاية وقال تعالى وفي انفسكم افلا تبصرون وفصل فالنظر مبتدأ في هذه الاشياء بالعقل فهو المقدم على كل شيء لان جميع احكام الدين لا تنفك عن كلا القسمين اقسام احدهما لا يصح ان يعلم الا بالعقل دون السمع والثاني لا يصح ان يعلم بالعقل بالسمع والثالث يصح ان يعلم بهما

فصل واثبات حدث العالم واثبات محدثه عز وجل واثبات وحدانيته وصفاته الواجبه له واثبات الرساله وتجويزها عليه وكل ما تعلق بهذه الجمله مما لا يصح ان يعلم التوحيد والنبوة الا

به حاصل بالعقل والدليل على ذلك ان السمع انما هو عبارة عن كلام الله وما يروي عن رسوله المميز عنه واجماع من اخبر رسوله انه لا يعطي في قوله ولن يصح ان يعرف ان العقل قول الله تعالى ورسوله وخبره الا بعد ان يعرف الله تعالى كما ان من المحال ان يعرف كلام زيد من لم يعرف زيدا فوجب ان يكون العلم بالله ورسوله من العلوم عقلا وقد استدل ابراهيم الخليل بعقله عليه السلام حين قال لا احب الافلين فعلم ان ما يجوز عليه التغير والانتقال من حال الى حال لا يكون الا مخلوقا وان الخالق لا يجوز عليه التغير والانتقال من حال الى حال

وانما يعرف بالسمع وليس باسناغ للعقل فيه وكالعلم بكون فعل المكلف حسنا وقبيحا ومجزيا وغير مجزي واما ما يصح بهما فكالعلم بان النظر للمذنبين والقياس في الاحكام فصل في اثبات الخالق سبحانه بالعقل خلافا للدهرية فنقول للخلق خالق دليلنا ان كل حادث فلحدوثه سبب والعالم حادث فلزم ان له سببا والعالم كل شيء موجود سوى الله تعالى والموجود اذا كان متحيزا غير متولف سمي جوهرا فان تولف الى غيره سمي جسما والعرض ما قام بغيره كاللون والحركة والسكون وما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث والدليل على ان لحدوثه سببا ان الحادث ما كان معدوما ثم وجد فلا يخلو ان يكون وجوده قبل ان يوجد فحال الوجود او ممكن الوجود لا يجوز ان يكون مما لا الان الحال لا يوجد ابدا فثبت انه ممكن الوجود والممكن ما يجوز ان يوجد ويجوز

القرب من الذات أجاز الملاصقه وما ذهب اليه القاضي
صرح بحكم التجسيم

الحديث الاربعون

رواه الدارقطني من حديث أبي اسحاق عن عبد الله بن خليفه
عن عمر انه قال قالت ام سلمه يا رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فقال
ادعو الله ان يخفف الجبه فنظر الرب عز وجل وقال ان
كرسيه وسع السموات والارض وان له اطيطا كاطيط
الرحل الجديد اذا ركب من ثقله قلت هذا حديث مختلف
جدا فتارة يروى عن عبد الله بن ابي خليفه عن عمر عن رسول الله صلى
الله عليه وسلم وتارة عن عمر موقوفا عليه وقد رواه ابو
اسحق عن يزيد بن اطيط عن عمر قال اذا جلس تبارك وتعالى على
الكرسي سمع له اطيط كاطيط الرحل ورواه بن جرير ان عبد الله
بن خليفه قال قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ان كرسيه وسع
السموات والارض وانه ليقعد فما يفضل منه مقدار اربعه اصابع
قلت هذا يخالف اللفظ الاول وكل ذلك يخالف من الرواه وبن
سنو الحفظ والاتقن فما يفضل منه مقدار اربعة اصابع والمعنى انه
قد ملاه بعظمته وهيبته ويكون هذا ضربا من المثل لعظمة الخالق
وقول الرواة اذا قعد واذا جلس من تعبير هم او من بعض ما يظنونه
المعنى كما قال قايل لم استوى على العرش فقعد وانما قلنا هذا لان
الخالق سبحانه لا يجوز ان يوصف بالجلوس على شيء فيفضل من ذلك الشيء
لان هذه صفة الاجسام وقال الزاغوني معنى الحديث خروج
عن صفة الاستواء اربعة اصابع قلت وهذا قد تصدى به معاند

العوام وهل ما قاله معنى الا ان يقال ان هذه الاربعه لم تحاذي
ولم تماس وكل هذا صريح في التشبيه ظاهر في التجسيم ثم هو اثبات
صفات بما لا يحسن اثباته من الاحاديث المعلوله وقد روينا
عن ابي بكر بن سالم العابدي قال هذا الموضع الذي يفصل فيه
الجلوس عليه قال وقد كان الليق بهذا المتعبد ان يشاغل
بعبادته عن الكلام في هذا الفن وقد روى القاضي عن النخعي
انه قال ان الله تعالى قد ملا العرش حتى ان له أطيطا كاطيط
الرحل قلت هذا الكذب على النخعي قال القاضي وغيره
منهم حمل الخبر على ظاهره في ان ذاته تملا العرش ثم قال
لا يخلو شيء امكان قلت ومن غلط هذا الغلط لا بد ان يجيز
ما يحال الامكانه لشغله روى القاضي عن خالد بن سعد ان انه قال
ان الرحمن ليثقل على حمله العرش وقال عنوه منهم حمل هذا على
ظاهره وان قوله تثقله فصلت الرحمن لم يعرف الا على وجه
المماسه فصيان الكلام مع قوله اولى

الحديث الحادي والاربعون

روى البخاري ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث ابي سعيد عن
رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم قال يقول الله يوم القيامة
يا ادم فيقول لبيك وسعديك فينادي بصوت ان الله يامرك
ان تخرج من ذريتك بعثا الى النار قلت انفرد بلفظ الصوت
حفص بن غياث وخالفه وكيع وجرير وغيرهما من اصحاب الاعمش
فلم يذكروا لفظ الصوت وسهيل احمل عن حفص فقال كان يخلط

فقد نزهت مذهب الامام أحمد ونقيت عنه
كذب المنقولات وهذيان المعقولات غير مقلد فيما اعتقده
وكيف اترك بهرجا وانا انتقده اخره والله تعالى اعلم
نقلته من نسخة مكتوب في اخرها ما صورته منقول من
نسخة نسخت من نسخة نسخت من خط يدي نور الدين علي
بن جمال الدين بن عبد الله الدمشقي الشافعي تلميذ الشيخ الامام
العلامة شمس الدين المحدث الشافعي بدمشق نفع الله
به المسلمين ۞ وقع الفراغ من نسخها سابع رجب الفرد سنة عشرة
وتسعمائة وتمامليه وحسبنا الله ونعم الوكيل ۞

PART TWO

TRANSLATION

[CHAPTER ONE]

[THE PLACE OF REASON IN MATTERS OF FAITH AND THE PROBLEM OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM][1]

[fol.1b] In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate One.

1 The *shaykh*, *imām*, Jamāl ad-Dīn Abū'l-Faraj ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. al-Jawzī, may God have mercy on him, said: Praise be unto God for the success made possible through the soundest of approaches

[1] The term anthropomorphism is used here and throughout this work as a rough equivalent for the Arabic terms *tajsīm* and *tashbīh*, two terms that occur frequently in *KAS*. For the most part, *tajsīm* and *tashbīh* are used as synonyms or near synonyms and are, therefore, virtually interchangeable. For Ibn al-Jawzī, they refer to any attempt to compare God to corporeal beings and categories, and they lead inevitably to a God conceived as a corporeal being. Such a process, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, necessarily takes sense perception as its point of departure and its frame of reference. When the two terms are differentiated, *tashbīh* comes to denote the act of comparison in and of itself, i.e., the act of comparing God to what is other than God, whereas *tasjīm* focuses attention on the object of the comparison, *viz.*, God and the world of corporeal existents. In this somewhat more refined usage, the terms refer to two quite different but necessarily complementary things, *viz.*, the act of comparison and its object.—It is important to distinguish Ibn al-Jawzī's conception of anthropomorphism from contemporary Western usage. In the latter, the term generally refers to attempts to conceive God in human terms, i.e., as a being possessing human attributes, irrespective of whether these attributes are emotional, rational or corporeal, or a combination of these. In *KAS*, by contrast, the notion of anthropomorphism is used only to refer to attempts to conceive God in corporeal terms. Thus, while Ibn al-Jawzī, who is adamant in his rejection of corporealist conceptions of God, vigorously denies that God has a body with limbs and organs, he has no trouble speaking of God as knowing, willing, acting, speaking, hearing, seeing, etc. (cf., §§71, 85, etc.). Again, while Ibn al-Jawzī repeatedly rejects the notion that God has eyes, he has no difficulty with the notion that God sees (cf. §160, e.g.). In fairness to Ibn al-Jawzī, however, it must be noted that when he speaks of God as seeing, knowing, speaking, etc., he may well be using these expressions metaphorically, i.e., as *majāzāt* or figures of speech. Unfortunately, this is an issue that is simply not addressed in *KAS*. Finally, it should be noted that the critique of anthropomorphism elaborated in *KAS* assumes an atomistic ontology—one consisting of bodies (*ajsām*), atoms (*jawāhir*) and accidents (*aʿrāḍ*). Although there was an occasional exception, atomism was almost universally assumed in medieval *kalam* (rational theology), at least until the late 11th and early 12th centuries. The essential elements of this ontology and their relationship to each other are elaborated in some detail in early parts of *KAS*.

(minhaj) and the straightest of paths *(ṭarīq)*,[2] who has blessed us with reason *(ᶜaql)*, which steadfastly "speaks" the truth,[3] and with a knowledge of revelation *(maᶜrifat an-naql)*.[4] And so our claim to noble descent (*nasab*), thank God, is rooted in [our] understanding of [revelation],[5] and we thus have joined the two of them together.[6] He has led us out of the narrow pass into the wide open expanses; we give praise that His branch *(farᶜuhu)* endures and that His root *(aṣluhu)* is possessed of rich foliage. We invoke God's blessing on our lord, Muḥammad, the Prophet, giver of sincere counsel *(shafīq)*, on his Family, and on those who were his Companions and their Successors in establishing the truth. May God's blessing also secure acceptance for us on the day of gathering and scattering.[7]

2 It is the first and principal duty of the believer to acquire a knowledge of God (*maᶜrifat Allāh*),[8] for that is obtained through reason *(ᶜaql)* and

[2] A reference to the guidance provided through the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet.

[3] Cf., §§20 and 59 (among others) where Ibn al-Jawzī speaks of the truth-telling powers of reason.

[4] The term *naql* includes both the Quran and the Sunna, the two principal forms of revelation understood in the broadest sense. Both belong to the category of transmitted reports, hence the term *naql* (transmission).

[5] That is, *naql*. True nobility is based on the knowledge of revelation (*naql*), not on birth or ethnicity. The subtext of this part of the *khuṭba* is the contrast between the religious attitude of Islam and traditional Arab notions of racial superiority. The only basis for claims to superiority is a knowledge of revelation, a knowledge ultimately made possible by the God-given faculty of reason. For Ibn al-Jawzī, the acquisition of knowledge by means of the rational faculties presupposes disciplined and determined effort. Cf., Ibn al-Jawzī, *Manāqib al-Imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal*, 502, 3-6, where the relationship of *maᶜrifa* (knowledge of sacred texts) and *nasab* is discussed; here too (indeed, throughout *KAS*) he insists on (or assumes) the intrinsic superiority of the former over the latter.

[6] That is, reason (*ᶜaql*) and revelation (*naql*) Cf., Frank, *al-Ghazālī and the Ashᶜarite School*, 7).

[7] The imagery of "gathering and scattering" comes from the Quran and is a reference to the day of resurrection and judgment (see S. 6: 22, 124; 10: 28, 45; 15: 25; 17: 97; 20: 124; 25: 17; 59: 2, etc.).

[8] For Ibn al-Jawzī it is a question here of a quite specific kind of knowledge, *viz.*, the knowledge that God exists, not a knowledge of God's nature or essence (Makdisi, *Ibn ᶜAqīl* [1997], 86-87). This latter kind of knowledge is, by definition, beyond the reach of reason and human understanding. Following common practice in medieval *kalām*, the terms *maᶜrifa* and *ᶜilm* are used virtually interchangeably by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS*; thus he sometimes speaks of the *maᶜrifat Allāh* (e.g., §§2 and 36) and sometimes of the *ᶜilm Allāh*

made obligatory by Scripture *(naql)*. If [such knowledge] is obligatory, it follows that rational reflection *(naẓar)* and the use of inferential reason *(istidlāl)*[9] are also obligatory, as God himself has commanded in the following verses of Scripture: "Reflect *(unẓurū)* on what is in the heaven and the earth."[10] "Have they not reflected on the kingdom of the heavens and the earth, and all that God has created?"[11] "Travel about on the earth and reflect *(unẓurū)*!"[12] And finally, "In your very selves [there are signs]; do you not observe (*tubṣirūna*)?"[13]

3 Those who reflect on such things with the aid of reason have a decisive advantage, for all religious precepts pertaining to human acts *(aḥkām ad-dīn)*,[14] taken in their entirety, fall into three categories: firstly, those which may be

(§§4 and 104). The identity or near identity of *maʿrifa* and *ʿilm* may be observed in other expressions as well. Thus in some contexts he uses the expression *maʿrifat an-naql*, the knowledge or understanding of scripture (§1), whereas elsewhere he uses the expression *ʿilm an-naql* (§106). On the use of the two terms in Ashʿarite *kalām*, see R. Frank, "Knowledge and *Taqlīd*: The Foundations of Religious Belief in Classical Ashʿarism," *JAOS*, 109 (1989), 37-62. See esp. p. 47, n. 24 where Frank notes that for al-Ashʿarī and for *kalām* in general the two terms "are understood as essentially synonymous..., even if they are not interchangeable in every context." Cf., also his comments on p. 54, n. 38. For a similar use of these two terms by the Muʿtazilī theologian ʿAbd al-Jabbār, see Peters, *God's Created Speech*, 47-56. On the term *maʿrifa* and its use in various genres of Arabic literature, see the very useful article by R. Arnaldez in *EI²*, VI, 568-571. See also the article on *ʿilm*, *EI²*, III, 1133-1134, as well as the art. *ʿilm al-kalām*, *EI²*, III, 1141-1150 by L. Gardet.

[9] For Ibn al-Jawzī *istidlāl* is a logical movement that begins with the *dalīl* (the sign or indication) and ends with the *madlūl* or *madlūl ʿalayhi* (the conclusion or that to which the sign points). Although *istidlāl* or inferential reason assumes the existence of a connection between the sign *(dalīl)* and the conclusion *(madlūl)*, the *dalīl* need not be of the same nature as the *madlūl*; hence, it is possible for Ibn al-Jawzī to move from the visible, phenomenal world to the invisible without difficulty. *Istidlāl*, which takes the particular as its starting point, stands in contrast to the strict deductive syllogism in which the particular is deduced from the universal. For more on *istidlāl*, see *EI²*, II, 101-102 *(Dalīl)*; *EI²*, V, 238 *(Ḳiyās)*; and J. van Ess, "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology" in *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, 21-50.

[10] S. 10:101.

[11] S. 7:185.

[12] S. 16: 36; also 27: 69; 29: 20; and 30: 43.

[13] S. 51:21.

[14] The expression *aḥkām ad-dīn* used here refers to those values or judgments that have human actions as their object. (cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 86).

known only through reason *(ʿaql)* to the exclusion of revelation *(samʿ)*; secondly, those which may not be known by reason, indeed, cannot be known except through revelation; and, thirdly, those things that may be known through both [reason and revelation].[15]

4 The establishment of the contingency of the world, the existence of its Creator, His absolute uniqueness *(waḥdānīya)*, those attributes that are necessary to Him (*ṣifāt wājiba*), His revelation *(risāla)* and its possibility (*tajwīz ʿalayhi*),[16] and all such related matters, including God's unity *(tawḥīd)* and prophecy *(nubuwwa)*, **[fol.2a]** are possible only through the exercise of reason *(ʿaql)*. The evidence (*dalīl*) for this is that the term revelation *(samʿ)* refers only to (1) the Word of God, (2) to what was transmitted on the authority of His Messenger who [in turn] received it from Him, and (3) to the consensus of those whom His Messenger declared to be protected against error. But it will never be possible to determine with certainty that the words [attributed to God] are the actual words of God and of His Prophet unless one knows that God exists, just as it is impossible to determine whether the words attributed to Zayd are indeed the words of Zayd unless one knows that Zayd exists.[17] It is essential, therefore, that the knowledge

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[15] Cf., Ibn ʿAqīl, *al-Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Beirut/Stuttgart, 1996), 32, 7-9; also Abū Yaʿlā, *al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, ed. W. Haddad (Beirut, 1974), 24-25, where a similar three-fold distinction among the *aḥkām ad-dīn* is made.

[16] As opposed to its being *mustaḥīl* (impossible).

[17] For Ibn al-Jawzī (following Ibn ʿAqīl), the credibility and authority of revelation rest on a prior, autonomous operation of reason through which the individual comes to know that God exists, the essential nature of His being (His Otherness and Oneness), the character of His attributes, the contingent nature of His creation etc. (cf., §31). The establishment of these foundational principles is the work of *uṣūl ad-dīn* (as opposed to *uṣūl al-fiqh*). It is only on the basis of this kind of knowledge that the claims of revelation can be judged and its authenticity established. Ibn al-Jawzī's statements here indicate quite clearly that there is for him a form of obligation that is independent of and prior to the obligations imposed by scripture—*viz.*, to follow reason's lead in seeking answers to the ultimate questions. He makes it quite clear in what follows, however, that the specific duties set forth in scripture can be known only through revelation. Thus, once reason has done its work in establishing the foundational principles, reason defers to revelation. It is here that *uṣūl al-fiqh* steps forward and takes up its work—*viz.*, the task of working out the implications of revelation for human conduct. Ibn al-Jawzī was not the only Ḥanbalī to differentiate the various categories of *aḥkām ad-dīn*. Similar distinctions are to be found in Ibn ʿAqīl, Ibn Taymīya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya. For the approach of these three Ḥanbalī thinkers to the differentiation of these categories, see George Makdisi, "Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine," *Ethics in Islam*, edited by R. G. Hovannisian (1985, Malibu, California), 47-63,

of God's [existence] *(ʿilm bi-Allāh)*[18] and of His Messenger belong to the category of what can be established through reason [alone]. Abraham, the Friend of God, employed reason to arrive at certain logical conclusions when he said: "I do not love things that vanish."[19] He understood [through reason] that what participates in change *(taghayyur)* and movement *(intiqāl)* must necessarily be created, and that change and movement cannot, therefore, be attributes of the Creator. Among the things that may be known through revelation *(samʿ)* alone, that is, [a form of knowing] in which reason plays no part [as a source], are matters such as the determination of whether the actions of a responsible adult *(mukallaf)* are good or bad, allowed or prohibited.[20] In the category of what may be known through both [reason and revelation] are such things as the possibility of forgiveness for the sinner and the use of analogy *(qiyās)* in arriving at legal judgments *(aḥkām)*.[21]

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esp. 59ff. (cf., also his *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 124-126).

[18] On this expression and its parallel, *maʿrifat Allāh*, see notes to §2.

[19] S. 6: 76.

[20] Cf., Ibn ʿAqīl, *Wāḍiḥ*, 33, for the longer text which Ibn al-Jawzī "cites" here in an abridged form. Following the Sunnī traditionalist position, Ibn al-Jawzī diverges from the view generally held by the Muʿtazila that moral qualities have an independent ontological reality and can be known through reason independently of revelation—a view that received its classic formulation in the writings of ʿAbd al-Jabbār (for a systematic account of this position, see esp. G. Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbār* [Oxford, 1971], as well as the shorter account in his "The Rationalist Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbār," *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition* [Columbia, South Carolina, 1972], 105ff. See M. Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam* [Leiden, 1991], 31-45, for a discussion of Muʿtazilī ethics within the larger context of medieval Islamic ethical theory). For Ibn al-Jawzī the determination of what is good and bad in the sphere of human action is based on divine command and can be known only through revelation. Here Ibn al-Jawzī stands within the general voluntarist tradition of medieval Islam as articulated by Shāfiʿī (and others) and embraced by most Ḥanbalīs and Ashʿarīs. For an excellent discussion of Ḥanbalī perspectives on this question, see G. Makdisi, "Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine," *Ethics in Islam*, edited by R. G. Hovannisian (1985, Malibu, California), 47-63; and D. Gimaret, "Théories de l'act humain dans l'école ḥanbalite," *BEO*, 29 (1977), 157-178. An interesting comparison of the voluntarist and rationalist positions is to be found in G. Hourani's "Two Theories of Value in Medieval Islam," *Muslim World*, 50 (1959), 269-278.

[21] Cf., G. Makdisi, "Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine," *Ethics in Islam*, 63. Among the things that may be known through both revelation and reason, according to Ibn ʿAqīl, is "the possibility of seeing God with our eyes" (*Wāḍiḥ*, 33; cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 88). Ibn al-Jawzī's deletion of this reference is interesting and may reflect some ambivalence on his part toward the idea.

Establishing the Creator's Existence by Reason Contrary to the Claims of the Materialists

5 We maintain that creation must have a Creator, and our proof *(dalīl)* is that everything which originates in time *(ḥādith)* must have a cause for its origination *(ḥudūth)*.[22] Thus, since the world *(ʿālam)* originated in time it follows that it must have a cause.[23] The term world [taken in its broadest sense] refers to everything in existence other than God.[24] An existent *(mawjūd)* which occupies space *(mutaḥayyiz)* and is not joined to anything other than itself is called an atom *(jawhar)*.[25] If it is joined to something other than

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[22] In general, for Ibn al-Jawzī, the active participle, *ḥādith*, refers to the act or state of coming into existence at some point in time, whereas the verbal noun *ḥudūth* refers to the state or condition of temporal existence that follows from *ḥādith*. For Ibn al-Jawzī, as for the whole of medieval *kalām*, *ḥādith* includes everything that does not belong to the category of the eternal (*qadīm*). These two terms include the whole of reality; everything is either temporal or eternal; there is no third or intermediate category, and there is no link or *wāsiṭa* between the two.

[23] The basis for asserting the world's contingency is provided in what follows.

[24] Cf. Baghdādī, *Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, 33, where "world" is defined in terms that are virtually identical to those employed here by Ibn al-Jawzī.

[25] For Ibn al-Jawzī, the "atom" is an indivisible particle that forms the basis of all finite, corporeal existence. The contingency of atoms is shown by the fact that they are essentially identical to each other *(tamāthul)* and may be joined *(tarkīb* or *taʾlīf)* to each other so as to form composite entities or bodies *(ajsām)*. In addition, they occupy space *(taḥayyuz)* and admit of receiving accidents *(aʿrāḍ)*. Although the term *jawhar* (pl. *jawāhir)* has sometimes been rendered "substance" (cf., Peters, *God's Created Speech* [Leiden, 1976], 119-123; and Gimaret, *La doctrine d'al-Ashʿarī* [Paris, 1990], 43-72), R. M. Frank has argued persuasively against such a translation on the grounds that it implies acceptance of an essentially Aristotelian conceptual framework and leads to a distortion when imposed on the thought of medieval Muslim theologians. For a fuller account of this argument, see R. Frank, "Bodies and Atoms: The Ashʿarite Analysis," *Islamic Theology and Philosophy* (M. E. Marmura, ed.), 19, n. 1; esp. p. 44, n. 19; as well as his *The Metaphysics of Created Beings*, 39, n. 5 (cf. *EI*^{2}, II, 493-494 *[Djawhar]*). Ibn al-Jawzī was not the first Ḥanbalī to use the technical theological terminology developed by the early Muʿtazilī thinkers and later taken over by the Ashʿarīs. The *Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn* of Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1066), written at least a century before our work, is replete with the technical language of *kalām* (see p. 35ff. for a discussion of atoms, bodies and accidents). Other Ḥanbalīs, also, are mentioned in *KAS* as being conversant with *kalām*; among them Ibn Ḥāmid (d. 403/1012), Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 511/1119) and Ibn Zāghūnī (d. 527/1132). When the history of Ḥanbalī *kalām* is finally written the list will most certainly include other names from the 5th and 6th centuries A.H. (for some interesting observations on the question of *kalām* within medieval

itself it is a body *(jism)*. An accident *(ʿaraḍ)*, on the other hand, is [an "entity"] that can only subsist through something other than itself and includes such things as color *(lawn)*, movement *(ḥaraka)* and rest *(sukūn)*.[26] What consists of such temporally originated entities *(ḥawādith)* is necessarily originated in time *(ḥādith)*. The proof that its origination in time is caused follows from the fact that its non-existence *(maʿdūm)* is anterior to its coming into being, hence it is not possible that its existence should precede its having come into being. Whether its existence is impossible *(muḥāl)* or possible *(mumkin)* is not a matter open to debate, for the impossible can never admit of existence. Thus it follows that its existence is possible, for the possible admits of both existence **[fol.2b]** and non-existence.[27] It is essential then that there be an agent capable of "tipping the scales" *(murajjiḥ)*[28] [so to speak] in favor of [existence] over non-existence, that agent being the will *(irāda)* of one who creates *(mūjid)*. This conclusion, which is required by reason and thus beyond refutation, explains why it is that a person begins as a clot, then becomes an embryo and finally a fetus of flesh and blood, for we know that [the embryonic life-form] is not able to move from one stage to the next by itself,[29] since it is plain that even in its fully developed [post-natal] state it is not capable of creating by itself the power to hear and see. If it is unable to do this in a fully developed state, it is even less able to do so in a state of incomplete development. This indicates that there must be an agent *(fāʿil)* who causes the movement and who directs it.[30] Anyone who observes the coming of the rain at the time of planting and its cessation as the grain ripens, followed by the arrival of the autumn winds

Ḥanbalism, see Gimaret, "Théories de l'acte humain dans l'école ḥanbalite," *BEO*, 29 [1977], 157-178).

[26] Accidents require a substrate *(maḥall)* in which to exist in contrast to atoms which can exist independently of a *maḥall* (cf., al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, 33). For more on accidents, see §§9, 22, 24, 33, 52-53, 89, etc.

[27] An assumption that underlies most medieval Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite *kalām* (cf., Gimaret, "Théories de l'acte humain dans l'école ḥanbalite," *BEO*, 29 [1977], 171).

[28] *Ibid*, 171ff.

[29] Sometimes referred to as the argument from change; frequently used by Ashʿarites, though the Muʿtazila found it unconvincing (cf., Gimaret, *La Doctrine*, 231-234).

[30] See his *Kitāb al-Maqāmāt* (fol. 5b) where he develops much the same line of reasoning. This was of course one of the standard arguments used by the *mutakallimūn*; see the *Lumaʿ* of al-Ashʿarī (ed. McCarthey, 1953), §§3-4, for a typical statement of the argument.

and the sun's drawing near so as to dry the grain and prepare it for storage—and anyone who observes how teeth are made hard for cutting and the molars wide for grinding and the tongue nimble for turning what is to be chewed, as the saliva gushes forth to moisten the food so that it can be swallowed[31]—knows that there exists a wise and sovereign Agent who is in control. It would take too long to cite all of the evidence [in support of this proposition]. [Suffice it to say that] in every existent *(kull shayʾ)* there are signs indicating that He is One.

6 The Creator of the universe must be an existent *(mawjūd)*,[32] for existence and non-existence are polar opposites *(mutaqābilān)* between which there is no intermediate mode of being *(wāsiṭa)*.[33] Since it has been established that things must have a cause *(fāʿil)*,[34] it is necessary that it be both existent *(mawjūd)* and eternal *(qadīm)*, for a [first] cause must be antecedent to

[31] See *Talbīs*, 42; and *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 415, for much the same argument.

[32] He is one of whom existence can be predicated.

[33] Although both Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites subscribed to the view that there is no intermediate state between existence and non-existence, the two schools understood the relationship between the two in quite different terms (cf. R. M. Frank, "*al-Maʿdūm wal-Mawjūd*," *MIDEO*, 14 [1980], 198). Ashʿarites posited a radical distinction between existence and non-existence, and regarded non-existence *(ʿadam)* as pure nothingness—a "state" of which nothing can be predicated and which cannot be an object of knowledge. Muʿtazilites held a quite different view of the matter. As the repository of all possibles (i.e., all that is potentially existent), non-existence has a certain reality or positive character *(thubūt)*, since each possible possesses its own special nature *(ṣifat adh-dhāt)* consisting of those qualities it will exhibit if and when it comes into being; i.e., if and when God as efficient cause chooses, in His freedom, to grant it existence. Creation in this view consists of clothing non-existent possibles with existence as an additional qualification. Since the essential nature of each possible "exists" prior to creation it is independent of God. For the Ashʿarites, this was tantamount to acknowledging the existence of eternal entities independent of God's will and power—hence their insistence on the absolute nothingness of non-existence. Ibn al-Jawzī takes the side of the Ashʿarites on the question of *ʿadam* and *mawjūd* in the present work (cf., *Talbīs*, 83, 3-8). For more on the debate between Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilites, see Gimaret, *La doctrine*, 29-31; Wensinck, *Muslim Creed*, 166-167; and esp. Frank, *MIDEO*, 14 (1980), 185ff. On the debate within the Muʿtazilī school over the question of the *maʿdūm*, see Frank, "Remarks on the Early Development of the *Kalām*," *Atti del terzo congresso di studi arabi e islamici* (Naples 1967), 323-329; also, Van den Bergh, *Tahāfut*, II, 62, n. 85.2. On how this debate played itself out in the field of grammatical theory, see Versteegh, *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking* (Leiden 1977), 135f. and nn. 35 and 36.

[34] An ultimate or first cause.

what is caused, necessary to its existence and without beginning, for if it had a beginning in time it would itself require a cause *(muḥdith)* and thus form a *regressus ad infinitum* (*tasalsul*). Since [God] is eternally existent, non-being may not be predicated of Him, for He whose eternal pre-existence *(qidam)* is established cannot be conceived as non-existent.[35] If His non-existence were possible, He would be dependent on a cause. However, He is one whose existence is uncaused, hence there can be no cause for His non-existence.

7 God is not a body *(jism)*,[36] for bodies consist of [a minimum of] two atoms *(jawhar)* joined to each other.[37] If He were a body, He would be subject, like all bodies, to such temporally produced states as movement and rest and those qualities that are inseparable **[fol.3a]** from the state of

[35] Cf., Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 37-38.

[36] Cf., §§29 (Hishām b. al-Ḥakam), 34 and 237.

[37] The minimum number of atoms required to constitute a body was a question debated at length by medieval Muslim theologians. Although the problem appears to have been debated first in Muʿtazilite circles (in Basra), and though it remained at the center of Muʿtazilite speculation for several centuries, both in Basra and later in Baghdad, discussion of the question was not confined to the Muʿtazilite school. From the 10th century on it also attracted the attention of leading Ashʿarite theologians (including al-Ashʿarī himself), and, what is even more interesting within the context of the present study, by the mid-11th century, at least, it was also the focus of debate within Ḥanbalī circles in Baghdad, as can be seen, e.g., from the *Muʿtamad* of Abū Yaʿlā (see espec. 35-39). The view, championed by Ibn al-Jawzī, according to which a body requires a minimum of two atoms joined to each other in order to be a body, made the idea of "union" *(taʾlīf, iʾtilāf*, or *ijtimāʿ)* the central element in its definition of bodies. It is interesting that, in adopting this view, Ibn al-Jawzī aligns himself with the position taken by al-Ashʿarī and subsequently defended by the majority of Ashʿarites. The definition of bodies adopted by the majority of Muʿtazilites, especially from the time of Muʿammar (d. 215/830), emphasized two elements: that bodies are three dimensional entities (they are "long, deep, and wide") and they require a minimum of eight atoms (*Maqālāt*, 302-303; also see Gimaret, *La doctrine*, ch. 1, esp., 67ff.; and Peters, *God's Created Speech*, 122-123). It should be added here, however, that the minimalist position championed by most Ashʿarites and at least some Ḥanbalīs was not unknown in Muʿtazilite circles. Abū Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854), a member of the Muʿtazilite school of Baghdad and a student of Jaʿfar b. Ḥarb, is known to have held this view (cf., *EI*^{2}, IV, 126-127; and Gimaret, *La doctrine*, 67-78). Whether there was a standard position on this question among Ḥanbalī *mutakallimūn* of the 11th and 12th centuries is unclear. Abū Yaʿlā does not declare himself on the question of number in the *Muʿtamad*, so far as I have been able to determine. Did Ibn al-Jawzī draw on Ashʿarite sources in the formulation of his position, or were there earlier Ḥanbalīs who held to a similar view? It is quite possible that he is here following the position of Ibn ʿAqīl, as he does on so many other questions.

contingency. On this question some Muslims have departed from the truth. They maintain, for instance, that He is a body but that He is not like other bodies. Some of them go so far as to say that [His body] is a form *(ṣūra)* composed of flesh and blood.[38] Others say simply that He is a body [and leave it at that], while still others maintain that His body has the shape *(hayʾa)* of an ingot *(sabīka)*. Then there are those who say that His body has the shape of a clear, round crystal *(billawra)*.[39] Finally, there are those who say that He is a body (*jism*) consisting of space *(faḍāʾ)* and that all other bodies exist within it.[40]

8 If it were not for the fact that some of the *ʿulamāʾ*[41] have made reference to such beliefs [in their writings], it would not be necessary to discuss them here.[42] [Some of] my fellow Ḥanbalites *(aṣḥābunā)*,[43] however, have exceeded the bounds of propriety *(insānīya)* and reason *(ʿaql)* in setting forth their views [on these matters].[44] Some have chosen to accept

[38] See *Maqālāt*, 34, where this view is attributed to certain Rāfiḍites.

[39] See *Talbīs*, 86, where many of the same views are reported, though in *Talbīs* they are associated with the Imāmī theologian Hishām b. al-Ḥakam. On the latter see Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, esp., 32-33, but also 207, 210-211 and 521; Shahrastānī, *Milal*, I, 399; and Baghdādī, *Farq*, 65. For more on Hishām, see Watt, *Formative Period*, 186-189; the valuable article by Madelung in *EI*², III, 496-498; and esp. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra*, I, 349-379.

[40] Cf., *Talbīs*, 86, 22-23, where the same belief is mentioned; neither in *KAS* nor in *Talbīs* does he identify those who championed this belief.

[41] Experts in the religious sciences, especially *fiqh*, *ḥadīth*, and *tafsīr*, along with certain ancillary sciences such as Arabic grammar, lexicography, etc.

[42] This paragraph which, in some respects, disrupts the flow of the argument in this section of *KAS*, appears to have been inserted here (by Ibn al-Jawzī) to provide a justification for mentioning beliefs (such as those referred to in the preceding paragraph), which some were certain to find objectionable. For Ibn al-Jawzī too, the less said about such views the better, for the mere mention of such might encourage some to delve into them and perhaps be influenced by them. However, once such views have been aired, ignoring them is no longer an option; they must be identified and rebutted, even if that means airing them again. It is a question of the lesser of two evils.

[43] Also see §§29, 30, 32 and 36, where the expression *aṣḥābunā* appears. In three of these occurrences (§§29, 30 and 36), the term is explicitly linked to the Ḥanbalī school. Though the term's referent in the other two occurrences (§§8 and 32) is not quite as clear, the context does support its identification with Ḥanbalīs.

[44] Here Ibn al-Jawzī is alluding to the views of certain Ḥanbalīs—views which he regarded as anthropomorphist and which will form the central concern of *KAS*. In Ibn

blindly what they have received from their teachers without giving it sufficient scrutiny *(naẓar).*[45] Now certain unprincipled individuals have fabricated traditions [and attributed them to reliable traditionists] in order to bring shame on the experts in this science so that some might be prompted to comment: "So this is what they believe!"[46] One such [fabricator] was Muḥammad b. Shujāʿ al-Balkhī[47] who transmitted a tradition, which he [claimed to have] received from Ḥibbān b. Hilāl[48] in a chain of authorities that includes Ḥammād b. Salama,[49] Abū'l-Muhazzim[50] and Abū Hurayra

al-Jawzī's view, such conceptions of deity belong to the same class as those mentioned in the previous paragraph.

[45] For a fuller discussion of the problem of *taqlīd*, see §§18-21.

[46] Or perhaps: "Is this what they really believe?"

[47] Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Shujāʿ al-Balkhī ath-Thaljī (d. 266/880), a respected Ḥanafite jurist of Baghdad who received his education in law under Ḥasan b. Ziyād al-Lu'lu'ī (d. 204/819), a student of Abū Ḥanīfa (for more on his contributions to the evolution of the Ḥanafī school of law, see Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law* [Leiden 1997], 51-52, also 9, n. 41). Despite his Muʿtazilī sympathies and his close association with Bishr al-Marīsī, Ibn Shujāʿ is said to have sided with the *wāqifa* on the question of the Quran (refusing to declare himself on the matter of whether it is *makhlūq* or *ghayr makhlūq* [cf., *Fihrist*, 206; *Maqālāt*, 583; and Watt, *Formative Period*, 203]). In addition to his work as a jurist and a theologian, he was also active in the field of *ḥadīth*, both as a student and a transmitter in his own right. It was in this area that his work received a good deal of critical comment, particularly from scholars of a traditionalist orientation. In addition to the judgments cited above in the text of our work, see also Bayhaqī, *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ*, 372-374; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, V, 350-352; *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 105-106, 348-9; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, IX, 220-221; and Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, III, 577-579. For a generally sympathetic assessment of Ibn Shujāʿ, see esp., Ibn Qutlūbughā, *Tāj at-Tarājim fī Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafīya* (Baghdad, 1962), 55-56. Ibn Shujāʿ was the author of a number of works, among them a critique of anthropomorphism *(Kitāb ar-Radd ʿalā al-Mushabbiha)*, which, however, is no longer extant. For a list of his works as well as additional biographical notices on him, see *GAS*, I, 436.

[48] Ḥibbān b. Hilāl Abū Ḥabīb al-Bāhilī (d. 216/831), a respected Basran traditionist who reportedly abandoned the study of *ḥadīth* toward the end of his life apparently because he had become disillusioned with the loose and undisciplined habits of many of his fellow Basrans who claimed the mantle of *muḥaddith* (Ibn Saʿd, VII, 299; *Shadharāt*, II, 36; and Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya* [Beirut, 1985-88], 283).

[49] Ḥammād b. Salama b. Dīnār Abū Salama, a *mawlā* of the Banū Tamīm and a traditionist from Basra who died in 167/783. He was generally considered to be reliable as a transmitter of *ḥadīth*, although there were some (including Ibn al-Jawzī) who had doubts about certain of the traditions transmitted in his name. Dhahabī notes that while Muslim included some of Ḥammād's traditions in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Bukhārī carefully avoided them (Dhahabī,

respectively, in which it was reported that the Prophet was once asked: "O Messenger of God, of what does your Lord consist?" He replied: "From water that flows copiously[51] [God] created a horse *(khayl)* and caused it to run so that it perspired whereupon he created His *nafs*[52] from the perspiration."[53] Abū Aḥmad b. ʿAdī[54] maintained that Muḥammad b. Shujāʿ was a

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Mīzān, I, 594). For more on Ḥammād, see §§77 and 150 *(KAS)*, including the notes to §150.

[50] Abū'l-Muhazzim (Muhazzam in some sources) Yazīd b. Sufyān (according to some ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Sufyān), a disciple of Abū Hurayra, who later settled in Basra where he died, sometime after 700. Despite his association with Abū Hurayra, his reliability as a transmitter was frequently the subject of heated debate among traditionists. For a summary of these judgments, see esp., Ibn Saʿd, VII, 238; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ wa'l-Matrūkīn*, III, 209; Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, IV, 426; and Bayhaqī, *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ*, 373-374.

[51] *min māʾin min darrin* or perhaps *min māʾi man darra* (from the water of him who runs swiftly...), though this latter reading fits less easily into the syntactical structure of the sentence. The linking of water, horse, perspiration and soul in this tradition is striking, and may indicate that we have here the reflection of a cosmogonic (or "theogonic") mythical pattern with quite possibly ancient (perhaps Indo-European) roots. Cf., Gimaret, *Images*, 32.

[52] Dhahabī states that this tradition was fabricated by the Jahmīya in order to buttress their view that the word *(kalām)* of God is created *(muḥdath)*. According to him, the Jahmīya reasoned that if God's *nafs* is a created entity *(muḥdatha)* in Him, even more should God's *kalām* be regarded as something created in Him and by Him. Thus, in the Jahmī view as presented by Dhahabī, one should understand expressions such as *nafs Allāh* and *kalām Allāh* as analogous to the Quranic expression *bayt Allāh* (Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, III, 359). For an illuminating discussion of the Jahmī view on the divine attributes, see R.M. Frank, "The Neoplatonism of Ǧahm ibn Ṣafwān," *Muséon*, 78 (1965), 395-424. On the term *nafs* and its interpretation in medieval Islam, see *EI*^{2}, VII, 880-884.

[53] Cf., J. Burton, *An Introduction to the Ḥadīth*, 121. For other versions of this tradition, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 350; Bayhaqī, *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ*, 372-373; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, 7 and note 3 (cf., Lecomte, 6 and note 1); *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 105; and Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, III, 579. Although Ibn al-Jawzī rejected this tradition on the grounds that both its *isnād* and *matn* are defective, he argues in his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* (I, 106) and elsewhere that a tradition may be disqualified solely on the basis of a defective *matn*. He puts it thus: "In a tradition of this sort, one should not assign undue value to the *isnād*, for an absurd text *(mustaḥīl)*, even if it comes from reliable transmitters, is to be rejected and ascribed to an error on their part. It is obvious that if a group of reliable transmitters were in agreement on the merits of a certain text and reported, e.g., that a camel passed through the eye of a needle, their reputation as reliable transmitters should not influence one's judgment regarding the merits of the text, for they reported what is clearly impossible." And he follows with what, for him, is a fundamental principle: "Any tradition whose *matn* contravenes the canons of reason *(maʿqūl)* or is in conflict with the canonical sources *(uṣūl)* is a

zealot *(mutaᶜaṣṣib)* who fabricated traditions of an anthropomorphic character which he then attributed to reliable traditionists thereby discrediting them *(yathlibuhum bihā)*.[55] Among such traditions is the one cited above. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal[56] insisted that [Ibn Shujāᶜ] was an innovator and a heretic. Indeed, al-Qawārīrī[57] went so far as to accuse him of being an infidel *(kāfir)* and Abū'l-Muhazzim of being entirely unreliable in matters of tradition.

9 God, may He be praised, is not an atom *(jawhar)*, for [all] atoms are similar to each other *(tatamāthal)* and occupy space *(tataḥayyaz)*. They are subject to change *(taghayyur)*, admit of being joined to each other *(tarkīb)* and are capable of receiving accidents *(aᶜrāḍ)*, all of which is evidence of their origination in time *(ḥadath)*. The Creator, however, possesses the attribute of [eternal] pre-existence *(qidam)*. What is predicated of one who is eternal *(qadīm)* cannot be ascribed to any other than Him. It should be noted that atoms *(jawāhir)* fall into two classes: those that exist singly *(basāʾiṭ)*[58] and those that are joined to other atoms *(murakkabāt)*. Single atoms (*basāʾiṭ*) being entities whose coming into existence *(ḥuṣūl)* does not

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fabrication *(mawḍūᶜ)*, and it is not necessary to give it any further consideration" (*Kitāb al-Mawḍūᶜāt*, I, 106).

[54] Abū Aḥmad ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAdī b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Jurjānī (d. 365/976), the author of *al-Kāmil fī Maᶜrifat aḍ-Ḍuᶜafāʾ wa'l-Matrūkīn*, which appears to be the source of the above quote (cf., Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, II, 142). For more on Ibn ᶜAdī and his writings in the field of *ḥadīth* criticism, see *GAS*, I, 198-199.

[55] For alternative readings, see the notes to the Arabic text.

[56] Abū ᶜAbd Allāh Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), eponym of the Ḥanbalī school of law and theology. For a general survey of the sources of his life and teaching see *GAS*, I, 502-509; and the excellent article by H. Laoust, *EI*², I, 272-277.

[57] Abū Saᶜīd ᶜUbayd Allāh b. ᶜUmar b. Maysara al-Qawārīrī al-Jushamī (d. 235/849), a leading *muḥaddith* of Basra (cf., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 321-322). In Baghdad also, where he eventually settled, he won the respect of some of the leading scholars in the field, among them Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and Yaḥyā b. Maᶜīn. For more on his life, see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 320-323; *Shadharāt*, II, 85 (where his *ism* is given as ᶜAbd Allāh); and Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, X, 286, 328.

[58] The difference between *basāᶜiṭ* and the single atom in its simplest form (i.e., abstracted from all else) is that the *basāᶜiṭ* are atoms that possess certain accidents. That is, they are atoms to which something has been added. They are not *murakkabāt*, however, because the accidents (*aᶜrāḍ*) which they have received are not "entities" or "things" in and of themselves. For more on the *basāʾiṭ*, see the article by F. Rahman *"Basīṭ wa Murakkab,"* *EI*², I, 1083-1084.

depend on pre-existing atoms, include the primal elements *(usṭuqussāt)*:[59] water, earth, air and fire. Composite entities *(murakkabāt)*,[60] on the other hand, are those whose origination **[fol.3b]** is dependent on [the joining of two or more] atoms, as is [the case of] animals and plants, for example. The origination [of composite entities as composite entities] thus depends on other things that are temporally prior *(awāʾil)*.[61] Those things which cannot come into existence apart from the existence of other things cannot precede the latter in time, and so the prior existence of the former is impossible. Thus the contingency *(ḥudūth)* of composite substances is established; moreover, the simple entities which precede composite substances cannot be eternal since everything that pertains to them cannot [be eternal]: they admit of being changed from one state to another whose nature is entirely different. Thus, for example, when heat is applied to water it becomes steam and the steam, in turn, changes to air. The eternal, however, is not subject to change.

10 We do not grant the possibility of two [deities] existing simultaneously, for if they [were to will things that] are in conflict with each other the one unable to realize the object of his will would be deficient in power.[62]

[59] The term, which appears in medieval Arabic in a variety of spellings (cf., *Muḥīṭ al-Muḥīṭ*, I, 23; also Dozy, I, 22), derives from the Greek *stoicheîon* (elements) via the Syriac *estuksā* (cf., Daiber, *Aetius Arabus. Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung* [Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980], 18). The word *usṭuqussāt* was adopted as a technical term in several scientific disciplines, especially medicine (cf., M. Ullmann, *Islamic Medicine*, 56-57) and grammar, where the term was gradually replaced by the term *ḥarf* (*ḥurūf*), meaning element in the sense of particle or letter (cf. Versteegh, *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking*, 46-47 and n. 69).

[60] That is, atoms joined to each other or what, in other contexts, Ibn al-Jawzī calls bodies *(ajsām)*.

[61] That is, simple, unjoined atoms.

[62] An abridged and highly simplified form of the argument from *tamānuᶜ* (mutual interference or hindrance), one of the proofs in medieval *kalām* used to demonstrate the unity of God. In the argument as presented here, the one deficient in power obviously cannot be a deity; and so only one (the one here assumed to possess the power to realize what he wills) can be God. For a more elaborate presentation of the argument, see Ashᶜarī's *Lumaᶜ* in *The Theology of al-Ashᶜarī* edited by R. McCarthy (Beirut 1953), §88; and Ibn Taymīya, *Minhāj*, I, 438-441; for other appeals to the argument, see ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl*, 278, 283; al-Juwaynī, *Irshād*, 53-54, 57; Baghdādī, *Uṣūl*, 85; Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat al-Iqdām* (ed. Guillaume 1934), 91-92; and al-Ījī, *Mawāqif*, VIII, 42; The argument from mutual interference had a long history going back to the Greeks (see Davidson, *Proofs*,

11 The divine attributes *(ṣifāt)* we establish only on the basis of evidence of a peremptory nature *(dalīl maqṭūᶜ bihi)*, that is, [the evidence of] the Book of God and those Prophetic Traditions that have come down to us through multiple chains of authority *(ḥadīth mutawātir)* on the basis of whose transmission the Community *(al-jamāᶜa)*—one which cannot agree in regard to what is false *(kidhb)*—has established a consensus. Moreover, the consensus *(ijmāᶜ)* of the Community too is based on evidence of a peremptory nature, *viz.*, the evidence of reason (*dalīl al-ᶜaql*), for [reason] is a safeguard against the possibility [of ascribing to] the Creator what is not possible to [ascribe to] Him.

Categories of Knowledge

12 Knowledge *(ᶜulūm)* may be divided into three categories.[63] The first of these is knowledge about which there can be no doubt *(ᶜulūm qaṭᶜīa)*, and it consists of two types. The first pertains to what is given to reason immediately *(badīhat al-ᶜaql)* and is self-evident, such as, for example, that two is more than one, and that a single object cannot be present in two places at one and the same time. The second type also belongs to the class of things known through reason although, in this case, reason must have recourse to either one of two means. The first of these may be called necessary means *(wasāʾiṭ ḍarūrīya)*, as in the case of knowledge based on correspondences *(maᶜlūmāt mutaṭābiqa)* in which certain things are seen as being necessarily linked to each other.[64] Thus, in the case of a building, for example, one is led necessarily to posit a builder or, in the case of movement *(ḥaraka)*, a mover *(muḥarrik)*.[65] Knowledge of this sort shares certain features with the first

166-167, 407-409); for medieval Muslim theologians, however, the immediate source was clearly the Quran, esp., S. 21:22 ("If there were gods in them (i.e., the heavens and the earth) other than God, [the heavens and the earth] would fall into ruin"). Cf., also, S. 23: 91.

[63] For a summary of medieval theories of knowledge *(ᶜilm)*, see F. Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), esp., ch. 4.

[64] Cf., Frank, *al-Ghazālī and the Ashᶜarite School*, 10 and nn. 6-7 (105-106).

[65] Cf., Ibn al-Jawzī's *Aḥkām an-Nisāʾ*, 6. What distinguishes this from the first type of judgment is that the link between the two things (building and builder, movement and mover) is rendered necessary by experience, not by something that is intrinsic to reason (as, for examples, that two is more than one). This experienced-based reason is a kind of inferential reason in which the building or the movement are taken as "signs" that point to a

category of knowledge in that it concerns what is necessarily true. The second type is arrived at through inferential means *(wasāʾiṭ istidlālīya)*. Thus, for example, we say that atoms are contingent *(muḥdatha)*, since they are incapable of **[fol.4a]** generating themselves...or facsimiles of themselves, and so we infer that they are dependent on an agent who belongs to another order of being (*min ghayr jinsihā*), namely, a deity who is eternal.

13 The second category of knowledge is that acquired by the five senses, viz., hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting and touching.[66]

14 The third category of knowledge *(ʿilm)* is that based upon reports, of which there are two classes. The first of these includes those reports that have been transmitted by numerous individuals *(tawātur)* who [on account of their number] could not have colluded in the transmission of something erroneous,[67] including such things as the Community's transmission of the Quran and the five daily prayers or reports of such things as the fact that there is a city called Mecca.[68] The second class consists of *āḥād* or "isolated"

builder or a mover. The Stoics called them commemorative signs (in contrast to indicative signs) because they presuppose past experience, without which the necessary connection could hardly have been perceived as necessary. For more on these distinctions, see van Ess, "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology," 33.

[66] As will be seen later in this work, Ibn al-Jawzī has very little confidence that knowledge arising out of sense experience can contribute to an understanding of the nature of deity.

[67] Cf., §11 where much the same language is used. Knowledge based on *tawātur* reports is certain knowledge precisely because it has been transmitted by a sufficiently large number of persons so as to rule out the possibility of collaborative fabrication. The number required to meet this condition varied from forty to seventy-two, depending on the theorist in question, although some (like al-Ghazzālī) categorically rejected any attempt to fix the number and held that it is known only to God. This condition of numerical sufficiency must apply to every point in the process of transmission between the original eye-witness of the event and the latest recipient of the report. According to al-Ghazzālī, who appears to represent the mainline view, every statement which meets these conditions will produce in the mind of its hearer a knowledge of its truth—a knowledge which is tantamount to a knowledge of the event itself with which the report is concerned. This is an historical knowledge, not a knowledge based either on sense experience or on discursive reason. For more on the concept of *tawātur*, see the excellent study by B. Weiss "Knowledge of the Past: the Theory of *Tawātur* according to al-Ghazālī," *SI*, 61(1985), 81-105; cf., also his "Language and Tradition in Medieval Islam: the Question of *al-Ṭarīq ilā Maʿrifat al-Lugha*," *Der Islam*, 61 (1984), 91-99.

[68] Cf., S. van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut* (London 1969), II, 16, where this line of reasoning, with virtually identical examples, is traced back to Galen and the

reports which are distinguished by the fact that they were passed on by a relatively small number of transmitters.[69] Isolated reports, in turn, fall into two sub-classes. The first consists of those reports which the Community has accepted because it regards the reliability of their transmission as being highly probable and so has agreed to base legal rulings on them though being cognizant of their probable character. That such reports should be elevated to the status of peremptory evidence *(maqām al-qaṭ^ᶜ)* is out of the question, however. Thus, the predication of the divine attributes on the basis of such reports is objectionable, for the attributes must rest on the same kind of compelling evidence *(dalīl qaṭ^ᶜī)* that is used to establish the divine essence *(dhāt)*. It is not permissible to differentiate between the attributes on the basis of the evidence on which they rest—thus giving some people the excuse to say that certain of the attributes are established on the basis of peremptory evidence *(dalīl maqṭū^ᶜ bihi)* and some on the basis of probable evidence *(dalīl ẓannī)*—because they are all equal by virtue of their eternal character. Thus they should not be established on [probable evidence] by appealing to the divine sayings: "I am present in my servant's

Greek empiricist tradition (cf., Versteegh, *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking* [Leiden 1977], 90ff., where the influence of the empiricist tradition on various disciplines in medieval Islam is discussed at some length). For Ibn al-Jawzī, geographical reports are an interesting example of the *mutawātir* report and demonstrate the possibility of a genuine knowledge of the world, both present and past, based on transmitted information. Just as one can have a certain knowledge of the existence of other places—even distant ones—so one can have knowledge of events located in the past, even the distant past.

[69] Since *āḥād* reports are those handed down by relatively few transmitters (generally no more than one in a given generation), it is necessary to admit the possibility of error or falsification unless it can be established (in the case of individual reports) that the transmitters were credible, honest persons known for their piety. Specialists in *jarḥ wa taᶜdīl* (the critical analysis of *ḥadīths*) generally acknowledged that *āḥād* traditions could never be regarded, even in the most favorable circumstances, as more than probably true *(maẓnūn)*. While probability was sufficient in Ibn al-Jawzī's view to establish a point of law (see the art. "*Khabar al-Wāḥid*" by Juynboll in *EI*^{2}, IV, 896), it was not adequate to establish a divine attribute. This generally accepted classification of reports into *tawātur* and *āḥād* in medieval Islam was not confined to traditionists. It was widely used by grammarians (e.g., Ibn al-Anbārī, the 12th century grammarian) as well as by jurists and theologians. For a discussion of the distinction between *tawātur* and *āḥād* traditions and its implications, see Weiss, "Language and Tradition in Medieval Islam: the Question of *al-Ṭarīq ilā Maᶜrifat al-Lugha*," *Der Islam*, 61(1984), 91-99. Cf., also *EI*^{2}, III, 25. There were those, like al-Baghdādī, who insisted on a threefold classification of reports into *tawātur*, *āḥād* and *mutawassiṭ*, the latter occupying an intermediate position between the *tawātur* and the *āḥād* reports (cf., *Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, 12).

supposition *(ẓann)* of Me," and "I am the Associate most free of association *(shirk)*"[70] as though these texts were on a par with the Quran itself, for the channels of transmission *(ṭarīq)* [of *āḥād* reports] are simply not equal to those of the Quran.[71] Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥāmid al-Warrāq[72] and some of his

[70] Divine sayings *(ḥadīth qudsī)* apparently used by some in Ibn al-Jawzī's day to justify the use of *āḥād* reports (i.e., presumptive evidence) as a basis for affirming certain of the divine attributes. The first saying is to be found in the following collections among others: Bukhārī, 97: 15(3) (cf., Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 588[3]); Muslim, 49 (*tawba*):1; 48 (*dhikr wa duʿāʾ*): 2 (1, 2), 19, 20 (1, 2); Ibn Māja, 33 (*adab*): 58; Tirmidhī, 34 (*zuhd*): 51; 45 (*daʿawāt*): 131; *Musnad*, II, 315, 391, 413; al-Munāwī, *al-Itḥāfāt as-Sanīya bi'l-Aḥādīth al-Qudsīya*, ed. Ziʿbī (Beirut, w.d.), 37-40; etc. For a complete list of the occurrences, see Wensinck's *Concordance, s.v., ẓann;* also W. Graham, *Divine Word*, 127-128. The second saying is also found in a number of *ḥadīth* collections, among them: Muslim, 53 (*zuhd*): 46; Ibn Māja, 37 (*zuhd*): 21(1,2); *Musnad*, III, 446, IV, 215 (cf. II, 301); al-Munāwī, *Itḥāfāt*, 34; and Graham, *Divine Word*, 125-126.

[71] Since this divine saying belongs to the class of *āḥād* traditions, it does not have the authority of a text from the Quran which belongs to the class of *mutawātir* reports.

[72] Al-Ḥasan b. Ḥāmid b. ʿAlī b. Marwān Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Warrāq who died in 403/1013 at Wāqiṣa (the victim of a Bedouin attack), on his return to Baghdad from the *Ḥajj*. A traditionist, jurist, theologian and ascetic, Ibn Ḥāmid was undoubtedly one of the most influential figures within the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad during the first half of the Būyid period. He left behind a number of works in *ḥadīth, fiqh, uṣūl al-fiqh*, and *uṣūl ad-dīn*, though apparently only one of these, his *Kitāb Tahdhīb al-Ajwiba*, has survived (cf. *GAS*, I, 515). The work for which he was best known, his *al-Jāmiʿ fī Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahāʾ*, aimed at reconciling divergent tendencies within Ḥanbalī *fiqh*. His *Sharḥ Uṣūl ad-Dīn* appears to have been his principle work in theology; it undoubtedly was a major influence on the thought of Abū Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ (d. 458/1066), his leading student, and perhaps also on Ibn Zāghūnī (d. 527/1132). Although Ibn al-Jawzī does not mention the *Sharḥ* in *KAS*, it is quite possibly this work that is the source of his information on Ibn Ḥāmid's theological views. While Ibn al-Jawzī speaks highly of his writings in *fiqh* (cf., *Muntaẓam*, VII, 263-264), he was severely critical of Ibn Ḥāmid's approach to theological and hermeneutic questions, especially his literalism and the anthropomorphic character of his theological views. It is evident from the many references to him in *KAS* (cf. §§30, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 48, 52, 56, 61, 64, 76, 135, 151, 177, 186, 188, and 244) that Ibn al-Jawzī held him primarily responsible for introducing anthropomorphist conceptions of God into Ḥanbalism. Ibn Ḥāmid is the earliest example of anthropomorphism *(tajsīm/tashbīh)* cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in the history of Ḥanbalism. The other Ḥanbalīs who receive the sharpest criticism in *KAS* (Abū Yaʿlā and Ibn Zāghūnī) were both spiritual and intellectual descendents of Ibn Ḥāmid. It is not surprising, therefore, that of these three Ḥanbalīs, Ibn Ḥāmid comes in for the sharpest criticism (cf., §§42, 46, 50, 54, 59, 62, etc.). Among the more important sources on Ibn Ḥāmid and his intellectual influence within the Ḥanbalī school, see *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 171-177; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, VII, 303; *Shadharāt*, III, 166-67; *Bidāya*, XI,

associates[73] have assimilated this class of reports entirely to the first class,[74] regarding both as valid sources of knowledge *(ʿilm)* and using them without distinction as a basis for establishing the divine attributes. This, however, is a grievous error, for what it does is to make probability *(ẓann)*, not sound knowledge *(ʿilm)* [sufficient for the establishment of the attributes]. It is astonishing that people can take such a position and at the same time **[fol.4b]** claim to have a knowledge of jurisprudence *(fiqh)* and its principles *(uṣūl al-fiqh)*.[75]

15 The second class of *āḥād* reports are those which the Community has refused to accept. These encourage[76] the use of supposition in matters relating to positive law, but it should not be extended beyond this.[77]

[The Limits of Sense Perception]

16 Many people search for the Creator *(ṣāniʿ)* through the senses, and when they do not discover Him they are overtaken by doubt. Had they understood that there are existents that can be known without the aid of sense perception they would not have fallen prey to doubt. Among such [existents] are the soul *(rūḥ)* and reason *(ʿaql)*, even though they are not perceived by the

373; Shaṭṭī, *Mukhtaṣar*, 26; Ibn Badrān, *Madkhal*, 206; and *al-Kāmil*, IX, 242. For additional sources, see *GAS*, I, 515; *EI*², III, 784 (Laoust), and Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 227-232.

[73] It is impossible to identify all the individuals whom Ibn al-Jawzī included in this group, but it certainly did include Abū Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ (d. 458/1066), who was the most influential of Ibn Ḥāmid's students and certainly one of the most important figures within the school during much of the first half of the 11th century.

[74] According to Ibn al-Jawzī, Ibn Ḥāmid and his anthropomorphizing associates within the Ḥanbalī school made no real distinction between *āḥād* and *tawātur* reports as a basis for establishing the divine attributes.

[75] In addition to sources listed in the notes on *āḥād* and *tawātur* reports at the beginning of this paragraph, see Laoust, *Le traité de droit d'Ibn Taimīya*, 71, n. 62, where the concept of *tawātur* (and its relationship to *āḥād* reports) is discussed in relation to the field of legal theory. For additional references pertinent to the status of *āḥād* reports in legal matters, see the article by Juynboll in *EI*², IV, 896.

[76] Perhaps simply by virtue of the fact that such reports exist, having in some cases been transmitted by individuals of obviously good character.

[77] In no case, however, may *āḥād* reports be used when dealing with questions of legal principle (*uṣūl al-fiqh*); their use is even less justifiable in relation to fundamental theological questions (*uṣūl ad-dīn*) such as the divine attributes, as Ibn al-Jawzī has already noted.

senses, for the influence of the soul is evident in the body [of a living creature], and the influence of reason is apparent in its organization. So also the existence of the Creator may be inferred from His influence and His workmanship. Anyone who suppresses [knowledge of] the soul and who fails to report it betrays a lack of interest in intellectual reflection (*fikr*).

17 Those who fail to reflect on this evidence *(dalīl)* fall into several classes. Among them are the *dahrīya*,[78] who deny the existence of a creator. A person who was sympathetic to this point of view once came to me and requested my help on account of the residue of faith *(li-baqīyat īmān)* that still lingered in his heart.[79] I said to him: "Summon your heart *(qalb)* and call upon your powers of reason! Neither the inanimate thing nor even the rational creature *(nāṭiq)* is able to generate itself *(yaṣnaᶜu nafsahu)*. Thus, when you hear people saying that something is the work of nature *(ṭabīᶜa)* point out to them, first of all, that what they refer to [as nature] is in fact the Creator, and it is merely in their designation of Him as nature that they err, and, secondly, that nature is not a living thing, nor does it possess the power to know (*ᶜālima*) what it is that defines human well-being (*maṣāliḥ*). To the extent that [nature] has been so inspired and given the power to act, the One who [inspired it and] endowed it with that power (*quwwa*) is God. If [nature] is not cognizant of what it does, the one who perfected it must be someone other than [nature] itself." [The *dahrī*] said to me: "The arguments of my opponent have convinced me." I replied: "Reflect on the evidence [pointing to the existence of a creator] and then act with prudence (*aḥwaṭ*)." **[fol.5a]** Sages *(ḥukamāᵓ)* [of old] have coined a striking parable (*mathal*) in which they said: "We arranged the prophets by rank and we arranged the *dahrīya*[80] by rank.[81] And we said to the *dahrīya*: 'What is your view of the

[78] The *dahrīya* generally adhered to what might be called a materialistic world view. They denied the existence of a creator, insisted on the eternity of the world, and maintained that knowledge is limited to what is available to the senses. It is this last point that makes them relevant to this section of *KAS*. For a more detailed account of the *dahrīya*, see the substantial article in *EI*², II, 95-97. See also *Atheismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance*, edited by Fr. Niewöhner and O. Pluta (Wiesbaden 1999 [=*Wolfenbätteler Mittelalter-Studien*, 12]), especially the contributions by H. Daiber, 23-44; and Badran, 61-84. Cf., also see *Talbīs*, 41-42, where Ibn al-Jawzī deals with some of the issues posed by the *dahrīya*.

[79] It might perhaps be rendered: requested my help in rescuing (restoring) his faith.

[80] Materialists.

[81] I have not been able so far to locate this saying in other medieval Arabic sources. The text as it appears in *KAS* may be an abridgment of a longer text. If this is the case, it would

prophets?' They replied: 'They are authors of legal codes *(nawāmīs)* and are persons endowed with wisdom *(ḥikma)*. However, what they promise concerning the hereafter is groundless. They make promises and issue threats only to instill fear in the hearts of people and to convince them to postpone enjoyment of the present life.' I asked them if there would be any unfortunate consequences for me if I chose to follow the prophets,[82] and they replied: 'No, but you will waste your time; and as to whether there will be a punishment or reward [in the hereafter], the answer is no.' Then I said to the prophets: 'What do you have to say?' They replied: 'Those who do not follow our teachings will suffer painful punishment in the hereafter.'" I responded: "Following [the prophets] is a better way of insuring the safety of one's soul even if there should be no evidence [to support their claims].[83] But what if the evidence in support of their claims is brighter than the sun itself? It is to this that the poet makes reference when he says:[84]

> The astrologer and the physician both say:
> 'The dead will not be raised.' I say to them:
> 'Even if what you say is true, I have nothing to lose,
> But if I am right, the loss will be yours, not mine.'"[85]

help to explain some of the difficulties presented by the text as it appears here in *KAS*.

[82] Who is represented by the first person singular in this sentence? There is nothing in the text to indicate the identity of the speaker. It can hardly be Ibn al-Jawzī, for in the lines that follow the speaker interrogates the prophets. Perhaps it is one of the *ḥukamāʾ*. It seems likely that what we have here is an abridged version of a longer text in which the various persons who appear in the parable are identified.

[83] An early version of Pascal's wager?

[84] The author of the lines that follow is none other than Abū'l-ʿAlā al-Maʿarrī (d. 449/1057), whom, in other contexts, Ibn al-Jawzī condemns as a sceptic and a heretic (cf., e.g., *KAS*, §29; and esp., *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 184-188). This may be the reason these lines are cited here without attribution.

[85] For the complete Arabic text of the poem, see *Luzūmīyāt* (Cairo 1343/1924), II, 300; and R. A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Poetry* (Cambridge 1921), 279, no. 282. For translations of these lines and commentary, see Nicholson, *Studies*, 185 (no. 282); and H. Laoust, "La vie et la philosophie d'Abū'l-ʿAlā al-Maʿarrī," *BEO*, 10 (1944-45), 149.

[Knowledge and the Authority of Tradition: Maʿrifa versus Taqlīd]

18 Among those [who fail to reflect on the evidence] are people who follow their experts and their ancestors blindly—a practice common among Jews and Christians, for example.[86] I once met a rabbi (*ʿālim al-Yahūd*) and I said to him: "If we were to meet Moses we would say to him: 'We (Muslims) believe in your prophethood and your Book, and we believe that God spoke to you directly. If someone were to believe in our Book and our Prophet but not in you [or your Book], his beliefs *(īmān)* would avail him

[86] In medieval Muslim discussions of *taqlīd*, Jews and Christians are frequently cited as examples of people who blindly accept what they are taught by parents and religious authorities rather than investigate matters for themselves and form an independent judgment. Cf., e.g., Ghazzālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* (Cairo, 1958), 71. For other examples, see Lazarus-Yafeh, "*Taqlīd* in the Writings of al-Ghazzālī," *Israel Oriental Studies*, I (1971), 250-251 (cf., *Talbīs*, 81). In contrast to al-Ghazzālī, who felt it was a waste of time to engage Jews and Christians in theological debates (cf., *Ibid*, 252, n. 10) because of their blind adherence to tradition, Ibn al-Jawzī did apparently invite such encounters if we are to judge from what follows. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the arguments against *taqlīd* set forth in this and the following paragraphs are directed primarily against fellow Ḥanbalīs (cf., §37), not against Muslims of other schools, certainly not against Christians and Jews. In his *Talbīs*, 81-82, Ibn al-Jawzī characterizes *taqlīd* as one of the more serious "delusions of the devil". He argues that even the *salaf* are not to be followed uncritically (81, line 9), and in support of his argument cites several Quranic references (in particular 43:22, and 37:98). Further, he argues, the practice of *ijtihād* is incumbent even on lay persons, but he does add a caveat: in matters of positive law (*ʿilm al-furūʿ*), lay persons and non-experts in general are excused from the practice of *ijtihād* because of the inherent complexity of positive law and the vast knowledge of textual sources required if it is to be practiced properly. In matters of belief (*iʿtiqād*), however, lay persons are expected to practice *ijtihād* (*Talbīs*, 82; also §20 below). Among the defenders of *taqlīd* within the early Ḥanbalī school, perhaps the two most outspoken were ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Warrāq (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 210, 20ff.) and al-Barbahārī (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 29, 10; and 39, 1-5). For a fuller account of Ḥanbalī views on *taqlīd*, see Makdisi, "Freedom in Islamic Jurisprudence: *Ijtihad*, *Taqlid*, and Academic Freedom," *La notion de liberté au Moyen Age: Islam, Byzance, Occident* (Paris 1985), 79-88. A brief but useful summary of Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite views on *taqlīd* is found in Baghdādī, *Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, 254-255. For an analysis and interpretation of selected Ashʿarite thinkers, among them al-Bāqillānī, al-Isfarāʾinī, and al-Juwaynī, see R. M. Frank, "Knowledge and *Taqlīd*: The Foundations of Religious Belief in Classical Ashʿarism," *JAOS*, 109 (1989), 37-62; cf., also his "al-Ghazālī on *Taqlīd*: Scholars, Theologians and Philosophers," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften* , 7 (1991/92): 207-252. Ibn al-Jawzī, of course, was not the only Ḥanbalī to attack *taqlīd*, as is clear from his comments in the following paragraphs.

nothing.'[87] Indeed, we are in accord with you as regards [the essential elements of] your creed. Your principal complaint against us, by your own admission, is that we do not observe the Sabbath. Our contention is that Sabbath observance properly belongs to the sphere of positive law *(farʿ min al-furūʿ)* and that differences regarding the prescriptions of positive law do not render one liable to eternal punishment." The rabbi then said to me: "By God, we do not demand that you observe the Sabbath, for it is a duty required only of the Banū Isrāʾīl." I replied: "I accept your statement; however, you and your coreligionists (still) run the risk of eternal punishment."[88] To that he had no reply.[89]

19 [fol.5b] Uncritical imitation of others *(taqlīd)* in matters having to do with the knowledge of God *(maʿrifat Allāh)* is not permissible. The evidence *(dalīl)* for this comes from the Quran, the established teaching of the community *(naql)*,[90] and from a consideration of what is implied (*maʿnā*) [in the act of *taqlīd* itself].—As for the evidence of the Quran, there is the verse: "You should *know* that there is no deity apart from God."[91] In the following verse [where the *munāfiqūn* are quoted as saying]: "We found our fathers following a community *(umma)* and we follow in their footsteps,"[92] they are, in effect, condemned for the blind imitation of their ancestors. [In the subsequent verse, addressed again to the *munāfiqūn*, God says:] "What if I were to bring you guidance better than you found your fathers following?"[93] The clear implication is: "Would you continue to follow [blindly] after them (the fathers)?"

20 As for the established tradition (*athar*) of the community, there are the

[87] I take this to be the end of the imaginary conversation with Moses. If this is correct, the referent of the second person pronouns that follow is the rabbi.

[88] Apparently for the following reasons: they follow traditional practices blindly (*taqlīd*) (cf., *Talbīs*, 81, 12-14), they confuse matters of positive law (*furūʿ*) with matters of principle (*uṣūl*) (cf., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 162, 3), and they refuse to acknowledge the prophethood of Muḥammad.

[89] Cf., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (Beirut 1987), 572-573. For a more detailed critique of Jewish beliefs and practices in the writings of Ibn al-Jawzī, see *Talbīs*, 70-74.

[90] See §20 where the term *athar* is used in place of *naql*.

[91] S. 47:19. Here knowledge (*ʿilm*) of God is a duty imposed on all those to whom the Quran is addressed, not just to an elite class of religious experts. This, at any rate, is what Ibn al-Jawzī takes from the verse.

[92] S. 43:23.

[93] S. 43:24.

words of ʿAlī to Ḥārith b. Ḥawṭ.[94] When the latter asked [ʿAlī] whether he thought Ṭalḥa and Zubayr were in error, [ʿAlī] replied: "O Ḥārith, you are confused! The truth is not known by reference to human beings. You should first of all establish the truth and then you will be able to identify those who possess it."[95] Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal once said: "A man must be severely limited in his knowledge if he chooses to imitate another person in matters of belief *(iʿtiqād)*."[96] Indeed, it is not permissible that we should follow others uncritically, not even men of the calibre of Abū Bakr, ʿAlī, Aḥmad, or Shāfiʿī. On the contrary, belief *(īmān)* in God and His attributes *(ṣifāt)* and a knowledge *(maʿrifa)*[97] of what is consistent with His nature and

[94] Perhaps Ḥūṭ. Cf., Dhahabī, *Mushtaba*, I, 259; also *Talbīs*, 81 (trans. by Margoliouth, *Islamic Culture*, 9 [1935], p. 389).

[95] Cf., *Talbīs*, 81; and *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (Beirut 1987), 48-49.

[96] Cf., *Talbīs*, 82; and *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (Beirut 1987), 166. However, cf. *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 31, where Aḥmad is quoted as approving *taqlīd*. What his views on the question of *taqlīd* were is difficult to determine from the sources available to us. If Aḥmad endorsed the idea of *taqlīd*, as seems possible (cf., Laoust, *La profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 7, n. 2; for a somewhat different perspective, see *KAS*, §§21 and 37, among others), later generations of Ḥanbalī scholars gradually distanced themselves from that position, perhaps in response to powerful Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī critiques of *taqlīd* (cf., Frank, "Knowledge and *Taqlīd*: The Foundations of Religious Belief in Classical Ashʿarism," *JAOS*, 109 [1989], 37-62). This shift is apparent already in the *Ibāna* of the 10th century Ḥanbalī, Ibn Baṭṭa (p. 4, etc.); by the early 11th century, the Ḥanbalī position as reflected in the *Muʿtamad* (e.g., pp. 20, 31) of Abū Yaʿlā is scarcely distinguishable from that of the Ashʿarite school. Clearly the position outlined by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS* (e.g., §37) and elsewhere is little more than the restatement of a view that had been well represented within Ḥanbalism, at least from the early 11th century.

[97] The concept of *maʿrifa* or *ʿilm* (knowledge) is central to Ibn al-Jawzī's critique of *taqlīd* (cf., also the last part of §37 where Ibn al-Jawzī states quite explicitly that *maʿrifat Allāh* and *taqlīd* are incompatible: وخصوصًا على معرفة الحقّ لا يجوز فيها التقليد ["... especially in matters pertaining to the knowledge of God *taqlīd* is not permissible"]). For him "knowing" means possessing knowledge *(maʿrifa* or *ʿilm)* based on an investigation of the sources, rational reflection on the evidence and inferences arrived at through this reflection. Knowing, in this sense, is necessarily a personal act—something which each individual who seeks knowledge must do for himself. Hence, examination of the evidence and reflection on its meaning is legally obligatory (§§2, 20, etc.). It is a duty that rests on the shoulders of every believer. In the words of Ibn al-Jawzī, it is على كلّ مخلوق (§20, last line). Ibn al-Jawzī is careful, however, to make a distinction between *maʿrifat Allāh* and *maʿrifat* (or *ʿilm*) *al-furūʿ* (positive law). In the sphere of positive law, by contrast, knowledge is the responsibility of the experts, *viz.*, those who have been duly trained and are able to find

what is not, as indicated by the evidence, are incumbent on every creature (*ʿalā kulli makhlūq*).[98]

21 [Reflection on] the essential meaning *(maʿnā)* [of *taqlīd*] indicates that the one who follows others does so because he is uncertain, in as much as [he realizes that the truth of] the matter may be other [than what he supposes]. *Taqlīd* negates the benefits of reason, for reason was created solely for the purpose of reflection *(taʿammul)*. It is a disgrace that those endowed with the power of reason should extinguish its flame and deny themselves its benefits, for reason is a light meant to provide illumination. The one who practices *taqlīd* is, in effect, [like] a blind person who must depend on someone other than himself. Ibn ʿAqīl[99] said: "Since Aḥmad did

their way amidst the complexity. Here it is permissible for the lay person to rely on experts (*Talbīs*, 82, 4-8; cf., G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [Edinburgh, 1997], 98).

[98] For one Ḥanbalī view on the question of whether a delay (*muhla*) in acquiring a knowledge of God is permissible for a person who has reached adulthood, see Abū Yaʿlā's discussion in *Muʿtamad*, 23-24. For a survey of Ashʿarite views on the general question of the knowledge of God and the degree to which this knowledge is incumbent on the adult Muslim, see Gimaret, *La doctrine d'al-Ashʿarī* (Paris 1990), 215-218 (also van Ess, *Die Erkenntnislehre des ʿAdudaddīn al-Īcī*, 349-350). As is frequently the case, Muʿtazilīs took a fairly strict position on the matter (Gimaret, 217-218).

[99] Alī b. ʿAqīl b. Muḥammad Abū'l-Wafāʾ al-Baghdādī (d. 513/1119), a pivotal figure in the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad during the latter half of the 11th century. Though raised within a Ḥanafī family, and from an early age exposed to Ḥanafī/Muʿtazilī thinking, Ibn ʿAqīl joined the Ḥanbalī school and remained a defender of the school's central doctrines for the remainder of his life. Although he ran into difficulty with some of the more conservative elements of the school on account of his theological views (some of which had been influenced by his earlier encounter with Muʿtazilism), he remained an important influence in the school and through his writings and his teaching helped to shape the views of a number of promising young Ḥanbalī scholars, among them Ibn al-Jawzī. The influence of Ibn ʿAqīl on the thinking of Ibn al-Jawzī is evident in many of the latter's works, particularly those that deal with doctrinal and methodological questions. Ibn ʿAqīl's influence is particularly evident in *KAS*, where he is quoted frequently and sometimes at length. He was a thinker for whom Ibn al-Jawzī had profound admiration. For a survey of the life and thought of Ibn ʿAqīl, see the excellent article by G. Makdisi in *EI*^{2}, III, 699-701, as well as his seminal study, *Ibn ʿAqīl et la résurgence de l'Islam traditionaliste au xi^e siècle* (Damascus 1963). Not to be overlooked is his more recent work on Ibn ʿAqīl (*Ibn ʿAqīl: Religion and Culture in Classical Islam* [Edinburgh 1997]) which updates and augments his earlier work. Ibn al-Jawzī himself wrote several important biographical notices on Ibn ʿAqīl, esp., in his *Muntaẓam*, IX, 212-215; and in his *Manāqib*, 526-527. On the specific question of *taqlīd*, Ibn ʿAqīl "believes that there is absolutely no reason why the 'ancients' [the *salaf*], simply because they come first, should be considered as superior to the 'moderns' [the *khalaf*]. Servile imitation of the ancients is simply not in the true spirit of Ḥanabalism. For

not practice *taqlīd* he was free to accept the position adopted by Zayd on the question of the grandfather's [right of inheritance] and reject the view of Abū Bakr.[100] Indeed, it is essential that people follow where the evidence *(dalīl)* leads. If you wish to know whether this position is correct or not, consider what is more likely, that I am closer to Aḥmad or that Aḥmad is closer to himself? Is it not true that Aḥmad is closer to himself?[101] How often did he adopt a point of view and then later change his mind! This phenomenon is well attested in reports concerning Abū Ḥanīfa **[fol.6a]** and in statements from Shāfiʿī. If such persons sometimes contradicted themselves, it was primarily because of the evidence [available to them]."[102]

22 Ibn ʿAqīl [reported hearing] a man discourse on the "soundness" *(salāma)* of *taqlīd*. I myself came across a book written by Abū Bakr ʿAbd

Ibn Ḥanbal himself did not shrink from criticizing the Companions of the Prophet when a principle was at stake. He bids us follow scripture, and to reason on the basis of scripture rather than to follow him blindly. We must therefore do his bidding; to do otherwise would be tantamount to rejecting the teaching of the founder of the school himself" (G. *Makdisi, The Notebooks of Ibn ʿAqīl*, Part I, xlix). Ibn ʿAqīl's defense of *ijtihād* is, according to G. Makdisi, "one of the most characteristic traits of his doctrine. [In his *Kitāb al-Funūn*] he shows his preference for the *ijtihād* of contemporaries over that of predecessors, for each generation has to solve a new set of problems...by a fresh interpretation and application of the sacred texts" (*The Notebooks of Ibn ʿAqīl*, Part I, l).

[100] Cf., *Talbīs*, 81, 2-82, 3; and G. Makdisi, "Quartre opuscules d'Ibn ʿAqīl sur le coran," *BEOS*, 24 (1971), 11 (introduction). For a discussion of the legal issues involved, see N. A. Coulson, *Succession in the Muslim Family*, 79-90.

[101] The point here seems to be that since examination of, and reflection on, the evidence is essentially an interior process—one in which reason and the conscience are the principle guides—one cannot know (i.e., participate in) the experience by which others arrive at their beliefs, what evidence *(dalīl)* those beliefs ultimately rest on, or the degree of conviction or certitude *(īmān)* with which those beliefs are held. It follows then that if one chooses to follow another person, even an eminent authority, one's beliefs by the very nature of things can never arise above the level of supposition *(ẓann)*. That is not a sufficient basis for authentic belief, especially in matters of *uṣūl*. For Ibn al-Jawzī (here following Ibn ʿAqīl), authentic belief must be accompanied by the kind of certitude that is only possible if one personally considers the evidence, reflects on that evidence and draws for himself those inferences *(istidlāl)* that arise from such consideration and reflection. *Ijtihād* is therefore indispensable. For Ibn al-Jawzī, belief is a necessarily personal matter; to make the views of others the basis of one's beliefs is to abdicate one's own responsibility.

[102] It is a question of changing positions, in part, because of the discovery of new evidence and, in part, because the ambiguity and/or complexity of the evidence rendered it amenable to different interpretations. For an interesting and important discussion of *taqlīd*, see Ibn ʿAqīl's, *Kitāb al-Funūn*, 606, 8-17; cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 68.

ar-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad as-Sunnī[103] entitled *al-Munabbih fī't-Tawḥīd* in which he maintained that the Messenger of God received his religion *(dīn)* from God by way of *taqlīd* and that [in such matters] he refused to have recourse to reason and its dictates. In like fashion, he asserted, the Companions of the Prophet received their religion from him, that is, in accordance with *taqlīd* and without requiring proof *(ḥujja)*. I observed that traditionists (*aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth*) admired this man's work. However, the confusion evident in his thought astonished me. After the Messenger of God encountered the angel he was disturbed by the thought that it might have been a devil, and [so he went to his wife and] said: "O Khadīja, I am fearful [that I might have been deceived]!" On more than one occasion, he was known to have prayed: "O God, show me a sign *(āya)* so that I need not be troubled by those who accuse me of lying." [On one such occasion] he was told: "Speak to this tree and it will come to you!" And so he spoke to it, and it approached him leaving a furrow behind it in the ground. Then he said [to the tree]: "Return [to your former place]!" And it did as he commanded, whereupon [the Prophet] was reassured.[104] Indeed, prophets are not superior [to other human beings?] except in their ability to distinguish between an angel and a devil through the use of reason *(ijtihād)*. The Companions of the Prophet, for their part, spared no effort in ferreting out evidence *(dalīl)* [bearing on the question] of his veracity and, [having obtained it,] they believed.

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[103] Or perhaps as-Sinnī. Although I have found no reference to him in the biographical and historical sources of the period, he was undoubtedly a Ḥanbalī, and quite possibly an associate or disciple of the 4th century firebrand conservative, al-Barbahārī (d. 329/941); the latter is known to have been an unapologetic defender of *taqlīd* (cf. *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 29, 20; and 39, 1ff). G. Makdisi mentions a Muḥammad b. ʿAbd ar-Razzāq b. Aḥmad as-Sinnī, a contemporary of Ibn ʿAqīl, who may have been a distant cousin of the Abū Bakr mentioned by Ibn al-Jawzī, but Makdisi was not able to identify him further (see Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 5; his "L'affaire d'ibn ʿAqīl," *Mélanges L. Massignon* [Paris-Damascus 1957), 124; and his "Autograph Diary—III," *BSOAS*, XIX [1957], 48).

[104] See Ibn al-Jawzī's *al-Wafāʾ bi-Aḥwāl al-Muṣṭafā*, I, 172-173, where two versions of this tradition are to be found, one ascribed to 'Umar, the other to Anas b. Mālik. It is the former that is cited here in *KAS*. This story is recounted here because it is an example of "evidence" provided in response to the Prophet's demand that he be given evidence/proof in the face of uncertainty.

[The Dangers of Kalām]

23 Nothing has been attributed to Aḥmad in the sources that even remotely smacks of anthropomorphism *(tashbīh)*, for his position was that the traditions of the Prophet should be allowed to stand as they are without comment. This also was the viewpoint of such leading authorities as Mālik b. Anas,[105] Sufyān,[106] Awzāʿī,[107] Ibn al-Mubārak,[108] and Shāfiʿī,[109] all of whom were

[105] Author of the celebrated *Muwaṭṭaʾ*, eponym of the Mālikī school of law, and a leading figure in the evolution of Muslim jurisprudence in the early period, who died in Medina in 179/796. For an account of the most important sources on him and an assessment of his contribution to the development of Islamic thought, see the excellent article on him by J. Schacht, *EI*^{2}, VI, 262-265; also see *GAS*, I, 457-484; *GAL*, I, 297-299; Y. Dutton, *The Origins of Islamic Law: the Quran, the Muwatta and Madinan Amal;* and Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, II, 213-231 (Eng. trans. 198-214).

[106] Abū ʿAbd Allāh Sufyān b. Saʿīd ath-Thawrī, a *ḥadīth*-oriented jurist and exegete, and a critic of the speculative tendencies of early Kufan legal circles. Despite his insistence on the importance of *ḥadīth*, however, his theological views place him close to the Qadarīya on a number of important questions, and among the precursors of early Muʿtazilism (cf., *EI*^{2}, IX, 771a). For a sketch of his life, an assessment of his contribution to early Islamic thought, and a list of sources on him, see the article by H. P. Raddatz in *EI*^{2}, IX, 770-772. Ibn al-Jawzī regarded Sufyān as a pillar among the early *salaf* and devoted an entire work to his life and thought (*Miʾāt az-Zamān*, 486, 2; *Dhayl*, I, 418, 5-6). The work appears to be lost, however.

[107] Abū ʿAmr ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. ʿAmr al-Awzāʿī (154/770), a leading Syrian authority in the fields of *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*, who died in 154/770 at Ḥantūs, near Beirut. For an account of his contributions to early fiqh and an outline of his life see the article by J. Schacht in *EI*^{2}, I, 772-773.

[108] ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Mubārak Abū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al-Marwazī (d. 181/797), a Khurasanian of non-Arab stock (according to al-Khaṭīb, his mother was a Khwārizmian and his father a Turk [*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 153]); he was the first Khurasanian to rise to prominence in the field of *ḥadīth* studies. Staunchly traditionalist in outlook, he bitterly attacked the study of *kalām* and insisted that interest in *kalām* inevitably leads to the adoption of heretical views (cf., Ibn Baṭṭa, *Ibāna*, 32: قال ابن المبارك: مَن تعاطى الكلام تزندق ["Those who devote themselves to *kalām* will succumb to heretical views"]). Among his contemporaries, he was well known for his mystical and ascetic practices (proof that Sufism and the traditionalist outlook were not seen as incompatible even in the early period). For more on his life and place within the emerging traditionalist movement of the second century, see the lengthy notices on him in *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* (X, 152-169), the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nuʿaym (VIII, 162-190), and Ibn al-Jawzī's *Ṣafwat aṣ-Ṣafwa*, IV, 109-122. Additional sources are listed in *GAS* (I, 95), and *EI*^{2}, III, 879. For other references to him in *KAS*, see §§37 and 132.

[109] Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Idrīs (d. 204/820), who played a pivotal role in

opposed to the science of *kalām*. It was Abū Yūsuf's[110] view that those who seek [to understand] religion (*dīn*) by means of *kalām* inevitably succumb to heresy. Of [all] people, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal was the most vigorous in his loathing of *kalām*. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan[111] said: "Abū Ḥanīfa[112] used to urge us to study jurisprudence and to avoid *kalām*. He used to say: 'God curse ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd,[113] who was the first to encourage the study of

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working out the doctrinal and methodological implications of *ḥadith*-centered, traditionalist Islam. For a list of the Arabic sources on Shāfiʿī, see *GAS*, I, 484-490. For a general account of his life and place in the history of Muslim jurisprudence and *ḥadīth*-studies, see J. Schacht, "On Shāfiʿī's Life and Personality," in *Studia Orientalia J. Pedersen* (1953), 318-326; and his *Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (Oxford, 1950), 1-22, etc. See also G. Makdisi, "The Juridical Theology of Shāfiʿī: Origins and Significance of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*," *SI*, 59 (1984), 5-47; and W. B. Hallaq,"Was al-Shafi'i the Master Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?" *IJMES*, 25 (1993), 587-605 (I owe this reference to Michael Feener).

[110] Yaʿqūb b. Ibrāhīm al-Anṣārī ad-Dawraqī (d. 192/807), a prominent Kufan lawyer, apparently the first to occupy the office of *qāḍī'l-quḍāt*, and one of the founders of the Ḥanafī school of law. Although he made a place for the principle of *raʾy* in his jurisprudence, he distinguished his position on this question from his teacher, Abū Ḥanīfa, in that he assigned more importance to the *ḥadīth* as a source of doctrine (cf., *EI*^{2}, I, 164-165). It is interesting that, despite his association with the Ḥanafī school, Ibn Abī Yaʿlā accords Abū Yūsuf a biography in his *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila* (I, 414-415) and notes the close personal relationship between Abū Yūsuf and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal; indeed, al-Khaṭīb claims that Abū Yūsuf was the first of Aḥmad's teachers in *ḥadīth* (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XIV, 255f.). For a list of the more important biographical sources on him as well as an enumeration of his writings, see *GAS*, I, 419-421.

[111] Presumably the reference here is to Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Farqad Abū ʿAbd Allāh ash-Shaybānī (d. 189/805), a leading influence in the Ḥanafī school in its formative period. Although his family hailed from Ḥarastā, a village near Damascus, Shaybānī grew up in Kufa, where he came into contact with Abū Ḥanīfa at an early age and devoted his life to the study of law and tradition under the direction of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and others. For a full list of sources on him as well as an enumeration of his writings, see *GAS*, I, 421-433.

[112] Nuʿmān b. Thābit Abū Ḥanīfa at-Taymī (d. 150/767), eponym of the Ḥanafī school of law and one of the most important legal authorities of the early period. For a list of the principle sources on his life and a brief account of his place in the history of early Islamic thought, see *GAS*, I, 409-419; and *EI*^{2}, I, 123-124, where important secondary works on him are cited.

[113] A student of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 144/762), who, like his teacher, endorsed the Qadarī doctrine of free-will; he did not conceal his doubts regarding the validity of those prophetic traditions that supported a predestinarian viewpoint (cf., van Ess, "La autorité de la tradition prophetique dans la théologie muʿtazilite" in *La notion d'autorité au moyen âge*, ed. G.

kalām.'"**[fol.6b]** Nūḥ al-Jāmiᶜ[114] asked Abū Ḥanīfa his view on what theologians had to say regarding such things as accidents *(aᶜrāḍ)* and bodies *(ajsām)*, and he replied: "[What they teach is derived from] the doctrines of the philosophers. It is essential that you follow the path laid down by the *salaf*. Be on your guard against innovations of whatever sort." Thawrī was asked about *kalām* and he responded: "Leave it alone, it is worthless!" ᶜAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Mahdī[115] said: "Those who study *kalām* will inevitably fall prey to heresy *(zandaqa)*."[116]

Makdisi [Paris 1982], 215-216). As the biographical notices on him indicate, his Qadarī views were combined with strong ascetic tendencies. For more on this important figure, see notes to §26.

[114] Nūḥ b. Abī Maryam Abū ᶜIṣma al-Marwazī (d. 173/789), known as *al-Jāmiᶜ* (the comprehensive) because of his wide-ranging scholarly interests: "... he studied *fiqh* with Abū Ḥanīfa and Ibn Abī Laylā, *ḥadīth* with Ḥajjāj b. Arṭāt, *tafsīr* with al-Kalbī and Muqātil, and *maghāzī* with Ibn Isḥāq" (*Mīzān*, IV, 279). During the reign of Manṣūr he was made *qāḍī* of Marw, a position he held until the end of his life. He seems to have won the respect of leading traditionalists, including Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, because of his strong criticism of the Jahmīya and his vigorous opposition to *kalām* (cf., Ibn Qudāma, *Dhamm at-Taᵓwīl*, 35). But these same traditionalists were severely critical of his practices in the science of *ḥadīth* and generally regarded his traditions as unreliable. Ibn al-Jawzī, himself, accuses him of deliberate fabrication (*Kitāb al-Mawḍūᶜāt*, I, 41; II, 60, 76, 291-293; III, 40, 53, 227-228; cf., also his *KDM*, III, 167-168). One of the traditions he reportedly acknowledged fabricating celebrated the excellent qualities *(faḍāᵓil)* of the Quran "because (Nūḥ explained) I saw people ignoring the Quran and occupying themselves with the study of the *fiqh* of Abū Ḥanīfa and the *maghāzī* of Ibn Isḥāq" (*Mawḍūᶜāt*, I, 41). His vigorous opposition to rationalist tendencies in early Islam, it seems, was enough to overcome his shortcomings as a traditionist. Cf., Watt, *Formative Period*, 145-146.

[115] Abū Saᶜīd ᶜAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Mahdī b. Ḥassān al-Baṣrī al-Luᵓluᵓī (d. 198/813), a *mawlā* of the Azd, and a leading Iraqī scholar (especially in *ḥadīth* and *fiqh*) noted for his highly emotional attacks against the Muᶜtazila and their sympathizers (cf., *Ḥilya*, IX, 7 (1-10). His support of the traditionalist cause took him to Baghdad in 180/796, where he met Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and joined forces with the traditionalist circles of the city. Aḥmad is said to have been impressed with his knowledge of tradition (particularly in the field of *jarḥ wa taᶜdīl)* and jurisprudence (*TB*, X, 242-243). Although Ibn Mahdī died forty years before Aḥmad, and well before the appearance of the Ḥanbalī school, Ibn Abī Yaᶜlā accords him a biography in his *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 206-207. For other notices on him, see *Shadharāt*, I, 355; Ibn Saᶜd, VII, 297; and *Bidāya*, X, 255. This reference to Ibn Mahdī here in *KAS* is the only mention of him in the whole of the work.

[116] On the term *zandaqa* and its participial form *zindīq*, see *SEI*, 659 (Massignon); cf., also Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 56, n. 2, and 59, n. 2. The perspective of Massignon and Laoust must now, however, be supplemented by the more recent and more thorough study by M. Chokr, *Zandaqa et Zindiqs en Islam au second siècle de l'Hégire*

24 Muzanī[117] said: "I used to study *kalām* and so when Shāfiʿī came [to Egypt] I went to discuss with him a matter having to do with *kalām*, and he said to me: 'Do you know where you are?' I replied: 'Yes, I am here in the cathedral mosque of Fusṭāṭ.' Then he said to me: 'At times you are on the Sea of Qulzum[118] where no ship is ever safe.' He then proceeded to ask me a question pertaining to jurisprudence. I responded to it, whereupon he raised certain points that exposed the inadequacy of my answer. I then replied with another answer, to which he raised further objection and so again expressed dissatisfaction with my answer. Whenever I tried to answer him, he would expose the weakness of my response. Finally, he said to me: 'If this is jurisprudence which is based on the Quran and the Sunna, and people introduce such things into it, how much more dangerous is *kalām*, which has as its object the Lord of the Universe, for disputation *(jidāl)* concerning Him is tantamount to disbelief.' At this I abandoned *kalām* and

(Damascus 1993). In §§26-28 Ibn al-Jawzī provides concrete examples of the "absurd" and "heretical" views that *kalām* can lead to. Although the specific instances of "heresy" cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in these paragraphs concern Muʿtazilīs, he nowhere condemns Muʿtazilism as such. Indeed, in the section that follows (beginning with §30), he turns his attention to the equally heretical views of certain traditionalists who championed anthropomorphist conceptions of God. These are examples of what can happen when reason is abandoned or misused. One might conclude from this that what Ibn al-Jawzī is calling for is not a rejection of *kalām per se* but rather a more moderate (and cautious) attitude towards it. It is quite clear from the early paragraphs of *KAS* as well as from the detailed analyses found in chapters II and III, that Ibn al-Jawzī cannot be against the application of reason to religious questions.

[117] Although he was one of the most important of Shāfiʿī's Egyptian disciples (he compiled a compendium of Shāfiʿī's legal teaching, the *Mukhtaṣar*, and played a major role in the systematizing and dissemination of the master's views), he was also an independent thinker who did not hesitate to challenge Shāfiʿī when he thought he was wrong (*EI*^{2}, VII, 822). As Christopher Melchert points out, al-Muzanī was a former Ḥanafī and continued to consult Ḥanafī sources even after his adoption of a Shāfiʿite perspective (*Formation of the Sunnī Schools of Law*, 7, n. 25). For a list of his extant works along with sources on him, see, *GAS*, I, 492-493.

[118] A term applied sometimes to the Red Sea as a whole, and sometimes also to the Gulf of Suez, owing to the fact that a port known as Qulzum (the Greek Clysma) was located on its western banks. Medieval tradition (and perhaps pre-Islamic tradition also) had it that it was near the port of Qulzum that Pharaoh and his armies perished. If this legend is the background of Shāfiʿī's remarks here, his point is clear: those who pursue the study of *kalām* will be destroyed as surely and completely as were Pharaoh and his men (*Marāṣid*, III, 1116-7; Yāqūt, *Muʿjam al-Buldān*, I, 344/2, line, 5-6; also cf., *EI*^{2}, V, 367-369, for a list of medieval sources on Qulzum and Baḥr Qulzum).

devoted myself to the study of jurisprudence." Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal once said: "The best evasive device *(ḥīla)* employed by Shāfiʿī was the absence of any desire for, or interest in, *kalām;* jurisprudence was his only concern." Shāfiʿī said to Rabīʿ:[119] "Do not allow yourself to become preoccupied with *kalām.* My view regarding those who engage in *kalām* is that their heads should be covered with scourges and that they should flee to other lands. They should be dealt with like ʿUmar did with Ṣabīgh."[120] According to a different line of transmission, Shāfiʿī is reported to have said: "My advice concerning those who take up the study of *kalām* is that they should be beaten with palm-branches, carried around on the backs of camels and paraded among the people, and that it should be proclaimed: 'This **[fol.7a]** is the punishment appropriate for those who abandon the Quran and the Sunna and take up the study of *kalām.*'"[121] Shāfiʿī also said: "Whenever I hear someone say that the name *(ism)* is other than the thing named *(musammā),* I declare that such a person is guilty of heresy *(zandaqa).*[122] If someone were to bequeath his books to another and works of *kalām* were to be found among them, such things should not form part of the bequest since *kalām* has nothing to do with knowledge *(ʿilm).*" Shāfiʿī once observed people debating theological questions in accordance with the rules of *kalām,* and he said: "These people should speak about matters that merit discussion or else they should leave." When Ḥafṣ al-Fard[123] said to Shāfiʿī [in the course of a

[119] Rabīʿ b. Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Jabbār Abū Muḥammad al-Miṣrī (d. 270/883), one of Shāfiʿī's Egyptian disciples (cf., *Talbīs,* 113). For notices on him see *Muntaẓam,* V, 77; *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfiʿīya,* II, 132-139; and *Shadharāt,* II, 159.

[120] Ṣabīgh b. ʿIsl al-Ḥanẓalī, a young Basran who reportedly was punished by ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb for his obsessive questioning of obscure terms used in the Quran. For the various accounts of Ṣabīgh and ʿUmar, see Ibn al-Jawzī's *Taʾrīkh ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb,* 146-148. Cf., also *Lisān al-ʿArab,* VIII, 439; and Mālik, *al-Muwaṭṭaʾ* (*jihād,* 19).

[121] Cf., *Talbīs,* 82-83.

[122] Cf., *Talbīs,* 82; al-Bayhaqī, *Iʿtiqād,* 22. For more on the question of the *ism* and the *musammā,* see notes to §25.

[123] Very few biographical details about him are known with certainty; his *kunya* is generally given as Abū ʿAmr (though occasionally as Abū Yaḥyā), and he is said to have been a native of Egypt, though neither the date of his birth or death are reported. He went to Basra where he attended the lectures of the great Muʿtazilī theologian Abū'l-Hudhayl, and seems to have considered himself a Muʿtazilī for a time; eventually, however, he turned against his former teacher and wrote a refutation of his ideas (cf., *Fihrist,* 189). As van Ess has shown in his study on Ḍirār b. ʿAmr (*Der Islam,* 44 [1968], 24-30), Ḥafṣ al-Fard came into contact with the ideas of Ḍirār and was profoundly influenced by him. Among

debate] that the Quran is created *(makhlūq)*, he replied: "Unbelief has overtaken you." Shāfiʿī added: "If people knew [the dangers that lurk in] *kalām*, they would flee it like they flee from lions. Indeed, I have learned things from[124] the theologians *(ahl al-kalām)* that I had never suspected. For a person to be in violation of what God has forbidden—polytheism excepted—is to be preferred to the study of *kalām*."[125]

25 A man once said to Ibn ʿAqīl: "Do you think that I should take up the study of *kalām?*" He replied: "Since religion entails [the giving of] sincere counsel *(naṣīḥa)*, it is my honest belief that you are now a sound, well-rounded Muslim *(muslim salīm)* even though you have not taken up speculation on such things as the particle *(juzʾ)*,[126] the leap *(ṭafra)*,[127] the void *(khalāʾ)*, the

his other Iraqī teachers was the Ḥanafite jurist Abū Yūsuf. Following his return to Egypt, Ḥafṣ come into contact with Shāfiʿī, sometime between 198/814 and 204/820, and earned the latter's censure (cf., *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfiʿīya*, II, 98; cf., also *Mīzān*, I, 564, where Dhahabī reports that Shāfiʿī condemned Ḥafṣ as a *kāfir*, apparently on account of his involvement with *kalām*).

[124] Or perhaps "about."

[125] Cf., *Talbīs*, 82, where a slightly different version of this saying is given; see also Tritton, *Muslim Theology*, 53, where some of the anti-*kalām* statements attributed to Shāfiʿī are cited in translation.

[126] The term *juzʾ*, here roughly synonymous with the term *jawhar* or *jawhar fard*, refers to the atom as an indivisible entity (cf., *Muʿtamad*, 280, 8-9: ومعنى الجزء عبارة عن بعض الأجسام وحقيقة أنّه منفرد من جملة، فإذا كان واحداً فهو غير متجزّئ [the term particle (or atom) is an expression for (entities) that make up bodies (*ajsām*); in reality (a *juzʾ*) is indivisible whether it is part of a whole or exists by itself]). For more on these terms, see "*Djawhar*," *EI*², II, 493-494 (S. van den Bergh); and "*Djuz*'" *EI*², II, 607-608 (L. Gardet); cf., also *EI*², II, 219-220, on the term *dharra*. For the impact of atomism on the natural sciences, see Dhanani, *The Physical Theory of Kalām; Atoms, Space and Void in Basrian Muʿtazilī Cosmology* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).

[127] A theory adopted by the Muʿtazilī theologian an-Naẓẓām (d. ca. 840) to provide a non-atomistic explanation for the possibility of movement—seemingly rendered impossible by an-Naẓẓām's doctrine of the infinite divisibility of bodies. Closely linked to the concept of *mudākhala* (mutual penetration of bodies), the theory of the leap maintained that a body may pass from one point to another without having to pass through all of the intermediate points of space. For a fuller explanation of the theory and its place in the thought of an-Naẓẓām, see especially the two studies by J. van Ess, *Science and Theology: The Case of Abū Isḥāq an-Naẓẓām* (Ann Arbor 1978), 4-16; and his "Une lecture à rebours de l'histoire du muʿtazilisme," *REI*, 46 (1978), 199ff. Although the theory of the leap came to be associated with the theology of an-Naẓẓām among later Muslim thinkers, W. Madelung has shown that it played an important role in the thought of the Imāmī theologian, Hishām

plenum *(malāʾ)*,[128] the atom *(jawhar)*, and the accident *(ʿaraḍ)*,[129] or such questions as whether an accident can endure over two separate moments of time,[130] whether the power to act *(qudra)* [exists only] at the time of the

b. al-Ḥakam (d. 795-6), and perhaps for some of the same reasons, since Hishām also rejected atomism (*EI*², III, 492). It is entirely possible, of course, that the idea of the leap was taken over from Greek sources since, as van Ess has shown, the idea is found already in the work of the late Neoplatonic philosopher, Damascius (van Ess, *Theology and Science*, 15). On objections to the concept of the leap among later Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī theologians, see Gimaret, *La doctrine d'al-Ashʿarī*, 54-60. It is interesting that, beginning in the 11th century (if not before), Ḥanbalī theologians took up the question (cf. e.g., Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 479; and Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 39, 280, where the position of the Muʿtazilī theologian, Abū'l-Hudhayl, is in effect endorsed). For more on this term, see Tritton, *Muslim Theology* (London, 1947), 93; Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre* (Berlin 1936), 12, 141; R. Frank, *The Metaphysics of Created Being*, 19; A. Dhanani, *The Physical Theory of Kalām* (Leiden 1994), espec., 176-181; and *KAS*, §§27-29. For the most definitive account of the thought of Naẓẓām and its impact on subsequent developments within Muʿtazilsm and medieval Islamic theology as a whole, see J. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra*, III, 296-445.

[128] The terms *khalāʾ* (void) and *malāʾ* (plenum) here refer to a debate carried on primarily within the Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī schools, it would seem, over the question of whether there is such a thing as empty, unoccupied space *(khalāʾ)*, or whether the world is to be thought of as completely filled *(malāʾ)*. Without reproducing the details of the debate here, suffice it to say that atomists, within both the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite schools, appear to have argued for the theory of the void, that is, that there exists between atoms and bodies interstices, i.e., empty spaces which are susceptible of being occupied by atoms or bodies. This was the position of both al-Jubbāʾī and al-Ashʿarī, for example, and both argued that if there is no void in the universe, no movement or displacement of space would be possible. For a fuller discussion of the question, see Gimaret, *La doctrine d'al-Ashʿarī*, 63-64; Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre* (Berlin 1936); and H. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 466ff., esp., 492ff. Also see the work by Dhanani referred to in the preceding note, espec., 71-89, where the question of the void is taken up.

[129] On the terms *jawhar* (atom) and *ʿaraḍ* (accident), see *KAS*, §5 and notes to the translation.

[130] The question, that is, whether accidents are strictly momentary phenomena or have the capacity to endure *(baqāʾ)* a succession of instants, was debated at some length by medieval *mutakallimūn*. According to al-Ashʿarī (*Maqālāt*, 358-360) and al-Baghdādī (*Uṣūl*, 50-52) there was little consensus on this question among the Muʿtazila; some like al-Balkhī and others (especially in the school of Baghdad) took the position that all accidents are strictly momentary phenomena, whereas Abū'l-Hudhayl and al-Jubbāʾī (of the Basran school) held the view that there are different classes of accidents, some momentary in duration and others which have the capacity to survive over time (until driven into non-existence by a contrary accident). Ashʿarites, on the other hand, appear to have generally adhered to the view that all accidents exist only for an instant, being created anew in each moment of time

action or is anterior to it,[131] whether the attributes *(ṣifāt)* are added to the divine essence *(dhāt)* [or are identical with it],[132] and whether the name *(ism)* is the same as the thing named *(musammā)* or other than it.[133] I am

(cf., al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl*, 50, 11). While early Ḥanbalīs generally avoided such questions because of their general antipathy toward *kalām* (cf., the *Ibāna* of Ibn Baṭṭa, e.g.), by the early 11th century some Ḥanbalīs were beginning to take an interest in the question. Thus, Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1066) takes up the question repeatedly in his *Muʿtamad* (pp. 30, 36, 140, 141, etc.). It is interesting that Abū Yaʿlā follows the Ashʿarī position on the main point: accidents come into being and cease to exist in each instant of time (cf. 30, 36). For a more detailed discussion of accidents within the context of medieval *kalām*, see Gimaret, *La doctrine*, 75-97, esp., 89-91; Frank, *The Metaphysics of Created Being* (Istanbul 1966), 16-23; and Peters, *God's Created Speech* (Leiden 1976), 123ff.

[131] A reference to the positions taken by Ashʿarīs and Muʿtazilīs on the question of human action. Muʿtazilīs in general (though there were differences among them) took the position that the power to act exists prior to the act and is a power to perform both an act and its opposite, that is, entails choice on the part of the human actor. By insisting on these points, the Muʿtazila intended to maintain that the power to act is a human power independent of God's power and one exercised freely. The Ashʿarīs, on the other hand, insisted that the power to act exists only at the time of the action, that it is a power to perform that act and not another, and that this power to act is a creation of God. To avoid a radical determinism (long associated with the Jahmīya) and to make a place for some degree of human responsibility, Ashʿarites adopted the theory of acquisition *(kasb)*, according to which the human actor, though not the creator of the power by which he acts, does, nonetheless, play a role in the action and the decision on which it is based (see *EI*^{2}, IV, 692-4, where L. Gardet surveys the history of the concept of *kasb* in medieval Islam). For an interesting and perceptive analysis of the Ḥanbalī position (or rather positions) on the larger question of human action, see Gimaret, "Théories de l'acte humain dans l'école ḥanbalite," *BEO*, 29 (1977), 57-178. As Gimaret has shown, Ḥanbalism underwent a remarkable evolution in this area—as it did on other questions also.

[132] For more on the question of the divine attributes, see "The Argument of the Work", Introduction, part III.

[133] Cf., §24 where a similar statement is attributed to Shāfiʿī. How the relationship between the *ism* (name) and the *musammā* (named) is to be understood was a problem for both grammarians and theologians. For an interesting account of the debate as it played itself out in grammatical circles, see Versteegh's, *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking* (1977), esp., 149-161. By the 10th century there was virtual unanimity among grammarians that *ism* and *musammā* participate in two distinctly different levels of being and, therefore, are fundamentally different. Among theologians, for whom it was primarily a question of how the divine names are to be understood in relation to a transcendent God, three principal positions emerged: 1) that of the Muʿtazila who, along with the grammarians, maintained that *ism* and *musammā* are fundamentally different (God and the names ascribed to Him are not one and the same; to suppose otherwise is to compromise His oneness and transcendence); 2) that of the Ashʿarites, who in general insisted on the identity of *ism* and

certain that the Companions of the Prophet died without knowing of such matters. If you think that the approach of the dialectical theologians *(mutakallimūn)* is more prudent than that adopted by Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, you are in error. The science of *kalām* has produced doubts among its proponents, and the odors of heresy *(ilḥād)* emanate from the errors of their doctrines.[134] The root cause of all this is that the theologians are not satisfied with [the study of] the *Sharīʿa* and its provisions, and so they seek to probe the divine realities themselves; reason, however, is powerless to apprehend the wisdom *(ḥikma)* to which God alone has access."[135]

26 [fol.7b] If someone should ask what this *kalām* is that has been

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musammā; and 3) that of the early Ḥanbalīs (and other traditionalists perhaps), who argued that the very debate over *ism* and *musammā* represented a heretical innovation and ought to be avoided (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila,* II, 280, 4-10). Up until the 4th century, Ḥanbalīs generally seem to have adhered to the third position. By the mid-5th/11th century, however, and most likely as a result of Abū Yaʿlā's influence, some Ḥanbalīs began to nuance their position on this question (perhaps under the influence of the Kullābīya). In his *Muʿtamad* (71-70), Abū Yaʿlā devotes several lengthy and involved paragraphs to the question, in which he differentiates between two classes of divine names: 1) those that designate the divine essence itself (among which he mentions such terms as Allāh, *qadīm, mawjūd, thābit,* etc.), and 2) those that "belong" to the divine essence (such as *ḥayy, ʿālim, qādir, khāliq,* etc.). Names of the first class are identical with the divine essence, but of those in the second class he says: "They cannot be said to be identical with [God's] essence or other than it" (71, 18-19). In his *ʿaqīda,* Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī (d. 488/1095) indicates that Ḥanbalīs were at variance on this question, but he himself advocates a position that is very close (if not identical) to that of Abū Yaʿlā (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 280, 4-10). Versteegh suggests that the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite positions reflected a fundamentally different understanding of the term *ism:* the Muʿtazila took it in its literal sense to mean the "physical" expression (*lafẓ*), i.e., the finite (human) word as uttered, whereas for the Ashʿarites the term *ism* referred to the essence of the thing named. When Ashʿarites said that the *ism* and the *musammā* are one and the same they were saying, in effect, that the essence of the name and the thing named are one and the same (Versteegh, 158-161; cf., Baghdādī, *Uṣūl,* 114ff.; and Bāqillānī, *Tamhīd* [ed. McCarthy, Beirut 1957], 225-236). Reflected in the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite positions, of course, were their respective views on the Quran.

[134] See *Talbīs,* 85, where the quotation from Ibn ʿAqīl is found in a slightly different form.

[135] Cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 149-150. The idea of a transcendent wisdom that lies beyond the reach of reason—a wisdom which God alone possesses, and in relation to which human reason has only two choices, submission or resistance—is a theme to which Ibn al-Jawzī returns repeatedly in his *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (see, e.g., 323-326, 364-366, 367-368, 375-376, 478-479).

condemned, our answer is that it is something which the theologians *(mutakallimūn)* pieced together out of what they produced, drawing [some of it] from the philosophers[136] and [some of it] from notions which they developed in the course of debate *(jidāl)* among themselves, most of which is unnecessary and [at best] of fleeting value. [*Kalām*] creates doubts in the minds of people, and it is often difficult to free them from such thoughts, as we have noted in statements cited from Ibn ʿAqīl and others on such matters. The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain that God has given them protection against such things by relying on the apparent meaning of scripture (*ẓawāhir*),[137] to which reason itself points, without having to delve beneath the surface [of the text], the results of which are not to be trusted. The evidence of reason

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[136] See §23, where a similar charge is attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa. *Kalām's* alleged indebtedness to philosophy is an allegation that was made frequently by traditionalists, and sometimes even by men who were themselves associated with *kalām* (cf., *Maqālāt*, 485, where al-Ashʿarī alleges that Abū'l-Hudhayl borrowed elements of his theology from Aristotle—al-Ashʿarī does not identify the so-called borrowed ideas). Whether Ibn al-Jawzī is here simply reiterating a charge made by earlier critics of *kalām* or has something different in mind is difficult to determine from the general nature of his comments above. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the *kalām* of Ibn al-Jawzī's time was in the process of undergoing something approaching a paradigm shift as a result of the infusion of Avicennian ideas into *kalām*, thanks in large measure to the efforts of men like al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111), Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), and al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286)—a trend continued in the works of later theologians, among them al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) and al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413). In a series of important studies, Frank has called attention to the subtle but nonetheless profound impact of Avicenna on the cosmological foundations and framework of al-Ghazzālī's theology; see especially his *Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School* (Durham and London, 1994); and the more detailed analysis in his *Creation and the Cosmic System* (Heidelberg, 1992). Earlier, van Ess had called attention to the impact of Aristotelian, Avicennian logic on al-Ghazzālī's thought (see especially his "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology," 21-50; cf., also Sabra, A. I. "Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islamic Theology," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, IX [1994],1-42). The changes in *kalām* that were well underway by the beginning of the 12th century were both methodological and substantive, and were destined to have a significant influence on the future of religious thought in Islam.

[137] By *ẓawāhir* Ibn al-Jawzī here seems to mean an understanding of the text that is in keeping with its true meaning or intention. As will be seen later in *KAS*, especially in chaps. II and II, Ibn al-Jawzī frequently attacks *ẓāhir/ẓawāhir* interpretations of scripture; when he does so he has in mind interpretations that carry with them anthropomorphic implications.

cannot be denied, for by it we have access to a knowledge [of God's existence] that cannot be refuted.

27 Abū Sulaymān b. al-Khaṭṭābī[138] said: "Satan has [sometimes] come in the guise of reasonableness, saying to those in whom he perceives a high degree of intelligence and understanding: 'Do not be satisfied with a knowledge of the apparent meaning *(ẓāhir)* of the traditions of the Prophet *(sunna)*, for this is the sort of understanding characteristic of the uneducated masses *(ʿāmma)*.' Satan thus misleads them so as to entangle them in doubt. Then when they consider the Book of God in which they profess to believe, they confuse one thing with another and interpret the text *(taʾawwala)* in the light of what happens to occur to them [at the moment]. They display contempt for the traditions of the Prophet and distort their contents in the course of transmitting them." ʿAmr b. ʿUbayd,[139] for example, used to say:

[138] Ḥamd (or Aḥmad) b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī al-Bustī (d. 388/998, according to some in 386/996), a native of Bust (Sijistān) whose learning spanned a number of disciplines (law, tradition, literary criticism and theology). His reputation as a scholar seems in part to have been the result of his ability to integrate fields of learning (especially tradition, literary criticism and theology) that tended increasingly in his day to go their separate ways. His two most influential works (*Kitāb Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* and his *Sharḥ al-Asmāʾ al-Ḥusnā*) were products of an interdisciplinary effort, and influenced several generations of scholars after him. His *Sharḥ al-Asmāʾ*, e.g., was one of the principal sources of al-Bayhaqī's *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ waʾṣ-Ṣifāt*. Although they belonged to different schools (al-Khaṭṭābī was a Shāfiʿite and possibly also an Ashʿarite), Ibn al-Jawzī had a great deal of respect for his views and cites him frequently in *KAS* (see, e.g., §§27, 58, 69, 85, 115, 144, 162, 180, 224, 225). Al-Khaṭṭābī was also a poet (his literary abilities attracted the attention of Thaʿālibī, among others) and a deeply religious person. For a list of his works and the most important sources on his life and thought, see *GAS*, I, 210-211; *EI*^{2}, IV, 1131-1132; and above all, Audebert, *al-Ḫaṭṭābī et l'inimitabilité du Coran* (Damascus 1982), esp., 19-53. Also see Allard, *Le problème des attributs divins* (Beirut 1965), 351-364; and Gimaret, *Images*, 46-48.

[139] A disciple of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, a defender of Qadarism and a vigorous opponent of predestinarian views that began to gain currency in the generation after Ḥasan. Although claimed by later Muʿtazilīs as the founder of their school (along with Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ), this seems doubtful, since none of the views attributed to him (apart from his Qadarī beliefs) are characteristic of Muʿtazilism or even of proto-Muʿtazilism. As the text cited at the end of §27 indicates, he was openly sceptical of traditions then coming into circulation, which represented the Prophet as defending the notion that what happens on earth, including the sinful acts of human beings, is decreed by God. For more on his attitude toward the newly emerging "science" of *ḥadīth*, see van Ess, "L'autorité de la tradition prophétique dans la théologie muʿtazilite," in *La notion d'autorité au moyen âge*, ed. G. Makdisi (Paris 1982), 215-216. On the question of his relationship to the later Muʿtazilī school, see van Ess,

"If the expression 'May the hands of Abū Lahab perish'[140] is recorded in the 'Preserved Tablet' *(lawḥ maḥfūẓ)*, how can Abū Lahab be held responsible for his misdeeds?"[141] ['Amr] also commented on a tradition attributed to Ibn Masʿūd in which the latter reported: "The Messenger of God who faithfully spoke the truth given to him said to me: 'The individual human being coheres in the mother's womb during a period of forty days; [from] a drop it becomes an embryo. Thereafter the term of its life, its fortune in the here and now as well as its fate in the hereafter—whether it will be damned or enjoy bliss—is recorded.'"[142] [In his commentary on this tradition ʿAmr] said: "If al-Aʿmash had reported this tradition to me, I would have accused him of having fabricated it; if Zayd b. Wahb had reported it to me, I would have rejected it; if Ibn Masʿūd[143] had reported it to me, I would have refused to accept it; and even if the Messenger of God himself had spoken **[fol.8a]** these words to me, I would have said to him: 'They are not

"Une lecture à rebours de l'histoire du Muʿtazilism," *REI*, 47 (1979), 56ff.; and Watt, *Formative Period*, 107ff. For a list of medieval sources on him, see *GAS*, I, 597 (cf. *GAL*, Suppl., I, 338).

[140] S. 111:1.

[141] That is, if the misdeeds of Abū Lahab had in fact been recorded in the *lawḥ maḥfūẓ* (and therefore decreed by God) from the beginning, he cannot justly be held responsible for his transgressions. One must conclude then, according to ʿAmr, that this text could not have been in the *lawḥ maḥfūẓ* (cf., *EI*^{2}, IV, 371a; and van Ess, *Traditionistische Polemik gegen ʿUmar b. ʿUbaid* [Beirut, 1967], 16). The text, cited here by Ibn al-Jawzī, is found, with slight variation, in a number of sources (see, e.g., Dāraquṭnī, *Akhbār ʿUmar b. ʿUbayd* (Beirut, 1967), 10, 19; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XII, 170, 20-21; 172, 15-16; 183, 18-19; *Mīzān*, III, 276, 16-17; and Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, X, 81, 22-23). For discussions of this text, see Watt, *Formative Period*, 108; and esp., J. van Ess, *Traditionistische Polemik* (Beirut, 1967), which includes a critical edition of Dāraquṭnī's polemic against ʿAmr with a translation and commentary.

[142] Although this tradition does not appear to have come into circulation until late in the Umayyad period (cf., Watt, *Formative Period*, 104; and van Ess, *EI*^{2}, IV, 371a), it gradually became a favorite in those circles that championed a predestinarian point of view. The above saying, in its many permutations, appears in virtually all of the major collections of *ḥadīth:* Bukhārī, *badʾ al-khalq*, 6; *anbiyāʾ* 1; *qadar* 1; Muslim, *qadar* 1; Abū Dāwūd, *sunna*, 16; Tirmidhī, *qadar* 4 (2137); *Musnad*, I, 382, 414, 430, etc. Cf., Bayhaqī, *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ*, 386-7, where several versions of this tradition are cited and discussed.

[143] In the standard versions of this tradition, the names Ibn Masʿūd (d. ca. 652), Zayd b. Wahb (d. ca. 703), and al-Aʿmash (d. 765), respectively, appear in the *isnād* as the earliest transmitters (cf., Watt, *Formative Period*, 113, where the relationship between al-Aʿmash and Zayd is discussed).

[consistent with] the revelation *(sharīʿa)* given to you.'"[144]

28 Abū'l-Hudhayl,[145] one of the *mutakallimūn*, used to assert that the objects of God's creative power *(maqdūrāt al-bāriʾ)*[146] will arrive at a point

[144] Cf., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XII, 172, 5-8; and *Mīzān*, III, 278, 17-19.

[145] Abū'l-Hudhayl Muḥammad b. Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. 226/840), one of the most original and influential members of the early Muʿtazilī school of Basra. He is credited, e.g., with the introduction of atomism into Islamic theology, a doctrine that was to become the dominant view not only within the Muʿtazilī school but also in both Ashʿarism and in non-Ashʿarite traditionalist *kalām* down to the end of the Middle Ages. For a masterful account of what is currently known of the life and thought of Abū'l-Hudhayl in its most important aspects, see J. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra*, III, 209-296; for a much briefer, though by now dated, summary, see the article on him by Nyberg, *EI*², I, 127-129. *GAS*, I, 617-618, contains a list of the most important medieval sources on him.

[146] The term *maqdūrāt* has been rendered variously by scholars, but for Abū'l-Hudhayl it generally has the same sense as the terms *ḥawādith* and *muḥdathāt*, i.e., phenomenal occurrences (entities, events or movements) brought into being by God's power *(qudra)*; they are from Abū'l-Hudhayl's perspective actualizations (objects) of God's power. For a variety of reasons, but primarily, it would seem, to defend the idea of creation *ex nihilo* against the philosophers, on the one hand, and the *dahrīya* (materialists), on the other, Abū'l-Hudhayl advanced the view that the *maqdūrāt* (all things that have ever been or will ever be) form a "whole" *(kull, jamīʿ)* that must necessarily be finite in terms of both space and time. There must be a last *maqdūr* if we are to suppose that there was a first (as the Quranic doctrine of creation requires); when the last *maqdūr* has been actualized all movement will cease as will the creation of new beings. Abū'l-Hudhayl postulated that this would happen sometime in the hereafter, at which time all movement (activity) in Paradise and Hell would cease, and the inhabitants of each would be reduced to a state of permanent quiescence (cf., *Talbīs*, 83, 12-14; *Maqālāt*, 163, 13-14; 475, 1-2; 485, 11-14; and al-Khayyāṭ, *al-Intiṣār*, 12, 8-10). Despite the good intentions behind the theory, it was perceived as problematic almost from the beginning—partly because of the dubious conclusions Abū'l-Hudhayl drew from it, but primarily because it appeared to impose limits on God's power. This was the criticism levelled by theologians such as al-Baghdādī (*Uṣūl*, 50f., 94, 238), and it appears to be the central problem for Ibn al-Jawzī (in addition to §§28 and 29, cf., also his *Talbīs*, esp., 83, 9-19). Because of the problems which attended the theory, it was soon abandoned by Muʿtazilīs themselves (even by some of Abū'l-Hudhayl's own students, among them Shaḥḥām and Jaʿfar b. Ḥarb), and there are reports that Abū'l-Hudhayl himself eventually abandoned it, although van Ess is convinced that he did not do so, and produces some evidence indicating that the theory survived in isolated pockets within the school for several generations. For a fuller discussion of Abū'l-Hudhayl's views on the *maqdūrāt*, see R.M. Frank's important studies, "The Divine Attributes According to the Teaching of Abū'l-Hudhayl," *Muséon*, 82 (1969), 451-506, esp., 473-490; and *The Metaphysics of Created Being According to Abū'l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf* (Istanbul 1966), 22ff.; as well as the study by van Ess, "Abu l-Hudhayl in Contact: The Genesis of an Anecdote," *Islamic Theology and Philosophy*, (Albany 1984), 13-30; and his *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2.*

in time when neither He nor any one else will have power over them so that if one of the inhabitants of Paradise were to reach out to take a fig—and that time had arrived—the Creator would be unable to secure it for him. The inhabitants of Paradise will become motionless, being unable to move, and the tormenting of the inhabitants of Hell will cease.[147]

29 [The words of] this foolish man are in conflict with a number of scriptural texts, including the verse: "What is with God will remain [forever]."[148] Had [Abū'l-Hudhayl] reflected on this matter he would have realized that contingent entities *(ḥawādith)* which do not yet exist have not entered into existence *(wujūd)*; rather they are brought into being (one by one) over a succession of instants *(ḥālan fa-ḥālan)*. What has not entered into existence cannot be termed "finite" *(mutanāhiyan)*[149] until it has been in existence and terminated; the power *(qudra)* of God, however, cannot come to an end (or reach its limit) since He has not yet created the totality of contingent entities *(makhlūqāt)* and abrogated His *maqdūrāt*, for had He created [contingent entities] all at once *(dafʿan)* they would be limited [in duration].[150]

und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, III, 255ff. For a more general introduction to Abū'l-Hudhayl's thought, see van Ess, "Une lecture à rebours de l'histoire du muʿtazilisme," *REI*, 46 (1978), 216-240; and the article by Nyberg in *EI*^{2}, I, 127-129. For a list of primary sources on his life and thought, see *GAS*, I, 617-618; and *GAL*, Suppl., I, 338.

[147] The punishment of Hell will not literally come to an end; rather the punishment experienced at the moment when the last *maqdūr* has been realized will become permanently fixed, and the inhabitants of Hell will remain in that condition presumably for ever (cf., Shahrastānī, *Milal* [Cairo 1910], I, 73, 3-5; Ibn Ḥazm, *Fiṣal*, IV, 83, 21-84, 4; al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl*, 94, 14-16; and Ibn Taymīya, *Minhāj*, I, 310-311). What will be different is that all movement will have ceased. Strictly speaking then, punishment will continue but it will be punishment frozen in time, if that is possible to conceive. Abū'l-Hudhayl's view is to be distinguished from that of Jahm b. Ṣafwān, who held that the *maqdūrāt* will be totally annihilated so that in the end only God will remain (cf. *Maqālāt*, 148, 11-149, 5).

[148] S. 16:97; cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, IV, 488.

[149] Since the word here in the MS is blurred, *mutanāhiyan* should be regarded as a tentative reading.

[150] If God had created all of them at once that event would necessarily have been in the past (since things obviously do exist); hence, from the vantage point of the present, His creative activity would be a thing of the past, and the *makhlūqāt*/*maqdūrāt* would necessarily be finite in terms of time or duration. One could not in that case speak of God's creative activity as being eternal (without end). The *maqdūrāt* would then be finite because they have ceased, and God's power *(qudra)* would be limited in the sense that there would be no further actualizations of that power. This leads me to conclude that when Ibn al-Jawzī speaks of the infinite in this paragraph it is an infinity of time or duration, not one of

Thus [Abū'l-Hudhayl's] belief that God's *maqdūrāt* are finite is worse than unbelief *(kufr)*, for anyone who holds that God's *maqdūrāt* are subject to limitations must also hold that His knowledge *(ʿilm)*, and even His essence *(dhāt)*, are finite. Indeed, al-Jubbāʾī[151] himself wrote a book in which he declared Abū'l-Hudhayl to be an infidel *(kāfir)*.[152]

Thumāma[153] once observed people rushing [to the mosque] to perform the Friday prayers and he said: "Look at these cattle! What has this Arab, that is, the Messenger of God, done to the people?"[154] The Muʿtazilīs of Baghdad maintained that anyone who steals so much as a grain of wheat and dies without having repented will remain in Hell forever.[155] Hishām b. al-Ḥa-

number, that he has in mind. Indeed, the question of number does not seem to figure in his response to Abū'l-Hudhayl. Since the latter's notion of the infinite concerned primarily the question of number, Ibn al-Jawzī's response must be judged less than adequate. For Ibn Taymīya's assessment of the Hudhaylian doctrine of the *maqdūrāt*, see his *Minhāj*, I, 310-311; cf., also ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī's *Ghunya*, 92, 23ff.

[151] Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (235/849-303/915), a leading figure in the Basran branch of the Muʿtazila in the period following the disestablishment of the school by al-Mutawakkil. His principle teacher in *kalām*, Abū Yaʿqūb ash-Shaḥḥām, was a disciple of Abū'l-Hudhayl, and al-Jubbāʾī counted among his students a number of influential Muʿtazilīs, including al-Ashʿarī himself for a time. Since none of his many works are extant, his views can be known only through the writings of his critics (al-Ashʿarī, e.g.) or those who considered him their spiritual master (ʿAbd al-Jabbār) and who reproduced his teaching in their various writings. It is clear that al-Jubbāʾī was a powerful, systematic thinker, and his teaching was a major factor in the subsequent development of theology in medieval Islam, not only among the Muʿtazila (cf., Frank, "Remarks on the Early Development of the *Kalām*," *Atti del terzo congresso di studi arabi e islamici* [Naples 1967], 315-329; and Gimaret, D. "Matériaux pour un bibliographie des Gubbāʾī", *Journal Asiatique*, 264 [1976], 277-332). For more on him, see the references in the article by L. Gardet, *EI*^{2}, 569-570; and *GAS*, I, 621-622.

[152] Cf., *Farq* (English trans., 125), where Baghdādī states that al-Jubbāʾī wrote a work in which he condemned Abū'l-Hudhayl as an unbeliever *(kāfir)*. For Murdār's criticism of Abū'l-Hudhayl's views on the *maqdūrāt*, see *EI*^{2}, VII, 604b.

[153] Thumāma b. Ashras Abū Maʿn an-Numayrī (d. 213/828), an influential member of the Muʿtazilī school of Baghdad, a close associate of al-Maʾmūn, and one of the teachers of al-Jāḥiẓ. Although ascetic tendencies were strong within the school of Baghdad, Thumāma was known for his enjoyment of the "good" life and his association with men of high station. For a summary biography with a list of the medieval sources on him, see *GAS*, I, 615-616.

[154] Cf., Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, 6.

[155] Cf., *Manāqib*, 168, 17; and al-Jīlānī, *Ghunya*, 93, 13-14.

kam[156] used to teach that God should be conceived of as a body and that bodies resemble each other. As for Ibn ar-Rāwandī,[157] nothing absorbed

[156] An early Imāmī theologian (d. 179/795) who, despite certain anthropomorphist tendencies, exerted an important influence on a number of early Muʿtazilī thinkers, among them an-Naẓẓām. For a sketch of his life and a summary of his teaching, see the excellent art. by W. Madelung on him in *EI*², III, 496-498; for a more detailed treatment reflecting more recent research, see J. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra*, I, 349-379.

[157] Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Isḥāq Abū'l-Ḥusayn ar-Rāwandī (d. 298 or 310 [*Muntaẓam*, VI, 99]), originally a member of the Muʿtazilī school who, allegedly under the influence of the Manichean Abū ʿIsā al-Warrāq, abandoned the teachings of the school and, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, embraced a number of dangerous heretical views combined with a systematic scepticism regarding the revealed religions. It was the tone of Ibn ar-Rāwandī's critique as much as its content that angered Ibn al-Jawzī and explains his remark that Ibn ar-Rāwandī was worse than Iblīs himself: even though Iblīs disobeyed God, he at least addressed Him with respect (*Muntaẓām*, VI, 102, 15-18). The importance which Ibn al-Jawzī attached to the case of Ibn ar-Rāwandī may be seen in the unusually long biographical notice devoted to him in *Kitāb Muntaẓam* (VI, 99-105; for a translation of Ibn al-Jawzī's notice, see H. Ritter, "Ibn al-Ǧauzīs Bericht über Ibn ar-Rēwendī," *Der Islam*, 19 [1931], 1-17; reprinted in *Beiträge zur Erschliessung der Arabischen Handschriften in Istanbul und Anatolien*, II [1986], 51-67). There Ibn al-Jawzī outlines some of the more dangerous views held by Ibn ar-Rāwandī and cites a number of refutations of him, all by Muʿtazilī scholars: Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī, his son Abū Hāshim, and Abū'l-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāṭ, the Baghdādī historian of Muʿtazilism (cf. also *Talbīs*, 111-112). Because none of Ibn ar-Rāwandī's works (which, according to van Ess, may have numbered as many as a hundred) are extant, the reconstruction of his life and his theological views by modern scholarship has progressed rather slowly. Even the date of his death has been the subject of considerable debate, with views ranging from 250 to 300AH. Among the contributions of modern scholarship to the study of Ibn ar-Rāwandī, especially important are the writings of P. Kraus ("Beiträge zur islamischen Ketzergeschichte," *RSO*, 14 [1934], 93-129, 335-379); H. S. Nyberg ("ʿAmr Ibn ʿUbaid et Ibn al-Rawendi, deux reprouvés," *Classicisme et declin* [Paris 1957], 125-136); G. Vajda (cf., *EI*², III, 905-906); J. van Ess ("Ibn ar-Rēwandī, or the Making of an Image," *al-Abhath*, 27 [1987/89], 5-25); his "Une Lecture à rebours de l'histoire du muʿtazilisme," *REI*, 46 [1878], 163-191); and the study by S. Stroumsa, "The Blinding Emerald: Ibn al-Rāwandī's *Kitāb al-Zumurrud*," *JAOS*, 114 (1994), 163-185; and her *Freethinkers of Medieval Islam*, 37-86. J. van Ess maintains (on the basis of a set of carefully constructed arguments) that Ibn ar-Rāwandī was not the dangerous heretic that he is made out to be in our medieval sources, but rather more likely a questioning believer who became the victim of a vicious campaign launched against him by the Muʿtazila of Baghdad. Stroumsa, on the other hand, is sceptical of van Ess's reading of the sources and argues that the traditional view of Ibn ar-Rāwandī is essentially correct. It is perhaps not entirely surprising, given the state of our sources on Ibn ar-Rāwandī, that modern scholarship should arrive at rather different views of Ibn ar-Rāwandī and his place in the intellectual history of medieval Islam. For a useful

more of his time than reproaching the Creator. Such also was the case of Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī,[158] as is **[fol.8b]** evident from the following lines:

Commandments there are which some people take lightly,
  Yet no one knows whom destruction will befall.
The Book of Muḥammad, and the Book of Moses,
  The Gospel of Mary's Son and the Psalms of David.[159]

In another poem he said (may God punish him!):

The vicissitudes of time wrench lovers from each other;
  O God, judge between that and me!
Do you forbid (to humankind) the premeditated taking of life,
  While You Yourself dispatch two angels to seize it?
You claim there will be a second chance in the hereafter.
  How much better it would be to escape both states![160]

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survey of the medieval Arabic sources on Ibn ar-Rāwandī, see *GAS*, I, 620-621.

[158] Cf., *Talbīs*, 111-112, where Ibn al-Jawzī lumps the cases of Ibn ar-Rāwandī and al-Maʿarrī together; see also *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 185, where Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī is added to the list of reprobates. The notice in the *Muntaẓam* is particularly scathing in its condemnation of Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī; apart from his vegetarianism, his sympathy for the plight of animals and his ascetic lifestyle, which Ibn al-Jawzī notes with some interest, the poet is accused of harboring severe doubts concerning a number of doctrines central to Islam (prophecy, the revealed character of the Quran, resurrection and the afterlife) and concealing a scepticism, even unbelief, under the cover of pious-sounding language. Ibn al-Jawzī was not alone in his views, as Laoust points out in his important study of the poet ("La vie et la philosophie d'Abū-l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī," *BEO*, 10 [1944-45], 136-138). For a critical discussion of the views held by Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ, see R. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Poetry* (Cambridge 1921), esp., ch. 2; and H. Laoust, "La vie et la philosophie d'Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī," *BEO*, 10 (1944-45), 119-156. Smoor's article on him in *EI*^{2}, V, 927-935, provides an overview of his life and his literary production (cf., also *GAL*, I, 254-255; and Suppl. I, 449-454).

[159] The following line, not included by Ibn al-Jawzī, reads: "No nation gave heed to their bans, [and so] their wisdom perished in vain." Cf., Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Poetry* (Cambridge 1921), 215, where additional lines are cited; also cf., *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 187; and Taha Husayn, *Taʿrīf al-Qudamāʾ*, 24, 57, 110, 146, 193, 306, 324, 330. For H. Laoust's rendering of these lines, see his "La vie et la philosophie d'Abū'l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī," *BEO*, 10 (1944-45), 142.

[160] That is, by never having been born. According to Smoor, al-Maʿarrī regarded the act of procreation as itself a sin (*EI*^{2}, V, 930b). In his *Muntaẓam* (VIII, 188) Ibn al-Jawzī prefaces the above lines (which he says he took from the history of Abū'l-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. Hilāl b. Muḥsin aṣ-Ṣābiʾ) with the remark: "I mention these lines of poetry only to demonstrate this man's unbelief *(kufr)*" (cf., *Taʿrīf al-Qudamāʾ*, 25, 56, 116, 145, 193, 283, 291, and 306).

[Anthropomorphist Tendencies in the Ḥanbalī School]

30 I have observed that some members of the [Ḥanbalī] school have taken positions on matters of *uṣūl*[161] that are not acceptable. Among them there are three persons, namely, Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥāmid,[162] his disciple the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā],[163] and Ibn Zāghūnī,[164] who have detailed [their views] in writing and whose books have brought shame on the school.[165] In my view they have descended to the level of the vulgar masses (*ʿawāmm*) by interpreting [texts from the Quran and the *ḥadīth* bearing on] the divine attributes *(ṣifāt)* in accordance with the requirements of sense perception (*ʿalā muqtaḍā'l-ḥiss*). Thus when they learn that God created Adam in his own "form" *(ṣūra)*, they conclude that God has a form [like ours?] consisting of a face (*wajh*), which [they say is an attribute] added to His essence *(zāʾid ʿalā'dh-dhāt)*,[166] two eyes, a mouth, an uvula, molars, a forehead bearing the marks of prostration *(subuḥāt)*, two hands, fingers—even a little finger and a thumb—a chest and a thigh, two legs and two feet, but they add: "We know of no reference to a head."[167] They also assert that God can touch and be touched, and that a person may actually draw near to the divine essence. Some of them even say that [God] breathes. They delight the uneducated public by advancing views that contravene the canons of reason. Having adopted a literal interpretation of the divine names *(asmāʾ)* and the attributes *(ṣifāt)* they go on to apply the term "attribute" [to both of them] indiscriminately—an

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[161] That is, *uṣūl ad-dīn, viz.*, those foundational theological principles on which religion rests. As Ibn al-Jawzī insists repeatedly in *KAS*, these are matters in which reason (*ʿaql*) must be the principle guide.

[162] On Ibn Ḥāmid, see notes to §14.

[163] See notes to §37.

[164] See notes to §37.

[165] Cf., §32 where the charge is repeated. As we learn from the *Risāla* of Abū'l-Faḍl al-ʿAlthī (d. 634) preserved in Ibn Rajab's *Dhayl* (II, 210, 12), Ibn al-Jawzī too was accused of bringing shame on the school through the views he championed (ولقد سوّدت وجوهنا بمقالتك الفاسدة was the way al-ʿAlthī put it [see Appendix, §17]), particularly his embrace of *taʾwīl* and his understanding of the divine attributes. It would appear that the charge of bringing shame on the school was one used fairly commonly in the 12th century by opposing factions within the school.

[166] That is, an attribute over and above the divine essence and therefore separate from it.

[167] Cf., Gimaret, *Image*, 54-55.

innovative method of designation for which there is no evidence (*dalīl*) in scripture or in reason.[168] They ignore the scriptural texts (*nuṣūṣ*) that discourage a literalistic interpretation (*ẓawāhir*) in favor of modes of representation (*maʿānī*) that are necessary to God's [oneness and transcendence] and [require] the negation of those references (*simāt*)[169] which, when taken literally, imply origination in time (*ḥudūth*). They are not satisfied to call such, "an attribute of action" (*ṣifat fiʿl*) but insist on designating it "an attribute of essence" (*ṣifat dhāt*). Then, having declared them to be such, they refuse to interpret them along lines required by literary usage, in which case the expression "hand [of God]" should be taken to mean His power (*qudra*) or blessing (*niʿma*); [references to His] "arriving" (*majīʾ*) or "coming" (*ityān*) as His kindness (*birr*) or His benevolence (*luṭf*), and [references to His] "thigh" (*sāq*) as His might (*shidda*). **[fol.9a]** Rather, they say: "We interpret such expressions literally (*ʿalā ẓāhir*)." However, since the literal meaning takes human qualities (*nuʿūt al-ādamīyīn*) as its point of reference, the expression may be construed in its concrete, literal sense (*ʿalā ḥaqīqatihi*) only when that is possible;[170] if that is not possible then it ought to be construed metaphorically (*ʿala majāz*). [In reality,] they are steeped in [the methods] of anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*),[171] their following having come [largely] from the uneducated classes (*ʿawāmm*).[172]

31 I have thus [thought it necessary to] expose the errors of both those who follow and those who are followed [in these matters]. I say to my fellow Ḥanbalīs: "You are proponents of scripture and tradition (*naql wa ittibāʿ*), and your distinguished *imām*, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, used to say when he was being scourged [on account of his beliefs]: 'How can I say what has

[168] For more on the problem of terminological confusion, see §33, item 1 and notes to the translation.

[169] By *simāt* Ibn al-Jawzī appears to mean those "attributes" mentioned above which, if taken literally, would imply that God is a corporeal being.

[170] Or "acceptable" in the sense that it is compatible with God's essential nature, including above all His oneness and His transcendence.

[171] At the end of this sentence, *DST* (6) and BA, 20a insert the following: "But they resent the application of [the term *tashbīh*] to them and they say: 'We are Ahl as-Sunna'. Their statements, however, are clearly anthropomorphist in character (وكلامهم صريح في التشبيه)."

[172] See D. Gimaret, *Dieu à l'image de l'homme* (Paris 1997), 54-55, where parts of this paragraph are translated.

not been said [before]?'[173] Be on your guard, therefore, lest you introduce heretical doctrines into his teaching! Did [Aḥmad] ever discourse on such matters as the recitation *(tilāwa)* and what is recited *(matlūw)*, the reading *(qirāʾa)* and what is read *(maqrūʾ)*?[174] Has anyone ever reported to you that [Aḥmad] taught that God's sitting on the Throne *(istiwāʾ)* is one of the attributes of essence *(ṣifāt adh-dhāt)* or an attribute of action *(ṣifāt al-fiʿl)*? On what grounds do you justify venturing into [a discussion of] such matters? Some of you have stated that a 'hand' is to be ascribed to God as an attribute added to His essence *(zāʾida ʿalā'dh-dhāt)*. All such statements are in conflict with established norms and are repugnant to those who oppose innovation *(bidʿa)*.[175] You insist that the traditions of the Prophet are to be interpreted literally *(ʿalā ẓāhir)*, but the literal meaning of 'foot' *(qadam)*, [alleged to be one of the divine attributes], is 'limb' *(jāriḥa)*. The only acceptable method is to allow [the words of scripture] to stand as they appear in the text [without comment]. They are to be recited, but nothing is to be added.

32 "If you had understood the difference between the two positions,[176] you would not have fallen into error. When it is said that Jesus is the spirit of God *(rūḥ Allāh)*,[177] Christians maintain that 'spirit' *(rūḥ)* is an attribute *(ṣifa)* of God which entered into Mary.[178] [Likewise] those who affirm that God sits on the Throne in His essence *(bi-dhātihi)* have relegated Him to the realm of the physical senses *(ḥissiyāt)*. It is essential that due consideration

[173] That is, by the early authorities of the Community: the Prophet, Companions, Followers, etc.

[174] On the analogous question of the *ism* (the name) versus the *musammā* (the thing named), see notes to §25 where the Ḥanbalī position is discussed.

[175] On the question of *bidʿa*, see Laoust, *La profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 8, n. 1. Cf., also the art. "*Bidʿa*" in *EI*[2], I, 1199. It should be noted here that the question of *bidʿa* is a complex one, for which the English rendering above (innovation) is not an entirely adequate one.

[176] That is, between the literalist position and (what might be called) the non-interventionist approach allegedly advocated by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal.

[177] Cf., S. 4: 171. For a discussion of this text in relation to the Christian claim (which for Ibn al-Jawzī is based on conceptions rooted in sense experience and, therefore, "materialist" or corporealist in nature), see Ibn al-Jawzī's *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 260-262; cf. also *KAS*, §§33 and 43, where the question of *rūḥ* is revisited.

[178] In the Christian view, as represented here, "spirit" is understood as a physical substance (cf., preceding note).

be given to what can be established by the principle of reason, for it is through this latter that we can know [that] the Creator [exists] and can ascertain Him to be eternal. Use reason, then, to shield God from those finite, corporeal qualities (*tashbīh aw tajsīm*) that are alien to His being, and permit the traditions of the Prophet to stand exactly as you find them, without adding to or subtracting from them! If you had said: 'We recite them [without comment],' no one would have censured you. It is your interpretation of them in a literalistic fashion (*ʿalā'ẓ-ẓāhir*) alone that is objectionable. Refrain from insinuating into the doctrine of [Aḥmad], our pious ancestor, what he never taught! Instead you have brought shame and dishonor to the school, so much so that the only thing that is now said of a Ḥanbalī is that he is an anthropomorphist *(mujassim)*.[179] Not only that, but you have embellished your doctrine with a narrowly partisan devotion (*ʿaṣabīya*) to Yazīd [b. Muʿāwiya] even though you know quite well **[fol.9b]** that the founder of the school actually permitted the cursing [of Yazīd].[180]

[179] Ibn al-Jawzī reports in his *Muntaẓam* (IX, 4, 15-19) that al-Bakrī, an Ashʿarite preacher who was active in Baghdad in 475/1082, stated, apparently in one of his sermons, that some Ḥanbalīs held the view that God even has a penis. Although Ibn al-Jawzī dismisses the charge as false, it does indicate the kind of reputation Ḥanbalīs had in some quarters.

[180] Ibn Rajab reports that the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad was indeed divided over the question of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya (see *Dhayl*, I, 354-358, but esp., 356-357; also *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 273-10-15, where Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī [d. 488/1095] confirms the observations of Ibn Rajab). According to Ibn Rajab, the Ḥanbalī traditionist ʿAbd al-Mughīth b. Zuhayr (d. 583/1187) was an outspoken defender of Yazīd, but Ibn Rajab also notes that ʿAbd al-Mughīth was not alone among Ḥanbalīs in his defense of Yazīd; among others, he mentions Abū'l-Ḥusayn b. Abī Yaʿlā (d. 526) and a certain Abū'l-Ḥasan b. al-Bannāʾ who died in 484 (*Dhayl*, I, 356, and *Muntaẓam*, IX, 59). Undoubtedly there were others, possibly including Ibn Abī Yaʿlā's father, Abū Yaʿlā. Ibn Rajab (who bases himself largely on the now lost chronicle of Ibn al-Qaṭīʿī) reports that Ibn al-Jawzī was one of the leaders of the anti-Yazīd faction and even authored a work on the question entitled *ar-Radd ʿalā al-Mutaʿaṣṣib al-ʿAnīd al-Māniʿ Man Dhamm al-Yazīd* (*Dhayl*, I, 356, 6; *GAL*, I, 503, no. 16; and ʿAlwajī, *Muʾallafāt Ibn al-Jawzī* [Baghdad 1965], 103) in which he detailed the case against Yazīd. That Ibn al-Jawzī's position was well known among his contemporaries is evident from the frequent references to it in medieval chronicles (cf., e.g., Ibn Athīr, *Kāmil*, XI, 562-563 *[sub anno* 583]; and Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, XII, 350). It is not surprising that Ibn ʿAqīl too was a member of the anti-Yazīd camp (cf., G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 176). G. Makdisi notes that behind the anti-Yazīd stance was an abiding affection for ʿAlī and especially Ḥusayn. Between these two positions there was a third group of Ḥanbalīs who refused to take sides over this question. In his *ʿaqīda*, Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī (d. 488/1095), while conceding that a case can be made for both positions, demands that

Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī[181] used to say of one of your leaders[182] that he had brought such shame on this school that it would not be washed away until the day of resurrection."[183]

33 The errors of the authors to whom I have referred above fall into seven categories. (1) They take scriptural texts which refer only to the

partisan debate over this question be set aside in the interest of the school and the larger community. For a statement of Abū Muḥammad's position, see the text of his *ʿaqīda* preserved in *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 273, 10-15; and 382, 10; see also II, 34, 10, where Barbahārī is cited as supporting a similar position. On the wider controversy over Yazīd, see Goldziher, *ZDMG*, 53 (1899), 645-652; *ZDMG*, 66 (1912), 139-142; and *Muslim Studies*, II, 96, n.6.

[181] Abū Muḥammad Rizq Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz at-Tamīmī (d. 488/1095), an influential and well-connected member of the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad whom Ibn al-Jawzī clearly held in high regard. For biographical details, see esp., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 250-251; *Muntaẓam*, IX, 88-89; *Dhayl*, I, 77-85; *Kāmil*, X, 253; *Shadharāt*, III, 384; and Ibn al-Jawzī, *Manāqib Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal*, 525 (cf., also G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 269-274, 342-343, 423-424).

[182] Following the printed edition of *DST* (Damascus 1345/1926, p. 8, n. 1), the editor of *al-Bāzī'l-Ashhab* (Beirut 1407/1987), Muḥammad Munīr, identifies the person referred to here as Abū Yaʿlā b. al-Farrāʾ.

[183] Ibn Athīr's notice on Abū Yaʿlā (*al-Kāmil*, X, 52, 19-21) makes it reasonably certain that the object of Abū Muḥammad's remarks (reported above by Ibn al-Jawzī) was none other than Abū Yaʿlā himself. The last sentence of Ibn Athīr's notice reads: وكان ابن تميمي الحنبلي يقول: لقد خرئ أبو يعلى الفرّاء على الحنابلة خرية لا يغسلها الماء [Ibn Tamīmī al-Ḥanbalī used to say: "Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrāʾ brought disgrace (lit. heaped refuse) on Ḥanbalīs to such an extent that it cannot be washed away"]. The conflict between Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī and Abū Yaʿlā, though in part the result of a personal rivalry, at the same time reflected the social and theological divisions that existed within the school (especially in Baghdad) in the 5th/11th century (cf., Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 267-268 and 342-350). Abū Muḥammad was affiliated with that branch of the school (which included such names as Abū'l-Faraj at-Tamīmī [d. 425], Abū ʿAlī al-Hāshimī [d. 428] and Ibn ʿAqīl) that was intellectually more open, more sensitive to the problematic of the traditionalist position on the question of the divine attributes (and one might also say, less resistant to Ashʿarī and Muʿtazilī perspectives on theological questions) in contrast to the more traditionalist views of men like Ibn Ḥāmid, Abū Yaʿlā, the *sharīf* Abū Jaʿfar and Ibn Zāghūnī. It was the former tendency that Ibn al-Jawzī came to associate himself with; it is the viewpoint of that wing of the school that is reflected in the arguments detailed in *KAS*. The importance of *KAS* lies, in part, in the fact that it reflects the outlook of a line of Ḥanbalī thinkers in the 11th and 12th centuries that wished to distance itself from the die-hard traditionalist wing of the school by insisting, in a somewhat circuitous and nuanced manner, that the Ashʿarī and Muʿtazilī critique of anthropomorphism be taken more seriously.

awṣāf (qualifications)[184] and construe them as though they were *akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt*.[185] Not everything ascribed to God [in scripture], however, should be assigned the status of an attribute *(ṣifa)*. Thus, when the Quran relates God as having said: "I breathed into [Adam] My spirit *(rūḥ),*"[186] the reference to "spirit" *(rūḥ)* here should not be taken to mean that God possesses an attribute by that name.[187] Indeed, those who term a simple qualification *(muḍāf)* an attribute have departed from normative practice.[188] (2) They say that the meaning of those sayings of the Prophet that fall into the category

[184] That is, "qualifications *(awṣāf)*" which may be ascribed to God based on a scriptural text. Although Ibn al-Jawzī does not use the expression *akhbār al-awṣāf* (texts on the basis of which a qualification may be ascribed to God) here, that, in fact, is what he is referring to. For more on the *awṣāf* and the distinction between these latter and the *ṣifāt*, see note 188.

[185] Scriptural texts on the basis of which a divine attribute may be predicated of God.

[186] See S. 12:29, and 38:72.

[187] Ibn Ḥāmid is said to have insisted on *rūḥ* as one of the divine attributes, indeed as one of the attributes of essence (*ṣifa min dhātihi* [§44]). See also §62, where the question of *rūḥ* in relation to God is discussed.

[188] Ibn al-Jawzī's insistence on differentiating between the *awṣāf* and the *ṣifāt* reflects a distinction that had long been standard within Sunnī, and especially Ashʿarī, theological circles. Ashʿarites were not the first, however, to make the distinction. It is to be found in the teachings of Ibn Kullāb (d. 855) and appears to go back as far as Hishām b. al-Ḥakam, the early Imāmī theologian (d. 795/6). Within this theological tradition the *ṣifāt* were held to be actual identifiable "entities" (*maʿānī*) within the divine essence itself, hence the designation attributes of essence, of which there were eight: life (*ḥayāt*), knowledge (*ʿilm*), power (*qudra*), will (*irāda*), hearing (*samʿ*), sight (*baṣar*), speech (*kalām*), and duration (*baqāʾ*). They are based on explicit references in the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet, that is, on what Ibn al-Jawzī calls peremptory evidence (see below, item no. 4 in §33; also §14). The *awṣāf*, by contrast, refer to "qualities" (Gimaret prefers the term "qualificatives" since it calls attention to the fact that the *awṣāf* are primarily words used by human beings) that in some way refer to God's actions, but, unlike the *ṣifāt*, they do not define the divine essence. Concerned to preserve the absolute unity of the divine essence, the Muʿtazila rejected the Ashʿarite understanding of *ṣifāt* as referring to specific entities (*maʿānī*) in the divine essence, and insisted that there is no real difference between *awṣāf* and *ṣifāt*; for them terms like *waṣf* (quality) *ṣifa* (attribute) and *ism* (name) may be used interchangeably; they are merely words that we apply to God, nothing more. For more on the distinction between *awṣāf* and *ṣifāt*, see Gimaret, *Doctrine*, 235-245; also *EI*^{2}, IX, 551a-552; Frank, *EI*^{2}, suppl. 343-348; and his "Attribute, Attribution, and Being...," *Philosophies of Existence, Ancient and Medieval*, 258-278. For a Ḥanbalī statement on the divine attributes that reflects the clear influence of Ashʿarism, see Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 44.

of the *mutashābihāt* (ambiguous sayings) is known only to God.[189] But then they add: "We take [these obscure texts] in their literal sense (*ʿalā ẓāhirihā*)." How strange it is that the literal meaning *(ẓāhir)* is one that only God knows?[190] Can the term *istiwā'*,[191] when taken in its literal sense, mean anything other than "sitting" *(quʿūd)*, or the term *nuzūl* anything other than "movement" *(intiqāl)*?[192] (3) They ascribe attributes to God [carelessly, not understanding] that attributes *(ṣifāt)* ought to be predicated of God on the same basis as essence (*dhāt*) is predicated, [that is,] only on the authority of peremptory evidence *(adilla qaṭʿīya)*. Ibn Ḥāmid[193] said: "Anyone who rejects what is ascribed to God in reliable traditions *(akhbār thābita)*—has he [not] blasphemed in a double sense? [194] The majority of Ḥanbalīs hold that those who reject traditions in which a leg, foot, fingers, palm, and so forth, are predicated of God are to be declared unbelievers even if the traditions in question have come down to us from a single source (*āḥād*),[195]

[189] This sentence presupposes the traditional distinction between two classes of verses in the Quran, the *muḥkamāt* (those whose meaning is clear) and the *mutashābihāt* (verses whose meaning is ambiguous). This classification is based on S. 3: 7, which reads: "He it is who sent down to you the Book in which there are clear verses (*muḥkamāt*)—they are the essence of the Book—and those that are ambiguous (*mutashābihāt*). As for those in whose hearts there is an inclination to fall away, they follow the ambiguous part (ما تَشابَهَ به), desiring dissension and seeking its interpretation (*taʾwīl*); and none knows its interpretation save only God." This distinction between the clear and the ambiguous was later applied to the sayings of the Prophet.

[190] Ibn al-Jawzī's position is that the *mutashābihāt* (ambiguous or obscure texts) concern mysteries which the human mind cannot penetrate. That being the case, all such texts should be allowed to stand without comment. A literal interpretation is particularly offensive since, by equating the mystery known to God alone with the literal (obvious) meaning, it makes a mockery of that mystery. A frankly acknowledged agnosticism is preferable to a literal interpretation, or indeed, to any interpretation at all.

[191] An allusion to the saying *istawā ʿalā'l-ʿarsh* (God is seated, or established, on the throne), an expression that is found in both the Quran and the *ḥadīth*.

[192] Notions that are perfectly comprehensible! If this is the kind of meaning that is to be attached to the *mutashābihāt*, where is the mystery or the ambiguity?

[193] On him, see notes to §36.

[194] The twofold blasphemy may be this: 1) a source that ought to be accepted is given less than the respect it deserves, and 2) God is denied attributes which are rightly His.

[195] Also referred to as *khabar al-wāḥid* or *khabar al-infirād*, i.e., traditions going back to a single authority in contrast to those that are termed *mashhūr* (reports that go back to more than two sources) and *mutawātir* (those that go back to multiple sources). See §14, where

for, in our view, their contents belong to the category of authoritative knowledge *(ʿilm)*." Statements of this sort can come only from one who does not understand either the principles of jurisprudence or those of reason. (4) They fail to distinguish between those prophetic traditions that rest on multiple authorities *(khabar mashhūr)* such as "He (God) descends to the lowest heaven," and traditions that are not at all reliable such as, for example, the saying "I saw my Lord in the best form *(fī aḥsani ṣūratin)*."[196] In fact, they establish divine attributes on the basis of both categories of traditions indiscriminately. (5) They make no distinction between traditions whose line of transmission goes back to the Prophet *(marfūʿ)* and **[fol.10a]** those that go back only to a Companion or a Follower *(mawqūf)*.[197] Indeed, they predicate attributes of God on the basis of both types of traditions without distinction. (6) They interpret certain expressions metaphorically (*taʾawwalū*) in one place but refuse to do so in [another] place. Thus, for example, they take the divine saying: "He who comes to Me walking I will come to him running"[198] as a figure of speech referring to God's bestowal of blessings on His creatures. However, in connection with the saying of ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz:[199] "On the day of resurrection, God will come

definitions of these terms are given. For more on these terms, see *EI*², IV, 896a; III, 25; and B. Weiss, "Language and Tradition," *Der Islam*, 61 (1984), 94-95; also *KAS*, §§102 and 116 where the question of *āḥād* traditions is discussed in relation to the "establishment" of the divine attributes.

[196] See §§72, 74, 76, 79 and 184, where this saying or approximations of it are cited and discussed.

[197] See §113 where Ibn al-Jawzī comments on the value of traditions that derive from *tābiʿī* sources, i.e., reports derived from Followers.

[198] These words belong to that class of sayings known as the *ḥadīth qudsī* or divine sayings. For other references to this tradition in *KAS*, see §§115, 181, and 222; cf., Ibn al-Jawzī's *al-Mashyakha* (Beirut 1980), 65-66, where the *isnād* is given in full as well as a brief sketch of Ibn al-Jawzī's early encounter with the saying. Virtually all of the canonical collections of *ḥadīth* contain the saying in one or another of its variant forms: Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 15, 3 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 588[3]); Muslim, *dhikr*, 2, 19, 20; *tawba*, 1; *Musnad*, II, 251, 315, 391, 413, etc. For medieval discussions of this saying, see esp., Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth* (Cairo 1386/1966), 224; al-Bayhaqī, *al-Asmāʾ*, 457ff.; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd*, 7. For additional references and a summary of more recent scholarly discussion of the saying, see W. Graham, *Divine Word*, 127-128.

[199] The eighth caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, noted for his piety, his tolerant attitude toward non-Muslims, and his far-reaching reform of governmental policy, especially with respect to the *mawālī* question. See the biographical notices on him in the *Ṭabaqāt* of Ibn

walking,"[200] they insist on a literal interpretation. How strange it is that they interpret a saying going back to the Prophet metaphorically but refuse to do so when considering [a similar saying] from ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz! (7) Finally, they make sense experience the basis of their interpretation of the *ḥadīth*. Thus, they say that God Himself *(bi-dhātihi)* descends *(yanzilu)* and moves from place to place *(yantaqilu wa yataḥarraku)*.[201] They maintain that such statements are not to be understood rationally. By such sophistry they deceive those who listen to them and they contradict both sense experience and reason (*al-ḥiss wa'l-ʿaql*).[202]

[The Language of Revelation and
The Necessity of Metaphorical Interpretation (Taʾwīl)]

34 If someone should ask why the Messenger of God summoned [people] to something by means of expressions that are seemingly anthropomorphic, it should be pointed out that sense experience conditions the way people think to such an extent that they are scarcely able to conceive what lies beyond the realm of the senses, and the reason for that lies in the natural human affinity (*mujānasa*) for things temporal (*ḥadīth*). [This explains why] some

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Saʿd (V, 330-408), and the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nuʿaym, (V, 253-353) where a very large number of his sayings are found (cf., also Ibn al-Jawzī's *Ṣafwa*, II, 63-72). Ibn al-Jawzī is the author of a full-length biography of ʿUmar, published in Cairo 1331/1912 (al-Muʾayyid Press) under the title *Sīrat ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz*, and reprinted again in Beirut in 1984/1404 (see also ʿAlwajī, *Muʾallafāt Ibn al-Jawzī* [Baghdad 1965] 112, 129, 163, 180).

[200] It is not entirely clear to me whether this saying is meant to be taken as a prophetic utterance transmitted by ʿUmar or a saying from ʿUmar himself. Apparently the latter is meant since in the following line of the Arabic text it is referred to as "*kalām* ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz" (the speech or saying of ʿUmar). I have searched the sources on ʿUmar available to me for traces of this saying but so far without result. See §§185-186 where another of ʿUmar's sayings bearing on the question of God's walking is cited and discussed.

[201] It is not clear here whether *intaqala* and *taḥarraka* are meant to be taken as synonyms or whether a distinction is intended? In general *taḥarraka*, which, along with *intaqala*, occurs fairly frequently in *KAS*, is used to denote motion in general whereas *intaqala* tends to denote one particular species of motion, *viz.*, movement from one place to another (*min makān ilā makān*).

[202] The term sophistry is not intended here in its technical sense but in the more general sense of specious arguments and forms of reasoning used for the purpose of deception or obfuscation.

people worship the stars and attribute beneficial and harmful influences to them;[203] [why] some people worship light and attribute good to it and evil to darkness;[204] [why] some people worship angels, some the sun, some Jesus, some ʿUzayr,[205] and some the cow, and [why] the majority of people [worship] idols. [People] have a natural affinity for those things whose existence can be apprehended through the senses. It was for this reason that [the Children of Israel] said to Moses: "Make us a god."[206] If revelation (*sharāʾiʿ*) had been given [to the Prophet] in the language of pure transcendence (*biʾt-tanzīh al-maḥḍ*),[207] it would have had to express itself through negation and denial *(an-nafy waʾl-jaḥd).* When they[208] said [to the Prophet]: "Describe your Lord to us,"[209] the verse: "Say, He is God the One" was revealed.[210] Had [the Prophet] merely said that He is not a body *(jism),* **[fol.10b]** or an atom *(jawhar),* or an accident *(ʿaraḍ);* that He is without length or breadth; that He neither occupies space nor is encompassed by space; that none of the six spatial relations apply to Him; that He neither moves *(mutaḥarrik)* nor is at rest *(sākin);* and that He is not accessible to the senses *(aḥsās),* et cetera,—[they would not have understood]. Had [the Meccans] only said: "Limit your use of [the language of] negation by making concrete[211] the One to whose worship you summon us [instead of relying solely on the language of] negation,[212] otherwise you call us to something that has no

[203] See *Talbīs,* 74, where the Ṣābiʾūn are described as worshippers of the stars: "Most of them (says Ibn al-Jawzī) claim that the world is uncreated. Some of them term the stars angels *(malāʾika)* while others call them gods and worship them...."

[204] Cf., *Talbīs,* 75ff., where Ibn al-Jawzī discusses the Mazdian *(majūs)* dualism of light and darkness.

[205] Cf., S. 9:30, and *Zād al-Masīr,* III, 422, where Ibn al-Jawzī summarizes the principal views current in the scholarship of his day with regard to ʿUzayr (cf., also *Talbīs,* 73). For a brief summary of modern research on the name, see the art. by H. Lazarus-Yafeh, *EI*^{2}, X, 960.

[206] S. 7: 138. Cf., Exodus 32:1-5.

[207] A language stripped of all images and symbolic expressions.

[208] That is, the Meccans.

[209] See *Zād al-Masīr,* IX, 265ff., where Ibn al-Jawzī presents different views as to the identity of the questioner(s).

[210] S. 112:1.

[211] Literally, by distinguishing (*bi-an tumayyiza*).

[212] That is, limit the use of negation so that God's existence may be discerned as something concrete and real.

reality [for us"—they would have spoken the truth]. It was for this reason that God applied to Himself expressions *(asmāʾ)* which they could comprehend—such as, for example, hearing, seeing, understanding, expressing anger, building the House, and designating the [Black] Stone as the hand [of God] which can be touched,[213] not to mention such expressions as face, hands, foot, ascending the Throne *(istiwāʾ)* and descending—all for the purpose of rendering His existence capable of affirmation. From the vantage point of revelation *(sharʿ)* this is more important than an emphasis on transcendence *(tanzīh)*, although the latter is an essential part of it. It was for this reason that the Prophet once asked a slave-girl: "Where is God?"[214] On another occasion when he was asked whether God laughs he answered in the affirmative.[215] However, while [the Prophet] affirmed God's existence by appealing to images *(ṣuwar)* drawn from sense experience, supposing such representations *(tashbīh)* [to be literally true] was proscribed by the verse: "There is nothing like unto Him."[216]

[213] An allusion to the tradition: الحجر الأسود يمين الله في الأرض، فمن صافحه فكأنّما صافح الله (the Black Stone is the right-hand of God on earth; whoever touches it, touches [the hand of] God) This is the tradition as reported by Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, I, 174-175; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth*, 117, reports a slightly different version of the *ḥadīth*: الحجر الأسود يمين الله في أرضه، يصافح بها من شاء من خلق (the Black Stone is the right-hand of God on earth; whomever God wills may touch it). Ibn Rajab notes that some Ḥanbalīs insisted on a literal interpretation of this tradition—e.g., al-Ḥasan b. al-Fāʿūs (d. 521/1127) and undoubtedly also the Sharīf Abū Jaʿfar (d. 470/1077). Ibn Rajab notes, however, that not all Ḥanbalīs were prepared to adopt such a position. For a discussion of other interpretations of this tradition, see Ibn Fūrak, 117-119, and Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 277 (cf., Lecomte, 240).

[214] See *KAS* §§122-123 (tradition # 17) where the larger tradition of which this question is a part is cited and discussed. The tradition (with slight variations) is found in a number of the standard collections of *ḥadīth*: Muslim, 5 (*masājid*): 33; Abū Dāwūd, 2 (*ṣalāt*): 167; and 21 (*aymān wa nudhūr*): 16 (an abridged version); Nasāʾī, 13 (*sahw*): 20; and the *Musnad*, V, 447-448. Al-Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 421-422, cites the short version and comments on it briefly (cf., Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 121-122). For an interesting Ḥanbalī discussion of the tradition, see *Muʿtamad*, 56, where, on the basis of this text, Abū Yaʿlā argues that it is possible to speak of God's "whereness" (*aynīya*).

[215] Cf., *KAS*, §§114-116 (tradition # 14). For the text of the tradition, see Ibn Māja, *Sunan*, *muqaddima*, 13 (181).

[216] S. 42:11. The point seems to be that images drawn from human experience are permissible if their purpose is to affirm the reality of God's existence. But once they are used as a basis for understanding the nature of the divine essence (including the question of the divine attributes) they cease to be permissible.

35 The Messenger did not utter his sayings (*aḥādīth*) *en bloc* (*jumlatan*) [at a particular point in time], but rather individually on [many] different occasions. Consequently, those who have compiled them [into books], with chapters arranged according to "image" (*ṣūra*),[217] have committed an egregious error.[218] Collections (*majmūʿ*) of this sort, even those containing sound traditions, are of little value (*yasīr*), [but they do call attention to the fact that the Prophet] was an Arab given to the use of metaphorical language (*tajawwuz*). Did [the Prophet] not say: "'The Cow' and 'the People of ʿImrān' [219] will come forth [on the day of resurrection] like two clouds or like two flocks of birds soaring in the air with outstretched wings," or that "death will be led forth [on the day of resurrection] in the form of a speckled ram and will be slain." [220]

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[217] That is, images (*ṣuwar*) applied to God in the Quran and the *ḥadīth*. It would seem from Ibn al-Jawzī's comments above that there were works in existence devoted to a treatment of these images, i.e., works in which individual chapters focussed on the question of a particular *ṣūra*, or perhaps entire works devoted to the treatment of a single image. Unfortunately, Ibn al-Jawzī does not tell us enough about such works to make it possible to identify them with confidence. He may, however, have in mind here works like Ibn Khuzayma's *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd*, which in fact consisted of series of chapters, each devoted to a particular image. Ibn al-Jawzī makes it clear elsewhere in *KAS* that he had little sympathy for the views of Ibn Khuzayma. Ibn al-Jawzī may also have in mind works like Ibn Zāghūnī's *Taṣḥīḥ Ḥadīth al-Aṭīṭ*, a short treatise devoted to a discussion of a particular facet of the *istiwāʾ*-image (i.e., God seated on the Throne). The work is lost, however, and our only knowledge of it is based on a brief reference in Ibn Rajab's *Dhayl* (I, 181, 18-19). The clear implication of Ibn al-Jawzī comments above is that there were other works of this kind in ciruculation, perhaps authored by the other men he takes to task in *KAS*.

[218] The point here is that, since the Prophet's utterances were given at different times and under different circumstances, they ought to be understood in light of the specific occasions on which they were given. To abstract them from time and place, and then to insist on a literal interpretation, can only lead to confusion and misunderstanding. The problem with such collections is that in organizing images by kind or type, they are torn from their proper setting and in the end distorted.

[219] Titles of the second and third surahs of the Quran, respectively. For fuller versions of the *ḥadīth*, see the following, among others: Muslim, 6 (*ṣalāt al-musāfirīn*) 252, 253; the *Musnad*, IV, 249, 251, 255, 257, 348, 353, 361; Tirmidhī, 42, (*thawāb al-Qurʾān*), 5. Cf., also *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 19.

[220] For the full text, see esp., Muslim, 52 (*janna*), 40; Bukhārī, 65 (*tafsīr surat*), 19 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, III, 379); Tirmidhī, 44 (*tafsīr surat*), 19; *Musnad*, II, 377, 423, 513; and III, 6. The significance of this saying lies (it would seem) in the fact that the Prophet acknowledges these two images as forms of speech that arise out of sense experience, and hence are to be treated as metaphorical expressions.

36 If someone should ask why the *salaf* refused to interpret *(tafsīr)* scriptural texts *(aḥādīth)*[221] and insisted that these latter be permitted to stand as they are, our answer is that they did so for three reasons. In the first place, [the texts of scripture] were recited [without explanation] in order to focus attention (*īnās*) on the reality of God's existence (*mawjūd*). When they are interpreted this does not happen,[222] given the fact that some of [these texts] contain expressions that do [when explained] require a metaphorical interpretation *(taʾwīl)*.[223] Thus, for example, the verse "Your Lord comes"[224] refers to the coming of His command (*amr*). **[fol.11a]** Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal said: "The proofs of reason *(adillat al-ʿaql)* lead to this conclusion, for movement *(intiqāl)* cannot be attributed to Him." Secondly, if a term like "hand" had been explained metaphorically *(taʾawwul)* to mean "power" *(qudra)*, this latter might have been construed in such a way as to include the notion of potentiality *(quwwa)*,[225] and so could have risked diverting attention away from what is acceptable.[226] Thirdly, if [the *salaf*] had adopted a metaphorical method of exegesis, the breach (*kharq*) would have widened and the result would have been confusion. When uneducated persons asked [the *salaf*] the meaning of the verse "[God] seated himself *(istawā)* on the Throne *(al-ʿarsh)*,"[227] they were simply told that God's sitting on the Throne is an established fact *(maʿlūm)* and that, even though its modality *(kayf)* is unknown, it is to be accepted by faith (*īmān*) and not

[221] What follows makes it clear that Ibn al-Jawzī has in mind not just the sayings of the Prophet (i.e., *aḥādīth* in the narrow sense of the term) but Quranic passages as well.

[222] That is, *īnās* does not occur.

[223] The argument in this paragraph assumes that the audience is the general (uneducated) public. Here Ibn al-Jawzī's point is that even though scripture does contain figurative language, it is best not to interpret such language out of respect for the simple faith of the ordinary believers. Ibn al-Jawzī does not oppose the use of *taʾwīl* if it is confined to circles equipped to apply it properly. In chapters II and III of *KAS* Ibn al-Jawzī will make extensive use of *taʾwīl* because he is addressing persons able to understand the intricacies of metaphorical exegesis.

[224] S. 89:22.

[225] See the excellent article by R. Arnaldez, "*Ḳuwwa*,", *EI*², V, 576-579.

[226] The notion of *quwwa* as potentiality (innate unrealized power) implies imperfection and, if applied to God, would have led to a serious qualification of divine *qudra*.

[227] S. 7:54, etc.

to be questioned.[228]—We follow this approach only because the masses *(ʿawāmm)* are not able to grasp matters that are complex and subtle *(ghawāmiḍ)*.

[Leading Proponents of Anthropomorphism Within the Ḥanbalī School]

37 The *imām* Aḥmad used to say: "Let the texts of scripture *(aḥādīth)* stand as they are." Some of his leading disciples followed this principle—men like Ibrāhīm al-Ḥarbī[229] and Abū Dāwūd al-Ashram,[230] as well as some of the [later] authorities of the school such as Abū'l-Ḥasan at-Tamīmī,[231] Abū

[228] Literally, asking questions about it is "heresy"(*bidʿa*).

[229] Ibrāhīm b. Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm Abū Isḥāq al-Ḥarbī (198-285/811-898), a student of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal in *ḥadīth*, and, like Aḥmad, a vigorous opponent of *kalām*, especially of the Muʿtazilī variety. His legal affiliation is less certain: both Ibn al-Jawzī (*Manāqib*, 508; *Muntaẓam*,VI, 3-7) and Ibn Abī Yaʿlā (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 86-93) list him as a Ḥanbalī and devote important notices to him, but Shāfiʿites also claimed him as one of their own (*EI*^{2}, III, 994). It is interesting that while Subkī includes a notice on him in his *Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfiʿīya* (II, 256-257), he does acknowledge that Ibrāhīm studied *fiqh* under Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal. For additional sources on him, see *GAL*, Suppl. I, 188, and *EI*^{2}, III, 994.

[230] I have not found an Abū Dāwūd al-Ashram listed in any of the sources on early Ḥanbalism. It is possible that "al-Ashram" is a corruption perhaps of al-Ashʿath, in which case the reference may be to Abū Dāwūd b. al-Ashʿath, known also as Abū Dāwūd as-Sijistānī (d. 275/888), author of the well known *Kitāb as-Sunna*, which he is said to have submitted to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal for his approval before putting the work into circulation. He was active in early Ḥanbalī circles and taught *ḥadīth* to a number of early Ḥanbalīs, among them Abū Bakr al-Khallāl. For notices on Abū Dāwūd, see *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 159-162; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IX, 55-59; and *Muntaẓam*, V, 97. Another possibility, though on paleographic grounds somewhat more remote, is that the reference here is to Abū Bakr al-Athram Aḥmad b. Hāniʾ (d. 296/909) whose *nisba* (al-Athram) in Arabic closely resembles al-Ashram. It is relatively easy to explain how a scribe could have mistakenly copied down al-Ashram in place of al-Athram; it is less easy to explain the *kunya* Abū Dāwūd if Abū Bakr was the intended reading. In light of the problems with the latter option, I am inclined to consider Abū Dāwūd b. al-Ashʿath as the more likely reading. Abū Bakr al-Athram, however, cannot be ruled out. For biographical sources on Abū Bakr, see *Muntaẓam*, VI, 83; *Manāqib*, 507; *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 66-74; and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, V, 110-112.

[231] ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. al-Ḥārith b. Asad b. al-Layth Abū'l-Ḥasan at-Tamīmī (317-371/929-981), an influential 10th century Ḥanbalī whose theological views reflect the subtle influences of Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism (Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 105-106, 109, and 130). For

Muḥammad [at-Tamīmī] Rizq Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb,[232] and Abū'l-Wafāʾ b. ʿAqīl.[233] However, three persons whom we have already mentioned, *viz.*, Ibn Ḥāmid,[234] the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā],[235] and Ibn Zāghūnī,[236] are well-known

biographical notices on him, see esp., *Muntaẓam*, VII, 110; *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 139, and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 461-462.

[232] For more on Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī, see notes to §31.

[233] See notes to §20.

[234] Al-Ḥasan b. Ḥāmid b. ʿAlī b. Marwān Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Warrāq (d. 403/1012), perhaps the most influential Ḥanbalī jurist of his time. In addition to his many works on jurisprudence, he did compose a treatise that dealt with theological and hermeneutical questions, *viz.*, his *Sharḥ Uṣūl ad-Dīn*. Unfortunately, none of his writings has survived apart from a relatively insignificant legal catechism (*GAS*, I, 515). For more on this interesting and important Ḥanbalī master, see notes to §14. See the following paragraphs of *KAS* for references to his views on the divine attributes: §§14, 33, 37, 39, 40, 44, 48, 52, 56, 61, 63, 64, 76, 135, 139, 151, 177, 186, 188, 244.

[235] Of the Ḥanbalīs chastised by Ibn al-Jawzī (in *KAS*) for their anthropomorphist views, none is censured more often nor more severely than Abū Yaʿlā, a leading influence in the Ḥanbalī school for a good part of the 11th century. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. al-Farrāʾ, known better as Abū Yaʿlā or simply the *Qāḍī*, was born 380/990 and died on the 19th of Ramaḍān 458/14 August 1066. A man of immense learning and a prolific writer (see *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 205-206, for the most complete list of his works), Abū Yaʿlā was a complex and controversial figure. He was criticized by some Ḥanbalīs (Ibn Taymīya) for his Shāfiʿite leanings on certain legal questions and by others for certain Ashʿarite sympathies. But the criticism voiced most often by Ḥanbalīs was that Abū Yaʿlā, in spite of works like *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*, had associated himself with views that were clearly anthropomorphist, and that through his advocacy of such views he had brought shame on the Ḥanbalī school (see *KAS* §31). Ibn Athīr reports that Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī was deeply offended by the views of Abū Yaʿlā on the question of the *ṣifāt* (*Kāmil*, X, 52). One is not surprised to learn that Ashʿarites also took exception to his views and, as we learn, again from Ibn Athīr, expressed their views in a quite public way, and rather early in the career of Abū Yaʿlā (see esp., *Kāmil*, IX, 460, where the role of Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Qazwīnī is mentioned). Abū Yaʿlā was well aware of the objections raised against his views and composed a number of works which, despite the use of the term *radd* [refutation] in their titles, were most likely attempts to defend himself by taking the offensive and raising objections to the views of his critics. Among such titles, one notices the following: *ar-Radd ʿalā'l-Ashʿarīya, ar-Radd ʿalā'l-Mujassima, ar-Radd ʿalā Ibn al-Labbān*, etc. (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 205, lines 8-11). Judging from references in medieval sources (cf., *Kāmil*, IX, 460), it is quite likely that the work by Abū Yaʿlā which occasioned the anthropomorphist charges was his *Ibṭāl at-Taʾwīlāt li-Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*, sometimes referred to simply as *Kitāb aṣ-Ṣifāt*, and its shorter version *Mukhtaṣar Ibṭāl at-Taʾwīlāt*. Unfortunately,

these works have not survived, but we do have fragments of them quoted in other works. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā cites several lengthy passages from the *Ibṭāl at-Taʾwīlāt* in *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila* (II, 211-212) as does Ibn Taymīya (e.g., in his *ʿAqīda Ḥamawīya*, 454-455) and others which cannot be mentioned here. Even if it is not possible to be dogmatic on this point, it seems likely that the unnamed work which Ibn al-Jawzī has in mind in *KAS* when he criticizes Abū Yaʿlā is exactly the *Ibṭāl at-Taʾwīlāt*; this latter, it would appear, was composed with a somewhat more popular audience in mind than was the case with the *Muʿtamad*. It is clear, in any case, that Ibn al-Jawzī was not the first to censure Abū Yaʿlā for holding anthropomorphist views; he does appear, however, to have been the most sustained in his critique of the *Qāḍī*. In chaps. II and III of *KAS* there are some sixty references to Abū Yaʿlā, and virtually all of them involve criticism. Whether there was a political dimension to Ibn al-Jawzī's critique of the *Qāḍī* is an interesting and important question, though one that cannot be answered satisfactorily until more is known of the internal dynamics of the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad in the 11th and 12th centuries.—For more on the life and work of Abū Yaʿlā, see the following: *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 193-230 (which must be read with care given the apologetic stance of its author); *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 243-244; *Manāqib*, 520-521; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, II, 256; *Bidāya*, XII, 101; *Kāmil*, X, 52; *Shadharāt*, III, 306-307; *GAL*, I, 502; Suppl. I, 686; *EI*^{2}, III, 765-766; Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 232-234 (and index); and, above all, Abū Yaʿlā's *Muʿtamad*, edited and introduced by W. Haddad. For an interesting perspective on Abū Yaʿlā and the intellectual evolution of medieval Ḥanbalism, see Gimaret, "Théories de l'acte humain dans l'école ḥanbalite," *BEO*, 29 (1977), 157-178.

[236] ʿAlī b. ʿUbayd Allāh b. Naṣr b. as-Sarī Abū'l-Ḥasan b. Zāghūnī (d. 527/1132), a leading Ḥanbalī jurist (*Dhayl*, I, 180), who was also well-known as an expert in the science of *ḥadīth*, Quranic readings, Arabic grammar, philology and *waʿẓ* (the art of preaching). G. Makdisi refers to him, along with Ibn Ḥāmid and Abū Yaʿlā, as one of the seven most influential members of the school in the 5th/11th century (*Ibn ʿAqīl*, 227). Ibn Zāghūnī received his education in law under Yaʿqūb al-Barzabīnī (d. 486/1093), Abū Yaʿlā's leading student in this field. In the discipline of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *uṣūl ad-dīn*, Ibn Zāghūnī's intellectual roots can be traced back to Abū Yaʿlā and through him to Ibn Ḥāmid. Ibn Zāghūnī composed a number of works on *fiqh* and *ḥadīth*, and is known to have left behind an important collection of homilies (*waʿẓ*), not to mention a chronicle that covered the important years between 512 and 527 (1118-1132). The chronicle, highly regarded by contemporary scholars, was continued by Ibn Zāghūnī's student Ṣadaqa b. al-Ḥusayn (Ibn Athīr, *Kāmil*, XI, 449). For a full listing of his works (see Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 265-267; and *Dhayl*, I, 181). Of the three men whose views on the *ṣifāt* are criticized in *KAS*, Ibn Zāghūnī is the only one whom Ibn al-Jawzī knew personally. Ibn Zāghūnī was his very first teacher in the field of jurisprudence, and one of his earliest teachers in *ḥadīth* and *waʿẓ*. The two men remained close until Ibn Zāghūnī's death in 527 (cf., Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, *Mirʾāt*, 481); we can assume that Ibn al-Jawzī's analysis of Ibn Zāghūnī's position on the *ṣifāt* was not developed until later in his life. It is the personal relationship between the two men that helps to explain Ibn al-Jawzī's reticence in taking his former teacher to task in *KAS*. In contrast to Ibn Ḥāmid and Abū Yaʿlā, who are mentioned frequently in chaps. II and III,

as advocates of a method of interpretation that takes sense experience *(ʿalā'l-ḥissiyāt)* as its point of departure. I have come to the conclusion that a refutation of their views is essential if [the name of] Aḥmad is not to be associated with such notions. Indeed, my not speaking out on this question would imply my acceptance of their views.[237] This endeavor—a matter of great importance in the minds of many (*amr ʿaẓīm fī'n-nufūs*)[238]—does not daunt me, for action based on evidence *(dalīl)* and especially on the knowledge *(maʿrifa)* of God is a matter in relation to which *taqlīd* is not permissible.[239] Aḥmad was once asked a question [regarding a point of law], and in response composed a legal brief *(fatwā)*. Someone pointed out to him that the views which he had set forth [in his *fatwā*] did not accord with those of Ibn al-Mubārak, to which he responded: "The views of Ibn al-Mubārak did not come down from heaven."[240] Shāfiʿī once said: "I sought divine guidance in refuting the views of Mālik."[241]

38 Since these three men have written books [setting forth their views on

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and who are criticized severely, Ibn Zāghūnī is referred to only three times (§§52, 107 and 191), and Ibn al-Jawzī's comments are relatively mild—at least for Ibn al-Jawzī. Of the three references to Ibn Zāghūnī, two concern the question of God's sitting on the throne (§§52 and 191); the third (§106) deals with the question of God's foot. If the majority of his writings were jurisprudential in nature, Ibn Zāghūnī did write a theological treatise (*al-Īḍāḥ fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*) as well as a short work entitled *Taṣḥīḥ Ḥadīth al-Aṭīṭ*, which, according to Ibn Rajab, treated prophetic traditions pertaining to the question of God's *istiwāʾ ʿalā al-ʿarsh* (*Dhayl*, I, 181). Since Ibn Zāghūnī's works are lost, one can only speculate on those of his writings that Ibn al-Jawzī had in front of him when referring to the views of his former teacher, but there is a good chance that one of them was the *Taṣḥīḥ*. See the following notices for additional details on the life of this influential Ḥanbalī: *Muntaẓam*, X, 32; *Dhayl*, I, 180-184; *Shadharāt*, IV, 80-81; *Bidāya*, XII, 220; the *Mukhtaṣar* of Shaṭṭī, 32; and Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 265-267. For an interesting report on his early study of *ḥadīth* under Ibn Zāghūnī, see Ibn al-Jawzī's *Mashyakha*, 79-80 (cf., *Manāqib*, 529).

[237] See §245 where Ibn al-Jawzī charges certain fellow Ḥanbalīs with distorting the teaching of Aḥmad; there too he describes his own efforts, in *KAS*, as an attempt to counteract those distortions.

[238] Cf. §46 where the expression *amr ʿaẓīm* occurs; there it seems to imply a threatening or grave situation. In §47 the expression *amr shadīd* seems to have the same meaning.

[239] In other words, duty requires doing what is right (following one's conscience) regardless of what others think (cf. §245).

[240] Cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 329, 5-7.

[241] For more on the question of *taqlīd*, see §§18-22.

the divine attributes], and especially since the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] devoted a work to the discussion of scriptural texts *(aḥādīth)* [bearing on the matter of the attributes], I will discuss [these texts in the next two chapters] following the order of his treatment (*ʿalā tartībihi*),[242] beginning with the Quranic verses.

[242] From this it seems clear that the organization of chaps. II and III of *KAS* corresponds to the order followed by Abū Yaʿlā in his work, whose title is unfortunately not given either here nor elsewhere in *KAS*. In my view (and for reasons suggested in the note above on Abū Yaʿlā), the most likely candidate is Abū Yaʿlā's *Kitāb Ibṭāl at-Taʾwīlāt li-Akhbār aṣ-Ṣifāt*, or perhaps its abridgment *Mukhtaṣar Ibṭāl at-Taʾwīlāt*. It is undoubtedly this work or its abridgement that Ibn Athīr had in mind when he referred to a work by Abū Yaʿlā under the title *Kitāb aṣ-Ṣifāt* in connection with the events of 429 (*Kāmil*, IX, 460). If it is Abū Yaʿlā's *Kitāb Ibṭāl at-Taʾwīlāt* that Ibn al-Jawzī is referring to in the passage above, chaps. II and III of *KAS*, which quote Abū Yaʿlā frequently and sometimes at length, may be seen as preserving at least a portion of this lost work and, in doing so, these chapters provide additional information on the views of Abū Yaʿlā—that is, above and beyond those found in the *Muʿtamad*, which was clearly written for professional theologians. It would appear that the information on Abū Yaʿlā in *KAS* reflects views that were designed for a less sophisticated audience. If that is the case, *KAS* may help us fill out the larger picture of Abū Yaʿlā's thought.

[CHAPTER TWO]

[fol. 11b] QURANIC VERSES RELATING TO THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

[The First Text][1]

39 [The Quran states that] "The face of your Lord will endure [forever]."[2] Those knowledgeable in the interpretation of the Quran construe this verse to mean: your Lord will endure [forever].[3] In like fashion they interpret the verse "They desire His face"[4] to mean: they desire *Him*. Ḍaḥḥāk[5] and Abū

[1] As will be seen, chapter II is a discussion of a series of expressions or texts from the Quran that were apparently used by the "*mujassima*" of the Ḥanbalī school to justify anthropomorphic representations of God. Ibn al-Jawzī aims to show here that if these texts and expressions are properly understood they are perfectly compatible with the view that God is beyond our categories of place, time and form.

[2] S. 55: 27.

[3] See *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 114 where the same explanation is given (cf., Raḍī, *Talkhīṣ al-Bayān fī Majāzāt al-Qurʾān*, 321, 10, where "face" is interpreted as follows: المراد: وتبقى ذاتُ ربّك وحقيقتُه ([to say that His face will endure] means that the essence of your Lord and His reality will endure [forever]). The early Muʿtazilī theologian, Abū'l-Hudhayl, advocated a position that was close to the one which Ibn al-Jawzī defends here: كان يقول [أبو الهذيل]: لله وجه هو هو فوجهه هو هو ونفسه هي هو ([Abū'l-Hudhayl] used to say: "God has a 'face' which is He Himself; His face is He Himself and His *nafs* is He Himself" [*Maqālāt*, 165, 11-12; cf., 484, 5-7]). While some of the details of Ibn al-Jawzī's position on the divine attributes are not always clear, on the question of the relationship between the attributes and the divine essence his position is quite clear and appears to be basically Muʿtazilī. On other facets of the question of the attributes, however, his position seems closer to the Ashʿarī view. His insistence on a clear distinction between the *ṣifāt* and the *awṣāf* is essentially Ashʿarī. Taken as a whole, Ibn al-Jawzī's position on the attributes appears to be a synthesis of Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī views—which leads one to suspect that in matters of theology, at least, he was something of an electic. For a somewhat fuller discussion of the question of God's "face" from an Ashʿarī perspective, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 301-312; cf., also Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 10-18.

[4] S. 30: 39.

[5] Most likely Ḍaḥḥāk b. Muzāḥim al-Hilālī (d. 105/723), who is said to have transmitted

ʿUbayda[6] take the verse "Everything will be destroyed except His face"[7] to mean that everything but God Himself will be destroyed.[8]

We reject the view of those who assert that the term "face" [in these texts]

exegetical traditions on the authority of a number of Companions, among them Ibn ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās, Abū Hurayra, and Anas b. Mālik. Ḍaḥḥāk is cited twice in *KAS*: here and again in §210, where he is mentioned in connection with the question of the *kursī*. Aḥmad is said to have respected him as an exegete (*Shadharāt*, I, 124-125). For additional information on him and a list of sources, see *GAS*, I, 29-30.

[6] Maʿmar b. al-Muthannā Abū ʿUbayda al-Baṣrī (d. 209/824), a distinguished grammarian, philologist, and literary critic who belonged to the Sufrīya branch of the Khawārij. Among Abū ʿUbayda's many works, his *Majāz al-Qurʾān* is the one for which he is best known; it is undoubtedly this work that lies behind Ibn al-Jawzī's reference above (see *Majāz al-Qurʾān* [Cairo 1381/1962], II, 112, line 6ff.). Although Ibn al-Jawzī cites Abū ʿUbayda only twice in *KAS* (here and again in §46, where he refers to his interpretation of the term *sāq* with approval), it is clear from Ibn al-Jawzī's published works (especially his *Zād al-Masīr fī ʿIlm at-Tafsīr*) that he was well acquainted with *Majāz al-Qurʾān* and undoubtedly other works by him. For an overview of his life and work, see the article by Gibb in *EI*^{2} (I, 158); for a full list of sources on Abū ʿUbayda as well as an account of his writings, see *GAS*, VIII, 67-71, and IX, 65-77.—Since the publication of Gibb's article, a number of important studies have appeared in which Abū ʿUbayda's understanding of language and the question of *majāz* have been treated at some length. See especially the following: J. Wansbrough, "*Majāz al-Qurʾān:* Periphrastic Exegesis," *BSOAS*, 33 (1970), 247-266; E. Almagor, "The Early Meaning of *Majāz* and the Nature of Abū ʿUbayda's Exegesis," in *Studia Orientalia Memoriae D. H. Baneth Dedicata* (Jerusalem 1979), 307-326; and the seminal study by W. Heinrichs, "On the Genesis of the *Ḥaqīqa-Majāz* Dichotomy," *SI*, 59 (1984), 111-140. Heinrichs places Abū ʿUbayda's *Majāz al-Qurʾān* in a somewhat larger historical context and demonstrates quite conclusively that for Abū ʿUbayda the term *majāz* had not yet come to mean "metaphorical" interpretation in opposition to *ḥaqīqa* or non-tropical interpretation. For Heinrichs, the dichotomy between *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*, which looms so large in later exegetical theory, most likely dates from the early 10th century.

[7] S. 28: 88.

[8] Abū ʿUbayda, *Majāz al-Qurʾān*, II (Cairo 1381/1962), 112, line 6ff. Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VI, 251-252, where two possible interpretations are given: 1) that the term "face" is to be understood metaphorically as referring to God himself (attributed to Ḍaḥḥāk and Abū ʿUbayda), and 2) that the term is to be interpreted literally (a view ascribed to Ibn ʿAbbās). Ṭabarī (*Tafsīr* [Cairo 1328/1910], X, pt. 20, 81-82) mentions the same two positions but without linking them to the names of specific authorities. Zamakhsharī in his *Kashshāf* (III, 194) explains the expression إلا وجهه as meaning إلا إيّاه, and then adds: والوجه يُعبَّر به عن الذات ("Face" is [an expression] meaning the divine essence itself). Ibn Qutayba supports a metaphorical interpretation of the term (*Taʾwīl Mushkil al-Qurʾān* [Cairo 1373/1954], 198, 366), as does Ibn ʿAqīl (*al-Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* [Beirut/Stuttgart, 1996], I, 94: المراد به إلا هو).

refers to a specific qualification (*ism*) added to the divine essence (*zāʾid ʿalā ʾdh-dhāt*).[9] On what authority do they assert this to be so? The only evidence for this view is derived from sense experience; [but taking this latter as one's point of departure] would mean that God is a composite being (*tabʿīḍ*). If what they claim were true it would mean that God Himself (*dhātahu*) will be destroyed and that only His face will endure. Ibn Ḥāmid writes: "We affirm that God has a face; it is not permissible, however, to assert that He possesses a head." I was shocked at the audacity of such a statement. To be guilty of anthropomorphism [in his view] one has to assert that God has a head.[10]

[The Second Text]

40 In the same category are the following verses: "...in order that you might be reared under My (watchful) eyes,"[11] and "build an ark under Our eyes."[12] The expression "under Our eyes" is taken by [some] exegetes to mean "under or by Our command (*amr*)," and by others to mean "under Our oversight (*marʾan minnā*)."[13] Abū Bakr b. al-Anbārī[14] pointed out that

[9] That is, an *ism* that is separate from the divine essence. This would appear to be the meaning of "added to." Abū Yaʿlā clearly endorses this point of view in the *Muʿtamad* (p. 51 [§85]): وقد وصف نفسه سبحانه بالوجه...وليس بجارحة، وهو صفة زائدة على ذاته خلافًا للمجسّمة في قولهم ان وجه اللّه جارحة مخصوصة كوجه الواحد منّا، وخلافًا للمعتزلة وجماعة من الأشعريّة ان وجهه ذاته. (He has described Himself as having a face...but not in the sense of a bodily member; it is [rather] an attribute added to his essence in contrast to the *mujassima* [corporealists] who say that the face of God is a bodily member like our face, and in contrast to the Muʿtazila and a group of Ashʿarīs who maintain that His face is His essence). On the question of God's "face," Ibn al-Jawzī does not hesitate to identify himself with a position that Abū Yaʿlā qualifies as Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite.

[10] According to Ibn Ḥāmid (so Ibn al-Jawzī claims), anything less than this does not qualify as *tashbīh*.

[11] S. 20: 39.

[12] S. 11: 37. Cf., 23: 27.

[13] Cf., *Talkhīṣ*, 224-225.

[14] Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim Abū Bakr b. al-Anbārī (d. 328/940), a leading representative of the Kufan school of grammar and lexicography. He wrote a number of important works on Quranic philology and exegesis, and it is likely that one of these was the source of Ibn al-Jawzī's reference above. Cf., also *KAS*, §120 where Ibn al-Anbārī's views are cited in

among the Arabs the plural [pronoun] is sometimes used even when the referent is singular; hence, one may say: "We travelled to Basra" [when one really means "I travelled to Basra"].[15] This use of the plural derives from the practice of kings who are in the habit of saying "our command" or "our prohibition." The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] maintained that "eye" is an attribute added to the divine essence (*zāʾida ʿalāʾdh-dhāt*).[16] Already before him Abū Bakr b. Khuzayma[17] said, in connection with the above verses: "Our Lord

connection with the term *kanaf* (side). For a survey of his writings as well as a brief biographical sketch, see *GAS*, IX, 144-147 (cf., Brockelmann, *EI*², I 485).

[15] See *Zād al-Masīr*, IV, 100-101, where the same linguistic explanation is ascribed to Ibn al-Anbārī, but in slightly different wording. In his "The Genesis of the *Ḥaqīqa-Majāz* Dichotomy" (*SI*, 59 [1984], 116-117 and 140), Heinrichs points out that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal may well have been one of the first, if not the first, among "the great school-founders" to make use of the term *majāz* and precisely in connection with the Quranic use of the first person plural pronoun to express the singular.

[16] Cf., *DST*, 11, and *BA*, 43, where the same reading is found. In the *Muʿtamad* (51, 1-4 [§84]) however, Abū Yaʿlā states his position as follows: وقد وصف نفسه بالعينين...وهما صفتان زائدتان على البصر والرؤية وليستا بجارحتين، خلافًا للمجسّمة في قولهم انّهما جارحتان مبنيّتان كبنية الواحد منّا، وخلافًا للمعتزلة وجماعة من الأشعريّة في قولهم: ليستا بصفتين زائدتين على الرؤية والبصر (He has described Himself as having two eyes which are two attributes added to [the attribute(s)] of sight and vision, but not in the sense of corporeal entities—this in contrast to the *mujassima* (corporealists) who say that [the two eyes] are actually two bodily members fashioned in their make-up like [the eyes] of one of us—and in contrast to the Muʿtazila and a group of Ashʿarīs who say that [the two eyes] are not attributes added to vision and sight.). This text raises an interesting question; assuming that the reading على البصر والرؤية is correct, does Abū Yaʿlā intend it to be taken here as an equivalent of على ذاته? Or does he really mean to suggest that one attribute can be added to another?

[17] Muḥammad b. Isḥāq b. Khuzayma b. al-Mughīra Abū Bakr an-Nīsābūrī (223-311/833-924), a Shāfiʿite traditionist noted for his opposition to *kalām*. His *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd wa Ithbāt ar-Rabb*, on which his reputation rested, was essentially a *ḥadīth*-based approach to the question of the divine attributes. The *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd*, as G. Makdisi points out (*Ibn ʿAqīl*, 337-340), was an influential text within Ḥanbalī-traditionalist circles in Baghdad during much of the 11th century. The work formed part of the arsenal used to combat Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī influences in Baghdad, and, undoubtedly, also in other centers where the traditionalist movement was active. Ibn al-Jawzī, who knew the work well and who cites it repeatedly in *KAS*, was generally critical of the work. For him it represented a point of view that was insufficiently sensitive to the anthropomorphist implications of a literalist interpretation of the *akhbār aṣ-ṣifat*.—In addition to the lengthy notice on Ibn Khuzayma in the *Muntaẓam* (VI, 184-186), see also Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt*, III, 109-113; *Bidāya*, XI, 149; and *Shadharāt*, II, 262-263. For a more complete list of sources on him, and a survey of his

has two eyes by which He sees."[18] Ibn Ḥāmid[19] said: "We must believe that God has two eyes." This view, however, is an innovation for which there is no justification in scripture. [Champions of this view] attribute two eyes to God only through a kind of inferential reason (*dalīl al-khiṭāb*)[20] based on the Prophet's statement: "He is not one-eyed."[21] These words, however, were meant only to deny that imperfection of any sort can be ascribed to God. Since it has been established that God is not a composite being, it is not to be supposed that a literal face [with two eyes] is **[fol.12a]** among the divine attributes.

[The Third Text]

41 Among the verses [used by anthropomorphists in support of their position] is the expression: "...to him whom I created with My two hands."[22] In literary usage, however, the word "hand" is [frequently] taken to mean favor (*niʿma*) or act of kindness (*iḥsān*), as the poet has said:

extant writings, see *GAS*, I, 601 (cf., also *GAL*, I, 193; and Suppl. I, 345).

[18] Although the wording is somewhat different, Ibn al-Jawzī may have in mind the following passage in Ibn Khuzayma's *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd* (p. 50, line 1ff.): نحن نقول: لربّنا الخالق عينان يبصر بهما ما تحت الثرى وتحت الأرض السابعة السفلى وما في السموات العلى وما بينهما من صغير وكبير.... (We hold that our Lord, the Creator, has two eyes by which he sees what is under the ground and what is beneath the seventh and lowest earth as well as what is in the highest heaven and [everything] between the two whether small or great).

[19] See notes to §14.

[20] Cf., *KAS*, §219, where *dalīl al-khiṭāb* is used in a similar context. For a discussion of the technical meaning of this expression and its use in medieval jurisprudence and theology, see the notes to §219.

[21] See §§217-219 where this tradition is cited by Ibn al-Jawzī and discussed at some length. The tradition on the Antichrist as a one-eyed creature occurs frequently in the standard medieval collections of prophetic traditions and with numerous variations. Among the more commonly cited forms of this tradition are the following: Bukhārī, *fitan*, 26; and Muslim, *fitan*, 101. See also Bukhārī, *jihād*,178; *anbiyāʾ*, 3; *adab*, 77; Muslim, *fitan*, 95; Abū Dāwūd, *malāḥim* 26; Tirmidhī, *fitan*, 56, 62; Ibn Māja, *fitan*, 33; *Musnad*, I, 228, 250, 333; II, 27, 149; and VI, 140. For a discussion of the theological significance of this saying, see Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 43-44; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 312-313; and *Muʿtamad*, §84.

[22] S. 38: 75. The full verse reads: "[God] said: 'O Iblīs, what prevents you from prostrating yourself before what (or 'before him whom') I have created with my two hands.'"

Whenever you quietly bring your petition to the gate of the Banū Hishām
and in hope await their response,
You will surely meet with the hands of their bounty (*fawāḍil*).

42 The words "Surely God's hand is fettered,"[23] a Jewish adage cited in the Quran, refers to God's withholding of largesse (*nafaqa*).[24] But the term "hand" may also sometimes convey the notion of power (*quwwa*), and so people will say: "We have no *hand* in this matter." It is in this sense that ʿUrwa b. Ḥizām[25] used the word in one of his poems.[26] In the Quranic verse "Nay, but His hands are outstretched,"[27] [said in response to the Jews], the expression "hands" connotes both favor (*niʿma*) and power (*qudra*); hence, in the verse "what I created with my hands," [the expression "with My hands"] means with My *power* and My *favor*.[28] Commenting on the verse "the hand of God is above their hands,"[29] Ḥasan [al-Baṣrī] said: "The term 'hand' means the blessing (*minna*) or kindness (*iḥsān*) of God." These are the words of Ḥasan himself![30] The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] maintained, however, that the expression "two hands" [when applied to God] refers to two essential attributes (*ṣifatāni dhātīyatāni*); it is these latter that are designated by the expression "two hands."[31] This is an arbitrary interpretation based on personal

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[23] S. 5: 63

[24] Abū ʿUbayda, *Majāz al-Qurʾān*, I, 170, line 10, glosses the verse as follows: أي خير الله ممسك (cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 392-393).

[25] ʿUrwa b. Ḥizām b. Muhājir (who died in the Rāshidūn or early Umayyad periods) was one of the so-called *ʿUdhrī* poets. For sources on ʿUrwa and his poetry, see *GAS*, II, 264-265 (cf. *GAL*, Suppl., I, 81-82; and Blachère, *Histoire de la littérature arabe*, II, 303 and index).

[26] Ibn al-Jawzī cites a line of ʿUrwa's poetry in *DST* (12) in which the term "hands" is used metaphorically. The line reads: فقالا شَفاك اللّهُ واللّه ما لَنا بما ضُمِّنَتْ منك الضُلوعُ يدان (for variant readings, see *Shiʿr ʿUrwa b. Ḥizām* [Baghdad 1961], 15). This may well be the line alluded to in *KAS*.

[27] S. 5: 64.

[28] On the use of the term "hands" to express the double sense of power and favor, see Raḍī, *Talkhīṣ*, 276, 1ff.

[29] S. 48: 10.

[30] Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 427-428, where this interpretation is mentioned but without reference to Ḥasan.

[31] In the *Muʿtamad* (p. 52, 13-18[§86]) Abū Yaʿlā states his position as follows: وقد

opinion (*raʾy*); there is no [textual or rational] support for it. Ibn ʿAqīl said: "The verse 'to him whom I created [with My two hands]'[32] means 'what I Myself created.' Thus also the verse 'This is that which your hands have sent ahead'[33] clearly means that which *you* have sent ahead.[34] Someone rather imprudently once said:[35] 'Had no special distinction been conferred on Adam over the animals through his having been created by [God's] hand— taken as a divine attribute—[God] would not have set him apart by mentioning [His hands in connection with Adam's creation], and so he said: "By My hands." Had God meant power (*qudra*) [when he used the term hands], no special rank would have been conferred [on Adam, for power was manifest in the creation of all things].'"

[Ibn ʿAqīl continued:] "If those [who advocate this view] should insist that the power expressed in creation does not itself confer praise, so that God added the expression 'by My hands' [to make the point clear], our response is that when an Arab says 'I have no *hands* in this matter,' he means that he has no *power* (*qudra*) over it. [When literalists] say: 'The advantage [conferred on Adam] does not reside in the act of creation as such [but in the fact that it was accomplished by God's hands],' our response is that when God said: 'We have created cattle for them of what We have made with Our hands,'[36] He did not mean to imply that cattle enjoy a

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وصف نفسه سبحانه باليدين...وليست بجارحتين ولا بمعنى النعمة ولا بمعنى القدرة، بل هي صفة ذاتيّة خلافًا للمجسّمة في قولهم أنّهما جارحتان، وخلافًا للمعتزلة في قولهم وجماعة من الأشعريّة أنّهما نعمة وقدرة. (He has described Himself as having two hands but not in the sense of corporeal entities nor in the sense of favor or power; rather they are an essential attribute in contrast to the *mujassima* (corporealists) who maintain that they are bodily members, and in contrast to the Muʿtazila and certain Ashʿarīs who insist that they are to be construed in the sense of favor and power).

[32] S. 38: 75.

[33] S. 22: 10.

[34] Ibn al-Jawzī's conclusion seems to be that the term "hand" may have multiple connotations (most of which are metaphorical), and that it is the context that finally determines the precise meaning of the term. To be sure, the importance of context is nowhere stated explicitly by Ibn al-Jawzī, but it is clearly implied in his discussion, and is apparent in his approach to exegetical questions.

[35] The version of this passage as it appears in *DST* (12, line 12f.) indicates fairly clearly that the person referred to here is none other than Abū Yaʿlā himself.

[36] S. 36: 71.

special status over other animals.[37] Indeed, the mere fact of God's having ascribed a quality [to Adam] is sufficient by itself to confer superiority. The *ʿulamāʾ* have said that the term 'hands' means power (*quwwa*) in the verse: 'We constructed the heavens with Our hands'."[38]

43 [God] states [in the Quran] that He breathed into [Adam] His spirit (*rūḥ*);[39] however, this reference [to God's breathing into Adam His *rūḥ*] simply means that He brought Adam into existence through **[fol.12b]** an act of origination (*takwīn*), and so the words ["I breathed into him My *rūḥ*"] mean "I breathed" [construed as a metaphor for the act of creation].[40] The [mere] attribution (*iḍāfa*) [of the term *rūḥ* to himself] is sufficient in and of itself to confer a special distinction [on Adam].[41] More than that is inappropriate to the Creator, for His actions are not dependent on means [for their actualization], seeing that He possesses neither bodily members or organs through which to act. Indeed, He is self-sufficient in and of Himself (*bi-dhātihi*). It is not fitting that one should occupy himself in seeking to exalt

[37] Cf., *Talkhīṣ*, 2275-275.

[38] S. 51: 47. See *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 40, where Ibn al-Jawzī specifically mentions the following authorities as having supported this interpretation: "Ibn ʿAbbās, Mujāhid, Qatāda, and the other exegetes and philologists."

[39] An allusion to S. 15: 29 which reads: "When I formed [Adam] and breathed into him my spirit (*rūḥī*)...." Cf., also 32: 9. On the various uses of the term *rūḥ* and its interpretation, see the interesting summary in Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl Mushkil al-Qurʾān*, 370-372. Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth*, 227-228, 145-149; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 361-368. For a summary discussion of Quranic uses of the term *rūḥ*, see the article "*Nafs*," *EI*^{2}, VII, 880.

[40] The argument here is directed against the view that *rūḥ* is a separate hypostatic entity in God which he imparted to Adam at creation. Such a view is problematic, in Ibn al-Jawzī's view, for at least two reasons: 1) it undermines the notion of God's absolute unity (*tawḥīd*), and 2) it implies that God is dependent on means other than His *dhāt* or essential being for the actualization of His will.

[41] Since, in the words of the verse, it is His *rūḥ* that He imparts to Adam. For Ibn al-Jawzī it is critical that the term *rūḥ* be taken as a metaphor. In his commentary on 15: 29, Ibn al-Jawzī explains at greater length his understanding of the reference to "my *rūḥ*": هذه الروح هي التي يحيا بها الإنسان ولا تُعلَم ماهيّتُها وإنّما أضافها إليه تشريفًا لآدم، وهذه إضافة ملك. وإنّما سُمّي إجراءُ الروح فيه نفخًا لأنّها جرت في بدنه على مثل جري الريح فيه ([Although] the *rūḥ* is that by which human beings live, its quiddity or essence is unknown; [God] attributed it to Himself primarily for the purpose of conferring distinction on Adam, for it entails the attribution of a quality. The moving of the *rūḥ* in him [Adam] is referred to as a "blowing" [or breathing] only because it moves in his body like the moving of wind). (*Zād al-Masīr*, IV, 400, 13-15).

Adam[42] while at the same time neglecting to grant the Creator the high honor which He deserves, an honor which can (only) be rendered by denying that He is a composite being (*abʿāḍ*) or that He follows the natural course of things (*ʿādāt*)[43] in His actions, for these are qualities peculiar to finite bodies (*ajsām*). Some simple-minded persons have gone so far as to imagine that God actually touched the clay out of which He formed Adam with His hand—a hand which they regard as one of the attributes of the divine essence. What they understand is that the totality of created things consists of separate bodies and that one [body] attracts another and acts through it as, for example, sorcerers who tie knots so as to alter a condition or a quality. Do you suppose that God causes the actions of persons and bodies to influence [other] bodies (*ajsām*) separated by a distance, but that, in the case of His own actions, He required the assistance of the clay? Those who hold this view are contradicted by the verse: "Jesus in God's eyes is like Adam whom He created from dust simply by saying to him: 'Be!' and he was."[44]

[The Fourth Text]

44 [On the question of the *nafs* (soul)] the Quran says: "God warns you that you beware of His soul (*nafsahu*)."[45] In another verse Jesus is reported as saying [to God]: "You know what is in my soul (*fī nafsī*) but I know not what is in Your soul (*fī nafsika*)."[46] According to [some] exegetes, the first verse means: "God warns you that you beware of *Him*,"[47] and the second: "You know what is within me (*mā ʿindī*) but I do not know what is within you (*mā ʿindaka*)."[48] The most reliable experts have said that *nafs* in these

[42] By implying that he shares in the divine substance as the recepient of God's spirit.

[43] The reference here seems to be to acting through the instrumentality of means, the established pattern or "custom" (*ʿāda*) for all actions carried out by finite creatures.

[44] S. 3: 59.

[45] S. 3: 28.

[46] S. 5: 116.

[47] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil al-Ḥadīth*, 320, line 7, where this is given as one of two possible interpretations.

[48] In *Zād al-Masīr* (II, 464) Ibn al-Jawzī, following the Muʿtazilī grammarian Abū Isḥāq az-Zajjāj, glosses this expression as follows: تعلم ما أضمره ولا أعلم ما عندك علمُه، التأويل: تعلم ما أعلم وأنا لا أعلم ما تعلم (You know what I conceal, but I do not know what

texts mean "essence," the *nafs* of something being its essence (*dhāt*).[49]—The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā], on the other hand, held that God's *nafs* is an attribute over and above His essence (*zāʾida ʿalā dhātihi*).[50] But this view is derivative of an anthropomorphist perspective, for it assumes that [God's] essence is a "thing" (*shayʾ*) and that [His] *nafs* is something distinct from it. The view advanced by Ibn Ḥāmid is even more objectionable! He stated: "Regarding the verse: 'I breathed into him My spirit (*rūḥī*),'[51] some [Ḥanbalīs][52] hold that spirit (*rūḥ*) is an attribute of essence (*ṣifa min dhātihi*) and that when it leaves [a person at the time of death] it returns to God." Such a view is even more repugnant than what **[fol.13a]** Christians teach. This man spared nothing in his advocacy of an anthropomorphist point of view (*tashbīh*)![53]

[The Fifth Text]

45 Another text [that has been the subject of debate] is the verse: "Nothing resembles His 'likeness' (*ka-mithlihi*)."[54] These words, taken in their literal sense (*ẓāhir*), would indicate that [God] has a likeness (*mithl*): nothing is like His "likeness" and [His "likeness"] is like nothing else. According to the lexicographers, however, a *mithl* designates nothing other than the thing

you know, which is to say, you know what I know, but I do not know what you know). See Raḍī, *Talkhīṣ* (135, 14ff.) where the same interpretation is offered and in much the same language. Raḍī, however, does not hesitate to call the term *nafs*, as used in the verse, an instance of *istiʿāra* (tropical language).

[49] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Muskhil al-Ḥadīth*, 319, 13-15; and al-Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 286, 6ff., where *nafs* is construed as the equivalent of *dhāt*.

[50] I have found nothing in the *Muʿtamad* that corresponds to the position here attributed to Abū Yaʿlā. Indeed, in the chapter of the *Muʿtamad* (44-72) devoted to a discussion of the divine attributes, no mention is made of the *nafs*. Most likely Ibn al-Jawzī is referring here to a statement from Abū Yaʿlā's work on the divine attributes which is presumed lost.

[51] S. 15: 29.

[52] Cf., a parallel text in *DST*, 19, line 1, where the Arabic reads: طائفة من أصحابنا (a group of our associates). An examination of the context of the expression أصحابنا (our associates) in both *DST* and *KAS* indicates that it is used invariably by Ibn al-Jawzī as a reference to Ḥanbalīs.

[53] Cf., last sentence of §56 where, apart from the use of *tajsīm*, an identical construction occurs and where again the subject is Ibn Ḥāmid.

[54] S. 43: 11.

(or being) itself.[55] Thus it is said: "One like me should not speak to one like you."[56] The only possible meaning of the text is that there is nothing like [God].

[The Sixth Text]

46 Among the texts [that have figured in the discussion of the divine attributes] is the following verse: "On the day when a leg is laid bare."[57] Ibn ʿAbbās, Mujāhid, Ibrāhīm an-Nakhaʿī, Qatāda, and the majority of *ʿulamāʾ* interpret this verse to mean: [On a day when] a grave or serious matter (*shidda*) is brought to light.[58] In support of this interpretation [of the term *sāq*], they cite the following lines of poetry: "The battle bared its leg (*sāq*) to us,"[59] and "the battle tucked up its garment, laying bare its leg (*sāq*)" [meaning that the battle became intense or vehement].[60] Ibn Qutayba

[55] Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 276, where Ibn Qutayba is quoted in support of this interpretation.

[56] Literally, "the likeness of me (*mithlī*) should not speak to the likeness of you (*mithlaka*)." For parallel passages, see Ibn Qutayba's *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, 275 (cf., Lecomte, *Le traité des divergences du Ḥadīṯ* [Damascus 1962], 243); and al-Bayhaqī's *Asmāʾ*, 277. The argument developed by Ibn al-Jawzī above follows closely the views found in Ibn Qutayba and al-Bayhaqī. The point made by both authors is that the *mithl* of a person or thing is none other than the person or thing itself. In like fashion God's *mithl* is none other than God himself. What Ibn al-Jawzī wishes to avoid is any suggestion that God has a *mithl* that is distinct from his essence. Presumably there were Ḥanbalīs or other traditionalists who insisted on such a distinction, otherwise his comments would have been purely academic. It is interesting, however, that Ibn al-Jawzī makes no mention here of Ibn Ḥāmid, Abū Yaʿlā or Ibn Zāghūnī—the usual targets of his criticism in *KAS*.

[57] S. 68: 42. The full verse reads: "On the day when a leg is laid bare, and they will be called to prostrate themselves but will not be able."

[58] Zamakhsharī, who takes the unveiling mentioned in this verse as a reference to the final judgment, reflects the standard interpretation found in the medieval commentaries (*Kashshāf*, IV, 147; cf., al-Farrāʾ, *Maʿānīʾl-Qurʿān*, III [Cairo 1972], 17; al-Juwaynī, *al-Irshād* (Cairo 1950), 159; and *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 341). This assumption runs through the whole of Ibn al-Jawzī's exegesis of the verse and is the background of much of the discussion above (§§46-48).

[59] A hemistich that is cited frequently in medieval lexical and exegetical works. I have not been able so far to identify the original source of this fragment.

[60] This hemistich is from one of the poems of Jarīr; for the full text of the poem, see Muḥammad Ismāʿīl aṣ-Ṣawī, *Sharḥ Dīwān Jarīr* (Cairo 1353/1934), 241; and the *Dīwān Jarīr*, ed. Nuʿmān Amīn (Cairo 1969-1971), I, 470.

writes: "The underlying idea behind [the expression 'baring the leg'] derives from its application to a person who, faced with a grave situation (*amr ʿaẓīm*),[61] has to exert himself to the utmost. Thus, [in a manner of speaking] he tucked up his garment, baring his leg. In effect, the word *sāq* [used in this way] was borrowed from idiomatic usage common among Arabs (*fa'stuʿīrat*) and employed [as a metaphor] in place of the word *shidda*."[62] This was also the view of al-Farrāʾ,[63] Abū ʿUbayda,[64] Thaʿlab,[65] and the lexicographers generally.

47 Bukhārī and Muslim report in their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs* that the Prophet said: "God the most high will bare (*yakshifu*) His leg (*sāq*)."[66] Here the

[61] Cf., §37 where the expression *amr ʿaẓīm* is used. Cf., the expression *amr shadīd* used in §47, which appears to be a synonym.

[62] For the full Arabic text of Ibn Qutayba's commentary on this verse, see *Taʾwīl Mushkil al-Qurʾān*, p. 103, line 11 ff. It is interesting that Ibn Qutayba takes up a discussion of the term *sāq* (in relation to the above verse) in a chapter devoted to a discussion of the "metaphor" or *istiʿāra*. Indeed, this verse is the very first example of *istiʿāra* cited by Ibn Qutayba. At the beginning of the chapter (p. 102, lines 2-3) he defines *istiʿāra* as follows: فالعرب تستعير الكلمة فتضعها مكان الكلمة إذا كان المسمّى بها بسبب من الأخرى أو مجاوراً لها أو مشاكلا (the Arabs borrow one word and put it in the place of another provided that the thing named [i.e., the word borrowed] is instrumental, or adjacent or similar to the other one [cf., Heinrichs, *The Hand of the Northwind* [Wiesbaden 1977], 30]). For a fuller analysis of Ibn Qutayba's definition and its significance for medieval Arabic literary theory, see the above study by Heinrichs. An explanation similar to the one offered by Ibn Qutayba is found in Raḍī's, *Talkhīṣ*, 341-342. In general the latter represented a Muʿtazilī point of view.

[63] Cf., his *Maʿānīʾl-Qurʾān* (Cairo 1972), vol. III, 177, 11, where after noting a variant reading of كشف, al-Farrāʾ adds the following comment: يريد القيامة والساعة لشدّتها. Yaḥyā b. Ziyād Abū Zakarīyāʾ al-Farrāʾ (d. 207/822) was a prominent grammarian of the Kufan "school" whose writings reflect Muʿtazilī influences. For more on al-Farrāʾ, see the article by R. Blachère in *EI*², II, 806-08; *GAS*, VIII, 123-125; and IX, 131-134, for a list of his extant writings.

[64] In his *Majāz al-Qurʾān*, II, 266, Abū ʿUbayda glosses the term as follows: إذا اشتدّ الحرب والأمر قيل: قد كشف الأمر عن ساقه (When the battle or an affair becomes intense, people say: "the affair has laid bare its leg"). For more on Abū ʿUbayda, see notes to §38.

[65] Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā Abūʾl-ʿAbbās Thaʿlab (d. 291/904), also a member of the Kufan "school" of grammar. For his comments on how the term *sāq* is to be construed in 68:42, see his *Majālis*, II, 11.

[66] Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *tawḥīd*, 2; *tafsīr*, 68, 2; and Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *īmām*, 302 (cf., also *Musnad*, III, 17). In each case the tradition is traced back to Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī.

term [*sāq*] is explicitly applied to God and the saying means: He will manifest (*yakshifu*) His power or might (*shidda*). What is predicated of God are His actions. The expression "He will bare it" means: He will remove [what conceals it]. ʿĀṣim b. Kulayb[67] said: "I saw that Saʿīd b. Jubayr had become angry, and [people] were saying: 'He is baring His leg.' Here [in contrast to the tradition from the two *Ṣaḥīḥs*] the expression refers to a grave or difficult situation (*amr shadīd*) [facing Saʿīd]." Abū ʿAmr az-Zāhid,[68] however, noted that the term "leg'" [construed metaphorically] may sometimes be used to refer to the person himself. It was in this sense that ʿAlī—may God show him honor—used the term in connection with the Khārijites. When the latter said: "[We will accept] no judgment but God's," ʿAlī responded: "I have no choice but to go to war against them even if my leg (*sāqī*) is destroyed."[69]According to this, [the tradition cited by Bukhārī and Muslim] may be taken to mean that [God] will manifest *Himself* (*tajallī*) to them. In a tradition reported by Abū Mūsā, the Prophet said: "[God] will remove the veil [surrounding Him], and they will see Him and prostrate themselves before Him. Some people, however, will remain [standing] as though **[fol.13b]** cattle's horns (*ṣayāṣī*)[70] were put to their backs; they will wish to prostrate themselves [before Him] but will be unable to do so." [71]

[67] ʿĀṣim b. Kulayb b. Shihāb al-Jarmī al-Kūfī (137/754), whom Ibn Maʿīn and Nasāʾī declared to be a reliable transmitter (Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 341).

[68] The reading of the name is uncertain. It appears twice in *KAS* (here and again in §111). If Abū ʿAmr is the correct reading, it is undoubtedly a question of Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Ḥamdān, the author of several works on the Quran and Arabic grammar, who died in 378/988 (cf., *GAS*, I, 204). However, in parallel passages in *DST*, 16; *BA*, 22a; *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 341; and al-Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 347, the name is given as Abū ʿUmar az-Zāhid, whose full name is Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. Abī Hāshim Abū ʿUmar al-Baghawī az-Zāhid. He was the author of a work on the *ḥadīth* (*Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*) and died in 345/956 (cf. *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, II, 356-35; and *al-Kāmil*, VIII, 517).

[69] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ* (347 and editor's note), where this tradition is cited in a slightly different form; the point made is the same, however. The reference to God's *sāq* is to be taken as referring to God himself.

[70] Some versions of this tradition use the term *safāfīd al-ḥadīd*, "curved prongs of iron" used to roast flesh (cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 341). But these are not to be taken literally, for Ibn al-Jawzī adds: they will not be able to prostrate themselves (as the end of the tradition reads) because "it is *as if* they had iron meat-hooks in their backs."

[71] The last part of this tradition is an allusion to the second half of S. 68:42. Although various versions of this tradition are to be found in the canonical collections, I have found none in which the text is traced back to Abū Mūsā.

48 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] maintained that "leg" (*sāq*) is an essential attribute (*ṣifa dhātīya*).[72] He made comments of a similar nature in connection with [the prophetic saying]: "[God] will place His foot (*qadam*) in Hell,"[73] and mentioned a tradition reported by Ibn Masʿūd in which the Prophet is alleged to have said: "[God] will lay bare His right leg and the earth will glow from the light of His leg."—Referring to "foot" and "leg" [as divine attributes] is anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*) pure and simple, and it is impossible to suppose that the statement quoted from Ibn Masʿūd is an authentic tradition. The divine attributes cannot be established on the basis of frivolous statements like these,[74] nor can the divine essence be described as rays of light by which particular places are illuminated. There is no justification for speaking [of God] in these terms, for when [it is said that] He bares His leg, [it means that] He manifests His strength or power *(shidda)*. Some people suppose that the expression "to lay [something] bare" (*yakshifu*) means "to make [that thing] manifest" (*yuzhiru*), whereas it has only [the negative] connotation of "removing" (*yuzīlu*, *yarfaʿu*) [something?].[75] Ibn Ḥāmid said:

[72] The position set forth in the *Muʿtamad* (53, 6-8) is somewhat different: وقد وصف نفسه سبحانه بالساق... وليس بجارحة ولا بمعنى الشدّة، بل صفة زائدة خلافًا للمعتزلة وللأشعريّة في نفي ذلك وحملوه على الشدّة. (...not in the sense of a corporeal entity or in the [metaphorical] sense of a grave matter (*shidda*); rather it is an additional attribute. This in contrast to the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿarīs who deny (that it is an attribute) and construe it as a trope for *shidda*). In the same paragraph he goes on to cite passages from the *ḥadīth* and the Quran to support his contention that *sāq* is a real attribute, though in what sense this is so is not explained other than that it is an attribute added to the divine essence. It is clear from §§37 and 38 that Ibn al-Jawzī's critique of Abū Yaʿlā in *KAS* is not concerned, for the most part, with the *Muʿtamad* but rather with views set forth in his more popular works. What is not clear on the basis of the sources available to us is whether the "anthropomorphist" views ascribed to Abū Yaʿlā above belonged to a particular period of Abū Yaʿlā's life or whether he held two positions: one for public consumption and another for the benefit of his fellow Ḥanbalī theologians. The style and content of the *Muʿtamad* suggest that it was meant for a fairly sophisticated circle of experts.

[73] These words or variations of them are found in a number of *ḥadīths* cited in the canonical collections: Muslim, *janna*, 37, 38; Bukhārī, *tafsīr al-qurʾān*, 50; *aymān*, 12; *tawḥīd*, 7; and Tirmidhi, *Janna*, 20.

[74] Literally, "*khurāfian* tales." The expression comes from a certain Khurāfa of the tribe of ʿUdhra who, according to legend, was carried off by the Jinn and later, following his return, related his experiences. "*Khurāfian* statements" are claims based on fantasy—fictitious, far-fetched, outrageous claims.

[75] The point may appear to be a rather technical one, for to remove something (i.e., a

"It is obligatory to believe that God possesses a leg (*sāq*) and that it is an attribute belonging to His essence (*ṣifa li-dhātihi*). Those who reject this view are infidels." If an uneducated person were to say such things it would be a serious offense; how much worse it is when the person in question claims to possess knowledge [of the sacred texts]! Indeed, those who interpret [such expressions] metaphorically (*mutaʾawwilūn*) have greater justification [for their approach] than he since they at least take [current] Arabic usage into consideration, whereas the former who assert that "leg" and "foot" are attributes belonging to the divine essence end up by ascribing corporeality (*tajsīm*) and a [finite] form (*ṣūra*) to God.

[The Seventh Text]

49 Among the texts [relating to the attributes] is the following verse: "Then [God] seated himself (*istawā*)[76] on the Throne (*ʿalā'l-ʿarsh*)" (7:54).[77] Khalīl b. Aḥmad[78] observed that a "throne" (*ʿarsh*) is an elevated seat (*sarīr*) which, when used by kings, is called an *ʿarsh*.[79] [He went on to point out] that the term was well known among the Arabs during the Jāhilīya as well as in [early] Islam. Umayya b. Abī'ṣ-Ṣalt said in one of his poems:

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cover) from something normally implies rendering it visible, i.e., making it manifest to the eye. What Ibn al-Jawzī apparently wishes to insist on here is that the verb *kashafa, yakshifu* can be used in a metaphorical or figurative sense, in which case it does not mean removing a literal cover from a thing.

[76] For other possible meanings of the verb *istawā*, see the discussion that follows.

[77] Cf., S. 10:30; 13:2; 25:59; 32:4; and 57:4.

[78] Khalīl b. Aḥmad b. ʿAmr b. Tamīm Abū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al-Azdi (d. ca 175/791), composer of the earliest lexicon of the Arabic language (*Kitāb al-ʿAyn*), and one of the principal teachers of Sībawayhī, author of the celebrated *Kitāb*. Khalīl was regarded by many as the founder of the Basran "school" of Arabic grammar, and he remained a major influence in philological studies for most of the medieval period. For more on his life and a list of his writings, see *GAS*, VIII, 51-56; and IX, 44-48 (cf., *GAL*, I, 98-99; Suppl. I, 159-160; and Suppl. III, 194). Sellheim's article on him (*EI*^{2}, IV, 962-964) provides a useful overview of his life and place within linguistic studies in early Islam. For Khalīl's specific contributions to the field of lexicograhy, see Haywood, *Arabic Lexicography*, ch. 3 (20-27). Sellheim makes the important point that Khalīl's interest in linguistic studies was initially sparked by his study of the Quran and the *ḥadīth*.

[79] For the source of this definition, see Khalīl's *Kitāb al-ʿAyn*, ed., ʿAbd Allāh Darwīsh (Baghdad, 1397/1967), 291, 7 (cf., *Lisān al-ʿArab*, IV, 313/1, 22ff.).

Praise God, the One Who is deserving of our praise,
Our Lord Who is great in the heavens.
By a supreme work which preceded mankind,
He established a Throne (*sarīr*) above the heavens,
A Throne which no human eye can reach.
Beneath it angels will be seen prostrating themselves.[80]

50 It should be noted that the term *istiwāʾ* [the verbal noun of *istawā*] has a variety of meanings in current Arabic usage. In one of its uses it is a synonym for *iʿtidāl* (meaning "even" or "equal").[81] This sense is expressed in a saying attributed to one of the Banū Tamīm: "The one who commits a wrong against a fellow tribesman and the person wronged are on a par with each other (*istawā*)," that is, the two of them are equal (*iʿtadalā*).[82] The term *istiwāʾ* may also mean the perfection or completion of something (*tamām ash-shayʾ*). Thus, the Quran says: "[Moses] achieved his full strength and reached maturity (*istawā*),"[83] meaning that he became an adult. **[fol.14a]** The term *istiwāʾ* may also mean to form an intention to do (*qaṣd ilā*) something. When the Quran says: "*thumma istawā ilā as-samāʾ*,"[84] it means, He formed an intention (*qaṣd*) to create them (the heavens). Finally, the term *istiwāʾ* is sometimes used to mean "making oneself master over" *(istīlāʾ ʿalā)* something,[85] as one of the poets has said:

[80] *Umajja ibn Abíṣ Ṣalt*, ed. by F. Schulthess (Leipzig 1911), 42, 30ff. (trans. p. 100, 3-10). Also see *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 212, 17ff.

[81] Cf., Lane, 1477/3-1478/1.

[82] That is, equal in the sense that both fall within the jurisdiction of the same legal entity, the law of the tribe, to which both belong, in contrast to those situations in which the perpetrator and the victim belong to different tribes. This seems to be the sense in which Ibn al-Jawzī uses the term *istawā/iʿtadala* here.

[83] S. 28: 14.

[84] S. 2: 99. See *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 58, where Ibn al-Jawzī glosses this verse with the words: أي عمد إلى خلقها (he formed an intention, or resolved, to create them).

[85] Abū Yaʿlā points out in the *Muʿtamad* (54, 11ff.) that *istīlāʾ* was characteristic of the Muʿtazilī interpretation of *istiwāʾ*. This is confirmed by both al-Ashʿarī (*Maqālāt*, 211, 14) and al-Baghdādī (*Uṣūl*, 112, 7-8). R. Frank remarks that most Ashʿarites "do not accept the equivalence of *istīlāʾ* for *istiwāʾ*" in connection with the Quranic expression *istawā ʿalā'l-ʿarsh* (*al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School*, 41 and ns. 22 and 24 [pp. 118-119]). In his *Zād al-Masīr* (III, 213), Ibn al-Jawzī sides with the Ashʿarites in rejecting the view that *istiwāʾ* as used in the Quran is synonymous with *istīlāʾ*.

Then Bishr made himself master over *(istawā ʿalā)* Iraq,
Without resorting to the sword or the shedding of blood.[86]

Or, as another poet has said:

Whenever he raids another tribe
He takes their women captive,[87]
And by the time morning dawns
He has made himself master (*istawā ʿalā*) of what they possess.[88]

51 Ismāʿīl b. Abī Khālid aṭ-Ṭāʿī reported a tradition in which the Throne (*ʿarsh*) is described as consisting of red sapphire.[89] All of the *salaf*, however, were in agreement that references to God's "sitting on the Throne (*ʿarsh*)" should be left to stand as they are without exegetical comment (*tafsīr*) or explanation (*taʾwīl*). ʿAbd Allāh b. Wahb said: "We were in the company of Mālik b. Anas when a man came up to him and said: 'O ʿAbd Allāh, [according to the Quran] "*Raḥmān* is seated on the Throne (*ʿalā'l-ʿarsh istawā*)."[90] How is the expression *istawā* to be understood?' Mālik looked down and began to perspire [as though he had a fever]. After a bit he raised his head and said: 'The expression is to be taken as it is presented [in the Quran]. It is not for us to inquire into the modality [of His sitting on the Throne] or His rising from it (*ʿanhu marfūʿ*).[91] You are an evil man and a heretic!' [Mālik then said to his associates:] 'Ask him to leave!' And so he was ordered to leave."[92]

52 More recently, however, some people have interpreted the attribute [of God's "sitting on the Throne"] in accordance with the dictates of sense

[86] A line from the poetry of al-Akhṭal (cf., Lane, 1478/1; and *Lisān*, XIV, 414/1). This line is frequently quoted in medieval discussions of *istiwāʾ* (cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 21; al-Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 412; Juwaynī, *al-Lumaʿ* [ed. Allard], 151; etc.).

[87] Or, perhaps "violates their sanctuary."

[88] I have not identified the source of this line.

[89] The name and identity of the transmitter of this report are uncertain. In *DST* (18) and *BA* (fol. 22b) the name appears as Ismāʿīl b. Abī Khālid aṭ-Ṭāʾī, whereas in *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 213, the *isnād* of the report reads: Ismāʿīl b. Abī Khālid *ʿan* Saʿd aṭ-Ṭāʾī. I have not found the report in any other of Ibn al-Jawzī's works (including *al-Mawḍūʿāt*). Whether the report is to be taken as a prophetic tradition or simply a statement by Ismāʿīl is not clear from the Arabic text.

[90] S. 20:5.

[91] Or perhaps: his elevation above it or his being exalted over it.

[92] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 404, 6-10.

experience, and so they say: "God Himself (*bi-dhāti*) actually sits on the Throne." This, however, is an amplification [of the Quranic text] which has not come down to us [from an accredited authority]. This understanding has no other source than sense experience, since the person who sits on something does so literally in person. Ibn Ḥāmid said: "*Istiwā'* implies contact (*mumāssa*) and is to be predicated as an attribute belonging to the divine essence; hence, [the term *istiwā'*] ought to be taken as meaning 'sitting' (*quᶜūd*).[93] Some [of our fellow Ḥanbalīs] have insisted that while God is on the Throne (*ᶜarsh*) He does not actually fill all of it and [so] He will invite the Prophet to occupy it with Him."[94] [Ibn Ḥāmid] added: "God's descent (*nuzūl*) [from the Throne] involves movement from one location to another (*intiqāl*)." This line of thought, however, implies that God Himself (*dhātuhu*) is actually smaller than the Throne. How such persons can claim that they do not conceive God in corporeal terms (*mujassima*) is beyond comprehension.

53 Ibn Zāghūnī[95] was asked whether a new attribute came into being upon the creation of the Throne (*ᶜarsh*) which had not existed previously,[96] and he replied: "No, only the world was created with the attribute of being 'beneath' (*ṣifat at-taḥt*) and so, in relation to [the Throne which God occupies], the world **[fol.14b]** is lower (*asfal*). Now when the attribute 'beneath' is established for one of the two entities (*dhātayni*), the attribute 'above' (*ṣifat al-fawq*) is established for the other as a logical corollary.[97]

[93] In the sense in which it is understood in human experience.

[94] See, e.g., the *Ibāna* of Ibn Baṭṭa, ed. H. Laoust (Arabic text, 61) where this point of view is set forth in unequivocal terms. Cf., *KAS*, §§186-188, where the issue is revisited in connection with a saying ascribed to ᶜĀ'isha.

[95] On Ibn Zāghūnī, see notes to §37.

[96] Since the *ᶜarsh* was created by God, and since God cannot be said to have been on the throne prior to its creation, can He be said to have possessed the attribute of *istiwā'* prior to the Throne's creation? Most Ḥanbalīs, like traditionalist Muslims generally, held that God's attributes, as well as His essence, are eternal. For specifically Ḥanbalī statements on the *ᶜarsh*, see e.g., *ᶜAqīda*, I, the longest creed attributed to Ibn Ḥanbal (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 28-29); the *ᶜAqīda* of Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 297); and the *al-ᶜAqīdat al-Wāsiṭīya* of Ibn Taymīya (*Majmūᶜat ar-Rasā'il al-Kubrā*, I, 391-411, espec., 397-400). For a translation of Ibn Taymīya's *ᶜaqīda*, see M. Swartz, "A Seventh-Century (A. H.) Sunnī Creed: The *ᶜAqīda Wāsiṭīya* of Ibn Taymīya," *Humaniora Islamica*, I, 91-131, espec., 114-117).

[97] Ibn Zāghūnī's solution seems to be that the creation of the *ᶜarsh* was the occasion or point in time at which the right to be characterized as possessing the attributes of *istiwā'* and *fawqīya* were established for God. But for Ibn Zāghūnī that does not imply change in

Since it has been established that there are no 'places' (*amākin*)[98] within the divine essence (*fī dhātihi*) nor does He (*dhātuhu*) exist within them—His separation (*infiṣāluhu*) from them being clear[99]—it is necessary to posit a space (*madan*)[100] in relation to which this separation occurred. Thus when [the Quran] says: 'Then [God] seated Himself on the Throne' we know that He meant to specify His location within a particular space (*jiha*).[101] We have no alternative, therefore, but to conclude that His essence [may be described as] having 'defined limits' (*nihāya wa-ghāya*)[102] which He knows."

54 This man does not understand the implications of what he says, for when he ascribes to God a *ghāya* and a *faṣl*, that is, a separation between the Creator and His creation, he imposes limits (*ḥudūd*) on Him and, in effect, declares Him to be a body (*jism*). In his book he writes:[103] "God is not an atom (*jawhar*) since an atom is an entity that occupies space (*mā taḥayyaza*)," but then he goes on to ascribe to God a place (*makān*) which

God or the origination of an attribute in time. It only means that God's right to be characterized as *mustawī* came to be established in time.

[98] *Amākin* are created and hence finite; no such entities can exist within God's being, nor is it possible for Him to exist within them. And yet, despite this, Ibn Zāghūnī goes on to claim that God occupies a *jiha* (space) by virtue of his being on the Throne. Cf., §55, where much the same kind of language is used.

[99] How God, conceived as being (in his essence) independent of space, can now (in time) be said to occupy space, as Ibn Zāghūnī clearly maintains, is difficult to comprehend, unless we assume that something is left out of Ibn Zāghūnī's argument as here presented by Ibn al-Jawzī. For the latter, quite clearly, the argument is flawed, a point he makes repeatedly in the following paragraphs.

[100] *DST* (19), where the reading is ء بد, gives the sentence a temporal (rather than spatial) sense.

[101] The inference seems to be that the creation of the Throne marks the beginning of God's relationship to space, but Ibn Zāghūnī also wants to insist that none of this involved a change in God or the origination of a new attribute.

[102] The expression *nihaya wa-ghāya* here seems to convey the notion of "lines of demarcation" or "boundaries" put somewhat crudely.

[103] On the basis of the information given in *KAS*, it is impossible to determine which of Ibn Zāghūnī's works Ibn al-Jawzī is here referring to. However, judging from the titles of Ibn Zāghūnī's works preserved in the biographical dictionaries, the two most likely candidates are his *Taṣḥīḥ Ḥadīth al-Aṭīṭ* and his *al-Īḍāḥ fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*, works on dogmatic theology. Both works are now lost. The title of the former, however, would suggest that it was a work devoted to the question of the *ʿarsh* and the related issue of *istiwāʾ* (cf., Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, I, 181). For more on the writings of Ibn Zāghūnī, see notes to §37.

He occupies (*yataḥayyaz*). All of this reflects the ignorance of its author and is anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*) in its purest form. This *shaykh* does not comprehend what is necessarily entailed in God's status as Creator or what is incompatible with that status, for God's existence is not like the existence of atoms and bodies which occupy space necessarily. Spatial relations of "below" and "above" apply only to entities which stand over against each other or exist side by side.[104] It is a matter of logical necessity that one such entity be larger than another, or smaller than it or equal to it. Relationships of this sort, however, apply only to bodies (*ajsām*). Whenever bodies are juxtaposed they admit of contact. Whatever admits of contact with (*mumāssa*), or separation from (*mubāyana*), bodies must have a beginning in time (*ḥādith*), for it has been shown that the proof of the temporal origination (*ḥudūth*) of atoms lies in the fact that they admit of contact and separation.[105] If such persons allow the attribution of [contact and separation] to God they concede His contingency (*ḥadath*), but if they deny [contingency while at the same time allowing Him the possibility of contact and separation] they leave us no way by which to establish the contingency of atoms. It is absurd to suppose that two beings, one independent of spatial relations (*mustaghniyan ʿan al-maḥall wa'l-ḥayyiz*) and the other dependent on location in space (*muḥtājan fī'l-ḥayyiz*), can be either contiguous to each other (*mutajāwir*)[106] or separate from each other (*mutabāyin*), for contiguity (*tajāwur*) and separation (*tabāyun*) are concomitant attributes (*lawāzim*) of things that occupy space. How can a being who is free of localization in space—indeed, one for whom such localization is impossible—be contiguous to something other than itself or separate from it since it has been established that conjunction (*ijtimāʿ*) and separation (*iftirāq*) are attributes inseparable from things located in space? Localization in space (*taḥayyuz*) cannot be attributed to God, for if He were localized in space (*mutaḥayyiz*) He would either have to be at rest in the space that He occupies or moving from it. It is not possible that He should be characterized by movement (*ḥaraka*), or rest (*sukūn*), or conjunction (*ijtimāʿ*), or separation (*iftirāq*). What is contiguous with something or separate from it is **[fol.15a]** finite in its essence, and since a finite being is defined by limits it requires a cause to determine [that

[104] That is, entities whose relationship to each other is spatially defined.

[105] Cf., §§5 and 9, among others.

[106] Or, are in contact with each other.

condition].

55 For this reason one should not say that God is inside the world (*dākhil al-ʿālam*) or that He is outside it (*khārij minhu*), for being inside or outside are concomitant attributes (*lawāzim*) of things located in space. Both of these relations along with movement (*ḥaraka*), rest (*sukūn*), and the other accidents (*aʿrāḍ*) are constitutive of bodies (*ajrām*). Regarding their[107] words: "No 'places' (*amākin*) were created in the divine essence, and so His separation from them (*infiṣāluhu ʿanhā*) was established," I would respond as follows: The divine essence does not admit of any created entity existing within it or inhering in it. From the vantage point of sense experience, separation (*faṣl*) would require of God what it requires of atoms, for inherent in the idea of location in space is the notion that what exists within a defined space necessarily excludes the possibility of anything like it occupying that same space. The views of these people are based entirely on sense experience, and this encouraged them to embrace an anthropomorphist point of view (*tashbīh*) and led to confusion, so much so, that one of their number said: "God referred to His sitting on the Throne (*istiwāʾ*) only because, of all existents, it is the thing nearest to Him."[108] This too is based on ignorance, for the notion of spatial proximity is conceivable only in relation to finite bodies. Another among them said: "The surface of the Throne is contiguous to that portion of the divine essence that is next to it, and so [the Throne] is not contiguous to all of the divine essence."[109] To speak thus is to reduce God to corporeal terms (*tajsīm*) and to introduce division (*tabʿīḍ*) [into His essence]. It is difficult for me [to understand] how the author of such a statement can be a member of the Ḥanbalī school. As evidence in support of the view that God is actually on the Throne, one of them appealed to the verses "Goodly speech *ascends* to Him"[110] and "He is all-powerful *above* (*al-qāhir fawqa*) His creatures."[111] They construe this [literally, that is,] in terms of spatial elevation (*fawqīya ḥissīya*) and they associate this spatial

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[107] A reference to Ibn Zāghūnī and those who shared his views. See §53, of the Arabic of *KAS*, where words similar to those that follow are attributed to Ibn Zāghūnī.

[108] I have not found these words cited elsewhere, though the source is probably a Ḥanbalī.

[109] Cf., §§192, 193 and 213.

[110] S. 35: 10.

[111] S. 6: 18 (also verse 61). Cf., §212, where this same verse is cited and briefly discussed.

elevation with finite bodies and atoms. They forget, however, that the notion of elevation (*fawqīya*) is sometimes used to connote the idea of elevation in rank or status (*ʿulūw ar-rutba*) as, for example, when we say that so and so is above (*fawqa*) so and so.[112] Just as [the Quran] refers to God as being "*above* (*fawqa*) His creatures"[113] it also refers to Him as being "*with* you" (*maʿakum*).[114] Those who interpret [*maʿakum*][115] to mean [God's being "with you" in] His knowledge (*ʿilm*) provide their opponents with encouragement to interpret *istiwāʾ* as connoting His might or power (*qahr*).[116]

56 I was informed by ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Abī ʿUmar ad-Dabbās,[117] on

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[112] See, e.g., *Mushkil*, 453, 15-17, where Ibn Fūrak sets forth an Ashʿarite view: لله...فوق خلقه وأنّ ذلك راجع إلى فوقيّة المنزلة والرتبة وفوقيّة القدرة العظمة. وأمّا الفوقيّة بالمسافة والمكان فمُحال في وصفه (God is above His creation in the sense that he is above [it] in rank, degree, power and majesty. As for His being above [it] in the spatial sense—it is impossible to describe Him thus [cf., also 173-175]).

[113] S. 6: 18 and 61.

[114] S. 57: 4. See *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 161, 9-10, where Ibn al-Jawzī glosses this phrase with the words: أي بعلمه وقدرته (cf., VIII, 188, 3, where in connection with a similar expression, Ibn al-Jawzī adds: أي علمه معهم). See also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 430-431, who attributes this interpretation to a number of early authorities, among them Sufyān ath-Thawrī, Ḍaḥḥāk and Muqātil b. Ḥayyān. As Ibn al-Jawzī well knew, this interpretation of *maʿakum* was accepted by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29, 1) and by most Ḥanbalīs after him, even literal-minded Ḥanbalīs notwithstanding the fact that this interpretation entailed a metaphorical or quasi metaphorical exegesis of the expression.

[115] The pronoun object of حملها may actually have been intended to include both expressions, not just the *maʿakum*.

[116] It is not clear from the above whether Ibn al-Jawzī supports this interpretation of *istiwāʾ* or is opposed to it or means to take a non-committal position. I am inclined to believe that despite Ibn al-Jawzī's seeming reticence in declaring himself openly on the question, he is actually sympathetic to the view that *qahr* is the meaning of *istiwā*. Could this reticence here have something to do with the fact that *istiwāʾ* = *qahr* was an interpretation favored by the Muʿtazila?

[117] ʿAli. b. Muḥammad b. Abī ʿUmar al-Bazzāz, more commonly known as Abū'l-Ḥasan ad-Dabbās, who died in 549/1154. The only biographical notices I have found on him come from Ibn al-Jawzī's *Muntaẓam* (X, 160) and his *Mashyakha* (137-139, no. 47). In these two brief notices, Ibn al-Jawzī reports that he studied under Abū'l-Ḥasan ad-Dabbās for a time. Abū'l-Ḥasan was undoubtedly a Ḥanbalī judging from the fact that he counted among his own teachers two of the most important Ḥanbalī scholars of his time, viz., Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī (d. 488/1095) and Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119). We know from a number of his writings (including *KAS*) that Ibn al-Jawzī was deeply influenced by both

the authority of Rizq Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb at-Tamīmī,[118] that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal **[fol.15b]** used to say: "*Istiwā'* is an attribute to be accepted without reservation, but it does not entail the notion of movement toward (*qaṣd ilā*) or elevation above (*istiʿlā'*) [something]." According to [Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī], Aḥmad did not hold the view that the Creator exists within a particular place (*jiha*), for finite spaces exclude what is outside them.[119] Ibn Ḥāmid, however, stated: "God is defined by [His location] in a particular place to the exclusion of other places (*bi-makān dūna makān*); and His place—the locus of His very essence—is on the Throne. Indeed, a group [of Ḥanbalīs] maintains that God fills the Throne on which He [sits].[120] The most acceptable view is that He is in actual contact with the Throne (*mumāss lil-ʿarsh*) and that the *kursī* serves as His footrest." Contact (*mumāssa*) involves a relationship that can only exist between two bodies. This man spared nothing [in promoting] a corporealist point of view (*tajsīm*)![121]

57 It should be understood that those who conceive God's existence in spatial terms (*wujūdan makānīyan*), thus requiring His location in finite space (*jiha*), are like those who imagine that His existence is temporally defined (*wujūdan zamānīyan*), thereby requiring His existence within finite time and His priority to the world as temporal in nature.[122] Both are groundless speculation (*takhyīl*), for it has been shown that all spaces (*jihāt*) are equal [in size] relative to the thing (or being) that admits of [location

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men, and it was undoubtedly from ad-Dabbās that he received at least some of his knowledge of their writings.

[118] Abū Muḥammad Rizq Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb at-Tamīmī (d. 488/1095), an important interpreter of Aḥmad's teaching, and also the author of an important Ḥanbalī creed (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 292-308). For more on Abū Muḥmmad at-Tamīmī, see notes to §32.

[119] Cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 296-297.

[120] Cf., §193, where similar words are ascribed to Abū Yaʿlā, though with some qualification.

[121] See §44 where, apart from reading *tashbīh* for *tajsīm*, the concluding sentence is identical to the one above. The use of the term *tajsīm* above in §56 (in contrast to *tashbīh* in §44 where it is a question of *nafs* or *rūḥ* in relation to God) reflects an important distinction in Ibn al-Jawzī's use of the two terms. By *tajsīm* he specifically means the predication of bodily attributes to God and is quite close in meaning to the term *tabʿīḍ* (composite). *Tashbīh* is clearly the broader of the two terms and refers to any attempt to compare God with what is not God. For Ibn al-Jawzī, and undoubtedly for the *mutakallimūn* in general, *tajsīm* is a particular kind of *tashbīh*.

[122] This view implies that God's existence presupposes the logical priority of the categories of space and time.

in] space (*jiha*).[123] The thing's determination (*ikhtiṣāṣ*) by virtue of its being located in a particular space is not necessary to its essence (*wājib li-dhātihi*) but rather possible (*jā'iz*). Thus it follows that it is dependent on a cause capable of determining [its spatial specification]. Its being qualified (*ikhtiṣāṣ*) in that respect is an addition to its essence (*zā'id ʿalā dhātihi*).[124] What admits of possibility (*jawāz*) cannot be eternal, for an eternal being is that being whose existence is necessary to the totality of defined spaces (*jihāt*). Every being that exists within such space (*jiha*) is, therefore, determined (*muqaddar*) and thus limited (*maḥdūd*). [God], however, is beyond that. Only atoms and bodies admit of spatial existence since they are entities which depend on localization in a particular space, for no defined space can exist within [another] space. When the impossibility of [God's existence] in space is established, so also is the impossibility of His existence in a particular place (*makān*). This makes it clear that a place, when it exists, circumscribes what is in it. Nothing, however, can circumscribe the Creator, nor do any of His attributes admit of origination in time.

58 If someone should point out that the two *Ṣaḥīḥs* contain a tradition concerning the Prophet's ascension reported by Sharīk b. Abī Namir in which Anas [b. Mālik] said: "Then [Gabriel] took [the Prophet] into the presence of the Almighty and, being in his place (*fī makānihi*), the Prophet said: 'O Lord, decrease [the obligations] which You placed upon us,'"[125] we would respond by noting the following remarks of Abū Sulaymān **[fol.16a]** al-Khaṭṭābī:[126] "The expression [*fī makānihi*] is found only in that version of the tradition reported by Sharīk.[127] No other transmitter reported it.

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[123] This may reflect the view, widely held in medieval *kalām*, that space like matter is discrete, i.e., it consists of "cells" of the same size as the bodies that occupy them. For more on this view of space as consisting of discrete units, see Dhanani, *Physical Theory*, 51ff.

[124] Since the power to determine its location in space is not intrinsic to its essence but is caused by something other than itself, that specification is said to be "added to" or "over and above" its essence.

[125] For citations of this *ḥadīth*, see Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 37; Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 438-439; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 210-213 (cf., also 139-140). I have not found the tradition (as cited above) in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim, though a somewhat different version attributed to Sharīk (minus the expression *fī makānihi*) is found in *īmān*, 262. In comments appended to this tradition, Muslim expresses grave doubts regarding Sharīk's reliability as a transmitter.

[126] For more on al-Khaṭṭābī, see notes to §27.

[127] In his *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafā'* (II, 40), Ibn al-Jawzī gives his full name as Sharīk b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Namir Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Madanī, and notes that both Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn and

Indeed, among the traditions transmitted by him there are a number of objectionable expressions. The [pronoun] in the expression 'his place' is not to be taken as referring to God, but rather to the Prophet, and denotes the first rank or station (*maqām*) assigned to him [as the seal of the Prophet]."[128] Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī added: "In the prophetic saying 'I will ask to have an audience with my Lord while He is in His House (*fī dārihi*),'[129] [the expression *dār*] was presumed to be the equivalent of *makān*; by the expression 'in His *dār*,' [the Prophet] was referring only to the abode (*dār*) which [God] has prepared for His saints."[130] As the *Qāḍī* Abū Yaʿlā [rightly] states in his *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*: "God is not to be described as being in a place (*al-makān*)."[131]

59 If someone argues that the denial of spatial relations (*jihāt*) [to an existent] is, in effect, to render its existence (*wujūd*) impossible, our response

Nasāʾī regarded him as an unreliable transmitter (ليس بالقوي). According to Dhahabī (*Mīzān*, II, 269-270), the scholarly opinion on Sharīk was divided. Abū Dāwūd regarded him as reliable, while Ibn Ḥazm regarded him as weak. Ibn ʿAdī, on the other hand, advised caution in regard to the traditions transmitted by Sharīk: his traditions are to be accepted only when transmitted from him by persons known to be trustworthy.

[128] For the details, see the full text of the tradition in Bukhārī (*tawḥīd*, 37).

[129] Part of a lengthy *ḥadīth* concerning the Prophet's intercession on the day of judgment. For versions of this tradition in which the expression *fī dārihi* occurs, see Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 24; and *Musnad*, III, 244. Qatāda is the transmitter of the tradition from Anas b. Mālik in both instances. The same tradition occurs in the following, but in all cases *fī dārihi* is absent: Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 51; *tawḥīd*, 19, 36; Muslim *īmān*, 322; Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 37; and *Musnad*, III, 116.

[130] Cf., *Lisān*, IV, 298/1, 20-21, where *fī dārihi* is glossed as follows: أي في حضرة قدسه وقيل: في جنّته فإنّ الجنّة تُسمّى دار السلام والله عزّ وجلّ هو السلام (that is, in His Sanctuary or, as is said, in His Paradise which is also called *Dār as-Salām*, for God is *as-Salām*). For Bayhaqī's analysis of this expression, see *Asmāʾ*, 442, 15ff. (cf., Ibn Ḥajar, *Fatḥ al-Bāriʾ*, XIII, 429, where the tradition is cited and the various interpretations discussed).

[131] This is a rough paraphrase of Abū Yaʿlā's position on the question of *makān* as set forth in the *Muʿtamad* (56-57); the first part of the passage reads: ولا يجوز وصفه بأنه في كلّ مكان ولا في مكان ويجوز أن يقال أنّه تعالى في السماء على العرش، خلافًا للمعتزلة في قولهم: هو في مكان، والمجسّمة في قولهم: هو في مكان، والأشعريّة في قولهم: لا يجوز إطلاق القول عليه بأنّه في السماء (It is impossible to describe Him as being everywhere or in a [particular] place. It is possible to say, however, that the Almighty is in heaven on the Throne, in contrast to the Muʿtazila who say that He is in [every] place, and the *mujassima* (corporealists) who maintain that he is in a particular place, or the Ashʿarīs who say that it is impossible to say definitively that he is in heaven).

is that if the existent (*mawjūd*) in question admits of contact (*ittiṣāl*) and separation (*infiṣāl*) the objection stands. But if [the existent] does not admit of either, the objection carries no weight, as the following will show. If you were to maintain that every existent (*mawjūd*) must either be knowing or not-knowing, I would respond: only if that existent is one that admits of both possibilities.[132] If it does not admit of either, as in the case of a wall, for example, neither knowledge or its opposite can be ascribed to it. And so we refuse to predicate of the Creator anything that might entail origination in time (*ḥadath*). If someone should say: "Your position requires that we posit [the reality of] what lies beyond the reach of the cognitive faculty (*fahm*)," my response is that if by "cognitive faculty" you mean the power to form images and concepts (*at-takhayyul wa't-taṣawwur*) drawn from sense experience [you are right], for the Creator cannot be known through such since He cannot be perceived by the senses. Only bodies that admit of color and size fall into that category, for the imagination (*khayāl*), having apprehended objects of perception (*muḥṣarāt*), can only form images on the basis of what it perceives since images are derived from sense experience. But if you mean that [God] cannot be known by the intellect (*ʿaql*) [then you are in error], for we have shown on the basis of evidence that [His existence] can be established by reason since the intellect is compelled to acknowledge as true (*taṣdīq*) what is indicated by the evidence (*dalīl*). You should know that since your experience is limited to bodies, atoms and accidents, and since you know that God is beyond such things through rational proofs (*dalīl al-ʿaql*) which dissuade you from supposing otherwise, [these same proofs] ought to dissuade you from supposing that He is a being who occupies space (*mutaḥayyiz*) or that movement (*mutaḥarrik*) or change of locality (*muntaqil*) can be predicated of Him. Since the layman (*ʿāmmī*) **[fol.16b]** does not understand such matters, our advice is that he not be exposed to what he cannot grasp. Do not disturb him, but rather let him remain secure in his beliefs. Make the way easy for him so that he need not inhabit the mountains.[133] All that one need say [on the question of *istiwāʾ*] is that God is on the Throne in a way that is consonant with His being.[134]

[132] Literally: only if that being admits of the two opposites.

[133] That is, rugged and dangerous terrain. Make matters easy for the lay person so that he need not face difficulties that might undermine his faith.

[134] As one of Baghdad's leading preachers, these sentences reflect his "pastoral" concerns.

[The Eighth Text]

60 Another verse [that has been the subject of controversy] is the following: "Are you certain regarding Him Who is in the heavens?"[135] It has been established beyond question that this verse cannot be taken in its literal sense, for, although the preposition "in" (*fī*) denotes the location of something within a spatial or temporal receptacle (*li'ẓ-ẓarfīya*), God is not a being contained within a receptacle (*maẓrūf*).[136] If sense perception is not allowed to exercise a controlling influence over the interpretation of such expressions, what remains is a simple statement designed to express [God's] greatness in terms that finite creatures can grasp.

[The Ninth Text]

61 Among the verses [discussed in connection with the *ṣifāt*] is the following: "O how I regret my neglect of God's side (*janb*)."[137] Here the term ["side"] is to be taken as a reference to God's obedience (*ṭāᶜa*)[138] and to His command (*amr*), for one may speak of neglect (*tafrīṭ*) only in relation to such matters.[139]

They also constitute part of the basis for his opposition to *kalām* when discussed in a public setting.

[135] S. 67:16. Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 322; Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, IV, 138; Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 420-421; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 110ff. where quite different interpretations of this verse are presented (cf., *DST*, 22, n. 2).

[136] See §§122-123, where Ibn al-Jawzī returns to the question of whether it is appropriate to speak of God's being in heaven. In *ᶜAqīda* I, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal does say that "God is on his Throne above the heavens," but he adds that such language should not be construed as implying any kind of limitation on God (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29), and, so far as I have been able to determine, Aḥmad nowhere uses the preposition "in" when he speaks of God in relation to the heavens. For Abū Yaᶜlā's position on this question, see the last note to §58.

[137] S. 39: 56, and the only reference to God's "side" or *janb* in the Quran. Vs. 56 forms part of a longer passage in which scoffers are summoned to repent and warned of the remorse they are certain to suffer if they desist. Bell translates vss. 55-56 as follows: "But follow the best of what has been sent down to you from your Lord, before the punishment comes to you suddenly before you are aware. Lest a soul should say: 'O, alas, for what I have thoughtlessly done in regard to Allah, for I was one of the scoffers.'"

[138] That is, the obedience which God rightly requires of his creatures.

[139] Cf., *DST*, 23, 5, where in place of "*fī dhālika*" the text reads "*fī dhātihi*."

If the term "side" is construed in its commonly accepted anatomical sense, the use of the term "neglect" in this context has no meaning. Ibn Ḥāmid, however, said: "We believe that God has a side on the basis of this verse."[140] How shocking is the absence of reason [in his statement]! If it makes no sense to speak of "neglect" in relation to a creature's "side," how is it possible to use the term in relation to something [alleged to be] a divine attribute? Thaʿlab recited the following line of poetry in which the term appears: "O my friends, restrain yourselves and be mindful of God in respect of 'my side,'" and he glossed it as meaning "my affair" (*amrī*).[141]

[The Tenth Text]

62 Among the verses [that have been used by some to establish a divine attribute] is the following: "We breathed into her[142] from Our *rūḥ* (spirit)."[143]

[140] See §177 where Ibn al-Jawzī returns to Ibn Ḥāmid's view on the matter of God's *janb* (cf., also §113). Abū Yaʿlā appears to be silent on the question of God's *janb* in the *Muʿtamad*, nor does *KAS* attribute a position to him on this question. I have not so far found any reference to Aḥmad's view on this question, nor does the question appear in the *ʿaqīda* of Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 292-307) or in the summary of Barbahārī's views given in *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, (II, 18ff.).

[141] In *Zād al-Masīr*, Ibn al-Jawzī cites five possible interpretations of the term *janb* in the above verse: it may mean 1) the obedience (*ṭāʿa*) owed to God (a position attributed to Ḥasan al-Baṣrī); 2) whatever is God's right or due (*ḥaqq Allāh*) (so Saʿīd b. Jubayr); 3) God's affair (*amr*) (Mujāhid and Zajjāj); 4) God's honor or reputation (*dhikr*) (ʿIkrama and Ḍaḥḥāk; and 5) nearness (*qurb*) to God or what enjoys proximity to him (al-Farrāʾ). Although Ibn al-Jawzī does not explicitly endorse any of the above interpretations, his concluding comments seem to reflect some interest in (and perhaps sympathy for) the view advocated by al-Farrāʾ, and he notes that if the latter is right, *janb* may actually refer to Paradise (*janna*) (VII, 192). In any case, Ibn al-Jawzī clearly opposes the notion that *janb* is one of the divine attributes. For other discussions of the term *janb*, see the lengthy discussion in Lane, 465/3-466/2 (cf., *Lisān*, I, 275/2). An Ashʿarite perspective can be found in Juwaynī, *Irshād*, 158-159; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 361. Cf., Zamakhsharī's *Kashshāf*, III, 404, for one Muʿtazilī's approach to the question.

[142] Strictly speaking, the antecedent of the pronoun in the expression *fīhi* is the term *farj* (womb) which occurs in the earlier part of the verse. I have chosen to follow Arberry's rendering of the prepositional phrase which, it seems to me, conveys the sense of the verse. For the full text, see the following note.

[143] S. 66: 12. The full verse reads: "And Mary, ʿImrān's daughter, who guarded virginity, so we breathed into her of our spirit, and she confirmed the words of her Lord and his books, and became one of the obedient" (Arberry). Also cf., S. 21: 91; and 19: 17, for

According to the exegetes, the expression "Our *rūḥ*" [is to be taken as a figure of speech] meaning "our mercy (*raḥma*),"[144] for the term *rūḥ* is closely linked to the idea of breath (*nafkh*) as the poet (Dhūʾr-Rumma) has said:

> I said to him: Lift [the coals] to [your mouth] and give them life
> by your breath (*rūḥ*), nourishing [them] gently [until they blaze].[145]

[The Eleventh Text]

63 When the Quran uses the expression "they hurt God"[146] it means in effect "they hurt His saints (*awliyāʾ*)." Thus when it says: "Ask the city"[147] it means "ask the people [of the city]."[148] [A similar recourse to ellipsis is found] in the words of the Prophet when he said: "Uḥud is a mountain that loves us and we love it."[149] Thus the poet has said:

> I was informed that the fires[150] were ignited after [your death],[151]

similar passages in which the term *rūḥ* figures.

[144] Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 261, 1; V, 385, 17ff.; and VIII, 316.

[145] Macartney, *The Dīwān of Ghailān Ibn ʿUqbah* (Cambridge 1919), 176 (no. 33). For commentaries on this line, see *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 261, 10 and n. 1; and *Lisān al-ʿArab*, II, 460, 1-2. God's *rūḥ* is to be understood as an act of generosity to Mary just as breath is to dying coals.

[146] S. 33: 57. The full verse reads: "Those who hurt God and His Messenger—them God has cursed in the present world and the world to come, and has prepared for them a humbling chastisement" (Arberry).

[147] S. 12: 82

[148] Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, IV, 268, 17, where Ibn al-Jawzī glosses the expression with the words: سل أهل القرية (ask the people of the village); and I, 115, 15ff., where other examples of this sort of phenomenon are cited from the Quran and explained in terms of the ellipsis of the *muḍāf* (for a discussion of the significance of ellipsis [*ḥadf*] in medieval literary theory, see W. Heinrichs, "Scriptural Hermeneutics," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, 7 [1991-92], 258, and 263ff. Heinrichs cites the case of the Ḥanafī/Muʿtazilī jurist, Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, who interpreted the above passage as an example of ellipsis).

[149] This saying appears a number of times in the canonical collections, among them: Bukhārī, *zakāt*, 54; *jihād*, 71, 74; *anbiyāʾ* 10; *maghāzī*, 27, 81; *aṭʿima*, 28; *daʿawāt*, 35; *iʿtiṣām*, 16; Muslim, *ḥajj*, 464, 503, 504/2; and *Musnad*, II, 337, 387; III, 140, 149, 159, 240, 243, 443; and V, 425.

[150] "The fires of animosity."

And after you, O Kulayb, the *assembly* engaged in mutual recrimination![152]

[The Twelfth Text]

64 Finally, there is the verse: "What can they expect but that God will come to them in the shadow of the clouds (*fī ẓulal*)."[153] [The expression "in the shadow"] is to be taken in the sense **[fol.17a]** of "with the shadow" (*bi-ẓulal);* hence, the verse is to be construed as meaning that God will bring them "[the protection of] the shadow[s]." [God's "coming"] in the verse "Your Lord will come"[154] is to be interpreted in a similar fashion.[155] The *Qāḍī* Abū Yaʿlā reported Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal as having said that the verse "God will come to them"[156] means that [he will come to them] through His power (*qudra*) and His command (*amr*),[157] and in support of this interpretation he cited the verse "The command of your Lord (*amru rabbika*) will come."[158] The expression "Your Lord will come," which is also found in the Torah, [was explained by Aḥmad as meaning that] it is His power (*qudra*) only [that will come]. However, Ibn Ḥāmid stated: "This interpretation is in

[151] In both the *Ḥamāsa* of Abū Tamām (ed. G. Fretag, 420, 13) and the *Amālī* of al-Qālī (I, 95, 13), this line is ascribed to the legendary poet ʿAdī b. Rabīʿa, better known in the annals of Arabic literature as Muhalhil, who is alleged to have been the creator of the *qaṣīda*. The killing of the poet's brother, Kulayb b. Rabīʿa (by Jassās b. Murra), precipitated the break-up of the alliance between the Bakr and the Taghlib, leading to the famous war of Basūs between the two branches of Wāʾil (cf., *EI*^{2}, V, 362).

[152] As Blachère has pointed out, the poetry ascribed to ʿAdī is of doubtful authenticity. For a discussion of ʿAdī b. Rabīʿa and his place in the early history of Arabic poetry, see Blachère, *Histoire de la littérature arabe*, 251; and *GAS*, II, 148-14. For an extended commentary on the above line, see Marzūqī's *Sharḥ Dīwān al-Ḥamāsa* (Cairo 1951), II, 928-930. The above line is cited twice by Ibn al-Jawzī in his *Zād al-Masīr* (I, 116, 2; and V, 69, 6). In both instances, he glosses the term *majlis* with the words أي أهل المجلس (on the elliptical use of *majlis*, cf., Lane, 444/2; and *Lisān*, VI, 40, 9-10).

[153] S. 2: 210. The expression "in the shadow (*fī ẓulal*) of the clouds" appears in a tradition that is discussed in §§185-186.

[154] S. 89: 22.

[155] That is, it is to be taken as meaning that God will bring (or send) them His protection, power, or blessing, not that God Himself will come.

[156] S. 2: 210.

[157] See *Zād*, I, 225.

[158] S. 16: 33.

error, for God Himself (*bi-dhātihi*) will descend only through movement that entails change of location (*intiqāl*)."

65 This statement concerning the divine essence takes sense experience as its point of reference as though it were a question of material bodies (*ajsām*).[159] Commenting on the verse: "[When they ask you concerning the spirit (*ar-rūḥ*)] say: 'The spirit [is a matter that] pertains to my Lord,'"[160] Ibn ʿAqīl said: "[If God implored] His creatures to refrain from asking questions about created things, how much better is it to refrain from [asking questions about] the Creator and His attributes!"[161]

[159] According to Ibn al-Jawzī's definition, "bodies" (designated by the term *ajsām*) are finite entities which consist of conjoined atoms (*jawāhir*) and accidents (*aʿrāḍ*). See §§5 and 9 for a fuller discussion of these terms.

[160] S. 17: 86.

[161] I have adopted the reading given in the printed edition of *DST* (26), which is also supported by a number of manuscripts of *DST* (see notes to the Arabic text).

[CHAPTER THREE]

TRADITIONS CONCERNING THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

66 It must be emphasized that there are in the traditions [ascribed to the Prophet] both obscure (*dafāʿin*) and defective elements (*āfāt*) of which only the experts (*ʿulamāʾfuqahāʾ*) are fully aware. [What is problematic] sometimes has to do with the transmission (*naql*) of the text and sometimes with the interpretation of the content (*kashf maʿnāhā*).[1] In what follows, we shall attempt to clarify these matters, if God permits.[2]

The First Tradition

67 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition reported by Abū Hurayra in which the Prophet said: "God created Adam in his form (*ṣūra*)."[3]

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[1] He might also have included the *matn* (text) among the sometimes problematic aspects of *ḥadīth* since he does frequently deal with the *matn* in the analyses that follow.

[2] Ibn al-Jawzī wrote extensively on the problems posed by the *ḥadīth* literature. The two works that tackle these matters in a direct and sustained way are his *Kitāb al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya fī'l-Aḥādīth al-Wāhiya* (Beirut 1983); and his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* (Medina, 1966). As Ibn al-Jawzī explains in his introduction to the work (p. 17, 7-14), *Kitāb al-ʿIlal* is concerned with those traditions that are defective and therefore problematic, but the defects in this case are not such as to require their wholesale rejection (cf., also *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 35, 14-19). *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, as the title itself makes clear, is devoted to a critical examination of apocryphal traditions which have no useful function and therefore must be rejected. In connection with this latter work, Ibn al-Jawzī composed a semi-biographical work entitled *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ wa'l-Matrūkīn* (Beirut 1986) in which disreputable traditionists are listed and their errors identified. Finally, in this connection, mention should be made of his *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (Beirut 1984), a specialized work which, as the title indicates, is devoted to a discussion of those traditions in which obscure and rare expressions are to be found (cf., *EI*^{2}, III, 25b).

[3] See, Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *isti'dhān*, 1 (cf., Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 214); for Muslim's version of this tradition, see his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *birr*, 115 (cf., *janna*, 28). This tradition or near approximations of it can be found in a number of other canonical collections, among them the *Musnad* of Ibn Ḥanbal, vol. II, 244, 251, 315, 323, 434, 463, 519, etc. For a critical review of medieval interpretations of this tradition, see W. M. Watt, "Created in His Image: A Study in Islamic Theology," *Transactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society*,

68 The experts have adopted two quite different approaches [to this tradition]. One group chooses to remain silent rather than become involved in a discussion of its meaning;[4] the other group, however, has no such reservation. Among those who make up the latter group, there are three different views as to the antecedent of the pronoun "his" [in the expression "his form"]. The first opinion maintains that the pronoun refers to a human being (*ilā baʿḍi banī Ādam*). Those who advocate this view cite a tradition in which the Prophet is reported to have passed by a man who was striking another in the face and saying to him: "God curse your face and the face **[fol.17b]** of those whose face is like yours." The Prophet then said to him: "When you strike [someone] spare his face, for God created Adam in his form (*ʿalā ṣūratihi*)."[5] [The proponents of this view] claim that one of the transmitters of this tradition abridged it [by omitting reference to the beating and the Prophets's response],[6] and so the shortened version ought to be

18 (1959-1960), 38-49.

[4] A position which the Ḥanbalī traditionist and jurist, al-Ājurrī (d. 360/970), sets forth with admirable clarity in his *Kitāb ash-Sharīʿa* (Beirut 1983). After quoting the above tradition in its variant forms, he adds: هذه من السنن التي يجب على المسلمين الإيمان بها ولا يقال فيها: كيف ولِم؟ بل تستقبل بالتسليم والتصديق وترك النظر كما قال من تقدّم من أئمة المسلمين (These are traditions in which it is incumbent upon Muslims to believe, and one should not ask how or in what way [they are to be understood]. On the contrary, submit to them [without asking questions] and offer them your assent. Shun rational reflection as did the *imāms* who came before you [315, 8-10]). This is a position which Ibn al-Jawzī himself sometimes advocates as we have seen in the first chapter of *KAS*. But he makes an important distinction: discussion of such matters is to be shunned on occasions when members of the general public are present. However, when it is a question of discussions confined to scholarly circles, such are entirely appropriate. This much is evident from §36 (last sentence) of *KAS* (cf., also the last part of §59). Quite obviously, *KAS* was intended for an academic readership.

[5] Among the canonical collections, this tradition is found only in the *Musnad* of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, II, 252 and 434 (the two texts are virtually identical). The tradition was the subject of frequent comment by later scholars (cf., for example, Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth* [Cairo 1326/1908], 277-278; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 291, 3-5; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd* , 36, 14-17).

[6] The abridged version of the tradition referred to here is apparently the one cited by Ibn al-Jawzī at the beginning of this section (§68). What was left out was the reference to the beating (including the curse) and the Prophet's response. According to the explanation given by Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil al-Ḥadīth* [Beirut 1985], 49), the assumption behind the abridgment was that since the longer version of the tradition was so widely known the transmitter thought it unnecessary to repeat it in full. One senses that the proponents of the view under discussion here in *KAS* were not entirely happy with the abridged version, since it left out what, in their view, corroborated their interpretation of the tradition.

understood in accordance with the meaning of the fuller tradition [if ambiguity is to be avoided].[7] They further point out that the expression "the face of those whose face is like yours" includes prophets as well as believers. [In their view] Adam was singled out for special mention in this tradition only because he was the first whose face was created in accordance with this form—but a form also shared by those who came after. Thus, it is as though the Prophet warned the man that [in cursing another] he had also in effect cursed both Adam and his progeny. This tradition shows the length to which the Prophet was prepared to go in restraining the man. According to those who hold this view, then, the pronoun "his" is to be taken as referring to the man who was struck,[8] and it is [according to them] a grievous error to suppose that it refers to God, given the tradition's use of the expression "the face of him whose face is like yours." If God is taken as the antecedent of the pronoun the result is anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*) pure and simple. In the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim there is another version of this tradition, reported by Abū Hurayra, in which the Prophet said: "If one of you does battle against his brother, spare his face, for God created Adam in his form."[9]

69 The second view is that while, in principle, the pronoun may be taken as referring to either of two explicitly stated nouns, [that is, God or Adam],[10] it may not in this instance be taken as referring to God in view of the evidence (*dalīl*) indicating that he does not possess a form. It must, therefore, be taken as referring to Adam. The meaning of the tradition [according to this view] is that God created Adam "in his, that is, Adam's, form" by creating him in a fully developed, adult form, and not through the gradual process of natural procreation as in the case of [Adam's] descendents. This view, adopted by Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī,[11] was mentioned [favorably]

[7] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 49, 5, where the wording is almost identical to that used in *KAS*, although Ibn Fūrak adds the words: حتّى يزول الإشكال.

[8] Cf., Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth* (Cairo 1326/1908), 277-278; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 49; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 290, 20-23.

[9] Muslim, *birr*, 115.

[10] It should be kept in mind that the argument in this paragraph concerns the basic tradition cited in §67.

[11] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ* (290, 4-11) where al-Khaṭṭābī is quoted at some length on the meaning of the term *ṣūra*. The passage reads: وقد قال أبو سليمان الخطّابيّ قوله «خلق اللّه آدم على صورته» الهاء وقعت كناية اسمين ظاهرين فلم تصلح أن تصرف إلى اللّه عزّ وجلّ لقيام الدليل على أنّه ليس بذي صورة سبحانه ليس كمثله شيء فكان مرجعها إلى آدم فالمعنى أنّ ذريّة آدم إنما خلقوا أطواراً كانوا في مبدأ الخلقة نطفة ثم علقة ثم مضغة، ثم صاروا صوراً أجنة إلى أن تتمّ مدّة الحمل فيولدون أطفالاً

before him by Thaʿlab in his *Amālī*.[12]

70 The third view is that [the pronoun] refers to God, though there are two views as to how [the term *ṣūra*] is to be construed. The first is that the term *ṣūra* denotes something God possesses (*mulk*) in the sense that it derives from his action and creative effort. [Form (*ṣūra*)] is said to belong to God for two reasons: 1) to confer distinction [on things or persons] through their association [with God] as in the Quranic expression "purify *My* house,"[13] or 2) to signify that He did not fashion [the *ṣūra* by which Adam was created] on the basis of a pre-existing model.[14] The tradition [cited in support of this view] goes back to Ibn ʿUmar, who reported that the Prophet **[fol.18a]** said: "Do not abuse the face of a person, for humankind was created in the form of *Raḥmān*."[15] This tradition, however, is defective in three respects. In the first place, Thawrī and Aʿmash reported it on the basis of conflicting *isnāds*. In Thawrī's *isnād* the tradition is traced back to a Follower[16] whereas in the case of Aʿmash it is traced back to a Companion.

وينشأون صغاراً، إلى أن يكبروا فتطول أجسامهم، يقول إنّ آدم لم يكن خلقه على هذه الصفة لكنّه أوّل ما تناولته الخلقة وجد خلقًا تامًّا (Concerning the prophetic tradition, "God created Adam in his form," Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī said: "The pronoun *hāʾ* [in this saying] may be taken as referring to either of the two stated nouns [i.e., God or Adam]. It is not fitting, however, that it be taken as referring to God because of the [scriptural] evidence indicating that He does not possess a form, for [the Quran says:] 'There is nothing like unto Him'. Hence, the pronoun here must refer to Adam, and the meaning is that the descendents of Adam were created only in stages: in the beginning they were drop(s), then clot(s), etc., and finally fetal forms until pregnancy reached completion, and so they were born as infants and grew up as children and became adults. Adam was not created in this fashion, but was the first to be created in a fully completed [form].").

[12] See Tha'lab, *Majālis* (=*Amālī*), I, 115. A number of Ashʿarite theologians also preferred this interpretation (cf., al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl*, 75-76; al-Juwaynī, *Irshād*, 163-164; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 52).

[13] S. 22: 26. The argument here is that special distinction is conferred on a particular house by associating it with God. For other Quranic expressions supposedly reflecting this kind of association or "annexation," see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 291, 7; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 39, 5-17. The argument here seems to be that the attribution of God's form to Adam was a way of conferring a special disctinction on him.

[14] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 291, 5-8.

[15] I have not found this tradition in any of the canonical collections. For citations of the above text with brief commentaries, see Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, 278, 4-5 (cf., Lecomte, *Le traité*, 244); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 291, 9-12; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 38, 4-8.

[16] That is, a second generation Muslim, literally, those who came after the Companions

Secondly, Aʿmash was in the habit of concealing defects in his *isnāds* (*kāna yudallis*). Thus, for example, he made no mention of the fact that he received [this tradition] from Ḥabīb b. Abī Thābit. Thirdly, Ḥabīb too was known to have concealed defects in his *isnāds*, for he does not report that he had received this tradition from ʿAṭāʾ [b. Abī Ribāḥ].[17] If these considerations, taken together, require that this tradition be considered weak (*wahn*), the same judgment ought to be applied to the view that construes the term *ṣūra* as something belonging to God.

71 [Among those who take the pronoun as referring to God,] the second view holds that the term *form* (*ṣūra*) denotes an attribute (*ṣifa*). It is sometimes said "this is the *form* of the matter" (*ṣūrat al-amr*), that is, this is its nature or attribute. The meaning of God's creation of Adam according to His *ṣifa* is that he endowed [Adam] with His own attributes, *viz.*, life, knowledge, power, hearing, sight, speech and will, by virtue of which [Adam] was set apart from all of the animals. Moreover, God also granted him a rank superior to that of the angels when he ordered them to prostrate before [Adam]. Ibn ʿAqīl said: "[God] set Adam apart by endowing him with His own 'form' (*ṣūra*) for no other reason than to confer distinction on him, *viz.*, [by granting him] power (*sulṭana*) and sovereign authority (*rubbūbīya*) to govern, receive homage, maintain law and order, and to regulate public affairs, [the exercise of which] brings prosperity and well-being to the [various] lands and their inhabitants. Among the angels and the jinn there is no race (*nawʿ*) or tribe (*qabīl*), apart from humans, that agrees to render Him obedience. This is the meaning of the tradition ['God created Adam in his form']. It follows, therefore, that *form* (*ṣūra*) here refers to spiritual essence (*maʿnawīya*), not to a form (or shape) possessing external features."[18]

Abū Muḥammad b. Qutayba's view of this tradition is seriously flawed (*qabīḥ*), for he writes: "God possesses an actual form, though it is not like

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of the Prophet. These *mursal* traditions, as they were called, were characterized by the fact that there was a gap in the first part of the *isnād*, that is, between the Prophet and the second generation authority who reported it. *Ḥadīth* critics such as Ibn al-Jawzī regarded such *isnāds* as problematic and therefore open to question as regards their authenticity.

[17] Cf., Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 38-39, where a similar analysis of the *isnād* of this tradition is given. It is interesting that Ḥabīb b. Abī Thābit is not listed in Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*. For a somewhat more favorable assessement of Ḥabīb, see Dhahabī's *Mīzān*, I, 451 (1690). On ʿAṭāʾ, see *Mīzān*, III, 70. Cf., *Asmāʾ*, 291, 12-14, where al-Bayhaqī focuses his critical comments on the *matn* of the tradition rather than its *isnād*.

[18] Cf., Maimonides, *Guide*, I, 1-2.

other forms, and he fashioned Adam after it."[19] This statement is confused (*takhlīṭ*) and incoherent (*tahāfut*), for it clearly implies that Adam's form is like God's. The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "The term *form* may be applied to God although it is not a form like other forms; the same is also true of the term essence (*dhāt*) [when applied to God]."[20] This reflects serious confusion, for the term essence refers to the quintessential character (*maʿnā*) of something whereas [the word] *form* (*ṣūra*) implies a shape (*hayʾa*) with limits (*takhāṭīṭ*) **[fol.18b]** and composition (*taʾlīf*), and it presupposes a fashioner or composer. Those who use the expression "a form not like other forms" face the same

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[19] Although these words do not appear in Ibn Qutayba's *Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, so far as I have been able to determine, it is clear from Ibn Fūrak's *Mushkil* (67-69) that Ibn Qutayba was identified with both the wording and position ascribed to him by Ibn al-Jawzī here in *KAS*. Without identifying his source, Ibn Fūrak quotes Ibn Qutayba in the *Mushkil (p. 67)* as follows: إنّ لله عزّ وجلّ صورة لا كالصور كما أنّه شيء لا كالأشياء (God is a form but not like other forms, just as he is a being unlike other beings). In his comments on Ibn Qutayba's position, Ibn Fūrak has the following to say: فأثبت لله تعالى صورة قديمة، زعم أنّها لا كالصور وأنّ الله خلق آدم على تلك الصورة، وهذا جهل من قائله، وتوغّل في تشبيه الله تعالى بخلقه. والعجب منه أنّه تأوّل الخبر ثمّ زعم أنّ الله صورة لا كالصور، ثمّ قال: إنّ آدم مخلوق على تلك الصورة وهذا كلام متناقض متهافت يدفع أوّله آخره (He predicated of God an eternal form [and] insisted that it is not like other forms, but then he went on to say that God created Adam [and patterned] him after that form. Those who speak thus are misguided and are guilty of comparing God with His creatures. It is astonishing that he should begin by construing the term metaphorically and claim that it is not a form like other forms but then add that Adam was patterned after that form. This is a contradictory, incoherent statement in which the last part contradicts the first [*Mushkil*, 67, 6-68, 3]). See the remainder of this section of *Mushkil* (68) where Ibn Fūrak expands on the comments cited above.

[20] Cf., *Muʿtamad*, 58, 13-16, where Abū Yaʿlā insists that the term *ṣūra* may be applied to God though, he adds: صورة لا كالصور (a form unlike other forms). In the same passage he approves the use of the terms *nafs* and *dhāt* as designations that may be applied to God, but he adds: نفس وذات لا كالذوات والنفوس (a soul and an essence unlike other souls and essences). Some Ḥanbalīs, especially those of a more literalist bent of mind, thought Abū Yaʿlā's qualification unnecessary. See, for example, the position set forth by Ibn Baṭṭa in his *Ibāna* (ed. by H. Laoust), 57, 9-13 (trans. 104), where he takes the term *ṣūra* quite literally. In his longest *ʿAqīda*, Aḥmad states his position as follows: وخلق [الله] آدم بيده على صورته (God created Adam by His hand after His own form [*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29, 1; cf., I, 313, 2-3]). Perhaps the most uncompromising position is that attributed to Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Warrāq (d. 864/5 AH.) who is quoted as having said: من لم يقل: إنّ الله خلق آدم على صورة الرحمن فهو جهميّ (He who refuses to say that God created Adam according to the form of Raḥmān is a Jahmī [*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 212, 8-9]).

problem as those who say "a body not like other bodies" for [in both cases] they contradict themselves.

The Second Tradition

72 ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. ʿĀʾish reported that the Prophet once said: "I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form (*fī aḥsani ṣūratin*) and He said to me: 'About what is the High Council (*malaʾ aʿlā*)[21] disputing, O Muḥammad?' I said: 'O Lord, only You know'. Then He placed His hand between my shoulders and I felt its coolness against my breast, whereupon I understood both what is in heaven and on earth." [22]

73 Aḥmad [b. Ḥanbal] said: "The source of this tradition as well as the various chains of authority on which it is based are disturbed (*muḍṭariba*)."[23] Dāraquṭnī said: "[According to one version] Muʿādh [b. Jabal][24] is said to have received it from the Prophet, but all of its chains are disturbed and cannot be trusted. [According to another chain] Qatāda[25] received it from

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[21] A Quranic expression (S. 37: 8; and 38: 69) which occurs several times in versions of the tradition cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in this section. See *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 48 and 154, where Ibn al-Jawzī explains the expression as referring to an angelic council (cf., Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, III, 336, and 381-382).

[22] Among the canonical collections, the tradition is found in the following: Dārimī, *Sunan*, *ruʾya*, 12 (from Ibn ʿĀʾish); *Musnad*, I, 368 (Ibn ʿAbbās); IV, 66 (Ibn ʿĀʾish from "from one of the *aṣḥāb*"); V, 243 (Mālik b. Yakhāmir from Muʿādh b. Jabal); and V, 378 (Ibn ʿĀʾish from "one of the *aṣḥāb*"). Cf., Bukhārī, *tafsīr*, *surat* 9, 15 (from Samura b. Jundub); and *taʿbīr*, 48 (Samura b. Jundub). For discussions of the tradition in its various forms, see Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 272; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 298-301; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 215-216; Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 85-86; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 69-73; and Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 29-37.

[23] When applied to the *isnād*, the term *muḍṭariba* refers to defects resulting from the erroneous addition or suppression of names, or to the attachment of *isnāds* to texts to which they do not belong (cf., Dozy, II, 7/1).

[24] Abū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Muʿādh b. Jabal b. ʿAmr, a Companion who died in 18/639. For biographical details and his role in the transmission of *ḥadīth*, see Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 387-389.

[25] Abū'l-Khaṭṭāb Qatāda b. Diʿāma (d. 117/735), a pupil of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Anas b. Mālik and others, and who is said to have embraced the doctrine of free-will, though he apparently renounced his Qadarī views later in life. Although highly respected in certain circles, opinions varied as to his reliability as a transmitter of Prophetic sayings (cf., *Mīzān*, III, 385). For more on him, see Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 229-231; *Shadharāt*, I, 153-154;

Anas [b. Mālik]—though doubts have been expressed regarding Qatāda[26]—and Yūsuf b. ʿAṭīya[27] passed it on from Qatāda, but he too had reservations regarding him. Hishām[28] also transmitted it from Qatāda in a chain that went back from Qatāda to Abū Qilāba[29] and from him to Khālid b. al-Lajlāj[30] and finally to Ibn ʿAbbās, but [Hishām] expressed doubts about whether indeed it was received from Ibn ʿAbbās. As a matter of fact, Khālid did not receive it [from Ibn ʿAbbās] but rather from ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. ʿĀʾish[31] who, in turn, got it, not from the Prophet, but from Mālik b. Yukhāmir[32] who received it from Muʿādh."[33]

74 I have already indicated that this tradition is not sound.[34] Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī pointed out that it circulated in a number of versions, all of which are weak.[35] [According to him,] the best of these different versions are the [two] which suggest that [the tradition] has to do with a dream experience. [In one of these] Abū Hurayra is reported to have related that

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and *EI*^{2}, IV, 748, where the main sources on him are listed.

[26] Cf., *Mīzān*, III, 385, 2-4, where the charge of *tadlīs* is mentioned.

[27] Yūsuf b. ʿAṭīya Abū Sahl aṣ-Ṣaffār al-Bāhilī (d. 187/802). Among traditionists generally he was regarded as a weak authority (cf., Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 22; and *Mīzān*, IV, 468-470, where much the same assessment is given).

[28] Hishām b. Abī ʿAbd Allāh Abū Bakr ad-Dastūwāʾī (d. 153/770), a transmitter of *ḥadīth* from Qatāda; for assessments of his merits as a transmitter, see *Shadharāt*, I, 235; and *Mīzān*, IV, 300.

[29] Abū Qilāba ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. Zayd al-Jarmī , a respected jurist and transmitter from Basra who later settled in Syria and died there in 104 or 105/722 or 723). For more on him, see the substantial notice in Ibn Saʿd *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 183-185; also *Shadharāt*, I, 126.

[30] *Tahdhīb at-Tahdhīb*, III, 115. The date of his death is not mentioned.

[31] Ibn Saʿd gives his *nisba* as al-Ḥaḍramī and reports that he claimed to have received traditions from the Prophet—a claim which Ibn Saʿd appears not to take seriously (*Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 438). Dhahabī, who devotes a notice to him, declares him to be unreliable in matters of *ḥadīth* (*Mīzān*, II, 571; cf., also *Tahdhīb at-Tahdhīb*, VI, 204-205). Somewhat surprisingly, Ibn al-Jawzī makes no mention of him in his *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuaʿfāʾ*. The date of his death is not reported and apparently was unknown.

[32] Also read Yakhāmir in some sources. Ibn Saʿd gives his full name as Mālik b. Yukhāmir al-Alhānī as-Saksakī (*Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 441). According to Ibn Saʿd, he received traditions from Muʿādh and died sometime during the reign of ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān (685-705). On his reliability as a transmitter, Ibn Saʿd is non-committal.

[33] Cf., *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 33-34.

[34] Cf., *KAS*. §32 where Ibn al-Jawzī explicitly declares the tradition to be unreliable.

[35] Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, p. 298ff., but especially 300-301.

the Messenger of God said: "Someone approached me in a most beautiful form and said to me: 'About what is the High Council debating?' I replied: 'I do not know'. Then he placed his hand on my shoulders and I felt its coolness against my breast, whereupon I knew everything about which he was asking." [36] In the other version Thawbān[37] reported as follows: "The Messenger of God came out to meet us one morning after the prayers and said: 'My Lord approached me during the night in the most beautiful form and said to me: "O Muḥammad, about what is the High Council in dispute?" I said: "O my Lord, I do not know." **[fol.19a]** Thereupon He placed His hand between my shoulders until I felt the coolness of His finger-tips on my breast, and suddenly everything between heaven and earth was revealed to me.'"[38] In still another version going back to Abū ʿUbayda b. al-Jarrāḥ, the Prophet said: "During the night I was taken on a journey and I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form."[39]

75 [The various versions of] this tradition differ from each other and are open to question. One version reads "someone came to me", which would [if established] remove the problem,[40] whereas in another the Prophet is quoted as saying "I saw my Lord." It has been reported, however, that the Prophet was in a dream state when the experience in question occurred. Now what is seen in dreams has to do with "mental" images (*wahm*) [prompted by God] in order to draw [the dreamer's] attention to something that either has occurred or will occur. The images (*awhām*) that occur while in that state are not to be confused with external reality, for [in a dream] one may suppose that he is a bird in flight or that he is an animal.[41] If

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[36] Cf., *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 34, where a slightly different *matn* is traced back to Abū Hurayra.

[37] His *kunya* is given as Abū ʿAbd Allāh, a *mawlā* of the Prophet, who, following the Prophet's death, moved to Homs where he remained until his death in 54/673 (Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 400). Ibn al-ʿImād credits him with having transmitted 172 traditions from the Prophet (*Shadharāt*, I, 63).

[38] Cf., Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 219, 8ff.

[39] Cf., *al-ʿIlal al-Muntanāhiya*, I, 30, 9-15; and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, VII, 153, 1-7, where the first part of the *ḥadīth* is cited.

[40] Since the term *ṣūra* is applied to the "someone" referred to in the expression *atānī ātin*, it presumably refers to someone other than God.

[41] "Or that he is in a different location." See, Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 72-73, where essentially the same interpretation of the dream experience is given though in somewhat more detail.

someone should say that dreams experienced by prophets are true (*ḥaqq*), our response is that the essential meaning conveyed [in such dreams] is not to be equated with the forms or images apprehended.[42] It is true that the Prophet said: "He who has seen me in a dream has seen me indeed," but what he meant is that the content of the dream experience was of positive value and beneficial, not that what was seen was the Prophet's actual form (*ṣūra*), for that lies buried in Medina. One may see a person in a dream as though he were alive when in fact he is deceased. The point is that the body seen by the physical eye is not what is apprehended in the dream state. Some people have seen God in their dreams, but the essence of what was seen in such a state was the best of His qualities (*ṣifāt*), especially those expressing His concern and His acceptance.[43] If it should be said that the reference in [the tradition] is to the Prophet, then it means: "I saw [my Lord], while I was in the best of form."

76 It is surprising that someone does not seek to establish a legal ruling regarding the rite of ablutions (*wudū'*) on the basis of certain versions of this tradition—notwithstanding their confused state—for Ibn Ḥāmid used them to establish the divine attributes.[44] [In connection with his discussion

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[42] Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal sets forth his position on the vision of God in dreams as follows: والرؤيا من اللّه عزّ وجلّ وهي حقّ إذا رأى صاحبها شيئًا في منامه ما ليس هو ضغْثٌ فقصّها على عالم وصدق فيها وأوّلها العالم على أصل تأويلها الصحيح ولم يحرّف. فالرؤيا حينئذ حقّ. وقد كانت الرؤيا من الأنبياء عليهم السلام وَحْيٌ. فأي جاهل أجهل ممّن يطعن في الرؤيا ويزعم أنّها ليست بشئ. وبلغني أنّ من قال هذا القول لا يرى الاغتسال من الاحتلام. وقد رُوي عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم «إنّ رؤيا المؤمن كلام يكلّم الربّ عبده». وقال: «إنّ الرؤيا من اللّه عزّ وجلّ» (The vision of God is true when the one who has this experience sees it in a dream that is not muddled and reports it to a learned man, and tells the truth, and the learned man interprets it in a manner that is sound and does not distort. In that case the vision is to be taken seriously. The vision experienced by prophets is divinely inspired [*waḥy*]. Who is more ignorant than the one who scoffs at visions and claims they are nothing? It has been reported to me that the one who makes such a claim does not approve the performance of ablutions following a nocturnal emission. It has been related that the Prophet said: "The vision experienced by a believer is a word spoken to him by God." He also said: "Visions are from God" [*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29-30; cf., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 618]).

[43] For the sake of translation I have chosen to recast the first person of the Arabic in the impersonal form. Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 71, 3-4, where a similar point is made.

[44] Some of the longer versions of this tradition contain a reference to the rite of ablution. If the tradition will not bear the weight of a ruling on *wuḍū'*, how much less can it serve as a basis for affirming the divine attributes? That some members of his own school had used

of the divine attributes] Ibn Ḥāmid cited a version of this tradition whose *isnād* went back to Ibn ʿAbbās. In it the Prophet said: "When I was taken on a night journey I saw the All-Merciful in the most beautiful form of a beardless young man [whose face] glistened—indeed, I was instructed not to describe him to you—and I asked my Lord **[fol.19b]** that He allow me a vision (*ruʾyā*) of Him, and behold He was like a groom at the time of his unveiling, sitting on His Throne (*ʿarsh*)."[45] This tradition is a grotesque fabrication; it was never transmitted among sound traditions, and not even among the false traditions was it well known. May God be protected from such things![46] We have already shown that such things belong to the realm of the dream experience—hence, the reference to the "night journey." May God reward [the Prophet], but may He punish those with Hell who liken God to a groom! [Of such people] he will not say [on the day of judgment]: "These are Muslims." As for the reference to the coolness [of His hand] in the tradition mentioned above, it should be observed that coolness is an accident (*ʿaraḍ*) which may not be ascribed to God. In his *Kitāb al-Kifāya*, the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] mentions that Aḥmad held that the tradition "I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form" meant "in the most beautiful place (*mawḍiʿ*)."[47]

The Third Tradition

77 According to Umm Ṭufayl, wife of Ubayy [b. Kaʿb], the Prophet reported that he saw his Lord in a dream in the form (*ṣūra*) of a most handsome, dignified young man (*shābb muwaqqar*); His legs were covered by a green garment, He had gold sandals on His feet and His head was surrounded by moths of gold.[48]

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the tradition for precisely that purpose was a matter of embarrassment to Ibn al-Jawzī; he does not hide his anger at the absurdity of such a procedure. Cf., *KAS*, §33 where he identifies those conditions that must be met if attributes are to be applied to God properly.

[45] See *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 35-36, where several versions of the tradition, all ascribed to Ibn ʿAbbās, are cited; cf., also *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 214, 13-19.

[46] That is, from such things as are ascribed to Him in the tradition attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās.

[47] The term *mawḍiʿ* can also mean position, rank or occasion.

[48] Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 273-274 (cf., Lecomte, *Le traité*, 242); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 446-447; Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 85, 11-13; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XIII, 311, 12-18; *Mīzān*, IV, 269,

78 This tradition was transmitted by Nuʿaym b. Ḥammād, whom Ibn ʿAdī described as a fabricator of traditions.[49] Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn said that Nuʿaym was not to be trusted in matters of tradition. Among his *isnāds* one finds the names of Marwān b. ʿUthmān and ʿUmāra b. ʿĀmir. Of the former, Abū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān an-Nasāʾī said: "Who is this Marwān that he can be counted on to relate the truth about God?" Muhannaʾ b. Yaḥyā[50] said: "When I asked Aḥmad about this tradition, he turned his head away from me and said: 'This is a *munkar*[51] tradition and this man, that is, Marwān b. ʿUthmān, is unknown (*majhūl*).'[52] [Aḥmad] added: 'ʿUmāra is also unknown.'"

79 ʿUbayd Allāh b. Abī Salama[53] reported that Ibn ʿUmar once sent a

3-6; *DST*, 31, 11-14; *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 125, 11-18; and *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 29-30.—If the expression *farāsh min dhahab* ("moths of gold") is to be taken literally, it may mean moths made of gold and worn as ornaments. If they are real moths, i.e., live, gold-colored moths, one must picture them as having been drawn by the light of His face, circling it as if it were a lamp.

[49] Nuʿaym b. Ḥammād b. Muʿāwiya Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Khuzāʿī al-Marwazī was a Ḥanafite jurist (d. 228/842). For notices on him, see Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 519; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XIII, 306-314; and *Shadharāt*, II, 67. For a full list of biographical sources, see *GAS*, I, 104-105; and *EI*^{2}, VIII, 87-88. Ibn Saʿd and al-Khaṭīb both report that he was imprisoned during the reign of al-Muʿtaṣim because of his refusal to endorse the Muʿtazilī view of the Quran. Despite his orthodox views on the Quran, however, he was widely regarded as suspect in matters of *ḥadīth* and was accused by Nasāʾī and Dāraquṭnī of having fabricated traditions in support of Sunnī orthodoxy, of which he was a vigorous defender. For a review of opinions on his reliability as a traditionist, see *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 164 (3543); and *Mīzān*, IV, 267-270 (9102).

[50] Known also as Abū ʿAbd Allāh ash-Shāmī, he was a student and close associate of Aḥmad (cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 345-381; and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XIII, 266-268). The date of his death is not reported, but since he was a contemporary of Aḥmad, we can assume that he died soon after his visit to Mecca in 298/910.

[51] The definitions given by traditionists vary; Dozy (II, 722) defines a *munkar* tradition thus: "A tradition coming from a reporter of weak authority." Other definitions given by Dozy: "blameworthy," "prohibited," or "absurd" (cf., Burton, *Introduction to the Ḥadīth*, 200). Some *ḥadīth*-critics were ready to reject traditions regarded as *munkar* more or less outright, while others were at least prepared to give them a hearing.

[52] A name identified as *majhūl* (unknown) raises the suspicion that the name may have been a fabrication inserted into an *isnād* by a forger in a form which could not be traced or identified.

[53] Ibn Khuzayma (*Tawḥīd*, 198), al-Bayhaqī (*Asmāʾ*, 443), and Dhahabi (*Mīzān*, III, 473) give his name as ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Salama. Ṭabarī also mentions him as a *rāwī* in his *Taʾrīkh*, II, 13, 16; III, 68. I have not so far found a biography devoted to him in any of the *ṭabaqāt* works.

message to ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbbās asking him whether Muḥammad had seen his Lord. He replied in the affirmative, whereupon [Ibn ʿUmar] sent inquiring of the details. [Ibn ʿAbbās] replied: "He saw Him in the form of a young man sitting on a Throne of gold born by four angels."[54] This tradition **[fol.20a]** was transmitted [in the generation after ʿUbayd Allāh] by a sole reporter, namely, [Ibn] Isḥāq,[55] whom a number of *ʿulamāʾ* [also] accused of having fabricated the following tradition in the name of Ibn ʿAbbās: "[The Prophet] saw [his Lord], and it appeared that His legs were covered with a green garment and that He was shielded by a screen made of pearls."[56] Among the transmitters of this tradition was Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥakam b. Abān,[57] whom Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn and others declared to be weak as a traditionist. In still another tradition traced back to Ibn ʿAbbās, the Prophet is reported as having said: "I saw my Lord, and He had short, curly hair, was beardless and wore a green-colored garment."[58] Both Ḥammād b. Salama and Ibn Abī'l-Awjāʾ,[59] Ḥammād's step-son, who was also a *zindīq*,

[54] Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 198, 15-22; cf., also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 443-444; and *Mīzān*, III, 473, 18-22.

[55] The authorities cited in the preceding note all identify this person as Muḥammad b. Isḥāq b. Yasār Abū Bakr al-Makhramī, author of the well known biography of the Prophet (for an English translation, see A. Guillaume, *The Life of Muhammad* [Oxford 1955]). For an assessment of his work as a traditionist as well as numerous biographical details, see *Mīzān*, III, 468-475.

[56] Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 445, 5-7.

[57] *Asmāʾ*, 444; cf., Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, V, 548; and *Mīzān*, I, 27.

[58] *Mīzān*, I, 593, 18-19.

[59] ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Abī'l-ʿAwjāʾ (d. 155 A.H.), alleged to have been a crypto-Manichean, was expelled from Basra on account of his heretical views and subsequently made his home in Kufa. He is said to have been a part of the circle around Jaʿfar aṣ-Ṣādiq and to have raised particularly difficult questions regarding the justice of God; e.g., if God is good, why are there catastrophes and epidemics and, especially, why do children suffer? He advocated a dualistic cosmology (perhaps as a way of dealing with the problem of evil) and held to the doctrine of metempsychosis. His views finally caught up with him, and he was executed in 155/772 on the orders of Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, the ʿAbbāsid governor of Kufa. Ṭabarī reports that he was the uncle of the famous Maʿn b. Zāʾida (*Taʾrīkh*, VIII, 47-48). Near the end of his life he is reported to have confessed that he fabricated four thousand traditions. For more on this interesting figure, see the very useful article on him by G. Vajda in *EI*^{2}, III, 682. In addition to the sources cited by Vajda, see also Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 122; Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, VIII, 47-48; Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, II, 644; and Massignon, *Passion*, III, 112, n. 104. Cf., also *KAS*, §152.

were among its transmitters. The latter was in the habit of introducing traditions of this sort into the writings [of Ḥammād]. To the extent that such traditions deserve attention they are to be taken as referring to dream experiences, and since dreams have to do with the imaginary (*khayāl*), such traditions cannot serve as a basis for anything [pertaining either to practice or belief]. Thus it is not proper that such traditions be adduced as canonical evidence in support of rulings on the rite of ablutions.

The Qāḍī [Abū Yaʿlā], however, used such traditions as a basis for ascribing attributes to God. He said: "Terms such as 'young man' (*shābb*), 'beardless' (*amrad*), 'short, curly' (*jaʿad wa qaṭaṭ*), 'moths' (*farāsh*), 'sandals' (*naʿlān*), and 'crown' (*tāj*) have been established as designations that apply to God, although we do not claim to know their precise meaning [when used for this purpose]. What is affirmed in the use of such terms is nothing more than an approximation of the temporal to the eternal (*min taqrīb al-muḥdath min al-qadīm*). This is permissible since there is a tradition in which [the Prophet] said: '[God] will draw His servant near to Himself', that is, He will bring him into proximity with Himself (*yuqarribuhu ilā dhātihi*)."[60] Those who establish the divine attributes on the basis of dreams or fabricated traditions—[and then add:] "we know of course that terms such as 'youth' (*shābb*) 'beardless' (*amrad*), etc., [when applied to God] do not mean what they do in ordinary speech or experience"—are like persons who say: "So and so *stood* or *sat*, but he is not to be described as standing or sitting."

80 Ibn ʿAqīl said: "This tradition is obviously a fabrication. Those who invent traditions of this kind make every effort to provide them with chains composed of reliable authorities, but [the addition of names of reliable] transmitters is pointless if the text of the tradition (*matn*) lacks credibility.

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[60] See *Muʿtamad*, 84-86, where Abū Yaʿlā cites the tradition of Umm Ṭufayl within the context of a discussion of the *ruʾya Allāh* in the dream state. Whether such traditions can be used as a basis for establishing the divine attributes is not taken up either here or elsewhere in the *Muʿtamad* so far as I have been able to determine. Ibn al-Jawzī's comments on Abū Yaʿlā above are apparently based on one of Abū Yaʿlā's lost works. The point of the quotation attributed to Abū Yaʿlā above seems to be that the application of terms (having a clearly temporal significance) to God is an attempt to narrow the gulf between the temporal and the eternal and, in doing so, to make the reality of God's existence more tangible and thus more accessible to ordinary people. As Ibn al-Jawzī points out in the last sentence of this paragraph, this is an illegitimate use of language, for in such cases words cease to have any real meaning.

This would be like attributing to a group of reputable persons a report that the camel of a cloth merchant passed through the eye of a tailor's needle. There is no reason to regard such persons as credible transmitters given the absurdity of their report."[61]

The Fourth Tradition

81 [fol.20b] It was reported [on the authority of Anas] that the Prophet once said: "When I was taken on the night journey I saw everything pertaining to my Lord, even a crown studded with pearls."[62]

82 Among the transmitters of this tradition was Abū'l-Qāsim b. Muḥammad b. al-Yasaʿ[63] who received it from Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm.[64] Al-Azharī[65] reported that he used to sit with Ibn al-Yasaʿ for periods of an hour, and he would say at the end of the hour: "I have completed reciting the whole of the Quran since you took your seat."[66] This man was not reliable in matters of tradition. Indeed, Dāraquṭnī claimed that he was a habitual liar. May God recompense to the full people who make up *ḥadīths* like this.

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[61] See G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl* (1997), 103-104, where a somewhat different interpretation of "the third tradition" and its variants is ascribed to Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn ʿAqīl on the basis of Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Hādī's *Tuḥfat al-Wuṣūl ilā ʿIlm al-Uṣūl*.

[62] For other citations of this *ḥadīth*, see especially *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 135, 6-12; *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 115, 5-11; and *DST*, 32. A slightly different version of the tradition is found in *Mīzān*, III, 367, 17-19.

[63] ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. al-Yasaʿ Abūʾl-Qāsim al-Qāriʾ al-Anṭākī, who died in 385/995 or, according to some, 387/997. For a notice on him, see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 134-135 (cf., *Mīzān*, II, 497, for his reputation as a traditionist).

[64] His name is given as Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad al-Malaṭī aṣ-Ṣūfī (no *kunya* is mentioned). Al-Khaṭīb calls him a "raving liar" and a prolific fabricator of traditions (cf., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XII, 446). For other assessments of him, see *Mīzān*, III, 367-368. The date of his death is not given, but based on the list of his associates it would appear that he probably died sometime during the latter part of the 4th century.

[65] That is, ʿUbayd Allāh b. Abīʾl-Fatḥ, known also as Abūʾl-Qāsim aṣ-Ṣayrafī al-Azharī, originally from Iskāf (Iraq), who later settled in Baghdād and died there in 435/1043. For notices on him, see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 385; and *Muntaẓam*, VIII, 117-118 (based largely on al-Khaṭīb). Ibn Athīr reports that he was the best known of al-Khaṭīb's teachers in the science of *ḥadīth* (cf., *Lubāb fī Tahdhīb al-Ansāb*, I, 48).

[66] Cf., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, X, 135, 16-17. Also see *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 115, 14-16, where a slightly different reading is given.

The Fifth Tradition

83 In their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs*, Bukhārī and Muslim cite a tradition on the authority of Abū Hurayra according to which the Prophet said: "God will gather the people together [on the day of judgment] and will say to them: 'Let each of you follow what he used to worship'.[67] And so they will follow what they used to worship, but [only] this Community, among which there are hypocrites,[68] will remain. Then God will come to them in a *form* (*ṣūra*) which they will not recognize, and he will say to them: 'I am your Lord'. They will respond: 'We ask God's protection against the likes of you! We shall remain here until our Lord Himself comes, for we will recognize Him [when He comes]!' Then He will come to them in a *form* which they will recognize and He will say to them: 'I am your Lord.' They will answer: 'You are our Lord indeed.'"[69]

84 According to another tradition cited in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs* on the authority of Abū Saʿīd [al-Khudrī], the Prophet said: "[On the day of judgement] the Almighty will approach [the believers] in a *form* (*ṣūra*) different from the one in which they saw Him the first time, and He will say to them: 'I am your Lord'. Only the prophets will speak to Him directly, and they will ask [the people]: 'Is there a sign by which you will recognize Him?' They will answer: 'The leg (*sāq*)![70] When God uncovers His leg every believer will prostrate himself before Him.'"[71]

85 It is essential for every Muslim to believe that God is beyond *form*

[67] The fuller version found in Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 52 reads: "Let each of you follow what he used to worship. Let those who worshipped the sun follow the sun; and let those who worshipped the moon, follow it; and let those who worshipped idols, follow them."

[68] Cf., Muslim, *īmān*, 302; and Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 24.

[69] Muslim, *īmān*, 299; Bukhārī, *adhān*, 129 (cf., Houdas and Marçais, *Les traditions islamiques*, I, 268-270); *riqāq*, 52 (Houdas, IV, 313-315); *tawḥīd*, 24 (Houdas, IV, 600-605); and *DST*, 33. For references to this tradition and a discussion of the theological problems involved, see Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 257-260 (Lecomte, 228-230); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 291-294; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 174, 5-11; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 86-9; and Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 82-86.

[70] In his translation of Bukhārī's *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *tawḥīd*, 24 (*Les tradtions islamiques*, IV, 602, note 2), Houdas adds the following note on the term *sāq*: "Il s'agit d'une expression métaphorique qui équivaut à la puissance éclatante."

[71] Bukhārī, 97 (*tawḥīd*), 24 (Houdas, IV, 600-605); Muslim 1 (*īmān*), 302; and *DST*, 33, 7-11.

(*ṣūra*) in so far as it implies shape (*hayʾa*) and composition (*taʾlīf*). Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī said: "The expression 'God will come to them' means in effect that He will remove the veil in such a way that they will see Him with their eyes (*ʿiyān*) just as [in this life] they had known Him **[fol.21a]** inferentially through reason (*istidlālan*).[72] And so they will see Him with their eyes for the first time as if someone whom they had not seen before were coming to them. As for the term form [*ṣūra*], it may be interpreted in two ways. In the first place, it may be taken metaphorically to mean the essential character (*ṣifa*) of something, as in the expression 'this is the *form* of the matter (*ṣūrat al-amr*).'[73] Secondly, the objects of worship mentioned in the first part of the tradition,[74] *viz.*, the sun, moon, idols, etc., are, in effect, forms (*ṣuwar*) and bodies (*ajsām*). Now when God was associated with them[75] [through the application of the term *form* to Him in the tradition] the expression was meant to be taken as a kind of *muṭābaqa* (antithesis).[76] The words of the Prophet: '[God will come to them] in a *form* more fitting (*adnā ṣūratin*) than that in which they had "seen" Him [before]'[77] are

[72] "Just as they had known Him in this life through knowledge (*ʿilm*) and through inferential reason (*istidlāl*)" (*DST*, 33).

[73] Meaning "this is the substance (or heart) of the matter."

[74] For the text of the tradition, see the first note to §83.

[75] Literally, "coupled with...."

[76] As al-Khaṭṭābī uses the term, *muṭābaqa* denotes a word that contains two contrasting or opposed meanings. In the full text of al-Khaṭṭābī's discussion of this tradition (as preserved in Bayhaqī's *Asmāʾ*, 296-297), he gives a number of examples of *muṭābaqa*: thus, for example, the term *aswad*, he says, may be used to mean either serpent or scorpion (cf., Lane 1463/3), and *ʿasr* may mean either night or day, morning or evening, etc. (Lane 2062/2). The point of al-Khaṭṭabī's argument is that the term *ṣūra* in this tradition falls into the category of this kind of *muṭābaqa* usage; when applied to the various objects of pagan worship (the *maʿbūdāt* mentioned in the tradition), the term is used in its literal sense of form, image or shape (i.e., something external) whereas when applied to God it is used metaphorically to mean attribute or nature (i.e., something internal). On the use of the term *muṭābaqa* in literary theory, see the article "*Ṭibāq*" by W. Heinrichs in *EI*², X, 450-452. On the distinction between *muṭābaqa* and *muqābala*, see the brief comments by W. Heinrichs in *EI*², VII, 491b (cf., also *Glossary and Index of Technical Terms*, a supplement to vols. I-VII of *EI*² [Leiden 1995], 257; and Qudāma b. Jaʿfar, *Naqd ash-Shiʿr*, ed. Bonebakker [Leiden 1956], 93, 13-16).

[77] These words form part of a much longer tradition cited by Bukhārī, Muslim, and others. See, for example, Bukhārī, *tafsīr sūra* 4, 8; Muslim, *īmān*, 302; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 297, 6-7. For a somewhat different rendering of the expression *adnā ṣūratin* (cf.,

evidence that the term *form* was meant to be taken here in the sense of essential nature (*ṣifa*), for they in fact had not seen Him previously.[78] You should understand that the term *form* means the essential character (*ṣifa*) which they previously knew Him to possess."[79]

86 Another authority maintained that the expression "[God] will come to them" should be taken to mean that He will come to them in or through the terrors connected with the resurrection, the forms (*ṣuwar*) of the angels and other such things as have not yet been experienced in this life. It is from such conditions that they will seek God's protection. The expression "when our Lord comes we will recognize Him" should be taken to mean "when He brings us what we will be able to recognize of His blessing"—this latter being the *form* which they will recognize—and then He will "uncover his leg," that is, He will manifest His might (*shidda*) so as to put an end to calamities, whereupon people will prostrate themselves before Him in gratitude. Still another authority maintained that [God] will manifest a *form* (*ṣūra*) in order to test the extent of their understanding as He will do also in the sending of Dajjāl.[80] It is for these reasons that they will say: "We take refuge in God from you."[81]

87 In a tradition reported by Abū Mūsā [al-Ashʿarī] the Messenger of God said: "[On the day of judgment] people will say: 'There was a Lord (*rabb*) whom we used to worship during our lifetime.' Then they will be asked: 'Will you be able to recognize Him when you see Him?' They will answer: 'Yes!' They will then be asked: 'But how will you recognize Him, never having seen Him before?' They will reply: 'He is utterly unique (*lā shabīha lahu*)!' Then [the Lord] will remove the veil and they will see Him and prostrate themselves before Him."[82]

88 Ibn ʿAqīl said: "Taken literally (*ʿalā'l-ḥaqīqa*) *form* (*ṣūra*) belongs to that category of things that possesses size and shape—the distinguishing characteristics of bodies. We refuse to conceive God in bodily terms (*jisman*),

Houdas, *Les traditions*, III, 297).

[78] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 297, 6-7.

[79] For the full text of al-Khaṭṭābī's discussion of the term *ṣūra* as used in this tradition, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 296, 15ff. (cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 94, 12-17).

[80] See notes to §217 for more on this figure.

[81] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 90, 1-5; and 94, 2-7, where a similar interpretation is given as a possibility.

[82] *DST*, 34, 5-8; cf., *KAS*, §46 (the latter part) and notes to the translation.

for there is convincing scriptural proof [indicating the unacceptability of such language] in the verse 'There is nothing like unto Him,'[83] and because reason too tells us that if God were a body His form would be an accident (*ʿaraḍ*). If He were a substratum in which accidents inhere, **[fol.21b]** it would be possible to ascribe to Him what is predicated of bodies (*ajsām*), and He would then require a creator (*ṣāniʿ*). If He were a body and at the same time eternal, we also would admit of being eternal. The evidence requires that we assign to the term *form* a meaning that may appropriately be applied to Him. That meaning is found precisely in the term 'condition' (*ḥāl*) which lexicographers use to explain the term *form* (*ṣūra*). Thus people say: 'How is your *form* (*ṣūra*) with so and so?' or, 'so and so is in a *form* of poverty'.[84] The condition [or *form*] which they[85] reject [when speaking of God] is the one associated with injustice (*ʿasf*), and the one they recognize is that expressive of blessing (*luṭf*); hence [the reference to] the unveiling has His power (*shidda*) as its object. Changes (*taghayyurāt*) [ascribed to God] are to be predicated of His action; as for His essence, it is beyond change. God forbid that we should interpret this tradition after the fashion of corporealists (*mujassima*) who construe the term *form* as referring to His essence, for that entails both the attribution of change to Him and His [materialization] in an outward *form*.[86] Whether [that *form*] be something concrete and particular—incredible as that might be—or whether it is an idea in the mind, that [*form*] is not He, and so what they apprehend is other than He."[87]

[83] S. 42: 11.

[84] Ibn ʿAqīl's point is that if the term *ṣūra* is stripped of connotations of corporeality (which he proposes to do by construing it tropically), it may appropriately be predicated of God. For an important and fuller discussion of the problems posed by the term *ṣūra*, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 86-94, who approaches the issue from an Ashʿarite perspective. There is nothing in Ibn Fūrak's treatment of the term, however, that Ibn ʿAqīl (or Ibn al-Jawzī) would have found problematic.

[85] That is, lexicographers.

[86] Or perhaps, his association with an external form.

[87] According to Ibn ʿAqīl there can be no thought of an exact correspondence between the *form* of God conjured up in the mind (whether that be conceived as something concrete or an abstraction of some sort) and God himself. The value of a metaphorical interpretation of *form*, for Ibn ʿAqīl, is that it assumes a certain disjunction between the mental construct and the reality of the divine essence.

The Sixth Tradition

89 The *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim contains a tradition traced back to al-Mughīra [b. Shuʿba] in which the Messenger of God is reported to have said: "No 'person' (*shakhṣ*)[88] is more jealous (*aghyar*) than God; no 'person' (*shakhṣ*) is more pleased to grant pardon than He; and no 'person' (*shakhṣ*) loves praiseworthy conduct more than He."[89]

90 Although some transmitters use the term *shakhṣ* in reporting this tradition, others follow the reading: "no being (*shayʾ*) is more jealous than God."[90] In the case of traditions [containing the expression *lā shakhṣa*], transmitters simply added the term *shakhṣ* [in place of *shayʾ*] because they supposed that to be the meaning of the text, but it should be noted that the use of this expression represents a change introduced by the transmitters. The term *shakhṣ* implies the existence of a body composed of parts, for one terms something a *shakhṣ* because it possesses corporeality (*shukhūṣ*) and height (*irtifāʿ*). The truth of the matter is that the term *shakhṣ* is to be taken as referring to creatures; it is not appropriate that the term be applied to the

[88] "Person" is not an entirely satisfactory rendering of the Arabic word *shakhṣ*, for as the best lexicons of the language point out repeatedly, the term *shakhṣ* connotes "the bodily or corporeal form or figure or substance (*suwād*) of a man," or something possessing height (*irtifāʿ*) and visibility (*ẓuhūr*)—something, in short, that can be perceived from a distance (Lane, 1517/1; cf., also *Lisān*, VII, 45, 4-11). The term *shakhṣ* is entirely devoid of anything comparable to the Western notion of personhood. Because of the inadequacy of the English term "person" I have chosen for the most part to retain the Arabic in the translation of this section of *KAS*.

[89] For that version of the tradition in which the reading لا شخص (no person) occurs, see Muslim, *liʿān*, 17; *Musnad*, IV, 248; and Nasāʾī, *nikāḥ*, 37, 3. In most occurrences of the tradition, however, لا أحد (no one) is clearly the preferred reading (cf., Muslim, *tawba*, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36; Bukhārī, *kusūf*, 2; *tawḥīd*, 15, 20; and *Musnad*, I, 381, 426).—For references to the tradition, and discussions of the theological problem posed by the expression لاشخص, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 286-289, 482-483; Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 58-59; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 95-97.

[90] See Bukhārī, *nikāḥ*, 107, 3; *tafsīr surah* 6, 7; *Musnad*, VI, 348, and 352. Cf., also Lane, 1517/1; and *Lisān*, VII, 45, 10 where the words لا شيءَ أغيرُ من الله are cited and the significance of لا شيء (no thing/being) is discussed. On the theological significance of the term *shayʾ*, see Frank, "The Neoplatonism of Ǧahm b. Safwān", *Muséon*, 78(1965), 399ff., and J. van Ess, "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology," *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, 33.

Creator. Hence, the tradition should be taken to mean: there is no jealous "person" among you but that God is more jealous than he. [The tradition should not be construed in such a way that the term *shakhṣ* applies to God], for when the general class (*al-kull*) is assimilated to [a single] expression, any of the terms included in the general class may be designated [by the general term], and so [in the Quran] the punishment for an act of ridiculing (*istihzā'*) is also called "ridiculing" (*istihzā'*),[91] and the punishment for **[fol.22a]** an act of plotting (*makr*) is called "plotting" (*makr*).[92] Another example [of the same linguistic phenomenon] is to be found in a saying attributed to Ibn Masʿūd: "God did not create a Paradise or a Hell more awesome than (*aʿẓam min*) the 'Throne verse' (*āyatu'l-kursī*)."[93] Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal said: "The act of creation referred to in this statement applies only to the created realm (*makhlūq*), not to the Quran."[94] A similar usage is to be found in the verse: "On that day the inhabitants of Paradise will occupy the best dwelling (*mustaqarr*) and the most wonderful place of rest (*maqīl*)."[95] It is well known, however, that the people of Hell will not occupy either a "dwelling" or "a place of rest." It is thus possible to maintain that [the term *shakhṣ*] pertains to that from which the exception was made (*mustathnā*

[91] An allusion to S. 2: 14-15 where both the misdeed and its punishment are designated by the same term. For Ibn al-Jawzī's discussion of this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 35-36.

[92] An allusion to S. 3: 54 and 27: 50. In both sets of Quranic references, the general term embraces two quite different categories, viz., an infringement and its punishment. For Ibn al-Jawzī's discussion of 3: 54 and 27: 50, see *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 395 and VI, 182 (cf., also *Lisān*, V, 183).

[93] S. 2: 255 is generally referred to as the Throne verse. Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 288, 6-7, and 15-16, where several different versions of the saying are cited and their implications discussed.

[94] Aḥmad's point is that the saying (or its context) contains within itself an implied exception (*istithnā'*). In Bayhaqī's *Asmā'* (288, 8-9), the commentary of the well known traditionist Abū Bakr al-Ismāʿīlī (d. 371/981) is quoted as follows: فليس فيه إثبات خلق آية الكرسي وليس فيه إلا أن لا خلق في العظم كآية الكرسي، لا أنّ آية الكرسي مخلوقة (there is nothing in his statement that can be taken as affirming the creation of the Throne verse; all that is said is that there is nothing comparable to the Throne verse in greatness, not that the Throne verse was created). The background of this discussion was of course the Muʿtazilī doctrine of the created Quran, one of the principal issues at stake in the Miḥna.

[95] S. 25:24. This verse taken as it stands implies that there will be more than one *mustaqarr* and *maqīl*, and that the people of Hell will also occupy such places, though presumably places of a lesser quality.

min) within the category of genus,[96] as in the verse: "They have no knowledge of him except to follow their own suppositions."[97]

91 Some authorities permit the application of the term *shakhṣ* to God, but that is an error for reasons we have already given. As for the question of jealousy (*ghayra*), the experts maintain that one who is jealous on account of something is so because he loathes it. It was because God forbad immoral acts (*fawāḥish*) and threatened punishment for such that his Messenger attributed jealousy to him.

The Seventh Tradition

92 Abū Mūsā [al-Ashᶜarī] reported that the Prophet said: "God created Adam from a 'handful' (*qubḍa*) [of clay] which he gathered from every part of the earth."[98]

93 The meaning [of the term *qubḍa* or "handful"] is the measure of something you take in hand. [When the term is applied to God] one ought not suppose that the handful known to finite creatures is intended, for God is beyond such associations. The taking of a "handful" may be predicated of Him only in the sense that the actions of a servant may be ascribed to his master as, for example, in the verse "We blinded their eyes"[99] [for in that case the act of blinding was carried out by Gabriel]. In his *Kitāb at-Ṭabaqāt* Muḥammad b. Saᶜd reported [on the authority of Ibn Masᶜūd] that God sent Iblīs to take [a handful of clay] from the surface of the earth, and He

[96] What Ibn al-Jawzī has in mind here is the "severed (or radical) exception," i.e., the *istithnāʾ munqaṭiᶜ*, the exception that is severed from, or wholly different in kind from, the general term (*mustathnā minhu* [cf., Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, II, 335D-336A]).—Ibn al-Jawzī's point is that in the tradition cited at the beginning of this section God is implicitly excluded from the general class designated by the term *shakhṣ* on the basis of an implied *istithnāʾ*.

[97] S. 4:157. As the context indicates, the reference in the verse is to Jesus (cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 24; and Zamakhsharī, *Khashshāf*, I, 580).

[98] See Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, *sunna*, 16; Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, *tafsīr sūra* 2, 1; *Musnad*, IV, 400; Ibn Saᶜd, *Ṭabaqāt*, I, 26; and Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 91-92. Cf., also, Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 327; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 63-64; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 98-104; and *Kitāb al-Mawḍūᶜāt*, I, 190.

[99] S. 54:37. For a more detailed gloss on this text, see *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 98-99 (cf., IV, 135-140; and also W. Thackston, *The Tales of the Prophets of al-Kisaʾ*, 155-159, especially 158).

created Adam from it. It was for this reason that [Iblīs refused to prostrate himself before Adam] saying: "Should I bow before someone You made from clay?"[100]

94 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "It is possible to attribute [the expression] 'the taking of a handful' (*qabḍ*) to God, but such an attribution is not to be taken as implying that he possesses a limb (*jāriḥa*), or in the sense of exerting himself (*muʿālaja*) or making an effort (*mumārasa*) [to achieve an end]."[101] [Abū Yaʿlā] should be told: "You make statements [about God], but you do not understand [the full import of what you say]."

The Eighth Tradition

95 [fol.22b] Salmān[102] is reported to have said: "God kneaded the clay of which Adam was formed and shaped it with His hands, whereupon all that is good (*ṭayyib*) appeared in His right [hand] and all that is evil (*khabīth*) in the other hand. He then mixed the two of them together, and so He caused the living (*al-ḥayy*) to come forth from the dead (*al-mayyit*) and the dead from the living."[103]

96 This tradition, it should be noted, goes back only to a Follower;[104]

[100] S. 17:61. Cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, V, 56-57. For the reference in the *Ṭabaqāt* of Ibn Saʿd, see vol. I, 26 (cf., Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 90-91).—For other interpretations of the term *qubḍa*, some of which are explicitly metaphorical, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 97-104. It is interesting that Ibn al-Jawzī chooses not to offer a metaphorical interpretation of the term.

[101] I have found no reference to the question of *qubḍa* in the *Muʿtamad*.

[102] Apparently Salmān al-Fārisī, an early convert to Islam and a Companion who is said to have died during the reign of ʿUthmān (644-656). For more on Salmān and a list of early sources on him, see *SEI* (500-501). Among Sunnī traditionists there was some uncertainty as to the source of the tradition here cited by Ibn al-Jawzī: Ṭabarī traces it back to Salmān al Fārisī (*Taʾrīkh*, I, 93); Ibn Saʿd, on the other hand, traces it back through Salmān to Ibn Masʿūd (*Ṭabaqāt*, I 27). Al-Bayhaqī frankly acknowledges his uncertainty, merely noting that it was either from Salmān or Ibn Masʿūd (*Asmāʾ*, 327). Judging from his comments in the following paragraph, Ibn al-Jawzī regarded both attributions as problematic, for he declares the tradition to be *mursal;* that is, one that went back no further than a second generation source, that is, to a Follower (*tābiʿ*).

[103] Cf., Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, I, 27, 6-10; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 102-108; and *DST*, 36. The last part of the tradition comes directly from the Quran: S. 10: 31; 30: 19, etc. For Ibn al-Jawzī's gloss of the Quranic expression, see *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 369-370.

[104] Ibn al-Jawzī, unfortunately, gives no basis for this classification of the tradition. It is

moreover, as we have already shown, it has been established that the living God cannot be described as having contact with anything. If this tradition is reliable, it must be taken as a metaphorical reference (*ḍarb mathal*) to the operations of the divine decrees (*aqdār*).[105]

97 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "The kneading of the clay and the mixing of one part of it with another may be ascribed to the hand by which Adam was created."[106] This, however, is a thoroughly anthropomorphist interpretation (*tashbīh maḥḍ*)!

The Ninth Tradition

98 ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn reported that while he was sitting in the mosque [of Medina] Qatāda b. Nuʿmān came and spoke with him. [In the course of the conversation] he said: "Let us go and visit Abū Saʿīd [al-Khudrī],[107] for I have heard that he is ill." So we went to his house and found him reclining (*mustalqiyan*), with his right leg placed over his left. He greeted us and had us seated, whereupon Qatāda reached up and pinched his leg so that Abū Saʿd cried out: "O son of Adam, you have caused me pain!" [Qatāda] responded: "I did that intentionally, for the Messenger of God said: 'When God finished creation, he reclined and placed one leg over the other, saying: "This is something my creatures ought not do."'"[108] Abū Saʿīd said: "You are right, I shall never do this again!"[109]

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clear from the last sentence of this paragraph that he was not certain of the reliability of the tradition.

[105] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 102-108, where a similar interpretation of the tradition is given.

[106] I have found no such statement in the *Muʿtamad*.

[107] Saʿd b. Mālik b. Sinān Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī, a prominent Companion, who died in 74/693. He is said to have been present at the Battle of the Trench, but he could hardly have been more than a young lad. For notices on him, see Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, III, 624; and *Shadharāt*, I, 81.

[108] This prohibition is found in a number of traditions with quite different *matns* (cf., e.g., *Musnad*, III, 299-300; and Muslim, *libās*, 72, 73, 74) in each of which the prohibition has to do with the concern for modesty.

[109] Cf., *DST*, 36-37; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 355; and *Mīzān*, III, 365-366. Bayhaqī (*Asmāʾ*, 356, 1) notes that the tradition is not to be found in either Bukhārī or Muslim. For a discussion of the tradition, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 120-124; also Gimaret, "Deux dits de Muḥammad (Mahomet) sur les 'jambes' de Dieu," *Comptes Rendus de l'Academie des*

99 The preceding tradition was transmitted by the following authorities:[110] ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad[111] from Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Isḥāq aṣ-Ṣāghānī[112] from Ibrāhīm b. al-Mundhir[113] from Muḥammad b. Fulayḥ[114] [from his father, Fulayḥ b. Sulaymān][115] from Saʿīd b. al-Ḥārith[116] from ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn.[117] I have not seen this tradition cited in any **[fol.23a]** of the collections of *ḥadīth* worthy of trust.[118] Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal was critical of Ibrāhīm b. al-Mundhir and censured him [publicly]. Zakarīyāʾ as-Sājī[119]

Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (1996), 14ff.

[110] They are listed as they appear in the *isnād*, i.e., in reverse chronological order.

[111] That is, ʿAbd Allāh the son of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, who died in 290/902. For the more important biographical notices on him along with a list of his extant writings, see *GAS*, I, 511; cf., also *GAL*, Suppl. I, 311.

[112] Died 270/883. A respected traditionist who travelled widely and who (according to al-Khaṭīb) studied under some of the leading experts of his time. It is also from al-Khaṭīb that we learn of his close association with Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal's son ʿAbd Allāh (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, I, 240-241). Although Ibn al-Jawzī's notice on him is based on al-Khaṭīb, it is clear that he shared the latter's assessment of Ṣaghānī (*Muntaẓam*, V, 7; cf., *Shadharāt*, II, 160).

[113] Ibrāhīm b. al-Mundhir Abū Isḥāq al-Ḥizāmī al-Madanī, who died in 236/850 (cf., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, VI, 179-181).

[114] The date of his death is generally given as 197/812. For notices on him, see *Shadharāt*, I, 349; and *Tadhīb*, IX, 406-407 (see *KDM*, III, 92, for Ibn al-Jawzi's assessment of his work as a transmitter). As Dhahabī's notice on him makes clear, not all authorities shared Ibn al-Jawzī's critical appraisal (*Mīzān*, IV, 10).

[115] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 355, 14. His name is given as Fulayḥ b. Sulaymān Abū Yaḥyā b. Abī'l-Mughīra (d.168/784), a *mawlā* of Banū Khaṭṭāb. For a list of the more important notices on him see *GAS*, I, 93. Opinions as to his trustworthiness in matters of tradition varied. For Ibn al-Jawzī's views, see *KAS*, 98 (especially the later part) and *KDM*, III, 10. While noting a number of critical opinions regarding Fulayḥ, Dhahabī does point out that both Bukhārī and Muslim cite *ḥadīths* in which the name of Fulayḥ b. Sulaymān occurs (*Mīzān*, III, 365-366; cf., also *Shadharāt*, I, 266).

[116] I have not been able so far to establish the identity of Saʿīd.

[117] Abū ʿAbd Allāh ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn, a *mawlā* of the Banū Khaṭṭāb, who died in 105/723. According to Ibn Saʿd, he was a reliable transmitter though he actually transmitted very little. Ibn Saʿd also notes that he was the paternal uncle of Fulayḥ b. Sulaymān (*Ṭabaqāt*, V, 285-286).

[118] Cf., Bayhaqī, 355-356, where a similar assessment of this *isnād* is to be found.

[119] Zakarīyāʾ b. Yaḥyā b. Khallād Abū Yaʿlā as-Sājī, died 307/919 (cf., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, VIII, 459-460; and *Shadharāt*, II, 250-251). On as-Sājī's judgment, see *Mīzān*, I, 67, 7 (cf., *Taʾrīkh Baghdad*, 180-181).

reported that the traditions transmitted by [Ibrāhīm] were lacking in credibility (*munākīr*). Speaking of Fulayḥ [b. Sulaymān], Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn said that his traditions are not to be admitted (*bi'l-jā'iz*) [as evidence], and on one occasion [Yaḥyā] referred to him as a weak traditionist. Nasā'ī said that he was not to be trusted as a traditionist. As for ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn, Bukhārī noted that his traditions were not regarded as sound by the experts of Medina. Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī said: "Whenever there is a difference of opinion among the experts as to the permissibility of the traditions of Fulayḥ serving as evidence (*fī jawāz al-iḥtijāj [bihi]*), his texts should not be used as a basis for canonical decisions, especially in a matter as important as the one under consideration.

"The above tradition is also defective in another respect: Qatāda b. Nuʿmān, who is alleged to have received it from ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn, died during the caliphate of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb[120] whereas ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn died in 105A.H.[121] at the age of seventy according to al-Wāqidī. There is thus a gap in the *isnād* of the tradition as it stands. The person who is quoted in the tradition as having said 'Let us go and visit Abū Saʿīd' cannot, therefore, have been ʿUbayd b. Ḥunayn but rather an unnamed individual who related it to him. If we refuse to accept traditions with incomplete *isnāds* (*marāsīl*)[122] as a basis for legal rulings then how can we accept them when important matters [of doctrine] are at stake?" [Al-Bayhaqī] continued: "If the chain of this tradition were reliable, one might suppose that the Messenger of God had passed it on from one of the 'People of the Book' for the purpose of refuting them but that Qatāda had failed to understand his purpose."

100 The problem of the above tradition is illustrated by an incident involving Zubayr [b. al-ʿAwwām], who reported that he heard a man relating a tradition which, he claimed, had come from the Messenger of God. Zubayr listened until the man had finished and then said to him: "Did

[120] Several sources report that Qatāda died in the year 23 A.H. (A.D. 643-4), the very last year of ʿUmar's reign (Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, III, 452; Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb*, VIII, 357-8). According to the information provided above by Ibn al-Jawzī, ʿUbayd was born in the year 30 A.H., seven years later.

[121] A.D. 723.

[122] Traditions so termed are those whose *isnāds* are traced back to a Follower who reports something from the Prophet without indicating the Companion through whom the Follower received it. Such traditions are regarded as defective because they omit a link (and a critically important one) in the chain of authorities.

you receive this tradition from the Prophet?" He replied: "Yes." [Zubayr] then added: "People like this make us reluctant to report sayings attributed to the Prophet, for I myself heard **[fol.23b]** these words from him; however, he prefaced them with the qualification: 'I heard the following from one of the People of the Book.' If one had arrived after this introductory remark and the reference to the People of the Book, one would naturally have assumed that the Prophet himself had been the source of this tradition."[123] It is most likely that Zubayr actually had in mind the tradition reported by Qatāda, for the People of the Book do indeed maintain that after God created the heavens and the earth, He rested. God, however, has said: "We were not affected by fatigue."[124] It is entirely possible that the Prophet did pass the above tradition on from [the People of the Book], but that Qatāda did not hear the Prophet's initial qualifying statement.

101 [Abū] ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad reports in his *Kitāb as-Sunna*[125] that Abū Sufyān said: "I saw al-Ḥasan [sitting] with his right leg placed over his left, and so I said to him: 'O Abū Saʿīd, sitting in such a position is not proper'. Ḥasan replied: 'God combat the Jews, for [the Quran] states: "We created the heavens and the earth and what is between them in six days, and We were not affected by fatigue."'"[126] [Abū Sufyān later said:] "I knew what troubled him and so I did not respond." What Ḥasan was alluding to [in his outburst] was precisely the saying of the People of the Book which we mentioned above.[127] According to another tradition which we have reported [elsewhere] al-ʿAwwām b. Ḥawshab asked Abū Mijliz about a man who sat with his legs crossed, and he replied: "There is nothing wrong with this practice; only Jews condemn it, for they claim that God created the heavens and the earth and what is between them in six days after which he rested. God, however, has said: 'We were not affected by fatigue.' "[128]

102 One scholarly authority has interpreted the above tradition in a

[123] This appears to be the end of the quotation from Zubayr. Clearly, the following sentence cannot be a part of the quotation since Zubayr is referred to in the third person.

[124] S. 50: 38. For exegetical commentary, see *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 22 and note 2; Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, IV, 12.

[125] On this work and its author, see *GAS*, I, 511 (no. 8); cf., also *GAL*, Suppl. I, 311.

[126] S. 50: 38.

[127] What precisely Ibn al-Jawzī is referring to here (if, indeed, these are the words of Ibn al-Jawzī) is not clear.

[128] S. 50: 38.

metaphorical fashion (*taʾawwala*), on the assumption that the tradition was in fact reliable. He argued that the expression "[God] reclined (*istalqā*)" means in effect that He completed the work of creation. Thus, when someone builds a house, we say "he reclined on his back (*istalqā ʿalā ẓahrihi*)," meaning that nothing remained to be done.[129] [According to this scholar] the words "He placed one leg **[fol.24a]** over the other" means that He placed some parts of creation over certain other parts.[130] The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā], however, maintained that reclining (*istilqā*ʾ) is to be regarded as an attribute (*ṣifa*) of God and that He indeed placed one leg over the other, though not in the sense in which we ordinarily understand such things. According to him, this tradition, however, does establish that God has two legs (*rijlān*), despite confessing his ignorance as to what this might mean. Attributes may not be ascribed to God on the basis of a defective tradition like the one under consideration; even if [the tradition] were not defective, an attribute may not be ascribed to God on the basis of a tradition derived from a single authority (*akhbār āḥād*).[131] And if the meaning of the expression [*istilqā*ʾ] were not understood, how could he say that it is not permissible for human beings [to sit or recline with their legs crossed]? Such behavior was not proscribed in the past, for a prohibition presupposes a likeness between two "acts."[132] It has been reliably reported that the Messenger of God as well as Abū Bakr and ʿUmar used to recline with one foot over the other. Such a practice was objected to only when it was done without the wearing of drawers.

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[129] Cf., Ibn Furak, *Mushkil*, 121, 3-5.

[130] Or, it might be rendered: "He placed some creatures over certain other creatures." Construed in this way, the interpretation becomes a justification for a hierarchical social order. See Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil*, 121, 15-18) where just such an interpretation is suggested (Cf., also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 359-360).

[131] Cf., §33/3.

[132] God's reclining with His legs crossed can have nothing in common with the human act of reclining with crossed legs. Since there can be no connection between God's action and human action, this reference cannot serve as the basis for a prohibition. This seems to be the point Ibn al-Jawzī wishes to make here.

The Tenth Tradition

103 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] cited a report going back to Ḥassān b. ʿAṭīya[133] that one of the *mushrikīn* cursed the Messenger of God whereupon a Muslim attacked the man and killed him. [When the Prophet heard what had happened] he said [to the people]: "Why should you be surprised at the assistance of God, for His Messenger met God while He was reclining (*muttakiʾan*) and [the Messenger] was invited to sit down with him."[134]

104 There is, however, a gap (*maqṭūʿ*) in [the *isnād* of] this tradition and [its *matn*] is far from credible. If [the text] had any merit at all, it would mean that God showed favor and bestowed blessing [on the Prophet].

The Eleventh Tradition

105 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition in which Anas b. Mālik reports that the Prophet said: "[The damned] will continue to be flung into Hell (*jahannam*) until finally the latter says: 'Are there any more?' The Almighty will push His foot (*qadam*) into Hell so as to force them in, one upon the other. And so it will be filled."[135]

106 It is essential that we affirm that God's essence is not a composite entity, existing within the limits of a particular place, subject to change or characterized by movement. According to Abū ʿUbayd al-Harawī, Ḥasan **[fol.24b]** al-Baṣrī maintained that the term *qadam* [in the tradition reported by Anas] refers to those whom God causes to advance toward (*qaddama*) Hell because of their evil deeds and compels them to enter it. The *imām* Ibn

[133] According to Dhahabī, he belonged to the generation of the *tābiʿūn* and was considered by some *ḥadīth* experts to have been a Qadarī, but Dhahabī makes it clear that this was a matter of suspicion, not an established fact (*Mīzān*, I, 479).

[134] Cf., *DST*, 39; and *BA* (Beirut), 82-83. This report is not to be found in any of the standard collections of *ḥadīth*. Although Abū Yaʿlā is cited as a transmitter, neither the name Ḥassān nor the report appear in the *Muʿtamad*.

[135] For citations of this tradition in more or less the form given above by Ibn al-Jawzi, see Muslim, *janna*, 37 and 38 (for versions of the tradition that go back to Abū Hurayra, see *janna*, 35 and 36); Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 76 (cf., Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 583); *Musnad*, III, 134, 141 and 234. For discussions of this tradition, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 348ff.; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 88, and 95-99; *DST*, 39-41; and *BA* (Beirut), 83.

al-Aʿrābī[136] said: "The word *qadam* means those who advance ahead (*mutaqaddim*)." According to Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī,[137] Naḍr b. Shumayl[138] held that the term *qadam* in this tradition refers to unbelievers (*kuffār*), who, in God's foreknowledge, will be among those to enter Hell. Abū Manṣūr al-Azharī said: "The *qadam* are those concerning whose final destiny word advances on ahead to Hell." It would appear then that the term [*qadam*] may be taken in two ways. According to the first, anything you cause to advance or move forward (*qaddamtahu*) is a *qadam*[139] in the same way that what you destroy (*hadamtahu*) is called a *hadam*[140] or what you seize (*qabaḍtahu*) is called a *qabaḍ*.[141] This interpretation is supported by the full text of the tradition in which the following words appear: "As for Paradise, God will create people for it." Thus the two parts of the tradition are in agreement in that both Paradise and Hell will be augmented by the amount required to meet the number promised to each, and so they will be filled. Since Hell was promised that it would be filled, when the number of people cast into it does not fill it, it will cry out: "Are there more? Increase the number, for you promised me that I would be filled." And so [God] will send forth into it people upon people until it finally says: "It is enough!"

107 The second possible interpretation is that *qadam* is to be taken as the plural of *qādim*[142] in the same way that *ghayab* is the plural of *ghāʾib*.[143] Some transmitters of the tradition, however, have adopted the reading *rijl* instead of *qadam* on the assumption that the two terms are synonymous.

[136] Muḥammad b. Ziyād Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Aʿrābī (d. 231/846), a celebrated grammarian, lexicographer and an authority on genealogy. For a brief biographical notice and a list of sources on him see *GAS*, VIII, 126-129; and *EI*^{2}, III, 706-707.

[137] *Kitāb al-Asmāʾ*, 352, 1-2.

[138] An-Naḍr b. Shumayl b. Kharasha at-Tamīmī (d. 203/819), a member of the Basran school of lexicography and student of al-Khalīl. He was the author of a number of works, among them a work on *ḥadīth* entitled *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*. For a brief biographical sketch, see *GAS*, VIII, 58-59. See Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VIII, 218-222, for an important notice.

[139] "What is sent ahead." The argument here is that *qadam* carries the force of the passive participle, *muqaddam*.

[140] "What is destroyed" = *mahdūm*.

[141] "What is seized" = *maqbūḍ*. See Lane, 2483 for more on this phenomenon in Arabic grammar; cf., *Lisān al-ʿArab*, VII, 214, and XII, 604.

[142] That is, one who arrives, advances forward, or precedes.

[143] *Ghāʿib*: something absent, concealed or invisible.

Thus in the various versions of the tradition cited by Dāraquṭnī the term *qadam* sometimes occurs while in others the term *rijl* is used. This indicates that [some of] the transmitters of this tradition took the term *rijl* to mean a group or multitude (*jamāᶜa*), since in literary Arabic the expression *rijl min jarād*[144] is sometimes used. If the term *rijl* is used in this sense, the tradition might mean: "a throng (*jamāᶜa*) whose number resembles an 'army' of locusts will enter Hell rushing headlong to their destruction."

108 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaᶜlā] said: "The term *qadam*[145] is to be taken as an attribute of the divine essence (*ṣifa dhātīya*)." I myself heard Ibn Zāghūnī say: "[God] will place His *qadam* in Hell to demonstrate to the damned that they and their kind **[fol.25a]** will burn in Hell but that He Himself will not [be affected]." Such statements are tantamount to an admission of multiplicity in the being of God—a most repugnant doctrine! I have also seen a work written by Abū Bakr b. Khuzayma on the divine attributes, among whose chapter headings were the following: "Affirming the 'Hand' [as a Divine Attribute]," "[God's] Holding the Heaven and Earth on His Fingers," "Affirming the 'Foot' (*rijl*) [as a Divine Attribute] Contrary to the Muᶜtazila." [At the beginning of this last chapter] he quotes the verse: "Do [idols] have feet (*arjul*) with which to walk or hands with which to grasp?"[146] And then he adds: "Indeed, our Lord has informed us that those who have neither hands nor feet are like cattle."[147] I am amazed that this man, notwithstanding his great learning in scripture (*naql*), should utter such words, for he

[144] A swarm or "army" of locusts.

[145] Here construed as meaning "foot."

[146] S. 7: 195. The full verse reads: "Do [idols] have feet with which to walk, or hands with which to grasp, or eyes with which to see, or ears with which to hear?"

[147] There is no reference to cattle in the full text of the S. 7:195. There is such a reference, however, in verse 184 of this same *surah*, and it seems likely that this verse is the background of the reference to cattle. Verse 184 reads as follows: "We have created for Hell many of the jinn and of mankind; hearts have they but they understand not with them; eyes have they but they see not with them; ears have they but they hear not with them; they are like the cattle, nay, they are further astray." It is interesting that in this verse it is jinn and men, not idols or the gods, who are compared to cattle, whereas in Ibn Khuzayma's statement it is the idols/gods that are compared to cattle. The editor of the 1968 Cairo edition of Ibn Khuzayma's work argues in a footnote to this passage that in this sentence Ibn Khuzayma is in fact comparing the idolaters, not the idols, to cattle. Even when his statement is examined in context in *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd* there is nothing to indicate that Ibn Khuzayma had idolaters (as opposed to idols) in mind. One can only conclude that Ibn Khuzayma is here piecing parts of two separated verses together to make a point.

ascribes [attributes] to God which the idols were condemned[148] for not having, *viz.*, a hand that grasps and a foot that walks.[149] He should also have ascribed [to God] an ear![150] If he had understood he would not have uttered such things. It should be observed that [in the above verse] God's condemnation of idols was directed to those who worshipped them. He was, in effect, saying to them: "How can you who have hands and feet worship what has neither hands capable of grasping or feet capable of walking?"

109 Ibn ʿAqīl said: "God is beyond having the attribute of occupying space. Indeed, such a notion is the very essence of anthropomorphism (*tajsīm*), for God is not made up of parts nor does He possess bodily members by which He carries out his actions. Thus, His authority (*amr*) and His creative power (*takwīn*) do not act on Hell in such a way that He must seek the assistance of some part of Himself (*bi-shayʾ min dhātihi*) or work His will on it[151] through one of His attributes, for [when Abraham was about to be consumed by fire God merely] said to it: 'O fire, be coolness and peace!'[152] How absurd is the view [advocated by the *mujassima*] and

[148] In S. 7: 195, for example.

[149] For Ibn al-Jawzī there are several problems with this procedure: 1) Ascribing to God what the idols do not possess is a thoroughly anthropomorphist act since what are denied to idols are literal hands, feet, etc. Ibn al-Jawzī wonders why Ibn Khuzayma did not go on to attribute an ear to God since this is among the things denied to idols in S. 7: 195. 2). Ascribing to God what the idols lack is a methodologically insufficient basis upon which to establish the divine attributes since it is to make negation the basis of predication. It is Ibn al-Jawzī's contention throughout *KAS* that the divine attributes be based on positive statements from scripture interpreted in a sound fashion.

[150] For the full verse also mentions that idols do not have ears. Ibn al-Jawzī has observed that among the attributes predicated of God in *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd* no mention is made of an ear. Following Ibn Khuzayma's logic of assigning to God what the idols lack, he should also have assigned to God an ear.

[151] That is, on Hell.

[152] S. 21: 69. The background of these words is the story of how Abraham's people had attempted to burn him alive because he had destroyed their idols and called for the worship of the true God. According to the details supplied by *Zād al-Masīr* (V, 366-367), they had built an enclosure which was filled with wood and set to fire (a fire which became so intense that birds flying over it were burned to a crisp). When Abraham reached the fire from a catapult specially constructed for the occasion, God issued His command to the fire "O fire, be coolness and peace for Abraham"—as a result of which Abraham was left untouched by the fire. Ibn al-Jawzī quotes Kaʿb [al-Aḥbar] and Wahb [b. al-Munabbih] to the effect that Abraham remained in the enclosure for six days (according to some authorities forty or fifty days) during which he was visited by Gabriel, who brought him a garment

how foreign to One who is the Creator of angels and the celestial spheres! The Quran itself repudiates those who hold such views when it says: 'If these had been truly gods, they would not have gone down [to Hell]'.[153] How then is it possible to suppose that the Creator Himself will descend to Hell? He is indeed beyond the fanciful notions of the *mujassima*."

The Twelfth Tradition

110 According to a report from Abū Hurayra, the Prophet said: "[In Hell] the tooth of the unbeliever will be like Mount Uḥud [in size], and his skin will be the measure of forty-two forearms (*dhirāʿ*) in thickness, each the length of the forearm of *al-Jabbār* (*dhirāʿ al-jabbār*)."[154]

111 [fol.25b] Abū ʿAmr az-Zāhid[155] maintained that the term *jabbār* here is [not a reference to God but] to the long forearm as in the expression: *nakhla jabbāra*, "the tall palm-tree."[156] According to Ibn Qutayba, the term *jabbār*, whose plural form is *jabābira*, means "king" (*malik*).[157] The *Qāḍī* Abū Yaʿlā, however, wrote: "We maintain that [the expression *dirāʿ al-jabbār*] is to be taken in its literal sense (*ẓāhir*), for *al-jabbār* is God.[158] However, we do not attribute to God a forearm (*dhirāʿ*) understood as a bodily organ (*jāriḥa*)." How astonishing it is that reason can forsake a man to such a degree! [Abū Yaʿlā] went on to say: "It is possible that the forearm will be increased forty fold until it reaches [the thickness] of the unbeliever's skin; [nonetheless] it is to be ascribed [to God] as an attribute of the divine

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and a carpet from Paradise. Ibn ʿAqīl quotes this verse to show that God does not need to be present in Hell literally in order to effect his will in or on it. For additional details on this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, V, 366-367; also Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, II, 578.

[153] S. 21: 99. For Ibn al-Jawzī's exegesis of this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, V, 391.

[154] For references to this tradition along with commentary, see Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 270-271 (cf., Lecomte, 239); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 341-343 (esp. 342); *DST*, 41-42; and *BA* (Beirut), 86-87. For variant forms of this tradition, see Muslim, *janna*, 44; Tirmidhi, *janna*, 3; and *Musnad*, II, 26, 328, 334, 537; and III, 29.

[155] On the identity of this person, see notes to §47.

[156] Cf., Lane 375, 1-2, where the expression is said to mean "the tall and young" palm tree, or one "tall and above the reach of the hand."

[157] A *dhirāʿ jabbār* would be a "king-size" forearm (Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 270-271; cf., Lecomte, *Le traité*, 239; also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 342, 20ff.).

[158] *Al-Jabbār* is indeed one of the ninty-nine names of God.

essence, though not in the sense of an actual limb."[159] However, if he did not have in mind a limb, how could it be increased forty fold?

The Thirteenth Tradition

112 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] reported that Mujāhid[160] said: "On the day of judgment David will acknowledge his sin, and God will say to him: 'Take a place in front of me (*amāmī*)!' Then David will say: 'O Lord, my sin!' God will reply: 'Take a place behind me (*khalfī*)!' Then David will say again: 'O Lord, my sin!' Thereupon God will say: 'Take my foot (*qadamī*)!'" In the version of this saying transmitted by Ibn Sīrīn, the following is added: "Then God will draw near to David so that he will be able to place his hand on [God's] thigh (*fakhidh*)."[161]

113 It is astonishing that anyone should attempt to base the divine attributes on statements derived from the Followers (*tābiʿīn*); [furthermore, this saying] may not actually reflect their views though it may meet the criteria of sound transmission,[162] for they may merely have been passing on what they had derived from the the *Ahl al-Kitāb*, as in the case of Wahb b. Munabbih. The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "We take the [above] saying in its literal sense (*ʿalā ẓāhir*) although we do not construe the terms 'foot' and 'thigh' to mean actual bodily members, nor do we take 'in front of' in a spatial sense." It is

[159] The question of the *dirāʿ al-jabbār* is not taken up in the *Muʿtamad* so far as I have been able to determine. Ibn al-Jawzī is undoubtedly quoting from one of the lost works of Abū Yaʿlā.

[160] Mujāhid b. Jabr Abū'l-Ḥajjāj, the "leading" expert on *tafsīr* of his generation, who, despite Ṭabarī's frequent use of his glosses on the Quran, was often criticized in later biographical works for having relied unduly on Jewish and Christian sources. For a list of biographical sources on him, see *GAS*, I, 29; and *EI*^{2}, VII, 293. Cf., also the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nuʿaym, III, 279-310; Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VI, 242-243; Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ghayat an-Nihāya*, II, 41-42; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṣafwa*, II, 117-119; and Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, III, 439-440, where questions are raised regarding his reliability.

[161] See *DST*, 42-43; and *BA* (Beirut), 87-88, where this saying is cited and glossed. Also see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 338,where a slightly different version of this tradition is cited and discussed. The tradition is not cited in the *Muʿtamad*.

[162] That is, this saying may well have been transmitted by the *tābiʿūn*, but it may not reflect their views since some of what they passed on came from the *ahl al-Kitāb*. Such sayings meet the formal requirements for sound transmission, but they do not carry the moral authority of the *tābiʿūn*. This seems to be Ibn al-Jawzī's point.

astonishing that [in enumerating the divine attributes] such persons produce a complete bodily form replete with a thigh (*fakhidh*), a leg (*sāq*), a foot (*qadam*), a face (*wajh*), two hands (*yadayn*), fingers (*aṣābiᶜ*), even a little finger (*khinṣir*) and a thumb (*ibhām*), a side (*janb*) and a waist (*ḥaqwᵓ*), [along with such movements as] ascending (*ṣuᶜūd*) and descending (*nuzūl*). They say: "We take these attributes in their literal meaning (*ᶜalā ẓāhir*), though not in the sense of bodily members (*jawāriḥ*)." How is it possible for an intelligent person to attribute to God a back or a front or a thigh [literally though not in the sense of a bodily member]? We ought to avoid discussing [matters of this sort] with such persons, **[fol.26a]** for we already know[163] that the thigh [ascribed to God in the *ḥadīth*] is not a thigh, nor the back a back. People like this should not discourse [on such matters], for they treat the principles of reason with disdain as though they were speaking to children.

The Fourteenth Tradition

114 According to a tradition reported by Abū Hurayra, which is cited by Bukhārī and Muslim in their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs*, the Messenger of God said: "God will laugh at two men [as they approach Paradise]; although one of them killed the other, both will enter Paradise."[164] Among those traditions found only in Muslim's collection there is one reported by Ibn Masᶜūd in which the Prophet is said to have laughed when he spoke of the last person to enter Paradise. Someone then asked him why he was laughing and he replied: "Because the Lord of the worlds will laugh when [the last person to

[163] And hence we do not need to be told.

[164] For the full tradition, see Muslim, *imāra*, 128 and 129; Bukhārī, *jihād*, 28 (cf., Houdas and Marçais, *Les traditions*, II, 294); Nasāᵓī, *jihād*, 38; Ibn Māja, *Muqaddima*, 13; and Mālik, *Muwaṭṭaᵓ*, *jihād*, 21. In the full tradition, the portion quoted by Ibn al-Jawzī is followed by these words: "[Those listening to the Prophet] said: 'O Messenger of God, how can this be?' He replied: 'One of them will fight in the way of God and will die a martyr's death. God will then turn to his killer and guide him aright so that he embraces Islam. Then when he is fighting in the way of God he too will die a martyr's death.' " For discussions of the question of God's laughing, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāᵓ*, 467-469; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 230-241; Ibn Qutayba, *Taᵓwīl*, 266-267 (cf., Lecomte, 235-236); and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 474-477.

enter Paradise] says: 'Are You making sport of me?'"[165]

115 The term "laughing" [in Arabic usage] carries with it the connotation of becoming evident or manifest. Thus when someone brings to light what was previously concealed, it is said that he laughed. It is also said that the earth laughes when vegetation appears and flowers break forth in blossom. Similarly, it is said that the heavens weep, as the poet has said:

> Every time a new camomile [appears],
> The earth laughs as heaven weeps.[166]

The act of laughing [in the literal sense], which for humans involves baring the teeth, is impossible for God. [When applied to God] the expression should be taken to mean that He manifests His generosity (*karam*) and kindness (*faḍl*). Thus, when the Prophet said: "I laughed on account of my Lord's laughing," he merely meant that he opened his mouth in order to express God's kindness and generosity.[167] In another *ḥadīth* [whose concluding line reads]: "We will not fail to receive good from a Lord who laughs,"[168] [Abū Razīn] was, in effect, expressing his pain over the separation [in the hereafter] between himself and those "persons" (*ajsām*) who will have no hope of receiving good from God.[169]

This [kind of] metaphorical interpretation (*taʾwīl*) was employed by a

[165] For the full text of this *ḥadīth*, see Muslim, *īmān*, 310b; cf., also *Musnad*, I, 392 and 411; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 474; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 231; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 476, 9-10.

[166] See Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 476, 5, where the last part of this line is cited with a brief commentary (cf., also Bayhaqī, 474, 11-12).

[167] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 477, 7-12.

[168] This last line is actually Abū Razīn al-ʿUqaylī's response to the words of the Prophet given in the first part of the tradition. The full text, as recorded in the *Sunan* of Ibn Māja (*muqaddima* 13/181) reads: ضحك ربُّنا من قُنوط عباده وقُرْبِ غيرِه. قال، قلتُ: يا رسول اللّه، أو يضحك الربُّ؟ قال: نعم. قلتُ: لن نعدم من ربٍّ يضحك خيراً عن وكيع بن حدس عن عمّه أبي رزين قال: قال رسول اللّه: (The Messenger of God said: "Our Lord laughs at the despair of His servants and the imminence of the change He will shortly bring about." I (Abū Razīn) said: "O Messenger, will the Lord laugh?" He replied: "Yes." I said: "We will never lack good from a Lord who laughs" [cf., also *Musnad*, IV, 11-12; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 473, 2-6; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 235, and note 3]). In the prophetic saying "God laughs at the despair..." He laughs, not in the sense of making-fun or belittling, but out of relief knowing that the despair will soon be replaced by joy.

[169] See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 467-474, where a number of authorities are cited in support of this interpretation (cf., *Mushkil*, 474ff.).

number of *ʿulamāʾ* [in dealing with this tradition]: al-Khaṭṭābī maintained that references to God's laughing are to be taken as expressing His satisfaction (*riḍā*) and the excellence of the reward.[170] In another tradition whose words are those of a Companion (a *ḥadīth mawqūf*), it is reported that "[the Prophet] laughed so heartily that the inside of his mouth and molars were visible." Al-Khallāl[171] quoted this tradition in his *Kitāb as-Sunna*, [and he observed that] al-Marwazī[172] once asked **[fol.26b]** Abū ʿAbd Allāh[173] what he thought about this tradition and that he replied: "It is objectionable (*bashiʿ*)." He continued:[174] "[If we assume the report to be true] the reference to laughing may be interpreted in two ways. In the first place, it may be construed as referring to the Prophet; that is, upon being informed that God laughed, [the Prophet himself] laughed so heartily that the inside of his mouth and molars were visible, just as it is reported in another tradition that [the Prophet] laughed until his teeth could be seen. This would be the correct interpretation were the tradition to be accepted as a reliable report. As a matter of fact, however, [its *isnād*] does not go back to the Prophet himself.[175] The second possibility is that 'laughing' is to be taken metaphorically (*tajawwuzan*) as a way of expressing God's abundant generosity (*karam*) and satisfaction (*riḍā*), in the same way he expressed himself in metaphor when he said: 'To him who approaches Me walking I will come running'."

116 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "It is not impossible to take these traditions [which refer to God's laughing] in their literal sense (*ẓāhir*), that is, by taking them as they are, without subjecting them to metaphorical

[170] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 469, 7-9; and 470, 2-5.

[171] Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Hārūn Abū Bakr al-Khallāl (d. 311/923), a student of Abū Bakr al-Marwazī and a leading figure in the early history of the Ḥanbalī school. For valuable accounts of his life and work, see *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 12-15; and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, V, 112-113. For a more complete list of sources on him, see *GAS*, I, 511-512. His *Kitāb as-Sunna* appears to be lost.

[172] Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥajjāj Abū Bakr al-Marwazī (d. 275/888), credited with a number of important works, among them an abridgement of the *Masāʾil* of Aḥmad. For a rather detailed account of his life, see *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 56-63; also see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IV, 423-425 and *GAS*, I, 507.

[173] Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal.

[174] A comparison of the text of *KAS* with the wording found in *DST* (44) and *BA* (fol. 29a) indicates that what follows is a continuation of the commentary of Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad.

[175] That is, it is a *ḥadīth maqṭūʿ*.

interpretation (*taʾwīl*). We do not, however, take them to mean that God laughs in the sense of opening his mouth or [that his laughing entails] the movement of other bodily organs." It is astounding that this man should have ascribed attributes to God on the strength of traditions that have a slender documentary base (*aḥādīth āḥād*) and contain expressions open to serious question. If he did not attribute to God a laughing in accordance with the principles of reason (*maʿqūlan*) he did nonetheless interpret the expression metaphorically (*taʾawwala*) without realizing that he was doing so.[176] How astonishing it is that he could take the expression "laughing" as an expression referring to [God's] favor (*faḍl*) and blessing (*inʿām*). As for the term "molars" how is it to be taken? By God, if [such an expression] were to be found [ascribed to God] in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs* it would be necessary to reject it. How much more if [the tradition in which the expression occurs] does not rest on a reliable base (*aṣl*)! After Aḥmad had transmitted the tradition "If only the people would keep aloof from them," that is, the rulers (*umarāʾ*), he later said: "Strike this tradition [from the record of sound traditions]."[177] Now this tradition is found in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs*.[178] How much more rigorous should one be in the case of a tradition which is not established [and] which runs counter to both revelation and reason! Those who affirm the molars (*aḍrās*) as a divine attribute (*ṣifa*) do not really understand Islam.

[176] Despite Abū Yaʿlā's insistance on taking "laughing" in its literal (*ẓahir*) sense, he does end up, in Ibn al-Jawzī's view, adopting a quasi-figurative interpretation. Ibn al-Jawzī's complaint seems to be Abū Yaʿlā's inconsistency and his failure to recognize what he is doing. Ibn al-Jawzī, of course, objected to Abū Yaʿlā's willingness to consider an *āḥād* tradition as an appropriate basis for a discussion of the divine attributes.

[177] According to his son ʿAbd Allāh, it was not until the very end of his life that Aḥmad finally declared this saying to be in conflict with the teaching of the Prophet and ordered that it be striken from the record of sound traditions (cf., *Musnad*, II, 301, 23-27). ʿAbd Allāh's comments on this tradition (as reported in the *Musnad*) are as follows: قال أبي في مرضه الذي مات فيه: اضرب على هذا الحديث فإنه خلاف الأحاديث عن النبيّ صلّى الله عليه وسلّم (My father said to me shortly before his death: "Remove this *ḥadīth* [from the *Musnad*], for it is in conflict with [other] *ḥadīths* that go back to the Prophet").

[178] See Bukhārī, *manāqib*, 25; and Muslim, *fitan*, 74.

The Fifteenth Tradition

117 In a saying classified as *mawqūf* (that is, one going back to a Companion), the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] reported that ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar once said: "God created the angels from the light of [His] two forearms and breast (*dhirāʿayn wa ṣadr*)."[179]

118 On the basis of this tradition the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] attributed two forearms and a breast to God as attributes, although he qualified it by saying that these are not to be thought of as parts of the body. This is **[fol.27a]** reprehensible, for the saying does not in fact go back to the Prophet (*laysa bi-marfūʿ*) nor is what it states true. Is it conceivable that finite creatures were made from [the light of] God's eternal essence? This is even more offensive than what Christians teach!

The Sixteenth Tradition

119 In the following tradition reported by Ibn ʿUmar and cited in the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim, the Prophet is quoted as saying: "[On the day of resurrection] God will bring the believer near [to Himself] and will cover him with His side (*kanaf*). And God will ask: 'Do you acknowledge [having committed] such and such a sin?'"[180]

[179] Since no mention is made of the Prophet, it would appear that Ibn ʿUmar is speaking for himself and not presuming to speak for the Prophet though that is not entirely clear. This saying is not cited in the *Muʿtamad*. See Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil*, 143, 5) and Bayhaqī (*Asmāʾ*, 342, 23-343, 1-5) where the saying is attributed to ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr [b. al-ʿĀṣ]. In addition to the version of the saying cited above by Ibn al-Jawzī, Ibn Fūrak cites an interesting variation: خلق الله تعالى الملائكة من شعر ذراعيه وصدره أو من نورهما (God created the angels from the hair of His forearms and His chest, or from their light [cf., also 144, 4]). Ibn Fūrak notes, however, that the saying in its various forms is problematic for several reasons: 1) it does not go back to the Prophet and thus must be taken as reflecting nothing more than the views of Ibn ʿAmr, and 2) it contains a number of grossly anthropomorphic expressions. For references to the creation of angels from light, see the *Musnad*, VI, 153 and 168 (cf., also Muslim, *zuhd*, 60; and Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 8 [Lecomte 6, n. 3]).

[180] For the full text of this tradition, see: Bukhārī, *maẓālim*, 2; *tafsīr surah* 11; *adab*, 60; *tawḥīd*, 36; Muslim, *tawba*, 52; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (183); *Musnad*, II, 74 and 105; *DST*, 44; and *BA*, 29a. See also Ibn al-Jawzī's *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, II, 302-303, where the tradition is cited and briefly discussed. Although Ibn al-Jawzī presents essentially the same point of view in this latter work, the authorities cited in support of that view differ from

120 The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain that the tradition means that God will bring [the believer] near to His mercy. Ibn al-Anbārī[181] said: "The expression 'His side' (*kanafuhu*) is to be taken [metaphorically] as meaning 'His attentive care' (*ḥiyāṭa*) and 'His protection' (*satr*). When someone surrounds or covers another person [with protection], it is said that he has given him his side. Whatever covers a thing is said to give it its side (*kanaf*). Thus a shield carried in battle (*turs*) is called a *kanīf* since it provides a protective covering to its bearer."

121 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "[This tradition] means that God will bring [the believer] near to Himself (*dhātihi*)."[182] These are the words of one who does not comprehend God[183] or realize that nearness defined in spatial terms is not applicable to Him. Thus when the Prophet said: "[God] draws near to [the believer] on the day of ʿArafa," he meant that [God] draws near in His mercy (*luṭf*) and His pardon (*ʿafw*).

The Seventeenth Tradition

122 In a tradition cited in [the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of] Muslim, and transmitted by a single authority, Muʿāwiya b. al-Ḥakam reported the following: "I had a young slave girl who tended my sheep. One day I went out [to the herd] and discovered that a wolf had seized one of the lambs. Being human I became angry and beat her. Afterward when I met the Prophet he reprimanded me for that, and I asked him whether I should set her free. He replied: 'Bring her to me!' When I had fetched her he said to her: 'Where is God?'"[184]

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those used here in *KAS*. For an Ashʿarite view on the proper interpretation of this tradition, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 154-157.

[181] Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim Abū Bakr al-Anbārī (d. 328/940), a member of the Kufan school of lexicography and grammar, and the author of important works in both disciplines. His *Kitāb Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (no longer extant) is perhaps the source of Ibn al-Jawzī's quotation above. For a summary of biographical details and a list of his most important writings, see *GAL*, I, 118; Suppl. I, 182-183; *GAS*, VIII, 151-154; and *EI*^{2}, I, 485b. Ibn al-Anbārī is not cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in his discussion of the term *kanaf* in his own *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (I, 302-303).

[182] I have found no reference to the question of God's *kanaf* in the *Muʿtamad*.

[183] Ibn al-Jawzī's point seems to be that Abū Yaʿlā failed to appreciate what follows necessarily from an affirmation of divine transcendence.

[184] See §34 where the Prophet's question is referred to and discussed briefly.

She answered: 'He is in heaven.'[185] Then he asked: 'Who am I?' She replied: 'You are the messenger of God'. He then [turned to me and] said: 'Free her, for she is a believer,' "[186]

123 We have already pointed out in an earlier part of this work that the Prophet was concerned [above all] to establish the fact of God's existence (*ithbāt al-wujūd*) [in the consciousness of his people].[187] Consequently, he spoke to them in terms with which they were familiar and emphasized [only] what was essential to the establishment [of God's existence]. He was satisfied to speak to them **[fol.27b]** in generalities (*jumal*) since elaborating on the details (*tafṣīl*) might cause confusion in the minds of the untutored.[188] However, it has been established among the *ʿulamāʾ* that heaven and earth do not contain Him nor is He located within the bounds of particular places (*aqṭār*). [The girl's statement that God is "in heaven"] is to be understood simply as her way of exalting the Creator.[189]

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[185] Cf. §60.

[186] For the full text of this tradition, see Muslim, *masājid*, 7 (33); Abū Dāwūd, *ṣalāt*, 167; *aymān*, 16 (1); Nasāʾī, *sahw*, 20; *Musnad*, II, 291; V, 447, 448; and Dārimī, *nudhūr*, 10. For discussions of the tradition, see *DST*, 45; *BA* (Beirut), 93-94; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 421-422; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 157-169; and Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 56. See Gimaret, *Image*, 66-67, where other versions of this tradition are cited and their sources given.

[187] See especially §34.

[188] What Ibn al-Jawzī seems to mean here is that in his conversation with the slave girl, the Prophet was satisfied with the general statement that God is in heaven and refused to get into a discussion of the details of what that might mean (cf., *Talbīs*, 83, 4, where *jumal* is contrasted with *tafāṣīl*). In §34 Ibn al-Jawzī seems to be saying something slightly different in regard to the approach of the Prophet—*viz.*, emphasizing the concrete and the particular so as to make God's existence something real.

[189] It is clear from this last line that Ibn al-Jawzī again opts for a metaphorical interpretation of the reference to God's being in the heaven—an interpretation advanced quite commonly in Ashʿarite circles (cf., the *Mushkil* of Ibn Fūrak [p. 159-160] where the view is supported by both theological and philological arguments; and Gimaret, *Image*, 68-69). For al-Ghazzālī's use of this tradition, see Frank, *al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School*, 39.—It is curious that Ibn al-Jawzī makes no mention of Abū Yaʿlā in connection with this tradition even though the latter held views which Ibn al-Jawzī would clearly have found problematic. Indeed, it is on the basis of a version of the above tradition that Abū Yaʿlā argues that it is possible to speak of God's location in space, or as he puts it, God's "whereness" (*aynīya*): ويجوز عليه سبحانه الأينيّة فيقال: أين هو؟ خلافًا للمعتزلة والأشعريّة في منعهم ذلك، والدلالة على جوازه ما رُوي عن معاوية بن الحكم قال...وروى أبو رزين قال: قلت: يا رسول اللّه أين كان ربّنا قبل أن يخلق السماوات والأرضين؟ قال: كان في عماء ما فوقه هواء وما تحته هواء ثمّ خلق العرش على الماء (It is possible to

The Eighteenth Tradition

124 The following tradition was handed down from Abū Razīn [al-ʿUqaylī][190] who reported: "I asked [the Prophet]: 'O Messenger of God! Where was God before He created His creatures?' He replied: 'He was in clouds (*fī ʿamāʾ*); below them[191] there was empty space (*hawāʾ*)[192] and above them there was empty space. Then He created His Throne (*ʿarsh*) above the waters.'"[193]

125 [As for the *isnād*] Yaʿlā b. ʿAṭāʾ was the only person to transmit this saying from Wakīʿ b. Ḥudus[194] [who in turn had gotten it from Abū Razīn]. Indeed, Yaʿlā is the only person known to have received traditions from Wakīʿ.[195] [As for the text of this tradition], the term *ʿamāʾ* means clouds (*saḥāb*).[196] It should be noted that the terms "above" (*fawq*) and "below" (*taḥt*) have "clouds," not the Creator, as their point of reference. Further,

attribute "whereness" (*aynīya*) [to God] for [the Prophet] was once asked: "Where is He?"—his in contrast to the Muʿtazilites and the Asharites who refuse to use that kind of language [in relation to God]. The evidence supporting the permissibility [of such language] comes from a tradition related by Muʿāwiya b. al-Ḥakam...going back to Abū Razīn, who asked the Prophet: "O Messenger of God, where was our Lord before he created the heavens and the earth?" He replied: "He was in the clouds; above them there was nothing and below them there was nothing; then He created the Throne above the waters" [*Muʿtamad*, 56, 10-19]).

[190] Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, V, 518.

[191] On the antecedent of the pronoun, cf., Lane 2161/3.

[192] See Lane (3046/3) where *hawāʾ* is defined as "a vacancy; vacuity; a vacant, or an empty, space; a vacant, or an empty, thing." For other possible interpretations, see Gimaret, *Image*, 62-65.

[193] Among the many occurrences of this saying, see the following: Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (182); Tirmidhī, *tafsīr sūra* 11 (1); the *Musnad*, IV, 11, 12; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XV, 246, 9-12; and also his *Taʾrīkh*, I, 37, 6-10. This tradition, like other prophetic sayings bearing on questions of cosmology, generated intense debate. In addition to discussions found in various of Ibn al-Jawzī's works (e.g., *DST*, 45-46; *BA* [Beirut], 94-95; a*l-Ḥadāʾiq fī ʿIlm al-Ḥadīth*, I, 81-82; and *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, II, 128), see also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 376ff.; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 221-222 (Lecomte, 246-247); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 168-175; and Abū Yaʿlā, *Muʿtamad*, 56, 18-20 (cf., also notes to the preceding tradition here in *KAS*). For additional references as well as an analysis of the saying, see Gimaret, *Image*, 61-65.

[194] In some sources, his name is given as Wakīʿ b. ʿUdus (e.g., Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, V, 520; Dhahabī, *Mīzān* IV, 335). He is said to have been a nephew of Abū Razīn and to have died in 209/824 (*Tahdhīb*, XI, 403-404).

[195] Cf., al-Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 377, 1-2 (cf., *Mīzān*, IV, 335, 16-17).

[196] Cf., Ibn al-Jawzī, *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, II, 128.

the preposition "in" (*fī*) has the force of "above" in this expression and indicates that God is "above the clouds" by virtue of His sovereignty (*tadbīr*) and power (*qahr*).[197] Since people are familiar with the world of created things (*makhlūqāt*), it is natural for them to inquire about it, including the clouds (*saḥāb*), which are part of His creation. If [the Prophet] had been asked about what existed before the clouds, he would have said that only God existed. Indeed, ʿImrān b. Ḥuṣayn reported that the Prophet once said: "[In the beginning] God existed and there was nothing apart from Him."[198] Abū'l-Ḥusayn b. al-Munādī[199] said—indeed, I transcribed his words from a document written in his own hand: "Describing the *hawāʾ*[200] as being above or below Him is abhorrent to the learned (*ahl al-ʿilm*) because it implies containment [within space] and posits something like a receptacle (*wiʿāʾ*) for Him who is not like [other] beings (*asyāʾ*). We are in agreement that no part of creation is above the Almighty in any sense, and that He neither indwells things in His essential being nor is He separate from them. If He were present in things He would be part of them, and if He were separate from them He would be absent from them.[201] Agreement amongst us on this point is not limited to this text in regard to what is an objectionable

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[197] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 173-174.

[198] Cf., Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh*, I, 38, 10; also his *Tafsīr*, XV, 248, 10-11. In both cases, ʿImrān, a Companion, is cited as the source of the report. Little is known of him except that he took a special interest in those sayings of the Prophet that had cosmological implications, apparently enjoyed expensive clothing, and died sometime during the reign of Muʿāwiya (cf., Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, IV, 287-291).

[199] Aḥmad b. Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad Abū'l-Ḥuṣayn b. al-Munādī (256-336/869-947), a Ḥanbalī traditionist and the author of a number of works on the Quran and the *ḥadīth* (cf., *GAS*, I, 44). According to Ibn Kathīr (*Bidāya*, XI, 233), Ibn al-Jawzī had a high opinion of his works and recommended them to others as sources of reliable instruction. For additional notices on him, see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IV, 69-70; *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 3-6; and *Muntaẓam*, VI, 357-358.—I have not so far been able to locate the statement attributed above to Ibn al-Munādī in any other source.

[200] It is possible perhaps that the reading of the MS (الهـــوى) is a garbled form of the Arabic root إله, and not *hawāʾ* as I have tentatively read it.

[201] For Ibn al-Munādī God's relationship to the world of finite existence cannot be defined in spatial terms, and so he appeals to a kind of dialectic of presence and absence. God's relationship to the world is not an either/or but rather a both/and kind relationship. What is worth noting is that Ibn al-Munādī (d. 336/947) was a Ḥanbalī, indeed, a contemporary of ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad, and appears to have been conversant with the language of *kalām*. *Kalām* appears to have had an influence on Ḥanbalism, or at least some Ḥanbalīs, as early as the first part of the 10th century—a century before Abū Yaʿlā.

interpretation [of it]. A metaphorical interpretation (*taʾwīl*) [of this tradition], however, is the [most] reliable one."

The Nineteenth Tradition

126 [fol.28a] In the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition in which Abū Hurayra reported the following: "A man came to the Messenger of God one day and said: 'I am tired and hungry!' The Prophet then called out: 'Who will show this man hospitality tonight?' One of the Anṣār responded: 'I will'. When he had arrived home with his guest he said to his wife: 'Is there any food in the house?' She replied: 'Only enough for my sons!' He said to her: 'Entertain them by whatever means you can, and if they ask for food send them to bed. When our guest (*ḍayf*) sits down to eat extinguish the lamp and make it appear to him that we are eating!' And so they sat while the guest ate. The following morning when [the Anṣārī] went out the Prophet said to him: 'God was amazed (*ʿajiba*) at your treatment of your guest last evening.'"[202]

127 Among the traditions unique to Bukhārī there is one in which the Prophet is reported by Abū Hurayra to have said: "Your Lord is amazed (*ʿajiba*) at people who are brought in chains and made to enter Paradise."[203]

128 The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain that amazement (*ʿajab*) has to do only with what occasions surprise in a person, and so it strikes his fancy because of what he did not know. Such a response, however, is not appropriate for the Creator. [When applied to God the term "amazement"] simply means that He regards the thing or event as significant, for the one who is amazed at something regards it as significant. The expression "in chains" [in the second tradition cited above] was intended to suggest that people are sometimes constrained to submit to God and that it is on this account that they will

[202] For this tradition in its variant forms, see: Muslim, *ashriba*, 172; Bukhārī, *tafsīr sūra* 59, 6 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, III, p. 468); Bukhārī, *manāqib al-anṣār*, 10 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, III, pp. 7-8); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, p. 469; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 267 (Lecomte, *Le traité*, 235); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 191-194; and *DST*, p. 48-49. For a lengthy paraphrase and explanation of this tradition by Ibn al-Jawzī, see his *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 213-214.

[203] See the following for this tradition in its various forms: Bukhārī, *jihād*, 144 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, II, p. 350); Abū Dāwūd, *jihād*, 114 (see Lane, 1956/3, for a translation); *Musnad*, II, pp. 302, 406, 448; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 191; *DST*, p. 49; Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān*, I, 581/1; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, p. 476.

enter Paradise. Ibn al-Anbārī[204] held that the expression "your Lord is amazed" [in the second tradition is a metaphorical way of saying] that He will grant them His blessing (*inᶜām*) and favor (*iḥsān*). It was this that the Prophet meant when he referred to God's amazement.

129 Ibn ᶜAqīl said: "In its most basic sense the term amazement (*ᶜajab*) denotes a response to something that is deemed to be unusual or extraordinary (*istighrāb*), that is, a response to the discovery of something not known previously, for with things that are commonplace amazement is inconceivable. Thus, when a person observes for the first time a magnet attracting iron he will [naturally] be amazed. But how can the Creator, from whose knowledge nothing is hidden, be amazed [in this sense]? The only plausible explanation of the traditions in question is that they refer to events whose occurrence occasioned 'delight' in Him, in the same way that laughing can **[fol.28b]** only be the expression of someone who is pleased as, for example, in the words of the Prophet: 'God is filled with more joy when one of His creatures repents,' [205] that is, he is pleased. God himself said: 'Each party rejoices (*farihūna*) in what they have,' [206] that is, they are pleased."

130 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaᶜlā] said: "[The Prophet] did not attribute 'amazement' to God [metaphorically] as a way of indicating the importance of something to Him. On the contrary, we affirm [*ᶜajab*] to be a divine attribute." [207] This point of view has nothing to commend it.

The Twentieth Tradition

131 This tradition has already been discussed in the preceding section.[208]

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[204] On Ibn al-Anbārī, see notes to §120.

[205] The full sentence reads: "God is filled with more joy when one of his creatures repents than you are when you find an animal lost in the desert." For the full text of this tradition, see Muslim, *tawba*, 1-8 (esp. 1); Bukhārī, *daᶜwāt*, 4/2 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 241); Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 30; Tirmidhī, *birr waʾṣ-ṣila*, 49, and 98; *Musnad*, I, 383; II, 316, 500, 524, 534; III, 83, 213; IV, 273, 275, 283. Cf., *DST*, 49-50.

[206] S. 23: 53.

[207] Although Abū Yaᶜlā discusses God's "rejoicing and laughing" in the *Muᶜtamad* (p. 59), I have found no mention of the problem of God's "amazement".

[208] The tradition Ibn al-Jawzī has in mind here is: "God is filled with more joy when one of His creatures repents than one of you is at finding an animal lost in the desert." For references, see notes to §129.

The Twenty-First Tradition

132 Bukhārī and Muslim record in their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs* a tradition reported by Abū Hurayra in which the Prophet said: "Our Lord descends each night to the nearest heaven while the last third of the night still remains, and He says: 'Who will call upon Me so that I might answer him?'" [209]

133 This tradition concerning God's "descent" (*nuzūl*) was reported by some twenty of the Prophet's Companions. We have already pointed out, however, that such things as motion *(ḥaraka)*, movement *(nuqla)* and change *(taghayyur)* are not to be ascribed to God. The authorities are of two points of view regarding the meaning of this tradition. One group construes [the reference to God's descent] metaphorically as meaning that His mercy will draw near, for He has spoken [metaphorically in the Quran] of things "descending" as, for example, the verse:"We caused the iron to descend" even though its source is in the earth below.[210] In another verse [the Quran] states: "Of the cattle He sent down to you eight in pairs."[211] Those who do not understand the reference to "the coming down" of these various classes [of things, in a metaphorical sense] how can they make sense [of their coming down]?[212] The second group holds that one should refuse even

[209] In both Bukhārī and Muslim, the following is added: "He who asks of Me, I will grant his request; and he who seeks forgiveness of Me, him will I forgive." For the full text, see Muslim, *ṣalāt al-musāfirīn*, 168, 169, 170 and 171; Bukhārī, *tahajjud*,14 (Houdas and Marçais, *Les traditions*, I, 371); Abū Dāwūd, *sunna*, 19; Ibn Māja, *iqāma*, 182; Tirmidhī, *mawāqīt aṣ-ṣalāt*, 211, and *daʿwāt*, 78; *Musnad*, II, 264, 268, 282, 419, 487 and 504. For other citations of this tradition, see Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 125-136; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 449-457; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 238; Abū Bakr al-Ājurrī, *Sharīʿa*, 306-314; Ibn Taymīya, *Wāsiṭīya*, 17 (English trans. *Humaniora Islamica*, I, 112 and note 14); Graham, *Divine Word*, 177-178; and Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 57 (Arabic text), 104-105 (translation). For versions of this tradition judged apocryphal by Ibn al-Jawzī, see his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 122-123.

[210] S. 57:25.

[211] S. 39:6 (cf., also vs. 7). It is a question of four pairs, presumably those mentioned in S. 6: 143-145: sheep, goats, camels and oxen. Unfortunately, Ibn al-Jawzī's discussion of these texts in *Zād al-Masīr* (VII, 163) throws little light on the question of *nuzūl*. Cf., Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, III, 388, and II, 56.

[212] My rendering of the last part of this sentence is admittedly something of a paraphrase of the Arabic. The argument here is somewhat strained perhaps, but it seems to be that the notion of "sending down" or "descent (*nuzūl*)," as used in this Quranic verse, is to be construed metaphorically as a reference to the act of creating (cf., *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 174, where "sending down" is equated with "creating").

to attempt an explanation [of the reference to God's descent]. Abū ʿĪsā at-Tirmidhī reported that Mālik b. Anas, Sufyān b. ʿUyayna and Ibn al-Mubārak all insisted that such traditions be allowed to stand as they are and that no attempt be made to explain them.[213]

134 It is essential that human beings acknowledge God's transcendence *(tanzīh)* and refuse the attribution of movement *(nuqla)* to Him, for descending, construed as movement from one place to another, presupposes three things: firstly, an elevated body, and a place (*makān*) whose occupant reposes therein; **[fol.29a]** secondly, a body in an inferior position;[214] and thirdly, a body which moves from the former to the latter. It is absolutely impossible to conceive God in these terms. If an uneducated person should ask what [the Prophet] meant by his reference to God's descending, it should be maintained that He intended only what is consistent with His transcendent majesty *(bi-jalālihi)*. It is not incumbent on you to pursue the matter further. If someone should ask how one can suppress what one does not understand, my response is that since you already know that the one who descends to you is near you, be satisfied with [the thought of God's] nearness, but do not suppose that this nearness is to be likened to the proximity of finite bodies.

135 Ibn Ḥāmid said: "God is on the throne in His very essence (*bi-dhātihi*) and is in contact with it (*mumāss lahu*). Since He descends from the place wherein He reposes,[215] His descending entails (actual) change of location (*intiqāl*)." This man did not understand what is required by the transcendence of God. The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "Descending *(nuzūl)* is an attribute of the divine essence (*ṣifa dhātīya*), although it does not entail movement from one place to another *(intiqāl)*."[216] Such a statement is pure sophistry! There are some among them who maintain that God's descending does entail

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[213] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 453.

[214] That is, the "nearest heaven."

[215] That is, according to the tradition, His celestial Throne.

[216] See the *Muʿtamad* p. 55 (§90) where Abū Yaʿlā sets forth his position on the question of the *nuzūl*. Although he does not state that *nuzūl* is an attribute of essence, he clearly regards it to be one of the divine attributes. What Ibn al-Jawzī says about him above does appear to square with what Abū Yaʿlā himself has to say in the *Muʿtamad*. He tries to stake out a middle-of-the-road position between literalists and those who interpret the *nuzūl* as a metaphor. His view is that God's descending (*nuzūl*) is real but that it does not entail motion or movement (*ḥaraka* and *intiqāl*).

motion *(yataḥarraku)*. They do not understand, however, that motion *(ḥaraka)* is not appropriate to the Creator.[217] Some have alleged that Aḥmad [b. Ḥanbal] held the above view, but this is a misrepresentation of his position.[218] If God's descending were a divine attribute then it would be one created anew everyday.[219] In truth, however, God's attributes are eternal [and unchanging].

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[217] One of Ibn al-Jawzī's clearest statements regarding the problematic posed by a spatialized conception of God is to be found in his *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 614, 16-19 where he writes: فترى أقوامًا يسمعون أخبار الصفات فيحملونها على ما يقتضيه الحسّ كقول قائلهم: ينزل بذاته إلى السماء وينتقل. وهذا فهم رديء لأن المنتقل يكون من مكان إلى مكان ويوجب ذلك كون المكان أكثر منه ويلزم منه الحركة وكلّ ذلك مُحال على الحقّ عزّ وجلّ (You will see people studying texts pertaining to the divine attributes and interpreting them in the light of sense experience such that one of them will say: "[God] descends in His essence to the [lowest] heaven in such a way so as to entail movement." This is a reprehensible way of understanding [and representing God], for the one who moves exchanges one location for another, and that [in turn] implies that the being [or existence] of space is a more [basic form of reality] than He, since it necessitates His movement within space. Now it is absurd to think of God [in these terms]). Not only does the application of spatial categories to God necessarily impose limits on Him, it makes God dependent on a more fundamental concept, *viz.*, that of place or space. For Ibn al-Jawzī that which occupies space is by definition secondary to the concept of space itself. Hence, God's existence must be conceived in such a way so as not to presuppose space as a condition or category essential to His existence. For Ibn al-Jawzī God must be conceived as being "outside" space. He seems to have been aware that expressing such a notion pushes language to its very limits.

[218] Aḥamd b. Ḥanbal is quoted (on the authority of al-Iṣṭakhrī) as having said: ويتحرّك ويتكلّم وينظر ويبصر ويضحك ويفرح ويحبّ ونكره... (He moves, He speaks, He reasons, He sees, He laughs, He rejoices, He loves and He loathes.... [*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29, 6-7]). The editor of *DST* (47, n. 1), however, sides with Ibn al-Jawzī and declares the statement attributed by al-Iṣṭakhrī to Aḥmad to be a fabrication, though he gives no reasons for regarding it so. He also expresses surprise that Ibn Taymīya should quote a similar statement from Aḥmad without denying or refuting it.—Although he has much to say about spatial contingency, the last two sentences of §135 make it quite clear that Ibn al-Jawzī was equally concerned with the notion of temporal contingency.

[219] By denying *nuzūl* (descending) as an attribute, as he plainly does here, Ibn al-Jawzī would appear to be placing himself squarely in the Ashʿarī-Muʿtazilī camp, particularly on this question.

The Twenty-Second Tradition [220]

136 Muslim cites a tradition, reported only by Abū Mūsā [al-Ashᶜarī],[221] according to which the Messenger of God rose up one day [and delivered a homily] which included the following: "God does not sleep, nor is it appropriate that He should sleep. He lowers the Balance (*qisṭ*) and He raises it.[222] Light (*nūr*)—or fire (*nār*), according to the version [related by Abū Bakr b. Abī Shayba]—is His veil (*ḥijāb*). If He were to remove [the veil], the splendors of His face (*subuḥāt wajhihi*) would consume every creature within reach of His sight." [223]

137 The meaning of the phrase "He lowers the Balance (*qisṭ*) and He raises it" is that He abases [people] with justice (*bi'l-ᶜadl*) and raises [others] with justice. In connection with the phrase "light...is His veil," it should be noted that the veil here has human beings as its object, not God, for it is not possible that God should be veiled since [the veil] must be greater than what is veiled. It is preposterous that God should be thought of as a body (*jism*) or an atom (*jawhar*) or a finite being existing alongside others, for all such things are marks of temporal existence (*ḥadath*). People know bodies to be contingent precisely because of their origination in time, their spatially limited character, and their susceptibility to the vicissitudes of time (*ḥawādith*). It is impossible [to suppose] that God's existence has **[fol. 29b]** a beginning or an end, nor is it permissible [to imagine] that His essence has limits.[224] The veil referred to [in the above tradition] pertains only to

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[220] Although the question of the *ruʾya* is not addressed directly in this tradition or the discussion that follows, it is the question lurking in the background. It is entirely possible that the question of God's veiling was meant to provide the basis for a discussion of the *ruʾya*, which is more directly taken up in connection with the following tradition. If this is the case, it would indicate that the traditions of this chapter are not organized haphazardly but in groups and in accordance with some principle of organization.

[221] Or perhaps: related from Abū Mūsā al-Ashᶜarī by a single transmitter.

[222] For a discussion of this expression, see Lane, 773/1; and the remarks of Muḥammad F. ᶜAbd al-Bāqī in Muslim, *īmān*, 79, 162 (notes 2 and 3); also Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13, 195.

[223] This tradition in various forms is found in the following collections: Muslim, *īmān*, 293, 295; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13: 195, 196; *Musnad*, IV, 401 and 405; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 19-20, 75-76; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 180-181; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 212-218; Ājurrī, *Sharīᶜa*, 304-305; *DST*, 50-51; and *BA* (Beirut), 100-102. Cf. also, *Lisān*, II, 473/1, 6-26; and Lane, 1290/2.

[224] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 213, 4-214, 2, where the same view is expressed in language that is strikingly similar.

finite creatures; it is they who are veiled from Him.[225] According to Sahl b. Saʿd, the Prophet once said: "[On the day of resurrection] God will be concealed from view by seventy thousand veils of light and darkness."[226] This tradition is not reliable. If it were, the veils mentioned therein would have to be taken as pertaining to finite creatures, not to God.

138 As for the term *subuḥāt* (splendors), it is the plural of *subḥa*. Abū ʿUbayd said: "I have never seen this word (*ḥarf*) except in this tradition. It is sometimes said that the term *subḥa* denotes the splendor (*jalāl*) of His face and, like the related expression *subḥān* Allāh, was meant to express only God's majesty (*taʿẓīm*) and His transcendence (*tanzīh*)."[227] [In his book *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd*], one of whose chapters is entitled "The Glow (*ḍawʾ*) of Our Lord's Face,"[228] Ibn Khuzayma cites the tradition of the *subuḥāt* because he regarded the term as referring to light (*nūr*) of the sort known [in human experience]. The Creator, however, is beyond the kind of light associated with bodies (*nūr jismānī*). Abū Bakr al-Khallāl reported in his *Kitāb as-Sunna*[229] that he once asked Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā[230] about the expression "the

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[225] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 402, 12-13: الحجاب المذكور في الأخبار يرجع إلى الخلق لا إلى الخالق (The veils mentioned in the traditions on this subject apply to human beings, not to the Creator); also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 462f., where a similar view is set forth.

[226] The full text of the version attributed to Sahl b. Saʿd is cited in §238 of *KAS* (tradition no. 58). For other references to this tradition along with assessments of its authenticity, see Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 116; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 402; Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, III, 191; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 20-21. For an analysis of this tradition, which in many ways parallels Ibn al-Jawzī's thinking, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 462-465. Cf., Gimaret, *Image*, 72ff.

[227] Cf. Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 180; and Ibn al-Jawzī, *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, I, 454.

[228] The chapter heading given in the Cairo edition of *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd* (1387/1968) is "On the Form of Our Lord" (باب ذكر صورة ربّنا [19, 1]). The discrepancy between the wording given in *KAS* (ضوء) and that found in the printed edition of *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd* (صورة) is understandable given the orthographic similarities of the two words, undoubtedly the result of variant readings in the manuscript tradition.

[229] This work appears to be lost. See *EI*², IV, 989-990; *GAL*, I, 183; and *GAS*, I, 511-512, for a list of of his works and sources on his life. Ibn Taymīya (*Kitāb al-Īmān*, 158) regarded the *Kitāb as-Sunna* to be one of the most important works on Ḥanbalī doctrine.

[230] Probably Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā Abū'l-ʿAbbās Thaʿlab (d. 291/904), the great Kufan lexicographer who spent some time in Baghdad and who was a contemporary of Abū Bakr al-Khallāl (d. 311/923). Cf., *GAS*, IX, 140-141. Less likely, but a possibility, is Aḥmad. b. Yaḥyā Abū Jaʿfar al-Ḥulwānī (d. 276), who is mentioned as one of Abū Bakr al-Khallāl's teachers (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 83) and considered by some to have been a member of

splendors (*subuḥāt*) of His face," and he replied: "The term *subuḥāt* refers [in the first instance] to the place on which one prostrates oneself [when performing the *ṣalāt*]."[231] This would suggest that [in his use of the term *subuḥāt* the Prophet] was expressing himself in language that was familiar [to his audience] as he did when he said: "The hearts of His creatures are between the two fingers [of *Raḥmān*]."[232]

139 Ibn Ḥāmid said: "It is essential to believe that the veil belongs to God and that He is behind it." The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "One should not refuse to attribute a veil to God, but it should not be taken as indicating a limit (*ḥadd*) or thought to be something existing alongside Him."[233] This is a confused statement meant to satisfy the masses (*ʿawāmm*).[234]

The Twenty-Third Tradition

140 Ibn ʿAbbās reported that the Prophet said: "The people of Paradise will see their Lord every week in the sands of Kāfūr,[235] and those sitting nearest Him will be the first to reach Him on the day of assembly (*yawm al-jumaʿ*)."[236]

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the Ḥanbalī school. On him, see also *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, V, 212-213; and *Shadharāt*, II, 224.

[231] See *Lisān*, II, 473/1, 25-26, where this definition of *subuḥāt* is cited along with others. Cf., also Lane, 1290/2.

[232] See §§143-146 for a discussion of God's fingers. For the full text of this tradition, see Muslim, *qadar*, 17; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13(199); Tirmidhī, *qadar*, 7; *daʿwāt*, 89; *Musnad*, II, 168, 173; VI, 182, 251, 302, 315. Cf., Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 263 (Lecomte, *Le Traité*, 233). The text given by Muslim might be translated as follows: "The Messenger of God said: 'The hearts of all persons are between the two fingers of *Raḥmān* as though they were a single heart, and he turns them as he wishes.' The Messenger of God added: 'O God, disposer of hearts, dispose our hearts to give obedience to you!'" See §145 where the tradition is quoted.

[233] This statement is not to be found in the *Muʿtamad*.

[234] "Confused" because Abū Yaʿlā again equivocates: he clearly has problems with a literal interpretation of the veil but cannot bring himself to accept a metaphorical interpretation.

[235] "Kāfūr" is said to be the name of one of the springs of Paradise (*Lisān*, V, 149, 17; Lane 2622/3), or the water from that spring said to resemble camphor (*kāfūr*) in its taste. The word occurs once in the Quran (S. 76:5) and has been the subject of much speculation by the commentators. For a summary of the views found in the *tafsīr* literature, see *Zād*, VIII, 430; Ṭabari, *Tafsīr*, XXIX, 128-129; and Zamakhshari, *Kashshāf*, IV, 195-196 (cf., also *EI*^{2}, IV, 417-418).

[236] That is, Friday. See Ājurrī, *Sharīʿa*, 265, 1-6, where the tradition in a slightly longer

141 The expression "in the sands of Kāfūr" has as its reference [the people of Paradise], for they are the ones who are "in the sands of Kāfūr", [not God]! The expression "those nearest Him" [does not imply a spatial relationship] but means those who most enjoy God's favor. In another tradition [reported by ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ] the Prophet said: "On the day of judgment those who have acted justly [will be seated] at the right hand of *Raḥmān* on *minbars* of light."[237] In a prophetic saying [sometimes referred to as] "the tradition of the market of Paradise"[238] [the Prophet said]: "There will be no one in the celestial assembly with whom God will not speak **[fol.30a]** face to face (*ḥāḍarahu muḥāḍaratan*)."[239] In another version of this tradition cited by Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, the Prophet said: "[There will be no one in the celestial assembly] but that God will walk hand in hand with him (*khāṣarahu mukhāṣaratan*)."[240] [Al-Bayhaqī] observed, however, that this version of the tradition was transmitted by Sayf b. ʿAbd Allāh[241] on the authority of Salama b. al-ʿAyyār[242] and is not to be found in

form is cited with a complete *isnād* (cf., also *DST*, 50; and *BA*, 30b, both of which give the tradition as it appears in *KAS*). Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil*, 221, 15-17 [cf., 219, 3-4]) cites a variant form of the the tradition which, despite certain differences, is essentially the same in substance: إنّ اللّه جلّ ذكره ينزل كلّ يوم جمعة لأهل الجنّة على كثيب من كافور فيكونون في القرب على قدر تبكيرهم إلى الجمعة ألا فسارعوا إلى الخيرات (God will descend every Friday to the people of Paradise, in the sands of Kāfūr, and their nearness [to Him] will depend on how early they arrived at the place of the Friday prayers. Alas, they will race ahead in striving for the good [transmitted on the authority of al-Minhāl b. ʿAmr, according to sources cited by Ibn Fūrak]). Ibn Fūrak, who regards the transmitter as "very weak," nonetheless holds the *matn* of the tradition to be authentic, but he does insist on a metaphorical interpretation (221-222).

[237] For the full text, see : Muslim, *imāra*, 18; Nasāʾī, *ādāb al-quḍāt*, 1; *Musnad*, II, 160; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 324. Cf., also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 115; and *Muʿtamad*, 53.

[238] In the full text of the tradition (see Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 39, e.g.), the *sūq al-janna* is described as a part of Paradise—a place of unimaginable luxury and abundance—to which believers will be invited after entering Paradise. It is said that the *sūq al-janna* will be surrounded by angels and in it believers will mingle freely with each other and will converse with God face-to-face. It is also said that there will be no buying and selling in the market of Paradise.

[239] For the various versions of this tradition, see Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 39; Tirmidhī, *janna*, 15; Dārimī, *riqāq*, 92; and Muslim, *janna*, 5. Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 460-461.

[240] *Asmāʾ*, 460, 14-15.

[241] Given as Sayf b. ʿUbayd Allāh by Bayhaqī (*Asmāʾ*, 460, 18-19); as Yūsuf b. ʿAbd Allāh in *DST*, 51.

[242] Cf., Bayhaqī, 460, 18.

the canonical collections of traditions (*ṣaḥāḥ*). He further noted that sayings of this sort are not strengthened by having such men as transmitters, pointing out that the term *mukhāṣara* spelled with a *khāʾ* means to join hands (*muṣāfaḥa*).[243]

142 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "It is not impossible that God will actually be present in the sands of Kāfūr." [By making such a statement] he has accepted [the idea of God's] location in a particular place, though he added: "Not in such a way as to entail movement." This is meaningless and misleading [talk]. He also said: "It is not impossible to conceive [of the people of Paradise] as being near to the divine essence (*ad-dhāt*)." Since he lacked a tradition to support this point, he cited the words of the Prophet: "There is not one of you but his Lord will be alone with Him."[244] [In his gloss on these words] he pointed out that the idea of "being alone with" (*khalwa*) implies nearness (*qurb*) and that nearness to the divine essence (*ad-dhāt*) is therefore possible. I have already refuted this view earlier [in the present work].[245]

The Twenty-Fourth Tradition

143 In a tradition included in the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim, Ibn Masʿūd reports that a [*rabbi*][246] once came to the Messenger of God and said to him: "O Muḥammad, [on the day of judgement] God will place the heavens on one of His fingers, the earths on another finger, the mountains on another, the trees and rivers on another, all living creatures on another, and—according to one version of this tradition—the water and land on a finger. And then God will shake them." [Upon hearing these words] the Prophet laughed and recited the verse: "They do not comprehend the power

[243] *Asmāʾ*, 460, 18-20.

[244] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 224. The tradition as found in Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Fūrak does not appear in the canonical collections; the version found in these latter reads سيكلّمه in place of سيخلو (see Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 185; *zakāt*, 28; Muslim, *zakāt*, 68; Bukhārī, *manāqib*, 25; etc. Cf., also Ājurrī, *Sharīʿa*, 269-270).

[245] An issue that is taken up repeatedly in *KAS*. See, e.g., tradition no. 16 (§§119-121).

[246] The Arabic text of *KAS* simply reads *rajulun min al-Yahūd*; other versions of the tradition, however, use the term *ḥabr* (*DST*, 51). The nature of the conversation in question does, I think, justify the term *rabbi* here.

of God in its full measure."[247] According to one version, the Prophet's laughing was meant to convey his astonishment at the [*rabbi's*] words and his concurrence [with his words].[248]

144 Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī said: "Do not ascribe attributes to God except by reference to the Quran or to reliable reports, that is, reports based on the Quran or prophetic sayings whose genuineness is beyond question! What is in conflict with these [two sources] should not be ascribed [to God] or should be interpreted (*yuta'awwal*) in accordance with the principles (*uṣūl*) agreed upon by competent authorities (*ahl al-ʿilm*), along with a rejection of anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*). Now the Quran and the Sunna—the [only] canonical sources on which the divine attributes are to be based—are silent on the question of God's fingers. The term 'hand', when used to designate a divine attribute, is not to be construed as a [literal] hand in such a way that by affirming it one is also affirming that God has fingers. On the contrary, the correct approach (*tawqīf sharīʿ*) **[fol.30b]** is to apply terms to God in accordance with the Quran without probing their modality (*takyīf*) or comparing them to human qualities (*tashbīh*). Although the [above] tradition was transmitted by a number of the students of Ibn Masʿūd, none of them [apart from ʿUbayda al-Salmānī] mentioned the Prophet's having affirmed (*taṣdīqan*) [the words of the *rabbi*].[249] These words[250] were added to the tradition by one of its [later] transmitters and expresses his own opinion. It is not permissible that we should derive a divine attribute from the supposition of a transmitter. The Prophet's laughing is to be taken, in fact, as an expression of his displeasure with Jews on account of their

[247] A verse-fragment taken from S. 39: 67. The same wording, however, is also found in S. 6: 19, and S. 22: 74.

[248] See the following for some of the more common forms of this tradition: Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 19 (4, 5) [*Les traditions*, IV, 592 (4, 5)], 36 [*Les traditions*, IV, 609], 39 (5) [*Les traditions*, IV, 629 (5)]; *tafsīr*, 39 (2) [*Les traditions*, III, 432(2)]; Muslim, *ṣifāt al-munāfiqīn*, 19, 20, 21, 22; Tirmidhī, *tafsīr*, 39 (2); Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 76-79; Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 333-337; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 238-245; *DST*, 51-52; and *BA*, 30b. Cf. Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, III, 408; and Ibn Qutayba, *Ta'wīl*, 264 (Lecomte, 234). Perhaps because the tradition of the fingers generated much discussion among medieval Muslims, it also attracted the interest of others. In 13th-century Sicily, for example, the tradition came to the attention of the Norman king, Frederick II, as well as others, and became the focus of debates involving Muslims and Sicilian Christians. For more on this interesting development, see A. Ahmad, *A History of Islamic Sicily* (Edinburgh 1975), 91-92.

[249] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 337, 3 (cf., 334, 17); also see Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 19, 39; and Muslim *ṣifāt al-munāfiqīn*, 19, 20, 22.

[250] That is, these words regarding the Prophet's having concurred with the *rabbi*.

anthropomorphist tendencies. The revelation of this verse[251] is proof of the Prophet's condemnation of them."

145 Ibn ʿAqīl said: "[The words] 'they do not comprehend the power of God in its full measure' [were revealed because the Jews] supposed that God's attributes are related to each other as are those of His creatures.[252] The reference to *shirk* in the verse is in fact a refutation of them.[253] The meaning [of the term 'fingers'] in the traditions of the Prophet [is apparent] in another of the Prophet's sayings: 'The hearts of human beings are between the two fingers of God; He turns them [between His fingers] as He pleases.'[254] Since what is turned between two fingers is under the control [of another], it points to the fact that the hearts [of human beings] are under the power and authority of the One who 'turns them.'"[255]

146 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "It is possible to interpret this tradition literally (*ʿalā ẓāhir*) and to regard 'the fingers' as attributes referring to (*rājiʿa ilā*) the divine essence (*adh-dhāt*).[256] However, we do not take the term 'fingers' to imply that God has limbs or that He is divided into parts." Such statements reflect confusion. Either we must take the term as implying the existence of bodily members or interpret it metaphorically. If the expression

[251] "They do not comprehend the power of God in its full measure" (S. 39: 67).

[252] Hence (following the logic ascribed to the Jews), if God possesses a hand, He must also possess fingers.

[253] See the last part of S. 39: 67, where the reference to *shirk* occurs: "Glory be to Him, and exalted be He far above what they associate (*yushrikūna*) [with Him]."

[254] For the full text of this tradition, see Muslim, *qadar*, 17; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (199); Tirmidhī, *qadar*, 7; *daʿwāt*, 89; *Musnad*, II, 168, 173; VI, 182, 251, 302, 315. Cf., Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 263 (Lecomte, *Le Traité*, 233). The text given by Muslim reads as follows: "The Messenger of God said: 'The hearts of all persons are between the two fingers of *Raḥmān* as though they were a single heart, and He turns them as He wishes.' The Messenger of God added: 'O God, Disposer of hearts, dispose our hearts so as to render obedience to You!' " Cf., Ājurrī, *Sharīʿa*, 316.

[255] For a quite different approach to the tradition of the fingers, see R. Frank's discussion of al-Ghazzālī's interpretation of the tradition (*al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School*, 23 n. 34 [p. 112]).

[256] Is the expression صفات راجعة إلى الذات to be taken as an equivalent of صفات الذات or does Abū Yaʿlā wish to make a distinction? Unfortunately, Abū Yaʿlā does not take up the question of the "fingers" in the *Muʿtamad;* it is clear, however, from Ibn al-Jawzī's quotation that Abū Yaʿlā did regard the أصابع (fingers) as *ṣifāt*. Beyond this, it is difficult to say more on the basis of *KAS*. For a summary of Ḥanbalī views on the question of the "fingers," see Laoust, *Profession*, 103 and n. 1.

is interpreted literally (*ʿalā ẓāhirihā*), it necessarily means bodily members, notwithstanding [Abū Yaʿlā's] insistence that it does not imply composition. These statements reflect vacillation and equivocation [on his part];[257] speaking to people who say such things is a waste [of time].

The Twenty-Fifth Tradition

147 In a tradition recorded by Bukhārī and Muslim in their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs* Ibn ʿUmar reports that the Prophet said: "On the day of judgment God will roll up the heavens [like a scroll], **[fol.31a]** and He will take them in His [right] hand and will cry out: 'I am the King (*malik*)! Where are the oppressors and those who exalt themselves?' Then He will roll up the earth with His left hand and will cry out: 'I am the King! Where are the oppressors and those who exalt themselves?'" This version of the tradition is found in Muslim and, of the various forms of this tradition, is the most complete.[258] In another version, also found in Muslim, it is reported that ʿUbayd Allāh b. Miqsam observed ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar [indicating by gesture] how the Messenger of God related the words: "God will take His heavens and His earths in His hands and He will say: 'I am God!—[as the Prophet related these words] he closed his hand and opened it—I am the King!'"[259]

148 It has already been established on the basis of peremptory evidence that the "hand" of God is not a limb and that His act of "taking in hand" (*qabḍahu*) does not involve contact (*mubāshara*) or imply the existence of a palm (*kaff*). In using such expressions [as "hand" or "taking hold of"], the Messenger merely sought to facilitate understanding by reference to what is known through sense experience. His [gesture] in closing and opening his hand was intended merely to call attention to the "similarity" (*shabah*)

[257] Literally: "these are the statements of one who cannot [decide whether to] stand or sit."

[258] See Muslim, *ṣifāt al-munāfiqīn*, 24; Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 44; *tawḥīd*, 6; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (198); Abū Dāwūd, *sunna*, 19; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 323-324; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 71-73; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 243; Ājurrī, *Sharīʿa*, 320; *DST*, 52-53; *BA*, 31a; and *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 196-197.

[259] See Muslim, *ṣifāt al-munāfiqīn*, 25; cf., also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 339, 17-340, 3. The *isnād* seems to imply that, in relating the tradition, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar repeated the Prophet's gestures.

between two acts of "taking in hand" (*qabḍatyn*).[260] Both of these involve the notion of seizing or taking possession of, just as [in another tradition the Prophet] called attention to the outward similarity (*shabah*) between the seeing (*ruʾya*) of God [in the hereafter] and the seeing of the moon[261]—a comparison intended to call attention to the outward similarities between the [two] acts of seeing (*ruʾya*), but a comparison that does not imply any likeness (*tashbīh*) between the objects seen (*al-marʾīy*).

149 As for the term "left hand," it occurs only in that version of the tradition which Muslim received from Ibn ʿUmar in a report transmitted by ʿUmar b. Hamza and Sālim [b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar]. However, in the version received from Ibn ʿUmar through the transmission of Nāfiʿ and others, the expression "left hand" is not to be found. Likewise, in the versions reported by Abū Hurayra and others from the Prophet there is not a single reference to the "left hand." The expression does appear in one other tradition, but that tradition has an entirely different text and is weak, for it was transmitted by an authority suspected of falsehood (*baʿḍ al-matrūkīn*).[262] Since it has been reliably established that the Prophet said: "Both of His hands are right hands,"[263] the reference to God's left hand must be regarded as weak.[264] Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī has suggested that the person who introduced this expression did so out of habit since the left hand is the natural counterpart of the right hand.[265]

150 The *Qāḍi* said: **[fol.31b]** "It is possible to ascribe the closing and opening of the hand (*al-qabḍ wa'l-basṭ*) to [God as an attribute of] His essence." We have already explained our reasons for rejecting such a view.[266]

[260] That is, God's action in taking in hand the heavens and the earth (as related in the tradition) and the Prophet's illustrative gesture.

[261] There are numerous occurrences of this tradition; see, e.g., Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (177 and 179); Muslim, *īmān*, 299 and 302.

[262] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 324, 5-6, where the same point is made in language that is nearly identical.

[263] For the full text of this tradition in its various forms, see Muslim *imāra*, 18; Nasāʾī, *ādāb al-quḍāt*, 1; and *Musnad*, II, 160. Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 324, 12; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 264-265 (Lecomte, 234-235); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 109-114, and 441; and Ājurrī, *Sharīʿa*, 323.

[264] Cf., *Muʿtamad*, 53, 2-4; 56, 2-8.

[265] Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 324, 8-9.

[266] See §§92-94; also §§41-42 where the question of God's "hand" is discussed.

The Twenty-Sixth Tradition

151 In the *Musnad* of Aḥmad there is a tradition from Anas [b. Mālik] who reported that the Prophet recited the verse "And when his Lord manifested Himself to the mountain He caused it to turn to powder [and Moses fell into a swoon]"[267] and then added: "He illustrated [these words spoken to Moses] by extending the tip of His finger (*khinṣir*)."[268] [Upon receiving this tradition from Thābit al-Bunānī who had previously received it from Anas], Ḥumayd aṭ-Ṭawīl said: "O Abū Muḥammad, why are you relating this tradition?"[269] Then [Thābit] struck him on the chest and said: "Who are you O Ḥumayd? What right do you have to question this tradition? Anas reported it to me on the authority of the Prophet, so how can you say: 'Why are you relating this tradition?'" In another version of the tradition on this verse [it is reported that the Prophet recited the words:] "When his Lord manifested Himself to the mountain," and then added: "He gestured with his finger and [the mountain] collapsed."[270] In still another version of this tradition cited by Ibn Ḥāmid, [the Prophet is reported to have said upon reciting the above verse]: "He extended his finger up to the first joint."[271]

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[267] S. 7: 143. The full verse: "When Moses arrived at his appointed time and his Lord spoke to him, he said: 'O Lord show me so that I may behold Thee!' He replied: 'You shall not see Me; but behold the mountain—if it stays in its place, then you shall see Me.' And when his Lord manifested Himself to the mountain, He caused it to turn to powder, and Moses collapsed." For Ibn al-Jawzī's gloss on this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 257; cf., Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XIII, 97-100; and Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, II, 114.

[268] For the full text of this tradition, see the *Musnad*, III, 125; also *DST*, 53-54; *BA*, 31a; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 245-248 (cf., also 393-395, and 465-467). Other versions of the tradition are found in Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XIII, 97-100; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 113-114; Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, I, 593; and Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 120-122.

[269] In place of the Arabic text found in the *Musnad* ما تريد إلى هذا ؟ (which seems to have given transmitters some difficulty), one finds the question recast in other renderings of the tradition: تحدّث بمثل هذا ؟ (Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, I, 593, 16; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 122, 7), أتحدّث بمثل هذا ؟ (Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 114, 6), تقول هذا ؟ (Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XIII, 99, 4), and دَعْ هذا، ما تريد إلى هذا ؟ (Ibn Khuzayma, 113, 5).

[270] See the *Musnad*, III, 209; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XIII, 98; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 113. Cf. *Lisān*, III, 27.

[271] Cf. Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 113, 12.—The subject of the sentence following the three occurrences of the Quranic verse is problematic (from a theological perspective); the context in each case indicates that it is a question of God's finger, not the Prophet's. Ibn Fūrak clearly assumes it to be so and seeks a way around the theological problem by suggesting a

152 Those traditionists who have expressed their views on this tradition have observed that Ḥammād b. Salama[272] was the only person to receive it from Thābit [al-Bunānī]. Further, Ibn Abī'l-ʿAwjāʾ,[273] the *zindīq*, is known to have tampered with [the traditions collected by] Ḥammād and during his later years passed them on to others. This explains why the collectors of sound traditions sometimes avoided those [with chains in which the name of Ḥammād appears]. The questions raised by the above tradition are not difficult to explain. The Prophet was attempting to encourage a better understanding [of the verse] among his listeners through an appeal to sense experience. Thus [the Prophet] placed his hand on his finger (*kinṣir*) as a way of indicating that God had manifested only a small part of His mystery (*āyāt*).[274]

153 Ibn ʿAqīl said: "[This tradition means that God] manifested of the light which He possesses only what might be compared to the tip of the small finger (*khinṣir*)—that is, only to a degree that is commensurate with the finite limits of our understanding. We do not suppose that what pertains to God can be measured or that the divine essence can be described as light [of the sort we know]. If someone should ask why Ḥumayd objected to Thābit's [transmission of this tradition], our answer is that he may have assumed that the [reference to the small finger] concerned the question of the divine attributes."

154 Indeed, the *Qāḍi* ascribed a small finger to God on the basis of this defective tradition.[275] **[fol. 32a]** As I have already said, the reference to the finger in the tradition was meant to apply to the Prophet [not to God].[276]

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metaphorical interpretation of "the small finger" (393ff.). See §154, however, where Ibn al-Jawzī insists that the reference is to the Prophet, not to God.

[272] Ḥammād b. Salama b. Dīnār Abū Salama, a Basran traditionist (d.167/783), was the nephew of Ḥumayd aṭ-Ṭawīl and was generally regarded as reliable in matters of tradition, although some critics raised questions about certain traditions transmitted in his name. Dhahabī notes that while Muslim included some of Ḥammād's traditions in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Bukhārī avoided them (Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, I, 594). For the details of his life and his extraordinary piety, see: Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 282; Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, I, 590-595; Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣbahānī, *Ḥilya*, VI, 249-252; and Massignon, *Essai*, 168, 201, 234-235. Cf. *KAS*, §§ 8 and 79.

[273] For more on ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Abī'l-ʿAwjāʾ (d. 155 A.H.), see notes to §79.

[274] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 246-247, where the same point is made.

[275] The *Muʿtamad* makes no reference to the small finger (*khinṣir*) as a divine attribute.

[276] Cf., the last part of §152. In his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* (I, 122), Ibn al-Jawzī refers to this tradition (though in a slightly different form) and, after a brief analysis, pronounces it a

The Twenty-Seventh Tradition

155 According to the *Qāḍī*, ʿIkrima[277] said: "When God decides to put fear in the hearts of His creatures, He manifests a part of Himself (*abdā ʿan baʿḍihi*) to the earth and it quakes; but when He wishes to destroy a people, He manifests Himself [fully] to it." [278]

156 The *Qāḍī* said: "The phrase 'He manifests a part of Himself' is to be taken in its literal sense (*ʿalā ẓāhirihi*) as referring to His essence, but not in such a way as to imply that God is divided into parts (*tabʿīḍ*)." Now he who says that [God] manifests a part (*baʿḍ*) of Himself that is *not in reality a part* (*baʿḍ*) utters nonsense.[279] To apply the term *part* [to God] on the basis of a report deriving from a Follower, even if it were authentic, is to contradict what the majority of Muslims have affirmed, for they are in agreement that the Creator is not to be thought of as divisible into parts (*yataba^{cc}ḍu*). The words [cited in the saying of ʿIkrima] mean that God manifests some of His signs or wonders (*baʿḍ āyātihi*) [to the earth], nothing more.[280]

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fabrication. Although he does declare the form reproduced here in *KAS* to be defective (§154), he seems unwilling to declare it a fabrication (*mawḍūʿa*).

[277] A *mawlā* of Ibn ʿAbbās and a leading (though controversial) transmitter of the latter's exegetical work. He travelled widely throughout the Umayyad empire (including Khurasān and the Maghrib), apparently in support of the Khārijī cause, and is said to have died in 105/723 (or, according to some, in 107/725). For a review of the widely divergent assessments of ʿIkrima's reliability as a transmitter and the soundness of his views, see Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, I, 93-97; the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nuaym (III, 326-347); and Ibn al-Jawzī's *Ṣafwa* (II, 58-59). For a modern perspective on ʿIkrima and a list of the sources on him, see the article by J. Schacht in *EI*^{2}, III, 1081-1082 (cf., Massignon, *Lexique technique*, 171, 289).

[278] Cf., *DST*, 54; and *BA*, 31b. See also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 254, 3-5, where a slightly different form of the tradition is cited (reported by ʿIkrima on the authority of Ibn ʿAbbās). It seems evident from §156 (where he refers to the saying as a *kalām tābiʿī*) that Ibn al-Jawzī regarded this tradition as originating with ʿIkrima.

[279] The verb يكلّم might be construed as a passive (he should not be addressed or spoken to) but in this case, too, one is forced to assume an ellipsis.

[280] Ibn Fūrak glosses the expression as follows: اعلم أنّه يحتمل أن يكون المراد بقوله «أبدى عن بعضه» أي عن بعض آياته وعلاماته ممّا تكون منذرة ومخوّفة ومحذرة كما قال تعالى:«وَمَا نُرسِلُ بِالآيَاتِ إِلا تَخْوِيفًا» (By the expression "He manifests a part (*baʿḍ*) of Himself" He may well have meant: [He manifests] some (*baʿḍ*) of His signs so as to warn, to instill fear and to caution, for the Most High has said: "We sent signs for the purpose of instilling fear" [Ibn Fūrak, 254, 6-7; cf., 255, 16-17; S. 17: 59]).

The Twenty-Eighth Tradition

157 Abū'l-Aḥwaṣ al-Jushamī reported the following: "The Messenger of God once said [to my father, Mālik b. Naḍla]: 'Is it true that you take a razor and cut off the ear of one of [your female camels] and then say: "This is a *baḥīra*"? And do you slit the ear of another and say: "This one is a *ṣarīma*"?'[281] He replied: 'Yes'. [The Prophet] responded: 'Stop this practice, for God's razor (*mūsā*) is sharper than yours and His forearm (*sāᶜid*) is stronger than yours.'"[282]

158 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaᶜlā] said: "On the basis of a literal interpretation of this text it is possible to ascribe a forearm to God as an attribute of the divine essence (*ṣifa li-dhātihi*)." However, the predication of a divine attribute on the basis of a questionable tradition ignores the normal understanding of such expressions in Arabic usage. When [Arabs] speak thus they mean it only to be taken as a figure of speech (*tajawwuz*) or metaphor (*istiᶜāra*), for the term "forearm" (*sāᶜid*), in such usage, is meant to connote

[281] On the various definitions of the terms *baḥīra* and *ṣarīma*, See Lane (157/2-3) and *Lisān* (IV, 43/2-44/1). Also, the article by Wensinck in *EI*[2], I, 922.

[282] See *DST*, 54; *BA*, 31b; Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 341-342; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XI, 122; *Musnad*, IV, 136-137; and Ibn Saᶜd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 28. The longer version of this tradition (*Musnad*, III, 473) reads as follows: "Abū'l-Aḥwaṣ related the following on the authority of his father, Mālik b. Naḍla: 'The Prophet came to me while I was in an unkempt state, and he said: "Do you own livestock (*māl*)?" I said: "Yes!" The Prophet said: "What kind?" [Mālik] said: "I have every kind, i.e., camels, cattle, horses, and sheep." [The Prophet] said: "Since God gave them to you, they are yours. Do the camels of your people give birth with sound ears and you then take a razor and cut them off, and say: 'These are *baḥīras*?' Do you slit the ears [of others], and then say: 'These are *ṣarīmas*?' And you forbid these to yourself and your people?" [Mālik] said: "Yes." [The Prophet] said: "Accept what God has given you, for the forearm of God is stronger and the razor of God is sharper"'" (cf., Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XI, 122). Lengthy discussions of this tradition are to be found in the standard commentaries on S. 5: 106 (cf., also S. 6: 140): e.g., *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 436-440; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XI, 121-122; and Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, I, 649. For a literary analysis of a version of this *ḥadīth*, see S. Stetkevych, "Toward a Redefinition of 'Badīᶜ' Poetry," *Journal of Arabic Literature*, 12 (1981), 1-29. For more on the pre-Islamic background of the practice of slitting the ears of animals, see the article "*Baḥīra*" in *EI*[2], I, 922 (Wensinck); R. Paret, *Kommentar*, 130-136; Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*, 112f.; Henninger, "Die unblutige Tierweihe der vorislamischen Arber in ethnologischer Sicht," in *Paideuma, Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde*, IV, 179-190; and Gräf, *Jagdbeute und Schlachttier im islamischen Recht; eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklung der islamischen Jurisprudenz* (Bonn 1959), 58ff.

power (*quwwa*) precisely because a person's power is in his forearm.[283] The ignoring [of this distinction between modes of speech] is typical of the uneducated (*ʿāmmīya*) and a violation of the conditions on which [true] understanding rests. [If one were to accept a literalist point of view] it would also be necessary to ascribe a razor (*mūsā*) [to God].[284]

The Twenty-Ninth Tradition

159 [fol.32b] According to a tradition reported by Abū Hurayra, the Prophet said: "When a believer performs his prayers (*ṣalāt*) he is before the two eyes of *Raḥmān*."[285]

160 In the preceding chapter, we have already discussed the question of "eyes" as applied to God in certain verses of the Quran. The point of the above tradition is [not that God has two eyes, but] that He observes the one who prays and so the latter ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting the occasion. It was for this reason that the Prophet said: "[When one of

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[283] Ibn al-Jawzī here alludes to a hermeneutic principle spelled out more fully by Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil*, 257, 12-14): العرب تسمّي محلّ الشيء باسم ما فيه من طريق القرب كما سُمّت البصر عينًا والسمع أذنًا فسُمّى القدرة ساعداً وان كان الساعد محلاً للقدرة (Arabs give the name of the substratum (locus) of a thing to the latter on account of the proximity [of the two], and so seeing is termed an *eye* and hearing an *ear*; so also power is termed a *forearm* because the forearm is a substratum or locus of power). Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 342, 12-17, where the same argument is made.

[284] The synatx of the Arabic text of the last part of the paragraph is rather involved, owing to the fact that a long parenthetical statement is embedded in a rather loosely constructed complex sentence. Because of the difficulty of rendering such a long sentence into an understandable English form, I have broken it down into several smaller units—while, at the same time, aiming to remain as close as possible to the overall sense of the Arabic.

[285] That is, before (or in front of) *Raḥmān*. This tradition does not appear in any of the canonical collections. In addition to *DST* (55) and *BA* (31b), where it appears in essentially the same form as we have it in *KAS*, it is also cited in the *Mushkil* of Ibn Fūrak (258, 12-259, 2), albeit in a somewhat longer form: روى عطاء بن إبي رباح عن أبي هريرة قال: قال رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلّم: إذا قام العبد إلى الصلاة فإنّه بين عيني الرحمن فإذا التفت قال له الربّ تعالى ذكره: إلى من تلفّتّ؟ أ إلى من هو خير مني؟ أقبل إليّ فإنّي خير لك ممّن تلتفت إليه (The Messenger of God said: "When a believer performs the *ṣalāt* he faces [lit. is before the two eyes of] *Raḥmān*; and when he turns [away], the Lord says to him: 'To whom do you turn? Is it to one who is better than I? Draw near to Me for I am better for you than he to whom you turn' ").

you says his prayers] God is in front of him (*qibala wajhihi*)."[286] The real point of these words is [not to locate God in a particular place but to underscore the point] that God sees [the one who prays].

The Thirtieth Tradition

161 Bukhārī and Muslim cite a tradition in their respective *Ṣaḥīḥs* in which ʿĀʾisha reports that the Prophet once came to visit her while another woman was in the house, and he said to ʿĀʾisha: "Who is this woman?" ʿĀʾisha replied: "She is so and so," and [ʿĀʾisha] went on speaking of [the woman's] dedication to her prayers.[287] The Prophet responded: "Enough said! You are responsible *only* for what you are capable of doing. By God, the Most High will not turn away (*yamallu*) [from you] until you first turn away from Him."[288] In another version of this tradition it reads: "God will not turn away [from you] in disgust (*yasaʾmu*) until you turn away [from Him] in disgust."[289]

162 The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain that this tradition means that He will not turn away (*yamallu*) even though you turn away. This is the view of Ibn

[286] These words are part of a tradition in which worshippers are warned against spitting in front of them during the *ṣalāt* since God's face is in front of the believer when he prays (see Muslim, *masājid*, 50; *zuhd*, 74; Bukhārī, *ṣalāt*, 33; *adhān*, 94; *adab*, 75; Ibn Māja, *masājid*, 10 [763]; Abū Dāwūd, *ṣalāt*, 22; Nasāʾī, *masājid*, 31; *Musnad*, II, 6, 29, 53, 66, 72). The text given by Ibn Māja reads as follows: ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar said: "The Messenger of God saw phlegm on the *qibla* of the mosque while he was saying his prayers, and he rubbed it off. After he had finished his prayers, he said [to those present]: 'When you say your prayers God is before your face. Therefore, let none of you spit in front of him during the prayers.' " Cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 465, 16ff.; also Ibn Fūrak, 263, 4, and 265, 10-12.

[287] One version has ʿĀʾisha saying that the woman was in the habit of spending the whole of the night in prayer (Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 483; cf., Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 28 [4239]).

[288] In slightly varying forms, this tradition appears in virtually all of the canonical collections. See, for example: Bukhārī, *īmān*, 32 (Houdas and Marçais, *Les Traditions*, I, 24); Muslim, *ṣalāt al-musāfirīn*, 221; Nasāʾī, *qiyām al-layl*, 17; *īmān*, 29. See also Bukhārī, *tajahhud*, 18; *ṣawm*, 52; *libās*, 43; Muslim, *ṣalāt al-musāfirīn*, 215; *ṣiyām*, 177; Nasāʾī, *qibla*, 13; Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 28; *Musnad*, VI, 40, 51, 61, 84, 122, 189, 199, 212, 231, 233, 241, 244, 250, and 268. Cf., also *Lisān*, XI, 629/1, 19-21; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 375 (Lecomte, 325); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 483, 8-11; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 272.

[289] Muslim, *ṣalāt al-musāfirīn*, 220; and *Musnad*, VI, 247.

Qutayba and al-Khaṭṭābī[290] as well as the lexicographers among whom there is a consensus.[291] Some scholars (*qawm*) say that the one who turns away (*malla*) from something abandons it (*tarakahu*). [In line with this] the tradition would mean that God will not abandon (*yatruku*) His reward [to you] as long as you have not ceased rendering Him obedience. However, [the kind of] "turning away" (*malal*) that entails dislike (*karāhiya*), irritation (*istithqāl*), aversion (*nufūr*) and loathing (*saʾāma*) is impossible for [God] since He is not subject to change (*taghayyur*); participation in the phenomenal world (*ḥulūl al-ḥawādith*) is not possible for Him.[292]

163 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "It is possible to attribute a [literal] 'turning away' (*malal*) to God, though not the kind that is a 'turning away in disgust' (*saʾāma*)." Such a statement, however, is contrary to what is known to the science of lexicography and [does not take into account] what is consistent with His being or what is a violation of that being. The expression "turning away in disgust" (*saʾāma*) may not be applied to Him.

The Thirty-First Tradition

164 Khawla bint Ḥakīm reported that the Prophet said: "The last time God trampled [the idolaters] under foot (*ākhiru waṭʾatin waṭiʾahā*) was at Wajj."[293]

165 Now Wajj is the name of a valley in the vicinity of Ṭāʾif[294] where God inflicted defeat **[fol.33a]** on the idolaters near the end of the Prophet's life. The reference [to trampling under foot] appears in another tradition in

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[290] See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 483, 12ff., where the views of al-Khaṭṭābī are reported more fully.

[291] Cf. *Lisān*, XI, 629/1, 19ff.

[292] See Ibn Fūrak, 272, 7-9, where almost identical language is used. Because God is beyond the world of change, *malal* may be applied to God only if construed as metaphor. Cf., his *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (II, 373, 11-13) where Ibn al-Jawzī offers three possible interpretations of the verb *malla*, each metaphorical or quasi-metaphorical.

[293] The *ḥadīth* fragment cited here is quoted in a number of sources; in addition to the citations by Ibn al-Jawzī in *DST* (56-57); *BA* (32a); and *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth* (II, 473); see also Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 268-269 (Lecomte, 237-238); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 279-280; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 461; and *Lisān*, I, 197/1, 25ff. For the full text of the tradition, see the *Musnad*, VI, 409; and Bayhaqī, 461 (cf., also *Musnad*, IV, 172; and Lane, 2949/2).

[294] According to some authorities, Wajj was another name for Ṭāʾif itself (*Lisān*, II, 397; cf., *Marāṣid*, III, 1426).

which the Prophet prays: "O God, make severe your trampling (*waṭ'ataka*) of Muḍar."[295] [What we have here is a metaphorical expression] involving the term "foot" (*qadam*); this was the view of Ibn Qutayba and a number of other authorities.[296] In his commentary on this tradition, Sufyān b. ʿUyayna maintained that it refers to the last campaign—that is, against Ṭā'if—undertaken by the Prophet.

166 The *Qāḍi* said: "It is permissible, on the basis of our principles (*uṣūl*), to interpret this tradition literally (*ʿalā ẓāhirihi*), for the meaning of the text refers to the divine essence itself (*adh-dhāt*), not to God's actions; thus we interpret [the term foot] in the prophetic saying 'God will descend and place His foot in Hell' as applying to the divine essence."[297] The principles to which this man alludes lead inevitably to the attribution of corporeality (*tajsīm*), locomotion (*intiqāl*), and movement (*ḥaraka*) to God. Not only is this position anthropomorphist (*tashbīh*), it violates literary usage (*lugha*) and contravenes both [sound] historical method (*maʿrifat at-tawārīkh*) and the proofs of reason (*adilla al-ʿuqūl*). [Abū Yaʿlā] was misled by a tradition in which Kaʿb[298] is reported to have said: "Wajj is [the name of] a sacred (*muqaddas*) place from which the Lord ascended to heaven after He had completed[299] the creation of the earth."[300] Even if these

[295] The tradition containing these words occurs frequently in the canonical collections; for a sampling of these, see the following: Bukhārī, *adhān*, 128; *istiqā'*, 2; *jihād*, 98; *anbiyā'*, 19; *tafsīr*, 3 (9); *adab*, 110; Muslim, *masājid*, 294, 295; Abū Dāwūd, *ṣalāt*, 216; *witr*, 10; Nasā'ī, *taṭbīq*, 27; Ibn Māja, *iqāma*, 145; *Musnad*, II, 239, 255, 271, 418, 470, 502, and 521. Bukhārī, *adhān*, 128 (*Les traditions*, I, 267), adds the following explanation at the end of the tradition: "The people of Muḍar who lived to the east [of Medina] were at that time hostile to him (the Prophet)."

[296] See Ibn Qutayba, *Ta'wīl*, 269; cf., also Bayhaqī, *Asmā'*, 461-462; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 279-280. Ibn Fūrak's interpretation of this expression is based almost entirely on Ibn Qutayba; in contrast to Ibn Qutayba, however, Ibn Fūrak goes on to work out the theological implications of the tradition. It is worth noting that all three authors cite the view of Sufyān in support of their own position, as Ibn al-Jawzī himself will do in the following sentence.

[297] On this tradition and its interpretation, see §§105-109.

[298] Kaʿb al-Aḥbār b. Mātiʿ, a Yemenite Jew who converted to Islam during the reign of ʿUmar and is said to have been the source of many reports of Jewish origin that found their way into early Islam. He reportedly died in Hims near the end of ʿUthmān's reign, possibly in 32/652.

[299] The expression *yawma qaḍā* used here might also be rendered: "on the day when He decreed the creation of the earth" (cf., Lecomte, 239).

words go back to Kaʿb, it is possible that he received them from the *Ahl al-Kitāb,* for we know that he transmitted numerous sayings from them. If we were to conclude that the saying does go back to [Kaʿb, Wajj] refers to the place at which [God] "ascended" (*istawā*) from the earth after its creation was completed.[301] He then went up (*ʿaraja*) [to the heavens], but only in the sense that He turned His attention to (*ʿamada ilā*)[302] the creation of the heavens, as the Quran itself says: "Then He 'went up to' (*istawā ilā*)[303] the heavens which then consisted [only] of vapor (*dukhān*)."[304] It was reported by Abū Hurayra that the Prophet said: "During my night journey Gabriel came and led me to the Rock of Jerusalem (*ṣakhra bayt al-muqaddas*) and said: 'This is the place from which your Lord ascended to heaven.'"[305] This saying, however, was transmitted by Bakr b. Ziyād, who used to fabricate traditions and claim that he had received them from a reliable transmitter.[306] If someone should point out that Ibn ʿAbbās said: "[The Quranic expression] *istawā ilā as-samāʾ* means that He ascended (*ṣaʿida*) to

[300] This tradition, with a full *isnād*, is cited by Ibn Qutayba (*Taʾwīl*, 270 [Lecomte, 239]) as an example of a tradition that is problematic on account of its anthropomorphist implications. For other instances of the tradition, see *Lisān* (II, 397); and *Tāj al-ʿArūs*, (II, 270 [Cairo, 1306]).

[301] According to this interpretation, Wajj was the name of the last part of the earth to be created, and thus the place from which God ascended to the heavens in order to attend to their creation.

[302] I take *ʿamada ilā* primarily as a gloss on *istawā*, not on the verb *ʿaraja*.

[303] Or perhaps: turned His attention to....

[304] Also translated "smoke" or "mist" by some. For further discussion of this verse (S. 41:11) and the problem posed by the verb *istawā*, see *Zād al-Masīr*, VII, 245, and especially I, 58; Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, III, 445 (also I, 270-271); Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, I, 429-437; R. Paret, *Kommentar*, 433-434; and *KAS*, §§49 to 59. On the question of the order of creation, Ibn al-Jawzī (following Mujāhid, Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Ibn ʿAbbās) favored the view that the earth was created before the heavens (*Zād al-Masīr*, I, 58).

[305] For a longer version of this saying, see: *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 113 (with a complete *isnād*); cf., *Mīzān*, I, 345, where a slightly different *matn* and *isnād* are given (Bakr b. Ziyād al-Bāhilī from Ibn al-Mubārak from Ibn Ḥibbān). Both Ibn al-Jawzī and Dhahabī reject the tradition as a fabrication (*mawḍūʿa*).

[306] In his *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ* (I, 149), Ibn al-Jawzī cites Ibn Ḥibbān as the source of this statement and notes that the latter regarded Bakr as a "charlatan" (*dajjāl*). Also, see Dhahabī (*Mīzān*, I, 345) where the same charges are made. Neither Ibn al-Jawzī nor Dhahabī locate Bakr in time, but it would appear from the two notices that he must have lived during the 8th century.

the heavens," we would insist that it rather means "His command (*amruhu*) ascended," since God does not admit of movement or change.

167 Scholars fall into three **[fol.33b]** classes in regard to texts bearing on the divine attributes (*akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt*). The first group allows such texts to stand as they are without gloss (*tafsīr*) or metaphorical interpretation (*taʾwīl*), unless there is no other recourse. Thus, for example, in the case of the verse "Your Lord comes" [307]—they take it to mean that His command (*amr*) comes. This was the approach followed by the *salaf*. The second group [consists of those who advocate] a metaphorical interpretation (*taʾwīl*), though it is a position fraught with some risk,[308] as we have noted previously. The third group takes sense experience as its point of departure in determining the meaning of the text. Ignorance is widespread among those [in this group] who specialize in the transmission of texts (*nāqilīn*), since they are not familiar with the rational sciences (*ʿilm al-maʿqūlāt*) by which one can know what may be ascribed to God and what may not, for the rational sciences (*ʿilm al-maʿqūlāt*)[309] safeguard such texts from being construed in

[307] S. 89:22

[308] Cf., §36 (and elsewhere in ch. 1) where Ibn al-Jawzī concedes that when practiced in a public setting metaphorical interpretation can undermine the faith of rank and file believers by raising doubts as to the adequacy and reliability of scripture. But Ibn al-Jawzī seems equally firm that *taʾwīl*, when practiced by competent authorities, need not have harmful consequences. Indeed, he argues frequently that it is the only sure way of protecting the unity and transcendence of God. It is a question of where and by whom *taʾwīl* is practiced.

[309] Apart from the two occurrences in §167, Ibn al-Jawzī uses the expression *ʿilm al-maʿqūlāt* nowhere else in *KAS* (the term *maʿqūlāt* does appear in §245, and in §115 *maʿqūl* occurs, but neither passage throws any light on his use of *ʿilm al-maʿqūlāt*). If, by this expression, he is referring to a specific science or a group of sciences, exactly what he has in mind is unclear since there is no elaboration of the expression. It is clear that he could not have had metaphysics in mind even though the expression is sometimes used in that sense. It is also possible, however, that he is not referring to a science or set of sciences at all but rather to a set of principles based on reason or a method of reasoning. In any case, it is clear from his repeated references to reason (*ʿaql*), especially in chapter 1, that Ibn al-Jawzī had a fairly robust faith in the essential goodness of reason and its powers (cf., e.g., his *Dhamm al-Hawā*, 5-11, where he takes up the question of *ʿaql*, its nature, and its virtues. In the same chapter he cites a number of prophetic traditions celebrating the virtues of *ʿaql*, among them the following: "A man may be among those who observe the fast, the *ṣalāt*, the *ḥajj*, and the *jihād*, but on the day of judgment he will be recompensed only in accordance with the degree to which he followed the dictates of reason" [*Dhamm*, 7, 6-7]). From the references to reason in *KAS*, it is clear that *ʿaql* is a faculty that has access to a truth independently of sense experience and revelation. It is on the basis of *ʿaql* that we can know that God is beyond the categories of time and place, and that He is not

anthropomorphic terms. When people lack [a knowledge of these sciences] they are prone to construe sacred texts by reference to sense experience.[310] It was this [very tendency] that the *Qāḍi* exemplified when he said: "On the basis of our principles, it is possible to interpret the expression 'trampling under foot'[311] as applying to God, and to relate it to the divine essence itself (*adh-dhāt*)." By his own admission their principles take the senses as their point of reference. If only they had understood that movement (*ḥaraka*), locomotion (*intiqāl*), and change (*taghayyur*) are not to be predicated of God, they would not have taken sense experience as their starting point.

168 It is astounding that [Abū Yaʿlā] could make the [above] statement and then turn around and say: "...but not in the sense of movement or change," thereby contradicting himself. One of the strangest things I have come across is a report from Abū'l-ʿIzz b. Kādish[312] according to which

capable, therefore, of being localized in space, or subject to movement or to change of any sort. Ibn al-Jawzī's conception of reason clearly owed much to Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī *kalām* and beyond these to the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic conceptions of reason, though we can be fairly certain that he had only the vaguest idea of the historical roots of the notion of *ʿaql* as he understood it. As for the Greeks and the medieval *mutakallimūn*, reason has a double function: it is the source of truth regarding the nature and being of God, but it is also a moral force in that it is through reason that human beings exercise control over the desires and passions of the carnal soul (*nafs*).

[310] Cf., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 428-432 (*faṣl* 236).

[311] See the first several lines of §164.

[312] In his notice on Ibn Kādish in the *Muntaẓam* (X, 28), Ibn al-Jawzī gives his name as Aḥmad b. ʿUbayd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Abū'l-ʿIzz b. Kādish al-ʿUkbarī (d. 526/1131), which he says, he copied down from a document written in the hand of Ibn Kādish himself. Ibn al-Jawzī acknowledges having studied *ḥadīth* under him and even having received an *ijāza* (permission) to transmit the traditions of Ibn Kādish. It is evident from the notice in the *Muntaẓam*, however, that Ibn al-Jawzī's attitude toward him was mixed. On the one hand, he notes that his knowledge of the *ḥadīth* was extensive and that he was highly regarded by a number of scholars, among them the Ḥanbalī polymath Abū Muḥammad b. al-Khashshāb (d. 567/1171), but Ibn al-Jawzī also notes that the highly respected *ḥadīth* expert, Muḥammad b. Nāṣir [d. 550/1155]), viewed him with suspicion because, on at least one occasion, he had fabricated a tradition and placed it in the mouth of the Prophet—something which Ibn Kādish later acknowledged and sincerely regretted. Ibn al-Jawzī does not include Ibn Kādish in his *Mashyakha* despite the fact that the latter was one of his first teachers in the science of *ḥadīth*. No mention is made in the biographical literature of Ibn Kādish's legal affiliation. In addition to the *Muntaẓam*, notices on Ibn Kādish can be found in the following: *Bidāya*, XII, 219; *Shadharāt*, IV, 78; *Kāmil*, X, 683; and *Mīzān*, I, 118 (cf., *Mirʾāt az-Zamān*, 344, and 455).

Abū Jaᶜfar Muḥammad b. ᶜUthmān b. Abī Shayba[313] is said to have written the following in his *Kitāb al-ᶜArsh:* "God informed me that He went (*ṣāra*) from the earth to heaven, and then from heaven to His Throne upon which He then seated Himself."[314] We are thankful to God that He has not diminished our portion of a knowledge that is based on both revelation and reason. We keep ourselves aloof from those who have brought shame on our school (*madhhabanā*), for people would otherwise censure *us* because of what *they* teach.

The Thirty-Second Tradition

169 [fol.34a] According to Abū Umāma, the Prophet said: "[God's] servants

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[313] The full *isnād* reads: Ibn Kādish from Abū Ṭālib al-ᶜUshārī from Abū'l-Fatḥ b. Abī'l-Fawāris from Abū ᶜAlī b. aṣ-Ṣawwāf from Abū Jaᶜfar Muḥammad b. ᶜUthmān b. Abī Shayba. The latter, the source of the report, was a Kufan traditionist who later settled in Baghdad where he died in 297/910. He was regarded by many as an exceptionally learned individual who composed a number of valuable works (*tawālīf mufīda*) in the science of *ḥadīth*, among them a biographical work on traditionists (Ibn Athīr, *Lubāb*, II, 315), and several other works on the science of tradition. In addition to these, he was the author of several more popular works, including the *Kitāb al-ᶜArsh* (referred to above by Ibn al-Jawzī) and a short work entitled *Kitāb Fīhi Dhikr Khalq Ādam wa Khaṭīᵓatihi* (*GAS*, I, 164). His work as a traditionist was vigorously defended by a number of contemporaries (among them Abū ᶜAlī Ṣāliḥ Jazara, ᶜAbdān and Ibn ᶜAdī); some traditionists, however, considered him unreliable, and some even accused him of the deliberate fabrication of traditions. Among the severest of his critics were ᶜAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Abū Muḥammad b. Khirāsh, Dāraquṭnī, Abū Bakr al-Barqānī, and, above all, Abū Jaᶜfar al-Ḥaḍramī (known to his contemporaries under the nickname Muṭayyan). As his notice on Ibn Abī Shayba indicates, Ibn al-Jawzī tended to side with the critics (*Muntaẓam*, VI, 95-96; cf., also his *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuᶜafāᵓ*, III, 84-85). For a detailed account of the conflict between Ibn Abī Shayba and Muṭayyan, see *Taᵓrīkh Baghdād*, III, 43-44; and *Mīzān*, III, 642-643. Cf., also *Bidāya*, XI, 118-119; and *Shadharāt*, II, 226.

[314] A manuscript of the work is fortunately extant under the title *Kitāb al-ᶜArsh wa Mā Ruwiya Fīhi* (Ẓahirīya Library, Damascus, Ḥadīth no. 297, fol. 105b—119a [cf., GAS, I, 164, where the title is given as *Kitāb al-ᶜArsh wa Mā Warada Fīhi*]). The sentence cited above by Ibn al-Jawzī is an exact quote of what appears near the bottom of fol. 106b of the manuscript. Whether this relatively short manuscript of *Kitāb al-ᶜArsh* is the complete work or merely an abridgment of a longer original remains to be determined, however. Though undated, the evidence furnished by the manuscript would indicate that it was copied sometime in the early part of the 7th century A.H.

do not approach Him with the like of what proceeded from Him (*kharaja minhu*), namely the Quran."[315]

170 In a tradition reported by ʿUthmān, the Prophet said: "The superiority of the Quran to other forms of speech is comparable to God's superiority over His creatures, for the Quran proceeded from Him (*minhu kharaja*) and will return to Him."[316] The point of the saying is that the Quran has come (*waṣala*) to us from Him (*min ʿindahu*) and will return to Him again; moreover, [the saying] is to be taken as resting on the authority of the Prophet.[317]

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[315] According to Tirmidhī, the words يعني القرآن at the end were added to the *matn* by one of its transmitters (*viz*., Abūʾn-Naḍr Hāshim b. Qays al-Kinānī [d. 207/822]) and are to be regarded as a gloss (Tirmidhī, *thawāb al-Qurʾān*, 17). In addition to Tirmidhī, the *matn* as it appears above in *KAS* (cf., also §237) is found in *DST*, 60; *BA*, fol. 32b; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 286; and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, VII, 88, 19-21. In his *al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr*, Suyūṭī cites the following variant: ما تقرّب العباد إلي الله بشيء أحبّ إليه ممّا خرج منه ([God's] servants do not approach Him with anything more pleasing to Him than what proceeded from Him [cited in *DST*, 60, n. 1]). For other variations on the tradition, see *Musnad*, VI, 256; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 241, 4-5, 9-10, and 236, 13-14.

[316] See Tirmidhī, *thawāb al-Qurʾān*, 25; Dārimī, *faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān*, 6 (2); Ibn Qudāma, *ʿAqīda* (edited by H. Daiber with commentary) in *Studia Arabica et Islamica* (Beirut 1981), 109, 20-21 (Arabic text; 116 [commentary]); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 288, 6-7; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 237-239, where several nearly identical versions of the tradition are cited; also R. Frank, *Beings and their Attributes* (Albany 1978), 9 and n. 2. For a detailed study of early debates concerning the origin of the Quran and the significance of the expression خرج منه ويعود إليه, see Madelung, "Origins of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of the Koran" in *Orientalia Hispanica sive studia F. M. Pareja octogenario dicata*, 513-516. Madelung suggests that the saying was an attempt by early (pre-*miḥna*) traditionalists to counter the Muʿtazilī (and earlier Jahmī) claim that the Quran was created outside God (خلق في غيره) and separate from Him since His essence is beyond change. Sunnī traditionalists, by contrast, maintained that the Quran enjoys a special relationship to the divine essence, for "it proceeded from Him and will return to Him." Hence, by virtue of its divine source, the Quran stands apart from the world of created things. Even though the Quran is not God it is qualitatively different from those entities that make up the created order.

[317] That is, it is to be taken as *marfūʿ*, *viz*, a tradition going back to the Prophet and reported by a Companion (cf., Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 237, 15, 20; 238, 19; and 239, 8). Even though Ibn al-Jawzī does not indicate here how the two sayings of this section were construed by Ḥanbalīs, his comments in §237, where he cites the tradition from Abū Umāma again, suggest that there was a tendency in Ḥanbalī circles to understand the process of revelation in ways that had anthropomorphic implications. In §237 he comments on the خرج منه as follows: المعنى ظهر عنه ولا يجوز أن يظنّ أنّه خروج جسم من جسم لأنّ الله عزّ وجلّ

The Thirty-Third Tradition

171 Abū Hurayra reported that the Messenger of God said: "God recited [the surahs] *Ṭāʾ Hāʾ* and *Yāʾ Sīn* for a thousand years before He created Adam.[318] When the angels heard [the recitation of these surahs from] the Quran, they said: 'Blessed be the community to whom these words shall be revealed; blessed be the hearts that shall memorize them and the tongues that shall recite them.'"[319]

172 This tradition, which Ibrāhīm b. Muhājir[320] transmitted from ʿUmar b. Ḥafṣ[321] is apocryphal (*mawḍūʿ*). Ibn ʿAdī remarked that among the traditions

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ليس بجسم ولا [خرج منه] كلامه جسم means that it became manifest from Him, but one should not suppose that it was like the going out of one body from another, for God is not a body nor is His word a body). Ibn al-Jawzī's paraphrase of the tradition in the last sentence of §170 seems to accent the destination of revelation (its reception by humankind) as opposed to the Quran's origins, though without neglecting entirely the question of origin. It is worth noting, however, that the origin of revelation is no longer described as a "going out" but rather as an "arriving to...from..." (وصل إلينا من عنده). The terminology and word order of this sentence does seem to indicate a shift of emphasis away from origin (and particularly a literalistic conception of origin) to an emphasis on reception. For a more detailed discussion of the theological implications of the two sayings of this section, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 286-289. There is little, if anything, in Ibn Fūrak's discussion that Ibn al-Jawzī would have objected to. For a Ḥanbalī perspective on the question of the Quran's eternity, see Arberry, "A Hanbalite Tract on the Eternity of the Qurʾān," *Islamic Culture*, III (1956), 23ff.

[318] The surahs in question are 20 and 36, respectively.

[319] In addition to *DST*, 61; and *BA*, 32b; see also, Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 232, 8-11; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 289, 11-12; *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 109, 2-5; and al-Ghazzālī, *Iḥyāʾ*, I, 273, 3-5. This *ḥadīth* is not to be found in any of the canonical collections. For a translation of the text of the saying, see Madelung, "Origins of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of the Koran" in *Orientalia Hispanica sive studia F. M. Pareja octogenario dicata*, 515.

[320] Ibrāhīm b. Muhājir b. Mismār, a Medinese traditionist who, according to Madelung, flourished during the first half of the 2nd/8th century (Madelung, "Origin," 515, n. 2). This dating, however, seems too early since in several sources (including *KAS*) Ibrāhīm is said to have studied *ḥadīth* under ʿUmar b. Ḥafṣ b. Dhakwān who, according to al-Khaṭīb, died in 198/813 (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 192-194). It seems more likely that Ibrāhīm belongs to the late 8th century (or perhaps early 9th). The only two notices I have found on him (Ibn al-Jawzī's *KDM*, I, 54-55; and Dhahabī's *Mīzān*, I, 67) focus almost entirely on his work as a traditionist and provide virtually no information on the details of his life.

[321] ʿUmar b. Ḥafṣ b. Dhakwān Abū Ḥafṣ al-ʿAbdī, a native of Basra who settled in Baghdad and died there in 198/813. The sources are virtually unanimous in declaring him to be unreliable in matters of *ḥadīth*. For notices on him, see Ibn Saʿd, VII, 344; *Ṭarīkh*

reported by this Ibrāhīm none fits the definition of a *munkar* tradition better than this one, for he was the only one to transmit it [from ʿUmar b. Ḥafṣ].[322] Bukhārī himself pointed out that Ibrāhīm b. Muhājir was a weak authority whose traditions fall into the class of those that are to be rejected in their entirety (*munkar al-ḥadīth*).[323] Of ʿUmar b. Ḥafṣ, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal said: "We burn his traditions!"[324] Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn maintained [that traditions reported by him] are not to be trusted. Nasāʾī said that his traditions are to be set aside (*matrūk al-ḥadīth*).[325] Finally, the traditionist Abū Ḥātim b. Ḥibbān said: "The text (*matn*) of this tradition is a fabrication (*mawḍūʿ*)."[326]

The Thirty-Fourth Tradition

173 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim it is reported on the authority of Abū Hurayra that the Prophet said: "When God had completed the creation of humankind, kinship (*raḥim*) stood up and said: 'This is the place of refuge from the severing [of kinship ties]!' [God] replied: 'Yes indeed! Are you not pleased that I strengthen those who strengthen you and weaken those who weaken you?'"[327] In another tradition recorded by Bukhārī, the

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Baghdād, XI, 192-194; *KDM*, II, 206; and *Mīzān*, III, 189-190.

[322] A *munkar* tradition is one that is objectionable because it is transmitted by a single authority whose reputation is insufficient to offset the fact of his being its only transmitter (*EI*^{2}, III, 26b; Dozy, II, 722/2; cf., Guillaume, *Traditions of Islam*, 181).

[323] If a transmitter is classfied as *munkar al-ḥadīth*, all of his traditions are to be rejected (cf., *EI*^{2}, III, 26b).

[324] Or "we tear them up" (e.g., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 193).

[325] See *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 193, where the same charge is levelled against ʿUmar b. Ḥafṣ. A tradition designated as *matrūk* is to be "abandoned" because it comes from "a single transmitter who is suspected of falsehood..., or is openly wicked in deed or word or is guilty of much carelessness or frequent wrong notions" (*EI*^{2}, III, 26b).

[326] Cf., *Mīzān*, I, 67. Although Ibn al-Jawzī's discussion of this tradition is limited to its *isnād*, it is likely that his real objection had to do with its *matn*, though he does not tell us what this was. He may have found the portrayal of God as reciting the Quran (with its anthropomorphist implications) troubling, but he also may have been troubled by the notion of the Quran's pre-eternity, which seems to be at least implied in the tradition. If this latter was a problem for him, he was not the only Ḥanbalī to be exercised over this question (cf., Madelung, "Origins," 523-525).

[327] Literally, "I join (or unite) those who join (or unite) you and I sever those who sever you." Among the numerous citations of this tradition, see esp., Muslim, *al-birr waʾṣ-ṣila*,

Prophet is reported to have said: "The term kinship (*raḥim*) is derived from the same root (*shajna*) as the term *Raḥmān* (the All-Merciful)."[328]

174 Abū ʿUbayd states that the term *shajna*, also pronounced *shujna* [or *shijna*], denotes the branches of a tree. **[fol.34b]** In the above tradition, then, the term *shajna* refers to an intimate relationship of interconnection like the roots and branches of a tree that are intertwined with each other.[329]

175 This tradition may be construed in one of two ways. It may mean that God shows special regard for kinship (*raḥim*); and so He strengthens those who strengthen it, weakens those who weaken it, and sees to it that its rights are respected—in the same way that one shows special regard for one's kinfolk over those to whom one is not related by blood. Or it may mean that the term *raḥim* is derived from [the same root as] the name *Raḥmān*, as if to emphasize [*raḥim's*] importance by calling attention to the derivation of the term. This latter interpretation is supported by a tradition in which ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf reports, on the authority of the Prophet, that God said: "I am *Raḥmān*! I have created *raḥim* and have derived its name from mine. Hence those who strengthen it, I will strengthen them, and those who sever it, I will scatter them."[330] In another tradition, not cited in the canonical collections, the following words are found: "*Raḥim* is a branch (*shajna*) which is joined to the loin (*ḥaqw*) of *Raḥmān*."[331] A variant of this tradition reads: "When God created humankind, *raḥim* stood

16; Bukhārī, *tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, 47 (*Les traditions*, III, 445); *adab*, 13 (*Les traditions*, IV, 143-144); *tawḥīd*, 35 (*Les traditions*, IV, 624); *Musnad*, II, 330, 383, 406; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 368-369; and Graham, *Divine Word*, 134ff. Cf., also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 301-303, where several related traditions are cited and discussed.

[328] The tradition in Bukhārī (*adab*, 13 [2]) reads: عن أبي هريرة عن النبيّ قال: إنّ الرحم شجنة من الرحمن، فقال الله: من وصلك وصلته ومن قطعك قطعته. Cf., also Tirmidhī, *al-birr wa'ṣ-ṣila*, 16; *Musnad*, I, 190, 321; II, 160, 295, 383, 406, 455; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 370, 8-13; also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 301; and Graham, *Divine Word*, 135.

[329] On the Kufan grammarian Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām (d. 224/838), see *EI*², I, 157. See also Ibn al-Jawzī, *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, I, 523, where Abū ʿUbayd's comments on *shajna/shujna* are cited.

[330] For this tradition, see Abū Dāwūd, *zakāt*, 45; *Musnad*, I, 191, 194; II, 160, 498; Tirmidhī, *al-birr wa'ṣ-ṣila*, 9; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 301; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 370; and Graham, *Divine Word*, 134.

[331] *DST*, 62; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 368, 369; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 301.

up and seized the loin of *Raḥmān* and said: 'This is the place of refuge from the severing [of kinship ties].'"[332]

176 Since [the above] sayings contain figures of speech (*amthāl*), whose meaning we have already explained, the reference to [*raḥim's*] clinging to the loin of *Raḥmān* also ought to be construed [metaphorically], *viz.*, as a request for aid (*istijāra*) and protection (*iʿiṣām*).[333] This is born out by a tradition in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs* in which ʿĀʾisha reports that the Prophet said: "*Raḥim* is suspended (*muʿallaqa*) from the throne (*ʿarsh*), and it says: 'Those who strengthen me, God will strengthen them, and those who weaken me, God will weaken them.'"[334] Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī said: "The loin (*ḥaqw*) is equated with loin cloth (*izār*);[335] hence the tradition [referring to *raḥim's* attachment to God's loin] means that it is attached to [or seeks the protection of] God's power (*ʿizz*)."[336]

177 Ibn Ḥāmid said: "It is essential to affirm that God does have a loin and that *raḥim* actually attaches itself to it. We also believe that God has a side (*janb*), for the Quran states: 'Alas for me, for I have neglected God's side (*janb*).'"[337] This man is utterly bereft of understanding! How can one be neglectful of someone's "side"? He then went on to maintain that attachment (*taʿalluq*) implies proximity and even contact (*mumāssa*) with [God's] loin, since it is reported in a tradition that God permitted **[fol.35a]** David to draw near enough as to be able to touch a part of Him.[338] The *Qāḍi* went even further [in his commentary] on this saying, but he added the caveat: [the reference to God's loin] does not mean that He [literally] possesses such an organ or that He is made up of parts; *raḥim's* taking hold of [God's loin] does not imply bodily organs or a multiplicity of parts, nor does it

[332] Bukhārī, *tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, 47.

[333] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 302, 1-3, 11-12; and Bayhaqi, *Asmāʾ*, 369, 6-8.

[334] Muslim, *al-birr waʾṣ-ṣila*, 17; *Musnad*, II, 163, 190, 193, 209; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 369. Cf., also *Lisān*, XIV, 189, 10.

[335] A metaphor for power.

[336] In short, God's power or might is the place of refuge from the severing of kinship ties (*raḥim*). Ibn al-Jawzī's "quote" here is actually a paraphrase of al-Bayhaqī's statement. The full text reads: وقيل: الحقو الإزار وإزاره عزّه بمعنى أنّه موصوف بالعزّ فلاذت الرحم بعزّه من القطيعة وعاذت به (*Asmāʾ*, 369, 8-9).

[337] S. 39: 56. See *KAS*, §61, for more on this verse and its "proper" interpretation.

[338] I have not found this saying cited elsewhere. For more on Dāwūd and his place in Muslim belief and piety, see *EI*^{2}, II, 182.

imply union (*ittiṣāl*) or contact (*mumāssa*). [Abū Yaʿlā] then went on to contradict these confused comments by adding: "The expression *raḥim* (kinship) is an ellipsis that stands for *dhū'r-raḥim* (one devoted to kinship);[339] it is [*raḥim*] who clings to the loin of *Raḥmān*. [Thus, in the text of the tradition] the governing word (*muḍāf*) of the construct phrase is suppressed and the object of the phrase (*muḍāf ilayhi*) stands by itself, for it makes no sense to attribute an act of 'clinging to' or 'attaching oneself to' (*taʿalluq*) *raḥim*. Rather, what is meant is that the person devoted to kinship (*dhū'r-raḥim*) attaches himself to the loin [of God]."[340]

178 [The net result of Abū Yaʿlā's approach] is to give added weight to anthropomorphic and corporealist interpretations [of the tradition]. Discussion with such persons is useless, for as the saying goes: "Without reason (*ʿaql*) there can be no meeting [of minds] (*qirān*)." If the one possessing *raḥim*—being a body (*jism*)—is attached (*taʿalluq*), then to what is it attached?[341] We seek God's protection against errors of understanding!

The Thirty-Fifth Tradition

179 In his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Muslim reports [from Abū Hurayra] that the Prophet said: "God says: 'Invincible power (*al-ʿizz*) is My loin cloth (*izārī*) and majesty (*al-kibriyāʾ*) is My cloak (*ridāʾī*). Whoever challenges Me in respect of either of them, him will I punish.'"[342]

180 Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī said: "This saying means that majesty (*kibriyāʾ*) and power (*ʿaẓama*) are attributes unique to God. No one is comparable to God in respect of these qualities. It is not appropriate for

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[339] Literally, "the one possessing *raḥim*" which I take to mean: the one devoted to filial ties or virtues.

[340] In the sense of taking refuge in, or seeking the protection of. One of Ibn al-Jawzī's problems with this kind of analysis is that it does not tackle the central problem of the tradition, viz., the question of the loin.

[341] Despite Abū Yaʿlā's grammatical analysis of the saying, the central problem remains: what is to be made of the reference to the loin?

[342] The tradition may be found in the following in substantially the same form cited by Ibn al-Jawzī: Muslim, *al-birr wa's-ṣila*, 136; Abū Dāwūd, *libās*, 28; Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 16 (2, 3); *Musnad*, II, 248, 376, 414, 427, 442; VI, 19; and Munāwī, *Itḥāfāt*, 45 (90-92). Also see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 133, 12-13; 138, 21-22; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 316; and Graham, *Divine Word*, 162-163. Most versions of this tradition are traced back to Abū Hurayra.

anyone to presume to possess them, for the qualities befitting a creature are modesty and self-abasement. The terms cloak (*ridāʾ*) and loin cloth (*izār*) are used above as figures of speech (*mathalan*) and, as such, were meant to emphasize that just as no one may share [God's] 'cloak' or 'loin cloth' so also no creature may share in His majesty or power."

The Thirty-Sixth Tradition

181 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition, cited on the authority of Abū Hurayra, in which the Prophet says: "God said: 'I am present **[fol.35b]** when My servant thinks of Me and I am with him whenever he mentions Me; if he mentions Me in his soul (*fī nafsihi*), I will mention him in My soul (*fī nafsī*). If he mentions Me before an assembly, I will mention him before an even better assembly. If he draws near to Me by a handsbreadth (*shibr*), I will draw near to him by an arm's length (*dirāʿ*); if he draws near to Me by an arm's length, I will draw near to him by a fathom (*bāʿ*); and if he comes to Me walking, I will come to him running.'"[343]

182 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] maintained that God has a soul (*nafs*) and that it is an attribute over and above His essence (*zāʾida ʿalā'dh-dhāt*). These are the words of an innovator (*mubtadiʿ*) and reflect an anthropomorphist stance (*tashbīh*); no distinction is to be made between God's *dhāt* and His *nafs*.[344]

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[343] See Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 15, 3 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 588); Muslim, *dhikr wa duʿāʾ*, 2a, 2b, also 19 and 20; and Muslim, *tawba*, 1. For other references to this tradition, see Ibn Māja, *adab*, 58; Tirmidhī, *daʿawāt*, 31; *Musnad*, II, 251, 315, 391, 413, 445, 480, 516, 517, 524, 534, 539; III, 210, 277, 491; and IV, 106. Other references to this tradition, with commentary, are found in Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 457ff.; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 222-223 and 317-322; Ibn Khyzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 7; Qushayrī, *Risāla*, 322; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 284 (cf., Lecomte, 249); and Graham, *Divine Word*, 127-128. Cf., also *KAS*, §§33/6 and 222 where the last part of this saying is cited.

[344] The statement attributed to Abū Yaʿlā and Ibn al-Jawzī's comments above should be read in the light of §44 where the meaning of the expression زائدة على is stated quite clearly: وقد ذهب القاضي على أنّ للّه نفسًا وهي صفة زائدة على ذاته. قلت: وهذا قول لا يستند إلا إلى التشبيه لأنّه يوجب أنّ الذات شيء والنفس غيرها (The Qāḍī [Abū Yaʿlā] held that God's *nafs* is an attribute over and above His essence. But this view is derivative of a corporealist perspective, for it assumes that [God's] essence is a 'thing' and that [His] *nafs* is something distinct from it). To affirm that something is زائدة على الذات is to assert that the thing in question is separate from the divine essence, which for Ibn al-Jawzī is tantamount to adopting an anthropomorphist or corporealist stance since it introduces multiplicity into the

There is no reason not to accept the interpretation referred to above in connection with our discussion of the verses of the Quran.[345] Expressions such as "drawing near" (*qurb*) and "running" (*harwala*) occur frequently in Arabic, as e.g., in the Quranic verse where it speaks of "...those who 'march' against our signs [so as to thwart them]."[346] It is clearly not a question of literal or physical movement (*mashy*).[347]

The Thirty-Seventh Tradition

183 Abū Saʿīd [al-Khudrī] reported a tradition in which the Prophet said: "God is beautiful (*jamīl*) and He loves beauty (*jamāl*)."[348]

184 According to the experts (*ʿulamāʾ*), the term *jamīl* here has the special sense of *mujmil*, *viz.*, one whose beauty is expressed in his actions. [When applied to God, it refers to] His creation of beauty of form (*ṣūra*), of character (*akhlāq*), and of deeds (*iḥsān*).[349] One judges to be beautiful

being of God. See *Mushkil*, 319-320, where Ibn Fūrak argues that the term *nafs*, when applied to God, must be construed as being identical with the divine essence. On the question of the *nafs*, see *EI*^{2}, VII, 880-884; and Lane, 2827/1-2828/2.

[345] See esp. §44, where Ibn al-Jawzī maintains that references to God's *nafs* in the Quran are to be construed as referring to his *dhāt* (essence).

[346] S. 22: 51 and 34: 5.

[347] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 318, 10-16.

[348] Lane (461/1) reads the last word of this saying as *jimāl* and translates it "and He loves those of like character." The standard *ḥadīth* collections, however, read it as *jamāl*, as does Ibn Manẓūr (*Lisān*, XI, 126/2). For references to the saying, see Muslim, *īmān*, 147; and *Musnad*, IV, 133, 134, 151. The same text is cited by Ibn Manẓūr in *Lisān*, XI, 126/1, 20-21; and Lane, 461/1, respectively, in their discussion of *jamīl*. Cf., also al-Ghazzālī, *Iḥyāʾ*, IV, 298; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 42; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 329. A slightly different version is found in Tirmidhī, *birr wa ṣila*, 61; and *Musnad*, I, 399. See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 41-42, 311-312; and especially Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 329-331, where the meaning of *jamīl* as applied to God is discussed in some detail. For other interpretations of the tradition, especially those offered by al-Ghazzālī and Ibn ʿArabī, see Ormsby, *Theodicy*, 104ff.

[349] Cf., Lane, 461/1; Bayhaqi, *Asmāʾ*, 42; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 330, 10ff., where he insists that *jamīl* here must be understood in the sense of *mujmil*. He writes: إنّ أهل اللغة قد يستعملون مثل هذا اللفظ من فعيل على معنى مُفعِل كوصفنا الله جلّ ذكره بأنّه حكيم والمراد به مُحكِم لما فعله، وكذلك يجوز أن يقال: الله تعالى جميل بمعنى مُجمِل وإجماله المضاف إليه على وجهين: أحدهما أن يكون يحسّن الصور والخلق .... الوجه الثاني من الإجمال المضاف إلى الله عزّ وجلّ وهو بمعنى الإحسان والفضل، أي وهو المظهر النعمة والفضل (Lexicographers sometimes use expressions of

(*jamīl*) what is characterized by perfection and goodness (*tāmma mustaḥsana*). The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā's] explanation [of beauty], however, is not in keeping with the notion of divine [transcendence]. He said: "It is permissible to describe God as beautiful and to regard that quality as an attribute of the divine essence itself; the expression *jamāl* denotes that quality of perfection and beauty (*ḥusn*) referred to by the Prophet when he said: 'I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form (*fī aḥsani ṣūratin*).'" This is anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*) in its purest form.[350]

The Thirty-Eighth Tradition

185 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] reported the following from ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz: "When God has finished [deciding the fate of] the people of Paradise and Hell, He will come walking in the shadow of the clouds with the angels.[351] He will stop at the first level [of Paradise][352] and will greet the people of that level. After being greeted by them He will say: 'Ask Me [what you wish]!' But they will respond: 'What shall we ask of You? Because of Your power, Your majesty, and Your exalted position (*makān*), if You were to divide **[fol. 36a]** among us the provisions for both men and jinn (*thaqalayn*)[353] we would give them to eat and drink, and what would

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the *faʿīl* pattern [act. part. of form I] in the sense of the *mufʿil* pattern [act. part. of form IV] as, for example, when we refer to God as *ḥakīm* [wise or judicious] in the sense of *muḥkim* [one who acts wisely or judiciously]. Thus it is permissible to speak of God as *jamīl* [beautiful] in the sense of *mujmil* [one whose actions are beautiful or characterized by beauty]. Beauty of action [*ijmāl*] may be predicated of God in one of two senses: 1) in the sense of producing beautiful forms and qualities, or 2) in the sense of doing deeds of goodness and generosity). Ibn Fūrak's point is that *jamīl*, when applied to God, is an attribute of action (*fiʿl*), not of essence (*dhāt*). This is precisely the point Ibn al-Jawzī insists on above.

[350] Following an Ashʿarite line of reasoning, Ibn al-Jawzī emphatically denies that *jamīl* can be applied to God as an attribute of the divine essence (cf., Ibn Fūrak, 329, 12, and 331, 5). When applied to God it can only be one of the *ṣifāt al-fiʿl* (attributes of action).

[351] An allusion to S. 2: 210 ("What, do they expect that God will come to them in the shadow of the clouds with the angels?"). For a discussion of this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 225-229; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, IV, 260-274; and Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, I, 353-354 (cf., §64).

[352] By "the first level" is presumably meant "the lowest level or rank."

[353] The term occurs once in the Quran in its dual form (S. 55: 31) and is regarded by most medieval exegetes as meaning "humankind and the jinn" (cf., Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*,

remain with us would not be decreased.' He will reply: 'So make your request!' They will answer: 'We ask for Your acceptance (*riḍā*).' He will respond: 'It is because of My acceptance that you will be invited to dwell in the house of My honor.' [God] will do this to the people of each rank [among the people of Paradise] until He reaches His court (*ilā majlisihi*)."[354]

186 This tradition is a fabrication placed in the mouth of ʿUmar. [But even if it were to be accepted as one of ʿUmar's sayings], how would it be possible to establish a divine attribute on the basis of what ʿUmar said? Ibn Ḥāmid said: "On the day of resurrection He will *come* to the place of judgment (*maḥshar*), for [the Quran] says 'Your Lord will come...,'[355] [that is,] at the time of His descent to [the nearest] heaven." The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "The verse 'God will come to them in the shadow of the clouds' [356] is a confirmation of what ʿUmar said." [Abū Yaʿlā], however, did not understand that this verse means that God will bring them the shadow [of the clouds as protection].[357] [Abū Yaʿlā] went on to say: "It is possible to take the text [of ʿUmar's saying] in its literal sense (*ʿalā ẓāhirihi*) though we do not construe His walking (*mashyahu*) and His arrival at His court to mean movement (*intiqāl*)." How can a person who says he interprets these terms in a literal fashion turn around and say "but not in the sense of movement"? He added this

IV, 47, e.g. Also see Paret, *Der Koran* [translation], 447, and note 14; and *Les traditions*, I, 431). For a summary of the meanings of the term *thaqal*, see Lane 344/2.

[354] See *DST*, 64, where the saying is quoted in full. Although Ibn al-Jawzī cites Abū Yaʿlā as his source, the saying does not appear in the *Muʿtamad*. Indeed, apart from Ibn Fūrak, where the middle portion of the saying is cited in a slightly different form (*Mushkil*, 334, 3-4), I have so far not found it cited elsewhere. The saying as quoted by Ibn Fūrak reads: إنّ الله يمشي في ظلل من الغمام والملائكة ويقف على أدنى أهل الجنّة درجةً، فيسلّم عليهم ويردّون السلام ثمّ يرجع إلى مكانه. (God will come walking in the shadow of the clouds and will stop at the lowest rank of the people of Paradise. He will greet them and they will reciprocate the greeting whereupon He will return to His 'Place').

[355] S. 6: 158 (cf., also 9: 24). On 6: 158, see *Zād al-Masīr*, III, 156; Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, II, 63. Cf., also *KAS*, §64.

[356] S. 2: 210.

[357] As he explains elsewhere (see, e.g., §64; also *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 226), *fī* in this verse carries the force of the preposition *bi* so that the verse should be construed as meaning: God will bring them the shadow (*bi-ẓulal*) of the clouds as an act of mercy, not that God will come to them literally in the shadow. In the former sense God is portrayed as exercising His power; in the latter He is portrayed as engaging in an act of movement.

qualification merely to please the uninformed, for how can walking (*mashy*) [taken in its literal sense] mean anything other than movement (*intiqāl*)?

The Thirty-Ninth Tradition

187 ʿĀʾisha is reported to have said: "When The Messenger of God was asked about 'the place of honor' (*maqām maḥmūd*),[358] he said: 'My Lord promised me that I would sit on the Throne (*ʿarsh*).'"[359]

[358] The Arabic expression *maqām maḥmūd* appears only once in the Quran (S. 17: 79); it does, however, occur in a number of traditions (e.g., *Musnad*, I, 398; III, 456; Dārimī, *riqāq*, 80; and Bukhārī, *tafsīr*, 17, 11). Sunnīs generally seem to have regarded the expression as a reference to the Prophet's role as intercessor for the Community on the day of judgment. In a lengthy discussion of the expression in his *Tafsīr* (XV, 97-100), Ṭabarī argues in favor of this interpretation and cites a long list of authorities in support of this view. Ṭabarī does concede, however, that the alternative view set forth by the first-century exegete, Mujahid (d. ca. 104/722), cannot be dismissed entirely. Mujāhid had argued that the *maqām maḥmūd* is a reference to the fact that on the day of judgment God will invite the Prophet to sit with Him on the Throne (*ʿarsh*). Mujāhid's interpretation apparently won little support until the late 9th century when it was taken over by some of the disciples of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and made into a kind of Ḥanbalī slogan, despite Aḥmad's silence on the question. The first Ḥanbalī known to have defended the view of Mujāhid was Abū Bakr al-Marwazī (d. 275/888). Later it was taken up by Barbahārī (d. 329/941) who organized a virtual crusade in support of the view, leading to a series of public demonstrations in which Ṭabarī himself came under attack (Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VI, 242-243; *Muntaẓam*, VI, 159, 172; and Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, XI, 174. For an interesting account of Ṭabarī's involvement in this controversy, see Rosenthal's introduction to his translation of Ṭabari's *Taʾrīkh* [vol. I, 69-78]). Other Ḥanbalīs who are known to have defended the view of Mujāhid are Abū Bakr an-Najjād (d. 348/960), Ibn Baṭṭa (d. 387/997), Ibn Ḥāmid (d. 403/1012), and (according to Ibn al-Jawzī) Abū Yaʿlā (d. 458/1065). Ibn Abī Yaʿla reports that Barbahārī never gave a lecture without making reference to the *maqām maḥmūd* (*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 43, 20-21). Clearly this was an issue about which some Ḥanbalīs felt deeply. It is interesting and perhaps significant that the issue appears to have been dropped from the Ḥanbalī agenda by the mid-12th century (cf., Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, cxxxiv, on the case of Ibn Qudāma). So far as I have been able to determine ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 561/1165) was the last prominent Ḥanbalī of the 12th century to take up a defense of the old Ḥanbalī position on the *maqām maḥmūd* (*Ghunya*, I, 71-72).

[359] See *DST*, 66, and *BA*, fol. 33b, where the saying is cited, in both cases traced back to ʿĀʾisha. The saying, reported by ʿĀʾisha, is also cited by ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī in his *Ghunya*, I, 71-72. ʿAbd al-Qādir also quotes another saying, attributed to ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb and ʿAbd Allāh b. Sallām, according to which God will have the Prophet seated in front of

188 This saying does not, in fact, go back to the Prophet. However, Ibn Ḥāmid [who regarded it as sound] said: "One must believe that contact with (*mumāssa*) and nearness to God (*qurb min al-ḥaqq*) are entailed in [God's] asking the Prophet to sit on his Throne, for Ibn ʿUmar pointed out in connection with the verse 'God is near to us and an excellent refuge'[360] that the nearness [to God] mentioned here is such that [when the Prophet sits on the Throne] he will actually touch a part of Him." Ibn ʿUmar, however, never said such a thing. Those who believe that the divine essence is made up of parts (*tabʿīḍ*) have, in effect, declared the consensus [of the *ʿulamāʾ* on this question] to be false.

189 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "[The saying] 'God will ask his Prophet to sit on His Throne' means that He will bring [the Prophet] near to Himself (*dhātihi*)—[a possibility] indicated by the verse 'He was within two bows' length of Him'[361] and supported by the comment of Ibn ʿAbbās: 'There was a distance of only two bows' length between them'." The reference in the above verse, however, is to Gabriel, not to God. Those who declare that it is possible **[fol.36b]** [for a creature] to draw near to the divine essence also acknowledge the possibility of actual contact (*mulāṣaqa*) with Him.[362] The position advocated by the *Qāḍī*, however, is tantamount to *tajsīm*, pure and simple.

The Fortieth Tradition

190 Dāraquṭnī cited a tradition whose chain of authorities goes back through Abū Isḥāq and ʿAbd Allāh b. Khalīfa to ʿUmar who reported that a woman

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Him on His *kursī* on the day of judgment. Cf., also *KAS*, §152, where the idea expressed in the above saying is mentioned and discussed briefly. In addition to the references cited in the preceding note, see also, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanabila*, II, 10, 1ff.; and 43, 20-21, where the views of Abū Bakr an-Najjād and Barbahārī are reported and discussed (cf., Laoust, *Profession*, 113, n. 1; also *EI*^{2}, I, 1039b; and Goldziher, *Richtungen*, 94). For Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite perspectives on the *maqām maḥmūd*, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 339 and 391; and Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, II, 462-463, respectively. Cf., also *Zād al-Masīr*, V, 76, where Ibn al-Jawzī presents the two interpretations of the *maqām maḥmūd* but without indicating which one is to be preferred.

[360] S. 38: 25 and 40. Cf., also S. 34: 37.

[361] S. 53: 9

[362] On the significance of form III of *laṣaqa*, see Ullmann, *Wörterbuch der Klassischen Arabischen Sprache*, II, pt. 1, 659/1, 666/2, and 670/1.

came to the Messenger of God and said to him: "Pray to God that He might allow me to enter Paradise!" [Upon hearing these words, the Prophet] praised God and then added: "His *kursī*[363] encompasses the heavens and the earth;[364] [when God occupies his *kursī*] it creaks like a new saddle when ridden."[365]

191 This tradition exists in a large number of different versions. Sometimes it is cited with an *isnād* going back through ʿAbd Allāh b. Khalīfa[366] and ʿUmar, respectively, to the Messenger of God, and sometimes with an *isnād*

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[363] Following Ṭabarī *(Tafsīr*, V, 397-403), Ibn al-Jawzī states in his commentary on the *āyat al-kursī* (S. 2: 255 [*Zād al-Masīr*, I, 403, 2-4]) that exegetes differ over the meaning of the term *kursī*: 1) some maintain that it refers to God's knowledge (*ʿilm*); thus when S. 2: 255 says that God's "*kursī* encompasses the heavens and the earth," it means, in effect, that His knowledge comprehends all things. 2) Some hold that it refers to God's footstool. 3) Finally, some maintain that the *kursī* is a synonym for *ʿarsh* (throne). While Ṭabarī declares himself in favor of the first interpretation of the term, Ḥanbalīs, following Aḥmad (cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 28, 14-16), traditionally preferred the second (cf., e.g., the *Muʿtamad* of Abū Yaʿlā, 177, 19; al-Jīlānī's *Ghunya*, I, 56, 7-9; and Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 88, n. 2; for a non-Ḥanbalī, but still traditionalist, point of view, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 403-405). In his commentary on the *āyat al-kursī*, Ibn al-Jawzī does not indicate which of the three views is to be preferred. Indeed, from remarks made below in §192, one has the impression that he personally inclined toward a fourth view not mentioned in the *Zād* or by Ṭabarī, but noted by Zamakhshari (*Kashshāf*, I, 385-386), *viz.*, one that sees the Quranic reference to the *kursī* (and the *ʿarsh*) as metaphorical language designed to express God's greatness and His power. In any case, it is clear from the discussion below in *KAS*, §§192-194, that the traditional Ḥanbalī view, indeed any view that smacks of literalism, is out of the question for Ibn al-Jawzī. For a similar approach to the question of the terms *kursī* and *ʿarsh*, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 341-342, and 387-390 (cf., *EI*^{2}, V, 509).

[364] Cf., S. 2: 255.

[365] For citations of this tradition in other works, see *DST*, 66; *BA*, fol. 34a; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 389, 7-8; and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 106, 5-9. For similar or closely related texts, see Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, V, 400, 1-6; *Muʿtamad*, 177, 17-19; *Asmāʾ*, 403-404; and Ibn al-Jawzī's, *ʿIlal*, I, 22-23. See also Gimaret, *Images*, 77, where still other references may be found. In spite of Ibn al-Jawzī's reference above to Dāraquṭnī, I have not found the saying in the latter's *Kitāb as-Sunan;* perhaps it is a question of his *Kitāb aṣ-Ṣifāt*.

[366] An early Kufan transmitter about whom little is known; he is said to have received traditions from ʿUmar and to have been regarded as a reliable transmitter by a number of 9th century scholars, among them: Ibn Ḥibbān, Ṭabarī, Ibn Māja, and others (*Mīzān*, II, 414; Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, V, 400 and n. 1). Although his dates are not given, he is identified as a member of the *tābiʿī* generation.

going back through Abū Isḥāq[367] and ʿAbd Allāh b. Khalīfa but stopping with ʿUmar. [In one such version] ʿUmar [is reported to have] said: "When God sits on the *kursī* it is heard to creak like a camel's saddle."[368] According to Ibn Jarīr,[369] ʿAbd Allāh b. Khalīfa reported [in still another version] that the Prophet said: "Verily [God's] *kursī* encompasses (*wasiʿa*) the heavens and the earth; [when] He seats Himself upon it no part of it is left [unoccupied], not even a space the width of four fingers [370]—and as he spoke these words he made a sign with his fingers and joined them—and verily [the *kursī*] creaks like a saddle on account of the load it must bear when ridden."[371] According to Abū Bakr al-Marwazī, however, Ibn Khalīfa reported that the Messenger of God said: "The *kursī* is that upon which the Lord sits and no part of it remains [unoccupied] except a space the width of four fingers."

192 There is a conflict between the wording of this last version and that of the preceding one, a conflict that is a consequence of confusion and poor memory on the part of its transmitters. The preferred reading is: "No part of it remains [unoccupied], not even a space the width of four fingers." These words, however, should be taken to mean that God fills [the *kursī*] with his power (*ʿaẓama*) and majesty (*hayba*).[372] In short, this text resorts to figurative language in order to impress [upon the consciousness the reality of] the Creator's majesty and power. The expressions "when He sits" (*idhā*

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[367] ʿAmr b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAlī Abū Isḥāq as-Sabīʿī, a respected Kufan transmitter who died in 128/745 or in 130/747 (cf., Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 313-315). Dhahabī reports that Abū Isḥāq, though a sincere and honest person, suffered from amnesia in his later years and sometimes inadvertently confused traditions he transmitted (*Mīzān*, III, 270).

[368] I have not found this version of the tradition cited elsewhere except in *DST*, 67; and *BA*, fol. 34a.

[369] The famous Ṭabarī (Muḥammad b. Jarīr Abū Jaʿfar aṭ-Ṭabarī, d. 310/922), author of a justly celebrated commentary on the Quran. For the text of what follows, see his *Tafsīr*, V, 400, 1-6.

[370] That is, the width of a palm. As the above translation indicates, I take the *mā* here as a negative. If it is taken as a pronoun (which seems feasible from a grammatical point of view), the results are quite different. In the former case, God occupies the whole of the *kursī* so that not even a space the width of a palm remains; in the latter case, He occupies the whole of it except the space of a palm.

[371] See Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, V, 400, 1-6; Dārimī, *ar-Radd ʿalā'l-Marīsī*, 432, 2-6; and *Muʿtamad*, 178, 2-5. In Ṭabarī and Dārimī the *isnād* is given in full. For additional references, see Gimaret, *Images*, 77.

[372] Cf., Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 341-342; also Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, I, 385, 6-9.

qaᶜada) or "when He takes his seat" (*idhā jalasa*), used by [certain] transmitters, represent either an alteration [of the original text] or an interpretation based upon what they presumed the meaning [of the original text] to be. Similarly, some have construed [the Quranic verse] "He seated himself (*istawā*) on the Throne (*ᶜarsh*)"[373] to mean that He [literally] seated himself (*qaᶜada*) [on the Throne]. The Creator, however, is not to be described as sitting on something so that part of the thing in question is left [unoccupied]. This is a characteristic of finite bodies (*ajsām*)![374] Ibn Zāghūnī said: "The meaning of this tradition is that the four fingers are deduced from the attribute of God's being on the Throne (*ṣifat al-istiwāʾ*)."[375] Such [nonsense] can only leave **[fol.37a]** the unlettered masses (*al-ᶜawāmm*) confused. Do his words have any meaning at all? [If not], then it should be said that the reference to four [fingers] does not imply contiguity or contact. All of this is clearly anthropomorphic and corporealist [in its conception of God]. Moreover, it entails the predication of divine attributes on the basis of what is not sound because it rests on defective traditions. Indeed, I have seen a report that Abū Bakr b. Muslim al-ᶜĀbidī[376] once said: "This is the space (*mawḍiᶜ*)[377] that will be left for Muḥammad so that he may seat himself on it."[378] It would have been better had this pious man given himself exclusively to the worship of God and not taken up the discussion of such matters.

193 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaᶜlā] reported that Shaᶜbī[379] said: "God fills the

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[373] S. 7: 54.

[374] See Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 389-390, where similar views are expressed.

[375] My translation here is a tentative attempt to render the Arabic of this sentence, but the point of Ibn az-Zāghūnī's statement is not entirely clear to me.

[376] Perhaps the reference is to Muḥammad b. Muslim b. ᶜAbd ar-Raḥmān Abū Bakr az-Zāhid al-Qanṭarī (d. 260/873), well known among his fellow Baghdādīs for his ascetic practices. Al-Qanṭarī is said to have practiced a brand of asceticism based on the teaching of Bishr al-Ḥāfī and to have counted al-Junayd among his students. Although he did count Ḥanbalīs (especially Abū Bakr al-Marwazī) among his close friends, he is not identified as a Ḥanbalī in the *ṭabaqāt* literature. For biographical notices on al-Qanṭarī, see esp., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, III, 256; *Muntaẓam*, V, 25-26; *Ṣafwa*, II, 221; and the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nuᶜaym, X, 309.

[377] That is, that part of the *kursī* or *ᶜarsh* which God does not (or will not) occupy.

[378] Cf., Ibn Baṭṭa, *Kitāb al-Ibāna*, 61 (trans., 113).

[379] Abū ᶜĀmir b. Sharāḥīl ash-Shaᶜbī, a leading jurist and traditionist of Kufa (died in 103/721 or, according to some, in 110/728). For a critical discussion of his life and work, along with a list of sources, see Juynboll, *EI*^{2}, IX, 162-163; also GAS, I, 277. Among the

Throne (*ʿarsh*) so completely that it creaks like a camel's saddle."[380] This, however, is a saying falsely attributed to Shaʿbī. In commenting on the saying, [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "It is entirely permissible to construe this saying in its literal sense (*ʿalā ẓāhirihi*) to mean that the divine essence fills (*tamlaʾu*) the Throne, but not, however, in the sense of occupying a place (*lā ʿalā shughli makānin*)." Those who spread this kind of confusion should not discourse on [matters of this sort in public]. How astonishing it is that something may fill a particular place but not occupy it!

194 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] reported that Khālid b. Maʿdān[381] said: "The All-Merciful One is heavy for the carriers of the Throne (*ʿarsh*) [to bear]." [Abū Yaʿlā] went on to say: "It is permissible to take this statement in its literal sense (*ʿalā ẓāhiri*), for the weight [born by the carriers of the Throne] derives from the essence of Raḥmān," but he added: "this interpretation does not imply actual contact." Such persons ought to be more discreet in the statements they make!

The Forty-First Tradition

195 According to the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Muslim and Bukhārī, Abū Saʿīd [al-Khudrī] reported that the Messenger of God said: "On the day of resurrection God will say: 'O Adam!' and he will reply: 'I am here at Your service ready to do Your bidding.' Thereupon a voice (*ṣawt*) will cry out saying: 'God commands that you send a group of your descendents to Hell.'"[382]

196 The term "voice" (*ṣawt*) is found only in traditions transmitted by

more important sources on him, see Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 246-256; *Ḥilya*, IV, 310-338; and *Ṣafwa*, III, 40-41.

[380] Cited also by Ibn Fūrak (*Mushkil*, 341, 3-4). Abū Yaʿlā, however, makes no mention of the saying in his *Muʿtamad*.

[381] Abū ʿAbd Allāh Khālid b. Maʿdān b. Abī Kurab (or Kurayb) al-Kalāʿī, a prominent Syrian ascetic who died in 103/721. For an interesting account of this colorful figure, see *Ḥilya*, V, 210-221 (cf. *Ṣafwa*, IV, 188); and Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 455. J.van Ess (*EI*^{2},IV, 369) regards him as a man of Qadarī sympathies.

[382] Cf., *DST*, 67; and *BA*, fol. 34a. This tradition, including the reference to the *ṣawt*, appears twice in Bukhārī: *tawḥīd*, 32 (3); and *tafsīr*, 22 (1), in both of which Ḥafs. b. Ghiyāth and his son ʿUmar are mentioned as among its transmitters. For versions of this tradition that omit reference to the *ṣawt*, see Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 45; Muslim, *īmān*, 379; *Musnad*, I, 388; and II, 378. Despite Ibn al-Jawzī's reference above to Muslim, I have not found this tradition (with its reference to the *ṣawt*) in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*.

Ḥafṣ b. Ghiyāth.[383] Wakīʿ, Jarīr and others who received traditions from al-Aʿmash diverge [from the wording transmitted by Ḥafṣ] and their version of this tradition contains no reference to the voice.[384] Aḥmad [b. Ḥanbal] once was asked about Ḥafṣ and he replied: "The traditions he transmitted **[fol.37b]** contain errors."[385]

197 There is a sound tradition [which reads as follows]: "When God 'uttered' His revelation (*idhā takallama...biʾl-waḥy*), the inhabitants of heaven heard [something] that sounded like a chain being dragged over rocks."[386] One traditionist, relating what he presumed to be the meaning of the tradition in his own words, reported it as follows: "The inhabitants of heaven heard [God's] voice (*ṣawt*)." However, the version reported by Ibn Masʿūd reads: "When God 'uttered' his revelation the inhabitants of heaven heard a noise that sounded like a chain being dragged across rocks."[387] This wording is more acceptable than that of the preceding one. The sentence containing the words "the inhabitants of heaven heard his voice" does not appear in any of the sound traditions.[388]

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[383] Ḥafṣ b. Ghiyāth b. Ṭalq Abū ʿUmar an-Nakhaʿī al-Kūfī (d. 194/809), an Iraqi jurist who was appointed to the office of *qāḍī* and held judgeships in both Baghdad and Kufa. Although he was equally well known in the field of *ḥadith* studies, *ḥadīth* critics were mixed in their assessment of his reliability as a transmitter. According to al-Khaṭīb, some (among them Abū'l-Ḥasan al-ʿIjlī and Yaʿqūb b. Shayba) had words of high praise for his competence and reliability in this field (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, VIII, 197-198). Others, however, had reservations. Ibn Saʿd accused him of *tadlīs* or fraudulent reporting (*Ṭabaqāt*, VI, 389-390); Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn are said to have had serious doubts as to the trustworthiness of traditions received from him (*Mīzān*, I, 568), especially when he transmitted from memory. For more on him, see *Taʾrīkh Baghād*, VIII, 188-200; Ibn Athīr, *Kāmil*, VI, 237; Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, I, 567-568; *Tahdhīb*, II, 415-418; and *Shadharāt*, I, 340.

[384] Cf., Muslim, *īmān*, 379.

[385] Cf., *Mīzān*, I, 567-568.

[386] For the full text of this tradition, see Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, *sunna*, 20; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 201-202 (in both, the tradition is traced back to Ibn Masʿūd). Cf., Bukhārī, *tawḥīd*, 32f.; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 351, 403, and 450-451.

[387] See *Zād*, VII, 452ff., where Ibn al-Jawzī discusses the tradition of Ibn Masʿūd in an extended gloss on S. 34:23. Cf., also Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, XVII, 87. In this connection see also Madelung, "Origins of the Controversy," 514f. For other versions of the tradition, see Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 145-149; and Bahyaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 201-202.

[388] Ibn al-Jawzī's objection to the tradition of the *ṣawt*, quoted above from Bukhārī's *Ṣaḥīḥ*, is twofold, textual and theological. Since the tradition is attested by a single authority, *viz.*, Ḥafṣ b. Ghiyāth, it is not an adequate basis for the predication of a divine attribute, for

The Forty-Second Tradition

198 In a tradition reported by Jābir [b. ʿAbd Allāh], the Prophet [is alleged to have] said: "When God spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai, He addressed him in a language (*kalām*)[389] different from the one He used when He [first] summoned Moses. [Moses asked: 'O my Lord, is the language in which you addressed me Your language (*kalām*)?'][390] He replied: 'O Moses, I spoke to you in ten thousand tongues (*lisān*) only, but I have the power to speak in all tongues. Indeed, I have a power greater even than that!' When [Moses] returned to the Banū Isrāʾīl, they said to him: 'Describe the speech (*kalām*) of your Lord!' He replied: 'It is impossible for me.' They said: 'Describe it for us as best you can!' He replied: 'Imagine the sound (*ṣawt*) of thunder which comes in the clearest form you have ever heard.'"[391]

Ibn al-Jawzī insists repeatedly (cf., §33, e.g.) that only those traditions that rest on multiple authorities (i.e., *ḥadīth mutawātir* or what he sometimes also calls *ḥadīth mashhūr*) constitute sufficient grounds for the assertion of a divine attribute. Important as these textual considerations are for Ibn al-Jawzī, if one views the above discussion in the context of *KAS* as a whole and its central concern, one must assume that Ibn al-Jawzī's principal objection to the *ṣawt* tradition is based on the theological conviction that God's speech, which is eternal and one, cannot be thought of as consisting of letters (*ḥurūf*) and articulated sounds (*aṣwāt muqaṭṭaʿa*), since these latter belong to the world of phenomenal existence (what he elsewhere refers to as the realm of the *shāhid*), and are therefore temporal and finite. Reliance on letters/words and sounds to express meaning is peculiar to finite corporeal beings. God, by contrast, has no need of temporally originated means to realize His purpose. To ascribe *ṣawt* to God is to fall prey to the error of *tajsīm*. For an exceptionally clear exposition of the theological problem posed by the attribution of *ṣawt* to God, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 351-352; 403-405; and 450-451. Running through Ibn Fūrak's discussion of the word or speech of God (*kalām Allāh*) is the distinction between God's word in its eternal essence and its articulation in time and space. He repeatedly insists that the *kitāba* (the written text of revelation) and the *maktūb* (the meaning expressed through that text) are not to be confused, or as he sometimes puts it, the *ʿibāra* (expression) is not to be equated with the *muʿabbar* (what is expressed), or the *dalāla* (indicator) with the *madlūl* (indicated). Although Ibn Fūrak was an Ashʿarite, the position he takes seems entirely consistent with the logic and general theological stance of *KAS*. Ibn al-Jawzī's earlier writings, however, reflect a somewhat different position (cf., e.g., *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 247-253).

[389] See Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, IX, 404-407, where *kalām* and *lisān* are used interchangeably in several traditions similar to the one cited above.

[390] Cf., Abū Nuʿaym, *Ḥilya*, VI, 210, 17-18.

[391] Found also in *DST*, 68; *BA*, fol., 34a; *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 112-113; and the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nuʿaym, VI, 210, 12-21. Slightly different versions of this tradition (with quite different *isnāds*) are given by Ṭabarī in his *Tafsīr* (IX, 404-407). For Ibn al-Jawzī's gloss

199 This is a defective tradition which ʿAlī b. ʿĀṣim[392] transmitted on the authority of Faḍl b. ʿĪsā.[393] [Speaking of ʿAlī b. ʿĀṣim], Yaḥyā [b. Maʿīn] said: "He is worthless as a traditionist."[394] Nasāʾī said: "The traditions of ʿAlī are to be rejected."[395] Yazīd b. Hārūn[396] said: "We have always known that he was given to deception."[397] As for al-Faḍl b. ʿĪsā, Ayyūb as-Sakhtiyānī said: "It would have been better for him had he been born dumb (*akhras*)." Ibn ʿUyayna said: "Faḍl b. ʿIsā is of no account [as a traditionist]." And finally, Yaḥyā said: "He is an evil man!"[398]

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on S. 4: 164, which must have been occasioned by the tradition attributed to Jābir, see his *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 256; cf., Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung*, 174-175.

[392] An Iraqī traditionist who died in 201/816. He was born in Wasit of non-Arab parentage and spent at least part of his life in Baghdad. Despite his considerable standing among the people of Wasit, and his reputation as an honest man (Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, II, 195, 19), he was widely regarded as a weak traditionist on account of his defective memory. However, cf., *Talbīs*, 192 and 298, where *ḥadīths* transmitted by ʿAlī are cited with approval. For a sympathetic account of his life, see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 446-458; also see *Mīzān*, III, 135-138; and *Shadharāt*, II, 2.

[393] Al-Faḍl b. ʿĪsā b. Abān Abū ʿĪsā ar-Raqāshī, member of a family of Persian preachers from Basra widely known for their skill in the use of Arabic and their Qadarī sympathies. Although Faḍl b. ʿĪsā's dates are not given in the standard biographical works, he is known to have lived toward the end of the Umayyad period. For more on this interesting figure, see *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 7; *Tahdhīb*, VII, 283-284; *Mīzān*, III, 356; *Ḥilya*, VI, 206-210; Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, 118, 513-514; Watt, *Formative Period* (index); and J. van Ess, *Anfänge muslimischer Theologie*, 243f. For a detailed account of the early Qadarī "movement," see the excellent article by J. van Ess in *EI*^{2}, IV, 368-372.

[394] Cf., *Mīzān*, III, 136; and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 450.

[395] On the assessment of Nasāʾī, see *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 456; *Mīzān*, III, 136; and *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 113.

[396] Yazīd b. Hārūn Abū Khālid al-Wāsiṭī (d. 205/820 or 206/821). For biographical details, see Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, VII, 314-316; *Taʾrīkh Baghḍad*, XIV, 347; and *Shadharāt*, II, 16. On his theological views, see Madelung, "The Origins of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of the Quran," 507.

[397] See the following where these words are quoted verbatim: *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, XI, 456; *Mīzān*, III, 136; and *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 113.

[398] Ibn al-Jawzī's critique of this tradition here is based solely on the inadequacy of its *isnād*. It is reasonably certain, however, that he also had serious reservations regarding the *matn* of the tradition. Despite the fact that several transmitters of this tradition were known for their Qadarī sympathies, there seems nothing particularly Qadarī about this tradition. As van Ess has pointed out, very few pro-Qadarī *ḥadīths* have survived (cf., *EI*^{2}, IV, 371a). It is more likely that Ibn al-Jawzī's objection has to do with the "anthropomorphism" implicit

The Forty-Third Tradition

200 According to the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā], Ḥassān b. ʿAṭīya[399] said: "The one who prostrates himself [in prayer] prostrates himself at the foot (*qadam*) of the All Merciful."[400]

201 These are the words of a Follower (*tābiʿī*) who was attempting to express the nearness of God's grace (*faḍl*) in the language of metaphor. The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā], however, used this text as the basis for the attribution of a foot to God [but with this caveat: "The worshipper] prostrates himself at God's foot literally (*ḥaqīqatan*) though this prostration does not entail contact (*mumāssa*)."[401]

The Forty-Fourth Tradition

202 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Muslim and Bukhārī there is a tradition in which Abū Mūsā reports that the Prophet said: "There are two Gardens [in Paradise] whose vessels and furnishings are of silver;[402] and there are two Gardens whose vessels and furnishings are of gold.[403] Nothing will prevent the

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in its comparision of God's speech with natural phenomena. This, in fact, is a point that Ibn al-Jawzī makes quite explicit in his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt* (I, 112-113) where he classifies and discusses the *ḥadīth* under the rubric of those traditions that are objectionable because they compare God's speech to thunder (*ṣawāʿiq*). The "anthropomorphist" tendency can also be seen in the tradition's portrayal of Moses as willingly complying with the popular demand that he describe God's *kalām*.

[399] I have found Ḥassān referred to in only two works, Dhahabī's *Mīzān* (I, 479) and Ibn al-Jawzī's *Talbīs Iblīs* (189 and 200). In the latter work, his name is mentioned only in two *isnāds* with no other information apart from the persons from and to whom he transmitted traditions. In his notice on Ḥassān, Dhahabī observes that he was reliable in matters of *ḥadīth* and one of the better known among the Followers, but Dhahabī adds that he was suspected of being sympathetic to the Qadarīs, a view supported by Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn. It is worth noting that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal regarded him as a trustworthy traditionist.

[400] For other references to this saying, see *DST*, 68; *BA*, fol. 34a; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 353, where the tradition appears in a slightly different form: إذا سجد أحدكم فإنما يسجد على قدم الرحمن.

[401] I have found no reference to this saying in the *Muʿtamad* of Abū Yaʿlā. For an Ashʿarite view, see the discussion in Ibn Fūrak, 353-355.

[402] Cf., S. 76: 15.

[403] In another version of this tradition cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in his commentary (*Zād*

blessed from seeing their Lord *in* the Garden(s) of ʿAdn[404] except the mantle of majesty (*ridāʾ al-kibrīyāʾ*) covering His face."[405]

203 [fol.38a] [In the above tradition it is those "seeing" who are in Paradise], not the One seen,[406] for He cannot be confined to a particular point in space. The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "The apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) of this tradition is that the One seen will be in the Garden of ʿAdn."[407] Such words clearly imply a corporealist view of God (*tajsīm*). "The mantle of majesty" is [a figure of speech] used to convey the idea of His majesty and grandeur. In other words, they will be prevented [from seeing Him] because of His majesty. If God should desire, however, He could be disclosed to them.[408]

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al-Masīr, V, 199), the text reads: "In Paradise (*firdaws*) there are four [Gardens]—two gardens whose ornaments, vessels and furnishings are of silver; two Gardens whose ornaments, vessels and furnishings are of gold..." (cf., S. 55: 62ff., and Ibn al-Jawzī's commentary in *Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 124).

[404] The expression *jannāt ʿadn* occurs frequently in the Quran (S. 9: 72; 13: 23, etc). In his *Zād al-Masīr* (III, 469) Ibn al-Jawzī cites Ibn ʿAbbās who defines the *jannāt ʿadn* as the highest part of Paradise where the All-Merciful has His dwelling (*dār*). The full text of the description offered by Ibn ʿAbbās reads as follows: جنّات عدن هي بُطنان الجنّة وبطنانها وسطها، وهي أعلى درجة في الجنّة، وهي دار الرحمن عزّ وجلّ، وسقفها عرشه، خلقها بيده وفيها عين التسنيم والجنان حولها مُحدقة بها (the Gardens of ʿAdn, [an expression that refers to] the water-courses located in the middle of Paradise, are its highest part; there the All-Merciful has His dwelling; His Throne is their ceiling, and He created them by His hand; in them the spring of Tasnīm is to be found, and the other Gardens of Paradise surround them). Given his insistence that God's being is not defined by the categories of time and place (a point made in §203, but also elsewhere in *KAS*), Ibn al-Jawzī could hardly have taken this definition in its literal sense.

[405] Cf., *DST*, 69; and *BA*, fol. 34b. This tradition, more or less in the form cited above by Ibn al-Jawzī, may be found in the following: Muslim, *īmān*, 296; Bukhārī, *tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, 55 (Houdas, *Les trad.* III, 463-4); *tawḥīd*, 24 (*Les trad.* IV, 606); Tirmidhī, *ṣifat al-janna*, 5; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13(186); and *Zād al-Masīr*, V, 199. For glosses on the tradition, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 302; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 16; Ghazzālī, *Iḥyāʾ*, IV, 536; and *Zād al-Masīr*, V, 199-200.

[406] That is, God.

[407] For Abū Yaʿlā's view on the vision (*ruʾya*) of God, see his *Muʿtamad*, 82-84, and 217-218.

[408] The main point of this paragraph is that because God necessarily transcends categories of time and place, it is impossible to suppose that He will (or can) be seen in particular places such as the Garden of ʿAdn, for example. On this point, Ibn al-Jawzī's break with the traditional Ḥanbalī view is dramatic. For statements expressing the view of Aḥmad, see

204 We have already discussed the question of God's face in the chapter on the Quran. Our view is that the term "face" [is a metaphorical way of] referring to God himself.[409]

The Forty-Fifth Tradition

205 In the respective *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition reported by Abū Hurayra in which the Messenger of God said: "When God completed the creation [of the world] He wrote in His Book which was with Him (*ʿindahu*) above the Throne: 'Verily, My mercy has triumphed over (*ghalabat*) My anger.'" In another version of this tradition, the text reads: "[My mercy] has outstripped (*sabaqat*) [My anger]."[410]

206 The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "The expression 'with Him' (*ʿindahu*), when taken in its apparent sense (*ẓāhir*), implies proximity (*qurb*) to the divine essence (*adh-dhāt*)." It is important to insist, however, that nearness to God should not be construed in spatial terms, for spatial relations apply

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Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, I, 145, 7-9; 242, and 312. For similar statements by other Ḥanbalīs, see II, 23, 11-12; and 27, 7-9 (Barbahārī); *Kitāb ash-Sharīʿa*, 275-276 (Ājurrī); and *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, II, 298 (Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī). H. Laoust accurately sums up the position of the school as follows: "La vision (*ruʾya*) de Dieu par les hommes, lors du jugement dernier et par les élus au paradis, est affirmée par toutes les *ʿaqīda* ḥanbalites" (*La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 98, n. 3). Ibn al-Jawzī appears to have gone beyond the Ashʿarite position (which admitted a form of *ruʾya*) to one that was scarcely distinguishable from that of the Muʿtazilī school. It is clear, however, that Ibn al-Jawzī had not always held to the position set forth in *KAS*. In his *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir* (618, 11-13), apparently written earlier, he attacks the Muʿtazilī position and defends something very close to the standard Ḥanbalī view. Just when he adopted the position set forth in *KAS* and the reasons behind the change are questions that cannot yet be answered.

[409] See §38.

[410] For occurrences of this saying, see *DST*, 69; *BA*, fol., 34b; Ājurrī, *Sharīʿa*, 290; Bukhārī, *badʾ al-khalq*, 1 (*Les trad.*, II, 423); *tawḥīd*, 15, 22, 28 and 55; Muslim, *tawba*, 14, 15, 16; Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (189), 37(35); *Musnad*, II, 242, 258, 260, 313, 358, 381, 397, 433, 466; and Munāwī, *Itḥāfāt*, 31-32 (no. 53); 41-42 (no. 80), 50 (no. 108). For glosses on the saying, with special reference to the meaning of عنده فوق العرش, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 395-396 (cf., *Asmāʾ*, 284); Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 455 (cf., also 228-231; 344-345; and 369-373); and Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 8, and 58; cf., also Graham, *Divine Word*, 184-185. Ormsby points out that this saying was used by al-Ghazzālī to support the argument that God never wills evil per se, only good (*Theodicy*, 257). Evil is an accidental by-product (*al-Maqṣad al-Asnā* [Beirut, 1971] *68*).

only to finite bodies (*ajsām*). God himself has spoken of "[clay stones] 'with' (*ʿinda*) your Lord, marked [for the destruction of the wicked]."[411]

The Forty-Sixth Tradition

207 It was reported that one of the Followers said:[412] "God created Adam with His hand; He wrote the Torah with His hand; and He planted [the trees (or gardens) of] Paradise with His hand."[413]

208 This is a tradition whose source has not been established. We have already taken up the question of God's hands in our discussion of the verse: "What I created with My hands."[414]

The Forty-Seventh Tradition

209 It was reported on the authority of Ibn ʿAbbās[415] that in connection with

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[411] S. 11: 83 (cf., also 51:34). Cf., Ibn al-Jawzī's *Zād al-Masīr*, IV, 145-146, where it is argued that *ʿindaka* is to be taken in its metaphorical sense. The argument here in §206 is largely negative. Apart from suggesting that *ʿindahu* be taken in some sort of metaphorical sense, Ibn al-Jawzī does not indicate precisely how the expression ought to be taken. For suggestions of how the expression might be construed, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 455; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 395-396.

[412] Bayhaqī cites two slightly different versions of this tradition, both of which are attributed to the Prophet himself (*Asmāʾ*, 318).

[413] See *DST* (p. 70); *BA* (fol. 34b); and *Ṣayd al-Khāṭir*, 145, where this saying is cited; also Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 372-373; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 314ff., esp., 318, where Bayhaqī cites two versions of the saying, both of which are ascribed to the Prophet. The second of the two traditions reads: the Prophet said: "God created three things with His hand: He created Adam with His hand, he wrote the Torah with His hand, and he planted [the gardens of] Firdaws with His hand...." (p. 318).

[414] S. 38: 75. For the discussion of the hands of God, see §§41-43, where Ibn al-Jawzī insists on a metaphorical interpretation. It is interesting that two elements of the above saying were incorporated into several Ḥanbalī creeds as crucial points of doctrine. See, e.g., Ibn Baṭṭa's *Ibāna*, 58, 16-18, where he states: والإيمان بأنّ الله عزّ وجلّ خلق آدم بيده وغرس جنّة الفردوس بيده (It is important to believe that God created Adam with His hand and that He planted the garden of Firdaws with His hand). Cf., Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 108; and Ājurrī, *Sharīʿa*, 173, 181.

[415] Al-Khaṭīb gives the *isnād* as follows: Aḥmad b. al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbd al-Jabbār from Shujāʿ b. Mukhallad al-Fallās from Abū ʿĀṣim from Sufyān from ʿAmmār ad-Duhnī from

the verse "His *kursī* encompasses the heavens and the earth,"[416] the Prophet said by way of commentary: "His *kursī* is His footstool, but the measure of the Throne (*ʿarsh*) is beyond determination."[417]

210 A number of reliable traditionists transmitted this tradition, but they attributed it to Ibn ʿAbbās, not to the Prophet. Only one authority, Shujāʿ b. Mukhallad[418] by name, traced it back to the Prophet.[419] [Shujāʿ] was known for his differences with leading traditionists and for the commission of errors. The meaning of this tradition is that the *kursī* is smaller than the Throne (*ʿarsh*), in much the same way that the *kursī* connected with **[fol.38b]** the throne of a king (*sarīr*), being the place on which the throne's occupant places his feet, [is smaller than the throne].[420] Ḍaḥḥāk said: "The *kursī* is

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Muslim al-Baṭīn from Saʿīd b. Jubayr from Ibn ʿAbbās from the Prophet (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IX, 251, 12-14).

[416] S. 2: 255. This verse was the object of endless discussion among medieval exegetes. For a range of views, see the following: Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, V, 397-403; also see *Zād al-Masīr*, I, 303-304, for Ibn al-Jawzī's view on the *kursī*; and *Kashshāf*, I, 385-386, for a Muʿtazilī perspective on the problem of the *kursī* and its relation to the *ʿarsh*.

[417] Cf., *DST*, 77; *BA*, fol. 34b; and Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, V, 398-399; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 387; Ibn Kathīr, *ʿUmda*, II, 162; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 107-108; *Muʿtamad*, 177; and *Lisān*, VI, 194, 6-10. Al-Khaṭīb cites this tradition in his notice on Shujāʿ b. Mukhallad (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IX, 251-252), along with several other versions attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās. For more on Shujāʿ, see the following note.

[418] Read by some as Shujāʿ b. Makhlad, known also as Abū'l-Faḍl al-Baghawī (150/767-235/849). Although a native of the district of Bagh in the province of Khurasan, he moved to Baghdad to pursue the study of *ḥadīth* and remained there until his death. Among his students were several Ḥanbalīs (e.g., Ibrāhīm al-Ḥarbī and Mūsā b. Hārūn). He is known to have been in contact with Bishr b. al-Ḥārith and may have been influenced by his mystical and ascetic views, although the evidence on this point is inconclusive. According to Ibrāhīm al-Ḥarbī, Bishr once criticized Shujāʿ for attending the meetings of the popular preacher Manṣūr b. ʿAmmār (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IX, 253; also cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in his *Kitāb al-Quṣṣāṣ*, 134). Despite the criticisms levelled against Shujāʿ by certain traditionists for what they regarded as insufficient rigor in the transmission of *ḥadīths*, he was defended by Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn as being honest and trustworthy as a transmitter (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IX, 252, 20-21; cf., also *Mīzān*, 265, 2). Dhahabī reports that Muslim, the compiler of the *Ṣaḥīḥ*, received traditions from him (*Mīzān*, II, 265, 2).

[419] Cf., *Taʾrīkh Baghdād*, IX, 251; and *Mīzān*, II, 265.

[420] In previous discussions of the *ʿarsh* (§§189-192, e.g.), Ibn al-Jawzī makes it clear that it is not an object (or a "body," as he prefers to say). If the *ʿarsh* is not an object and, therefore, not amenable to being described in spatial categories, what sense does it make to say that the *kursī* is smaller than the *ʿarsh*?

that on which kings place their feet."[421] The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "The foot [ascribed to God in the *ḥadīth*] is an attribute of the divine essence; it is this that God will place in the Fire [on the day of judgment]."[422]

The Forty-Eighth Tradition

211 Al-ʿAbbās reported a tradition in which the Prophet said: "Above the seventh heaven there is a sea (*baḥr*); and [the distance] between the top [of the sea] and its bottom is equal to the distance between the [lowest] heaven and the earth. God, may He be exalted, is above [the sea]."[423]

212 This tradition, however, is not found in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*, for Yaḥyā b. al-ʿAlāʾ[424] was the only one of his contemporaries to transmit it. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal said that [Yaḥyā] was a habitual liar who forged traditions. Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn held that he was not to be trusted in matters of *ḥadīth*, and Ibn ʿAdī said that his traditions are forgeries.[425]

213 We have already discussed the question of God's being above His creation (*fawqīya*) in connection with the verse "God is above (*fawqa*) His

[421] The full text of this tradition as preserved by Ṭabarī (*Tafsīr*, V, 398) reads: "In response to the verse 'His *kursī* encompasses the heavens and the earth', Ḍaḥḥāk said: 'His *kursī* is what is placed underneath the Throne (*taḥt al-ʿarsh*); it is that on which kings place their feet.'"

[422] An allusion to a prophetic tradition reported by Mālik b. Anas (cf., *KAS*, §§103-107). In the *Muʿtamad* (54, 3) Abū Yaʿlā advocates a slightly different view: the *qadam* (or *rijl*) is an attribute added (صفة زائدة) to the divine essense.

[423] Cf., *DST*, 70; and *BA*, fol. 35a. As Ibn al-Jawzī himself notes in the following paragraph, the saying in this precise form does not occur in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*. For relatively close approximations, see, e.g., Ibn Māja, *muqaddima*, 13 (193); Tirmidhī, *tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, 69; Abū Dāwūd, *sunna*, 18; *Musnad* I, 206-207. See also Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 399; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 452; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 102 (cf., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 28, 12-15; and Ājurrī, *Sharīʿa*, 290-293).

[424] Abū ʿAmr Yaḥyā b. al-ʿAlāʾ al-Bajalī ar-Rāzī, who flourished during the latter half of the 8th century. Dhahabī reports that Yaḥyā received traditions from Zuhrī (d. 124/742) and Zayd b. Aslam (d. 136/753), and that he transmitted *ḥadīths* to ʿAbd ar-Razzāq b. Hammām al-Ḥimyarī (d. 211/827) and Abū ʿUmar al-Ḥawḍī (d. 225/839), among others (*Mīzān*, IV, 397-398). Apart from his activity as a *muḥaddith*, little is known of his life. In addition to Dhahabī's *Mīzān*, see also Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 200; his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 253; and III, 213, for assessments of his work.

[425] These statements are also cited by Dhahabī in his *Mīzān*, IV, 397-398 (cf., *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 200).

creatures."[426] The *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] said: "The notion that God is above His creation (*fawqīya*) has its basis in the fact that God is on the Throne (*ʿarsh*) in His very essence (*adh-dhāt*). He is on the Throne in the sense that part of his essence is contiguous to the Throne and so is limited by it. However, that part [of the divine essence] that is not contiguous to the Throne, *viz.*, the top, back, front and left sides, is not limited." This statement is grounded in a corporealist view of God, for what is contiguous to something is larger or smaller [in relation to it]. Such qualifications (*maqādīr*) are applicable only to finite bodies (*ajsām*).[427]

214 The *Qāḍī* said: "Since it has been established that God is on the

[426] See especially *KAS*, §§55-56 where Ibn al-Jawzī takes up the question of *fawqīya*. The traditional Ḥanbalī view was that discussions of terms like *istiwāʾ* and *fawqīya* should be limited to a reiteration of what the Quran and the *ḥadīth* have to say, *bila kayfa*, that is, without further elaboration (cf., Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, lxxiv- lxxv, and n. 175.). Ibn al-Jawzī knew, however, that Ḥanbalīs frequently went beyond the formulations of scripture in their discussion of such terminology. In the two sections of *KAS* where this question of *istiwāʾ* and *fawqīya* is taken up (§§55-56, and 213-214; cf., also §135), Ibn al-Jawzī cites statements from three prominent Ḥanbalīs (Ibn Ḥamid, Abū Yaʿlā and Ibn Zāghūnī) which are problematic, in his view, because they naively assume that God's relationship to the world can adequately be described in spatial and temporal terms. Aḥmad's position on the question is uncertain: some statements ascribed to him suggest a literalistic interpretation of *istiwāʾ* (e.g., *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 28, 12-15); others seem to reflect discomfort with a literalistic interpretation. Abū Muḥammad at-Tamīmī quotes Aḥmad as follows: ولا يجوز أن يقال: استوى بمماسّة ولا بملاقاة، تعالى الله عن ذلك علواً وكبيراً والله تعالى لم يلحقه تغيّر ولا تبدّل... (It is not permissible to say that He sits [on the Throne] in such a way as to involve touching or contact. God the High and Mighty is beyond that, for He is not subject to change or alteration [*Ṭabaqāt*, II, 296, 21-297, 2]). Ibn al-Jawzī's solution to the problems posed by the terms *istiwāʾ* and *fawqīya* is to construe them metaphorically, but with a particular twist that seems to reflect a Muʿtazilī influence (cf., §55, especially the last several sentences of the paragraph where he construes *fawqīya* in the qualitative terms of rank or status). Ibn Fūrak, an Ashʿarite whose views are often indistinguishable from those held by Muʿtazilīs on such questions, neatly summarizes the position defended above by Ibn al-Jawzī. In his commentary on the reference in S. 67: 17 to "Him who is in heaven," he states: معنى ذلك أنّه فوق السماء لا على معنى فوقيّة المتمكّن في المكان لأنّ ذلك صفة الجسم المحدود المحدث ولكنّ بمعنى ما وصف به أنّه فوق من طريق الرتبة والمنزلة والعظمة والقدرة (He is above the heaven not in the sense of being located in a particular place, for that is an attribute of finite, contingent bodies; "above" is ascribed to Him rather in the sense of rank, standing, esteem and power [*Mushkil*, 392, 6-9]).

[427] Because they define the relationship between things in quantitative and/or spatial terms.

Throne, is it [not] possible to speak of Him as 'sitting' (*julūs*) or 'standing' (*qiyām*), for nothing has been found in the teaching of our *imām* dealing with this point?" In fact, neither of these terms is permissible. Although the expression "sitting" (*quʿūd*), as applied to God, is found in a tradition going back to Ibn ʿAbbās, the tradition in question is not authentic.[428] The expression "standing" (*qiyām*), on the other hand, does occur in a tradition going back through ʿIsā and Jābir[429] to ʿUmar b. aṣ-Ṣubḥ.[430] However, according to Bukhārī, ʿUmar b. aṣ-Ṣubḥ himself admitted that he had forged the Prophet's *khuṭba*.[431] Ibn Ḥibbān said: "[ʿUmar] used to fabricate traditions and then construct *isnāds* for them made up of the names of reliable transmitters.[432] **[fol.39a]** His books on *ḥadīth* serve no useful purpose except to entertain." Dāraquṭnī said that his traditions are to be rejected. Al-Azdī said: "He was a callous liar."[433] Can a divine attribute be established on the authority of a man like this?[434] What has become of reason? God is too exalted to be described as standing, that is, [as a body] in an upright position.[435] He can be described as standing only in the sense of "standing for" [something, such as] justice (*qāʾim bi'l-qisṭ*). He cannot be described as sitting (*quʿūd*), for that is a condition peculiar to finite bodies.

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[428] See Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 122, 18; also his *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 20, 14, for examples of traditions that ascribe sitting (*julūs* and *quʿūd*, respectively) to God, all of which are rejected as apocryphal.

[429] Perhaps ʿĪsā b. Mūsā Ghunjār (*Mīzān*, III, 206, 22; and 325, 3) and Jābir b. ʿAbd Allāh.

[430] Dhahabī gives his name as ʿUmar b. Ṣubḥ Abū Nuʿaym al-Khurāsānī but provides no dates and gives very little biographical information (*Mīzān*, III. 206-7. Also see *Tahdhīb*, VII, 463-4).

[431] In the *Mīzān* this charge is attributed to Aḥmad b. ʿAlī as-Sulaymānī, who accuses him of having fabricated only the last part of the Prophet's *khuṭba*.

[432] Cf., *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, II, 211, 17-18; *Mīzān*, III, 206, 23.

[433] On the statements by both Dāraquṭnī and al-Azdī, see the sources cited in the previous note.

[434] Or perhaps, on the basis of a tradition like this.

[435] This sentence indicates that Ibn al-Jawzī's problem with this tradition was not just its *isnād* but also the content of its *matn*.

The Forty-Ninth Tradition

215 There is a tradition in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs*, reported by Abū Hurayra, according to which the Messenger of God said: "Those who give as alms to God a measure of dates acquired honestly—for God accepts only what has been so acquired—He will receive the [dates] in His right hand and will nurture them, as one would do with a colt (*falūw*), until they become as large as a mountain."[436] In the version of this tradition cited by Muslim, [the last sentence reads]: "[The dates] will grow in the palm of God's hand (*kaff*) until they are larger than a mountain."[437]

216 The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain that this saying was part of an address intended for the general public and so [the Prophet made use of terms which] they could comprehend—terms such as *akhdh* (accepting or receiving), *tarbīya* (increasing or causing increase), and *numūw* (multiplying).[438] When [the Prophet] spoke of God receiving something with His hand or taking it in His palm, he was evoking experiences understood by his audience. The term "right hand" was used because it served to underscore the importance of the matter.[439] The term *tarbīya* is synonymous with *muḍāʿafa* (doubling or multiplying).

The Fiftieth Tradition

217 In the *Ṣaḥīḥs* of Bukhārī and Muslim there is a tradition from Anas b. Mālik in which it is reported that the Prophet said while discussing [the

[436] See *DST*, 71; *BA*, fol. 35a, and *Kitāb al-Ḥadāʾiq*, II, 200 (where the tradition is listed under the rubric of *faḍl aṣ-ṣadaqa*). The saying is cited frequently in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*: Bukhārī, *zakāt*, 8 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, I, 459); *tawḥīd*, 23 (Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 596); Muslim, *zakāt*, 64; Tirmidhī, *zakāt*, 28; Nasāʾī, *zakāt*, 24, 28; Ibn Māja, *zakāt*, 28; *Musnad*, II, 268, 331, 381, 418, 419, 431, 538, 541, and VI, 24, 28. For glosses on the saying, see Bayhaqī (*Asmāʾ*, 328, 425); Ibn Khuzayma (*Tawḥīd*, 59-63); and Goldziher, Die *Ẓāhiriten*, 169.

[437] See Muslim, *zakāt*, 63; Nasāʾī, *zakāt*, 48; Ibn Māja, *zakāt*, 28; and *Musnad*, II, 268, 538.

[438] *Akhdh* and *numūw* do not appear in the particular text of the tradition cited by Ibn al-Jawzī, but they do appear in a number of the many variant forms of the tradition (e.g., *akhdh* in Ibn Māja, *zakāt*, 28; and *numūw* in Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 59, 10).

[439] Cf., Goldziher, Die *Ẓāhiriten*, 169. For Ibn al-Jawzī's analysis of the term "hand," see *KAS*, §§41-43, and 92-97, etc.

signs of] the Antichrist (*dajjāl*):[440] "He will have one eye (*aʿwar*), but your Lord is not one-eyed."[441]

218 The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain that the chief aim of this saying is to assert that God cannot be described in any way that might imply imperfection, for being one-eyed is obviously an indication of imperfection. The Prophet did not mean to ascribe to God bodily organs, for there is nothing praiseworthy in the attribution of such to God.[442]

219 Ibn ʿAqīl said: "The ill-informed sometimes assume that since [the Prophet] denied that God is one-eyed He meant to establish by a kind of inferential reason (*dalīl al-khiṭāb*)[443] that God has two eyes. This is a

[440] The *dajjāl* (or *al-masīḥ ad-dajjāl*), often described as a corpulent, red-faced man with one eye and with the word *kāfir* engraved on his forehead, played a prominent role in medieval apocalyptic literature in Islam, and undoubtedly for some of the same reasons the person of the Antichrist figured so prominently in the apocalyptic literature of medieval Christianity. On medieval Christian speculation on the subject as well as certain parallels between Muslim and Christian representations of the Antichrist, see R. Lerner, "Antichrist," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, I, 321-322 (cf. also, vol. X, 340-341). For a survey of Muslim literature on the subject, see the articles by Abel (*EI*^{2}, II, 76-77) and Wensinck (*SEI*, 67) on the *dajjāl*. The subject also attracted the attention (and interest) of Ḥanbalīs (see Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 106 and n. 3, for a brief survey of Ḥanbalī views and a preliminary list of sources).

[441] See *DST*, 71; *BA*, fol. 35a; and *Kitāb al-Ḥadāʾiq*, III, 376. The tradition on the Antichrist as a one-eyed mythical figure occurs frequently in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*. For the more commonly cited forms of this tradition see: Bukhārī, *fitan*, 26; and Muslim, *fitan*, 101. See also Bukhārī, *jihād*, 178; *anbiyāʾ* 3; *adab*, 77; Muslim, *fitan*, 95; Abū Dāwūd, *malāḥim*, 26; Tirmidhī, *fitan*, 56, 62; Ibn Māja, *fitan*, 33; *Musnad*, I, 228, 250, 333; II, 27, 149; and VI, 140. For commentaries on the tradition, see Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 43-44; Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 312-313; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 253; and *Muʿtamad*, 51. Cf., also *KAS*, §40.

[442] The text of *KAS* here follows almost verbatim Ibn Fūrak's commentary on this tradition (*Mushkil*, 253, 8-12).

[443] Cf., *KAS*, §40, where the expression *dalīl al-khiṭāb* occurs. As a technical term in medieval jurisprudence, *dalīl al-khiṭāb* (literally "the indicator of the text"—that is, the indicator found in, or provided by, the text) designated a method by which meanings present only by implication could be derived from the text on the basis of "indicators" (*adilla*) furnished by the text. The method aimed to identify such indicators and, by the application of a kind of inferential reason (*qiyās*), to arrive at the intended meaning. The *qiyās* employed by some exegetes (such as Ibn ʿAqīl, e.g.) in this process differed from the *qiyās* of classical jurisprudence where it was linked closely to the notion of "cause" or *ʿilla*. In the case of *dalīl al-khiṭāb*, what is critical is the *dalīl*. In a short passage in his *al-Wāḍiḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (edited by G. Makdisi [Beirut/Stuttgart, 1996] I, 17-18) Ibn ʿAqīl provides

serious misunderstanding [of the saying], for by denying that God is one-eyed [the Prophet] merely intended to negate [the possibility of] imperfection in Him. The intention of the Prophet's words then is that your Lord does not possess creaturely organs, for He would then be subject to imperfection. **[fol.39b]** This is analogous to the refusal to ascribe to God a son on the grounds that He is indivisible. If this tradition were taken to mean that God's form is complete or perfect (*ṣūra kāmila*),[444] that would *not* be sufficient to prove that He is divine or eternal, for this kind of perfection of form is a common occurrence. To those who say that [the words of the

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a short, highly condensed, definition of the *dalīl al-khiṭab* and cites several texts—one from the Quran and having to do with the question of divorce, the other from the *ḥadīth* bearing on the question of *zakāt*—to illustrate the method. In connection with S. 65: 6, وَإِنْ كُنَّ أُولَاتِ حَمْلٍ فَأَنْفِقُوا عَلَيْهِنَّ (If they be pregnant, then bear their expenses) he concludes on the basis of *dalīl al-khiṭab* that in the case of women who are not pregnant at the time of divorce, no such support is required. Simarily, in connection with the prophetic saying, في سائمة الغنم زكاة ([If it is a question of] freely grazing sheep, *zakāt* [is required]), one may conclude that in the case of stall-fed cattle, *zakāt* is not required. In his discussion, Ibn ʿAqīl does not lead us through the steps involved in the application of *dalīl al-khiṭab* to these texts; all he provides is the conclusion. However, the examples he cites together with the conclusions reached are consistent with general practice among Shāfiʿite and Ḥanafite jurists. How widely the method was used by Ḥanbalīs to deal with legal questions is unclear, but it does seem likely that those Ḥanbalīs opposed to the use of *qiyās* would also have been opposed to *dalīl al-khiṭab* applied in this way. It is known that Ibn Ḥazm, who was bitterely opposed to all forms of *qiyās* and who frequently sided with Ḥanbalīs on legal and theological questions, was vehemently opposed to any kind of *dalīl al-khiṭab* that entailed the use of *qiyās* (for a more detailed treatment of Ibn Ḥazm's position on *dalīl al-khiṭāb*, see R. Arnaldez, *Grammaire et théologie chez Ibn Hazm de Cordoue,* 161-165 (cf., also Goldziher, *Die Ẓāhiriten,* 157-159; also al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl ad-Dīn,* 223-224, for an Ashʿarite/Shāfiʿite perspective on the question). While Ibn ʿAqīl, in principle, had no objection to the use of *dalīl al-khiṭāb* in the realm of positive law, he does note in the passage cited here in *KAS* (§219) that its use can produce conflicting conclusions. In the same passage—especially from the last several sentences of §219—it is clear that Ibn ʿAqīl had serious reservations regarding the application of *dalīl al-khiṭāb* to theological questions, especially to questions having to do with the divine attributes, where only peremptory evidence (*adilla*) is acceptable; here presumptive analogy (*qiyās maẓnūn*) is not sufficient. It may be used in dealing with theological questions of less moment, but two conditions must be met: 1) the findings arrived at through *dalīl al-khiṭāb* must square with the teaching of scripture taken as a whole, and 2) they must be consistent with the findings of reason (cf., Ibn ʿAqīl, *Kitāb al-Jadal,* 41-42). This was also Ibn al-Jawzī's position.

[444] That is, that he possesses two eyes, not one; or perhaps, that he possesses a full compliment of bodily organs.

Prophet] establish that God has two eyes on the basis of an inference drawn from the text (*dalīl al-khiṭāb*), it should be pointed out that this kind of inferential reasoning is the subject of debate [among scholars] regarding its validity as evidence in matters of law based on the data of revelation (*aḥkām al-fiqh wa-furūᶜ ad-dīn*). [And if that is true] then how much more so when it is a matter of a theology based on reason (*uṣūl*). Those who believe it to be valid evidence (*ḥujja*) are of the opinion that it is superseded by the sense of the revealed text (*maᶜnā an-nuṭq*), when in reality it is presumptive reasoning (*qiyās maẓnūn*). How then can it have the authority of evidence when the evidence provided by reason condemns it by refuting it?" [445]

The Fifty-First Tradition

220 Among the "unique" traditions (*afrād*)[446] cited by Bukhārī [in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*] there is one, reported by Abū Hurayra, in which the Prophet said: "God says:[447] 'My servant does not cease to draw near to Me through his supererogatory prayers (*nawāfil*) until I love him. Now when I love [My servant], I am his ear (*samᶜ*) by which he hears, his eye (*baṣar*) by which he sees, his hand (*yad*) by which he grasps, and his foot (*rijl*) by which he walks. There is nothing more distasteful[448] to Me than taking the life of a

[445] The translation given above is an attempt to render what seems to me to be the meaning of the Arabic text. The passage quoted from Ibn ᶜAqīl must have been part of a longer text. Until the full text is recovered the exact meaning of these sentences may be open to question. Nonetheless, the general sense of the passage cited by Ibn al-Jawzī is reasonably clear: that while the use of *dalīl al-khiṭāb* may be permissible, such a method ought not be applied to texts that deal with foundational theological questions (*uṣūl*).

[446] The term "unique" (*afrād*, sing. *fard*) refers to reports passed on by a single transmitter. This tradition was designated *fard* because Sharīk b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Abī Nimr is said to have been the only one of his generation to tansmit it (Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, I, 641-642; cf., also Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 38; and Abū Nuᶜaym, *Ḥilya*, I, 4-5).

[447] The first part of the tradition, omitted by Ibn al-Jawzī, reads: "God said: 'He who treats My friend (*walī*) as an enemy, I permit warfare against him; My servant draws near to Me with nothing more dear to Me than what I have prescribed as his duty (*iftaraḍtu ᶜalayhi*). My servant does not cease to...." (Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 38, 2).

[448] The Arabic word *taraddud* here rendered "distasteful" includes the notion of wavering or hesitating (and putting off or deferring) in the face of what is distasteful.

believer (*muʾmin*); he loathes [the thought of] death, and I loathe doing him harm.'"[449]

221 The expression "I am his ear, his eye, etc.," are figures of speech *(mathal)* that can be interpreted in three different ways. In the first place, they may be taken to mean that "[the believer] loves obedience to 'Me' *(ṭāʿatī)* as much as he loves his own limbs *(jawāriḥ)*." Secondly, they may mean that "he is so completely devoted to 'Me' that nothing other than his devotion to 'Me' concerns him, and so he devotes himself to [the keeping of] My commands." Thirdly, ["I am his ear, his eye, etc.,] in the sense that I make his intentions (*maqāṣid*) a reality as he does through his own ears, his eyes, and hands, that is, through [the very limbs] by means of which he protects himself against his enemy."[450]

222 The term *taraddud*[451] is used because it is an expression that we understand [from experience]. God, however, is far beyond such a thing taken in its literal sense (*ʿan ḥaqīqatihi*); in short, [the saying] belongs to the same class as the *ḥadīth qudsī*: "To him who approaches Me walking, I will come to him running (*harwala*)."[452] One of the *ʿulamāʾ* said: "When a believer is ill and prays for the restoration of his health, and then is restored—there is a kind of *taraddud* (hesitation or wavering), as it were, [in God] before finally decreeing his death."[453]

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[449] This *ḥadīth qudsī* is also cited by Ibn al-Jawzī in *DST*, 72-73; and *BA*, fol. 35a. Though quoted frequently in medieval sources, the saying appears in only one of the canonical collections of *ḥadīth, viz.*, Bukhārī's *Ṣaḥīḥ, riqāq*, 38 (2) (cf., Houdas, *Les traditions*, IV, 296). There is a similar text in Ibn Ḥanbal's *Musnad* (VI, 256); the text cited by Ibn Ḥanbal, however, is attributed to ʿĀʾisha, not to Abū Hurayra. The tradition is cited and discussed critically at some length by two knowledgeable authorities, Bayhaqī (*Asmāʾ*, 490-495) and Dhahabī (*Mīzān*, I, 641-642). Since the tradition lends itself naturally to a mystical interpretation, it was bound to attract the attention of Sufīs. For an indication of how Ṣūfīs construed the text of this tradition, see the following among others: Sarrāj, *Lumaʿ*, 383-384; Makkī, *Qūt al-Qulūb*, II, 109; Qushayrī, *Risāla*, 610; Ibn ʿArabī, *Mishkāt*, 38; Madanī, *Itḥāfāt Sanīya*, 18-19, 36, 68, 75; and the *Ḥilya* of Abū Nuʿaym (I, 4-5).

[450] God's identification with the believer's limbs (understood figuratively) is another way of saying that God works through the believer to achieve His purposes.

[451] To hesitate or waver in the face of what is distasteful (see §220 where it is used).

[452] Cf. §§33, 115 and 181-182. For more on the saying, see notes to §181.

[453] This, however, is not actual hesitation or wavering on God's part; it is merely what appears as hesitation viewed from the vantage point of human experience. Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī gives a similar explanation of *taraddud* in his commentary on the saying (see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 491-492, where al-Khaṭṭābī's commentary is quoted at length).

[fol.40a] *The Fifty-Second Tradition*

223 Jubayr b. Muʿṭim reported that a Bedouin came to the Messenger of God and said: "O Messenger of God, [my] people are in difficult straits: their families are starving, their belongings are depleted and their herds are dying. Pray [to God] for rain! We beg that you intercede with God [on our behalf] and that God intercede with you." Then the Messenger of God replied: "Do you understand what you are saying?" Thereupon the Messenger began to praise God and he continued until his Companions perceived that [from the expression] on his face.[454] Then [the Prophet] said: "God should not be asked to intercede with one of His creatures, for His station is too majestic for that! Do you understand what God is (*mā Allāh*)? Verily, His Throne (*ʿarsh*) is above (*ʿalā*) the heavens thus and so—and as he was saying these words he[455] made a dome-like shape[456] with his fingers[457] —and verily, it creaks like the creaking of a camel's saddle from [the weight of] the rider [and his gear]."[458]

224 Muḥammad b. Isḥāq[459] was the only traditionist of his generation to

[454] In addition to the problem of the numerous variant readings, none of which is entirely persuasive, there is the question of the antecedent of *dhālika*. Assuming that the reading given in *KAS* is the correct one, it is possible to see in *dhālika* a reference to the pain, even shock, the Prophet must have felt at the Bedouin's suggestion that God might interecede with one of His creatures.

[455] See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 417, 18-19, where the gesture in question is attributed to one of the transmitters of the tradition, not to the Prophet. The two possibilities noted by Bayhaqī are Wahb b. Jarīr and Abū'l-Azharī, both of whom appear in the *isnād* of the tradition.

[456] Cf., Gimaret, *Image*, 76 and n. 4. Gimaret believes that "tent" is the correct rendering of *qubba* in the context of this tradition.

[457] That is, in order to illustrate the Prophet's words. In his commentary on the tradition, Bayhaqī insists that the "dome" was meant to represent the Throne (*Asmāʾ*, 418).

[458] Cf., *DST*, 73; and *BA*, fol. 35b. Among the standard collections of *ḥadīth*, this tradition appears only in Abū Dāwūd, *sunna*, 18. However, it is quoted in full by Ibn Khuzayma in his *Tawḥīd*, 103-104 (cf., Dārimī in his *Radd ʿalā'l-Jahmīya*, 272, 16-23; and Ājurrī, *Sharīʿa*, 293, 12-21); and by Bayhaqī in his *Asmāʾ*, 418, along with a lengthy commentary. For additional references to this tradition in its many variants, see Gimaret, *Image*, 76. On the last line of this tradition, see also *KAS*, §190 and notes.

[459] Muḥammad b. Isḥāq b. Yasār Abū ʿAbd Allāh, a *mawlā* of the Banū Muṭṭalib and author of the well known biography of the Prophet, who was born in Medina around 85/704 and died in Baghdad in 150/767 or 151/768. The biographical sources leave little doubt that he had both his defenders and his detractors (*Mīzān*, III, 469, 1). Zuhrī referred

transmit this tradition from Yaʿqūb b. ʿUtba.[460] The most competent authorities did not cite [traditions transmitted by] these two men as a basis for legal rulings. Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī said: "This tradition, when taken in its literal sense (*ʿalā ẓāhirihi*), is in its own way an attempt to define the modalities (*kayfīya*) of things, but such is forbidden when it is a question of God and His attributes. It should be observed that [this tradition] draws on the language of human experience (*kalām taqrīb*) for the purpose of expressing the might and majesty of God in such a way that those who hear it might understand, even when they are crude Bedouin who do not possess the means by which to grasp language that is subtle and intricate."[461]

225 [Al-Khaṭṭābī continued:] "The question 'Do you understand what God is?' is another way of asking: 'Do you comprehend the greatness and majesty of God?' The expression 'it creaks because of Him' means that [the Throne] is unable [to bear] the might and majesty of God, for it is well known that a saddle creaks because of its occupant, that is, because of the weight, or because of its inability to sustain it. By using the kind of expression that was familiar to his listeners, [the Prophet] intended to clarify the measure of God's power and majesty so as to reinforce the point that the one who occupies a lofty position does not intercede with one who is below him in rank."

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to him as one of the best informed historians of Medina in his day, and others (among them ʿĀṣim b. Qatāda, Ibn Maʿīn and Ibn Saʿda) regarded him as reliable in matters of *ḥadīth*. The judgment of others, however, was not as kind. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, while accepting historical reports transmitted by him, refused to use *ḥadīths* related by him as a basis for deciding legal questions—reportedly because of Ibn Isḥāq's use of the collective *isnād*, but there were others (such as Nasāʾī) who accused him of outright deception in matters of tradition. He was also accused of having Shīʿite sympathies (Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VI, 400) and of being crypto-Muʿtazilī in his theology (*Tahdhīb*, IX, 42, 6ff.; *Mīzān*, III, 469, 11). For a sketch of his life and a list of the more important sources on him, see *EI*^{2}, III, 810-811 (J. M. B. Jone); and *GAS*, I, 288-290.

[460] Yaʿqūb b. ʿUtba b. al-Mughīra ath-Thaqafī al-Madanī, who died in 128/745. He was a contemporary of Zuhrī, an expert on the life of the Prophet and the transmitter of a number of reports on the Prophet that have been preserved by Ṭabarī in his *Taʾrīkh* (see index). From these it is evident that he did not normally cite the informants on whom he depended. For accounts of his life see Ibn Ḥajar's *Tahdhīb* (XI, 392) as well as his *Taqrīb* (II, 376). For comments on Yaʿqūb b. ʿUtba as a source and transmitter of prophetic traditions, see A. Fischer, *Biographien von Gewährsmännern des Ibn Isḥāq*, 87-88.

[461] For a discussion of al-Khaṭṭābī's interpretation of this tradition, see Gimaret, *Images*, 79.

226 We have already noted earlier that the *Qāḍī* [Abū Yaʿlā] once said: "[The Throne] creaks on account of the weight of the divine essence."[462] Now this is tantamount to conceiving and representing God in corporeal terms.

The Fifty-Third Tradition

227 [fol.40b] Abū Hurayra reported that after the Prophet recited the verse "Verily, God is all-hearing and all-seeing,"[463] he placed his index finger and his thumb on his eyes and ear.[464]

228 The *ʿulamāʾ* maintain that by this action [the Prophet] meant to affirm that God possesses the power to hear and see, and that he pointed to the two organs which are the respective seats of these human faculties [in order to make this point]. He did not mean to imply that God actually possesses such organs.[465]

The Fifty-Fourth Tradition

229 Abū Dardāʾ reported that the Prophet said: "Verily, God descends during the last three hours of the night. During the first hour He opens [the Book of] Remembrance (*dhikr*), and He erases what He wishes and records [what He wishes]. During the second hour He descends to the Garden of ʿAdn[466]—it is His dwelling (*dāruhu*), for He alone resides there—and He says: 'Blessed is the one who enters you.' And finally, during the third hour, He descends to the lowest heaven with His spirit (*rūḥ*) and the angels. And trembling He cries out: 'Rise up before My majesty and power (*ʿizzatī*)!'"[467]

[462] Cf., §§192-193.

[463] S. 4: 58. For Ibn al-Jawzī's gloss on this verse, see *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 113-114. Cf., Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, VIII, 494-495; and Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, I, 535.

[464] Cf., *DST*, 74; and *BA*, fol. 35b. Both Bayhaqī (*Asmāʾ*, 179-180) and Ibn Khyzayma (*Tawḥīd*, 43) cite this tradition along with several others of a similar content.

[465] See Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 179-180, where the same argument is made. Cf., *Muʿtamad*, 50.

[466] For more on this expression, see §202 and the notes to the paragraph.

[467] See *DST*, 74; and *BA*, fol. 35b (cf., also Ibn al-Jawzī's *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 38-39, where a variant form of this tradition is cited). The tradition does not occur in any of the canonical collections, but it is cited frequently in religious texts of the period. See, e.g., Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, II, I, 98; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 135; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 399-400.

230 The text of the above report has come down to us through the transmission of Ziyāda al-Anṣārī.[468] When this tradition was mentioned to Bukhārī by certain traditionists, he declared it to be objectionable (*munkar al-ḥadīth*).[469] Abū Ḥātim b. Ḥibbān said: "[Ziyāda] transmitted faulty traditions (*manākīr*) on the authority of reputable persons [through the use of contrived *isnāds*]; his traditions ought to be avoided."[470] Abū Jaʿfar b. Abī Shayba,[471] one of the transmitters of this tradition, erroneously recorded his name as Zāʾida. Ziyāda is the only correct spelling.

231 Assuming that [the above tradition] is sound, we offer the following interpretation: [In the tradition, the Garden of ʿAdn] is said to be "God's abode" (*dāruhu*) in the same way [the Quran] ascribes to God a house (*bayt*).[472] People frequently speak of this or that as being His abode (*maskan*), but we only use such language [as a figure of speech] because [we know] it is not possible to speak of God's having a place of abode (*suknā*) [in the literal sense of the term].[473]

The Fifty-Fifth Tradition

232 Abū Umāma reported that the Prophet said: "My Lord promised me that He would permit seventy thousand and three handfuls (*ḥathayāt*)[474] **[fol.41a]** of My community to enter Paradise."[475]

[468] Dhahabī gives his name as Ziyāda b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī, but little else is known of him except that he was a traditionist of questionable character (*Mīzān*, I, 95; cf., also Ibn Hajar, *Tahdhīb*, III, 392-393; and Ibn al-Jawzī's *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, I, 303). Judging from the dates of men from whom he received traditions, Ziyāda appears to have flourished during the latter half of the Umayyad period.

[469] Cf., *EI*², III, 26, for a discussion of this term.

[470] Cf., *Mīzān*, I, 95; *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, I, 303; and *al-ʿIlal al-Mutanāhiya*, I, 39.

[471] Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān [b. Sulaymān] b. Abī Shayba, a *mawlā* of the Banū ʿAbs who died in 297/910. For a list of biographical sources and assessments of his work as a *muḥaddith*, see notes to §168. In addition to the sources cited there, see also *Muntaẓam*, VI, 95-96.

[472] An allusion to S. 2: 125; and S. 22:26, where the expression "My house" (*bayt*ī) occurs.

[473] For a similar interpretation of the tradition, see Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 400.

[474] The Arabic text specifies "His handfuls" thus implying that God has hands.

[475] Cf., *DST*, 75; *BA*, fol. 36a; and Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 329. Versions of the tradition are

233 The term *ḥathya* (singular of *ḥathayāt*) means what fills the palm of the hand (*mil' al-kaff*). The expression was used in the above saying as a way of making the meaning of the tradition accessible to human understanding. The term in any case is not to be taken literally (*lā ḥaqīqata'l-ḥathya*).

The Fifty-Sixth Tradition

234 Abū Hurayra reported that the Prophet said: "On the day of judgment God will sit above the Bridge (*al-qanṭara al-wusṭā*) between Paradise and Hell."[476]

235 ʿUthmān b. Abī ʿĀtika,[477] one of the transmitters of this tradition, was said by Yaḥyā [b. Maʿīn] to be worthless as a transmitter.[478]

also found in Ibn Māja, *zuhd*, 34; Tirmidhī, *qiyāma*, 12; and the *Musnad*, V, 268. Bayhaqī indicates that he regards the tradition as weak, though he does not specify precisely what is problematic in the tradition (*Asmā'*, 330).

[476] See Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 127, where the tradition is cited along with a complete *isnād*. Cf., also *DST*, 75; *BA*, fol. 36a; and *Tahdhīb*, VII, 124. For additional references, see *BA*, (Beirut, 1987), 138, n. 5. The tradition does not appear in any of the canonical collections of *ḥadīth* and seems to have been regarded as apocryphal by most *ḥadīth* authorities. The *qanṭara*, however, is mentioned in several *ḥadīth* found in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*. In the best known of these (cited by Bukhārī on the authority of Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī), the Prophet is reported as saying: "The believers will be freed from Hell, but they will be held back at the Bridge (*qanṭara*) between Paradise and Hell; there they will be punished for the wrongs they did to each other in this life. After they have been corrected and purified they will be given permission to enter Paradise" (Bukhārī, *riqāq*, 48; cf., also *Musnad*, III, 13, 57, 63, 74; and H. Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, 95, n. 1, where the *qanṭara* is related to the doctrine of the *ṣirāṭ*).

[477] He was a popular preacher (*qāṣṣ*) and a Quran reciter from Damascus. Dhahabī gives his *kunya* as Abū Ḥafṣ and reports that he died in 155/771 (*Mīzān*, III, 40).

[478] It is clear that Ibn al-Jawzī shared this judgment, though in his *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafā'* (II, 168) he does cite one authority (a certain Abū Saʿīd ad-Dimashqī known by the *laqab* Duḥaym) who had words of praise for Ibn Abī ʿĀtika. On the views of other scholars, see Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, III, 161-162; and *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 127. Despite the fact that Ibn al-Jawzī limits his criticism to the *isnād*, we can be certain that it was the *matn* that troubled him most, *viz.*, its anthropomorphic portrayal of God as occupying a particular point in space.

The Fifty-Seventh Tradition

236 According to the Qāḍī [Abū Yaʿlā], Muḥammad b. Kaʿb al-Qurazī said: "When the people heard the Quran from the mouth of Raḥmān (*min fī'r-Raḥmān)* it was as if they heard nothing."[479]

237 The Qāḍī said: "It is permissible to apply the term 'mouth' to God." It is astonishing that he takes the term *fī* in the expression *min fī'r-Raḥmān* to mean mouth [in its literal sense] and so asserts it to be one of God's attributes on the basis of a statement made by a Follower—a statement which does not, in fact, go back to him.[480] As for the prophetic tradition: "God's servants do not approach Him with anything like what proceeds from Him,"[481] the expression "what proceeds from Him" *(mā kharaja minhu)* should be construed to mean what becomes manifest through Him *(ẓahara ʿanhu).* We are not to suppose that the expression implies one body coming out of another, for God is not a body (*jism*) and His word (*kalām*) is not a body (*jism*).[482]

[479] The saying is found in *DST*, 75-76; and in *BA*, fol. 36a, though it is not among the sayings of Muḥammad b. Kaʿb collected by Abū Nuʿaym (*Ḥilya*, III, 212-221) or by Ibn al-Jawzī (*Ṣafwa*, II, 75-76). It is possible that Ibn al-Jawzī knew it only from the writings of Abū Yaʿlā, since it is this latter who is quoted as its source. My rendering of the saying above must be considered tentative.

[480] It was apparently not uncommon for Ḥanbalīs to describe God as having a mouth. No less an authority than Aḥmad himself states in his most important creed: وكلّم الله موسى تكليمًا من فيه (God spoke to Moses directly with his mouth [*Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, I, 29, 18]). Barbahārī, a 10th century Ḥanbalī, writes: والإيمان بأنّ الله هو الذي كلّم موسى بن عمران يوم الطور وموسى يسمع من الله الكلام بصوت وقع في مسامعه منه لا من غيره، فمن قال غير هذا فقد كفر بالله العظيم (God spoke to Mūsā b. ʿImrān on Mt. Sinai, and he heard the sound of God's speech—and no one else's—with his own ears. Whoever says otherwise is an unbeliever [*Ibid*, II, 26, 10-11]). Ibn Fūrak takes up the question of whether a *fam* (mouth) can be ascribed to God in connection with those traditions that speak of God's laughing (*Mushkil*, 476-477).

[481] See §§169-170 where the saying is cited and discussed. For sources, see the notes to §169.

[482] See §§7, 29, and 34. Also *Mushkil*, 286-287, where Ibn Fūrak glosses the saying in terms that are virtually identical to those used here by Ibn al-Jawzī.

The Fifty-Eighth Tradition

238 I heard the following tradition [from ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. al-Mubārak] in which Sahl b. Saʿd reports that the Prophet said: "[On the day of judgment] God will be concealed by seventy thousand veils of light and darkness. No one will hear even the slightest sound from [behind?] those veils else he would perish."[483]

239 This tradition, of which Mūsā b. ʿUbayda was a transmitter, is without any basis whatever.[484] [Speaking of Mūsā,] Aḥmad [b. Ḥanbal] said: "In my view one should not accept traditions handed down from him." Yaḥyā [b. Maʿīn] said: "He is not a reliable traditionist. Moreover, Mūsā received it from ʿUmar b. al-Ḥakam,[485] a man whom Bukhārī described as being unreliable in matters pertaining to *ḥadīth*."[486]

[fol.41b] *The Fifty-Ninth Tradition*

240 Anas reported that the Prophet said: "Verily, there is with God a Tablet *(lawḥ)*; one of its surfaces is made of pearls, the other of sapphire. His pen is of light; by it He creates and gives sustenance, and by it He gives life and brings death. He exalts and brings low, and He does what He wills from one day to the next."[487]

241 This is an apocryphal tradition transmitted by Muḥammad b. ʿUthmān

[483] See *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 166, where the saying appears with a complete *isnād*. See also *DST*, 76; *BA*, fol. 36a; Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, III, 191; Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 291; Ibn Khuzayma, *Tawḥīd*, 20-21; and *KAS*, §137, where the first part of the saying is cited and glossed. Bayhaqī cites several variant, and less explicitly anthropmorphist, forms of the tradition (*Asmāʾ*, 402-403). The saying, as cited by Ibn al-Jawzī, does not appear in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth*.

[484] Mūsā b. ʿUbayda Abū ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ar-Rabadhī, who died in 153/770 (cf., *Mīzān*, IV, 213; and *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 147).

[485] ʿUmar b. al-Ḥakam al-Hudhalī al-Baṣrī, who flourished during the late Umayyad period (*Mīzān*, III, 191; and *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, II, 207).

[486] Here again Ibn al-Jawzī confines his remarks to the *isnād*—perhaps because he has dealt with the anthropomorphic implications of the *matn* earlier in *KAS*. See, in particular, his remarks in §§137-139 where the analysis he offers is strikingly similar to that of Ibn Fūrak (cf., *Mushkil*, 213-214; 292, 8-12; and 460-465).

[487] See *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 117-118, where the tradition is found with a full *isnād*. See also *DST*, 76; *BA*, fol. 36a; and *Mīzān*, III, 641.

al-Ḥuddānī.[488] [Al-Azdī said that] his traditions are to be discarded.[489]

The Sixtieth Tradition

242 Jābir[490] reported that the Prophet said: "When you see the wind (*rīḥ*), do not curse it, for it is the *nafas*[491] of Raḥmān which brings both mercy and punishment. Rather ask God for the good things it brings and seek His protection against the harm it can cause."[492]

243 The term *nafas* as used here means that by which anxiety and distress are dispelled (*tanfīs ʿan al-makrūb*).[493] A similar use of this term is to be found in another tradition reported by Abū Hurayra. In it the Messenger of God is reported to have said: "I find the *nafas* of God coming from the direction of Yemen."[494] By the term *nafas*, the Prophet was here referring to his escape from difficulty (*tanfīs ʿan al-kurba*) through the aid given him by the people of Medina, whose ancestors had come from Yemen. This is a matter of [historical] fact on which all Muslims agree.

244 Ibn Ḥāmid said: "I have seen [statements in the writings of] some

[488] Or perhaps al-Ḥarrānī (*Mīzān*, III, 641, 8). Little is known of him except that he received traditions from Mālik b. Dīnār (d. 131/748) and probably flourished in the late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid periods. Cf., also *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 84.

[489] Cf., *Kitāb al-Mawḍūʿāt*, I, 118, 3; *Kitāb aḍ-Ḍuʿafāʾ*, III, 84, 6; and *Mīzān*, III, 641, 10.

[490] See §198.

[491] Among the more common meanings of *nafas* is breath or gentle breeze (Lane, 2828/2). *Nafas* can also mean a liberation or freeing from something (*Lisān al-ʿArab*, VI, 236/1-2; Lane, 2829/1).

[492] The saying is cited and glossed frequently in medieval sources: *DST*, 76f.; *BA*, fol. 36a; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 267 (Lecomte, 236-237); Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 463; and Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 195-196, among others. Varying forms of the saying also appear in several canonical collections: Ibn Māja, *adab*, 29; Tirmidhī, *fitan*, 65; and the *Musnad*, II, 250, 268, 409, 437, 518; and V, 123. Cf., also Goldziher, *Die Ẓāhiriten*, 153, n. 3. For lexical discussions of the saying, with particular reference to *nafas*, see the following note.

[493] According to the lexicographers, *nafas* is sometimes used with the meaning of the verbal noun of Form II (*tanfīs*: liberating or freeing from...). For more on this interpretation, see Bayhaqī, *Asmāʾ*, 463, who reports the view of al-Azharī; cf., also *Lisān al-ʿArab*, VI, 236/2, 7ff.; *Asās al-Balāgha*, 648/1; *al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ*, II, 255; Lane, 2829/1; and Ibn al-Jawzī's *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, II, 425.

[494] See *DST*, 77; Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 268; and Ibn al-Jawzī, *Gharīb al-Ḥadīth*, II, 425. For additional references, see the notes to §242.

members of the Ḥanbalī school asserting that breathing (*yatanaffas*) is a divine attribute.[495] They said: 'The various winds (*riyāḥ*) that blow such as the *ʿāṣifa*,[496] the *ʿaqīm*,[497] the *janūb*,[498] the *shamāl*,[499] the *ṣabā*,[500] and the *dabūr*[501] are all created (*makhlūqa*); there is, however, a wind (*rīḥ*) that is one of God's attributes (*ṣifāt*): it is a gentle, life-giving breeze (*nasīm ḥayāʾī*) that comes from the breath (*nafas*) of Raḥmān.'" Those who believe such things are under a curse (*laʿna*), for they represent God as a body with a hollow interior (*jasad mujawwaf*).[502] Such persons are not Muslims.

[Concluding Remarks]

245 When a group of ignorant men learned of this book of mine (*ʿalima bi-kitābī*) they were not pleased, since they were fond of the views of their anthropomorphist teachers.[503] They responded: "[The viewpoint defended in

[495] Cf., §30.

[496] Said to be the violent (cold) wind that brings clouds (Lane, 2064/2).

[497] Identified in S. 51: 41 as the westerly wind that destroyed the people of ʿĀd (*Zād al-Masīr*, VIII, 39; Lane, 2117/2-3).

[498] The wind that blows from the south bringing rain.

[499] The cold, dry north wind. "When it blows for seven days upon the people of Egypt, they prepare grave clothes, for its nature is deadly" (Lane, 1601/1).

[500] The east wind, frequently described as gentle and pleasant (Lane, 1650/1-2).

[501] The scorching west wind; it brings neither clouds or rain and is said to be the worst of winds (Lane, 847/ 1-2).

[502] Ibn Fūrak, *Mushkil*, 195, 199.

[503] The first part of this paragraph seems to imply that Ibn al-Jawzī's critics were privy to the contents of *KAS* and apparently offered criticisms of it even before it was completed and issued. How could they have learned of the contents of the work in advance of its "publication"? Two possibilities suggest themselves: a) perhaps they had learned of the contents of the work indirectly, by word-of-mouth, perhaps from sources close to Ibn al-Jawzī (colleagues, friends, students)—persons in whom Ibn al-Jawzī might have confided as the work was being written; or perhaps b) a shorter version of *KAS* had already been in circulation prior to the latter's completion—from which Ibn al-Jawzī's critics could have learned of his views and the arguments developed in support of those views. We know that Ibn al-Jawzī did produce a shorter version of *KAS* (under the title of *Dafʿ Shubhat at-Tashbīh*). On the basis of our present knowledge, however, it is impossible to assign a definite date to this latter work. To assume that it was in circulation prior to the completion of *KAS* is going too far given the present state of our knowledge. Until more data are forthcoming,

this book] is not in keeping with the teaching of the [Ḥanbalī] school." I replied: "It is not [in accord with] your views nor with those teachers of yours whom you follow blindly. **[fol.42a]** [In this work] I have held up the teaching of the Imām Aḥmad and disassociated it from views falsely ascribed to him, along with the irrational prattle, not being one who follows the views of others blindly.[504] How can I ignore such distortions (*bahraj*) when I find them [so] objectionable?

The end of the treatise—God knows best![505]

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the second possibility remains purely speculative. It seems entirely possible that Ibn al-Jawzī's critics could have learned of the main elements of the position presented in *KAS* from sources close to him and would have been in a position to critique it even before the work was "published." In addition, we should not forget that Ibn al-Jawzī had never been shy about expressing his views. His *madrasa* lectures provided such an opportunity as did the sermons he preached frequently at some of the largest mosques in Baghdad.

[504] See §37 (latter half) where he levels the same charge and speaks of his efforts, in *KAS*, to counter the distortions of his fellow Ḥanbalīs. Cf., also §30-32.

[505] The colophon of the MS of *KAS* reads: "I copied [the present MS] from a MS [1] whose colophon reads: 'this was copied from a MS [2] which was copied from a MS [3] that was in the hand of *my* master Nūr ad-Dīn ʿAlī b. Jamāl ad-Dīn b. ʿAbd Allāh ad-Dimashqī ash-Shāfiʿī, a student of the renowed *shaykh* and *imām* Shams ad-Dīn al-Muḥaddith ash-Shāfiʿī. May God benefit Muslims through this work.' The transcribing of the present copy was completed on the 17th of Rajab in the year 890 (30th of July 1485)."—The last sentence containing the date of the present copy of *KAS* is marked off from what precedes by a circle with a dot in the middle indicating the end of the colophon of MS no. 2. What we have here, in effect, are two colophons: an older one nested within the colophon of our MS. While the colophon of our MS is dated it has so far not been possible to assign even relative dates to the other MSS mentioned in the colophon. Until Nūr ad-Dīn ʿAlī is identified, it will not be possible to say very much about the manuscript tradition of *KAS* except that the work did attract the interest of some Shāfiʿites and that the MS of *KAS* had made its way to Damascus sometime before 890 A.H.. My efforts to identify Nūr ad-Dīn ʿAlī from the existing biographical literature and indices has so far produced no clues as to the dates or identity of this person.

APPENDIX

A ḤANBALĪ RESPONSE TO IBN AL-JAWZĪ'S DEFENSE OF *TAʾWĪL*: THE *RISĀLA* OF ABŪ'L-FAḌL AL-ʿALTHĪ

A ḤANBALĪ RESPONSE TO IBN AL-JAWZĪ'S DEFENSE OF *TAʾWĪL*: THE *RISĀLA* OF ABŪ'L-FAḌL AL-ʿALTHĪ

In his biographical notice on Abū'l-Faḍl al-ʿAlthī, Ibn Rajab relates the following: "[al-ʿAlthī][1] sent a lengthy letter (*risāla ṭawīla*) to *shaykh* Abū'l-Faraj b. al-Jawzī criticizing him for having aligned himself with those who advocate a metaphorical interpretation (*taʾwīl*) [of the *akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt*]."[2] My translation of the *Risāla* of al-ʿAlthī as preserved by Ibn Rajab is given below.[3] In appending a translation of al-ʿAlthī's *Risāla* to this study, I do

[1] Ibn Rajab (*Dhayl*, II, 205) gives his name as Isḥāq b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ghānim Abū'l-Faḍl (according to some, Abū Muḥammad) al-ʿAlthī who died in Rabīʿ I, 634 (November 1236). Although H. Laoust and A. Hartmann read the *nisba* as al-ʿUlthī, I have found no support for this spelling in any of the medieval sources available to me (Yāqūt, Mundhirī, Dhahabī, Ibn Rajab, and Ibn al-ʿImād each take the *nisba* as al-ʿAlthī). Only the author of *Marāṣid* (II, 956) spells it al-ʿIlthī, though the editor notes quite correctly that this is an erroneous reading. The *nisba* is related to the small town of al-ʿAlth, located north of Baghdad between ʿUkbarā and Sāmarrā. For more on al-ʿAlthī, see the following: Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, II, 205-211; Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh al-Islām*, XLVI, 181-182, and his *Mukhtaṣar*, 143; Mundhirī, III, 441 (no. 2720); and *Shadharāt*, V, 163.

[2] Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, II, 205, 16-17.

[3] Ibn Rajab's *Dhayl* (II, 205-211) is the only medieval source, so far as is known, to have preserved the text of this important document; it is quite likely, however, that what Ibn Rajab reproduces in his *Dhayl* is only a portion of the *Risāla*. In his introduction to the *Risāla* he describes it as a long letter or treatise (*risāla ṭawīla*); the text of the *Risāla* as preserved by Ibn Rajab, however, comes to little more than five pages. Furthermore, there are clear breaks in the text as given in the *Dhayl* which suggests that what we have here is a selective reproduction of the original *Risāla*. How widely al-ʿAlthī's tract circulated in scholarly and religious circles is unclear though it must have been known at least in Ḥanbalī circles in Baghdad and Damascus, and probably elsewhere. Al-ʿAlthī clearly intended the *Risāla* as an open letter addressed both to Ibn al-Jawzī and a wider audience. The date of the *Risāla's* composition cannot be determined solely on the basis of internal evidence. What can be said is that it must have been written sometime before 590/1193, the year in which Ibn al-Jawzī was arrested and taken to Wasit where he was kept under house arrest until 595. If the *Risāla* had been written after the events of 590 there would almost certainly have been some reference to the events of that year in the *Risāla*. It seems most likely that it was written sometime between 580/1184 and 590/1193. For reasons discussed briefly in the notes to §§15 and 17, I am inclined to favor a date closer to 590. In 590 al-ʿAlthī was in his early to mid-thirties; it is difficult to imagine that the *Risāla* could have been written much before then.

not wish to imply that the *Risāla* was written solely as a response to Ibn al-Jawzī's *KAS*. What can be said, however, is that the *Risāla* does address issues that are at the core of the position set forth by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS*. It is difficult to imagine that the text of *KAS* was not at least one of the works of Ibn al-Jawzī that al-ᶜAlthī had in front of him or, at least, had in mind when he penned the *Risāla*. Among the issues taken up in the *Risāla*, four are particularly prominent: 1) the question of the divine attributes and Ibn al-Jawzī's use of *taᵓwīl*, or metaphorical exegesis, 2) the centrality of the Sunna and al-ᶜAlthī's contention that Ibn al-Jawzī's approach to the *ḥadīth* seriously diminished its authority, 3) the issue of *taqlīd* and what al-ᶜAlthī perceived to be a less than respectful attitude on Ibn al-Jawzī's part toward the early authorities of the Community, *viz.*, the Companions of the Prophet (*ṣaḥāba*), the Followers (*tābiᶜūn*), and the Ancestors (*salaf*), and, finally, 4) the question of angels (*malāᵓika*), specifically that class of angels known as the *muqarrabūn* (those "brought near").[4]

Of these, the first three figure prominently in *KAS*. It is only the last, the question of the *muqarrabūn*, that is of no concern to *KAS*. The *Risāla* is relevant to our study of *KAS* not only because it was directed specifically to Ibn al-Jawzī but because it addresses issues that are germane to the position so vigorously defended in *KAS*. In presenting the response of a Ḥanbalī who was thoroughly traditionalist in outlook and firmly opposed to the rationalism defended by Ibn al-Jawzī in *KAS*, the *Risāla* serves to highlight the cleavage that existed within the Ḥanbalī school of Baghdad over questions considered foundational.[5] It is difficult to know the relative size of the two wings of the Ḥanbalī school represented by Ibn al-Jawzī and al-ᶜAlthī, but it is reasonable to suppose, based on what is currently known of the history of the school, that al-ᶜAlthī represented the majority point of view. It would seem, however, that the rationalist wing of the school was stronger in Ibn al-Jawzī's day than it had been a century earlier. When Ibn ᶜAqīl (431-513/1040-1119) was charged with championing heretical views on the very same questions on which Ibn al-Jawzī was criticized, Ibn ᶜAqīl had no choice but to recant. Though criticized severely and even sent into exile for a period, there is no evidence that Ibn al-Jawzī ever recanted the views

[4] For more on the *muqarrabūn*, see notes to §3.

[5] In this respect the Ḥanbalism of Baghdad may have been unique among the various branches of the school. In Ḥarrān and Damascus, perhaps the two most important branches of the school outside Baghdad, the traditionalist position was firmly entrenched.

defended in *KAS*. In 595/1198, after an absence of five years, he returned to Baghdad without a word of apology and seemingly unbowed by the ordeal. While Ibn al-Jawzī hardly represented the viewpoint of the majority, he did have some support within the school and, certainly also, outside the school, including well-placed members of Baghdad's political elite.

I have included a translation of the *Risāla* for the purpose of documenting some of the issues over which Ḥanbalīs had sharp disagreements throughout much of the 11th and 12th centuries. Although the debate continued into the 13th century, it was carried on with less intensity, perhaps in some measure because the rationalist wing of the school had lost some of its influence. Debate within the school was not finally stilled, however, until the middle of the 13th century when the Mongols swept into Baghdad and virtually put an end to the school of Baghdad. The school was later reconstituted but never again exhibited the intellectual prowess it displayed in the 11th and 12th centuries.

The Risāla *of al-ᶜAlthī: A Translation*

[p. 205] 1 From God's humble servant, Isḥāq b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ghānim al-ᶜAlthī, to ᶜAbd ar-Raḥmān b. al-Jawzī: may God protect us and him from supposing that we are beyond receiving sincere counsel, and give both us and him[6] success in following after the pious ancestors (*as-salaf aṣ-ṣāliḥ*). May He illuminate us through the light of Sunna and not deprive us of the guidance of the Prophet's teaching, and may He protect us against introducing innovations (*ibtidāᶜ*) into the praiseworthy *Sharīᶜa* (*sharīᶜa muḥammadīya*). There is no need for such, for we were bequeathed what is perfect and pure.[7] God has perfected religion for us,[8] and freed us from the views of the long-winded, for the Book of God and the Sunna of His Messenger contain all that is required to satisfy those who desire [understanding] and who fear [God].

[6] Despite the fact that al-ᶜAlthī addresses Ibn al-Jawzī directly in the second person throughout much of the *Risāla*, the fact that he here, and occasionally elsewhere, refers to him in the third person singular might be seen as a not-so-subtle indication that the *Risāla* was addressed (in part, perhaps primarily) to a larger audience.

[7] Cf., S. 37:76 (Lane, 305/1).

[8] A paraphrase of S. 5:3.

May He bless us with doctrine (*iᶜtiqād*) that is **[p. 206]** sound, and may He not deny us success, for when He withholds [success] from His creatures, instruction avails nothing. May He give us to understand the destinies of our souls and guide us on the straight path (*ṣirāṭ mustaqīm*). There is no power or strength save in God the Almighty.[9] "Over every man of knowledge there is One who is [all-] knowing."[10] Praise be unto God, and may peace be upon His Messenger. The religion of sincere counsel (*dīn naṣīḥa*) is manifestly the special prerogative of the [Prophet, our] Noble Master (*al-mawlā al-karīm*), and the Merciful Lord. How often has a pen slipped, a foot stumbled, or a speaker (*mutakallim*)[11] erred! "They comprehend Him not in knowledge (*ᶜilm*)."[12] As God has said: "Among men there are those who dispute (*yujādil*) concerning God without knowledge (*ᶜilm*) or guidance (*hudā*) or [the aid of] an illuminating book (*kitāb munīr*)."[13]

2 It is frequently reported concerning you, O ᶜAbd ar-Raḥmān, and even heard from you directly [in your lectures], and found in books [of yours] read back to you,[14] that you often quote learned men (*ᶜulamāᵓ*) of the past inaccurately all the while you yourself believe that you are relating the content accurately (*min ghayr muḥābāt*).[15] Therefore, there is no alternative but to bring these matters out into the public arena of sincere counsel in order that you might derive benefit, if God should guide you to the truth. Otherwise the evidence of God will be arrayed against you.[16] People (*nās*)

[9] Cf., S. 18:39.

[10] S. 12:76.

[11] I have taken متكلّم here as an active participle; it seems to me it might also be taken as a passive (meaning "speech") which would not substantially change the meaning.

[12] S. 20:110; cf., 2:255.

[13] S. 31:20.

[14] That is, books read back to Ibn al-Jawzī and certified personally by him as being correct copies of the original.

[15] Cf., Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, I, 414; and Dhahabī, *Taᵓrīkh al-Islām*, XLII, 301ff., where similar criticisms are reported.

[16] This could be taken as a not-so-veiled threat that action would be taken against Ibn al-Jawzī if he failed to recant certain of his views and mend his ways. Al-ᶜAlthī undoubtedly has the case of Ibn ᶜAqīl (and perhaps also that of al-Ḥallāj) in mind (cf., §14 of the *Risāla*). If one dates the composition of al-ᶜAlthī's tract in the late 580s, it is also possible that there is an allusion here to the case of ᶜAbd as-Salām al-Jīlānī, who was arrested in 588/1192, brought before a tribunal (of which Ibn al-Jawzī himself was a member), and banished to Wasit on account of his "heretical" views (for a detailed account of this case,

are on their guard against your perverse teaching. Your feverish pursuit of the various sciences (*ʿulūm*) will not enrich [your understanding]. Oftentimes the one who is told something directly (*muballagh*)[17] benefits from it more than the one who receives (*sāmiʿ*) [it secondhand]. Frequently those who pass as experts in jurisprudence (*ḥāmilu fiqh*)[18] lack real understanding (*fiqh*) [of the subject]. "How often the [water] is murky in the large river while in the rivulet it is clear."[19] You are not more knowledgeable than the Prophet! When ʿUmar asked [the Prophet] whether he was going to say prayers over Ibn Ubayy [on the latter's death],[20] the following verse was revealed to him: "Do not pray over a single one of them."[21] Were those of lesser knowledge not to censure those of greater knowledge, the divine command to order the good (*al-amr bi'l-maʿrūf*) would become null and void, and we would become like the Banū Isrāʾīl, for, as the Quran says, "They did not forbid to each other the evil which they committed."[22] On

see *Dhayl*, II, 71-73, Abū Shāma, 55-56; *Shadharāt*, V, 45-46; and R. Levy, *Baghdad Chronicle*, 239-240). The case of Ibn ʿAqīl (accused of being a crypto-Muʿtazilī), too, was a celebrated one, and perhaps more relevant to al-ʿAlthī since Ibn al-Jawzī was known to have studied his works, and, in general, made no attempt to conceal his admiration for the man (for a detailed account of Ibn ʿAqīl's encounter with the legal system and his eventual recantation, see G. Makdisi, *Ibn ʿAqīl*, 426-441; and his *Ibn ʿAqīl* [1997], 28-43). Evidence of Ibn ʿAqīl's influence can be seen in many of Ibn al-Jawzī's writings, including his *KAS*, where Ibn ʿAqīl is quoted frequently.

[17] Cf., Dozy, I, 113/2.

[18] Perhaps an allusion to S. 62:5, where a person with superficial learning is compared to a donkey carrying books.

[19] Although I have not so far found this saying cited elsewhere, it most probably circulated as a common proverb.

[20] ʿAbd Allāh b. Ubayy, chief of the Sālim, a subdivision of the ʿAwf of Khazraj. An influential Medinan who converted to Islam relatively early, but who appears to have been lukewarm in his attitude toward Islam. He became increasingly alienated from the Prophet and eventually came to be classed among the *munāfiqūn*. Ibn Ubayy had close ties to the Jewish clans of Medina, especially the Qaynuqāʾ and the Naḍīr; he is said to have pled with Muḥammad that he exercise restraint in dealing with them. He died in 9A.H. (631), a broken man. For additional details and a list of sources, see the art. on him in *EI*², I, 53. The main point al-ʿAlthī is making here is that ʿUmar, a man of lesser stature and knowledge, exercised a correcting influence on the Prophet.

[21] S. 9: 84. The full verse reads: "Do not pray over a single one of them when he is dead, nor stand over his grave; they disbelieved in God and his Messenger, and died while they were ungodly." Cf., *Zād*, III, 480-481.

[22] S. 5: 79.

the contrary, the one surpassed (*mafḍūl*) [in knowledge] has the obligation to call to account those who excel (*fāḍil*) [in learning]; even the profligate (*fājir*) [has an obligation] to call the *walī* (saintly individual) to account, [at least] to the extent the *walī* possesses knowledge (*maᶜrifa*).[23]

3 You should know that men of learning and virtue in various lands have become increasingly critical of your perverse pronouncements regarding the divine attributes (*ṣifāt*).[24] They have exposed the "cracks" in your arguments and report that you refuse to accept counsel given in good faith. You have made statements that do not accord with the Sunna—which I cannot enumerate here because it would take too long. It has been reported that you devote a chapter [in one of your books] to a discussion of "the angels brought near" (*malāʾika muqarrabūn*),[25] that is, "the noble recorders" (*kirām kātibūn*),[26] claiming it is [merely] exhortation (*mawāᶜiẓ*), while in fact it is [little more than] inflated speech and a shameful subterfuge,[27] apart from [quotations from] the traditions of the Prophet **[p. 207]** and the sayings of the pious *salaf*, who do not reject a single *sunna*. And then you proceed to make it appear as though it is a question of engaging in debate with them (*munāẓara maᶜahum*). Who gave you permission to engage in this sort of thing? [The *salaf*] were persons who sought forgiveness for the faithful, and they did not deem themselves above the service of God.[28] [The Prophet's] creed (*shahāda*) was their creed (*shahāda*) before it was a question of the *ijmāᶜ* of

[23] I.e., to the degree the *walī* is capable of receiving instruction and benefiting from it. On the significance of the إلى... أن قال inserted here by an editorial hand, see notes to §8.

[24] An acknowledgment that Ibn al-Jawzī's writings were known well beyond the confines of Iraq. Although Ibn al-Jawzī's critics were to be found in different regions of the East (from Egypt to Transoxiana, and perhaps elsewhere), his reputation was hardly as negative as al-ᶜAlthī would have his readers believe. Judging from the notices devoted to him by the biographical writers of the 13th and 14th centuries, he was held in high regard for the breadth of his learning and the usefulness of his writings in various fields, especially his biographical, historical, exegetical, and homiletical writings.

[25] S. 4:170 (cf., also *Zād al-Masīr*, II, 263). For more on the *malāʾika muqarrabūn* see *EI*², VI, 216-219, and especially, 217a.

[26] Cf., S. 82:11. On the *kātibūn*, Ibn al-Jawzī says: "[they are the angels] who record your deeds" (*Zād*, IX, 49). For more on the matter of angels, see §5 below.

[27] It is not clear from al-ᶜAlthī's remarks here precisely what it is about Ibn al-Jawzī's treatment of the *muqarrabūn* that is objectionable. Perhaps his point is that any discussion of them is necessarily speculative and therefore a matter to be shunned.

[28] Cf., S. 7:206 and 21:19.

the *ʿulamāʾ*. Is any person more excellent than they or not? That is another issue!

4 You take aim[29] [at your critics by] saying: "When the fires of jealousy rage who will extinguish them?[30] Slander is slander, to say nothing of the fact that it is speech in poor taste (*kalām ghathth*)! Do we not have among us so and so? Do we not have prophets and saints among us?" [31] Who among the *salaf* before you behaved in this manner? If only one of the angels were to say to you: "Is there not in your midst also the [likes of] Pharaoh and Haman and people who claim divinity?"

5 From whom did you receive these heretical doctrines (*aqwāl muḥdatha*) and embellished expressions (*ʿibārāt muzawwaqa*)? They serve no purpose whatever. By means of such things you have diverted people's attention away from the kind of knowledge (*ʿilm*) that is beneficial. One [of your mentors?] [32] ignored the Quran, while at the same time emphasizing the superiority of angels [over humankind] and their superintendency [of earthly affairs], and discoursing on such matters far and wide. Where is the exhortation (*waʿẓ*) and admonition (*tadhkīr*) in such odious discourse?

6 You then took up the question of the Creator's attributes [and presented an interpretation of them], which seems to spring from a heart in which there is no reticence, reverence, or awe in the face of the Almighty, but derives rather from empty, spurious human musings. You claim that some of the Ahl as-Sunna and men of virtue were faced with the question [of the divine attributes], but that [since] they lacked any real understanding [of the subject] they chose not to get involved in a discussion of such matters. On the contrary, they refrained from idle chatter and worthless talk not, thank God, because they were incapable of engaging in debate (*jidāl*) or argumen-

[29] On the uses of *sharaʿa*, see Lane, 1534/2-3.

[30] Perhaps implying that the criticism levelled against him was rooted in jealousy or envy, and thus ought to be ignored.

[31] If reported accurately here, these questions might have been part of Ibn al-Jawzī's effort to defend himself against his critics by using such questions to put them on the defensive. Al-ʿAlthī clearly regards Ibn al-Jawzī's way of dealing with criticism as unacceptable, even dishonest.

[32] The text reads: أحَدُهم. The use of the plural pronoun here makes it clear that al-ʿAlthī has more than one individual in mind, but it is also clear that he has one particular individual in mind above others. There is nothing in the *Risāla*, however, to indicate the identity of this person.

tation (*khiṣām*), nor because they were ignorant of the methods of dialectic (*ṭuruq al-kalām*). Rather they refused to get involved precisely because of their knowledge (ᶜ*ilm*) and understanding (*dirāya*), not out of ignorance or through folly (ᶜ*amāya*).

7 It is amazing that one who [supposedly] subscribed to the doctrine of the *salaf* and who disapproved of delving into dialectic (*kalām*) should [turn around and] take up the study of what he originally disapproved, saying: "When we use such and such an expression, it actually means thus and so." By a process of analogical reasoning based on those attributes of the Creator that have been established [33] he [presumes to] arrive at conclusions which have no basis [in scripture].[34] This is something I deplore! How can you go back on your [original] pledge and teaching by [citing] the statements of so and so among the moderns [in support of your views]? Do not give innovators an occasion to ridicule us saying: "You accuse us of holding heretical views (*bidaᶜ*) but in fact you are more guilty of heresy than we." Do you not consider **[p. 208]** the soundness of those whose creed (ᶜ*aqd*)[35] you accept, or determine their knowledge and their competence? [As Aḥmad once said:] "How can I say what has not been said?" [36] How is it possible that you follow the views (*ārāʾ*) of the dialectical theologians (*mutakallimūn*) and join with those who delve into such matters and then turn around and censure them? [37] This is truly incredible! If one human being (*makhlūq*)

[33] That is, established primarily through recourse to the Quran and the Sunna.

[34] Precisely the method used by the Muᶜtazila (cf., *EI*², 787b-789a).

[35] On the use of ᶜ*aqd* as a synonym for ᶜ*aqīda*, see Dozy, II, 150a.

[36] That is, how can I subscribe to what is not explicitly affirmed in the Quran and the Sunna, and reiterated by the *salaf*?

[37] Al-ᶜAlthī may well have *KAS* in mind here; after having developed a series of definitions and arguments based on *kalām*, in the first part of chapter I, Ibn al-Jawzī goes on in §§23-29 to speak of *kalām* in rather negative terms. One can also see a similar conflict in Ibn al-Jawzī's treatment of *taʾwīl*. In §§26-27 of chapter I he condemns the use of *taʾwīl*; in chaps. II and III, however, he not only uses *taʾwīl* but openly advocates it as the only way to avoid *tajsīm*, *viz.*, a corporealist understanding of the divine attributes. Whether these are contradictions or a usage based on distinctions that men of the background of al-ᶜAlthī simply could not grasp is a question that can hardly be answered satisfactorily on the basis of that small part of the Jawzian corpus presently available. Too many of his works remain unpublished and unstudied to be able to give anything approaching a reasoned response to the criticism raised by al-ᶜAlthī. For Ibn al-Jawzī, clearly his use of *kalām* and *taʾwīl* in *KAS* were not contradictions or even inconsistencies. He did regard *kalām* as

were to ascribe attributes to another like himself without having seen the latter or relied on the report of an honest witness, his statements would be those of a liar. How then can you and your ilk ascribe to God attributes whose validity you have not ascertained but based rather on conjectures (*ẓunūn*) and arbitrary hunches (*wāqiʿāt*)? You reject attributes which He saw fit to ascribe to Himself and which have been duly reported in the most reliable prophetic traditions, [saying]: "Perhaps [this] is the correct interpretation," or "perhaps [that] is."

8 In your book *al-Kashf li-Mushkil aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥayn* (*Clarification of Difficult [Traditions] in the Two Ṣaḥīḥs*)[38] there are [a number of] incredible statements

potentially dangerous, particularly when it fell into the hands of the wrong people, i.e., people without a proper grounding in the rational and religious sciences. Consequently, he felt justified in calling attention to the potential dangers of *kalām*; however, his criticisms should be seen not as a rejection of *kalām* per se but as underscoring the potential harm it can cause, particularly when used by those without the proper skills. He clearly considered himself as one qualified to use it, as he does throughout *KAS*. Similarly, he saw *taʾwīl* or metaphorical exegesis as potentially dangerous, but he also saw it as indispensable in protecting the *akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt* against a corporealist interpretation that, in his view, fell under the Qurʾanic strictures against *shirk*, i.e., an idolatrous conception of God which, in effect, reduces Him to a corporeal being. Even though such images might be confined to the mind, they still qualify as idols (*aṣnām*)—perhaps even more dangerous than physical idols because they are hidden from public view and beyond criticism. It should be clear from the above that al-ʿAlthī's charge that Ibn al-Jawzī was guilty of inconsistency, if not outright contradiction, ought to be taken with a grain of salt. Until we understand the thought of Ibn al-Jawzī better there is no way that the question can be answered definitively. It is sufficient for now to keep in mind the very real possibility that Ibn al-Jawzī regarded *kalām* and *taʾwīl* with a kind of ambivalence—as necessary for the defense of divine transcendence but as susceptible to misuse and worse.

[38] This work was known under a number of different titles, among them *Sharḥ Mushkil aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥayn* (cf., *GAL*, Suppl., I, 918; and ʿAlwajī, *Muʾallafāt Ibn al-Jawzī* [Baghdad 1965], 113, and 149). Brockelmann notes that the work is extant in two manuscripts, one in Cairo and a second in Rampur (*GAL*, Supp., I, 918, no. 27d). Ibn Rajab mentions the work (with exactly the same title as given above by al-ʿAlthī) and adds that it consisted of four volumes (*Dhayl*, I, 417). ʿAlwajī (p. 29) notes that it is referred to in the *Hidāya* of Ismāʿīl al-Baghdādī under the title *Kashf Mushkil Ḥadīth aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥayn*. ʿAlwajī also notes (p. 43) that the work is referred to in the *Kashf aẓ-Ẓunūn* of Ḥajjī Khalīfa under the title *Kitāb Mushkil aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥayn*. According to ʿAlwajī (p. 50), Dhahabī mentions what appears to be the same work under the title *Mushkil aṣ-Ṣaḥāḥ* in his *Tadhkirat al-Ḥuffāẓ*. Finally the work is also mentioned in the anonymous bibliography of Ibn al-Jawzī's works entitled *Fihrist Kutubihi* under the title *Kashf Mushkil aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥayn* (for more on this citation of the work, see Nājiya ʿAbd Allāh Ibrāhīm, "Ibn al-Jawzī: *Fihrist Kutubihi*" in *Majallat al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿIrāqī*, vol. 31, pt. 2 (1400/1979), 204. Since compiling the above information, I

[regarding the divine attributes]. Sometimes you base these on the authority of al-Khaṭṭābī[39] and other moderns. Do such persons have knowledge of the unseen (*al-ghayb*)?[40] You and your ilk are fond of saying: "*Taqlīd* is not permissible in such matters."[41] Then [you say:] "So and so mentioned it, [or] Ibn ᶜAqīl mentioned it." [You defend such practice by saying: "In citing such statements] we also have in mind the evidence (*dalīl*) to which the expert in question refers." This, however, is nothing more than a claim (*daᶜwā*) on your part. Statements concerning God and His attributes are not trivial matters that can be left to supposition (*ẓunūn*).[42]—When it suits your purpose "Ibn ᶜAqīl is a learned man," and when it suits your purpose "He does not understand." [By such whimsical behavior] you weaken the force of the meaning of what he wrote.

9 You make unfounded statements (*kalām muḥdath*) concerning the *ḥadīth*, and then you add: "This is the way it seems to me." Doing such is tantamount to putting yourself above God. You also sometimes say: "Our *ᶜulamā'* say [thus and so], but this is the way it seems to me." Do you make statements about God having to do with the divine attributes on the basis of your own personal musings (*wāqiᶜāt*)? But even this does not satisfy you, and so you say: "[The reading of this *ḥadīth*] is erroneous, an error committed by one

have learned of the publication of this work by the Dār al-Ḥadīth (2000) in Cairo, under the title of *Kashf al-Mushkil* and edited by Muṣṭafā Dhahabī in five volumes, but unfortunately, I have not been able to consult the work.

[39] Ḥamd (or Aḥmad) b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī al-Bustī (d. 388/998 or, according to some, in 386/996), a noted traditionist, but one who also had an interest in theological and literary questions. He generally represented a moderate point of view in the debate between the *mutakallimūn* and traditionalists. Although they belonged to different schools (al-Khaṭṭābī was a Shāfiᶜite), Ibn al-Jawzī had a high regard for his views and cites him frequently in *KAS* (see, e.g., §§27, 58, 69, 85, 115, 144, 162, 180, 224, 225). For a list of his works and the most important sources on his life and thought, see *GAS*, I, 210-211; *EI*², IV, 1131-1132; Audebert, *al-Ḫaṭṭābī et l'inimitabilité du Coran* (Damascus 1982), esp., 19-53; Allard, *Le problème des attributs divins* (Beirut 1965), 351-364; and Gimaret, *Images*, 46-48.

[40] An allusion to S. 19:78

[41] For Ibn al-Jawzī's position on the question of *taqlīd*, see *KAS*, §§18-22.

[42] The insertion here of the phrase إلى أن قال..., presumably by Ibn Rajab or an earlier editorial hand, would seem to indicate that a part of the original text of the *Risāla* has here been omitted. We cannot automatically assume that the text of the *Risāla* available to Ibn Rajab was an unabridged edition of the work. See p. 206, 18 of the Arabic text (§2 of the trans.), where the same expression occurs.

of the transmitters." [You go on] making judgments in this way without supporting evidence (*min ghayr dalīl*). You do not cite real evidence by producing a reliable authority who says: "The transmitter has altered the text of this tradition." It is not reasonable to suppose that transmitters with honorable reputations should commit errors [in the transmission of prophetic sayings]. Even if you had been authorized by them to transmit the sense (*maʿnā*) of the text,[43] they are in a better position to know the correct reading than you. Whenever one cites a tradition, innovators object to it, saying: "It is likely that it was altered by one of the transmitters." If the tradition in question is sound (*ṣaḥīḥ*) [but] transmitted with an erroneous reading[44] from one of the transmitters, your response is that [the tradition] is probably the personal view (*raʾy*) of an amateur transmitter (*ghuwāt*).

10 You say: "al-Khaṭṭābī[45] was disturbed by these expressions." But what was it that disturbed him if it was not the very thing [you do]? We observe you constructing something and then demolishing it. You say: "So and so has said [thus and so]," and then you trace it back to our *imām* **[p. 209]** Aḥmad, but his teachings (*madhhab*) are known to be silent on such matters. He avoided involvement in questions of interpretation, concerned himself with establishing the soundness of the *ḥadīth* and refused to have anything to do with metaphorical exegesis (*taʾwīl*).

11 Many persons who studied under you, after they returned home and had time to examine what they had taken down, found errors [in their notes],[46] and so they criticized statements made by you and declared them to be unreliable. Indeed, we have heard that very thing from some of your advanced students (*aʿyān aṣḥābika*)—persons beloved and praised by you for their knowledge. They clearly have no bias against you; rather they offer you sincere counsel on account of their devotion to God.[47] With you a statement and its opposite are equally well-grounded. All of that, however, is based on arbitrary hunches (*wāqiʿāt*) and subjective musings (*khawāṭir*).

[43] The sense or meaning of the tradition as opposed to a word-for-word transmission.

[44] What al-ʿAlthī seems to mean here is a minor inaccuracy such as a misspelling or some other minor disturbance in the text, the result of an inadvertent error on the part of the transmitter.

[45] On him, see notes to §8.

[46] Cf., Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl*, I, 414.

[47] There seems to be a break in the text—perhaps a result of the fact that the text in Ibn Rajab's *Dhayl* is an abridgement.

12 You maintain that the Companions of the Prophet (*aṣḥāb*) were confused on the question of the divine attributes (*ṣifāt*), but in fact you yourself are more deserving of censure than they. Clearly the Sunna does not suffice you.[48] Fear God and refuse to speak of Him simply on the basis of your own subjective judgment (*raᵓy*), for [matters pertaining to the divine] are a mystery (*khabar ghayb*) about which one is not to receive instruction except from the infallible Prophet. You and your ilk, however, have declared war on the sound traditions of the Prophet. Those who transmit them, in fact, transmit the laws of Islam (*sharāᵓiᶜ al-Islām*).

13 You have composed a *qaṣīda* which is heard on your own authority in many lands (*āfāq*). Some people accepted its tenants and died holding beliefs opposed to those you now hold as these latter have been reported. The following lines are among those quoted on your authority:

If you were to see Hell, you would recoil in fear;
  [Its flames] consume the unjust and the stiff-necked.
It crushes everything thrown into it
  And devours it, all the while it continues to grow.
Then the Almighty places a foot into it,
  A foot unlike anything pertaining to ordinary bodies.
[Hell] draws back out of fear of Him, being filled to the brim!
  If only you were to hear the voice [of Hell] calling out:
"It is enough, it is enough! I am overwhelmed with what I see
  Of an awesomeness that repels with great force."
So beware of what an innovator (*mubtadiᶜ*) puts forth in his teaching,
  For he loves [to find] *taᵓwīl* [practiced] everywhere.[49]

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[48] The Arabic (وما وسعتك السنّة) implies that Ibn al-Jawzī was, by virtue of his attitude toward the Companions and the Sunna, a Muᶜtazilī at heart. The Muᶜtazila were well known for their coolness toward the *ḥadīth*. Some were openly hostile. Ashᶜarites differentiated themselves from the Muᶜtazila, in part, by their embrace of the *ḥadīth*. While Ibn al-Jawzī was not hostile or even cool toward the notion of sunna, he was highly critical of a good deal of the *ḥadīth* literature (more critical than most Ashᶜarīs) and wrote several major works (among them his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūᶜāt* and his *al-ᶜIlal al-Mutanāhiya fī'l-Aḥādīth al-Wāhiya*; apparently *al-Kashf li-Mushkil aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥayn* belongs to this same genre) in which he applies the critical tools developed within the discipline of *jarḥ wa taᶜdīl* to the analysis of *ḥadīths*. Ibn al-Jawzī could be severe in his analysis of *ḥadīth*, as is abundantly evident in his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūᶜāt*. For more on the Muᶜtazilī attitude, see van Ess, "L'autorité de la tradition prophétique dans la théologie muᶜtazilite" in *La notion d'autorité au moyen âge Islam, Byzance, Occident*, eds. G. Makdisi and D. & J. Sourdel (Paris, 1982), 211-226.

[49] Lit. "in every valley." Al-ᶜAlthī does not object to the content of these lines as such. What apparently scandalized him is that they could have been penned by a man who

14 How can such words [have been uttered by a champion of *taʾwīl*]? What can they possibly mean? We fear that you are introducing into our midst a third doctrine (*qawl thālith*) so that the original creed (*iʿtiqād*) will pass away.[50] Indeed, you have done harm to believers and have led them astray. You have devoted yourself to little more than transmitting words.[51] It has been reported that Ibn ʿAqīl, may God pardon him, recanted teachings such as these before the *ʿulamāʾ* of his day in the City of Peace—may God prolong its life for the sake of Islam and the Sunna. Thus he was cleared of what was found written in his own hand as well as the speculative views (*taʾwīlāt*) and other teachings attributed to him that were in conflict with the Quran and the Sunna.

15 [p. 210] I come to you as a spokesman for "the people" (*nās*), the *ʿulamāʾ*, and the "traditionists" (*ḥuffāẓ*). If you renounce these (heretical) doctrines and recant in good faith as others have done before you, [well and good, but if you do not,] they will bring your case to the attention of the public and will spread word of it to other lands, and they will demonstrate [for all to see] the shallowness of your pronouncements.[52] This is a matter

dabbled in *kalām* and practiced *taʾwīl*, and who actually advocated the latter in his writings. For al-ʿAlthī, the poem is a vivid example of the kind of inconsistency, self-contradiction, and insincerity to be found (he believed) in the writings of Ibn al-Jawzī. I have checked the works of Ibn al-Jawzī available to me but so far have not found these lines cited elsewhere. Hence the question of the poem's date remains an open one. It is entirely possible that these lines come from a period of Ibn al-Jawzī's life when he openly (and perhaps sincerely) opposed *taʾwīl* and the rationalist tendencies of which al-ʿAlthī accuses him in the *Risāla*.

[50] The traditionalist, anti-*taʾwīl* creed is undoubtedly the "original creed" mentioned here. The second way appears to be the rationalism of the Muʿtazila and others who champion *taʾwīl*. But what exactly is the third way or teaching? Is it something in between the two, a blend of the two that is perhaps in essence close to the rationalist creed but which on the surface appears to be not too different from the "original creed"? If this is what al-ʿAlthī means, it is a position that promotes itself through obfuscation—precisely what he accuses Ibn al-Jawzī of engaging in.

[51] A reference to the kind of thing exemplified in the poetry cited by al-ʿAlthī—nice-sounding words to the ears of a traditionalist, but ultimately empty because al-ʿAlthī is convinced that Ibn al-Jawzī does not really believe them. As al-ʿAlthī sees it Ibn al-Jawzī is the sort of person who is in the business of transmitting texts which he does not really believe or does not really understand, and—judging from §11—texts which he sometimes transmits inaccurately.

[52] This is a threat that would only have made sense if we assume that it was issued sometime before 590/1193. It would have meant little after Ibn al-Jawzī's public humiliation and banishment to Wasit in the summer of 590 (*MZ*, 438-439). It is, in fact, possible that

over which there should be consultation, one that ought to be dealt with under the cover of darkness.[53] This earth is not lacking in people who will stand up for God with evidence. There is no doubt that criticism (*jarḥ*) is a prerequisite to correction (*taᶜdīl*).[54] Verily, "God is a witness (*wakīl*) of what we say,"[55] for he who gives warning will be excused.

16 When you interpret the divine attributes metaphorically on the basis of a philological analysis, then rationalize [such a procedure] in your own mind and refuse to accept the counsel of others given in good faith, this [you should know] is not in keeping with the teaching of the great *imām* Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal—may God bless his soul! You cannot attribute such things as this to him. Choose another school if you think you can. My fellow Ḥanbalīs (*aṣḥābunā*) will continue to speak the unvarnished truth whenever necessary even in the face of threats to their lives. They do not fear the censure of their opponents because of [their faith in] God, nor are they troubled by the vilification of slanderers or the lies of liars, for they have an agreeable and wholesome reputation. Their renunciation of this world and their aversion to it—preoccupied as they are with the hereafter—are well known.

17 You have indeed brought shame on us through your erroneous teachings,[56]

al-ᶜAlthī was one of the behind-the-scenes actors in the events leading up to Ibn al-Jawzī's exile in 590. The role played by other Ḥanbalīs, especially the Jīlī family, is well known. It would be surprising, given the tensions that existed within the school, if other Ḥanbalīs were not also involved in the plot to rid Baghdad of Ibn al-Jawzī's influence.

[53] These words might be taken as a not-so-veiled threat that some kind of unspecified action might be taken if Ibn al-Jawzī does not recant. Presumably, the regular courts operated by day—a warning of action by night could have had an ominous ring. One wonders, given the reference here to night-time deliberations, whether the timing of Ibn al-Jawzī's actual arrest, and his dispatch to Wasit, all of which took place at night, were purely accidental.

[54] An ironic allusion to *jarḥ wa taᶜdīl*, the science of *ḥadīth*-criticism—a discipline that Ibn al-Jawzī practiced with zest, as one can see from his *Kitāb al-Mawḍūᶜāt* and his *Kitāb al-ᶜIlal al-Mutanāhiya*. The critical method he practiced in his study of the *ḥadīth* (without justification in al-ᶜAlthī's view) should now be directed against Ibn al-Jawzī himself. He is the one who stands in need of *jarḥ wa taᶜdīl* (criticism and correction).

[55] S. 12: 66.

[56] This may be al-ᶜAlthī's response to charges levelled by Ibn al-Jawzī against Ḥanbalīs whom he regarded as *mujassima* (corporealizing anthropomorphists) (cf., *KAS*, §30 and the end of §32).

not to mention your aloofness,[57] as though you are one of the high and mighty.[58] You have no special rank or endowment [that sets you apart from others]. We will make it impossible for you to publicize [views that] contradict the Sunna.[59] If [your reliance on] personal opinion (*raʾy*) had been known from the beginning as it is known now[60] nothing would have been heard of you anywhere.[61] But God has issued His decree, and what He

[57] Although Ibn al-Jawzī was very much in the public eye, especially through his activities as a preacher and a teacher, he did in fact spend much of his time in seclusion, perhaps in part because he preferred privacy to fraternizing (though he certainly did some of that), but in large part because his ambitious goals as a scholar and writer demanded long periods of quiet on a regular basis. Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, who was in a position to know from personal observation, reports that his contact with even his own children was limited (*MZ*, 482). But if the pressure of work left little time for social contacts with members of the Ḥanbalī school, it is also known that he was rather contemptuous of the school of his day and may even have contemplated leaving it at one point in his career (*MZ*, 326. Cf., *KM*, X, 252-253). Al-ᶜAlthī, however, sees his practice of seclusion differently: Ibn al-Jawzī secluded himself because he thought he was too good to waste his time with others. It is difficult to know the truth from this distance in time.

[58] The Arabic reads: ولقد سوّدتَ وجهَنا بمقالتك الفاسدة وانفرادك بنفسك كأنّك جبّار من الجبابرة. This is very strong language, but it does express quite accurately the deep animosity that was harbored toward Ibn al-Jawzī in some quarters of the Ḥanbalī school. Especially during the last two decades of his public life in Baghdad (roughly from 570/1174 or thereabouts to 590/1193), he had progressively alienated himself from the "conservative" wing of the school as well as those elements within the school that were under the influence of the Jīlānī family—in short, a substantial part of the school. Both Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī and Ibn Rajab allude to this repeatedly in their respective works.

[59] Is it possible to see in this sentence a knowledge of the plans being made in 590 to have Ibn al-Jawzī arrested and sent into exile where he could no longer be the gadfly that he had become? If the *Risāla* had been written on the eve of Ibn al-Jawzī's arrest in 590/1193, it is possible to imagine that al-ᶜAlthī had been among those laying the groundwork for this plot. There is, however, no independent evidence supporting such an interpretation. At this point all that can be said is that it is a possibility. It is quite clear that although ᶜAbd as-Salām al-Jīlānī played a leading role in the events of 590, he was not alone among the conspirators. The plot appears to have had the tacit support of many within the Ḥanbalī school. One does not need to assume that those involved in the plot saw eye-to-eye on all matters of doctrine. The fact that they had a common enemy was sufficient.

[60] On the use of the verbs استدبر and استقبل, see Lane 845/2.

[61] Lit., "not a word would have been related about you (or on your authority) either in the plain or in the hill country." This sentence seems to imply that Ibn al-Jawzī had not always espoused the views for which he is here being criticized and suggests that his views had changed at some point in his career. This is supported by al-ᶜAlthī's statement in §7.

has willed that will He do. Let the Book of God and His Messenger decide between us, for God has said: "If you have disagreements among yourselves in anything, refer the matter to God and His Messenger." [62] He did not say: "[Refer the matter] to Ibn al-Jawzī."

18 You seem to think that every one who criticizes you does so out of ignorance. Has God's favor been given to you alone? If you consider [all] the people (*nās*) to be ignorant, then who is there to certify that you are a man of learning (*ᶜālim*)? Who indeed is more ignorant than you, seeing that you pay no attention to those who offer you sincere counsel? You say: "Who is so and so, or who is and so?" They are, in fact, among the *imāms* from whom you received your knowledge! So who are you? Those who stand in fear and awe of the majesty of God are surely at ease.[63] They hold back from plunging into that of which they have no knowledge so as not to suffer remorse.

19 Come to your senses, you wretched man, before death overtakes you! Rectify your words and your deeds, for the appointed time has drawn near![64] **[p. 211]** The affairs [of men] are in the hands of God both before and after;[65] all power and might belong to God, the High and Mighty One!

Apart from remarks here and there in the *Risāla*, there is so far precious little available evidence on which one might attempt to reconstruct the development of Ibn al-Jawzī's thought. Ibn al-Jawzī nowhere acknowledges (or even alludes to) any significant change in his thinking. Until the chronology of his works is established and many more of these latter studied, we can only speculate on the nature and timing of the changes his thought may have undergone over the course of his career. That his views did undergo change seems to me certain, and would help to explain some of the difficulties Ibn al-Jawzī faced in his relations with the Ḥanbalī school in his later years. It is clear from al-ᶜAlthī's remarks above that he saw himself as setting the public record straight, probably in the hope that, once corrected, Ibn al-Jawzī's reputation (and fame) would crumble. One seems justified in assuming that at the time of the *Risāla's* composition, Ibn al-Jawzī's reputation was still intact.

[62] S. 4: 59.

[63] Or "are at peace [with themselves]," because of their faith in the sufficiency of the Quran and the Sunna.

[64] This surely implies that Ibn al-Jawzī was already well on in years.

[65] Cf., S. 30: 4.

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من قِبَل اليمن، »[١] يعنى تنفيسه عن الكربة[٢] بنصرة [٣] أهل المدينة إيّاي، والمدينة من جانب اليمن. وهذا شيء لا يختلف فيه[٤] المسلمون .

٢٤٤ قال ابن حامد: رأيت بعض أصحابنا يثبتون للّه وصفًا في ذاته بأنّه يتنفّس. قال: وقالوا: الرياح الهفّافة[٥] مثل العاصفة والعقيم والجنوب والشمال والصبا والدبور مخلوقة، إلا ريحًا من صفاته هي ذات نسيم حيائي[٦] وهي من نفس الرحمن. قلت: على من يعتقد هذا اللعنة لأنّه يثبت جسداً مجوّفًا[٧] وما هؤلاء بمسلمين.

٢٤٥ ثمّ قلت: ولمّا علم بكتابي[٨] هذا جماعة من الجهلة[٩] لم يعجبهم لأنّهم ألفوا كلام رؤسائهم المجسّمة. فقالوا: ليس هذا المذهب. قلت: ليس بمذهبكم ولا بمذهب من قلّدتم من أشياخكم . [42a] فقد نزّهت مذهب الإمام أحمد ونفيت عنه كذب المنقولات، وهذيان المعقولات غير مقلّد فيما اعتقده. وكيف أترك بهرجًا وأنا أنتقده؟

آخره، واللّه تعالى أعلم.[١٠]

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[١] دفع، ص٧٧: «من جهة اليمن.»

[٢] دفع، ص٧٧: «الكرب.»

[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] دفع، ص٧٧: «الهابة.»

[٦] دفع، ص٧٧: «خيالي.»

[٧] دفع، ص٧٧: «مخلوقًا.»

[٨] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

[٩] دفع، ص٧٧: «الجهال.»

[١٠] كلمات في نهاية المخطوطة: «نقلته من نسخة مكتوب في آخرها: ما صورته منقول من نسخة نُسخت من نسخة نُسخت من خطّ سيدي نور الدين علي بن جمال الدين بن عبد الله الدمشقيّ الشافعيّ تلميذ الشيخ الامام العلامة شمس الدين المحدّث الشافعيّ بدمشق. نفّع الله به المسلمين. وقع الفراغ من نسخها سابع عشر رجب الفرد سنة تسعين وثمانمائة. وحسبنا الله ونعم الوكيل.»

شيئًا من حسّ [١] تلك الحجب إلا زهقت.»[٢]

٢٣٩ قلت: هذا حديث لا أصل له، يرويه موسى بن عبيدة. قال أحمد: لا يحلّ عندي الرواية عنه. وقال يحيى: ليس بشيء، وموسى يرويه عن عمر بن الحكم. قال البخاريّ: عمر ذاهب الحديث.

[41b] الحديث التاسع والخمسون

٢٤٠ رواه أنس أنّ النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «إنّ للّه لوحًا، أحد وجهَيه درّة والآخر ياقوتة. قلمه النور، فبه[٣] [يخلق وبه][٤] يرزق وبه يحيي ويميت ويعزّ ويذلّ [٥] ويفعل ما يشاء في يوم وليلة».

٢٤١ قلت: هذا حديث موضوع يرويه محمّد بن عثمان الحرّانيّ وهو متروك الحديث.

الحديث الستّون

٢٤٢ روى جابر عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «إذا رأيتم الريح فلا تسبّوها[٦] فإنّها من نَفَس[٧] الرحمن، تأتي بالرحمة وتأتي بالعذاب. فاسألوا اللّه خيرها واستعيذوا باللّه من شرّها.»

٢٤٣ قلت: النفس بمعنى التنفيس عن المكروب، ومثله ما روى أبو هريرة عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «إنّي لأجد نفس الرحمان[٨]

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[١] دفع، ص٧٦: «حسن»؛ فكذلك في كتاب الموضوعات، ج ١، ص١١٦، ومشكل لابن فورك، ص٢٩١.

[٢] ميزان الاعتدال، ج٣، ص١٩١: «الا زهقت نفسها.»

[٣] الأصل: «فيه.»

[٤] دفع، ص٧٦: «فبه يخلق وبه يزرق»؛ فكذلك في كتاب الموضوعات، ص١١٨.

[٥] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٦] دفع، ص٧٦: «تسبوه.»

[٧] ابن ماجة، أدب، ٢٩: «رَوح»؛ فكذلك في كتاب الأسماء للبيهقيّ، ص٤٦٣.

[٨] دفع، ص٧٧: «ربكم.»

الحديث السابع والخمسون

٢٣٦ روى القاضي عن محمّد بن كعب القرظيّ قال: «كان الناس إذا سمعوا القرآن من في الرحمن لم[١] يسمعوه قطّ.»

٢٣٧ قال القاضي: ولا يمتنع[٢] أن يطلق الفم[٣] عليه. قلت: واعجبًا يعني «في الرحمن» فمه، فيثبت[٤] للّه صفة بقول تابعيّ لا تصحّ الرواية عنه، هذا من أقبح[٥] الأشياء. فأمّا الحديث الذي سبق عن أبي أمامة عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «ما تقرّب[٦] العباد إلى اللّه تعالى بمثل ما خرج منه»[٧] فالمعنى ظهر عنه، ولا يجوز[٨] أن يظنّ أنّه خروج[٩] جسم من جسم لأنّ اللّه عزّ وجلّ ليس بجسم ولا كلامه جسم.

الحديث الثامن والخمسون

٢٣٨ رويناه[١٠] عن سهل بن سعد[١١] عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «دون اللّه تعالى سبعون ألف حجاب من نور وظلمة.[١٢] وما يسمع[١٣] من نفس

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[١] دفع شبه التشبيه (بيروت ١٩٩١)، ص٢٧١: «كأنهم لم.»

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٣] الأصل: «الفي.»

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة.

[٦] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

[٧] دفع، ص٧٦: «ما تقرب العباد اليّ بمثل ما خرج مني»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٦و.

[٨] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[٩] دفع، ص٧٦: «كخروج»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٦و.

[١٠] دفع، ص٧٦: «روينا.»

[١١] دفع، ص٧٦: «سعيد.»

[١٢] كتاب الموضوعات، ج ١، ص١١٦: «من نور وظلمة وماء.»

[١٣] دفع، ص٧٦: «وما من نفس تسمع.»

قومي بعزّتي.»[١]

٢٣٠ قلت: هذا حديث يرويه زيادة[٢] الأنصاريّ. قال البخاريّ: هو منكر الحديث، وذكر له أهل الحديث هذا الحديث. وقال أبو حاتم بن حبّان: يروي المناكير عن المشاهير ويستحقّ[٣] الترك. وقد رواه أبو جعفر بن أبي شيبة، فقال فيه: زائدة، وهو غلط، إنّما هو زيادة.

٢٣١ ونقول على تقدير الصحّة: إنّها مضافة إليه كما أُضيف البيت إليه. يُقال: هذا بيته وذلك مسكنه، وإنّما قلنا[٤] هذا لأنّ السكنى مستحيلة في حقّه.

الحديث الخامس والخمسون

٢٣٢ روى أبو أمامة[٥] عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «وعدني ربّي أن يدخل الجنّة من أمّتي سبعين ألفًا وثلاث حَثَيات من حثيات [41a] ربّي[٦] عزّ وجلّ.»

٢٣٣ قلت: الحثية ملء الكفّ، والمراد التقريب بما يُعقَل لا حقيقة الحثية.

الحديث السادس والخمسون

٢٣٤ روى أبو هريرة[٧] عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «إنّ اللّه يجلس يوم القيامة على القنطرة الوسطى بين[٨] الجنّة والنار».

٢٣٥ قلت: يرويه عثمان بن [أبي] عاتكة. وقال يحيى: ليس بشيء.

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[١] دفع، ص ٧٤: «فيقول بعزتي»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٥ظ.

[٢] الأصل: «زياد»؛ دفع، ص٧٤: «زيادة بن محمد الانصاري». راجع كتاب الضعفاء، ج١/ص٣٠٣؛ وميزان الاعتدال، ج٢ ص٩٨.

[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٤] دفع، ص ٧٥: «وانما قلت.»

[٥] الأصل: «روى امامة.»

[٦] دفع، ص ٧٥: «حثياته.»

[٧] دفع، ص ٧٥: «أبو امامة»؛ فكذلك في كتاب الموضوعات، ج١، ص١٢٧.

[٨] دفع، ص ٧٥: «القنطرة بين الجنة والنار»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٦و.

التمثيل[١] عنده معنى عظمة اللّه وجلاله ليُعلم أنّ الموصوف بعلوّ الشأن لا يجعل شفيعًا إلى من دونه[٢] في القدر.

٢٢٦ وقد ذكرنا فيما تقدّم عن القاضي أنّه قال: يئطّ من ثقل الذات. وهذا صريح في التجسيم.

الحديث الثالث والخمسون

٢٢٧ [40b] روى أبو هريرة عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قرأ أنّه ﴿كَانَ سَمِيعًا بَصِيراً﴾، فوضع إصبع الدعاء وإبهامه على عينيه[٣] وأذنه.

٢٢٨ قال العلماء: أراد بهذا تحقيق السمع والبصر للّه سبحانه فأشار[٤] إلى الجارحتين اللتين هما محلّ السمع[٥] والبصر، لا أنّ للّه جارحة.

الحديث الرابع والخمسون

٢٢٩ روى أبو الدرداء عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «إنّ اللّه عزّ وجلّ ينزل في ثلاث ساعات يبقين من الليل فيفتتح[٦] الذكر في الساعة الأولى فيمحو[٧] ما يشاء ويُثبِت. ثمّ ينزل في الساعة الثانية إلى جنّة عدن، وهي داره التي لم يسكنها غيره وهي مسكنه، ثمّ يقول: طوبى لمن دخلك. ثمّ ينزل في الساعة الثالثة إلى السماء الدنيا بروحه وملائكته. فينتفض[٨] فيقول:

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[١] سقط «التمثيل» في دفع، ص٧٤.

[٢] دفع، ص٧٤: «من هو دونه.»

[٣] قارن كتاب التوحيد لابن خزيمة، ص٤٣ وكتاب الأسماء، ص١٧٩- ١٨٠.

[٤] في هامش الأصل: «فاشار» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[٥] دفع، ص٧٤: «اللتين هما السمع.»

[٦] دفع، ص٧٤: «فيفتح.»

[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٨] مشكل الحديث لابن فورك، ص٣٩٩: «فتنتفض.»

صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم فما زال يسبّح حتّى عرف ذلك في وجهه أصحابه.[١] ثمّ قال: إنّه لا يُستشفع باللّه على أحد من خلقه، شأن اللّه أعظم من ذلك. ويحك، أتدري ما اللّه؟ إنّ عرشه على سمواته كذا. وقال بأصابعه مثل القبّة،[٢] وإنّه ليئطّ به أطيط الرحل بالراكب.»

٢٢٤ قلت: هذا الحديث تفرّد بروايته محمّد بن إسحاق عن يعقوب بن عتبة،[٣] وكلاهما لا يحتجّ[٤] به أرباب الصحاح. قال أبو سليمان الخطّابيّ:[٥] هذا الحديث[٦] إذا أُجرِي على ظاهره كان فيه نوع من الكيفيّة وهي عن اللّه وصفاته منفيّة، فعُلم أنّه كلام تقريب أريد به[٧] تقرير[٨] عظمة اللّه من حيث يدركه فهم السامع[٩] إذا كان أعرابيًّا جلفًا لا علم له بمعاني ما دقّ من الكلام.

٢٢٥ [قال:] ومعنى قوله «أتدري ما اللّه» أتدري[١٠] ما عظمة اللّه وجلاله؟ ومعنى «تئطّ به» يعجز[١١] عن جلاله وعظمته إذ كان معلومًا أنّ أطيط الرحل بالراكب لقوّة[١٢] ما فوقه أو لعجزه[١٣] عن احتماله. فقرّب[١٤] بهذا النوع من

[١] سنن أبي داود، ٣٩/١٨: «في وجوه أصحابه»؛ فكذلك في كتاب التوحيد لابن خزيمة، ص١٠٣.

[٢] سنن أبي داود، ٣٩/١٨: «مثل القبة عليه.»

[٣] الأصل: «يعقوب عن عتبة»؛ قارن سنن أبي داود، ٣٩/١٨.

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] الأصل: «الحطابي.»

[٦] في هامش الأصل: «تفرد بروايته محمد بن إسحاق عن يعقوب عن عتبة وكلاهما لا يحتج به أرباب الصحاح قال أبو سليمان الخطابي هذا الحديث» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٩] قارن كتاب الأسماء، ص٤١٩.

[١٠] دفع، ص٧٣: «اي اتدري»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٥ظ.

[١١] دفع، ص٧٤: «اي يعجز»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٥ظ.

[١٢] دفع، ص٧٤: «بالراكب انما يكون لقوة.»

[١٣] دفع، ص٧٤: «ما فوقه وعجزه.»

[١٤] كتاب الأسماء، ص٤١٩: «فقرر.»

يبطش بها ورجله التي يمشي عليها.[١] وما ترددّت عن شيء أنا فاعله ترددّي عن نفس المؤمن يكره الموت وأكره مساءته».

٢٢١ قلت: قوله «كنت سمعه... وبصره» فهو مثل وله ثلاثة[٢] أوجه. أحدها «كنت سمعه... وبصره» فهو يحبّ طاعتي كما يحبّ هذه الجوارح. والثاني أنّ كلّيّته مشغولة بي فلا يصغي إلى غيرها[٣] ولا يبصر إلا عن أمري. والثالث أنّي أحصّل له مقاصده كما ينالها بسمعه وبصره ويده اللواتي[٤] تعينه على عدوّه.

٢٢٢ وأمّا «التردّد» فخطاب لنا بما نعقل والحقّ منزّه عن حقيقته فهو كقوله «ومن أتاني يمشي أتيته هرولة». وقال بعض العلماء: لمّا كان المؤمن يمرض[٥] فيسأل[٦] العافية فيُعافَى كان ذلك كالتردّد في إماتته.

الحديث الثاني والخمسون [40a]

٢٢٣ روى جبير بن مطعم قال: «أتى رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلّم أعرابيّ فقال: يا رسول الله جُهدت الأنفس وجاع العيال ونُهكت الأموال وهلكت الأنعام فاستسق لنا.[٧] فإنّا نستشفع بك على الله ونستشفع بالله عليك. فقال رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلّم: ويحك، أتدري[٨] ما تقول؟ وسبّح رسول الله

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[١] دفع، ص٧٣: «بها»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٥و.

[٢] دفع، ص٧٣: «أربعة»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٥ظ: «أربع.»

[٣] دفع، ص٧٣: «الى غير ما يرضيني»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٥ظ.

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] الأصل: الياء غير منقوظة.

[٦] الأصل: الياء غير منقوظة.

[٧] دفع، ص٧٣: «فاستسق الله لنا»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٥ظ.

[٨] دفع، ص٧٣: «ويحك أتدري ما.»

٢١٩ قال ابن عقيل: يحسب بعض الجهلة أنّه لمّا نفى[١] العور عن اللّه عزّ وجلّ أثبت من دليل الخطاب[٢] أنّه ذو عينين، وهذا بعيد من الفهم. إنّما نفى عنه العور من حديث نفي النقائص. وكأنّه قال: إنّ ربّك[٣] ليس بذي جوارح، فتتسلّط النقائص عليه.[٤] [39b] وهذا مثل نفي الولد عنه لأنّه[٥] يستحيل عليه التجزّؤ[٦] ولو كانت الإشارة إلى صورة كاملة لم يكن في ذلك دليل على الألوهيّة[٧] ولا القدم فإنّ الكامل في الصورة كثير. قال: ومن قال بدليل الخطاب فأثبت عينين، قيل له: دليل الخطاب مختلف في كونه دليلاً في أحكام الفقه وفروع الدين، فكيف بأصوله. ثمّ هو عند من اعتقده حجّة[٨] يقضي[٩] عليه معنى النطق، وهو القياس المظنون، فكيف يكون له حكم الدليل وقد قضى عليه دليل العقل بالردّ؟

الحديث الحادي والخمسون

٢٢٠ روى البخاريّ [١٠] في أفراده من حديث أبي هريرة عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «يقول اللّه عزّ وجلّ: لا يزال[١١] عبدي يتقرّب إليّ بالنوافل حتّى أحبّه فإذا أحببته كنت سمعه الذي يسمع به وبصره الذي يبصر به ويده التي

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] الأصل: «الحاطب.»

[٣] دفع، ص٧٢: «قال الا ربك.»

[٤] دفع، ص٧٢: «يتسلط عليها النفائص»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٥و.

[٥] دفع، ص٧٢: «بل كأنه.»

[٦] الأصل: «التجزي». انظر نهاية الفقرة، ٤٠.

[٧] الأصل: «الالاهية.»

[٨] الباز الأشهب (بيروت ١٩٨٧)، ص١٣٤: «جحد.»

[٩] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١٠] الأصل: «روى البخاري ومسلم في»؛ قارن دفع، ص٧٢. لايوجد هذا الحديث في صحيح مسلم.

[١١] دفع، ص٧٢: «ما يزال.»

يُوصَف بقعود لأنّها[١] حالة الجسماني.

الحديث التاسع والأربعون

٢١٥ في[٢] الصحيحين من حديث أبي هريرة عن رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلّم قال: «من تصدّق بعدل[٣] تمرة من كسب طيّب ولا يقبل الله إلا طيّبًا فإنّ الله يقبلها[٤] بيمينه ثمّ يربّيها[٥] كما يربّي أحدكم فلوّه حتّى تكون مثل الجبل». وفي لفظ أخرجه مسلم: «تربو[٦] في كفّ الرحمان حتّى تكون أعظم من الجبل».

٢١٦ قال العلماء: هذا خطاب للناس بما يفهمونه[٧] من الأخذ والتربية والنموّ. لمّا كان التناول باليد والقبض بالكفّ خاطبهم بما يعقلون. وإنّما جرى ذكر اليمين لإنّها مرصدة لما عزّ من الأمور. ومعنى التربية المضاعفة.

الحديث الخمسون

٢١٧ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث أنس بن مالك عن النبيّ صلّى الله عليه وسلّم أنّه ذكر الدجّال. فقال: «ألا أنّه أعور وإنّ ربّكم عزّ وجلّ ليس بأعور».

٢١٨ قال العلماء: إنّما أراد تحقيق وصفه بأنّه[٨] لا يجوز عليه النقص والعور نقص. ولم يذكر[٩] إثبات جارحة لأنّه لا مدح في إثبات جارحة.

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] دفع، ص ٧١: «روى البخاري ومسلم في.»

[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٤] دفع، ص ٧١: «يتقبلها»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٥و: «يقبلها.»

[٥] دفع، ص ٧١: «يربيها لصاحبها كما»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٥و.

[٦] الأصل: «تربوا».

[٧] الأصل: «يفهموه»؛ دفع، ص٧١: «بما يعلمونه ويفهمونه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٥و.

[٨] الأصل: «فانه.»

[٩] دفع، ص٧٢: «لم يرد.»

٢١٢ قلت: هذا حديث[١] لا يصحّ، تفرّد به يحيى بن العلاء.[٢] قال: أحمد ابن حنبل: هو كذّاب يضع الحديث. وقال يحيى بن معين: ليس بثقة. وقال ابن عديّ: أحاديثه موضوعة.

٢١٣ وقد تكلّمنا على الفوقيّة[٣] في قوله تعالى ﴿وَهُوَ القَاهِرُ فَوْقَ عِبَادِهِ﴾. قال القاضي: المراد من الفوقيّة استواء الذات على العرش، وقال: هو على العرش أي ما حاذى[٤] العرش من ذاته فهو حدّ له وما عدا[٥] الجهة المحاذية للعرش، وهو الفوق والخلف والأمام واليسرة لا يُحَدّ. قلت: هذا الكلام أصله التجسيم لأنّ المحاذي يكون أكبر أو أصغر، والمقادير لا تكون إلا في الأجسام. الجلوس والقيام، ما وجدت عن إمامنا في هذا شيئًا؟ قلت: وكلا الشيئين[٦] لا يصحّ. أمّا لفظة «القعود» فقد رواها عن ابن عبّاس ولا يصحّ. أمّا لفظة «القيام» فيرويها عيسى عن جابر عن عمر بن الصُبْح.[٧] قال البخاريّ: قال عمر ابن الصبح: أنا وضعت خطبة رسول اللّه. وقال ابن حبّان: وكان يضع الحديث على الثقات،[٨] [39a] لا يصحّ[٩] كتب حديثه إلا على التعجّب.[١٠] وقال الدارقطنيّ: متروك. وقال الأزديّ: كذّاب ذاهل. قلت: وبمثل هذا يثبت للّه صفة؟ أين العقول؟ تعالى الحقّ أن يُوصَف بقيام وهو انتصاب[١١] القامة إنّما هو قائم بالقسط. ولا

[١] دفع، ص ٧١: «الحديث.»

[٢] الباز الأشهب، ٣٥و: «يحيى بن أبي العلاء.»

[٣] دفع، ص ٧١: «تكلمنا في الفوق في»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٥و.

[٤] الأصل: «حادي.».

[٥] الأصل: «عدي.»

[٦] الأصل: «السينن».

[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٩] كتاب الضعفاء، ج٢، ص٢١١: «يحل».

[١٠] تهذيب، ج ٨، ص٤٦٣: «لا يحل كتب حديثه الا وجه التعجب.»

[١١] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

الحديث السادس والأربعون

٢٠٧ رُوي عن بعض التابعين قال: خلق اللّه آدم بيده وكتب التوراة بيده وغرس الفردوس بيده.

٢٠٨ قلت: هذا حديث لا يثبت عن قائله، وقد تكلّمنا على قوله تعالى ﴿لِمَا خَلَقْتُ بِيَدَيَّ﴾.

الحديث السابع والأربعون

٢٠٩ رُوي عن ابن عبّاس عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم في قوله تعالى ﴿وَسِعَ كُرْسِيُّهُ السَمَاوَاتِ والأَرْضَ﴾، قال: «كرسيّه موضع قدمه[١] والعرش لا يُقدَّر قدره».

٢١٠ قلت: رواه جماعة من الأثبات فوقفوه[٢] على ابن عبّاس، فرفعه منهم شجاع بن مخلّد. فعُلم بمخالفته الكبار المتقنين[٣] أنّه قد غلط. ومعنى الحديث أنّ الكرسيّ صغير بالإضافة إلى العرش كمقدار كرسيّ [38b] يكون عند سرير قد وضع لقدمي القاعد على السرير. قال الضحّاك: الكرسيّ[٤] الذي يجعل الملوك أقدامهم عليه، وقال القاضي: القدم قدم الذات وهي التي يضعها في النار.

الحديث الثامن والأربعون

٢١١ حديث العبّاس عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «فوق السماء السابعة بحر، بين أعلاه وأسفله كما بين السماء والأرض،[٥] واللّه تعالى فوق ذلك».

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[١] ميزان الاعتدال، ج٢، ص٢٦٠: «قدميه.»

[٢] الأصل: القاف غير منقوطة.

[٣] الأصل: «المتقنون». دفع، ص٧٠: «المتقنين»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٤ظ.

[٤] الأصل: «كرسيه»؛ دفع، ص٧٠: «الكرسيّ.»

[٥] ابن ماجة، المقدّمة، ١٣: «بين سماء إلى سماء.»

الحديث الرابع والأربعون

٢٠٢ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث أبي موسى عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «جنّتان من فضّة آنيتهما وما فيهما. وجنّتان من ذهب، آنيتهما وما فيهما.[١] وليس بين القوم وبين أن ينظروا إلى ربّهم إلا رداء الكبرياء على وجهه في جنّة [38a] عدن».

٢٠٣ [قلت:] لا المرئي[٢] لأنّه لا تحيط به الأمكنة. وقال القاضي: ظاهر الحديث أنّ المرئي في جنّة عدن. قلت: وهذا التجسيم المحض، ورداء الكبرياء ما له من الكبرياء والعظمة وكأنّ له أن يمنعهم[٣] لعظمته[٤] وإن شاء كُشف لهم.

٢٠٤ وقد تكلّمنا على الوجه في الآيات وقلنا: المراد بالوجه هو.[٥]

الحديث الخامس والأربعون

٢٠٥ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث أبي هريرة قال: قال رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: لمّا قضى اللّه الخلق كتب في كتابه وهو عنده فوق العرش: إنّ رحمتي غلبت غضبي. وفي لفظ سبقت.

٢٠٦ قال القاضي: ظاهر قوله «عنده» القرب من الذات. [قلت:] اعلم أنّ القرب إلى[٦] الحقّ لا يكون بمساحة.[٧] إنّما ذلك من صفة الأجسام وقد قال سبحانه ﴿مُسَوَّمَةً عِنْدَ رَبِّكَ﴾.

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[١] في هامش الأصل: «وجنّتان من ذهب انيتهما وما فيهما» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[٢] دفع، ص٦٩: «الرائي في جنة عدن لا المرئي.»

[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٤] دفع، ص٦٩: «وكأنه ان منعهم فلعظمته»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٤ظ.

[٥] دفع، ص٦٩: «وقلنا المراد هو»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٤ ظ؛ دفع شبه التشبيه، تحقيف لحسن السقاف (بيروت ١٩٩١)، ص٢٥٥: «قلنا المراد بالوجه هو (ذات اللّه) سبحان.»

[٦] دفع، ص٦٩: «القرب من الحق»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٤ظ.

[٧] دفع، ص٦٩: «مسافة.»

كلّمتك بقوّة عشرة آلاف لسان[١] ولي قوّة الألسنة كلّها وأنا أقوى من ذلك. فلمّا رجع إلى بني إسرائيل قالوا: صف لنا كلام ربّك.[٢] قال: لا أستطيع. قالوا: قرّبه لنا. قال: ألم تروا صوت[٣] الصواعق التي تقبل[٤] بأجلى[٥] كلام سمعتموه قطّ؟»

١٩٩ قلت: هذا حديث لا يصحّ. يرويه عليّ بن عاصم عن الفضل بن عيسى. قال يحيى: ليس بشيء. وقال النسائيّ: عليّ متروك الحديث. قال يزيد ابن هارون: ما زلنا نعرفه بالكذب.[٦] وأمّا الفضل بن عيسى فقال أيّوب السختيانيّ: لو خُلق[٧] أخرس كان خيراً له. وقال ابن عيينة: الفضل بن عيسى لا شيء. وقال يحيى: هو رجل سوء.

الحديث الثالث والأربعون

٢٠٠ روى القاضي عن حسّان بن عطيّة أنّه قال: «الساجد يسجد على قدم الرحمن».

٢٠١ قلت: هذا قول تابعيّ وهو مثل القرب[٨] من فضل اللّه. وأثبت القاضي بهذا وصف قدم. وقال: يسجد على قدمه حقيقة لا على وجه المماسّة.

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[١] الأصل: «عشرة آلاف ملك». دفع، ص٦٨ : «عشرة آلاف لسان»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٤و، وأيضًا في كتاب الموضوعات، ج١، ص١١٣.

[٢] دفع، ص٦٨: «كلام الرحمن»؛ فذلك في كتاب الموضوعات، ج١، ص ١١٣.

[٣] كتاب الموضوعات، ج١ ، ص١١٣: «الى أصوات»؛ فكذلك في حلية، ج٦،ص٢١٠.

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] الأصل: «باحلا». كتاب الموضوعات، ج١، ص ١١٣ : «أجلى كلام»؛ في حلية، ج٦،ص٢١٠: «أجلى جلاء.»

[٦] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٧] كتاب الضعفاء والمتروكين، ج٣، ص٧: «وُلد»؛ فكذلك في كتاب الموضوعات، ج١، ١١٣.

[٨] دفع، ص٦٨: «للقرب.»

الرحمن . ثمّ يقول: لا على وجه المماسّة. [قلت:] فصيانة[1] الكلام مع هؤلاء أولى.

الحديث الحدي والأربعون

١٩٥ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث أبي سعيد عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «يقول اللّه يوم القيامة: يا آدم. فيقول: لبّيك وسعديك. فيُنادَى بصوت: إنّ اللّه يأمرك أن تخرج من ذرّيّتك بعثًا [إلى] النار».

١٩٦ قلت: انفرد بلفظ «الصوت» حفص بن غياث، وخالفه وكيع وجرير وغيرهما من أصحاب الأعمش، فلم يذكروا لفظ «الصوت». وسُئل أحمد عن حفص فقال: كان يخلّط [37b] في حديثه.

١٩٧ وفي الحديث الصحيح «إذا تكلّم [اللّه] بالوحي سمع أهل السماء كجرّ السلسلة على الصفا». فرواه بعضهم بالمعنى الذي يظنّه فقال: سمع صوته أهل السماء. وفي حديث لابن مسعود «إذا تكلّم اللّه بالوحي سمع أهل السماء صلصلة كجرّ السلسلة على الصفا.»[2] وهذا مع اللفظ الأوّل الأليق. وليس في الصحيح: سمع صوته أهل السماء.

الحديث الثاني والأربعون

١٩٨ روى جابر عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «لمّا كلّم اللّه موسى يوم الطور كلّمه بغير الكلام يوم ناداه[3] فقال له: يا موسى. فقال: إنّما

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[1] الأصل: غير واضحة.

[2] في هامش الأصل: «فرواه بعضهم بالمعنى الذي يظنّه فقال: سمع صوته أهل السماء وفي حديث لابن مسعود: إذا تكلّم اللّه بالوحي سمع أهل السماء صلصلة كجرّ السلسلة على الصفا» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[3] دفع، ص٦٨: «بغير الكلام الذي كلمه به يوم ناداه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٤و؛ حلية الأولياء، ج٦، ص٢١٠: «بغير الكلام الذي كلمه به يوم ناداه فقال موسى يا رب هذا كلامك الذي كلمتني به.»

بعظمته وهيبته، ويكون هذا ضرب مثل يقرّب[١] عظمة الخالق. وقول الرواة «إذا قعد» و«إذا جلس»، من تغييرهم[٢] أو من تعبيرهم[٣] بما يظنّونه المعنى كما قال قائل ﴿ثُمَّ اسْتَوَى عَلَى العَرْشِ﴾ قعد. وإنّما قلنا هذا لأنّ الخالق سبحانه لا يجوز أن يُوصف بالجلوس على شيء فيفضل من ذلك الشيء لأنّ هذه صفة الأجسام. وقال [ابن] الزاغونيّ: معنى الحديث يخرّج عن صفة الاستواء أربع أصابع. قلت: وهذا قد قصد به مغالطة [37a] العوامّ. وهل لما قاله معنى؟ إلا أن يُقال: إنّ هذه الأربعة لم تحاذ[٤] ولم تماسّ وكلّ هذا صريح في التشبيه ظاهر في التجسيم. ثمّ هو إثبات صفات بما لا يحسن إثباته من الأحاديث المعلولة. وقد روينا عن أبي بكر بن مسلم العابديّ قال: هذا الموضع الذي يفضل لمحمّد ليجلس عليه. قلت:[٥] وقد كان الأليق بهذا المتعبّد أن يتشاغل بعبادته عن الكلام في هذا الفنّ.

١٩٣ وقد روى القاضي عن الشعبيّ[٦] أنّه قال: «إنّ اللّه تعالى قد ملأ العرش حتّى أنّ له أطيطًا كأطيط الرحل». قلت: هذا كذب على الشعبيّ. قال القاضي: وغير ممتنع حمل الخبر على ظاهره في أنّ ذاته تملأ العرش. ثمّ قال: لا على شغل مكان. قلت: ومن يخلّط هذا التخليط لا يتكلّم. واعجبًا ما يملأ مكانه [لا] يشغله.

١٩٤ روى القاضي عن خالد بن معدان أنّه قال: «إنّ الرحمن ليثقل على حملة العرش». وقال: غير[٧] ممتنع حمل هذا على ظاهره وإنّ ثقله يحصل بذات

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[١] دفع، ص٦٧: «لقدر.»

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٣] الأصل: التاء والياء غير منقوطتين.

[٤] الأصل: «تحادي.»

[٥] الأصل: «قال.»

[٦] الأصل: «السعبي.»

[٧] الأصل: «غيره.»

عمر [قال:] «إنّ امرأة جاءت إلى رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم فقالت: ادع اللّه أن يدخلني الجنّة. فعظّم الربّ عزّ وجلّ، وقال: إنّ كرسيّه وسع السموات والأرض. فإنّ له أطيطًا كأطيط الرَحْل الجديد إذا ركب من ثقله».[١]

١٩١ قلت: هذا حديث مختلف جداً. فتارة يُروى عن عبد اللّه بن خليفة[٢] عن عمر عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم، وتارة عن عمر موقوفًا عليه. وقد رواه أبو إسحاق عن ابن خليفة عن عمر[٣] قال: «إذا جلس تبارك وتعالى على الكرسيّ سُمع له أطيط كأطيط الرحل». ورواه ابن جرير أنّ عبد اللّه بن خليفة قال: قال رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: «إنّ كرسيّه وسع السموات والأرض وإنّه ليقعد [عليه] فما يفضل[٤] منه مقدار أربع[٥] أصابع، ثمّ قال بأصابعه[٦] فجمعها، وإنّ له أطيطًا كأطيط الرحل إذا رُكب من ثقله». ورواه أبو بكر المروزيّ[٧] أنّ ابن خليفة قال: قال رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: «الكرسيّ الذي يجلس عليه الربّ، ما يفضل منه إلا مقدار أربع[٨] أصابع.»[٩]

١٩٢ قلت: هذا على ضدّ اللفظ الأوّل، وكلّ ذلك تخليط من الرواة ومن سوء الحفظ.[١٠] والأليق فما يفضل منه مقدار أربع أصابع. والمعنى أنّه قد ملأه

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] الأصل: «عبد الله بن ابي خليفة.»

[٣] دفع، ص ٦٦-٦٧: «عن ابن عمر»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٤ظ: «عن عمر.»

[٤] الأصل: «يفصل.»

[٥] الأصل: «اربعة.».

[٦] دفع، ص ٦٧: «قال باصبعه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٤و.

[٧] الأصل: «المرورذي.»

[٨] الأصل: «اربعة.»

[٩] في هامش الأصل: «ثم قال بأصابعه فجمعها وان له أطيطا كأطيط الرحل اذا ركب من ثقله ورواه أبو بكر المرورذي ان ابن خليفة قال قال رسول الله صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم الكرسي الذي يجلس عليه الرب ما يفضل منه الا مقدار أربعة أصابع» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[١٠] دفع، ص ٦٧: «وكل ذلك من تخليط الرواة وسوء الحفظ»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٤و.

قال: ولا يمتنع إمراره على ظاهره لأنّا لا نؤكّد[١] مشيه وانها ءه[٢] إلى مجلسه عن انتقال. قلت: من يقول: نحمل هذا على ظاهره، كيف يقول: بلا انتقال. وإنّما يقول هذا إرضاءً للجهّال، وهل المشي إلا انتقال؟

الحديث التاسع والثلاثون

١٨٧ رُوي عن عائشة قالت: سُئل[٣] رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم عن المقام المحمود فقال: «وعدني ربّي بالقعود على العرش.»

١٨٨ قلت : هذا حديث لا يصحّ.[٤] قال ابن حامد: يجب الإيمان بما ورد من[٥] المماسة والقرب من الحقّ في إقعاده[٦] على العرش. قال: وقال ابن عمر في قوله ﴿ وَإِنَّ لَهُ عِنْدَنَا لَزُلْفَى وَحُسْنَ مَآبٍ﴾ قال: ذكر الدنوّ منه حتّى يمسّ بعضه. قلت: هذا كذب على ابن عمر. وكذّب من اعتقد تبعيض الذات بالإجماع.[٧]

١٨٩ قال القاضي: يقعد نبيّه على عرشه بمعنى يدنيه من ذاته ويقرّبه منها، ويشهد له قوله ﴿فَكَانَ قَابَ قَوْسَيْنِ﴾ وقال ابن عبّاس: وكان بينه وبينه مقدار قوسين. قلت: هذا عن جبرئيل لا عن اللّه سبحانه. ومن أجاز [36b] القرب من الذات أجاز الملاصقة . وما ذهب إليه القاضي صريح في التجسم.

الحديث الأربعون

١٩٠ وراه الدارقطنيّ من حديث أبي إسحاق عن عبد اللّه بن خليفة عن

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[١] الأصل: غير واضحة؛ قارن الباز الأشهب (طبعة،١٩٨٧)، ص١٢٤.

[٢] لأصل: بدون نقط..

[٣] الأصل: «سئلت.»

[٤] دفع، ص٦٦: «لا يصح عن رسول الله.»

[٥] دفع، ص٦٦: «بما ورد به من»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٣ظ: «بما ورد من.»

[٦] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٧] دفع، ص٦٦: «وهذا كذب على ابن عمر ومن ذكر تبعيض الذات كفر بالجماع»؛ هكذا في الباز الأشهب، ٣٣ظ.

يليق بالحقّ سبحانه. فقال: غير ممتنع وصفه بالجمال وإنّ ذلك صفة راجعة[١] إلى الذات لأنّ الجمال معنى الحسن وقد تقدّم[٢] قوله «رأيت ربّي في أحسن صورة» . وهذا تشبيه محض .

الحديث الثامن والثلاثون

١٨٥ ورى القاضي عن عمر بن عبد العزيز أنّه قال: «إذا فرغ اللّه من أهل الجنّة والنار [أقبل] يمشي في ظلل من الغمام والملائكة فيقف على أوّل درجة فيسلّم عليهم فيردّون عليه السلام فيقول: سلوني. فيقولون: ماذا نسألك؟ وعزّتك وجلالك وارتفاعك في مكانك[٣] لوأنّك قسمت [36a] علينا رزق الثقلين لأطعمناهم وسقيناهم ولم ينقص ما عندنا. فيقول: بلى سلوني. فيقولون: نسألك[٤] رضاك. فيقول: رضاي أحلّكم دار كرامتي. فيفعل هذا بأهل كلّ درجة حتّى ينتهي إلى مجلسه».

١٨٦ قلت: هذا حديث مكذوب به على عمر، وبعد فكيف يثبت للّه صفة بقول عمر؟ قال ابن حامد: يأتي[٥] يوم القيامة إلى المحشر كقوله ﴿يَأْتِيَ[٦] رَبُّك﴾ على وقف[٧] نزوله إلى السماء. وقال القاضي:[٨] يشهد لحديث عمر يعنى قوله تعالى ﴿يَأْتِيَهُمُ اللّهُ فِي ظُلَلٍ﴾. قلت: ولا يدري[٩] أنّ المعنى يأتيهم اللّه بظلل.[١٠]

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[١] دفع، ص ٦٥: «فان ذلك راجع الى.»
[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٣] دفع، ص ٦٥: «في علو مكانك.»
[٤] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.
[٥] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.
[٦] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.
[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط؛ لعلّ: وقت.
[٨] الأصل: «قال الحديث»؛ انظر دفع، ص٦٥.
[٩] دفع، ص٦٦: «لم يدر»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٣ظ.
[١٠] الأصل: بدون نقط.

والعظمة مخلوق.

الحديث السادس والثلاثون

١٨١ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث أبي هريرة عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «يقول اللّه تعالى: أنا عند [35b] ظنّ عبدي بي وأنا معه حين يذكرني. فإن ذكرني في نفسه ذكرته في نفسي، وإن ذكرني في ملأ ذكرته في ملأ خير منهم. وإن اقترب[١] إليّ شبراً اقتربت[٢] إليه ذراعًا، وإن تقرّب إليّ ذراعًا اقتربت إليه باعًا، وإن أتاني يمشي أتيته هرولة».

١٨٢ قلت: قد ذهب القاضي إلى أنّ للّه نفسًا [وهي] صفة زائدة على الذات.[٣] وهذا قول مبتدع ينزع إلى[٤] التشبيه لأنّه لا يُفرَق بين الذات والنفس. وما المانع من[٥] أن يكون المعنى ذكرته أنا وقد سبق هذا في الكلام على الآيات. والقرب[٦] والهرولة توسع في الكلام كقوله تعالى: ﴿سَعَوْا فِي آيَاتِنَا﴾ لا يُراد به المشي.

الحديث السابع والثلاثون

١٨٣ روى أبو سعيد عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «إنّ اللّه جميل يحبّ الجَمال».

١٨٤ قال العلماء: الجميل المُجمِل بتحسين الصورة[٧] والأخلاق والإحسان، والذي أراه أنّ الجميل الذي أوصافه تامّة مستحسنة. وقد فسّره القاضي بما لا

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[١] دفع، ص٦٤: «تقرب»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٣و.
[٢] دفع، ص٦٤: «تقربت»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٣و.
[٣] دفع، ص٦٤: «نفسًا هي صفة زائدة عن الذات». قارن كتاب أخبار الصفات، فقرة ٤٤.
[٤] دفع، ص٦٤: «ينوع به.»
[٥] دفع، ص٦٤: «المانع أن.»
[٦] دفع، ص٦٤: «تقريب.»
[٧] دفع، ص٦٥: «الصور»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٣ظ: «الصورة.»

في الخبر[١] إضمار تقديره ذو الرحم يأخذ بحقو الرحمن فحُذف[٢] المضاف وأقام المضاف إليه مقامه. قال: لأنّ الرحم لا يصحّ عليها التعلّق، فالمراد ذو الرحم يتعلّق[٣] بالحقو.

١٧٨ قلت: فقد زاد على التشبيه والتجسيم، والكلام مع هؤلاء ضائع كما يُقال: لا عقل ولا قران، وإذا تعلّق ذو الرحم وهو جسم فبماذا يتعلّق؟ فنعوذ بالله من سوء الفهم.

الحديث الخامس والثلاثون

١٧٩ روى مسلم[٤] في صحيحه [عن أبي هريرة] أنّ رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلّم قال: «يقول الله عزّ وجلّ: العزّ[٥] إزاري والكبرياء ردائي[٦] فمن نازعني شيئًا منهما عذّبته.»[٧]

١٨٠ قال أبو سليمان الخطّابيّ: معنى[٨] الكلام أنّ الكبرياء والعظمة صفات[٩] لله اختصّ بهما، لا يشركه فيهما أحد ولا ينبغي لأحد[١٠] أن يتعاطاهما لأنّ صفة المخلوق التواضع والتذلّل.[١١] وضرب الرداء والإزار مثلاً يقول: والله اعلم كما لا يشرك الإنسان في ردائه وإزاره أحدٌ، كذلك لا يشركه[١٢] في الكبرياء

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٢] الأصل: «فحدف».
[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٤] الأصل: «البخاري»، ولكن هذا الحديث لا يوجد في صحيح البخاريّ؛ انظر الصحيح لمسلم،٤٥/ ١٣٦؛ أيضًا السنن لابن ماجة، ١٦/٣٧(٢ و٣).
[٥] دفع، ص٦٣: «العظمة.»
[٦] دفع، ص٦٣: «الكبرياء ردائي والعظمة إزاري»؛ قارن ابن ماجة، ١٦/٣٧(٢).
[٧] دفع، ص٦٣: «فمن نازعني فيهما عذبته»؛ قارن كتاب الأسماء، ص ١٣٨.
[٨] دفع، ص٦٣: «في الكلام.»
[٩] دفع، ص٦٣: «صفتان»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٣و.
[١٠] دفع، ص٦٣: «لمخلوق»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٣و.
[١١] الأصل: «التدلل.»
[١٢] الأصل: «يشركني.»

قطعها بثتّه»[١] وقد رُوي[٢] هذا الحديث بلفظ لم يخرج في الصحاح: «الرحم شجنة آخذة بحقو[٣] الرحمن.» وفي لفظ: «لمّا خلق اللّه الخلق قامت الرحم فأخذت بحقو[٤] الرحمن فقالت:[٥] هذا مقام العائذ بك من القطيعة.»[٦]

١٧٦ قلت: وهذه كلّها أمثال ترجع إلى ما بيّنّا ومعنى تعلّقها بحقو الرحمن الاستجارة والاعتصام. وفي الصحيحين من حديث عائشة عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «الرحم معلّقة بالعرش، تقول:[٧] من وصلني وصله اللّه ومن قطعني قطعه اللّه». وقال أبو بكر البيهقيّ: الحقو الإزار. قال: والمعنى تتعلّق بعزّه.

١٧٧ وقال ابن حامد: يجب التصديق بأنّ للّه حقواً فتأخذ الرحم بحقوه. قال: وكذلك نؤمن[٨] بأنّ للّه جنبًا لقوله تعالى «عَلَى مَا فَرَّطْتُ فِي جَنْبِ اللّهِ.» قلت: وهذا لا فهم له أصلاً، كيف يقع التفريط في جنب الذات؟[٩] قال: والمراد بالتعلّق القرب والمماسّة بالحقو كما رُوي أنّ اللّه تعالى يدني إليه [35a] داوّد حتّى يمسّ بعضه. قلت: قد طمّ القاضي على هذا فقال: لا على وجه الجارحة والتبعيض والرحم آخذة بها لا على وجه الجارحة والتبعيض، والرحم آخذة بها لا على وجه الاتّصال والمماسّة. ثمّ نقض[١٠] هذا التخليط وقال:

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[١] سقطت «بثته» في دفع، ص٦٢.

[٢] دفع، ص٦٢: «ورد.»

[٣] دفع، ص٦٢: «شجنة من الرحمن تعلق بحقوي الرحمن.»

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٦] الأصل: القاف غير منقوطة.

[٧] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

[٨] الأصل: «يؤمن.»

[٩] وفي دفع إضافة «نعوذ باللّه من سوء الفهم» إلى النصّ (ص٦٣)؛ هكذا في الباز الأشهب، ٣٣و.

[١٠] الأصل: «نفض».

بشيء. وقال النسائيّ: متروك الحديث. وقال: أبو حاتم بن حبّان الحافظ: هذا متن موضوع .

الحديث الرابع والثلاثون

١٧٣ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث أبي هريرة عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «إنّ اللّه عزّ وجلّ خلق الخلق حتّى إذا فرغ منهم قامت الرحم فقالت: هذا مقام العائذ بك من القطيعة. قال: نعم، أما ترضين أن أصل من وصلك وأقطع من قطعك؟» وفي لفظ أخرجه البخاريّ أنّ النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «إنّ الرحم شجنة من الرحمن».

١٧٤ قال أبو عبيد: الشَجْنَة والشُجْنَة كالغصن[١] من الشجرة. [34b] ومعنى شجنة أي قرابة مشتبكة كاشتباك العروق والشجر تشجّن[٢] إذا التفّ بعضها[٣] ببعض.

١٧٥ قلت: ولا يخلو هذا الحديث من أحد أمرين، إمّا أن يُراد أنّ اللّه تعالى يراعي الرحم فيصل من وصلها[٤] ويقطع من قطعها ويأخذ لها حقّها كما يراعي القريب قرابته فإنّه[٥] يزيد في المراعاة على الأجانب، أو أن[٦] يُراد أنّ الرحم بعض[٧] حروف الرحمن فكأنّه عظّم قدرها بهذا الاسم. ويؤكّد هذا حديث[٨] عبد الرحمن بن عوف عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: قال اللّه عزّ وجلّ: «أنا الرحمن، خلقت الرحم، شققت لها اسمًا من اسمي فمن وصلها وصلته ومن

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٢] الأصل: الشين غير منقوطة.
[٣] الأصل: «بعصه.»
[٤] دفع، ص٦٢: «يصلها»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٢ظ.
[٥] دفع، ص٦٢: «كأنه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٢ظ.
[٦] الأصل: «وان.»
[٧] دفع، ص٦٢: «الرحم حروف الرحمن.»
[٨] الأصل: «هذا الحديث.»

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١٦٩ [34a] روى أبو أمامة عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «ما تقرّب العباد إلى اللّه بمثل ما خرج منه يعني القرآن».

١٧٠ وفي حديث عثمان[١] أنّ النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «فضل[٢] القرآن على سائر الكلام كفضل اللّه على خلقه، إنّ القرآن منه خرج وإليه يعود.» قلت: [المعنى] أنّه وصل إلينا من عنده وإليه يعود، فيُرفع.

الحديث الثالث والثلاثون

١٧١ ورى أبو هريرة عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «إنّ اللّه تعالى قرأ طه ويس قبل أن يخلق آدم بألف سنة[٣] فلمّا سمعت الملائكة القرآن[٤] قالت:[٥] طوبى لأمّة ينزل هذا عليهم وطوبى لأجواف تحمل هذا وطوبى لألسن تتكلّم بهذا.»[٦]

١٧٢ قلت: هذا حديث موضوع يرويه إبراهيم بن مهاجر عن عمر بن حفص. قال ابن عديّ: لم أر لإبراهيم هذا[٧] أنكر من هذا الحديث لأنّه لا يرويه غيره. قال البخاريّ: إبراهيم بن مهاجر ضعيف منكر الحديث. وأمّا عمر بن حفص فقال أحمد بن حنبل: حرقنا[٨] حديثه. وقال يحيى بن معين: ليس

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[١] دفع، ص ٦٠: «عفان»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٢ظ.

[٢] دفع، ص٦٠: «فضيلة»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٢ظ.

[٣] كتاب الموضوعات، ج١، ص١١٠: «عام.»

[٤] لا يوجد «القران» في دفع، ص٦١.

[٥] دفع، ص٦١: «قالوا.»

[٦] إحياء علوم الدين، ج١، ص٢٧٣: «لألسنة تنطق بهذا»؛ دفع، ص٦١: «لألسن تتكلم به»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٢ظ.

[٧] كتاب الموضوعات، ج١، ص١١٠: «لم أجد لإبراهيم حديثا.»

[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط؛ دفع، ص٦١: «حرقت»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٢ ظ: «حرقنا»؛ فكذلك في كتاب الضعفاء، ج٢،ص٢٠٦؛ تأريخ بغداد، ج١١، ص١٩٣: «تركنا حديثه وخرقناه.»

مقام خطر على ما سبق بيانه. المرتبة الثالثة القول بمقتضى[١] الحسّ، وقد عمّ جهلة الناقلين إذ ليس لهم حظّ من علم[٢] المعقولات التي بها يُعرف ما يجوز على اللّه وما يستحيل، فإنّ علم المعقولات يصرف[٣] ظواهر المنقولات عن التشبيه. فإذا عدموها تصرّفوا[٤] في النقل بمقتضى الحسّ. وإليه أشار القاضي بقوله: لا يمتنع أن يحمل[٥] الوطأة التي وطئها[٦] الحقّ على أصولنا وأنّه معنى يتعلّق بالذات. وأصولهم على زعمه ترجع إلى الحسّ. ولو فهموا أنّ اللّه تعالى لا يُوصف بحركة ولا انتقال ولا تغيّر ما بنوا على الحسّيّات.

١٦٨ والعجب أنّه يقرّ[٧] بهذا الذي يقول ثمّ يقول:[٨] من غير نقلة[٩] ولا حركة. فنقض ما بناه.[١٠] ومن أعجب ما رأيت لهم ما أنبأنا أبو العزّ[١١] بن كادش[١٢] قال: أنبأنا أبو طالب العشاريّ قال: أنبأنا البنّاء قال: أنبأنا أبو الفتح بن أبي الفوارس قال: أنبأنا أبو عليّ بن الصوّاف قال أنبأنا أبو جعفر محمّد بن عثمان بن أبي شيبة أنّه قال في كتاب العرش: إنّ اللّه عزّ وجلّ قد أخبرنا أنّه صار من الأرض إلى السماء ومن السماء إلى العرش فاستوى على العرش. قلت: ونحن نحمد اللّه إذ لم يبخس حظّنا من المنقولات ولا من المعقولات ونبرأ من أقوام شانوا مذهبنا فعابنا الناس بكلامهم.

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[١] دفع، ص٥٨: «القول فيها بمقتضى»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٢و.

[٢] دفع، ص٥٨: «علوم»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٢و.

[٣] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[٤] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

[٥] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٦] دفع، ص٥٨: «يحمل التي وطئها»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٢و.

[٧] الأصل: بدون نطق؛ قارن دفع، ص٥٩، والباز الأشهب، ٣٢و.

[٨] دفع، ص٥٩: «والعجب انه يقر بهذا القول ثم يقول»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٢ظ.

[٩] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١٠] دفع، ص٥٩: «فينقض ما بنى»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٢ظ.

[١١] الأصل: «عبد العزيز». انظر حاشية إلى الترجمة

[١٢] الأصل: «كادس.»

وقال سفيان بن عيينة في تفسير هذا الحديث: آخر غزاة غَزاها رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم الطائف.

١٦٦ قال القاضي: غير ممتنع[١] على أصولنا حمل هذا الخبر على ظاهره وإنّ ذلك معنى يتعلّق بالذات دون الفعل[٢] لأنّا حملنا قوله: «ينزل ويضع قدمه في النار» على الذات. قلت: وهذا الرجل يشير بأصولهم إلى ما يوجب التجسيم والانتقال[٣] والحركة، وهذا مع التشبيه بعيد عن اللغة ومعرفة التواريخ وأدلّة العقول، وإنّما اغترّ بحديث رُوي عن كعب أنّه قال: «ووجّ مقدّس منه عرج الربّ إلى السماء يوم قضى خلق الأرض». وهذا لو صحّ عن كعب احتمل أن يكون حاكيًا له[٤] عن أهل الكتاب وقد كان يحكي عنهم كثيراً. ولو قدّرناه من قوله كان معناه أنّ ذلك المكان آخر ما استوى من الأرض لمّا خُلقت ثمّ عرج الربّ، أي عمد إلى خلق السماء وهو قوله تعالى ﴿ ثُمَّ اسْتَوَى إِلَى السَمَاءِ وَهِيَ دُخَانٌ ﴾ ويُروى عن أبي هريرة أنّ النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «لمّا أُسري بي مرّ بي جبرئيل حتّى أتى بي إلى صخرة بيت المقدّس فقال: منْ[٥] هاهنا عرج ربّك إلى السماء.» قلت: وهذا حديث يرويه بكر بن زياد وكان يضع الحديث على الثقات. فإن قيل: قال ابن عبّاس: «استوى إلى السماء» أي صعد، قلنا: [صعد] أمره إذ لايجوز عليه النقلة والتغيّر.

١٦٧ واعلم أنّ الناس في أخبار الصفات على ثلاث [33b] مراتب، أحدها إمرارها على ما جاءت من غير تفسير ولا تأويل إلا أن تقع ضرورة كقوله تعالى: ﴿وَجَاءَ رَبُّكَ﴾، أي جاء أمره، وهذا مذهب السلف. والمرتبة الثانية التأويل وهو

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٣] الأصل: النون والتاء غير منقوطتين.

[٤] دفع، ص٥٦: «حاكيا عن»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٢ظ.

[٥] دفع، ص٥٧: «يا محمد من.»

الحديث الثلاثون

١٦١ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث عائشة رضى اللّه عنها أنّ النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم دخل عليها وعندها امرأة. فقال: «من هذه؟ قالت: فلانة، تذكر من صلاتها. قال: مه عليكم ما تطيقون.[1] فواللّه ما يملّ اللّه حتّى تملّوا. وفي لفظ لا يسأم اللّه حتّى تسأموا.»

١٦٢ قال العلماء: معنى الحديث لا يملّ أبداً وإن مللتم. وهو قول ابن قتيبة والخطّابيّ، ولا يختلف في ذلك أهل اللغة. وقال قوم: من ملّ من شيء تركه، والمعنى لا يترك الثواب ما لم تتركوا العمل. فأمّا الملل الذي هو كراهية النفس[2] والاستثقال ونفور[3] النفس عنه والسآمة منه فمحال في حقّه لأنّه [يقتضي] تغيّره، وحلول الحوادث في حقّه محال.[4]

١٦٣ وقال القاضي: لا يمتنع إطلاق الملل عليه لا معنى السآمة. قلت: وهذا بعيد عن معرفة اللغة وما يجوز عليه وما لا يجوز عليه، ومن لفظ السآمة التي مُنع منها.

الحديث الحادي والثلاثون

١٦٤ روت خولة بنت حكيم عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «آخر وطأة وطئها الرحمان بوجّ.»

١٦٥ ووجّ واد بالطائف وهي آخر [33a] وقعة أوقعها اللّه بالمشركين على يد رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم، ومنه قوله صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: «اللهمّ اشدد وطأتك على مضر». ومأخوذ من القدم وإلى هذا ذهب ابن قتيبة وغيره.

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[1] الأصل: التاء والياء غير منقوطتين.

[2] دفع، ص٥٥: «كراهة الشيء»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣١ظ.

[3] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[4] دفع، ص ٥٦: «فمحال في حقه تعالى لأنه يقتضي تغيره وحلول الحوادث في حقه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣١ظ. قارن كتاب المشكل لابن فورك، ص ٢٧٢.

الحديث الثامن والعشرون

١٥٧ روى [أبو] الأحوص الجشميّ [1] [عن أبيه قال:] إنّ رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال له: «لعلّك تأخذ موساك فتقطع أذن بعضها؟ وتقول: هذه بحيرة وتشقّ أذن أخرى[2] وتقول: هذه صريمة؟[3] قال: نعم. قال: لا تفعل فإنّ موسى اللّه أحدّ من موساك وساعد اللّه أشدّ من ساعدك».

١٥٨ قال القاضي: لا يمتنع حمل الخبر على ظاهره في إثبات الساعد صفة لذاته. قلت: إثبات صفة للّه بهذا الخبر الذي لا يكاد يثبت - مع الإعراض عن فهم خطاب[4] العرب وإنّها تريد تمثّل[5] هذا التجوّز والاستعارة وإنّ المراد بالساعد القوّة لأنّ قوّة الإنسان في ساعده - غفلة عامّيّة وخروج عن مقتضى الفهم. وكان ينبغي أن يثبت الموسى أيضًا.

الحديث التاسع والعشرون

١٥٩ [32b] روى أبو هريرة عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «إنّ العبد إذا قام في الصلاة[6] فإنّه بين عيني الرحمن.»

١٦٠ قلت: قد ذكرنا صفة العين في الآيات المذكورة قبل الأحاديث،[7] والمراد بالحديث أنّ اللّه تعالى يشاهد المصلّي فليتأدّب. وكذلك قوله صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: فإنّ اللّه قبل وجهه، أي أنّه يراه.

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[1] الأصل: «الجمحي»؛ قارن اللباب لابن الأثير، ج١، ص٢٨٠.
[2] دفع، ص٥٤: «الأخرى»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣١ظ.
[3] الأصل: «صرم»؛ قارن لسان العرب، ج٤، ص٤٤.
[4] الأصل: «حطاب.»
[5] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[6] دفع، ص، ٥٥: «الى الصلاة»؛ فكذلك في كتاب المشكل لابن فورك، ص ٢٥٨.
[7] في هامش الأصل: «الاحاديث» متبوع بـ«صح.»

وليس للذات وصف يُقال له نور. فإن قيل: كيف أنكر حميد على ثابت؟ قلنا: يحتمل أن يكون توهّم[١] أنّ هذا يرجع إلى الصفات.

١٥٤ وقد أثبت القاضي للّه سبحانه خنصراً بهذا الحديث المعلول. [32a] وقد ذكرنا أنّ ذلك يرجع إلى رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم.

الحديث السابع[٢] والعشرون

١٥٥ روى القاضي عن عكرمة أنّه قال: «إذا أراد اللّه عزّ وجلّ أن يخوّف عباده أبدى عن بعضه إلى الأرض فعند ذلك تزلزل[٣] وإذا أراد[٤] أن يدمدم على قوم تجلّى[٥] لها.»[٦]

١٥٦ قال القاضي: «أبدى عن بعضه» هو على ظاهره وهو راجع إلى الذات على وجه لا يفضي إلى التبعيض. قلت: ومن يقول: أبدى عن بعض ذاته وما هو بعض لا يكلّم. ثمّ إثبات البعضيّة بكلام تابعيّ لو صحّ يخالف إجماع المسلمين فإنّهم أجمعوا أنّ الخالق لا يتبعّض، وإنّما أراد[٧] أبدى بعض آياته.[٨]

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[١٠] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.
[١١] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.
[١٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٢] الأصل: «الثامن» ولكنّ «الثامن» مشطوبة و«السابع» مكتوبة علي رأس الصفحة.
[٣] دفع، ص٥٤: «تتزلزل.»
[٤] دفع، ص٥٤: «واذا اراد الله ان»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣١ظ: «واذا اراد ان.»
[٥] الأصل: بدون نطق.
[٦] دفع، ص٥٤: «لهم»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣١ظ.
[٧] دفع، ص٥٤: «وانما المراد»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣١ظ.
[٨] دفع، ص٥٤: «أبدى عن آياته.»

الحديث السادس والعشرون

١٥١ رواه أحمد في مسنده من حديث أنس عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم في قوله تعالى ﴿فَلَمَّا تَجَلَّى رَبُّهُ [لِلجَبَلِ جَعَلَهُ دَكًّا]﴾ قال هكذا، يعني أنّه أخرج طرف الخنصر. فقال حميد الطويل لثابت: ما تريد إلى هذا يا أبا محمّد؟ قال: فضرب صدره ضربة شديدة فقال: من أنت يا حميد وما أنت يا حميد؟ فحدّثني به أنس بن مالك عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم تقول أنت: ما تريد إليه؟ وفي لفظ ﴿فَلَمَّا تَجَلَّى رَبُّهُ لِلجَبَلِ﴾ قال: وأومأ بخنصره، قال: فساخ. وروى ابن حامد ﴿فَلَمَّا تَجَلَّى رَبُّهُ﴾ قال: خرّج منه أوّل مفصل من خنصره.

١٥٢ قلت: قد تكلّم [فيه] علماء الحديث وقالوا: لم يروه عن ثابت[١] غير حمّاد بن سلمة، وكان ابن أبي العوجاء[٢] الزنديق قد أدخل على حمّاد أشياء فرواها في آخر عمره. ولذلك تجافى[٣] بعض أصحاب الحديث الصحيح عنه الحديث.[٤] ومخرّج[٥] الحديث سهل وذلك أنّ النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم كان يقرب[٦] إلى الإفهام بذكر الحسّيّات فوضع يده على خنصره إشارةً إلى أنّ اللّه تعالى أظهر اليسير[٧] من آياته.

١٥٣ وقال ابن عقيل: كشف من أنواره[٨] التي يملكها بقدر طرف الخنصر وهذا تقدير[٩] لنا بحسب ما نفهم[١٠] من القلّة، لا نحكم[١١] أنّه يتقدّر[١٢] ما منه

[١] الأصل: «ثابت عن غير.»
[٢] الأصل: «العوحا.»
[٣] الأصل: «تحافى.»
[٤] دفع، ص٥٤: «بعض أصحاب الصحيح الاخراج عنه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣١و.
[٥] الأصل: «محرح.»
[٦] دفع، ص ٥٤: «يقربه»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣١و: «يقرب.»
[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٩] الأصل: بدون نقط.

المتكبّرون؟ ثمّ يطوي الأرض بشماله ثمّ يقول: أنا الملك، أين الجبّارون؟ أين المتكبّرون؟ » هذا في رواية مسلم وهي أتمّ[١] الروايات وفي لفظ أخرجه مسلم من حديث عبيد اللّه بن مقسم أنّه نظر إلى عبد اللّه بن عمر كيف يحكي رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «يأخذ اللّه عزّ وجلّ سمواته وأرضه[٢] بيديه فيقول: أنا اللّه - ويقبض أصابعه ويبسطها - أنا الملك».

١٤٨ قلت: قد ثبت بالدليل القاطع أنّ يد الحقّ سبحانه ليست جارحة وأنّ قبضه للأشياء ليس بمباشرة ولا في كفّ.[٣] وإنّما قرّب رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم إلى الإفهام ما يدركه الحسّ. فقبض رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أصابعه وبسطها فوقوع الشبه بين القبضتين من حيث[٤] ملكه المقبوض كما وقع الشبه في رؤية الحقّ سبحانه برؤية القمر في إيضاح الرؤية لا في تشبيه المرئي.

١٤٩ فأمّا لفظ «الشمال» فهي في رواية مسلم وهي ممّا انفرد به عمر بن حمزة عن سالم عن ابن عمر. وقد روى الحديث نافع وغيره عن ابن عمر فلم يذكروا لفظة الشمال. ورواه أبو هريرة وغيره عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم فلم يذكر أحد منهم فيه الشمال. وقد رُوي ذكر الشمال في حديث آخر في غير هذه القصّة إلا أنّه ضعيف ممرّه،[٥] و رواه بعض المتروكين. وقد صحّ عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «وكلتا يديه يمين». وهذا يوهّن ذكر الشمال. وقال أبو بكر البيهقيّ: وكان الذي ذكر الشمال، رواه على العادة في أنّ الشمال يقابل[٦] اليمين.

١٥٠ وقال القاضي: [31b] غير مستحيل إضافة القبض والبسط إلى ذاته. قلت: وقد سبق إنكار هذا.

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] مسلم، ٢٥/٥٠: «أرضيه.»

[٣] دفع، ص٥٣: «ولا له كف»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣١و.

[٤] الأصل: غير واحضة.

[٥] كتاب الأسماء للبيهقيّ، ص٣٢٤: «ضعيف بمرّة.»

[٦] الأصل: بدون نقط.

الحبر» ظنّ وحسبان. ولا يجوز أن نبني على ظنّ الراوي صفة اللّه سبحانه. وظاهر «ضحك رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم» الإنكار واليهود مشبّهة، ونزول الآية دليل على إنكار رسول صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم.

١٤٥ وقال ابن عقيل: «وَمَا قَدَرُوا اللّهَ حقَّ قَدْرِهِ» حيث جعلوا صفاته تتساعد وتتعاضد على حمل مخلوقاته، وإنّما ذكر الشرك في الآية ردّاً عليهم. وفي معنى هذا الحديث قوله عليه الصلاة والسلام: «إنّ قلوب بني آدم بين إصبعين من أصابع الرحمن، يقلّبها كيف يشاء». ولمّا كان المقلِّب[١] بين إصبعين دليلاً[٢] مقهوراً دلّ بهذا[٣] على أنّ القلوب مقهورة لمقلِّبها.

١٤٦ وقال القاضي: غير ممتنع حمل الخبر على ظاهره في إثبات الأصابع صفات راجعة إلى الذات لأنّا لا نثبت أصابع هي جارحة ولا أبعاض. قلت: وهذا كلام مختلط[٤] لأنّا إمّا أن نثبت[٥] جوارح وإمّا أن نتأوّلها.[٦] فأمّا حملها على ظاهرها فظاهرها الجوارح. ثمّ يقول: ليست أبعاضًا. فهذا كلام قائم قاعد ويضيع الخطاب لمن يقول هذا.

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١٤٧ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث ابن عمر عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «يطوي اللّه عزّ وجلّ السموات يوم القيامة [31a] بيده[٧] ثمّ يأخذهنّ بيده[٨] [اليمنى] ثمّ يقول: أنا الملك، أين الجبّارون؟ أين

[١٠] الأصل: «تصديقا لقول الرواة فقول» ولكنّ «لقول الرواة» مشطوبة للناسخ.

[١] دفع، ص٥٢: «القلب»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣١و.

[٢] الأصل: «دليلا»؛ دفع، ص٥٢: «ذليلا»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣١و.

[٣] دفع، ص٥٢: «هذا.»

[٤] دفع، ص٥٢: «مخبط»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣١و.

[٥] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة؛ دفع، ص٥٢: «يثبت».

[٦] دفع، ص٥٢: «يتأولها.»

[٧] سقط في دفع (ص٥٢): «بيده.»

[٨] مسلم، ٢٤/٥٠: «بيده اليمنى»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٥٢.

رجل من اليهود[١] إلى رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم فقال: يا محمّد إنّ اللّه يضع السماء على إصبع والأرضين[٢] على إصبع والجبال على إصبع، والشجر والأنهار[٣] على إصبع والخلق على إصبع، وفي لفظ الماء والثرى على إصبع، ثمّ[٤] يهزّهنّ. فضحك رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم، قال: ﴿وَمَا قَدَرُوا[٥] اللّهَ حقَّ قَدْرِهِ﴾. وفي بعض الألفاظ: فضحك رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم تعجّبًا وتصديقًا له.[٦]

١٤٤ قال أبو سليمان الخطّابيّ: لا تثبت[٧] للّه صفة إلا بالكتاب أو خبر[٨] مقطوع له بصحّته يستند إلى أصل في الكتاب أو في السنّة المقطوع على صحّتها،[٩] وما كان بخلاف ذلك فالواجب التوقّف عن إطلاق ذلك ويُتأوّل على ما يليق بمعاني الأصول المتّفق[١٠] عليها من أقوال أهل العلم مع نفي[١١] التشبيه. قال: وذكر الأصابع لم يُوجد في الكتاب ولا في السنّة التي شرطها في الثبوت ما وصفنا. فليس معنى اليد في الصفات معنى اليد[١٢] حتّى يُتوهّم ثبوتها ثبوت الأصابع، بل هو توقيف [30b] شرعي أطلقنا[١٣] الاسم فيه على ما جاء به الكتاب من غير تكييف ولا تشبيه. قال: وقد روى هذا الحديث غير واحد من أصحاب ابن مسعود[١٤] لم يذكروا فيه «تصديقًا». فقول[١٥] من قال من الرواة «تصديقًا لقول

[١] في هامش الأصل: «من اليهود» بيد أخرى؛ دفع، ص٥١: «جاء حبر الى.»
[٢] دفع، ص٥١: «الله يمسك السموات يوم القيامة على إصبع والارضين.»
[٣] في هامش الأصل: «الانهار» بالناسك.
[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٥] الأصل: «قدر.»
[٦] مسلم، ١٩/٥٠: «تعجّبًا ممّا قال الحبر تصديقًا له.»
[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٩] كتاب الأسماء للبيهقيّ، ص ٣٣٥: «السنة المقطوع بصحتها.»
[١٠] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[١١] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[١٢] كتاب الأسماء، ص٣٣٦: «بمعنى الجارحة.»
[١٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[١٤] كتاب الأسماء، ص٣٣٧: «عبد اللّه من غير طريق عبيدة».

١٤١ قال المصنّف: قوله «في رمال الكافور»[١] إشارة إلى الحاضرين فهم[٢] في رمال الكافور و«أقربهم منه» أحظاهم[٣] عنده. وفي حديث آخر عن رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلّم: «المقسطون يوم القيامة على منابر من نور عن يمين الرحمن.»[٤] وفي حديث سوق الجنّة «ولا يبقى في ذلك المجلس أحد إلا حاضَره [30a] الرحمن محاضرة». وقد رواه أبو بكر البيهقيّ: إلا خاصره[٥] الرحمن مخاصرة بالخاء[٦] المعجمة. وقال: وهذا يرويه سيف بن عبد الله عن سلمة بن العيّار، ولم يُذكر في الصحاح، ومثل هذا لا يثبت برواية هؤلاء. قال: والمخاصرة[٧] بالخاء[٨] المصافحة.

١٤٢ وقال القاضي: لا يمتنع أن يكون الحقّ في رمال الكافور. قلت: فقد أقرّ بالحصر. ثمّ قال: لا على وجه الانتقال.[٩] وهذا تلاعب. ثمّ قال: ولا يمتنع قربهم من الذات. وهذا يضيع معه الحديث ولذلك قال في قوله:[١٠] «ما منكم من أحد إلا سيخلو[١١] به ربّه». قال: الخلوة عبارة عن القرب ويجوز القرب من الذات. وقد سبق ردّ هذا.

الحديث الرابع والعشرون

١٤٣ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث ابن مسعود قال: جاء

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[١] في هامش الأصل: «واقربهم منه...قوله في رمال الكافور» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[٢] دفع، ص٥١: «الحاضرين ثم في»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٠ظ: «الحاضرين هم في.»

[٣] الأصل: «احطى عنده.»

[٤] يضمّ دفع (ص٥١) «وقال بعضهم يمين العرش» إلى النصّ؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٠ظ.

[٥] في هامش الأصل: «محاضرة وقد رواه البيهقي الا خاصره» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[٦] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٧] الأصل: «المحاضرة».

[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٩] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١٠] دفع، ص٥١: «معه الحديث واستدل بقوله.»

[١١] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

١٣٨ وأمّا السبحات فجمع سُبْحة. قال أبو عبيد: لم نسمع[١] هذا الحرف إلا في هذا الحديث. قال: ويُقال:[٢] إنّ السبحة جلال وجهه، ومنه قوله «سبحان اللّه» وإنّما هو تعظيم له وتنزيه. وقال ابن خزيمة: باب ضوء وجه ربّنا.[٣] ثمّ[٤] ذكر حديث السبحات متوهّمًا النور المعروف، والخالق منزّه عن النور الجسماني. وروى أبو بكر الخلال في كتاب السنّة، قال: سألت[٥] أحمد بن يحيى عن قوله: «لأحرقت سبحات وجهه»، فقال: السبحات الموضع الذي يُسجد عليه. قلت: فعلى هذا يكون الخطاب[٦] بما يعرفون كما قال: قلوب[٧] العباد بين إصبعين.

١٣٩ وقال ابن حامد: يجب الإيمان بأنّ للّه حجابًا وهو من وراء ذلك. وقال القاضي: لا يُمنع إطلاق [حجاب][٨] من دون اللّه لا على وجه الحدّ والمحاذاة. قلت: وهذا كلام مختلط يرضي[٩] العوامّ.

الحديث الثالث والعشرون

١٤٠ روى ابن عبّاس عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «أهل الجنّة يرون ربّهم تعالى في كلّ جمعة[١٠] في رمال الكافور وأقربهم منه مجلسًا أسرعهم إليه يوم الجمعة.»[١١]

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] الأصل: «يقول.»

[٣] في كتاب التوحيد لابن خزيكة، ص١٩، اسم الباب: «باب ذكر صورة ربنا».

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] الأصل: «سئلت.»

[٦] الأصل: «الحطاب.»

[٧] الأصل: القاف غير منقوطة.

[٨] قارن دفع، ص٥٠.

[٩] دفع، ص٥٠: «يرضى به»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٠ظ.

[١٠] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١١] يضمّ الآجرّيّ (في [كتاب]الشريعة،ص٢٦٥): «وأبكرهم غدوا» إلى النصّ.

عن أحمد ذلك وهو كذب عليه. ولو كان النزول صفة[١] كانت صفته كلّ يوم[٢] تتجدّد وصفاته قديمة.[٣]

الحديث الثاني والعشرون

١٣٦ روى مسلم في أفراده من حديث أبي موسى قال: قام فينا رسول اللّه[٤] بخمس كلمات، فقال: «إنّ اللّه لا ينام ولا ينبغي له أن ينام. يخفض القسط ويرفعه. حجابه النور - وفي رواية [أبي بكر بن أبي شيبة][٥] النار - لو كشفه لأحرقت سُبُحاتُ وجهه ما انتهى إليه بصرُه من خلقه».

١٣٧ قلت: معنى «يخفض القسط ويرفعه»، أي يخفض بعدل ويرفع بعدل. وقوله «حجابه النور» ينبغي أن يُعلم أنّ هذا الحجاب للخلق عنه لأنّه لا يجوز أن يكون محجوبًا لأن[٦] يكون أكبر ممّا يستره ويستحيل أن يكون جسمًا أو جوهراً أو متناهيًا محاذيًا[٧] إذ جميع ذلك من إمارات الحدث وإنّما عرف الناس حدوث الأجسام من حديث وجودها متناهية محدودة محلاً للحوادث وكما أنّه لا يجوز أن يكون لوجوده [29b] ابتداء ولا انتهاء ولا يصحّ أن يكون لذاته نهاية. وإنّما المراد أنّ الخلق محجوبون عنه.[٨] وقد روى سهل بن سعد عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «دون اللّه سبعون ألف حجاب من نور وظلمة». قلت: وهذا حديث لا يصحّ ولو كان صحيحًا كانت الحجب للخلق لا للحقّ.

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[١] دفع، ص٤٧-٤٨: «صفة ذاتية لذاته»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٠و: «صفة لذاته».

[٢] دفع، ص٤٨: «كل ليلة»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٠و

[٣] دفع، ص٤٨: «صفاته قديمة كذاته.»

[٤] في هامش الأصل: «من حديث...رسول اللّه» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[٥] قارن مسلم، ١/٢٩٣.

[٦] دفع، ص٥٠: «لان الحجاب يكون»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٠ظ.

[٧] الأصل: «مجادبا.»

[٨] يضيف دفع (ص٥٠) «كما قال تعالى: كلا انهم عن ربهم يومئذ لمحجوبون» إلى النصّ.

﴿وَأَنْزَلْنَا الحَدِيدَ﴾ وإن كان معدنه في الأرض. وقال: ﴿وأَنْزَلَ[١] لَكُمْ مِنْ الأَنْعَامِ ثَمَانِيَةَ أَزْوَاجٍ﴾، ومن لم يعرف نزول الجمل كيف يتكلّم في تفصيل هذه الجمل؟[٢] والثاني الساكت عن الكلام في ذلك.[٣] روى أبو عيسى الترمذيّ عن مالك بن أنس وسفيان بن عيينة وابن المبارك أنّهم قالوا: أمرّوا هذه الأحاديث بلا كيف.

١٣٤ قلت: وواجب على الخلق اعتقاد التنزيه وامتناع تجويز النقلة وإنّ النزول الذي هو انتقال من مكان إلى مكان يفتقر إلى ثلاثة أقسام:[٤] جسم عال هو مكان لساكنه، [29a] وجسم سافل، وجسم ينتقل[٥] من علوّ إلى سفل. وهذا لا يجوز على اللّه قطعًا. فإن قال العامّي: فما الذي أراد بالنزول؟ قيل: أراد به معنى يليق بجلاله،[٦] لا يلزمك التفتيش عنه. فإن قال: كيف حُذف[٧] بما لا أفهمه؟ قلنا: قد علمت أنّ النازل إليك قريب منك فاقتنع بالقرب ولا تظنّه كقرب الأجسام!

١٣٥ قال ابن حامد: هو على العرش بذاته مماسّ له وينزل من مكانه الذي هو فيه فينزل[٨] وينتقل.[٩] قلت: وهذا رجل لا يعرف ما يجوز على اللّه تعالى. وقال القاضي: النزول صفة ذاتيّة ولا ينزل[١٠] نزول انتقال. قلت: وهذا مغالطة.[١١] ومنهم من قال: يتحرّك [إذا نزل]،[١٢] ولا يدري أنّ الحركة لا تجوز على الخالق. وقد حكوا

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[١] دفع، ص٤٦: «برحمته»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩ظ.
[١] الأصل: «أنزلنا.»
[٢] دفع، ص٤٧: «يتكلم في الجمل»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩ظ.
[٣] دفع، ص٤٧: «في ذلك مع اعتقاد التنزيه.»
[٤] دفع، ص٤٧: «أجسام»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩ظ.
[٥] دفع، ص٤٧: «وجسم منتقل»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩ظ.
[٦] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٧] الأصل: «حدف»؛ الباز الأشهب (بيروت، ١٩٨٧)، ٩٧: «حدّث.»
[٨] الأصل: «فنزول»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٠و: «وينزل».
[٩] دفع، ص٤٧: «وهو فيه وينتقل.»
[١٠] دفع، ص٤٧: «لا نقول نزوله انتقال»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٠و.
[١١] دفع، ص٤٧: «مغالط»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٠و.
[١٢] دفع، ص٤٧: «يتحرّك اذا نزل»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٠و

حجر المغناطيس يجذب الحديد ولم يكن رآه قبل[١] ذلك عجب. والبارئ سبحانه لا يغرب عن علمه شيء فأين العجب منه؟ فلم يبق للحديث معنى إلا أن يكون فعل شيء أعجبه فعله وكذلك الضحك لا يصدر [28b] إلا عن راض، وكذلك قوله صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: «للّه أفرح بتوبة عبده»، أي رضي، ومنه قوله تعالى ﴿كُلُّ حِزْبٍ بِمَا لَدَيْهِمْ فَرِحُونَ﴾ أي راضون.

١٣٠. وقال القاضي: لا نثبت[٢] عجبًا هو تعظيم الأمر، بل نثبت ذلك صفة. [قلت:] وهذا ليس بشيء.

الحديث العشرون

١٣١ قد اندرج في الذي قبله.

الحديث الحادي والعشرون

١٣٢ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث أبي هريرة عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «ينزل ربّنا كلّ ليلة إلى السماء الدنيا حين يبقى ثلث الليل الأخير[٣] فيقول: من يدعوني فأستجيب له.»[٤]

١٣٣ قلت: قد روى حديث النزول عشرون نفسًا من الصحابة[٥] وقد سبق القول بأنّه[٦] يستحيل على اللّه الحركة والنقلة والتغيّر. فبقي[٧] الناس رجلين، أحدهما التأوّل له بمعنى[٨] [أنّه] يقرب رحمته[٩] وقد ذكر أشياء بالنزول. فقال تعالى:

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[١] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة.

[٢] الأصل: «يثبت.»

[٣] مسلم، ١٦٨/٦: «الآخر»؛ فكذلك في البخاريّ، ١٤/١٩.

[٤] يضمّ مسلم (١٦٨/٦) «ومن يسألني فأعطيه ومن يستغفرني فأغفر له» إلى النصّ. فكذلك في البخاريّ، ١٤/١٩.

[٥] دفع، ص٤٦: «عشرون صحابيا»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩ظ.

[٦] دفع، ص٤٦: «القول انه.»

[٧] دفع، ص٤٦: «فيبقى.»

[٨] دفع، ص٤٦: «المتأول بمعنى»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩ظ.

عندك شيء؟ قالت: لا إلا قوت صبياني. قال: فعلّليهم بشيء. فإذا أرادوا[١] الصبية العشاء فنوّميهم فإذا دخل ضيفنا[٢] فأطفئ السراج وأريه أنّا نأكل. فقعدا[٣] فأكل الضيف. فلمّا أصبح غدا على رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم فقال له: لقد عجب اللّه من صنيعكما بضيفكما الليلة.»

١٢٧ وفي أفراد البخاريّ من حديث أبى هريرة عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: عجب ربّكم من قوم جيء[٤] بهم في السلاسل حتّى يدخلهم الجنّة.

١٢٨ قال العلماء: العجب إنّما يكون من شيء يدهم الانسان[٥] فيستعظمه بما لا يعلم. وذلك[٦] لا يليق بالخالق لكنّ معناه عظم قدر ذلك الشيء عند اللّه لأنّ[٧] المتعجّب من الشيء يعظم قدره عنده. ومعنى في السلاسل[٨] أكرهوا على الطاعة التي بها يدخلون الجنّة. وقال ابن الأنباريّ: معنى «عجب ربّك» زادهم إنعامًا وإحسانًا. فعبّر[٩] بعجب عن هذا.[١٠]

١٢٩ وقال ابن عقيل: العجب في الأصل استغراب الشيء وذلك يكون من علم ما لم يعلم وألا فكلّ شيء أنس به لا يتصوّر العجب منه فإنّ الإنسان إذا رأى

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[١] دفع، ص٤٩: «أراد.»

[٢] الأصل: «طيفنا»؛ دفع، ص٤٩: «ضيفنا»؛ الصحيح لمسلم، ١٧٢/٣٦: «ضيفنا.»

[٣] الصحيح لمسلم، ١٧٢/٣٦: «فقعدوا»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٤٩، والباز الأشهب، ٣٠و.

[٤] البخاري، ١٤٤/٥٦: «من قوم يدخلون الجنّة في السلاسل»؛ دفع، ص٤٩: «جر بهم»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٠و: «جيء بهم.»

[٥] دفع، ص٤٩: «الانسان مما لا يعلمه فيستعظمه»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٠و: «الانسان فيستعظمه مما لا يعلمه».

[٦] دفع، ص٤٩: «وهو.»

[٧] الأصل: «ان.»

[٨] دفع، ص٤٩: «معنى السلاسل»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٣٠و.

[٩] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١٠] دفع، ص٤٩: «فعبر في الحديث بالعجب عن ذلك.»

١٢٥ قلت: هذا حديث تفرّد [به] يعلى[١] بن عطاء عن وكيع بن حدس[٢] وليس لوكيع راوٍ غير يعلى. والعماء السحاب. واعلم أنّ الفوق والتحت يرجعان إلى السحاب لا إلى الخالق سبحانه و«في» معنى فوق. فالمعنى كان فوق السحاب بالتدبير والقهر. ولمّا كان القوم يأنسون بالمخلوقات، سألوا عنها، والسحاب من جملة خلقه ولو سُئل عمّا كان قبل السحاب لأخبر أنّ اللّه تعالى كان ولا شيء معه. وكذلك عمران بن حصين عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «كان اللّه ولا شيء معه.»[٣] وقال أبو الحسين بن المنادي، ونقلته[٤] من خطّه: وصفُ الهواء[٥] بالفوقيّة والتحتيّة مكروه عند أهل العلم لما في ذلك من الاحتواء والجعل كالوعاء لمن ليس كالأشياء جلّ وتعالى. قال: ولسنا نختلف أنّ الجبّار لا يعلوه شيء من خلقه بحال وأنّه لا يحلّ في الأشياء بنفسه ولا يزول عنها لأنّه لو حلّ بها كان منها ولو زال عنها لنأى عنها. واتّفاقنا على هذا أكثر من هذا الخبر على المعنى المكروه، والتأويل المأمون.

الحديث التاسع عشر

١٢٦ [28a] روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث أبي هريرة أنّ رجلاً جاء إلى رسول[٦] اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم فقال: إنّي مجهود. فقال: «من يضيف هذا[٧] الليلة؟ فقام رجل من الأنصار فقال: أنا، فانطلق به.[٨] فقال لامرأته: هل

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[١] الأصل: «ابو علي بن عطاء.»

[٢] الأصل: «عويس.»

[٣] في هامش الأصل: «وكذلك عمران...ولا شيء معه» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] الأصل: «الهوى.»

[٦] دفع، ص ٤٨: «رجلا أتى النبي»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٣٠و: «رجلا أتى الى رسول الله.»

[٧] دفع، ص ٤٨: «يضيفه هذه الليلة.»

[٨] الصحيح لمسلم، ١٧٢/٣٦: «فانطلق به إلى رحله»؛ دفع، ص٤٨: «فانطلق به الى امرأته.»

عليه وسلّم: «[إنّه] ليدنو به يوم عرفة»، أي يقرب بلطفه وعفوه.

الحديث السابع عشر

١٢٢ روى مسلم في أفراده من حديث معاوية بن الحكم قال: «كانت لي جارية ترعى غنمًا لي[١] فانطلقت[٢] ذات يوم فإذا الذئب قد ذهب بشاة[٣] وأنا من بني آدم آسفُ كما يأسفون لكن صككتها[٤] صكّة. فأتيت النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم فعظّم ذلك عليّ. فقلت: أَوَلا أعتقها؟ فقال: ائتني بها. فجئته بها. فقال لها: أين اللّه؟ قالت: في السماء. قال: من أنا؟ قالت: رسول اللّه. قال: أعتقها فإنّها مؤمنة.»

١٢٣ قلت: قد ذكرنا في ما تقدّم أنّ همّة الشارع كانت في إثبات الوجود فذكر لهم ما يأنسون به وأقرّهم على ما يوجبه إثبات وقنع[٥] منهم [27b] بالجمل[٦] إذ تفصيل[٧] ذلك يخبط الجهّال. وقد ثبت عند العلماء أنّ اللّه تعالى لا تحويه السماء ولا الأرض ولا تضمّه الأقطار، وإنّما عُرف بإشارتها تعظيم الخالق عندها.

الحديث الثامن عشر

١٢٤ رواه أبو رَزين قال: قلت: يا رسول اللّه أين كان ربّنا قبل أن يخلق خلقه؟ قال: «كان في عماء، ما تحته هواء وما فوقه هواء. ثمّ خلق عرشه على الماء.»

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[١] الصحيح لمسلم، ٥/٣٣: «قبل أحد والجوّانيّة.»

[٢] الصحيح لمسلم، ٥/٣٣: «فاطّلعت.»

[٣] الصحيح لمسلم، ٥/٣٣: «بشاة من غنمها.»

[٤] دفع، ص٤٥: «بشاة فصككتها.»

[٥] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٦] الأصل: «بالحمل.»

[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.

الحديث الخامس عشر

١١٧ رواه القاضي عن عبد اللّه بن عمر[١] موقوفًا أنّه قال: «خلق اللّه الملائكة من نور الذراعين والصدر».

١١٨ قلت: قد أثبت به القاضي ذراعين وصدراً صفة للّه تعالى، وقال: ليس بجوارح. وهذا [27a] قبيح لأنّه حديث ليس بمرفوع ولا يصحّ. وهل يجوز أن يُخلق مخلوق من ذات القديم؟ هذا أقبح ممّا ادّعاه النصارى.

الحديث السادس عشر

١١٩ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث ابن عمر[٢] أنّ النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «إنّ اللّه عزّ وجلّ يدني عبده[٣] المؤمن[٤] فيضع عليه كنفه[٥] ويقول: أتعرف ذنب كذا؟»

١٢٠ قال العلماء: يدنيه من رحمته.[٦] وقال [ابن] الأنباريّ: وكنفه حياطته وستره. يُقال: قد كنف فلان فلانًا إذا أحاطه وستره وكلّ شيء ستر شيئًا فقد كنفه. يُقال في الترس[٧] كنيف لأنّه يستر صاحبه.

١٢١ وقال القاضي: يدنيه من ذاته. قلت: وهذا قول من لم يعرف اللّه عزّ وجلّ ولا [يعلم] أنّه لا يجوز عليه الدنوّ الذي هو مساحة.[٨] وكذلك قوله صلّى اللّه

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[١] المشكل لابن فورك، ١٤٣: «ابن عمرو»؛ قارن دفع شبه التشبيه لابن الجوزيّ، تحقيق حسن السقاف (بيرت ١٩٩١)، ص٨٣ و ١٨٤.

[٢] الأصل: «عمران»؛ انظر البخاريّ، مظالم ٢؛ ومسلم، توبة، ٥٢.

[٣] غريب الحديث لابن الجوزيّ، ج٢، ص٣٠٢: «عنده.»

[٤] دفع، ص٤٤: «يدني المؤمن»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٩و: «يدني عبد المؤمن.»

[٥] البخاريّ، ٢/٤٦: «كنفه ويستره فيقول.»

[٦] دفع، ص ٤٥: «من رحمته ولطفه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩و.

[٧] دفع، ص ٤٥: «ويقال للترس»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩و.

[٨] دفع، ص ٤٥: «مسافة»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٩و: «مساحة».

أحدهما أن يكون ذلك راجعًا إلى النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم كأنّه ضحك حين أخبر بضحك الربّ عزّ وجلّ حتّى بدت لهواته وأضراسه كما رُوي أنّه ضحك حتّى بدت نواجذه. وهذا [هو] الصحيح لو ثبت الحديث، وإنّما هو مقطوع. والثاني أن يكون تجوّزاً يتبيّن[١] به كثرة[٢] الكرم وصفة[٣] الرضى كما تجوّز[٤] بقوله: من أتاني يمشي أتيته هرولة.

١١٦ وقال القاضي: لا يمتنع الأخذ بظاهر الأحاديث في إمرارها[٥] على ظواهرها من غير تأويل، لأنّا لا نثبت ضحكًا هو فتح الفم ولا أضراسًا ولهوات وجوارح وأبعاضًا. قلت: واعجبًا هذا قد أثبت للّه صفات بأحاديث آحاد بألفاظ لا تصحّ. وإذا لم يثبته ضحكًا معقولاً فقد تأوّل ولا يدري. واعجبًا قد عرف أنّ الضحك يُشار به إلى الفضل والإنعام فالأضراس ما وجهها؟ واللّه لو رُويت في الصحيحين وجب[٦] ردّها. فكيف وما ثبتت أصلاً وقد روى أحمد: لو أنّ الناس اعتزلوهم،[٧] يعني[٨] الأمراء، فقال: اضرب على هذا! وهذا الحديث في الصحيحين، فكيف بحديث لا يثبت يخالف المنقول[٩] والمعقول. ومن أثبت الأضراس صفة فما عنده من الإسلام خبر.

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[١] الأصل: الياء الثانية غير منقوطة.

[٢] دفع، ص ٤٤: «تجوزا عن كثرة»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٩و: «تجوزا من كثرة».

[٣] دفع، ص٤٤: «وسعة الرضى»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩و.

[٤] دفع، ص ٤٤: «جوز»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩و.

[٥] دفع، ص٤٤: «وامرارها»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩و.

[٦] الأصل: «وحب.»

[٧] الأصل: «اعترلوهم.»

[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٩] الأصل: «المنفول.»

أخبر عن آخر من يدخل الجنّة وضحك. فقيل: «ممّ تضحك؟ قال: من ضحك ربّ العالمين حين قال: أتهزأ[١] بي؟»

١١٥ قلت: إنّ الضحك له [معان] ترجع[٢] إلى معنى البيان والظهور فكلّ من أبدى من أمر ما[٣] كان مستوراً قيل: قد ضحك. يُقال: ضحكت الأرض بالنبات إذا ظهر فيها وانفتق عن زهره كما يُقال: بكت السماء. قال الشاعر:

[الخفيف]

كُلُّ يَوْمٍ بِأُقْحُوَانٍ[٤] جَدِيد تَضْحَكُ الأَرْضُ مِن بُكاءِ السَمَاءِ

وكذلك الضحك الذي يعتري البشر إنّما هو انفتاح عن الأسنان[٥] وهذا يستحيل على اللّه عزّ وجلّ. فوجب حمله على [معنى] أبدى اللّه كرمه وأتى بفضله. ومعنى قوله صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: «ضحكت لضحك ربّي» أبديت عن أسناني بفتح فمي لإظهار ربّي فضله وكرمه. وقول الآخر: «لن نعدم من ربّ يضحك خيراً» أي يكشف الكرب فرقًا بينه وبين الأجسام التي لا يُرجى[٦] خيرها. قلت: وهذا تأويل جماعة من العلماء، وقال الخطّابيّ: معنى ضحك الجبّار عزّ وجلّ [الإخبار] عن الرضى وحسن المجازاة. وقد رُوي في حديث موقوف: «ضحك حتّى بدت لهواته وأضراسه». ذكره الخلال في كتاب السنّة. وقال المروزيّ: [26b] قلت لأبي عبد اللّه: ما تقول في هذا الحديث؟ قال: هذا بشعٌ. قال: قلت: ثمّ يقول: على تقدير الضحك[٧] يحتمل أمرين،

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[١] الأصل: الزاء غير منقوطة؛ الصحيح لمسلم (إيمان ٣١٠): «أتستهزئ منّي»؛ قارن كتاب التوحيد لابن خزينة، ص٢٣١.

[٢] دفع، ص٤٣: «له معان ترجع»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٨ظ.

[٣] دفع، ص٤٣: «عن أمر كان»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٨ظ.

[٤] الأصل مكتوبة: «بالاحوان»، ثمّ زِيد «ق» عليها بين «ا» و«ح» بخطّ مغاير لخطّ الناسخ.

[٥] دفع، ص٤٣: «هو انفتاح الفم عن الاسنان»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩و.

[٦] الأصل: الجيم غير منقوطة.

[٧] دفع، ص٤٤: «الصحة»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٩و.

الحديث الثالث عشر

١١٢ روى القاضي عن مجاهد أنّه قال: «إذا كان يوم القيامة يذكر داود ذنبه فيقول اللّه عزّ وجلّ: كُن أمامي. فيقول: يا ربّ ذنبي. فيقول: كُن خلفي. فيقول: يا ربّ ذنبي. فيقول: خُذ بقدمي. قال في لفظ عن ابن سيرين: فإنّ اللّه عزّ وجلّ ليقرب داوّد حتّى يضع يده على فخذه.»

١١٣ قلت: العجب من إثبات صفات الحقّ[١] سبحانه بأقوال عن التابعين، وما تصحّ[٢] عنهم ولو صحّت، فإنّما يذكرونها عن أهل الكتاب كما يذكر وهب بن منبّه. قال القاضي: نحمله على ظاهره لأنّا لا نثبت قدمًا وفخذاً هو جارحة وكذلك لا نثبت الأمام. قلت: واعجبًا لقد كمّلوا هيئة[٣] البدن بإثبات فخذ وساق وقدم ووجه ويدين وأصابع وخنصر وإبهام وجنب[٤] وحقو وصعود ونزول. ويقولون: نحمله على ظاهره وليست جوارح. وهل يجوز لقائل[٥] أن يثبت للّه خلفًا وأمامًا وفخذاً ؟ ما ينبغي أن نحدّث هؤلاء لأنّا قد عرفنا الفخذ، [26a] فيقال: ليس بفخذ والخلف ليس بخلف. ومثل هؤلاء لا يحدّثون فإنّهم يكابرون العقول كأنّهم يحدّثون الأطفال.

الحديث الرابع عشر

١١٤ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث أبي هريرة عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «يضحك اللّه إلى رجلين يقتل[٦] أحدهما الآخر يدخلان الجنّة». وفي أفراد مسلم من حديث ابن مسعود أنّ رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم

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[١] الباز الأشهب، ٢٨ظ: «اثبات صفات للحق»؛ دفع، ص٤٢: «اثبات ذلك للحق.»

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٣] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[٤] الأصل: بذون نقط.

[٥] دفع، ص٤٢: «لعاقل»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٨ظ.

[٦] الأصل: بدون نقط.

النار أمره وتكوينه حتّى يستعين[١] بشيء من ذاته ويعالجها بصفة من صفاته، وهو القائل ﴿كُونِي بَرْداً وَسَلاماً﴾. فما أسخف هذا الاعتقاد وأبعده عن المكوّن للأملاك[٢] والأفلاك. وقد نطق القرآن بتكذيبهم[٣] فقال: ﴿لَوْ كَانَ هَؤُلاءِ آلِهَةً مَا وَرَدُوهَا﴾ فكيف يُظَنّ بالخالق أنّه يردها؟ تعالى اللّه عن تخاييل[٤] المجسّمة.

الحديث الثاني عشر

١١٠ روى أبو هريرة عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال:

«ضرس الكافر[٥] مثل أُحُد وكثافة[٦] جلده اثنان وأربعون ذراعًا بذراع الجبّار.»[٧]

١١١ [25b] قال أبو عمرو[٨] الزاهد: الجبّار ههنا الطويل يُقال: نخلة جبّارة. قال ابن قتيبة: الجبّار ههنا الملك والجبابرة الملوك. قال القاضي: نحمله على ظاهره فإنّ الجبّار اللّه عزّ وجلّ لأنّا لا نثبت ذراعًا هو جارحة. قلت: واعجبًا إذ ذهبت[٩] العقول إلى هذا الحدّ! قال:[١٠] ويجوز أن يُقال: إنّ الذراع ينشأ أربعين[١١] مرّةً حتّى يبلغ جلد الكافر، ويُضاف إلى الذات القديمة. ثمّ قال: ليس بجارحة. فإذا لم يكن جارحة كيف ينشأ أربعين مرّة؟

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] دفع، ص٤١: «مكون الاملاك.»

[٣] دفع، ص٤١: «وقد صرح بتكذيبهم»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٨و: «وقد نطق بتكذيبهم.»

[٤] دفع، ص٤١: «تجاهل»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٨و.

[٥] دفع، ص٤١: «ضرس الكافر في النار مثل»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٨و: «ضرس الكافر مثل.»

[٦] الأصل: الثاء غير منقوطة.

[٧] تأويل مختلف الحديث لابن قتيبة، ص٢٧١: «بباع الجبار.»

[٨] الأصل: «قال عمر»؛ دفع، ص٤١: «ابو عمرو»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٨و: «ابو عمر.»

[٩] دفع، ص٤٢: أذهبت»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٨ظ: «ذهبت.»

[١٠] الأصل: «قال» مكتوبة فوق السطر بيد الناسخ.

[١١] دفع، ص٤٢: «الذراع اثنان واربعون.»

جماعة. يُقال: رجل من جراد. فيكون المعنى: يدخلها جماعة يشبهون في كثرتهم الجراد فيسرعون التهافت فيها.

١٠٨ قال القاضي: القدم صفة ذاتيّة.[١] وسمعت أنا [ابن] الزاغونيّ يقول: إنّما وضع قدمه في النار ليخبرهم أنّ أصنافكم[٢] [25a] تحترق وأنا لا أحترق. قلت: وهذا إثبات تبعيض وهو من أقبح الاعتقادات. ورأيت أبا بكر بن خزيمة قد جمع كتابًا في الصفات. فقال: باب إثبات اليد، باب إمساك السموات [والأرض وما عليها] على أصابعه،[٣] باب إثبات الرجل وإن رغمت أنوف المعتزلة.[٤] ثمّ [قال:] قال اللّه تعالى: ﴿أَلَهُمْ أَرْجُلٌ يَمْشُونَ بِهَا أَمْ لَهُمْ أَيْدٍ يَبْطِشُونَ بِهَا﴾. فأعلمنا [ربّنا] أنّ من لا يد له ولا رجل فهو كالأنعام. قلت: وإنّي لأعجب من هذا الرجل مع علوّ قدره في علم النقل يقول هذا ويثبت للّه ما ذُمّ الأصنام بعدمه من اليد الباطشة والرجل الماشية ويلزمه أن يثبت الأذن. ولو رُزق الفهم ما تكلّم بهذا. ويُفهَم أنّ اللّه تعالى عاب[٥] الأصنام عند عابديها. والمعنى لكم أيد وأرجل فكيف عبدتم ناقصًا لا يد له يبطش ولا رجل يمشي بها.

١٠٩ قال ابن عقيل: تعالى اللّه أن يكون له صفة تشغل الأمكنة.[٦] هذا عين التجسيم وليس الحقّ بذي أجزاء وأبعاض فيعالج بها. ثمّ إنّه لا يعمل[٧] في

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[١] الأصل: «ذاتية قلت وسمعت أنا الزعفراني» ولكنّ «قلت وسمعت أنا الزعفراني» مشطوبة للناسخ.

[٢] دفع، ص٤٠: «اصنامهم»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٨و.

[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٤] كتاب التوحيد لابن خزيمة، ص ٩٠: «وان رغمت أنوف المعطلة الجهمية»؛ دفع، ص٤٠: «وان رغمت المعتزلة»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٨و.

[٥] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٦] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٧] دفع، ص ٤١: «ثم انه أليس يعمل»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٨و: «ثم انه لا يعمل.»

النضر[١] بن شميل[٢] أنّه قال: القدم ههنا الكفّار الذين سُبق[٣] في علم اللّه أنّهم من أهل النار.[٤] وقال أبو منصور الأزهريّ: القدم الذين تقدّم القول بتخليدهم[٥] في النار. فعلى هذا يكون في المعنى وجهين. أحدهما كلّ شيء قدّمته. يُقال لها قدم ولما هدمته هدم ولما قبضته قبض.[٦] ويؤيّد هذا قوله في تمام الحديث: «وأمّا الجنّة فينشئ اللّه[٧] لها خلقًا». فاتّفق المعنيان في أنّ كلّ واحدة من الجنّة والنار[٨] يُمدّ بزيادة عدد يستوفي[٩] به عدّة أهلها فتمتلئ عند ذلك. ولمّا وُعدت النار أن تمتلئ فأُلقِي فيها ما لم يملأها قالت: هل من مزيد أي زدني لأنّك وعدتني أن أُملأ. فلا يزال يقدّم إليها قومًا بعد قوم حتّى تمتلئ،[١٠] فتقول: حسبي!

١٠٧ والوجه الثاني أنّ كلّ قادم إليها [يُسمّى قدمًا] فالقدم جمع قادم كما يُقال: غائب[١١] غَيَب.[١٢] فأمّا من روى لفظة الرجل فبعض الرواة رواه بما يظنّه[١٣] المعنى من أنّ القدم الرجل وقد رواه الدارقطنيّ من طرق. فقال: قدمه أو رجله. قلت: وهذا دليل على تعبير[١٤] الرواة بما يظنّونه على أنّ الرجل في اللغة

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[١] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.

[٢] الأصل: الشين غير منقوطة.

[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٤] كتاب الأسماء، ص٣٥٢: «من سبق في علمه أنه.»

[٥] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٦] الأصل: «لما هدم هدم ولما قبض قبض»؛ قارن كتاب الأسماء، ص٣٥١.

[٧] دفع، ص٤٠: «فينشئ لها خلقا.»

[٨] الأصل: «من الجنة واحدة يمد»؛ كتاب الأسماء، ص٣٥١: «من الجنة والنار تمد.»

[٩] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١٠] الأصل: «تمتلا.»

[١١] الأصل: «عايب.»

[١٢] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة.

[١٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

على رجل، وإنّما يُكرَه ذلك لمن لا له سراويل.[١]

الحديث العاشر

١٠٣ رواه القاضي عن حسّان بن عطيّة أنّ رجلاً من المشركين سبّ رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم فحمل عليه رجل من المسلمين فقاتله[٢] وقُتل الرجل. فقال رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: «ما تعجبون من نصر[٣] اللّه، ورسوله لقي اللّه متّكئًا[٤] فقعد له».

١٠٤ قلت: هذا حديث مقطوع بعيد الصحّة. ولو كان له وجه كان المعنى أقبل اللّه عليه وأنعم.

الحديث الحادي عشر

١٠٥ روى البخاريّ ومسلم[٥] في الصحيحين من حديث أنس بن مالك عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلم أنّه قال: لاتزال جهنّم يُلقَى فيها فتقول: هل من مزيد؟ حتّى يضع ربّ العزّة فيها قدمه فينزوي بعضها إلى بعض فتمتلئ.»

١٠٦ قلت: الواجب علينا أن نعتقد أنّ ذات اللّه تعالى لا تتبعّض ولا يحويها مكان ولا تُوصَف بالتغيّر ولا بالانتقال. وقد حكى أبو عبيد الهرويّ عن الحسن [24b] البصريّ أنّه قال: القدم هم الذين قدّمهم [اللّه لها] من شرار الخلق[٦] وأثبتهم لها. وقال الإمام ابن الأعرابيّ:[٧] القَدَم المتقدّم. وروى أبو بكر البيهقيّ عن

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[١] دفع، ص٣٩، «وانما يكره هذا لمن لا سراويل له واللّه اعلم.»

[٢] الأصل: «فقتله»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٣٩.

[٣] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] الأصل: «البخاريّ عن حسان» ولكنّ «عن حسان» مشطوبة و«ومسلم» مكتوبة فوق «عن حسان».

[٦] دفع، ص٤٠: «قدمهم اللّه لها من شرار خلقه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٨و؛ قارن لسان العرب، ج١٢، ص٤٧٠.

[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.

العوّام بن حوشب، قال: سألت أبا مجلز[١] عن رجل يجلس فوضع إحدى رجليه على الأخرى، قال: لا بأس وإنّما يكره[٢] ذلك اليهود، زعموا أنّ اللّه عزّ وجلّ خلق السموات والأرض وما بينهما في ستّة أيّام [ثمّ استراح، فقال اللّه تعالى:] ﴿وَمَا مَسَّنَا مِنْ لُغُوبٍ﴾.

١٠٢ قلت: وقد تأوّل بعض العلماء الحديث الذي نحن[٣] فيه على تقدير الصحّة. فقال: معنى «استلقى» أتمّ[٤] خلقه وفرغ.[٥] يُقال: بنى فلان داره واستلقى على ظهره أي لم يبق[٦] له فيها عمل. وقوله «وضع رجلاً [24a] على رجل»، أي وضع بعض المخلوقات على بعض. وذهب القاضي إلى جعل الاستلقاء[٧] صفة وأنّه[٨] وضع رجلاً على رجل. ثمّ قال: لا على وجه يعقل معناه. قال: ويفيد الحديث إثبات رجلين. قلت: ولو لم يعقله[٩] ما أثبت رجلين، ولم يثبت صفات بمثل[١٠] هذا الحديث المعلول ولو لم يكن معلولاً لم يثبت صفة بأخبار الآحاد ولو لم يعقل معناه ما قال: لا يصلح للبشر، ولا كان يقع نهي وإنّما النهي[١١] أشبه ما بين الفعلين. وقد صحّ عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم وأبي بكر وعمر أنّهم كانوا يستلقون ويضعون رجلاً

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[١] الأصل: «مخلد»؛ في هامش الأصل: «مجلز.»

[٢] الباز الأشهب (بيروت، ١٩٨٧)، ص٨٢: «وانما ذكره.»

[٣] الأصل: غير واضحة.

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] الأصل: «فرع.»

[٦] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة.

[٧] الأصل: «الاستلقى.»

[٨] الأصل: «وان.»

[٩] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١٠] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١١] الأصل: «الهى.»

قال له الزبير: أنت سمعت هذا من رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم؟ قال:[١] نعم. قال: هذا وأشباهه [ممّا] يمنعنا[٢] أن نحدّث عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم. قال:[٣] لعمري سمعت [23b] هذا من رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم وأنا يومئذ حاضر ولكنّ رسول اللّه صلّى عليه وسلّم ابتدأ بهذا الحديث: فحدّثناه عن رجل من أهل الكتاب حدّثه إيّاه. فجئت أنت يومئذ بعد انقضاء[٤] صدر الحديث وذكر الرجل الذي هو من أهل الكتاب فظننت أنت أنّه من حديث رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم وغالب الظنّ أنّ الإشارة في حديث الزبير إلى حديث قتادة. فإنّ أهل الكتاب قالوا: إنّ اللّه تعالى لمّا خلق[٥] السموات والأرض استراح. فنزّل قوله تعالى ﴿وَمَا مَسَّنَا مِنْ لُغُوبٍ﴾. فيمكن أن يكون رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم حكى ذلك عنهم ولم يسمع قتادة أوّل الكلام.

١٠١ وقد روى [أبو] عبد اللّه[٦] بن أحمد في كتاب السنّة عن أبي سفيان قال: رأيت الحسن وقد وضع رجليه اليمنى[٧] على شماله.[٨] فقلت: يا أبا سعيد تُكرَه هذه القعدة. قال الحسن: قاتل اللّه اليهود! قال اللّه تعالى: ﴿وَلَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا السَّمَاوَاتِ والأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا فِي سِتَّةِ أَيَامٍ وَمَا مَسَّنَا مِنْ لُغُوبٍ﴾. فعرفت ما عني [به] فأمسكت. قلت: إنّما أشار الحسن إلى ما ذكرناه عن اليهود. وروينا عن

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[١] دفع، ص٣٨: «فقال الرجل نعم».

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط؛ كتاب الأسماء، ص٣٥٧: «هذا وأشباهه مما يمنعنا أن.»

[٣] دفع، ص٣٨: «وسلم قد لعمري»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٧ظ: «وسلم قال لعمري.»

[٤] الأصل: القاف غير منقوطة.

[٥] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٦] دفع، ص٣٨: «عبد الرحمن بن أحمد.»

[٧] الأصل: «يمينه»؛ دفع، ص٣٨: «رجله اليمنى على»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٧ظ.

[٨] دفع، ص٣٨: «وهو قاعد فقلت»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٧ظ.

الحديث في ديوان من دواوين[١] الشريعة المعتمد عليها. وكان أحمد بن حنبل يذمّ[٢] إبراهيم بن المنذر ويتكلّم فيه. وقال زكرياء الساجيّ: عنده مناكير. وقال يحيى بن معين: فليح ليس حديثه بالجائز، وقال مرّةً: هو ضعيف. وقال النسائيّ: ليس بالقويّ. وأمّا عبيد ابن حنين فقال البخاريّ: لا يصحّ حديثه في أهل المدينة. وقال أبو بكر البيهقيّ: إذا كان فليح مختلفًا في جواز[٣] الاحتجاج [به] عند الحفّاظ لم يثبت بروايته مثل هذا الأمر العظيم. قال: وفي الحديث علّة أخرى وهي أنّ قتادة بن النعمان مات في خلافة عمر بن الخطّاب وعبيد بن حنين مات سنة خمس ومائة، وله سبعون[٤] سنة في قول الواقديّ،[٥] فتكون روايته عن قتادة بن النعمان منقطعة. وقول الراوي: «فانطلقنا حتّى دخلنا على أبي سعيد» لا يرجع إلى عبيد بن حنين، وإنّما يرجع إلى من أرسله عنه ونحن لا نعرفه. قال: ولا نقبل[٦] المراسيل في الأحكام فكيف في هذا الأمر العظيم. قال: ثمّ لو صحّ طريقه احتمل[٧] أن يكون رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم حدّث به عن بعض أهل الكتاب على طريق الإنكار عليهم، فلم يفهم[٨] إنكاره عليهم قتادة.

١٠٠ قلت: ومن هذا الفنّ[٩] حديث رويناه أنّ الزبير سمع رجلاً يحدّث عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم فاستمع له الزبير حتّى إذا قضى الرجل حديثه،

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[١] الأصل: «في ديوان من ديوان»؛ دفع، ص٣٧: «في دواوين»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٧و.

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٣] الأصل: «حواز.»

[٤] كتاب الأسماء للبيهقيّ، ص٣٥٦، س١١: «وله خمس وسبعون»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٧ظ.

[٥] كتاب الأسماء، ص٣٥٦، س١١: «في قول الواقدي وابن بكير.»

[٦] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.

[٧] كتاب الأسماء، ص٣٥٧: «ثم إن صح طريقه يحتمل»؛ دفع، ص٣٧: «ثم لو صح طريقه احتمل».

[٨] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[٩] الأصل: بدون نقط.

شيء. فإن صحّ فضَرْبُ مثلٍ[١] لما جرت به الأقدار.

٩٧ قال القاضي: تخمير الطين وخلط بعضه ببعض مضاف إلى اليد التي خلق بها آدم. قلت: وهذا التشبيه المحض.

الحديث التاسع

٩٨ روى عبيد بن حنين[٢] قال: «بينما أنا جالس في المسجد جاء[٣] قتادة بن النعمان فجلس فتحدّث. ثمّ قال: انطلق بنا إلى أبي سعيد فإنّي قد أخبرت أنّه قد اشتكى.[٤] فانطلقنا[٥] حتّى دخلنا على أبي سعيد فوجدناه مستلقيًا واضعًا[٦] رجله اليمنى على اليسرى[٧] فسلّمنا وجلسنا فرفع قتادة يده إلى رجل أبي سعيد الخدريّ فقرصها قرصة شديدة فقال أبو سعيد: سبحان اللّه يا ابن آدم أوجعتني.[٨] قال: ذاك أردت، إنّ رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: إنّ اللّه عزّ وجلّ لمّا قضى خلقه استلقى ثمّ وضع إحدى رجليه على الأخرى. ثمّ قال: لا ينبغي لأحد من خلقي[٩] أن يفعل هذا. قال أبو سعيد: لا جرم لا أفعله أبداً.»

٩٩ قلت: وقد رواه عبد اللّه بن أحمد عن أبي بكر محمّد بن إسحاق الصاغانيّ قال: حدّثنا إبراهيم بن المنذر قال: حدّثنا محمّد بن فليح [عن أبيه] عن سعيد بن الحارث عن عبيد بن حنين.... قلت: وما رأيت [23a] هذا

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[١] دفع، ص٣٦: «فيضرب مثلا»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٧و.

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٣] دفع، ص٣٦: «اذ جاء».

[٤] الأصل: «استكى».

[٥] الأصل: القاف والنون الثانية غير منقوطتين.

[٦] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٨] دفع، ص٣٧: «يا ابن أم أوجعتني»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٧و: «يا آدم اوجعتني.»

[٩] الأصل: «حلفى».

خلق آدم من قبضة قبضها من جميع الأرض».

٩٣ المعنى مقدار قبضته وليست[١] على ما يتصوّر من قبضات المخلوقين فإنّ الحقّ منزّه عن ذلك وإنّما أضيفت القبضة إليه لأنّ أفعال[٢] المملوك تُضاف[٣] إلى المالك[٤] كقوله ﴿فَطَمَسْنَا أَعْيُنَهُمْ﴾. وقد روى محمّد بن سعد في كتاب الطبقات: إنّ اللّه تعالى بعث إبليس فأخذ من أديم الأرض[٥] فخلق منه آدم، فمن أجل ذلك[٦] قال: ﴿أَأَسْجُدُ لِمَنْ خَلَقْتَ طِينًا﴾.

٩٤ قال القاضي: لا يمتنع إطلاق اسم القبض إليه، وإضافة القبضة لا على معنى الجارحة ولا على المعالجة والممارسة. قلت: فيُقال له: أطلقت وما تدري.

الحديث الثامن

٩٥ [22b] روى سلمان قال: «إنّ اللّه عزّ وجلّ لمّا خمّر طينة آدم ضرب[٧] بيديه فيه فخرج كلّ طيّب في يمينه وكلّ خبيث في يده الأخرى ثمّ خلّط بينهما فمن ثَمّ يخرج[٨] الحيّ من الميّت ويخرج[٩] الميّت من الحيّ».

٩٦ قلت: فهذا مرسل وقد ثبت بالدليل أنّ الحيّ[١٠] سبحانه لا يُوصَف بمسّ

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] الأصل: «الافعال» وأداة التعريف مشطوبة.

[٣] دفع، ص ٣٦: «تنسب الى»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٧و.

[٤] دفع، ص ٣٦: «الى المالك وذلك انه بعث من قبض كقوله»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٧و.

[٥] كتاب الطبقات لابن سعد، ج١، ص٢٦: «الأرض من عذبها وملحها»؛ فكذلك في التأريخ للطبريّ، ج١، ص٩٠-٩١.

[٦] دفع، ص ٣٦: «فمن ثم قال»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٧و.

[٧] دفع، ص ٣٦: «وضرب»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٧و: «ضرب.»

[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٩] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[١٠] دفع، ص ٣٦: «الحق»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٧و.

تغيير الرواة، والشخص لا يكون إلا جسمًا مؤلّفًا وسُمّي شخصًا فإنّ له شخوصًا وارتفاعًا، والصواب أنّه يرجع ذكر الشخص إلى المخلوقين لا أنّ الخالق يُقال له شخص. فيكون[1] المعنى ليس منكم أيّها الأشخاص أغير من اللّه لأنّه لمّا اجتمع الكلّ في الذكر سُمّي بأسمائهم كما سُمّي الجزاء[2] على استهزائهم استهزاءً وعلى [22a] مكرهم مكرًا. ومثله قول[3] ابن مسعود «ما خلق اللّه من جنّة ولا نار أعظم من آية الكرسيّ». قال أحمد بن حنبل: الخلق يرجع إلى المخلوق[4] لا إلى القرآن. ومن هذا الجنس قوله تعالى ﴿[أَصْحَابُ] الجَنَّةِ يَوْمَئِذٍ خَيْرٌ مُسْتَقَرّاً وَأَحْسَنُ مَقِيلاً﴾. ومعلوم أنّ أهل النار لا مستقرّ لهم ولا مقيل. ويمكن[5] أن تكون[6] من باب المستثنى من غير الجنس كقوله تعالى ﴿مَا لَهُمْ بِهِ مِنْ عِلْمٍ إِلا اتِّبَاعَ الظَنِّ﴾.

٩١ وقد أجاز بعضهم إطلاق الشخص على اللّه تعالى وذلك غلط لما بيّنّاه.

وأمّا الغيرة فقال[7] العلماء: كلّ من غار من شيء أُسنِدت كراهيتُه له. فلمّا حرّم الفواحش وتوعّد[8] عليها وصفه رسوله بالغيرة.

الحديث السابع

٩٢ روى أبو موسى عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم قال: «إنّ اللّه تعالى

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[12] دفع، ص ٣٥: «وكذلك شخص من»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٦ظ: «فيكون ذكر الشخص من.»

[1] دفع، ص ٣٥: «وقد يكون»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦ظ.

[2] الأصل: «الجرا.»

[3] دفع، ص ٣٥: «ومثل هذا قول.»

[4] دفع، ص٣٥: «يرجع الى الجنة والنار لا الى...»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦ظ.

[5] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[6] دفع، ص ٣٥: «ويجوز ان يكون هذا من»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦ظ.

[7] دفع، ص ٣٥: «فقد قالت»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٧و.

[8] الأصل: «تواعد» والألف مشطوبة؛ دفع، ص٣٥: «ووعد.»

ولو كان جسمًا مع قدمه جاز قدم أحدنا. فأحوجتنا الأدلّة إلى تأويل صورة يليق إضافتها إليه وما ذلك إلا الحال التي[١] يوقع عليها أهل اللغة اسم الصورة.[٢] فيقولون: كيف صورتك مع فلان؟ وفلان على صورة من الفقر. والحال التي أنكروها العسف والتي يعرفونها اللطف، فيكشف عن الشدّة. التغيّرات[٣] أليقُ[٤] بفعله، فأمّا ذاته فتتعالى[٥] عن التغيّر. ونعوذ بالله أن نحمل[٦] الحديث على ما قالت[٧] المجسّمة: إنّ الصورة ترجع إلى ذاته، فإنّ في ذلك[٨] تجويز [التغيّر] على صفاته فخروجه[٩] في صورة وإن كانت حقيقة، وذلك استحالة، وإن كان تخيّلاً فليس ذلك هو إنّما يريهم غيره.

الحديث السادس

٨٩ روى مسلم في الصحيح من حديث المغيرة عن رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «لا شخصَ أغير من الله ولا شخص أحبّ إليه العذرُ[١٠] من الله ولا شخص أحبّ إليه المدحةُ من الله».

٩٠ قلت: لفظة «الشخص» يرويها بعض الرواة ويروي بعضهم «لا شيء أغير من الله». والرواة يزيدون[١١] ما يظنّونه من المعنى، فيكون ذكر الشخص[١٢] من

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[١] دفع، ص ٣٤: «الذي يوقع عليها»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦ظ.

[٢] دفع، ص ٣٤: «اسم صورة»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦ظ.

[٣] دفع، ص ٣٤: «التغير.»

[٤] دفع، ص ٣٤: «التغير انما يليق.»

[٥] دفع، ص ٣٥: «فتعالت.»

[٦] دفع، ص٣٥: «ان يحمل.»

[٧] دفع، ص ٣٥: «ما قالته»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٦ظ: «ما قالت.»

[٨] دفع، ص ٣٥: «وان ذلك تجويز»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦ظ.

[٩] دفع، ص٣٥: «فخرجوه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦ظ.

[١٠] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١١] دفع، ص ٣٥: «يرون بما»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦ظ.

رأوه فيها» دليل على أنّ المراد بالصورة الصفة لأنّهم ما رأوه قبلها. فعلمت أنّ المراد الصفة التي عرفوه فيها.

٨٦ وقال غيره من العلماء:[١] يأتيهم بأهوال القيامة وصور الملائكة وما لم يعهدوا مثله في الدنيا. فيستعيذون[٢] من تلك الحال، يقولون: «إذا جاء ربّنا عرفناه»، أي إذا أتانا بما نعرفه من لطفه وهي «الصورة التي يعرفون»،[٣] «فيُكشف عن ساق»، أي عن شدّة كأنّه يرفع تلك الشدائد[٤] «فيسجدون» شكراً. قال بعضهم: يظهر صورة يمتحن إيمانهم بها كما يبعث[٥] الدجّال، فيقولون: «نعوذ باللّه منك».

٨٧ وفي حديث أبي موسى عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّ الناس يقولون: «[إنّ] لنا ربًّا كنّا نعبده في الدنيا. فيقال: وتعرفونه[٦] إذا رأيتموه؟ فيقولون: نعم. فيقال: كيف تعرفونه ولم تروه؟ فيقولون: إنّه لا شبيه له، فيكشف الحجاب. فينظرون إلى اللّه تعالى، فيخرّون سُجّداً».

٨٨ قال ابن عقيل: الصورة على الحقيقة تقع[٧] على التخاطيط والأشكال، وذلك من صفات الأجسام. والذي صرفنا عن كونه جسمًا، الأدلّة القطعيّة كقوله ﴿لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ﴾، ومن الأدلّة العقليّة أنّه لو كان جسمًا كانت صورته عرضًا. ولو كان حاملاً للأعراض[٨] [21b] جاز عليه ما يجوز على الأجسام وافتقر إلى صانع.

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[١٠] الأصل: النون الأولى غير منقوطة. كتاب الأسماء، ص٢٩٧: «نوع.»

[١١] الأصل: «المطابفه.»

[١] دفع، ص٣٣: «وقال بعض العلماء»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦و.

[٢] الأصل: الياء الثانية غير منقوطة.

[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٤] دفع، ص ٣٤: «الشدائد المهولة»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦و.

[٥] دفع، ص ٣٤: «يمتحنهم بها كما يبعث»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦و.

[٦] دفع، ص ٣٤: «او تعرفونه.»

[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٨] دفع، ص ٣٤: «حامل الأعراض»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦ظ.

فليتّبعه[١] فيتّبعون ما كانوا يعبدون وتبقى هذه الأمّة فيها منافقوها.[٢] فيأتيهم اللّه عزّ وجلّ في غير الصورة التي يعرفون فيقول: أنا ربّكم. فيقولون: نعوذ باللّه منك. هذا مكاننا حتّى يأتينا ربّنا، فإذا جاء ربّنا عرفناه. فيأتيهم في الصورة التي يعرفون.[٣] فيقول: أنا ربّكم. فيقولون: أنت ربّنا».

٨٤ في الصحيحين من حديث أبي سعيد عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «فيأتيهم الجبّار في غير صورته [التي] رأوه فيها أوّل مرّة.[٤] فيقول: أنا ربّكم.[٥] ولا يكلّمه إلا الأنبياء. فيقال: هل بينكم وبينه آية تعرفونها؟ فيقولون: الساق. فيكشف عن ساقه، فيسجد له كلّ مؤمن».

٨٥ قلت: اعلم أنّه يجب على كلّ مسلم أن يعتقد أنّ اللّه سبحانه لا يجوز عليه الصورة التي هي هيئة وتأليف. وقال أبو سليمان الخطّابيّ: معنى «فيأتيهم اللّه»، أي فيكشف لهم الحجاب حتّى يرونه[٦] عيانًا كما كانوا [21a] عرفوه[٧] استدلالاً فيرونه بعيان [بعد أن] لم يكونوا[٨]رأوه بمنزلة إتيان الآتي لم يكن شُوهد قبل. وأمّا الصورة فتُتأوّل على وجهين، أحدهما أنّها بمعنى الصفة، يقال: صورة الأمر كذا. والثاني أنّ المذكورات من المعبودات في أوّل الحديث صور [وأجسام كالشمس والقمر والطواغيت ونحوها، ثمّ لمّا عُطف عليها ذكر اللّه سبحانه][٩] يخرج الكلام على نوعين[١٠] من المطابقة.[١١] وقوله: «في أدنى صورة

[١] الأصل: «فليعبده»؛ تصحيح في الهامش بيد أخرى: «فليتبعه» ولكنّ الياء والباء غير منقوطتين.

[٢] دفع، ص٣٣: «وتبقى هذه الأمة بمنافقيها»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦و.

[٣] دفع، ص٣٣: «يعرفونها»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦و.

[٤] دفع، ص٣٣: «في صورة غير صورته التي رأوه فيها أوّل مرّة».

[٥] في دفع إضافة: «فيقولون انت ربنا» إلى النصّ (ص٣٣).

[٦] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[٧] في دفع إضافة: «في الدنيا» إلى النصّ (ص٣٣).

[٨] دفع، ص٣٣: «فرؤيته بعد ان لم يكونوا»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٦و.

[٩] كتاب الأسماء، ص٢٩٦-٢٩٧.

مثل هذا يطلب له الرجال الثقات.[١] ثمّ لا تقطع بنفع[٢] الرواة إذا كان المتن مستحيلاً. وصار هذا كما لو أخبر[٣] جماعة من الثقات[٤] بأنّ جمل البزّاز دخل في خرم إبرة الخيّاط فإنّه لا حكم لصدق الرواة مع استحالة خبرهم.

الحديث الرابع

٨١ [20b] رُوي أنّ[٥] رسول الله صلّى الله عليه وسلّم قال: «ليلة أُسْرِي بي رأيت كلّ شيء من ربّي حتّى رأيت تاجًا مخوّصًا من لؤلؤ».[٦]

٨٢ قلت: هذا يرويه أبو القاسم بن محمّد[٧] بن اليسع عن قاسم بن إبراهيم. قال الأزهريّ: كنت أقعد مع ابن اليسع ساعة فيقول: قد ختمت ختمة[٨] منذ قعدت. وقاسم ليس بشيء. قال الدارقطنيّ: هو كذّاب. قلت: كافأ الله من عمل مثل هذا الحديث.[٩]

الحديث الخامس

٨٣ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث أبي هريرة عن النبيّ صلّى الله عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «يجمع[١٠] الله الناس فيقول: من كان يعبد شيئًا

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[١] الأصل: «الثقاة.»

[٢] دفع، ص٣٢: «ثم لا تنفع ثقة الرواة.»

[٣] دفع، ص٣٢: «اخبرنا»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ.

[٤] الأصل: «الثقاة»؛ دفع، ص٣٢: «المعدلين.»

[٥] دفع، ص٣٢: «روي عن انس قال قال رسول»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٦و: «روي عن انس بن مالك رضي الله عنه قال قال رسول.»

[٦] قارن ميزان الاعتدال، ج٣، ص٣٦٧.

[٧] دفع، ص٣٢: «ابو القاسم محمد بن اليسع.»

[٨] دفع، ص٣٢: «الختمة.»

[٩] دفع، ص٣٢: «من عمل هذا»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب ٢٦و.

[١٠] الأصل: بدون نقط.

رواية عن ابن عبّاس: رآه كأنّ قدميه على خضرة دونه ستر من لؤلؤ. قلت: وهذا يرويه إبراهيم[١] بن الحكم بن أبان وقد ضعّفه[٢] يحيى بن معين وغيره. وفي رواية[٣] أخرى عن ابن عبّاس عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «رأيت ربّي جعداً أمرد عليه حلّة خضراء». قلت: هذا يُروى من حديث[٤] حمّاد بن سلمة وكان ابن أبي العوجاء الزنديق ربيب حمّاد. وكان يدسّ في كتبه هذه الأحاديث، على أنّ هذا كان منامًا والمنام خيال، ومثل هذه الأحاديث لا ثبوت لها. فلا يحسن أن يحتجّ بمثلها في الوضوء. وقد أثبت بها القاضي صفات للّه سبحانه. فقال: قوله شابّ وأمرد وجعد وقطط والفراش والنعلان[٥] والتاج، قال: يثبت ذلك تسميّة لا نعقل معناها. وليس في إثبات أكثر من تقريب المحدث من القديم، وذلك جائز كما رُوي: يدني عبده إليه، يعني يقرّبه إلى ذاته. [قلت:] ومن يثبت بالمنام وبما لا يصحّ صفات،[٦] وقد عرفنا معنى الشابّ والأمرد ما هو فنقول[٧] كما نعلم،[٨] كمن يقول: قام فلان وما هو قائم[٩] وقعد وليس بقاعد.

٨٠ قال ابن عقيل: هذا حديث مقطوع[١٠] بأنّه كذب. ومن صنع

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[١] الأصل: «ابو ابرهيم». كتاب الأسماء، ص٤٤٤: «ابراهيم»؛ فكذلك في الطبقات لابن سعد، ج ٥، ص٥٤٨.

[٢] الأصل: الضاد غير منقوطة.

[٣] الأصل: «روايه».

[٤] دفع، ص٣٢: «مروي عن طريق حماد...»

[٥] الأصل: «النعلين.»

[٦] دفع، ص٣٢: «وما صح نقله صفات»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ.

[٧] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.

[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٩] الأصل: «وما لا يصح صفات هو قائم»، ولكنّ «لا يصح صفات» مشطوبة.

[١٠] دفع، ص٣٢: «هذا الحديث نجزم بأنه»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ: «الحديث مقطوع بانه.»

الحديث الثالث

٧٧ روت أم الطفيل، امرأة أُبَيّ، أنّها سمعت رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم يذكر أنّه رأى ربّه عزّ وجلّ في المنام في أحسن صورة شابًّا موقّرًا،[١] رجلاه في خضر، عليه نعلان[٢] من ذهب، على وجهه فراش من ذهب.

٧٨ قلت: هذا حديث يرويه نعيم بن حمّاد. قال ابن عديّ: كان يضع الحديث. قال يحيى بن معين: ليس نعيم بشيء في الحديث.[٣] وفي إسناده مروان بن عثمان عن عمارة بن عامر.[٤] قال أبو عبد الرحمن النسائيّ: ومن مروان حتّى يُصدَّق على اللّه عزّ وجلّ؟ قال مهنّأ[٥] بن يحيى: سألت[٦] أحمد عن هذا الحديث، فحوّل وجهه[٧] عنّي وقال: هذا حديث منكر، هذا رجل مجهول يعنى مروان بن عثمان. قال: ولا يُعرَف أيضًا عمارة.

٧٩ وقد روى عبيد[٨] اللّه بن أبي سلمة قال: بعث ابن عمر إلى عبد اللّه بن عبّاس: «هل رأى محمّد ربّه؟ فأرسل إليه: إنّ نعم قد رآه. فردّ الرسول إليه: كيف رآه؟ قال: رآه على كرسيّ من ذهب تحمله أربعة من الملائكة في صورة رجل شابّ». قلت: وهذا الحديث [20a] تفرّد به [ابن] إسحاق[٩] وكذّبه جماعة من العلماء في

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[١] دفع، ص ٣١: «منورا»؛ تأريخ بغداد، ج١٣، ص٣١١: «موفرا»؛ كتاب الموضوعات لابن الجوزيّ، ج١، ص ١٢٥: «موفورا.»

[٢] دفع، ص ٣١: «منورا في خضر في رجله نعلان»؛ تأريخ بغداد، ج١٣، ص٣١١: «موفرا رجلاه في خف عليه نعلان.»

[٣] قارن تأريخ بغداد، ج١٣، ص٣١٢؛ وكتاب الموضوعات، ج١، ص١٢٥.

[٤] ميزان الاعتدال، ج٣، ص١٧٧: «عمارة بن عمار.»

[٥] في هامش الأصل: «مهنّى» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[٦] دفع، ص ٣١: «سئل.»

[٧] دفع، ص ٣١: «فأعرض بوجهه عنه.»

[٨] كتال الأسماء للبيهقيّ، ص٤٤٣: «عبد اللّه»؛ فكذلك في ميزان الاعتدال، ج٣، ص٤٧٣.

[٩] كتاب الأسماء، ص٤٤٣: «محمد بن اسحاق»؛ فكذلك في كتاب التوحيد لابن خزيكة، ص١٩٨.

رأيته على[١] أحسن صفاته معي[٢] من الإقبال عليّ والرضى عنّي. وإن قلنا: ترجع إلى رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم فالمعنى رأيته وأنا على أحسن صورة.

٧٦ قلت: والعجب مع اضطراب هذه الأحاديث وكون مثلها لا يثبت به حكم في الوضوء وإنّ ابن حامد أثبت بها صفات اللّه سبحانه. روى ابن حامد من حديث ابن عبّاس عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «لمّا أُسرِي بي رأيت الرحمن تعالى في أحسن صورة شابّ[٣] أمرد[٤] يتلألأ، وقد نُهيت عن صفته لكم، فسألت ربّي [19b] أن يكرمني برؤيته فإذاً هو كأنّه عروس حين كشف عنه حجابه مستوٍ على عرشه». قلت: هذا حديث كذب قبيح. ما رُوي قطّ في[٥] صحيح ولا في كذب مشهور.[٦] فأبعد اللّه من عمله فقد كنّا نقول ذلك في المنام[٧] فذكر هذا في ليلة الإسراء. كافأه[٨] اللّه وجزاهم[٩] النار يشبّهون اللّه بعروس، ما قال[١٠] هذا مسلم؟ وأمّا ذكر[١١] البرد في الحديث الماضي فإنّ البرد عرض لا يجوز أن يُنسَب إلى اللّه تعالى. فقد ذكر القاضي في كتاب الكفاية عن أحمد: «رأيت ربّي في أحسن صورة»، أي في أحسن موضع.

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[١] الأصل: «في على» ولكنّ «في» مشطوبة.

[٢] دفع، ص٣٠: «صفاته من الاقبال»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ. قارن مشكل لابن فورك،ص٧١، س٤.

[٣] دفع، ص٣١: «في صورة شاب»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ.

[٤] دفع، ص٣١: «أمرد له نور»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ.

[٥] دفع، ص٣١: «روي قط لا في»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ: «روي لا في».

[٦] سقط «مشهور» في دفع، ص٣١: ؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ.

[٧] دفع، ص٣١: «ذاك منام»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ: «ذلك منام».

[٨] دفع، ص٣١: «كافأهم»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ.

[٩] الأصل: «حراهم.»

[١٠] دفع، ص٣١: «ما كتب هذا مسلم»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ.

[١١] دفع، ص٣١: «اما حديث»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥ظ.

كلّها ضعيفة وأحسن طرقه يدلّ على أنّ ذلك كان في النوم.[١] وقد رُوي من حديث أبي هريرة قال: قال رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: «أتاني آتٍ في أحسن صورة فقال: فيم يختصم الملأ الأعلى؟ قلت: لا أدري. فوضع كفّه بين كتفيّ فوجدت بردها بين ثديي فعرفت كلّ شيء يسألني عنه». ورُوي من حديث ثوبان قال: خرج علينا رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم بعد صلاة الصبح فقال: «إنّ ربّي أتاني الليلة في أحسن صورة فقال لي: يا محمّد، فيم يختصم الملأ الأعلى؟ قلت: لا أدري[٢] يا ربّ. [19a] فوضع كفّه بين كتفيّ حتّى وجدت برد أنامله في صدري، فتجلّى لي [ما] بين السماء والأرض». ورُوي عن أبي عبيدة بن الجرّاح عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «لمّا كنت ليلة أُسري بي رأيت ربّي في أحسن صورة».

٧٥ قلت: وهذه الأحاديث مختلفة وليس فيها ما يثبت، وفي بعضها «أتاني آت»، وذلك يرفع الإشكال وقوله «رأيت ربّي». فقد رُوي أنّه كان منامًا ورؤيا المنام وَهْم قد جعلها دلالة على أمر كان أو يكون، والأوهام لا تكون حقائق فإنّ الإنسان يرى أنّه يطير أو إنّه[٣] قد صار بهيمة. فإن قالوا: منامات الأنبياء حقّ قلنا: ثمراتها[٤] ومقاصدها لا صور المرئيات. فقد قال: من رآني في المنام فقد رآني، قلت: أراد أنّ ما رأى له فائدة صحيحة وثمرة[٥] حسنة، لا أنّه رأى صورته المدفونة بالمدينة، فقد يرى شيخًا وما كان شيخًا. وبيان[٦] ما قلناه أنّ الجسم تراه العين الحسّيّة وتلك لا تُرى في حالة النوم. وقد رأى أقوام في منامهم الحقّ سبحانه وتعالى فالمعنى

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[١] كتاب الأسماء للبيهقيّ، ص٣٠٠: «وقد روى من وجه آخر وكلها ضعيف وأحسن طريق فيه رواية جهضم ابن عبد اللّه ثم رواية موسى بن خلف وفيهما ما دل على ان ذلك كان في النوم.»

[٢] دفع، ص٣٠: «اعلم»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٠و.

[٣] دفع، ص٣٠: «يرى كأنه يطير او كأنه قد صار»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥و.

[٤] الأصل: الثاء غير منقوطة.

[٥] الأصل: الثاء غير منقوطة.

[٦] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة.

تخليط وتهافت لأنّ معنى كلامه أنّ صورة آدم كصورة الحقّ. وقال القاضي: يُطلَق على الحقّ تسميّة الصورة لا كالصور كما أطلقنا اسم الذات. قلت: وهذا تخليط لأنّ الذات بمعنى شيء. وأمّا الصورة فهي هيئة وتخاطيط [18b] وتأليف وتفتقر إلى مصوّر ومؤلّف، وقول القائل لا كالصور يفضي[1] بمنزلة من يقول: جسم لا كالأجسام فقد نقض[2] ما قال.[3]

الحديث الثاني

٧٢ روى عبد الرحمن بن عائش[4] عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم إنّه قال: «رأيت ربّي في أحسن صورة فقال لي: فيم يختصم الملأ الأعلى يا محمّد؟ قلت: أنت أعلم يا ربّ، فوضع كفّه بين كتفيّ فوجدت بردها بين ثديي، فعلمت ما في السموات والأرض».

٧٣ قال أحمد: أصل هذا الحديث وطرقه مضطربة.[5] قال الدارقطنيّ: يرويه معاذ من رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم وكلّ أسانيده مضطربة ليس فيها صحيح. ورواه قتادة عن أنس واختُلف على قتادة. فرواه يوسف بن عطيّة عن قتادة ووهم فيه. ورواه هشام عن قتادة عن أبي قلابة عن خالد بن اللَجْلاج عن ابن عبّاس ووهم في قوله عن ابن عبّاس وإنّما رواه خالد عن عبد الرحمن بن عائش[6] وعبد الرحمن لم يسمعه من رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم. إنّما رواه عن مالك بن يَخامِر عن معاذ.

٧٤ قلت: قد ذكرنا أنّه لا يصحّ. وقال أبو بكر البيهقيّ: فقد رُوي من أوجه

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[1] الأصل: غير واحضة.

[2] الأصل: «نفص.»

[3] دفع، ص ٢٩: «لا كالصور نقض لما قاله وصار بمثابة من يقول جسم لا كالأجسام فان الجسم ما كان مؤلفًا فاذا قال لا كالأجسام نقض ما قال.»

[4] دفع، ص٢٩: «عايس»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥و.

[5] الأصل: «مطربه»، ولكنّ «ض» مكتوبة فوق «مطربه» لعلّ للناسخ.

[6] الأصل: «عايس.»

الحديث فيه ثلاث علل، أحدهنّ أنّ الثوريّ[١] والأعمش اختلفا فيه فأرسله الثوريّ ورفعه الأعمش. والثانية أنّ الأعمش كان يدلّس فلم يذكر أنّه سمعه من حبيب بن أبي[٢] ثابت. والثالثة أنّ حبيبًا كان يدلّس ولم يعلم[٣] أنّه سمعه من عطاء. قلت: وهذا كلّه يوجب وهنًا في الحديث ثمّ هو محمول على إضافة الصورة إليه ملكًا.

٧١ القول الثاني أنّ تكون الصورة بمعنى الصفة. تقول:[٤] هذا صورة الأمر،[٥] أي صفته فيكون المعنى خلق[٦] آدم على صفته من الحياة[٧] والعلم والقدرة والسمع والبصر والكلام والإرادة. فمُيّز[٨] بذلك على جميع الحيوانات. ثمّ ميّزه على الملائكة بصفة التعالى حين أسجدهم له. قال ابن عقيل: إنّما خصّ آدم بإضافة صورته إليه لتخصيصه وهي السلطنة التي تشاكلها الربوبيّة استعباداً وسجوداً وأمراً نافذاً وسياسات تعمر[٩] بها البلاد ويصلح به العباد، وليس في الملائكة والجنّ من يجمع[١٠] على طاعته نوعه وقبيله سوى الآدمي، وهذا هو الوجه الذي في تفسير الحديث وإنّ الصورة ههنا معنويّة لا صورة هي تخاطيط.[١١] وقد ذهب أبو محمّد بن قتيبة في هذا الحديث إلى مذهب قبيح فقال: للّه صورة [لا] كالصور[١٢] فخلق آدم عليها. وهذا

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] في هامش الأصل: «ابي.»

[٣] في هامش الأصل: «يعلم» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[٤] الأصل: «التاء غير منقوطة.

[٥] دفع، ص٢٨: «هذا الامر.»

[٦] دفع، ص ٢٨: «ويكون خلق»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥و.

[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٨] دفع، ص٢٨: «فميزه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥و.

[٩] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[١٠] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١١] دفع، ص ٢٨: «لا صورة تخاطيط.»

[١٢] دفع، ص ٢٩: «لا كالصور»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٥و.

كأنّه نبّهه[1] على أنّك قد سببت آدم ومن[2] ولده. وكان ذلك مبالغة في زجره. فعلى هذا تكون «الهاء» كناية[3] عن المضروب، ومن الخطأ الفاحش أن ترجع إلى اللّه تعالى لقوله «ووجه من أشبه وجهك». فإنّه إذا نُسب[4] إليه سبحانه كان تشبيهًا صريحًا. وفي الصحيح لمسلم من حديث أبي هريرة عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: إذا قاتل أحدكم [أخاه] فليجتنب الوجه فإنّ اللّه خلق آدم على صورته.

٦٩ القول الثاني: إنّ «الهاء» كناية عن اسمين ظاهرين، فلا يصلح أن تُصرَف إلى اللّه تعالى لقيام الدليل أنّه ليس بصورة.[5] فعادت إلى صورة آدم. ومعنى الحديث أنّ اللّه تعالى خلق آدم على صورته التي خلقه عليها تامًّا لم ينقله من نطفة إلى علقة كبنيه. هذا مذهب أبي سليمان الخطّابيّ وقد ذكره ثعلب في أماليه.

٧٠ القول الثالث أنّها تعود إلى اللّه تعالى وفي معنى ذلك قولان: أحدهما أن تكون صورة ملك لأنّها فعله وخلقه. فتكون إضافتها إليه من جهتين:[6] أحدهما التشريف بالإضافة كقوله تعالى ﴿وَطَهِّرْ بَيْتِي﴾. الثانية لأنّه ابتدعها[7] لا على مثال سبق. وقد رُوي هذا الحديث من طريق ابن عمر عن النبيّ صلّى[18a] اللّه عليه وسلّم أنّه قال: «لا تقبح الوجه فإنّ ابن[8] آدم خُلق على صورة الرحمن». قلت: هذا

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[1] دفع، ص٢٧: «نبه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٤ظ.

[2] دفع، ص٢٧: «وانت من ولده»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٤ظ.

[3] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.

[4] دفع، ص٢٧: «نسبه اليه»؛ فكذلك في البادي، ٢٤ظ.

[5] دفع، ص٢٨: «بذي صورة»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٤ظ، وكتاب الأسماء للبيهقيّ، ص٢٩٠.

[6] دفع، ص٢٨: «وجهين.»

[7] دفع، ص٢٨: «الثاني ابتدعها»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٤ظ: «والثاني لانه ابتدعها.»

[8] تأويل مختلف الحديث لابن قتيبة، ص ٢٧٧: «فان اللّه عز وجل خلق آدم»؛ فذلك في كتاب الأسماء للبيهقي، ٢٩١؛ كتاب التوحيد لابن خزيمة، ص٣٨: «فان ابن آدم خلق.»

باب في ذكر
الأحاديث التي سمّوها أخبار الصفات

٦٦ اعلم أنّ للأحاديث دفائن[١] وآفات لا يعرفها إلا العلماء الفقهاء تارة في نقلها[٢] وتارة في كشف معناها. فسنوضح[٣] من ذلك إن شاء اللّه تعالى.

الحديث الأوّل

٦٧ روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين من حديث أبي هريرة قال: قال رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: «خلق اللّه آدم على صورته».

٦٨ قلت: للناس في هذا مذهبان، أحدهما السكوت عن تفسيره والثاني الكلام في معناه. واختلف أرباب هذا المذهب في «الهاء» إلى من تعود على ثلاثة أقوال. أحدها تعود إلى بعض بني آدم، قالوا:[٤] وذلك أنّ النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم مرّ برجل يضرب[٥] رجلاً في وجهه[٦] وهو يقول: «قبح اللّه وجهك ووجه [17b] من أشبه وجهك». فقال: «إذا ضرب أحدكم فليتّق الوجه فإنّ اللّه خلق آدم على صورته». قالوا: وإنّما اقتصر بعض الرواة على بعض الحديث فيُحمَل[٧] المقتصر على المفسَّر. قالوا: فـ«وجه من أشبه وجهك» يتضمّن سبّ الأنبياء والمؤمنين، وإنّما خُصّ آدم بذكر لأنّه هو الذي أُبدِئت[٨] خلقة وجهه على هذه الصورة التي احتذى عليها من بعده،

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[١] دفع، ص٢٦: «دقائق»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٤ظ.

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط؛ الباز الأشهب (بيروت، ١٩٨٧)، ص٦٣: «نظمها».

[٣] الأصل: «فسنوصح».

[٤] دفع، ص٢٧: «قال»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٤ظ.

[٥] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[٦] سقط «في وجهه» في دفع، ص٢٧؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٤ظ.

[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٨] دفع، ص٢٧: «ابتدئت»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٤ظ.

[الآية الحادية عشرة]

٦٣ ومنها ﴿يُؤْذُونَ اللّهَ﴾. قلت: يؤذون أولياءه كقوله تعالى ﴿وَاسْأَلِ القَرْيَةَ﴾ أي أهلها. وقال عليه الصلاة والسلام: أُحُد جبل يحبّنا ونحبّه. قال الشاعر:

[الكامل]

أُنْبِئْتُ[1] أنَّ النارَ بَعْدَكَ أُوقِدَتْ واسْتَبَّ بَعْدَكَ يَاكُلَيْبُ المَجلِسُ

[الآية الثانية عشرة]

٦٤ ومنها قوله تعالى ﴿هَلْ يَنْظُرُونَ إلا أَنْ يأتِيَهُمُ اللّهُ فِي ظُلَلٍ﴾، أي [17a] بظلل وكذلك قوله تعالى ﴿وَجَاءَ رَبُّكَ﴾. قلت: ذكر القاضي أبو يعلى عن أحمد ين حنبل أنّه قال في قوله تعالى ﴿أَنْ يَأتِيَهُمُ اللّهُ﴾، قال: المراد به قدرته وأمره. قال: وقد بيّنه[2] في قوله تعالى ﴿أَو يَأتِيَ أَمْرُ رَبِّكَ﴾ ومثل هذا في التوراة ﴿وَجَاءَ رَبُّكَ﴾ قال: إنّما هي قدرته. قال ابن حامد: وهذا خطأ إنّما ينزل بذاته بانتقال.

٦٥ قلت: وهذا كلام في ذات الله سبحانه بمقتضى الحسّ كما يتكلّم في الأجسام. وقال ابن عقيل في قوله تعالى ﴿قُلِ الرُوحُ مِنْ أَمْرِ رَبِّي﴾، قال: من كفّ خلقه عن السؤال عن مخلوق فكفّهم[3] عن الخالق وصفاته أولى.[4]

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[1] كتاب الأمالي للقاليّ، ج١،ص٩٥: «نُبِّئْتُ»؛ انظر أيضًا زاد المسير، ج١، ص١١٦،و ج٥، ص٦٩.

[2] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[3] الأصل: «عن مخلوق فهم علم انه كفه عن»؛ دفع،ص٢٦: «عن مخلوق فكفهم عن.»

[4] وفي دفع إضافة: «وانشدوا: كيفية النفس ليس المرء يدركها -- فكيف كيفية الجبار في القدم» (ص٢٦) إلى النصّ.

هو عظيم عند الخلق.

[الآية التاسعة]

٦١ ومنها قوله تعالى ﴿ يَا حَسْرَتَى عَلَى مَا فَرَّطْتُ فِي جَنْبِ اللّهِ ﴾ أي في طاعته وأمره لأنّ التفريط لا يقع إلا في ذلك.[١] فأمّا الجنب المعهود من ذوي[٢] الجوارح فلا يقع فيه تفريط. وقال ابن حامد: نؤمن[٣] بأنّ للّه جنبًا لهذه الآية. قلت: واعجبًا من عدم العقل،[٤] إذا لم يتهيّأ التفريط في جنب مخلوق كيف[٥] يتهيّأ في صفة الخالق؟ وأنشد ثعلب وفسّره «خَلِيلِيّ كُفّا واذْكُرَا اللّهَ في جَنْبِي»، أي في أمري.

[الآية العاشرة]

٦٢ ومنها قوله تعالى ﴿ فَنَفَخْنَا فِيهِ مِنْ رُوحِنَا ﴾. قال المفسّرون: من رحمتنا[٦] والروح النفخ. قال الشاعر:

[الطويل]

فَقُلْتُ لَهُ ارْفَعْهَا إِلَيْكَ وأَحْيِهَا بِرُوحِكَ واقْتَتْهُ[٧] لَهَا قِيتَةً[٨] قَدْرَا

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[١١] دفع، ص٢٣: «الى مثل»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٤و: «في مثل.»

[١٢] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة.

[١٣] دفع، ص٢٣: «العظيم»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٤و.

[١] دفع، ص٢٣: «ذاته»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٤و: «ذلك».

[٢] دفع، ص٢٤: «ذي»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٤و.

[٣] الأصل: النون الأولى غير منقوطة.

[٤] دفع، ص٢٤: «العقول.»

[٥] دفع، ص٢٤: «فكيف.»

[٦] يضمّ صاحب لدفع (ص٢٤) «وانما نسب الروح اليه لانه بامره كان» إلى النصّ.

[٧] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط؛ قارن ديوان غيلان بن عقبة، ص١٧٦؛ و لسان العرب، ج٢، ص٤٦٠.

قيل: أنتم[١] تلزموننا أن نقرّ[٢] بما[٣] لا يدخل تحت الفهم قلنا: إن أردت بالفهم التخيّل والتصوّر فإنّ الخالق لا يدخل تحت[٤] ذلك إذ ليس بمحسّ، ولا يدخل تحت ذلك إلا جسم له لون وقدر فإنّ الخيال قد أنس[٥] بالمبصرات فهو لا يتوهّم شيئًا إلا على وفق ما رآه لأنّ الوهم من نتائج الحسّ. وإن أردت أنّه لا يُعلم بالعقل فقد دللنا أنّه ثابت بالعقل لأنّ العقل مضطرّ إلى التصديق بموجب الدليل. واعلم أنّك لمّا لم تجد إلا جسمًا أو جوهرًا أو عرضًا وعلمت تنزيه الخالق عن ذلك بدليل العقل الذي صرفك عن ذلك فينبغي أن يصرفك عن كونه متحيّزًا أو متحرّكًا أو منتقلاً. ولمّا كان مثل هذا الكلام [16b] لا يفهمه العامّي، قلنا: لا تسمعوه[٦] ما لا يفهمه ودعوا اعتقاده، لا تحرّكوه بل يسّروه أن لا يساكن[٧] الجبال[٨] ويُقال: إنّ اللّه تعالى استوى على عرشه كما يليق به.

[الآية الثامنة]

٦٠ ومن الآيات قوله تعالى ﴿ أَأَمِنْتُمْ مَنْ فِي السَمَاءِ ﴾، قلت: قد ثبت قطعًا أنّها[٩] ليست على ظاهرها لأنّ لفظة «في» للظرفيّة والحقّ سبحانه غير مظروف. فإذا امتنع[١٠] الحسّ أن يتصرّف في مثل[١١] هذا، بقي[١٢] وصف التعظيم[١٣] بما

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.

[٣] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة.

[٤] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[٥] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[٦] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

[٧] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[٨] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[٩] دفع، ص٢٣: «ان الآية»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٤و.

[١٠] الأصل: «فاذا امنع»؛ دفع، ص٢٣: «فاذا منع»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٤و.

مكانه:[١] يا ربّ خفِّف عنّا!». الجواب أنّ أبا سليمان [16a] الخطّابيّ قال: هذه لفظة تفرّد بها شريك ولم يذكرها غيره وهو كثير التفرّد بمناكير الألفاظ. قال:[٢] المكان لا يُضاف إلى اللّه عزّ وجلّ، إنّما هو مكان النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم ومقامه الأوّل الذي أقيم فيه. قال الخطّابيّ:[٣] وفي هذا الحديث «فأستأذن[٤] على ربّي وهو في داره»[٥] توهّم[٦] مكانًا وإنّما المعنى «في داره» التي دوّرها لأوليائه.[٧] وقد قال القاضي أبو يعلى في كتاب المعتمد: إنّ اللّه تعالى لا يُوصَف بالمكان.

٥٩ فإن قيل: نفي[٨] الجهات يحيل وجوده، قلنا: إن كان الموجود يقبل[٩] الاتّصال والانفصال فقد صدقت. فأمّا إذا لم يقبلهما[١٠] فليس خلوّه من طرفي النقيض[١١] بمحال ويوضح[١٢] هذا، لو قلت: كلّ موجود لا يخلو[١٣] أن يكون عالمًا أو جاهلاً، قلت: إن كان ذلك الموجود يقبل الضدّين.[١٤] فإذا لم يقبلهما كالحائط مثلاً فإنّه لا يقبل العلم ولا الجهل ونحن ننفي عن الخالق كلّ ما يدلّ على الحدث. فإن

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[١] الصحيح للبخاريّ، توحيد ٣٧: «وهو مكانه.»

[٢] الأصل: «قالوا»؛ سقط الفعل في دفع، ص٢٢، وأيضًا في الباز الأشهب، ٢٣ظ.

[٣] سقط «قال الخطابي» في دفع، ص٢٢.

[٤] دفع، ص٢٢: «فاستاذنت»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٣ظ.

[٥] الصحيح للبخاريّ، توحيد ٢٤: «ربّي في داره.»

[٦] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٧] يضمّ البيهقيّ «وهي الجنة» إلى النصّ (كتاب الأسماء ص٤٤٢).

[٨] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[٩] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة.

[١٠] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[١١] الأصل: النون والقاف غير منقوطتين.

[١٢] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[١٣] الأصل: «يخلوا».

[١٤] الأصل: الضاد غير منقوطة..

وليست بمعنى القصد ولا الاستعلاء. قال: وكان [15b] أحمد لا يقول بالجهة للبارئ لأنّ الجهات تخلّي عمّا سواها. وقال ابن حامد: الحقّ يختصّ بمكان دون مكان ومكانه الذي هو فيه وجود ذاته على عرشه. قال: وذهبت طائفة إلى أنّ اللّه على عرشه قد ملأه. قال: والأشبه أنّه مماسّ العرش[١] والكرسيّ موضع قدميه. قلت: المماسّة إنّما تقع بين جسمين. وما أبقى هذا في التجسيم بقيّة!

فصل

٥٧ واعلم أنّ كلّ من يتصوّر وجود الحقّ سبحانه وجوداً مكانيّاً طلب له جهة كما أنّ من تخيّل أنّ وجوده وجوداً زمانيّاً طلب له مدّة في تقدّمه[٢] على العالم بأزمنة. وكلا التخييلين باطل، وقد ثبت أنّ جميع الجهات تتساوى بالإضافة إلى القابل بالجهة. فاختصاصه ببعضها ليس بواجب لذاته، بل هو جائز فيحتاج إلى مخصّص يخصّصه ويكون الاختصاص بذلك المعنى زائداً على ذاته، وما تطرّق الجواز إليه استحال قدمه لأنّ القديم[٣] هو الواجب الوجود من جميع الجهات. ثمّ إنّ كلّ من هو في جهة يكون مقدّراً محدوداً وهو يتعالى[٤] عن ذلك. وإنّما الجهات للجواهر والأجسام لأنّها أجرام تحتاج إلى جهة والجهة ليست في جهة. وإذا ثبت بطلان الجهة ثبت بطلان المكان ويوضحه أنّ المكان إذا كان يحيط بمن فيه والخالق لا يحويه شيء ولا تُحدَث له صفة.

٥٨ فإن قيل: فقد أخرج[٥] في الصحيحين من حديث شريك ابن أبي نمر عن أنس أنّه ذكر حديث المعراج فقال فيه «فعلا به إلى الجبّار تعالى فقال وهو في

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[١] دفع، ص٢١: «مماس للعرش».

[٢] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[٣] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[٤] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[٥] الأصل: بدون نطق.

والفصل من حيث الحسّي يوجب عليه ما يوجب على الجواهر، ومعنى الحيّز أنّ الذي يختصّ به يمنع مثله أن يُوجَد بحيث هو. وكلام هؤلاء كلّه مبنيّ على الحسّ، وقد حملهم الحسّ على التشبيه والتخليط حتّى قال بعضهم: إنّما ذكر الاستواء[١] لأنّه أقرب الموجودات إليه. وهذا جهل أيضًا لأنّ أقرب[٢] المسافة[٣] لا يتصوّر إلا في حقّ جسم.[٤] وقال بعضهم: جهة العرش تحاذي ما يقابله من الذات ولا تحاذي جميع الذات. وهذا صريح في التجسيم والتبعيض، ويعزّ علينا كيف ينتسب[٥] هذا القائل إلى مذهبنا. واحتج بعضهم بأنّه على العرش بقوله عزّ وجلّ ﴿إِلَيْهِ يَصْعَدُ الكَلِمُ الطَّيِّبُ﴾ وقوله[٦] تعالى ﴿وَهُوَ القَاهِرُ فَوْقَ عِبَادِهِ﴾. وجعلوا ذلك فوقيّة حسّيّة ونسبوا إلى الفوقيّة الحسّيّة بجسم أو جوهر[٧] ونسوا[٨] أنّ الفوقيّة قد تُطلق لعلو الرتبة[٩] فيُقال: فلان فوق فلان. ثمّ إنّه كما قال[١٠] ﴿فَوْقَ عِبَادِهِ﴾ [قال تعالى:] ﴿وَهُوَ مَعَكُمْ﴾، فمن حملها[١١] على العلم حمّل خصمه الاستواء على القهر.

٥٦ أخبرنا عليّ بن محمّد [بن] أبي عمر الدبّاس قال أنبأنا رزق اللّه بن عبد الوهّاب التميميّ قال: كان أحمد بن حنبل يقول: الاستواء صفة مسلّمة

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[١٢] دفع، ص٢١: «فيها شيء»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٣ظ.

[١] دفع، ص٢١: «الاستواء على العرش»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٣ظ.

[٢] دفع، ص٢١: «قرب»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٣ظ.

[٣] هكذا في الأصل؛ لعلّها: «مساحة.»

[٤] دفع، ص٢١: «في جسم»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٣ظ.

[٥] دفع، ص٢١: «ينسب.»

[٦] دفع، ص٢١: «بقوله.»

[٧] دفع، ص٢٣: «ونسوا أن الفوقية الحسية إما ان تكون لجسم او جوهر.»

[٨] الأصل: «نسبوا.»

[٩] دفع، ص٢١: «المرتبة»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٣ظ.

[١٠] الأصل: «كما كان قال» و«كان» مشطوبة.

[١١] الباز الأشهب (بيروت، ١٩٨٧)، ص٥٦: «حملهما.»

عليه][1] قالوا: بجواز[2]حدثه، وإن منعوا جواز هذا عليه لم يبق لنا طريق إلى إثبات[3] حدث الجواهر. ومتى قدّرنا مستغنيًا عن المحلّ والحيّز ومحتاجًا إلى الحيّز ثمّ قلنا: إمّا أن يكونا متجاورين أو متباينين كان ذلك محالاً، فإنّ التجاور والتباين من لوازم المتحيّز[4] في المتحيّزات. فكيف يكون المستغني عن التحيّز بل المستحيل عليه التحيّز، إمّا متجاوراً وإمّا متباينًا وقد ثبت أنّ الاجتماع والافتراق من لوازم التحيّز؟ والحقّ سبحانه لا يُوصف بالتحيّز لأنّه لو كان متحيّزاً لم يخل [إمّا] أن يكون ساكنًا في حيّزه أو متحرّكًا عنه، ولا يجوز أن يُوصف بحركة ولا سكون ولا اجتماع و لا افتراق.[5] وما جاور أو تباين[6] [15a] فقد تناهى ذاتًا والمتناهي[7] إذا اختصّ بمقدار استدعى مخصّصًا.

٥٥ ولذلك ينبغي أن يُقال: ليس بداخل العالم[8] وليس بخارج منه لأنّ الدخول والخروج من لوازم المتحيّزات وهما كالحركة والسكون وسائر الأعراض التي تختصّ[9] بالأجرام النيّ وأمّا قولهم: خلق الأماكن لا في ذاته فثبت انفصاله عنها [ف]قلت:[10] ذاته[11] لا تقبل أن يُخلق فيها شيء ولا أن يحلّ فيها [شيء]،[12]

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[1] قارن، دفع، ص٢٠.

[2] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة وبدون الألف.

[3] دفع، ص٢٠: «لاثبات.»

[4] دفع، ص٢٠: «التحيز»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٣و: «المتحيز.»

[5] في هامش الأصل: «من لوازم التحيز والحق سبحانه لا يوصف بالتحيز لانه لو كان متحيزا لم يحل ان يكون ساكنا في حيزه او متحركا عنه ولا يجوز ام يوصف بحركة ولا سكون ولا اجتماع ولا افتراق» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[6] دفع، ص٢٠: «ومن جاور او باين»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٣ظ: «وما جاور او باين.»

[7] دفع، ص٢٠: «التناهى.»

[8] دفع، ص٢٠: «في العالم.»

[9] دفع، ص٢٠: «تحس»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٣و: «تختص.»

[10] دفع، ص٢١: «قلنا»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٣ظ.

[11] دفع، ص٢١: «ذاته المقدسة.»

قال: لا إنّما خلق العالم بصفة التحت فصار العالم بالإضافة [14b] إليه أسفل. وإذا ثبت لإحدى الذاتين [صفة] التحت ثبت للأخرى استحقاق صفة الفوق وقد[١] ثبت أنّ الأماكن ليست في ذاته ولا ذاته فيها فثبت انفصاله عنها ولا بدّ من مدى[٢] يحصل به الفصل. فلمّا قال: ﴿ثُمَّ اسْتَوَى عَلَى العَرْشِ﴾ علمنا اختصاصه بتلك الجهة. قال [ابن] الزاغونيّ: ولا بدّ أن يكون لذاته نهاية وغاية نعلمها.[٣]

٥٤ قلت: هذا رجل لا يدري ما يقول لأنّه إذا قدّر غاية وفصلاً بين الخالق والمخلوق فقد حدّده وأقرّ بأنّه جسم. وهو يقول في كتابه: إنّ اللّه ليس[٤] بجوهر لأنّ الجوهر ما تحيّز، ثمّ يثبت له مكانًا يتحيّز فيه. قلت: وهذا كلّه[٥] جهل من قائله وتشبيه محض، فما عرف هذا الشيخ ما يجب للخالق وما يستحيل عليه. فإنّ وجوده تعالى ليس كوجود الجوهر والأجسام التي لا بدّ لها من حيّز، والتحت والفوق إنّما يكون فيما يقابل ويحاذي.[٦] ومن ضرورة المحاذي[٧] أن يكون أكبر من المحاذى[٨] أو أصغر منه أو مثله. وإنّما يكون هذا في الأجسام.[٩] وكلّما يحاذي الأجسام يجوز أن يمسّها، وما جاز عليه مماسّة الأجسام ومباينتها فهو حادث، إذ قد ثبت أنّ الدليل على حدوث الجواهر [قبولها المماسّة والمباينة. فإن أجازوا هذا

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[١] دفع، ص١٩: «قال وقد ثبت.»

[٢] الأصل: «مدى»؛ دفع، ص١٩: «بدء»؛ الباز الأشهب (بيروت، ١٩٨٧): «شيء.»

[٣] دفع، ص١٩: «يعلمها.»

[٤] دفع، ص٢٠: «انه ليس.»

[٥] دفع، (ص٣٠) والباز الأشهب (٢٣و): «كلام.»

[٦] الأصل: الذال غير منقوطة.

[٧] الأصل: الذال غير منقوطة.

[٨] الأصل: الذال غير منقوطة.

[٩] دفع، ص٢٠: «او أصغر او مثله وان هذا ومثله انما يكون في الاجسام»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٣و.

٥١ وروى إسماعيل بن أبي خالد[١] الطائيّ قال: العرش ياقوتة حمراء. قلت: وجميع السلف على إمرار[٢] هذه الآية كما جاءت من غير[٣] تفسير ولا تأويل. قال عبد اللّه بن وهب: كنّا عند مالك بن أنس فدخل رجل فقال: يا أبا عبد اللّه، ﴿الرَحْمَانُ عَلَى العَرْشِ اسْتَوَى﴾ كيف استوى؟[٤] فأطرق مالك وأخذته الرحضاء. ثمّ رفع رأسه فقال: «الرحمن على العرش استوى» كما وصف نفسه ولا يُقال له كيف[٥] وكيف عنه مرفوع، وأنت رجل سوء صاحب بدعة. فأخرجوه فأخرج[٦]

٥٢ وقد حمل قوم من المتأخّرين هذه الصفة على مقتضى الحسّ، فقالوا: استوى على العرش بذاته. وهذه زيادة لم تُنقل،[٧] إنّما فهموها من إحساسهم وهو أنّ المستوي على الشيء إنّما يستوي عليه بذاته. وقال ابن حامد: الاستواء مماسّة، وصف[٨] لذاته والمراد به القعود. قال: وقد ذهبت طائفة [أصحابنا][٩] إلى أنّ اللّه على عرشه ما ملأه وأنّه يقعد نبيّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم معه على العرش. وقال: النزول انتقال. قلت: وعلى ما حكى تكون ذاته أصغر من العرش. فالعجب من قول هؤلاء:[١٠] ما نحن مجسّمة.

٥٣ وقيل لـ[ابن] الزاغونيّ: هل تجدّدت له صفة لم تكن بعد خلق العرش؟

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[١] الأصل: «حلله»؛ دفع (ص١٨) والباز الأشهب (٢٢ظ): «ابن أبي خالد»؛ زاد المسير، ج٣، ص٢١٣: «اسماعيل بن ابي خالد عن سعد الطائي».

[٢] دفع، ص١٨: «على ايراد».

[٣] في هامش الأصل: «غير» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[٤] كتاب الأسماء للبيهقيّ، ص٤٠٨: «استواؤه.»

[٥] المرجع السابق، ص٤٠٨: «ولا يقال كيف.»

[٦] المرجع السابق، ص٤٠٨: «أخرجوه قال فأخرج الرجل.»

[٧] دفع، (ص١٨) والباز الأشهب (٢٢ظ): «لم ينقلوها.»

[٨] دفع، ص١٩: «وصفه لذاته»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٢ظ: «وصف لذاته.»

[٩] دفع، ص١٩: «طائفة من اصحابنا»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٣و.

[١٠] دفع، ص١٩: «من قول هذا.»

[الآية السابعة]

٤٩ ومنها قوله تعالى: ﴿ثُمَّ اسْتَوَى عَلَى العَرْشِ﴾. قال الخليل بن أحمد: العرش السرير وكلّ سرير [الملك] يُسمّى عرشًا والعرش مشهور عند العرب في الجاهليّة والإسلام. قال أميّة بن أبي الصلت شعراً:

[الخفيف]

مَجِّدُوا اللّهَ ذَا المَجَدِّ فينَا[1] رَبُّنَا فِي السَمَاءِ أَمْسَى كَبِيرا
بِالبَنَاءِ الأَعْلَى الذِي سَبَقَ النا سَ وَسَوَّى فَوْقَ السَمَاءِ سَرِيرا
لا يَنَالُ السَرِيرَ نَاظِرُ عَيْـ نٍ وتَرَى دُونَهُ المَلائكَ صُورا[2]

٥٠ واعلم أنّ الاستواء في اللغة على وجوه، منها الاعتدال. قال بعض بني تميم: فاستوى ظالم العشيرة والمظلوم، أي اعتدلا، والاستواء تمام الشيء. قال اللّه تعالى: ﴿ولَمَّا بَلَغَ أَشُدَّهُ واسْتَوَى﴾ أي تمّ. [14a] والاستواء القصد إلى الشيء، قال تعالى: ﴿ثُمَّ اسْتَوَى إِلَى السَمَاءِ﴾ أي قصد خلقها. الاستواء الاستيلاء [على الشيء].[3] قال الشاعر:

[الرجز]

ثُمَّ[4] اسْتَوَى بِشْرٌ عَلَى العِرَاقِ[5] مِنْ غَيْرِ سَيْفٍ ودَمٍ مُهْرَاقِ

وقال آخر

[الطويل]

إِذَا مَا غَزَا قَوْمًا أَبَاحَ حَرِيمَهُمّ وأَضْحَى عَلَى مَا مَلَكُوهُ قد اسْتَوَى

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[1] ديوان لأميّة بن أبي الصلت، ص٤٢: «وهو»؛ زاد المسير، ج٣، ص٢١٢: «مجدوا اللّه فهو للمجد أهل.»

[2] ديوان، ص٤٢: «شرجعًا لا يناله بصر الناس ترى دونه الملائك صورا.»

[3] كذلك في دفع، ١٨.

[4] زاد المسير، ج٣، ٢١٣: «حتى»؛ لسان العرب، ج١٤، ص٤١٤: «قد.»

[5] الأصل: «العراقي»، والقاف غير منقوطة.

يريدون السجود فلا يستطيعون.[١]

٤٨ وقد ذهب [القاضي] إلى أنّ الساق صفة ذاتيّة. قال مثله: «يضع قدمه في النار» وقد حكى عن ابن مسعود أنّه قال: يكشف عن ساقه اليمنى فتضيء من نور ساقه الأرض. قلت: القدم مع الساق تشبيه محض[٢] وما ذكره عن ابن مسعود محال ولا يثبت للّه صفة بمثل هذه الخرافات ولا تُوصف ذاته بنور شعشعانيّ[٣] تضيء به الأمكنة.[٤] والاحتجاج[٥] بالإضافة ليس بشيء لأنّه إذا كشف عن شدّته[٦] كشف[٧] عن ساقه. وهؤلاء وقع لهم أنّ معنى يكشف يظهر وإنّما المعنى يزيل ويرفع. وقال ابن حامد:[٨] يجب الإيمان بأنّ للّه ساقًا صفة لذاته فمن جحد ذلك كفر. قلت: لو تكلّم بهذا عامّيّ[٩] كان قبيحًا وكيف ممّن يُنسب إلى العلم؟ وإنّما[١٠] المتأوّلون[١١] أعذر منه[١٢] لأنّهم ردّوا[١٣] الأمر إلى اللغة. وهؤلاء أثبتوا ساقًا للذات وقدمًا حتّى يتحقّق التجسيم والصورة.

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[١] في دفع إضافة: «فذلك قوله تعالى: يوم يكشف عن ساق ويدعون الى السجود فلا يستطيعون» إلى النصّ (ص١٦).

[٢] دفع، ص١٦: «قلت وذكره الساق مع القدم تشبيه محض.»

[٣] دفع (ص١٦) والباز الأشهب (٢٢ظ): «شعاعى.»

[٤] دفع، ص١٦: «الارض»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٢ظ: «الامكنة.»

[٥] دفع (ص١٦) والباز الأشهب (٢٢ظ): «احتجاجه.»

[٦] الأصل: «سدته.»

[٧] دفع، (ص١٦) والباز الأشهب (٢٢ظ): «فقد كشف.»

[٨] الأصل: «مجاهد»؛ دفع (ص١٦) والباز الأشهب (٢٢ظ): «ابن حامد.»

[٩] دفع، ص١٧: «عامى جلف»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٢ظ.

[١٠] دفع (ص١٧) والباز الأشهب (٢٢ظ): «فان.»

[١١] الأصل: «المتأولين»؛ دفع، ص١٧: «فان المتأولين.»

[١٢] دفع (ص١٧) والباز الأشهب (٢٢ظ): «منهم.»

[١٣] دفع، ص١٧: «يردون»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٢ظ: «ردوا.»

وقال آخر:

وإنْ[١] شَمَّرَتْ عَنْ سَاقِهَا الحَرْبُ شَمَّرا[٢]

قال ابن قتيبة: وأصل هذا أنّ الرجل إذا وقع في أمر عظيم يحتاج إلى معاناة[٣] الجدّ فيه، شمّر عن ساقه. فاستُعيرت الساق في موضع الشدّة.[٤] وهذا قول الفرّاء وأبي عبيدة وثعلب واللغويّين.

٤٧ وقد روى البخاريّ ومسلم في الصحيحين عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: إنّ اللّه تعالى[٥] «يَكْشِفُ عَنْ سَاقِهِ» وهذه إضافة إليه معناها: يكشف عن شدّته وأفعاله المضافة إليه ومعنى يكشف عنها: يزيلها. وقال عاصم بن كليب: رأيت سعيد[٦] بن جبير غضب وقال: يقولون: يكشف عن ساقه وإنّما قال عن أمر شديد.[٧] وقد ذكر أبو عمرو[٨] الزاهد أنّ الساق بمعنى النفس. قال: ومنه قول عليّ كرم اللّه وجهه لما قالت الشراة:[٩] لا حكم إلا للّه، فقال: لا بدّ من محاربتهم ولو تلفت[١٠] ساقي. فعلى هذا يكون المعنى يتجلّى لهم. وفي حديث أبى موسى عن النبيّ صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم [أنّه قال:] يكشف لهم الحجاب فينظرون إلى اللّه سبحانه ويخرّون [للّه] سجّداً ويبقى أقوام في ظهورهم مثل [13b] صياصي البقر

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[١] شرح ديوان جرير للصاويّ، ص٢٤١: «إذا شمّرت.»

[٢] من شعر جرير؛ كلّ البيت: «ألا رب سامي الطرف من آل مازن - اذا شمرت عن ساقها الحرب شمرا.»

[٣] تأويل مشكل القرآن، ص ١٠٣: «معاناته والجد»؛ فكذلك في زاد المسير، ج٨، ص٣٤١.

[٤] الأصل: «السدة.»

[٥] الأصل: «تع.»

[٦] الأصل: «سعد.»

[٧] دفع، ص١٦: «وانما ذلك من امر شديد»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٢و.

[٨] دفع، ص١٦: «ابو عمر»؛ فكذلك زاد المسير، ٨/ص٣٤١، وكتاب الأسماء للبيهقيّ، ص٣٤٧.

[٩] الأصل: «السراة.»

[١٠] الأصل: «تلف»؛ دفع، ص١٦: «تلفت»؛ زاد المسير، ج٨، ص٣٤١: «أقاتلهم ولو تلفت ساقي.»

عيسى ﴿ تَعْلَمُ مَا فِي نَفْسِي وَلا أَعْلَمُ مَا فِي نَفْسِكَ ﴾. قال المفسّرون: ويحذّركم اللّه إيّاه، وقالوا: تعلم ما عندي ولا أعلم ما عندك. قال المحقّقون: المراد بالنفس هاهنا الذات ونفس الشيء ذاته. وقد ذهب القاضي على أنّ [1] للّه نفسًا وهي صفة زائدة على ذاته. قلت: وهذا قول لا يستند إلا إلى التشبيه لأنّه يوجب أنّ الذات شيء والنفس غيرها. وحكى ابن حامد أعظم من هذا. فقال: ذهبت طائفة في قوله تعالى ﴿ وَنَفَخْتُ فِيهِ مِنْ رُوحِي ﴾ أنّ تلك الروح صفة من ذاته وأنّها إذا خرجت رجعت إلى اللهّ تعالى. قلت: وهذا أقبح من كلام [13a] النصارى. فما أبقى هذا من التشبيه بقيّة!

[الآية الخامسة]

٤٥ ومنها قوله تعالى ﴿ لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ ﴾ ظاهر الكلام أنّ له مثلاً، وليس [2] كمثله شيء وليس كذلك وإنّما معناه عند أهل اللغة أن يُقام المثل مقام الشيء نفسه، يقول [الرجل]: [3] مثلي لا يكلّم مثلك، وإنّما المعنى: ليس [4] كهو شيء.

[الآية السادسة]

٤٦ ومنها قوله تعالى ﴿يَوْمَ يُكْشَفُ عَنْ سَاقٍ ﴾. قال ابن عبّاس ومجاهد وإبراهيم النخعيّ وقتادة وجمهور العلماء: [يُكشف] عن شدّة [5] وأنشدوا:

وقَامَتِ الحَرْبُ عَلَى سَاقٍ بِنَا [6]

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[1] دفع، ص١٣: «الى ان»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ.

[2] دفع، ص١٤: «فليس»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٢و.

[3] دفع، ص١٤: «يقول الرجل مثلي»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٢و.

[4] في هامش الأصل: «ليس.»

[5] الأصل: «سده.»

[6] زاد المسير، ج٨، ص٣٤١: «وقامت الحرب بنا على ساق.»

٤٣ ثمّ أخبر[١] أنّه نفخ فيه من روحه، ولم يرد إلا الوضع [12b] بالفعل[٢] والتكوين فالمعنى[٣] نفخت أنا، ويكفي شرف الإضافة إذ لا يليق بالخالق سوى ذلك لأنّه لا يحتاج أن يفعل بواسطة ولا له أعضاء وجوارح يفعل بها لأنّه الغنيّ بذاته. فلا ينبغي أن يُتشاغل بطلب تعظيم آدم[٤] مع الغفلة عمّا يستحقّ البارئ سبحانه من التعظيم بنفى الأبعاض والعادات[٥] في الأفعال لأنّ هذه الأشياء صفة الأجسام. وقد ظنّ بعض البله[٦] أنّ اللّه تعالى يمسّ حتّى توهّموا أنّه مسّ طينة آدم بيد هي بعض ذاته، وما فطنوا أنّ من جملة مخلوقاته جسمًا يقابل جسمًا فيجذبه[٧] ويفعل فيه ومن السحرة من يعقد عقداً فيتغيّر[٨] به حال وصفة. أفتراه سبحانه جعل أفعال الأشخاص والأجسام تتعدّى[٩] إلى أجسام بعيدة، ثمّ يحتاج هو في أفعاله إلى معاناة الطين؟ ثمّ قد[١٠] ردّ قول من يقول[١١] هذا بقوله تعالى ﴿إِنَّ مَثَلَ عِيسَى عِنْدَ اللّهِ كَمَثَلِ آدَمَ خَلَقَهُ مِنْ تُرَابٍ ثُمَّ قَالَ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ﴾.

[الآية الرابعة]

٤٤ ومنها قوله تعالى ﴿وَيُحَذِّرُكُمُ اللّهُ نَفْسَهُ﴾ وقوله تعالى على لسان

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[١] دفع، ص١٣: «ثم قد اخبر»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ.

[٢] دفع، ص١٣: «ولم يرد الوضع بالفعل»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ.

[٣] دفع، ص١٣: «والمعنى»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ.

[٤] دفع، ص١٣: «آدم عليه الصلاة والسلام.»

[٥] الباز الأشهب، ١٢ظ: «العادات»؛ دفع، ص١٣: «الآلات.»

[٦] دفع، ص١٣: «بعض الثلاثة»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ: «بعض البله.»

[٧] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة؛ دفع، ص١٣: «فيتحد به»؛ كتاب الأسماء للبيهقيّ، ص٣١٧: «فيجذبه.»

[٨] الأصل: الياء الأولى والتاء غير منقوطتين.

[٩] الأصل: التاء الثانية غير منقوطة.

[١٠] دفع، ص١٣: «وقد»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ.

[١١] دفع، ص١٣: «من قال»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ.

قاله، وقوله: ﴿بَلْ يَدَاهُ مَبْسُوطَتَانِ﴾ أي نعمته وقدرته. وقوله: ﴿لِمَا خَلَقْتُ بِيَدَيَّ﴾ أي بقدرتي ونعمتي. وقال الحسن في قوله تعالى: ﴿يَدُ اللّهِ فَوقَ أَيْدِيهِم﴾ أي منّته وإحسانه. قلت: هذا كلام الحسن.[١] وقال القاضي: اليدان صفتان ذاتيّتان تُسمّيان باليدين. وهذا تصرّف بالرأى لا دليل عليه. وقال ابن عقيل: معنى الآية ﴿لِمَا خَلَقْتُ﴾ أنا، فهو كقوله ﴿ذَلِكَ بِمَا قَدَّمَتْ يَدَاكَ﴾ أي بما قدّمت أنت. وقد قال بعض البله [في] الإضافات إلى اللّه تعالى: لو لم يكن لآدم[٢] ميزة[٣] على سائر الحيوانات[بخلقه] باليد[٤] التي هي صفة لما عظّمه بذكرها وأجلّه فقال: ﴿بِيَدَيَّ﴾. ولو كانت القدرة لما كانت له ميزة.[٥] فإن قالوا: القدرة لا تثنّي[٦] وقد قال: ﴿بِيَدَيَّ﴾ قلنا: بلى فقد قال[٧] العرب: ليس لي بهذا الأمر يدان أي ليس لي به قدرة.[٨] وقولهم: ميزة بذلك ليس ما في الخلق، قلنا: فقد قال[٩] اللّه تعالى: ﴿خَلَقْنَا لَهُمْ مِمَّا عَمِلَتْ أَيْدِينَا أَنْعَامًا﴾، ولم يدلّ هذا[١٠] على تمييز الأنعام على بقيّة الحيوان، بل كان مجرّد الإضافة كافيًا في الميزة. وقال العلماء: قوله تعالى ﴿والسَمَاءَ بَنَيْنَاها بِأَيْدٍ﴾ أي بقوّة.

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[١] دفع، ص١٢: «احسانه هذا كلام المحققين»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ.

[٢] دفع، ص١٢: «لآدم عليه الصلاة والسلام.»

[٣] الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ: «مزيه»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص١٢.

[٤] دفع، ص١٢: «الحيوانات بخلقه باليد.»

[٥] الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ: «ميزة»؛ دفع، ص١٢: «مزية.»

[٦] الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ: «ولو كانت القدرة لم تثن.»

[٧] دفع، ص١٢: «قلنا بلى قالت العرب»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ.

[٨] في دفع إضافة: «قال عروة بن حزام: فقالا شفاك اللّه والله ما لنا - بما ضمنت منك الضلوع يدان» إلى النصّ (ص١٢).

[٩] دفع، ص١٣: «ميزة بذلك عن الحيوان فقد قال»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ.

[١٠] سقط «هذا» في دفع (ص١٣) وفي الباز الأشهب (٢١ظ).

أمرنا ونهينا. وذهب[١] القاضي إلى أنّ العين صفة زائدة على الذات. وقد سبقه أبو بكر ابن خزيمة فقال في الآية: لربّنا عينان ينظر بهما. فقال ابن حامد: يجب الإيمان بأنّ للّه[٢] عينين. قلت: هذا ابتداع لا دليل عليه،[٣] وإنّما أثبتوا عينين من دليل الخطاب من قوله[٤] صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم: ليس بأعور. وإنّما أريد نفي النقص عنه ومتى ثبت أنّه لا يتجزّأ[٥] لم يكن لما يتخايل من [12a] الصفات وجه.

[الآية الثالثة]

٤١ ومنها قوله تعالى: ﴿لِمَا خَلَقْتُ بِيَدَيَّ﴾. اليد في اللغة بمعنى النعمة والإحسان، قال الشاعر:

[الطويل]

مَتَى مَا تُنَاجِي[٦] عند بَابِ بني[٧] هَاشِمٍ تُرَجِّي[٨] فَتَلْقَى مِنْ فَوَاضِلِهِ يداً

٤٢ ومعنى قول اليهود: ﴿يَدُ اللّهِ مَغْلُولَةٌ﴾ أي محبوسة عن النفقة. واليد القوّة، يقولون: ما لنا بهذا الأمر من يد،[٩] يريد قول عروة ابن حزام[١٠] في شعر[١١]

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[١٠] زاد المسير، ج٤، ص١٠١: «من عادة.»

[١١] زاد المسير، ج٤، ص١٠١: «ان يقول»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص١١.

[١] دفع، ص١١: «وقد ذهب»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١و.

[٢] دفع، ص١١: «له»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١و.

[٣] دفع، ص١١: «دليل لهم عليه»؛؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١و.

[٤] دفع، ص١١: «في قوله.»

[٥] الأصل: «يتجزى.»

[٦] الباز الأشهب (بيروت، ١٩٨٧)، ٤٤: «تناخي.»

[٧] الأصل: «بن.»

[٨] الباز الأشهب (بيروت، ١٩٨٧)، ٤٤: «تريحي.»

[٩] دفع، ص١٢: «يقولون له بهذا الامر يد»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢١ظ: «يقولوا ما لنا بهذا الامر يد.»

[١٠] الأصل: «حرام.»

[١١] الأصل: «سعر.»

[11b] باب ما جاء في القرآن من ذلك

[الآية الأولى]

٣٩ قال اللّه تعالى ﴿وَيَبْقَى وَجْهُ رَبِّكَ﴾. قال المفسّرون: ويبقى ربّك. وكذلك قالوا في قوله تعالى: ﴿يُرِيدُونَ وَجْهَهُ﴾، أي يريدونه. وقال الضحّاك وأبو عبيدة في قوله تعالى: ﴿كُلُّ شَيْءٍ هَالِكٌ إِلا وَجْهَهُ﴾، أي إلا هو.[1] وقد ذهب الذين أنكرنا عليهم إلى أنّ الوجه[2] يختصّ باسم زائد على الذات. قلت: فمن أين قالوا هذا وليس لهم دليل على ذلك[3] إلا ما عرفوه من الحسّيّات؟ وذلك يوجب التبعيض.[4] ولو كان كما قالوا كان المعني أنّ ذاته تهلك إلا وجهه. وقال ابن حامد: أثبتنا للّه وجهًا ولايجوز إثبات رأس. قلت: ولقد اقشعرّ بدني من جرأته على ذكر هذا. فما أعوزه في التشبيه[5] غيرُ الرأس.

[الآية الثانية]

٤٠ ومن ذلك قوله[6] تعالى: ﴿وَلِتُصْنَعَ[7] عَلَى عَيْنِي﴾، ﴿واصْنَعِ الفُلْكَ بِأَعْيُنِنَا﴾. قال المفسّرون: بأمرنا. وقال بعضهم: بمرأى منّا. قال أبو بكر بن الأنباريّ: إنّما جمع العين على مذهب العرب في إيقاعها الجمع على الواحد تقول:[8] خرجنا في السفر[9] إلى البصرة وإنّما جمع لأنّ عادة[10] الملك [أن] يقول:[11]

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[1] قارن مجاز القرآن لأبي عبيدة، ج٢، ص١١٢.

[2] الباز الأشهب، ٢١و: «الوجه صفة تختصّ»؛ دفع، ص١٠: «الوجه صفة يختص.»

[3] سقط «على ذلك» من دفع، ص١٠؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢١و.

[4] الأصل: التاء والباء غير منقوطتين.

[5] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[6] دفع، ص١٠: «ومنها قوله.»

[7] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[8] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

[9] زاد المسير، ج٤، ص١٠١: «في السفن.»

التميميّ وأبو محمّد رزق اللّه بن عبد الوهّاب وأبو الوفاء بن عقيل. فنبغ[١] الثلاثة الذين ذكرناهم، ابن حامد والقاضي و[ابن] الزاغونيّ، فحملوا الأحاديث على الحسّيّات. فرأيت الردّ عليهم لازمًا لئلا يُنسَب أحمد إلى ذلك وإذا سكتُّ نُسبتُ إلى اعتقاد ذلك،[٢] ولا يهوّلني[٣] أمر عظيم[٤] في النفوس[٥] لأن العمل على الدليل وخصوصًا على معرفة الحقّ لا يجوز فيها التقليد. وقد سُئل أحمد عن مسألة فأفتى فيها، فقيل: هذا لا يقول به ابن المبارك. فقال: قول[٦] ابن المبارك لم ينزل من السماء. وقال الشافعيّ: استخرت اللّه في الردّ على مالك.

٣٨ ولمّا صنّف [هؤلاء] الثلاثة[٧] كتبًا وانفرد القاضي فصنّف الأحاديث ذكرتها على ترتيبه وقدّمت عليها الآيات[٨] التي وردت في ذلك.

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] دفع، ص٩: «اعتقادي ذلك» الباز الأشهب: «اعتقادي في ذلك.»

[٣] الأصل: الياء الأولى غير منقوطة.

[٤] دفع، ص٩: «أمر يعظم.»

[٥] الباز الأشهب، ٢١و: «في ذلك.»

[٦] سقط «قول» في دفع (ص٩) والباز الأشهب (٢١و).

[٧] قارن دفع، ص٩؛ والباز الأشهب، ٢١و.

[٨] دفع، ص٩: «الآيات الشريفة.»

القائل: «تأتي[١] البقرة وآل عمْران كأنّهُما غمامتان وفرْقان[٢] من طير صَوافَّ»،[٣] و«يُؤتَى[٤] بالمَوْت في صورة كَبْشٍ أمْلَحَ فيُذبَح».[٥]

٣٦ فإن قيل: لم سكت السلف عن تفسير الأحاديث وقالوا: أمرُّوها كما جاءت؟ قلنا: لثلاثة أوجه. أحدها أنّها ذُكرت للإيناس بموجود فإذا فُسّرت لم يحصل الإيناس[٦] مع أنّ فيها ما لا بدّ من تأويله كقوله تعالى: ﴿وَجَاءَ رَبُّكَ﴾ أي جاء أمره. [11a] وقال أحمد بن حنبل: وإنّما صرفه إلى ذلك أدلّة العقل فإنّه لا يجوز عليه الانتقال. والوجه الثاني أنّه لو تأوّلت اليد بمعنى القدرة جاز أن يتناول معنى القوّة، فيحصل الخطر بالصرف عمّا يُحتمل.[٧] والثالث أنّهم لو أطلقوا في التأويل اتّسع الخرق فخلّط المتأوّل. فإذا سأل[٨] العامّيّ عن قوله تعالى: ﴿ثُمَّ اسْتَوَى عَلَى العَرْشِ﴾ قيل له: الاستواء معلوم والكيف مجهول والإيمان به واجب والسؤال عنه بدعة. وإنّما فعلنا هذا لأنّ العوامّ لا يدركون الغوامض.

فصل

٣٧ وكان الإمام أحمد يقول: أمرُّوا الأحاديث كما جاءت، وعلى هذا من كبار أصحابه كإبراهيم الحربيّ وأبي داود الأشرم[٩] ومن كبار أصحابنا أبو الحسن

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٣] الأصل: «صاف»؛ قارن الصحيح لمسلم، صلاة المسافرين، ٢٥٢، ٢٥٣.

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] الأصل: الذال غير منقوطة.

[٦] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٨] الأصل: «سيل.»

[٩] الأصل: هكذا.

الأصنام فآنست نفوسهم بالحسّ المقطوع بوجوده، ولذلك قال قوم لموسى: ﴿اِجْعَلْ لَنَا إِلَهًا﴾. فلو جاءت الشرائع بالتنزيه[١] المحض جاءت بما يطابق النفي والجحد. فلمّا قالوا: صف لنا ربَّك نُزلت ﴿قُلْ هُوَ اللّهُ أَحَدٌ﴾. ولو قال لهم: ليس بجسم ولا جوهر ولا [10b] عرض ولا طويل ولا عريض ولا يشغل الأمكنة ولا يحويه[٢] مكان ولا جهة من الجهات الستّ وليس بمتحرّك ولا ساكن ولا تدركه الأحساس. فلو قالوا: حُدّ لنا النفي بأن تميّز[٣] ما تدعونا إلى عبادته عن النفي وإلا فأنت تدعونا[٤] إلى عدم. فلمّا علم الحقّ سبحانه ذلك جاء هم بأسماء يعقلونها من السمع والبصر والحلم والغضب وبناء البيت وجعل الحجر بمثابة[٥] اليمين المصافحة. و جاء بذكر الوجه واليدين والقدم والاستواء والنزول لأنّ المقصود الإثبات فهو أهمّ عند الشرع من التنزيه[٦] وإن كان التنزيه منها. ولهذا قال للجارية: أين اللّه؟ وقيل له: أيضحك ربّنا ؟ قال: نعم. فلمّا أثبت وجوده بذكر صور الحسّيّات نفى خيال التشبيه بقوله: ﴿لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ﴾.

٣٥ ثمّ لِمَ يذكر الرسول الأحاديث جملةً وإنّما كان يذكر الكلمة في الأحيان. فقد غلط من ألّفها أبوابًا على ترتيب صورة غلطًا قبيحًا. ثمّ هي مجموعها يسير،[٧] والصحيح منها يسير:[٨] ثمّ هو عربيّ وله التجوّز، أليس[٩] هو

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[١] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٣] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

[٤] الأصل: «تدعوا.»

[٥] الأصل: الباء الأولى غير منقوطة.

[٦] الأصل: التاء والنون غير منقوطتين.

[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٩] الأصل: بدون نقط.

يفرقوا في الأحاديث[١] بين خبر مشهور كقوله: «يَنْزِلُ إلى السَمَاءِ الدُنْيَا»، وبين حديث لا يصحّ كقوله: «رَأَيْتُ رَبِّي فِي أَحْسَنِ صُورَةٍ». بل أثبتوا بهذا صفة وبهذا صفة. والخامس أنّهم لم يفرقوا بين حديث مرفوع إلى رسول[٢] اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم [10a] وبين حديث موقوف على صحابيّ أو تابعيّ. فأثبتوا بهذا ما أثبتوا بهذا. والسادس أنّهم تأوّلوا بعض الألفاظ في موضع ولم يتأوّلوها في موضع كقوله «وَمَنْ أَتَانِي يَمْشِي أَتَيْتُهُ هَرْوَلَةً». قالوا: هذا ضربُ مَثَلٍ مِثْلَ الإنعام.[٣] ورُوي عن عمر بن عبد العزيز أنّه قال: «إِذَا كَانَ يَوْمَ القِيَامَةِ جَاءَ اللّهُ يَمشِي». فقالوا: نحمله على ظاهره. فواعجبًا من تأوّل حديث رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم ولايتأوّل كلام عمر بن عبد العزيز. والسابع أنّهم حملوا الأحاديث على مقتضى الحسّ. فقالوا: ينزل بذاته وينتقل ويتحرّك.[٤] ثمّ قالوا: لا كما يُعقَل.[٥] فغالطوا من يسمع[٦] وكابروا الحسّ والعقل.

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٣٤ فإن قال قائل: ما الذي دعا رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أن يتكلّم بألفاظ موهمة للتشبيه؟ قلنا: إنّ الخلق غلب عليهم الحسّ فلا يكادون يعرفون غيره وسببه المجانسة لهم في الحديث، فعبد قومٌ النجوم وأضافوا إليها المنافع والمضارّ، وعبد قوم النور وأضافوا إليه الخير وأضافوا الشرّ إلى الظلمة، وعبد قوم الملائكة وقوم الشمس وقوم عيسى وقوم عُزَير[٧] وعبد قوم البقر. والأكثرون[٨]

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[١] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠ظ: «الاثبات»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٩.

[٢] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠ظ: «النبي»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٩.

[٣] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠ظ: «ضرب مثلا للانعام»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٩.

[٤] دفع، ص٩: «يتحول.»

[٥] دفع، ص٩: «نعقل.»

[٦] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠ظ: «يستمع.»

[٧] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط.

كسوتم هذا المذهب شينًا قبيحًا حتّى صار لا يُقال عن حنبليّ إلا مجسّم. ثمّ زيّنتم مذهبكم بالعصبيّة ليزيد[١] وقد علمتم [9b] أنّ صاحب المذهب قد أجاز لعنته. وقد كان أبو محمّد التميميّ[٢] يقول في بعض أئمّتكم: لقد شان هذا المذهب شينًا عظيمًا[٣] لا يُغسَل[٤] إلى يوم القيامة.

٣٣ قلت: وقد وقع غلط المصنّفين الذين ذكرتهم من سبعة أوجه . أحدها[٥] أنّهم سمّوا الأخبار أخبار صفات وإنّما هي أوصاف[٦] وليس كلّ مضاف صفة. فإنّه قال تعالى: ﴿وَنَفَخْتُ فِيهِ مِنْ رُوحِي﴾ وليس للّه صفة تُسمّى روحًا فقد ابتدع من سمّى المضاف صفة . والثاني أنّهم قالوا: إنّ هذه الأحاديث من المتشابه الذي لا يعلمه إلا اللّه تعالى. ثمّ قالوا: نحملها على ظاهرها. فواعجبًا ما لا يعلمه إلا اللّه تعالى أي ظاهر له! وهل ظاهر الاستواء إلا القعود، وظاهر النزول إلا الانتقال؟ والثالث أنّهم أثبتوا للّه سبحانه صفات، وصفات الحقّ[٧] لاتثبت إلا بما تثبت به الذات من الأدلّة القطعيّة. وقال ابن حامد: من ردّ ما يتعلّق[٨] به بالأخبار الثابتة فهل يكفر على وجهين؟ وقال: غالب أصحابنا على تكفير من خالف الأخبار في الساق والقدم والأصابع والكفّ ونظائر ذلك وإن كانت أخبار آحاد لأنّها عندنا توجب[٩] العلم. قلت: هذا قول من لا يفهم الفقه ولا العقل. والوجه الرابع أنّهم لم

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[١] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠ظ: «ليزيد ين معاوية»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٨.

[٢] الأصل: «التيمي.»

[٣] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠ظ: «شينا قبيحا»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٨.

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] دفع، ص٨: «اولها.»

[٦] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠ظ: «اضافات»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٨.

[٧] دفع، ص٨: «الحق جل جلا له.»

[٨] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٩] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

لم يُقل؟ فإيّاكم أن تبتدعوا في مذهبه[١] ما ليس منه! فهل تكلّم في التلاوة والمتلوّ والقراءة والمقروء؟ وهل بلغكم[٢] أنّه قال: الاستواء من صفات الذات أم من صفات الفعل؟ فمن أين أقدمتم على هذه الأشياء؟ وقال بعضهم: يُوصَف بيد زائدة على الذات. وهذا كلّه ابتداع وهو قبيح بمن ينكر البدعة. ثمّ قلتم[٣] في الأحاديث: تُحمَل على ظاهرها، وظاهر القدم الجارحة.[٤] وإنّما ينبغي أن يُقال: تُمرّ كما جاءت، أي تُقرأ ولا يُقال شيء.

٣٢ فلو فهمتم ما بين الكلمتين سلمتم. فإنّه لمّا قيل: عيسى[٥] رُوح اللّهِ اعتقدت النصارى أنّ للّه صفة هي روح[٦] ولجت في مريم. ومن قال: استوى بذاته[٧] فقد أجراه مجرى الحسّيّات. فينبغي أن لا يُهمَل ما به ثبّت[٨] الأصل وهو العقل فإنّا به عرفنا الخالق[٩] وحكمنا له بالقدم. فاصرفوا بالعقول عنه ما لا يليق به من تشبيه أو تجسيم، وأمرّوا الأحاديث كما جاءت من غير زيادة ولا نقصان. فلو أنّكم قلتم: نقرأ الأحاديث، لما[١٠] أنكر[١١] أحد عليكم. إنّما حملكم إيّاها على الظاهر قبيح. فلا تدخلوا في مذهب الرجل[١٢] الصالح السلف ما ليس منه. فلقد

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[١] الأصل: «مذهبي»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٠و: «مذهبه»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٦.

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٤] الأصل: «الحارحه.»

[٥] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠و: «قيل في عيسى»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٧.

[٦] في هامش الأصل: «اعتقدت النصارى ان لله صفة هي روح»، ومتبوع بـ«صح.»

[٧] دفع، ص٧: «بذاته المقدسة.»

[٨] دفع، ص٧: «ما يثبت به»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٠و.

[٩] دفع، ص٧: «اللّه»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب، ٢٠و.

[١٠] الأصل: «ما.»

[١١] دفع، ص٧: «الاحاديث ونسكت لما انكر.»

[١٢] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠ظ: «هذا الرجل»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٧.

وقالوا: ما سمعنا بذكر الرأس. وقالوا: يجوز أن يمسّ ويُمسّ ويدني العبد من ذاته. وقال بعضهم: يتنفّس. ثمّ هم يرضون العوامّ بقولهم لا كما يُعقَل. وقد أخذوا في الظواهر[١] في الأسماء والصفات، فسمّوها بالصفات تسميةً مبتدعةً لا دليل لهم في ذلك من النقل ولا من العقل. ولم يلتفتوا إلى النصوص الصارفة عن الظواهر إلى المعاني الواجبة للّه تعالى ولا إلى إلغاء ما توجبه الظواهر من سمات الحدوث.[٢] ولم يقنعوا أن يقولوا: صفة فعل حتّى قالوا: صفة ذات، ثمّ لمّا أثبتوا بها[٣] صفات قالوا: لا نحملها على ما توجبه[٤] اللغة مثل «يد» على قدرة أو نعمة[٥] ولا «مجيء» و«إتيان» على معنى برّ ولطف ولا «ساق»[٦] على الشدّة. بل قالوا: [9a] نحملها على ظاهرها.[٧] والظاهر هو المعهود من نعوت الآدميّين، والشيء إنّما يُحمل على حقيقتة إذا أمكن فإنْ صرف صارف حُمل على المجاز، وهم[٨] يتخرّجون من التشبيه[٩] وقد تبعهم خلق من العوامّ.

٣١ فقد فضحت[١٠] التابع والمتبوع، فقلت لهم: يا أصحابنا أنتم أصحاب نقل واتّباع وإمامكم الأكبر أحمد بن حنبل كان[١١] يقول وهو تحت السياط: كيف أقول ما

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[١] دفع، ص٦: «بالظاهر»؛ هكذا أيضًا في الباز الأشهب، ٢٠و.

[٢] دفع، ص٦: «الحدث»؛ هكذا أيضًا في الباز الأشهب، ٢٠و.

[٣] دفع، ص٦: «أنها.»

[٤] الأصل: التاء والجيم غير منقوطتين؛ دفع، ص٦: «على توجيه اللغة.»

[٥] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠و: «نعمة وقدرة»؛ فكذلك أيضًا في دفع، ص٦.

[٦] الأصل: «الساق»؛ الباز الأشهب، ٢٠و: «لا ساق»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٦.

[٧] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠و: «ظواهرها»؛ دفع، ص٦: «ظواهرها المتعارفة.»

[٨] دفع، ص٦: «ثم.»

[٩] في الباز الأشهب إضافة: «ويأنفون من اضافته اليهم ويقولون نحن اهل السنة وكلامهم صريح في التشبيه» على النصّ (٢٠و)؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٦.

[١٠] الباز الأشهب، ٢٠و: «وقد نصحت»؛ فكذلك في دفع، ص٦.

[١١] الباز الأشهب، (٢٠و) ودفع (ص٦): «احمد بن حنبل يقول.»

على الخالق سبحانه وكذلك أبو العلاء المعرّيّ فمن [8b] قوله:

[الوافر]

أُمُورٌ تَسْتَخِفُّ[١] بِها حُلُومٌ[٢] وَ مَا يَدْرِي الفَتَى لِمَنِ الثُّبُورُ
كِتَابُ مُحَمَّدٍ وكِتَابُ مُوسَى وَإِنْجِيلُ ابْنِ مَرْيَمَ وَالزَّبُورُ

وقال قابله اللّه:

[الكامل]

صَرْفُ الزَّمَانِ مُفَرِّقُ الإِلْفَينَ فَاحْكُمْ إِلهِي بَيْنَ ذَاكَ وَ بَيْنِي
أَنَهَيْتَ عَنْ قَتْلِ النُّفُوسِ تَعَمُّدًا وَ بَعَثْتَ أَنْتَ لِقَتْلِهَا[٣] مَلَكَيْنِ
وَزَعَمْتَ أَنَّ لَهَا مَعَاداً ثَانِيًا مَا كَانَ أَغْنَاهَا عَنِ الحَالَيْنِ

[فصل]

٣٠ قلت: وقد رأيت من أصحابنا من تكلّم في الأصول بما لا يصلح، وانتدب للتصنيف ثلاثة أبو عبد اللّه بن حامد وصاحبه القاضي وابن الزاغونيّ. فصنّفوا كتبًا شانوا بها المذهب ورأيتهم[٤] [قد نزلوا] إلى مرتبة العوامّ، فحملوا الصفات على مقتضى الحسّ فسمعوا أنّ اللّه خلق آدم على صورته فأثبتوا[٥] صورةً ووجهًا زائداً على الذات وعينين وفمًا ولهواتٍ وأضراسًا وجَبْهَةً[٦] هي السُّبُحات[٧] ويدين وأصابع[٨] وخنصراً وأبهامًا وصدراً وفخذاً وساقين ورجلين،

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[١] الأصل: «يستحفن»؛ لزوميّات، ج١، ص٤٤٣: «تستخفّ»؛ قارن أيضًا المنتظم، ج٨، ص١٨٧.

[٢] انظر تعريف القدماء، محقّق لطه حسين، ص٢٤، ١١٥، ١٤٦، ١٩٣، ٣٣٠.

[٣] المنتظم، ج٨، ص١٨٨: «لاهلها»؛ تعريف القدماء، ص٥٧: «لقبضها.»

[٤] دفع، ص٥: «ورأيتم قد نزلوا»؛ فكذلك في الباز الأشهب لابن الجوزيّ، ٢٠و.

[٥] دفع، ص٥: «فأثبتوا له.»

[٦] دفع، ص٦: «واضواءً لوجهه.»

[٧] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة.

[٨] يضمّ صاحب لدفع: «وكفًا» إلى النصّ (ص٦).

يقدر على شيء ولا أن يقدر غيره على شيء حتّى لو مدّ أحد أهل الجنّة يده إلى تمرة[١] ودخلت[٢] هذه الحالة لم يقدر البارئ أن يوصّلها إليه وإنّ أهل الجنّة مهمدون لا يقدرون على حركة وينقطع[٣] عذاب أهل النار.

٢٩ قلت: وهذا الأبله مع مخالفة النصوص كقوله تعالى ﴿وَمَا عِنْدَ اللّهِ بَاقٍ﴾. لو تفكّر لعلم أنّ الحوادث التي لم تُوجد بعد لم تدخل في الوجود وإنّما تُحدَث حالاً فحالاً وما لم يدخل في الوجود لا يُقال متناهيًا[٤] [إ]لا بعد ما وُجد وما وُجد فقد أنهي، وقدرة الحقّ لا تتناهى ولم يخلق[٥] جميع مخلوقاته وفي نسخه[٦] مقدوراته إذ لو خلقها دفعة كانت متناهية. فاعتقاده أنّ مقدورات الحقّ تتناهى فوق الكفر. ومن يقول: إنّ مقدورات الحقّ تتناهى يلزمه أن يقول: إنّ علمه يتناهى وذاته. وقد صنّف الجبّائيّ كتابًا في تكفير أبي الهذيل. ونظر ثمامة[٧] المتكلّم إلى قوم يعدون إلى الجمعة[٨] فقال: انظروا إلى هؤلاء البقر![٩] ما صنع هذا العربيّ بالناس يعني رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم؟ وقال البغداديّون من المعتزلة: من سرق حبّة[١٠] ثمّ مات ولم يتب خلد في النار أبداً. وقال: كان هشام بن الحكم يقول في الخالق سبحانه بالتجسيم والأجسام شباه. وكان ابن الراونديّ[١١] ليس له شغل إلا الاعتراض

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[١] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

[٢] الأصل: «دحلت.»

[٣] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.

[٤] الأصل: غير واضحة.

[٥] الأصل: الياء والخاء غير منقوطتين.

[٦] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٧] الأصل: «تمامة.»

[٨] كتاب تأويل مختلف الحديث لابن قتيبة، ص٦٠: «يتعادون يوم الجمعة الى المسجد لخوفهم فوت الصلاة.»

[٩] الأصل: «النفر.»

[١٠] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[١١] الأصل: غير واحضة.

تعالى قد كفاهم ذلك بالظواهر التي[١] دلّت عليها العقول من غير إيغال فيها لا يُؤمَن عاقبته. وأمّا أدلّة العقول فلا تُنكَر والتوصّل بها إلى المعارف لا يُجحَد.

٢٧ قال أبو سليمان الخطّابيّ: وقد صار الشيطان بلطيف حيلته يقول لكلّ من أحسّ منه زيادة فطنة وذكاء: لا ترض من علمك بظاهر السنّة فتكون[٢] أسوة العامّة. فيخدعه حتّى يورّطه في شبهات،[٣] فإذا رأى كتاب اللّه ما انتحله ضرب بعضه ببعض وتأوّله على ما سنح له، ونصب[٤] العداوة لأخبار رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم وأساء في نقلتها المقالة. كان عمرو بن عبيد يقول: إن كان «تَبَّتْ يَدَا أَبِي لَهَبٍ» في اللوح المحفوظ فما على أبي لهب من جناح؟[٥] وقال في حديث ابن مسعود: حدثّني [رسول اللّه وهو] الصادق المصدوق: إنّ أحدكم يُجمع خلقه[٦] في بطن أمّه أربعين يومًا ثمّ يكون نطفة ثمّ علقة ويُكتب أجله ورزقه وهل هو شقيّ[٧] أو سعيد. فقال: لو حدثّني به الأعمش لكذّبته ولو حدثّني به زيد بن وهب ما صدّقته[٨] ولو حدثّني [به] ابن مسعود لرددته.[٩] ولو قال [هذا] [8a] لي رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم لقلت: ما هذه شريعتك.[١٠]

٢٨ وكان في المتكلّمين أبو الهذيل يقول: مقدورات البارئ تنتهي حتّى لا

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[١] الأصل: «الذي.»

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٣] الأصل: «سبهات.»

[٤] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.

[٥] قارن تاريخ بغداد لأبي بكر الخطيب، ج١٢، ص١٧٠، ١٧٢، ١٨٣.

[٦] الأصل: «حلقه.»

[٧] الأصل: «سقى.»

[٨] تاريخ بغداد، ج١٢، ص١٧٢: «ما أجبته.»

[٩] تاريخ بغداد، ج١٢، ص١٧٢: «ما قبلته»؛ ميزان الاعتدال، ج٣، ص٢٧٨: «لرددته.»

[١٠] تاريخ بغداد، ج١٢، ص١٧٢، يُضيف الخطيب: «ولو سمعت اللّه تعالى يقول هذا لقلت له ليس على هذا اخذت ميثاقنا» إلى النصّ؛ قارن ميزان الاعتدال، ج٣، ص٢٧٨.

ولئن يُبتلى المرء بما يُنهى عنه خلا الشرك باللّه خير له من أن يُبتلى بالكلام.[١]

٢٥ وقال رجل لابن عقيل: تراني[٢] أن أقرأ علم الكلام؟ فقال: الدين النصيحة، أنت الآن عليّ بك مسلم سليم وإن لم تنظر في الجزء وتعرف الطفرة ولا عرفت الخلاء والملاء والجوهر والعرض، وهل يبقى العرض زمانين، وهل القدرة مع الفعل أو قبله، وهل الصفات زوائد على الذات، وهل الاسم المسمّى أو غيره. وإنّي أقطع أنّ الصحابة ماتوا وما عرفوا ذلك.[٣] فإن رأيت[٤] طريقة المتكلّمين أحوط[٥] من طريقة أبي بكر وعمر فبئس الاعتقاد.[٦] قال: وقد أفضى علم الكلام بأربابه[٧] إلى الشكوك وشمّ[٨] روائح الإلحاد من فلتات كلامهم. وأصل ذلك أنّهم ما قنعوا بما صنعت[٩] به الشرائع فطلبوا الحقائق وليس في قوّة العقل إدراك لما عند اللّه من الحكمة التي انفرد بها.

٢٦ [7b] فإن قال قائل: ما هذا الكلام الذي قد ذُمّ؟ قلنا: هو ما أحدثه المتكلّمون من أشياء أحدثوها، أخذوها من الفلاسفة ومعانٍ وضعوها بينهم في الجدال، عمومها لا يُحتاج إليه وهي في العاجل. تثير الشبه في القلوب وربّما عسر إخراجها منها مثل ما ذكرنا عن ابن عقيل وغيره من المسائل. فرأي العلماء أنّ اللّه

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[١] قارن تلبيس، ص٨٢.

[٢] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.

[٣] تلبيس، ص٨٥: «وما عرفوا الجوهر والعرض فان رضيت ان تكون مثلهم فكن»؛ قارن، كتاب الذيل على طبقات الحنابلة لابن رجب، ج١، ص١٥٢.

[٤] تلبيس، ص٨٥: «رايت ان»؛ انظر كتاب الذيل، ج١، ص١٥٢.

[٥] تلبيس، ص٨٥ وكتاب الذيل، ج١ ، ص١٥٢: «اولى.»

[٦] تلبيس، ص٨٥ وكتاب الذيل، ج١، ص١٥٢: «فبئس ما رايت.»

[٧] تلبيس، ص٨٥: «باهله.»

[٨] تلبيس، ص٨٥: «تشم.»

[٩] الأصل: بدون نقط؛ تلبيس، ص٨٥: «بما قنعت.»

جوابي. فأجبت[١] بغير ذلك فأدخل شيئًا فأفسد جوابي فجعلت كلّما جئت بشيء أفسده. ثمّ قال لي: هذا الفقه الذي فيه الكتاب والسنّة وأقاويل الناس يدخله مثل هذا فكيف الكلام في ربّ العالمين الذي الجدال فيه كفر. فتركت الكلام وأقبلت على الفقه. وقال أحمد بن حنبل: خير حيلة كانت في الشافعيّ أنّه لم يكن يشتهي الكلام، إنّما همّه الفقه. وقال الشافعيّ للربيع: لا تشتغل بالكلام ! وقال الشافعيّ: مذهبي[٢] في أهل الكلام [أن] يُقنَّع رؤوسهم بالسياط ويشردون[٣] في البلاد. وحكمي فيهم حكم عمر في صبيغ.[٤] وقال في رواية أخرى: حكمي في أهل الكلام أن يُضربوا بالجريد ويُحملوا على الإبل ويُطاف بهم في العشائر والقبائل ويُنادى[٥] عليهم: هذا [7a] جزاء من ترك الكتاب والسنّة وأقبل[٦] على الكلام. قال الشافعيّ: إذا سمعت الرجل يقول: الاسم غير المسمّى،[٧] فأشهد عليه بالزندقة.[٨] ولو أنّ رجلاً أوصى بكتبه من العلم لآخر وكان فيها كتب الكلام لم تدخل في الوصيّة لأنّه ليس من العلم. ورأى الشافعيّ قومًا يتكلّمون في الكلام، فقال: إمّا أن يحاورونا بخير وإمّا أن يقوموا عنّا. ولمّا كلّم الشافعيّ حفص الفرد[٩] فقال حفص: القرآن مخلوق، فقال الشافعيّ: كفرت باللّه العظيم. وقال الشافعيّ: لو علم الناس ما في الكلام لفرّوا منه كما يفرّون من الأسد. وقال: لقد اطّلعت من أهل الكلام على شيء ما توهّمته قط.

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[١] الأصل: «فاجئت.»

[٢] الأصل: «مدهبي.»

[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٤] الأصل: «صبيع.»

[٥] تلبيس، ص٨٢: «يقال»؛ انظر تحريم لابن قدامة، ص١٧.

[٦] تلبيس، ص٨٢: «أخذ في»؛ صيد الخاطر، ص ٤٧٩: «اشتغل بالكلام»؛ قارن تحريم، ص١٧.

[٧] تلبيس، ص٨٢: «الاسم هو المسمى او غير المسمى.»

[٨] تلبيس، ص٨٢: «فاشهد انه من اهل الكلام ولا دين له.»

[٩] الأصل: «القرد.»

فرجعت فسكن.[١] وما فضل الأنبياء إلا باجتهادهم الفارق بين الملك والشيطان. وأمّا الصحابة فبالغوا في طلب الدليل على صدقه ثمّ آمنوا.

[فصل]

٢٣ قلت: ولم يُنقل عن الإمام أحمد شيء من التشبيه ولا يقاربه، وإنّما كان يأمر بإمرار الأحاديث كما جاءت، وهذا مذهب الأئمة الكبار كمالك بن أنس وسفيان والأوزاعيّ وابن المبارك والشافعيّ وكان هؤلاء ينهون عن علم الكلام. قال أبو يوسف: من طلب الدين[٢] بالكلام تزندق. وكان أحمد بن حنبل أشدّ الناس كراهية للكلام. قال محمّد بن الحسن: كان أبو حنيفة يحثّنا على الفقه وينهانا عن الكلام. وكان يقول: لعن الله عمرو بن عبيد لقد فتح للناس الطريق إلى الكلام. [6b] وقال نوح الجامع: قلت لأبي حنيفة: ما تقول فيما أحدث الناس من الكلام في الأعراض والأجسام؟ فقال: مقالات الفلاسفة. عليك بطريق السلف.[٣] وإيّاك وكلّ محدثة [فإنّها بدعة]![٤] وسُئل الثوريّ عن الكلام فقال: دَعْ الباطل! وقال عبد الرحمن بن مهديّ: من طلب الكلام فآخر أمره إلى الزندقة.

٢٤ قال المزنيّ: كنت أنظر في الكلام فلمّا قدم الشافعيّ أتيته فسألته عن مسئلة من الكلام. فقال: [أ]تدري أين أنت؟ قلت: نعم، في المسجد الجامع في الفسطاط. فقال لي: أنت في تارات وتارات موضع في بحر قُلْزُم لا تكاد تسلم فيه السفينة. ثمّ ألقى عليّ مسئلة في الفقه، فأجبت[٥] عنها فأدخل شيئًا فأفسد

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[١] الوفاء، ص ١٧٣، س٤-٥: «ثم قالت ما تشاء ما تريد. قال ارجعي الى مكانك فرجعت الى مكانها فقال: والله ما أبالي من كذبني من قريش.»

[٢] تحريم لابن قدامة، ص١٧: «طلب العلم.»

[٣] رسالة ذمّ التأويل لابن قدامة، ٣٥: «عليك بالأثر وطريق السلف.»

[٤] قارن رسالة ذمّ التأويل لابن قدامة، ٣٥.

[٥] الأصل: «فاجنت.»

أنّه يجوز أن يكون الأمر على خلافه، وفي التقليد إبطال منفعة العقل[١] لأنّه إنّما خُلق للتأمّل،[٢] وقبيح بمن رُزق العقل أن يطفئ نوره ويبطل فائدته. فإنّ العقل نور يُستضاء به والمقلّد أعمى يتوكّأ على غيره. قال ابن عقيل: ولمّا لم يقلّد أحمد مال إلى قول زيد في الجدّ وترك قول أبي بكر. وينبغي للإنسان أن يتّبع الدليل. قال: وإذا أردتم صحّة هذا القول فانظروا أيّما أقرب، أنا إلى أحمد أو أحمد إلى نفسه. أليس أنّ أحمد أقرب إلى نفسه؟ فكم قد ذهب إلى شيء ثمّ عاد عنه؟ وكذلك الروايات عن أبي حنيفة [6a] والأقوال للشافعيّ وهؤلاء إنّما خالفوا أنفسهم للدليل.

٢٢ وسمع ابن عقيل رجلاً يحدّث[٣][عن] السلامة في التقليد. قلت: وقد رأيت كتابًا صنّفه أبو بكر عبد الرحمن بن أحمد السنّيّ وسمّاه المنبّه في التوحيد، فقال فيه: إنّ رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم أخذ الدين عن اللّه عزّ وجلّ تقليداً ولم يرجع فيه إلى عقله ولا إلى ما يوجبه عقله، وكذلك الصحابة أخذوه عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم تقليداً ولم[٤] يطالبوه بحجّة.[٥] ورأيت أصحاب الحديث معجبين بهذا الكتاب، فأدهشني ما رأيت من تخليط هذا الرجل. فإنّ رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم لمّا رأى الملك خاف أن يكون شيطانًا فقال: يا خديجة قد خفت على نفسي! كان يقول: اللهمّ أرني آية لا أبالي من كذّبني بعدها.[٦] فقيل له: قل لهذا الشجرة تأتيك. فقال لها فأقبلت تخدّ الأرض.[٧] ثمّ قال لها: ارجعي!

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[١] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٢] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٤] الأصل: في الهامش «يرجع فيه الى...تقليد ولم» متبوع بـ«صح.»

[٥] الأصل: الباء غير منقوطة.

[٦] الوفاء بأحوال المصطفى لابن الجوزيّ، ص١٧٣، س١: «بعدها من قريش.»

[٧] في كتاب الوفاء إضافة: «حتى وقفت بين يدي رسول اللّه» إلى النصّ (ص ١٧٣، س٣).

لا يخلد[١] في النار. قال ذلك العالم: واللّه ما نطالبكم[٢] بالسبت لأنّه إنّما فرض على بني إسرائيل. فقلت: قد سلّمت بإقرارك وبقيتم أنتم الذين خاطرتم بنفوسكم بالخلد[٣] الدائم في العذاب. فلم يكن له عن هذا جواب.

فصل [5b]

١٩ ولا يجوز التقليد في معرفة اللّه سبحانه والدليل على ما قلنا القرآن والنقل والمعنى. أمّا القرآن فقوله تعالى ﴿فَاعْلَمْ أَنَّهُ لا إِلَهَ إِلا اللّهُ﴾. وذمّ المنافقين مع التقليد بقوله تعالى ﴿إِنَّا وَجَدْنَا آبَآءَنَا عَلَى أُمَّةٍ وإِنَّا عَلَى آثَارِهِمْ مُقْتَدُونَ. قُلْ: أَوَلَوْ جِئْتُكُمْ بِأَهْدَى مِمَّا وَجَدْتُّمْ عَلَيْهِ آبَآءَكُمْ﴾. المعنى أَفتتّبعونهم؟

٢٠ ومن الأثر قول عليّ رضي اللّه عنه للحارث بن حوط حين قال له: أتظنّ[٤] أنّ طلحة والزبير كانا على الباطل؟[٥] فقال له: يا حارث إنّه ملبوس عليك، إنّ الحقّ لا يُعرف بالرجال. اعرف الحقّ، تعرف أهله. وقال أحمد بن حنبل: من ضيق علم الرجل أن يقلّد في اعتقاده [رجلاً].[٦] ولا يجوز لنا أن نقلّد أبا بكر ولا عليّاً ولا أحمد ولا الشافعيّ. بل يجب إيمان باللّه وصفاته ومعرفة ما يجوز[٧] عليه وما يستحيل بالدليل على كلّ مخلوق.

٢١ وأمّا من جهة المعنى فإنّ كأنّ المقلّد على غير ثقة ممّا قلّد فيه من جهة

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[١] الأصل: «يحلد».

[٢] الأصل: «يطالبكم»؛ قارن، صيد الخاطر، ص ٤٤١.

[٣] الأصل: «بالحلد.»

[٤] تلبيس، ص٨١: «أتظنّ أنا نظنّ»؛ قارن صيد الخاطر، ص٢٨.

[٥] تلبيس، ص ٨١-٨٢: «على باطل»؛ انظر صيد الخاطر، ص٢٨.

[٦] صيد الخاطر، ص١١٨ : «في دينه الرجال»؛ انظر تلبيس، ص٨٢. قارن رسائل في القرآن لإبن عقيل (بيروت ١٩٧١)، ص١١، سطر ١١.

[٧] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

وأقمنا الدهريّة صفّاً. وقلنا للدهريّة: ما تقولون في الأنبياء؟ فقالوا: أصحاب نواميس ولهم حكمة إلا أنّ ما يعدون به ليس بشيء وإنّما يقصدون بالتخويف والتسويف مصالح الخلق في الدنيا. قلت: فإن تبعتُهم فهل عليّ درك؟ فقالوا: لا إنّما تضيع زمانك وأمّا إن يكون عقاب وثواب[١] فلا. فقلت للأنبياء: ما تقولون؟[٢] قالوا: من لم يتّبعنا فلهم العذاب الأليم. فقلت: اتّباع هؤلاء أولى لدفع المخاطرة بالنفس إن لم يثبت دليل، فكيف والأدلّة أجلى من الشمس؟ وإلى هذا أشار القائل:

[الكامل]

قَالَ المُنَجِّمُ والطَبِيبُ كِلاهُمَا لا تُبْعَثُ[٣] الأمْوَاتُ[٤] قُلْتُ إِلَيْكُمَا
إنْ صَحَّ قَولُكُمَا فَلَسْتُ بِخَاسِرٍ أو صَحَّ قَولِي فالخَسَارُ عَلَيْكُمَا

فصل

١٨ ومن الناس من قلّد علماءه وآباءه كاليهود والنصارى، ولقد اجتمعت[٥] يومًا بعالم اليهود فقلت له: لو[٦] لقينا موسى عليه الصلاة والسلام قلنا له: آمنّا بك وبكتابك وبأنّ اللّه تعالى كلّمك. ولو أنّ شخصًا آمن بكتابنا ونبيّنا[٧] ولم يؤمن بك لم ينفعه إيمانه بما آمن به. وقد وافقناك في جميع ما اعتقدت. فغاية ما تقول[٨] لنا على زعمك: لم تمسكوا السبت. فنقول:[٩] السبت فرع من الفروع ومخالف الفروع

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[١] الأصل: الثاء غير منقوطة.
[٢] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.
[٣] الأصل: «تبعت.»
[٤] لزوميّات، ج٢، ص٣٠٠: «لا تحشر الأجسام.»
[٥] الأصل: الجيم والتاء غير منقوطتين.
[٦] الأصل: «إذا»؛ قارن صيد الخاطر لابن الجوزيّ (بيروت ١٩٧٨)، ص٥٧٢، س١٩.
[٧] الأصل: بدون نقط.
[٨] الأصل: «يقول».
[٩] الأصل: القاف غير منقوطة.

الظنّ[١] في مسائل الاجتهاد الفروعيّة فحسب .

فصل

١٦ واعلم أنّ كثيراً[٢] من الناس طلبوا الصانع من طريق[٣] الحسّ، فلمّا لم يجدوه داخلهم الشكّ . ولو فطنوا لموجودات طريقُ[٤] وجدانها العلم دون الحسّ لما خامرهم الشكّ . منها الروح والعقل فإنّهما وإن لم يتخيّلا للحسّ، فتأثير الروح ظاهر في البدن وتأثير العقل ظاهر في التدبير. فكذلك البارئ سبحانه يُستدَلّ عليه بتأثيراته وصنعه . ومن كتم الروح فلم يخبر بها فقد نبّه على السكوت عن الفكر فيه .

فصل

١٧ وقد انقسم من لا ينظر في الدليل إلى أقسام . منهم الدهريّة جحدوا البارئ الصانع . فمال إليهم شخص فاستغاث بي لبقيّة إيمان في قلبه، فقلت له: أحضِر قلبك وتدبِّر بعقلك، إنّ الجماد لايصنع نفسه ولا الناطق . فإذا سمعت قومًا يقولون: هذا عمل الطبيعة، فأجبهم بجوابين: أحدهما أنّ الذي تشيرون إليه هو الخالق سبحانه وإنّما غلطتم في التسمية فسمّيتموه طبيعة . والثاني أنّ الطبيعة ليست حياة قادرة عالمة بالمصالح . فإن كانت قد أُلهِمت ذلك وجُعل فيها قوّة تفعل ذلك فالذي جعل فيها القوّة هو الإله سبحانه، وإن كانت لا تدري ما تعمل فالمتقن غيرها. فقال لي: قد تدوّخت بالكلام الخصوم، فقلت: انظر في الدليل ثمّ[٥] اعمل على الأحوط . فقد [5a] ضرب الحكماء مثلاً عجيبًا، فقالوا: أقمنا الأنبياء صفّاً

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[٨] الأصل: «تنلقه.»

[١] الأصل: «الطن.»

[٢] الأصل: الثاء غير منقوطة.

[٣] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[٤] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[٥] الأصل: بدون نقط.

الإله القديم.

١٣ القسم الثاني ما يُدرَك بالحواسّ الخمس وهي السمع والبصر وآلة الشمّ وآلة الذوق وآلة اللمس.

١٤ القسم الثالث العلم بمخبِر. الأخبار على ضربين، أحدهما التواتر وهو الذي نقله الجماعة الذين لا يصحّ[١] منهم التواطؤ[٢] على الكذب كنقل الأمّة القرآن والصلوات الخمس وأنّ في الأرض بلداً يُقال لها مكّة . والثاني أخبار الآحاد وهو ما نقله عدد يسير[٣] وهو قسمان، أحدهما [ما] تلقّته الأمّة بالقبول ومعنى تلقّيهم بالقبول أنّهم أحسنوا الظنّ برواية وعملوا به في الظنّيّات . فأمّا أن يرتقي[٤] إلى مقام القطع فمحال، وإثبات الصفة به قبيح لأنّ الصفات لا تثبت إلا بدليل قطعيّ كما ثبت الذات . ولا يجوز[٥] أن تختلف الصفات في ثبوتها فيُقال: إنّ بعضها يثبت بدليل مقطوع به وبعضها بدليل ظنّيّ، لأنّها متساوية في القدم، ولهذا ما تثبت لما رُوي أنّ اللّه تعالى يقول: «أنا[٦] عند ظنّ عبدي بي» فـ«أنا أغنى الشركاء عن شرك» كحكم القرآن ، وما ذلك إلا لأنّ طريقه ليس كطريق القرآن . وقد ألحق هذا القسم أبو عبد اللّه بن حامد الوّراق وجماعة من أصحابه بالقسم الأوّل في إثبات العلم مجرّده وأثبتوا للّه سبحانه صفات. وهذا غلط قبيح لأنّ مثل هذا يوجب الظنّ لا العلم . والعجب [4b] ممّن يقول ذلك ويدّعي الفقه ومعرفة أصول الفقه.

١٥ والقسم الثاني من أخبار[٧] الآحاد ما لم تتلقّه[٨] الأمّة بالقبول فهذا يقوّي

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[١] الأصل:الياء غير منقوطة.

[٢] الأصل:«التواطي.»

[٣] الأصل:الياء الأولى غير منقوطة.

[٤] الأصل:التاء غير منقوطة.

[٥] الأصل:الياء غير منقوطة.

[٦] الأصل:«ان»؛ قارن، الصحيح للبخاريّ، توحيد، ١٥؛ والصحيح لمسلم، ذكر، ٢، ١٩.

[٧] الأصل: «الأخبار» ولكنّ أداة التعريف مشطوبة.

فصل

١٠ ولا نجوّز اثنين لأنّهما لو اختلفا لكان الذي لا يتمّ مراده عاجزاً.

فصل

١١ وله سبحانه صفات أثبتناها[١] بالدليل المقطوع به، وهو كتاب اللّه تعالى والحديث المتواتر عن رسول اللّه صلّى اللّه عليه وسلّم التي اجتمعت على نقله الجماعة الذين لا يجوز[٢] عليهم التواطؤ على الكذب، وإجماع الأمّة على دليل قطعوا به و[هو] دليل العقل، فإنّه يمنع[٣] أن يجوز عليه ما لا يجوز[٤] على المُحدِث.

فصل
في بيان أقسام العلوم

١٢ تنقسم [العلوم إلى] ثلاثة أقسام، أحدها العلوم القطعيّة وهي على ضربين. أحدهما ما يُعلم ببديهة العقل وهو أوّل فيه كعلمنا أنّ الاثنين أكثر من الواحد وأنّ الواحد لا يكون في مكانين في حالة واحدة. والثاني معلوم بالعقل إلا أنّه يحتاج إلى وسائط وهذه الوسائط تنقسم قسمين، أحدهما وسائط ضروريّة مثل المعلومات المتطابقة التي لابدّ من اقترانها مثل البناء لابدّ له من بانٍ والحركة لابدّ من محرِّك. [و]يلحق بالقسم الأوّل في أنّه من علم الضرورة. والثاني ما وسائط استدلاليّة مثل قولنا أنّ الجواهر المحدثة،[٥] لمّا كانت عاجزة [4a] عن إحداث نفسها عجزت عن إحداث مثلها. فاستدللنا على افتقارها إلى فاعل من غير جنسها وهو

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[١] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.

[٢] الأصل: الياء والزاء غير منقوطتين.

[٣] الأصل: النون غير منقوطة.

[٤] الأصل: «عليه على» ولكن «عليه» مشطوبة.

[٥] الأصل: غير واضحة تمامًا.

قال أبو أحمد ابن عديّ: محمّد بن شجاع متعصّب كان يضع الأحاديث في التشبيه ينسبها إلى أصحاب الحديث يثلبهم[١] بها، منها هذا الحديث. وقال أحمد بن حنبل: هو مبتدع صاحب هوى.[٢] وقال القواريريّ: هو كافر[٣] وأبو المهزّم ليس بشيء.[٤]

فصل

٩ والحقّ سبحانه ليس بجوهر لأنّ الجواهر تتماثل[٥] وتتحيّز[٦] ويجوز عليها التغيُّر وتقبل[٧] التركيب والأعراض، وهذا دليل على حدثها والخالق منزّه عن ذلك إذ له صفة القدم، وما ثبت للقديم لم يجز[٨] لغيره. واعلم أنّ الجواهر تنقسم إلى بسائط ومركّبات. فالبسائط هي التي لم يتعلّق حصولها بجواهر تقدّمتها كالأسطقسّات[٩] التي هي الماء والتراب والهواء والنار. والمركّبات ما تعلّق حصولها [3b] بجواهر كالحيوان والنبات فإنّ حصولها يتعلّق بالأوائل وما لا يحصل إلا بوجود شيء قد تقدّمه، فمستحيل وجوده قبله، فثبت حدوث المركّبات، ومستحيل قدم الأوائل لأنّ كلّ شيء منها مستحيل جزءًا فجزءًا[١٠] وينقلب عن جبلّته إلى الطبيعة المضادّة له فإنّ الماء يصير بالحرارة بخارًا والبخار ينقلب هواءً. والقديم لا يجوز عليه التغيّر.

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[١] الأصل: الثاء غير منقوطة؛ ميزان الاعتدال، ج٣، ص٥٧٧: «يسابهم بذلك.»

[٢] انظر المنتظم، ج٥، ص٥٧؛ أيضًا تاريخ بغداد، ج٥، ص٣٥١.

[٣] قارن، تاريخ بغداد للخطيب، ج٥، ص٣٥١؛ وكتاب الموضوعات، ج١. ص١٠٦.

[٤] انظر كتاب الموضوعات، ج١، ص١٠٦.

[٥] الأصل: بدون نطق.

[٦] الأصل: التاء الأولى غير منقوطة.

[٧] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

[٨] الأصل: «يجر».

[٩] الأصل: «ص» مكتوبة فوق الكلمة.

[١٠] الأصل: «جزا فجزا.»

جاز عدمه لافتقر[١] إلى سبب ومن لا سبب لوجوده فلا سبب لعدمه.

فصل

٧ وليس بجسم لأنّ الجسم ما ايتلف من جوهرين. ولو كان جسمًا لجاز عليه ما يجوز على الأجسام من الحركة والسكون المحدثين[٢] وما لا ينفكّ عن [3a] المحدث. وقد زاغ قوم من المسلمين، فقالوا: جسم لا كالأجسام، وقال بعضهم: صورة لحم ودم، ومنهم من قال: هو جسم، ومنهم من قال: جسم على هيئة[٣] السبيكة. وقال بعضهم: هيئة البلّورة الصافية المستديرة،[٤] ومنهم من قال: هو جسم فضاء والأجسام كلّها فيه.

٨ فلولا أنّ بعض العلماء ذكر هذه المذاهب ما كان ينبغي أن تُذكر. فإنّ أصحابنا خرجوا[٥] بأقوالهم عن الإنسانيّة والعقل. وجاء قوم فقلّدوا أشياخهم من غير نظر، وقد وضع أقوام لا دين لهم أحاديث يشينون بها أصحاب الحديث ليُقال: هذا مذهبهم.[٦] منهم محمّد بن شجاع البلخيّ[٧] روى عن حبّان[٨] بن هلال عن حمّاد بن سلمة عن أبي المهزّم عن أبي هريرة قال: قيل: يا رسول اللّه ممّ ربّنا؟ فقال: من ماء من درّ خلق خيلاً[٩] فأجراها فعرقت فخلق نفسه من ذلك العرق.[١٠]

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[١] الأصل: «لاافتقر.»

[٢] الأصل: «المحدتين» او «المحرتين.»

[٣] الأصل: «هئه.»

[٤] تلبيس إبليس لابي الجوزيّ، ص٨٦: «الاستدارة.» انظر كتاب مقالات الإسلاميّين للأشعريّ، ص ٣٢، ٢٠٧؛ والفرق للبغداديّ، ص ٦٥.

[٥] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٦] الصل: الذال غير منقوطة.

[٧] المنتظم لابن الجوزيّ، ج٥، ص٥٧: «الثلجي.» انظر تاريخ بغداد للخطيب، ج٥، ص ٣٥٠.

[٨] الأصل: «حيان.»

[٩] كتاب الموضوعات لابن الجوزيّ، ج١، ص١٠٥: «قال لا من الارض ولا من سماء خلق خيلا.»

[١٠] كتاب الموضوعات، ج١، ص١٠٥: «إن اللّه عزّ وجلّ خلق الفرس فأجراه فعرقت ثم خلق نفسها منها؛» انظرأيضًا ميزان الاعتدال للذهبيّ، ج٣، ص٥٧٩.

على أنّ لحدوثه سببًا أنّ الحادث ما كان معدومًا ثمّ وُجد، فلا يخلو أن يكون[١] وجوده قبل أن يُوجد. فمحال الوجود أو ممكن الوجود لايجوز أن يكون محالاً لأنّ المحال لا يُوجد أبداً. فثبت أنّه ممكن الوجود والممكن ما يجوز أن يُوجد ويجوز [2b] أن لا يُوجد. فلابدّ لوجوده من مرجِّح له على العدم وذلك إرادة الموجد. وهذا أمر ضروريّ في العقل لا نزاع فيه يوضحه أنّ الآدميّ كان علقةً ثمّ مضغةً ثمّ صار لحمًا ودمًا وقد علمنا أنّه لم ينقل نفسه من حال إلى حال لأنّا نراه في زمان كماله لا يقدر أن يحدث لنفسه سمعًا ولا بصراً. فإذا عجز عن ذلك في حيّز الكمال كان في زمان النقص أعجز. فدلّ على أنّ له فاعلاً نقله ودبّره. ومن رأى المطر يأتي[٢] في وقت الزرع ويمسك[٣] حين تكامل الحبّ ثمّ تُرسل الرياح البدريّة وتقرب الشمس ليجفّ الحبّ فيمكن ادّخاره، ومن نظر في خلق الأسنان حديدة الرؤوس لتقطع والأضراس عريضةً لتطحن واللسان يقلّب المضوغ وله ماء حلو ينبع من تحته يبلّ الطعام ليصحّ بلعه علم وجود حكيم قدير مدبّر.[٤] ومثل هذا يطول ذكره وفي كلّ شيء له آية تدلّ على أنّه واحد.

فصل

٦ وصانع العالم موجود لأنّ الوجود والعدم متقابلان من غير واسطة بينهما. وقد ثبت أنّه فاعل للأشياء فوجب أن يُقال أنّه موجود وهو سبحانه قديم لأنّ الفاعل يتقدّم[٥] المفعول وهو واجب الوجود لا أوّل لوجوده لأنّه لو كان حادثًا لافتقر إلى مُحدِث وتسلسل ذلك. وهو باقٍ أبداً فلا يعدم لأنّ ما ثبت قدمه استحال عدمه. ولو

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[١] الأصل: الياء غير منقوطة.

[٢] الأصل: الياء الأولى غير منقوطة.

[٣] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٤] الأصل: بدون نقط.

[٥] الأصل: التاء غير منقوطة.

فصل

٤ وإثباتُ حدث العالم وإثبات مُحدِثه عزّ وجلّ وإثبات وحدانيّته وصفاته الواجبة له وإثبات الرسالة وتجويزها عليه وكلّ ما تعلّق بهذه الجملة ممّا لا يصحّ أن يُعلم التوحيد والنبوّة إلا [2a] به حاصلٌ بالعقل. والدليل على ذلك أنّ السمع إنّما هو عبارة عن كلام اللّه وما يُروى عن رسوله المخبر عنه،[1] وإجماع من أخبر رسوله أنّه لا يخطئ في قوله. ولن يصحّ أن يُعرف أنّ القول قول اللّه تعالى ورسوله وخبره إلا بعد أن يُعرف اللّه تعالى كما أنّ من المُحال أن يعرف كلام زيد من لا يعرف زيداً. فوجب أن يكون العلم باللّه ورسوله من المعلوم عقلاً. وقد استدلّ إبراهيم الخليل بعقله عليه السلام حين قال: ﴿لا أُحِبُّ الآفِلِينَ﴾. فعلم أنّ ما يجوز عليه التغيّر والانتقال من حال إلى حال لا يكون إلا مخلوقًا وأنّ الخالق لا يجوز عليه التغيّر والانتقال من حال إلى حال. وأمّا ما[2] يُعرف بالسمع ولا مساغ للعقل فيه فكالعلم بكون فعل المكلّف حسنًا وندبًا ومجزئًا وغير مجزئ. وأمّا ما يصحّ بهما فكجواز الغفران للمذنبين والقياس في الأحكام.[3]

فصل

في إثبات الخالق سبحانه بالعقل خلافًا للدهريّة

٥ فنقول:[4] للخلق خالق، دليلنا أنّ كلّ حادث فلحدوثه سبب والعالم حادث فلزم أنّ له سببًا. والعالم كلّ شيء موجود سوى اللّه تعالى، والموجود إذا كان متحيّزًا غير مؤتلف سُمّي جوهراً فإن ايتلف إلى غيره سُمّي جسمًا. والعرض ما قام بغيره كاللون والحركة والسكون. وما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث، والدليل

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[1] الواضح لابن عقيل، ص٣٢: «وما هو مرويّ عمّن يُعلَم أنّه رسوله المخبر عنه.»

[2] مكتوبة في هامش الأصل: «ما.»

[3] الواضح، ص٣٣: «غير الكفّار والعلم بصحّة التعبّد بالعمل بخبر الواحد والقياس في الأحكام.»

[4] الأصل: «فتقول.»

[باب في معرفة اللّه
بواسطة العقل والنقل: النقد على التشبيه والتجسيم]

[الخطبة]

[1b] بسم اللّة الرحمن الرحيم.[1]

١ قال الشيخ الإمام جمال الدين أبو الفرج عبد الرحمن بن عليّ بن محمّد ابن الجوزيّ رحمه اللّة: الحمد للّه على التوفيق، لأسلم منهج وأقوم طريق، الذي[2] أنعم علينا بالعقل الصادق الصدّيق وبمعرفة النقل فنسبنا[3] بحمد اللّه في فهمه عريق، فجمعنا بينهما فأخرجنا إلى السعة من المضيق، حمداً فرعه مستمرّ وأصله وريق، وصلّى اللّه على سيّدنا محمّد النبيّ الوالد الشفيق، وعلى آله ومن صحبه واتّبعه على التحقيق، صلاة تجمع لنا الرضا يوم الجمع والتفريق.

فصل

٢ أوّل ما وجب على العبد معرفة اللّه تعالى وهي حاصلة بالعقل واجبة بالنقل. فإذا وجبت وجب النظر والاستدلال وقد أمر اللّه عزّ وجلّ بذلك فقال تعالى: ﴿قُلِ انْظُرُوا مَاذَا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ والأَرْضِ﴾. وقال تعالى: ﴿أَوَلَمْ يَنْظُرُوا فِي مَلَكُوتِ السَّمَاوَاتِ والأَرْضِ وَمَا خَلَقَ اللّهُ مِنْ شَيْءٍ﴾. وقال تعالى: ﴿قُلْ سِيرُوا فِي الأَرْضِ فَانْظُرُوا﴾ الآية. وقال تعالى: ﴿وَفِي أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَفَلا تُبْصِرُونَ﴾.

فصل

٣ فالذي ينظر في هذه الأشياء بالعقل فهو المتقدّم على كلّ شيء لأنّ جميع أحكام الدين لا تنفكّ من ثلاثة أقسام، أحدها لا يصحّ أن يُعلم إلا بالعقل دون السمع، والثاني لا يصحّ أن يُعلم بالعقل بل بالسمع، والثالث يصحّ أن يُعلم بهما.

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[1] صفحة العنوان للأصل: «كتاب أخبار الصفات للإمام العلامة أبي الفرج بن الجوزيّ رحمة اللّه.»

[2] الأصل: غير واضحة تمامًا.

[3] الأصل: غير واضحة.

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كتاب أخبار الصفات

لأبي الفرج عبد الرحمن بن عليّ
ابن الجوزيّ البغداديّ
توفّي ٥٩٧

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