

SUFFERING IN THE MU‘TAZILITE THEOLOGY

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE

Texts and Studies

EDITED BY

H. DAIBER and D. PINGREE

VOLUME XLI



SUFFERING IN THE MU‘TAZILITE THEOLOGY

‘Abd al-Ĵabbār’s Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice

BY

MARGARETHA T. HEEMSKERK



BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON · KÖLN
2000

This book is printed on acid-free paper

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Heemskerk, Margaretha T.

Suffering in the Mu'tazilite theology : 'Abd al-Jabbār's teaching on pain and divine justice / by Margaretha T. Heemskerk.

p. cm. — (Islamic philosophy, theology and science, ISSN 0169-8729 ; v. 41)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 9004117261 (cloth : alk. paper)

1. 'Abd al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad al-Asadābādī, d. 1025. 2. Mu'tazilites—Doctrines. I. Title. II. Series.

BP195.M6 H44 2000

297.2'118—dc21

00-021536

CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Heemskerk, Margaretha T.:

Suffering in the Mu'tazilite theology : 'Abd al-Jabbār's teaching on pain and divine justice / by Margaretha T. Heemskerk. - Leiden ; Boston ; Köln : Brill, 2000 (Islamic philosophy, theology and science ; Vol. 41)

ISBN 90-04-11726-1

ISSN 0169-8729

ISBN 90 04 11726 1

© Copyright 2000 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

Preface	ix
Introduction	1
1. The Problem of Pain and Suffering	1
2. Three Mu'tazilite Texts	2
3. The Place of the Subject of Pain in the Three Texts	9
 Chapter One: The Bahshamiyya	 13
1. The Chain of Transmission of Mu'tazilism	14
2. The Bahshamiyya/Ikhshīdiyya Conflict	21
3. The Leadership of the Bahshamiyya after the Death of Abū Hāshim	 29
3.1. Ibn Khallād	30
3.2. Abū Ishāq b. 'Ayyāsh	32
3.3. Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī	32
4. 'Abd al-Jabbār	36
4.1. 'Abd al-Jabbār's Youth	37
4.2. 'Abd al-Jabbār in Baghdād and Rāmhumuz	38
4.3. 'Abd al-Jabbār Chief Judge of Rayy	41
4.4. The End of the Judgeship	48
4.5. 'Abd al-Jabbār's Death	52
5. Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī	53
6. Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his School	57
7. Mānkdim Shashdīw	60
8. Ibn Mattawayh	62
9. The Mu'tazila from the Fifth/Eleventh to the Eighth/ Fourteenth Century	 67
10. Conclusion	70
 Chapter Two: The Ontology and Perception of Pain	 72
1. The Existence of Pain	72
2. How Pain is Perceived	81
3. Pain and Pleasure	82
 Chapter Three: How Pain Comes into Existence	 89
1. <i>Ṣiḥḥa</i> and <i>Wahā</i>	91

2.	How Pain is Generated	94
3.	The Problem of the Two Needle-Pricks	98
4.	The Duration of Pain	102
5.	The End of Pain	106
6.	Pain Brought into Existence by God	106
7.	The Problem of the Scorpion Sting	107
8.	Can Pain Exist in Inanimate Objects?	108
Chapter Four: Judgments on Inflicting Pain		112
1.	The Analogy Between Divine and Human Acts	112
2.	Terms Used in Reference to Good and Bad	113
3.	The Grounds on Which Acts are Good or Bad	116
4.	How to Know Whether a Particular Act is Good or Bad	119
5.	How to Know Whether a Particular Act of Inflicting Pain is Good or Bad	122
6.	Good Infliction of Pain	126
6.1.	Inflicting Pain that Involves a Profit	127
6.2.	Inflicting Pain in Order to Avert another Harm	129
6.3.	Inflicting Deserved Pain	131
6.4.	Inflicting Pain that is Supposed to be Good	134
7.	Judgments on Some Particular Cases of Inflicting Pain	137
7.1.	Saving Someone and Harming Him	137
7.2.	Inflicting Pain on Someone in Self-Defence	139
7.3.	Pain Inflicted by Children and Animals	140
Chapter Five: Compensation of Pain		142
1.	<i>Taktīf</i> and <i>Lutf</i>	142
1.1.	Definitions of <i>Taktīf</i>	143
1.2.	The Purpose of God's <i>Taktīf</i>	145
1.3.	The <i>Mukallaf</i>	146
1.4.	<i>Lutf</i>	148
2.	Why God Imposes Pain	151
2.1.	Illnesses	151
2.2.	<i>Hadd</i> Punishment	154
2.3.	Children's Illnesses	155
3.	The Compensation of Different Sorts of Pain	157
3.1.	Compensation for Pain Imposed by God	157
3.2.	Compensation for Pain Inflicted by Humans	161

3.3. Compensation for Pain Inflicted by Children, Insane People and Animals	163
3.4. Compensation for Pain Inflicted by God's Com- mand or Permission.	166
3.5. Compensation for Self-Inflicted Pain	169
3.6. Compensation for Pain Inflicted by Exposing Someone Else to Harm.	171
3.7. Compensation for Sorrow.	172
4. The Administration of Compensation	176
5. The Provision of the Compensation	180
5.1. The Compensation of People in Paradise	182
5.2. The Compensation of People in Hell	186
5.3. The Compensation of Animals	187
5.4. The Compensation of Children	189
6. Conclusion.	190
References	193
Index.	207

PREFACE

This book is a revision of my dissertation *Pain and Compensation in Mu'tazilite Doctrine: 'Abd al-Ġabbār's Teaching and Its Adoption by Mānkḏīm and Ibn Mattawayh*, which I presented in 1995 at the University of Nijmegen for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy under the supervision of Prof. Jan Peters and Prof. Kees Versteegh. I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors for their helpful advices and their encouragement. I am also grateful to the late Prof. Marie Bernard who used to read the drafts of my dissertation up to her sudden death in 1993. I deeply regret missing her valuable remarks and advice. Prof. Richard Martin also read the drafts. I wish to thank him for his useful comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank Prof. Hans Daiber, Prof. Josef Van Ess, Prof. Richard M. Frank, Prof. Daniel Gimaret and Prof. Wilferd Madelung for commenting on the original dissertation. I have gratefully made use of their remarks and observations.

INTRODUCTION

1. *The Problem of Pain and Suffering*

Many questions may arise for a person who reflects on the phenomenon of pain. If he directs his attention to what happens in his body at the moment that he feels pain, he may wonder how it is that he has this kind of experience. Why does it hurt when he is hit and why does one injury hurt more than another? And how is it that some sorts of pain, such as headaches, occur without any visible injury? How does the pain stop?

The above questions relate to the suffering of pain, but how does one account for the infliction of pain? As pain in general is considered to be a disagreeable sensation that should be avoided, it seems obvious that it is morally bad to inflict pain on someone else, but does this apply to every infliction of pain? Are there circumstances in which it is good to inflict pain? For instance, is it good to inflict pain on someone else in order to obtain a profit for him or to avert a harm to him? Should he give his consent first?

A religious person may wonder why pain exists at all in our world. If he considers this world as created by God, who is good and omnipotent, he may suppose that God could have created a world in which nobody suffers. But our world is not like that. People suffer pain as a result of illness and disaster. Are these imposed by God? If so, for what reason does He subject His creatures to them? Are they meant as a punishment for sin? Why, then, are children and animals also made to suffer? Can they have sinned so that they deserve to be punished?

Religion has always tried to find an answer to the problem of pain and suffering in this world¹. In Islamic theology the problem of suffering is usually discussed as part of the larger problem of God's omnipotence and human free will. Adherents of the view that God has absolute omnipotence hold that God is the only true agent in

¹ Of the works on this subject, I mention only Hebblethwaite (1976), who gives a short introduction to views about evil and suffering in the world's religions, and Hick (1985ⁿ) who describes the development of Christian thought on this problem. A good treatment comparing Islamic and Western theodicy is Ormsby (1984).

this world. This implies that not only God's own acts but also all human acts are created by God. However, this theory raises a problem: how are we to interpret the evil done by humans? If God creates the human acts, does this imply that He also creates the evil they do? Does this mean that God creates bad actions?

The Mu'tazilite thinkers strongly objected to the idea that God creates human acts. They emphasized that God does no evil at all. In their opinion, all evil in the world is caused by human agency. In support of this view, they defended the notion of human freedom of choice. They maintained that the evil done by humans is not God's will, but is chosen by these humans by their own will because God has given them freedom of choice, which implies that they can choose between doing an evil act and not doing it.

The Mu'tazilites referred to the principle that God only performs good actions as the principle of Justice (*'adl*). However, the principle that God does no evil at all raises the question of how to account for illness and disaster which are thought to have been created by God. Because of their adherence to the principle of Justice, the Mu'tazilites defended the opinion that illnesses and disasters created by God are good, although at first sight they seem to be bad as they involve pain and suffering². As the problem of the existence of pain and suffering in this world is closely related to the question of the Justice of God, the subject of pain is given considerable attention in the three Mu'tazilite texts *al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawhīd wa-'l-'adl*, [*Tā'liq*] *sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* and *al-Majmū' fī 'l-muḥīṭ bi-'l-taklīf*.

2. Three Mu'tazilite texts

At the end of 1951 an Egyptian scientific expedition was sent to Yemen to explore libraries there in order to find unknown manu-

² For the opinions of Muslim thinkers on questions of pain and suffering see Watt (1979), who discusses the Sunni opinions about suffering and the place of suffering in Ṣūfism, and Pessagno (1984), who describes al-Māturīdī's opinion. For specifically Mu'tazilite opinions on this subject see Nader (1956, 83-86), Watt (1973, 238-242), Gimaret (1974, 1975 and 1980, 341-360), Daiber (1975, 253-281) (on Mu'ammār b. 'Abbād al-Sulamī), Hourani (1971, 97-102) (on 'Abd al-Jabbār) and Peters (1976, 269-271) (on 'Abd al-Jabbār). Vajda (1985, 333-386) describes the opinions held by the Karaite Yūsuf al-Baṣīr and 'Abd al-Jabbār. On the related question of the best of all possible worlds (*al-aṣlah*) see Brunschvig (1974a, 5-23), who describes the Mu'tazilite view, and Ormsby (1984), who discusses al-Ghazālī's view.

scripts written by Mu'tazilite authors. A number of manuscripts were found and photographed on the spot. The photographs were taken to Cairo, where they are now kept in the National Library (Dār al-kutub). Among the manuscripts that were photographed in Yemen was a large manuscript that contained volumes IV-VIII, part of volume IX, volumes XI-XIV, XVI and XX of a work that was called *al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawhīd wa-'l-'adl*, or *al-Mughnī*³ for short. It appeared to be a systematically built-up explanation of the Mu'tazilite doctrine by the Mu'tazilite theologian 'Abd al-Jabbār⁴ (d. about 415/1024). From what 'Abd al-Jabbār says at the end of volume XX it becomes clear that with this volume the work is complete (*Mughnī* XX/2, 257: 18-19). It is to be regretted that the large Yemen manuscript does not contain the whole work, but fortunately volume XV and a part of volume XVII, which are missing in this manuscript, have been found in two smaller manuscripts⁵. The text of all the volumes that were available was published by several editors in Cairo in the years 1380-1389/1960-1969.

Another Mu'tazilite work that was photographed by the expedition in Yemen is [*Tā'liq*] *sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*. The work was already known, as some collections of Arabic manuscripts contain copies of it⁶. However, the text of this work had not yet been edited. It was only edited in 1965 in Cairo by 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uthmān, after the Yemen expedition. He used two manuscripts for his edition: the Istanbul manuscript⁷ and the Yemen manuscript, the photocopy of which is kept in the National Library in Cairo⁸. 'Uthmān attributed

³ See Anawati (1957, 281-284). The titles *al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawhīd wa-'l-'adl* and *al-Mughnī* were used both as can be concluded from the fact that both titles are written in the manuscripts. See also el-Khodeiri (1958, 417).

⁴ For the biography of 'Abd al-Jabbār, see below, 36-53. For more details on the *Mughnī*, see below, 8-10 and 44-45.

⁵ See el-Khodeiri (1958, 417-418). Until now, no manuscripts of volumes I, II, III, X, XVIII and XIX and the missing parts of volumes IX and XVII of the *Mughnī* have been found. Ben-Shammai (1974, 302-303) believes that a missing part of the volumes IX and X exists in the Firkovich collection in Leningrad. Monnot (1974, 25-27) mentions a fourth manuscript of the *Mughnī* that is an original manuscript belonging to the collection of Dār al-kutub in Cairo. However, he found that it does not contain any volumes besides some of those already found in the other three manuscripts.

⁶ Gimaret (1979, 48-49) mentions seventeen manuscripts that are found in collections in Ankara, Berlin, Istanbul, Milan, Munich, Şan'ā', Rome and Vienna.

⁷ Collection of Ahmet III 1872 (*Tā'liq*, 28-29).

⁸ Collection of Maktabat al-Jāmi' al-kabīr, kalām 190 (undated); Dār al-kutub photocopy B 277799 (*Tā'liq*, 29-30). See also Gimaret (1979, 49).

the work to ‘Abd al-Jabbār. He thought that ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s disciple Mānkḏīm, whose name is also mentioned on the title page, wrote it down from ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s dictation (*Tā’līq*, 27: 16-28: 3). However, when studying the text, some scholars became aware that Mānkḏīm’s contribution to the work must have been more than only writing it down. They therefore started to refer to *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* as a commentary or paraphrase made by Mānkḏīm, although they did not give arguments for this⁹.

It was Gimaret¹⁰ who convincingly argued that the text edited by ‘Uthmān was not a work by ‘Abd al-Jabbār himself but rather a critical paraphrase of a work by him. Gimaret pointed out that a first indication for this is to be found on the title page of the Istanbul manuscript that ‘Uthmān used as the basis of his edition. It reads: *Kūṭab Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa li-Qāḏī ‘l-quḏāt ‘Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī al-Asad‘abādī al-mutawaffā sanat 415 hijriyya ‘ullīqa ‘an al-sayyid al-imām Qawām al-ḏīn Mānkḏīm* etc. (*Tā’līq*, 37). Gimaret concluded that “‘ullīqa ‘an ... Mānkḏīm” means that the work was “received” from Mānkḏīm, in the sense that it contains the reports of lectures¹¹ given by Mānkḏīm on a work by ‘Abd al-Jabbār entitled *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*¹². This means that the title of the text edited by ‘Uthmān should be: *Tā’līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*¹³.

⁹ Madelung (1965, 182-183 and 256) referred to the work as Mānkḏīm’s “Kommentar (*Tā’līq*) zu Qāḏī ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s Erläuterung der fünf Grundlehren” and Vajda (1985, 303) pointed out that the text that was known as ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* did not reproduce ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s teachings literally.

¹⁰ Gimaret (1979, 47-57).

¹¹ See Gimaret (1979, 51-52). This implies that Mānkḏīm is to be considered as the author of the work. His authorship is confirmed by another manuscript that says “*ta’līf*” instead of “‘ullīqa ‘an”. (See note 13). That the verb ‘*allaqa* ‘an means “he wrote down what is taught”, is confirmed by Makdisi (1981, 114), who says about this term in relation to the study of law: “The verb ‘*allaqa*, with the prepositions ‘*alā* or ‘*an*, was said of a student who took notes of the lecture of his master-jurisconsult.”

¹² ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* has not been preserved. On this work, see below, 45-46.

¹³ Application of this title is debatable because it is found on the title page of another manuscript of the work, manuscript no. 194 of the list of manuscripts that were filmed during the 1974 expedition to Ṣan‘ā’ (*Makhtūṭāt*, 1976, 31). This list also contains two other manuscripts of this work: nos 94 and 237. They are entitled: *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa, li-‘l-Qāḏī ‘Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad*, but instead of the formula “‘ullīqa ‘an”, they say: “*ta’līf Qawām al-ḏīn Mānkḏīm Aḥmad b. Husayn al-mā’rūf bi-Shashḏūw*.” As for manuscript no. 95, which is mentioned as another manuscript of Mānkḏīm’s paraphrase, Gimaret (1979, 49, note 1) has found that it is not *Tā’līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, but a different work.

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s time, and probably in Mānkdīm’s time as well, professors used to dictate their works to their students, so that these students wrote down complete books from dictation. But, in addition to this, a professor could give lectures for which he made lecture notes, or he could teach with the help of one of his own works or the work of another master. The students took notes of these lectures. This is what the verb *‘allaqa* ‘an refers to. The record of the notes made by a student was called *ta’līq* or *ta’līqa*¹⁴. A student could use a *ta’līq* as a book. The difference between a commentary and a *ta’līq* was probably that a commentary was dictated word by word, whereas a *ta’līq* contains notes of a lecture that was given at the normal rate of speech. It is likely that Mānkdīm gave lectures about ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, explaining it and commenting on it. A student made notes of Mānkdīm’s words and the result was *Ta’līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*.

Among the manuscripts photographed in Yemen by the expedition is another work that was also attributed to ‘Abd al-Jabbār at first, but which later also turned out to be a critical paraphrase of one of his works. The name of this critical paraphrase is *al-Majmū‘ fi ‘l-muḥīt bi-‘l-taklīf*¹⁵ and it consists of four volumes. The text of

¹⁴ The term *ta’līqa* was also used to designate the professor’s own lecture notes, his own syllabus for the course he taught. According to Makdisi (1981, 118-127), works of the *ta’līqa* type were used as textbooks for the study of law from the second half of the third/ninth century. The *ta’līqa* was first developed by Shāfi‘ī and Ḥanafī jurisconsults, and was adopted at a later date by the Ḥanbalīs and Mālikīs and in other disciplines such as grammar, *kalām*, and medicine. Makdisi (1981, 125-126) deems it likely that in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s time Mu‘tazilites made use of such *ta’līqāt* for their study of the Mu‘tazilite system.

¹⁵ The manuscript of the *Majmū‘* that was photographed by the Yemen expedition, the photocopies of which are kept in the Dār al-kutub in Cairo, is the only complete text that is known to exist. Manuscripts of only the first volume exist in the collection of Depot der ehemaligen Preussischen Staatsbibliothek in der Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen, in the collection of the Fondation “Caetani” in the library of the Academy of Lincei in Rome and in the collection of Taymūr Bāshā in the Dār al-kutub in Cairo (*Majmū‘* I, 8). The Yemen manuscript and the manuscripts belonging to the collections in Tübingen and Cairo were used by Houben for his edition of volume I that he mistook for *al-Muḥīt bi-‘l-taklīf* by ‘Abd al-Jabbār. It was published in Beirut in 1965. Volume I was also edited that year in Cairo by ‘Azmī, who likewise mistook it for ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *al-Muḥīt bi-‘l-taklīf*. For the edition of volume II Houben made use of two manuscripts: the Yemen manuscript and a manuscript found in the National Library in Vienna (*Majmū‘* II, 17). Houben died before the text could be published. After his death, the first draft of the text was revised and corrected by Gimaret. It was published in Beirut in 1981. Volume III, edited by Peters, was published in Beirut in 1999. Daiber (1975, 509-510, note 2) has pointed out

volume I was edited by Houben and, separately, by ‘Azmī in Cairo, both in 1965. Both editors attributed the work to ‘Abd al-Jabbār¹⁶. Later, Gimaret¹⁷ produced evidence that *al-Majmū‘ fī ‘l-muḥīṭ bi-‘l-taklīf* is a paraphrase written by Ibn Mattawayh, another disciple of ‘Abd al-Jabbār of a work by ‘Abd al-Jabbār entitled *al-Muḥīṭ bi-‘l-taklīf*. The following words appear on the title-page of the manuscript that is the basis of the Houben edition: *al-Majmū‘ fī ‘l-muḥīṭ bi-‘l-taklīf li-Qāḍī ‘l-quḍāt Abī ‘l-Ḥasan ‘Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad wa-huwa min jam‘ al-shaykh al-inām Abī Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. Mattawayh*. Gimaret has made it clear that the expression *min jam‘* does not mean “written down from dictation by...”, as Houben assumed, but rather “composed by...”¹⁸. Another argument put forward by Gimaret to defend

that in Ṣan‘ā two other manuscripts of parts of *al-Majmū‘ fī ‘l-muḥīṭ bi-‘l-taklīf* exist which were not photographed by the Egyptian expedition to Yemen in 1952 and are not mentioned in the list of the manuscripts photographed by this expedition. I found that these two manuscripts are neither mentioned in the list of manuscripts that were photographed by the Egyptian expedition to Yemen in 1974 (*Makhtūṭāt*, 1976).

¹⁶ When Houben edited the first volume of *al-Majmū‘ fī ‘l-muḥīṭ bi-‘l-taklīf* he assumed that it was a version of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Kitāb al-Muḥīṭ* made by one of his students (*Majmū‘* I, 8). However, he noticed the difference in style between the *Mughnī* and *al-Majmū‘ fī ‘l-muḥīṭ bi-‘l-taklīf*. He found that the latter was less complete than the former and that it showed a greater freedom and independence. However, he did not draw the conclusion that it was a commentary made by Ibn Mattawayh. He thought that Ibn Mattawayh had merely written down ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s dictation and he therefore presented the work as ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s work. On the French title-page of the printed text Ibn Mattawayh’s name is not even mentioned. Nevertheless, as early as 1902, Biram (1902, 6-7) had referred to the *Majmū‘* as the work of Ibn Mattawayh and to the *Muḥīṭ* as the work of ‘Abd al-Jabbār, although without explaining the relation between them. It was Gimaret (1977, 20-31) who presented arguments that *al-Majmū‘ fī ‘l-muḥīṭ bi-‘l-taklīf* is not the original *al-Muḥīṭ bi-‘l-taklīf* by ‘Abd al-Jabbār but a critical paraphrase by Ibn Mattawayh.

¹⁷ Gimaret (1977, 20-31).

¹⁸ The main meaning of the verb *jama‘a*, of which *jam‘* is the verbal noun, is “he collected; brought, or gathered together”, but it can also mean “he composed, arranged, or settled a thing, or an affair” (Lane, 1868/93, 455). That *min jam‘* in the title of *al-Majmū‘ fī ‘l-muḥīṭ bi-‘l-taklīf* means “composed by” had been understood by Luṭf and ‘Awn, the editors of Ibn Mattawayh’s *al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-‘l-‘rād* (*Tadhkira*, 14-15). There are other examples to be found in which *jama‘a* is used in the sense of writing or dictating a book. In his *al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-‘l-‘rād*, Ibn Mattawayh says: “I saw in what Qāḍī ‘l-quḍāt wrote [or dictated] (*jama‘ahū*) in *Ta‘līq al-Baghdādiyyāt ...*” (*Tadhkira*, 86: 17-18). Another example of *jama‘a* in the sense of “he wrote [or dictated]” is to be found in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Faḍl al-‘tizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Mu‘tazila*, where ‘Abd al-Jabbār says about Abū ‘l-Faḍl al-Kashshī that he wrote a good book in which he “brought together” (*jama‘a*) what is not to be seen in other works (*Faḍl* 319: 1-3; see also *Ṭabaqāt*, 101: 8-10).

his opinion that *al-Majmūʿ fī ʿl-muḥīṭ bi-ʿl-taklīf* is a paraphrase is that in the text ‘Abd al-Jabbār is referred to in the third person¹⁹. On the basis of these and other indications in the text, Gimaret²⁰ concluded that *al-Majmūʿ fī ʿl-muḥīṭ bi-ʿl-taklīf* is a paraphrase of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *al-Muḥīṭ bi-ʿl-taklīf*.

Gimaret referred to *Tāʿlīq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* and *al-Majmūʿ fī ʿl-muḥīṭ bi-ʿl-taklīf* as paraphrases because in them Mānkdīm and Ibn Mattawayh describe in their own words what ‘Abd al-Jabbār said in *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* and *al-Muḥīṭ bi-ʿl-taklīf*, respectively. However, *Tāʿlīq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* and *al-Majmūʿ fī ʿl-muḥīṭ bi-ʿl-taklīf* are not mere paraphrases. Gimaret has made this clear by mentioning several passages that show evidence that Mānkdīm and Ibn Mattawayh added their own opinions and critical comments to what ‘Abd al-Jabbār said or left out what they deemed to be superfluous²¹.

Mānkdīm’s and Ibn Mattawayh’s critical approaches to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s teaching should not be seen as a lack of respect for their master. Criticism from disciples was stimulated by the Muʿtazilite masters. This may be a corollary of the great importance the Muʿtazilites attached to independent thinking and reflection (*nazar*) as a way to finding the truth about God and the world. ‘Abd al-Jabbār strongly disapproved of uncritical adherence (*taqlīd*) to the opinion of another person or to the doctrine of a school (*Mukhtaṣar*, 199: 11-200: 3). He certainly also applied this to his own disciples and his fellow Muʿtazilites. He shows this attitude at the end of the *Mughnī*, where he invites his fellow Muʿtazilites to correct the mistakes they may find in it (*Mughnī* XX/2, 257: 12-14). It shows that ‘Abd al-Jabbār was open to correction by his fellow Muʿtazilites. So, when Mānkdīm and Ibn Mattawayh criticize ‘Abd al-Jabbār and correct what they deem to be a wrong opinion, they are only doing what they are expected to do as good Muʿtazilites.

Because of his findings that *Tāʿlīq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* and *al-*

¹⁹ Gimaret (1977, 22) gives some examples from volume II. Other examples, to be found in the volumes II and III, are: “And in other [books] than this book [*al-Muḥīṭ*], Qāḍī ʿl-quḍāt chose ...” (*Wa-qad ikhtāra Qāḍī ʿl-quḍāti fī ghayri hādihā ʿl-kitābi*) (*Majmūʿ* III, 91:20). “But what Qāḍī ʿl-quḍāt says is different: ... what he says in the *Mughnī* is that ..., then he withdrew that and said: ...” (*Wa-innamā khtalāfa kalāmu Qāḍī ʿl-quḍāti ... fa-ʿlladhī qālahū fī ʿl-Mughnī annahū ..., thumma rajāʿa ʿan dhālika wa-qāla ...*) (*Majmūʿ* II, 305: 12-13).

²⁰ Gimaret (1977, 29-31).

²¹ Gimaret (1979, 53-57 and 1977, 24-26).

Majmūʿ fi ʿl-muḥīṭ bi-ʿl-taklīf are critical paraphrases, Gimaret²² advises that these paraphrastic texts should be used with caution and that not all the opinions that are found in them should automatically be attributed to ʿAbd al-Jabbār. In line with Mānkḏīm’s and Ibn Mattawayh’s critical approach to ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s texts, it is to be expected that *Taʿlīq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* and *al-Majmūʿ fi ʿl-muḥīṭ bi-ʿl-taklīf* contain opinions that are their own rather than those of ʿAbd al-Jabbār²³. The conclusion of my dissertation confirms this. The comparison of the subject of pain in the three texts has made clear that in some cases Mānkḏīm and Ibn Mattawayh introduced in their paraphrases opinions that differ from ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s opinions.

The possibility that the *Mughnī* as it is found in the manuscripts is a paraphrase can be eliminated. Firstly, that the text was dictated by ʿAbd al-Jabbār is indicated by the words *imlāʿ al-qāḏī Abī ʿl-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Jabbār* that follow the main title on the title page of each volume. Unlike the paraphrases, no one apart from ʿAbd al-Jabbār himself is mentioned on the title pages as being involved in any way in the production of the work. The person(s) who wrote down the *Mughnī* from dictation is (are) not even mentioned. That this text was dictated by ʿAbd al-Jabbār is confirmed by ʿAbd al-Jabbār himself at the end of the *Mughnī*, where he uses the word dictation (*imlāʿ*), several times in reference to his work on it (*Mughnī* XX/2, 258: 1-

²² Gimaret (1979, 57).

²³ This had already been observed by Vajda. Working on an annotated translation of *al-Kitāb al-muḥṭawī*, written by the Muʿtazila influenced Karaite *mutakallim* Yūsuf al-Baṣīr (first half of the eleventh century), he compared the contents of this work with those of works by ʿAbd al-Jabbār in order to get a better understanding of Yūsuf al-Baṣīr’s thinking. Doing so, Vajda knew that [*Taʿlīq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* and *al-Majmūʿ fi ʿl-muḥīṭ bi-ʿl-taklīf*] were not works by ʿAbd al-Jabbār but rather critical paraphrases, made later, of these works. He pointed out that because [*Taʿlīq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* and *al-Majmūʿ fi ʿl-muḥīṭ bi-ʿl-taklīf*] were made later, they could not have been known to Yūsuf al-Baṣīr when he wrote *al-Kitāb al-muḥṭawī*, which was finished in 411/1021 (see Vajda, 1985, 592), shortly before the death of ʿAbd al-Jabbār in 415/1024. Vajda said: “Notre documentation concernant ʿAbd al-Jabbār comprend, on le sait, des oeuvres qui sont certes issues de son enseignement, mais ne reproduisent pas littéralement celui-ci, et prennent même assez souvent une attitude critique sur des points de détail: il s’agit du *Šarḥ* et du *Maǧmūʿ* au demeurant postérieurs l’un et l’autre à Yūsuf al-Baṣīr. Par conséquent, s’il est indispensable de se référer à ces textes, voire d’y recourir constamment, il importe de ne jamais oublier qu’ils ne peuvent avoir servi, sous la forme où nous les lisons aujourd’hui, de sources au Maître karaïte. A ce point de vue, seul le *Mughnī* peut être actuellement considéré comme renfermant des textes qui nous vent parvenus dans la rédaction que Yūsuf peut avoir eu sous les yeux” (Vajda, 1985, 303).

259: 2). A second indication is the fact that in it, the voice of ‘Abd al-Jabbār is always given in the first person²⁴. Taking these indications into account, it can safely be assumed that the text of the *Mughnī* as it was found in the Ṣan‘ā’ manuscript is not a paraphrase like *Tā’līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* and *al-Majmū‘ fī ‘l-muḥūṭ bi-‘l-taklīf*.

3. The Place of the Subject of Pain in the Three Texts

The edited text of the *Mughnī* consists of the fourteen volumes that have been discovered²⁵. The sequence of subjects in these volumes shows that the *Mughnī* was dictated according to a carefully thought out design, so that the twenty-volume work forms a coherent whole²⁶. The *Mughnī* consists of two main parts: *al-Tawḥīd* (Unity) and *al-‘Adl* (Justice). The names of these parts correspond to the two main Mu‘tazilite principles. The second main part, *al-‘Adl*, starts with volume VI and ends with volume XX. The subject of pain is mainly discussed by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in the second part of volume XIII of the *Mughnī* (*Mughnī* XIII, 226-568), which is named *al-Luṭf* (Divine Assistance)²⁷ because this is the subject that is discussed in this volume²⁸. According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār pain imposed by God is an important *luṭf*²⁹. In addition, particular aspects of pain are consid-

²⁴ To the examples of sentences in the first person that Gimaret has included, many more can be added such as: “we have explained in another place that ...” (*wa-qad bayyannā fī ghayri mawḍi‘in anna ...*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 242: 14); “we have spoken at length on it ... and now we raise the question of ...” (*wa-qad ashbā‘nā ‘l-qawla fīhi ... wa-nahnu ‘l-āna nūridu ...*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 262: 3); “we have explained in the beginning of the section on justice that ...” (*wa-qad bayyannā fī awwali bābi ‘l-‘adli annahū ...*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 298: 14).

²⁵ These volumes were edited by several editors and published in Cairo in the years 1960-1969. Volume XX was published in two separate parts. For a survey of the titles of the volumes and the names of their editors, see References, Primary sources, *Mughnī*.

²⁶ For an outline of the structure of the *Mughnī*, see Peters (1976, 34-35).

²⁷ For an explanation of the meaning of the term *luṭf*, see below, 148-151.

²⁸ Volume XIII (*al-Luṭf*) was edited by Abū ‘l-‘Alā’ ‘Afīfī and published in Cairo in 1962. Several scholars have studied parts of this volume dealing with pain. Brunschvig (1974 a) partly based his study of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s analysis of pain on it. Vajda (1985, 333-386) studied it, comparing ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory on the compensation of pain as it is expressed in this volume with the corresponding chapter in Yūsuf al-Baṣīr’s *al-Kitāb al-muḥṭawī*. McDermott (1978, 181-186 and 382-384) studied the discussions on pain in this volume in order to compare ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory on this subject with the theories of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd and al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā.

²⁹ See below, 151-153, 155-156.

ered briefly in other volumes of the *Mughnī* in the discussion of other subjects. ‘Abd al-Jabbār mostly does this in order to clarify the subject under discussion or to strengthen an argument. For instance, in his discussion of the way in which humans act ‘Abd al-Jabbār also discusses how they bring pain into existence³⁰.

As opposed to the printed text of the *Mughnī* that consists of fourteen volumes, the printed text of *Tā’līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* consists of only one volume. There are some indications that Mānkdīm not only paraphrased but also summarized ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s work³¹. He may have done so because the work was meant to be used as a studybook and therefore should not be too extensive. It is likely that the structure of Mānkdīm’s *Tā’līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* in general conforms to the structure of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*. It consists of an introduction and five parts that are named after the five Mu‘tazilite principles (*uṣūl*). Although Mānkdīm declares that he prefers the system of two principles as it is followed in the *Mughnī*, he maintains the structure of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, which is based on the five principles. As for the order of subjects within each part, it seems that Mānkdīm mostly keeps the order as it was in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*. This is indicated by remarks like: “However, he presented it in this way, so we follow him” (*Tā’līq*, 81: 13). Sometimes Mānkdīm disapproved of the order chosen by ‘Abd al-Jabbār. For instance, he says: “The right sequence would be to begin with..., but we follow his [‘Abd al-Jabbār’s] way, so we start with what he started with” (*Tā’līq*, 666: 4-7). However, Mānkdīm sometimes changed the order: “We will answer the second question first, because that suits better...” (*Tā’līq*, 409: 5) and, “After he, may God have mercy upon him, had explained that God cannot be a body, he explained that He cannot be an accident (*araḍ*), but we will first explain what an accident is” (*Tā’līq*, 230: 10-11). The subject of pain is discussed in the second part, that deals with the principle of Justice (*‘adl*) (*Tā’līq*, 299-608). The discussion of pain and its compensation takes twenty-two printed pages (*Tā’līq*, 483-505). Because of the rather limited scope, some aspects of pain,

³⁰ *Mughnī* IX, 52-59. In this section ‘Abd al-Jabbār confines himself to the way in which pain is brought into existence by human beings, leaving out any discussion of other aspects of pain.

³¹ Studying the pages of *Tā’līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* that deal with the subject of the appointed time (*ajal*), Abrahamov (1993a, 14, note 38) noticed that they seem to summarize ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s views.

such as how it comes into existence, are not explicitly discussed in *Tā'liq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*.

Al-Majmū' fī 'l-muḥīṭ bi-'l-taklīf is longer than *Tā'liq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, but shorter than the *Mughnī*. At present three volumes of the text have been published, but as the manuscript consists of four volumes, it is likely that the edited text will also consist of four volumes. *Al-Majmū' fī 'l-muḥīṭ bi-'l-taklīf*, like the *Mughnī*, is divided in two main parts: Unity and Justice. As a sort of introduction, an explanation is first given of God's imposing obligations (*taklīf*) on humans and what one must know with respect to this subject (*Majmū' I*, 1-25). This is followed by the first main part, *al-Tawḥīd* (Unity), which deals with attributes in general and the attributes of God in particular (*Majmū' I*, 26-226). The second main part, *al-'Adl* (Justice), which is much longer than the first main part, *al-Tawḥīd*, starts at the end of volume I (*Majmū' I*, 227). The main discussion of the subject of pain is to be found in the second main part, in the first section of volume III (*Majmū' III*, 11-129). Although the discussion of pain in the *Majmū'* is not as extensive as that in the *Mughnī*, it deals with all the aspects of pain that are discussed in the *Mughnī*.

The authors of the three texts, 'Abd al-Jabbār, Mānkḏīm and Ibn Mattawayh, belonged to three successive generations who adhered to the same Mu'tazilite school, the Bahshamiyya. The subject of my dissertation was the adoption of the teaching of 'Abd al-Jabbār by his disciples Mānkḏīm and Ibn Mattawayh. In this dissertation I made a comparison of the sections on pain in *al-Mughnī*, *Tā'liq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* and *al-Majmū' fī 'l-muḥīṭ bi-'l-taklīf*. The conclusion was that Mānkḏīm and Ibn Mattawayh agreed with 'Abd al-Jabbār on most points. Those parts in their discussion in which they do not add anything to the topic at hand, have been left out here. Only some additional remarks made by Mānkḏīm and Ibn Mattawayh which show their disagreement with 'Abd al-Jabbār have been included.

In the original dissertation attention was paid to schools within the Mu'tazila, in particular in a historical survey of the Bahshamiyya. As this survey contains useful information on 'Abd al-Jabbār, Mānkḏīm, Ibn Mattawayh and other Mu'tazilites, I have kept it, although it is not essential for the subject of the present study.

CHAPTER ONE

THE BAHSHAMIYYA

If “school” is understood in the sense of the definition that says that a school is “a body or succession of persons who in some department of speculation or practice are disciples of the same master, or who are united by a similarity of principles and methods”¹, then the Mu‘tazila can be said to constitute a school, as its members were united by a similarity of principles. The Mu‘tazila as a whole can be distinguished from other theological schools such as the Ash‘ariyya and the Māturīdiyya. Although some Mu‘tazilites had different opinions on several details of Mu‘tazilite doctrine, they all adhered to a set of fundamental theories. These theories are expressed in “the five principles” (*al-uṣūl al-khamsa*)². The five principles are explicitly mentioned by the Mu‘tazilite al-Khayyāṭ (ca. 220/835-ca. 300/913) in his *Kitāb al-intiṣār* in order to define the characteristics of the Mu‘tazila. According to him, Mu‘tazilites are those who adhere to the following principles: Unity (*tawḥīd*), Justice (*‘adl*), the Promise and the Threat (*al-wa‘d wa-’l-wa‘‘d*), the Intermediate Position (*al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn*) and Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong (*al-amr bi-’l-ma‘rūf wa-’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar*). Al-Khayyāṭ maintains that whoever defends all of these five principles is a Mu‘tazilite.

However, although the Mu‘tazilites agreed on certain principles, there were many details about which they disagreed³. The Mu‘tazila was not a homogeneous group. Rather, it consisted of diverse groups of thinkers following the doctrines of particular Mu‘tazilite masters. However, these masters based their doctrines on theories of their predecessors. If they formed their doctrines on the basis of theories of the same predecessors, for instance, the early Mu‘tazilites of Baṣra,

¹ *The Oxford English dictionary*. Second edition, prepared by J.A Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, XIV, 633.

² On these five principles see Watt (1973, 228-249), Madelung (1965, 8-23), Nyberg (1953, 425-426). Gimaret (1992, 786-787) and Van Ess (1986, 224-225).

³ Frank (1966, 10) says about the Mu‘tazila: “...there are between diverse authors basic and fundamental differences of view which are nigh absolutely incompatible”.

their doctrines showed similarities. These similarities make it possible to speak of the Baṣra school within the Mu‘tazila. The same is true of those Mu‘tazilites whose doctrines can be traced back to the early Mu‘tazilites of Baghdād. In fact, most modern scholars distinguish two schools within the Mu‘tazila, the Baṣra and Baghdād schools⁴. Some others have distinguished more than two⁵. The classical books about Islamic sects distinguished several Mu‘tazilite schools. Al-Shahrastānī (479/1086-548/1153) divided the Mu‘tazila into twelve schools, each with its own doctrines (*Milal* I, 46-85), whereas ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī went so far as to distinguish twenty-two Mu‘tazilite schools (*Farq*, 67). The reason for this is that the main Mu‘tazilite schools may be subdivided into schools consisting of the adherents to the doctrines of particular masters.

1. *The Chain of Transmission of Mu‘tazilism*

‘Abd al-Jabbār is said to have belonged to the Baṣra school⁶ or, more specifically, to the Bahshamiyya school⁷ within the Baṣra Mu‘tazila. The Bahshamiyya school is the school of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā‘ī (d. 321/933). An indication that ‘Abd al-Jabbār considered himself a member of the Baṣra-school and, in particular, of the Bahshamiyya school, can be found in his account of the way in which Mu‘tazilite knowledge was transmitted from master to master. In his account, he describes a chain (*sanad*) of authorities who transmitted the knowledge from one authority to another. The chain only mentions Baṣra Mu‘tazilites, among them the teachers of ‘Abd al-Jabbār himself⁸.

‘Abd al-Jabbār is not the first Mu‘tazilite to mention a chain of transmission of Mu‘tazilite knowledge. His teacher Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh also said that the knowledge of the Mu‘tazila was passed down by a chain of transmission and he started his chain with Wāṣil and

⁴ See, for instance, Watt (1973, 217-224), Frank (1978, 29 and passim) and Madelung (1987, 327-329).

⁵ See, for instance, Busse (1969, 439-441), McDermott (1978, 6) and Kraemer (1986, 72-73).

⁶ Peters (1976, 6-7) and Frank (1978, 5-6).

⁷ Busse (1969, 439-440) and McDermott (1978, 6).

⁸ Two other chains of transmission, described by Ibn al-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1437) and al-Farrazādhī (d. about 510/1116), respectively, also mention these Baṣra Mu‘tazilites and include ‘Abd al-Jabbār as the next authority in the chain. These chains will be discussed later. (See below, 29-30).

‘Amr (*Ṭabaqāt*, 5: 11-12). According to a standard account of the origins of the Mu‘tazila, Wāṣil b. ‘Aṭā’ (d. 131/748)⁹ and ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd (d. 144/761)¹⁰ were the founders of the Mu‘tazila. The account¹¹ gives an explanation of the name Mu‘tazila and says that this name was given to ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd and his companions (*aṣḥāb*) because they had dissociated themselves (*ʿtazalū*) from the study-circle of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728) after disagreeing with him about the status of the grave sinner¹². ‘Amr then joined Wāṣil with respect

⁹ On Wāṣil b. ‘Aṭā’, see Van Ess (1991, II, 234-280) and Daiber (1988).

¹⁰ On ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd, see Van Ess (1991, II, 280-310).

¹¹ Watt (1973, 209-211) came to the conclusion that this story must be a late invention that does not reflect the historical course of events. Van Ess (1991, II, 335-338) thinks that this and other accounts were invented by opponents of the Mu‘tazila. The facts about how the Mu‘tazila originated and why they were given the name Mu‘tazila are difficult to establish. Several scholars have tried to shed light on these questions. Stroumsa (1990, 271-273) took into consideration the fact that by the first quarter of the second Islamic century ascetics were called “Mu‘tazila”. She assumed that ‘Amr and his disciples were called “Mu‘tazila” because they were ascetics who had separated themselves from worldly pleasures. ‘Amr then joined Wāṣil (d. 131/748) with respect to the question of the grave sinner and the early followers of both leaders were called Mu‘tazila. Several scholars assumed that, at first, the Mu‘tazila was a political movement and only later became a theological movement. One of those who held this view was Nyberg (1953, 422), who made it clear that the name Mu‘tazila was given to those whose position was neutral with respect to the quarrels about ‘Alī’s rights to the caliphate and who refused to fight for or against ‘Alī. Nyberg supposed that Wāṣil and ‘Amr and their followers were called Mu‘tazila because they were politically neutral. He explained that the question of the grave sinner has a political background and that the political neutrality of ‘Amr and Wāṣil was expressed in the principle of the *manzila bayn al-manzilatayn*. However, Van Ess (1991, II, 340-342) has pointed out that it is possible that the group around ‘Amr was already called Mu‘tazila before ‘Amr joined Wāṣil. He took into account the fact that among the Ibāḍites the term *ʿtazāl* meant “renouncing one’s allegiance to the imām” and speculated that the group of ‘Amr was called Mu‘tazila because they renounced their allegiance to Quraysh. He added that this is no more than a hypothesis. The Mu‘tazilite author of *Kitāb uṣūl al-niḥāl* explained the name as “neutrality”. He declared that originally Mu‘tazila was a name given to one of the two groups that kept aloof (*ʿtazalū*), from the “battle of the camel” (36/656). This battle had its origins in the conflict between ‘Alī on the one hand and Ṭalḥa, al-Zubayr and ‘Ā’isha on the other hand. According to him, two groups did not take part in the battle: one group because they deemed it wrong to kill their fellow Muslims, the other group because they did not know which of the two parties was in the right. The latter group was called the “Mu‘tazila”. The author of *Kitāb uṣūl al-niḥāl* suggests that the group around Wāṣil b. ‘Aṭā’ and ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd was called Mu‘tazila, because Wāṣil and ‘Amr declared that they did not know which of the two parties was in the right (*Masā’il al-imāma*, Arabic text, 16-17). *Kitāb uṣūl al-niḥāl* has been attributed to al-Nāshī’ al-Akbar (d. 293/906), however, Madelung (1980a and 1987b, 374) has pointed out that the work must be earlier. He thinks that the Mu‘tazilite Ja‘far b. Ḥarb (d. 236/850) may be the author of *Kitāb uṣūl al-niḥāl*.

¹² In early Islam there had been disagreement about the status of the grave sinner.

to the question of the grave sinner and the early followers of both leaders were called Mu‘tazila.

It is reported that the Baṣra Mu‘tazilite Abū ‘l-Hudhayl (ca. 135/752—between 226/840 and 236/850) described a chain of transmission that did not start with Wāṣil and ‘Amr, but started with the Prophet. His teacher ‘Uthmān al-Ṭawīl had learned him this chain of transmission of “Justice and Unity” that he, in fact, let start with God, as he declared that the Prophet learned the doctrine of “Justice and Unity” (*al-‘adl wa-‘l-tawḥīd*) from the angel Gabriel, who brought it down from God (*Fihrist*, 202). The next authorities mentioned in this chain are: ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, ‘Alī’s son Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafīyya, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafīyya’s son Abū Hāshim ‘Abdal-lāh and Wāṣil b. ‘Aṭā’, who transmitted the knowledge of Justice and Unity to ‘Uthmān al-Ṭawīl.

These chains of transmission were probably composed with the intention of strengthening the legitimacy of Mu‘tazilism against its opponents. Considering the place given to ‘Alī, it reminds us of the

The Khārijites (*Khawārij*) were of the opinion that a grave sinner’s status was that of an unbeliever. Their adversaries (the Murji‘ites) believed that a grave sinner does not lose his status as a believer. Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s opinion was midway between those of the Khārijites and the Murji‘ites. He declared that a grave sinner is a hypocrite (*munāfiq*) (Watt, 1973, 17). The term *munāfiq* refers to a Muslim who pretends to be a believer but in his heart is an unbeliever. The Mu‘tazilites’ position on this question was somewhat different from that of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. They declared that the grave sinner is a malefactor (*fāsiq*). They called their opinion on the legal status of the grave sinner “the Intermediate Position” (*al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn*) because their position is midway between declaring that this sinner is a believer and declaring that he is an unbeliever. The difference between al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s term *munāfiq* and the Mu‘tazilites’ term *fāsiq* is that being judged as *fāsiq* could have consequences for holding a function. In Islamic law the judgment that someone is a *fāsiq* implies that he is excluded from acting as a legal witness, making it impossible for him to perform certain functions in the Muslim community (Wensinck, 1965², 105). When ‘Abd al-Jabbār discusses the qualities that the leader of the Muslim community must have, he declares that he cannot be a malefactor (*fāsiq*) because he must have the quality of justice (*‘adl*). If he had the quality of viciousness (*fisq*), he would legally not be able to be a witness or pass judgment (*Mughnī* XX/1, 201: 16-19). In *al-Uṣūl al-khamsa*, ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that the judgment that a malefactor (*fāsiq*) is neither a believer (*mu‘min*) nor an unbeliever (*kāfir*) implies that he is not honoured or respected because he is not a believer. However, as opposed to an unbeliever, he can marry a Muslim woman because he is not an unbeliever. He is also buried with Muslims and Muslims will pray for him (*Uṣūl*, 82: 3-5 and 93: 13-24). ‘Abd al-Jabbār argues that it is not right to call such a person a “hypocrite”, as a hypocrite is an unbeliever in his heart, although he pretends to be a Muslim. As opposed to a hypocrite (*munāfiq*), a malefactor (*fāsiq*) does not pretend to be different than he is.

Shī'ite chains of imāms and the Ṣūfīs' spiritual chains which indicate how esoteric wisdom was transmitted from Muḥammad to the later Ṣūfīs through 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and his descendants. Obviously, the Mu'tazilite chains of transmission reflect little historical truth, especially with respect to the first authorities in the chain.

It is likely that 'Abd al-Jabbār adopted the names of the first authorities in his chain from Abū 'l-Hudhayl's chain as he, too, starts the chain with Muḥammad. He probably chose the names of the later authorities himself. It appears that each name mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbār in his chain corresponds to one generation (*tabaqa*) of Mu'tazilites in his *Faḍl al-ī'tizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazila*¹³. 'Abd al-Jabbār gave numbers to the generations in this work. Keeping to these numbers, the following chain of transmission can be constructed:

–Muḥammad

[1]. 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib

[2]. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafīyya

[3]. Abū Hāshim b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafīyya

[4]. Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā' and 'Amr

[5]. 'Uthmān al-Ṭawīl

[6]. Abū 'l-Hudhayl

[7]. The disciples (*aṣḥāb*) of Abū 'l-Hudhayl of whom, according to 'Abd al-Jabbār, the most prominent was Abū Ya'qūb al-Shaḥ-ḥām

[8]. Abū 'Alī [al-Jubbā'ī]

[9]. Abū Hāshim

[10]. A group of prominent disciples of Abū Hāshim, such as Abū 'Alī b. Khallād, al-shaykh Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī and others (*Faḍl*, 164: 16-25).

The first authority mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbār in the chain is the Prophet, who is said to have transmitted the knowledge to 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, so that Wāṣil and 'Amr gained their knowledge through 'Alī's family (*Faḍl*, 164: 16-25). The fifth authority is Abū 'Amr b. Abī 'Uthmān Khālīd al-Ṭawīl. He is mentioned as the person who received this knowledge from Wāṣil (d. 131/748) and 'Amr b. 'Ubayd (d. 144/761). 'Uthmān al-Ṭawīl was a disciple of Wāṣil, who sent him to Armenia as a missionary for the Mu'tazila (*Dhikr*, 67: 8-10, *Faḍl*,

¹³ In 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Faḍl al-ī'tizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazila* the first generation (*tabaqa*) of "Mu'tazilites" is that of 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (*Amīr al-mu'minīn*) (*Faḍl*, 214: 3).

251: 4-5, and *Ṭabaqāt*, 42: 2-3). Little is known about him, except for some anecdotes, but Abū 'l-Hudhayl mentions him as his teacher¹⁴.

The sixth authority in the chain is Abū 'l-Hudhayl Muḥammad b. al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf al-‘Abdī (ca. 135/752—between 226/840 and 236/850)¹⁵. He was an important theologian. Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī showed great respect for him, declaring that speculative theology (*kalām*) began with Abū 'l-Hudhayl¹⁶. (*Faḍl*, 258: 17).

Abū 'l-Hudhayl transmitted his knowledge to several disciples of whom al-Shaḥḥām was the most prominent, according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār. However, he may have mentioned al-Shaḥḥām as the most prominent among them in order to defend his assertion that he is the link between Abū 'l-Hudhayl and Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī¹⁷. Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf b. ‘Abdallāh al-Shaḥḥām¹⁸ (ca. 184/800-257/871?) does

¹⁴ However, Gimaret (1986, 190, note 5) and Van Ess (1991, II, 313-314) have pointed out that probably the main reason why he called him his teacher was that he could function as the link between Abū 'l-Hudhayl and Wāṣil in the chain of transmission. ‘Uthmān does not seem to have been an important theologian as he is not mentioned by al-Khayyāt or al-Ash‘arī. He is not known to have written any work.

¹⁵ On Abū 'l-Hudhayl and his teachings, see Van Ess (1991, III, 209-296 and 1985) and Frank (1966).

¹⁶ This remark suggests that Abū 'l-Hudhayl developed a theological system by himself, not building on the works of his predecessors. Yet Van Ess (1991, III, 216) thinks it likely that he was influenced by the important speculative theologian Ḍirār b. ‘Amr (ca. 110/728-200/815) who taught in Baṣra, where Abū 'l-Hudhayl also spent most of his life. Later Mu‘tazilites like al-Balkhī did not consider Ḍirār a Mu‘tazilite because he did not adhere to all five Mu‘tazilite principles (*Dhikr*, 75: 4-5). On Ḍirār, see Van Ess (1991, III, 33-63 and 1981).

¹⁷ Abū 'l-Hudhayl’s best known disciple is usually considered to be Abū Ishāq al-Nazzām (ca. 165/782-221/836). On him, see Van Ess (1991, III, 296-445; 1985b and 1992). In some respects his doctrine deviated from Abū 'l-Hudhayl’s doctrine (*Faḍl*, 264: 2). ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037) reports that most of the Mu‘tazilites, including Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī and Abū 'l-Hudhayl himself, regarded al-Nazzām as an unbeliever (*Farg*, 80). According to Madelung (p.c.), this report must be taken with caution, because ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī often was a liar when it came to reporting the views of opponents. In any case, even if al-Nazzām had been acknowledged by all Mu‘tazilites, he could not have functioned in the chain as the link between Abū 'l-Hudhayl and Abū ‘Alī because he died in about 221/836. It is therefore impossible that he could have taught Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī, whose date of birth was 245/849.

¹⁸ On al-Shaḥḥām, see *Faḍl* (280: 11-281: 5), *Ṭabaqāt* (71: 16-72: 10), Van Ess (1991, IV, 45-51) and al-Khayyūn (1997, 201-208). Al-Shaḥḥām was probably a young boy when he became a disciple of Abū 'l-Hudhayl, since he is called “the youngest of the young students of Abū 'l-Hudhayl” (*aṣghar al-ghilmān*). The singular of *ghilmān* is *ghulam*. Makdisi (1990, 235) translates this term as “student-servitor”. Young students acted as their master’s servant. ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that al-Shaḥḥām

not seem to have been an important theologian, although he is said to be the first who defended the thesis that the nonexistent (*al-ma'dūm*) is something (*shay'*)¹⁹. Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 385/995) does not mention any work by him (*Fihrist*, 220). 'Abd al-Jabbār only mentions a commentary on the Qur'ān by him (*Fadl*, 280: 12-13). However, al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348)²⁰ mentions the following works: *al-Istīṭā'a 'alā 'l-Mujbira*, *al-Irāda*, *Kāna wa-yakūnu* and *Dalālat al-ā'rād*. Al-Shahḥām seems to have been the teacher who gave Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī most of his Mu'tazilite instruction, since no other Mu'tazilite teachers of Abū 'Alī are known.

The next authority in the chain is Abū 'Alī Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Jubbā'ī²¹. He was born in Jubbā in Khūzistān in 235/849. In about 257/871 he left Baṣra and went to Baghdād but later took up residence in 'Askar Mukram in Khūzistān²². In a mosque in 'Askar Mukram Abū 'Alī held public sessions in which he taught Mu'tazilite doctrine. These sessions were open to everybody who wanted to ask him questions²³. Abū 'Alī also held classes in which

reached the age of eighty, but he does not give the dates of his birth and death. Gimaret (1986, 199, note 52) thinks he died in about 257/871. It is said that in 257/871, when the Zanj captured Baṣra, the commander of the Zanj had a discussion with al-Shahḥām, but after the discussion he let him leave freely. According to al-Khayyūn (1997, 203), al-Shahḥām subsequently fled by sea, possibly to Oman or India or elsewhere. Although al-Shahḥām became known as the teacher of Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī, he could not have taught him for long because in 257/871, when he died or left Baṣra, Abū 'Alī was probably no older than twenty-three (Gwynne 1982, 10).

¹⁹ McDermott (1978, 197) and al-Khayyūn (1997, 204-205). However, Van Ess (1991, IV, 45) thinks that al-Shahḥām may have learned this from other Mu'tazilite thinkers of his time, although not from Abū 'l-Hudhayl himself.

²⁰ *Siyar a'lām al-nubalā'*. X, 522. See al-Khayyūn, 1997, 208.

²¹ On Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī, see *Fadl* (287: 1-296: 4), *Ṭabaqāt* (80: 2-85: 4), *Fihrist* (217-218), Gwynne (1982), Gimaret (1976 and supplement: 1984), Khushaym (1968) and Gardet (1965).

²² Probably he did not return to Baṣra because of the difficult situation in this town after the Zanj revolt that had continued from 255/869-270/883. Baṣra had been severely damaged by the battles between the Zanj and the caliphal armies. It must have been some time before the town had recovered from this damage. As a result of the Zanj revolt, many intellectuals took refuge in 'Askar Mukram and other towns of Khūzistān (Gwynne, 1982, 11).

²³ It is reported that in 'Askar Mukram women, too, came to these sessions and that Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī did not neglect them but answered their questions (Khushaym, 1968, 77). The interest of these women in Mu'tazilism might be the result of the missionary activity of Abū 'Alī's daughter, who was well versed in Mu'tazilite doctrine and propagated its teachings among women (*Ṭabaqāt*, 109: 9-10 and *Fadl*, 330: 10-11).

he taught his special students²⁴. His two most famous students were his son, Abū Hāshim, and Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī (260/873-324/935). Al-Ash'arī stayed with him for a long period, but when he was about forty years old, he abandoned Mu'tazilism and converted to a more traditionalist doctrine. This was the beginning of Ash'arism, which in later times became a serious rival for Mu'tazilism. In 304/915, only a few years after al-Ash'arī's conversion, Abū 'Alī died.

When Abū 'Alī died, his son Abū Hāshim 'Abd al-Salām b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Jubbā'ī, was only twenty-five years old, assuming for the moment that Abū Hāshim was born in 277/890. However, some biographers mention the year 247/861 as the date of Abū Hāshim's birth, which means that he was fifty-four years old when his father died. This would imply that his father was only thirteen years old at his birth. As this is unlikely, it can be concluded that the later date of 277/890 is the correct one²⁵. Further evidence in favour of this later date is the fact that 'Abd al-Jabbār apologizes in *Faḍl al-ʿitizāl* for mentioning Abū Hāshim as the first of the ninth generation of Mu'tazilites, the generation of Abū 'Alī's disciples. He admits that considering his age, he should be dealt with later because he was younger than many of the persons mentioned in this generation. (*Faḍl*, 304: 5; *Ṭabaqāt*, 94: 3). Abū Hāshim seems to have spent most of his life in 'Askar Mukram and Baṣra²⁶. However, in 314/926 he took up residence in Baghdād (*Fihrist*, 222) and died there in 321/933.

After Abū Hāshim, the next authorities in the chain mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbār are Abū Hāshim's disciples. Of these disciples, 'Abd al-Jabbār mentions specifically Abū 'Alī b. Khallād and Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī, thus distinguishing these two disciples from the other disciples. At this point, 'Abd al-Jabbār's chain of transmission stops, but Ibn al-Murtaḍā and al-Farrazādhī describe a chain of transmission

²⁴ Khushaym (1968, 77).

²⁵ Both Gwynne (1982, 12) and Khushaym (1968, 306) stick to the later date of 277/890. Khushaym argues that if Abū Hāshim was born in 247/861, his father Abū 'Alī would have been only thirteen years old at the time of his birth. Watt (1973, 300) gives more credit to this earlier date of 247/861, reasoning that the later date of 277/890 implies that Abū Hāshim became the leader of the Baṣra Mu'tazila at the age of twenty-five years, which is very young to become the leader of a theological school, and that the later date implies that it is impossible that he studied under al-Mubarrad, who died in 898.

²⁶ Khushaym (1968, 310).

that continues further and includes ‘Abd al-Jabbār himself. This chain will be discussed later²⁷.

The chain of transmission described by ‘Abd al-Jabbār not only shows that he considered himself as belonging to the Baṣra school, but it also indicates which school within the Baṣra Mu‘tazila he belonged to. In this respect it is significant that Abū Hāshim is named as the authority who received the knowledge from Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbāī because Abū Hāshim was not accepted by all of Abū ‘Alī’s *aṣḥāb*²⁸ as his successor. After Abū ‘Alī’s death, his adherents divided into two schools that both claimed to continue the tradition of Abū ‘Alī. That ‘Abd al-Jabbār mentions Abū Hāshim as the authority who transmitted the knowledge from Abū ‘Alī therefore makes it clear that he considered himself part of the school of Abū Hāshim’s adherents.

Before discussing the authorities of the last part the chain of transmission, I will consider the conflict concerning Abū ‘Alī’s successor, as it gives important information about the way schools were formed within the Mu‘tazila.

2. *The Bahshamiyya/Ikshūdiyya Conflict*

‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that some of Abū ‘Alī’s disciples (*aṣḥāb*) refused to acknowledge Abū Hāshim as his successor because Abū Hāshim’s opinions on certain questions differed from those held by his father. ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not deny that there were differences of opinion between father and son, but he denies that they were important enough for Abū Hāshim to be rejected as Abū ‘Alī’s successor. In his view, they differed only on minor questions and this was admissible because it was considered acceptable for disciples to differ from their masters. He gives the example of Abū Ḥanīfa and his disciples

²⁷ See below, 29-30.

²⁸ Makdisi (1981, 128-129) came to the conclusion that the *aṣḥāb* of a certain master were his special students who had studied with him on a steady basis and who had proceeded to a certain degree in their study; students who had only occasionally studied with him would not be counted among his *aṣḥāb*. The term *aṣḥāb* in the sense of special students is also found in al-Jushamī’s *Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*. Al-Jushamī introduces the twelfth generation of Mu‘tazilites as follows: “They are the *aṣḥāb* of the Chief Judge Abū ‘l-Ḥasan [=‘Abd al-Jabbār] and those who studied with him (*qara’ū ‘alayhi*)... (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 382: 5-6). We see that al-Jushamī mentions the *aṣḥāb* of ‘Abd al-Jabbār separately, which means that he makes a distinction between *aṣḥāb* and other students.

(*aṣḥāb*) (*Faḍl*, 304: 18-305: 1). Ibn al-Murtaḍā adds other examples. He points out that Abū ‘Alī himself also disagreed with Abū ‘l-Hudhayl and al-Shaḥḥām, and that there was also a difference of opinion between Abū ‘l-Qāsim al-Balkhī and his master (*Ṭabaqāt*, 95: 5-8).

Nevertheless, for some of Abū ‘Alī’s *aṣḥāb* the disagreement was apparently too drastic and so they turned away from Abū Hāshim. One wonders, therefore, whether it is true that the difference of opinion between Abū ‘Alī and Abū Hāshim concerned only questions of detail. In order to verify this, one has to rely on reports about them because, although they both are the authors of many works, not a single work has survived. This is surprising since the later Mu‘tazilites attached great importance to their teaching. Fortunately, the opinions of Abū ‘Alī and Abū Hāshim are frequently quoted by ‘Abd al-Jabbār, who refers to them even more than to his direct masters, Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh and Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī²⁹. Abū ‘Alī’s and Abū Hāshim’s opinions are also found in the works of non-Mu‘tazilites, such as al-Ash‘arī’s *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*. However, when Mu‘tazilites’ opinions are described by opponents whose object it was to refute Mu‘tazilite doctrine, it must be taken into account that their rendering might not be reliable.

From the opinions of Abū ‘Alī and Abū Hāshim as they are quoted in the works of ‘Abd al-Jabbār and other authors, an impression can be formed about their teachings³⁰. Khushaym³¹ has described the general principles of Abū ‘Alī’s teaching on the basis of these quotations. He examined quotations by Abū ‘Alī in both Ash‘arite and Mu‘tazilite sources and compared Abū ‘Alī’s opinions with those of Abū Hāshim that he found in the same sources. Khushaym concluded that there is no doubt that Abū Hāshim disagreed with his father on certain essential points of Mu‘tazilite doctrine³² such as the theory

²⁹ In many cases, we are also informed about the names of the works in which these opinions were found. On the basis of these references Gimaret (1976 and 1984) compiled a bibliography of the works of Abū ‘Alī and Abū Hāshim. To these references can be added another reference to one of Abū Hāshim’s works, *Naqd al-abwāb* (mentioned by Gimaret, 1976, 298), in *Mughnī*, XI, 318: 15.

³⁰ Abū Hāshim’s theory of the “states” (*aḥwāl*) has been described by Gimaret (1970) on the basis of discussion in Ash‘arite sources. Gwynne (1982) made a first reconstruction of Abū ‘Alī’s *Tafsīr*, collecting the citations of Abū ‘Alī’s commentary on the Qur’ān that are found in later Qur’ān commentaries. Another reconstruction of this *tafsīr* was made by Gimaret (1994).

³¹ Khushaym (1968, 97-299).

³² ‘Abd al-Jabbār probably described the differences of opinion between Abū ‘Alī and Abū Hāshim in his work *al-Khilāf bayn al-shaykhayn* (‘Uthmān, 1968, 62).

of the “states” (*ahwāl*)³³ and the doctrinal question of what one can be blamed for.

Abū ‘Alī’s disciples reacted differently to the difference of opinion between father and son. ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that some of them fully or partially agreed with Abū Hāshim, whereas others refrained from expressing an opinion on the disagreement between father and son. However, ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that some of Abū ‘Alī’s disciples exaggerated their support for Abū ‘Alī because they finally declared that Abū Hāshim was an unbeliever (*Faḍl*, 305: 11-13 and *Ṭabaqāt*, 95: 15-96: 1). Reacting to the rejection of his opinions, Abū Hāshim wrote books in which he refutes the opinions of his adversaries among Abū ‘Alī’s disciples (*Faḍl*, 305: 13 and *Ṭabaqāt*, 96: 1). It is likely that *Jawābāt al-Šaymarī* (*Answers to al-Šaymarī*)³⁴ was one of Abū Hāshim’s refutations of his adversaries.

Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad b. ‘Umar al-Šaymarī (ca. 234/848-315/927) reportedly remained loyal to Abū ‘Alī and his hostility towards Abū Hāshim reached such a pitch that he called him an unbeliever. He tried to win Abū Hāshim’s supporters round to his point of view, but they refused to take his side (*Ṭabaqāt*, 96: 15-18). Before becoming Abū ‘Alī’s disciple, al-Šaymarī had studied with Mu‘tazilite masters of Baghdād, such as al-Khayyāṭ (*Faḍl*, 308: 15-16 and *Ṭabaqāt*, 96: 12-13). He then stayed with Abū ‘Alī in ‘Askar Mukram for a long period. He was about the same age as Abū ‘Alī and seems to have been a man of influence among Abū ‘Alī’s disciples. Ibn al-Nadīm reports that Abū ‘Alī himself used to refer to him as “our master (*shaykhunā*) Abū ‘Abdallāh” (*Fihrist*, 219). This use of the title *shaykh* is a sign of respect³⁵. Al-Šaymarī was well versed in

Sezgin (1967, 625) assumed that a manuscript in the Vatican collection, entitled *al-Ikhtilāf fī uṣūl al-fīqh* (Vat. Vida 1100), contained *al-Khilāf bayn al-shaykhayn*. However, it can be concluded from the title that this manuscript deals with legal theory and methodology. It is therefore unlikely that it is identical with *al-Khilāf bayn al-shaykhayn*, since this latter work presumably deals with the controversies between Abū ‘Alī and Abū Hāshim which, as we have seen, were theological rather than legal in nature. That *al-Khilāf bayn al-shaykhayn* dealt with theological questions can also be deduced from references made by Ibn Mattawayh to this work. These references concern theological or ethical subjects (*Majmū‘* II, 201: 6 and *Tadhkira*, 245: 12). Madelung (1965, 179 and 1986a, 5-6) thinks that the manuscript Vat. Vida 1100 may turn out to be part of Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq’s *Kitāb al-Mujzī fī uṣūl al-fīqh*.

³³ For an explanation of the theory of *ahwāl*, see Frank (1982a and 1971), Gimaret (1970), Peters (1976, 145-148 and 324-327) and Wolfson (1976, 167-197). See also below, 78.

³⁴ On this work, see Gimaret (1976, 319-320).

³⁵ The term *shaykh* can mean “teacher”. Ibn al-Murtaḍā says of Abū ‘Alī al-

Abū ‘Alī’s teachings and a fervent adherent to his doctrines. He defended Abū ‘Alī’s opinion, as becomes clear from his refutation of al-Balkhī’s *Kūtāb al-nihāya fī ‘l-aṣlah ‘alā Abī ‘Alī* in which al-Balkhī refutes Abū ‘Alī’s doctrine of the optimum (*al-aṣlah*) (*Fihrist*, 219).

Al-Ṣaymarī rejected the innovations that were introduced by Abū Hāshim³⁶, breaking with him and returning to Baghdād, probably shortly after Abū ‘Alī’s death (*Faḍl*, 309: 6). It may be that in Baghdād al-Ṣaymarī claimed to be the new leader³⁷ of the Baṣra Mu‘tazila. This would explain why Ibn al-Nadīm says that al-Ṣaymarī became leader of the Mu‘tazilites of Baṣra after Abū ‘Alī had died³⁸. In fact,

Jubbā‘ī: “*wa-kāna shaykhuhū Abā Yáqūba ‘l-Shahhāmī*” (and his *shaykh* was Abū Ya‘qūb al-Shahhām) (*Ṭabaqāt*, 80: 5-6). When ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā‘ī, Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā‘ī, and his own teachers Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh and Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī in the *Mughnī*, he almost always prefixes to their names the title *shaykhunā* (our *shaykh*). However, the title of *shaykh* can also be given as an expression of respect. ‘Abd al-Jabbār sometimes used the title *shaykhunā* to refer to Abū ‘l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, a Baghdād Mu‘tazilite. (See, for instance, *Mughnī* VIII, 4: 1, *Mughnī* XIV, 61: 9, *Mughnī* XX/2, 176: 3 and 184: 3). Evidently the term *shaykh* is not used here in the sense of teacher, but as an expression of respect. The title of *shaykh* as an expression of respect can also be found in the way in which ‘Abd al-Jabbār addressed his disciple Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī. When Abū Rashīd became a member of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s study-circle, he was already a respected Mu‘tazilite master and an author of books (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 382: 10). It is reported that he was the only disciple addressed by ‘Abd al-Jabbār with the title *shaykh* (*Ṭabaqāt*, 116: 8 and *Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 382: 131).

³⁶ For instance, with respect to the question of whether it is possible that some substances are continuous and others disappear. Abū ‘Alī declared that this indeed is possible, whereas Abū Hāshim declared that it was impossible. It is reported that Abū ‘Alī adopted his son’s opinion later, but al-Ṣaymarī refused to accept Abū Hāshim’s innovation and held to Abū ‘Alī’s original opinion (*Masā’il*, 97: 5-12). Al-Ṣaymarī possibly took a stand against innovations of any kind, as he is reported to have opposed Abū ‘Alī’s plan to amalgamate the Mu‘tazila and the Shī‘a in ‘Askār Mukram (*Faḍl*, 291: 12-14). It is not known whether Abū ‘Alī did intend to do such a thing.

³⁷ The terms *ra’īs* (leader) and *riyāsa* (leadership), when used with respect to scholarship, imply that a certain scholar was considered to be the top man among his colleagues, the *primus inter pares*. The term *ra’īs* thus entails notions of excellence and superiority (Makdisi, 1981, 131-133). When Ibn al-Murtaḍā says of Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir: “He was the leader (*ra’īs*) among the Mu‘tazilites of Baghdād”, he means that he was the most important scholar among them (*Ṭabaqāt*, 52: 7). ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses yet another term for “leader”: in his report about Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir, he says that Bishr was “the *zā‘im* (leader) of the Baghdādīs among the Mu‘tazila” (*Faḍl*, 265: 9).

³⁸ Ibn al-Nadīm also says that al-Ṣaymarī was the same age or about the same age as Abū ‘Alī (*Fihrist*, 219). That this is explicitly mentioned may be a hint that the age of the candidates played a role in the question of who became the new leader of the school after Abū ‘Alī’s death.

al-Şaymarī had all the necessary qualifications for the leadership: he had reached a respectable age and was generally known as a great scholar³⁹. It must have been a bitter experience for him when Abū Hāshim succeeded Abū ‘Alī and thus got the position that he possibly thought he himself was entitled to. That Abū Hāshim was much younger than al-Şaymarī probably exacerbated the situation, since it must have been difficult for al-Şaymarī and other senior disciples to accept such a young person as their master. This may also have been a reason, quite apart from his refusal to accept Abū Hāshim’s innovations, for al-Şaymarī’s hostility towards him.

Nevertheless, Abū Hāshim had disciples, among them those disciples of Abū ‘Alī who had decided to accept him as their new master. We do not know how many they were. ‘Abd al-Jabbār mentions one of them by name, Abū ‘l-Ḥasan al-Farzawī. He is reported to have sympathized with Abū Hāshim and to have disapproved of the hostility that was shown by many of Abū ‘Alī’s disciples towards Abū Hāshim (*Faḍl*, 296: 2-4).

This means that after Abū ‘Alī’s death there were two groups: firstly, Abū ‘Alī’s former disciples who, sticking to his doctrine, refused to accept Abū Hāshim and possibly recognized al-Şaymarī as their new leader and, secondly, those disciples who accepted Abū Hāshim as their new leader. It is conceivable that both groups considered themselves as the continuation of Abū ‘Alī’s school⁴⁰. We do not know the name by which the two groups were known in the period after Abū ‘Alī’s death, but it is certain that a generation later there were

³⁹ See *Faḍl* (290: 14-15) and *Ṭabaqāt* (96: 12).

⁴⁰ Gimaret (1980, Introduction, 13) refers to the school of Abū ‘Alī as the “Jubbā’ite school” to which Abū ‘Alī and Abū Hāshim and their followers, like ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī, Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ibn Mattawayh, belonged. He came to the conclusion that they formed a school and called it the Jubbā’ite school because the adherents frequently refer to Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī and Abū Hāshim in their works. Gimaret says: “Il faut donc parler d’une école jubbā’ite, comme on parle, du côté sunnite, d’une école ash‘arite et d’une école māturīdite”. The schools of both the Bahshamiyya and the Ikhshīdiyya can be seen as a continuation of the Jubbā’iyya, Abū ‘Alī’s school, whose doctrine was built on that of Abū ‘l-Hudhayl. The school of ‘Abd al-Jabbār and his disciples is referred to as Bahshamiyya because its doctrine is a continuation and an elaboration of Abū Hāshim’s doctrine. On the other hand, it would not be wrong to refer to it as Jubbā’iyya, because Abū Hāshim based his doctrine on that of his father Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī. However, the name Jubbā’iyya is less clear because the Ikhshīdiyya can also be referred to as Jubbā’iyya, as they also adhered to Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī’s doctrine. The need to distinguish between these schools makes it necessary to refer to each of them by a specific name.

two rival schools, called the Ikhshīdiyya⁴¹ and the Bahshamiyya.

The Ikhshīdiyya was named after Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. ‘Alī b. Ma‘jūr al-Ikhshīd (or: al-Ikhshād) (about 263/876-326/938)⁴², a disciple of al-Ṣaymarī, who had stayed with him for a long period (*Faḍl*, 309: 6). He had adopted his master’s hostility towards Abū Hāshim and was a fanatical adversary not only of Abū Hāshim, but also of his disciples, who were called the Bahshamiyya or the Bahāshima⁴³. Ibn al-Ikhshīd was the author of a book on the points of difference between Abū Hāshim and Abū ‘Alī (*Ṭabaqāt*, 110: 13). He was not only an expert in the field of Mu‘tazilite doctrine, but also a jurist and a grammarian⁴⁴. The only unfavourable thing mentioned in connection with him was his zealous opposition to the Bahshamiyya (*Ṭabaqāt*, 100: 7-9).

The enmity between the Ikhshīdiyya and the Bahshamiyya was intense. Ibn al-Ikhshīd and his disciples were not the only fanatics; it appears that there were also fanatics among Abū Hāshim’s disciples, like Abū ‘l-Qāsim al-Sirāfī, who lived in Baṣra. Originally, he had been a follower of the Ikhshīdiyya, but Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh, the teacher of ‘Abd al-Jabbār, had persuaded him to leave the Ikhshīdiyya and become an adherent to the Bahshamiyya. After joining the Bahshamiyya, he is reported to have become “a sword” against the Ikhshīdiyya (*Faḍl*, 328: 14-15). Another fanatical adherent to the

⁴¹ According to Nyberg (1953, 425), the Ikhshīdiyya dominated in Baghdād during the whole 4th/10th century. It is not clear whether the Baghdād Mu‘tazila school continued to exist in Baghdād. Nyberg says that Abū ‘l-Qāsim ‘Abdallāh b. Aḥmad al-Balkhī al-Ka‘bī, who is considered to belong to the Baghdād Mu‘tazila school, founded a school at Nasaf. Nyberg also mentions the school of Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Zubayrī in Iṣfahān. It seems that this was a Baṣra Mu‘tazila school different from the Ikhshīdiyya and the Bahshamiyya. ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that in Iṣfahān he saw Ibn al-Zubayrī’s daughter who was old aged then. According to him, Ibn al-Zubayrī for the greater part adhered to the doctrine of Abū ‘l-Hudhayl (*Ṭabaqāt*, 90: 1-11).

⁴² Since Ibn al-Ikhshīd died in 320/932 at the age of fifty-six (*Ṭabaqāt*, 100: 5-6), he must have been born in about 263/876. Ibn al-Nadīm gives a different date for his death and says that he died in 326/937 (*Fihrist*, 220).

⁴³ ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (*Farq*, 111) and al-Shahrastānī (*Milal* I, 78: 13) refer to the disciples of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā‘ī as the Bahshamiyya, whereas Ibn al-Murtaḍā uses the name Bahāshima (*Ṭabaqāt*, 119: 2). The names Bahāshima and Bahshamiyya were probably derived from Bā Hāshim, the Persian form of the name Abū Hāshim. (Compare this, for instance, with Bāyazīd, which was the Persian form of Abū Yazīd). Gimaret (1986, 265, note 1) and Khushaym (1968, 306, note 2) say that the name Hāshimiyya was also used for the disciples of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā‘ī.

⁴⁴ Gimaret (1976, 308). The grammarian Abū ‘l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. ‘Īsā al-Rummānī (296/908-384/994) was a disciple of Ibn al-Ikhshīd.

Bahshamiyya was Abū Aḥmad b. Abī ‘Allān, a disciple of Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī (*Ṭabaqāt*, 114: 13-15).

The discord between the two rival schools became so vehement that, in Baṣra, the vizier of the Būyids Abū ‘l-Qāsim b. Sa‘d al-Iṣfahānī⁴⁵ organized a meeting for the followers of both schools in order to reconcile them (*Faḍl*, 329: 1-3). A dispute (*munāzara*) was held between the representatives of each of the two groups⁴⁶, the Ikhshīdiyya being represented by their leader Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥabashī⁴⁷ and the Bahshamiyya by Abū ‘l-Qāsim al-Sīrāfi, mentioned above. ‘Abd al-Jabbār was one of those who attended the meeting. He reports that Abū ‘l-Qāsim al-Sīrāfi rebuked al-Ḥabashī in the presence of all his school’s followers. ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not reveal who ultimately prevailed (*Faḍl*, 328: 13-329: 10 and *Ṭabaqāt*, 107: 15-108: 4).

After some time, perhaps as a result of this meeting, the enmity between the Ikhshīdiyya and the Bahshamiyya became less intense. ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that when he met Abū Aḥmad b. Salma, one of al-Ṣaymarī’s disciples, in ‘Askar Mukram, he still was a fanatical adversary of the Bahshamiyya, but that later he became more moderate (*Faḍl*, 333: 5-9). The same thing is reported about ‘Alī b. ‘Īsā al-Rummānī (d. 384/994), who at first was an adversary of the Bahshamiyya and wrote a work in which he systematically refuted Abū Hāshim’s *al-Baghdādiyyāt*⁴⁸. It is said that he later became milder towards Abū Hāshim and his followers (*Faḍl*, 333: 2-4).

It is not clear whether the Ikhshīdiyya as a separate school within the Baṣra Mu‘tazila continued to exist. ‘Abd al-Jabbār and other Mu‘tazilites, like Ibn Mattawayh and Ibn al-Murtaḍā, do mention the Ikhshīdiyya⁴⁹, but although the Ash‘arite ‘Abd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir

⁴⁵ Busse (1969, 441, note 2) thinks that he might be Abū ‘l-Qāsim Sa‘d b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Iṣfahānī, secretary (*kātib*) to the Būyid al-Ḥabashī b. Mu‘izz al-Dawla, the governor of Baṣra.

⁴⁶ It was not unusual in that time for one scholar to try and defeat another by means of arguments in public meetings. On *munāzara*, see Van Ess (1976).

⁴⁷ On al-Ḥabashī, see *Ṭabaqāt* (110: 5).

⁴⁸ On this work, see Gimaret (1976, 308-312). Al-Rummānī also wrote some books on Islamic law (*Fihrist*, 220-221) and a commentary on the Qur‘ān, which was greatly admired by al-Ṣāhib b. ‘Abbād (*Ṭabaqāt*, 110: 7-11).

⁴⁹ The Ikhshīdiyya are mentioned by ‘Abd al-Jabbār (*Faḍl*, 328: 14 and 329: 2). Mānkdm (d. 425/1034) does not mention them in *Ta‘līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* (see the index of *Ta‘līq*), but Ibn Mattawayh (d. 469/1076) refers to them in *al-Majmū‘ fi ‘l-muḥīṭ bi-‘l-taklīf*. (See, for instance, *Majmū‘* I, 296: 9 and 341: 7, *Majmū‘* II, 311: 16, and *Majmū‘* III, 31: 9-83: 19). They are also mentioned by Ibn al-Murtaḍā (d. 1437) in *Ṭabaqāt al-Mu‘tazila* (*Ṭabaqāt*, 107: 17, 114: 15 and 115: 3). Al-Shahrastānī

al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037) was a contemporary of ‘Abd al-Jabbār and might have heard about them, he does not mention the Ikhshīdiyya in his book on the Muslim sects. When he discusses Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī and the Jubbā’iyya, he says: “The Baṣrian Mu’tazilites in his time adhered to his [Abū ‘Alī’s] doctrine. Then, after him, they went over to the doctrine of his son Abū Hāshim” (*Farq*, 110). He does not seem to have known that there was a conflict about Abū ‘Alī’s successor. For outsiders, it may not have been clear which different schools existed within the Mu’tazila. However, he does know of the Bahshamiyya and that this was the school of ‘Abd al-Jabbār. Of Abū Hāshim and the Bahshamiyya, he says:

Most of the Mu’tazilites of our time adhere to his [Abū Hāshim’s] doctrine because of the propaganda of [al-Ṣāḥib] Ibn ‘Abbād, the vizier of the Būyids. They are called “the Dhammiyya”, because of their opinion on [the question whether someone] deserves blame (*dhamm*)⁵⁰ for what he has omitted to do (*Farq*, 111).

‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī’s reference to al-Ṣāḥib b. ‘Abbād⁵¹, ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s patron, makes clear that he is referring to the Mu’tazilite school to which ‘Abd al-Jabbār belonged, the Bahshamiyya. According to him, this school had become the dominant Mu’tazilite school in his time⁵².

(d. 548/1153) does not mention them in *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, but Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (543/1149-606/1209) does mention them in his *I’tiqādāt firaq al-muslimīn wa-l-mushrikīn* (*I’tiqādāt*, 44).

⁵⁰ One of the main points of difference between Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī and Abū Hāshim was the deserving of blame (*dhamm*). Abū Hāshim’s opinion was that a person can deserve blame for failing to do what is obligatory (Gimaret, 1976, 305). This became one of the points of conflict between the Ikhshīdiyya and the Bahshamiyya, as is confirmed by ‘Abd al-Jabbār (*Faḍl*, 329: 3). It is possible that the followers of Abū Hāshim were referred to by the nick-name of “Dhammiyya” because of this. They were not the only group to be called Dhammiyya. There were other, non-Mu’tazilite, groups that were also called Dhammiyya (Hodgson, 1965).

⁵¹ On al-Ṣāḥib b. ‘Abbād, see below, 42-43.

⁵² The different schools were not equally successful, one school often surpassing others in different periods. This may have happened because of the high standard of learning of a particular master’s school or because of the support this master received from a ruler. It is conceivable that if one school became dominant, the other schools did not disappear at once. They may have continued to exist in the background for some time without attracting any attention, finally losing all their followers to the dominant school. This may have happened to the Ikhshīdiyya.

3. *The Leadership of the Bahshamiyya after the Death of Abū Hāshim*

It is not clear who succeeded Abū Hāshim as leader of the Bahshamiyya after his death in 321/933. ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s chain of transmission of knowledge does not inform us about this, telling in the last part only that

from Abū Hāshim, the [Mu‘tazilite] knowledge was received by a group of well-advanced [disciples] (*mutaqaddimūn*), such as Abū ‘Alī b. Khallād, al-shaykh Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī and others; then, in a comparable way, [it was transmitted] into our time (*Faḍl*, 164: 23-25).

If ‘Abd al-Jabbār had mentioned one disciple of Abū Hāshim, it is likely that this person would have been the new leader of the Bahshamiyya after Abū Hāshim’s death. However, by saying that a whole group transmitted the Mu‘tazilite knowledge received from Abū Hāshim and mentioning two people by name, Abū ‘Alī b. Khallād and Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī, he leaves it uncertain who was the leader.

Unlike ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Ibn al-Murtaḍā and al-Farrazādhī mention in their chains of transmission the name of only one authority who transmitted the knowledge from Abū Hāshim. The last part of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s chain of transmission includes the following names⁵³:

- [9]. Abū Hāshim and his generation (*ṭabaqatuhū*)
- [10a]. Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh
- [10b]. Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī
- [11]. ‘Abd al-Jabbār (*Ṭabaqāt*, 7: 5-7).

The names in the last part of al-Farrazādhī’s chain of transmission⁵⁴ are:

- [9]. Abū Hāshim
- [10a]. Ibn Khallād
- [10b]. Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī
- [11]. ‘Abd al-Jabbār
- [12]. Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī
– Ibn Mattawayh

⁵³ The numbers before the names have been added by me in accordance with the generations of Mu‘tazilites these masters belong to, according to the Mu‘tazilite *Ṭabaqāt*-books.

⁵⁴ The text of this chain is quoted in *Ta‘līq*, 24, note 1, and *Rasā’il* I, 87.

- Muḥammad b. Mazdak⁵⁵
- al-Farrazādhī

If we compare these chains of transmission with ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s, we see that the name of Ibn Khallād, the first of Abū Hāshim’s disciples mentioned by ‘Abd al-Jabbār, is missing in Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s chain, but is included in al-Farrazādhī’s chain. Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī, mentioned by ‘Abd al-Jabbār as the second person in Abū Hāshim’s group of disciples, is presented as the only person who received the Mu‘tazilite knowledge from Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh or Ibn Khallād and who in his turn transmitted this knowledge to ‘Abd al-Jabbār. The strange thing is that, according to what Ibn al-Murtaḍā himself says in his *Ṭabaqāt al-Mu‘tazila*, Ibn Khallād, Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh and Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī belonged to the same generation of Mu‘tazilites. Why did Ibn al-Murtaḍā present Abū Ishāq and why did al-Farrazādhī present Ibn Khallād as the one who transmitted the knowledge to Abū ‘Abdallāh? Before answering this question, I will first give the biographies of the persons mentioned in the last part of the chains.

3.1. Ibn Khallād (?-?)

Abū ‘Alī Muḥammad b. Khallād⁵⁶, who is mentioned by ‘Abd al-Jabbār and al-Farrazādhī at the end of the chain of transmission, was a disciple of Abū Hāshim. His dates are unknown⁵⁷. In his *Faḍl al-‘itizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-mu‘tazila* ‘Abd al-Jabbār assigns him the first place in the generation of the disciples of Abū Hāshim. As ‘Abd al-Jabbār usually classifies the masters within each generation according to their age⁵⁸, it is likely that the date of Ibn Khallād’s birth was earlier than

⁵⁵ Gimaret (1979, 60) says that he has not been able to find out who this Ibn Mazdak was. Al-Farrazādhī studied with al-Murshad bi-llāh Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn Yaḥyā (d. 477/1084). As it is unlikely that b. Mazdak is a wrong reading of al-Murshad, he must have been another of al-Farrazādhī’s masters.

⁵⁶ On his life and works, see *Fihrist* (222), *Faḍl* (324: 3-11), *Ṭabaqāt* (105: 5-10), Sezgin (1967, 624), Schacht (1971) and *Tadhkira* (624-625).

⁵⁷ His dates are not given by Ibn al-Nadīm either, although he considers Ibn Khallād to have been one of Abū Hāshim’s most important disciples (*Fihrist*, 222). Sezgin (1967, 624) supposes that he died in about 350/961, but he does not cite evidence for this date.

⁵⁸ We have seen that ‘Abd al-Jabbār finds it necessary to justify his mentioning of Abū Hāshim before older masters of his generation by referring to Abū Hāshim’s high level of knowledge (*Faḍl*, 304: 5).

that of Abū 'l-Qāsim Ibn Sahlawayh⁵⁹ and Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī, who are mentioned after him. According to 'Abd al-Jabbār, Ibn Khallād first studied with Abū Hāshim in 'Askar Mukram. After Abū Hāshim took up residence in Baghdād, he too moved to Baghdād to study with him (*Faḍl*, 324: 4-6). This must have been after 314/926, since it was in this year that Abū Hāshim moved to Baghdād. Ibn Khallād is said not to have attained the rank of master (*shaykh*) (*Faḍl*, 324: 11-12 and *Ṭabaqāt*, 105: 9-10). We are not told why he never attained this rank. Did he die at a young age? Did he stop being a Mu'tazilite? Yet we know that he had students, as Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī is said to have started his study of Mu'tazilite doctrine with him.

Ibn Khallād reportedly was the author of two works: *Kitāb al-uṣūl* and *Kitāb al-sharḥ*. This last work seems to have been his own commentary (*sharḥ*) on the first work. For some unknown reason he did not complete *Kitāb al-uṣūl* and it was later completed by 'Abd al-Jabbār⁶⁰, who is also the author of a commentary on this work⁶¹. This is an indication that *Kitāb al-uṣūl* was considered to be an important work, even though Ibn Khallād had not completed it. From this it can be concluded that Ibn Khallād was well versed in Mu'tazilite doctrine even though he never attained the rank of *shaykh*.

⁵⁹ The correct reading of this name is Ibn Sahlawayh or Ibn Sahlūya, in analogy to Sībawayh/Sībūya (Madelung, p.c.).

⁶⁰ See Gimaret (1979, 69).

⁶¹ The Zaydite imām al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh is said to have made notes (*'allaqa 'an*) of a work called *Ṣiyādāt al-sharḥ* (*Hadā'iq*, 265: 19-266: 1). This work may have concerned additions (*Ṣiyādāt*) to Ibn Khallād's *Sharḥ* or to 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Sharḥ* on Ibn Khallād's *Kitāb al-uṣūl*. The Zaydite imām Abū Ṭālib Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn al-Nāṭiq bi-'l-ḥaqq (d. 424/1033) made *Ṣiyādāt* (additions) to 'Abd al-Jabbār's commentary (*Sharḥ*) on Ibn Khallād's *Kitāb al-uṣūl* (Madelung, 1965, 180-181, Gimaret, 1979, 70-73 and 78, and Madelung 1986a, 10). Another commentary on Ibn Khallād's *Kitāb al-uṣūl* was edited by Abū Rīda in Cairo in 1969, entitled *Fī 'l-tawḥūd*. The author is not mentioned in the manuscript. Abū Rīda thought that the edited text was written by Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī himself. Gimaret, however, thinks that it is not Abū Rashīd's work itself, but a critical paraphrase of it made by a later author. Gimaret also thinks it possible that it is a commentary not on Ibn Khallād's *Kitāb al-uṣūl*, but on Ibn Khallād's *Kitāb al-sharḥ* (Gimaret, 1979, 73). A part of Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī's *Ṣiyādāt* has been identified by Martin (1978).

3.2. *Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh (?- ?)*

Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. ‘Ayyāsh al-Baṣrī⁶², who is mentioned by Ibn al-Murtaḍā as the person who received the Mu‘tazilite knowledge from Abū Hāshim and his generation, was the first teacher who instructed ‘Abd al-Jabbār in Mu‘tazilite doctrine. ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not mention the dates of his birth and death. In his *Faḍl al-‘iṭizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Mu‘tazila*, he discusses Abū Ishāq as fourth person of the Mu‘tazilites of the tenth generation, directly after Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī, which may imply that he was younger than Abū ‘Abdallāh.

Abū Ishāq is reported to have studied first with Abū ‘Alī b. Khallād and then with Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī. He was already teaching Mu‘tazilite doctrine before 321/933, while Abū Hāshim was still alive. This can be concluded from the report that one of his students, Abū ‘l-Ḥasan b. al-Najīb, left him to study with Abū Hāshim in Baghdād (*Ṭabaqāt*, 109: 11-12) and, as we know, Abū Hāshim died in 321/933.

‘Abd al-Jabbār describes Abū Ishāq as an ascetic who never engaged in idle pastimes, devoting his whole life to learning. He travelled from place to place in the district of Khūzistān, teaching in Tustar, ‘Askar Mukram, Ahwāz, al-Ubullah (a town near Baṣra) and Baṣra itself. It seems that he did not teach in Baghdād because people reportedly travelled from Baghdād to Khūzistān to study with him (*Faḍl*, 328: 6-8). ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that Abū Ishāq was the author of books that contained refutations and answers to questions, but he does not mention these books by name (*Faḍl*, 328: 10-11)⁶³.

3.3. *Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī (289/902 or 293/905 or 308/920–369/979)*

Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Alī al-Baṣrī⁶⁴ was ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s other Mu‘tazilite teacher. According to Ibn al-Nadīm, Abū ‘Abdallāh was born in Baṣra in 308/920 (*Fihrist*, 222), but others say that he was born in 293/905 or 289/902⁶⁵. Although ‘Abd al-Jabbār studied with

⁶² On Abū Ishāq, see *Faḍl* (328: 3-10), *Ṭabaqāt* (107: 8-13), Sezgin (1967, 624) and ‘Uthmān (1968, 48-49).

⁶³ Ibn al-Murtaḍā maintains that Abū Ishāq was the author of a book on the imāmate of al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn (*Ṭabaqāt*, 107: 12-13), but this work is not mentioned by ‘Abd al-Jabbār.

⁶⁴ On Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī, see *Faḍl* (325: 10-328: 2), *Ṭabaqāt* (105: 11-107: 7), *Fihrist* (222), Van Ess (1980), Kraemer (1986, 178-184) and ‘Uthmān (1968, 50-51).

⁶⁵ Van Ess (1980, 12).

Abū ‘Abdallāh and must have known him well, he does not mention Abū ‘Abdallāh’s birthplace, saying only that he belonged to the people of ‘Irāq (*Faḍl*, 324: 13). ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not give his date of birth, either.

‘Abd al-Jabbār says that Abū ‘Abdallāh first studied with Ibn Khallād and then with Abū Hāshim (*Faḍl*, 325: 11-12). Ibn al-Nadīm also mentions Abū ‘l-Qāsim b. Sahlawayh⁶⁶ as Abū ‘Abdallāh’s professor (*ustādh*) (*Fihrist*, 222). We do not know in which period Abū ‘Abdallāh studied with Abū Hāshim but it must have been before 321/933, as this is the year in which Abū Hāshim died. If ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s report that Abū ‘Abdallāh studied with Abū Hāshim is correct, it would prove that Abū ‘Abdallāh’s date of birth was one of the two earlier dates (289/902 or 293/905). If he was born in 308/920, he would only have been thirteen years old when Abū Hāshim died. As he first studied with Ibn Khallād, it would imply that he started to study Mu‘tazilite doctrine when he was younger than thirteen. Since this is unlikely, it is more probable that Abū ‘Abdallāh was born in 289/902 or 293/905 than in 308/920.

‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that Abū ‘Abdallāh dictated from the year 330/941 until his death (*Faḍl*, 325: 17-18). If we accept that he was born in 289/902 or 293/905 this would imply that he started to dictate when he was about forty years old. It is unclear what his occupations in the preceding period were. He possibly devoted all his time to study. ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that he studied Islamic law with the prominent Ḥanafite legal scholar Abū ‘l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī (d. 340/952) for a long period. Al-Karkhī was himself a Mu‘tazilite and had many Mu‘tazilites among his students⁶⁷. Abū ‘Abdallāh died in Baghdād in 369/979 (*Fihrist*, 222 and *Faḍl*, 325: 18).

We return now to the question of who became the leader of the Bahshamiyya after Abū Hāshim’s death. Ibn al-Nadīm informs us that in a later period Abū ‘Abdallāh became the leader of his “colleagues” (*wa-īlayhi ‘ntahat riyāsatu aṣhābihī fī ‘aṣrihī*), not specifying which Mu‘tazilite school he means (*Fihrist*, 222). As Ibn Nadīm previously

⁶⁶ Ibn Sahlawayh was a disciple of Abū Hāshim. ‘Abd al-Jabbār mentions him among the disciples of Abū Hāshim, after Ibn Khallād and before Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī, but he does not say that Ibn Sahlawayh was the teacher of Abū ‘Abdallāh (*Faḍl*, 324: 13-325: 9).

⁶⁷ Busse (1969, 443-444).

said that Abū ‘Abdallāh adhered to the doctrine (*madhhab*⁶⁸) of Abū Hāshim, it must be concluded that he means that Abū ‘Abdallāh became the leader of the Bahshamiyya. However, Abū ‘Abdallāh started to dictate in 330/941. It is therefore unlikely that he was already considered to be the leader of this school before that date. By the year 330/941 Abū Hāshim had already been dead for nine years. This means that Abū ‘Abdallāh did not become leader any earlier than nine years after the death of Abū Hāshim.

This still leaves unanswered the question of who was the leader of Abū Hāshim’s school in the first nine years after his death. The other disciple of Abū Hāshim mentioned by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in his chain of transmission is Ibn Khallād. However, it is unlikely that he became the leader of the Bahshamiyya in the period between Abū Hāshim’s death and Abū ‘Abdallāh’s leadership, as he reportedly did not attain the rank of *shaykh*. Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s chain of transmission suggests that Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh was the leader of the Bahshamiyya in the period between Abū Hāshim and Abū ‘Abdallāh. He had not studied with Abū Hāshim himself, but he belonged to the Bahshamiyya and already had students before Abū Hāshim died. It is therefore possible that he became the leader of the Bahshamiyya after Abū Hāshim’s death. If he became the leader of the Bahshamiyya after

⁶⁸ The noun *madhhab* is a derivative of the verb *dhahaba*. In the Mu‘tazilite texts the verb *dhahaba ilā* is used to indicate that someone held a certain theory, for instance, in the sentence: “*wa-‘lladhī yadhhabu ilayhi shuyūkhunā Abū ‘l-Hudhayli wa-aktharu aṣḥābīhī wa-Abū ‘Alī wa-Abū Hāshimī raḥīmahum-u ‘llāhu annahū...*” (and the opinion held by our masters Abū ‘l-Hudhayl and most of his companions and Abū ‘Alī and Abū Hāshim, may God have mercy upon them, is that...) (*Mughnī* VI/I, 128: 2-3). The meaning of *madhhab*, corresponding to this meaning of the verb *dhahaba*, is opinion. An opinion can be attributed to an individual or to a whole group. An example of an opinion attributed to an individual is found in the sentence: “*wa-kāna madhhabuhū madhhaba Mu‘ammarin fi af‘āli ‘l-ṭabā‘ī lā fi ‘l-ma‘ānī*” (with respect to the acts of “natures”, his opinion was that of Mu‘ammar, but not with respect to the *ma‘ānī*) (*Ṭabaqāt*, 58: 9-10). *Madhhab* can also mean the whole body of someone’s opinions. When used in this sense it means “doctrine”, as in the sentence: “*wa-huwa min-a ‘l-tābī‘īna li-madhhabi Abī ‘Alī ‘l-muta‘aṣṣibīna lahū*” (and he belonged to the fanatical followers of the doctrine of Abū ‘Alī [al-Jubbā‘ī]) (*Ṭabaqāt*, 98: 5). Another way to express adherence to someone else’s doctrine is to say *dhahaba madhhabahū*, as in the sentence: “*kāna yadhhabu madhhaba Mu‘ammarin*” (he adhered to the doctrine of Mu‘ammar) (*Faḍl*, 267: 12). When *madhhab* is used in this sense, it comes very close to the meaning of “school”. *Madhhab* can mean school in the sense of a set of opinions shared by a group of people. Al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī (413/1022-494/1100) says about Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī: “*wa-kāna Baghdādīyya ‘l-madhhabī*” which can be translated as: “his doctrine was that of the Baghdād Mu‘tazila” (he belonged to the school of Baghdād) (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 382: 10).

Abū Hāshim, then why do ‘Abd al-Jabbār and al-Farrazādhī not mention him in their chains of transmission? The reason for this may be that it is unlikely that he transmitted the Mu‘tazilite knowledge to Abū ‘Abdallāh because he was not Abū ‘Abdallāh’s teacher. Rather, they were two colleagues, the one teaching in Baṣra and other towns in Khūzistān, and the other in Baghdād. Another problem is that although Abū Ishāq is reported to have met Abū Hāshim, he seems not have studied with him. ‘Abd al-Jabbār and al-Farrazādhī may have taken this into account. This may be the reason why they do not present Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh as the one who transmitted the Mu‘tazilite knowledge from Abū Hāshim to Abū ‘Abdallāh.

As for the leadership of the Bahshamiyya after the death of Abū ‘Abdallāh, according to Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s and al-Farrazādhī’s chains Abū ‘Abdallāh transmitted the Mu‘tazilite knowledge to ‘Abd al-Jabbār. ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s appearance in the chain does not pose problems. It is known that he studied with Abū ‘Abdallāh in Baghdād for a long period and later became the leader of the Mu‘tazila (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 365: 11 and *Ṭabaqāt*, 112: 10-11). His being mentioned as the leader of the Mu‘tazila as a whole and not only of the school of Abū Hāshim may be due to the fact that Abū Hāshim’s school became the dominant Mu‘tazilite school, as is reported by ‘Abd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī (*Milal Baghd.* 129: 10-11). The school of ‘Abd al-Jabbār was a continuation of the Bahshamiyya, although some refer to his school as the Rayy Mu‘tazila, since Rayy is where ‘Abd al-Jabbār trained most of his disciples.

In what follows, I will give the biographies of ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Mānk-dīm Shashdīw, Ibn Mattawayh, Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī, who was leader of the Bahshamiyya after ‘Abd al-Jabbār, and Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, who dissociated himself from the school of ‘Abd al-Jabbār and became the leader of a new Mu‘tazilite school. There are few if any reports about their lives. The information about them which does exist deals primarily with their scholarly achievements. Yet it is likely that political events in those days did influence their lives, especially when a new ruler came to power whose attitude towards the Mu‘tazila was different from the previous ruler’s. I will therefore also shortly describe some political events that took place during the lifetimes of these Mu‘tazilites, even though the effects of these events on their lives cannot be known with certainty.

4. *‘Abd al-Jabbār*

‘Abd al-Karīm ‘Uthmān has written an extensive biography of ‘Abd al-Jabbār based on a study he made of several sources⁶⁹. I will mainly rely on his biography for my description of the life of ‘Abd al-Jabbār. ‘Uthmān gives a survey of the known⁷⁰ titles of works by ‘Abd al-Jabbār, presenting them in a thematic order⁷¹. He explains that he decided not to present them in chronological order because in all but a few cases the date of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s works is difficult to determine. The date of some of them is known because at the end of the *Mughnī* ‘Abd al-Jabbār mentions works he dictated before he started dictating that work and also works he dictated during the twenty years it took him to dictate the *Mughnī* (*Mughnī* XX/2, 258: 11-14 and 4-7). Some other works can be dated on the basis of other information, but for most of the works the period in which they were dictated or written remains unknown.

In this study I will consider each period of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s life and mention those works that are known to have been dictated during it. This means that works that cannot be dated will not be mentioned. For a complete survey of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s works the reader should refer to the list in ‘Uthmān’s study⁷².

⁶⁹ ‘Uthmān (1968, 11-41). For a bibliography of the sources on ‘Abd al-Jabbār, see ‘Uthmān (1968, 245-247) and Madelung (1985, 118).

⁷⁰ ‘Uthmān collected the titles of sixty-nine works. For some additional titles, see below, note 4. For those works of ‘Abd al-Jabbār that have been published, see Madelung (1985, 117). These works are: 1. *Mutashābih al-Qur’ān*, ed. ‘Adnān Muḥammad Zarzūr, 2 vols. Cairo, 1969. 2. *Al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-‘adl* (see References: *Mughnī*). 3. *Al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn* (See References: *Mukhtaṣar*). 4. *Tanzīh al-Qur’ān ‘an al-maṭā‘in*. Cairo, 1329/1911, and Beirut, 1967. 5. *Taḥbīt dalā’il al-nubuwwa*, ed. ‘Abd al-Karīm ‘Uthmān, 2 vols. Beirut, 1966. 6. *Kitāb faḍl al-‘itizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-mu’tazila* (see References: *Faḍl*). To this list can be added: *Kitāb al-uṣūl al-khamsa* (see References: *Uṣūl*).

⁷¹ ‘Uthmān (1968, 57-72).

⁷² Works that have been attributed to ‘Abd al-Jabbār but which are not found in ‘Uthmān’s list are: *al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn*, which might be identical with *Mukhtaṣar al-Husnā (or al-Hasanī) (Ta’līq, 122: 15)* (on this work, see below, 47), *al-Mūjībāt wa-l-mu’aththirāt (Tadhkira, 597: 17)*, *al-Uṣūl al-khamsa* (on this work, see below, 45-46) and *Ta’līq al-Baghdādiyyāt*. Ibn Mattawayh mentions ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Ta’līq al-Baghdādiyyāt* in his *al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-l-a’rāq (Tadhkira, 86: 17 and 87: 11)*. It probably was a *ta’līq* of Abū Hāshim’s *al-Baghdādiyyāt*. On Abū Hāshim’s *al-Baghdādiyyāt*, see Gimaret (1976, 308-312).

4.1. *‘Abd al-Jabbār’s Youth*

Abū ‘l-Ḥasan ‘Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad b. al-Khalīl al-Hamadhānī al-Asadābādī was born in about 320/932, in Asadābād, a town situated 54 kilometres west-southwest of Hamadhān on the road that connects Baghdād, Hamadhān and Rayy⁷³. In the fourth/tenth century Asadābād was a populous city with a mosque and good markets⁷⁴. In 319/931, Hamadhān had been conquered by the Ziyārid prince Mardāwīj⁷⁵, who was murdered in 323/935 by his own Turkish troops⁷⁶. A long drawn out battle followed during which the Būyids occupied a large part of the Ziyārids’ territory, leaving to them only the Caspian provinces⁷⁷. The Būyids originated from the Caspian province of Daylamān and adhered to Shī‘ism. In a short time they succeeded in extending their control over ‘Irāq, Khūzistān, Kirmān and Fārs. Control over their territories was divided among three brothers: Mu‘izz al-Dawla ruled ‘Irāq, Rukn al-Dawla ruled Jibāl and ‘Imād al-Dawla ruled Fārs and Khūzistān. This means that during ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s youth Asadābād, which was situated in Jibāl, was ruled by Rukn al-Dawla. The provincial capital of Jibāl in this period was Iṣfahān⁷⁸.

It seems that ‘Abd al-Jabbār originated from a poor family⁷⁹. He started his religious studies in his home town Asadābād, where he studied *ḥadīth*, Shāfi‘ite law and other subjects. With respect to theology, ‘Abd al-Jabbār is said to have first adhered to the Ash‘arite school (*Ṭabaqāt*, 112: 3)⁸⁰. Like many students in his time⁸¹, he left his home town after completing his initial studies. He travelled from town to town, studying with famous scholars to broaden his knowledge. It is known that he stayed for some time in Hamadhān, Iṣfahān, ‘Askar Mukram and Baṣra⁸².

⁷³ Bosworth (1987, 697).

⁷⁴ Le Strange (1930, 196).

⁷⁵ Madelung (1975, 212).

⁷⁶ Bosworth (1980, 92).

⁷⁷ Bosworth (1980, 92-93) and Busse (1969, 18).

⁷⁸ Busse (1975, 280).

⁷⁹ ‘Uthmān (1968, 29).

⁸⁰ Madelung (1985, 117) warns that this statement should be viewed with caution. He considers it more likely that ‘Abd al-Jabbār was brought up on a traditionalist Shāfi‘ite creed.

⁸¹ On the travels of Muslim scholars and students in different periods, see Ahmed (1968, 100-111) and Kraemer (1986, 24-25).

⁸² ‘Uthmān (1968, 23-24) and Madelung (1985, 117).

Around 346/957 ‘Abd al-Jabbār was in Baṣra collecting *ḥadīth*⁸³. Baṣra was one of the important cultural centres of the Būyid empire and a centre of Mu‘tazilite learning. In 336/947 it had been conquered by the Būyid Mu‘izz al-Dawla, who took up residence in Baghdād and made his son, al-Ḥabashī, governor of Baṣra. Al-Ḥabashī had a great interest in culture and collected a library with fifteen thousand volumes⁸⁴. Apart from this library, Baṣra had a Mu‘tazilite library which had been founded by Ibn Suwār⁸⁵. According to ‘Uthmān⁸⁶, it was in Baṣra that ‘Abd al-Jabbār abandoned his former creed and became a Mu‘tazilite. He started to study Mu‘tazilite doctrine with the famous Baṣrian scholar Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh⁸⁷.

4.2. ‘Abd al-Jabbār in Baghdād and Rāmḥurmuz

From Baṣra ‘Abd al-Jabbār travelled to Baghdād. It is not known when he arrived there, nor when he left Baghdād again. In 346/957 he was still in Baṣra and in 360/970 he was in Rāmḥurmuz. It can therefore be concluded that his stay in Baghdād must have been sometime between these two dates, although he probably did not remain there the whole time. The situation in Baghdād in those years was turbulent. There were frequent clashes between the Sunnite and Shī‘ite factions that sometimes ended in heavy fighting, burning, and looting, as happened in 348/959 and 349/960⁸⁸. In Baghdād ‘Abd al-Jabbār⁸⁹ became a student of Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Alī al-Baṣrī.

Al-Jushamī says that ‘Abd al-Jabbār stayed with Abū ‘Abdallāh for a long time during which he compiled many books (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 366: 5-6). It is likely that the titles of some of these books are mentioned among the works that ‘Abd al-Jabbār says he dictated before he started to dictate the *Mughnī* (*Mughnī* XX/2, 258: 11-14). These works are:

– *Naqḍ al-lumā’*⁹⁰. This is a refutation of al-Ash‘arī’s *Kitāb al-lumā’*.

⁸³ ‘Uthmān (1968, 43).

⁸⁴ Busse (1969, 524).

⁸⁵ Busse (1969, 524-525) thinks that this might be Abū ‘Alī b. Suwār al-Kātib, who was a contemporary of Ibn al-Nadīm, the author of the *Fihrist*.

⁸⁶ ‘Uthmān (1968, 24).

⁸⁷ On Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh, see above, 32.

⁸⁸ Canard (1962, 278-283).

⁸⁹ On Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī, see above, 32-33.

⁹⁰ *Naqḍ al-lumā’* is mentioned by al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 368: 8) and by Ibn

- *Kitāb al-ʿumad*⁹¹. This is a work on legal theory and methodology (*uṣūl al-fiqh*). ‘Abd al-Jabbār is also the author of a commentary on it⁹² (*Ṭabaqāt*, 113: 11).
- *Ṭaqrīb al-uṣūl*⁹³.
- *Tahdhīb al-sharḥ*⁹⁴. It is not clear which *sharḥ* is meant here.
- *Kitāb al-mabsūt*⁹⁵.
- *Sharḥ al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr*⁹⁶. This is a commentary on Abū Hāshim’s *al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr*⁹⁷.
- *Kitāb al-nihāya*⁹⁸. This is a work on legal theory and methodology (*uṣūl al-fiqh*).

These are probably only the most important of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s

al-Murtaḍā (*Ṭabaqāt*, 113: 11). For other references, see ‘Uthmān (1968, 71). Mānkdim’s and Ibn Mattawayh’s references (*Taʿlīq*, 325: 3 and *Majmūʿ* I, 351: 14) to *Naqḍ al-lumaʿ* can also be added to these references. The Ashʿarite al-Bāqillānī is the author of *K. Naqḍ al-naqḍ* in which he, in his turn, refutes ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Naqḍ al-lumaʿ* (Gimaret, 1985a, 187, note 12).

⁹¹ *Kitāb al-ʿumad* is mentioned by al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn*, 368: 6) and by Ibn al-Murtaḍā (*Ṭabaqāt*, 113: 11). For other references to it, see ‘Uthmān (1968, 61). Mānkdim’s reference to it (*Taʿlīq*, 46: 3) can also be added to these references. The text of *Kitāb al-ʿumad* has not been found but Ḥamīdullāh, the editor of Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn’s *Kitāb al-muʿtamad* has pointed out that several passages from ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Kitāb al-ʿumad* are found in *Kitāb al-muʿtamad*. Ḥamīdullāh considers it possible that a fragment of a manuscript in the Vatican collection will turn out to be a part of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Kitāb al-ʿumad* (*Muʿtamad* II, French text, 18). However, Madelung (1965, 179, and 1986a, 5-6) thinks that the manuscript may turn out to be part of Abū Tālib al-Nāṭiq’s *Kitāb al-Mujzī fī uṣūl al-fiqh*.

⁹² Another commentary on *Kitāb al-ʿumad* was made by ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s disciple, Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, before this disciple wrote his *Kitāb al-muʿtamad*. This can be concluded from references in *Kitāb al-muʿtamad*, in which Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn refers to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Kitāb al-ʿumad*, ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ* [on *Kitāb al-ʿumad*] and his own *sharḥ* on ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Kitāb al-ʿumad*. See, for instance, *Muʿtamad* I, 324: 13-14 where all three works are mentioned in one passage.

⁹³ *Ṭaqrīb al-uṣūl* is not mentioned by al-Jushamī or Ibn al-Murtaḍā.

⁹⁴ *Tahdhīb al-sharḥ* is not mentioned by al-Jushamī or Ibn al-Murtaḍā.

⁹⁵ Mentioned by al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn*, 368: 1) and Ibn al-Murtaḍā (*Ṭabaqāt*, 113: 8).

⁹⁶ ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers in the *Mughnī* to his *Sharḥ al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr* (*Mughnī* IX, 69: 22-23). Both al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn*, 368: 3) and Ibn al-Murtaḍā (*Ṭabaqāt*, 113: 9) mention a work that they call *Sharḥ al-jāmiʿayn*. It may be that this is a commentary on both Abū Hāshim’s *al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr* and his *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*.

⁹⁷ On Abū Hāshim’s *al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr*, see Gimaret (1976, 316-317).

⁹⁸ Al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn*, 368: 6) and Ibn al-Murtaḍā (*Ṭabaqāt*, 113: 10) say that *Kitāb al-nihāya* is a work on legal theory and methodology (*uṣūl al-fiqh*). For other references to it, see ‘Uthmān (1968, 62), who is of the opinion that it was dictated in the period of the dictation of the *Mughnī* but before the death of Abū ‘Abdallāh, which means that it dates from the period 360/970-369/979. ‘Uthmān does not give arguments for his opinion.

works from the period before he started to dictate the *Mughnī* and it is worth noting that among them are *Kitāb al-ʿumad* and *Kitāb al-nihāya*, two important works on legal theory and methodology.

ʿAbd al-Jabbār left Baghdād in 360/970 at the latest. This can be concluded from the fact that in 360/970 he started to dictate the *Mughnī* in Rāmhurmuz. Perhaps he was still in Baghdād in 356/967 when the Būyid Muʿizz al-Dawla died and was succeeded by his eldest son ʿIzz al-Dawla. It is not known why ʿAbd al-Jabbār did not continue his stay in Baghdād, although the difficult economic situation there may have been a reason for his departure. Life had become hard in Baghdād in those days: the price of food was extremely high and it seems that in 358/968 many of the city’s inhabitants left for Mosul, Syria and Khurāsān⁹⁹. ʿAbd al-Jabbār may also have left the city for fear of a famine¹⁰⁰. For whatever reason, ʿAbd al-Jabbār travelled from Baghdād to the province of Khūzistān.

At the time of ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Muʿtazilism was widespread in the province of Khūzistān. ʿAskar Mukram, where Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī and his son Abū Hāshim had lived, was a centre of Muʿtazilism¹⁰¹. This town had a Muʿtazilite library which, like the one in Baṣra, had been founded by Ibn Suwār. In this library students could study Muʿtazilite doctrine¹⁰². Other places in Khūzistān with important Muʿtazilite communities were Rāmhurmuz, Tustar, Sūs and Junday-sābūr (*Dhikr*, 112-113). ʿAbd al-Jabbār taught Muʿtazilite doctrine in ʿAskar Mukram and Rāmhurmuz (*Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn*, 366: 7). As we have seen, in 360/970 he started to dictate the *Mughnī* in the mosque of Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh b. al-ʿAbbās al-Rāmhurmuzī in Rāmhurmuz (*Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn*, 366: 7-8 and *Ṭabaqāt*, 98: 9-10). During the time that ʿAbd al-Jabbār was in Khūzistān he kept in touch with Abū

⁹⁹ Canard (1962, 283).

¹⁰⁰ If ʿAbd al-Jabbār did leave Baghdād for this reason, he may have done the same as Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Baṣrī before him. ʿAbd al-Jabbār suggests in his biography of Abū ʿAbdallāh that in a period of famine and scarcity Abū ʿAbdallāh left Baghdād. This might have been in 334/945, when many people died from starvation (Canard, 1962, 283). Abū ʿAbdallāh travelled to ʿAskar Mukram, in the province Khūzistān, but he later returned to Baghdād (*Faḍl*, 325: 14-15). Like his master, ʿAbd al-Jabbār left for Khūzistān but, unlike him, he did not return to Baghdād, except for a short stay many years later.

¹⁰¹ Abū ʿl-Qāsim al-Balkhī reports that ʿAskar Mukram was completely Muʿtazilite (*Dhikr*, 112), which probably meant that the people adhered to some fundamental Muʿtazilite doctrines. Visitors to the town report on its inhabitants’ Muʿtazilite leanings (Bosworth, 1987a).

¹⁰² Busse (1969, 525).

‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī. This can be concluded from the report that Abū ‘Abdallāh’s books used to reach ‘Abd al-Jabbār until he settled in Rayy¹⁰³ (*Ṭabaqāt*, 107: 5-6).

4.3. ‘Abd al-Jabbār Chief Judge of Rayy

Rukn al-Dawla, who had ruled over Jibāl since 335/947, died in 366/976. It was his wish that after his death control of his territory should be given to two of his sons, Mu‘ayyid al-Dawla, who should rule over Rayy and Iṣfahān, and Fakhr al-Dawla, who should rule over Hamadhān and Dīnawar. However, Fakhr al-Dawla was not content with his share and tried to seize Rayy as well. Thereupon, he was driven away by a third brother, ‘Aḍud al-Dawla, who ruled over Fārs and Khūzistān at that time and resided in Shīrāz. Fakhr al-Dawla took refuge in Khurāsān, which belonged to the territories of the Sāmānids. ‘Aḍud al-Dawla gave Fakhr al-Dawla’s territory to Mu‘ayyid al-Dawla, who thus gained control over the whole of Jibāl, although this was on condition that he acknowledge the supremacy of ‘Aḍud al-Dawla¹⁰⁴.

At first, Mu‘ayyid al-Dawla retained Rukn al-Dawla’s vizier but after some time he replaced him with his own secretary, al-Šāḥib b. ‘Abbād. Because a chief judge is appointed by the vizier, a new chief judge was needed in Rayy, so al-Šāḥib looked for a person able to perform this important function. He may already have set his mind on a Mu‘tazilite judge for this post since it is reported that he approached Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī for his advice. Reportedly, Abū ‘Abdallāh first sent him Abū Ishāq al-Naṣībī¹⁰⁵ (or al-Naṣībī), one of his disciples, but al-Šāḥib did not want him. Then Abū ‘Abdallāh sent ‘Abd al-Jabbār, another of his disciples, who was accepted (*al-Wāfi bi-’l-wafayāt* XVIII, 32: 3-12). Al-Šāḥib and ‘Abd al-Jabbār possibly knew each other already. They may have met in Iṣfahān,

¹⁰³ According to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Abū ‘Abdallāh died in 367/977, which is exactly the same year as ‘Abd al-Jabbār became chief judge of Rayy (*Ṭabaqāt*, 107: 5-6). Ibn al-Nadīm, however, mentions 369/979 as the year in which Abū ‘Abdallāh died (*Fihrist*, 222).

¹⁰⁴ Cahen (1965, 748).

¹⁰⁵ On al-Naṣībī see *Ṭabaqāt* (114, 16). He was a leading member of the school of Abū ‘Abdallāh. It is reported that he as head of the Baṣra Mu‘tazilite school debated Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī in ‘Aḍud al-Dawla’s court in Shīrāz. Al-Tawḥīdī unfavourably spoke of him (Kraemer, 1986, 185-186). Al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā was one of his students (*Ṭabaqāt*, 117).

when al-Şāhib was still Mu'ayyid al-Dawla's secretary¹⁰⁶.

'Abd al-Jabbār became the chief judge of Rayy in 367/977. The splendid certificate of his appointment was written by al-Şāhib himself¹⁰⁷. It states that 'Abd al-Jabbār was appointed as chief judge of Rayy, Qazwīn, Abhar-Zanjān, Suhraward, Qumm and Dunbāwand (Damāwand). He supervised the judges in the northern half of the province of Jibāl and was allowed to appoint judges as his representatives in the towns of the district.

'Abd al-Jabbār's patron, al-Şāhib b. 'Abbād, had been educated as a secretary and had an intellectual interest in a variety of subjects. Although he was not educated as a theologian and lawyer like 'Abd al-Jabbār, he engaged in philosophical and theological questions. His biographers disagree about which theological doctrine he adhered to. It seems that he considered himself to be a Mu'tazilite, although he followed Shī'ite doctrine with regard to the theory of the imāmate. His works include books on Mu'tazilite theology¹⁰⁸. Ibn al-Murtaḍā seems to have regarded him as a Mu'tazilite, since he mentions his name among the Mu'tazilites of the generation of 'Abd al-Jabbār (*Ṭabaqāt*, 115: 11-13). Mānkḍīm's regard for al-Şāhib as a theologian was such that he mentioned al-Şāhib's opinion on one of the Mu'tazilite questions (*Tā'liq*, 494: 17-18).

Al-Şāhib favoured Mu'tazilism and probably for this reason appointed a Mu'tazilite as chief judge. He wanted to propagate Mu'tazilism, not only among the learned but also among the common people¹⁰⁹. With this objective in mind, he held meetings in which he discussed theological subjects with the people, speaking in the vernacular. In addition to this, he sent missionaries to the bazaars in order to promulgate Mu'tazilite doctrine¹¹⁰. It seems that 'Abd al-Jabbār supported al-Şāhib in his aspirations. It is said that he, too,

¹⁰⁶ Madelung (1985, 117).

¹⁰⁷ In the fifth/eleventh century this valuable document was given as a present to Niẓām al-Mulk (Mez, 1922, 168). The text has survived because it was included by al-Rāfi'ī al-Qazwīnī 'Abd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad (d. 623/1226) in his *al-Tadwīn fī akhbār Qazwīn*. A manuscript of this work exists in the collection of Dār al-kutub in Cairo. That part of this work in which the biography of 'Abd al-Jabbār and the text of the certificate of his appointment as chief judge are found has been edited by Fu'ād Sayyid as an introduction to his edition of 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Faḍl al-ī'tizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazila* (*Faḍl*, 122-126).

¹⁰⁸ Cahen (1971, 672).

¹⁰⁹ Kraemer (1986, 211 and 270).

¹¹⁰ Kraemer (1986, 265).

sent Mu‘tazilite missionaries to Ḥanafite communities in the region¹¹¹. A work like *al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn*, which ‘Abd al-Jabbār wrote at the request of al-Ṣāḥib, may have been intended for missionary activities.

Al-Ṣāḥib promoted science and literature as well and invited many scholars and men of letters to his court in Rayy. Among them were famous poets, such as al-Sharīf al-Raḍī (d. 406/1016) and Ibn al-Ḥajjāj (d. 391/1001)¹¹². Al-Ṣāḥib himself was also active in the literary field. He wrote poems, anecdotes, and studies on literature and lexicography¹¹³. It is not known whether ‘Abd al-Jabbār regularly visited the sessions¹¹⁴ (*majālis*) that al-Ṣāḥib held at his court, but it is certain that he attended some of them, perhaps those sessions in which al-Ṣāḥib educated secretaries¹¹⁵. This can be concluded from what ‘Abd al-Jabbār says at the end of the *Mughnī*. He explains that there is a difference in style between the first part of the *Mughnī* and the last part because the last part was dictated in Rayy, where he attended al-Ṣāḥib’s sessions¹¹⁶.

When Mu‘ayyid al-Dawla died in 373/983, al-Ṣāḥib proposed that Fakhr al-Dawla, the expelled brother of Mu‘ayyid al-Dawla, be accepted as the new ruler of Jibāl. Having been driven away, Fakhr al-Dawla had lived in exile in the empire of the Sāmānids. When Fakhr al-Dawla came from Nīsābūr and took up residence in Rayy, al-Ṣāḥib became his vizier¹¹⁷. This change of rulers did not affect al-Ṣāḥib’s position much, nor that of ‘Abd al-Jabbār.

¹¹¹ Madelung (1988, 30).

¹¹² Makdisi (1990, 236) compares the court of al-Ṣāḥib with that of Hārūn al-Rashīd and concludes that there were more poets at the court of al-Ṣāḥib than at Hārūn’s court. He observes that al-Tha‘alibī (d. 429/1038) cites eight great poets for the court of Hārūn al-Rashīd, whereas he cites thrice that number for al-Ṣāḥib’s court.

¹¹³ Cahen (1971, 671-672), Kraemer (1986, 259-272) and Makdisi (1990, 235-236).

¹¹⁴ Kraemer (1986, 259-272) gives an account of some sessions held by al-Ṣāḥib as they were described by Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023), who himself thought unfavourably of al-Ṣāḥib.

¹¹⁵ Makdisi (1990, 66).

¹¹⁶ ‘Abd al-Jabbār says: “When we came to live near him [al-Ṣāḥib], we had the good fortune to attend his sessions on science, and so it cannot be denied that because of this there was a change in the expression and meaning of what we dictated.” (*Mughnī* XX/2, 259: 1-2). ‘Abd al-Jabbār implies that al-Ṣāḥib taught him to use a more eloquent style. He may have practised this in the elegant introduction to *al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn* which he wrote for al-Ṣāḥib.

¹¹⁷ Busse (1975, 289-290).

During the period that ‘Abd al-Jabbār was a chief judge, he stayed in Rayy most of the time, although he sometimes visited neighbouring towns. In spite of his duties as chief judge he found the time to dictate many books. He completed the *Mughnī*, which he had started in 360/970 before he became chief judge. When the *Mughnī* was finished in 380/990, he sent it to al-Ṣāhib. In reply, al-Ṣāhib sent him a letter in rhymed prose written in his own handwriting¹¹⁸.

As ‘Abd al-Jabbār dictated the twenty volumes of the *Mughnī* over a period of twenty years (360/970-380/990), one would expect him to dictate one volume a year. However, at the end of volume XX of the *Mughnī* ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that the mayor part (*mu’zamuhū*) of the *Mughnī* was dictated during Abū ‘Abdallāh’s life¹¹⁹. Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī died in 369/979, as ‘Abd al-Jabbār himself says in his biography of Abū ‘Abdallāh in *Faḍl al-’itizāl wa-ṭabaqāt*

¹¹⁸ For the text of this letter, see *Sharḥ al-’uyūn* (369: 13-371: 1).

¹¹⁹ *Wa-lā’alla qā’ilan yaqūlu: inna mu’zama ’l-kūtābi yadullu mā yajrī fīhi min dhikri saykhinā Abī ‘Abdillāhi ’alā ḥayātihī fa-awākhiruhū tadullu ’alā wafātihī, wa-innamā tajīduhū ka-dhālika li-annā amlaynā mu’zamaḥū wa-huwa ḥayyun* (*Mughnī* XX/2, 258: 9-10). ‘Abd al-Jabbār suggests that at the beginning of the *Mughnī* he added the blessing for the living to the name of Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī, whereas in the last part he added the blessing for the deceased to his name. The blessings meant by ‘Abd al-Jabbār are the blessings “May God make his life long” (*aṭāla ’llāhu baqā’ahū*), which is placed after the name of living persons as a sign of respect, and “May God have mercy upon him” (*raḥimahū ’llāhu*), which is placed after the name of deceased persons. This leads one to assume that in the first nine volumes of the *Mughnī*, Abū ‘Abdallāh’s name will be found with the blessing for the living. However, an investigation of the edited text shows that as early as volume IV, the first available volume of the *Mughnī*, the blessing for the deceased “May God have mercy upon him” appears after the name of Abū ‘Abdallāh. See, for instance, *Mughnī* (IV, 79: 2, 94: 13, 129: 6 and 262: 13). An explanation for this might be that the copyist of the manuscript changed the blessing for the living in the blessing for the death, because at the moment of copying Abū ‘Abdallāh had already died. At the end of the manuscript the year 606 (1210) is mentioned as the year in which the copy of the manuscript was completed (*Mughnī* XX/2, 262: 21). It is known that blessings after names were sometimes changed. When Sulaymān b. Nāṣir b. Sa’īd (sixth/twelfth century) wrote an abridgement of Abū ’l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s *Kitāb al-Mu’tamad fī uṣūl al-fiqh*, he said that he changed the blessing “May God make his life long” (*aṭāla ’llāhu baqā’ahū*) after the name of Qāḍī ’l-quḍāt (‘Abd al-Jabbār) to the blessing “May God have mercy upon him” (*raḥimahū ’llāhu*) because ‘Abd al-Jabbār had died by then. However, sometimes Sulaymān forgot to change this, so that the original blessing “May God make his life long” has been maintained in some places in the abridgment (*Mu’tamad* I, 23, note 4). Such a forgetfulness from the side of the copyist may also explain that in the edited text of the *Mughnī*, al-Ṣāhib’s name appears with the blessing for the living (*Mughnī*, VI/2, 4: 12 and *Mughnī* XX/2, 258: 18-19), although he had died by the time the copy of the manuscript was made.

al-Mu'tazila (*Faql*, 325: 18). If 'Abd al-Jabbār dictated one volume a year, he should have dictated about nine volumes during Abū 'Abdallāh's life. This is nearly half of the *Mughnī* and not the mayor part of it.

However, there is another remark from 'Abd al-Jabbār that seems to indicate that the greater part of the *Mughnī* was dictated after 367/977, when he had become a chief judge. In volume VI/2 of the *Mughnī* he says that he heard al-Ṣāhib b. 'Abbād giving his opinion on a theological question. He refers to him as al-Ṣāhib al-Jalīl, adding to his name the blessing "May God make the life of his Highness long" (*adāma 'llāhu 'uluwwahū*) (*Mughnī*, VI/2, 4: 12). The fact that 'Abd al-Jabbār says that he heard al-Ṣāhib express his opinion and the respectful way in which he speaks about him suggest that when he dictated volume VI/2, he was already a chief judge in Rayy. A possible explanation for 'Abd al-Jabbār's remarks is that the first volumes of *Mughnī* were dictated once again in the period of 367/977-380/990, after 'Abd al-Jabbār had become a chief judge.

At the end of the *Mughnī*, 'Abd al-Jabbār mentions books that he dictated in the same period as the *Mughnī* (*Mughnī* XX/2, 258: 4-7). These works are:

– *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*. This work should not be confused with Mānkḏīm's critical paraphrase of it¹²⁰. As we have seen, the work that was paraphrased by Mānkḏīm is a commentary made by 'Abd al-Jabbār on one of his earlier works, *Kitāb al-uṣūl al-khamsa*¹²¹. On

¹²⁰ 'Uthmān edited this critical paraphrase under the title *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*. On this work see above, 3-4. Mānkḏīm's *ta'līq* is not the only *ta'līq* on 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*. Another *ta'līq* was later made by Abū Muḥammad Ismā'īl al-Farrazādhī. Gimaret (1979, 61) places al-Farrazādhī's death in about 510/1116. He concluded that al-Farrazādhī's *ta'līq* is very close to Mānkḏīm's but that it still is a new *ta'līq*.

¹²¹ This is a relatively short text that renders only the principal doctrinal points of the Mu'tazila without extensive elaboration. Gimaret thinks that it was meant as a sort of Mu'tazilite creed (*aqīda*) in the form of questions and answers that could easily be understood by the average reader. The text of *Kitāb al-uṣūl al-khamsa* was published by him as part of an article (Gimaret 1979, 79-96). An English translation of the text with explanations has been published by Richard C. Martin, Mark R. Woodward & Dwi S. Atmaja (1997, 90-115). *Kitāb al-uṣūl al-khamsa* is not mentioned by al-Jushamī or Ibn al-Murtaḏā among the works of 'Abd al-Jabbār, nor is it mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbār himself at the end of the *Mughnī*. Perhaps it was not mentioned because it was regarded as a less important work after 'Abd al-Jabbār had dictated his commentary (*sharḥ*) on it. As for 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, we know that it existed because it is mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbār among the works that he dictated in the same period as the

the basis of a study of several manuscripts Gimaret concluded that ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* is a commentary made by him on one of his earlier works, *Kitāb al-uṣūl al-khamsa*. Gimaret discovered the text of *Kitāb al-uṣūl al-khamsa* in a manuscript in the Vatican collection. Comparing this work with Mānkḏīm’s critical paraphrase of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, he became convinced that this was the work which *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* is a commentary on. – *Sharḥ al-maqālāt*¹²². This is a commentary on *al-Maqālāt*, a work by Abū ‘l-Qāsim al-Balkhī¹²³.

– *Bayān al-mutashābih fi ‘l-Qur’ān*¹²⁴. This is an explanation of difficult passages in the *Qur’ān*.

– *Kitāb al-‘itimād*¹²⁵.

– *Sharḥ al-jawāmi‘*. It is likely that one of the collections (*jawāmi‘*) referred to is Abū Hāshim’s *al-Ĵāmi‘ al-kabīr*¹²⁶, but it is not clear what the other collections are. We have seen that ‘Abd al-Jabbār dictated a commentary on Abū Hāshim’s other collection, *al-Ĵāmi‘ al-ṣaġhūr*, in the period before the dictation of the *Mughnī*¹²⁷.

– *Kitāb al-tajrīd*¹²⁸.

– *Sharḥ kashf al-‘rād*¹²⁹.

Mughnī (*Mughnī* XX/2, 258: 6). It is also mentioned by al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 368: 2) and by Ibn al-Murtaḏā (*Ṭabaqāt*, 113: 9). However, the text of this work has not been discovered in any collection of manuscripts yet. Prof. Madelung kindly informed me that there is a quotation from ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* in Nashwān al-Ĥimyārī’s *Al-Khūr al-‘in* [or *al-‘ayn*], Beirut/Ṣan‘ā’, 1985², 259-260.

¹²² *Sharḥ al-maqālāt* is mentioned by al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 368: 3) and by Ibn al-Murtaḏā (*Ṭabaqāt*, 113: 10). This work was also known to Ibn Sīnā because in one of his letters he refers to what ‘Abd al-Jabbār says in it about space (*faḏā*). Dhanani (1994, 70) gives a translation of this passage.

¹²³ On him, see above, 26, note 41, and below, 60, note 196.

¹²⁴ *Bayān al-mutashābih fi ‘l-Qur’ān*, *al-Mutashābih* for short, is mentioned by al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 369: 1). The text has been edited by ‘Adnān Muḥammad Zarzūr (Cairo, 1969). On its contents, see Peters (1976, 11-12) and ‘Uthmān (1965, 58). ‘Uthmān concluded that it was completed before ‘Abd al-Jabbār dictated volume XVII of the *Mughnī* because he refers to it in that volume. Bernard (1984) studied the exegetical method applied by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in *Bayān al-mutashābih fi ‘l-Qur’ān*.

¹²⁵ *Kitāb al-‘itimād* is mentioned by al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 367: 17) and by Ibn al-Murtaḏā (*Ṭabaqāt*, 113: 6). Ibn Mattawayh refers to it (*Tadhkira*, 601: 10).

¹²⁶ On this work, see Gimaret (1976, 313-316).

¹²⁷ See above, 39.

¹²⁸ *Kitāb al-tajrīd* is mentioned by al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 369: 3).

¹²⁹ Ibn Mattawayh refers to it by the title *Sharḥ kashf al-‘aġhrād ‘an al-‘rād* (*Tadhkira*, 337: 8-9) but al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 368: 4) and Ibn al-Murtaḏā (*Ṭabaqāt*, 113: 10) refer to it by the title *Sharḥ al-‘rād*. Ben Shammai (1974, 302) considers

– a part of *Sharḥ adab al-jadal*¹³⁰. The title indicates that *Sharḥ adab al-jadal* must be a commentary on a work on the rules of disputation, entitled *Adab al-jadal*. It is not clear who was the author of this *Adab al-jadal*. It is known that Ibn al-Rāwandī is the author of a work called *Kitāb adab al-jadal* and that there is another book on this subject in which al-Balkhī corrected mistakes that he discovered in Ibn al-Rāwandī's book¹³¹. 'Abd al-Jabbār's commentary may be on one of these two works, although it is also possible that it is a commentary on an earlier work on disputation by himself¹³².

– answers to questions. 'Abd al-Jabbār says that in this period he also gave answers to questions. Al-Jushamī (*Sharḥ al-'uyūn*, 368: 9-11) and Ibn al-Murtaḍā (*Ṭabaqāt*, 113: 12-13) mention works by 'Abd al-Jabbār that contain answers to questions posed to him. Most of these works are named after towns, for instance, *al-Rāziyyāt* after Rayy, *al-'Askariyyāt* after 'Askar Mukram, and *al-Nīsābūriyyāt* after Nīsābūr. They were probably given these names because the questions were posed by inhabitants of these towns.

'Abd al-Jabbār's *al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn* probably also dates from the period in which he was chief judge because he wrote this work at the request of al-Šāḥib. 'Abd al-Jabbār does not mention it among the books he dictated between 360/970 and 380/990. It is therefore possible that he dictated it after he finished the *Mughnī*, in the period 380/990-385/995. *Al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn* is a rather short work on Mu'tazilite doctrine, presumably meant for laymen who adhered to Mu'tazilism¹³³.

it possible that a part of this work exists in a manuscript in the British Museum.

¹³⁰ This work is not mentioned by al-Jushamī or by Ibn al-Murtaḍā.

¹³¹ Gimaret (1985, 247-248).

¹³² Al-Jushamī mentions among 'Abd al-Jabbār's works one that is named *al-Jadal* (*Sharḥ al-'uyūn*, 369: 4). 'Uthmān (1968, 63) supposes that by *al-Jadal* al-Jushamī means *Sharḥ adab al-jadal*.

¹³³ It is not mentioned by al-Jushamī or Ibn al-Murtaḍā, probably because it was not an important work. The text has been edited by Muḥammad 'Imāra in *Rasā'il al-'adl wa-'l-tawḥīd* (Cairo, 1971. Reprint: 1988). It is a compendium of Mu'tazilite learning (Daiber, 1975, 266). Possibly, it is identical to 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Mukhtaṣar al-Husnā* (or *al-Hasanī*), because Mānkḍīm reports that in *Mukhtaṣar al-Husnā* 'Abd al-Jabbār says that the principles of Mu'tazilite doctrine are Unity (*tawḥīd*), Justice ('*adl*), Prophethood (*nubuwwāt*) and Prescriptions of the Religious Law (*sharā'ī*) (*Ta'līq*, 122: 15-16). The same four principles are mentioned in *al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn* (*Mukhtaṣar*, 197: 16-19). It is unusual to have only four principles: the usual number is five. It is therefore possible that Mānkḍīm is referring to the work that was edited by 'Imāra under the title of *al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn*. Frank (1982a, 355) refers to this work as *Risālat al-Husnā*.

The titles of the works mentioned make it clear that in the period 360/970-385/995 ‘Abd al-Jabbār composed all kinds of works, including an extensive “summa theologica” (*al-Mughnī*), commentaries on classical Mu‘tazilite texts and on some of his own works, works on specific subjects of speculative theology, and a work on the Qur’ān. However, none of the works from this period seem to deal with legal subjects. This is surprising since, as chief judge, one would have expected him to have dictated works on law like the two important works *Kitāb al-‘umad* and *Kitāb al-nihāya* which date from before the *Mughnī*.

4.4. *The End of the Judgeship*

Al-Šāḥib died in 385/995. In accordance with his wishes, he was buried in Iṣfahān. It is said that ‘Abd al-Jabbār refused to pronounce the funeral prayer of remission for his sins and that Fakhr al-Dawla arrested ‘Abd al-Jabbār for this and fined him heavily¹³⁴. It is possible that this is a historically inaccurate story, fabricated by ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s adversaries on the basis of his opinion that one is punished for one’s sins unless one really repents of them and that there is no intercession for sinners¹³⁵. Even if ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s convictions were so strong that he refused to say the funeral prayer, it is more likely that his arrest and the seizure of his properties were the result of the loss of al-Šāḥib’s patronage, so that he was no longer protected against Fakhr al-Dawla’s actions. Al-Šāḥib’s heirs were no safer from Fakhr al-Dawla’s actions than ‘Abd al-Jabbār and it is unlikely that Fakhr al-Dawla would have defended al-Šāḥib’s honour while at the same time confiscating his property and showing his discontent with him. Fakhr al-Dawla confiscated al-Šāḥib’s property¹³⁶,

¹³⁴ Kraemer (1986, 272).

¹³⁵ ‘Abd al-Jabbār was of the opinion that repentance of sins is an obligation (*Mughnī* XIV, 335-337). However, he emphasizes that repentance must be genuine, which implies that one must feel regret about the sin committed and must be determined never to do it again (*Mughnī* XIV, 371-373). He is of the opinion that one who genuinely repents no longer deserves to be punished or blamed (*Mughnī* XIV, 311: 4) and that punishment from God will only be remitted after the sinner has truly repented and not as the result of someone else’s intercession. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore considers it wrong to intercede for those who die without repenting of their sins (*Ta’līq*, 688: 14-17). In this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s position is much stricter than Abū Hāshim’s, who maintains that intercession is a good act (*Ta’līq*, 689: 1-2).

¹³⁶ Busse (1975, 295) and Cahen (1965, 749).

possibly because he was in urgent need of money, apparently the reason why, some years earlier he had arrested the commander of the army and confiscated his possessions¹³⁷ and why several officials lost both their positions and their properties after al-Šāhib's death. 'Abd al-Jabbār was probably dealt with in the same way as these officials.

It is not known when 'Abd al-Jabbār was released but it is certain that he was not re-established in his position of chief judge under the new vizier appointed by Fakhr al-Dawla after al-Šāhib's death. This could not have been the result of his adherence to Mu'tazilism or the Shāfi'ite school of law, as the new chief judge of Rayy, Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Jurjānī¹³⁸ was, like 'Abd al-Jabbār, a Mu'tazilite and a Shāfi'ite (*Ṭabaqāt*, 115: 4-5 and *Sharḥ al-'uyūn*, 380: 11-12). Relations between the new chief judge and 'Abd al-Jabbār were apparently good, since 'Abd al-Jabbār said the funeral prayer for al-Jurjānī when he died in 392/1002 (*Sharḥ al-'uyūn*, 380, note 83).

Fakhr al-Dawla died in 387/997, only two years after al-Šāhib. After his death rulership was divided between his eldest son Majd al-Dawla in Rayy, and his youngest son Shams al-Dawla in Hamadhān. However, both sons were minors at the time, so Fakhr al-Dawla's widow al-Sayyida Shīrīn ruled over Jibāl as their regent¹³⁹. She acknowledged the supremacy of Bahā' al-Dawla in Baghdād. When Majd al-Dawla¹⁴⁰ came of age, he did not take over the rulership because his mother refused to give up power and continued to rule in his name. So, Majd al-Dawla, who had been educated by the philologist and grammarian Ibn Fāris, occupied himself with his study and his harem. It seems that he had an interest in Mu'tazilism, since 'Abd al-Jabbār wrote a work for him, al-Majdī, named after him¹⁴¹.

¹³⁷ Cahen (1965, 749). Fakhr al-Dawla's need of money is further evidenced by his order to the new vizier to collect 30,000,000 dirhams from the provinces and from officials, allegedly because al-Šāhib had neglected to collect these sums (Mottahedeh, 1973, 43, note 35).

¹³⁸ On him, see *al-Wāfi bi-'l-wafayāt* (XVIII, 33: 19) and Madelung (1965, 15). He was not only a scholar but also a poet. He wrote a commentary on the Qur'ān and treatises on law and history, and poems (*Ṭabaqāt al-shāfi'iyya* I, 163-164).

¹³⁹ Spuler (1952, 106).

¹⁴⁰ On Majd al-Dawla, see Bosworth (1986, 1028). The philosopher Ibn Sīnā stayed for a short time at his court in Rayy, probably around the year 404/1014 (Gutas, 1988, 99).

¹⁴¹ 'Uthmān (1968, 71-72).

The economic situation in Rayy was bad during the regency of al-Sayyida and political instability was perhaps one of the main reasons for this. Unceasing war efforts were needed to ward off attacks from outside and to suppress internal uprisings. Majd al-Dawla had to renounce a part of his territory in the west, where Zanjān and several other towns were occupied by an Ādharbāyjān dynasty. Shortly after 398/1007 al-Sayyida made the Kurdish prince Ja‘far ‘Alā’ al-Dawla b. Kākūya governor of Iṣfahān, but this was a mistake since ‘Alā’ al-Dawla soon succeeded in making himself independent¹⁴². The rule of al-Sayyida over Rayy did not come to an end until she died in 419/1028.

‘Abd al-Jabbār died some years before her, having lived to a very old age. He had been about sixty years old when he lost his position of chief judge in 385/995. He lived for another thirty years, devoting his time to teaching and writing or dictating books. He spent most of this time in Rayy, although he visited Baghdād in 389/999 on his way to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage. On the way back, he stayed in Baghdād for some time to teach¹⁴³. We have seen that one of those who studied with him during this stay in Baghdād was the Imāmīte theologian al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā¹⁴⁴. ‘Abd al-Jabbār also visited other places, such as Qazwīn in 409/1018¹⁴⁵, ‘Askar Mukram, and Iṣfahān, where he taught his own books¹⁴⁶. When he grew old, he began to suffer from gout. It is said that once, when he needed to go out but was unable to do so because of the gout, *sharīfs* (descendants of the Prophet) carried him on their shoulders (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 369: 8-9). This illustrates their great respect for him.

‘Abd al-Jabbār used to transmit knowledge by both dictation and teaching, but apparently he spent more time teaching than dictat-

¹⁴² Busse (1975, 294).

¹⁴³ Madelung (1985, 117).

¹⁴⁴ Al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā Abū ‘l-Qāsim ‘Alī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī ‘Alām al-Hudā (355/967-436/1044) became the leader of the Imāmītes of Baghdād after the death of his teacher al-Shaykh al-Mufīd in 413/1022. On al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s doctrine, see McDermott (1978, 373-394). McDermott (1978, 382) observes that al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s doctrine on pain and compensation is in general similar to that of ‘Abd al-Jabbār.

¹⁴⁵ ‘Uthmān (1968, 26).

¹⁴⁶ In Iṣfahān ‘Abd al-Jabbār gave lessons on *Ziyādāt al-sharḥ* which were attended by the Zaydīte imām al-Mu‘ayyad bi-‘llāh (*Hadā’iq*, 265: 19-266: 1). It is not clear to which commentary the additions (*ziyādāt*) were made. It may have been Ibn Khallād’s famous *Sharḥ* (see above, 31).

ing¹⁴⁷. When teaching, he may have taught one of his own books. Teaching by means of a book became frequent in the fifth/eleventh century, whereas dictation was used less often, although it was not completely dropped. The students may have had copies of the work that was taught and the master would read this work and explain it to them¹⁴⁸. One of the works that ‘Abd al-Jabbār taught in this way was *al-Muḥīt bi-’l-taklīf*. This can be concluded from a remark made by Ibn Mattawayh who, in his critical paraphrase of this work, says “and he [‘Abd al-Jabbār] said when he taught this book [*al-Muḥīt bi-’l-taklīf*]...” (*wa-qāla fī tadrīsi hādihā ’l-kitābi...*) (*Majmū’* I, 184: 11)¹⁴⁹. The teaching was not always done by ‘Abd al-Jabbār himself. Al-Labbād, one of his best graduate students (*aṣḥāb*), would be his substitute (*khalīfa*) in teaching (*Sharḥ al-’uyūn*, 383: 8 and *Ṭabaqāt*, 116: 15)¹⁵⁰.

As said before, in the last period of his life ‘Abd al-Jabbār also wrote or dictated books. We know the titles of some of them. These are:

- *Tathbūt dalā’il al-nubuwwa*¹⁵¹. This deals with Muḥammad’s prophethip. According to a notation in the book itself, ‘Abd al-Jabbār wrote this work in 385/995¹⁵², the year in which he lost his position as chief judge.
- *Tanzīh al-Qur’ān ‘an al-maṭā’in*¹⁵³. In this work ‘Abd al-Jabbār clarifies verses of the Qur’ān and refutes objections of opponents.
- *al-Majdī*¹⁵⁴. As we have seen, this work was written for Majd al-

¹⁴⁷ *Wa-kāna raḥimahū ’llāhu yakhtaṣīru fī ’l-implā’i wa-yabsuṭu fī ’l-darsi* (*Sharḥ al-’uyūn*, 369: 6).

¹⁴⁸ Endress (1982, 287). On this method of teaching, see also Van Ess (1976, 24), Makdisi (1981, 112-126 and 114) and Kraemer (1986, 56-57).

¹⁴⁹ See also below, 65, note 218.

¹⁵⁰ On the function of a master’s substitute, see Makdisi (1981, 189).

¹⁵¹ This may be the same work as *al-Adilla*, of which al-Jushamī says it is a work on the Qur’ān (*Sharḥ al-’uyūn*, 369: 1). It is not mentioned by Ibn al-Murtaḍā. For other references to it, see ‘Uthmān (1968, 60). The text was edited by ‘Abd al-Karīm ‘Uthmān and published in 1966 in Beirut. On its contents, see Peters (1976, 12-13) and Madelung (1985, 117).

¹⁵² Peters (1976, 13, note 45).

¹⁵³ On this work, see Peters (1976, 12). He deems it probable that it was written after 380/990. The text was published in Cairo in 1329/1911 and in Beirut in 1967. (‘Uthmān, 1968, 59, and Madelung, 1985, 117). It is mentioned by al-Jushamī as *al-Tanzīh* (*Sharḥ al-’uyūn*, 369: 1). Ibn al-Murtaḍā does not mention it.

¹⁵⁴ On this work, see ‘Uthmān (1968, 71-72). Al-Jushamī and Ibn al-Murtaḍā do not mention a work with this title.

Dawla. As Majd al-Dawla was still very young when Fakhr al-Dawla died in 387/997, it is likely that it was written for him after this date, when he had come of age.

– *Faḍl al-ʿitizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila*¹⁵⁵. This work contains a short summary of the Muʿtazilite doctrine and biographies of famous Muʿtazilites. ʿAbd al-Jabbār wrote it at the request of the Khwārazm-shāh al-Maʿmūn II (r. 399/1009-407/1017)¹⁵⁶, who, according to what ʿAbd al-Jabbār says in the introduction, had become an adherent of Muʿtazilism. (*Faḍl*, 137-138). This work was a source for both al-Jushamī's *Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn* and Ibn al-Murtaḍā's *Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila*¹⁵⁷.

– *al-Amālī fī ʿl-ḥadīth* or, *Naẓm al-fawāʿid wa-taqrīb al-murād li-ʿl-rāʿid*. Presumably ʿAbd al-Jabbār dictated this work after *Faḍl al-ʿitizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila* because at the beginning of that work he says he will compile a work on *ḥadīth* (*Faḍl*, 213: 15). This work on *ḥadīth* is probably what later became *al-Amālī fī ʿl-ḥadīth*¹⁵⁸.

4.5. ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Death

There is no agreement among ʿAbd al-Jabbār's biographers on the exact date of his death. Some say that he died in 414/1023 and others give the date as 416/1025, but the majority mention the year 415/1024¹⁵⁹. It is reported that eight *sharīfs* participated in the

¹⁵⁵ On this work, see ʿUthmān (1968, 63-64). The text was edited by Fuʿād Sayyid and published in 1974 in Tunis. ʿUthmān drew the conclusion that it was written between 388/998 and 407/1017 because he took it for granted that Shāh Abū ʿl-ʿAbbās al-Maʿmūn II reigned from 388 to 407. Fuʿād Sayyid (*Faḍl*, 137) thought that al-Maʿmūn II came to power in 390. He refers to E. de Zambaur (*Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam*. Hanovre: Lafaire, 1927, 316), who indeed mentions the date of 390. However, according to Bosworth (1996, 89) al-Maʿmūn II reigned from 399/1009 to 407/1017.

¹⁵⁶ The court of Abū ʿl-ʿAbbās Maʿmūn II in Gurgānj was a centre of learning and literature. Among the brilliant figures who surrounded al-Maʿmūn II were the philosopher Ibn Sīnā and the philologist Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Mālik al-Thaʿalibī. (Bosworth, 1978, 1066). For Ibn Sīnā's stay in Gurgānj, see also Gutas (1988, 29 and 80).

¹⁵⁷ *Ṭabaqāt* (XVI) and Madelung (1987, 330).

¹⁵⁸ This is ʿUthmān's conclusion (ʿUthmān, 1968, 59-60). The work is not mentioned by al-Jushamī or Ibn al-Murtaḍā. For references to it, see ʿUthmān (1968, 59). Manuscripts of this work exist in the collections of the Vatican (Sezgin, 1967, 625), the British Museum and in a private collection in Cairo (ʿUthmān, 1968, 60).

¹⁵⁹ ʿUthmān (1968, 26-27).

prayer for the deceased at his funeral. One of them was Mānkḏīm Shashḏīw¹⁶⁰, the author of *Taʿlīq Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*. Another participant was Abū ʿl-ʿAbbās al-Sammān, the chief judge of Rayy at that time. He was a Muʿtazilite and one of the disciples (*aṣḥāb*) of ʿAbd al-Jabbār but, unlike ʿAbd al-Jabbār, he followed the Ḥanafite school of law (*Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn*, 391: 2 and note 129). The funeral was also attended by Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī¹⁶¹, who, as we have seen, became the leader of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s school, the Bahshamiyya, after his death.

5. *Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī*

As already mentioned, al-Sayyida Shīrīn died in 419/1028, a few years after the death of ʿAbd al-Jabbār. After her death Majd al-Dawla at last got the opportunity to rule but, because his mother had always kept him out of state affairs, he had no practical experience at ruling and, unable to maintain order, was forced to ask a neighbouring ruler, Maḥmūd of Ghazna, for assistance. Maḥmūd willingly took up this invitation and came to Rayy with his army in 420/1029 but, instead of helping Majd al-Dawla, he dethroned him and took possession of his territory¹⁶². Having occupied Rayy, Maḥmūd sacked the city and killed many citizens. It is said that he sent the treasuries of Majd al-Dawla, among them fifty camel-loads of books, to Ghazna, the capital of his empire.

Maḥmūd dealt severely with the Carmathians, the Bāṭinites and the Muʿtazilites who lived in Rayy. In his report on the capture of Rayy that he sent to Caliph al-Qādir in Baghdād he announced that he had cleared Rayy from Bāṭinite and heretic propaganda and had burnt the Muʿtazilite, philosophical and Shīʿite books that he had come across¹⁶³. He added that the leaders of the Muʿtazila and the extremist Shīʿa were carried off to Khurāsān together with Majd al-Dawla and his son¹⁶⁴.

¹⁶⁰ For his biography, see below, 60-62.

¹⁶¹ For his biography, see below, 55-57.

¹⁶² Bosworth (1986, 1028).

¹⁶³ For this report, see Glassen (1981, 10-11) and Bosworth (1962, 70-72).

¹⁶⁴ Al-Jushamī does not report on deportations of Muʿtazilites from Rayy and does not refer to any action of Maḥmūd of Ghazna against them. Instead, he reports that ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s former servant, Abū Bakr al-Dīnawarī, held a dispute with Abū ʿl-Ḥasan al-Tūnī in the presence of Maḥmūd after Maḥmūd’s

Maḥmūd's severe attitude towards Shī'ites and Mu'tazilites may have been a demonstration of his loyalty to the 'Abbāsid caliphs in Baghdād. The caliph al-Qādir (r. 381/991-422/1031) strove to strengthen the position of the orthodox Sunnites by issuing a proclamation in 408/1017 in which he commanded theologians to remain aloof from the Mu'tazila. The proclamation also forbade speculative theology (*kalām*) and the teaching or discussion of Mu'tazilism (*ʿiṭizāl*) and Imāmism (*rafḍ*). Those who failed to observe this ban would be punished. Because of this proclamation, the Ḥanafite lawyer Abū 'Abdallāh al-Ṣaymarī (d. 436/1045) had to renounce his Mu'tazilism in order to be appointed as a judge in Baghdād¹⁶⁵. In 420/1029, several years after the proclamation, Caliph al-Qādir had three letters officially read in his palace in Baghdād in which he again rejected Mu'tazilism and Shī'ism¹⁶⁶.

Maḥmūd's banishment of the Mu'tazilites and his report on the actions he had taken in Rayy against the Carmathians, the Bāṭīnites and the Mu'tazilites can be seen as responses to the caliph's proclamations. Maḥmūd might have hoped to win the caliph's favour by presenting himself as a fighter for orthodox Sunnite Islam. It is possible that he wanted the caliph's legal and moral approval of his expansionist policies, which had involved questionable actions such as the deposition of Majd al-Dawla and the occupation of his territory¹⁶⁷.

After occupying Rayy, Maḥmūd placed it under the rule of his son Mas'ūd and commanded him to subjugate the neighbouring dynasties. Obeying this order, Mas'ūd first defeated the Daylamite Sālār. Then, in 421/1030 he captured Hamadhān and Iṣfahān from the Kurd 'Alā' al-Dawla b. Kākūya, the former Būyid governor¹⁶⁸.

arrival in Rayy (*Sharḥ al-'uyūn*, 390: 12-15). However, al-Jushamī does report al-Maḥmūd's action against three Mu'tazilites of Nīsābūr when he was in Ghazna. They were brought to him and he exiled them to Quzdār, where they died (*Sharḥ al-'uyūn*, 387: 7-11) (See also *Ṭabaqāt*, 118: 7-10). It is likely that they were banished because of their adherence to the Mu'tazila, although this is not explicitly mentioned as the reason for their banishment. The name of their place of exile is read as 'Uzdār (*Sharḥ al-'uyūn*, 387: 10) or as Ghuzdār (*Ṭabaqāt*, 118: 10) but evidently the place meant here is Quzdār, the capital of Tūrān, one of Maḥmūd of Ghazna's early conquests (Le Strange, 1930, 331 and Gaube, 1994, 142).

¹⁶⁵ Makdisi (1973, 156), Glassen (1981, 10) and Nagel (1988, 56-57).

¹⁶⁶ Makdisi (1963, 301-303) and Laoust (1973, 173).

¹⁶⁷ Bosworth (1973², 53).

¹⁶⁸ Ibn Kākūyā had to leave Iṣfahān together with Ibn Sīnā, his vizier and physician (Gutas, 1988, 135).

When his father Maḥmūd died in the same year, Mas‘ūd marched to Nīsābūr and claimed the throne¹⁶⁹. Ibn Kākūya made use of his absence to occupy Rayy, but this did not last long¹⁷⁰. He was soon driven out again by a force dispatched by Mas‘ūd and for several years after this, Rayy was ruled by Mas‘ūd’s governors. It was a turbulent period in which the governors of Rayy repeatedly fought Ibn Kākūya. Another disruptive factor was the presence of groups of Oghuz Turks who raided the district. In 428/1037 or 429/1038 Rayy was attacked by two of these groups¹⁷¹. In the same year Ibn Kākūya at last succeeded in occupying Rayy, but he ruled over it for only a short period because he died in 433/1041¹⁷². Soon after his death, Rayy was occupied by another rising power, the Seljuks.

By then, about fifteen years had passed since the death of ‘Abd al-Jabbār. What had happened to his school during this turbulent period? Al-Jushamī and Ibn al-Murtaḍā report that the leadership (*riyāsa*) of the Mu‘tazila after the death of ‘Abd al-Jabbār passed to Abū Rashīd Sa‘īd b. Muḥammad b. Sa‘īd al-Nīsābūrī¹⁷³ (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 382: 11-12 and *Ṭabaqāt*, 116: 4). We have seen¹⁷⁴ that this leadership did not imply political leadership but it meant that after ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s death Abū Rashīd was regarded as the most outstanding of all living Mu‘tazilites. He also became ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s successor as master of his school, the Bahshamiyya (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 382: 14).

Who was Abū Rashīd? His date of birth is not known but he was probably born in the second half of the fourth/tenth century, although before 360/970¹⁷⁵. At first, Abū Rashīd adhered to a Mu‘tazilite school of the Baghdādian tradition. When he was already an acknowledged scholar and author of books he went to Rayy to study with ‘Abd al-Jabbār, who is said to have received him most favourably, and he became one of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s disciples (*aṣḥāb*) (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 382: 11 and *Ṭabaqāt*, 116: 3-4). Abū Rashīd’s arrival

¹⁶⁹ Nāzīm (1971², 85).

¹⁷⁰ Bosworth (1973², 234) and Gutas (1988, 135).

¹⁷¹ Bosworth (1968, 38).

¹⁷² On ‘Alā’ al-Dawla b. Kākūyā’s war with the Ghaznavids, see Bosworth (1970, 76-81).

¹⁷³ On the life and works of Abū Rashīd, see *Sharḥ al-‘uyūn* (382: 83-383: 5), *Ṭabaqāt* (116: 2-13), Madelung (1985a), Frank (1980), Martin (1978), ‘Uthmān (1968, 50), Sezgin (1967, 626-627), Horten (1910, 6-9) and Biram (1902, 7-10).

¹⁷⁴ See above, 24, note 37.

¹⁷⁵ Madelung (1985a, 367) considers it likely that he was born no later than 360/970.

in Rayy must have preceded the death of al-Şāhib b. ‘Abbād in 385/995 since Abū Rashīd said that he saw the Zaydite al-Mu’ayyad bi-’llāh at al-Şāhib’s scholarly meetings (*Ḥadā’iq*, 266: 1-4).

The relationship between Abū Rashīd and ‘Abd al-Jabbār was almost that of two colleagues. Ibn al-Murtaḍā reports that one day ‘Abd al-Jabbār was asked to compile a book on opinions (*fatāwā*) in speculative theology (*kalām*) that could be read and commented on, as was done in law (*fiqh*). However, ‘Abd al-Jabbār was busy with other books and he therefore passed the request on to Abū Rashīd, who thereupon compiled *Dīwān al-uşūl* (*Ṭabaqāt*, 116: 10-13 and *Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 382: 18-383: 2).

After staying with ‘Abd al-Jabbār for some time, Abū Rashīd went back to Nīsābūr where he had a study-circle (*ḥalqa*) of theologians¹⁷⁶ (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 382: 18 and *Ṭabaqāt*, 116: 9-10). He later returned to Rayy, where he remained until his death (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 382: 14-16). He also visited Jurjān, perhaps on his journey to or from Nīsābūr. It is reported that he made a new version of *Dīwān al-uşūl* in Jurjān, because people there had objected to the sequence of the subjects in the first version that he had written or dictated in Rayy. In the first version he discussed the subject of atoms (*jawāhir*) and accidents (*‘arād*) before discussing the unity (*tawḥīd*) and the justice (*‘adl*) of God. In the new version the sequence of subjects was changed, so that the subjects of atoms and accidents were discussed at a later stage (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 383: 2-5).

Abū Rashīd was in Rayy when ‘Abd al-Jabbār died in about 415/1024. This can be concluded from the fact that he is mentioned among the mourners at ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s funeral¹⁷⁷. Assuming that Abū Rashīd was born before 360/970, he must have been at least fifty-four when he became the new leader of the school after ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s death. We do not know how much longer he lived after this because the date of his death is unknown¹⁷⁸. It is possible

¹⁷⁶ It is not clear whether he had this circle before or after his first stay in Rayy. Frank (1980, 32) is of the opinion that he gave it up before he returned to Rayy to take up permanent residence there.

¹⁷⁷ See above, 53.

¹⁷⁸ According to Horten (1911, 433), Abū Rashīd died in about 1068, but he does not explain why he says this. Ahlwardt (1887/99, IV, 448) also gives no explanation of how he reached the conclusion that Abū Rashīd lived between 320/932 and 460/1068. He may have concluded this from the fact that the copyist of manuscript Berlin no. 5125 of Abū Rashīd’s *Kitāb al-masā’il fī ‘l-khilāf bayn al-Baṣriyyīn wa-‘l-Baghādīyyīn* wrote that he copied this manuscript from a man-

that five years later, in 420/1029, he witnessed the occupation of Rayy by Maḥmūd of Ghazna. If so, he probably was not among the Mu'tazilite leaders who were banished by Maḥmūd because al-Jushamī says that Abū Rashīd stayed in Rayy until he died (*Sharḥ al-'uyūn*, 382: 14-16). It is possible that he went into hiding. We can only speculate about the last part of his life because the biographers are silent about it.

6. *Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his School*

Another of 'Abd al-Jabbār's important disciples was Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī Muḥammad b. 'Alī¹⁷⁹, who was born in Baṣra. He studied with 'Abd al-Jabbār in Rayy, but he also studied philosophy with Ibn al-Samḥ (d. 418/1027) in Baghdād¹⁸⁰. Like 'Abd al-Jabbār, Abū 'l-Ḥusayn was both a theologian and a jurist but, unlike 'Abd al-Jabbār, he followed the Ḥanafite school of law¹⁸¹. He spent most of his life in Baghdād, where he taught and wrote or dictated books on Mu'tazilite theology and on law. It is likely that he had already started to teach before 415/1024¹⁸². We have seen that in 408/1017 Caliph al-Qādir had issued his proclamation in which he forbade the teaching of Mu'tazilism. Abū 'l-Ḥusayn apparently did not observe this prohibition.

The doctrine of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn¹⁸³ differed at several points from

uscript that was copied in 460/1068. In another manuscript of Abū Rashīd's work that is mentioned in the list of manuscripts that were filmed during the expedition to Yemen in 1974, the date of 400 (1009) is written as the year of his death (*Makhtū'āt*, 1976, 24, item 145). This must be wrong because it implies that he died earlier than 'Abd al-Jabbār, which is contradicted by the report that he attended 'Abd al-Jabbār's funeral in 415/1024 (or 414/1023 or 416/1025).

¹⁷⁹ For literature on Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his works, see the bibliography made by Madelung (1980, 25-26). To the studies mentioned by Madelung we may add a later article on Abū 'l-Ḥusayn by Gimaret (1985b).

¹⁸⁰ Madelung (1980, 25) and Kraemer (1986, 131).

¹⁸¹ Madelung (1980, 25) reached this conclusion because, when Abū 'l-Ḥusayn died in 436/1044, the prayers at his funeral were said by the Ḥanafite judge al-Ṣaymarī, a Mu'tazilite jurist who had to renounce Mu'tazilism in order to be appointed as a judge (see above, 54).

¹⁸² This is Madelung's opinion (Madelung, 1980, 25).

¹⁸³ For the main points of his doctrine, see Gimaret (1985b). All the theological works of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn are lost. His doctrine has to be constructed from the works of his disciples. The most prominent of his disciples is Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141) (Gimaret, 1986b, 486). The extant parts

the doctrine of ‘Abd al-Jabbār. Al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī and Ibn al-Murtaḍā report that the Bahshamiyya¹⁸⁴ felt an antipathy towards Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn, accusing him of the adoption of theories from the philosophers and the refutation of arguments of the Mu‘tazilite masters in a way they could not approve of (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 387: 15-18, and *Ṭabaqāt*, 119: 2-4). Points of difference between ‘Abd al-Jabbār and Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn are mentioned by al-Shahrastānī (479/1086-548/1153) in his book about religions and sects. In his judgment, Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn was a philosopher¹⁸⁵ who presented his doctrine to the Mu‘tazilites as if it was speculative theology (*kalām*) (*Milāl I*, 85: 3-9). Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (543/1149-606/1209) considered the followers of Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn to form a Mu‘tazilite school separate from the Bahshamiyya and referred to this school as al-Ḥusayniyya (*Ftiqādāt*, 45).

These observations indicate that because of a divergence of opinion between master and disciple, the school of ‘Abd al-Jabbār split into two schools¹⁸⁶, the Bahshamiyya and the school of Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. The same thing had happened before, when the school of Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā‘ī split into the Bahshamiyya and the Ikhshīdiyya, but with this difference: there are no reports about hostilities between the Bahshamiyya and the Ḥusayniyya. The school al-Rāzī refers to as “Bahshamiyya” was probably the school of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s successor Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī and his followers. Others may have followed Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, forming a new Mu‘tazilite school.

Adherents to the school of Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn included Maḥmūd Ibn

of Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s *Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad fī uṣūl al-dīn* have been published by Martin McDermott and Wilferd Madelung. (London: Al-Hoda, 1991). An edition of his *Kitāb al-Fā‘iq fī uṣūl al-dīn* is under preparation by Martin McDermott and Wilferd Madelung (Schmidtke, 1997, 8, note 5). Gimaret (1985b, 322) studied a manuscript of *al-Fā‘iq fī uṣūl al-dīn* and two other manuscripts in which references are made to opinions of Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn. He concluded that Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn disagreed with the Mu‘tazilite masters of the Baṣrian tradition about a number of significant issues. For Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn’s opinions, see also Gimaret (1986, 287-289, notes).

¹⁸⁴ Ibn al-Murtaḍā uses the name al-Bahāshima, but al-Jushamī speaks of “our fellows” (*aṣḥābunā*).

¹⁸⁵ Madelung (1991, 250, note 18) agrees with Gimaret that one should be sceptical with respect to this remark.

¹⁸⁶ Uthmān (1968, 51) describes the school of Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn as a small school (*madrasa*) within the school of ‘Abd al-Jabbār, but Madelung (1980, 25) speaks of Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn’s school as a separate school that had diverged from ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s school.

al-Malāḥimī al-Khwārazmī¹⁸⁷, who is considered the most prominent of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn's disciples. Two of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn's other disciples were Abū 'Alī b. al-Walīd (d. 478/1086), who at first had been a disciple of 'Abd al-Jabbār but who had later become a disciple of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn¹⁸⁸, and Abū 'l-Qāsim b. Barhān (d. 456/1064), who lived in Baghdād¹⁸⁹. A later adherent was Taqī al-Dīn al-Najrānī¹⁹⁰, who lived in the sixth/twelfth century. In his work he refers to Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Rukn al-Dīn al-Khwārazmī¹⁹¹ as being his masters. Ibn al-Murtaḍā says that Abū 'l-Ḥusayn and his disciple Ibn al-Malāḥimī were followed by many of the later theologians and by most of those Imāmites who adhered to Mu'tazila¹⁹² (*Ṭabaqāt*, 119: 9-11). There were also Zaydites who partly adhered to Abū 'l-Ḥusayn's doctrine¹⁹³.

¹⁸⁷ On him, see *Ṭabaqāt*, 119: 9-11. See also above, 57-58, note 183. Al-Ju-shamī does not give a biography of Ibn al-Malāḥimī.

¹⁸⁸ On Ibn al-Walīd, see Makdisi (1963, 407-409). See also below, 64, note 210.

¹⁸⁹ On Abū 'l-Qāsim b. Barhān, see Makdisi (1963, 393-394).

¹⁹⁰ Elshahed (1983) has edited, translated and analyses a part of his *Kitāb al-kāmil fī 'l-istiḡṣā' fī-mā balaghānā min kalām al-qadamā'*. This work deals with the differences between the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and the Bahshamiyya. According to Schmidtke (1991, 3), it is a valuable source for the theological views of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

¹⁹¹ Apparently, this Rukn al-Dīn al-Khwārazmī is the same person as Maḥmūd Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Abū 'l-Ḥusayn's disciple and the author of *Kitāb al-Mu'tamad fī uṣūl al-dīn*. The latter's full name is Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd Ibn al-Malāḥimī al-Khwārazmī (d. 536/1141) (Madelung, 1987, 329 and *Mu'tamad fī uṣūl al-dīn*, title-page and IV).

¹⁹² See also Madelung (1965, 222) and (1991, VIII). The Imāmite Sadīd al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. 'Alī b. al-Ḥasan al-Ḥimmaṣī al-Rāzī (d. after 600/1204) was influenced by the doctrine of the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (Madelung, 1991, VIII). According to Schmidtke (1997, 7, note 2), his *Kitāb al-Munqidh min al-taqlīd* has been published (2 vols, Qumm, 1412-4/1991-3). She says that it contains lengthy quotations from Ibn al-Malāḥimī's *Kitāb al-Fā'iq fī uṣūl al-dīn*. To Sadīd al-Dīn's Imāmite Mu'tazilite school belonged the Imāmites Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), Kamāl al-Dīn Mītham b. Mītham al-Baḥrānī (d. 699/1300), and Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (al-'Allāma al-Ḥillī) (d. 726/1325) (Schmidtke, 1991, 4).

¹⁹³ Madelung (1965, 222) mentions some of them by name. He says that Abū 'l-Qāsim b. Shabīb al-Tihāmī and 'Abdallāh b. Zayd al-'Ansī adhered to most of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn's doctrine, whereas the imām Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza adopted all of his doctrine.

7. *Mānkdm Shashd̄w*

A contemporary of Abū Rashīd and Abū 'l-Ḥusayn was the Zaydite sharīf Abū 'l-Ḥusayn Aḥmad b. Abī Hāshim Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī al-Qazwīnī¹⁹⁴, who was named “Mānkdm” and whose surname was “Shashd̄w”. He was a disciple of the Zaydite imām al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh¹⁹⁵ and stayed with him in Lanjā in Daylamān where al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh had his residence. Like many other Zaydite theologians, they both felt attracted to Mu'tazilite theology¹⁹⁶.

¹⁹⁴ On the life and works of Mānkdm, see Madelung (1965, 181-183) and Gimaret (1979, 57-60). His complete name, showing his descent from 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is mentioned by al-Muḥallī (*Ḥadā'iq*, 270: 7-13). The name Mānkdm is also vocalized as Mānekd̄m, Mānakd̄m or Mānkad̄m. Monnot (1974, 263, note 1) explains that Mānkdm is the Arabic form of the Persian name Māng-d̄m which means “Face of the Moon”. According to al-Muḥallī he was also called al-Mustazhir bi-'llāh (*Ḥadā'iq*, 292: 10).

¹⁹⁵ According to the index in *Tā'liq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, Mānkdm refers to al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh only once (*Tā'liq*, 52: 8). He usually refers to other masters such as Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī and 'Abd al-Jabbār.

¹⁹⁶ For a description of the historical connections between Zaydism and Mu'tazilism, see Madelung (1965, 153-222), Zayd (1985, 17-38), 'Ārif (1987, 62-72), and Madelung (1987a, 361-362). According to Zayd (1985, 33) the first to combine Zaydism and Mu'tazilism was al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Rassī (169/785-246/860) who lived in Egypt in the period before 199/815 until 212/826. He then settled in Rass near al-Madīna. A thorough study on him was written by Madelung (1965). There is no agreement on whether he should be considered a Mu'tazilite. Madelung (1965, 153) is of the opinion that he was not a Mu'tazilite, but that he “opened the door to Mu'tazilism”. Zayd (1985, 33) also thinks that he was not a Mu'tazilite, arguing that he has not come across a single passage in al-Qāsim's works in which he openly admits that he has become a Mu'tazilite. Abrahamov (1990, 55), however, thinks that “al-Qāsim seems to have been a Mu'tazilite thinker”. Madelung (1989, 1991a and 1992) disagrees with Abrahamov about al-Qāsim being influenced by Mu'tazilite doctrine; he is of the opinion that he rather was influenced by contemporary Christian theology. Some of al-Qāsim's followers propagated Zaydism in Iran. In 250/864 the Zaydite al-Ḥasan b. Zayd became the ruler of Ṭabaristān, where he imposed Shī'ite ritual and law in combination with Mu'tazilite theology. After his death in 270/884 he was succeeded by his brother Muḥammad b. Zayd (d. 287/900), whose secretaries were two Mu'tazilites, Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī and Abū Muslim al-Iṣfahānī (Madelung, 1988, 88). A grandson of al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm was Yaḥyā al-Hādī ilā 'l-Ḥaqq (245/859-298/911), whose theological doctrine was strongly influenced by Mu'tazilite doctrine, particularly by the Baghdādian (Madelung, 1965, 163-168). Al-Hādī founded a Zaydite imāmate in Yemen, where some of the Zaydites of Ṭabaristān joined him (Zayd, 1985, 55-95). In Daylamān and Jilān, two provinces neighbouring Ṭabaristān, Zaydism was propagated by al-Nāṣir bi-'l-Ḥaqq b. 'Alī al-Uṭrūsh (d. 304/917), whose doctrine differed in several respects from that of al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm. He was less interested in Mu'tazilism than al-Hādī (Madelung, 1965, 159-163). His adherents became

When al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh died in 411/1020, Mānkdīm said the funeral prayer for him¹⁹⁷ and then departed for Rayy to study Mu'tazilite theology. It is not clear how long he stayed there, but we know that he was in Rayy when 'Abd al-Jabbār died (in 415/1024, 414/1023 or 416/1025) as he is mentioned among the sharīfs who attended his funeral. In 417/1026 he was back in Lanjā, where he tried unsuccessfully to be accepted by the Zaydites as their imām. He may have returned to Rayy after this failure because it is known that he died there in 425/1034¹⁹⁸. By then the political situation had changed in Rayy: it was under Ghaznavid rule from 420/1029 to 429/1038. We have seen that Maḥmūd took action against the Mu'tazilites in Rayy, but it is not known whether this affected Mānkdīm.

It is not clear whether Mānkdīm ever studied with 'Abd al-Jabbār himself. He was probably trained in Mu'tazilism by al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh, who himself had studied with Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī and later with 'Abd al-Jabbār. It is possible that Mānkdīm attended lessons given by 'Abd al-Jabbār when he was in Rayy after 411/1020, although by then 'Abd al-Jabbār was more than eighty-five years old and perhaps for that reason was no longer engaged in teaching, plagued as he was by gout.

As we have seen¹⁹⁹, Mānkdīm is the author of a critical paraphrase (*ta'liq*) of 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*. It seems to have been a widely used work on Mu'tazilite doctrine since several copies have survived up to the present²⁰⁰ and a commentary on it was written

known as the Nāṣiriyya, whereas the adherents of the school of al-Qāsim and al-Hādī were referred to as the Qāsimiyya. Most of the Daylamites belonged to the Qāsimiyya and therefore had ties with the Zaydites in Yemen. Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh (333/944-411/1020) and his brother Abū Ṭālib Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn al-Nāṭiq bi-'l-Ḥaqq (340/951-424/1033), two Caspian Zaydite imams who studied Mu'tazilite theology with Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī, also belonged to the Qāsimiyya. (For works by Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq bi-'l-Ḥaqq, see Madelung 1986a). Their doctrine shows the influence of the Baṣrian tradition of the Mu'tazila, as distinct from the doctrine of al-Hādī who was closer to the Baghdāadian tradition (Madelung, 1988, 90). One of the brothers, al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh, later studied in Rayy with 'Abd al-Jabbār. Al-Jushamī reports that it was said that 'Abd al-Jabbār himself also studied with al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh (*Sharḥ al-uyūn*, 376: 3-12). As al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh himself was a prominent scholar, they must have been more like two colleagues rather than student and teacher. During his stay in Rayy, al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh belonged to the group of scholars who surrounded al-Ṣāhib b. 'Abbād. Mānkdīm was one of his disciples.

¹⁹⁷ Al-Muḥallī (*Ḥadā'iq*, 292:9).

¹⁹⁸ Madelung (1965, 182).

¹⁹⁹ See above, 3-4.

²⁰⁰ See above, 3, note 6.

by al-Qāsim al-Muḥallī²⁰¹. It is not known whether Mānkḏīm had students but, as he composed a work like *Tāʿlīq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamṣa*, it is likely that he did teach Muʿtazilite theology. However, we do not know the names of any of his students. Nor is it known whether he is the author of any works other than *Tāʿlīq Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamṣa*.

Although Mānkḏīm was a Zaydite²⁰², in the *Tāʿlīq* he usually identifies himself with the Muʿtazila, to whom he refers as the People of Justice. He refers to them as “our companions” (*aṣḥābunā*) and he often places the title “our master” (*shaykhunā*) before the name of a Muʿtazilite master. However, he distances himself from the Muʿtazila when he discusses the imāmate, juxtaposing Zaydite and Muʿtazilite opinion on this subject and using the expression “in our opinion” (*ʿindanā*) with respect to the Zaydite opinion and referring to “the Muʿtazilites” and “they” with respect to Muʿtazilite opinion (*Tāʿlīq*, 753: 17-754: 18).

8. *Ibn Mattawayh*

Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. Mattawayh²⁰³ probably lived in the Ghaznavid and early Seljuk periods. In 434/1042, some years after the death of Mānkḏīm, Rayy was occupied by the Seljuk Tughril-beg. The Seljuks were a group of Oghuz Turks who had moved into Khurāsān and had occupied the towns Marw, Harāt and Nīsābūr before they captured Rayy. After its occupation, Rayy became the capital of Tughril-Beg’s empire until he made Iṣfahān

²⁰¹ His full name was al-Qāsim b. Aḥmad b. Ḥumayd al-Muḥallī al-Wāḏiʿī al-Ṣanʿānī. Probably, he was the grandson of Ḥumayd al-Muḥallī (d. 652/1254), the author of *al-Ḥadāʾiq*. The title of his commentary is *Kitāb taʿlīq ʿalā sharḥ al-imām al-mashhūr bi-Mānkḏīm alladhī sharaḥa bihī ʿl-Uṣūl al-khamṣa li-qāḏī ʿl-quḏāt ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad raḥimahum-u ʿllāhu*. Gimaret (1979, 63) has pointed out that there is a mistake in this title, as the commentary by Mānkḏīm is not on ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s *Uṣūl al-khamṣa* but on his *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamṣa*.

²⁰² That Mānkḏīm was a Zaydite becomes clear when he mentions Zayd as the fourth Imām after Muḥammad, saying that the Imāms are “‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, then al-Ḥasan, then al-Ḥusayn, then Zayd b. ʿAlī and then those who lived like them” (*man sāra bi-siratihim*) (*Tāʿlīq*, 757: 18).

²⁰³ Madelung (1982) has pointed out that the name as it appears on the title-page of volume I of the *Majmūʿ* is deceptive. The last part of the name, ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUṭba (read: ʿAṭīyya) b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Najrānī, appears to be the name of the scribe. This was known to Houben, who edited the text and who, in his introduction, mentions this person as the scribe of the manuscript of Rome (*Majmūʿ* I, French text, 10).

the capital in 442/1050²⁰⁴. In 447/1055 Tughril-beg occupied Baghdād which meant the end of the empire of the Būyids.

In Baghdād Tughril-beg was acknowledged as sultan by Caliph al-Qā'im who had succeeded his father al-Qādir in 422/1031. Al-Qā'im continued his father's traditionalist politics and, like him, he forbade the teaching of Mu'tazilism. In 433/1041 he held a meeting in his palace with Baghdāadian scholars and ascetics, where his father's proclamation against Mu'tazilism and Shī'ism was read again and all those present had to sign it²⁰⁵. However, despite his loyalty to the caliph, Tughril-beg seems to have left the Mu'tazilites undisturbed, probably because of his preference for the Ḥanafite school of law, to which most of the Mu'tazilites belonged²⁰⁶. He disliked Shāfi'ism, hence his hostile attitude towards the Ash'ariyya, most of whom were Shāfi'ites²⁰⁷. Because of his preference for the Ḥanafite

²⁰⁴ Bosworth (1968, 42 and 38).

²⁰⁵ Glassen (1981, 12). Another reason why the situation in Baghdād was difficult for the Mu'tazilites was that they had close relations with the Shī'ites. Both groups lived in the same quarter of the city and were subject to attacks from the traditionalist Sunnites, who knew they had the caliph's support. In this period another group of Shī'ites, the Ismā'īlite Fāṭimids, created a special threat to Sunni Islam. They had conquered Aleppo in 429/1038 and had spread propaganda for Ismā'īlism in Iran and Transoxania by sending missionaries to these districts (Kennedy, 1986, 341). The caliph, and especially his vizier Ibn al-Muslima, therefore pursued an anti-Shī'ite policy that was not only directed against Fāṭimid propaganda but also against the Shī'ites in Baghdād, most of whom lived in the Karkh quarter, where many Mu'tazilites also lived (Glassen, 1981, 45, and Makdisi, 1963, 332). Laoust (1973) gives an account of the incidents that took place there. Because of the Shī'ites' difficult position, the Imāmite scholar Abū Ja'far al-Ṭūsī (d. 459/1067), who was a disciple of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, took refuge in Najaf in 449/1057 (Glassen, 1981, 40). For the Shī'ites things improved temporarily when Baghdād was reoccupied in 450/1058 by the former Būyid commander al-Basāsīrī, who had the support of the Fāṭimids. He executed the vizier Ibn al-Muslima, but in 451/1060 he himself was killed when Tughril-beg, who supported the caliph, occupied Baghdād (Glassen, 1981, 43-44). After al-Basāsīrī's defeat the Karkh quarter was plundered by the mob. The large library that had been founded by the Būyid vizier Shāpūr in 383/993 and which had many Mu'tazilite and Zaydite books was plundered and burned. The books that survived were appropriated by the Seljuk vizier 'Amīd al-Mulk al-Kundurī (Busse, 1969, 527).

²⁰⁶ Madelung (1971, 129-130).

²⁰⁷ In 445/1053 Tughril-beg issued an order that al-Ash'arī was to be cursed from the pulpits in Khurāsān. He also gave the command to arrest and deport the four most prominent Shāfi'ites of Nīsābūr. One of them was the theologian Abū 'l-Ma'ālī al-Juwaynī, who, however, managed to escape and take refuge in Mecca (Bulliet, 1973, 83). Under Alp Arslān, who succeeded his uncle Tughril-beg as sultan in 455/1063, the persecution of the Ash'ariyya came to an end. His vizier Nizām al-Mulk supported the Shāfi'ites and, as the Ash'arites were most-

school, Tughril-beg appointed Ḥanafite judges and built new mosques for the Ḥanafites, such as the new congregational mosque in Rayy²⁰⁸. In Nīsābūr he founded the madrasa al-Sulṭāniyya, in which Ḥanafite law was taught²⁰⁹.

As a result of Tughril-beg's preference for the Ḥanafite school, the position of the Mu'tazilites improved. Although the early Seljuks themselves did not adopt a hard line against the Mu'tazilites, there was in those days bitter enmity towards the Mu'tazilites from traditionalist Sunnites, especially from their adherents among the common people. In Baghdād both the Mu'tazilites and the As'arites were attacked several times by mobs that supported traditionalist Sunnism²¹⁰.

A Mu'tazilite who had an official function under the Seljuks was Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Nāṣiḥī (d. 484/1091). He had specialized in Ḥanafite law and was appointed as a judge, first in Nīsābūr and later in Rayy²¹¹. We do not know whether he also taught Mu'tazilism in Rayy. It is known that in the early Seljuk period Mu'tazilite theology was taught in Rayy by the traditionist and jurist Ismā'īl b. 'Alī al-Sammān (d. after 447/1056)²¹² and by al-Murshad bi-'llāh Abū

ly Shāfi'ites, they benefited from this support. Nizām al-Mulk founded *madrasas* called Nizāmiyya, in both Nīsābūr and Baghdād. These *madrasas*, in which Shāfi'ite law was taught, were open to Shāfi'ite students only (Makdisi, 1973, 158-161). One of the professors of the Nizāmiyya in Baghdād was the famous al-Ghazālī, who taught Shāfi'ite law there from 484/1091 until 488/1095.

²⁰⁸ Madelung (1971, 126-127).

²⁰⁹ Bulliet (1972, 252). The Mu'tazilite-Ḥanafite Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṣandalī (d. 484/1091) enjoyed good relations with the Seljuk government. He occupied the position of preacher (*khaṭīb*) at the old congregational mosque in Nīsābūr for nine years. It was said that he was the prime mover in the persecution of As'arite leaders in Nīsābūr (Bulliet, 1972, 236).

²¹⁰ The Mu'tazilite theologian Abū 'Alī b. al-Walīd (d. 478/1086), a disciple of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, is said not to have left his house in Karkh during the last fifty years of his life for fear of the Baghdād mobs. Because of this, his students had to come secretly to his house (Makdisi, 1963, 407-408 and Makdisi, 1997, 20). Ibn 'Aqīl (431/1039-513/1119), one of these students, was forced to publicly renounce the Mu'tazilism he was accused of in 465/1072 (Makdisi, 1963, 426-428 and Makdisi, 1997, 3-5). (The English translation of the text of Ibn 'Aqīl's retraction is to be found in Makdisi, 1997, 4). This illustrates the difficult position of the Mu'tazilites in Baghdād in that period.

²¹¹ Bulliet (1972, 206).

²¹² Madelung (1988, 30 and 91). It is reported that he was well versed in Zaydite law and gave lessons not only in Rayy but also in Daylamān (*Sharḥ al-'uyūn*, 389: 1-5, and *Ṭabaqāt*, 119: 14-16). It is reported that he was the author of many books, but I do not know whether any of his works has survived.

ʿI-Ḥusayn Yaḥyā (d. 477/1084). Al-Murshad bi-ʿllāh was a Zaydite jurist who combined Muʿtazilite theology with Zaydite law²¹³. One of his students was Abū Muḥammad Ismāʿīl b. ʿAlī al-Farrazādhī who, like Mānkdim, was the author of a *taʿlīq* on ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*²¹⁴. Their presence in Rayy is evidence of the fact that in the early Seljuk period there were Zaydites in Rayy who studied Muʿtazilite doctrine.

It is not known whether Ibn Mattawayh lived in Rayy during this period because the dates and places of his birth and death are unknown, as is information about where he lived. Some²¹⁵ say he died in 469/1076, others²¹⁶ in 468/1075. Madelung²¹⁷ thinks that neither of these dates is reliable and that he may have died earlier. Al-Jushamī’s assertion that Ibn Mattawayh studied with ʿAbd al-Jabbār (*darasa ʿalā Qāḍī ʿl-quḍātī*) is one of the few indications of when he lived (*Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn*, 389: 15). That Ibn Mattawayh did study with ʿAbd al-Jabbār himself seems to be confirmed by remarks he made in his works. Sometimes he refers to what ʿAbd al-Jabbār said in his lessons, for instance, “he said when he taught this book...”²¹⁸ (*Majmūʿ* I, 184: 11). This suggests that he personally attended lessons given by ʿAbd al-Jabbār about the *Muḥīṭ bi-ʿl-taklīf*, although he may be simply reporting what he heard others say about these lessons.

If Ibn Mattawayh did study with ʿAbd al-Jabbār, this was probably when ʿAbd al-Jabbār was a very old man and Ibn Mattawayh

²¹³ On al-Murshad bi-ʿllāh Abū ʿI-Ḥusayn Yaḥyā, see Madelung (1965, 184-185).

²¹⁴ Gimaret (1979, 60-61). A reference to al-Farrazādhī’s *taʿlīq* is found in *Fī ʿl-tawḥīd* (622: 18) in which al-Farrazādhī is referred to as the commentator on *Kitāb al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, although what is meant is ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* (Monnot, 1974, 267, note 1).

²¹⁵ The date of 1076 was mentioned by Horten (1912, 465) as the year in which Mattawayhi, the author of a commentary on the Qurʾān died. This date was probably adopted by other scholars, including Houben (*Majmūʿ* I, French text, 8) and Sayyid (*Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn*, 389, note 124) as the year in which Ibn Mattawayh died.

²¹⁶ ʿUthmān (1968, 51) and Ben-Shammai (1974, 298, note 32) say that Ibn Mattawayh died in 468/1075.

²¹⁷ Madelung (1982).

²¹⁸ *Wa-qāla fī tadrīsi hādihā ʿl-kitābi*. Other remarks on ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s teaching are “he said in the lesson” (*ḥakā fī ʿl-darsi*) (*Majmūʿ* I, 160: 23), “he pointed out this aspect when he taught this book” (*wa-īlā hādihā ʿl-wajhi ashāra fī tadrīsi hādihā ʿl-kitābi*) (*Majmūʿ* III, 90: 20) and “he pointed this out in the lesson and it is clearer than what is said in the book” (*wa-ilayhi ashāra fī ʿl-darsi wa-huwa abyanu mim mā dhakarāhū fī ʿl-kitābi*) (*Majmūʿ* III, 91: 20-21).

a young student. He seems to have been younger than ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s other students, something which can be deduced from the place he is given in the generation (*ṭabaqa*) of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s students in al-Jushamī’s *Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, which usually mentions the persons belonging to the same *ṭabaqa* in a loose chronological order²¹⁹. Since Ibn Mattawayh is mentioned as ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s second to last student, this indicates that he was probably younger than the other students.

Another indication for Ibn Mattawayh’s young age is the place he is given in the chain of transmission of Mu‘tazilism described in the introduction to Abū Muḥammad Ismā‘īl b. ‘Alī al-Farrazādihī’s *ta‘līq* on ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*²²⁰. Although this chain is not considered historically reliable²²¹, it shows that al-Farrazādihī considered Ibn Mattawayh as a student of Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī. We do not know whether Ibn Mattawayh really was one of Abū Rashīd’s students but, whatever the case, his place in the chain of transmission shows that Ibn Mattawayh was considered to be younger than Abū Rashīd. This chain of transmission also shows that Ibn Mattawayh belonged to the Bahshamiyya as it was continued by Abū Rashīd and that he did not belong to the school of Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. After Abū Rashīd’s death he probably became the leader of the Bahshamiyya, as can be concluded from the chain of transmission.

It is not known whether Ibn Mattawayh lived in Rayy. In the Ghaznavid period he may have had to live elsewhere because of Maḥmūd of Ghazna’s hostility towards the Mu‘tazilites and extremist Shī‘ites there. If he did live in Rayy during the Ghaznavid rule, he may have had to hide his Mu‘tazilism until 434/1042, the year in which the Seljuks gained control of Rayy. We have seen that in the early Seljuk period Mu‘tazilite theology was taught in Rayy by some Mu‘tazilites and Ibn Mattawayh may have been one of them.

Ibn Mattawayh was not a Zaydite: his opinion on the imāmate differed from the Zaydite opinion. This can be concluded from the title of a work written by the Zaydite Qāḍī Ja‘far in which he refutes Ibn Mattawayh’s opinion on the imāmate. The title of the work

²¹⁹ Mentioning someone at the end of the *ṭabaqa* could also mean that he was considered less important because, for instance, he did not belong to the same Mu‘tazilite school. This, however, does not seem to apply to Ibn Mattawayh.

²²⁰ For this chain, see above, 29-30.

²²¹ This is Gimaret’s opinion (Gimaret, 1979, 61).

is: *K. al-naqd 'alā ṣāhib Majmū' al-muḥīt fī-mā khālaḥa fīhi 'l-zaydiyya min bāb al-imāma*²²² (Refutation of the opinions on the imāmate by which the author of *Majmū' al-muḥīt* opposed the Zaydiyya). Yet, Ibn Mattawayh had Shī'ite sympathies because he is said to have confirmed the superiority of 'Alī over Abū Bakr in his *Kitāb al-kifāya* but he seems not to have been an Imāmite Shī'ite²²³.

The following works by Ibn Mattawayh are known:

- *al-Majmū' fī 'l-muḥīt bi-'l-taklīf*. As we have seen, this work is a critical paraphrase of 'Abd al-Jabbār's *al-Muḥīt bi-'l-taklīf*.
- *al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-'l-a'rād*. Two alternative titles of this work are *Risāla fī laṭīf al-kalām* and *al-Tadhkira fī 'ilm al-kalām* (*Tadhkira*, 17-20)²²⁴. As the first title indicates, this work deals with atoms and accidents.
- *al-Kifāya*²²⁵. This work has been mentioned above.
- *Kitāb al-tahrīr*²²⁶.
- *Tā'līq al-iḥāṭa* is possibly also a work by Ibn Mattawayh. There is an anonymous manuscript with this title in the library of al-Jāmi' al-Kabīr in Ṣan'a' and Ibn Mattawayh is mentioned as the possible author²²⁷.

9. *The Mu'tazila from the Fifth/Eleventh to the Eighth/Fourteenth Century*

The last generation of Mu'tazilites mentioned by al-Jushamī and Ibn al-Murtaḍā is the generation of 'Abd al-Jabbār's students. Certainly, there were still Mu'tazilites after 'Abd al-Jabbār's students had

²²² Madelung (1965, 214, note 409) and Daiber (1975, 509-510, note 2).

²²³ Madelung (1982) points out that Ibn Mattawayh's opinion with respect to the imām's immunity from sin differed from Imāmite opinion on this subject, as Ibn Mattawayh did not consider immunity from sin to be a prerequisite for the validity of the imāmate.

²²⁴ Two manuscripts of the work exist in collections in Yemen. The photocopies of these manuscripts are kept in the Dār al-kutub in Cairo. A third manuscript forms part of the collection of the Bibliotheca Ambrosiana in Milan (Löfgren, 1981, 173-174). The text of volume I was edited by Sāmī Naṣr Luṭf and Fayṣal Badīr 'Awn in Cairo in 1975. Volume II of the Ambrosiana manuscript, which deals with the subject of man, has not yet been published (Dhanani, 1994, 13, note 30). A commentary on the *Tadhkira* was made by an unknown author. It is called *Sharḥ al-tadhkira fī laṭā'if al-kalām* (Dhanani, 1994, 13).

²²⁵ On this work, see Madelung (1982) and Sezgin (1967, 627).

²²⁶ Madelung (1982) discovered a quotation from this work in Ibn al-Malāḥimī's *Kitāb al-mu'tamad fī uṣūl al-dīn*.

²²⁷ *Makhtūṭāt* (1976, 10, item 46).

died but adherence to Mu'tazila decreased. In Baghdād Mu'tazilism gradually disappeared, although in the sixth/twelfth century Mu'tazilite theology was still taught by some Ḥanafite scholars²²⁸. There were still Mu'tazilites in Rayy in the first half of the sixth/twelfth century. One of them was a chief judge who followed the Ḥanafite school of law²²⁹.

At the beginning of the sixth/twelfth century the Seljuk sultans favoured the Shāfi'ites and Ash'arism, but Sultan Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad (r. 529/1134-547/1152) favoured the Ḥanafites again, as Tughril-beg had done earlier. However, Mas'ūd's preference of Ḥanafism did not imply that he favoured Mu'tazilism. Rather, he supported Māturīdism and wanted the Mu'tazilites to accept Māturīdism. However, when they refused to do so, he did not take action against them²³⁰ as he had against the Ash'arites²³¹. It seems that he tolerated Mu'tazilism because the Mu'tazilites were mostly Ḥanafites. This may have been the reason that Mu'tazilite doctrine was still taught in Rayy and Baghdād during this period, although probably only on a small scale.

At the end of the sixth/twelfth century Mu'tazilism still existed, but it was clearly losing ground²³². A district in which Mu'tazilism survived for a long time was Khwārazm, where it had already existed in 'Abd al-Jabbār's time—he wrote his *Faql al-i'tizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazila* at the request of the Khwārazm-shāh Ma'mūn II. A well-known Khwārazmian Mu'tazilite was al-Zamakhsharī (467/1075-538/1144)²³³, who wrote a famous commentary on the Qur'ān.

²²⁸ Madelung (1971, 136).

²²⁹ Madelung (1971, 135, note 68).

²³⁰ Madelung (1971, 135-136).

²³¹ In 537/1142 Sultan Mas'ūd forced two prominent Shāfi'ites in Rayy to sign documents disavowing some points of their Ash'arite doctrine. The next year al-Ash'arī was cursed from some pulpits in Baghdād and two Ash'arites were deported (Madelung, 1971, 131-134).

²³² This is Madelung's opinion (Madelung, 1987, 330).

²³³ Jār Allāh Maḥmūd b. 'Umar al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) belonged to the Bahshamiyya. Probably, he studied in Jusham with a disciple of al-Ḥākim Abū Sa'd al-Jushamī (d. 494/1101), who was an adherent of the Bahshamiyya school. Later he had a close relationship with Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141), the most prominent disciple of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, and he became influenced by the theology of his school (Madelung, 1986b, 485-495, and Schmidtke, 1997, 7-8). He wrote a short text on the principles of Mu'tazilism, *al-Minhāj fī uṣūl al-dīn*, which has been edited and translated by Sabine Schmidtke (1997). According to Madelung (1986b, 489), in this text al-Zamakh-

In the last half of the sixth/twelfth century Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (543/1149-606/1209), an Ash'arite theologian from Rayy, visited Khwārazm and Transoxania where he engaged in disputes with the Mu'tazilites²³⁴. In *I'tiqādāt fīraq al-muslimīn wa-'l-mushrikīn*, a short work on sects, he says that, of all the Mu'tazilite groups (*fīraq*) that he has described, only the adherents (*aṣḥāb*) of Abū Hāshim and the adherents of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī have survived (*I'tiqādāt*, 45). It can be concluded from this that, by then, the Mu'tazilite school of Baghdād, which had continued the doctrine of Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, had disappeared altogether. The Mu'tazilites living in Baghdād probably belonged to the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī or the Bahshamiyya.

In Khwārazm Mu'tazilism continued to exist until at least the eighth/fourteenth century. The traveller Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (704/1304-779/1377) reported that when he visited the town Khwārazm shortly before the year 734/1334, a group of prominent people came to visit him. They informed him that the prevailing doctrine among them was Mu'tazilism, although they did not openly profess it because the ruler, Sultan Özbek (a Mongol prince, Khan of the Golden Horde, r. 712/1312—742/1341), and his governor were orthodox Sunnites (*Rihlat Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, 360). By then Mu'tazilism was on the verge of disappearing, as can be concluded from the silence of sources about Mu'tazilites living later than the eighth/fourteenth century²³⁵. The hostile attitude of the rulers of Khwārazm towards Mu'tazilism, as described by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, makes it unlikely that even here Mu'tazilism survived much longer.

However, Mu'tazilite principles survived in another way, not as a separate doctrine, but within the doctrine of the Zaydites of Yemen. Some Zaydites in the Caspian provinces had partly adopted Mu'tazilite doctrine²³⁶. They took their doctrine with them to

sharī most often refers to Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī and his son Abū Hāshim, rather than to his teacher Ibn al-Malāhimī or to Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, although he is deeply influenced by them.

²³⁴ Anawati (1965, 751-752). Madelung (1971, 116, notes 25 and 26 and 1986b) mentions the names of several other Khwārazmian Mu'tazilites who lived in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries.

²³⁵ Makdisi (1993, 384) says that Ibn Abī 'l-Wafā' (d. 775/1373), in his work *al-Jawāhir al-mudīyya fī ṭabaqāt al-ḥanafīyya*, mentions only one Mu'tazilite Ḥanafite living in the eighth century.

²³⁶ See above, 60-61, note 196.

Yemen²³⁷, where Zaydism continues to exist up to our time. This explains why manuscripts of Mu‘tazilite works can be found in libraries in Yemen. Mu‘tazilite ideas also survived, but on a smaller scale, within the doctrine of the Imāmite Shī‘ites, especially in their legal theory and methodology. The Imāmite theologian al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) and his disciple al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (‘Alam al-Hudā) (d. 436/1044), who both studied with ‘Abd al-Jabbār, adopted many Mu‘tazilite opinions²³⁸. Through al-Murtaḍā’s disciple Abū Ja‘far al-Ṭūsī (Shaykh al-Ṭā‘ifa) (d. 459/1067) Mu‘tazilite ideas found acceptance in Imāmite theology²³⁹.

10. Conclusion

It seems that the Bahshamiyya Mu‘tazila of Rayy achieved their greatest number of adherents under ‘Abd al-Jabbār, as can be concluded from the many Mu‘tazilites who are said to have studied with him (*Sharḥ al-‘uyūn*, 365: 10-11). Without doubt, the support of the Būyid vizier al-Ṣāḥib b. ‘Abbād, who favoured Mu‘tazilism, stimulated the growth of the school. When al-Ṣāḥib died, the Mu‘tazilites lost their political support and their position was weakened. The situation became even more unfavourable when Rayy was occupied by the Ghaznavid Maḥmūd, who disapproved of Mu‘tazilism. Although there is no exact information about adherence to Mu‘tazilism in those days, it is likely that Maḥmūd’s attitude had a negative influence. Another negative factor for the adherence to the Bahsha-

²³⁷ Schmidtke (1998, 402) says that the Mu‘tazilite principles were introduced in Yemen in the 6th/12th century and that as a result of the close relation between Mu‘tazilism and Zaydism several Zaydite works contain information on the doctrines of both the Bahshamiyya and the school of Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

²³⁸ McDermott (1978) has written a study on the theology of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd in which he also considers the ideas of his disciple al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā. For a short description of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd’s theology, see also Sander (1994, 82-122).

²³⁹ Madelung (1970, 27), Momen (1985, 79-81), Madelung (1987a, 367) and Schmidtke (1991, 1-4). These Imāmite Mu‘tazilites adhered largely to the school of Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. One of them was al-‘Allāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325). In her dissertation on his theology, Sabine Schmidtke (1991, 250) comes to the conclusion that the impact of the school of Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī on al-Ḥillī’s theological views was crucial and that in all issues where this school disagreed with the Bahshamiyya, al-Ḥillī followed them closely.

miyya may have been the appearance of a new Mu'tazilite school, the school of Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

Mānkḏīm and Ibn Mattawayh were undoubtedly disciples of 'Abd al-Jabbār in the sense that belonged to his school and adhered to his doctrine. However, as a result of the scarcity of information about the Mu'tazila of Rayy we do not know exactly how the relationship between them was. Ibn Mattawayh seems to have belonged to a younger generation than Mānkḏīm, although they are both mentioned as students of 'Abd al-Jabbār. It is not known with certainty whether they studied with 'Abd al-Jabbār personally. Nevertheless, Mānkḏīm and Ibn Mattawayh had a thorough knowledge of 'Abd al-Jabbār's doctrine, as becomes clear from their critical paraphrases.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ONTOLOGY AND PERCEPTION OF PAIN

1. *The Existence of Pain*

First ‘Abd al-Jabbār turns his attention to the question of how we know that pain exists¹. He is concerned with establishing (*ithbāt*) the existence of pain in general. The point is whether pain is a really existing thing or whether we suffer because of the absence of something that we need. Before this question can be answered, attention must be given to the question of how we know the existence of things. What are reliable ways to this knowledge?

As for perceptible things, it can be argued that the fact that they are perceived proves their existence. In this case it is taken for granted that perception is a reliable way to knowledge. However, some philosophers, such as the Sceptics, deny that perception is reliable. They maintain that perception cannot be trusted as we are sometimes deceived by our senses. They point out that we may see things that do not really exist, such as mirages. ‘Abd al-Jabbār appears to have been acquainted with the Sceptics’ opinion on this matter that in his time was adhered to by people to which he refers as Sophists². He disagrees with them and is convinced that perception is a reli-

¹ ‘Abd al-Jabbār discusses the existence of pain in a chapter called “Chapter on establishing the existence of pains” (*Faṣl fī ithbāt al-ālām*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 229: 17-270: 9). Dhanani (1994, 26, note 31) points out that *thabata* and its cognates (*ithbāt*, etc.) in the *kalām* context are used both with their normal meaning of confirming or establishing that something is true, and in the specialized meaning of confirming that something is a possible being, whether or not it presently exists. *Muthbat*, as a passive participle, is a technical term related to the term *ithbāt*. With respect to the term *muthbat* (being established to exist), Van Ess (1966, 198) came to the conclusion that it is a broader term than the term *mawjūd* (presently existing), as *muthbat* includes both *mawjūd* (presently existing) and *ma’dūm* (not presently existing, but existing at other moments). Van Ess added that the Mu’tazilites used the term *manfī* (impossible) as the opposite of *muthbat*.

² See *Mughnī* XII, 42: 20-43: 1 and *Mughnī* IV, 79: 6-7. Bernand (1982, 71-72) thinks that the Sophists to whom ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers were groups of thinkers who belonged to the early *mutakallimūn* and became attracted to philosophical speculation.

able way to the knowledge of things. Discussing the question of how we know that pain exists, he says:

Know, that there is no clearer way to the knowledge of a thing than perception. When something is perceived, there is no need for an indication [that leads to knowledge of this thing] in order to establish its existence (*Mughnī* XIII, 229: 19-20)³.

In this context, “thing” (*shayʿ*), means anything that can be known, irrespective of whether it is material or immaterial⁴.

In the quoted passage, ‘Abd al-Jabbār mentions two ways of acquiring knowledge about something. One way is the perception of the thing in question. However, when something is not perceptible, it must be known in another way. In that case it can be known by deduction. According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory, this implies that one reflects⁵ on something that is already known in order to acquire knowledge about something that is not yet known. The thing which is already known functions as an indication (*dalīl*) of the thing to be known. Reflection (*nazar*) is a way to acquire knowledge about the thing (*al-madlūl*) to which the indication refers.

Pain is perceptible. Therefore, ‘Abd al-Jabbār declares that in order to know whether pain exists it is not necessary to reflect on some indication, because a person who is in pain perceives pain in his body. ‘Abd al-Jabbār describes how the existence of pain is established:

We know that we feel pains in our limbs, just as we feel warmth and coldness in objects, nay, even clearer. Therefore, the existence of a perceptible *maʿnā* must be established. We know that this *maʿnā* cannot be the body itself, nor one of the other things that happen [at that moment to the body] such as a separation [injury] or pressure or something else. So, it must be established that it [the *maʿnā* of pain] exists [and that it is] a perceptible class of things different from the other accidents (*Mughnī* XIII, 230: 3-9)⁶

³ *Iʿlam annahū lā ʿarīqa li-ʿl-ʿilmi bi-ʿl-shayʿi awḍaḥu min al-idrāki. Fa-matā tanāwala ʿl-idrāku shayʿan fa-qad istaghna fī ithbātihī ʿan dalīlin.* See also *Mughnī* IX, 53: 23-24.

⁴ ‘Abd al-Jabbār declares that even God can be referred to as a “thing” (*shayʿ*), because He is an object of knowledge (*Mughnī* V, 253: 4-10). On the meaning of *shayʿ* in the works of the Muʿtazilites, see Bernand (1982, 265), Dhanani (1994, 29-30) and Van Ess (1966, 192-202), who discusses the use of *shayʿ* for things that are not presently existent (*maʿdūm*).

⁵ For the method of reflection in order to acquire knowledge and the function of the indication (*dalīl* or *dalāla*) in it, see Bernand (1982, 233-243), Reinhart (1995, 155-156), Peters (1976, 65-66) and Van Ess (1966, 364-367).

⁶ *Wa-qad ʿalimnā annā najidu fī abʿāḍinā ʿl-ālāma ʿalā ḥaddi mā najidu fī ʿl-aḥsāmī ʿl-harārata wa-ʿl-burūdata, bal awḍaḥa minhā, fa-yajibu ithbātu maʿnan mudrakin. Wa-qad*

‘Abd al-Jabbār says that what is perceived is a *ma’nā*, but what does the term *ma’nā* mean? And what did his master Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh⁷ mean when he denied that pain is a *ma’nā*? (*Mughnī* IX, 59: 9). Before answering this question, it will be useful to briefly consider his theory about the structure of beings in this world⁸.

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory, material things (objects) consist of atoms (*jawhar*, plural *jawāhir*)⁹ and accidents (‘*arad*, plural *arād*). The atoms form a substrate (*maḥall*) in which accidents inhere. These accidents determine the forms and appearances of the material things. In an atom several accidents can inhere, but an atom must always at least have in it the accident of spatial occupation (*tahayyuz*)¹⁰ and the accident of its “spatial relation” (*kawn*)¹¹ at that moment. The spatial relation of an atom takes into consideration whether it is separated from another atom or is joined with it. It also takes into consideration whether it is moving or is at rest. This is determined by an accident (the accident of its spatial relation) that inheres in the atom at that moment. As a result of the inherence of this accident, the atom is moving or at rest and separated or joined with another atom. The atom’s other qualities are determined by other accidents.

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine, some accidents can inhere in any substrate, but other accidents need a special substrate for which certain conditions must be fulfilled. In other words, some accidents

‘alimnā annahū lā yajūzu fī dhālika ‘l-ma’nā an yakūna nafsa ‘l-jismi wa-sā’ira mā yaḥduthu min tafriqin wa-‘timādin wa-ghayrihimā, fa-yajibu ihbātuhū jinsan mudrakan mukhālīfan li-sā’iri ‘l-‘arādi.

⁷ On Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh, see above, 32.

⁸ It is difficult to get a clear idea of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s cosmology as he probably discussed the theory of atoms and accidents in the missing first volumes of the *Mughnī*. Dhanani (1994) studied the various Mu‘tazilite theories on the atom, but he mainly relied on the works of Ibn Mattawayh when considering ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory. Peters (1976, 105-158) describes the cosmological theories of ‘Abd al-Jabbār based on a study of the *Mughnī*, the *Tā’līq* and the *Majmū‘*. For the cosmological theories of ‘Abd al-Jabbār, see also Frank (1978, especially 39-57), where he describes cosmological notions within the Baṣra school of the Mu‘tazila. Gimaret (1990, 43-126) gives many references to the cosmological theories of the school of Abū Hāshim in his discussion of al-Ash‘arī’s cosmology.

⁹ *Jawhar* is a term that is used both for atom and substance. Frank (1984, 290-291, note 19) remarks that *jawhar* in *kalām* texts means “atom”. Dhanani (1994, 59, note 16) agrees with him.

¹⁰ For the meaning of the term *tahayyuz*, see Dhanani (1994, 62-71).

¹¹ Mostly, the term *kawn* (plural: *akwān*) is translated as “mode of being”. However, Schmidtko (1997, 13) translates this term as “spatial relation”, which is a good rendering of its meaning.

can inhere in a substrate only if certain other accidents simultaneously inhere in it. For instance, the accident of the power of acting can only exist in a living being. This implies first that it needs a substrate in which the accident of composition (*taʿtīf*) inheres, so that the atoms together form a body. Secondly, this body must have a special structure in order to be the body of a living being, which implies that the accident for this structure must inhere in it. Thirdly, in order to be living, the substrate must have the accident of life in it. Only if all these accidents inhere in the substrate can the accident of the power of acting inhere in it¹².

Let us return to what ʿAbd al-Jabbār means when he says that pain is a *maʿnā*. In the *Mughnī*, ʿAbd al-Jabbār uses the term *maʿnā* in different senses. Sometimes he uses it with its common meaning, “sense” or “meaning”. He also uses the term *maʿnā* to refer to that which transmigrates from one body to the other, as is believed by those who defend the doctrine of the transmigration of souls (*tanāsukh*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 379: 18-380: 1)¹³. However, when he speaks about issues such as the qualities of beings and the way in which these qualities come into existence, it is obvious that he uses the term *maʿnā* in a different sense.

In volume V of the *Mughnī* (V, 253: 4-15)¹⁴, ʿAbd al-Jabbār enumerates several meanings of *maʿnā* as part of his discussion on whether it is permissible to describe God as being a *maʿnā*¹⁵. He points out that this depends on what is understood by *maʿnā*. He reports that Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī rejected the description of God as being a *maʿnā*

¹² On the different sorts of accidents see Peters (1976, 123-128) and Frank (1978, 93-108).

¹³ ʿAbd al-Jabbār describes the opinion of the adherents to the theory of the transmigration of souls, who believed that every illness is a punishment we deserve from God. He reports that “they believed that disobedience [to God] was done by him [the ill person] when he was different from this shape [the shape/body this person has now]. Then he was transformed (*nusikha*) into this shape. Because of this, they defended the transmigration of souls (*tanāsukh*). They therefore believed that the living being on which God has imposed duties (*mukallaf*) is not the person (*shakhs*) but a *maʿnā* in him, that migrates in the persons and the shapes (*hayākil*)”.

¹⁴ Frank (1967, 250, note 15), Daiber (1975, 226) and Monnot (1974, 40) refer to this passage for the meaning of the term *maʿnā*.

¹⁵ The description of God as a *maʿnā* may have been derived from Christian doctrine. Wolfson (1976, 128) points to the use of the term *maʿnā* in the discussion on the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In the presentation of this doctrine it is said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are each a hypostasis or person (*aqnūm*) or a thing (*maʿnā*).

and argued that *ma'nā* means “meaning”¹⁶. ‘Abd al-Jabbār goes on to discuss other meanings of the term *ma'nā*. He says that the *mutakallimūn* use the term *ma'nā* in reference to causes (*'illa*, plural *'ilal*)¹⁷ [of qualifications], as they say: “a moving being (*al-muṭaḥarrik*) is moving by virtue of a *ma'nā*”, and equate this with saying: “it is moving by virtue of a cause (*'illa*)”. ‘Abd al-Jabbār adds that *ma'nā* in this sense is not used with reference to God. (*Mughnī* V, 253: 9-11). He goes on to say that sometimes something whose existence has been established (*al-shay' al-muthbat*) is referred to as a *ma'nā* and he adds that when *ma'nā* is used in this broad sense, it cannot be denied that God is a *ma'nā* (*Mughnī* V, 253: 12-15). We see that ‘Abd al-Jabbār acknowledges that *ma'nā* can have the sense of “cause (*'illa*) of a qualification” and that it can also mean “something whose existence has been established” (*al-shay' al-muthbat*).

Several *mutakallimūn*, and not only Mu'tazilites¹⁸, used *ma'nā* as a

¹⁶ Understanding *ma'nā* in the sense of “meaning”, Abū 'Alī denied that it is permissible to describe God as being a *ma'nā*. However, he considered that it was permissible to say that God is *ma'nīyy*, in the sense that God is meant, when God is spoken of in speculative theology (*kalām*) and in the Traditions (*akhbār*) (*Mughnī* V, 253: 4-8). ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s report does not make clear whether it must be concluded that Abū 'Alī only knew *ma'nā* in the sense of “meaning” and in no other sense.

¹⁷ *'Illa* means cause of a qualification. Reinhart (1995, 147) explains the relation between the terms *ma'nā*, *'illa*, *ṣifa*, and *ḥukm* as follows: “*Ma'nā* is used to describe the ontological nature of a quality, insofar as it can be imagined to be apart from the thing in which it resides. Thus, ‘redness’ is the ‘redness’ of the apple’s being red, and is said to be, as ‘redness,’ its *ma'nā*; but when the redness is considered as causative (of the apple’s being red) it is called *'illah*. The quality that it causes, namely the apple’s *redness*, is called *ṣifah*; the *ṣifah* is the attribute, or adjective in the phrase ‘the *red* apple.’ Declaring the apple to be red, or assessing it to be red, or predicating redness of the apple, is an ‘assessment’, (*ḥukm*). In the phrase ‘this apple is *red*, ‘red’ is the *ḥukm* of the apple.”

¹⁸ Daiber (1975, 78-90) describes how concept of *ma'nā* was used by several *mutakallimūn*. Before her sudden death Dr. Marie Bernand kindly sent me the following information with respect to the meaning of the term *ma'nā*: “*Ma'nā* peut vouloir dire “disposition”, notion empruntée au stoïcisme. Selon les Zāhirites le *ma'nā* est considéré comme un intermédiaire entre la réalité et la subjectivité en ce qu'elle a de valable grâce à l'appréhension pure. Selon les Imāmītes le *ma'nā* est le sens divin à donner aux événements, intention divine. C'est aussi une sorte de substrate conceptuel, ce dont le concept suppose l'existence réelle. Somme toute le terme de *ma'nā* a des sens très diversifiés. Mis à part le sens grammatical (signification), on peut dire que le terme *ma'nā* se caractérise par une vaste ampleur conceptuelle et il subsume des valeurs allant de la réalité abstraite à l'existence réelle. Au centre de cette constellation on peut dire que se situe la notion de dis-

technical term with a specific meaning. What this meaning was exactly, and how it can be adequately translated are questions which have occupied the minds of scholars studying the works of these *mutakallimūn*¹⁹. Frank studied the term *mā'nā* as it is used by several *mutakallimūn* in order to clarify its technical meaning in the *kalām* in general²⁰. At the end of the first part of his article, having given examples from the *Mughnī* and other works, he concludes that:

Many other examples may be found but these few will more than suffice to demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that the term *mā'nā*, in this technical sense, means an immediate, intrinsic causal determinant²¹.

Daiber made an extensive study of the theological-philosophical system of the Mu'tazilite Mu'ammār b. 'Abbād al-Sulamī (d. 215/830). In this study he describes the specific meaning of the term *mā'nā* in Mu'ammār's philosophy where *mā'nā* refers to an entity that determines something and which itself is determined by another *mā'nā*, so that there is a chain of *mā'ānī*. He says:

Damit ist nichts anderes ausgesagt, als daß die Wirkung einer Substanz, nämlich sein Akzidens, durch ein sogenanntes *mā'nā* bedingt ist: das *mā'nā* bestimmt das So-sein des Seienden, d.h. was das Seiende ist; durch das *mā'nā* unterscheidet sich ein bestimmtes Seiendes, die durch ein Akzidens verwirklichte Substanz, von einem anderen. Dieses bedingt also die Art und Weise der Bestimmtheit des Seienden, d.h. die Verwirklichung eines begrenzten Seinsgehaltes; das Seiende ist das, "was" es ist, durch sein W e s e n. *Mā'nā* ist eine Wiedergabe von "Wesen"²².

Descriptions of the meaning of *mā'nā* as it was used by 'Abd al-Jabbār can be found in monographs on him. In his monograph on 'Abd al-Jabbār Peters translates *mā'nā* as "qualifier" and he explains its meaning as:

Mā'nā: qualifier, accident which causes something to be entitled to a quality. When I use the word "qualifier", I do not use it in its gram-

position qui peut aller jusqu'à signifier la positivité d'une détermination. Le *mā'nā* en ce sens est une abstraction réalisée déterminant dans un corps quelque chose de non-corporal, ainsi un état (*hāl*) (*Tā'līq*, 410)".

¹⁹ For references to some special studies on the term *mā'nā* in *kalām* texts, see Peters (1976, 156, note 234). See also Daiber (1975, 78-90).

²⁰ Frank (1967).

²¹ Frank (1967, 253).

²² Daiber (1975, 79).

matical sense, but, literally, as that which makes something to be qualified, to be entitled to a qualification²³.

The meaning “qualifier” is given by Bernand, as well, but she gives more definitions of *ma'nā*. She distinguishes the following meanings of *ma'nā*: (in French) 1. “entité causale”, “cause qualifiante”, “synonyme de ‘illa’”; 2. “réalité incorporelle”; 3. “accident spécifique”; 4. “signification”, “sens”²⁴. Of the first meaning “qualifier”, she says:

La qualification *ṣifa* ou *ḥukm* est ce que les mu'tazilites disent d'un existant. Elle désigne, chez celui-ci, une qualification qui n'existe pas en soi, mais qui est dans l'existant accidentellement et en vertu d'autre chose que lui. Cette chose est la cause (*ma'nā*) de cette qualification²⁵.

An example of the use of *ma'nā* in the sense of “cause of a qualification” or “qualifier” can be found in 'Abd al-Jabbār's discussion of the subject of desire. He explains that we are described as “feeling a desire” (*mushtahī*) by virtue of a *ma'nā* that exists in us, and this *ma'nā* is a desire (*shahwa*). He argues as follows: a person finds himself in the state of “feeling a desire” (*mushtahī*) for something after he was not in this state. There must be a cause for this change: there must be something that has brought about the state of “feeling a desire”. The only possibility is that this state is caused by the existence (*wujūd*) of a *ma'nā* in this person. This *ma'nā* can only be a desire (*shahwa*) (*Mughnī* IV, 19: 17-20)²⁶. The existence of this *ma'nā* is the cause (*'illa*) of this person's being qualified as “feeling a desire”.

'Abd al-Jabbār says that nothing is clearer is than the state we find ourselves in. He asserts that with respect to the strength of our knowledge of it, finding oneself in a state is analogous to perceiving something (*Mughnī* XII, 5: 3-9). However, according to 'Abd al-Jabbār, the existence of the *ma'nā* of pain need not be established by comparing two states we find ourselves in: its existence is established by the direct perception of pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 230: 4-9).

²³ Peters (1976, 155-157). Monnot (1974, 40) concluded that *ma'nā* means “accident”. He said: “Peut-être, en somme, la *ma'nā* n'est-elle autre que l'accident en tant qu'il est cause d'une attribution et raison de validité d'un attribut?”.

²⁴ Bernand (1982, 370).

²⁵ Bernand (1982, 77-78).

²⁶ For an English translation and explanation of this passage see Frank (1967, 249). In a similar way, 'Abd al-Jabbār explains that we are “willing” (*murīd*) or “reflecting” (*nāẓir*) [on something] by virtue of the existence of a *ma'nā* in us. This *ma'nā* is a will (*irāda*) or “reflection” (*nazar*), respectively. If this *ma'nā* exists in a person it is the cause (*'illa*) of his being qualified as “willing” or “investigating” (*Mughnī* VI/2, 24: 9 and 25: 12; *Mughnī* XII, 5: 3-9).

‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that pain is a *ma’nā*. However, although *ma’nā* means “cause of a qualification” or “qualifier”, he denies that the existence of pain alone in us is the cause of a qualification. He explains that we are described as “suffering” (*ālīm*), not because of the existence of pain in us but rather because we perceive something and feel an aversion (*nufūr*) for what we perceive. This aversion is the reason why we suffer; the existence in us of pain alone does not bring us in a state of suffering²⁷ (*Mughnī* IV, 55: 10-11).

Ma’nā in the sense of “immediate, intrinsic causal determinant” is more or less equivalent to the term ‘*araḍ* (accident)²⁸. In a passage cited before²⁹ ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to pain as being a *ma’nā* different from the other accidents (‘*araḍ*, plural *‘rāḍ*). We have already seen that accidents determine the qualities of the substrate they inhere in. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory, the accident of pain determines a quality of its substrate. This means that when the accident of pain inheres in a living substrate, there is pain in that part of the body. It is possible to make a distinction between two parts of the body: one with pain and the other without pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 231: 9-11).

The accident of pain determines a quality for a part of the body and not a quality or a state for the person as a whole. However, when pain exists in a part of his body, the person as a whole can be qualified as “suffering”. As we have seen, it is because of the aversion that this person feels for what he perceives—pain in a part of his body—that he as a whole is qualified as “suffering”.

That it is not self-evident that pain is a *ma’nā* becomes clear from what ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports about his teacher Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh. ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that Abū Ishāq denied that pain is a *ma’nā*. How are we to understand this statement? ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that

Abū Ishāq b. ‘Ayyāsh, may God have mercy upon him, used to deny [the existence of] pain absolutely. He used to say that it is not a *ma’nā*, but that a living being suffers if the soundness of its body ceases and the life disappears from it, [that is to say], from that place. Then he suffers, just as he suffers if he perceives something bitter. He does not

²⁷ That the *ma’nā* of pain does not cause a state is confirmed by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in more than one place. See, for instance, *Mughnī* VII, 36: 16-17 and *Mughnī* IX, 164: 19.

²⁸ Frank, 1967, 252.

²⁹ See above, 73.

establish the existence of a perceptible *ma'nā* (*Mughnī* IX, 59: 9-11)³⁰.

Abū Ishāq did not deny that people suffer when they are injured but rather he denied that something new, a *ma'nā*, comes into existence. He seems to have been of the opinion that we suffer from the absence of “soundness” (*sihha*)³¹, when this temporarily disappears from a part of our body as the result of an injury. This implies that we do not suffer because something new comes into existence in a part of our body, but because of the absence of something that we need: the soundness of our body. We suffer because of its disappearance. Abū Ishāq therefore says that pain is not a *ma'nā*.

In another passage, 'Abd al-Jabbār reports that Abū Ishāq said that we suffer when the body is injured, because in that case the balance of the body is disturbed:

Our *shaykh* Abū Ishāq, may God have mercy upon him, used to say that the pain that comes into existence in his [the human being's] body is not a *ma'nā*. The human being rather suffers when a separation has been made in his body because this has ended its soundness and the balance of his body has been disturbed. (*Mughnī* IV, 29: 7-9)³²

'Abd al-Jabbār himself does not use the concept of balance (*'itidāl*) in his theory of pain. It is possible that Abū Ishāq derived the concept of the balance of the human body from the medical theory on pain that was current in his time. This theory implied that in the human body there are four humours: blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile. They are mixed with one another in different quantities. The particular blending of the four humours in a person was called “temperament” (*mizāj*)³³. If these elements are present in a right proportion to each other, the organic body is “balanced” (*mu'tadil*)³⁴.

³⁰ 'Alā anna shaykhanā Abū Ishāqa bna 'Ayyāshin rahimahū 'llāhu kāna yanfi 'l-alama aṣlan, wa-yaqūlu innahū laysa bi-ma'nān wa-innamā ya'lamu 'l-ḥayyu idhā baṭalāt ṣiḥhatu jismihī wa-'ntafat-i 'l-ḥayātu 'anhū 'an dhālika 'l-mawḍi'i fa-ya'lamu 'inda dhālika kamā ya'lamu idhā adraka 'l-marārata wa-lā yuthbitu ma'nān mudrakan.

³¹ For an explanation of what is understood by “soundness” (*sihha*), see below, 91-92.

³² Wa-qad kāna shaykhunā Abū Ishāqa rahimahū 'llāhu yaqūlu inna 'l-alama 'l-ḥāditha fī jismihī laysa bi-ma'nān wa-innamā ya'lamu 'l-insānu 'inda tafriqi jismihī li-annahū qad baṭala ṣiḥhatahū wa-zāla 'tidālu jismihī.

³³ Gutas (1988, 75, note 10).

³⁴ See Ullmann (1978, 57-58). Ullmann (1978, 10) has pointed out that medicine in the medieval Islamic world was strongly influenced by the writings of Galen. Galen wrote numerous medical treatises in which scattered remarks about pain occur. His book *On the Diseased Parts* (*De locis affectis*) includes some chapters in

Abū Ishāq probably believed that we suffer when the balance of the humours in our body is disturbed³⁵. This must be the “disappearance of soundness” to which he refers in the foregoing passage.

Although ‘Abd al-Jabbār had studied with Abū Ishāq, he did not adopt his teacher’s opinion that pain is not a *ma’nā*. ‘Abd al-Jabbār saw the implications of denying the existence of a perceptible thing. He pointed out that Abū Ishāq’s opinion that pain is not a *ma’nā* may lead to the denial of the existence of all perceptible things (*Mughnī* IX, 59: 14-20, *Mughnī* IV, 29: 18-20)³⁶.

2. How Pain is Perceived

‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that pain is a perceptible *ma’nā*, but how does he think about the actual perception of pain? It is known that perceptible things are perceived by different sense organs and that each sense organ has a special structure. Sounds are perceived by the ears, objects by the eyes, smells by the nose, tastes by the tongue. Pain is a perceptible thing but by which sense organ is it perceived? ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that pain does not require a sense organ with a special structure (*bīnya makhṣūṣa*) in order to be perceived: pain can be

which he systematically analyzes pain (Siegel, 1970, 184). Siegel (1970, 186) came to the conclusion that “Galen was convinced that a localized disturbance of the humoral balance was the common cause of pain.” Galen’s writings were known to Ibn Sīnā (370/980-428/1037), a contemporary of ‘Abd al-Jabbār, who spent a short time (between 403/1013 and 405/1015) in Rayy in the period after ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s judgeship (Gutas, 1988, 261). Ibn Sīnā explains that pain is caused either by the occurrence of a bad blending of the humours that suddenly changes the existing blend (*mizāj*) or by something that disrupts the connectedness (*ittiṣāl*) of the body (*Qānūn fi ‘l-ṭibb*, I, 108). In his opinion, pain means experiencing the incompatibility of the changed mixture (*mizāj*) of humours. He thinks that every incompatible (*munāfi*) thing that is felt hurts because of its incompatibility. Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the cause of pain resembles Abū Ishāq’s opinion that a human being suffers because the “soundness” of his body disappears and its balance is disturbed.

³⁵ Abū Ishāq’s denial of the existence of pain as a *ma’nā* leads us to ask why his opinion was so different from ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion. Ibn Mattawayh reports that Abū Ishāq formed this opinion because he was not able to find an adequate answer to a question concerning the generation of pain (*Majmū‘* III, 15: 16-17). See below, 101-102, note 36.

³⁶ A detailed refutation of Abū Ishāq’s opinion is given by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in volume XIII of the *Mughnī*, where he puts forward many arguments refuting this opinion, not addressing Abū Ishāq directly but presenting his arguments in the usual form of a dialogue: “If he says..., he is answered....” (*Fa-in qāla..., qīla lahu...*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 262: 3-269: 17).

perceived by any part of the body on condition that there is life (*hayāt*) in that part of the body³⁷ (*Mughnī* IV, 38: 3, *Mughnī* XI, 336: 4). That pain can be perceived by any living part of the body, whatever its structure, is a feature that it shares with another category of perceptible things: warmth (*harāra*). However, in one aspect the perception of pain differs from the perception of temperature: we can perceive warmth that exists in someone else's body, whereas we can only perceive pain that exists in our own body (*Mughnī* XIII, 260: 4 and 256: 9).

The "instrument" of sense by which pain is perceived is that part of the body in which this pain appears (*Mughnī* XIII, 260: 3-9). 'Abd al-Jabbār considers this a feature distinguishing pain from all other things (*Mughnī* XIII, 256: 8-13). However, according to his doctrine physical pleasure (*ladhdha*) is also perceived by means of that part of the body in which it appears. This means that pleasure has the same feature as pain. This does not contradict 'Abd al-Jabbār's assertion that this feature is specific to pain. According to his doctrine, pain and pleasure are the same kind of thing.

3. Pain and Pleasure

According to 'Abd al-Jabbār, the difference between pain and pleasure lies not in what they are but in the emotion with which they are perceived. That which is perceived is given a different name because of the difference in emotion. When something that can be pain or pleasure is perceived with aversion (*nufūr al-tab'*) it is called pain, but if it is perceived with desire (*shahwa*) it is called pleasure. We have seen that according to 'Abd al-Jabbār, we suffer not because of the existence of the *ma'nā* of pain in our body, but because of our aversion to what we perceive. Had we perceived this *ma'nā* with desire (*shahwa*), we would instead have experienced pleasure³⁸ (*Mughnī* IV, 15: 12-17, 17: 3-12). 'Abd al-Jabbār explains it thus:

³⁷ The condition of the existence of life holds for all parts of the body that are used for perception: each sense organ can only function if life inheres in it. 'Abd al-Jabbār establishes a strong connection between life and perception, making the ability to perceive by means of that part of the body the criterion by which he distinguishes living parts of the body from lifeless parts. As a result, he considers hair, bones and blood as lifeless parts of the body because it is not possible to perceive things by means of them (*Mughnī* XI, 335: 13-18).

³⁸ See also Brunschvig (1974, 78-79).

But when he has an aversion to it, he suffers because of it, and it is called pain; but if he desires it, he enjoys it, and it is called pleasure. The class does not change, but the name changes and the predicate of the living being changes through it (*Mughnī* IX, 54: 20-22)³⁹.

It is ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion that when we set pain and pleasure apart from the emotions with which they are perceived, they are one and the same thing and he therefore says that they are the same class⁴⁰ (*jins*) of things (*Mughnī* IX, 54: 21 and *Mughnī*, XIII, 255: 12-13).

In order to strengthen his argument, ‘Abd al-Jabbār mentions actions that can cause both pain and pleasure, such as exposing oneself to intense cold (*bard shadīd*), warming oneself at a fire (*iṣṭilā’*), submerging oneself in lukewarm water, or scratching a part of the body that is affected by scabies (*jarab*). The result of these actions can be experienced as pain or as pleasure (*Mughnī* XIII, 243: 3-5). Scratching a healthy part of the body hurts, but someone suffering from scabies⁴¹ who scratches the itchy part of his body affected by scabies enjoys the scratching and experiences this not as pain, but as pleasure. This implies that the same *ma’nā* can be experienced as pain or as pleasure (*Mughnī* IV, 17: 17-19).

Opponents may object to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory that pain and pleasure are one class of things by pointing out that there is no word to denominate⁴² this class and that it is therefore doubtful whether

³⁹ *Lākinmahū idhā kāna nāfira ‘l-ṭab‘i ‘anhu alima bihī wa-summiya alaman wa-idhā kāna mushtahiyan lahū ‘ltadhha bihī wa-summiya ladhhatan, fa-‘l-jinsu lā yataghayyaru wa-in taghayyaru ‘alayhi ‘l-ismu wa-taghayyaru hukmu ‘l-hayyi bihī.*

⁴⁰ The term *jins* may also be translated as “genus” but, as Frank (1984, 290, note 19) has pointed out, the term *jins* as it is used by the Baṣrian *mutakallimūn* of this period is not equivalent to the English “genus”. Frank (1985, 78, note 19) explains that the Baṣrian Mu’tazilites used the term *jins* primarily to speak of the lowest, essential classes of beings, though they also commonly used it for more extensive classes. For instance, ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to the four “spatial relations” (movement, rest, composition and separation) as forming one *jins*. He also says that speech (*kalām*) and “articulated” sounds (*aṣwāt muqattā‘a*) form one *jins* (*Mughnī* VII, 22: 1-2). On the other hand, he also speaks of the *jins* of sound in general, which comprises all possible sounds including speech and “articulated” sounds (*Mughnī* VII, 23: 6 and 41: 18-42: 2). See Peters (1976, 292-312).

⁴¹ Scratching a scabious place had already been used as an example by the Greek philosophers. Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. about AD 200) says that when Aristotle discussed the possibility of feeling happy and sad at the same time he mentioned, among other things, the example of a man who suffers from scabies and scratches the affected part of his body, so that he enjoys the scratching, but is sad at the same time, because he feels the need for more scratching (Badawi, 1968, 146).

⁴² One may wonder why it is that the class of pain and pleasure does not have

such a class exists. This objection takes into consideration the relation between words and the existence of things. Can we know that something exists if we cannot denominate it? ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that this is indeed possible. He explains that the lack of a denomination for a thing is not a reason to conclude that this thing does not exist. He argues that, notwithstanding the lack of a denomination (*ibāra*) for the class of pain and pleasure, the existence of this class can be known because it has a predicate (*ṣifa*) by which it distinguishes itself from all other things. He points out that each thing, perceptible as well as imperceptible, is known by a specific feature by which it is distinguished from other things. As for the class of pain and pleasure, its unique quality is that it is perceived by means of the living substrate in which it appears. As soon as we know that a certain thing is perceived by means of that part of the body in which it appears, we know that we are dealing with something that belongs to the class of pain and pleasure, even though we cannot name this class (*Mughnī* XIII, 255: 16-256: 10). It is evident that whatever belongs to this class can be given a name as soon as we know the emotion it is perceived with.

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory raises the following question: is it possible to perceive something belonging to the class of pain or pleasure without an aversion to it or a desire for it, so that we experience that which is perceived as neither pain nor pleasure? ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that this is indeed possible. He explains that if this happens, we know from the way it is perceived that it is something that belongs to the class of pain and pleasure, although we cannot denominate it⁴³ (*Mughnī* XIII, 257: 1-6 and 256: 3-7).

‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that it is possible to perceive something of the class of pain and pleasure without experiencing any pain or pleasure at all because he takes it for granted that human beings can be without aversion or desire. However, the Mu‘tazilites differed

a name. ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s explanation is that speakers of Arabic (*ahl al-lughā*) give denominations (*ibārāt*) to things (*ma‘ānī*) according to their most striking feature. They therefore gave pain a name but not the class it belongs to (*Mughnī* XIII, 256: 1-7).

⁴³ It may appear strange that something can be perceived and yet cannot be given a name. ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that such a thing may also happen when we taste food. When we taste mixed food, we perceive a mixed flavour. From the way it is perceived, we know that we perceive a flavour, but we cannot denominate this flavour. This makes it clear that the lack of a denomination for a perceived thing is not a reason to deny its existence (*Mughnī* XIII, 255: 1-9).

about this. Some of them, probably including Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī and his son Abū Hāshim⁴⁴, were of the opinion that a living being must always feel either aversion or desire. This idea seems to have resulted from their interpretation of the theory of opposite⁴⁵ accidents. According to this theory, some accidents continue to exist and only disappear when opposite accidents appear in the substrate they inhere in. This means that things continue to have the qualities determined by these accidents. These qualities do not disappear until the opposite qualities appear. At that moment, the first accidents must disappear because accidents that are each other's opposites cannot exist together in the same substrate: they exclude each other. The qualities determined by the opposite accidents appear. Accidents that do not have opposites disappear of themselves⁴⁶. The qualities determined by these accidents disappear without the appearance of opposite qualities.

The question with respect to the perception of pain is whether or not desire and aversion are each other's opposites. Does desire only disappear when aversion appears, and vice versa, so that one is never without either of them? Or, are they not each other's opposites and is it possible that someone is sometimes without either of them? 'Abd al-Jabbār asserts that the latter is indeed possible. He explains that living beings can be without any desire or aversion because life does not imply that the living being must feel either desire or aversion. He argues that if life implied desire and aversion, a living being would always desire all desirable things or feel an aversion to all things one

⁴⁴ Ibn Mattawayh reports that, as opposed to 'Abd al-Jabbār, Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī and his son Abū Hāshim were of the opinion that living beings must feel either desire or aversion, so that they are never without either of them. Abū 'Alī therefore believed that everything that is perceived by the senses is perceived with either desire or aversion (*Tadhkira*, 321: 8). Ibn Mattawayh does not mention the reasoning of Abū 'Alī with respect to this question. It appears that his son Abū Hāshim agreed with him on this point. Ibn Mattawayh reports that Abū Hāshim believed that life entails (*muḍammīn*) aversion and desire (*Tadhkira*, 321: 9-10). This means that as long as a person is alive, he must feel desire or aversion, just as he must always perceive that which can be perceived by him. (See Peters, 1976, 175-180). When 'Abd al-Jabbār discusses the question of whether life entails aversion and desire, he does not mention what Abū Hāshim's opinion on this question was. He only says that Abū Hāshim gave information about it (*nabbaha 'alā dhālika*) and that Abū 'Abdallāh explained it (*sarraḥa bi-'l-qawli bihī*), so that it is not clear which opinion was Abū Hāshim's and which opinion was Abū 'Abdallāh's on this question (*Mughnī* XIII, 243: 14-19).

⁴⁵ On the concept of *ḍidd* (opposite), see Peters (1976, 142-143).

⁴⁶ Peters (1976, 125-126).

can feel an aversion to and there would be no difference between the living beings with respect to this. From the fact that things are not that way, ‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes that it is possible for a living being to feel neither desire nor aversion (*Mughnī* XIII, 244: 10-17).

‘Abd al-Jabbār then argues that if we can be without desire or aversion, it is possible that we perceive something belonging to the class of pain and pleasure without feeling a desire for what we perceive or an aversion to it: we just perceive it. In that case, that which is perceived is not called pain or pleasure. He adds that the belief that living beings can be without desire or aversion also explains why they may differ from each other with respect to their experiences of pain and pleasure (*Mughnī* XIII, 242: 10-13 and *Mughnī* IV, 17: 16-17). He does not explain what he means by this remark, but it is likely that he refers to the fact that one person does not feel pain in a situation in which another person does feel pain.

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s disciple Ibn Mattawayh agrees with him that it is possible that something belonging to the class of pain and pleasure is perceived without feeling a desire for it or an aversion to it, but Ibn Mattawayh explicitly applies this to God. He declares that when something of the class pain and pleasure is perceived by “One who is considered to be without desire or aversion”, this *ma’nā* is not called pain or pleasure (*Majmū’* III, 17: 1-2)⁴⁷. By “One who is considered to be without desire or aversion”, Ibn Mattawayh means God. According to Mu’tazilite doctrine, it is impossible for God to feel a desire for or an aversion to something, as this would imply that God has needs and this would conflict with His omnipotence. Yet, because God perceives all perceptible things, He also perceives that which belongs to the class of pain and pleasure. Ibn Mattawayh emphasizes that although God perceives what belongs to the class of pain and pleasure He is not described as feeling pain or pleasure, as He does not perceive this class with aversion or desire (*Majmū’* III, 17: 2-3).

Another question with respect to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory of pain and pleasure is whether it is possible to perceive as pleasure that which normally is painful. We have already seen that ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives examples of actions, such as exposing oneself to intense cold, that can result in pain or pleasure. Depending on the circumstances and the quantity of what one is exposed to, the result of such an act can

⁴⁷ See also *Tadhkira*, 308: 12-13 and 315: 3-5.

at one time be perceived with aversion, so that it is experienced as pain, and at another time with desire, so that it is experienced as pleasure. However, does 'Abd al-Jabbār consider it possible that someone who is dismembered experiences this as a pleasure? It should be taken into account that the question is not whether this person enjoys suffering, but whether he experiences as pleasure that which is normally experienced as pain.

'Abd al-Jabbār does not deny that, in theory, it is possible for someone to experience his dismemberment as a pleasure, but he denies that this can normally happen. He asserts that the normal course of events (*'āda*)⁴⁸ does not allow this. Like many things in this world, pain and pleasure do not occur at random but always happen in the same way which is normal for them. 'Abd al-Jabbār admits that deviations from the usual way in which things happen can occur, but only in times when prophets appear⁴⁹ (*Mughnī* XIII, 241: 16-17). He therefore concedes that it is possible for somebody to be dismembered without experiencing pain, but he points out that usually such a thing does not happen because it would contradict what is normal for pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 242: 1-2).

'Abd al-Jabbār adds that if someone experienced his dismemberment as a pleasure, this pleasure would be overpowered by additional sorrow. He argues that such a person would not only feel pleasure but also, simultaneously, sorrow (*ghamm*) because of the realization that he will be physically disfigured, and this sorrow would outweigh any pleasure he felt. 'Abd al-Jabbār is convinced that people who are in full possession of their mental faculties must feel sorrow about the loss of their limbs because they need them as instruments. As long as their limbs are sound, they can obtain pleasure and profits using their limbs. Having lost them, this is no longer possible (*Mughnī* XIII, 243: 10-13).

⁴⁸ Peters (1976, 98), who translates *'āda* as "usage", explains that: "this 'usage' is concerned not with the acts of human beings, but with God's acts; it is the normal course of events in this world, which is changed by God alone. For such a deviation of the normal course of events in the time of Ibrāhīm, who is not burnt by fire, see Qur'ān 21; 69. *'Āda* corresponds, qua contents, with what we call the laws of nature." For an explanation of the concept of *'āda*, see also Antes (1970, 40-44), Wolfson (1976, 544-551), Schwarz (1976, 251-252, note 87) and Gimaret (1980, 262).

⁴⁹ One of the criteria for a miracle performed by a prophet is that it must break with the normal course of events (*al-'āda*). See *Mughnī* XV, 171: 13, Peters (1976, 98, note 316) and Rahman (1996, 413-414).

Ibn Mattawayh also pays attention to a related question. He points out that when we feel pain we cannot change this into a feeling of pleasure because we cannot change our aversion into desire. In his opinion, we ourselves cannot create an aversion or desire: only God can create these things (*Majmūʿ* I, 433: 28-434: 3).

Another question to be asked is whether it is possible to feel pain and pleasure at the same moment. The question discussed by ʿAbd al-Jabbār is not whether something of the class of pain and pleasure that happens in one part of the body can be experienced as pain and pleasure at the same moment⁵⁰, but rather whether it is possible to experience pain in one part of the body and pleasure in another part. This question is raised because it implies that one can have an aversion to a particular thing and at the same moment a desire for the same sort of thing. ʿAbd al-Jabbār believes that it is indeed possible to feel pain and pleasure at the same moment. He makes this clear by the example of a man who scratches a part of his body that is affected by scabies (*jarab*) and experiences pleasure as the result of this scratching. However, if he at the same moment scratches one of his healthy limbs, he experiences pain. This means that he experiences pain and pleasure at the same moment (*Mughnī*, XIII, 259: 1-8). ʿAbd al-Jabbār also considers it possible for something to be experienced at one moment as pain and at another moment as pleasure, or that it may be experienced by one person as pain and by another as pleasure (*Mughnī* XIII, 257: 14-258: 11).

⁵⁰ This question is discussed by Ibn Mattawayh in *al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-l-aʿrād*. He declares that it is impossible to perceive one and the same thing with aversion and desire at the same time. He explains that when aversion and desire concern one and the same thing, they are each other's opposites and exclude each other (*Tadhkira*, 328: 1-5).

CHAPTER THREE

HOW PAIN COMES INTO EXISTENCE

After having explained what pain is and how it is perceived, ‘Abd al-Jabbār discusses the way in which pain comes into existence. He first considers whether pain is something that can be produced¹ by human beings (*Mughnī* XIII, 271: 2). According to his doctrine, only a limited number of acts (*af‘āl*, plural of *fi‘l*) in this world can be done by human beings; the production of things like colours, smells, and life, is not possible for humans: only God can produce them².

Defining what human beings are able to produce, ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to what Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī and Abū Hāshim said on this subject. They said that human beings can do two sorts of actions: firstly, “acts of the limbs” (*af‘āl al-jawāriḥ*) such as movements (*ḥarakāt*), different sorts of pressure (*i‘timādāt*), composition (*taḥlīf*), different sorts of pain (*ālām*) and sounds (*aṣwāt*), and, secondly, “acts of the heart” (*af‘āl al-qulūb*) such as thought (*fikr*), will (*irāda*), conviction (*i‘tiqād*) and “the opposites of conviction”³, and remorse (*nadam*) (*Mughnī* IX, 13: 13-16). This enumeration makes it clear that ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers pain as something that can be produced by human beings.

‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that human beings can only produce pain in a way that he refers to as “generation” (*tawlīd*)⁴. According to his doctrine, human beings can produce things in two ways. Some things such as pain and sounds can only be produced by them by

¹ Speaking about divine and human acting, ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the verb *fa‘ala*, *yaf‘alu* (to do; to act) which I mostly will translate as “to produce”.

² See Peters (1976, 127).

³ By “the opposites of conviction” ‘Abd al-Jabbār means things such as doubt, supposition and suspicion which he regards as opposites of conviction because they exclude each other if they concern the same subject.

⁴ The term *tawallud* is also used. On the Mu‘tazilite theory of generation (*tawlīd*) see Bernand (1982, 233-240), Daiber (1975, 393-402), Van Ess (1966, 290-295), Fakhry (1991, 37-38), Frank (1982, 324-326), Gimaret (1980, 36-47, and 1990, 401-409), al-‘Irāqī (1983⁶, 51-60), McDermott (1978, 169-177), Nader (1956, 198-204), Peters (1976, 60-61 and 206-209) and Schwarz (1976, 250-251, note 85-86). Hecker (1975) gives an explanatory translation of volume IX (*Kitāb al-tawlīd*) of the *Mughnī*, that deals with generation.

way of generation. The process of generation implies that in order to produce something, the cause (*sabab*) of this thing is produced. For instance, in order to produce a sound we have to put a special kind of pressure (i.e., knocking) on something in such a way that it produces a sound. This pressure is the cause of the sound. It is impossible for us to produce sound directly without first producing its cause: pressure in the form of a knock⁵.

A second group of things can be produced by human beings only directly (*muḥtada'an*—"begun") inside themselves without first producing something else: they directly start producing the thing itself. The will is an example of this second group of actions: according to 'Abd al-Jabbār's doctrine, a person who wants to do something directly produces in him- or her-self the will to do that thing. A third group of things can be produced in both ways: either directly ("from inside") or by generation ("from outside") (*Mughnī* IX, 13: 16-19). An example of this third group is movement. We can move our own arms or legs from inside, but we also can move objects from one place to another.

When 'Abd al-Jabbār says that human beings can only produce pain by the process of generation, he means that we are not able to produce pain in our body directly, "from inside", but only "from outside": we have to press something against our body, causing a wound in it (*Mughnī* IX, 127: 19-22). It is only in this indirect way, by first causing a wound, that we can produce pain in our own body or in someone else's body⁶. According to 'Abd al-Jabbār's doctrine, pain is generated by the injury. He therefore refers to the injury as the cause⁷ (*sabab*) of the pain. Nevertheless, the pain is considered to have been produced by the person who put the pressure and caused the injury. According to 'Abd al-Jabbār's doctrine, he who produces a cause (in this case, the injury) must be seen as the one who produces its effect (in this case, the pain) (*Mughnī* IX, 139:

⁵ See Peters (1976, 141). See also below, 93.

⁶ See below, 94-97.

⁷ Generally, *sabab* and *'illa* are both translated as cause, although they are different terms. *Sabab* is used in relation to the production of acts, whereas *'illa* is used in relation to the changing qualities of persons or objects. Frank (1967, 251) and Peters (1976, 209) note that, as opposed to a *sabab*, a *'illa* produces its effect directly and necessarily. In order to distinguish between "cause" as a translation of *'illa* and "cause" as a translation of *sabab*, some scholars speak of "secondary cause" when they refer to *sabab*. However, the addition of "secondary" is not necessary in discussions of generation because it is evident in this context which kind of cause is meant.

20-21). This is the result of the close relation between a cause and its effect (*musabbab*). Once a cause has been brought into existence, it must generate its effect, unless it is prevented from doing so by hindrances that impede generation⁸. Producing something by means of the process of cause and effect is called generation (*tawlād*) in Mu‘tazilite doctrine.

1. *Ṣiḥḥa and Wahā*

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s discussion of the generation of pain, two terms are often used by him. These are the terms *ṣiḥḥa* and *wahā*. In what follows, attention will first be given to the meaning of the term *ṣiḥḥa*. I have not come across a definition of this term in those parts of the *Mughnī* that I have studied. What ‘Abd al-Jabbār means by it becomes clear from the way in which it is used⁹. It appears that in reference to living bodies, the existence of *ṣiḥḥa* in a body means that this body is intact and without injury. This can be concluded from ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s assertion that *ṣiḥḥa* exists in the body of a living being if this body is free from defect (*sālim min al-āfa*); appearance of a deficiency (*ikhtilāl*) in a living body implies the disappearance of the soundness of that part of the body (*Mughnī* XIII, 269: 12-14). Used in this sense, *ṣiḥḥa* only applies to living beings. ‘Abd al-Jabbār emphasizes this by specifying that the soundness he refers to is needed for life (*al-ṣiḥḥatu ‘ulatī taḥtāju ilayhā ‘l-ḥayātu*) (*Mughnī* IX, 52: 23). He adds that this soundness cannot be perceived, which implies that its existence is known by deduction (*Mughnī* XIII, 262: 11). It is difficult to find an adequate translation for the term *ṣiḥḥa*. I have chosen to translate this term not as “health” or “healthiness”, but as “soundness”, as a living being whose body is without defect is described as being sound, even though he may feel ill.

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s time the term *ṣiḥḥa* was also understood in senses other than that described above. This can be concluded from the definition of *ṣiḥḥa* given by Mānkḏīm. In order to refute an opinion of the Baghdādian Mu‘tazilites, Mānkḏīm mentions three

⁸ See Peters (1976, 60-61).

⁹ ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the term *ṣiḥḥa* in more than one sense. In reference to ideas and statements, he uses it in the sense of correctness or possibility, indicating that what is said is correct or logically possible (Peters, 1976, 80-81).

possible meanings of *ṣihha*, the first of which is “composition in the sense of having healed” (*al-taʿlīfu min jihati ʿl-iltiʿāmī*) (*Taʿlīq*, 392: 4)¹⁰. Composition (*taʿlīf*) is a term that is used in ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s cosmology to indicate that two atoms are connected to each other, so that they form one substrate¹¹. The word *iltiʿām* is the verbal noun of the verb *iltaʿama*, which means “being repaired”, “being connected” or “having healed” (wound). This meaning of *ṣihha*, “composition in the sense of having healed”, conforms to the sense in which *ṣihha* is used by ʿAbd al-Jabbār because in both cases it refers to the intactness of a living body without any injury.

The second meaning of *ṣihha* mentioned by Mānkḏīm is “the balance of the mixture” (*iʿtidāl al-mizāj*) (*Taʿlīq*, 392: 4). This is the sense in which it was used by physicians in Mānkḏīm’s time. This becomes clear from another part of the *Taʿlīq* where Mānkḏīm explains that by the “balance of the mixture” the physicians (*aṭibbāʾ*) understand the balance of “the four natural dispositions” (*ṭabāʾiʿ*): warmth (*ḥarāra*), coldness (*burūda*), wetness (*ruṭūba*) and dryness (*yubūsa*) (*Taʿlīq*, 154: 15-18). For these physicians “balance of mixture” meant that the four humours were in balance¹². The third meaning mentioned by Mānkḏīm is “the cessation of illnesses and sicknesses” (*zawālu ʿl-amrāḏi wa-ʿl-asqāmi*) (*Taʿlīq*, 392: 4-5). This was probably the sense in which *ṣihha* was understood by the common people.

*Wahā*¹³ is a verbal noun derived from the verb “*w-h-y*” that, according to Kazimirski¹⁴, means “being burst” or “being torn” (French: *être crevé, déchiré*). Kazimirski translates *wahā* itself as “crack”, “fissure”, “burst”, “rupture” (French: *fissure, rupture, solution de continuité, crevasse, déchirure*). Brunschvig¹⁵ translates this term with the French word “lésion” which corresponds with the English “lesion”. As for an English translation of *wahā*, Peters¹⁶ translates it as “cleav-

¹⁰ See also *Taʿlīq* (154: 15).

¹¹ See Peters (1976, 132-134).

¹² On the four humours, see above, 80.

¹³ In the *Mughnī* two forms are found: *wahā* and *wahy*. In *Mughnī* (IX, 52-56) it is written with an *alif* at the end of the word. In *Mughnī* XIII (for instance, 261) it is written with a *yāʾ maqṣūra*; in both cases the pronunciation is “*wahā*”. However, in *Mughnī* (XIII, 231: 4) the *manṣūb* form *wahyan* is found which indicates the pronunciation as “*wahy*”.

¹⁴ Kazimirski (1860, II, 1618-1619).

¹⁵ Brunschvig (1974, 76).

¹⁶ Peters (1976, 134).

age”, whereas Hecker translates it as “infirmity”¹⁷ or “weakness”¹⁸. In view of the way ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the term, I have chosen to translate *wahā* as “lesion”, as it is clear that he uses this term to refer to a separation made in the body of a living being, so that it is injured. By translating *wahā* as “lesion”, we also distinguish it from other related terms used by ‘Abd al-Jabbār, such as separation (*taf-rīq* or *iftirāq*) and wound (*jurh*).

Defining what is meant by a lesion (*wahā*), ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā’ī and says that “by a lesion (*wahā*) he [Abū Hāshim] means a separation (*iftirāq*) upon whose occurrence the soundness (*sihha*) needed by life disappears, and not a separation that does not have this effect”¹⁹ (*Mughnī* IX, 52: 23-24). ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not provide a definition of his own: he probably agrees with Abū Hāshim’s definition of a lesion. This definition makes it clear that a lesion is a separation that is distinguished from other kinds of separation by the simultaneous disappearance of soundness. This implies that not every separation generates pain.

‘Abd al-Jabbār makes the occurrence of this special feature, simultaneous disappearance of soundness, the condition for the generation of pain, saying that pain is generated by a separation on condition that soundness disappear from the substrate (*Mughnī* IX, 54: 13-16)²⁰. To defend his assertion that it is possible that a cause (separation) only generates its effect (pain) if a special feature (simultaneous disappearance of soundness) is present, ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to sounds. We have seen²¹ that according to his doctrine, sound is generated by pressure (*i’timād*), although only by a certain type of pressure. He considers that knocking on an object is a form of putting pressure on it. Only pressure on an object in the form of a knock (*muṣākka*) generates sound; other kinds of pressure do not generate sound. ‘Abd al-Jabbār argues that, similarly, not all kinds of separation generate pain: pain is only generated by separations that have the special feature that their oc-

¹⁷ Hecker (1975, 135 ff.)

¹⁸ Hecker (1975, 563).

¹⁹ *Wa-’l-wahā innamā yurīdu bihī ’l-iftirāqa ’lladhī tantafti ’indahū ’l-sihhatu ’llatī tahtāju ilayhā ’l-hayātu dūna ’l-iftirāqi ’lladhī lā yu’aththiru hādihā ’l-ta’thīra* (reading *tantafti* rather than *tantaqi*). Hecker (1975, 171, note 144) proposes to correct *tantaqi* as it is written in the edition to *tantafti*, which is indeed a good solution.

²⁰ I agree with Hecker (1975, 171, note 158) that *Mughnī* (IX, 54: 15-16) should be read as *wa-illā lam yuwallid dhālika* instead of *wa-’l-alamu yuwallidu dhālika*.

²¹ See above, 90.

currence implies the disappearance of soundness. This means that if soundness continues, a separation does not generate pain: in that case it is prevented from doing so because the condition for the generation has not been fulfilled (*Mughnī* IX, 163: 22-23).

In addition to the term *wahā* (lesion), ‘Abd al-Jabbār also uses the general term *ifirāq* or *tafrīq* (separation) in reference to that which generates pain. In volume IX of the *Mughnī* (*Mughnī* IX, 52: 16-59: 8), he almost exclusively applies the term *wahā* (lesion) when he discusses the generation of pain, whereas in volume XIII of the *Mughnī* he often uses the term *tafrīq* (separation). For instance, at the beginning of the chapter in volume XIII that deals with the generation of pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 272-275), he says that pain is generated by a separation (*tafrīq*) on the condition that soundness disappears²² (*Mughnī* XIII, 272: 3). Yet, in this volume he also uses the term *wahā* (lesion), for instance, when he explains that pain is generated by a lesion (*Mughnī* XIII, 260: 10).

Although ‘Abd al-Jabbār mostly uses the terms *wahā* (lesion) and *tafrīq* (separation) with reference to that which generates pain, he sometimes uses a third term. This term is *kawn* (“spatial relation”). An example of the use of this term can be found in volume VI/1 of the *Mughnī*, where ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that “... it is an established fact that it [the pain] is generated by the spatial relation (*kawn*) that is the lesion (*wahā*)²³” (*Mughnī* VI/1, 169: 6-7). We have seen²⁴ that *kawn* (spatial relation) is a term used by ‘Abd al-Jabbār to indicate the relation that an atom has to another atom, whether it is connected to it or separated from it and whether it is moving or at rest. The spatial relation meant here by ‘Abd al-Jabbār is “separation” (*ifirāq*) which indicates that two atoms are separated rather than connected to each other.

2. How Pain is Generated

As we have seen, ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that pain is generated by a specific sort of separation in a living body. This separation is the result of pressure (*i’timād*) that is put on the body. This means that in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion the process by which pain is produced

²² *Flam anna ‘l-ṣaḥīḥa anna ‘lladhī yuwalliduhū huwa ‘l-tafrīqu bi-sharṭi nafyi ‘l-ṣiḥḥati.*

²³ *Qad thabata annahā [al-ālām] tatawalladu ‘an-i ‘l-kawni ‘lladhī huwa ‘l-wahā.*

²⁴ See above, 74.

consists of the following steps: firstly, pressure is put on the body; secondly, the pressure generates a separation (lesion) in the body; thirdly, the separation generates pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 273: 14). In his article on ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory of pain, Brunschvig²⁵ presents the process of producing pain as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & i'timād \rightarrow wahā (=tafrīq) \rightarrow alam \\ & (\text{pressure} \rightarrow \text{lesion} (= \text{separation}) \rightarrow \text{pain}) \end{aligned}$$

This makes clear that according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, it is not the pressure that generates the pain, but rather the lesion (*wahā*), although it is not possible to produce pain without the use of pressure.

‘Abd al-Jabbār advances several arguments to support his opinion that the lesion, and not the pressure or something else, generates the pain. In his opinion two related things only can be cause (*sabab*) and effect (*musabbab*) if the first (i.e., the cause) can exist separately from the second (i.e., the effect). The reason for this is that according to his theory a cause (*sabab*) may be prevented from generating its effect (*musabbab*). If it appears that two related things can only exist in co-existence with each other, it implies that they cannot be cause and effect. To clarify this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of an atom (*jawhar*). As we have seen²⁶, atoms must have some spatial relation (*kawn*). They cannot exist without having a spatial relation: they must be moving or be immobile and be connected to another atom or be separated from it. (*Mughnī* IX, 53: 4-8). ‘Abd al-Jabbār argues that this is different for a lesion (*wahā*) and pain. He points out that a lesion is a separation (*tafrīq*) and it is known that separations can exist without the simultaneous existence of pain (*Mughnī* IX, 52: 24-53: 8). Therefore a lesion and pain can be a cause and its effect.

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory of generation sets still other conditions for the relationship between cause and effect, one of which is that the effect must come into being during the existence of the cause. This means that an effect cannot come into existence if its cause is non-existent, for instance, if the cause disappeared before the effect came into existence. A further condition is that the quantity

²⁵ Brunschvig, (1974, 75).

²⁶ See above, 74.

of the effect must be commensurate with the quantity of the cause. Lastly, the process of generation must always be the same.

‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that with respect to the generation of pain the lesion meets all of these conditions (*Mughnī* IX, 52: 16-18). He rejects the idea that it is not the lesion but rather the disappearance (*nafy*) of the soundness (*ṣihha*) which generates pain. He explains that this is impossible because things that do not exist cannot generate effects: their nonexistence (*adam*) prevents their doing so (*Mughnī* XIII, 274: 10-11). He also rejects the idea that before its disappearance the soundness generates pain but on condition that it will disappear after having generated the pain. He argues that it cannot be obligatory for something to become nonexistent in order to be able to generate its effect (*Mughnī* XIII, 275: 1 and *Mughnī* IX, 55: 24).

As for the condition that the quantity of an effect is commensurate with the quantity of a cause, ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that lesions and pain meet this condition because “when the injuries increase, the pain increases” (*wa-matā zādat al-jirāhātu zādat al-ālāmu*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 272: 7-8). ‘Abd al-Jabbār adds that some people maintain that it is pressure rather than a lesion which is the cause of pain because they take into consideration that a heavy blow causes intense pain and a soft blow causes little pain. They conclude from this that pain is commensurate with the blow, so that the blow must be the cause of pain. ‘Abd al-Jabbār refutes this, arguing that if the blow (the pressure) was the cause of pain, two equal blows would always generate an equal quantity of pain. However, two equal blows may generate different quantities of pain, if the separations differ. If someone is hit in a hard part of his body there is a small separation (*tafīq*) and little pain, but if he is hit equally hard in a soft part there is a large separation and the pain is intense (*Mughnī* XIII, 272: 5-7). This means that the pain is commensurate with the separation and not with the pressure, thus it must be concluded that it is not the pressure but the separation which is the cause of the pain.

Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāī had different opinions on this subject. Like ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Abū Hāshim took into consideration that a blow to a soft part of the body is more painful than a blow to a hard part and therefore concluded that it is the lesion and not the pressure which generates pain (*Mughnī* IX, 52: 19-22). Thus, in his book

*al-Ĵāmi*²⁷ he said that pressure (*i'timād*) generates a lesion (*wahā*) in the body and this lesion generates the pain (*Mughnī* IX, 138: 11-14). However, 'Abd al-Jabbār reports that in Abū Hāshim's works other opinions on the generation of pain are found²⁸: in *al-Abwāb*²⁹ Abū Hāshim said that it is possible that pressure generates both pain and a lesion and in another part of the same work he said that pain is generated by pressure and not by the "spatial relation" (*ka'wān*) (by which he means separation) (*Mughnī* IX, 138: 14-15). As we do not know the chronological order of Abū Hāshim's works, it is not clear which of these opinions was the last to be held by him.

However this may be, 'Abd al-Jabbār is of the opinion that pressure on a body generates a lesion, and that this lesion generates pain. As for Mānkḏīm, he adopted one of Abū Hāshim's other opinions: the opinion that pressure generates the pain. In his discussion of the generation of acts in general (*Tā'liq*, 387-390), Mānkḏīm does not consider the generation of pain, nor does he explicitly discuss this subject elsewhere. However, when discussing other subjects, he does make some remarks on the generation of pain. For instance, he comments that when someone hits someone else, the quantity of pain is commensurate with the quantity of the blow (*fa-inna 'l-alama yaqa'u bi-ḥasabi 'l-ḏarbi 'l-mawjūdi min jihatihī*) (*Tā'liq*, 338: 3-4). He argues that there is little pain if the blow is light but that there is intense pain if the blow is heavy. From this we may conclude that he is of the opinion that pressure (i.e., the blow), and not a lesion, generates pain. There is evidence that he rejects the idea that a lesion generates the pain, as he denies that pain is generated by "spatial relations" (*akwān*) and asserts that "a human being (*al-qādir bi-'l-quḏra*) can only produce something in something else by means of pressure (*i'timād*)" (*Tā'liq*, 91: 19-92: 1). This conforms with Abū Hāshim's opinion in *al-Abwāb*.

²⁷ Gimaret (1976, 313) assumes that *al-Ĵāmi* was a work that discussed theological problems in a systematic order.

²⁸ Ibn Mattawayh confirms that Abū Hāshim's opinions about the generation of pain differed. He reports that Abū Hāshim's opinion (*madhhab*) is that the cause (*sabab*) of pain is the lesion (*wahā*), but that in some places he said that the pressure (*i'timād*) generates it (*Majmū'* III, 22: 21-22).

²⁹ On this work, see Gimaret (1976, 298-304).

3. *The Problem of the Two Needle-Pricks*

A difficult question with regard to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory on the generation of pain is the fact that two needle-pricks are equally painful. According to Mu‘tazilite thinking, we are able to act by virtue of the power (*qudra*) that inheres in the substrate of our limbs. The quantity of this power defines the proportions of the acts we can perform using our limbs (*Mughnī* IX, 18: 16). It implies that a strong person can put more pressure on an object than a weak person. We have seen that according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār a lesion (*wahā*) is caused by pressure (*i‘timād*). We have also seen that a condition for the relationship of cause and effect is that the effect is commensurate with the cause. This implies that the greater the pressure, the greater the lesion. Thus, pain that results from pressure applied by a strong person must be greater than pain that results from pressure applied by a weak person because, the larger the lesion, the greater the pain. If this is right, then how can it be explained that a needle-prick is equally painful, whether given by a strong or a weak person, and that the prick given by the weak person may even hurt more?

‘Abd al-Jabbār gives a solution to this question. He calls into question the correctness of the premise that a prick given by a strong person results in a larger lesion than the prick given by a weak person. He points out that the quantity of power that inheres in someone’s limbs only determines the absolute limit of what can be achieved by using these limbs; it is not necessary for a strong person to use all his strength when giving a prick—as a matter of fact, this also holds true for a weak person. A strong person who does not use his full strength may produce a lesion that is as large as or even smaller than a lesion produced by a weak person (*Mughnī* XIII, 233: 5-7). ‘Abd al-Jabbār says:

It is possible that notwithstanding his weakness, a weak person pricks the needle in the body of a living being in such a way that it penetrates in its length and breadth and that the strong person does it differently, so that what actually is produced by the strong person is as much or less than what is produced by the weak person (*Mughnī* XIII, 233: 8-10)³⁰

³⁰ *Wa-yajūzu fī ‘l-da‘fī an yakūna li-du‘fihī taḡhūšu ‘l-ibrata fī badani ‘l-ḥayyi ‘alā wajhin yadhhabu ṭūlan wa-‘arḍan wa-‘l-qawīyyu bi-khilāfihī fa-yakūnu ‘l-mawjūdu min fī‘li ‘l-qawīyyi mithla ‘l-mawjūdi min fī‘lihī aw aqalla.* I prefer to read *badani ‘l-ḥayyi* as it

After giving his own solution to this question, ‘Abd al-Jabbār describes, without rejection³¹, what Abū Hāshim said about this issue. Abū Hāshim discussed the question of pain produced by a weak and a strong person, although he did not refer to two needle-pricks but to “cutting” (*taqtī*)³² in general (*Mughnī* IX, 54: 24-55: 15). He took it for granted that a strong man’s act must be more effective than a weak man’s. He declared that when a strong person cuts someone’s body, he makes more particles of separation (*ajzā’ al-tafrīq*)³³ than a weak person. He considered separation as consisting of particles (*ajzā’*) of separation. He then weighed how much soundness disappears against how much separation there is. He said that if the soundness that disappears does not correspond to the quantity of particles of separation, as in the case of the strong person cutting, this means that some particles of separation cannot generate pain. The shortage of disappearing soundness implies that for these particles the condition of disappearance of soundness is not fulfilled and a condition not being fulfilled prevents a cause from generating its effect. Only those particles of separation for which the condition of disappearance of soundness has been fulfilled can generate pain. This means that in his opinion, the quantity of pain is determined by how much soundness disappears and not by the quantity of separation (*Mughnī* XIII, 233: 11-236: 11, *Mughnī* IX, 55: 1-13 and *Majmū’* III, 24: 11-16). With respect to the two needle-pricks this means that they are equally painful because in both cases the same quantity of soundness disappears.

‘Abd al-Jabbār observed that Abū Hāshim’s opinion raises some

is found in the manuscript rather than *badanihī* ‘*l-hayyi* (*Mughnī* XIII, 233, note 2).

³¹ Although in the *Mughnī* ‘Abd al-Jabbār describes Abū Hāshim’s solution to the question of the two needle-pricks without rejecting it, it is possible that he later rejected it. This would explain why Ibn Mattawayh in the *Majmū’ fi ‘l-muhīṭ bi-‘l-taklīf* says that ‘Abd al-Jabbār did not agree with Abū Hāshim and rejected the idea that only a part of the separation generates pain. (*Majmū’* III, 24: 17-18). As the *Muhīṭ* was probably written (or dictated) after the *Mughnī*, it is possible that ‘Abd al-Jabbār expressed opinions different from those in the *Mughnī* because he had gained new insights.

³² Hecker (1975, 143) translates *taqtī* as “dismemberment” but this is not meant here.

³³ *Juz’* means “atom”, the smallest possible part into which material beings can be divided. However, an atom is a substance (Peters, 1976, 121-122). Because a separation is not a substance, the meaning of *juz’* in this context cannot be atom. I therefore decided to translate *juz’* as “particle” in this context.

questions. For instance, if separation consists of particles of separation does this mean that pain is generated by particles of separation working together? (*Mughnī* IX, 56: 15-57: 6 and *Mughnī* XIII, 234: 1-2). If so, this would mean one thing (pain) is generated by a number of causes working together, which conflicts with the Mu'tazilite principle that for each act there can be only one agent (*fā'il*)³⁴. Abū Hāshim explained that his idea that pain is generated by some particles of separation did not contradict this principle because the disappearing soundness is not divided into particles and, as one soundness disappears, one pain is generated (*Mughnī* XIII, 233: 16-18).

Another difficult point in Abū Hāsim's solution is how to explain that it is indeed possible that the disappearance of soundness does not concern all particles of a separation, but only some of them. This may have been the reason why Ibn Mattawayh rejected Abū Hāshim's solution to the question of the two needle-pricks. He objected to the premise that two needlepricks are equally painful. He thought that one may say: "It is impossible to prick in such a manner that the two pricks are equally painful. Rather, we may find that the prick of the strong person hurts more, or the other way round" (*Majmū' III*, 24: 2-3). Or one may say: "Rather, we find that the prick of the weak person hurts more than the prick of the strong person because the strong person pricks with a steady hand (*'alā samti 'l-istiqāmati*) and the weak person does not prick in this steady way because of his weakness, and so pain is generated at the sides of the needle-prick" (*Majmū' III*, 24: 3-5).

Notwithstanding his objections to the premise that the two needle-pricks are equally painful, Ibn Mattawayh tries to find a solution to the question that starts from the idea that the two pricks

³⁴ The principle that one act cannot be produced by two agents acting together is an important principle because it forms the basis for the Mu'tazilites' rejection of the opinion of the Mujbira, who declared that something can be the act of God and man together. Mujbira was a name used by the Mu'tazilites for their opponents on the subject of predestination (Watt, 1973, 118, Hourani, 1971, 23-24, note 17, and Gimaret, 1980, 62). These opponents adhered to the opinion that God determines the acts of man. In the time of 'Abd al-Jabbār and his pupils this doctrine was held by the Ash'arites who introduced the concept of *kasb*, which means that God creates an act but that this act is "acquired" by man. Gimaret (1980) has written a detailed study on Mu'tazilite and Sunnite thought on the subject of human acts and the arguments theologians used to defend their positions. For the Mu'tazilite argument that an act can only be done by one acting subject, see Gimaret (1980, 287-298).

are indeed equally painful. For his solution he takes into account the duration of the prick. He considers that it is possible that the weak person takes more time (more time particles: *awqāt*) for the prick and produces something of which the total quantity is equivalent (*muqābil*) to what is done by the strong person in less time (*Majmūʿ* III, 23: 22-24: 1) and *Tadhkira*, 311: 13-15).

Apart from this solution, Ibn Mattawayh gives another solution to the question in which he starts from the idea that the strong person and the weak person take the same time for pricking the needle and that the strong person's act is more effective than the weak person's. To explain that the two needle-pricks are equally painful, Ibn Mattawayh takes into account that pain and pleasure are the same sort of thing and that which is experienced as pain is so because it is perceived with aversion. He considers it possible that the two needle-pricks are equally painful because they are perceived with an equal quantity of aversion (*nufūr*): "if the aversion (*nufūr*) is equal, the suffering (*ta'allum*) is equal, and if the aversion increases, the suffering increases" (*Majmūʿ* III, 24: 7-8). It should be noted that in the latter solution Ibn Mattawayh does not speak of equal pain (*alam*), but of equal suffering (*ta'allum*). His solution implies that he thinks two different lesions can produce equal quantities of pain because, in spite of the difference in quantity of pain generated by them, it provokes equal quantities of aversion³⁵.

The question of the two needle-pricks may seem to be an unimportant question but had Abū Hāshim, 'Abd al-Jabbār and Ibn Mattawayh not been able to answer it, their opponents could have used this to challenge them about their doctrine on pain³⁶. This

³⁵ The idea that the quantity of pain is related to the quantity of aversion is also found in the *Mughnī*, where 'Abd al-Jabbār says that living beings differ from each other with respect to the quantity of pain they feel because one living being may have a greater aversion to what he perceives than another. However, as opposed to Ibn Mattawayh's opinion, 'Abd al-Jabbār's remark concerns the different quantities of aversion felt by different persons, and not by the same person. He explains that someone who can bear suffering does not have as much pain as another person, just as one person is not sorrowed by that which another is sorrowed by. He adds that one can be trained to endure things more easily (*Mughnī* XIII, 251: 7-13). 'Abd al-Jabbār is probably referring to people like mystics who have trained themselves to bear pain, such as, for instance, the Persian mystic Abū Sa'īd b. Abī 'l-Khayr (967-1049), a contemporary of 'Abd al-Jabbār who underwent difficult ascetic practices (Schimmel, 1975, 241-242).

³⁶ In the *Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-'l-a'rāḍ*, Ibn Mattawayh reports that the question of the two needle-pricks and Abū Hāshim's answer was the very

becomes clear from ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s introduction to this question in which he presents the question as being raised by opponents who refute that pain is a perceptible *ma’nā* that can be produced by humans by means of the process of generation (*Mughnī* XIII, 232: 14-18).

4. *The Duration of Pain*

We have seen³⁷ that in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s cosmology, objects in this world consist of atoms and accidents (*a’rād*). All accidents are temporal, but some of them are continuous (*bāqī*) and some are not. Continuous accidents exist as long as they are not annihilated by the appearance of their opposites in the same substrate. Thus, for instance, the “spatial relations” (*akwān*) form two pairs of incompatible accidents. An atom cannot exist without having a spatial relation, so the accident of its present spatial relation has to persist until its opposite comes into existence. This means that an atom continues to be immobile as long as the accident of immobility inheres in it. But, as soon as the accident of movement, the opposite of the accident of immobility, comes into existence in the substrate, the atom becomes moving. At that moment the accident of immobility ceases to exist because of the existence of its opposite, the accident of moving, in the atom. Likewise, the two other spatial relations, composition and separation, are each other’s opposites. When one of them comes into existence in the substrate, the existence of the other one comes to an end.

Accidents that do not have an opposite cease to exist of their own accord³⁸. According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār pain is such an accident (*Mughnī* IX, 62: 17). But if pain is not continuous, then why does the pain from a stab or a blow continue for some time? Why does it not stop immediately? ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion is that the pain continues because the injury does not generate pain only once, but goes on to generate pain continually, as long as it exists (*Mughnī* XIII, 237: 1-8).

That it is indeed possible that an effect, such as pain, comes into

reason why Abū Ishāq concluded that pain is not a *ma’nā* but rather the disappearance of soundness (*zawāl al-ṣiḥḥa*) (*Tadhkira*, 310: 14-311: 6). (See above, 79-81).

³⁷ See above, 74.

³⁸ See Peters (1978, 125-126).

existence continually, as long as the cause persists, is made clear by ‘Abd al-Jabbār with the example of “intrinsic pressure” (*i’timād lāzim*)³⁹. Intrinsic pressure means pressure that results from the weight of an object, the burning of fire or the lightness of a thing. The weight of an object gives intrinsic pressure downwards; the burning of fire⁴⁰ and the lightness⁴¹ of a thing give intrinsic pressure upwards. Intrinsic pressure generates its effect not only at the moment that it comes into existence but for as long as the pressure persists. Like all causes (*asbāb*), whether or not they are continuous, intrinsic pressure must generate its effect, unless it is prevented from doing so (*Mughnī*, XIII, 237: 4-7)⁴². A condition that is not fulfilled prevents a cause from generating its effect but as long as the condition is fulfilled and no other hindrances exist, the cause must generate the effect. This holds for pain as well. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore argues that as long as the wound lasts, the condition of the disappearance of soundness is fulfilled and so the cause, the lesion, must continue generating its effect, the pain. The pain is generated over and over again by the first incision (*taqtīʿ*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 237: 7-8).

Opponents may have argued that the condition for the generation of pain is only fulfilled when the pain comes into existence and not after that because soundness disappears only once, then how⁴³ can the incision generate pain during its continuance? (*Mughnī* XIII, 237: 9-10). To this objection ‘Abd al-Jabbār answered that the incision can generate pain during its continuance because the soundness disappears not only at the moment that the wound is made, but also after this moment for as long as the wound exists. The disappearance of soundness does not stop: it continues disappearing just as a heavy object continues exerting pressure (intrinsic pressure) on the place where it lies (*Mughnī* XIII, 237: 11-13). Because of this, the wound continues generating pain for as long as the soundness has not returned.

However, the lasting pain does not stay as severe as it was im-

³⁹ On intrinsic pressure, see Gimaret (1990, 73, 100, 115-116), Frank (1978, 79) and Peters (1976, 136).

⁴⁰ Gimaret (1990, 73, 100, 115-116).

⁴¹ Pines, 1979, 44.

⁴² A comparison of this text with the text of *Mughnī* XIII, 237: 3-4 makes it clear that the edition should be corrected to *wa-kāna bāqithā ka-ḥādithihā fī dhālika ʿl-wajhi*.

⁴³ In the text *fa-kallafa* should be corrected to *fa-kayfa*.

mediately after the wound was made. The pain becomes less, although from time to time its severity may increase and the pain may again become as severe as it was in the beginning. How can this be explained? If the first incision continues to generate pain, should not the pain be equally severe all the time? ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that the pain lessens and that its severity fluctuates because of differences in the quantity of disappearing soundness. In his opinion the quantity of generated pain is commensurate with the fluctuating quantity of disappearing soundness. At times the pain becomes less because some soundness has returned, and at times the pain becomes the same as it was in the beginning because some returned soundness has disappeared again (*Mughnī* XIII, 238: 10-12). He deems it possible that the one time a smaller quantity of soundness disappears than the other, so that the quantity of disappearing soundness varies from time to time.

Abū Hāshim held a different opinion on the question of why pain continues after a stab or blow. He said that the reason why a living being continues to be in pain is that the cause of the pain comes into existence recurrently. As opposed to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, he did not believe that soundness continues to disappear. Instead, he believed that the lesion (*wahā*) continues to come into existence for as long as the pain lasts. From the fact that the quantity of pain varies from time to time he concluded that it was impossible that pain at a later instance was still generated by the first cause (*sabab*). He thought that if each new occurrence was generated by the first cause, there could not be such a variation in the quantity of pain (*Mughnī* IX, 164: 10-14 and *Mughnī* XIII, 238: 1-2).

Abū Hāshim therefore concluded that the variation in the quantity of pain was the result of the variation in the quantity of the wound (*jurh*). He considered it possible that as long as soundness is absent⁴⁴, the state of the wound varies, in the sense that the cause (*sabab*) of the pain repeatedly (*hālan ba’dā hālin*) comes into existence. He said that this was possible because of renewed “induced pressure” (*ʿitimād mujtalab*). Induced pressure is pressure that is generated in an object, for instance, by throwing it. Such pressure does not persist, as opposed to intrinsic pressure (*ʿitimād lāzim*) which, as we have seen, is pressure that results from the weight of a heavy

⁴⁴ Reading in *Mughnī* XIII, 328: 5 *muntafiya* instead of *muntaqila*, in accordance with *Mughnī* XIII, 238: 10.

object, the burning of fire or the lightness of a thing⁴⁵. According to Abū Hāshim, the renewed induced pressure can be the result of a human or divine act⁴⁶ (*Mughnī* XIII, 238: 1-6).

‘Abd al-Jabbār thought that the lesion lasts and repeatedly generates its effect for as long as it exists, but would Abū Hāshim have approved this opinion? ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that, as he could not remember in detail Abū Hāshim’s teaching with respect to this, he asked Abū ‘Abdallāh about it. Abū ‘Abdallāh answered him that it is possible, but that he himself considered it more likely that the lesion only generates pain while it comes into existence because it is a condition for the generation of pain that soundness disappears. In his opinion, soundness only disappears at the moment that the lesion comes into existence, but not when the lesion continues to exist⁴⁷ (*Mughnī* IX, 164: 1-7).

As for Ibn Mattawayh, he says that pain is something that is generated only once by its cause so, for its continuance, the cause must be renewed (*Majmū‘* I, 424: 5-7). From this we may conclude that he agreed with Abū Hāshim about this question, although he does not explicitly criticize ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion. Ibn Mattawayh’s disagreement with ‘Abd al-Jabbār implies that he did not adopt an innovation introduced by ‘Abd al-Jabbār but maintained the original teachings of the Bahshamiyya with respect to this question.

⁴⁵ See above, 103.

⁴⁶ With respect to *Mughnī* XIII, 238: 3 the editor gives as possible readings: *al-khārij* or *al-jārih*. The meaning of both readings is not clear, but possibly the correct reading should be *jawārih*, as *fi’l al-jawārih* is the singular of *af’al al-jawārih* (the acts of the limbs). For the acts of the limbs, see above, 89. We have seen that Abū Hāshim reportedly said in one of his works that it is pressure rather than a lesion which generates pain. This may also apply to his opinion on the duration of pain in existing wounds. Maybe, he considered that renewed pain in the limbs of an injured person is the result of pressure on his wounds by movements when he moves his wounded limbs either by his own intention or unwillingly, for instance, when he trembles. Involuntary movements of a person who trembles or is partly paralysed are seen as acts of God, because one can not avoid trembling or shivering. See also below, 106.

⁴⁷ Abū ‘Abdallāh’s answer makes clear that the problem lies in the condition for the generation of pain, namely, the disappearance of soundness. If this is understood in the sense that soundness only disappears at the moment that the lesion comes into existence, it implies that after this moment the lesion must stop generating because the condition is no longer fulfilled. ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s solution for the duration of pain is that the soundness continues to be disappearing so that the condition for the generation of pain is fulfilled both when the lesion comes into existence and during its continuance.

5. *The End of Pain*

We have seen that according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, the lesion continues to generate pain after a stab or blow has been inflicted. The quantity of generated pain varies because the disappearing soundness fluctuates. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, this also explains why pain stops after some time: as the wound heals soundness is no longer absent; the condition for the generation of pain (the disappearance of the soundness) is no longer fulfilled and the cause is prevented from generating its effect. Pain is not continuous, so it stops of its own accord as soon as its cause stops generating it. This means that as soon as soundness has completely returned, there is no pain anymore (*Mughnī* XIII, 237: 12-14).

6. *Pain Brought into Existence by God*

Some sorts of pain, such as headaches, occur without any visible injury. ‘Abd al-Jabbār mentions the example of internal pain which one feels without being able to discern the cause by which it is generated. This pain exists although nobody has put pressure on that part of the body and soundness continues to exist in it. No one could have produced this pain because, as ‘Abd al-Jabbār has made clear, humans only can produce pain by first applying pressure.

The absence of pressure means that the sorts of pain that exist without lesion, such as illnesses (*amrād*), cannot be produced by humans. This leads ‘Abd al-Jabbār to conclude that they can only be produced by God. In order to make clear that it is possible that things happen inside the body which are produced by God, ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the examples of the involuntary movements of a person who trembles or who is partly paralysed (*maflūj*), and of the movement of throbbing arteries. He asserts that these movements are produced by God and that they have in common with pain produced by God the fact that we cannot avoid them. For a piece of evidence that pain can be produced by God, ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to the Qur’ān in which it is said that God tries (*yamḥana*) his worshippers by illnesses (*Mughnī* XIII, 367: 11-14).

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, pain that exists without the existence of a lesion is produced by God directly (*‘alā jihati ‘l-ibtidā’i*).

God need not first produce a lesion in the body in order to create pain. This does not imply that He is not able to produce pain through generation, as humans do. ‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that everything we can do through generation, God can do in two ways: either through generation or directly (*mutawallidan wa-mubtada’an*) (*Mughnī XIII*, 276: 2-4). Just as humans, God is able to bring pain into existence by first bringing into existence the cause (*sabab*) that generates pain (*Mughnī XIII*, 366: 1-8)⁴⁸. A cause generates its effect, regardless of which agent produces it.

However, is it possible to find an example of such pain? ‘Abd al-Jabbār knows an example of pain that is produced by God through generation:

It is conceivable that in the Hereafter, the Exalted One brings pain into existence in the people in Hell which is generated by the pressure of the fire (*Mughnī IX*, 111: 10)⁴⁹.

‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that it is known that God will punish the people in Hell through fire. The effect of fire on a living body is seen as pressure on the body, which generates a separation which in turn generates pain (*Mughnī IX*, 112: 10-13).

7. The Problem of the Scorpion Sting

From the foregoing it becomes clear that ‘Abd al-Jabbār recognizes two categories of pain: pain produced through generation and pain produced directly by God. The notion that pain can be produced by God is applied by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in order to answer the question of why, when we are stung by a hornet (*zunbūr*) or a scorpion (*aqrab*), we experience severe pain although the separation in our

⁴⁸ ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī was of the opinion that God does not act through generation because this would imply that God needs a cause (*sabab*) when He wants to produce things that we produce through generation. As Abū ‘Alī took it for granted that God cannot have needs, he concluded that God only acts directly (*Mughnī IX*, 94: 1-7 and *Majmū’ I*, 417: 9-12). It is not clear how Abū ‘Alī explained the punishment by fire in Hell. (See below, 107, note 49).

⁴⁹ *Wa-qad ṣahḥa annahū Ta’ālā yaq’alu fī ‘l-ākhirati ‘l-ālāma fī ahli ‘l-nāri muta-wallidan ‘an i’timādi ‘l-nāri*. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that there is a good reason for God to use fire in Hell: pain produced in this way is more terrifying than pain produced by God directly. The people in Hell suffer more when they see the fire touching them (*Mughnī IX*, 112: 10-14).

body made by the sting is very small. This seems to contradict the rule that generated pain is commensurate with the lesion that generates it.

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s answer is that the pain generated by the separation is increased by additional pain brought into existence by God. According to him, it is the normal course of events (*‘āda*) in cases like this that pain from God is added to the pain generated by the separation⁵⁰. This additional pain is produced directly and not through generation. The quantity of this additional pain can therefore vary: it may be more at one time than at another time. It is even possible that the additional pain does not come into existence at all, whereas the pain that is generated by the lesion must always come into existence, unless the lesion is prevented from generating its cause. This means that a scorpion sting always hurts because the separation made by the sting always generates pain. The quantity of this generated pain is always the same. However, the quantity of additional pain may vary and therefore the total quantity of pain felt by someone who is stung by a scorpion varies (*Mughnī* IX, 53: 9-14).

8. *Can Pain Exist in Inanimate Objects?*

There was some difference of opinion among the Mu‘tazilites on the question of whether pain can exist in an inanimate object (*jamād*)⁵¹. It is not clear why they considered it necessary to discuss this. Had the question its origin in early theological discussions on the Punishment in the Grave⁵²? Anyhow, it is clear that

⁵⁰ It may seem strange to us that ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that additional pain is brought into existence by God and that he does not mention the venom that is injected in the wound by the scorpion. However, even if the additional pain is the result of the venom, ‘Abd al-Jabbār would probably consider the working of the venom as an act of God similar to the working of fire. However, there is, according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, a difference between pain that is the result of a venom and pain produced by God by means of fire: fire works by putting pressure on the body of a living being and this pressure produces a lesion (a burn) which in turn produces pain. The venom, however, does not work in this way because it does not cause an injury.

⁵¹ On ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion on this question, see Brunschvig (1974, 80-81). On the opinions of Abū ‘Alī, al-Balkhī, Abū Hāshim and al-Ash‘arī on this point, see Gimaret (1990, 130).

⁵² There was disagreement among the *mutakallimūn* as to whether or not the

‘Abd al-Jabbār, Mānkdm⁵³ and Ibn Mattawayh discuss the question without applying this to the Punishment of the Grave⁵⁴. They probably discuss this because opponents may use this question to refute the theory of generated pain.

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Abū Hāshim first said that pain cannot exist in inanimate bodies but he later changed his opinion, saying that it is possible⁵⁵. In this context, ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not speak of “pain”, but of the “class of pain” (*jins al-alam*). He explains that Abū Hāshim said that when this class exists in inanimate objects, it is not called pain: that which belongs to this class is only called pain if it is perceived with aversion (*Mughnī* IX, 62: 23-24 and 164: 17-21, *Mughnī* XIII, 274: 2-3 and *Tadhkira*, 321: 18-322: 2).

‘Abd al-Jabbār shares Abū Hāshim’s opinion on the question of whether pain can exist in inanimate objects, asserting that this is possible. He argues that in order to exist this *ma’nā* only needs a substrate (*mahall*). This means that it can exist in any substrate, including that of an inanimate object. He agrees with Abū Hāshim that in that case it is not called pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 252: 7-8 and *Mughnī* VII, 36: 15-19).

Some opponents of ‘Abd al-Jabbār may have objected to his opinion on the grounds that we cannot know anything about the

dead are punished in their graves. Al-Ash’arī says that most people believed that the dead are punished in their graves; only the Mu’tazilites and the Khārijites (*Khawārij*) rejected this (*Maqālāt*, 430: 10).

⁵³ Mānkdm does not deny that there will be a Punishment of the Grave (*adhāb al-qabr*), although he believes that this punishment will not take place before the interval between the two blasts of the trumpet on Judgment Day (*Ta’līq*, 733: 15-16). He explains that the dead must be brought back to life in order to be punished, since the punishment of an inanimate body is impossible and inconceivable. One might have expected him to defend this opinion by arguing that pain cannot exist in inanimate bodies. However, although he believes that pain cannot exist in inanimate objects, he does not mention this when he says that the dead must be brought back to life. This indicates that the question of whether or not pain can exist in inanimate objects was not discussed by him in reference to the Punishment of the Grave. On Mānkdm’s opinion about the Punishment of the Grave, see also McDermott (1978, 271).

⁵⁴ Brunschvig (1974, 81).

⁵⁵ According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, the work in which Abū Hāshim expressed his new opinion is called *Naqd al-ṭabā’* (*Mughnī* XIII, 252: 8), but Ibn Mattawayh says that it is called *al-Naqd ‘alā aṣḥāb al-ṭabā’* (*Tadhkira*, 321: 19-322: 1). Gimaret (1976, 327) assumes that *al-Naqd ‘alā aṣḥāb al-ṭabā’* is the same work as *Naqd al-ṭabā’* and that it belongs to the works that Abū Hāshim wrote or dictated in the last period of his life.

existence of pain in inanimate bodies because we cannot perceive this pain and that it therefore makes no difference whether it exists or not. But ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that if this *ma’nā* exists in an inanimate object, we do know something about it: we know that it would be called pain if it existed in a living substrate and was perceived with aversion. He compares the existence of pain in an inanimate object with the existence of the power to act (*qudra*) in someone who is prevented from acting. Although such a person, because he is hindered, cannot do anything that humans usually do, it is wrong to say that the power to act does not exist in him: we know that he would do whatever it is possible for humans to do if he were not prevented from doing so. ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that in the same way, one should not say that we cannot know anything about pain in an inanimate object, nor that there is no difference between its presence (*wujūd*) in the inanimate object and its absence (*‘adam*) (*Mughnī XIII*, 252: 7-15).

This raises the question of who can know the existence of pain in an inanimate object, as we humans cannot perceive its existence. ‘Abd al-Jabbār answers that when this *ma’nā* exists in an inanimate object, it is perceived by God⁵⁶ (*Mughnī XIII*, 252: 18-20). According to Mu‘tazilite doctrine God perceives all perceptible things⁵⁷, so He also perceives pain. ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that the fact that only God perceives pain in an inanimate object, while we ourselves cannot perceive it, is no reason to deny that this pain exists. We cannot perceive pain in someone else’s body because we can only perceive pain in our own body⁵⁸, yet we do not therefore deny that this pain exists.

‘Abd al-Jabbār does not discuss how the *ma’nā* pain is brought

⁵⁶ It should be noted that according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine this does not imply that God feels pain. What is perceived by God is only the *ma’nā*: aversion is impossible for God and this *ma’nā* is therefore not called pain because it is not perceived with aversion. Thus, God can never be described as “being in pain”, although He perceives the pain we suffer (*Mughnī XIII*, 384: 15-16).

⁵⁷ Peters (1976, 244).

⁵⁸ ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that the reason why we cannot perceive pain in another body, whether this body is animate or inanimate, is that the substrate in which the *ma’nā* inheres is not part of us. Pain is only perceived by the living body in whose living substrate it inheres. If the substrate of another body in which the pain inheres could become part of our substrate, we would be able to perceive it. Since it is impossible that the substrate of one body becomes part of another body, two living beings cannot perceive each other’s pain. It is not because of the *ma’nā*, but because of the impossibility of their sharing one substrate (*Mughnī XIII*, 253: 6-10).

into existence in an inanimate object. He only reports that Abū Hāshim said that a separation can generate the class (*jins*) of pain and pleasure in each object. This seems to be in contradiction with the theory that says that pain is generated on condition that soundness (*sihha*) disappear. Soundness does not apply to inanimate objects, but only to living bodies. Abū Hāshim conceded this, but he added that this only concerns the expression and not the essence of that which is meant by soundness. In his opinion, soundness means that there is “connection” (*taʿlīf*) in the substrate of a living being, and connection also applies to the substrate of an inanimate object⁵⁹. According to him, this implies that the condition for the generation of pain is fulfilled if one speaks of the disappearance of connection instead of the disappearance of soundness (*Mughnī* IX, 164: 18-165: 5).

⁵⁹ However, we may observe that by equating soundness in a living body with connection in an inanimate object, Abū Hāshim does not take into account that there is an important difference between living beings and inanimate objects. A separation (lesion) in the body of a living being disappears after some time and soundness returns. This does not happen to inanimate objects: the separation continues to exist.

CHAPTER FOUR

JUDGMENTS ON INFLICTING PAIN

Before directing our attention to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion on how to judge the infliction of pain, I will discuss his theory on good and evil. From his discussion of this subject, it becomes clear that his object is not to set up an ethical system to be applied to human acts but rather to show that all God’s acts are good.

1. *The Analogy Between Divine and Human Acts*

The assertion that all God’s acts are good leads to the question how we can judge God’s acts. Does what applies to human acts also apply to divine acts? ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that it is indeed the case. His theory says God is not known by intuitive knowledge or by perception. This means that knowledge about God must be acquired¹. The question is how this can be done as, in his view, God is far above the world in which we live. We can perceive the world in which we live with our senses, whereas the divine world is hidden from us. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore refers to the divine world as “the absent” (*al-ghā’ib*), whereas he uses the term “the present” (*al-shāhid*) for the world in which we live². However, although God belongs to the absent world (*al-ghā’ib*), He acts in the present world (*al-shāhid*). In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, God’s acts in the present world function as indications (*dalā’il*) from which knowledge about Him can be acquired by means of reflection (*nazar*). This method of acquiring knowledge about God is called *al-istidlāl bi-’l-shāhid ‘alā ’l-ghā’ib* (using indications found in the present world for drawing conclusions about the absent world)³.

¹ On the knowledge by which God is known, see Peters (1976, 224).

² On *al-shāhid* and *al-ghā’ib*, see Peters (1976, 407-409).

³ On the method of using evidence found in the present world for drawing conclusions about the absent world, see Bernand (1982, 243-261). Frank (1992, 31) expressed as his opinion that systematic attention should be given to the rules and conditions for thinking rationally about, and for drawing valid inferences with regard to, the absent world on the basis of what is phenomenally available, as they are set forth in the texts of the speculative theologians.

Closely related to the method in which knowledge of God is acquired from evidences in this world is the method in which this knowledge is acquired by drawing an analogy between this world and the absent world. This is called *ḥaml al-ghā'ib 'alā 'l-shāhid* or *qiyās al-ghā'ib 'alā 'l-shāhid* (drawing an analogy between the absent world and the present world)⁴. This method is applied by 'Abd al-Jabbār. He explains that knowledge about a particular predicate (*ism*) of God is acquired by applying to the absent world (*al-ghā'ib*) what is known about this predicate from the present world (*al-shāhid*) (*Mughnī* VII, 210: 7-9 and *Mughnī* VIII, 233: 18-234: 2). In his opinion, the correctness of judgments with respect to the absent world can be proved by the same arguments as are used with respect to the present world (*Mughnī* VI/2, 269: 4-6).

In his discussion of pain inflicted by God, 'Abd al-Jabbār frequently uses the method of "drawing an analogy between the absent and the present world". He first describes which human ways of inflicting pain are good and why they are good. Having done this, he discusses the subject of God's infliction of pain, drawing an analogy between this world and the absent world in order to make it clear that God's infliction of pain is good because it is done in a way which is good.

2. Terms Used in Reference to Good and Bad

Before discussing 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion on whether inflicting pain is good or bad, I will explain the meaning of some terms used by him in reference to good and bad. In his discussions of good and bad, 'Abd al-Jabbār uses the following couples of terms: *khayr* (something good) and *sharr* (something bad), *ḥasan* (good) and *qabīḥ* (bad⁵), *naf'* (profit) and *ḍarar* (harm).

⁴ On the method of drawing an analogy between the absent world and the present world, see Gimaret (1980, 281-283).

⁵ There are different opinions on how to translate the term *qabīḥ*. Reinhart (1955, 185, note 8) translates *qabīḥ* as detestable since he believes that "the word's overtones are aesthetic rather than moral (as with the word evil)". Hourani (1971, 29, 39, 48) translates *qabīḥ* as "evil" and *ẓulm* as "wrongdoing". He considers *sharr* and *fasād* as synonyms of *qabīḥ* (1971, 49). Frank (1985, 73) translates *qabīḥ* as "ethically bad" and Fakhry (1991, 32) as "bad", whereas Peters (1976, 87) translates *qabīḥ* as "evil". Mohammed (1985, 65) also translates *qabīḥ* as "evil", but adds that *qabīḥ* is only the equivalent of evil if it is used in a moral sense; if *qabīḥ* is used in a nonmoral sense, he considers it better to translate it as "bad". I have chosen to translate *qabīḥ* as "bad" without the addition of "ethically" or "mo-

When ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the terms *khayr* (something good) and *sharr* (something bad), he refers to good and bad things that happen to people. He relates this to profit and harm and takes into consideration that what happens to people usually has aspects of both profit and harm. In some cases, profit prevails and, in other cases, harm. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore describes *khayr* as “good profit” (*al-naf‘ al-ḥasan*) and *sharr* as “bad harm” (*al-sharr al-qabīḥ*) (*Mughnī* V, 45: 11-12). What he understands by good profit and bad harm becomes clear from his descriptions of profit and harm. He characterizes profit as pleasure (*malādhḍha*, plural *malādhḍh*) and joy (*surūr*), which may happen immediately or at some time in the future. He therefore adds that also things that lead to pleasure and joy are considered to be a profit. However, something is a profit on condition that it does not entail a harm that outweighs it. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore describes *khayr* not just as “profit”, but as “good profit”: it does not entail a harm that outweighs it.

Harm (*ḍarar*) is characterized by ‘Abd al-Jabbār as pain (*alam*, plural *ālām*) and sorrow (*ghamm*, plural *ghumūm*). Similarly, as he did with respect to profit, he includes in harm not only those things that are pain or sorrow but also those which lead to pain or sorrow. However, when pain or sorrow are outweighed by a greater profit they are not considered as “bad harm” (*sharr*). ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that something is a real harm for someone only if it does not involve a profit which is greater than the harm. He therefore adds “bad” when he describes the meaning of *sharr*, thus characterizing *sharr* as “bad harm” (*Mughnī* V, 14: 3-5).

‘Abd al-Jabbār declares that one and the same thing (*shay‘*) can occur in such a way (*wajh*) that it is something good (*khayr*), but it can also occur in such a way that it is something bad (*sharr*) (*Mughnī* V, 45: 9-10). That is, sometimes we may experience a particular thing as bad because it harms us. At other times the same thing may happen to us but then it may be something good because it involves a profit for us. We will see that pain is such a thing. Pain may happen to us without bringing us any profit, yet it may also lead to a profit greater than the pain⁶.

rally” because in several cases ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the term *qabīḥ* in a non-moral sense, for instance, when he describes harm done by animals as *qabīḥ*. He also uses *qabīḥ* in reference to unwise acting, when he describes useless acts as *qabīḥ*.

⁶ When ‘Abd al-Jabbār in this context speaks of pain he means pain that is experienced as pain because it is perceived with aversion. Although pain may

‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the terms *ḥasan* and *qabīḥ* in reference to actions that result in good (*khayr*) or bad (*sharr*) happening to someone. The result of such an action may concern the person who acted or someone else: a person may inflict harm on someone else, but also on himself. ‘Abd al-Jabbār declares that an act is described as bad (*qabīḥ*) if its agent deserves blame (*dhamm*) for it, “if it stands alone” (*idhā ’nfarada*) (*Mughnī* VI/1, 7: 8). Hourani⁷, translating *idhā ’nfarada* as “taken in isolation”, supposed that ‘Abd al-Jabbār added these words “to make an exception for peccadilloes and white lies by a person who is on the whole of good character and performance”. This seems to be contradicted by ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion that telling a lie is intrinsically bad⁸. The explanation for ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s addition of the words “if it stands alone” is found in the last part of Hourani’s suggestion. ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the expression “if it stands alone” with respect to bad acts that are trivial (*Mughnī* VI/1, 26: 14-16). He points out that when someone does some good acts and some other trivial acts that are bad, this person does not deserve blame if the praise for his good acts is equal to, or more than, the blame for his bad acts. In that case the blame for his bad acts is “neutralized” by the praise for his good acts (*Mughnī* V, 34: 11)⁹. However, that the agent of the bad acts does not deserve blame does not mean that these acts are not bad. Had he not done the good acts, but only these bad acts, he would be blamed for doing the bad acts. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore adds “if it stands alone”, when he says that the agent of a bad act deserves blame for doing such an act. This means that Hourani’s suggestion is correct, although it refers not only to peccadilloes and white lies, but to all kinds of trivial acts that are bad.

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion it depends on the circumstances whether or not the agent of a bad act is to be blamed. We will see

lead to a profit, this does not mean that in that case it is experienced as a pleasure. It does not stop being pain.

⁷ Hourani (1971, 49).

⁸ In a later article (1972, reprint 1985) Hourani (1985, 104) says: “‘Abd al-Jabbār shows some hesitation about lying, whether it belongs to absolute or prima facie evils. In principle he holds it an absolute evil, but he has to face hard cases raised by his Ash‘arite opponents. Would it be evil to tell a lie to save the life of a Muslim, for example by saying he is not at home to someone coming to his house with evident intent to murder him? ‘Abd al-Jabbār says one can always escape from such a dilemma by insinuations or silence, and never needs to tell a direct lie (*Mughnī* VI.ii, 342)”.

⁹ For a French translation of this passage, see Monnot (1974, 195).

that in the discussion of acts that are not done intentionally ‘Abd al-Jabbār describes some of these acts as being bad, although he denies that the agent of such an act deserves blame. This concerns cases in which someone is unintentionally harmed. The agent does not deserve blame because the act is not done intentionally. Nevertheless, ‘Abd al-Jabbār describes these acts as bad because of the harm involved.

‘Abd al-Jabbār says that it is a characteristic of an act that is described as good (*hasan*) that its agent does not deserve blame for doing it. As good is the opposite of bad, and praise is the opposite of blame, one might expect ‘Abd al-Jabbār to say that an act is good when its agent deserves praise (*madḥ*). However, this description would not cover all acts that he describes as good. Indeed, one deserves praise for doing certain kinds of good acts. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion one deserves praise for doing what is recommended (*nadb*), desirable (*muraghghab fīhi*) or obligatory (*wājib*)¹⁰. However, one does not deserve praise for acts that are permissible (*mubāḥ*)¹¹ (*Mughnī* VI/1, 7: 14-8: 1, and *Mughnī* XIV, 16: 11). As one is not blamed for doing them either, ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers permissible acts good: they fulfil the requirement that one does not deserve blame for doing them.

3. *The Grounds on Which Acts are Good or Bad*

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, whether an act is good or bad depends on several factors such as the profit and harm the act involves and whether or not permission has been given. He refers to the combination of factors that determine whether an act is good or bad as the way (*wajh*)¹² in which the act is done. He points out that acts

¹⁰ ‘Abd al-Jabbār declares that a person deserves praise (*madḥ*) for doing what is obligatory. (*Wa-min haqqi ‘l-wājibi an yustahaqqa bihī ‘l-madḥu*, *Mughnī* XIV, 16: 11). When Hourani (1971, 39) gives a table of the ethical categories of acts according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, he adds that the doer of an obligatory act does not deserve blame or praise. This does not accord with what ‘Abd al-Jabbār says in the *Mughnī* (XIV, 16: 11). In the table of ethical values that he made in a later article Hourani (1985, 101) has omitted this addition.

¹¹ The terms permissible (*mubāḥ*) and obligatory (*wājib*) are also used in law. However, Mohammed (1984, 51) warns that we should not be misled by the apparent similarity between ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s terms and the terms used in the *sharī‘a*, as ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s terms do not refer to legal matters. On the meaning of *mubāḥ*, see Reinhart (1995, 128-132).

¹² On *wajh*, see Reinhart, 1995, 148-151. It is difficult to give an adequate

cannot be described as good or bad merely on the grounds that they belong to a particular class of acts. For instance, it is wrong to say that every infliction of pain is bad just because it is infliction of pain. ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks it possible to inflict pain in such a way that this act is described as good.

Yet, ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers that there are some actions that cannot be done in such a way that they are good: it is always considered bad to do them. These acts include: telling a lie (*kidhb*), committing an injustice (*zulm*), commanding someone to do a bad thing (*amr bi-qabīh*), having a conviction that is not in accordance with truth (*jahl*), and the will to do something bad (*irāda li-qabīh*)¹³ (*Mughnā* VI/1, 10: 16-17).

To explain that an action can be done in different ways, ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of making a statement: the same statement can be at one time in accordance with reality and at another time not in accordance with reality. I will explain what ‘Abd al-Jabbār means by taking as an example the statement: “Aḥmad is in the house”. If the person who makes the statement knows that Aḥmad is in the house, the statement is true, but if he knows that Aḥmad is not in the house, the statement is a lie. According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, in the first case making the statement is good and in the second case it is bad because it is a lie. ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to whether or not the statement is in accordance with reality as the “way” (*wajh*) in which the statement is made. He is of the opinion that once it is

translation of the term *wajh*. ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the term in different ways. Sometimes he uses *wajh* as a technical term, for instance, in the discussion of the moral judgement on acts, but at other times he uses it with respect to the qualities of things. Reinhart (1995, 148-151) mostly uses the term untranslated, but says that it means face, aspect, perspective (148). He adds (219, note 19): “Sometimes it means nothing more than ‘the way the act is done.’” Hourani (1971) translates *wajh* (plural *wujūh*) as “aspect” (27, 31, 32 a.o.), “respect” (63), “ground” (69, 121), or “reason” (96). Frank translates it as “manner” (1978, 132-135 a.o.), “mode or manner” (1985, 71), and “way” (1985, 72). Gimaret (1980, 20-25 a.o.) translates it in French as “modalité”. Brunschvig (1974a, 15) gives the French translation “aspect”. These translations do not render the exact meaning of the term *wajh*. Because of this, most translators add an explanation if the meaning is not clear from the context. For instance: “the manner or the character (*wajh*) of the occurrence of the act” (Frank, 1978, 132) or “all the reasons (*jam‘a ’l-wujūh*) for which acts are done” (Hourani, 1971, 96).

¹³ The knowledge that these acts are bad makes part of the innate knowledge of a human being. It belongs to the knowledge of the *‘aql* which is created in him or her by God (Reinhart, 1995, 151-153).

known that a statement is a lie (*kidhb*), it is also known that making this statement is bad.

A statement can also be a command. ‘Abd al-Jabbār declares that if it is known that this command concerns the performance of a bad act, it is also known that making this statement is bad. Similarly, if it is known that a particular act is an injustice (*zulm*), it is also known that this act is bad. This is so because the acts mentioned by ‘Abd al-Jabbār are intrinsically bad acts. The Arabic words that are used to describe these acts have a meaning that entails the judgment that they are bad. For instance, describing a particular act of injustice (*zulm*) as a good act is impossible because it is a contradiction in terms.

‘Abd al-Jabbār recognizes a category of acts that cannot be judged as good or bad (*Mughnī* VI/1, 7: 4-5). There was a difference of opinion among the Baṣra Mu‘tazilites about the judgment on acts that are done by a sleeper (*nā’im*) or absentminded person (*sāhī*)¹⁴, people who are not aware of their actions¹⁵. Some said that these acts are neither good nor bad. At first sight the question of whether the act of a sleeper or absentminded person is good or bad may look trivial. However, the real issue here is not the act of a sleeper or absentminded person but the reason why an act is bad. A sleeper acts without intention, yet his act may imply harm or profit to someone else. Then, what is decisive for the judgment passed on an act: the intention of its agent or the result of the act?

Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī and his son Abū Hāshim considered the intention of the agent to be the deciding factor. They said that all acts by sleepers and absentminded people are neither good nor bad, because they are done without any intention or awareness that the act is good or bad (*Mughnī* VI/1, 11: 15-17, *Mughnī* XIII, 304: 6-7). Even if someone in his sleep or absentmindedly harms someone else by unintentionally striking him with his fist, they did not regard this as bad because the harm is done unintentionally (*Mughnī*, VI/1, 88: 2-5).

The Ikhshīdiyya held an opinion very close to that of Abū ‘Alī and Abū Hāshim: they considered that an act is bad because of the agent’s will (*irāda*). Ibn Mattawayh refuted their opinion, pointing out that

¹⁴ Hourani (1971, 38, note 24) chose to translate *sāhī* as “unconscious”, but ‘Abd al-Jabbār means every state in which someone is unaware of his actions. Therefore, I think that “absentminded” may be a better translation.

¹⁵ This question and the different opinions held on it are discussed by Hourani (1971, 41-42) and Mohammed (1984, 52-53).

the reason why an act is bad cannot be the agent's will. He argued that it is bad to will something bad. If this act were bad because of the agent's will, it would imply that the first will is bad because of a second will, and that this second will is bad because of a third will, and so on and on (*Majmū'* III, 31: 9-11).

Abū 'Abdallāh al-Baṣrī and Abū Ishāq b. 'Ayyāsh, teachers of 'Abd al-Jabbār, considered that the result of an act was the decisive factor. They admitted that sleepers and absentminded people can do acts that are neither good nor bad, such as speech and slight movements. However, they declared that when someone in his sleep or absentmindedly harms someone else, his act is bad even though it is done unintentionally. They considered that sleepers and absentminded people may do acts that belong to a category of acts that are injustices if they are done knowingly. Acts included in this category cannot be good acts because they are intrinsically bad. Abū 'Abdallāh and Abū Ishāq said that sleep and absentmindedness cannot have a bearing on the judgment on acts of this category: they are always bad, whether they are done intentionally or unintentionally. However, they declared that sleep and absentmindedness do have a bearing on the blame attributed to the agent of a bad act: someone who harms another person in his sleep or absentmindedly should not be blamed for his act, even if this act is described as bad (*Mughnī* XIII, 311: 14-17, *Mughnī* VI/1, 11 : 18-12: 9).

'Abd al-Jabbār declares that he prefers the opinion of Abū 'Abdallāh and Abū Ishāq in this question to that of Abū 'Alī and Abū Hāshim (*Mughnī* XIII, 311: 13-21). He agrees with them that if the act of a sleeper or absentminded person harms somebody else, this act is bad, although its agent should not be blamed for doing it. He adds, moreover, that if this act involves a profit for someone else, it is a good act, although the sleeper or the absentminded person does not deserve praise for doing it. 'Abd al-Jabbār mentions as an example the act of someone else, who in his sleep, scratches someone else, so that the other person experiences pleasure as a result of the scratching (*Mughnī* VI/1, 12: 10-11).

4. *How to Know Whether a Particular Act is Good or Bad*

With respect to acts that are done intentionally, 'Abd al-Jabbār not only takes into consideration the harm and profit they involve, but

also other factors such as permission that has been given to do a particular act. When these factors are known, it can be known by reason whether a particular act is good or bad. We will see that ‘Abd al-Jabbār also considers what is disclosed in the divine revelation. He acknowledges that God’s revelation may disclose that a particular act is permitted by God, or that it involves a profit or harm that is not known by reason.

When ‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that it is known by reason, whether a particular act is good or bad, he opposes the opinion of the “Compulsionists” (Mujbira)¹⁶ on this question. The “Compulsionists”, among whom ‘Abd al-Jabbār includes the Ash‘arites, believed that it is known from God’s revelation and religious law whether an act is good or bad (*Mughnī* XIII, 282: 7-12). This implies that according to them acts are good or bad because of a divine command or prohibition¹⁷. ‘Abd al-Jabbār refutes this, arguing that an action cannot be good only because it is done on someone else’s command. Nor can an act be bad only because someone has prohibited it. He rejects the opinion of those who argue that God is the Lord and Master (*mālik*)¹⁸ and that a divine prohibition is therefore the reason why an act is bad (*Mughnī* VI/1, 102: 9-14).

To support his argument, ‘Abd al-Jabbār first explains that in our world the quality of the agent does not define whether an act is good or bad. When two different agents do the same act with the same intention and with the same result, both acts are good or both acts are bad because they are done in the same way (*wajh*). He considers it impossible that the act of one of them could be good and the act of the other bad. It is the way (*wajh*) in which an act is done which determines whether it is good or bad. He adds that someone who distinguishes between the acts of two agents on the basis of their quality might conclude that committing an injustice (*zulm*) is bad if the injustice is done by a human, but good if it is done by a prophet or an angel. This is impossible, according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, because

¹⁶ According to Watt (1990, 177) the Mu‘tazilites applied the name Mujbira to all who denied their doctrine of human freedom to act, which means that most Sunnites, from Traditionalists to Ash‘arites, are included in this term.

¹⁷ The opinion of the “Compulsionists” that acts are good or bad because of a divine command or prohibition has been described as “ethical voluntarism” (Fakhry, 1991, 46-52). Fakhry (1991, 31-45) describes the ethical doctrines of the Mu‘tazilites as “ethical rationalism”.

¹⁸ On the meaning of *mālik* according to the Ash‘arites and the Mu‘tazilites, see Gimaret (1988, 313-318).

injustice is always bad, regardless of whether it is done by humans or by prophets and angels (*Mughnī* VI/1, 125: 11-19). The quality of the agent does not have a bearing on this matter. Applying this to the other world, ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that when an act of God is good because it is done in a particular way, the act of a human being that is done in the same way (*wajh*) must also be good (*Mughnī* VI/1, 59: 16-60: 1).

After having explained that the quality of the agent has no bearing on whether an act is good or bad, ‘Abd al-Jabbār argues that if acts were bad because of a divine prohibition (*nahy*), every prohibited act would be bad, not only acts prohibited by God but also acts prohibited by man. In that case, it would be possible for an act to be good and bad at the same time. This would happen if the act was commanded by one person and prohibited by another person (*Mughnī* VI/1, 102: 4-8). By these arguments ‘Abd al-Jabbār refutes that a divine command or divine prohibition defines whether an act is good or bad.

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion that we know by reason whether an act is good or bad does not imply that he disregards what is said in God’s revelation (*al-sam’*) about good and bad acts. In his view, this confirms what is already known by reason. He argues that when we know by reason that an act is an injustice (*ẓulm*), we know that this act is bad, even before we have learned this from God’s revelation (*Mughnī* XIII, 309: 18-310: 3). However, there may be discrepancies between what we know by reason and what we learn by revelation. How to explain this? In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, the cause of these discrepancies is that God’s revelation discloses aspects of a particular act that cannot be known by reason¹⁹. For instance, it may disclose that an act is permissible (*ḥalāl*) because God has given permission to do it, which cannot be known by reason (*‘aqlan*) (*Mughnī* VI/1, 32: 3-7). ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of the slaughtering of livestock. By reason, one may conclude that this act is forbidden (*maḥẓūr*). However, the disclosure of God’s permission in His revelation provides additional information that says that slaughtering livestock is permissible, which implies that this act is good²⁰ (*Mughnī* VI/1, 64: 11-12).

¹⁹ See also Reinhart (1995, 157-159).

²⁰ We will see (below, 167-168) on which grounds it is good, according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, that God permits the slaughtering of livestock.

The same applies to some acts that the religious law describes as a religious duty, which means that they are obligatory (*wājib*). One who does not know God's revelation, may not consider these acts to be obligatory. For instance, in God's revelation it is disclosed that the *ṣalāt* (ritual prayer) is obligatory, which means that performing the *ṣalāt* is a good act. However, someone who does not know God's revelation may think differently. 'Abd al-Jabbār explains that in His revelation God has promised to reward those who perform the *ṣalāt*. Thus, performing the *ṣalāt* leads to a profit (the reward). In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion the profit that can be obtained is so great that because of the very knowledge about this profit people would conclude by reason that performing the *ṣalāt* must be obligatory. They would say:

Had we known by reason that we obtain an enormous profit if we perform the *ṣalāt*, that it [the *ṣalāt*] leads us to choose to do what is obligatory and that we deserve a reward for it, we would have known by reason that it [the *ṣalāt*] is obligatory (*Mughnī* VI/1, 64: 14-16)²¹.

Someone who knows God's revelation knows the reward or punishment that God will give for particular acts. If he knows that he can obtain a profit (the reward) or can be harmed (by the punishment), he knows by reason, weighing profit against harm, whether it is good or bad to do these acts. This means that it is not because of a divine command or prohibition that these acts are considered good or bad but because of a divine reward or punishment. This may ultimately amount to the same thing. However, 'Abd al-Jabbār's theory does not imply arbitrariness on God's part. We will see that he believes that God's acts are in accordance with what reason considers to be good.

5. *How to Know Whether a Particular Act of Inflicting Pain is Good or Bad*

When 'Abd al-Jabbār discusses whether inflicting pain is good or bad, he does not restrict this to physical pain; he also includes causing sorrow. According to him, sorrow (*ghamm*) is a "conviction" (*i'tiqād*) someone has. He uses the term conviction (*i'tiqād*) as a general term

²¹ *Li-annā law 'alimnā bi-'l-'aqli anna lanā fī 'l-ṣalāti nafan 'azīman wa-annahā tu'addī binā ilā an nakhtāra fī'la 'l-wājibi wa-nastahaqqa bihā 'l-thawāba la-'alimnā wujūbahā 'aqlan.* For a translation, see also Reinhart (1995, 159).

that comprises knowledge (*‘ilm*) and supposition (*zann*)²². A sorrowful person (*mughtamm*) is therefore described by him as one who “knows or supposes that a harm has happened or will happen to him” (*Mughnī* IV, 15: 5-6)²³. The counterpart of sorrow is joy. Joy (*surūr*) is the knowledge or the supposition that a profit (*naḥ*) is acquired or will be acquired (*Mughnī* IV, 15: 5). ‘Abd al-Jabbār declares that causing someone sorrow is comparable with inflicting pain on this person; both acts are good or bad on the same grounds (*Mughnī* IV, 16: 1-8). Although he mostly gives examples of the infliction of pain, it is clear that what he says concerns sorrow as well. According to his theory, pain (*alam*) and sorrow (*ghamm*) or what leads to pain and sorrow amount to harm (*ḍarar*)²⁴ (*Mughnī* IV, 14: 4 and *Mughnī* XIII, 298: 10-11). All three terms—harm, pain and sorrow—occur in his discussion of the infliction of pain.

The method followed by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in order to find out whether a particular act of inflicting pain or sorrow is good or bad is to find out whether this act should be called an injustice. We have seen that committing an injustice is one of the acts that he considers intrinsically bad. This means that as soon as an infliction of pain is known to be an injustice, it is also known that this act is bad because injustice can only ever be bad. It is ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s belief that adults of sound mind have “necessary knowledge” (*‘ilm ḍarūrī*) of this, that is, knowledge that necessarily exists in an adult of sound mind, in the sense that he or she cannot be without this knowledge²⁵.

When ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that it is “necessarily” known that injustice (*ẓulm*) is bad, it implies that no reflection (*naẓar*) is needed for knowing this (*Mughnī* XIII, 301: 3-6). However, one must reflect in order to know whether or not a particular act of inflicting pain or sorrow is indeed an injustice and take into consideration the circumstances, and the harm and profit it involves. ‘Abd al-Jabbār calls knowledge that is the result of reflection “acquired knowledge” (*‘ilm muktasab*) (*Mughnī* XII, 67: 19-68:4). If reflection on the aspects of an act leads to the conclusion that it is an injustice, it is known by neces-

²² On the different kinds of knowledge see also below, 134.

²³ For a French translation of *Mughnī* IV, 15: 20, see Vajda (1985, 244-249).

²⁴ ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses both the terms *ḍarar* and *maḍarra* (plural *maḍārr*). The terms are synonyms, but *ḍarar* is mostly used for harm in general, whereas *maḍarra* usually refers to a particular harm.

²⁵ Bernand (1982, 137-180) explains ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory of necessary knowledge in her study on ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theories of knowledge. See also Abrahamov (1993), Reinhart (1995, 151-153) and above, 117, note 13.

sary knowledge that doing this act is bad (*Mughnī* XIII, 305: 2-6 and 307: 1-7)²⁶. However, it is possible, after reflection, to conclude that what at first sight seems to be an injustice is in fact a good act. Before discussing the different aspects of inflicting pain, it is useful to first consider what ‘Abd al-Jabbār understands by injustice (*zulm*).

‘Abd al-Jabbār defines injustice in a negative way by mentioning those cases in which doing harm is not an injustice. He says that

- injustice is every harm that
- does not involve a profit that outweighs it,
 - does not avert a harm greater than it,
 - is not deserved
 - and is not done on the supposition that it has one of the mentioned aspects (*Mughnī* XIII, 298: 8-9)²⁷.

This definition is formulated briefly and it is therefore not complete, standing in need of explanation. From this definition alone, wrong conclusions may be drawn about ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s understanding of injustice. ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives another more extensive description of injustice. He says that we know that the harm inflicted is an injustice if it is known that

- ‘Amr [the harmed person] does not deserve to be hurt and Zayd [the person inflicting the harm] cannot have the right to punish the other;
- he [the harmed person] is safe from great harm or fear so that it is not possible that a greater harm is averted in this way;
- the harm is not inflicted on him [the person harmed] with the intention of providing him with a profit, nor is there any evidence of a profit;
- the harm is not done on the supposition that this harm will provide [the harmed person with] a profit nor [on the supposition that this harm has] one of the [other] aspects [mentioned] (*Mughnī* XIII, 306: 12-16)²⁸.

²⁶ Because of what ‘Abd al-Jabbār says in the preceding passage, I propose to read *Mughnī* XIII, 307: 2 as “*lā yajūzu an lā yu‘lama qubhuhū*” instead of “*lā yajūzu an yu‘lama qubhuhū*” because the latter reading is not in agreement with what ‘Abd al-Jabbār has said before.

²⁷ *Fa-haqīqatu ‘l-zulmi huwa kullu dararin lā naf‘a fihi yūfī ‘alayhi wa-lā daf‘a maḍarratin zā‘īdatin ‘alayhi wa-lā mustahiqqin wa-lā yuzannu fihi ba‘du hādhihi ‘l-wujūhi*.

²⁸ *Wa-dhālika li-annahū qad ya‘lamu anna ‘Amran ghayru mustahiqqin li-‘l-ālāmin, wa-anna Zaydan lā yaṣihhu an yastahiqqa an yu‘āqibahū, wa-ya‘lamu annahū salima ‘an dararin ‘azīmin wa-khawfin* (reading *khawf* instead of *hawf*); *fa-lā yajūzu an yakūna madfū‘an bihi dararin ‘azīmun, wa-ya‘lamu annahū lam yaqṣid mā aqdama ‘alayhi ṭṣālahū ilā naf‘in, wa-ya‘lamu aydan anna lā imārata li-‘l-naf‘i, wa-ya‘lamu ta‘ammudahū li-dhālika min ghayri zanni ‘l-naf‘i wa-li-ba‘di ‘l-wujūhi*.

In this description some aspects are added that are not mentioned in the first definition, such as the remark that the harm is an injustice if the harming person does not have the right to inflict the harm deserved. On the other hand, some aspects that are present in the first definition are omitted, such as the condition that the profit must be greater than the harm that is done. In the discussion of the different aspects of good infliction of pain the purport of what is mentioned in these definitions will be made clear. First, attention will be given to inflicting harm that is described as a useless act (*‘abath*).

From ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s definitions of injustice it becomes clear that according to him inflicting a harm that entails a profit outweighing the harm, or that averts another harm greater than the harm suffered, is not an injustice but a good act (*Mughnī* XIII, 314: 14). The profit must outweigh the harm; if the profit is less than the harm, ‘Abd al-Jabbār maintains that inflicting this harm is an injustice. Similarly, if the harm averted is less than the harm suffered, the act is considered an injustice. But what about inflicting harm that entails a profit equal to the harm, or that averts an equal harm? Is this act an injustice or not?

‘Abd al-Jabbār does not describe such an act as an injustice. Yet, he considers it a bad act because, in his opinion, it is a useless act (*‘abath*)²⁹ (*Mughnī* XIII, 314: 13-15 and 331: 6-8). He explains that when the profit is equal to the harm, it is as if the act is not done. He gives the example of someone who disposes of something in order to obtain the same thing. His act is without any advantage (*fā’ida*) and is therefore a useless act (*‘abath*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 331: 8-10). ‘Abd al-Jabbār adds some other examples of useless acts. For a good understanding it is necessary to know that he regards it as a harm to have someone do hard work. This harm is compensated for by the payment the worker gets for his work. An example given by him of a useless act is that of someone who engages a workman to refresh the open air because he wants to provide the workman with a *dīnār* (*Mughnī* XIII, 395: 10-11). With respect to this example is important that the employer’s intention is to provide the workman with money. He could have given the money to the workman as a gift without making him do useless work, reaching his aim (giving

²⁹ The meaning of the term *‘abath* is discussed by Hourani (1971, 75-76), Peters (1976, 89-90) and Frank (1978, 133-134). Madelung (1991b, 246) describes *‘abath* as “vain, aimless action”. He explains that: “The fully conscious agent who acts without motive and aim (*gharad*) is described as acting vainly (*‘abith*).”

money) in an easier way. The employer's act is therefore described as useless.

‘Abd al-Jabbār also gives the example of someone who pays a workman to pour out water from one side of the sea to the other side (*Mughnī* XIII, 312: 6-7). The acts mentioned are by no means an injustice as the workman is paid for his work. Yet they are bad because they are superfluous. The result of these acts can be achieved in another, easier way. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore defines a useless act (*‘abath*) as “every act that is not done by its agent with the intention of doing it in a reasonable way” (*wajhan ma‘qūlan*) (*Mughnī* XI, 191: 3-4). He emphasizes, however, that acts done by sleeping or absent-minded people are not to be considered as useless acts, although they are not done in a rational way. These acts are done unknowingly, whereas the characteristic of a useless act is that it is done knowingly (*Mughnī* VI/1, 11: 5-11)³⁰.

Although ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers that useless acts do not involve injustice, he does not describe them as good acts. Had he described them as good acts, this would have had consequences for his discussion of acts done by God. It is evident that ‘Abd al-Jabbār discusses the subject of good and bad acts in this world in order to apply this to the acts of God³¹. If he said that useless acts are good, it could be concluded that some of God's acts are good but useless. We will see later³² that this would subvert ‘Abd al-Jabbār's theory of divine compensation for suffering.

6. *Good Infliction of Pain*

‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that it is possible to inflict harm (pain or sorrow) in such a way that the act in question is judged as a good act. Such an act must not be an injustice or a useless act: it must belong to the exceptions that he has mentioned in his definitions of injustice. This means that doing harm can only be good by exception: in general it is a bad act. We have seen that ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that doing harm is an injustice unless this harm [1] involves a profit greater than the harm, [2] averts a harm greater than the inflicted harm,

³⁰ Frank (1978, 144, note 48) points out that *‘abathan* should be read for *ghny*’ in line 5; *li-‘l-‘abath* for *llghyb* in line 6; and *al-‘abath* for *‘lghyb* in line 8.

³¹ For instance, see *Mughnī* XIII, 395: 6-14 and *Mughnī* XI, 64: 8-9.

³² See below, 159.

[3] is deserved, or [4] is done on the supposition to be as mentioned before (*Mughnī* XIII, 298: 8-9 and 316: 4-6). In what follows each of these four exceptions will be discussed.

6.1. *Inflicting Pain that Involves a Profit*

We have seen that according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, inflicting pain is good if it provides the harmed person with a profit that outweighs the pain. To explain this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of someone who disposes of his garment in order to obtain money for it (*Mughnī* XIII, 318: 3-8). According to his theory, this act is good if the profit (the money that is obtained) is more than the harm (missing the garment). ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore takes into consideration how much this profit is. If a large sum of money is obtained, the act of disposing of the garment is good, because the harm of missing the garment is outweighed by the profit. If a small sum of money is obtained, the act is bad because the profit obtained by possessing the money is not enough to outweigh the harm of missing the garment.

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār this example shows that the basis for deciding whether the act of disposing of the garment is good or bad is the quantity of the profit, and nothing else. The act is good only if the profit outweighs the harm. He emphasizes that it is not enough for the profit to be equal to the harm. If harm and profit are equal it is a useless act (*‘abath*) and, like all useless acts, it is bad (*Mughnī* XIII, 331: 4-10).

The example just mentioned concerns harm that someone willingly does to himself. If the harm is done by one person to another more aspects must be taken into consideration. The profit must not only outweigh the harm, but the act must be done with the intention of providing a profit and, if the harmed person is an adult of sound mind, he must give his consent to be harmed for this profit. In the example above the agreement to sell the garment for a certain sum of money implies that the owner gives his consent to be “harmed” by the buyer in order to obtain the profit (the money). The act of the owner is good because the profit obtained outweighs the harm of missing the garment; the act of the buyer is good because the owner has given his consent beforehand to be “harmed”.

It would have been a different matter if the garment was taken from the owner without his consent or, put differently, if the garment had been stolen from him. ‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that stealing

is bad. He admits that there is profit involved in this act: however, the profit is for the agent of the act, the thief, but not for the victim who suffers a loss. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that the profit is not to be taken into consideration because it does not fulfil the condition that it must be obtained by the harmed person and not by the person inflicting harm. It is clear that it is bad to harm someone else in order to obtain a profit for oneself (*Mughnī XIII*, 396: 15-17 and 345: 7-8). ‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that compensation for the loss of the garment does not turn the theft of a garment into a good act, although the compensation is a profit for the owner. He points out that turning the theft into a good act is impossible because of the thief’s intention when he stole the garment, which was to obtain a profit for himself. It was not the thief’s intention to provide the harmed person with a profit in the form of compensation; even if this had been his intention, his act would be bad because the harmed person did not give his consent beforehand.

‘Abd al-Jabbār adds that, apart from this, there is another reason why the act of the thief would not be turned into a good act by a compensation afterwards: the compensation for a stolen garment is normally equal to its value. Thus, the profit for the owner of the garment is equal to the harm. This does not meet the condition that the profit must outweigh the harm (*Mughnī XIII*, 320: 7-20).

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s assertion that a compensation afterwards does not turn the act of harming someone without first obtaining his consent into a good act places him in an awkward position. His purpose in discussing these questions is to draw an analogy between the present world and the absent (divine) world. If he first declares that doing harm without consent is bad, how can he explain that God’s imposing illnesses and pain on His creatures without obtaining their consent beforehand is good? In the present world an adult of sound mind (*‘āqil*) has to give his consent to be harmed. Only children, madmen and animals are not asked for their consent. ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers it good that their caretaker inflicts pain on them in those situations in which he would deem it good to inflict this pain on himself. He does not need their consent, because they are put into his care and he knows what is best for them. If the pain leads to a profit greater than the harm, it is good to inflict pain on them.

Some Mu‘tazilites³³ said, indeed, that the relation between God

³³ ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not mention them by name but refers to them as “our masters” (*shuyūkhunā*).

and humans is like the relation between a caretaker and those who are put into his care. God created them, giving them life, and is therefore in the best position to know what is good for them. When God imposes illnesses on them, He does not have to ask for their consent to be harmed if this harm leads to a profit for them that outweighs the harm (*Mughnī* XIII, 454: 17-455: 9).

This solution is rejected by ‘Abd al-Jabbār because it conflicts with his theory on God imposing obligations (*taklīf*)³⁴ on humans. This presupposes that these humans are adults of sound mind, otherwise it would be wrong to impose obligations on them. That they are adults of sound mind implies that they should give their consent to be harmed. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore presents a different solution. He has thought out a situation in which it is good to harm an adult of sound mind, even though he has not given his consent beforehand. This is the case if the compensation for the harm is so great that it is indisputable that all adults of sound mind, different as they are, would choose to bear this harm to obtain the compensation that is awarded for it. He gives the example of someone who is compensated a thousand *dīnār* for having to stand up after being seated. In his opinion, someone who is awarded such compensation and yet refuses to bear the harm for it must be considered as not being of sound mind (*Mughnī* XIII, 322: 15-17). He needs a caretaker. If, then, his caretaker inflicts pain on him without his consent, the act of the caretaker is good because of the profit it involves for this person. (*Mughnī* XIII, 321: 9-19, 322: 9-18, 401: 1-12).

6.2. *Inflicting Pain in Order to Avert another Harm*

Another exception to the rule that doing harm is bad concerns harm that is done to avert another harm. For the harm to be good, the harm averted must be greater than the harm suffered. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains this by giving the example of someone who hurts himself walking through thorns in order to escape a predatory animal or a fire. It is considered good that he hurts himself in this way because he would suffer more pain if he was torn to pieces by the predatory animal or was burned by the fire. ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives other examples as well, such as undergoing a severe treatment in order to shorten the duration of an illness, or exerting oneself by working in crafts

³⁴ On his theory of *taklīf*, see below, 142-148.

or trade in order to avoid poverty or the fear of poverty (*Mughnī* XIII, 335: 6-8). ‘Abd al-Jabbār also adds that reflection (*nazar*) in order to acquire knowledge of God is good because it averts a harm: by taking the trouble to reflect one gets rid of a great fear that is evoked by one’s inner voice (*khāṭir*)³⁵ and the urge to know truth (*Mughnī* XIII, 335: 8-10).

The problem in the examples mentioned is that the averted harm does not happen, precisely because it is averted. Is it good to suffer harm to avert a harm that is only expected to happen? Answering this question, ‘Abd al-Jabbār distinguishes between a threatening harm that already exists and a threatening harm that is expected to come into existence but which does not yet exist.

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, adults of sound mind (*‘uqalā*) know intuitively (*bi-’dḥīrār*) that it is good to avert an existent harm by means of another existent harm if that harm is less than the averted harm (*Mughnī* XIII, 355: 10-12). There was difference of opinion as to the reason why this is good. Some said that bearing the chosen harm is good because it leads to a profit, namely, joy (*surūr*) about the greater harm being averted. ‘Abd al-Jabbār rejects this, arguing that this amounts to saying that bearing the harm is good because it stops sorrow (*ghamm*) about the threatening harm. In his opinion, this is wrong because it is the threatening harm itself that is averted and not the knowledge of it, the fear of it, or the psychological picture of it (*Mughnī* XIII, 336: 10-18). Only in those cases in which the averted harm does not yet exist but is likely to come into existence does he deem it possible to say that fear of the harm is averted. However, he prefers to say that the harm itself is averted (*Mughnī* XIII, 337: 19-338: 2).

We have seen that according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory, it is only if the averted harm is greater than the chosen harm that it is good to bear the chosen harm. In order to know whether bearing a harm

³⁵ The motive (*dā’ī*) and the inner voice (*khāṭir*) have a function in the process of the acquisition of knowledge. They urge us to find out what truth is (Bernand, 1982, 181-199). I have chosen to translate *khāṭir* by “inner voice”, in view of Peters’ (1976, 64-65) explanation: “I believe that we justly compare this *khāṭir* with what we know as God’s voice in our heart, our conscience”. Reinhart (1995, 157) says that Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā’ī and ‘Abd al-Jabbār held that the *khāṭir* is a form of speech. He explains that the *khāṭir* provokes fear that leads to inquiry, which in its turn leads to knowledge. Reinhart translates *khāṭir* as warner. Wolfson (1976, 624-644) discusses the theory of the two *khāṭirs* (one inciting to doing an act and one inciting to not doing it) in relation to freedom of choice.

is good, the quantities of the two harms must therefore be weighed against each other. ‘Abd al-Jabbār admits that in many cases it is difficult to know the quantity of an averted harm, especially if it does not exist yet and is only expected to happen. It is therefore difficult to know with certainty whether the averted harm is greater than the chosen harm. For this reason ‘Abd al-Jabbār deems it necessary that there be a great difference in quantity between the averted harm and the chosen harm. In his opinion, it is only good to choose an existent harm in order to avert an expected harm if the expected harm is much greater than the chosen harm (*Mughnī* XIII, 342: 9-343: 2).

Evidently, it is bad to expose oneself to a great harm in order to avert an insignificant harm. ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers this an injustice (*zulm*) because the chosen harm is greater than the harm averted. In his opinion, it is also bad to choose to bear a harm in order to avert an equal harm because in that case it is a useless act (*‘abath*). However, if it concerns an expected harm that is equal to the chosen harm, he considers it an injustice to choose to bear this harm, taking in consideration that the harm to be averted does not exist but the chosen harm does exist (*Mughnī* XIII, 342: 3-8).

6.3. *Inflicting Deserved Pain*

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory it is, on certain conditions, good to inflict pain or sorrow on someone who deserves a punishment (*‘iqāb*), blame (*dhamm*) or a reproof (*lawm*). Doing such a thing is good because it is deserved. It should not be concluded from this that ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers it good to take justice into our own hands. We have seen that in his second definition of injustice, he says that harming someone else is not an injustice if that person has deserved this harm, but he adds that the person inflicting harm must have the right to punish him. In the following example of deserved pain, he prudently³⁶ speaks of blame and sorrow, and not of punishment and physical pain:

³⁶ Although one might think of physical pain inflicted on a criminal when ‘Abd al-Jabbār speaks of deserved pain, he does not mention the *ḥadd* punishments as an example of deserved pain. The *ḥadd* punishments are: 1. stoning or scourging for illicit intercourse (*zinā*); 2. scourging for falsely accusing a married woman of adultery (*qadhf*); 3. scourging for drinking wine or other intoxicating drinks; 4. cutting off hands for theft; 5. various punishments, including crucifixion, for various forms of robbery (Juynboll, 1930, 304-312, and Baradie, 1983,

I have explained that it is good that we blame someone who has wronged us or has committed terrible deeds of evil, although that blame and the fact that the blame is deserved sadden him, annoy him and affect his heart (*Mughnī XIII*, 344: 4-6)³⁷.

‘Abd al-Jabbār gives an example of sorrow felt by someone who deservedly is blamed. To make clear that the blame is really deserved, he speaks of “terrible deeds of evil” (*qabā’ih ‘azīma*) committed. The blame is expressed by the persons who are wronged themselves and not by other persons. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, we know intuitively (*bi-ṭarīqat al-idṭirār*) that in this case it is good to blame the wrong-doer, even though he is hurt by the blame (*Mughnī XIII*, 344: 9).

There are some respects in which deserved pain differs from pain that involves a profit or averts a harm. ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that pain which involves a profit or averts a harm is mostly self-inflicted. A person chooses to bear such pain, or, if this pain is inflicted by someone else, he gives his consent to be harmed³⁸. However, with respect to deserved pain quite the opposite is true: the deserved pain is inflicted on someone without asking him for his consent.

Although ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that—on certain conditions—it is good to inflict pain on someone who deserves a punishment, he considers it bad to punish oneself (*Mughnī XIII*, 344: 15-17). In his opinion, it is even bad to expose oneself voluntarily to punishment: on the contrary, he considers it good to escape punishment. Evidently, this is related to his opinion that we strive to obtain profit and try to avert harm. ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers that punishment is of no use for the one to be punished and that his exposure to punishment is therefore a useless act (*abath*) which, like all useless acts is bad. In his view, escaping a deserved punishment is a good act because in

96-129). Apparently, ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not mention them here because they are imposed on God’s command, as disclosed in the revelation. The divine command means that it is God who punishes, although the punishments are carried out by humans. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore gives an example of deserved pain (sorrow) inflicted by humans on their own initiative.

³⁷ *Wa-qad bayyantu annahū yahsunu min aḥadinā an yadhumma man asā’a ilayhi aw aqdama ‘alā ‘l-qabā’ihā ‘l-‘azīmati wa-in kāna dhālika ‘l-dhammu wa-‘l-istiḥqāqu yughim-muhū wa-yu’dhīhi wa-yu’aththiru fī qalbihi.*

³⁸ We have seen (above, 128) that there are some exceptions to this rule, for instance, with respect to humans who are not in full possession of their mental faculties. Their caretaker may take the decision for them to bear a pain. Another exception, mentioned by ‘Abd al-Jabbār, is when the profit is so great that everyone would choose to bear the pain for this profit.

this way the person to be punished averts a harm to himself (*Mughnī* XIII, 290: 16-18; see also *Mughnī* XIII, 413: 13-15).

Does this mean that ‘Abd al-Jabbār, himself a judge, considers that escaping punishment is legally permissible? He reports that some jurists did, indeed, declare it permissible for a judge to refrain from the infliction of a *ḥadd* punishment if the guilty person avoids punishment by flight (*ḥarab*) or repentance (*tawba*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 432: 6-7). ‘Abd al-Jabbār himself does not completely agree with them. He does agree with them about flight from the punishment. However, he does not think that a *ḥadd* punishment³⁹ should be abandoned if the guilty person repents; it is his opinion that in that case, the religious leader (*imām*) must still inflict the *ḥadd* punishment even though the repentance implies that the guilty person no longer deserves to be punished. The *ḥadd* punishment should then not be seen as a punishment but as a trial (*miḥna*) from God (*Mughnī* XIII, 408: 15-16 and 409: 16-18). We will see later⁴⁰ that ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that the pain of a *ḥadd* punishment given to one who repents is compensated for by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 461: 15-18; *Mughnī* XIII, 493: 11).

‘Abd al-Jabbār indicates another point of difference between deserved pain and pain that involves a profit or averts a harm. As we have seen⁴¹, in order to know whether the latter pain is good, quantities of pain and profit or averted harm must be weighed against each other. ‘Abd al-Jabbār declares that this does not hold for deserved pain. In his opinion, the infliction of deserved pain is good by the mere fact that it is deserved and it is therefore not necessary to take into consideration whether or not the quantity of the offence is greater than the quantity of the punishment (*Mughnī* XIII, 347: 1-6). Does ‘Abd al-Jabbār mean that giving a heavy punishment for a trivial offence is a good act? He does not explain this further, but refers to his discussion of “the threat [of hell]” (*al-wa‘īd*)⁴². Since I

³⁹ On the *ḥadd* punishments, see above 131-132, note 36.

⁴⁰ See below, 154.

⁴¹ See above, 126-131.

⁴² Peters (1976, 34) supposes that a part of the missing volumes XVIII and XIX must have dealt with “the Promise and the Threat”, but from ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s use of the past tense of the verb “explain” (I explained/*bayyantu*) we may conclude that he discussed it in a volume earlier than volume XIII. This does not exclude the possibility that the main discussion of this subject was contained in volumes XVIII/XIX as in *Mughnī* XIII, 365: 20 ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to *al-Wa‘īd* (the Threat) in the present tense: “we [will] study (*nataqaṣṣā*) ... in the *Wa‘īd*”.

have been unable to trace the discussion he is referring to, I can only speculate about his opinion on the quantities of offence and punishment. I think it unlikely that he considers it good to severely punish someone for a trivial offence. His opinion probably should be explained as follows: one who commits a trivial offence only deserves a light punishment; if he were punished severely this would be an undeserved punishment and, consequently, a bad act because inflicting pain is only good if it is deserved.

6.4. *Inflicting Pain that is Supposed to be Good*

We humans cannot know with certainty what will happen in the future; we can only suppose that certain things will happen. Then, what about exerting oneself in order to obtain a profit which does not eventuate? Or choosing to bear a harm in order to avert a greater harm, but that harm is not averted? Are these acts bad? This question concerns the certainty of knowing. As 'Abd al-Jabbār asserts the omniscience of God, he obviously does not discuss these questions with the intention of applying them to God's acts; for him, it is an established truth that supposing does not apply to God but only to humans.

Referring to the different kinds of knowledge, 'Abd al-Jabbār uses the terms *ʿitiqād* (conviction), *ʿilm* (knowledge) and *zann* (supposition)⁴³. The meaning of these terms can be clarified as follows: someone has a conviction (*ʿitiqād*) about something if he considers it to be true. His conviction may be in accordance with reality or not. In the latter case his conviction is a wrong conviction, for which 'Abd al-Jabbār uses the term *jahl* (*Mughnī XIII*, 352: 6-7). If his conviction is in accordance with truth it is called knowledge (*ʿilm*). How can we be certain that a conviction we have is in accordance with reality? 'Abd al-Jabbār points out that if we are certain that something is in accordance with reality, we feel in ourselves a true and authentic feeling of certitude (*sukūn al-nafs*) that we do not feel when we are not certain of this⁴⁴. This certitude exists in us, for instance, when we are certain that something exists because we have seen it with our

⁴³ For more details on the meaning of the terms *ʿitiqād*, *ʿilm* and *zann*, see Peters (1976, 41-56), Bernand (1982, 279-300) and Reinhart (1995, 155-156).

⁴⁴ In her detailed study on 'Abd al-Jabbār's theory of knowledge, Bernand (1982, 291-300) explained how the concept of *sukūn al-nafs* was applied by the Mu'tazilites. See also Peters (1976, 48-50).

own eyes. This certitude is missing when we only have a supposition (*zann*) about something, for instance, when something is supposed to happen in the future. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore says that we do not have knowledge (*ilm*) of, but only a supposition (*zann*) about, what will happen in the future.

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion it is good to inflict pain in order to obtain a profit that does not exist at that moment, but which it is supposed will eventuate in the future. To illustrate this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār again takes up the example of selling a garment for a *dīnār*. He considers this act to be good, regardless of whether the *dīnār* is spent at that moment or later, although there is only certainty about the profit if the money is spent at once. If the *dīnār* is spent later, it is supposed that the profit will eventuate; it does not exist at the moment when the owner disposes of his garment. Similarly, in many other cases when pain involves a profit, the profit is not known with certainty because it will happen in the future. Yet suffering the pain for it is considered good. ‘Abd al-Jabbār mentions as examples trade and labour that are done in order to obtain gains. Another example involves exertion in the search for science, culture or exquisite things. At the moment someone decides to harm himself like this, the profit has not yet happened and cannot be known with certainty, yet his act is considered to be good because it is supposed that it will yield him a profit in the future (*Mughnī* XIII, 348: 3-9).

However, it is possible that a profit that is supposed to happen in the future does not happen at all. This implies that the harm inflicted does not lead to a profit that outweighs it. Similarly, it is possible that a harm is chosen in order to avert a greater harm but that the harm intended to be averted happens after all. Must these acts be judged as being bad? ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not think so. He considers them good acts, notwithstanding the harm they involve. What, then, makes these acts good? It cannot be the profit because there is no profit, nor the averting of harm because harm is not averted. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that these acts are good because of the supposition (*zann*) someone has at the moment that he chooses the pain, namely, that the pain will involve a profit or avert a harm (*Mughnī* XIII, 348: 12-13). However, he makes it conditional that the supposed profit is much greater than the pain suffered (*Mughnī* XIII, 349: 1-7 and 362: 3-12).

The examples that ‘Abd al-Jabbār has given above concern self-inflicted pain. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion it is also good to inflict

pain on someone else on the supposition that it will provide him with a profit in the future or that it will avert an expected harm, but only if the other person has given his consent to be harmed. ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers that harming an adult of sound mind (*‘āqil*) without his consent is bad when it concerns a future profit, however great this profit may be: no exception is made for a profit that is so great that every adult of sound mind would choose to be harmed in order to obtain it (*Mughnī XIII*, 357: 11-14). However, in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion it is good if someone harms living beings who are not in full possession of their mental faculties and are put into his care, when he supposes that this will lead to a profit for them in the future or that it will avert an expected harm (*Mughnī XIII*, 362: 1-8).

Opinion diverged on the question of whether or not it is good to inflict pain that is supposed to be deserved. Evidently, the question is not whether it is good to punish someone for an offence it is supposed he will commit in the future but rather whether it is good to punish someone on the supposition that he has already committed an offence. A different kind of supposition is therefore involved: there is uncertainty about something, not because it has not happened yet but because it is unclear what exactly has happened.

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion it is not good to inflict pain on the supposition that it is deserved. He declares himself in agreement with Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī, who was of the opinion that supposition cannot take the place of knowledge with respect to deserved pain. In Abū ‘Alī’s opinion, inflicting deserved pain is only good if it is known with certainty that the pain is deserved. However, he reportedly made an exception for blame, considering it good to blame someone on the supposition that this person deserves to be blamed. He explained that this act is good, not because of the blaming person’s supposition (*ẓann*) but because of the profit that the blamed person derives from the blame: the blame may prevent him from committing the offence for which he, perhaps undeservingly, has been blamed (*Mughnī XIII*, 363: 3-7).

Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī’s son Abū Hāshim is reported⁴⁵ to have said that it is good to inflict pain even if it is only supposed that the pain is deserved (*Mughnī XIII*, 363: 13-14). This evidently referred to blaming someone, as he argued that it is difficult to know with cer-

⁴⁵ The works to which ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers are Abū Hāshim’s *al-Abwāb* and his *al-Baghdādiyyāt* (not *al-Ta’dādiyyāt* as is written in the edition).

tainty whether the blame is deserved: in many cases in which blaming is considered good the blame is, in fact, based on supposition rather than knowledge (*Mughnī*, XIII, 363: 14-364: 6). Abū Hāshim disagreed with Abū ‘Alī that in those cases the reason why blaming is good is a future profit. Abū Hāshim took into account that the blame is not given with the consent of the one who is blamed. As we have seen, harming an adult without his consent to obtain a future profit for him is not good. He therefore concluded that blaming in those cases cannot be good because of a profit and that it must therefore be good because of the supposition that it is deserved (*Mughnī* XIII, 364: 6-10). ‘Abd al-Jabbār rejects this. He is convinced that the infliction of deserved pain is only good if it is known that it is deserved (*Mughnī* XIII, 365: 12-20).

7. *Judgments on Some Particular Cases of Inflicting Pain*

7.1. *Saving Someone and Harming Him*

We have seen that according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, it is good to avert a serious harm by bearing a trivial harm. But what about someone whose hand is broken while he is being saved from drowning⁴⁶? Is saving him in this way good because a serious harm (drowning) is averted by a trivial harm (breaking the hand of the drowning person)? However, the drowning person may be saved without breaking his hand. Although this question concerns a theoretical case which it is hard to imagine ever happening in reality, it was already a point of discussion in Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī’s time (*Majmū’* III, 29: 6-9).

The question of saving someone from drowning by breaking his hand has different aspects. With respect to the drowning person himself, it can be asked whether his exposing his hand to be broken is good. ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion is that this is good if he supposes that this is the only way to be saved. ‘Abd al-Jabbār argues that the act of the drowning person can be compared with the act of someone who has his hand amputated for fear that the gangrene in it will spread to the rest of his body. Having his hand amputated is good

⁴⁶ Hourani (1971, 75) mentions the question of the drowning person but speaks of the rescuer’s broken hand and the compensation that the drowning person gives to the rescuer. It is not clear which passage in the *Mughnī* Hourani based this on.

in this case because he supposes that the amputation will avert the greater harm of dying from gangrene. Similarly, the act of the drowning person is good if he supposes that the only way to be saved is by exposing his hand to be broken (*Mughnī* XIII, 340: 13).

However, in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion the drowning person’s act is bad if he knows that he can be saved without having his hand broken. Again, ‘Abd al-Jabbār compares the drowning person’s act with the act of someone who has his hand amputated because of gangrene. If the person with gangrene knows that he can be saved from gangrene without having his hand amputated it is bad of him to have his hand amputated. Similarly, if the drowning person knows that he can be saved without exposing his hand to be broken yet still exposes it to be broken, his act is bad (*Mughnī* XIII, 340: 3-5).

This concerns the act of the person who is drowning. As for the person who saves him and breaks his hand, ‘Abd al-Jabbār is of the opinion that if the rescuer intentionally breaks the drowning person’s hand, it is good of him to do so, even if he were able to save him without breaking it. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that if the rescuer breaks the hand for a purpose (*gharad*) it means that he supposes that there is an advantage in saving the drowning person in this way. However, ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers that his act is bad if he breaks the hand for no purpose, because in that case it is a useless act (*‘abath*)⁴⁷ (*Mughnī* XIII, 340: 5-9). We have seen⁴⁸ that according to him every act that is not done with the intention of doing it in a reasonable way is a useless act and useless acts are bad.

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion on this question differs slightly from Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī’s. In Abū ‘Alī’s view, breaking the hand of the drowning person although he could be saved without breaking his hand is a bad act on the rescuer’s part. He argued that the rescuer harms himself because he will not receive thanks and praise from the person he has saved. Abū ‘Alī considered that the rescue altogether is not an injustice because the profit for the drowning person (i.e., being saved) outweighs the harm (i.e., his broken hand). However, he added that the act of the drowning person who exposes his hand to be broken is bad because it is a useless act (*‘abath*) (*Majmū’* III, 29: 9). We have seen that in ‘Abd al-Jabbār view the act of the drowning

⁴⁷ This example is also given by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in another passage in which he explains that doing harm is bad in those cases in which it is a useless act (*‘abath*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 312: 8-10).

⁴⁸ See above, 125-126.

person is good if he supposes that this is the only way he can be saved.

7.2. *Inflicting Pain on Someone in Self-Defence*

Many people will consider that it is good to defend oneself against an attack by someone else, even if it means that the attacker is harmed⁴⁹. Yet, on what grounds is self-defence a good act? According to 'Abd al-Jabbār's theory it is bad to harm someone else in order to gain a profit for oneself. He thinks that, similarly, it is bad to harm someone else for the purpose of averting a harm to oneself. He argues that this is known by reason, which says that it is not good to take someone's bread (harming him in this way) to appease one's own hunger (averting harm to oneself) (*Mughnī* XIII, 341: 6-7)⁵⁰. Does self-defence not imply that we harm someone else in order to avert a harm to ourselves?

Presumably 'Abd al-Jabbār in his function as a judge often dealt with cases of self-defence. Answering the question of whether it is good to harm someone else in self-defence he takes into account whether it is necessary to use violence in order to avert the attack. He concedes that it is good to inflict pain in self-defence, but only if it is impossible to ward off an attacker without inflicting pain on him. He emphasizes that if it is possible to fend off the attacker without harming him there is an obligation to do so.

The same holds for an attack that can be warded off with only slight harm to the attacker. 'Abd al-Jabbār considers that it is bad to harm the attacker more than is necessary: it should not be the defender's object to harm the attacker. If possible, he must try to stop the attacker by keeping him off with his hands and if he can keep him off without the use of violence, he should do so (*Mughnī* XIII, 340: 18-341: 3)⁵¹.

In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, it is not bad to harm someone in

⁴⁹ Ḥanafite lawyers say that it is permissible (*mubāh*) to kill someone else in self-defence, provided that the attack cannot be averted in another way (Schacht, 1978, 768).

⁵⁰ We should remember that 'Abd al-Jabbār does not discuss the legal aspects of acts. Whether or not the thief of a loaf of bread should be punished according to law is a different question that he does not discuss here.

⁵¹ Although I did not come across any passage in the *Mughnī* in which 'Abd al-Jabbār explicitly speaks as a judge, passages like the one discussed here may evidence his experience with juridical cases.

self-defence if this is the only way to ward off an attacker. He believes that this act is good because the attacker himself chooses to be harmed: at the moment that he decides to attack someone, he also chooses to expose himself to harm from the attacked person acting in self-defence. Thus, harm done in self-defence should not be seen as harm inflicted by the person attacked but rather as harm inflicted by the attacker on himself (*Mughnī XIII*, 341: 4-6).

7.3. *Pain Inflicted by Children and Animals*

We have seen⁵² that ‘Abd al-Jabbār considered bad the act of someone who in his sleep or absentmindedly harms someone else⁵³. Although the act is not done intentionally ‘Abd al-Jabbār nevertheless considers it bad because it involves harm. However, no blame is attached because the harm is done unintentionally. Another reason why no blame is attached for some bad acts is that they are done by living beings without complete minds, such as children, insane adults and animals. They are not blamed because they cannot know that these acts are bad.

In Mu‘tazilite thought God imposes obligations on adults of sound mind but not on children, insane adults and animals⁵⁴. ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that some speculative theologians believed that acts that are bad if adults of sound mind do them are not bad if they are done by living beings on whom God has not imposed obligations (*laysa bi-mukallafin*) (*Mughnī XIII*, 304: 4-6). ‘Abd al-Jabbār rejects the opinion of these theologians. In his view, harm done by such living beings is bad even though they do not know that doing harm is bad. However, they do not deserve blame for their acts because they cannot be prevented from acting by the knowledge that doing harm is bad: they do not have this knowledge (*Mughnī XIII*, 478. 9-10).

In the next chapter we will see that ‘Abd al-Jabbār, having explained that there are ways in which inflicting pain is good, goes on to apply the method of drawing an analogy between this world and the divine world in order to make clear that God’s acts of inflicting pain

⁵² See above, 118-119.

⁵³ It is obvious that this harm is good if it involves a greater profit for the harmed person or averts a greater harm to him, even though the harm is not done with this intention.

⁵⁴ See below, 147.

are good because they are done in those ways. However, this is not the only reason why he has specified which human acts of infliction of pain are good. The distinction between good and bad infliction of pain is important for him because he believes that in particular cases God compensates for pain, even if this pain is produced by humans. However, he is convinced that God does not compensate for bad infliction of pain: someone who inflicts pain on someone else in such a way that his act is bad must himself compensate for this pain. In the next chapter we will see how, according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, this is done.

CHAPTER FIVE

COMPENSATION OF PAIN

We have seen¹ that ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that pain that is not produced by humans or other living beings must be brought into existence by God. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theology all acts of God are good. This implies that also those acts of God that entail suffering for living beings must be good. A key question to be answered is the purpose for which God inflicts pain on humans and animals in this world. ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine says that God’s infliction of pain must have a purpose, otherwise it would be a useless act (*‘abath*), which implies that it is bad. To answer the question of purpose, ‘Abd al-Jabbār relates God’s infliction of pain to the theory that God imposes obligations on those living beings that can be made responsible for their actions: adults of sound mind.

1. *Taklīf and Luṭf*

The theory that God imposes obligations on all adults of sound mind (*‘uqalā’*) is an important issue in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine. The Arabic term for God’s imposing of obligations is *taklīf* (charging). *Taklīf* is the verbal noun of the verb *kallafa* which is used in the Qur’ān, in the statement that God does not impose the impossible on man². According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine, several of God’s actions towards humans have a relation to God’s *taklīf*: they are done with the purpose of informing people about which obligations are imposed on them or to motivate them to fulfil these obligations. ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to these acts of God as *alṭāf* (plural of *luṭf*). According to him, God’s sending of prophets to the people in order to inform them about the obligations imposed on them is a *luṭf*. Equally, he considers God’s infliction of pain a *luṭf*. For a good understanding of how this can be a *luṭf*, I will first discuss ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory of *taklīf*.

¹ See above, 106-107.

² See Qur’ān 6: 152, 7: 42, 23: 62, 2: 286, 65: 7 and 2: 233.

1.1. *Definitions of Taktīf*

For a definition of *taktīf*, ‘Abd al-Jabbār³ refers to Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā’ī, who said that *taktīf* means: “willing an act [to be done] that involves discomfort (*kulfa*) and trouble (*mashaqqa*) to the person on whom it is imposed” or “commanding and willing something that involves discomfort for the person who is commanded to do it” (*Mughnī* XI, 293: 5-7). From these definitions it becomes clear that *taktīf* implies that someone (the *mukallif*) wants someone else (the *mukallaf*) to do something and that he tells (or commands) him to do it. An essential element of *taktīf* is that the *mukallif* informs the *mukallaf* about what he wants him to do. Further, what is imposed on the *mukallaf* involves discomfort for him: the act to be done is not easy and agreeable but, rather, difficult and unpleasant. With reference to God’s *taktīf* it means it is His will (*irāda*) that particular troublesome acts are done by humans and, according to Abū Hāshim’s definition, God makes this known to them by commanding them to do these acts.

According to Ibn Mattawayh, ‘Abd al-Jabbār said in *al-Muḥīt bi-’l-taktīf* that *taktīf* means “making known (*i’lām*) and willing (*irāda*)”. In this definition the term “commanding” from Abū Hāshim’s definition is replaced by the term “making known”, which is a term that includes more than “commanding”. The explanation for the use of “making known” is that ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that the *mukallaf* can know obligations imposed on him not only from the revelation, in which God’s commands are found, but also by deduction or by the intuitive knowledge which is created in him by God⁴ (*Majmū’* II, 189: 7-10). Examples of rationally known obligations are gratitude for a benefaction (*shukr al-ni’ma*) (*Mughnī* XIV, 161: 6-7), refraining from injustice and usurpation⁵, returning what is entrusted to one’s custody, and paying debts (*Mughnī* XIII, 423: 8-9).

³ ‘Uthmān (1971, 17-44) gives a detailed description of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine of *taktīf* basing it on the texts of the *Mughnī* and Ibn Mattawayh’s *Majmū’*. See also McDermott (1978, 57-69), Peters (1976, 32-33) and Sander (1994, 66-67).

⁴ See above, 117, note 13.

⁵ In his review of my dissertation in *Bulletin Critique des Annales Islamologiques* 14 (1998, 46) Prof. Daniel Gimaret suggests that in *Mughnī* XIII, 423: 9 “*ghaṣb*” should be read in stead of “*ghaḍab*”.

Ibn Mattawayh thinks that in the definition of *taklīf* the term “making known” is to be preferred to the term “commanding” (*amr*) (*Majmūʿ* II, 191: 4-7). Schwarz⁶ supposes that the reason for Ibn Mattawayh’s objection to the term “commanding” is that it may conflict with the principle that a (divine) command cannot be the reason why acts are good: the use of the term “commanding” with respect to *taklīf* may suggest that those acts that make up part of the *taklīf* are good because of God’s command. However, this does not seem to be the main reason why Ibn Mattawayh objects to the term “commanding”: he points out that “commanding” suggests that the obligations of God’s *taklīf* can only be known from God’s revelation, which would imply that people who are unfamiliar with this cannot know that God imposes obligations on them. The term “making known”, however, includes what is known intuitively by all adults of sound mind, whether or not they believe in God. God’s obligations are also imposed on people who do not believe in Him.

According to the definitions given by Abū Hāshim and ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *taklīf* also means “willing something to be done”. Ibn Mattawayh also objects to the use of the term “willing”, arguing that this only refers to what God wants people to perform and does not take account of what He does not want them to perform; yet, God’s *taklīf* also concerns the prohibition of particular acts, which means that these acts are not willed by God. He further objects to the term “willing” because it does not exclude constraint (*iljāʾ*): it leaves open the possibility that God constrains people to act in accordance with His will (*Majmūʿ* I, 1: 12-13). Ibn Mattawayh points out that the idea of constraint conflicts with the principle of *taklīf*. Imposing obligations presupposes freedom of choice for those on whom the obligations are imposed. Ibn Mattawayh therefore gives the following definition of *taklīf*: “making known (*iʿlām*) to the *mukallaf* that there is profit (*naʿf*) or harm (*ḍarar*) for him in what he, with trouble (*mashaqqā*), performs or does not perform, provided it does not reach the extent of constraint (*iljāʾ*)” (*Majmūʿ* I, 1: 14-15).

Mānkḍīm’s definition of *taklīf* bears a strong resemblance to Ibn Mattawayh’s definition⁷. He defines *taklīf* as: “Making known (*iʿlām*)

⁶ Schwarz (1976, 237).

⁷ When we compare the definitions of Ibn Mattawayh and Mānkḍīm with the definitions of Abū Hāshim and ‘Abd al-Jabbār, we see that Ibn Mattawayh and Mānkḍīm do not use the term “willing”, but they do use the term “making known” (*iʿlām*). On this point it may appear that they agree with ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s

to the other that there is profit (*naḥ*) or averting of harm (*daḥ* *darar*) for him in what he, with trouble, performs or does not perform, to the extent that the situation does not reach the point of constraint (*iljāʿ*)” (*Taʿlīq*, 510: 4-5).

1.2. *The Purpose of God’s Taktīf*

ʿAbd al-Jabbār asserts that God’s purpose in imposing obligations on all adults of sound mind is that He wants to give them the opportunity to earn a reward (*thawāb*)⁸ (*Mughnī* XIII, 420: 3). He argues that God’s purpose cannot be that He wants particular acts to be done or to be refrained from. If this was His purpose, He could achieve it in another way, by forcing humans to act accordingly. Only by constraint would God achieve His purpose with certainty: imposing obligations is not a safe way to achieve this because it is always possible that people will choose not to do that which is imposed on them (*Mughnī* XIII, 420: 16-421: 1). ʿAbd al-Jabbār therefore concludes that by imposing obligations on humans, God’s purpose must be to give them the opportunity to earn a reward.

Taking into consideration that God usually bestows many favours on His creatures without first imposing obligations, one may wonder what the difference is between these favours and the reward that God holds out. ʿAbd al-Jabbār explains that this reward is much greater than God’s usual favours. A divine favour may be small because it is a purely gratuitous act (*tafaddul*). It is always good to give a gift, however small it may be. This does not apply to a reward because it is not good to reward someone by giving him a trifle: a

definition. However, Mānkḍīm and Ibn Mattawayh apparently do not understand by *ʿilām* “making known which acts are obligatory and which acts are bad”—as ʿAbd al-Jabbār said—but rather “making known that by doing certain acts a reward can be acquired and a punishment can be averted”. Another new element in their definitions is the emphasis on freedom of choice. Although, as we will see, ʿAbd al-Jabbār shares with them the opinion that freedom of choice is a condition for *taktīf*, he does not mention this in his definition of *taktīf*. The fact that Mānkḍīm’s and Ibn Mattawayh’s definitions of *taktīf* closely resemble each other but differ from ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s definition makes one wonder whether they both adopted their definitions from a Muʿtazilite master other than ʿAbd al-Jabbār. As they do not mention the source of their definition, and I did not find any information about this in other works, I am unable to answer this question at the moment.

⁸ See also Sander (1994, 64-66).

reward must be more than a gift (*Mughnī XIII*, 392: 17-393: 4). Another difference that ‘Abd al-Jabbār sees between a gift and a reward is that a reward is given with honour and respect for its receiver, and a gift is not (*Mughnī XIII*, 393: 4-5). The honour and respect are given because something difficult has been done: it is not considered good to reward someone for doing what is easy for him (*Mughnī XIII*, 425: 14-17). This means that if God’s purpose is to give people the opportunity to earn a reward, He must impose on them something difficult. This difficult thing is to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by Him. This is difficult to do, but not so difficult that it is impossible⁹. ‘Abd al-Jabbār refutes the idea that divine obligations cannot be fulfilled, arguing that it is bad to impose an impossible task (*Mughnī VI/1*, 61: 6-9) and God does not perform bad acts.

1.3. *The Mukallaf*

‘Abd al-Jabbār takes it for granted that God does not impose the impossible and he therefore believes that God is obliged to do certain things to enable people to fulfil that which He has imposed on them (*Mughnī XI*, 292: 5-293: 3). He points out that thus, it is obligatory for God to give people able bodies so that they can perform their task (*Mughnī XI*, 292: 7-8). But this alone is not enough: people also need the power to use their bodies. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion God is obliged to give people the power (*qudra*) to act before He imposes the obligations on them (*Mughnī XI*, 367: 18-368: 1). He argues that imposing obligations on someone who is not able to perform them is a bad act.

‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes from this that a person on whom God’s obligations are imposed (*mukallaf*) must have the following qualities: able to act (*qādir*), knowing (*‘ālim*), perceiving (*mudrik*), living (*ḥayy*) and willing (*murīd*) (*Mughnī XI*, 309: 13). The ability to act, the possession of life and perception are closely related to each other. The ability to act is given only to living beings: inanimate beings cannot act. The characteristic of living beings is their ability to perceive. This means that one who is able to act must also be living and perceiving. A *mukallaf* shares these qualities with all living beings, including those who are not *mukallaf*.

⁹ This is what is said in the Qur’ān. For the places where this is said, see above, 142, note 2.

‘Abd al-Jabbār goes on to say that it is necessary for a *mukallaf* to feel desire or aversion for certain things. He explains that this is closely related to the purpose of God’s *taklīf*, which is to hold out a reward for doing something difficult. It is not difficult to do something one has no aversion to or to refrain from something which one feels no desire for: it would not be good to be rewarded for doing such a thing. A *mukallaf* must therefore feel desire or aversion (*Mughnī* XI, 387: 7-12).

A *mukallaf* must also know and have a will¹⁰. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that a *mukallaf* must know which obligations are imposed by God and he must know the particular way in which these acts must be performed. He must have the will to do these acts in the required way. Only someone with a sound mind (*‘āqil*) is able to acquire knowledge about God’s *taklīf* and to distinguish between that which does and that which does not belong to the obligations of the *taklīf* (*Mughnī* XI, 371: 18-20). This means that only those who have a sound mind can be *mukallaf* (*Mughnī* XI, 375: 14-15); children (*Mughnī* XIII, 430: 11-12), insane adults (*Mughnī* XIII, 410: 13-14) and animals cannot be a *mukallaf*. God does not impose His obligations on them and this implies that they cannot deserve a reward or a punishment from God.

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, God must provide those who are *mukallaf* with the knowledge they need in order to be able to fulfil the obligations. We have seen that some obligations are known by the intuitive knowledge that is created in people by God (*Mughnī* XI, 371: 19-372: 2). Other obligations are known by deduction after reflection on indications (*adilla*, plural of *dalīl*) that God has placed in this world. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore thinks that reflection (*nazar*) and learning (*ma‘rifā*) are the most important obligations imposed on a *mukallaf* (*Mughnī* XIII, 422: 13).

There is a clear relation between God’s obligation to make the obligations known and a *mukallaf*’s obligation to reflect and learn: doing so, he acquires the knowledge about all that God has imposed on him. Another way in which God makes His commands and prohibitions known is by sending prophets who bring a message from Him about these things. They inform humans about the

¹⁰ ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that not only humans but also angels have the qualities mentioned by him but, although God has imposed obligations on the angels, too, they are not described as *mukallaf* (*Mughnī* XI, 309: 17). The qualification *mukallaf* applies only to a human being.

contents of the obligations and about the reward or punishment that God will give for fulfilling or failing to fulfil them (*Mughnī* XI, 375: 5-13).

1.4. *Lutf*

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, the prophets not only inform people of the obligations imposed by God, but also motivate them to fulfil these obligations. In his opinion, God is obliged to motivate those on whom He has imposed His obligations (*Mughnī* XV, 22: 9-10 and *Mughnī* XI, 292: 16-17). He thinks that adults of sound mind choose to perform a particular act on the basis of motives that exist in their hearts. Such a motive (*dā‘ī*) is not the cause of this act: it urges (*iqṭadā*) someone to choose to perform the act but does not make performance necessary (*laysa bi-mūjibin li-dhālika*)¹¹ (*Mughnī* VI/1, 188: 18). If the motive were the cause of the act, the act would have to happen as soon as the motive existed and the conditions for performing the act were fulfilled. That the motive is not the cause of the act means that it is possible for the motive to exist in somebody without the act being actually performed.

‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that the knowledge (*‘ilm*), supposition (*ẓann*) or conviction (*i‘tiqād*) that a particular act is good is a motive to choose to do this act¹². Similarly, the knowledge that a particular act is bad is a motive to refrain from doing it (*Mughnī* VI/1, 196: 1-5). Why then do people sometimes choose to perform bad acts¹³? ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that this is because they feel the need (*hāja*) for a particular profit, or the need to avert a particular harm. Need is another motive (*dā‘ī*) to choose to perform an act: it can urge people to choose to perform a particular act even if they know that the act is bad¹⁴ (*Mughnī* VI/1, 187: 17-188: 5). However, this need

¹¹ Hourani (1971, 83) points out that by declaring that the motive does not necessarily cause the performance of an act, ‘Abd al-Jabbār avoids the position that the acts of man are determined by God creating motives in the hearts of people.

¹² See Madelung, 1991b, 246-248.

¹³ On this question and how ‘Abd al-Jabbār answers it, see Hourani (1971, 92-97).

¹⁴ The theory that bad acts are done because of a particular need for something can be used as an argument that God does not perform bad acts. ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that God, unlike human beings, is without need or desire (*Mughnī* IV, 25: 20-21 and 30: 8-9; *Mughnī* V, 247-248). One of the reasons why all God’s acts are good is that He is without needs (*Mughnī* VI/1, 177).

must be real and they must know that there is no other way to obtain the needed thing. ‘Abd al-Jabbār is convinced that had the doer of a bad act not needed to do it, he would have refrained from doing it. Similarly, he would have refrained from doing the bad act if he had known that he could obtain the needed profit in another way (*Mughnī* VI/1, 181: 7-13). According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, the knowledge that there is no real need to perform a bad act prevents someone from choosing to do this act (*Mughnī* VI/1, 188: 2-6).

The motive to choose to perform an obligatory act can be reinforced by the knowledge that a profit can be acquired by doing it. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore says that God strengthens the motives of those on whom He has imposed His obligations by holding out a reward and by threatening them with punishment (*Mughnī* VI/1, 187: 3-4). Apart from reward and punishment, there are other ways in which God motivates the *mukallaf*. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, everything that motivates a *mukallaf* to choose to fulfil the obligations of God’s *taklīf* is a *lutf*¹⁵.

Taking into account the sense in which *lutf* is used by ‘Abd al-Jabbār, it is difficult to find an adequate translation for this term. I agree with Abrahamov¹⁶ that translating *lutf* as “divine assistance” is preferable to translating it as “grace”, but it can be objected that this translation suggests that *alṭāf* (plural of *lutf*) are only produced by God. However, we will see that a human act, for instance performing the *ṣalāt*, can also be a *lutf* in the sense that it motivates people to fulfil the obligations imposed by God. *Lutf* may therefore be translated as “assistance in fulfilling the obligations of God’s *taklīf*”, but this translation is not workable because it is too long. I therefore prefer to use the Arabic term or nevertheless to translate *lutf* as “divine assistance”, taking into consideration that most *alṭāf* come from God.

For his definition of *lutf* ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to the Mu‘tazilite masters (*shuyūkhunā*), who defined *lutf* as “that which motivates [a person] to perform an act of obedience so that at its occurrence

¹⁵ On *lutf*, see also Schwarz (1972, 427), who explains that ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory of *lutf* does not conflict with his theory of constraint (*iljā*). *Lutf* induces human beings to do an act, but does not necessarily entail the action. Abrahamov (1993b) gives an annotated translation of the chapter on *lutf* in Mānkḏīm’s *Tā’līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* (*Tā’līq*, 518-525).

¹⁶ Abrahamov (1993b, 43, note 16).

this act is chosen or is most likely to be chosen” (*Mughnī* XIII, 9: 3-4). A *lutf* is an act done by God or a human being that motivates someone to perform an act; it is not the motive itself: as we have seen, a motive (*dāʿī*) is knowledge that exists in a person’s heart. Like the motive, the *lutf* does not cause an act, but it urges someone to perform it¹⁷. It is possible that someone knows a *lutf* but does not choose to do that which the *lutf* motivates him to do¹⁸.

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s definition of *lutf* does not explicitly relate it to God’s *taklīf*. But although ‘Abd al-Jabbār admits that the term can be used in a general sense, he declares that the Muʿtazilite masters usually applied this term with respect to God’s *taklīf* (*Mughnī* XIII, 9: 10). They used *lutf* in the sense of that which motivates a person on whom God’s obligations are imposed (*mukallaf*) to choose to do an act of obedience to God, although some said that they also used the term *lutf* with respect to immorality (*mafsada*) and referred to immorality as a *lutf fi ʿl-qabīh*: that which motivates someone to choose to perform a bad act (*Mughnī* XIII, 9: 13). ‘Abd al-Jabbār adds that it is out of the question that a *lutf fi ʿl-qabīh* is an act of God: it is bad to motivate someone to choose a bad act and God does not perform bad acts (*Mughnī* XIII, 23: 6-7)¹⁹.

Not only God can do a *lutf*, an act that motivates people to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by Him, but a human act can also function as a *lutf*. ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of a prophet. It is a *lutf* from the side of God to send a prophet with a message from Him. When this prophet teaches the religious law and holds himself to its prescriptions, the prophet’s action is a *lutf*, as well: his action motivates others to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by God (*Mughnī* XV, 22: 5-6). This *lutf* is an act done by a human being. This makes it clear that it is not a condition that a *lutf* be done by God.

‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore distinguishes three sorts of *lutf*: firstly, a *lutf* that is done by God, secondly, a *lutf* done by the *mukallaf* for whom it is meant, and thirdly, a *lutf* not done by God nor by the

¹⁷ Ṣubḥī (1983², 64-67) points out this aspect, explaining that the Muʿtazilites were of the opinion that a *lutf* does not force the *mukallaf* to perform an act of obedience to God but only motivates him to perform this act.

¹⁸ Thus, I think that the description that ʿUthmān (1971, 386) gives of *lutf* as “the act of which God knows that man obeys at its occurrence” is not precise, because it rules out the possibility that a *lutf* does not result in an act of obedience.

¹⁹ See also Abrahamov (1993b, 56, note 62).

mukallaf for whom it is meant (*Mughnī* XIII, 27: 4-6). As we have seen, adhering to the prescriptions of religious law, for instance performing the *ṣalāt*, is a *lutf*. This *lutf* is an example of the second sort of *lutf*: it is done by the person for whom the *lutf* is meant. ‘Abd al-Jabbār also gives an example of a *lutf* that is not done by God nor by the person for whom the *lutf* is meant: when a prophet teaches the religious law his teaching is a *lutf* meant for people other than himself. However, ‘Abd al-Jabbār observes that although the *lutf* is not meant for the prophet, the prophet himself also profits from it as he is also motivated by what he teaches (*Mughnī* XIII, 46: 12-15).

2. Why God Imposes Pain

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār pain from God is an important *lutf*. In the *Mughnī* the discussion of pain follows immediately on the discussion of *lutf* in general. When ‘Abd al-Jabbār discusses pain inflicted by God, he not only discusses illnesses and other sorts of physical pain imposed by God, but he also includes sorrow caused by acts of God, such as sorrow about the death of a loved one. In his view this sorrow is caused by God because He made the beloved die (*Mughnī* XIII, 106: 10-12). ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not explain how a *mukallaf* (a person on whom God’s obligations are imposed) is motivated by pain or sorrow from God, but as he refers to pain as including a warning, he probably thought that pain and sorrow warn people of a painful punishment in hell if they fail to fulfil the obligations imposed by God.

2.1. Illnesses

‘Abd al-Jabbār rejects the idea that illness is a punishment from God, as was believed by several different groups whom ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to as “the adherents of the transmigration of souls” (*aṣḥāb al-tanāsukh*). According to him, they believed that humans suffer because of their bad acts in their previous lifetimes. They maintained that pain that comes from God is good because it is deserved as a punishment²⁰. They believed that pleasure can also

²⁰ On them, see above, 75, note 13. ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that these people

be deserved and that both reward and punishment are given in this world. Because of this, they denied that there is a hereafter. In their view, cattle and birds were also living beings on whom God's obligations are imposed, and they said that God has sent a prophet to each sort (*jins*) of them. Consequently, many of them said that reflection and learning do not belong to the obligations imposed by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 379: 14-381: 3). 'Abd al-Jabbār mentions the Khurramiyya as one of the groups who adhered to this doctrine (*Mughnī* XIII, 380: 7). However, mentioning this name does not make clear whom he refers to because Khurramiyya was a name that was used for several extremist Shī'ite religious movements that existed mainly in Iran²¹.

Although Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī did not believe in the transmigration of souls, he did believe that many illnesses are a punishment from God. In his opinion, they can be a divine punishment that God inflicts in this world, like the *ḥadd* punishments. *Ḥadd* punishments are only given to Muslims, and Abū 'Alī thought it possible that illnesses which unbelievers suffer from are a punishment inflicted on them instead of *ḥadd* punishments (*Mughnī*, XIII, 431: 4-15). He made an exception for illnesses suffered by living beings that according to his doctrine cannot have deserved punishment, such as prophets and animals. Prophets cannot have deserved punishment from God because they do not commit grave sins (*kabā'ir*) (*Mughnī* XV, 300-303). Abū 'Alī therefore believed that the prophets' illnesses are a trial imposed on them by God. 'Abd al-Jabbār reports that although Abū 'Alī believed that God compensates for undeserved illnesses, he did not consider them as a *lutf* but rather as a trial (*miḥna*)²² (*Mughnī* XIII, 431: 2-4, 104: 8-9, 105: 5-6). (The difference between *lutf* and trial is that a *lutf* can motivate not only the person who suffers but other persons, as well,

believed in God's imposing of obligations, but they maintained that at first God imposed easy obligations. Then, when the human beings were disobedient to God, He punished them by imposing difficult obligations on them. They said that therefore, nowadays, God's *taklīf* is difficult, as a punishment for humans. They also believed that humans can be without obligations imposed on them by God if they are completely obedient to God. In that case, for them the acts of devotion are permitted but not obligatory. If they perform them, they are an expression of their thanks to God (*Mughnī* XIII, 380: 5-10).

²¹ Madelung (1986).

²² 'Abd al-Jabbār says that it is reported that later Abū 'Alī changed his opinion to that of Abū Hāshim (*Mughnī* XIII, 104: 11).

whereas a trial only concerns the person who suffers.)

Abū 'Alī's son Abū Hāshim rejected his father's opinion that illnesses can be a punishment from God. In his opinion, illnesses cannot be intended as punishment. According to 'Abd al-Jabbār, he argued that it is wrong to punish someone unless he knows what he is being punished for. Someone who is ill does not know whether his illness is a punishment, and even if he did understand that it was a punishment, he would not know which offence he was being punished for. Abū Hāshim concluded from this that each illness is a *lutf* that motivates adults of sound mind to fulfil the obligations imposed on them by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 431: 16-432: 19, 104: 9-10, 105: 6-17).

'Abd al-Jabbār agrees with Abū Hāshim and defends his opinion that illnesses cannot be intended as punishment. He points out that prophets and pious people suffer from illnesses, although they cannot have deserved punishment from God. This is an indication that illnesses are not a punishment. (*Mughnī* XIII, 407: 7-10). 'Abd al-Jabbār also agrees with Abū Hāshim that someone who is punished must know which offence he is being punished for. He adds that if this person does not know this, he may think that an injustice is being done to him and this may prompt him to do bad acts. This makes it clear that illnesses are not a punishment from God (*Mughnī* XIII, 415: 13-416: 4).

'Abd al-Jabbār asserts that even the illnesses of people who are aware that they have failed to fulfil the obligations of God's *taklīf* and know that they deserve punishment are not a punishment. He points out that inflicting illnesses on them as a punishment conflicts with the theory of God's *taklīf*. According to this theory, God threatens those who fail to fulfil the obligations with a severe punishment²³. This means that their punishment must be more than only suffering illnesses in this world. It implies that they will be punished in the hereafter (*Mughnī* XIII, 417: 9-418: 9).

²³ In the Qur'ān it is said that the punishment in the hereafter will be heavier than the punishment in this world (Qur'ān 39: 26 and 68: 33). For verses of the Qur'ān in which it is made clear that there is a great difference between reward and punishment in the hereafter, see Qur'ān 22: 19-24, 56: 11-56 and 78: 21-36. Apart from this, several descriptions are given of the horrors of the punishment in hell (for instance, Qur'ān 40: 71-76 and 4: 56) and the delights of the reward in paradise (for instance, Qur'ān 36: 55-57, 52: 17-27, 55: 46-78 and 76: 5-22).

2.2. *Hadd Punishment*

Although ‘Abd al-Jabbār defends the opinion that illnesses imposed by God are not a punishment, he does not deny that there is pain in this world inflicted by God, or on His command, that is meant to be a deserved punishment. However, in these cases the punished persons know why they are punished²⁴. An example of such a deserved punishment from God is a *ḥadd* punishment: although it is carried out by humans, it is considered to come from God because it is done on His command. ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers a *ḥadd* punishment a punishment from God that is given here and not in the hereafter, in hell (*Mughnī XIII*, 417: 16).

‘Abd al-Jabbār does not think that a *ḥadd* punishment can be both a punishment and a trial (*miḥna*) for someone in the same way as an illness is an trial. He defends his opinion by pointing out that the law allows a person to escape a *ḥadd* punishment²⁵ and that it is not considered good to expose oneself to a *ḥadd* punishment. This indicates that the *ḥadd* punishment is not a trial because it is considered good to bear a trial (*miḥna*). In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, a *ḥadd* punishment is meant to be a deserved punishment and, therefore, it cannot at the same time be a trial for the punished person (*Mughnī XIII*, 433: 15-18), although, it is a *lutf* for people other than the punished person (*Mughnī XIII*, 459: 1-3).

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār, it is different if the person on whom a *ḥadd* punishment is inflicted has genuinely repented of his offence. In that case he no longer deserves to be punished (*Mughnī XIII*, 432: 5). Still, in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, the sentence must be carried out all the same and in that case the *ḥadd* punishment will, indeed, be a trial (*miḥna*) for this person. In that case the *ḥadd* punishment is not only a *lutf* for others but becomes a *lutf* for the “punished” person himself, too (*Mughnī XIII*, 408: 15-16 and 497: 16).

²⁴ An example of punishments given by God in the present world is to be found in the Qur’ān where it is said that the people of Thamūd and Madyan were killed by an earthquake after they had been warned by a prophet (Qur’ān 7: 78 and 7: 91). The Qur’ān says that God only punishes after He has warned by means of a prophet (Qur’ān 17: 15). ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to this verse in order to defend his opinion that children, and even the children of unbelievers, do not deserve punishment from God. See *Mukhtaṣar*, 251 and Heemskerck (1992, 60).

²⁵ On escaping a punishment, see above, 132-133. Evidently, the punishment of someone who escapes the punishment for a *ḥadd*-offence will be given in the hereafter, unless he repents.

2.3. *Children's Illnesses*

From the preceding we may conclude that in 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion an illness or other pain that comes from God is a *lutf*. If a *mukallaf* suffers an illness, it is a *lutf* not only for himself, but also for other people who live near him. 'Abd al-Jabbār thinks it possible that pain inflicted on one *mukallaf* by God can motivate another *mukallaf* to refrain from doing an injustice to this person (*Mughnī* XIII, 370: 14-16). Similarly, pain suffered by a non-*mukallaf* can be a *lutf* for a *mukallaf*. For instance, the illness that a child suffers from is a *lutf* for its parents (*Mughnī* XV, 22: 11-12).

Explaining that the illness of a child is a *lutf* for its parents, 'Abd al-Jabbār gives a solution to the difficult question of why innocent children suffer from illnesses. We have seen that adherents of the transmigration of souls explained these illnesses as a punishment for sins committed in an earlier life. People who do not believe in the transmigration of souls have to find another explanation. Apparently, some people in 'Abd al-Jabbār's time did not know how to explain this and simply ignored the problem. 'Abd al-Jabbār reports that some Muslims declared that children do not feel pain, or that they only feel pain inflicted on them by humans and not pain inflicted by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 382: 9-383: 2). 'Abd al-Jabbār refutes the opinion of these people, pointing out that every adult knows that during his own childhood he suffered pain in the same way as in his adulthood (*Mughnī* XIII, 382: 4-8). Children become ill just as adults do. These illnesses cannot be produced by other living beings. From this 'Abd al-Jabbār concludes that children suffer from illnesses produced by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 385: 15-19).

We have seen that 'Abd al-Jabbār considers each illness a *lutf*. Adults of sound mind can profit from the motivation contained in illnesses and deserve a reward by fulfilling the obligations of God's *taklīf*. After having reached maturity children become *mukallaf* so that they can also profit from the *lutf* contained in their illnesses. However, children who die before reaching maturity cannot do this: they cannot deserve a reward, as they never become *mukallaf*. We have seen that according to 'Abd al-Jabbār their suffering is not useless: adults living near to them can profit from the *lutf* contained in their illnesses. Yet, there must be a profit for the children as well. It would be bad if God inflicted illnesses on them from which only other people can profit and not they themselves. The question is what kind of profit children can get from their illnesses. 'Abd

al-Jabbār's solution to this problem is found in a compensation (*'iwad*) that is given by God.

'Abd al-Jabbār asserts that God's infliction of pain is good because it involves a profit. However, we have seen that there are two other grounds on which the human infliction of pain can be good: these are the averting of a greater harm and the supposition that the pain involves a profit or averts a harm. This leads to the question of whether pain inflicted by God can be good because it averts a greater harm, or because it is done on the supposition that it involves a profit or averts a harm. 'Abd al-Jabbār rejects this. He points out that God's omniscience implies that supposition (*zann*) is impossible for Him. It is therefore not possible that God's infliction of pain is good because of a supposition made by Him (*Mughnī XIII*, 356: 10-11 and 369: 1-6).

'Abd al-Jabbār also does not consider it possible that God's infliction of pain is good because a harm is averted by it. He points out that this would be in conflict with God's omnipotence. Suppose that the harm to be averted by God's infliction of pain comes from God: it would be bad if God averted this harm by a second harm because in that case both harms are done by the same person. In our world it is not considered good if a person inflicts a harm in order to avert a harm to be inflicted by himself. This also applies to God (*Mughnī XIII*, 369: 11-15).

If the harm to be averted comes from someone other than God, 'Abd al-Jabbār explains that there are two possibilities: the harm to be averted is either good or bad. If the harm is good, it need not be averted. If the harm is bad, there are again two possibilities: the harm is done by a *mukallaf* or it is done by a non-*mukallaf*. If the harm is done by a *mukallaf*, 'Abd al-Jabbār thinks that God should not intervene and prevent this *mukallaf* from inflicting the harm because, as a *mukallaf*, he has freedom of choice (*Mughnī XIII*, 370: 6-8). He must be given the choice between doing an act and not doing it, even if his choice implies that he will be punished for it. However, a non-*mukallaf* does not need freedom of choice. God could prevent him from inflicting harm because He has the power to prevent every living being from doing any act: there is no need for God to inflict pain in order to achieve this. 'Abd al-Jabbār concludes from this that God does not inflict pain in order to avert a harm (*Mughnī XIII*, 370: 1-6).

3. *The Compensation of Different Sorts of Pain*

3.1. *Compensation for Pain Imposed by God*

To explain that God compensates for illnesses and pain inflicted by Him, ‘Abd al-Jabbār draws an analogy between the present world and the “absent” (divine) world. He points out that in the present world humans who have damaged the possessions of another human being must compensate him as restitution for the damage. ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of someone who spoils someone else’s garment. It is considered obligatory that the spoiler compensate the owner for the harm. This means that the owner has a claim²⁶ on the spoiler for an amount equal to the value of the garment (*Mughnī* XIII, 387: 16-388: 4). It should be noted that ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not take into consideration whether the damage is done deliberately or by accident. It is evident that in both cases restitution should be made to the owner.

As pain is a sort of harm, ‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes that pain must also be compensated for. He makes an exception for good infliction of pain that meets the conditions that we saw earlier²⁷. Although, in a manner of speaking, spoiling a garment is “made good” by compensating the owner, the act of spoiling does not become a good act even if the compensation is much more than the value of the garment. This is, firstly, because the spoiling is not done with the intention of providing the owner of the garment with a profit. We have seen that harming someone else is only good if it is done for the purpose of obtaining a profit for him (*Mughnī* XIII, 488: 4-6). Secondly, the owner did not give his consent. If harm is done to an adult of sound mind with the intention of providing him with a profit, he must give his consent beforehand. ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of an employer who imposes work on an employee for agreed pay—the imposition of fatiguing work on the employee can be equated with doing harm to him and the pay can be equated with compensation given for the harm done to him. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that the act of the employer is good, be-

²⁶ ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the Arabic verb *istahaqqa*. He speaks of *istihqāq ‘iwāḍ* (having a right to be compensated) along with *istihqāq thawāb* (deserving a reward), but points out that deserving compensation is not quite the same as deserving a reward, because in order to get a reward one has to perform difficult acts.

²⁷ See above, 126-137.

cause the employee has previously given his consent to be “harmed” for the agreed “compensation”.

‘Abd al-Jabbār applies this to God’s infliction of pain. It is clear that there is a difference between a human who compensates someone else for a spoilt garment and God who compensates for pain inflicted by Him. Spoiling someone’s garment is a bad act, whereas God’s infliction of pain must be a good act. The two acts of doing harm are therefore not really comparable. What they have in common is that the person to whom the harm is done “deserves” to be compensated. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore compares God’s compensation for illnesses to the “compensation” given to an employee for fatiguing work imposed on him (*Mughnī* XIII, 188: 9-10). Yet, these two acts are not completely comparable. The employee has given his consent to be “harmed”, whereas those who suffer from illnesses have not given their consent to God. When God imposes illnesses on adults of sound mind, He does not ask them whether they agree to bear the pain for the profit that He will give them. Yet, God’s imposition of illnesses must be a good act.

We have seen²⁸ that ‘Abd al-Jabbār allows two exceptions to the rule that the person to be harmed must give his consent beforehand. One exception is pain inflicted on children and other living beings without intellectual faculties by someone whose care they are in. Another exception is harming adults of sound mind for a profit that is so great that every adult of sound mind (*‘āqil*) would choose to bear the harm for it. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, God’s imposition of illnesses is done in accordance with the latter exception. From this he concludes that the compensation that God gives for pain inflicted by him is so great that all people of sound mind (*‘uqalā*), however different their circumstances may be, would choose to bear the pain for it. This implies that God gives a large quantity of compensation for illnesses and other sorts of pain that He imposes on living beings in this world (*Mughnī* XIII, 453: 19-454: 1, 401: 2-5, 402: 1 and 542: 4-11).

With respect to the question of the infliction of pain on adults without their consent, Ibn Mattawayh disagrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār. He believes that those who are *mukallaf* have given God some kind of silent permission to inflict pain on them. His opinion is that if they know God, they also know that God will certainly compen-

²⁸ See above, 128-129.

sate them for the pain He inflicts on them²⁹, and that He will make a compensation so great that each of them would choose to bear the pain for it. In his view this amounts to giving permission to God to inflict pain (*Majmūʿ* III, 69: 11-16).

ʿAbd al-Jabbār reports that Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī believed that God inflicts pain because He wants to provide people with a compensation³⁰ (*Mughnī* XIII, 390: 1-8). However, his son Abū Hāshim disagreed with him and asserted that God’s purpose was not only to provide a compensation but also to give a warning (*ʿtibār*) to the *mukallafūn* (plural of *mukallaf*). He agreed with his father that God compensates for pain inflicted by Him. God’s act would be an injustice (*ẓulm*) if no compensation was given. However, he pointed out that, notwithstanding the compensation, God’s infliction of pain would be a useless act (*ʿabath*) if it was not a warning³¹ (*Mughnī* XIII, 390: 9-11). If God’s only purpose was to give a compensation, He could give this as a gift, without first inflicting pain. Abū Hāshim concluded from this that God’s infliction of pain must be done with a second purpose: to warn those who are *mukallaf* that they should fulfil the obligations imposed on them by God. In Abū Hāshim’s opinion, God’s infliction of pain is good because of the combination of compensation and warning.

ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s opinion on this question differs only slightly from Abū Hāshim’s. According to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, God’s purpose is to provide a benefit (*maṣlaḥa*). By “benefit” he does not mean God’s

²⁹ It should be noticed that what Ibn Mattawayh says can only apply to someone who believes that God compensates for illnesses. It does not apply to people who think differently.

³⁰ This is confirmed by Ibn Mattawayh, who reports that Abū ʿAlī was of the opinion that God inflicts pain because of the compensation (*Majmūʿ* III, 13: 12-14). However, it should be noticed that Abū ʿAlī had a different notion about God’s compensation. As opposed to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, he was of the opinion that compensation will be provided everlastingly (*Mughnī* XIII, 508: 3-4). For this reason, he rejected the suggestion that God may provide the compensation as a gift, without first inflicting pain. In his opinion, the compensation must be deserved by first suffering pain, the way a reward must be earned by doing what is difficult. Probably, the Ikhshīdiyya adopted Abū ʿAlī’s opinion. Ibn Mattawayh reports that they said that at the moment that God inflicts pain He wants to provide a compensation (*Majmūʿ* III, 83: 19).

³¹ ʿAbd al-Jabbār observes that Abū Hāshim said that Abū ʿAlī shared this opinion, but that he himself could not discover this in Abū ʿAlī’s books, although he did find that Abū ʿAlī thought it possible that pain is a benefit (*maṣlaḥa*) (*Mughnī* XIII, 390: 11-13). The way in which ʿAbd al-Jabbār checks the correctness of Abū Hāshim’s report on Abū ʿAlī shows his critical use of sources.

compensation for pain but the *lutf* contained in pain inflicted by Him on His creatures. He considers the fact that pain is a *lutf* as the main reason why God's infliction of pain is good and the compensation for the pain as a secondary reason. In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, God is obliged to produce acts that motivate a *mukallaf* to fulfil the obligations of His *taklīf*. If God does so by inflicting pain on this *mukallaf* or on other living beings, He does what is obligatory (*wājib*) for Him and this is the main reason why the infliction of pain is good (*Mughnī XIII*, 390: 14-391: 3).

Inflicting pain without compensating for it is a bad act. 'Abd al-Jabbār is therefore convinced that God compensates for the pain He inflicts. However, he does not consider this to be the purpose for which God inflicts pain. The compensation is only the corollary of God's motivating people by the infliction of pain: God gives the compensation in order to ensure that His infliction of pain is not a bad act. We see that 'Abd al-Jabbār does not disagree with Abū Hāshim that God's infliction of pain is good because of the compensation and the warning, but his emphasis is different.

Ibn Mattawayh agrees with 'Abd al-Jabbār that the first reason why it is good that God inflicts illnesses is that, by giving a warning (*ītibār*), God does what is obligatory (*wājib*) for Him with respect to His imposing of obligations (*taklīf*) and that the second reason is the compensation given for this pain (*Majmū' III*, 42: 5-8).

With respect to those who are *mukallaf*, the question may arise whether it is at all necessary for God to compensate them for pain that He inflicts on them. Is it not sufficient that this pain contains a warning (*ītibār*) for them? If they take the warning to heart and fulfil the obligations of God's *taklīf*, they will be rewarded in the hereafter. This reward can be seen as a profit that outweighs the harm, so that God's infliction of pain is good because of it. 'Abd al-Jabbār rejects this suggestion. He points out that both a *mukallaf* and a non-*mukallaf* can be compensated for harm done to them. He concedes that a *mukallaf* and a non-*mukallaf* differ with respect to the divine reward: a non-*mukallaf* cannot deserve this reward. However, with respect to being entitled to compensation for harm done to them he sees no difference between them. 'Abd al-Jabbār therefore thinks it unlikely that only the non-*mukallaf* would be compensated while the *mukallaf* was not. He believes that both will be compensated for pain inflicted by God (*Mughnī XIII*, 398: 6-9).

3.2. *Compensation for Pain Inflicted by Humans*

‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that pain inflicted by God is compensated for by Him. But what about pain inflicted by humans or animals? In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion justice must be done to whoever has suffered damage, whether this damage concerns his possessions or his body. He therefore thinks that, except for pain that is deserved and pain that involves a greater profit or averts a greater harm, each pain must be compensated for. The question is, who must make this compensation. The manner of compensation will be discussed later³².

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion living beings are accountable for harm that is done on their initiative, regardless of whether this harm is inflicted intentionally or by accident, or whether it is done by a living being that does not know that doing harm is bad. This means that both *mukallaf* and non-*mukallaf* must compensate for the pain they inflict on another living being, except for pain that is not inflicted on their initiative (*Mughnī* XIII, 483: 3-5). The initiative to inflict pain determines who compensates. This implies that living beings must not only compensate for pain that they themselves inflict on someone else, but also for pain that is inflicted by others on their initiative. If someone forces someone else to inflict pain on a third person, he, and not the person who actually inflicted the pain, must compensate this third person (*Mughnī* XIII, 492: 19-493: 1). This also implies that if a human being inflicts pain with the permission or on the command of God, God is considered to have taken the initiative and God will therefore compensate the suffering person for his pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 493: 1-2). ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s arguments for this opinion will be discussed later³³.

How this is to be applied is explained by ‘Abd al-Jabbār using the example of an imām who wrongly condemns someone to be punished with a *ḥadd* punishment. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion justice must be done to the wrongly condemned person. He must be compensated for his undeserved pain, but by whom? Several persons are involved in a *ḥadd* punishment. ‘Abd al-Jabbār first pays attention to the executioner who carries out the sentence. In his opinion the executioner does not have to compensate for the pain he inflicted on the wrongly condemned person because he acts on

³² See below, 176-190.

³³ See below, 166-169.

the orders of the imām. ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers that inflicting a *ḥadd* punishment is an act of obedience to God and he therefore thinks that the executioner did not act wrongly in obeying the imām carrying out the sentence. In his opinion, it is the imām who must compensate the wrongly condemned person for his pain, supposing he made the mistake. If the mistake was not made by the imām but by the witnesses, the witnesses must compensate the wrongly condemned person for his pain (*Mughnī XIII*, 493: 6-10).

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, the compensation to be paid by someone who, on his own initiative, inflicts pain on another living being must be equal to the quantity of pain. To defend his opinion, he uses the example of stealing a garment. Someone who has stolen someone else’s garment must return it to him. If this is impossible, he has to give him a compensation that is equal to the value of the garment (*Mughnī XIII*, 484: 8-7). If a human being does an injustice to someone else, inflicting pain on him, his act is comparable to the act of someone who steals a garment. Both acts are bad and involve harm to the person they are done to. ‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes from this that compensation for human infliction of pain must be equal to the pain. This implies that this compensation is considerably less than the compensation given by God for illnesses and other pain inflicted by Him (*Mughnī XIII*, 453: 19-454: 4). The reason for this is that the human compensation is given as a restitution for harm whereas God’s compensation is given in order to make His infliction of pain a good act and is so great that each would choose to bear the pain for it.

‘Abd al-Jabbār emphasizes that giving compensation is not a punishment; it is not a fine. Compensation must be given because justice must be done to someone who is harmed. A thief who compensates for that which he has stolen will still be punished for his offence, if not in this world, then in the hereafter. One should not think that this means that he is punished twice: first by the compensation that he must pay to his victim and, secondly, by a punishment in hell. The compensation is not meant to be a punishment. Similarly, the punishment of a criminal does not abolish his obligation to compensate for the pain he has inflicted on his victim, nor is the quantity of the compensation reduced by the punishment. ‘Abd al-Jabbār also rejects the suggestion that punishment by God implies that God will compensate the victim for the pain inflicted on him by the criminal to be punished. He argues that

God does not compensate for bad acts. Yet, the person on whom the pain is inflicted is entitled to be compensated for his pain. This means that the criminal must compensate him (*Mughnī* XIII, 525: 3-5, and 558: 9-11).

Paying blood-money (*diya*) is a way in which murder and bodily injury are compensated for in this world. Can paying blood-money for murder take the place of compensation for the pain suffered by the victim? ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not think so. His opinion is that paying blood-money to the family of the victim does not exempt the murderer from his obligation to compensate his dead victim for his pain. As he is dead, the victim cannot profit from money which is paid in this world. Yet, he must be compensated for the harm done to him (*Mughnī* XIII, 497: 10-12 and 497: 17-19). ‘Abd al-Jabbār makes an exception for bodily injuries. He thinks that paying blood-money can compensate for bodily injuries, but only if the required quantity of blood-money is known, for instance, from the divine revelation (*Mughnī* XIII, 498: 1-14). If the quantity of blood-money is not known, the paying of compensation must be done in the manner to be described later.

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, pain that is not inflicted intentionally must also be compensated for. In the example of the man who was wrongly condemned to be punished, ‘Abd al-Jabbār speaks of a mistake (*khata*’), by the imām or the witnesses. His use of the term “mistake” indicates that the imām did not intentionally pass a wrong sentence, nor did the witnesses intentionally give wrong declarations. ‘Abd al-Jabbār takes into consideration that justice must be done to the person who suffers the pain: he must be compensated for his pain, even if it is inflicted in a state of unawareness, by mistake, or in sleep (*Mughnī* XIII, 494: 19-495: 2).

3.3. *Compensation for Pain Inflicted by Children, Insane People and Animals*

‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that children, insane people and animals must also compensate for the pain they inflict on other living beings. He points out that for the obligation to compensate for pain to exist, it is not necessary that a person must know that pain must be compensated for. This means that those who do not know this must also compensate for the pain they inflict on other living beings. Regardless of who inflicts pain, justice must be done to those who suffer this pain, whether they are human or animal. Every living

being must be compensated for its pain, whether or not it knows that it is entitled to compensation. As for the quantity of compensation that must be given, it also makes no difference whether the pain is inflicted by an adult of sound mind or by a living being that does not possess mental faculties: in both cases the compensation is equal to the quantity of pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 481: 2-7).

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion that animals must also compensate for pain they inflict on other living beings raises questions with respect to carnivorous animals. One might object to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion by saying that they cannot help inflicting pain on other living beings because God has given them sharp claws and teeth and thus enabled them to inflict pain: it is therefore God who should compensate for the pain they inflict on other living beings. ‘Abd al-Jabbār rejects this suggestion. He argues that enabling (*tamkīn*) someone to inflict pain does not lead to an obligation to compensate for the pain he inflicts.

To explain this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives an example from human experience: somebody provides someone else with a knife to slaughter sheep but, instead, he uses the knife to kill somebody. This does not imply that the man who provided the knife must compensate for the murder. On the contrary, it is the murderer who has to compensate for it. ‘Abd al-Jabbār adds that the idea that one must compensate for enabling someone else to do a particular act would imply that the ironsmiths and the polishers have to compensate for all the murders and pain inflicted by the knives and swords produced by them. It is clear that this is not right, hence one does not have to compensate for enabling someone to do harm. Further, ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that if this holds for the human world, it must also hold for the divine world, which leads to the conclusion that God does not have to compensate for enabling living beings to inflict pain on other living beings (*Mughnī* XIII, 468: 8-16).

Some people might object that because of His omniscience, God knows that when He enables a living being to harm other living beings, this living being will do that what it has been enabled to do and harm some other living beings. They think, therefore, that if God does not intervene and prevent this living being from doing harm, He must compensate for the harm inflicted by it (*Mughnī* XIII, 468: 4-6). ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not agree with them. He points out that enabling does not mean that God approves of the act of the living being. There is a difference between enabling (*tam-*

kān) and giving permission (*ibāḥa*)³⁴. Just because a person is enabled to inflict pain does not mean that he is given permission to do so. Permission implies approving of someone being harmed. If God gives permission, He will compensate for the harm He permits. As we will see later, ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that the person who permits (and thus approves of) pain being inflicted is the one who takes the initiative in this infliction of pain, which implies that he must compensate for it.

‘Abd al-Jabbār also explains that enabling is not the same thing as forcing. Forcing someone to do something limits his freedom of action, whereas enabling does not have this effect. Someone who is enabled to inflict pain is free to choose between doing and not doing it. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that for the same reason, invoking a desire in someone is not the same as forcing him. Invoking a desire means motivating someone to perform a particular act. Motivating does not limit freedom of action. ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore thinks that one who instigates someone else to inflict pain does not have to compensate for this pain, supposing that the instigation does not reach the point of constraint (*Mughnī* XIII, 476: 2-6).

The way in which carnivorous animals are created by God, with claws, sharp teeth, and a desire to eat meat is considered by ‘Abd al-Jabbār as enabling and instigating them to inflict pain, but not as forcing them to do so. He therefore thinks that God does not have to compensate for pain inflicted by these animals (*Mughnī* XIII, 475: 4-476: 2). In his opinion, these animals are free to choose between inflicting pain and not inflicting it. This implies that if an animal, whether it is carnivorous or not, hurts another living being, it must be considered as acting of its own free will (*ikhtiyār*) and not under constraint. This implies that the animal must compensate for the pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 475: 14-17 and 476: 2-20). Perhaps ‘Abd al-Jabbār takes into consideration that predatory animals, although they must eat other living beings, are free to choose how to kill these living beings: in a painless way or with great pains.

Although Ibn Mattawayh agrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār that God does not compensate for pain inflicted by predatory animals, he gives one exception to this rule. He believes that God compensates for pain inflicted by predatory birds used for hawking, as long as the hawking is done in the way permitted by God. He argues that

³⁴ On giving permission, see below, 166-167.

God has given His permission for this and the pain inflicted by these birds is therefore compensated for by Him. If the hawking is not done in the manner permitted by God, then either the bird or the hawker must compensate for it, depending on the circumstances (*Majmūʿ* III, 104: 3-6).

3.4. *Compensation for Pain Inflicted by God's Command or Permission*

According to 'Abd al-Jabbār's theory, God's command or permission (*ibāḥa*) to humans to inflict a particular pain on other living beings implies that inflicting this pain is a good act as God does not give a command or give permission to do something bad. 'Abd al-Jabbār explains that what makes inflicting pain with God's permission a good act is that God will give compensation for the pain. Without divine compensation the act would be bad, in spite of the permission given (*Mughnī* XIII, 456: 10-14)³⁵. According to 'Abd al-Jabbār, the compensation given by God for pain inflicted by humans with His permission or on His command is on a par with the compensation given by Him for pain inflicted by Himself. This means that God compensates generously for this pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 452: 16-17).

God's permission or command is also taken into consideration if the profit fails to eventuate of pain that is inflicted on the supposition that it will yield a profit. In that case, justice requires that the living being on whom this pain was inflicted must still be compensated for his pain. 'Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of a father who disciplines his son on the supposition that it will lead to a profit for the son. If it turns out that the desired profit does not

³⁵ Reading *Mughnī* XIII, 456: 13, *fa-jā'alnāhu* as written in the manuscript, and not *fa-jā'alnāhā* as suggested by the editor. 'Abd al-Jabbār declares that the slaughter of cattle is good because God will compensate the cattle for being slaughtered. He explains that this compensation is the reason why the slaughtering is good: if God did not compensate the cattle, the slaughtering would not be good, even though He had permitted it. Similarly, if we know that God compensates for slaughter of cattle, we know that this act is good, even if we do not know that He permits it. *Hu* in *fa-jā'alnāhu* refers to *al-'iwaḍ*. *La-sabab* does not make sense in this sentence. It should be read as *laysat*, as has been pointed out by Gimaret in his review of my dissertation (*Bulletin Critique des Annales Islamologiques* 14, 1998, 46), so that the sentence is "*fa-jā'alnāhu dalālatan 'alā ḥusniḥ li-annah bi-nafsihā laysat tūgibu ḥusnahū* (So we made it [the divine compensation] an evidence that it [the slaughter] is good because it [the permission] itself does not necessarily cause that it [the slaughtering] is good)" (reading *tūgibu* for *yūgibu*).

happen, who will compensate the son for his pain: God or the father? ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God will compensate the son, because He has commanded fathers to discipline their sons. However, if the expected profit results, no compensation is needed (*Mughnī* XIII, 403: 16-404: 1 and 462: 1-17).

Another case of inflicting pain by divine permission is the slaughtering of cattle. In Qur’ān 5: 3 it is said that the eating of all cattle (*bahīma*) is permitted, with these exceptions: carrion, swine, animals that have been dedicated to a god other than God, animals that have been strangled, beaten down, fallen to their deaths or been gored, animals that have been eaten by savage animals (except those that were slaughtered by Muslims), animals that have been sacrificed to idols, and animals that have been used for divination. From this it can be concluded that slaughtering cattle is permitted by God. This means that it is a good act: God does not give permission for bad acts (*Mughnī* VI/1, 64: 11-13).

In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, slaughtering cattle is good because of the divine compensation given to the slaughtered animals. He explains that the pain these animals suffer cannot be a deserved punishment: animals cannot deserve punishment as God has not imposed any obligations on them. Nor can the slaughtering be meant to avert a greater harm to the cattle, since what could be a greater harm for them than slaughter? It must be concluded from this that slaughter is good because the cattle are given a divine compensation. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that with respect to the cattle God’s permission to slaughter them can be equated with God’s imposition of obligations on humans. The possibility to acquire divine compensation for being slaughtered is comparable with the possibility to deserve a reward (*thawāb*) from God offered to humans by God’s imposition of obligations (*Mughnī* XIII, 459: 9-11). ‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that God’s permission to slaughter cattle is good because it is a *lutf* for the slaughterer himself and for others who are *mukallaf* (*Mughnī* XIII, 457: 13-18 and 458: 18-459: 3). The slaughter contains a warning (*‘tibār*) for them (*Mughnī* XIII, 458: 4-6). He does not explain this any further but probably means that it warns people only to slaughter those cattle which God has given permission to slaughter. It warns them to obey God and to fulfil the obligations imposed on them.

‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that God does not compensate for the illegal slaughter of cattle. This implies that God does not compen-

sate for slaughtering stolen cattle. In that case, the slaughterer must compensate the cattle for being slaughtered and, in addition, he must also compensate the owner of the cattle for the loss of his cattle. Nor does God compensate for slaughtering cattle in a way prohibited by Him. A slaughterer who slaughters in a prohibited way performs a bad act and he himself must therefore compensate the cattle for being slaughtered (*Mughnī* XIII, 550: 5-7). Of course, this means that cattle slaughtered in a prohibited way gets less compensation than cattle slaughtered in a permitted way. This seems to be unfair with respect to the cattle: the cattle cannot help being slaughtered in a prohibited way. However, we should realize that according to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s way of thinking the opportunity for cattle to earn a generous compensation by being slaughtered in a permitted way can be equated with the opportunity to earn a compensation for illnesses. Only those living beings on whom God imposes illnesses can acquire compensation for those illnesses: healthy living beings are not given this opportunity.

In this way ‘Abd al-Jabbār justifies the slaughter of cattle. However, in his time there were people who opposed the slaughter of cattle. ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that they said: “If cattle could speak and understand things, they would say: ‘What is the wrong that I have done and what is the crime that I have committed? What enmity is there between you and me? Why do you want me to die, although no harm has been done to you? Why do you satisfy your thirst for revenge (*ghalīl*) on me, although I have not committed a crime against you?’” (*Mughnī* XIII, 460: 3-6). ‘Abd al-Jabbār refers to a book on this subject called *al-Nawḥ ‘alā ‘l-bahā’im* (The lamentation on the animals)³⁶ (*Mughnī* XIII, 459: 4). He reports that in this book it is said that it cannot have been revealed that God permits to slaughter cattle: the transmitters (*ruwāt*) must have made a mistake, since it is more likely that they made a mistake than that God (*al-Hakīm*) is wrong (*Mughnī* XIII, 460. 12-13). ‘Abd al-Jabbār comments that this is a misconception (*jahl*).

³⁶ Ibn Mattawayh says that its author was Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq (*Majmū’* III, 14: 7-9). Ibn al-Nadīm indeed mentions among the books of Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq a book called *Kūṭab al-gharīb al-mashriqī fī ‘l-nawḥ ‘alā ‘l-ḥayawān* (*Fihrist*, 216). Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq is reported to have belonged to the Mu‘tazila first, but later he was accused of being a Manichean. He is said to have died in 247/861 but Madelung (1987b, 375, note 7) points out that this must be wrong, since he wrote his famous *Kūṭab al-maḡālāt* after 250/864.

‘Abd al-Jabbār does not explicitly discuss killing animals other than cattle. It is likely that he thinks that killing animals is bad unless it is permitted by God³⁷. He probably knew that in *ḥadīth* literature it is said that in the holy territory of Mecca some sorts of animals, such as mice, scorpions and crows, must be killed. On the other hand, the killing of certain other sorts of animals, such as honeybees, ants, frogs and swallows, is prohibited³⁸. However, opinions differ on this subject.

3.5. *Compensation for Self-Inflicted Pain*

If we ourselves destroy our belongings, we get no compensation for this loss. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that, similarly, we are not compensated for self-inflicted pain that does not involve a greater profit or avert a greater harm. He considers that in that case the self-infliction of pain means doing an injustice (*ẓulm*) to oneself and an injustice is compensated for only if it is done to someone else. To explain this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār compares self-compensation with self-praise. We do not praise ourselves for acting well towards ourselves and, similarly, we do not compensate ourselves for doing injustice to ourselves (*Mughnī* XIII, 489: 3-15).

It is evident that self-inflicted pain is mostly done for the purpose of obtaining a profit or averting a harm. ‘Abd al-Jabbār points out that pain that leads to a greater profit need not be compensated for, whether it is done to oneself or to someone else. The profit that is acquired, or will be acquired, replaces the compensation (*Mughnī* XIII, 490: 5-6). ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers that exerting oneself in order to fulfil the obligations of God’s *taklīf* is a form of self-inflicted pain. This pain need not be compensated for because a reward is given for it (*Mughnī* XIII, 490: 3-4).

However, if someone inflicts pain on himself in order to avert a harm, he does not obtain a profit that can take the place of compensation. Will he be compensated for this self-inflicted pain? ‘Abd al-Jabbār answers this question in the affirmative. He thinks that in that case compensation must be given by the person who threatened the other person with harm, since this person forced the other

³⁷ On which animals are allowed to be slaughtered or killed, see Eisenstein (1990, 14-17).

³⁸ Eisenstein (1990, 15).

person to inflict pain on himself. It is not only humans or animals that can threaten other living beings with harm: it is also possible that a threat of harm comes from God. ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of someone who is very hungry and exerts himself trying to still his hunger and to avert starvation. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God compensates this person for his exertion, which is a form of self-inflicted pain. He explains that by making him hungry, God forced this person to inflict pain on himself (*Mughnī* XIII, 490: 7-9). He adds that the compensation implies that God will not reward this person for his exertion: deserving a reward presupposes freedom of choice, which is impossible if one acts under constraint (*Mughnī* XIII, 558: 5-9).

It is possible that self-inflicted pain is the result of being threatened by a creature, for instance, a lion. ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that if someone sees a lion in his way and hurts himself taking flight through a thorny bush, the lion must compensate him for the pain caused by the thorns because the lion forced him to act in this way (*Mughnī* XIII, 490: 11-12). ‘Abd al-Jabbār emphasizes that this only applies to cases of real constraint. However, if the person in question is able to avert the harm without pain, and yet averts it by inflicting pain on himself, he harms himself unnecessarily. This is seen as pain for which the fleeing person himself took the initiative and he therefore is not compensated for it, either by the lion or by anyone else (*Mughnī* XIII, 490: 17-491: 1).

We have seen that ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers it good that a person inflicts pain on himself on the supposition (*zann*) that it will yield him a profit in the future. However, the expected profit may not eventuate. ‘Abd al-Jabbār is convinced that even in that case the infliction of pain is good. Even if the expected profit does not eventuate, the pain involves a profit: at the moment that someone chooses to inflict pain on himself in order to obtain a profit he feels gladness about the expected profit; this gladness may be greater than the pain. In that case, the harm need not be compensated for (*Mughnī* XIII, 491: 3-5).

But what if the gladness is less than the harm? ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that in that case God will compensate for the self-inflicted pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 491: 5-8). He argues that God made the person in question believe that it was good to harm himself in order to obtain a future profit. ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that this self-inflicted pain can be equated with self-inflicted pain for which God has given

permission. In both cases one chooses to inflict the pain because one is convinced that it is good to do so. However, ‘Abd al-Jabbār emphasizes that one is not compensated for this pain if the self-infliction was unnecessary and the expected profit could have been obtained in another way (*Mughnī* XIII, 491: 10-11). This is comparable to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion that one is not compensated for inflicting pain on oneself to avert a harm which could have been averted in another way³⁹. In both cases the self-infliction is unnecessary and is not compensated for. ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion that unnecessary self-infliction of pain is not compensated for, implies that an attacker is not compensated for pain inflicted on him by the defender. We have seen⁴⁰ that ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers that pain inflicted by someone on an attacker to defend himself against the attack should be seen as pain that the attacker inflicts on himself. This means that the attacker is not compensated by the defender, nor by anyone else, for his pain because it is considered to be unnecessary self-infliction of pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 493: 3-6 and 465: 5-10).

3.6. *Compensation for Pain Inflicted by Exposing Someone Else to Harm*

‘Abd al-Jabbār considers coldness, fire, and other natural phenomena to be acts of God. This means that if somebody exposes a child to the cold and the child dies, in his opinion the death of the child is an act of God. Yet, ‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that the person who exposes a child to the cold, and not God, must compensate the child for its pain. He argues that coldness belongs to those acts of God that always happen in the same way. The person who exposes the child to the cold therefore knows that the normal course of events (*‘āda*)⁴¹ is that this child will suffer or even die. Because he knows this, it is as if he himself inflicts the pain and therefore he must compensate the child (*Mughnī* XIII, 450: 4-11). This principle applies to all acts of God that always happen in the same way, according to the normal course of events: someone who exposes someone else to such an act must compensate this person if he is harmed.

This principle is also applied by ‘Abd al-Jabbār with respect to

³⁹ See above, 170.

⁴⁰ See above, 139-140.

⁴¹ For the meaning of *‘āda*, see above, 87, note 48.

the pain that is the result of a scorpion sting. We have seen⁴² that in his view only the prick of the sting is the scorpion's act but the normal course of events is that pain produced by God is added to the pain of the sting. As the additional pain is something that belongs to the acts of God that always happen in the same way, 'Abd al-Jabbār thinks that the scorpion must compensate for the total quantity of pain, included the additional pain from God. He explains that when pricking someone, the scorpion exposes this person to an act of God; therefore it must compensate for the additional pain as well (*Mughnī* XIII, 450: 14-16). 'Abd al-Jabbār comments that in the case that the additional pain from God is more than is normal, God compensates for the extra quantity of additional pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 450: 16-18 and 500: 1-3).

3.7. *Compensation for Sorrow*

We have seen⁴³ that by "harm" 'Abd al-Jabbār understands both pain and sorrow (*ghamm*). In his opinion, a person in sorrow (*mughtamm*) is someone who knows or supposes that harm happens or will happen to him (*Mughnī* IV, 15: 5-6). Sorrow is the knowledge or supposition that harm has happened or will happen. Sorrow being knowledge or supposition implies that, according to 'Abd al-Jabbār, humans can produce sorrow in themselves, for instance, by acquiring knowledge about harm that has happened to them, but sorrow can also be produced in them by God. However, regardless of who produces a particular sorrow, what is taken into consideration is who produces that which gives cause for this sorrow.

If someone's father or son dies, or if someone loses something which he used to take advantage of, he feels sorrow about this loss. According to 'Abd al-Jabbār's doctrine, such things as the death of living beings or the destruction of one's possessions by a flood, a fire or other natural disasters are acts of God. 'Abd al-Jabbār therefore equates sorrow about such losses with illnesses: in both cases people suffer as a result of God's action. This leads him to conclude that God compensates his creatures for their sorrow about misfortunes that are the result of divine acts, just as He compen-

⁴² See above, 107-108.

⁴³ See above, 114.

sates them for their illnesses (*Mughnī* XIII, 437: 4-8).

To explain this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives the example of the death of a child. He asserts that both the child and its father are entitled to compensation from God. The child is compensated for the pain it suffers when dying and the father for his sorrow about the loss of his child. ‘Abd al-Jabbār emphasizes that the sorrow felt by the father is not produced by God, but it is an act of the heart⁴⁴ produced by the father himself: it is the knowledge that his son has died. However, he would not have had this knowledge if God had not made the child die. His sorrow is the result of God’s action and can therefore be equated with physical pain inflicted by God. God therefore compensates the father for his sorrow (*Mughnī* XIII, 437: 11-17, 438: 3-4)⁴⁵.

In the above case, the father’s sorrow is produced by himself, but sorrow can also be produced in someone by God. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that if a child’s father dies, some of the child’s sorrow about this loss is intuitive knowledge (*‘ilm ḍarūrī*) produced in the child by God. God will compensate the child for this sorrow: if He compensates for sorrow produced humanly, He certainly also compensates for divinely-produced sorrow (*Mughnī* XIII, 438: 6-8).

‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that the quantity of compensation that God gives for sorrow is commensurate with the quantity of sorrow rather than commensurate with the extent of that which gives cause for the sorrow. People differ from each other with respect to the sorrow they feel. Adults may feel more sorrow than children, and one adult may feel more sorrow than another. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains this, using the example of a miser (*bakhīl*). He points out that a miser feels more sorrow about losing one of his possessions than a generous person (*jawād*). As a result, the miser gets more compensation for losing something than a generous person who loses the same thing because the miser feels more sorrow. One may think that compensation should be commensurate with the value of the thing that is lost and think it unfair that the miser gets more compensation. Nevertheless, ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God compensates the miser for all of his sorrow, however great it may be. He argues that God made the miser the way he is. It is therefore due to

⁴⁴ On acts of the heart (*af‘āl al-qulūb*), see above, 89.

⁴⁵ In the text of *Mughnī* XIII, 438: 4, the word *al-imāna* should be corrected to read *al-imāta*.

an act of God that the miser feels more sorrow than the generous person (*Mughnī* XIII, 438: 13-17). Probably, ‘Abd al-Jabbār reasons that the miser has no choice with respect to the sorrow he feels: he cannot choose to feel less sorrow⁴⁶.

‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts that God does not compensate for sorrow that is not the result of a divine act. For instance, if somebody feels sorrow despite the fact that none of his loved ones has died, God will not compensate him for his sorrow. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that if somebody feels sorrow without reason (*min ghayri sababīn*), his sorrow is considered as being produced on his own initiative. ‘Abd al-Jabbār equates this form of sorrow—he may be thinking of depression or melancholy—with unnecessarily self-inflicted pain and asserts that a person is not compensated for it unless it is produced by divine permission (*ibāḥa*)⁴⁷ (*Mughnī* XIII, 438: 19-439: 4). He does not clarify what kind of sorrow he means by “sorrow produced by divine permission”.

‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that if there is a reason for sorrow but people do not feel sorrow, God does not compensate them. We have seen that in his opinion, God does not compensate for the loss of possessions but rather for the sorrow about the loss. This implies that if there is no sorrow, no compensation will be given. For example, if a person’s property is destroyed by fire without his knowing—for instance because he died before someone could tell him about the loss—he is not compensated for this by God, although the fire is an act of God. This is because this person did not feel sorrow. To clarify this, ‘Abd al-Jabbār equates this sorrow with physical pain that is not felt by a person, although something is done to him that should hurt him. This person is not compensated for what has been done to him, because there is no pain. The same applies to sorrow that does not take place (*Mughnī* XIII, 439: 5-16).

But should God not compensate for the loss of the property that is destroyed by fire without his owner knowing it? ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not think so. He argues that no harm has been done to this

⁴⁶ We may observe that ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks differently about predatory animals. We have seen (above, 165) that in his opinion, God does not compensate for pain inflicted by them, although He made them as they are, arguing that animals can choose their acts.

⁴⁷ In *Mughnī* XIII, 439: 1-2, *atāḥa* should be corrected to read *abāḥa* and *al-itāḥa*, *al-ibāḥa*.

person: being dead he is no longer able to profit from his property. This raises the question of God's purpose when destroying the property of this person. As the owner is dead, God's purpose cannot have been to provide him with a profit. Then why has God destroyed his property? 'Abd al-Jabbār thinks that God's intention must have been to benefit someone other than the owner (*Mughnī* XIII, 439: 13-17). It is likely that he means that God's act is a *lutf* for a *mukallaf* other than the owner.

Until now, the discussion has been about compensation for sorrow caused by acts of God but what does 'Abd al-Jabbār think about sorrow that is the result of human acts? We have seen that when discussing good and bad infliction of pain, he equates physical pain to sorrow. For instance, he argues that it is good to blame a person although he is grieved by this and concludes from this that the infliction of pain is good if the pain is deserved (*Mughnī* XIII, 344: 9-14). However, discussing compensation of pain, he does not discuss compensation for sorrow caused humanly. It is not clear why he ignores this subject.

'Abd al-Jabbār does discuss another aspect of the loss of possessions by human acts: the loss of profit. For instance, if someone takes something that belongs to someone else, he harms the owner because he prevents him from deriving a profit from this possession. 'Abd al-Jabbār asserts that if a thief steals something he must compensate the owner not only for the stolen thing itself but also for his loss of profit (*Mughnī* XIII, 555: 4-19 and 559: 7-11). In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, this compensation cannot be given in this world because we cannot know how much compensation must be given for a loss of profit. We will see later how this compensation can be given.

In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, loss of profit must be compensated for even if the owner does not know about the loss of his possession. He disagrees with Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī on this question. Abū Hāshim considered that if the owner is not grieved or harmed by the loss, no injustice is done to him and therefore no compensation is required (*Mughnī* XIII, 439: 17-19). 'Abd al-Jabbār refutes this and points out that taking what belongs to someone else harms the owner, regardless of whether he knows this or not. In his opinion, the occurrence of the harm is to be taken into consideration and not whether the harm is known. He asserts that it is an injustice (*zulm*) to take the possessions of a child or a madman or some-

one who is absent, even though they do not know that their possessions are taken. He therefore thinks that these people must be compensated for the harm, notwithstanding the fact that they do not know that they have been harmed. However, he adds that they need not be compensated for sorrow about the loss of their possessions: sorrow is a kind of knowledge and if this knowledge does not exist, it is not compensated for (*Mughnī* XIII, 440: 4-7).

Ibn Mattawayh discusses a particular case of sorrow not discussed by ‘Abd al-Jabbār: sorrow about being slandered. He thinks that somebody who slanders somebody else does not have to compensate the other person if this person does not know he has been slandered. However, as soon as he knows this and feels sorrow about it, the slanderer must apologize to him and compensate him for his sorrow (*Majmū’* III, 90: 5-8). It is also possible that the slandered person suffers harm as a result of the slander: the ruler, hearing the slander, may confiscate his property. Ibn Mattawayh thinks that in this case the slanderer must only compensate the slandered person for his sorrow about being slandered and not for the harm that is the result of the slander. He argues that the ruler who confiscates the property acts of his own free will and that it is therefore the ruler who must compensate for the confiscation (*Majmū’* III, 112: 21-113: 4).

4. *The Administration of Compensation*

We have seen⁴⁸ that in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, humans and animals must compensate other living beings for the pain that they inflict on them, even if these living beings do not know that they are entitled to compensation. He asserts that having knowledge is not a condition for the obligation to compensate for inflicted pain, nor is it a condition for deserving to be compensated for pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 493: 17-19). However, as he points out, we cannot know how much compensation we must make for pain. This means that we ourselves are not able to fulfil the obligation to compensate for pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 454: 8-9). Yet, as ‘Abd al-Jabbār asserts, this does not imply that the obligation is inapplicable to us (*Mughnī* XIII, 494: 2-3). How, then, can humans and animals compen-

⁴⁸ See above, 161-166.

sate each other for pain? ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God will mediate in the making of compensation. God is omniscient and therefore knows exactly how much compensation must be given for each pain. God will take the required quantity of compensation from the person who inflicted the pain and transfer this to the person who suffered the pain. ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that this mediation is obligatory for God. He explains that after having enabled a wrongdoer (*zālim*) to wrong someone else and not having prevented him from doing so, God is obliged to pass a verdict on this wrongdoer and to administer justice (*intaṣāfa*) to him and the person wronged (*mazlūm*) by him (*Mughnī* XIII, 472: 2-3).

This is in accordance with ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion that God is the manager (*mudabbir*) of the affairs of his worshippers. He argues that God has an insight into their interests that is better than their own insight. God’s transferring quantities of compensation from one person to another without their knowing this can be compared to a trustee (*wālī* or *qayyim*) who takes care of the financial interests of a minor⁴⁹ and administers justice between two or more of them until their insight has grown and they are able to take care of their affairs themselves (*Mughnī* XIII, 472: 5-7 and 526: 4-8). The trustee is entitled to be a creditor in the name of his clients and to collect for them the money that others owe them. He is also entitled to pay on their behalf the money that they owe to others. This collecting and paying of money is what ‘Abd al-Jabbār has in mind when he speaks of God’s administration of justice (*Mughnī* XIII, 526: 8-9).

⁴⁹ The idea that God can be compared to a trustee who takes care of the interests of minors was used by some Mu’tazilite masters, who are not mentioned by name, to defend their opinion that God can inflict illnesses on his creatures without their consent. They pointed out that God has created humans and animals. He gives them life, food and all kinds of benefits. Therefore, the relation between God and His creatures can be compared with that between a guardian and an orphan. The guardian knows better than the orphan himself how to take care of the orphan’s interests. This holds even when the orphan is an adolescent (*murāhiq*). Notwithstanding the fact that the orphan is no longer a child, his guardian knows better than he himself which things will profit and which will harm him. Reasoning in this way, and comparing God with the guardian of an orphan, these Mu’tazilite masters declared that it is good that God inflicts pain on His creatures without asking their consent because, as their guardian, He knows best what is good for them. Therefore, they did not say that illnesses are good because they are a *lutf*. Although ‘Abd al-Jabbār differs with them about this last point, he agrees with them that God can be seen as the guardian of His creatures (*Mughnī* XIII, 454: 17-455: 9).

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory, living beings can be considered to own the compensation that they are entitled to receive from God for illnesses, sorrow and pain that He made them suffer (*Mughnī XIII*, 485: 14-486: 2). If one living being inflicts pain on another, he owes this living being a quantity of compensation equal to the quantity of inflicted pain. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God will subtract this quantity from the total quantity of divine compensation that the former is entitled to receive and transfer it to the quantity of divine compensation that the latter is entitled to: it is as if God takes a quantity of compensation that He would have given to the former and gives it to the latter instead (*Mughnī XIII*, 530: 8-16).

From ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory it can be concluded that he believes that God is a sort of bookkeeper, who keeps the accounts of the compensation that each creature is entitled to receive from Him and transfers amounts from one account to the other. Every pain inflicted by one creature on another is compensated for. If an animal hurts a human, this human will be given a part of the compensation that the animal is entitled to receive from God (*Mughnī XIII*, 482: 6-13). The same applies to animals that are hurt by humans in a way that God has not given permission for⁵⁰.

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s theory that God transfers compensation from one creature to another raises the question of what happens if a wrongdoer (*zālim*) commits many acts of injustice. Is it possible that a tyrannical ruler who oppresses and terrorizes people does not have enough compensation to be transferred to all those who are wronged by him? Answering this question, some Mu‘tazilite masters started from the principle that people who are wronged must be compensated anyhow. They said that if these people cannot get compensation from the tyrant, God will ensure that they are compensated. He will provide the tyrant with a gift (*tafaḍḍul*) from Him and transfer this as a compensation to the people who are wronged by the tyrant (*Mughnī XIII*, 540: 1-8 and 473: 11-15).

‘Abd al-Jabbār rejects this idea. He reasons that this implies that God would be obliged to make a donation to this tyrant because God would fail to mete out justice if He did not do so. However, being obliged to make a donation is a contradiction in terms. The

⁵⁰ If a human hurts an animal in a way that God has permitted, God will compensate the animal for its pain. See above, 167.

characteristic of a donation is that one is free to make it: one may also not make it (*Mughnī* XIII, 540: 4-541: 5). ‘Abd al-Jabbār also argues that it is unthinkable that God would make donations to wrongdoers (*Mughnī* XIII, 543: 17-544: 2).

On his side, ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that a tyrant definitely has enough divine compensation to compensate for all his acts of injustice. He points out that we cannot know how many sorrows, pains, misfortunes and terrifying events have happened to this wrongdoer. Even if we knew this, we could not know how much compensation he will be given by God for these sufferings (*Mughnī* XIII, 542: 7-543: 4 and 472: 17-473: 107). ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers it unthinkable that God would allow a wrongdoer to commit his acts of injustice if He knew that this wrongdoer did not have enough compensation. He thinks that in that case God would somehow prevent him from committing an injustice, for instance, by distracting him with some preoccupation (*darb min al-shawāghil*)⁵¹ (*Mughnī* XIII, 543: 9-17, 472: 12-15 and 494: 14-18).

Ibn Mattawayh agrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār that God only enables a wrongdoer to commit injustice to somebody else if He knows that this wrongdoer has enough compensation to be transferred to the person wronged (*Majmū‘* III, 116: 8-14). He also gives a solution of his own to the question of the tyrant. He thinks it possible that if a wrongdoer does not have enough compensation to also compensate for crimes that are done on his orders, he must only compensate for crimes he has committed with his own hands. In that case, those who acted on his command must themselves make compensation for these acts, unless they acted under constraint⁵² (*Majmū‘* III, 103: 11-12).

⁵¹ ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not consider the possibility that God stops the wrongdoer by force, probably because this would conflict with the principles of God’s *taklīf*. Stopping by force would imply that the wrongdoer no longer has freedom of choice. However, if God distracts him by means of some preoccupation, he is still free to choose to commit the injustice, although God stimulates him to do another act in place of the injustice.

⁵² Ibn Mattawayh probably reasons that this wrongdoer’s subordinates could have refused to obey him. However, his solution conflicts with the rule that someone who commands someone else to inflict pain on a third person must compensate for this pain himself.

5. *The Provision of the Compensation*

‘Abd al-Jabbār is certain that God does not provide compensation for pain before the pain occurs. He points out that in this world it is not good to give compensation before the harm is done unless some agreement is made about the amount of compensation, for instance, when an employee is paid a wage agreed on beforehand for work to be done by him. From the fact that no such agreement is made with respect to pain inflicted by God, ‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes that God gives the compensation after the harm is done and not beforehand (*Mughnī XIII*, 520: 8-521: 3). This does not preclude the fact that God may already compensate living beings during their lifetimes for illnesses and sorrow that He has made them suffer.

However, there are some particular cases of pain for which compensation cannot be given in this world. Living beings who suffer pain while dying can be compensated for this pain only after their deaths. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God therefore has to revive at least those living beings that died in pain since it is only then that He can compensate them for this pain. This means that not only the *mukallaḥūn* are revived to be rewarded or punished by God but also animals, children and other non-*mukallaḥūn* that cannot have deserved reward or punishment (*Mughnī XIII*, 520: 9-10). God must also revive those living beings who in long-lasting illnesses suffered so much pain that their compensation is too great to be received in its entirety during their lifetimes (*Mughnī XIII*, 520: 14-521: 3).

Apart from these special cases, ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks it rationally possible that God already compensates His creatures during their lifetimes for sorrows, illnesses and other pain inflicted on them by Him (*Mughnī XIII*, 520: 8-10), although he deems it also possible that the compensation is provided in the hereafter because it is permissible to postpone the provision of compensation. Drawing an analogy between the existent world and the divine world, ‘Abd al-Jabbār argues that the entire compensation for a spoilt garment can be made immediately, but can also be paid later (*Mughnī XIII*, 494: 3-5). From this, he concludes that God’s provision of compensation can be postponed until the hereafter. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that God determines whether a person will be compensated in this world or in the hereafter. As God is omniscient, He knows what is best for each creature. He will compen-

sate each creature at the best moment for him. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that if it is better for a living being to be compensated in this world, God will provide the compensation in this world, during this living being’s lifetime. If it is better for this living being to be compensated later, in the hereafter, He will provide it in the hereafter, after having revived this living being (*Mughnī* XIII, 526: 2-527: 3).

Mānkḏīm agrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār that God provides the compensation either in this world or in the hereafter. He adds that if God provides His compensation in this world, it may all be given at one time, or spread over several periods (*Ta’līq*, 498: 8-13). He even thinks it possible that God provides compensation in this world without the receiver feeling or knowing that what is given to him is compensation for pain (*Ta’līq*, 497: 9-13).

In this world one may require compensation for a delay in the payment of a debt because of the impossibility of profiting from the money during the delay. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion this does not apply to God’s delaying the provision of compensation because God does what is best for the receiver, which means that he is not harmed by the delay (*Mughnī* XIII, 496: 17-497: 3).

If we are entitled to compensation for a spoilt garment, we may remit this compensation and tell the person who destroyed the garment that he need not compensate us. Is this also possible with respect to the compensation that God will provide us with? ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not think so. He points out that the possibility of remitting compensation is related to the possibility of claiming it. Compensation provided in this world, such as for a spoilt garment, can be claimed and can therefore also be remitted. Compensation that is to be given or transferred by God in the hereafter cannot be claimed in this world. From this ‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes that this compensation cannot be remitted. This means that, with respect to the compensation that will be transferred by God, one who is wronged cannot release the wrongdoer from his obligation to compensate him.

Similarly, the wrongdoer cannot discharge himself beforehand. ‘Abd al-Jabbār emphasizes that if a wrongdoer gives the wronged person a sum of money with the intention of already compensating him in this world, this money will be considered to be a donation by him to the wronged person and not the payment of compensation. Despite his payment, God will take from the wrongdoer

the amount of compensation that is due and transfer it to the wronged person.

This seems unfair at first sight, but ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains its justice by the example of an orphan (*yatīm*) whose affairs are managed by a trustee. If the trustee decides that the payment of a debt should be delayed, it is not possible to pay the orphan at once. Similarly, it is not possible for the orphan, even if he is an adolescent (*murāhiq*), to let his debtor off his debt if the trustee has decided differently. In ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion this also applies to the compensation that is administered by God (*Mughnī* XIII, 532: 3-533: 3).

Ibn Mattawayh agrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār that compensation that is to be given or transmitted by God cannot be remitted. He is more explicit than ‘Abd al-Jabbār in his explanation, mentioning a blow (*laṭma*), an insult (*shatīma*) or slander (*ghība*) as examples of harm for which compensation cannot be remitted (*Majmū‘* III, 82: 1-4). He says that he disagrees with Abū ‘Abdallāh who reportedly said that compensation for offence that people commit against each other can be remitted if it is known how much compensation must be paid⁵³. As for the compensation for illnesses and other pain inflicted by God, Abū ‘Abdallāh said that we cannot remit God from His obligation to compensate us, even if we knew the quantity of compensation, because the amount of the divine compensation is so great that we are, so to speak, forced not to remit it (*Majmū‘* III, 82: 7-10). However, according to Ibn Mattawayh, most Mu‘tazilite masters believed that compensation for offence such as a blow, an insult or slander may not be remitted because we are considered to be placed under the guardianship of God (*Majmū‘* III, 82: 11-14).

5.1. *The Compensation of People in Paradise*

We have seen that in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, the provision of compensation for both divinely and humanly inflicted pain is delayed until the hereafter if God knows that this is the better thing for the recipient. *Mukallaḥfūn* will be rewarded or punished in the

⁵³ Probably, he refers to compensation for bodily injuries. We have seen (above, 163) that ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that paying blood-money can compensate for bodily injuries if the required quantity of blood-money is known, for instance, from the divine revelation.

hereafter, which means that if compensation is delayed until the hereafter, they will receive it together with their reward or punishment.

In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, God's giving of compensation in the hereafter should not lead to a situation where someone who has not fulfilled the obligations of His *taklīf* receives something that amounts to a reward from God. He therefore stresses the difference between compensation and reward. A reward is given with respect and honour for the recipient because it can only be earned by fulfilling a difficult task. Compensation, on the other hand, is given without honour and respect. 'Abd al-Jabbār therefore rejects the idea that in the hereafter God may take a part of a wrongdoer's reward—after having committed acts of injustice he may have deserved a reward—and transfer this to the person wronged by him. 'Abd al-Jabbār argues that the wronged person is not entitled to the honour and respect included in the reward (*Mughnī* XIII, 545: 4-7).

Another difference between compensation and reward is found in their duration. 'Abd al-Jabbār believes that the people of Paradise will be given their reward everlastingly, whereas the giving of compensation will end at the moment that the amount that is due has been given (*Mughnī* XIII, 508: 5-17 and 515: 19-516: 3). In his opinion, the giving of compensation is limited (*munqaṭi'*)⁵⁴. However, other Mu'tazilites⁵⁵ believed that compensation was also given everlastingly. They argued that it is impossible that in the hereafter the giving of compensation comes to an end because, as soon as God stops providing a particular compensation, its recipient would be displeased. As this displeasure is the result of an act of God, God would have to compensate the recipient for it. This would lead to a never-ending obligation for God to compensate, because each time compensation was stopped, a new displeasure would result that had to be compensated for.

Adherents to the opinion that compensation is given everlastingly also argued that displeasure about the compensation being ended

⁵⁴ The term *munqaṭi'* is used, for instance, in the title of the chapter of the *Mughnī* that deals with this subject. This title is: *Faṣl fī bayān al-dalāla 'alā anna 'l-'iwaḍ munqaṭi'* (Chapter on the evidence that the compensation is limited) (*Mughnī* XIII, 508: 1-2).

⁵⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbār says that Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī and many other masters believed that the divine compensation is provided everlastingly (see above, 159, note 30). Mānkḍīm and Ibn Mattawayh say that Abū 'l-Hudhayl and a group of Mu'tazilites of Baghdād were of this opinion (*Ta'liq*, 494: 15-18 and *Majmū'* III, 70: 2-4).

conflicts with the theory of God's *taklīf*. According to this theory, pain from God—and this displeasure is equated with pain from God—is either a deserved punishment or a warning from God that the obligations imposed by Him must be fulfilled in order to deserve a reward in the hereafter. However, after the Last Day it is no longer possible to deserve a reward from God and therefore there will be no *taklīf* in the hereafter. If there is no *taklīf*, there are also no grounds for God to inflict pain as a *lutf* for the *mukallafūn*. This means that if God causes displeasure by stopping the provision of compensation, this act cannot be a good act, even if He compensated for the displeasure (*Mughnī XIII*, 511: 8-18).

‘Abd al-Jabbār agrees with his opponents that it is impossible that people in Paradise would feel displeasure about something. If he nevertheless sticks to his opinion that compensation ends after the quantity that is due has been given, he must find a solution for the displeasure about the compensation being ended. His solution is that the recipient will not be aware that the provision of compensation has ended and that he will therefore feel no displeasure (*Mughnī XIII*, 511: 20). However, this unawareness is only possible if the recipient is also not aware that he is receiving his compensation. How can this be done? Receiving compensation without being aware of it is certainly possible for those recipients of compensation who do not possess mental faculties (*Mughnī XIII*, 512: 3-9). But what about adults of sound mind in Paradise who, in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s opinion, obtain their compensation together with their reward? Can they be unaware of receiving their compensation? ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that God may break the compensation up into many parts and give these parts over a long period. If the recipients are given a small part of their compensation added to their reward each time, they do not distinguish this part of compensation from what they receive as reward. In this way, they will not miss the compensation when it is no longer given and so they will not feel displeasure (*Mughnī XIII*, 513: 3-6).

Mānkḏīm pays a great deal of attention to the question of the duration of the giving of compensation. He reports that ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s patron, al-Ṣāhib al-Kāfī [b. ‘Abbād]⁵⁶, asserted that

⁵⁶ He was the Būyid vizier who appointed ‘Abd al-Jabbār as his chief judge. On al-Ṣāhib b. ‘Abbād, see above, 42-43.

compensation is given everlastingly. However, Mānkḏīm himself agrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār that the giving of a particular compensation ends as soon as the amount that is due is given (*Tā’līq*, 495: 6-496: 3)⁵⁷. As for how to avoid displeasure about the compensation being ended, Mānkḏīm also gives a solution that ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not mention. He points out that the people in Paradise know the amount of compensation they are entitled to receive, so when the giving of compensation ends they do not feel displeasure (*Tā’līq*, 496: 9-13). As for Ibn Mattawayh, he, too, adds a solution that is not mentioned by ‘Abd al-Jabbār: after the recipient in Paradise has received all of his compensation, God distracts him, so that he does not notice that the compensation has ended and is not displeased about it (*Majmū’* III, 75: 21-22).

People who suffer in this world may find little comfort in the thought that they will be compensated in Paradise but without being aware that they are being compensated. Two other of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s solutions may give more comfort. The first is that God may give those who are rewarded in Paradise all of their compensation in one instant before they enter Paradise (*Mughnī* XIII, 513: 10-12). Mānkḏīm disagrees with ‘Abd al-Jabbār about giving the whole amount of compensation in one instant, arguing that this would imply that someone who has been ill for a year receives the compensation for this illness in one instant, “and it is known that someone of sound mind does not choose an illness of a year to [obtain] profits that reach him in one instant, large as the amount of profit may be” (*Tā’līq*, 499: 4-13).

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s other solution is that after the giving of compensation has ended, God may continue to provide those things which comprised the compensation, but then as a donation (*tafaḏḏul*). In this way, the recipients do not have to miss those things that make part of the compensation and so they will not feel displeasure (*Mughnī* XIII, 513: 13-17).

⁵⁷ In the text of *Tā’līq*, 495: 19, *al-luṣūṣ*, should be corrected to read *al-mu’awwad*. Mānkḏīm declares that if divine compensation was given everlastingly, the state of someone who is compensated would sometimes be equal to the state of someone who is rewarded.

5.2. *The Compensation of People in Hell*

‘Abd al-Jabbār is convinced that people in hell will also receive the compensation that they are entitled to. He argues that the fact that these people deserve punishment does not nullify their right to be compensated for pain and illnesses they suffered. As opposed to reward, compensation is not given with honour and ‘Abd al-Jabbār therefore sees no reason why it should not be given to them (*Mughnī* XIII, 524: 3-12). He thinks it rationally possible that God, to the extent that He has not given them their compensation during their lifetimes, compensates them in the time after their revival and before they enter hell. However, although this is rationally possible, it would contradict what is revealed about the Day of Resurrection. In the revelation it is said that unbelievers (*kuffār*) will feel sorrow and grief on the Day of Resurrection. If they received their compensation on that day, they would not feel sorrow but happiness about the pleasures and profits that normally comprise compensation. Thus, although providing them with their compensation before they enter hell is rationally possible, ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers this unlikely (*Mughnī* XIII, 522: 16-20).

The consequence is that people in hell who have not been compensated in this world must receive their compensation together with their punishment in hell. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that this is indeed possible, but he thinks that it cannot consist of the same things that are given to people in Paradise. He points out that, rationally, giving pleasure can be equated with taking away pain. He also points out that it is possible that God diminishes (*khaffafa*) the punishment of a malefactor (*fāsiq*) with that amount of reward that he has deserved for being obedient to God. This means that this person receives a lighter punishment than he would have received if he had not been obedient. From this ‘Abd al-Jabbār concludes that, similarly, someone’s punishment can be diminished in proportion to the compensation he is entitled to receive. In his opinion, this also applies to unbelievers: their compensation for pain will also be in the form of a diminution (*takhfīf*) of their pain in hell (*Mughnī* XIII, 523: 1-6 and 486: 15-16)⁵⁸.

If all the diminution of punishment were given at the same time, the result could be that someone who deserves to be punished is

⁵⁸ In the text of *Mughnī* XIII, 523: 1, *tahqīqan* should be corrected to read *takhfīfan*.

no longer punished during that time. ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks that this is not right and therefore believes that the diminution will be spread over a long period, so that the punished person will not find complete relief from his or her pain (*Mughnī* XIII, 518: 1-6). Like the compensation for people in Paradise, the diminution of punishment will end at a certain moment. After this, the punishment will be as heavy as it was intended to be (*Mughnī* XIII, 524: 15-17).

5.3. *The Compensation of Animals*

Animals and children who die before reaching maturity are not *mukallaf*: God has not imposed obligations on them. Therefore they cannot deserve a punishment or a reward from God. As we have seen⁵⁹, ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that if they have not received all their compensation in this world, it is inevitable that God will revive them⁶⁰, together with the *mukallafūn*, on the Day of Resurrection so that they can receive their compensation in the hereafter. (*Mughnī* XIII, 486: 6-13). He refers to an account that says that God will revive some cattle as a reward for the people in Paradise so that they can enjoy the beautiful forms of these animals, whereas other animals, such as snakes and scorpions, will be revived as a punishment for the people in hell (*Mughnī* XIII, 514: 8-10).

One question is what the animals revived on the Day of Resurrection will be given as compensation. This was a problem for Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī who, as ‘Abd al-Jabbār reports, was of the opinion that compensation consists of the same things as reward: things that people have a desire for⁶¹. This would imply that the revived animals receive a compensation that consists of what humans have a desire for, but what they themselves may not like. Is it permissible that the compensation for the pain that animals have suffered

⁵⁹ See above, 180.

⁶⁰ Although ‘Abd al-Jabbār says that God will revive the animals, he does not say that they will be judged on the Day of Resurrection. Several Muslim theologians believed this because of Qur’ān 6: 38, where it is said that the animals will be gathered to their Lord (Bousquet, 1958, 39-40). Mānkḏīm asserts that animals are revived on the Day of Resurrection in order to receive their compensation in the hereafter. He quotes a *ḥadīth* in which the Prophet said: “On the Day of Resurrection God does justice (*intaṣafa*) between wrongdoer (*ẓālim*) and wronged (*mazlūm*), and even between the hornless (*jammāʿ*), and the horned (*qamāʿ*)” (*Taʿlīq*, 505: 4-9).

⁶¹ For instance, in Qur’ān 47: 15, it is said that in Paradise there are rivers of water, milk, wine and honey, and all kinds of fruit.

consists of things they have no desire for? ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks it is permissible because, in his opinion, a compensation need not consist of things that the recipient has a desire for: it is sufficient if the compensation consists of profitable things. However, he also gives another solution: he thinks it possible that God creates in these animals a desire for the food that is given to them in the hereafter so that they eat what people like to eat, although in this world they have a desire for different things (*Mughnī* XIII, 521: 4-18).

Ibn Mattawayh says that there is no reason why water could not be given as compensation to an animal (*Majmū‘* III, 78: 12). He explains that eating other living beings is out of the question in Paradise because it involves pain, which is impossible in Paradise as there is no *taklīf* anymore. He thinks that the predatory animals in Paradise will therefore not desire to eat other living beings: God will create in them the wish for other profitable things (*Majmū‘* III, 78: 13-17).

Another question with respect to revived animals is what happens after an animal has received the whole amount of its compensation. Their compensation is not given in combination with a reward. We have seen before⁶² that animals probably do not know that what they are receiving is a compensation, but as they will not receive something else—they are not rewarded—they will certainly notice if the giving stops and feel displeasure about this. We have also seen⁶³ that according to the doctrine of God’s imposing of obligations there will be no pain (or displeasure) in the hereafter, except for pain that is a deserved punishment. Then how can it be avoided that an animal feels displeasure when the giving of its compensation ends?

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s solution to this problem is that God continues to give the animal the same things, but then as a donation⁶⁴ (*Mughnī* XIII, 514: 10-14). Another solution he gives is that God ends the life of the animal in a painless way by saying “Be dust”, and then it stops living. ‘Abd al-Jabbār adds that in that case God’s act would

⁶² See above, 176.

⁶³ See above, 184.

⁶⁴ Like ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Mānkḏīm thinks it possible that God does not end the lives of animals after they have received all their compensation. He points out that this agrees with the opinion of people who say that after the Day of Resurrection (*al-ḥaṣhr*) there will be no death (*Ta‘līq*, 497: 7-8). Mānkḏīm does not specify who these people are.

not be a useless act (*‘abath*) because the death of the animal can be a cause of joy for someone in Paradise (*Mughnī* XIII, 514: 17-515: 3). He does not specify which kind of joy he has in mind. Mānkdīm explains that people in Paradise may be gladdened by the forms of animals whose lives have ended in this way (*Ta’līq*, 496: 15-17). He thinks that not only the forms of the dead animals may be a joy for people in Paradise but also that they may be gladdened by the realisation that, unlike the compensation of an animal, their reward is given everlastingly. People in hell who see the end of an animal’s life may wish that their lives had ended because they know that their punishment will go on for ever (*Ta’līq*, 496: 18-497: 6). Mānkdīm refers to a verse from the Qur’ān about the Last Day that says: “and the unbeliever shall say: O would that I were dust” (Qur’ān 78: 40).

5.4. *The Compensation of Children*

‘Abd al-Jabbār does not explicitly discuss how children who have died before reaching maturity receive their compensation from God. From what he says about the compensation of other non-*mukallaḥfūn* such as animals, it can be concluded that he believes that, similarly, children who have not received their compensation in this world will be revived on the Day of Resurrection in order to receive their compensation. The question is what happens to these children after they have received the whole amount of their compensation. ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks it possible that from that moment God will for ever donate to them the things that they received as compensation, so that they will not feel displeasure when the giving of compensation ends (*Mughnī* XIII, 514: 3-4).

‘Abd al-Jabbār reports that some people thought differently on this subject and maintained that in the hereafter God will give these children a complete mind so that they will have knowledge of God. It is not clear who these people are. ‘Abd al-Jabbār views them as opponents, but he does not describe their opinions completely and he does not mention their names. It is known that there were Ḥanbalites who believed that children will be questioned in the grave after God has completed their mental faculties⁶⁵. ‘Abd al-Jabbār explains that, from a logical point of view, the Mu‘tazilites

⁶⁵ Smith (1981, 174).

do not think it necessary for God to complete the mental faculties of children who have not reached maturity and that no indication of this is found in the revelation either, but even if this were necessary, it would not contradict the idea that children receive their compensation in the hereafter (*Mughnī* XIII, 513: 17-514: 33).

‘Abd al-Jabbār agrees with people who think it possible that in the hereafter God makes children like adolescents in this world. He thinks that this is the most likely thing to happen, considering the fact that it is said that the children will be the servants of those in Paradise (*Mughnī* XIII, 514: 4-7). ‘Abd al-Jabbār probably refers here to the Qur’ān 52: 24, 56: 17-18 and 76: 19, where it is said that in Paradise young boys move around presenting drinks to the inhabitants⁶⁶. However, whether or not children are given a complete mind, they probably feel displeasure if the giving of their compensation stops after the full amount that is due has been given to them. We have seen that ‘Abd al-Jabbār thinks it possible that after this moment God will donate everlastingly that which they used to receive as compensation.

6. Conclusion

‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine of God’s *taklīf* includes an explanation for the existence of pain and suffering. His doctrine says that God has imposed obligations on humans because He wants to reward them in the hereafter. A reward is earned by carrying out a difficult task of one’s own free will and not under constraint. God has therefore given people freedom of choice so that they can choose between fulfilling the obligations and not fulfilling them. Probably as a corollary of the freedom given to humans, animals are also given freedom of choice, although God has not imposed obligations on them. Freedom of choice implies that God does not intervene if creatures hurt each other. He therefore does not prevent creatures from committing crimes and inflicting pain on each other, giving blows, kicks and stings. ‘Abd al-Jabbār believes that because God does not intervene, He takes care that all who suffer from in-

⁶⁶ Smith (1981, 178). She also quotes a tradition in which the Prophet said that children will be the servants of the inhabitants of the Garden (Smith, 1981, 175).

justice are compensated for this by those who have wronged them.

Creatures also suffer pain as the result of illnesses and plagues. In 'Abd al-Jabbār's opinion, this pain is brought into existence by God and also has a relation to His *taklīf*. He believes that God motivates people to choose to fulfil the obligations that He has imposed on them. 'Abd al-Jabbār is convinced that illnesses are a warning from God to remind people that they must fulfil the obligations He has imposed on them. In his opinion, God will give a generous compensation to all those creatures that He uses in this way—that is, inflicting pain on them in order to give a warning. This compensation may be given to them in this world or in the hereafter in the form of a temporary provision of things they like or in the form of a temporary mitigation of their punishment. God also uses this compensation in order to mete out justice between wrongdoers and their victims. The compensation of wrongdoers is diminished and the compensation of their victims is increased.

This means that according to 'Abd al-Jabbār's doctrine all pain in this world is related to God's imposing of obligations (*taklīf*). Pain inflicted by living beings on their initiative is the corollary of the freedom of choice given by God because of this *taklīf* and pain from God is a warning for all adults of sound mind that they must fulfil the obligations imposed by Him. This pain is copiously compensated for. The doctrine of *taklīf* enables 'Abd al-Jabbār to justify why God has created a world in which pain exists.

REFERENCES

Primary sources

Dhikr:

Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Balkhī. (*Bāb dhikr al-Mu'tazila min "Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn"*), in: *Faḍl al-ʿiʿtizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-mu'tazila*, ed. Fu'ād Sayyid. Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūnisiyya li-'l-nashr, 1393/1974, 61-119.

Faḍl:

'Abd al-Jabbār, Qāḍī 'l-Quḍāt 'Imād al-Dīn Abū 'l-Ḥasan, b. Aḥmad. *Kitāb faḍl al-ʿiʿtizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-mu'tazila wa-mubāyanatihim li-sā'ir al-mukhālifīn*, in: *Faḍl al-ʿiʿtizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-mu'tazila*, ed. Fu'ād Sayyid. Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūnisiyya li-'l-nashr, 1393/1974, 135-350.

Farq:

Abū Maṣṣūr 'Abd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī. *Al-Farq bayn al-firaq*, ed. 'Izzat al-'Aṭṭār al-Ḥusaynī. Cairo: Maktabat nashr al-thaqāfa al-islāmiyya, 1367/1948.

Fī 'l-tawhīd:

[attributed to] al-Nisābūrī, Abū Rashīd, Sa'īd b. Muḥammad. *Fī 'l-tawhīd: [Dīwān al-uṣūl?]* Ed. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ḥādī Abū Rīda. Cairo: al-Mu'assasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿamma li-'l-ta'lif wa-'l-tarjama wa-'l-ṭibā'a wa-'l-nashr, 1969.

Fihrist:

[Ibn] al-Nadīm, Abū 'l-Faraj Muḥammad b. Abī Ya'qūb Ishāq al-ma'rūf bi-'l-Warrāq. *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. Riḍā Tajaddud al-Ḥā'iri al-Māzandarānī. [Beirut: Dār al-maṣīra, 1988³].

Ḥadā'iq:

al-Muḥallī, Ḥumayd b. Aḥmad. *Siyar a'imma mukhtāra min K. al-ḥadā'iq al-warḍiyya fi manāqib a'immat al-Ḍaydiyya*. In: *Akhbār a'immat al-Ḍaydiyya fi Ṭabaristān wa-Daylamān wa-Gilān (Arabic texts concerning the history of the Ḍaydī imāms of Ṭabaristān, Daylamān and Gilān)*, collected and ed. by Wilferd Madelung. Beirut: Orient-Institut der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft; Wiesbaden: in Kommission bei Franz Steiner. 1987, 171-349. (Beiruter Texte und Studien; 28).

Intiṣār:

al-Khayyāt, Abū 'l-Ḥusayn b. 'Uthmān 'Abd al-Raḥīm b. Muḥammad al-Mu'tazilī. *Kitāb al-intiṣār (Le livre du triomphe et de la réfutation d'Ibn al-Rawandī l'hérétique)*, trad. par Albert N. Nader. Beyrouth: Les Lettres Orientales, 1957. (Recherches publiées sous la direction de l'Institut de Lettres Orientales de Beyrouth; 6).

I'tiqādāt:

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. *I'tiqādāt firaq al-muslimīn wa-'l-mushrikīn*, ed. 'Alī Sāmī al-Nashshār. Cairo: Maktabat al-nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1356/1938.

Majmū':

Ibn Mattawayh, Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad. *Kitāb al-majmū' fi 'l-muḥūṭ bi-'l-taklīf li-Qāḍī 'l-Quḍāt Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad*.

Tomé I, [attributed to 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad, Qāḍī 'l-Quḍāt al-Mu'tazilī], éd. J.J. Houben. Beirut: al-Maṭba'a al-Kāthūlikiyya, 1962. (Recherches publiées sous la direction de l'Institut de lettres orientales de Beyrouth).

Tome II, éd. J.J. Houben et Daniel Gimaret. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1980. (Recherches publiées sous la direction de la Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de l'Université Saint-Joseph, Beyrouth; Nouvelle série; A 12).

Tome III, éd. J.R.T.M. Peters. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1999. (Recherches publiées sous la direction de l'Institut de lettres orientales de Beyrouth, Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines, Université Saint-Joseph; Nouvelle série; A 19).

Maqālāt:

al-Ash'arī, Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ismā'il. *Kitāb maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn* (*Die dogmatischen Lehren der Anhänger des Islam*), hrsg. von Hellmut Ritter. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980³. (Bibliotheca Islamica; 1).

Masā'il:

Abū Rashīd Sā'id b. Muḥammad b. Sā'id al-Nīsābūrī. *Kitāb al-masā'il fi 'l-khilāf bayn al-Baṣriyyīn wa-'l-Baghdādiyyīn. Al-kalām fi 'l-jawhar*, ed. by A. Biram, in: *Studien zur Philosophie des Abū Rashīd an-Nīsābūrī*. Nachdruck von Schriften von Arthur Biram (1902) und Max Horten (1910, 1911), hrsg. von Fuat Sezgin. Frankfurt am Main: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 1986, 82-170. (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften. Reihe B, Abt. Philosophie; 2). A complete edition of this work is: al-Nīsābūrī, Abū Rashīd, al-Mu'tazilī Sa'id b. Muḥammad b. Sa'id. *Al-Masā'il fi 'l-khilāf bayn al-Baṣriyyīn wa-'l-Baghdādiyyīn*, ed. Ma'n Ziyāda [and] Riḍwān al-Sayyid. Beirut; [Tripoli, Libya]: Ma'had al-inmā' al-'Arabī, 1979.

Masā'il al-imāma:

[attributed to] al-Nāshī' al-Akbar. *Masā'il al-imāma wa-muqṭatafāt min al-kitāb al-awsaṭ fi 'l-maqālāt*. (Frühe Mu'tazilitische Häresiographie), hrsg. von Josef van Ess. Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft; Wiesbaden: In Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag, 1971. (Beiruter Texte und Studien; 11).

Milal:

Abū 'l-Faṭḥ Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm b. Abī Bakr Aḥmad al-Shahrastānī. *Al-Milal wa-'l-niḥal*, ed. Muḥammad Sayyid Kilānī. Beirut: Dār Sa'b, 1406/1986. 2 vols.

Milal Baghd.:

Abū Mansūr 'Abd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir b. Muḥammad al-Tamīmī al-Baghdādī. *Kitāb al-milal wa-'l-niḥal*, ed. Albert N. Nader. Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1983².

Mughnā:

'Abd al-Jabbār, Abū 'l-Ḥasan, al-Asadābādī. *Al-Mughnā fi abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-'l-'adl*. Cairo, 1380-1389/1960-1969. 16 vols. (Turāthunā).

IV. *Ru'yat al-bārī*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī and Abū 'l-Wafā al-Ghunanaymī. Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li-'l-ta'lif wa-'l-tarjama, s.d.

V. *Al-Firaq ghayr al-Islāmiyya*, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Khuḍayrī. Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li-'l-ta'lif wa-'l-tarjama, s.d.

VI/1. *Al-Tā'dīl wa-'l-tajwīr*, ed. Aḥmad Fu'ād al-Ahwānī. Cairo: al-Mu'assasa al-Miṣriyya al-'amma li-'l-ta'lif wa-'l-tarjama wa-'l-ṭibā'a wa-'l-nashr, 1382/1962.

VI/2. *Al-Ṭirāda*, ed. G.C. Anawati. Cairo: al-Mu'assasa al-Miṣriyya al-'amma li-'l-ta'lif wa-'l-tarjama wa-'l-ṭibā'a wa-'l-nashr, 1382/1962.

VII. *Khalq al-Qur'ān*, ed. Ibrāhīm al-Abyārī. Cairo: al-Shirka al-'Arabiyya li-'l-ṭibā'a wa-'l-nashr, 1380/1961.

VIII. *Al-Makhlūq*, ed. Tawfiq al-Ṭawīl and Sa'id Zāyid. Cairo: al-Mu'assasa al-Miṣriyya al-'amma li-'l-ta'lif wa-'l-tarjama wa-'l-ṭibā'a wa-'l-nashr, s.d.

- IX. *Al-Tawḥīd*, ed. Tawfīq al-Ṭawīl and Saʿīd Zāyid. Cairo: al-Muʿassasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿamma li-ʿl-taʿlīf wa-ʿl-anbāʾ wa-ʿl-ṭibāʾa wa-ʿl-nashr; al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li-ʿl-taʿlīf wa-ʿl-tarjama, s.d.
- XI. *Al-Taklīf*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Najjār and ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm al-Najjār. Cairo: al-Muʿassasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿamma li-ʿl-taʿlīf wa-ʿl-anbāʾ wa-ʿl-ṭibāʾa wa-ʿl-nashr; al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li-ʿl-taʿlīf wa-ʿl-tarjama, 1385/1965.
- XII. *Al-Nazar wa-ʿl-maʿārif*, ed. Ibrāhīm Madkūr. Cairo: al-Muʿassasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿamma li-ʿl-taʿlīf wa-ʿl-tarjama wa-ʿl-ṭibāʾa wa-ʿl-nashr, s.d.
- XIII. *Al-Lutf*, ed. Abū ʿl-ʿAlāʾ ʿAffīf. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Dār al-kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1382/1962.
- XIV. *Al-Aṣḥāh–Istihqāq al-dhamm–al-Tawba*, ed. Muṣṭafā al-Saqā. Cairo: al-Muʿassasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿamma li-ʿl-taʿlīf wa-ʿl-anbāʾ wa-ʿl-nashr; al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li-ʿl-taʿlīf wa-ʿl-tarjama, 1385/1965.
- XV. *Al-Tanabbuʿāt wa-ʿl-muʿjizāt*, ed. Muḥammad al-Khuḍayrī and Maḥmūd Muḥammad Qāsīm. Cairo: al-Muʿassasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿamma li-ʿl-taʿlīf wa-ʿl-anbāʾ wa-ʿl-nashr; al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li-ʿl-taʿlīf wa-ʿl-tarjama, 1385/1965.
- XVI. *Iʿjāz al-Qurʿān*, ed. Amīn al-Khulī. Cairo: al-Shirka al-ʿArabiyya li-ʿl-ṭibāʾa wa-ʿl-nashr, 1380/1960.
- XVII. *Al-Sharʿiyyāt*, ed. Amīn al-Khulī. Cairo: al-Muʿassasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿamma li-ʿl-taʿlīf wa-ʿl-tarjama wa-ʿl-ṭibāʾa wa-ʿl-nashr, 1382/1963.
- XX. *Fī ʿl-imāma*, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd and Sulaymān Dunyā. Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li-ʿl-taʿlīf wa-ʿl-tarjama, s.d. 2 vols.
- Mukhtaṣar:*
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, [Abū ʿl-Ḥasan] al-Qādī. *Al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn*, in: *Rasāʾil al-ʿadl wa-ʿl-tawḥīd*, ed. Muḥammad ʿImāra [or: ʿAmāra]. Cairo; Beirut: Dār al-Shurūq, 1988². I, 189-282.
- Muʿtamad:*
Abū ʿl-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-Ṭayyib al-Baṣrī. *Kitāb al-muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-fiqh*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥamīdullāh. Damascus: Institut français de Damas, 1964-1965. 2 vols.
- Qānūn fī ʿl-ṭibb:*
Ibn Sīnā. *Al-Qānūn fī ʿl-ṭibb*. Beirut, Dār Ṣādir, [ca. 1970]. Reprint from the Būlāq-edition [1294/1877].
- Rasāʾil:*
Rasāʾil al-ʿadl wa-ʿl-tawḥīd, ed. Muḥammad ʿImāra [or ʿAmāra]. Cairo, 1988². 2 vols.
- Rihlat Ibn Baṭṭūta:*
Ibn Baṭṭūta. *Rihlat Ibn Baṭṭūta*, [ed. Karam al-Bustānī]. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir; Dār Bayrūt, 1384/1964.
- Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn:*
[al-Ḥākim] Abū ʿl-Saʿd al-Muḥsin b. Muḥammad Karāma al-Jushamī al-Bayhaqī. *Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn* (fragments), in: *Faḍl al-ʿitizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-muʿtazila*, ed. Fuʿād Sayyid. Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūniṣiyya li-ʿl-nashr, 1393/1974, 363-393.
- Siyar aʿlām al-nubalāʾ:*
al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. ʿUthmān. *Siyar aʿlām al-nubalāʾ*, ed. Shuʿayb al-ʿArnawṭ. Beirut: Muʿassasat al-Risāla, 1413/1993². 25 vols.
- Ṭabaqāt:*
Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā. *Kitāb ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila* (*Die Klassen der Muʿtaziliten*), ed. Susanna Diwald-Wilzer. Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique; Wiesbaden: In Kommission bei Franz Steiner, 1961. (Bibliotheca Islamica; 21).

Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya:

Ibn Qāḍi Shuhba, Abū Bakr b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ʿUmar b. Muḥammad Taqī al-Dīn (779/1377-851/1448). *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya*, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAlīm Khān. Beirut: Dār al-Nadwa al-jadīda, 1978. 2 vols.

Tadhkira:

Ibn Mattawayh, [Abū Muḥammad] al-Ḥasan. *Al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-l-ʿarād*, ed. by Sāmī Naṣr Luṭf and Fayṣal Badr ʿAwn. Cairo: Dār al-thaqāfa li-l-ṭibāʿa wa-l-nashr, 1975.

Tāʿlīq:

Mānkḍīm Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn b. Abī Hāshim al-Ḥusaynī Shashdīw. *Kitāb sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa li-Qāḍī ʿl-Quḍāt ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī al-Asadābādī*, [attributed to Abū ʿl-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī], ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān. Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1965.

Tahdhīb:

al-Azharī. *Tahdhīb al-luḡha*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Najjār. [Cairo: al-Muʿassasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿamma li-l-taʿlīf wa-l-anbāʿ wa-l-nashr], 1964/1384-1967/1387. 15 vols. (Turāthunā).

Uṣūl:

ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Qāḍī. *Kitāb al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, In: Gimaret (1979), 79-96.

Wāfi bi-l-wafayāt:

al-Ṣafadī, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl b. Aybak. *Kitāb al-wāfi bi-l-wafayāt* (Das biographische Lexikon des Ṣalāḥaddīn Ḥalīl ibn Aibak aṣ-Ṣafadī). Vol. XVIII, ed. Ayman Fuʿād Sayyid. Beirut: Orient-Institut der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft; Wiesbaden: in Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag, 1988. (Bibliotheca Islamica; 6r).

Secondary sources

- Abrahamov, Binyamin. 1990. *Al-Kāsim b. Ibrāhīm on the proof of God's existence: Kitāb al-dalīl al-kabīr*, ed. with translation. Leiden: Brill. (Islamic philosophy and theology; 5).
- . 1993. "Necessary knowledge in Islamic theology", in: *British journal of Middle Eastern studies* 20, 20-32.
- . 1993a. "The appointed time of death (*aḡal*) according to ʿAbd al-Jabbār: annotated translation of al-Muḡnī, vol. XI, pp. 3-26", in: *Israel oriental studies* 13, 7-38.
- . 1993b. "ʿAbd al-Jabbār's theory of divine assistance (*lutf*)", in: *Jerusalem studies in Arabic and Islam* 16, 41-58.
- Ahlwardt, Wilhelm. 1887-99. *Verzeichnis der arabischen Handschriften*. Berlin: Schade. Reprint Hildesheim and New York: Olms, 1980-1981. 10 Bde.
- Ahmed, Munir-ud-Din. 1968. *Muslim education and the scholars' social status upto the 5th century Muslim era (11th century Christian era) in the light of Taʿrīkh Baghdad*. Zürich: "Der Islām". (Studies in Islamic history).
- Anawati, G.C., R. Caspar et Maḥmūd el-Khodeiri. 1957. "Une somme inédite de théologie moʿtazilite: le *Moghni* du Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār", in: *Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales du Caire* 4, 281-316.
- Anawati, G.C. 1965. "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill, 751-755.
- Antes, Peter. 1970. *Prophetenwunder in der Ashʿarīya bis al-Ġazālī (Algazel)*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Schwarz. (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen; 2).
- ʿĀrif, Aḥmad ʿAbdallāh. 1978. *Al-ṣila bayn al-zaydiyya wa-l-muʿtazila: dirāsa kalāmiyya*

- muqārīna li-ārā' al-firqatayn*. Beirut: Dār Āzāk/Şan'ā': al-Maktaba al-Yamaniyya.
- Badawī, 'Abdurrahmān. 1968. *La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde arabe*. Paris: Librairie philosophique Vrin. (Études de philosophie médiévale; 56).
- Baradie, Adel El. 1983. *Gottes-Recht und Menschen-Recht*. Baden-Baden: Nomos. (Rechtsvergleichende Untersuchungen zur gesamten Strafrechtswissenschaft; 3. Folge, 14).
- Ben-Shammai, H. 1974. "A note on some Karaite copies of Mu'tazilite writings", in: *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African studies* 37, 295-304.
- Bernand, Marie. 1982. *Le problème de la connaissance d'après le Muġnī du cadī 'Abd al-Ġabbār*. Algiers: Société nationale d'édition et de diffusion.
- 1984. "La méthode d'exégèse coranique de 'Abd al-Ġabbār à travers son Mutaşābih", in: *Mélanges in memoriam Michel Allard, s.j./Paul Nwyia, s.j.*, présentés par Louis Pouzet. Beirut: Dar El-Machreq. I, 85-100. (Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph, 50/1).
- Biram, Arthur. 1902. *Kitābu 'l-masā'il fī 'l-ḥilāf bejn al-Başriyyīn wa 'l-Baġdādhiyyīn: al-kalām fī 'l-ġawāhir/Die atomistische Substanzenlehre aus dem Buch der Streitfragen zwischen Basrensem und Bagdadensem*, [von Abū Raşīd Sa'īd b. Muḥammad b. Sa'īd al-Nisābūrī], in: *Studien zur Philosophie des Abū Raşīd an-Nisābūrī*. Nachdruck von Schriften von Arthur Biram (1902) und Max Horten (1910, 1911), hrsg. von Fuat Sezgin. Frankfurt am Main: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 1986, 1-171. (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften. Reihe B, Abt. Philosophie; 2).
- Bosworth, C.E. 1962. "The imperial policy of the early Ghaznawids", in: *Islamic studies* 1, nr. 3, 49-82.
- 1968. "The political and dynastic history of the Iranian world (AD 1000-1217)", in: *Cambridge history of Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. V, 1-202.
- 1970. "Dailamīs in Central Iran: the Kākūyids of Jibāl and Yazd", in: *Iran* 8, 73-95. Reprint in: Bosworth, C.E., *The Medieval history of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia*. London: Variorum Reprints, 1977. (Collected studies series; CS213).
- 1973². *The Ghaznavids: their empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, 994:1040*. Beirut: Librairie du Liban.
- 1978. "Kḥ"ārazm-shāhs", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. II, 1065-1068.
- 1980. *The Islamic dynasties*, revised ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (Islamic surveys; 5). (Edinburgh paperbacks).
- 1986. "Maġjd al-Dawla", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. V, 1028.
- 1987. "Asadābād", in: *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. London etc.: Routledge and Kegan Paul. II, 697.
- 1987a. "'Askar Mokram", in: *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. London etc.: Routledge and Kegan Paul. II, 768.
- 1996. *The new Islamic dynasties*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Bousquet, G.H. 1958. "Des animaux et de leur traitement selon le judaïsme, le christianisme et l'islam", in: *Studia Islamica* 9, 31-48.
- Brocket, A. 1992. "al-Munāfiķūn", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. VII, fasc. 123-124, 561-562.
- Brunschvig, Robert. 1974. "Analyse mu'tazilite de la douleur", in: *Mélanges d'Islamologie: volume dédié à la mémoire d'Armand Abel par ses collègues, ses élèves et ses amis sous la rédaction de Pierre Salmon*. Leiden: Brill, 74-83.

- Republished in Brunschvig, Robert, *Études d'islamologie*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1976. I, 253-262.
- 1974a. "Mu'tazilisme et optimum (*al-aṣlah*)", in: *Studia Islamica* 39, 5-23. Republished in Brunschvig, Robert, *Études d'islamologie*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1976. I, 233-251.
- Bulliet, Richard W. 1972. *The patricians of Nishapur: a study in medieval Islamic social history*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Harvard Middle Eastern studies; 16).
- 1973. "The political-religious history of Nishapur in the eleventh century", in: *Islamic civilisation 950-1150*, ed. D.S. Richards. Oxford: Cassirer, 71-91.
- Busse, Heribert. 1969. *Chalif und Grosskönig: Die Buyiden im Iraq (945-1055)*. Beirut: Orient-Institut der deutschen morgenländische Gesellschaft; Wiesbaden: In Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag. (Beiruter Texte und Studien; 6).
- 1975. "Iran under the Būyids", in: *Cambridge history of Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. IV, 250-304.
- Cahen, Cl. 1965. "Fakhr al-Dawla", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. II, 748-749.
- , and Ch. Pellat. 1971. "Ibn 'Abbād", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. III, 671-673.
- Canard, Marius. 1962. "Bagdād au IVe siècle de l'hégire (Xe siècle de l'ère chrétienne)", in: *Arabica* 9, 267-287.
- Daiber, Hans. 1975. *Das theologisch-philosophische System des Mu'ammār Ibn 'Abbād as-Sulamī (gest. 830 n. Chr.)*. Beirut: Orient-Institut der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft; Wiesbaden: In Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag. (Beiruter Texte und Studien; 19).
- 1988. *Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā' als Prediger und Theologe: ein neuer Text aus dem 8. Jahrhundert n. Chr.*, hrsg. mit Übersetzung und Kommentar. Leiden: Brill. (Islamic philosophy and theology. Texts and studies; 2).
- Dhanani, Alnoor. 1994. *The physical theory of kalām: atoms, space, and void in Basrian Mu'tazilī cosmology*. Leiden: Brill. (Islamic philosophy, theology, and science; 14).
- Eisenstein, Herbert. 1990. *Einführung in die arabische Zoographie*. Berlin: Reimer.
- Elshahed, Elsayed. 1983. *Das Problem der transzendenten sinnlichen Wahrnehmung in der spätmu'tazilitischen Erkenntnistheorie nach der Darstellung des Taqīdīn an-Nağrānī*. Berlin: Schwarz. (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen; 86).
- Endress, Gerhard. 1982. "Handschriftenkunde", in: *Grundriß der arabischen Philologie. Band I: Sprachwissenschaft*, hrsg. von Wolf Dietrich Fischer. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 271-296.
- Ess, Josef van. 1966. *Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Aḡudaddīn al-Īcī: Übersetzung und Kommentar des ersten Buches seiner Mawāqif*. Wiesbaden: Steiner. (Veröffentlichungen der orientalischen Kommission der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur; 22).
- 1971. *Frühe Mu'tazilitische Häresiographie: zwei Werke des Nāṣī' al-Akbar (gest. 293 H.)*. Beirut: Orient-Institut der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft. (Beiruter Texte und Studien; 11).
- 1976. "Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie", in: *Revue des études islamiques* 44, 23-60.
- 1978. "al-Khayyāt", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. IV, 1162-1164.
- 1980. "Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Baṣrī", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. Supplement, facs. 1-2, 12-14.

- 1981. “Dirār b. ‘Amr”, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. Supplement, fascs. 3-4, 225-227.
- 1984. *Une lecture à rebours de l'histoire du Muʿtazilisme*. Paris: Geuthner. Extrait de *Revue des études islamiques*, 46/2(1978), 47/1 (1979). (*Revue des études islamiques—hors serie*; 14).
- 1985. “Abu ʿl-Hoḡayl al-ʿAllāf”, in: *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. I, 318-322.
- 1985a. “Abu ʿl-Qāsem al-Balkī al-Kaʿbī”, in: *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. I, 359-362.
- 1985b. “Abū Eshāq al-Nazzām”, in: *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. I, 275-280.
- 1986. “Muʿtazilah”, in: *The Encyclopedia of religion*, ed. by Mircea Eliade. New York: MacMillan. X, 220-229
- 1991-1997. *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam*. Berlin und New York: De Gruyter. 6 Tle.
- 1992. “al-Nazzām”, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. VII, fascs. 129-130, 1057-1058.
- Fakhry, Majid. 1991. *Ethical theories in Islam*. Leiden etc.: Brill. (Islamic philosophy, theology and science; 8).
- Frank, Richard M. 1966. *The metaphysics of created being according to Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf: a philosophical study of the earliest kalām*. Istanbul: Nederlands historisch-archaeologisch instituut in het Nabije Oosten. (Uitgaven van het Nederlands historisch-archaeologisch instituut te Istanbul; 21).
- 1967. “al-Maʿnā: some reflections on the technical meanings of the term in the kalām and its use in the physics of Muʿammar”, in: *Journal of the American oriental society* 87, 248-259.
- 1971. “Abu Hashim’s theory of “states”: its structure and function”, in: *Actas do IV congresso de estudos árabes e islâmicos Coimbra-Lisboa 1 a 8 Setembro de 1968*. Leiden: Brill, 85-100.
- 1971a. “Several fundamental assumptions of the Baṣra school of the Muʿtazila”, in: *Studia Islamica* 33, 5-18.
- 1978. *Beings and their attributes: the teaching of the Basrian school of the Muʿtazila in the classical period*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press. (Studies in Islamic philosophy and science).
- 1980. “Abū Raṣhīd al-Nīsābūrī”, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. Supplement, fascs. 1-2, 31-32.
- 1981. “Meanings are spoken of in many ways: the earlier Arab grammarians”, in: *le Muséon* 94, 259-319.
- 1982. “The autonomy of the human agent in the teaching of ‘Abd al-Jabbār”, in: *le Muséon* 95, 323-355.
- 1982a. “Ḥāl”, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. Supplement, fascs. 5-6, 343-348.
- 1984. “Bodies and atoms: the Ashʿarite analysis”, in: *Islamic theology and philosophy: studies in honor of George F. Hourani*, ed. by Michael E. Marmura. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 39-53; notes: 287-293.
- 1985. “Can God do what is wrong?” In: *Divine omniscience and omnipotence in medieval philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian perspectives*, ed. by T. Rudavsky. Dordrecht: Reidel, 69-79. (*Synthese historical library*; 25).
- 1992. “The science of kalām”, in: *Arabic sciences and philosophy* 2, 7-37.
- Gardet, L. 1965. “al-Djubbāʿī, Abū ʿAlī Muḡammad b. ʿAbd al-Waḡḡāb”, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. II, 369-370.

- Gaube, Heinz, and Thomas Leisten. 1994. *Die Kernländer des 'Abbasidenreiches im 10./11. Jh.: Materialien zur TAVO-Karte B VII 6*. Wiesbaden: Reichert. (Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients. Reihe B, Geisteswissenschaften; 75).
- Gimaret, Daniel. 1970. "La théorie des *aḥwāl* d'Abū Hāšim al-Ġubbā'ī d'après des sources aš'arites", in: *Journal asiatique* 258, 47-86.
- . 1974. "Un problème de théologie musulmane: Dieu veut-il les actes mauvais? Thèses et arguments", in: *Studia Islamica* 40, 5-73.
- . 1975. "Un problème de théologie musulmane: Dieu veut-il les actes mauvais? Thèses et arguments (suite et fin)", in: *Studia Islamica* 41, 63-92.
- . 1976. "Matériaux pour une bibliographie des Ġubbā'ī", in: *Journal asiatique* 264, 277-332.
- . 1977. "Note annexe", in: Ibn Mattawayh. *Kitāb al-majmū' fī 'l-muḥīṭ bi-'l-taklīf*. II. Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1981, 19-32.
- . 1979. "Les *Uṣūl al-ḥamsa* du Qāḍī 'Abd al-Ġabbār et leurs commentaires", in: *Annales islamologiques* 15, 47-96.
- . 1980 *Théories de l'acte humain en théologie musulmane*, Paris: Vrin. (Études musulmanes; 24).
- . 1984. "Matériaux pour une bibliographie des Jubba'i: note complémentaire", in: *Islamic theology and philosophy: studies in honor of George F. Hourani*, ed. by Michael E. Marmura. New York: State University of New York Press, 31-38.
- . 1985. "Bibliographie d'Aš'arī: un réexamen", in: *Journal asiatique* 273, 223-292.
- . 1985a. "Un document majeur pour l'histoire du kalām: le Muğarrad maqālāt al-Aš'arī d'Ibn Fūrak", in: *Arabica* 32, 185-218.
- . 1985b. "Abu 'l-Hosayn al-Baṣrī", in: *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. I, 322-324.
- . 1986. "Introduction et notes", in: Shahrastani. *Livre des religions et des sectes*. I. Traduction avec introduction et notes par Daniel Gimaret et Guy Monnot. Leuven: Peeters/Unesco. (Collection Unesco d'oeuvres représentatives. Série arabe).
- . 1986. *Les noms divins en Islam*. Paris: Cerf. (Patrimoines. Islam).
- . 1990. *La doctrine d'al-Ash'arī*. Paris: Cerf. (Patrimoines. Islam).
- . 1991. "Pour un rééquilibrage des études de théologie musulmane", in: *Arabica* 38, 11-18.
- . 1992. "Mu'tazila", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. VII, facs. 127-128, 783-793.
- . 1994. *Une lecture Mu'tazilite du Coran: Le Tafṣīr d'Abū 'Alī al-Djubbā'ī (m. 303/915) partiellement reconstitué à partir de ses citateurs*. Louvain-Paris: Peeters. (Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes études. Section des sciences religieuses; 101).
- Glassen, Erika. 1981. *Der mittlere Weg: Studien zur Religionspolitik und Religiosität der späteren Abbasiden-Zeit*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner. (Freiburger Islamstudien; 8).
- Gutas, Dimitri. 1988. *Avicenna and the Aristotelian tradition*. Leiden: Brill. (Islamic philosophy and theology; 4).
- Gwynne, Rosalind Ward. 1982. *The "tafsir" of Abu 'Ali al-Jubba'i: first steps toward a reconstruction, with texts, translation, biographical introduction and analytical essay*. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. Unpublished dissertation, University of Washington.
- Hebblethwaite, Brian. 1976. *Evil, suffering and religion*. London: Sheldon Press. (Issues in religious studies).

- Hecker, Judith Katz. 1975. *Reason and responsibility: an explanatory translation of Kitāb al-tawḥīd from al-Mughnī fi abwāb al-tawḥīd wa 'l-'adl* by Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār al-Hamadḥānī, with introduction and notes. Ann Arbor, University Microfilms. Unpublished dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.
- Heemskerk, G. 1992. "Waarom kinderen volgens 'Abd al-Jabbār geen straf van God verdienen", in: *Elf wijzen van interpreteren*, onder red. van Ed. de Moor. Nijmegen: Mandara, 55-67.
- Hick, John. 1966. *Evil and the God of love*. Houndmills etc.: MacMillan. Reissue 1985.
- Hinds, M. 1990. "Miḥna", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. VII. 2-6.
- Hodgson, M.G.S. 1965. "Dhammiyya" in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. II, 218.
- Horten, Max. 1910. *Die Philosophie des abu Raschid (um 1068)*, aus dem Arabischen übersetzt und erläutert. Bonn: Hanstein, 1910. (Reprint in: *Studien zur Philosophie des Abū Rašīd an-Nisābūrī*, hrsg. von Fuat Sezgin. Frankfurt am Main, 1986, 173-408. (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften. Reihe B, Abt. Philosophie; 2).
- 1911. "Die Erkenntnistheorie des abu Raschid (um 1068): ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam", in: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 24, 433-448. (Reprint in: *Studien zur Philosophie des Abū Rašīd an-Nisābūrī*, hrsg. von Fuat Sezgin. Frankfurt am Main, 1986, 409-424) (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften. Reihe B, Abt. Philosophie; 2).
- 1912. *Die philosophischen Systeme der spekulativen Theologen im Islam*. Bonn: Cohen.
- Hourani, George F. 1971. *Islamic rationalism: the ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbār*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- 1985. "The rationalist ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbār", in: *Islamic philosophy and the classical tradition, for Richard Walzer on his seventieth birthday*, ed. by S.M. Stern, A. Hourani and V. Brown. Oxford: Cassirer, 1972, 105-115. (Oriental studies, 5). Reprint in: Hourani, George F., *Reason and tradition in Islamic ethics*. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 98-108.
- al-Ṭrāqī, Muḥammad 'Aṭīf. 1983⁵. *Tajdīd fī 'l-madhāhib al-falsafīyya wa-'l-kalāmīyya*. Cairo: Dār al-ma'ārif.
- Juynboll, Th. W. 1930⁴. *Handleiding tot de kennis van de Mohammedaansche wet volgens de leer der Šāfi'itische school*. Leiden: Brill.
- Kazimirski, A. de Biberstein. 1860. *Dictionnaire arabe-français*. Paris: Maissonneuve. (Reprint: Beirut: Librairie du Liban). 2 vols.
- al-Khayyūn, Rašīd. 1997. *Mu'tazilat al-Baṣra wa-Baghdād*. London: Dār al-Ḥikma.
- Khodeiri, Mahmoud el-. 1958. "Deux nouvelles sections du Moghni du Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbār", in: *Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales du Caire* 5, 417-424.
- Khushaym, 'Alī Fahmī. 1968. *al-Jubbā'īyyān: Abū 'Alī wa-Abū Ḥāshim*. Tripoli (Libya): Dār maktabat al-fikr.
- Kraemer, Joel L. 1986. *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: the cultural revival during the Buyid Age*. Leiden: Brill. (Studies in Islamic culture and history; 7).
- Kraus, P., and G. Vajda. 1971. "Ibn al-Rāwandī", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. III, 905-906.
- Lane, E.W. 1863/93. *Arabic-English lexicon*. London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate. 8 vols.
- Laoust, H. 1973. "Les agitations religieuses à Baghdād aux IV^e et V^e siècles de l'Hégire", in: *Islamic civilisation 950-1150*, ed. by D.S. Richards. Oxford: Cassirer, 169-185. (Papers on Islamic history; 3).

- Le Strange, G. 1930. *The lands of the eastern caliphate*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Cambridge geographical series).
- Löfgren, Oscar, and Renato Traini. 1981. *Catalogue of the Arabic manuscripts in the Bibliotheca Ambrosiana*. Vol. II: Nuovo fondo: Series A-D (Nos. 1-830). Vicenza: Pozza. (Fontes ambrosiani).
- Madelung, Wilferd. 1965. *Der Imām al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. (Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients; 1).
- 1970. "Imamism and Mu'tazilite theology", in: *Le Shī'isme imāmīte*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 13-29. (Travaux du Centre d'études supérieures spécialisées d'histoire des religions de Strasbourg / Bibliothèque des Centres d'études supérieures spécialisées).
- 1971. "The spread of Māturidism and the Turks", in: *Actas do IV congresso de estudos árabes e islâmicos, Coimbra-Lisboa 1 a 8 Setembro 1968*. Leiden: Brill, 109-168. Reprint in: Madelung, Wilferd, *Religious schools and sects in medieval Islam*. London: Variorum reprints, 1985. (Collected studies series; CS213).
- 1975. "The minor dynasties of Northern Iran", in: *Cambridge history of Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. IV, 198-248.
- 1980. "Abu 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition*. Leiden: Brill. Supplement, fasc. 1-2, 25-26.
- 1982. "Ibn Mattawayh", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition*. Leiden: Brill. Supplement, fasc. 5-6, 393.
- 1985. "'Abd-al-Jabbār", in: *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. London etc.: Routledge and Kegan Paul. I, 116-118.
- 1985a. "Abū Rašīd Nīsābūrī", in: *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. London etc.: Routledge and Kegan Paul. I, 367-377.
- 1986. "Kḥurramiyya", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. V, 63-65.
- 1986a. "Zu einigen Werken des Imams Abū Ṭālib an-Nāṭiq bi 'l-Ḥaqq", in: *Der Islam* 63, 5-10.
- 1986b. "The theology of Zamakhsharī", in: *Actas del XII congreso de la U.E.A.I. (Malaga, 1984)*. Madrid: Union Européenne d'Arabisants et d'Islamisants, 1986, 485-495.
- 1987. "Der Kalām", in: *Grundriß der arabischen Philologie. Band II: Literaturwissenschaft*, hrsg. von Helmut Gätje. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 326-337.
- 1987a. "Die Š'ra", in: *Grundriß der arabischen Philologie. Band II: Literaturwissenschaft*, hrsg. von Helmut Gätje. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 358-373.
- 1987b. "Häresiographie", in: *Grundriß der arabischen Philologie. Band II: Literaturwissenschaft*, hrsg. von Helmut Gätje. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 374-378.
- 1988. *Religious trends in early Islamic Iran*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press. (Columbia lectures on Iranian studies; 4). (Bibliotheca Persica).
- 1989. "Imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm and Mu'tazilism", in: *On both sides of al-Mandab: Ethiopian, South-Arabic and Islamic studies presented to Oscar Löfgren on his ninetieth birthday 13 may 1988*, [editors: Ulla Ehrensvaerd and Christopher Toll]. Stockholm: distr. Almqvist & Wiskell International, 39-48. (Transactions; 2).
- 1991. "Introduction", in: al-Malāḥimī al-Kḥuwārazmī, Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad. *Kitāb al-Mu'tamad fī uṣūl al-dīn: the extant parts* edited by Martin McDermott and Wilferd Madelung. London: Al-Hoda, III-XVI.

- 1991a. “Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm and Christian theology”, in: *Aram* 3 (1991), 35-44.
- 1991b. “The late Mu`tazila and determinism: the philosophers’ trap”, in: *Yād-nāma in memoria di Alessandro Bausani*, ed. Biancamaria Scarcia Amoretti e Lucia Rostagno. Roma: Bardi, I, 245-257. (“Studi orientali” / Pubblicati dal Dipartimento di studi orientali, Università di Roma “La Sapienza”; 10).
- 1992. “Review of Al-Ḳāsim b. Ibrāhīm on the proof of God’s existence: Kitāb al-dalīl al-kabīr, ed. Binyamin Abrahamov. Leiden: Brill, 1990”, in: *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 3rd series, 2, 267-270.
- Mainz, Ernst. 1935. “Mu`tazilitische Ethik”, in: *Der Islam* 22, 191-206.
- Makdisi, George. 1963. *Ibn ‘Aqīl et la résurgence de l’Islam traditionaliste au XI^e siècle (V^e siècle de l’Hégire)*. Damas: Institut Français de Damas.
- 1973. “The Sunnī revival”, in: *Islamic civilisation 950-1150*, ed. by D.S. Richards. Oxford: Cassirer, 155-168. (Papers on Islamic history; 3).
- 1981. *The rise of colleges: institutions of learning in Islam and the West*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (Islamic surveys).
- 1990. *The rise of humanism in classical Islam and the Christian West*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- 1993. “*Ṭabaqāt*-biography: law and orthodoxy in classical Islam”, in: *Islamic studies* 32, 371-396.
- 1997. *Ibn ‘Aqīl: religion and culture in classical Islam*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Makḥṭūṭāt. 1976. “al-Makḥṭūṭāt allatī ṣawwarathā ba`that al-Ma`had ilā ‘l-Jumhūriyya al-‘arabiyya al-yamaniyya”, in: *Majallat Ma`had al-makḥṭūṭāt al-‘arabiyya* 22, I, 3-81.
- Martin, Richard C. 1978. “The identification of two Mu`tazilite Mss.”, in: *Journal of the American oriental society* 98, 389-399.
- , Mark R. Woodward & Dwi S. Atmaja. 1997. *Defenders of reason in Islam: Mu`tazilism from medieval school to modern symbol*. Oxford: Oneworld.
- McDermott, Martin J. 1978. *The theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022)*. Beirut: Dar el-Machreq. (Recherches publiées sous la direction de l’Institut de lettres orientales de Beyrouth; Nouvelle série; A 10). (Persian studies series; 9).
- Mensia, Mokdad. 1990. “Falsafat al-uṣūl al-khamsa min khilāl sharḥihā li-‘l-qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Mu`tazili”, in: *IBLA (Revue de l’Institut des belles lettres arabes, Tunis)* 53, 321-336.
- Mez, A. 1922. *Die Renaissance des Islams*, Heidelberg. (Reprint: Hildesheim: Olm, 1968).
- Mohammed, Abdalla I. 1983. *The notion of good and evil in the ethics of ‘Abd al-Jabbār: a philosophical study, with a translation of The determination of justice and injustice (al-taḍlīl wa-al-tajwīr) sections 1-12*. Unpublished dissertation, Temple University.
- Momen, Moojan. 1985. *An introduction to Shi‘i Islam: the history and doctrines of Twelver Shi‘ism*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Monnot, Guy. 1974. *Penseurs musulmans et religions iraniennes: ‘Abd al-Jabbār et ses devanciers*. Paris etc.: Vrin etc. (Études musulmanes; 16).
- Mottahedeh, R. 1973. “Administration in Būyid Qazwīn”, in: *Islamic civilisation 950-1150*, ed. by D.S. Richards. Oxford: Cassirer, 33-45. (Papers on Islamic history; 3).
- Nader, Albert N. 1956. *Le système philosophique des Mu`tazila, (premiers penseurs de l’Islam)*. Beirut: Les lettres orientales. (Recherches publiées sous la direction de l’Institut de lettres orientales, Beyrouth; 3).

- Nagel, Tilman. 1988. *Die Festung des Glaubens: Triumph und Scheitern des islamischen Rationalismus im 11. Jahrhundert*. München: Beck.
- Nāzīm, Muḥammad. 1971². *The life and times of Sultān Maḥmūd of Ghazna*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
- Nyberg, H.S. 1953. "Mu'tazila", in: *Shorter encyclopaedia of Islam*. Leiden: Brill. 421-427.
- 1957. "Préface", in: al-Khayyāt, Abū 'l-Ḥusayn b. 'Uthmān, *Kitāb al-intiṣār (Le livre du triomphe et de la réfutation d'Ibn al-Rawandī l'hérétique)*, trad. par Albert N. Nader. Beyrouth: Les Lettres Orientales, French text, 15-44. (Recherches publiées sous la direction de l'Institut de lettres orientales, Beyrouth; 6).
- Ormsby, Eric L. 1984. *Theodicy in Islamic thought: The dispute over al-Ghazālī's "best of all possible worlds"*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pessagno, J. Meric. 1984. "The uses of evil in Maturidian thought", in: *Studia Islamica* 60, 59-82.
- Peters, J.R.T.M. 1976. *God's created speech: a study in the speculative theology of the Mu'tazilī Qādī l-Qudāt Abū l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Ḥabbār bn Aḥmad al-Hamadānī*. Leiden: Brill.
- 1982. "Triniteit en incarnatie in de kalam van de Mu'tazila", in: *Historische betrekkingen tussen Moslims en Christenen*, onder red. van Sjoerd van Koningsveld. Nijmegen: MOI (Vereniging voor de studie van het Midden-Oosten en de Islam), 81-91. (Midden Oosten en Islampublicatie; 9).
- Pines, Schlomo. 1979. "Études sur Awḥad al-Zamān Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī. [reprint]", in: Pines, Schlomo, *Studies in Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī's physics and metaphysics*. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1979, 1-95. (The collected works of Shlomo Pines; 1).
- Rahman, Yusuf. 1996. "The miraculous nature of Muslim scripture: a study of 'Abd al-Jabbār's Ijāz al-Qur'an", in: *Islamic studies* 35, 409-424.
- Reinhart, A. Kevin. 1995. *Before revelation; the boundaries of Muslim moral thought*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press. (SUNY series in Middle Eastern studies).
- Sander, Paul. 1994. *Zwischen Charisma und Ratio: Entwicklungen in der frühen imāmītischen Theologie*. Berlin: Schwarz. (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen; 183).
- Schacht, J. 1971. "Ibn Khallād", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. III, 832.
- 1978. "Ḳatī", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New edition*. Leiden: Brill. IV, 766-772.
- Schimmel, Annemarie. 1975. *Mystical dimensions of Islam*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Schmidtko, Sabine. 1991. *The theology of al-'Allāma al-Hillī (d. 726/1325)*. Berlin: Schwarz. (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen; 152).
- 1997. "Introduction", in: al-Zamakhsharī, *A Mu'tazilite creed of az-Zamahsharī (D. 538/1144) (al-Minhāġ fī uṣūl ad-dīn)*, ed. and transl. by Sabine Schmidtko. Stuttgart: Deutsche morgenländische Gesellschaft; Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner, 7-11. (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes; 51,4).
- 1998. "Neuere Forschungen zur Mu'tazila unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der späteren Mu'tazila ab dem 4./10. Jahrhundert", in: *Arabica*, 45, 379-408.
- Schwarz, Michael. 1972. "Some notes on the notion of *iljā'* (constraint) in Mu'tazilite kalām", in: *Israel Oriental Studies* 2, 413-427.
- 1976. "The qādī 'Abd al-Ḡabbār's refutation of the Aṣ'arite doctrine of 'acquisition' (*kasb*)", in: *Israel oriental studies* 6, 229-263.
- Sezgin, Fuat. 1967. *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums*. Leiden: Brill. Band 1: *Qur'anwissenschaften, Ḥadīṡ, Geschichte, Fiqh, Dogmatik, Mystik, bis ca. 430H*.

- Siegel, Rudolph E. 1970. *Galen on sense perception: his doctrines, observations and experiments on vision, hearing, smell, taste, touch and pain, and their historical sources*. Basel/New York: Karger.
- Smith, Jane Idleman, and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad. 1981. *The Islamic understanding of death and resurrection*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York press.
- Spuler, Bertold. 1952. *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit: Politik, Kultur, Verwaltung und öffentliches Leben zwischen der arabischen und der seldschukischen Eroberung, 633 bis 1055*. Wiesbaden: Steiner. (Veröffentlichungen der Orientalischen Kommission der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz; 2).
- Stroumsa, Sarah. 1990. "The beginnings of the Mu'tazila reconsidered", in: *Jerusalem studies in Arabic and Islam* 13, 265-293.
- Şubhî, Ahmad Maḥmūd. 1983². *al-Falsafa al-akhlāqīyya fī 'l-fīkr al-Islāmī*. Cairo: Dār al-ma'ārif .
- 1985³. *Fī 'ilm al-kalām. I: al-Mu'tazila*. Beirut: al-Nahḍa al-'arabiyya.
- Ullmann, Manfred. 1978. *Islamic medicine*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University press. (Islamic surveys; 11).
- Uthmān, 'Abd al-Karīm. 1968. *Qāḍī 'l-quḍāt 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamādhānī*. Beirut: Dār al-'Arabiyya.
- 1971. *Nazarīyyat al-taklīf: ārā' al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār al-kalāmīyya*. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risāla.
- Vajda, Georges. 1985. *Al-kitāb al-muḥtawī de Yūsuf al-Baṣīr: texte, traduction et commentaire*, ed. by David R. Blumenthal. Leiden: Brill. (Études sur le judaïsme médiéval; 12).
- Watt, W. Montgomery. 1973. *The formative period of Islamic thought*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University press.
- 1979. "Suffering in Sunnite Islam", in: *Studia Islamica* 50, 5-19.
- 1990. *Early Islam*. collected articles. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University press.
- Weisweiler, Max. 1951. "Das Amt des Mustamlī in der arabischen Wissenschaft", in: *Oriens* 4, 27-57.
- Wensinck, A.J. 1965². *The Muslim creed: its genesis and historical development*. London: Cass.
- Wolfson, Harry Austryn. 1976. *The philosophy of the kalam*. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University press. (Structure and growth of philosophic systems from Plato to Spinoza; 4).
- Zayd, 'Alī Muḥammad. 1985². *Mu'tazilat al-Yaman: dawlat al-Hādī wa-fīkruhū*. Ṣan'ā': Markaz al-dirāsāt wa-'l-buḥūth al-yamanī/Beirut: Dār al-'awda.

INDEX

- ‘*abath* (useless act) 125-126, 127, 131, 132, 138, 142, 159, 189
- Abrahamov, Binyamin 10, 60
- Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Baṣrī (d. 369/979) 20, 22, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32-33, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 61, 85, 105, 119, 182, 187
- Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī (d. 304/915) 17, 19-20, 21-26, 28, 34, 40, 69, 75, 76, 85, 89, 107, 118, 136, 137, 138, 152, 159, 183
- Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) 21
- Abū Hāshim ‘Abdallāh b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafīyya (d. ca. 98/717) 16, 17
- Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā’ī (d. 321/933) 17, 20-23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40, 46, 48, 69, 85, 89, 93, 96-97, 99-101, 104-105, 109, 111, 118, 130, 136, 143, 153, 159, 160, 175
- Abū ‘l-Hudhayl (d. between 226/840 and 236/850) 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 34, 183
- Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) 25, 39, 44, 57, 58, 59, 64, 69
- Abū ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s school 58-59, 69-71
- Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq (d. ca. 250/864) 168
- Abū Iṣḥāq b. ‘Ayyāsh (4th/10th century) 14, 22, 23, 26, 29, 30, 32, 34, 38, 74, 79-81, 101, 119
- Abū Muslim al-Iṣfahānī 60
- Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī (5th/11th century) 23, 24, 25, 29, 31, 34, 53, 55-57, 58, 66
- Abū Rīda, Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Hādī 31
- Abū Ṭālib al-Nāfiq bi-‘l-Ḥaqq (d. 424/1033) 23, 31, 39, 60, 61
- al-Abwāb* (by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā’ī) 97, 136
- accident, see ‘*arad*
- act, see *fi’l*; see also *tawlid* (generation) and *ibtidā’* (acting directly)
- ‘*āda* (normal course of events) 87, 108, 171-172
- K. adab al-jadal* (by Ibn al-Rāwandī) 47
- ‘*adam* (absence; nonexistence) 96, 110; see also *mā’dūm*
- al-Adilla* (by ‘Abd al-Jabbār) 51
- ‘*adl* (divine justice) 2
- adolescent (*murāhiq*) 177, 182, 190
- ‘Aḍud al-Dawla, Būyid, (d. 372/983) 41
- Ahlwardt, Wilhelm 56
- ‘Alā’ al-Dawla b. Kākūya (d. 433/1041) 50, 54, 55
- ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) 15, 16, 17, 60
- ālim* (suffering) 79
- ‘*allaqa* ‘*an* (to write down what is taught; to take notes) 4, 5, 31, see also *ta’liq*
- Alp Arslān, Seljuq (d. 465/1072) 63
- al-Amālī fi ‘l-ḥadīth* (by ‘Abd al-Jabbār) 52
- amputation 137, 138
- amr* (command) 118, 120-122, 132, 143, 144, 154, 161, 162, 167, 179; *amr bi-qabūh* 117
- ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd (d. 144/761) 15, 17
- analogy between the absent world and the present world (*qiyās al-ghā’ib ‘alā ‘l-shāhid*) 112-113, 126, 128, 157, 164, 180
- animals 128, 140, 147, 163-169, 170, 176, 178, 180, 187-189, 190; are not *mukallaf* and cannot deserve a divine reward or punishment 147, 152, 167, 187; in the hereafter 187-189; carnivorous and predatory animals 164-166, 174, 188; see also ‘*aqrab*, (scorpion), *zunbūr* (hornet), and slaughter of livestock
- ‘*āqil*, plural ‘*uqalā’* (adult of sound mind) 123, 128, 129, 130, 136, 142, 147, 155, 158, 185
- ‘*aql*, see ‘*ilm*
- ‘*aqrab* (scorpion) 107-108, 172, 187
- ‘*arad*, plural *‘arād* (accident) 73, 74-75, 77, 78, 79, 102
- Asadābād 37
- aṣḥāb* disciples 21, 22, 25, 26, 55; graduate students 21, 51; companions 58, 62
- al-Ash‘arī, Abū ‘l-Ḥasan (d. 324/935)

- 20, 63, 68, 74, 108, 109
 Ash'arites / Ash'arism 37, 63, 64, 68, 69, 100, 120
 'Askar Mukram 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 31, 32, 37, 40, 47, 50
al-'Askariyyāt (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 47
 atom, see *jawhar*
 aversion, see *nufūr*
 averting of harm (*daf' darar*) 124, 129-131, 134-135, 145, 156, 169-170
 'Awn, Fayṣal Badīr 6
 'Azmi, 'Uthmān al-Sayyid 5, 6
- bad, see *qabīh*; see also *sharr* (something bad)
 Baghdād 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 31, 32, 33, 35, 38, 40, 50, 54, 57, 59, 63, 64, 68;
 Baghdādī Mu'tazila 14, 23, 24, 26, 34, 55, 60, 61, 64, 69, 91, 183
 al-Baghdādī, 'Abd al-Qāhir b. Tāhir (d. 429/1037) 14, 18, 26, 27, 28, 35
al-Baghdādiyyāt (by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī) 27, 36, 136
 Bahā' al-Dawla, Būyid, (d. 403/1012) 49
 Bahāshima (alternative name for Bahshamiyya) 26
 Bahshamiyya 11, 14, 25, 26-28, 53, 55, 58, 59, 66, 68-70, 105; leadership 29-35
bakhīl (miser) 173
 al-Balkhī al-Ka'bī, Abū 'l-Qāsim (d. 319/931) 18, 23, 26, 46, 47, 60, 69, 108
bāqī (continuous) 102
 al-Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr (d. 403/1013) 39, 41
 al-Basāsīrī (d. 451/1060) 63
 Baṣra 18-20, 26, 27, 32, 35, 37, 57
 Baṣran Mu'tazila 13, 14, 21, 24, 26, 28, 41, 57, 61
 Bāṭinites 53
Bayān al-mutashābih fi 'l-Qur'ān (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 46
 Ben-Shammai, H. 3, 46, 65
 benefit, see *maṣlaḥa*
 Bernard, Marie 72, 76, 78, 123, 130, 134
bīnya (structure) 75, 81
 Biram, Arthur 6
 Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir (d. between 210-226/825-840) 24
 blame, see *dhamm*
 blessings after names 44, 45
 blood-money, see *diyya*
 blow 96, 97, 102
 Bosworth, C.E. 52
 Brunshvīg, Robert 9, 92, 95, 116
 Busse, Heribert 27, 38
 Büyids 37, 63
- caretaker 128, 129
 Carmathians 53
 cause (in the process of generation), see *sabab*
 cause (of a qualification), see 'illa
 chains of transmission of Mu'tazilism 14-18, 21, 29, 30, 66
 children 128, 140, 155-156, 158, 163, 171, 173, 175, 180, 187, 189-190; are not *mukallaḥ* and cannot deserve a divine reward or punishment 147, 154; in the hereafter 180, 189-190; — who have died before reaching maturity 155, 187, 189-190; sorrow of — 173; disciplining — 166-167
 class of things, see *jins*
 coldness (*burūda*) 73, 92; exposing a child to — 171
 command / commanding, see *amr*
 compensation, see 'iwāḍ; see also *diyya* (blood-money)
 composition (spatial relation), see *ta'tīf*
 condition (*shart*) for the generation (*tawlād*) of pain 93, 94, 99, 103, 105, 106, 111
 consent to be harmed 127, 128, 129, 132, 136, 137, 157, 158, 177
 constraint, see *ijbā'*
 continuous, see *bāqī*
 conviction, see *ī'tiqād*; see also *jahl* (a conviction that is not in accordance with truth)
 cosmology 74, 92, 102
- dā'ī* (motive) 130, 148, 149, 150
 Daiber, Hans 5, 76, 77
dalīl, plural *dalā'il* or *adilla* / *dalāla* (indication) 73, 112, 147, 166
darar / *maḍarra*, plural *maḍārr* (harm) 113-114, 122-125 and *passim*
 Day of Judgment 109
 Day of Resurrection 186, 187, 188, 189
 Day, Last 184

- Daylamān 37, 60, 64
 death 171, 172, 173, 180, 188; sorrow
 about — 151, 172, 173
 denomination, see *'ibāra*
 deserved pain 124, 131-134, 136
 desire, see *shahwa* and *mushtahī*
 al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348) 19
dhamm (blame) 28, 115, 116, 119, 131,
 132, 136, 137, 140
 Dhammiyya 28
 Dhanani, Alnoor 46, 72, 74
 dictation (*imlā'*) 5, 8, 51
ḍidd (opposite) 85, 88, 89, 102
 difference of opinion 7, 21, 22, 58
 al-Dīnawarī, Abū Bakr (d. 405/1014) 53
 Dīrār b. 'Amr (d. ca. 200/815) 18
 disasters 172
 dispute, see *munāzara*
Dīwān al-uṣūl (by Abū Rashīd al-
 Nīsābūrī) 56
ḍiya (blood-money) 163, 182
 donation, see *tafaḍḍul*
- effect, see *musabbab*
 enabling, see *tamkīn*
 Ess, Josef van 15, 18, 19, 72
 executioner 161, 162
 exertion 129, 134, 135, 169, 170
 existence; establishing the — of some-
 thing, see *ithbāt*; see also *muthbat* (be-
 ing established to exist)
- Faḍl al-ʿitizāl wa-tabaqāt al-Muʿtazila* (by
 'Abd al-Jabbār) 36, 52, 68
al-Fā'iḳ fī uṣūl al-dīn (by Ibn al-Malāḥimī)
 58, 59
 Fakhr al-Dawla, Būyid, (d. 387/997) 41,
 43, 48, 49
 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) 28,
 58, 69
 Fakhry, Majid 113, 120
 al-Farrazādhi, Abū Muḥammad Ismā'īl
 b. 'Alī (d. ca. 510/1116) 29, 30, 35,
 45, 65
 Fārs 37, 41
 al-Farzawī, Abū 'l-Hasan 25
fāsiq (malefactor) 12, 16, 186
 Fāḥimids 63
 fear 124, 130
Fī 'l-tawhīd (attributed to Abū Rashīd al-
 Nīsābūrī) 31
fī'l, plural *af'al* (act) 89, 90, 98, 100; —
 s of the limbs (*af'al al-jawāriḥ*) 89, 98,
 105; —s of the heart (*af'al al-qulūb*)
 89, 173; — cannot be produced by
 two agents acting together 100; act-
 ing through generation, see *tawlīd*;
 acting directly, see *ibtidā'*
 fire (*nār*) 103, 107, 108; exposing some-
 one to — 171; sorrow about destruc-
 tion by — 172, 174
 Frank, Richard M. 3, 47, 74, 77, 78, 90,
 112, 113, 116, 126
 freedom of choice 2, 130, 144, 156, 165,
 170, 179, 190, 191
- Gabriel (angel) 16
 Galen 80, 81
 generation of acts, see *tawlīd*
al-ghā'ib (the absent world; the divine
 world) 112, 113; see also analogy
 between the absent world and the
 present world (*qiyās al-ghā'ib 'alā*
'l-shāhid)
ghamm, plural *ghumūm* (sorrow) 87, 114,
 122, 123, 131, 132, 151, 172-176,
 179, 180; — without reason (*min*
ghayri sababīn) 174
al-Gharīb al-mashriqī fī 'l-nawḥ 'alā 'l-
ḥayawān (by Abū 'Isā al-Warrāq) 168
 Ghaznavids 55, 61
ghulam (student-servitor) 18
 gift, see *tafaḍḍul*
 Gimaret, Daniel 5-7, 9 18, 22, 25, 26,
 30, 31, 45, 46, 58, 62, 66, 74, 97,
 100, 109, 116, 143, 166
 God; described as being a *ma'nā* 75, 76;
 perceives all perceptible things 86,
 110; is not described as feeling pain
 or pleasure 86, 110; is without desire
 or aversion 86, 110, 148; does not
 have needs 86, 107, 148; brings pain
 into existence 106-108, 110; acts di-
 rectly, but can also act through gen-
 eration 107; creates intuitive knowl-
 edge in humans 117, 143; imposes
 obligations, see *taklif*; does not impose
 the impossible 146; does what is
 obligatory for Him 146, 147, 160,
 177; motivates the *mukallafūn* 142,
 148, 160, 165; does not stop the
 wrongdoer by force 156, 179; can be
 compared to a caretaker, a trustee or
 a guardian 128-129, 177, 182; God's

- commands, permission or prohibitions 120-122, 132, 143, 144, 147, 165, 166, 167, 171, 174; purpose of God's infliction of pain 159, 160; acquisition of knowledge about God 112-113, 130
 good, see *ḥasan*; see also *khayr* (something good)
 grave sinner, 15, 16
 Gwynne, Rosalind Ward 20, 22
 al-Ḥabashī, Abū 'Abdallāh 27
 al-Ḥabashī, b. Mu'izz al-Dawla, Būyid, 27, 38
ḥadd punishment 131-132, 133, 152, 154, 161, 162
 al-Hādī ilā 'l-Ḥaqq, Yaḥyā (d. 298/911) 60, 61
 Ḥadīth 37, 38, 52, 169, 187
ḥāja (need) 148-149
 al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī (d. 494/1100) 34, 68
ḥāl (state) 77, 78, 79
ḥalāl (permissible) 121
 Hamadhān 37, 41, 49, 54
 Ḥamīdullāh, Muḥammad 39
 Ḥanafites / Ḥanifism 43, 53, 54, 63, 64, 68, 69, 139
 Ḥanbalites 189
ḥaraka, plural *ḥarakāt* (movement) 83, 89, 90, 102, 105; involuntary movements 105, 106
 harm, see *ḍarar*
ḥasan (good) 113-116 and *passim*
 al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728) 15, 16
 al-Ḥasan b. Zayd (d. 270/884) 60
 Hāshimiyya (alternative name for Bahshamiyya) 26
ḥayāt (life) 75, 79, 80, 82, 85, 89, 91, 93, 146
 headaches 106
 Hecker, Judith Katz 93, 99
 hell 107, 153, 154, 186, 187, 189
 hereafter (*al-ākḥira*) 107, 152, 153, 154, 162, 180-184, 187-191; see also hell, and paradise
 al-Ḥillī al-'Allāma (d. 726/1325) 59, 70
 al-Ḥimmaṣī, Sadīd al-Dīn (d. after 600/1204) 59
 al-Ḥimyārī, Nashwān (d. 574/1178) 46
 hornet, see *zunbūr*
 Horten, Max 56, 65
 Houben, J.J. 5, 6, 62, 65
 Hourani, George F. 115, 116, 118, 137, 148
ḥukm (assessment; predicate) 76, 77, 78, 83
 humours 80, 81, 92
 hunger 170
 Ḥusayniyya, see Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's school
ibāḥa (permission) 116, 158, 161, 165, 166-169, 171, 174
'ibāra (denomination) 83, 84
 Ibn 'Abbād, see al-Sāḥib b. 'Abbād
 Ibn Abī 'Allān, Abū Aḥmad 27
 Ibn Abī 'l-Wafā' (d. 775/1373) 69
 Ibn 'Aqīl (d. 513/1119) 64
 Ibn 'Ayyāsh, Abū Ishāq, see Abū Ishāq b. 'Ayyāsh
 Ibn Barhān, Abū 'l-Qāsim (d. 456/1064) 59
 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 779/1377) 69
 Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004) 49
 Ibn al-Ḥajjāj (d. 391/1001) 43
 Ibn al-Ikshīd, Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. 'Alī (d. 326/938) 26
 Ibn Khallād, Abū 'Alī (4th/10th century) 17, 20, 29, 30-31, 32, 33, 34, 50
 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd (d. 536/1141) 57, 58, 59, 67
 Ibn Mattawayh (d. ca. 468/1075) 23, 29, 36, 39, 46, 51, 62, 65-67, 71, 74, 81, 85, 86, 88, 97, 99, 100, 101, 105, 109, 118, 143, 144, 145, 158-160, 165, 176, 179, 182, 183, 185, 188
 Ibn al-Murtaḍā (840/1437) 22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 35
 Ibn al-Muslima (d. 450/1058) 63
 Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 385/995) 19, 23, 26, 30, 32, 33, 38, 41
 Ibn al-Najīh, Abū 'l-Ḥasan 32
 Ibn al-Rāwandī (4th/10th century) 47
 Ibn Sahlwayh, Abū 'l-Qāsim 31, 33
 Ibn Salma, Abū Aḥmad 27
 Ibn al-Samḥ (d. 418/1027) 57
 Ibn Sīmā (d. 428/1037) 46, 49, 52, 54, 81
 Ibn Suwār al-Kātib, Abū 'Alī 38, 40
 Ibn al-Walīd, Abū 'Alī (d. 478/1086) 59, 64
 Ibn al-Zubayrī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad 26
 Ibrāhīm, Prophet, 87

- ibtidā'* ('*alā jihat al-ibtidā'*) (acting directly and not through generation) 106; see also *mubtada'an*
- idrāk* (perception) 72, 73, 82, 85, 110, 134, 146
- iftirāq* (separation), see *tafrīq*
- Ikhshidiyya 25-28, 118, 159
- ijā'* (constraint) 144, 145, 149, 165, 170, 179
- '*illa*, plural '*ilal* (cause of a qualification) 76, 78, 90
- illness (*marād*, plural *amrād*) 75, 106, 129, 151-153, 155, 158, 159, 168, 172, 177, 179, 180, 182, 185, 186, 191
- '*ilm* (knowledge) 72-73, 123, 134-135, 147, 172, 173; intuitive, innate knowledge (— *ḍarūrī* / *bi-tarīqat al-iḍtirār* / '*aqlan*) 117, 120, 121, 122, 130, 132, 143, 147, 173; acquired knowledge (— *muktasab*) / acquisition of knowledge 72-73, 130, 147; see also *nazar*
- Imād al-Dawla, Būyid, (d. 338/949) 37
- Imāmites / Imāmism 50, 54, 59, 63, 70
- imposing of obligations, see *taklīf*
- inanimate object, see *jamād*
- indication, see *dalīl*
- injustice, see *zulm*
- insane people 128, 129, 140, 147, 163, 175
- instigation 165
- intaṣafa* (to administer justice) 177, 187
- intention 118, 124, 125, 127, 128, 138; unintentionally 118-119, 140, 163, 157
- K. al-intiṣār* (by al-Khayyāt) 13
- irāda* (will) 78, 89, 90, 143, 144, 147
- irāda li-qabīḥ* (will to do something bad) 117, 119
- Iṣfahān 26, 37, 41, 50, 54, 62
- al-Iṣfahānī, Abū 'l-Qāsim b. Sa'd 27
- iḥbāt* (establishing the existence of) 72, 73
- i'tidāl* (balance of the body) 80, 81
- i'tidāl al-mizāj* (balance of the mixture) 92
- i'timād*, plural *i'timādāt* (pressure) 73, 74, 89, 90, 93, 94, 95-98, 105, 107; induced pressure (— *mujtalab*) 104; intrinsic pressure (— *lāzim*) 103
- K. al-i'timād* (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 46
- i'tiqād* (conviction) 89, 122, 134
- I'tiqādāt firaq al-muslimīn wa-'l-mushrikīn* (by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) 69
- i'tizāl*, see Mu'tazilism
- ittiṣāl* (connectedness) 80
- '*uwaḍ* (compensation) 128, 129, 157-190; right to — 164, 186; obligation to compensate 157, 161-164, 176; impossibility of remittance 181, 182; quantity 158-159, 162, 164, 168, 173, 177-178, transference 177-178, 181, 182; moment of provision 180-181, 185, 186-187; duration 159, 183-184; components 187-188; displeasure about the — being ended 183, 184, 185, 188, 189, 190
- 'Izz al-Dawla, Būyid, (d. 367/978) 40
- al-Ḥadal* (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 47
- Ja'far b. Abī Yahyā, al-Qāḍī (d. 573/1177) 66
- Ja'far b. Ḥarb (d. 236/850) 15
- jahl* (wrong conviction, not in accordance with truth; misconception) 117, 134, 168
- jamā'a* (to compose; to write) 6
- jamād* (inanimate object) 108-111
- al-Ḥāmī* (by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī) 97
- al-Ḥāmī* *al-kabīr* (by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī) 39, 46
- al-Ḥāmī* *al-ṣaghīr* (by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī) 39, 46
- jarab* (scabies) 83, 88
- Jawābāt al-Ṣaymarī* (by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī) 23
- jawhar*, plural *jawāhir* (atom) 74, 92, 94, 95, 99, 102
- Jibāl 37, 41-43, 49
- Jilān 60
- jins* (class of things) 73-74, 83, 84; class of pain and pleasure 82-88, 109, 111
- joy, see *surūr*
- Jubbā 19
- al-Jubbā'ī, Abū 'Alī, see Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī
- al-Jubbā'ī, Abū Hāshim, see Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī
- Jubbā'iyya 25, 28
- juh* (wound) 93, 103, 104
- al-Jurjānī, Abū 'l-Ḥasan (d. 392/1001) 49
- al-Jushamī, al-Ḥākim, see al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī
- justice, see '*adl*; to administer —, see *intaṣafa*

- al-Juwaynī, Abū 'l-Ma'ālī (d. 478/1085)
63
juz', plural *ajzā'* (particle) 99, 100
- al-Ka'bī, see al-Balkhī al-Ka'bī, Abū
'l-Qāsim
kāfir, plural *kuffār* (unbeliever) 16, 152,
154, 186
kalām (speculative theology) 54, 56
kalām (speech) 83
*al-Kāmīl fī 'l-istiḡṣā' fī-mā balaghanā min
kalām al-qudamā'* (by Taqī al-Dīn al-
Najrānī) 59
Karkh quarter (Baghdād) 63, 64
al-Karkhī, Abū 'l-Ḥasan (d. 340/952) 33
kawn, plural *akwān* (spatial relation) 74,
83, 94, 95, 97, 102
khalīfa (substitute-teacher) 51
Khārijites (Khawārij) 16, 109
khātir (inner voice) 130
khayr (something good) 113, 114
al-Khayyāt (d. ca. 300/913) 13, 23
al-Khayyūn, Rashīd 19
al-Khilāf bayn al-shaykhayn (by 'Abd al-
Jabbār) 22, 23
al-Khūr al-'in [or *al-'ayn*] (by Nashwān
al-Ḥimyārī) 46
Khurāsān 40, 41, 53, 62, 63
Khurramiyya 152
Khushaym, 'Alī Fahmī 20, 22, 26
Khūzistān 19, 32, 35, 37, 40, 41
Khwārazm 68, 69
kidhb (lie) 115, 117, 118
al-Kifāya (by Ibn Mattawayh) 67
al-Kitāb al-Muhtawī (by Yūsuf al-Baṣīr) 8,
9
knock, see *muṣākka*
knowledge, see *ilm*
Kraemer, Joel L. 43
al-Kundurī, Amīd al-Mulk (d. 456/
1064) 63
- al-Labbād, Abū Muḥammad 'Abdallāh
51
ladhdha / *maladhdha*, plural *malādhdh*
(pleasure) 82-84, 86-88, 114, 115
Lanjā 60, 61
leadership (*riyāsa*) of a theological
school 20, 24, 25, 33, 55
learning, see *ma'rifa*
lesion, see *wahā*
libraries 38, 40, 63
- lie, see *kidhb* 115
life, see *ḥayāt*
lifeless parts of the body 82
K. al-luma' (by al-Ash'arī) 38
lutf, plural *alṭāf* (assistance in fulfilling the
obligations of God's *taklīf*) 142, 149-
151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 160, 167,
175, 184; *lutf fī 'l-qabīh* 150
- K. al-mabsūt* (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 39
Madelung, Wilferd 4, 15, 18, 23, 37, 39,
46, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 65, 67, 68,
125, 168
madh (praise) 115, 116, 119
madhhab (opinion; doctrine; school) 34
madrasa (institution of learning) 63, 64
Madyan 154
ma'dūm (not presently existing, absent)
19, 72, 73, 95
mafsada (immorality) 150
maḥall (substrate) 74, 75, 79, 85, 92, 102,
109, 110
Maḥmūd, Ghaznavid, (d. 421/1030) 53,
54, 55, 57, 71
maḥzūr (forbidden) 121
Majd al-Dawla, Būyid, (d. 420/1029)
49-51, 53, 54
al-Majdī (by 'Abd al Jabbār) 50, 51
al-Majmū' fī 'l-muḥūṭ bi-'l-taklīf (by Ibn
Mattawayh) 5-7, 8, 11, 67
Makdisi, George 4, 5, 18, 21, 43, 69
al-Ma'mūn II, Khwārazm-shāh, (d.
407/1017) 52, 68
ma'nā, plural *ma'ānī* (causal determinant)
73-81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 102, 109, 110
maṣfi (impossible) 72
Mānkdim (d. 425/1034) 4, 5, 7, 8, 10,
11, 39, 42, 45, 47, 53, 60-62, 71, 91,
92, 97, 109, 144, 145, 181, 183-185,
187-189
al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn (the inter-
mediate position) 15, 16
al-Maqālāt (by Abū 'Isā al-Warrāq) 168
al-Maqālāt (by al-Balkhī) 46
Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn (by al-Ash'arī) 22
Mardāwīj, Ziyārid, (d. 323/935) 37
ma'rifa (learning) 147, 152
Martin, Richard C. 31
*K. al-masā'il fī 'l-khilāf bayn al-Baṣriyyīn wa-
'l-Baghdādiyyīn* (by Abū Rashīd al-
Nīsābūrī) 56
maṣlaḥa (benefit) 159

- Mas'ūd, Ghaznavid, (d. 431/1040) 54-55
- Mas'ūd b. Muḥammad, Seljuk, (d. 547/1152) 68
- Māturīdism 68
- mawjūd* (presently existing) 72
- McDermott, Martin 9, 50, 58, 70
- Mecca 50, 63, 169
- medical treatment 129
- mihna* (trial) 133, 152, 153, 154
- al-Minhāj fī uṣūl al-dīn* (by al-Zamakhsharī) 68
- miracle 87
- miser, see *bakhīl*
- mizāj* (blend; temperament) 80, 81, 92
- Mohammed, Abdalla I. 113, 116
- Monnot, Guy 3, 60, 78
- motivation 148, 150, 155, 165
- motive, see *dā'i*
- movement, see *ḥaraka*
- moving, see *mutaḥarrik*
- Mu'ammār b. 'Abbād al-Sulamī (d. 215/830) 2, 34, 77
- al-Mu'ayyad bi-'llāh (d. 411/1020) 31, 56, 50, 60, 61
- Mu'ayyid al-Dawla, Būyid, (d. 373/984) 41, 43
- mubāḥ* (permissible) 116, 139
- al-Mubarrad (d. 285/898) 20
- mubtada'an* (directly and not through generation) 90, 107, 108
- mudrak* (perceptible) 73, 74, 80, 81, 86, 102
- al-Mufīd, al-Shaykh (d. 413/1022) 9, 50, 63, 70
- al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-'l-'adl* (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 3, 8-10, 36, 44-45, 133
- al-Muḥallī, Ḥumayd (d. 652/1254) 60, 62
- al-Muḥallī al-Qāsīm b. Aḥmad b. Ḥumayd 62
- Muḥammad, Prophet, 16, 17
- Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafīyya (d. 81/700) 16, 17
- Muḥammad b. Mazdak 30
- Muḥammad b. Zayd (d. 287/900) 60
- al-Muḥīṭ bi-'l-taklīf* (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 6, 7, 51, 65, 99, 143
- Mu'izz al-Dawla, Būyid, (d. 356/967) 37, 38, 40
- Mujbira 100, 120
- al-Mūjībāt wa-'l-mu'aththirāt* (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 36
- K. al-Mujzī fī uṣūl al-fiqh* (by Abū Ṭālib al-Nāfiq) 23, 39
- mukallaḥ*, plural *mukallaḥūn* 75, 143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 150, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 180, 182, 187; obligations imposed on — 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 152
- al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn* (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 36, 43, 47
- Mukhtaṣar al-husnā* (or *al-Ḥasanī*) (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 36, 47
- munāfiq* (hypocrite) 16
- munāzara* (dispute) 27, 53
- al-Munqidh min al-taqīd* (by Sadīd al-Dīn al-Ḥimmaṣī) 59
- murder 163, 164
- murīd* (willing) 78, 146
- Murjī'ites 16
- al-Murshad bi-'llāh Abū 'l-Ḥusayn Yaḥyā (d. 477/1084) 30, 64
- al-Murtaḍā, al-Sharīf ('Alam al-Hudā) (d. 436/1044) 9, 41, 50, 70
- musabbab* (effect) 90, 91, 95, 96, 98, 102, 103, 107
- muṣākka* (knock), 90, 93
- mushṭahī* (feeling a desire) 78, 83
- al-Mustazhir bi-'llāh (d. 512/1118) 60
- mutaḥarrik* (moving) 76, 102
- mutakallimūn* 72, 76, 77
- al-Mu'tamad fī uṣūl al-dīn* (by Ibn al-Malāḥimī) 57, 58, 59, 67
- K. al-Mu'tamad fī uṣūl al-fiqh* (by Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī) 39, 44
- Mutashābih al-Qur'ān* (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 36
- Mu'tazila / Mu'tazilism (*i'tizāl*) 15, 40, 49, 54, 61, 63, 64, 67-70; origins 15; name 15, 16; favouritism of — 42, 60; repression of — 53, 54, 57, 63, 64; Mu'tazilite principles, see *uṣūl muthbat* (being established to exist) 72, 76
- nadb* (recommended) 116
- naḥf* (profit) 113, 114, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127-130, 132, 135, 136, 137, 144, 145, 149, 166, 169, 170
- nā'im* (sleeper) 118, 119, 126, 163
- al-Najrānī, 'Alī b. 'Abdallāh b. 'Aṭīyya 62
- Naqd al-abwāb* (by Abū Ḥāshim al-

- Jubbā'ī) 22
al-Naqd 'alā aṣḥāb al-ṭabā'ī (by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī) 109
al-Naqd 'alā ṣāhib Majmū' al-muḥīṭ ... (by Qāḍī Ja'far) 67
Naqd al-luma' (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 39
Naqd al-naqd (by al-Bāqillānī) 39
 al-Nāshī' al-Akbar (d. 293/906) 15
 al-Naṣībīnī (or al-Naṣībī), Abū Ishāq 41
 al-Nāṣihī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad (d. 484/1091) 64
 al-Nāṣir bi-'l-Ḥaqq b. 'Alī al-Uṭrūsh (d. 304/917) 60
 al-Nāṭiq bi-'l-Ḥaqq, see Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq bi-'l-Ḥaqq
al-Nawh 'alā 'l-bahā'im (by Abū 'Īsā al-Warrāq) 168
nazar (reflection) 7, 73, 78, 112, 123, 130, 147, 152
Nazm al-fawā'id wa-taqrīb al-murād li-'l-rā'id (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 52
 al-Nazzām, Abū Ishāq (d. ca. 221/836) 18
 need, see *hāja*
 needle-pricks 98-101
K. al-nihāya (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 39, 48
K. al-nihāya fī 'l-aṣṭah 'alā Abī 'Alī (by al-Balkhī) 24
 Nīsābūr 43, 47, 53, 54, 55, 56, 62-64
 al-Nīsābūrī, Abū Rashīd, see Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī
al-Nīsābūriyyāt (by 'Abd al Jabbār) 47
 Nizām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092) 42, 63
nufūr (aversion) 79, 82, 84-86, 88, 101, 109, 110, 147
 Nyberg, H.S. 15, 26
- obligations, see *taklīf* (imposing of obligations)
 obligatory, see *wājib*
 Oghuz Turks 55, 62
 opposite, see *ḍidd*
 Ormsby, Eric L. 2
 Özbek, Mongol, (d. 742/1341) 69
- pain (*alam*, plural *ālām*) *passim*, see Contents; quantity of — 96, 97, 98-102, 104, 108; — is harm 114, 123
 paradise 153, 183-185, 187-190
 particle, see *juz'*
 perception, see *idrāk*; see also *mudrak* (perceptible)
 permissible, see *mubāh*; see also *ḥalāl*
 permission, see *ibāha*
 Peters, J.R.T.M. 51, 74, 77, 87, 90, 92, 113, 130, 133
 pleasure, see *ladhdha*
 power of acting, see *qudra*
 praise, see *madh*
 presence, see *wujūd*
 pressure, see *ṭimād*
 principles of Mu'tazilism, see *uṣūl*
 profit, see *naḥf*
 prophets 87, 142, 147, 148, 150-152, 153, 154
 punishment (*'iqāb*) 122, 131, 132, 133, 136, 144, 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 180, 183, 186, 187; the right to punish 124, 125, 131; wrongly condemned person 161-162; children, insane people and animals cannot have deserved — 147, 152, 154, 167; diminution (*takḥfīf*) of — in hell 186; see also *ḥadd* punishment
 Punishment of the Grave (*'adhāb al-qabr*) 108, 109
- qabīh* (bad) 113-118 and *passim*
qādir (able to act) 146; — *bi-'l-qudra* 97; see also *qudra* (power of acting)
 al-Qādir, Caliph, (d. 422/1031) 53, 54, 57
 al-Qā'im, Caliph, (d. 467/1075) 63
 al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Rassī (d. 246/860) 60-61
 Qazwīn 42, 50
qudra (power of acting) 75, 98, 110, 146
 Qur'ān 106, 142, 146, 153, 167, 187, 189, 190
- ra'īs* (most important scholar; leader of a theological school) 24; see also leadership
 Rāmḥurmuz 38, 40
 al-Rāmḥurmuzī, Abū Muḥammad 'Abdallāh b. al-'Abbās 40
 Rayy 35, 41-44, 47, 49, 50, 53-57, 61, 62, 64-66, 68, 81
 al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn, see Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī
al-Rāziyyāt (by 'Abd al Jabbār) 47
 reflection, see *nazar*
 Reinhart, A. Kevin 76, 113, 117, 130
 repentance, see *tawba*

- revelation, see *al-samʿ*
 reviving 109, 180, 186, 187, 189
 reward, see *thawāb*
Risāla fī laṭīf al-kalām (by Ibn Mattawayh) 67
Risālat al-ḥusnā (by ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 47
 Rukn al-Dawla, Būyid, (d. 366/976) 37, 41
 al-Rummānī, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā (d. 384/994) 26, 27

sabab, plural *asbāb* (cause in the process of generation) 90, 95, 96, 97, 98, 103, 106, 107
sāhū (absentminded person) 118, 119, 126, 163
 al-Šāḥib b. ʿAbbād (d. 385/995) 27, 28, 41, 42-43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 45, 61, 70, 184
ṣalāt (ritual prayer) 122, 149, 151
al-samʿ (revelation) 120, 121, 122, 132, 144, 163, 190
 Sāmānids 41, 43
 al-Sammān, Abū ʿl-ʿAbbās (5th/11th century) 53
 al-Sammān, Ismāʿīl b. ʿAlī (d. after 447/1056) 64
 al-Šandalī Abū ʿl-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan (d. 484/1091) 64
ṣawt, plural *aṣwāt* (sound) 83, 89, 90, 93
 al-Šaymarī, Abū ʿAbdallāh (d. 436/1045) 54, 57
 al-Šaymarī, Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. ʿUmar (d. 315/927) 23-27
 Sayyid, Fuʿād 42, 65
 al-Šayyida Shīrīn (d. 419/1028) 49, 50, 53
 Sceptics 72
 Schmidtke, Sabine 59, 70
 schools within the Muʿtazila 13-14, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34, 35, 58
 Schwarz, Michael 149
 scorpion, see *ʿaqrab*
 scratching 119; see also *jarab* (scabies)
 self-defence 139-140, 171
 Seljuks 55, 62, 64, 66, 68
 separation, see *tafrīq*
 sessions (*majālis*) 19, 42, 43
 Sezgin, Fuat 22
 Shāfiʿites / Shāfiʿism 37, 49, 63, 64, 68
 al-Shaḥḥām, Abū Yaʿqūb (d. 257/871?) 17, 18-19, 22, 23

al-shāhid (the present world) 112, 113; see also analogy between the absent world and the present world (*qiyās al-ghāʾib ʿalā ʿl-shāhid*)
 al-Shahrestānī (d. 548/1153) 14, 26, 58
shahwa (desire) 78, 82, 84-86, 88, 147, 148, 165
 Shams al-Dawla, Būyid, 49
 Shāpūr b. Ardashīr (d. 416/1025) 63
K. al-sharḥ (by Ibn Khallād) 31, 50
Sharḥ adab al-jadal (by ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 47
Sharḥ al-ʾarād (by ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 46
Sharḥ al-jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr (by ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 39
Sharḥ al-jāmiʿ ayn (by ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 39
Sharḥ al-jawāmiʿ (by ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 46
Sharḥ kashf al-aghṛād ʿan al-ʾarād (by ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 46
Sharḥ al-maqālāt (by ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 46
Sharḥ al-tadhkira fī laṭīf al-kalām (by unknown author) 67
Sharḥ al-ʿumad (by ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 39
Sharḥ al-ʿumad (by Abū ʿl-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī) 39
Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa (by ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 4, 10, 45-46, 65
Sharḥ al-ʿuyūn (by al-Hākīm al-Jushamī) 52
 al-Sharīf al-Raḍī (d. 406/1016) 43
sharr (something bad) 113, 114
shayʿ (thing) 73, 76
shaykh (master) 23, 24, 31
 Shīʿa / Shīʿism / Shīʿites 24, 37, 38, 53, 54, 63, 67, 70, 152
 Siegel, Rudolph E. 80
ṣifa (attribute; predicate) 76, 84, 78
ṣiḥḥa (soundness), 79-81, 91-94, 111; disappearance of — 80, 81, 91, 93, 96, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105
 sinner; status of the grave — 15, 16
 al-Sīrāfī, Abū ʿl-Qāsim 26, 27
 slander 176, 182
 slaughter of livestock 121, 167-168
 sleeper, see *nāʾim*
 Smith, Jane Idleman 190
 Sophists 72
 sorrow, see *ghamm*
 sound, see *ṣawt*; see also *muṣākka* (knock)
 soundness, see *ṣiḥḥa*
 spatial occupation, see *taḥayyuz*
 spatial relation, see *kawn*
 state, see *ḥāl*

- stealing 127-128, 139, 162, 168, 175
 Stroumsa, Sarah 15
 structure, see *binya*
 Ṣubḥī, Aḥmad Maḥmūd 150
 substance (*jawhar*) 74
 substrate, see *maḥall*
sukūn al-nafs (certitude) 134-135
 Sulaymān b. Nāṣir b. Sa'īd (6th/12th century) 44
 Sunnites 38, 54, 63, 64, 69
 supposition, see *zann*
surūr (joy) 114, 123, 130, 170, 189
- ṭabā'ī* (natural dispositions) 92
ṭabaqa (generation of Mu'tazilites) 17, 20, 21, 29, 30, 66
Ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazila (by Ibn al-Murtaḍā) 52
 Ṭabaristān 60
al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-'l-a'rāḍ (by Ibn Mattawayh) 6-8, 11, 67
tafaḍḍul (donation, gift) 145, 146, 159, 178, 179, 185, 188, 189, 190
tafīrīq / ifīrīq (separation) 73, 80, 83, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102
Tafsīr (by Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī) 22
taḥayyuz (spatial occupation) 74
Tahdhīb al-sharḥ (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 39
K. al-tahrīr (by Ibn Mattawayh) 67
K. al-tajrīd (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 46
taḥlīf (imposing of obligations) 129, 142-151, 152, 153, 155, 159, 167, 169, 179, 183, 184, 187, 188, 190, 191
ta'līf (composition) 75, 83, 89, 92, 102, 111
ta'līq / ta'līqa 4, 5, see also 'allaqa 'an
Tā'līq 'alā sharḥ al-imām al-mashhūr bi-Mānkḍīm (by al-Qāsim al-Muḥallī) 62
Tā'līq al-Baghdādiyyāt (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 6, 36
Tā'līq al-iḥāṭa (attributed to Ibn Mattawayh) 67
Tā'līq Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa (by al-Farrazādhī) 45, 65, 66
Tā'līq sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa (by Mānkḍīm) 3-5, 7-8, 10, 11, 61-62, 149
tanḳīn (enabling) 164
tanāsukh / aṣḥāb al-tanāsukh (adherents of the transmigration of souls), 75, 151-152
- Tanzīh al-Qur'ān 'an al-maṭā'īn* (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 36, 51
 Taqī al-Dīn al-Najrānī 59
taqlīd (uncritical adherence) 7
Taqrīb al-uṣūl (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 39
taqīf (cutting; incision) 99, 103
Tathbūt dalā'il al-nubuwwa (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 36, 51
tawba (repentance) 48, 133, 154
tawlīd (generation) 89-91, 94-97, 99, 102, 103, 105, 106
 teaching 5, 19, 20, 50, 51, 65
 Thamūd 154
thawāb (reward) 122, 145-146, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153, 157, 160, 167, 169, 170, 180, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187
 trial, see *mīhna*
 Tughril-beg, Seljuk, (d. 455/1063) 62-64
 al-Tūnī, Abū 'l-Ḥasan 53
 al-Tūsī, Abū Ja'far (Shaykh al-Ṭā'ifa) (d. 459/1067) 63, 70
 tyrannical ruler 178-179
- Ullmann, Manfred 80
K. al-'umad (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 39, 48
 unbeliever, see *kāfir*
 useless act, see 'abath
al-uṣūl (the Mu'tazilite principles) 10, 47;
al-uṣūl al-khamsa 10, 13, 18
K. al-uṣūl (by Ibn Khallād) 31
K. al-uṣūl al-khamsa (by 'Abd al-Jabbār) 36, 45, 46
K. uṣūl al-niḥal (attributed to al-Nāshī' al-Akbar) 15
 'Uthmān al-Ṭawīl 16, 17
 'Uthmān, 'Abd al-Karīm 3, 4, 36, 39, 45, 46, 47, 51, 52, 65, 143, 150
- Vajda, Georges 4, 8, 9, 123
- wahā* (lesion) 92-94, 95, 97, 98, 103, 104, 105
wajh, plural *wujūh* (way in which an act is done; aspect) 114, 116, 117, 120, 121
wājib (obligatory) 28, 116, 122, 149, 157, 160
 warmth (*ḥārara*) 73, 82, 92
 warning (*ītibār*) 159-160, 167
 Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā' (d. 131/748) 14, 15, 16, 17
 Watt, W. Montgomery 15, 20, 120

- weight, see *ʿtimād lāzim* 103
 will, see *irāda*; see also *murīd* (willing)
 Wolfson, Harry Austryn 75, 130
 women 19
 wound, see *juh*; see also *wahā* (lesion)
wujūd (presence) 78, 110
- Yemen 3, 6, 57, 61, 69, 70
- Zāhirites 76
zaʿīm (leader) 24
 al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) 68
 Zambaur, E. de 52
 Zanj 18, 19
zann (supposition) 89, 123, 124, 134-137,
 166, 170
- Zayd, ʿAlī Muḥammad 60
 Zaydites / Zaydism 50, 59-61, 62, 63,
 65, 66, 69, 70
Ziyādāt (by Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī) 31
Ziyādāt al-sharḥ 50
Ziyādāt al-sharḥ (by ʿAbd al-Jabbār) 31
Ziyādāt al-sharḥ (by Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq)
 31
- Ziyārīds 37
zulm (injustice) 117, 118, 119, 120, 121,
 123-125, 131; refraining from —
 143, 149, 155
zubbūr (hornet) 107

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE

TEXTS AND STUDIES

ISSN 0169-8729

8. Fakhry, M. *Ethical Theories in Islam*. Second expanded edition. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09300 1
9. Kemal, S. *The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna*. 1991. ISBN 90 04 09371 0
10. Alon, I. *Socrates in Medieval Arabic Literature*. 1991. ISBN 90 04 09349 4
11. Bos, G. *Qusṭā ibn Lūqā's Medical Regime for the Pilgrims to Mecca*. The Risāla fī tadbīr safar al-ḥajj. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09541 1
12. Kohlberg, E. *A Medieval Muslim Scholar at Work*. Ibn Tāwūs and his Library. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09549 7
13. Daiber, H. *Naturwissenschaft bei den Arabern im 10. Jahrhundert n. Chr.* Briefe des Abū l-Faḍl Ibn al-ʿAmīd (gest. 360/970) an ʿAḍudaddaula. Herausgegeben mit Einleitung, kommentierter Übersetzung und Glossar. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09755 4
14. Dhanani, A. *The Physical Theory of Kalām*. Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian Muʿtazilī Cosmology. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09831 3
15. Abū Maʿsar. *The Abbreviation of the Introduction to Astrology*. Together with the Medieval Latin Translation of Adelard of Bath. Edited and Translated by Ch. Burnett, K. Yamamoto and M. Yano. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09997 2
16. Sābūr Ibn Sahl. *Dispensatorium Parvum (al-Aqrābādhin al-ṣaghīr)*. Analysed, Edited and Annotated by O. Kahl. 1994. ISBN 90 04 10004 0
17. Maróth, M. *Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie*. Übersetzung aus dem Ungarischen von Johanna Till und Gábor Kerekes. 1994. ISBN 90 04 10008 3
18. Ibn Abī al-Dunyā. *Morality in the Guise of Dreams*. A Critical Edition of *Kitāb al-Manām*, with Introduction, by Leah Kinberg. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09818 6
19. Kügelgen, A. von. *Averroes und die arabische Moderne*. Ansätze zu einer Neubegründung des Rationalismus im Islam. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09955 7
20. Lameer, J. *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics*. Greek Theory and Islamic Practice. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09884 4
22. Adang, C. *Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible*. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10034 2
23. Dallal, A.S. *An Islamic Response to Greek Astronomy*. *Kitāb Taʿdīl Hayʾat al-Aflāk* of Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa. Edited with Translation and Commentary. 1995. ISBN 90 04 09968 9
24. Conrad, L.I. (ed.). *The World of Ibn Ṭufayl*. *Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Ḥayy ibn Yaḡzān*. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10135 7
25. Hermansen, M.K. (tr.). *The Conclusive Argument from God*. Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi's *Hujjat Allāh al-Bāligha*. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10298 1
26. Abrahamov, B. *Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qurʾān in the Theology of al-Qāsīm ibn Ibrāhīm*. *Kitāb al-Mustarshid*. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10408 9
27. Wild, S. (ed.). *The Qurʾan as Text*. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10344 9

28. Riddell, P.G. and T. Street (eds.). *Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought and Society*. A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony H. Johns. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10692 8
29. Jolivet, J. and R. Rashed (eds.). *Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindī*. Volume I. *L'Optique et la Catoptrique*. Edited by R. Rashed. 1997. ISBN 90 04 09781 3
30. Rudolph, U. *Al-Māturīdī und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand*. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10023 7
31. Endress, G. and J. A. Aertsen (eds.). *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition*. Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198). Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne, 1996). ISBN 90 04 11308 8
32. Elmore, G.T. *Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time*. Ibn al-ʿArabi's *Book of the Fabulous Gryphon*. 1999. ISBN 90 04 10991 9
33. Abū Maʿšār. *Kitāb al-milal wa-d-duwal*. Arabic text edited by K. Yamamoto with an English translation by K. Yamamoto and Ch. Burnett. 1999. ISBN 90 04 10725 8
34. Albumasar. *De Magnis Coniunctionibus* (On the Great Coniunctions). Latin text edited by Ch. Burnett and Arabic-Latin, Latin Arabic Glossaries by K. Yamamoto and Ch. Burnett. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11074 7
35. Stroumsa, S. *Freethinkers of Medieval Islam*. Ibn al-Rāwandī, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, and Their Impact on Islamic Thought. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11374 6
36. King, D.A. *World-Maps for Finding the Direction and Distance to Mecca*. Innovation and Tradition in Islamic Science. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11367 3
37. Bar-Asher, M.M. *Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imāmi Shiism*. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11495 5
38. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī et al. *Consciousness and Reality*. Studies in Memory of Toshihiko Izutsu. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11586 2
39. Schmidtke, S. *Theologie, Philosophie und Mystik im zwölftershiitischen Islam des 9./15. Jahrhunderts*. Die Gedankenwelten des Ibn Abi Ğumhūr al-Aḥsāʿī (um 838/1434-35 — nach 906/1501). 2000. ISBN 90 04 11531 5
40. Griffel, F. *Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam*. Die Entwicklung zu al-Ġazālī's Urteil gegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11566 8
41. Heemskerck, M.T. *Suffering in the Mu'tazilite Theology*. ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11726 1