



Polish Ethnopolitical Myth and the Caucasus

Looking at the Past

Przemysław Adamczewski

BRILL

Polish Ethnopolitical Myth and the Caucasus

Iran and the Caucasus Monographs

Series General Editor

Garnik S. Asatrian (*Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University*)

Executive Board

Victoria Arakelova (*Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University*)

Gohar Hakobian (*Goethe University*)

Matthias Weinreich (*Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University*)

Academic Council

Uwe Bläsing (*Leiden University*)

Alexey Chibirov (*Russian Academy of Sciences*)

Vyacheslav Chirikba (*Abkhazian State University*)

Ela Filippone (*Tuscia University*)

Jost Gippert (*University of Hamburg*)

Hermann Kreuzmann (*Free University of Berlin*)

Alexander Lubotsky (*Leiden University*)

Nadereh Nafisi (*Islamic Azad University*)

Irina Natchkebia (*Ilia State University*)

Antonio Panaino (*University of Bologna*)

Adriano Rossi (*L'Orientale University*)

Martin Schwartz (*University of California*)

VOLUME 6

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/icm

Polish Ethnopolitical Myth and the Caucasus

Looking at the Past

By

Przemysław Adamczewski

Translated by

Filip Gajos



BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON



This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, which permits any non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided no alterations are made and the original author(s) and source are credited. Further information and the complete license text can be found at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

The terms of the CC license apply only to the original material. The use of material from other sources (indicated by a reference) such as diagrams, illustrations, photos and text samples may require further permission from the respective copyright holder.



Ministerstwo Nauki
i Szkolnictwa Wyższego



Publication co-financed from the state budget under the program of the Minister of Education and Science called “Science for Society”, project number NdS/528993/2021/2021, funding amount PLN 281,250, total project value PLN 281,250.

Cover illustration: Polish Prometheus (1831) by Horace Vernet (1789–1863), *Polish Library in Paris*.

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at <https://catalog.loc.gov>
LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2025032621>

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 2950-2349

ISBN 978-90-04-74453-0 (hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-74454-7 (e-book)

DOI 10.1163/9789004744547

Copyright 2026 by Przemysław Adamczewski. Published by Koninklijke Brill BV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill BV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Schönningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Brill Wageningen Academic, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress. Koninklijke Brill BV reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. For more information: info@brill.com.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents

List of Figures and Tables VII

- 1 Introduction 1**
 - 1 A Few Remarks on the Ethnopolitical Myth, Myths, and Science 3
 - 2 The Image of Russia as Poland's "Historical Enemy" 16
 - 3 Purpose, Scope, and Work Methods 26
 - 4 Characteristic of the Materials Used 29
- 2 The Caucasus – Ancestral Homeland of the Poles 33**
- 3 Creation of the Image of the Caucasus in Nineteenth-Century Literature 53**
 - 1 In Polish-Language Literature Published in Western Europe 53
 - 2 In the Polish Émigré Press 59
 - 2.1 *In Polish Literature Published in Germany and Austria/Austro-Hungary* 62
 - 2.2 *In Polish Literature Published in Russia* 67
- 4 Plans of the Polish Émigré Community Concerning the Caucasus and Their Influence on the Image of the Region 79**
- 5 The Image of the Caucasus in Works from the Period of the Polish People's Republic 104**
- 6 Poles in Imam Shamil's Armed Forces 121**
- 7 Desertions of Poles from the Tsarist Army and the Attitude of the Independent Caucasian Peoples towards Runaways 139**
- 8 Poles in Russian Service and Their Attitude towards Polishness 148**
- 9 The Notion of Poles' Contributions to Developing the Caucasus 164**
- 10 The Caucasus as a Site of Polish Martyrology 182**

11	Applying <i>Argumentum ad Rossicum</i> to Explain Processes Underway in the Caucasus	196
	Conclusion	216
	Bibliography	221
	Index of Names	242
	Index of Geographical Places and Ethnic Groups	247

Figures and Tables

Figures

- 1 Michał Stachowicz: Sarmaci północnych Słowian, stępujący z gór Kaukazu na równiny roksolańskie pod wodzem Alanem, przychodzą do Europy 46
- 2 A picture captioned “The Poles under Imam Shamil” from the article *Imam Shamil w Wiedieno* (2) 125
- 3 A frame from the film *The Last Samurai* 126

Tables

- 1 Percentage of illiterates among conscripts in the Russian Empire 168

Introduction

In 2014, I was involved in compiling the memoirs of Karol Kalinowski, entitled *Pamiętnik mojej żołnierki i niewoli u Szamila. Od roku 1844 do 1854*. The author of this work was a remarkable figure, perhaps the only Pole who served in the army of Imam Shamil, publishing his memoirs upon returning to Poland. They provide valuable source material for researchers studying the history of the regions of the North Caucasus not controlled by the tsarist administration in the mid-19th century. I was particularly interested in information from Kalinowski's works concerning Poles' activity on the side of the independent mountaineers, or rather, the lack thereof. The author mentioned only two compatriots, being however of little importance to the people of the North Caucasus. For me, previously not very deeply involved in research on the participation of Poles in the Russian conquest of the Caucasus, this was somewhat of a novelty. In many publications about the Caucasus, written by contemporary Polish authors, I often did find references to numerous Poles deserting from the tsarist army and joining Shamil, said to particularly respect and value them.

Noticing this discrepancy, I began to inquire about what materials authors opining the frequent desertion of Poles from the tsarist army and their involvement on the side of the independent mountaineers in the fight against Russia rely on. I soon concluded that in most cases there is no reliable source material to substantiate this position. This was compounded by one other observation. The years when I began undertaking the question of Poles serving under Imam Shamil constituted an apogee of Polish media interest in the migration crisis. Talks around the reception of refugees by individual member states began across the European Union. Politicians from the then largest opposition party, Law and Justice, supported by numerous right-wing columnists, vehemently protested the plans of the Civic Platform and Polish People's Party government to accept refugees into Poland. One noticeable phenomenon of this period was a significant increase in anti-Islamic sentiment within Polish society. On the Internet, hostile attitudes against Muslims visibly targeted Chechens living in Poland. Ever more so-called "hate speech" was directed against one Chechen holding a Polish passport, Mamed Khalidov – just a few years prior an idol of mixed martial arts (MMA) fans. Virtually no contemporary news item published on the Internet on his topic came without a reader comment not referring to "Islamic terrorism" and not calling for the expulsion or, more

bluntly, the kicking out of Chechens from Poland. The same practice was targeted at Khalidov's immediate family, particularly his wife, an ethnic Pole who admitted to journalists in an interview that she had converted to Islam. Online forums began insulting her, parallelly accusing her of betraying her faith and national culture. Concurrently, I could recall the widespread political and social support for Chechens that existed in Poland during their armed conflict with Russia in the 1990s.

In the meanwhile, two opinions that caused me to think more deeply on the issue surfaced. Their authors were Selim Chazbijewicz, a professor, Law and Justice party member, and Muslim Tatar activist, and Piotr Lisiewicz, one of the better-known right-wing columnists. I began pondering why Chazbijewicz, who in the face of the 1990s Chechen war preached all-Muslim unity and called on Poles to stand in solidarity with the Chechen struggle, was now insinuating that Middle Eastern Muslims had nothing in common with "Polish" Tatars. He spoke out against Europe's acceptance of refugees and stated publicly that he was occasionally ashamed of being a Muslim (*Prof. Selim*). Lisiewicz too, who, on the one hand, bombastically penned about Poles serving in the units of Imam Shamil, leader of an Islamic religious state based on Sharia principles, while on the other – in response to Pope Francis' appeal to young people to view the immigrant as a brother – wrote the following about "fanaticized Islamists":

it doesn't matter whether their majority supports, tolerates, or condemns terrorism – what matters is that this community does not have the capacity to neutralize murderers. This is why there is no place in our country for any representative of this community, which cannot itself eliminate murderers. (Lisiewicz 2016)

I noticed that his publications in this area, like the above excerpt, are close in their articulation to 19th-century Russian propaganda arguing the need to conquer the Caucasus. In the opinion of tsarist politicians and generals, the communities there also "did not possess the strength" to rid their community of various "murderers" and "thieves". Consequently, there was thus no place on the "civilized world map" for the independent territorial units of this area of the globe. It was intriguing to seek an answer to the question of why a journalist describing in a positive light 19th-century Poles joining an "Islamic state" and "Islamic fanatics" or, as the modern media would call them – "jihadists", could assert that Muslims should not be allowed into Poland because: "The defence of the national community against murderers is more important to a Christian than the fear of aggrieving some strangers by not letting them in" (Lisiewicz 2016).

My desire to identify the source of the seemingly contradictory views of Chazbijewicz and Lisiewicz, as well as Poles' changing attitude toward Chechens, gave impetus to research resulting in an article (originally intended as an introduction to a contemporary edition of Kalinowski's memoirs) growing to the size of the present work. I was incessantly rankled by the question of why authors, oftentimes academics, proclaim views unsupported by the research material, committing in parallel interpretative misapplications bearing the hallmarks of mere manipulation.

I recognized that this conjuncture results from the influence of the Polish ethnopolitical myth. Subsequently, I decided to analyze in detail this myth's relationship to the Caucasus, the main area of my academic interest.

1 A Few Remarks on the Ethnopolitical Myth, Myths, and Science

The key category I employ in this paper is the ethnopolitical myth. To theorize it, I draw on the views of Viktor Shnirelman, who considers the ethnopolitical myth as an integral part of the ethnopolitical movement. This myth is related to the national (ethnic) image of the past, which emphasizes mainly four elements: 1) finding a homeland; 2) forming and developing one's statehood; 3) the conquests conducted and 4) national catastrophe. According to this anthropologist, it is these four narratives that are key to the functioning of the ethnopolitical myth, as the first one legitimizes the right of the nation to a certain territory, the second one allowing it to consider itself a political subject while legitimizing the creation of its own state. The third and fourth, although seemingly contradictory, are in fact arguments for a nation's claim to a dignified seat among the contemporary community of nations (Šnirel'man 2005: 168).

At least three of the above narratives in the case of Polish ethnopolitical myth are linked to the Caucasus. The first and the second are related to the notion, now historical and functioning as legend, of the origin of the Pole's ancestors in the Caucasus and the significant influence of this region's peoples on Polish ethnogenesis. Alternatively, only the ancestors of the upper stratum, the nobility, who were of major importance in the formation of Polish statehood, were viewed as deriving from this region. The fourth – national catastrophe – is linked to the partitions and Poland's loss of independence. It resulted in a portion of lands falling to the Russian Empire, with the people living on them being conscripted into the military and sent to conquer the Caucasus. A national martyrdom thus comes into play here, focused on presenting the region as a place of exile for patriots fighting for the independence of their homeland, and also as a place of death for Poles killed "in the wrong"

cause, conquering new lands “for the tsar”, which is further intended to demonstrate their tragedy. This martyrdom fits in with the concept of catastrophe, often associated with the attention given to some “world evil” against which a given nation is constantly forced to struggle. This “world evil” is often personified in the face of a real “nation-foe” (Šnirel'man 2005: 171). Thus, catastrophe, on the one hand, provides a ground for consolidation and ethnic solidarity, while, on the other, constructs an image of the enemy (Šnirel'man 2002: 9). This phenomenon is most important in understanding the Caucasus' significance in the Polish ethnopolitical myth.

All ethnocentric myths, and I consider the ethnopolitical as one, have in common a high degree of permanence and continuity of cultural tradition. However, they are no stimuli for the evolution of culture. For this reason, in Shnirelman's view, these myths must rely on external factors to explain the changes taking place. This is served precisely by national catastrophes (wars, occupations, deportations, etc.), to which the main historical importance is attributed, thus consolidating the creation of a “historical enemy”. These tales of a given nation's tragedies are contained in the symbolic legacy that a given culture's participant acquires in the process of socialization – in the family or in the processes of institutionalized education, to name some examples. As such, ideas around certain events become permanent, being reproduced from generation to generation, and become part of the national consciousness. This process greatly facilitates the assimilation of history, which is often complex and ambiguous. This occurs through a clear division between what is “good” and what is “bad”. We are the “good” ones, the wronged, while “bad” are the perpetrators of our misfortunes. This causes us to sympathize with and pity those we consider likewise wronged, more so if they have been wronged by the same “bad” people against whom hatred and contempt remain. Through such optics, the diversity, and ambiguity of interpretation of various events and processes disappears, and past events become more simplified, as all shades of grey disappear and only “white” and “black” remain, thus becoming more assimilable to non-specialists.

As an ethnopolitical myth, I consider any myth constituting the basis of a principled, that is, strictly defined and unchanging (or at least long-lasting) ideological construct, which can be used for the political mobilization of a group whose members feel unity among themselves out of common ethnicity. For this reason, the main requirement is the myth's presence in the collective memory of society, as only then can it perform political functions. Leszek Kołakowski put it as follows: “A myth can be accepted only to the extent that, with regard to a particular point of view, it becomes a kind of constraint, binding equally the whole group, be it humanity at large or a tribe” (Kolakowski 1989:

19), that is, ethnic. The myth, in creating the idea of a unified and cohesive society, refers to the past and constructs an extra-historical schema, presenting the nation as an eternal and unchanging whole (Šnirel'man 2005: 162). This follows from what Timothy Snyder has recognized in the work of Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz, that:

This impersonal solidarity (which Anderson would later call the “imagined community”) takes the form of a belief in a shared fate, articulated with reference to a mythical national past. Although the national identity is a genuinely new form of consciousness, it is invariably expressed in the language of eternal tradition. The creation of a national idiom of the mythicized past is one of the main tasks of nationally-oriented intellectuals. Although historical memory is rather weak, the use of “invented traditions” (in Hobsbawm's later term) has a powerful consolidating effect. Historical myths will inevitably conspire to justify a nation's demand for sovereignty and independence. (Snyder 1997: 247)

It is in this way that the myth imbues reality and empirical time with a coherent meaning and creates a non-temporal paradigm. On the non-temporal construction of a myth, Jerzy Topolski stated: ‘[...] in myths [...] we find smaller or larger crumbs of historical thinking, however trapped in a timeless norm and essentially subordinated to an ahistorical central idea’ (Topolski 1976: 60). In another work, Topolski added that the main feature of a myth is dogmatic thinking alongside a description of the world accompanied by sacred elements (Topolski 2008: 169). In our case, of the Polish ethnopolitical myth, I would argue that the sacred element is precisely to wage war against Russia.

The features of “national character” or “national spirit” are presented particularly within this ahistorical snapshot and through the use of dogmatic thinking (Šnirel'man 2005: 164). In the Polish reality, this is often associated with anti-Russianism. Shnirelman also noted that every nation possesses the characteristic of amnesia: “forgetting” that which violates the harmony of the current national myth (Šnirel'man 2006: 278). The question of why this is the case has been tackled by many philosophers and cultural scholars. I accept Kołakowski's answer, whereby it results from the myth being all about “[...] to avoid acceptance of a contingent world which expends itself of each occasion in its impermanent state, which is what it is now and bears no reference to anything else” (Kołakowski 1989: 5). The philosopher linked this to the fact that the myth satisfies the social need to answer questions that are ultimate, metaphysical, and therefore non-convertible into scientific inquiries. Per Kołakowski, this issue should be described in three ways: 1) as a need

to understand empirical realities as meaningful, that is, as a need to experience the world as meaningful by relativizing it to an unconditioned reality that binds phenomena intentionally; 2) as a need to have faith in that answers to ultimate questions, like human values, have permanence; 3) as a need to see the world as continuous (Kolakowski 1989: 2–4).

At the same time, this does not mean that myths should be resisted in every case. As Kołakowski argued: “[...] the project of a total demythologizing of culture appears chimerical. An awareness of this situation is valuable to both sides: both in counteracting the destructive consequences of the natural rapaciousness of myth as well as in forestalling the dangers which arise from attempts – ineffective as they are – to suppress the mythical consciousness totally, since both dangers are constantly fermenting in cultures capable of growth” (Kolakowski 1989: 124).

This does not imply, however, that myths do not pose a danger, considering, as the philosopher noted:

all those who warn against the threat of myth will be right. Myth can be threatening in many ways – for example, by its tendency to limitless expansion. A myth may grow like a tumor: it may seek to replace positivistic knowledge and laws, may attempt forcibly to take over almost all areas of culture, and may become encrusted in despotism, terror, and mendacity. It also threatens to relieve its participants of responsibility for their own situation, drain away the desire for freedom, and bring the value of freedom as such under suspicion. (Kolakowski 1989: 104)

I see serious peril in authors communicating mythmaking activities (and thus also ideological worldview ones) in the name of science and cognitional values, exploiting the prestige of science in the process. Sporadically, this can occur unconsciously, especially in the absence of methodological knowledge regarding the practice of the humanities, among others in distinguishing between description and valorization. In unknowingly blurring the differences and requirements between the realization of cognitional values and the different requirements of myth-making activities, harm is done to academic science – to political science and history, for example. This makes it difficult for science to fulfil the function of a third (adjudicating) view in a dispute between, for example, two opposing myths. Often, ridicule accompanies such pseudoscience when an event compromising its axiology suddenly takes place. The prestige of academic science suffers in tandem, as most of the public does not possess the expertise to distinguish it from pseudoscience and mythmaking, especially if scientists are involved in the latter activities. The threat to

the prestige of science posed by myths was also noticed by Kołakowski. In his view, when a myth is transformed into a creation requiring and seeking proof, its deformation occurs. This is because attempts to imitate knowledge are the form in which the degeneration of faith takes place (Kołakowski 1989: 3).

Topolski pointed to the general principles of the infiltration of myths into the narration created by humanists (more precisely, the historian addressed the issue of the emergence of myths in historiography, but I believe that his observations can be applied to the work of all representatives of the humanities and social sciences, not only historians, but also political scientists, ethnologists, sociologists, etc.). To his mind, the emergence of myths in the work of scientists is related to four causes: 1) the psychology of scientific work: the researcher identifies with his interpretation and is reluctant to expose his own claims to criticism that may subject them to falsification. Topolski observed that occasionally, researchers, applying all assumptions of the critical method to other works, are inclined to defend their own factual and interpretative claims “at all costs”. Consequently, considering the reluctance to subject their own claims to tests of falsification, dogmatization of various parts of the narrative manifests; 2) ideology, because of which research is directly guided by ideological and political convictions; 3) manipulation, often linked to 4) censorship aimed at forming an image of the past in accordance with the established assumptions. In the last cause, Topolski gave as example centres of political or religious power (Topolski 2008: 172, 222–224). Manipulation occurs not only when the researcher hopes to create an image whose pattern has been imposed on him by external factors, but also when he wants to convince the viewer of “his” image of the world but lacks either sufficient knowledge or arguments.

The influence of the ethnopolitical myth on the creation of an image of the Caucasus is closely tied to an author’s ideology, which makes it difficult to accept facts and arguments that contradict it. Within texts, ideology is usually located in the inarticulate layer of the narrative, where it functions together with what can be called theory or quasi-theory. As such, the theoretical substructure is to be understood as not only the actual theoretical constructs that result from systematic nomothetic procedure, but also everything that enables the researcher to create narrative wholes from the information extracted from a source. Thus, while the theoretical substructure gives coherence to the informing layer, ideology controls persuasion. Ideology thereby primarily incorporates the categories of identification (national, ethnic, etc.) of individuals and groups, thus linking it to the existence of the ethnopolitical myth. The mythologization of a narrative occurs when information unsupported by reliable sources seeps into it, and when there is unauthorized amplification

of information from originating sources. It then spreads when the information provided cannot be verified or is not subjected to verification, persisting instead in the awareness of researchers (Topolski 2008: 169, 172, 305–307).

It is worth pausing here for a moment to explain what constitutes science. According to Topolski's definition:

Science is the result of a long historical process that has constituted its likeness as a specific kind of intellectual activity, different from poetry or philosophy, oriented towards the acquisition of knowledge about the world. [...] This activity ought to seek its basis in reason and experience (or observation) rather than in power, that is, it should 'produce' knowledge that is objective and verifiable, at the same time representing knowledge that makes it possible to predict and act in accordance with those predictions. (Topolski 2006: 31)

Topolski distinguished several attributes that can define this intellectual activity recognized as science. These are:

- 1) the rigorous and precise thinking necessary to establishing intersubjective communication;
- 2) advancement in the study of realities, both past and present;
- 3) idealization, meaning the construction of models, concepts, points of view that emphasize certain aspects of the object under study (the world) and neglect others because, the historian noted, it is not possible to describe or explain "everything";
- 4) observation of the real world, regardless of opinion, or whether we have access to it or not.

Topolski emphasized that these attributes allow science to be redefined, without referring to an idea of an ideal science, like physics, and they do not assume the existence of a single, unknown reality that the researcher is trying to reconstruct. At the same time, Topolski underlined that among the attributes presented by him, he included progress in the study of reality (the development of knowledge about the world) to eliminate from science's definition all dogmatic systems, such as religion or myth, which present static and change-resistant visions of the world (Topolski 2006: 33–34).

In the study of Polish-Caucasian linkages dealt with in this work, the issue of objectivity is substantial. In the Polish literature on the subject, voices arise attempting to undermine this supreme value that science holds. A glaring example can be found in an article by Elżbieta Later-Chodyłowa devoted to Poles in Georgia, and published by the publishing house of the Catholic University of Lublin. The author advocated that the condition of objectivity

ought to now be transferred to the history of science, and that research on Poles and the Polish Diaspora should rely on “more humanistic principles of intersubjective communicability”. In Later-Chodyłowa’s view, the requirements of absolute research objectivity should be abandoned with regard to problems “which nearly every Pole, including the researcher, reacts to acutely” (Later-Chodyłowa 2002: 53–54). Voices thus arise within the Polish scientific community declaring one need not be objective, or at least “absolutely objective” in research that touches Poles emotionally. The Caucasus, however, is a region of the world where many topics that could stir the Polish reader exist.

Later-Chodyłowa’s proposal is a classic example of the negation of one of science’s most important assumptions. As pointed out by Hayden White, a scientifically responsible approach to the historiological record of progress or regression in a given field of human activity must presuppose the necessity of an objective or at least axiologically neutral attitude towards the object of study (White 2006: 86). For Paul Ricoeur, in turn, history is a social science insofar as it retains a methodological objectivity that epistemologically breaks with what are memory and mere storytelling (Ricoeur 2006: 183).

Undoubtedly, one of the greatest threats to objectivity in humanities research is ethnocentrism. In our case, concerning the analysis of links between the Polish ethnopolitical myth and the Caucasus, ethnocentrism can be observed in the construction of an image of the nation as a monolith devoid of internal contradictions. As Shnirelman observed, such a narrative is often accompanied by an image of the enemy, used to reinforce the internal bonding of a given ethnos. Reality is then presented in two-colour images, underpinned by well-known oppositional patterns: self–foreign, white–black, good–evil (Šnirel’man 2005: 164). The image of the enemy and the notion of the nation’s homogeneity are integral components of the ethnopolitical myth.

It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the activity of a professional historian, trying to maintain the principles of impartiality, and that of a person influenced by myths. The matter of distinguishing between a work determined by the ethnopolitical myth and more or less objective history is not easy. In Shnirelman’s view, the boundary between the two is not clear, albeit differences can be identified. Firstly, the goals are different: the historian tries to get as close as possible to knowing the historical reality (which, however, he is ultimately unable to reach), while the mythmaker manipulates historical data to achieve a preconceived goal, tied to a specific ethnopolitical myth. Secondly, while the work of a professional researcher is open to discussion and making changes when new information is acquired is permissible, the work associated with a myth constitutes a hard structure, intolerant of criticism and requiring strong faith. Thirdly, the mythmaker entirely ignores the methods adopted by

science (by way of supplementation, it may be noted that they do not necessarily have to thoroughly ignore the methods adopted by science but may employ treatments that mimic them). Moreover, the myth rejects the possibility of several equally valid hypotheses to explain a given phenomenon on the grounds that its foundation constitutes a reduction-based perception of the past or contemporary reality. The myth simplifies these and makes use of inadmissible (from the point of view of scientific methodology) generalizations based on singular and often completely ambiguous facts (Šnirel'man 2005: 164). Professional researchers, naturally, also separate beliefs specific to the era and their environment. This is reflected in their scholarly activities, from the choice of research subject to the interpretation of the data analysed (Šnirel'man 2006: 265).

The issue of the reinforcement of patriotic myths for the creation of national traditions by humanities scholars was highlighted by Georg Iggers. He did not deal so much with the control and manipulation of history in authoritarian regimes, but in relatively open societies. According to him, the emerging abuses are in large part due to the state's interest in historical research and already existed at the time of the emergence of history as a profession, which Iggers referred to the early 19th century and the works of Leopold von Ranke. The attention paid to precisely this field was directly tied to the rise of nationalism, as:

The task of research was to help contribute to the construction of a national identity and this is exactly what the historians did, in the case of the so-called Prussian School even openly. Historians went into the archives not so much to be guided by the sources as to find support for their arguments which preceded their research.

Iggers stressed that to be a historian at the beginning of the 20th century in countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, but also in those struggling for independence, such as Poland, the Czech Republic or Greece, meant to be a patriot. Patriotism in its essence amounted to nationalism, and in numerous instances to chauvinism. Concurrently, prominent historians of the period did not see any conflict between their biased interpretation of history and their professional ethos. All this meant that over the years, professional historians contributed to the creation of national myths (Iggers 2001: 311–319).

One must agree with Topolski that even though adopting the stance of an uninvolved observer allows humanistic and social scientists to move towards truth, it cannot be achieved on its own. The boundary between a historical account and any other that operates on the temporal dimension would readily

be seen precisely in the criterion of truth. A historical account would thus be one that reproduces past reality in a manner consistent with that reality, thus a true account. According to Topolski, however, even the most subtle scientific account can be said to at most move towards truth. The difference between an account of a historical nature and another type of account, then, is merely quantitative, not absolute. To illustrate this point, the historian gave the example of a scale at the poles of which there is historical “truth”, that is, an absolutely true account, on the one hand, and “inventions and fables” about the past on the other. The first pole, however, is purely an idealization. The second pole, in turn, has nothing to do with the historical account. The historical account must have to do with the pursuit of truth, which is not ultimately attainable. Topolski noted that between the historian and past reality, there are many obstacles already preventing an even objective scientist with the best methodological background from a relatively complete and consistent reconstruction of the past. Indeed, the mere fact that certain historical sources are lost or that others cannot be reached is enough for the process of striving for isomorphism between the past and its representation to be disrupted. Moreover, there is probably an even greater discrepancy between the picture presented by historians and what reaches the public consciousness (Topolski 1976: 20, 199–200).

In research related to the promotion of certain perceptions by historians, the publicism they produce cannot be ignored. Indeed, more often than not, they display their committed attitude within this field, which is due to the style of such works as well as the characteristics of their audience.

In this work, I demonstrate how various authors, including academics, participate in the construction of Polish national identity in publications on the Caucasus in accordance with the commonly held ethno-political myth. At the same time, they perpetuate one of its parts – the image of Russia as Poland’s “historical enemy”. The influence of the myth is often camouflaged in the works of scientists or in the actions of politicians, and it takes specialist knowledge to spot it. It is much easier to find its influence within publicism, an example of which are the texts of Mirosław Kuleba. This journalist, explaining his active involvement in the Chechen armed struggle against the Russians, wrote that for him there was no one in Chechnya who:

would fight for Poland. With Russia, which even now, as centuries ago, oozes poisonous venom on everything dear to us. [...] Poles should harden themselves in Russian fire. Officers from our General Staff should be sitting here instead of drinking rakija in Bosnia. The Germans fought for their freedom in Soviet Berlin, the Hungarians, Czechs, Afghans,

Chechens, they all fought – and us? The whole country watched the convulsions of Poznań, the massacre of the Coast, the murder of miners at “Wujek” [...]. And yet – Somosierra, Rarańcza, Westerplatte! [...] There was no one to shoot at the Russians in Chechnya. [...] A bullet to the dome! Because that’s how they should be dealt with. (Wilk¹ 2014: 73)

The quoted passage contains mythical thinking that cannot be argued with. It does not require any “correction” or “rectification”. Yet, when Mirosław Kuleba repeatedly seeks historical justification for his myth of struggle against Russia by creating a notion of a traditional Polish-Chechen alliance (to illustrate, one chapter is entitled ‘The Most Faithful Allies’ (Kuleba 1998: 19)), which will be discussed later in the work, a deformation of this myth occurs. This is because the author wished to explain the myth of the struggle against the “eternal enemy” through arguments designed to create (with less effect) the impression of being scientific, by referring, for example, to works authored by scientists or by presenting manipulated information about past events as historical fact.

A distinction must be made, of course, between referring to history and exploiting it to seek justification for one’s own motives for action from the historical knowledge adopted by “scientist-experts”. It is based on this knowledge, having appropriately modified it, that we create our own narratives (myths) that we treat realistically, that is to say, we believe in them and consider the world depicted in them to be real – it is our world. They rationalize our behaviour. The stories that arise in these circumstances build historical memory, which should be distinguished from historical knowledge acquired according to academic standards. However, in several instances, Kuleba does not prepare and modify for his own purposes the information provided by “recognized experts”, but refers directly to it with the sources cited. The problem lies in that it is these very academic researchers who have chosen to publish works steeped in myth, and although intended to be scientific, these do not meet the criteria to be considered as such.

The question arises as to how to treat these perceptions of the Caucasus, grown out of historical memory. With those propagated, for example, by Kuleba, when he writes why he chose to kill Russians in Chechnya: ‘a bullet to the dome! Because that’s how they should be dealt with’, cannot be challenged because they are entangled with the axiology of the person creating them. Polemically opposing them would lead to invoking a different axiology. In this circumstance, it is best to recognize the justification of a given behaviour as

1 Mirosław Kuleba wrote this work under the pseudonym Władysław Wilk.

a fact that people may be driven by such motives and to examine the reasons and causes for taking such a position. With this, however, we abandon traditional historical research and inch closer to cultural studies, political science, and sociology, with the ethnopolitical myth appearing on the horizon. Here we can espy the benefit of Immanuel Wallerstein's proposal for modern regional studies and the need to include – within a single analytical framework – analyses carried out according to the old division separately by researchers representing the individual social sciences and humanities.

In this book, I also deal with interpretations, above all those in which I find the influence of the ethnopolitical myth. Through the act of interpretation, the interpreter makes a symbolic appropriation of the world and aspires to wield the beliefs and consciousness of a particular group. As Tony Judt pointed out, it is particularly crucial to possess the ability to interpret past events, as this allows one to shape the present and the future. This researcher stressed that the manipulation of history is the oldest form of exercising control over knowledge. It is sensible for people to know history for this very reason. It is then more difficult to deceive them by machinations about the past. According to Judt, only a reliably informed reader can determine whether a historical work is good. Therefore, if the viewer is not sufficiently informed, he or she may succumb to the ideological stance of the author of the work being read. Judt believed it reprehensible to invent or exploit the past for present purposes. He maintained that many historians of modern-day treat history as participation in political polemics. To use knowledge for biased engagement in ongoing disputes is a betrayal of the historian's vocation, which is to attempt to explain the past (Judt, Snyder 2012: 259–260, 265).

Jerzy W. Borejsza noticed situations where, though rarely, this specific, worldview-determined interpretation of history did occasionally display a positive dimension. This happens to be the case in times of partition and occupation when a given group is threatened with denationalization. In Poland's case, in these periods the idealization of its past and the mythmaking of a not so numerous political elite and intelligentsia, in Borejsza's opinion, did serve noble purposes: creating national unity, forming and mobilizing the nation. The truth was embellished "to raise spirits", exaggerating the importance of Poland's independence cause for Europe while avowing the world's obligations towards Poles (Borejsza 2009: 62–64).

I agree with Borejsza in the sense that, under certain conditions, the failure to develop an ethnopolitical myth can lead to the complete assimilation of an ethnic group and, consequently, its complete disappearance. In the case of the Caucasus, the Batsbi of Georgia, for example, serve a good illustration. A Nakh people by origin, they have over time adopted the Georgian ethnopolitical

myth, which has contributed to their full Georgianization. It is expected that the Batsbi language – the Batsbi people’s last feature distinguishing them from ethnic Georgians – will disappear in the next ten to twenty years. Debatable is granting professional historians, even in extraordinary circumstances, a right to mythmaking. It is possible to imagine an academic who, faced with a threat to the existence of their homeland as an independent state, abandons their previous professional activity and embarks on propagandistic work aimed at uniting a given society against the enemy. Such activity, however, cannot be characterized in “scientific” terms. It focuses on a worldview-imposing and ideological function, with cognitional functions ceasing to bear any significance.

If, to contrast, certain notions, constructed for patriotic reasons, are disseminated by the intelligentsia over a long period of time (everything depending on the duration of a national liberation struggle, the political project of a certain segment of the intelligentsia centred mainly on the principle of common ethnicity), they may become constituent of an ethnopolitical myth. If, these perceptions are additionally consolidated by scientists exploiting their own authority and science’s prestige, all the while attempting to legitimize them with supposed scholarly knowledge, they will become deeply rooted in the public consciousness. An example of this is the image of Poles’ mass desertions from the tsarist army in the Caucasus and their going over to the side of the mountaineers struggling for independence. This image was created by the Polish independence émigrés in the 19th century and continues to function in the public, as well as academic, consciousness even into the present century.

There exists another danger to science, in the case of national liberation struggles, tied to the social acceptance of practising sorcery to “raise spirits”. It relates to the subjectivity of perceiving threats to the state by members of a given community, including humanists. Since academics in the described situation would maintain a right to prioritize ideological and worldview functions over cognitional ones in their scientific work, they would also have a right to do so in any situation where state independence is threatened. Herein, a problem related to the discretionary nature of “sensing” danger arises. In current geopolitical circumstances, it is not difficult to imagine that a scientist, depending on their views, will feel an internal right, or perhaps even an obligation, to let the cognitional functions in their work be dominated by ideological and worldview ones, gleaming a threat to Polish statehood from either the European Union or Russia.

Azerbaijan is an extreme example of the dangers posed to the humanities by socially granting scholars a right to interpret the past through a worldview/ideological prism under conditions of “sensing a threat to state security”. On the one hand, an independent country, on the other, having large parts of it

occupied under international law for many years by Armenians. Under these specific conditions, one of the main goals of Azerbaijani humanities was (is) to prove that Azerbaijanis are a nation inhabiting the South Caucasus' eastern part since antiquity, and that Armenia represents an artificial state – created on “indigenously Azerbaijani” territories. Such a narrative, emphasizing the need to compensate for “historical wrongs”, leads to society’s radicalization and makes compromise with the Armenians on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue unrealistic. Political motivation cannot be overlooked either. The task of the narrative, which is on the one hand, carried out within the framework of a need to “establish historical justice” in dealings with the Armenians, and on the other supposed to contribute to strengthening the constant “sense of insecurity” among the Azerbaijanis, is, among other things, to ensure public support for the current camp in power, centred around President Ilham Aliyev. When any person who might become his political rival (even if only in theory) appears and expresses critical opinions about him, they are accused in the public space of destabilizing the state and collaborating with the Armenians, and even of having “Armenian roots”. The same is true when any person goes against the official interpretation of history. This was the case, for example, with writers Akram Aylisli² and Rustam Ibrahimbekov.³ In the light of the above, it is clear that the line separating the positive aspects of prioritizing worldview/ideological functions over cognitional ones during a period of national “bondage” from their material exploitation by the camp in power is fluid and virtually imperceptible. It depends solely on the subjective senses of the observer. Even if Azerbaijani humanities does perform some positive patriotic tasks (if bringing, for example, the rhetoric of the “enemy” to the fore consolidates society), it does not enjoy significant international prestige. This is due to the perception of it being overly politically engaged and with little cognitional functionality.

2 Akram Aylisli is an Azerbaijani writer currently living in Russia. In 2012, he published the novel “Kamennye sny” in the magazine *Družba narodov*, in which he depicted pogroms against Armenians in Azerbaijan in the early and late 20th century. After publication, mass protests began in Azerbaijan targeting the writer. In his hometown of Ganja, slogans such as “Akram the Armenian” or “Death to Akram Aylisli” were commonplace during demonstrations. Consequently, President Aliyev stripped him of the title of “national writer of Azerbaijan” as well as of his state pension.

3 Rustam Ibrahimbekov is an Azerbaijani writer and director. In 2013, he was meant to run as an opposition candidate in Azerbaijan's presidential elections but was not registered by the court. The writer is known for his willingness to engage in dialogue with Armenians, about whom he speaks positively. As a result, campaigns are periodically organized against him in Azerbaijan. During one such initiative he was dismissed from his job. Ibrahimbekov is also occasionally accused of having “Armenian roots” and of acting to Azerbaijan's detriment.

Thus, the historian, regardless of the geopolitical situation in which their homeland might find itself, should observe certain professional standards if they wish their activities to be classified as professional. A scientist who, under any conditions, places worldview/ideological functions over cognitional ones in his work simply ceases to be one. The example of Azerbaijan is a case in point, illustrating the situation in which loosening methodological requirement criteria or even their complete abandonment by humanists leads to them, alongside politicians, being the ones to create an image of the “historical enemy” of a given nation during conflict, with this image becoming an integral component of historical memory and the ethnopolitical myth.

2 The Image of Russia as Poland’s “Historical Enemy”

In the analyses presented here, the part of the ethnopolitical myth related to the notion of “historical enemy” is key. This is because, in many cases, it determines Poles’ perception of the Caucasus and distorts their perception of their own role in the area, especially concerning the 19th century. I will therefore briefly explain how the role of the “historical enemy” came to be played by Russia.

I link the emergence of the notion of Russia as Poland’s “historical enemy” to a phenomenon accurately described by Janusz Tazbir, namely the emergence of the bulwark concept. Tazbir noted that already during the reigns of the Piast dynasty’s last rulers, Władysław the Short and Casimir the Great, documents drawing a picture of Poland as Christianity’s bastion tasked with fighting opponents of the Christian faith, including also Eastern schismatic Ruthenians, appeared. In the second half of the 15th century, the concept of Poland as Europe’s bulwark protecting her from Turkey and Muscovy took shape within Polish society. Foreign writers reinforced this conviction among the Polish elite. Tazbir pointed to Erasmus of Rotterdam, who in a letter to a patrician from Kraków in 1523 celebrated the victories of Sigismund the Old in his fight against the Tatars and Muscovy. According to the Dutch humanist, no one was better able to defend the Christian world than Poland’s sovereign. The second example cited by Tazbir was the German poet Helius Eobanus Hessus. In a eulogy in honour of Sigismund the Old’s marriage to Barbara Zápolya, he called Poland the protector of Christ’s cross, which was threatened not only by the Tartars and Wallachians, but also by Muscovy. We find a similar view in the writings of both the Calvinist Christopher Trecy and the Catholic poet and rector of the Kraków Academy, a German by origin, Andreas Schoneus. The latter, in his 1589 work *O pokoju sarmackim* (On the Sarmatian Peace), wrote that

Poland lies at the edge of the Christian world and that “further on no one worships God”. She was also to keep the Tartars, Turks, and Muscovy from invading Europe. This image persisted into the next century. Janusz Tazbir quoted a letter from Cardinal Richelieu in 1634 to Władysław IV, who was besieging Smolensk, in which the cardinal described Poland as “Christianity’s bulwark” (Tazbir 1987: 8–18).

Poles tried to cement the perception of their own country as a bulwark in the 15th and 16th centuries, a period when European states were seeking an understanding with Moscow. According to Tazbir, they tried to convince Europe that they were fighting Muscovy for the sake of the entire Christian world. It was in the 16th century that the notion of a Polish bulwark against Muscovy, rather than against Turkey – with which relations were then amicable –, intensified. Tazbir explained these endeavours by a desire if not to gain support then to at least gain sympathetic neutrality in the fight against Muscovy. Concurrently, the concept of the bulwark was seen not only through a religious prism, but also a political one. Poland was portrayed as a bastion of liberty protecting Europe from Asian despotism, including its Russian iteration. Russia was thus positioned not only outside the Christian world, but also outside the sphere of freedom. Tazbir noted that Stefan Batory’s victorious wars against Ivan the Terrible were described as a triumph of civilisation and freedom over barbarism and despotism. The historian argued that, as a result, all European agreements with Muscovy were considered inadvisable by both Polish rulers and society. He cited here a letter from one papal diplomat who, in 1523, took a proposal to Moscow that, for the price of a regal title, the Tsar should agree to ecclesiastical union with Rome and join the anti-Turkish league. The diplomat wrote that he had to conduct his mission in secret from the King of Poland (through where his route took him), who feared the designed union between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The diplomat explained this, among other things, by the fact that, in the absence of this union, the Polish king could initiate wars against Moscow as a schismatic state hostile to Catholicism, thereby gaining support across Europe. Tazbir observed that if Vasili III had recognised Rome’s supremacy, the Polish king would become bereft. Thus, it was in Poland’s interest at the time to build its image as Europe’s bulwark, defending her from the Russian threat. In tandem, this came to be the last period when the Commonwealth actively fought for influence in Eastern Europe. According to another historian, Jan Sowa, this was because until 1648 (the Khmelnytsky Uprising) Polish policy was essentially expansive, and the wars waged either on the eastern frontiers of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or, later, of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were offensive in nature. The apogee according to Sowa were the Dimitriads, that is, the Polish-Russian War of

1609–1616 and the Smolensk War of 1632–1634, when Poland’s political power, military dominance, and territory reached the furthest extent east in its entire history. In Sowa’s view, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had the same imperial ambitions as Russia, albeit being in a much worse geopolitical position to realise them (Sowa: 348, 503).

The Truce of Andrusovo was followed by a short-lived period of rapprochement between the two countries. Janusz Tazbir saw this as the reason why, from the second half of the 17th century onwards, the perception of the main threat to the frontier shifted towards Turkey. The situation began to change again with Russia’s rise to power. By then, however, in the 18th century that is, she was already widely recognised as a member of Europe’s great family of civilised states. Tazbir noted that from that point on, the sympathies of the Western European Enlightenment gradually turned towards enlightened absolutism (and thus the rule of Catherine the Great) rather than towards the Commonwealth, which had sunk into chaos and lost its stature, accused moreover of anarchy and religious fanaticism. Due to this fact, no one was inclined to go on believing that Poland represented any kind of protection for Europe against Russia. According to Tazbir’s assessment, the weak Commonwealth of the 18th century could no longer play the role of a defensive bastion against anyone. Yet, awareness of this fact failed to penetrate the society, which continued to regard Poland as a bulwark for a long while. According to Sowa, the conviction of its cultural and civilisational superiority over the rest of Europe flourished among the nobility until the First Commonwealth’s fall, despite its economic backwardness and political dependence on other states. In turn, Tazbir noted that political publicists, historians, preachers, and writers remained eager to preach about Europe’s Christian unity, of which Poland was to be both sword and shield. They paid no heed to the fact that this unity had disintegrated several centuries earlier. Per Tazbir, claims that Poland was defending Europe from pagans (Turks) in the south and from schismatics (Russians) in the east explained the historiosophic sense of the noble estate’s existence. The answer had two dimensions: 1) temporal – guarding Europe’s interests on her periphery, and 2) metaphysical – if Poland was encircled by enemies of the faith, it was by God’s will, who assigned it precisely such a spot on the world map.

Tazbir highlighted one interesting point: during Poland’s Saxon period, in protecting the interests of Christianity’s bulwark the nobility assigned Turkey a central role. He based these assertions on the observation that, from close to the end of the 17th century, it was in the Sublime Porte that a guarantor of Polish sovereignty and protector of her “golden freedom” began being construed. Members of successive confederations: the Tarnogród, Dzików, and Bar Confederations, all sought support, military assistance, and asylum therein.

Cooperation with the recent enemy was initiated against Russia, whose imperial interests clashed with those of both Poland and Turkey. Tazbir noted that while in the 17th century Poles usually appeared in Turkey as envoys, prisoners of war, or renegades, in the following century they began to arrive as political emigres. In turn, participants of the Bar Confederation, who went over to Turkey and took part in battles against Russia on the Turkish side, initiated a Polish-Turkish brotherhood of arms that continued into the 19th century.

The 19th century saw the processual culmination of constructing Russia's image as the "historical enemy", which was linked to Poland's loss of independence. This resulted in the bulwark's worst enemies, having threatened it for centuries, coming to be seen in the three partitioners, with Russia at the forefront. Sowa claimed that the Commonwealth's collapse in the 18th century could be interpreted as a failure of Polish colonialism in its rivalry with Russian, Prussian, and Austrian imperialism. Poland had been in a struggle with its neighbours for control of territories within a common sphere of influence and lost that struggle (Sowa 2011: 26). Its prestige was most damaged by its defeat to Russia – her main rival for supremacy in the region.

Sowa rationalised the hatred toward Russia that resulted from the partitions by two factors. The first he linked to the fact that her rule over the Poles contributed to the failure of the Polish colonial project, in which the Poles had been competing for two centuries precisely against the Russians. This struggle took place over the area between the Bug and Dnieper rivers, with eastward expansion being an imperative of Polish state ideology. Russian victory meant a calamity for the entire Polish state and national project. The second reason, per Sowa, was that the Poles considered themselves culturally and civilisationally superior to the Russians (Sowa 2011: 466–467).

The partitions reinforced the long-held belief that the Polish bulwark shielded Europe from Orthodox Russia. Tazbir noted that the argumentative strategy had changed from the period prior. There was no longer any attempt at proving that the Russians were in fact semi-pagans, as was still being done in the 16th and 17th centuries. By this time, no one in Europe cared for such matters. The focus therefore turned to accentuating cultural and political differences. The same pattern was followed as in previous centuries – just as before, attempts were made to question Russians' belonging in the great community of Christian nations, so in the 19th century they were denied a place within Slavdom. Tazbir gave the example of Zygmunt Krasieński, who claimed that Ruthenia was built on a Mongol-Byzantine tradition. His view began being propagated by representatives of the Great Emigration (Tazbir 1987: 101, 112, 114–115). This was done, for example, by the well-known messianist Bronisław Trentowski, who saw in Russia a "Mongolian spirit" (Trentowski 1847: 15).

Interestingly, the exclusion of Russians from the Slavic community and the “civilised” nations is also noticeable in the memoirs of Poles who ended up in the Caucasus in the 19th century. One example are the works of Zygmunt Rewkowski, a Vilnius University professor, who was the first to teach probability theory in the lands formerly belonging to the Commonwealth. In 1833 he was exiled to serve in the Absheron Regiment deployed in Dagestan for contacts with one conspiracy network organiser. In his memoirs, Rewkowski referred to Russians as a “Mongol tribe” and on their topic wrote: ‘Whether the Russians are Slavs, let the brothers of the Poles, the Ruthenians, answer – each one will disavow them, call them Moskals with disgust, for they are indeed of a different tribe, they come from the Finns, the Mongols, and the Scandinavians of old’ (Rewkowski 2011: 142). In opposition to them were the Poles, to whom: ‘Europe often owed her salvation; they were an object of reverence and respect for all civilised peoples’ (Rewkowski 2011: 102).

The 19th century saw the evolution of Poland as Christianity’s bulwark to Poland as the bastion of Western culture and liberty, opposed to barbarism and despotism. To substantiate this observation, Tazbir cited, among others, an article published in the newspaper *Nowa Polska* in 1831, thus during the November Uprising. Its author upheld the view that the Poles protect the radiance, liberties, and glory on which the peoples of Western Europe had worked for centuries from the sword of northern barbarism (that is, Russia). This defence of civilisation and freedom was to have been entrusted to the Poles by God himself. The Battle of Grochów was described as the second victory after the Battle of Vienna where the Poles had once again put a dam on the influx of the Asiatic hordes threatening European values. Tazbir noted that a similar statement was made during the Sejm of 1831 by the deputy foreign minister, Gustaw Małachowski, who stated that by initiating a war against Russia, Poland had put an end to its further expansion in Europe (Tazbir 1987: 114–115). Tazbir also quoted an excerpt from an article from this period by one publicist, Ignacy Stawiariski, which stressed that it was Providence that demanded of the Poles that they forever remain Christianity’s stronghold, a bulwark of civilisation and Europe’s free peoples against the barbarians from the east and north. In another work, its author, Karol Hofman, took the view that the fall of the last bulwark (that is, Poland) of western and anti-Russian Slavdom opened Europe’s gates to a northern power (that is, Russia), as terrible in its might as it was in vandalising its principles. Tazbir maintained that there existed a belief in certain segments of Polish society that Poland had twice, at the cost of its own existence, succeeded in protecting Europe from Russian expansion – in 1794 the Kosciuszko Uprising had saved the French Revolution, while in 1830 the November Uprising thwarted Russia’s intentions to restore the French

monarchy. It was prophesied that this situation might have no encore, and thus visions of Cossacks bivouacking for a second time on Parisian streets were drummed up to scare the West. As part of the same narrative, Adam Mickiewicz warned the English government that Russia might in time forbid free navigation on the Thames, and in one article reminded French peasants that Cossack troops had burned the villages of Lorraine and Champagne to ashes. In Tazbir's view, binding the bulwark to the West against Russia gave rise to the hope that, in the name of its own well-understood interests, this would help the Poles "spring into independence". The West did, after all, historically owe it to "this easternmost bastion of European civilisation". Thus, in the Poles' worldview, a conviction began cementing whereby other states were obliged to take care of their fate out of cultural communion. Tazbir noted that there was a shift taking place then, from thinking in terms of political realism to the view that it was the sacred duty of France and England (with the United States added in the 20th century) to look after this Polish bulwark, first as a Christian and then as a civilisational one. This was said to stem from the centuries-long gratitude that Europe ought to have towards Poland reaching back to the Battle of Varna in 1444, or even the Battle of Legnica in 1241 (Tazbir 1987: 116–117).

The image of Poland as a bulwark was shaped in the 19th century not only by Polish independence activists, but also by left-wing intellectuals, including those from Europe. As the most vivid example, Tazbir cited Karl Marx, who described Poland as "Europe's immortal knight" and a bastion protecting it from a deluge of Asian despotism. In Marx's view, Poland's restoration would mean the destruction of Russia and depriving her of the ability to dominate the globe. In 1867 in London, at a celebration organised to mark the fourth anniversary of the January Uprising in Poland, the philosopher gave a speech which he concluded with the words:

This leaves Europe with only one of two choices. Asian barbarism, led by the Muscovites, will fall on her head like an avalanche, or she must rebuild Poland, thus fencing herself off from Asia with twenty million heroes and gaining free moments to accomplish her social transformation. (Marks 1867: 1)

The strengthening of the perception of Russia as the "historical enemy" resulted from processes that took place in the Polish lands after the 1905 revolution. Sowa noted that the influential at the time socialist movement structured a symbolic universe along an oppositional axis of proletariat (the exploited) versus bourgeoisie (the exploiters). For this reason, the national movement had to accentuate its narrative of the collective imaginary more strongly. To do this,

it employed the power of the sense of injustice that defined Poles as always being wronged by non-Poles, mainly the partitioners (Leder 2014: 57).

After the October Revolution, and especially after the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, the concept of the Polish bulwark once again acquired a religious character. Tazbir observed that a causal force started being sought in the work of Providence. The view emerged that communism had shattered upon Poland and halted its march on Europe through divine intervention. The war strengthened the belief in the Poles' historical mission. In the historian's opinion, however, this view did not serve post-war Poland as it was a state in which more than 30% of the population was made up of ethnic minorities, consequently leading to the disintegration of society. It was difficult to count on enthusiasm for the bulwark cause among "schismatic" Belarusians or Ukrainians, Protestant Germans, not to mention Jews, while also putting off Polish Calvinists and Lutherans. Tazbir stressed that the Catholic Church, however, remained serious about its bulwark slogans. Poland was to continue to play the role of Christianity's bastion, albeit now in relation to a new enemy, the Judeo-Bolshevik East. She thus became a fortress protecting Europe against a "communist deluge" (Tazbir 1987: 137, 139, 143).

Tazbir concluded his work with the argument that although Poland had fought primarily for its own borders in the 17th century, a section of Western European society believed that Poland's defeat could mean the flooding of neighbouring countries not only by the Turks, but also by Tatars and the Muscovite state. According to him, this deviated from their actual capacities, as at the time neither the Khanate nor Russia possessed the forces to carry out such expansion deep into the continent. He also noted that although the entire history of pre-partition Poland included no more than 30 years of Polish-Turkish wars and several decades of Polish-Muscovite/Russian struggles, the *raison d'être* of the bulwark/barrier's existence was not grounded in direct military clashes, but in the very fact of its existence. Poland's partitions, in turn, brought changes in terms of viewing her own history, while the image of the *antemurale* enriched the arsenal of national myths and became a tool of the independence struggle (Tazbir 1987: 142).

After the Second World War and Poland's finding itself in the camp of socialist states, the historical policy pursued by the Polish state authorities was directed at reinforcing the image of the "historical enemy" in relation to Germany. This was also reflected in academic works. This is evidenced, for example, by one article by Ryszard Zięba, one of the best-known Polish political scientists of the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, published in 1989 and dealing with the most important tasks of ensuring the state national interest. The scholar wrote:

In Polish national security policy, this first, “negative” objective is the elimination of the threat posed by German nationalism. The national interest implies striving to neutralise, postpone, and eliminate the traditional threat of territorial and political expansion towards Poland. Although these threats were of varying dynamics, in Poland Germany was and is perceived as a traditional enemy. This perception of the German threat is not only influenced by actual dangers but is also influenced by the historical experience of the Polish nation, which for centuries had to resist German expansion and pressure. (Zięba 1989: 159–160)

Regarding Russia, there was an attempt to shift the perception of the enemy, especially in the context of the partitions and national uprisings, from the state and the population to the “reactionary” regime – the Tsardom. It was supposed to fill the role of main opponent and perpetrator of the Poles’ oppression. This narrative was abandoned following the regime changes at the turn of 1989–1990, when the focus again turned to the threat from the Russian state, regardless of its political system. As a result, perceptions around the two “historical enemies” were (and remain) strong within society: around Russia, constituting a centuries-long process becoming established primarily in the 19th century; and Germany, mainly as a remnant of historical politics from the period of the Polish People’s Republic. Poland’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures has, at least in part, had a positive effect on the image of Germany. After all, it would be illogical to apply for membership in the European Union where a “historical enemy” would play a central role. Such connotations towards the western neighbour linger, however, above all among the conservative part of society and members of various anti-EU movements.⁴ Nevertheless, the main, or at least traditional, “historical enemy” in the light of the Polish ethnopolitical myth remains Russia.

The fact that Russia appears as Poland’s “historical enemy” was evident, among other things, in publications following the political transformations and the collapse of the socialist bloc. A return to a narrative in which Poland was presented as a bastion of civilisation against eastern barbarism was also noticeable. This can be found, for example, in works on the Caucasus, which was particularly evident during the Chechen-Russian wars in the 1990s.

4 The use of the term “historical enemy” in reference to Germany also happens in Poland at the highest levels of government. This is evidenced, for example, by a statement to the American press by Anna Fotyga, Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2006–2007, who stated that Poland is threatened by the close ties between its historical enemies, Russia and Germany. See: Dempsey 2007.

Mirosław Kuleba, for example, wrote at the time that Russia had to murder Chechens in order to:

drown out the boundless inferiority complex, its own humiliation caused by the very existence of this noble nation. [...] In the same way, Russia had to enslave Poland, murder its soldiers in the Katyn forest – in order to nullify, to entangle with barbed wire the liberty of which Poland had always been a nest and pillar. A liberty which, for Russia, a colonial slave empire, is the seedbed of its fatal decay. This is the origin of this extraordinary commune of ideas and history between two nations, Chechens and Poles, distant from one other yet so close, connected by a chain of uprisings and wars of liberation that broke out on two ends of the tsarist state, by the terror of Stalin's executions, and by the blood shed in a common cause. (Kuleba 2006: 6)

In another work by the same author, it is clear his perception of Polish history is influenced by the notions of the two “historical enemies” I have already mentioned – Russia and Germany. Kuleba would state that: ‘We have two eternal, natural enemies – Russia and Germany’. He went on to exonerate the Poles and blamed the Russians for creating the “eternal” hatred between the nations: ‘There is no hatred in us towards Russians. We understand that the Russians are victims of Russia. It is the Russians who hate us because they feel inferior’ (Wilk 2014: 167). At the same time, the publicist extended the notion of a Polish *antemurale* to Chechnya, writing that ‘Chechnya upholds the civilisation of liberty, with Europe, let alone Russia, having no right to judge it’. Significant in this regard is the fact that Kuleba, in building parallels between Poles and Chechens, emphasised religious issues and stressed the poorly documented view that Chechens, prior to adopting Islam, had been Christians, with that faith being brought to them by Georgia (Kuleba 2007: 355, 16).

Similar views regarding the “historical enemy” were voiced by another publicist covering the Caucasus, Witold Michałowski. In an interview with Khattab, alongside constructing parallels between Poland and Chechnya he stated that the former had been at war with Russia for 700 years already.⁵ The identification of the Chechen struggle with the Poles is also evident in the work of one of the activists most involved in humanitarian aid to independent Chechnya, Paweł Chojnacki:

5 W.S. Michałowski, *Plonący Kaukaz*, Wrocław 2000, p. 74.

The people of the Caucasus suffer in the name of their human and national liberty. However, in defending themselves, they are also defending us from the same threat. The coincidence of our histories is no coincidence – we are subject, despite our geographical distance, to similar geopolitical factors. The outbreak of war in Chechnya has reminded us all of a truth known for several centuries: Russia threatens our freedom and independence. (Chojnacki 1999: 370)

Also evident in this passage, something analysed by Janusz Tazbir, is an absorption of Chechnya into this “Polish bastion” that had for centuries defended Europe against Russia’s “Asian barbarism”. For Chojnacki, too, Russia appears as a “historical enemy” with whom no settlement can be reached. Her policies are irrelevant, because, in the author’s view, even if they were not imperial, there is no possibility of finding a compromise with her. According to Chojnacki, a liberal Russia, following Western models, could be even more dangerous for Poland (Chojnacki 1999: 350).

Much less commonly did Polish authors extend the Polish *antemurale* to the South Caucasus, though this too occurred. Here, an article by Rafał Geremek may serve as one example, where the author stated that ‘Georgia, like Poland, defended Christianity against the onslaught of Islam’ (Geremek 2008: 80).

These examples of Russia’s image as Poland’s “historical enemy”, a component of the ethnopolitical myth, reveal an important feature of the mythical vision toward history. In Topolski’s opinion, history should be perceived as a constant, cyclical succession, like the necessary natural transition from day to night or the sequence of seasons, or the cycle of human life from birth to death – a deeply ahistorical view. Such a frame creates the impression of life in a continuous present, only stretched out in time. Per this historian, such a manner of presenting the past shows that people are united by a belief in the cyclical nature of coming eras. Fatalistic attitudes then form, allowing all misfortunes to be treated as necessary, given that they are situated along some section of an infinitely renewing reality (Topolski 1976: 69–70). We are thus faced here with a myth of eternal repetition. One key point should be underlined through the prism of Tazbir’s analysis of the concept of the “Polish bulwark” and the emergence of the notion of Russia as a “historical enemy”. As noted by the social anthropologist Valery Tishkov, ethnicity alone is not the cause of conflicts seen as a result of antipathies between group identities, but as a consequence of intergroup competition for the possession of economic or natural resources (Tiškov 2012: 633). The fact that the notion of a Polish bastion against the Eastern Slavs is already apparent during the reign of the final Piasts

in Poland can be linked to specific political events. When Władysław the Short undertook the task of “collecting the Polish lands” after the period of feudal fragmentation, his political ambitions were directed also towards lands inhabited by Eastern Slavs, above all the Principality of Halych, exemplified by his expedition in 1323. This was reinforced during the reign of his son Casimir the Great. This led to a series of wars with the Ruthenians, which culminated in the incorporation of the Principality of Halych into Poland at the end of the 14th century. A redefinition of Polish foreign policy would take place through the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Union, initiated in Poland by the reign of Jogaila and the Act of Krewa signed in 1385. From that point on, practically all of Poland’s resources and efforts were directed towards the East, with its western policy marginalised. This led to a clash with the interests of the Muscovite rulers, who, since the days of Ivan Kalita (first half of the 14th century), had begun a long process of “collecting the Ruthenian lands”. It was at this time that the Polish-Muscovite and then Polish-Russian rivalry over the lands east of the Bug River began, giving rise to the image of Russia as Poland’s “historical enemy”. A similar view was held by Jan Sowa, who emphasised that under the pretext of the *antemurale*, Poland pursued imperial interests by absorbing Ruthenian lands (Sowa 2011: 497). The image of the bulwark functions to this day, given that the Polish-Russian rivalry over influence in Eastern Europe (including the Caucasus) continues, with Poland at least seeking to increase her influence in this region, at the same time aiming to limit Russia’s.

3 Purpose, Scope, and Work Methods

In connection with this work’s conception, alongside my view towards science, one point requires clarification. I identify with the spirit of the propositions put forward by Immanuel Wallerstein. This academic advocated the abolishment of reverence for the traditional boundaries of the social sciences and analytical conduct, which according to traditional delineations were dealt with by historians, political scientists, or sociologists, within a unified analytical framework. I believe that solely this approach can foster modern regional studies, in this case, Caucasian studies, of which I consider myself a representative.

The object of my interests is mainly the present, which serves as a horizon for my reflections. However, these contain a significant bit of history, as I aim to demonstrate the historical conditions behind the current realities, while attempting to avoid a shallow historicism inconsiderate of the past further than a few decades back. Therefore, I describe events from the 19th century, occasionally earlier – concerning even the Middle Ages – that would lead

to the Caucasus' inclusion in the Polish ethnopolitical myth. This treatment results from the fact that the Commonwealth's collapse, alongside the entire 19th century, were centrifugal to the formation of Polish national identity. This period produced and disseminated a new image of the past, under the influence of which most Poles remain to this day – including, naturally, academics as well (Tazbir 1987: 108). The contemporary Polish ethnopolitical myth formed alongside a Polish identity, a component of which is the notion of Russia as the “historical enemy”.

The subject of my research is the Polish ethnopolitical myth insofar as it influences Poles' perception of the Caucasus. Thus, the stated research problem oscillates around the issue of how the ethnopolitical myth determines the perception of the world around us, as well as the historical phenomena and events related to this part of the world. The outlined inquiry thus represents a case study of one group (Poles) and one global region (the Caucasus). My inquiries are intended to answer several research questions, two of which I view as the most focal: 1) How and under what conditions was the Caucasus encompassed by the Polish ethnopolitical myth?; 2) How does the impact of the ethnopolitical myth deform the presentation of processes and phenomena taking place across the Caucasus in works authored by Polish academics, journalists, and publicists?

My research hypothesis assumes that the stronger the influence of the Polish ethnopolitical myth, the more pronounced the tendency to treat the processes taking place across the Caucasus through the prism of Poland's national interests (which are culturally determined and with the image of Russia as the “historical enemy” playing an important role within them).

Qualitative research was essential to my analysis, which stemmed from the desire to explain why those who “construct the past” (that is, academics, first and foremost historians and political scientists, journalists, and politicians) treat any armed movement against Russia in the Caucasus as “our violence”, thus presenting it through a prism of their own ideological values and world-view. Consequently, I devoted particular attention to analyzing scholarly works in which I noticed a subordination of narratives about the past to world-view and ideological functions, in tandem with a marginalization of cognitional functions. Moreover, I underscore that the deficiencies of Caucasus studies in Poland strengthen the Caucasus' perception through the prism of the ethnopolitical myth.

One of the more key aims of the current work is to explicate the reasons for the 19th-century inclusion of the Caucasus in the narrative of the Polish national catastrophe, bound to the activities of the “historical enemy” – Russia, against which a prolonged struggle was waged for the restoration of

the homeland. Once this restoration took place, the equally important goal of defending the homeland took on the mantle under modern Polish geopolitical conditions, implying a desire to ensure a sense of security, something also determined culturally. In this work, I explain why this gave rise to an image of Polish-Caucasian cooperation, especially through the prism of military action against a common foe, and why – as part of the Polish ethnopolitical myth – a patriotic duty to act against Russia was extended to the inhabitants of the Caucasus.

Among the methods used here, four are the most eminent. I employ the method of source analysis to study political documents, drawn up primarily by political parties, social movements sporting political ambitions, or 19th-century Polish émigré camps (primarily the representatives of the Hôtel Lambert). The ethnographic method allowed me to capture cultural manifestations, and thus occurrences of the ethnopolitical myth within the studied group, through written text analysis. The related and complementary methods of qualitative content analysis and narrative analysis were also essential to my research. The former was useful in explicating messages by demonstrating the concepts and meanings of words on a network. I employed it in the study of phenomena and processes occurring through various communicative acts, serving as my base research material. I used narrative analysis to extract and circumstantiate the persuasive potential of the communication under analysis, demonstrate a statement's ideological nature, and identify and describe the identity of the text's subject. My work covers an analysis of that narrative aspect, which testifies to the occurrence of the ethnopolitical myth. The analytical unit most often came down to judgments and opinions, sometimes claiming to be historical fact – herein is its presence most clearly manifested.

The present work is a translation of part of its Polish edition, published in 2019 by the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Mainly due to the size of the Polish edition, I have decided to divide it and publish it in English in two parts. In the first part presented here, I focus on explaining the reasons for the inclusion of the Caucasus in the Polish ethnopolitical myth and the entrenchment of its image as a region intimate and especial to Poles. The second part, not included in this edition, deals with the most recent affairs. In it, I analyze the ethnopolitical myth's presence in the contemporary attitudes of Polish society and the Polish authorities concerning the Caucasus, as well as in narratives about this region. I devote significant space to an interpretation of Poland's foreign policy, referring partially to the Caucasus, through the prism of its connection to the ethnopolitical myth, employing Alexander Wendt's social theory of international relations. I also analyze Polish society's perceptions of the 1990s Chechen-Russian

conflict and Poles' changing attitudes towards Chechens, determined by whether they are fighting Russia in the Caucasus or whether they appear in Poland as migrants/refugees. Additionally, I raise minor, yet, from the purview of my research, important questions, like how the Olympic Games in Sochi were presented or Polish attitudes towards issues of independence regarding nations/ethnic groups not inhabiting Russia. The final part of the book is devoted to a phenomenon distinct from my main line of considerations – the way the Caucasus and the processes taking place there are presented by Polish Eurasianists, among whom the notion of Polish-Russian unity plays a critical role. Eurasianism was present in Poland over several years, after which it dissipated. Although it was a marginal phenomenon, it did manifest itself in Polish political, social, as well as academic life.

The research constituting the basis of my work was possible thanks to funding from Narodowe Centrum Nauki [the National Science Centre] for project no. 2016/20/S/HS5/00047. Its translation into English, in turn, was made possible thanks to a grant under the “Science for Society” programme, project no. NdS/528993/2021/2021, financed by the Polish Ministry of Education and Science.

4 Characteristic of the Materials Used

The main source base in the analysis of the phenomenon that prompted the inclusion of the narrative of the Caucasus in the Polish ethnopolitical myth are works by Polish writers, above all from the 17th–19th centuries. It was then that the foundations of the idea of Polish-Caucasian brotherhood were laid, through a search for the Poles' ancestral homeland in the Caucasus and the view that the peoples of the region played an important role in the Poles' ethnogenesis. Weaving such a narrative was not a peculiarity of professional historians alone, however, but of literary scholars too. For this reason, I also undertake an analysis of their works on historiography and historiosophy, above all the works of Adam Mickiewicz, who most fully formulated a concept of a Caucasian origin for a portion of Polish society (or for a portion of the Poles' ancestors at the least).

In analysing how the ethnopolitical myth influences the way Polish authors portray the history of the Caucasus and Polish-Caucasian relations, works of the late University of Gdańsk professor Andrzej Chodubski, who passed away in 2017, are of particular relevance. His contribution to Polish studies on the Caucasus was invaluable, with its particular focus on Polish-related topics. Chodubski is considered one of the most prominent researchers of the turn of

the 20th and 21st centuries in this field, which is why he is so often referenced by other authors. According to *Publish or Perish*, this political scientist's h-index is 11, being cited almost 800 times, probably the highest number among all Polish authors writing about the Caucasus. Chodubski produced more than a thousand publications on political science, Caucasian and Polish studies, as well as ethnic studies. He received several university awards for his scholarly and popularising activities and was a long-standing member of the Political Science Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences, where he served, among other positions, as chairman. It is also not uncommon for Polish authors writing on the Caucasus to emphasise Chodubski's contribution to the development of research into the field, or note that he was an eminent Polish Caucasologist and outstanding researcher into the activities of Poles in the Caucasus (Furier 1997: 122, idem 2009: 12, Koseski 2002: 34, Kwiatkiewicz 2013: 30, Hofman 2007: 447, Bodio 2014: 19). In light of the above, when analysing Polish scholars' perception of the Caucasus, it is impossible to ignore Chodubski's accomplishments, as he had a significant impact on shaping opinions about the region, not least among the numerous recipients of his works. In a similar vein to Chodubski's work, I will address the contributions of his student, another political scientist from the University of Gdańsk, Grzegorz Piwnicki (Chodubski was Piwnicki's Ph.D. supervisor). Proportions will of course be maintained, given Piwnicki's "Caucasian" legacy is much more modest.

In addition to the works of the above-mentioned scholars, I will analyse works in which the theme of the Caucasus has been addressed and where I notice the ethnopolitical myth's influence. It should be noted that currently there are few researchers in Poland who deal with the history of this region. Most often, works on this subject are written on the "periphery", so to speak, of their authors' main interests. Of great importance in the analyses undertaken by me is the research of Wiesław Caban, an academic whose many years of archival queries inside Polish and Russian institutions have made a major contribution to the knowledge of the service of persons of Polish origin in the tsarist army, including those stationed in the Caucasus. His monograph *Służba rekrutów z Królestwa Polskiego w armii carskiej w latach 1831–1873* (Service of Recruits from the Kingdom of Poland in the Tsarist Army in the Years 1831–1873) deserves special attention. In this book are presented in detail such issues as the desertion of Poles from the tsarist army, or how many recruits from the lands of the Kingdom of Poland served in the units conquering the Caucasus.

Among the researchers who devoted the most attention to the Caucasus' history in the 20th century are Ludwik Widerszal, who wrote on the significance of the region in European politics in the mid-19th century, as well as

Bohdan Baranowski and his son Krzysztof Baranowski, authors of such works as *Historia Gruzji* (History of Georgia) and *Historia Azerbejdżanu* (History of Azerbaijan), published in the 1980s. The author of the third Transcaucasian country's history, that is, Armenia's, is Mirosława Zakrzewska-Dubasowa. Among the best-known researchers whose works are cited in this monograph, also worthy of mention, are Jan Reychman, a historian and versatile orientalist, and Mieczysław Inglot, who dealt with the writings of Polish exiles in the Caucasus.

In presenting the situation of Poles in the Caucasus at the time of Russia's conquest of the region, the insights of Polish exiles are noteworthy. These were usually educated people, some of whom left behind interesting diaries and memoirs. They are now a valuable source on the perception of the region by Poles who had the opportunity to reside there personally. Two works deserve special attention: Mateusz Gralewski's *Kaukaz. Wspomnienia z dwunastoletniej niewoli* (The Caucasus. Memories from a Twelve-Year Captivity), first published in Lviv in 1877, and the work by Karol Kalinowski mentioned above, *Pamiętnik mojej żołnierki na Kaukazie i niewoli u Szamila. Od roku 1844 do 1854* (A Memoir of my Soldiering in the Caucasus and Enslavement under Shamil. From 1844 to 1854), published in Warsaw in 1883.

Journalistic and popular-science magazines also played a crucial role in shaping the image of the Caucasus among Poles. For this reason, I also analyse the content published on their pages in this work. Due to the 19th-century conditions brought on by the partitions in which Poles found themselves, I am interested in both émigré and domestic periodicals. This is because independence periodicals published by émigrés were important for the formation of certain social perceptions, and in relation to the Caucasus, some of these are present to this day.

I focus primarily on the works of authors who lived or live in Poland currently, given that it is in their research that I see the impact of the Polish ethnopolitical myth. I therefore omit researchers such as Tadeusz Świętochowski or Ewa Thompson, who, although born in Poland, spent most of their professional lives abroad. I have made an exception only for those of their works which were addressed to a Polish audience and could have contributed to the formation of various images of the Caucasus in Poland. In the works of both researchers, however, one can notice the prioritisation of worldview and ideological functions over cognitive ones. The fact that most of their works have been omitted is a consequence of the fact that I have not been able to establish whether these authors' adoption of an engaged rather than observational stance was due to the influence of the Polish ethnopolitical myth or some American one, or perhaps resulted from some other process.

The phenomenon of adopting an engaged stance is particularly evident in Thompson's work, including her best-known publication, *Imperial Knowledge: Russian Literature and Colonialism*. One of the many examples illustrating this is the author's portrayal of the 1998 incidents that took place in Russia's Far North. At that time, several sailors from Dagestan sent on military service to Novaya Zemlya decided to flee to their families in the Caucasus following some months. Thompson presented the whole affair from the perspective of a meta-Caucasian struggle against imperial Russia, with an unambiguously anti-Russian tone (Thompson 2000: 4–5).

Thompson, in describing the events, provided no sources for her information, so it is difficult to verify. It is doubtful that she consulted the prosecution's case files directly or interviewed any of the events' participants. Most likely, she relied on publicly available media reporting. She did, however, conceal from the reader some important facts that affect any perception of the event she described. The whole case involved not five Dagestanis, as Thompson wrote, but three, as well as one Ingush and one ethnic Russian (*K probleme*) (the presence of a Russian in the deserter group disrupts the author's narrative, which tries to present the whole incident as a Caucasian-Russian conflict). Additionally, the author failed to disclose that these Caucasian soldiers had previously been detained for abusing their unit mates, while the Russian had been detained for desertion. The most important piece of information she did not provide, however, was that all five decided to escape without waiting for a court order. They reached the village of Rogačevo, where they broke into a school and took hostages: eight teachers and fifty-seven children (Gudkov 1999). Mentioning that a threat to kill the child captives was issued – hardly justifiable by Russia's policy in the Caucasus – would have negatively affected the image of the escapees on whose side the author was emotionally involved; the inconvenient fact was thus omitted.

In the light of available material, the soldiers' desertion was purely criminal in nature and no argument exists to justify it being put in the context of a struggle for the independence of the peoples living in the Caucasus against Russia, which is how Thompson put it. Moreover, her omission of several important facts not corresponding to the narrative she adopted shows that cognitive functions were subordinated to worldview and ideological ones. This is a phenomenon characteristic of works produced under the influence of the ethnopolitical myth, yet, because Thompson has lived in the United States for many years, I have decided that an analysis of her work is beyond the scope of this paper.

The Caucasus – Ancestral Homeland of the Poles

I see the beginning of linkage between the Caucasus and the Polish ethnopolitical myth in the attempts to explain the Poles' ethnogenesis that took place at the end of the Middle Ages and into modern times. It was then that contemporaries began to discover their ancestors in peoples who had come from this region of the world and who were also to have had an impact on the establishment of Polish statehood. Thus, Polish-Caucasian ties became not so much ties based on temporal grounds the likes of trade or diplomatic contacts, but something much deeper: the Poles were found to be spiritually connected to the Caucasus, with this region turning out to be the place whence their very ancestors hailed.

The Caucasus appeared in the ideas surrounding the ethnogenesis of the Poles as a result of Polish intellectuals' search for their ancestral homeland or, more broadly, the ancestral homeland of the Slavs, with particular emphasis on the Western branch of that group. Firstly, at the end of the Middle Ages and beginning of the Renaissance, the theory that Poles were descendants of the Sarmatians gained wide popularity. The formation of such a view was largely associated with the phenomenon of humanists of the time harkening back to terms known from antiquity. Thus, Sarmatians filled a suitable role for seekers of the Poles' "ancient protoplasts". This tribe, appearing in the works of such ancient authors as Herodotus and Strabo, was presented in them as extremely brave and warlike. Consequently, portraying them as one's ancestors served as a kind of ennoblement. The geographical distribution of the Sarmatians was also important. Ptolemy claimed that its western edges included the lands on the Vistula River (Ptolemy 1991: 79), so the location of some Sarmatians would more or less correspond with the location of the later Poles. With time, the theory of their Sarmatian origin began to supplant others also referencing antiquity. One such concept was the derivation of Poles and other Western Slavs from the Vandals. For example, Wincenty Kadłubek included the legend of Wanda in his *Chronicle of Poland*, written at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Therein he inserted a footnote stating that the name of the river Vandalus (i.e. Vistula – P.A.), located in the center of Wanda's kingdom, took its name from her, and that her subjects were called Vandals (Kadłubek 1823: 45).

On the other hand, in the so-called *Dzierzwa Chronicle*, written at the beginning of the 14th century, its author stressed that the Poles descend from

the line of Japheth, son of Noah. '[...] While Alan, first to set foot in Europe, gave birth to Negnon. Negnon then bore four sons, the firstborn named Vandalus, from whom the Vandals (now called Poles) originated' (Dzierzwa 1823: IX).

The perception linking Poles to the Vandals was rejected with the development of antiquity studies and the idealization of ancient culture. The Vandals came to be associated with the great sack of Rome in 455, becoming synonymous with devastators and primitives, and thus ceased to be a people who could be used for national "ennoblement".

Jan Długosz, author of the most outstanding work of Polish medieval historiography, the *Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae*, consistently referred to Poland as Sarmatia, and identified the Poles with the Sarmatians, writing for example 'the Sarmatians, that is, the Poles' (Długosz 1867: 3). According to Długosz, the Sarmatians were descendants of Negnon, son of Alan, who came from Japheth's line. Negnon and his people were said to have come out of Shinar (a land now most often identified as Babylonia), crossed Greece, and settled on the shores of the Black Sea at the mouth of the Danube. According to the Polish chronicler, it was in Pannonia where the original homeland of the Slavs lay (Długosz 1867: 17).

The phenomenon of originating the Poles out of the Sarmatians is connected with the notion that the Caucasus, primarily Colchis, was one of the places where the ancestors of the Poles inhabited. Such a thesis in the second half of the 16th century was included in the *Annales, sive de origine et rebus gestis Polonorum et Lithuanorum libri VIII* by Stanisław Sarnicki, who described their history from the 3rd millennium BC onwards (Sarnicki 1587: 1–22). Remarks on the Caucasus appeared sporadically in this period however, and did not play a central role in the creation of a history for the Poles.

Twelve years after Sarnicki's work, a short dissertation entitled *O Czechu y Lechu historia nagoniona* was published by Jan Kochanowski. It contained a hint of the theory of the Poles' Caucasian origins, but the author expressed doubts about the possibility of uncovering their ancient homeland (Kochanowski 1589). Literary scholar Julian Maślanka noted that the poet's work was exceptional against the background of Polish historiography of the 16th and 17th centuries. According to him, it did not raise much interest among the writer's contemporaries, probably because the author dared to present novel views. These contradicted the widely held beliefs of the time that the brothers Lech and Czech had come from the Balkans, and that the ethnic names for Poles and Czechs derive from these two "forefathers" (Maślanka 1984: 39–40).

In at least two of Kochanowski's works we can find passages that suggest he was a supporter of the Caucasian origin of the Poles. In the aforementioned

treatise, *O Czechu y Lechu historia nagoniona*, the poet questioned whether Poles and Czechs belonged to the Slavic family, writing that “they were never proper Slovaks (i.e. Slavs – P.A.)” (Kochanowski 1589: 9). He also speculated that the Czechs’ ancestors were the Tseks of the Caucasus.¹ Kochanowski also did not rule out the possibility that the Poles, before they were known as “Lakhs”, were one nation with the Czechs and only later separated from them (Kochanowski 1589: 12). In his work entitled *Proporzec albo hold pruski* however, published in 1587 and in which the author extolled the power of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, he again suggested the Poles’ Caucasian origin: ‘These Laxi, whence Lakh is said, are the mighty Tseks, after whom today’s Czechs are named’ (Kochanowski 1587: 13).

It may be that this “Laksi”/“Laxi” in Kochanowski’s work refers to the Laz. It also cannot be ruled out that the author had in mind the peoples of Dagestan, whom ancient authors called “Legs”, Georgians and Armenians “Lekos”, Arabs “Lakz”, with the name “Leks” often applied to them at a later date (Kaloiev 2002: 229).

In the oldest sources dealing with the Sarmatian origin of the Poles, the Caucasus is mentioned sporadically, but is nevertheless present in the literature on the subject. In the middle of the 18th century Jan Skorski published *Lechus, carmen heroicum*, a work that stands out against the backdrop of its era. According to Roman Krzywy, a scholar of early Polish literature, it represents a heroic epic modelling the Virgilian type. In his work, Skorski derived the Polish nobility from the inhabitants of Colchis, referencing the legend of the Argonauts. It is for this reason that Lech, the progenitor of the Poles, brought a golden fleece to Poland from a distant land, which served as an allegory of the nobility’s greatest pride: its “golden liberty” (Krzywy 2012: 279). This device was motivated by the author’s desire to oppose the popular at the time opinion that Poles descended from the Sarmatians, whom he considered unworthy of this role. For this reason, we find this fragment in the preface to his work:

The Fatherland’s respectability shall be extolled
and that Poland’s birth was from simple blood untold.
Nor from Sarmatians, as many surmise,
With golden liberty our Poland does rise. (Skorski 1751: 6)

¹ I.e. the Zygii/Zygiants (Greek: Ζυγοί, Zygoí). This name was used by Strabo to describe a nation to the north of Colchis. Its various variants were used by Greek and Roman writers to describe the Abkhazo-Adyghean tribes.

Over the next several decades the Sarmatians were commonly associated with the Scythians, and the place of their original existence came to be located in the Caucasus. Already at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries Hugo Kołłątaj wrote that the Scythians were a Slavic people. He placed the cradle of the Slavs in the Caucasus, which was to be the place of origin of all the peoples in the world. In this instance the historian gave priority to the Slavs, from whose language he derived all other world languages. In his opinion, Slavic remained the language of communication for the indigenous Caucasian peoples currently inhabiting the region at the time Kołłątaj was writing his work (Kołłątaj 1842: 300–303).

However Enlightenment humanists spoke out against the Sarmatian origin of Poles. One of the most respected Polish historians, who came from the Polonized Prussian nobility, Joachim Lelewel, classified this thesis as a “fairy tale”. In his work *Dzieje Polski*, writing about the ethnogenesis of Poles and Slavs, he promoted the autochthonous theory – stating that such a numerous group as the Slavs could not have been immigrants and had to be formed in the area of their current residence. According to Lelewel, on the other hand, the Sarmatians were a small group who came from the Caucasus region, and resembled the Circassians in customs, clothing and weaponry. The Sarmatians were supposed to have reached Europe (the Ukrainian steppes or Pannonia) divided into several hordes, which wandered without a definite goal and with time were broken up and exterminated by other peoples (Lelewel 1829: 14–15).

Lelewel described his idea of the Sarmatians in his work *Narody na ziemiach Słowiańskich przed powstaniem Polski* in an introductory volume published in 1853. The historian emphasized that its content was strongly opposed to the Slavs', especially Poles', fondness for descending from the Sarmatians (Lelewel 1853: VI–VII).

In his opinion the Sarmatians, like the Scythians, Teutons and Huns, died out and were forgotten (Lelewel 1853: xv). In another of his works, *Wyjątek z rozprawy historycznej*, Joachim Lelewel stated that the Scythians, living on the right bank of the Don River, were crushed by the Sarmatians who had previously inhabited its left bank. Then the Sarmatians continued their march across Europe, where they reached, among other places, the Vistula, and with time disappeared, pushed back by the Goths, Germans and others. In the opinion of the historian, in the absence of sources, it is impossible to guess their origin. In his opinion, the Sarmatians resembled the Circassians in lifestyle, and if the two peoples were not fraternal, then they formed in one area in the North Caucasus. At the same time Lelewel criticized the authors who propagated the thesis that Poles descended from the Sarmatians, because ‘there was

no evidence for this, apart from general consent, in almost a thousand years from the disappearance of the Sarmatians [...]’ (Lelewel 1842: 71–81).

The Polish historian presented his views on the origins of the Slavs and the groups that inhabited the Slavic lands before the establishment of Poland in the later part of *Narody na ziemiach ...* In it he referred to the ideas of the Slavic scholar and anthropologist Wawrzyniec Surowiecki, who as one of the first Polish humanists rejected the immigrant theory and supported the autochthonous origin of the Slavs. Lelewel’s position was that the Slavs evolved from the Geto-Dacians, who, in his opinion, inhabited vast areas of Central and Eastern Europe. He did not mention the influence of peoples from the Caucasus on the ethnogenesis of Poles. He only pointed out that the tribes of the Alans-Asians, who lived in the area of the Caucasus, after arriving in Europe and breaking away from their southern seats, circulated between Germans and Slavs. Over time, some of them became extinct and some fell in battle with the local population. It should be noted that the historian emphasized: ‘a completely separate [from the Sarmatians – P.A.] reproach of the Median population turns out to be the Alans-Os. Nobody had them for Sarmatians’ (Lelewel 1829: 129, 141, 501, 547).

Joachim Lelewel was a prominent Polish historian of the first half of the nineteenth century and played an important role in the development of modern Polish history writing. However, already in the middle of the nineteenth century there was an evolution in the interpretation of history associated with the spread of the ideas of Romanticism. Their consequence was, among others, a change in the perception of the Caucasus and the impact of peoples originating from there on the ethnogenesis of Poles and the creation of the Polish state. This phenomenon can be observed, for example, in the historiography of Adam Mickiewicz, a student of Lelewel at Vilnius University. According to Andrzej Waśko, a scholar of the history of literature of the Romanticism period, Mickiewicz belonged to a generation that was fascinated like no other with learning and discovering history. This was due to the fact that young people of the time drew from history lectures models according to which they could understand and evaluate reality independently of the official truth (Waśko 2012: 16), i.e. the truth presented by the partitioning states. This was particularly important in the conditions of Poland’s loss of statehood, when the discussion of national history was considered a patriotic duty. For this reason, in the middle of the nineteenth century there appeared articles, whose authors pointed out with reproach that in Lelewel’s classes there was often not a single mention of patriotism (A.C. 1855: 1). This was because, in the opinion of the people of that time, history had an important practical task – it was

supposed to build respect for the enslaved homeland. The historian, in turn, reluctantly referred to the heroic interpretation of history (Bronowski 1969: 6).

As Waśko pointed out, Mickiewicz quite quickly began to depart in his works from the Lelewel school, which was based on the foundations of the Enlightenment. The reason for this was Romanticism, which recognized the primacy of the irrational way of cognition and departed from the methodological assumptions of an earlier epoch based on a thorough analysis of historical sources (Waśko 2012: 22). The development of philosophical reflection on history was also significant. This influenced Mickiewicz to take a stand against the classics, including Lelewel, and to oppose a system limited to obvious empirics and science as elite cognition (Zawadzka 2014: 187).

Adam Mickiewicz as a historiographer contrasted “learned history” (scientific truth) with “folk history” (folk truth), in which, according to Waśko, he saw a higher value than in factual accuracy. In the researcher’s opinion, this was due to the fact that for the poet it was precisely this that led the people to the knowledge of the moral truth about timeless justice to a greater extent than empirical cognition. For Mickiewicz, the truth derived from scientific research was never final and acknowledged by everyone, while the truth coming from folk tradition appeared to be the most important and in its scope final (Waśko 2012: 24). In Waśko’s opinion, this did not mean that the poet literally believed in what he called “mythical histories”, but as a Romantic he regarded them as a trail of truth from the past (Waśko 2012: 37).

In addition to poetry and journalism, Mickiewicz’s main forms of expression on historical topics were academic lectures and historiographical works. The influence of the peoples of the Caucasus on the ethnogenesis of the Poles is described most extensively in the work *Pierwsze wieki historii polskiej*. The work was not published during the poet’s lifetime; it was preserved only in manuscripts from the mid 1830s. According to the author’s view, the Slavs were a tribe descended from Japheth and came from the depths of Asia, through the Caucasus, the Volga and the Don, to the Dnieper. From there they proceeded northward and westward, occupying lands which more or less corresponded to their present position. Although the Slavs were, in Adam Mickiewicz’s opinion, among the first in Europe, they were a “passive” and “unhappy” tribe, oppressed by “morally superior” peoples. To a large extent this was a consequence of the Slavs’ adherence to a traditional religion and their failure to embrace the revealed religion (i.e. Christianity). Without it, no “moral authority” and higher organization developed among them that would make possible the creation of a state (Mickiewicz 1997: 9–10, 16, 26–27). This state-forming power, according to Mickiewicz, was to be brought to the Slavs by two foreign peoples from two parts of the world: the Caucasus and Scandinavia.

According to Mickiewicz's conception, the Caucasus was inhabited by the Arya-Medes,² one of the most ferocious and bellicose tribes. They were to be divided into three groups. The Black Sea was inhabited by the Cercetae (Adyghes), the central Caucasus was home to the main tribe of the Aryans, while the Caspian Sea was inhabited by the "Legs, or Lechs".³ Thus, Mickiewicz merged three separate groups under the banner of Aryans: The Adyghes, whose language belongs to the Abkhazo-Adyghean family, the Indo-European Aryans, and the Nakh-Dagestani Legs (Legae), with whom, because of their similar sound, he also identified the Lechites, i.e., the Lachs. The latter name was used (in some cases still is) by the Eastern Slavs and some other peoples in the East, as well as by the Scandinavians to describe the Poles.

According to Mickiewicz, the word "Lag" and its alternatives "Lach", "Lech" and "Lek" meant in Caucasian languages a man, a husband, a warrior. Thus they were not a tribal name, but a title given to a group of the bravest people inhabiting the eastern part of the Caucasus (Mickiewicz 1997: 28) (The other class was the slaves freed by the Lechs/Lechites, who engaged in agriculture and paid them gifts for their care). Thus both Mickiewicz and Lelewel, despite their often emphasized opposing concepts of historiography, believed that the name "Lech"/"Lechites" should not be identified with a specific people. Also for Lelewel, it was a estate name, not a tribal one. Analogically to the name "Serb" or "Croat" (Lelewel 1855: 271). However, the historian did not attempt to expand on this concept. Adam Mickiewicz did it instead. According to him, in the first centuries AD the Legs were to cross the Caucasus, subdue the Aryans and reach the Black Sea, where on both sides of the Phasis River (now the Rioni) they established a state, whose inhabitants were called Laz by the Greeks (Mickiewicz 1997: 28). Thus, Mickiewicz identified the Dagestani Legs, based on a similar name, with the Lazs, who are one of the Kartvel ethnic groups now living in northeastern Turkey.

In Mickiewicz's conception the Laz occupied a strategic area in the Caucasus, which was the key to two parts of the world – Europe and Asia. The Avars were supposed to be distinguished by their bravery and numbers (the Pole did not explain in detail their origin and the origin of their name;

2 Mickiewicz identified two peoples here: the Aryans and the Medes. The Aryans were originally Indo-European peoples who inhabited Central Asia in the 3rd and 2nd millennium BC, and then spread to Iran, Afghanistan, and India. The Medes, on the other hand, are an Indo-European people first mentioned in the early 1st millennium BC. The lands of the Medes were then located in the Zagros Mountains to the east of Mesopotamia.

3 The Legae, according to Strabo's account, were one of the 26 tribes inhabiting Caucasian Albania. Today they are identified with the ancestors of the modern inhabitants of Dagestan, primarily with the Lezgins or Laks.

in Mickiewicz's conception, the Avars should be treated as one of the groups of Lazs/Lachs/Lechs). The Avars were allies of the Byzantine emperors, who asked them for help in fighting the hordes of nomadic Turkic tribes. The Avars, however, being constantly at war and under increasing pressure from hostile peoples, decided to look for a new, safe home. For this reason, they set off for Europe via Kuban, Don and Dnieper, together with some of the Laz and "Dajns, or Cechs" (Mickiewicz 1997: 30). In the latter case, Mickiewicz probably meant the Zygians, i.e. the ancestors of the contemporary Adyghe people.

After the departure of the Avars from the Caucasus, the Laz kingdom was deprived of a significant number of valuable soldiers. Pressured by Persians, Armenians and Georgians, it was unable to survive and collapsed. The remnants of the Lazs, as Mickiewicz stated, wander between the Turks and the Tatars at the Kars River. On the other hand, the former neighbors of the Laz, according to his terminology, the Irs,⁴ were called Alans, and their hordes still made several trips to Europe. Those who settled in the Caucasus were referred to by foreigners as "Ossians" or "Ossetians". They, like the Adyghe called Circassians by their neighbors, retained (in Mickiewicz's time) the same system they had before the migration of some of the Laz with the Avars. Having, however, neglected the Christian religion and not embraced Islam, they lost their kings, but did not submit to the despotism of the feudal lords. On the other side of the Caucasus, on the Caspian Sea, the oldest and most warlike tribes of the Lachs, such as the Avars, Dido and "Akouczy",⁵ after the fall of the Laz kingdom became savage and mixed with the Turkic and Mongol tribes. They remained independent, but began to live on robbery and plunder. According to Mickiewicz, foreigners called them Lezgin, and Armenians and Georgians called them Leki and Lechi. He also stated that they themselves did not have a national name, as they did not form a nation (Mickiewicz 1997: 31).

The peoples that emerged from the Caucasus, on the other hand, crossed the Danube and populated Pannonia. The local Slavic population was intimidated by the Avars and turned into slaves. However, unlike the nomadic and plundering Huns, they adopted a sedentary lifestyle as a result of their inability to break through the Christian Germans of Bavaria. The farthest place the Avars were to reach, according to Mickiewicz, was the river Lech, now flowing on the border between Germany and Austria. In this paragraph, too, one can discern Lelewel's influence. However, unlike Mickiewicz, who led the narrative without referring to any sources, Lelewel often referred to ancient authors. For

4 It is about the Iron one of the subgroup of the Ossetians.

5 This probably refers to the Dargins – the inhabitants of Akusha, the present administrative center of Akushinskiy District in Dagestan.

this reason, in justifying the hostile relations between the Slavs and Avars settled in Pannonia, he cited the works of Menander the Protector. This Byzantine historian described in them wars between the Avars and the Slavs, whom the former were said to have oppressed. At the same time Lelewel referred to Fredegar and Nestor, who also provided information about the oppression of the Slavs by the Avars (Lelewel 1855: 242–243).

According to Mickiewicz's view, some of the Lachs and Lazs who came from the Caucasus to Pannonia headed for the Carpathians. In support of his thesis, the author cited all the place names and topographic names between Pannonia and the Carpathians, which more or less resemble the name of the Lachs or Laz – for example Levoca, Likavka, Legnava, Lazy and many others – and linked their appearance to the migration of these peoples. In Spisz/Spiš, in the area of Krępak,⁶ the moving Lech people were said to have spotted eagles. Because they were reminded of the native birds of the Caucasus, they took this as a lucky omen and founded a city: Gniazdo (Mickiewicz 1997: 31). It is difficult to determine whether Mickiewicz shifted the location of one of the most important so-called capital cities of the first Piast period from Gniezno, located in central Poland, to the south, or whether he believed that these were two separate cities. Gniezno, located in Greater Poland, according to a legend first recorded in the so-called Hungarian-Polish Chronicle of the early 13th century, was founded by Lech, whose younger brother was Rus and older brother was Czech.

From Gniazdo, according to Mickiewicz, the Lechs began their penetration of lands stretching north from the Carpathians, i.e., the land of modern Poland. In this area they were to encounter a fragmented and separated population, which in turn was a consequence of the earlier Hunnic invasions. The Lechs easily conquered the Carpathians and then the plain area between the Vistula and Bug rivers. Their sons continued their fathers' work and reached the Odra River and the Baltic Sea. Then the Lechs moved their capital to the vicinity of the Vistula River and Kraków came into being. The problem of the population coming from the Caucasus was the small number of women. For this reason, the Lechs took Slavic women as wives (according to Mickiewicz, women and children came with the Avars who settled in front of the Carpathians and for this reason they did not merge with the local population). Due to the numerical superiority of the local population, children born from such unions spoke the language of their mothers and blended in more and more quickly with the local Slavic population. Thus the Lechs ceased to be a separate horde, they

6 Most likely, Mickiewicz meant a place that is now called Krempace and is located in southern Poland, near the border with Slovakia.

assimilated with the Slavic tribe of Polans and with time began to call themselves Poles (Mickiewicz 1997: 36, 52). In a further part of his work, Mickiewicz specified that the Lechs in Polish society became a higher stratum, which was divided into magnates and nobility (the etymology of the term “szlachta” itself was supposed to be related to the Lechs/Lachs⁷). They fraternized with the inhabitants and many mighty Polanians (i.e. Slavic ancestors of the Poles) became Lachs, i.e. nobility (Mickiewicz 1997: 87). The Lech peoples were not to vanish without a trace. Their Caucasian blood was to remain in the Slavs, and they also adopted the political thought and martial customs of the peoples of the Caucasus. The fusion of the two elements, Slavic and Caucasian, changed the mentality of the local people, who wanted to move to a higher stage of political development. They felt the need for unity, supreme power and centralization, i.e. the creation of a kingdom, which they did not have before. For this reason they were baptized.

In Mickiewicz’s historiography, the Lechs’ passage from the Caucasus to what would later become Poland was an act of Providence. According to Mickiewicz, as long as the “ark of truth and civilization” was in the East (most likely Mickiewicz identified it with the birth of Christianity), and the Scythians were threatened by attacks from the Volga and Don steppes, the Lechs were needed in the Caucasus. As a fighting and freedom-loving people they were a barrier protecting the lands to the south. However, when the “capital of faith and light” moved to the West (Mickiewicz probably had in mind here the establishment of Rome as the capital of Western Christianity), and the threat to order shifted from the steppes above the Caucasus to the farther East, from which it began to come to Europe through Greece, there was a need for broader protection. For this reason the Lachs, along with other peoples from the Caucasus, moved into the Slavic region to create a barrier to civilization from sea to sea (in this case, a barrier stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean). Significant or even symbolic for Mickiewicz was the fact that the newcomers retained their earlier distribution (Mickiewicz 1997: 52) – Lachs settled on one side of the Carpathians and Czechs on the other, which was supposed to resemble their location in the Caucasus (Lachs/Legs on one side of the mountains, Zygians/Czechs on the other).

The problem for the Lachs in this case was their numbers. They were numerous enough to protect such a large area. For this reason they joined with the Slavs (importantly for Mickiewicz’s mysticism, he had only the Western Slavs in mind) to oppose together ‘all the East and all the North, [...] all the unfriends

7 Probably the Polish word “szlachta” comes from the Old Low German language (slahta – family).

of the cross and the universal Church' (Mickiewicz 1997: 38). At that time, according to Mickiewicz, Slavic lands were divided into an eastern part (Rus'), where the Rus' people, a tribe of the Varangians, came from Scandinavia, and a western part (Bohemian-Lechitic), where people from the Caucasus came. With time, both began to grow, which led to fighting between them. However, the memory of unity and old brotherhood survived among the people, symbolized by the story of three brothers: Czech, Lech and Rus (Mickiewicz 1997: 40).

The theory that the peoples of the Caucasus played an important role in the ethnogenesis of the Poles and the creation of Poland was not the work of Adam Mickiewicz, although it was he who developed it the most. The creator of this theory, sometimes called Kolkhida-Sarmatian, was a German historian from Gdańsk, Gotfryd Lengnich. His work involved the negation of the historicity of Slavic myths and at the same time attempts to find their cradle (Maślanka 1984: 50–51). It was Lengnich who was the first of the historians to promote the view that in the 5th century AD two groups set out from the Caucasus. One was then called the Poles (the name was to change according to the scheme: Lazy – Lacy – Polacy), while the other, Zichow, gave rise to the Czechs (the name was to change according to the scheme: Zichi – Zachy – Cechy – Czechy) (Kleczkowski 1767: 32). Thus, it was a significant change in the explanation of the etymology of the names "Poland" and "Poles". The most widely accepted explanation was presented in the middle of the 16th century by the humanist and historian Marcin Kromer. He presented two variants of the origin of the name Poland. The first was connected with the field, while the second with the first prince of the Poles – Lech (Klemensiewicz, 1985: 471). However, Lengnich found it more convincing to refer in this case to the Laz, who came from the Caucasus and were to keep their name during the reign of Mieszko I. He identified them with the Licicaviques mentioned by Widukind, the 10th century Saxon chronicler. However, for the historian, neither the Zichs nor the Lazs were ethnically Caucasian, but were Slavs of Sarmatian origin (Maślanka 1984: 52).

Over the next several decades Lengnich's theory became generally accepted. It was used by the greatest Polish historians of the second half of the 18th century. Among them were Jan Chrzyciel Albertrandi, Teodor Waga and Józef Kajetan Skrzetuski. Adam Naruszewicz also leaned towards this concept. He derived the Lech family from the "Sarmatian horde of Lacy". (from which the name Poles was also supposed to derive), who came to Europe together with their brothers the Zechy during the Hutian invasions. The proximity of the Lacy and the Zechy was to be symbolized by the legend of Lech and Czech (Naruszewicz omitted Rus). The Lacs, identified by the historian with the Lazs, abandoned the Caucasus, reached the Slavic area and mixed with the local population,

giving rise to the Poles. The name “Lachy”, according to Naruszewicz, was supposed to come from Laz, which is proved by the fragment, in which he wrote that: “Rusini Polaka, Lazem czyli Lachem nazywają” (‘Ruthenians call a Pole, Laz, id est Lach’) (Naruszewicz 1830: 242). Whereas the Zechy, who were to give rise to the Czechs, are a distorted name of the Zygians (i.e. the ancestors of the Adyghes/Circassians). It is worth noting that for Naruszewicz the latter were also a Slavic people, because he wrote that the Circassians “are also a Slavic nation and one with the Czechs” (Naruszewicz 1830: 257). And in another of his works first published in 1787, he made an explanatory footnote to Lazica: ‘the land of Lazs, i.e. Lachs was where Georgia is now’ (Naruszewicz 1805: 123).

Józef Sękowski, a Polish orientalist and professor at St. Petersburg University, joined the supporters of the exodus of the Lachs from the Caucasus. During a certain period of his scientific activity, he began to express views that the Polish nobility was of a different ethnic origin than the rest of the population. Initially, Sękowski maintained that the upper class consisted of people of Turkic origin, and later that the Polish nobility were the remains of barbarian hordes that once ruled over the Slavs. He was inclined to believe that they were Avars, whose name survived in the Caucasus, similarly to the name Lech/Lezg (Jabłonowski 1913: 78). According to the orientalist, the Polish-Caucasian (more precisely, the Polish nobility) connection was evidenced by the vocabulary, especially concerning armament and clothing, taken from the language, which, according to the researcher, was used by the Turkic tribes living on the Caspian Sea as late as in the 19th century. Also the traditional Polish costume was in fact supposed to be a Lezginian costume, albeit brought to Poland by the Tatars (Sękowski 1824: 246). It should be noted, however, that in the end Sękowski himself rejected his concept of the origin of the Polish nobility from the conquerors who came from the Caucasus, calling it a “folly” (Jabłonowski 1913: 121). At that time, the search for one’s first homeland in this region was not a phenomenon characteristic only of the Poles. It could also be observed in Hungary, as described in detail by the historian Péter Kránitz (Kránitz 2014: 205–223).

Adam Mickiewicz most thoroughly developed the concept of the merging of Caucasian peoples with the Slavs and the creation of the Poles as a consequence. On the scientific ground it was rejected in the second half of the XIX century, which was connected with the development of Caucasus studies. The Dagestan Lezgins, the Kartvelian Lazs, and the Slavic Lachs were connected by a name beginning with La/Le, but on the basis of the available research material it is impossible to prove the ethnic-cultural connections between the groups from the Caucasus and the ancestors of the Poles. Already Joachim Lelewel treated similar considerations in terms of fairy tales and wrote, not without a note of irony, that Lengnich “dreamed” of leading

the Lachs away from the Lazs and Colchs, and the Czechs from the Zygians. Lelewel's work *Krótkie zbiory historii polskiej Lengnichy, Szmit i Albertrande, Teodor Wagi, Jerzy Samuel Bandtke* has a similar overtone, in which he wrote about the German historian's Colchis-Sarmatian theory that it was "the most clumsy conjecture, supported by conjecture, that in his imagination linked the Caucasian Lazs and Zygians with the Lachs (Poles) and Czechs. This miserable thought, apart from some initial sounds of similarity, cannot even cite other evidence" (Lelewel 1816: 260).

Nevertheless, as late as in the middle of the 19th century, the exodus of Polish ancestors, especially the gentry, from the Caucasus had supporters, especially in traditionalist circles, which tried to elevate this particular social group. This is well illustrated by an article printed by the conservative "Przegląd Poznański". Its author, promoting the connections of the Polish nobility with the peoples of the Caucasus, wrote that Julius Klaproth derived the word "Leh" from the Avar language, and Georgians call the Lezgins "Lek".⁸ He also cited information that Persian and Turkish chroniclers called the Lezgins "legzi" and the Poles "leh/lehy", which was supposed to prove the connection between the two groups. The author also contradicted Lelewel, who disagreed with the views of Paweł Szafarzyk and Adam Mickiewicz, who believed in the Asian origin of the Polish nobility. Namely, he stated that Lelewel's position was due to the fact that "he loves neither lords, nor nobility, nor Lech". The author of the article stressed that reading the first Polish chronicle, the so-called Chronicle of Gall Anonim, and knowing the Caucasus and its customs, one can see the similarity of Poland with that region. In order to confirm the connections of Poles (interestingly, only Poles, but not other Slavs) with the Caucasus, he cited, among other things, linguistic arguments – in Polish speech there would be sounds that do not exist in other Slavic languages, but are present in Georgian, Circassians (i.e. Adyghe) and other languages of the peoples inhabiting the Caucasus (the sounds $\text{d}\ddot{z}$ [digraph – "dz"], $\text{d}\acute{z}$ [digraph – "dź"], $\text{ś}\text{ć}$ [digraph – "ść"] and ć [digraph – "ć"]). Another proof would be the convergence of local names in the Caucasus and in Poland, as well as the fact that the Polish rulers dressed in the "Eastern style". In addition, the lifestyle of Georgians was said to resemble that of the Polish nobility. The author asked rhetorically: "but above all, where does this Caucasian, crisply Eastern look of the Polish lord come from?" (A.C. 1855: 20–23). It was obvious to him that the Lachs, who formed the Polish nobility, must have come from the Caucasus.

8 J. Klaproth derived the term "Leh" from the Avar language, but in no part of his work did he link it to the Polish "Lech/Lach". See J. Klaproth, *Voyage au Mont Caucase et en Georgie*, Paris 1836, p. 292.



FIGURE 1 Michał Stachowicz: Sarmaci północnych Słowian, stępujący z gór Kaukazu na równiny roksolańskie pod wodzem Alanem, przychodzą do Europy

SOURCE: NATIONAL ARCHIVE IN KRAKÓW, [HTTPS://WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/ARCHIWUMNARODOWEKRAKOW/PHOTOS/A.324155104361422.68695.324002311043368/429649597145305/?TYPE=1&THEATER](https://www.facebook.com/archiwumnarodoweKrakow/photos/a.324155104361422.68695.324002311043368/429649597145305/?type=1&theater) [8.02.2017]

The exodus of Polish ancestors from the Caucasus was not reflected only in literature. It was also visible in other arts. As an example, we can use the work of Michał Stachowicz, a painter and graphic artist living at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, entitled *Sarmaci północnych Słowian, stępujący z gór Kaukazu na niziny roksolańskie pod wodzem Alanem, przychodzą do Europy* (Northern Slavic Sarmatians, Passing From the Caucasus Mountains to the Roxolan Lowlands Under the Leadership of Alan, Come to Europe).

Polish exiles to the Caucasus in the mid-nineteenth century also mentioned Polish-Caucasian ties in ancient times in their diaries. One of them, Julian Surzycki, wrote that the inhabitants of the Kumukh Khanate were supposed to have been Slavs or had close contacts with them. The evidence for Surzycki was words that reminded him of Polish words. The author gave as an example the word “zdrów” (“zdrów” means “healthy” in Polish; it can also be used as a greeting, as in “be healthy”), with which the locals were supposed to greet each other (Surzycki 1858: 234) (in this case it was either the word “bizrov” [lak. бизров], which in the Lak language is used when greeting people of the female gender, or the word “ivzrav” [lak. ивзрав], which is used when greeting people of the male sex). However, not all Poles took these Polish-Caucasian relations seriously. Sometimes they were even the subject of jokes. As an example may serve a story quoted by Mateusz Gralewski in his work *Kaukaz. Wspomnienia z dwunastoletniej niewoli*. One of the officers of Armenian origin, named Lazariev, was commissioned to prepare scientific information about the various localities in the Caucasus. According to Gralewski, he followed improvised theories and arranged the history according to his own imagination and pestered all his friends with their stories. A Pole, wanting to make fun of Lazariev, said that he was wrong in claiming that the inhabitants of a mountain village in Dagestan, Chokh, were descendants of 13th century European crusaders. To wit, the Pole began to prove that they were in fact Slavs. To prove it, he pointed out that even the very name of the village resembles the name “Czechs”, he also added that Poles had lived in the Caucasus in former centuries. Lazariev objected to this thesis and replied that no chronicle mentioned it. The Pole replied that he had no use for books in view of the living monuments to these events around him. He began to dwell on the fact that the eastern coast of the Black Sea is inhabited by the Laz people, whom many consider to be the ancestors of the Poles (noticeable in this statement is a reference to the thesis of the Caucasian origin of the Lechs/Lachs). He also cited the argument that: [the Lezgins call themselves Leksi, and since they pronounce “k” as if it were “ch”, the name “Lech-si” is already there. They call a Pole a “Polek” or “Polech”. In the meantime they call their country “Leksistan”, and Poland “Lekistan”. So there is almost no difference in names]. The names of the mountains were also supposed to be a proof of the Poles’ residence in Dagestan – mountain Kuja-dach

was associated with the Polish land – Kujawy, while Gunib with a part of clothing worn by the Kujawy people – gunias. Gralewski concluded his story: “I don’t know where Lazariev, who was researching the Caucasus, stopped, but I heard that he toiled long over the names of mountains, streams, and villages that resembled Polish names” (Gralewski 2015: 322–323).

The popularity of the theory that linked Poles with the Caucasus is also evidenced by the information provided by Ludwik Widerszal in his work *Sprawy kaukaskie w polityce europejskiej 1831–1864* (Caucasian issues in European politics 1831–1864). Based on archival materials, he wrote that a mystic named Grotkowski, who had earlier served in the tsarist army in the Caucasus, came to Adam Czartoryski’s collaborator in Istanbul, Michał Czajkowski, in the 1840s. This mystic wanted to destroy the Russian rule in the Caucasus by some extraordinary “spirit”, where he saw the original home of the Slavs and therefore called these mountains the proper homeland of the Poles. As Widerszal pointed out, Adam Czartoryski was sceptical about Grotkowski’s idea, but he did not want to break contact with him.

Today, most Polish scholars adhere to the position advocated by Joachim Lelewel. They are in favor of the autochthonous origin of the Slavs in the sense that their ancestral homeland was somewhere in the areas currently inhabited by the Slavs, although there is no uniform view as to where exactly. The view that peoples from the Caucasus played an important role in the ethnogenesis of the Poles has also been rejected. The origin of the names “Poland” and “Poles” is usually considered to be the Slavic word “field”, which probably functioned already in the Proto-Indo-European language and originally meant a plain suitable for cultivation (Lehr-Spławiński 1978: 64). Most likely, the name Lach/Lech has a similar etymology, which linguists associate with the Western Slavic tribe of Lendians. It is supposed to contain the Proto-Slavic root “lęd”. Hence, “lęda” – meaning an area suitable for farming (Lehr-Spławiński 1959: 32) after clearing a burnt forest. This thesis was already put forward by Antoni Małeckı, a historian living in 1821–1913, rector of Lviv University, and a student of Leopold von Ranke in his youth. According to the scholar, the word “Lech” is connected with lenda, which contains the same root as the Spanish “landa”, French “la lenda” or German “das Land” (Małeckı 1907: 37). It should be noted, however, that this theory is not shared by all historians.

Currently, there are also references to the origin of Poles from the Caucasus. In scientific texts this theory is called a legend. The same is done in travel literature. It was also referred to as a legend in the work *Lechici znad Terek* (Lechites from Terek) by Ryszard Badowski (Badowski 1977: 6), a journalist and traveller, but the title itself is telling and suggests that Poles are connected with the area situated on one of the main Caucasus rivers. The author describes his journey

to the Caucasus, especially to Ossetia, where he followed in the footsteps of Mickiewicz's theory. Although he considered it to be an unverified legend, he noticed many common features between Poles and Ossetians.

The legend of the origin of Polish ancestors from the Caucasus also appears in contemporary journalism. As an example can serve an article, which appeared in the pages of "Wprost", one of the most widely read Polish weekly magazines (Geremek 2008: 80–82). The purpose of the text, which is very pro-Georgian in its tone, can be seen in the desire to promote the "eternal Polish-Georgian friendship". It quotes, among other things, Mickiewicz's conception of the Caucasian origin of the Polish nobility. In addition, the author of the article noted that the bard considered Georgians to be a brotherly nation, which was additionally emphasized in a larger font, immediately drawing the reader's attention. It shows an overinterpretation of the source material, because in fact, there is no argument that Mickiewicz considered Georgians to be a "brotherly" nation to Poles. As I pointed out earlier, the poet did not consider the Laz people, from whom he derived the Lachs – the protoplasts of the Polish nobility – as a Kartvelian people. Moreover, it was the Georgians, along with the Armenians and Persians, who were supposed to be the ones who destroyed the kingdom of the Lachs/Lazs in the Caucasus, after one of their groups went to Slavdom, giving rise to the Poles. The cited article is important in further considerations for one reason. It is an example of the fact that, although the procedure of taking the Lachs out of the Caucasus, which began in the 18th century and was greatly developed during the Romantic period, is now regarded only as a legend, it can be used to build the image of the "eternal Polish-Caucasian brotherhood".

The aftermath of this mythical derivation of the Poles' ancestors from the Caucasus can also be seen in the shifting of Polish-Caucasian contact to the dawn of Polish statehood, evident also in the works of professional historians. This creates an image of "eternal" cooperation, thanks to which it appears "close" and "unique" and, above all, becomes part and parcel of the "Polish tradition".

Theses concerning Poland's millennia-long contacts with the Caucasus and its particular regions were most commonly put forward by Andrzej Chodubski (see: Chodubski 1995: 66; idem 2000b: 229; idem 2000c: 41; idem 2003: 99; idem 2003c: 383; idem 2003d: 7; idem 2005: 108; idem 2005a: 21; idem 2005b: 191; idem 2005c: 65; idem 2015: 66), but are also present in the works of other historians (Zakrzewska-Dubasowa 1985: 91; Koseski 2002: 30). They are mostly laid out *a priori* and unsupported by any argumentation. In this context, for example, is solidified the view that a trade route leading to Derbent and Ganja was supposed to have run through Poland in the 10th century. Amber, honey,

and slaves were said to have been sent to the Caucasus from Poland at that time, with crafts and silks being imported from the Caucasus (Chodubski 1985: 63–64; idem 1995: 66; idem 2000b: 229; idem 2000c: 41; idem 2005: 108; idem 2005a: 35; idem 2005b: 191–192). In reality, no references to this exist in written sources, nor is it confirmed by archaeological research. Another original view relates to Armenians' settlement of Polish lands, which was supposed to have occurred as early as the 11th century (Chodubski 1993: 4; idem 2005b: 191; idem 2016: 18). This, however, contradicts sources that link the appearance of Armenians in the Kingdom of Poland to the organization of Lviv in the mid-14th century (Pisowicz 2000: 135–142). The appearance of Poles in the Caucasus is also unfoundedly shifted in time, which in extreme cases is dated to the 13th century. The argumentation in favour of such a view is related to the appearance of the Mongols in both regions, who were said to have taken Poles into slavery and resettled them in the Caucasus (Chodubski 1982a: 5; idem 2000c: 44; idem 2003d: 83–84). However, there exists no source information on this. If one were to apply analogous logic, it could be argued that Poles also found themselves in Korea in the 13th century, since this country too became a target of Mongol invasions during this period. Occasionally the accounts of Jan Struys, who had met a local's Polish wife while travelling around northern Persia (publishing a work about his expeditions entitled *Drie aanmerkelijke reizen* in 1675), are used to justify the presence of Poles in the Caucasus in the 13th century (Chodubski 2003d: 84). However, this formulation cannot be accepted. The Dutch traveller's account refers to the second half of the 17th century, thus 400 years after Poles were supposed to have appeared in the Caucasus, as per the theses of proponents of shifting Polish-Caucasian contact to the Polish state's earliest period.

The sources do however allow us to fix the beginning of Poles' stay in the Caucasus to the 17th century precisely. This primarily took place in relation to the missionary activities of Catholic clergy, who were among these first Poles (Woźniak 1987: 233). During this period, the Polish king Jan III Sobieski, for example, took under his protection missionaries residing in Shamakhi, which had the duty of supporting envoys heading from Kraków to Persia. Polish clergymen were also active in Yerevan, which contributed to the establishment of a mission house in that city (Koseski 2000: 194). These issues are quite well researched. The first Poles in the Caucasus known by name were most likely Michał Illinicz and Jan Siebiecki, whom King Władysław IV of Poland sent in 1647 as legates to Persia to persuade Shah Abbas II of joint action against the Ottomans (Brzeziński 1935: 8). In his 19th-century memoirs, Gralewski did record that when he was staying in the Caucasus in the late 1940s and early 1950s, one Polish soldier supposedly discovered a stone with the Latin inscription

Polonus Joannes Dembovscius fecit 1618 (built by the Pole Jan Dembowski 1618) embedded in the wall of a mosque near Shamakhi. He noted, however, that no one had any way of verifying this information (Gralewski 2015: 352). It should therefore be considered with great caution. The first Poles to leave more widely known written traces of their stay in the Caucasus (its southern part) were the Jesuits Michał Wieczorkowski and Tadeusz Krusiński. Their expedition to the East at the beginning of the 18th century occurred in connection with the activities of Catholic missions in Persia, which for some time fell under the protection of the rulers of the Commonwealth. Krusiński is particularly well known, having left behind such works as *Relatio de mutationibus Regni Persorum, Chronicon peregrinantis seu historia ultimi belli Sarum cum Aghvanis, Prodromus ad historiam revolutionis persicae* or *Pragmatographia de legitimo usu ambrozji tureckiei, that is: On the proper consumption of Turkish coffee, by X. Tadeusz Krusiński s.J. Missionary to Persia*. A fragment selected from His manuscript and put to print. His texts included the first description of peoples inhabiting the eastern part of the Caucasus (primarily the areas of Dagestan and Shirvan) written by a Pole.

In addition to religious contacts, we possess sources attesting to diplomatic contacts between the rulers of Poland and states from the Caucasus region, but the earliest of these come from the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries. We know that in 1495 an envoy of King Constantine II of Kartli arrived at the court of the Lithuanian prince, later king of Poland, Alexander I. Although no documents survive confirming the stay of any Georgian diplomats at the court of the then Polish king Jan Olbracht, considering Poland and Lithuania were united under a personal union, it is plausible that envoys also stopped in Kraków (Woźniak 1992: 82; Materski 2002: 57). It should be borne in mind that Polish-Georgian (Caucasian) diplomatic contacts were only one-off and incidental before the end of the 18th century.

Against this background, interestingly portrayed are Polish-Azerbaijani diplomatic relations. According to some Polish researchers, these were initiated in the 1570s (Baranowski 1985: 92; Chodubski 2003a: 122; idem 2003d: 72; idem 2005a: 36; idem 2015: 9; Patlewicz 2016: 9). This is also the information provided on the official website of the Azerbaijani embassy in Warsaw (*Historia*). In 2012, a number of events were held in Poland to celebrate the “540th anniversary of the establishment and 20th anniversary of the revival of Polish-Azerbaijani diplomatic relations”.

This “540th anniversary of the establishment of relations” commemorated the arrival of Uzun Hasan’s envoy to Kraków in 1472 to meet with King Casimir IV Jagiellon of Poland, with whom he was to hold talks on organizing the anti-Ottoman coalition (Adamczewski 2007: 165). Uzun Hasan at that

time ruled a state covering roughly the area of modern northern Iraq, Iran, the eastern part of Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In historiography, this state is known as Aq Qoyunlu (i.e., the White Sheep state). It constituted a confederation of nomadic Turkoman tribes that had come to the Near and Middle East from the steppes of Central Asia. Turkmen peoples naturally played an important role in the ethnogenesis of modern Azerbaijan. But to equate the stay of representatives of a Turkoman federation's ruler in Kraków with the beginning of Polish-Azerbaijani relations lies on the same plane as arguing that 6th-century Roman missions to the Antes initiated diplomatic relations between Italy and Ukraine.

Creation of the Image of the Caucasus in Nineteenth-Century Literature

1 In Polish-Language Literature Published in Western Europe

The consolidation of the Caucasus' presence in the Polish ethnopolitical myth occurred in the 19th century, i.e. during a period when the modern Polish nation in the modern sense was forming. Romanticism played a major role in this. It is assumed that in Polish literature this period began more or less at the turn of the first and second decade of the 19th century. Polish Romantic literature took on characteristic features, such as being part of the messianic or mystic currents following in the wake of the November Uprising's crushing. Among other important consequences of this unsuccessful independence uprising for literature was its division into a national and an émigré one. This was linked to the departure of many writers involved in nationalist activity to Western Europe, threatened as they were with political repression if they remained in the Russian Empire. Thanks to their emigration, they ceased to be restricted by tsarist censorship and were able to continue their ideological struggle against the invader, including through the publications of literary works.

For Polish creators in exile, the political circumstances of the 1830s to 1850s provided a carrying theme for their works, in the form of the independence struggle of the small peoples of the Caucasus opposing tsarist Russia, one of the greatest European powers. Motifs around the Caucasus fitted in snugly with Romantic assumptions – oriental landscapes, liberational upheaval combined with the struggle against tyranny and human enslavement, or the widespread idea of the highlanders' elemental nature. The fact that, throughout the conquest of the Caucasus, Poles served in the tsarist army in the region was also significant. For Polish émigré writers, the key feature of the battles fought in the Caucasus was the local population's opposition to Russia, i.e. their own greatest enemy, by whom they were forced to leave their homeland.

It is worth noting that the Polish writers who found themselves abroad, unlike those at home, did not usually ever have the opportunity to visit the Caucasus and become personally acquainted with the situation there. For this reason, they drew their knowledge of the region primarily from journalistic reports appearing in the press and from popular opinions circulating Europe.

One of the better-known poets who raised the theme of the Polish-Caucasian struggle against Russia in his works was Konstanty Gaszyński, a nationalist creator and prose writer who belonged to the circle of Romantic poets debuting in the late 1820s. Gaszyński took part in the November Uprising and after its suppression settled in France. The poet's works were often published in the monarchist *Dziennik Narodowy* (National Daily).¹ A volume of his poems entitled *Poezje* (Poems) was published in 1844 in Paris. Among them was the 21-stanza *Gość Czecheńca* (The Chechen's Guest) from 1833 (Gaszyński 1844: 83–87). Analysing the content of this work, it is evident that the author possessed a vague notion of the Caucasus and was not familiar with its geographical and ethnic specifics. However, for Gaszyński, this was not a question of primary importance, that being instead the struggle against Russia.

Its first three stanzas depict the Chechens, an indomitable people, defying the power of the tsar. They stand in opposition to the rulers, implicitly European, who have subjugated themselves to the Russian despot. Notable is that Georgia and the Georgians unexpectedly appear in the second stanza, although the piece is about Chechnya and the Chechens: "Every year in Georgia the tsar loses his troops, While the Georgian bears him a gift; A tribute of poisoned arrows he pays him, In homage delivering shots from muskets". The author likely confused the two lands out of his unfamiliarity with the realities of the Caucasus. It should be noted that in Georgia, during the period described – the first half of the 19th century, there was no major unrest or resistance against tsarist rule, which did in turn exist in the North Caucasus. It is most likely, therefore, that this reference to "poisoned arrows" and "musket shots" with which the Georgians were supposedly "paying" the Tsar tribute, essentially concerns the Chechens. The author's equating of Chechnya and Georgia also occurs in subsequent stanzas.

Apparent is the author's emphasis on the commitment to the armed struggle of the freedom-loving highlander who "fights by the sabre only, not by the pen". Gaszyński also noted that he did not believe "in courtly relations", which was probably a reference to the Polish émigré factions relying on European governments to rebuild an independent Poland. The highlander in the poem is exalted for having rejected unnecessary diplomacy and taken an active role in defending his freedom.

From the eighth to tenth stanza, the hospitality of the highlanders towards a newcomer from Poland, who is received like a brother, is depicted. In the next

1 *Dziennik Narodowy* was a Polish émigré periodical published in Paris between 1841 and 1848. Its founder was Władysław Plater.

seven stanzas, the Pole introduces himself to the householders. Among the words he utters, we find a platitude for cooperation between the newcomer Pole and the Chechens, that is the desired revenge against the tsar: "I am son to a land far away, I differ in lineage, custom and faith, But our hearts have united us for eternity, As I too have sworn vengeance against the tsar". The newcomer then shows his host that his land, too, is being ravaged by tsarist troops and its people displaced deep into Russia: "The tsar ruins the temples of my forefathers, Mocks the blood and tears of my homeland, Populates the deserts with my brethren, Or shackles them to wheelbarrows in the mines". The poem's Polish protagonist also describes to his Chechen hosts the post-uprising repressions, which included punitive conscription into the Russian army and deployment to the North Caucasus to fight against the freedom-fighting highlanders: "He tears away the children of our mothers, And forces us to murder compatriots. Me too the oppressors instructed, Forcibly putting me in Moscow uniform, Dragged me here in chains over a thousand miles And ordered me to kill Chechens".

According to literary historian Jacek Lyszczyna, the martyrdom presented in the poem *Gość Czeczeńca* (The Chechen's Guest) is a polemical allusion to Mickiewicz's work *Do Matki Polki* (To the Polish Mother). In his work, one of Poland's greatest Romantic poets foresaw for the son of the eponymous Polish mother a battle for the independence of the fatherland, that instead of being noble and glorious, would be a tragic and hopeless one against violence. Yet, in Gaszyński's work the fate of the Poles is in fact even worse than in Mickiewicz's, since the consequence of the liberational upheaval is that the insurrectionists are sent in chains to the Caucasus, where they are ordered to conquer locals in the name of the tsar (Lyszczyna 2000: 41). Thus, the Poles fighting for independence are used to deprive others of it. In Gaszyński's poem, however, the lyrical subject avoids this disgraceful fate and escapes the Russian troops. Joining the warring Caucasian highlanders binds the Pole and the Chechens in a common struggle: "Yet I escaped from under the tsar's guard! A Pole am I, Proclaiming my despair to you, And a free man – to a free people I bring my arm in sacrifice".

In the eighteenth stanza, the Polish-Chechen brotherhood and joint struggle against the Russian aggressor are illustrated: "Henceforth the Pole was brother to the highlanders – With them, he shared farming hardships, Together in the mountains they thrashed the Moskals, Together they bore booty back to their huts".

The last two stanzas deal with cultural matters. Despite the commonality of fate with the people of the North Caucasus and fraternity with them, the Pole

remained at heart bound to Poland and Polish culture. One may perceive in this paragraph a moralistic position: under no conditions should one succumb to assimilation. The author equates Chechens and Georgians in this part of the poem as well, making them out to be one nation: “The Georgian women famous for their grace and voice, Each day the Pole delighted in their song, But he did not pick a lover from their midst, For he had left a lover in his homeland. Beautifully woven is the Chechen *delia*, A beautiful feather flows down their kalpak, But a foreign turban he did not don, For foreign dress disgraces the Pole”.

Another émigré poet who drew on Caucasian motifs in his patriotic poems was Jan Kazimierz Radecki.² In 1842, he published in Brussels his best-known collection of works entitled *Poezje Mazura* (The Mazur’s Poems). The volume included a poem entitled *Majuma* with a theme very similar to that employed by Gaszyński. The work depicts the fate of a Pole forcibly conscripted into the tsarist army and sent to the Caucasus, where he meets Chechens resisting the Russian conquests. After one skirmish against tsarist troops, the Chechens bring home several dozen prisoners. Upon discovering that they are Poles, they immediately release them. The titular *Majuma*, sister of one of the Chechens who brings home this man dressed in Russian uniform, is initially very hostile towards the newcomer. Nonetheless, her brother calms her down and explains that he is a victim of the tyrant (i.e. the tsar), and adds: “Let in this Lach another brother to you be (the motif of Polish-Chechen brotherhood thus also appears – P.A.), one who will stand up against the tsars in battle”. In turn, “the Lach swore fraternity on the blade of his weapon; he trampled his uniform under his feet” (obviously the tsarist uniform is meant – P.A.). For this gesture, the Pole is “thanked with tears” by *Majuma*.

The piece goes on to depict a conversation between the Chechen woman and the Pole, who have developed feelings for each other. *Majuma* asks her interlocutor why the Poles had resigned themselves to the fate of slaves. He, unable to answer her, remains silent. The Chechen woman explains that her own compatriots have decided to fight the enemy to the death. She addresses the Pole with the words: “If the Heavens do not grant us favour, we will all perish and curse the Heavens! You – do you not want to escape from under the tsar’s fist?”. The newcomer tries to explain that the Poles’ struggle had been forsaken by treachery. The Chechen woman replies that if any Chechen clan

² Jan Kazimierz Radecki (1813–1864) participated in the November Uprising as a soldier in the artillery. In the 1840s he moved to France and settled in Paris. In exile, he was active in the Polish national movement and spent his time creating patriotic works.

behaved like the Poles, it would be disdained: "Here a curse befalls any such clan, whose knight does not hold out in battle; Eternal scorn upon him: – Yet the word betrayal, – My brothers know not still how to pronounce, The Caucasus has not produced such a man!". Faced with the proclamation that no traitor had ever yet been born in the Caucasus, the Pole is "overcome with shame". The Chechen woman continues to dwell on the subject and asks: "I die fighting thus, do you die so as well? – The Pole clenches his fists and goes silent". Majuma hints to the newcomer that she could become his wife: "But spouse I may call only the one who fights as my countrymen do". She also states a condition: "And with my compatriots make it so, that the Muscovite tsar wails in pain here under my feet!". The piece ends with a tender farewell, after which the Pole rides off to fight the Russians (Radecki 1844: 123–130).

Two themes are particularly important in the work presented here. The first concerns the joint Polish-Chechen struggle against Russia after the Pole defects from the tsarist army over to the independent highlanders. The second important motif is the author's construction of a juxtaposition between the active and honourable Chechens and the passive Poles resigned to their fate, who have submitted to the invader. Radecki's clear intention was that, by offending their national pride, he was trying to spur the latter to take up arms against Russia.

Novelists also played a role in shaping the image of Polish-Caucasian cooperation against Russia. In this respect, Jakub Gordon's work *Kaukaz czyli ostatnie dni Szamyla* (The Caucasus or the Last Days of Shamil) appears most interesting. No less interesting is the author's biography itself. His real name was Maksymilian Jatowt; he came from the lesser nobility and was arrested, as he himself wrote, as a result of a provocation. Consequently, he was conscripted into the Caucasus Corps in 1846. He never did reach the Caucasus, escaping while being escorted to his destination. Gordon a.k.a. Jatowt was arrested again in 1848 while illegally crossing the border of the Kingdom of Poland and sent to Siberia punitively. However, he managed to obtain a transfer to the Crimean front in 1855. While en route, he escaped once again and made his way to the United States. He returned to Europe in the 1860s and settled in Lviv (Śliwowska 1998: 242).

Kaukaz czyli ostatnie dni Szamyla was published in 1865 in Leipzig. The author situated the work's plot in literary fiction, although setting it in actual historical context – the struggle of the independent highlanders against Russia. The novel tells the story of Polish soldiers fighting on the side of Imam Shamil. The plot suggests that Poles had been coming to the Caucasus to fight against Russia there since olden times. The author even suggested that

Sheikh Mansur³ was Polish, which he deduced from the man's name, associating it with a region in north-eastern Poland – Masuria. Poles were to be so numerous in the ranks of the independent highlanders that the novel's Shamil speaks Polish. He also possesses an elite unit of more than 300 Poles, fighting side by side with the highlanders against the tsarist army.

Although contemporary Polish exiles were already of the opinion that Gordon's work as a novel⁴ had no value as a source, the motif of a Polish unit operating alongside Imam Shamil contained in the book has become ingrained in the notion of Polish-Caucasian brotherhood and joint struggle against Russia. This is evidenced by the fact that information about the literary regiment is reproduced in some circles, including academic ones, as confirmed historical fact, while the work itself is considered a historical source on military activities in the Caucasus. For example, historian Wojciech Sulewski, in his book *Konterfekty dziwnych Polaków* (Portraits of Strange Poles), wrote that Gordon's work "contains much valuable historical information" (Sulewski 1973: 57). Czesław Zwierz also found the information contained in *Kaukaz czyli ostatnie dni Szamyla*, concerning Shamil having a side-retinue of Polish uhlans, to be true (Zwierz 1996: 137). Such a notion has also taken hold in journalism, a good example of which is Paweł Chojnacki's book *Kasztany z Gudermesu. Doświadczenia czeczeńskie* (Chestnuts from Gudermes. Chechen Experiences). The author, citing Gordon, claimed that Shamil knew Polish and had a *sotnia* of Poles at his side. Moreover, according to Chojnacki, even Gordon himself fought alongside Shamil (Chojnacki 1999: 133).

I share Ludwik Widerszal's view that the interest in the Caucasian peoples and their struggle against Russia was not a phenomenon characteristic only of Polish literature. The historian noted that fascination with the Caucasus in the mid-19th century was evident in many European countries and the United States. The famous English biologist Thomas Henry Huxley, for example, in his novel *Schamyl, The Prophet-Warrior of the Caucasus*, juxtaposed Imam Shamil with Oliver Cromwell. The American John Milton Mackie, on the other hand, saw in Shamil heroism on a par with Franz von Sickingen or El Cid. In turn, the author of the poem *The Words of Schamyl, The Prophet*, who went by the initials J.S.B., compared the imam to Saul, the first king of Israel according to the Bible. Ludwik Widerszal also cited as an example a play entitled *Shamil*, performed in Paris in 1854 at the Porte St. Martin theatre. In it, the main character

3 Sheikh Mansur was a Sufi preacher and, between 1785 and 1791, a leader of the independence movement against Russia in the North Caucasus.

4 A case in point is Agaton Giller (1831–1887), accused of anti-Russian activities in 1853 and sentenced to exile in Siberia. For Giller's opinion of Gordon's work (see Giller 1869: 1–2).

is portrayed as a Russian governor's pupil from Tiflis. Dissatisfied with his situation, however, he flees to the mountains to fight the Russians. Shamil is made into an idealised character, ready to forgive all and hating no one. The play ends with a scene in which the leader of the highlanders welcomes the arriving French and English fleet on the shores of the Black Sea (Widerszal 2011: 227–228).

Nevertheless, the conditions in which nineteenth-century Poland found itself – partitions, defeated independence uprisings, emigration, and the tsarist authorities' use of Poles to conquer the Caucasus – led to the appearance of specific themes surrounding cooperation between Poles and Caucasian peoples in Polish émigré works. One such important motif was escape from the tsarist ranks as salvation from the disgrace awaiting one if he were to remain in Russian service. Through this, catharsis was accomplished, which culminated in the taking up of arms alongside the highlanders against the common foe. This laid the foundation for the formation of the idea of Polish-Caucasian brotherhood, grounded in hatred towards Russia.

2 In the Polish Émigré Press

The fact that it was Polish émigré circles in Western Europe that played an important role in shaping the image of the Caucasus through the prism of the ethnopolitical myth and its crucial part – the struggle against the “historical enemy” – is evidenced by the activities of the Polish press. It took a pro-Caucasus stance and presented the region from the point of view of the interests of the Polish independence movement. This applied not only to publications with some specific political direction but to their entire spectrum – from conservative newspapers to liberal ones.

As early as 1837, one Polish newspaper, the conservative periodical *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* (Polish Émigré Chronicle), published a manifesto for Circassian independence (*Manifest niepodległości czerkieskiej* 1837: 358–361) prepared, incidentally, by the British. Information on the Caucasus also appeared in the French- and later British-issued *Demokrat Polski* (The Polish Democrat), the main press organ of the largest Polish émigré party – the Polish Democratic Society. One of the first to take up Caucasian themes in his journalism was the radical democrat and co-founder of the society, Jan Czyński. In 1837, in Paris, he published the pamphlet *La revolte des Circassiens*, in which he defended the Circassians, who were portrayed by Russian propaganda as renegades. In Czyński's view, the Circassians were simply waging a defensive war against an aggressor. He believed that Europe should actively support the

people of the Caucasus instead of passively watching this conquest of partition (Czynski 1837).

The sympathy of the members of the Polish Democratic Society afforded the Caucasian peoples fighting against Russia can be evidenced by one of the issues of the *Demokrata Polski* from 1844. It contained information on the independent highlanders' struggle in the Caucasus against the Russians:

This reminds us of similar scenes within the Christian Church during the Crusader wars; acts of heroism and faithful devotion to death are indeed no rarer among the Muslims than they were then in the Christian ranks. In general, the longer one associates with these enemies, the more respect one must have for them; the closer one is in contact with them, the greater the respect for their virtues. They are true knights. That which they are so often accused of, immeasurable greed and plunder, are the markings and results of a strong, as yet undeveloped character. Let us go through all the nations of the East and West, and name even one in which these qualities, in that age of still crude mind and life, were not a main characteristic. (*Kronika krajowa* 1844: 52)

On the one hand, this brief passage shows appreciation for the resistant highlanders of the Caucasus, who were seen as heroes displaying medieval virtues of chivalry, but on the other, there is a noticeable sense of superiority over Muslims, who were supposedly at an earlier stage of civilisational development than Europeans. In another issue of *Demokrat Polski*, a short note was provided about Shamil's expedition to Kabarda. The details ended with a sentence that has embedded itself in the consciousness of Poles for centuries now, its content considered historical fact even in the 21st century: "Shamil, as always, was to have with him a retinue of Polish uhlans" (*Wiadomości* 1847: 32).

This Caucasian theme was also noticeable in *Dziennik Narodowy*, which maintained pro-independence and anti-Russian views. One example was an article on Shamil's military operations, which, as the publication's editors pointed out, was based on news taken from the French newspaper *L'Univers*. The Polish newspaper wrote that the forces under the Dagestani imam grow in strength and gain more victories. Congruently, it emphasised that they were being trained by Polish officers who had escaped the Russian army. In addition, Shamil was said to move around surrounded by a guard composed mostly of Polish uhlans and Cossack cavalry. The source of this type of information was not given, but the notion was formulated by using an impersonal verb form like "it was to have" or "it was heard" (Polish *miano, słyszano*). Information regarding Poles in Shamil's entourage was likely the product of Polish editorial

boards. In this way, they probably wanted to maintain the hope among their readers that their compatriots had not yet finally come to terms with the loss of their homeland's independence but were fighting the partitioning power in the distant Caucasus shoulder to shoulder with the locals.

An interesting comparison between Circassians and Poles was presented by one anonymous author in an article published in June 1845 in the pages of *Dziennik Narodowy*. He described Tsar Nicholas I's stay in Warsaw and contrasted the behaviour of the city's inhabitants with that of the North Caucasians. The author bitterly stated:

When, from the proud and honour, freedom, and independence-loving Cherkess [in the publication 'Circassian' also refers to Dagestani highlanders and Chechens – P.A.], we turn our thoughts to our land, immeasurable sadness grips our heart. What hatred there, what revulsion towards foes in the entire nation, – what indifference here, the forgetfulness of some, the degeneracy and mendacity of others! In the land of the Cherkess, the tsar would not dare take a step without a strong escort; in Warsaw, he rode calmly amidst the crowds thronging his vehicle, who had arrived from all over to see him out of curiosity. (*Warszawa nawiedzona przez Mikołaja* 1845: 878)

It is evident that for the author of the article, the heroes were the Caucasian highlanders battling the Russian army, whom he contrasted with the passive and wicked, in his opinion, Poles who idly accepted Russian rule.⁵

On another occasion, *Dziennik Narodowy* published a note about Shamil's victories over tsarist troops, the author of which inquired with envy: "when will we Poles take up arms to wage such a fierce war on Moscow from the west, as it already faces from the east" (i.e. in the Caucasus – P.A.). In his view, if Russia were to withdraw from the North Caucasus, there would be an uprising of the population throughout the country (*Wiadomości* 1845: 888). Once again the main motif of Polish interest in the Caucasus appeared in this short detail: struggle against Russia thanks to which Poland could regain its independence.

In yet another issue of *Dziennik Narodowy* from 1845, we find an article in which the author explained the lack of progress of the Russian army in the Caucasus in the 1830s through, among other things, the desertion of Poles to

5 Similar treatments also occur nowadays. One text by Witold Michałowski is a case in point. In it, he states that Chechens have a "moral advantage" over Poles because they had never chosen Russian tsars as their rulers (see Michałowski 2006: 152).

the Circassian side. Once again, the trick was to juxtapose the actions taken by Caucasian highlanders against the Russians with the passivity of Polish society:

If we Poles also had, perhaps not the position of the Cherkess, but their energy, their perseverance, their active hatred, and, what is more, a leader like theirs, possessing the confidence of all and with his acknowledged bravery and superiority uniting all, loved and heeded, we ought to quickly give battle from the west, as they have been doing for so many years in the east. However, without going deeper into this issue today, let us ask God to inspire our nation with similar courage, so that at the given time it may take up the weapons it has, and perhaps, by his grace, some Shamil will appear among us, and Moscow's might will shatter against our forests and glades, against our scythes and lances, as it shatters today against the Cherkess mountains, yatagans, and daggers; perhaps we, too, will drive her armies from our plains, as they have driven them from their mountains; for although the Muscovite forces are far greater here, different their position and ours, we too are forty times more numerous than the Cherkess.

The defeats of the tsarist army in the Caucasus were attributed by the author, among other things, to the actions of the Poles, as they either defected to the Circassians or fought unenthusiastically (*Rosja i Kaukaz* 1845: 933–934). Analysing the article, one can conclude that its author also wanted to arouse hatred towards Russia in his compatriots living in Poland and stir them to initiate combat operations similar to those taking place in the Caucasus. To win sympathisers to the idea of armed struggle, he used as an example the suppression of tsarist power in the region, which in turn, according to the author, was to a large extent linked to the desertion of Poles serving in the tsarist army to the side of the independent highlanders. The article aimed to make the reader realise that somewhere in the distant mountains a fierce struggle against Russia was taking place alongside, notably, a victorious struggle involving Poles. Similar successes, in the author's opinion, could be achieved on the Vistula, but the passivity of the society and the lack of a leader of Shamil's calibre stood in the way.

2.1 *In Polish Literature Published in Germany and Austria/ Austro-Hungary*

Another group of works are those published in lands that were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth before the partitions but found themselves outside the Russian Empire – that is in the Prussian and Austrian partitions. Both Poles who had never been to the region and Poles who had left Russia

after serving in the tsarist army in the Caucasus for various reasons – often emigrating for fear of reprisals for their involvement in the January Uprising – published their works about the Caucasus here.

One such work written by a Polish emigrant who had never been to the Caucasus, but who took up the theme of the struggle between the highlanders and the Russians, is Karol Brzozowski's *Ognisty lew* (The Fiery Lion)⁶ published in Lviv, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The work is set in the Caucasus and its main theme is amorous adventures displayed against the backdrop of the fight against the Russians. The plot tells the story of a brave Chechen who kidnaps his beloved. The abductee's father swears death to the culprit, and even the main character saving his life in a battle against Russians does not alter his decision. The old Chechen only forgives the young man for his deed and agrees to him becoming his son-in-law after the youth brings him a sack of Russian soldiers' severed ears. The Chechens are portrayed in the work as noble and freedom-loving people, while the Russians are described by the author with epithets like "plague" or "Muscovite dogs" (Brzozowski 1857: 10, 27, 34).

One of the most anti-Russian and pro-Caucasus in its tone works published in the lands of the former Commonwealth is Mateusz Gralewski's *Kaukaz. Wspomnienia z dwunastoletniej niewoli*, published in Lviv in 1877. In my opinion, this is one of the best reportages on the Caucasus ever published by a Polish author in terms of the historical and ethnographic information therein.

While studying in Warsaw, Gralewski became involved in the Polish People's Union. The organisation was broken up in 1843, and Gralewski was sentenced to penal service in units stationed in the Caucasus. He remained there for 12 years, after which, having been amnestied in 1857 based on Alexander II's coronation manifesto, he returned to Poland. After the outbreak of the January Uprising in 1863, he joined in the activities of the Executive Committee of the National Government, which exercised actual power in the first phase of combat on behalf of the Provisional National Government.

After the fall of the January Uprising, he went abroad and resided in Saxony and Switzerland. In the early 1870s, upon receiving permission from the Austro-Hungarian authorities to settle in Galicia, he moved to Lviv (Janik 1928: 273). He then took up compiling memories of his time in the Caucasus, as well as collecting ethnographic material. He died in 1891 at the age of 65 and was buried in Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv.

6 Karol Brzozowski (1821–1904) was an engineer, geologist, and poet. He took an active part in the January Uprising of 1863 and was also involved in political activity during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878.

Kaukaz ... is in its tone an anti-tsarist work undoubtedly influenced by Gralewski's views, which repeatedly surfaced throughout the pages of the book. Because of his worldview, he ideologically identified with those against whom he was sent. Although the author did not himself defect to the side of the highlanders fighting for independence, towards the end of the book one can sense resentment at the fact that exiled Poles did not decide to take such measures. He did not, however, identify unreservedly with all the actions of those Caucasians at war with Russia, as is evident in the section devoted to Imam Shamil, whom he criticised for the way he ruled in the last period of his reign.

Another member of the Executive Committee of the National Government during the January Rising who had previously spent time in exile in the Caucasus and portrayed its conquest by the Russians in a negative light was Julian Surzycki. In his work *Dwie pieśni dagestańskie* (Two Dagestani Songs), published in Lviv in 1877, he unequivocally identified himself with the struggle of the highlanders. In the author's opinion, it was not they, but the Russians, who were sowing destruction. His work also negatively portrayed the Dagestani khans collaborating with the invaders.

Yet, and this is worth emphasising, in the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that had found themselves under Prussia and Austria-Hungary, works published were not exclusively anti-Russian nor solely portrayed the Caucasians in a positive light. One example is an article by Antoni Rehman, a geographer and geobotanist, and professor at Lviv University, who travelled to the Caucasus in the early 1870s. The result of the expedition was a book he published in Kraków, entitled *Kilka kartek z Kaukazu* (A Few Pages from the Caucasus), in which he wrote negatively about Shamil, leader of the peoples fighting the Russians in the eastern part of the Caucasus. He portrayed him as a fanatic while putting in a favourable light Alexander Baryatinsky, to whom the imam surrendered in 1859: "a high official, warrior and comrade, in the Caucasus he left the best memory of his himself". The author also referred pejoratively to the people of Georgia: "Mingrelian soil is the lushest in the world, and yet its inhabitant is a lazy wretch, all his life sullen, silent, seemingly meek and humble, in reality sly, deceitful, and prone to cruelty" (Rehman 1879: 5, 16).

Hipolit Jaworski, commander of a Polish insurgent unit in the January Uprising and formerly a tsarist soldier in the Caucasus, also left behind a work on the Caucasus. He stayed in the region at about the same time as Gralewski and, like the latter, was exiled there for nationalist activity; after returning to Poland he actively participated in the January Uprising. In his memoirs published in Poznań in 1877, Jaworski included a great deal of information on the conquest of the Caucasus by Russia. Unlike Gralewski, however, he described

the local Muslim peoples negatively and believed that Russia was carrying out a civilising mission in the area. In his work, he gave examples of Caucasians turning to Russian commanders for protection against murid raids and thievery. On the topic of Ghazi Muhammad, the first imam of Chechnya and Dagestan, he wrote: “at the head of a considerable party of murids, he spread murder and conflagration across the country, in which, thanks to the wise decrees of corps commander General Yermolov and the troops’ bravery, near utter peace prevailed” (Jaworski 1877a: 2, 6).

Jaworski’s work was generally well received among Polish émigrés, although the author was sometimes accused of identifying too much with the tsarist army conquering the Caucasus. A review of his book published in *Wiadomości Polskie* (Polish Tidings), the press organ of the Hôtel Lambert, may be cited as an example. It cast positive overtones, but ended with the statement:

It tugs at the heartstrings to just think that this blood is largely Polish [concerning the tsarist soldiers conquering the Caucasus – P.A.], that the unfortunate suffer to multiply the number of unfortunate and suffering, the subjugated serving as subjugators! This thought is far from the author, it does not come through in any stroke of his quill. He does not seem to remember under which flag and for which cause he fought, aside from that he fought among the brave and belonged to the victors. The fame of the Caucasian corps lies in his heart, it stirs up in him such fervour and joy as if it were national fame. (*News without a title and author* 1858: 199)

Hipolit Jaworski’s response to these allegations was as follows:

To this, I might reply that, in writing *Memories from the Caucasus*, I was the Bau-Adjutant of the imperial fingers, and that would be sufficient; – but I am sincere, – I will tell the truth, – it may, after all, be useful.

During my journey to the Caucasus, the thought occurred to me more than once that I will inevitably increase the number of the oppressors, – that I am going to fight against peoples who, with heroic sacrifice and perseverance, fight for independence – and I felt doubly my misfortune, – because these peoples possessed my sympathy as I considered them comrades in bondage, – as brothers.

On the first expedition, which I undertook a few weeks after my arrival in the regiment; – I looked upon everything with a kind of disbelief, with sadness and even with apprehension; – I questioned the old soldiers; and after everything I was told, after every observation of my own, my faith in the heroism of the highlanders, – in their nobility and the sanctity of the cause, diminished.

The ardent supporters of independence, quand-meme, will curse me, but what to do, – better that, than I should sully myself with a lie, inflict falsehood on my own conviction.

Today, when thirty years have passed since my stay in the Caucasus, – when with age and circumstances acquired experience has taught me sufficiently that there are cases in which independence leads to the most terrible misery, that only civilisation and education give a nation essential independence, that it is not the form of government, nor the name of its head, – but institutions, strictly applied to the degree of that civilisation and education, that give prosperity and happiness, – I have formed the unshakable conviction that liberties should be granted according to merit, degree of education and morality; – otherwise they lead the nation to anarchy, and necessarily to decline. – Good laws are the highest good, – therefore they should be respected unconditionally. (Jaworski 1877: 2–3)

Jaworski believed that in Georgia, since it became part of the Russian Empire, prosperity had set in and trade flourished. Members of royal and princely families enlisted in Russian service and rose to the highest dignities. In the Pole's opinion, however, the peoples of the eastern part of the Caucasus lived in a semi-wild state and understood patriotism exclusively through the prism of Islam. At the same time, he emphasised the arbitrariness and omnipotence of the local rulers, writing that the inhabitants "ruled by khans, beys, or beks are victims of the cruellest despotism" (Jaworski 1877: 5). According to Jaworski, peoples in such circumstances, though independent, cannot dream of happiness as they have no sense of security and do not freely dispose of their property. He believed that societies living under Russian rule were more independent, happy, and secure than they had been before the Caucasus was occupied by tsarist forces. He supported this with an example: "the cities of Derbent, Kuba, Baku, Nukha,⁷ Shemakha and others, toiling in industry and commerce, own considerable property and feel the full force of the care the government gives them in securing their property from robbery and their own lives from murder; they are now also loyal subjects and would not agree to regress by fifty years for anything" (Jaworski 1877: 5).

To illustrate the "barbarism" of the local population fighting against Russia, Jaworski cited Ghazi Muhammad's attack on Kizlar. On it he wrote:

⁷ Nukha is today Shaki in northern Azerbaijan.

If this assault had been made on a Russian fortress, if the whole garrison had fallen victim to it, I would have understood it, and perhaps with the others I would have shouted: serves them right, what do they barge onto another's land for! – though every honest and clear-thinking person probably understands that Russia's occupation today is a result of necessity, not to mention the fact that the civilising of the Caucasus, as a neighbouring land, is its necessary duty; – but no, Kazi-Mulla and his band thought only of murdering Christians and theft; – let whoever wishes advocate their brave deeds, their love of freedom, – but I will not do so, because I know them. (Jaworski 1877: 6)

Researchers of the issue of Poles in the Caucasus in the 19th century Bohdan Baranowski and Krzysztof Baranowski concluded that Jaworski fully justified the tsarist conquests in Chechnya and Dagestan. He portrayed them as necessary measures to bring “modernity” to these “backward” regions in terms of economic, social, and cultural development. According to the scholars, the Pole believed that he was fighting on the side of the Russians for a just cause to eradicate “savagery and backwardness” and win these mountainous areas for “civilisation” (Baranowski, Baranowski 1985: 103). Andrzej Furier, on the other hand, noted that Jaworski's book was published in Poznań, so was thus not subject to interference from Russian censors and, as a consequence, could well have been anti-Russian. That was not the case, however. Furier concluded that this was because Jaworski assessed the events in the Caucasus in which he participated without influence from Polish independence ideology. Therefore, the picture he presented of the region differed significantly from the one depicted by the Romantics (Furier 2009: 148).

2.2 *In Polish Literature Published in Russia*

Polish-language publications on the Caucasus appeared much more frequently in the Russian Empire than in the émigré literature in Western Europe. They were so numerous that some 20th-century scholars were convinced that the themes of the Caucasus, Elbrus, or Caucasian rivers appeared more frequently in Polish poetry of the 1830s and 1840s than those of the Giewont and the Danube (Warneńska 1960: 197). The phenomenon of the use of Caucasian motifs at this time was connected to the fact that, for their participation in the November Uprising and their activity in various Polish national organisations, the tsarist administration in the 1840s punitively conscripted into the Russian army operating in the Caucasus a group of people whose members were already more or less successfully engaged in literary work. In the Polish literature on the subject, they are sometimes referred to as the “Caucasian group

of poets”, although it should be remembered that they did not have a distinct literary programme and, in fact, the only thing they did have in common was their location and take on Caucasian themes.

Authors who decided to publish their works in the Russian Empire first had to obtain the approval of the censors. For this reason, it was not possible to publish the same kinds of texts as in exile, that is patriotic works and works celebrating the theme of the Polish-Caucasian liberation struggle against the common enemy. The existence of censorship makes it much more difficult to analyse literary works in terms of examining their authors’ attitudes towards Caucasians, as it is not known what the censor’s involvement was in the final version of a given work. The second challenge facing the researcher is that in the works published in the lands incorporated into the Russian partition, it was relatively rare to find paragraphs indicating the attitude (whether positive or negative) of the author towards the local population. Nevertheless, it is noticeable in some of them and feelings such as sympathy or resentment can be distinguished. Private letters sent by writers to friends and family are another source of knowledge on the issue under study. Although it should be borne in mind that not many of the latter have survived.

When analysing the contents of verses by poets residing in the Caucasus, one can see that the motif of the local population is present in only a small portion of them. Elżbieta Lijewska, a researcher dealing with the poetry of, among others, Władysław Strzelnicki,⁸ concluded that Polish exiles in the Caucasus primarily wrote under the auspices of Alexander Bestuzhev a.k.a Marlinsky’s *Sketches of the Caucasus* (Lijewska 2013: 13). The Caucasus corresponded to the assumptions and character of Romantic poetry – the solemnity of the high mountains aroused intellectual reflection, and the majesty of the landscape evoked reverie over the human plight. Moreover, untamed nature appeared as a power against the fragility and futility of human life. For this reason, scenery of the region was one of the dominant motifs in the works of Polish poets who ended up in the Caucasus. However, it does not provide research material to establish attitudes towards the local population. The same is true of the equally frequent motif of loneliness and alienation. Although, in this case, one can conclude that when it did appear, this meant that the author had found their place neither in the tsarist ranks nor among the local population; the reality encountered in the Caucasus was alien to them and it is difficult to infer any feeling of fraternity for any side. In one of his poems

8 Władysław Strzelnicki (1820–1846), for his participation in the organisation of the Polish People’s Association, was punitively conscripted into the Russian army and assigned to the Caucasus Corps.

Ksawery Pietraszkiewicz⁹ wrote: “a stranger alone, among strangers” and “no one feels me, no one understands me” (Gralewski 2015: 542). In this situation, therefore, one cannot deduce that the author felt any solidarity or unity with the highlanders. Rather, in this case, the region should be regarded as a prison; this motif did appear often in the said works after all.

Some Polish scholars of exile literature take the view that the role Poles played in the Russian army in the Caucasus was a source of ethical dilemmas – on the one hand, they were enslaved themselves, on the other, they were meant to enslave other peoples, being a tool in the tsar’s hand. One author promoting this thesis is, for example, Elżbieta Lijewska. In her work, she included statements such as: “Poles conscripted into the tsarist army were in a very difficult moral situation. They were forced to participate in the subjugation of the free nations of the Caucasus”; “the parallel fates of Poland and the states of the Caucasus become vividly clear, while at the same time the role of the Pole in tsarist uniform in the Caucasus becomes vividly tragic”; “those Poles who found themselves in the areas directly affected by the fighting were particularly aware of the tragedy of their own situation”; or that “Poles faced a dilemma: whether to be zealous in service of the oppressor of free nations or to avoid fighting [...]” (Lijewska 1998: 24–27).

The problem with such a presentation of the issue is that these dilemmas are evident in the works of a few, dozen or so authors, mainly those who were conscripted punitively for patriotic activity. These are then generalised and the sparse testimonies of moral reproach are extended to all Poles who took part in battles against the Caucasian highlanders over the 19th century.

The narrative presented above ignores the fact that these “moral dilemmas” appear in the works of political exiles, who were mostly educated people with pronounced nationalist views. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of Poles serving in the Caucasus was made up of illiterate peasants, among whom issues such as “the sense of patriotism”, “Polish national consciousness” and, above all, “awareness of the tragedy in which they found themselves” are impossible to examine due to an absence of research tools. The attitude of Poles who voluntarily joined the tsarist army is completely ignored. Several of these even reached the rank of general and successfully led Russian troops against the highlanders fighting for independence. Views on the “moral dilemmas” of Poles serving in the Caucasus exemplify the domination of memory (and its mythologisation) over professional history practice and the perpetuation of myths.

9 Ksawery Pietraszkiewicz (1814–1887) was arrested for his participation in the secret Polish People’s Union and exiled in 1839 to the Caucasus. In 1843 he was wounded and, as an invalid, discharged from the army.

Danuta Ossowska, who specialises in the literature of Polish exiles in the Caucasus, observed that moral reproaches among this group have been recorded, but stressed that the Polish national mythology and historical facts often diverge. The literary scholar objected to the use of, for example, the works of Tadeusz Łada-Zabłocki,¹⁰ perhaps the most outstanding Polish-language writer to have spent time in the Caucasus, to substantiate the exiles' dilemma thesis. As proof, she quoted his letter to a friend in which he wrote: "We have very few tidings [...]. The most pertinent is that the Lezgins besieged Nukha and that our boys have already shattered and driven them away" (Ossowska 2013: 15). In this paragraph, it is clear that Łada-Zabłocki did not identify with the Caucasian highlanders fighting for independence, but with the tsarist soldiers, whom he referred to as "our boys". In another letter, writing on the topic of Mikhail Vorontsov, the poet stated: "You rightly bless our good, noble, and wise Viceroy" (Filina, Ossowska 2007: 37). Moreover, it should be added that in Łada-Zabłocki's works, the theme of Poles' activity in the Caucasus was only mediate and no direct references to it were made. The theme of the relationship between man and nature predominated with this author, and he depicted Caucasian culture quite often as well.

Łada-Zabłocki did not include in his works sections from which it would appear that he was in any way fascinated by the liberation movement among the local population or saw in the highlanders heroes fighting against the tsarist army. On the other hand, there are not many negative images of Caucasian highlanders in his poems either. One of the few examples is the poem *Na śmierć Feliksa Ordyńskiego, poległego w bitwie z Goralami 1841 r.* (To the Death of Feliks Ordyński, Killed in Battle against the Highlanders in 1841). In it, Tadeusz Łada-Zabłocki wrote of the title character:

No more of you remains! you have died for glory
In the midst of battle, O young knight of ours!

As such, the main character is not condemned in the poem, as Polish émigré writers often did, for having served in the tsarist army. The author even pointed out that he had fallen in glory fighting the highlanders, and this was no cause

10 Tadeusz Łada-Zabłocki (1811–1847) was arrested and exiled to the Caucasus in the 1830s for his participation in secret societies. In 1845 his collection of poetry, entitled *Poezje Tadeusza Łada-Zabłocki* (The Poems of Tadeusz Łada-Zabłocki), was published in St. Petersburg, while that same year a collection of Ukrainian folk songs he had collected was published in Paris.

for shame or disgrace to his mind. On the other hand, of the Chechens, by whose hand Feliks Ordyński had died, he wrote:

And the funerary kurgan I have built you,
The day after next the Chechen will unearth! (Łada-Zabłocki 1844: 198)

Thus, in this case, the Chechens are portrayed pejoratively as grave destroyers who do not respect the dead.

A negative opinion about Chechens was expressed in the works of Wincenty Dawid,¹¹ who, as a political suspect in the 1840s, was exiled to the Russian units stationed in the Caucasus. In the preface to his novel *Tehe czyli zburzenie Aulu-Dubby* (Tehe or the Demolition of Aul-Dubba), he characterised them with the following words:

This people, savage, inaccessible to any familial feelings, always ready to pounce on birth father and brother with kinzhal in hand, never laughing nor crying, unless out of anger and wrath, breaths with a single sensation of vengeance and murder. It is enough to look upon the features of his face and you will guess that he will never reconcile with you, will not ally by blood and heart. Derisive in speech, contemptuously smiling, he approaches the other-believer only for revenge or profit. (Dawid 1859: 325)

For Dawid, anatomical observations were enough to come to regard the Chechens as foes. However, he did not identify with the fight against the highlanders either, which he treated in terms of necessity. On this subject he wrote:

O when, my star of destiny,
Will you tear me from the slaughter and flame.
It is I, the son of valleys and worshiper of trees and flowers,
I, who spared the life of forest fowl,
With bayonet, with the arsonist's firebrand, a demolisher,
Today I tread into the Chechen's forest hideout,
Under the quiet thatch I place embers,
I fell and burn oaks and larches. (Dawid 1859: 331–332)

11 Wincenty Dawid (1816–1897) was an educator and poet. He stayed in the Caucasus from 1844 to 1853.

What is more, Jan Załęski, exiled in connection with the Szymon Konarski affair,¹² spoke positively of the general Grigory Zass¹³ and the Russian army in the Caucasus. In doing so, he felt no moral quandaries around fighting the highlanders. For him, it was a better occupation than idly dwelling at camp and being bored (Załęski 1849: 159).

Another individual exiled to the Caucasus in the 1830s in connection with the Szymon Konarski affair, author of the two-volume *Szkice Kaukazu* (Sketches of the Caucasus), was Michał Butowd-Andrzejkowicz (Butowd-Andrzejkowicz), who sympathised with the Russians and expressed so in his diaries. He served as an artilleryman and, describing both the march on Akusha in 1844 and on Dargo in 1845, he did not indicate that he felt any moral dilemma about firing on auls that refused to accept Russian supremacy. Instead, he spoke openly of the residents of Chirkey, which was demolished by government order:

I didn't feel sorry for the inhabitants, because they were real highway-men, and nothing bad befell them through their resettlement deeper into the mountains anyway. I only felt sorry for that forest [i.e. the forest had been felled – P.A.] of walnut trees, in whose shade I oftentimes read Shakespeare or Goethe.

Imam Shamil, on the other hand, was, in Butowd-Andrzejkowicz's opinion, "not a foolish man, he seduces people and fools fanatics through his charlatanism". When characterising the people of the Caucasus, he stated that "the most read man in Asia has no notion of Europe; for him, the Frengi are creatures he despises and wants to know nothing about". For the author, the Russian conquests in the Caucasus did not have negative connotations, and he even apotheosised the fallen tsarist soldiers. This can be seen, for example, in one passage where he wrote about a Russian fort located near Gergebil:¹⁴

12 Szymon Konarski (1808–1839) organised the underground Polish People's Union in the Polish lands incorporated into the Russian Empire. The authorities would eventually break it up and carry out numerous arrests of its members.

13 Grigory Zass (1797–1883), a Russian general serving in the Caucasus from 1820 to 1840, was one of the cruelest Russian commanders, who believed that the best way to conquer the region was to terrorise and intimidate the local population. It is known that he ordered the severed heads of the Adyghe to be displayed on pikes stuck in the ground at Prochny Okop (Lorer 1988).

14 In November 1843 a battle took place near Gergebil, which resulted in Imam Shamil's forces occupying the village.

Just across the river are the ruins of a former Russian fort, where two companies of infantry were felled in 1843 while bravely defending against a treacherous and superior enemy. Scattered there still lie the skulls and bones of the martyrs unburied by the Muslims.

It is also noticeable that Michał Butowd-Andrzejkiewicz equated Poles and Russians, for he wrote of them: “the Slavic Eagles constantly pave their own way forward” (Butowd-Andrzejkiewicz 1858: 93–100, 124, 134, 136, 167, 187), which would indicate that he considered the conquests made by the tsarist army as “his own”.

The comparison of Russians to eagles was also made by Leon Janiszewski, who was exiled to the Caucasus for his participation in the November Uprising. He employed this treatment when describing the incorporation of Georgia into the country of the tsars:

Slavic eagles hovered over the valleys of Georgia on victorious wings; Slavic chests served as a shield to oppressed brothers, of one church, and the care of the monarchs of Russia, rekindling once again the ancient spark of this people of learning, strengthens their national existence on the basis of proper administration.

The subjugation of the region to Russia was, for Janiszewski, a civilisational advancement, for previously Georgia was supposed to have been governed by misrule and, moreover, constantly attacked by “the savage Lezgin” (Janiszewski 1843: 7). The view that it was the Russians who stood behind the “advance of civilisation”, while the North Caucasus was inhabited by fanatical and savage tribes of highlanders, was echoed by Janiszewski in his article published in the publication *Rubon*, which appeared in Vilnius (Janiszewski 1849: 105–106).

Władysław Strzelnicki, imprisoned in 1839 for his participation in a secret organisation linked to the Polish People’s Association and then conscripted punitively into the Russian army and sent to the Caucasus, was also of the opinion that the local peoples were developmentally backwards (Strzelnicki 1846: 94–95). In his unfinished poem *Bey-Bulat*, Strzelnicki added a footnote on the Lezgins, explaining that they are characterised by “savagery, poverty, and a propensity to plunder”. Of Chechnya he wrote that it is one of the most fertile provinces of the eastern Caucasus, but “it is a pity though, that the rebellious and thuggish spirit of its inhabitants does not allow it to reach that degree of civilisation to which nature, location and, above all, the vicinity of Russia seem to call it”. Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus, in turn, was in Strzelnicki’s view “punishment for incessant unrest”. It should be noted that, for the author,

participation in these military operations was not something to be proud of either. In a poem entitled *Do ... (To ...)*, he wrote of “battles with no glory” (Strzelnicki 1860: 34, 55). It is difficult to find motifs of identification with Russian policies in Strzelnicki’s work. There too is a lack of sympathy for the independent Caucasian peoples, whom he considered “savage” and “plunderous”. Most often, the motif of loneliness and alienation shines through in his works.

Adam Idzikowski, who spent time in the region, had an unequivocally negative opinion of the peoples of the North Caucasus. According to him, they were a “dim and savage” people, who “sucked all the good out of the earth, gave it nothing in return, armed themselves with murderous iron and set out to annihilate learning and nations. Having envied the happiness of the enlightened peoples, unable to comprehend it, unable to match it, they swore to its ruin” (Idzikowski 1843: 227–228).

Works on Caucasian themes appeared in the 1840s in, among others, the then-popular literary publication *Athenaeum*. Among these works’ authors was Henryk Dzierżek, who travelled to the Caucasus as a volunteer and published memoirs of his service in the tsarist army. It is clear from the contents of his work that he unequivocally identified with Russian policy towards the highlanders fighting for independence. For the Pole, the region was witness to the glory of Russian arms. This is evidenced, for example, by one paragraph in which the author stated that in the Caucasus “the past is being resurrected under the wing of a new Rome” (implying, of course, Russia). Dzierżek believed that she was carrying out a civilising mission: “Not many years will pass; and on the wild summits of the Caucasus, where today dreary forests blacken, where idolatry still nests, perhaps the emblem of the Saviour will rise! And the light will shine anew on this neighbouring land of clouds!”. He was critical of the highlanders and believed that their main trait was a desire for brigandage. In Dzierżek’s opinion, it was not a policy of expansion that pushed Russia to conquer the Caucasus, but the highlanders’ perfidy and their plunderous nature that distinguished, as he claimed, all the Muslim tribes. He mentioned in passing that the Chechens had sworn peace many times but then organised assaults on Cossack *stanitsas* (Dzierżek 1848: 112–113, 138–140).

Another work published in *Athenaeum* in which the author’s attitude to Caucasian peoples was revealed is *Niewola u Szamila* (Bondage under Shamil), signed with the initials A.Z. Its author was a Polish exile sentenced for national activities to the tsarist army stationed in the Caucasus. He had taken part in the defence of Kumukh,¹⁵ whose inhabitants had been favourably disposed

15 Kumukh – is a village and the administrative center of Laksky District in Dagestan.

towards Russia when it was captured by Shamil's troops in 1842. The author identified with the Russian conquests, for in his opinion Russia's destiny was to "spread the light of enlightenment and civilisation deep into the dark cradle of mankind", i.e. the Caucasus, and he saw in its policy towards the region "the work of all enlightened humanity". He called all those who spoke out against Russia "inimical highlanders" or, more bluntly, "savage barbarians". Characterising them, A.Z. wrote: "at every step, one can see an innate tendency towards plunder and idleness. The man's occupation is either theft or war, while at home he spends his time idling". Imam Shamil, on the other hand, in the author's opinion, was a "common serf" who bore no trace of genius, but was instead a "wild fanatic". In the struggle of those highlanders who wanted to preserve their independence, the author saw Islamists fighting against Christianity and the struggle of Asian barbarism against benevolent European civilisation. Furthermore, he stated that "if the heroic sword of Russia did not guard the borders of Europe, these new Arabs would certainly remind her of the times of Muhammad and Omar", therefore alluding directly to the possibility of a Muslim conquest of Europe (A.Z. 1850: 122–152).

Another Polish volunteer in the fight against the highlanders who published his thoughts on them was Wojciech Potocki. For him, the murids were "chosen ones among the followers of false prophets". Potocki considered Ghazi Muhammad as such. Characterising him, he wrote: "he is a faitour claiming to be a prophet", while elsewhere he said of the imam that "when the victorious arms of the Russian forces humiliated Persia and Turkey, this vagabond, faitour and fanatic all in one, knew how to stir up the dim tribes of the Lezgins and Chechens and swayed even the mind of the peaceful Kumyks". Wojciech Potocki unequivocally identified with the Russians and not with the highlanders who fought against them (Potocki 1841: 562–576; Potocki 1845: 132).

Probably the work in which a Pole referred with the greatest sympathy to the people of the Caucasus fighting against the Russians, and which was published in the Russian Empire, was *Pamiętnik mojej żołnierki na Kaukazie oraz niewoli u Szamila. Od 1844 do 1854* (A Memoir of my Soldiering in the Caucasus and Enslavement under Shamil. From 1844 to 1854) by Karol Kalinowski, published in Warsaw in 1882.

Kalinowski was punitively conscripted into the tsarist army stationed in the Caucasus, where he arrived in 1845. His place of stay became the Vnezapnaya fortress located on the border of Chechnya and Dagestan. A few months after his arrival at the deployment site, the Pole was kidnapped by locals and sold as a slave to the independent highlanders. He was taken first to the Chechens, then to the Andis, and then back to the Chechens. While staying in Vedeno, where Imam Shamil's residence was at the time, he embraced Islam, made a large circle of friends and tragically fell in love with a local girl, for whom he

considered staying in Chechnya and abandoning his dream of returning to his homeland. Fate, however, would turn out differently. According to the tradition and customs of the highlanders, Kalinowski's beloved was betrothed to another, who in turn caused her death. After a stay of about two years among the independent highlanders, Kalinowski was freed by Shamil and was able to live alongside them as a free man. However, after having lost the woman he loved, he no longer had any reason to remain with the Chechens, and so decided to defect to the Russian army. He saw this as the only way to return to Poland, for which he constantly longed. Karol Kalinowski served for several more years in the ranks of the tsarist army in the Caucasus. In 1858, he returned to his homeland and settled in Warsaw, where he died in 1882.

In memoirs published in the late 1870s and early 1880s, Kalinowski included passages that show he valued living among the independent Chechens much more than among the tsarist soldiers (Kalinowski 2017: 308–309). However, despite his sympathy for the Chechens, Kalinowski served in the Russian army loyally. He actively participated in treks against the independent highlanders, for which he was promoted to officer, the rank of battalion adjutant, and was awarded the Cross of St. George given for combat merit.

One of the few Caucasus researchers who have drawn attention to the negative descriptions of Caucasian highlanders by Polish authors is Andrzej Furier. The scholar did state that they were regarded by many writers as bearers of the noblest ideals of liberty and potential allies in the fight against Russia. However, individual perceptions of the Caucasian War meant that the mountain tribes' opposition to Russia was no longer as interesting as the Romantic legend (Furier 2009: 147). The above opinion could be supplemented by the observation that the idealisation of the Caucasian peoples fighting against Russia occurred among Polish émigré writers who had no direct contact with them. 19th-century writers with independence-minded views, who had never been to the Caucasus and had never come into contact with the local people, afforded them, or rather the idea of their struggle against Russia, sympathy and presented them as fraternal to Poles. However, those who were able to familiarise themselves with the situation in the Caucasus and, above all, with the local culture, which was alien and incomprehensible to them, in the vast majority no longer considered the inhabitants fighting for independence as an object worthy of being presented as heroic fighters for freedom and justice. In many cases, such writers believed that they were savages to whom civilisation had only just been brought by Russia. There were, of course, works in which the author's sympathy for the local population shone through visibly, but these were isolated cases. The majority of writers nonetheless identified with the Russian side, or, if both sides of the Caucasus conflict were to them alien, felt no sympathy for either.

Tsarist censorship likely played its part in all of this. However, the lack of research material makes it impossible to examine the issue of whether, and if so, how, it influenced Polish writers' depiction of the Caucasus. It should be noted that no manuscripts have come down to us (or at least none have yet been found) that were not allowed to be published during the period of intensified tsarist censorship for political reasons, because they portrayed the people of the Caucasus in a positive light. Leo Tolstoy's *Hadji Murat* can serve as one example of such a work in Russian literature. It was initially not accepted by the censors but was eventually published in 1912 (the book was published in full in 1917). Moreover, themes and motifs in works by Polish-language authors in which the Caucasian peoples are presented in a negative light can be found, but there is no evidence to support the thesis that this was a condition imposed by the tsarist censorship for such works to be published. Most likely, therefore, it came from the authors themselves.

The work of the already mentioned Zygmunt Rewkowski, who was exiled to the Caucasus in the early 1830s, should be mentioned here. For many years his memoirs lay in an archive in manuscript form and were published only in 2011. I have not been able to find information as to why they were not published during the tsarist era. One cannot exclude the thesis that the reason was indeed their anti-Russian character. Throughout the work, one can find paragraphs in which he presented Russians and Russia in a negative light, such as one stating that in the Caucasus it is the Russians who are the real bandits, not the highlanders (Rewkowski 2011a: 48). Despite this, the author maintained very good relations with the tsarist generals, as will be discussed further in this book. Of interest is also how Rewkowski described the local population in the Caucasus. Although he sometimes presented them in a positive context, we also find numerous completely contrary opinions. Thus, according to the Polish exile, "the Armenians will disperse and, like vile vermin, slither far and wide, devouring themselves when other sustenance becomes scarce – and when the time comes, Providence will find them unworthy of its gifts [...] The Armenians have committed suicide and will never resurrect" (Rewkowski 2011a: 166). In turn, on the peoples of the North Caucasus, he wrote that they are barbarians and characterised by "thick ignorance". Reporting on the Siege of Akhoulgo of 1839, he further stated: "great losses were suffered by the highlanders, but ours were no smaller". The author thus identified himself with the tsarist troops, whom he referred to as "ours".

Rewkowski's negative attitude towards the Russians did not prevent him from volunteering for operations against the highlanders. He also had no objections to the shooting of praying elders during the Siege of Tilitli (modern Teletl) in 1837 (Rewkowski 2011a: 125). It is also significant that Rewkowski

presented the person of Aleksey Yermolov¹⁶ with great sympathy, as a man who was supposedly fair not only to his soldiers but also to the people of the Caucasus. The Polish exile claimed: “There was no talk of taking their lands [i.e. the lands of the highlanders – P.A.], introducing Russian rule, law, or of their land’s conquest and subduing at that time. The whole Caucasus was calm; for troops, today’s army, there was no need”. In Rewkowski’s opinion, “he alone [Yermolov] understood and maintained the country entrusted to him, acting as the good of his own homeland demanded, and in contradiction to what the pride and anti-civilisational intentions of the Russian government instructed”. He was said to be so good to the Caucasus that in “Petersburg they began to suspect Yermolov of considering secession from Russia along with the whole Caucasus land”. It was for this reason, according to the Pole, that the tsar dismissed him from his posts (Rewkowski 2011a: 47–48).

Yet, Yermolov is regarded as one of the cruellest tsarist commanders from the period of the conquest of the Caucasus. His actions were characterised by such a degree of brutality that he earned himself the nickname “stoker of the Caucasus”. The general’s policies were based on intimidating the local population through brutal military operations. The controversies that Yermolov stirs up in the Caucasus to the present day are evidenced by the protests of the non-ethnic Russian population in the North Caucasus against the general’s statue, which was unveiled in 2008 in Pyatigorsk.

16 Aleksey Yermolov (1777–1861) – on 1816 he was appointed commander of the Independent Georgian Corps w 1816 r. został mianowany dowódcą Samodzielnego Korpusu Kaukaskiego. Na Kaukazie przebywał do 1827 r. He stayed in the Caucasus until 1827.

Plans of the Polish Émigré Community Concerning the Caucasus and Their Influence on the Image of the Region

The notion of Polish-Caucasian brotherhood, which I link to the Polish ethnopolitical myth, based on the narrative of fighting a common enemy – Russia, was born among the circles of Polish independence émigrés residing in Western Europe during the period of the Commonwealth's partitioning. It was characterised not only by Romantic overtones manifested in literary works but was also closely connected to politics, first and foremost with the activities of the Hôtel Lambert headed by Prince Adam Czartoryski. This organization, pursuing policy aimed at the restoration of an independent Polish state, tried to coax the European powers into building an anti-Russian coalition of which Poles would constitute an important element. One of the regions in which they would play that important role, in the opinion of the Hôtel Lambert representatives, was the Caucasus. The key issue was one of image – they wanted to convince European leaders and public opinion that the Polish émigrés had great potential to influence this trouble spot within the Russian Empire. These efforts contributed to the specific perception of the region developed by Polish émigrés in Europe, the effects of which can also be seen in the contemporary image of the Caucasus.

After going into exile following the fall of the November Uprising, Adam Czartoryski set about building his quasi-diplomatic posts. The main role in the Caucasus plans was played by Istanbul, where the politician's agents resided. This was an important outpost, for Turkey had conflicting interests with Russia on many levels that also applied to the Caucasus. Another country whose interest reached this region was Great Britain, which was concerned about the growth of Russia's military capabilities and the expansion of its borders in Asia. British interest in the Caucasus was well illustrated by the fact that in 1835, David Urquhart, who sought to curb Russian influence and was actively involved in the question of Circassian independence, was sent to the British embassy in Istanbul as secretary. His attitude is well illustrated by the fact that even before he departed for the post, he founded, together with Władysław

Zamoyski¹ and president of the Literary Association of the Friends of Poland in London, Thomas Beaumont, the anti-Russian publication *Portfolio*, in which many pages were devoted to Caucasian affairs. Among other things, it was in *Portfolio* that the declaration of independence of Circassia was printed, which Urquhart wrote personally.²

The Hôtel Lambert activists' interest in the Caucasus developed around the middle of the 1830s. This resulted from their supposition that in the event of a war with Russia, the possibility of which was being discussed in Europe at the time, one of the main theatres of war would be this region – something Adam Czartoryski, among others, was convinced of. Moreover, it was of interest to politicians because of the thousands of Poles serving in the ranks of the Russian army there (Widerszal 2011: 50). Of significance was also that Russia had to maintain its numerous troops in the Caucasus at great expense (*Memorandum* 1836).

One of the first examples of interest in the region can be seen in a memorial submitted in 1834 by Prince Czartoryski to British politicians. It presented plans for the creation of an 18,000-strong Polish army in the Caucasus, composed primarily of deserters from the tsar's army. This unit, aided by Persia and Turkey and working with the independent highlanders of the Caucasus (Caban 2001: 167–168), was to pose a serious threat to Russia. It was soon realized that the implementation of the project was unrealistic. This was because, for it to be realized, all or almost all the Poles serving in the tsarist army would have had to desert (Caban 2001a: 739).

Ludwik Widerszal made one interesting point in his work. According to the historian, there was a major difference between the pro-Caucasian actions of Urquhart and those of Czartoryski and Zamoyski. He considered the Briton's enthusiasm for the cause of the highlanders selfless because it was driven by ideological belief. According to Widerszal, some even saw in his activities a holy war for the cause of the Caucasian peoples (see Brewda 1999: 24). A similar statement was made by American historian Charles King, who said that

1 Władysław Zamoyski (1803–1868) was a relative of Adam Czartoryski and also one of his closest associates. On behalf of the prince, Zamoyski directed the foreign policy of the Hôtel Lambert. He served as an officer in the Polish, Turkish, and British armies.

2 Interestingly, David Urquhart wrote the declaration of Circassian independence on his own initiative. In 1835, using his Circassian pseudonym Daud-Bey, he wrote a letter to the Circassians subsequently published in many European, including Polish, dailies, in which he called on them to declare independence and form a national government. He wrote that the Polish people would then understand that their own fate was linked to theirs and that the 20,000 Poles serving in the tsarist army would “soon realize that their weapons are aimed at brothers” (see *List Dauda do Czerkiesów* 1837: 91–93).

for the Briton and those around him, the Circassian cause was linked not only to action against Russia but also to the British commitment to defending the rights of oppressed peoples in general (King 2007: 249). King put Urquhart in the same ranks as Thomas Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) – of individuals fascinated by the cultures of peripheral groups inhabiting the area stretching from Central Europe to the Arabian Peninsula, and who contributed to the sprouting of the seed of national feeling that could then be used politically (King 2007: 238).

One can, of course, debate the American historian as to whether it was indeed due to the values they shared that the two individuals he mentioned became involved in fostering a “national spirit” among the Circassians and Arabs, or whether British interests were at stake. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that Urquhart contributed to the emergence of Circassian nationalism. He not only wrote the Circassian declaration of independence but also designed their national symbols. His actions were aimed at making out of them a modern, united nation with one unified government representing them internationally. In Urquhart’s case, I perceive actions that, in perspective, were intended to benefit Great Britain politically. In turn, I am sceptical of claims that he was driven by some altruistic desire to help “oppressed peoples”.

In the opinion of Widerszal, representatives of the Hôtel Lambert were interested in the Caucasus only because of the immediate and short-term gains that dealing with these “Asian hordes” could bring to the Polish cause, in Adam Czartoryski’s words (Widerszal 2011: 53). One can also be supported in this assumption by documents produced within the prince’s camp, such as the *Zarys wyprawy na Kaukaz, o jej celach i spodziewanych skutkach* (Outline of an expedition to the Caucasus, on its aims and expected results), drawn up in 1847 in Paris by Ludwik Bystrzonowski (*Zarys wyprawy 1847*). It defined two goals for the Caucasus expedition. The first, and most important, was to bring “benefits for Poland”, while the second was to “harm Russia”. This lacks any declaration of “bringing freedom to the Caucasian peoples” or similar pronouncements. The armed forces of Shamil and the Circassians are classified in the document as “tools” that can be used for both of these purposes.

In 1836 Czartoryski sent his emissary Marian Brzozowski to Istanbul. From the memorandum written for Brzozowski, we learn that Czartoryski sought to establish a “Polish outpost” in the Caucasus, which would maintain contact with the region’s inhabitants and provide them with military assistance in their fight against Russia. It was also meant to enter into a pact with Poles serving in the tsarist army. Additionally, Brzozowski’s task was to gain information about the actual forces of the Caucasian highlanders, their organization, the plans of their commanders and the possibility of forming a regular army,

as well as to gauge the attitude of Poles towards desertion from Russian units. Moreover, Czartoryski was interested in the question of whether a Polish general could inspire confidence in the local population and head the Circassian armed forces, or at least a portion of them (*Memorandum* 1836).

Adam Czartoryski also provided Marian Brzozowski with an instruction. It shows that David Urquhart, then secretary of the British embassy in Istanbul, considered it desirable to coordinate the Polish and Caucasian independence movements. For this reason, he asked Czartoryski to assign a Polish officer to special tasks. The Polish politician appointed Brzozowski to just this role. In coordination with Urquhart, he was to either go to the Caucasus or remain in the Ottoman Empire. This should be linked to Czartoryski's position that Polish actions ought to be coordinated with British policy (*Memorandum* 1836). However, Brzozowski only ever reached Istanbul and never ended up leaving for the Caucasus (Żurawski vel Grajewski 2003: 189).

In 1836, the case of the ship *Vixen*, which was a provocation prepared by David Urquhart and Władysław Zamoyski, reverberated loudly across Europe. In 1831 Russia took steps indirectly targeting English entrepreneurs. It was that year that foreign ships were forbidden to call at the Circassian shores, except at a few points where Russian forts were established. The idea was that this would restrict the supply of armaments to the highlanders of the Western Caucasus, who remained outside the control of the Russian administration. As a result, English goods to Circassia could be transported primarily as contraband smuggled on small Turkish ships (Widerszal 2011: 30–54). This practice was carried out even though the Sultan also forbade trade with the Circassians, a consequence of pressure from the Russian ambassador (*Czerkassia* 1837: 192). At the time, whether Russia had the right to act so was widely debated in Europe. It was believed that Article 4 of the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople, which granted her the eastern coast of the Black Sea, may have been in contradiction to international law (*Vixen* 1837: 15).

Urquhart and Zamoyski sent a British-flagged ship in 1836 with weapons for the Circassians, with the intent that the vessel encounters Russian ships on patrol off the Black Sea coast. This is evidenced, for example, by the diary of James Stanislaus Bell, the ship's owner and close associate of David Urquhart, printed in the *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* (Chronicle of the Polish Emigration) (see Bell 1837: 162). Both hoped that this would provoke a conflict between Great Britain and Russia, which could even lead to armed confrontation. Just as the organizers of the plot expected, the *Vixen* was seized by the Russian fleet. An international scandal erupted. The Polish émigré press wrote that a "rape of an English vessel" had been committed (*Vixen* 1837: 15). British conservatives raised in parliament the question of the legality of Russian jurisdiction

over the Circassian coast. There were also voices calling for a declaration of war against Russia and the introduction of a British fleet into the Black Sea (Ajrapetov 2006: 149–153). These discussions were reported daily by Polish journals, including the *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* (*Vixen* 1837: 53–59). From Istanbul, Adam Czartoryski's envoy, Wojciech Chrzanowski, suggested the politician earnestly urge the British to send warships to the Black Sea under the pretext of protecting merchant vessels. This would have however contradicted the Russian-Turkish agreement of 1833 that closed the Bosphorus Strait to foreign warships (Żurawski vel Grajewski 2003: 189–190). These actions should be interpreted as a desire to bring about a war between the superpowers, which, according to Czartoryski's faction, could bring Poland independence.

The government in London, however, managed to de-escalate the situation and recognized Russia's right to establish its own laws in this part of the world. This marked the beginning of a period of thaw in Russian-English relations, which led to the signing of an agreement in 1840, an attempt to rebuild the Holy Alliance against France (Potemkin 2015: 426). From then on, Britain's policy towards Russia entered a new phase: friction was not allowed on Caucasian issues, which were of secondary importance to the London Cabinet anyway. Only the Crimean War would bring a shift in attitude towards the Caucasus (Widerszal 2011: 64).

In 1837 David Urquhart managed to organize an expedition to Circassia, in which Stanisław Krajewski took part as interpreter. It brought no real benefits and Michał Czajkowski wrote of it with irony, that what had been hailed as the eighth wonder of the world by English dailies and diplomacy amounted to a landing on the shore of Circassia and a two-month camp-out in an aul a mile offshore (Reychman 1972: 219).

A negative opinion of Urquhart's actions related to the *Vixen*, as to indeed most of his actions as regards the Caucasus, was held by Henry Temple, which led to Urquhart's dismissal from his post in Istanbul in 1837. As a consequence of the whole incident with the ship, some British and Polish politicians eventually lost hope that the government in London would take a more serious interest in the affairs of the Caucasus and prevent its conquest by Russia. As Ludwik Widerszal noted, from then on the Poles took sole charge of Caucasus policy, albeit maintaining contacts with the British in this field. This came however to the exclusion of David Urquhart, who had become *persona non grata*, especially among circles in the British Foreign Office, and whose name could now blemish any enterprise. For some Hôtel Lambert activists, this was no great loss. One of those sceptical towards cooperation with Urquhart was Ludwik Zwierkowski. In 1838, he wrote to his brother: "do not believe any English affairs or arrangements around the Cherkess [...]. Spencer, Bell, Longworth, Urquhart,

all are men who want to rouse their spice merchants against Moscow ... Not out of love for us, but for their own interests [...]" (Widerszal 2011: 61, 88).

After the change in British policy and, above all, after a clash with reality – when it became clear that desertions were not as numerous as had been assumed, activists of the Hôtel Lambert began mainly pushing for the formation of legions out of Poles residing in western Europe and the Ottoman Empire. There were also plans of establishing a Cossack-Ukrainian formation (Karbownik 2012: 216). At the same time, the commitment to forming a Polish army in the Caucasus was reduced (Caban 2008: 128–129). However, this did not mean that plans for the region were completely abandoned. In the mid-1840s, for example, a project involving the outbreak of a great independence movement of Caucasian peoples – Chechens, Dagestanis, Armenians, Georgians, Circassians, as well as Cossacks, was concocted. After Russia's expulsion from the Caucasus, the states therein were to be established as fiefdoms of Turkey, while the Cossacks would come under the sovereignty of Poland. Ludwik Widerszal noted that during the same period Adam Czartoryski presented a plan that he himself placed in the realm of fantasy and considered a distant prospect. As per him, the highlanders from the Caucasus were to strike along the Volga as far as Moscow. The Don Cossacks were to also head in its direction via the Don River and Voronezh. The Black Sea Cossacks and the Polish corps from Turkey, meanwhile, would march on Ukraine while congruently inciting an uprising in Poland (Widerszal 2011: 93, 106). We find a similar plan in the already mentioned *Zarys ...*, drawn up by Ludwik Bystrzonowski (Czartoryski possibly based his concepts precisely on this plan). According to it, the goal of the expedition to the Caucasus would be to bring about an uprising against Russia in Poland. Shamil was to set out along the Volga to the north and lead the entire Muslim population behind him. As a result, the Astrakhan Khanate would be restored. As per Bystrzonowski's plan, however, the imam's activities would not end there. He envisioned that Shamil would then march on Kazan and further north, operating with his forces between the Vyatka and Kama rivers. The Circassians, in turn, were to take western Georgia. One variant plan presented in the document assumed that the Poles, together with the Black Sea and Don Cossacks, would strike Moscow (Bystrzonowski 1847). Interestingly, very similar assumptions were also made in the 1860s. We find them, for example, in a memoir entitled *Kwestia kaukaska* (The Caucasus Issue) kept with documents left by Władysław Czartoryski in the Princes Czartoryski Library. It assumes the outbreak of a revolution and uprising in Russia, during which Polish legions supported by "masses of Circassians" would advance from the Kuban towards the Dnieper River (*Kwestia kaukaska* 1863).

In the 1840s, Adam Czartoryski attempted to deploy a Polish mission permanently residing at the side of Imam Shamil but lacked the funds to do so. Ludwik Widerszal put forward the thesis that the main source of money for the maintenance of the diplomatic service at the Hôtel Lambert was the offerings of rich Englishmen, made to the supporter of Polish independence Lord Dudley Stuart. However, to obtain new donations, tangible results of Adam Czartoryski's activities were required (Widerszal 2011: 102). These were absent. Thus, efforts were made to demonstrate Polish activity in the Caucasus through modest means.

In 1844, a representative of Czartoryski, Ludwik Zwierkowski, went to the Caucasus with the task of establishing contact with Shamil (Adamczewski 2018: 47–62). He had with him letters from Michał Czajkowski, in which the imam was proposed with undertaking joint ventures in the Caucasus and Europe. We learn quite a lot about Zwierkowski's expedition from the notes of its principal agent, to whom the envoy gave an account upon his return to Istanbul. In them, we learn that upon arrival in Dzhubga³ the Pole was welcomed with full honours by influential beys from among the Shapsugs and Abzakhs. As for Zwierkowski's trip to Shamil, almost all of those gathered expressed concern lest the imam appears among the Circassians and begins ruling them as despotically as he rules the Chechens, Lezgins, and other peoples in the eastern Caucasus. One of the more influential people was said to have said to Zwierkowski about Shamil:

Let Sheikh Shamil war on his own behalf and we will also war, but let him think not to govern us; to be under his rule is harder than under the rule of the Turks at the time when they controlled Anapa. You could make money off the Turks, while with Shamil you can only lose your head. If things were to come to this, it would be better to just submit to the authority of the mighty and strong Russian Tsar, who demands only subordination from us but does not lay claim to our property and protects the lives of his subjects. (Čajkovskij 1898)

Czajkowski stressed in his memoirs that “many [i.e., of the Adyghe – P.A.] had contacts with the Russian authorities, from whom they received salaries and gifts. Besides, the love of freedom or, better said, of anarchy was in the blood of these people”. Eventually, the Circassians took Zwierkowski to Shamil but

³ Dzhubga is currently located in the southwestern part of Krasnodar Krai in Russia.

declared to the Pole that there would be no collaboration with the imam, which he was to communicate to him personally. He reached the borders of Ossetia with a group of several Circassians. There he was wounded by an unknown assassin. Czajkowski came up with the suspicion that the Circassians themselves were behind this, fearing that Zwierkowski would bring Shamil with his murids (Czajkowski 1962: 199) down upon them. After the Pole was wounded, it was decided to send only two men further with letters to Shamil and await a reply. It soon arrived, which Zwierkowski then sent back to Czajkowski (Čajkovskij 1898). With that, his mission had ended.

Shamil's letter to Czajkowski delivered through Zwierkowski is one of the few clues testifying to the establishment of contacts between the Polish émigrés and the leader of independent peoples in the eastern Caucasus. In his work, Adam Czartoryski's agent in Istanbul briefly discussed the contents of the letter. Shamil was said to have assured him that the bravery of the Poles was known to him and he would be happy if an alliance could be made with them. He also asked Czajkowski to report to his superior that from now on he would look upon all Poles who made it to him as his children and that they would be counted among his murids. According to Czajkowski's account, along with the letter from the imam he also received a letter from Daniyal, Sultan of Elis. In it, the latter explained in detail all of Shamil's wishes and spoke positively about the possibility of an alliance with the Poles. Daniyal was to assure Czajkowski that the imam would always remain a loyal ally. He also informed him that there were many Poles living in the area that could form an army, but would only be useful if commanded by a Pole, and that they were awaiting the arrival of such a leader (Čajkovskij 1898).

In his memoirs, Michał Czajkowski provided information about another letter he allegedly received from Shamil. According to his account, in the mid-1840s, a Galician resident who served in the tsarist army at the rank of lieutenant arrived in Istanbul from the Caucasus. Having been involved in some intrigues in Volhynia, he was exiled to the Caucasus in 1836 as a private. After some time, he gained the favour of the Vorontsov couple.⁴ Because of this, he was quickly promoted to the rank of officer and was repeatedly sent to Shamil for negotiations. During one meeting, he was said to have told the imam that he was Polish, had resigned, and would like to return to his homeland. Shamil, who already treated the newcomer as a good friend, was said to have asked him if he knew Michał Czajkowski. Terlecki replied that they had never met, though he was someone known to him as an author of works popular in

4 The Vorontsovs arrived in the Caucasus in 1844, when Mikhail took office as viceroy of the Caucasus.

Poland.⁵ Shamil then gave the officer a letter addressed to Czajkowski, along with a gift – a local outfit with a sabre, pistols, cartridges, and horse harness. All this Terlecki delivered to its addressee. In his memoirs, Czajkowski wrote that the horse harness was gifted to Witold Czartoryski⁶ for the Princes Czartoryski Museum (Čajkovskij 1898).

Both of Shamil's letters to Czajkowski are interesting material for a researcher of Polish-Caucasian relations, but a problem stems from the fact that the originals have not been introduced into scholarly circulation (it is not known whether they have survived to our time at all). They are known only from Czajkowski's brief account of them, which he included in his memoirs published in Russian in 1883. This significantly limits the possibility of conducting a reliable analysis of them. It is also impossible to be absolutely certain that the imam actually sent them to Adam Czartoryski's agent and that they were not merely Czajkowski's invention, intended to raise his prestige and importance within the Hôtel Lambert.

In 1846, Kazimierz Gordon, who, on Czartoryski's instructions was travel to the Caucasus, arrived in Istanbul from Paris. Władysław Zamoyski prepared instructions for him. These stipulated that he should not enter into any contact with the Black Sea, Azov or Line Cossacks, but wage a constant fight against them. In addition, the document formulated the following tasks: 1) wherever Polish Catholics reside, attempt to form independent units out of them; 2) send priests to the Poles so that they would not forget the faith and customs of their ancestors; 3) win permission from the Circassians and Shamil to build churches, and if it turns out that several thousand believers attend them, deploy to them a bishop; 4) establish contact with Shamil, Sultan Daniyal-Bek, and the English authorities in India via Persia and Herat, or otherwise with the English envoy in Persia and the English consuls in Russia and neighbouring countries. In Czajkowski's opinion, if these instructions were realized, one could conclude that activities in the Caucasus are best carried out on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church and England, rather than to serve Turkey and the Polish cause. Nevertheless, he noted that Mehmed Ali Pasha⁷ did allocate money and resources for Kazimierz Gordon's expedition. Thanks to this aid, he went to the Ubykhs living on the eastern coast of the Black Sea.

5 Michał Czajkowski is the author of such works as: *Powieść kozacka* (1837), *Wernyhora wieszcz ukraiński: powieść historyczna z roku 1768* (1838), *Stefan Czarniecki* (1840), *Owruczanin* (1841) czy *Hetman Ukrainy* (1841).

6 Witold Czartoryski (1822–1865) was the eldest son of Adam Czartoryski.

7 Most likely the reference is to Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha, foreign minister of the Ottoman Empire at the time.

Czajkowski entrusted Gordon's mission with two letters to Shamil. One of the letters Gordon had in his keeping. In it, the agent encouraged the imam to establish contacts with Adam Czartoryski to work out a plan for joint action against Russia. He wrote:

I have only God left to thank that we found the way to reach Y.M. [Your Majesty – P.A.] and to pray that the day soon comes on which our swords may resist this unsatiated foe, who, having wrought misery and destruction in our lands, aims to bring enslavement upon the peoples of the Caucasus. (Czajkowski 1846)

For reasons of security, in the event Gordon perished or did not reach the imam, the second letter was held by another member of the expedition. In it, too, joint action against Russia was proposed. In the letter, Czajkowski stressed that the international situation was extremely favourable and the slightest misunderstanding could lead to war between the powers. He also called for the formation of a detachment composed exclusively of Poles as part of the forces of the independent highlanders, with its own national emblems (Czajkowski 1847). This letter revealed that Ludwik Zwierkowski had made contact with Shamil's naib, Suleiman-Efendi, two years earlier in Circassia.

Before leaving for the Caucasus, Kazimierz Gordon received instructions from Michał Czajkowski that stated that "a necessary condition of the mission" was to reach Shamil and come to an agreement with him. Regarding relations with Keranduk Berzeg (one of the leaders of the Ubykhs), it was specified that these were to be harnessed to achieve the goal of the mission. If the Ubykh intended to gain the kind of position in the Western Caucasus that Shamil possessed in Dagestan, then Gordon was to support and advise him, "always guiding him, however, if not to the unconditional recognition of Shamil's power, then to at least a close agreement with him and concerted action against Moscow". If, on the other hand, Keranduk avoided armed action, the Pole was to reach Shamil as soon as possible (Czajkowski 1846a). Excerpts from Gordon's reports show that they reinforced Czajkowski's belief that Gordon's presence in the Western Caucasus would "by no means advance relations with the Caucasus", while also indicating the "questionable goodwill of the Cherkess". Instead, the principal agent needed to establish contacts with Shamil and only then organize broader ventures, such as sending a larger expedition (Czajkowski 1847a).

According to Czajkowski's account, Gordon was not happy with the Circassians, as they treated all Poles who came to them as slaves. Alternatively, they sent them off to the Abazin, who lived in the Sukhum-Kale area and were subordinate to the Russians, and these in turn sold these Poles to Persia, Egypt, or

Turkey. The locals supplied Gordon with only the most elderly and disabled, i.e. those who could not bring the locals financial profit. They also permitted the construction of two backyard chapels. Gordon's mission yielded no further results, with the Pole soon ending up murdered (Čajkovskij 1898).

In Polish historiography, the popular account holds that the assassination was carried out by a tsarist agent – a Circassian or Armenian (see Drożdż 2008: 177; Zwierz 1996: 139), and this has also permeated into journalism.⁸ Such an account was already established within internal Hôtel Lambert documents. A dispatch sent from Istanbul to Paris in June 1847 stated that Gordon's assassin was an official sent by Russia to exchange prisoners of war (Czajkowski 1847b). However, Czajkowski stated in a letter sent to Władysław Sabatyn in 1873 that he was actually killed by Keranduk, with whom he was staying. The reason was supposedly the Pole's affair with his host's wife (Rolle 1908: 116). This thread was elaborated upon by Czajkowski in his memoirs. In them, he recorded that after Gordon's death, his servant Janek, who was fluent in Circassian, returned to Istanbul and recounted the whole incident. According to his story, once in the Caucasus, Gordon stayed at Keranduk Berzeg's, alongside whom he had sailed from Turkey. There, the Pole engaged in an affair with Berzeg's beloved wife, and it was for this reason that the Ubykh shot him with a pistol. Fearing his own colleagues, however, who valued Gordon and had become attached to him, he blamed a certain Armenian who was apparently sent by the Russians from Sukhum-Kale to carry out the murder. From this was born the legend that the Pole was murdered by an agent of the Tsar. Czajkowski claimed that Keranduk came to Turkey with the final wave of Circassian emigrants. Questioned by the Turks about the Gordon case, he was said to have told them, "True, I killed him, but he was my brother in arms, and she was my wife". Elsewhere in his memoirs, Czajkowski added that in addition to amorous intrigues, Gordon's murder resulted from Keranduk's fear that he would give the Ubykhs over to Shamil's rule (Czajkowski 1962: 12, 200).

In the 1840s, the Caucasian policy of the Hôtel Lambert failed to achieve any success. It is difficult to consider as such the contact made by one Circassian faction, centred around the controversial and ambiguous Seferbiy Zaneqo,⁹

8 One journalistic example of this phenomenon can be found in an article by Piotr Korczyński, in which the author claims that "Zwierkowski and Gordon became victims of the poisoned daggers of tsarist agents residing in Istanbul" (See Korczyński 2015).

9 Seferbiy Zaneqo (1789–1859) – a political activist. Initially, he was in Russian service but fled to the Ottoman Empire. He then returned to his native Circassia and became one of the most influential individuals among the local peoples. Though Zaneqo acted against the Russians, his close circle, including his own son, occasionally cooperated with them. During the Crimean War, he was awarded the title of pasha by the Sultan.

with Adam Czartoryski concerning Circassian representation before the French government. Czartoryski's hopes for the creation of a Polish legion in the Caucasus were strengthened after the outbreak of the Crimean War. However, these plans changed after the crushing of the Turkish fleet by the Russians in the naval battle at Sinope in October 1853. After this allied defeat, it was intended to form units in the western part of Anatolia, in Kars. The realization of this concept was hindered by further Turkish defeats (Widerszal 2011: 109, 123–124). Earlier, as early as June 1853, the former head of the Hôtel Lambert's Istanbul agency, Michał Czajkowski (he ceased being its head after embracing Islam and transferring to Turkish service in 1850; he nevertheless continued to cooperate with Czartoryski) submitted a memorandum to the Turkish authorities, in which he advised organizing a broad coalition against Russia. This was intended to bolster support for the conduct of military operations among the European public. To this end, the Pole suggested, among other things, that Polish and Hungarian officers be called into service, that Cossack and Tatar military organizations be formed, and that an armed operation by the Circassians be organized and coordinated (Szpotański 1911: 468–469). And here the fundamental problem became apparent. Polish emigrants residing in Western Europe were not very eager to participate in armed actions against Russia. Although after arrangements with Czajkowski the Turkish authorities did grant funding and requested that Karol Różycki, Wojciech Chrzanowski, Władysław Zamoyski, and Ludwik Bystrzonowski enter military service at the rank of general, there was little reaction from said individuals. The first two refused, while Zamoyski relinquished his appointment to Feliks Breański. Of those invited, only Bystrzonowski was open to going to the Ottoman Empire, as he had a plan for creating a Polish legion in the Caucasus (near Batumi) that would consist of 800 people – deserters from the tsarist army (though the design was never realized) (Chudzio 2011: 154–155).

Czajkowski achieved some success in forming units within the Turkish army. He became commander of the 1st Regiment of Sultan Cossacks. However, out of a total of 1600 soldiers, only 400 were Poles (Szpotański 1911: 478). They were coalesced into one *sotnia* (a company), while an additional five were formed out of Bulgarians, Roma, Jews, Romanians, and various refugees from Russia. During the Crimean War, the unit fought in the European theatre, that is the Balkans. A significant problem in the course of forming Polish units, in addition to the aforementioned lack of volunteers and insufficient funding (for example, Bucharest residents held a fundraiser to buy shoes for Czajkowski's soldiers (Karbownik 2012: 220)), became the conflict between him and Zamoyski, who wished to take command of the unit. In addition to those loyal to the Hôtel Lambert, democratic circles led by General Józef Wybicki also tried to

form their own legions in Turkey. However, these efforts lasted a few months and ended in failure. To some extent, problems with the organization of Polish units in the Turkish army should be linked to the opposition of Austria-Hungary (Morawski/Szawłowska 2006: 138). The government in Vienna feared unrest among Poles living in Galicia if these units were to appear in large numbers close to this region. Nevertheless, the primary reason for the setbacks can be perceived as misunderstandings among the Poles themselves. In letters to friends, Michał Czajkowski complained that his compatriots had not come to his aid during the Crimean War. Due to the intrigues of political opponents (he mentioned in this context mainly Zamoyski, who had been forming the 2nd Regiment of Sultan Cossacks) as well as Poles serving under his command, he was forced to resign. Czajkowski was also disappointed with recruitment to his units. In letters, he stated that his plans to fight Russia were not acknowledged by the Poles. In this context, he mentioned his intention to cross the Danube with his unit in 1863 and organize an uprising against Russia. Ultimately, however, this did not occur, as no one in Poland answered his call. Czajkowski lamented that his cause was not supported at home, and was resisted abroad among the exiles (Szpotański 1911: 473–476). Some contemporary scholars identify the reasons for his disagreements with the Polish independence camp in Czajkowski's pan-Slavism and, above all, Ukrainianophilism. Though he strived for the restoration of the Commonwealth, his ideas around a hetmanate Ukraine and Slavic federation did not fit into the mainstream worldview of the Polish émigrés (Volxonskij et al. 2007: 147–160).

Other Polish generals in the Turkish army were much less successful than Michał Czajkowski. Ludwik Bystrzonowski and Feliks Breański, who had volunteered for the Turkish army, were assigned to the Caucasus front. They took part in the defence of Kars, but both quickly came into conflict with the commanders of the Turkish forces, and above all with the British providing support to the Turks. Bystrzonowski's behaviour was particularly negatively perceived during the Battle of Kurekdere in August 1853, when under unexplained circumstances he retreated away from the front line. Because of this, he was blocked from influencing Hôtel Lambert policy, and Adam Czartoryski himself began avoiding the general. In October 1854, both Bystrzonowski and Breański left Kars and resigned, returning to Istanbul in the shadow of a scandal (Chudzio 2011: 168–170).

Given the above testimonies, Polish attempts to create national units within the Turkish army should be considered unfulfilled. By the same token, I consider Charles King's statement that "Poles were sometimes organized into special regiments and even accompanied Ottoman forces in the invasion of western Georgia during the Crimean War" to be exaggerated (King 2008: 56).

It is worth noting that there were plans to use Polish units in the Caucasus, but these were opposed by the Poles themselves. They viewed this as a threat to the national interest, while the émigré leaders sought to use them in territories closer to Polish lands, such as Moldavia, in the hopes that this would lead to a national uprising. Thus, the Turkish offensive in the Western Caucasus commenced lacking any units under Czajkowski's command (Widerszal 2011: 145–146).

The case of the formation of Polish troops in the Ottoman Empire provides interesting research material in terms of studying the issue of Polish involvement in the struggle against the Russian Empire in the 1850s. In the opinion of Andrzej Furier, the key problem, besides the issue of Western European powers' support and consent of the authorities in Istanbul, was the question of recruits. Several conscription centres were set up in Europe – including Paris, London, Strasbourg and Marseilles – but the influx of volunteers was small (Furier 2006: 196). Polish prisoners of war from the Tsarist army taken captive by the Allies during the Crimean War also did not join Polish units fighting against Russia in large numbers. In his memoirs, Czajkowski gave the example of Poles who found themselves in French prisons after the Battle of Bomarsund, which took place in September 1854. Napoleon III decided to send back to Istanbul those of them who would declare their desire to fight in Polish units against Russia. In such cases, the French promised to pay their passage and living expenses. Czajkowski reported that the money was distributed generously, but many of those who took it did not make it to Turkey, remaining instead in other countries to wait out the hard times of war. On the other hand, Poles who did want to reach their destination were stopped in France and Malta by Władysław Zamoyski's men, as he did not want fresh recruits to come under Czajkowski's command (Czajkowski 1962: 224).

Just after the end of the Crimean War, the most famous military mission that Poles would take part in was dispatched to the Caucasus. At its head stood Teofil Łapiński. It should be noted that by that time the attitude of European countries towards the Adyghe had changed, which was because they had not taken action against Russia and behaved passively during the war. Adam Czartoryski wrote about this in a letter to Zaneqo sent in February 1859, in which he explained why their governments will not assist the Circassians (Czajkowski 1859).

No Polish émigré organization participated officially in the preparations for Łapiński's expedition, as it was prepared chaotically and unprofessionally from its onset. For this reason, too, politicians and activists had no desire of getting involved in such provisional operations. Nevertheless, one can find traces of cooperation between Teofil Łapiński and representatives of the Hôtel

Lambert in Istanbul. The Pole turned out, however, to be a less-than-ideal organizer. For example, insufficient supplies of weapons were prepared, so some participants of the expedition had neither rifles nor pistols. In addition, much of the equipment was stolen in transport by Łapiński's Turkish accomplices. Cooperation from Zaneqo, with whom the Poles were supposed to undertake joint action against the tsarist army, was also lacking. It turned out that his attitude toward the Russians was ambiguous. He personally seemed to act against them, while several people in his closest circle openly cooperated with the Russians. Zaneqo's son, for example, served as their guide in punitive expeditions against the local population (Łątka 1988: 83–113), whereas his milk brother¹⁰ passed letters sent by Łapiński to the more high-profile Circassians on to the Russians (Filipson 1857).

With time, it became clear that Zaneqo did not so much want to use the Poles against the Russians as against the independent Shapsugs, with whom he was feuding (Łątka 1988: 84). It was not until 1859 that Łapiński began negotiations with Muhammad-Amin, the naib in the Western Caucasus appointed by Imam Shamil. The Pole signed an agreement with him (on behalf of Adam Czartoryski, who was most likely not informed prior) to form a Polish unit and decided to go over to his side (*Ugoda* 1859). While Muhammad-Amin had controlled a real force just a few years earlier, by 1859 he no longer possessed significant troops, due in large part to his conflict with Zaneqo. The naib eventually ceased fighting after Imam Shamil's surrender at Gunib, which occurred in August 1859, and left for Turkey. Teofil Łapiński would leave the Caucasus that same year.

Upon arrival in Istanbul, the Pole had nothing to be tasked with. One agent of the Hôtel Lambert wrote to Władysław Zamoyski that he did not know what to do with Łapiński, as he risked compromising the organization and its plans entirely, and would most willingly dispatch him to Paris. In Paris, Łapiński was not welcomed either. For a while, a place was sought for him within the Polish units forming in Italy. However, he refrained from signing up as a large role therein was played by Hungarians, and these the Pole detested. His critical attitude towards them had developed during the Spring of Nations. The author of Łapiński's biography, Jerzy Łątka, noted that he held an almost organic dislike of Hungarians and considered them all potential traitors (Łątka 1988: 123–129).

Łapiński's character and perhaps difficult financial situation caused him to pay a secret visit to the Russian embassy in Istanbul in the middle of 1860,

10 In the Caucasus, it was customary to give children to persons unrelated to their parents for upbringing. The children of such individuals relative to the child being raised were referred to as 'milk brothers' or 'milk sisters'.

where he submitted a memorandum to the Russians outlining a rapid conquest of the Caucasus. In it, he described the relations between the Ubykhs, Shapsugs, and Abazins. The Pole stated that the only way to handle the highlanders was through force. He advised that houses be set aflame during marches against the local population and that expeditions should be organized more often and with more rigour than before. Łapiński stressed that the Circassians should be persuaded by all means to move to the Ottoman Empire (one can thus consider the Pole a supporter of resettlement policy). He noted in the presented document: “We reiterate once more that we consider it possible to conquer this country, but will consider it a conquered country only when the tribe is expelled or disarmed and when Russian colonists are settled along the Black Sea coast”. At the same time, despite his offer to the Russians, Łapiński tried to raise funds to continue his expedition against the Russians in Circassia and maintained close contacts with the Circassian émigré community in Turkey. The case of this memorandum was only revealed in the early 20th century. Łątka approached it emotionally and admitted that the document was the most appalling source he had read while looking for materials for Teofil Łapiński’s biography. He noted that Łapiński’s conduct could usually be explained by financial troubles. The historian concluded that if he had wanted to make the biography more belletristic, he would have attempted to explain the move more casually: Łapiński may have hoped that the Russians would take his advice and attack the Circassians, thereby triggering an all-out war in the Caucasus. The Pole may have thought – in Łątka’s opinion – that the desperate highlanders would resist the invaders, and that the countries of Western Europe would join in the conflict and prevent the annexation of Circassia to Russia (Łątka 1988: 123–129, 216–227).

However, it seems that the above interpretation goes too far. It is worth quoting here the opinions of Teofil Łapiński held by Alexander Herzen and Mikhail Bakunin. The former wrote this about the Pole:

Łapiński was, in all senses of the word, a condottiere. He had no fixed political beliefs. He could go along with the “whites” and the “reds”, with the dirties and the cleans; belonging by birth to the Galician nobility, by upbringing – to the Austrian army, he gravitated towards Vienna. Russia, and everything Russian, he hated wildly, madly, incorrigibly. (Gercen 2018: 275)

Bakunin, initially fascinated by Łapiński, changed his mind about him and wrote that he was:

a brave man, skilful but devoid of conscience [...] a condottiere, a patriot in the sense of implacable and invincible hatred of Russians, as a professional military man, hating everyone, even his own nation. (Bakunin 1896: 118)

Perhaps Łapiński's hatred of the Russians was not as great as was widely believed. It is nonetheless difficult to explain his proposal to them. It is not out of the question that, deprived of his means of livelihood, this was the way he tried to acquire the means to support himself. Towards the end of his life, he settled in Lviv and did not maintain social relations. In one section of *Kronika in "Dziennik Polski"*¹¹ from 15 May 1886, a short notice was published:

Teofil Łapiński has passed away, legionary of 1848, Polish soldier from 1863, before that Turkish officer in the Caucasus, known for his "naval expedition" in 1863, died at the general hospital on Holy Saturday. The late Łapiński did not reside with anyone in recent times, which is why no one knew of his death and only today we found out about it, by accident at that. (*Kronika* 1886: 2)

The Hôtel Lambert agents' greater interest in the Caucasus arose when Łapiński had already been in Circassia for a year. To a large extent, this was related to the fact that in 1858 Władysław Jordan became the head of Adam Czartoryski's agency in Istanbul, assisted by his brother Zygmunt. Jordan's correspondence demonstrates that the region was a priority for the agency even when there was no longer any prospect of obtaining aid for the peoples fighting for independence there, and when all the major activists from Hôtel Lambert headquarters were basically advising to fully cease the solicitation of Western governments and Turkey for this purpose. Despite low support from headquarters, Jordan continued his efforts with the Turkish authorities to obtain funds for the establishment of a Polish legion in the Caucasus (Nowak 2014: 170–171). Ludwik Widerszal reported that in 1860 Ibragim Karabatyr (most likely referring to Karabatyr Zaneqo, son of Seferbiy) arrived in Istanbul and approached Jordan, requesting Czartoryski act on behalf of the Circassians before the British government. The Polish agent asked for plenipotence to be issued and in 1861 received such documentation, but the British responded to the proposal in the negative (Widerszal 2011: 192–194). A few months before

11 "Dziennik Polski" was published in Lviv in the years 1869–1918.

the outbreak of the January Uprising, however, Władysław Zamoyski, taking advantage of his contacts in London, helped organize the arrival of a Circassian delegation to Great Britain (Nowak 2014: 171). Already after the outbreak of fighting in the Polish lands, a meeting was held in London on Russia's policy towards Poland and the Caucasus. A report on this initiative was published in a pamphlet entitled *Poland and Circassia*. It included a speech by Władysław Zamoyski, who spoke of the Circassians as Poland's tried and tested allies and argued that an independent Caucasus was necessary for both the Poles and the British (Zamoyski 1863). Visible in these actions are thus renewed attempts to create a coalition against Russia, one that would include Poles along with the Caucasian peoples.

The Caucasus was a key region for the Hôtel Lambert agency in Istanbul during the January Uprising. It actively began soliciting funds at the time from Britain, France, and Turkey for a Caucasus expedition and assistance for the Circassians. A diversion in the Caucasus was intended to tie up Russian troops and consequently weaken the empire of the tsars. Thus, an opportunity was sought to relieve the frail insurgent forces fighting in the homeland. In the spring of 1863, Władysław Jordan presented the Polish National Government with a plan for the insurgents to capture Odesa. Since the Poles-in-exile themselves were not very eager to participate in military operations against Russia, Jordan intended to supplement the Polish forces with a contingent of two to three thousand Circassians. In 1863 Władysław Jordan, in a letter to Władysław Zamoyski, wrote enthusiastically that everything was already prepared for an uprising throughout the Caucasus and that he saw the chance of organizing a great diversion. It follows that the agent did not completely comprehend the situation in the region, where armed resistance against Russia was already petering out. He maintained a level of disconnect with reality similar to other conceptions of Hôtel Lambert representatives at the time. For example, Władysław Jordan, together with Witold Czartoryski, assumed that Austria could cede Galicia to an independent Poland and in return receive Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Danube principalities from Turkey, while Turkey could take the Caucasus under its sovereignty (Nowak 2014: 171–174).

Władysław Jordan did realize his intentions to a small extent. Because it was not possible to obtain subsidies from foreign partners, Witold Czartoryski equipped from his own funds a group of 150 people to be sent to the Caucasus. This nucleus of a Polish unit set out under the leadership of Klemens Przewłocki in the strength of a dozen officers and non-commissioned officers, mostly Poles, though there were others as well, Frenchmen for example. The remainder of the unit's manpower was planned to be filled out by refugees from the tsarist army upon arrival in Circassia. However, the plan did not yield

its intended results. As Przewłocki reported, the Circassians did not want to give over to the unit the Polish slaves in their possession, who were anyway already few in number by that time. He also stated that attempts to induce their compatriots to desert from the tsarist army fell flat (Widerszal 2011: 215). Klemens Przewłocki, having failed to form this Polish unit, returned to Istanbul in the spring of 1864. Thus, the information provided by Przewłocki differs significantly from such notions, sometimes held in Poland, that a Pole had halted the occupation of the Caucasus by the Russians for some time and organized a detachment in the strength of more than a thousand highlanders, or that Władysław Zamoyski and Witold Czartoryski organized arms supplies to Chechnya (see Kuleba 1998: 21; Zwierz 1996: 141). At that time Chechnya was already under Russian control, and even beforehand representatives of the Hôtel Lambert entertained no such plans, nor possessed any such means, with regards to the eastern part of the Caucasus.

At the beginning of 1863 the only remaining opponents of the Russians in the Caucasus were small-scale mountain communities living on the northern slopes of the Caucasus' main ridge, in the territory between the Adagum and Belaya rivers, and peoples living on the Black Sea coast, on the current Russian-Abkhazian border (such as the Ubykhs and Shapsugs). The operations of the tsarist army in this period ended with numerous successes, which led to the representatives of the free peoples to begin leaving the Caucasus in the summer of 1863. In autumn, the Abdzakh elders arrived at the camp of Nikolai Yevdokimov, head of the Kuban district. An agreement was made between them that by 1 February 1864, they would either accept Russian serfdom and begin resettling to their assigned places or depart for the Ottoman Empire. On 21 May 1864, four Russian units arriving from different parts of Circassia met at Qbaada aul¹² and a solemn prayer was held to mark the completion of the conquest of the Caucasus. This day is considered the end of the Caucasian War. After this event, the Polish émigré community's plans for the region became even more unrealistic and could hardly serve as a pretext for obtaining further funds.

This does not mean, however, that the Poles abandoned such intentions. Józef Adam Grekowicz, for example, had his own plans for the Caucasus. During the January Uprising, he was appointed by the National Government as colonel and commander of a military unit that set out from Kraków to wage guerilla war in the partitioned territories belonging to Russia (Grodziska 2016: 195). After combat had ended, the military man went into exile and lived, among

12 Qbaada was located on the site of today's town of Krasnaya Polyana, east of Sochi.

other places, in France and Turkey. In 1877, Grekowicz appeared in Istanbul on behalf of the conspiratorial organization *Koło Lwowskie* (Lviv Circle). He had a project involving the instigation of a highlander uprising in the Caucasus, which would be coordinated with operations taken by the revolutionary Russian movement *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom) (Reychman 1959/1960: 573). The whole endeavour would be supported by a special Polish corps, which would carry out diversionary activities throughout the Turkish-Russian war fought between 1877–1878, with the intent of stoking the uprising's spread (Reychman 1939: 271). This was planned to encompass the whole of Russia and cause it to split into independent states, Poland included.

Grekowicz presupposed that the uprising in the Caucasus must be strong enough that the Russian army, operating in Asia Minor, would have to retreat to hold its lines of communication and act against the insurrectionists. In his view, the tsar could not count on the absolute loyalty of his forces residing in the region, as they consisted, to his mind, largely of “unsure” Circassians, Tatars, Poles, and a Russian “suspicious element”. The Turks should pursue the retreating tsarist army, which would begin to “melt away” and be forced to gather its forces in a concentration, which in turn would prevent it from containing the uprising. The uprisings rapid collapse, in the Pole's opinion, would otherwise occur if the Turks were to give up on such an offensive. The primary operational Turkish bases, he argued, should become Batumi, Poti, and Sukhumi.

Grekowicz foresaw a momentous role for the Poles within his conception. Thus the Turks, for diversionary purposes, were to send a well-equipped Polish corps to the Caucasus, commanded by an officer well-known among Polish soldiers fighting in the ranks of the tsarist army. As per Grekowicz, in such a case Poles serving in the Russian army would begin to transfer en masse to the Polish corps and, consequently, having faced several defeats, the enemy forces would find themselves in disarray. On a par with the Polish corps, the Turks were to also send a Tatar unit, to which Tatars would defect in turn. At the same time, the revolutionary organization of *Zemlya i volya* was supposed to provoke mass desertions of Russians from the tsarist army. The two national corps, actively supported by the Circassians, would occupy Astrakhan and then spark a Tatar uprising on the Volga. Grekowicz considered this city crucial, as the main supply route for the tsarist army in the Caucasus led through it. Its capture would force the Russians to withdraw their forces from the Danube and move them deeper into their own territory. A further advance by the Turkish army, the Pole assumed, would threaten the existence of the Russian state. The Turks were to issue a manifesto stating they were entering foreign land to aid oppressed peoples, who were to gain independence. Russian revolutionaries would take advantage of the situation and launch an uprising in the eastern part of Russia. If it spread to the central part of the country, Grekowicz

assumed, Polish troops could land on the northern shores of the Black Sea, which would become possible with the Turkish fleet's domination, and a new operation could be launched (Grekowicz 1932: 453–456). The road to an independent Poland would lay open.

Polish plans concerning the Caucasus in the 19th century were drawn up primarily by people affiliated with the Hôtel Lambert. They established contacts with the Circassians living along the eastern coast of the Black Sea, which was motivated logistically by the proximity of the Ottoman Empire. A major problem in implementing the plans was that the Circassians fighting the Russians had not organized a central authority. This had occurred only in the eastern part of the Caucasus – Chechnya and Dagestan, which significantly increased the efficiency of operations. The lack of a supreme command among the Circassians and the consequence of such a state of affairs was pointed out by Czajkowski in his reports:

As for the Cherkess, I have long held the conviction that they were worth little and that they could not be counted on. That they were more like a collection of bold thugs, efficient thieves without any morals, who sold their children, their wives, their mothers, and themselves, rather than a martial and political nationality that could inspire confidence. (Czajkowski 1962: 198)

Moreover, according to Czajkowski, the Circassians did not want to change their situation at all and were content to have the Russians nearby. He supported this claim with the words of a representative of Seferbiy Zaneqo, who told him that the Circassians prefer the neighbourhood of the Russians to that of the Turks, as the former can be looted, while the latter possessed nothing and would themselves loot the Circassians, just as they loot their own subjects. In his memoirs, Czajkowski stated that not only he was disaffected with the Circassians, but some of the more influential Turks were also. In this context, he mentioned, for example, Foreign Minister Reshid Pasha and naval commander Riza Pasha. In his view, only Mehmed Ali Pasha, the sultan's brother-in-law, cared for the Circassians but pointed out that he did so out of whimsy rather than conviction. It seems Imam Shamil also had an opinion of the Circassians analogous to the Pole's. A paragraph from his letter to Czajkowski, which the latter quoted in his memoirs, can be cited as evidence. The leader of the independent peoples of the eastern Caucasus was to write: "If you can by means of your influence with the Caliph and by the presence of your Poles transform the Cherkess from slave merchants, from robbers and thieves to warriors of the holy faith and fatherland, I am ready to accept any intrigue you may call me to" (Czajkowski 1962: 200–201, 209).

Michał Czajkowski had on the other hand a very positive opinion of Shamil and the peoples living in Dagestan and Chechnya. In his view, it was the imam who sought to build his own independent state, while the Circassians wanted to engage in slave trading and plunder. Although Czajkowski was sympathetic to the peoples of the eastern part of the Caucasus, being well-versed in the realities of the region he realized that given their considerable remoteness and the general situation related to Russia's military operations, establishing cooperation with them would be considerably difficult, if not impossible. According to the Pole, the most promising cooperation would be with the Black Sea and Azov Cossacks (Czajkowski 1962: 199, 201). However, his superiors at Hôtel Lambert headquarters did not allow him to take this up, which had ideological reasoning behind it. In Władysław Zamoyski's view, contacts with the Cossacks were unacceptable, since they were enemies of Catholicism and Poland for religious and historical reasons. The politician believed that even if they stepped forward militarily to defend Poland, it could only doom her, as the Cossacks would not accept the Catholic faith, and would in turn seek to turn the Poles into followers of Orthodoxy and separate them from Western civilization (Čajkovskij 1898).

In his report on Ludwik Zwierkowski's expedition to the Caucasus, Michał Czajkowski included the opinion that he saw neither now nor in the future any benefit to the Polish cause in contacts with the Circassians or even with Shamil. According to the Pole, these could not benefit Turkey either, given that the Circassians did not want to recognize the authority of the Turks, to whom they preferred the proximity of the Russians. With the former, they wanted to maintain only religious contacts, as well as commercial ones – to sell slaves to Turkey and acquire there all necessary goods, including weapons and ammunition. In wishing so, the Circassians also refused to enter into an alliance with Shamil or cooperate with him. Czajkowski's most important remark, in the context of Czarotoryski's plans, was the observation that the Circassians, like the Chechens (who he stressed were much more devoted to their homeland), were ready to organize looting expeditions against neighbouring Russian settlements but could never be persuaded to go on an expedition deep into Russia. The leaders of the Hôtel Lambert, however, viewed relations with the Caucasus differently and believed that they had positive overtones for reasons of propaganda (Čajkovskij 1898).

In his memoirs, Michał Czajkowski confirmed that during the period when he was Adam Czarotorysk's agent in Istanbul, three Polish representatives – Ludwik Zwierkowski, Kazimierz Gordon and one Mikorski from Poznań – were sent to the Caucasus, although the latter failed to reach his destination and returned to Istanbul. Czajkowski underlined that he never wanted to

organize similar expeditions and dissuaded Grand Vizier Mehmed Ali Pasha from doing so. In his opinion, such activities were doomed to failure in advance and led to nothing but suspicion, accusations, and ridicule. On the other hand, when Władysław Jordan became Adam Czartoryski's political agent, two expeditions were organized to the Caucasus – those of Teofil Łapiński and Klemens Przewłocki. In Czajkowski's opinion, the former demonstrated only the ineptitude and impunity of the Poles, as well as a lack of any preconception for cooperation with the Circassians. The latter, in turn, accelerated the Circassians' exodus from their homeland. In his view, both consumed huge sums of money and came up empty-handed (Czajkowski 1962: 200).

Adam Czartoryski's faction spent several years trying to demonstrate to Western European society that its activities influenced (or could influence, given adequate funding) the struggle of the highlanders, which weakened Russia. Their focus came down to mainly winning the hearts of anti-Russian circles in Great Britain that sympathized with the Circassians. Michał Czajkowski argued that: "From the earliest times the Cherkess were England's warhorse, upon which, if the English weren't warring, they invaded the Russians, and in this they wanted to imitate the French, who had their Poles. England always wanted to match France in similar things" (Czajkowski 1962: 198). Ludwik Widerszal, rightly it seems, noted that the nature of that era, which can be linked to the "spirit" of Romanticism, turned out to be significant for the curiosity of European societies regarding the Circassians. Because the Caucasus was very poorly known to Europeans, on occasion fantastical rumours did circulate on its topic, arousing sympathy for its inhabitants, who remained shrouded in an aura of mystery (Widerszal 2011: 224–225).

It was advantageous for the Poles to spread the belief that Russia's actions in the Caucasus posed a threat to British interests, to the effect that it would become a trigger for conflict on a larger, European scale. This could have led, after all, to the emergence of an independent Poland.

Financial matters were not insignificant. After all, it was the anti-Russian liberal British aristocrats who generously sponsored the activities of the Hôtel Lambert. This is evident in Czajkowski's reports from when he served under Czartoryski. For example, in 1846, in one of his dispatches, he wrote that Kazimierz Gordon's expedition to the Caucasus should provide a good motive for requesting new funds from the English (*Wyciąg z depeszy* 1846). Czajkowski also raised this topic in his memoirs. He wrote there that when he presented the leaders of the Hôtel Lambert with arguments underlining the futility of contacts with the Caucasian peoples in the context of the Polish cause, he received a reply from Władysław Zamoyski who stated they should be constantly supported and further encouraged to raid Russian possessions. In the

words of the politician, quoted by Michał Czajkowski, therein lay the only means to “draw” money from the English and Turks to increase the “perpetual fund”. The larger this fund turned out to be, the more favourably it would impact the strength of Czartoryski’s authority and importance, and the more his influence on Polish affairs would grow regardless of all the intrigues of his opponents (Čajkovskij 1898).

Thus, Adam Czartoryski was anxious to convince the British public of the great potential influence his faction maintained in the Caucasus and hence its great importance for policy of the government in London. This caused an overvaluation of the Hôtel Lambert’s capabilities to influence the situation in the region. This method of political calculation can be seen, for example, in Adam Czartoryski’s letter to Ludwik Bystrzonowski from September of 1836. In it the prince wrote:

You need not have explained the importance of the matters being con-
nived in the East. On this topic remember only that the initiative cannot
hinge on us. It is only necessary that we show just how much strength
they will find in us once the task begins, that today they will find in us
self-sacrifice, perseverance, patience, and thousands of Poles under arms
in the Caucasus. (Czartoryski 1836)

The Hôtel Lambert activists exaggerated above all the importance of Polish deserters from the Russian army. The conviction of their large numbers made it possible to submit plans involving the creation of Polish units, which were intended to constitute a serious military force in the region. This, in turn, provided a good pretext for seeking funds.

Reports exaggerating the success of the independent highlanders in their fight against the Russians also occurred, which may have further contributed to the unrealistic planning. Michał Czajkowski was also guilty of this, though from among Adam Czartoryski’s agents he was normally best-versed in Caucasian affairs. Thus, in 1844, he informed his superiors that Shamil had occupied Derbent and that the entirety of Dagestan had been engulfed by an uprising against Russia (Document 1844). Meanwhile, in the 1840s, the imam admittedly did win several significant victories over Russian troops, but never succeeded in capturing any city, nor were there any mass uprisings of which it could be said that “all of Dagestan” had been engulfed in a liberation struggle.

It is appropriate to mention another interesting phenomenon on the margin of considerations surrounding Polish émigré circles’ plans relating to the Caucasus, foremost those of the Hôtel Lambert led by Czartoryski. It has become popular today to perceive Adam Czartoryski as a politician who

possessed a vision of Polish Caucasus policy and who supported the local peoples fighting against Russia. This topic has been addressed both in numerous scientific and journalistic works. However, in presenting the issue of the politician's attitude towards the Caucasus, authors practically omit the earlier period when he headed the Russian Foreign Ministry. This lasted only two years, from 1804 to 1806, but was marked by Russia's intensive annexation of the Caucasus: in 1804, for example, this concerned Imereti and Guria; that same year war also broke out with Persia and Russia annexed the Ganja Khanate; in 1805: the Shuragel Sultanate, Karabakh, Shirvan, and Shaki khanates; and in 1806: the Derbent and Baku khanates. One of the few historians that have mentioned this at all was Andrzej Nowak. The scholar, citing a correspondence between Adam Czartoryski and Prince Pavel Tsitsianov,¹³ who commanded the Russian troops conquering Transcaucasia, concluded that the minister had been very diligent in overseeing its annexation to Russia (Nowak 2008: 108). Despite the rather rich source material on Prince Czartoryski's involvement in the annexation of the Caucasus to Russia, this topic has not been even vaguely studied by Polish historians.

13 Pavel Tsitsianov (1754–1806) – Russian general of Georgian descent. In 1802, he became the governor of Astrakhan and commander-in-chief of Russian troops in Georgia.

The Image of the Caucasus in Works from the Period of the Polish People's Republic

After 1945, the ethnopolitical myth became the subject of considerable modification by those in power in Poland. The new authorities required a new perception of history, one that could be used in the political reality of the time related to the formation of the Eastern Bloc. As for the image of the “historical enemy”, efforts were made to shape it primarily around Germany. However, the image of Russia was so strongly linked to this conceptualization that it was impossible to dislodge it. With help came the new ideology. Naturally, of course, all nations in the common socialist family were fraternal, while conflicts were only provoked by reactionary elements. Thus, the emphasis within the image of the “historical enemy” was shifted from the country – Russia – to the system – tsardom. This procedure meant that the 19th-century image of Polish-Caucasian cooperation corresponded to the new approach to history as regards its worldview, albeit with minor differences. Thus, this specific perception of the Caucasus, which was largely linked to the political ambitions of the Polish independence émigrés, was solidified within the Polish People's Republic. However, no longer emphasized was the struggle against a partitioning Russia, but rather against tsardom, seemingly opposed by various national liberation movements, including the Polish and Caucasian. This was, of course, a result of the official ideology adopted by the power centre, to which slogans emphasizing the “struggle for freedom” of the oppressed popular masses corresponded. This phenomenon is well illustrated by the response of the editorial board of *Przekrój* (Cross-section), one of the most culturally generative magazines in the Polish People's Republic, given in 1965 to a letter of a reader interested in the activities of Imam Shamil. In it was stated that the imam's person was the subject of much controversial deliberation among historians – some saw in him a leader of a reactionary movement, while others identified his positive national liberation values. The editors stressed that the latter judgement had become widely accepted (*Odpowiedzi* 1965: 15).

The perception in Poland of the movement headed by Imam Shamil was directly related to its reception in the Soviet Union. What the actual position of the Soviet authorities was is well illustrated by the case of the publication of a book by Russian historian and Caucasian scholar Nikolai I. Pokrovsky titled

Kavkazskie vojny i imamt Šamilya (The Caucasian Wars and Shamil's Imamate). It was published only in 2000, although it was written as early as the 1930s. The author's son, Nikolai N. Pokrovsky wrote in the introduction to the modern edition that his father's work was supposed to have appeared before World War II in the Sotsekgiz publishing house. However, in 1937 its editors demanded that the author more clearly emphasize the fact that the movement of the peoples of the north-eastern Caucasus in the 19th century was of a national liberation nature and directed against the colonial policy of tsarism (Pokrovskij N.N. 2000: 4). Due to Nikolai I. Pokrovsky's low commitment to making corrections per political specifications, his monograph was not published at the time.

Sotsekgiz's position stemmed from the fact that in the Soviet Union, up to the 1940s, Shamil's activities were presented as a struggle for social liberation against tsardom and Shamil's local property-owning classes. Subsequently, however, it came to be seen as a reactionary nationalist-religious movement standing in the way of the civilisational progress being carried out by Russia. In this period, too, the narrative was enriched by an emphasis on the clandestine nature of the murids. This is well illustrated in the work *Šamil' – stavlennik sultanskoj Turcii i anglijskix kolonizatorov* (Shamil – protégé of sultanic Turkey and the English colonisers) published under the editorship of Shalva Tsagareishvili in Tbilisi in 1953. Such perceptions of Shamil fell out of use in the second half of the 1950s, which should be linked to the changes in the USSR occurring after Stalin's death (Ciesielski 2003: 8–9). Later, the possibilities around describing the struggle of the Caucasian peoples against Russia were significantly liberalized, though its predominant portrayal as a national liberation struggle against a reactionary regime persisted.

Also in Poland, when the first individuals interested in Caucasian studies began appearing after World War II, Shamil was portrayed in a positive light and his movement was spoken of as a struggle of the “oppressed national masses” against tsarism, just as in the Soviet Union. For this reason, it is difficult to find a text from this period in which the author evaluated the imam's activities negatively. Only instances of placing unfavourable allusions to the religious nature of his movement appeared. One such example is the work *Kaukaz* (The Caucasus) by Grażyna and Andrzej Miłosz. Although Shamil is portrayed therein mainly as an outstanding strategist and social reformer (above all as one who knocked down class divisions) – the abolition of the beks' privileges being underlined – congruently negative statements concerning religious aspects appear, like that he attracted believers “obsessed with fanaticism” (Miłoszowie 1979: 55).

Throughout Poland's communist period one really does not encounter publications that fail to conform to the official interpretation of the history of the highlanders' struggle against the Russians and the Poles' participation in this development. The slogan "For our freedom and yours" was quite popular at the time. It was by this slogan that journalist Stanisław Pagaczewski described Polish deserters from the Russian army who went over to the side of the highlanders (Pagaczewski 1963: 115). Polish scholars did the same. This is well illustrated by the journalistic article *Udział Polaków w walce o wolność ludów Kaukazu* (Participation of Poles in the Struggle for Freedom of the Peoples of the Caucasus), which appeared in 1957 in a series titled *Polacy na barykadach wolności* (Poles on the Barricades of Freedom) in the magazine *Wojsko Ludowe* (People's Army). The article's author, Piotr Łossowski, one of the best-known historians of the second half of the 20th century, argued that Poles fought following the ideals of the slogan "For our freedom and yours" and that:

There existed no place in Europe or the world where the cause of freedom was defended, where the power of tyrants was challenged, that the Poles had not reached. They were also to be found in the remote and inaccessible mountains of the Caucasus, whose inhabitants heroically resisted the violence of the Tsardom over several decades. (Łossowski 1957: 44)

In another passage, however, he noted that "the tsarist armies conducted their activities in the Caucasus with unheard-of cruelty". The author clearly avoided the term "Russia" and rather than emphasize that the highlanders had fought against Russia as a state, emphasized the struggle against the system – tsardom. Further in the article Łossowski wrote: "Forcibly conscripted into the tsarist army, the Poles were used against their will and convictions to fight against the Caucasian highlanders. Under these conditions, their desire was to desert from the hated ranks". He also stressed that "the role played by Polish deserters and prisoners of war among the Caucasian highlanders has not been sufficiently studied to date. In any case, even in Shamil's immediate circle, there were quite a few of them". Elsewhere, he added that "the Caucasian highlanders became natural allies of the Poles, united by their struggle for freedom against a common enemy" (Łossowski 1957: 46). Thus, the tone of the article is very similar to that of one Romantic poem by Konstanty Gaszyński. In both texts, Poles were depicted as humiliated victims of the system. Also in both texts appeared the motif of "dreams of desertion", which were to be realized by an "escape from disgrace" and culminate in a kind of catharsis – through the switching of sides to the independent highlanders.

Piotr Łossowski partially based his arguments on the Polish émigré press of the 19th century, noting that:

For example, *Demokrata Polski* (The Polish Democrat) in 1846 wrote: "Shamil, as always, had a retinue of Polish uhlans with him", while *Dziennik Narodowy* (National Daily) of that year reported: "Shamil always rode on horseback at the head of a select guard, composed in large part of Polish uhlans and Cossack cavalry". (Łossowski 1957: 47)

Thus, what occurred was the reinforcement of a messaging not grounded in news from the Caucasus, but rather crafted in the 19th century for ideological reasons.

The changes that have taken place in Polish historical policy are well illustrated by its attitude towards Karl Marx. In his article, Łossowski referenced details about the philosopher's interest in Polish activities in the Caucasus, which was thereby supposed to "ennoble" them in the eyes of readers. Today, however, state institutions are reluctant to go to such lengths, considering Marx to be an extremely negative figure. This involves attempts to discredit Marx's legacy and "saddle" him with blame for the rise of Soviet communism. In light of this, for Poles, especially those with right-wing views, he has become a symbol of a murderous system. This is well illustrated by publications of the Institute of National Remembrance, which is one of the main tools of the Polish authorities for shaping historical policy. One example is an article in which two Institute employees stated that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were the first philosophers in history to allow and justify genocide as a means to an end (Mandela, Kowal 2017: 2–3). Jan Sowa noted that Polish scholars also exorcise Marx. As an example, he cited one of them, in whose opinion the presence of Marxism in anti-colonial discourse is mainly due to the political machinations of the USSR (Sowa 2011: 444–448).

The fact that Marx was one of the greatest supporters of Polish independence among 19th-century European intellectuals has gone by the wayside. During Poland's communist period, however, there were as of yet no negative perceptions of the philosopher, and even, on the contrary, his commitment to the cause of liberation of the peoples fighting against Russia (or, according to the terminology of the time, the tsarist system) was emphasized. Piotr Łossowski noted that Marx took a keen interest in the liberation struggle of the Caucasian highlanders, which he considered just, and condemned European governments for indifferently watching their annihilation. He was also a close follower of the battles in the Caucasus and noted Shamil's successes with joy.

In the article, Łossowski cited one of the philosopher's notes, in which he wrote about the "magnificent" victories of Shamil's forces over Russian troops. Another material presented by Łossowski was an excerpt from the Manifesto edited by Marx for the International Working Men's Association (the First International), in which the following passage can be found:

The shameless approval, mock sympathy, or idiotic indifference with which the upper classes of Europe have witnessed the mountain fortress of the Caucasus falling a prey to, and heroic Poland being assassinated by, Russia: the immense and unresisted encroachments of that barbarous power, whose head is in St. Petersburg, and whose hands are in every cabinet of Europe. (Marx 1864)

In Łossowski's view, Marx placed the Polish uprisings and the liberation struggle of the peoples of the Caucasus on an equal level as examples of sacrificial and heroic struggle for freedom. The historian also cited information that Karl Marx held Teofil Łapiński in very high esteem. The two met in London in 1863, when the Pole was preparing a naval expedition to Lithuania to deliver armed aid to the January insurrectionists. In a letter to Engels, Marx wrote: "The most interesting acquaintanceship I have struck up here is that of Colonel Lapinski. He is, without doubt, the cleverest Pole – besides being an homme d'action – I have ever met" (Marx 1863). On the other hand, Marx devoted two articles to the case of Łapiński's unmasking of the espionage activities of Colonel Janos Bangya,¹ which he published in the *New York Daily Tribune* on 16 June and 23 September 1858, defending the Pole's position.

A characteristic feature of the Polish narrative on the Caucasus during Poland's communist period was that authors tended to show both the pluses and minuses, in their view, of the Russian conquest of the region (sometimes even only the minuses) in the tsarist period, but were then exclusively one-sided in their portrayal of the establishment of Soviet power there. This is well illustrated in a book by historians Wojciech Hensel and Ilia Tabagua, *Gruzja wczoraj i dziś* (Georgia Yesterday and Today), published in 1976. Presenting Russian actions in Georgia in the 18th century, the authors cited the example of tsarist general Gottlob Heinrich Curt von Tottleben, who commanded a detachment sent to the country in 1769. Officially, he was supposed to lead joint operations against the Ottoman Empire, with which Russia had been at war

¹ János Bangya, who travelled with Teofil Łapiński to the Caucasus, turned out to be a Russian spy.

since 1768, in conjunction with King Erekle II of Kartli and Kakheti. However, the general ended up conspiring with the king's opponents. When hostilities against the Turks in the Akhaltsikhe region were under way in April 1770, von Tottleben abandoned Erekle and returned with his army to Kartli. There he again intrigued against the king, who meanwhile won the Battle of Aspindza on 20 April 1770 and inflicted huge losses on the Turks. In another passage, the authors claimed that when in 1793 Erekle II learned that the Persian Shah was preparing for war against Georgia, he asked Russia for aid. The latter, in turn, based on signed treaties, was indeed obliged to provide it but refused to do so, and the king ended up not receiving any support. In their ultimate conclusions, the historians presented both positive and negative consequences of Russia's occupation of Georgia in the 19th century. On the one hand, they acknowledged that Russian rule brought Georgia the possibility of national survival, after having been severely weakened by the plundering policies of the Turkmen and Persians and invasions of Muslim Dagestani peoples, while the peace that prevailed under Russian rule promoted economic development. On the other hand, however, they noted that a tragic paradox in Georgian history was that it was the Tsardom, for whose aid the rulers of Georgia had hoped so much, counting on religious unity and cultural proximity, that dealt the fatal blow to Georgian statehood (Hensel 1979: 158, 162–165).

Dual assessments of Russia's annexation of the Caucasus also appeared in other publications from Poland's communist period. The Miłoszes pointed out that after the end of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) Adjara, the Muslim part of Western Georgia, was liberated from the Turkish "yoke", while also adding that Russia pursued colonial oppression and Russification policies. The Miłoszes also referred to muhajirism:

The tsarist authorities, after establishing control over the situation in the Caucasus, proceeded to systematically colonize the Circassian lands. Thousands of highlanders were displaced and forced to emigrate to Turkey. Refugees stripped of all their belongings and crowded under the sleepers of ships were decimated by epidemics en route. (Miłoszowie 1979: 57, 75)

In turn, one of the most famous Polish writers and publicists of the second half of the 20th century, Józef Hen, wrote in one of his works about the difficulties of historical memory in the Caucasus: "the names of people who are made out as heroes of one nation are a slap in the face of another. One cannot glorify the victories of Russian arms over Shamil [...] without bypassing the truth" (Hen 1957: 162).

Stanisław Pagaczewski also spoke out negatively about the actions of tsarist Russia, believing she treated the region like a colony. Moreover, he mentioned the uprisings in Abkhazia against tsarist policies, the exploitation of Abkhazian peasants by tsarist officials, as well as the fact that after the Abkhazians emigrated to Turkey, the land ended up in the hands of tsarist landowners and monasteries. Monks were also negatively portrayed in Pagaczewski's book – as one of the main elements perpetuating tsarist (the author, writing about the negative consequences of Russia's occupation of the Caucasus, did not name the state, but the political system – tsardom) rule in the western part of the Caucasus. In his view, the clergy, supported by subsidies from the central government, educated Abkhazian youth in the spirit of loyalty and obedience to the tsar and Orthodox Church. In doing so, they preached sermons steeped in servilism, acted under the tsar's *raison d'état* at every turn, and stood as one of the pillars of the tsar's colonization policy. The issue of the Russian conquest of the Caucasus was summed up by Pagaczewski with the statement: "the tsar's feet tread upon stones often stained with the blood of Abkhazians and Georgians, who fought for their freedom against Arabs, Persians, Mongols, Turks ..." (Pagaczewski 1963: 163, 174–176).

Occasionally some authors during Poland's communist period manipulated source texts to create a picture of the 19th-century Caucasus as a place of cooperation between Polish and Russian revolutionaries. Such an approach is evident, for example, in the book by historians Wojciech Hensel and Ilia Tabagua. They proceeded from the premise that the joint struggle against tsardom brought progressive Poles, Georgians, and Russians together (Hensel, Tabagua 1976: 230). To support themselves through evidence, they referred to Mateusz Gralewski, who, to their mind, was friends with Russian exiles, most notably Vasyl Golovinsky, who belonged to a literary group of young intellectuals called the Petrashevsky Circle. Jan Reychman argued similarly, writing: "At the foot of the magnificent peaks of the Caucasus, in shared misery threads of cordial friendship and cooperation were established between Polish and Russian deportees. One and the other saw tsardom as a common enemy and oppressor". Just a few lines later, the author added that Gralewski devoted heartfelt words in his memoirs to Golovinsky, a friend of the Poles and Russian exile to the Caucasus (Reychman 1954: 41–42).

However, from the content of Gralewski's memoirs, it does not appear that he had close relations with Russian revolutionaries. He did mention Golovinsky but portrayed the Russian as a traitor. Gralewski wrote that when Golovinsky ended up in the Caucasus, the Poles welcomed him like a brother. After some time, however, Golovinsky befriended tsarist commanders. The Poles

were particularly concerned about his ties with Colonel Prince Vasilchikov and General Zakhar Maniukin, who were their superiors in the Shirvan regiment (it was in this regiment that Gralewski served). Gralewski reported that Golovinsky passed information entrusted to him in secret by the Poles to the officers, as a result of which they were subsequently subjected to harassment. The memoirs also include a conversation between the Poles and Golovinsky on Russian politics. The Russian stated: "We are acting patriotically by resisting the West, which wants to support the Christian-prosecuting Turks". To the objection that the tsar is not in fact concerned about protecting Christians, but about taking land, he replied: "I am surprised that you do not understand that not only the tsar, but all of Russia has an interest in the eastern question; that our civilisational mission pushes us in these directions, and every Russian, along with the tsar, is interested in it". Golovinsky emphasized:

As for Poland, I will repeat to you what I have said, that if she were to renounce her separateness, if she were to agree to federate with us, all of Russia would support her. There will even come the moment when Russia is free, when she gets rid of the tsar, she will give you freedom from herself, but as a federated part. Though then Lithuania and Ruthenia, as provinces that have long been Russian, must belong to the Russian whole.

To accusations levelled by the Poles that, although he had been sentenced to death by the tsar, he remained his supporter, Golovinsky replied:

I am not and was not a supporter of tsarism, but I am, was, and will be a supporter of Tsar Nicholas. For is Nicholas not striving to abolish the supremacy of the nobility, is he not thinking of liberating the peasants? Certainly, he is the first democrat in Russia, and if I were allowed to stand before him during interrogation, and if I were to speak my thoughts to him, with him thus feeling the pulse of my blood, he would certainly press me to his chest as a father presses his son.

The Poles summed up the musings of this Russian, considered by them to be a representative of the liberals, with the words: "We are ashamed of you progressives. You have deceived, you have misled the world with your cause. You have clothed yourselves in sheepskin. Enough ..." (Gralewski 2015: 565–566).

These are the only passages relating to Golovinsky in Gralewski's memoirs, and it is difficult to substantiate the idea that the two shared a collegial relationship on their basis.

Overinterpretations of Gralewski's work aimed at portraying the Caucasus as a place of rapprochement between Polish and Russian revolutionaries acting against the tsar are also evident in the work of Grażyna and Andrzej Miłosz. The authors wrote:

Polish and Russian exiles saw tsardom as a common enemy, so bonds of cordial friendship soon grew between them. One of the Russians – Korovayev, was sentenced to deportation to “warm Siberia” for attempting to free Szymon Konarski in Vilnius,² not only won the sympathy of many Poles but even superbly mastered the Polish language. Mateusz Gralewski, exiled in 1844 and author of the important book *Kaukaz. Wspomnienia z dwunastoletniej niewoli*, devoted many pages to Poles in the Caucasus and their relations with Russian exiles. (Miłoszowie 1979: 72)

In reality, Gralewski wrote this about Korovayev:

There remained one Nikolai Korovayev, who was demoted and sentenced to Siberia for his intention to release Konarski from prison. He distinguished himself by his goodwill towards Poles and mingled almost exclusively in their circles. He learned Polish well, read and transcribed our forbidden works, distributed them to Poles to read and was always liked by them. It thus remained necessary to communicate with Korovayev to maintain at least one Russian soul in our venture. Careful probing of him convinced us, unfortunately, that Korovayev, too, was of one mind with the Russians, with Golovinsky and with the tsar, as to policy in Asia and Turkey. However, we were surprised to find that his opinion on Poland was the same as Golovinsky's as if he had taken it straight from Golovinsky's mouth. So what ought we have thought about his springing of Konarski? It was one great mystery to us. We asked him one time to tell us the story of this affair.

It turned out that Korovayev became involved in the freeing of the Polish independence activist out of his love for the wife of one of the other inmates. As proof of his affection, the woman demanded the springing of her husband, and, to give the matter a political cover, Korovayev was to additionally free Konarski from the prison. Moreover, Korovayev did not appreciate Prince

² Szymon Konarski (1808–1839) was an independence activist and participant in the November Uprising. He was sentenced to execution, and his punishment was carried out on February 27, 1839. His grave was trampled with horses so that it would never be found.

Trubetskoy's actions towards the Poles. He declared: "In loving Russia, I wanted the rage of one prince not to weaken the ties that nonetheless bound Poland and Russia together". Gralewski concluded this part of his memoirs with the words:

After such a clear statement from Korovayev, we lost in him our last Russian friend. We had been abandoned. We were left with the conviction that our most friendly relations with the most liberal Russians fracture when it comes down to our independence. Whoever claimed that he knew Russians sympathetic to the Polish cause was certainly mistaken. He did not understand these liberals, who with their superficial cooperation on occasion delude us, exploit and muddy our cause. The direction of their activities, seemingly at odds with tsardom's, is identical to it in the desire to rule, albeit in a different form, over Poland, over Slavdom, over Asia and the entire world. The tsarist government, which is capable of reconciling itself in times of need with all governments and peoples, progressive or reactionary, mercantile or philosophical, exploits these liberals most openly, most skilfully and most dangerously for humanity.

There is no passage in Gralewski's memoirs in which any cooperation between exiled Poles and Russians did not end fairly quickly. In the Polish exile's book, the Russians exiled for their revolutionary or liberal views basically hold views similar to the tsar's. The best summary of Gralewski's thoughts on cooperation with "progressive" Russians is a quote from his memoirs: "Any individual familiar with the situation in the Caucasus cried out: 'God save the people from the Russians, and especially from their liberals!! ...'" (Gralewski 2015: 567–568).

During Poland's communist period, the establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus was presented quite differently from the conquest of the Caucasus by tsarist Russia. Here no more room remained for presenting positive as well as negative aspects. Authors focused exclusively on the former. Stanisław Pagaczewski, who identified the harmful effects of tsarist activities, wrote about the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus in positive context only and attributed the blame for the fighting breaking out to their opponents. When it came to Georgia, for example, in the author's opinion everything started with the local Mensheviks carrying out bloody repressions against Bolsheviks. Thus the peace treaty between Georgia and Russia signed in May 1920 was broken, in his opinion, by the Georgian Mensheviks, who were said to have carried out a pogrom against Abkhazia's Bolshevik organization. It was this event that had forced the workers of Georgia and Abkhazia, aided by the Red Army, into an armed struggle that ultimately ended in victory in 1921 (Pagaczewski 1963: 164).

In *Gruzja wczoraj i dziś* we also find a tendentially put, positive aspect of the establishment of Soviet power. In the authors' opinion, the rejection by the Georgian authorities of the proposal put forward by the Bolsheviks to conclude an alliance against Anton Denikin was evidence of their anti-Soviet policy. According to the two historians, this was why the Caucasian National Committee of the Russian Communist Party sent a letter to the party and military centres of Soviet power asking to provide armed assistance to the peoples of Transcaucasia in their struggle against bourgeois rule. The said work also negatively portrayed the brief period of the Transcaucasian states' independence between 1918–1920/21. As per the authors, territorial and national disputes quickly heated up at this time, ending unity and bringing “regrettable” mutual persecution. Wojciech Hensel and Ilia Tabagua believed that partial responsibility for this should also be attributed to the Western powers. The pretext for the involvement of Germany, England, the United States, France, and even Turkey in the Transcaucasus, in their view, was to defend the independence of the Transcaucasian countries, but was in essence actually colonial policy (Hensel, Tabagua 1976: 191–193).

In the Miłoszes' book, the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan is also positively portrayed. We find this passage therein:

In April 1918, the Council of People's Commissars, headed by Stepan Shaumian, was formed in Baku. It announced the nationalization of the oil industry, merchant fleet, banks, etc. But by July, the counter-revolution came to a head, with British and later Turkish troops entering. A bloody terror reigned in Azerbaijan, and punitive expeditions were rampant. On 30 September 1918, 26 Bakuvian commissars were executed. Throughout Azerbaijan and Dagestan, counter-revolutionaries, taking advantage of the multinational composition of the population, stoked mutual feuds, especially on religious grounds. The Caucasus became an arena of fierce class struggle. In Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, bourgeois-nationalist governments took power. Germans and Turks were supposed to leave the Caucasus by November. New occupiers, however, appeared immediately – the Entente forces. (Miłoszowie 1979: 61–62)

According to this work's authors, after the English, followed then by the Turks, had entered, a “bloody terror” ensued in Azerbaijan. This is probably a reference to the massacres of Armenians that took place in Baku in September 1918. However, the authors fail to mention anything about the mass killings of Muslims in March of that same year, in which one of the key roles was played by the Bolshevik Stepan Shaumian.

The Miłoszes presented the 11th Red Army as a force bringing aid to the people of the Caucasus in defence against the troops of the “whites”. The Bolsheviks, according to the authors, were to have liberated the lands on which the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were later established, and then incorporated into the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The Red Army garnered merit not only through its liberation of the North Caucasus. The authors claimed that the reactionary government in Azerbaijan was overthrown in 1920 thanks to an uprising prepared by the Bolsheviks and supported by the 11th Red Army. When the Bolsheviks staged an uprising in the Borchaly uezd in February of 1921, Red Army troops assisted them there also against the counter-revolutionary forces ruling Georgia. The Miłoszes’ approach to the issue of Armenia was similar. In this case, too, they wrote that a popular armed uprising broke out against the nationalist government, and the Red Army came to the aid of the insurrectionists. As a result, the nationalist government was overthrown and on 29 November 1920 the creation of the Armenian SSR was proclaimed. The Miłoszes, who, writing about the 19th-century Caucasus stated that “the tsarist authorities per the old Roman principle of *divide et impera* skilfully stoked national antagonisms, which led to frequent unrest, bloody brawls, and often even to slaughter” (Miłoszowie 1979: 62–63, 293), did not opt for a similar reflection when it came to the Soviet period. For this reason, therefore, the reader will learn nothing of the uprisings against Soviet power in the 1920s in both the North Caucasus and the Transcaucasian republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

A researcher may face interpretive difficulties with the work titled *Skromny chłopiec w haremie* (A Modest Boy in the Harem) by Józef Hen. In general, it was written in a balanced tone and it is difficult to find within it the influence of official ideology. However, one such passage did find its way in, not fitting in its resonance with the rest of the book: “Finally, the most brilliant man in the world was a Georgian, leader of progressive humankind, vanquisher of Hitlerism, a genius of economics, linguist, builder of socialism, a friend of nations, the sun of the fatherland, creator of the Constitution and standard bearer of peace” (Hen 1957: 161). Although the name of the person to whom the quote refers is not mentioned, it is clear that the individual in question is Joseph Stalin. This is a unique passage; apart from it, there are no other analogous ones that could be interpreted as glorification of Soviet power or the communist system. Given the year the book was published, 1957, perhaps the passage is the aftermath of a censor’s tampering. Nor can it be ruled out that the hyperbole used by Hen was actually meant to portray the Soviet leader ironically.

When Poland belonged to the bloc of socialist countries, works devoted to the Caucasus dealt with topics that could be placed in the category of “brotherhood and friendship between communist nations”. World War II was well suited for this purpose, especially the case of Poland’s liberation from Nazi occupation by the Red Army. This theme was exploited, for example, by Ryszard Badowski. In his work *Lechici znad Tereku* (Lechites from along the Terek) he introduced several Ossetian generals who, while serving in the Red Army, took part in driving the Germans out of Poland.

Not only World War II became an amplifying theme for the ideology of the fraternal struggle of the popular masses. Similar was the theme of Poles’ participation in the establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus. In this regard, the figure of Michał Lewandowski led the way uncontested. He was born in Tiflis into the family of a Polish unterofficer, who remained in the region after having served in the tsarist army in the Caucasus. Lewandowski, as a soldier residing in Petrograd during the 1917 revolution, sided with the Bolsheviks. He then became a communist activist and organized the Red Guard in the Caucasus, in which he served as a people’s commissar for military affairs of the Terek Soviet Republic. He was also the commander of the Vladikavkaz-Grozny Army Group, and from January 1919 – commander of the Bolshevik 11th Army. The figure of Lewandowski was recalled in a report by Ryszard Badowski, who noted that the Pole was a hero of the revolutionary struggle in Chechnya-Ingushetia and a co-organizer of the contingents that liberated Vladikavkaz in the spring of 1920 (Badowski 1977: 63). Andrzej Chodubski also dedicated a journalistic article to this activist, in which he wrote that the 11th Army, which Michał Lewandowski had established, liberated the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. It made the seizure of power by the popular masses possible in the Caucasus in 1920. This researcher of Polish-Caucasian relations also added that Lewandowski took part in the liberation of Georgia, where he freed, among others, the city of Kutaisi (Chodubski 1982: 5). Polish traveller Tadeusz Lankamer, describing his expedition to Transcaucasia, also recalled the revolutionary activities of Poles writing:

The 19th century was a period of Russification and fomentation of feuds between peoples throughout Transcaucasia and the development of capitalism. The struggle against the policies of tsardom, against the increased exploitation of the working class created by the expansion of industry, and the development of the labour movement, was the result of the opposition of local society to the existing reality. Poles, there in the thousands, had a significant share in this struggle. Transcaucasia, and above all Georgia, was a place of exile for Polish patriots. Poles

fraternised with Georgians and Azerbaijanis in the joint struggle against tsardom, often tasked therein with important assignments and achieving successes throughout the pre-revolutionary period, during its unfolding and after its victory – J. Cybulski (commissar in the Baku Council), J. Godlewski (co-founder of the Communist Party in Azerbaijan), who cooperated with local leaders of the revolution – S. Shaumian, S. Kirov, G. Ordzhonikidze. (Lankamer 1979: 18–19)

The Polish scholar who most often addressed the topic of Polish participation in the establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus during Poland's communist period was Chodubski. He was then of the belief that once the Bolsheviks had occupied the region, things were unquestionably better off than under the independent states of 1918–1920/21 or during the tsarist period. In the researcher's opinion, the establishment of the communist system positively affected the Poles' situation, which is well demonstrated by the conclusion to one of his articles, in which he wrote: "Poles suffered in the Caucasus until 1920 – until the victory of Soviet authority in the region" (Chodubski 1984: 4). From among Polish Bolshevik activists the scholar cited the figure of Jan Godlewski, a member of the initiating group for convening the illegal founding congress of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Azerbaijan. Chodubski provided information that during the first congress of the CPB of Azerbaijan he joined its Central Committee, was a member of its Revolutionary Tribunal, and between 1923 and 1925 held the position of chairman of the Baku District Court. The politologist stressed that during the first years of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan, Polish communists sat in almost all the local government bodies. He further touched on the subject of Poles' involvement in the issue of the Caucasus' atheisation:

Of all the activities of Polish communists in Azerbaijan, the involvement of Polish women in emancipation and atheisation activities among Muslim women is also noteworthy. The main platform of atheisation activities was the League of Militant Atheists. It was headed by Ignacy Dębicki. Poles constituted an asset to the organization. (Chodubski 1983a: 5)

The Miłoszes also touched upon the revolutionary activities of Poles in the Caucasus in their work. Among other things, they familiarized their reader with the character of Jerzy Fronczewski, who was arrested in 1898 for founding a Marxist circle in Batumi and printing the first Georgian translation of the Manifesto. In the Miłoszes' book, the reader may discover additional curiosities that do not currently appear in publications by other Polish authors.

Describing a museum in Grozny, they noted that in the room dedicated to the revolution hung a photograph of an old man wearing a sheepskin papakha and Chechen burka. Its caption informed that this was one of the leaders of the revolution in Chechnya – Nuridin Torczyński. The Pole was born in Kalisz and served in the tsarist army in the Caucasus in the late 19th century. In 1900 he took part in an assassination attempt on the governor of the Caucasus, General Grigory Golitsyn. The assassination attempt failed, the conspirators were captured and only one – Torczyński – daringly managed to escape on horseback from the pursuing Cossacks. The fugitive went into hiding in Chechnya. He settled there permanently, took the name Nurydin, married a Chechen woman and soon won respect among the highlanders. While civil war raged in the Caucasus and Anton Denikin was besieging Grozny, Torczyński defended the city alongside the highlanders. The Red Army then rushed to the relief of the besieged and its commander listened with interest to Torczyński's autobiographical story. The authors concluded that they were supposed to have talked in Polish because this commander turned out to be a Pole as well – Michał Lewandowski. Another source of pride for the Miłoszes was the figure of Jerzy (Grigory) Andrzejewski, a Bolshevik activist in the Caucasus and son of a Pole exiled to Crimea. In their work, they mentioned that a pedestal was erected in Pyatigorsk with a bust of Andrzejewski, who had fought for the victory of the October Revolution and was murdered by the Whites. It is noticeable that the authors tried to avoid presenting any information that could portray Soviet rule in the Caucasus in an unfavourable light. For example, in a passage describing the Metekhi castle in Tbilisi, their regret that it had not survived to our times shines through (Miłoszowie 1979: 95, 119–121, 123, 172), yet they fail to provide information that it was on the orders of the communist authorities that the monument was blown up in 1959. The Miłoszes, who wrote extensively on the colonization and displacement of the Adyghe in the 19th century by the tsarist authorities, never mentioned the displacement of Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, and Karachays carried out by the Soviet authorities.

After the political changes in Poland of the late 1980s and early 1990s, authors virtually ceased including information in publications related to the history of the Caucasus concerning the merits of Poles in establishing Soviet rule in the region. This was probably due to the belief that such a topic is a cause for “shame” and should be shelved.

It is worth noting that Polish-Caucasian academic cooperation did develop during the existence of the socialist bloc. In the 1970s, there was cooperation between the University of Łódź and Tbilisi State University. As a result, the first university entity in Poland to deal with the study of the Caucasus was

established – the Interdisciplinary Team for Polish-Caucasian Scientific Research at the University of Łódź (Głowacki 1998: 56). Around the same period, there was an increase in Poland in the frequency of popular science and scholarly books on the Caucasus. However, these were compilation works, based primarily on Soviet materials. Another problem was that during Poland's communist period it was difficult to undertake academic research that did not conform to the prevailing communist ideology. This is well illustrated by the case of Professor Wojciech Materski,³ who in the late 1980s was collecting materials for a monograph on the Democratic Republic of Georgia between 1918–1921. For this reason, he twice applied for a trip to Tbilisi, citing as his aim his desire to conduct research on the history of Georgia in the years 1917–1922. He however kept failing to obtain permission from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. On the advice of his supervisor, Materski changed the research topic in his documentation to “Georgia. Origins of Dynamic Development” and immediately received approval from the Soviets. Ultimately, the historian's book, *Georgia rediviva: Republika Gruzjińska w stosunkach międzynarodowych, 1918–1921* (Georgia Rediviva: The Georgian Republic in International Relations, 1918–1921), was published in 1994 and was the first monograph on the Caucasus on the Polish publishing market after the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe.

In Wojciech Materski's opinion, the problem with historiography concerning the Caucasus from Poland's communist period should be linked to the fact that Polish scholars, at least until the mid-1950s, accepted the theses of Soviet historiography, which were considered unofficially binding. Meanwhile, in later periods, polemics against these theses could make it difficult to function in the academic community, e.g. by limiting one's chance for professional promotion and, above all, preventing travel to the USSR to conduct research. Resultingly, Polish researchers avoided taking up controversial topics that could be frowned upon by the centres of power. Thus, during Poland's communist period, issued publications covered literary contacts, a compilation history of the region, the contribution of Poles to the establishment of Soviet rule in the Caucasus, or activities of the Polish intelligentsia in the Caucasus, such as writings by 19th-century exiles.

3 Wojciech Materski provided information on this subject to the author of this paper during a 2018 consultation.

Wojciech Materski's opinion on this issue is similar to Viktor Shnirelman's observations regarding historiography in the USSR when an effective system of its control was established. According to the anthropologist, it consisted not so much of official censorship, but, above all, of strict self-censorship and pressure from colleagues and co-workers, felt at highly varying levels. Each manuscript had to thus be formally discussed at academic meetings of the department or section. It was then referred to the scientific council of the respective unit (an institute or university). Special weight was given to both the opinion of the directorate and the local party committee. If the manuscript passed successfully through this instance as well, it went to the editor of the publication in question, who searched not so much for scientific as political errors.

Poles in Imam Shamil's Armed Forces

One of the most important components of the Polish ethnopolitical myth in the context of the Polish-Caucasian fraternal struggle against the common enemy, Russia, is the notion of there having been some significant number of Poles in the army of Imam Shamil. As I stated earlier, this notion arose in the 19th century and was linked to the political aims of the Polish émigrés. It was sustained during the period when Poland, together with the Soviet Union, was in the camp of socialist countries, as this fitted into the propaganda story of the internationalist “struggle for the freedom of the oppressed popular masses”. Despite the development of Caucasus studies, this image is still frequently encountered, whether in scholarly works or journalism and, even more broadly, it finds itself in the public consciousness. This is a consequence of, on the one hand, the 19th-century Polish émigré opinion journalism, which I wrote about in an earlier section. On the other hand, it is the work of contemporary Polish scholars who perpetuate such a view, regardless that it is unsupported by the source material.

One of the first Polish scholars to proclaim the view of the closeness between Poles and Caucasian peoples due to their common struggle against Russia was historian and Orientalist Jan Reychman. In 1931 he stated that this 19th-century struggle had brought Poles and Caucasians closer together and that battles fought by the brave mountaineers had always found understanding in Poland. He also stressed that Poles actively supported the insurrectionist proclamations of the Caucasian peoples and that many political exiles had fled to Shamil, where they organised artillery units (Reychman 1931: 48, 51). In another work from this period, the Orientalist noted that “quite a few Poles” had gone over to the side of the Caucasian peoples fighting for independence (Reychman 1939: 268). Historian Michał Janik was of a similar opinion (Janik 1928: 275). An attempt to specify the number of Poles in Shamil's army was indeed made by one diplomat of the interwar period, Jan Gawroński. According to him, it stood at around 7,000 (Gawroński 1931: 30).

After World War II, during Poland's communist period, the belief developed that there was a sizable group of Poles serving in Shamil's forces. This theme was taken up, for example, by Andrzej Chodubski, who claimed that “considerable” groups of Polish deserters deserted to the imam's army (Chodubski 1988: 36). A similar opinion was held by historian Piotr Łossowski, according to whom Shamil had a foreign command in which Poles made up a “significant

percentage” (Łossowski 1957: 46–47). This theme also appeared in reportage from the Caucasus, e.g. by Stanisław Pagaczewski, who wrote that ‘there were too, of course, Poles in the ranks of Shamil, who fought fiercely against the Russians in 1834–1859’ (Pagaczewski 1963: 115). There were also reports that a Pole was the commander of Shamil’s guard (Sulewski 1873: 56).

Even after 1989 Polish scholars continued propagating the belief that Poles played a significant role in Shamil’s army. This motif appeared most often in the works of the aforementioned Chodubski, who furthermore believed that Imam Shamil was particularly favourable to and formed his own honorary guard out of them (Chodubski 1993b: 3; Chodubski 2003c: 383). Similar beliefs have been voiced by other researchers writing on the Caucasus (Zwierz 1996: 135; Lewandowski 1998: 166; Szukalski 2015: 77).

The notion that Poles played an important role in the independence movement of the Caucasian mountaineers appears in texts by Islamic religious activists. Rafał Berger, chief imam of the Muslim Unity Association in Poland, can serve as an example in this regard. Presenting famous Muslims in Poland’s history, he mentioned Imam Shamil and underscored:

Between 1831 and 1855, some 40,000 citizens of the Kingdom of Poland were conscripted into the Russian army in the Caucasus. Many of them deserted and went over to Shamil’s troops. To this day in the Caucasus, the Polish “blue hussars” fighting shoulder to shoulder with Imam Shamil are recalled with great respect. (Berger 2013)

The notion of active and numerous Polish participation in Shamil’s forces is also present in Polish opinion journalism. Interestingly, that which was once in line with socialist ideology, i.e. the propagation of the idea of a joint national liberation struggle of the popular masses of Poland and the Caucasus against Russian tsardom, has been taken up in contemporary Poland primarily by right-wing conservative journalists. Similar types of publications did however also occur in the left-liberal or right-liberal press, which was noticeable principally in the 1990s, i.e. during the period of active fighting in Chechnya. The only difference in the contemporary narrative in this respect from that of the communist period is that the enemy in the form of a system (tsardom) has been replaced by a state (Russia). The Polish-Chechen brotherhood-in-arms under Shamil also features in their narrative (Michałowski 2000: 19; Piłsiewicz 2016: 118), or of Polish officers deserting the tsarist army and going over to the side of the mountaineers fighting for independence (Gelberg 1997: 6). A typical article written in such a vein is that of Piotr Lisiewicz’s *Polska hussaria w Czeczenii* (Polish Hussars in Chechnya), published in *Gazeta Polska*. The author brought

to bear several typical images in his piece: Shamil's 400-strong bodyguard consisting of Poles – the so-called “blue hussars”, numerous desertions from the Russian army, Shamil's particularly favourable attitude towards Poles, whose education, military knowledge, and ideological commitment were supposed to be irreplaceable (Lisiewicz 2004: 18).

Analogous views were shared by one of the best-known journalists who covered Chechen issues in the 1990s, Mirosław Kuleba. In his book he stated:

Only the few are aware that Poles fought against Russia in Shamil's units in the mid-19th century. These were officers and soldiers deserting the tsarist army and exiles from the November Uprising. Chechens, however, remember this still to this day and you can often hear from them about the Polish “Blue Hussars” fighting alongside Imam Shamil. (Kuleba 1997:19)

In contrast, in another book:

The ranks of the insurrectionists began being filled by the first Polish deserters, for whom the ideals of the mountaineers' liberation struggle were particularly dear. Young Polish patriots, ready to fight for the resurrection of their homeland with weapons in hand, also reached Shamil's units. [...]. Shamil quickly came to realize the Poles' worth. It was difficult not to appreciate the ideological commitment, education, and military prowess of the tsarist-army fugitives [...] soon Shamil's name became a real magnet for Poles serving forcibly in the Russian ranks. (Kuleba 1998: 19)

Two features are characteristic of authors writing about the “numerous” Poles in Shamil's army. Firstly, they use indefinite quantifiers such as “numerous”, “many”, “quite a few”, etc. Thus, it is not clear whether they are meant to mean, for example, ten, a hundred, or a thousand people. A second feature is that, for the most part, they fail to make any reference to the sources or justify their judgements. They thus make their assertions dogmatically. One example is Piotr Grochmalski's work *Czeczenia. Rys prawdziwy* (Chechnya. A True Outline). Writing about the number of Poles in the forces of Imam Shamil, the author admitted that we have little knowledge of the Polish deserters who went over to the side of the insurrectionists, and even their estimated number is unknown. This did not prevent him from uncritically citing the opinion that Poles deserted often, that special Polish formations did exist among the independent mountaineers, or that Poles were to have advised Shamil and directed the armed operations of the Caucasian locals against Russia. He concluded his

paragraph on this subject with an authoritative statement: “One thing is in any case certain – of all the nations occupied by Russia – Poles and Lithuanians played the greatest role in the Chechen army” (Grochmalski 1999: 60–61).

Significant is that the authors promoting the view of undefined, numerous desertions of Poles from the tsarist army over to the side of Imam Shamil are fully aware of also the large number of Poles serving in the Russian army conquering the Caucasus. This matter has been thoroughly researched and there is a consensus among Polish historians that the percentage was significant and, during its active phase, reached up to 20% of the personnel composition of the Caucasus Corps. Usually, authors writing about the contribution of Poles to the independence movement in the North Caucasus do provide this information, especially if they are professional historians. However, immediately after presenting it, they provide a follow-up – about the flight of Poles from the army. In this way, they try to reduce the negative (in their opinion) overtones of the generally accepted fact of tens of thousands of Poles conquering the Caucasus for the tsar. Thus, they carry out a kind of catharsis, using the same procedure as the Romantic poets with Konstanty Gaszyński at the helm. To avoid forming an image of the Pole as a Russian tool used to oppress other peoples, an image is created of their alliance with the free mountaineers in the name of fighting the common enemy. A quote from one of Chodubski’s works is characteristic of this group of scholars: “The Poles realising while in the army [i.e. the tsarist army – P.A.] that they had to fight in defence of the interests of the tsardom and against the nations fighting for liberty, did not want to fight against Shamil’s forces. Consequently, they decided to desert” (Chodubski 1994: 61). In this way, an image is created of the noble Pole who, although he himself was defeated by the invaders and forcibly conscripted into the partitioner’s army, is “moral” and “ethical” enough not to want to deprive the Caucasian peoples of their freedom. Given this, he decides to run away from the army, just so as not to be a helpless instrument in the hands of the tsar. Thus, a treatment familiar to one employed in 19th-century Romantic poetry has been applied in the works of contemporary historians.

In tandem with the promotion of the view of the significant participation of Polish deserters in the North Caucasian independence movement is the belief that its leaders, led by Imam Shamil, regarded Poles with particular sympathy (Chodubski 1994: 61; Miłoszowie 1979: 72; Piwnicki 2013: 8; Sulewski 1973: 59; Szukalski 2015: 78; Zwierz 1996: 136). Occasionally, to explain why the independent North Caucasian population then treated Polish deserters from the Russian army as slaves, the argument is used that they did not distinguish them from Russians (Miłoszowie 1979: 72).

The existence of the notion that Poles were particularly involved in the North Caucasus independence movement in the public consciousness can be

seen in a discussion that arose around Poland's most popular book-related portal and concerned Charles King's title *The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus*. The American historian placed far too much emphasis in his work on the issue of Polish deserters from the tsar's army stationed in the Caucasus, and began his description of the adventures of one of them by stating: "The story of Jan Sarembo is not atypical" (King 2008: 55). In the light of the available sources, however, desertions by Poles were a marginal phenomenon and, given this, the case of Jan Sarembo should be regarded as unusual, as I will write later in this work. The most important point here, however, is that King was criticised by readers precisely for, in their opinion, too cursory a presentation of the subject. One of them stated:

The author wrote a bit on the Poles also, although in my opinion far too little if one considers how great a contribution the Poles made in supporting the mountaineer uprisings, above all that of Imam Shamil. For example, the author did not mention that the imam possessed a guard consisting of Polish uhlans, his artillery was commanded by a Pole, and had a battalion or regiment consisting of Poles and Russians among his troops. (*Widmo* 2013)

Occasionally supporters of the view that Poles were active among Shamil's units resort to mystification. A good example of this can be found on a Polish portal of Caucasus Emirate sympathizers. In June 2007, it featured an article titled *Imam Szamil w Wiedieno* (Imam Shamil in Vedeno), accompanied by an illustration captioned "The Poles under Imam Shamil".

A discussion about Polish-Caucasian cooperation in the 19th century ignited below the article. Only one participant noted that there was a Japanese *torii* gate in the background of the image. The others denied this, with someone



FIGURE 2

A picture captioned "The Poles under Imam Shamil" from the article *Imam Szamil w Wiedieno* (2)

SEE: <[HTTP://CZECZENIA.BLOG.ONET.PL/2007/06/27/IMAM-SZAMIL-W-WIEDIENO-2/](http://CZECZENIA.BLOG.ONET.PL/2007/06/27/IMAM-SZAMIL-W-WIEDIENO-2/)>, ACCESSED 14.01.2017



FIGURE 3 A frame from the film *The Last Samurai*
 SEE: <[HTTP://UMDB.ORG.UA/MOVIE/1306/WALLPAPERS](http://umdb.org.ua/movie/1306/wallpapers)>, ACCESSED
 14.01.2017

writing back: “If you enlarge the picture, you can see two Chechen flags. What would Chechen fighters be doing in Japan? The dress is Caucasian. The Poles had no other outfit; if any, it was Russian army uniform, but that would be the uniform of the enemy, not very safe for identification” (*Imam* 2007). The attentive reader was right, however, and there is indeed a *torii* gate in the illustration as the whole thing is a reworked frame from the film *The Last Samurai* starring Tom Cruise.

Compared to the original photo, the one depicting “The Poles under Shamil” is of much poorer quality. In addition, some individuals have been removed, horsemen have been given Caucasian-style caps, and two flags of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria from the 1990s, which were not used in the 19th century, have been added. It should be noted, however, that this Polish site was not the first to feature the fabricated image. It probably initially appeared in March 2007 on www.kavkazcenter.com, where it was used to illustrate the article *Polyaki v armii Imama Šamilya* (Poles in Imam Shamil’s Army) (*Polyaki* 2007), and it is probably from there that it found its way onto the Polish web page.

To lend credibility to the activity of Poles in Shamil’s forces, the names of individuals who are said to have played some particularly significant role in them are often brought up. Two are most often mentioned in this context – Józef Dzik and Rusiecki (first name unknown). Both appear in

academic (Chodubski 1988: 36; idem 1994: 62; idem 2003d: 92; Piwnicki 2013: 8; Reyhman 1939: 268; Szukalski 2015: 78; Zwierz 1996: 136) as well as journalistic opinion works (Lisiewicz 2004: 18; Kuleba 1998: 19; Korczyński 2015). The former is portrayed as the chief engineer among the independent mountaineers and the builder of their fortresses. Although Dzik is often treated as a historical figure whose existence is not doubted in the slightest, the only source in which he appears is the memoirs of Wincenty Gedeon Giedroyc,¹ written in rhymed form and titled *Kilka wspomnień z kaukazkiego wygnania* (A Few Recollections from Caucasian Exile), issued in 1867. In them, the author wrote that Józef Dzik had served with him in the Shirvan regiment. During a joint patrol, he was to have pointed out for the work's protagonist some strategic spots from which, in his opinion, it would be possible to resist the Russians for a long time if suitable fortifications were constructed. After some time, it turned out that Dzik had fled to Shamil. Two years after this event, the hero of the work participated in an expedition against the independent mountaineers. On this occasion, he noticed that fortresses had been built in the places Dzik had mentioned earlier, the creation of which he attributed to his former comrade-in-arms. The memoirs also describe another meeting between the protagonist and Dzik, when the latter was already serving in the forces of Imam Shamil. At the time, the deserter was said to have confirmed that it was indeed he who had built the fortresses and that he was now taking revenge on the Russians for the wrongs he had suffered in the past (Giedroyc 1867: 91–92, 101–103).

However, Giedroyc's work is not a reliable historical source, as it contains many misrepresentations and significant generalisations of events in the Caucasus. Given the very form of the text, literary fictionalization cannot be ruled out either. Giedroyc did not even mention the names of the fortresses supposedly built by Dzik, even though they were to have contributed to several defeats of tsarist troops. The fact that fortresses were not built in Shamil's state, but rather existing auls were usually strengthened, should also instigate reflection. Without support from other sources, it is impossible to advance the view that it was the Pole Józef Dzik who was "the main builder of Shamil's fortresses". This is all the more difficult given that no other sources mentioning Józef Dzik, Russian or North Caucasian, are known. Nor is he to be found in other Polish materials. It is significant that one very insightful observer of events in the Caucasus, Mateusz Gralewski, who served in the Shirvan regiment – and

1 Wincenty Gedeon Giedroyc was accused of preparing an attempt on the life of Tsar Nicholas I and sentenced to death. The tsar commuted this to exile in the Caucasus Corps. Giedroyc served in Dagestan, where he took part in battles against Shamil's troops. In the Caucasus, he reached the rank of officer. On returning to Poland, he took part in the January Uprising. After its suppression, he settled in Lviv.

according to the information provided by Giedroyć, Dzik had also served in this unit – did not once mention such a person in his memoirs.

Equally interesting is the story of the Pole Rusiecki. His “career” in the forces of Imam Shamil was first introduced to a wider readership in the 1960s. In 1965, in a letter to the editor of *Przekrój*² one reader, while listing Poles who were said to have stayed with Shamil, cited Rusiecki’s surname, who was to have been the builder of a gunpowder factory (O Szamilu 1965: 8). Several decades later, this has become evidence of the involvement of Polish officers on the side of the independent mountaineers. However, it is worth looking at the primary source in which this character appears. These are the memoirs of Karol Kalinowski. The information quoted by Kalinowski is usually accurate and corroborated by other sources. It can therefore be assumed with a high degree of probability that he did indeed meet such a person. When Kalinowski was staying with the independent mountaineers, Rusiecki also arrived there and, out of their common origin, they lived together for some time. Kalinowski wrote of him:

His surname was Rusiecki or Rusalski. As a child, he was conscripted into the cadet corps, where, ridiculed for being a Pole by his comrades, he dreamed up revenge for the insults and derision of his colleagues by becoming famous for heroic deeds. From the corps, as an officer sent to the Caucasus, he set himself to the idea of fulfilling his dreams and, to this end, deserted. (Kalinowski 2017: 200)

According to Kalinowski’s text, Rusiecki was admittedly greeted at Shamil’s court with cannon fire, but it soon became apparent that he had serious psycho-emotional issues. Kalinowski explicitly wrote that he himself had warned the imam about Rusiecki’s ideas, calling them “the absurdity of a demented mind”. The conduct of the Polish officer was so bizarre that he stripped himself of all repute, with some commanders wanting to kill him, suspecting him to be a Russian spy. This did not occur, but Rusiecki found himself in a tragic situation and because of it fled the mountains, deserting back to the Russian forces. In this primary source, Rusiecki is an unequivocally negative character who did not contribute in any way to successes in the struggle against the Russians.

This is not even the only example of overinterpretation of Kalinowski’s memoirs employed by authors promoting the notion that Poles actively participated in Shamil’s forces. This is evident, for example, in the references to it as a

² *Przekrój* had been published since 1945. It was a socio-cultural weekly, one of the important culture-producing elements in Poland’s communist period.

source justifying the thesis that there were many Poles in the imam's entourage (Chodubski 2017: 454; Darski; Łossowski 1957: 46). In fact, Kalinowski's work mentions only three Poles in the independent part of Chechnya – himself, the aforementioned Rusiecki, and an unnamed gravedigger. Most likely, the latter did not belong to the group of valued specialists among the local population. When in Vedeno, he burned an ox hide while working, for which he was brutally beaten and expelled from the aul. Interestingly, this soldier was married to a Chechen woman and, after his expulsion, stayed alongside his children with his wife's family in Achereshki.³ Kalinowski never mentioned any other compatriots, even when describing Shamil's unit, which did consist of former tsarist army soldiers. It is possible, and even very likely, that during his stay in Vedeno, where the imam had his residence at the time, there were also other Poles. However, it is not legitimate to cite Kalinowski's memoirs to substantiate the thesis of the existence of any unit composed of Poles under Shamil, for they contain no such information.

Additionally, important material that could illuminate the issue of Poles' presence among the independent mountaineers was the diaries of Stanisław Branowski. As a private in the tsarist army in the early 1830s, he deserted and went over to the side of the independent mountaineers at the time when Hamzat-Bek was their imam. He stayed with them for about eight months and kept a diary during this time. These writings have not survived to the present day. It is known, however, that they were used, among others, by Kazimierz Pruszanowski, a Pole and staff captain of the General Staff, who in the 1840s worked in the Separate Caucasian Corps as a researcher on the region's history. However, Nikolai Pokrovsky had already noted that Pruszanowski's descriptions of events were untrue and distorted (Pokrovskij N.I. 2000: 42–48). Moreover, it was Pruszanowski, citing Bronowski, who wrote that there was a personal guard made up of deserters from the tsarist army under Hamzat-Bek, which Branowski was said to have personally commanded. The best-known contemporary historians dealing with the history of the 19th-century independence movement in the eastern part of the North Caucasus, Hajji Murad Donogo and Sirazhutdin Kasumov, have expressed scepticism towards Pruszanowski's text based on Bronowski's diaries, which mention the mountaineers' benevolent attitude towards tsarist army deserters in the period of Hamzat-Bek's imamate and the likelihood of forming any unit composed of them at that time. According to their research, in the 1830s the attitude of the independent

3 Achereshki is currently located in the Kurchaloyevski District in Chechnya.

mountaineers towards deserting Russian army soldiers was not amicable. This changed only in the 1840s, i.e. during the period of Shamil's imamate (Donogo, Kasumov 2013). Branowski's diary, which was kept in Polish and is known only from a rather poor Russian summary, we are unable to verify. This results from the fact that these materials were lost during World War II, most likely being destroyed in a fire at the archive in besieged Leningrad.

Sources currently available to us indicate that Poles were associated with artillery service in Shamil's forces. For example, Izmael-Bek (Józef) Pietrucin-Pietruszewski, a Pole who fought in the ranks of the "whites" in the North Caucasus during the Russian civil war of 1918–1920, recorded in his memoirs that the people in Chechnya recalled the Poles under Shamil, who were supposed to have explicitly served in the artillery (Adamčevskij et al. 2022: 266).

If this were the only evidence for the researcher of the question of foreigners in the independent mountaineer forces, it would not be very noteworthy. After all, memory is divorced from the constraints of facts and does not require corroboration in the documentation. It could also be the result of Russians blaming the Poles, who supposedly supported Shamil militarily, for their defeats in the Caucasus. However, the memoirs of Poles who were in the Caucasus in the 19th century also note that their compatriots in the independent mountaineer forces, like other deserters from the tsarist army, were used mainly for artillery service and farm work. Gralewski, describing Shamil's artillery, wrote that it was "manned mostly by Poles who had deserted from the Russians, and especially by Ruthenians [Gralewski, in his work, often used the term "Ruthenians" to describe Ukrainians, or possibly all peoples who communicated in an East Slavic ethnolact aside from Russians – A.P.] from along the Dnieper, though there were also ethnic Russians" (Gralewski 2015: 499–500). Often, however, this did not constitute "front line" service. The case of Karol Kalinowski, for example, testifies to this. After embracing Islam, he served with the mountaineers in a unit made up of deserters from the tsarist army. His main occupation during battle marches was to drive a supply-laden mule; as such, in this case, we can speak of auxiliary work at best.

This would more or less confirm the findings of the Dagestani researchers. Historian Hajji Murad Donogo, in his article *Artilleriya v imamate Šamilya (1840–1859 gg.)* (Artillery in Shamil's Imamate (1840–1859)), stated that, based on Ustarkhan's account, the Russian army deserters under the imam were formed into an auxiliary work detachment, meant for the artillery also, where they dealt, for example, with the preparation of gun carriages (Donogo 2016: 267). In contrast, no reliable sources indicate that the Poles constituted Shamil's guard, as some Polish authors would have it.

The Hôtel Lambert activists are often cited in the context of propagating the notion of a large number of Poles serving under Shamil. However, it should be borne in mind that they had no understanding of the subject and their assumptions were incorrect. This is well illustrated by a letter from Władysław Jordan, Adam Czartoryski's agent in Istanbul, sent to his superior in November 1859, in which he reported on Shamil's surrender to the Russians (which took place in August). Jordan wrote that he could not find out what had happened to the several thousand Poles supposed to have been, according to him, alongside the imam. In his opinion, it was most likely that they had managed to hide in the high mountains, whose inhabitants continued resisting Russia. The agent came to this conclusion because he believed that otherwise, the Russians would have "bragged" in official reports about taking such a large number of Poles captive (Jordan 1859). Even then, therefore, he did not realise that these thousands of Poles at Shamil's side had simply never existed.

To estimate (the exact number cannot be determined due to the lack of source material) how many Poles may have been in the ranks of the independent mountaineers, it is best to turn to Russian sources produced by the Russian administration, which are far more reliable when it comes to examining the number of deserters who went over to Shamil's side than material produced by the Polish émigrés. When Shamil changed his approach to deserters and took steps to employ them in the fight against the Russians, General Marcellin Olshevsky reported at the beginning of 1842 that the imam had gathered up to 80 of them, specifying that these former soldiers had been bought or taken from Chechen and Dagestani landlords with whom they had stayed as slaves (Ol'shevskij 1842). On the other hand, in the testimony of Ustarkhan of Katyr-Yurt, which should be dated to the period of Shamil's stay in Vedenó, that is 1845 at the earliest, appears the number of 300 deserters living near this village and comprising the so-called "Shamil's unit" (Pokazaniya žitelya 1959: 498). The largest number in this context was cited by a certain Private Maksimov, who in January 1843 testified that, while staying in Dargo, he saw "up to 500 men – our [i.e. Russian – P.A.] deserters – who are used by Shamil for artillery service" (Pokazaniya soldat 1959: 365). We can see in the above estimates a large discrepancy of between 80 and 500 people. However, we can perceive the scale of Russian army deserters in Shamil's ranks. Their number was in the tens to the few hundreds, and this discounting ethnicity. Thus, knowing that the number of Poles in the tsarist army in the Caucasus varied over the years, but was up to a maximum of 20% of the total and that at the same time the scale of Polish desertions did not differ from that of other ethnic groups, we can apply the ratio of up to 20% also to estimate the number of Poles in

the “Shamil’s unit” based on its total state. In addition to these, Shamil’s lands also contained Poles enslaved by individual landlords in the various auls of Chechnya and Dagestan, though it is not possible to determine the size of this phenomenon, even approximately.

I believe that the vast majority of Russian army deserters who went over to Shamil’s side were privates, possibly non-commissioned officers but in much smaller numbers. This reasoning is based on the fact that officers rarely chose to desert. One of the few such cases in the eastern part of the Caucasus was Rusiecki, described by Karol Kalinowski (we have, in addition, some information on Polish officers who deserted to the Adyghe in the western part of the Caucasus). On the other hand, the tsarist authorities either tried to exchange kidnapped officers for prisoners in their custody or paid a monetary ransom for them. Deserters among the independent mountaineers, therefore, possessed no specialised military training, although some of them were craftsmen and their skills proved useful in farm work.

Analysing the memoirs of Karol Kalinowski, one can conclude that it was not religious issues that were the main obstacle in deserting to the independent mountaineers. This thesis is sometimes put forward by researchers in Poland, according to whom the murids were intolerant, waged holy war against the infidels, and treated Christians with hostility (Caban 2001: 170; Furier 2000: 65; Lijewska 2013: 6; Olchowska 2017: 257; Szukalski 2015: 79). Rather, the above claims are a repetition of the Russian propaganda message justifying the need to conquer the Caucasus inhabited by “savage enemies of Christianity”, but are not strongly supported by the source material.

The murid movement did not operate with slogans of combating “infidels”; it proclaimed only that Muslims could not remain under the rule of non-Muslims. For Shamil, deserters from the tsarist army, regardless of religion, were potential allies in the fight against Russian forces. Converting to Islam undoubtedly helped Christian soldiers taken prisoner, given that Islamic principles forbade the ownership of a Muslim slave (this was particularly underscored within the murid movement, one of its main messages being the equality of all Muslims). It is important to meanwhile consider that captured soldiers were treated differently from deserters who voluntarily crossed over to Shamil’s side. Consequently, it can be assumed that the latter were able to retain their faith and remain free at the same time, at least from 1840 onwards. For it was then that Shamil ordered his commanders: “Know that those who have fled to us from the Russians are loyal to us. These people are our sincere friends. Create all conditions and opportunities for life [for them – P.A.]. By appearing among the righteous, they too have become pure people” (Ovsyannikov 2008: 18). Around the same time, Nikolai Pokrovsky reported,

Shamil forbade the mountaineers to make deserters into slaves and allowed them to serve at his unit. Remaining as slaves, however, were kidnapped soldiers, as well as those taken prisoner during battles and looting expeditions (Pokrovskij N.I. 2000: 344). Thus, those belonging to this group, like Karol Kalinowski, could only become free men after having embraced Islam. The Russian researcher did note that the naibs did not always pursue as conciliatory a policy towards deserters as Shamil. Therefore, it can be assumed that some of the deserters were also nonetheless treated as slaves, even following Shamil's aforementioned order.

Karol Kalinowski, describing "Shamil's unit" composed of former tsarist army soldiers, did not once mention any persecution of them because of their faith. Indeed, he claimed that "Shamil wished to acquire a Christian priest so that they would not live like cattle, but such a man was not taken prisoner, and none was found who would voluntarily commit himself to this" (Kalinowski 2017: 191). Kalinowski also informed that deserters from the Russian army enjoyed far-reaching liberty, being able, among other things, to make wine and produce vodka, even though these drinks are forbidden in Islam. The memoirs of other Poles also show that, for the independent mountaineers, religious affiliation did not play an essential role in combating the tsarist army. Gralewski, for example, described the tense situation in Russian units due to the persecution of the Old Believers, many of whom belonged to the Greben Cossacks. The Cossacks resolved to go under Shamil's protection. The imam even sent his troops to aid them, but in the end, their desertion to the side of the independent mountaineers did not come to pass, as the tsarist authorities appeased the situation (Gralewski 2015: 65).

Polish sources are not the only ones to report on religious freedom in Shamil's state. General Melentij Olshevsky⁴ wrote in his memoirs that Old Believers persecuted by the Russian government often hid in the mountains (i.e. with the independent mountaineers), and cited the aforementioned Greben Cossacks as one example (Ol'shevskij 2000: 276). In contrast, Imam Shamil's son-in-law, Abdurakhman of Gazikumukh, reported that:

soldiers settled there [in Vedeno – P.A.] and lived peacefully, content with the injunctions of Allah and Shamil. They found peace and lived without oppression. In their rooms they had icons to which they prayed, they made alcoholic drinks prepared from grapes and moonshine from

4 Melentij Olshevsky (1816–1895) served in the Caucasus from 1841, initially in its western part and from 1844 in its eastern part. He completed his military service with the rank of infantry general.

millet and other grains. They ate, drank, and enjoyed themselves, especially on major holidays. No one from our side disturbed them, because Shamil ordered Alimammad [commander of a unit made up of former tsarist soldiers, about whom, in fact, Karol Kalinowski spoke very negatively – P.A.] not to allow the murids to offend them by word or deed. (Abduraxman 2013)

Polonophobia in the Russian Empire played a significant role in the construction of the notion of Polish-Caucasian cooperation. It happened that in the 1840s, i.e. during a period of the greatest Russian defeats against the imam's troops, the Russians blamed Poles for their failures and accused them of secret collaboration with Shamil. In this way, propaganda was able to shift the responsibility for the failures from the incompetent command to a "subversive element" – the Poles. A good example of this is the opinion of Russian General Ivan von der Howen, who believed that Polish exiles to the Caucasus were doing more harm than good. He had a particularly negative opinion of Catholic priests, who had been taken prisoner during the November Rising with guns in hand and conscripted into the tsarist ranks. To his mind, Poles deserted often and the mountaineers received them willingly and treated them much better than Russians. According to the Russian commander, the result was that, because so many Poles had gone over to Shamil, he had made them into his bodyguard. According to von der Howen, it was Poles who led the imam's troops during attacks on Russian positions and it was the Poles who had taught the mountaineers how to make gunpowder and use cannons. It was in the Poles' cooperation with Shamil that this tsarist general saw one of the main reasons for the mountaineers' long resistance and the imam's success in attacking Russian garrisons (Fon-der-Xoven 1877: 221–224).

As can be seen from the above example, even the highest-ranking tsarist commanders had some perception of Polish-Caucasian cooperation against Russia, though this was not reflected in official documents of the Russian administration. Such views became so widespread that soldiers also made unfounded accusations against Poles, hoping to please their superiors that way. One such case involved, among others, Wincent Dawid.⁵ In 1848, together with a group of Poles, he was arrested in Groznaya⁶ and accused of being involved in a conspiracy to collaborate with Shamil. It was not until further investigation

5 Wincent Dawid (1816–1897) was a poet and educator. He spent many years in the Caucasus, so he associated much of his work with the region.

6 Current Grozny.

that the allegations were found to be completely unfounded (Śliwowska 1998: 125). This case was described in more detail in Gralewski's memoirs. According to his account, there was a certain junker named Sołłogub serving in the tsarist army, a thief who led a dissipated life. Facing a court-martial, he fled to the free mountaineers. However, life in the mountains did not suit him and he decided to return to the Russian ranks. When Sołłogub stood trial, he testified to knowing of a Polish plot, supposedly being hatched in the fortress of Grozny. At the same time, he explained that he had not yet investigated its particulars in detail, but that if his past faults were forgiven, he would soon uncover the whole conspiracy as someone who knew the Polish language. Gralewski related that Sołłogub's presented interrogation protocol made a great impression on the head of the gendarmerie and the minister of war. The Polish exile also admitted that the Russians, given the failures of their troops, had already suspected the Poles of treachery and conspiracy with the mountaineers. A provocation was therefore prepared involving Sołłogub, who was deployed once again to the Caucasus Corps but under a new surname – Nowicki. In 1847 he put forth official accusations against the Poles of secret contacts with Shamil aiming at giving up some Russian forts to him. As a result, a dozen people from various units stationed in Chechnya and Dagestan were arrested. Two commissions were set up simultaneously to investigate the case – one in Grozny and another in Temir-Khan-Shura. In the course of their work, the commission members learned of only one Polish fugitive residing in the mountains, who was of no importance there and whom the mountaineers had threatened that if he uttered a word against Shamil and his rule, they would immediately cut off his head. After an investigation lasting several weeks, the commissions concluded that there had been no conspiracy and that the accused had not been in any way in contact with the free mountaineers. All the arrested Poles were freed, and Sołłogub was sentenced by court-martial to deprivation of noble status and eternal settlement in Siberia (Gralewski 2015: 554–558).

A confirmation of the story provided by Gralewski can be found in an article by Mark Zhivov, a literary scholar of Jewish origin and Polish-Russian translator. Zhivov informed that a denunciation by one Aleksander Nowicki, whom we can confidently identify with the Sołłogub/Nowicki from Gralewski's memoirs, had been preserved in the Central State Archive in Tbilisi. Zhivov quoted the contents of this document accusing Polish officers and soldiers of criminal plotting with the enemy (i.e. the free Caucasian peoples). It listed Poles from the staff captain to the company commander, all alleged to be traitors pushing the plans of the Democratic Society. According to Nowicki, all staff positions in both regiments and divisions were filled by members of the organisation. To

his mind, this provided evidence that Poles in the Caucasus remained “soldiers of the revolution” (Żywow 1959: 563).

Radosław Żurawski vel Grajewski also included interesting material on this subject in his work. Upon analysing an 1840 report by Adam Czaratoryski’s agent in Istanbul, Wojciech Chrzanowski, he concluded that:

He disavowed [...] the rumours concerning Polish officers allegedly commanding attacks [i.e. attacks by Circassians – P.A.] on Russian forts, having supposed that these were spread by the European press, and was otherwise unable to explain to himself the series of Circassian successes, or it was that even the Russians themselves were ashamed to admit that they had been bested by the “savage” mountaineers. (Żurawski vel Grajewski 2003: 196)

Ludwik Widerszal noticed an increase in the tsarist authorities’ suspicion towards Poles serving in the Caucasus during the Crimean War. As one example, he cited a decision made by the governor-general of the Kutais Governorate, a district situated close to the Caucasus front as it were. Following denunciations concerning Poles’ “political unorthodoxy”, he ordered his subordinates to prepare reports on their “state of mind”. No suspicious attitudes, however, were discovered (Widerszal 2011: 36).

Among the works of Europeans who ended up in the Caucasus during the mid-19th century, there are also examples of scepticism regarding Russian information about significant numbers of Poles defecting to Shamil’s side. Such an attitude can be seen, for example, in one note by German botanist Karl Koch, who travelled in the Caucasus in 1843–1844, quoted by Nikolai Pokrovsky. The German wrote: “Much weight is given to the Polish assistance that Shamil received during his fight against the Russians and to which he often ascribes its happy outcome. This is however completely untrue ... The number of Polish deserters is not as large as they think” (Pokrovskij N.I. 2000: 380).

Material for analysing the issue of the creation of the image of Polish-mountaineer cooperation through the prism of Polonophobia in the Russian Empire is also provided in memoirs by top Russian commanders. One example is General Grigory Filipson,⁷ who, addressing the early 1840s, wrote:

It was also at this time that Lieutenant Colonel Karow was assigned to the 5th Line Black Sea Battalion from among the military retirees. From

⁷ Grigory Filipson (1809–1883) was a Russian general during the Caucasus War, and also Acting *Ataman* of the Black Sea Cossacks.

the crew complement sent to us before his arrival, it was clear that he was 60 years old, and had served in the Polish army in all the Napoleonic wars, in 1812 he commanded a squadron in the Italian guard; after Poland was joined to Russia he left service and retired; in 1831 he commanded a regiment against us, and in 1840 he wished to join the ranks of our army. [...] General Raevsky appointed Karow military head of the Novotroitsk fortification, whose garrison consisted of one *rota*. His sensible kindness quickly became known even among the unfriendly mountaineers, and it was not uncommon for them to come to the old man asking him to settle their quarrels or conflicts. Because of this, the hostility of the mountaineers living nearby eased considerably, and the garrison was able to exchange cattle for food, from which the incidence of disease was greatly reduced. Hieromonk Pansiy alone could not come to terms with his Polish roots and often brought up absurd complaints and made ridiculous denunciations. (Filipson 2000: 161–162)

Oleg Matveyev cites additional archival documents supporting the thesis that the notion of secret cooperation between Poles and the free mountaineers arose out of informers' mystifications and unconfirmed information. One such document concerns the case of deserters in 1852 in the western Caucasus, who were dealt with by Major General Nikolai Wolf⁸ and Vice Admiral Lazar Serebryakov.⁹ Initially, Wolf informed Serebryakov that information had reached the commander-in-chief of tsarist troops in the Caucasus about a Polish officer named Kryżanowski deserting the army and taking up brigandage (the implication was that he had gone over to the free mountaineers – P.A.). Accordingly, the corps headquarters asked the Black Sea Shore Line command to scout the mountains for an escaped officer, or possibly a soldier of lower rank, named Kryżanowski; if so, they were to find out the reasons for his desertion and determine whether there were grounds for an investigation. Serebryakov, entrusted with this case, relayed that the intelligence officers had obtained information that there was no Kryżanowski among the mountaineers, but that seven different auls contained one Russian fugitive each (in the original the word used is “russkij”, indicating an ethnic Russian) who was involved in mountaineer attacks. The Vice Admiral reported that their names

8 Nikolai Wolf (1811–1881) took part in the suppression of the November Uprising in 1831 and was particularly distinguished in the capture of Warsaw. From 1837 he served in the Caucasus.

9 Lazar Serebryakov (1792–1862) served in the Black Sea fleet from 1810. In 1851, he became commander of the Black Sea Shore Line.

were not known, but that these individuals did not display cruelty during the assaults (Matveev 2008: 111).

To conclude this part of the work, it is worth giving the floor once more to Grigory Filipson, who in his memoirs objected to the negative judgements Russians made about Poles based on unverified conjecture:

Discipline was strictly enforced everywhere, although escapes to the mountaineers were, unfortunately, quite frequent. My distinguished comrade-in-arms, M.F. Fyodorov,¹⁰ going off of the words of Major General von Brink,¹¹ posted in the June 1877 issue of *Russkaya starina*¹² an article on the capture of the Mikhailov fortification. Among other inaccuracies, the article cites a claim that “the mountaineers received the most accurate tidings about the situation in our garrisons from deserter Poles”. I must protest against such an opinion. I have never felt sympathy for the Polish nation, nevertheless, in the Caucasus I met very many Poles of various ranks and importance who were ready full-heartedly to lend a friendly hand. Poles in the Shore Line troops, officers and soldiers, were more than 10%. There were proportionately no more deserters to the mountaineers from among the Poles than from among the Russians. Information could be passed on by the former as well as the latter if the mountaineers even needed it at all. From the mountains, rising above the fortifications at a distance of 250 fathoms,¹³ and sometimes less, they were able to see everything down to the smallest detail of what was going on within the fieldworks (Filipson 2000: 142).

10 Mikhail Fyodorov participated in the suppression of the November Uprising and served in the Caucasus from 1835. He is the author of memoirs entitled *Poxodnye zapiski na Kavkaze s 1835 po 1842 god.*

11 Yegor von Brink was the commander of Anapa. He died in 1841.

12 *Russkaya starina* was a historical monthly published in St. Petersburg between 1870 and 1918.

13 250 Russian fathoms at the time were approx. 533 meters.

Desertions of Poles from the Tsarist Army and the Attitude of the Independent Caucasian Peoples towards Runaways

The Polish subject literature, to substantiate the assertion that Poles served against their will in the tsarist army and that they were used to conquer the Caucasus despite their moral convictions, references the Poles' supposed mass desertions (Chodubski 1984: 4; Chodubski 1994: 61; Chodubski 2003d: 91; Chodubski 2005a: 22; Chodubski 2005b: 178; Miłoszowie 1979: 72; Zwierz 1996: 136). No source documents are usually cited to support this position, nor are calculations presented to demonstrate that desertions by Poles were somehow particularly more frequent than those by, for example, Russians, as well as being politically motivated.

Occasionally, as evidence of the mass desertion of those conscripted into the tsarist army after the November Uprising, certain information is cited regarding 500 Poles who were said to have fled tsarist units and joined the Persian army in the 1830s (Chodubski 2003d: 92; Darski; Piwnicki 2001: 48). However, it is worth verifying the source of this information. It first appeared in the second volume of the work by Polish missionary Manswet Aulich, *Dziennik dwunastyletniej misji apostołskiej na Wschodzie* (Diary of a Twelve-Year Apostolic Mission in the East), published in Kraków in 1850. The author, referring to the year 1837, wrote that a certain inhabitant of Lviv had come to him and asked him to go to Persia on a mission to perform spiritual service among Poles of whom, he claimed, as many as 500 were said to be enlisted in the army of the Persian Shah. He also claimed that these Poles had been without a priest for eight years already. Aulich then described his arrival in Persia in 1838, at which time the missionary reached the town of Khoy in north-western Iran. He found that there were up to 80 Poles and Russians in the area, serving in the army of the town's *basha* (i.e. administrator). However, during the missionary's stay, an order arrived from the state authorities to transfer all Poles and Russians to Tebriz, and this was carried out. The Polish priest then set out to visit a Chaldean bishop who lived in the city of Salmas and had about 500 Catholics in his parish. There he was informed that his efforts had been in vain, for the Shah of Persia had signed a treaty with the Tsar stipulating that Poles and Russians who had fled the Russian army and were living in Persia would be expelled to Russia. Wanting to confirm this for himself, Aulich travelled

to Tebriz. In that city, the Russian consul confirmed the information that he had previously received. The missionary also received news from Tehran that Persian forces had attacked the 500 Poles residing in the city. Some of them were said to have perished, some to have fled to India and Arabia, and others to have been handed over to Russia. Aulich returned thus to Istanbul, finding no reason why he should remain in Persia (Aulich 1850: 28–29). From the missionary's memoirs, therefore, it is not possible to deduce either the scale of Poles' desertions from the tsarist army or their numbers in the Persian army, as information on the number of Poles is limited to only two locations: the area around the city of Khoy and Tehran. Moreover, the missionary did not mention anything about the Poles residing in Tehran being soldiers. This could have been the case, but it is not inferable from the source text. For our consideration, the relevant information within the memoirs is that by 1837 eight years had passed with the Poles residing in Persia without a priest. As such, they could not have been November insurrectionists from 1830–1831. They had to have been in Persia by 1829 and cannot be considered 1830s deserters. Most likely, they had been prisoners and deserters from the Russo-Persian War of 1826–1828.

It should be noted that there are also identified cases of Poles living in Western Europe voluntarily joining the service of the Persian Shah. However, we have no documents proving this constituted a large group. Rather, these should be regarded as single cases. One such person, for example, was described by Wojciech Sulewski. The said individual went by Izydor Borowski, a legionnaire of the Polish Legions in Italy, who later took part in the French operation against Santo Domingo. The Pole settled there and joined the locals, cooperating with Simón Bolívar, among others. After a few years, however, he returned to Europe. In France, he learned that in Persia they were looking for experienced officers. He and his colleagues thus set off for that country, where Borowski went about forming infantry units. He also took part in a punitive expedition against the Arabs and in operations against the Afghans in 1826 (Sulewski 1973: 40–41).

Diaries are an important source for researching Poles' attitudes towards desertion. It would be expected that first and foremost those sent to exile for patriotic activities would have a positive attitude towards escape, yet it is difficult to distinguish such a position in their works. One opinion regarding escapes can be found, for example, in writings by Stanisław Pilat,¹ who, for his participation in the November Uprising, was punitively conscripted into the Russian army in the Caucasus and served there until 1835. He provided the story

1 It should be noted that Stanisław Pilat's memoirs were published in Lviv, so the author was not restricted by Russian censorship.

of a comrade-in-arms planning an escape to the Circassians. From the way this case was presented, it is clear that it represented a unique and rare phenomenon. The author, in an attempt to justify the intentions of the desertion-set man, wrote that he was not an ethnic Pole, but a polonised, Muslim Tatar. Stanisław Pilat advised his acquaintance against going over to the side of the Circassians and believed that it would be better for him to remain in the ranks of the Russian army. He argued that the Circassians were a “barbarous people even in their own cause” (Pilat 1862: 130). The memoir author stated that among the Poles serving alongside him in his unit, plans to go over to the side of the independent mountaineers initially did appear among soldiers, but these were quickly abandoned. The reason for this was that the independent mountaineers had surrendered two deserters in exchange for their own comrades in Russian captivity (Pilat 1862: 134). Pilat’s diary is characteristic in that he describes Russia and the tsar negatively, while manifesting a lack of sympathy for the peoples living in the Caucasus in parallel.

There were of course some Poles who sympathised with the independent mountaineers and expressed this in their memoirs. The most prominent examples are Wincenty Gedeon Giedroyć and Mateusz Gralewski. However, even they did not decide to join Shamil’s forces and instead served in the tsarist army well enough to be promoted to the rank of officer. Relating a clash between the Russian army and forces of the independent mountaineers at Chokh aul in 1849, Gralewski wrote that 200 soldiers fled at the time,² among whom Poles and Ukrainians were the most numerous (Gralewski 2015: 315), although without specifying whether they deserted over to Shamil. But even this author wrote at the end of his memoirs with undisguised regret that Poles did not flee to the independent mountaineers:

Before 1830 the Poles, having rarely come into contact with the Caucasians could explain themselves in that the mountaineers’ battles, resembling border skirmishes, did not yet define the people’s potential. However, after 1830, especially during the period of Shamil’s imamate, not uniting with them, while remaining in the invader’s ranks, albeit without the intent of killing the freedom-seeking peoples, was more than a mistake; it was an outward contradiction of the ideal they represented. There were no doubt personalities to whom inspiration indicated the correct path, nonetheless, unsupported by the whole, they squandered this sonorous manifestation of God’s voice. (Gralewski 2015: 579)

² This number of 200 soldiers who were to desert at Chokh aul seems inflated in the light of Wiesław Caban’s calculations, which will be discussed later in the publication.

Residing among the independent Circassians Teofil Łapiński, on the other hand, did describe in his memoirs a case of desertion from the tsarist army that took place in 1857. At the time, 166 privates were said to have escaped from a Russian camp (such a large number given by Łapiński is questionable, but it is not pertinent here). The author stated additionally that there were very few Poles and Ruthenians among them, only eight, while the vast majority were Russians and Tartars (Lapinskij 1995: 345). It should be borne in mind, of course, that this is one individual account and concerns the western part of the North Caucasus. However, it illustrates an important point – even the arrival of a Polish detachment, whose commander was cooperating with representatives of the Polish national camp centred around Prince Adam Czartoryski, did not spur Poles' desertions from the tsarist army. It is also difficult to argue that the increase in escapes was influenced by the appearance in the Caucasus of Czartoryski's envoys, whose task was, among other things, to goad Poles into fleeing to the independent mountaineers. The Princes Czartoryski Library has preserved the *Odezwa do Polaków* (Pronouncement to the Poles) that Ludwik Zwierkowski took to the Caucasus in 1844. It read:

Providing good will our duty is simple. Abandon the enemy ranks and the Moskals themselves, persuade others to flee. Destroy warehouses, war supplies. Sparl gunpowder, kill military horses. Exterminate the enemy. Sabotage roads, bridges, and army buildings. Run hither to the mountains with weapons and cartridges. Every such deed will be glory for a Pole, and after such a deed, every individual will be able to tell themselves, I serve my homeland rightly, I fulfil my duty. (Czajkowski 1844a)

During the Crimean War, an ostensibly convenient occasion for desertion, agents financed by Adam Czartoryski's camp informed their superiors about the small number of Polish runaways within the Caucasus. One such report was referred to by Andrzej Furier: "Overall, the hundred or so deserters who have turned up to date have long since been sent back to the minister of war. [...] Generally Moskals, Tartars, but very few Poles" (Furier 2009: 194). Polish historians have counted only a few cases of desertion over to the Turkish side during the Crimean War (Caban 2001a: 742). Similar conclusions are found in the diaries of tsarist generals. In such diaries, for example, the chief of staff of the Caucasus Army and later minister of war Dmitry Milyutin recorded that "the Poles were calm throughout the Crimean War" (Milyutin 1999: 47).

Polish desertions were so few that some members of the Hôtel Lambert began to realize that Poles could not constitute an independent force in the

region against the Russians. One such individual was Ludwik Bystrzonowski, who believed that an operation in the Caucasus could be successful if Muslims, Russians, and Poles acted together. Here he did not have in mind deserter Poles from the tsarist army, but rather Poles transported to the Caucasus from Western Europe (Caban 2001: 170). Reality thus verified Czartoryski's assumptions, who in the 1830s was still convinced of the possibility of instigating mass desertions among Polish soldiers.

The fact that escapes by Poles were not numerous (or at least not more frequent than among other nationalities) is also evidenced by reports of Russian commanders. In the 1840s, General Pavel Grabbe reported to his superiors that, although there were instances of Poles siding with the independent mountaineers, the majority of soldiers sent from Poland were distinguished by their exemplary behaviour (Klyčnikov/Lazaryan 2019: 6).

It is significant that researchers maintaining that desertions of soldiers of Polish origin from the tsarist army in the Caucasus were numerous do not provide data and rely on generalizing references like "frequent escapes". In contrast, reliable calculations, to the extent of available sources, were presented by Wiesław Caban, who pointed out that the number of Polish fugitives under Shamil had been hitherto exaggerated in publications (Caban 2005: 55). He cited data from the Caucasus Corps that shows, for example, that in 1833 (when representatives of the Hôtel Lambert planned to create an 18,000-strong Polish army in the Caucasus consisting of deserters from the tsarist army) 123 people, that is approximately 1.2% of the Poles serving in the unit, attempted to escape (Caban 2001: 169). Therefore, in the year in which Poles with particularly independence-minded views – participants of the November Uprising – served in the region, the rate of escapes was only slightly higher than the average rate for the tsar's army, regardless of a deserter's nationality. Indeed, between 1825 and 1850, it amounted to 0.7% of the army's total forces, meaning on average 6,235 people fled from garrisons across Russia each year (Caban 2001a: 740). As for the frequency of escapes by soldiers of Polish origin, according to the historian, these became increasingly rare from 1833 onwards (Caban 2001: 169). They did not, therefore, differ significantly from the average for the Russian army as a whole.

Based on Caban's research, it is possible to advance the thesis that desertions were a marginal phenomenon. A certain mindset likely prevailed among Polish soldiers, which was often expressed in diaries. It was connected with the dream of returning to the fatherland. The only way to realise this, however, was to serve a prescribed period in the army. If life among the independent mountaineers became the case, a return to Poland proved unrealistic. For this

reason, only a few decided to take such a desperate step as to escape. The relevant observation here is that this was conditioned primarily by arduous service and not by sympathy towards the peoples fighting against the Russians. Nikolai Pokrovsky, a researcher into the history of Shamil's state, found that, based on reports from the tsarist general staff, deserters most often fled after the commencement of summer processions, when drilling became particularly burdensome. They stayed in the forests for as long as it was possible to feed on the fruits there. Once foraging became no longer possible, many deserters returned to their regiments, albeit some did go over to Shamil (Pokrovskij N.I. 2000: 380). In the opinion of historian Oleg Matveyev, too, an analysis of archival material allows one to conclude that the majority of desertions from the tsarist army were in no way related to the ideals behind the slogan 'For Our Freedom and Yours', but rather to matters of livelihood: crimes committed in the line of duty and the desire to avoid punishment, negligence, or dissatisfaction with harsh living conditions (Matveev 2008: 113).

It should also be borne in mind that a portion of the deserters who went over to the mountaineers did return to the tsar's ranks after some time. This was mentioned, for example, by Karol Kalinowski, in his description of a group of deserters engaged in ferrying former soldiers back to Russian forts (Kalinowski 2017: 299–309). Returns of Polish deserters were recorded by, among others, French traveller Edouard Taitbout de Marigny. This individual recorded that he had seen several Poles who had come to Gelendzhik, claiming that their misfortune with the Russians was better than what had befallen them under the Circassians who treated them like slaves (de Marin'i 2002: 96). Other fugitives in turn were handed over by the local population to the Russians for money (there is no material based on which it would be possible to establish even an estimate of this practice's scale). In this way, for some mountaineers, this procedure turned into a profitable activity. It was not uncommon for them to also receive salt or food in exchange for deserters (Arsanukajewa 2012: 123). Even long-term residence among the Circassians did not guarantee fugitives their acceptance. In 1854, Vice Admiral Lazar Serebryakov informed the Caucasus Corps command that mountaineers had handed over a fugitive Pole and participant of the November Uprising, Franciszek Dłuski, who had lived with them for 15 years. In exchange, the Circassians received 10 roubles (Matveev 2008: 114). Starting a family and having children also did not shield deserters from being handed over to the Russians. A known case is that of one Łapicki, who lived among the Circassians for 9 years, married a local woman and had children, yet was still handed over by the independent Circassians at Novorossiysk (Matveev 2008: 114–115).

The mother of Roman Sanguszko,³ who was himself exiled to the Caucasus for taking part in the November Uprising, passed on in her memoirs the information she had received from her son regarding the above practice. By her account, the Circassians were a savage people. Several Poles decided to join them in the early 1830s. As Klementyna Sanguszkowa recounted, the most prominent of these was Major Bronowski (she did not mention his name, but probably Stanisław is implied), a participant in several battles on the side of the Circassians, whom he advised. He was later to arrange with them his transport to Turkey. In the end, however, the Circassians betrayed the Pole and sold him to the Russians for 300 roubles (Sanguszkowa 1927: 92). The practice of the Adyghe treating fugitives and prisoners from the Russian army as slaves (irrespective of their ethnic origin) was so well-established that Teofil Łapiński, who in the late 1850s resided in the part of the Western Caucasus not yet occupied by the Russians, estimated their number at around 2,400–2,500 (Łątka 1988: 223) (a similar calculation was made by Ludwik Widerszal (Widerszal 2011: 80)). Describing their situation, he stated that a defector was considered by the Circassians as the property of whoever came across him first. If the deserter possessed a horse, weapons, and money, he was stripped of everything. Even the clothing on his body was rarely left to him. The Polish commander reported that a Circassian would lead such a person home, shave his head, give him a tattered outfit, and keep him on the farmstead as a slave until deciding to sell him. A deserter was usually kept if he was a good craftsman, a blacksmith or saddler for example. In such cases, the householder would buy him the necessary tools, set up a workshop, and profit from his work. Those lacking a trade were instead used for work in the fields, tending cattle, and performing all manner of farm chores (Lapinskij 1995: 144).

Accounts of deserters being treated as slaves by the Caucasian peoples are also found in documents of the Russian command. One example is an 1838 report by General Nikolai Raevsky⁴ prepared for General Yevgeny Golovin.⁵ He reported therein that in most cases, deserters were turned into slaves who were then sold at markets in the Ottoman Empire, though some did participate in battles against Russians. According to Raevsky, the export of Poles from the

3 Roman Stanisław Sanguszko (1800–1881) – prince, Polish social activist. He was exiled to Siberia for his participation in the November Uprising, but thanks to his family's efforts was transferred to the Caucasus. He was promoted to officer for his distinction in fighting against the local population.

4 Nikolai Raevsky (1801–1843) commanded the Black Sea Shore Line from 1839 to 1841.

5 Yevgeny Golovin (1782–1858) was commander of the Caucasus Independent Corps from 1837 to 1842.

Caucasus to the Middle East decreased significantly when in the second half of the 1830s the Russians strengthened the blockade of Circassia and increased the number of coastal forts. Because of this, the price for slaves began falling (Matveev 2008: 115). General Marcelin Olshevsky, on the other hand, wrote in a report to his superiors that during the 1834 expedition beyond the Kuban an unusually large number of Poles fled, but that escapes decreased when the Poles discovered that the Shapsugs mistreat them and assign them to the heaviest farm labour (Arsanukajewa 2012: 124).

When Polish-English plans (drawn up mainly by Hôtel Lambert partisans) to exploit the Circassians against the Russians were drawn up, David Urquhart and James Bell began lobbying the latter to treat better the Poles residing among them, as they were to be used to fight tsarist troops. The British were said to have been informed by Poles serving in the Russian ranks that if they were provided with a good reception among the mountaineers, the number of desertions would inevitably increase. This was of no interest to the locals, however, as they valued slaves too highly to give them up, even in the name of fighting a common enemy. At most, they agreed to resell Polish slaves to the British for the equivalent of 4 pounds sterling and saw no possibility of releasing them without financial compensation to the owners (Widerszal 2011: 81). In contrast, John Longworth, another associate of David Urquhart who had spent several months among the Circassians, observed that they made no distinction between Poles and Russians and sought to sell anyone to the Ottoman Empire (Longworth 1840: 195).

Polish slaves found their way to the Ottoman Empire not only as a commodity supplied by the Circassians. Their arrival was also a consequence of the Russo-Turkish wars, especially those of 1828–1829 and 1853–1856, and the turning of prisoners of war into slaves. The scale of this phenomenon must have been considerable, for even one Polish émigré newspaper mentioned it: “A not inconsiderable number of Poles finds itself in Turkey, prisoners of war from the Russian campaign against the Turks, who have been sold as slaves in various places” (*Wiadomości* 1842: 322). Polish pro-independence circles recognised this problem and began buying them up. In the early 1840s, on the initiative of Adam Czartoryski, land was acquired near Istanbul and a village – Adampol – was built on it,⁶ where Poles bought out of slavery, some of whom were deserters from the Russian army stationed in the Caucasus, began settling (Widerszal 2011: 91).

6 Modern-day Polonezköy.

Occasionally, in descriptions of the phenomenon of the trade in Polish slaves, one can discern their authors' efforts to specifically exalt Poles and demonstrate their uniqueness. For example, in the opinion of Andrzej Chodubski, Poles were sold at above-average prices because they were considered exceptionally valuable. The researcher argued that they were sold for as much as £4 (most probably the £4 Chodubski writes of relates to the price offered by the Circassians to David Urquhart for buying up Poles, though the author did not specify this), while slaves from Asia or Africa were supposed to cost no more than half a pound (Chodubski 1984: 4; idem 1988: 36; idem 2000: 413; idem 2003d: 92; idem 2005a: 22; idem 2005b: 178). The same information was repeated by Grzegorz Piwnicki (Piwnicki 2001: 48). However, one should object to the reasoning that a slave was sold at a high price just for being Polish. What was most important was his skills and state of health, which influenced the future capacity of using him in farm work. This is evidenced by the case of Karol Kalinowski, who recorded in his memoirs that he was bought by his owner for one ram due to being in poor health (Kalinowski 2017: 52). Moreover, Baron Fyodor Tornau, a Russian officer who resided with the mountaineers as an intelligence gatherer in the 1830s, noted (regarding 1838) that the Ubykhs did not value Polish slaves over a single horse, and sometimes even paid for one with two Poles (Tornau 1999: 479).

There is a strong conviction among Polish authors writing about the Caucasus that Poles were not partitioners and aggressors against the locals of their own volition, but were forced out of necessity, which concurrently exacerbated the tragedy of Polish soldiers serving in the tsarist ranks. I discern in this a clear manifestation of the influence of the Polish ethno-political myth. It determines the view that Poles could not have cooperated with the 'historical enemy' in conquering other peoples, including possible contemporary allies in the fight against him (i.e. the Promethean assumptions already mentioned). At the same time, an image of the widespread "suffering" and "anguish" of Polish servicemen who fought for Russia in the Caucasus is created, although there is no methodological basis for it. In this context, I believe that Oleg Matveyev's thesis that Poles serving in tsarist ranks in the Caucasus tried to maintain their identity not in opposition to the tsar and through solidarity with the mountaineers, but above all by preserving their Catholic faith, should be considered correct (Matveyev 2008: 119).

Poles in Russian Service and Their Attitude towards Polishness

Among Polish authors writing on the Caucasus, there exists a conviction that Poles did not identify with the Russian conquests, that their participation in the endeavour was only out of compulsion and that, although participating in it, they fundamentally sympathised with the independent peoples and remained Polish patriots, cultivating Polish culture and striving for an independent Poland. In such an understanding of the matter, I identify a manifestation of the Polish ethno-political myth's influence, which determines the notion that Poles could not cooperate with the "historical enemy" in the conquest of other peoples, as they had "always" been champions of liberty and fought against its adversary – Russia.

In the above outline concerning the issue of Poles' service in the tsarist army in the Caucasus, several procedures used by contemporary Polish historians are distinctive. The first is a strong emphasis on the fact that Poles took part against their will in the conquest of the region and had moral dilemmas because of it. This is supposed to stem from them not wanting to come to terms with the fact that they had to fight against people defending their own independence. The explanation goes that Poles pitied and sympathised with the people of the Caucasus, perceiving them through the prism of their own fate and historical experience, which made them view their struggle against Russia as just. Consequently, they themselves did not identify with Russian conquests (Chodubski 1988: 36; idem 1994: 61; idem 2003d: 91; idem 2012a: 176; Filina/Osowska 2007: 36; Koseski 2002: 25; Later-Chodyłowa 2002: 48; Lijewska 1998; Piwnicki 2001: 48; idem 2011: 260; idem 2013: 8). Similar representations can also be found in journalistic writing (see Geremek 2008: 80; Jastrzębski 2014: 206).

The second procedure amounts to generating an image of the patriot-Pole who, even in the distant Caucasus, remained devoted to his homeland. Such a procedure was employed as early as the end of the 19th century. It is visible, for example, in works by historian and sociologist Bolesław Limanowski, who wrote: "and we saw more than once that Poles returned from the Caucasus more patriotic than they had been before" (Limanowski 1894: 233). Nevertheless, it wasn't till the beginning of the 21st century that this way of presenting Poles serving in the tsarist army became popular. The most influential scholar

propagating such an image was Chodubski. He mainly dealt with Poles in Azerbaijan but extended many of his theses to all Poles who had found themselves in the Caucasus in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The academic's most important premise, characteristic of his work and recurring in many of his publications, was the claim that Poles were patriots (regarding Poland) preserving their religion (i.e. Catholicism) and culture, acclimated easily in any new place without succumbing to Russification, and at the same time set an example for other nationalities living in the Caucasus through their demeanour, winning universal respect (Chodubski 1986: 93; idem 2000b: 236–239; idem 2001: 158; idem 2003d: 10; idem 2006a: 107–108; idem 2012a: 183).

In Chodubski's opinion, an important role in the preservation of Poles' national and religious identity was played by the cultural and educational organisations in which they were actively involved, and this applied not only to the intelligentsia but to their entire community (Chodubski 2000b: 236–237; idem 2005: 111; idem 2006: 13). This, in turn, meant that Poles set an example in the organisation of cultural life and consolidation of one's own culture for other nationalities living in the Caucasus (Chodubski 2005b: 194; idem 2005c: 74). In the context of strengthening Polishness, the Polish House is pointed to as an institution that aided Poles in safeguarding against assimilation (Chodubski 2005a: 38; Olszewski 2012: 139; Piwnicki 2001: 234).

When discussing the situation of Polish exiles to the tsarist army stationed in the Caucasus, it should be noted that, per historians dealing with the Russian army, Polish "political criminals" were not discriminated against for their previous conduct concerning conscripted soldiers, nor were they persecuted for their views. This was in connection with the view adopted in tsarist Russia that army service "smooths over" past transgressions (Matveev 2008: 103). These did not thus affect the possibility of advancement. It was relatively easy for exiles to obtain non-commissioned officer ranks and, with the right education, be promoted even to officer. Here, the clearest example is that of Wincenty Gedeon Giedroyć, who, although convicted of attempting to assassinate Tsar Nicholas I, was promoted to officer after several years of service in the Caucasus (Baranowski 1982: 287).

Wiesław Caban noted that a substantial portion of the conspirator youth was made up of senior secondary school pupils, students, and civil servants, as such individuals excluded from compulsory military service under conscription regulations. They also usually hailed from the noble estate, which commanded a certain respect from their superiors in the army, and resulted in more lenient treatment compared to conscripts. A second reason was their cultural and educational activity. A portion of Russian officers wanted Poles to teach their children foreign languages, music, introduce them to Western

literature, etc. (Caban 2001: 138–139). This was a consequence of the fact that there was a disproportionate number of intellectuals among Polish exiles (concerning the total number of soldiers serving in the tsarist army). For this reason, they occupied positions requiring adequate mental grooming. The example of exiled Vilnian academics, who wrote down regimental histories or worked in regiments' orderly rooms, may serve here (Widerszal 2011:33). Due to their education, they were able to occupy executive positions even lacking officer status, like Kazimierz Łapczyński, who, with his technical education, was in charge of engineering work even though he was not a non-commissioned officer (Baranowski/Baranowski 1985: 51).

Confirmation of this can be found in Polish exiles' memoirs, in the work of Zygmunt Rewkowski for example. It contains many anti-Russian accents, but also plenty of evidence that a Pole was treated better than other soldiers on account of noble origin. He experienced this already on his way to the Caucasus, about which he wrote:

To a senior non-commissioned officer at headquarters, the auditor Kalashnikov recommended in front of my eyes that they should have consideration for us, as befitting *dvoriane* [i.e. noblemen – P.A.]; it also happened that they themselves were well-mannered and very honest people; so they served and nearly fawned all over us the whole way, such that we never experienced the slightest botheration from any of them. (Rewkowski 2011a: 12)

In another instance, while making his way to his unit through Dagestan, one Pole alongside several recruits committed insubordination (significantly overtaking the convoy commander during a march). Rewkowski wrote of this incident:

Finally, it came to pass that a non-commissioned officer on a wagon was left far behind, he rushed out and called after us, and having caught up, proceeded to cudgel each of us in turn – I was standing to the side at the time, waiting to get my comeuppance – but it ended with a rather polite remark that the country here is dangerous, that he is responsible for the entirety, and that we cannot straggle – the good fellow must have known that I am a *dvorianin* [i.e. a nobleman – P.A.], and must not be beaten. (Rewkowski 2011a: 27)

After arriving at his regiment, Rewkowski recalled that he and others “from among the Polish nobility exiled for 1831 and various political transgressions”,

as well as exiled demoted officers, had no responsibilities: “all these men were assigned no duty – they were not called for drill – each lived as he wanted and was able. Almost all wore civilian attire – in a word, they were given complete leeway, and no one considered oppressing, tormenting, or persecuting them”. Rewkowski, remaining on good terms with command, never performed ordinary soldier duties. When, thanks to his connections, he was promoted to officer, he wrote: “Having arranged my quarters, the time came to think on my duties. As a soldier, I had never been on duty. I absolutely did not know how to be a front-line officer either” (Rewkowski 2011: 31–32, 196).

Zygmunt Rewkowski had strings pulled mainly through the regimental commander, General Franz von Klugenau. The Polish exile became his son’s tutor and lived in his superior’s house until he himself was promoted to officer. According to the exile’s writings, von Klugenau liked Poles and favoured them. The author noted that on expeditions he surrounded himself with a bodyguard made up of junkers and demotees, mostly Poles, whose valour he valued. Another tsarist commander favourably disposed towards Poles was said to have been General Pyotr Nesterov,¹ who, as Rewkowski wrote, “greatly patronized demoted Poles”. Another sympathetic figure towards Polish nobles was said to be Nikolai Yevdokimov.² Describing social relations in his unit, the Polish exile stressed that “almost all the unfortunate soldier Poles [the author meant here those sent to military service as punishment – P.A.] from the nobility [...] constantly frequented Yevdokimov’s men”. We can assume that General Konstantin Ivelich too was not indifferent to their fate. When he learned from Rewkowski that one of the exiled Polish noblemen was tasked with carrying water, he gave him an extra ration of meat, made sure that he was no longer sent to do manual labour, and then placed him in the regimental orchestra. In Zygmunt Rewkowski’s memoirs, we find passages testifying to the promotions of Polish noblemen to officers as well. He mentions, for example, 10 exiles from the Konarski case who went on to make careers in the tsarist army. Rewkowski himself, thanks to von Klugenau’s manipulations (on this in a further passage of this work), was promoted to officer in 1841 and became regimental adjutant (Rewkowski 2011a: 31–36, 63, 76, 91, 139).

1 Pyotr Nesterov (1802–1854) suppressed the November Uprising in the Kingdom of Poland in 1831 and then served in the Caucasus. In 1842 he became commander of Vladikavkaz and in 1846 chief of the Vladikavkaz district. He reached the rank of lieutenant general.

2 Nikolai Yevdokimov (1804–1873) was the son of a serf, so his career in the tsarist army in the Caucasus exemplifies one of the most spectacular. He joined the military as a volunteer at the age of 16. He spent his entire service in the Caucasus, where he reached the rank of general and was awarded the title of *graf* for his combat merits.

Many other examples of Polish political exiles' advancement can be found in the subject literature. Of these, probably the greatest career in the Russian army in the Caucasus was that of Franciszek Wojakowski, a student at the Vilnius Medicine and Surgery Academy, who was exiled to the Caucasus in 1839 for his participation in an outlawed association. There, thanks to his combat merits against the mountaineers, he was promoted to the rank of major general, holding, among other positions, the respective posts of chief of the Kumyk and Kabardian districts (Savel'ev 2013). Promotions to general ranks in the tsarist army in the Caucasus did not bypass November insurrectionists either. One example is Apolinary Rukiewicz, who left behind memoirs entitled *Iz vospominanij starogo érivanca*, published in 1914 in volumes 137 and 138 of the journal *Istoričeskij V'stnik*. He came from a Polish noble family settled in Lithuania (Grodno Governorate). Rukiewicz's father was a major in the Polish army who had settled in Volhynia during the Napoleonic wars. As the outbreak of the November Uprising approached, he sent his son to university in Kraków to take him out of danger. However, in the summer of 1831, Apolinary came home for holiday and joined a partisan unit. When he fell into the hands of the Cossacks he was sentenced to be shot, which was later commuted to exile as a private to the tsarist army stationed in the Caucasus (Rukevič 1914: 512–526). He served there for 52 years. In 1839 Rukiewicz was promoted to the first rank of officer for his combat merits in operations against the free mountaineers. His career progressed and in 1863, as a colonel, he took command of the 151st Pyatigorsk Infantry Regiment. He ended his military career in 1875 with the rank of major general, having been war chief of the Kuban region since 1871 (Komisarčuk 2015). Later January Uprising commanders, such as Ludwik Narbutt, were also promoted to officers during punitive service in the Caucasus. According to his sister's memoirs, Narbutt took part in dozens of skirmishes against free mountaineers, being wounded four times. He distinguished himself in these battles by his extraordinary bravery, personal courage, and acumen, thus commanding the highest respect from the Russians. As a result, he was promoted to officer (Sołtysowa 1903: 434).

According to Caban's calculations, made concerning Russia as a whole, 62% of Polish exiles were promoted to the rank of non-commissioned officer or officer (Caban 2001: 158). It should be assumed that in the Caucasus this ratio may have been somewhat higher due to combat against mountaineers, in which one could prove oneself to superiors. For this reason, exiles considered this region more attractive than other parts of Russia. A model example is the fate of Roman Sanguszko, who came from a well-known magnate family. He was exiled to the Orenburg Line for his participation in the November Uprising, but thanks to family connections and acquaintances managed to

transfer to the Caucasus, which was considered a better place for army service (Sanguszkowa 1927: 63).

The matter of the promotions of Polish exiles did not escape the attention of the foreign press. Traces of this can be found in the pages of *Dziennik Narodowy*. Referencing information taken from the "Augsburg Gazette", it included a note about November Uprising participants, stating that "having been taken prisoner, they were sent to the Caucasus as simple soldiers, but as a result of their great bravery they mostly regained their officerial ranks" (Wiadomości 1846: 1076). In this context, one document, written in 1836 in Paris within the circle of people closely connected to Adam Czartoryski, proved interesting. It noted: "We heard here that Poles in the Caucasus distinguish themselves by their courage in battles against the Cherkess. That this was even reported to Nicholas [referring to Russia's tsar – P.A.]" (Czartoryski 1835).

Regarding the involvement of Poles in the struggle against the mountaineers, an 1834 letter sent by Grigory Rozen, commander of the Caucasus Independent Corps, to Minister of War Alexander Chernyshyov is interesting. Describing an expedition in Dagestan commanded by Franz von Klugenau, he noted that Poles performed special dangerous tasks with exemplary zeal and made up the majority of volunteers in the units assigned to these (Cifanova 2005: 87).

General Grigory Filipson, in turn, wrote in his memoirs about Poles' initiative:

[...] these were Trzaskowski and Lisowski, both students at Kiev University, exiled to serve in Abkhazia for their participation in one of the conspiracies that were so often concocted in that country ... They ended up in Abkhazia in 1828 [...] When Abkhazia became part of the Black Sea Shore Line, I took Trzaskowski into my staff as senior adjutant. In this position, he worked very reliably and sensibly. Before starting any expedition, I would send him on a ship to all the fortifications to collect all demotees who wanted to take part in combat operations. Up to 200 people were usually gathered, whom we jokingly called the "foreign legion" [it consisted mostly of Poles – P.A.]. Trzaskowski was often their commander. It does not even need to be said that this legion frantically charged into fire, to stand out and change their predicament. It is pleasant to recall that a great many of these unfortunates achieved this goal. In general, there were quite a few excellent officers and soldiers among the Poles, just as there were among other nationalities, albeit they were more conspicuous as their situation afforded them a particular originality. (Filipson 2000: 161)

One may judge that promotions were not always ethical and were a taboo subject. Such a conclusion can be drawn from the diary of Gralewski, who, not wishing to elaborate on the subject, cut the discussion with the statement that “it is a divine mystery by what means Poles had obtained ranks and titles” (Gralewski 2015: 94). In the absence of research material, it is currently difficult to analyse this phenomenon. One of the few examples in this regard is provided by the memoirs of Zygmunt Rewkowski, tutor to the son of General Franz von Klugenau. They show that the Pole and his protégé were sent in the spring of 1840 to the mineral waters in Pyatigorsk (the general wanted to treat his son). In the meantime, von Klugenau went on an expedition against the mountaineers. In his expedition report, he noted that Rewkowski, who was said to have distinguished himself in the battle against Shamil’s forces at Ishkarty, also took part, even though the Pole was actually in a completely different place at the time (Rewkowski 2011a: 76).

In the annexation of the Caucasus to Russia, also of merit were Poles who voluntarily enlisted in the tsarist army. Several of them made careers as generals. Of these, the best known were: Feliks Krukowski, from 1848 major general and *ataman* of the Caucasus Line Army, who took part in many expeditions against the Chechens and Dagestani peoples; Józef Reutt (Reut), lieutenant general, head of the civilian Transcaucasus Region Administration, who served in the Caucasus for several decades, for which he was decorated with, among other things, numerous orders; Sylwester Malinowski, lieutenant general, who from 1832 commanded the Black Sea Cordon Line and led operations against the Adyghe beyond the Kuban; Marcellin Olszewski, lieutenant general, who took part in operations against the Adyghe and was, among other things, commander of troops of the Kuban region; Andrzej Pacowski, major general, in the 1830s commander of Russian troops in the Transcaucasus. In the 1830s, he was commander of Russian troops in Abkhazia, as well as commander-in-chief of the Akhaltsikhe province; Justyn Czaplic, lieutenant general, who in the 1840s and 1850s took part in the conquest of the Caucasus, including operations against Imam Shamil, commanding, among others, the 1st and 2nd brigades of the 21st Infantry Division; Mikołaj Zawadowski, cavalry general, from 1848 commander of troops on the Caucasus Line and Black Sea, *ataman* of the Black Sea Cossack Army, who played a significant role in expeditions against the Shapsugs and *naib* Muhammad-Amin; Benedykt Kozłowski, infantry general, from 1841 commander of a Kabardian regiment, which took part in operations against Shamil, and from 1853 was commander of troops on the Caucasus Line and Black Sea (Cifanova 2005: 101).

Even after the end of hostilities, commanders of Polish origin continued making military careers, consolidating tsarist rule in the region. In this case,

one of the most famous is Zygmunt Wolski. Having spent time in the Caucasus since the 1870s, he rose to the rank of lieutenant general in the tsarist army. The crowning achievement of his career was his appointment to wartime governor of Dagestan from 1908 to 1915 and his command of the Caucasian War District from 1915 to 1917 (*Vol'skij* 2012).

The fact that Poles adapted well to the existing conditions under tsarist administration in the Caucasus after the Russian conquest is evidenced, among other things, by the memoirs of Russian general and diplomat Konstantin von Benckendorff:³

The Poles acclimated exceptionally well in the Caucasus and put down deep roots here in all offices and chancelleries. They have covered the entire war administration with an invisible net and ensnared all its sections and departments, starting with the shift-plan writers and ending with the heads of administration of our generals-administrators. (Benckendorf 2000: 347–348)

Benckendorff also noted: “Of course, this cobweb had no political significance, and no mention of this in the Caucasus could be made [...]”. This passage concerning Poles in the Caucasus concluded: “The Poles confer [...] excellent officers and soldiers, worthy companions to the Russians” (Benckendorf 2000: 348). In turn, the aforementioned Grotkowski reported in Istanbul to representatives of the Hôtel Lambert that Mikhail Vorontsov’s administration is very temperate, and the governor and his wife do a lot of good for the Poles, so much so that the Tsar himself was said to be angered” (Grotkowski 1846) (the author did not specify what this good was supposed to entail, but likely it concerned promotions).

There is of course the additional problem of their feeling of “being Polish” due to origin and the issue of Russification, which today is no longer clearly definable. These difficulties are well illustrated by the information concerning General Benedykt Kozłowski quoted in Grigory Filipson’s memoirs:

He was a Pole (from Mogilev Governorate) and a Catholic, but he tried concealing this. Being a regimental commander, he would tell me that on holidays he always went to the Orthodox church and crossed himself in our manner, i.e. from his right shoulder to his left, yet would

³ Konstantin von Benckendorff (1817–1858) was a Russian major general who served in the Caucasus in the late 1830s and early 1840s. From 1847 to 1849 he held the position of military attaché in Berlin.

then make the Catholic cross under his greatcoat, i.e. from left to right. (Filipson 2000: 169)

Among the best-known Poles who chose a career in the tsarist army and served in the Caucasus was Józef Hauke-Bosak. In January 1861, he signed up to serve in a unit stationed at the Ust-Laba war encampment as a volunteer. There he commanded a rifle battalion of the Stavropol Infantry Regiment, in which he was deputy commander. He was rewarded with a promotion and the tsar's decoration for his merits in expeditions against the mountaineers (Bulava 2013: 149). When the January Uprising broke out in January 1863, Hauke-Bosak resigned and became a close associate of Romuald Traugutt, the uprising's dictator. Another famous Pole who enlisted in the Russian army and served in the Caucasus was Jarosław Dąbrowski. He stayed in the region from 1855 to 1859 and fought against the Circassians as an artilleryman in the 19th Field Artillery Brigade, which had its headquarters at the Urupskaya *stanitsa*. He was sent to the Caucasus with the rank of ensign after graduating from the Cadet Corps in Saint Petersburg. Dąbrowski's Russian biographer, Vladimir Dyakov, cited documents in his work demonstrating that the Pole actively participated in operations against the free mountaineers. In 1857, he received a reward of 122 silver roubles for distinguishing himself during a summer expedition and was promoted to second lieutenant the following year (D'yakov 1969: 36–40). Historian Adam Buława also mentioned Edmund Różycki among the well-known commanders of the January Uprising who had previously voluntarily joined tsarist forces and served in the Caucasus. He stayed in the region three times throughout the 1840s and 1850s, took part in operations against the inhabitants of Dagestan and joined the staff of the Caucasus Corps with the rank of captain (Bulava 2013: 148–149). After his return to the country and the outbreak of the January Uprising, Różycki became one of the main leaders of the independence movement in Ukraine.

In the context of the patriotism and attachment to the idea of Polish independence of former soldiers of Polish origin serving in the tsarist army in the mid-19th century, to date no broader study has been conducted. However, Caban has cited data that contradicts the thesis of the widespread involvement of this group in the idea of building an independent Poland. According to his calculations, out of 6,000 Poles serving in the officer corps about 300 went over to the insurrectionists during the January Uprising (Caban 2014: 205). The historian also analysed data on the involvement of former soldiers in the January Uprising. While political exiles did actively support it, the complete opposite was true for recruits and volunteers. Studying documents relating to the inhabitants of Radom Governorate, Caban calculated that out of the 9.7 thousand arrested for participation in the uprising, former servicemen

accounted for 0.9%, i.e. there were fewer of them among the insurrectionists than Jews, who were calculated at 2%, or foreigners – 2.8%. The historian cited one interesting case concerning Radom Governorate, where intensive military operations were carried out from January 1863 to November 1864. About 4,200 former soldiers were serving in the tsarist army in this area. Caban managed to identify 223 people among them who reacted in some way politically to the fighting. Of these, 127, i.e. 63.2%, voluntarily reported to the nearest Russian troops and declared their willingness to take part in the suppression of the uprising (Caban 2001: 198, 202, 210).

When researching the question of Polish soldiers' returning (dismissed and on leave) from the tsarist army, the historian claimed that when analysing police reports from Lublin, Kielce or Radom, thus fairly significant cities in the Kingdom of Poland, he did not come across information indicating that such individuals got involved in patriotic activity. The researcher explained this by the fact that conscripts taken into the army, after 15–20 years of service, were largely russified and upon their return became "foreign" in their environment (Caban 2001: 194–195).

Caban's thesis that the emergence of the image of Polish soldiers serving in the tsarist army and supposedly being patriots – in the sense that they strived for the establishment of an independent Poland – seems to be justifiably connected with the myth of Wallenrodism⁴ disseminated by those who successfully passed verification in the Second *Rzeczpospolita*. In their view, Poles joined the Russian army to use at an opportune moment the experience they gained for the good of their homeland. According to Caban, however, they enlisted mainly out of material motives. Based on archival queries, he concluded that, in general, entering military schools from the Kingdom of Poland and partitioned territories were young individuals whose families found themselves in financial straits (Caban 2014: 205).

According to Oleg Matveyev, the phenomenon of the involvement of Poles serving in the Caucasus (the historian made his remarks concerning Poles in Black Sea Shore Line units, but it seems to me that nothing stands in the way of extending his observations to the entire Caucasus) in the fight against the mountaineers can be explained by cultural bilingualism. Through service in the armed forces of a multinational empire, they came to be a link between Russia and their homeland, Poland. For this reason, Polish soldiers in the Caucasus became the bearers, defenders, and builders of Russian statehood (Matveev 2008: 128–129).

4 Wallenrodism – a term associated with the novel *Konrad Wallenrod* by Adam Mickiewicz. It denotes a man who pursues a lofty and noble goal by deception.

The presence of employees of Polish origin was evident in the tsarist administration, especially in Tiflis, where the administrative centre was located. Antoni Rehman, who resided in the Caucasus in the 1870s, wrote that the city was divided into three parts: European, Asian – inhabited mainly by Persians and Tartars⁵ – and German. The European part, then, was half inhabited by Russians, Poles, Germans, and French, and half by local Armenians and Georgians. The traveller noted: “Russians and Poles represent the local intelligentsia, remain almost without exception in government service and occupy high ranks as military and civil servants” (Rehman 1879: 7–8). In the eastern part of the Caucasus too however Poles made careers in administration, as can be seen in the case of Stanisław Despot-Zenowicz, who held the post of mayor of Baku for several years at the end of the 19th century (Chodubski 2005c: 73).

In addition to administrative and military personnel, geologists, engineers constructing roads, railways, and involved in the mining industry, architects, doctors, and teachers, among others, played a visible role in the Caucasus. However, they constituted a tool for the Russification of the region. The tsardom’s colonisation plans called for the settlement of as many Christians as possible to provide a “counterbalance” to Muslims, who – in the opinion of Russian officials – posed a threat due to their proximity to Muslim Persia and Ottoman Empire. It was for this reason that Poles, Czechs, Germans and, of course, Russians, representing intellectual professions, appeared in the Caucasus (Grigorašvili-Burakovskaya 2007: 196). They consolidated Russian power over the region.

I share Oleg Matveyev’s view that Poles usually adapted well within the Slavic environment of civil servants and military officers in the Caucasus, and built their identity not in opposition to the tsar and Russia, but through attachment to the Catholic religion and preservation of traditional values. Caban was of a similar mind to the Russian historian. This researcher believed that the sense of Polish identity should be looked at differently regarding recruits, the vast majority of whom were peasants, than regarding the educated exiled for political reasons. Fulfilling religious practice was important for both groups however (Caban 2001a: 737). Confirmation of such a state of affairs can be found in archival material. For example, concerning Polish soldiers in the Caucasus, Grotkowski stated that “religion speaks over nationality among them”, while about priests residing in the region that “[they] are bad Poles, completely sold out to Moscow” (Grotkowski 1846).

5 The Tatars were referred to as the Turkic people and the term should not be equated with ethnic Tatars.

Because Poles built their identity around religion, the tsardom did not interfere (at least overtly) with the maintenance of Catholic practice by soldiers serving in the Caucasus. Occasionally, but not too often, symbolic support from state authorities for the construction of Catholic churches also occurred. For example, in the 1840s, Nicholas I added 40 roubles in gold to the 180 roubles already collected by Poles for the construction of a church in Pyatigorsk. At that time, this parish had about 130 parishioners, 90 of whom were Poles (Komaiszko 2015: 6). Catholicism was not openly combated in the eastern part of the Caucasus either. For example, it is known that Julian Surzycki, serving in the Absheron Regiment stationed in Dëshlagar⁶ in which 300 to 500 Polish Catholics served, initiated the construction of a church. The tsarist authorities agreed to the idea and allocated the site, but did not support the project materially. Those involved had to cover the entire cost out of pocket, and the building was erected by their own hands, being completed in 1856 (W.D. 1882: 290).

In his memoirs, Gralewski wrote on the topic of Catholics, that in the Caucasus they consisted of Armenians and Poles, as well as a small number of Chaldeans. They possessed forty-seven houses of prayer, some of which were staffed by Polish and Armenian clergy alongside one another. Polish priests were sent to the Caucasus from Lithuanian and Ruthenian monasteries as military brigade chaplains. They performed the duties of parish priests at churches and received salaries equivalent to a captain's pay. Gralewski also mentioned that occasionally Catholic priests took part in marches against the mountaineers alongside Orthodox ones (Gralewski 2015: 227).

Based on analyses of normative acts and correspondence, Caban made the observation that possibly all applications from commanders for the assignment of a chaplain were granted, albeit this constituted a lengthy bureaucratic process. The Ministry of War had to obtain the tsar's approval on the matter in each instance. In October 1835, the tsar agreed with the position of the commander of the Separate Caucasian Corps that one Catholic priest be appointed for every five infantry brigades (Caban 2001a: 737–738).

Poles' attachment to Catholicism in the Caucasus is, nonetheless, a very complicated subject. One may reference the aforementioned example of General Benedykt Kozłowski, who attended an Orthodox church and concealed his Catholic faith. This did not apply only to individuals who hoped for a military career and volunteered to serve. Abandoning Catholicism was also noticeable among political exiles. Here, Tadeusz Łada-Zabłocki, the best-known Polish-language poet residing in the Caucasus, can be mentioned first and

6 Current Sergokala in Dagestan.

foremost. At his trial, during which he was accused of participating in underground student associations, he expressed remorse, declared his attachment to Russia, and that he intended to convert to Orthodoxy (Filina/Ossowska 2007: 29). The religious affiliation of another well-known exile, Apolinary Rukiewicz, who chose a military career in the tsarist army, where he rose to the rank of major general, is also not entirely clear. Although he came from a Catholic family, he was buried in the Orthodox cemetery in Krasnodar per his own wishes (Rukevič 1914: 791).

Aleksander Sielicki, who studied the history of Poles in the Kuban, provided interesting information in his work. The historian found that they lived almost exclusively in towns. According to him, only two cases of Polish villages being founded in the region are known. One of these is Razdolnoye (located near Sochi), while the other is Temnolesskaya (now located in Apsheronky District of Krasnodar Krai). Razdolnoye was founded by Polish relocatees from the partitioned territories. They arrived around 1870 mainly from the Kiev, Kharkov, and Podolia governorates, and by the 1870s and 1880s a portion of them had already converted to Orthodoxy. The second village, in turn, was founded in the 1860s, after the end of the Caucasian War. It was founded by Poles from Podolia Governorate at the invitation of the region's authorities as part of a colonisation campaign to settle Christians in the Caucasus. In the case of the Temnolesskaya *stanitsa*, already the first generation would convert entirely to Orthodoxy (Selickij 2008: 6).

Sometimes attachment to national-religious values was manifested in the issue of choosing a spouse. It is noticeable that marriages between Polish men and Caucasian women were very rare. If they did occur, they were most often to Georgian women (Baranowski 1982: 288). A feature of the Polish element in the Caucasus was the preponderance of young men over women. Although the number of women increased over the years, finding a Polish wife was extremely difficult (according to official statistics, at the end of the 19th century in the Caucasus lived 68% Polish men and 32% Polish women, while 50 years earlier the percentage of men was even higher, with Gralewski mentioning that in 1848 there were 28,000 Poles in the Caucasus, of whom men accounted for 93% (Gralewski 2015: 562)). Candidates for spouses were therefore sought among women of foreign origin, with consequences for family life (Furier 2009: 214). Poles mostly married representatives of other Slavic groups (mainly Eastern Slavs), so children born in such unions (i.e. Catholic-Orthodox) had to be, according to the laws in force, Orthodox. This was a purely civil requirement, as this rule is not strictly applicable within the Orthodox Church. Irina Tsifanova, who analysed 19th-century marriages

of Poles in the Caucasus, found that this was the reason behind Poles' trying to nonetheless marry Catholic women. These, in turn, were not numerous enough in the region, hence the popularity of marrying Orthodox women. The most common model for such a family was Catholic husband and Orthodox wife and children. This quickly led to Russification, as the language spoken at home was Russian. Occasionally, the man would convert to Orthodoxy before marriage, which may have been related to a desire to facilitate a career in the army or administration. Much less often it was the Orthodox woman who converted to Catholicism before marriage (Cifanova 2007: 176–177). It is difficult to operate on any statistical data in this matter, and one can only rely on the individual cases documented by Tsifanova. Of course, it would be false to claim that Catholicism prevented a career in the tsarist army. The best example of this would be Lieutenant General Józef Reutt (Reut), one of those Poles who made their greatest career in the tsarist army while serving in the Caucasus. The exile Zygmunt Rewkowski characterised him as a Pole from Lithuania, distinguished in constant battles against the mountaineers, and at the same time a very devout Catholic (Rewkowski 2011a: 87).

It is extremely challenging methodologically to investigate the attachment of Poles residing in the region to Polishness. Given the paucity of research material, it is doubtful that it will ever be possible to analyse this issue holistically. An important source, but also one that is not representative of the entire community at the disposal of a contemporary researcher, is memoirs and epistolographic material (after all, the vast majority of Poles in the Caucasus were illiterate peasants). It should be stressed, however, that even in these materials the threads illuminating the attitudes to Polish culture and the “patriotism” of Poles residing in the Caucasus are not very numerous. One work that devotes space to them is Gralewski's memoirs.⁷ He wrote on, among other things, the functioning of various circles intended to sustain Polish culture among soldiers. However, due to the lack of material, it is impossible to determine to what extent such phenomena were typical of the Polish community and contributed to containing Russification.

The contemporary researcher also has at his disposal materials suggesting that Poles were not unique in this respect and, similarly to other groups, were subject to denationalisation. This may be evidenced, for example, by letters from Poles residing in Georgia in the second half of the 19th century sent to periodicals published in Poland. In one such letter, the author stressed that

7 Gralewski devoted one of the chapters entirely to Poles living in the Caucasus (see Gralewski 2015: 534–587).

Poles were ceasing to use their mother tongue and that even the Polish intelligentsia in Tiflis spoke very little Polish. Another, in turn, lamented to the editor: “Well, here in Tiflis we have only countrymen – and nothing else: no connectedness, no node, no institution, each person lives closed in on themselves”. In turn, a Polish newspaper correspondent lamented that the children of local middle-class Poles often do not know their mother tongue at all, and yet Polish teachers cannot find work. The Polish press also reported on the difficulties of organising a national life that could be a mainstay of Polishness, such as libraries. At the beginning of the 20th century, still, the author of one letter wrote: “We live here [i.e. in Tiflis – P.A.] very isolated, connecting little with one another, as we lack a focal point around which to gather”. This may indicate that the Polish intelligentsia in Tiflis was largely Russified, while for many it was only with the great wave of Polish affairs that arrived in the Caucasus during World War I that a return to Polishness and a discovery of national identity began (Woźniak 1991: 155–160). Before 1914–1918, it is difficult to find evidence that Poles living in the region were somehow exceptionally attached to their own culture or patriotism when compared to other groups. Tadeusz Wyganowski, who was constructing an oil pipeline in Transcaucasia from Baku to Batumi, had impressions similar to those of the authors of the letters cited above. In his memoirs, he wrote that Poles are very easily denationalised and that already the second generation loses its Polish character (Wyganowski 1907: 7, 20).

Some statistical data can also attest to the denationalisation of Poles in the Caucasus. For example, at the end of the 19th century, there were just over 3,000 Poles living in Tiflis, of whom 277 could read and write in Polish, while 1,884 could read and write in Russian. It is also difficult to find evidence of Poles’ active involvement in initiatives to preserve Polish culture and protect it against Russification. When a Polish school was established at St. Peter and St. Paul’s Church in Tiflis in 1901, it was attended by 80 pupils. The following year saw an increase to 105 pupils, but then a steady decline was observed, down to 61 pupils by 1906 (Mądzik 1987: 36, 69–70). In the following years, other such undertakings received even less attention. At the end of 1907 Poles succeeded in forming the association Polish House (*Polski Dom*), its main task being to promote the cultural development of all strata of Tiflis’ Polish population. The plan was to establish a library, a reading room, a bookshop, and a Polish school, and start publishing books. In 1909, the association had 84 members, but by 1910 there were only 11 left and only the library remained functioning (Woźniak 1991: 157–158).

Legitimising the lack of organisation of Polish life in the Caucasus, Andrzej Furier stated that Poles' activity faced obstacles from the authorities (Furier 2009: 328). It is possible to partially agree with this assumption, particularly concerning the mid-19th century. However, when tsarist policy evolved at the end of the 19th century and ceased to be as restrictive as it had been in earlier decades, no sudden development of Polish organisations occurred in this period either. I explain this by the fact that Poles in the Caucasus felt comfortable in a Russian-speaking environment and did not feel the need to concern themselves with fostering Polish culture.

The Notion of Poles' Contributions to Developing the Caucasus

Inherent to the Polish narrative around Polish-Caucasian brotherhood within the Polish ethnopolitical myth, is the belief in the momentousness of Poles' contributions to modernising the Caucasus, and to developing scientific knowledge of the region. There are quite a few scholars propagating this thesis. Grzegorz Piwnicki took the position that Poles even played a significant role in "civilising the Caucasus countries" (Piwnicki 2001: 232; idem 2001a: 124). The historian's position concerned Polish soldiers serving in the ranks of the tsarist army in the Caucasus, who, according to him, "were educated people and distinguished by their personal culture", and many of them also being sensitive to beauty (Piwnicki 2001: 203, 232–233; idem 2011: 265). Elsewhere, Piwnicki claimed that, compared to other nationalities, Polish soldiers distinguished themselves by their cultural, scientific, and social life, which came out of their relatively higher-than-average education (Piwnicki 2001: 125); the researcher also noted:

They were synonymous with great professionals. Anywhere they found themselves, Poles made their civilisational contribution. To this day, in many cities throughout the Caucasus, the contribution of Polish soldiers to this region's civilisational development is remembered. (Piwnicki 2001: 233; idem 2001a: 124)

In his works, the researcher stressed that Poles in the Caucasus displayed a high mental level (Piwnicki 2001: 235), and "all [...] Poles who, for various reasons, found themselves in the Caucasus, contributed to its economic, cultural, and civilisational development" (Piwnicki 2001: 192; Piwnicki 2002a: 141).

An advocate of similar views was Andrzej Chodubski, who believed that "the distinctive feature of all Poles residing in the Caucasus in the 19th and 20th centuries is the so-called cult of modernity; they commonly regard themselves as the bearers of progress, of civilisation", and during their stay in the Caucasus they spread technical progress and education (Chodubski 1995: 77; idem 2000b: 236–237, 227, 239; idem 2005: 120–121; idem 2005c: 65, 72; idem 2006: 21; idem 2006a: 118; idem 2012a: 178). Per the researcher, it was Polish soldiers' education that influenced the idea among the tsarist authorities to send them to this

region, where they were to carry out a “civilising mission” (Chodubski 2000: 412; idem 2000b: 239). For this reason, the Poles – in the academic’s view – made an important contribution to its development, and this was, to his mind, of import because “the Caucasus in the early 19th century was a backward region of the world in terms of civilisation” (for example: Chodubski 2005: 114; idem 2006b: 107). He also pointed out that “Poles in the Caucasus have been among the intellectual elite for generations” (Chodubski 2005a: 21; idem 2005b: 177) and “against the backdrop of the various peoples in the Caucasus, Poles alongside Georgians stood out for their high degree of cultural development, while the Muslim peoples were the most ‘culturally deprived’” (Chodubski 2001a: 152). For this reason, Poles in the 19th-century Caucasus “attracted the attention of the local intelligentsia, whom they impressed with their attitude, education, and level of mind” (Chodubski 2000b: 232). In addition, they “introduced new patterns, values, judgements, behaviours through their work, activity, and attitudes” (Chodubski 2000b: 239). Consequently, “it was very difficult to find a domain in the 19th century in which Poles did not excel” (Chodubski 1984: 4) in this region. Analogous opinions are also presented with regard to specific parts of the Caucasus – Poles were said to have significantly influenced the civilisational transformation in Azerbaijan or to have made an overwhelming contribution to the civilisational development of Georgia (Chudzińska-Parkosadze 2012: 422; Olszewski 2012: 127; Rohoziński 2018: 251). At the same time, Poles were to make such a contribution to the region’s development that they were universally respected and enjoyed the affection of the Caucasians (Piwnicki 2001: 11; Chodubski 2005a: 41; idem 2016a: 68).

Complementing the narrative of Poles’ contribution to the Caucasus’ civilisational development is painting them as the founders of Caucasus studies (Chodubski 2000c: 59; idem 2003b: 141; idem 2012a: 185; Furier 2009: 11; Koseski 2002: 35; Piwnicki 2001: 235). In Poland, special scholarly merit in this area is attributed to Jan Potocki, which is linked to a journey to the Caucasus that he went on in late 1797 and early 1798. He kept a diary over its course, which was published in 1828 in Paris under the title *Voyage dans les steps d’Astrakhan et du Caucase*.

The perception of Potocki as a meritorious Caucasus expert is not only a contemporary phenomenon, given that Wiktor Gomulicki, one of the most important contributors within Polish positivism, already portrayed him as such at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. In his opinion, Potocki devoted an entire year to a comprehensive study of the Caucasus, its people, and its history, which is why the description drawn up by this traveller is of “primary historical importance” (Gomulicki 1900: 1032). In another article, in which Gomulicki

reviewed the work *Obrazy Kaukazu* by Edward Strumpf,¹ he accused its author of failing to mention the “illustrious predecessor in this field, the first Pole, and reputedly also the first European, to have revealed a century ago this then mysterious land: the brilliant Jan Potocki” (Gomulicki 1900: 406). In writing Jan Potocki was presented as an outstanding researcher of the Caucasus also during Poland’s communist period. In the 1970s, Jan Fabiański regarded him as one of the first researchers into the ethnography of the Caucasian peoples, whose insights belong among the loftiest scientific achievements (Fabiański 1971: 279–280).

Currently, a similar view is held by historians dealing with the Caucasus. One such academic is Andrzej Furier, who takes the view that Potocki’s depiction of the Caucasus contains the first modern Polish description of the North Caucasian peoples’ customs. For many years – claims the historian – it remained also the only description of its kind within the European literature (Furier 1997: 122). Discussing the Polish edition of Charles King’s book “Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus”, he griped that although the American historian’s work included a description of the activities undertaken by Western scholars in the Caucasus, the author did not say a word about Potocki’s expedition. In Furier’s opinion, however, it was of great significance for the development of Caucasus studies (Furier 2014: 128). Similar notions about Potocki can also be found in publications by other historians (Lewandowski 1998: 169; Piwnicki 2001: 226; idem 2001a: 115).

It is important to trace the state of education of the Polish soldiers who ended up in the region for any analysis of the “Caucasus being civilising” by Poles, alongside their uniqueness in terms of education. This is because more than 50% of the Poles residing in the Caucasus at the end of the 19th century were military men. Bohdan Baranowski, on the basis of a census conducted in 1897, calculated that at that time 9,000 out of 15,000 Poles served in the army in broadly-defined Transcaucasia (i.e. Baku, Elizavetpol, Erivan, Tiflis, and Kutais governorates, as well as Kars Oblast) (Baranowski 1982: 291). It must be assumed that in earlier periods the proportions in favour of military men were even higher, in the 1830s probably standing at around 95%, albeit we do not possess exact data on this.

A decrease in the proportion of military personnel among Poles residing in the Caucasus occurred after 1855 when conscripts stopped being dispatched to the region, which was linked to conscription’s discontinuation in the Kingdom of Poland. It was also at this time that the number of Polish economic migrants

1 Edward Strumpf (1873–1901) was a Polish botanist. His work *Obrazy Kaukazu* (Images of the Caucasus), in which he described his journey to the Caucasus, was published in 1900.

arriving in the Caucasus in search of work began to increase. The Polish community at the end of the 19th century was already diverse. In addition to the still dominant group of military men, there resided a large group of domestic servants, as well as administrative, judicial, and law-enforcement workers, railwaymen, doctors, and teachers. Their presence was part of the tsarist policy of increasing the Christian, most of all Slavic, population in this land, which was afforded executive positions in the administration.

The most important thing, therefore, to confirm or deny the thesis of the "Poles' above-average education" and the "Polish soldiers' contribution to the civilisational development of the Caucasus" is to examine soldiers' education. Wiesław Caban noted that the main cohort sent to the tsarist army from the Kingdom of Poland in the 1830s and 1840s came from the countryside. The historian calculated that, for example, in the years 1839–1854 – 83% of conscripts to the tsarist army from the Kielce district came from the countryside. According to the researcher, among the recruits of that period, only a few percent at the least could write and read at a basic level. After conducting archival queries, he concluded that up until the first half of the 19th century it is extremely difficult to determine illiteracy among soldiers from the Kingdom of Poland, as the box where literacy was meant to be marked in the conscription questionnaire was filled out inaccurately and very often one's profession was written there instead. During the Crimean War, in turn, when conscription was carried out hastily, this box was not checked at all (Caban 2001: 17, 70–72). Official statistics only appear for later years.

The data presented above shows that the illiteracy characterising recruits from the Kingdom of Poland in the second half of the 1870s and early 1880s was representative of the entire Russian Empire. A very similar phenomenon was observed in subsequent years. *Ėnciklopedičeskij slovar' Brokgauza i Ėfrona* provides data on this subject. The 1893 edition gives the average percentage of illiterates among recruits drafted into the army in 1884–1890 from 72 governorates and *oblasts* of the Russian Empire. The smallest number of illiterates came from the Estonia Governorate with 4.85%, the Livonia Governorate with 5.25%, and Yaroslavl Governorate with 36.58%. Among the governorates comprising the Kingdom of Poland, the smallest number of illiterates came from Warsaw Governorate, which ranked 24th on the list with 76.17%, Płock Governorate was 36th with 81.06% of illiterates among recruits, Łomża Governorate 46th with 83.75% of illiterates, Piotrków Governorate 47th with 83.88% of illiterates, Siedlce Governorate 48th with 83.98% of illiterates, and Kielce Governorate 56th with 83.98% of illiterates, Kalisz Governorate 57th with 86.18% of illiterates, Suwałki Governorate 58th with 86.37% of illiterates, Lublin Governorate 69th with 89.92% of illiterates, and in 71st place came

TABLE 1 Percentage of illiterates among conscripts in the Russian Empire

	1874	1875	1876	1877	1878	1879	1880	1881	1882	1883	10-year average
Russia, European part	78	78	78	78	78	78	77	76	75	74	77
Kingdom of Poland	83	81	83	84	89	85	85	85	86	86	85
Russia, Asian part and Caucasus	86	86	87	86	86	86	86	84	85	85	86
Russia-wide average	79	79	79	79	79	79	78	77	76	76	78

SOURCE: OWN WORK BASED ON: "VSEOBŠČAYA VOINSKAYA POVINNOST' V ROSSIJSKOJ IMPERII ZA Pervoe DESYATILENIE", *STATISTIČESKIJ VREMENNİK* SERIYA III, VYP. 12, SPB. 1886

Radom Governorate with 92.96% of illiterates (it may be added that the last spot at 72nd with the highest percentage of illiterates in the Russian Empire among recruits was Ufa Governorate with a rate of 93.59%) (Rubakin 1893: 537–546). From the above list, it thus follows that the vast majority of Poles who found themselves in the Caucasus in the 19th century were rural illiterates, and that the governorates of the Kingdom of Poland, apart from Warsaw, were in the bottom half of the list of administrative units supplying the fewest illiterates to the Russian army.

Analysing data from the census conducted in 1897, Marek Mądzik noted that, as late as the end of the 19th century, the majority of Poles in Georgia were illiterate – 44% of over 8,200 people living there could write and read (Mądzik 1987: 36).

On the issue of culture in the Caucasus, the important role of Polish women is also raised – as Chodubski quite often did – writing, among other things, that they brought European civilisation to the region, promoted social change, and actively participated in socio-cultural life (Chodubski 2000b: 238; idem 2005c: 73). He referred here to the work of Gralewski, claiming that Polish women “shone like stars of devotion [...]. Women of other nationalities: Georgian, Armenian, Persian, Muscovite, even sought their acquaintance, and those who obtained it highly valued this relationship” (Chodubski 2003d: 21).

The problem with the above argumentation, however, is that the researcher took a selective approach to Gralewski's memoirs and picked from them only those passages that supported his assumption of Poles being universally respected in the Caucasus. In doing so, he omitted those passages that contradicted this thesis. The Polish exile, describing the Polish families living in Port-Petrovsk,² wrote:

As we approached Franka's house, it being Sunday and after lunch, the voice of a violin struck our ears. A *kujawiak* was being played.³ [...] So the merry folk danced two *kujawiaks*, and in this revelry we were reminded of our tavern, if it were not for the fact that to ten lads there was only Franka, half-drunk at that and bearing the stains of a fast life on her visage. We left after wishing them a pleasant time, and my companion ruminated on that fate which yearly hurls thousands of people into this abyss of odd Caucasian life and mixes it with the sediments of Russian filth. (Gralewski 2015: 108–109)

In turn, about the Polish families whose men served in the Shirvan regiment:

After my being exiled to the Caucasus, I was assigned to the Shirvan regiment, one of those squalid nests where the nature of uncorrupted man flinches at the sight of atrociousness. Among the military families, there were about twenty Polish ones, of which only six belonged to the officer class. Polish soldier families suffered from an epidemic of general corruptness. (Gralewski 2015: 186)

In contrast, writing about Russian and Polish women, Gralewski stated on the whole:

As soldiers' wives, the women here were brought with their children at their own request from Russia and Poland at government expense. Abysmal poverty was usually the primary reason for these women's immorality. The second reason for the indifferent view towards the shamelessness of their wives was the soldiers' lack of dignity and desire for life's comforts. Passions also played their part, however. Quarrels and fights were common, especially during winter, when active battalions usually returned from expeditions. Yearly, atrocious crimes occurred:

² Modern-day Makhachkala.

³ *Kujawiak* – a Polish folk dance originating from Kuyavia and derived from Kuyavian wedding rituals.

people killed each other, slaughtered and poisoned. These latter incidents were influenced not only by soldiers' but also by officers' wives. Hardly any household lacked amorous intrigues, and as such every military settlement was a nest of wickedness, filth, and shamelessness. Every moral person looked upon this with sadness and deplored the society that sent all women, except officers' wives, to the hospital each week for medical care. It came as no surprise that the locals despised these cattle, that they spat on them, that they called them vile swine! ... And to be surprised that they wished not to permit this cattle into their dwellings, amongst their families! ... Among the Sunnis, similar transgressions resulted in stoning. A punishment terribly moving to any human, but a punishment that expressed their inordinate notions around a woman's duties of chastity. (Gralewski 2015: 185–186)

The problem with promoting an image of Polish women's elevated role in the Caucasus is the lack of research material that would allow generalising judgements to be formulated. A contemporary researcher has at their disposal only a very scant number of opinions drawn up by people who resided in the Caucasus in the 19th century. In them, one can find sections both quoting examples of educated, ethically-behaving Polish women and those displaying their demoralisation. However, taking into account that several thousand of them resided in the Caucasus at the time, the researcher is not able to analyse their attitudes comprehensively. One can cite only fragments referring to individual cases, but we are unable to determine to what extent they were typical of this community. Opinions maintaining the view that the conduct of Polish women was, in terms of "morality" or "attachment to national culture" particularly different from the attitudes of women of other nationalities, are to be doubted. No research has ever been carried out in this regard.

As for the view that Poles made specific and exceptional contributions to knowledge of the Caucasus, it too is poorly argued. Probably the most distorted in this respect are the merits of Jan Potocki. It should be emphasised that he did not carry out research in the Caucasus, and his expedition was not scientific, but for the purposes of tourism and sightseeing. For this reason, Potocki, in light of available sources, may deserve at most the title of the first known Polish tourist in the Caucasus. Potocki was certainly a very well-educated man as well as an insightful observer of the surrounding world, interested in the Caucasian reality. Thus, his diary contains many valuable insights, but it cannot be considered a scientific work. Nevertheless, it is a source from which the contemporary historian or ethnologist can obtain information on the peoples

living in the foothills of the North Caucasus – Potocki chose not to venture into the mountains of the Main Caucasus Ridge.

Potocki was certainly not the first European to travel through the Caucasus and write a description of it (at least of a portion of the region). Many had done so before him, and one of the first to do just that was William of Rubruck, a Flemish Franciscan, who in the mid-13th century was sent by King Louis IX of France on a diplomatic mission to the court of the great Mongolian Möngke Khan, residing in Samarkand. William returned to Europe, travelling through the western Caspian coastlands and Transcaucasia. His account was first published in Paris in the mid-17th century. After William of Rubruck, in the Caucasus resided, among others, the Dominican Johannes de Galonifontibus, Bishop of Nakhichevan from 1377. He visited the western part of the Caucasus, including Abkhazia and Mingrelia. Several works on western Mingrelia were written as a consequence of the proselytising carried out in the area by Catholic clerics in the 17th century (Hewitt 2003: 199). Another story is linked to the German Johann Schiltberger. He was a crusader's squire and in 1386 fell into enemy hands at the Battle of Nicopolis. During his captivity he travelled through, among other places, Circassia, Abkhazia, and Mingrelia. After his release and return to Germany, he penned his memoirs, which were largely devoted to his stay in the Caucasus. They were first published in the second half of the 15th century (Beazley: 1911: 326). Among other travellers who published works containing a description of the Caucasus, the better known were Adam Olearius, Jean Chardin, John Bell, Andreyan Lopukhin, and Jacob Reineggs. Prior to Jan Potocki's trip to the Caucasus, a number of publications on the region of a scientific nature had also appeared. One of the first was published in 1502 in Venice by the Genoese historian and ethnographer Giorgio Interiano. It was entitled *La vita: sito de' Zichi, chiamiti Ciarcassi: historia notabile* and was the result of the author's journey to the Adyghe that he made in the second half of the 15th century. Among later works to gain recognition were, among others, those by Johann Gustav Gaerber, Fyodor Soimonov, Samuel Gottlieb Gmelin, Johann Anton Güldenstädt, Peter Simon Pallas, or Friedrich Marschall von Bieberstein. Before Potocki's diary was published appeared the works of Heinrich Julius Klaproth – one of the most eminent Caucasus scholars and orientalisists of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Compared to the publications by the scholars mentioned, Potocki's output on Caucasian matters is more than modest. Although he included a great deal of interesting cultural information (e.g. on Ingush religion), this should be treated more as incidental details obtained by an educated and curious man rather than scientific research. Jan Potocki attained information from people he met by chance,

often on vodka-drinking occasions, which he did not conceal in his diary. Despite Furier's reproaches to Charles King for not mentioning Potocki's expedition to the Caucasus, the American historian's choice is understandable. For a non-Polish researcher, it will not be of much interest, especially given that it was not important for scientific advancement.

Nor can Jan Potocki be regarded as the first Pole to leave extensive notes on the Caucasus. In this respect, the Jesuit Tadeusz Krusiński holds primacy. This missionary, diplomat, and historian, who lived at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries, was sent by his holy order to Persia in 1705. And although it was this country and the Persian-Afghan War that were the main focus of the monk's interest, he also devoted numerous sections of his extensive works to Georgia, Dagestan, and Shirvan – writing about the customs and relations between the inhabitants of these areas. Krusiński's works have been translated from Latin into many languages but not into Polish, which may also indicate that Caucasus studies do not enjoy much appreciation in Poland.⁴

As far as Potocki's scholarly activity is concerned, he was already criticised in the early 20th century for his lack of accuracy and systematicity. It was observed that he often failed to separate invention from fact and jotted down details without examining them closely, presenting them in a false light (Ułaszyn 1902: 22). Similar charges could be applied to Potocki's notes on the Caucasus if one chose to treat them as scientific. Their author wrote down what he heard, without verification or a desire to uncover the essence of an issue. Turkologist Jan Reychman, however, recognized Potocki's important contribution to the development of Caucasus studies, which usually escapes writers celebrating his research achievements. Namely, the Pole's unquestionable contribution to science was his material assistance and acting as patron to the initiator of linguistic and ethnographic research on Caucasian peoples, Julius Heinrich Klaproth. It was thanks to Potocki's intercession that the Saint Petersburgian Academy of Sciences decided to send and fund the German scholar's expedition. So it was precisely these activities of Potocki that were an important contribution to the development of Caucasus studies, to a much greater extent than his independent work. The closeness of the Pole's and German's relationship in Russian service is evidenced by the fact that it

4 Among Krusiński's works (1675–1751), the most famous throughout Europe was *Relatio de mutationibus Regni Persorum*, published in 1727, which was translated from Latin into many European languages. In addition, he authored works like *Chronicon peregrinantis seu historia ultimi belli Persarum cum Aghvanis* published in 1731, *Prodromus ad historiam revolutionis persicae* from 1733, and *Pragmatographia de legitimo usu ambrosyi tureckiej, to jest: Sposobu należytego zażywania kawy tureckiej, przez X. Tadeusza Krusińskiego S.J. Missyonarza Perckiego. Rzecz z rękopisma Jego wybrana y do druku podana z 1769 r.*

was Klaproth who, after his patron's death, published his work "*Voyage dans les steppes d'Astrakhan et du Caucase*" in Paris in 1829, which he annotated with personal comments.

There is one additional important point about Jan Potocki that Polish scholars tend to overlook, but that Western scholars have noticed: namely that the Pole's views lined up with Russian imperialism. The French historian Daniel Beauvois did discern this. He counted Potocki among a generation that lived through the partitions of Poland quite painlessly and immediately began attempting to form a wider Slavic community within the Russian Empire (the researcher counted Adam Czartoryski among the same generation). Beauvois noted that Potocki communicated to Catherine II praise for Valery Zubov, who had been commander-in-chief of Russian troops in the Caucasus from 1796. The Pole suggested to the tsarina that just as Pomponius had accompanied Pompey on his expedition to Armenia, so too he could act as historiographer for the victorious Zubov. Because the new tsar would dismiss the general, Potocki was unable to accompany the military man to the Caucasus, going instead as a private citizen. In Daniel Beauvois' view, he became a theorist of Russia's conquest of the East. The researcher saw a clear political purpose in the Pole's ethnographic descriptions – he sought out a crack in local arrangements and customs through which "civilisation", i.e. Russian order, could be introduced. Although Potocki was interested in the minute details of the local peoples' lives, he looked down on all these "backward barbarians". Beauvois argued that, considering the local peoples' primitiveness emphasised by the Pole, the "right to civilise" was more than justified. He also noted that Potocki showed no mercy towards the invaded and repressed peoples, but portrayed them as a "band of thieves" and a threat to "civilisation". He quoted relevant passages from Potocki's work in this context and contrasted them with Russian propaganda, which in the 1990s similarly justified the need to intervene in Chechnya. The French historian noted that when Adam Czartoryski became Russia's foreign minister in 1804, Jan Potocki set about planning to create a handbook on Asian relations for the ministry. Beauvois came to possess a fragment of this work. According to the researcher, it contained guidelines that boiled down to one thing: finding as soon as possible a pretext to subdue the peoples of the Caucasus, invade Persia, and occupy Armenia. Furthermore, per the French researcher, Potocki's work was written in the spirit of Russian imperialism and colonialism not only in relation to the Caucasus but the whole Eurasian area (Beauvois 1995: 49–65).

One of the few Polish researchers who detected the above problem was Ludwik Widerszal. He pointed out that the first Polish travellers were not very enthusiastic about the Caucasus. As an example, he cited a passage from

Potocki's diary, in which the author noted that banditry was highly respected throughout the Caucasus, and that in Kabarda no "prince can sit quietly at home and avoid disgrace for more than a week ... so he must rob either the Ossetians and Chechens ... or [plunder] the other bank of the Kuban, or the Russian border or even other princes, his relatives" (Widerszal 2011: 220).

I concur with the above opinions surrounding Jan Potocki's activities. Moreover, it is worth noting that authors promoting the view of Polish merits in civilising the Caucasus are influenced by the myth of evolution/myth of progress, which, among others, Jerzy Topolski wrote on. He noted that the development of evolutionism, i.e. the notion of a transition from less to more developed forms, was influenced by states' colonial expansion and the nationalism that emerged at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. The latter focused over time on emphasising ethnic, even racial differences, and thus contributed to thinking in terms of there existing a model nation, "which other peoples standing for whatever reason on lower rungs of (mainly civilisational) development, in the sense of Western civilisation, can only just begin evolving towards" (Topolski 2008: 245–246). This is also how the fundamental myth – the myth of evolution – was born. Per the methodologist, the bearers of this myth compare certain territories exhibiting particular structures with others, making it clear that some are more or less modern, or more or less developed. Behind this, however, hides the conviction that evolution is inevitable or desired. In Topolski's opinion, with which I identify, centrism is a concrete form of the myth of evolution. In our case, that being: Polonocentrism. Subscribing to this academic's views, opinions around Poles' contribution to development (economic, civilisational, etc.) can also be situated within the myth of sublimity, which occurs alongside the myth of evolution. In this case, violence organised by the state – in the analyses I have presented, by the military units and official apparatus of Tsarist Russia that Poles were an important part of – ceases to be, in the terms proposed by Topolski, seen in terms of war, crime, misfortune, and conquest, becoming instead an element of other concepts, such as defence, *raison d'état* (Topolski 2008: 245–246), or in our specific example, "civilisational development".

I believe that the myth of evolution formulated by Topolski leads to cultural racism as formulated by Shnirelman. According to this anthropologist, in Western Europe, racism in its archetypal form was a consequence of colonialism. Thus, the external factor related to territorial expansion into ethnically foreign territory played the most important role in its formation. The researcher concluded that until the mid-20th century, biological components were key to racism, being then supplanted by cultural components. For this reason, contemporary racism is often not about the racial superiority underlying classical

racism, but about cultural differences between particular groups (Šnirel'man 2011: 45–46, 460).

According to Viktor Shnirelman, contemporary racism has the following characteristics: 1) it shifts the emphasis from biology to culture and cultural values; 2) cultural differences, which are exaggerated, reified, and declared as “cultural incompatibility”, are put in a hierarchy; 3) racist sentiments are expressed in a covert form and are difficult to recognise. Consequently, racists believe that there is a hierarchy of cultures, where the culture of the dominant population is given a higher place, which allows discrimination against ethnic minorities and immigrants (Šnirel'man 2011: 145–146).

I consider Shnirelman's claim about the existence of “scientific racism”, spread by academics (or more precisely: by sorcerers in Jerzy Kmita's terms), of relevance. According to the anthropologist, many of them are not convinced racists, but do believe that they engage in research and establishing “objective reality”. In his view, “scientific racism” should be seen as an important, but not sole component of the doctrinal racism developed and popularised by politicians, writers, journalists, and researchers who present rational arguments for everyday irrational stereotypes (Šnirel'man 2011: 465). In light of Shnirelman's above claims, I classify opinions that Poles “civilised” the Caucasus as bearing the hallmarks of cultural racism.

It is worth noting that the peculiar pride in accentuations of Poles' participation in “civilising” the Caucasus is not accompanied by the reflection that, in reality, their actions were associated with the process of Russification. The opinion that Poles bore some “civilising” merit tacitly assumes that before their appearance in this region, which occurred thanks to the Russian aggression on these lands, it was inhabited by “savages” who did not generate presumed “civilisation”. This position is fully in keeping with propaganda of the tsarist era, when authorities used similar slogans to explain the need to conquer the Caucasus. It is true that the percentage of Poles with an academic education was higher than the percentage of representatives of Caucasian peoples who had one. However, this is no “civilisational” indicator. After all, the percentage of educated was higher in Prussia than in Poland, and it was in the Polish territories incorporated into the Prussian partition that illiteracy was virtually eliminated (depending on the region it did not exceed 5%), while in the independent *Rzeczpospolita* it stood at 33% in 1921 (Stańczyk 2016: 11). It is nonetheless difficult to find a single Polish author who would advance the thesis that it was the Prussians who “civilised” Poles in the 19th century.

The notion that Poles made some special contribution to scientific knowledge on the Caucasus is reinforced by the procedure of identifying memoir authors in terms of professions clearly associated with science.

Consequently, exiles the likes of Hipolit Jaworski, Mateusz Gralewski, or Michał Butowd-Andrzejkowicz are presented as historians and ethnographers (Later-Chodyłowa 2002: 47). Although their works contain valuable material for the researcher of 19th-century Caucasian history, they are diary-descriptive in nature and their authors were not associated with academia.

Attempts to exaggerate Poles' merits for the Caucasus are not an exclusively contemporary phenomenon. They were observed as early as in the 19th century and should be associated above all with Tadeusz Łada-Zabłocki, who in letters wrote about the scientific contribution of Poles to the region's elucidation. Leon Janiszewski, who also resided in the Caucasus, protested against this. In a letter to the publisher of *Pamiętnik Naukowo-Literacki*, he stressed that Łada-Zabłocki, "with a single stroke of the pen, had conjured up a gang of historians, statisticians, ethnologists, geologists, orientalists, etc.", even though reality differed significantly from this representation. Polish poets were also not held in such high esteem, in Janiszewski's opinion, as has been assumed. He did conclude that Władysław Strzelnicki was a great poet, and spoke well of Wincent Dawid, but was reserved concerning others. Of Łada-Zabłocki's works he wrote that there was no "puissant thought" in them and "everywhere his thought is a slave to superficial crudeness". He also remarked with little refinement of the man's decision following military service, when Łada-Zabłocki chose to remain on government service in the Caucasus: "he accepted the station of salt works caretaker shortly before his death and ended his life over registers and columns – *vanitas vanitatis*". About Konstanty Zach, in turn, Janiszewski wrote that although he knew Persian, Tatar, and Turkic and had spent his whole life preparing to write a grammar of the latter, this was only a project, and he failed to advance beyond composing a title and meagre historical notes on the Tatar provinces. Michał Andrzejkowicz, on the other hand, was, in Janiszewski's eyes, an industrious compiler. The Pole also wrote with reserve about his own self. He pointed out that in Łada-Zabłocki's letter he was listed as a poet, prose writer, and musician, but explained that although in the past he had indeed devoted himself much to poetry and created music as an amateur, he had since abandoned the former of these occupations, and was only connected with the latter in that he gave daily music lessons. He also admitted that literature would gain little if his works were published (Janiszewski 1850: 115).

In the pieces of Poles who resided in the Caucasus in the 19th century and wrote about the region, we find clear traces of the fact that they did not consider themselves to be researchers of the region. For example, Władysław Strzelnicki in his introduction to the book *Szkice Kaukazu* noted:

I am not a researcher by profession. [...] I only make known to you [i.e. the readers – P.A.] and will make known that which I have experienced, have heard from knowledgeable people, have ultimately seen with my own eyes [...] during my wanderings done out of duty and not out of curiosity, already on war expeditions [...]. (Strzelnicki 1860a: 32)

A similar statement was made by Ignacy Dobrski, who wrote that the reader “will encounter only faint sketches of this country, as well as a few incoherent thoughts thrown about, thoughts put down with a spurious pen and scribbled scratchily amidst the tedium and hardships of a wanderer’s life in the Caucasus” (Dobrski 1850: 7). The natural scientist Edward Strumpf also did not consider the trip he took to the Caucasus at the end of the 19th century to be scientific. In a book about it, he stressed: “All parts of the Caucasus land I did not see, so I could not give a complete and comprehensive picture. I wrote down loose notes and impressions I experienced here and there, noted what I saw, what I managed to find out” (Strumpf 1900: 9). It should be assumed that this was the case with almost all works by Polish authors from this period.

The popularity of the contemporary idea concerning the exceptional contribution of Poles to the culture of the Caucasus is also evidenced by an article that appeared in one of Poland’s most widely read editorial magazines, in which the author promoted the view that it was Kazimierz Łapczyński, a Pole exiled to the Caucasus in the 19th century, who was the first to translate the Georgian epic “The Knight in the Panther’s Skin”, and it was only from Polish that it was then translated into other languages of the world (Geremek 2008: 81). Polish, however, was not as popular as the author of the article presumed, for it to be the source from which the Georgian national epic was translated into other languages of the world. To date, it has been translated into some forty languages, most often either directly from Georgian or from Russian, not from Polish. Nevertheless, Polish was one of the first languages into which “The Knight ...” was translated. The first two short fragments of the poem were published in Polish translation in 1830 by Konstanty Rdułtowski (Rdułtowski 1830: 149–160). Kazimierz Łapczyński, in turn, also published excerpts, albeit more extensively, in the periodical *Biblioteka Warszawska* in 1863. The first complete translation of a version of “The Knight in the Panther’s Skin” was published in Poland in 1960 as a translation from Russian by Igor Sikirycki, and from Georgian by Jerzy Zagórski in 1976. A popular theory also persists that the Polish translation is considered to be the first translation of “The Knight ...” into a European language (Kapla 2017: 16; Krawczyk-Wasilewska 1991: 10; Rohoziński 2016: 22). This happens to be the information found, for example,

on the Polish version of Wikipedia (Rycerz). This is not, however, strictly factual. The fragments translated by Rdułtowski were, admittedly, among the first, but not the first. Before him, Evgenii (Evmii Bolkhovitinov), a bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church, also published a small fragment in Russian in 1802 (Bolkhovitinov 1802: 90–91), while in French this was done in 1828 by the Kartvelologist Marie-Félicité Brosset (Brosset 1828: 277–294).

At the same time, one cannot deny the fact that in the 19th century, Poles did naturally contribute to scientific knowledge of the Caucasus, and my goal is not to negate this. In historical research, Siemion Broniewski holds an important, perhaps even the most important, place. He hailed from a Polish noble family that settled in the Smolensk Governorate (one could of course debate over to what extent he felt Polish, and to what Russian). Broniewski was born in 1763, and in the early 1790s he travelled to the Caucasus and joined the service of Count Valery Zubov. He took part in the Russo-Persian War, and in the early 1800s became administrator of the chancellery under Pavel Tsitsianov, commander-in-chief of the Russian army in the Caucasus. Broniewski was then given the post of Director of the Asiatic Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Saint Petersburg. The then minister Adam Czartoryski had Broniewski write a textbook on the history of Russia's diplomatic relations with the Caucasus countries and Persia. The result of this work is the publication *Istoričeskie vypiski o snošenyax Rossii s Persieyu, Gruzieyu i voobščę s gorskimi narodami, v Kavkaze obitayuščimi, co vremen Ivana Vasil'eviča donyne*. Siemion Broniewski also authored the two-volume work *Novejšie geografičeskie i istoričeskie izvestiya o Kavkaze*, published in Moscow in 1823. It contains a great deal of material on the ancient and modern history of the peoples of the Caucasus, the Near East, and Europe, plus materials on the geography, flora and fauna, and hydrology of the Caucasus. In addition, the author provided information on the archaeology and ethnography of the mountain tribes, including matters of religion. In doing so, he used a wide range of predecessors' works – Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Persian, Turkish, or Genoese historians and travellers, as well as Georgian, Chinese, Arab, and Persian chronicles. For a long time, Siemion Broniewski's work was the primary source of information on the Caucasus in Russia (Savel'ev 2010: 10–11). In Poland, however, he is virtually unknown, and his publications are hardly mentioned in the context of Poles writing on the Caucasus. This is probably due to the fact that he published all his works in Russian and was in the service of the tsar, which makes it more difficult to discern his Polish origins, all the more hindered by his unusual (for a Pole) name. If his pieces are mentioned, their authorship is attributed to Włodzimierz Broniewski (Ingłot 1957: 540; Occheli 2009: 241), who was in fact a relative of their real author, Siemion.

For Caucasian – mainly Turkic – folklore, the greatest contribution was made by Aleksander Chodźko, a poet and orientalist, who spent many years in Russian service working at consular posts in Rasht and Tehran, among other places. He collected Turkic folk songs, which he translated into European languages. He was one of the first to take up the study of the Talysh language (Calmard 1991). Tadeusz Łada-Zabłocki also collected and translated Turkic folk songs, putting them into Polish (Reychman 1963: 126).

An unquestionable contribution to the knowledge of the Caucasus through the prism of the technical sciences was made by Józef Chodźko, Aleksander's brother. He was one of the main executors of this region's triangulation. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general by the tsarist authorities for his merits in this regard. Józef Chodźko was also head and one of the founders of the Caucasus Branch of the Imperial Geographical Society, which, after the Pole's retirement, established an award named after him for the best geographical work on the Caucasus. However, false information concerning Józef Chodźko's achievements also exists. For example, in Poland, one may encounter the view that he was the first person in the world to reach the summit of Ararat in 1850 (Chodubski 2000: 414; idem 2000a: 72; idem 2006: 14; idem 2012: 314; idem 2016: 13; idem 2016a: 59).⁵ In actuality, the mountain was first climbed in 1829 by an expedition of six people led by the German Friedrich Parrot, a professor at the University of Dorpat (Parrot 1846: 196).

Among Polish representatives of the technical sciences who made their presence felt in the Caucasus, Witold Zglenicki and Paweł Potocki also deserve mention. Their names are closely linked to the development of the oil industry on the Absheron Peninsula. The former was an employee of the Bakuvian Assay Office from 1891. He is known for his construction of an apparatus for measuring the curvature of wells, and also for his plans to extract oil from under the seabed on an industrial scale. The latter of these ideas, however, was not recognised by officials and was not implemented at the time. Zglenicki's unquestionable merit was the delineation of oil-bearing plots – he discovered oil in more than 100 spots on the Absheron Peninsula (Adamczewski 2013: 183–204). Potocki, in turn, had been in charge of backfilling the bay of Bibiheybat from 1910, as the authorities concluded that this would be the most cost-effective way of extracting oil from the site. The Pole was such a respected specialist that he was left at his post even after the establishment of communist rule in Azerbaijan (Adamčevski/Kuzavleva-Adamčevska 2016: 51–60).

5 It is interesting that this opinion appeared already in the 19th century. He reproduced it, among others: Zygmunt Rewkowski in his memories (see: Rewkowski 2011: 83).

Poles in the Caucasus also made a name for themselves in the field of natural sciences, with Ludwik Młokosiewicz holding primacy here. In Poland, he is portrayed as a biologist (e. g. Piwnicki 2000: 246; idem 2001: 229; idem 2011a: 122; idem 2012: 86), but although he had been fascinated by nature since childhood, he lacked any instruction in this field. During his military service, which he volunteered for, he was sent to the Caucasus at his own request, where he remained for the rest of his life. One of Młokosiewicz's greatest contributions to the region was collecting previously unknown specimens and sending them to European academics, who then described them (Hryniewiecki 1950: 138). One such case involved several Caucasian grouse attained on a hunt that had puzzled him by their uniqueness. So, he had them sent to Warsaw to ornithologist Władysław Taczanowski. He in turn wrote a description of this new species of grouse and named it *Lyrurus mlokosiewiczzi* to honour his friend (Potapov/Pavlova 2009: 889). Academics of the era did not regard Młokosiewicz as a professional colleague, although they undoubtedly appreciated his merits. This is confirmed, for example, by publications of one of the most eminent Polish botanists, Bolesław Hryniewiecki. In his memoirs, he described Młokosiewicz as a "lover of nature" who, through his hospitality and knowledge of the region, helped researchers carry out scientific studies (Hryniewiecki 1949: 73).

Occasionally, the intellectual activity of the Polish intelligentsia in the Caucasus is used as an argument to assert its close relations with the local intelligentsia. This argument, however, is often unsubstantiated. In this regard, one flagship example is the relationship between Abbasgulu Bakikhanov and Tadeusz Łada-Zabłocki. In Polish publications, one can find information that the two were connected through friendship and warm relations, evidenced by the fact that Łada-Zabłocki translated a large portion of Bakikhanov's work *Gyulistan-i Iram* into Russian (e. g. Piwnicki 2001: 121; idem 2003: 210–211). However, an analysis of the Pole's letters shatters this picture of friendship between the two. In one such document, Łada-Zabłocki wrote to one acquaintance:

A few days ago I took up the task of translating Abbasgulu's "History of the Transcaucasian Land" from Persian into Russian. I am working under the author's supervision. [...] This task, which I have been forced to undertake *ex officio*, is now consuming every moment of my spare time.

And in another letter:

As I have just returned from expedition, I have not yet had time to gather my wits when I am saddled with thankless work, from which neither

fame nor advantage to me, nor general benefit to the nation can arise. For several months I have been working on a translation into Russian of the 'History of the Eastern Part of the Transcaucasian Land' written by Colonel Abbasgulu Baku Khan. I do this work *ex officio*, under the guidance of its very author, so the fame and benefit will go to the author Abbasgulu himself. My name as the translator will not even be known. I kill about six hours per day over this tedious labour, and I am so disheartened that, to free myself from it for a short while, I took advantage of a fortunate circumstance two months ago and visited Great Armenia, which none of ours had visited before. (Filina/Ossowska 2007: 243–244, 254)

It is clear then from these letters that cooperation between Łada-Zabłocki and Bakikhanov was not the result of friendship but of a top-down decision by the command, who instructed the Pole to take on the translation of the work into Russian.

At the same time, it is likely that Łada-Zabłocki did have contacts with some representatives of the Georgian intelligentsia, such as the Romantic poets Mikhail Tumanov (Tumanishvili) and Nikoloz Baratashvili. However, too little research material has survived to modern day to analyse this issue in a broader context. This was evident to Mark Żywow, who was one of the first to take up the subject of relations between exiled Polish poets and Caucasian intellectuals, as early as the 1950s (Żywow 1959: 564–565). There is also no research to support the thesis that some exceptionally positive image of Polish culture has formed in the Caucasus, as no research has been carried out on this topic. One of the few initiatives in this regard took place in 2008. At that time, I prepared a questionnaire for students of Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. It was filled out by 159 respondents. One of the questions related to attitudes towards Polish culture. The respondents were asked to rate the nine cultures listed in the questionnaire on a scale from 1 (lowest rating) to 5 (highest rating). Georgian culture was rated best with an average score of 4.84, followed by Jewish culture with 3.61, Russian with 3.37, Arab with 3.36, Iranian with 3.18, Polish with 3.06, American with 2.9, Turkish with 2.72 and Armenian with 2.43 (Adamčevski/Kuzavleva-Adamčevska 2013: 113–134). Naturally, this survey had many shortcomings and the results cannot be considered representative. However, it was one of few studies that addressed the topic of Polish culture's perception in Georgia.

The Caucasus as a Site of Polish Martyrology

The Caucasus's presence in the Polish ethnopolitical myth shapes the entrenchment of treating the region through a prism of Poles' martyrology, along with its deformation. In the second aspect, four processes are externalized: 1) overestimating the number of Polish exiles in the region, 2) postponing the initiation of deportations to a period earlier than the available source materials allow, 3) extending the period during which Poles were exiled to the Caucasus, and 4) overestimating the number of Poles who perished in the Caucasus.

As for the first point, one group of scholars in Poland popularizes the thesis that about one million Poles were exiled to the Caucasus. This figure was most likely first employed by Andrzej Chodubski (Chodubski 1984: 4; idem 1995: 69; idem 2000: 227; idem 2000c: 46; idem 2003: 89; idem 2006a: 107; idem 2015: 87). Arguably, it was his view that fostered the appearance of this number in the works of subsequent historians (Kiełbasiński 2001: 141; Piwnicki 2001: 11, 203, 233, 236; idem 2011: 252). Regarding specific areas of the Caucasus, Chodubski, for example, advocated the view that some 350,000 Poles were exiled to Azerbaijan in the 19th century (Chodubski 2005a: 37; idem 2005b: 194; idem 2015: 87), with Baku hosting about 10,000 Polish exiles (Chodubski 1993a: 3). The thesis of high percentages of political exiles to this part of the Caucasus was also advocated by Piwnicki. According to this researcher, they accounted for 80% of the several to dozens (depending on the period) of thousands of Poles who ended up in Azerbaijan in the 19th century (Piwnicki 2001: 236; idem 2003: 221; idem 2011: 265). Other researchers also believe that the largest Polish group in the Caucasus were exiles (Filina/Ossowska 2007: 5).

Roughly this same body of scholars promoting the one-million figure of Poles exiled to the Caucasus in the 19th century advocates that the first deportations to the region began as early as the 18th century. For example, Chodubski in his works furthered the view that these took place after the fall of the Kościuszko Uprising in 1794 (Chodubski 1993a: 3; idem 2003: 87; idem 2010: 205). Similar positions are reproduced in the works of other Polish researchers (Chudzińska-Parkosadze 2016: 60; Piwnicki 2000: 237; idem 2002: 89; idem 2012: 75; Zwiery 1996: 135). Sometimes the start of deportations is pushed back even to the early 1770s, thus implying it as the punishment meted out to the Bar Confederation participants (Piwnicki 2001: 183; idem 2002a: 133; idem 2011a: 117), or in the deportation of Poles to the Caucasus after the First Partition of the Commonwealth in 1772 (Kiełbasiński 2001: 140; Ordzowiły-Grzegorzczak 2016:

165; Porada 2015: 268; Siciński 2005: 256). The prevalence of such views in scholarly works has led to their surfacing in journalistic publications as well (Geremek 2008: 80; Jastrzębski 2014: 216; Meller 2018).

As for the third issue, i.e. extending deportation of Poles to the Caucasus in time, here, foremost, Chodubski popularized the position that this took place even after the January Uprising (Chodubski 1993a: 3). In one article, he even cited a figure of 20,000 Poles supposedly exiled to the Caucasus after the tsarist authorities had suppressed the national revolt (Chodubski 2012a: 175). Regarding Azerbaijan, the researcher believed “the largest number of Poles in history” ended up there after the January Uprising. The scale of this phenomenon was said to have been so large that, as Chodubski claimed, they made up 30% of soldiers in the region’s tsarist garrisons (Chodubski 1983: 39). Here, too, it can be assumed that this researcher’s authority led other academics to write about Poles – that is, January Uprising participants – exiled to the Caucasus (Chudzińska-Parkosadze 2016: 60; Olszewski 2018: 212, Piwnicki 2001: 183). This narrative has also made its way into journalistic writing and has found its way into the works of the most widely read Polish authors dealing with Caucasus issues (Górecki/Grochmaliski 2000: 198; Jastrzębski 2014: 75; Meller 2018; Sawicki 2015: 58).

The problem with the propositions of researchers advocating that one million Poles were exiled to the Caucasus, and that the deportations began in the late 18th century, is that they are not supported by any documentation or source material. In their absence, it is impossible to verify the method these researchers used in their calculations and on which basis they formed their opinions. To contrast, in the light of the calculations based on many years of archival searches carried out by Wiesław Caban, the million figure, regardless whether we relate it only to exiles or the total of recruits serving in the tsarist army in the Caucasus, is a number overstated several-fold. Indeed, several thousand Poles were exiled to the region, but it is impossible to determine how many precisely. This number included several hundred people sentenced for political reasons to forced service in the tsarist army stationed in the Caucasus, as well as several thousand national uprising participants, sent to the region also as a means of repression. A completely different issue is the sending of recruits of Polish descent to the Caucasus, who completed basic military service there. Such individuals numbered in the tens of thousands.

One of the reasons why it is difficult to calculate exactly how many Poles were in the Caucasus is that in 19th-century Russia, no statistics were kept regarding nationality, only religious affiliation. As a result, the literature must lean on the number of Catholics when determining the number of Poles in the tsarist army. The inadequacy of this system, introduced due to a lack of alternatives,

is evidenced, for example, by one fragment from the memoirs of Gralewski, stating that “thousands of people from the Kingdom [i.e., the Kingdom of Poland¹ – P.A.], not counting from the taken land,² who were Uniates recorded as Orthodox” (Gralewski 2015: 559). This state of affairs related to the policy of Russification and the effort to weaken the Catholic Church within the empire. It is nonetheless impossible to calculate how large a group of Uniates considering themselves Polish was affected. In his work, Gralewski stated that they numbered several thousand, but there is no way to verify this figure. It is likely that Gralewski is reliable in giving this several-thousand figure. It should also be borne in mind that in addition to Poles, Catholics in the Russian Empire could include, for example, Lithuanians, Belarusians, Latvians, Estonians, or Armenians. It is also important to note that due to the occurrence of identical surnames among, for example, Poles and Belarusians, there exist no research methods for determining whether a given person living in the 19th century felt Polish or Belarusian.

The first accurate data on the number of Poles residing in the Caucasus is provided in the Russian Empire census conducted in 1897.³ Per its results, 1,439 lived in Baku Governorate, 1630 in Dagestan Oblast, 616 in Elizavetpol Governorate, 3,243 in Kars Oblast (though from a methodological standpoint one could question the inclusion of this governorate in the Caucasus), in Kuban Oblast 2,719, in Kutais Governorate 1,938, in Stavropol Governorate 961, in Terek Oblast 4,173, in Tiflis Governorate 6,282, in the Black Sea Governorate 731, and in Erivan Governorate 1,385 (*Pervaya vseobščaya perepis’* 1897). Thus, at the end of the 19th century, 25,117 Poles resided within the broadly-defined Caucasus.

It is difficult to determine when the tsarist authorities began using the punishment of deportation to the Caucasus against Poles. There are no known documents on the basis of which it would be possible to ground the view that this procedure began as early as the end of the 18th century. Of course, the case is different with Polish volunteers serving in the army of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus during this period. Probably the most famous among them

-
- 1 The Kingdom of Poland was formed in 1815 from the area of the Commonwealth's lands that fell under the Russian partition. It had its own constitution, parliament, army, and currency, with Polish as the official language. It was connected with the Russian Empire by personal union through the monarch. After the fall of the November Uprising, the tsarist authorities limited the Kingdom's autonomy and joined it to the Russian Empire through a real union.
 - 2 The term “taken lands” (Western Krai) referred to the eastern provinces of the First Commonwealth that became part of the Russian Empire in 1772–1807, and were not included in the Kingdom of Poland established in 1815.
 - 3 It should be noted that there was no rubric in the census for specifying nationality, only native language and confessional affiliation.

was Bartłomiej Giżycki, a Polish nobleman who was awarded the War Order of Virtuti Militari at the rank of rotamaster for participating in the Battle of Zieleńce that took place during the Polish-Russian War of 1792. Several years later, he joined the Russian ranks. In 1797, he was promoted to colonel and appointed commander of the Bour (Pavlograd) Hussar Regiment stationed in Georgia, in 1798 became a major general, and ended his career as governor of Volhynia (Čulkov 1916: 175–176).

It is likely that supporters of shifting Poles' exile to the Caucasus to the end of the 18th century rely on only two facts – the partition of the Commonwealth took place at that time, as a result of which its eastern lands became part of the Russian Empire, and that Russian troops were concurrently present in the Caucasus. However, the first known testimonies of Polish exiles from the region are related to Poles' participation in Napoleon's expedition to Moscow, the captives from which the Russian authorities exiled precisely to the Caucasus. Ludwik Widerszal noted that in 1812 likely about 10,000 Polish POWs were sent to the region, but almost all returned home in 1815 (Widerszal 2011: 30). In some articles by Russian researchers, a figure of 2,000 also appears (Savel'ev 2013), with others oscillate around a figure of 12,000 Poles, said to have been relieved from stationing in the Caucasus after Alexander I's victory over Napoleon (Sudavcov 2015: 125). Interesting in this regard is information cited by turn-of-the-century Russian scholar and editor of the newspaper *Severnyj Kavkaz*, Grigory Prozritelev. In one work he wrote that in 1912, in a village located about 80 kilometres west of Stavropol within Stavropol Governorate, Polish inscriptions were discovered on some rocks. One of them read: "For the Fatherland a pleasant death, wounds and chains. Poles. Year 1813". Inscribed next to it were 16 Polish surnames (Prozritelev 1914: 11–14).

A portion of exiled Poles from the war against Napoleon participated in the final phase of the Russo-Persian War (1804–1813), as mentioned, for example, by Michał Janik in reference to Polish diaries. Others, in contrast, ended up in auxiliary units engaged in farm labour (Janik 1928: 94–95). Information about Polish participants of the Napoleonic campaign exiled to the Caucasus can be found, among others, in the memoirs of Stanisław Nowacki, a captured non-commissioned officer of the Legion of the Vistula, published in Poznań in 1833 under the title *Podróże do Georgii w czasie moiej niewoli w Rossyi odbyte w roku, 1813–1815*. On the basis of undertaken archival queries, examples of exiled Poles' stay in the Caucasus during this period were also cited by Russian researcher Irina Tsifanova. She described the story of one Pole who, in 1812, while serving punitively in the Russian army, deserted from Georgiyevsk and was captured by independent mountaineers. In 1826, they exchanged him for a "jailed Asiatic" held by the Russians. The latter, however, on the grounds that

the Pole had not taken an oath of servitude and faithful service to the tsar, sent him back to his homeland. To contrast, another Pole, a former Napoleonic soldier, remained in Dagestan despite the possibility of returning to Poland as he lacked the strength for such a long-distance journey. He then worked for a local businessman, was taken into slavery by mountaineers, and after several years, ransomed back to the Russians (Cifanova 2005: 86).

Other groups of Poles were sent to the Caucasus as a repressive measure for their participation in various organizations (such as the Filarets⁴ or the Fatherland [Sarmatian Tribe] Friends), posing, in the opinion of the tsarist administration, a threat to the political order in force at the time. Knowledge of this can be obtained by analysing, for example, the diaries of soldiers serving in the Caucasus. Gralewski mentioned the exiled Filarets in his work (Gralewski 2015: 95, 534). In turn, the case of Adam Trzaskowski, exiled to Georgia for being a member of the Fatherland (Sarmatian Tribe) Friends organization, was described by Bohdan Baranowski (Baranowski 1982: 281). In the first 30 years of the 19th century, however, deportation to the Caucasus was not frequently enforced and can be considered a marginal phenomenon. One Russian officer serving in the Caucasus noted in his memoirs that in the 1820s Poles served in the region in small numbers, being mainly officers (Andreev 1876: 21). It may be assumed, then, that the vast majority of Poles in the tsarist army in the Caucasus at the time were those who had entered its ranks voluntarily.

Forced conscription into the tsar's army in the Caucasus for political convictions, on the other hand, gained prominence after 1831. This was related both to the policy of the Russification and repression of Poles, which became apparent especially in the 1830s and 1840s, as well as to the military operations carried out by tsarist forces in the Caucasus. Caban noted that the most important source for calculating how many Poles were sentenced to forced conscription is the files of the Permanent Commission of Inquiry kept at the Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw. This Commission passed sentences on some 3,700 people. The researcher calculated that between 1833 and 1856, 435 people were forcibly conscripted into the army for patriotic activities (Caban 2001: 95–96). It should be noted that this figure does not apply only to those sentenced to deportation to the Caucasus, but to all regions of the Russian Empire in general.

The largest exile group was conscripted into the Caucasus Corps immediately after the November Uprising. It consisted of insurrectionists taken

4 The Filarets were a Polish secret society of Vilnian youth, active between 1820–1823.

prisoner in 1831. Of the 9,346 total captured in the fighting, a mere 1,865 were sent to the Caucasus Corps, with their first batch arriving at the dislocation site on 23 October (Old Style) (Caban 2001a: 727). Caban still stressed that these only represent estimates based on allocation, while how many actually reached the Caucasus cannot be determined (Caban 2001: 91). In 1832 this was a group of conscripts – about 8,900 people. The researcher referred to this conscription as “repressive” given it also covered uprising participants. There are thus methodological reasons to include this group in the “exile” category: in light of the law on the books at that time, a crime (participation in the uprising) had been committed, for which a punishment was subsequently imposed (service in the army stationed in the Caucasus). In turn, about 2.6 thousand people were sent to the Caucasus under the draft in 1834 (1833 saw no draft in the Kingdom of Poland), a particularly high ratio as it accounted for 72% of all recruits from the Kingdom called up to the Russian army (Caban 2001: 114–115).

Caban underscored the difficulty of determining the exact number of Poles serving in the Caucasus as a result of conscription, starting from 1835 and ending in 1855. He meanwhile questioned the findings of Ludwik Widerszal, who calculated the number of recruits regarding this period as follows: based on documents from the War Office of the Governor of the Kingdom of Poland concerning the years 1844–1848, he estimated that on average 700 people were sent to the Caucasus each year. He then related this data to the years 1835–1863 and got a result of about 20,000 Poles. Caban noted that Widerszal did not take into account the fact that the final conscription in the Kingdom of Poland took place in 1855, and either way, in his view, these five years could not be extrapolated to the entire period calculated. He therefore proposed a different methodology. Relying on official information from the Ministry of War for the years 1849–1853, he concluded that 1,200 soldiers from the Kingdom of Poland were sent to the Caucasus every year. In 1854, thus during the Crimean War, this number increased. Data pertaining to the Radom Governorate – one of five into which the Kingdom of Poland was divided between 1845 and 1866 – shows that 915 people were sent to the Caucasus Corps in 1854. The historian assumed that a similar quota was also imposed on the other governorates and that an analogous phenomenon took place in 1855. Thus, in his opinion, about 9,000 people from the Kingdom of Poland were sent to the Caucasus between 1854–1855. The researcher noted that determining how many people were sent to the Caucasus in 1835–1843 is complicated. To his mind, it should be assumed that from 1835 the number of Poles sent to the region decreased, thus reaching a level of 700–900 people per year for 1843–1844. Therefore, he assumed an average of 1,200 people sent each year, as was the case in the period 1849–1853. If all the data then is added up, it would come to 41,460 people being sent to

the Caucasus in 1831–1855 (Caban 2001a: 730), accounting for 21% of all conscripts drafted into the tsarist army. An approximate 200 conspirators forcibly conscripted into the army (punishment for patriotic activity) should be additionally added to the resulting figure (Caban 2001: 116).

Caban's assumptions that an average of 1,200 people from the Kingdom of Poland were sent to the Caucasus in the 1830s and 1840s are more or less in line with the findings of Russian historians. For example, Oleg Matveyev stated that the surviving documents of Alexander Dondukov-Korsakov⁵ show that 14,430 Poles were drafted into the Separate Caucasian Corps between 1835 and 1846 (Matveev 2008: 99). In turn, Gralewski wrote in his memoirs that "male Polish Catholics [in the Caucasus – P.A.], almost exclusively serving in the army, numbered about 26,000 in 1848, with women numbering up to 2000" (Gralewski 2015: 562). In contrast, the French consul in Tiflis in 1840 sent information to his superiors that the number of Poles in the Caucasus Corps stood at 25–30,000 men (Widerszal 2011: 32).

Caban noted in his work that the number of Poles in the Caucasus never exceeded 20% of the total number of Russian troops stationed there, thus this top-down rate was adhered to – it was a decision of the tsarist authorities that limited the maximum number of Poles to 20% of the total number of personnel. There could however exist fluctuations within individual units, which was particularly evident with regard to officers. Although there was an official regulation that Polish officers in individual garrisons should not exceed 20% of the cadre, it was not rigidly observed. Consequently, there were units in the Caucasus where the officer cadre of Polish origin reached 40% (Caban 2014: 204).

In light of the above findings, it should be emphasized that Poles in the Caucasus were primarily conscripts serving in the tsarist army, not exiles. There has been no research to date as to when the tsarist authorities began channelling this group to the southern fringes of the empire. It is possible to link this phenomenon to the creation of the Black Sea Cossack Host. Catherine II allotted those Cossacks belonging to it the lands along the right bank of the Kuban in 1792, to protect the borderland from raids by "peoples from beyond the Kuban", that is, primarily Adyge. The resettlement of Cossacks to the new territories from areas previously occupied by them between the Bug and Dniester rivers took place between 1792–1794. Moreover, two years prior, i.e. in 1790, Grigory Potemkin-Tauricheski, viceroy of the Novorossiia, Azov, and Astrakhan governorates, signed an order to include "mercenaries from Little

5 Alexander Dondukov-Korsakov (1820–1893), a Russian state activist and military commander, served as commander-in-chief of Russian troops in the Caucasus between 1882–1890.

Russia and Poland” in the Black Sea Cossack Host, while in 1799 Tsar Paul I added to this “vagabonds from Little Russia, Poland, and former Zaporozhye” (Selickij 2008: 8). Resultingly, the Black Sea Cossack Host would consist in part of individuals from Poland, though it is impossible to determine at present how many there were. Among the most important reasons for this fact, Aleksander Sielicki cited the lack of specific information linking any given person to Poland. Terms of origin such as “of Polish nobility” or “descendant from Poles” applied only to those who had enrolled with the Cossacks. These were absent, meanwhile, in the case of their children. They, in turn, had, for example, “staff-officer children” marked down as their origin. Another problem stems from the fact that a Pole who enrolled with the Cossacks quite often changed his Polish surname to a Cossack moniker. Additionally, Polish Catholics often converted to Orthodoxy when joining the Cossacks, especially if they had married an Orthodox woman. Sielicki managed to identify some 60 people who volunteered to join the Cossacks and had simply “of Polish nobility” or “descendant from Poles” written as their origin in their documentation (Selickij 2008: 20–38).

It should also be borne in mind that a portion of officers treated service on this dangerous front – where, after all, armed clashes occurred regularly – as an opportunity to make one’s name and attain a speedy promotion. For this reason, they gladly volunteered to enlist in units stationed in the Caucasus (Baranowski/Baranowski 1987: 160). Contemporary researchers estimate that the number of Polish volunteers during the period of most intense fighting in the region, i.e. the mid-19th century, numbered several hundred (Cifanova 2005: 99).

Poles were sent to the Caucasus until 1855, that is, till the final conscription before the January Uprising. The last wave of Polish exiles flowed into the Caucasus in the 1850s. (Reychman 1954: 36). In turn, after 1865 (in 1855–1865 conscription was not conducted in the Kingdom of Poland), when conscription was reintroduced in the Polish territories, deportation to the region became sporadic. This was in connection with Russia’s subordination of the entire Caucasus and the end of hostilities in its eastern part after the surrender of Shamil in 1859, and likewise its western part with the Adyghe surrender in 1864. Nevertheless, Poles continued to serve in local garrisons. These were, for example, individuals who ended up in the Caucasus with their units stationed in other parts of Russia, or volunteers (Baranowski/Baranowski 1987: 201). In addition, after Russia’s subjugation of the entire Caucasus, Polish labour emigration to the region intensified, which saw a steadily increasing percentage of soldiers of Polish origin (Woźniak 1991: 154). For this reason, Polish doctors, engineers, teachers – so the intelligentsia in general – began appearing.

Caban noted that after the January Uprising's fall, the Russian authorities chose not to use forced conscription as a form of punishment. This stemmed from opinions cropping up in the tsar's entourage from mid-1863 that an excess of exiles would contribute to the growth of revolutionary sentiment and could cause perturbations for the authorities. Where there were fears of revolutionary sentiment among Poles sent for settling or to penal labour, even more so were there fears of conscripting January Uprising participants into the army. Resultingly, only 2,670 people were deported to penal servitude (Caban 2001: 212) (for the entirety of Russia, not only the Caucasus). Caban pointed out that after 1865, when the tsardom re-initiated conscription in the Kingdom of Poland, no information appears in any source suggesting anyone was sent to toil in the Caucasus before 1873 (Caban 2001: 114).

There remains the issue of Poles who were conscripted into the tsarist army and hailed from the so-called taken lands. Caban stressed that it is likely impossible to determine their number, because although several hundred volumes of recruit registers have been preserved in Lithuanian archives, the personal data do not contain information regarding nationality, only religion. It is likewise difficult to make a judgement concerning nationality on the basis of how the surname sounded and religious affiliation. The researcher pointed to examples of popular surnames, such as Mackiewicz, occasionally including an annotation stating the person bearing them was Catholic, at other times that he was Orthodox. Official statistics, meanwhile, counted Poles from the taken territories called up for military service as "Byelorussians" and "Malorussians", or Lithuanians. This treatment was not only applied to those entering military academies and schooling to become officers (Caban 2001: 10). The historian calculated that at the beginning of the 1820s the tsarist army's officer corps numbered approximately 30,000, while just before World War I it stood at 49,000. In that period, about 20,000 Poles or persons of Polish origin would pass through it. Among them, 60% came from the taken lands, 30% from the Kingdom of Poland, and 10% from the central governorates (Caban 2014: 204).

Caban also proved that, statistically, 7,900 people were conscripted from the Kingdom of Poland into the army each of the years between the uprisings. This accounted for less than 10% of total Russian forces. By 1855, 201,000 Poles had served (both conscripts and those sentenced to military service), while the period 1865–1873 saw 119,000 serve (Caban 2001: 83, 203, 213). The historian calculated that overall, from 1832 to 1913, some 1.3–1.4 million people were conscripted into the Russian army from the Kingdom of Poland (Caban 2014: 201).

Caban's calculations, demonstrating that 21% of the total population of the Kingdom of Poland conscripted into the tsarist army was sent to this

region between the uprisings (when the largest number of Poles served in the Caucasus), are important in that they undermine claims that Polish recruits were primarily sent to this area. The researcher showed that about 20% of them served in the Caucasus, while 10% served in Siberia (Caban 2001: 224). Thus, their vast majority, with 70% of Polish recruits, were stationed in the European part of Russia. Recruits also commonly did not serve in the Kingdom of Poland, though no official ban on this existed. For example, in 1836, of the 6,911 conscripts, 7% (or 487 recruits) were sent to garrisons stationed in the Kingdom of Poland. By contrast, from the 1840s onwards, an average of about 11% served locally. During the Crimean War, no Polish recruits were sent to serve in their homeland, while following the war's end that figure again oscillated at around 11% each year (Caban 2001: 116). In turn, from 1868 to 1913, between 3% and 36% of Poles served in the Kingdom of Poland (Caban 2014: 202). Thus, claims that Poles could not serve in their homeland are false (Piwnicki 2002a: 133).

It can be accepted that the appearance of the notion that Poles served mainly in Siberia and the Caucasus was largely influenced by publications of political exiles' memoirs in the 19th century (who were indeed directed mainly to the two aforementioned regions, with about 50% of the penally conscripted landing in the Orenburg and Siberian Corps, and about 20% in the Caucasus Corps between 1833–1856, though they were relatively few considering the total number of Poles serving in the tsarist army). Readers thus became convinced that since so many memoirs were published from these two areas alone, it implied that “all Poles must have served there” (Caban 2001: 96, 223).

When discussing the issue of Polish exiles in the Caucasus, another problem in the Polish literature on the subject must be mentioned. Namely, some scholars apply the term “exiles” to individuals who did not hold this status. Among the most well-known such individuals, first place must be afforded to Józef Chodźko.⁶

Andrzej Furier, who worked on the geodesist's biography, established that during his studies Chodźko belonged to initially legal patriotic associations. During a trial of the Filarets in Vilnius, he was summoned before an investigation commission, to which he gave a detailed description of the organization (Furier 2001: 41–42). He consequently avoided being convicted (Furier 1997a: 830), in turn enlisting in the Russian army and travelling to Moldavia and Wallachia to conduct land-surveying work (Furier 2001: 44).

6 He is called an “exile” by, for example, Chodubski 2012a: 179; Jastrzębski 2014: 219. He is also presented as an exile in the Polish version of Wikipedia: *Józef Chodźko*, [see <https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Józef_Chodźko>, accessed 29.04.2024].

To the Caucasus he was deployed in 1840 at the request of Caucasus Corps commander Yevgeny Golovin, who, valuing the Pole, wanted him to work in his Army-Topographical Detachment (Furier 1997a: 831). Chodźko distinguished himself in the Crimean War, especially in operations around Kars, for which he was awarded the Order of Saint Stanislaus, 1st class. A few years later, he became head of the Caucasus Army's Topographical Detachment (Berezowski 1970: 430), earning the rank of lieutenant general (Furier 2001: 88). For his contributions to topography, he came to be not only a member of the Russian Geographical Society, but also a corresponding member of the French Academy of Sciences (Rehman 1879: 15).

Another example is Albert (Wojciech) Potocki, also portrayed by scholars and publicists as an "exile" (Geremek 2008: 81; Piwnicki 2002: 90; idem 2012: 76; Reychman 1972: 181). Such a description is also found on the Polish version of Wikipedia (*Albert Potocki*). Some researchers further claim that Potocki was a participant in the November Uprising (Inglot 1957: 543). Based on available sources, it can be concluded that he was indeed penally conscripted in the 1820s, but served in the Kingdom of Poland. When the November Uprising broke out, he decided not to take up arms against his countrymen fighting for independence, but did not join their cause either. He instead leveraged family connections with General Grigory Rozen, one of the tsarist army commanders deployed against the insurrectionists, and transferred to the Caucasus Corps (Filina/Ossowska 2007: 61). This unit soon came to be led by Rozen himself, who made Potocki an officer and personal adjutant. Already holding the rank of lieutenant colonel, the Pole, at his own request, transferred to units stationing in Volhynia, from there landing in the Kingdom of Poland. He deployed to the Caucasus again in 1845 and became an advisor to Viceroy Mikhail Vorontsov (Woźniak 1987: 234–235).

Witold Zglenicki, the most famous geologist among the Poles in the Caucasus, is also at times portrayed as an "exile" (Chodubski 2012a: 179). In reality, however, he came to the region as a labourer (Adamczewski 2013: 187). He would work at the assay office in Baku from 1891 until his life's end. This Pole is known, among other things, for his contributions to technologies in mining-well drilling and extracting mineral oil from under the seabed.

In addition to questions related to Polish exiles, the martyrology aspect of the Polish ethnopolitical myth with regard to the Caucasus also concerns the issue of the number of Poles who passed away or were killed in the region being overstated.

The largest figure of Poles who perished in the Caucasus was provided by Grzegorz Piwnicki. Per his estimates, more than 500,000 Poles died in the

region's numerous wars (Piwnicki 2001: 11; idem 2011: 250). However, these estimates are so greatly exaggerated that if they were to be accepted as factual, it would mean that considerably more Poles died in the Caucasus than were sent there.

Most likely, this 500,000 figure employed by Piwnicki is the result of a misinterpretation of estimates provided in Gralewski's memoirs, which, incidentally, the Polish academic cited in one of his articles (Piwnicki 2003: 203). Looking at the writings of the Polish exile, one finds calculations suggesting that, to his mind, 20,000 tsarist soldiers died in the Caucasus per year (from combat and disease) (Gralewski 2015: 581). In a later section, Gralewski wrote that only a fourth of these soldiers were ethnic Russians. In his opinion, half the army was supplemented by "peoples from Little Russian governorates", like Poltava, Kharkov and Voronezh. The other half:

was filled with people of various rites from the lands of our former Commonwealth – as calculated by me comparatively on several regiments' forms. It would thus stand that about three hundred thousand Poles together with Lithuanians and Ruthenians were killed since 1831. And if to this horrifying figure we add those who from 1773 to 1831 perished in the mountains and on the peripheral Persian and Turkish battle-grounds, and who fell victim to the epidemics raging at the time, we will arrive at the huge sum of five hundred thousand. (Gralewski 2015: 582)

It is clear from Gralewski's text that when he wrote about this 500,000 dead, he meant all individuals from the territories of the former Commonwealth who had fallen under Russia's dominion: Poles, Lithuanians, and Ruthenians (the latter he considered the entire population speaking Eastern Slavic ethnolects and living on the lands of the former Commonwealth). Piwnicki, on the other hand, ascribed this 500,000 exclusively to Poles. It should also be noted that the figure given by Gralewski was already disputed in the 1930s by Ludwik Widerszal, who considered it grossly inflated (Widerszal 2011: 32), later also by Jan Reychman (Reychman 1939: 268).

To illustrate how exaggerated is an estimate of 500,000 Poles perishing in the Caucasus as a result of wars, it is worth quoting statistics on how many of its soldiers, regardless of ethnicity, Tsarist Russia lost warring in the Caucasus. According to these sources, in all the armed conflicts fought by Russia in the North Caucasus between 1801 and 1864, the tsarist army lost 4,050 officers and 92,225 "rank-and-file" soldiers. This brings the total to about 96,000 soldiers – killed, wounded, and taken prisoner. To this should be added about

55,000 soldiers – killed, wounded and taken prisoner – from the following wars: with Persia and Turkey in 1803–1813 (about 8.2 thousand), against Persia in 1826–1828 (about 4 thousand), against Turkey in 1828–1829 (about 4.3 thousand), in the Crimean War in 1853–1856 (about 16.8 thousand – this number referring only to losses from military operations in the Caucasus and Anatolia), against Turkey in 1877–1878 (19.6 thousand), and in the suppression of the 1877 uprising in the Dagestan and Terek oblasts (about 1.1 thousand). Additionally, an approximate 1.2 thousand soldiers died in advances into the South Caucasus in the 19th century (Gizetti 1901: 129–182).

In sum, throughout its wars in the Caucasus and surrounding regions, Russia lost about 150,000 soldiers (that is, killed, wounded, and taken prisoner) to various armed clashes. Thus, the figure of 500,000 Poles perishing in the Caucasus is three times higher than the tsarist army's personnel losses in all wars and skirmishes in the Caucasus region over the course of the 19th century, regardless of the nationality of the soldiers killed.

It should be taken into account, however, that to comprehensively determine the total number of tsarist soldiers killed or perished in the Caucasus, the difficult-to-estimate number of dead resulting from diseases (particularly dangerous for those stationed on the Black Sea line), failed escapes, suicides, and killings by fellow servicemen should be added to the 150,000 figure. These were losses greater than those the tsarist army suffered from direct confrontation with the enemy. For example, Yevgeny Krinko cited the following numbers of soldiers who died of disease: during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829–110,000, during the Crimean War – 88,800, in various Caucasus campaigns – 102,000, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878–82,600 (Krinko 2016: 21). Other numbers also surface in this regard. Much larger ones are cited, for example, by Vladimir Lapin. Per his estimates, for each tsarist soldier who died in battle or as a result of wounds during the Caucasus War, ten died of disease. As one extreme case, the historian gave the example of the Tengri Infantry Regiment. Between 1820 and 1824, ten of its soldiers were killed in battle, while 1,159 died in the same period inside their unit (see Lapin 2014). On the other hand, it should be remembered that Poles were sent to the Caucasus primarily from 1832 to 1855, so it seems reasonable to assume that during this period the mortality rate due to disease had decreased compared to earlier decades.

Caban estimates that by 1856, 75% of the 200,000 conscripted Poles died from disease (as the main factor) and combat, regardless of their place of stationing (Caban 2001: 215). The historian calculated that during this period the mortality rate in the Caucasus was higher than in other parts of the empire,

in 1842 being, for example, 95.6 deaths per 1,000 soldiers and thus more than twice as high as for the entire tsarist army (Caban 2001a: 734).

In attempting to estimate how many soldiers from Polish lands died as a result of military operations and disease in the Caucasus while citing Caban's calculations (which show that in the years 1831–1855 about 41 thousand soldiers were sent to the region from the Kingdom of Poland), it can be assumed that it was around 90% of them, or about 37 thousand. We have no data in turn that could be employed in estimating how many Poles among civilians died in the Caucasus, and it seems unlikely that this matter will ever be clarified.

Applying *Argumentum ad Rossicum* to Explain Processes Underway in the Caucasus

I see the influence of the Polish ethnopolitical myth, or rather that part of it concerning the image of Russia as an “historical enemy”, in the use of *argumentum ad Rossicum* and its variations in explaining various phenomena and processes in the Caucasus. I adopt the concept of *argumentum ad Rossicum* directly from Godwin’s law, also known as *reductio ad Hitlerum* or *argumentum ad Hitlerum*. It states: “As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1”, and was jokingly formulated by American lawyer and writer Mike Godwin. He observed that in English-language online discussions, arguments such as “that’s what Hitler did” or “just like the Nazis” are often used to discredit someone’s views, regardless of the subject of their argument. Memes substantively unrelated to the discussion, but which trigger certain feelings in the audience – in this case negative ones – are also used. Godwin gave the example of pro-life movement activists in the United States proclaiming that abortion is worse than Nazi death camps (Godwin 1994). In such argumentation, characteristics of *argumentum ad auditorem*, in which the discussant does not address the substance of the issue but addresses the audience and populistically appeals to the audience’s inclinations and beliefs, show themselves. The aim is to replace factual argumentation to clarify an issue with memes that affect the emotions of the perceiver and evoke certain associations in him.

As the role of the “historical enemy” in the Polish ethnopolitical myth relates primarily to Russia, it is mainly with this country that the arguments I link to Godwin’s Law are associated. These take various forms, but four are most common: *argumentum ad Stalinum*, *argumentum ad Putinum*, *argumentum ad Rossicum*, and *argumentum ad bolsevicum/communismum*. Thus, while American opponents of abortion refer to Hitler to discredit it, Polish opponents refer to Stalin (Dunin 2016).

In contemporary Polish politics, *argumentum ad Rossicum* is one of the more common ploys used to discredit the views of a rival by both the ruling camp and the opposition. Both sides accuse each other of being “Russian agents” or of pursuing Russian interests. The Polish political scene is naturally also host to references to the other “historical enemy”: Germany. This is most often used by members of the Law and Justice party to discredit the actions of Donald Tusk,

against whom a perception is cultivated wherein he acts to the detriment of Poland and to Germany's benefit. In turn, the accusation of being a "Russian agent" is used against political opponents by practically all parties.

In the case of the Caucasus and Russian activity in the region, the method of employing *argumentum ad Hitlerum* Polish authors use more rarely, in addition to the far more frequent phenomenon of *argumentum ad Stalinum/Putinum*. As for the first of these eristic tricks, it appears in the context of Russian activities in Chechnya in the late 1990s, which are juxtaposed with Adolf Hitler's policies and German concentration camps (e. g.: Grochmalski 2005: 54; Kurczab-Redlich 2005: 8; Lisiewicz 2005). This is intended to foster in the reader the notion that the Russians dealt with the Chechens in the same way that the Germans dealt with the Jews during the Second World War. It also happened that one Polish scholar considered the proposal to recognise the independence of Abkhazia as an analogy to actions vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Munich Conference in 1938 (Potocki 2009: 33).

Occasionally, arguments of the *argumentum ad Hitlerum* type occur simultaneously alongside *argumentum ad Stalinum* and its variations. For example, members of the Free Caucasus Committee issued a statement in February 2000, linked to the 56th anniversary of the deportation of the Chechens, which read that "Even the manner of this new 'strong man' Vladimir Putin is reminiscent of the old methods practised by Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler" (Komitet "Wolny Kaukaz" 2000). Among the most prominent scholars who chose to make similar juxtapositions was Paweł Wieczorkiewicz, regarded in Poland as a top expert on the history of the USSR and Russia. During an interview concerning the 2008 Georgian-Ossetian-Russian war, he stated that the Russian forces were continuing the work of the Red Army, and that Putin was Stalin's illegitimate grandson. These associations "were obvious" to the scholar, given Europe's same predicament as the one it was in 1938 (the interview took place in 2008 and Wieczorkiewicz's words referred to that time). He failed then, in his view, even though the Poles recognised the danger and proposed a preventive war to the French in 1933. Wieczorkiewicz went on to claim:

Today too, we Poles, due to our historical experiences, recognise the danger. It is difficult, however, to speak of European unity in the light of Italy's or Germany's pro-Russian stance. History does not only teach fools. Unfortunately, most European politicians are fools who do not look to the future and cannot look to the past. [...] What the Russians are doing with South Ossetia is as if the Germans, instead of organising the Gliwice provocation, had announced in 1939 that the people of Silesia wanted to join the Reich. [...] Paper treaties are no security guarantee for

Poland. In 1939, we also had “hard guarantees” from France and England, and how did that end? In 1939, no one wanted to die for Danzig. And in 2010 – I would rather not be a negative prophet – perhaps no one will want to die for Białystok. (Zychowicz 2008)

Paweł Wieczorkiewicz’s statement is a case in point of national myth construction. He constructs an ahistorical, timeless schema related to the Russian threat. Its essential component is also Poles’ possession of unique knowledge, inaccessible to others, which they acquired through “historical experience”. It is with this knowledge that they aim to save Europe, thus reinforcing the motif of: Poland – a bulwark shielding the West from “Eastern barbarism”. At the same time, however, Poland is ignored by European politicians who are “fools” – probably because they have not acquired the same “knowledge” that the Poles have.

The use of *argumentum ad Rossicum* or *argumentum ad bolsevicum* is characteristic of authors who, on the one hand, have insufficient knowledge of the phenomena occurring in the Caucasus and, on the other, present a committed attitude. Consequently, they reduce the processes taking place – which are primarily negative in the perception of such authors – to “Russia’s actions”, which cannot actually explain anything. For example, using *argumentum ad Rossicum* or *argumentum ad bolsevicum/communismum* in the context of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and pointing out that Soviet/Russian policy was to blame for its outbreak does not require any specialised knowledge. It is much more difficult to analyse the formation of nationalism among Armenians and Azerbaijanis emerging at the end of the 19th century, the economic situation in the region, and other factors still that led to ethnic conflict between these groups. Analysing this requires thorough knowledge, grounded in years of source-material research. All this arduous work becomes replaced by a single banal argument: that the conflict was just a consequence of Russian policy.

The reduction of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh to Russian interference is found in both journalistic (Kuleba 1998: 35; idem 2002: 217; Brzeziecki/Nocuń 2016: 116) and academic works (Baziur 2016: 188). In such cases, no substantive argumentation is conducted, or it is unconvincing. The work of one of Poland’s better-known historians writing on the Caucasus, Jerzy Rohoziński, may serve as one example. In his view, the Armenian-Muslim conflict in the Transcaucasus of 1905–1906 was inspired by tsarist secret services and constituted a provocation organised by the tsarist administration. The historian pointed out that admittedly “There are many question marks surrounding all of this, but one thing is beyond doubt: the authorities were behind the riots” (Rohoziński 2014: 935). The use of an oxymoron of sorts is

thus used: while the author sees “many question marks”, at the same time maintaining a conviction that Russian authorities were behind the riots. The aim of such Russian actions is claimed to have been to “channel the people’s anger so as to decimate the ‘uncertain and revolutionary element’” at a time when a wave of strikes was sweeping Baku. According to the historian, with this, the authorities aimed to turn the revolutionary turmoil into an ethnic riot. In this way then, he claims, Russia’s rulers were trying to solve the Armenian problem, for which they themselves were responsible (here, Rohoziński most likely had in mind the management of Armenian settlement across the South Caucasus, though he did not specify this), by the hands of the local Muslims (Rohoziński 2010: 237–238; idem 2014: 916–917).

According to Rohoziński, the early 20th century saw no economic conflict between Muslims and Armenians in the eastern part of Transcaucasia. Instead, the fighting that broke out was a consequence of a plan devised by the Russian authorities, including Mikhail Nakashidze, Baku’s governor, who travelled around and incited Muslims against the Armenians (Rohoziński 2014: 938).

Taking the Muslim side unequivocally, Rohoziński prioritised underscoring Armenian violence against Muslims, writing that in the second half of 1906 there was systematic aggression by Armenians against other ethnic groups in the Elizavetpol Governorate, or that Armenian attacks on Muslims in the Governorate took place with the authorities’ consent. Such statements support notions that killings committed by Armenians against Muslims were Russian provocation, thus the logical consequence of such a view of the matter is that any killings committed by Muslims ought to be classified as merely self-defence. Rohoziński also employed such terms as “Armenian terrorism” and “Armenian mafia” in relation to the early 20th century (Rohoziński 2014: 941–943). Characteristically, he did not apply similar pejorative epithets regarding organised violence to Muslims, which is explainable by his taking of a position that they represented agents solely defending themselves.

Rohoziński’s anti-Armenian attitude, which, I believe, is determined by his anti-Russian views, is clearly visible in his descriptions of killings committed against Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. According to the historian, “pogrom-minded Armenian units from the onset were also responsible for the tragic wave of violence that swept through Anatolia and affected the Armenian population”. He did not specify which “waves of violence” he had in mind, but he probably meant the massacre of Armenians carried out between 1915–1917, during which, according to various estimates, between 1 and 2 million people were exterminated within Ottoman territory (Forsythe 2009: 98). It therefore follows that, in the author’s view, the Armenians are themselves to be blamed for the genocide committed against them.

One would think that to confirm the thesis that the Armenian-Muslim conflict of 1905–1906 was a Russian provocation, the historian should have sought evidence in the archives of Baku, Tbilisi, albeit St. Petersburg or Moscow, but he chose not to do so. He laid out his claims without backing them with source evidence, occasionally citing materials from later years. This is evident, for example, in his assertion that there were no fanatical Muslims in Transcaucasia in the early 20th century, or that if there were, these were provocateurs of the Tsarist Okhrana or Armenian nationalists. To back one claim, Rohoziński cited a document from 1914, i.e. written nine years after the events, in which a Tsarist official pointed out that the programme of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, adopted in 1913, indicated it would send its people posing as pan-Islamic emissaries to set Muslims against Russia and trigger an uprising. This, in turn, was to lead to repression by Russia and the breaking up of the Muslim community (Rohoziński 2014: 930).

The means of persuasion used by Rohoziński also includes insinuation. He suggested, for example, that the murders of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century also represented Russian inspirations. When discussing the spread of news in the Transcaucasus of Kurdish attacks against Armenians, the historian used the rhetorical construction: “perhaps it was meant to spread” (Rohoziński 2014: 607), clearly suggesting to the reader that the Russian authorities wanted such news publicised to inflame Armenian-Muslim conflict. Elsewhere, he stated that “the involvement of the authorities seems almost certain” in the riots that took place in Baku during the autumn of 1905 (Rohoziński 2014: 933). This construction was employed by Rohoziński because he likely did not know how to or was unable to bring to bear other arguments supporting his views.

One distinctive feature of Rohoziński’s work is his reduction of the 1905–1906 conflict to a Russian provocation and complete disregard for the complex cultural, economic, or social issues. In doing so, he chose to adopt a biblical-phenomenological stance. Consequently, the reader, in the absence of evidence and testimony, must accept “on faith” the theses of a historian presenting a committed attitude instead of that of an observer, characteristic of academic research.

A thoroughly different approach from Rohoziński’s to explaining the Armenian-Muslim conflict of the early 20th century was laid out by German historian Jörg Baberowski. Drawing on documents from Russian archives, he comprehensively analysed the causes behind the emergence of Armenian-Muslim antagonism in Transcaucasia. However, he avoided reducing this to “Russian provocation”, rather looking for its roots in the deteriorating situation of Muslims in the region caused by industrialisation, which was progressing at

pace in the second half of the 19th century. Particularly unfavourable conditions came about for them precisely in rapidly developing Baku, where pogroms subsequently took place. In explaining the causes of the Armenian-Muslim conflict, Baberowski emphasised such issues as 1) The declining percentage of Muslims in Baku – in 1843, 91% of the city's population was Muslim, while in 1903, Turkic-speaking Muslims accounted for 30%; this process was linked to mass arrivals of economic migrants, mainly Russians and Armenians. 2) The atomisation of Bakuvian society – representatives of different ethnic groups lived in closed communities. 3) The Muslim community disproportionately under-shared in the profits derived from oil production, the main driver of the city's development. 4) The lack of Muslim influence outside the economic sphere, e.g. Baberowski noted that in 1905, out of 258 teachers in Baku, no more than 10 were Muslims. 5) The local Muslim population, in the process of competition, lost contact with the economically developing and urbanised Armenian immigrant community. According to the historian, it was in Baku, as in no other city in Russia, that migrants succeeded in comprehensively undermining the economic and political positions of the local population, an essential ground for future armed conflict. 6) Differences in Armenian and Muslim education – the Armenian community had its own network of schools and had also succeeded in secularising education and making it independent of clerical influence as early as the 1870s. On the other hand, having analysed the schooling available to Muslims, the historian concluded that many of them abandoned their careers and did not pursue an education. He saw the reasons for this, among others, in the peculiarities of local Shiite conservatism, which inhibited the development of secular education. Baberowski noted that a Muslim choosing to pursue an education and a career had to reject the traditional values held by most members of his religious group. As a result, Muslims in 1905 in Bakuvian grammar schools accounted for 6.7% of pupils in female schools and 0.5% in male schools, while Armenians accounted for 43.6% and 37% respectively. 7) The removal of communities from city governance – according to an 1892 tsarist decree, a maximum of 20% of city deputies could be non-Christians. This document, given the context of its creation, was anti-Jewish in intent – in the Caucasus it had a negative impact on Muslims. Consequently, Muslims had an ever-diminishing influence on Baku's power structures, which went to migrants. 8) The rise of Turkic self-consciousness and nationalism. 9) The situation of Muslim workers, the sanitary conditions at their places of work and residence, as well as Muslims' involvement (or rather lack thereof) in the struggle for the protection of workers' rights and social security for Muslim workers. 10) In explaining the causes of the outbreak of armed struggles between Armenians and Muslims in the early 20th century,

Baberowski also conducted an analysis of the conflicts between Muslim and Armenian workers at individual industrial plants (see Baberowski 2004: 307–352). Rohoziński, on the other hand, puts the matter much more simply: the Armenian-Muslim conflict with was a Russian provocation. This positioning of the matter by the Polish historian, however, does not really explain anything, and is at its core reasoning through ideology.

Rohoziński also regarded the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict of the late 20th century as provocations orchestrated by Moscow decision-makers, with the pogroms in Sumgait as “most likely” organised by the KGB (Rohoziński 2010: 246). On what he based this “probability”, he never cared to explain.

Another historian, Jerzy Targalski, claimed in turn that, Colonel Alikram Hummatov announced the establishment of the Talysh-Mugan Republic in Lankaran in August 1993 at Moscow’s behest (Darski 1998: 134). As is often the case with the use of *argumentum ad Rossicum*, he presented no evidence to support his view, with the reader being expected to accept it relying solely on faith in the author’s good word. Targalski belongs to a group of Polish authors who present this matter as if Hummatov were a separatist seeking to detach the lands inhabited by the Talysh from Azerbaijan, on “Moscow’s orders” at that. It is difficult to agree with such a construction. Hummatov, appearing on Talysh TV on 21 June 1993, announced the creation of the Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic within Azerbaijan. At the same time, he did not mention anything about breaking away from the rest of the country.

According to Azerbaijani political scientist Rasim Musabekov, Hummatov’s speech should not be qualified as separatist – neither he nor his supporters called for separation from Azerbaijan. Moreover, no conflicts between Azerbaijanis and Talysh were recorded in the areas that temporarily fell out from the control of the government in Baku. According to this researcher, the most likely explanation is that the declaration of autonomy was intended as a political and ideological screen for an attempted power grab by a group of military officers seeking to rely on local clans, similar to what Surat Huseynov organised in Ganja in May 1993, albeit on a smaller scale and with more modest aims (Musabekov 2011). This thesis sounds more convincing, in my view, than referencing “Russia’s actions”. I thus accept Rasim Musabekov’s explanation as plausible based on currently available sources. In contrast, evidence of Russian involvement in the whole enterprise has not been provided by Targalski, making it difficult to comment. This historian’s approach to the whole issue can be explained by his ideological stance, similarly to his attitude towards the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. Here, too, the researcher concluded that the armed clashes between Ossetians and Ingush at the end of 1992 were a provocation by the Russian authorities. The reason was said to be the search for a pretext

to send federal troops into North Ossetia in connection with the situation in Chechnya. The historian argued that the conflict ended with the murder of several thousand Ingush, with some 70,000 being forced to emigrate, done in accordance with the will of the initiators (by implication, the Russian authorities) (Darski 1998: 127). Thus, instead of addressing the history of the Prigorodny region (with which the conflict was largely linked), the development of an Ingush movement that demanded its incorporation into Ingushetia (or, more precisely, the then Chechen-Ingush ASSR), or the unresolved land disputes between Ossetians and Ingush that had been going on since 1944 (that is, since the Ossetians had taken over the homes and land of those Ingush deported to Kazakhstan), Targalski reduced everything to “Russian provocation”. One would also have to inquire whether it was necessary for the Russian authorities to provoke an armed conflict between the Ossetians and the Ingush to have a pretext to send troops into North Ossetia. Were there any obstacles to this before the conflict? After all, Mozdok since Soviet times been home to one of the country’s largest military airbases, while Vladikavkaz serves as a major gathering point for various military units. In presenting this case, Targalski also failed to provide any methodology for counting the several thousand victims from the Ingush side. This is an essential matter, given that per official data, 105 Ossetians and 407 Ingush were killed in the clashes (Kuštavkina). Furthermore, the claim of 70,000 expelled Ingush seems greatly exaggerated. According to the 1989 census, North Ossetia was inhabited by some 33,000 Ingush (*Vsesoyuznaya perepis’ naseleniya 1989 goda*), and not everyone left the republic as a result of the conflict.

Targalski has also employed *argumentum ad Rossicum* to explain other processes taking place in the South Caucasus, such as an intervention by the KGB explaining the seizure of power in Georgia by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, whom the KGB was said to have supported (Darski 1998: 138). I, however, am unable to uncover any arguments supporting this thesis, while Targalski did not cite any. I once again attribute his stance to the influence of the Polish ethnopolitical myth, the consequence of which was another adoption of a biblical-phenomenological stance by the author. It is difficult to substantiate why the KGB would have helped a Georgian independence activist take power in Georgia. After all, it was Gamsakhurdia who organised anti-Soviet demonstrations in the USSR’s final years, was one of the authors of the referendum on Georgian independence, and, once president, blocked Georgia’s entry into the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Argumentum ad Rossicum is also used as an explication for many other issues in the Caucasus, above all those concerning ethnic and border disputes. An example is again the opinion of Targalski that it is Russia that stimulates

the Lezgin problem in Azerbaijan, when in fact the Lezgins in that country enjoy cultural autonomy gained as early as 1993, and currently (the article being published in 1998) possess schools with Lezgin as the language of instruction in grades 1–10 along with private radio and television stations (Darski 1998: 125). Here, again, instead of trying to clarify the given issue and cite evidence to support his opinion, Targalski revealed his thesis without presenting any argumentation. Moreover, he presented selective information in such a way as to testify to the good situation of the Lezgins in Azerbaijan. However, there was no Lezgin TV in Azerbaijan in the 1990s. The first such station, Murad TV, only appeared in 2004, and was shut down by the authorities after a few months of operation. It should also be noted that there are not and never have been schools in Azerbaijan with Lezgin language instruction in any grade.

I consider it inappropriate to explain away all manner of problems related to the preservation of the culture and language of the Lezgins, or even Dagestanis more broadly, with “Russian intervention”. In my opinion, Russia prioritises relations with Azerbaijan over assistance to ethnic minorities. One example is the issue of delimitation and demarcation of the Russian-Azerbaijani border. As a result of this, the Russian authorities decided to hand over two villages, inhabited by its citizens of Lezgin origin, to Azerbaijan.¹ In this context, analyses comparing Russia’s policy of securing the “rights and security” of ethnic Russians, e.g. in the context of the annexation of Crimea and the start of a full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022, to the policy of securing the “rights and security” of Russian citizens who are not ethnic Russians (such as the Dagestani population), would be interesting. Analogous procedures are also employed within Polish journalism, e.g. in constructing the notion that Russia supports Armenian separatists in Javakheti (Winiecki 2008: 50). No analysis or evidence of possible Armenian separatism in Georgia or evidence of Russian involvement therein is presented. While the contentious issues of Armenian-Georgian relations are fairly well known, evidence for “Armenian separatism” supposedly existing in Javakheti is not known to me, much less evidence of Russia’s involvement there.

The characteristic and camouflaged *argumentum ad bolsevicum*, one variation of *argumentum ad Rossicum*, is used in the context of border demarcation within the Caucasus. It was used, for example, by Wojciech Górecki, one of the best-known Polish analysts on the region, who wrote that it was the Bolsheviks who divided the Circassians into three republics: Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria,

1 Referring to villages Xrax-Uba and Yr’yan-Uba.

and Karachay-Cherkessia, so that in the place of a single strong nation, three miniscule ones would develop (Górecki 2014: 72). In his book, he stated:

The internal borders, now often becoming state borders, cut some nations in half, separated others from their historic provinces, and united others with an eternal enemy within the same republic. The creator of the division of the Caucasus was Stalin, who was himself a Caucasian and knew how to drive a wedge between the mountaineers in order to rule them more easily. (Górecki 2013: 49)

In an article on Chechnya, written during the period of the First Chechen-Russian War, he stated that “the borders inside the USSR, drawn mechanically, dated back to Stalin’s time. If the world has condemned Stalin, then why does it respect his borders?” (Górecki 1995: 8). Here, the author’s argumentation ran as follows: the borders within the USSR were formed “under Stalin” – Stalin had been condemned – the borders drawn inside the USSR ought to be condemned. This is thus an example of using non-substantive argumentation to justify one’s arguments precisely with *argumentum ad bolsevicum*, here employed by the author to criticise how borders run in the Caucasus. This treatment is, in fact, quite common in Polish publications. For example, another authors, in an attempt to prove that Soviet policy was unfavourable towards Georgia, stated that it was the authorities who made significant changes to her borders and detached the Zaqatala District from Georgia, which they then annexed to the Azerbaijani SSR (Sanecka-Tyczyńska 2013: 296). For the authors of the work *Konflikty na Kaukazie* (Conflicts in the Caucasus), on the other hand, the separation of Ossetia into northern and southern parts is an example of “despotic actions of the communists with no regard for national composition” (Bańbor et al. 1997: 158). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict too was claimed to stem from the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan drawn by the Soviet authorities after the October Revolution (Modrzejewska-Leśniewska 2000: 482–483). In the opinion of Mirosław Kuleba, Stalin, by dividing the autonomous republics in Russia, skilfully created a dozen potential flashpoints. This was to also apply to Georgia, where, according to the author, Abkhazia and South Ossetia served this purpose (Kuleba 2007: 77). Barbara Patlewicz, in turn, believed that the Bolsheviks supported small nations “in order to break down Muslim unity” (Patlewicz 2016: 9). For Piotr Grochmalski and Michał Domański, however, this unification of Caucasian peoples was already a punishment of sorts and attempt to antagonise them, a sign for which they took the creation of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (Domański 2014: 319; Grochmalski 1999: 69; idem 2012: 279). Thus, it is evident that both “separating” and “unifying” the nations of

the Caucasus are portrayed as Bolshevik foul play, whose hidden aim was to antagonise these peoples.

Similarly to Barbara Patlewicz, that the source of contemporary conflicts is the “artificial ‘creation’ of nations, demarcation of borders detached from reality” by the Bolsheviks was maintained by Maciej Falkowski. In his view, this was precisely how most of the “Dagestani nations”, came into being, not having existed prior to the 1917 revolution. This researcher maintained that earlier, the locals felt themselves to be Muslims and Dagestanis, while the concept of nation in the 19th-century European sense of the word was unknown to them. It was only based on ethnographic and linguistic studies of that time that the Soviet authorities “created” the Avars, Dargins, Laks, and Lezgins, exploiting the linguistic differences that did exist but had nothing to do with ethnic divisions. In Falkowski’s opinion, the theory of Dagestan’s “14 titular nations” introduced by the Communists was then instilled for so long by means of propaganda and the educational system into the inhabitants of the republic that, in their conception, it eventually became an objective truth. The researcher concluded that later, based on these national divisions established several decades earlier, national movements were created (due to Falkowski’s use of the non-personal form of the verb “created”, the reader has no way of deducing who the author thought was doing the creating of these “national movements” – communists, state authorities, civic movements, or individual social activists?) in the 1990s, with the help of which many significant figures on the contemporary political scene were generated. For Falkowski, one example of effective Soviet manipulation of nationality issues was also the creation of the ethnonym “Vainakh” in the 1920s to jointly describe Chechens and Ingush (Falkowski 2010: 44–45).

Maciej Falkowski’s claims raise numerous doubts and provoke a series of questions. What research methods did the author use to investigate who the inhabitants of Dagestan “felt” themselves to be before 1917? Moreover, by what means did he manage to establish this “artificiality” of divisions in relation to the Nakh-Dagestani peoples, and how do these differ from “natural” ones? Can these criteria of “artificiality” also be applied to other linguistic-ethnic groups? It should be noted that there is no “titular nation” in Dagestan (let alone the 14 that Falkowski writes about). An order adopted by the Dagestan State Council on 18 October 2000, i.e. after the collapse of communism in Russia, does enumerate Dagestan’s indigenous peoples. Per this document, they are: Avars, Aghuls, Azerbaijanis, Tsakhurs, Aukh-Chechens,² Dargins, Kumyks, Laks,

2 The Aukhs (endonym: akkxij) inhabit the Novolaksky, Khasavyurtovsky, Babayurtovsky, and Kazbekovsky districts of Dagestan. Some regard themselves as an ethnographic subgroup of the Chechens, others as a people separate from them.

Lezgins, Tats, Tabasarans, Nogais, Rutuls, and Russians (Postanovlenie 2000). This decision was taken because of the adoption by the Duma in 1999 of the law “On guarantees of the rights of indigenous small peoples of the Russian Federation”. With it, the individual entities of the federation were obliged to submit a list of indigenous peoples in order to add them to the Joint Census of Indigenous Small-Scale Peoples of the Russian Federation. In contrast, the Constitution of Dagestan, adopted in 2003, no longer mentions the names of indigenous peoples or their languages. Article 11 only states that: “The state languages of the Republic of Dagestan are Russian and the languages of the peoples of Dagestan” (*Konstituciya Respubliki Dagestan*).

Thus, Maciej Falkowski created an image of communists who, for unknown reasons (the author did not provide any argumentation), decided to divide the previously “unified” inhabitants of Dagestan, at the same time, in an equally “artificial” way, trying to bring about the unification of Ingush and Chechens (interpretable from the author’s claims that the term “Vainakh” was created because of Bolshevik manipulation). Moreover, the researcher did not undertake a substantive analysis of the processes that led to the strengthening of ethnic self-consciousness among the various peoples living in Dagestan and reduced his entire explanation to the application of *argumentum ad bolsevicum*. Like Maciej Falkowski, Jerzy Szukalski also concluded that bringing about the creation of a common Ingush-Chechen entity “was a deliberate political move by the Kremlin to create national antagonisms, as it actually placed one nation in a subordinate role” (Szukalski 2015: 98) Stanisław Ciesielski, on the other hand, argued that the Bolsheviks used the experience of the colonial policy of antagonising conquered peoples when drawing borders, and continued it in the pursuit of their own interests. This policy was to be expressed in the creation of separate autonomous regions, implementing formally the principles of individual ethnic groups’ self-government (Ciesielski 2003: 130).

To my mind, one of the main problems concerning the authors who denigrate the borders existing inside the Soviet Union is that I have not come across any work in which they propose an alternative delineation that would be “fair”, and substantively argue it. In such a case, it would be possible to compare them with the “political” and “unjust” borders drawn by the Soviet authorities. Otherwise, this whole enterprise boils down solely to a negation of Tsarist/Soviet/Russian actions, that is, of the “historical enemy” whose image has been shaped by the influence of the Polish ethnopolitical myth.

I believe that the use of *argumentum ad bolsevicum* in border-related matters is intended to conceal a lack of knowledge of the processes described. For example, a knowledge of the history of Transcaucasia would not allow one to reduce the question of Zaqatala District’s belonging down to a simple decision

by the Bolsheviks to detach it from Georgia (the Georgian SSR) and transfer it to Azerbaijan (Azerbaijani SSR). After the Bolshevik Revolution and the Russian Empire's collapse, Zaqatala District was claimed by the independent states of the Mountainous Republic (now Dagestan), the Democratic Republic of Georgia, and the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Meeting in mid-1918, the Zaqatala People's Council decided to join the region to Azerbaijan. The rejection of incorporation into Georgia was justified by religious barriers (most of the population in the region was Muslim – 92%, Orthodox Georgians constituted 3% (Adres-kalendar' 1919: 125), while Dagestan was viewed unfavourably due to the high mountains separating it and preventing efficient communication. In turn, the council members, in justifying the decision to join Azerbaijan, pointed out that in terms of culture, economy, way of life, religion, also industry and language, this state was most like in Zaqatala District (Xapizov/Galbacev 2016: 151–152). Once Soviet power was established throughout Transcaucasia, this state of affairs was accepted by the central Bolshevik authorities. Similarly, reducing the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan to a “political decision by the Bolsheviks” ignores a string of issues, such as the traditional economic ties linking the region to the lowlands to the east, which were stronger than those with the area occupied by Armenia, and the ethnic composition of lands surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh with a decidedly predominantly Muslim (Turkic and Kurdish) population. That the Bolsheviks were not the only ones who thought it best to give the region to Azerbaijan is evidenced, among others, by William Thomas, commander of British troops in Transcaucasia after the end of the First World War, who recognised the jurisdiction of the Baku government over this area.

In order to explain the course of borders in the Transcaucasus, both in Soviet and modern times, it is important to emphasise that, to a large extent, borders correspond to the administrative boundaries from the Tsarist period. This is well-illustrated, for example, by the Russian-Azerbaijani border. Both the northern borders of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijan SSR with Russia were based on the northern borders of Zaqatala District, Elizavetpol Governorate, and Baku Governorate, which were in turn established in 1860 in connection with the creation of Dagestan Oblast. During the Soviet period, they saw minor adjustments, which were mainly related to tweaking the local economy. This occurred when the high-mountain fields and pastures located in one republic were more easily accessible to the workers of the kolkhozes located in another. After 1991, the administrative borders from the Tsarist period became the basis for the demarcation of the borders between Azerbaijan and Russia.

An issue more complicated than borders in the South Caucasus is the question of the borders of the North Caucasus republics currently belonging to the Russian Federation. As far as the creation of Adyghea, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-Cherkessia is concerned, the view that this took place due to the Bolsheviks' desire to break the Adyghe into three small groups is, in my view, a reductionist explanation based on the negative perception of the Bolsheviks by Polish society. This narrative creates an image of exceptionally "strong" Adyghe, who, for reasons unknown (as no author has explained this), were to be feared by the Bolsheviks. A census carried out in 1926 showed that in the USSR, which had a population of over 140 million, there were around 200,000 Adyghe, that is, 0.15% of the country's population (*Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleleniya 1926 goda*). This raises the question whether, indeed, and if so, why, the Bolsheviks were so afraid of such a small group that they decided to break it up further into the said "three nations"? It is worth noting that at the same time, the Ukrainian SSR was inhabited by some 21 million Ukrainians. When the borders of the USSR were being established, memories were fresh of the existence of the anti-Bolshevik West Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic, which functioned until 1919 and 1920 respectively and posed a far greater threat to the Bolsheviks than the anti-Bolshevik movement among the Adyghe. If "dismemberment" of a given nation was to be the main motive for the Bolsheviks' border demarcations, the Ukrainians and, for example, the Georgians, among whom Menshevik sympathies were strong, should have been the first to be affected. Concerning the latter, past events (Georgia's fragmentation) or ethnolinguistic differences between the various Kartvelian peoples would have served an adequate propagandistic basis to justify a need to partition the Georgians. Moreover, linguistic and cultural differences between the eastern and western Ukrainian SSRs could have easily been used by the Bolsheviks to motivate the need to create, for example, two Ukrainian republics.

It should be emphasised that until the conquest of the North Caucasus by Russia, many of the peoples settled there lived in free societies scattered among the mountain valleys. Although some were close to each other in language and culture, they did not form any integrated whole. It was in 19th-century Russia that the rationale for the creation of ethno-territorial units emerged under the conditions of tsarist authorities introducing administrative divisions in mountain districts corresponding to ethnic areas. According to historian Aslan Tsutsiyev, this accelerated integration processes for some peoples, such as between the Irons and Digors, who found themselves in a single administrative unit, while cementing the separateness of others – like the Chechens

and Ingush, as the latter changed administrative affiliation several times (Cuciev 1998: 37–38). However, it was only after the October Revolution that local ethnicities were given political status. Viktor Shnirelman, who addressed the issue of the Bolsheviks' delimitation of administrative boundaries between different North Caucasian units, noted that initially Soviet authorities did not aim to create any ethnic autonomies. The Communists thought that it was more appropriate to have one large administrative unit in the North Caucasus, under full control of the centre, able to ensure the security of the state's southern borders (Šnirel'man 2006: 22). It seems reasonable, therefore, to argue that if the Bolsheviks had indeed feared the 200,000-strong Adyghe, they would not have “split” them into “three nations”, nor would they have created any autonomous unit in which the Adyghe ethnicity was the titular one.

Following the establishment of Soviet power in the North Caucasus in 1920, the idea of creating a single Mountain Republic arose within Stalin's clique, made a reality at the Extraordinary Assembly of the Terek Nations held in Vladikavkaz in autumn. The point of the proposed project was, firstly, to involve the mountaineers themselves in the management of their affairs in place of Russian officials, and, secondly, to permanently separate them from the Cossacks so as to avoid endless conflicts between them, primarily over land. It was also decided to maintain the *sharia*- and *adat*-based legal system within the republic (Šnirel'man 2006: 26). I find the interpretation presented by Shnirelman convincing. At the same time, I consider unjustified the claim presented by Polish historians that if in 1918 Stalin stated: “[...] the demarcation of people in a given oblast should take place not based on national characteristics, but based on class [...]”, what he actually meant was that newly created Caucasian autonomies could not be governed by local peoples (Grochmalski 1999: 67). I view this as a serious over-interpretation, not supported by research material, but instead intended to create the idea that the Bolsheviks were already by 1918 planning to pursue a nationality policy towards the Caucasus mirroring Tsarist officials.

The Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established on 20 January 1921 at the Mountain Organisational Congress, with its administrative centre in Vladikavkaz and recognised by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (hereafter the VtSiK – Vserossijskij Tsentralny Iсполnitelny Komitet). It consisted of districts formed on an ethnic basis, such as Kabardian or Chechen. Dagestan at this time was declared an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, stemming from its extremely complex ethnic composition. The Dagestan ASSR proved to be a stable creation; it survived until 1991, when its name was changed to the Republic of Dagestan.

The fate of the Mountain ASSR, which proved to be an unstable entity, was a different story. Viktor Shnirelman advocated the thesis, to which I also

subscribe, that one reason for this was that some 60% of its administrative apparatus consisted of Russian officials who did not know nor cared to understand local historical and cultural conditions. Resultantly, the central administration did not enjoy authority within the individual districts, where power was held by the local population. Moreover, chauvinism and discrimination against mountaineers was commonplace in the larger cities of the Caucasus, where all important decisions were made by Russian officials. This was what led the authorities of the various districts to plan to break away from the republic. The second reason for the Mountain ASSR's disintegration were land issues under conditions of endemic famine, exacerbated by a policy of mass resettlement of former nomads – cattle breeders. The Soviet authorities abolished private ownership of land and nationalised it. Belonging to the Mountain ASSR thus proved beneficial primarily to those groups in whose favour the land was allocated. In contrast, those who had held this land before felt disadvantaged (Šnirel'man 2006: 27).

Viktor Shnirelman pointed out that in Western European literature the consensus was that the disintegration of the Mountain ASSR was linked to the Soviet authorities' desire to break up the unity of the Caucasian peoples, as well as to curb Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic tendencies. This was said to be done by fragmenting larger national groups or by uniting peoples belonging to different language families under a single autonomy. At the same time, he noted that authors promoting such theses rely primarily on the opinions of North Caucasian emigrants who found themselves in Europe after the establishment of Soviet rule in the Caucasus. The latter were particularly interested in creating an image of unity between local peoples in the face of the totalitarian power they believed Russia embodied. Such a framing of the issue lacks serious merit. For Shnirelman, no more explanatory are the claims, originating in Soviet times, emphasising the ethnic diversity that supposedly requiring the mountaineers' separation so as to bring them into the fold of the Soviet system. Thus, the main reason for the creation of the separate autonomies was, on the one hand, the land issue and, on the other, the dissatisfaction of individual constituent units with the Mountain ASSR's authorities, which were dominated by Russian officials (Šnirel'man 2006: 29). I accept these explanations as credible and consider them a response to the considerations of Iwona Kaliszewska, who deemed it difficult to ascertain why the Mountain ASSR disintegrated and concluded that the issue should be considered either in the context of a "divide and rule" policy or a desire to put into practice a "great reform project" aimed at creating an empire of free nations (Kaliszewska 2016: 91).

Shnirelman's research indicated that the authorities of Kabarda (Kabardian District), led by Betal Kalmykov (chairman of the local Revolutionary Committee), were the most adamant in seceding from the Mountain ASSR.

Furthermore, they were dissatisfied with the republic's authorities' policy of land distribution, which deprived Kabardians of their traditional holdings in the region. For this reason, as early as May 1921, Kabarda announced its desire to leave the Mountain ASSR. Disregarding protestations by the republic's authorities, Kabarda found support in Stalin, who believed that with the establishment of Soviet power in Transcaucasia, the existence of a single republic in the North Caucasus had become unnecessary. The support received from the People's Commissariat for Nationalities resulted in the establishment of the Kabardian Autonomous Oblast in September 1921 by order of the VTsIK. With Kabarda's exit from the republic, it made no sense for Balkaria, which was economically intricately linked to the former, to remain within it. This was well-understood inside Kabarda, spurring talks around unification from the outset. Consequently, the Kabardino-Balkarian autonomy was established in 1922 (Šnirel'man 2006: 29).

The Karachay authorities announced their desire to leave the Mountain ASSR in May 1921. By autumn, Cherkessia, then part of the Kuban-Black Sea district, too began demanding secession. Congresses of the Karachays, Circassians, Nogais, and Abazins took place throughout October and November, calling for the reunification of Karachay and Cherkessia. The issue was taken up by the Council of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities at the beginning of January 1922, which formulated a proposal that the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast should be created alongside the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Oblast. The latter was established by order of the VTsIK a few days later. Šnirelman pointed out that power struggles between the titular ethnicities lasted throughout. Due to a lack of compromise and mutual resentment, in the spring of 1926 the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast was disbanded; in its place were formed the Karachay Autonomous Oblast, the Cherkess National District, while some areas were incorporated into Armavir District of North Caucasus Krai.

Viktor Šnirelman explained the greater stability of Kabardino-Balkaria compared to Karachay-Cherkessia partly by economic and partly by ethnic issues. Firstly, the Balkars, who lived in the high mountain gorges, could not engage in their traditional cattle grazing without access to pastures belonging to Kabardians and Nogais located on the plains, and so were somewhat economically dependent on them. The Karachays also rented grazing land from the Circassians, but were not as strongly dependent on them as the Balkars were on the Kabardians. Secondly, the Kabardians were clearly dominant in Kabardino-Balkaria in demographic terms, while the proportions between Turkic and Adyghe peoples in Karachay-Cherkessia were more balanced. For this reason, the power struggle among ethnic leaders was much greater in the latter case than in the former (Šnirel'man 2006: 30).

The question of creating a separate autonomous region out of Chechnya was put forward in the autumn of 1922 and considered positively by the VTsIK. At the same time, as Viktor Shnirelman noted, all administrative offices were concentrated in Grozny, though the city itself with its petrochemical infrastructure formed a separate administrative unit. Thus, by December 1922, only the Vladikavkaz, Nazran and Sunzha Cossack districts remained within the Mountain ASSR. This meant that among the republic's Caucasian population, only Ossetians and Ingush were left, between whom existed an insoluble problem of land distribution. It is apparent that for a time the Soviet authorities sought to preserve the republic for this reason, fearing that its division into Ingush and Ossetian parts would exacerbate these agrarian disputes. Despite this fact, the republic ultimately fell apart in 1924 (Šnirel'man 2006: 30).

Shnirelman observed that with the Mountain ASSR's disintegration, the issue of setting borders between the emerging political-administrative units appeared. Representatives of the various peoples sought to establish "historical settlement boundaries of individual ethnicities". However, due to the ethnic mixing and local economic relations, in which a considerable role was played by the grazing of cattle and sheep on seasonal pastures, the demarcation of clear boundaries proved impossible, and their "correctness" was constantly questioned by one of the national groups. As this researcher underlined, an important change occurred where previously (before the creation of ethno-territorial units) when land conflicts concerned individual communities or landowners and could be resolved through traditional mechanisms, they now touched upon the interests of considerable political autonomies, with the central state administration gradually taking on the role of arbiter. Thus, local conflicts moved to a new, previously unknown level. This made them particularly acute; the border disputes so common in the North Caucasus's history began transforming from localised conflicts into interethnic/inter-republic ones. In Shnirelman's view, one report by the VTsIK commission, which dealt with the North Ossetia-Ingushetia border issue in 1924, was symptomatic. It read:

In their border disputes, the leaders of the workers of Ingushetia and Ossetia do not start from notions of simple administrative separation of their *oblasts*, convenience of administration, or the Soviet structure, but process their dispute as one concerning political boundaries between their nations. This is evidenced by the repeated references of these comrades to historical documents and monuments of bygone eras. (Šnirel'man 2006: 31)

Viktor Shnirelman also stressed that these mountainous *oblasts*, which suffered from land shortages in the past, had significantly increased their acreage at the expense of Cossack territories. He cited Ingushetia as one example, which in the 1920s expanded the area of her agricultural land by some 100,000 hectares that had been cultivated before the establishment of Soviet rule by Cossacks. The national Communists at the head of individual units at the time thus had no reason to push back against the central authorities (Šnirel'man 2006: 31).

In the second half of the 1920s, however, a policy of centralisation emerged inside the USSR, prompted by the view that the presence of various small autonomies was an anachronism and that Soviet officials ought to merge them into larger units. Here, too, manifested the diverse and often conflicting interests of the various ethnicities in the North Caucasus, overlapping with the political intentions of decision-makers in Moscow. Added to this was the Soviet system's gradual evolution, which was becoming increasingly oppressive, even towards party activists. This is well-illustrated by the case of Irdis Zyazikov, first secretary of the Communist Party Committee of the Ingush Autonomous Region, who stood firm against the incorporation of Vladikavkaz into North Ossetia. This led to his removal from politics, arrest, and execution sentence. Following these events, the obduracy of the Ingush Regional Committee categorically weakened, and Vladikavkaz was joined to North Ossetia. Consequently, plans for the reunification of Ingushetia and Chechnya, which had previously been blocked by Zyazikov, among others, resurfaced. This was influenced, among other things, by the previously mentioned lack of urbanization within Ingushetia.³

The establishment of politico-administrative borders in the North Caucasus was thus a multifaceted issue in which quite a few different interests, both ethnic and political, clashed. Among Polish authors, this issue is often reduced to a Bolshevik desire to carve up local peoples. To this end, a non-substantive *argumentum ad bolsevicum* is employed, possessing no explanatory power. Instead, it boils down to criticising “bad” and “unjust” borders because they were established by the Bolsheviks for political reasons. These “political reasons” remain unaddressed, as I do not believe that the claim that the Bolsheviks were guided by a principle of “divide and rule” or sought to turn the local peoples against

3 According to the 1939 census, the largest town within Ingushetia was Nazran, which had a population of just under 3,000, of whom approximately 30% (i.e. 800 people) were Ingush.

each other explains anything. What was to be the purpose of such antagonisation? What was the purpose of division? Did these peoples previously have any sense of community? How did they themselves view this division? How was it that the divisions made by the Bolsheviks, if in fact “artificial”, were accepted by the region’s peoples, whose representatives populated, after all, the regional power structures? In the above narrative, all these questions remain unanswered.

Conclusion

In this book, I aimed to analyse and demonstrate the influence of the ethnopolitical myth on the narrative of Polish authors concerning the history of the Caucasus and Polish-Caucasian relations. I wanted to show that the Polish perception of this region of the world is not infrequently grounded in an ethos of struggle against the “historical enemy” – Russia – and low-quality Caucasus studies. The influence of the ethnopolitical myth at this level reinforces the dilettantism of authors (including academics) who, behind a façade of scientism, convey content dominated by ideological issues – relating to a sympathy for Caucasians and an antipathy towards Russia – rather than a scientific approach characteristic of an observer’s stance. This conditions, among other things, sympathy for national/separatist movements within the Caucasus, but only those fighting against Russia. These alone are qualified as struggling “for our freedom and yours”. At the same time, the Caucasus provides fertile material for a negative portrayal of the “historical enemy”, with which the Polish historical mission, through the prism of the ethnopolitical myth, must be constantly confronted.

Within the Polish ethnopolitical myth’s framework, the Caucasus became symbolically married to Poland in an alliance against Russia. This was influenced by several elements. Firstly, significant was the Poles’ search for the “nation’s ancient roots”, which in the past centuries led to the formation of the view that their ancestors hailed from the Caucasus. Today, faced with research development into the Poles’ ethnogenesis, such concepts have been discarded, but do persist in the form of a “legend” occasionally used to build a positive image of this region of the world. A second important factor was the similar fate of Poland and the Caucasus, in the sense that both regions fell victim to imperialism-determined Russian expansion. Thirdly, there was a concurrent emergence of a Polish independence movement alongside an armed struggle against Russia waged by a portion of the Caucasian peoples, from roughly the 1830s to the 1860s. Resultantly, the idea of capitalizing on events in the Caucasus became embedded within Polish liberation plans. Moreover, that this took place during Europe’s Romanticist period and at a time when Poles began appearing in the Caucasus in larger numbers, was also relevant.

It is likely that this third reason was decisive for the Caucasus’ embracement into the Polish ethnopolitical myth. In connection with the phenomena given above, the nineteenth century saw press reports misconstruing reality begin appearing among Polish émigré circles, alongside undertakings determined by the propagandistic endeavours of specific political camps. The image

of a “community” and “brotherhood” between Poles and Caucasian peoples against a hostile Russia was thus created. Contemporary scholars and publicists writing on the Caucasus and citing publications from the nineteenth century at times fail to verify them, and do not consider the ideological context behind their creation. Often, this does not interest them, as doing so would undermine the message behind their own publications, which are grounded in the same ethnopolitical myth.

As an academic, I do not claim it to be impossible that Poland had contacts with the Caucasus in the eleventh century; that the first ruler of Poland, Mieszko I, was a representative of some unknown Caucasian tribe that arrived in Europe centuries ago; or that the Caucasian peoples’ opposition to the Russian conquest had Polish deserters from the tsarist army serving a backbone. I do claim that, considering the knowledge and verifiable testimony I possess, the above opinions do not seem to me to be supported by the available sources. However, should new evidence emerge – the existence of which we are now unaware – and contradict my findings, in the cases where I have made judgements in this work I am inclined to change my view on the events described. I realize that every author, including myself, is an interpreter of the material in his possession. Interpretation, in turn, can be considered an act of “ruling over the world”. This desire to govern the world can be unleashed under the influence of an ethnopolitical myth, of which one must remain aware. I also believe that the desire to rule over the world can be further pursued by staying silent/forgetting certain things. I find support here in Paul Ricœur’s thought that “forgetting can be so closely tied to memory that it can be considered one of the conditions for it” (Ricœur 2006: 426). Of importance here is the French philosopher’s reference to John Locke and his assertion that everything composing the fragility of identity gives reason to manipulate memory, primarily through ideology. This becomes realized through the selective nature of stories. Forgetting also leaves its mark, through the desire to remain ignorant (wanting-not-to-know) (Ricœur 2006: 448–449).

The Polish ethnopolitical myth has contributed to the creation of – and all the while sustaining – an image of Poles as having rendered some exceptional service to the Caucasian peoples through supporting their struggle against Russia. To contrast, those Poles who aided in conquering the Caucasus and formed part of the system that drove its Russification are forgotten. Consequently, publications appear wherein their role in the region’s history is distorted. This is due to the ethnopolitical myth being conditioned by the “desire to remain ignorant” to the fact that Polish involvement in the Russian annexation of the Caucasus and in the introduction of Communism to this territory is much better documented than their participation in the Caucasian national liberation

movement – which is in most cases only an imagined concept determined by the same myth, not a matter based on evidence or testimony. It is also the reason Prince Adam Czartoryski is cited almost exclusively in the context of the common struggle against Russia, while the fact he belonged to the Russian Empire's power elite, holding also the position of Foreign Minister when the lands of present-day Georgia and Azerbaijan were being actively incorporated into its borders, has been “forgotten”. The ethnopolitical myth leads Polish authors to entertain notions of some Polish troop faithfully serving Shamil until his end at Gunib, and to ignore that the best testimony of this location's Polish connection is Konstanty Zaleski, a Bolshevik and Gunib Fortress commander (Gadžiev 2005: 79) (the only Pole to ever become an honorary citizen of the village). Also forgotten is Konstanty Paszkowski, a Pole with merits for introducing Communism to the Caucasus, chairman of the Terek People's Council (Lobanov 2015: 19), and recipient of the Order of the Red Banner for his actions against the army of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (*Paškovskij Konstantin Kazimirovič*). The figure of Michał Lewandowski, who headed the Eleventh Army conquering the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan for the Bolsheviks, admittedly is mentioned sporadically by authors touching upon his subject, though not without embarrassment. In contrast, a source of pride is “Mr Dzik”, who, though probably never having existed and a literary figure, deserted the tsarist ranks and became the “chief builder of Shamil's fortresses”. Rusiecki gained acclaim on similar grounds, despite being presented as a mentally disturbed man in the source text.

The influence of the ethnopolitical myth can also explain the situation noted by Jerzy W. Borejsza. This historian concluded that knowledge of how many Poles became Germanized or Russified is often not pursued. According to him, Polish political imagination is burdened by a schema per which Polonization and the “strength of Polishness” are positive concepts, while Germanization and Russification are unequivocally negative phenomena. Furthermore, he noted that Polish history textbooks emphasize the history of resistance to foreign violence and the role of the Church and the Catholic religion in the preservation of Polishness and the development of national culture, yet very rarely touch upon assimilation, collaboration, or denationalization – phenomena all common throughout Polish society in the nineteenth century. He also stressed that thousands of Poles – soldiers, officers, and generals – were faithful servants of Russian and Prussian interests. Frequently they were also convinced of the rightness, for example, of Russian rationales and slogans related to the need to defend Christians against the Turks, to fight Muslims, while also identifying with ideas of Slavic community and brotherhood-in-arms. Honours granted by the tsar to Józef Hauke-Bosak for his deeds against the Caucasian highlanders,

and to Romuald Traugutt for his hand in suppressing the Hungarian uprising, did not prevent these individuals from becoming models for the next generations of Poles fighting for independence (Borejsza 2009: 62–64).

The explanation for the phenomenon of the ethno-political myth's influence on creating a particular vision of history I find in the work of Paul Ricœur. In one of his works, he invoked Gilles Deleuze's view that memory's deepest paradox is that the past is "contemporaneous" with that present which it had been. Nor would it have ever constituted itself had it not coexisted with the present, for which it serves as its past (Ricœur 2006: 434). This fosters the rise of an imagined "historical enemy", situated outside the framework of empirical time. Thanks to the narrative employing it, the need to ensure the permanence of human values and to see the world as continuous is satisfied. There then appears a timeless construction containing the image of a Pole eternally struggling against the Russian threat, professing unaltered values – love for homeland (in the national-ethnic sense) and a willingness to fight in its defence against external and internal enemies, possibly convinced that the overriding goal of any activity should be the "enslaved" homeland's attainment of independence. Thus, the image of the "true" Pole (that is, one that corresponds to that image of the Pole determined by the most widespread contemporary ethno-political myth) is consigned to the past. As a result of this procedure, the multifaceted issue of describing Poles' national feelings in the nineteenth century is often simplified by being reduced to a narrative played out on the axis of "evil" Russia versus "good" Poles. Consequently, formed is the belief that once the latter had found themselves in the Caucasus, they sympathized, actively or passively, with any local population opposed to Russian conquest. What is missing here, then, is a place for those Poles in Russian service, fulfilling their professional duties to the state in which they lived and lacking a motivation of "how to hurt Russia?", who constituted the decided majority of Poles in the Caucasus.

Bibliography

- Abduraxman iz Gazikumuxa (2013), *Kniga vospominanij* (available online at https://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Kavkaz/XIX/Arabojaz_ist/Gazikumuchi_III/frameset2.htm, accessed on 18 October 2020).
- A.C. (1855), "Geographie du moyen age etudiee par Joachim Lelewel", *Przeгляд Poznański* Vol. XXI: 1–24.
- Adamczewski, Przemysław (2007), "Kontakty dyplomatyczne Rzeczypospolitej z państwem Ak Kojunlu", *Bliski Wschód* No. 4: 163–170.
- Adamczewski, Przemysław (2013), "Zapis testamentowy Witolda Zglenickiego dla Kasy im. Józefa Mianowskiego", *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* Vol. XLVIII: 183–204.
- Adamczewski, Przemysław (2018), "On the Correspondence of the Adam Czartoryski Party with Imam Shamil and His Naibs", *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* Vol. 53: 47–62.
- Adamčevski, Pšemy Slav/Kuzavleva-Adamčevska, Ekaterina (2013), "Istoričeskoe i nacional'noe samosoznanie studenčeskoj molodeži g. Tbilisi (Respublika Gruzija)", *Problemy vseobščej istorii i politologii* No. 5: 113–134.
- Adamčevski, Pšemy Slav/Kuzavleva-Adamčevska, Ekaterina (2016), "Vklad polyakov v razvitie neftjanoy promyšlennosti na Apšeronskom poluostrove v konce XIX–načale XX vv.", *Vestnik Dagestanskogo naučnogo centra RAN* No. 61: 51–60.
- Adamčevskij, Pšemy Slav/Vojtkovyak Yakub/Mamulia Georgij (2022), *Vospominaniya Izmaél'-beka (Yuzefa) Petrucina-Petruševskogo kak istočnik po istorii Fevral'skoj revolyucii i vojny na Kavkaze. 1917–1919 gg.*, Varšava.
- Adres-kalendar' Azerbajdžanskoj Respubliki na 1920 god* (1920), A. Stavrovskij (ed.), Baku.
- Ajrapetov, Oleg (2006), *Vnešnyaya polityka Rossijskoj imperii (1801–1914)*, Moskva.
- Andreev, Vasilij (1876), "Vospominaniya iz kavkazskoj stariny", *Kavkazskij sbornik* Vol 1: 1–122.
- Arsanukajewa, Malika (2012), "Polacy i Górale Kaukazu Północnego w XIX i na początku XX wieku: historia wzajemnych kontaktów", *Wschodni Rocznik Humanistyczny* Vol. VIII: 117–134.
- Aulich, Manswet (1850), *Dziennik dwunastoletniej misyi apostolskiej na Wschodzie*, Vol. II, Kraków.
- A.Z. (1850), "Niewola u Szamila", *Athenaeum* Vol. IV: 121–163.
- Baberovski, Jorg (2004), "Civilizatorskaya missiya i nacjonalizm v Zakavkaz'e: 1828–1914 gg.", I. Gerasimov et al. (eds.), *Novaya imperskaya istoriya postsovetskogo prostranstva*, Kazan': 307–352.

- Badowski, Ryszard (1977), *Lechici znad Tereku*, Warszawa.
- Bakunin, Mixail (1896), *Pis'ma M.A. Bakunina k A.I. Gercenu i N.P. Ogarevu*, Źeneva.
- Bańbor, Jan et al. (1997), *Konflikty na Kaukazie*, Warszawa.
- Baranowski, Bohdan (1985), "Azerbejdżan", J. Krzyżanowski (ed.), *Literatura polska: przewodnik encyklopedyczny* Vol. II, Warszawa.
- Baranowski, Bohdan (1982), "W żołdacy na Kaukaz". Położenie polskich działaczy politycznych wysłanych karnie do służby wojskowej na Kaukazie w drugim trzydziestolecium XIX w.", *Annales. Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, Sectio F. Historia* Vol. XXXVII: 279–293.
- Baranowski, Bohdan/Baranowski, Krzysztof (1985), *Polaków kaukaskie drogi*, Łódź.
- Baranowski, Bohdan/Baranowski, Krzysztof (1987), *Historia Gruzji*, Wrocław.
- Baziur, Grzegorz (2016), "Rola separatyzmów południowo-kaukaskich w geopolityce Federacji Rosyjskiej na przykładzie konfliktu karabachskiego i południowo-oseetyjskiego", *Kaukaz – Przeszość – Teraźniejszość – Przyszłość* No. 2: 185–200.
- Beauvois, Daniel (1995), "Czego Jan Potocki szukał w Czeczenii?", *Rocznik Towarzystwa Literackiego imienia Adama Mickiewicza* Vol. 30: 49–56.
- Beazley Charles Raymond (1911), "Schiltberger, Johann or Hans", H. Chisholm (ed.), *Encyclopædia Britannica* Vol. 24: 326.
- Bell, Jakub Stanisław (1837), "Wypisy z dziennika żeglugi na skunerze Vixen, do brzegów Czerkassii", *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* Vol. VI: 161–173.
- Benkendorf, Konstantin (2000), "Vospominaniya. 1845", Y. Gordin (ed.), *Osada Kavkaza. Vospominaniya učastnikov Kavkazskoj vojny XIX veka*, Sankt-Peterburg: 330–407.
- Berezowski, Eugeniusz (1970), "Józef Chodźko – geodeta i geograf XIX wieku (1800–1881)", *Przegląd Geodezyjny* Vol. XLII, No. 10: 430–431.
- Berger, Rafał (2013), *Muzułmanie w powstaniu stycznym* (available online at <https://islampopolsku.wordpress.com/tag/slawni-muzułmanie-w-historii-polski/page/2/>, accessed on 21 August 2024).
- Bodio, Tadeusz (2014), "Elity Kaukazu Północnego – badania i wyzwania", T. Bodio (ed.), *Kaukaz Północny: elity, reżimy, etnopolityka, bezpieczeństwo*, Warszawa: 19–44.
- Bolxovitinov Evfimij (1802), *Istoričeskoe izobrażenie Gruzii v poličičeskom, cerkovnom i učebnom ee sostoyanii*, Sankt-Peterburg.
- Borejsza, Jerzy W. (2009), "Od pierwszej do trzeciej", *Polityka*, 14.11.2009.
- Brewda, Joseph/de Hoyos, Linda (1999), "David Urquhart's Holy War", *EIR* Vol. 26, No. 36: 24–27.
- Bronowski, Franciszek (1969), *Idea gminowładztwa w polskiej historiografii*, Łódź.
- Brosset, Marie-Félicité (1828), "Première histoire de Rostéwan, roi d'Arabie, traduite du roman géorgien intitulé L'Homme à la peau de tigre", *Journal asiatique* Vol. 2: 277–294.
- Brzeziecki, Andrzej/Nocuń, Małgorzata (2016), *Armenia. Karawany śmierci*, Wołowiec.

- Brzeziński, Stanisław (1935), *Misjonarze i dyplomaci polscy w Persji w XVII i XVIII wieku*, Potulice.
- Brzozowski, Karol (1857), *Ognisty lew*, Lwów.
- Bulava, Adam (2013), "Kavkazskie veterany iz čisla byvsix oficerov carskoj armii kak predvoditeli povstančeskix otrjadov vo vremya pol'sko-russkoj partizanskoj vojny 1863–1864 gg.," A. Aranovič (ed.), *Voennaya istoriya Rossii XIX–XX vekov. Materialy VI Meždunarodnoj voenno-istoričeskoj konferencii*, Sankt-Peterburg: 148–155.
- Bystrzonowski, Ludwik (1847), *Zarys wyprawy na Kaukaz, o jej celach i spodziewanych skutkach*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5440, casebook: L. Bystrzonowski na Kaukazie.
- Caban, Wiesław (2001), *Służba rekrutów z Królestwa Polskiego w armii carskiej w latach 1831–1873*, Warszawa.
- Caban, Wiesław (2001a), "Służba wojskowa Polaków na Kaukazie w latach 1831–1856", Z. Karpus et al. (eds.), *W kraju i na wychodźstwie*, Toruń-Olsztyn: 725–743.
- Caban, Wiesław (2005), "W niewoli u Szamila", *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio F. Historia* Vol. LX: 55–62.
- Caban, Wiesław (2008), "Oficerowie rosyjscy polskiego pochodzenia wobec wojny krymskiej", J. Borejsza/G. Bąbiak (eds.), *Polacy i ziemie polskie w dobie wojny krymskiej*, Warszawa: 126–134.
- Caban, Wiesław (2014), "Mity wokół służby Polaków w armii rosyjskiej w XIX wieku", Caban Wiesław/Smoliński Józef, *Mity i legendy w polskiej historii wojskowości* Vol. 1, Kielce: 200–207.
- Calmard, Jean (1991), "Chodźko, Aleksander Borejko", *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, (available online at <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/chodzko-aleksander-borejko>, accessed on 01 September 2024).
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1982), "Dowódca armii", *Głos Wybrzeża*, 15–17.01.1982.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1982a), "Polki na Kaukazie", *Głos Wybrzeża*, 2–4.04.1982.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1983), "Inteligencja polska w Azerbejdżanie w końcu XIX i na początku XX wieku", *Przegląd Polonijny* Vol. IX, No. 1 (27): 39–47.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1983a), "Wkład w realizację rewolucyjnych idei", *Głos Wybrzeża*, 17–18.09.1983.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1984), "Rodak za jednego funta", *Głos Wybrzeża*, 14–15.01.1984.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1985), "Kontakty gdańsko-kaukaskie do I wojny światowej", *Nautologia*, Vol. 20, No. 1: 63–70.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1986), "Polacy w Azerbejdżanie w latach 1914–1920", *Przegląd Polonijny* Vol. XII, No. 4: 93–101.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1988), "Z działalności pedagogicznej i pisarskiej Wincentego Dawida (1816–1897)", *Notatki Płockie* No. 33/2: 32–39.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1993), "Polacy w Armenii", *Biuletyn Stowarzyszenia »Wspólnota Polska«* No. 20: 3–4.

- Chodubski, Andrzej (1993a), "Polacy w Baku", *Biuletyn Stowarzyszenia »Wspólnota Polska«* No. 21: 3–4.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1993b), "Polacy w Dagestanie", *Biuletyn Stowarzyszenia »Wspólnota Polska«* No. 19: 2–4.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1994), "Imam Szamil (1796–1871) i jego działalność", *Rocznik Tatarów Polskich* Vol. 11: 55–65.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (1995), "Działalność cywilizacyjna Polaków na Kaukazie", *Cywilizacje w Czasie i Przestrzeni* No. 1: 65–77.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2000), "O polskim micie Kaukazu", T. Wallas (ed.), *Przeszłość odległa i bliska: studia z zakresu politologii i historii*, Poznań: 411–419.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2000a), "Polski mit Armenii i Ormian", E. Walewander (ed.), *Polacy w Armenii*, Lublin 2000: 61–81.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2000b), "Wkład Polaków w rozwój gospodarczy, społeczno-polityczny i kulturalny Kaukazu", *Eastern Review* Vol. 4: 227–240.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2000c), "Z dziejów kontaktów polsko-ormiańskich", E. Walewander (ed.), *Polacy w Armenii*, Lublin: 41–59.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2001), "Aleksander Piestun-Dubrowski wobec problemów rozwoju azerbejdżańskiej sztuki po I wojnie światowej", A. Chodubski (ed.), *Swoistości cywilizacyjne, kwestie narodowościowe i polonijne*, Toruń: 157–164.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2001a), "Swoistość przemian kulturalnych na Zakaukaziu po I wojnie światowej", A. Chodubski (ed.), *Swoistości cywilizacyjne, kwestie narodowościowe i polonijne*, Toruń: 149–155.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2003), "Armenia", K. Dopierała (ed.), *Encyklopedia polskiej emigracji i Polonii* Vol. 1, Toruń.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2003a), "Azerbejdżan", K. Dopierała (ed.), *Encyklopedia polskiej emigracji i Polonii* Vol. 1, Toruń.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2003b), "Azerbejdżan w recepcji Polaków w XIX i na początku XX wieku", E. Walewander (ed.), *Polacy w Azerbejdżanie*, Lublin: 113–141.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2003c), "Dagestan", K. Dopierała (ed.), *Encyklopedia polskiej emigracji i Polonii* Vol. 1, Toruń.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2003d), *Polacy w Azerbejdżanie*, Toruń.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2005), "O przeszłości i teraźniejszości Polaków na Kaukazie", J. Faryś/M. Szczerbiński (eds.), *Historia i bibliologia*, Gorzów Wielkopolski: 107–121.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2005a), "O rozwoju kontaktów polsko-kaukaskich", *Rocznik Polonii* No. 1: 21–41.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2005b), "Ogniwa rozwoju kontaktów Polaków z Kaukazem", M. Dobroczyński/J. Marszałek-Kawa (eds.), *Skomplikowane stosunki Polaków i Rosjan*, Toruń: 177–198.

- Chodubski, Andrzej (2005c), "Polacy w nurcie przeobrażania kulturowego Kaukazu w XIX i na początku XX wieku", *Annales. Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio F. Historia* Vol. LX: 63–75.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2006), "O Polkach na Kaukazie", *Tygiel. Kwartalnik Elbląski* No. 2: 9–21.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2006a), "Wartości społeczno-polityczne Polaków litewskich w rzeczywistości życia zesłańczego na Kaukazie", M. Kosman (ed.), *Kultura polityczna w Polsce*, Vol. VI, No. 1: *Litwa w polskiej tradycji i kulturze politycznej*, Poznań: 107–120.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2010), "Polacy w Baku w XIX i na początku XX wieku", G. Błaszczyk/P. Kraszewski (eds.), *Studia z dziejów Europy Wschodniej*, Poznań: 205–215.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2012), "Kontakty polsko-azerbejdżańskie w procesie przemian politycznych", *Przegląd Polsko-Polonijny* No. 4, Issue 1: 309–321.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2012a), "Polacy na Kaukazie po powstaniu styczniowym", *Przegląd Polsko-Polonijny* No. 4, Issue 4: 175–186.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2015), *Azerbejdżan–Polska. Odstony kontaktów kulturowych*, Toruń.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2016), "Armenia: współzależności geopolityczne", P. Nieczuja-Ostrowski (ed.), *Armenia. Dziedzictwo a współczesne kierunki przemian kulturowo-cywilizacyjnych*, Poznań: 11–26.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2016a), "Konteksty biografii pogranicza: Polacy na Kaukazie w XIX i XX wieku", *Biografistyka Pedagogiczna* No. 1: 55–69.
- Chodubski, Andrzej (2017), "Dagestan: specyfika narodowościowo-religijna", T. Bodio (ed.), *Kaukaz Północny: religie, polityka, elity i bezpieczeństwo*, Warszawa: 451–466.
- Chojnacki, Paweł (1999), *Kasztań z Gudermesu. Doświadczenia czeczeńskie*, Kraków.
- Chudzińska-Parkosadze, Anna (2012), "Maria Filina jako działaczka związku kulturalno-oświatowego Polaków w Gruzji „Polonia” oraz przedstawicielka gruzińskiej inteligencji", *Przegląd Polsko-Polonijny* No. 3: 417–431.
- Chudzińska-Parkosadze, Anna (2016), "Polskie wątki w historii kultury i nauki gruzińskiej", M. Filina (ed.), *Polski Kaukaz. Historia i perspektywy kontaktów polsko-gruzińskich*, Tbilisi: 60–74.
- Chudzio, Hubert (2011), "Generałowie polscy w obronie twierdzy Kars podczas wojny krymskiej", *Studia z historii społeczno-gospodarczej XIX i XX wieku* Vol. IX: 153–172.
- Ciesielski, Stanisław (2003), *Rosja–Czeczenia. Dwa stulecia konfliktu*, Wrocław.
- Cifanova, Irina (2005), *Pol'skie pereselency na Severnom Kavkaze v XIX veke: osobennosti processa adaptacji*, Stavropol'.
- Cifanova, Irina (2007), "Problemy semejno-bračnyx otnošenij pol'skix pereselencev na Severnom Kavkaze v XIX veke", A. Selickij (ed.), *Polyaki v Rossii: istoriya i sovremenost'*, Krasnodar: 175–178.

- Cuciev, Artur (1998), *Osetino-inguškijskij konflikt (1992-...): ego predystoriya i faktory razvitiya*, Moskva.
- Czajkowski, Michał (1844), *Document [without title] from 16 July 1844*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5412, casebook: Wyciągi raportów Czajkowskiego 1844.
- Czajkowski, Michał (1844a), *Odezwa do Polaków na Kaukazie zawieszona przez p. Lenora*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5438, casebook: Dokumenty dotyczące misji na Kaukazie.
- Czajkowski, Michał (1846), *Lettre a Schah Schamyl Effendy*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5417, casebook: Korespondencja M. Czajkowskiego i A. Czartoryskiego.
- Czajkowski, Michał (1846a), *Instrukcja dana K.G. przez M.C.*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5417, casebook Korespondencja M. Czajkowskiego.
- Czajkowski, Michał (1847), *Lettre a Szamil Bey*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5419, casebook: Depesze ze Stambułu, korespondencja M. Czajkowskiego.
- Czajkowski, Michał (1847a), *Kaukaz*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5419, casebook: Depesze ze Stambułu, korespondencja M. Czajkowskiego.
- Czajkowski, Michał (1847b), *Wyciąg z depeszy carogrodzkiej z dnia 26 czerwca 1847 r.*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5420, casebook: Korespondencja M. Czajkowskiego.
- Czajkowski, Michał (1859), *Do Sefer Paszy*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5416, casebook: Korespondencja M. Czajkowskiego.
- Czajkowski, Michał (1962), *Moje wspomnienia o wojnie 1854 roku*, Warszawa.
- Czartoryski, Adam (1835), *Do Bystrzonowskiego*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5484, casebook: Książę do Bystrzonowskiego.
- Czartoryski, Adam (1836), *Do Bystrzonowskiego*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5484, casebook: Książę do Bystrzonowskiego.
- “Czerkassia” (1837), *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* Vol. VI: 192.
- Czynski, Jan (1837), *La revolte des Circassiens*, Paris.
- Čajkovskij, Mixail (1898), *Zapiski Mixaila Čajkovskogo (Mexmet-Sadyk Paši)* (available online at https://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Turk/XIX/1820-1840/Sadyk_pasa_2/text20.htm, accessed on 14 August 2024).
- Čul'kov, Nikolaj (1916), “Gižickij, Varfolomej Kaetanovič”, N. Čul'kov (ed.), *Russkij biografičeskij slovar'* Vol. 5, Moskva: 175–176.
- Darski, Józef vel Jerzy Targalski, *Polskie plany antyrosyjskiej współpracy politycznej i wojskowej z ludami Kaukazu w XIX wieku* (available online at <http://jozefdarski.pl/6730-polskie-plany-antyrosyjskiej-wspolpracy-politycznej-i-wojskowej-z-ludami-kaukazu-w-xix-wieku>, accessed on 28 November 2019).
- Darski, Józef vel Jerzy Targalski (1998), “Kto na Kaukazie potrzebuje Rosji?”, *Obóz* No. 33: 103–141.
- Dawid, Wincenty (1959), “Tehe czyli zburzenie Aułu-Dubby”, *Biblioteka Warszawska* Vol. III: 323–358.

- Dempsey, Judy, "Poland's Status Still 'Not Equal', Foreign Minister Says", *The New York Times* (available online at <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/14/world/europe/14iht-poland.4.7116334.html>, accessed on 18 June 2024).
- Długosz, Jan (1867), *Jana Długosza Kanonika Krakowskiego Dziejów Polskich ksiąg dwanaście*, Vol. I, Kraków.
- Dobrzański, Ignacy (1850), *Szkice Kaukazu*, Warszawa.
- Domański, Michał (2014), "Kaukaska pętla śmierci" – geneza konfliktu rosyjsko-czeczeńskiego, *Journal of Modern Science* No. 4: 309–326.
- Donogo, Xadži Murad/Kasumov Siražutdin (2013), "Ličnaya oxrana" imama Gamzata (available online at <http://www.gazavat.ru/history3.php?rub=27&art=664>, accessed on 23 August 2024).
- Donogo, Xadži Murad (2016), "Artilleriya v imamate Šamilya (1840–1859 gg.)", *Vojna i oružie: Novye issledovaniya i materialy. Trudy Sed'moj Meždunarodnoj naučno-praktičeskoj konferenciji 18–20 maja* Vol. II, Sankt Peterburg: 261–277.
- Drożdż, Jerzy (2008), "Adampolskie ślady wojny krymskiej", J. Borejsza/G. Bąbiak (eds.), *Polacy i ziemie polskie w dobie wojny krymskiej*, Warszawa: 149–179.
- Dunin, Kinga (2016), "Jak za Stalina?", *Krytyka Polityczna* (available online at <http://krytykapolityczna.pl/felietony/kinga-dunin/jak-za-stalina/>, accessed on 03 September 2024).
- D'yakov, Vladimir (1969), *Yaroslav Dombrovskij*, Moskva.
- Dzierżwa (1823), *Kronika Polska przez Dzierżwę w końcu wieku XII napisana*, Warszawa.
- Dzierżek, Henryk (1848), "Wspomnienia Kaukazu", *Athenaeum* Vol. IV: 77–215.
- Fabiański, Jan (1971), "Północny Kaukaz przełomu XVIII i XIX w. w świetle relacji Jana Potockiego", *Etnografia Polska* Vol. XV, No. 1: 249–283.
- Falkowski, Maciej (2010), "Najważniejsze problemy i konflikty współczesnego Kaukazu", M. Ząbek (ed.), *Dylematy kaukaskie. Problemy narodowościowe i migracyjne*, Warszawa: 41–72.
- Filina, Maria/Ossowska, Danuta (2007), *Losy Polaków na Kaukazie*, Tbilisi 2007.
- Filipson, Grigorij (1857), "1857 g. iyunya 1. – Otzyv nakaznogo atamana Černomorskogo kazač'ego vojska Filipsona, načal'niku glavnogo štaba vojsk o pol'skom vyxodce Lapinskom", *Vostočnaja Literatura* (available online at https://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Kavkaz/XIX/1820-1840/Probl_kavk_vojny/21-40/33.htm, accessed on 14 August 2024).
- Filipson, Grigorij (2000), "Vospominaniya. 1837–1847", Y. Gordin (ed.), *Osada Kavkaza. Vospominaniya učastnikov Kavkazskoj vojny XIX veka*, Sankt-Peterburg: 76–197.
- Fon-der-Xoven, Ivan (1877), "Moe znakomstvo s dekabristami i drugimi zamečatel'nymi ličnostyami, služivšimi ryadovymi v Kavkazskix vojskax v 1835–1836 godax . (Rasskaz očevidca)", *Drevnyaya i Novaya Rossiya* No. 2: 221–224.
- Forsythe, David (2009), *Encyclopedia of Human Rights*, New York.

- Furier, Andrzej (1997), "Czeczenia i jej mieszkańcy w oczach Polaków", *Etnografia Polska* Vol. XLI, No. 1–2: 121–146.
- Furier, Andrzej (1997a), "Józef Chodźko – mierniczy Kaukazu", *Przegląd Wschodni* Vol. IV, No. 4 (16): 819–851.
- Furier, Andrzej (2000), "Historyczne aspekty kulturowego zróżnicowania Kaukazu", *Sprawy Narodowościowe* No. 16–17: 53–72.
- Furier, Andrzej (2001), *Józef Chodźko, 1800–1881. Polski badacz Kaukazu*, Warszawa.
- Furier, Andrzej (2009), *Polacy w Gruzji*, Warszawa.
- Furier, Andrzej (2014), "Polskie badania Kaukazu a wyzwania współczesnej nauki", *Nowa Polityka Wschodnia* No. 2 (7): 103–133.
- Gadžiev, Bulač (2005), *Polyaki v Dagestane*, Maxačkala.
- Gaszyński, Konstanty (1844), *Poezje*, Paryż.
- Gawroński, Jan (1931), *Zagadnienie czarnomorskie*, Warszawa.
- Gelberg, Andrzej (1997), "Słowo wstępne" (foreword), Kuleba Mirosław, *Niezłomna Czeczenia*, Kraków: 5–7.
- Gercen, Aleksandr (2018), *Byloe i dumy* Vol. 3, Moskwa.
- Geremek, Rafał (2008), "Nasza Gruzja", *Wprost*, 14.09.2008.
- Giedroyc, Gedeon (1867), *Kilka wspomnień z kaukaskiego wygnania*, Lwów 1867.
- Giller, Agaton (1869), "Wykłady publiczne w Paryżu. Odczyt Mat. Gralewski: O Polakach na Kaukazie", *Dziennik Poznański*, 20.12.1869.
- Gizetti, Anton (1901), *Sbornik svedenij o poteryax Kavkazskix vojsk vo vremya vojn Kavkazsko-gorskoj, persidskix, tureckix i v Zakaspijskom krae. 1801–1885 gg.*, Tiflis.
- Głowacki, Albin (1998), "Badania – nauka – przyjaźń. Zarys historii współpracy Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego i Uniwersytetu Tbiliskiego", *Pro Georgia* No. 7: 53–66.
- Godwin, Mike (1994), *Meme, Counter-meme* (available online at <https://www.wired.com/1994/10/godwin-if-2/>), accessed on 03 September 2024).
- Gomulicki, Wiktor (1900), "Jan Potocki jako podróżnik", *Wędrowiec* Vol. XXXVIII, No. 52: 1032–1033.
- Gomulicki, Wiktor (1900a), "Żniwo literackie", *Kraj* No. 29: 404–406.
- Górecki, Wojciech (1995), "Przestępcza republika", *Tygodnik Solidarność*, 13.01.1995.
- Górecki, Wojciech/Grochmalski, Piotr (2000), "W kaukaskiej pułapce", Fischer-Malanowska, Zofia/Magomedow, Magomed, *Nie bój się, nie ufaj, nie proś ...*, Warszawa.
- Górecki, Wojciech (2013), *Abchazja*, Wołowiec.
- Górecki, Wojciech (2014), "Olimpiada na kościach przodków", *Do Rzeczy*, 20–26.01.2014.
- Gralewski, Mateusz (2015), *Kaukaz. Wspomnienia z dwunastoletniej niewoli*, Poznań.
- Grekowicz, Józef (1932), "Plan udziału korpusu polskiego w wojnie rosyjsko-tureckiej r. 1878/9, celem poparcia powstania kaukaskiego", *Niepodległość* Vol. VI: 453–456.
- Grigorašvili-Burakovskaya, Марианна (2007), "Polyaki v Severnoj Osetii", A. Selickij (ed.), *Polyaki v Rossii: istoriya i sovremennost'*, Krasnodar: 194–198.

- Grochmalski, Piotr (1999), *Czeczenia. Rys prawdziwy*, Wrocław.
- Grochmalski, Piotr (2005), "Bomba z opóźnionym zapłonem", *Znak* No. 10: 38–72.
- Grochmalski, Piotr (2012), "Elity polityczne Czeczenii: historia i współczesność", T. Bodio (ed.), *Kaukaz: mechanizmy legitymizacji i funkcjonowania elit politycznych*, Warszawa: 267–309.
- Grodziska, Karolina (2016), *Szwajcarskie stypendium Michaliny Grekowicz-Hausnerowej*, *Rocznik Biblioteki Naukowej PAU i PAN w Krakowie* Vol. LXI: 195–238.
- Grotkowski, Józef (1846), *Relacja p. Grotkowskiego o Kaukazie*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5438, casebook: Dokumenty dotyczące misji na Kaukazie.
- Gudkov, Vyačeslav (1999), "Moryaki xoteli žit' po zakonu gor", *Kommersant'*, 8.04.1999.
- Hen, Józef (1957), *Skromny chłopiec w haremie*, Warszawa.
- Hensel, Wojciech/Tabagua, Ilia (1976), *Gruzja wczoraj i dziś*, Warszawa.
- Hewitt, George (2003), "Caucasus. Western Visitors", J. Speake (ed.), *The Literature of Travel and Exploration. An Encyclopedia* Vol. 1, New York–London: 199–201.
- Hofman, Iwona (2007), "Sprawozdanie z Jubileuszu Profesora Andrzeja Chodubskiego", *Cywilizacja i Polityka*, No. 5: 446–448.
- Hryniewiecki, Bolesław (1949), "Ze wspomnień kaukaskich", *Wierchy* Vol. XIX: 70–87.
- Hryniewiecki, Bolesław (1950), "Ludwik Młokosiewicz. Miłośnik i badacz przyrody Kaukazu (1831–1909)", *Wszechświat* No. 5: 136–139.
- Idzikowski, Adam (1843), "Wspomnienie Kaukazu", *Biblioteka Warszawska* Vol. II: 225–242.
- Iggers, Georg (2001), "The Uses and Misuses of History. The Responsibility of the Historian, Past and Present", S. Sogner (ed.) *Making Sense of Global History: the 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences*, Commemorative Volume, Oslo: 311–319.
- Inglot, Mieczysław (1957), "Polacy piszący na Kaukazie w pierwszej poł. XIX w.", *Pamiętnik Literacki* No. 2: 538–551.
- Jabłonowski, Aleksander (1913), *Pisma Aleksandra Jabłonowskiego* Vol. VII, Warszawa.
- Janik, Michał (1928), *Dzieje Polaków na Syberii*, Kraków.
- Janiszewski, Leon (1843), "Pielgrzymka do mogiły Aleksandra Gribojedowa", *Biblioteka Warszawska* Vol. III: 1–16.
- Janiszewski, Leon (1849), "Obrazy i myśli z podróży do Tyflisu w 1841 r.", *Rubon* Vol. 10: 84–117.
- Janiszewski, Leon (1850), "Z listu Leona Janiszewskiego", *Pamiętnik Naukowo-Literacki* Vol. II, No. 4: 115–127.
- Jastrzębski, Maciej (2014), *Kłątwa gruzińskiego tortu*, Gliwice.
- Jaworski, Hipolit (1877), *Wspomnienia Kaukazu*, Vol. I, Poznań.
- Jaworski, Hipolit (1877a), *Wspomnienia Kaukazu*, Vol. III, Poznań.
- Jordan, Władysław (1859), *List Władysława Jordana do Adama Czartoryskiego z 8 listopada 1859 roku*, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5612, casebook: Depesze carogrodzkie.

- Judt, Tony / Snyder, Timothy (2012), *Thinking the Twentieth Century*, London.
- Kadłubek, Wincenty (1862), *Kronika Polska*, Kraków.
- Kaliszewska, Iwona (2016), *Za Putina i za szarijat*, Warszawa.
- Kalinowski, Karol (2017), *Pamiętnik mojej żołnierki na Kaukazie oraz niewoli u Szamila. Od 1844 do 1854*, Warszawa.
- Kaloev, Boris (2002), *Zapiski kavkazoveda*, Moskwa.
- Kapła, Grzegorz (2017), *Gruzja. W drodze na Kazbek i z powrotem*, Warszawa.
- Karbownik, Krzysztof (2012), "Polskie formacje zbrojne w armii tureckiej w wojnie krymskiej 1853–1856", *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy* No. 4 (242): 215–233.
- Kielbasiński, Henryk (2001), "Udział Polaków w życiu kulturalnym Armenii, w XIX i na początku XX wieku", A. Chodubski (ed.), *Swoistości cywilizacyjne, kwestie narodowościowe i polonijne*, Toruń: 139–148.
- King, Charles (2007), "Imagining Circassia: David Urquhart and the Making of North Caucasus Nationalism", *The Russian Review* No. 66: 238–255.
- King, Charles (2008), *The Ghost of Freedom. A History of the Caucasus*, New York.
- Kleczewski, Stanisław (1767), *O początku dawności, odmianach y wydoskonaleniu języka polskiego*, Lwów.
- Klemensiewicz, Zenon, (1985), *Historia języka polskiego*, Vol. II, Warszawa.
- Klyčnikov Jurij/Lazaryan Sergej (2019), *Pol'skie insurgenty v ryadax «nemirnyx» gorcev*, Pyatigorsk.
- Kochanowski, Jan (1587), *Proporzec albo hołd pruski*, Kraków.
- Kochanowski, Jan (1589), *O Czechu y Lechu historia naganiona*, Kraków.
- Kolakowski, Leszek (1989), *The Presence of Myth*, Adam Czerniawski (transl.), Chicago-London.
- Kołątaj, Hugo (1842), *Rozbiór krytyczny zasad historyi o początkach rodu ludzkiego*, Kraków.
- Komaiszko, Leokadia (2015), "Nawet ptaki wracają": urywki reportażu z Kaukazu, *Wiadomości Polskie/Pol'skie Vedomosti* No. 1 (45): 5–6.
- Komisarčuk, Viktor (2015), *Russkij general – Apollinarij Fomič Rukevič* (available online at <https://www.adm-tbilisskaya.ru/about/archives/istoriya/9685/>, accessed on 29 August 2024).
- Komitet "Wolny Kaukaz" – Poznań, 23.02.2000 (available online at <http://www.rozbrat.org/archiwalia-wolny-kaukaz/422-komitet-wolny-kaukaz-poznan-23-02-2000?start=1>, accessed on 30 April 2024).
- Korczyński, Piotr (2015), *Jihad po polsku* (available online at <http://www.bezc.pl/artukul/228/jihad-po-polsku/2>, accessed on 05 August 2017).
- Koseski, Adam (2000), "Polacy w Armenii: problematyka kwerendy i główne kierunki badań", *Dzieje Najnowsze* Vol. 32, No. 1: 193–202.
- Koseski, Adam (2002), "Polacy w Gruzji. Problematyka kwerendy i główne kierunki badań", E. Walewander (ed.), *Polacy w Gruzji*, Lublin: 23–44.

- Krawczyk-Wasilewska, Violetta (1991), "W hołdzie dla Szoty Rustawelego", *Pro Georgia* No. 1: 9–15.
- Kránitz, Péter Pál, (2014), "The Idea of the Caucasian Hungarians and Its Armenian Aspects in 19th Century Hungary", *Banber Matenadarani* No. 21: 205–223.
- Krinko, Evgenij (2016), "Yug Rossii v vojnax i vooružennyx konfliktax: opyt statističeskogo obobščeniya", G. Matišov (ed.), *Yug Rossii i sopredel'nye strany v vojnax i vooružennyx konfliktax*, Rostov-na-Donu: 17–25.
- "Kronika", *Dziennik Polski*, 15.05.1886.
- "Kronika Krajowa", *Demokrata Polski*, 26.10.1844.
- Krzywy, Roman (2012), "Jan Skorski Lech polski (1751) – fragment pieśni I w przekładzie Benedykta Kotfickiego", R. Grzeškowiak/R. Krzywy (eds.) *"Umysł stateczny i w cnotach gruntowny": prace edytorskie dedykowane pamięci profesora Adama Karpińskiego*, Warszawa: 277–291.
- Kuleba, Mirosław (1997), *Nieztomna Czeczenia*, Kraków.
- Kuleba, Mirosław (1998), *Imperium na kolanach*, Warszawa.
- Kuleba, Mirosław (2002), *Miecz proroka*, Warszawa.
- Kuleba, Mirosław (2007), *Szamil Basajew*, Warszawa.
- Kurczab-Redlich, Krystyna (2005), "Ludobójstwo i oklaski", *Rzeczpospolita*, addition *Plus Minus*, 12.02.2005.
- Kuštavkina, Evgeniya, *Osetino-ingušskij konflikt: istoriya i sovremennoe sostoyanie* (available online at https://www.politregionalistika.ru/ru/kushtavkina_e_a.php, accessed on 03 September 2024).
- Kwiatkiewicz, Piotr (2013), *Przemiany polityczne w Azerbejdżanie. Od republiki radzieckiej do współczesnego państwa*, Toruń.
- Kwestia kaukaska* (1863), Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 7320, casebook: Władysław Czartoryski, memoriały.
- Lankamer, Tadeusz (1979), *Słoneczne Zakaukazie*, Warszawa.
- Lapin, Vladimir (2014), "Kavkazskaya vojna i ee soldaty", *Zvezda* No. 10 (available online at <https://zvezdaspb.ru/index.php?page=8&nput=2372>, accessed on 03 September 2024).
- Lapinskij, Teofil (1995), *Gorcy Kavkaza i ix osvoboditel'naya bor'ba protiv russkix*, Nač'ik.
- Later-Chodyłowa, Elżbieta (2002), "Polacy i Polonia w Gruzji. Zarys tematyki i podejścia badawczego", E. Walewander (ed.), *Polacy w Gruzji*, Lublin: 45–54.
- Leder, Andrzej (2014), *Prześliona rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej*, Warszawa.
- Lehr-Spławiński, Tadeusz (1959), "Łędzice-Łędzianie-Lachowie", A. Horst (ed.), *Opuscula Casimiro Tymieniecki septuagenario dedicata*, Poznań 1959: 195–209.
- Lehr-Spławiński, Tadeusz (1978), *Język polski*, Warszawa.
- Lelewel, Joachim (1816), "Krótkie zbiory historii polskiej Lengnichy, Szmita i Albertrandego, Teodora Wagi, Jerzego Samuela Bandtke", *Dziennik Wileński* Vol. 3, No. 15: 256–295.

- Lelewel, Joachim (1829), *Dzieje Polski*, Warszawa.
- Lelewel, Joachim (1842), "Wyjątek z rozprawy historycznej", *Biblioteka Warszawska* No. 2: 71–98.
- Lelewel, Joachim (1853), *Narody na ziemiach słowiańskich przed powstaniem Polski*, Poznań 1853.
- Lelewel, Joachim (1855), *Polska wieków średnich*, Vol. I, Poznań.
- Lewandowski, Edmund (1998), "Casus Czeczenia", *Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Sociologica* No. 27: 154–167.
- Lisiewicz, Piotr (2005), "Współczesny Auschwitz jest na Kaukazie", *Wirtualna Polska* (available online at <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/wspolczesny-auschwitz-jest-na-kaukazie-6037185041212033a>, accessed on 03 September 2024).
- Lorer, Nikolaj (1988), *Zapiski moego vremeni. Vospominanie o prošlom* (available online <http://historic.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000101/st063.shtml>, accessed on 12 August 2024).
- Łada-Zabłocki, Tadeusz (1844), "Na śmierć Feliksa Ordyńskiego, poległego w bitwie z Goralami 1841 r.", *Rocznik Literacki* Vol. 2: 197–198.
- Łątka, Jerzy (1988), *Romantyczny kondotier*, Katowice.
- Lewandowski, Edmund (1998), "Casus Czeczenia", *Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Sociologica* No. 27: 154–167.
- Lijewska, Elżbieta (1998), *Szkice kaukaskie. O twórczości wygnańczej Władysława Strzelnickiego*, Poznań.
- Lijewska, Elżbieta (2013), "Władysław Strzelnicki: pisarz wielkich nadziei", *Poezje Władysława Strzelnickiego*, Kraków (available online at https://kaukaz.upjp2.edu.pl/ksiegozbior_1/wladyslaw_strzelnicki_poezje.html, accessed on 12 August 2024).
- Limanowski, Bolesław (1894), *Stuletnia walka Narodu polskiego o niepodległość*, Lwów.
- Lisiewicz, Piotr (2004), "Polska husaria w Czeczeniu", *Gazeta Polska*, 29.09.2004.
- Lisiewicz, Piotr (2016), "Zero islamistów", *Niezależna* (available online at <http://niezalezna.pl/84117-zero-islamistow>, accessed on 25 April 2024).
- "List Dauda do Czerkiesów" (1837), *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* Vol. VI: 91–93.
- Lobanov, Vladimir (2015), "Pyatigorsko-Vladikavkazskij s'ezd narodov Tereka, 16 fevralya–15 marta 1918 g.", *Vestnik SpbGUKI* Vol 2: 19–23.
- Longworth, John (1840), *A Year among the Circassians* Vol. I, London.
- Lyszczyna, Jacek (2000), *Pielgrzym w kraju rozkoszy. O poezji Konstantego Gaszyńskiego*, Katowice.
- Łossowski, Piotr (1957), "Udział Polaków w walce o wolność ludów Kaukazu", *Wojsko Ludowe* No. 8: 44–54.
- Małecki, Antoni (1907), *Lechici w świetle historycznej krytyki*, Lwów.
- Mandela, Przemysław/Kowal, Grzegorz (2017), "Zbrodnicze wizje. Komunizm-Czerwony terror 1917–2017", addition *Dziennika Zachodniego* 6.11.2017.

- “Manifest niepodległości czerkieskiej” (1837), *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* Vol. 5: 358–361. de Marin’i, Tébu (2002), *Putešestve po Čerkesii*, Vol. 1, Nač’ik.
- Marx, Karl (1863), *Letter to Friedrich Engels, September 12, 1863* (available online at https://wikirouge.net/texts/en/Letter_to_Friedrich_Engels_September_12_1863, accessed on 14 August 2024).
- Marx, Karl (1864), *Inaugural Address and Provisional Rules of the International Working Men’s Association, London, 1864* (available online at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_The_First_International.pdf, accessed on 14 August 2024).
- Marx, Karl (1867), “Czwarta rocznica powstania styczniowego”, *Głos Wolny* No. 130, 10.02.1867.
- Maślanka, Julian (1984), *Literatura a dzieje bajeczne*, Warszawa.
- Materski, Wojciech (2002), “Pięćset lat kontaktów polsko-gruzińskich. Zarys problematyki”, E. Walewander (ed.), *Polacy w Gruzji*, Lublin: 55–66.
- Matveev, Oleg (2008), “Polyaki v ukreplenyax Černomorskoj beregovoj linii v 1830–1850-e gg.”, A. Selickij (ed.), *Polyaki v Rossii: vexi istorii*, Krasnodar: 97–129.
- Mądzik, Marek (1987), *Działalność społeczno-kulturalna i polityczna Polaków w Gruzji na przełomie XIX i XX wieku*, Lublin.
- Meller, Andrzej (2018), *Polacy po stronie kaukaskich górali. Mit czy rzeczywistość?* (available online at <http://podroze.onet.pl/ciekawe/czy-polscy-zeslancy-walczyli-na-kaukazie-przeciw-rosjanom/3pkp14>, accessed on 02 September 2024).
- Memorandum dla Pana Mariana Brzozowskiego o Kaukazie* from 20.08.1836, Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5282, casebook: Pisma.
- Michałowski, Witold (2000), *Płonący Kaukaz*, Wrocław.
- Michałowski, Witold Stanisław (2006), *Szamańskie safari. Przez Wielki Step, Kaukaz i Bieszczady*, Warszawa.
- Mickiewicz, Adam (1997), *Pisma historyczne. Wykłady lozańskie*, Warszawa.
- Milyutin, Dmitrij (1999), *Vospominaniya general-fel’dmaršala grafa Dmitriya Alekseeviča Milyutina 1860–1862*, Moskva.
- Miłoszowie, Grażyna/Andrzej (1979), *Kaukaz*, Warszawa.
- Modrzejewska-Leśniewska, Joanna (2000), “Konflikt armeńsko-azerbejdżański 1990–1993”, A. Bartnicki (ed.) *Zarys dziejów Afryki i Azji. Historia konfliktów 1869–2000*, Warszawa 2000, pp. 482–491.
- Morawski, Wojciech/Szawłowska, Sylwia (2006), *Wojny rosyjsko-tureckie od XVII do XX wieku*, Warszawa 2006.
- Musabekov, Rasim (2011), *Stanovlenie nezavisimogo azerbajdžanskogo gosudarstva i etničeskie menšinstva* (available online at http://old.sakharov-center.ru/publications/azrus/az_012.htm, accessed on 07 July 2021).
- Naruszewicz, Adam (1805), *Tauryka, czyli wiadomości starożytne i późniejsze o stanie i mieszkańcach Krymu do naszych czasów*, Warszawa.

- Naruszewicz, Adam (1830), *Historia narodu polskiego* Vol. 1, Warszawa.
[News without a title and author], *Wiadomości Polskie*, 6.11.1858.
- Nowak, Andrzej (2008), "Poligony imperialnej polityki: między Barem, Krymem, Kaukazem i kazachskim stepem", *Arcana* No. 6: 89–112.
- Nowak, Joanna (2014), "Władysław Jordan i jego działalność na wschodzie w okresie powstania styczniowego", *Pamiętnik Biblioteki Kórnickiej* Vol. 31: 159–182.
- "O Szamilu", *Przekrój*, 12.12.1965.
- Occheli, Wiera (2009), "Społeczne oraz kulturalne stosunki Polski i Gruzji w XVI–XVIII w.", *Porównania* No. 6: 239–243.
- "Odpowiedzi", *Przekrój*, 28.11.1965.
- Olchowska, Patrycja (2017), "Swoj czy obcy: konstruowanie wizerunku Czechenów przez Rosjan", J. Marszałek-Kawa/Z. Girzyński (eds.), *Pogranicze cywilizacji. Współczesne wyzwania Azji Centralnej i Kaukazu*, Toruń: 249–265.
- Olszewski, Paweł (2012), "Rola Polaków w przeobrażeniach rosyjskiego Azerbejdżanu na przełomie XIX i XX wieku", *Przegląd Polsko-Polonijny* No. 4, Issue 1: 127–140.
- Olszewski, Paweł (2018), "Relacje polsko-kaukaskie w pamiętnikach i literaturze naukowej – zarys problematyki", *Niepodległość i Pamięć* Vol. 25, No. 3: 211–238.
- Ołševskij, Marcellin (1842), *Raport načal'nika levogo flanga Kavkazskoj Linii gen.-m. Ołševskogo gen.-l. Grabbe o merax predotvraščeniya dezertirstva nižnix činov* (available online at <https://www.vostlit.info/Texts/Dokumenty/Kavkaz/XIX/1800-1820/Dvizenie/161-180/176.htm>, accessed on 23 August 2024).
- Ołševskij, Melentij (2000), "Zapiski 1844 i drugie gody", Y. Gordin (ed.), *Osada Kavkaza. Vospominaniya učastnikov Kavkazskoj vojny XIX veka*, Sankt-Peterburg: 261–329.
- Ordzowiały-Grzegorzcyk, Klaudia (2016), "Kaukaz jako miejsce śmierci i zniszczenia w twórczości polskich zesłańców", *Kaukaz – Przeszłość – Teraźniejszość – Przyszłość* No. 2: 165–183.
- Ossowska, Danuta (2013), "Tadeusz Łada-Zabłocki – poeta kaukaski", *Poezje Tadeusza Łady-Zabłockiego*, Kraków (available online at https://kaukaz.upjpp.edu.pl/ksiego_zbior_1/poezje_tadeusz_lada_zablocki.html, accessed on 12 August 2024).
- Ovsyannikov, Dmitrij (2008), "Inorodcy v ryadax gorcev v period kavkazskoj vojny", *Vestnik Sankt-Petersburskogo Universiteta* Vol. 2, No 3: 16–21.
- Pagaczewski, Stanisław (1963), *Dzień dobry Kaukazie*, Warszawa.
- Parrot, Friedrich (1846), *Journey to Ararat*, New York.
- Patlewicz, Barbara (2016), *Azerbejdżańska droga do pierwszej niepodległości*, Szczecin.
- Piłasiewicz, Zofia (2016), *Gruzja w pół drogi do nieba*, Białystok.
- Pilat, Stanisław (1862), "Ustęp z pamiętników", *Album Lwowski*: 123–149.
- Pisowicz, Andrzej (2000), "Ormianie polscy. Problem świadomości narodowej a kwestia języka", M. Bobrownicka (ed.), *Język a tożsamość narodowa: slavica*, Kraków: 135–142.

- Piwnicki, Grzegorz (2000), "Losy Polaków – wojskowych, służących w armii carskiej na terenie Armenii w XIX i na początku XX w.", E. Walewander (ed.), *Polacy w Armenii*, Lublin: 237–257.
- Piwnicki, Grzegorz (2001), *Polacy wojskowi i zesłańcy w carskiej armii na Kaukazie w XIX i na początku XX wieku*, Toruń.
- Piwnicki, Grzegorz (2001a), "Udział Polaków – wojskowych w przeobrażeniach cywilizacyjnych Kaukazu w XIX w.", A. Chodubski (ed.), *Swoistości cywilizacyjne, kwestie narodowościowe i polonijne*, Toruń: 115–124.
- Piwnicki, Grzegorz (2002), "Losy Polaków – wojskowych służących w armii carskiej na terenie Gruzji w XIX i na początku XX w.", E. Walewander (ed.), *Polacy w Gruzji*, Lublin: 89–109.
- Piwnicki, Grzegorz (2002a), "Polacy na Kaukazie w XIX i na początku XX wieku", A. Żukowski (ed.), *Przemiany cywilizacyjne i kulturowe. Kwestie etniczne i polonijne*, Olsztyn–Gdańsk: 133–143.
- Piwnicki, Grzegorz (2003), "Polacy wojskowi w Azerbejdżanie w XIX i na początku XX wieku", E. Walewander (ed.), *Polacy w Azerbejdżanie*, Lublin: 201–222.
- Piwnicki, Grzegorz (2011), "Losy polskich zesłańców wojskowych w Azerbejdżanie przez pryzmat ich dokonań cywilizacyjnych w XIX i na początku XX wieku", A. Chodubski/A. Frączek/B. Słobodzian (eds.), *Politologiae Miscellanea. W świecie wielu rzeczywistości*, Toruń: 248–266.
- Piwnicki, Grzegorz (2011a), "Polacy wojskowi w Armenii w XIX i na początku XX wieku", *Tygiel* No. 1–2 (62–63): 117–128
- Piwnicki, Grzegorz (2012), "Polacy w Gruzji w XIX w. i na początku XX wieku", *Przegląd Polsko-Polonijny* No. 3: 75–90.
- Piwnicki, Grzegorz (2013), "Charakterystyka pamiętnika Karola Kalinowskiego pt. <Pamiętnik mojej żołnierki na Kaukazie i niewoli u Szamila od roku 1844 do 1854 przez Karola Kalinowskiego>", *Pamiętnik mojej żołnierki na Kaukazie i niewoli u Szamila od roku 1844 do 1854 przez Karola Kalinowskiego* (available online at <https://kaukaz.upjp2.edu.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=49&Itemid=54>, accessed on 22 August 2024).
- "Pokazaniya soldat i oficerov Kavkazskoj armii, byvšix v plenu, o vzyatii gorcami selenij Balaxany, Catanyx, Axalči, Gocat' i ob otnošenii Šamilya k russkim plennym i perebežavšim soldatam. 12 yanvarja 1843 g." (1958), G.-A. Daniyalov (ed.), *Dviženie gorcev Severo-Vostočnogo Kavkaza v 20–50 gg. XIX v. Sbornik dokumentov*, Maxačkala: 364–368.
- "Pokazaniya žitelya aula Kater-Yurta Ustarxana o položenii beglyx russkix soldat, naxodivšixsya v Vedeni, i ob otnošenii k nim Šamilya. Ne ranee 1845 g." (1958), G.-A. Daniyalov (ed.), *Dviženie gorcev Severo-Vostočnogo Kavkaza v 20–50 gg. XIX v. Sbornik dokumentov*, Maxačkala: 498.

- Pokrovskij, Nikolaj I. (2000), *Kavkazskie vojny i imamt Šamilya*, Moskva.
- Pokrovskij, Nikolaj N. (2000), "Vmesto predisloviya", Pokrovskij Nikolaj I, *Kavkazskie vojny i imamt Šamilya*, Moskva: 3–7.
- Porada, Aleksandra (2015), "Poles in the Caucasian Corps, 1830–1860: Personal Freedom, Political Independence, Captivity and Slavery as Ideas and Experience", Ch. Witzentrath (ed.), *Eurasian Slavery, Ransom and Abolition in World History, 1200–1860*, London–New York: 268–280.
- Potapov, Roal'd/Pavlova, Elena (2009), "Kavkazskij teterev Lyrurus mlokosiewiczzi Taczanowski, 1875: xronologiya izučeniya i sovremennye problemy", *Russkij ornitologičeskij žurnal* Vol. 18, No. 487: 887–923.
- Potemkin, Vladimir (2015), *Istoriya diplomatii*, Vol. 1 *S drevnejšix vremen do novogo vremeni*, Moskva.
- Potocki, Robert (2009), *Wojna sierpniowa: glosa do preludium konfliktu*, Warszawa.
- Potocki, Wojciech (1841), "Asłan-Temirów. Wypadek na Kaukazie", *Biblioteka Warszawska* Vol. 1, pp. 562–586;
- Potocki, Wojciech (1845), "Ostatnie chwile Marlińskiego", *Athenaeum* Vol. 1: 121–134.
- Ptolemy, Claudius (1991), *The Geography*, Edward Luther Stevenson (transl.), New York.
- Prozritelev, Grigorij (1914), "O voennoplennyx polyakax na Severnom Kavkaze v vojne 1812", N. Veselovskij (ed.), *Zapiski razryada voennoj arxeologii i arxeografii Imperatorskogo Russkogo voenno-istoričeskogo obščestva* Vol. 3, Petrograd: 11–14.
- Radecki, Jan Kazimierz (1844), *Poezje Mazura*, Bruxella.
- Rdułtowski, Konstanty (1830), "Szota Rustaweli. Georgiański poeta", *Noworocznik Litewski na rok 1831*: 149–160.
- Rehman, Antoni (1879), *Kilka kartek z Kaukazu*, Kraków.
- Rewkowski, Zygmunt (2011), *Pamiętniki* Vol. 1: *Wilno. Ostatnie lata uniwersytetu*, Wrocław.
- Rewkowski, Zygmunt (2011a), *Pamiętniki* Vol. 11: *Zestanie. W żołdacy na Kaukaz*, Wrocław.
- Reychman, Jan (1931), "Z przeszłości polsko-kaukaskiej", *Wschód* Vol. 11, No. 1–2: 48–55.
- Reychman, Jan (1939), "Kaukaz", W. Pobóg-Malinowski (ed.), *Polska i Polacy w cywilizacjach świata: słownik encyklopedyczny* Vol. 1, No. 4.
- Reychman, Jan (1954), „Polacy w górach Kaukazu do końca XIX w.”, *Wierchy* Vol. 23: 19–58.
- Reychman, Jan (1959/1960), "Grekowicz Józef Adam", K. Lepszy (ed.), *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* Vol. VIII, Wrocław–Kraków–Warszawa.
- Reychman, Jan (1963), "Stosunki literackie polsko-azerbejdżańskie w XIX wieku", *Przegląd Humanistyczny* Vol. VII, No. 6 (39): 123–128.
- Reychman, Jan (1972), *Podróżnicy polscy na Bliskim Wschodzie w XIX w.*, Warszawa.
- Siciński, Jan T. (2005), "Polscy botanicy na Zakaukaziu. Materiały biograficzne", *Studia Polonijne* Vol. 26: 255–272.

- Ricoeur, Paul (2006), *Memory, History, Forgetting*, Kathleen Blamey/David Pellauer (transl.), Chicago-London.
- Rohoziński, Jerzy (2010), "Wojna 'ormiańsko-tatarska' 1905 roku. Historyczna wrogość: mity i fakty", M. Ząbek (ed.), *Dylematy kaukaskie. Problemy narodowościowe i migracyjne*, Warszawa: 219–246.
- Rohoziński, Jerzy (2014), *Bawelna, samowary i Sartowie*, Warszawa.
- Rohoziński, Jerzy (2016), *Gruzja. Początki państwa*, Poznań.
- Rohoziński, Jerzy (2018), *Najpiękniejszy klejnot w carskiej koronie. Gruzja pod panowaniem rosyjskim 1801–1917*, Warszawa.
- Rolle, Michał (1908), *Z minionych stuleci*, Lwów.
- "Rosja i Kaukaz", *Dziennik Narodowy*, 20.09.1845.
- Rukevič, Apollinarij (1914), "Из воспоминаний старого ériřanca. (1832–1839 гг.)", *Istoričeskij Vstnik* Vol. 137: 512–526.
- Rubakin, Nikolaj (1893), "Gramotnost", K. Arsen'v/F. Petruševskij (eds.), *Énciklopedičeskij slovar' Brokgauza i Éfrona* Vol. IXa. 1893: 537–549.
- Sanecka-Tyczyńska, Joanna (2013), "Geografia historyczna, polityczna i ekonomiczna Kaukazu Południowego", M. Korzeniowski et al. (eds.), *Wprowadzenie do studiów wschodnioeuropejskich* Vol 4: *Armenia, Azerbejdżan, Gruzja – przeszłość i teraźniejszość*, Lublin: 281–308.
- Sanguszkowa, Klementyna (1927), *Roman Sanguszko, zesłaniec na Sybir z 1831 r., w świetle pamiętnika matki ks. Klementyny z Czartoryskich*, Warszawa.
- Sarnicki, Stanisław (1587), *Annales, sive de origine et rebus gestis Polonorum et Lithuanorum libri VIII*, Book 1, Kraków.
- Savel'ev, Aleksandr (2010), "Rol' rossijskix oficerov v issledovanii Kavkaza", *Vestnik Krasnodarskogo universiteta MVD Rossii* No. 2: 9–13.
- Savel'ev, Aleksandr (2013), "Polyaki v Kavkazskoj vojne – dve grani odnogo yavleniya", *Wiadomości polskie* No. 3–4 (available online at <http://dompolski-journal.ru/articles/article/27/>, accessed on 29 August 2024).
- Sawicki, Marcin (2015), *Pestki winorośli i trzy jabłka*, Białystok.
- Selickij, Aleksandr (2008), *Polyaki na Kubani: istoričeskie očerki*, Krasnodar.
- Sękowski, Józef (1824), *Collectanea z dziejopisów tureckich rzeczy do historyi polskiej służących*, Warszawa.
- Skorski, Jan (1751), *Lech Polski albo wolnego i złotego narodu polskiego początki, starożytność, fortuna i różne sukcesów odmiany*, Lwów.
- Snyder, Timothy (1997), *Nationalism, Marxism, and Modern Central Europe. A Biography of Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz (1872–1905)*, Cambridge-Massachusetts.
- Sołtysowa, Helena (1903), "Ludwik Narbutt. Wspomnienia spisane według opowiadania Teodory Monczuńskiej, rodzonej siostry Ludwika", *W czterdziestą rocznicę powstania styczniowego 1863–1903*, Lwów: 433–437.

- Sowa, Jan (2011), *Fantomowe ciało króla. Peryferyjne zmagania z nowoczesną*, Kraków.
- Stańczyk, Piotr (2016), "Wykształcenie ludności 11 Rzeczypospolitej w świetle badań GUS", *Spółczesność i Ekonomia* No. 5: 7–26.
- Strumpf, Edward (1900), *Obrazy Kaukazu*, Warszawa.
- Strzelnicki, Władysław (1846), "Dwaj uzdzeni", *Rocznik Literacki* Vol. 3: 65–112.
- Strzelnicki, Władysław (1860), *Poezje Władysława Strzelnickiego*, Żytomierz.
- Strzelnicki, Władysław (1860a), *Szkice Kaukazu*, Żytomierz.
- Sudavcov, Nikolaj (2015), "Vozvraščenie voennoplennyx polyakov otečestvennoj vojny 1812 goda s Kavkaza na rodinu", *Almanach Historyczny* Vol. 17, No. 2: 125–157.
- Sulewski, Wojciech, (1973), *Konterfekty dziwnych Polaków*, Warszawa.
- Surzycki, Julian (1858), "Obrazy Dagestanu", *Biblioteka Warszawska* Vol. 11: 225–238.
- Szukalski, Jerzy (2015), *Przeobrażenia polityczno-ustrojowe w Czeczenii w latach 1990–2000*, Toruń.
- Śliwowska, Wiktoria (1998), *Zesłańcy polscy w Imperium Rosyjskim w pierwszej połowie XIX wieku*, Warszawa.
- Szpotkański, Tadeusz (1911), "Michał Czajkowski w Turcji", *Biblioteka Warszawska* Vol. IV, No. 3: 465–478.
- Šnirel'man, Viktor (2002), "Globalizacija i konflikty", V. Tiškov/V. Šnirel'man (eds.), *Étničnost' i religija v sovremennyx konfliktax*, Moskva: 4–22.
- Šnirel'man, Viktor (2005), "Cennost' prošlogo: étnocentristskie istoričeskie mify, identičnost' i étnopolitika", *Collegium* 19: 160–186.
- Šnirel'man, Viktor (2006), *Byt' alanami. Intellektualy i politika na Severnom Kavkaze v XX veke*, Moskva.
- Šnirel'man, Viktor (2011), *Porog tolerantnosti. Ideologija i praktika novogo rasizma*, Moskva.
- Tazbir, Janusz (1987), *Polskie przedmurze chrześcijańskiej Europy. Mity a rzeczywistość*, Warszawa.
- Thompson, Eva (2000), *Imperial Knowledge: Russian Literature and Colonialism*, Westport-London.
- Tiškov, Valerij (2012), "Étnopolitičeskij konflikt: sistemnyj i antropologičeskij podchod", V. Tiškov/V. Šnirel'man (eds.), *Étničnost' i religija v sovremennyx konfliktax*, Moskva: 627–650.
- Topolski, Jerzy (1976), *Świat bez historii*, Warszawa.
- Topolski, Jerzy (2006), "Historia jako nauka po postmodernizmie", E. Domańska (ed.), *Pamięć, etyka i historia*, Poznań: 31–36.
- Topolski, Jerzy (2008), *Jak się pisze i rozumie historię*, Poznań.
- Tornau, Fedor (1999), *Sekretnaya missiya v Čerkesiju russkogo razvedčika barona F.F. Tornau*, Naččik.
- Trentowski, Bronisław (1847), *Wizerunki duszy narodowej s końca ostatniego szesnastolecia*, Paryż.

- Uгода między Muhammad-Aminem i Teofilem Łapińskim* (1859), Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5612, casebook: Depesze carogrodzkie.
- Ułaszyn, Henryk (1902), *O Janie Potockim i literaturze Kaukazu*, Warszawa.
- "Vixen" (1837), *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* Vol. VI: 15–16.
- Volxonskij, Mixail/Prigarin, Aleksandr/Sen' Dmitrij (2007), "Panslavizm Mixala Čajkovskogo i istorija kazačestva v osmanskoj imperii", A. Selickij (ed.), *Pohyaki v Rossii: istorija i sovremennost'*, Krasnodar: 147–160.
- W.D. (probably Wincenty Dawid) (1882), "Julian Surzycki, inżynier, żołnierz, poeta", *Wędrowiec* Vol. 40, No. 1036: 289–291.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (2004), *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, Durham.
- Warneńska, Monika (1960), "Notatki z podróży do Gruzji", *Przegląd Humanistyczny* No. 3 (18): 195–202.
- "Warszawa nawiedzona przez Mikołaja", *Dziennik Narodowy*, 14.06.1845.
- Waško, Andrzej (2012), "Adam Mickiewicz o historii Polski", A. Rzegocki (ed.), *Historia ma konsekwencje. Mickiewicz, Mochnacki, Norwid, Witkacy o dziejach Polski*, Kraków-Warszawa: 15–50.
- White, Hayden (2006), "Kosmos, chaos i następstwo w przedstawieniu historiologicznym", Paulina Ambroży (transl.), E. Domańska (ed.), *Pamięć, etyka i historia*, Poznań: 85–104.
- "Wiadomości i doniesienia", *Dziennik Narodowy*, 8.10.1842.
- "Wiadomości i doniesienia", *Dziennik Narodowy*, 28.06.1845.
- "Wiadomości i doniesienia", *Dziennik Narodowy*, 30.05.1846.
- "Wiadomości i doniesienia", *Demokrata Polski*, 26.06.1847.
- Widerszal, Ludwik (2011), *Sprawy kaukaskie w polityce europejskiej 1831–1864*, Warszawa.
- Wilk, Władysław vel Mirosław Kuleba (2014), *Dziennik snajpera*, Ustron.
- Winiecki, Jędrzej (2008), "Bałkanizacja po kaukasku", *Polityka*, 3.05.2008.
- Woźniak, Andrzej (1987), "O kaukaskich drogach Polaków", *Etnografia Polska* Vol. XXXI, No. 1: 231–236.
- Woźniak, Andrzej (1991), "Tygodnik Polski" – czasopismo tyfliskiej Polonii, *Etnografia Polska* Vol. XXXV, No. 1: 153–172.
- Woźniak, Andrzej (1992), "Z dziejów diaspory gruzińskiej w Polsce", *Etnografia Polska* Vol. XXXVI, No. 1: 81–98.
- Wyciąg z depeszy z dnia 16 maja 1846 roku* (1846), Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5438, casebook: Dokumenty dotyczące misji na Kaukazie.
- Wyganowski, Tadeusz (1907), *Wspomnienia z Kaukazu*, Warszawa.
- Xapizov, Šaxban/Galbacev, Surxaj (2016), *Avarskij Cor (Zakatal'skij okrug) v XVIII–pervoj polovine XX veka*, Maxačkala.
- Załęski, Jan (1849), "Rys życia obozowego", *Gwiazda* No. 4: 156–184.
- Zakrzewska-Dubasowa, Mirosława (1985), "Armenia", J. Krzyżanowski (ed.), *Literatura polska: przewodnik encyklopedyczny* Vol. II, Warszawa.

- Zamoyski, Władysław (1863), *Poland & Circassia: report of a public meeting of the inhabitants of Keighley, Yorkshite including an address*, Bradford.
- Zarys wyprawy na Kaukaz, o jej celach i spodziewanych skutkach (1847), Princes Czartoryski Library, signature: 5440, casebook: L. Bystrzonowski na Kaukazie.
- Zawadzka, Danuta (2014), "Paralela recepcji. Lelewel i Mickiewicz w odbiorze literaturoznawców i historyków", *Sensus Historiae* No. 2: 177–198.
- Zięba, Ryszard (1989), "Polskie interesy narodowe a współistnienie w Europie", Z. Pietraś/M. Pietraś (eds.), *Interesy narodowe a współistnienie państw*, Warszawa–Lublin: 155–186.
- Zwierz, Czesław (1996), "Udział Polaków w walkach o niepodległość Czechenii w XIX w.", *Przegląd Orientalistyczny* No. 3–4: 133–142.
- Zychowicz, Piotr (2008), "Historia wściekle przyspieszyła", interview with Paweł Wieczorkiewicz, *Rzeczpospolita* (available online at <https://www.rp.pl/swiat/art16065001-historia-wsciekle-przyspieszyla>, accessed on 03 September 2024).
- Żurawski vel Grajewski, Radosław (2003), "Kaukaz w „dyplomacji” księcia Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego w okresie kryzysu wschodniego (1832–1840)", *Przegląd Nauk Historycznych* Vol. 11, No. 2 (4): 181:198.
- Żywow, Mark (1959), "Polscy poeci ,kaukascy", *Pamiętnik Literacki* Vol. 3/4: 563–591.

Internet Resources

- "Albert Potocki", *Wikipedia* (available online at https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Potocki, accessed on 29 April 2024).
- Historia azerbejdżańsko-polskich stosunków kulturalnych* (available online at <http://azembassy.pl/?section=29>, accessed 16.02.2024).
- Imam Szamil w Wiedieno* (2007) (available online at <http://czeczenia.blog.onet.pl/2007/06/27/imam-szamil-w-wiedieno-2/>, accessed on 04 May 2016).
- "К проблеме сохрannости в России ядерного ору́жия", *What the Papers Says* (available online at <http://wps.ru/arhiv/military/military-1998-09-14>), accessed 18.06.2024).
- Paškovskij Konstantin Kazimirovič* (available online at https://ria1914.info/index.php/Пашковскій_Константин_Казимирович, accessed on 03 September 2024).
- Pervaya vseobščaya perepis' naseleniya Rossijskoj Imperii 1897 g. Raspredelenie naseleniya po rodnomu yazyku i uezdám Rossijskoj Imperii krome gubernij Evropejskoj Rossii* (available online at http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/emp_lan_97_uezd.php?reg=566, accessed on 02 September 2024).
- Konstitucija Respubliki Dagestan* (available online at http://constitution.garant.ru/region/cons_dagest/chapter/, accessed on 30 April 2024).

- Polyaki v armii Imama Šamilya* (2007) (available online at <http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2007/03/24/50167/polyaki-v-armii-imama-shamilya.shtml>, accessed on 22 August 2024).
- Postanovlenie Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Respubliki Dagestan ot 18 oktyabrya 2000 g. N 191 "O korennyx maločislennyx narodax Respubliki Dagestan"* (available online at <https://base.garant.ru/26500150/>, accessed on 30 April 2024).
- "Prof. Selim Chazbijewicz: Tragedia która wydarzyła się w Paryżu powoduje, że czasem wstydę się, że jestem muzułmaninem", *w Polityce* (available online at <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/271761-prof-selim-chazbijewicz-tragedia-ktora-wydarzyla-sie-w-paryżu-powoduje-ze-czasem-wstydze-sie-ze-jestem-muzułmaninem>, accessed on 25 April 2024).
- Rycerz w tygryziej skórze* (available online at https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rycerz_w_tygryziej_sk%C3%B3rze, accessed 02.02.2023).
- Widmo wolności. Historia Kaukazu* (available online at <http://lubimyczytac.pl/ksiazka/91634/widmo-wolnosci-historia-kaukazu>, accessed on 22 August 2024).
- Vol'skij Sigizmund Viktorovič* (available online at <http://www.grwar.ru/persons/persons.html?id=451>, accessed on 30 August 2024).
- Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1926 goda. Nacional'nyj sostav naseleniya po respublikam SSSR* (available online at http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_26.php, accessed on 03 September 2024).
- Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1989 goda. Nacional'nyj sostav naseleniya po regionam* (available online at http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_89.php?reg=48, accessed on 03 September 2024).

Index of Names

- Abbas II (shah) 50
Alan (legendary figure) 34, 47
Alimammad (commander) 134
Aliyev, Ilham 15
Alexander I (king) 51
Alexander I (tsar) 185
Alexander II (tsar) 63
Andrzejewski, Jerzy (Grigory) 118
Aulich, Manswet 139–140
Aylisli, Akram 15
- Baberowski, Jörg 200–202
Badowski, Ryszard 48, 116
Bakikhanov, Abbasgulu 180–181
Bakunin, Mikhail 94
Bangya, Janos 108
Baranowski, Bohdan 31, 67, 166, 186
Baranowski, Krzysztof 31, 67
Baratashvili, Nikoloz 181
Baryatinsky, Alexander 64
Batory, Stefan (king) 17
Beaumont, Thomas 80
Beauvois, Daniel 173
Bell, James Stanislaus 82–83, 146, 171
von Benckendorff, Konstantin 155
Berger, Rafał 122
Berzeg, Keranduk 88–89
Bestuzhev, Alexander (a.k.a Marlinsky) 68
Borejsza, Jerzy 13, 218
Branowski, Stanisław 129–130
Breański, Feliks 90–91
von Brink, Yegor 138
Broniewski, Siemion 178
Brosset, Marie-Félicité 178
Brzozowski, Karol 63
Brzozowski, Marian 81–82
Butowd-Andrzejkowicz (Butowt-
Andrzejkowicz), Michał 72–73
Bystrzonowski, Ludwik 81, 84, 90–91, 102,
143
- Caban, Wiesław 30, 141*n*, 143, 149, 152,
156–159, 167, 183, 186–188, 190,
194–195
Casimir the Great (king) 16, 26
- Casimir IV Jagiellon (king) 51
Catherine the Great, Catherine II
(empress) 18, 173, 188
Chazbijewicz, Selim 2–3
Chernyshyov, Alexander 153
Chodubski, Andrzej 29–30, 49–50, 116–117,
121–122, 124, 147, 149, 164–165, 168,
182–183
Chodźko, Aleksander 179
Chodźko, Józef 179, 191–192
Chojnacki, Paweł 24–25, 58
Chrzanowski, Wojciech 83, 90, 136
Ciesielski, Stanisław 207
Constantine II (king) 51
Cromwell, Oliver 58
Czajkowski, Michał 48, 83, 85–92, 99–102
Czaplic, Justyn 154
Czartoryski, Adam 48, 79–88, 90–93, 95,
100–103, 131, 136, 142–143, 146, 153, 173,
178, 218
Czartoryski, Witold 87, 96–97
Czech (legendary figure) 34–35, 41, 43
Czyński, Jan 59
- Daniyal (naib) 86–87
Dawid, Wincenty 71, 134, 176
Dąbrowski, Jarosław 156
Deleuze, Gilles 219
Denikin, Anton 114, 118
Despot-Zenowicz, Stanisław 158
Dębicki, Ignacy 117
Długosz, Jan 34
Dłuski, Franciszek 144
Dobroski, Ignacy 177
Donukov-Korsakov, Alexander 188
Donogo, Hajji Murad 129–130
Dzierzwa (chronicler) 33
Dzierżek, Henryk 74
Dzik, Józef 126–128
- El Cid 58
Engels, Friedrich 107–108
Erasmus of Rotterdam 16
Erekle II (king) 109
Evgenii (bishop) 178

- Falkowski, Maciej 206–207
 Filipson, Grigory 136, 138, 153, 155
 Fotyga, Anna 23*n*
 Fronczewski, Jerzy 117
 Furier, Andrzej 67, 76, 92, 142, 163, 166, 172, 191
 Fyodorov, Mikhail 138
- Gall Anonim (historian) 45
 de Galonifontibus, Johannes 171
 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad 203
 Gaszyński, Konstanty 54–56, 106, 124
 Geremek, Rafał 25
 Ghazi Muhammad (imam) 65–66, 75
 Giedroyc, Wincenty Gedeon 127–128, 141, 149
 Giżycki, Bartłomiej 185
 Godlewski, Jan 117
 Godwin, Mike 196
 Golitsyn, Grigory 118
 Golovin, Yevgeny 145, 192
 Golovinsky, Vasyl 110–112
 Gomulicki, Wiktor 165
 Gordon, Jakub 57–58
 Gordon, Kazimierz 87–89, 100–101
 Grabbe, Pavel 143
 Gralewski, Mateusz 31, 47–48, 50, 63–64, 110–113, 127, 130, 133, 135, 141, 154, 159–161, 168–169, 176, 184, 186, 188, 193
 Grekowicz, Józef Adam 97–98
 Grochmalski, Piotr 123, 205
 Grotkowski, Józef 48, 155, 158
- Hamzat-Bek 129
 Hauke-Bosak, Józef 156, 218
 Hen, Józef 109, 115
 Hensel, Wojciech 108, 110, 114
 Herodotus (geographer) 33
 Hesus, Helius Eobanus 16
 Herzen, Alexander 94
 Hitler, Adolf 196–197
 Hofman, Karol 20
 von der Howen, Ivan 134
 Hryniewiecki, Bolesław 180
 Hummatov, Alikram 202
 Huseynov, Surat 202
 Huxley, Thomas Henry 58
- Ibrahimbekov, Rustam 15
 Idzikowski, Adam 74
 Iggers, Georg 10
 Illinicz, Michał 50
 Inglot, Mieczysław 31
 Interiano, Giorgio 171
 Ivan Kalita (tsar) 26
 Ivan the Terrible (tsar) 17
 Ivelich, Konstantin 151
- Jan Olbracht (king) 51
 Jan III Sobieski (king) 50
 Janik, Michał 121, 185
 Janiszewski, Leon 73, 176
 Japheth (biblical figure) 34, 38
 Jatowt, Maksymilian 57
 Jaworski, Hipolit 64–67, 176
 Jogaila (king) 26
 Jordan, Władysław 95–96, 101, 131
 Judt, Tony 13
- Kadłubek, Wincenty 33
 Kalinowski, Karol 1, 31, 75–76, 128–130, 132–133, 144, 147
 Kaliszewska, Iwona 211
 Kalmykov, Betal 211
 Kelles-Krauz, Kazimierz 5
 Khalidov, Mamed 1–2
 Khattab 24
 King, Charles 80–81, 125, 172
 Klaproth, Julius 45, 171–173
 von Klugenau, Franz 151, 153–154
 Koch, Karl 136
 Kochanowski, Jan 34–35
 Kołakowski, Leszek 4–5, 7
 Kołłątaj, Hugo 36
 Konarski, Szymon 72, 112, 151
 Korovayev, Nikolai 112–113
 Kozłowski, Benedykt 154–155, 159
 Krajewski, Stanisław 83
 Krasiński, Zygmunt 19
 Kránitz, Péter 44
 Kromer, Marcin 43
 Krukowski, Feliks 154
 Krusiński, Tadeusz 51, 172
 Kryżanowski (soldier) 137
 Krzywy, Roman 35
 Kuleba, Mirosław 11–12, 24, 123, 205

- Lankamer, Tadeusz 116
 Later-Chodyłowa, Elżbieta 8–9
 Lawrence, Thomas (Lawrence of Arabia) 81
 Lech (legendary figure) 34–35, 41–43, 45
 Lelewel, Joachim 36–41, 44–45, 48
 Lengnich, Gotfryd 43–44
 Lewandowski, Michał 116, 118, 218
 Lijewska, Elżbieta 68–69
 Limanowski, Bolesław 148
 Lisiewicz, Piotr 2–3, 122
 Locke, John 217
 Longworth, John 83, 146
 Lyszczyzna, Jacek 55
 Łada-Zabłocki, Tadeusz 70, 159, 176, 179–181
 Łapczyński, Kazimierz 150, 177
 Łapiński, Teofil 92–95, 101, 108, 142, 144–145
 Łątka, Jerzy 93–94
 Łossowski, Piotr 106–108, 121
- Mackie, John Milton 58
 Malinowski, Sylwester 154
 Małachowski, Gustaw 20
 Małecki, Antoni 48
 Maniukin, Zakhar 111
 Mansur (sheikh) 58
 Marx, Karl 21, 107–108
 Maślanka, Julian 34
 Materski, Wojciech 119–120
 Matveyev, Oleg 137, 144, 147, 157–158, 188
 Mądzik, Marek 168
 Mehmed Ali Pasha 87, 99, 101
 Menander the Protector (historian) 41
 Mickiewicz, Adam 21, 29, 37–45, 49, 55,
 157*n*
 Michałowski, Witold 24, 61*n*
 Mieszko I (duke) 43, 217
 Milyutin, Dmitry 142
 Miłosz, Grażyna and Andrzej 105, 109, 112,
 114–115, 117–118
 Młokosiewicz, Ludwik 180
 Muhammad-Amin (naib) 93, 154
 Musabekov, Rasim 202
- Nakashidze, Mikhail 199
 Napoleon I (emperor) 185
 Napoleon III (emperor) 92
 Narbutt, Ludwik 152
 Naruszewicz, Adam 43–44
- Negnon (legendary figure) 34
 Nesterov, Pyotr 151
 Nicholas I (tsar) 61, 111, 127*n*, 149, 153, 159
 Noah (biblical figure) 34
 Nowacki, Stanisław 185
 Nowak, Andrzej 103
- Olshevsky, Marcelin 131, 146
 Olshevsky, Melentij 133
 Ordyński, Feliks 70–71
- Pacowski, Andrzej 154
 Pagaczewski, Stanisław 106, 110, 113, 122
 Paszkowski, Konstanty 218
 Patlewicz, Barbara 205–206
 Paul I (tsar) 189
 Pietraszkiewicz, Ksawery 68
 Pietrucin-Pietruszewski, Izmael-Bek
 (Józef) 130
 Pilat, Stanisław 140–141
 Piwnicki, Grzegorz 30, 147, 164, 182, 192–193,
 193
 Plater, Władysław 54*n*
 Pokrovsky, Nikolai I. 104–105, 129, 132, 136,
 144
 Pokrovsky, Nikolai N. 105
 Pomponius 173
 Potemkin-Tauricheski, Grigory 188
 Potocki, Albert (Wojciech) 75, 192
 Potocki, Jan 165–166, 170–174
 Potocki, Paweł 179
 Prozritelev, Grigory 185
 Pruszanowski, Kazimierz 129
 Przewłocki, Klemens 96–97, 101
 Ptolemy (geographer) 33
 Putin, Vladimir 197
- Radecki, Jan Kazimierz 56
 Raevsky, Nikolai 137, 145
 von Ranke, Leopold 10, 48
 Rdułtowski, Konstanty 177–178
 Rehman, Antoni 64, 158
 Reutt (Reut), Józef 154, 161
 Rewkowski, Zygmunt 20, 77–78, 150–151,
 154, 161, 179*n*
 Reychman, Jan 31, 110, 121, 172, 193
 Richelieu (cardinal) 17
 Ricoeur, Paul 9, 217, 219

- Rohoziński, Jerzy 198–200, 202
 Rozen, Grigory 153, 192
 Różycki, Edmund 156
 Różycki, Karol 90
 Rukiewicz, Apolinary 152, 160
 Rus (legendary figure) 41, 43
 Rusiecki (officer) 126, 128–129, 132, 218

 Sanguszko, Roman 145, 152
 Sanguszkowa, Klementyna 145
 Saremba, Jan 125
 Sarnicki, Stanisław 34
 Schiltberger, Johann 171
 Schoneus, Andreas 16
 Serebryakov, Lazar 137, 144
 Sękowski, Józef 44
 Shamil (imam) 1, 2, 57, 58–62, 64, 72, 75, 81, 84–88, 93, 99–100, 102, 104–107, 121–136, 141, 143–144, 218
 Shaumian, Stepan 114, 117
 Shnirelman, Viktor 3–5, 9, 120, 174–175, 210–214
 von Sickingen, Franz 58
 Siebiecki, Jan 50
 Sielicki, Aleksander 160, 189
 Sigismund the Old (king) 16
 Sikirycki, Igor 177
 Skorski, Jan 35
 Snyder, Timothy 5
 Sołłogub (junker) 135
 Sowa, Jan 17–19, 21, 26, 107
 Stachowicz, Michał 47
 Stalin, Joseph 24, 105, 115, 196–197, 205, 210, 212
 Stawiarski, Ignacy 20
 Strabo (geographer) 33, 35ⁿ, 39ⁿ
 Strumpf, Edward 166, 177
 Struys, Jan 50
 Strzelnicki, Władysław 68, 73–74, 176
 Stuart, Dudley 85
 Suleiman-Efendi (naib) 88
 Sulewski, Wojciech 58, 140
 Surowiecki, Wawrzyniec 37
 Surzycki, Julian 47, 64, 159
 Szafarzyk, Paweł 45
 Szukalski, Jerzy 207
 Świętochowski, Tadeusz 31

 Tabagua, Ilia 108, 110, 114
 Taczanowski, Władysław 180
 Taitbout de Marigny, Edouard 144
 Targalski, Jerzy 202–204
 Tazbir, Janusz 16–22, 25
 Thomas, William 208
 Thompson, Ewa 31–32
 Tishkov, Valery 25
 Tolstoy, Leo 77
 Topolski, Jerzy 5, 7–8, 10–11, 25, 174
 Torczyński, Nuridin 118
 Tornau, Fyodor 147
 von Tottleben, Gottlob 108–109
 Traugutt, Romuald 156, 219
 Treacy, Christopher 16
 Trentowski, Bronisław 19
 Trzaskowski, Adam 153, 186
 Tsitsianov, Pavel 103, 178
 Tsutsiyev, Aslan 209
 Tumanov (Tumanishvili), Mikhail 181
 Tusk, Donald 196

 Uzun Hasan 51
 Urquhart, David 79–83, 146–147

 Vandalus (legendary figure) 34
 Vasili III (grand prince) 17
 Vorontsov, Mikhail 70, 86, 155, 192

 Wallerstein, Immanuel 13, 26
 Wanda (princess) 33
 Waśko, Andrzej 37–38
 White, Hayden 9
 Widerszal, Ludwik 30, 48, 58, 80–81, 83–85, 95, 101, 136, 145, 173, 185, 187, 193
 Widukind (chronicler) 43
 Wiczorkiewicz, Paweł 197–198
 Wiczorkowski, Michał 51
 Wilk, Władysław. *See* Kuleba, Mirosław
 William of Rubruck (explorer) 171
 Władysław IV (king) 17, 50
 Władysław the Short (king) 16, 26
 Wojakowski, Franciszek 152
 Wolf, Nikolai 137
 Wolski, Zygmunt 155
 Wybicki, Józef 90
 Wyganowski, Zygmunt 162

- Yermolov, Aleksey 65, 78
 Yevdokimov, Nikolai 97, 151
- Zach, Konstanty 176
 Zagórski, Jerzy 177
 Zakrzewska-Dubasowa, Mirosława 31
 Zaleski, Konstanty 218
 Załęski, Jan 72
 Zamoyski, Władysław 80, 82, 87, 90–93,
 96–97, 100–101
 Zaneqo, Karabatyr 95
 Zaneqo, Seferbiy 89, 92–93, 95, 99
- Zass, Grigory 72
 Zawadowski, Mikołaj 154
 Zápolya, Barbara 16
 Zglenicki, Witold 179, 192
 Zięba, Ryszard 22
 Zubov, Valery 173, 178
 Zyazikov, Irdis 214
 Zwierkowski, Ludwik 83, 85–86, 88, 100,
 142
 Zwierz, Czesław 58
 Żurawski vel Grajewski, Radosław 136
 Żywow, Mark 181

Index of Geographical Places and Ethnic Groups

- Abazins 88, 94, 212
Abkhazia 110, 113, 153–154, 171, 197, 205
Abkhazians 110
Absheron Peninsula 179
Abzakhs 85
Adampol (Polonezköy) 146
Adjara 109
Adygea 204, 209
Adyghes 39–40, 44–45, 72*n*, 85, 92, 118, 132, 145, 154, 171, 188–189, 209–210, 212
Afghanistan 39*n*
Afghans 11, 140
Akhoulgo 76
Akusha 72
Alans 37, 40
Albania (Caucasian) 39*n*
Anapa 85, 138*n*
Anatolia 90, 194, 199
Andrusovo 18
Antes 52
Aq Qoyunlu 52
Arabia 140
Arabian Peninsula 81
Arabs 35, 75, 81, 110, 140, 178
Armenia 15, 31, 52, 114–116, 173, 181, 205, 208
Armenian SSR. *See* Armenia
Armenians 15, 40, 49–50, 77, 84, 89, 114, 158–159, 168, 184, 198–202, 204
Aryans 39
Asia 21, 38–39, 52, 72, 79, 98, 112–113, 147
Astrakhan 84, 98
Austria 40, 62, 96
Austro-Hungarian Empire 63–64, 91
Avars 39–41, 44, 206
Azerbaijan 14, 15*n*, 16, 51–52, 114–117, 149, 165, 179, 182–183, 202–205, 208, 218
Azerbaijani SSR. *See* Azerbaijan
Azerbaijanis 15, 117, 198, 202, 206

Babylonia 34
Baku 66, 103, 114, 158, 162, 182, 192, 199–202, 208
Balkaria 212
Balkars 118, 212
Baltic Sea 41–42

Batsbi 13–14
Batumi 90, 98, 117, 162
Bavaria 40
Belarusians 22, 184
Berlin 11, 155*n*
Black Sea 34, 39, 47, 59, 82–83, 87, 94, 97, 99, 137*n*, 154
Bosnia 11, 96
British 59, 83, 91, 95–96, 102, 146
Bug (river) 19, 26, 41, 188

Carpathians (mountains) 41–42
Caspian Sea 39–40, 44, 171
Cercetae 39
Champagne 21
Chechen-Ingush ASSR 203, 205
Chechens 1, 2, 12, 24, 29, 54–58, 61, 63, 71, 74–76, 84–85, 100, 118, 123, 126, 129, 154, 174, 197, 206–207, 209–210
Chechnya 11–12, 24–25, 54, 65, 67, 73, 75–76, 97, 99–100, 118, 122, 129–130, 132, 135, 173, 197, 203, 205, 213–214
Cherkess. *See* Circassians
Cherkessia 212
Chirkey 72
Chokh 47, 141
Circassia 59, 79–83, 88, 94–97, 146, 171
Circassians 36, 40, 44–45, 59, 61–62, 80*n*, 81–83, 84–90, 92–101, 136, 141–142, 144–147, 153, 156, 204, 212
Colchis 34–35
Colchs 45
Cossacks 21, 84, 87, 90–91, 100, 118, 133, 136*n*, 152, 154, 188–189, 210, 213–214
Crimea 204
Czech Republic 10
Czechoslovakia 197
Czechs 11, 34–35, 42–45, 47, 158

Dagestan 20, 32, 35, 39*n*, 40*n*, 47, 51, 60, 65, 67, 74*n*, 75, 88, 99–100, 102, 114, 115, 127*n*, 132, 135, 150, 153, 155–156, 159*n*, 172, 184, 186, 194, 206–208, 210–213
Dagestan ASSR. *See* Dagestan
Dagestan Oblast. *See* Dagestan

- Dagestanis 32, 62, 84, 109, 154, 204, 206
 Danube (river) 34, 40, 67, 91, 96, 98
 Dargins 40, 206
 Dargo 72, 131
 Derbent 49, 66, 102–103
 Deshlagar (Sergokala) 159
 Dido. *See* Tsez people
 Digors 209
 Dnieper (river) 19, 38, 40, 84, 130
 Don (river) 36, 38, 40, 42, 84
 Dzhubga 85
- Egypt 88
 Elbrus (mountain) 67
 England 21, 83, 87, 101, 114, 146, 198
 English 82, 101–102, 105, 114
 Europe 2, 13, 16–22, 25–26, 34, 36–40,
 42–43, 53–54, 57–60, 67, 72, 75, 79–82,
 84–85, 90, 92, 94, 101, 106, 108, 119, 140,
 143, 158, 171, 174, 178, 197–198, 211, 217
 European Union 1, 14, 23
- Far North 32
 Finns 20
 France 21, 54, 56*n*, 83, 92, 96, 98, 101, 114,
 140, 171, 198
 French 92, 101, 158, 197
- Galicia 63, 91, 96
 Ganja 15*n*, 49, 103, 202
 Georgia 8, 13, 24–25, 44, 54, 64, 66, 73, 84,
 91, 108–109, 113–116, 119, 161, 165, 168,
 172, 181, 185–186, 203–205, 208, 218
 Georgians 14, 35, 40, 45, 49, 54, 56, 84, 110,
 117, 158, 165, 208–209
 Gergebil 72
 Germany 10, 22–24, 40, 104, 114, 171, 196–197
 Germans 11, 16, 22, 36–37, 40, 114, 116, 158,
 197
 Geto-Dacians 37
 Giewont 67
 Gliwice 197
 Gniezno 41
 Goths 36
 Great Britain 79–84, 95–96, 101
 Greece 10, 34, 42
 Greeks 39
 Grochów 20
 Grozny 118, 134–135, 213
- Groznaya. *See* Grozny
 Gunib 48, 93, 218
- Halych 26
 Hungarians 11, 93
 Hungary 44
 Huns 36, 40–41
- India 39*n*, 87, 140
 Indo-European people 39*n*
 Ingush 32, 118, 202–203, 206–207, 210,
 213–214
 Ingushetia 203, 213–214
 Iran 39*n*, 52, 139
 Irons 209
 Ishkarty 154
 Istanbul 48, 79, 81–83, 85–87, 89–93, 95–98,
 100, 131, 136, 140, 146, 155
 Italy 52, 93, 140, 197
- Javakheti 204
 Jews 22, 90, 157, 197
- Kabarda 60, 152, 174, 211–212
 Kabardian AO. *See* Kabarda
 Kabardian District. *See* Kabarda
 Kabardians 210, 212
 Kabardino-Balkaria 204, 209, 212
 Kabardino-Balkarian AO. *See*
 Kabardino-Balkaria
 Karachay 212
 Karachay AO. *See* Karachay
 Karachay-Cherkess AO. *See*
 Karachay-Cherkessia
 Karachay-Cherkessia 205, 209, 212
 Karachays 118, 212
 Karabakh 103
 Karelia 171
 Kars (city) 90–91, 192
 Kars (river) 40
 Kars (oblast) 166, 184
 Kartli 51, 109
 Kartvelian people 49, 209
 Katyn 24
 Kazakhstan 203
 Kazan 84
 Khoy 139–140
 Kielce 157, 167
 Kizlar 66

- Kraków 16, 41, 50–52, 64, 97, 139, 152
 Krasnodar 160
 Kreva 26
 Kuba 66
 Kuban (region) 84, 160
 Kuban (river) 40, 146, 154, 174, 188
 Kuban-Black Sea District 212
 Kujawy 48
 Kumukh 47, 74
 Kumyk District 152
 Kurds 200, 208

 Lachs. *See* Lechites
 Laks 39*n*, 206
 Laz people 35, 39–41, 43–45, 47, 49
 Lazica 44
 Lech (river) 40
 Lechs. *See* Lechites
 Lechites 34, 39–42, 44, 47–48, 116
 Legae 39
 Legnica 21
 Lendians 48
 Lezgins 39*n*, 40, 44–45, 47, 70, 73, 75, 85, 204, 206–207
 Lithuania 17, 51, 108, 111, 152, 161
 Lithuanians 124, 184, 190, 193
 London 21, 80, 83, 92, 96, 102, 108
 Lorraine 21
 Lviv 50, 63, 95, 139

 Marseilles 92
 Medes 39
 Media 37
 Mediterranean Sea 42
 Middle East 52, 146
 Moldavia 91, 191
 Mongols 20, 40, 50, 110
 Moscow 17, 55, 61–62, 84, 88, 158, 178, 185, 200, 202, 214
 Mountain Autonomous SSR. *See* Dagestan
 Mountainous Republic. *See* Dagestan
 Mozdok 203
 Muscovy 16–17, 22
 Muscovites 21, 168

 Nagorno-Karabakh 15, 198, 205, 208
 Nakh people 13
 Nakh-Dagestani peoples 206
 Near East 178

 Nogais 207, 211
 Novaya Zemlya 32
 Nukha 66, 70

 Odesa 96
 Odra (river) 41
 Ossetia 49, 86, 197, 203, 205, 213–214
 Ossetians 40, 49, 174, 202–203, 213
 Ottoman Empire. *See* Turkey

 Pannonia 34, 36, 40–41
 Paris 21, 54, 56*n*, 58–59, 81, 87, 89, 92–93, 153, 165, 171, 173
 Persia 50–51, 75, 80, 87–88, 103, 139–140, 158, 172–173, 178, 193–194
 Persians 40, 49, 109–110, 158, 168
 Phasis (river). *See* Rioni
 Polans 42
 Prussia 19, 64, 175, 218
 Prussians 175
 Pyatigorsk 78, 118, 154, 159

 Qbaada 97

 Rarańcza 12
 Rasht 179
 Razdolnoye 160
 Rioni (river) 39
 Ruthenia 19, 20, 111
 Ruthenians 16, 26, 44, 130, 142, 193
 Rogačevo 32
 Rome 17, 34, 42, 74

 Salmas 139
 Santo Domingo 140
 Sarmatia 34
 Sarmatians 33–37, 43, 45, 47, 186
 Saxony 63
 Scandinavia 38, 43
 Scandinavians 20, 39
 Scythians 36, 42
 Shamakhi 50–51
 Shapsugs 85, 93–94, 97, 146, 154
 Shinar 34
 Shirvan 50, 103, 172
 Siberia 57, 112, 135, 191
 Slavs 20, 25–26, 33–45, 47–48, 160, 167, 173
 Smolensk 17–18, 178
 Sochi 29, 97*n*, 160

- Somosierra 12
 Soviet Union 104-105, 107, 121, 207
 St. Petersburg 78, 108, 156, 178, 200
 Stavropol 185
 Strasbourg 92
 Sublime Porte. *See* Turkey
 Sukhumi, Sukhum-Kale 88-89
 Sumgait 202
 Switzerland 63

 Talysh 202
 Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic 202
 Tatars 2, 22, 40, 44, 90, 98, 141, 176
 Tbilisi (Tiflis) 59, 116, 118-119, 135, 158, 162,
 166, 188, 200
 Tehran 140, 179
 Teletl 77
 Temnolesskaya 160
 Terek (river) 48
 Terek Oblast 194
 Terek Soviet Republic 116
 Teutons 36
 Thames 21
 Tilitli. *See* Teletl
 Tsez people 40
 Turkey 16-19, 39, 50-52, 75, 79-80, 82, 84,
 87, 89-99, 100, 105, 108-110, 112, 114, 142,
 145-146, 158, 194, 199
 Turkmen peoples 52, 109
 Turkic peoples 40, 44, 201, 208, 212
 Turks 17-18, 22, 40, 85, 89, 91, 98-100, 102,
 109-111, 114, 146, 218

 Ubykhs 86, 88-89, 94, 97, 147
 Ukraine 36, 52, 84, 91, 156, 204, 209
 Ukrainian People's Republic. *See* Ukraine
 Ukrainian SSR. *See* Ukraine
 Ukrainians 22, 130, 141, 209
 United Kingdom 10
 United States 10, 21, 32, 57-58, 114, 196

 Vandals 33-34
 Vandalus (river). *See* Vistula
 Varna 21
 Vedeno 75, 125, 129, 131, 133
 Vienna 20, 91, 94
 Vilnius 112, 152, 191
 Vistula 33, 36, 41, 62, 185
 Vladikavkaz 116, 151*n*, 203, 210, 213-214
 Volga (river) 38, 42, 84, 98
 Volhynia 86, 152, 185, 192
 Voronezh 84, 193

 Wallachia 191
 Wallachians 16
 Warsaw 31, 51, 61, 63, 76, 137*n*, 167-168, 180
 Westerplatte 12

 Zagros Mountains 39*n*
 Zaqatala district 205, 207-208
 Zygians 35*n*, 40, 42, 44-45

Does the fact that we dislike someone influence our perception of the world? If Poles consider Russians as “historical” enemies, does this affect how they interpret the present and the past? Przemysław Adamczewski argues this is indeed the case. In his book, the author illustrates this through the example of the Caucasus, primarily in the context of the nineteenth century, when the modern Polish nation was being formed. How did the Polish independence emigration view the independence struggles of the Caucasian peoples? And how do contemporary Polish researchers and publicists approach the issue? Where does Russia fit into all of this? The author seeks to answer these and many other questions in his account about an imagined Polish-Caucasian comradeship.

Przemysław Adamczewski is a professor at the *Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences*. He obtained his Ph.D. in 2010 at the *Adam Mickiewicz University* in Poznań. He specializes in Caucasian studies, primarily Polish-Caucasian relations.



IRAN AND THE CAUCASUS MONOGRAPHS, 6

ISSN 2950-2349
brill.com/icm