

## Spain's African Colonial Legacies

# Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia

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# Spain's African Colonial Legacies

*Morocco and Equatorial Guinea Compared*

*By*

Yolanda Aixelà-Cabré



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
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# Introduction: Cities at the Decolonial Margins

The African cities of Bata and Al-Hoceima were created during the Spanish colonial rule of Equatorial Guinea and Morocco, respectively.<sup>1</sup> This book constructs their local history by taking a comparative perspective to explain how Spanish colonialism worked, what its legacies were and the imprints it left on their national histories.

The research will make use of a premise formulated in Mudimbe's *The Invention of Africa* (1988) and Stoler's *Making Empire Respectable* (1989), according to which European colonisation transferred a Eurocentric worldview to Africa. While the aims and formulations of these two texts differed<sup>2</sup> – both sought to introduce new ways to explain the effects of European colonisation

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- <sup>1</sup> This book was supported by the Project “Enriching European Cultural Heritage from Cultural Diversity and Collaborative Participation” (2017–2019) (EUN2017-85108) and by the Research and Development project “African Memories: Reconstructing Spanish Colonial Practices and their Imprint in Morocco and Equatorial Guinea. Towards a Spanish-African Cultural Heritage” (2016–2018) (HAR2015-63626-P, MINECO/FEDER, UE), both directed by Yolanda Aixelà-Cabré (IMF-CSIC). This work has been translated by Tom Hardy and revised by Nandini Bedi. I would like to thank certain people for their generous assistance: Araceli González Vázquez (IMF-CSIC), who patiently reviewed the book and made extremely valuable contributions, Maribel Fierro (CCHS-CSIC) for her noteworthy support, Itzea Goikolea (SOAS), Mimoun Aziza (UMI) and Zoubida Boughaba on the Spanish footprint in Al-Hoceima, and Jesús Rafael Eyama Nchama, Eduard Giménez Ferrer, Fernando Gimeno and Gustau Nerín (UB) on Spanish legacies in Bata. In particular, I must mention to Eloy Martín Corrales, Director of the Colección Alborán, and José Luis Ponce, Director of Edicions Bellaterra, whose work continues to reflect their interest in Spanish colonisation in Africa. I would like also to expressly thank Dale Eickelman for his kindly support as editor of Brill book series “Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia”, the two reviewers for their generous suggestions on where to strengthen the book's theoretical basis and main arguments, and to editors Nienke Brien-Moolenaar and Nicolette van der Hoek for their welcome to Brill and its facilities during the editing process. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to all the people who have shown me such patience in my travels over these years. Without their voices this book would not exist. May everyone's memories live long, regardless of our sociocultural and geographical origin.
  - <sup>2</sup> For Mudimbe (1988: 2) “colonists ... as well as the colonialists have all tended to organize and transform non-European areas into fundamentally European constructs.” For Stoler (1989: 634), “Having focused on how colonizers have viewed the indigenous Other, we are beginning to sort out how Europeans in the colonies imagined themselves and constructed communities built on asymmetries of race, class and gender-entities significantly at odds with the European models on which they were drawn.”

on Africa and to dispel the myths around the roots of its notions of race – the first from an African perspective, and the second with a gender focus. It is worth noting that what Mudimbe and Stoler present constitutes a basic principle for decolonising memory that involves the theoretical and methodological awareness of the need to counteract biases. Only in this way can we limit the confusion caused by the circulation of biased rhetoric, racist ideologies and androcentric narratives. The premise established by Mudimbe and Stoler can help train our gaze so that we notice decolonial contestation activity in today's African societies, no matter how subtly formulated it may appear. The protests against the Spanish colonial legacy, which are this book's subject of study, are one example. They show that the wounds of decolonisation remain unhealed more than half a century on, either due to an absence of African revision or of European reparation. Suggesting that Europeans transferred their way of seeing the world to African contexts also allows the conjecture to be made that certain postcolonial conflicts are the inheritance of a colonial management that today's African governments have been unable – or unwilling – to reverse.

But how should we detect which colonial legacies have persisted? Mudimbe (1988) offers some clues in his chapter *Colonizing Structure and Marginality*. He describes this “colonizing structure” as a composite formed of methods and actions designed to facilitate the “organization of colonization” (Mudimbe 1988: 1). In the same work he also provides tools for unmasking the structural patterns that have led to inequality, taking inspiration from the work of Césaire (1970), among others. Mudimbe's methods of colonial organisation (1988: 2) were: “the procedures of acquiring, distributing, and exploiting lands in colonies; the policies of domesticating natives; and the manner of managing ancient organizations and implementing new modes of production.” The decisive actions for successful colonisation consisted of “the domination of physical space, the reformation of natives' minds, and the integration of local economic histories into the Western perspective” (Mudimbe 1988: 2). Ultimately, the colonising structure “completely embraces the physical, human, and spiritual aspects of the colonizing experience” (Mudimbe 1988: 2).

These arguments underpin this book's interest in reconstructing the pasts of Bata and Al-Hoceima, as without knowing significant aspects of their contemporary history, their current tensions cannot be decoded. Based on lived and narrated memories, a comparative reconstruction allows us to review the relations between the local populations of these territories and the Spaniards during colonial times, and to faithfully reflect the hierarchical effect of the civilising discourses emitted by the metropole. The historical approach to the cities includes the postcolonial imprints that permeate current sociopolitical histories of Equatorial Guinea and Morocco in terms of territorial outlines and

the management of ethnic diversity, as the contemporary history of Morocco and Equatorial Guinea have been coloured by Spanish colonisation.

The work also seeks to explore the *margins* of these Afro-Spanish colonial cartographies<sup>3</sup> to resize the effects of Spanish colonisation in regions considered secondary and peripheral for Spaniards and which therefore lay on the edges of its small African colonial empire. The reconstruction of the history of the cities that grew up in the Spanish shadow, make visible that both were built in territories populated by national minorities, the Riffians and the Ndowe, and that both lay outside the centres of colonial power – at that time centralised in Tétouan and Santa Isabel, the capitals of the Spanish Protectorate and the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea, respectively. As we will see, Al-Hoceima and Bata retained a degree of relevance as secondary areas in the colonised territories due to their late “pacification.” The growth of Al-Hoceima and Bata in the twentieth century can be attributed to a wide range of postcolonial urbanisation processes in Africa.

Hence, taking the formation and the development of Al-Hoceima and Bata into consideration is crucial towards rethinking the postcolonial history of Morocco and Equatorial Guinea today, if we are to gauge the effects of the colonial legacy on their current centrality and understand their local, national and global dimensions in the 21st century.

3 After losing most of its overseas possessions, in the late nineteenth century, the Spanish empire was in its twilight. Seeking new horizons to reestablish its hegemony, its interest turned to an African continent already shared out between Britain, France, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Belgium and Austria. After initial apathy towards the colonisation of Equatorial Guinea subsided and Moroccan territory was taken at the start of the twentieth century, political, economic and military interests eventually brought about the effective colonisation of Equatorial Guinea and the joint control of Morocco with France in the form of a protectorate.

# Al-Hoceima and Bata

## *Local Histories, Glocal Impacts*

This book adopts a comparative perspective to reconstruct the histories of Bata and Al-Hoceima from 1900 to 2019. Marginal to both Spanish and European African endeavours, and geographically peripheral to the centres of influence, they fit Massey's description of "a cartography of power" (2005: 85). I seek to provide histories of Bata and Al Hoceima that allow us to analyse the impact of Spanish colonisation in Morocco and Equatorial Guinea, both during colonisation and after independence, presenting them as examples of cities that projected a postcolonial identity that was global in nature and managed to give centrality to historically marginal regions. This glocal projection – studied by Thiedman Faber and Pristed Nielsen (2015: 4) in the context of relations between Nordic and continental Europe – faces major obstacles due to the peripheral role globalisation has awarded Africa and Africans (Falola and House-Soremekun 2011: 1).

In what follows, I present the hypothesis, the specific research goals, the theoretical framework, the literature review and the methodology used.

### 1 Hypothesis

The roots of this book lie in Cultural Anthropology and Historical Anthropology. The proposed reconstruction of the history of Bata and Al-Hoceima has three general objectives: (1) to understand the development of Spanish colonisation, the repressive mechanisms it used against the population and the ideologies disseminated to justify their socio-political exclusion; (2) to study the processes of independence and decolonisation in order to detect the colonial legacies that endured in the postcolonial period; (3) to analyse how the traces left by these processes marked local memories and national histories.

With these objectives, the book focuses on studying each city's contested cultural heritage as an expression of a glocal decolonial one without entering into the legitimate debate about their cataloguing or preservation. As examples, on the one hand I have chosen graffiti that appeared in Al-Hoceima in 2016 at the viewpoint of the *Playa del Quemado* (see Figure 1)

and at the *La Cántabra* canning factory (see Figure 2) and, on the other, the political use of Bata's *Plaza del Reloj* (see Figure 4) during colonial and postcolonial times. Both constitute examples of *contested cultural heritage* that seek to make visible individual and collective actions of sociopolitical reclaiming, as contested cultural heritage is a form of protest that is exercised in emblematic places. Studying contested cultural heritage from a postcolonial and decolonial studies perspective highlights the weight of memories in local histories. This is the only way to understand the appearance of anonymous graffiti in emblematic colonial sites in Al-Hoceima, and the centrality of a square with a colonial past in the eras of Macías Nguema and Obiang Nguema.

Taking this as the starting point, the work proposes two main hypotheses.

My first hypothesis is that residents of Bata accepted Spanish colonial legacy, which was characterised by violence, abuse and racial segregation. In doing so, they obstructed Obiang Nguema's demolition of the *Plaza del Reloj* in 2000 as a way to challenge dictatorial regimes whose postcolonial sociopolitical project ultimately boiled down to identity decolonisation, rather than to sociopolitical and economic improvement. My second hypothesis is that Riffians accepted Spanish colonisation and the rhetoric of Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood from the 1970s onwards in spite of the labour abuses and segregation that followed a violent pacification process. The graffiti in 2016 is evidence of a people challenging their current integration in the Alawite kingdom. From my point of view, both constitute expressions of a collective reclaiming that confronts a colonised past with an uncomfortable present, inasmuch as they are actions that accept or reject Spanish colonialism to question current political regimes.<sup>1</sup>

Although the research aims at studying the similarities and differences between colonial and postcolonial imprints in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, it also addresses the parallels between Spanish colonialism and that of other European colonial nations, such as France, without neglecting a history based on plurality that brings together Riffian, Equatorial Guinean and Spanish experiences.

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1 Bata has been called Baata, Bata Viejo and Nueva Bata by the Spanish; Ciudad Vilangwa by the Ndowe; and Mang by many Fang. Al-Hoceima has been called Villa Sanjurjo, Villa Alhucemas and Alhucemas – commonly shorted to Villa – by the Spanish and, additionally, Taghzout by many Riffians.

## 2 State of the Art

The search for a globalised African city which “what is called local is in large degree constructed on a trans- or super-local basis” (Robertson 1995: 36) and the analysis of contested cultural heritage is understood as “asserting, defending, or denying critical claims to power, land, legitimacy” (Silverman 2011: 1). This allows for a lively and dynamic collective memory that finds ways to respond to ethnic and national challenges and to historical obstacles that relegated certain populations to marginality, and most Africans to the periphery of globalisation (Falola and House-Soremekun 2011). There is great interest in analysing these subjects from the perspectives of postcolonial and decolonial studies and global history.

In postcolonial and decolonial studies there is an insistence on the need to neutralise inequality and resize the world. Dirlik (1997) and Chakrabarty (2000) highlight the Eurocentrism present in the Western view of the other, which resolidifies colonial identities, provincializing, resizing and territorializing the non-Western world. Authors such as Mudimbe (1988) and Cooper (2005) have urged the recalibration of the relational foundations of Africa and Europe because of the need for other narratives. Falola and House-Soremekun (2011) similarly stake claims for the place of the African in a globalised world. Palmié and Stewart (2019) highlight the validity of Historical Anthropology and the ethnographic approach to understanding the present from the past, following Stoler’s work (1989) exposing the rhetoric that justified postcolonial inequalities; Mudimbe (1988) was a pioneer in this with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa, and Mignolo (2011) and Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel (2007) for Latin America as South and Central American researchers. Mudimbe (1988) sought to reveal the way Europeans thought about Africa, and his critical gaze opened up new spaces for African ways of thinking about the continent. For Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel (2007: 17), the twenty-first century world needs a decolonialism that complements decolonisation.

As this work’s foundations lie in postcolonial and decolonial studies we may venture to conclude that the shortage of histories of Bata and Al-Hoceima reflects not only their marginality, but is also the consequence of what E. Wolf (1987) called “people without history,” in order to reclaim the history of other peoples, especially marginalised and excluded communities. Keese’s (2016) work on how different ethnicities fit within the national frameworks of various West African states is an excellent example of how global history works, as this framework neutralises old Eurocentric focusses to endow all histories with equal importance.

Contributing to the role cities play in today's states and studying memories as cultural heritage are two challenges in a globalized world in which cultures have been deterritorialized (Appadurai 1990) and reconfigured even beyond borders (Vertovec 1999). Nowadays, the interest in using history to decolonise the past (Goikolea-Amiano 2020; Aixelà Cabré 2020) merges with the need to study how new forms of social contestation and cultural identification combine (Merolla 2021) by using multiscalar perspectives to assess the projection of sociocultural phenomena at various levels (local, regional, national and global) (McDougall and Parks 2016: 1–8).

Hence, the focus of this work is on the effects of globalisation in two historically marginal African cities, Bata and Al-Hoceima.<sup>2</sup> The term “glocalisation”,<sup>3</sup> was chosen once their classification as “global cities” had been ruled out (neither fits the profile established by Sassen [1995]),<sup>4</sup> and because glocalisation studies the way the “reality of internal globalisation (or glocalisation) is responsible for the transformation of people’s everyday lives irrespective of whether they are transnational or not” (Roudometof 2005: 113). Two complementary dimensions of what we define as the glocalisation of Bata and Al-Hoceima will be reconstructed in this volume.

The first is the decolonial contestation of a cultural heritage marked by the wounds of contemporary history. The same approach is taken for analysis as authors who use the glocal to study resilience (Fraile-Marcos 2019) and human–animal interactions (Wells 2020). In our case, this is to observe how contested cultural heritage constitutes a useful tool for decolonising the past, projecting out of the local to create global connections with similar protests taking place on other continents.

The second dimension of the glocalisation of the two African cities concerns making regional ethnic identifications visible beyond their states so that,

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2 For the origins of “globalisation” as a concept the work by Roudometof (2021: 772) (a disciple of R. Robertson) is recommended, who notes that the first use of the term was attributed to Levitt (1983) (Roudometof 2016: 3).

3 Robertson (2012: 194) explains the origins of the neologism “glocalisation” in the early 1990s and highlights, among its earliest uses, that: “The terms glocal and glocalisation became features of business jargon during the 1980s, but their major locus of origin appears to have been Japan, a society which has for a very long time strongly cultivated the spatio-cultural significance of Japan itself and where the general issue of the relationship between the particular and the universal has historically received almost obsessive attention.”

4 For Sassen (1995) “global cities” are Western capitalist cities with international visibility, economic weight or interest to global capital, something Swyngedouw notes (2004: 28) is a far cry from the reality of many African cities: “To put it in the old language, today, much of Africa does not even have the luxury any more of being exploited by global capital.”

via local empowerment, they are projected into the wider world. In this case, beginning with the global projection of local economic activities, inter-firm networks (Swyngedouw 2004) and localised food companies (Askegaard and Madsenn 1998), we study situations in which regional minorities' marginal position is either subverted by a level of local identification that promotes a global identification extending beyond national borders (Al-Hoceima, in the case of the Riffian Imazighen), or we give recognition to cities that represent large ethnic majorities but do not have the status of capitals in their states in order to favour global ethnic identification (Bata, in the case of the Fang).

Economists who study how the glocalisation of businesses affects global forms of consumption may be uncomfortable with this second dimension. However, the concept of "glocalisation" allows the intense debates to be concluded around the limits of the term globalisation (Roudometof 2021: 778) and the risks of the local being erased by the global (Robertson 2020: 3; Robertson 2012: 191). In fact, the use of the concept has been broadened to take in new business realities and the analysis of nation-states (Brenner 1998; Fraile-Marcos 2014). For those of us who study minority or majority cultural identities that are not sufficiently visible in their states, this glocalised urban dimension is a powerful tool for understanding how some cultures transcend state borders and achieve global visibility. Such a view of glocalisation is particularly useful for understanding states in continents like Africa that are characterised by significant ethnic diversity. They are states that lack sufficiently broad national identifiers to encompass all their diversity and populations, spread out across different continents and who often profess greater allegiance to their ethnic group than to their nation (Enguita-Fernández 2021).

Bearing these prior publications in mind, in this literature review I have selected the researchers whose work is most essential for this book, such as those writing on colonial structures and social coexistence, and others that delve into the political processes that followed independence. Nevertheless, I must emphasise that this book's fields of study remain underexamined compared to the work on the former centres of Spanish colonial power, such as Tétouan and Santa Isabel. In fact, the area that was formerly the Spanish Protectorate remains quite marginal in present-day Morocco, as shown by the modest scientific output in comparison with other areas of the country. Although Equatorial Guinea currently enjoys a high political profile, Bioko Island continues to retain the greatest research interest. This is because it is the area where oil extraction takes place and is an island experiencing notable Fangisation, understood as the promotion of Fang linguistic and cultural practices as the norm for the territory (Aixelà-Cabré 2012).

In what follows I will present the state of the art organised by theme, differentiating that on Equatorial Guinea from that on Morocco. Notable among the studies that analyse the socio-political aspects of Spanish colonisation in Equatorial Guinea are Berman (1956), Pélissier (1963, 1992), Ndongo (1977), Belmonte Medina (1998), Nerín (2006a), García Cantús (2006), Petit (2007), Zarandona (2012), Álvarez Chillida (2013), Álvarez Chillida and Martín Corrales (2013) and Vilaró (2018); on economic aspects, Carnero and Díaz (2014) and Sant (2017) should be mentioned; along with Sanz (1983) and Guerra and Ruíz-Valdepeñas (2015) on colonial exploitation. Researchers addressing colonial society include González Echegaray (1960, 2017), Nerín (1999), Castro and de la Calle (2007), G. Santana (2008), Carrasco González (2011), Martino (2012) and Sá (2016, 2018). Furthermore, the works of the colonial officers García Figueras (1928) and Unzueta (1947), and Father Fernández (1950) should be noted, as well as those on missionary activity, such as Vilaró (2011) and Fernández Moreno (2018), which built on the description by Father Pujadas (1983) of the experiences of the Claretians. The most innovative work is that of Ndongo (1977), which combines oral and documentary sources to offer a well-founded critical view of the impact of colonisation on Equatorial Guinea and the double standards of Spanish colonialism.

Colonial rhetoric in Equatorial Guinea is a subject of great interest that deserves more attention. Notable analyses have been made by Cornejo (2007), Martín Márquez (2011), Lewis (2009, 2017), Ugarte (2015), Aixelà-Cabré (2017), Stucki (2019) and Nerín (2019). The works of Cornejo (2007), Martín Márquez (2011) and Lewis (2009, 2017) are replete with the study of colonial rhetoric from the literature, as is Ugarte (2009), who openly raises the self-interested use of the notion of the Hispanic race in Equatorial Guinea. The issue of colonial narratives is related to that of segregationism. From an even sparser bibliography in this field, I must mention the work of Nerín (1999, 2017) and Sánchez Molina (2002). Nerín's (1999) magnificent analysis details the Spanish abuses during colonisation, while Sánchez Molina (2002) refers to the infantilisation promoted by Spanish rhetoric. The scarcity of works detailing segregationism promoted my interest in applying Stoler's approach (1989: 653), especially regarding the troubling similarities between British, French and Dutch race policies and those of Spain in the Bata and Al-Hoceima case studies:

despite French assimilationist rhetoric, Dutch tolerance of intermarriage, and Britain's overtly segregationist stance, the similarities in the actual maintenance of racial distinctions through sexual control in these varied contexts is perhaps more striking than the differences ... See Simon (1981: 46–48) who argues that although French colonial rule was

generally thought to be more racially tolerant than that of Britain's, racial distinctions in French Indochina were in practice vigorously maintained.

Ethnic diversity is another little researched but revealing topic in the socio-political dynamics of Equatorial Guinea. Works stand out on the Fang by Tessmann (2003) and Aranzadi (1962); on the Bubi by Aymemí (1942), Martín del Molino (1989), Fernández Moreno (1999) and Sepa (2011); on the Ndowe by Iyanga Pendi (1991, 1992) and Dyombe Dyangany (2008); on the Benga by Dy'lkèngue (2004) and Uganda (2014); on the Annobonese by Zamora (2010), by Wulf (2014), and Hagemeyer and Zamora (2016); and about the Pichi language by Yakpo (2017). Notable work has been done on inter-ethnic coexistence on Buale (1989), Cusack (1999b), Bolekia (2003, 2010), Muakuku Rondo Icambo (2006), Ávila Laurel (2006) and Sá (2013). In these works, the pessimism of the Equatorial Guinean perspective stands out because, regardless of the author's ethnic origin, consensus seems to exist that complex solutions are needed to find a way through the Equatorial Guinean labyrinth and to promote an equal ethnic coexistence that respects cultural and linguistic differences.

Politics absorbs most of the scientific output on Equatorial Guinea due to the spiral of dictatorships in which the country has been immersed since independence as Paz's research shows (1969), as well as the research of García Domínguez (1977), Artucio (1979), Liniger-Goumaz (1983, 1988, 1996), Ela (1984), Calvo (1989), Jones (1990), Sundiata (1990), Klitgaard (1990), Nerín (2016), Nvé Oyana et al. (2018) and Jensen (2019). Many works connect the dictatorial system with the discovery of oil in the mid-1990s, including those by Bolekia (2003), Frynes (2004), Nzé Nfumu (2004), Liniger-Goumaz and Seibert (2008) Esteban (2009), Velloso (2009), Williams (2011), Campos (2011), Campos and Sant (2011), Appel (2012) and Allan (2019). The works make several worthwhile contributions: Liniger-Goumaz (1983: 14–15) coins the term "Nguemism" to refer jointly to the dictatorships of Macías Nguema and his nephew Obiang Nguema as corrupt, despotic, repressive governments that spread terror among the population; Sundiata (1990) uses highly diverse data to reveal the harshness of the Macías regime; and Nerín's (2016) interesting portrait of Macías addresses the socio-political effects of his hatred and paranoia.

The dictatorial spiral and oil exploitation have also been linked to both internal and transnational migration. In this field, I would like to mention the work by Cusack (1999a), Ugarte (2009), Aixelà-Cabré (2011), Ndongo (2015), Armengol (2015), Iliescu and Bosaho (2015), and Iliescu (2017). Equatorial Guinean exile and migration have particularly encouraged the emergence of narratives that contested dictatorial discourses. In that line, the works by Fegley (1981), Owono-Okomo (2014), Oyono Nvé Oyana (2015) and Licata (2016)

are interesting, especially for revealing the pressure dictatorship exerts on the entire Equatorial Guinean population and some groups in particular, such as the Bubi. Other more specialised studies address general questions about the Bubi (Fernández Moreno 1996); circumcision (Martí 2010); education (Negrín-Fajardo 2011); music (Aranzadi 2009); while linguistic issues are examined by Lipski (2007), Ngah Elingui (2014), Schlumpf (2016) and Castillo (2016).

Research has also recorded the mutual influences of Equatorial Guinean and Spanish history. Notable work has been done on this by Martínez (1969), R. Fernández (1976), Castro and Ndongo (1998), Nerín (2006b), Sánchez Gómez (2006), Laguna et al. (2007a, 2007b, 2007c), Doppelbauer and Fleischmann (2012), Morales and Vieitez (2014), Antebi et al. (2017) and Stucki (2016). It is worth noting the highly critical stances Nerín (2006b) and Stucki (2016) took in their research on the participation of Equatorial Guinean women in the Women's Section of the Falange, a topic that resonates with the impact of the Spanish Falange on Macías, as well as the similarities between Macías and the dictator Francisco Franco.

Those studying the cultural heritage of Equatorial Guinea remain a minority, with Samp Pedro (2012), Almazán (2015) and Villaverde and Memba (2018) standing out; their studies reconstructing the colonial legacies of Spanish heritage provided inspiration for this book, as well as those on Equatorial Guinean cities by, for example, Martín del Molino (1994), Caballero (2015) and Valenciano (2019), whose work was founded on the solid foundations of urban studies in Malabo. Nevertheless the absence of more extensive reflections on heritage and the city has led me to include other researchers studying different contexts, such as Andersen (2018), Amine (2018), C. Ortiz (2006) and Vecco (2010) on the subject of heritage, and Low (1996) and Mains (2016) on urban anthropology. Finally, some of the ethnographies conducted in Equatorial Guinea should be mentioned, among which figure Fernández Moreno (1999), Appel (2012), Caballero (2015), Valenciano (2012, 2019) and Allan (2019).

The bibliography on Morocco is far richer. Worthwhile approaches to Spanish colonialism have been made by Martínez Carreras (1993) and Fradera (1999), and excellent work done on the Spanish Protectorate, such as those by Martín (1973), Morales Lezcano (1976), La Porte (1997, 2001), Martín Corrales (1999, 2002c), Pennell (2003), Ibn Azzuz Hakim (2003), Villanova (2004), Jensen (2005), Akmir (2012), Miller (2013), Wyrzten (2013, 2015), Álvarez Chillida and Martín Corrales (2013), Aixelà-Cabré (2015a, 2015b) and Guerin (2015). Among these, of particular interest are Fradera's (1999) explanations of how Morocco became a substitute for Cuba and the Philippines, and the role of the military as central, from Latin America to Africa (Fradera 2015: xxxv); the works by Morales Lezcano (1976) on the Spanish Protectorate; Martín Corrales

(1999, 2002c) on Spain's desire to colonise Morocco; Pennell's (2003) excellent endeavours to include the Rif in the understanding of the region's low level of integration in the kingdom; and the voice of Ibn Azzuz Hakim (2003) narrating various key episodes of Spanish colonisation. All these works provide a historical and political framework for the Rif in Morocco that explain why the Arab and the Alawite dynasty were the constituent elements of Moroccan national identity, which Wrytzen (2013: 653) saw as "marginalising Berber cultural or linguistic markers of national identity."

Other works have looked into the judicial system, such as those by Feria (1998) and Guerin (2011); on *interventores*, such as Villanova (2006), and Mateo Dieste and Villanova (2013); on military aspects, such as Jacobson (2012), Al Tuma (2016) and Jensen (2016, 2017); on the colonial economy, such as Carnero (2015); on interpreters, such as Feria (2012); on agriculture, such as Marchán (2014); on press publications and magazines, such as Moga (2007), Mora Villarejo (2012) and Martínez Travado (2013); and on internal political borders, such as Troin (2002, 2010). These contributions explore colonial themes that measure the sociopolitical effects of the consolidation of Al-Hoceima, particularly the consequences of fragmenting essentially homogeneous territories such as the Rif. Troin (2002, 2010) addresses this subject successfully and it is an aspect we will study in the case of Equatorial Guinea.

Other older texts, written by chroniclers and colonial officers, described the Spanish colonial organisation, justification, judicial system, military and urban deployment in Morocco, such as Lobera (1926a), Ruiz Albéniz (1930), Artigas and Arpón (1925), Bonelli et al. (1914), Muñoz Bosque (1922), Ramos Charco-Villaseñor (1930), Cordero Torres (1942, 1943), Viguera (1949), and Delbrel (2009). Of particular value is the work by Ruiz Albéniz (1930) on Alhucemas (the colonial name of Al-Hoceima), because despite containing several serious errors, including the assertion that Riffians lived in the city during the colonial period, the inclusion of primary statistical sources has enabled subsequent reinterpretations.

Although it is a major issue, colonial rhetoric in Morocco has received less scientific attention than other subjects. Notable works include those by Mateo Dieste (1996, 2003), Martín Corrales (2002a), Tofiño-Quesada (2003), Martín Márquez (2011), Aixelà-Cabré (2017), Goikolea-Amiano (2018) and Fernández Parrilla and Cañete (2019). Related to the issue of colonial rhetoric, is that of segregationism in Morocco, greatly understudied, where work stands out by Rodríguez Mediano (1999) and Mateo Dieste (2006), especially archival work. This book compensates for this shortage of oral sources by including new voices offering unheard perspectives on the segregationism that prevailed in

Al-Hoceima, dispelling the myth that the Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood existed in practice rather than being merely rhetorical.

The situation is quite different with regard to the scientific output that exists on a classic theme of anthropology, such as the study of the Arab and Berber ethnicities, and of Amazigh revitalisation, a central theme of this book. With respect to the differences and similarities between Arabs and Imazighen, the works of Gellner (1973b, 1968), Gellner and Micaud (1973), Vinadgrov (1973) and Waterbury (1973) should be highlighted. This topic was revisited by Hoffman and Miller (2010: 1–2) who replaced the dichotomisation of Arabs and Berbers “with a perspective that situates Berbers at multiple poles of identification, allegiance and affinity.” The Jewish minority has been studied by Schroeter (2002), Boum (2013), Ojeda (2018) and Calderwood (2018b), with the first two particularly illuminating on the use of oral sources to reconstruct collective histories, a key methodology in this book. Other notable works address the Amazigh issue, such as Camps (1980), Chaker (1989), Boukous (1995), Aixelà-Cabré (2002, 2013), Akioud and Castellanos (2007), Venema and Mguild (2003), Hassan Yahia (2013), Zouhir (2014), Karell (2015), Kossmann (2017), Fleisch (2018), and Merolla (2015, 2017) on a more general level. On Riffians in particular, the notable work of colonial officers Michaux-Bellaire (1925), Lobera (1926b) and Blanco Izaga (1939, 1995, 2000) merit special mention, with the extensive resources left by the latter particularly valuable on the reclaiming of Riffian culture and society. Work has also been done in this area in the post-colonial period by Boukous (2005), Moga (2009, 2014) and González Vázquez (2015a).

Riffian history and ethnography are especially relevant to this book, as are works that have studied Riffian synergies with the kingdom of Morocco. Notable works include, first of all, those that address the Rif from a historical perspective, such as Ayache (1975, 1990), Pennell (1987), Boutbouqalt (1992), Benjelloun (1995), Ybarra (1997), Aziza (2003), El Manouar (2006), Iskander (2010), Madariaga (2010) and Paniagua (2016). Essential to this book are the contributions by Ayache (1975), the great Moroccan forerunner of the study of the Rif’s importance to the historical account of colonial times; Pennell (1979, 1987), who provided previously unseen data on the Rif, thanks to his meticulous study of the Riffian opposition to Spanish colonisation led by Abd el-Krim el Khatabi, and his research on Riffian women’s resistance to Morocco’s colonisation, where he explains that only a small number worked for the Spanish; Ybarra (1997), whose study of the chronicles reports that Moroccan troops captured the Rif from the *Playa del Quemado* in Al-Hoceima, the same location used by the Spanish troops, and the site of some of the graffiti discussed in this analysis; Aziza (2003), whose authoritative scientific production

has contributed to the knowledge in the area, and who is one of the Riffian researchers who has reminded the state of its duty to be accountable to the Rif after decades of socio-political disagreement; and Madariaga (2010) for her efforts to retrieve the history of the Rif through the biography of Abd el-Krim.

Some studies focus on Amazigh mobilisation in general, such as Goodman (2004), K. Hoffman (2006) and Silverstein (2011), while others study recent Riffian mobilisations, such as Fromherz (2014), El Messoudi-Amed (2016), Aidi (2017), Wolf (2019), El Maarouf and Belghazi (2019), and Aixelà-Cabré (2019). Particularly relevant among them are the studies by Silverstein (2011) connecting the Amazigh movement across borders, and Aidi's (2017) magnificent analysis on the meaning and significance of the Riffian *Hirak* movement. These works are complemented by others with a wider spectrum, such as those by Mateo Dieste (2012) and Schwarz (2017) on political movements, or those by Daoud (1993) and Zahra (1995) on women and politics, or Aixelà-Cabré (2007) on similarities between Amazigh and feminist movements.

Ethnographic works on the Rif have been contributed by Coon (1931), Hart (1965, 1973, 1976a, 1976b, 1997), Jamous (1981, 1992, 1993), Munson (1989, 1999) and Seddon (1973, 1979). On Abd el-Krim's biography, Hart (1976b) and Madariaga (2009) are recommended. Other subjects investigated in the Rif include female souks (Hajjarabi 1988); Riffian women (U. Hart 2006); and its geography (Droussi 2002). Of studies on Al-Hoceima, we can only highlight four: Rubio Alfaro and Lacalle Alfaro (1992), Román (1994), Martín Corrales (2008) and, recently, Aixelà-Cabré (2019). The lack of Riffian and Moroccan voices in the first three points to the need for a more complete history of this city.

Some of the most important ethnographies referred to for this book focus on the Rif, such as those of Hart (1976a), Seddon (1973) and Munson (1989, 1993a), although other works should be mentioned such as those by Westermarck (1914), Berque (1955), Eickelman (1976), and in the Spanish field, by Aixelà-Cabré (2000) and González Vázquez (2015b). Of these works, the first three are the most significant. Hart's (1976a) brilliant ethnography is of great use for gathering data on Abd el-Krim's tribe, the Aït Waryaghar, as well as for understanding his negligible relationship with Al-Hoceima. Seddon's (1973) magnificent research on the Eastern Rif provides an excellent timeline of the consolidation of postcolonial Morocco, as well as an ethnography containing a wealth of socio-political and linguistic contributions to the Amazigh regional framework; and Munson's (1989, 1993a) painstaking work connects the Rif with the makhzen from a historical perspective. It should be pointed out that the scant attention given to the Rif has added to the fact that French colonial imprints have been central to the reconstruction of colonial Morocco (Aixelà-Cabré

2015a), meaning that because it was part of the territories colonised by Spain, the region became a doubly marginal setting: the Rif region was located in a cartography that relegated it to the margins of the also marginal Spanish colonial experience in the Alaouite kingdom.

An interesting topic for this book is that of the overlapping histories of Spain and Morocco. This has been approached from various perspectives for the French case by, among others, Mouralis (1999), Blanchard et al. (2005) and Schroeter (2019), although less so in the case of the Spanish Protectorate. On Hispano–Moroccan history, notable work has been done by Madariaga (1999), Balfour (2002), Martín Corrales (2002b, 2016), González Alcantud (2003), Moga (2008), Marín (2015b) and Calderwood (2018a), following the precedent set by Millas y Vallicrosa (1944). Another classic subject with an abundant bibliography is that of political changes since Moroccan independence, with particular attention given to the Alaouite monarchy. Highlights include the work by Ashford (1961), Gellner (1973b), Waterbury (1975), Hammoudi (1997), Willis (2002), Benhaddou (2009) and Crawford (2005), although few have related it to the international movement, as Stenner has (2019a, 2019b).

Other issues given less weight in this volume are the place of Islam in Moroccan society. Numerous classic works exist, such as Lévi-Provençal (1922) and Gellner (1969, 1986), and more recently González Vázquez (2018); the studies on rituals and healing, by Mateo Dieste (2010) and González Vázquez (2017); works on linguistic topics such as Errihani (2006), Fleisch (2007), Benítez (2010) and Fernández (2010).

It should be noted that the Rif's tangible and intangible cultural heritage, a central subject of this book, has been poorly studied in the Moroccan context. Important work has been done by Bravo Nieto (2000), Gómez Barceló (2014), López Soler (2013) and Nahhass (2017). Especially relevant is the research by Nahhass (2017) on the role the Mezian museum plays in the Rif, analysing its socio-political interest and impact with regard to the Rif and the makhzen. The same applies to the issue of Riffian cities, which also lack urban anthropological study. For that reason I will rely on classic works, such as those by Brown (1976), Adam (1973) and Geertz, Geertz and Rosen. (1979), contextualised in other Moroccan regions. Brown (1976) and Adam (1973) studied the coexistence between Arabs and Berbers in Salé and Casablanca, respectively, while Geertz, Geertz and Rosen (1979) looked at Berber coordination at social and political level in Sefrou – all of which constitute excellent case studies of urban anthropology on Morocco.

Finally, I should mention some of the work researching the Spanish presence in Equatorial Guinea, such as that by Ndongo (1977), Brunet et al. (2008), Santana (2008), Aixelà-Cabré (2013) and Armengol (2015); studies that focused

on the Spaniards in Morocco, such as those by Martín Corrales (1996), Bonmatí (1998), Rodríguez Mediano and Felipe (2002), M. Ortiz (2003), López García (2007, 2008, 2016), Benjelloun (2008), Aouad Lahrech and Benlabbah (2008) and Marín (2015a). In fact, the number of researchers who have studied daily interactions between Spaniards and Moroccans, and Spanish and Equatorial Guineans from an anthropological perspective remains even smaller. I would like to highlight Mateo Dieste (2003), Nerín (1998), Ojeda (2018) and Aixelà-Cabré (2019).

### 3 Aims

This research has five specific interlinked aims. The first is to determine the importance of the Spanish colonisation of Bata and Al-Hoceima to the postcolonial consolidation of the two cities, as both constituted clear traces of European urbanisation processes in Africa (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1991: 5, Brockey 2008),<sup>5</sup> and both featured social dynamics characterised by segregation and discriminatory practices (Andersen 2018). With regard to the first issue, it should be noted that, with some exceptions, the Equatorial Guinean and Riffian populations were unable to settle in the cities until colonisation had ended, despite the fact that the services the cities provided in terms of infrastructure, health and education were infinitely superior to those in their small rural villages. In fact, at the time of independence, certain communities in Bata and Al-Hoceima helped to channel the drive for national affirmation. These aspirations were unable to take shape under the exclusionary colonial regime. For the Fang, Bata was a stronghold that could embody the potential identity of their people in an independent plurinational Equatorial Guinea, in which they formed the majority population and provided the presidents. The Riffians, who were disadvantaged by their status as republicans and by their belonging to an Amazigh group that, despite being in the majority, lacked power in an Arab-led kingdom, used Al-Hoceima as a platform for their demands. In the case of Bata, it was the Fang's symbolic refuge during the Macías regime, as the city that strengthened Fang representation and power on the continent in comparison to the Bubi capital, Malabo, located on Bioko Island. Nevertheless, Bata's centrality was somewhat

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5 The case studies chosen show Spanish colonisation pursuing different colonial strategies in two distinct contexts: North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. This was also the case with other examples of colonisation, such as the French. The similarities and differences between the French management of Gabon and Cameroon and the French Protectorate of Morocco provide clear comparisons.

called into question in 2017, when Obiang's illicit enrichment with Equatorial Guinean oil led him to promote an internal reorganisation that raised the profile of Djibloho (Oyala), another Fang city mid-way between Bata and Mongomo. For its part, Al-Hoceima went from being Spanish to becoming the most emblematic city in the Riffian region from the 1980s onwards, thanks to its proximity to Ajdir, the hometown of the great Amazigh leader, Abd el-Krim al-Khattabi. This, in turn resulted in Al-Hoceima as the chosen destination for various Riffians in the neighbourhood consisting of the Aït Waryaghar and Ibuqquyen *dhzqba'ir* (plural of *dhaqbitsh*, tribe).<sup>6</sup> They eventually settled in the city, projecting their Riffian identity at a glocal level. Bata is an example of a city that has been reappropriated by a majority ethnic group seeking to form a national identity, as described by Mains (2016: 651). Al-Hoceima is an example of a city that takes advantage of ethnic homogeneity in a given territory to obtain greater socio-political projection, thereby overcoming the obstacle of being a minority nation in the state, as Etherington (2004) has described in the case of Catalonia. These processes should help Bata and Al-Hoceima gain prominence transnationally, in line with Hannerz (1996), and glocally, as Robertson (1995) has described. Low (1996) points out that to understand the interrelationship between time, space and knowledge production, city studies must analyse the relationship between individuals and communities, observing them in broad socio-political processes. In terms of the socio-political dynamics that impacted both cities during colonisation, a comparison to the protectorate colonial regime is of interest. In the protectorate, there was a level of respect towards the local populations in terms of co-responsibility, certain rights and a degree of authority – but all three were limited and any authority could be exercised only over their own population, and not against the colonisers. These prerogatives were absent from the colonial regime in Equatorial Guinea, but not in Morocco. A study of segregation and discriminatory practices based on Andersen's (2018) work on the decolonisation of knowledge inspired by Thiong'o (1992) is also of great interest. Bata and Al-Hoceima witnessed racial or ethnic segregation, as the Spanish population reproduced the power relations that existed in other European colonies. Few contact spaces were structured according to more egalitarian norms, as the application of

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6 While the Spaniards routinely referred to the "tribes" as "*cabilas*", following the Arabic concept "*qabila*", in the Rif they were called "*dhaqbitsh*". I will therefore use this Amazigh concept, which the Riffians use to define these socio-political units, rather than the Arabic one used by Spaniards and other Europeans, incorrectly. Abundant literature exists on this subject, in particular Pennell (1987) and the theoretical debate is discussed in Aixelà-Cabré (2000).

Creshaw's intersectionality (1991) to the ethnographic and archive material shows. Very few Equatorial Guineans and Moroccans in these two cities escaped the hierarchical racialisation of otherness (see Figures 3 and 7), – a discriminatory framing to justify inequalities based on erroneous arguments about race, studied in other contexts by Stoler (1989, 1991) and Stolcke (1994, 1995)<sup>7</sup> until Equatorial Guineans finally began to be empowered during the decade prior to independence and occupied premises and homes previously reserved only for the Spanish population. Riffians did not have the same opportunity, except for a few who were able to rent modest houses in the city because they worked for the Spaniards.

The second objective is to clarify whether the contestation of certain emblematic monuments or spaces (Silverman 2011) identified by the citizens as cultural heritage (Ortiz 2006, Vecco, 2010) sought to decolonise local and national histories (Santamaría Colmenero 2018). In Bata, this may be seen in the postcolonial appropriation of the *Plaza del Reloj*, which was a potent colonial legacy for Battians; and in Al-Hoceima through the appearance of graffiti in symbolic places such as the *Playa del Quemado* viewpoint and a Spanish canning plant. The importance of these issues grow when seen in terms of the proposals made by Andersen (2018), for whom there are various aspects to decolonising history, such as the material legacies of colonialism. These are the legacies that have been contested in Al-Hoceima through graffiti that, along with confronting the memory of Spanish occupation, also rejects what many Riffians define as postcolonial Moroccan occupation. It also attests to the revitalising effect of Amazighness on the city's *Hirak* movement (Aidi 2017: 10), – understood as an expression of the social mobilisation that emerged in the Rif after a fish seller was crushed to death in a garbage truck while trying to recover goods confiscated by the police, as well as on other conflicts that have reopened old wounds that we will review in this book. As Amine (2018: 153) found in the case of Paris, some graffiti disturbs the city, as it represents cultural communities and traumatic memories that are marginalised by French postcolonial narratives. Contestation of the colonial heritage also occurred in Bata. The *Plaza de la Torre del Reloj* housed the Spanish authorities during the numerous colonial parades and later became the place Macías Nguema chose for people to assemble during the first dictatorship. Obiang Nguema later named the square

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7 Stoler (1991: 51) condemned the hierarchical racialisation of otherness: “we are starting to solve how the Europeans in the colonies ... built communities constructed on asymmetries of race, class, and gender.” Stolcke (1995: 7) concluded that “Racist doctrines are only one variation of the same theme, namely, the endeavour to reconcile an idea of shared humanity with existing forms of domination.”

*Plaza de la Libertad*. The aim of this contestation of Bata's *Plaza de la Torre del Reloj* seems to have been to decolonise the history of Bata and, in turn, that of Equatorial Guinea, because, although the appropriation of this cultural heritage was less the result of a collective and community action, and more an identity claim made by its first dictator, the Equatorial Guinean people decoded its meaning perfectly. It was only when the second president, Obiang Nguema, tried to demolish it during his dictatorship that the Battians, silenced and oppressed by two harshly repressive regimes, raised their voice to save it from demolition.

The book's third objective is to evaluate the impact of Spanish colonisation on Morocco and Equatorial Guinea after independence, to assess whether the contemporary identity consolidation processes of the two case studies can be understood as imprints left by the Spanish. Both cities were created on European military or missionary enclaves and were located in regions that were marginal for the coloniser; areas in which their ethnic groups, the Amazigh Riffians and Fang, were not especially important to the Spanish. This is because the most influential ethnic groups in the Spanish Protectorate and the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea at the time were the Arabs, the Bubi and the Fernandinos. Arab centrality upheld through the Moroccan makhzen and the Bubi's was due to their status as a pre-existing population on Fernando Po (now Bioko), the centre of Spanish colonisation. As Berman (1956: 353) and later Massey (2005) have pointed out, the edges of the colonies were peripheral areas where the limited empowerment of local ethnicities was unable to be reversed until independence. Fundamentally, this is because the Rif and the continental territory of Equatorial Guinea were not key areas for exploitation in the first phase of colonisation: in the case of Equatorial Guinea, in 1843 the colonial centre was the island of Fernando Po, with the continental colonisation beginning gradually after 1910. In fact, the continental region witnessed the significant arrival of Europeans in *Río Muni* and a struggle over borders that eventually led to Spanish Guinea's continental territory being reduced to a seventh of the territories Spain initially claimed. Spanish colonisation in Morocco focused more on the Jbala and Kert regions than the Rif, even though controlling this area seriously delayed Spanish colonisation. On the other hand, the provincial and regional boundary the Spaniards drew in Morocco and in Equatorial Guinea were a clear colonial legacy, as studied in the case of Morocco by Troin (2002), an argument revisited by González Vázquez (2015a). In recent years, re-provincialisation processes have been taking place that weaken minority ethnic groups, retracing the boundaries drawn in colonial times. It should be added that neither Bata nor Al-Hoceima were "port cities" in the style of many other colonial examples, like Tangier – cosmopolitan cities portrayed in literature,

painting and the arts by both inhabitants and travellers. Port cities (Hein 2016) were included in romantic chronicles that only partially reflected the urban segregation that characterised them. No great writers sketched idyllic narratives about Bata and Al-Hoceima, and their ports closed in on themselves rather than opening outwards.<sup>8</sup>

The fourth objective of this research is to address Spanish colonial rhetoric around the colonisation of these two African territories. The rhetoric of Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood, based on a putative coexistence and respect between Spaniards and Moroccans and articulated from the position of older brother (Mateo Dieste 2003; Martín Corrales 2002a; Marín 2015), does not seem to have materialised in Al-Hoceima. As an exclusively Spanish city, no narratives to facilitate intercultural coexistence were activated. Everyday relations between Spaniards, Riffians and Moroccans had an Orientalist (Said, 1978) and at times even Islamophobic slant – understood as a form of cultural racism encouraged by colonial structures to subordinate Muslims, as Grosfoguel and Mielants (2006: 2) and others have shown. Ethnographic and historical data point to persistent segregation, with insurmountable obstacles preventing Riffians seeking to settle in the city from doing so. This data is interesting because, if the Riffians were unable to settle until the Spanish departed, the notion that Spanish colonisation in the Spanish Protectorate always prioritised Hispano–Moroccan coexistence is called into question. In Equatorial Guinea, the discourse around the “Hispanic race” promoted since the colonisation of the Americas (Ugarte 2009; Álvarez Chillida and Martín Corrales 2013; Aixelà-Cabré 2017) continued in the city of Bata. The population was racially segregated in the urban centre, but not in the small communities that surrounded the city and were swallowed up during its expansion. As Brettell (2002) points out, the city remains underexplored. Combining urban anthropology and urban history allows us to

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8 Al-Hoceima and Bata were cities that turned in on themselves in spite of their geographical openness to the sea potentially enabling fruitful cultural exchanges. Al-Hoceima emerged as a military dock and Bata as a missionary anchorage. Their port capacities were conditioned by their marginal importance to the Moroccan Protectorate and in the Spanish Territories in the Gulf of Guinea, with their development constrained by the political and socioeconomic interests around Spanish colonialism. So, while the movement of troops and the exploitation of fisheries encouraged some development of the port of Al-Hoceima, Bata remained a simple mooring throughout colonisation, a site for loading and unloading goods and people. After independence, the port of Al-Hoceima fell into almost complete insignificance, while the port of Bata gained visibility as one of Macías Nguema’s most emblematic works and was later enlarged by Obiang Nguema. Today, both are port cities, and although smaller than many other American and African cities, they have become important parts of their states. On the significance of ports to certain African cities, see J.M. Santana-Pérez (2016).

TABLE 1 Population of Bata

1907	1942	1950	1963	1983	1994	2015	2019
237	848	6,790	27,024	43,210	71,046	309,345 <sup>a</sup>	173,046

<sup>a</sup> The high figures are offered by the Government of Equatorial Guinea.

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1945: 30–31). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1949: 29). *BOP*, XXXVIII, NO. 1, 1950 (PP. 16–17). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS REGIÓN ECUATORIAL, PROVINCIAS DE FERNANDO PÓO Y RIO MUNI 1963 (P. 460). *ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE ESPAÑA 1969* (P. 456). *CENSUSES OF POPULATION OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA AND ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE GUINEA ECUATORIAL 2018* (P. 56). *WORLD POPULATION REVIEW: EQUATORIAL GUINEA AND BATA. ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE GUINEA ECUATORIAL 2018* (P. 19).

compare cities that have traditionally received immigrants and those that have been reconfigured more recently, taking into consideration forms of residential segregation, and racial and ethnic enclaves. Bata's racial segregation decreased as soon as colonisation progressed, especially following its provincialisation and, above all, its consideration as an autonomous region, at which point certain institutions were immediately occupied by Equatorial Guinean citizens (Sundiata 1983; Nerín 1999, 2006b, 2017). This change, which took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s, gradually affected Equatorial Guinean empowerment, which remained incomplete until colonial independence was achieved in October 1968, when all the rights that had been denied were regained, but only for six months, as in March 1969 the fateful Macías Nguema dictatorship initiated the dictatorial spiral that continues to this day.

The fifth and final aim of the book relates to gender. Specifically, the work will analyse the effect of Spanish colonisation on women in both cities, following the works of Stoler (1989) and Stucki (2019). For Spanish women, gender constructions that prevailed in the metropole were transferred to the colonies according to which women were first and foremost to play the roles of mothers and wives (Nash 1983; Nash 1991). Hence, girls faced difficulties both in accessing education and in studying the same subjects as boys – a distinction that also applied to the subjects young Equatorial Guineans and Moroccans were obliged to study in contrast to the Spanish. These educational limitations on Spanish women, who grew up in the colonies, matched those faced by Riffian and Equatorial Guinean women – although the Riffians faced greater obstacles than the Equatorial Guineans. Indeed, while women's lack of development

TABLE 2 Population of Al-Hoceima

1933	1945	1950	1960	1971	1982	1994	2014	2020
6,941	10,576	10,770	11,262	18,686	41,662	55,216	56,716 <sup>a</sup>	55,530

<sup>a</sup> The latest data available is from 2014. It was not possible to update statistics data.

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1935: 145). *BOP*, XXXVIII, NO. 1, 1950 (PP. 16–17). HART (1976A: 17–18). *RECENSEMENT DE LA POPULATION* 1971, 1981, 1994, 2004, COMPILED BY COMMUNE URBAINE D'AL HOCEIMA. *RECENSEMENT GENERAL DE LA POPULATION ET DE L'HABITAT 2014*.<sup>A</sup> PROJECTION 2020, IN *PROJECTIONS DE LA POPULATION DES PROVINCES ET PREFECTURES DE LA REGION TANGER-TETOUAN-AL HOCEIMA 2014–2030* (P. 39).

equality with men reflected that of the metropole (Stucki 2019), it was closer to the widespread gender construction in Morocco (Aixelà-Cabré 2000) than that in Equatorial Guinea, where clear improvements took place and many Equatorial Guinean girls graduated (Aixelà-Cabré 2011). The prohibition on marriages between Spaniards and local women was another classic measure that failed to prevent informal relationships and the abuse of women in Equatorial Guinea (Nerín 1999), just as the ban on unions in Morocco, which were rejected by both communities (Rodríguez Mediano 1999; Mateo Dieste 2006). This did not stop Spanish men from abusing Moroccan girls.

#### 4 Methodologies

The research on Bata and Al-Hoceima combines different methodologies from Cultural Anthropology and Historical Anthropology, as successfully reinterpreted by Palmié and Stewart (2019) and revised by Coello and Mateo Dieste (2016). To this end, Oral History, as well as the study of various documentary and archival sources were used as research material. Fieldwork was based on participant observation and informal and semi-structured interviews conducted within a framework of multisited ethnography (Marcus 1995). The oral sources were compiled in line with the work by Thompson (1988) and Jelin (2002), as the goal was to retrieve life stories that would allow different historical periods to be reconstructed from the informants' experiences, with greater weight given to the ethnographic approach Palmié and Stewart (2019) propose.

With the written sources I have continued the work of Martín Corrales (1999, 2002a), Mateo Dieste (2003) and Marín (2015) on finding and analysing

documents in order to contextualise and understand various historical events that took place in Morocco and Equatorial Guinea. The combination of oral and written sources was especially necessary for reconstructing the history of Bata and Al-Hoceima, as neither city has a history that runs from its foundation to the present day. The only exceptions are the publications by Spaniards in Alhucemas: Román (1994), Rubio Alfaro and Lacalle Alfaro (1992) and Martín Corrales (2008). While of great value, these works are not sufficient, as they comprise a history of the life of Spaniards in the city that ignores the presence of Riffians and other Moroccans and the coexistence with them.

Some of the informants' narratives have also been assessed from the perspective of the Anthropology of Emotions. Hence, these interviews follow Beatty's philosophy (2013), which recommends carrying out narrative ethnographies to provide sufficient biographical and social information to be able to understand informants' emotional episodes; and Leavitt's (1996) work on the need to merge the meaning and experience of informants based on the Anthropology of Emotions. As Delgado, Fernández and Labanyi (2016: 2) have asserted, using a multidisciplinary framework, emotions are provoked, moderated, tolerated and stimulated by different historical, social and political situations and circumstances, which allows a sociological history to be gleaned from the local.

Oral sources have been divided into *lived memories* and *narrated memories*. The *lived memories* have been compiled in semi-structured interview format and are characterised by grouping in the life story format in order to extrapolate biographical experiences in specific times and spaces. The *narrated memories* have been compiled from documentary materials written by the protagonists. Such documents allow us to recover their voices in the first person, but their thoughts cannot be verified through interviews. In this sense, they are missing persons. Ethnographic materials have been used that were compiled in different periods and which include plural, diverse voices of Riffians, Moroccans, Equatorial Guineans and Spaniards to reconstruct the histories of Bata and Al-Hoceima. Emic versions of the colonised subjects' experiences were preferred to histories generally subsumed by colonial rhetoric and by much more powerful Spanish voices with more central positions in the existing historical account of these cities.

In the case of Bata, I have combined participant observation and interviews that directly relate to the city with the data collected on other key themes of this book, such as the construction of national identities and the place of ethnic diversity in Equatorial Guinea. I gathered these interviews with Battians during my multisited ethnography in Bata, but also from Battians living in other cities around the country, especially Malabo, and from Fang, Bubi, Ndowe, Annobonese and Bissio Equatorial Guineans residing in other African

countries, especially Cameroon (my fieldwork in South Africa did not prove useful in this case). I have also included interviews with Equatorial Guineans living in European countries such as Spain and Great Britain. The data gathered in Switzerland and the Netherlands did not provide significant information for this book. It should be added that my trips to Bata took place between 2004 and 2012, during which time I travelled to the city for a week almost every year, and took the opportunity to gather a number of ethnographic materials and interviews on various topics. This means that the ethnographic work of interviewing has been continuous up to the present via transnational voices of people, who for different reasons have moved to Spain and other European countries.

In the case of Al-Hoceima, I combined participant observation and interviews conducted during a two-week stay in September 2016<sup>9</sup> with additional interviews with Riffians and other groups in Morocco that I conducted since I began my fieldwork there in 1992. I lived for a year in a number of cities around the country, among them Rabat, Casablanca, Mohammedia, Salé and Tétouan, and travelled through northern Morocco at various times until 1998. From 1999 to 2018, my trips to Morocco continued, albeit more intermittently. Particularly relevant is that I located one of the first Riffian families to settle in Al-Hoceima, which allowed me to reconstruct this group in a city that was for decades mostly inhabited by Spaniards. These interviews about the Rif gathered in Morocco along with those with Moroccans – mostly Riffians – assembled in Spain, particularly Catalonia and Barcelona province, from the year 2000 to the present were conducted as a means to retrieve the life stories that are essential to my research.

The interviews with Spaniards who lived in Bata and Al-Hoceima were gathered systematically from 2008 to the present. My interest in interviewing Spaniards grew after a conversation with one of them who had been expelled from Guinea in the final period of Spanish colonisation due to an over-friendly relationship with an Equatorial Guinean working in her home. It was a story that surprised me, not in the least because of the emotion with which it was told. From that point on, I began methodically collecting the impressions and memories of Spaniards who lived in Equatorial Guinea and Morocco, above all Andalusians and Catalans. I collected voices from 2013 and especially from 2014 onwards, after being awarded the R&D Project “Memories of Africa” (2016–2018), on which work continued until 2019. A total of 167 interviews were

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9 I interviewed thirty-three people, of whom nine were Spaniards and the rest Riffians while on fieldwork in that period.

conducted with Equatorial Guineans, 151 with Moroccans, and thirty-two with Spaniards. It is important to state that some interviews took place over a number of years. For this book, I have made a selection of thirty-two lived memories and three narrated ones. An index is provided to help find them, which also gives key details on the informants and the times and places of the interviews (see section 5.1.). Nonetheless, I must declare that I have limited their personal data as far as possible in order to guarantee their complete anonymity due to the concerns many had about being identified. The oral sources used in this work have been subject to the ethical commitments all researchers in general, and anthropologists in particular must make, prioritising the informant's anonymity and safeguarding their identity, except for cases in which this is expressly waived. All participants were informed of my research interests and I only interviewed people who freely decided to cooperate because they considered their life story to represent a collective good. In terms of the processes for guaranteeing confidentiality, anonymity is mandatory where the informants want it. In this case, it is every researcher's obligation to guarantee it, since any personal data and sensitive information must not be shared unless informants expressly renounce anonymity. For the above reasons, the majority of Spanish, Moroccan and Equatorial Guinean informants have been given false names, except for those who wanted their real name to be recorded.

In terms of written sources, extensive documentation of a varied nature has been analysed. Regarding the primary sources, I must mention the Fondos de Marruecos del Archivo General de la Administración, the *Resúmenes Estadísticos de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea* (referred to hereafter as the statistical summaries),<sup>10</sup> the Spanish government's census, the *Boletín Oficial de la Zona de Protectorado Español en Marruecos*, various maps on the continental region of Equatorial Guinea and the Rif, photographs, the *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial* (statistical yearbook) for 2018, the Equatorial Guinean censuses from 1984 to 2001, the data from the Commune Urbaine d'Al-Hoceima, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco of 2011, the Regional Authority of Tanger-Tétouan-Al-Hoceima, the High Commissioner for Planning, the Portail National des Collectivités Territoriales, and the Portail de l'Administration Marocain (see sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, where the information

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10 It should be noted that the data from the statistical summaries (*Resúmenes Estadísticos de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea*) has been used as much as possible, referring, wherever, possible to the specific information published about the city of Bata, although on many occasions the data was grouped by district or even by province or continental region, depending on the administrative vicissitudes legislatively transforming the colony.

consulted in each case is set out). In this section I want to particularly mention the Fondo Giménez Ferrer acquired by CSIC's Institució Milà i Fontanals thanks to the generous donation by Eduard Giménez Ferrer described in section 5.2, to whom I would like to publicly state my heartfelt thanks for their great help and selfless dedication to safeguarding the memories of Equatorial Guinea.

Regarding secondary sources, the selection of NO-DO documentaries<sup>11</sup> on Bata and Al-Hoceima should be mentioned, including the movie *El escritor de un país sin librerías* by Marc Serena, the programme *Cartas en el Tiempo* dedicated to Equatorial Guinea, a short documentary produced by the territorial army on the islet of Alhucemas, various European and Arab news reports on *Hirak*, and the digital press and articles published in electronic magazines and on internet blogs. The magazines *La Guinea Española*, the *Heraldo de Alhucemas* and the *Revista de Tropas Coloniales* were consulted, as were websites that included relevant information, such as the official websites of the Government of Equatorial Guinea, Amnesty International, the Arabic Network for Human Rights, and those of Asodegue and the Central Intelligence Agency. For the information and materials consulted, see sections 5.2. to 5.9. On the written sources, I would like to underline that the gathering and analysis of the available documents and materials were performed in accordance with copyright permissions.

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11 The NO-DOs were audiovisual documentaries made during the Franco regime that showed local, national and world news in a short one- to three-minute format, and were a powerful propaganda tool for the Spanish dictatorship.



FIGURE 1 *Playa del Quemado* viewpoint, Al-Hoceima. September 2016  
PHOTO: YOLANDA AIXELÀ-CABRÉ



FIGURE 2 *La Cántabra* canning plant, Al-Hoceima. September 2016. See graffiti on left  
PHOTO: YOLANDA AIXELÀ-CABRÉ



FIGURE 3 Friends meeting, Al-Hoceima, 1950s  
PRIVATE COLLECTION



FIGURE 4 *Torre del Reloj*, Bata. August 2019  
COURTESY OF ANONYMOUS PHOTOGRAPHER



FIGURE 5 *Monumento al Golpe de Libertad. Plaza de la Libertad, Bata. August 2019*  
COURTESY OF ANONYMOUS PHOTOGRAPHER



FIGURE 6 *Torre de la Libertad*, Bata. August 2019  
COURTESY OF ANONYMOUS PHOTOGRAPHER



FIGURE 7 Ramon Reig at *Hacienda Virgen de Montserrat*, Oveng (Bata), 1930s. Fondo Giménez Ferrer (IMF-CSIC)

## Colonial Imprints in African City Formation

The history of the city of Bata not only shows the colonial extension across continental Spanish Guinea, but it also reveals the European and African rivalries shaped by racial supremacism and ethnic competition present in the gestation of many African cities in the early twentieth century. In the case of Villa Alhucemas, it was an urban environment built on a military enclave in a region whose majority ethnic group was Riffian (Amazigh). The military expansion and the coercive application of regulations restricting the rights of the local populations came to shape Bata's future. In Villa Alhucemas, as the majority of the population was Spanish, the rhetoric of Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood was not activated to manage relations between Spaniards, Moroccans and Riffians.

Bata's emergence from colonial marginality and as unexplored territory is evident in the spectacular population growth, which can be seen in the censuses of *Guinea Continental*: from 266 in 1900 to 16,437 in 1910, 95,589 in 1920, 130,691 in 1932 and 130,049 in 1936.<sup>1</sup> Another very revealing detail may be added to this data: in 1950 the population of *Guinea Continental* was 156,176, out of a national total of 198,663.<sup>2</sup> This meant that once the entire territory had been effectively colonised, the continental population amounted to 78.6 percent of the total. In the case of Alhucemas, the marginality is also clear, not so much because of the city's population figures, but because after focusing attention on controlling the territory until 1927, once the Republic of the Rif was overthrown and Abd el-Krim captured, the area returned to the margins, this time of the Spanish Protectorate. One key difference between Al-Hoceima and Bata was education, which was widespread among men and women in Spanish Guinea, but not in Alhucemas.<sup>3</sup>

Spanish colonisation had political, social and cultural impact, as did the Spanish imprints left on postcolonial states. As we shall see, the most characteristic “colonizing structures” of African colonies and protectorates (Mudimbe

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1 Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1943: 5).

2 Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1957: 29).

3 Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1943: 17).

1988) were deployed in both cities, preparing these territories to be settled colonies.

Like other European colonisations, attempts were made to build cities that were Spanish from the start and whose African traces were erased – something that is even visible in the naming policies in both cities. Legislation approved in both territories also curtailed the rights of the local population in favour of the Spanish, with the limitation of rights and segregationist policies being much more pronounced in Equatorial Guinea, a colony, than in Morocco, a protectorate. All of this was endorsed by racial ideologies designed to support the purported work of civilizing by foregrounding the rhetoric of Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood, Andalusian blood ties and the “Hispanic race”, while concealing the very significant withdrawal or limitation of the rights of local populations, with unforgivable arbitrariness of all kinds, including expropriation, labour and sexual abuse. During colonial times, Spanish imprints became visible in both cities’ cultural heritage, and their legacies went on to be contested in the independent period. In what follows, we reconstruct the cities’ histories from gestation to independence.

## 1 Baata, Bata Viejo, Nueva Bata and Bata: A European City in Central Africa

Eurocentric narratives have concealed the histories of many African cities’ origins. Bata is a clear example. For many Spaniards it was a purely European city, despite nineteenth century maps showing numerous settlements in the area with African place names. In fact, detailed study of Bata shows that it changed from being an area inhabited by local populations with some European missionary, military, trading and smuggling activity to become the continental capital of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea, with a Spanish, German, French, English, Portuguese and Italian population and, as the final stretch of the colonial period approached, Equatorial Guinean and African. Its status as continental capital thus prepared it to become the Fang capital in the independent period.

It should be mentioned that six ethnic groups co-existed in the country: the Fang, the Bubi, the Ndowe, the Annobonese, the Bissio and the Fernandinos, the last of pluri-ethnic origin. Although all of these groups learnt and communicated in Spanish after colonisation (in addition to some who also spoke Pichi), the Fang spoke the Fang language especially on the island of Bioko; the Bubi, the Bubi language; the Ndowe, the Ndowe language; the Annobonese, Fa d’Ambô; the Bissio, the Bissio language; and

the Fernandinos originally spoke English and pidgin. The percentages of the different ethnic groups in the country is controversial, but may be summarised as comprising a Fang majority of up to 85.7 percent, with the rest being 6.5 percent Bubi, 3.6 percent Ndowe, 1.6 percent Annobonese, 1.1 percent Bissio, and 0.3 percent Fernandino.<sup>4</sup>

In the next section, I will reconstruct the history of Bata by combining different Equatorial Guinean and Spanish memories and experiences.

### 1.1 *Baata, Bata Viejo, Nueva Bata and Bata (1880–1939): Occupation and Supremacism*

The Baata area was a Ndowe settlement since the seventeenth century. Iyanga Pendi (1991) provides some information about its origin. The city had been an ancient enclave of several Ndowe tribes, specifically the Kombe:<sup>5</sup>

from the Ekuku River, what is today the vast city of Bata was traditionally the settlement of several Ndowe tribes ... Kombe, Bapuku, Basek and Balengue. And from Nyope Bay, where the airport is located today to the Ekuku River, it was the territory of the tribes: Asonga, Bomundi, Yandye, Moganda, Bole, Dama, Bapuku (a few families), Mooma, Bobenda and Kombe (a few families).

IYANGA PENDI 1991: 29

This Ndowe map, which Dyombe Dyangany also describes (2008: 11), was retained during the colonisation of Bata as, according to missionary reports, the Ndowe linguistic variations of northern Bata were distinguishable from those of the south (Nghah Elingui 2014: 184). The word “Bata” derives

from these inhabitants, from *baata*, high or hill; elevation where some Ndowe communities had fled from the vicinity of the sea for fear of being captured by slave traders ... the peoples of Dyembe, a depression or low-lying area near the coast, began to identify them as inhabitants of *baata*

4 Figures of the CIA, except for the Fernandino minority. Data available at: <https://www.cia.gov/>. Accessed November 2021. For more details, see Aixelà-Cabré (2013: 12–15).

5 For the sake of avoiding misunderstandings, I would like to specify that the Bujeba group refers to the Bissio group, and that they are different to the Ndowe group. The common confusion has been due to the fact that to distinguish the inhabitants of the continental coast, the Spanish called the Bujeba/Bissio *semi-playeros* (semi-beach people) and the Ndowe *playeros* (beach people). Dyombe Dyangany (2008: 30).

*or ibati*, those of above or high ... a name that Europeans used ... and generalised to the whole area.

IYANGA PENDI 1991: 29

Bata's surroundings had thus been Ndowe territories<sup>6</sup> and Niefang was the village that marked the division between the Ndowe and Fang territories, as the (Fang) name itself suggests (Mbomio 2016; Iyanga Pendi 1991: 30). Niefang's nature as an ethnic border was enshrined in the Ndowe–Fang treaty signed by the two communities in 1885. The treaty was meant to reduce the tension between the two ethnic groups and limit Fang expansion towards the coast. But Niefang also reflected the poor control the Spaniards had of *Río Muni* in 1913, almost thirty years after the Ndowe–Fang treaty. As Vilaró recalled (2016: 25), “70 km from Bata on the Benito River, [Spanish] ignorance of the territory was total.” Certainly, until the mid-1910s, the continental region remained unexplored by the Spanish. The information available was based on data from the map drawn by Enrique d'Almonte in 1901, which in turn, combined other European maps from the area, as the map legend states. The superficiality of the data and the gaps in Spanish knowledge of *Río Muni* were thus very significant.

Bata Viejo was founded by the French at the end of the nineteenth century by taking advantage of a commercial enclave containing four factories – the German Jantzen-Thorwalden and Woermans, the French Sajeux and the English John Holt – most of which were within walking distance of Bata Viejo (D'Almonte 1903). The area was of major French, German and (to a lesser extent) British interest, as evidenced by the numerous existing maps cited on the D'Almonte's map (1903). In fact, European factories used the anchorage built by the Catholic mission of the French order of the Congregation of the Holy Spirit located a few hundred metres inland for supplies. The factories' ships anchored on the coast of Bata Viejo and unloaded the cargo into canoes using the small missionary jetty. This system of loading and unloading of goods from ships to the dock continued throughout colonisation until, as we shall see, Macías Nguema built the port of Bata after independence. Bata's power as

6 The territory was Ndowe, not Fang. The reason why I reject Ngah Elingui's (2014) explanation regarding the origin of the word “bata” is that she based it on Spanish colonial literature and on the centrality of the Fang people. For Ngah Elingui (2014: 306), the toponym Bata substituted “Bindele. En langue fang, ce vocable désigne un vêtement sous forme de jupe de raphia. Dans la culture fang, c'était une tenue vestimentaire qui se portait à l'intérieur de la maison. Or, les habitants de localité connue aujourd'hui sous la dénomination de Bata, arboraient ce vêtement pour les sorties à la plage. Les Espagnols ont imposé la dénomination *Bata* qui signifie robe de chambre en langue française.”

a port city, open to the world and to globalisation was postponed until the end of Spanish colonisation.

As González Echegaray describes (1960: 10), Bata Viejo was on the road from Nueva Bata to the Ekuku River. He recalled that following the path that crossed Ikunde and Ucomba, there was a small group of stone or concrete houses in which “indigenous<sup>7</sup> people lived and which looked like it had been ... many years before, an old European settlement ... It was the former Bata, primitive capital of the district of that name.”

Bata Viejo was transferred to the Spanish in 1901 by the Treaty of Paris of June twenty-seventh 1900,<sup>8</sup> but the continent’s effective occupation was delayed and Spanish settlement postponed. Possession of the city finally occurred in 1905 and was precarious.<sup>9</sup> According to one military report, the Lieutenant Governor of Bata district, Ramón Izquierdo y Vivar, advised changing its location. First, because Bata Viejo was unhealthy due to the swamps that surrounded it and so, lacked access to drinking water and, second, because the old anchorage was poorly located, as shown by the fact that some boats got beached on the sand banks, while others disappeared.

Nueva Bata was the name given to the brand new urban Spanish enclave after its refounding in a place close to the one chosen by the French (González Echegaray 1960: 10). The adjective “new” was necessary to distinguish it from the old French enclave, Bata Viejo, which the Spaniards abandoned. They created the small town centre, which was mostly newly built, although they did take advantage of structural elements of Bata Viejo. In fact, lacking the means to transport heavy materials to build the city at another location, the Spaniards exploited the Equatorial Guinean population. Materials had to be carried by the *braceros* (“the Spanish term for agricultural contract workers derived from the word for arms”),<sup>10</sup> according to González Echegaray (1960: 12).

Nueva Bata was built as a military base, but with a clear commercial and strategic vision in the territory. The initial population was just 300 inhabitants.<sup>11</sup> The town centre consisted of a government delegation (subgovernment), a

7 Throughout the book the concepts “indigenous”, “race” and “native” used by the Spanish in their information and statistics are retained to show the extent of their use.

8 Bilateral agreement between Spain and France for the delimitation of the possessions of both countries on the Sahara coast and the Gulf of Guinea.

9 The Spanish military presence was negligible. I do not share the assertion of Laguna et al. (2007a: 19) that there had been a permanent military base in Bata since 1888, because no evidence is provided and its existence is not corroborated by any of the available documentary sources.

10 Martino (2012: 40).

11 See figures of the population of Bata and the continental región in the next section.

hospital, a residence for officials, “housing for European classes of the Colonial Guard”, barracks, a house for workers and a mission (González Echegaray 1960: 12). The missionary jetty had to be rebuilt and the lamppost that showed Nueva Bata’s location from the sea like a lighthouse was eventually placed 2,200 metres northeast of Bata Viejo. Likewise, all the facilities of the Congregation of the Holy Spirit mission were transferred to the Padres Misioneros del Corazón de María in 1918, proof of the definitive replacement of the French colonial legacy by Spanish colonisation. Nevertheless, citing Francisco del Río, González Echegaray (1960: 12) insisted that Nueva Bata continued to be similar in size to Bata Viejo in 1918. The city’s geographical limits at that time were Isimbo and Udubandyolo, although near its coast there would be more factories than in Bata Viejo, including Moritz, Iñigo, Cañada, John Holt, Hatton, Antonio Azconl, Woermann and Aurelio Santiuste.

Bata was a city built for and by Spaniards and Europeans, even though during the colonial period they comprised an extraordinarily small group compared to the total of the Equatorial Guineans resident in the continental region. As in other colonial settings, the Spanish wielded their power over the population through military control, acculturation through missionary action, and the authority of the white population over the black, as embodied in the *Patronato de Indígenas* (Indigenous Council), and the property laws. The Royal Decree of July twelfth 1904 on the Property Regime granted rights to white people ahead of the locals in the acquisition and exploitation of land and the commercialisation of products, leading the African population to withdraw to other nearby areas (Iyanga Pendi 1991: 30; Sá 2016; Sá 2018). This property law was framed in the Organic Statute of 1904 that subdivided the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea into four districts: Fernando Po, Bata, Elobey and Annobón, with two sub-governors in Bata and Elobey and a Governor General in Santa Isabel.

Vilaró’s (2016) reconstruction of the German presence in the area shows that the Bata area was shaped by French, German and Spanish territorial desires and by British commercial aspirations. These tensions remained years later when the borders of the Spanish continental territory were defined in 1914 and in the gradual effective control of the territory. Despite France’s repeated statements of its respect for the Spanish border, Spanish territory was significantly reduced from the initial 300,000 square kilometres to about 26,000, as stipulated at the Berlin Conference on February 26th 1885 (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 648). France was the main colonial power to benefit from the Spanish decline and continued to defend its supposed neutrality. It demonstrated this by not issuing the village chiefs with French identity cards, unlike the German authorities that had entered the Spanish territories (Vilaró 2016: 155). These European rivalries paralleled the tensions that also dominated the relations

between the Ndowe and Fang populations with respect to their territorial boundaries, since, as Rabat (2004: 23) explained, there were “constant inter-cine struggles with neighbouring towns” that would only be appeased “as Western civilisation penetrated ... [and] the fighting in the Muni coastal region saw diminishing episodes.” In any case, it was the initial Spanish disinterest that led the Germans and French to enter the Spanish zone in an attempt to extend their borders to the outer reaches of New Cameroon and Gabon, respectively. In fact, German smugglers were involved in significant trade in the Bata area until they were expelled by the French in 1906.

The Spanish occupation of *Río Muni* did not occur until Ángel Barrera’s second mandate (1910–1924). From 1884 onwards, the governor of Fernando Po, Antonio Cano had tried to encourage the effective colonisation of the continental region with little success (Vilaró 2016: 29). To this end, Manuel Iradier and Bulfy had made an expedition in 1885 (Vilaró 2016: 32–34) on a British-flagged boat, as the British had the means and business interests in the region (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 650).

The city of Bata was consequently affected by the Ndowe–Fang dispute and also by the tension between European powers. This included several significant episodes related to World War I, even though Spain had declared itself neutral territory. Vilaró (2016: 31) recounted a shortage of basic supplies in Bata as “the number of German subjects seeking refuge” was rising. In addition, Bata bore witness to the commercial rivalry between Britons, Germans and Spaniards in the region. For example, the extraction of ivory from *Río Muni* was for a time one of the most profitable activities of the German factories (Vilaró 2016: 92). Some Germans, who crossed the border in the direction of Bata, carried canned food and livestock that made Spanish business in the city impossible due to “unfair” competition (Vilaró 2016: 89). These events took place in 1915 when Spain had already supposedly taken control of the continental territory and ten years after Nueva Bata was founded. These examples show the rivalries between colonial powers, as well as the subordinate place of local populations that were also rivals of each other.

In spite of its Ndowe origin, Bata began to gradually incorporate the Fang population from the 1920s onwards. In part this was due to Spanish colonial activity, but also because the Fangs were forced to labour in factories and plantations near the city and in the public works the Spanish state sought to promote. The regime was similar to that of a prison, and included corporal punishment (Ndongo 1977: 67).<sup>12</sup> Nerín (2019: 24) recalled that the Equatorial

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12 For further information related to the work in the plantations of Fernando Po, see Martino (2012).

TABLE 3 Population of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea

1900	1910	1920	1932	1942	1950	1960	1963
23,488	29,295	111,810	167,002	157,891	198,663	245,989	225,931

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1943: 5). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1957: 28). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS REGIÓN ECUATORIAL, PROVINCIAS DE FERNANDO PÓO Y RIO MUNI 1964 (P. 378). *ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE ESPAÑA 1969* (P. 456, 460).

Guineans who did not work for white-owned companies were forced to labour on public works that mainly benefited the settlers: “Many Equatorial Guineans were imprisoned for minor offences in order to provide labour for the tasks of the Equatorial Guinean administration.”

In the 1920s, some Spanish colonists began to settle in the continental zone of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea, preferring proximity to the city of Bata, as it was the territory under colonial control. Official maps, reports and statistics show that around this time Nueva Bata lost the adjective *Nueva* and became just Bata. These first settlers built factories and plantations to exploit coffee, wood<sup>13</sup> and cacao but never to the levels of the Fernando Po plantations.<sup>14</sup> In 1940, there were 583 plantations on Fernando Po and only eighty-seven on the continent: 15 percent of the total.<sup>15</sup> Hence, the main Spanish plantations remained on the island of Fernando Po until the end of colonisation.

The censuses of the Equatorial Guinean population prove that Spain did not begin the continent’s effective colonisation until the first decades of the twentieth century: in 1920 the population was many times the 1900 estimate, and continued its astonishing growth until the mid-1930s (see Tables 3 and 4).

Bata’s growth differed from that of Santa Isabel. The capital of Spanish Guinea, Santa Isabel was a small city founded by the British in 1843, whose population was African. Spanish influence began in 1850, particularly after effective colonisation in 1900 (Martín del Molino 1994: 9). Bata was a small coastal urban nucleus, relatively cosmopolitan in European terms, with little

13 On logging exploitation see Guerra y Ruíz-Valdepeñas (2015).

14 Jordi Sant (2017) carried out an excellent work on Catalan businessmen in Equatorial Guinea.

15 Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1947: 82).

TABLE 4 *Indigenous population of Guinea continental*

1900	1910	1920	1932	1942	1950	1960
248	16,437	95,589	130,691	130,049	156,176	238,908

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. *CENSO DE POBLACIÓN DE LAS POSESIONES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA*, VOLUME I, DETAILED BY PROVINCES (P. 327). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1943: 5). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1957: 28). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS REGIÓN ECUATORIAL, PROVINCIAS DE FERNANDO PÓO Y RÍO MUNI 1964 (P. 378).

African presence and racially segregated, as the skin colour of inhabitants was what determined borders and ethno-social hierarchies (Sepa 2011: 247). As with the Dutch, French and British imperial cultures studied by Stoler (1989: 634), in its colonies Spain “constructed communities built on asymmetries of race, class and gender-entities.” The *Patronato de Indígenas* created in 1928 fulfilled its task of subjecting the Equatorial Guinean population to “tutelage” (Ndongo 1977: 55). Santa Isabel’s powerful and educated Fernandino minority, which held rights and property despite their negritude, and were descended from Sierra Leoneans and Liberians, never existed in the continental region. In *Río Muni* there were only *braceros*, servants and Equatorial Guinean and African *Miningas*. Those who were not in their villages and worked in cities or on plantations faced 12–14-hour working days. As Ndongo explains (1977: 45) “the *braceros* lived with their families in long unhealthy barracks, and were forced to buy food ... in the farmhouse, which was owned by the boss.”

In the city of Bata, and in the continental region in general, the first part of Spanish colonisation took the form of a social pyramid with Europeans at its peak, a second tier of African workers of non-Equatorial Guinean origin, and a base of Equatorial Guineans. This hierarchical structure was eventually nuanced by the approval of the figures of the fully emancipated and assimilated, the partially emancipated and the non-emancipated. It was a structure that established power groups and differences within the Equatorial Guinean population. Full emancipation was comparable to the status of whites, the partially emancipated had intermediate rights somewhere between those of whites and Equatorial Guineans, and the non-emancipated were subject to harsh legislation especially with regard to labour. Many of these issues were elucidated at the *Delegación de Asuntos Indígenas* (Delegation for Native Affairs) established in Bata. The colonists’ situation of privilege with respect

to the Equatorial Guineans was reflected in their generally derogatory opinions of the African population. There was no empathy or acknowledgement of the constant abuse to which the latter were subjected; instead, contempt and disinterest towards the local people abounded among Spaniards, with various forms of discrimination and exclusion expressing racial prejudice and cultural inferiorisation (Stucki 2019: 138). This was how the colonial regime operated. As Sánchez Molina (2002: 116) has pointed out, the emancipated would be rigorously chosen, “only those who, in a way, demonstrated their loyalty and profitability to the colonial system were guaranteed their emancipation.”

Bata was the driving force of the continental region’s Hispanisation (Álvarez Chillida and Martín Corrales 2013), race policy (Álvarez Chillida 2013b) and assimilationist logic (Aixelà-Cabré 2017). A similar project was undertaken in Fernando Po (Fernández 2018), following the example of the colonisation of the Americas. Thanks to missionary activity, the Spanish language was able to prevail in coexistence with vernacular languages. Furthermore, according to Lipski (2007: 88) and the recent work by Schlumpf (2016), a variant dialect was created. The extensive knowledge of Spanish achieved by the Equatorial Guinean population was the result of intensive education taught only in that language. This guaranteed that Spanish was widely used, although its initial implementation and development was very complicated because absenteeism was chronic and there was widespread rejection of teaching in Spanish in the colony (Ngha Elingui 2014: 192). Schools were opened in Bata between 1928 and 1930. In 1937 two more were built, although always noticeably fewer than those opened in Santa Isabel and throughout Fernando Po (Ngha Elingui 2014: 202–203). As Ndongo (1977: 45) recalled, in the missions “break time was used for the black children and catechists to cut the grass on the missionaries’ farms, while the whites went home for lunch.”

It should also be noted that continental colonisation reduced the visibility achieved by the Bubi ethnic group during the colonisation of Fernando Po. Their prevalence derived from being the native population of an island that was the centre of Spanish colonisation, but they soon began to share visibility with other ethnic groups, especially the Fang.

Data shows that Bata was a highly segregated city until the autonomous period, much more so than Santa Isabel, where a socially powerful and visible Fernandino minority displayed significant intersectionalities in terms of class and colour that were residual in Bata. Evidence of segregation could be seen by the fact that the spaces for whites were clearly differentiated from those of the black population. Until the end of the 1940s the only people living in the city proper were Europeans and their “boys” (Equatorial Guineans in domestic service), while the African population lived on the outskirts of the city. The

1942 census showed Bata's white and Equatorial Guinean populations to be almost equal because one of the perks of Spanish colonisation was to offer a *boy* as a gift to each European who settled there.<sup>16</sup> The census counted domestic employees living in white homes. Irmina, the Catalan wife of the boss of a coffee plantation, Hacienda Virgen de Montserrat in Oveng, was contemptuous and unempathetic about the abuse many servants received during the colonial regime, explaining in her letter from Oveng/Bata on April eighth, 1943: "Now I don't even have a laundry room and with a *boy* in the kitchen who the moment I look away burns everything and on top of that is still sleeping ... The last cook I had was a drunk who stole all he could and even drank some of the wine for the roast chicken while it was cooking."<sup>17</sup> Like most Spaniards, Irmina clearly failed to understand how oppressive the colonial regime was for the Equatorial Guineans. As José Luís,<sup>18</sup> a Fang man working as a lawyer in Spain summed up, "Fang men were brave warriors. They would never have chosen to be *boys* if they had been free men" (Informant: José Luís 2018).

This racial segregation, which protected the rights of the European minority in relation to the local majority in all the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea, was legalised by decree on September tenth, 1938. It drew an explicit distinction between two legal systems that were from then on to work in parallel and which divided the population according to the colour of their skin: European and "indigenous" legislation. These *Tribunales de Demarcación* (Demarcation Courts) or *Tribunales de Raza* (Race Courts) were imposed during the Spanish Civil War, although daily life in the territories was already racially segregated. In fact, Bata was taken by the rebels on October fourteenth, 1936, a few months after Santa Isabel. Canarian and *Moorish* troops from Ifni occupied the city using mortars, machine guns and cannon, retaliating against Republicans, especially whites, but also Equatorial Guineans, as Miguel Ángel Pozanco describes in his book *Guinea mártir*, cited by Nerín (2019: 18). As Ndongo (1977: 46) recalls, although the Spanish Republic was not anti-colonialist, it did "make a serious attempt to modernise colonial relations", an attempt that was cut short. As with the rest of the territory, Spanish Francoism's National Catholicism reached Bata as the heir to the slogans of the Civil War. The settlers showed unabashed adherence, as Irmina's letter of January thirtieth, 1938 from Bata shows. Entitled *Arriba España* she wrote:

16 Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1955: 211).

17 Letter from Oveng-Bata of April eighth 1943. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

18 José Luís is Fang, was born in Bata district in Equatorial Guinea and is sixty-one years old. He studied law. Ongoing interviews in Barcelona from 2011 to 2019.

I'm so happy to be able to write directly and think that you are now free to speak and say what you think ... Fortunately God is great and Our General Franco victorious. A few days ago we arrived from the peninsula, we travelled throughout our liberated Spain where it is a pleasure to see how well everything is going ... The reds stole everything from us and then took our home, luckily a few indigenous people got to it in time and the house was not burned down, we had escaped a few days beforehand, or you can imagine what would have happened to us ...<sup>19</sup>

The new legislation from the *Tribunales de Raza* established a “European justice” that was adjudicated by the Colonial Court and “indigenous justice” applied by the Indigenous High Court without recourse to appeal. Both were applied by the District Courts of Bata and Santa Isabel. To offer just a few illustrative figures, which I will go into in more detail in the next section, the white population registered in the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea in 1942 was 4,124. Of these, only 19.5 percent lived in the continental region: 805 people. The continental region had little appeal to cacao entrepreneurs already established in Fernando Po.

Under Spanish colonisation, Bata grew in accordance with a day-to-day segregation that differentiated Equatorial Guinean people from Europeans. As detailed in the Spanish Census of 1940 (1949: 29), the “indigenous” population of Bata was located on the outskirts: “[population] usually lives outside the city, occupying nearby places such as Moganda, Lea, Komandachina.” So, although the Fang and other Equatorial Guinean populations did not live in the same neighbourhoods as the Europeans, the Africans were integrated into Bata when the city expanded towards the end of colonisation and took in small *dzal* (villages).

In 1907 the Colonial Guard was created as a tool for the administration to control the population. Heir to the Colonial Police of 1904, it was eventually incorporated into the Civil Guard. Its role was decisive in what the Spaniards called the “pacification of the territory” – a euphemism for the violent subjugation of the population. It always combined Equatorial Guinean personnel with Spanish officers and, later, a very high proportion of the former, as we will see in the next section. Its role was key towards the maintenance and surveillance of the colony, as well as in the implementation of colonisation and its continuity. As the officers only spoke to them in Spanish, the immersion of the personnel in the language was serious and they also took numerous language courses

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19 Letter from Bata of January thirtieth, 1938. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

(Ngah Elingui 2014: 276–277). Vilaró describes the punishment operations organised against the rebellion in Bata’s northern district in 1915. The operation was designed and supervised by Barrera, a governor apparently respected for his aptitude for dialogue (Sá 2018). Barrera sent the military to direct over a hundred Colonial Guards to carry out reprisals with carefully marked itineraries of the towns to be punished, “burning villages, destroying the plantations and chasing the rebels without cease or rest ... The ploy ... was to leave some cabin unburned in the razed towns, in which a squad of guards would hide and open fire as soon as the rebels confidently returned” (Vilaró 2016: 142). The consequences for those who rebelled against the Spanish colonial presence was to have all of their villages burned and destroyed for not being Spanish enthusiasts, leaving 115 dead and many injured, and capturing thirty-six women and thirty-four children who were sent to Bata (Vilaró 2016: 142–143).

Another documented case was the repression of the Ysen tribe, also in the district of Bata. For this “effective action,” the participating members of the Colonial Guard were decorated. However, the medals awarded to the four African participants did not come with the significant financial reward given to the Spanish, as published in the Royal Order of January twenty-sixth, 1914 (Petit 2007: 492,510). Barrera’s response to the rebellion was repeated by the other governors of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea. They deployed strict military control and were even more hierarchical and discriminatory against the Equatorial Guinean people, if that was possible. Núñez del Prado, for example, was praised for “the zeal and interest he has put into solving the problems that have arisen” (García Figueras 1928: 161), thereby enabling “a large-scale agricultural and forestry operation” to begin.

Bata was a prime witness to the actions of the Colonial Guard in the continental region because, as the regional capital, the “rebels” had to be executed there. That was the case of Bongo Roku, who was transferred to Bata after his capture in 1915. After his surrender, colonial administrators forced his tribe to hand over all their weapons and “clear six-meter-wide roads from their villages to Bata” (Vilaró 2016: 144). These road-building punishments imposed by the colonial administrators were part of the Spanish strategy for subjugating the population. The so-called *prestación personal obligatoria* was nothing other than forced labour, although it was endorsed by Spanish legislation. In fact, the so-called “total pacification” of the continental territory of *Río Muni* initiated by Ángel Barrera took place under the mandate of Governor General Miquel Núñez de Prado (1926–1931), on orders of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–1930), and with Tomás Buiza commanding the Colonial Guard. The “pacification” materialised in the construction of the Bata–Mikomiseng–Ebebeyín highway, built with Equatorial Guinean labour: “The action stifled

Fang political resistance under the weight of the *Pax hispánica*" (Liniger-Goumaz 1988: 57).

For all these reasons Baata, Bata Viejo, Nueva Bata and Bata bore direct witness to the European colonisation of the continental region. Its location and control symbolised the tensions between the Spaniards, Germans and French, but also the rivalries between the Ndowe and the Fang – a very large group, also present in Gabon and Cameroon, which was successfully spreading towards the coast. With power in Spanish hands, the local communities suffered total repression. The Spanish desire to control the territory led to a profound process of subordination of the Equatorial Guinean population that, as we shall see, would last for decades.

### 1.2 *From Segregated Bata to Equatorial Guinean Empowerment (1940–1968)*

Racial segregation in the city of Bata went through different phases, from a deep-rooted segregationism that remained visible in the 1940s to a degree of flexibility in the late 1950s. This flexibility was the product of two status changes. Bata was made a province and a minority of the Equatorial Guinean population became fully or partially emancipated after being employed in the Spanish administration as teachers and helpers, or even as performers of missionary tasks. With provincialisation in 1959, the legal categorisation of fully or partially emancipated or assimilated was eliminated (Stucki 2019: 137), although that category continued to be used informally in the colony in order to differentiate the origin of some from that of others. These days it is used to retrace the biographies of prominent Equatorial Guineans, as seen in the scientific output of numerous Equatorial Guinean researchers, who use the condition of assimilated or emancipated as a way of revealing their integration or participation in the colonial administration (Ndongo 1977, Dyombe Dyangany 2008, Sepa 2011). The definitive decline of this racial segregation began with the autonomous regime of 1963, when political changes eventually limited the highly extensive rights Spaniards had enjoyed until then at the expense of the Equatorial Guineans. Below we present the socio-political issues affecting life in Bata from 1940 until independence in 1968.

In 1940 the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea were structured into colonial administrations, each with its own respective leader. Territorial districts were also expanded to include Santa Isabel, San Carlos, Bata, Río Benito, Puerto Iradier, Niefang, Mikomeseng, Ebebeyín, Mongomo, Evinayong, Nsorc, Acurenam and Bimbiles. Before spreading to the Utonde and Ekuku rivers, Bata comprised the area of Ikunde,<sup>20</sup> the football pitch, Udubuangyolo, the

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<sup>20</sup> For more on Ikunde and its role as the base for the animal trade to supply the Barcelona zoo, see Antebi et al (2017).

*Plaza del Reloj*, the Catholic mission and the Isimbo river next to Moganda (Iyanga Pendi 1991: 30).

The segregation of the Equatorial Guineans in Bata over previous decades was enacted through the *Tribunales de Demarcación* and Raza and was exacerbated by the obvious differences between the Equatorial Guinean population and the African workforce imported to work in factories and plantations. In general, the white and black populations were accountable to different courts, while foreign African groups enjoyed greater rights thanks to the general agreements framing their contracts (Sepa 2011: 247). For example, in one of her letters Irmina explained the problems they had with the *braceros* in the period before provincialisation:

Every day one is more disgusted by the conflicts that occur. The *braceros* are unbearable, looking for reasons not to work and as you can imagine one gets into a heap of trouble. I always advocate calm but, believe me, the farm wears you out. Thanks to his position, Ramon can resolve many tricky moments but always working with great diplomacy and caution.<sup>21</sup>

In fact, in the accounting of the Hacienda Virgen de Montserrat (Oveng, Bata), the estate Ramon and Irmina managed and co-owned with the Giménez Ferrer family (see Figure 7), Nigerian *braceros* were paid much more than the Fang, a practice that was maintained from the farm's foundation in 1927 until its closure in 1965, and which shows the difficulties the emancipated had getting paid. As Ramon explained in a letter from Bata – Hacienda Virgen de Montserrat on May second, 1965:

Last month I had to deal with eight liquidations of Nigerian *braceros* ... I have five Pamues left that have aged along with the farm, one of them the old foreman, which makes me very sad because he has been with us since 1927. I will keep the Pamues until the moment of departure and compensate them in line with what the law sets out ... I have had a hard time getting the instalments from the native I sold a plot of farmland to.<sup>22</sup>

Towards the end of colonisation, the costs of Equatorial Guinean labour rose (see Table 5). When hiring became more expensive, farms used fewer *braceros* to do the same work and spent more. Maintaining the plantation became

21 Letter from Bata of November 27th 1957. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

22 Letter from Bata-Hacienda Virgen de Montserrat of May second, 1965. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

TABLE 5 Salary costs of African workers of the Hacienda Virgen de Montserrat

	1959	1960	1962
<i>Indigenous personnel</i>	856,203	900,348	1,033,233

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. ACCOUNTING OF THE *HACIENDA VIRGEN DE MONTSERRAT*, FONDO GIMÉNEZ FERRER (IMF-CSIC).

TABLE 6 *Black people* in the continental territory: Coast

1942
41,175

SOURCE: RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1947: 31).

“unsustainable”, according to seventy-eight year-old Barcelona native Eduard Giménez Ferrer,<sup>23</sup> son of one of the owners. This was despite Ramon Reig and the other Catalan contracted on the farm reducing their salaries by a third during the last three years.

Racial segregation was the order of the day in Bata, with people distinguished by their skin colour and restricted in their access to certain areas. The Equatorial Guinean inhabitants “were relegated and almost confined to their villages ... pillaged and exploited” (Ndongo 1977: 41). As in other European colonial settings, the fact that the Spaniards were manifestly in the minority did not diminish their power over the African population (see Tables 6 to 10).

The Spaniards who lived outside Bata in nearby plantations and factories also came in to the city. Opportunities to start businesses were taken,

23 Two informants (father and son) with the same name are distinguished by giving both their surnames. This differs substantially from the methodology used for the majority of Spanish, Moroccan and Equatorial Guinean informants, for whom a false first name is supplied in order to respect their desire for anonymity, as I explained in the introduction. Eduard Giménez Ferrer is Catalan. He is seventy-eight years old. Interviewed in Barcelona since December 2015.

TABLE 7 *White people in the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea*

1942		1950	
4,124		3,937	
3,489 men	635 women	2,721 men	1,216 women
2,693 Spaniards	375 Spanish	2,493 Spaniards	1,102 Spanish
114 Portuguese	39 Portuguese	139 Portuguese	64 Portuguese
20 Germans	5 Germans	45 Lebanese	30 Lebanese
17 Syrians	4 Syrians	23 Germans	10 Germans
11 Italians	1 Italian	8 Indians	1 Indian
2 French	2 French	5 Italians	3 Italians
3 English	1 English	4 British	1 British
20 others	12 others	4 others	5 others
"White people" in the continental territory			
805 (19.53 percent of the total)		1,497 (38 percent of the total)	
609 men	196 women	1,047 men	450 women

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1945: 30-31). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1953: 26-27).

TABLE 8 *White people in Bata district (continental Equatorial Guinea)*

1942		1950
301		698
220 men	81 women	-

SOURCE: RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1945: 30-31).

TABLE 9 *Black people in Bata district (continental Equatorial Guinea)*

1942		1950
19,288		19,173
10,517 men	8,771 women	–

SOURCE: RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1945: 30–31). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA DE (1953: 26–27).

fundamentally, by settlers and later on by some of the emancipated. Irmina wanted to start her own business despite not needing the income because her husband had the salary of a plantation manager, as well as company shares. As she explained in a letter from Oveng-Bata on June fourteenth, 1944: “I do not know if my sister will have told you that a lady friend and I have set up a shop in Bata selling items for ladies, children and gifts, we are going to give it a try even though there has been a major crisis for the past three months and, as always, no lack of imitators ...”<sup>24</sup>

The Spanish community of Bata got its news from the weekly magazine *Potopoto*, which ran from 1951 until closing in 1968 (Nghah Elingui 2014: 282), as did *Ébano*, Santa Isabel’s newspaper, which had been published since 1939 (González Echegaray 2017: 2). Although on general sale, the magazine was published by and for the Spanish and reflected their interests and points of view, as did the sports weekly *La Voz de Guinea Continental*, published in Bata in 1947 (Nghah Elingui 2014: 283). Bata also had a radio station, Radio Ecuatorial EAJ 206, *La voz de Río Muni*, which opened in December 1953. Although its content was aimed at the Spanish community, its public access ensured the promotion of Spanish language and culture among the Equatorial Guinean population (Nghah Elingui 2014: 288).

The annual budgets of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea clearly reflect the colonial expansion that began in the 1940s and was consolidated in the late 1950s. The colony’s statistical summaries show that their expenses were usually covered by their own income,<sup>25</sup> more than half of which came

24 Letter from Oveng-Bata of June fourteenth, 1944. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

25 This statement is based on an in-depth review of the *Resúmenes Estadísticos*. It should also be underlined that the Civil War and the first post-war years were also marked by

TABLE 10 *White people and Black people in Bata city*

1942		1950		1962	1963
848		6,790		25,760	27,024
235	613	617 Europeans	6,173 "colour"	–	–
Europeans	<i>indigenus</i>		( <i>indigenus</i>		
	people		people)		
171 men /	431 men /	–	–	–	–
64 women	182 women				

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA 1949 (1949: 29). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS REGIÓN ECUATORIAL, PROVINCIAS DE FERNANDO PÓO Y RIO MUNI 1963 (P. 460). ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE ESPAÑA 1969 (P. 456).

from direct taxes on rural wealth and on the profits of companies in the territories. This allowed the Spanish state to obtain a surplus, enabling budgets to be increased at no cost and swelling the "Colonial Treasury."<sup>26</sup> The 1939 budget quadrupled in the space of ten years, and increased by 140 percent in 1957, following UN pressure on Spain to start moving towards decolonisation, as shown by the table of budgets of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea (see Table 11).

The colony's favourable budgetary balance improved with the provincialisation of 1959, but the nine short years before independence were not enough to remedy scant Spanish investment and the precarious services bequeathed by a century of exploitation of human and natural resources. Buale assesses these issues (1969: 59, 75–76) in his review of the balance sheets of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea.<sup>27</sup>

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scarcity, as Irmina describes in her Oveng – Bata letter of March second, 1943: "... upon return, found things much changed, there is little food, flour on the first of the month ... The *morenos* do not want money but payment in kind ..." See also letter from Bata of November twenty-seventh, 1957. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

26 Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1955: 152–157).

27 The overall figures throughout the colonisation of Spanish Guinea are worth examining for the startling revelation that the Spanish budgets had 8.2 percent gaps in the colony's favour, like Zarandona (2012: 60–61). The situation was different in the Spanish Protectorate, as income there did not match expenditure.

The most important items of expenditure in these budgets were typically – and in this order – public works, urban construction and industrial inspection, the Territorial Guard and territorial administrations, the general government, the provincial health service, and justice and religion.<sup>28</sup> It is notable that imports were lower than exports (see Table 12). Carnero and Díaz (2014: 723) write that the contribution to Spanish coffers was small because “their relative importance to Spanish foreign trade was insignificant, representing 0.25 percent of national imports and 0.5 percent of Spanish exports.”

The colony’s budgets were essential because they formed the basis of the budgets of the local haciendas, organised by Neighbours’ Councils. Bata’s budget was always smaller than Santa Isabel’s (see Table 13).

Of these budgets, and by way of example, it should be noted that the largest expenditure in both Bata and Santa Isabel was on public works, followed by urban and rural police, and health and hygiene.<sup>29</sup> The data shows that in the years prior to independence, “economic dependence ... on the former metropole was total: 90 percent of exports and 70 percent of imports” (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 647).

Although the 1940s and 1950s were decades of Spanish colonial consolidation, they were also the toughest and most repressive years for the population, as the metropole wanted to contain all potential desires for independence and rebellion produced by the start of the European decolonisation of Africa. The almost free or very badly paid workforce established by the *prestación personal* clause remained active. As Nerín (2019: 24) recalled, “those hired by forestry or agricultural companies could not terminate their contract, could not change owner, were paid a large amount of their salary at the end of the contract: they were definitely semi-forced labourers.” The *prestación personal* workers were mainly assigned to plantations, where the work was for a long time unpaid or almost unpaid. This made it possible to strengthen Spanish authority over the populations, while abusing free labour to realise Spain’s supposedly “civilising work” – building roads, bridges, houses, airports “and other so-called ‘development projects’ with a high number of Equatorial Guinean victims from across *Río Muni*” (Obiang Biko 2016: 419).

There is no way of calculating what percentage of the continental population worked in deplorable conditions and with low or almost non-existent

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28 Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1958: 142).

29 Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1955: 157).

TABLE 11 Budget of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea

Year	Budget (amount in thousands of pesetas)	Percentage of increase or decrease compared to the previous year
1939	14,159	—
1949	61,159	+54.64
1950	53,052	-13.25
1951	62,855	+18.47
1952	73,853	+11.7.
1953	73,936	+0.11
1954	112,220	+51.07
1955	120,158	+7.07
1956	125,902	+4.78
1957	160,007	+27.09

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1955: 152). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1858: 140).

TABLE 12 Value of exported and imported goods (in thousands of pesetas)

Year	Export	Import
1953	617,303	317,315
1954	698,170	403,268
1955	770,142	544,775
1956	929,179	551,286
1957	1,088,016	676,155
1958	1,130,728	776,231
1959	1,131,805	818,944
1960	2,006,079	916,469

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1958: 76). NDONGO (1977: 81) FOR 1958, 1959 AND 1960.

TABLE 13 Budget of Bata and Santa Isabel (in thousands of pesetas)

Year	Bata	Santa Isabel
1949	1,122	2,999
1950	1,046	3,535
1951	2,335	3,412
1952	2,441	3,893
1953	2,553	4,615

SOURCE: RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1955: 157).

salaries in the public works around *Río Muni* in conditions similar to those produced in Fernando Po. However, between 1956 and 1957 they had already built 767 kilometres of road connecting Bata with Mbini and Ebebeyín, as well as bridges, and other roads that connected these cities with different important towns in the district. Only the road budgeted in order to connect Bata to the pretentious “International Airport” in 1957 remained; the “airport” was in reality nothing more than an airfield.<sup>30</sup> These roads, not all of which were paved,<sup>31</sup> were built with Equatorial Guinean labour. Foreign African women were hired directly for the plantations, while the European population was very small and performed roles with greater responsibility in line with the racial hierarchies that existed in the colony.

Although a classification of the professions of the Equatorial Guinean population of *Río Muni* is lacking, those of Fernando Po are available, and are likely to have been similar. It is observed that, excluding children and students (7,477), 70 percent of the 38,041 people were *braceros* or engaged in forestry and agricultural tasks, with only 0.007 percent engaged in liberal professions (three people).<sup>32</sup> Obiang Biko (2016: 419–421), a very significant Fang figure

30 The data on the length of the main roads have been added together. Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1958: 16, 20).

31 That not all roads were asphalted can be deduced from the list of works approved in 1956 and 1957 in which bitumen is claimed for in the budget for different roads, as well as bridge trusses. Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1958: 17–18).

32 Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1957: 29).

in the colonial independence process, who was based in the United States for decades, recounts the way the Equatorial Guineans distinguished the *prestación personal* and the type of tasks the colonists entrusted to them. As we shall see, the terms used depended on the difficulty of the work and the remuneration: (1) *bibomo* (Fang language: at dawn); (2) *nkwara-n'kwara* (Fang language: machete vs. machete); (3) *bibalik-be-beka-boyon* (Fang language: Mr Beka-Boyon's wheelbarrows); (4) *beretta* (the name of the Italian slaver who eventually acted as a contractor to build highways in *Río Muni*); and (5) *akel-anguma* (Fang language: a strict man, recalling a well-known Portuguese slaver who treated the Equatorial Guineans brutally).

The Equatorial Guineans' translations of the different *prestación personal* duties compiled by Obiang Biko (2016: 43) should be supplemented by the collective memory of the mass graves in which the Spaniards buried the Equatorial Guineans who did not survive the ceaseless hard work they were forced to carry out for weeks on end on the countless roads and highways meant to connect the continental region of the colony. Mbare Ngom (1996), Lewis (2009, 2017), Ugarte (2009), Rizo (2004, 2012) and Otabela (2009), among others, have analysed the traces of that veiled memory through the literary work of Donato Ndongo (1987, 1997, 2015), Juan Tomás Ávila Laurel (1999, 2000, 2009) and Joaquín Mbomio (2016), as until recently these memories were only found in literature.

For many Equatorial Guineans punishment often meant imprisonment. For example, not being employed by any of the colonial companies was considered a serious matter. The same applied to a person leaving the settlement in which they were registered without travel documents, which numerous inspection posts placed on the roads were set up to detect. Other serious offences included absence from work, showing disrespect to a settler, and rebellion even in response to abuse (Obiang Biko 2016: 44). If these offences occurred in a plantation or factory and were not serious, they could be resolved internally. This so-called "internal" solution, which goes some way to explaining the scarcity of criminal and custodial cases in the statistics, is at odds with the complaints many Equatorial Guinean informants made about colonial abuse.

The statistics also show the abuse of complaints made against Equatorial Guineans (see Table 14). This becomes clear when comparing the information on complaints with the convictions handed down, as well as the fact that the data on those sentenced to deprivation of liberty do not appear in the prison data, because they were confined in the facilities where they worked. The reality was that many suffered constant physical abuse in plantations and factories if they complained about the treatment received (Nerín 2019: 40, 44). For all these reasons, the numbers of those sentenced to prison seem extraordinarily

low when compared to the numbers of arrests and punishments (see Table 15)). As Ndongo (1977: 68) explained, “the death or disappearance of blacks was common currency.” Hence, we should be wary about the reliability of the statistics on those convicted, deprived of liberty or executed. To illustrate these issues, below I have included some tables with “indigenous” justice data (which applied only to Equatorial Guineans), and another with prison data, from which I have selected some representative years.

It is also instructive to review the main causes for which government police made arrests (see Table 16). This clearly shows the subordinate status of Equatorial Guineans when compared to Spaniards and Europeans. Europeans were honourable and honest and there were no lawsuits against them, while against the Equatorial Guineans<sup>33</sup> there were numerous.<sup>34</sup> In this regard, we include data from 1946 and 1956 showing that the trends did not begin to reverse until the end of colonisation.

A separate issue was “maintaining romantic relationships with white women, which could lead to shooting and execution” (Obiang Biko 2016: 44; Nerín 2019: 26). María del Mar,<sup>35</sup> a Canarian woman who had lived in Santa Isabel during her youth, explained to me that after her parents overheard her speaking in a friendly way to her “boy” “that very night my parents consulted the Governor about what they should do with me. The next day they boarded me on the first Iberia flight to the peninsula. They kicked me out of there. It was 1962” (Informant: María del Mar 2008). Double moral standards are laid bare, as white men were intimate with Equatorial Guinean girls without any practical penalty for those relationships (Ndongo 1977: 57).<sup>36</sup> Indeed, the various Spanish authorities, European foremen and other male settlers had frequent intimate relationships with them. Nerín’s (1999) analysis on this matter is excellent. With no contraceptives, it was common for these Equatorial Guinean women to bear children who were mostly abandoned in the colony after independence. Josefa,<sup>37</sup> who is Bubi and lives in Spain, is a descendant of one of the numerous

33 The data does not differentiate men from women.

34 The data does not differentiate Europeans from “indigenous.” As in previous censuses Europeans are always zero, it is understood that they are “indigenous.”

35 María del Mar is a seventy-two year-old woman born in the Canary Islands. She lived in Santa Isabel until she was fifteen years old. Interviewed in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria in September 2008.

36 The topic is studied in the chapter Aixelà-Cabrè, “Colonial Segregation, Racism, Gender and Naming.” In Aixelà-Cabrè, ed, *Africa in Europe. Europe in Africa. Reassessing the Cultural Legacy*. New York: Peter Lang, 39–61.

37 Josefa is Bubi. She lives in Spain since the 1990s. Informal interview in Castilla y León región in October 2019.

TABLE 14 *Indigenous justice in Bata*

Year	Civil			Penal		
	Lawsuits filed	Condemned	Complaints filed	Convictions	Condemned to fines	Condemned to deprivation of liberty
1941	390	56	56	3	3	3
1942	450	133	64	44	1	56
1946	375	175	66	58	0	58
1947	196	32	29	0	0	0
1952	262	101	4	3	0	3
1953	342	98	3	2	1	1
1956	170	122	—	24	1	26
1957	172	105	—	—	—	—

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1943: 14, 16). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1945: 131). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1949: 150–151). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1957: 140–142). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1958: 125–126).

relationships that could not be legalised, as the practice was prohibited. However, the family bond could be registered, and they were given the Spanish surname. As Josefa explained, “My grandfather was one of the Spaniards who had to leave Equatorial Guinea quickly. He recognised my mother, giving her his surname, but he left Equatorial Guinea with a Catalan with whom he later married. He never came back” (Informant: Josefa 2019).

With regard to the *Patronato de Asuntos Indígenas* (Indigenous Affairs Council), it should be said that it was a purely Spanish body in Bata that was superficially updated<sup>38</sup> in 1952.<sup>39</sup> Like “indigenous education” it aimed mainly to create auxiliaries of the colonial administration, with the limitation that

38 See NO-DO of November seventeenth, 1958, NOT N 828 A.

39 *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, March eighteenth, 1952 (year 22, No. 78).

TABLE 15 Prison movement in the continental territory

Year	Government arrests	Provisional prison	Minor arrest	Major arrest	Major prison	Other serious penalties	Death	Total
1941	0	28	17	16	1	1	0	63
1942	0	121	0	0	21	22	0	166
1946 <sup>a</sup>	3	30	8	24	38	7	—	110
1947 <sup>b</sup>	1	9	34	5	39	0	—	88
1952	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	130
1953	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	199
1956	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	204
1957	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	241

a It only reflects males. Women are not broken down, only twenty-nine are counted in total.

b It only reflects males. Women are not broken down, only fifty-one are counted in total.

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1943: 16). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1945: 132). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1949: 156). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1957: 146). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1958: 129).

only students who demonstrated that they had converted to Catholicism were admitted (Nerín 2019: 34). Among its successes, the board promoted the opening of the Bata School of Arts and Crafts in 1958 (Nghah Elingui 2014: 202–213), which was widely mentioned in different accounts for the empowerment conferred on the lucky recipients. However, as Ndongo (1977: 66) explained, in class, teachers had to ask, “Are we Spanish? ... ‘We are Spanish by the Grace of God!’ ‘Why are we Spanish?’ – they asked again, ‘We are Spanish because we had the luck of being born in a country called Spain!’”

As in previous decades, the Colonial Guard controlled the colony. Its troops remained mostly Equatorial Guinean (see Table 17). On July second, 1946, a new regulation was promulgated for the Colonial Guard of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea, reorganising certain aspects, although their internal functions and organisation remained intact. Over the decades, the Colonial Guard was filled with men who were “Fang from the interior of *Río Muni*” trained “in techniques of terror and torture against the native population” (Obiang Biko 2016: 31, 32). The abuse of the native population by Spaniards, Europeans and

TABLE 16 Detentions in the Bata delegation

Acts	1946		1956			
	European		Indigenous people		Total	Indigenous people <sup>a</sup>
	Men	Women	Men	Women		
Acts against public order	0	0	46	9	55	293
Falsehoods	0	0	2	0	2	13
Acts against the Administration of Justice	0	0	1	0	1	0
Games and raffles	0	0	19	0	19	4
Thefts	0	0	57	13	70	99
Other facts	0	0	39	11	49	408

a The figures do not differentiate Europeans from "indigenous people." As in previous censuses, Europeans were always zero, it is understood that they were "indigenous people."

b The data do not differentiate men from women.

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1949: 148). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1958: 122).

Colonial Guards took the form of beatings, lashes or *melongazos*, a term related to the Fang word *melongo*, a very strong elastic strap, (Obiang Biko 2016: 45). It is also noteworthy that they ended up organising mixed territorial companies composed of the Colonial Guard and Civil Guard, as is seen in the NO-DO of February twenty-seventh, 1961.<sup>40</sup>

Making Bata capital of *Río Muni* meant centralising many Equatorial Guinean prisoners from the continental region, although the most serious cases normally went to Santa Isabel, where they could be placed under strict police surveillance upon release. This police and prison activity occurred

<sup>40</sup> See NO-DO of February twenty-seventh, 1961, NOT N 947 C.

alongside possible punishment operations in their area of influence, although setting up the *Tribunales de Raza* in the territorial districts began the harshest period against the Equatorial Guinean population because of their ability to simultaneously punish people of different origins and regions. These courts spread the fear of being unfairly penalised or imprisoned.

One detainee transferred to Bata was Federico Ngomo Nandong, who was imprisoned and tortured in Bata in 1958 (Ela 1984: 51), after he was accused along with others, of sharing secessionist ideas. He later ended up being appointed President of the Provincial Council of Bata in 1963, with “adopted Equatorial Guinean” Ramon Reig as Vice-President. Two other significant arrests were those of Atanasio Ndong and Joaquín Ndong, who were taken to Bata when they crossed the border with Gabon. They were wanted for their role in the uprising against Spanish colonisation of the Banapá seminarians in 1951, especially Atanasio Ndong who led the insurrection along with Enrique Gori Molubela and Rafael Dámaso Sima. Once in Bata, they were sentenced to jail with forced labour and stayed several months in the *Modelo* prison (Obiang Biko 2016: 74, 76; Owono-Okomo 2014: 173). When released, they returned to Gabon.

African pressure to end colonisation in the mid-1950s had an impact on Equatorial Guinea, and political changes began to occur gradually thanks to the pressure exerted when Spain joined the UN, which explicitly requested that independence be granted to Spanish possessions (Bolekia 2003: 91). In this setting, the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea became provinces of the Gulf of Guinea in 1956, a prior phase that led to provincialisation in 1959 and autonomy in 1963. The Banapá insurrection played a significant role in the political atmosphere that took hold over various parts of Equatorial Guinea in those days. Finally, a solid sociopolitical alternative emerged, led by Equatorial Guineans themselves, to challenge Spanish colonialism. Thanks to the Banapá insurrection, “terms such as change, freedom, decolonisation, revolution, political parties, coup d’état, independence, etc., were the daily discourse of Equatorial Guineans of all social groups and levels” (Obiang Biko 2016: 77). The uprising of the seminarians raised political awareness sharply in Equatorial Guinea, but also ushered in a stage of heavy Spanish repression against those demanding reforms.

So decisive was Equatorial Guinean mobilisation that the Spanish administration opted to establish the colony’s provincialisation in 1959. It wanted to demonstrate some flexibility to international observers by softening the territorial legislation of previous decades. It was thought that provincialisation would facilitate the slow, controlled entry of local people with affinity for Spain into positions of sociopolitical importance, something that had previously

TABLE 17 Colonial Guard of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea

Year	European personnel	<i>Indigenous</i> personnel
1944	73	688
1945	68	688
1946	68	688
1947	65	713
1955	67	767
1957	67	793

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1947: 124, 140). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1955: 120). RESÚMENES ESTADÍSTICOS DEL GOBIERNO GENERAL DE LOS TERRITORIOS ESPAÑOLES DEL GOLFO DE GUINEA (1958: 118).

been banned. Actually, this was the moment the true Africanisation of the colonial administration began in Bata, as well as in Malabo. Provincialisation did not satisfy Equatorial Guinean society's demand for change, and a vote was eventually held that established the Regime of Autonomy of Spanish Guinea in 1963.

The settlers, concerned by the result, spoke of the manifest incapacity of the Equatorial Guineans to self-govern. What they really feared was losing their privileges, high salaries and good standard of living. Like others, Ramon and his wife Irmina boasted of their status and savings on visits to Barcelona, even taking their imported car, bought in the Canary Islands, with them, while life in postwar Spain was hard and poverty manifest. Ramon expressed his uncertainty about autonomy in several letters, like this one from Bata of October ninth, 1963: "On November second there is a referendum to say whether or not they accept the Bases of Autonomy, let's see what comes out of it. There is a great confusion because most *morenos* do not know what they want."<sup>41</sup>

Meanwhile, the NO-DO bulletins at the beginning of the 1960s attempted to usher new rhetoric into circulation about the Spanish presence in Equatorial Guinea under the banner of Franco's National Catholicism. For example, one

41 The italics are mine. Letter from Oveng-Bata of October ninth, 1963. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

of its reports on Bata – a city highly segregated by skin colour – reversed reality by expressly speaking of brotherhood, circulating the same older brother discourse that had been activated in Morocco: “the brotherhood of the coloured and white peoples ... is evident in the unity of enthusiasm and the patriotic fervour.”<sup>42</sup> As Stucki (2019: 197) points out, the propaganda of the 1960s could not erase fifty years of segregation in Spanish Guinea.

Clearly then, receiving the status of autonomous region involved a degree of change for some settlers and better rights for some Equatorial Guineans. In his letter from Bata on September tenth, 1963, Ramon explained that the political change had led some “boys” to leave the whites they served when their duties as servants were regulated by law: “There is a lot of nervousness here and some panic, a lot of ladies and boys are leaving.”<sup>43</sup>

The demand for greater autonomy by some Equatorial Guineans led the Spanish state to entrust the Civil Guard with controlling possible insurrections in the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea. According to the Benemérita (2018: 1), their intervention was justified “by the [...] situation on the black continent, where political imperatives were leading other countries’ former colonies to achieve independence – not without revolutions and clashes – in order to ensure peace ... where there was no force other than the Colonial Guard on the borders with Cameroon and Gabon, who won independence in 1960, which prevented public disorder and the infiltration of guerrillas at home by ‘contagion’”

The doubts about the colony’s future were well founded. The mobilisation of the Equatorial Guineans in exile to continue their fight from outside was gathering international support. In a letter from Bata on September tenth 1963, Ramon explained, “the exiles protected by the Cameroonian government have deauthorised the native commission that went to speak with our government, and when they return quite a bit of trouble is expected.” In another letter sent from Bata on January fifth, 1964, Ramon, contemptuous but fearful, expressed his fear of a possible contagion effect – that the Equatorial Guineans might take revenge for all the injustices they had suffered:

the *morenos* generally don’t know anything about anything, some – especially the young people *who have never worked and never plan to* – only dream of a repetition of the Congo, murder, rapes and seizing everything they can. Since politics began here along with so much tolerance and

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42 See NO-DO of February twelfth, 1962, NOT N 997 B.

43 Letter from Bata of September tenth 1963. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

flattery with the natives in different incidents, five of them have already died, several are wounded and two whites have been wounded ... For the council elections, which I believe will be this month, they will make a great deal of fuss, as they all seek positions, and then there is the tribal hatred, and, later, when the governing council is formed, I don't know how things will go ... I don't believe the autonomous regime will last, internally and externally complete independence will be sought. May God prove me wrong ... by some miracle may *good and able natives emerge*.<sup>44</sup>

By March 1959, the Civil Guard reinforcements had reached Bata to defend Spanish interests in the case of disputes:

In less than a month, a dormitory ship was built able to house a section ... The troops were received with enthusiasm, both by the Europeans and by the natives ... In 1961 the second company was organised to go to Santa Isabel ... Between the two units there were 350 men. Their mission in the future was going to be very delicate, due to the prevailing decolonisation processes.

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In 1961, the Civil Guard's aim was "the maintenance at all costs of public order in cases where it could be seriously affected and give rise to anti-Spanish demonstrations that damage the internal peace in those territories" (Benemérita 2018: 1). And in particular they were well equipped to face an Equatorial Guinean population armed only with machetes: "combat groups were organised, equipped with mobile offensive means" (Benemérita 2018: 1). Certainly, the Civil Guard's passage through the country is remembered by numerous Equatorial Guineans. Nerín (2006a) described the savage acts of one of them in the continental area: Julián Ayala Larrazábal, also cited by Ndongo (1977: 68). Among the acts of harassment and murder this colonial officer perpetrated, as Nerín recounts (2006a: 10), was the burning of six babies alive at the stake because one night they had disturbed his sleep with their crying. In Nerín's words (2017: 238) Julián Ayala Larrazábal was "a man of unlimited cruelty who committed atrocities with the Fang to force them into labouring on public works and as *braceros* on cacao plantations." As one informant explained to Nerín (2006a: 10) about the need to explain these excesses and outrages: "There

44 The italics are mine. Letter from Bata of January fifth, 1964. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

can be almost no history. In the fifties, a Civil Guard who found you with a note with a name on it, an anecdote, could persecute you, could kill you. That's why ... there is only oral history ... If you had a letter, a note ... they took you to Bata, to the prison."

The wounds inflicted by the colonial repression remain raw today because the Spaniards who perpetrated such violence against the Equatorial Guinean people remain anonymous. The Spanish state has also never apologised. So strong is this feeling that various books reiterate the need for lists to be made of the cruellest Spaniards acting in Spanish Guinea during colonial times. This is less to seek reparations, than to put everyone in their place in the memory of colonial history, just as Dyombe Dyangany (2008: 43) and Obiang Biko (2016: 32) have done. Dyombe Dyangany (2008: 43) undertook a historical-cultural reconstruction of the Ndowne community, and included the names of Spaniards involved in the cruel repression of Equatorial Guinean nationalists, such as Manuel Cervera Cabello, Deputy Governor of Bata in 1958. Concerned by historical memory, Nerín (2017: 238) sought out new opportunities to publicise the names of the Spaniards who took part in these savage and appalling acts. He mentioned Victor Suances, the Commissioner General before independence (the position that replaced the Governor General before the autonomous period), whom they called Etang Ngom, "he who burns" for "his love of torturing prisoners by burning them with a hot badge."

Hence, as well as meeting the aspirations of Equatorial Guinean nationalists, the autonomous period was meant to ease the concerns of a population that had been harassed for decades. However, Spain "sought to keep the true mentors of independence from power ... the most radical opposition and the propagators of change during this autonomous regime ... [were marginalised] by the men who led this autonomous government" (Obiang Biko 2016: 118). Obiang Biko's criticisms were aimed at the appointments of Bonifacio Ondó Edu as president of the autonomous government and Macías as vice-president in 1964, whose appointments took advantage of the renewal of Bata and Malabo as continental capital and island capitals, respectively (*Boletín Oficial del Estado*, July sixth, 1964).

The settlers were worried. This is Ramon Reig's letter of August sixteenth 1963, from Bata:

In the first courts ... the law of autonomy will be approved and I believe there will be a black civil governor and regional government that will monopolise everything, budget and administration, and the Spanish government will retain the military forces. In advance, tomorrow, the new

president, who is a *smart black* and who has been trained specifically for politics is taking over the council. History continually repeats itself.<sup>45</sup>

This important detail, by which Equatorial Guineans were to be chosen to hold the positions in the autonomous period, was not noted by the settlers. In Ramon Reig's letters, his preoccupation after the autonomous period was put down to "the political positions have led the *blacks* to grow."<sup>46</sup> Meanwhile the changes in the Spanish state were not to his liking. The settlers did not understand the government's intentions, and the transformations provoked concern and nostalgia for the past. In his letter from Bata on December seventh, 1964, Ramon explained that: "on the twelfth the last white civil governor left for Spain, the black has not yet been named but he has been accidentally replaced by the president of the regional government."<sup>47</sup>

In fact, it would seem that the settlers were the first to realise that colonisation was coming to an end. For example, between 1963 and 1965, Irmina and Ramon were already explaining that their friends and acquaintances were leaving and transferring money to their bank accounts on the peninsula. They had also decided to leave. In his letter of August sixteenth, 1963 Ramon wrote from Bata: "There are already people here who have no roots, who leave, and others want to send families."<sup>48</sup> These were already times of concern for some Spaniards who lost privileges and were contemplating return. In this same letter, Ramon went on, "Garriga, like others, faced with the danger of not collecting his retirement ... wants to ask for it for having worked twenty-five years to retirement, without waiting until retirement age, claiming that he is ill and that it does not suit him to live in this country, using any medical certificate [as justification]."<sup>49</sup>

Meanwhile, the Spanish state wanted to continue influencing Equatorial Guinean society. An example was what they called, highly uninventively, "adopted Guineans." These figures were intended by the colonial administration to influence Equatorial Guinean political representation during the autonomous regime, as international supervision ensured that the positions available to Equatorial Guineans were indeed held by Equatorial Guineans and not by Spaniards. Ramon Reig was one of the adopted Equatorial Guineans that Obiang Biko (2016: 157) explicitly mentions and defines as "settlers and

45 Letter from Bata of August sixteenth, 1963. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

46 Letter from Bata of December seventh, 1964. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

47 Letter from Bata of December seventh, 1964. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

48 Letter from Bata of August sixteenth, 1963. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

49 Letter from Bata of August sixteenth, 1963. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

slavedrivers born or living in Equatorial Guinea.” For the Spaniards, an adopted Equatorial Guinean should be able to influence political decision-making bodies like any other Equatorial Guinean. This would end up as enshrined in the law on the autonomous regime of Equatorial Guinea, which clearly expressed in articles 2.1 and 2.2, that the original nationals of Fernando Po and *Río Muni* were equal to other Spaniards, just as it granted equal status to the other nationals resident in Equatorial Guinea (*Boletín Oficial del Estado*, July 6th 1964). And yet, the limitations on Equatorial Guineans exercising their rights as Spaniards emerged everywhere. For Obiang Biko (2016: 100), this was a scandalous issue compared to French assimilationism, which guaranteed that people of African origin were members of the cabinet of the French Fourth Republic, “Equatorial Guinean solicitors were merely decorative figures in the Madrid parliament ... Legal equality before the law existed on paper only.”

Many settlers also had their own opinion of the previous year’s meeting in Madrid with selected Equatorial Guineans and concluded that their intention was to take advantage of Spain. As Ramon also explained in his letter of September tenth, 1963 from Bata, “You must already know that a commission is on the peninsula to try to implement the autonomy ... they want a period of time to continue taking millions from the Spanish state to invest here and leave everything done for them.”<sup>50</sup> In another letter, months later, of November seventh, 1963, Ramon explained: “We’re going through a period of many meetings and speeches by the natives ... A few – cleverer but supporters of independence – understand that they cannot sustain this independently and it suits them for Spain to squander millions here for a while ... Among the European population there is more distrust and worry every day.” And he concluded, “we are getting old in this strange world in which it is difficult for us to adapt.”<sup>51</sup>

The Equatorial Guinean reading of the situation was completely different. Macías himself, who would become the first dictator of independent Equatorial Guinea, spoke on the Spanish situation at the Constitutional Conference. He said that

Spain is divided into two parts: peninsular Spain and colonial Spain ... I, Macías, without fear, without fear of threat or intimidation, state clearly that there is no freedom of the press in Equatorial Guinea. The broadcasters are only available to ... favourites of the colonial government. I

50 Letter from Bata of November seventh, 1963. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

51 Letter from Bata of August sixteenth, 1963. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

speaking clearly because I have a duty to defend the rights of my people ... colonialism must be fought.

OBIANG BIKO 2016: 190

Political changes were thus underway, especially in the cities of Bata and Malabo. The metropole had shown no flexibility at all, especially since Franco's dictatorship was well established and no end to it was yet in sight.

In fact, Spanish Guinea's gradual recognition was the fruit of struggles in the country's interior (Ndongo 1977: 72) and political articulation on the international scene. A leading role was played by the *Cruzada de Liberación Nacional de Guinea Ecuatorial* (CNLGE), which triggered the political mobilisation of the 1950s. Acacio Mañé Ela had become the symbol of liberation after his arrest in Bata on November twentieth, 1958, with his subsequent handover to the Civil Guard and mysterious murder in the military camp (Liniger-Goumaz 1988: 77). Nsé Nfumu says that photographs of him were passed around at the time in secret "like a relic" (2004: 30).

Atanasio Ndongo's *Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de Guinea Ecuatorial* (MONALIGE) inherited the CNLGE movement. Their activity meant that many Equatorial Guineans committed to a new era in those years had to go into exile to countries like Cameroon and Gabon. MONALIGE maintained contact with the inter-ethnic *Idea Popular de Guinea Ecuatorial* (IPGE) led by Marcos Ropo Uri<sup>52</sup> and Enrique Nvo,<sup>53</sup> among others, who presented the petition for independence to the UN's Special Committee on Decolonisation in 1962.

Hoping to dilute MONALIGE, the Spanish administration promoted Ondó Edu's *Movimiento de Unión Nacional de Guinea Ecuatorial* (MUNGE), inspired by the *Movimiento Nacional Español* (Obiang Biko 2016: 113, Nerín 2019: 28). In those years the OJE and the Sección Femenina (Nerín 2006b; Bengochea 2019; Morales and Vieitez 2014; Stucki 2016: 350), Spanish youth and Francoist organisations were established there to promote scholarships for Battians to study in the metropole and, above all, they used propaganda to promote the notion that the Spanish had not been racist (Nerín 2019: 28).

52 Liniger-Goumaz (1988: 76) credits him with being the first Equatorial Guinean to lead a protest movement for the country's independence.

53 Most of the leading figures in the national liberation movement were male and linked to the colonial administration via different functions and positions. For example, see the extensive biographical summary of Salvador Nsamiyo, a person linked to Enrique Nvó, who practised and trained in Bata and later in his hometown of Mikomeseng in Okenvé Obang (1969: 76–78).

In the early 1960s, the Equatorial Guineans' political mobilisation was so powerful that, as mentioned above, the UN General Assembly's Fourth Committee agreed in 1965 to request decolonisation from Spain, claiming that Equatorial Guinean society was ready to hold elections. In those years leading up to independence, Carrero Blanco and García Trevijano played a unique and decisive role in the conversations. Elections were held on September 22nd 1968, before independence was granted. Spain recognised rights for Equatorial Guineans that were unimaginable in the metropole. Macías Nguema stood with the IPGE and defeated Ondó Edu in the second round, thanks to the support of *Unión Bubi* and MONALIGE. He was appointed Equatorial Guinea's first president upon independence on October twelfth, 1968.

Spain left Equatorial Guinea with many deficits, including everything related to infrastructure, which was clearly evident in the city of Bata. Fegley (1981: 36) lists some notable absences: "few paved roads, inadequate medical and educational facilities, no public transportation service, little access to running water, and an erratic consumer market." An important point should be added to this, which was the lack of electrical infrastructure, which would extend the need to incorporate generator systems into homes, as well as a deplorable prison system (Fegley 1981: 36).

The colony had also been built to reflect the metropole's handling of ethno-cultural diversity. However, while in Spain there was an attempt to reduce cultural diversity to folklore, all dances and music, alongside the denial of historical sociopolitical recognition to Basques, Catalans and Galicians, the opposite was done in Spanish Guinea, where historical ethnic and cultural rights were recognised. This is how many Equatorial Guineans interpreted the period prior to independence because, for them, autonomy meant the recognition of an ethnic diversity that distorted the country's majorities and minorities. And, as we have seen, the original population of Fernando Po was made up of Bubis living alongside Fernandinos, while the original population of Bata and the coastal strip were the Ndowe and the Bissio, in a continental territory mostly inhabited by Fang people.

Bata hosted Fraga Iribarne on January seventeenth 1966,<sup>54</sup> who also visited Río Benito (Mbini), where he was entertained with folk dances and welcome banners. The older members of the community still recall how their parents had to carry these unequivocal signs of colonial acceptance.<sup>55</sup> One relevant

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54 See NO-DO of January seventeenth 1966, NOT N 1202 B.

55 For more on this subject, the NO-DO reports are worth consulting, for example, the NO-DO from January seventeenth 1966, NOT N 1202 B.

issue concerning Bata's role in this period – later boasted of in the independent period – and a key reason for seeding Fang discontent was that the autonomous regime granted the same number of representatives to the island territory as to the continental. Four councillors were given to each area, even though Fernando Po had only one ethnicity of origin, the Bubi, plus another smaller minority, the Fernandino, and even though the Fang presence on the island was overwhelming compared to the Ndowe and Bissio, who were excluded from the distribution (Sepa 2011). The Fang ethnic group was both the most numerous and the worst represented by size of population. In addition, the same political weight was given to the two territories, Fernando Po and *Río Muni*. This was a clear colonial legacy. The Fang preference for the continent to have greater weight was based in its larger population, even if Fernando Po's economic and commercial weight was greater. As we shall see, these issues would leave traces in the postcolonial period, when Fang centrality was the driving force in Bata in the independent period.

Although Equatorial Guinea achieved independence on October twelfth 1968, several hundred Spaniards remained in the city of Bata for a few months longer. They were officials, doctors, Civil Guards and teachers who stayed under the uncomfortable command of the new president, Macías Nguema Biyogo (Papa Messié). It should be said that colonial Bata had little draw for the populations of *Río Muni*. Péliissier (1992: 162) defined Bata as a “very white city” before independence (Nerín 2017: 239). At the start of the 1960s, coinciding with the administrative changes around autonomy and some improvements in the rights of Equatorial Guineans, the city had certain advantages, as it offered schools and hospitals, which the rest of the continental area lacked. This was because it was the territorial capital. Nevertheless, the restrictions on the mobility of the Equatorial Guineans in continental territory remained great, as were their opportunities to settle freely in Bata. Mobility was restricted by an obligation to show a permit to move around the country, specifying origin and destination of the journey (Nerín 2019: 26–27).

By way of conclusion, it may be stated that Bata was never subject to mass immigration of the African population in colonial times, except in the last decade. Colonial abuse and the restrictions on the movement of Equatorial Guineans were decisive factors in limiting the city's population growth beyond fully or partially emancipated Equatorial Guineans, who were integrated into Bata's colonial administration or the Colonial Guard as auxiliaries. The city's expansion as other neighbourhoods were added, would not begin until an autonomous period that was more flexible towards the rights of the people, which encouraged more African inhabitants. As we shall see, certain colonial practices continued to resonate after independence, showing that Spanish

traces endured in dictatorial Equatorial Guinea, including in its parades, punishments and the abuse of the workforce.

### 1.3 *Urban Spaces and Colonial Power: La Plaza del Reloj*

The consolidation of Spanish colonisation that began in the 1940s but above all in the 1950s involved the construction of numerous buildings that went up across Bata. Some became private homes while others housed institutions. As private construction activity was limited to that necessary to prepare, repair or refurbish plantations and businesses, the leading constructor was the colonial administration. Reviewing the available Spanish government information, occasionally provided in the statistical summaries, urban building projects appear to have been few in number and always allocated to offices of official bodies or accommodation for relocated officials.

Midway through the 1950s, the Administrator's residence was renovated and the Naval Assistantship, Teaching Subinspection offices, and groups of houses for police guards, the Colonial Guard and the Urban Communities Service were built (it is unclear whether the latter was in Santa Isabel or Bata).<sup>56</sup> And of course the *Torre del Reloj* (clock tower) was constructed, which was a particularly emblematic building for the citizens of Bata. It crowned the *Plaza del General Queipo del Llano*,<sup>57</sup> although the people generally called the square the *Plaza del Reloj*.<sup>58</sup>

The *Plaza de la Torre del Reloj* is a remnant of Bata's historical colonial heritage, bearing witness to many of the major events that have taken place in the city and multiple political speeches. The clock tower and the square that bears its name were undoubtedly a reference point. Major colonial parades passed through there and it hosted the box from which the authorities observed these on various occasions. As a curiosity, it is worth viewing the NO-DO that records the visit of then undersecretary of the Presidency of the Spanish government, Carrero Blanco, on twenty-ninth October, 1962.<sup>59</sup> The documentary's grandiose and exaggerated narration explains that on the day four warships and the Civil Guard also travelled to the port of Bata with the aim of escorting the undersecretary. The images include numerous shots of the square, as well as

56 Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1957: 90).

57 Gonzalo Queipo del Llano was a key figure in Franco's rebel uprising.

58 Battians' identification of this square with Spanish colonisation shares similarities with Real Madrid football fans' choice of monuments like the Neptune Fountain to celebrate their victories, as explained by Ortiz (2006: 196).

59 See NO-DO of October ninth 1962, NOT N 1034 A.

the long parade through much of the city, lined with thousands of people who would have been expressly brought from the different districts of *Río Muni* at their own cost. This practice was imposed by force, first by Macías and later by Obiang. According to the NO-DO, the parade to honour Carrero Blanco's visit was attended by 50,000 people, a figure that seems hard to believe, given it would have meant a third of the total population of the continental region had travelled to the city.

Other buildings from that decade, most of which were built in the early 1950s were Bata Cathedral, perhaps the most emblematic building in colonial Bata, the Town Hall, the *Modelo* prison, Bata Hospital and the new *Indigenous* Hospital, the Post Office, the Import and Export Regulatory Board and the building for Agricultural Service. Still other important buildings had been constructed long before, such as the Deputy Governor's Office, the command headquarters, various houses, dispensaries, the *Delegación de Asuntos Indígenas*, the Court of Justice,<sup>60</sup> some schools, the Labour Inspectorate, and the Police Inspectorate. Photographs of all these buildings can be seen, along with others, in the colony's statistical summaries. For many Battians, the most important buildings from colonial times are Bata Cathedral, the clock tower, the Post Office, the Red Palace, the (old) soccer stadium, Bata Town Hall and the school complex.

Many of these works were driven by the need to demonstrate at an international level, that Spain was investing resources in Spanish Guinea, as it was from the autonomous period onwards that the institutions and buildings began to house Equatorial Guineans. Thus, for example, Bata's Red Palace, previously the residence of the Deputy Governor of *Río Muni*, became the residence of the President of the Autonomous Government, Bonifacio Ondó Edu.

With the provincialisation of the late 1950s, the Spanish government also sought not to restrict building only to the capitals of the island and continental districts. The buildings elsewhere often took the form of churches built to justify Spain's civilising work, while ensuring that missionaries could be deployed as colonial agents in the most distant corners of the continental region, including Mongomo.<sup>61</sup> The exceptions to the building of churches were the experimental towns Carrero Blanco promoted between 1962 and 1968, which were also meant to justify Spain's investment in the colony. The Franco regime called these *pueblos de colonización agraria* (agrarian colonisation villages),

60 See NO-DO of February twelfth 1962, NOT N 997 B.

61 See NO-DO of February twelfth 1962, NOT N 997 B.

and to a large extent they were built in the continental region, in places on the transport routes of the raw materials that went to Bata's dock, as Laida Memba has established.<sup>62</sup>

In fact, it was considered urgent to connect Bata to the exterior by constructing a port, as most of the goods produced on the continent were imported and exported by sea. However, unlike as in Santa Isabel, the Spanish state did not invest in this, because, as we have seen, most Spanish farms were located on the island. Instead, the Spanish government built a dock in Bata with large moorings that no heavy ship could use, and which was merely decorative. It was described as "a dock for barges; it consists of a 120-meter-long jetty ... on a 7,000-square-metre esplanade."<sup>63</sup> The improvements made to the port were superficial, as can be seen in a NO-DO<sup>64</sup> in which boats and ships are still unable to disembark there. They have to use a smaller boat to reach the pier, despite the enormous moorings available. In fact, many accounts state that small boats were essential for boarding ships and numerous bags of coffee and cacao were left on the land because ships like the *Ciudad de Pamplona* did not accept them, as they exceeded the production quota established by Spanish government. Their return to the plantation being unprofitable, "the bags were all thrown on the dock", as Eduard Giménez Ferrer recalled (Informant: Eduard Giménez Ferrer 2016). An aerodrome was also built to enable Iberia flights to connect the peninsula with Santa Isabel, via Bata (Santa Isabel was big enough for jets to land).<sup>65</sup> Military flights could also land, and the NO-DOs document parades with air shows to honour important visits to Bata.

In this regard, the NO-DO report of December second, 1968, after the independence of Equatorial Guinea is highly interesting.<sup>66</sup> It was made in colour and no expense was spared in order to demonstrate the Spanish colony's "great work". The different places and buildings in Bata (as well as other towns in *Río Muni*) can be seen and their Equatorial Guinean use imagined, with the population benefitting from full legal rights and the region making an about-turn. Many settlers left after the legislative changes that made Spanish Guinea an autonomous region, but many others did so on the cusp of independence,

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62 The information is in Bokung Ondo (2019). See also Villaverde and Memba (2018) on the city of Malabo.

63 Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (1958: 20). See also picture in p. 23.

64 See NO-DO of February twenty-seventh 1961, NOT N 947 C.

65 See NO-DO of July fifteenth, 1963, NOT N 1071 B.

66 See NO-DO of December second, 1968, NOT N 1352 A.

and even later. Equatorial Guinea was finally going to be for the Equatorial Guineans, leaving the creation and consolidation of a new African state in their hands. But along with different perspectives, history is filled with different emotions. Ramon explained his anguish as he closed the plantation. His final letters contain phrases drenched in defeat and helplessness. On May second, 1965 he wrote:

Nobody is buying any of the machinery. We only have buyers for the few things we have in the house ... The two banks have several foreclosed estates and as they do not know what to do with them, they are completely abandoned ... The end of this business and of a lifetime in Africa is that, if something strange doesn't come up at the last minute, we will take our last trip from these lands in the *Pamplona* that will leave after June twentieth.<sup>67</sup>

On October twelfth, 1968, the celebration in Malabo was huge. Some could not resist damaging the bust of Governor Ángel Barrera in the *Plaza de España*. Symbols had to be contested and rejected in the atmosphere of liberation that Equatorial Guineans breathed in those days, because Spanish colonisation had finally ended. As Almazán (2015: 210) described, “previously secret archives of Radio Televisión Española and the accounts of direct witnesses ... show how, during Macías' speech, pro-independence groups celebrated freedom by climbing the Monument ... hitting and abusing it.” In Bata, the *Plaza del Reloj* had been one of the symbols of Spanish colonial heritage. The clock tower, witness to so many events and parades, embodied the “civilising work” declared by the Spanish government, as well as by many of the settlers who lived in the city. Colonial independence was meant to put an end to Spanish colonisation and allow a reckoning with the past. A few months later, Macías Nguema Biyogo led a coup. From then on, *Plaza del Reloj* became Macías's favoured location for his incendiary political speeches against the Spanish occupation. The Equatorial Guinean journey towards contested memory had begun.

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67 Letter from Bata of May second, 1965. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC. I highly recommend the documentary *Cartas en el Tiempo* on TVE2 (see list of documentaries in section 5.6), to which I contributed this letter, which formed the film's leitmotif. I was interviewed, as was Eduard Giménez Ferrer, a descendant of one of the families who own the Virgen de Montserrat Hacienda.

## 2 Taghzout, Villa Sanjurjo, Villa Alhucemas and Alhucemas: A Spanish City in Riffian Lands

The city of Al-Hoceima was founded in the Rif, an eminently Amazigh area with little political weight in the Kingdom of Morocco, and one that had its own particularities and sociopolitical dynamics. From the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries the Rif's appearances in the chronicles are limited to the expeditions several sultans made to collect taxes. The Rif was therefore a highly peripheral region in precolonial makhzen-ruled Morocco. The situation did not change with the establishment of the Spanish Protectorate. After the costly "pacification of the territory" and the overthrow of the Republic of the Rif, which challenged Spanish colonialism and the khalifian structure, the area regained its marginal political role in colonial and sultanate structures.

Al-Hoceima's subsidiary position was accentuated during the protectorate by the centrality of two cities with long histories, Tétouan and Melilla. On the one hand, Tétouan, located in a mainly Arab area in the Jbala region, was the capital of the Spanish Protectorate and, as such, where the main colonial management organisations and institutions were concentrated, as well as the residences of the Khalif and Spain's High Commissioner in Morocco. Melilla, on the other hand, was, along with Ceuta, one of the two Spanish cities located in Africa. Characterised by its deep pluricultural and pluri-religious composition, Melilla's proximity to Al-Hoceima, which was populated mainly by Spaniards, made it a preferred destination for constant trips for shopping and medical and legal services. Tétouan and Melilla thus stole visibility and power from Al-Hoceima: Tétouan for its Arab Moroccanness and Melilla for its Spanishness.<sup>68</sup>

As mentioned, Al-Hoceima was built on Amazigh territory. It should be noted that in the kingdom of Morocco, Arabs and Imazighen coexist with a Moroccan Jewish minority. Conservative percentage estimates calculated that "the number of native Berber speakers in Morocco range from 40 percent to 45 percent of the population" (Zouhir 2014: 40). The *Encyclopedia Britannica* shows higher percentages, giving the Imazighen population as three-fifths of the Moroccan total. On the disputed statistics, Geertz (2003: 234) summarised that "in Morocco, the figures published on the percentage of the Berber population range from 35 percent to 60 percent; some nationalist leaders would like to believe, or lead others to believe, that the Berbers are a French invention." Geertz is referring here to the way the disagreements over the percentages

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68 Melilla and Ceuta occupied 32 square kilometres. For the advantages Riffians enjoyed in Melilla, see Aziza (2003: 49).

of the Arab and Berber populations were historically resolved. This is particularly with regard to the failure to recognise the number of Imazighen in Morocco and how this matter was taken up by the Moroccan nationalist movement. In the colonial period, the issue was greatly conditioned by the French Protectorate's supposedly pro-Amazigh policies (the Spanish Protectorate, with policies that recognised both cultures, stayed out of the dispute). In the independent period, however, Arab nationalism was supported by a pro-Arab makhzen, which was reflected in the continuing controversies over the percentage of the Moroccan population identified as Amazigh. The issue conditioned diversity management policies in Morocco, as the national identity was built upon the Arab identity, with the Amazigh somewhat neglected until the creation of IRCAM and the constitutional changes of 2011. There is thus enough evidence to show that historically, the makhzen treated the Imazighen as a minority, and this was especially so during the construction of the postcolonial state after independence. The Riffians were the most marginalised people of all, as they were the group that had most clearly defied the state, first with the establishment of the Republic of the Rif from 1921 to 1925, then with the uprising from 1958 to 1959, the revolt in 1984 and *Al-Hirak* in 2016. These actions were driven by the sense of exclusion that the Riffian people felt from the concepts of Morocco and Morocanness: for them, Moroccan national history, as formulated, does not represent the population as a whole.

As we will see in this history of Alhucemas, the Hispano–Moroccan rhetoric of brotherhood, which was characteristic of Spanish colonisation in the Spanish Protectorate, was absent in colonial Alhucemas, as there was hardly any coexistence or cultural exchange with the Rif's Amazigh population. The city ended up being a purely Spanish settlement and this left deep impressions on the Riffian people with regard to the city's cultural heritage, as well as the treatment they received.

In what follows, I will reconstruct the colonial city using Riffian, Moroccan and Spanish voices.

### 2.1 *Taghzout, Cala del Quemado, Villa Sanjurjo, Villa Alhucemas y Alhucemas (1927–1956): No Sign of Hispano–Moroccan Brotherhood*

The range of names given to Al-Hoceima in the colonial period is a faithful reflection of the imposition of the Spanish gazetteer. Military accounts indicated that there was nothing on the site where Villa Sanjurjo was before they arrived: "The city quickly emerged out of nowhere."<sup>69</sup>

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69 Another city created by the Spaniards was El Jebha, formerly Puerto Capaz, and originally called Mesiaba (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1935: 223). This

Hamid,<sup>70</sup> a Riffian of almost sixty from Al-Hoceima, spoke in the same terms, “before the Spanish arrived, there was nothing here” (Informant: Hamid 2016). However, Merien,<sup>71</sup> a fifty-year-old Riffian from Al-Hoceima, later qualified “nothing”: “In Al-Hoceima there were no buildings, it is true, but, in what is called the ‘Florida’,<sup>72</sup> weekly markets were organised, souks,<sup>73</sup> before the Spanish arrived, where fish was sold along with everything else, which we [Riffians] called *Taghzut*” (Informant: Merien 2019). The Amazigh term *Taghzut* was defined by Mouliéras (1895: 48) as “narrow” or “narrow place.” Aziza said “it is a place located near a stream or brook” adding, “*Taghzout* is a place name of Amazigh origin, which is transcribed in Arabic on maps as it was in the classical sources of Arab geographers.”<sup>74</sup> Merien, like other informants, translated it as “what is united” (Informant: Merien 2019), which matches Mouliéras translation. While my consultation of European maps from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to locate the name “*Taghzut*” was unsuccessful,<sup>75</sup> a 1720 map of Africa clearly defined the area of Al-Hoceima as *Ryffadirum*. Another

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belonged to the province of Chefchaouen. Puerto Capaz was a very small fishing town that was not linked to the other cities until the construction of the highway that connects the Riffian area. It is interesting because it shows how a city’s history can help propel it towards the future, which has not been the case with El Jebha.

70 Hamid, born in 1961 is Riffian and lives between Al-Hoceima and Catalonia. Interviewed in different locations of Barcelona province and in Al-Hoceima since 2001.

71 Merien is fifty and was born in Al-Hoceima in 1967. Since 1998 she has been living in Catalonia and travels once a year to visit her mother in Al-Hoceima. Interviewed in different locations of Barcelona province since 2002.

72 The Florida Hotel is in the *Plaza del Rif*. The toponym “Florida” comes from the name of the popular hotel located in one of the most important squares of Villa Sanjurjo and Alhucemas since colonial times.

73 It should be noted that in the Rif region, there were markets purely feminine. Coon (1931: 133) explained that their role was to ease the arrangement of marriage alliances made by women in the 1930s. It also refers to the Riffian women’s markets Millás and Vallicrosa (1944: 46) and Hajjarabi (1988).

74 Mimoun Aziza, personal communication September 2019. I am grateful for his help in clarifying the meaning and origin of the term, since apart from the informants’ versions, “*Taghzut*” did not emerge in my searches in the main Amazigh dictionaries in Spanish and French. This is perhaps proof of the marginal place of Al-Hoceima in the study of Amazigh languages and dialects. Another source (López Soler 2013: 214) translated it as “fertile agricultural land.”

75 I also consulted the map of “Situación de los Zocos existentes en la Zona” in which it did not appear either (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1936: 502).

map of North Africa from 1849 marked the locality of Al Buzema<sup>76</sup> on the coast, probably in order to point out the Peñón.<sup>77</sup>

Taghzout and the Rif were marginal on certain European maps from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but also in Moroccan historiography: except for a few specific episodes, partially gathered by Pennell (2003), the area had been absent from Moroccan history since the seventeenth century. Aziza (2003: 41) and El Messoudi-Ahmed Messaud (2016: 49) have noted that centuries passed in which events that reflected Riffians playing a part were barely mentioned. This was the case, for example, during the Saadi dynasty. However, in periods like the Alaouite dynasty more attention was paid. Moroccan nineteenth century sources include minor references, such as the sale of Riffian grain to Europeans at the start of the century, which resulted in three trips by Sultan Muley Suleiman to stop them and collect the makhzen's taxes, and Riffians buying soap or tea from Algerians from Oran in the late nineteenth century (El Messoudi-Ahmed Messaud 2016: 49).<sup>78</sup> The Moroccan accounts gathered by Seddon and Aziza, among others, seem not to mention the fact – well known in the area – that labour migrations of Riffians to Algeria took place from 1849 onwards (Seddon 1973: 113; Aziza 2003: 43–46), which “became permanent migration in the twentieth century” (Tassouli 2017).

The marginality of the Rif and the Al-Hoceima area in the precolonial period is also evident from some maps from before the 1912 colonisation. No precolonial administrative boundaries appear that connect it with the rest of the country on Spanish maps of the Kingdom of Morocco in 1910. It is also absent from the map of northern Morocco of 1910.<sup>79</sup> These points support the

76 On the word, “Buzema”, the Arabic etymological approach proposed by the Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos (1936: 302) is taken, where it is suggested “to separate ‘bu’ (from), from ‘samma’ (hard rock) or ‘somoá’ (tower or minaret).” The maps are cited among the documents consulted in the section 5.3.

77 Currently the Peñón is occupied by a small Spanish garrison. In addition to some buildings and a prison, it contains a small cemetery in which sixty people are buried, including civilians and soldiers. In 2011, it was installed a desalination system to guarantee the island's autonomy from the Moroccan coast. Information included in the short documentary edited by the *Ejército de Tierra* of the Spanish Government on YouTube (see section 5.6).

78 Benjelloun (1995) documents contacts between the Ait Said and the makhzen (he studied Arhives Diplomatiques de Nantes, Archives Nationales de la France, Public Record Office of London, Archivo Histórico Nacional of Madrid, among others). But it is difficult to assess their impact in the Rif region. Benjelloun (1995: 244) concluded that “que l'on serait en droit de nous poser la question de savoir si nos notables saidis étaient chargés officiellement d'une mission politique locale inofficielle, ou si au contraire, ils étaient inofficiellement chargés d'une mission officielle.”

79 The maps are cited in section 5.3. and form part of the ICGC's Cartoteca Digital.

idea that the Riffian area was largely peripheral until colonisation. As a result, as we shall see, the colonial administrative boundary drawn by the Spanish was decisive in the administrative and political layout of the independent Kingdom of Morocco.

But the fact that the Rif's history was not told does not mean that this region was without solid socio-political structures. In fact, two key elements of its contemporary history were its legal autonomy and social organisation, as was thoroughly investigated by the soldier, ethnographer and architect Blanco Izaga (1939, 1995), by Moga (2009, 2014), and by the anthropologist Hart (1973, 1976a, 1997). This Amazigh autonomy also showed a clear disconnection from the makhzen, despite Munson's (1999) verification of them paying taxes to an Alaouite sultan at the end of the nineteenth century.

Taking a broader perspective, the lack of interest in the Rif shown by other European countries is also notable. It should be remembered that, while the area that went on to become the Spanish Protectorate in the late nineteenth century had been disputed by various European powers, such as Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain, European interest centred on the north of Morocco in general, but not on the Rif in particular. Their rivalries were evident in the work leading up to the signing of the 1912 treaty, which formalised the Spanish Protectorate's constitution. The Algeciras Conference of April seventh, 1906, whose proceedings finally recognised Franco-Spanish ascendancy, was attended by a number of countries that were concerned about the European division of Africa, such as Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia and Sweden. Despite the tension between several European powers, their interests never lay in the Rif area (El Messoudi-Ahmed Messaud 2016: 42).

The legislative and judicial control of the Spanish government and the French republic were included in the second paragraph of article twenty-four of the Treaty of Fes of 1912 (Viguera 1949: 17).<sup>80</sup> Control of the territory and the total "pacification" of the Spanish Protectorate were halted until July 1927 – the year Villa Sanjurjo was founded.<sup>81</sup> This was due to the resistance of El Raisuni

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80 The Agreements between Spain and France concerning Morocco as consequence of the Madrid Conference of 1925 can be found in AGA, Caja M34, catalogue number (15) 3 81/10012. They are also included in Ramos Charco-Villaseñor (1931: 411–428).

81 The French state actively collaborated in the "pacification" of the Spanish Protectorate. The telegram of April seventh 1926 from the Spanish Ambassador in Morocco to the President of the Council of Ministers detailed the peace plan he wanted to impose in the Rif: "a) submission of Abd el-Krim to the sultan; b) withdrawal of Abd el-Krim; c) disarmament of the tribes (who will receive unspecified guarantees); d) handover of prisoners",

in Jbala from 1913 to 1919 and the later and more forceful and constant resistance of Abd el-Krim el-Khattabi in the Rif from 1921 to 1926, both of which were preceded by that of Rogui Bou Hamara from 1903 to 1909 in the pre-colonial period (Ramos Charco-Villaseñor 1930: 279; Seddon 1973: 128; González Alcantud 2014).

The area's instability had lasted for a third of the Spanish colonial period, with the defeat in the Battle of Annual on July twenty-first, 1921 as particularly notable, where the Spanish army, unable to quash the revolt, saw Abd el-Krim proclaim the Republic of the Rif on September eighteenth, 1921.<sup>82</sup> Thanks to his firm control of the territory (Pennell 2003: 144), it remained active until dissolution on May twenty-seventh, 1926 (de Madariaga 2009). The figure of Abd el-Krim is highly present in Spanish memory. Martín Corrales (2002a: 125) described the confrontations between Spaniards and Riffians at Annual and Monte Arruit (1921) as "terrible carnage." His collection of images from 1900 to 1927 includes everything from caricatures to photographs of the heads of Riffians stuck through with weapons or displayed as trophies, with the Riffians presented "as bloodthirsty beings, and especially, as traitors ready to revolt against ... those who went to Morocco and risked their lives for the sole purpose of civilising them" (Martín Corrales 2002a: 126). The Spanish military's thirst for revenge unleashed extreme violence in the Rif with the aim of putting an end to their Republic and the Riffian resistance. As Martín Corrales (2012a: 135) concluded, there was no thoughtfulness about the Spanish army's advance – the scorched earth policy initiated in 1909 was followed, which consisted of "the destruction of villages by bombing or burning them."

Eduard Giménez Noguera, a Catalan dispatched to the Rif from September 1921 to June 1922 who co-owned the Hacienda Virgen de Montserrat in Oveng (Bata) showed a degree of desperation in his letters about the war situation and the soldiers.<sup>83</sup> As his son Eduard Giménez Ferrer stated:

they had a really bad time. In the Rif of that time ... transport was by mule, which were the most suitable for the terrain. In Infantry ... [they had to] collect the remains of those who died in battle ... Convoys

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AGA, Box M3, catalogue number (15) 3 81/9981. The memorandum in which the conditions for peace are specified is in the same box. It is from the Spanish Embassy in Paris and is dated April seventh, 1926.

82 A Riffian antecedent to this organisational capacity dates back to the eleventh century kingdom of Nekor as recalled Aziza (2003: 40), among others, an experience that for some constituted the first Muslim state in the region.

83 Fondo Giménez-Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

transported food and ammunition were transported one way, and picked up the wounded and dead on the way back.

INFORMANT: EDUARD GIMÉNEZ FERRER 2016

For Pepe,<sup>84</sup> who is now in his eighties, and son of one of the first Spanish families to settle in Alhucemas, the Rif of that time was a complex destination because of “the Spanish war, the battle of Annual, the defeat at Monte Arruit, the war of Alhucemas, and because of its Riffian leader, Abd el-Krim” (Informant: Pepe 2015). Eduard Giménez Ferrer recalled that his father, Eduard Giménez Noguera, had said repeatedly that “Abd el-Krim was a traitor who had worked for us and then turned against us” (Informant: Eduard Giménez Ferrer 2016). Others must have thought the same when remembering that Abd el-Krim’s father had been awarded the distinction of Knight of the Royal Order of Isabella the Catholic (Jensen 2015: 92). Nevertheless, for most Riffians, regardless of whether the figure was representative of them or not, “Abd el-Krim was a hero.” As Hart (1976b: 45) concluded, “For whatever reason, Abd el-Krim occupies a place in the annals of Moroccan nationalism. That place is neither traditionalist nor modernist; it is halfway between the two.”

Abd el-Krim’s Republic of the Rif was the result of an anti-colonial struggle that was by nature nationalist.<sup>85</sup> It found a worthy way to unite the Riffian *dhzq-ba’ir*, while also seeking support amongst the Algerian Imazighen.<sup>86</sup> Madariaga (2010: 1), who wrote a meticulous biography, stated, “the Riffian movement idealised by some parts of the Arab and European left ... has little separatist tendency, something that is visible in the Riffian rebellion of 1958 and 1959, which did not seek secession.” This is a key question and should be the subject of further reflection due to the way postcolonial Morocco remembers this figure. Pennell (2003: 146) gathered statements from Abd el-Krim himself, in which he said that his objective was to found “a country with a government and a flag”, which certainly opens up his true intentions to interpretation. Whatever these were, the exploits of Abd el-Krim were significant enough to secure widespread international impact across the Arab world and in Western Europe (Madariaga

84 Pepe was born in Melilla in 1931 and lives in Almería. His family was among the first Spanish ones to settle in Al-Hoceima. Interviewed from 2015 to 2018.

85 Guerin (2015) offers other experiences of anti-colonial struggle.

86 Telegram of August twenty-second, 1924 from the High Commissioner of Spain in Tétouan, AGA, Box M151, catalogue number (15) 3 81/10129. To mention that the AGA offers multitude of documents and telegrams sent during the Rif war, part of which have been studied by Paniagua (2016) on issues related to smuggling.

2009; La Porte 2001),<sup>87</sup> consolidating this hero as the undisputed legendary leader of the Riffian community. His exploits were not seen in the same way in the rest of Morocco, where the Alaouite state fought to influence his legacy. His role in the anti-colonial struggle is given less prominence and is built on an assumption that he founded an Amazigh rather than Arab republic – and made it out to reflect a double treason – against the monarchy and against Arabs. Researchers like Julien (1978) have highlighted the bitter Sharifian view of him, as his popularity weakened their legitimacy based on a claim that they, the Sharifians, had a genealogical link to the prophet Muhammad (Hammoudi 1997: 15; Pennell 2003: 75).<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, his opposition to Spanish colonisation revealed the collaboration of the Moroccan sultan with the French and Spanish authorities, because the indirect regime would not have been possible without the co-responsibility of the sultans, which Abd el-Krim condemned, but which had no political costs for Sharifian power (Aixelà-Cabré 2015a). It is interesting to note that, after the conquest of the Rif and the founding of Alhucemas, there were Spaniards who believed they had seen the end of it. Pepe spoke naively of Abd el-Krim: “yes ... the father of the revolution. Ajdir was eight kilometres from Alhucemas! But since we were there, nothing had been preserved to recall Abd el-Krim. Nothing had been saved! No one spoke of nationalism. I don't believe those who were born with us had heard of or spoken of him” (Informant: Pepe 2016).

Thus, the sources and works reviewed establish the Rif region's peripheral situation within precolonial Morocco as well as with regard to the lack of interest shown by Europe. In fact, in those times, no city in the Spanish Protectorate was markedly Amazigh, or had Amazighness as a symbol of their identity. Nor did their language, Tarifit or Chelha, receive any attention, besides that shown by European linguists. Spanish colonial structures therefore ended up explaining the Rif's marginality in terms of the existing antagonism between the *bilad as siba* (country of dissidence) and *bilad al makhzen* (country of government), as popularised by French colonialists (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1935: 183).<sup>89</sup> Villa Sanjurjo was therefore built in Riffian territory,

87 For example, consult the document “Datos referentes a la relaciones europeas y panislámicas de Abd El-Krim el Jatabi”, AGA, Box M6, catalogue number (15) 3 81/9984. It can also be found in the English press compilation on the Rif and Spain of 1925, AGA, Caja M6, catalogue number (15) 3 81/9984.

88 By “sharifian” I refer to the Moroccan elites, although the Moroccan monarchy also tried to justify its descent from the prophet Mohamed as *Shorfa*. The classic work on the subject is that of Lévi-Provençal (1922).

89 No attempt is made here to reproduce the whole debate around this division, but to mention some of the leading exponents of the discussion: see the classic work by Gellner and

and its marked Spanishness was superimposed on Amazigh specificity, as the Franco–Spanish alliance was with an Arab and Alaouite makhzen.

A key element in the founding of Villa Sanjurjo was the Peñón de Alhucemas. Its location in front of the beach played a fundamental role in the landing at Alhucemas on September eighth 1925, as the island was covered in all kinds of canyons. The Riffians recognised the Peñón de Alhucemas as Tazrut Nekur (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1936: 302). Located in the bay that the Spanish gave the same name to, and just over a square kilometre in size, it belongs to the small group of islands retained by Spain off the coast of Morocco (Martín Corrales 2016: 1312). Until the creation of Alhucemas, the references to that name in the maps and books referred to the bay or the Peñón, as was the case of Folch and Torres (1911) in their story for young people about the territories that formed part of the Spanish empire in Africa. The Prince of Sacro Monte carried out the occupation of the Peñón de Alhucemas (or Alhucemas Island) on August twenty-eighth, 1673 (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1935: 153).

Al-Hoceima and the Rif fitted into a Spanish Protectorate that extended over 21,243 square kilometres, compared to the 202,630 of the French Protectorate (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1935: 143). According to the 1933 census, there were 697,211 inhabitants in the Spanish Protectorate (see Table 18), while 3,765,104 resided in the French Protectorate, making a total of 4,462,315 inhabitants (see Table 22).

The largest region in Spanish Morocco was Gomara-Xauen, followed by the Rif, and the third was the eastern region. The Rif region therefore, had the highest population and was one of the largest in size (see Tables 19 and 20).<sup>90</sup> The two most influential Riffian *dhaqbitsh* in the Al-Hoceima area were, in order of importance, the Aït Waryaghar (Beni Urriaguel to the Spanish),<sup>91</sup> whose capital was Ajdir, and Ibuqquyen (Bocoia to the Spanish), where Villa Sanjurjo was created. Both belonged to the Rif Region, although Aït Waryaghar and Temsamam were considered to be the oldest in the region (Hart 1976b: 36). The Aït Waryaghar were the most numerous. In this regard, it is worth recalling

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Micaud (1973): Gellner (1969, 1973a, 1986), Brown (1976) and Rosen (1984), among others. For more information see Aixelà-Cabré (2000).

90 The Rif also stood out in agricultural production as it had the second place after the western Yebala in 1931 (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1936: 374).

91 In this work, two of the names that Hart (1976a: 3) gathered from the Riffians to define themselves, Aït Waryaghar and Ibuqquyen, will be used. Beni Urriaguel (Beni Ouriaghel) and Bocoia, the Spanish names put into circulation, will be disregarded, except where official statistics of the protectorate or citations are concerned.

TABLE 18 Population of the Spanish Protectorate

Census	Population
1933	697,211
1940	991,954

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1935: 143). ESTADO MAYOR CENTRAL DEL EJÉRCITO (1947: 68).

the interview with Rhimou,<sup>92</sup> a Riffian born in the vicinity of Al-Hoceima in 1945, who explained the reasons that her grandfather had had so many wives and children: “my paternal grandfather had nine extraordinarily fertile wives, he was very rich ... They gave him an average offspring of four children each ... Back then you had to have lots of children to be able to defend the town!” (Informant: Rhimou 1993).

Martín Corrales (2008: 212) recovered an important detail about the city’s foundation: Villa Sanjurjo’s final location was the result of an agreement between the *dhaqbitsh* Ibuqquyen and the Spanish. In the pact, the Ibuqquyen freely ceded the lands to the Spanish, but the lands of the Aït Waryaghar, the *dhaqbitsh* of Abd el-Krim, were excluded from the negotiation. This agreement, promoted by Spain, probably aimed to fracture Riffian community consensus, creating divides between the two *dhaqbitsh*. It definitely weakened the centrality Ajdir had enjoyed until then as Abd el-Krim’s birthplace. I will return to this detail about the city’s foundation, which is not insignificant, in the next section to explain the current divisions in Riffian unity.

It should be added that there was a third influential *dhaqbitsh* in the Al-Hoceima area, Temsamam, – although in the Spanish territorial distribution they belonged to the Eastern Region, whose capital was Nador (see Table 21).

Although these three Riffian *dhaqbitsh* – Aït Waryaghar, Ibuqquyen and Temsamam – belonged to two different Riffian regions, they were neighbours. Due to their relationship to Abd el-Krim, the most prestigious were the Aït Waryaghar, followed by the Temsamam, whose capital was Ben Tieb, and who were strengthened by the centrality of Villa Nador, an important nucleus.

92 Rhimou, seventy-four, is a Riffian born near Al-Hoceima. Of low, upper class, she was married to her cousin. Interviewed in Casablanca from June 1993 to September 1997.

TABLE 19 Extension and Population of the main regions of the Spanish Protectorate

Region	Extension	Population
Gomara–Xauen Region	5.422 km <sup>2</sup>	105,208
Rif Region	4.707 km <sup>2</sup>	179,928
Eastern Region	4.702 km <sup>2</sup>	142,273

SOURCE: COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1935: 143).

TABLE 20 Population of the Rif, 1950 census

Region	Total population
Rif Region	154,602

SOURCE: SPANISH POPULATION CENSUS OF DECEMBER 31ST 1950.

However, Villa Nador did not achieve the status of Al-Hoceima where Riffian sentiment was concerned.

Because of the postcolonial consequences for independent Morocco, I must mention that the protectorate's territory was administratively organised into three civilian regions and three military regions (decree of December twenty-ninth, 1931), according to "their geographical position or the situation of the *qabilas* and their greater or lesser degree of pacification" (Estado Mayor Central del Ejército 1947: 40). The three civilian areas established were West Jbala with its "centre" in Alcazarquivir, East Jbala whose centre was in Tétouan, and the Eastern Region whose centre was Nador. The three military regions were Central Jbala, with headquarters in Tétouan, Gomara-Xauen, with headquarters in Xauen, and, of course, The Rif, whose headquarters were in Villa Alhucemas (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1935: 184–186). Years later, in 1948, the metropole reconfigured the protectorate into five major civilian regions after merging the Jbalas (see map in Aziza 2003: 119).<sup>93</sup>

93 Its 70 *dhzqba'ir* were organised as follows, as reported by García Figueras and Fernández Llebrez (1955: 157–158): a) Eastern Region or Kert which included 14 *dhzqba'ir*: Temsamam, Beni Tuzin, Beni Ulichek, Beni Said, Tafersit, M'talsa, Beni Bu Iahi, Ulad Setut, Quebdana, Beni Sidel, Beni Sicar, Beni Fu-Ifrur, Beni Bugafar, and Mazuza; b) Rif Region formed of

TABLE 21 Extension and population of the nearest *dhzqba'ir* to Al-Hoceima

Region	Qabila ( <i>dhaqbitsh</i> )	Population 1929 census	Population 1940 census	Extension in km <sup>2</sup>
Rif Region (capital Villa Sanjurjo)	Aït Waryaghar (Beni Urriaguel)	39,537	60,132	1.028,58
	Ibuqquyen (Bocoia)	7,079	10,675	281.32
Eastern Region or Kert (capital Villa Nador)	Temsamam	24,729	30,017	420.25

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. ESTADO MAYOR CENTRAL DEL EJÉRCITO (1947: 64–65). HART (1976A: 17).

Eastern Region or Kert, Rif Region, Gomara-Chauen Region, Yebala Region and Western Region or Lucus.

These civilian regions, as in the previous organisation, divided the Amazigh Rif in half,<sup>94</sup> separating the “Rif” from the so-called “Eastern Region.” In the starkest example, Nador and the Temsamam *dhaqbitsh* were separated from neighbouring Al-Hoceima and from the Aït Waryaghar *dhaqbitsh*, which was problematic for Riffian unity. However, the choice of Villa Alhucemas as capital of the military region of the Rif gave it a boost that led to its catapulting, after independence, to become the symbolic capital of the Moroccan Rif.

18 *dhzqba'ir*: Mestasa, Beni Guemil, Beni Bu Frah, Beni Iteft, *Bocoia* (Ibuqquyen), *Beni Urriaguel* (Aït Waryaghar), K'ama, Targuist, Beni Ammart, Beni Seddat, Beni Mesdui, Sarkat, Beni Jannus, Beni Bu-Ensar, Beni Ahmed, Beni Buchir, and Beni Buchibet; c) Gomara-Chauen Region that included 13 *dhzqba'ir*: Beni Ziat, Beni Sechyel, El Ajmas (alto y bajo), Guesaua, Beni Iahamed, Beni Jaled, Beni Guerir, Beni Ersin, Beni Selán, Beni Bus'ra, and Beni Mansur; d) Yebala Region formed of 11 *dhzqba'ir*: El Fahs, Anyera, El Hauz, Beni Ider, Beni Hozmar, Beni Mesauar, Yebel Hebib, Uad-Ras, Beni Said, Beni Lait, and Beni Hasan; e) Western Region or Lucus which included 14 *dhzqba'ir*: Garbía, Aamar, Mesora, Bedaua, Bedor, Beni Gorfet, Es-Sahel, Beni Arós, Jolot, Sumata, Jolot-Tilig, Ahl Serif, Beni Issef, and Beni Scar. The italics are mine to highlight the most influential *dhzqba'ir* in Al-Hoceima.

94 The area had Arabic-speaking groups like the Ulad Stut studied by Seddon (1973: 109).

The city of Villa Alhucemas developed as a typical colonial settlement. Moroccans were labelled “indigenous”, “Moors”,<sup>95</sup> “*Morillos*”, “Riffians”, “Hebrews”, “Jews” and “Muslims” once they lost control of their territory and the Spanish began to arrive (Aziza 2007: 172), especially from the lower social classes (Aziza 2003: 151). It should be noted that the settlement in the Spanish Protectorate was urban, not rural. Of the 32,804 Spaniards who lived in the Protectorate in 1933, 32,801 were in the main Moroccan cities.

The location of the city was of military interest as it served “as a base for operations against the Rif, secured by the height of its surroundings, which protect it and the sheltered coves and depths that open below it” (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1936: 182). The city was a war child. *Cala del Quemado*, like Monte Malmusi, was remembered as the place the Spanish landed, and the bay and its viewpoint went on to become the most popular place in the city.<sup>96</sup> The conquered area sowed the seeds for Villa Sanjurjo to grow. *Cala del Quemado* had a few huts in 1926, but in 1927 masonry buildings began to be built, usually with one or, at most two floors (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1936: 181, 184), as numerous postcards of the area<sup>97</sup> show: “every six days on average, a new house was finished.”<sup>98</sup>

The first Spaniards to settle in Villa Sanjurjo provided food and accommodation services for the colonial military officers, troops and officials. As Pepe explained, “[after] the conquest of Alhucemas and with the burden of their children [my parents] went there. It was 1926. They were among the first civilians. My grandfather set up a small *pensión* and Spaniards continued to arrive in the conquered lands” (Informant: Pepe 2015).<sup>99</sup> A city, that initially provided a strategic beach for landing troops,<sup>100</sup> ended up as a colony of Spain after “pacification”, and gained publicity after the visit of the Spanish king, Alfonso XII, on October seventh, 1927. The year Villa Sanjurjo was founded, 1927, the Spanish government made the decision not to incite Moroccans to rebel, and

95 Regarding the conceptualisation of “Moors”, see the detailed analysis of Martín Corrales (2002a) and Mateo Dieste (1996).

96 M. Bertuchi made a painting entitled *Cala del Quemado*, published in the magazine *Revista Tropas Coloniales* in October 1926, work reproduced in López Soler (2013: 214).

97 Many of these postcards, as other photographs, can be consulted on some web pages that collect the memories of former colonists, part of them are referenced in the European project “Europeana Collections”, whose website is: <http://www.europeana.eu/portal/ca>. Accessed November 2021.

98 Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos (1936: 184).

99 The italics are mine.

100 It can be seen the *Playa del Quemado* at the foot of the still small town of Villa Sanjurjo, in NO-DO of December twenty-sixth, 1949, NOT N 364 A.

TABLE 22 Morocco. 1933 census

	Spaniards	Europeans	Moroccans
Spanish and French Protectorates – (in thousands of people)	–	95,000	4,411,000
Spanish Protectorate (in thousands of people)	32,804	605	673,876
Spanish Protectorate (in percentage)	5 percent	–	95 percent (2 percent Jews)

SOURCE: COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1935: 285).

chose to respect Arab and Amazigh laws and specificities, unlike the French policy of divide and rule that set the groups in opposition (Aixelà-Cabré 2015).<sup>101</sup> Villa Sanjurjo was originally named as a tribute to the military leader who conquered it, General José Sanjurjo. Soon after, however it was renamed Villa Alhucemas, as it appears in official documents of the early 1930s and, eventually, Alhucemas, in the late the 1940s. But while for Spanish civilians, as well as many Riffians, the city was always Alhucemas or Villa, many military personnel preferred to call it Villa Sanjurjo or Villa Alhucemas.

Although daily life between Spaniards and Moroccans in some of the cities in the protectorate, like Tétouan, was characterised by intercultural coexistence (Marín 2015a),<sup>102</sup> this was not the case in Al-Hoceima. Spaniards built the city and settled in it (see Table 23). A few Moroccan Arab Muslims and an even smaller number of Moroccan Jews (forty-four, according to the 1933 census,

101 The Spanish government's decision not to provoke more problems in the area after 1927 explains the tone and content used by the Joint Information Office in reference to the Spanish attitude towards Morocco and its diversity. One example is the classified delivery of November twenty-ninth 1933 to the Council of Ministers signed by Juan Moles of the High Commission of the Colonies. AGA, catalogue (15) 3 81/10200.

102 For example, the Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos (1936: 172–173) indirectly questioned intercultural coexistence until the first third of colonisation was over, by pointing out that the three communities in Tétouan lived segregated, separate lives, meaning that there were no points of contact: "Tétouan unites three cities, rather than different neighbourhoods; the indigenous city or medina, which is the largest part, the *mel-lah* or Hebrew neighbourhood, and the Spanish (as opposed to European) city. All three had perfectly defined unmistakable boundaries, even if they were in material contact."

of a total of 12,988 Jews living in the Spanish Protectorate) were also resident there.<sup>103</sup> It should be said that among the Moroccan Arab potentates who lived in the city were businessmen and dignitaries such as Ami-Sidi Mohatar Dukali, Adel-Sidi Mohatar Buckar and Sidi Mohatar Dadi (Martín Corrales 2008: 206), and that the Jewish community was eminently urban, well-off and dressed in European style.<sup>104</sup> Neither of these Moroccan groups developed close relations with the Spanish. All of the informants recall that the Riffians lived outside the city, and this includes Merien: “They lived on the outskirts! The Spaniards wanted modern people in the city, not people like us, almost all of whom were from the countryside” (Informant: Merien 2017).

No other city in the protectorate reached the levels of Spanish representation that Villa Alhucemas did: in 1933, Spaniards made up 91 percent of its population (see Table 24). Comparing the number of Spaniards in Villa Alhucemas with the largest city in the protectorate, Tétouan, we can see that, despite concentrating the greatest number of Spanish officials in the territory because of its position as the capital, their figure remained far below that of Alhucemas, at around 24 percent (the situation in the Spanish autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla was another story as can be seen in Table 25).<sup>105</sup>

Even the few inhabitants of the Peñón de Alhucemas settled in Villa Alhucemas in 1935, according to the Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos (1935: 224): “[the Peñón] had a population of 300 souls, which today have moved to Villa Alhucemas ... it was one of the old prisons and is under Spanish sovereignty” (see Table 26). Years later, the population resident on the islet traded with the Riffian *dhzqba’ir*. The Peñón also served as a prison for Republican prisoners after the Civil War. Pepe recalled visiting an uncle who was a prisoner in the mid-1940s, brought from the peninsula.

So the statistics show that cultural diversity was not a key element of Villa Alhucemas, unlike the other cities in the Spanish Protectorate, except perhaps Nador, as the following table shows (see Table 27).

103 Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos (1935: 283).

104 For more information on the Jewish community in Morocco, see Schroeter (2002), Boum (2013), Calderwood (2018b) and Ojeda (2018).

105 Pepe described Melilla’s opulence in those times: “some things reached us before Spain because American products arrived: pens, cameras, watches, Rayban glasses, televisions, transistors ... The products entered through Ceuta and Melilla and to a lesser extent Tangier, and you did not pay taxes. In those days you left the port of Melilla in taxis that were American brands like Chevrolet or Chrysler, while in Almería they were horses and carts! Melilla was therefore a very cosmopolitan atmosphere with more wealth than Almería. Melilla in the 1950s was an up-and-coming city” (Informant: Pepe 2015).

TABLE 23 Population of the Spanish Protectorate by cities and regions

	1933 Census	1950 Census
Population of Villa Alhucemas	6,941	10,770
Population of Tétouan	59,476	93,658
Population of Tangier	66,000	–
Total urban population	95,000	246,389
Rural population of the Rif Territory	–	155,356
Total rural population	–	835,620
Total population: Spanish Protectorate	697,211	1,082,009
Spanish enclaves: Ceuta	50,293	–
Spanish enclaves: Melilla	66,478	–

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. *BOP*, XXIII, NO. 36, 1935 (PP.1557–1558, 1561–1562). COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1935: 145, 238). THE DATA FOR CEUTA AND MELILLA CORRESPOND TO THE STATISTICS FROM 1930.

Spanish colonisation thus shaped the segregation of the city of Villa Alhucemas, differentiating the scant Moroccan population that lived with the Spanish from the Riffians living in the small villages around Villa Sanjurjo. As we will see, this data shaped a social pyramid of the city showing the segregation of the Spanish among themselves and of the Spaniards from the Moroccans, Arabs, Jews and Riffians. As Pepe recalled, always very positive about their treatment of the Moroccans, “the relationship with the Moroccans was good in terms of treatment, but our feeling of superiority towards the natives was notable. Some used that superiority to their advantage” (Informant: Pepe 2017).

It should be added that Spanish colonisation, structured in a tutelage regime, gave special protection to the sultan and all those who could serve French and Spanish interests via a parallel organisation. This organisation of the colony’s management (see Table 28) was perfectly visible in Villa Alhucemas, where various officials lived. Pepe recalled, “the authority for the Spanish was the *interventor*, who held all the power. There was also a *Junta Municipal*, which was like a city council today, whose representative was also Spanish ... In Alhucemas there was a military *interventor*, a civilian one and the General Chief of the Rif District. The General Chief ... had authority over the whole military.” And he added, “the *Bacha* was the highest civil, religious and political authority, he assumed the three powers: legislative, executive and judicial” (Informant: Pepe 2016).

TABLE 24 Percentage of Spanish population in the main cities. 1933 census

	Spaniards	Muslims	Jews
Villa Alhucemas	91 percent (3,657)	8 percent	1 percent
Tétouan	24 percent (11,481)	63 percent	13 percent
Alcazarquivir	10 percent (2,605)	80 percent	10 percent
Larache	33 percent (10,325)	57 percent	10 percent
Arcila	22 percent (1,275)	67 percent	11 percent
Xauen	9 percent (573)	90 percent	1 percent
Nador	58 percent (2,442)	36 percent	6 percent
Torres de Alcalá	50 percent (-)	1 percent	49 percent
Puerto Capaz	36 percent (2,605)	57 percent	7 percent

SOURCE: COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1935: 285).

TABLE 25 Cultural diversity in the main Spanish enclaves

Population of Ceuta. 1933 Census				
Ceuta	European	Muslims	Jews	Total
	47,680	2,224	389	50,293

Population of Melilla. 1930 Census				
Melilla	European	Muslims	Jews	Total
	51,166	180	3,283	66,478

SOURCE: COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1935: 145).

The parades organised to honour the visits of the High Commissioners were an opportunity to see the different military and administrative representatives together. The city's various military and political classes were obliged to attend these public demonstrations without objection, along with prominent Moroccans, *qaid*s, *indigenous* troops and, of course, the Spanish and Riffian people. As an example, in the Filmoteca Nacional archive, the parade can be seen that was held in Villa Alhucemas in October 1952, as well as the lunch held afterwards with numerous Moroccan attendees.<sup>106</sup>

106 See the NO-DO of October twentieth, 1952, which also includes a visit to the Peñón de Vélez and Arba de Taurirt, where "15,000 *qabila* people were organised in six *jarcas*" led

TABLE 26 Population of the Peñón of Alhucemas

Year	Women	Men	Total
1877	53	224	277 (28 born in Spain)
1887	80	286	366 (57 born in Spain)
1897	101	180	387
1900	—	—	353
1910	—	—	406
1920	—	—	322
1930	—	—	132
1940	18	132	148
1950	—	38	38
1960	—	—	139

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. *CENSO DE POBLACIÓN 1887 DE POSESIONES DEL NORTE Y COSTA ORIENTAL DE ÁFRICA* (P. 724–725). *CENSO DE POBLACIÓN 1897 DE POSESIONES DEL NORTE Y COSTA ORIENTAL DE ÁFRICA* (P. 320). *CENSO DE POBLACIÓN 1930 DE POSESIONES DEL NORTE Y COSTA ORIENTAL DE ÁFRICA*, VOLUME II (P. 7–8) (WITHOUT FIGURES ORGANIZED BY CITIES). *CENSO DE POBLACIÓN 1940 DE POSESIONES DEL NORTE Y COSTA ORIENTAL DE ÁFRICA*, VOLUME I (P. 307). *CENSO DE POBLACIÓN 1950 DE POSESIONES DEL NORTE Y COSTA ORIENTAL DE ÁFRICA*, VOLUME I (P. 331). *CENSO DE POBLACIÓN Y VIVIENDAS 1960 DE PLAZAS Y PROVINCIAS AFRICANAS. POBLACIÓN DE DERECHO Y HECHO DE LOS MUNICIPIOS ESPAÑOLES* (P. 104).

Relevant also is that the official documents of 1940 distinguish between “European personnel”, which included the Spanish, and “Indigenous personnel”, a category that covered the Moroccan population. Some Moroccans would advance by working for the colonial structure as assistants in different bodies, including roles such as prison guards, doormen, drivers and messengers,<sup>107</sup> just as the Spaniards did. However, Spanish nationality was an indispensable condition for most positions of responsibility, so Moroccans faced difficulties accessing these until the final phase of colonisation.

by *qaid* Budra – one of Abd el-Krim’s former ministers – that paraded before the High Commissioner. The figure of 15,000 *qabila* people seems exaggerated. For parades around the same dates in other small Riffian communities such as Uad Lau, see NOT N 511 B. Also see NO-DO parade in Tétouan on April thirtieth 1945, NOT N122 B. To see a large rural parade see NO-DO of June 17th 1946, NOT N 180 B.

107 For example, *BOP*, XLIII, No. 49, 1955, pp. 1727–1730.

TABLE 27 Urban settlement. 1933 census

	Total	Europeans	Muslims	Jews	Budget
Population of Villa Alhucemas	6,941	6,887	7	47	340,829
Population of Tétouan	59,476	17,312	35,992	6,172	1,429,454
Population of Tangier	66,000	14,100	38,000	14,000	—
Population of Nador	3,222	2,928	101	193	201,859
Spanish enclaves: Ceuta	50,293	47,680	2,224	389	—
Spanish enclaves: Melilla	66,478	51,166	180	3,283	—

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1935: 145). COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1936: 186–187). THE DATA OF CEUTA AND MELILLA ARE FROM THE SPANISH STATISTICS OF 1928 AND 1930.

Moroccans also held positions in Islamic justice, as *aadel* (secretary), but also as *qadi* (judge).<sup>108</sup> They served as military personnel, such as soldiers, corporals, sergeants and even *qaids* (rural civilian leaders).<sup>109</sup> Some Moroccans went on to serve the metropole for up to forty-three years, as the 1955 retirement lists record.<sup>110</sup> The Spaniards also controlled the appointment of the sheikhs (tribal chiefs), who were always allies of the colonial regime and whose names were published in the Boletín Oficial del Protectorado (*BOP*, Protectorate's official gazette).<sup>111</sup> Even nurses were appointed, giving special visibility to these women under the heading "Moroccan Nurses", as can be seen in the appointments section of the protectorate's various gazettes.<sup>112</sup> Competitive civil service entrance

108 For example, *BOP*, XXVIII, No. 36, 1940, pp. 21–23.

109 For example, *BOP*, XXVIII, No. 36, 1940, pp. 48–49.

110 For example, *BOP*, XLIII, No. 50, 1955, pp. 1766–1771.

111 For example, *BOP*, XXVIII, No. 36, 1940, pp. 84–85.

112 To this end, you can consult the long list of appointments in which some Moroccans appear among the Spaniards, albeit in a subordinate position. *BOP*, XXIII, No. 36, 1935, pp. 1591–1593; *BOP*, XXVIII, No. 36, 1940, p. 38; *BOP*, XLIV, No. 3 1956 pp. 59–86.

TABLE 28 Colonial structures and dual authorities in the Spanish Protectorate

Spanish administration Government of Spain	Moroccan administration <i>sultan, Sharifian power</i>	
High Commissioner	<i>Khalif</i>	
<i>Delegación de Asuntos Indígenas</i>	<i>Khalifian makhzen</i>	
Territorial <i>Interventor</i>	<i>Qaid</i> (rural chief)	<i>Bacha</i> (urban chief)
Regional <i>Interventor</i>	–	
District <i>Interventor</i>	<i>sheikh</i> (leader factions)	<i>Qadi</i> <sup>a</sup> (judge who applied civil law)
Local <i>Interventor</i> <sup>b</sup>	<i>Mokadem</i> (village leader)	<i>Mokadem</i> (urban district leader)

a According to Capdequí (1923), he was designated by the sultan in the cities or by *aith arba'in* (*jama'a* in Arabic) in the rural contexts. In 1934, a hierarchical subdivision was established: (1) the *Qadi* of *Qadis* of Tétouan, followed by (2) the *Qadi* of the region, and finally by (3) the *Qadi* of circumscription, and the last by (4) the *Qadi* of the qabila (dhaqbitsh). In 1938, the (3) and (4) merged and become *Qadi* of location.

b In Al-Hoceima, his position coincided with the vice-presidency. See Cordero Torres (1942: 216).

SOURCE: AIXELÀ-CABRÉ (2015B: 98).

examinations after the Civil War were very clear about the qualities of the candidates. For example, in the exams for second auxiliaries in the municipal civil service body, “good social and political conduct” was a requirement. The Spanish justified this with a certificate issued by their municipalities and the provincial headquarters of the *Falange Española Tradicionalista* and the JONS. Moroccans were required to present a certificate from their *bacha* or *qadi*.<sup>113</sup>

Moroccan access to this range of professions, posts and the protectorate's civil service was not common in Alhucemas. Tétouan was a different story as, being a capital, it clustered colonial organisational and management structures, while Villa Alhucemas remained marginal to the Spanish Protectorate. In fact, Tétouan was more important to the small Moroccan population living in Villa Alhucemas than to many Spaniards, who preferred to travel to Melilla. Tétouan therefore eclipsed not only Al-Hoceima, but also the rest of the Moroccan cities in the Spanish Protectorate, like Larache and Alcazarquivir. For the Spanish, Melilla became a bridge for Spanish penetration in the northeast of Morocco

113 See BOP, XXVIII, No. 25, 19,40, p. 596.

(Seddon 1973: 113). The full implementation of the colonial structures in Villa Alhucemas, as in the rest of the territory in the late 1920s, was entrusted to the military, without which colonisation could not have been maintained.

It should be remembered – and it is highly relevant – that until 1921 there was no prison in the Rif, because as Pennell (1987: 110) explained, “there was no central authority to set one up. In precolonial Morocco, the power of the sultan in the cities was extremely indirect over mountainous districts like the Rif.” The permanent Spanish military presence in the Rif meant a substantial change in its coordination with the rest of Moroccan territory. In 1946, the prisons built in the Spanish area contained between 7,500 and 8,000 prisoners (Aziza 2003: 184).

Several regiments of Spanish troops were sent to the protectorate. García Figueras and Fernández Llebrez (1955: 141) detail the role of some of the soldiers who would later lead the rebellion that brought about the Spanish Civil War. These soldiers were assigned to the Spanish Protectorate:

The culminating part of the war [in the Rif] was the joint Hispano-French action against the leader Abd el-Krim, attacking his stronghold of Ajdir (Bay of Alhucemas), prepared for us by the then Chief of the Government of the Dictatorship, the illustrious General Primo de Rivera, who, alongside valuable collaborators – Sanjurjo, Millán Astray, Franco and other heroic leaders of our glorious army – managed to bring down the last pockets of resistance of a stubborn and brave enemy.<sup>114</sup>

While it is not the subject of this book, one cannot overlook the fact that the rebellion against the republic led by Franco and his henchmen could not have been won without the recruitment of Moroccans, including many Riffians (Ibn Azzuz Hakim 1997, 2003). This had a direct impact on the Spanish Protectorate (Martín Corrales 2002a, 2002b). Of those recruited to fight on the peninsula, the Riffian Mohammed ben Mizzian, an emblematic figure for the Franco regime, stood out above all (Jensen 2015: 93).<sup>115</sup>

Coming back to the presence of the regiments in the Spanish Protectorate, it should be noted that they were not visible in urban areas until the territory was under control. For a long time, the troops destined for the Rif did not leave

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<sup>114</sup> As Martín (1973: 186) pointed out, if the republican government had accepted Moroccan nationalist claim to some extent, the military rebellion of 1936 might not have prospered due to the lack of Moroccan support.

<sup>115</sup> On the participation of Moroccans in the Civil War, the wonderful work by de Madariaga (2002) is recommended.

their barracks, other than for surveillance and combat duties. Hence, it was some time before the soldiers began to walk through the area to which they were assigned and became visible in the cities. As Pepe recalled, in Alhucemas “the soldiers had very little social life” (Informant: Pepe 2016).

Along with the Spanish troops, the Royal Order of July 1911 led to the creation of the Regular Indigenous Forces for Melilla (Jensen 2017: 137). In 1914, among others the Tabor de Alhucemas was added. (Cordero Torres 1942: 83).<sup>116</sup> These Moroccan units, the *Compañías de Regulares Indígenas de Infantería* were commanded by infantry and cavalry chiefs and officers, “except the Moorish Officers of the second ... maintaining 20 percent European troops” (Cordero Torres 1942: 83). These units formed of Moroccan recruits had the same functions as the Spanish metropolitan forces: to conquer the country and impose the protectorate on any *dhzqba'ir* that resisted.<sup>117</sup> According to Pepe, “after the first years of pacification, an army was formed in Alhucemas of four special regiments with local people, with Moors. In the Mehala they were all Moors except the privileged Spaniards who went; they performed policing duties” (Informant: Pepe 2016). Alfaro and Lacalle (1993: 211) mention Sidi Mohamed Boryla as the first Riffian to become captain of the city’s *Regulares*.

There were also sharifian forces formed of the “Indigenous Police”, which recruited from among the Moroccans, and were responsible for keeping order in the occupied areas. This government and urban police was renamed the Security Service in a *dahir* (decree) on December 15th 1929. The decree stipulated that in order to be recruited through selective competition, one must have served in the sharifian’s forces or the protectorate’s regular forces for two years. The criteria were the same for both Spaniards and Moroccans, as long as they spoke Arabic. Amazigh neither prompted interest nor guaranteed, in their opinion, valid dialogue. Although they distinguished between European and local personnel, this group belonged to the Spanish corps (Cordero Torres 1942: 25). To illustrate the distribution of tasks between the bodies, we refer to Pepe’s description of their organisation in Alhucemas:

a few policemen were Riffian ... A robbery was the business of the national police, which had mixed Moroccan and Spanish troops. There was a superior police chief who was Spanish and reported to the *interventor*

<sup>116</sup> On the military establishment, see Jensen (2005).

<sup>117</sup> Riffian troops from Targuist and those from Ait Waryaghar (Beni Urriaguel) can be seen parading in the NO-DO of November seventh 1955, NOT N 670 A. Another parade of “Moorish forces” appears in the NO-DO of April thirtieth, 1945 NOT N 118 B.

rather than the military ... and was perhaps able to consult the government delegation in Melilla. The *bacha* would intervene when a Moor robbed a Spaniard, because I saw that with thieves or a dispute with us, it was the Moroccan authority who decided to send them to prison, but it would be handed over to the courts, as there was a Justice of the Peace who was Spanish.

INFORMANT: PEPE 2016

It should be noted that the Civil Guard was also deployed in the Spanish Protectorate. A decree on November 21st 1933 established the Comandancia de la Guardia Civil de Marruecos, “a unit that, in addition to its specific task ... would be in charge of the instruction and organisation of the *mejzanías*” (Estado Mayor Central del Ejército 1947: 43). Cordero Torres (1942: 27–32) gives details of their establishment as armed *mejzanías* in 1934, and of their deployment by decree on November twenty-first of the same year “to handle the particular services of the Institute in the territories under Spanish sovereignty” (Cordero Torres 1942: 31). The establishment of their barracks was recorded in 1942.<sup>118</sup>

On the other hand, the appointment of the *interventores* was crucial to the territory’s control (Villanova 2004, 2006; Mateo and Villanova 2013). The role of the *interventor* was clearly defined. Lobera (1926a: 272) synthesised this by pointing out that “the role of interventor in the Protectorate regime is more important than that of the administrator in that of direct administration. At root they are analogous, but the interventor needs greater adaptability and diplomacy because he has to work through the indigenous authority.”

As mentioned, the Riffians lived on the outskirts of Villa Sanjurjo in small towns, *douars*, with subsistence economies. Such was the case, for example, of Malika’s<sup>119</sup> maternal and paternal grandparents, who were from the vicinity of Alhucemas, and both of whom worked in the fields. She recalls one uncle dedicating himself to fishing, but otherwise “we are a big family. Everyone ... worked the same land” (Informant: Malika 1996). A few Riffians came and went from the city every day, other than for the performance of subordinate duties for the Spanish, to sell eggs or agricultural produce to the city folk. Pepe was surprised by their forbearance: “They hardly ever stole, even being so hungry!” (Informant: Pepe 2017). The Riffians walked over 15 kilometres up steep slopes to sell their products or work in the city, like Merien’s father, who explained that “always walked, poor thing. I think it was almost 15 km ... He left in the

118 See *BOP*, xxx, No. 3, 1942, pp. 64–65.

119 Malika is a Riffian who was born in Al-Hoceima in 1972. Interviewed in Casablanca in 1996.

morning and did not return until night. He only slept from three until six in the morning” (Informant: Merien 2017). This was not personal preference, but resulted from his inability to buy or rent a house because of his acute poverty, which Hart (1976a: 67) calculated by adding up his expenses and income. After the Spanish Civil War, this situation began very slowly to reverse, although the Riffian soldiers who fought on Franco’s side (Martín Corrales 2008: 213) never received the benefits promised after the war ended (Madariaga 2002: 340–341). Large-scale Riffian settlement of Alhucemas really began in the 1950s, particularly after independence.

The work and trade some Riffians did in Alhucemas was an unequivocal sign of a desire on their part to forget the bloody fighting that set them against the Spanish. Indeed, many acts of great harm to the Riffian people, such as the disproportionate use of Spanish bombs in the Rif, and especially the use of mustard gas, were covered up (Balfour 2002; Marín et al. 2015b; Tassouli 2017). But despite Villa Alhucemas having electricity, running water, jobs, a market, schools and hospitals, all of which were precious services given the precarious lives of the Riffian people, not everyone wanted to go down to the city or engage with the Spanish (Hart 1976b). That the integration of Riffians who wanted to settle was ultimately postponed until late in the colonial era was due to a lack of Spanish interest in providing them with facilities and high housing costs, rather than disinterest on the part of those Riffians. The Riffian people’s non-integration in the city occurred as the buildings built for them continued to be occupied by Spaniards.

As indicated, the colonial literature used the categories of *bilad as siba* and *bilad al makhzen* to reflect the differences between Arabs and Imazighen, a classification that basically developed in the French Protectorate and was assimilated by some Spanish military officers, with the clear exception of Blanco Izaga (Moga 2008, 2009, 2014). The military made statements to that effect on several occasions: “the original division of the Empire has emerged, based on that historical reality of *Blad el Makhzen*, that is, the country of government, submitted to that absolute authority, and *Blad es Siba* or territories the imperial power never reached or only temporarily through punitive expeditions sent by the sultan” (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1935: 183); and “our Zone belonged to *Blad el Siba* and a Makhzenian organisation had to be set up in it, of which naturally not the slightest shadow existed, and a political and administrative structure for which in Spain ... no usable precedents were found” (Estado Mayor Central del Ejército 1947: 31).<sup>120</sup> These

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120 See also Ramos Charco-Villaseñor (1931: 13).

arguments sought to reflect the difficulties of establishing centralised taxation, a decisive issue studied by Seddon (1973). And yet they did not note what Aziza (2003: 63) pointed out, that another significant effect of Spanish colonisation in the Rif was the transition from a subsistence economy to a market one, with wages as the basis of livelihood, at least in urban areas, something that was clearly evident in the city.

It should also be noted that outside Alhucemas, Tarifit was the most widely used language. This was despite the pessimism of the Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos (1935: 302), which said that Amazigh was “frankly in decline because it had been affected by the establishment of the Spanish and French protectorates ... [which would contribute] to accelerating its defeat.” The lack of female schooling, including in Koranic schools, was one reason for the strength of Riffian language, as it was women, as educators, who spread it within the family context. On the other hand, reality undermined the optimism of the Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos (1935: 304–305) about the use of Spanish. It believed that Ceuta and Melilla would have greater influence, as large contingents had been dispatched to Melilla in 1909, and hoped that expanding education would bear fruit. “In the not too distant future ... our beautiful language will have grown ... to 600,000 men who know and use it” (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1935: 305) However, their predictions were wrong.

Another important issue to note is that outside the city of Alhucemas, the application of *urf* or customary law continued in Riffian *dhzqba'ir*.<sup>121</sup> The *urf* was a strictly oral legal code, except in cases where its laws were written on their own initiative, or following contact with Western officials or jurists.<sup>122</sup> The continuity of the body that had historically resolved its conflicts, *aith arba'in* (the tribal assembly), was also guaranteed. Lobera (1926a: 272) wondered, “how justice should be invigorated without previously knowing if the *qabila* accepts the qadi and the prescriptions of the Koran and Sunna or, on the contrary, the laws prevail of *urfs*, custom and tradition.”

As Alhucemas was built on Ibuqquyen land, direct expropriations were not necessary for its development, although they were used against those who

121 On retaining Amazigh customary law, see the “Informe sobre la Reorganización de la Justicia Secular en la Zona Española de Protectorado en Marruecos”, a report by José Antonio de Sangroniz, the secretary of the Spanish Embassy, dated April eighth 1925, AGA, Box M260, catalogue number (15) 3 81/9606.

122 Along these lines, it should be noted that Blanco Izaga (1939) recovered some Riffian laws in the Spanish Protectorate, just as Morand (1910) had done before in Algeria. Also noteworthy is the approval of the Dahir Beréber in 1930 in the French Protectorate.

resisted colonisation. The direct expropriation of the lands of Abd el-Krim, his family and followers are well known (Madariaga 2009: 422), and there were many more.<sup>123</sup> As Douhou (1997: 330–331) points out, expropriations got bad press<sup>124</sup> among the Moroccans: “the Spanish tried to colonise the surroundings of Melilla, keeping the plots of two to five hectares for the settlers. The local press of that time emphasised the contribution of the local population to the development of colonial projects.”

Local resistance always hampered colonial processes. In the case of the Spanish Protectorate, it made the idea of self-financing the costs of the protectorate until 1930 impractical (see Table 29). Armed conflict made exploitation difficult, and the metropole had no intention of making a large investment, as Aziza points out (2003: 90), “the budgets did not lead to the creation of a solid economic infrastructure or to a true modernisation of agriculture.” After “pacification”, income did not offset expenses either, so the protectorate ended up representing a significant outlay for Spanish coffers (Carnero 2015).

The budget fell significantly after “pacification.” For example, in 1940 it amounted to 112,854,214.89 pesetas<sup>125</sup> (see Table 30). Of the total, only 26,761,793.75 corresponded to the Makhzen’s resources, 23.7 percent. The Spanish Protectorate was clearly in deficit. The largest expenses related to personnel: the cost of relocated civil servants, the staff of *interventores*, health workers, the staff working on Spanish education and Moroccan Islamic education staff, the Moroccan makhzen staff and that of the khalifian *Mehalas*. Public works and official construction were a separate issue. Of these amounts from 1940, the *Delegación de Asuntos Indígenas* had a budget of 42,195,116 pesetas, the khalifian Forces 23,491,778 pesetas, and the Delegation of Development 16,505,532 pesetas. For 1945, the budget was 177,042,532.92, of which 107,042,532.92 were estimated to have come from the makhzen’s own resources.<sup>126</sup> In the economic biennium 1954–1955, the budget was quite high relative to previous expenses, and it was specified that 220,242,893 corresponded to the makhzen’s own resources,<sup>127</sup> whose main expense was the *Delegación de Asuntos Indígenas*, the Khalifian Forces and public works.

123 In this regard, see Marchán (2014). Normally, exchanges and returns were published in the *Boletín Oficial de la Zona de Protectorado Español en Marruecos*. For example, see *BOP* no. 36 of December thirty-first, 1933 (page 1058), which contains the return of confiscated assets requested by several “indigenous” of the *qabila* of Beni Said (Eastern Region).

124 Douhou (1997: 330) mentioned the *Telegrama del Rif*, No. 9.964 of January sixth, 1927.

125 For example, *BOP*, XXVIII, No. 11, 1940, pp. 242–255.

126 For example, *BOP*, XXXIII, No. 2, 1945, pp. 15–18.

127 For example, *BOP*, XLII, No. 2, 1954, pp. 35–51.

Of the expenses, it is interesting to look, on the one hand, at the provision of infrastructure in 1930, because at that time they were able to plan and develop with no armed fronts, and, on the other, because this made it possible to see how much of the budget reached Villa Alhucemas (see Tables 31 to 33).

Villa Sanjurjo's first budgets<sup>128</sup> were very similar to those of later years, and small compared to those of other cities such as Tétouan.

In Alhucemas, the budgets contained various items. In total they comprised 20 percent of that of Tétouan, the capital of the Protectorate and a more populous city (see Table 34). It is interesting to note that in Al-Hoceima "Duties and Taxes" and "Municipal Tax" accounted for over 80 percent of income, compared to 64 percent in Tétouan. In the expenses column, the largest was the broad concept "General obligations", which accounted for 10 percent of total expenses, compared to 20 percent for Alhucemas. After these, came "Public Works" and then "Surveillance and security" and "Urban Police" which together represented 22 percent of Alhucemas's budget and 33 percent of Tétouan's.

Villa Sanjurjo's budget for 1946 amounted to 233,149.75 pesetas, although an extra item was approved for that year of 215,516.35, most of which was dedicated to municipal works (160,516.35).<sup>129</sup> It is interesting to compare its budgets with those of the capital, Tétouan (see Table 35).

As mentioned, Alhucemas society was segmented. At the base of the pyramid was a floating Riffian population, which was the poorest and most neglected, and which did not sleep there, except for some who stayed on a landing or in some commercial space. In the next tier were the Spanish lower classes, fishermen, workers and labourers. Above them were the Moroccan potentates and the wealthy Jews who lived in the city, although they did not socialise with the Spanish. Equal with them were the Spanish relocated officials and immigrants who had become rich in Alhucemas and owned houses, shops and businesses. Right at the top of the pyramid was the Spanish military corps, high-ranking military men, who had great power over the city, and below these the *bacha*, which had relative authority, albeit only over the Moroccan population.

Pepe summed it up very well: "the first to colonise us [the Spanish population] were the military" (Informant: Pepe 2016). In fact, he described the officers as "the Alhucemas jet-set ... The officers ... married Spanish girls there and rented houses" (Informant: Pepe 2015). The Spaniards in Alhucemas reproduced the segmentation of Spanish cities, shaped in those times by a clientelist political ideology, that also had an impact on social classes by advancing

128 With the Dahir of February first, 1928, the Junta de Servicios Locales (Local Services Board) of the city was constituted (Cordero Torres 1942: 210).

129 *BOP*, XXXIII, No. 42, 1945, p. 1.061.

TABLE 29 General expenses in Morocco from 1920 to 1930

Financial year	Presidency	War	Marine	Government	Development	TOTAL
1921-1922	22,953,769	605,046,887	6,906,977	2,723,933	3,694,325	641,325,892
1922-1923	54,895,745	407,340,015	9,908,766	2,851,934	5,866,802	480,862,363
1923-1924	70,446,277	339,312,826	3,896,426	2,846,253	6,224,253	422,726,038
Trimestre 1924	31,557,209	126,355,059	2,115,259	722,457	2,235,042	162,985,047
1924-1925	49,853,572	481,478,558	7,053,539	2,907,656	4,269,107	545,562,435
1925-1926 (budget)	31,010,317	238,441,963	4,030,154	2,832,461	4,265,250	280,580,147
2on semester 1926	43,235,611	211,899,254	1,889,857	1,868,778	114,000	259,007,501
1927	57,186,395	341,195,890	2,776,448	3,569,785	230,500	404,939,020
1928	53,805,959	239,793,747	8,360,055	3,484,353	35,376	305,479,491

SOURCE: RUIZ ALBÉNIZ (1930: 194).

TABLE 30 Budget of the Spanish Protectorate (in pesetas)

Years	1935	1940	1945	1950	1954-55
Total	29,300,000	112,854,214.89	177,042,532.92	88,319,079.1	470,242,893

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. ESTADO MAYOR CENTRAL DEL EJÉRCITO (1947: 467). *BOP*, XXVIII, NO. 11, 1940 (P. 242-255). *BOP*, XXXVIII, NO. 52, 1950 (P. 1.205). *BOP*, XLII NO. 2, 1954 (P. 35-51).

TABLE 31 Budget of the Rif Region (in pesetas)

Years	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
Total	492,000	552,000	1,447,000	2,531,000	2,5000,000

SOURCE: ESTADO MAYOR CENTRAL DEL EJÉRCITO (1947: 468).

TABLE 32 Expenses and provision for infrastructures in the Spanish Protectorate in 1930

<i>Public works</i>	Budget	Public Works finished
Roads	29,360,230.85	10,130,622.93
Bridges	1,432,203.49	482,203.49
Infrastructures	11,992,503.02	5,915,217.98
Maritime signals	469,426.52	268,452.43
Water	5,662,779.49	2,568,791.14
Diverse works	276,101.97	232,458.67
Subtotal	49,193,245.34	18,697,746.65
<i>Civil works</i>	Budget	Civil Work finished
Subtotal	3,957,941.70	2,340,833.87
TOTAL	53,131,187.04	21,038,580.52

SOURCE: RUIZ ALBÉNIZ (1930: 194).

TABLE 33 Balance of Villa Sanjurjo (in pesetas)

	Income	Expenses
1929	322,018	293,450
1930	361,600	368,029
1931	410,193	415,166

SOURCE: COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1936: 184).

or downgrading them. Pepe explained that “from 1940 to 1956, the population was highly differentiated in treatment and housing. Moroccans lived in the outskirts of Alhucemas. There were only a few Moroccans, eight or ten, who lived in houses like us, but they were a minority, the majority were wholesalers” (Informant: Pepe 2016). He also recalled that, as well as the Moroccan and Jewish potentates, “there were some Riffians who worked for the military and officials; a few Riffians who signed up to be police in the city; and a few prostitutes and some homeless children” (Informant: Pepe 2016).

The octogenarians María<sup>130</sup> and Pepe, the first born in Al-Hoceima and the second in Melilla, had multiple stories that illustrated the segmentation in a city in which “there was a lot of military surveillance on the streets” (Informant: María 2016), and in which Pepe said that “the military did not respect the Spanish! They didn’t respect anyone! ... There were more differences between civilians and military personnel than with the Moroccans themselves” (Informant: Pepe 2016), although, of course, the situation of most Riffians could not be compared to that of the Spanish. María explained that, on her staircase, “my father, who was generous, let the [six or seven] *morillos* sleep. But the neighbours did not want them and poured water on them to make them leave” (Informant: María 2016). Pepe remembered the anecdote as an act of cruelty: “throwing buckets of cold water over them in the middle of winter, before dawn, to send them out into the street ... It was nasty.” And, he added, as if thinking aloud and with admiration, “the Moroccans always endured it with enormous integrity” (Informant: Pepe 2016).

Until the 1950s, there was minimal socialisation between Spaniards and Riffians outside areas of contact such as the market or the hammam, or meetings

130 María was born in Al-Hoceima in 1936, and moved to Alicante in the 1960s where she still lives. Interviewed in Alicante in May 2016.

TABLE 34 Comparative income and expenses in 1936 Villa Alhucemas and Tétouan Municipal Councils (in pesetas)

	Villa Alhucemas	Tétouan
	<i>Income</i>	
Rent	–	146,315
Use of communal assets	1,000	–
Grants	–	–
Municipal services	–	290,000
Extraordinary expenses	3,750	15,150
Duties and taxes	164,900	438,600
Surcharges on makhzen taxes	4,000	25,000
Participation in makhzen taxes	1,000	4,500
Municipal tax	119,373.35	838,927.85
Fines	500	6,000
Council credits	40,000	–
Maritime <i>Mustafadtto</i>	7,300	–
<i>Total income budget</i>	341,823.35	1,764,492.85
	<i>Expenses</i>	
General obligations	33,221.85	348,193.66
Municipal representation	2,360	6,700
Surveillance and security	28,400	270,631
Urban police	49,325	327,730
Administration and collections	8,700	53,948
Central offices	26,640	137,000
Health and hygiene	22,900	239,470
Healthcare and charity	36,588	184,090
Public culture	4,250.50	4,250
Public works	93,450.60	134,030.19
Promotion of communal interests	3,750	34,200
Unforeseen expenses	3,000	24,000
Council debts	29,237.90	–
<i>Total expenses budget</i>	341,823.35	1,764,492.85

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. *BOP*, XXIII, NO. 36, 1935 (PP.1557–1558, 1561–1562).

TABLE 35 Budget of Villa Alhucemas and Tétouan Municipal Councils (in pesetas)

Years	Villa Alhucemas	Tétouan
1946	233,149.75	1.130,023.49
1954	–	1,485,000
1955	140,874.98	675,350

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. *BOP*, XXIII, NO. 36, 1935 (P. 1.321). *BOP*, XXXIII, NO. 23, 1945 (P. 640). *BOP*, AÑO XXXIII, NO. 42, 1945 (P. 1.061). *BOP*, XLII, NO. 49, 1954 (P. 1.721). *BOP*, AÑO XLII, NO. 51, 1954 (P. 1.796).

in the workplace. Segregation was notable in public spaces even if they were accessible to all. Pepe recalled that, in general, “there were no Moroccans in bars as customers, only as waiters or bar workers” (Informant: Pepe 2015). Contrary to a few of the comments made, the lack of sociability should not be put down to their low level of education, as that was also true of many Spaniards. But it is true that more Riffians were likely to be illiterate. As Imazighen not Arabs, they had no opportunity to learn the Arabic language except in rural mosques. Pepe confirmed: “there were no educated Moroccans in Alhucemas. Moroccans couldn’t even read or write in Arabic. For example, one earned a degree in Granada and always said: I am the first Riffian lawyer! It was 1948! There were no Moroccan university graduates there ... In the north there were no universities” (Informant: Pepe 2015). In fact, between the years 1940 and 1945, there were also almost no graduates among the teachers on the Alhucemas High School Board of Trustees, a situation that did not change until the 1950s.

An example of good relations between Spaniards and Riffians, although not very representative, was that of Rhimou’s father. His power and authority in the *douar* allowed him to settle in Al-Hoceima along with his family in 1950. There his knowledge of Spanish enabled him to start working for the Spanish colonial organisation. Rhimou was born in 1945 and married her cousin at fourteen who she met at Alhucemas high school, having been educated in the 1950s at the city’s only school for Moroccan girls.

María recalled that friendships between Spaniards, Arabs and Jews was rare and that there weren’t any with Riffians: “only my cousin had a friend, the *Bujía*, who was a Moor [son of one of the Moroccan potentates], and the Hebrews ... Very few Moors lived in Alhucemas, they lived in the *qabilas*, only a few lived there” (Informant: María 2016). She also recalled how Alhucemas had

begun to change in the mid-1950s: “My husband had some working with him on the construction site, and there were also those who were vendors in the market, a taxi driver, waiters, one who worked in a Moorish bakery, a Moorish tobacconist, and there were also the Moors who sold butter, but it revolted us even though it was delicious” (Informant: María 2016).

Pepe recalled an anecdote with sadness that synthesised the disdain with which the Spanish treated the Moroccans in general:

Playing an adult tournament in Tétouan, with football players who were also from Larache and Nador, they were from the Polytechnic School of Tétouan, one kicked me and I said 'Moor, get out of the way and give yourself a proper wash! And he answered me, why do you call me Moor? Would you like me to call you Celtiberian? ... My comment hurt him a great deal because he expected greater consideration.

INFORMANT: PEPE 2017

Contact between the Spaniards and the Riffians was therefore superficial, so much so that as Pepe stated, “over the years I was there, it didn’t interest me at all, and we weren’t interested in them at all either. I did not know a word of Chelha or Arabic. The truth is I didn’t learn a single thing from them in so many years, just curses, thanks and greetings” (Informant: Pepe 2017). The life of the Spanish in Al-Hoceima was clearly purely Spanish. The *Heraldo de Alhucemas*, which began publication in 1933, even kept them up to date with the city’s news (Moga 2007; Mora Villarejo 2012; Martínez Travado 2013).

The Spaniards went to the market to buy fruit, vegetables and eggs. The sale of all products, from animal ones to simple fabrics, was taxed.<sup>131</sup> María explained that her mother always went to markets,<sup>132</sup> which were well stocked, despite much of the production of the nearby *qabilas* in 1931 being barley, wheat and, to a lesser extent, maize, olives and vines (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1936: 371). One could buy meat, cattle, dates, oranges, wax, honey, spices, sugar, tea, coffee, figs bread, textiles, pots, leather products and slippers. Many of the Riffian vendors were women like Soumaya,<sup>133</sup> Hamid’s paternal great-grandmother, who “came to sell eggs and did not return until she had sold them all, even if it was late” (Informant: Hamid 2016). The

131 *BOP*, XXIII, No. 36, 1935, p. 1076–1077. See also *BOP*, XXIX, No. 36, 1941, p. 953–956. Aziza (2003: 137) offers data related to this topic.

132 To know how a market operated in a small town, see the market of Alcazarquivir in the *NO-DO* April third 1944, NOT N 66 B.

133 Soumaya, eighty-eight, was born in 1931. She is the mother of Merien and the mother-in-law of Hamid. Interviewed in Al-Hoceima in September 2016.

city spaces, especially for Moroccans and Riffians, were the mosque and the *hammam*. Pepe recalled the mosque with admiration and how the Moroccans attended it. María remembered the *hammam*, stressing that the venue also had Spanish clients: “The Moorish bath, the *hammam*, on the road to the cemetery, some Spaniards did go there” (Informant: María 2016).

Regarding labour relations, it should be noted that many Spaniards from Alhucemas preferred to hire Spaniards over Riffians, despite the very different wage costs. Pepe said that “the Moors all worked with verbal contracts: *no vengo, no vengas!* (I’m not coming, don’t come!) There were no settlements, or extra payments. The waiters had a symbolic salary and earned from what was taken from the terraces and lounges ... The kitchen assistants had food included, but the waiters did not.” He added, “we Spaniards were trying to hire Spaniards, Moroccan personnel were not equally well trained. Neither in presentation, nor in cleanliness. The Moroccan was at a lower level” (Informant: Pepe 2016).

Riffian men in Alhucemas most commonly worked in peonage, cooking, cleaning and helping out in shops.<sup>134</sup> María also remembered that “the Moors were the ones who sewed with machines” (Informant: María 2016) and, like Hart (1976a: 62), that “many were fishermen and had their little boats” (Informant: María 2016). The best paid were those who loaded and unloaded at the port since, as Pepe recalled, “they all had a better salary than most Moroccans, although they never had as much as a Spaniard” (Informant: Pepe 2016).<sup>135</sup>

Villa Alhucemas was the most important fishing port in the Spanish Protectorate, with 1,139,798 kilograms of fish caught in 1931 (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1936: 469). No surprise then that several Spanish canning and fishing companies were established there. In fishing, a notable Moroccan nicknamed *el Caballo* (The Horse) stood out for having three boats.<sup>136</sup> As Aziza (2003: 194) points out, for the entire Spanish Protectorate, “the canning industry experienced notable growth between 1940 and 1946, both in production and number of companies, and in employed labour: 579 workers in 1942, 2,041 in 1946.”

134 This does not include Riffians who went to the city to sell their products on a daily basis, as most were farmers (Hart 1976a: 64) as well as soldiers and police.

135 Aziza (2003: 236–237) provides figures on Riffian salaries, which were over 5 hassani pesetas (3 and a half Spanish pesetas), and on average at 11.6, depending on the sector, and added “an excessively low remuneration by comparison with the French zone or Algeria ... until February 20th 1951 when the first *dahir* was promulgated that established the rate for unskilled jobs: 17 pesetas for men and 12 for women.” Hart (1976a: 38) provides the figures for Riffian Ait Waryaghar workers, whose average was 6 pesetas.

136 The magazine of the Spanish former settlers of Alhucemas published his obituary. See *Heraldo de Alhucemas* 45, p. 66.

As well as this masculine work, there was the feminine work in the city that went beyond the clichés reproduced by Eduard Giménez Noguera after passing through the Rif in 1921: “the very surprising hierarchical custom of the man walking, the donkey following and the woman at the back. Or the Moor on the donkey and the woman behind, laden with bundles. The woman was a slave.”<sup>137</sup> Pennell (1987: 112) is highly recommended on this subject. He describes how the Republic of the Rif asked major responsibilities of certain Riffian women who, prior to 1921, already handled family subsistence in agricultural terms by caring for farm animals or producing items for consumption and sale. Thus, beyond the clichés, and without counting all the Riffians who went to sell their products in Alhucemas market, the Spaniards employed women in domestic service and in some kitchens. María recalled that her mother never had problems replacing a cleaner: “if a Moorish woman missed work, my mother would lean out [of the window], and when a Moorish woman passed by on the street, she would yell at them [to come upstairs] ... She gave them money and food and they did the work for her” (Informant: María 2016). And, she added, “We never saw Moorish women. Only the whores that the whole town knew. They didn’t do anything, they didn’t mix, they didn’t bother anyone” (Informant: María 2016).

The case of Soumaya provides evidence of the type of work Riffian women did for the Spanish, and allows for a reconstruction of the various phases of Riffian settlement and employment in Al-Hoceima. Soumaya contradicts the myth that Riffian women merely walked behind their husbands with the donkey and didn’t work. Soumaya’s work included being a vendor in Alhucemas market, mining<sup>138</sup> and employment in a cannery. “As we were poor”, she explained, “I started working from a very young age. First, outside the house, I went down to the market; later in a phosphate mine<sup>139</sup> run by the Spaniards [1949]: I broke up the ground, dug up the earth and looked for phosphate.<sup>140</sup> Very hard work! That was too much for me and after two years, I gave up (1951). But I continued working for Spaniards in a canning factory (from 1951 to 1957). I worked in the salting factory” (Informant: Soumaya 2016). After seven years of contact with Spaniards, this old woman only remembered two words in Spanish, which

137 Eduard Giménez Ferrer recalling his father’s stories (Eduard Giménez Ferrer 2016).

138 The case is especially relevant because Aziza’s (2003) accurate research practically did not include female work as it was unusual.

139 On the Riffian work in the mines, see Aziza (2003: 226–235) who promoted its recovery in oral history.

140 It should be noted that the *Archivo de las Minas del Rif* holds relevant documentation regarding the Rif cultural heritage. The archive is located in San Juan de la Mina. Personal communication from Eloy Martín Corrales.

she reluctantly repeated in the same tone the Spaniards had used with her, screaming: “*¡venga, venga!*” (“come on, come on!”), “*¡trabaja, trabaja!*” (“work, work!”) (Aixelà Cabré 2019: 864). A few Riffians thrived during colonisation, like Rhimou’s father as mentioned above, but they were exceptions. Hamid’s father was another case. His enrichment and prestige was not due to collaboration with the Spanish or the supposed education Spain gave him, which incidentally pigeonholed Moroccans into medium and auxiliary positions. He prospered thanks to his knowledge of written Arabic, a language few Riffians used. His mother saved the money she earned from selling her eggs in Alhucemas for years and managed to send him to Tétouan to be educated, where he improved his knowledge of Arabic. As Hamid recalled, “Thanks to that, [my father] bought a house in Al-Hoceima” (Informant: Hamid 2016). He may have been one of the first Riffians to buy a house, but this was not possible until the Spanish left and the price of housing fell to “next to nothing”, according to the Spanish. That was in 1961, five years after the end of Spanish colonisation.

Forced labour, under the umbrella of the *prestación personal*, was less widespread in the Spanish Protectorate than in other colonised territories. Proof is contained in the *Anteproyecto de Organización de la Enseñanza Musulmana e Hispanoárabe in the Moroccan Zone* of March fourth 1933,<sup>141</sup> which stated that

in the public works carried out (perhaps in all) the *qabila* people have contributed with their *prestación personal*, the custom of which must be maintained but which cannot be a fundamental basis because of its abusiveness and for lending itself to violations ... in the long run it is the cause of displeasure and the source of grudges.

Certainly, road-building, which was initially meant to have more Moroccan labour in the form of *prestación personal*, ended up using both Spanish and Moroccan soldiers sent to military interventions in the area (see Table 36). An example of this is the 72 kilometer section from Villa Alhucemas to Targuist, which was completed by the army (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1936: 481).

It should also be noted that Spanish expectations regarding the implementation of the school system were exaggerated. The first schools were set up late, and the inclusion of Moroccan teachers and students postponed. The philosophy was that “school policy must be oriented so that while it is as favourable as possible to the indigenous, it also benefits the protector country” (Lobera

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141 AGA, Box M180, catalogue number (15) 3 81/10158.

1926b, in Moga 2014: 30; Fernández 2015), which explains the limitations on the study of certain subjects in Moroccan schools. This was not so with regard to the Jews, who even had schools for girls from 1862–1864 (Daoud 1994: 243).

Schooling in the Spanish Protectorate was established very late. Primary education did not begin until 1933, and secondary 1948. For this reason, in both the precolonial period and into the 1930s, boys studied in Koranic schools that excluded girls (Valderrama 1948a), a practice that has continued since independence. As Jensen (2015: 96) put it, “in 1932, the Spanish Protectorate had a total of 2,720 Koranic primary schools, with a total of 24,338 students. For the 1952–53 school year, the number of Muslim-focussed elementary schools was 3,236, with a total of 26,217 students.”

The Spanish state divided education into Spanish teaching and Moroccan teaching. This was evident in Villa Alhucemas, which has extremely low figures for Moroccan primary education in the 1942/43 academic year (see Table 37).

The figures for Moroccan primary education doubled in Alhucemas in the 1943/44 (see Table 38) academic year, with a greater number of the descendants of the few Moroccans who lived there, including the Jews, entering the system. But the figure for rural schools remained very low, considering tens of thousands of people, such as the Ibuqquyen and the Aït Waryaghar lived in the surrounding villages, such as the Ibuqquyen and the Aït Waryaghar. As Pepe recalled, “Moroccans did not go, they were not educated there, they did not study” (Informant: Pepe 2016). A total of 648 Spanish students<sup>142</sup> enrolled in public and private primary schools, which, although a high number, did not include all the children residing in Alhucemas. María and Pepe confirmed this in their interviews, referring to friends from their circle that were not educated. Pepe added “other friends from trade or business who tried to save wages by putting their children to work ... when independence came hard times came too and the children were not equipped to do anything else” (Informant: Pepe 2016).

In Villa Alhucemas there was no school for Moroccan secondary students, as this was seen as necessary for the Spanish, not for Moroccans. The closest centre for continued study was in Villa Nador, which had the Escuela Elemental de Trabajo, that specialised in wood and electromechanics,<sup>143</sup> Those who wanted to study in arts and trade schools also had to travel.<sup>144</sup>

142 Estado Mayor Central del Ejército (1947: 420, 422).

143 Estado Mayor Central del Ejército (1947: 428).

144 To see how Moroccan schools and those of rural arts and trades worked, see the NO-DO of September thirtieth, 1946, NOT N 195 B.

TABLE 36 Roads and paths in the Spanish Protectorate (1935)

Eastern Region. The Rif	481 kilometres
Central Region	393 kilometres
Western Region	232 kilometres
Total	1,106 kilometres

SOURCE: COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1936: 481).

The colonial goals on Hispanisation were not met either. But while the language did not come to dominate, they did manage to reduce Moroccan studies to vocational training. In terms of studies for girls, it should be noted that the schools in the Spanish Protectorate prioritised manual work in keeping with expectations related to their domestic duties (Onieva 1947). Education was meant to prepare them to be good wives and housewives, and not to set them up in artisan jobs, thus ignoring the traditional tasks rural women carried out by making textiles, baskets and ceramics (Hart 1976a: 46–48; Boukobza 1974). Such tasks were prestigious (González Vázquez 2015b), but the colonial structure had decided that girls would study manual work, notions of hygiene, education and work in the home (Valderrama 1951). This was the same for Spanish girls. María was educated in this way and was taught to sew by nuns. It took years to establish education in Alhucemas. Pepe explained that fortunately “a school run by Mexican missionary nuns had been set up and my parents enrolled me. I went there from the age of ten to the fifth year of high school” (Informant: Pepe 2016).

TABLE 37 Moroccan primary education in Villa Alhucemas and its surroundings. 1942–1943 Academic year

Environment	Place	Boys’ schools	Girls’ schools	Boys	Girls
Urban	Alhucemas	1	1	76	50
Rural	Jemis	1	–	24	–
(near to	Ajdir	1	–	45	–
Alhucemas)	Insoren	1	–	67	–

SOURCE: ESTADO MAYOR CENTRAL DEL EJÉRCITO (1947: 425).

TABLE 38 Moroccan primary education in Villa Alhucemas and its surroundings. 1943–1944 Academic year

Environment	Place	Boys' schools	Girls' schools	Boys	Girls
Urban	Alhucemas	1	1	177	110
Rural	Jemis	1	–	42	–
(near to Alhucemas)	Ajdir	1	–	55	–
	Insoren	1	–	54	–

SOURCE: ESTADO MAYOR CENTRAL DEL EJÉRCITO (1947: 426).

The Spanish Protectorate established the healthcare system. Prior to that, only Tangier had some kind of healthcare organisation,<sup>145</sup> although traditional medicine and healing was extensive throughout the country (Estado Mayor Central del Ejército 1947: 435; Mateo Dieste 2010). Pepe recalled that his parents, who went to Villa Sanjurjo in 1926, found that “in Alhucemas, there were no hospitals, everything was precarious. So my mother went to Melilla to give birth to me, but a few hours later returned to Alhucemas” (Informant: Pepe 2015).

The health and pharmaceutical service was gradually established in the 1930s. There were six civilian hospitals throughout the protectorate, that of Villa Alhucemas, Tangier, Tétouan, Larache, Villa Nador and Alcázar, in addition to different stations and health centres (Cordero Torres 1942: 170). The most common diseases during the first third of colonisation were malaria, syphilis and smallpox. In Alhucemas in August 1949 the most common infectious diseases were chickenpox, tuberculosis and malaria.<sup>146</sup>

Healthcare was provided through rural doctors, but the deployment was fairly rudimentary due to a shortage of means (see Table 39). Rhimou is a typical example of what happened to pregnant women in the rural Rif, as three of her nine children died (one from an miscarriage and two aged one):

the doctors did not arrive on time. Back then we lived a long way from cities with medical centres ... Also, most doctors are useless. One of my

<sup>145</sup> Estado Mayor Central del Ejército (1947: 420, 422).

<sup>146</sup> The hospital services do not appear to have recorded all their activity, since only twelve cases were registered out of an urban population of 10,770 people. *BOP*, XXXVIII, no. 1, 1950, pp. 16–17.

sons ended up lame when he was four years old because he was treated by a doctor who made the wrong diagnosis. He didn't even acknowledge it! A couple of hours after giving him an injection, I saw that his little leg wasn't moving, that it was dangling ... I told the doctor and the idiot replied that he it must already have been like that!.

INFORMANT: RHIMOU 1995

On the other hand, one issue that has not yet been addressed is that of the mistreatment of Moroccans by the Spanish. Although these are “isolated” cases, they certainly existed. Pepe recalled complicated scenes – “especially between the military and the Riffians” – in which Spanish civilians did not normally get involved: “I remember a low-ranking soldier asking to have his shoes cleaned and when it was finished, he kicked the shoeshiner’s equipment box and I thought that those of us who were there could have said something because it was mistreatment, but no, and the individual in question continued drinking as if nothing had happened” (Informant: Pepe 2016). He also recalled the different positions of Moroccans and Spaniards before the law:

You went to prison for committing crimes but it wasn't the same for Spaniards and Moroccans because the pressure was on the latter. Eating during Ramadan was a serious crime. Complete abstinence was practised in mid-summer there. If they caught someone not complying, they got a hard time, abuse, and with sticks they beat them badly ... The Moroccan police themselves could do what they wanted ... The Spanish faced no limitations on public activities like the Moroccans did ... Although there were confrontations with the military.

INFORMANT: PEPE 2016

One of the Spanish informants in Alhucemas, who was keen not to be identified in any way by other ex-settlers, recalled another episode that exemplified the *bacha's* treatment of Riffians and other Moroccans, an episode that took place in the centre of the city between 1945 and 1948 in the form of public shaming.

A boy who had committed some type of 'crime', but which was almost certainly not a crime, was taken to the *Plaza del Florido* and ... in front, in the middle of the street, they tied him up by his hands and forced him to his knees and they were going to give him ten to fifteen lashes with a whip ... When the punishment began, a high-ranking Spanish officer passed ... and ordered them ... to stop. Everyone was afraid of the *bacha*

because they solved everything with the blows and jail. The Spanish officer ordered them to stop and when they did not obey him the second time, he ordered him under his responsibility to stop flogging the young man ... And he stopped. That was how authority worked in Morocco.

The soldiers lived in the barracks and visited the city centre during their one-hour leave. Pepe explained that “the soldiers did not fit in at all in the town ... they drove everyone away. It was the army ... The legion was also there and they were a lot of them” (Informant: Pepe 2016). He remembered more than one beating given to Moroccans without a word being said, like when

the Legionaires went to the Florido, there was a Moroccan at the bar: they beat him up, insulted him and started a commotion. The owner called the police but as they were military they did nothing. They turned a blind eye. The next day a senior officer from the Legion arrived to pay for the damage ... That was the relationship of the army with civilians in Morocco ... the army acted insultingly.

INFORMANT: PEPE 2016

In terms of romantic relationships between groups, it should be noted that, except for the sexual relationships the Spanish had with Riffian and Moroccan prostitutes, relationships between Spaniards and Moroccans were rejected legally (Rodríguez Mediano 1999), morally and culturally (Martín Corrales 2002a), which reflected the prohibitions imposed by monotheistic religions -Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Moral questions aside, Pepe recalled unpleasant episodes, because “some abused the young Riffian women” (Informant: Pepe 2016). María also remembered the distances young Spanish women had to keep from Riffians: “I have a photo that was found by a *morillo*, which he took and wrote on the back – my girlfriend! ... Wow ... Because there were suitors, but not Moors. The boys were after the

TABLE 39 Healthcare in the Rif 1943

Environment	Patients
Urban (assistance in medical centers)	4,350
Rural (rural medical assistance)	34,408

SOURCE: ESTADO MAYOR CENTRAL DEL EJÉRCITO (1947: 456–458).

girls when we walked through Alhucemas. They always complimented us.” But Maria insisted again “but not with the Moors!” (Informant: María 2016). Eduard Giménez Noguera sent a letter from Tétouan, when he was assigned to the Rif after the Annual disaster. He mentions the Moroccan women in a humorous tone, “And how are you doing out there among the Moorish girls and boys? Won’t you find a nice Moorish girl in Tétouan (converted to Christianity it is understood) that at the same time is *ricachonda* (well heeled) as the Argentinians say?”<sup>147</sup>

In another sphere, it should be noted that the nationalist movements in the Spanish Protectorate in Tétouan and Tangier in the 1930s (Aixelà-Cabré 2015a) do not seem to have impacted Alhucemas, probably because it was a city with a small Moroccan population that after “pacification” had returned to the margins of the protectorate. Pepe recalled how quiet the Moroccan independence movement was in Alhucemas until the 1950s: “We learned three months later that a riot had been organised in the French zone ... There were guerrillas in the French zone, but not in the Spanish zone, there was tranquillity because with Franco everything with the Khalif was going very well ...” (Informant: Pepe 2016). However, Pepe did add that “guerrillas” had taken refuge, but he could not be sure if they were related to the Liberation Army in which many Riffians were involved between 1954 and 1955 (Geertz 2003: 255). Hence, he explained, “the *guerrillas* from the French zone even came to the Spanish one because the French zone was in turmoil too. So the French granted Mohamed V freedom” (Informant: Pepe 2016). If Pepe’s “guerrillas” were the Army of Liberation, which seems likely, this was the period as Wyrzten (2013: 630) described when “the regions with a Berber majority in the Rif and Atlas mountain ranges rose up ... In the armed struggle, the leadership of the rural-based Moroccan Army of Liberation had an antagonistic relationship with the leadership of the urban nationalist movement.” Pepe gave more details on the absence of political parties in Alhucemas, concluding that “in the Spanish [zone], nothing, there were not even embers of nationalism ... In Alhucemas no pamphlets were distributed in Arabic, or anything at all. Neither did I see any of that in Alhucemas nor in the [rural] *souks* I went to” (Informant: Pepe 2016).

The fact that the Istiqlal<sup>148</sup> Moroccan nationalist ideology did not penetrate the city of Alhucemas did not stop the Francoist ideology of colonial power from taking root in the city. After the rebels’ victory in 1939, Falangism found a

147 Letter from Tétouan of February twenty-first, 1922. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

148 The Istiqlal party, led by Allal al-Fasi, had been founded in 1943 and was heir to the National Party for the Realisation of Reforms (PNRR).

place in the sociopolitical structures of the metropole (Stucki 2019; Schroeter 2019). The JONS were represented in various organisations such as, for example, the protectorate's Anti-Tuberculosis Organisation.<sup>149</sup> In Alhucemas, Pepe recalled a character called Kaddur<sup>150</sup>:

He was very old and I remember him in the clinic. He was a kind of unqualified medical assistant and I remember that he always wore a Spanish Falange shirt. Lots joined the Falange bandwagon. Some because they had been in the army. Others because they had fought in the Civil War and were mutilated by war. The taking of Barcelona was celebrated in Alhucemas. In other words, the Falangists were very visible. ...

INFORMANT: PEPE 2017

It is interesting to note that the charity the Falange boasted about, which was supposedly also distributed in the city, never arrived. Pepe confirmed: "there was no charity, and we felt sad about the hunger [among the Riffians] and that it could not be alleviated. And if there had been, it wouldn't have been for the Moroccans ... Famine came in 1941 and 1942 due to a terrible drought. The barley did not come through. But from 1939 to 1941 there was hunger in Spain, but not in Alhucemas" (Informant: Pepe 2016). As Maria said, the Civil War had little effect on the city: "we lived very well there, we wanted for nothing in the war. We had sugarloaf, soap, charcuterie, we wanted for nothing." The relevance of this information is that it highlights that the impact of the economic crisis from 1940 noted by Aziza (2003: 185) would not have had equal effects throughout the area, much less in all cities.

But the protectorate was coming to an end, which caught most Spaniards by surprise. Pepe explained, "the people, the Spaniards, were farsighted, even though the subject hit very hard because nobody thought about independence – neither my parents nor my uncles saw it coming, but everyone had been putting a little aside despite everything" (Informant: Pepe 2015). The compensation after departure therefore came from what they had saved to a lesser or greater extent. In Pepe's memory most Spaniards, whatever their condition, came to Alhucemas with nothing but in varying degrees, they all made a fortune. The savings they were able to take with them upon their return to Spain proved this, even though they were very hurt that they had not been compensated after they left:

149 *BOP*, XXVIII, No. 13, 1940, pp. 276–278.

150 Rubio Alfaro and Lacalle Alfaro (1993: 211) dedicate a brief profile to him.

Well, the civilian population, I'm not talking about the military or civil servants, I'm talking about the civilian population, they received no compensation or anything. And considering that the entire population – and there were about 70,000 of us, which I know now from the ex-residents association – we all put ourselves in a decent position, despite all leaving any way we could, nevertheless, everyone had a little money saved, so that they could reinvent themselves ... The fishermen had savings too. The boat owners sold their boats to the Moroccans. Fishermen and shipowners set themselves up very well on the coasts of Castellón and Catalonia.

INFORMANT: PEPE 2016

Despite being a powerful magnet for the surrounding towns Alhucemas was not subject to mass internal immigration until colonisation ended in 1956. At most, some factory workers like Soumaya shared small houses with various family members in the early 1950s. As Pepe concluded, “Morocco was a colony of officials and the military, but in terms of working to protect the Moroccans, there was very little” (Informant: Pepe 2016).

Two conclusions may be drawn from the historical reconstruction of life in Alhucemas. The first is that there was no trace of Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood until the postcolonial period and there was even some Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism. The Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood narrative had been present in the political sphere since the times of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and the Second Republic, and ended up expressing a certain cultural respect for the Moroccans and their institutions. It was the Franco dictatorship that spoke most profusely about Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood, albeit always with the pretension of being the civilising “older brother.”<sup>151</sup> The case study shows that while the rhetoric of Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood was present in other cities such as Tétouan, it was absent from colonial Alhucemas. As they formed the overwhelming majority group in the city, the Spanish saw no need to activate this discourse in order to coexist with or govern Moroccans. This is clear proof that not all of the Spanish Protectorate was founded on an allegedly convivial fraternity. When the Spanish were able to create a city “out of nothing” and choose which policies to prioritise, Riffians and Moroccans were kept on the margins, minimising their opportunities and exchanges with the Spanish.

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151 Mateo Dieste (2003) studied it as a strategy to colonize the Moroccan zone without new disputes.

The second conclusion, which will be taken up in the next section, is that the Spanish footprint on the administration and layout of the area was so significant that Spanish policy on the Rif became the foundation on which the postcolonial Moroccan state designed its territorial organisation there. Hence a clear influence remains on the current configuration of the Riffian community and its relationship with and dependence on the Moroccan state.

## 2.2 *Urban Heritage and Settlers: A City with No Riffians*

The city of Alhucemas was consolidated very rapidly thanks to the initial military planning in 1925. Starting in 1927, houses, a church, the port, the cemetery,<sup>152</sup> the slaughterhouse, the post office and telegraph building, the Municipal Council and the Civil Intervention buildings were built; the Mexican mission Divina Infantita provided schooling, and was later joined in this by the Sagrado Corazón; health services were provided by the small Red Cross Hospital until the Military Hospital was built (Rubio Alfaro and Lacalle Alfaro 1993: 108, 115).<sup>153</sup> As the city developed, bars, restaurants and hotels opened.

One of the most important works in Villa Sanjurjo was the port, which was begun in 1927 and completed in 1931 (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1936, p. 181). It was expanded in 1943 and 1949, with the work ending in 1954 (Gómez Barceló 2014: 31).<sup>154</sup> The Spanish valued the port of Alhucemas as a link between Ceuta and Melilla. The French, on the other hand, feared that this Mediterranean port could lead its Atlantic ports to lose competitiveness if roads were created to connect Villa Sanjurjo with other cities like Fes (Comisión Histórica de las Campañas de Marruecos 1936, p. 183). The port was constructed at the foot of *Cala del Quemado*, the axis on which the city was built, between two large cliffs, Morro Nuevo and Morro Viejo. The port could accept ships with a draft of up to 11 metres, had a 260-metre dock and two mooring alignments. It was perfect as a military port but also as a fishing port (see Table 40). A Barcelona–Ceuta line was soon opened up, with mid-route stops in Alicante, Oran, Melilla and Villa-Alhucemas, which was operating at full capacity in 1931, and later included the city of Almería.

Haberdasheries, bakeries, grocery stores and, of course, pharmacies would also be constructed. Numerous homes were built for the relocated Spanish civil service staff,<sup>155</sup> and public works were carried out like Alhucemas Civil

152 About the church and the cemetery of Alhucemas, see Quecedo (2008).

153 See Bravo Nieto (2000) to study the architectural heritage of the Spanish Protectorate.

154 To see the works in the port of Villa Alhucemas, see NO-DO October twentieth, 1952, NOT N 511 A.

155 An example of the construction of houses and its cost can be seen in *BOP*, XXVIII, No. 4, 1940, p. 71.

Hospital, which was budgeted for in 1935<sup>156</sup> and needed furniture and medical equipment to be purchased in 1940<sup>157</sup>; work on the customs building was completed in 1940.<sup>158</sup> The buildings of the Territorial Intervention and Municipal Intervention and the Justice of the Peace were also built. Regarding civil works, it should be noted that the Masjid Al Atiq mosque, with the city's first minaret was built in 1927, with the probable intention of attracting Riffian people and facilitating prayer for indigenous troops. Pepe recalled, "as the mosque was on the way out of town, you couldn't hear it. The church on the other hand could be heard everywhere in town: Father Antonio, a Franciscan and a Basque was worried about that" (Informant: Pepe 2015). Later the so-called *Casas del Rey* was built. Along with the centre (*Centro*), other notable neighbourhoods took the names of workers. There was the *barrio Obrero* (workers' quarter), the *barrio de Pescadores* (fisherman's quarter), the *barrio de Ingenieros* (Engineers' quarter) and "a neighbourhood with no name, like Barcelona's Chinatown", explained Pepe (Informant: Pepe 2015).

It should be said that the Spanish discretion to build in Alhucemas was taken advantage of at times by the colonial structures in order to reinforce sharifian structures. For example, there were situations in which the Junta de Servicios Municipales de Alhucemas (Alhucemas Municipal Services Board), the body that ran the cities, was obliged to make various donations of land to the makhzen because they had been allocated to the construction of buildings that were for khalifian use, such as the regional *qadi's makhama*.<sup>159</sup> Those lands, along with others, had not previously been owned by the makhzen, which therefore consolidated its territorial influence thanks to the colonisation of areas in which – as in the Rif – the makhzen had not previously penetrated. In Pepe's opinion, the houses were small and

had been built by the Spanish since 1926. So those of us who built houses were ordinary Spaniards, and although there were a lot of soldiers, they had the barracks, except for the military officers who lived in houses in the city. The Spaniards who went to do business or look for work neither built nor bought. The town's houses were built between 1931 and 1940. Hotel Florido was built during the Civil War. Sometimes a second floor would be added to existing buildings. In the 1940s Spanish builders began to appear who built small houses and rented them out. Like my sister's

156 BOP, XXIII, No. 42, 1945, p. 1061.

157 BOP, XXVIII, No. 32, 1940, p. 731.

158 BOP, XXVIII, No. 36, 1940, p. 485.

159 BOP, XXVIII, No. 35, 1940, pp. 788–790.

husband, whose father had a factory ... That evolved from 1940 onwards until independence in 1956.

INFORMANT: PEPE 2015

The list of emblematic buildings in Alhucemas is thus long. In addition to the official bodies of the colony and the barracks, the church, the cemetery, theatres, the cinema, hotels like El Florido and the Oriente stand out, as well, of course, as companies such as the canneries, and of course, the *Playa del Quemado* viewpoint, accessed by walking through the city centre and a must-see, a symbol of the Spanish taking of the Rif and the construction of the city. Miró (2012: 58) recalled the emblematic buildings that he felt showed the city's Spanishness: "El *Teatro Español*, *Plaza del Florido*, *Confitería el Negro*, the *Cine Viejo*, the *Cocodrilo bar*, to name just a few, are names that take us to any Spanish city." Miró (2012: 58) also traced the imprints in "the *fonduk*, the *alcaicería*, the hammam, largely the work of the military architect Emilio Blanco Izaga" as Moga has shown (2009, 2014). As I explained, many of them were built in the 1930s, just like the municipal slaughterhouse. Pepe also remembered the well-known Spanish construction company *Entrecanales y Tabora*, because they offered him a job in Equatorial Guinea, an offer that he rejected:

After building Santa Isabel airport, the company that did it, 'Entrecanales', which had a base in Alhucemas, made me an offer to go and work there. I refused to go to Santa Isabel. We had received photos of huge snakes and heard about the diseases, as the son of an acquaintance had died there of malaria. Spanish Guinea was a very unhealthy place.

INFORMANT: PEPE 2017

TABLE 40 Port of Villa Alhucemas (in pesetas)

Years	Import	Export
1927	—	336,000
1928	—	272,000
1929	409,000	794,000
1930	910,000	752,000
1931	1,535,000	1,858,000

SOURCE: COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS CAMPAÑAS DE MARRUECOS (1936: 181).

Alhucemas had a fair amount of cultural life. First, the *Teatro Español* was built and later the *Cine Teatro Florida*. Pepe pointed out that

companies from the peninsula came to the Alhucemas theatre, including the town in their tours. Amparo Rivelles's mother performed there and put on plays that were done in Madrid and Barcelona. The theatre was called *Teatro Español* and it was very old. It was tiny, with twenty rows of seats. 100 or 120 people ... The *Florida* was built later, very large ... I think the *Florida* later disappeared and the little theatre continued. Moroccans did not go to the plays, they were not able to understand the plays, neither in terms of language nor cultural level ... The Spanish middle class and the most distinguished went to the theatre, but not all of the Spanish ... people from the worker's and fisherman's neighbourhoods were poorly educated. They didn't go as much or hardly ever.

INFORMANT: PEPE 2015

There was also the Catholic Mission and the *Teatro Andaluz* (Rubio Alfaro and Lacalle Alfaro 1993: 152). The bullring was very successful but lasted just two years in the early 1950s, because in Pepe's opinion, "they took it away because, in Moroccan territory, it was strictly prohibited! It was very much frowned upon by the Moroccan population" (Informant: Pepe 2016).

The city also had a football pitch, and there were various clubs (Rubio Alfaro and Lacalle Alfaro 1993: 163–190). As Pepe explained, "there was footballing rivalry between the workers, the fishermen and the middle class, that does not mean that we all said hello when we saw each other in the street. In other words, there were no problems, just good neighbours" (Informant: Pepe 2015). Although they did not socialize with the Moroccans, they did play football with them. Some of the notable Moroccan players were Majdyud and Chipula. As Pepe recalled, "Majdyud, well known there. He was there for many years, he was hired as a coach ... Another Moroccan was Chipula. This was 1954–55. He was a footballer and moved between the Moroccan and Spanish populations. And he ended up setting up a travel agency. Both he and Majdyud dressed in the European-style" (Informant: Pepe 2017). There were also different leisure venues where Spaniards met, according to their social class. The *Casino Español* (which would years later become the Hunting and Fishing Club), which was attended by the bulk of the middle-class Spaniards residing in the city, the Sports Club, which was more for officials, military officers and large merchants, and the Casa del Mar Club, which was attended by fishermen.

For many years, the city's economic life revolved around building works and the services provided to the military, civil servants and Spanish residents,

although the port increasingly took centre stage, with a small but prosperous canning industry even developing. As Pepe explained, “canning industries were also opened by a Galician family and a Cantabrian family” (Informant: Pepe 2015). Certainly, in Alhucemas, tuna, mackerel, sardines, horse mackerel, bonito, red mullet, whiting, molluscs and prawns abounded. Pepe recalled, “one of the canning factories was *La Cántabra* and the other *La hispano-marroquí*. The *Cántabra* brought all its own staff, thirty or forty Galicians with their respective families. They brought them because they were experts in preserves and a significant Galician settlement was created. That was between 1945 and 1955. [‘*La hispano-marroquí*’] was taken to Melilla after independence and continued to operate. They were Valencians who saw the place’s fish-farming potential” (Informant: Pepe 2015). And he added,

at that time the main source of income for the Spanish were the officials and the military. Because the canneries were not that big either, in addition to the fact that the Spaniards needed more money than the Moroccans to live ... 80 percent or 90 percent of the population came from Andalusian families. There were marriages between Andalusians from different provinces, especially from Malaga and Almería. There were lots of them. Those from Cádiz were more in Tétouan ... And with the canning industry came the Galician colony who were fishermen and canners. That gave a curious air to the town, where there had previously been more Andalusians.

INFORMANT: PEPE 2015

The *La Cántabra* cannery was on Valencia street, in the Casas Nuevas neighbourhood. Today it is partially demolished, but some of the rooms where the Riffian women worked, remain. Its owner was Conservera Marroquí SA (Rubio Alfaro and Lacalle Alfaro 1993: 235).

Soumaya was one of the first Riffians to live in the small houses near the barracks that were then on the outskirts of the city. The houses would be shared between several Riffian relatives. She went to work in the salting factory of the *La Cántabra* cannery every day, and the working conditions were very harsh. From her years working there for Spaniards, as mentioned above, the only words she was able to remember in Spanish were “*venga, venga*” (“come on, come on”) and “*trabaja, trabaja*” (“work, work”), which seems symptomatic of the distant and hierarchical relationship the majority of Riffians had with the Spanish. Soumaya explained her work in the salting factory,

the Spanish ... did not want us to be distracted or to stop much. We worked really long hours, from the night until the afternoon, although we were free on weekends. We had a house for rent there near a barracks, and I lived with women from the family. The point is that there, in the salting factory, I worked for six years from the age of twenty, but in the end it was so hard that I left. I told them that there was also a lot of work at my parents' house! Animals, wheat, tomatoes, chickens ... Who would do all that otherwise? Then I got married.

INFORMANT: SOUMAYA 2016

Except for the few Riffians who sought to stay overnight in the city, or who were police officers, most began to settle in Alhucemas – renting properties – only after 1952, because, as we shall see, purchasing homes would not become a reality until the beginning of the 1960s.

### 3 Epilogue: Empowerment from the Margins

The case studies have enabled comparative observation of how Spanish colonial structures were rolled out, which ideologies were most widespread and to what extent everyday racism existed. They have also helped us understand which were the most common repressive mechanisms until almost the final stretch of colonisation. The colonial legacies of Bata and Al-Hoceima would leave their mark in terms of racial segregation, territorial layout, labour abuses, linguistic imposition, cultural homogenisation, processes of subalternisation, territorial unification and violence.

Territorial rivalry between colonial powers, a subordinate Equatorial Guinean population, and existing tensions between ethnic groups worsened by the occupation of the territory are some of central features in Bata's foundation and development. With the exception of the European competition for the region, the same is true for Al-Hoceima. "Pacification of the territory" was a euphemism for the violence deployed to subdue the African residents of Bata and Al-Hoceima in a military occupation of the territory that withdrew their rights, while extending those of the Spanish.

Bata was never subject to mass African immigration in colonial times: colonial abuse and the people's limited mobility made mass immigration impossible. The people were unable to settle in Al-Hoceima either, albeit for different reasons, although some men and women Riffians travelled over fifteen kilometres to work in the city every day.

Bata's growth coincided with the autonomous period, which was more flexible towards the rights of the local population, and resulted in more Equatorial Guinean inhabitants. In Al-Hoceima, flexibility had to wait until a few years before independence, and the almost entirely Spanish city did not begin to integrate the Riffian population until the settlers' departure notably lowered housing prices.

Spanish colonial Bata perpetuated racial segregation policies. As the colony's second city, Bata remained on the colonial margins, overshadowed by Santa Isabel and Fernando Po, which provided most of the income to the Spanish coffers. For its part, Al-Hoceima, which did not have expressly segregationist policies in the public space, but very clear ones in terms of social practices, was also on the margins of the Spanish Protectorate, in the shadow of Tétouan and Melilla. With a majority Spanish population, the famous Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood rhetoric was not a reality.

The research also brings out a recurring feature of many African cities that merits reflection, given how crowded many of the continent's cities have become: settlement by African communities, which went on to replace European populations, occurred after independence, not during the colonial period, a fact that calls into question some of the about the *civilising* Spanish and European claim.

The founding of Bata and Al-Hoceima are clear European imprints in Africa. Their colonial marginality was reversed in the postcolonial period, since, as we shall see, the two cities were reappropriated by the Fang and by the Riffians, respectively, in order to transmit and strengthen their influence and identity. Bata and Al-Hoceima are clear examples of how cities can take advantage of glocalisation processes, accepting the colonisation that both nurtured and stunted them, and projecting their history forwards into an uncertain decolonial future in which, finally, their voices pick up the reins of their story.

## Cities after Colonial Independence

### *The Search for Collective Affirmation and Decolonial Contestation*

Spanish colonialism concluded with the independence of its colonies, but its legacies and traces persist in national histories, as comparative analysis reveals. Reconstructing the local postcolonial histories of Bata and Al-Hoceima will show the burden of Spanish colonialism in the territorial layout (Troin 2002), the consolidation of previously decentralised regional units (Seddon 1973), the transition from a subsistence to a market economy (Aziza 2003) and, in the case of Equatorial Guinea, also in Hispanisation via evangelism (Ndongo 1977), the exploitation of natural assets without benefit for the population (Appel 2012) and the constant and persistent abuse of women (Nerín 1999). The history will also show traces of colonialism in the methods of controlling dissent through violent punishment and repression operations (Obiang Biko 2016, Nerín 2006a), methods of clientelist co-option akin to those of the Spanish Falange (Stucki 2019) and no less significant, legacies like the personality cult of the Franco-inspired Nguemist dictators (Sundiata 1990).

As we shall see, all these aspects give lie to the argument that Spanish colonial rhetoric was less severe than its British, French, Dutch and Portuguese equivalents and that its narrative – activated to suggest that a degree of fraternity existed between the Hispanic race and Equatorial Guineans (Ugarte 2009), or between peoples of monotheistic faiths or Andalusian inheritances in the case of Morocco (Mateo Dieste 2003) – was actually highly superficial.

The development of the cities of Bata and Al-Hoceima were not identical processes, and as we shall see their glocalisations have two dimensions, one related to collective affirmation and the other to decolonial contestation. Bata capitalised on Fang desires for visibility and the recognition given by two dictators, Macías Nguema Biyogo and Obiang Nguema Mbasogo. However, it would never acquire the status of the formal capital of Equatorial Guinea to add to its legitimacy as the leading Fang city, which was even more doubtful after the emergence of the continental co-capital of Djibloho, promoted by Obiang Nguema. Al-Hoceima faced strong repression from a makhzen with little interest in Amazighness and particular enmity towards the Rif region. However, both their positions on the margins of Spanish colonisation meant glocalisation processes for collective affirmation had very similar effects. Bata and Al-Hoceima acquired glocal relevance in terms of identity: Bata, because it

represented the country's majority Fang ethnic group; and Al-Hoceima because it was able to connect Riffians with each other and capitalise on assertions of identity. At the same time, decolonial contestation had a glocal dimension and this plays a prominent role in cultural heritage, with Equatorial Guinean and Riffian memories decolonising certain Spanish colonial legacies of the past. As we shall see, the acceptance of Spanish colonial heritage allowed supposed post independence achievements to be questioned: in the case of Bata, it emerged as a form of protest against dictatorial regimes, while in Al-Hoceima, such acceptance allowed Riffians to raise doubts about their lack of integration in today's Morocco.

### 1 Bata, Ciudad Vilangwa, Mang: Glocalised Fangisation

Bata is undoubtedly the city's best-known name, although some of the Ndowe diaspora community call it Vilangwa City to honour the nineteenth century Ndowe king,<sup>1</sup> Vilangwa, and many Fangs also call it Mang, especially those inland as the word means "sea."

As indicated in previous sections, after populating nearby places such as Moganda, Lea and Komandachina, a Fang population began to grow in Bata. These areas eventually became neighbourhoods of what is now Bata, with the Fang ethnic group integrating fastest when the city began to grow after independence. During the Macías and part of the Obiang dictatorships, the city's economic stagnation was very marked. Bata's economic opportunities were delayed and it received only small numbers of migrants from other districts of the continental territory. Its true growth occurred from 1995 onwards, when the discovery of oil created attractive employment opportunities and prosperous businesses. Starting in 2000, migration also increased, with people of different nationalities arriving from Asia, America, Europe and Africa.

While Bata has clearly maintained its position as the Fang capital and is still considered the economic capital, Malabo, the political capital, has an indisputable primacy for its role in oil production (Appel 2012), which has drawn major migration from the continent to the island and has led to a Fangisation of the territory. Bata's centrality as the country's second – and indisputably Fang – capital has been called into question by Obiang's building work in Djibloho. Obiang decided to transfer the government for the duration of 2017 and Djibloho's status as a province was approved, making it independent

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1 On the figure of Vilangwa, see Rabat (2004: 23).

from its original district, Wele-Nzas. This was an important event that we will return to in this section. On the other hand, Bata's image as a city founded by Spaniards meant that the debate over its Ndowe origin was avoided, with Fang legitimacy prevailing over any other consideration.

A few comments and data on the country's population are important to keep in mind. The most accurate censuses of the Equatorial Guinean population were carried out in the colonial period, as after independence, the dictatorial political systems neither recognised multitudinous transnational migration, nor did they produce correct statistics.<sup>2</sup> In 1970, the national administration (based on data from the last Spanish census) gave the total population as 225,000 inhabitants (Liniger-Goumaz 2011).

Four censuses have been carried out during the Obiang regime: in 1983, in 1994, in 2001 and in 2011.<sup>3</sup> In 1983, the General Directorate of Statistics and National Accounts of Equatorial Guinea put the population at 300,000; in 1994, at 406,151;<sup>4</sup> in 2001 at 1,014,999; and in 2015, at 1,225,377.<sup>5</sup> This contrasts with those produced by other organisations, which tend to be a third lower. For example, in 1980, the US Census Bureau calculated 256,000 people; in 1990, 371,000 people; in 1995, 426,000 people; and in 2005, 567,000 people. In 2009, the World Bank reported a population of 676,273.<sup>6</sup> For 2011, 668,225 people were counted using data from the US CIA and Internet World Statistics.<sup>7</sup>

In an unexpected turn in 2018 the World Bank, for the first time, accepted the data provided by the government of Equatorial Guinea, which put the

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2 Van Moppes (2006: 2) has also highlighted the enormous difficulty of obtaining reliable statistics on African migration movements.

3 *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial* 2018, p. 51.

4 Data available on the Equatorial Guinean government website. The proximity of these figures to those of the US Census Bureau is an exception. The statistics compiled by the government of Equatorial Guinea are generally neither reliable nor transparent, especially since the discovery of oil in the mid-1990s. The Equatorial Guinean government has gone as far as registering some people up to four times when grouping them in the censuses of the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea, of residents, of the home community and of work. Hence we must be cautious about these statistics.

5 The data for 2001 and 2015 was taken from the *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial* 2018, p. 53. As there was no census in Equatorial Guinea in 2015 – although there was one in 2011 – it is not clear what this data is based on. *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial* 2018, p. 54.

6 Data of the World Bank (2009), available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/equatorial-guinea>. Accessed November 2021.

7 Data of the US CIA available at <https://www.cia.gov/> Accessed November 2021. Internet World Statistics data are available at <http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#gq>. Accessed November 2021.

TABLE 41 Population in the Littoral Province and the North Bioko Province

Population in the Littoral Province (includes Bata, Mbini and Kogo)			
1983	1994	2001	2015
66,750	146,811	298,414	367,348
			(12.3 percent were foreign and 90.2 percent urban)
Population in the North Bioko Province (includes Malabo and Baney)			
47,170	110,258	231,428	300,374

SOURCE: ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE GUINEA ECUATORIAL 2018 (PP. 53–54).

population at 1,308,974.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, the CIA remains unbending in its doubts about official data, giving the plausible figure for 2019 of 797,457 people in total<sup>9</sup> (again, two-thirds of the Equatorial Guinean figure). These general statistics are important in order to know the total number of inhabitants of the country and the percentage moving to the city of Bata, as Equatorial Guinea is a small state with a low population.

Regarding the population of Bata, some estimates and data worth noting are presented in two tables. In the first, the aim is to provide a comparison of the population of the country's two most populous provinces, those of the political capital, Malabo, and the economic capital, Bata, according to official Equatorial Guinea censuses (see Table 41).

The second table focusses on Bata by comparison with Malabo and the growth of its population is notable, according to unreliable censuses by the Equatorial Guinean government (see Table 42).

The figures in these two tables seem inflated, as is the case with the overall figures provided by the Equatorial Guinean government.

Other sources show significant variations. For example, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* estimated Bata's population to be 66,800 inhabitants in 2003,<sup>10</sup> four times lower than the Equatorial Guinean government's statistics for 2001. However, as no other population data for the city of Bata from the postcolonial

8 Data of the World Bank (2019), available at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/equatorial-guinea>. Accessed November 2021.

9 Data of the US CIA available at <https://www.cia.gov/> Accessed November 2021.

10 *Encyclopaedia Britannica* data available at website: <http://www.britannica.com/place/Bata>. Accessed November 2021.

TABLE 42 Population of Bata and Malabo

		Population of Bata		
1983	1994	2001	2015	2019
43,210	71,046	230,282	309,345 (12.7 percent were foreign)	240,000 –
		Population of Malabo		
37,690	64,439	211,276	271,008 (12,7 percent were foreign)	297,000 –

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. *CENSUSES OF POPULATION OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA AND ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO DE GUINEA ECUATORIAL 2018* (P. 56). US CIA FOR DATA OF 2019.

period can be offered systematically, I include them, using the CIA data, which estimated Bata's current population to be around 240,000 inhabitants in 2019, almost 70,000 fewer than the official data.<sup>11</sup>

As we saw, Bata's ethnic diversity began to be visible from the autonomous period of 1963 until independence in 1968, as in those times the fully emancipated Equatorial Guineans began to empower themselves, gaining visibility and the ability to exert influence. But the process was slow. Fang dominance in population terms was continuous, but it became more evident after the rise of the postcolonial dictatorships of Macías in 1969 and Obiang in 1979, both of whose leaderships were Fang.

### 1.1 *Macías Nguema (1969–1979): Covert Fangisation*

Becoming the administrative capital of the continental region was the decisive factor in strengthening Bata's political centrality in the independent state. This position endowed it with infrastructure, services, healthcare and educational institutions. Bata also had great strategic potential: with a port in good condition, it could open out to the sea and become a powerful trading centre. Above all, Bata was located in the continental area of Equatorial Guinea, in what was originally Fang territory. Despite being Equatorial Guinea's majority ethnic

11 The figure is the result of calculating the CIA's data estimate regarding its urban population (in 2018, it was 71.1 percent). Malabo is the largest city in the country with 297,000 inhabitants. Data available at: <https://www.cia.gov/> Accessed November 2021.

group, the Fang did not originate in coastal regions – their large numbers and migrations compared to other ethnic groups led Bata to become the *de facto* Fang capital, as the continental Fang population demanded.

Bata was thus prepared to compete with Santa Isabel and the great architect of its role was none other than Macías Nguema Biyogo himself (born Nsegayong, Mongomo, 1/2/1924; died Malabo, Bioko Island, 29/9/1979), also nicknamed the “Tiger”<sup>12</sup> and *Papa Messié* to the adult Equatorial Guinean population. A historical review of the city of Bata interweaves some of the main events in the terrifying Macías regime: mass exodus, precarious public services, a terrified population, violence, and the rejection of missionary work and ethnic minorities. I will not explore the figure of Macías here or his political ideology. He has already been extensively studied by various authors, of which Nerín is particularly outstanding (2016).<sup>13</sup>

During the first months of independence, the Equatorial Guinean government maintained a degree of cordiality with the Spanish government. Clear examples may be seen in the statements made by Edmundo Bosio,<sup>14</sup> the country’s vice-president and leader of the Bubi Union, in the Spanish parliament on December 4th 1968: “the independence of Equatorial Guinea has been an exemplary process in the history of decolonisation. There has been neither violence nor sudden rupture, no latent resentments or grudges have remained. Spain has listened to the wishes of the inhabitants of Equatorial Guinea” (Martínez 1969: 6). His message presented the reinvention of the Spanish civilising action as an explicitly positive endeavour: “the work of Spain in Equatorial Guinea, humane and Christian, [was] totally different to the oppressive, materialist colony” (Martínez 1969: 6). The President of the Spanish parliament responded to Bosio in a way that was meant to activate the discourse of brotherhood that the Franco government had begun circulating in the Moroccan Protectorate, which they said would become reality thanks to the ties between Macías, the JONS and the *Sección Femenina* (Stucki 2019). But, as we saw in the previous

12 This nickname was related to the rituals and witchcraft Macías often engaged in. In some quarters, it was believed that Macías could transform himself into a tiger to take revenge on his enemies. For more information, see Sundiata (1990: 128–130).

13 As Nerín points out (2016: 150), opinions varied: “the Spanish diplomat Fernando Morán ... considered him an imitator of Francoism”, the Swiss analyst Max Liniger-Goumaz an “Afro-fascist” (1983: 14–15), while Sundiata saw “terroristic despotism” (1983: 91).

14 Edmundo Bosio was found dead in 1975. Officially recorded as suicide, it is known that Macías was furious when he learned that his portrait had been torn from the door of his house. When the matter was addressed at a meeting in Malabo, Bosio’s death was requested in response to the affront (Goytisolo 1979).

section, Bata and Equatorial Guinea had been mired in exploitation and racial segregation. The President went on:

Equatorial Guinea and Spain are, as of October twelfth, two brother peoples ... born out of action that reflects our Christian sense of life, a moral lineage of shared conscience and the tradition of the mother creator of new peoples ... Equatorial Guinea must fulfil a great mission as an African nation of Hispanic lineage.

MARTÍNEZ 1969: 7

These initial exchanges did not reflect Macías's staunch rejection of Spanish colonial action and, somewhat paradoxically, he would need Spanish financial and technical help after independence.

Macías declared a state of emergency on February twenty-seventh, 1969, succeeded in aborting the coup d'état Atanasio Ndongho had initiated against him, and consummated his undisputed leadership on March fifth, 1969. As Nerín (2016: 152) recounts, "Macías unleashed a brutal repression against his opponents and against the Spanish, accusing them ... of a supposedly 'neo-colonial manoeuvre' ... On March fifth ... would be spoken of as 'the beginning of the Equatorial Guinean Revolution.'" His presidency plunged the country into a totalitarian regime that began a dictatorial spiral. The repression extended from the political cadres to the whole of society (Sundiata 1983). Equatorial Guinea was mired in misery as Messié's "reign of terror" against his political opponents left thousands dead or untraceable, with unidentified and disinterred mass graves along the Cameroonian and Gabonese border. Some older citizens like Mercedes,<sup>15</sup> a septuagenarian Fang woman, still remember these times and connects the violence with the suffering in the colonial period during the construction of the highways that linked the continental territory.

Macías's coup led thousands of foreigners to flee. Nigerians and Sierra Leoneans left for their respective countries, Europeans too, via Madrid. Much of the Equatorial Guinean population, including a majority of its intellectuals, left for Cameroon, Gabon and their former metropole, initiating the Equatorial Guinean exile. It is estimated that around a quarter of the population left the country (Aixelà-Cabré 2013: 10–14). Mbare Ngom (1996: 22) estimated that a third of Equatorial Guinea's population was in exile: "The regime of terror

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15 Mercedes, over seventy, is Fang and an Equatorial Guinean born on the mainland. After her settlement in Bata, she moved to Malabo in the 1980s, where she still lives. Interviewed in Malabo in July 2008.

established by Macías Nguema ... thus created one of the largest postcolonial African diasporas.”

The Spanish also returned to the peninsula: “At the end of March the mass exodus of foreigners, particularly Spaniards peaked. Around 4,000 passengers were transported almost every day on Iberia planes” (VVAA 1969: 100). Liniger-Goumaz counted 7,000 Spaniards who left the country, which paralysed the institutions and the economy (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 646). The missionary community mistakenly hoped that this situation would be temporary. In their accounts they gave assurances that by April 1969 many Spaniards had already returned and that the Equatorial Guineans had greeted them with phrases like “we, following the wishes of peace and friendliness of our President, shake hands one by one. Welcome to our homes” (VVAA 1969: 100). This was false. After the “flags crisis” in Bata that led to the dismissal of Ndongo Miyone, accused by Macías of an attempted coup d’état (Liniger-Goumaz 1988: 111–112), the last Civil Guard detachment left with the remaining Spaniards on April nineteenth, 1969, “bearers of the last Spanish flag that flew in those territories that had just been granted independence” (Benemérita 2018: 1). The Spanish state began censoring information in Spain, forbidding the publication of the Equatorial Guinean political situation until the ban was lifted in 1976, after Franco’s death. The prohibition was replaced by new restrictions that considered information on Equatorial Guinea *materia reservada* (confidential material) (Fernández 1976).

The mass departure of foreigners in 1969 had a direct impact on the Spanish health care system established in the colony, but not on traditional healers, who continued working. Thanks to the World Health Organisation, the Spanish doctors, nurses, practitioners and pharmacists who left were replaced by Cuban and Chinese doctors (Esteban 2009: 675). Macías had established international relations with communist countries and China, Russia, North Korea and Cuba were the preferred partners, also providing military advisers, fishing boats and public works (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 653). Following this diplomatic effort, it was calculated that in mid-1969 in Equatorial Guinea, there were forty-eight doctors and six hundred and fifteen nurses (VVAA 1969: 102). No mention is made of medical equipment. Pablo,<sup>16</sup> a missionary who moved to Equatorial Guinea in the early 1970s, found the situation of the hospitals in Bata in 1972 to be critical: “there was the odd foreign doctor, but they had nothing. Not even medicine” (Informant: Pablo 2016).

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16 Pablo, over seventy, is a Spanish and missionary. He lived in Bata from October 1972 to June 1973. Interviewed in Madrid in May 2016, where he presently resides.

One of Macías's fixations was to put an end to missionary activity and expel it from the country. As an affirmation of Equatorial Guinean identity, he took the symbolic measure of prohibiting Catholic names. This was very well received by the people, although they at first seemed somewhat disoriented. Josefa, a Bubi woman residing in Spain, explained with some satisfaction: "Macías forced the children of my generation to remove our Catholic names. We had to call each other by our village names. He did not want to hear a single Mary or a single Jesus. And anyone without a name had to invent it! And he was right! He himself gave up the name of Francisco and banned it from being used again" (Informant: Josefa 2019). In one of his political speeches, Macías said:

we forbid ... the church from meddling in matters of state ... We recognise God, but we do not consent to flawed trends like those of the colonial era, when they imposed certain things on us that the Equatorial Guinean people did not want. To get a shotgun or a permanent position they asked us for a moral and religious certificate. That is not Catholic.

PAZ 1969: 115

According to *La Guinea Española*, in the second quarter of 1969 "religion has barely suffered, as Spanish missionaries have not abandoned their posts" (VVAA 1969: 100). Maybe they were right, but the situation was quickly reversed. After all, as Nerín correctly pointed out (2019: 52), the church "had played an important role in ensuring that the Equatorial Guineans did not resist colonisation or Francoism." The Macías presidency thus began to expel missionary orders, beginning with the Claretians. As Sundiata (1990: 130) documents, Macías warned the population at an event in Bata in 1975 that any contact with Catholic missionaries would be severely punishable. In 1978, Macías expelled the last missionaries while proclaiming an "atheist state" (Sundiata 1990: 130).

As the missionaries were in charge of schools, their departure had profound consequences for the school system: "the teachers were replaced by the most outstanding students who were studying for their university entrance" (VVAA 1969: 100) (see Table 43). In June 1969, the Joint Unesco/ILO Mission calculated that 469 teachers were teaching in the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (Ngha Elingui 2014: 361).

In Bata, the schools were running at half-speed (see Table 44).

Teaching was very complicated, as Pablo recalled, "At school ... everything was lacking" (Informant: Pablo 2016). Ndongo (1977: 168) recounted how the missionaries themselves destroyed some centres in response to their expulsion: "in all the schools, the missionaries took rugs, pictures, art figurines, embroidery and all the teaching material that had been paid for by the

TABLE 43 Schooling in primary studies

1971	1974
86,273	102,292

a These figures from the World Bank are high for those difficult years, so they should be regarded with great caution.

SOURCE: WORLD BANK DATA OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA

TABLE 44 Schooling in secondary education in the city of Bata (until June 1969)

Centre	Registered
<i>Instituto Carlos Lwanga</i>	1,254
<i>Escuela Nacional de Magisterio</i>	50
<i>Escuela Laboral "La Salle"</i>	198
<i>Escuela de Maestría Industrial</i>	200
Other schools (4 in Santa Isabel and 1 in Ebebeyín)	2,047
Total	3,738

SOURCE: *LA GUINEA ESPAÑOLA*, IXVI (P. 101).

Equatorial Guinea provincial councils. In some cases they smashed the desks, blackboards, windows and the secretarial documents." So the schools were in a pitiful state for several reasons. Pablo also remembered that the teachers did not even have textbooks: between those taken by the missionaries and those that Macías ordered to be destroyed, there was no bibliographical support. Macías saw all books as subversive. Equatorial Guineans did not dare to read or keep them at home so as not to be accused of treason and be killed: "the only readings available were the Bibles and the New Testaments that were in the hands of the few remaining native religious people." The writer Juan Tomás Ávila Laurel<sup>17</sup> shared these facts, when explaining how he was able to become a writer, despite growing up in a country and a time when intellectuals were

17 Juan Tomás Ávila Laurel is an Equatorial Guinean writer from Annobón. He is in his fifties and lives between Malabo and Barcelona. Interviewed in Malabo and Barcelona since 2010.

killed and books were banned. In the movie *El escritor de un país sin librerías* (*The writer from a country without bookshops*), he recalled that children in Macías's time were not allowed to speak a single word of Annobonese in school.<sup>18</sup> If the teachers heard them doing so, they would be punished by being prevented from going home for lunch. At the end of class, a second punishment would also await them.

Pablo also attested to the Macías regime's pressure on the missionaries who left the schools without teachers, something that had become very visible in 1972:

the large missions of Bata and Malabo were all abandoned, with two Claretians in charge ... The seminaries were only held abroad, because they were prohibited. They were killed. In Bata, only a few black priests remained. There were also two groups of native nuns, the famous Mother Vita, and the Oblates who had the house beneath Enrique Nvo school. They were friends with the president ... And then there was us [three]. That was in the whole country

INFORMANT: PABLO 2016

However, the precarious state of the school system in Equatorial Guinea made Macías reconsider and go back on his anticlericalism. Eventually, a missionary order was established to take charge of Equatorial Guinea's schooling with the aim of making it "more apolitical", (Informant: Pablo 2016) as far as the international arena was concerned. After consulting with Spanish authorities on which order would be most appropriate to further his interests, Macías chose the Salesian mission for establishment in both the island and continental regions, an order that did not depend on the Vatican.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, school in Macías's time was a place of indoctrination where internal politics was concerned: "a platform for *macista* political ceremonies ... Children learned to venerate the party and the leader" (Nerín 2016: 159). Pablo remembered: "They made me start classes with the national anthem sung in Spanish because they spoke Spanish, as it was the only lingua franca. But then we started singing it in Fang, as well as patriotic proclamations about the system, about the PUNT and Macías" (Informant: Pablo 2016). As González Echeagaray (2017: 2) summarised, "the Macías Nguema dictatorship arrived with independence, and produced total deculturation."

18 For details of the documentary, see section 5.6.

19 For example, Father Santiago Martínez Martín spent five years in the Diocesan Seminary of Banapá, on the island of Bioko (1974–1979) (Martínez Martín 2013: 21).

In order to guarantee that some Equatorial Guineans had university training, Macías set up a scholarship system with communist countries (Aixelà-Cabré 2011: 13–22). For example, Samuel,<sup>20</sup> a Fang, studied Medicine in Russia, completing his studies in 1982, once Macías had been overthrown:

Back then Macías was demanding the students back. Despite pressure from the regime, the Russians defended human rights, so they brought us together and told us that they did not intend to repatriate us ... but that they could no longer keep us in the country. Many of us left for other European countries. Those who were closer to the regime returned to Equatorial Guinea ... I was lucky because I was awarded a scholarship in 1969. When the dictatorship broke out, I had already left. When they demanded we return, three years later, I already knew that I did not want to go back in these conditions. All the students ... who studied with me in the former Soviet Union ... were pro-Macías ... which is why they all returned to Equatorial Guinea after their studies ... they felt protected.

INFORMANT: SAMUEL 2012

In 1970, Macías created the United National Workers' Party (PUNT), taking advantage of the structure of the United National Party (PUN), while banning the other political parties on the grounds that he sought a common ideology. The party card was requested to seek employment and educate children (Otabela 2009), just like the moral and religious certificate he so criticised in colonial times. This card had to be carried upon the person and presented if identification was requested. The PUNT youth section was called *Juventudes en Marcha con Macías* (Youth in March with Macías), which coexisted with the Popular Revolutionary Militia, a paramilitary unit made up of 2,000 men trained by Cubans, Soviets and North Koreans (Liniger-Goumaz 1988: 121), in which all ethnic groups were initially represented. Finally, the PUNT had its own *Sección Femenina* of the *Falange Española* de las JONS.

In just one year of dictatorship, terror was unleashed both in Bata and in the rest of Equatorial Guinean territory. The violence was indiscriminate, extending to the accused and immediate and extended family. They were all watching each other for the possible consequences of inappropriate action. Pablo explained that in Bata in 1972 “there was a lot of fear. Macías had got rid of everyone. Everyone from his ethnic group who opposed him was either sent to

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20 Samuel is a Fang born in Eveveyín. He is in his sixties and lives in Cameroon. Interviewed in Yaundé in July 2012.

do forced labour, or was sent out to clear ground, where they could be killed by a rifle butt” (Informant: Pablo 2016). He added that

Macías was hysterical that outsiders were going to colonise him and that insiders were going to mount a coup d'état. I saw constant accusations, envy, aversion to whites ... There were assassinations and political surveillance out of extreme fear ... In Bata, the men struggled to survive – they were trying not to be killed. They were held prisoner, scared, menaced, they didn't trust anyone

INFORMANT: PABLO 2016

Mass killings and executions were undoubtedly some of the hallmarks of the *Macista* regime that was devastating the country (Fegley 1981: 34). *El País* reported some of the atrocities, as recounted by the Minister of Public Health, Pedro Ekong Anderne. He explained that, between 1971 and 1975, he had attended to the beatings and deaths of 157 colleagues, and that ten of the twelve ministers who formed the first cabinet after independence had been executed on the orders of Macías (Goytisoló 1979). Nerín describes a mass execution that took place on the outskirts of Bata in 1972 (2016: 165), as does Ndongo (1977: 210). They sound very similar to others narrated by Fernández (1976), which also took place in Bata:

the prisoners were forced to dig a pit in the mud in to which they were later thrown. They were liquidated by blows from picks and shovels. The citizens present, forced to watch the ceremony, could not show grief for their deaths because they did not want to risk being considered 'counter-revolutionaries' and suffering reprisals.

In June 1974, ninety people were accused of an attempted coup allegedly instigated by the Cruzada de Liberación de Guinea Ecuatorial por Cristo. They were tried at the Okangon cinema in Bata. The defence, led by Iyanga Malango, requested the death penalty for the ministers, those in other positions, artists, workers, farmers and a stewardess. Nine Ndowne and nine Bubi were among them, and twenty-seven were sentenced to death by public execution in Ekuko on the outskirts of Bata (Liniger-Goumaz 1988: 135, Ndongo 1977: 247). Artucio (1979: 41) documented how in the trial, it had been possible to prove that most of the political prisoners “died as a result of beatings and mistreatment during forced labour; others died in prison itself. The victims were beaten to death with machetes, sticks and whips ... A minority were shot at night ... Most of the corpses were buried in the jungle, without informing their relatives.”

Carmina,<sup>21</sup> an enterprising fifty-three year old Fang woman living in London, recalled the effects of that terror on children:

one of the childhood memories that has stayed with me the most is when I saw my father go past in a truck with other men screaming, Long live Macias! They were taking him away. I didn't understand anything ... Years later, when I told my father, he could not believe that I remembered the anecdote. We did not know what was happening but we felt the changes. Luckily ... my father was confined to his hometown. That saved his life because many of those who went to jail did not come out, and there were children who lost both father and mother.

INFORMANT: CARMINA 2009

Certainly, those who were arrested were better off avoiding prison. Bata prison in Macías's time was called the "university" for its ability to "educate" dissidents and put them back on track.

Pablo had dealings with Macías on several occasions, as part of his duties and because he was his son's teacher. The first problem came when he removed the photo of Macías from the classroom at his school, Enrique Nvo, and replaced it with a crucifix: photos of Macías were in all buildings, schools and public institutions and could not be taken down. He was seriously reprimanded but ultimately escaped harsh punishment for being a newcomer. As Pablo recalled, in Bata "there was a cult of Macías" (Informant: Pablo 2016).

Macías was a megalomaniac. In his parades, he liked Equatorial Guineans to wear clothes featuring his image (Nerín 2016: 162), a habit that ended up becoming mandatory and continued with the Obiang regime. Pablo recalled that Macías was rude to deal with: "with Macías nothing was discussed, you received orders. That was Macías. He wasn't one for diplomatic relations or conversation" (Informant: Pablo 2016). Pablo said that Macías was obsessed with coups: "Macías had the psychosis of the coup d'état inside him, and he didn't trust anyone ... When this man got worse ... the *Juventudes de Macías* (Youths of Macías) arrived" (Informant: Pablo 2016).

Among the experiences Pablo never forgot from his year and a half in Bata was when the soldiers guarding the Presidential Palace were on the point of killing him, thinking that he was going to try and kill the president on one of his visits to Macías's residence. And when a gruff, very serious Macías, whom Pablo had not yet met, called for him in a very loud voice, a deep silence by

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21 Carmina is a Fang born in Malabo. Interviewed for the first time in London in October 2009.

those present followed. That was when he arrived at a banquet on October twelfth, 1972 for a meeting held in a hangar in a forest near Bata. The banquet took place at a u-shaped table, chaired by Macías, with Chinese, Russian and Cuban diners, the Spanish consul, some Equatorial Guineans and the city's only two remaining missionaries. Pablo was very distressed and scared but he saw that "some of the diners, grouped by nationality, were laughing and very drunk" (Informant: Pablo 2016). But perhaps Pablo's most shocking experience, which very clearly reflects the paranoia and indiscriminate violence in the country, was the occasion of his first visit to the hospital in Bata: "On arrival, there was a man on the ground in a pool of coagulated blood, but the *boy* would not let me touch him because he did not know if he had been thrown out of the window. He said, don't do anything, don't ask, it may be misinterpreted" (Informant: Pablo 2016).

As Ndongo (1977: 220) pointed out, "nobody could ask the whereabouts of a relative or neighbour: 'if you don't see him in two or three days, you can be sure that he is dead and don't ask any more' ... The government and the party oblige the relatives themselves to organise dances ... They have no right to cry for their relative." Ndongo (1977: 211) also explained the indiscriminate violence:

the majority of those who had studied in Spain, and who had returned after independence out of pure patriotism, are no longer around to tell the tale. The example of Manuel Elá Nkogo, an assistant health technician, who was beaten to death along with his brother in the Bar Central in the centre of Bata, suffices as a comment on the situation in the country.

But the Macías who reached the presidency sought not only to spread fear, he also wanted to prevail and pass into posterity. One of his first priorities was to build the port of Bata. He sought to give a centrality to the city that, previously, only Santa Isabel had been able to enjoy. One of the first investments his government made was to award the works for the new port of Bata, which was approved with the agreement of ministers on March seventeenth, 1969 (Martínez 1969: 12–13). Bata was important to Macías and he hoped to achieve great popularity with this work. That same month, the study about the city's water supply was approved (Martínez 1969: 13), which was meant to improve its access and distribution. Macías also planned different emblematic buildings in Bata, which Battian people today remember as his work. As Javier<sup>22</sup> and José,<sup>23</sup> two Fangs of over forty years old, recalled, "...among others, the

22 Javier is Fang. He lived in Bata but now lives in Spain. Interviewed in Spain in July 2019.

23 José, a Fang of over forty, was born and lives in Bata. Interviewed in Spain in July 2019.

port. It would be followed by the Nkuku Bridge, the Presidential Palace or Palace of Africa,<sup>24</sup> the National Bank or Central Bank of Bata and Bata Radio” (Informants: Javier and José 2019).

All these works relied on credit granted by France and were carried out by the French Society of Dredging and Construction – proof of the influence France sought to establish with Equatorial Guinea in a geographical area that had previously been under its control (Fegley 1981: 41). The 450 million pesetas Spain gave in 1969 after signing an agreement in Bata ended up diluted by French aid (Ngah Elingui 2014: 379). In exchange, in 1972 France obtained the largest logging concession so far granted, for which it also provided a helicopter for territorial surveillance, a mechanic and a pilot (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 648). Even the European Commission financed fuel depots in Bata in 1976 (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 648), although France was the only European country with a permanent embassy in Malabo (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 648). China built the power plant that supplied Bata with electricity from 1979 onwards (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 670). All these works would not have been possible without international complicity and participation, which was silent on Macías’s crimes while cushioning the deep economic crisis affecting the country.

At almost the same time as planning investments and constructing emblematic buildings, Macías was cutting people’s rights. On March eleventh, 1969, a ministerial order was approved that revealed a restrictive dictatorial regime with freedom of movement: “on March eleventh, an order of the Ministry of the Interior is published that regulates road traffic on intercity roads when used by the Hon. President ... On urban roads, road traffic will be temporarily suspended” (Martínez 1969: 14). This measure remained unchanged during the Obiang regime, and its violation led to the abuse, beating and arrest of citizens who failed to comply. Certainly, clogging up urban roads (and national highways) for hours – often on a weekly basis – was a very effective way to remind the population that their rights ended where those of their president began: their ability to move was a freedom that was subject to presidential privilege.

From that time on, the Equatorial Guinean population got used to oil drums on the road and roadblocks guarded by soldiers with rifles stopping anyone seeking to pass, emulating Spanish controls in colonial times. At the checkpoints, documentation and permits to circulate in that area were checked. If you did not have permission to move, you were arrested and abuses of

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24 In 1994 the basements of Bata’s Presidential Palace were used to imprison opponents while the second PDGE Congress was being held (Liniger 1996: 687).

authority could easily occur, especially if the soldiers were grumpy and drunk, and hoping to get some extra money to compensate for their low pay. Abuse was the general rule at the barriers, while some travellers were even murdered for the most senseless reasons.

This mandatory cessation of all activity due to presidential privilege extended to working and daily life. Whenever Macías decided to pay a visit, everything was stopped for hours beforehand, because the population had to be prepared and he must not be made to wait. For example, Pablo recalled how school life in Bata was frozen, as it was in the workplace: the president had to be welcomed on a journey because he expected to see citizens lining both sides of the street, in his path, welcoming him: “from time to time, Macías was seen and had to be received. But if he came at 1:00 pm we had to go with the students of the school at 8:30 am. There was a lot of fear” (Informant: Pablo 2016).

In line with this overprotection of the president, the prohibition of pedestrians walking on the pavement in front of the Malabo presidential palace was also approved in March 1969, an order that was extended to Bata. The obligation of all citizens to deposit all kinds of weapons at the Bata Inspectorate was also approved (Martínez 1969: 15). Macías wanted to have the people under control and to neutralise any intention to carry out a coup d'état. The city was locked down. Pablo recalled that “in Bata, only the cathedral, the chapel and the teaching functioned, and occasionally a radio station” (Informant: Pablo 2016).

In 1974, popular disinformation was total. There was no written press and the news was broadcast only by Radio Bata, which was not continuous due to the frequent power cuts and the problems with the power generators that backed up the system. (Artucio 1979: 18). Pablo remembered the poverty in Bata:

In Bata, the population asked for nothing, they just hung on. The people from there, nobody moved, nobody asked me to process a visa because they would have been killed. If they had asked, it would have been like betraying the system. They were all silent ... In Bata only the four Claretians remained, a businesswoman from Madrid and no one else. Everything had been abandoned for independence: cacao, wood, everything. The country was unable to rise up.

INFORMANT: PABLO 2016

For Pablo, like others, Spanish colonisation had been exploitative, bringing specialised labour from the metropole. As he recalled, “we settlers did not build factories there, we did not teach them how to collect the raw material, transform it and develop it. We only brought ... national products” (Informant: Pablo 2016).

One of the most interesting elements of the historical analysis of Bata is undoubtedly the Fang ethnic supremacism of the Macías presidency, which was of course denied. It seems to have been cloaked in the alleged interest in promoting Equatorial Guinean nationalism without ethnic distinctions. Macías's political activity hid a covert Fangisation. This was clear from his habit of making speeches only in the Fang language. The lack of sociopolitical cohesion in a country where no political party held a majority across the whole territory (Nerín 2016: 150) seems to have concerned him. It was a complex subject.

Ethnic and territorial tensions had already emerged during the Constitutional Conference held behind closed doors in Madrid on October thirtieth, 1967. At the meeting, Bubis like Marcos Ropo had asked that Fernando Po be separated from *Río Muni* after colonial independence “for historical, ethnic and linguistic reasons.” Macías took a stance on these demands:

I find no argument for the total political separation of Fernando Po and *Río Muni*. If Spain granted the separation of the territories of Fernando Po and *Río Muni*, Spain would lose its prestige worldwide ... What will Spain benefit from dividing a territory of a quarter of a million inhabitants? This is driven by Spanish economic sectors, not peninsular Spaniards, Mr President ... I never want to mix peninsular Spain and colonial Spain.

OBIANG BIKO 2016: 190

Macías added, “by this I mean that separation is a myth for Equatorial Guinea and a discredit before the international world for Spain ... I consider this constitutional panel to be internationally unlawful” (Obiang Biko 2016: 190–191). Macías concluded that in his capacity as vice-president “I ask for the total independence of Equatorial Guinea – I am not speaking on behalf of Fernando Po or the *Río Muni*; *I am not a racist!*” he concluded (Obiang Biko 2016: 193).<sup>25</sup> Obiang Biko also criticised the Spanish colonial handling of the issue of ethnic minorities (2016: 117), considering it as a way to guarantee their presence in the country after independence:

The idea of administrative separation of the two provinces was aimed at the establishment of a Machiavellian policy to set Fernando Po's Bubis against the Fang and other Ndowe ethnic minority groups in *Río Muni*; this would give the green light to the large foreign European landowners,

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25 The italics are mine.

owners of the island's cacao farms, to continue dominating economically in perpetuity.

The truth is that the Franco government placed great importance on the ethnic issue in the design of Spanish Guinea's independence; Macías therefore perceived ethnicity as a hindrance to Equatorial Guinean independence. The visibility granted to Equatorial Guinean minorities was due, on the one hand, to the centrality of the island of Fernando Po to the Spanish, where the largest groups were actually in the minority in the country as a whole. On the other hand, Franco also ended up transferring the regionalist ethnic diversity policies of the metropole to the colony. But while in Spain talk of Basque, Catalan and Galician "regionalism" was meant to dilute their historical specificities and empty them of political content, in Equatorial Guinea sociopolitical representation quotas were promoted in recognition of the country's ethnic diversity.

In reality, the problem for many Fangs was that Fernando Po's centrality meant that the population percentages of the different ethnic groups were not properly weighted when designing the diversity policies and their influence on the structure of independence. The ethnic mosaic reflected neither majorities nor minorities. The Fang were the country's majority group coexisting, on the continent, with Ndowne and Bissio, while the Bubi coexisted on the island of Bioko with the Fernandinos and Annobonese. This was not taken into account. To Fang eyes, the ethnic puzzle laid out by Franco on the road to independence distorted the proportions of ethnic representation. So when the new state was proclaimed, many Fangs, like Macías, sought to weaken and dilute the issue of ethnicity in order to pre-empt requests for the independence of Bioko Island, and buy time to reverse the relative institutional and demographic political representativeness of the Fang in Bioko and other areas of the country.

These circumstances explain why, after his coup d'état, Macías promoted an Equatorial Guinean nationalism based on a relatively un-explicit pro-Fangism, while making Bata "the cradle of the revolution" (Nerín 2016: 152) and always attempting to maintain the representativeness of all ethnic groups in the military. García Domínguez (1977: 228) recounts a speech by Macías's Minister of Education in which he spoke with great clarity: "if as I leave here I ask one of you who you are, and you reply that you are a Bubi, Fang or Fernandino, I will give you a slap that will be heard from Bata. How must you answer if I ask you? – Equatorial Guinean! all the children shouted in unison" (Nghah Elingui 2014: 361).

Meanwhile, Macías's ritual practices and activity pointed to the Fangisation of the territory and the institutions. Liniger-Goumaz (1996: 652) describes how

Macías picked on Fernando Po's Bubi minority, although his phobia of minorities was generalised. Juan Tomás Ávila Laurel also describes the Annobonese fear of Macías: "being Annobonese, or of a non-Fang ethnic group, meant you were suspected of treason" (Informant: Juan Tomás 2018). Pablo also recalled, "in Santa Isabel, there was danger. [The black missionaries] were confined to the mission because they were Bubis. The atmosphere was bad" (Informant: Pablo 2016). In fact, Cusack (1999b: 207) went as far as to argue that Macías's abuse of the entire population meant that at the core of Equatorial Guinean identity was the unitary reaction to terror. This might have been the case, except that minority groups perceived their exclusion from the socio-political spheres of influence for ethnic reasons.

So in this general context, Macías's Bata embodied the pressure brought by the Fang expansion to the continental coast, with a clear intention to appropriate, territorially and symbolically, the country's "second capital." This Fang symbolism was primarily in Bata, because the capital, Malabo, lay on an island with a Bubi majority until the Fang migration, particularly after the oil boom. During the Macías dictatorship Fang ethnicity was thus strengthened in both capitals, with Bata as a political stronghold.

In the Bata of those times, Fang Equatorial Guineans coexisted with Ndowes, Bissio, Annobonese and Bubis, as well as with Africans from other countries such as Benin, Senegal and Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta) (Liniger-Goumaz (1988: 127). The latter were contracted to build the port of Bata. But there were also Chinese, Cubans, North Koreans and Russians living there who had moved due to the cooperation between their countries. As Pablo recalled, "Spaniards and Europeans of other nationalities were residual" (Informant: Pablo 2016).

During his presidency, Macías often toured Equatorial Guinean territory, but the first half of his mandate was mainly spent in Bata. His trips to Malabo stopped abruptly in 1975, although they continued to Bata, albeit infrequent. As Artucio (1979: 17) explained, "From his home and sometimes from Bata – since he had not come to the capital for five years – he administered the state's funds." His dread of being assassinated or deposed in a coup d'état led him to withdraw first to Mongomo, and later to his native town, Nzangayong, from where he controlled the country, with sporadic trips to Bata, which was considered the continental capital (Nerín 2016: 157).

As we shall see, his groundwork, to make Bata the continent's iconic Fang city was perpetuated by Obiang, and only began to be reversed after the construction investments in Mongomo and especially Djibloho that started in the 2010s. In 1976, as Nerín recounts (2016: 165), "there were no longer any opponents of Macías in Equatorial Guinea, but the unstoppable violence continued." The arbitrariness and unpredictability of the entire system plunged

the regime into self-destruction (Sundiata 1990) and when Macías Nguema Biyogo's closest collaborators – members of his family circle – began to fear for their survival (Owono-Okomo 2014: 176), his nephew, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, carried out a coup d'état. Messié was sentenced to death alongside several members of his government and executed on August third, 1979 in what became known as the *Golpe de Libertad* (Freedom Coup). Like Equatorial Guinea itself, the city of Bata was devastated by the violence and torture of the Macías regime.

### 1.2 *Obiang Nguema (1979–): From ayong and muadjang to etunga-bot of Wele-Nzas (or How to Shift from Ethnic to Family Community)*

While Macías launched a covert Fangisation process that was suspicious of ethnic minority groups, Obiang's four decades have been openly pro-Fang. On the one hand, membership of the Fang community has become a key element for ensuring integration into the system, and Fang distinguishing features are used as the basis of social cohesion. On the other hand, Bata was promoted as the Fang capital that informally governed the country, by which Fang identity began to overlap with national identity (Aixelà-Cabré 2012). This political map was turned upside down in 2012, when it was revealed that the city of Djibloho was being built in the province of Wele-Nzas. In 2017, Djibloho was requalified as a province of the continental territory: with this action Obiang was altering the political and administrative weight of the two most important cities in the country, Bata and Malabo, while clearly empowering some of his clan.

Throughout almost the whole Obiang presidency, with its self-proclaimed *Golpe de Libertad*, he has prioritised the *ayong* or united community under a common ancestor (Fang)<sup>26</sup> and *muadjang* or brotherhood (Fang), over other forms of establishing power. Both *ayong* and *muadjang* are formulas that protect ethnic unity, Fang identification and the extension of their clientele, as Eyama Nchama (2014) analyses extensively. However, in the latter years of the Obiang dictatorship, the *etunga-bot* or family group has taken greater precedence: the dictator's circle of trust has become increasingly smaller and a new province with its capital in Djibloho has been established that is independent from the extensive Wele-Nzas province.

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26 Eyama Nchama (2014) has done highly interesting work on *ayong* and *muadjang* and *etunga-bot*, as well as many other concepts in Fang society, providing detailed analysis of the Fang worldview in the search for human rights from a Fang cultural perspective. Buale (1989: 17–19) also offers a brief but clear description of the meaning of *ayong*, *muadjang* (brother), and *etunga-bot*.

So while Bata retained its importance as a (notably Fang) socio-economic “capital” and second political centre throughout Macías and much of Obiang’s regimes, a triple tension has emerged in recent years: Bata is the unofficial capital, and indubitably recognised as such by the majority of the population; Malabo (the actual capital) has been marginalised; and Djibloho is the emerging capital. Djibloho receiving its own province, separate from Wele-Nzas, has further reduced the previously unquestioned centrality of the Fang and their elite symbolically, located in the city of Mongomo (capital of Wele-Nzas) and, in a Bata that integrates all Fang groups.

Obiang’s actions thus promote division among the Fang, not cohesion. By excluding minority ethnic groups, Obiang reminds the Fang that while everyone is Fang, there are great differences between them. But what is above all relevant in these circumstances, alongside the regime’s hegemonic discourse on being Fang is that it conceals the fact that a large contingent of Fang society is just as much abused by the regime as the rest of the population, that Fang cultural values are respectful of diversity (Eyama Nchama 2014: 77–80), and that the large Fang opposition has been fighting for decades to eradicate the dictatorship in Equatorial Guinea in order to build a country based on cultural diversity, and not on Fang centrality.

In what follows, I will develop some of these arguments, as well as the most significant elements of Obiang’s presidency for the evolution of the city of Bata.

Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (born June fifth, 1942 Akoakam-Esangui, Mongomo) is the President of Equatorial Guinea and the longest serving dictator in Africa. He has spent years preparing the succession, which is close at hand due to his advanced age. The perpetuation of the dictatorial system is ensured through his son, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, popularly known as Teodorín.

Obiang led the military uprising of August third, 1979 and the subsequent summary trial of Macías at the Marfil cinema in Malabo, for which the latter was convicted and shot on September twenty-ninth. Moroccan troops from his personal escort acted as the executioners (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 647), given the fear Equatorial Guinean soldiers had of Macías’s magical powers (Sundiata 1990: 129). The same month, Obiang decreed a general amnesty to release all political prisoners and allow all exiles to return. He sought to turn the page on the Macías regime and played down his own past as a hardcore Macías supporter, but he did not erase it. In all likelihood he saw an advantage in being able to continue to spread fear among the people.

Confirmation of this came during the parade for the fortieth anniversary of the *Golpe de Libertad* in Djibloho in 2019, where he received the First

Class Military Medal “for his participation on the historic date of August third, 1969.”<sup>27</sup>

Because Obiang was indeed at the heart of the Macías regime:

In 1969 he was named Lieutenant of the National Guard; in 1970 he was appointed Director General of Planning and Procurement for the Ministry of National Defence; in 1971 he was appointed army Captain; in 1975 he was appointed Commander; in 1976 he was appointed Secretary General of the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces and in 1979 he was appointed Vice-Minister of the People's Armed Forces.

NVÉ OYANA and JIMÉNEZ 2018: 158

As Liniger-Goumaz (1988: 136) recalled, after being made president, Obiang continued the Macías-era practice of arresting senior government officials each year, doing so in 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1987, with any deaths classified as suicides.

Despite Obiang's similarities to Macías, Spain gave massive aid, totalling \$45 million to be spent between 1979 and 1983 (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 670), as well as military cooperation in the training of officers and troops in Bata and Malabo (Laguna et al. 2007b: 45), or and three hundred aid workers, including doctors, functionaries, and religious and civilian aid workers in January 1980 (Laguna et al. 2007c: 65). Major visits were also made, such as that of Spanish king and queen in December 1979 or President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo in December 1981, which we will analyse in the next section. To commemorate the fortieth anniversary in 2019, Obiang declared that his “brave action” had changed the country's course. Referring to the Macías regime, he said, “the people had been kidnapped and the concepts of tolerance and dialogue did not exist; there was only persecution and violence.”<sup>28</sup> But, despite these words, the Obiang regime has been condemned for torture, kidnapping, abuse and assassination by organisations such as the United Nations and Amnesty International since 1976, thanks to the work of the Alianza Nacional para la Restauración Democrática (ANRD) carried out from Switzerland (Fegley

27 For further information of the Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial, see <http://www.pdge-guineaecuatorial.com/miles-de-militares-participan-en-el-gran-desfile-conmemorativo-del-400-aniversario-del-golpe-de-libertad/>. Accessed November 2021.

28 To read his discourse, see the Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial website, available at: <http://www.pdge-guineaecuatorial.com/miles-de-militares-participan-en-el-gran-desfile-conmemorativo-del-400-aniversario-del-golpe-de-libertad/>. Accessed November 2021.

1981: 40). EG Justice and Human Rights Watch have also been working on this over the past five years, and compiling information in their annual summaries. Censorship, restrictions on movement and a lack of freedom of association and expression that were characteristic of Macías (Fegley 1981: 38) have continued in the Obiang regime. Exile therefore becomes the only solution for a population persecuted for dissent (Aixelà-Cabré 2011). In fact, the Akonibe Charter of 1982 approved by Obiang was a fundamental law that aimed to prohibit multipartyism (Owono-Okomo 2014: 65), and whose effect would be reversed years later.

Pedro,<sup>29</sup> who is Ndowe and more specifically Benga from Punta Mbonda, explained his family's exile abroad and the difficulties he had contacting them for decades:

My father left in the early 1980s, between 1980 and 1981, I think, after the *Golpe de Libertad*, forced him into exile. My aunt and brother also went to France and took the children of the older brother who stayed in Equatorial Guinea, probably out of fear that something would happen to them. At least that's what I think! As my aunt and my older brother's children left for France from Gabon and not Equatorial Guinea, we wrote to the French ministry for information about them, but we heard nothing at all. They didn't answer us, and there seemed to be no way to get in touch with them. For a few years I stopped searching although in my mind I never forgot the importance of finding them ... And yes, it took me 30 years to find the children of the first-born but, finally, I did it, pulling strings, talking to relatives ... It was very important for me to find them, especially after my older brother's death thirty years ago, and that of my aunt. It's like now I can be at peace.

INFORMANT: PEDRO 2009

As González Echegaray (2017: 2) has written, "Macías... was replaced by his nephew Obiang Nguema ... This change raised hopes among the exiles, many of whom returned to Equatorial Guinea and some of whom even participated in the new government. Later, these hopes were frustrated and a second exile began."

Obiang created the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) in 1987, a replica of Macías's PUNT (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 665). He used it to rule a

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29 Pedro is Ndowe, Benga from Punta Mbonda. He is in his sixties and lives in Bata. Interviewed in Bata in 2009.

single-party system until he approved a multi-party system in 1991 – or at least the semblance of a multi-party system forged from PDGE, satellite parties and leaders friendly to himself. The opposition was very precarious. At first it was led by a coalition, the *Plataforma de Oposición Conjunta* (POC), spearheaded by Plácido Mikó, and whose importance Balboa (1998) spoke of. It was later replaced by the *Convergencia Popular y Democrática Socialista* (CPDS), a party heavily influenced by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) that Andrés Esono Ondo has led since Mikó's leadership ended. Multiple political parties opposing Obiang have emerged in exile, such as the Movement for the Self-Determination of Bioko Island (MAIB) and the Government in Exile of Severo Moto.

The PDGE is controlled by the Esangui clan from Mongomo and dominates the state's political power structures (Liniger-Goumaz and Seibert 2008).<sup>30</sup> Obiang has easily won every election in the past forty years amid accusations of fraud and police pressure on election days. Under the PDGE, a client-centric network has been extended that continues to be ruled by the Macista *Hermanos Militantes* (Militant Brothers), who demand party membership be provided to obtain certain posts, political and otherwise. Other groups include the PDGE's *Jóvenes Antorcha*,<sup>31</sup> and satellite organisations such as the *Movimiento de Amigos de Obiang* (Movement of Friends of Obiang or MAO), whose known members include the former Spanish socialist minister, Miguel Ángel Moratinos. In fact, the close interests of other Spanish politicians like Bono and Duran i Lleida, of businessmen like Juan Roig, and of relatives of the Spanish royal family is one of the most likely reasons for the Spanish state's complicit silence with regard to the excesses of the leadership in its former colony (X. Montanyà 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017f, 2017g, 2017h, published in the newspaper *Vilaweb*). Spain appears to exert no pressure at all on the Obiang regime to take a democratic route. The cold reaction of the socialist government when Juan Tomás Ávila Laurel began a hunger strike in February 2011 to protest the courtesy visit to Equatorial Guinea by various high-ranking Spanish state officials from the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), the People's Party (PP) and Convergence and Unity (CiU) was another clear example of this. Ávila Laurel's act of denunciation of "a dictatorship that was eating its own soul" (Informant: Juan Tomás 2011) remains the most forceful

30 For example, after the 2006 elections, eleven of the fifty-eight members of his government were relatives. For more information see Liniger-Goumaz and Seibert (2008).

31 On the changes in the appointments of its leaders, see the website of Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial at: <http://www.pdge-guineaequatorial.com/reestructuracion-de-la-organizacion-jovenes-antorcha/>. Accessed November 2021.

expression a citizen has made against the regime, a sign of the influence of the “springs” in Libya, Egypt, Spain and Tunisia.

The above-mentioned variables in the total hegemony Obiang’s party, the PDGE, has been showing, were studied by the World Bank Group, which ended up summarising, in its April 2019 report, that “the absence of real checks and balances grants his political party, the *Partido democratico de Guinea Ecuatorial* (PDGE), [to give Obiang] absolute executive power,” especially after the modification of the Constitution of Equatorial Guinea, and after the referendum of November 2011. Furthermore, the World Bank Group added that despite the dominance of the PDGE, “legalized opposition parties continue to voice their discontent over the country’s governance.”<sup>32</sup> An example of this was evident in the next elections, the 1995 municipal elections, which, like all of those held, took place in a climate of persecution and harassment of political leaders and the population, with arrests and even three deaths of citizens who did not want to vote for the PDGE (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 658). As Cabana (1995: 33) stated, the concentration of the three powers – legislative, executive and judicial – in the hands of Obiang, has led to impunity and the absence of legal guarantees, favouring widespread corruption. Williams (2011: 620) has classified Equatorial Guinea as a petro-state.

On religious matters, Obiang distanced himself from Macías’s anticlericalism. As proof of his good relations with the church, he received Pope John Paul II in Bata and Malabo on February twelfth, 1982. María Jesús<sup>33</sup> said, “in his search for legitimacy, he began alliances with a Church that had been reviled by Macías and that he himself decided to resurrect” (Informant: María Jesús 2011). In fact, even the services make the support clear. In his documentary *El escritor de un país sin librerías*, Serena shows a Spanish priest officiating a mass in 2018 which vehemently affirmed that “the population has to take care of all its political representatives because the most important thing is to live in *tranquility and peace*.”<sup>34</sup>

But Obiang’s favouring of Catholicism has never distanced him from traditional religions, perhaps because, as Sundiata (1990: 130) points out, they have a great capacity to “affirm their collective identity.” In fact, characters such as Father Rafael Nzue Abuy would have seen “traditional morality and theology as essentially consistent with Catholicism” (Sundiata 1990: 131). It should be said that many voices tell stories of Obiang and other members of his family

32 World Bank Group Report, available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/equatorial-guinea/overview>. Accessed November 2021.

33 María Jesús is Fang. She is in her thirties and lives in Bata. Interviewed in Bata in July 2011.

34 The italics are mine.

performing black magic, including the anthropophagy of their enemies' vital organs. In her fieldwork in Malabo, Caballero (2015: 80–81) recovered some of the stories circulating about witchcraft in Bata, and concluded that in Equatorial Guinea “it is known that ‘those from Mongomo,’” the native district of the Nguema, “use a lot of black magic and witchcraft”, and that cases of mutilation of corpses or missing body parts are common. She added that “the city of Bata is considered ‘dangerous territory’ when it comes to human sacrifice” (Caballero 2015: 80–81).

The country changed significantly with the discovery of oil in the mid-1990s, creating a powerful business hub that developed the city of Bata (Frynes 2004).<sup>35</sup> Equatorial Guinea became one of Africa's leading producers, with per capita income skyrocketing to become one of the continent's highest (\$37,800 in 2017 according to the World Bank). By then, Obiang had shifted from Russian to American support in the early 1980s. He also confirmed the importance of France over Spain by joining the French CFA franc zone in 1982 (Liniger-Goumaz 1996: 654–5), after the 1969 Equatorial Guinean peseta had failed (Nghah Elingui 2014: 379). PUNT announced in 1972 that the currency would be renamed *Ekwele* in honour of the country's primitive (Fang) one, (Ndongo 1977: 234, 609), with the change becoming effective in 1975 (Nghah Elingui 2014: 609).

But while Obiang's dictatorship has been less terrifying than that of Macías, it is because the *Macista* regime carried out indiscriminate violence against the people, spreading it to relatives, neighbours and towns. That was Macías's legacy. Obiang's regime has preferred to focus the violence on the suspects, and less on those around them, even though torture, abuse, disappearances and illegal arrests have continued along with summary judgments. As Cusack (1999a: 30) concluded, “the present regime of Obiang Nguema commemorates each year the overthrow of Macías, so assisting in the stimulation of collective memories of the terror.”

Since oil was discovered, Obiang's main objective has been to enrich himself and his family at the expense of the state's natural resources, which has led it to be called a kleptocratic dictatorial system.<sup>36</sup> As the American

35 According to United Nations sources, there was a dramatic increase in exports from Equatorial Guinea after 1995. Data is available on the Equatorial Guinea website: <https://www.guineaecuatorialpress.com/>. Accessed November 2021.

36 As US CIA stated in 2018, “Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent

ambassador John E. Bennet explained that in the 1990s, “arbitrary arrests, torture, summary trials, rape, robbery, waste, institutionalised drug trafficking, etc., are ... the modus vivendi of civil and military officials of the Nguemista state” (Liniger 1996: 665). Equatorial Guinea is considered one of the world’s most corrupt countries (Klitgaard 1990; Liniger-Goumaz and Seibert 2008). Obiang put an end to the brutal Macías regime, it is true, but he took advantage of the legacy of terror to continue with socio-political repression, while enriching himself with oil and spreading corruption throughout the social fabric.

As we saw in the introduction to this section, the city of Bata did not undergo major growth until 2000 when its population was 230,282, which rose to 309,345 by 2018<sup>37</sup> (according to the *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial*). While CIA data reduced this figure significantly to 240,000 inhabitants in 2019, nevertheless it is clear that Bata’s true growth followed the discovery of oil. This population growth reflected Equatorial Guinean immigration. While predominantly Fang, Ndowe and Bissio also moved within the continental region. Bubis and, to a lesser extent, Annobonese<sup>38</sup> came from the island, and African and especially Asian, European and Latin American foreigners arrived in response to the demand for skilled labour. As José pointed out,

before [in the 1950s], the city had an administrative establishment, and people left to seek life improvements ... There were companies, schools, hospitals. But then the growth of Bata was relative, because they preferred that people stayed in villages. It was the chance to study that attracted the population of the districts, but also job opportunities. The city really grew in the mid-1990s and, especially from the year 2000. And not only with local people, but foreigners too.

INFORMANT: JOSÉ 2019

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on skilled foreign workers.” Information available at: <https://www.cia.gov/>. Accessed November 2021.

37 *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial* 2018, p.19. It must be emphasised that the Equatorial Guinean government’s statistics are unreliable because their data is intended to legitimise the Guinean dictatorship, and to soften and conceal unjust policies and corruption. Hence, in this book they will be taken as a simple guide and contrasted with other sources whenever possible. On the other hand, the aforementioned *Anuario Estadístico* has received support and advice from the World Bank, as stated in its report on Equatorial Guinea. More information available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/equatoria/guinea/overview#3>. Accessed November 2021.

38 For Annobonese people in Bata, see Hagemeyer y Zamora (2016: 202).

In Bata, as in Malabo, various ethnic groups and nationalities cluster together in neighbourhoods, they say, to guarantee their safety.<sup>39</sup> Some frictions have even emerged between Equatorial Guineans and foreigners. For example, some Equatorial Guineans have complained that the Chinese only consume and shop in Chinese establishments, which seems unfair to them. Compared to Western nationalities, Esteban (2009: 684) has shown that the Chinese do not integrate better even when they endure worse living conditions.

However, Bata lacks basic resources of various types that its large population needs. The CIA estimated that for 2018 “continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence.”<sup>40</sup> This is because Obiang has not reinvested oil revenues. Some infrastructure and roads receive sham investment, while the majority of the population remain in a very precarious situation, with hospitals and schools that require urgent supplies and investment, and with significant issues with access to basic resources such as water, electricity and transportation in various areas.

At territorial level, Bata’s spectacular growth since the 2000s to the present day has expanded and engulfed surrounding areas. According to Campos and Sant (2011: 86), “in Bata, the traditional neighbourhoods Ikunde, Komandachina, Ukomba, Mbandang, Lea, Moganda and Ngolo have seen their population density increase exponentially, while others such as Ncolombong, Biyendem or Bikuy have spread enormously.” The expansion has been such that today Bata’s main neighbourhoods are: Ngolo, Bomudi, San Pedro de Lía, Komandachina, Bikuy, Moganda, Ecobenam, Ukomba, Utonde, Iyubu, Mbangán, Ekuku, Nkolombong, La Paz, Asonga, Ntobo, Ikunde, Covadonga and Acacio Mañé. As the neighbourhoods grew, so did the markets, such as Mercado Grande, Bikuy, Mondoasi and Ikunde, which had foreign products. These were predominantly from China,<sup>41</sup> but also from Cameroon, as explained by the agronomist Juan Javier,<sup>42</sup> a Fang man of over sixty years old. For this Equatorial Guinean, the transportation problem was a key issue in a country without public services:

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39 This question is argued in Aixelà-Cabré, Yolanda. “To Be an African City under an Oil Dictatorship: Conflictual Intersections seen from Ethnicity and Race in Malabo and Bioko Island (Equatorial Guinea)”, (in press).

40 For more information, see. <https://www.cia.gov> Accessed November 2021.

41 For more information on Chinese cooperation in Equatorial Guinea, see Esteban (2009).

42 Juan Javier, over sixty-five, is Fang. He lives in Malabo but spent many years in Bata. Interviewed in Malabo in December 2010.

We have no production of our own! It's the same with horticulture and other agricultural products ... the growers of malanga, cassava, tomato and carrots do not have the labour or transportation to ensure that their products reach the cities. As towns do not have the means to transport merchandise, they depend on the price imposed by the driver, which can vary from day to day, as he routinely abuses the system. As there is no guaranteed daily transport from the towns to the city, they cannot be sure that they will be able to transport the products!.

INFORMANT: JUAN JAVIER 2010

On the other hand, on the subject of housing, it should be said that numerous irregularities have been detected in Bata. As Campos and Sant (2011: 87) point out, social housing ended up in the hands of senior civil and military officials: "in the last three years, the government has built sumptuous homes ... in Bata's new 'Noville' (Nguema Obiang Ville) neighbourhood with the budget earmarked for social housing ... These homes have been awarded to senior officials of the civil administration and the state military (ministers, secretaries of state, generals, colonels, etc.)."<sup>43</sup> Other serious irregularities detected include evictions in Bata for road-building, as denounced by Amnesty International and recounted by Asodegue on numerous occasions.<sup>44</sup> The city's exponential growth has been at the cost of expropriations, just as it has in Malabo. As Campos (2011: 40) explained, "The real estate needs of the transnational companies established in Malabo and Bata are covered by the purchase or lease of land owned by the president or his relatives; often after the expropriation or expulsion of its previous owners." Oyono Nvé (2015: 63) ended up defining Bata as "the city of concentration of real power, nepotism, the centre of misappropriation", encouraged by "Obiang's older brother, Armengol, and his son Teodorín."

The health system, is too precarious to serve the population as well. In Bata there is only one hospital (the *Hospital de la Paz*, inaugurated in 2007, where

43 CPDS Report on Human Rights 2006, available at <http://www.cpdsg.org/>. See also "Las viviendas sociales de Obiang", Asodegue, November sixth, 2006, available at <http://www.asodegue.org/octubre0606.htm>. Both documents are cited by Campos and Sant (2011: 87).

44 Some relevant news items are: "Guinea Ecuatorial: 300 familias desalojadas y sin techo", Doc. AFR 24/006/2006, August twenty-third, 2006, [https://www.es.amnesty.org/en-que-estamos/noticias/noticia/articulo/300-familias-desalojadas-y-sin-techo/?\\_ga=2.229511196.1070686351.1636108711-1655881185.1636108710](https://www.es.amnesty.org/en-que-estamos/noticias/noticia/articulo/300-familias-desalojadas-y-sin-techo/?_ga=2.229511196.1070686351.1636108711-1655881185.1636108710); and "Guinea Ecuatorial. La nueva riqueza expulsa a la gente de sus hogares", Doc. AFR 24/007/2009, October fourth, 2009, <http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/info/AFR24/007/2009/es>. Both are cited by Campos (2011).

with few exceptions payment is required for treatment), four health centres, and various private clinics and doctor's surgeries, mostly Chinese.<sup>45</sup> For example, Juan Javier explained an experience in 2010 – when the Hospital de la Paz was already open: “I was in Bata a couple of weeks ago because I wanted to take the opportunity to speak to an elderly man who had a lot of knowledge, but he got sick and they took him to Bata. He had a hernia. Unfortunately, he came to Bata alive, but there were no doctors, nurses or anything in the hospital to care for him. And he died there! A disaster” (Informant: Juan Javier 2010). Fortunately, the health care system is partially supported by the widespread practice of traditional medicine. These are healers with authorisation to practice, some of which have their own spaces to which patients can be admitted for weeks. However, traditional medicine has limits when it comes to curing certain ailments – true not only of Equatorial Guinean medicine, but also of Chinese medicine as practised in the city.

With regard to education, one of Obiang's first measures in Bata was to create adult schools that would shortly afterwards be extended to other cities on the continent (Owono-Okomo 2014: 221). The country was in a state of devastation: Macías was especially quick to chase and murder intellectuals and the most learned. Adult education was therefore a popular measure that gave credibility to the new start of the Obiang regime which prompted some exiles to return. They would end up with their hopes frustrated and emigrate again. Because, generally, little has changed in the school system since colonial times: most of the schools remain in the hands of Spanish religious congregations even today, and are partly financed by the Spanish government cooperation programme.<sup>46</sup> In the absence of specific up-to-date data for the city of Bata, it should be noted that the global figures for schooling in the Littoral District for the 2016/17 academic year totalled: 18,694 preschool students; 42,967 in Primary education; to 19,690 in Secondary education; 7,372 students enrolled at the National University of Equatorial Guinea (UNGE).<sup>47</sup>

In this general context of precariousness and scarcity, the population of Bata has continued to grow along with Fang centrality. They have come to represent a powerful transnational ethnicity at the glocal level, and Fang rivalry with other ethnicities has not been neutralised. One of Obiang's measures to give Bata greater power and visibility was the habit of moving the country's

45 *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial* 2018, p. 65.

46 In this regard, it is only necessary to consult the *Boletín Oficial del Estado* (BOE) on the subsidies granted by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (AECID) each year.

47 *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial* 2018, p.116.

government in alternate years from Malabo to Bata and back again, a habitual practice since at least 2002 and which, as we shall see, has recently been extended to Djibloho. Other assets that strengthened Bata's socio-political and economic influence were, for example, hosting the national parliament and the headquarters and the subsidiaries of major companies.

Hence, Fang prioritisation has been evident in various social spheres. While Obiang has represented the Fang majority and led a dictatorial political system that did not require consensus to manage diversity, he did seek to generate some rhetoric about diversity and Equatorial Guinean identity that differed from the general *Macista* discourse. While Macías insistently spoke of Equatorial Guinean diversity only to later surreptitiously abandon the ethnic issue, during the 1980s Obiang sought refuge in Hispanic identity as a way to reunite the different ethnic groups under the myth of common Bantu origin (Cusack 1999b: 207). But this Hispano-Bantuist discourse ended up being purely rhetorical,<sup>48</sup> because Obiang's Fangisation process proved unstoppable both on the continent and on Bioko Island (Aixelà-Cabré 2012). Thus, Bantuism notwithstanding, Obiang followed the logic of *ayong* and *muadjang*.

Other signs show the regime's disinterest in addressing the issue of ethnicities and its indifference to the task of reviewing certain colonial socio-political constructions. In the case of the island of Corisco (*Manji* for the Ndowe) and the two islands, Elobey Chico and Elobey Grande (*Lobe Etubwe*, in Ndowe), no postcolonial Equatorial Guinean government, neither that of Macías nor that of Obiang, introduced changes in the colonial administrative division<sup>49</sup> that established that they were affiliated to the continental territory.<sup>50</sup> The same happened with the current layout of the Littoral province, which almost certainly dates from the colonial period and was nothing more than the reflection of the old Ndowe and Bissio territory. The administrative absorption of these mostly Ndowe territories into a Fang majority domain has had socio-political and population effects that have resulted in the Fangisation of the region. Nevertheless, it is very interesting that the historical settlement of the Littoral province appears to be clearly outlined – alongside the Bissio – on a final map published by the Equatorial Guinean government in 2018<sup>51</sup> in the section on Kombes and Bujebas, exactly as it appeared on colonial maps.

48 Not to mention that researchers like Buale (1989: 21) regarded the differences between Fang and Bubi political traditions to be completely irreconcilable.

49 *Resúmenes Estadísticos del Gobierno General de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea* (1958: 22). It also happens with Fernando Po and Annobon, the second attached to the first since colonial times despite their geographic distance.

50 *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial* 2018 (p. 20).

51 *Anuario Estadístico del Gobierno de Guinea Ecuatorial* 2018 (p. 209).

The issue of the territorial and historical rights of ethnic groups is not therefore reflected in the Constitution. Nor have laws been passed that could indicate their specificities as cultural minorities, as the 2012 reform of the Constitution was completely inadequate in addressing this. In fact, the customary laws of the country's different ethnicities remain exclusively oral due to the regime's opposition to giving them the status of written law. Hardly any of the reports by the government of Equatorial Guinea give ethnicity data, although the 2018 statistical yearbook is an exception. In this, although Ndowe ethnicity is recognised as integral to the nation's cultural plurality, the Ndowe language is not cited as a vernacular one, but Kombe is.<sup>52</sup> This could be a misunderstanding or human error, but on a delicate issue such as that of ethnic groups, it is not common to see many involuntary errors from the government of Equatorial Guinea.

The Kombe and non-Ndowe language listing allows for debate about the Ndowe ethnic affiliation of various groups. It also reduces the visibility and legitimacy of the Ndowe, who are also very active in the diaspora on the issue of the city of Bata and the coastal territory, as many Ndowe consider it as usurped by the (Fang) state institutions. So, explicitly citing the Kombe language and not the Ndowe allows misunderstandings of a diverse nature within the ethnic community itself. In fact, by naming the group Bujeba and not Bissio,<sup>53</sup> their right to give their own name was not even recognised. While it is true that these details may be a simple reflection of the colonial biases that remain unresolved by the dictatorships fifty years on, the disinterest is symptomatic of a self-serving laziness on the issue.

The same thing is happening with the Fangisation of the continental coast. This may be attributed, first of all, to the Spanish colonial past, but it has absolutely not been amended in postcolonial times. For Ma-a Jobe (2011: 3), "the Ndowe know what it is to be disinherited and deprived of our rights." Part of the Ndowe diaspora does not agree with being considered a minority, because until the Fang ethnic group arrived and occupied their territory, the Ndowe were not a minority (Buale 1989: 10). María Jesús summarised her unease about the matter: "Obiang lost his opportunity to create a democracy and political and administrative decentralisation through the recognition of ethnic groups" (Informant: María Jesús 2011).

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52 "Languages. The official language is Spanish, with French and Portuguese being co-official languages. Vernacular languages include Fang, Bubi, Kombe, Bissio and Anobonese; other languages such as 'Pichi', among others, are also spoken." *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial* (2018: 19). For more information about Pichi, see Yakpo (2017).

53 See Dyombe Dyangany (2008: 30).

All of this occurred despite the Obiang government repeating the colonial practice from the autonomous period of creating positions for different ethnic groups in the country's administrative and political structures to ensure a certain visibility and influence. But it is also true that they were always tiny percentages, in roles with very limited responsibility, supervised by other higher-ranking officials – always Fang – and under the threat of falling into the regime's networks of repression if they made an unacceptable demand. Ávila Laurel (2012: 1) made a wise assessment of the meaning of Obiang's measures:

out of malice, we are reminded that the men from the minority chosen by the dictator would be nobody in their communities. They are not people worthy of respect in the traditions of their ethnic groups, they were nothing until they stood out for what they could steal, permitted by those who appointed them. Do you promote an ethnic group by rewarding its delinquent members?

The proof of the inaction shown by representative officials of minorities in the Obiang regime is evident by the fact that no one stood up against the brutal repression that he carried out against the Bubis in January of 1998. This was aimed at subduing the Movement for the Self-determination of Bioko Island (MAIB), by raping women and arresting 500 people in Luba, Rebola, Baney and Moka on Bioko Island.<sup>54</sup> For example, José María,<sup>55</sup> who is a Bubi and lives in Malabo, and is not suspected of having militated in the MAIB, or in any similar independence organisation, stated: "it is true that we Bubis are very closed. We are defensive, it is true, and we have a hard time trusting people. With the Fang we certainly get along badly and I think it will be difficult for us to get used to living together. It's normal, they bit our hands for a long time and now we have to undo all the damage done. We'll see."

In this context, Obiang's changes in the 2012 Constitution to improve the visibility of Equatorial Guinea's ethnic groups lacked credibility: Bioko Island continues to face a process of Fangisation of enormous dimensions in political, cultural and linguistic terms. An example of how migrants from Bata are generically classified as Fang can be seen in the debate held by prominent Equatorial Guinean intellectuals on social networks around the concept

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54 More on this can be found in the literary and testimonial analysis of Licata (2016) in the novel *Okiri* that narrates the events that happened in Bioko in those days.

55 José María, over sixty-five, is Bubi and lives in Malabo. Interviewed in Malabo in December 2010.

of *bataman* (people from Bata in Bioko) and *bilobloblo* or *bilop* (derogatory term for the Bubi). The term *bataman*, which has pejorative connotations, notes the growing presence in Malabo of (mostly Fang) migrants from Bata. Their large numbers encourage the Fangisation of Malabo and the island. Mba Mombe, a Fang, complained that, “what does have a pejorative, ethnic, racist connotation are words like *bataman*, *batafoot*, which the Bioko Islanders use towards the Fang and I say Fang because I don’t know if the members of the other ethnic groups coming from the continent are included” (2011: 1). For Bubi Riochí (2011: 1) the *bataman-bilop* discussion reflected the ethnic tensions in Equatorial Guinea: “Often I wonder why members of Fang political parties do not self-criticise or wonder why the other peoples that make up Equatorial Guinea are wary of this forced coexistence.” The bluntest was the Fang writer Abaga Edjang (2011: 1) who in “Bataman Go Home” suggested that the Fang would be expelled from Bioko and Littoral despite being the majority population:

Coordination is needed here to make a sequence for the mass deportation of the Fang, so that first the ‘Batamanes’ are driven out of Bioko, later, from the Littoral zone of the continental region towards the jungle interior. This sequence would allow the ‘Batamanes’ expelled from Bioko to leave along the Littoral towards the jungle interior, along with their brothers currently settled in Bata, Kogo, Mbini and Niefang. We are talking about more or less of 85 percent of the population of current Equatorial Guinea. From the resulting disintegration of Equatorial Guinea – because that is what this means – three different countries would be born, which we could call: the Republic of Bioko (Bubi and Annobonese), the Republic of the Littoral (Ndowne and Bissio) and the Republic of the Interior (Fang).

The same Bioko Fangisation process that the mentioned controversy showed is happening in the minority continental Ndowne and Bissio areas. For example, Uganda Beholi (2014: 142) says, “ethnic minorities in Equatorial Guinea are marginalised and ignored by the Fang ethnic majority. Non-Fang ethnic groups lack opportunities. You have to be ‘father-in-law of’, ‘son-in-law of’ or ‘friend of a Fang’ to be promoted, or to get a job in the Equatorial Guinean government.” Given the information reviewed, Obiang may appear to fulfill a kind of union in ethnic diversity, but Fangisation continues because his treatment of minorities is poor and the measures to empower them are intentionally inoperative.

One last aspect that could have a great impact on the Fang's glocal projection, enacted until now through the city of Bata, remains to be analysed: Obiang's interest in Djibloho. Bata's historical centrality has been in question since Obiang's interest became known in Djibloho in Wele-Nzas, which lies halfway between his hometown of Mongomo and the city of Bata. It is an important issue taking into consideration that Obiang, like Macías, has felt threatened on numerous occasions by the attempted coups d'état – real or fictitious – that he has condemned,<sup>56</sup> most of which have served to eliminate awkward opponents.

In 2012, the opposition CPDS party learned from the press of the costly work Obiang had started in the town of Djibloho (Molano 2012) with the intention of transferring the political capital from Malabo to Djibloho (Molano 2012). The change of location would create a new formal political centre, this time of Fang identity, which would directly reinforce the Esangui clan from the Wele-Nzas province to which Djibloho belonged. It is true that, for the time being, his wishes have not materialised. Moving the capital to Djibloho would not only marginalise the more popular candidate, Bata, as the new capital, but also mean giving up on Bioko Island hosting the capital. This is where the oil production is, besides being the place that diaspora Bubi continue to claim as their own due to historical rights – requests that are systematically ignored by Obiang. But the proof that Obiang was continuing with his plans is evident by his decision to move the government to Djibloho for the first time in 2017 (Guinea Infomarket 2017), which was also the time that the province of Djibloho was created from scratch by the Law 4/2017 of June twentieth.<sup>57</sup> These two moves are clear signs that Obiang's intentions remain, despite the fact that the experience of the Equatorial Guinean population "reveals that these changes usually entail a period of administrative paralysis that affects all aspects of the country's life, from business to citizens' interests."<sup>58</sup> The current justification is that the transfer of the government to Djibloho falls within the historical practice of moving the government away from Malabo every other year, an act that never fails to demonstrate the profound Fang discomfort at having their capital in Bubi territory.

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56 One of the best documented was the attempt by sixty South African mercenaries instigated by British businessmen in 2004 (Liniger-Goumaz and Seibert 2008).

57 See *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial* 2018 (p. 24). It is said that there is no population data for this province because its constitution was written after the census was taken.

58 See *Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial* 2018 (p. 24).

There are interesting parallels between Obiang's withdrawal to Djibloho and that of Macías to Nzangayong. Without comparing the socio-political framework, or the feelings of the population in 1979 and 2019, it is true that the president's fears of facing a coup d'état have never vanished: quite the contrary, not in the least because he himself deposed and executed his uncle Macías, despite being part of his inner circle. Obiang thus knows that the loyalty around him is relative and that the safest place for him could be Djibloho. In addition, his closest circle knows that while genealogical and family proximity benefits them, it will not spare them from reprisals or death when the dictator feels threatened. Until Obiang's death, Djibloho's centrality is likely to be temporary. It allows him to gradually withdraw in favour of Teodorín and helps his son not to feel threatened by his father. This is due to the fact that the transfer of power is expected to be carried out in an orderly manner, in agreement with the military establishment, which wields such influence in the state because it benefits in various ways from the oil revenues.

But I would like to underline that the move to Djibloho, if consolidated or extended over time, would cause a fragmentation within the Fang ethnic group. This has existed for decades, but was concealed behind the Fang's central place in a glocal Bata. Bata's unofficial status as co-capital dilutes the internal divisions in Fang unity. The city was built on Fang migrations from all areas and its importance underscores Fang power and economic and political potential, but this would be lost with the change of the Fang capital to Djibloho and the awarding of a separate province outside Wele-Nzas. It is clear proof that the Obiang family's circle of trust has shrunk and the foundations of the Obiang regime's kleptocratic clientalist structure have been broken. *Ayong* (Fang community) and *Muadjang* (Fang brotherhood), which spread the client structures in the form of a network (Muakuku 2006: 49), have become *etunga-bot* (family circle).

For this reason, Djibloho seems more like a golden retreat to assuage Obiang's fears of possible coup d'états than a real change of capital that could make an impact in the social, political or ethnic spheres. The loss of centrality of other clans and families from the continental region who exercised their power from Bata does not interest his son Teodorín either. By gradually withdrawing to Djibloho, Obiang reassures Teodorín to some extent that he will not repeat the mistakes that triggered his uncle Macías's deposing and execution, as Owono-Okomo recounts (2014: 176). Meanwhile, the majority of the population – insular and peninsular – continue to regard Bata, Mang, as the capital of the Fang, ignoring its Ndowe past, and understanding that the centrality of Bioko Island is a lesser evil that is necessary for its oil wealth.

### 1.3 *Memories in Conflict: Nkum Was (Plaza del Reloj) and Plaza de la Libertad*

In the independent period, the people of Bata began calling the *Plaza del Reloj*, *Nkum Was*.<sup>59</sup> As we have seen, the *Plaza del Reloj* was one of the symbols of colonial power and bore witness to the speeches and parades of Spanish political power during colonisation. However, after independence, Macías faced the uncomfortable past and reappropriated the square as an embodiment of the new era, using slogans extolling his person like the well known “there is no God but Macías.” As we shall see, in an attempt to re-appropriate the square, Obiang installed commemorative statues in front of the Clock Tower to celebrate his *Golpe de Libertad* (see Figure 5). But although Obiang called the space *Plaza de la Libertad*, the appropriation failed due to the limited success he had, among the people of Bata, in his attempt to erase the traces of colonialism and Macías from the square. Unsatisfied, Obiang later weighed up demolishing the clock tower in the name of the city’s supposed modernisation. But when the criticism of the Battian people led him to reject this option, he built a modern construction next to the tower to try, as on other occasions, to eclipse the emblematic building. The aim was to erase or failing that, to tarnish old colonial and *Macista* symbols, while building his own monument in the city of Bata, (see Figure 6): finally Obiang was building a heritage site in the city that was worthy of his stature. And although the *Torre de la Libertad* has been strong enough to create a new centre around it, thus emulating the interest that the *Plaza del Reloj* had in other times, Obiang has not been able to remove the colonial and *Macista* memories at *Nkum Was*. The decision to shift attention to the *Torre de la Libertad* drew eyes away and silenced malcontents. But the defence of the *Plaza del Reloj* in a dictatorial country may be seen as a subtle way for the population to show their discontent with the current regime: defending the memory of abuse and terror of the colonial and Macías eras and sending out a powerful message about the current deficiencies of the Obiang regime.

In what follows we will look at the uses of *Plaza del Reloj* and *Plaza de la Libertad* in order to better understand the strategies and methods of reappropriating heritage that took place in this dictatorial context.

#### 1.3.1 Macías

The use of an urban space that had been purely Spanish, such as the *Plaza de la Torre del Reloj*, allowed Macías to send the people a powerful message about

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59 As José explained, “*nkum* came to mean tower in Fang, and *was* [watch] was a neologism or linguistic loan” (Informant: José 2019), probably from Pichi or English.

the meaning of political autonomy after his coup. As José explained, “the tower is very colonial. At every rally, Macías condemned colonialism and went on to insult the king of Spain. There were a lot of harsh words about Spain and colonialism” (Informant: José 2019).

In one of Macías’s first speeches in the *Plaza del Reloj*, he justified his coup: “I was smarter than my rivals. They campaigned, one trusting in Spain and its gifts, the other trusting a group of intellectuals. Meanwhile, I went to the village with its knowledge, with the things that are our symbols: tree branches, the broom and the rooster” (Nzé Nfumu 2004: 27). Back then, Macías had already abandoned his initially lukewarm analysis of the Spanish colonial presence at the 1967 Constitutional Conference, where he shelved the forceful criticism of Spanish colonialism that was characteristic throughout his mandate: “We have the colonial problem for a past. Now we want to build a stable Equatorial Guinea, which can be equal to Spain and can count on Spain, both at home and abroad” (Obiang Biko 2016: 190).

In the first years of his presidency, Macías used the *Plaza del Reloj* as a reference point for his public speeches, where he publicised his initiatives and proposals for independent Equatorial Guinea. As one of the most politicised colonial spaces in Bata, choosing the *Plaza del Reloj* seemed natural to the people, while Macías found a privileged space in which to visualise his break with the old metropole – although other speeches took place in other locations like the Bata soccer stadium in December 1968, the aim of which was to captivate Equatorial Guinean young people. As Owono-Okomo (2014: 159) pointed out, “[in this venue] he becomes the leader of the youth.”

For the Macías regime, the symbolic occupation of all the centres of colonial and ecclesiastical power was essential, and meant that over the years, Macías left his mark on a *Plaza del Reloj* that formerly symbolised colonial might. Macías gobbled up Catholic holy spaces to appropriate the ritual sites of colonial influence, as Nerín (2016: 160) has explained, and he also wanted to neutralise colonial power building up in other loci in the civilian and political spheres. This was the essence of his speeches in the *Plaza del Reloj* (Nsé Nfumu 2004: 85, 106): the plaza ended up constituting the meeting place between the president and the people of Bata and the continental region. These were large-scale events with mandatory attendance, just as they had been in the time of the Spanish. Attendance was compulsory at all *Macísta* events, as Nerín (2016: 156) explains, “the population also had to participate ... on January first (the official date of Macías’s birthday), on March fifth (Victory Day) and on September twenty-ninth (the anniversary of Macías’s electoral victory). In those acts ... it was necessary to demonstrate ‘revolutionary fervour’”

Macías also publicised the PUNT in the *Plaza del Reloj*. His political proclamations made the gatherings seem like genuine rallies (Nsé Nfumu 2004: 85, 106), but very soon the people realised that his words were orders and should be carried out without delay. For example, Nsé Nfumu (2004: 85) recalls that, after an unsuccessful call for plantation workers to be recruited in order to fill empty state coffers, Macías used the PUNT to ensure that cacao plantations did not stop working.<sup>60</sup> Unions have never been allowed in Equatorial Guinea, not in colonial times, or in those of Macías and Obiang (Liniger-Goumaz and Seibert 2008). As Artucio (1979: 14) points out, “political and union activity carried out outside the PUNT framework was prohibited and ... harshly punished.” In 1977, Buale (1989: 162) documents that some 25,000 workers were recruited for the plantations and that they received no salary, only rice, palm oil and fish that was not enough for them or for their dependents. This prompted huge discontent and the working conditions were reminiscent of those on colonial plantations.

Messié’s speeches were also deeply anticlerical (Calvo 1989; Nerín 2016). Examples abound: “I personally am a Catholic, but I cannot oppress anyone, since we are not in a colonial era when the colonial government did what it wanted. We are a free government; a people’s government [applause]” (Paz 1969: 115). And, Macías went on, “the new government is responsible before God and before history because my appointment as president was God’s work, as despite the obstacles put in my way, I won the elections [applause]” (de Paz 1969: 116).

For Macías, the Equatorial Guinean universe had to revolve around him. In 1972, the motto of government officials was “there is no God but Macías”, and church services had to begin with singing “God created Equatorial Guinea thanks to Macias- Without Macias Equatorial Guinea would not exist” (Sundiata 1990: 129) or “nothing without Macías, everything for Macías ... Down with colonialism and the ambitious” (Artucio 1979: 15). Many of the patriotic proclamations and announcements urging people to come out and welcome the dictator were made over the radio – indeed that was its main function in those days. As Javier explained, “when Macías warned that he was going to make a speech, everyone knew that the meeting place was the *Torre del Reloj*. That was where people gathered” (Informant: Javier 2019).

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60 It should be remembered that in 1972 a large-scale departure of Nigerian workers took place following serious clashes with the Equatorial Guinean military that left several dead. Nigerians were forbidden to travel with their Equatorial Guinean wives and children (Fegley 1981: 38).

This ran in parallel to what he took from traditional religions. It is well known that he engaged in the Fang traditional worship known as *Bieri*, the *Bwiti* rite that originated in Gabon, and used *Nvet* troubadours to spread his propaganda to all corners of the country, and had sanctuaries that housed his collection of skulls and human sacrifices. All this was understood as a way to extend his power while seeding fear in the population and espousing the dignity of the Fang lifestyle. The *Bwiti* and *Bieri* rites Macías practised connected with a Fang genealogical statement of shared ancestry that extended across Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Gabon called *Alor Ayong*, which had clear connotations of a Fang ethnic revival (Cusack 1999b: 210), and the ability to mark out all those who did not belong to the *Ayong* as enemies (Buale 1989: 19).<sup>61</sup> For Macías, traditional religion was an ideological antidote to Franco's Hispanicisation (Sundiata 1990: 129), even though he maintained close links with the JONS and the Sección Femenina. But traditional religion was also a powerful tool with which to scare a population that had never abandoned its rituals and who fully understood the scope of its witchcraft practices.

The markedly pro-Fang nature of Macías's ritual and political framework in spite of the fact that most ethnic groups in Equatorial Guinea shared a Bantu origin helps us gauge the impact of the public execution of Mocache, a Ndowe originally from Punta Mbonda, along with another Ndowe comrade, for *mokuku* (witchcraft) on December seventeenth, 1970. Numerous mass executions and murders were carried out in Bata and throughout the rest of Equatorial Guinean territory, but Mocache's was the only execution to take place for *mokuku* in the *Plaza del Reloj* during the Macías regime. The choice of the *Plaza del Reloj* was not incidental, as it was meant to demonstrate the exercise of justice to the public in general, and the Ndowe and other minorities in particular. As Fernando Gimeno related, "Mocache was accused of *mocucu* [*mokuku*] in Punta Mbonda, where he was originally from. The truth is that his imputation as official poisoner was not very convincing. In reality, he was a truck driver for the Spanish company Blasco in Bata."<sup>62</sup>

This execution reveals at least two key factors, if not three, that must be analysed. Firstly, the execution had a religious dimension. Several authors describe what Ndowe *mokuku* was and how it competed with the *Bieri* and *Bwiti* sects. Dyombe Dyangany (2008: 101) defined *mokuku* as a kind of double soul that was composed of blood, soul and body, in which "thanks to the soul, man lived

61 It is worth noting that a small Ndowe group also participated in the *Bwiti* ritual (Dyombe Dyangany 2008: 100–111).

62 Personal communication from Fernando García Gimeno in August 2019. I would like to express my gratitude for his help for this information.

his life"; it was the soul that passed to the spirit world after death, making reincarnation possible. Pedro Nsue Ela characterises Ndowe *mokuku* as welcoming the spirits in order to worship death and purify them (quoted in Sundiata 1990: 130). For Dyombe Dyangany (2008: 115), *mokuku* in Punta Mbonda was exercised by means of a poisonous powder that only a few families owned. Arresting and executing a Ndowe for practicing *mokuku* in one of the most symbolic locations in Bata therefore had a sobering effect on a population that continued to practice the traditional rituals of their ethnic group: the message about what was not allowed was clear. Mocache's execution could be read as a suppression of ritual practices that, despite sharing features with those practised by Macías, had their influence and power questioned. This execution announced the centrality of Fang ritual practices in the new postcolonial era.

Secondly, Mocache's execution also had an ethnic dimension, not only because of the grievance the Ndowe community felt, but also because it was a warning to other minorities, such as the Bubi and the Fernandinos. I will reproduce at length the account of the event given by José Luís Jones (1990: 21–23), a Fernandino from Malabo, to show the impact the execution had on them, and how he interpreted it at the time:

Out of a treacherous murder, Macías will stage a macabre historical vindication to seek redress for the 'Fang' people for the age-old offence inflicted by the Ndowe people. Before designating the composition of the court that will hear the case, he has already commissioned the Bolado carpenter, a Spaniard who chose to stay, to build the gallows for the execution, and Bata's *Plaza del Reloj* as the place for the execution. On December sixteenth, a LAGE (Líneas Aéreas de Guinea Ecuatorial) aeroplane, transferred the court from the national capital, Santa Isabel, to Bata, the capital of *Río Muni*. It is presided over by the only registered Fang member of the Bar Association, Salvador Nsi Ntutumu Bindang. Like the prosecutor Tomás King and myself, Luis Maho Sicacha and Manolo Morgades are members of the tribunal and hail from Island Equatorial Guinea. I am appointed to the defence. From the airport we are taken to the palace, where Macías Nguema receives us and I am given to contemplate the relish with which he has hatched the plot. He urges the prosecutor to act harshly, explains down to the tiniest details what our position should be on the floor, the location of the security officers, where the gallows have been placed and the area the public will fill. Because, naturally, the next day all *Río Muni* must gather in the *Plaza del Reloj*. Since the day before, buses have been arriving, transporting the people from the interior. Schoolchildren will go early, as a compulsory lesson, led by their

teachers to contemplate the enactment of the macabre deed. The seventeenth dawns bright and sunny. A vehicle picks us up from the meeting point, the Examining Magistrates' Court, and transports us to the place assigned by the Court, hastily installed on one side of the square. I look at the huge clock set in a short tower that gives the square its name. It says half past ten. I look at the huge crowd clustered within a radius of two kilometres and shudder to see two gallows on the grotesque scaffold. The rope is tied. When I look up at the tower again, the clock strikes eleven in the morning and it's all over. Since that day the *Plaza del Reloj* is known by the name of the *Plaza Mocache* and Macías has obtained another title, 'A leader of a people'.<sup>63</sup>

This detailed description of the hanging in the *Plaza del Reloj* and the events leading up to it clearly reveal the execution's ethnic effects.

Third, the execution of Mocache had another side effect, which was not insignificant: the only person executed by Macías in the *Plaza del Reloj* was from the Ndowe ethnic group. From this it may be deduced that Macías intended to teach a lesson to the minorities thwarting his project of uniting the country because they saw it being shaped only from a Fang point of view. It should also be remembered that the city of Bata had a Ndowe – and specifically Kombe – origin, despite becoming increasingly Fang over the decades. In fact, a lot of trouble was taken to stage the execution in Bata and not Malabo, as Mocache had to be transferred from Bioko, along with the court and his lawyer. And it is true that, from that day onwards, some of the older people in Bata know the *Plaza del Reloj* by the nickname of *Mocache*. As Javier recalled, "yes, the plaza is also known as *Plaza de Mocache* because he was executed there after a trial, and everything was public" (Informant: Javier 2019).

Mocache's execution was of a piece with Macías's disinterest in expressly addressing the issue of ethnic minorities. His pro-Fang sentiment was veiled by a supposed Equatorial Guinean nationalism that was itself based on values that emanated from the Fang ethnic group. His position had been clear since the 1967 Constitutional Conference, where he opposed Spain guaranteeing the separation of the island from the continental territory: "The best thing for Spain to be praised worldwide is for it to grant full independence to Equatorial Guinea. The consequences that follow will come from the Equatorial Guinean people, not from Spain, because the Equatorial Guinean people are the ones asking for independence, not Spain" (Obiang Biko 2016: 193).

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63 The italics are mine.

As mentioned, the colony and its legacies often resonated in Macías's time. Pablo remembered his first experience of a parade that passed through the *Plaza del Reloj* shortly after arriving in Bata. Macías had assigned him an adviser/spy disguised as a "boy", even though that type of Equatorial Guinean servant for whites had already disappeared in the postcolonial period. Pablo found out that the "boy" was, in fact,

a secretary of the PUNT, who had to report what we said or did not say, and what we did or did not do ... [Soon after arriving] the 'boy' comes to look for me because I had to go to the parade. And they took me to the box beneath Macías's, which was where the authorities stood. Young people passed, parading with rifle-shaped sticks,<sup>64</sup> which were like props, because they had no weapons. I didn't know about protocol or anything. The girls passed by, parading with their breasts in the air. And finally army cars passed by, with better weapons. I was not ready for all that.

INFORMANT: PABLO 2016

After the Macías terror regime Battian urban legends continued to claim that Macías was still alive because he was seen everywhere. As Edmundo recalled, "after Macías' death, they said he was not dead ... And you see!" On two of my trips to Bata in the 2000s I was personally told that Macías had shot political dissidents from the clock tower. Fortunately, this story seems clearly to be false, as I have found no one able to corroborate it.

### 1.3.2 Obiang

After the coup, Obiang presented himself as the liberator of the Equatorial Guinean people. The *Plaza del Reloj* was a unique urban space due to the numerous speeches by Macías that it had witnessed in which, while rebuking the people by imposing repressive rules, he passionately criticised colonialism and Catholicism. Macías's imprint on Bata's *Plaza del Reloj* was so evident that, after removing him, Obiang chose it as the location for his memorial to the *Golpe de Libertad* – reminding the people of Bata that he was their true liberator. The monument, located in the middle of the square and in front of the clock tower, depicts three soldiers, the central one is carrying a flag while the other two hold rifles. To complement it, Obiang renamed the space *Plaza de la Libertad*.

64 As Nerín (2016: 158) describes very well, it was strictly forbidden to call them sticks – everyone should refer to them as rifles.

During the first years of Obiang's mandate, the square was pre-eminent, with the events held in Malabo replicated in Bata as if it were a second capital. During those first five years, most of the leaders who visited Equatorial Guinea had to travel to Bata. Institutional visits would include speeches and offerings in the *Plaza de la Libertad*. The *Plaza del Reloj* and the *Plaza de la Libertad* thus staged Obiang's first speeches, as he was aware that his new leadership should occupy the spaces that had been Macías's reference points.

In the first five years of his presidency, Obiang received the Spanish royal family (1979), the President of the Spanish Government Calvo Sotelo (1981) and Pope John Paul II (1982). He, and held the first International Hispano–African Congress of Culture in Bata<sup>65</sup> (1984) (Nvé Oyana and Jiménez 2018: 159; Owono-Okomo 2014: 65). All these events took place in *Plaza de la Libertad*, next to *Plaza del Reloj*, except for the congress, for which a speech and a floral offering was made at this important location.

The king and queen of Spain, Juan Carlos and Sofía, visited Equatorial Guinea from December thirteenth to fifteenth, 1979. Almost five months had passed since Obiang had executed Macías and seized power. This flying visit was meant to welcome the new president who had overthrown Macías, as if Spain should still approve and endorse its former colony's presidents. The political speeches were made from the *Plaza de la Libertad*, where Macías had criticised Spain so much. Calvo (1989) explained that

Don Juan Carlos and Doña Sofía became aware of the poverty suffered by Equatorial Guineans when they were almost overwhelmed in the port of Bata while trying to oversee the distribution of provisions that had arrived by boat from Spain. A crowd of about 15,000 people had gathered in Bata's *Plaza del Reloj* throughout the afternoon, the same one Macías used to insult Spain and its rulers ... Obiang, in that first contact with his Fang people from *Río Muni*, allowed himself to joke that now that 'the two Franciscos' had gone, meaning Franco and Macías, things were going to improve, 'since two regimes of tyranny and misery have ended'.<sup>66</sup>

Sebastián (1979) wrote a falsified report of this visit for the newspaper *El País*. The likely aim was to praise the figure of the new king of Spain, while

65 For more on the congress, see Ezguerra Guereña (1985). Interestingly, Cusack (1999a: 30) recounts that at this congress it was concluded that Equatorial Guinea should find its place in the Hispanic-Bantu realm.

66 Document available at Asodegue website: <http://www.asodeguesegundaetapa.org/la-rec-onstruccion-nacional-capitulo-16-de-la-ocasion-perdida-juan-maria-calvo/>.

redesigning what was meant to be the future Spanish tutelage of Equatorial Guinea. In the article, Sebastián (1979: 1) said that Obiang had been unable to return to the continental region since Macías's execution and that he would do so now thanks to the presence of the Spanish royals. This detail is not credible: at that time Obiang not only led the country from the continental region, he was acclaimed by a population grateful for having been freed from *Macista* terror. Obiang needed neither the permission of the Spanish royals nor their company to travel to Bata. On the contrary, the king and queen were invited and presented to the citizens of *Río Muni* by Obiang, not the other way around. Not to mention that Obiang spoke in Fang not because King Juan Carlos gave him permission – encouraged him, as the report put it – but because it was the language Obiang decided to use, as he often did when giving speeches.<sup>67</sup> The write-up of the visit is meant to show Spain turning the page on Macías, reinventing the Hispano–Equatorial Guinean ties with the new Equatorial Guinea.

Calvo Sotelo visited Bata on December twenty-second, 1981, coming from Malabo. Like that of the royals two years before, his visit was brief, in his case lasting twenty-four hours. On the twenty-first, he held a tense dinner with Obiang in Malabo, who directly reproached him for not granting him greater financial support. The following day, Calvo Sotelo made a trip to Bata for just three hours, after considering cancelling his visit. Calvo (1989) described how, in the few hours he was in Bata, he passed through the newly built *Palacio de África* and that later the two rulers deposited a floral wreath in front of the monument to the soldiers in the *Plaza de la Libertad*, where they gave separate speeches. As in the case of the royal visit, Obiang's speech was almost entirely in Fang, with no simultaneous translation because, according to Calvo (1989), no one dared translate for him. Obiang spoke for the Fangs of *Río Muni*, ignoring Calvo Sotelo, and said that Spain was demanding more effort from them than before. There were no more smiles on that visit.

The third emblematic meeting in that five-year period was also fleeting and particularly relevant due to Macías's anticlerical discourse: Pope John Paul II

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67 In the article Sebastián (1979: 1) wrote: "Don Juan Carlos was the promoter of President Teodoro's meeting with the continental people. President Obiang had not visited *Río Muni* since the coup d'état on August 3, and has done so now with the support of Don Juan Carlos, who personally encouraged the new Equatorial Guinean leader to address the crowd hailing the royals in Fang. After the words of Don Juan Carlos, the king of Spain took President Obiang by the arm and asked him to speak to his continental people of his race, the Fang. Teodoro Obiang received spectacular acclaim in his speech, which was delivered in Fang, criticising the Macías regime, giving thanks for the returning exiles and emphasising that freedom had been reborn throughout Guinea. Over 20,000 people enthusiastically applauded their president at their first meeting."

came to Bata on February eighteenth, 1982. Speeches were made in the *Plaza de la Libertad* and the square was given a Catholic imprint when the name of the street that crossed the *Plaza del Reloj* was renamed *Avenida de Juan Pablo II*<sup>68</sup> and a pillar was erected to commemorate his visit to Equatorial Guinea. Days later, a homily was given in Bata Cathedral and when the Pope died on April second, 2005, a mass was held in *Nkum Was*.

Obiang's interest in reappropriating the *Plaza del Reloj* did not last many more years, nor did he hold other events as significant as those mentioned. Perhaps this was due to the difficulty of erasing the colonial and *Macista* legacy, or perhaps Obiang simply wanted the Battian and *Río Muni* population to identify him with a place in Bata that was not borrowed, as were the *Plaza del Reloj* or his own *Plaza de la Libertad*. For one reason or another, the truth is that after a few years of government, Obiang stopped making public speeches in the square, in favour of giving them from his residence. Javier recalled, "Obiang shifted the importance of the *Plaza* and the *Torre del Reloj*. His interest was short-lived. It was his way of putting an end to the Macías regime. Obiang's rallies began in the 1990s, but the palace, by that time, was a more suitable place" (Informant: Javier 2019). From then on, the *Plaza del Reloj* and the *Plaza de la Libertad* were used for specific events, such as opposition rallies, demonstrations opposing the regime and for Teodorín to hand out gifts. Javier also had his own opinion: "Yes, it is a place for the opposition, but that is also because they do not have permission to hold them elsewhere" (Informant: Javier 2019).

*Nkum Was* remained the place allocated for opposition political forces to hold their rallies in Bata. It was there that the CPDS organised speeches by Mansogo and Esono in December 2002, asking the population to lose their fear even as they were watched by law enforcement and pressured by the *Asociación Hijos de Obiang* (ASHO – Obiang Sons Association).<sup>69</sup> The *Plaza del Reloj* was also where the opposition asked for prisoners' health to be demonstrated, when they appeared to have been tortured, as Oyono de Renage did in a petition to the Spanish Government on April third, 2002.<sup>70</sup>

Around the year 2000, shortly before these political rallies took place in the *Plaza del Reloj*, the Obiang government planned new buildings as well as remodelling and restoration work in Bata, using the income from the oil

68 The homily can be read on the Vatican website, available at: [http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/es/homilies/1982/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_hom\\_19820218\\_bata-guinea.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/es/homilies/1982/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_19820218_bata-guinea.html). Accessed November 2021.

69 See informative note December 1st 2002 at Asodegue website.

70 News available at Guineaecuatorial.net website: [http://www.guinea-ecuatorial.net/pop\\_print\\_mail.asp?cd=re&item=ni675](http://www.guinea-ecuatorial.net/pop_print_mail.asp?cd=re&item=ni675). Accessed November 2021.

extracted from Bioko Island. Obiang targeted colonial buildings more than those constructed by Macías. As Javier recalled, “many buildings that Macías built have been repaired. The palace, the Bata radio, both built by Macías, the two banks ...” (Informant: Javier 2019). The exception was the port: “the port was especially emblematic of Macías’s works. Obiang dismantled it and made a new one between the 1990s and 2000s” (Informant: Javier 2019).

In those years, the Obiang government’s interest was focussed on demolishing the clock tower due to its apparently dilapidated state. In reality it had already demolished notable houses in the city of Bata in an attempt to discredit and jettison colonial heritage. But with the clock tower it was different. Javier explained, “voices rose against it. The tower was not to be demolished. People got angry. They didn’t want to allow it” (Informant: Javier 2019). For José, the monument’s colonial symbolism was unquestionable: “the clock tower today symbolises the colonial because it was made by the Spanish. Today there are many modern buildings. But the clock tower is one of the last colonial references we have in Equatorial Guinea and in Bata” (Informant: José 2019).

Faced with the citizens’ opposition to the plan, Obiang decided to restore it. As Javier recalled, “the clock tower was restored in the 2000s, or in the year 2000 itself, I don’t remember exactly. It was abandoned and run down” (Informant: Javier 2019). In Javier’s opinion, Obiang’s desire to destroy it was part of his policy of preventing certain public spaces in Bata from overshadowing his figure and his mark on the history of contemporary Equatorial Guinea: “for the government it is important to erase the traces of Macías and colonialism. Obiang does it with the buildings from both times, either destroying them or repairing them a little, or puts something more impressive up next to it in order to relativise the work of the Spanish or of Macías, as if to say ‘Spain did this but we do more’ ” (Informant: Javier 2019).

So it was impossible to demolish the tower, and it needed restoring. But result of the public controversy over what to do with the clock tower was to add an adjoining building to it and to give permission to build a modern enclosure. As Javier explained, “he did it next to the clock tower when he saw that the people opposed getting rid of it” (Informant: Javier 2019). José said that

Obiang’s policy is to discredit colonial monuments. The clock tower is very emblematic because it is in the centre. They’ve been knocking buildings down, like in Malabo, but people in Bata got angry and refused to allow it. Obiang’s response was to build the *Torre de la Libertad* to forget the clock tower. And now the clock tower is not in fashion, but the *Torre de la Libertad* is.

INFORMANT: JOSÉ 2019

Obiang's true legacy to the city of Bata, as the supposed liberator of Equatorial Guinea, came with the construction of what he sees as city's icon: the *Torre de la Libertad* on the seafront. Inaugurated on October twelfth, 2011, the date that celebrates colonial independence, it was erected to be an Equatorial Guinean Eiffel Tower, and as well as being a landmark, it has a restaurant, is illuminated at night and stands in a small park.<sup>71</sup> Its magnificent seafront location with ocean views and gardens has ended up attracting the locals who often stroll through it, without visiting the exclusive restaurant, which is beyond the financial reach of most Equatorial Guineans – except those close to the regime. With a large structure, the *Torre de la Libertad* may well have been inspired by the clock tower, with the possible aim of encouraging Obiang to be remembered as the president who freed his people from Macías's brutality. Tangible cultural heritage seems always to guarantee a partial immortality, and many of the major works undertaken by Obiang appear to relate to this. For Javier and José, they are representative of his mandate, “the *Torre de la Libertad*, the Promenade, the twin towers of Bata” (Informants: Javier and José 2019) (see Table 45).

Fewer visits from the leader may be received in the square and the square's appearance has changed, but Obiang, like Macías and the Spanish governors, has maintained the aesthetics and composition of the parades and political speeches, in the *Plaza del Reloj*, the *Plaza de la Libertad*, and the palace. To conclude his tour of the country in the city of Bata on March sixteenth, 2019, the government report insisted that in his speech Obiang “has congratulated the people of Bata, both native and foreign, for the massive attendance at the reception, and for their participation in the last celebration of the anniversary of independence.” He also added that the reason for the tour was to move towards “a shared reflection on Equatorial Guinea's past, and to demand that peace be maintained.”<sup>72</sup>

A few final comments: the first relates to several statements by José, who supposed that Obiang received the royals and the Pope in the *Plaza de la Torre del Reloj* because “it was the only place in Bata set up for this type of event,

71 The government of Equatorial Guinea's website published various news stories on the occasion of its inauguration, for example at: <https://www.guineaequatorialpress.com/index.php/noticias/La%20bella%20estampa%20de%20la%20Torre%20de%20la%20Libertad%20de%20Bata%20iluminada>. Accessed November 2021.

72 The review of the event was published under the title “Bata recibe masivamente al Presidente en su fin de la gira de Estado”, and the article is available at the Guinea Ecuatorial website: <https://www.guineaequatorialpress.com/noticias/Bata%20recibe%20masivamente%20al%20Presidente%20en%20el%20fin%20de%20su%20gira%20de%20Estado>. Accessed November 2021.

TABLE 45 Bata's iconic buildings

*Iconic colonial buildings*

First is Bata Cathedral, a colonial symbol that connects to Spain and Catholicism.

Then there is the *Torre del Reloj*, the three post office buildings, the Red Palace, the old football stadium, Bata Town Hall, the *Complejo Escolar*, containing the Polytechnic and *La Salle*.

*Macias's iconic buildings*

First, the port.

Followed by Nkuku Bridge, the Presidential Palace or Palacio de África, the National Bank, Central Bank of Bata and Bata Radio.

*Obiang's iconic buildings*

First, the *Torre de la Libertad*.

Followed by the *Paseo Marítimo*, the twin towers, Mbini Bridge, the new parliament building, social housing, the *Hospital de la Paz*, and the new Bata stadium.

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SOURCE: COMPILED BY AUTHOR USING DATA GATHERED FROM THE INFORMANTS.

which brought together so many people ... When the Pope came, it was done there because a lot of people came from the villages" (Informant: José 2019). José assessed organisational and not symbolic aspects, but Obiang was aware of the importance of heritage in a despotic system. Knowing that memories are projected into the future by retrieving episodes from the past that confer legitimacy (Stoler and Strassler 2000), such heritage appropriation is neither naive nor accidental in a country plunged into a dictatorial spiral that seeks to perpetuate the system.

The second relates to Obiang's unsuccessful attempt to reappropriate the *Plaza del Reloj*. It proved impossible to erase the traces of the Spanish and Macías. This much is clear from the fact that the people refer to the square as *Nkum Was*, meaning the name *Plaza del Reloj* has outlasted the *Plaza de la Libertad*. The new name has never managed to replace the old one. For the Battian people they are different spaces, even if their current marginality may be a prelude to being forgotten and even if collective Battian memory continues to associate the square with the speeches and parades of Macías's times, and colonial memory with urban heritage.

Javier concluded by reflecting on the ephemeral nature of memory: "I am a native of Bata. It will be forty years old since Macías's death. I am from the

1970s. There has been a desire to bury Macías and how Macías fought against colonialism. Obiang is erasing the traces of him. Few of us know what the clock tower really means" (Informant: Javier 2019). Certainly, the young Fang student Teresa<sup>73</sup> did not know that the *Plaza del Reloj* was also called *Plaza de Mocache*. Nor did she know that Macías gave numerous speeches there. She was not even aware of the colonial symbolism of the *Torre del Reloj*. In fact, her response was very illustrative, beyond the detail about the *Torre de la Libertad* and the bars that have recently opened to serve the thirsty walkers: "my grandmother must know all this about the *Plaza del Reloj*, but nobody explained it to me" (Informant: Teresa 2019). Despite Macías's terror, José was reserved about which of the two presidents most strongly opposed the colonial legacy: "On who has done more to erase traces of colonialism, I would say both presidents. Macías was brutal, confronted colonialism because he was the liberator. But, although more refined and ideological, like Macías Obiang has confronted the meaning of colonisation" (Informant: José 2019).

In this general framework, the Battian protest against the destruction of the clock tower in a dictatorial and repressive environment gave a clear indication of society's dissatisfaction with Obiang. That the contestation was largely Fang (as they are the best represented group in the city), means that opposition exists in spite of the self-serving identification the two dictators have made between the Fang and national identity to divide the population. It therefore seems clear that, despite the president's proclamations, many Fang want the dictatorial regime to end as much as the other ethnic groups. The unease has taken its toll on the Equatorial Guinean people. As Carmina concluded, "after Macías and Obiang, we do not need another dictator who plunges the country into terror. It would be worse than Obiang! Whoever wins will want to steal. I prefer them to steal what they can because they can't take all the wealth. But, please, no killing" (Informant: Carmina 2009).

## 2 Al-Hoceima – Taghzout: The Glocal Affirmation of the Riffian Community

After colonial independence, the city of Alhucemas was officially renamed Al-Hoceima and popularly Taghzout, although the latter is not commonly heard. The oldest Riffians still refer to it as Alhucemas, or even *Bíya*, using a spelling

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73 Teresa, twenty-one, is Fang. She lives between Bata and Spain. Interviewed in Barcelona in August 2019.

that differs from the Spanish *Villa* of yesteryear. If the weekly market, as Merien and Hamid claim, that gave rise to the name Taghzout existed, it must have disappeared with the construction of the city. With it, some potentially intangible heritage was lost too, since few people remember the word being used to refer to what would later constitute the centre of Alhucemas.<sup>74</sup>

As explained above, Al-Hoceima grew rapidly, absorbing *Cala del Quemado*, Mount Malmusi and expanding inland towards Morro Nuevo and Morro Viejo, which were mostly populated by Spaniards. These areas formed the current city, which began to be widely populated by Riffians after independence. New neighbourhoods appeared in the 1980s and 1990s and the Spanish community reconstituted itself in fits and starts, but never again reached the 91 percent it did in the 1933 census. Al-Hoceima's economic vitality sank with the Spanish departure, as the canning factories ended up closing and the owners of the fishing vessels moved to the peninsula. The mining activity also declined, leaving the city with little commercial and industrial dynamism.

Fortunately, the population data for Al-Hoceima is somewhat more transparent and reliable than that for Bata. It allows us to see the city's remarkable growth since the 1970s, with the population doubling in 1982 and showing a certain increase in 1994. It then stabilised, probably due to a lack of industries and companies to accelerate its growth. Moroccan state projections calculate that the population will remain stable with a slight decline in 2020 (see Table 46).

The history of Spanish colonisation is thus recorded in the city of Al-Hoceima, not least because of the Riffian victory over the Spanish and the founding of the Republic of the Rif. A stateless nation was forged that, despite postcolonial ups and downs, has catapulted an ethnic identity into the future by using the Riffian to promote a glocal process of Amazigh identification. Opposing this project is a Moroccan state, that has inherited colonial territorial boundaries and has sought nothing more than to dilute the Rif's sociocultural homogeneity by fragmenting its territorial unity<sup>75</sup>.

74 Perhaps they were not the only ones concerned about the old market being forgotten: an occasional market in the square shows that its former weekly function has been regained, although Merien has complained, "the place is named in Arabic, not Amazigh" (Informant: Merien 2019).

75 The Rif region I am referring to is based on B.G. Hoffman (1967), whose map drawn in 1958 accurately delimited the following territories of ancient *dhaqbitsh*: "Metiua, Mestasa, Beni Guemil, Beni Bu Frah, Beni Itteft, Bokoia, Beni Urriaguel, Temsamam, Beni Tasin, Beni Oulichek and Tafersit." I dismissed interesting were the works of the Riffian geographical delimitation, and the borders imposed by Spanish structures, which varied according to their concrete colonial interests. I also dismissed the Riffian area delimited by researchers such as Hart (1976a: 1–5) for whom the Rif included Ghomara, Senhadja du

TABLE 46 Population of Al-Hoceima

1950	1960	1971	1982	1994	2004	2014	2020 <sup>a</sup>
10,770	11,262	18,686	41,662	55,216	54,333	56,716	55,530

a Note that in this section on the postcolonial history of Al-Hoceima, the latest data available is from 2014, and it is not possible to update it.

SOURCE: COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. *BOP*, XXXVIII, NO. 1, 1950 (P. 16–17). HART (1976A: 17–18). *RECENSEMENT DE LA POPULATION* 1971, 1981, 1994, 2004, OF *COMMUNE URBAINE D'AL HOCEIMA*. *RECENSEMENT GENERAL DE LA POPULATION ET DE L'HABITAT 2014.A\** PROJECTION 2020, IN *PROJECTIONS DE LA POPULATION DES PROVINCES ET PREFECTURES DE LA REGION TANGER-TETOUAN-AL HOCEIMA 2014–2030* (P. 39).

Al-Hoceima was on the margins of kingdom and colony and subsequently of the postcolonial state since its foundation. However, it has become central towards uniting Riffian desires to find their place in a global world. The postcolonial state, based around the makhzen and overridingly Arab, had crushed successive Riffian protests, notably in 1958–1959 and 1984. In the first uprising, the Moroccan government explained that the Riffians had intended to provoke a civil war with the aim of re-establishing the Republic of the Rif, an argument made in the country for decades. By the time of the second one, the Riffian image was too badly tarnished to receive explicit support from other regions and it coincided with Hassan II's "years of lead."

The repression of the Rif region led thousands of Riffians to migrate to Morocco and Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s, diminishing their ability to articulate a solid identity movement in the region. The situation changed after the Amazigh protests in Morocco in the 2000s, and with the 2011 constitutional reform. These were key elements that allowed Amazigh discomfort to be reversed, although hopes were dashed again when the Moroccan state shut down the *Hirak* movement in 2017 and imprisoned its leader, Nasser Zefzafi, along with a variety of leaders (some minor), who participated in the protests.

Starting in 2010, graffiti began to appear in different emblematic places in Al-Hoceima. Some of the most interesting were those that appeared at the *Playa del Quemado* viewpoint and the old Spanish cannery. As we will see, *Playa del Quemado* was where the Riffians were conquered, first by Spanish

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Srair and Jbala. Riffian native language is generally Tarifit. To clarify this point, I suggest González Vázquez (2018: 131–133).

troops in 1925, and later by Moroccan troops in 1959. Some graffiti on the balustrade of the viewpoint overlooking the beach says “Rif-Land” – a declaration of intent with respect to the memory of Al-Hoceima and Riffian territory. For its part, the Spanish cannery was a company in which Riffian women suffered greatly from long working hours and difficult labour, so the graffiti saying “Rif” is a very direct way of showing accountability to the city’s colonial memory. Both graffiti are good examples of how contested cultural heritage merges past and present, and is projected into the future.

In what follows, I present a history of postcolonial Al-Hoceima that retraces these issues, and contrasts voices from the Rif, Morocco and Spain.

### 2.1 *Al-Hoceima becomes Riffian: From the Repression of 1958–1959 and 1984 to the Creation of IRCAM in 2001 and the Truth Commission in 2005*

Morocco’s independence was proclaimed on March second 1956 in the French Protectorate and on April seventh in the Spanish one. Many of the Spaniards who remained in Alhucemas during the summer of 1958 remember the visit of Mohamed V as the precise moment that Moroccan discontent about Spanish colonisation became clear: “Shortly after proclaiming independence, Mohamed V came north and reached Alhucemas. And I never saw a welcome like it! The sultan came with an open car and the natives threw themselves on top of the car to stop it. Then we understood that in the north they also wanted independence. I left ... There was nothing to do there anymore!” (Informant: Pepe 2016).<sup>76</sup> That visit, so hailed by some, sought to bring about rapprochement between the sultan and the Rif region, something that, as we shall see, was not to be and ended with thousands of deaths in the Rif. This is why Hamid’s memory of the visit was less enthusiastic than Pepe’s. Voice cracking slightly, he said: “He had come to Al-Hoceima. Everyone knows about it and remembers it” (Informant: Hamid 2019).

At that time, Al-Hoceima was already fully integrated into its Riffian surroundings, and was the hub for trading produce, administrative procedures, schooling and healthcare. As Hart (1976a: 71) recalled, “Al-Hoceima ... by 1940 [was] becoming integrated into the life of the surrounding tribal lands; by 1950 it had become completely so.” Spanish was the administrative language in the city until 1956, when it was replaced by Arabic and French. Pepe recalled the change of administration: “the Moroccan government sent its officials, who

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76 This account comes from Pepe. For more on that controversial visit to the old Spanish Protectorate, Ybarra (1997: 341) is recommended.

were from the French zone, and who, being from there ... were better trained ... The French ... invested more ... When independence came, the south was better prepared than the north" (Informant: Pepe 2016). The issue of education was probably important in configuring the state's new administrative cadres, but it certainly influenced the makhzen's takeover of the city. In addition, according to information from Hart (1976a: 71), by the end of the 1950s the Riffians had already joined the administration, even though they had only recently arrived in the city: "apart from the governor and some of his immediate staff, almost all the administrative personnel and almost all the inhabitants of the town are Riffians only a generation removed – if that – from the countryside."

The independent Moroccan state aimed to control the whole of Morocco, and the Rif could not be an exception. Seddon (1973, 1976, 1979), who had studied the province of Nador in detail, divided the history of the north of the country into periods for the years between 1870 and 1970. His intention was to demonstrate that the socio-political changes the area underwent from the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century were related to the makhzen ceasing to collect taxes with the use of force because, after colonisation, payment was managed by a centralised makhzen administration. Seddon (1973: 111) concluded that five periods could be distinguished, taking into account the relationship between the Rif and the makhzen: a) 1860–1890, with the traditional management of tax collection, marked by the use of weapons and of force; b) 1890–1908, the precolonial period; c) 1909–1956, the Spanish occupation of the area; d) 1956–1960, the first years of independence, with the clear exclusion of Moroccan citizenry from the state-building process, which was controlled by the king; and e) 1960–1970, the "present" situation, under King Hassan II, who also took on governmental duties as prime minister. In his postcolonial schema, the role of the monarchy and of himself was key. What is certain is that on July ninth, 1957 he was appointed successor to Mohamed V and invested on March third, 1961, after his father's death. The legitimacy he inherited was based on kinship, religion and the monarchy's historical activity (Fierro 1991: 166). On June second, 1961, the constitutional monarchy was established.

Decades later, Wyrzten (2013: 621) revisited Seddon's argument noting, "one of the most significant of these processes was the introduction of a radically different notion of state power." For him, "pacification" had reconfigured the 'non-state space', because it subjugated "largely Berber (Tamazight) speaking regions in the Rif and Atlas Mountain ranges and in the pre-Sahara regions of the south" (Wyrzten 2013: 621). The monopoly on force eliminated the threat of armed dissent against the colonial state. Wyrzten (2013: 622) concluded, "the

total military pacification of Morocco consolidated not only a territorial but also a nascent social unit.”

What is certain is that on his return to Rabat from exile in 1955, Mohamed V was forced to create representative institutions and draft a Constitution. This gave him the institutional power of the state and moral authority over the Moroccans once independence was achieved. As Geertz (2003: 252) points out, his return facilitated the makhzen's political and cultural revival, perhaps as a “modernizing autocracy.” Aware that the other source of power recognised by all citizens was the Istiqlal party, the standard-bearer for the nationalist movement, Mohamed V sought closer ties with Istiqlal, as well as others like the Democratic Party of Independence and the Popular Movement.<sup>77</sup> It was Mahjoubi Aherdane who founded the Popular Movement in 1957 (Miller 2013: xxiii). The party was criticised for not defending Amazigh interests (Willis 2002). Rosen (1979) confirms this, describing the difficulty Amazigh people had voting for Amazigh parties. In those days, Mohamed V had the moral authority and nominal power, but the Istiqlal had the social recognition and some control of the National Liberation Army. The most pressing issue for Mohamed V was therefore to include the National Liberation Army, as some leaders questioned the work of the Istiqlal both in the Rif (Wyrzten 2013, 2015), and in other areas of the Atlas and Tafilalt (Geertz 2003: 253). This is a key issue, because it helps explain the serious consequences for the Rif area of openly maintaining its opposition when the revolt took place at the end of 1958.<sup>78</sup>

Before continuing with the events of 1958, it should be noted that the configuration of the city of Al-Hoceima changed substantially after colonial independence, because most of the Spanish left. As López García (2013: 255) points out, “except for these few thousand and those who settled in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, Morocco's Spaniards no longer live in North Africa.” Pepe said, “in 1956 Moroccan independence marked the decline of the Spanish in Alhucemas, as they had to return to Spain” (Informant: Pepe 2015). Maria recalled, “the officials left first” (Informant: María 2016). Pepe also explained, “we had to up and leave everything, and those who couldn't sell their houses,

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77 It is worth briefly noting that after independence Morocco established a multiparty system – albeit not developed democratically – which led to opposition parties confronting the system (Zahra 1995: 61). In 1992 all the opposition parties – the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, the Istiqlal, the Organisation for Democratic and Popular Action, the National Union of Popular Forces, and the Party for Progress and Socialism – united to demand the revision of the constitution and constitutional guarantees (Daoud 1993: 332).

78 Geertz (2003: 253) writes that what made the Rif different was that “the king's personal popularity, diplomatic ability, military strength and religious charisma” prevailed over the discontent.

a minority, had to leave all their belongings, including televisions, which were very expensive, and very scarce on the peninsula.” And, he concluded, “with independence everyone had to emigrate, even though my parents wanted to stay a while longer” (Informant: Pepe 2015).

Few Spaniards remained in Al-Hoceima in the first period after independence. Some of those who stayed became more cautious, somewhat afraid of how their relations with the Moroccans would change. Maria recalled, “we were never afraid of the Moors, of rape or anything. They showed us a lot of respect. It was after independence ... Everything changed.” In her case, after her wedding in 1957, she explained, “every time the ship came from Málaga, a lot of people got onboard to escape! And we saw the Moors watching the boats from the mountains, with their rifles ... In 1958, we felt very threatened!” For Maria, the shift from colonial to postcolonial times was very evident: “the Moors in 1958 were not the same, they were puffed up!” They had to renegotiate rents and begin to treat Moroccans with more respect: “the day came when my mother had Moorish tenants ... they told her that ‘this was no longer theirs, that it belonged to the *chafarillo*. ‘*Mohamadillo*’ – which is what we called him – we had to start calling ‘Mohamed’ because the Moors were getting full of themselves. And we all went back to Spain and dispersed.” Maria’s parents were among those who stayed into the 1970s. As we shall see, the community grew again without ever returning to its original size. Maria said that her father “never lost his home and never wanted to sell it, they rented it, but they didn’t want to sell!”

The change in relations between Spaniards and Moroccans took place after 1956, and especially from the early 1960s onwards. From then until today, an ostensibly more believable narrative of Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood and egalitarian relations has been reconstructed. Merien’s father, Mustafa, proudly explained that he had more Spanish than Moroccan friends. His work as a sewing machine repairman brought him into contact with the city’s Spanish community, but as a worker, not as a friend, and most of his close relations with the Spanish were consolidated after independence, not before. Of course, despite a lifetime working for them, they never registered him in the social security system or anything like that. So when his retirement age approached, all the official procedures he initiated were unsuccessful and he was greatly disappointed not to be entitled to any pension. Merien was angry and disappointed, “there’s no right! ... I went to Nador, to the Spanish Consulate ... he had been working for Spaniards all his life ... but even though he had all the paperwork, they told him that all the companies had closed” (Informant: Merien 2017).

As soon as the Spanish left, the Riffians arrived and settled in Al-Hoceima. As Maria recalled: “Dad didn’t want to sell his properties that, he was sorry to.

TABLE 47 Population of Al-Hoceima and most influential *rural communes* of the area.  
1960 Census

		Total	Moroccans	Europeans (spaniards)
Urban context	Al-Hoceima	11,262	9,139	2,123
<i>Rural communes</i> <sup>a</sup>	Ibuqquyen	12,200	12,190	10
(ancient <i>dhaqbitsh</i> )	Aït	75,988	75,895	93
	Waryaghar			
	Temsamam	37,598	37,581	17

a Tribal structures, *dhaqbitsh*, were named “rural communes” (Hart 1976a: 17).

SOURCE: HART (1976A: 17–18).

He also said that it was time to buy everything! Dad rented everything, the houses and the cottages too.” It should be said that the migration to the city was not so advantageous for the first Riffian women. Hamid’s mother did not leave the house for years, Hamid proudly explained, which was not the case for his daughters, who left to study. For her part, Malika studied only until the age of nine, so she could neither read nor write: “I no longer remember anything I learnt. I only know how to count” (Informant: Malika 1996). Malika was forced to leave school because of its distance from her home. She explained, “I couldn’t go alone. That’s why I gave up my studies. The truth is that I didn’t care because I didn’t like it at all” (Informant: Malika 1996).

The process of the Amazigh population settling in the city led to the inevitable Riffian appropriation of Al-Hoceima, as can be seen in the population tables from the 1960 census, which show the change in the city’s make-up (see Table 47). In fact, the most representative *dhezqba’ir* were the Ibuqquyen, Aït Waryaghar, Temsamam and, according to Al-Hoceima City Council, Beni Tuzin<sup>79</sup> – two from the Rif region and two from the Eastern Region, although when explaining the significance of Al-Hoceima to many Riffians, Merien only included “Ibuqquyen, Aït Waryaghar and Temsamam” (Informant: Merien 2018).

At the same time as a Riffian population was expanding in Al-Hoceima, the Riffian *dhezqba’ir* around the city were also growing, with the Aït Waryaghar of Abd el-Krim, particularly notable. Hart (1976a: 19) compared the size of Aït

79 Al-Hoceima explanatory document issued by the Commune Urbaine d’Al-Hoceima, p. 1.

Waryaghar with other *dhaqbitsh* across the whole of Morocco, and found them to be the most numerous group, surpassed only by the Algerian Kabyle in the whole of rural North Africa. He therefore concluded that the Aït Waryaghar were the most influential *dhaqbitsh* in the whole Rif area.

It is highly interesting to note that these new civil regions, as in the previous organisation, divided the Amazigh Rif in half, separating the “Rif” from the so-called “Eastern Region”. The most prominent example of this was evident in how the Nador and the Temsamam *dhaqbitsh* were severed from neighbouring Al-Hoceima and from the Aït Waryaghar *dhaqbitsh*. These divisions hindered Riffian unity. The Temsamam were one of the most influential in 1957 (Seddon 1973: 115), along with the Aït Waryaghar, according to the figures contained in the table above. Dividing the Rif in half had the effect of weakening Riffian cohesion and projecting its identity as Amazigh (González Vázquez 2015a; Troin 2002). Today, that identity has been further diluted by the new reconfiguration of the Moroccan provinces that unites ancient *dhaqbitsh* from the north with others from further south.

From 1956 onwards, state initiatives began to spread schooling across urban Morocco. But despite the child population rising, the educational means did not increase significantly. In the 1960s, by sex, the ratio of students was one woman to six men in cities, and one woman to twenty-six men in rural communities. In the late 1970s, 67 percent of the urban child population was educated, compared to 29 percent in rural areas. The state sought to fix this with the 1981–1985 plan (Belarbi 1991: 64–5). Although in 1990 schooling continued to spread in urban areas, it was still very problematic in rural ones. Urban primary school education rates were 88 percent for boys and 85 percent for girls (between the ages of seven and thirteen), but in rural areas, the figures were 58 percent for boys and 30 percent for girls (Courbage 1993: 56). School enrolment among those aged fourteen to sixteen in urban settings was 100 percent among boys and 74.8 percent among girls; in rural areas it continued to decline, falling to 26.4 percent for boys and 9.6 percent for girls (Abaakrouch 1993: 252). In the case of Al-Hoceima, the 2014 statistics reflected an illiteracy rate of 23.3 percent higher for women compared to men; a high rate of post-secondary school dropouts; and interesting data on the use of Amazigh, Darija and French, where the exclusive use of Darija amounted to the modest figure of 10.4 percent, while that of Amazigh was somewhat higher (see Table 48).<sup>80</sup>

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80 On Moroccan sociolinguistic research, see the works of Vicente et al. (2017) and Benítez (2010).

TABLE 48 Alhucemas education and illiteracy data: 2014 census

	Male	Female	Total average
Illiteracy rate	13.6	32.8	23.3
Education level: preschool	–	–	24.2
Education level: primary	–	–	1.8
Education level: secondary col.	–	–	24.3
Education level: secondary qual.	–	–	19.6
Education level: higher	–	–	13.2
Arabic only	20.1	15.4	17.7
French and Arabic	31.4	24.6	28
Arabic, French and another language	29.6	23.6	26.6
Arabic, another language except French	4.1	2.6	3.3
Other languages	0.8	0.7	0.8
Local language: Darija only	10.4	9.3	9.8
Local language: Darija and Amazigh	69.4	62	65.7
Local language: Amazigh only	18.6		22.8

SOURCE: REPORT *RECENSEMENT GENERAL DE LA POPULATION ET DE L'HABITAT 2014* (PP. 67–68).

Excessive unemployment in Al-Hoceima is one of the main reasons for migration. In 2014, unemployment rose to 21.8 percent: 14.8 percent for men and 40.1 for women.<sup>81</sup> The region represented only 0.2 percent of Morocco's industry in 2014,<sup>82</sup> a negligible figure considering how the area had stood out for its fishing and mining activity. Schwarz (2017: 324) analysed the generation of young educated Moroccans who were either in a precarious situation or out of work, and connected it with current social protest movements through the

81 Report *Recensement General de la Population et de l'Habitat 2014*, p. 71, available on Direction Régionale de Tanger Tétouan Al Hoceima website.

82 Government of the Kingdom of Morocco, industrial contribution data by région available at: <http://www.data.gov.ma/data/fr/dataset/industrie-selon-les-regions-l-observatoire-marocain-de-l-industrie/resource/932fa0a5-2692-4cd7-8760-5f3b955f339d>. Accessed November 2021.

concept of “waithood” – a period of time when young people have no expectations, and find themselves in what may be described as *limbo*. One of his informants, Omar, who was born in a small Riffian town and studied in Fez, had joined his contemporaries in protesting because of his despair at the low wages he received after completing his master’s degree. Omar’s biography has much in common with that of many other Riffians and the majority of today’s young Moroccans. Merien was clear about Al-Hoceima – the situation was unsustainable:

there is no work there. Those who live there have nothing, zero. Only those with relatives who send them money every month live well. The others have a terrible time. Also, in the Rif there is a lot of cancer and not many hospitals. There are a lot of cancer patients! And the land is not green, it is all stone. Nothing grows because of how much they bombed us! We are poor.

INFORMANT: MERIEN 2018

For the first three years of independence, the formal structure of the Moroccan government and administration barely changed at all, and although numerous political parties emerged, communication between the centre and the periphery, and urban and rural areas, did not improve (Seddon 1973: 133). In fact, pre-independence political parties did not seek the support of the northern *dhzqba’ir*, and specifically those of the Rif (Ashford 1961: 45–56). So it was not until the Liberation Army emerged in 1954 that members of those *dhzqba’ir* felt involved in an active fight against colonisation, even though the activity was focused on the French zone (Seddon 1973: 132–133). In areas like the Rif, the population was confident that there would be a substantial improvement in their services and living conditions. They hoped that independence would resemble what the Spanish had enjoyed during colonisation, which they were unable to take advantage of as far as the same privileges were concerned. But that was not what happened. The Alaouite monarchy’s disinterest in the Rif region became clear after independence.

Geertz (2003: 233) recalls that in the postcolonial period the Riffians were offended when they found out that “their substantial military contribution to the fight for independence was not rewarded with greater government aid in the form of schools, jobs and better connections.” For Geertz (2003: 233), this was the time the Riffians revolted again, “refusing to pay taxes, boycotting local markets, retreating to the mountains to engage in predatory activities to win Rabat’s consideration.” The disillusionment of the Riffian people was already too great.

Dissent grew in the areas containing the poorest and most underdeveloped *dhzqba'ir* when they perceived that the Spanish departure had not led to an improvement in their living conditions (Seddon 1973: 134). In fact, Ashford (1961: 212–213) reported that precarious rural conditions led to numerous uprisings in different areas of Morocco, although the Rif uprising of October 1958 was the most important. As we shall see, the uprising could not be subdued until Hassan II, son of King Mohamed V, led a 20,000 strong royal navy force against the area (Seddon 1973: 134). Waterbury (1975: 235–243) points out that the most important complaints related to administrative injustices, interference in judicial matters by political parties and, of course, unemployment, unfair taxation, lack of hospitals, highways, schools and agricultural credits. As Geertz (2003: 255) concluded, “the plan of absorbing the irregular military forces formed by the tribes into the Royal Army during the sultan’s exile – the so-called Liberation Army – was an extremely difficult task that led to open clashes.”

Abd el-Krim was still in exile in Egypt when the Riffian rebellion of 1958–1959 broke out. As Hart (1976b: 45) recalled, from his forced residence on Reunion Island (1926–1947) he changed to “voluntary residence in Egypt from June 1947 until his death in February 1963.” Ybarra (1997: 336) claims that the reason for his not wanting to return to Morocco was “his particular phobia of the Istiqlal party.” She even commented that Abd el-Krim’s eldest son visited the king Mohamed V in May 1958, “to express his father’s misgivings about the Istiqlal, especially against their leader Allal al-Fassi, with whom he had severed ties” (Ybarra 1997: 336). However, his failure to return after 1956 had more to do with the tangible royal disinterest in having a potential rival on Moroccan soil, as well as the cultural and regional differences inside Morocco.<sup>83</sup>

Mohamed V’s response to Abd el-Krim’s requests was to name the well-known Riffian, General Mizzian, a former military officer given high honours by Franco, Chief of all the Royal Armed Forces of the Northern Zone (Ybarra 1997: 338).<sup>84</sup> With that appointment, Abd el-Krim in Egypt as well as the Riffians understood that the fight would be relentless, and that if they could not withstand it, their integration into the country without recognition or privileges was inevitable. As pointed out Ybarra (1997: 344), Hassan II declared that “he was not going to consent’ to a few Berber uprisings jeopardising the authority of his father, the king.”<sup>85</sup> Ybarra (1997: 342) recalled how the Rif Liberation

83 This period was very well described by Jean and Simone Lacouture (1958).

84 Ybarra (1997: 340) explained how Mohamed V tried unsuccessfully to win over the Riffians by officially returning land seized by the Spanish to Abd el-Krim’s family, as well as making monthly payments for the entire family to return Morocco.

85 See Ybarra (1997: 344).

Army resisted and in December 1958 managed to “take all the accesses to Villa Sanjurjo (Alhucemas), allowing only Spaniards to pass through. Their demands in exchange for laying down their arms were: the departure of the *qaid*s from outside their region and the appointment of their leaders as the area’s principal authorities.”

The Riffian resistance led to the decision that it would be the crown prince, Hassan II, who would lead thousands of soldiers into the Rif in January 1959. The difficult Riffian terrain meant once again, that the region would be conquered by sea, with the landing in Al-Hoceima, just as the Spanish had done in 1925 (Ybarra 1997: 343). *Cala del Quemado* was once again an exceptional viewpoint for witnessing the taking of the Rif region and the conquest of the territory, this time by the makhzen.

This is how Hassan II managed to subjugate the movement by force, leaving thousands of dead throughout the area, including in the immediate vicinity of Al-Hoceima. As Iskander (2010: 44) recounts, Hassan II “left 3,000 dead and a region that would remain politically marginalised during his reign.” Dahbia,<sup>86</sup> a forty-two year old liberal professional born in Oujda and resident in Rabat, told me, “the 1959 revolt was very severe. They still remember it today. Children died ...! Please!” (Informant: Dahbia 2018).

In 1959, the revolt ended and the mistrust between the makhzen and the Rif, as well as between the Moroccan and Riffian population grew (Ybarra 1997: 344). The repression of the *dhaqbitsh* that historically gave most support to Abd el-Krim was particularly harsh (Seddon 1973: 114). Mohamed V’s gesture of reconciliation by visiting Cairo did not do much to help redirect the makhzen’s relationship with the Rif. As Aidi (2017: 15) explained, “in 1960 King Mohammed V went to Cairo to reconcile with Abd el-Krim, addressing him as a ‘father’ and inviting him to return to Morocco. But the monarch died soon after, and upon coming to power in 1961, his son, King Hassan II ... published a new Constitution, which Abd el-Krim quickly condemned for its lack of ‘democratic contours.’” As Aidi (2017: 15) concluded, “Hassan also participated in a policy of economically isolating and strangling the north.”

For Aziza (Tassouli 2017: 1), what happened was framed by the changes that integration into the Moroccan state involved for the Rif. The revolt was motivated by their precarious economic situation, while the local Spanish-speaking Riffian elite was excluded in favour of French-speakers from the rest of Morocco. The colonial legacies of the French Protectorate were clearly

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86 Dahbia is forty-two, born in Oujda in 1976. Interviewed in Rabat, Sevilla and Barcelona since 2015.

substantial compared to those of the Spanish Protectorate, something that Pepe could not help but recognise:

in the French zone they were better trained than in the Spanish: the French did more works, invested more and, what happened is that independence came and since the south was better prepared than northern Morocco, the leaders who arrived were from the French zone and spoke French. So they went on to take up roles in city councils, security and also as teachers.

INFORMANT: PEPE 2016

Shortly after the 1958–1959 repression, Riffian migration began to urban areas in Morocco and to Europe. For Seddon (1973: 114), these migration flows began in 1963. Tangier was one of the most popular destinations in the north of Morocco (Aidi 2017), but so were cities in the centre of the country like Rabat and Casablanca,<sup>87</sup> as my fieldwork of the 1990s (Aixelà-Cabrè 2000) shows. However, most Riffian migrants went to Europe, especially France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Spain (particularly Catalonia).

Hart (1976a: 93) described high unemployment between 1956 and 1960, aggravated by the uprising that prompted the migration of Riffians to West Germany through Spain and France from the mid-1960s: “700 went from Al-Hoceima [provincia] (or so I was told).” In fact, many of the Riffians who came to Catalonia also did so as a second or third destination, due to the complicated legal situation some encountered in these countries, as is shown in the ongoing research by Jordi Moreras.<sup>88</sup>

In 1974, Riffian migrants from the administrative provinces of Rif and Nador represented 18 percent of all migration from the kingdom of Morocco (Iskander 2010: 44). This is a very high figure as a proportion of the country’s total population and underlines the lack of job opportunities in the Rif area. Hamid and Merien’s families illustrate the Riffian exodus to Europe perfectly, which began then and continues to this day. Hamid has four brothers and, except for one sister who lives in Al-Hoceima, all are spread across different countries:

87 Amazigh migration from rural to urban contexts has been a constant in the country’s urbanisation process, as many anthropologists have found. A couple of specific examples are the studies done by Rosen (1984: 15) in the city of Sefrou and Adam (1973) in Casablanca.

88 Personal communication from Jordi Moreras, Faculty Member at Universitat Rovira i Virgili in Tarragona.

one of my sisters lives in Madrid, and rarely goes to Morocco; another brother lives in Belgium and is building a house on the street below our mother [in Al-Hoceima]; and another lives in France. The older brother who lived in the Netherlands died a few years ago, although his wife and children occasionally go to Al-Hoceima. I live in Spain, but I try to spend long periods of time in Al-Hoceima now that I have lost my job. I have my own house there, but I try to go almost every day to see my mother and take care of her.

INFORMANT: HAMID 2016

Merien, who lives in Catalonia, is one of four sisters, “one lives in the Netherlands, another lives in Belgium, and another lives with my mother in Al-Hoceima to take care of her, as she is very old. Every summer we try to get our families together there” (Informant: Merien 2009). These are just a few of many examples. Nur el-Huda’s husband, who was from the Rif, took her from Taza to the Netherlands in the 1980s. Also Amazigh, she had previously emigrated to the home of her paternal uncle in France at the age of eight, but at eighteen, she asked to return because “I didn’t like Paris ... I didn’t feel comfortable among those people” (Informant: Nur el-Huda 1997). It did not surprise her, therefore, when her second husband took her to the Netherlands: “[there] he was a representative of a well-known commercial chocolate firm” (Informant: Nur el-Huda 1997). Although the relationship ended badly and she did not get a divorce until years after her return, because “my husband was a very popular man in Al-Hoceima with a lot of power ... No one paid any attention to me” (Informant: Nur el-Huda 1997). Naima<sup>89</sup> was a Riffian born in Alhucemas who had to emigrate in search of work in the 1970s and settled at her sister’s house in Salé. She had studied Spanish in Al-Hoceima, Tangier and Tétouan because her father’s job meant the whole family moved often. The departure of many Riffians whose families were beginning to settle in Al-Hoceima slowed an expansion that might have been more pronounced. The neighbourhoods once populated by Spaniards were filled with Riffians in the *barrio Obrero*, *barrio de los Pescadores*, *barrio de los Ingenieros*, and so on. Hamid’s father bought a house in 1961:

My parents lived in the village until they moved to Al-Hoceima. It was 1961 and they were one of the first families to buy a house. It was in the Barrio

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89 Naima was a Riffian born in Al-Hoceima in 1963. She lived in Casablanca after her migration in 1994. Interviewed from 1993 to 1997 in Casablanca.

Obrero, the ground floor and the first floor. It is now rented because in the 1990s my father built a three-story building, which they moved to. It was a new neighbourhood called Heddo. So there was always space for everyone! There were five children, and my mother lives there now.

INFORMANT: HAMID 2016

Like many other Riffians, Hamid's father set up a store in the basement of his house in the Barrio Obrero in the 1980s, where he sold everything, including food and drinks. However, his very high expectations with regard to income, and the people's very low purchasing power led him to close the business. Unlike him, many others continued, so the downtown area is littered with small businesses that must report meagre profit. In fact, according to economic figures for 2014, the majority of the population is employed (65.1 per cent), while a large chunk is self-employed (26.2 per cent).<sup>90</sup>

The city grew, the neighbourhoods were renamed and new ones appeared like Sraghna, Marmoucha and Heddo. The elderly still remember the Spanish names. The settlement of Riffians in the city resulted in the gradual purchase, rather than renting of homes. In 2014, the percentage of home ownership was 56.5 per cent, compared to the renting of accommodation, which was 27.9 per cent.<sup>91</sup> These figures resulted in high rates of poverty and inequality in the area (see Table 49).

The Spanish community of Al-Hoceima was partially rebuilt between the late 1960s and early 1970s. They were boosted by the creation of the Casa de España in 1961, which brought together the old Spanish social clubs (Rubio Alfaro and

TABLE 49 Poverty and inequality 2007 (last data available)

	Poverty rate	Inequality index
Al Hoceima	1.9	39.5
Nador	7	42.9

SOURCE: *INDICATEURS COMMUNAUX DE LA PAUVRETÉ, DE LA VULNÉRABILITÉ ET DE L'INÉGALITÉ DEL HAUT-COMISSARIAT AU PLAN.*

90 Report *Recensement General de la Population et de l'Habitat 2014*, p. 20. Available from the Direction Régionale de Tanger Tétouan Al-Hoceima.

91 Report *Recensement General de la Population et de l'Habitat 2014*, p. 73. Available from the Direction Régionale de Tanger Tétouan Al-Hoceima.

Lacalle Alfaro 1993: 148). Finally, Hispano–Riffian coexistence was to become a reality, with relations established on the basis of greater equity. For example, Abdel,<sup>92</sup> a Riffian from Al-Hoceima in his late fifties, recalled the Spanish community that existed then: “when I was born, there were still [Spaniards] here, but there were many more in colonial times that had already begun to leave. The Spanish stayed until 1974, but in 1975 with what happened in the Sahara, almost all of them left. Those of us who are over fifty years old, in general, all speak or understand some Spanish” (Informant: Abdel 2016). Rhimou explained that her husband became very strict towards her and her children and extraordinarily jealous when they went out to parties or to dance with the Spaniards living in town, with whom they had become friends. Rhimou qualified this: “the Spaniards were his friends, not mine. Although I had relationships with their wives, they never came to visit me” (Informant: Rhimou 1993).

This is the period in which the rhetoric of Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood was forged in the city, although María recalled that at first she was quite afraid, “when my husband travelled to building sites in other places, he taught me to pray in Arabic. So that they would leave me alone, in case they attacked me!” (Informant: María 2016). And she added that at the time her husband’s workers were all Moroccans: “I had ... four or five in total, they were all Moors, and we went to Moorish weddings. I have had Moors staying here in Alicante for a while. They came to visit us, they loved us very much” (Informant: María 2016). Many Spaniards left after independence and as María recalled, the remaining ones had little work, which led to their definitive departure: “my husband left because there was no business. And when we came, those Moroccans hadn’t got going” (Informant: María 2016). The rhetoric of brotherhood was also strengthened by the positive influence of Riffians who had emigrated to Catalonia and other parts of Spain since the 1970s, and who returned to Al-Hoceima for holidays or to enjoy their retirement. Naturally, it was also consolidated by the arrival of Spaniards who settled in the city.

The longing of the ex-settlers for their life in Alhucemas led to the foundation of an association to reunite them in Spain. After its first meeting in 1988 the *Asociación de Antiguos Residentes en Alhucemas* began to publish *El Heraldillo de Alhucemas*, reusing the name of the weekly publication that appeared in the city in 1933 (Moga 2007: 95). It was a newsletter in which Spaniards remembered places and stories from Villa, and the articles were illustrated with photographs preserved by their families. It should be noted that the only pictorial records that remain from those times are of Spanish families. The Riffians’

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92 Abdel is a Riffian born in Al-Hoceima in 1961. Interviewed in Al-Hoceima in September 2016.

poverty and marginalisation made it impossible to pay for portraits, which meant that any photos of Riffians were mostly those taken by the colonial services. Halima<sup>93</sup> and her husband were among the few Riffians able to have their portraits taken, thanks to the income he earned with his knowledge of Arabic. Halima has only one photograph of herself and one of her husband, from when they were in their fifties. Both portraits are carefully arranged on her nightstand, the only testimony to her past.

Manuel Palomo, one of the presidents of the *Asociación de Antiguos Residentes en Alhucemas*, collated the documentation kept by the Spanish families and facilitated the collection's transfer. It will be shared between Spain and Morocco, with what goes to Morocco forming the basis of the future Al-Hoceima Museum to be located in the old Colegio Español which, currently in very poor condition and full of bastides, awaits restoration work.<sup>94</sup>

Al-Hoceima faced a second makhzen onslaught in 1984. Mateo Dieste (2012: 10) has pointed out that this revolt was repressed “with extreme harshness by the army, which machine-gunned villages and houses; in a televised speech the day after these riots, King Hassan II used the word *awbach* (“savages”, “waste”) to refer to Riffians.”<sup>95</sup> Peregil (2017) interviewed one of the participants, Mohamed Moha, who recounted the episode in detail: “We high school students started it ... We asked for student unions in high schools to be legalised. I was sixteen years old. I still perfectly remember the tanks he put on the streets. About 500 young people were put in jail. I was sentenced to two years in prison, from 1987 to 1989. I went through thirteen prisons in those two years.”

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that many Riffian people felt a real dislike for Hassan II, who never returned to the Rif after leading the repression of the revolt and condemned the region to the most abject poverty.<sup>96</sup> The 1984 uprising thus reopened old wounds and made the Rif once again the focus of repression by the makhzen. Two Riffians from Al-Hoceima, of different generations – Hamid, almost sixty, and Ahmed,<sup>97</sup> aged twenty-nine – were offended by the kind of excuses Hassan II gave for a cancelled visit to Rif. An example of

93 Halima was born in 1936. She is a Riffian woman who lives in Al-Hoceima. Interviewed there in September 2016.

94 For more information, see Villatoro (2017).

95 The most common translation of “awbash” is “trash.” Mateo Dieste (2010: 10–11) also highlights the harshness with which the 20-F protests in Al-Hoceima were put down compared to other Moroccan cities.

96 Notable is that the Ketama area found a source of income in the production of hashish.

97 Ahmed, twenty-nine, is a Riffian born in Al-Hoceima. Interviewed in Barcelona province in August 2019.

this was that one of his flights had been sabotaged. They concluded, “the truth is that [as king] he never visited us” (Informants: Hamid and Ahmed 2019). In the 1984 revolt, Mateo Dieste (2012: 10) recalls, “they were repressed extremely harshly by the army, which machine-gunned villages and houses.”

Silverstein (2011: 73) provided insights into the affirmation of Amazigh identity. He observed that it began to take shape when the Imazighen organised themselves – through different bodies and from different continents to form a kind of Amazigh cultural renaissance at the end of the 1960s. Amazigh students and intellectuals participated, “forming cultural associations originally in the diaspora in France; secondarily in the North African urban centres of Algiers, Tizi-Ouzou, Rabat and Agadir; and more recently in rural zones of Kabylia, the Rif, the Sous valley and the High and Middle Atlas mountains.” As Silverstein (2011: 73) suggests, the Amazigh movement was organised transnationally, albeit through “an idiom of nationalism.” As Aziza explains (Tassouli 2017: 1)

the political climate of independent Morocco, essentially characterised by repression and lack of freedom of expression, did not offer victims the possibility of expressing themselves. The work of reconciliation with the central power also involves working on memory. This ... allows the Riffians ... to condemn the atrocities committed against them by the public authorities in 1958 and 1984.

The Agadir Charter of 1991 gave visibility to the main demands of the Berber rights movement. It specified the need for them to be granted legal and constitutional recognition, to implement linguistic policies, to establish cultural and linguistic rights, to integrate Amazigh languages into the educational system and the media, and to create an institute for the Amazigh language. As we shall see, these demands led to the creation of the Institut Royale de Culture Amazigh. According to Cornwell and Atia (2012: 260), the homogenisation of the Amazigh state and invisibility “led Moroccan Amazigh to create cultural associations to help, protect and promote Amazigh identity ... in the national political discourse. In 1991, six of these national associations gathered in Agadir and drafted the ‘Agadir Charter.’”

Among the misfortunes that devastated Al-Hoceima in the 2000s, and which the Moroccan state has not remedied, was the 2004 earthquake in which 564 people died and 300 were injured (*El País* 2004). Some colonial urban heritage in the city was rebuilt (López Soler 2013: 220), but many buildings were not reinforced despite the devastating impact. Much of the city’s population continues to live in old houses. Statistics from 2014 state that only 14.9 percent and

18.2 percent of the population lived in houses of less than ten years, or those between ten and nineteen years old, respectively. The rest, 67.4 percent, live in buildings of between twenty and forty-nine years (57.8 percent) or over fifty years old (9.6 percent).<sup>98</sup> This data also reflects the slowdown in construction that has afflicted the city for decades.

The damaged buildings, visible on a simple walk through the city, provides evidence of the makhzen's lack of involvement in restoring or definitively demolishing some of the buildings affected, whether homes or business headquarters. This neglect, scattered around different corners of the city, reminds Al-Hoceima's inhabitants of the state's lack of involvement with the region. As Hamid said, "there are buildings that are dangerous and are in a sorry state ... Many years have passed and nothing is solved" (Informant: Hamid 2016). In fact, the earthquake, felt in 2016 once again worried its inhabitants about the state of their city.

However, as a gesture to "his people", after the earthquake Mohamed VI decided to spend a few days there on vacation. Merien said that after the earthquake, "he fixed up some streets and began to come in the summer" (Informant: Merien 2018). Soumaya said that "Mohamed VI has built himself a big house, a little beyond Einsolen ... And it is noticeable that in recent years there has been building work to attract tourism" (Informant: Soumaya 2016).

The creation of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) by King Mohamed VI in 2001 was an important moment. The institution was meant to overturn the makhzen's non-existent Amazigh policies. The recovery and promotion of Amazigh culture and the visibility of some Amazigh researchers supported the aims of IRCAM. However, as various researchers have also stated, following Benhaddou (2009), the strategies that Moroccan elites have historically deployed to keep themselves in power, which seek to counter the vitality of Moroccan Amazigh association in order to neutralise it, have hampered IRCAM. On a more positive note, at the time of writing, Morocco's three main Amazigh languages are being orthographically standardised in an initiative launched by the IRCAM because Moroccan Arabic, Darija, coexists with three Amazigh linguistic communities: in the Riff with Tarifit or Chelha; in the Atlas, with Tamazight; and in the Sous with Tachelhit (Kossmann 2017; Hassan Yahia 2013).

The IRCAM notably launched the makhzen's first initiative to incorporate the Amazigh language into some state institutions, specifically the school system.

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98 Report *Recensement General de la Population et de l'Habitat 2014*, p.73. Document available at the Direction Régionale de Tanger Tétouan Al Hoceima website.

To do this, an ancient script, *Tifinagh*, was given official status, and chosen as a vehicle for teaching in Amazigh (Boukous 2005). However the task was not easy, given its differences from other alphabets. Its use prompted criticism and irony among Riffians. Merien, for example, with a slightly bitter smile, said, “it means nothing is understood” (Informant: Merien 2019). Hamid was more serious and upset: “I can’t read it!” (Informant: Hamid 2019). But Ahmed was the most blunt, pointing out that the use of *Tifinagh* “was ridiculous. Nobody learns it unless they want to and they make an effort” (Informant: Ahmed 2019). As Zouhir (2014: 50) concluded, “the choice of *Tifinagh* for teaching Berber is not educational or pedagogical ... It is a policy that is imposed from above on a majority of Berbers” and adding rightly, “the question is whether the students in the first three years of their schooling will be able to acquire three completely different alphabets within three academic years.”

What more critical researchers have shown is that IRCAM has implemented policies that have aimed to redirect the resurgence of Amazigh identity, which were supported by internal partnerships and the influence of Amazigh transnational communities in Europe. For Silverstein (2011: 73), the trigger for the creation of IRCAM was the arrest of six members of the Tilelli Association in 1994, for displaying posters written in Tamazight during a May Day parade in Errachidia: “responding to the international outcry against these arrests, the government promised a series of reforms that subsequently led to the 2001 establishment of a Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) and the introduction of Tamazight into the media and primary school classrooms.” Zouhir (2014: 45) also addressed the creation of IRCAM from a critical perspective, stating that it “was not created to maintain the multicultural heritage of Morocco, but to appease Berber activists and to maintain power reputation and global recognition [of the regime].” However, on the other hand, the foundation of IRCAM was announced on October seventeenth, 2001 in the city of Ajdir,<sup>99</sup> birthplace of Abd el-Krim. With this gesture, Mohamed VI recognised the ancestry of the Riffian community in the Moroccan Amazigh body politic, while at the same time, sending out a message of peace to counter the region’s troubled past within the state framework of the state.

King Mohamed VI went on to create the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (ERC) on January seventh, 2004, which provided the opportunity for the resolution of conflicts, including those with Riffians. The ERC was an initiative that should have healed wounds and facilitated reconciliation among

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99 The data is clearly specified in the chronology on the IRCAM website: <http://www.ircam.ma/?q=fr/chronologie>. It should be added that Ajdir’s centrality is recognised in works such as that by El Manouar (2007: 18–22).

Moroccans, while also contributing to improving the image and the possibilities of the coexistence of Riffians and other Imazighen with the country's other peoples. As Aidi (2017: 15) summarised, when Mohammed VI took the throne, "he began a policy of reconciliation with Tangier and the Rif region." However, the work proved entirely insufficient. Firstly: because of the superficiality with which many issues were discussed, while others were set aside. Secondly: because the outcome was unable to reverse the rejection and marginalisation of Riffians in the rest of the country. And yet, as demonstrated by the speech King Mohamed VI gave in Al-Hoceima in July 2011, the general feeling was one of self-satisfaction and complacency. At the meeting, sponsored by the royal family, which brought together the National Human Rights Council (CNDH), the municipal council of the city of Al-Hoceima, the council of the Taza-Al-Hoceima-Taounate Region, the Council of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad and IRCAM, Mohamed VI said:

a constitutional institution has been established ... which we have adopted to guarantee the protection and promotion of human rights in our country. In this regard, we would like to acknowledge the tireless efforts of the National Human Rights Council, in collaboration with its partners, to implement the recommendations of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, with their various ramifications. These include those related to the repair of collective damage, history and the safeguarding of memory, which are of utmost importance in the consolidation of the Moroccan model: a model with recognised regional and international leadership in transitional justice, dedicated to achieving equity and reconciliation.<sup>100</sup>

It must be said that despite the satisfaction that the monarch voiced, the commission received little domestic attention in the Rif area. As Aziza (Tassouli 2017: 2) very lucidly points out, it was logical that the history of the Rif had to be considered from the perspective of reconciliation with the makhzen as "reconciliation was instead requested by the makhzen, especially after the enthronement of King Mohamed VI. However, the majority of Riffians are still reluctant to face this reconciliation, as long as there are issues that have not yet been resolved." Aziza added that the folders concerned the 'rehabilitation' of

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100 Full text of the speech addressed by the king to the Nation on the occasion of the fifty-seventh anniversary of the king and the people's revolution available at the Portail National des Collectivites Territoriales: <https://www.collectivites-territoriales.gov.ma/>.

Abd el-Krim: “Civil society in the Rif demands true recognition of the crimes committed by power for more than a century” (Tassouli 2017: 2).

## 2.2 *The Recognition of Amazighness in the Constitution (2011) and the Hirak Movement (2016–) as Riffian Responses to Marginalisation and Reprovincialisation*

As established, IRCAM was created in response to a longstanding Amazigh request as well as various Amazigh protests on local and global scales. Given that the lack of action on this matter hampered the visibility and recognition of about half of the Moroccan population, the need to address this issue was clear (Boukous 1995). In fact, Amazigh unrest had deep roots in the Alaouite Kingdom, which pointed to that fact the Rif situation was by no means exceptional. However, it was probably the worst, given the extent of repression in the Rif region. For Crawford (2005) Amazighness was the logical political response to the historical Arab opposition to their recognition in North Africa.

The socio-political visibility of the Imazighen in postcolonial Morocco is thus relatively recent, having gained strength in the 2000s (Goodman 2004; Venema and Mguild 2003; K. Hoffman 2006; Aixelà-Cabré 2007). For Errihani (2006), linguistic recognition was the crucial step towards social, economic and political recognition. In fact, Brown (1976: 208) and Chaker (1989: 10, 14) reflected on the absence of Berber languages at the administrative, public and private levels, in schools and in the media, as well as on the complete non-existence of bodies that enforce Berber customary laws. According to them, the situation had led to a decline in the use of the Amazigh language because, as Zouhir also (2014: 41) mentioned, “it occupies a rather marginal place in the linguistic repertoire of Moroccans” due to its limited influence.

Zouhir (2014: 37) focused on understanding the role of the new language policy on Amazigh, pointing out that the linguistic situation of the Berbers had taken a new turn “as it has been incorporated into the realm of Moroccan schools”. Zouhir thought that the reform of the Moroccan Constitution would allow a historical change because “it has acknowledged Berber as an official language, a move that has raised several questions with regard to the real motivation behind it.” On the unrecognised intentions of the makhzen, Silverstein (2011: 81) believed that “Berberness has become a constituent element of new Moroccan multiculturalism and a reimagined national Islamic practice.”

Thus, one of the most important issues that favoured the constitutional reform was the articulation of Amazigh mobilisation in response to the makhzen’s inaction. By structuring the movement around internal and external coordination, it was possible to finally confront the forced Arabisation that had, for decades relegated Amazigh languages and cultures to insignificance,

giving them a marginal position in the state and denying any possibility of learning them in school, or of them achieving visibility in the media (Chaker 1998; Aixelà 2002; Goodman 2004). Goodman (2004: 76) saw external, political and media support as crucial. In particular the validation of the issue by the European Commission, on the one hand, and the French press, on the other, as well as by transnational rights associations such as Amnesty International and the International League for Human Rights, made it impossible for the monarchy to ignore it.

Silverstein (2011: 67) studied how a popular festival in the city of Goulmina in southeastern Morocco was reappropriated to promote political, local and national causes, “attracting police surveillance and the repeated threat of state intervention.” He went on to say, “costumed activists regularly brandish Amazigh flags and banners that advocate the recognition of Tamazight as an official language of Morocco.” One of the most interesting questions about the case Silverstein (2011) studied was the pressure he saw exerted by the Amazigh groups to counter the rancid Moroccan nationalism that urban Arab elites and those of the *Istiqlal* had laid as foundations for unifying the nation with the Arab at the centre, and to the exclusion of Amazighness. Silverstein (2011: 71) saw all this happening while “Berber tribes and military leaders had long resisted colonial penetration, most notably in the 1921–6 Rif revolt of Abd al-Krim al-Khattabi.”

The Goulmina festival shows how an attempt to folklorise Amazigh cultural and ritual practices can become a weapon used against its promoters, in clear reference to the work done in this line by IRCAM. Because as Silverstein concluded (2011: 73), “for Goulmima Amazigh activists, the festival thus constitutes a claim to national belonging, lifting Berber and Jewish culture onto the same plane of authenticity as ... other nationally recognised aesthetic practices within the Moroccan cultural canon.” Such endeavours to reclaim Amazigh pride resulted in encouraging King Mohamed VI to propose Constitutional reform. The Amazigh demanded representation in their regions of origin, and sought the involvement of many emigrants in urban areas in the centre of the country. Mohamad VI conceded to the historic requests for visibility that the Amazigh population made, which was unthinkable under the mandate of his father, Hassan II.

After the reform, article five of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco kept Arabic as the official state language, committing to protect, develop and promote its use, but added that “Amazigh is an official language of the State, as common heritage to all Moroccans without exception.”<sup>101</sup> It is important to

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101 Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco of 2011, available on the website of the Ministry of Culture and Communication of the Kingdom of Morocco at: <http://www.maroc.ma/es/content/constituci%C3%B3n>. Accessed November 2021. The translation is of the

note that the preamble of the Constitution clearly established the indivisibility of the kingdom, incorporating the Amazigh and the Saharan into the new national construction, and setting out that Morocco was “a sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plentitude and its diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity, is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [Amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [Saharo-Hassanie] components ...”<sup>102</sup>

With this constitutional reform, in addition to integrating the Imazighen, Mohamed VI managed to promote a national feeling in a group that had not yet fully identified with Moroccanness. The effect of this was observed in the Riffian people, but also in other Amazigh populations. For Dahbia,

Riffians have a notion of the collective. The Arabs and the Imazighen, who are not from Rif, are seen by different people ... And they do not feel Moroccan! But those from Oujda, are not border people either ... They do not feel Moroccan or Algerian. They do not have that feeling of national identity, or it is not very well developed when it comes to Morocco.

INFORMANT: DAHBIA 2018

The constitutional reform finally allowed a significant proportion of the population to be recognised that, along with the lower Arab classes and some of the Jewish community, were those who had struggled most to make progress and who faced the most obstacles in attempting to improve their socio-political prospects. As Ahmed, while going through the Amazigh Moroccan regions, pointed out, “there is no work. There is a great deal of poverty in Alhucemas. And in the Atlas, it is also terrible. It is Amazigh too!” (Informant: Ahmed 2019). Furthermore, despite the changes made to legitimise Amazigh languages and the concern about including it in schools and in the media, official reports on illiteracy and language usage in Al-Hoceima province continued to leave out the assessment of the use of Tarifit, thereby ignoring Amazigh linguistic diversity. For example, one of these reports stated:

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UN: [http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CESCR/Shared%20Documents/MAR/INT\\_CESCR\\_CSS\\_MAR\\_21119\\_E.pdf](http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CESCR/Shared%20Documents/MAR/INT_CESCR_CSS_MAR_21119_E.pdf).

102 Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco of 2011. The translation is available at the UN Women website. at: <http://constitutions.unwomen.org/en/countries/africa/morocco?provisioncategory=acb7c06f73b14e8aa83789f3471fcef3>. Accessed November 2021.

the data in Table 12 shows that the phenomenon of bilingualism (Arabic and French) is very notable in Alhucemas province, since it excludes the population that can neither read nor write (39.3 percent), and those who only know Arabic, come in the second round with 23.1 percent. Those who know Arabic and French represent 22.1 percent, while other categories of languages are poorly represented.<sup>103</sup>

The Moroccan state continues to be “Arab-centric.” A very simple example is the in the naming of the city of Al-Hoceima, which was put into practice after independence. Merien, like other Riffians in the city, is aware of the makhzen’s continued interest in Arabising the area, despite the policy of preserving the Amazigh language that has been precariously implemented. This Arabising and Arab-centric policy was visible in the renaming in Arabic of squares and streets in an eminently Amazigh city. Rubio Alfaro and Lacalle Alfaro (1993:106) compile some of the major name changes. They clearly show the streets and squares with Spanish names, dedicated to illustrious Spanish figures, being changed to the Arabic names of eminent, mostly Arab figures. The chance is thus missed to replace Spanish names with Tarifit ones, and to honour notable Amazigh and Riffian personages who would represent the community

In another order of things, a still unexplained issue that helps better understand Al-Hoceima’s reach as a glocalised city was that the makhzen did not redraw the colonial territorial and administrative boundaries of the two former protectorates until 1960 and in subsequent revisions the Rif was systematically fragmented. Troin (2010) lists fifteen provinces and one prefecture in Casablanca on the 1960 map, with the inland provinces of Taza and Beni Mellal emerging, while the extended provinces of Fes, Meknés and Marrakech are amputated to give birth to the new pre-Saharan provinces (Ksar-es-Souk, now Errachidia, Ouarzazate). Noteworthy is the fact that in 1971, the French protectorate’s seven regions were retained, along with four of the Spanish ones. As Troin (2010) has pointed out, the region was further subdivided in 1989 to become forty provinces, nine prefectures and two *wilayas*, which was actually the result of an earlier redesign. However, it was in 1997 that the Kingdom of Morocco doubled the number of regions to sixteen, with forty-four provinces, 24 twenty-four prefectures and ten *wilayas*. Troin (2010) writes that this update

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103 Report *Recensement General de la Population et de l’Habitat 2014*, p. 20, available at the Direction Régionale de Tanger Tétouan Al Hoceima website. The quotation is confusing but it refers to a population that neither read, write nor probably speak Tarifit, Arabic or French. However, Tarifit is excluded from the questionnaire because for the state, it remains invisible.

included “tribal denominations for certain regions, particularly regions five (Gharb-Chrarda-Beni Hassen), ten (Rabat-Salé-Zemmour, Zaer) and eleven (Doukkala-Abda).” What is particularly revealing is “the persistent denomination of region number eight, the ‘Oriental’, a marginalised space with which it was never known what to do.” The last internal border review was in 2015,<sup>104</sup> as approved by Decree 2.15.10 of twentieth February, 2015, and was published in its official gazette on fifth March 2015 (number 6340). This new territorial division produced twelve regions, and established the number, names, chiefs, prefectures and provinces that were to make up the Kingdom of Morocco. Eventually the Moroccan state reduced the number of regions to twelve, with Western Sahara included among them.

In all these layouts recovered by Troin (2010), the Rif remains divided in two, with the Al-Hoceima area separated from the area of Nador. Its extension to the south in 1997 was an additional factor that, along with the previous one, hindered Riffian cohesion (González Vázquez 2015a). Since the separation was maintained after independence, this new structure may have been an attempt to integrate the areas of northern Morocco. These areas had been clearly divided in colonial times, and the memories of Moroccans elsewhere in the country reflected the colonial construct. Instead of integrating the Rif, the effect was one of continuing hinderance to its consolidation into a single region, which also prevented its cultural unity, which is a key aspect in the perpetuation of culture.

The political division of Riffian territory suggests that the postcolonial Moroccan state has no interest in repairing the colonial divide and seeking greater ethnic and cultural coherence in the country. Nador and Al-Hoceima remain separate, making it difficult for sociocultural synergies and a unified Riffian–Amazigh identity to emerge. The division is not only hindering Riffian cohesion, it is perpetuating territorial “divide and rule” policies in a pro-Arab state. This vision is also evident in how recently the Imazighen have been incorporated, and in the violent and repressive episode against Riffians just two years after independence. Today the Rif, fragmented into two regions, is further diluted by joining Al-Hoceima to Tétouan and Tangier, while the eastern region, which includes Nador, extends to the south.<sup>105</sup>

104 It should be said that most of the official statistics consulted for this publication continue to classify the data according to the sixteen regions stipulated in the 1997 revision.

105 Information included in the report “Nouveau découpage territorial du Royaume”, available on the Portail National des Collectivités Territoriales website: <https://www.collectivites-territoriales.gov.ma/>. Accessed November 2021.

However, my historical review of the founding and development of the city of Al-Hoceima suggests that despite these efforts by the makhzen to dilute Riffian distinctiveness, a local strategy exists that has global impact. It is strengthened by the proximity to Ajdir, and has slowly been taking shape, especially among the urban youth. The signs are numerous, such as the sale in 2010 in both Al-Hoceima and Tangier of pro-Riffian merchandise, including Amazigh necklaces, flags and symbols. Added to this is the community mobilisation supported by some of the main Riffian groups, such as the Aït Waryaghar, Ibuquyen and Temsamam, who, according to my informants, consider the city common, neutral territory. As Ahmed recalled,

the *Tifnagh* thing started at the same time as the graffiti and the necklaces. Not long ago. That didn't exist ... I remember that when we came to Spain and went down there on holiday in 2001, 2002, all of that did not exist. None of this Amazigh thing, no flags, never, never! I think the flag thing started around 2008, more or less, the necklaces featuring the sign of the Rif started around then too. They were sold in Alhucemas, on the street, in the bazaar, and the topic started like that.

INFORMANT AHMED 2019

He added, "selling all that stuff wasn't to encourage anyone. It was to say, here we are. They had been in hiding for a long time and they began to poke their heads out and, with *Hirak*, they came into full view."

It would seem, then, that a community exists among Riffians who live in the Rif, as well as other places in Morocco and Europe. They recognise Al-Hoceima as the city capable of centralizing and capitalizing on its Amazigh feeling due to its size, connections and, above all, to its proximity to Ajdir. Aziza (Tassouli 2017:2) voices this succinctly:

after a long period of silence, we have recently witnessed a return of repressed memory ... Riffian civil society takes charge of the question of revising the Rif's colonial and postcolonial history. This action is not limited to the commemoration of outstanding events in local history, but rather aims to begin a new project in order to rewrite the history of the Rif.

*Al-Hirak al-Sh'abi*, the Rif Movement, tested the strength of the Riffian protests. The uprising demonstrated Al-Hoceima's ability to centralise the stronghold of the Rif struggle, catapulting local protests to the glocal sphere. It also showed Riffian people could connect with each other, weave supranational Amazigh

alliances, connect with cultural communities with the same problems and motivations, and obtain useful support from international associations and organisations, thereby transmitting many of their social difficulties and local identity interests to a global level.

Notable is the fact that *Al-Hirak al-Sh'abi* emerged in Al-Hoceima after the death of a young fish seller, Mouhcine Fikri, on October twenty-eighth, 2016, who was crushed by a garbage truck while trying to retrieve goods confiscated by the police. The force with which the revolt broke out into continual protests over Fikri's death with a strong emotional component (El Maarouf and Belghazi 2019), and the way dissent spread to the country's main cities, such as Casablanca, Fez, Tangier, Nador, Marrakech, Agadir and Rabat, revealed, as Aidi has explained (2017), the deep discontent felt by young people from other cities and regions. They face many unfair situations in their daily lives, as they wait for their *limbo* to end. For El Maarouf and Belghazi (2019: 638) "the death of Fikri may alleviate the shame he felt but living after Fikri and doing nothing about his death is something people consider very shameful."

There was a precedent for Fikri's death in Al-Hoceima that was known throughout Morocco, and which Ahmed recounted: "in that case, some boys were found dead at an ATM in Al-Hoceima. The official version is that it was an accident that occurred while they were stealing, but none of us believe any of that. It looked like they had been tortured. That was a scandal. They were five youths" (Informant: Ahmed 2019). The episode took place on February twentieth, 2011, as part of the so-called "Arab Spring" protests against political systems. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that many of those who demonstrated in North Africa, including Morocco, were Imazighen, not Arabs, or not just Arabs.<sup>106</sup> The death of those five young men, who may have been deliberately burned – although the official version describes a bank robbery that went wrong – was another episode shaped by poverty, marginalisation and lack of hope that the youth experienced.

The recent uprising in Al-Hoceima managed to mobilise the population. It gained international press attention and featured in news bulletins of many countries. At the 2017 demonstrations, slogans were shouted against the Moroccan government and in support of the Rif such as "this regime is a dictatorship" or "Long live the Rif, long live the Rif," while waving Amazigh flags and portraits of Zefzafi and Abd el-Krim.<sup>107</sup> Those photos and proclamations were

106 The news can be read on Maghreb Online (see section 5.9.).

107 TVE reported on the protest. The content can be viewed online and is referenced in the sources consulted in paragraph 5.4.

very damaging to a regime that wished to maintain a good international image and convey that the Amazigh situation was under control.

International human rights organisations monitored the arrests, prisoner transfers and imprisonments meant to reduce to ashes the Riffian movement that challenged the makhzen (Wolf 2019: 2). There was a punctual release of some of the attendees of the demonstrations. Amnesty International reported on June second, 2017 that Zefzafi had been arrested and that “at least thirty-three people are now on trial after being charged by the Crown Prosecutor in Alhucemas. The charges against them include assaulting and insulting public officers, stone-throwing, rebellion and unauthorised gathering” (Senna 2017). The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information also addressed the situation of the main figures in the uprising and their exclusion from royal pardons in their 2017 report.<sup>108</sup> After Zefzafi’s arrest many Riffians grew angry. Merien was very affected in the summer of 2018,

everything is bad! The city is under siege! They won’t let us in! Some people have travelled and have not been let through unless their parents are seriously ill. And many don’t dare to go in case they cannot go back and restart their jobs! And the king has locked them all up and has not pardoned them. There’s a lot of police and military. It’s all terrible! The people of Al-Hoceima dare not speak.

INFORMANT: MERIEN 2018

A year later, the situation was calmer but at the cost of police repression. As Merien explained in July 2019, “there are a lot of police in town. A lot! This year the city has not been closed by the police, but there is a lot of repression. They have Zefzafi under arrest, facing sentences of up to twenty years ... Poor thing. They don’t want to grant amnesty” (Informant: Merien 2019). What is certain is that the force with which the situation erupted in Al-Hoceima, with constant protests over Fikri’s death, revealed the deep discontent already present in the city and in the region. The makhzen persists in separating the protest from identity issues, which increases the suspicions that this is one of the principal motivations, aggravated by the lack of interest in investing and enhancing the region, as well as in improving education, health and other services.

There is great esteem for Nasser Zefzafi in the city. Almost everyone there knows him or his family. Merien appreciated the value of what he does and

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<sup>108</sup> Report “Freedom of Expression in the Arab Countries in 2017”, available at the *Arabic Network for Human Rights Information* website.

explained how proud his family was. However, Ahmed believed that “Zefzafi refers too much to Abd el-Krim. It’s like they don’t have a project for the future, they always talk about the past. And, besides, the people around him are not educated, they belong to the *qabilas*, they just follow him” (Informant: Ahmed 2019). The Republic of the Rif and the figure of Abd el-Krim are undoubtedly a model for Amazigh self-affirmation (Aixelà-Cabré 2015a), but perhaps not for the future. Ahmed, highly critical, added “everything Zefzafi says about Abd el-Krim is correct, yes. But there are big differences between the two and their ideas and the army Abd el-Krim had. Not all of that is comparable” (Informant: Ahmed 2019).

Aidi (2017) details the calls for change that the activists were preparing. They included the repeal of the 1958 *dahir* (royal decree) declaring the Rif to be a military zone, the use of the Tarifit language in the local administration, a detailed investigation into the death of Fikri and the five young people found in the bank in Alhucemas, public investment in roads, universities, hospitals and a cancer treatment centre. Of these demands, only the linguistic one addressed identity issues – and indirectly. Riffians are well aware that the reason the list of demands is so long is because the state has neglected its duties with respect to the Rif region and because their historical relationship with the Kingdom of Morocco and the makhzen has been almost non-existent.

The assertion made by some Riffians that “the Rif is not Morocco” should be given serious consideration. It is well known that its precolonial history with the makhzen was minimal and that it was unaware it was “part of Morocco” until the Spanish occupation. For many Riffians, the end of the Spanish period was when the Moroccan occupation began, rather than a liberation of the Rif. Like other Moroccans, Dahbia believed that there was a profound lack of acceptance of the Riffian, beyond that of other Moroccan Amazigh groups of the Atlas or the Sous. She also stressed that the Riffians were isolated because the other Amazigh groups did not dare to show public support for fear of the possible consequences: “the Riffians do not receive solidarity from the Atlas or Sous Imazighen because they don’t want any problems with the government” (Informant: Dahbia 2018). For Merien, the rejection of the Riffians was very significant. “Al-Hoceima is in a terrible state. It’s like Catalonia! Those from Rabat, Casablanca and Fez don’t want us. We get along terribly. They say we want to kill the king! We don’t want to kill the king, we want healthcare, education and work, but we have nothing against the king”. And, she added, “I know what I’m talking about because my daughter’s husband is from Fes” (Informant: Merien 2018). Part of the deterioration of the relationship is perhaps due to the faith Riffians have in themselves, which has led to great misunderstandings, if not a certain feeling of superiority. In this regard, Ahmed acknowledged that

“for a long time it was said that we are better than the Arabs ... Growing up, the kids got used to all these claims” (Informant: Ahmed 2019). Dahbia confirmed this point by acknowledging that “they feel as Riffian as Amazigh ... but they believe they are superior to other Imazighen” (Informant: Dahbia 2018). Dahbia’s reflections on whether or not this was a misunderstanding are worth examining because, as she pointed out, “there is a part of the Moroccan population that saw Riffian pride as a feeling of superiority over the rest of the population” (Informant: Dahbia 2018). She believed the Riffians had been defined by the other Moroccans “more as Riffians than as Imazighen.” As Raja,<sup>109</sup> daughter of a Riffian father and an Arab mother from Fez, concluded, being Riffian isn’t just about the place you were born in, because she had inherited her father’s surname: “my father is also from the Rif, just like my grandfather. It doesn’t matter that he was born in Fez, he will always bear a Riffian surname” (Informant: Raja 1997).

The symbols that reinforce Riffian identity need studying in greater depth. Dahbia referring to the Republic of the Rif as the “Amazigh Republic” is symptomatic of this. Abd el-Krim’s republic did not use this name and his was not a strictly ethnic project, according to Madariaga (2010), one of the researchers who has worked most on the subject. In fact, the interpretation of what exactly Abd el-Krim founded is a recurring question in the research on memory, as it reveals how the subjects of the present reappropriate the past, and how the past is analysed through present eyes. Given the previous explanations in this book of Riffian relations with the Spanish and with other Moroccans, Soumaya’s confident assertion is easy to understand, “We were better off with the Spanish, wow! Much better than now! Before the Spaniards arrived, in the mountains there were no roads, barely even tracks, only paths, “all that was done by the Spanish.” And when the Spanish left, everything stopped! Since then, nothing” (Informant: Soumaya 2016).

Soumaya’s were not the only words to this effect. In fact, they are typical of many others made by Riffians from Al-Hoceima. Mohamed,<sup>110</sup> a taxi driver from Al-Hoceima said, “the Spaniards of colonial times were better than the Arabs. The Arabs have done nothing. They have invested nothing. The Spanish did. Electricity, streets, houses, schools, hospital. The Arabs, zero. They are rich but stupid. We Riffians here are strong. We speak Riffian and claim who we are” (Informant: Mohamed 2016).

109 Raja, forty-one, was an Amazigh middle class woman born in Fez, and married to an Arab of Fez. She lived in Casablanca and was interviewed there in 1997.

110 Mohamed, over forty, is a Riffian born in Al-Hoceima and lives there. Interviewed in September, 2016.

Preferring the Spanish occupation over the Moroccan seems like a riddle with a trick. On the one hand, the experiences marked the Riffians. Soumaya, for example, did not want to answer the question of how the Spanish treated her. After a long, fairly determined silence she said “there were good Spaniards and bad Spaniards ... There was everything” (Informant: Soumaya 2016). Soumaya’s response was probably conditioned by the nationality of her interlocutor, and her very restrained response seems all the more magnanimous given the reasonable criticism she could have expressed about her experiences.

On the other hand, the stated preferences for the Spanish to which many Riffians allude seem likely to be due to the fact that over sixty years have passed since their departure – enough distance for memories to be reinvented. But it may also be an indication that, given the suffering that the Spanish capture and colonisation of the Rif caused Riffians (not even those who fought in the Spanish Civil War received the promised reward), they think the best way to express their enormous discomfort with the Moroccan state is by hailing the Spanish colonial past. This argument is strengthened by the contradictory legacy of Abd el-Krim’s Republic of the Rif, which, according to the biography by Madariaga (2010: 1), sought not so much the separation of Morocco, as the rejection and expulsion of the European colonists from the area.

Finally, I would like to end this section with two indications that Riffian cohesion is not particularly solid, and with a reflection on the return of Abd el-Krim’s remains. Neither diminishes Al-Hoceima’s global capacity, which today lies in the hands of the urban youth.

Hamid communicated two important insights. Firstly, he said that “he had never visited Abd el-Krim’s house, nor did he know where it was in Ajdir” (Informant: Hamid 2016); seeing my surprised reaction, he clarified that this was normal because he was Ibuqquyen. The second was that “the Aït Waryaghar were very proud of Abd el-Krim.” When I thought back on it, I was surprised that Hamid did not know where Abd el-Krim’s house was, and that he did not share the pride he mentioned. This seemed to provide a glimpse of the limitations yielded by the figure of Abd el-Krim, where cohesion and representation were concerned.

One of the keys to understanding why Abd el-Krim is not a symbol for all Riffian people may lie in a detail explained by Martín Corrales (2008: 212): the final location of Al-Hoceima was the result of an agreement between the Ibuqquyen and the Spanish, with the Ibuqquyen giving them the land for free. This negotiation did not include the lands of the Aït Waryaghar. Could it be that the pact between the Ibuqquyen and the Spanish that made Al-Hoceima capital of the Rif ahead of Ajdir tarnished Riffian cohesion? To what extent

does Riffian identity unite the whole community, if being Ibuqquyen means that Hamid does not feel proud of Abd el-Krim?

Finally, a reflection on the difficulties of repatriating Abd el-Krim's body: with a state that reflexively opposes Riffian demands, it is not surprising that Abd el-Krim's mortal remains are still buried in Cairo, despite many Riffians wanting them to be transferred to their homeland. Madariaga (2009: 533) and Aidi (2017) both describe Riffians requesting the repatriation, the second at the *Hirak* demonstrations. This issue is connected with the restitution of Abd el-Krim as a Moroccan leader who fought valiantly against colonialism. One concession being associated with the other, it seems likely that the day the makhzen restores the memory of Abd el-Krim, he will have to bring back his mortal remains and guarantee a state burial. This would create mutual understanding between the Riffians and other Moroccans, as well as heal the wounds and improve the image of Riffians throughout the country. It is true that it could be considered a kind of surrender, because it could be interpreted as the Rif's final acceptance of its full integration into the Kingdom of Morocco. The founding of the IRCAM announced in Ajdir in 2001 was an important step towards reconciliation, but the absence of subsequent measures shows its complete inadequacy in terms of restitution.

It seems likely that the city of Al-Hoceima has already been affected this dilemma. Aside from the restitution and repatriation of Abd el-Krim's remains, the city is allowing young Riffians to construct a centrality from the margins of the makhzen that connects them with other Imazighen realities, and weaves activist networks across North Africa and Europe. Zefzafi's liberation, which leaves much to be desired, may not turn out to be the indispensable factor for the future revitalisation of the Rif movement.

### 2.3 *The Challenge from the Street. Graffiti for a Collective Memory*

Most of the emblematic Spanish colonial buildings and sites remain standing in Al-Hoceima. Some continue to be used the way they were until independence, including the old prison. Notable of these sites are the *Plaza del Rif*, which contains the *Hotel Oriente* and the *Hotel Florido*; the *Plaza 3 de Marzo*, with the church and the Catholic Mission; *Plaza Mohamed VI*, with the *Interventor's Office*; Tarik Ibn Ziyad Avenue, with the municipal council and Al-Atiq Mosque; and the *Camino de Sebadilla* where the Spanish cemetery is located. Next to the *Cala del Quemado* are Boulevard Mohamed V, Boulevard Hassan II and Boulevard Abd el-Krim.

For Riffians like Ahmed, Merien, Hamid and Mohamed, some of the places that are most representative of colonial times are the *Playa del Quemado*, *Cala Bonita*, the *Florido*, the church and the Spanish school. These places combine

Al-Hoceima's past and the present. While the majority retain their uses, they are testimonies to a renewed memory that moved from Spanish segregation of sociocultural hierarchies to the appropriation of the Rif and the presence of the makhzen (see Table 50).

Al-Hoceima's heritage began to be contested around 2010. Accounts describe almost no graffiti in the city before it began to be seen on the streets in that year. It was also the year that the euphoric atmosphere around Riffian demands became very visible in Al-Hoceima. As Ahmed explained, "they began to sell flags with the colours and later the word "Rif" written on them. And with that protest the graffiti began" (Informant: Ahmed 2019). These indications of the Rif were a part of the affirmations of Amazighness taking place in different parts of Morocco (Zouhir 2014: 47). In fact, the expression of Al-Hoceima's Amazighness in this manner also grew in Tangier, where all kinds of Amazigh merchandise was sold, as explained by Ahmed, who had showed me an Amazigh flag some years before with the slogan "Al-Hoceima–Tanger."

Ahmed was surprised by the protests in Al-Hoceima in that period. They "were times when lots of people were buying Amazigh flags, necklaces with the Rif symbol" (Informant: Ahmed 2019) and consuming the "Rif Hop" music of which Aidi (2017) spoke. The mobilisation coincided with the imminent constitutional change in the kingdom, and also with the mobilisations for social and political improvements that had an impact in North Africa and other countries such as Spain. This culminated in a new form of assertion in September 2016, when anonymous graffiti reading "Rif Land" and "Rif" appeared at the *Cala del Quemado* viewpoint and at the Spanish canning company. Both places were symbols of Spanish and Moroccan occupation, formed part of the city's

TABLE 50 Emblematic buildings of Al-Hoceima

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*Iconic colonial buildings*

First is *Playa del Quemado*, followed by *Cala Bonita*, the *Florida*, the church, the Spanish school, the *Matadero*, the *Playa de la Sabadilla*, the *Mirador del Morro Viejo*, the cannery, the port, the Spanish cemetery, the prison of Alhucemas, and the *Saladero* (salting factory).

*Emblematic Riffian places*

First is *Playa del Quemado*. Hamid says "we always go, it is the most emblematic" (Informant: Hamid 2019).

Followed by the football stadium.

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cultural heritage and provided intangible testimony to historical events in the Rif's collective past.

*La Cala del Quemado* looks out over the beach between Morro Nuevo and Morro Viejo. It was the starting point for the Spanish military capture of Riffian lands and colonisation of the region in 1925, and the location Hassan II used to disembark his troops and crush the Rif rebellion in 1959. The capture of Alhucemas and the Rif seen from the *Cala del Quemado*, thirty-four years apart, must have been imprinted on the memories of those who lived through those attacks. Hassan II's occupation of Al-Hoceima beach re-established *Cala del Quemado* as a unique location for witnessing the conquest of the Rif. However, in 1959, prince Hassan II and their own compatriots inflicted violence on the Riffians, not the Spanish. Now a viewpoint where pedestrians and Arab officials stop to admire the spectacular views of the Mediterranean, *Cala del Quemado* has become one of the locations that connects the Spanish conquest of the city to the makhzen's subsequent occupation.

Only part of the *La Cántabra* canning factory<sup>111</sup> remains standing, as the rest has been demolished. Yet it remains a clear link to the colonial past of exploitation, segregation and subalternity. As one of the many remaining colonial buildings in the city, the cannery is a reminder of a Spanish colonisation that took the region by force and built a city on the captured lands in the image and likeness of the Spanish – a place, incidentally, that Riffians were unable to enjoy until the Spanish left. The canning factory is also a metaphor for extremely long hours of poorly paid work, as well as an allegory of *no vengo, no vengas; venga, venga* and *trabaja, trabaja*.

The choice of the locations for the graffiti -itself decipherable, only to locals and those who know the history of the Rif- was probably an attempt to stubbornly contest an arrogant partial memory. Because what the graffiti affirms, with enormous forcefulness, is that, despite the occupations, the Rif would always be free in the hearts of the Riffians, and its memory would withstand the onslaught of time.

The graffiti was also a reminder to those who occupied the region that they are unlikely to be more than passers-by, who may coexist with and leave some traces that enrich the country, but that it is a Riffian and Amazigh country. The graffiti, having the strange virtue of simple things, placed Spanish and Moroccans on the same level, and ultimately put everyone in their place. This way of contesting heritage – tangible and intangible – also allows us to gauge

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111 The canning factory was called "La Cántabra" and is located in the old Valencia street, in the Casas Nuevas neighborhood. Its owner was Conservera Marroquí S.A., according to the information collected by Rubio Alfaro and Lacalle Alfaro (1992: 235).

the atmosphere of Rif–Amazigh affirmation that the city has experienced in recent decades: the Riffian affirmation in Al-Hoceima probably seeks to add it to the long list of cities of stateless nations. The graffiti expresses a contestation out of anonymity, as shared feelings do not need authors.

Furthermore, the graffiti represents the days of hope for change – changes that did not, however, come to pass, but were the breeding ground for the Riffian *Hirak* protests in 2016. *Hirak* managed to connect with the situations of injustice suffered by young people in precarious realities and indefinite limbo throughout the country. The just condemnation of the death of a young Riffian brought thousands of young people to the streets in many cities. But after the euphoria came the repression. Many changes were unforeseen and so the protests could not spread. Ultimately, the Riffians did not have enough in common with the young people because, in reality, they did not feel like them and neither did they feel Moroccan. The August 2017 state of siege was imposed to prevent European Riffians from accessing the city. If they tried, they risked being unable to leave again in time to return to their jobs. Protest leaders and supporters were jailed in prisons far away from Al-Hoceima to make attendance and family visits difficult, all without royal forgiveness for the leaders of the revolt, and especially so for Zefzafi.

After the Riffian euphoria, came the punishment. Again.

From 2017 onwards, painting and graffiti on the streets of Al-Hoceima became a high-risk activity until the situation calmed down, as did organising and attending demonstrations. And yet, Merien explained that, although at first “there was no new graffiti, because there are a lot of police and they watch everything”, one day “a new one appeared, near *Cala Bonita*, at the bus station, to welcome those arriving ... Yes ... Rif,” she said with a smile (Informant: Merien 2019).

Since the events leading up to *Hirak*, the city has been heavily controlled by police forces. The king has not needed to cancel his holidays in the large mansion built near Einsolen on the outskirts of Al-Hoceima – incidentally, in the same Ibuqquyen territory that the Spanish chose to build the city, rather than the “Khattabi” lands of the Aït Waryaghar. Every time the king visits his royal residence, with its spectacular views of the Mediterranean cliffs, the roads are cut off for all citizens. Only inhabitants of the nearby towns through which passage is unavoidable are able to protest.

The king of Morocco’s summers in Al-Hoceima, at the wheel of his car like any other citizen, signify that the makhzen considers that the Rif uprising will not be repeated. They also confirm Mohamed VI’s desire not to distance himself excessively from the region that in 1921 was proclaimed the Republic of the Rif, putting the entire Hispano–French colonial apparatus and the Moroccan

sharifian makhzen at risk. Not to mention that the king probably also thinks that sovereignty issues are not trivial matters when you have a neighbour like Spain, which retains an islet in front of Al-Hoceima, two autonomous cities on either side, and some other small islets of little importance, but which bear witness to the old Spanish empire.

### 3 Epilogue: Social Contestation and Glocal Projections

Bata and Al-Hoceima are examples of African cities that grew at the colonial margins and used transgression as a tool to create new narratives about themselves and reposition their cities within national frameworks and an increasingly global world, combining the local and the global. Both cities allow anonymous Moroccan and Equatorial Guinean voices to be incorporated. These voices reveal a history of two cities whose citizens are critical of their past and their tangible heritage, as there was a time when these cities were symbols of oppression and racial or ethnic segregation.

The two cases are at once similar and very different. Riffian sociopolitical integration in Morocco is problematic, as it is for other communities that consider themselves stateless nations within their countries. This book brings narratives about the Riffian past into circulation that reverse its dual invisibility, one of which was the product of colonialism, while the other was promoted by the postcolonial state. With the Fang, the situation is completely different. Their relative colonial invisibility lasted well into the twentieth century as, despite comprising the majority group, they remained on the margins in Spanish Guinea. Bata provided community representation that helped subvert this and, finally gave the Fang a place in a global framework. So, while the Fang continue to be denied their capital city, the potential shown by the city of Bata has allowed old wounds to be healed with the Equatorial Guinean minorities, despite these same minorities bearing the scars of their permanent subaltern status within the national framework.

But Al-Hoceima and Bata are also examples of African cities created by and for Spaniards, and traces of colonialism remain in ethnic, racial, political and labour segregation. Colonial independence marked the moment Al-Hoceima and Bata finally became Riffian and Equatorial Guinean, with the Amazigh and Fang ethnic elements emerging in both as the distinctive features meant to position them on a glocal scale, in a global world.

Studying how the people of both cities faced the colonial past was a key focus because it shaped the lives of previous and current generations. And yet, the debates over colonial memory oscillate between the rejection of colonisation

and social condemnation, and the acceptance of the past to resolve their present, be it with respect to the position of the Rif region within the framework of the Moroccan state, or the continuity *sine die* of a dictatorial system that curtails the rights of the population.

In any case, the task of identifying and understanding the contested cultural heritage in cities that remain on the margins of history is an uplifting challenge due to the prominence of peripheral voices. Bata's *Plaza de la Torre del Reloj* has facilitated the analysis of the legacies and inheritances of Spanish colonialism and Equatorial Guinean dictatorships. The graffiti in Al-Hoceima has allowed the yearnings of a community to be rediscovered that straddle the heroic and the tragic. The Battians, plunged into a spiral of dictatorships, share their complaints with euphemistic criticism of the current system, so that it is understood that it is not acceptable that they could be worse off today than in colonial times, while Riffians stake claims for identity in graffiti written on a map of the past that is accountable to the present as it searches for its future.

## Conclusions: African Cities Asserting Themselves in a Global World

Cultural Anthropology and Historical Anthropology, particularly the theoretical perspectives offered by postcolonial studies, decolonial studies and global history lie at the foundations of this book. Using comparative analysis, my aim was to discover the contemporary history of two African cities, Bata and Al-Hoceima.

Riffians and other Moroccans, Fangs and other Equatorial Guineans, and Spaniards, especially Andalusians and Catalans provided lived and narrated memories of these cities, which I compiled to reconstruct history. I was interested in taking advantage of post/decolonial theoretical–methodological tools to recover local and subalternised voices. In this way, episodes in a little-known history have been recovered and analysed using methodologies aimed at neutralising Eurocentric biases. This approach has allowed contrasting emotions and rhetoric to be observed, which are clearly distinguishable in Moroccan and Equatorial Guinean voices, on the one hand, and Spanish voices, on the other. One of the issues that has surfaced, is evidence that emotions permeate both individual and collective memories. Contrasting the versions of these urban experiences, bringing out voices that remain marginalised from their own history, has shown the unequal relationships established between Spanish and local populations, and the decolonial contestation of cultural heritage.

With this as a starting point, the study has measured the impact of Spanish colonialism and its legacies on these two cities, which are in both cases strongly intertwined with their national histories. One of the book's general objectives was to analyse in detail how Spanish colonisation and ideologies were established, and the study of the repressive mechanisms it promoted. Reconstructing the local histories of Bata and Al-Hoceima undoubtedly revealed legacies of racial segregation, territorial determination, processes of subordination, cultural homogenisation and, of course, violence. The book also aimed to study how independence evolved as well as how the traces left by these processes influenced memories and histories. I have therefore, studied the imprints of colonial legacies, the collective memory that acts on tangible colonial heritage, the appropriations of colonial legacies, the rejection of colonial rhetoric in the search for collective affirmation, the legitimisation of power or its acceptance in order to show current discontent, the role of these

cities in configuring independent states, the construction of new centralities within the framework of contemporary states and the handling of recent history about their development and growth.

I have sought to explain the revision of collective memories of the past in the present as a form of decolonisation that seeks to build different foundations for the future in a transnational and glocal framework. Two dimensions have emerged from the glocalisation of Bata and Al-Hoceima. The first glocalises a decolonial contestation process that uses cultural heritage to connect the local with the global. The second glocalises an ethnic-cultural identification that takes advantage of the local in order to transcend state borders and project itself globally. These two dimensions demonstrate the vitality of glocal phenomena in a world in which cities are gaining representation at a time when much of Africa seems to have been left behind by globalisation. Both are responses to the challenges of combining the stories of the past with the present, as they are the fruits of a world that emerged from Eurocentric foundations and continued growing thanks to African appropriation.

The research has highlighted that Spanish colonisation facilitated the consolidation of the Riffian minority and encouraged the promotion of the Fang as an essential element of national identity. As I have explained, the Riffians were not central or visible in the period before Spanish colonialism, and they were on the margins of Spanish colonial interests. This connects to the Riffian voices today saying that they do not feel Moroccan and that what followed Spanish colonisation was Arab colonisation by the makhzen. The case of the Fang was different. Their expansion in the nineteenth century towards the continental coast provides clear proof of their probable pre-eminence over other ethnic groups in Equatorial Guinea. This territorial conquest was halted during colonisation due to the forced submission to which all local populations were subjected. For the Fang in the continental region, this meant losing centrality to the island of Fernando Po and other groups such as the Bubis and Fernandinos.

Thus, with regard to my general objectives and hypothesis, my research explores how the cities on the margins of the Spanish empire in Africa were created and what the effects were of colonisation in these states after independence. The intention was to reveal why the response to the colonial heritage in Bata coincided with a sociopolitical project focused on decolonisation. This response needed to demonstrate that the regime, under a fierce dictator represented a continuing colonisation, even if only in terms of identity and not on quality of life. I have also sought to contextualise why the Riffians, who suffered Spanish colonisation in the violent process of “pacification”, ended up choosing to view Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood positively: my assertion is

that accepting Spanish colonialism allows them to question their current integration into the Alaouite kingdom.

I will now briefly summarise the main objectives of my research, as I have explained in the first chapter.

The first objective was to review certain aspects of European heritage in Africa, specifically those related to urbanisation processes that took place in eminently rural contexts, and those related to the effects of discriminatory practices seen in colonial urban contexts.

As noted, the development of Bata and Al-Hoceima entailed the provision of facilities such as electricity and drinking water, the construction of roads, streets and houses, the implementation of healthcare and educational services, and a profusion of possibilities for jobs. However, all these facilities and services – which in the case of Equatorial Guinea were developed using the sweat of the local population – could not be enjoyed until the final stretch of colonisation. This was because Bata was designed for Spaniards and Europeans and not for the Equatorial Guinean population. Al-Hoceima was similar, although formally it was claimed for the settlers of the area. The truth was that Equatorial Guineans could not be integrated into Bata until the city's growth absorbed the small villages that surrounded it because the controls on the movement of the local population were too great for them to migrate freely. This situation lasted until the autonomous period, when the city's gates were opened to the Equatorial Guinean population. The situation was distinct in Al-Hoceima. Firstly because the long tradition of urban populations in Morocco meant the European footprint was smaller, and secondly because Al-Hoceima was home to some local people. As a protectorate, it had Moroccan representatives in its administrative ranks. In Equatorial Guinea there was no urban tradition, and its status as a colony meant that all the most important positions went to the Spanish population. This second difference encouraged some Moroccans (especially potentates and Jews) to settle in Al-Hoceima, although they were in the minority and exceptional. However, what is relevant is that this Moroccan minority – who were not Riffian – did not mix with the Spaniards, except for some superficial friendships between their children. Riffians did not establish themselves in the city until some rented homes in the early 1950s in order to be able to work in the few factories there – with the exception of a few notable ones and those serving in the military. The Spanish footprint in Bata and Al-Hoceima is clear: colonisation created roads and spurred a process of urbanisation. Cities were built in a rural environment where, before colonisation, only *douars* and *dzals* existed. These cities would go on to play essential roles in Riffian and Fang ethnic identity assertions when colonisation ended. The Riffians faced the obstacle that their identity was not recognised by the

Moroccan postcolonial state. The Fangs, on the other hand, benefitted from presidents sharing their ethnicity. The privileges this brought, coupled with their large population relative to the other ethnic groups, led Fang elites to dominate the country from a Bata that had in turn subsumed Ndowe territory. The slow speed at which the cities were populated by local ethnic communities leads us to the second question about the first objective, which was meant to elucidate the consequences of Spanish colonialism for discriminatory practices. This issue is very clear in the case of Equatorial Guinea, because while the purpose of this book was not to explore whether the Equatorial Guinean dictatorships were a consequence of the Franco dictatorship, there is no doubt that certain hierarchical and exclusionary practices with continuities between the colonial and postcolonial periods were influenced by a Francoist metropole. In Bata and Al-Hoceima this took the form of the worship of governors and then the president or king, violence and repression exerted to maintain authority, impunity in the socio-political system, and the constant abuse of power. In Bata, these discriminatory and alienating practices became highly visible in parades, at schools and in access to work. In the case of Al-Hoceima, the effects of discriminatory practices were perhaps somewhat milder. After the independent period, Riffians and other Moroccans were able to settle in large numbers in the city and, although the Kingdom of Morocco's political system still lacks adequate democratic measures, the repression of the Riffian population by the makhzen is less intense than the comparable example in Equatorial Guinea. Nevertheless, the repression of the Rif has been sustained over time and features notable episodes of sporadic violence. It therefore seems that the discrimination Riffians suffer today in the city comes more from the Arab groups, and from the state's pro-Arab policies, than from a colonial heritage as such.

The book's second objective was to analyse contested cultural heritage in Bata and Al-Hoceima. In the case of the graffiti in Al-Hoceima, the contestation used family and social memory to question, on the one hand, the Spanish conquest and the power of the makhzen at the *Playa del Quemado* viewpoint, and reject the labour exploitation by the Spanish settlers in the graffiti in the cannery. Memories are conjured up that clash with the saccharine reminiscences of some Riffians and Spaniards of a colonial coexistence, that in fact, was almost non-existent and was reduced to labour relations constituted of low-paid work and abuse. Important to keep in mind is, that the cannery graffiti does not disrupt current coexistence, because it is on a plot that is to be demolished, and not on any premises run or owned by the Spanish. Moreover, the graffiti appears in particularly relevant public places in the city, like the *Playa del Quemado* viewpoint and the bus station at the entrance to the city,

as it constitutes a statement about identity. It is expressed in the context of a Moroccan state that is recognising Amazigh rights in fits and starts, driven by a desire to neutralise any large scale protests coordinated by the country's different Amazigh groups. So it is likely that if no demands are being made to decolonise Al-Hoceima – apart from the example at the cannery – it is because any criticism aims to show disaffection with the Moroccan state. This is the only way to understand the voices that affirm, “with the Spaniards we were better” or that “the Rif is not Morocco.” In this regard, the two case studies are nuanced. In Bata, there was an express rejection of decolonisation, an action that was much needed by a people that had suffered deeply from racism and exploitation within the framework of colonial rule. The decolonisation of the past by Macías and Obiang also concealed the strategic interest of improving the image of regimes that were far from democratic: they may have been dictatorships, but at least they offered advantages over the colonial system such as identity claims. Recovering the memory of the Battian Fangs has also been very revealing. It has allowed us to look at their urban heritage from the different periods that have shaped the city's history – colonialism and the two dictatorial regimes – and shown that much of the Fang community suffered from the repression exerted during the dictatorships, just like the country's other ethnic groups. The informants were asked to choose the most emblematic buildings of the colonial, Macías and Obiang eras. In the case of the dictators the buildings represented their figures more than their governance, and were highly personalised. Bata and Al-Hoceima have allowed us to retrace the legacies of Spanish colonisation. Clear sociopolitical imprints have been left that allow us to see how legacies are present in a contested collective memory. The study of the appropriations of colonial legacies has also been crucial, since the *Plaza de la Torre del Reloj* has ended up symbolizing loyalty to Macías in opposition to Spanish colonisation in spite of Obiang's endeavours. Al-Hoceima capitalised on the affirmation of identity and set itself up as a Riffian stronghold. All of these are expressions of the rejection of colonial rhetoric and the pursuit of collective affirmation, although in the Riffian case, the current narratives that look positively on Spanish colonisation should be interpreted as a manifestation of discontent with the makhzen, if not a total repudiation of the Moroccan state, rather than the acceptance of Spanish colonisation.

This book's third objective concerned postcolonial glocalisation and Spanish imprints, as Al-Hoceima and Bata share common features of Spanish colonialism and urban populations. This has allowed us not only to observe the colonial imprint on the cities' futures, but also how the Spaniards populated the two cities, the traces they left behind, and the effects of regional border design on the management of current ethnic diversity. Two important

issues were, on the one hand, the Moroccan state's interest in perpetuating the division of the Riffian region inherited by Spanish colonisation to make it difficult to strengthen the territorial unit, taking into account a certain sociocultural homogeneity, and, on the other hand, the gradual centrality Al-Hoceima has gained in glocal Riffian revindication. This has become especially true since the beginning of the 2000s and following the *Hirak* protests, thanks to Al-Hoceima's proximity to Ajdir. For its part, the government of Equatorial Guinea has retained the colonial layout of the Littoral province, which is former Ndowe and Bissio territory that was subsumed by the ethnic Fang majority. It is also likely that Bata will regain its undisputed Fang centrality when Obiang Nguema dies, and his empowerment of Djibloho is neutralised, if the future new government really seeks the consensus of all Fang groups. However, what is certain is that as long as there is no regime change, some Fangs will continue to use ethnic distinction as a means of excluding some of the population, taking Bata as a glocal bulwark of Fang projection, while other Fangs will continue to fight valiantly against the dictatorial system, questioning Fangisation as the essential element of national affirmation.

The fourth objective was to contrast colonial rhetoric with social practices. As can be seen, the mutual understanding between the local and Spanish populations was minimal during much of colonisation, with strong racial segregation in Bata and an Islamophobia in Al-Hoceima. Santa Isabel and especially Tétouan were cities with some flexibility around ethnic borders and cultural encounters, due to their own historical dynamics. The coexistence in Santa Isabel and Tétouan was a key part of the attempt to soften the image of Spanish colonialism in Africa. Fundamentally, it has concealed the more rigid and cruel practices existing in other areas. The case studies chosen, Al-Hoceima and Bata, are places where the Spanish imposed more repressive colonial practices through abusive labour relations, especially with the Equatorial Guineans. As in other colonial projects in Africa, these proved deeply hierarchical and androcentric and converged with the colonial rhetoric, undermining the false myth of "race" inclusivity Francoism promoted in the Americas. In fact, like other European colonial powers, Spain advocated a profound racialisation of cultural differences with respect to Riffians and Equatorial Guineans. The aim was to ensure the legitimacy of colonisation, despite the discourse on Hispano–Moroccan brotherhood and the uniqueness of the "Hispanic race." Al-Hoceima and Bata project the assertion of 'Spanishness' through colonial imposition in order to protect and benefit the minority. Spanish colonial rhetoric is shown to have been a narrative of civilizing the other as the justification but was oppressive, and was integrated as such into Hispano–African memories in emotional terms.

The fifth and final objective was to examine the role of women in Spanish colonisation and how the construction of gender in the metropole influenced the two cities and the local peoples. The research shows the subordinate role of Spanish women who settled in the colonies, and how the construction of gender in both cities was a reflection of the same in the metropole, although its impact was greater in Bata, due to the missionary activity that accompanied Spanish colonisation. In fact, Spanish women were more restricted in Bata than in Al-Hoceima, where their activities were very similar to those in any Spanish city, in accordance with their social class. It was different for the local people. In Bata, the abuse of Equatorial Guinean women was constant, and there was no possibility for them of escaping subordination. The discursive parameters of the racialisation of cultural differences meant that many Equatorial Guinean women found themselves having sexual relations, sporadic or continuous, with Spanish men who abused them. In many cases, this resulted in children who would be abandoned to their fate upon independence. In Al-Hoceima, Spanish men's access to Riffian women was anecdotal, beyond sex workers and abandoned children. Spanish men also had no access to the few Moroccan women who lived in the city as the wives of potentates or to Jewish women. Marriages with locals in colonial Morocco and Spanish Guinea were legally prohibited, but sexual relations were not, and the abuse of women was socially accepted, especially in Equatorial Guinea. In both colonial territories, women from the local populations worked: the Equatorial Guineans on plantations, the Riffian women in domestic work or by selling their agricultural or artisan products at market. Notable also is that there was a substantial inclusion of Equatorial Guinean women in education, and although the subjects of study were restricted to the interests of colonisation for all Equatorial Guineans, these women advanced rapidly over the decades. This was not so for Riffian women, among whom rates of education remained low until independence. These situations were common to all women because, in truth, Spanish girls attended school more often in Equatorial Guinea than in Al-Hoceima, a situation that did not improve until colonisation was already halfway through.

My hope is that the book's comparative perspective helps to explain the relation of the past of both cities and countries to the present and the place local memory occupies in their national histories.

# Bibliography

## 1 Informants

### 1.1 *Lived Memories*

Abdel is Riffian, born in 1961 in Al-Hoceima where he presently resides. Interviewed in Al-Hoceima in September 2016.

Ahmed is Riffian born in Al-Hoceima. He is twenty-nine years old. He lives in Catalonia but he usually travels to the city in summer. Interviewed in Barcelona province in August 2019.

Carmina is Fang, born in Malabo. Her father is Fang and her mother, Bubi. She is fifty-three and lives in London. Interviewed for the first time in London in October 2009.

Dahbia, forty-two, was born in Oujda in 1976. She lived in Alicante for four years and met many Riffians from Al-Hoceima during her studies in Fez. She lives in Rabat. Interviewed in Rabat, Sevilla and Barcelona since 2015.

Eduard Giménez Ferrer, seventy-eight, is Catalan. His father was co-owner of Hacienda Virgen de Montserrat in Oveng, Bata district. His archive of the coffee plantation was ceded to IMF-CSIC. Interviewed in Barcelona since December 2015.

Halima was born in 1936 and lives in Al-Hoceima. Interviewed in Al-Hoceima in September 2016.

Hamid, a Riffian was born in 1961. He divides his time between Al-Hoceima and Catalonia. Interviewed at different locations of Barcelona province and in Al-Hoceima since 2001.

Javier, in his forties, is Fang. He lived in Bata but now lives in Spain. Interviewed in Spain in July 2019.

José, in his forties is Fang. He was born in Bata and resides there. Interviewed in Spain in July 2019.

José María is Bubi and lives in Malabo. He is in his late sixties. Interviewed in Malabo in December 2010.

José Luís, sixty-one is Fang. He was born in Bata district in Equatorial Guinea and studied law. Interviewed in Barcelona from 2011 to 2019.

Josefa is Bubi and lives in Spain since the 1990s. She travelled sporadically to Equatorial Guinea. Informal interview in Castilla y León región in October 2019.

Juan Javier, in his late sixties, is Fang. He lives in Malabo but spent many years in Bata. Interviewed in Malabo in December 2010.

Juan Tomás Ávila Laurel is an Equatorial Guinean writer from Annobón. He is over fifty, and divides his time between Malabo and Barcelona. Interviewed at these locations since 2010.

- Malika is a Riffian, born in Al-Hoceima in 1972. She married and migrated to Casablanca in the 1990s. Interviewed in Casablanca in 1996.
- María was born in Al-Hoceima in 1936, and moved to Alicante in the 1960s. Interviewed in Alicante in May 2016.
- María del Mar, a woman of seventy-two, was born in the Canary Islands. She lived in Santa Isabel until she was fifteen. Interviewed in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria in September 2008.
- María Jesús, over thirty, is Fang. She lives in Bata. Interviewed in Bata in July 2011.
- Mercedes, over seventy, is Fang and Equatorial Guinean. She was born on the mainland and lives in Malabo. After settling in Bata, she moved to Malabo in the 1980s. Interviewed in Malabo in July 2008.
- Merien, fifty, was born in Al-Hoceima in 1967. She lives in Catalonia since 1998 and travels once a year to visit her mother in Al-Hoceima. Her father Mustapha, died in Al-Hoceima in 2016, at the age of ninety-four. Interviewed at different locations of Barcelona province since 2002.
- Mohamed, in his forties, is a Riffian and was born in Al-Hoceima. Interviewed in Al-Hoceima in September 2016.
- Naima is a Riffian, born in Al-Hoceima in 1963. She lived in Casablanca after migrating in 1994. Interviewed from 1993 to 1997 in Casablanca.
- Nur el-Huda is an Amazigh, born in Taza in 1964. She was married to a Riffian from Al-Hoceima and lived in the Netherlands. Interviewed in Rabat in 1997.
- Obiang Biko, in his seventies, is a Fang writer living in United States. He was born in 1940 and was a privileged witness to the independence of Equatorial Guinea. Interviewed in Barcelona in March 2017.
- Pablo, in his seventies, is a Spanish missionary. He is a resident of Madrid but lived in Bata from October 1972 to June 1973. Interviewed in Madrid in May 2016.
- Pedro, in his sixties, is Ndowne, Benga of Punta Mbonda and lives in Bata. Interviewed in Bata in 2009.
- Pepe was born in Melilla in 1931 and lives in Almería. His parents were one of the first Spanish families to settle in Al-Hoceima. He left Morocco in 1957 and only went back for a short visit one year later. Interviewed from 2015 to 2018.
- Raja, forty-one, is Amazigh, born in Fez and lives in Casablanca. She is married to an Arab of Fez. Interviewed in Casablanca in 1997.
- Rhimou, seventy-four, is a Riffian, born near Al-Hoceima. She is of lower upper class and married to her cousin. Interviewed in Casablanca from June 1993 to September 1997.
- Samuel, in his sixties, is Fang, born in Eveveyín. He lives in Cameroon. Interviewed in Yaundé in July 2012.
- Soumaya, eighty-eight, was born in 1931. She is the mother of Merien and the mother-in-law of Hamid. Interviewed in Al-Hoceima in September 2016.

Teresa, twenty-one is Fang. She lives between Bata and Spain. Interviewed in Barcelona in August 2019.

### 1.2 *Narrated Memories*

Eduard Giménez Noguera (father of Eduard Giménez Ferrer) was a Catalan who was sent to the Spanish Protectorate. He remained in the Rif for eight months, between September, 1921 to June, 1922. Fondo Giménez Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

Irmina Margenat was Catalan. She lived on the coffee plantation Hacienda Virgen de Montserrat with her husband Ramon Reig from 1927 to 1965. Her opinions and reflections have been drawn from the letters she wrote to Eduard Giménez Noguera. Fondo Giménez-Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

Ramon Reig was Catalan. He was co-owner of, and carried the responsibility for the Hacienda Virgen de Montserrat coffee plantation located in Oveng (Bata). He lived there with his wife Irmina Margenat from 1927 to 1965. Fondo Giménez-Ferrer, IMF-CSIC.

## 2 **Physical Documentary Archives**

*Fondos Marruecos*. Archivo General de la Administración, Alcalá de Henares.

*Fondo Giménez Ferrer*. This archive constitutes the documentation of the Hacienda Virgen de Montserrat in Oveng-Bata (Continental region of Spanish Guinea), established in 1927. This coffee plantation was created by different Catalan and Canarian partners and ceased to be operational in 1965. The land was legalised in the 1990s under the Obiang dictatorship, which was an essential procedure for requesting compensation from the Spanish and Equatorial Guinean governments. The archival collection includes more than a hundred letters from Ramon Reig and Irmina Margenat written from Bata and Oveng, in addition to numerous company documents such as balance sheets, participations and notarial documents, among others. The collection was ceded to Institució Milà i Fontanals (IMF-CSIC) by Eduard Giménez Ferrer. At <https://www.imf.csic.es/index.php/investigacion/diversidades-emergentes-islam-africa-europa/coleccion-gimenez-ferrer-hacienda-virgen-de-montserrat-guinea-ecuatorial>.

Revista *Heraldo de Alhucemas*. I have consulted twenty numbers from the fifty (from No. 25 to 45).

*Resúmenes Estadísticos de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea (from 1942 to 1959)*. Institució Milà i Fontanals (IMF-CSIC).

*Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya*.

*Population Censuses*. Population census of 1940 of Posesiones del Norte y Costa Oriental de África, Vol. II, pp. 7–8, no data disaggregated by cities. Population census of 1940 of Posesiones del Norte y Costa Oriental de África, Vol. I, p. 307. Population census

of 1950 of Posesiones del Norte y Costa Oriental de África, Vol. 1, p. 331. Population and Housing Census of 1960 of Plazas y provincias africanas. Población de derecho y hecho de los municipios españoles, p. 104. Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya.

### 3 Digitalised Documentary Archives

*Boletín Oficial de la Zona del Protectorado Español en Marruecos* (BOP). Years consulted: 1925, 1935, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1954, 1955, 1956. Volumes selected: BOP, XIII, 15, 1925; BOP, XXIII, 36, 1935; BOP, XXVIII, 11, 1940; BOP, XXXVIII, 52, 1950. BOP is available at *Biblioteca Virtual de Prensa Histórica*. At [http://prensahistorica.mcu.es/es/publicaciones/numeros\\_por\\_mes.cmd?idPublicacion=1000483](http://prensahistorica.mcu.es/es/publicaciones/numeros_por_mes.cmd?idPublicacion=1000483).

Magazine *La Guinea Española*. This bi-weekly magazine was published from 1903 to 1969 and is available online on different platforms. Years consulted: from 1910 to 1920. The whole collection is available at website *Bioko.net*. At <http://www.bioko.net/guineaespanola/laguies.htm>.

*NO-DO*: Documentaries started in 1943. Of the 167 programs responding to the search “Bata” between the periods 1943 and 1981 (both included), I selected these eight programmes. References: NOT N 828 A (November seventeenth, 1958, “Patronato de Asuntos Indígenas de Bata”), NOT N 947 C (February 27th 1961, “Compañías militares mixtas en Bata”), NOT N 997 B (February twelfth, 1962, “Vistas de Bata”), NOT N 1034 A (October twenty-ninth, 1962, “Torre del Reloj”), NOT N 1071 B (July fifteenth, 1963, “Aeropuerto de Bata”), NOT N 1079 B (September ninth, 1963, “Representantes guineanos en Madrid”), NOT N 1202 B (January seventeenth, 1966, “Visita de Fraga a Bata”), NOT N 1352 A (December second, 1968, “Tras la independencia” –film in colour-). Regarding the searches on “El Rif”, because the other options were unsuccessful, five programs appeared and the following has been selected: NOT N 670 A (November seventh, 1955, “Desfile de Tropas Indígenas del Rif”), NOT N 511 A (October twentieth, 1952, “Desfile militar en Villa Sanjurjo y otras imágenes del Rif”), and NOT N 511 B (October twentieth, 1952, “Desfile militar en Uad Lau y otras imágenes del Rif”). I also searched for “Morocco” from 1943 to 1950 (both included). Documentaries selected are: NOT N 66 B (April third, 1944, “Mercado de Alcazarquivir”), NOT N 118 B (April thirtieth, 1945, “Desfile de fuerzas moras”), NOT N 195 B (September thirtieth, 1946, “Funcionamiento de escuelas de enseñanza marroquí y de Escuelas de Artes y Oficios rurales”), NOT N 180 B (June seventeenth, 1946, “Gran desfile rural”), NOT N 364 A (December twenty-sixth, 1949, “Playa del Quemado de Villa Sanjurjo”). The *NO-DO* is available in the *Filmoteca Española*, on the *RTVE* website at: <http://www.rtve.es/filmoteca/no-do/>. I must put on record that many older *NO-DO* have neither voice nor precise geographical indications, although I have been able to recognize Al-Hoceima.

- Mapa de D'Almonte: Guinea Ecuatorial. Mapas generales. 1903. Instituto Geográfico Nacional.* At <http://www.ign.es/web/catalogo-cartoteca/resources/html/003653.html>.
- Mapa de África de Guillaume de l'Isle de 1720. Mapa del norte de África de 1849. Mapa del Imperio de Marruecos de 1910, Mapa del Reino de Marruecos de 1910.* Cartoteca Digital, *Institut Cartogràfic i Geològic de Catalunya.* At <http://cartotecadigital.icc.cat/cdm/landingpage/collection/africa>.
- Mapas y textos sobre el Rif. *Biblioteca Virtual del Ministerio de Defensa.* At <https://bibliotecavirtual.defensa.gob.es/BVMDefensa/i18n/inicio/inicio.do>.
- Revista de Tropas Coloniales (Ceuta).* Consulted years 1926, 1928 and 1960. The numbers from 1924 to 1926 are available at *Biblioteca Nacional.* At <http://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/results.vm?q=parent%3A0004278726&s=0&lang=en>.
- Pictures of Al-*Hoceima.* Many can be found on *Europeana.* At <http://www.europeana.eu/portal/ca>.

#### 4 Statistics and Official Reports of the Governments of Equatorial Guinea and the Kingdom of Morocco

- Anuario Estadístico de Guinea Ecuatorial 2018.*
- Population censuses of Guinea Ecuatorial, from 1984 to 2001.*
- Commune Urbaine d'Al Hoceima. Kingdom of Morocco.* At <http://www.auah.ma/auah/home.html>. Accessed November 2021.
- Constitution of 2011. *Kingdom of Morocco.* At <http://www.maroc.ma/es/content/constitution%3%B3n>.
- Direction Régionale de Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceima. *Kingdom of Morocco.* Available at: <http://www.hcp.ma/region-tanger/>. Accessed November 2021.
- Statistical data of Morocco. *Haut-Commissariat au Plan.* At <http://www.hcp.ma/>.
- Guinea Ecuatorial. Página web institucional del Gobierno.* At <http://www.guineaecuatorialpress.com/>. Accessed November 2021.
- Portail National des Collectivités Territoriales. *Kingdom of Morocco.* Available at: <https://www.collectivites-territoriales.gov.ma/fr/node/140>.
- Portail Data.gov.ma, Les données ouvertes de l'Administration Marocaine. *Kingdom of Morocco.* Available at: <http://www.data.gov.ma/fr>.

#### 5 Consultation of the Websites of International Organisations and National Associations

- Amnistía Internacional. Available at: <http://www.es.amnesty.org/>.
- Arabic Network for Human Rights Information. Available at: <http://www.anhri.info/>.

Asodegue. Available at: <http://asodegue.org/>.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/>.

World Bank Group. Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/>.

World Population Review. Available at: <http://worldpopulationreview.com/>.

## 6 Documentaries and Audiovisual Archives

“Cartas en el Tiempo”, TVE2. The documentary approaches the reality of Spaniards in Equatorial Guinea with the participation of Eduard Giménez Ferrer and Yolanda Aixelà-Cabré. Available at: <http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/programa/cartas-tiempo-letras-cambio-cartas-ramon-reig-eduardo-gimenez-obeng-mayo-1965/4633178/>. Accessed November 2021.

“El escritor de un país sin librerías”, film by Marc Serena. The film premiered at the Film Festival of Valladolid in 2019. The main carácter is the Equatorial Guinean writer Juan Tomás Ávila Laurel.

“Islotes españoles. Alhucemas”, Ejército de Tierra del Ministerio de Defensa del Gobierno de España. Short documentary. December 2012. At <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vf-jh8YQfDI>. Accessed November 2021.

TVE, reportages on *Al-Hirak*. Available “A la Carta”: a) “El movimiento de protesta en el Rif se extiende a las redes sociales.” twelfth June, 2017. At <http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/noticias-24-horas/marruecos-movimiento-protesta-rif-se-extiende-redes-sociales/4061739/> Accessed November 2021; b) “Miles de rifeños desafían la prohibición y se manifiestan en Alhucemas.” twenty-first July, 2017. At <http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/telediario/marruecos-miles-rifenos-desafian-prohibicion-se-manifiestan-alhucemas-nueva-protesta-del-movimiento-hirak-shaabi/4125845/> Accessed November 2021; c) “El líder de las protestas del Rif, en prisión, inicia una huelga de hambre.” First September, 2018. At <http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/programa/lider-protestas-del-rif-inicia-huelga-hambre-indefinida-para-denunciar-torturas-humillaciones-sufre-carcel/4719040/>. Accessed November 2021.

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