

## Islam in Post-communist Eastern Europe: Between Churchification and Securitization

# Muslim Minorities

*Editorial Board*

Jorgen S. Nielsen (*University of Copenhagen*)  
Aminah McCloud (*DePaul University, Chicago*)  
Jorn Thielmann (*EZIRE, Erlangen University*)

VOLUME 35

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/mumi*

# Islam in Post-communist Eastern Europe

*Between Churchification and Securitization*

By

Egdūnas Račius



BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: Interior of the Sarena Dzamija Mosque in Tetovo, North Macedonia. Photo: istockphoto.com/JudyDillon.

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at <http://catalog.loc.gov>

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: "Brill". See and download: [brill.com/brill-typeface](http://brill.com/brill-typeface).

ISSN: 1570-7571

ISBN: 978-90-04-42534-7 (hardback)

ISBN: 978-90-04-43052-5 (e-book)

Copyright 2020 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

# Contents

Acknowledgements	VII
List of Figures and Tables	VIII

Introduction: What? The Churchification of Islam; Where? In Eastern Europe	1
--	---

<b>1</b>	<b>Notions of Church</b>	<b>12</b>
1.1	Grappling with Terms: Church and Other Forms of Religious Collectivities	12
1.2	Islam—A Church-Less Religion?	26
<b>2</b>	<b>Islam in Minority (Diaspora) Contexts</b>	<b>34</b>
2.1	The Diaspora: Between Migration, Ethnicity and Religion	34
2.2	Muslims as (Religious) Diaspora(s): Immigrants versus Autochthons	40
2.3	<i>Fiqh al-aqalliyat</i> versus ‘Euro-Islam’/‘European’ Islam	45
2.4	Patterns of Governance of Religion (with an Eye on Islam) in (Western) Europe	61
<b>3</b>	<b>Key Concepts in the Regimes of Governance of Religion in Europe</b>	<b>74</b>
3.1	The Churchification of Islam in Europe	74
3.2	The Securitization of Islam in Europe	81
3.3	Religious Nationalism	91
3.4	The Analytical Framework and Model	99
<b>4</b>	<b>State-Church Relations in Eastern Europe: An Overview</b>	<b>106</b>
4.1	Islam in Eastern Europe: The Context	106
4.2	Historical Precedents of State-Church Relations in Eastern Europe	116
4.3	Frameworks of Governance of Islam in Post-communist Eastern Europe	125
<b>5</b>	<b>Three Levels of (Non)Accommodation of Islam in Eastern Europe</b>	<b>137</b>
5.1	Legal Level	137
5.2	Practical Politics Level	157
5.3	Non-Muslim Social Actors Level	175

<b>6</b>	<b>Bottom-Up View: Dynamics in the Islamic Field</b>	<b>188</b>
6.1	From Islamic Spiritual Administrations into National Muslim Churches	188
6.1.1	<i>“Encompasses the totality of believers of that faith understood here as a set of dogmas, rituals and ethics”</i>	193
6.1.2	<i>“Has an ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure staffed by professional (ordained) clergy”</i>	196
6.2	Inner-Islamic Plurality and Community Dynamics	202
	<b>Conclusions: The Winners, the Losers, and the Prospects</b>	<b>214</b>
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>223</b>
	<b>Index</b>	<b>247</b>

## Acknowledgements

Like most research in the Social Sciences and Humanities, even though the author bears full responsibility for the research results, he or she is hardly the sole person to have participated in the research process. There are always 'significant others', ranging from people who provide the funding, those who facilitate the fieldwork research, to those who provide, initially, relevant material and, later, critical insights, as well as those who see through the publication process of the research results. Their efforts and input are indispensable to making the research worthwhile in the first place and to whom the author remains very much indebted.

In my case, I am grateful, first of all, to my fellow colleagues in the research countries who helped not only with locating relevant material but who also introduced me to the appropriate people. Sincere thanks go to Ahmet Alibašić in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Daniel Vekony, Erzsebet N. Rozsa and Omar Sayfo in Hungary; Agata Nalborczyk and Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska in Poland; Simeon Evstatiev, Atanas Krussteff and Aziz Shakir in Bulgaria; Karel Černý in Czechia.

I am obliged to the three anonymous reviewers for their critical comments, which led me to improve immensely the contents of the book. I only can hope that I have met their expectations expressed in the reviews.

I am grateful to the Editors of the Muslim Minorities Series at Brill who deemed my research idea and its results publishable.

I appreciate Nienke Brienen-Moolenaar's assistance as well as everyone else at Brill for guiding me throughout the whole publication process.

My sincere thanks go to Shaun O'Neill for doing the proofreading.

I also need to apologize to my family—Aušra, Rachelè and Magdalena—for having been absent from home for too many days while on fieldwork trips or writing retreats. I sincerely hope that the result of my efforts—this book—will somehow compensate for that.

The research for this book was made possible by the research project No 09.3.3-LMT-K-712-01-0085, funded by the European Social Fund under grant agreement with the Research Council of Lithuania (LMTLT). I am grateful to Tomas Sodeika, the head of the project, for having invited me to join the project team.

# Figures and Tables

## Figures

- 1 Dynamic-compound framework of the state accommodation of Islamic religious practices 66
- 2 Three-level interaction in churchification/securitization of Islam in Eastern Europe 104
- 3 Location of the countries under research on the churchification-securitization coordinate system 219
- 4 The churchification-securitization loop 220

## Tables

- 1 Phases of securitization of Islam in Europe 85
- 2 Muslim populations in Eastern Europe 108
- 3 Forms of Islamic religiosity and their representatives in countries under research 112
- 4 Status of religions in Eastern Europe 128
- 5 Levels of official securitization of irregular migration of 2015–2016 168
- 6 Muslim religious organizations in countries under research 189

# Introduction: What? The Churchification of Islam; Where? In Eastern Europe

While initiating a book project on muftiates in the European lands of the former empires (Račius and Zhelyazkova, 2017), it did not cross my mind to think of the institution of the muftiate (or however it is referred to in local settings) as an ecclesiastical structure. Though I accepted the muftiate's administrative function, I thought of it mainly as a power base for the Muslim community, comprising both spiritual and administrative capacities. However, with time, and particularly during the research for my book on Muslims in Eastern Europe (Račius, 2018a), it increasingly dawned on me that the institutionalization (as a continuous process rather than a one-time legislative act) of Islam in some post-communist countries of the region embraces features akin to nothing less than its churchification. I shared my impressions and an emerging wish to explore this in more detail with colleagues in the region. Most of them found it worth an effort and encouraged me to embark upon the task. This book is the result and product of the efforts of several years devoted to answering the question of whether the governance of Islam in post-communist Eastern Europe is infused with the intent of the institutional (if only, functional) churchification of Muslim religious collectivities in the region.

Admittedly, the term “churchification of Islam” so far is not commonly used in Anglophone academic or other literature and still remains an exotic, politically and otherwise sensitive, neologism. But the strategy and the process based on it that the term designates are, as shown by the sources used in this book, one or another way recognized, described, and analyzed by numerous researchers of Islam in Europe. Sometimes they are referred to as ecclesification (or ecclesiastification, as Jørgen S. Nielsen prefers it (Vinding, 2018: 50, 57)) and their end-state is seen as formation of “Muslim churches.” Ecclesification, however, should not be seen as a synonym of churchification. Put simply, ecclesification of any religion implies creation (top-down, by outside lay forces, such as the State, or bottom-up, by inside actors) of a clerical class or stratum that monopolizes the right to perform and lead religious rituals and to interpret holy texts and religious signs. The process (and strategy, if it is top-down, e.g. State-pursued) of ecclesification, however, may stop short of churchification, which comes to its fruition when a religious collectivity ultimately turns into a hierarchically structured ecclesiastical-bureaucratic institution staffed and served by clergy. In other words, while churchification is hardly possible

without ecclesification, ecclesification should not, at least in theory, necessarily end in churchification.

In the German-speaking realm, the German-language equivalent of the concept “churchification of Islam,” “Verkirchlichung des Islam,” has not only been coined but has also been widely used in German, Austrian, and Swiss academia and media (Tezcan, 2016; Şahin, 2017: 102; Engelhardt, 2017: 15, 140; Schmid et al., 2014: 15; Hunger and Schröder, 2016: 230; ORF, 2017). In German-language texts, churchification of Islam in the form of “Verkirchlichung des Islam,” is seen by its users, who advocate either for or against churchification of Islam, as a controversial term, and is used almost exclusively in connection with state-religion relations and intra-communal dynamics in Muslim communities in Germany, Austria or Switzerland (Akgün, 2015). In the Francophone realm, no direct equivalent of the term “churchification of Islam” appears to have been used so far; however, the term “Église musulmane” (a Muslim Church), still seen as a polemical, appeared as early as the 1980s (Rouzeik, 1988; Etienne, 1989) and is used to this day (Tincq, 2016), particularly in connection with the governance of Islam in France. A Russian equivalent of the term, “оцерковление ислама,” though a technically grammatically correct neologism, has hardly been used yet either. Nonetheless, I dare to suggest that the term “churchification of Islam” describes best a seminal feature of the governance of Islam in a range of Eastern European countries explored in this book.

But how is this “churchification of Islam” to be understood? The general term “churchification” may imply that the religion under research (in this case, Islam) is being turned (either from within, by its own followers or from outside, for instance, by political authorities, or both, from within and outside) theologically into a Christian-like system of religious beliefs and rituals—in other words, its Christianization. Or it may suggest that the religion under investigation is being turned (either from within, by its own followers or from outside, for instance, by political authorities, or both, from within and outside) institutionally into a church-like religious (ecclesiastical-bureaucratic) structure, as defined and analyzed by the sociology of religion from Weber and Troeltsch on. Though the first alternative may also occur in practice (particularly in local forms of folk religiosity in religious borderlands), any possible tendencies within Islam of getting closer to Christianity (through some syncretic beliefs and practices), undeniably having taken place in Muslim diasporic communities (and particularly, in Eastern Europe), remain outside of the scope of the analytical gaze of this book. It is solely the second understanding of churchification which is the focus of the present research. Needless to say, this book confines itself to an analysis of the institutional, structural, and functional

churchification of just one religious tradition, that of Islam, and is limited both time- (the current post-communist period) and space-wise (Eastern Europe).

The overwhelming majority of Muslims, both in Europe and outside, are expected to deny that there has been, is, or may be, a church in Islam and thus to reject the applicability of the concept of “churchification” to Islam. This is the case, however, not necessarily because the dynamics of the institutionalization and governance of Islam in Europe (in this example, Eastern Europe) is seen by them as not showing the signs and features of the churchification (as understood sociologically) of Islam, but because there is a stigma attached to any comparison of Islam to Christianity and the application of Christian terms and concepts to anything Islamic. But, as Tezcan aptly notes, “the rejection of the church model by Muslims—to state their distinct religious identities—does not deny the process of a de facto *functional* churchification” (Tezcan, 2016: 166 – 167). He provides the example of Germany and Switzerland, where, according to him, “[d]espite their rejection of the term “church,” associations aspire to achieve the status of body of public law in Germany and Switzerland with all the attached privileges that Christian Churches have enjoyed” (Tezcan, 2016: 167). In other words, for there to be a process of, to borrow Tezcan’s term, functional churchification of Islam in Europe, consent and acknowledgement of this fact by Muslims is not needed, as its contents does not depend on a value judgement. This may also serve as some sort of a disclaimer—the present research is not tailored to suit anyone’s taste or be complimentary of conventional ways of describing the dynamics in the institutionalization and governance of Islam in (Eastern) Europe; instead, it seeks to grasp the sociologically explainable nature of the processes taking place. On the other hand, the research has no intention whatsoever of stripping Islam and Muslims of their own agency or otherwise belittling Islam or Muslims or denying Islam’s unique path of development—both inside and outside Europe. The concept of “churchification,” applied in the present research, is cleansed of any Christian connotations to a bare sociological category, and as such may be applied to any other non-Christian religious tradition and religious collectivities, provided, they meet the defined criteria.

Though the present research confines itself to analysis of the churchification of Islam in a minority context (that is, of diasporic Islam), the concept of the churchification of Islam may be, and indeed has already been, applied to Muslim-majority contexts (where the Muslim-majority population is ruled by “Muslim” government, i.e. the government whose members are of Muslim background). For instance, the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*), universally known as Diyanet, has been found by researchers to resemble a national, if not state, church (Tezcan, 2016: 167). Sunier et al.

argue that “in practice, Diyanet operates mainly as a modern Sunni ‘church’ institution” (Sunier et al., 2011: 144). Shakir compares it even to the Catholic Church: “[w]ith close to 80,000 employees and a budget larger than that of many service ministries of the Republic, (...) is probably the world’s largest and most centralized Muslim religious organization, comparable in scope and capabilities only to the Vatican. The Diyanet employs imams, pays their salaries, organizes religious life and acts as the highest religious authority in questions of doctrine and practice” (Shakir, 2017: 110). Gözaydın, although avoiding Christian terminology and not calling the Diyanet a church, in her description of how the Diyanet is structured and functions, nonetheless shows it to be a virtually national Turkish “Muslim Church” (Gözaydın, 2013, 2006).

The progression of the churchification of Islam is arguably of a double nature. On the one hand, it is the State that has an expectation that Muslims residing in the respective country form a church-like religious organization, which would be recognized by the State as the representative organization of the country’s entire Muslim population. On the other hand, certain groups of local Muslims appear to be tempted to follow this line suggested (and even endorsed) by the State and start competing among themselves for the status of representative organization, as a rule, at the cost of rival organizations. As the State, very often implicitly, but sometimes also explicitly, sets out the vision of what it sees as “appropriate” forms of Islamic religiosity on its territory (in Eastern Europe often called “traditional” Islam), competing Muslim organizations often get dragged into portraying themselves as being precisely of this type, while demonizing the competitors as representing alien, and therefore potentially or actually dangerous forms of Islam, which, in turn, are often labelled as deviant or even altogether anti-Islamic.

This state-instigated competition among Muslim groupings not only fragments the Muslim community in a given country, but it also stigmatizes huge swathes of it and indirectly contributes to increasingly unfavorable views of Islam and Muslims in non-Muslim majority societies. Since in many of the Eastern European countries autochthonous “ethnic” Muslims make up the majority of the wider Muslim populations of the respective countries, this competition as a rule happens along ethnic lines, in other words, between the autochthon ethnic groups of Muslims, on the one hand, and immigrant and convert Muslims, on the other. Consequently, in some Eastern European countries (for instance, Lithuania, Belarus, Poland, Bosnia, to name just a few) it has come to the point where the State has elevated the organization of the autochthonous ethnic Muslims to the status of the sole representatives of Islam in the country and the measuring yardstick of what it means to be a Muslim in that country. Such a stance on the part of the State has inadvertently marginalized (if not

criminalized) other forms of Islamic religiosity (such as classical Shi'i, Sufi, Ahmadi or more contemporary forms, like Salafi or other revivalist and neo-traditionalist). But more importantly, it has antagonized significant segments of the local Muslim population, which find it unfair that the State has, through legal instruments and other policy tools, engaged in the churchification of Islam, managing to lure into this process certain Muslim religious organizations, which, by virtue of succumbing to state pressure are seen by opponents to have forsaken the true spirit of Islam, i.e., being non-church-like and therefore of an egalitarian nature.

But in a number of post-communist Eastern European countries, alongside (or sometimes, instead of) the churchification of Islam another course can be observed, i.e., that of its securitization. The term "securitization" promulgated by the so-called Copenhagen School of Buzan et al., has become an accepted analytical category, and its use in relation to religion—particularly Islam—does not seem to raise any doubts or objections among researchers. There is plenty of research analyzing the securitization of Islam in Europe (especially post-9/11) but most of it is confined to Western Europe, with just a dearth of research on the topic so far in the former communist part of Europe. Even so, the securitization of Islam has already been recognized by scholars across the continent as a tangible phenomenon, particularly so in the wake of the so-called "migration crisis" of 2015/6, in a number of post-communist Eastern European states.

The term the "securitization of Islam" may be seen as an antithesis to the "churchification of Islam." As shown in the second part of this book, in post-communist Eastern Europe, the State's position vis-à-vis Muslims and Islam has oscillated between the two extremes—that of perceiving and treating Islam as "yet another admittedly, not Christian, church" (with the ensuing churchification, a "positive" end) and that of seeing it as "not even a religion but rather a radical (violent) political ideology" (with the ensuing "securitization," a "negative" end). In the first case, Islam is either seen organizationally as already a type of (non-Christian) church or at least with the potential to be molded into one, in other words, churchifiable. In the second case, Islam is perceived to be not only inherently unintegratable (uneuropeanizable), but also dangerous; subsequently requiring close monitoring, censoring, and controlling.

However, the two concepts, the "churchification" and the "securitization" of Islam, may not always be mutually exclusive. The churchification of Islam may serve as a policy strategy (adopted by the State/political actors) parallel to (and sometimes even serving within) the wider understood socio-political and particularly legal securitization of religion, particularly, Islam. Here, the

churchification, both top-down and bottom-up, of Islam may be instrumentalized by the State to distinguish between those Muslim collectivities and their followers, which are susceptible to soft state control through “Muslim churches,” and those that require hard state control entailing state intelligence and security services. This way, the churchification of Islam would serve a function in the overall process of the securitization of Islam in a given country.

This book may be seen as complimenting Jonathan Laurence’s *The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration* (2012). In his research on the governance of Islam in Western Europe, Laurence clamors for the need to “plac[e] the nation-state back at the center of discussions of religious politics” (Laurence, 2012: 18). Although in his book, Laurence focuses exclusively on Western Europe, concentrating primarily on the usual suspects—France, Germany, the UK, and Italy, and his terminology is also entirely different from the one used in this book, he in essence deals with the same processes and analyzes the same phenomena as the present book does—the religious policies, particularly those pertaining to Islam, of non-Muslim majority nation-states. However, if the subject of Laurence’s and the present research is partially the same—the states, their agencies, political and non-Muslim social actors, the object of the research—Muslim populations—are of different nature and background; Muslim communities in Eastern Europe, unlike those in Western Europe, which are composed of mainly autochthons, are often centuries-old. Thus, the history of their appearance and development as well as their current social and political status differ, at times, profoundly from those of Western European Muslim populations. Yet, they are some of the least studied within the global Muslim commonwealth. While they survived the atheist policies of the communist regimes, they are now faced with new sociopolitical challenges, which are profoundly changing not only the composition of local Muslim communities but also the nature and status of Islam in respective countries of the region.

All of the countries under investigation in this book, by virtue of being post-communist, are located in what during the Cold War period was known in international political jargon as “Eastern Europe” (Okey, 1992; Twardzisz, 2018; Bianchini, 2015). Lately, new labels, distinguishing country clusters in this region, have been self-promoted. So, for instance, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary introduce themselves as Central European rather than Eastern European; countries in the Balkan Peninsula are referred to and refer to themselves as those in South-Eastern Europe, and the Baltic States increasingly locate themselves in Northern Europe. This way, Eastern Europe appears to have shrunk to a handful of former republics of the USSR, including Russia (or, at least, its European part). Irrespective of this geopolitical fragmentation of

formerly communist Eastern Europe, in the present book, in order to avoid a puzzling geographical terminological cacophony, the term “Eastern Europe” is retained and applied to all former communist lands, and certainly all those under research.

The present research focuses on almost a third of post-communist Eastern European countries with different characteristics pertaining to the presence of Muslims on their territories. Of the seven countries under investigation in this book, between the end of WWII (1945) and the end of the Cold War (1990), only Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary were sovereign states, albeit with USSR satellite regimes. Czechia was part of Czechoslovakia—another country with a USSR satellite regime. Lithuania, a formerly independent country in the inter-war period, was itself part of the USSR. Bosnia and North Macedonia were constitutive parts of Socialist Yugoslavia. With the collapse of the communist regimes in Europe, Lithuania regained its independence in 1991, while North Macedonia (back then known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter in this book referred to by its common shorter version, namely, Bosnia) became sovereign states for the first time in their modern history in 1991 and 1992, respectively. After Czechoslovakia split in 1993, Czechia also become fully sovereign.

Basically, the seven countries under research, in regard to the presence of Muslims on their territory, are representative of three types of Eastern European countries: those that have a well-established and sizable long-term community of autochthonous Muslims (Bosnia, North Macedonia, and Bulgaria), those that also have an established long-term autochthonous community, which, is however, small in size (Lithuania and Poland), and those that have not had any historical autochthonous Muslim community (Hungary and Czechia). Respectively, while the current Muslim populations in the countries of the first and second types are overwhelmingly indigenous Muslim-borns, in the second, they are made up of a mix of autochthons, immigrants, and converts, with the autochthons now constituting a minority, and in the third, Muslim communities are exclusively of immigrant and convert nature. Most of other Eastern European countries would fit into one of these types.

Other characteristics include dominant religious confessions (namely, Christian), the typology of the recognized religions, and the legal status of Islam. Dominant confession-wise, four of the countries are of Catholic heritage, two are Orthodox, and one is of mixed Islamic-Orthodox-Catholic heritage. In respect to the governance of religion, countries under investigation vary from those that have a semi-established state confession (Bulgaria and North Macedonia, both Orthodoxy), through those that have a number of recognized “traditional” confessions (Bosnia, Lithuania, Poland), to those that do not have any

formally recognized “traditional” confessions (Hungary and Czechia). As for the legal status of Islam, in five (Bosnia, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Poland, and Lithuania) out of seven countries, it is more or less recognized as a “traditional” religion in the country, while in two others (Hungary and Czechia) it is not.

All these characteristics, including others, were deemed sufficient to justify the selection of these seven countries, the totality of which is considered to be representative of the spectrum of state-religion (and specifically, state-Islam) relations as well as the internal dynamics in Muslim communities in post-communist Eastern Europe. This is, however, not to suggest that all other countries in post-communist Eastern Europe experience either the churchification or securitization of Islam the same way, if at all, as the countries under research in this book; the spectrum of regimes of governance of religion in Eastern Europe is very long and varied (Račius, 2018b). Nonetheless, it is believed that the progression of both the churchification and securitization of Islam are indeed most advanced in some of the respective countries under investigation in this book.

The key concept in the present research is “governance” (of religion in general and specifically Islam) as defined and used by Maussen (2007). As Maussen argues, “[i]ntroducing the concept of governance in studies on the accommodation of Islam (...) creates opportunities for a type of analysis that goes beyond the study of (formal) legal arrangements, and also looks at practices of application, implementation and interpretation” (Maussen, 2007: 5). He contrasts it to the narrower concept of “government”: “whereas the term “government” would almost inevitably lead to the analysis of governments, state-agencies and public authorities, the term “governance” identifies a wider set of actors, institutions and instruments that play a role in creating specific opportunities and constraints for Islam in Western Europe” (Maussen, 2007: 5 – 6). This way, he widens the scope of actors relevant to the analysis of broadly understood state-Islam relations in Europe. Maussen further correctly notes that “[d]ifferent forms of governance of religious diversity should be distinguished” (Maussen, 2007: 62) and sets a number of criteria: differences in actors, instances, or units of governance, which, among others, include governments at different institutional levels and in different branches and departments, networks of organizations, including Christian organizations (Churches), inter-faith networks and NGO’s, and specific organized forms of Islamic religious organizations as well as differences in the “modes of action-coordination, steering and regulation (hierarchical imposition, laws, law-like rules and regulations, internal forms of self-regulation in associations or networks etc.)” (Maussen, 2007: 62). Maussen’s proposed triangle of the interaction, with its

different modes of action-coordination, steering and regulation, among three types of actors—political, non-Muslim and Muslim social—is utilized in the analytical part (Part 2) of this book.

The logic of the present research is based both on Maussen and on Bader, who, very much in agreement with Maussen, argues that “in order to get a fuller picture of ‘governing’ Islam we urgently need more detailed studies on what ‘governments’ on all levels actually, and not only legally, have done and do to Muslims” (Bader, 2007: 883). For this, he insists that “we should investigate the two fairly neglected areas of governance (...): research on internal governance (both topdown but maybe even more importantly also bottom-up), and research on the corporate governance of Islam in a comparative perspective” (Bader, 2007: 883). Thus, the present research, besides dwelling on the legal side of the governance of Islam in Eastern Europe, looks into the broader political actors’ level, where, next to political powers in the government, opposition political forces—both mainstream and moderate as well as populist and even far-right—are all included in the analysis. Moreover, such non-Muslim social actors as public intellectuals and opinion makers, civic society agents, media, and Christian Churches are also included to make the analysis more comprehensive. Bader goes on by arguing that “even a fuller analysis of governance (what governments, other actors, and Muslim organisations and leaders ‘do to Muslims’) is clearly only part of the whole story of incorporation processes. This is because polities are not all-powerful, policies have unintended, counterproductive effects, and a lot depends upon ‘what Muslims do to states’ and to other actors, including their own organisations and leaders” (Bader, 2007: 883). This is why an analysis of intra-communal dynamics in Muslim communities compliments that of non-Muslim political and social actors.

The value-added of the present research is also seen in its comparative nature. As Maussen argues, “[i]t is important to further develop theories and models to systematically describe relevant (institutional) differences between countries (for example in terms of different state-church regimes, (Political) Opportunity Structures, and models of political organization) and to develop instruments to measure and systematically describe the relevant dependent variables, such as different degrees and forms of the accommodation of Islamic presence and practice” (Maussen, 2007: 60). Though he focuses exclusively on Western Europe, his observation is perfectly valid for Eastern Europe and may be meaningfully implemented in what he calls the accommodation of the Islamic presence and practice in post-communist Eastern Europe. Maussen’s expressed wish to have more qualitative studies with a comparative and/or explanatory focus on the actual practices of interpretation and application of regulations and policies within specific social contexts is taken up in this book.

Though the national Constitution and *lex specialis* may be seen as the basis of state-religion relations in practically all of the countries under research, they are not sufficient sources for a comprehensive research of institutionalization or governance of Islam in those countries. As Stan argues, “[n]one of the new EU member states—or the old ones, for that matter—spell out their church-state relations model in one single document. Rather these models have to be pieced together by closely examining the interaction between religion and politics in different areas of life, gathering information from a variety of sources, and keeping in mind both the formal and informal aspects of this constantly negotiated relationship” (Stan, 2009: 12 – 13). What she suggests is, very much like Maussen and Bader, i.e., to delve into the analysis beyond the formal institutional level and into the levels of practical politics. For the purposes of the present research, this meant both desk research of openly available materials in academic, journalistic, and other sources as well as fieldwork research in all of the countries under investigation, where meetings and interviews were held with academics, representatives of both state institutions and Muslim communities and their religious collectivities. Since a number of texts, both primary sources such as documents of religious collectivities and secondary sources such as articles in media and academic articles, come only in their original (local) languages, translation of quotes from them has been undertaken by the author, mainly with the help of native speakers, but in a few cases Google Translate was employed, and thus should be treated as unofficial translations.

The book is divided into two parts, the first of which is dedicated to the conceptual and contextual framework of the research, and the second to the analysis of the double course of the churchification and securitization of Islam in the seven selected post-communist Eastern European countries. The first part is comprised of three chapters. In the first, a working definition of church is developed and its applicability to Islam is discussed. Chapter 2 is devoted to the discussion of Islam in minority settings as diasporic Islam and the conceptualization of both “Euro-Islam” and “European” Islam as forms of diasporic Islam. The concept of *fiqh al-aqallīyyat* and its applicability to diasporic Islam is also addressed in this chapter as well as an assessment of regimes of governance of religion in general (and Islam in particular) in (Western) Europe. In Chapter 3, the conceptualization of the two key concepts of the research—the churchification and securitization of Islam—is provided, followed by a discussion on the concept of religious nationalism, found to be useful in the analysis of the churchification and, particularly, securitization of Islam in Eastern Europe. The chapter ends with the provision of the analytical framework and model applied in the second (analytical) part of the book.

The second part consists also of three chapters. Chapter 4 provides the context of state-Islam relations in Eastern Europe, focusing on the seven selected countries. In Chapter 5, an analysis of the churchification and securitization of Islam on the legal, political, and non-Muslim social actor levels is developed (top-down perspective), while in Chapter 6, the focus is turned to the reaction to, and the role of, Islamic spiritual administrations in both churchification and securitization as well as to the intra-communal dynamics in Muslim communities of the respective countries (a bottom-up perspective).

In 1997, while overviewing research on the governance (called by him “accommodation”) of Islam in (Western) European countries, Maussen spoke of possible different paths “to further develop the understanding of these differences [in accommodation of Islam] and possible explanations,” he suggested that “[s]tudies could focus on explaining the emergence, stabilization and reproduction of distinct patterns of relations between religions, societies, politics, nations and states and describe these in terms of models to make them suitable for descriptive and explanatory purposes” (Maussen, 2007: 64). He also foresaw another option, namely, “to select countries in a way that would allow the study of the importance of specific historical legacies, such as an imperial past, (legal) legacies of the (...) empire[s], and the presence of ‘indigenous’ Muslim minorities” (Maussen, 2007: 64). At the same time, he warned that “[i]t should be avoided that the focus on national models and variations between countries results in too static, reified and even stereotypical images of “country specific models” (Maussen, 2007: 64). This book, hopefully, fulfills his wishes to some degree, particularly in that it analyzes selected “countries in a way that would allow the study of the importance of specific historical legacies and the presence of ‘indigenous’ Muslim minorities.”

# Notions of Church

## 1.1 Grappling with Terms: Church and Other Forms of Religious Collectivities

In the discussion of religious collectivities/bodies and institutions/organizations, one encounters numerous labels, ranging from “religious group,” “religious movement” or “religious community” to “cult,” “sect,” “congregation,” “denomination,” “ecclesia” and, finally, “church.” The present study focuses on the latter, or rather on the process of becoming one. The concept of “church” may be studied from at least four perspectives: the theological, the sociological, the legal, and the political. Though the theological (and exclusively Christian) analysis of the concept of “church” has been most prolific, it is the other perspectives, and particularly the sociological, that are of particular relevance for the present research. Thus, the present chapter mainly relies on the conceptualizations of church advanced by sociologists of religion and authors from filial fields.

For the purposes of clarity, it may be useful to first establish a distinction between “church” and all other designations. Sociologists of religion have been grappling with the terms and distinctions in their contents for just over a hundred years. Though it was Max Weber who first used terms such as “church” and “sect” in a sociological application (Weber, 1978), it is Ernst Troeltsch, who is credited with elaborating in the late 1910s the distinction between “church” and “sect” (Troeltsch, 1919, 1931). Weber put the distinction between the two straight: “If one wishes to make a conceptual distinction between a sect and a church, a sect is not an institution (*Anstadt*) like a church, but a community of the religiously qualified” (Toennies et al., 1973: 141). He further reasoned that “[w]hat is most characteristic of the church, even in the common usage of the term, is the fact that it is a rational, compulsory association with continuous operation and that it claims a monopolistic authority. It is normal for a church to strive for complete control on a territorial basis and to attempt to set up the corresponding territorial or parochial organization. So far as this takes place, the means by which this claim to monopoly is upheld will vary from case to case” (Weber, 1978: 56). The latter point, that churches “strive for complete control on a territorial basis and (...) attempt to set up the corresponding territorial or parochial organization,” is of particular relevance to the present study and thus is employed in the analysis of Muslim religious administrations in Eastern Europe in the second part of this book.

According to Troeltsch, “the Church is that type of organization which is overwhelmingly conservative, which to a certain extent accepts the secular order, and dominates the masses; in principle, therefore, it is universal, i.e. it desires to cover the whole life of humanity. The sects, on the other hand, are comparatively small groups; they aspire after personal inward perfection, and they aim at the direct personal fellowship between the members of each group” (Troeltsch, 1931: 331). Troeltsch further argues that “the fully developed Church (...) utilizes the State and the ruling classes, and weaves these elements into her own life; she then becomes an integral part of the existing social order” (Troeltsch, 1931: 331).

For both, Weber and Troeltsch, the church is a religious collectivity (religious body) into which one is born, while the sect is composed of members who joined out of their free will. Weber argues that “[i]t is its character as a compulsory association, particularly the fact that one becomes a member of the church by birth, which distinguishes the church from a ‘sect.’ It is characteristic of the latter that it is a voluntary association and admits only persons with specific religious qualifications” (Weber, 1978: 56). Peter Berger summarized Weber’s distinction between church and sect in the following words: “A church is (...) an institution which administers religious sacraments after the manner of a finance ministry. Membership, at least in theory, is compulsory, and consequently proves nothing concerning the qualities of the members. A sect, however, is a voluntary association, theoretically restricted to those who are religiously and ethically qualified. The sect is entered voluntarily by those who have received acceptance by virtue of their religious qualification” (Berger, 1954: 468 – 469). The dichotomy suggested by Weber and Troeltsch led to the understanding, upheld by some yet critiqued by others, that a church is “a religious group that is in low tension with the social environment,” while the sect is “a religious group that is in high tension with the surrounding environment” (Steinberg, 1965: 118).

On the point of compulsory versus voluntary membership, one may wonder if the concept of conversion would be of use here. If conversion ideally is voluntary, following the Weberian-Troeltschian tradition, members of sects may be regarded as converts of sorts. However, as is well known from both history and contemporary instances, conversions to faiths that have churches have been happening since the emergence of those churches, many times, not only individually, but *en masse*. In other words, though the membership of churches is overwhelmingly of a “born-into-tradition” type, there may be and indeed always have been newcomers (converts), who voluntarily chose the concerned religion and its church. This critical point should be kept in mind as it is of relevance to the research of Muslim communities in Eastern Europe, who are the focus of the present book.

In sum, the Weberian-Troeltschian understanding of church as a religious collectivity encompasses a range of features such as being large in size, conservative in outlook, relaxed on obedience of membership, on good terms with the secular State, and being an integral part of the social order. All this, arguably, makes it not only distinct but even the opposite of sect, which, as Wilson contends, among others, “may be identified by the following characteristics: it is a voluntary association (...); exclusiveness is emphasized, and expulsion exercised against those who contravene doctrinal, moral, or organizational precepts; its self-conception is of an elect, a gathered remnant, possessing special enlightenment (...); the sect is hostile or indifferent to the secular society and to the state” (Wilson, 1959: 4).

As Troeltsch focused exclusively on Christian religious collectivities in Europe of pre-modern and modern times, Tinaz argues that he “did not intend his typology to be universally applicable. For him, church and sect were historical constructs, helpful chiefly in conceptualising two very different organisational and orientational tendencies of Christian bodies down to the threshold of modern times” (Tinaz, 2005: 67). Weber was oriented much more widely—in his writings, he talks virtually about all historic religions. But his conceptualization of the notions of church and sect is less concentrated and elaborate than Troeltsch’s, making the latter much more read and commented on. Troeltsch’s, admittedly simplistic typology, or rather binary opposition, was both critiqued but also built on by numerous other authors, who subsequently introduced an array of terms, which were supposed to better grasp and explain the complex nature and reality of religious collectivities, first within Christianity and then later among non-Christian (including post-Christian) religions.

Niebuhr in his *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* contends that the binary opposition between church and sect is too static. He argues that sects as voluntary associations may survive as such just for a generation and are bound to evolve and change with the coming of the second generation through births given by the first generation members, thus gradually evolving from sects to churches (Niebuhr, 1929: 19 – 20). Therefore, what in Weberian-Troeltschian understanding were opposite poles, in Niebuhrian understanding became part of an ever-evolving continuum. Niebuhr introduced the term “denominationalism,” which has led to the emergence of a typology of denominations created by later authors.

Wilson suggests that among the features of denomination are such that “it is formally a voluntary association; it accepts adherents without imposition of traditional prerequisites of entry, and employs purely formalized procedures of admission; breadth and tolerance are emphasized; since membership is

laxly enrolled, expulsion is not a common device for dealing with the apathetic and the wayward; its self conception is unclear and its doctrinal position unstressed; it is content to be one movement among others, all of which are thought to be acceptable in the sight of God; it accepts the standards and values of the prevailing culture and conventional morality; there is a trained professional ministry; lay participation occurs but is typically restricted to particular sections of the laity and to particular areas of activity; services are formalized and spontaneity is absent; education of the young is of greater concern than the evangelism of the outsider; additional activities are largely non-religious in character; individual commitment is not very intense; the denomination accepts the values of the secular society and the state; members are drawn from any section of the community, but within one church, or any one region; membership will tend to limit itself to those who are socially compatible" (Wilson, 1959: 4 – 5).

Though Niebuhr and his followers would see denomination as an evolutionary outcome of sect's life course, others, like Martin, do not see it that way. Martin even argues that "in most 'normal' situations sects do not become denominations: they remain sects or they die" (Martin, 1962: 2). However, like most others, he places the denomination in between church and sect by arguing that denomination "formally maintains that it has no institutional monopoly of salvation, and thus it maintains a fairly tolerant position. Its organisational principles are more fluid and pragmatic than those of the church, and its separate ministry—which is maintained in contrast to the more typically sectarian rejection of it—is seen more as a matter of convenience than of the divine institution... In its attitude to the existing social order, the denomination is neither conservative (as is the church) nor revolutionary/indifferent (as is the sect), but reformist" (Martin, 1965: 221 – 224).

Johnstone, in his providing of the eight characteristics of denominations, also squarely distinguishes them from churches and sects. For him, denominations are "(a) similar to churches, but unlike sects, in being on relatively good terms with the state and secular powers and may even attempt to influence government at times; (b) maintain at least tolerant and usually fairly friendly relationships with other denominations in a context of religious pluralism; (c) rely primarily on birth for membership increase, though it will also accept converts; some even actively pursue evangelization; (d) accept the principle of at least modestly changing doctrine and practice and tolerate some theological diversity and dispute; (e) follow a fairly routinized ritual and worship service that explicitly discourages spontaneous emotional expression; (f) train and employ professional clergy who must meet formal requirements for certification; (g) accept less extensive involvement from members than do sects, but

more involvement than churches; (h) often draw disproportionately from the middle and upper classes of society” (Johnstone, 2016: 64).

With time, the scholarly crafted typology of religious collectivities grew even bigger. So, for instance, Yinger contributed to it by distinguishing six types: universal church, ecclesia, denomination, established sect, sect, and cult. He further subdivided sects into three categories: (a) acceptance sects, (b) aggressive sects, (c) avoidance sects (Yinger, 1946: 18 – 23; 1957: 142 – 45). Wilson, meanwhile, divided sects into four types: conversionist, adventist, introversionist and gnostic. According to him, “[t]he Conversionist sects seek to alter men, and thereby to alter the world; the response is free-will optimism. The Adventist sects predict drastic alteration of the world, and seek to prepare for the new dispensation—a pessimistic determinism. The Introversionists reject the world’s values and replace them with higher inner values, for the realization of which inner resources are cultivated. The Gnostic sects accept in large measure the world’s goals but seek a new and esoteric means to achieve these ends—a wishful mysticism” (Wilson, 1959: 5). As for cult, according to Becker, it is “a kind of quasi-group embodying an individualistic search for ecstatic experience” (Becker, 1932: 627) and, apparently, it is at the extreme end of the opposite of church.

There is also “congregation,” which may be defined as an association of persons “that associate for some kind of religious services” (Louthian and Miller, 1994: 4) or as “a well-defined body of people who share the same priest(s) for purposes of worship and / or for performance of rites of passage” (Hertel, 1977: 21 – 22). Ammerman defines congregations as “locally situated, multigenerational, voluntary organizations of people who identify themselves as a distinct religious group and engage in a broad range of religious activities together. They are usually, but not always, associated with some larger tradition and its affiliated regional and national bodies (i.e., a denomination). The space where they meet may or may not be an identifiably religious building, but congregations do typically have a regular meeting place and regular schedules of religious activities” (Ammerman, 2011: 562). As such, congregations are then “membership groups within churches and sects” (Hertel, 1977: 21 – 22). Congregation may arguably be seen as a synonym of “religious community;” though, as will be evident in subsequent chapters of this book, sects, denominations, and even churches are sometimes, particularly in the case of non-Christian religious groups, referred to or even officially called “religious communities,” this way obscuring the term.

Though Louthian and Miller contend that “[t]he term ‘church’ is intended to be synonymous with the terms ‘denomination’ or ‘sect’ rather than to be used in the universal sense” (Louthian and Miller, 1994: 1), it appears that most

scholars would feel a clear distinction between, on the one hand, church and, on the other hand, all other types of religious collectivities. However, it remains to be established what is, if at all, the difference between “church” and “ecclesia.” To start with, “[t]he word translated church comes from ekklesia. (...) This word is formed from two Greek words: ek (meaning ‘from’ or ‘out of’) coupled with a derivative of ka-leo (which means ‘to call, invite, or name’). Thus, the basic meaning of ekklesia is ‘to call out of’ or, with relation to a group of people, the ‘called out ones.’ It is understandable that ekklesia has been translated as ‘congregation’ or ‘assembly’ or ‘company’ although these words dilute the core meaning that ekklesia (church) has a greater emphasis on people being ‘called out’ by God instead of their meeting together” (WordTruth, 2010). The latter observation suggests that such terms as “congregation,” “assembly,” “community,” “movement” and the like, standing alone, may carry a secular meaning, while “ecclesia” by default carries exclusively a religious meaning.

Though it may be that etymologically “church” is simply an English rendering of the Greek word “ekklesia,” in Christian theology but also the sociology of religion, the two terms appear to be understood as designating distinct though overlapping religious collectivities. It may be understood as “a slight modification of the church type,” where “[e]cclesias include the (...) characteristics of churches with the exception that they are generally less successful at garnering absolute adherence among all of the members of the society and are not the sole religious body”(Lumen, n.d.). Thus, “[a]n ekklesia may exist but not be considered an ‘official church.’ This non-recognition can come from secular or religious sources. Secular authorities may not recognize small group gatherings as an ‘official church’ because there are governmental requirements that must be met by the group. As a result, believers may choose to ‘render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s’ and comply with ‘non-profit, corporation, or other ratification requirements’ to be an ‘official church’ as recognized by the government” (WordTruth, 2010).

This understanding of ecclesia and particularly its status in, and relations with, the State is of particular relevance to the present research, as in some Eastern European countries the Muslim scene has several features as described above. The above passage indirectly alludes to the process of the “churchification” of ecclesia—the process where an ecclesia chooses to go down the government-designed path (enshrined in legislation governing religion) to be recognized by the state as an “official church.” “Official church” here, however, is not to be understood as the “state church” (or “state religion”) but rather as the status of a religious collectivity at the top level of official state recognition of it, like in Bulgaria. This is particularly relevant in countries with double and sometimes triple layer registration systems for religious bodies. Alternatively,

it is suggested that “a church that functions like a corporate structure (an organization) may have many ekklesias within it. As a result, believers can easily leave a ‘church organization’ and its associated events/programs but have great difficulty leaving a small group of believers (ekkleisia) within that same organizational structure” (WordTruth, 2010). In this case, however, ecclesia appears to be a synonym for denomination or even congregation.

Referring to ekklesia and the Hebrew word *qāhāl*, “meaning ‘the congregation of the faithful’”, Sedgwick argues that “[b]oth the Greek and the Hebrew terms are pre-Christian, and the two senses of Church that derive from them denote two universal categories: the community, and the institutional authority within it” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40). Following Sedgwick, one could argue that the concept of church includes two distinct, yet intertwined dimensions—a totality of believers (community) and ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure (institutional authority) that presides over and governs the first. Psychologically, the community needs to have the identity of church, the embodiment and institutional expression of which is the ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure.

So, what constitutes a church or, to put it another way, what makes a religious collectivity into one? Sengers provides all four of the above-mentioned perspectives on what “church” may mean: “[i]n a theological sense, it means the whole group of the faithful who, at the commandment of Jesus, regularly assemble to study the Scriptures, to celebrate the sacraments (especially the Last Supper) and to preserve the apostolic tradition, according to Acts 2.42. In a sociological sense it means the (Christian) religious organisation that is more or less accommodated to society with a message and vision for the whole of society. ‘Church’ also has a political/legal meaning, when it is used to describe the difference between religious organisations which are accepted or registered and those which are not. Thus, for example, the regular Jewish organisations in the Netherlands are called ‘church’” (Sengers, 2012: 55). This political/legal meaning of “church” is, as is shown in subsequent chapters in this book, easily recognizable in legislation governing religion in Eastern Europe, where the relevant *lex specialis* often carries in its very title the word “churches.”

In addition, Sengers reasons that “[t]he word ‘church’ can further be used to describe either a local church congregation or parish (or even its building), or a whole group of congregations with the same tradition, theology, liturgy and organisation. This depends also on theological visions, as represented by the congregational and episcopal church models” (Sengers, 2012: 55). This understanding of church is, admittedly, exclusively Christian as it revolves around a building designated (and likely consecrated) for religious worship and service. Religions that do not have churches-as-buildings would hardly fit this understanding of “church.” However, the congregational and episcopal church

models, like some others, may arguably be applied to non-Christian religious collectivities. This is dealt with further below.

But more relevantly to the present research, Sengers argues that “[i]n sociology, four main characteristics are used to describe these religious organisations (churches—*my insertion*): a bureaucratic organisational structure, a passive relationship with their members, a positive relationship and attitude to society and the state, and a leading vision for the whole of society including a positive attitude to other religious bodies” (Sengers, 2012: 55). These features, although not identical to, are reminiscent of the Weberian-Troeltschian understanding of church spoken about above. The first three, as is shown in the subsequent chapters of this book, are very relevant to the study of demographically and politically dominant Muslim religious administrations in Eastern European countries. The fourth is conditionally valid, as those Muslim religious administrations that are studied in this book may not necessarily have “a leading vision for the whole of society” as they may claim to represent a minority faith community. Johnson’s reasoning that it would be justifiable to classify as churches “those religions that comprehend the entire society or at least its dominant classes” (Johnson, 1963: 544), likewise may only conditionally and cautiously be applied in the study of minority religions, while his suggestion that religious “bodies permitting their members to participate freely in all phases of secular life should probably also be classified as churches” (Johnson, 1963: 544), is very liberal and obscures the entire typology as it is only in the case of cults and some sects that their religious leadership does not allow their members to participate freely in all phases of secular life. For Louthian and Miller, “[t]o be a ‘church’ a religious organization must engage in the administration of sacerdotal functions and the conduct of religious worship in accordance with the tenets and practices of a particular religious body” (Louthian and Miller, 1994: 1), in other words, to have a group (of professional ministers) who are recognized by the believers to be authorized to preside over religious rituals/liturgy. Sengers goes further by pointing out two very relevant aspects pertaining to churches. The first concerns not only the institutional structure but its employees: “[t]heir (churches’—*my insertion*) organisation is rational and bureaucratic, their ministers are professionals and hold their office from the institution” (Sengers, 2012: 56). Having professional ministers serving in institutionalized hierarchical ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structures makes religious collectivities churches. His second point is that “Churches (through their institutional authorities—*my insertion*), and politics form a coalition to profit from the (sacral or secular) powers of their partner: the church needs the temporal powers to realise its universal claims, the state needs the church for supernatural legitimation and control of the masses. A church thus becomes a part and

guarantee of the secular order” (Sengers, 2012: 56). The claim that “the state needs the church for supernatural legitimation,” even though it may seem outdated in the context of many Western European countries, still holds true for many post-communist Eastern European states; it is likewise plausible to argue that in Eastern Europe, the State may want to and indeed does instrumentalize churches (particularly Orthodox) in its aim to control the masses of their believers.

Steinberg seconds Sengers’ view when he suggests that churches are those religious institutions that “partake of and help to maintain the normative order of the larger society” (Steinberg, 1965: 120). He even goes so far as to suggest that “most religious institutions are churches” (Steinberg, 1965: 120). In other words, Churches use the State to their benefit but also subscribe to being used by the State, particularly, as is shown in the second part of the book, to fend off, marginalize or even destroy other contestant religious collectivities and this way help to maintain the normative order.

Johnstone provides six characteristics of churches, which, however, read as representing exclusively Christian Churches of the medieval times. Churches, according to Johnstone, “(a) claim universality, include all members of the society within their ranks, and have a strong tendency to equate ‘citizenship’ with ‘membership;’ (b) exercise religious monopoly and try to eliminate religious competition; (c) are very closely allied with the state and secular powers—frequently there is overlapping of responsibilities and much mutual reinforcement; (d) are extensively organized as a hierarchical bureaucratic institution with a complex division of labour; (e) employ professional, full-time clergy who possess the appropriate credentials of education and formal ordination; (f) almost by definition gain new members through natural reproduction and the socialization of children into the ranks; (g) allow for diversity by creating different groups within the church (e.g., orders of nuns or monks) rather than through the formation of new religions” (Johnstone, 2016: 63).

Louthian and Miller provide an even more exhaustive list, though less Christianity-biased and open to including non-Christian churches, of what are called “objective” characteristics of churches: “(a) a distinct legal existence, (b) a recognized creed and form of worship, (c) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government, (d) a formal code of doctrine and discipline, (e) a distinct religious history, (f) a membership not associated with any other church or denomination, (g) an organization of ordained ministers, (h) ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies, (i) a literature of its own, (j) established places of worship, (k) regular congregations, (l) regular religious services, (m) Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young, (n) schools for the preparation of its ministers, and (o) any other facts and circumstances that may bear upon the organization’s claim for church status” (Louthian and

Miller, 1994: 2). They, however, warn that “[t]he fifteen criteria are not an attempt to quantify the factual circumstances required for recognition as a church. Determinations are not made solely on the number of characteristics an organization possesses. Given the variety of religious practice, the determination of what constitutes a church is inherently unquantifiable. Attempts to use a dogmatic numerical approach might unconstitutionally favor established churches at the expense of newer, less traditional institutions” (Louthian and Miller, 1994: 2 – 3). Nonetheless, out of the fifteen characteristics, for the purposes of the present study, five are most relevant: (1) a distinct legal existence, (2) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government, (3) an organization of ordained ministers, (4) ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies and (5) established places of worship.

Greely argues that “a church without structure is a non-existent community, because all human groups, even the most simple, quickly evolve established patterns of behaviour and agreed-upon norms to regulate the patterns of behaviour. In other words, even the most elementary community has structure and laws” (Greely, 1968: 52). Yinger, however, maintains that “church can be present in either an institutional form with an elaborate hierarchy among the clergy or in a diffused form” (Yinger, 1970: 256). There is certainly no denial that historically (and to the present) there have been numerous religious communities that lacked institutionalization of their religious collectivities and might not have had “an elaborate hierarchy among the clergy,” even though they might have had some sort of “structure and laws,” this does not warrant classifying them as churches. Thus, for the purposes of the present research, churches are religious collectivities that have structure and internal laws, though the degree of their institutionalization, particularly, on the political level (the legal status within the state), may vary from case to case, as institutionalization (and purported churchification) of a religious community depends on numerous external and internal factors.

However, structurally (as ecclesiastical polities), churches, at least when viewed from an internal Christian point of view, may have one of these common systems: episcopal, connexional, presbyterian, or congregational. The episcopal system is the most hierarchical and multilevel and implies governance of church through “bishops” (overseers, to translate directly from the Greek *epískopos*), who preside over dioceses, where clergy of lower ranks working in the diocese submit to bishop’s religious and administrative (political) power. Bishops may have their own collective bodies with high-ranking bishops (“archbishops,” “metropolitans,” “patriarchs”) presiding over them.

The least hierarchical system (where there are no “bishops” at all) is congregational, where, as Whelan argues, “[i]n the congregational churches, the faith and internal religious law of the denominations make each local congregation

autonomous. The coordination of the various congregations' activities is a matter of voluntary agreement or 'covenant'" (Whelan, 1977: 903). He contrasts the congregational system to those of a hierarchical nature, where "[i]n the hierarchical churches, (...) the faith and internal religious law create a single church authority with jurisdiction over all the members and branches of the church. Local congregations are divisions, not autonomous units" (Whelan, 1977: 904). This juxtaposition of, on the one hand, congregational (the diffused form, to use Yinger's term), and, on the other hand, hierarchical (Yinger's institutional form), churches is based on distinctions between the nature and structure of religious authority and its right to organize believers' (religious) life. In this, the question of who constitute (religious) authority and how individuals within its structures relate to each other, looms large. The connexional and presbyterian systems fall between the two extremums, with progressively less hierarchical structures, but additionally with the increasing role of structural units formed by lay members that complement or even supersede those formed by clergy of different ranks.

One may ask, whether a church may exist without the clergy. As has been argued above, sects and even denominations indeed may be led by laymen and non-professional clergy (or laymen serving as clergy). But for churches, professional clergy is indispensable. For the purposes of the present research, professional clergy are understood to be "a defined group of trained persons who possess knowledge and skills not accessible to the general public, a group which is relatively autonomous in that the members are entitled to make judgements based on their expertise and are empowered to be largely selfgoverning. Like other professionals, clergy claim to have authority in their own domain, which gives them status and influence" (Hoge, 2011:581). Though clergy in different churches may or may not have hierarchical structures, their formal and informal bodies would function as a sort of a guild where there is a set of clear internal criteria of, and rules on, when one becomes a clergyman, where in the structure one finds oneself, and how one may advance through the ranks.

One, thus, might argue that a sect starts turning into a church when it starts training its professional clergy. The professionalization of clergy and particularly the institutionalization of its training programs (in the form of "seminaries" or university faculties, whatever their title is) are then a symptomatic feature of the churchification (or churchliness) of a religious collectivity. At the same time, this leads to the natural hierarchization of clergy in two related senses—administratively (possessors of political power) and in regards to the production of religious knowledge (possessors of symbolic power). This is how the rank and file of professional clergy (the ecclesiastical class) is born and

then sustained and perpetuated. Furthermore, the uninitiated are denied the right to perform ecclesiastical duties, as a rule, by internal religious law but sometimes also by state legislation. However, the professionalization of clergy with its hierarchization does not by default lead to a hierarchical system of the given church as such—the congregational model of churches arguably allows for more horizontal relations among individual congregations who remain relatively autonomous.

Though it has mainly been the domain of the sociology of religion, distinction among religious collectivities found its place in law also, as many countries of the world, some under study in the present book, have *lex specialis* devoted to the governance of religion and religious collectivities. As a rule, distinctions between churches and other types of religious collectivities are set out in such laws. Ultimately, it is the courts that have to deal with such distinctions in practice. So, for instance, in the American context, for taxation purposes, the legislator had to grapple with the distinction between religious organizations that are and are not churches (Whelan, 1977). Louthian and Miller report that “[i]n *Church of Eternal Life and Liberty, Inc. v. Commissioner*, 86 T.C. 916, 924 (1986), the Tax Court defined a church, for IRC 170(b)(1)(A)(i) purposes, as ‘a coherent group of individuals and families that join together to accomplish the religious purposes of mutually held beliefs’” (Louthian and Miller, 1994: 3). They draw a conclusion that, purportedly, according to the Tax Court, “a church’s principal means of accomplishing its religious purposes must be to assemble regularly a group of individuals related by common worship and faith” (Louthian and Miller, 1994: 3). Furthermore, according to Louthian and Miller, “[i]n order to receive recognition as a church, the facts and circumstances must show that the primary focus of or purpose towards which the organization’s activities are directed is the promulgation of its religious beliefs and doctrines through a congregation” (Louthian and Miller, 1994: 6).

It may be noted that from a (Christian) theological point of view, church is something very different from how it is understood in sociology, law or politics. A prominent theologian, Avey Dulles, is credited for having “identified in history a series of paradigms of the church, i.e. dominant models and images” (Gleeson, 2008: 1). His models of church, besides the two basic—church as institution and church as community—also include church as Herald, church as Sacrament, church as Servant, and church as School of Discipleship. Later authors followed Dulles typology, but also critiqued as well as expanded it. So, for instance, Fuellenbach added two other models: that of church as basic ecclesial communities and church as a contrast society (Gleeson, 2008: 2). The Christian theological conceptualization of church is, however, of least relevance in the present study.

As all of the above-mentioned authors came from the Judeo-Christian environment and were focused on Christianity (and very much so on its Protestant branch), it is legitimate to ask whether the terminology—arguably, of Christian origin—used by them is applicable to non-Christian religions. When it comes to such a key analytical category as “church,” Sengers assures that “‘Church’ is not a protected word; everybody can claim it, as is shown by the examples Church of Scientology or Church of Latter Day Saints. These organisations are not what the general public means by the word ‘church’” (Sengers, 2012: 55). However, arguably, the two examples provided by Sengers, though correct, are of religious collectivities that are either in effect post-Christian or emerged in a Judeo-Christian, albeit very secularized, environment; both may be assigned to the category of Western New Religious Movements.

The facts that these religious collectivities claim to be churches and use the word church in their official titles does not automatically confer on them the status of church (even sociologically, let alone theologically, legally, and politically). Usage of the word “church” in the titles only reveals how important that word is to these religious collectivities, particularly for missionary purposes—to attract followers to whom it may be important to belong to a “church” rather than to any other type of religious collectivity. In other words, though Sengers is right in indicating that “‘Church’ is not a protected word; everybody can claim it,” the claim by itself does not make the claimer a church. Conversely, arguably, a religious collectivity may never mention the word ‘church’ when referring to itself, yet from a sociological point of view be a church, because it is the ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure (no matter, how called) that may make a religious collectivity into a church, Christian, post-Christian or non-Christian. So, for instance, Steinberg poses a question “Is Reform Judaism a church or a sect?” (Steinberg, 1965: 117) and himself replies by defining Reform Judaism as a “church movement.” Steinberg defines “church movements” as religious groups (called by him “rump groups”) which “come into less tension with society from the time of their separation from the parent institution” (Steinberg, 1965: 119).

Sengers, following in the Weberian-Troeltschian tradition, argues that “[i]n their organisation, Christian religious bodies are supposed to be rational and bureaucratic. In the relationship with their members, they are thought to be not very demanding and to rely on people who become members by birth and remain members for the rest of their life. Christian religious organisations will have a positive relationship with the political, economic, and cultural power structures of a given society and sometimes even sanctify these. Christian religious organisations will see themselves, be considered as, and behave as the guarantors of social cohesion and tradition—even for those who are not

members" (Sengers, 2012: 58). If this is so in the case of Christian Churches, it may be asked if it is (or at least may be) valid for non-Christian religious bodies. For instance, if one substitutes "Christian" in the above quotation with "Islamic" (having in mind a particular Muslim religious body in a Eastern European country), would it still hold true? Would it not be so that in its organization, a Muslim religious body will be rational and bureaucratic? Regarding its relationship with its members, would it not be very demanding and rely on people who become members by birth and remain members for the rest of their life? Or would that Muslim religious organization not have a positive relationship with the political, economic, and cultural power structures of a given society and sometimes even sanctify these? Would that Muslim religious organization not see itself, be considered as, and behave as a guarantor of social cohesion and tradition—even for those who are not members? If so, then maybe indeed the label of church is more universal than just Christianity-bound?

Wilson argues that "if the sociology of religion is to move forward, we must create categories which allow us to study comparatively the social functions and developments of religious movements. As a consequence, such studies must shun categories dictated too specifically by the characteristics of a particular theological tradition. Obviously, the types we can use are still drawn mainly from the material at our disposal, especially from Christian movements. But it is imperative that we should try to enlarge their application, and, if needs be, modify their formulation in the light of this extension of their meaning, so that we shall have a series of analytical instruments which will no longer be centred on a particular civilisation and religion (in this case, Christian)" (Wilson, 1969: 361). With Wilson's tacit encouragement, the present research, in its study of church and the churchification progression, ventures outside of the comfort zone of Christianity and its churches into analysis of a religious tradition that is least associated with church, denomination or sect, Islam. The author is convinced that the theoretical conceptualization on churches and sects and their distinctions, found in the texts of sociologists of religion and scholars from filial disciplines, may be fruitfully applied in the study of Muslim religious collectivities.

There are scholars who appear to support this approach. So, for instance, Robertson contends that "it is possible to argue that church and sect, and even other types, can be applied to Islam and, rather less easily, to Buddhism" (Robertson, 1972: 122). Johnson, in his turn, basing his conclusion on the analysis of the Weberian notions of religions as being modeled by emissary and exemplary prophesies, also contrives that "we are safe in assuming that the church-sect distinction may be applied to most groups in the Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions" (Johnson, 1963: 542). Martin, however, is more reserved on

the applicability of the term “sect” in the Islamic context. For him, “Islam is a Church which absorbs society and produces no ‘sects,’ only divisions” (Martin, 1965: 22).

It may be stressed that it is only to be expected that not all non-Christian religious traditions have churches. For instance, Martin argues that “[t]here is, of course, *no institution in Confucian society* which can be described as a ‘church’ which exists separately from the pattern of conservative institutions. *Just because Confucianism is the extreme* case of simple conservation the ‘church’ is merged in the social pattern and becomes invisible” (Martin, 1965: 7). But in some other historical world religions, there arguably are churches. Subsequently, Hertel argues that “there is a Hindu church and many sects whose members, in each case, have considerable influence on their clergy” (Hertel, 1977: 16). But as Robertson, somewhat echoing Wilson’s quote from above, aptly notes, the typology of religious collectivities needs to be “adumbrated in reference to a societal context” (Robertson, 1972: 124). This is as relevant to the study of Muslim religious collectivities and bodies in Eastern Europe as elsewhere.

In conclusion, taking into account the insights of scholars from the Social Sciences, particularly the sociology of religion, for the purposes of the present analysis, church is conceived of as an institutionalized (legally recognized) religious community (encompassing the totality of believers of that faith, understood here as a set of dogmas, rituals, and ethics, either of a Christian or non-Christian nature), which has an ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure staffed by professional (ordained) clergy and which has a positive relationship and attitude to society and the State. Such sociological categories as “denomination,” “congregation,” “sect” and “cult” may also be meaningfully applied equally to Christian and non-Christian religious collectivities. In this book, denominations and congregations are understood to be part of churches, while sects and cults fall outside of church structures. Furthermore, churches, on the one hand, and sects and cults on the other, are seen to be in a state of mutual tension leading to a range of consequences and repercussions that affect both sides.

## 1.2 Islam—A Church-Less Religion?

In the classical sociology of religion, the church-sect (with whatever types of religious collectivities fall in between) dichotomy presupposes that one (particularly the latter) may not exist without the other. Consequently, if there are sects, there needs to be a (mother) church against which those sects may be

positioned, for, arguably, “sects are created by schisms within churches, which are aligned with the dominant social structure” (Dawson, 2011: 527). As is shown further below, the term “sect,” contrary to how Martin sees the situation with Islam (as a “sect-less church”), has been used time and again to describe various Muslim religious collectivities. If the application of the term “sect” is indeed justified in Islamic studies, it may be naturally asked, if the term “church” (and “denomination”) may not be meaningfully instrumentalized in the analysis of some Islamic religious bodies.

When it comes to the study of organizational structures in Islam, there are two broad scholarly traditions—one (espoused by both non-Muslim and Muslim scholars) claiming that there is (and certainly has been in history) no church in Islam, the other is less sure about that and even tentatively suggests that there may indeed be (have been) church(es) in Islam, though not the Church of Islam. Both traditions, however, agree that there are Muslim religious collectivities approximating sects. So, for instance, Sedgwick maintains that “[r]eligious bodies in the Islamic world, as elsewhere, may be divided into denominations, sects, and cults” (Sedgwick, 2000: 200).

The main discussion revolves around the question of how to see *ulama*—possessors of religious knowledge. Are they to be treated like, if not identical to, priests and ministers in Christianity? Are they a trained professional clerical class with ranks and hierarchies? Or, rather, are they a loose horizontal group of “men of learning” who have been awarded by the believers the right to interpret the sacred texts, but not the duty to be followed and obeyed in their interpretations?

Al-Alwani insists that Islam “has no room for ‘priests’ or ‘clergy’ or a ‘grand *ulama*’ board’ to dominate and monopolize the sources of religious knowledge and the interpretation of religious dogma, thereby denying the rest of society access to them and preventing those who were interested from studying, analyzing and interpreting them. The idea of an élite setting itself up as a reference for religious responsibility and authority is alien to Islam” (Alwani, 2010: xvi). Sedgwick seconds al-Alwani’s line of reasoning by assuring that “[t]he *ulama* are not in any sense priests, but rather scholars, akin to the New Testament’s ‘doctors of the law’” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40). Tatari, similarly, argues that there is “the lack of an organisational structure and of clergy in the Islamic tradition, as are present, for example, in Catholicism. The institutional framework of Sunni Islam does not sanction a hierarchical clergy or an established church. Hence, there may be scholars who are specialised in Islamic law, yet who are by no means authoritative figures, and whose ideas and interpretations are not binding for Muslims, and certainly not for Muslims in the West” (Tatari, 2009: 283 – 284). Likewise, Thomson is quoted as having argued that “Unlike

Christianity, then, Islam did not found a church with an independent constitution and a recognized relationship to the state. ... And it devised no interpretative authority. ... Like [modern] Judaism, if for a different reason, Islam has no priesthood. A class of religious officials arose, indeed, as a result of a felt need, preaching sheikhs, Koran reciters, Imams, or leaders in prayer, and muezzins. But these officials do not form a closed profession" (Zwemer, 1944: 17 – 18).

Many Muslim scholars also maintain the notion of church-less and clergy-less Islam. Zaki Ali is quoted as insisting that "Islam has no clergy nor Church organization, and the office of priesthood is rejected altogether. Any Muslim may suffice to conduct the ritual, and none is invested with sacred character. The theologians are merely those who know the Divine Law; they do not compose a clerical caste" (Zwemer, 1944: 17). Agbaria refers to the famous Egyptian reformer alim Muhammad Abduh, who arguably "asserted that Islam does not recognize the existence of a religious authority that can impose its teachings on matters of doctrine and faith. He advocated against any kind of hierarchical ecclesiastical authority for Muslims. For him, there is no Papal Islam" (Agbaria, 2018: 209). And Gilani argues that "[t]here is no religious hierarchy or priestly class in Islam. However, despite the absence of any church, priests and sacraments, with the passage of time there emerged in the Muslim world a class of religious luminaries who possessed legislative, social and political authority" (Gilani, 2010: 1).

Some authors compare *ulama* to rabbis. So, for instance, Krämer and Schmidtke reason that "there is no church in Islam, and no ordained clergy. What did emerge at an early date is a class of religious semiprofessionals and professionals (...), religious experts closely resembling Jewish rabbis rather than the ordained clergy of the Christian churches, who claimed the right, on the basis of their acquired religious knowledge, to interpret the foundational texts of the Qur'an and sunna and to compose authoritative texts themselves" (Krämer and Schmidtke, 2006: 5 – 6). One may easily find numerous more authors, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in the past and today, who argue decisively against the presence of clergy in Islam akin to that of Christian churches. All of them, however, grapple with the dilemma of how to label the *ulama*—to acknowledge their special status and role among Muslims yet not to equate them to Christian clergy.

Naturally, those who insist that *ulama* do not constitute an ecclesiastical class of professional clergy would not see in Islam any traits of church as there arguably can hardly be a "clergy-less church." However, some make a distinction between Sunni and Shi'i branches of Islam. So, Sedgwick specifically argues that "Sunni *ulama* have no rigid hierarchical organization" (Sedgwick, 2003: 40) and that "Sunni Islam lacks any overarching, formal, corporate

institution that might be identified as a Church” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40). However, he appears to allow that there was a church in Islam, and in fact not so long ago, when he admits that “[t]wo hundred years ago the ulama held most of the religious authority in Islam, confirming the possible identification of the ulama as the Church of Islam” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40) and particularly when he states that “the location of religious authority two hundred years ago indicates that there was a Church in Islam, and that that Church was the body of ulama” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40). However, in both cases he immediately adds: “The situation today, however, is very different” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40), and “Today, this is no longer the case” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40). He repeats himself by concluding that “while there was a Church in Islam two centuries ago, that Church has now disintegrated” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40).

Agbaria appears to oppose Sedgwick when he argues that “[s]tates and political authorities do attempt to intervene in matters of faith to varying degrees. And while there is no formal authority that can impose particular doctrines, it is hardly the same thing as saying that Muslims treat all interpreters of Islamic teachings as equally valid. *This is particularly true in modern times, when the power of the ulama class has been institutionalized in line with the modern state’s interests in political legitimacy and stability* (italics added)” (Agbaria, 2018: 210). Agbaria’s observation is very relevant as he draws into the discussion the role of political powers. It is not so much the theological issues that are at stake as the socio-political role of religion promoted and administered through and by *ulama* as a collective actor for whom the process of institutionalization may involve a degree of hierarchization. In other words, what Sedgwick laments to have disintegrated may, in fact, be very much in the making, admittedly, with the tacit involvement of political authorities.

Sedgwick acknowledges that “[t]here are other important groups, notably Sufi sheikhs, and there are formal institutions” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40), but still argues that “all these other groups and institutions are within Islam, not of Islam” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40). Sedgwick’s observation that formal Muslim religious institutions are only *within* Islam and not *of* Islam may be correct. But that does not preclude them from being (or becoming) churches, admittedly, *within* Islam, not *of* Islam, very much along the lines of Christianity, as there is no Church *of* Christianity but rather a plethora of Churches *within* Christianity. In other words, though there arguably may be no Church of Islam or Islamic Church, there nonetheless may be Muslim Churches, in cases where institutionalization (and formalization) of Islam entails it having been or being churchified, top down or bottom up.

On the other hand, there is a group of scholars who would allow for, or even argue strongly, that there is (has been) a clergy in Islam. One of the most

outspoken among them is Zwemer, who, writing back in 1944, after having insisted that “[e]very religion has had its clergy or priesthood by whatever name called; no one denies that there were Jewish priests and Levites, or that there are Hindu priests and Buddhist priests” (Zwemer, 1944: 17), passionately argued that there is a clergy in Islam whom he found to be more “Protestant rather than Roman Catholic in their authority and function” (Zwemer, 1944: 18). According to Zwemer, “[p]riesthood is not a matter of etymology (priest, presbyter, sheikh, elder) but of actual spiritual and temporal power over those who acknowledge its function” (Zwemer, 1944: 21). Drawing on numerous contemporary authors and his own practical experiences, he proceeds with discussing different types of what he calls Islamic clergy. He arrives at a conclusion that “[a]lthough Islam never developed any institution entirely similar to the clergy of Christianity, it had from early days and has now three religious classes quite comparable to ‘priests’ and ‘clergy.’ The one class, (...), are appointed for public worship and preaching. The second are theologians and masters of canon-law. The third class are hereditary saints and Holy-men” (Zwemer, 1944: 39). Finally, he argues that “[n]o priest or clergyman in Christendom is more duly “authorized to be a minister of sacred things or perform on behalf of the community certain public religious acts”, or has more power over the laity” (Zwemer, 1944: 39).

Of the three classes distinguished by Zwemer, the most relevant for the present study is the first, the *ulama* in the person of imams of various ranks at mosques and Islamic spiritual administrations. Zwemer not only sees *ulama* as a priestly class but finds it hierarchical, at least since the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman’s time. Even more, he does not shy away from polemical insinuations, when he suggests that “[i]n the reign of Suleiman, the Sheikh-al-Islam acquired undisputed authority over all the ‘ulema of the empire. *This was possibly in imitation of the Christian hierarchy under the Ecumenical patriarch*” (italics added) (Zwemer, 1944: 30). Zwemer here refers to the Ottoman religious-bureaucratic institution (muftiate) presided over by a Grand Mufti under whose oversight all officially appointed *ulama* operated. Though the Ottoman Muftiate may be seen as having arguably functioned as a sort of “Imperial Muslim Church,” certainly not all muftiates in Muslim-majority lands (usually known by their Arabic name “dar al-ifta”) would function like such. Therefore, the term “muftiate” should not be automatically associated with and even less so seen as a synonym of “church,” particularly in Muslim-majority contexts.

In the context of the church-sect dichotomy, some scholars and many Sunnis see Shi’is as constituting a sect (or a set of sects), while Sunnis see themselves and are seen by many outsiders (though, certainly, not Shi’is) as a mainstream branch, almost akin to church, though as Zubaida argues, “only

metaphorically, as there is no equivalent concept or institution in Islam” (Zubaida, 2011: 545). Zubaida reasons that “[t]here may also be an argument for considering Salafis/Wahhabis as Sunni sects. They are sectarian in that they consider all other Muslims to be deficient in their faith and practice” (Zubaida, 2011: 546). Sedgwick, however, considers Sunnis and Shi‘is as Islamic denominations, though, according to him, “the Shi‘a originated as a sect” (Sedgwick, 2000: 201). For him, “[t]he closest Arabic term to “denomination” is *madhhab*, a word normally but inadequately translated as “school of law”” (Sedgwick, 2000: 201). But he sees all four Sunni *madhhabs* forming a single denomination, “since the differences between them have almost no theological or sociological significance” (Sedgwick, 2000: 201). Shepard disagrees with Sedgwick’s ascription of Sunnis and Shi‘is *in toto* to two Islamic denominations: “For the Sunni/Shi‘i distinction, I do not find the word ‘denomination’ appropriate” (Shepard, 2002: 155), and suggests that “[s]ince ‘Sunni/Shi‘i’ denotes the main large-scale division in the Muslim world, it is probably better to speak of Sunnis and Shi‘is as ‘major divisions’ than denominations” (Shepard, 2002: 158). However, he partly supports Sedgwick’s insights, by seeing *madhhabs* as approximating denominations (Shepard, 2002: 160 – 161).

According to Shepard, “[w]here they predominate, i.e., Shi‘is in Iran since 1500 and Sunnis in most other places, both groups relate to their societies more like Troeltschian churches than like denominations” (Shepard, 2002: 159). He tries to prove his point throughout his text and arrives at the conclusion that although Sunnis and Shi‘is as religious collectivities maintain some features of denominations, they (and particularly Shi‘is in Iran) have even more features of Troeltschian churches. Sedgwick, in reply to Shepard, argues that “[s]ince the term ‘church’ is too specifically Christian, I shall use the term ‘[religious] establishment.’ I think this term conveys both the privileged position and relatively amorphous character of the institutions in question, which include centrally the *ulama* (religious scholars), but also other religious actors and in some respects the government” (Shepard, 2002: 159). So, Sedgwick, when talking about Islamic collectivities, settles on using such terms as “cult,” “sect,” “denomination” and “establishment,” with the last for him substituting for “church.” However, he argues that “[i]n general, a religious denomination may: (1) constitute the establishment; (2) be part of a pluralistic establishment (in which case it is an ‘accepted denomination’); (3) be excluded by the establishment (in which case it is either an ‘alien denomination’ or a ‘rejected denomination,’ depending on the degree of tension between it and its environment)” (Sedgwick, 2004: 234).

Sedgwick further argues that “[i]t is in institutional terms that Islam most differs from Christianity. An institution may be formal or informal, and while

the overarching institutions of Christianity are formal, those of Islam are informal” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40). He may be right, especially in the historical perspective, that many, if not most Islamic religious institutions have been informal. However, there may be no denial that some of the most important of Islamic institutions in the Muslim majority polities have been and continue to be formal. What is of more relevance for the present research is the tendency that formerly informal historical and newly emerging Islamic institutions in Eastern Europe are increasingly turning formal. This process of institutionalization cum formalization, both top down and bottom up, is the focus of the present book and the research turns towards this theme in the second part of the book.

Sedgwick also makes an observation very relevant to the present research, namely, that “[w]here a single denomination constitutes the establishment, it may exercise significant control over the general sociocultural environment. In pluralistic systems, the reverse tends to be true, with the sociocultural environment playing a central role in defining the nature of the establishment. When a denomination is rejected, it is rejected primarily by the sociocultural environment. Persecution, however, is done by an establishment” (Sedgwick, 2004: 234). Similarly, he argues that “[w]here there is a monopolistic religious or political system, the environment is under the control of the established church or ruling party, and all parties and denominations other than those that constitute the establishment will find themselves excluded, in a state of high tension with both their environment and the political or religious establishment—or even with both, given the tendency for religious and political authority to coalesce in monopolistic systems” (Sedgwick, 2004: 233). Though meant by Sedgwick to explain possible situations in Muslim-majority lands, these two kin observations, as is shown in the second part of this book, are very apt in the context of the Islamic religious realm of post-communist Eastern Europe, where Muslim populations constitute minorities. Shepard, in quotations above, sees only those Muslim religious collectivities approximating churches which make demographic and political majorities; for the purposes of this book, one needs to consider precisely those Muslim religious collectivities that operate as “religious minorities.” Thus, a distinction should be made between Muslim religious collectivities in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority environments. In connection with this, Ammerman argues that “[o]utside Muslim territories, mosques often take on fully ‘congregational’ forms, with imams who function much like other professional clergy” (Ammerman, 2011: 564). Although it is true that Muslim populations in the minority contexts, and particular those of diaspora nature, may function in the form of numerous “congregations” (often called by Muslims themselves *jamaat* or *jama’ah*), with their own imams, independent of each other, the evidence suggests that there is a

natural bottom-up course of evolution into representative collective religious bodies (muftiate or riyaset), if only for the purposes of lobbying power, often coupled with a top-down push for collective institutionalization by the State through legislation. What this double, bottom-up, and top-down process of collective institutionalization leads to, is the object of the research of this book.

One may conclude from the above discussion that the labels “clergy,” “priests,” “sect,” “denomination,” “congregation” and even “church” are being, albeit with much contestation and confusion, used in application to Muslim religious authorities and collectivities in research on Islam. The main issue here is what contents they carry in an Islamic context. “Sect” and “denomination” appear to be acceptable to many scholars, although they may see their content and therefore applicability to particular types of Muslim collectivities differently. “Church,” however, is a less used term when referring to Muslim religious collectivities, though it also has been legitimized to a certain extent by some scholars, not least Shepard. It appears that perceiving Islam as having (or having had) both clergy and church was a rather common feature in Western Islamology of the first part of the twentieth century—Zwemer’s text with numerous references attests to that (he even refers to a book by Osborne called *The Church of Islam*) (Zwemer, 1944: 18). The above discussion lends itself to another conclusion, namely that “religious bodies in the Islamic world can be analyzed using standard sociological terms and concepts already established in Western contexts, albeit with some slight modifications” (Sedgwick, 2000: 195).

All of the authors referred to above, unfortunately, stop short of considering a kin process to that of “denominalization” (when sects or even cults gradually turn into denominations), namely, the “churchification” (when whatever religious collectivities gradually turn into churches or at least increasingly acquire various churchly features). It may be said that churchification, like denominalization, is a bottom-up process which may or may not lead to a *fait accompli*, i.e. the formation of a complete church. When applied to Islam, and particularly in the minority (diasporic) contexts, like post-communist Eastern Europe, concepts of “denominalization” and “churchification” acquire new specific features, especially if the latter is analyzed as a complex two-way, bottom-up and top-down, course.

## Islam in Minority (Diaspora) Contexts

### 2.1 The Diaspora: Between Migration, Ethnicity and Religion

Though presently there are some 50 countries in the world in which inhabitants of Muslim background purportedly make demographic majorities (Pew 2015: 234 – 244), in virtually all other countries there are Muslim communities which live as religious (and often ethnic) minorities. However, while in some of the countries, it is autochthonous Muslim populations that constitute minorities, in others, Muslim communities are of either (predominantly) immigrant background or mixed nature. What term best defines these Muslim communities in minority contexts? Numerous authors have appropriated the term “Muslim diaspora” (Kastoryano, 1999; Akbarzadeh and Mansouri, 2007; Moghissi, 2017; Schumann, 2007; Weine, 2012), which is arguably valid for communities comprised of immigrants and their progeny, particularly in Western Europe and North America. But what about autochthonous Muslim communities, such as, for instance, the bulk of the Eastern European Muslim populations? Are they also to be subsumed under the category of “diaspora,” even though they evidently lack a purportedly essential experience constitutive of a diaspora—migration? Furthermore, how is Islam, practiced by these Muslim populations, to be identified? Can one talk about “diaspora Islam” (Schiffauer, 2004) (or, perhaps, “diasporic Islam”)?

A conceptual distinction between the terms “minority” and “diaspora” needs to be established first. Though the two may overlap and the same group of people may be a (religious, ethnic, or other) minority, and at the same time constitute a diaspora (Laurence apparently treats the two terms in his *The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims* (Laurence, 2012) as synonyms), it is not understood in this study that all diasporas are (religious, ethnic, or other) minorities or that all (religious, ethnic, or other) minorities constitute diasporas. Both terms are complex and problematic in that their definitions, though abundant, remain unsatisfactory (Barten, 2015). Nonetheless, both are more constructs than facts (Mahmood, 2016), and the same group of people may present itself and be perceived by out-group as either a minority or diaspora in some situations, or based on certain criteria (like ethnicity, religion, or language) but would not count as such in different circumstances or according to other criteria.

In this book, following Capotorti (Capotorti, 1991: 96), minority is understood to be a group of people, united under a common ethnicity, religion or language, which is “numerically inferior to the rest of the population” of a given country. It can be either of autochthonous nature or immigrant background. At least in one of the countries under investigation in this book, namely, Bosnia, the Muslim population may not be considered a minority as they constitute around a half of the country’s population, and thus are not “numerically inferior to the rest of the population.” In all other countries under research in this book, Muslim populations are clearly “numerically inferior to the rest of the population” and thus constitute diverse religious, ethnic, and linguistic minorities, parts of which (as in Poland, Lithuania, and North Macedonia) or even the bulk of (as in Czechia and Hungary), are diasporic in nature.

Though the term “diaspora” has been originally applied to such ethno-religious groups as Jews and Armenians (whose diasporas are referred to as “victim diasporas” (Cohen, 2007: 18), because they formed in the aftermath of some major calamity that befell those ethno-confessional groups), the scientific study of diasporas now includes many other ethnic, religious, racial, and even economic groups under this category (Cohen, 2007: 1, 18). However, the scholarly community appears to be divided into two broad, and opposing camps—the “exclusivists” and “inclusivists.” The first camp consists of those scholars who see the term “diaspora” as having been misused, and even abused by those who extend it to mean those groups, which have not experienced traumatic mass emigration, holding the Jewish example as a measuring stick if not a benchmark. So, for instance, King and Melvin point out to a “semantic malleability of the label ‘diaspora’—its appropriation by and application to a variety of vastly different ethnocultural groups, many of which may bear little resemblance to archetypal dispersed peoples such as Jews or Armenians” (King and Melvin, 1999/2000: 113). Vertovec likewise laments that “[o]verall, during the past few years the term diaspora has become a loose reference confusing categories such as immigrants, guest-workers, ethnic and ‘racial’ minorities, refugees, expatriates and travelers” (Vertovec, 2000: 6). Safran also sounds irritated when he observes that, arguably, “[t]oday, ‘diaspora’ and, more specifically, ‘diaspora community’ seem increasingly to be used as metaphoric designations for several categories of people—expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants, and ethnic and racial minorities *tout court*” (Safran, 1991: 83). Finally, Brubaker, in exasperation, laments that one now may even talk of “‘diaspora’ diaspora.”: “As the term has proliferated, its meaning has been stretched to accommodate the various intellectual, cultural and political agendas in the service of which it has been enlisted. This has resulted

in what one might call a 'diaspora' diaspora' – a dispersion of the meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space" (Brubaker, 2005: 1).

The second camp consists of those scholars who, in view of seminal geopolitical, demographic and technological changes that have occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, and particularly its last decade, and still continue to the present, contend that, unless the term "diaspora" is put to rest altogether as the term applicable only to phenomena that took place in a historical past, the term may be meaningfully applied in the analyses of contemporary phenomena, this way refreshing and expanding its semantic field of meaning. For the inclusivists, elements sacrosanct for exclusivists, such as forced migration from the homeland, dispersion in several scattered places, a longing for and hope to return to the homeland, diaspora consciousness and the like, lose their aura and urgency. Some of the inclusivists allow themselves to talk about groups that have not (or never) migrated as diasporas.

This begs a rhetorical question: "what makes a particular group of people into a diaspora," if the hitherto crucial element, that of migration, ceases to be the decisive condition of diaspority? Behloul has an answer: "Diasporas are not the automatic consequence of objective facts but should rather be analysed as the outcomes of socio-political practices triggered by political events and processes of social change" (Behloul, 2016: 69). In other words, politics (and/or policies) that have consequences to the socio-political (but also economic and cultural) status of the groups concerned, may make them into diasporas. Brubaker takes it even further by suggesting that "rather than speak of 'a diaspora' or 'the diaspora' as an entity, a bounded group, an ethnodemographic or ethnocultural fact, it may be more fruitful, and certainly more precise, to speak of diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices, and so on" (Brubaker, 2005: 13), stemming from both inside the concerned group and outside it. In the end, the diaspora is not a fact but a construct.

Thus, King and Melvin maintain that "[l]ike nations, diasporas are constructed by political and cultural elites" (King and Melvin, 1999/2000: 109), both in an "emic" and "etic" way, i.e. from within and without. Additionally, they are constructed, or even invented, by academics and media and there is to this day no single universal definition what the term "diaspora" means in the current geopolitical and migratory context. King and Melvin, preferring the "etic" approach, argue that "[t]he role of states in defining a particular group as a diaspora is crucial" (King and Melvin, 1999/2000: 113). This may be so. But which state? The so-called "homeland" or the "host," or both at once? And if there has not been a migration, though the jurisdictions may have changed because of either the collapse of the State, secession or occupation, the same territory may hold both the (chronologically earlier) "homeland" and the

(current) “host” state. In such instances, one may consider the “host” state to have “immigrated” to the homeland, especially through military conquest or some international treaties establishing or recognizing it, to the point of swallowing the “homeland.” In that case, though the concerned group remains indigenous to the territory, they may become aliens (legally, socially, or otherwise) in the new, by now, “host” state. Likewise, groups of colonist origins may also become aliens in the territories of former “colonies.” The fate of French colonists in North Africa is a telling example.

This line of reasoning may seem to stretch the meaning of “diaspora” too far but this is how some (inclusivist) scholars of diaspora studies see the situation. They speak of new diasporas, both in the sense of their chronological novelty, and that their nature and the circumstances in which they were born, are novel. For them, “[t]he new diasporas (...) were created when *borders moved*” (Mandelbaum, 2000: 2). So, for instance, Russians in former Soviet republics are spoken of as one of such new diasporas (Shlapentokh et al., 1994). Likewise, it is argued that “[t]he break-up of Yugoslavia resulted in some 120,000 Bosniaks and Albanians living in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia in a ‘semi diasporic’ situation similar, in many respects, to that of the Muslims in Western Europe” (Bougarel, 2005a: 25).

However, exclusivists such as King and Melvin are not happy with the development when they lament that “[m]any Eurasian states have come to use the label ‘diaspora’ in speaking of several distinct groups: immigrants who came to western Europe or North America in the last century, political exiles who fled abroad during the communist period, and *communities that were separated from the homeland in 1991 by changes in interstate boundaries*” (italics added) (King and Melvin, 1999/2000: 118). Cohen, another exclusivist, argues: “The stranded minority is not in my view (normally) a diaspora” (Cohen, 1996: 513). King and Melvin echo Cohen when they contend that “[s]trictly speaking, it may be inappropriate to refer to any transborder ethnic group—especially groups that have found themselves ‘abroad’ because of changes in international borders rather than because of migration—as a ‘diaspora.’” (King and Melvin, 1999/2000: 113) But even they admit that methodologically such factual references facilitate the analysis of “the ways in which states attempt to conceptualize transborder ethnic populations as diasporas” (King and Melvin, 1999/2000: 113). They also rightly note that “the proliferation of new national states in Europe has called into question the relationship between the political boundaries of states and the amorphous and ascriptive cultural boundaries of nations” (King and Melvin, 1999/2000: 113).

Notwithstanding the reservations, if not outright rejection, by exclusivists, some ethnic and confessional groups, whose status from either a demographic

or political (or both) majority changed into that of minority, due to the movement of borders, are not only referred to in scholarly research as (new) diasporas but earned their own distinct label—"beached diasporas" (Laitin, 1995). Laitin explains the application of the label, coined by him, this way: "I refer to the Russian population living in the states of the former Soviet Union as a diaspora—although, since they acquired that status because the borders of the Soviet Union receded, rather than because they dispersed from their homeland, it is perhaps better to think of them as a beached diaspora" (Laitin, 1998: 29). Mandelbaum argues that "[t]he creation of a new [beached] diaspora is thus more akin to a kidnapping. A national group is suddenly, unexpectedly, and against its will transferred, politically although not physically, from one jurisdiction, where it had long resided and where it constituted the majority, to another, where it is outnumbered, when borders are redrawn. Its reaction is anger, resentment, and the desire to escape" (Mandelbaum, 2000: 3). The so-called Russian speakers, like ethnic Albanians and Bosniaks of former Yugoslavia, have in fact been immigrants, if not colonists, only internally, so becoming beached diasporas after the collapse of the USSR and Socialist Yugoslavia, respectively, involves earlier migration.

Although both Laitin and Mandelbaum see these new beached diasporas as a consequence of border shifts of the late twentieth century, the concept of beached diasporas could probably be instrumentalized when defining and analyzing Muslim populations in South East Europe after the retreat of the Ottoman Empire from the region. Hitherto, for several centuries, the political and in certain areas demographical majority living "at home" in the Ottoman state in the nineteenth century found itself as both a political and demographic minority in non-Muslim majority nation states. What followed was a mass forced exodus, which, however, was seen as a repatriation to the remaining Ottoman realm (and later, the Turkish Republic) and not as exile into diaspora.

One might argue that diasporic groups are as a rule conceived as foremost ethnic (or national) in their origin, while religious affiliation, if at all, is seen as of marginal relevance. So, though practically each of the "classical" diasporic ethnic groups were also confessional groups, religious identification was subsumed or at least overshadowed by that of ethnicity. As Vertovec, referring to Baumann, observes, "[m]ost writings on diaspora today have, in fact, 'marginalized the factor of religion and relegated it to second place in favour of ethnicity and nationality'" (Baumann 1998: 95). However, it is argued that "religion as a multidimensional phenomenon that depends on various factors in the country of origin as well as in the country of residence of the respective migrant communities may trigger the processes of both construction and deconstruction of ethno-specific diasporic identities. (...) in the situation of

migration, the equation between religion and ethnicity may be maintained or newly established, or elsewhere, one may observe tendencies towards a de-ethnification of religion" (Behloul, 2016: 67). This implies that religion in diasporic contexts may not only take the front seat but actually squeeze out the former front-seater and fellow traveler—ethnicity. Though theoretically plausible, it remains to be seen if this has indeed happened in any of the diasporic settings.

In the second edition of his seminal *Global Diasporas. An Introduction*, Cohen talks very reservedly and only briefly about the relation (connection) between religion and diaspora (Cohen, 2007: 150 – 154). Though he admits that there is a connection, he also laments that "[i]t is difficult to know how to theorize the connection between religion and diaspora" (Cohen, 2007: 153). However, in the first edition of his *Global Diasporas*, Cohen was unequivocal: "In general, I would argue that religions can provide additional cement to bind a diasporic consciousness, but they do not constitute diasporas in and of themselves" (Cohen, 1997: 189). In this light, it may be legitimately asked if such a term as "diasporic religion" is analytically meaningful.

Hinnells uses the term "diaspora religion," which he finds "applicable to the religion of any people who have a sense of living away from the land of the religion, or away from 'the old country'" (Hinnells, 1997: 686). According to Hinnells, "diaspora religion" indicates a religion practised by a minority group, conscious of living in a culturally and religiously different, possibly hostile, environment, away from the old country of the religion" (Hinnells, 1997: 687). However, it remains unclear, if a religion becomes a diaspora religion only by virtue of being practiced in diaspora or there needs to be an adjustment or a shift in the contents of religious beliefs and practices for that form of religion to become diasporic as distinct from a "homeland religion," which may imply a majority setting as opposed to the almost by default minority setting of "diasporic religion." Furthermore, the relation between the "diasporic religion" and "homeland religion" remains unestablished.

The tension between being a mere immigrant and a member of the diaspora, in the words of Hinnells, is acute for such people "who wish to see themselves not only as Muslims or Pakistanis but also as Australian, British, Canadian or US citizens. The question of identity is one which will recur" (Hinnells, 1997: 687). This line of reasoning is not only sound, as the so-called second- and third-generation immigrants are not immigrants at all, but because it makes it possible to extend the usage of the term "diaspora religion" to those religious communities that may be counted as and certainly maintain themselves to be autochthonous (indigenous or at least indigenized), like most of the Eastern European Muslims. But more importantly, Hinnells implies the disassociation

of “diaspora religion” (or, as I would use, “diasporic religion”) from the immediacy of migration (though migration of certain type, of either people or religious beliefs and practices, or both, has certainly happened in the distant past).

So, can Muslims be recognized as diaspora(s) and, if so, who among them in particular? Can forms of their practiced Islam be a diasporic religion (diasporic Islam)?

## 2.2 Muslims as (Religious) Diaspora(s): Immigrants versus Autochthons

From the classical Islamic perspective, irrespective of the circumstances, all those Muslims residing outside of the *dar al-islam* (Abode of Islam) are technically “diaspora” (though, admittedly, not referred to by this term). And though some classical legal traditions (notably, Maliki) (Miller, 2000) have been adamant that Muslims must relocate to *dar al-islam* and avoid long-term residence in *dar al-harb*, this way foreclosing the possibility of diaspora forming, others (particularly, Hanafi) would allow Muslims to permanently settle outside of *dar al-islam* and thus form diasporas (Fadl, 1994).

Historically, Muslim diasporas formed in several ways—either through conquest and colonization (akin to “imperial diasporas” in Cohen’s typology) (Cohen, 2007: 18) or through immigration. As conquerors and colonists, Muslims settled in the territories in Asia, Africa, and Europe formerly under non-Muslim rule and inhabited by non-Muslims. In some regions (North Africa, Western and Central Asia, as well as in parts of South Asia), they became, aided by mass conversions and other demographic processes, the dominant—both demographically and politically—religious group; in others (like in parts of India and Eastern Europe)—albeit political overlords, they were demographically a minority, yet in others (like in parts of South East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa) they remained both political underdogs and the demographic minority—a true diaspora. Over centuries, the fortunes and sizes of these diasporas fluctuated, often leading to first losing political power (if held at all) and then demographic decline, sometimes to the point of extinction.

Jenkins produced a hefty two-volume *The Muslim Diaspora: A Comprehensive Chronology of the Spread of Islam in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas* (Jenkins, 1999) which recorded relevant instances found in archives. And though the spread of Islam in the world did not produce diasporas everywhere, Muslim diasporas, as recorded, were in great part produced through this spread, which, besides the obvious meaning of movement of people, includes movement of ideas (religious beliefs). Albrecht notes that “Muslim communities located outside the commonly recognised ‘Muslim world’ are

widely labelled, both in and beyond academic discourses, as living in a diaspora” (Albrecht et al., 2016: 1), and that its “most important feature is its collective consciousness about the group members’ marginal location in the larger society in which they reside” (Moghissi, 2009: 11). In Cohen’s typology of diasporas (Cohen, 2007: 18), Muslims are ascribed to the category of “deterritorialized” diasporas, though he never elaborates on this. It would be hard, if at all possible, to talk about a single global Muslim diaspora (though there are those who see all living Muslims, irrespective of their place of residence, as belonging to the global Muslim commonwealth—Umma), as disparate groups of Muslims living as minorities are not only very diverse in their religious beliefs, rituals, and cultural practices, but may not necessarily identify with or even recognize each other.

Today Muslim communities of immigrant background of varying sizes and levels of organization live in practically all post-industrial countries, including practically all Western European states. Muslim populations in Western Europe are rather a novelty—the large-scale immigration and settlement by people from a Muslim background in Western Europe began less than a hundred years ago and continues to this day. Pew Research Center forecasts (Pew, 2017a)<sup>1</sup> that the absolute numbers, and even more so the share of the European population of Muslim background are destined to rise, particularly so in Western Europe. If the levels of immigration of people of Muslim background to Western Europe remain high, the number of people of Muslim background is projected to almost double by 2050 from what it was in 2010 (Pew, 2017a: 7). If immigration ceases, the number (and share) of Muslims in some Western European countries is still projected to continue rising, apparently both due to birth rates and conversion. Saint-Blancat calls them “a potential diaspora” (Saint-Blancat, 2002: 140) and projects that “[o]nly self-definition and interaction with the gaze of the Other (...) will make the Muslims of Europe a structured diaspora in reality” (Saint-Blancat, 2002: 141). Meantime, she argues, “the instrumental use of the morphological configuration of settlements in migration and the interolarity of relationships do not mean that a Birmingham Pakistani and a Strasbourg Turk feel they belong to the same diaspora” (Saint-Blancat, 2002: 140 – 141). This, however, also does not mean that Birmingham Pakistanis and Strasbourg Turks do not have a diaspora feeling or consciousness

---

<sup>1</sup> A note should be made regarding the Pew Research Center’s publications—though they are extensively used in this book, the author, being aware of methodological shortcomings in the Center’s data gathering (see Wuthnow, 2015), employs them for mere illustrative purposes to highlight demographic trends and tendencies in Muslim populations around the world.

on a national (British and French) level, but only that they may not (yet?) see themselves as belonging to a pan-(Western) European Muslim diaspora.

Most of formerly communist Eastern Europe to this day has not experienced any significant immigration of people of Muslim background. Nonetheless, it has had and continues to have its long-established Muslim populations. However, differently from Muslim communities in Western Europe, which chiefly were born out of (mainly voluntary) immigration, these populations of Eastern European Muslims formed not only through migration in the form of colonization that followed conquests (what is valid for Turks and partially Tatars) but also through mass conversion of parts of local, mainly Slavic and Albanian speaking, populations to Islam. Though the latter, at the time of conversion and for a long time afterwards, could not be regarded as diasporas; with the retreat and subsequent demise of the Muslim states that they were subjects of (most notably the Ottoman Empire but also the Golden Horde and its successor states (khanates)) they arguably became (beached) diasporas—and not least because they would often be identified by the non-Muslim majorities and sometimes identify themselves with Turks and be treated by the State, if not legally, then at least socially, as aliens. Thus, though the central notion of diasporic feeling, that of the lost homeland and dreamt-of return to it, do not directly apply in the case of Slavic and Albanian (but also some Turkic) speaking Muslims of Eastern Europe, other features of a new (beached) diaspora are evidently present.

The notions of Muslim diaspora(s) is tightly connected to the concepts of *dar al-islam* and *dar al-harb*, referred to above, and the distinctions between them. Technically, only those Muslims who live outside of *dar al-islam* may be regarded as living in diaspora. However, with the tectonic geopolitical and migratory changes of the past half century, the boundaries of and even the very concept of *dar al-islam* have become very blurred, while the concept of *dar al-harb* appears to have undergone a profound reconsideration. So, for instance, Europe has not only ceased to be viewed by some Muslim scholars (both *ulama* and lay) as part of *dar al-harb* but has even been accorded positive designations, such as *dar ash-shahada* (Abode of Witness), *dar as-salam* (Abode of Peace); some even regard it as (a new) *dar al-islam*, since in Europe, Muslims are allowed to practice and live Islam far more freely than in many Muslim-majority (and thus presumably *dar al-islam*) countries. The most common designation for Europe from the perspective of Muslims, though, is *dar as-sulh* (Abode of Truce). So, for instance, former Bosnian grand mufti Mustafa Cerić argues that “Europe is neither *Dāru-l-islām* (the House of Islam) nor *Dāru-l-harb* (the House of War). Europe is *Dāru-l-sulh* (the House of Agreement/Contract). Europe is not *Dāru-l-islām* because Muslims do not constitute

the majority of the European population, and thus Muslim law cannot be fully implemented. Europe is not *Dāru-l-harb* because some aspects of Muslim law can be implemented. The land of Europe is *Dāru-l-sulh* because it is possible to live in accordance with Islam in the context of the Social Contract” (Cerić, 2017: 5 – 6; 2007: 45). Those, chiefly revivalist Muslims of conservative inclinations, who prefer to see Europe as opposite to *dar al-islam* but short of being *dar al-harb*, refer to it as *dar ad-dawa* (Abode of Invitation to Islam).

The concept of *dar al-islam* in contemporary Islamic discourse is very closely connected to the notion of “homeland” (*watan*). One of the most influential contemporary Muslim thinkers, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, has addressed this connection. He understands *dar al-islam* to include “any country that is inhabited by a Muslim majority population and ruled by a Muslim, even if its political and legal system might not correspond to what he understands by a truly ‘Islamic state’” (Albrecht, 2016: 117 – 118). However, al-Qaradawi “not only classifies Muslim majority countries as *dār al-islām* but, at the same time, identifies them with the ‘Islamic homeland’ (*al-waṭan al-islāmī*)” (Albrecht, 2016: 118). And, as is reported, “[w]hile al-Qaradawi does not rule out Western countries being considered, at the same time, a Muslim’s ‘homeland’ (*waṭan*) in a physical and social sense, he continually implies that a Muslim’s original or spiritual ‘home’ is located in Muslim majority countries by suggesting that the West lies outside of *dār al-islām*, and thus outside of the ‘Islamic homeland.’ Building on this notion of territorial otherness, he draws a picture of Muslims in the West as constituting a dispersed and alienated, and thus a ‘diasporic,’ community and, thereby, turns Western countries into ‘diasporic territory’” (Albrecht, 2016: 119). It may then be legitimately asked, if Islam practiced in such “diasporic territory” is itself distinct from that practiced in the homeland—in other words, diasporic.

In her analysis of contemporary Islamic discourse on Muslims in the West, Albrecht sums up: “Muslims in the West live geographically, socially, politically, culturally and religiously outside of a particular territory, which may be a country of origin, such as Morocco, or an imaginative territory, such as the idea of a ‘Muslim world’ or ‘homeland.’ At the same time, the notion entails the idea that those Muslims live inside a particular territory, i.e., *al-mahjar*, which is implicitly portrayed as different from the Muslims’ physical or imaginative place of origin” (Albrecht, 2016: 115). The invention of the term ‘mahjar’ as a substitute for lack of an Arabic word for diaspora is helpful on several counts. First, it allows one to transcend the binary opposition of the *dar al-islam-dar al-harb* dichotomy. Secondly, it enables one to talk about Muslim minorities, particularly of immigrant background, as both being diasporas (“the condition” meaning of *mahjar*) and living in diaspora (“the place/space” meaning of

*mahjar*). On the other hand, though the appearance of the term *mahjar* is rather novel, it does not mean that there was no notion of diaspora prior to its coining. Albrecht dismisses the position that there exists “no Islamic concept of diaspora that grounds in the history or even in the original sources of Islam” (Tiesler, 2009: 164), and argues that “it is in fact not the concept of ‘diaspora’ that does not exist within Islamic legal discourse, but rather the term ‘diaspora’” (Albrecht, 2016: 110) and further contends that “the wide use of the term *mahjar* illustrates [that] diasporic ideas are pervasive in Islamic legal discourse on Muslims in the West” (Albrecht, 2016: 114).

More specifically, in the diasporic context and in response to it, “[i]n contemporary Islamic legal discourse, the term *mahjar* is used, inter alia, in the neologism *fiqh al-mahjar*, the ‘interpretation of Islamic norms for the diaspora,’ which was introduced in the late 20th century during a period of increasing Islamic legal debates about the status of Muslims in the West. Thus, it not only appeared in the same context as the more popular notion *fiqh al-aqalliyyāt*, the ‘fiqh for minorities,’ but it is sometimes also used synonymously with it, as it basically encompasses the same idea, namely the interpretation of religious norms specifically tailored for Muslims living in predominantly non-Muslim societies. However, unlike *fiqh al-aqalliyyāt*, the notion *fiqh al-mahjar* does not, from a terminological point of view, focus on the minority status ascribed to these Muslims, but on their supposedly ‘diasporic’ condition” (Albrecht, 2016: 112). In other words, the emergence of *fiqh al-mahjar*, better known by its more popular synonym *fiqh al-aqalliyyāt*, implies that there is diasporic Islam (and possibly several varieties of it) the contents of which (conditioned, first of all by the fact that it is to be practiced in minority settings) differs not only from the idealist normative Islam designed for majority settings of *dar al-islam* but also from “homeland Islam” as it is lived and practiced by Muslims in Muslim majority contexts. Like *fiqh al-aqalliyyāt*, diasporic Islam encompasses Muslim diasporas of both immigrant and autochthonous background.

The term “diasporic Islam” appears to be used by academics since at least the beginning of the 2000s but it has gained currency only in the 2010s (Mandaville, 2003; Wardana, 2013; Fedele, 2013). But what exactly does it imply/cover? Does it cover all of the constituent parts of the Islamic religion—dogmas, rituals, and ethics, or just some of them? In reply, it may be plausibly argued that Islamic dogmas remain universal, irrespective of the physical and spiritual condition of the groups of believers—fundamental Islamic eschatological beliefs are not susceptible to either space or time vicissitudes. Rituals and ethics, however, may be. Thus, talking about diasporic Islam, one may bear in mind the various changes in religious rituals and ethics caused by circumstances of the state and the place of the diaspora.

These last observations allow one to not only meaningfully use the terms “diaspora” and “diasporic” in conjunction with Muslims and Islam but apply them particularly to the contexts of the Muslim presence in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, both Muslim populations of immigrant and autochthonous nature in Eastern Europe is treated in the present book as being “in diaspora,” with (some) forms of their practiced Islam as “diasporic.” The status of “diaspora Muslims” with their “diasporic Islam” distinguishes them from the development of Islam in Muslim-majority environments, if not so much in dogmatic and ritual matters, then very much so in the administration of Islam and its governance. As is argued further, it is the diasporic status of Islam and Muslims in Eastern Europe that has allowed for, if not facilitated, the progression of the churchification of Islam in this part of the continent.

### 2.3 *Fiqh al-aqalliyat* versus “Euro-Islam”/“European” Islam

Diasporic Islam in Europe, and certainly so in its Eastern part, has been viewed by Muslim actors primarily through either of two prisms—through the prism of the “jurisprudence of minorities” (*fiqh al-aqalliyat*) and that of “European” Islam. The two approaches may be seen as mutually exclusive, and not only in that the first one entails the feeling of temporality, while the second the feeling of permanency. The proponents of the two approaches to diasporic Islam in Europe come from two different backgrounds—“jurisprudence of minorities” is advocated by Muslim scholars either residing outside of Europe or of recent immigrant background; “European” Islam, on the other hand, is mainly propagated by autochthonous Muslims, though increasingly Muslims of immigrant background join their ranks. However, within the camp of advocates of/for “European” Islam, autochthons speak about it as a fact, while immigrants see it as something still to be created. Furthermore, there is a palpable difference between what is called “European” Islam and “Euro-Islam.” In the perspective of the churchification of Islam, “jurisprudence of minorities” sticks to a notion of church-less Islam. “European” Islam, on the contrary, is susceptible to churchification.

The alleged specificity of religious needs (in the sense of rituals and ethics) of Muslims in diaspora had to be not only recognized but also addressed by Islamic scholars and this is how what is known as the “jurisprudence of minorities” (*fiqh al-aqalliyat*) emerged. Though Hassan suggests that “[t]he discourse of *fiqh al-aqalliyāt* was primarily developed by Sunni activist jurists of Arab origin in the 1970s and the 1980s in response to the immigration flow of Muslims to the West during that time” (Hassan, 2013: 8), there is an almost

universal consensus that the term was coined and the concept of *fiqh al-aqalliyat* came into currency in the 1990s. al-Alwani, one of the founding fathers of it, defines it very broadly: “Fiqh for minorities” is a specific discipline which takes into account the relationship between the religious ruling and the conditions of the community and the location where it exists. It is a fiqh that applies to a specific group of people living under particular conditions with special needs that may not be appropriate for other communities. Besides religious knowledge, practitioners of this fiqh will need a wider acquaintance with several social sciences disciplines, especially sociology, economics, political science and international relations” (Alwani, 2010: 3). For al-Qaradawi, another founding father of it, *fiqh al-aqalliyat* is a “mere branch of the ‘general Fiqh’” (Qaradawi, 2003: 3). However, in enumerating its objectives (Qaradawi, 2003: 6 – 7) and characteristics (Qaradawi, 2003: 7 – 8), al-Qaradawi practically repeats what al-Alwani states in his description of *fiqh al-aqalliyat* in the quote above.

Researchers of the “jurisprudence of minorities” in describing it elaborate upon these original definitions and descriptions. So, for Shavit, “jurisprudence of Muslim minorities” is a “field of jurisprudence that examines the legitimacy of voluntary, modern migration to and residence in non-Muslim societies and addresses specific, everyday challenges that Muslim minorities confront” (Shavit, 2015: 2). As such, it “draws from the religio-juristic heritage that developed in relation to previous minority conditions while struggling to resolve dilemmas that have not been treated by jurists of the past” (Shavit, 2015: 2). Likewise, Mustafa and Agbaria argue that “[a]s a contemporary intellectual discipline, this doctrine has emerged as an independent legal strand within modern Islamic Jurisprudence to provide Muslim minorities in countries of non-Muslim majorities with religious guidance and edicts (fatawa) that would facilitate Muslims’ engagement with the states and societies within which they are residing, without compromising their faith” (Mustafa and Agbaria, 2016: 1).

However, as Fishman notes, for al-Alwani, *fiqh al-aqalliyat* is “not only as a simple system for answering personal questions in jurisprudence, but also as a framework for political and social interaction between the majority and the minority populations in non-Muslim lands, as well as within the Muslim minority itself” (Fishman, 2006: 3). Thus, *fiqh al-aqalliyat* goes beyond the individual spiritual (fatwa-issuing) level into the social realm, where Muslims form their religious collectivities, which need to relate to and interact with both non-Muslim populations and the State. By extension, *fiqh al-aqalliyat* is to assist them in this, including the adoption of institutional structures, some of which may be alien to classical Islam and Islamic jurisprudence; these are expected from Muslim religious collectivities by the (host) states. This is where

*fiqh al-aqalliyat* may inadvertently facilitate the churchification of diasporic Islam in Europe, even if only as a temporary measure to secure smooth practice of Islamic precepts in a non-Muslim environment.

Different authors writing about *fiqh al-aqalliyat* label it differently. To some, it is a field (Shavit), to others a discipline (Mustafa and Agbaria, al-Alwani), doctrine (Mustafa and Agbaria) or a discourse (Hassan). The variation in terminology pertaining to assigning *fiqh al-aqalliyat* to one or another analytical compartment betrays not only a loss among authors dealing with the concept but more so the fluid and still evolving nature of the phenomenon. Therefore, rather than considering *fiqh al-aqalliyat* as a *fait accompli* with its strict internal structures and borders, one is to see it as a project-in-the-making, as an unfolding process with no clear end-state in sight. With three major proponents (and founding fathers)—Taha Jabir al-Alwani, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and Tariq Ramadan—retreating from writing and active engagement in the issue, it remains to be seen what becomes of this new field/discipline/doctrine/discourse. Meanwhile, it appears to have captured the attention of Muslims in Europe and therefore is relevant in the broader discussions pertaining to both the churchification and securitization of (diasporic) Islam in Europe.

Ideally, “jurisprudence of minorities,” with certain adjustments, should apply to any diasporic settings. However, it is almost universally understood to have been designed and tailored for Muslims living in the West, that is, the Muslim diaspora. In the words of Hassan, “*fiqh al-aqalliyāt* is part of and a response to the debate on the function of Shari‘ah in the West. While *fiqh al-aqalliyāt* represents a new stage of the adaptation of *fiqh* to reality, it also provides the Muslim’s response to the claim that Shari‘ah cannot exist in the West because its values are different from those of the West, and hence Muslims are not able to integrate into the fabric of Western societies. *Fiqh al-aqalliyāt* serves to prove that the Shari‘ah can in fact accommodate and be accommodated in the Western realm” (Hassan, 2013: 4). Hassan goes even further by claiming that *fiqh al-aqalliyat* as a discourse, among other things, “constructs a neo-Muslim identity where law, context, and identity converge and balance” (Hassan, 2013: 13).

One may be tempted to perceive *fiqh al-aqalliyat* as an abbreviated and watered-down version of classical *fiqh*, particularly in the form of procured fatwas (Fishman, 2006: 10 – 11) making it lighter on diasporic Muslims, who supposedly, due to adverse conditions and obstacles, cannot lead a full-fledged Islamic way of living. For instance, Mustafa and Agbaria maintain that “[t]hus far, this evolving doctrine has reflected a more tolerant and more enabling approach regarding the issue of religious permissions or dispensations (*rukhsah*) in order to make it easier for Muslims not to compromise the requirements of

their faith” (Mustafa and Agbaria, 2016:1). They also argue that “Fiqh al-Aqalliyat developed as an independent strand of jurisprudence that is more contextual, amenable to negotiation, and with a strong individualistic orientation. As Muslim immigrants have often developed their own versions of ‘our Islam’ in Europe that is more tolerant and open than the version they had in their countries of origin, Fiqh al-Aqalliyat mirrored this ‘individual Islam,’ which is more apt to integrate within the framework of citizenship, yet ensures the maintenance of a Muslim identity” (Mustafa and Agbaria, 2016: 5). To such insinuations, al-Alwani has to say this: “It is not meant to give minorities privileges or concessions not available to Muslim majorities. On the contrary, it aims to project minorities as representative models or examples of Muslim society in countries in which they live. It is the fiqh of model communities, élites and, a rigorous rather than frivolous or concessionary, approach” (Alwani, 2010: 3). In any case, *fiqh al-aqalliyat* was born in the first place as a reaction to and search for alleviating the plight and serving the spiritual needs of religious Muslims who found themselves in the diasporic setting starting with the second half of the twentieth century. In other words, it was designed to address the state of vulnerability that Muslims of immigrant background in Europe (and the wider West) were in. *Fiqh al-aqalliyat* was to turn this state of limbo and fluid temporality into a feeling of semi-permanency, and thus bolstering stability and security for the concerned individuals.

Taha distinguishes between two types of what she calls solutions that *fiqh al-aqalliyat* can provide: “a long-term one, for a permanent Muslim presence in the West, and a short-term – exceptional – one, for a temporary presence. The first suggests that we are dealing with full citizens and members of the society who happen to be Muslims in religion, while the second assumes that Muslims’ natural and ultimate residence is in a Muslim majority country” (Taha, 2013: 2). This distinction is very handy as it allows to divide the whole doctrine of the “jurisprudence of minorities” into two broad parallel strands. The first of them accepts the fact that Muslims have become and are to stay part and parcel of Western societies and their share in them is destined to continuously rise, due to both the coming of the second, third, and subsequent generations and fresh arrivals from outside of the West (not to mention increasing numbers of converts to Islam from among indigenous Westerners). The second holds onto the idea (or rather hope) that the Muslim presence in the West, although justifiable, is temporary—only until the socio-political, and especially economic, conditions in Muslim-majority regions improve significantly enough for them to naturally repatriate of their own will. So, in the first case, Muslims are in need of new lasting and sustainable solutions, whereas in

the second they can get by with interim “short-term – exceptional – ones.” It is the first strand that is of relevance and interest for us. From here on, it is this that will be referred to by the term *fiqh al-aqalliyat*.

*Fiqh al-aqalliyat* stands in the middle of the tension between Muslims’ obligations to their faith and the socio-political and cultural requirements of living in states and societies that do not follow Islamic law” (Mustafa and Agbaria, 2016: 1 – 2), which it seeks to diminish by searching “for solutions that will mitigate potential conflict and strive to attain appeasement—even if this is only fragile, temporary, and specific—between Muslims and the non-Muslim society in which they live, between the duties of Islam and the pressing demands of economics, politics, education, and daily life in a non-religious reality where the believer acts as an employee, citizen, and member of a community” (Mustafa and Agbaria, 2016: 2). *Fiqh al-aqalliyat* was, then, a necessity, not a privilege, for diasporic religious Muslims of immigrant background, without which they would have been at best spiritually lost, and at worst assimilated and apostacized.

Both Hassan and Moore emphasize the normalization function of *fiqh al-aqalliyat*. According to Hassan, *fiqh al-aqalliyat* “is intended to normalize Muslims’ life in the West via an Islamicized package that addresses individuals’ religious aspirations, the integrity of traditions, the authority of jurists, the threat of identity erasure in a globalized context, and the theoretical discourse of globalization and liberalization” (Hassan, 2013: 15). Moore, in her turn, argues that “diasporic jurisprudence is a form of legal strategy designed to ‘normalize’ Muslims’ presence in the West, not necessarily in terms of the dominant institutions of a society, but internally, through the conscious use of Islamic idioms” (Moore, 2010: 5).

Though the normalization of Islam in Europe is seen by non-Muslim and some Muslim actors through the prism of its domestication (arguably leading to institutional, structural and functional churchification), in the case of *fiqh al-aqalliyat*, with its emphasis on fatwa-issuing by independent muftis and the use of *ijtihad*, and independent reasoning, normalization does not amount to institutional domestication of a church-like type because there is hardly a hierarchical ecclesiastical structure envisioned. And though founding fathers of *fiqh al-aqalliyat* have established umbrella organizations (like the European Council for Fatwa and Research founded by al-Qaradawi), such organizations are of a horizontal collegial nature, where differences of opinion (even over the nature and usefulness of *fiqh al-aqalliyat* itself) are accepted, rather than authoritarian superimposing structures. In this regard, the pan-European movement of “jurisprudence of minorities,” rather than following the line of churchification, sticks to the classical notion of church-less Islam.

On the other hand, *fiqh al-aqalliyat*, though not much use in the discussion on the churchification of Islam in Europe, is very relevant in the discussion on its securitization. *Fiqh al-aqalliyat* may be seen as an antidote to radicalization, which is arguably the driving factor behind the securitization of Islam. In other words, *fiqh al-aqalliyat*, as has been mentioned, in its own way normalizes, if not domesticates, Islam in diasporic settings, including Europe, by integrating features of Shari'a into a non-Islamic socio-political and legal environment. Thus, the successful introduction of *fiqh al-aqalliyat* among diasporic Muslims would remove not only major securitizing factors such as Muslim religious radicalization and extremism, but also those related to socio-cultural integration and cohabitation between Muslims and non-Muslims on a daily basis.

*Fiqh al-aqalliyat*, by its therapeutic nature, arguably enables a Muslim individual to move from the state of being an alien immigrant into the state of citizen in a broader sense of the word. *Fiqh al-aqalliyat*, though directly having nothing to do with legal naturalization, i.e. becoming a citizen of a host country, serves as a bridge between what, in terms of daily habitual behavior covering beliefs and actions, the immigrant has left behind when they first moved out of their homeland and how they are to believe and behave in the adopted country, all without compromising their faith. Mestiri argues that “[t]he ‘fiqh of minorities’ should be seen not as a strategic concept but as a stage of evolution from the status of immigration to that of citizenship” (Mestiri, 2016: 42). This may be read as implying that once *fiqh al-aqalliyat* serves a purpose and exhausts itself, other stages, bound to being a Muslim citizen in a non-Muslim state, would follow. But what might fill the shoes of a discarded *fiqh al-aqalliyat*? “European” Islam would arguably seal the escape from the mentality of temporary yet permanent diaspora.

It remains to be asked whether this jurisprudence of minorities is applicable to non-immigrant, autochthonous Muslim populations of Eastern Europe. Whereas originally *fiqh al-aqalliyat* emerged as an attempt to bring together immigrant Muslims of different legal traditions under one legal umbrella, the autochthonous Muslim populations of Eastern Europe have been Hanafi, that is of a well-established legal tradition. Of course, having found themselves in a minority (diaspora) situation—particularly in the Balkans in the post-Ottoman era—they had to redesign their legal tradition to fit the expectations of the non-Muslim majority nations and their states. But does this mean they had to switch to *fiqh al-aqalliyat*? Most *ulama* in Eastern Europe would reject the insinuation that they have been applying *fiqh al-aqalliyat* as it is understood by the creators of it in the 1970s and 1980s; their used legal practices predate the emergence of *fiqh al-aqalliyat* by a margin of a hundred or so years. So, for

instance, former long-term Bosnian Grand Mufti Cerić, himself a member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, which has endorsed *fiqh al-aqalliyat* for Europe's Muslims, appears to go against the grain when he baldly declares: "I do not believe in the Fiqh of Minority. The reason is that I do not accept to be treated as a halfway Muslim because I have political minority status. In the universal Ummah, I have majority status, for Prophet Muhammad granted me the full equality of my status wherever I live" (Cerić, 2016: 21). Such a view appears to be supported by faculty members of the Sarajevo Faculty of Islamic Studies, who suggest that the Bosnian Muslim authorities and intellectuals are developing an alternative view to *fiqh al-aqalliyat*.<sup>2</sup>

*Fiqh al-aqalliyat* makes the first step in recognizing that Islam in a diaspora is diasporic Islam, which requires a novel approaches on the jurisprudential level to the reality (in terms of religious rituals and ethics but also Islam's institutional side) on the ground. As Hajji argues, "[t]his kind of jurisprudence theorizes the suspension or moratorium of Islamic rules and laws, not because of positive interaction with the values of European majority, but as a strategy in the majority-minority game of power" (Hajji, 2015). Thus, it stops short of offering ways out of the state of diaspora toward (full) integration of Muslims' religious rituals and ethics into the socio-political fabric of the place of diaspora, in this case, Europe. In other words, *fiqh al-aqalliyat* entrenches the transitional state of being in diaspora—that of being neither in the "Islamic homeland" nor at home in Europe, but somewhere mid-way. The furthest it goes is to accept the possibility of limited integration through accommodation, but it does not foresee as an end state the indigenization of Islam in Europe or its de-diasporization.

A step further in the direction of the indigenization (naturalization, normalization) of Islam in Europe (and with it of the de-diasporization of Muslim communities) is its domestication through "Europeanization" (dealt with in detail in Chapter 4). While the development and promotion of *fiqh al-aqalliyat* is but exclusively a bottom-up process, advocated for and advanced by Islamic scholars (*ulama*) and Muslim thinkers, some of whom do not even live in Europe, the advocacy for, endorsement of, and the activities pertaining to the Europeanization of Islam are taken up both top-down (by European states) and bottom-up (foremost by European Muslim intellectuals and civic and political leaders but also some religious figures). As the top-down direction of it is addressed in Chapter 4, the present section focuses on its bottom-up direction.

---

<sup>2</sup> Interview with a faculty member of the Faculty of Islamic Studies, Sarajevo, October 21, 2018.

The bottom-up Europeanization of Islam may take place in a variety of spheres. de Ruiter talks of the “gradual Europeanization of Muslim theology and practices” (Ruiter, 2017: 15), which he sees happening in what he identifies as three areas: structure (the institutionalizing of Islam in Europe), practice (the individualization of Islamic practices) and theology (a new hermeneutics of interpretation of the Qur’an/Sunnah). This Europeanization, according to him, arguably, is happening, among other things, through the “establishment of national Islamic councils, the emergence of political and civic leaders and associations, the westernization of mosques, the democratization of religious authority, the development of Islamic youth culture, traditional law schools losing much of their meaning, the development of European fatwahs, the organization of slaughter during the feast of sacrifice, growing diversity in religious practice and convictions among Muslims, a desire for gender equality, a changed interpretation of Shariah, the status of apostates, Islam’s status as a minority culture” (Ruiter, 2017: 15), whatever the latter might mean. This impressive, yet undoubtedly not exhaustive, list of areas of purported Europeanization of Islam indicates a process toward an end state, which variably has been called “Euro-Islam” or “European” Islam.

Both terms came into circulation in the last decade of the twentieth century. The first one was arguably coined by Tibi (Tibi, 2010: 158). For him, Euro-Islam is “a cultural pattern of Islam adjusted to the political culture of civil society and to the separation between culture and politics. This liberal design of Islam could result from a process of indigenisation of Islam in which Islam could become European” (Tibi, 2001: 206). Elsewhere, he argues that “Euro-Islam” is about “an open-minded cultural and political adjustment of Islam to European standards to facilitate the embracing of European identity by Muslim migrants” (Tibi, 2001: 226). Although Tibi acknowledges the presence of sizable indigenous Muslim populations in Eastern Europe, he does not relate “Euro-Islam” to them. For Tibi, “Euro-Islam” is all about Muslims of immigrant background. Thus, the usability of the term with the content ascribed to it by Tibi to a Eastern European context, where the overwhelming majority of Muslims are autochthonous, remains dubious.

In the words of Tibi, “Euro-Islam” “means no more and no less than a Europeanized Islam”. Tibi envisions this “Euro-Islam” to resemble other territorialized Islams, like Afro-Islam, Indo-Islam and the like. As Hajji aptly observes, such a conceptualization of “Euro-Islam” “bears the seal of an unmistakable will to territorialize Islam, to confine Islamic faith and spirituality to a geographical space” (Hajji, 2015). This geographical space is, however, first of all a cultural space in which the status and role of, as well as relations between, different religious traditions may vary significantly. Thus, Tibi acknowledges that

while Afro-Islam and Indo-Islam were born in the process of the indigenization of Islam by local populations who accepted Islam as their faith, in a (Western) European context, the birth of “Euro-Islam” is tied to people primarily with an immigrant background. Tibi reasons that “Euro-Islam is an interpretation of Islam that makes it compatible with four European constitutional standards: laicism (that is, the separation of religion and politics), secular tolerance based on individual human rights (this includes the freedom of dissent and belief), democratic pluralism and last but not least, civil society” (Tibi, 2001: 226). However, once again, as all these standards work differently in different European states and in a range of Eastern European countries their applicability remains wanting, the fortunes of “Euro-Islam” or its Eastern European equivalent may differ from those in Western Europe.

The Europeanization of Islam toward “Euro-Islam,” according to Tibi, though may also go top-down (discussed further below), is seen by him as a truly bottom-up process: “Though I do not exclude the state as an actor, I believe that civil society should be the primary framework for making Euro-Islam a reality in Europe” (Tibi, 2010: 164). However, it appears that the civil society Tibi refers to means secular lay groups and individuals rather than Muslim religious collectivities. In this regard, his understanding of “Euro-Islam” diverges from that which is pursued by national governments in partnership with Muslim religious umbrella organizations and in the building of which pan-European supranational institutions are engaged. In the end, this “Euro-Islam” is more political than religious in its nature. In the words of Hajji, it is an emerging “political platform for negotiation between the European continent and its citizens from Muslim migration backgrounds. (...) No doubt as a political platform Euro-Islam could and should predispose Muslims to get more involved in European social and intellectual debates, more and more concerned with the future of living together, and more and more alert to the changing nature of the relationship between believing and belonging” (Hajji, 2015). It is apparent that the religious side of Tibi’s “Euro-Islam” is relegated exclusively to the private sphere, while the public sphere remains strictly secular. In the end, Tibi’s envisioned “Euro-Islam” is not just a modern “Europeanized” version of Islam but a very sterile remnant of it, for which Tibi has been severely criticized by fellow European Muslims. For instance, Hajji, who, incidentally, sees *fiqh al-aqalliyyat* as the flip-side of “Euro-Islam” is critical of “Euro-Islam” as he finds it to “expect Muslims to unquestionably abide by the rules of an allegedly modern, enlightened continent, unreservedly adhere to its basic values and philosophical tenets, and unconditionally subscribe to its vision of the world” (Hajji, 2015), which they should and could not completely do, because “[n]either Euro-Islam, nor any other integration policy, can spiritually cut them off from

the outside. Their adherence to European laws and values cannot be complete without the corroboration of their theological references, which cannot be confined to a geographical space” (Hajji, 2015).

Tibi, however, maintains that this bottom-up “Euro-Islam can also replace the security-based approach used today, in which huge amounts of police time and resources are devoted to monitoring and thwarting radical Islamists’ activities—because under the principles of Euro-Islam, Muslims would not tolerate criminals in their midst even if they share the same religion, but would instead support the rule of law above all” (Tibi, 2010: 164). As in his writings, Tibi constantly contraposes the desired Europeanization of Islam (leading to “Euro-Islam”) to the detested Islamization of Europe (purportedly pursued by Islamists and other revivalists); the successful creation of “Euro-Islam,” in his conviction, would assist in the victory of the “Europeanization of Islam” camp over the “Islamization of Europe” camp, which is seen by Tibi as an imminent danger to overall European security and even the survival of it as it is. “Euro-Islam” as an expression (or even an end state) of the domestication of Islam in Europe, is meant not only to make Muslims comfortable full-fledged citizens of Europe, but to also make them theologically and politically independent from outside ideological and financial tutelage, particularly that which is coming from state and non-state actors based in Muslim-majority regions (Mirta-heri, 2010: 83), subsequently presumably decreasing security risks such as radicalization and extremism.

Tibi, however, feels his original concept of “Euro-Islam” has been hijacked by those very Islamists (and particularly Tariq Ramadan and his followers), who, according to him, have a hidden agenda and are wolves in sheep’s clothing and who, although declaring as their aim the creation of “Euro-Islam,” supposedly seek to Islamize Europe or turn it into “Islam-Europe.” Finally, Tibi concedes that rather than being a *fait accompli* or at least an ongoing process, “Euro-Islam, however, is only a vision and a policy proposal waiting to be implemented” (Tibi, 2014: 25), while the purported Islamization of Europe is well on its way.

Tibi’s understanding of “Euro-Islam” as a bottom-up process is in sharp variance not only with its understanding as a top-down process described further in Chapter 4, but also with the other notion (intermittently also used by Tibi himself in his writings), namely, “European” Islam. The concept of “European” Islam may be seen as coterminous with but not synonymous to that of “Euro-Islam.” The first difference stems from the fact that “European” Islam may imply either a pan-European or national level. While on the pan-European level, it may resemble Tibi’s “Euro-Islam,” on the national level, “European” Islam inevitably goes into plural, Islams; every national “European” Islam may have

its own distinct dogmatic, ritualistic, ethic and, structural features, thereby making the content of particular “European” Islams different from each other.

Bougarel explains that, on the pan-European level, “[t]he notion of a ‘European Islam’ refers to the creation of a public space common to the various Muslim communities living in Europe and, under the influence of their integration into non-Muslim and largely secularised societies, to the emergence of new interpretations and practices of Islam” (Bougarel, 2005a: 29, n. 1). Observers are, however, not unanimous on whether a pan-European “European Islam” already exists or is still in the process of being born. Bougarel argues that “one has to consider European Islam not as an existing fact, but as an ongoing process” (Bougarel, 2005b: 12). Klausen, likewise, sees it emerging “based upon a new epistemology of faith and a new hermeneutics of textual interpretation” (Klausen, 2005a: 205). Cesari, however, is unequivocal: “if European Islam means the adjustment of Muslims’ practices to Europe’s post-Enlightenment values and norms such as human rights, rule of law, democracy, and gender equality, European Islam already exists” (Cesari, 2018: xi).

To distinguish “European” Islam on the pan-European level from “Euro-Islam” as it is envisioned by Tibi, one needs to see how much role religion is accorded. If for Tibi, “Euro-Islam” squeezes religion into the private sphere, “European” Islam allows for its public place, though expects it to follow commonly agreed patterns. Moreover, if in Tibi’s “Euro-Islam,” it is the secular lay “civil society” that is at its helm, in “European” Islam, it is both religious and lay actors who partake in its forming and maintaining.

Viewed from a top-down perspective, “Euro-Islam” implies a transnational pan-European project, covering, if not all European, then at least EU member, states. In this regard, “Euro-Islam” is a generic term referring to a set of lowest common denominators and criteria set from outside the Muslim populations throughout Europe. “Euro-Islam” is something sterile, and acceptable (from the point of view of non-Muslims) across the board. Though individual nation states are prominent actors in laying the foundations for such a version of Islam, they act not individually on their own but as a team, sometimes supervised, but more often tacitly encouraged and guided by pan-European institutions. The EU itself may become an active participant in the formation of “Euro-Islam,” particularly through the directives of the European Commission and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and similar institutions. Mirtaheri even argues that what he refers to as “European Islams” but is in fact “Euro-Islam” as defined above, “may only appear through active and affirmative engagement of European institutions, including the EU, which in turn, entails more flexible and more pragmatic versions of secularism. Indeed the EU might be better positioned to engage in such initiatives compared to most

European governments caught in deadlocked national debates over the integration of Muslims” (Mirtaheeri, 2010: 84). EU institutions, however, often act in a reactive manner, when there is an outside trigger. Though this trigger may be actions by member states, it is often the Muslim actors (in the person of institutionalized or not groups or even individuals) who bring such actions by member states to the attention of EU institutions. In any case, “Euro-Islam” is to be of a supra-national type, with its features (and treatment of it on the practical level) not differing in any significance among European states. To stretch it even further, “Euro-Islam” could become a geographically bound sort of top-down imposed quazi-neo-madhhab. In reality, such a “Euro-Islam” is still more of a vision than an ongoing process.

“European” Islam, meanwhile, implies a national level, where both state (top-down) and non-state (bottom-up) actors participate in the creation and sustenance of it. Though there may be features common to “European” Islam in different nation states, because of socio-political differences, including state-religion relations and regimes of governance of religion, it is more appropriate to talk of a spectrum of national “European” Islams, rather than one universal “European” Islam. In other words, “European” Islam in France is French European Islam, while “European” Islam in Bosnia is Bosnian European Islam, with their commonalities and differences. Moreover, in some European states, national “European” Islam is seen as a *fait accompli*, a fact, not a project to be pursued. As is shown in Chapters 5 and 6, in a number of Eastern European countries, national “European” Islam is seen by different state and non-state actors as a historical fact and even part of their national heritage, which arguably needs not creation but preservation (against unwanted alien and novel forms of Islamic religiosity) and dissemination into other, namely, Western, parts of Europe.

Ultimately, “Euro-Islam” (as a vision) and “European” Islam (as an ongoing process or a purported fact) refer to two different levels of diasporic Islam in Europe; the former encompasses the entire continent and is of a pan-European level, while the latter is of a national or, at best, regional level. As such, the notion of “European” Islam denotes not one but a range of forms of diasporic Islam. Therefore, rather than talking about diasporic Islam in Europe as something uniform, one needs to recognize the variety of forms of diasporic Islam, effectively making them diasporic Islams.

Bougarel proposes, at the expense of both terms, a new one: “the ideas of a sui generis ‘European Islam’ or a homogenous ‘Euro-Islam’ should be replaced by more nuanced considerations on the formation of a pan-European Islamic public sphere that would enable European Muslims to discuss the status and practical forms of their religion within the context of secularised European

societies” (Bougarel, 2005b: 11 – 12). Bougarel’s proposed “pan-European Islamic public space” may be seen as complimenting “Euro-Islam” discussed in Chapter 4, as, while “Euro-Islam” is a top-down project (or rather still a mere vision), “pan-European Islamic public space” is an envisioned end state (or product) of a bottom-up process engaged in by interested Muslim (lobby) groups (first of all transnational, like the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe, but also national with a transnational bent). The connection between the two is shown by Bougarel himself, when he rhetorically asks: “It (...) remains an open question whether the possible formation of such a pan-European Islamic public space is more likely to result from the activities of pan-European religious forums or rather be facilitated by the European institutions to which the Muslims of the Balkans and Western Europe turn to raise their problems and present their demands” (Bougarel, 2005a: 25). This “pan-European Islamic public space,” according to Bougarel, however, though currently being formed (Bougarel, 2005a: 6; 2005b), “is still in its infancy” (Bougarel, 2005a: 25).

One, however, needs to ask, what geographical scope is implied under pan-European “European” Islam or Bougarel’s proposed “pan-European Islamic public space”? Is it the entire European continent (including or not Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey)? Countries that belong to the EU? Or just exclusively Western Europe? Hashas rhetorically asks: “Which Europe is meant here and by implication what European Muslims?” and immediately notes that “Western Muslims is vague as a label as is European Muslims, unless one is satisfied with generalizations” (Hashas, 2013:14). The Muslim population in Europe is composed of several categories of people of Muslim background. The main distinction runs along the religiosity lines—there are very devout Muslims in Europe, whose forms of Islamic religiosity vary greatly among themselves, and there are people who, although of Muslim cultural background, identify themselves as not religious, all the way to being agnostic and even atheist. Naturally, the majority would fall somewhere in-between these extreme ends.

European populations of Muslim background may also be divided along the lines of their ethno-confessional background—they may be either Muslim-born autochthons or recent immigrants, or Europe-born progeny of parents of immigrant Muslim background, or, finally, non-Muslim born Europeans who have converted to Islam. Cerić calls these different categories “indigenous Muslims,” “emigrant Muslims” and “native Muslims” and describes them in the following way: “Indigenous Muslims are those who have a long historical background in Europe, such as the Muslims of Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Bulgaria and so on. Emigrant Muslims are those who have migrated to Europe as either students or workers and have settled permanently in all the Member States of the European Union. Native Muslims are the children of

Muslim emigrant parents as well as those Europeans who have recently entered Islam” (Cerić, 2007: 46).

As the share and composition of Muslim populations in different European countries varies greatly across the continent, so potentially will the understanding of “European” Islam by interested parties—Muslim and non-Muslim. Here, one needs to acknowledge the distinction between the Western and the Eastern halves of the continent: while the talk of “European” Islam on the pan-European level is focused on Western Europe, national “European” Islam(s) is the topic in many Eastern European countries. There are, of course, discussions on national “European” Islams in Western Europe, but there they are initiated mainly by non-Muslims and top-down guided. However, what is even more important, while the discussions about “European” Islam in Western Europe are projected into the future (they talk about the need to create such an Islam), discussions in Eastern Europe focus on history (they talk about the need to preserve such a form of Islam). As noted by Hashas, “the indigenous Muslims (...) feel a kind of malaise because their common perception of European Islam is now being confused with the European Islam being debated in Western Europe. Though the ‘indigenous Muslims,’ like those of the Balkans and parts of Russia and the Baltic (Tatars), seem to be trying to feel that their past history and their old presence in Europe can help in enriching the current debate on this issue and thus contribute to solidifying the idea of European Islam, Western Europe does not seem to have invested much in this direction, nor do the Muslims in Western Europe seem to have learnt from their coreligionists in the same Continent” (Hashas, 2013: 14 – 15). On the other hand, Elbasani argues that in post-communist Eastern Europe, in particular, the Balkans, the “term ‘European Muslim’ is now employed to suggest their active support for the post-1989 project of ‘return’ to Europe and the concrete criteria of EU accession – democracy, the rule of law and market economy – with which candidate countries are required to comply” (Elbasani, 2015a: 6). Thus, in post-communist Eastern Europe, “European” Islam may imply the regaining and preservation of indigenous Islamic heritage; however, this time it is filtered through novel criteria bound to EU accession, namely democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy.

Indeed, in Eastern Europe, the official national Muslim administrations constantly present Eastern European Muslims as “indigenous,” “autochthonous,” in other words, as being “of” (Eastern) Europe/Europeans. Consequently, Islam in Eastern Europe (or, to put it another way, the Islam of Eastern Europeans) is unequivocally discursively presented as “European” Islam, in what may be called “indigenization of religious identity” (Kozák, 2009). As Kozák

argues, “[t]he discourse of indigenization revolves around the centre piece of ethno-religious characteristics as a fundamental element in identification and categorization. The main dimensions are recounting local history (tradition), religion as personal option, symbolic religion, and ecumenism. In this discourse religious practice is shaped by local tradition meaning that cultural identification in the form of ethnoregional imagery supersedes or more precisely qualifies the religious one” (Kozák, 2009: 13). Thus, in Eastern Europe, among the autochthonous inhabitants of Muslim background, belonging is prioritized over believing, and high levels of ethno-religious identification sharply contrast with low levels of religiosity.

But who are the carriers of these national “European” Islams? If “European” Islams of autochthonous Muslim groups is a historical legacy, then their carriers must have been peasants with their forms of folk Islam, since the majority of autochthonous Muslim populations have been rural. If, however, “European” Islam is associated with reform-inclined modernizing urbanites, it is not so much a historical legacy as a rather recent transition from historical (traditional) forms of Islamic religiosity into novel (modern) ones. Bougarel reviews this process of transition in South-East Europe: “Everywhere, the emerging Muslim intelligentsia denounced the backwardness of their own community and challenged traditional elites, rejecting their communitarian and clientelistic strategies and promoting nationalist projects or militant ideologies. These institutional and cultural changes contributed to profound changes in religious life as well. The need for Islamic religious institutions to adapt to their new minority status – and more generally to the modernisation of the state and society – prompted changes in the way in which religion was taught in the madrasas, waqfs were administered by their mutawalis (trustees), and Sharia was implemented by the Sharia courts. This reform of these institutions, sometimes encouraged by central government, occurred alongside various debates on the legitimacy of traditional syncretic and Sufi practices, the adoption of western dress, the status of women and, more generally, the relationship between Islam, national identity and western modernity” (Bougarel, 2005a: 9 – 10). He further argues that “[f]rom the end of the 19th century, part of the Balkan Muslim elite distanced itself from the declining Ottoman Empire and sought to formulate a ‘local Islam’ that would be compatible with Western modernity. To this end, secular intellectuals and reformist ulema (religious scholars) looked for new models in the Arab world, the Indian sub-continent or Tsarist Russia, and became interested in the Salafist ideas of Jamaluddin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh” (Bougarel, 2005a: 10). The question, though, remains—do rural and recently urbanized Muslims in the Balkans recognize this new

“European Islam” of modernized and often secularized urban elites as theirs and live according to its principles? It is hard to believe the answer is entirely positive.

Thus, on the level of national “European” Islam(s), one may see several ways of understanding the content of “European” Islam in a given locality, ranging from the “traditionalist” view (which would include forms of local folk religiosity into the notion of “European” Islam) to a “modernist” view (which would accord the status of European Islam only to reformed modern forms of its religiosity) with a number of intermediary positions. In any case, the designation of Muslims and Islam as “European” first of all implies a (positively charged) distinction from the Middle Eastern, Asian, African, and any other possible Islam(s). The keyword “European” is routinely meant to signal the affinity, indeed the very roots, of this Islam with the European value system. In other words, in the framework of the politics of loyalty and belonging, it is argued by the advocates of this label that the “European” Islam of (indigenous/autochthonous) Eastern European Muslims belongs in and to this part of Europe, and through it to the entire European cultural zone. As Bougarel notes, “[i]n many works about south-eastern Europe, Balkan Islam is defined as a ‘genuine European Islam,’ since its followers are autochthonous and largely secularized Muslims. Implicitly, this ‘European Islam’ is then contrasted with a ‘non-European Islam,’ encompassing not only those countries with a Muslim majority, but also the Muslim migrants who settled in western Europe in the second half of the twentieth century” (Bougarel, 2005b: 1).

In Eastern Europe, in the minds of local Muslim leadership supported by the mainstream political elite, this “European” Islam is not only set to stay but also expand. For this, it calls for a double strategy—on the one hand, the promotion of the image and status of local forms of Islam in Eastern Europe as “European” Islam *par excellence*, and on the other hand, fending off other (read, alien, and unacceptable) forms of Islam, usually falling under the category of “revivalist” Islam. However, as Bougarel aptly notes, “the celebration of Balkan Islam as a ‘European Islam’ conceals – rather than reveals – its specific characteristics, as do the concerns expressed by outside experts on the post-Communist Balkans about the ‘radicalisation’ of Muslim populations or the creeping ‘wahhabisation’ of Balkan Islam” (Bougarel, 2005a: 11). This observation is valid for other Eastern European (chiefly post-Soviet) countries with autochthonous ethnic communities of Muslim background.

The double process of the “Europeanization” of Islam/presenting it as “European” Islam in post-communist Eastern Europe lays ground for the two-way churchification of Islam in a range of Eastern European countries. While the “Europeanization” of Islam works foremost on the legal and political levels,

presenting Islam in Eastern Europe as *de facto* already “European” is promoted primarily by Muslim communities, and particularly their representative Islamic spiritual administrations. National “European” Islam falls in-between, on the one hand, local cultural forms of Islamic religiosity typical to Eastern Europe, often of a non-normative/non-legalist nature, and, on the other hand, transnational deterritorialized Islam of a revivalist nature. While the “European” Islam seeks to absorb those historical forms of Islamic religiosity, transnational deterritorialized Islam denies their validity altogether and vehemently opposes the Europeanization of Islam—whatever that might entail. The resistance to Europeanization and, in particular, the churchification of Islam by some Muslim groups is dealt with in detail in Chapter 6.

#### 2.4 Patterns of Governance of Religion (with an Eye on Islam) in (Western) Europe

State-religion relations, within a European context often referred to as state-church relations, is a well-discussed topic in academia. Legal and political scientists as well as sociologists of religion have given it ample attention in the past few decades. The concept of state-religion relations presupposes a two-way interaction between the State (and its representative bodies) on one side and religion(s) in the person of their representative organizations (both formal and informal) on the other; in practically all modern states the fundamental of these relations is the regime of governance of religion, as a rule imposed over faith communities by the State as the more powerful partner in these relations. In other words, it is the State that has a monopoly in state-religion relations.

European liberal democracies are routinely portrayed and portray themselves as secular and neutral states. However, this common knowledge is being challenged by some researchers. So, for instance, Klausen is blunt in her assessment: “Western European states are not secular. Nor are they neutral in matters of religion. On the contrary, Europe is riddled with Christian privileges” (Klausen, 2005: 555). She goes even further by arguing that “[t]wentieth-century European states modernized religion but they never embraced constitutional principles about state neutrality and the separation of church and state. Secularization in Europe was achieved by means of state control of religion” (Klausen, 2005: 555). To follow upon Klausen, the State appropriated the control of religion through designing and imposing constitutional regimes of governance of religion, which made the State an interested (or even a deciding) party as opposed to an envisioned (presumed) neutral by-stander on religious

matters. The modern State, contrary to all claims, is a very much interested and involved actor in religious affairs, in the European context, naturally leaning toward some sort of privileging of Christian tradition(s), upon which the very regimes of governance of religion are based, even if sometimes in an adversarial manner (as in France or Ireland). Within individual regimes of governance of religion, however, different religions may receive different treatment. Therefore, every individual religion's case, though sharing in commonalities with other religions, in details may rather significantly differ from some or even all other religions of/in a given country. Islam, the object of the present research, is one such religion.

Numerous scholarly works dealing from one or another angle with the governance of Islam in Europe have been produced (Laurence, 2012; Maussen, 200; Sunier, 2012; Elbasani, 2017). However, on closer inspection, it becomes obvious that their authors' gaze hardly ever goes beyond Western Europe, with the overwhelming majority of research focusing on France, Germany, and the UK. These three countries are, as a rule, taken to best represent the three ideal types of regimes of the governance of religion in Europe. France is portrayed as the representative *par excellence* of what is labelled the "separation system" (also called "secular"), the UK—as the representative of the opposite "state church system," and Germany as the archetypical example of the middle path, the "cooperation system" (also called "hybrid") (Leustean, 2008: 247 – 248). There is also a slightly different typology, which "distinguish[es] between constitutional establishment and non-establishment, whereby the latter can be further subdivided into separatist countries and selective cooperation countries" (Permoser, 2010: 1466). Though it may seem to be proposing a bipartite framework of models of governance of religion, in essence it is just a different wording of the same system of coordinates.

These typologies of the models of governance of religion in Western Europe have already been severely criticized (Sandberg, 2008: 331; Bowen, 2007b: 1005). Sandberg, for instance, insists that "these models are flawed. The state church categorisation often has more to do with theory than practice; with history rather than sociology. Although it is true that those countries labelled under this heading have in common the fact that they grant one religious community (or more) a special constitutional position and special benefits and burdens resulting from that special position, it may be observed that European state church systems have little else in common" (Sandberg, 2008: 331). Flawed as they may be, these typologies continue to be the best offered for the explanation of the variety of regimes of governance of religion in Europe. It may be legitimately asked, to what extent the dominant Western European theoretical approaches to the governance of religion (and particularly, of Islam) in Europe

are applicable (or even relevant) to post-communist Eastern Europe? Unfortunately, so far, there appear to have been practically no comparative analyses of the governance of religion in Europe, which would encompass patterns of it found in post-communist Eastern Europe.

The concept of “governance of religion,” which also subsumes “governance of Islam,” here in principle is understood along the lines argued by Maussen, who suggests that “[i]ntroducing the concept of governance in studies on the accommodation of Islam (...) creates opportunities for a type of analysis that goes beyond the study of (formal) legal arrangements, and also looks at practices of application, implementation and interpretation. It includes the systematic study of customs, conventions and agreements that result in specific forms of regulation, and it widens the scope of actors and institutions that might be involved in one way or the other in the actual accommodation of Islam in Europe” (Maussen, 2007: 5). Maussen invites the reader in the analysis to go beyond the static level of formal legal regulations of “state-church” relations and incorporate into the research more dynamic supra-legal factors, this way significantly expanding its basis. Consequently, though the formal legal regulations of “state-church” relations remain indispensable, they in themselves are not sufficient to disclose a fuller picture of the actual situation of faith communities in a given country and can at best serve as a starting point from which to proceed with a comprehensive analysis.

However, when arguing for “governance” as an analytical tool, Maussen uses the term “accommodation of Islam” in the studies of which he seeks to apply the concept of “governance.” Though in the Western European context, “accommodation,” which invariably carries a positive value, may be applied when talking of governance of religion, in the Eastern European context, as is shown further below, it may not always suit. Take, for instance, Slovakia and Kosovo (the latter being a Muslim majority country), where to this day, due to a combination of legal and political impediments, Muslim communities may not have legally registered religious organizations and are forced to operate as NGOs; or Moldova, where, despite the legal registration of a Muslim religious organization after a dragged-out process, the Muslim presence faces both political and social revisionist backlash; or even Bosnia, where the official community organization, the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though possessing representative status of the Muslim majority in the country, still has no comprehensive agreement with the State, although representative religious authorities of minority faith communities, such as Catholics and Serb Orthodox, do. These and numerous other examples suggest that the “accommodation” in many instances may, if at all, be used only in conjunction with “lack of.” Therefore, one should not, at least in the Eastern European context,

directly tie governance to accommodation and rather confine oneself to the use of “governance.”

It may also be made clear from the onset that there may be no one (or three, as suggested by researchers of regimes of governance of religion in Western Europe) model when discussing the governance of religion (including Islam) in post-communist Eastern Europe, for, as Sunier, though having in mind Western European countries, aptly notes, “the diverging reactions to Islam in different European nations are best explained by the different discourses of nationhood, the disparate political cultures in those countries, and the different paths emancipation takes” (Sunier, 2006: 249). As is shown further below, Sunier’s indicated factors have heavily influenced diverging, and, at times, even opposing regimes of governance of religion (*inter alia* of Islam) in post-communist Eastern Europe. Basing on his own and others’ research, Koenig concludes that “[a]s cross-national comparisons show, Church-State relations, national identities, political opportunity structures and deliberate policy initiatives in European countries have led to distinctive patterns of Muslim incorporation, thus giving rise to rather different varieties of European Islam” (Koenig, 2007: 912). Though he has in mind first of all Western European countries, as will become evident below, post-communist countries of Eastern Europe likewise prove this point.

As indicated above, the common typology of regimes of governance of religion in Western Europe is based on a three-tier system of church-state relations comprising “the state church model, the cooperationist (or hybrid) model and the secular (or separation) model” (Leustean, 2008: 247). Sandberg defines these models as follows: “State church systems are those countries characterised by the existence of close links between the state and a particular religious community, which may be styled as a ‘state,’ ‘national,’ ‘established,’ or ‘folk’ church. (...) By contrast, separation systems include those countries where there is a constitutional barrier forbidding the financial support and establishment of any one religion. (...) Hybrid systems, effectively, are those states whose constitutional provisions concerning religion come in between state church systems and separation systems. Also known as cooperationist systems or sometimes concordatarian systems, these states are characterised by a simple separation of state and church coupled with the recognition of a multitude of common tasks which link state and church activity, which are often recognised in the form of agreements, treaties, and Concordats” (Sandberg, 2008: 330 – 331). Sandberg’s examples mainly stem from Western Europe; from among the post-communist Eastern European states Sandberg assigns Bulgaria to the first model (the “state church”), while Hungary and the Baltic States to the third (the “hybrid”).

A complimentary way to see governance of religion in Europe is proposed by Bader who distinguishes between democratic (bottom-up) and hierarchical (top-down) modes of governance (Bader, 2007). Braginskaia utilizes this distinction in her comparative analysis of governance (called by her accommodation) of Islam in the UK and Russia. She calls the British approach “horizontal” and the Russian “vertical.” She contends that “[t]he British example of horizontal governance focuses on liberal multiculturalism and its communitarian preference for resolving internal tensions within the local institutional framework. Russia’s increasingly conservative policy of consolidating Muslim institutions and building strong relations between Muslim senior representatives and state officials on the national level is exemplary of its vertical approach” (Braginskaia, 2010: 42). Braginskaia notes that “[b]oth countries seek to integrate Islam within its institutional framework of state-religion relations (...). And yet, the ways in which the Russian and British authorities communicate their agenda are different. The British case illustrates a strong reliance on local partners and community initiatives, whereas the Russian efforts have largely focused on encouraging consolidation of previously fragmented religious institutions” (Braginskaia, 2010: 42). Though Braginskaia focuses solely on these two countries, her findings may be extended to include many more countries on the two sides of the invisible divide between Western Europe and (post-communist) Eastern Europe, at the same time elucidating, at times essential, differences between the modes of governance of Islam practiced in Western Europe and post-communist Eastern Europe, where, as is shown further below in this book, the “hierarchical”/“vertical” mode of governance predominates.

Tatari, however, maintains that what he calls the most popular state accommodation theories (or what is referred to in this book as regimes of governance of religion) fail to include an essential independent variable which would “account for the particularities of the institutional framework of Islam, which changes the impact of church-state structures compared to Christianity, Judaism or other religious traditions, each with their unique institutional arrangements” (Tatari, 2009: 280). Thus, talking of the analysis of state accommodation of Muslim religious needs in Western Europe, he proposes his own dynamic-compound framework of state accommodation of Islamic religious practices, (Tatari, 2009: 280 – 281) which specifies complex multilayered relations among the institutional framework of Islam, church-state structure, political opportunity structures, and policy outcomes. In the figure (Figure 1) modeling the framework, these relations are indicated by arrows, which, as Tatari notes, “do not necessarily denote causal mechanisms but refer to the direction of the interaction between the variables” (Tatari, 2009: 281).




FIGURE 1 Dynamic-compound framework of the state accommodation of Islamic religious practices  
SOURCE: TATARI, 2009: 281

The direction (H) of interaction between political opportunity structures (the State) and the institutional framework of Islam is indicated as uni-directional, its direction being from political opportunity structures toward the institutional framework of Islam. This suggests that the institutional framework of Islam may be influenced (altered) by political opportunity structures, a very valid point. However, the relation (F) between the institutional framework of Islam and Muslim minorities is also uni-directional (from the institutional framework of Islam toward Muslim minorities), implying that it is only the institutional framework of Islam which sets the direction of interaction between it and Muslim minorities, this way stripping them of the ability to influence (alter) it. Tatari explains this by arguing that “Muslims do not fail to grasp the secular construct of society, but that Islamic history presents a different understanding of plurality, where different groups were welcome to practice their religion freely, and where plurality—or the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups—did not require the confinement of religion to a private sphere. Consequently, the ‘institutional framework of Islam’ variable determines the rules of the game for Muslim minorities, shaping the way they interact with the state in order to pursue policy change” (Tatari, 2009: 284). Much literature and many arguments and examples in this book, however,

would suggest that Muslim communities in the person of their representative authorities do influence and even alter the understanding of the institutional framework of Islam. Tatari himself seems to agree to that when he states that “[a]lthough the institutional framework of Islam seems to be fixed in stone, it does in fact vary according to the interpretation of different individuals” (Tatari, 2009: 280).

Irrespective of the model of governance of religion, all European states through their legal systems (and particularly, through the legal arrangements of state-church relations) inevitably regulate a crucial aspect of religious practice and identity—the institutionalization of religion through representative spiritual administrations, as a rule, in the form of religious organizations or their associations (councils). However, the available legal options for religious communities may differ significantly, ranging from voluntary through compulsory registration with the State, to rejection or denial of registration (with or without a formal ban of the organization). It is suggested, at least for Western European states, that “[c]ountries with a strong separation of church and state, such as France, will be far less likely to take initiatives to institutionalize Islam than countries with cooperative ties between church and state, such as Belgium, Germany or UK” (Loobuyck et al., 2013: 63). However, practice shows that the French State has actually made no less effort to institutionalize Islam than the other mentioned countries. On the other hand, it is also argued that “[t]he overall proportion of Muslims also plays a decisive role: the greater the number of Muslims, the greater the recognition by the state of a representative body” (Godard, 2007: 183). This, however, as shown further below, is not always the case in Eastern Europe—both Poland and Lithuania have a minuscule share of population that professes Islam, yet, due to historical reasons and other considerations, they both have accorded broad recognition of representative religious bodies of Muslims.

In many Western European countries, the institutionalization of Islam entails an expectation on the side of the State that Muslims create a single representative national religious body or an association of religious organizations, often commonly called a “council,” to serve as an umbrella organization. The expectation for a representative national Muslim religious body comes from a cultural and legal background, both bound to the perception of religion as inevitably having an organized administrative body, akin to those that Christianity, until recently the dominant religion in much of Europe, has. Nielsen argues that “the regular attempts in most countries to establish some form of common Muslim ‘front’ or umbrella organization, often in response to government initiative, is evidence of an adaptation of structures in a pseudo-ecclesiastical direction” (Nielsen, 1999: 116).

In relation to this, Ferrari maintains that it “is the cultural and legal background that lies behind the request which many states have addressed to the Muslim communities resident in their territories, namely, to provide a representative organization at the national level which is capable of functioning as an interlocutor of the state. (...) This request has sometimes been formulated in an excessively inflexible way, with the state insisting on the need for unitary representation which was not always required from other religious communities (for instance, the Christian ones, which have separate representative institutions). (...) At other times, the demand to create a single representative institution at the national level has masked delaying tactics by public administrations that were not ready for a productive relationship with Muslims” (Ferrari, 2010: 22). Sometimes, arguably, the “demand to create a single representative institution at the national level has masked delaying tactics by public administrations that were not ready for a productive relationship with Muslims” (Ferrari, 2010: 22). Though Ferrari apparently has in mind first of all some Western European states, this is discernible in some post-communist Eastern European countries, notably, Hungary and Czechia, but also Latvia and Slovakia.

Ferrari argues that “the need for structured representation at the national level is alien to the Islamic tradition and it thus seems unusual for many Muslims who come from countries where the relationships between state and religion are not organized according to such a model” (Ferrari, 2010: 22). Therefore, at least in the case of Islam in Western Europe, the process of the institutionalization of Muslim religious organizations is often coupled with the corresponding wider process of general “Europeanisation” of Islam, which is expected (sometimes explicitly but almost always invariably implicitly) to lead to something labelled “Euro-Islam”/“European” Islam or its national forms, like “German” Islam, “French” Islam and the like. The “Europeanization” of Islam may go two ways—top-down (state-led) and bottom-up (Muslim community-led). In any case, the envisioned end state, “Euro-Islam”/“European” Islam, is a novel form of Islam (indeed, a diasporic Islam *par excellence*), and is a way of believing and behaving, capable of both coexisting with other weltanschauungs present in contemporary multicultural European societies and maintaining a positive relationship to the socio-legal system, including the regime of governance of religion, of a given national state.

Regulations on the institutionalization of Islam in general and the state-guided process of its “Europeanisation” in particular, in a Western European context, are often viewed by researchers through the prism of what is called the “domestication of Islam.” As Martikainen explains, “[d]omestication’ can have at least two meanings. First, it can refer to processes of adaptation, e.g., with regard to religious institutionalisation. Second, it can refer to the ‘taming’

of a possible threat to social cohesion or security” (Martikainen, 2007: 255). Sunier understands the “domestication of Islam” as “the political programmes and modes of governance that emanate from the complex relationship between integration, and political priorities of security and national identity” (Sunier, 201: 190). In other words, the term “domestication of Islam” may mean both a process and a strategy.

By all means then, the domestication of Islam in Western Europe arguably goes beyond institutionalization, as, according to Sunier, “[d]omestication is a process of containment and pacification based on national identity politics. It is a process that is in the first place and self-evidently about integration of Islam into European societies. But in fact it is more explicitly about the character of nation-states and the challenges they face. Domestication politics revolve around the question of how national states should deal with the presence of Islam in all its perceived facets. Since domestication involves a good deal of monitoring and control of religion, it also implies an intervention in the very content of Islamic practices and convictions” (Sunier, 201: 190).<sup>3</sup> Sunier further argues that “the domestication of Islam is an important device of the symbolic reproduction of European nation states” (Sunier, 2014: 1141). Though it is not stated so explicitly in the above quotes, domestication-driven governance of Islam in Western Europe perceives Islam as of alien nature, as an “immigrant religion” or a religion of immigrants. As such, Islam is seen by Western European states to be in need of adjustment to be integratable and this is what the domestication means, in both senses of the word explained by Martikainen, when it is applied to Islam in Western European contexts. Domestication of Islam in Western Europe may be equated to its diasporization so that instead of remaining an imported Islam “in” diaspora it becomes a domesticated Islam “of” diaspora.

Ultimately, rather than accommodating Muslims in Western Europe, European states, through their governance of Islam, seek (and this is where it become a strategy) to change its institutional structure to fit the existing organizational and ideological frameworks of state-church relations. Generally, “[b]y institutionalizing Islam (...), states convey their interest in reforming religion or in transforming how citizens relate to their religion” (Laurence, 2012: 18).

3 Elsewhere (Sunier, 2014: 1142), Sunier argues that “[t]he domestication of Islam is a process of containment, pacification and legitimization based on a national imaginary. It is about the place of Islam in European societies and the challenges they face, against the backdrop of a particular conception of national identity. Different nation states have historically grown nationally specific modes of dealing with religious difference, sometimes informed by colonial practices, experiences and histories, so that the domestication of Islam takes on nationally specific features and outlooks.”

For Laurence, European states “are not engaged in the special accommodation of Muslims; they are incorporating Islam into pre-existing state-church institutions. European governments are trying to create the institutional conditions for the emergence of an Italian or German Islam, e.g., rather than just tolerating Islam ‘in’ Italy or Germany” (Laurence, 2012: 13). But in doing this, “European governments are not just trying to initiate a dialogue with Muslim representatives—let alone to simply appease their demands. Rather, they are trying to reconfigure the Muslim religious organizational field with explicit reference to the centrality of the national state. The offer of official recognition of Islam is conditional upon participating organizations’ recognition of the state (and its constitutional framework) in return” (Laurence, 2012: 249). This observation, as is shown in Chapter 5, is very relevant to the Eastern European context and particularly the Balkans.

Tatari seconds Laurence’s argument by noting that “[e]stablished church-state relations set the institutional framework within which Muslim minorities have to function. Most importantly, the legal status of religious minorities vis-à-vis the state is legislated according to the established church-state relations of the country. This, in turn, determines the bargaining power of religious minorities to obtain state accommodation for their religious practices” (Tatari, 2009: 282 – 283). In the end, however, Muslim communities, even if united, remain at the receiving end, with the State imposing its view on those willing to be coopted and sanctioning (coupled with securitizing) those who oppose it. Laurence, however, argues that even “repressive measures that have put Muslim communities on the defensive, in fact, belie a broader trend toward greater religious freedom and institutional representation for Islam in Europe” (Laurence, 2012: 6), as, according to him, “[t]he gestures of restriction and toleration are complementary and part of a unified process. European Muslims are experiencing the throes of a distilled and abbreviated era of emancipation: a dual movement of expanding religious liberty and increasing control exerted over religion. Every religious community that has joined the national fabric accepted certain restrictions on its freedoms and autonomy at the moment of recognition” (Laurence, 2012: 6). What Laurence appears to suggest is that there is a paradox that, at a time of ever-increasing rights and freedoms to practice publicly their religion, those Muslims in Europe who want to exercise them, are forced by the State to play by its rules, which, in the end are intended to enable the State to control as much as possible the religious field in the country. So, by going by the State’s will, institutionalized (State registered) Muslim religious collectivities are in fact abandoning part of their freedom (or what they are or want to be), subsequently losing part of their original identity.

Laurence concludes that in the end, “religion policy (...) allows European governments to gradually take ‘ownership’ of their Muslim populations because it grants them unique influence over organizations and leadership within this hard-to-reach minority” (Laurence, 2012: 12). This “taking of ownership” may be seen as one step further than domestication, or the extreme end of domestication, and, as such, entails a high level of control. In a Western European context, “taking of ownership” needs to be viewed against the backdrop of the earlier policies of the outsourcing of the internal management of Islam in Western European countries to embassies of Muslim-majority states, most notably, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, and Turkey, and to transnational revivalist movements and networks (Laurence, 2012), none of which were under any sort of real control by any European state. States initiating the process of the establishment of consultative Muslim religious councils in tandem with interested counterparts from among the myriad Muslim religious organizations is part of this “taking of ownership.”

Governance of religion, in this case, of Islam, however, involves many actors, of whom the two primary actors are the State and the Muslim community (in the person of both common believers and their organizations) at large. The domestication of Islam may have certain unintended consequences for the internal dynamics of the respective country’s Muslim population. Martikainen draws attention to several of them, the first of which is that “[c]ertain people are raised to important positions, where they act on behalf of others” (Martikainen, 2007: 258). This may lead to the unequal distribution of power among different actors and therefore offer opportunities for the misuse of held power; it is also unfavorable towards people, who, although of Muslim background, may “hold different views from those who act as their spokespersons” (Martikainen, 2007: 258). Martikainen sees even larger risks as he argues, “the authorities are actually actively involved in creating “cultural others.” We may ask whether strong state involvement can lead to the clientisation of immigrants, as well as to a pathologisation of cultural and social difference; with time, these processes may create permanent structures that support the status quo, in which many people of immigrant background are in a disadvantaged position” (Martikainen, 2007: 258). All this points to an integration paradox: while actively involving themselves in the integration of Muslims on their territories through legal measures covering the institutionalization of Islam, states run the risk of inadvertently “culturally othering” (or, to use the Saidian term, “orientalising” (Said, 1978)) them. There is another drawback, pointed to by Bowen, with which European states engaged in construction of representative Muslim religious bodies from the top down are faced: “those willing to be ‘co-opted’ are also those with the least legitimacy” (Bowen, 2007a: 55).

A separate mention in the context of the process of the Europeanization of Islam should be made of institutions of higher education where imams and Muslim catechists are trained. While in some Western European countries imam training programs were set up at secular public universities, in a number of Eastern European states there have been or were newly established “faculties of Sharia” to train professional imams. In itself, this is of no wonder, as such institutions may be seen as an equivalent of Christian priest seminaries or university divinity faculties/departments found in practically all European countries. What is of importance here is the legal requirement that individuals who wish to serve officially as imams need to be graduates from national institutions of higher education where imam training programs are offered. In some cases, only nationals of the country are allowed to serve as imams. These requirements, as much as they are to preclude graduates of Islamic universities abroad from taking up positions as imams, are also to safeguard that Islam preached at a given country’s mosques is of a nationally approved version, with as little Middle Eastern or other foreign influences as possible. Besides, the nationally approved and endorsed imam training programs, next to serving the function of reproducing “European” Islam-minded imams, also have a security dimension—Islam taught at such government-controlled programs and later preached to the laity by graduates is safe and sterile, free of the radicalization virus that may lead to the disease of extremism.

As argued in the Introduction and above in this chapter, state-imposed institutionalization of Islam may and often does have as its aim higher control over the religious life of believers. Institutionalization is in a way taming. Those Muslim religious actors who are susceptible to taming, through institutionalization (in the form of state recognition and registration) undergo a process of normalization or, as some researchers call it, emancipation. Roy talks of a policy of “communitarisation from above,” “implemented by non-Muslim states in parallel with the quest by Muslim organisations to be recognised as legitimate partners by the same non-Islamic states, while using any such legitimacy bestowed upon them to rally a constituency around them” (Roy, 2003: 209).

In the course of this process of normalization/emancipation, entailing taming-cum-domestication, institutionalized Muslim religious bodies experience expectations and sometimes even pressure from the State’s side (first of all, through legislation but often through extra-legal political and other measures and means) to assume church-like organizational appearance and behavior. In such cases, the whole process of normalization through strategic institutionalization in essence amounts to the churchification of Islam in a given state. Organizationally, the religion of Islam is then perceived to be yet another church among other (institutionalized—recognized and registered) churches,

both Christian and non-Christian. This is, *inter alia*, rather evident in the case of imam training and appointment, which in a number of Western European countries is becoming more and more formalized and bureaucratized. It is worth mentioning here that in this book the church is conceived of as an institutionalized (legally recognized) religious community (encompassing the totality of believers of that faith understood here as a set of dogmas, rituals and ethics), which has an ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure staffed by professional (ordained) ministers, and which has a positive relationship and attitude to society and the State.

On the contrary, those Muslim religious elements who do not meet the State-set criteria for normalization and are denied state recognition and registration (that is, denied institutionalization), or themselves desist such normalization (with its end-state of churchification), fall into the category of those who undergo an opposite process to the normalization, namely, that of othering leading to securitization. It is then different State agencies as opposed to those in the case of institutional churchification that take charge. Accordingly, the securitized Muslim religious elements are of a totally different status—they are perceived, if at all as religious, at best as dangerous sects and cults and in the worst cases as groups espousing extremist violent political ideology, variably called fundamentalism, Islamism, jihadism, Salafism or Wahabbism.

All in all, as Roy argues, in reaction to the regimes of governance of religion in Europe, Islam in Europe may assume one of two distinct forms: “[o]ne is integration, by which is meant the development of a distinct European, or French or British, ‘Muslim church.’ Another is re-communalization along supranational lines. It is within this latter phenomenon that radicalism and violence become potentially serious issues” (Roy, 2003b). These two distinguished forms invite different reactions from the concerned actors, first of all, the State. While the former opens the possibility for continuous support for the churchification of Islam in Europe, the latter calls for nothing less than the securitization of Islam with all the ensuing consequences.

# Key Concepts in the Regimes of Governance of Religion in Europe

## 3.1 The Churchification of Islam in Europe

State policies in the realm of religion toward Muslim populations in Europe and reactions to those policies by the affected communities are routinely described as integration, which is often measured in terms of the “Europeanization” of Islam. This Europeanization is first of all sought in Islamic dogmatics and ethics—so that Muslims start believing and behaving like Europeans. This, however, does not imply the Christianization of Islam on a theological level as it does not encompass eschatology but only Islam’s adjustment to the European value system in daily mundane life. Nonetheless, the “Europeanization” of Islam sometimes goes beyond the intellectual-spiritual level and into the structural. There, it includes the sought after “Europeanization” not so much of the Muslim mind but of the institutional structure of Islam. In this book, this double “Europeanization” of Islam is identified as its churchification. The end-state of this process is the birth/establishment of Muslim churches—institutionalized (legally recognized) religious communities, which have an ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure and are staffed by professional (ordained) clergy and which have a positive relationship and attitude to society and the State. As Koenig argues, “in the process of organizational incorporation, a formalization and hierarchization of Muslim community structures can be observed, which certainly leads to a churchification of Islam” (Koenig, 2006: 54).

The concept of the churchification of Islam in Europe infers two interrelated patterns: a strategy to transform—both top-down and bottom-up—the institutional structure of Islam in Europe into a church-like one, and a process in which the new (churchified) institutional structure of Islam starts resembling Christian Churches, particularly their ecclesiastical hierarchies. In other words, the churchification of Islam in Europe first and foremost goes through the ecclesification of the body of its spiritual leadership, collectively known as *ulama*. There is growing evidence that *ulama* are increasingly being viewed by European states (in practical terms, in the person of State institutions charged with supervision of governance of religion, be it ministries of the interior or justice, or special departments) as nothing less than Islamic clergy, that is,

professional ministers, “a defined group of trained persons who possess knowledge and skills not accessible to the general public, a group which is relatively autonomous in that the members are entitled to make judgements based on their expertise and are empowered to be largely selfgoverning” (Hoge, 2011:581). Although this does not automatically imply their hierarchization, there is an observable tendency to seek consolidation of spiritual authority in the hands of “high *ulama*” akin to Christian bishops. So far, however, it would be a too far-fetched statement to claim that the strategy of the ecclesification of *ulama* in Western Europe has already produced strict established hierarchies identical to or at least closely resembling those in Christian Churches. On the other hand, the trends are evident and this has led some researchers (Vinding, 2018) to start looking into the unfolding progression of the ecclesification of Islam in Western Europe. The ecclesification of *ulama* in a number of Eastern European countries, as is shown in the following chapters, is arguably on a much more advanced level than in Western Europe but, unfortunately, it has not been hitherto investigated.

The ecclesification of Islam, even with hierarchization, though, does not automatically mean churchification either, for there may be, at least theoretically, a clergy of some sort in an otherwise church-less religious collectivity. There may, however, arguably be no clergy-less church, as the church organization requires by default administrative-spiritual apparatus with its own hierarchies. As discussed in Chapter 1, having professional ministers serving in institutionalized hierarchical ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure makes religious collectivity a church, though Yinger allows that “church can be present in either an institutional form with an elaborate hierarchy among the clergy or in a dif-fused form” (Yinger, 1970: 256). In any case, there needs to be some sort of organization, no matter how loose, as well as ministers who are professionals and those ministers need to work within the organization—be trained, appointed and dismissed by it, as church “organisation is rational and bureaucratic, their ministers are professionals and hold their office from the institution” (Sengers, 2012: 56). There is a tendency that, as regards the development of Islam in Europe, these three aspects are emerging and merging in much of Europe, and certainly so in a range of Eastern European countries.

Both the ecclesification and, through it, the churchification of Islam may proceed top-down and bottom up, in parallel or separately. The top-down churchification—besides being a deliberate State-pursued policy strategy—may also be an unintended outcome or a by-product of the State-driven institutionalization of Islam in European countries. Thus, even though the institutionalization of Islam in Europe may not necessarily have the intention of, or lead to, the churchification of it, domestication (through a “Europeanization”

filter) arguably has a flavor of churchification as it entails molding according to what is common at home.

In religious terms, in Europe, it has been chiefly Christianity in the form of various Protestant, Orthodox or Catholic Churches. Vinding argues that “[t] here is a degree of political power associated with modelling of Islam on the Christian example or fitting it in the established framework for state and religion relations. When speaking of Islam, politicians hold that Islam should or ought to become like the churches, even if they don’t want to. There is a normative assessment of the different religious traditions, where the Christian model produced as ‘objectively’ better, or for historical reasons, the right way of organising religion” (Vinding, 2018: 59). Roy talks about “an institutional convergence between religions, when in the European context “the figure of the ‘priest’ or of the ‘minister’ tends to define all religious practitioners or professionals; ulemas (religious scholars) become theologians, imams and rabbis ‘parish’ leaders”” (Roy, 2014: 189). He notes that “[i]n the name of equality between believers, the law, courts and also institutions tend to format all religions in the same way. For example, in extending the principle of chaplaincy to Islam, the army and the prison authorities reinforce the institutional alignment of Islam with Christianity. In this sense we can speak of the ‘churchification’ of religions by courts and states” (Roy, 2014: 189 – 190).

The top-down side of the churchification of Islam in Europe, either as a manifest or latent strategy, sharply contrasts with the idea of State neutrality (neutral State). In a nutshell, a neutral State is “one that deals impartially with its citizens and which remains neutral on the issue of what sort of lives they should lead” (Jones, 1989: 9). Monsma and Soper define this state neutrality “as government neither favoring nor burdening any particular religion, nor favoring or burdening religion as a whole or secular systems of belief as a whole. Governmental religious neutrality is attained when government does not influence its citizens’ choices for or against certain religious or secular systems of belief, either by imposing burdens on them or by granting advantages to them” (Monsma and Soper, 2008: 6 – 7). By engaging in the top-down churchification of Islam through means of governance of religion, the State, on the contrary, becomes not merely an interested but very much an intrusive actor. In the life of no other religious group in Europe is the state so partial and biased as it is vis-à-vis Muslims “on the issue of what sort of lives they should lead.” The State not only has a set of expectations of what sort of lives Muslims in Europe should lead, but it actively promotes their implementation, both through legislation and practical politics. Ultimately, as Madeley concludes, “[s]tate religious neutrality is still far from realisation in Europe” (Madeley, 2003: 17).

The other religious tradition widespread in Europe since the Middle Ages has been Judaism, which arguably has been “Europeanized”/churchified in a range of European countries starting from the nineteenth century. As Nielsen observes, “rabbis moved from being teachers, scholars and jurisconsults to being pastors and clergy, their synagogues become ‘churches,’ and their chief rabbis become ‘archbishops”’ (Nielsen, 1993: 98; also Nielsen, 1999: 115 – 116). Now the time has come for Islam, which in most parts of Western Europe is a rather recent phenomenon. On the other hand, in a range of Eastern European countries, the presence of Islam dates back to the Middle Ages and its institutionalization (and arguably normalization-churchification) there proceeded much more earlier than in Western Europe, though it was halted in many Eastern European countries during the communist period. This is discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter.

The bottom-up churchification of Islam in Europe is also a strategy, this time stemming from the leadership of Muslim religious organizations, particularly those aspiring to be representative of Muslim believers on a national level. These leaders need to make a choice between two extreme ends, or what Roy calls identity models. Roy sees a “permanent vacillation” between “an ethnocultural community and a purely religious one (akin to a ‘Muslim church’)” (Roy, 2003: 201). For him, community building on the national level is executed “through the establishment of some kind of “Muslim church” or a national council of Muslim associations in order to promote the interests of Muslim citizens of a given nation” (Roy, 2003: 201). He argues that the bottom-up “strategy of building a nationwide Muslim church is implemented by specific actors: community leaders whose social identity (and advancement) is linked with this constructivist approach” (Roy, 2003: 208). In other words, those community and Muslim religious organization leaders, who opt for and embark upon the churchification of Islam (and seek to build “Muslim churches”) from below, do this partially in the interest of their followers, but also because of personal and institutional power (prospective empowerment) considerations.

The churchification of Islam from below proceeds on at least two levels—legal-administrative and rhetorical. On the legal-administrative level, leadership of Muslim spiritual-administrative organizations seeks to create internal structures that turn these organizations into comprehensive, as a rule, bureaucratized multi-task institutions, supervising all aspects of religious life of their members—from rituals and spiritual care (chaplaincy in State institutions) to education (religious but also lay, starting with kindergartens through secondary education all the way up to imam-training seminaries) to social services (marriage, funeral, provision of halal food), all performed by hired and trained

staff, often assisted by volunteers. On the rhetorical level, the bottom-up churchification of Islam in Europe proceeds through rhetoric saturated with “Euro-Islam” and “European” Islam jargon tactically taken over from European politicians, who have been continuously speaking of the need to “Europeanize” Islam, and based on advanced casuistic of *fiqh al-aqalliyat* (jurisprudence for minorities) introduced by *ulama* based outside of Europe, but vehemently promoted by some local pundits.

Vinding sums up the range of notions the concept of the churchification of Islam in Europe may carry, depending on the active agent, ranging from outside observers, through the State, to Muslim community leaders. According to Vinding, “Firstly, churchification is understood as pedagogical, analogical or rhetorical usages comparing mosques to churches, or imams to priests, and so on. Secondly, churchification as normativisation is identified, which maintains that mosques should or ought to function like the churches, imams should act like priests, and that for a number of politically or ideologically motivated reasons. Thirdly, churchification can be identified in terms of structural and implicit hegemony emanating from the established paradigms of church and state relations, or from the churches themselves. Here, the sheer positional power and presence of the churches in Europe makes it almost impossible to avoid an influence on Islam and Muslim organisations. Fourthly and finally, churchification can be seen as a deliberate neo-institutionalist isomorphic strategy—or counter-strategy—where Muslim organisations and institutions deliberately model themselves on the church either because they are structurally coerced to do so, because it raises standards or because doing so is smart and cost-efficient” (Vinding, 2018: 51). Though the first three notions are very valid and appreciated in the present study, it is the fourth one, that of strategy, that is most relevant and thus paramount in the research of the churchification of Islam in Eastern Europe, not only top-down but also bottom-up.

As regards the institutionalization of Islam in Europe, one needs to acknowledge differences between Muslim umbrella religious organizations found across Western Europe, commonly called “councils,” on the one hand, and Muslim spiritual administrations in Eastern Europe, known as “muftiates” (Račius and Zhelyazkova, 2017), on the other hand. Laurence maintains that “[t]he most striking illustration of a Europe-wide move toward the ‘domestication’ of Islam—and the summit of the process of institutional recognition—came with the development of national consultations with prayer spaces and civil society organizations. Between 1990 and 2010, national interior ministries established local and national ‘Islam Councils’” (Laurence, 2012: 11–12). Though this may be true in the case of Western Europe, in much of Eastern Europe, counterparts to Islamic councils in the form of national Islamic spiritual

administrations (aka “muftiates”) were established as early as the 1920s and even earlier (in Russia, starting with the late eighteenth century, and in Bosnia in the end of the nineteenth century) (Račius and Zhelyazkova, 2017).

Perhaps the most seminal difference between the Islamic councils and the “muftiates” is that the “councils” are, at least in theory, pluralist—both their rank and file come from different cultural and confessional backgrounds. And although none of the councils has been perfectly inclusivist, most of them have managed to unite a bunch of organizations that represent diverse and sometimes even antagonistic forms of Islamic religiosity. Contrary, as a rule, “muftiates” tend to be unitary—there are few if any differences in either the cultural or confessional background of their rank and file. From this major difference follow others, related to both inner structures and infrastructure, but also ideology or at least worldview. Ultimately, if a given Islamic council’s legitimacy very much depends on how inclusive (and representative) it is, and how successful it is in accommodating its constituent member organizations, a muftiate’s legitimacy depends almost solely on how many mosques (with their imams) it controls. In the end, while Islamic councils in Western Europe tend or at least try to be democratically (horizontally) governed, the muftiates are often less democratic (that is, governed more vertically).

Many if not most Western European states are content with the establishment of umbrella organizations, especially if they are representative enough of the spectrum of the forms of Islamic religiosity found in the country. Islamic councils in Western Europe serve as interlocutors between the State and the believers, represented by religious organizations that are member of the councils, and in themselves function as corporate lobbying bodies. That said, not all observers are convinced of the utility of such councils. Karasik and Benard, the authors of a RAND report on the issue, note that “[t]he phrase ‘Muslim church’ is reminiscent of the French government’s approach, which has been to attempt to create a French Muslim central religious authority for official dealings. This strategy carries two important risks. One, it can artificially give more weight, importance, and voice to a strain within the diaspora that in fact represents only a small part of that community, inadvertently turning it into an official representative of a group that it does not represent at all. (...) Upgrading such organizations into the official institutions of the minority is negative because it undermines the prospects of integration, which is the preferred and most stabilizing of possible outcomes. A central authority is particularly bad, however, if state efforts to create a national Muslim church go awry, and instead of the moderate church the state has in mind, it gets fundamentalist leadership. This second risk is not unlikely, precisely because of the constitution of the diaspora community: Most are only mildly religious and do not

participate in organized Islamic affairs. This leaves the strongly religious, who in turn are either traditionalists or fundamentalists. In France, precisely this unwanted outcome appears to be taking shape, with fundamentalists gaining control of the government-induced official Islamic church” (Karasik and Benard, 2004: 444 – 445). Karasik and Benard’s reasoning implies that such top-down churchification may later call for a radically different approach—namely, securitization.

Roy is also dismissive of the State-pushed building of “a national body to represent all Muslims,” but for different reasons. He argues that (in the Western European context) “[i]t has never worked and probably never will work, for two main reasons. First, Islam is closer to Protestantism than to Catholicism: there is no clergy and no church. Second, it is precisely the manner in which Islam has been entrenched from the grassroots level that prevents the building of an organisation for all Muslims” (Roy, 2003: 208). In fact, although most of the issues advocated by the Islamic councils are in nature religious, the councils themselves, strictly speaking, are not religious organizations with a hierarchical religious structure. Individual member religious organizations may have some sort of hierarchical religious structure all the way to approximating those of Protestant Churches. In this, the councils may be reminiscent of councils of Protestant Churches found in many countries around the globe.

However, while individual Muslim religious organizations constituting an Islamic council may have the features of a church, described in Chapter 1 and above in this chapter, (and there may indeed be more than one Muslim church in a given council), councils themselves, as we know them throughout Western Europe, to this day hardly resemble churches in any sense. Thus, Karasik and Benard sound too alarmist and their assessment, though theoretically valid, is premature and even baseless. And not so much because it is not the fundamentalists who are “gaining control of the government-induced official Islamic church” anywhere in Western Europe, but precisely because there still is no such a thing as a “government-induced official Islamic church,” with the understanding of church as elucidated both in Chapter 1 and the present chapter, in any Western European countries. It is a very different story with the muftiates in Eastern Europe, particularly in the countries with autochthonous Muslim populations, where in some countries something akin to a “government-induced official Islamic church” is indeed present. The situation with muftiates is dealt with in detail in Chapters 4 and 6.

Admittedly, not all Muslim religious collectivities in Europe would submit themselves to the enticements of this integration-domestication-Europeanization-churchification of Islam. As Vinding notes, “there are Muslim organisations and communities who move in the opposite direction exactly because

they want to distance and distinguish themselves from European churches, priesthood, theology, and institutional expectations” (Vinding, 2018: 51). Generally, it is revivalist groupings who desist and oppose both the State policies leading to or supporting the churchification of Islam, and the bottom-up churchification strategies by their co-religionists. Those openly and actively denouncing European states, with their value systems and internal as well as external policies, soon find themselves at the receiving end of an opposite (or at least parallel) phenomenon to churchification, namely, that of the securitization of Islam.

### 3.2 The Securitization of Islam in Europe

At the bottom of the concept of securitization lie threat construction and assessment followed by measures to deal with those threats. Buzan and Weaver, founding fathers of what became known as the Copenhagen School, define securitization as a “discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 491). It is argued that, in the process of securitization, “[s]ecuritized’ issues are lifted above ordinary politics and moved from normal to emergency politics. They are assigned an urgency that requires extraordinary strategies to eliminate the threat” (Fox and Akbaba, 2015: 176). Cesari likewise argues that securitization operates “outside the domain of ‘normal politics,’ because it aims to respond to an existential threat” (Cesari, 2013: 83). On the other hand, it may be argued that securitization, if sustained for prolonged periods of time, may become part of “new normal politics,” where the initially “urgent and exceptional measures” become routine ones. This does not remove the state of securitization but, through legal institutionalization, merely routinizes it. South Africa under Apartheid may be presented as an example of routinized securitization of the Black African population of the country.

Schlentz, drawing from the framework of the Copenhagen School, points out that “securitization—in any sector and in relation to any given referent object—is based on the premise that security issues are constructed through securitizing moves whereby an actor represents—through a speech act—an object as constituting an existential threat to the survival of a given referent object” (Schlentz, 2010: 6; see also Karyotis and Patrikio, 2010: 44). In this regard, it is irrelevant if the securitized phenomenon exists at all or, if it indeed exists, whether it has features attributed to it by the securitizing agent.

What matters is the securitization initiative, which is then “sold” to the wider audience to be endorsed. Securitization may be considered completed or successful when the securitizing move is endorsed by the society or at least critical mass within it. So, there may be many more securitizing moves than fulfilled securitizations, as “[s]ecuritization does not take place by the securitizing move of the securitizing actor alone. The securitizing move, conducted by a securitizing actor, is always addressed to an audience (or to several audiences). The success of a securitizing move depends on the support it receives among the audience” (Lenz-Raymann, 2014: 249).

Though the primary securitizing actor is the State (in the person of the political elite, both in power and in opposition), there may be a plethora of other securitizing actors acting either in tandem with the State or independently, ranging from media, through NGOs and religious communities and organizations, to individual public intellectuals and artists, while media, in its capacity as “populariz[ing] the security discourse,” may serve as a functional actor (Karyotis and Patrikio, 2010: 44). Securitization is executed through acts of securitization, which encompass the rhetorical, policy and practices levels. While the State may engage in securitization on all three levels, non-State actors, who may go along or contrary to the State promoted policies, are limited to the rhetorical and practices levels. If the State securitizes a particular (conceived) phenomenon on any level, non-State actors are likely to follow suit; however, if it does not proceed with the securitization, non-State actors may still engage in it. In other words, securitization can go both ways—top-down and bottom-up.

Securitization is as a rule preceded or supported by the othering of a target group. According to Cilingir, othering (called by him otherization) “means ‘us’ and ‘them’ are constructed as homogenous groups with assigned characteristics turned into hierarchized binary oppositions. The other is bound to exist outside the community, either as an inferior alien or as a foe. The repercussion would be exclusion or calls for assimilation, since the other cannot be incorporated into the collectivity as it is” (Cilingir, 2016: 3 – 4). Othering may take on different forms and be called, depending on the nature of the target group, xenophobia, homophobia, or chauvinism. Though in itself othering may not imply securitization, infused with a threat dimension, supposedly stemming from the othered group, it may lead to securitization (Cilingir, 2016: 1). In other words, while there may be othering without securitization, securitization by default always encompasses othering.

Securitization may cover different aspects of human groups, their life and interaction, for instance, contagious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, transnational crime, human trafficking, immigration and asylum, or minority rights (Fox and

Akbaba, 2015: 177). For the purposes of the present research, the securitization of religion and its followers (namely, of Islam and Muslims) and of related matter, that of immigration and asylum, are most relevant. Together, the securitization of immigration and asylum, and of Islam in Europe are part of the securitization of minority (in this case, Muslim) rights.

Bartoszewicz argues that “[t]he original societal security concept [of the Copenhagen School] did not dwell on the issue of religion. Authors acknowledged religion only when combined with nationalism. (...) To the contrary, since the prominence of religion in Europe has increased significantly in recent years (in regard to migration, Muslim minorities in Europe, Turkey’s prospective membership in the EU) it should be acknowledged as a salient factor and the analytical framework should be modified to accommodate it” (Bartoszewicz, 2016: 17 – 18). She further reasons that “it is important to note that when religious and national identities reinforce each other they can create very strong identities (e.g. Muslim immigrants vs. indigenous Christian Europeans), and very strong patterns of fear, hostility and societal insecurity” (Bartoszewicz, 2016: 17 – 18). In the course of the securitization of Islam in Eastern Europe, as is shown in Chapter 5, religious and national identities indeed very often reinforce each other not only to create very strong identities but also pave the way for such formidable phenomenon as religious nationalism, which plays a decisive role in othering and ultimately securitization.

On the whole, in the case of Islam in Europe, “[r]elated not only to cultural irreconcilability with the Western/European/national self, the Muslim other is constituted as a potential enemy of these states and their identities. Hence, otherization of Muslims in West European countries has taken the form of securitization with repercussions for their Muslim minorities, irrespective of their citizenship status” (Cilingir, 2016: 1). According to Cesari, the securitization of Islam “refers to processes by which Islam is seen as an existential threat to European and American political and security interests and thereby justifies extraordinary measures against it” (Cesari, 2013: xvii – xviii). The threats may be either external or internal, stemming from organizations, movements, groups and individuals from outside or inside of Europe. But what is important, as Cesari contends, “[a]s domestic and national concerns converge, these factors result in cultural talk that tends to overemphasize the role of religion in the process of integration. Unfortunately, the characterization of Islam in the current debate has encouraged a process of institutionalizing the notion of Islam as a security threat. In both political rhetoric and policy areas, politicians and academics are conflating factors such as immigrant background, ethnicity, socio-economic deprivation, and the war on terror with Islam as a religion. (...) the confusion has exacerbated the securitization process” (Cesari, 2010b: 10).

The securitization of Islam, and, as is shown in subsequent chapters, particularly in Eastern Europe, has led to a distinction between foreign alien ‘their’ Islam and domestic acceptable ‘our’ Islam. Cesari points out that “a distinction between radical, ‘bad’ Islam and law-abiding, ‘good’ Islam has become a common political framing. The fact that Muslims must be named as good or law-abiding means that there is an underlying assumption that Islam is a potential menace to society” (Cesari, 2010b: 14). Though the carriers of either “form” of Islam can be both immigrant/expatriate and autochthonous Muslims, it is as a rule assumed that the first group are more prone to the first type, while the second is naturally inclined more toward the latter. In any case, however, as Cesari laments, there is “the continuous ‘otherization’ and externalization of Muslims in the West” (Cesari, 2013: 83), which is the precursor to the securitization of this category of people and their faith.

But within the confines of the securitization of Islam in Europe, one needs to determine what exactly about Islam is being securitized. There are two broad possibilities—either Islam *in toto* or its certain features or forms (like radical, extremist Islam, Islamism, fundamentalism, jihadism etc.). Fox and Akbaba maintain that the securitization of Islam “is a process that includes discourses constructed around a perceived Islamist threat and the promotion of actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure that requires commitment of greater resources in order to eliminate it” (Fox and Akbaba 2015: 177). This implies that what is being securitized is a part of Islam and its adherents, a fringe group, while all other forms of Islam and their followers escape securitization. Cesari altogether argues that “securitization is present not because Islam is already seen as the enemy, but because specific and extraordinary international conditions have built or rebuilt Islam as the external enemy” (Cesari, 2013: xviii). However, the reality on the ground shows that the securitization of Islam, intentionally or not, extends to practically all sectors of Muslim populations in Europe, for if the States play the “good Muslim,” “bad Muslim” game, other securitizing actors (opposition and far-right politicians, media, NGO and civil society sector, public intellectuals) are very often inclined to see Muslims as only “bad.”

The securitization of Islam in Europe arguably precedes 9/11, when in the 1990s the first terrorist attacks were being planned and took place on European soil, apparently in connection with armed conflicts in the MENA region, but sometimes also with internal armed conflicts, as in the case of Russia. It was also the time, when Muslim dress started receiving attention from Western European politicians and the first attempts to regulate (proscribe) it were made. As Schlentz argues, even before 9/11, “[e]xogenous political, economic and societal developments as well as endogenous issues of trust played a part in the

shaping of a new security agenda, which further bound the migration – asylum – security nexus” (Schlentz, 2010: 4).

9/11 was symbolic in that it accelerated the course of the securitization of Islam in Europe and made “Islamic radicalism and extremism” a major preoccupation of European governments, which in no time spilled over (through media discourses) into European societies. As Fox and Akbaba argue, “despite pre-existing concerns about Muslims, the events of 9/11 escalated and perhaps catalyzed this securitization trend” (Fox and Akbaba, 2015: 178). Cesari is convinced that “[t]he post-9/11 situation has blurred the distinction between national and international politics when it comes to Islam. The convergence of European and American political discourse is noteworthy for the automatic correlation between the war on terrorism, internal security measures and immigration policy—always, it seems, with a focus on individuals of a Muslim background. Such a correlation increasingly invalidates the distinction between international and domestic policy and has consequences not only for the status of Muslim minorities, but also for more general issues of secularism and multiculturalism in the democratic nations concerned” (Cesari, 2010a: 4). However, while in the first two phases, securitization of Islam was mainly latent or an unintended consequence of anti-terrorist measures, in the third, it has become very direct and aggressive, mainly in relation to the rise of ISIS in 2014 – 2016, with its “foreign fighters” phenomenon and the so-called “migration crisis” of 2015.

One may want to make a distinction between the securitization of Islam and the securitization of Muslims. Academic literature has used both, often interchangeably, as synonyms. For the purposes of this book, as there arguably is a course of churchification of Islam (as religion), there is an alternative

TABLE 1 Phases of securitization of Islam in Europe

1990s	2001–2014	2014–present
Some of the Western European countries, first of all France, but also the UK, Germany, as well as Russia	Practically all European countries, initially as a response to 9/11 and later to attacks of 2004 and 2005 in Western Europe	Throughout Europe, in particular in reaction to attacks in Western Europe but also in relation to the so-called ‘migration crisis’ and the rise of the ISIS

(parallel but sometimes counter-) course of securitization of Islam (as a violence-prone religion or even simply as an extremist political ideology). Admittedly, there may be securitization of Muslims as a category of people (aka followers of Islam), who, because of their belonging to the Islamic faith, are taken to fail to integrate and who are seen as inclined to acts or lifestyles that are not only incompatible with Western (European) values and lifestyle, but are criminally contrary to them and therefore dangerous. Petty criminality, other forms of delinquency, dealing in drugs, human trafficking, domestic violence, low levels of education, unreliability at work, and other features that are associated with Muslims (as a rule also identified as of immigrant background), all point at their non-integration and call for the securitization of the group of people identified as Muslims. As none of these features is traceable to the religion of Islam, the securitization of Muslims in such cases involves non-religious aspects of their behavior. Thus, a distinction here is clear—while the securitization of Islam is strictly about religion (or ideology), the securitization of Muslims (particularly of immigrant background) may be a reaction to their (perceived) socio-cultural behavior. The attention in this book is concentrated on the securitization of Islam (as a religion/ideology), with the prospective religious radicalization of Muslims as the main securitizing factor, with the securitization of Muslims pertaining to the context of their socio-cultural integration accorded secondary importance.

There is, however, a clear connection between the securitization of immigration and asylum and the securitization of Islam in Europe—immigrants are perceived foremost as Muslims, so much so that non-Muslim immigration, even from outside of Europe, is hardly securitized. Chinese, Indian, non-Muslim African immigrant communities, if securitized at all, are never viewed by European states and societies through their religious affiliation. The securitization of Islam in Western Europe is mainly a by-product of the securitization of immigration, with the supposed failed integration of immigrants of Muslim cultural background in the foreground. In the end, the securitization of immigration and asylum in Europe, particularly since the so-called “migration crisis,” has become all but in name synonymous with the securitization of Islam.

But in the Eastern European context, where there is practically no immigration from Muslim-majority countries (with a tentative exception of transit movement of a significant mass of people in the brief episode of the so-called “migration crisis” in and around 2015), the securitization of Islam, though also directly connected to the integration debate, often, if not exclusively, relates to autochthonous populations of Muslim background, and rather than concentrating on the perceived failed integration focuses on the danger of de-integration, particularly through radicalization. Thus, the securitization of

Islam in Eastern European countries with autochthonous Muslim populations needs to be de-coupled from the securitization of immigration, though, admittedly, the so-called “migration crisis” has played its role in the securitization of Islam in the region, in particular in states that have served as transit countries. On the other hand, in those several Eastern European countries (chiefly, the Višegrad Four) where there has not been autochthonous Muslim communities, the securitization of Islam has been directly and almost exclusively tied to the debates about and securitization of immigration.

The securitization of Islam in Europe proceeds on several intertwined and mutually reinforcing levels: the legal, the political and the popular. On the *legal* level, as Cesari argues, “[t]he securitization paradigm encompasses the multifaceted process through which the normal rule of law is suspended in favor of exceptional measures justified by extraordinary situations that threaten the survival of the political community” (Cesari, 2013: 83). 9/11 may be perceived as the symbolic event initiating true *legal* securitization of Islam in Europe. In reaction to the attacks on NYC and D.C., European states proceeded with hitherto unseen legal measures, which officially aimed at combating terrorism and radicalism, but inadvertently had consequences for wider Muslim populations. Following 9/11 and particularly the bombings in 2004 in Spain and 2005 in the UK, EU member states implemented a range of restrictive acts of legislation aimed at the prevention of Islamic radicalization, including profiling, enhanced surveillance (also in mosques), restrictions on dress (anti-veil laws), tightening of visa and asylum rules, arrest, prosecution and deportation of suspected and convicted extremists and radical imams etc.

The securitization of Islam in Europe on the legal level targets both groups and individuals. On the group level, it pertains mainly to the institutionalization (or its refusal) of Muslim groupings that are deemed by states to be dangerous or threatening to the State and society security. It is, as a rule, revivalist leaning groups with or without inclinations toward radicalism or even extremism. Parallel to this, it is individual Muslims who are at the receiving end of the securitization of Islam on the legal level. It is often imams and other spiritual and community leaders, but they may also be individuals who are found to nurture radical/extremist views and may be plotting acts of violence against European states and societies. Anti-terrorist legislation has an ingrained, though not necessarily intended or even comprehended by the legislator, feature of securitization of Islam; practically all terrorist organizations and their activities against which the new legislation was enforced have been of Muslim background.

Intentional or deliberate securitization of Islam in Europe, and in particular post 9/11, has been on the increase on the *political* level, first of all in connection

with the emergence and rise of far-right and populist parties, who declare their main (and often sole) mission to be the fight against Muslim immigration which allegedly leads to the Islamization of Europe. On the political level, the securitization of Islam entails what has been termed Islamophobia (though an alternative and arguably more correct term would be Muslimophobia). And while far-right and populist parties are by default Muslimophobic (cultivation of Muslimophobia is their *raison d'être*), there is an observed tendency that mainstream parties are also tilting toward the Muslimophobic side through their rhetoric and actions abetting the securitization of Islam.

On the *popular* level, the securitizing actors are numerous, with the media playing a major role, both as an actor creatively engaged in the securitization of Islam and as a channel (functional actor) through which all other actors (NGOs, civil society groups, individuals) partake in this securitization. It is argued that “media representation of Muslims has been primarily influenced by counterterrorism policy, so that these ideological constructions of Muslims provide a popular ‘permission to hate.’ However, what is distinctive about the securitisation perspective is the way it highlights how international security issues become constructed as requiring domestic policy responses in ways that permeate everyday life” (Hussain and Bagguley, 2012: 718). As perceptions of the view of the “Other” among the population at large is almost entirely drawn from the media, its role in the othering of Muslims on the popular level is second to none. Generally, on the popular level, the securitization of Islam both proceeds from and reinforces Muslimophobia.

One of the more peculiar securitizing actors on the popular level are religious organizations (in the person of their leaders), because, arguably, “religious actors can themselves be powerful discourse entrepreneurs and therefore influential in securitization processes” (Karyotis and Patrikio, 2010: 44). As Karyotis and Patrikio argue, “[t]he social construction of security is typically associated with political elites presenting an issue as an existential threat, although in issues such as migration, other societal actors may also be involved in the process by supporting or opposing political discourse. Among those, religious elites are likely to be very influential, particularly in countries where national and religious identities are closely interwoven” (Karyotis and Patrikio, 2010: 43). Furthermore, they are of the opinion that “in cultural contexts where religion holds a prominent place in the public sphere, the influence of religious elites on public attitudes may even outweigh that of political elites. This is because while political actors usually construct rational—or at least apparently rational—arguments in an appeal to logic, religious actors require a ‘leap of faith’ on behalf of the individual, since faith discourses by definition make universalistic claims of primacy and infallibility” (Karyotis

and Patrikio, 2010: 43 – 44). In the case of the securitization of Islam in Europe, it is usually Christian organizations and their leaders. The role of Christian (Catholic and Orthodox) Churches, in the person of their high-ranking clergy, in the othering and securitization of Islam in Eastern Europe is examined in Chapter 5.

However, the securitization of Islam, or rather of its certain forms, in Eastern Europe on the popular level sometimes involves unexpected securitizing actors—Muslims themselves. As is shown in Chapter 6, national Islamic spiritual administrations (muftiates), aka “Muslim churches,” sometimes partake in securitizing rival and/or independent Muslim religious collectivities, particularly those of a revivalist leaning, by publicly portraying them as “radical.” Sometimes, it is not the muftiates’ initiative to securitize revivalist Islam, but they are pressurized by other securitizing actors to do so. By succumbing to such pressures, the muftiates not only strengthen the securitizing discourse but, through distancing themselves from the securitized groups, also secure some breathing space for themselves as they exonerate themselves in the eyes of the State and the public.

On both the political and popular levels, the securitization of Islam in Europe is permeated by what has been labeled “cultural talk,” which arguably “essentializes Islam as a unified ideology spreading from Europe all the way to Iraq and Afghanistan. In this perspective, Muslims are determined by history and fit a mold from which they cannot escape, defined by their so-called conformity to the past and incapacity to address the current challenges of political development and liberal religious thinking. Such an approach justifies the imaginary creation of an insurmountable boundary between modern and premodern times, between secularism and Islam, and, therefore, supports exceptional political measures to fight against ensuing anti-modern and anti-Western forces. The cultural talk operates under the assumption that Islam is a radical ideology and, therefore, cannot be treated like all other religions” (Cesari, 2013: 83). This last observation, i.e., that within the framework of “cultural talk” Islam is downgraded from the status of a (world) religion of 1.7 billion people all around the globe to a mere (political) “radical ideology,” is of crucial significance as such a view stands at the opposite end of how Islam is perceived and portrayed in the course of its churchification, namely, as exactly “like all other religions.” In the same vein, if within the framework of the churchification of Islam mosques are perceived as the equivalent of Christian churches, in the securitization context they are “considered not to be places of worship but a potential source of political radicalization and extremism” (Edmunds, 2012: 74).

One may distinguish between hard and soft securitization permeated or not by Muslimophobia. It might be argued that soft securitization, particularly on

the popular level, where it mainly is confined to rhetoric, is more Muslimophobic than hard securitization pursued by legislation and State policies that may not be circumscribed by Muslimophobic views and have no Muslimophobic intentions. Edmunds also talks about hard and soft securitization; however, she places the distinction exclusively within the legal level of securitization: “It is useful to distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ regimes of regulation and surveillance. In the sphere of national security, severe securitization measures affected only small numbers of Muslims—for example in European based rendition conduits as well as Guantanamo Bay. Such practices involve ‘hard’ cases of securitization, involving the breach of absolute human rights, such as the right not to be tortured. In contrast, ‘soft’ cases of securitization involve the ‘hyper-legalization’ of perceived cultural threats—for example, in measures designed to outlaw the wearing of Islamic clothing in secular contexts or the building of minarets” (Edmunds, 2012: 73). Edmunds’s described “hard” securitization indeed goes to extremes but the spectrum of “soft” securitization measures, both in legislation but also more widely, covers a plethora of them ranging from those that target certain groups, to those that are aimed at Muslims *in toto*, the latter, as a rule, being of Muslimophobic nature.

Fox and Akbaba propose to look at securitization beyond the realm of security. They insinuate that “once a minority is securitized, policies that restrict that minority can be justified even if there is little connection between the policy and enhanced security. In fact, these policies can even undermine security by agitating the targeted minority, which may inspire acts that undermine security—that is, simply appealing to popular anti-Muslim sentiment is not enough to create policies that undermine basic human rights such as religious freedom in a democratic country. These policies require a legitimating rationale that goes beyond popular sentiment. We suggest that SOI [securitization of Islam] is one form of support for this legitimacy” (Fox and Akbaba, 2015: 181). This implies that securitization instigates a reality, which then calls for securitization, in this way justifying it in the first place. Though, arguably, one of the most cynical, such a course of action is not a mere hypothetical option, it appears to be taking place in some Eastern European countries. This is dealt in detail in the following chapters.

Fox and Akbaba further argue that the securitization of Islam “in the post-9/11 era has led to increased restrictions on the religious freedoms of Muslims in the West, even though these restrictions, are not likely to increase security. Thus, securitization theory can explain how reactions to terrorism can lead to policies that aggravate the subjective conditions that many argue motivate the terrorism in the first place” (Fox and Akbaba, 2015: 191). Their argument suggests that the securitization of Islam in (Western) Europe not only is unlikely

to have increased security but has actually facilitated further erosion of it, or, as in the words of Cesari, “the measures intended to prevent radicalization actually engender discontent and prompt a transformation of religious conservatism to fundamentalism” (Cesari, 2010b: 9).

As has been noted above that churchification of Islam in the case of failure may lead to securitization, likewise, the securitization of Islam on a legal level may be seen not so much as an attempt at the eradication of Islam, as paving the way for and the facilitation of its churchification; the securitization of Islam on a legal level makes (even if implicitly) a distinction between ‘good’ and “bad” Muslims, albeit that distinction is made by the State and on its terms. Thus, as is shown in subsequent chapters, analyzing the progression of the churchification and securitization of Islam in Eastern Europe, the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and may proceed parallel and not at each other’s expense instead rather facilitating (and reinforcing) each other. Humphrey also sees that domestication (if seen as a synonym for the churchification) and securitization of Islam may serve the same purposes: “[d]iaspora Muslim communities and Islam have been made objects of ‘securitisation’ and ‘domestication’ through policies directed at their policing and urgent social and cultural integration. Securitisation and domestication are governance strategies based on the logic of spatial exclusion and inclusion focused on disciplining bodies” (Humphrey, 2009: 137). Indeed, both top down churchification (domestication) and securitization of Islam in Europe are about selective inclusion and exclusion of Muslims into the European “us.”

### 3.3 Religious Nationalism

Governance of religion, and particularly its securitization, in many post-communist Eastern European countries, differently from Western Europe, is arguably permeated by religious nationalism, as a form or strain of “ethnic nationalism,” common to a number of Eastern European societies, including even those that are the least religious such as Czechia, Hungary, and Lithuania (Pew, 2017b: 48, 70 – 71; Pew, 2013). Nationalism in general is, arguably, a prominent feature of both inter- and intra-state politics of post-communist Eastern European states (Bollerup, 1997). Nationalism of Eastern Europeans has been identified with titular ethnicities and thus routinely designated as “ethnic nationalism” as opposed to the more common variant of nationalism in Western Europe—“civic nationalism.” Little succinctly established the difference between the two: “‘Ethnic nationalism’ signifies a claim on the part of the ethnic group in question to preeminent, or perhaps exclusive, political control.

By contrast, ‘civic nationalism’ signifies a willingness on the part of the ethnic group in question to share power with other groups according to ethnically impartial, inclusive legal and political standards (typically associated with the ideas of ‘rule of law,’ ‘human rights,’ etc.)” (Little, 2002: 42). While “civic nationalism” is inclusive and in no need of any “significant other” (at least within state borders), “ethnic nationalism’s” very *raison d’être* is and it sustains itself through the perpetuation and constant (re)invention of “significant others.”

Triandafyllidou argues that “the identity of a nation is defined and/or re-defined through the influence of ‘significant others,’ (...) that are perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness, authenticity and/or independence” (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 594) and that “[t]he history of each nation is marked by the presence of significant others that have influenced the development of its identity by means of their ‘threatening’ presence” (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 600). The “significant other” Triandafyllidou talks about may be either another nation or ethnic group “that is territorially close to, or indeed within, the national community and threatens, or rather is perceived to threaten, its ethnic and/or cultural purity and/or its independence” (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 600). As nation and state should not be conflated, to the list of Triandafyllidou’s identified “significant others” one may add the foreign state. So, for instance, while the Russian nation in itself may not be perceived in the eyes of Lithuanians or Poles as a “significant other,” Russia, and certainly the more aggressive Russia under President Putin, is seen by both Lithuanians and Poles as a very threatening “significant other.” What is most important is that, as Triandafyllidou argues, “[t]he feature that makes some other group a ‘significant other’ is the fact that it is perceived to pose a threat to the existence of the nation. This threat may concern the nation’s independence and self-determination, that is, the ‘significant other’ may be a nation [or rather a state—*my insertion*] that is in conflict with the ingroup because of a territorial or ethnic dispute” (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 600). Conflict here is not to be understood narrowly, in terms of armed conflict (war), but, more broadly, as tensions sustained on a rhetorical level for prolonged periods of time.

The “significant other” by definition belongs to the outgroup. But the outgroup may be external (“those that form a separate political unit”) or internal (“those that belong to the same political entity with the ingroup”) (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 600). Ethnic and religious minorities as well as immigrants are among the potential internal “significant others.” According to Triandafyllidou, “[e]thnic minorities that have participated in the constitution of the state within which the ingroup forms the national majority may become significant others for the latter. Such minorities usually have distinct culture, language, traditions and myths of origin from the dominant nation and may therefore be

perceived by the dominant nation to pose a threat either to the territorial integrity of its quasi nation-state, if they raise secessionist claims, or to its cultural unity and authenticity, when they assert their right to difference and thus disrupt the cultural and political order of the quasi nation-state" (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 601). Immigrants become a collective internal "significant other" when purportedly "their different language, religion or mores are perceived to threaten the cultural and/or ethnic purity of the nation. The nation is likely then to engage in a process of reaffirmation of its identity and seek to re-define it so as to differentiate the ingroup from the newcomers" (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 601). This reaffirmation of identity more often than not involves the process of the securitization of the designated "significant other."

Ethnic (and racial, particularly in the case of immigrants) distinctiveness is often sharpened by religious differences, and ethno-confessional minorities—both indigenous and from an immigrant background—become particularly susceptible to othering (and possible subsequent securitization). However, as Triandafyllidou notes, these groups "only become significant others when their threatening presence becomes salient. This happens during periods of instability and crisis, when the territorial and symbolic boundaries of the ingroup are unstable and/or unclear. (...) Significant others (...) become salient in periods of social, political or economic crisis during which the identity of the nation is put in question. The significant other in these cases serves in overcoming the crisis because it unites the people in front of a common enemy, it reminds them 'who we are' and emphasizes that 'we are different and unique.' In times of crisis, the significant other serves also as a scapegoat" (Triandafyllidou, 1998: 603). To sum up, nationalism of the ethnic type is by default permeated by othering—constantly looking out for "significant others," who, in the course of othering, are either subsequently securitized or sought to be domesticated (and integrated, in other words, normalized and drawn into the ingroup). When it involves religious groups other than the ingroup, ethnic nationalism acquires features of religious, or, as Bardos labels it, ethnoconfessional (Bardos, 2013), nationalism.

The relation between religion and nationalism may vary depending on concrete cases. Brubaker identifies four ways of studying the relationship between religion and nationalism. According to him, "[t]he first is to treat religion and nationalism, along with ethnicity and race, as analogous phenomena. The second is to specify ways in which religion helps explain things about nationalism—its origin, its power or its distinctive character in particular cases. The third is to treat religion as part of nationalism, and to specify modes of interpenetration and intertwining. The fourth is to posit a distinctively religious form of nationalism" (Brubaker, 2012: 2). For the purposes of the present

book, it is the third and the fourth “ways,” which are relevant. There is, however, a very fine line between the latter two “ways” as it is difficult to measure when religion from having been a part of nationalism takes over it (in the sense that religion becomes the sole guiding principle driving nationalism) to make it into a truly religious nationalism as a distinct form of nationalism. Thus, these two analytically distinct “ways” identified by Brubaker, for practical purposes, in this book are seen as one—nationalism becomes religious when religion becomes part of it. There may be more or less religion in any given nationalism, but as long as the presence of religion becomes obvious and visible, that case of nationalism is to be treated as religious nationalism.

In any case, the place and role of religion in nationalism may be very different. For instance, if one distinguishes between “liberation nationalism” as a mobilizing ideology to attain national sovereignty (or at least autonomy) and “defense nationalism” as an (often securitizing) agenda that is adopted to fend-off real and perceived external and/or internal threats to the survival of the nation (and the State). In “liberation nationalism” religion may play a major, even decisive, positive role, since next to language and ethnicity, it lends yet another bond of solidarity among the members of the group bound by a national cause. In cases where ethnicity and confession tightly overlap, in movements of “liberation nationalism,” religion may even take a driver’s seat. In “defense nationalism,” religion may also play a significant role; however, here, rather than working in tandem with non-religious nationalist ideas, religion is itself instrumentalized by the political elite and made to serve essentially non-religious aims of a given nationalism. Thus, religious nationalisms of “liberation” and “defense” are indeed very different as regards the balance of power between the two components—religion and nationalism—and their functioning.

Rieffer refers to the religious nationalism of the “defense” type as “instrumental pious nationalism” to distinguish it from the religious nationalism of the “liberation” type. Very much along the lines of distinction made above, she argues that in cases of “instrumental pious nationalism,” “the nationalist movement is the primary movement, but religion comes into play as a supporting element that can unite a population. Often with instrumental pious nationalism, religion is a useful resource to national leaders. Since religion is a powerful source of identity and one that can unify a group and create loyalty to the national movement, national leaders try to draw on religion to create a cohesive public body” (Rieffer, 2003: 229). Furthermore, instrumental pious nationalism may develop “when religion is used by national leaders in developed states to bolster their legitimacy in times of crisis. Often political leaders attempt to use religious and national sentiments and attachments to rally the population and

shore up support when the political, economic, military or social institutions are failing to provide for the needs of the people” (Rieffer, 2003: 229). Ultimately, “defense” religious nationalism may occur both in the emerging states and nations and established (developed) states, with both types found in post-communist Eastern Europe.

Riedel argues that, in post-communist Eastern Europe, “nationalist ideology is oriented towards a religious revitalisation of their societies connecting nationality with religious consciousness” (Riedel, 2008: 264 – 265). She provides several examples of this: “In the opinion of the nationalist ‘League of Polish Families’ (PLG) and the conservative ‘Law and Justice’ the Catholic religion is an essential attribute of the Polish nationhood; for the nationalist Bulgarian political party ‘Ataka’ the Bulgarian nationality depends on belonging to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church” (Riedel, 2008: 264 – 265). Thus, “instrumental pious nationalism” may occur in otherwise very secular states, for as Mihelj, echoing Rieffer, aptly argues, “[r]ather than being rejected by secular nation-states (...), religious beliefs and practices may easily be co-opted and supported by them, in particular if they are seen to play a major social role, for example functioning as an instrument of national defence or survival” (Mihelj, 2007: 269), particularly in crisis (or perceived crisis) situations, like, for instance, the recent so-called “migration crisis” in Europe. Hungary, as is shown in Chapter 5, perfectly fits the description drawn by Rieffer and Miheli, but several other of the seven countries under investigation also show the described features.

As religion in itself is not an actor, it is religious groups and particularly institutionalized ones (foremost, Churches but not only Christian) that may, out of their own calculations, willingly participate in “instrumental pious nationalism,” particularly in newly-formed fledgling polities. As Rieffer notes, “[l]ongstanding religious institutions can assist newly-formed governments to consolidate political stability. Historically dominant religions have access to a large portion of the population. The ability to reach out to citizens and, in some instances, to influence their choices is an asset to newly-formed and developing political systems. Religion in these cases can serve as a source of legitimacy to national leaders who are developing new political institutions” (Rieffer, 2003: 229). Many post-communist Eastern European states, and particularly first-timers, in the Balkans as well as post-Soviet Moldova, fit this picture, where both Catholic and Orthodox Churches, and in the case of Bosnia, a Muslim church, have been actively involved in this form of religious nationalism. Perica, bearing in mind first of all Balkan Orthodox Churches, argues that these “[e]thnic churches are designed as instruments for the survival of ethnic communities (...) They are authoritarian-minded and centralized organizations capable of organizing resistance against an outside threat and maintaining

stability inside the community. The upper section of clerical hierarchies exercise a hegemony in ecclesiastical affairs (at the expense of the lower clergy and lay members). Ethnoclericalism is thus both an ecclesiastical concept and political ideology. It champions a strong homogeneous church in a strong homogenous state, with both institutions working together as guardians of the ethnic community” (Perica, 2002: 215). The Bulgarian and North Macedonian cases, analyzed in Chapter 5, are symptomatic of this ethnoclericalism.

For the North Macedonian case, it is argued that “having in mind that there is an overlap between the ethnic and religious cleavages in the country, which (...) are the cornerstone of the Macedonian political system, МОС (the Macedonian Orthodox Church—*my insertion*) acts not only as a religious, but also as an ethnic organization” (Vangeli, 2010: 84). Since ethnicity and belonging to the nation in both North Macedonia and Bulgaria are perceived to be intimately connected, identification of ethnicity with a particular branch of Eastern Orthodoxy almost by default translates into identification of the (entire) nation with that branch of Orthodoxy, naturally, at the expense of ethno-confessional ‘outsiders.’ In all such cases, however, as Loizides argues, “nationalism drives religion, not the other way around” (Loizides, 2009: 205).

In view of the politics of belonging, which, as argued by Yuval-Davis, “comprises specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging in particular ways to particular collectivities that are, at the same time, themselves being constructed by these projects in very particular ways” (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 197), in Eastern Europe, there is an apparent State-Orthodox Church nexus in countries with the Orthodox majority. Among the seven countries under research in this book, two—Bulgaria and North Macedonia—are of this type. This nexus grows out of shared self-interest on both sides, where both actors, if standing alone, are perceived to be insecure: “it is in the interests of both insecure regimes and insecure religious groups to pursue religious establishment. For the insecure regime, the support of a hegemonic religious organization can give it popular legitimacy. For a religious organization, establishment brings both benefits from the state, and access that allows it to cement its monopoly status and limit religious competition. Especially in the majority Orthodox countries, the actions of both church leaders and politicians display recognition of these interests and the actions needed to guarantee survival in rapidly changing societies” (Sarkissian, 2009: 493). North Macedonia is a prime example of this nexus.

Sarkissian argues that “[i]n exchange for legal concessions in the field of religious liberty, churches have offered nationalist legitimacy and stability to regimes” (Sarkissian, 2009: 473). The nexus between the political elites and Orthodox Churches is observable as much in the constant participation in

political events and celebrations by Church officials, as in attendance of purely religious events by top state and municipal officials, like the starting of construction or opening of churches, the starting of the erection or unveiling of religious monuments and the like (Department, 2015). As Vangeli argues, in North Macedonia, “[t]he Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) has had an exceptionally salient political meaning in the contemporary North Macedonian political discourse, and has acted as if not separated from state institutions, and moreover, received a treatment of being ‘more equal’ than the other religious communities” (Vangeli, 2010: 84). So, for instance, in 2015, jointly the central government and the City of Skopje provided some 1.4 million Euros to upgrade the controversial 217-foot-tall Millennium Cross (Department, 2015).

The nexus between politics and Orthodox Christianity in some countries may also be observed in the official documents of some of the political parties. So, for instance, in North Macedonia, in 2009, the then-ruling IMRO-DPMNU, in its Doctrine, not only listed faith as one of the eight core values but also stated that “spirituality, religion and faith are the eternal food of the Macedonian identity during all the turmoil that the Macedonian people has been going through. (...) Therefore, an exceptional place in the Macedonian state and society is given to the Macedonian Orthodox Church” (Vangeli, 2010: 85). The same party is reported to have “initiated a Declaration for support of the efforts of the MOC to protect its unity and to demand recognition of its autocephaly” (Vangeli, 2010: 85), something “that was later adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia” (Vangeli, 2010: 85). Vangeli argues that “[w]ith this act, the state has officially backed the Church in the dispute with other Orthodox Churches that do not recognize its legitimacy and autocephaly, departing from the premise of separation of the state and the religion” (Vangeli, 2010: 85).

The forming of the state-Orthodox Church nexus purportedly has facilitated what Vukomanovic (Vukomanovic, 2008: 248) and others have called the “de-secularization of state,” maybe even all the way to its clericalization. In North Macedonia, Cacanaska also talks of a de-secularization process (Cacanaska, 2003), and Vangeli argues that “the construction of the Millennium Cross was one of the most visible actions of desecularization, as the government not only put itself into a position of promoter of religion, but it also marked a highly visible public space with a religious symbol” (Vangeli, 2010: 91). Echoing Vukomanovic and others, Roudometof argues that “[r]eligion was re-sacralized through its connection to the nation; in the Orthodox nation-states, Orthodox institutions became emblematic not only of universal Christianity but also of national particularism” (Roudometof, 2014: 1027). This is particularly valid for the North Macedonian case, where the nation-building process is very recent— tentatively starting in the 1940s, when a constituent

republic of the socialist Yugoslavia was carved out. Since the gaining of independence in the early 1990s, this process took off in earnest and the role of the Orthodox Church increased enormously.

Religious nationalism is no different from (secular) ethnic nationalism in its search for “significant others,” as “in the development of the religious national identity, an ‘alien other’ is created or identified. This other is, by the nature of religious nationalism, excluded” (Rieffer, 2003: 234). Rieffer further argues: “while religious nationalism promotes and develops a sense of community and belonging, it often has an exclusionary element that breeds intolerance and hatred. This tends to create internal moralities that give preference to the needs and interests of those inside the religious national community. One consequence of this preferencing is the common indifference or hostility to those outside the religious national community” (Rieffer, 2003: 234). Religious nationalism chooses as its target groups for othering (and turning, if need be, into significant others), first of all, from among adherents of other religions and confessions, but in exceptional cases it may also target believers of the same confession, who, however, are seen as having gone astray, particularly through their institutional affiliation. The case of adherents of the Serbian Orthodox Church in North Macedonia, who are denied the right to practice religion their way, is a good example of this.

Though nationalism, and particularly, religious nationalism, with its ingrained propensity toward othering and the permanent search for significant others, is often directly associated with securitization of “the other,” one should not automatically foreclose the option where nationalism (foremost in its type of “civic nationalism” but also soft versions of religious nationalism) is inclined toward domestication (and ultimate integration or even assimilation) of the religious other. In the case of Islam and Muslims in Europe as a religious “other,” such open and inclusivist nationalism may, indirectly, serve the purposes of the churchification of Islam through calls and support for the programs and policies of its nationalization and domestication-normalization. In other words, nationalism may go either way, i.e., of securitization or domestication. The Lithuanian case, where Muslim Tatars are seen even by some of the most ardent ethnic Lithuanian nationalists as part of the national “Us” (Račius, 2014), is an example of such tentative accommodating nationalism.

Finally, as aptly observed by Barker, “religious nationalism does not refer to any level of religious adherence or participation. In fact, in many cases in the modern world, religious nationalism drives religious practice as opposed to the other way around. (...) The importance is in the way people identify themselves” (Barker, 2009: 14). Opinion polls and other statistical evidence reveal that Eastern Europeans, with few exceptions, are not particularly religious; (Pew, 2017b: 48, 70 – 71; Pew, 2013) yet the level of religious nationalism is

comparatively high and increasing. As Evstatiev aptly notes, “in the Balkans and, more broadly, in Eastern Europe that shared decrease in devotion does not necessarily mean a shared ubiquitous retreat from religion, particularly Christianity, as a cornerstone of collective identities” (Evstatiev, 2019: 95). Ultimately, one may even observe a paradox when the low levels of religiousness of Eastern Europeans in the private sphere translate into high levels of religious nationalism in the public socio-political sphere. It remains to be answered, to what extent the current rise in ethno-confessional nationalism in Eastern Europe is caused or influenced by the securitizing discourse around immigration and the prospective Islamization of Europe.

Though, as convincingly argued by numerous scholars, nationalism is a prominent feature of both inter- and intra-state politics of post-communist Eastern European states, the religious side of it in this part of the continent features unevenly. It may be argued that religious nationalism, at least until recently, has been almost absent in both Hungary and Czechia, which are one of the least religious (or, at least, least Christian) among the post-communist Eastern European societies. Poland is a case of advanced Catholic religious nationalism, while Lithuania, another Catholic-majority state, trails somewhat behind. The Orthodox-majority societies of Bulgaria and North Macedonia as well as Bosnian constituent ethno-confessional groups (namely, majority Muslim Bosniaks, minority Orthodox Serbs, and Catholic Croats) are more prone to religious nationalism. As Elbasania and Tošić argue, “[n]ationalism as an ideology, often infused with ethno-religious overtones, has historically been a powerful dimension of Balkan politics, but it gained strength during the new wave of post-Communist conflicts” (Elbasani and Tošić, 2017: 502). Bardos likewise claims that ethnoconfessional nationalism, which in the Balkans is a chronic widespread and pervasive phenomenon, (Bardos, 2013: 6 – 7) has been “[t]he dominant force in Balkan politics and society for the past 200 years” (Bardos, 2013: 1). In the words of Barker, “[t]he former Yugoslavia is perhaps the most notorious example of modern religious nationalism in Europe. It fits the pattern of religious nationalism perfectly” (Barker, 2009: 144). Chapters 5 and 6 look into the practical politics pertaining to the status and situation of Islam and Muslims in the post-communist Eastern European countries under investigation, which are arguably permeated by nationalist, including religious, ideologies on both, political and social actors’ levels.

### 3.4 The Analytical Framework and Model

Legislation pertaining to the governance of Islam in Eastern Europe may go both ways—toward implicit churchification of Islam or its securitization.

The level of practical politics, that of suggested and implemented policies within the confines of the legislation, or, at times, contrary to it, as well as the overall socio-political climate with its diverse social actors complete the picture of the progression of the churchification and securitization of Islam in Eastern Europe. The realm of practical politics, particularly on the rhetorical level, is very diverse and may contain in itself opposing views on and perceptions of Islam and Muslims, and their place and role in the State and society. The social actors' level, unrestrained by conventional political ethics and political correctness, is even more diverse and contains in itself an even wider range of views, all the way to the most extreme.

In general, one may see the spectrum of these political and social actors ranging from liberal and tolerant, and accepting of and inclusive of Muslims, at the one end, to conservative, traditionalist, intolerant, unaccepting and exclusivist (in other words, nationalist, xenophobic, chauvinist and Muslimophobic), at the other end. Those leaning toward the latter end are also, as a rule, in favor of securitizing Islam and Muslims, while the former may be inclined toward accepting and promoting Islam (at least in Europe) as yet another church—though possibly still in the making. Muslim communities, in themselves far from unified and united, represent a micro cosmos of views on the churchification and securitization of Islam and, as is shown in Chapter 6, themselves engage in both.

The practical politics level encompasses both the mainstream and nationalist-populist political forces, both in government and in opposition (inside or outside of the parliament). The social actors who one or another way partake in the development of the churchification and securitization of Islam in Eastern Europe range from media through to individual public intellectuals to secular NGO sector and religious (non-Muslim) organizations. Political actors, non-Muslim social actors, and Muslim communities (themselves also social actors) interact among themselves forming a triangle of interaction, where non-Muslim and Muslim social actors seek to influence political actors to adopt policies and to pass laws seen as appropriate by particular social actors. There is, however, a two-way flow of influence and persuasion—sometimes it is the politicians who serve as trail-blazers, while at other times, it is individual journalists, public intellectuals, NGO sector or religious figures. Thus, ultimately, both the churchification and securitization of Islam may work either top-down or bottom-up.

In discussions pertaining to the churchification and securitization of Islam in European countries, the interaction of like-minded actors on the national level has created parallel opposing triangles which openly clash (as do among themselves their constituent actors). The struggle among the parallel triangles

evolves around who will come out on top to either keep the constitutional *status quo* on governance of Islam (in respect to its churchification or securitization) in respective countries or change it through new legislation, followed or, at times, preceded by practical politics in interaction with the social actors' level.

The present analysis takes Tatari's proposed (Figure 1, p. 66) "Dynamic-compound framework of the state accommodation of Islamic religious practices" as the springing board for its own framework, or rather model (Figure 2), that better correlates with the two key concepts of this analysis, namely, the churchification of Islam and the securitization of Islam, while including all relevant actors. The central variable in Tatari's framework, "State (political opportunity structures)," in the proposed model is split into two, "the State (legal level)" and "Political actors (practical politics level)," to reflect the tension between the established legal level and the practical politics level, both of which contain and in a way replace Tatari's "ideology" variable. Ideologically, both the State and political actors may be placed along the "civic"- "religious" nationalism spectrum. It is presumed that the dominance of "civic" nationalism on the legal level and among the political actors facilitates the normalization-domestication-churchification of Islam approach. The dominance of "religious" nationalism on the legal level and/or among political actors, however, expedites the othering-securitization of Islam approach. The State and certain political actors, as well as different political actors among themselves, may find themselves at different ends of this spectrum. In such cases, ideologically driven groups of political actors would not only pursue their own political visions of the churchification or securitization of Islam, but also seek, through changes in legislation, to, respectively, preserve or change the very legal level pertaining to the governance of Islam in the country. Though the legal and the political actors' levels interact directly, they also interact indirectly, through the policy outcomes that ensue from the political actors.

In addition, the legal level is seen to contain what in Tatari's framework is identified as the "Church-state structure" variable—it is precisely the national constitutions and the legislation (particularly in the form of *lex specialis*, a law on religions) that set and spell out the regime of governance of religion in the country (i.e., the "Church-state structure"), which, *inter alia*, also betray their ideological underpinnings. Therefore, a separate variable of "Church-state structure" would be redundant. The legal level, by virtue of containing the existing legal regime of governance of religion, is the first level on which the churchification/securitization of Islam in a given country proceeds.

The proposed model retains the "Policy outcomes" variable, which, like the legal level, covers both the churchification and securitization tracks. The

proposed model does not oppose them to each other but rather suggests them as alternative, or even parallel, strategic options before the political actors. The churchification of Islam is understood here to be synonymous with domestication and normalization of Islam and thus falls under the accommodating strategies of it. On the contrary, the securitization of Islam is seen to contain othering, Muslimophobia, and the search for the “significant other” and thus falls under the non-accommodating strategies of Islam. Securitization, however, in certain circumstances, may facilitate churchification as a rectifying measure, particularly, where securitization of Islam distinguishes between “good” and “bad” Islam and Muslims. The churchification of Islam, on the other hand, may also inadvertently lead to its subsequent securitization, particularly in situations where “Muslim churches” “go radical.” Therefore, there is a tentative two-way connection between the two, even if, in the absence of tangible evidence, it is more theoretical than practical. The practical politics level is the second level on which churchification/securitization of Islam in a given country proceeds.

Furthermore, the original framework is enhanced by the inclusion of a “Non-Muslim social actors” variable. By doing this, the picture of actors, one or another way involved in either the churchification or securitization of Islam, is completed. The non-Muslim social actors, such as public intellectuals, fringe political movements, media, NGOs, and non-Muslim religious collectivities, like Christian Churches, all one way or another to a higher or lesser degree, indirectly but sometimes even explicitly directly participate in furthering either the churchification or securitization of Islam in their respective countries. They serve as pressure and lobbying groups supporting or objecting policies pertaining to the churchification/securitization of Islam coming out of political actors’ actions (practical politics).

The “Muslim minorities” variable in Tatari’s framework, though relabeled “Muslim communities,” is retained as indispensable in the proposed model; but not only because they are at the receiving end of the policies of churchification/securitization of Islam. Muslim religious collectivities and individuals as social actors even more than non-Muslim social actors participate in the churchification/securitization of Islam, either by supporting or opposing political actors’ actions related to the governance of Islam, very much like non-Muslim social actors serve as pressure and lobbying groups. In this regard, Muslim communities are not monolithic, and, as is shown in Chapter 6, comprise a spectrum of Muslim religious collectivities and individuals ranging from staunch supporters (in the person of “national Muftiates,” aka national “Muslim Churches”) of the churchification of Islam in their country to those vehemently opposing (as a rule, in the person of informal revivalist leaning

groups) it. By taking sides, these different Muslim actors not only react to the policy outcomes coming out of political actors, but also seek to influence them for their own benefit, this way engaging in intra-communal competition for the status and recognition as the (true) representatives of Islam in the country, something that not only involves self-churchification but intra-communal securitization of certain forms of Islamic religiosity. The social actors level, comprising non-Muslim social actors and Muslim communities, is the third level on which the churchification/securitization of Islam in a given country proceeds.

Finally, but not least importantly, in the proposed model, the “Institutional framework of Islam” variable is also removed. But not because it is redundant; rather, it is an ultimate object of the analysis for which the proposed model is designed. However, contrary to Tatari’s maintaining that the “institutional framework of Islam seems to be fixed in stone” (Tatari, 2009: 280), and that the “institutional framework of Islam’ variable determines the rules of the game for Muslim minorities, shaping the way they interact with the state in order to pursue policy change” (Tatari, 2009: 284), it is argued in this research that there is no universal agreement in Muslim communities on what the contents of the “institutional framework of Islam” is and different Muslim religious collectivities and individuals, as shown in Chapter 6, are engaged in fierce debates on how it should look like in diaspora settings (minority contexts), in which Muslim communities find themselves in Europe. Euro-Islam, European Islam, *fiqh al-aqalliyat*, all are proposed possible solutions.

Though Muslim actors discuss and have a say on the contents of the “institutional framework of Islam,” not least through lobbying with political actors, it is on the policy outcomes level and through it on the legal level that the contents of it is shaped for the respective country. In other words, the State-pursued strategies of governance of Islam have a profound influence on the very “institutional framework of Islam” in the country—it is ultimately the State that decides to churchify or not to churchify, to securitize or not to securitize Islam. It is up to the Muslim communities then to accept or object to that decision and this is where resource mobilization comes into play. The proposed model takes resource mobilization—both for Muslim religious collectivities and for non-Muslim social actors—for granted; therefore, it is not even indicated as a variable in the model.

In the end, Tatari’s original framework is modified into a triangle (Figure 2) of interaction among the three main groups of actors—the political, the non-Muslim social, and the Muslim. While the interaction between the political actors, on the one hand, and the non-Muslim social actors and Muslim communities on the other, is of a vertical nature, the interaction between

non-Muslim social actors and Muslim communities is horizontal. The vertical interaction is inevitably two-way, while the horizontal interaction may be also one-way (without a response), or there may even be no interaction between different non-Muslim social actors and the Muslim community. Of all the actors in the triangle, it is only the political actors, which interact with the legal level, which is above the triangle of interaction itself. The legal level and the political actors' level interact, as indicated above, both directly and indirectly. Both interactions are one-way: from the legal level directly down to the political actors' level and from the political actors' level, through to the policy outcomes (with a direct one-way relation between the two), back up to the legal level, making it a circular movement.

The model itself does not endorse either churchification or securitization, nor does it juxtapose or oppose the two. In fact, the model is seen to be operational without instrumentalizing any of the two concepts, which, depending on the situation and the need, may be replaced with any other concepts—be it domestication, naturalization or nationalization of Islam, or its othering. The model does not suggest any strategies the political and social actors may resort to in their view of, and dealing with Islam and Muslims, but merely indicates them and places them vis-à-vis each other as well as the two main variables: the “legal level” and the “policy outcomes.” The model, however, is seen to best enable the analysis of the strategies of churchification and securitization in the countries under research.




FIGURE 2 Three-level interaction in churchification/securitization of Islam in Eastern Europe  
COMPILED BY AUTHOR

On the other hand, though the proposed model is designed to facilitate the analysis of the churchification and securitization of Islam in post-communist Eastern Europe, it is seen to be as valid for the analysis of outcomes of policies of the governance of Islam in Western Europe. In other words, the proposed model, albeit with possible adjustments, may be equally applied across Europe and arguably to any State in which Muslims find themselves in diasporic settings and where Islam is a (political) minority religion, that is, itself diasporic.

# State-Church Relations in Eastern Europe: An Overview

## 4.1 Islam in Eastern Europe: The Context

In terms of religious legacy, Eastern Europe is primarily shaped by the heritage of Orthodox Christianity, with Catholicism and Islam sharing second and third places. Unlike Western Europe, in Eastern Europe, in general, Protestantism occupies a negligent part with Judaism historically possibly superseding it. Protestantism has only been dominant in Estonia, while a large share of Latvia's population has historically also been Protestant. Over half a dozen contemporary post-communist Eastern European countries (Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia) historically have had Catholic majorities, with almost a dozen (among them, the most populous) countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro) having Orthodox majorities.

Though it would probably be too far-fetched to compare Orthodox Churches to Protestant Churches, there certainly are similarities both in that they in a European nation-state context tend to be, unlike the Catholic Church, national Churches, with all the ensuing consequences. So, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, for instance, in this regard is similar to, say, the Swedish Lutheran Church. Whereas, the Catholic Church in Lithuania, the Catholic Church in Hungary, and the Catholic Church in Poland are all transnational, i.e., their rank and file follow and submit to the Vatican, though, admittedly, they indeed do carry a national flavor. The Eastern European Orthodox Churches are known to be closely connected to the conceptualization of nationhood and the very nations in the countries where Orthodoxy predominates. The close identification of belonging to a nation with belonging to a particular national branch of the Orthodox Church has had repercussions not only to the nation- and state-building processes in Eastern Europe, but to the relations between different religious groups and ultimately the governance of religion in these countries.

The religiosity of Eastern Europeans, though rebounded after the collapse of the choking communist system, has been lately receding, with some societies presently being in a state of post-Christianity, if not post-religiousness. Estonia and the Czech Republic are two telling examples; while in the former

Christians of different denominations, according to the latest (2011) census, make up over 48 per cent, with over 47 per cent confessing to be non-believers, in the latter, Christians make up even less—less than 13 per cent, with over 34 per cent being non-believers. Various research show that daily practice of religion by Eastern Europeans (including Muslims) is rather low. In many countries of the region, the share of those practicing their religion regularly hovers between 10 – 25%, with just several states showing higher shares (Pew, 2017b: 48, 70 – 71; Pew, 2013).

When it comes to Muslim presence, there is hardly any geographical context in Eastern Europe that in the course of history has not had a Muslim presence,<sup>1</sup> though, admittedly, some Central European lands (namely, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) have not had any substantial and continuous presence of Muslims on their territories. In three quarters of the post-communist Eastern European countries, Muslim presence has a hundreds of years-long history, and in two of them (Kosovo and Albania) Muslims constitute clear majorities, while in Bosnia their share hovers around 50 per cent. As may be seen in Table 2., in none of the Catholic or Protestant majority countries does the share of the population of Muslim background exceed 3%, while their share in several Orthodox majority countries is significantly higher—over a third in North Macedonia, a fifth in Montenegro, a seventh in Russia, and a twelfth in Bulgaria.

Determining the size of Muslim populations in Eastern European countries is an arduous task. Firstly, this is due to the fact that in some Eastern European countries national censuses do not include questions on religious identity/affiliation. Consequently, any publicly circulating numbers are either extrapolations, based on census results for ethnic background of the population groups, where certain ethnic groups are accorded the label and status of “Muslim” or claims, usually little substantiated, made by representatives of Muslim religious organizations. Even in cases where such questions are included in the census questionnaire, the official size of the Muslim population is not always accepted by different concerned parties, even Muslims themselves, who often claim much higher numbers than the official statistics show. For instance, in North Macedonia, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Serbia, leadership of national Islamic spiritual administrations have all contested their national census results and have argued that the official figures are far below the community-held numbers. The figures for the number of individuals of Muslim background (nominal Muslims) in Eastern European countries, provided in Table 2, represent the upper ceiling offered by researchers, which as a rule falls between the usual

---

1 For a brief overview of the history of Islam in Eastern Europe, see Račius, 2018a: 23 – 44.

TABLE 2 Muslim populations in Eastern Europe

Country	Muslim share in population	Muslims in absolute figures	Majority religion
Kosovo	96	1,750,000	Islam
Albania	65	2,300,000	Islam
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>1,790,000</b>	<b>Islam</b>
<b>North Macedonia</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>730,000</b>	<b>Orthodoxy</b>
Montenegro	19	119,000	Orthodoxy
<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>600,000</b>	<b>Orthodoxy</b>
Serbia	4	350,000	Orthodoxy
Slovenia	3	60,000	Catholicism
Croatia	1.5	63,000	Catholicism
Ukraine	0.6	250,000	Orthodoxy
Romania	0.3	65,000	Orthodoxy
<b>Hungary</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>32,000</b>	<b>Catholicism</b>
<b>Czechia</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>20,000</b>	<b>Catholicism</b>
Belarus	0.2	20,000	Orthodoxy
Latvia	0.2	6,000	Protestantism
Moldova	0.2	5,000	Orthodoxy
Estonia	0.2	2,000	Protestantism
<b>Lithuania</b>	<b>0.15</b>	<b>4,000</b>	<b>Catholicism</b>
<b>Poland</b>	<b>0.09</b>	<b>35,000</b>	<b>Catholicism</b>
Slovakia	0.09	5,000	Catholicism
TOTAL, up to		8,206,000	
Russia	15	20,000,000	Orthodoxy

Note: countries under research in this book are in bold.

SOURCE: BASED ON RAČIUS 2018a: 155

overestimates by Islamic religious leadership and the underestimates provided, if at all, by the census.

Consecutive official censuses, when measured against each other,<sup>2</sup> reveal some telling common dynamics in the Muslim population in the countries of Eastern Europe: in many countries of the region, one witnesses a steady

<sup>2</sup> Compare, for instance, Nielsen et al., 2009 and Scharbrodt et al., 2018.

decrease in absolute numbers of autochthonous populations of Muslim background; this is due to a combination of negative birth-death rates in the communities, emigration, secularization, and even changes in ethnic (and religious) identity. Bulgaria, where the number of those inhabitants who self-identify as Muslims in a ten-year period between two censuses (2001 and 2011) dropped by a staggering 40 per cent at least, in arguably the most notorious case.

In four of the countries under investigation in this book (marked in bold in Table 2), populations of Muslim background are composed predominantly of autochthonous Turkic (Bulgaria, Lithuania<sup>3</sup>), Albanian (North Macedonia) or Slavic (Bosnia) speaking ethnic groups, while in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, Muslims of immigrant Asian and African background constitute the majorities of the national Muslim populations. These countries carry similarities with Western Europe, where Muslim populations are also predominantly of immigrant background. Muslim population composition-wise, the seven states, like the rest of the region's countries, fall into one of these distinct camps: (1) those with primarily indigenous autochthonous Muslim populations (Bosnia, Bulgaria, North Macedonia), (2) those with mixed autochthonous and immigrant Muslim populations (Poland and Lithuania), and (3) those with Muslim populations of overwhelmingly immigrant nature (Hungary and Czechia). It may be added, though, that besides the autochthonous and immigrant segments in national Muslim populations, there is an ever increasing segment of local converts to Islam, who, however, hardly identify and socialize with autochthonous Muslims and rather either organize with those from immigrant backgrounds or create their own social circles (Račius, 2018a: 157 – 159).

It may be worth noting that forms of Islamic religiosity practiced by Eastern European Muslims extend from legalist Islam (practiced by autochthons and immigrants alike) to Sufi and folk Islam (practiced almost exclusively by autochthons) to various strands of revivalist Islam (practiced primarily by immigrants and converts though in some countries also by autochthonous Muslims). Most of the groups espousing these different forms of Islamic religiosity have their (registered or unregistered, state recognized or not) communities and organizations, led by respective religious authorities.

When it comes to Islamic mysticism, Sufism, has been a very pronounced dimension of non-legalist Islam, with a number of brotherhoods

---

3 Lithuanian Tatars, who still make up more than a half of Lithuania's Muslim population, in the assimilation process lost their Turkic mother tongue and use Lithuanian or Slavic languages.

active throughout the region—in particular in the Balkans and Russia. With the arrival of the Ottomans to the Balkans, several brotherhoods soon became widespread and in fact were instrumental in attracting locals to convert to (often mystical forms of) Islam. Likewise, Sufism played a prominent role in the conversion to Islam of some Caucasian groups. Sufi Islam in Eastern Europe has survived the communist period—there are now dozens of brotherhoods with numerous functioning *zawiyyas/tekkes* headed by *shaykhs*—but the level of its institutionalization in post-communist Eastern Europe is lower than that of normative Islam.

Historically, as elsewhere, Muslims in Eastern Europe would massively resort to religious practices and rituals that would not only have little to do with normative Islam but would also be distinct from more universal practices of Sufis. This category of practices came to be referred to in the scholarly parlance as folk (or “lower” as opposed to “higher” Islam of the learned classes) Islam. Being open to outside influences, folk Islam has been in essence susceptible to syncretism and one thus might find quazi- or crypto-Christian practices among practitioners of folk Islam in Eastern Europe. Folk Islam, being in its nature local, had, as a rule, local informal authorities, the most prominent of whom would be healers and soothsayers. These informal leaders of practices of folk Islam survived the communist period but in the face of seminal demographic changes—movement of villagers, the historical custodians of folk Islam practices, to urban areas, increased educational levels in villages and overall secularization trends but also a growing revivalist backlash to their practices—have been left with an ever-shrinking following and pushed onto the defensive.

On the other hand, in practically all post-communist Eastern European nation states forms of Islamic religiosity have been diversifying, particularly in the direction of revivalist Islam. Though the agents of revivalist Islam in the immediate years following the collapse of the communist system were foreign actors, both states and state-supported as well as independent NGOs and religious movements and organizations, local Muslims soon became not only recipients but also carriers of ideas and ways of living the revivalist Islam. Consequently, revivalist Islam in Salafi disguise may be found in practically all post-communist Eastern European countries.

Although some Islamic revivalists are prone to religiously motivated (political) violence, the overwhelming majority of revivalists are peaceful and law abiding citizens who shun violence. Islamic radicalism, though it had appeared in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s, exploded in full blossom in the early 1990s, in a direct connection with two major armed conflicts—the Bosnia and Chechnya wars. The presence of radicalism among local Muslims was

particularly visible in the North Caucasus, where the initial separatist fight for a sovereign nation-state of Ichkeriya (Chechnya) was soon transformed into a full-blown “jihad” against “infidel” Russia with the declared aim of creating an Islamic emirate in North Caucasus (the so-called Caucasus Emirate), which, besides Chechnya, was to incorporate Daghestan, Ossetia, Ingushetia and other Muslim-inhabited regions in the Northern Caucasus and southern Russia. And though the jihadi insurgency in the North Caucasus was eventually suppressed by the Russian regime by the late-2000s, cells of radicalized Northern Caucasian Muslims continued to menace the Russian state for years on.

The collapse of nation-states in the Middle East in the wake of the so-called “Arab Spring,” the subsequent emergence of armed groups of radicalized Muslims on their territories and the founding of a post-nation state formation—the Islamic State—in 2014, opened a new page in the evolution of radical strains of revivalist Islam in Eastern Europe. As the fighting in Syria and Iraq, but also Libya, took on a more international face, with tens of thousands of foreign fighters from all over the world joining various armed factions, Eastern Europe also got its share. Publicly available estimates (Soufan 2015) suggest that well over a thousand Eastern European Muslims (excluding those who hailed from Russia, estimated to be up to five thousand) voluntarily relocated to parts of Syria and Iraq under rebel control. Expatriates from Bosnia and Kosovo (more than 300 from each) and those from Albania and North Macedonia (over 200 from each) made up the bulk of those who went to the conflict zones in the Middle East, but Serbia, Poland, and Montenegro also had their share, with several dozen nationals from each country following the suit.

As indicated above, the main religious organizations in many Eastern European countries are the national Islamic spiritual administrations (muftiates) and their spiritual, and often administrative, head is a Mufti (*rais al-ulama*). Some countries have even more than one organization aspiring to be such a (national) muftiate. As a rule, these muftiates are comprised of autochthonous Muslims and are representative of autochthonous Muslim populations and various forms of their practiced Islam (first of all legalist but sometimes also Sufi and other heterodox), routinely called by the muftiates “traditional” Islam. Nominally, this “traditional” Islam in its legalist form usually implies Sunni Islam of Hanafi tradition, historically practiced by the overwhelming majority of Eastern European Muslims, but other branches of Sunni Islam, such as Shafii, practiced in the Caucasus, may also be included. Thus, the muftiates see themselves as foremost the custodians of Sunni Islam, albeit often in its local variant.

Among the countries under investigation in this book, all three Balkan countries (Bosnia, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia) as well as Poland and

TABLE 3 Forms of Islamic religiosity and their representatives in countries under research

Country	Dominant form, ethnicity	Other forms, ethnicity
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Normative Sunni Hanafi Islam inclusive of Sufism (Bosniaks)	Salafism (Bosniaks, Arabs) Gulen movement (Turks and Bosniaks)
North Macedonia	Normative Sunni Hanafi Islam inclusive of Sufism and Bektashism (Albanians, Torbeshis)	Salafism (Albanians)
Bulgaria	Normative Sunni Hanafi Islam (Turks, Pomaks)	Heterodox Islam (Roma) Gulen movement (Turks) Salafism (Pomaks)
Hungary	No dominant form	Moderate revivalist (Hungarians, Arabs)
Czech Republic	No dominant form	Moderate revivalist (Czechs, Arabs)
Lithuania	Normative Sunni Hanafi Islam (Tatars, Turks)	Salafism (Lithuanians)
Poland	Normative Sunni Hanafi Islam (Tatars, Turks)	Moderate revivalist (Poles, Arabs)

COMPILED BY AUTHOR

Lithuania have representative Muslim religious organizations headed by a (chief/grand) mufti. Hungary and Czechia, however, have nominal umbrella Islamic religious organizations akin to Islamic councils in Western Europe. Thus, organizationally, the five former countries fall into one category, while the latter two into another. Moreover, in Bulgaria (since 1992), Poland (since 2004) and Lithuania (since 2018), there have been rival/alternative Muslim spiritual administrations that have sought (and in the Bulgarian case, have, even if only temporarily, attained) state recognition as representative Islamic organizations.<sup>4</sup> While the Bulgarian case is exceptional in all respects (the rival muftiates, headed and staffed by autochthonous Muslims of the same form of Islamic religiosity—namely, Hanafi Sunni—were alternatively supported by the governments in office), in the Polish and Lithuanian cases, the alternative/rival muftiates are of mixed (autochthonous, convert, and immigrant)

4 For more on the history and development of these organizations, see Račius, 2018a.

membership and are of revivalist (moderate Islamist) leaning. Though the Islamic Community of Hungary has positioned itself as of Hanafi tradition (it has even asked the Bosnian Islamic Community to appoint a mufti for it), all other Islamic organizations in both Hungary and Czechia are of a non-denominationalist (moderate revivalist) type (with alleged connections to the Muslim Brotherhood or other transnational revivalist groups).

A common trait among practically all post-communist Eastern European states is the nationalization, in a double sense, of Islam, particularly in those newly independent countries, where there has not been a historical precedent to fall back on, or the earlier historical precedents were irrelevant. This is foremost in the cases of newly (primarily first-time but also reconstituted) independent states that emerged out of the ruins of the USSR and socialist Yugoslavia. In most of these countries, Muslim populations proceeded with founding (or rejuvenating the existing) their (autocephalous) religious organizations, i.e., the Islamic spiritual administrations (the muftiates), referred to above. However, as in many countries, there was a dominant ethnic group within the Muslim population of the country, this nationalizing of Islam was coupled with its (re)ethnicization.

Though it was not the states that did this, the nationalization of institutionalized Islam became useful to governing elites as among other things it also meant the taming of Islam/Muslims—the officially recognized (and expectedly coopted and easily controlled and coerced, if be need) national institutions were to serve as (sole) representatives and custodians of “acceptable” Islam and were entrusted by the State to “issue binding decisions in all administrative and spiritual issues pertinent to the Muslim community” (Elbasani and Roy, 2015: 461). At the same time, arguably, “[p]olicies of nationalization-cum-etatization of Islam often served worldly interests of subjecting religion to the service of concrete political projects and agendas” (Elbasani, 2015a: 3).

The above discussed conditions and circumstances have effectively made Muslim populations in post-communist Eastern European countries into diasporas, sometimes beached (as in the case of South-Eastern Europe, but also the former European republics of the USSR) and other times of immigrant nature (as in the case of the Višegrad Four). Their representative Islamic spiritual administrations emerged, as is shown further below, as national autocephalous, if not independent, establishments (to use Sedgwick’s term) who have sought to monopolize the Islamic religious field in their respective nation states, effectively becoming, with the tacit approval and very often active involvement of the State, church-like entities.

Despite, or rather as a reaction to, the processes of the institutionalization-cum-nationalization of Islam and the bureaucratization of its administrative

structures in post-communist Eastern European countries, a dissenting major tendency, common to practically all those states, revealed itself—that of the individualization of religiosity. This dissension expressed itself in alternative forms of religiosity, chiefly of a revivalist nature, and was in clear opposition to the forms of religiosity promoted by the official Islamic administrations and presented by them as “traditional” to the land. There formed *de facto* independent Muslim groups who were not only hostile but even rival to the officially espoused Islam and who manifested experience of religiosity that has become “detached from organized religion and official doctrinal prescriptions” (Elbasani and Roy, 2015: 458). In the words of Elbasani and Roy (Elbasani and Roy, 2015: 458), the result of this ongoing novel turn “is the revival of Islam as faith, not as a collective identity or organized form of ‘belonging.’” Therefore, the coming back of the Sacred to post-communist Eastern European states has been accompanied not only by the resurgence of institutionalized Islam but also of its opposite, individualization and privatization, with the emergence of “autonomous ‘faith communities,’ informal structures where members of an ethno-national group or subgroup endeavor to build a community of believers within a larger group of ‘cultural Muslims’” (Elbasani and Roy, 2015: 466).

In the context of the countries under investigation in this book, one may distinguish among them at least three types of Muslim religious collectivities: 1. institutionalized autochthonous Muslim-run and state-recognized as representative Islamic spiritual administrations—muftiates (Bosnia, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Lithuania, Poland), 2. rival/alternative institutionalized and run by mixed revivalist-leaning membership but not state-recognized as representative Islamic organizations (Lithuania, Poland) and independent institutionalized and run by mixed revivalist-leaning membership Islamic organizations and their umbrella organizations (Hungary, Czechia), and 3. non-institutionalized radical revivalist (Salafi, Wahhabi) groupings of mixed membership. While the first group is the object of the State-pursued strategy of the churchification of Islam, the third group is the *raison d’être* of the securitization of Islam, with the second oscillating between the two ends.

The physical co-existence of Muslim groups and non-Muslim (majority) populations in Eastern Europe does not warrant their positive engagement, either in history or at the present. On the contrary, in many cases this coexistence has historically caused discomfort on both sides, leading to tensions and even political and legal discrimination and/or inter-communal violence. Muslim communities in Eastern Europe, particularly since the formation of the post-Ottoman and, more recently, post-communist nation-states, have been often received by local non-Muslims with open hostility, both, on the State and

social level; they have been at the receiving end of intermittent othering bordering on latent but at times also manifest Muslimophobia.

Since as far back as the nineteenth century, international treaties obliging national legislation to guarantee the basic rights of Muslim citizens in nascent nation states have facilitated the steady formal increase in such rights. Today, in practically all Eastern European countries, Islam has been institutionally recognized through registration of Muslim representative religious organizations. However, the actual level of religious rights varies considerably from country to country; where Islam is officially recognized as one of the “traditional” religions of the country, Muslims as a rule have many more rights and privileges, not only compared to Muslim communities in the countries where Islam does not hold such status but also *vis-à-vis* other (non-Muslim) religious communities without such status. By large, however, Muslims and Islam in Eastern Europe have remained, historically, the internal, and, with the appearance of “new” Muslims in the person of immigrants and converts, also as the external, “Other,” with all the ensuing consequences. In the Eastern European context, particularly in those parts where the Muslim presence has been for hundreds of years, and in which there are still very few immigrants, dislike, hatred or fear of Islam and Muslims primarily rises from the past-oriented historical narratives of ethnocentric national evolution, where Muslims (first of all, in the person of Turks) often serve as either former “invaders” (the historical external “Other”) or the “misguided part of ‘us’” (the internal “Other”).

In most countries in South-Eastern Europe, national folklore and literature are sprinkled with negative attitudes toward Turks. While Bulgaria and Serbia stand out as the countries whose national folklore and writings by national(ist) poets and writers are peppered with, what one in contemporary terms would call “hate speech,” Hungarian literary heritage also contains some such examples. Though in North Eastern Europe there are significantly less folkloristic tropes of an anti-Muslim nature, one may still find authored works from the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly in Russian, in which the portrayal of Muslims is often biased, to say the least. Practically universally, such literature refers to the perceived brutal misconduct on the side of the invading Muslims (Turks or Mongol-Tatars) and the brave resistance by the righteous local Christians. Conscripted young Christian boys to the Ottoman army (*devşirme*), where they were also (forcibly) converted to Islam, receives a particular share of scornful attention.

In many Eastern European countries, Muslims by virtue of belonging to a non-Christian faith (often coupled with belonging to a non-Slavic speaking ethnicity) had to constantly struggle to be accepted as part of the nation and

its state. However, sometimes, their efforts have been offset by the antagonist reaction from the dominant/national Christian Church's side. Moldova, Serbia, and North Macedonia may be out forward as the countries where the leadership of the majority Orthodox communities have openly espoused anti-Islam/anti-Muslim sentiment and even instigated to act against Muslims and their interests through public protests, boycotts, and lobbying for or against relevant legislation.

Since in some Eastern European (particularly Central and Eastern Balkan) countries, Church and state habitually work in tandem, if not as one, the political parties, both in government and opposition, often either follow the Muslimophobic line of the (national) Church or, *vice versa*, tacitly encourage it. So, for instance, the institutionalization of Islam in Moldova that was vehemently opposed by the Orthodox Church was also derided by parts of the country's political elite, including former president. Likewise, in North Macedonia, the political elite and the Orthodox Church have on many occasions worked closely in not only advancing the "Christian nature of the nation" but also belittling and demonizing the country's Muslim population. In the mid-2010s, the North Macedonian President publicly vilified Muslim refugees coming to Europe and even warned the world of the prospect of a "Balkan Chaliphate." A radical nationalist party in Bulgaria has even gone so far as to engage in physical violence against Muslims and their property. The role of Christian Churches in the othering of Muslims and securitizing of Islam in Eastern Europe is analyzed in more detail in Chapter 5.

Both the internal dynamics in Muslim communities in post-communist Eastern Europe and their reception by state and non-state actors has led to Islam being pulled into two opposite directions—its effective churchification and securitization. The last two chapters of the book are devoted to the analysis of these two trends in the seven selected countries of the region.

#### 4.2 Historical Precedents of State-Church Relations in Eastern Europe

The history of state-church relations in Eastern Europe may be divided into four periods. The first one does not have a definite beginning (in different countries of the region it may be placed anywhere between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries) but lasted until WWI. This period is the longest and most complex as it covers both imperial states—Russia, Ottoman Turkey, and Austro-Hungary—and nascent nation states that were founded in South-Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century. The second period encompasses the two inter-war decades (1918 – 1939/40) when most of the states in this research

were sovereign nation states. The third period is framed by the communist rule of 1945 – 1990 in all states under research. Finally, the fourth, and current period may be called post-communist. It is the three first periods that are over-viewed in this subchapter.

The first period of state-church relations covers a lengthy period of time, when all of the states under research were part of one of the great empires of the region (North Macedonia and Bulgaria of the Ottoman Empire since the fifteenth century; Czechia and Hungary of Austro-Hungary since the sixteenth and seventeenth century respectively; Bosnia of both, first the Ottoman Empire since the fifteenth century, and then Austro-Hungary since the nineteenth century; and Lithuania and Poland of Russia, since the end of the eighteenth century). During that period state-church relations, and particularly state-Islam relations, developed differently in the three empires. The Ottoman Empire was itself a Muslim-majority state ruled by Muslim political elite, in which Islam was the state religion. In Russia, Muslims, increasingly from the sixteenth century on became the second largest faith community, while Austro-Hungary had hardly any Muslims before it occupied Bosnia in 1878.

Though one may hardly talk of the churchification of Islam in imperial Eastern Europe, metropolises (Constantinople, St. Petersburg, and Vienna) had proceeded with the institutionalization of Islam on their territory, which later served as a blueprint for its churchification in subsequent nation states. In the Ottoman Empire, Shaykh al-Islam, or Grand Mufti, since the end of the sixteenth century was seen as the top ecclesiastical figure, in addition to his juridical function, that of issuing fatwas, heading the entire bureaucratic religious-judicial structure akin to the ministry of religious affairs; he was “responsible for all religious and legal nominations in the empire” (Gerber, 1994: 22). Regional muftis, among them those in Eastern European possessions, though elected locally, were appointed by the Grand Mufti. It is reported that “[s]ince the 1850s, all Bosnian muftis were members of the Administrative Council of the Ottoman Province of Bosnia” (Mujadžević, 2017: 37). Nonetheless, the overall Ottoman religious structure and bureaucracy, particularly in provinces, was loose enough to see it more as horizontal than vertical.

In Russia, Empress Catherine, first (in 1773) promulgated a ground-breaking law on religious tolerance which curtailed the Russian Orthodox Church's interference in the religious life of the Empire's Muslims and then, towards the end of the century, initiated the process of founding Muslim spiritual administrations (a.k.a. muftiates), headed by regional state-appointed and state-salaried muftis, that effectively functioned as state departments under the Ministry of Interior. In Crews' words, “[t]o domesticate Islam in the empire, and to turn Muslims away from alternative sources of authority in Kabul,

Istanbul, and elsewhere, Catherine and her officials opted to introduce a churchlike organization among a population that had previously known no such institutions” (Crews, 2006: 33), while through “rules restrict[ing] the legal performance of clerical duties to men licensed by the state, effectively creat[ed] an official Muslim clergy where none had existed before” (Crews, 2006: 54). Even more, Crews maintains that through her legislative and executive reforms, Catherine had “transformed the imperial regime into a patron of Islam” (Crews, 2006: 32). In the nineteenth century, several other regional muftiates were established by imperial decrees completing the implementation of the state strategy of, if not churchification, then certainly the ecclesification of Islam in imperial Russia.

In 1882, Austro-Hungary established an Islamic spiritual administration for Bosnian Muslims, also headed by a (grand) mufti, called *rais al-ulama*. Like in the Russian case, the grand mufti and regional muftis were appointed by the Austro-Hungarian authorities and paid out of state coffers. A year after the annexation of Bosnia in 1908, a “Constitution for autonomous administration of Islamic religious affairs, pious foundations and education in Bosnia-Herzegovina” was promulgated establishing the status of Muslims in the province and their relations with the state (Mujadžević, 2017: 38). That said, even prior to this formal institutionalization of Islam in Habsburg Bosnia, authorities in 1887 established the School for Shari‘a judges in Sarajevo, where, besides the expected Islamic subjects, students had to study a number of modern secular subjects (Karčić, H., 2012: 42). The Islamic infrastructure in Habsburg Bosnia did not function like a government department but was more like a church-in-the-making, because the Austro-Hungarian authorities modeled it after the Christian understanding of religious organizations. The Austro-Hungarian model of institutionalized Muslim religious collectivity was closest in approximating a “Muslim church” of a congregational type. As is shown in the following chapters of the book, the Bosnian Islamic Community is arguably one of the most advanced in the progression of the churchification of Muslim religious collectivities in post-communist Eastern Europe.

In the post-Ottoman Balkans (starting with the second half of the nineteenth century), the founding of sovereign Slavic-Orthodox majority states “triggered the collapse of the established interreligious relations and the microstructure of society and brought about a profound reconfiguration in the region’s social and political geography” (Merdjanova, 2013: 7). While the hitherto second-class (*dhimmi*) citizens—Slavic speaking Christian Orthodox—became the political and social core of the new nations, the formerly politically and socially (though not demographically) dominant Muslims were almost overnight stripped of their status: “[f]rom followers of the dominant faith in the Ottoman Empire who enjoyed a privileged legal and social position, Muslims

turned into religious minorities who had to struggle continually to define their place in non-Muslim polities” (Merdjanova, 2013: 7). Mentzel notes that “the Balkan Christian nationalists were faced with the problem of the Muslim populations in their midst. In particular, these nationalists had to determine how these populations (sometimes quite substantial) fitted into their plans for the construction of a nation state. In some cases (perhaps most of the time), the nationalists regarded the Muslims as foreigners who had to be expelled. In other instances, the Muslims were regarded as renegade members of the dominant national group who needed to be brought back into the fold. In very few cases were the Muslims simply left alone, and in even fewer were they regarded as a distinct ethnic or national group” (Mentzel, 2000: 8). Looking from the perspective of local Muslims, “[t]he growth of nationalism and the establishment of the Balkan nation states likewise put the Balkan Muslims in a difficult position. Some identified with the Ottoman Empire, others with the ruling national group. Still others engaged in building distinct national identities for themselves” (Mentzel, 2000: 8). Eventually, Muslim communities in these newly founded nation states in the post-Ottoman Balkans established their own spiritual administrations, arguably modeled after the Bosnian example.

Of the three Balkan countries under research in the present book, Bulgaria was the first to become a post-Ottoman state. Its path to sovereignty began with it becoming a semi-independent Principality in the aftermath of the Berlin Congress of 1878. Its first Constitution (Art. 40, 42) guaranteed Muslims the right to profess their religion (Kanev, 2002: 319). For practical purposes, “[e]xecutive supervision over religious minorities in this period was exercised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Public Worship,” something that Kanev finds of symbolic significance because “local communities of Bulgarian citizens were placed under the jurisdiction of a government ministry in charge of foreigners” (Kanev, 2002: 319). In 1880, the Provisional Regulations for the Spiritual Administration of Christians, Muslims, and Jews were promulgated. Inter alia, the Provisional Regulations “made the first timid attempt to specify the provisions of Article 42 of the Constitution on executive supervision over minority religious communities. They abrogated the office of the kadi, or Muslim judges, and transferred their powers to the muftis. Ten mufti judicial districts were formed, with the mufti of each district elected by ‘the Muslim population.’ Under the Provisional Regulations, the elected muftis did not have to be endorsed by the authorities. However, the Chief Mufti and all regional muftis were paid by the government” (Kanev, 2002: 320).

The Sofia Muftiate “started to play a mediating role between the state and the district muftiates and in 1910 it became ‘Chief Muftiate’” (Shakir, 2017: 102). However, with the passing of new Provisional Regulations for the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in 1895, the electoral procedure of the Grand Mufti

was abandoned and from then on he was to be appointed by a royal decree, while election of regional muftis by state-appointed boards was also to be endorsed by a decree. All muftis were civil servants receiving state salary (Kanev, 2002: 320). The situation once again changed when, “[i]n accordance with a couple of Ottoman-Bulgarian agreements (namely, the first and second Istanbul Protocols from 1909 and 1913), the chief mufti initially had to be elected for a five year period by the district muftis, after that he had to be approved by the Ottoman Sheikh ul-Islam and only then acknowledged by the Bulgarian government” (Shakir, 2017: 102). This system with a fixed term in office effectively was to make the chief mufti not only *primus inter pares*, but also truly legitimate and representative. Unfortunately, throughout both the interwar and communist period only two muftis were elected under the system, while the rest were directly appointed by the state (Shakir, 2017: 103). Thus, state interference and control of the Islamic administrative structure and its leadership in Bulgaria (as in fact, in many other post-Ottoman states in Southeast Europe, including Yugoslavia) preceded the communist period.

The Statute on Spiritual Organization and Administration of Muslims in the Kingdom of Bulgaria of 1919 further increased the state’s role in internal governance of Islam in Bulgaria: the Ministry in charge was empowered to endorse and annul the election of “boards of Muslim parishes and of the Chief Mufti. Article 123 also empowered the Ministry to dismiss the Chief Mufti if he “does not conscientiously fulfill his duties and, by his actions, violates the provisions of this Statute and the laws and regulations effective in the country” (Kanev, 2002: 321). Regional muftis and Muftiate staff remained on the payroll of the state (Kanev, 2002: 321). Kanev relates that “[t]he Ministry interfered at all stages of the examination and appointment of all Muslim clerics. It supervised the Muslim courts and the affairs of all Muslim institutions. The Ministry licensed the construction of all new mosques, as well as trade in, mortgages, and exchange of vakif-owned property (i.e. property owned by the Muslim religious charities)” (Kanev, 2002: 321 – 322) and concludes: “By this Statute, the authorities established full control over the Muslim religious community” (Kanev, 2002: 321 – 322). Besides political control, there was all but total financial control by the state of the Islamic clergy, as “[a]ccording to Articles 94, 131 and 160 of the second Istanbul Protocol (that came into effect in 1919), the muftis were to be paid by the Bulgarian government and (...) were considered official personnel” (Shakir, 2017: 103).

In the interwar, as well as the communist, period, two countries under investigation in the present research—namely Bosnia and North Macedonia—were part of Yugoslavia. Though during the first decade of the existence of the state, the governance of Islam remained diffused, in 1930, the Yugoslav regime

“sought to solidify the new unitarian Yugoslav ideology among its Muslims by uniting them in one singular pro-regime Islamic religious body” (Mujadžević, 2017: 40), and the Islamic Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, with the seat of *rais al-ulama* moved to the capital Belgrade. With the centralization of the administration of Islamic affairs, the Islamic institution lost its autonomy and the principle of election of its officials (Karčić F., 2015: 133). This once again changed with the state-promulgated new Constitution of the Islamic Religious Community of 1936, when it was once again decentralized (with the seat of *rais al-ulama* returned to Sarajevo in Bosnia), and state control was somewhat eased (Mujadžević, 2017: 40).

In the aftermath of WWI, of the former European possessions of the Russian Empire, only Poland saw the establishment in 1925 of a Muslim spiritual administration (muftiate), this time, bottom-up. Already in 1925, the leadership of the Polish Tatar Muslims “prepared the Temporary Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Mohammedan Church [Pol. Kościoła Mahometańskiego] in Poland and submitted it to the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment” (Nalborczyk, 2017: 298). It is symbolic that the Islamic organization being formed was called by Muslims themselves the Mohammedan Church, for such a title suggests, if not betrays, that the institutionalized religious collectivity of Muslims in Poland was to be modeled after and resemble (Christian) Churches. However, it took more than a decade for the Muftiate, in the person of the Muslim Religious Union, to be officially recognized by the state. The recognition came in 1936 in the form of an agreement between the Polish state and the Muslim Religious Union, which effectively endorsed a national (autocephalous) “Muslim church,” however, this time with no word “church” in the title itself.

The signed Act stipulated that the Mufti was the head of the Muslim Religious Union and “managed the Union single-handedly, he was not limited by the opinions of the Highest Muslim Board and his post was to be held for life (Article 3)” (Nalborczyk, 2017: 300). Like in Bulgaria, “[t]he government supported the Muslim Religious Union financially e.g. by paying the salaries of the Mufti, imams and muezzins (Article 38)” (Nalborczyk, 2017: 300). However, as Nalborczyk and Borecki argue, “[t]he state had a great influence on appointments to positions in and the functioning of the Union. The Minister of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment approved the list of candidates for the posts of the Mufti and members of the Highest Muslim Board. The voivodes (local governors), had the right to veto candidates put forward to be imams and the right to demand the removal of any clerics whose activities were contrary to the state’s interests. Any disputes were to be settled by the Minister of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment, while the

authorities also influenced the Union's property management" (Nalborczyk and Borecki, 2011: 347 – 348).

Lithuanian Muslims, though, made lukewarm attempts at unification, because of intra-community bickering and infighting failed to come to terms among themselves and to establish a representative national Muslim religious organization and throughout the interwar period operated on the basis of independent informal congregations (Račius, 2015). The minuscule Muslim communities in interwar Czechoslovakia and Hungary, formerly parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, failed to secure registration of their religious organizations with the state authorities and were forced to function as amebic congregations (Mendel, 1998).

Reflecting on the pre-wwII period of the seven current countries under investigation, only Bosnia, Bulgaria and Poland had institutionalized and formally recognized national Islamic spiritual administrations. All of these nascent Islamic organizations in many respects resembled, if were not altogether modeled after, the image of Christian religious organizations, i.e. Churches, and appear to have been perceived by the states, first of all, legally, but also socio-politically, a sort of "national Muslim Churches." Thus, the state-pursued strategy of the churchification of Islam in certain Eastern European countries had started well before the Second World War. In Bosnia and Bulgaria, this strategy, to a certain degree, was carried over into the communist period.

The communist period in the history of Europe may be tentatively divided into two sub-periods—the interwar (1917 – 1939) period, when it was only Russia/the USSR that was ruled by communists, and the Cold War (1945 – 1989/90) period, when besides the expanded USSR, practically all Central and Eastern European countries were under communist control. The rise to power of communists halted the development of representative Muslim religious organizations in most of Eastern Europe. Speaking generally, the situation of Muslim communities in the communist-ruled Eastern European countries was similar in that all over the "Eastern bloc"; practicing Islam was made difficult by menacing and harassing state policies that placed numerous restrictions on Muslim communities.

The victorious Bolsheviks who came to power in Russia in late 1917 initially appeared to have been rather tolerant of Russia's Muslims, as their policy towards Islam and Muslims "was characterized by considerable flexibility, tolerance and tactfulness" (Yemelianova, 2002: 103). Nonetheless, within several years, communists turned against Islam. The intellectual activities, and not only religious, were severely affected by purges—educational establishments shut down, publishing houses and media closed, publications banned. All of the establishments of Islamic religious education on the European side of the

USSR were closed. The tsarist-era Ufa-based muftiate, charged with supervision of religious affairs of Muslims of the European part of the USSR, however, was preserved. The draconian restrictions on religious activities of Muslim citizens were somewhat eased during WWII, and even three new state-controlled regional muftiates were founded, with two of them in the Caucasus, and the third one in Central Asia (Yemelianova, 2002: 121). Nevertheless, a new wave of anti-religious measures aimed at the atheization of Soviet society, including Muslims, were introduced by the regime in 1954 (Yemelianova, 2002: 125 – 126). A decade later, in view of persistent Islamic religious practices, particularly those related to rites of passage and family occasions, like marriage, birth and the like, in 1962 the authorities came up with a plan to introduce lay alternatives to them. In the early 1980s, the government called for renewed efforts to suppress Islamic practices.

Bulgaria's Muslims, though not as severely, also had to bear the brunt of the state's double-natured atheist-cum-nationalist policies; Turks, who made up the bulk of Bulgaria's population of Muslim background, where denied their ethnic identity and culture (including religious). As a consequence, the Muslim minority in Bulgaria was subjected by the communist government not only to atheist policies but also to forced Bulgarization. It is argued that the Denominations Act of 1949 had as its "prime objective" "to enable the authorities to establish full control over the denominations" (Kanev, 2002: 333). Communist authorities set up a Department of Religious Affairs, which "had extensive powers to control the religious communities: to censor in advance all their addresses, circulars and other communications of public relevance; and to control all international contacts, as well as all foreign donations. Article 12 [of the Denominations Act] empowered the Director of Religious Affairs to remove from office clerics of all denominations who were found to have 'violated the law,' [breached] the public order and [acted against] good morals, or to have worked against the democratic structure of the state" (Kanev, 2002: 333).

Very much like elsewhere in communist-ruled Eastern Europe, the regime in socialist Yugoslavia proceeded with the persecution of religion, which in the first decade of the regime was particularly virulent. Right after coming to power in 1946, the communist regime abolished the Shari'a courts; then, in 1952, it shut down primary religious schools, placed a virtual ban on Sufi activities, and proceeded with the expropriation of waqf properties (Merdjanova, 2013: 31). Of over 40 madrasas in pre-WWII Bosnia, by 1949 only one was allowed by the communist authorities to continue offering Islamic education in the entire Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, the Yugoslav government, starting with the 1960s, adjusted its religious policies by relaxing restrictions on religious organizations and practices. The Islamic Religious Community was

given more power in actual administering of internal Islamic affairs, censorship was relaxed, Islamic religious education and public propagation of Islam allowed, Muslims were permitted to travel abroad for pilgrimage and religious studies (Karčić, F., 2015: 100 – 118). In 1977, the regime even allowed a Faculty of Islamic Studies to be opened in Sarajevo.

Though the new Constitution of Islamic Religious Community in the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, adopted in 1947, sought once again to centralize the Islamic Religious Community, (Mujadžević, 2017: 42). and governance of Islam in Socialist Yugoslavia was subsequently decentralized, with the Yugoslav Islamic Community functioning as “a Pan-Yugoslav, multi-ethnic federation of autonomous Muslim institutions and associations. The constitution of the Islamic Community was congruent with the Yugoslav ‘self-management’ system. Self-administered regional assemblies (...) influenced the central authority at Sarajevo through representatives and delegations. Sarajevo religious authorities also granted broad autonomy to local muftis and Muslim assemblies (...). The reis-ul-ulema had special prerogatives as the religious authority and head of the clergy but could not veto decisions passed by the autonomous assemblies (...) Some Sufi (or dervish) orders and monasteries (tekijas) recognized the Sarajevo authorities, while some others were independent” (Perica, 2002: 79). The Constitution of the Islamic Community of 1969 reintroduced the position of mufti, abandoned in its 1936 Constitution, only this time “muftis were given administrative duties in the religious hierarchy (supervision of imams)” but “not entrusted with the traditional ifta’ function” (Karčić, F., 2015: 137). In any case, since the 1970s, socialist Yugoslavia witnessed an overall Islamic revival unseen anywhere else in communist Eastern Europe of the time.

In the aftermath of WWII, the Central European states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary did not escape the nightmare of communist rule. Though the history of Islam on their territories predates the formation of nation states and there even were tiny Muslim communities in the first part of the twentieth century, the significant increase (if not reappearance) of Muslims in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and to a certain extent in Poland is somewhat paradoxically connected to the communist period (Hannova, 2014). This happened because, starting in the 1970s, students, mostly male, from what was then seen as “friendly” Arab and other Asian and African states with significant Muslim populations, started coming to local universities for full studies; subsequently, present Muslim communities started slowly taking shape. In the communist period, however, they remained non-institutionalized and one may hardly talk about state-Islam relations in either communist Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

Though centralization and control by the state of Muslim religious activities have certainly been the features of governance of Islam (and religion in general) in communist Eastern Europe, one may not talk, as some are tempted, about sustained efforts by communists to eradicate Islamic religious beliefs and practices—apart from Albania during the time. If anything, the progression of the churchification of Islam that had started in some Eastern European states in the pre-WWII period was temporarily halted or put off; instead, it was substituted with a drive to subordinate the religious communities to the regime and even incorporate their religious organizations into the overall communist public administration system. This was being done by coercion, cooperation, recruitment and infiltration, so that by the end of the Cold War, the top leadership in representative Islamic organizations, particularly in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, was in fact part of the state apparatus. The collapse of the communist regimes and with them some of the states (foremost, Yugoslavia and the USSR but also Czechoslovakia) starting in 1990, among other cataclysmic socio-political changes ushered in numerous novelties, both into the lives of the Muslim populations of post-communist Eastern European countries and state-Islam relations.

#### **4.3 Frameworks of Governance of Islam in Post-communist Eastern Europe**

With the fall of the Berlin Wall (and with it the Iron Curtain), the disintegration of the USSR, and the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe, the newly independent and sovereign states (with the final dismemberment of Yugoslavia their number surpassed 20) faced a challenge to overhaul their legislation pertaining to state-church relations in general and the governance of religion in particular. Potz, confining his attention to Orthodox majority post-communist Eastern European countries, claims that in state-religion relations “most of the countries emerging from communism opted for the Western European model, considering it more corresponding with their own history and more suitable to their own social structure. This was in principle an understandable choice, but there was of course the question which of the various types of relations available within the Western European system of law on religion was preferred by the post-Communist countries with an Orthodox tradition” (Potz, 2008: 49).

However, as is shown below, such an optimistic view of the regimes of governance of religion and state-religion relations in post-communist Eastern Europe, and particularly the Orthodox majority countries, is superficial, as the

chosen purportedly Western models either do not function as they should (or as they function in Western Europe), or the chosen models are not entirely or even at all Western European. Contrary to Potz, and arguably more to the point, Kalkandjieva maintains that “[a]lthough the Soviet successor-states, Tito’s Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria preserved Lenin’s formula of a ‘separation of the church from the state,’ they did not bring church-state relations closer to the western model. In fact, postcommunist legislation has weakened the principle of separation in the case of the local Orthodox churches by emphasizing their traditional nature or historical roles” (Kalkandjieva, 2011: 609).

Riedel rhetorically asks: “[W]hy most of the former socialist countries have not changed their authoritarian laicism in favour of a neutral one but established new cooperationist models of church-state relations,” and immediately responds that “[t]he answer lies in the political activities of religious communities during the transition period as a part of the civil society struggle against authoritarian governments. Either they were not willing to abandon political engagement after achieving a real system change or they considered the transition period as an opportunity to recover their lost influence in society” (Riedel, 2008: 263). Though this observation appears to be particularly valid for the Orthodox majority post-communist Eastern European countries, some of the Catholic majority states (foremost Croatia and Poland) also fit the picture.

Furthermore, from the perspective of governance of religion in post-communist Eastern Europe, as Gunn argues, “[t]hose who are responsible for regulating religion...will often see ‘neutrality,’ ‘equality’ and ‘nondiscrimination’ not through some relatively ‘objective’ lens, but through the rose-colored glasses of the founding myths and perceived identities” (Gunn, 2006: 37). These founding myths and perceived identities, as is shown in the next chapter, often conflate ethnicity, religion, and nation into one leading to religious nationalism, all at the expense of those who do not fit the framework of the perceived national identity based on the founding myth.

Our own research findings on state-religion relations in post-communist Eastern European countries corroborate Kalkandjieva’s conclusion; this, however, does not imply that non-Christian religious communities have not been formally accorded religious rights. Rather, as Elbasani argues, basing on her research in the Balkans, “[i]n line with their democratic aspirations, all post-communist states have allocated new religious freedoms, while taking the lead in closely managing the emerging religious groups and activities. Institutionally, post-communist states have continued to ‘administer’ religious organisations by preserving a multi-tiered system of registrations and institutional controls, subject to unilaterally revocable conditions” (Elbasani, 2016: 257). On the other hand, though her observations are true for most of the

post-communist Eastern European countries, looking broadly and beyond the Balkans, one may notice that at least several of them seem not to have followed this trail, with Estonia and Ukraine, arguably, the most liberal regimes of governance of religion, being the obvious examples.

The post-communist Eastern European states, due to their enacted legislation giving the basis for the governance of religion, may be clustered into several groups, which, admittedly, are more Weberian ideal types, in practice overlapping with each other and at the same time differing internally. The ideal-type groups are:

1. though, notably, no state in post-communist Eastern Europe has an official state religion, there is a significant group of countries that have an unofficial (semi-established) state religion (among others regarded by the State as “traditional” or as the sole “traditional”): Moldova, Romania, Russia, Belarus, Serbia, Bulgaria, North Macedonia;
2. states that have a number of officially recognized “traditional” religions without formally prioritizing any one among them: Montenegro, Albania, Latvia, Poland, Bosnia, Lithuania;
3. states that have unofficial “traditional” religions: Ukraine, Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo;
4. states that have neither official nor unofficial state or “traditional” religions: Estonia, Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary.

Compared to the models of governance of religion and state-religion relations in Western Europe, one may argue that the first category is a soft version of the “state church” system, but only in the cases where the Orthodox Church is recognized by the constitution or a *lex specialis* as the representative of the national or traditional confession. Hence, countries falling under this category may be grouped only very tentatively, as both the formal and actual status of the Orthodox Church in, for instance, North Macedonia, differs significantly from that in Romania or Belarus, where it is closer to the second category. The second and third categories represent the “cooperation” or “hybrid” system, while the fourth is a chrestomathic example of the “separation” or “secular” system. One, therefore, may conclude that although in terms of the governance of religion, post-communist Eastern European states may be conditionally placed into the models operationalized to explain the state-religion relations in Western Europe, the reality on the ground is much more complex and fluid than these ideal types would suggest. The main difference from the Western European models of formalized state-religion relations in Eastern Europe is that the states (with the exception of those falling under the fourth category) recognize multiple “traditional” religions, something that is practically non-existent in Western Europe. Moreover, some countries (Serbia, Lithuania, and

TABLE 4 Status of religions in Eastern Europe

<b>Semi-established state confession</b>	<b>Officially recognized “traditional” religions</b>	<b>Unofficial “traditional” religions</b>	<b>No “traditional” religions</b>
Belarus	Latvia	Ukraine	Estonia
Serbia	Montenegro	Slovenia	Slovakia
Moldova	Albania	Croatia	
Romania		Kosovo	<b>Czechia</b>
Russia	<b>Poland</b>		<b>Hungary</b>
<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>Bosnia</b>		
<b>North Macedonia</b>	<b>Lithuania</b>		

Note: countries under research in this book are in bold.

COMPILED BY AUTHOR

Romania) use a two-tier or even three-tier system of registration of religious organizations, (Schanda, 2010: 159). where, as a rule, “traditional” religious groups have much more favorable conditions compared to “non-traditional.”

Anderson questions “the appropriateness of ‘privileging’ particular religious organisations in a liberal democratic setting where constitutional orders normally promise equality regardless of religious faith and where in most cases only a minority of the population are practicing members of a single religious community” (Anderson, 2003: 6). In his remark, Anderson draws attention to a very valid point, particularly in the Eastern European context; though nominally (according to the censuses), members of the leading “traditional” faith may make a clear majority of the population of the country, in practical terms (in the actual practicing of their religion through religious rituals and other duties), they make a minority (though, likely, a biggest one among other minorities) in the overall population (Pew, 2017b). And although Anderson contends that “[c]learly the privileging or establishment of one religious group does not in and of itself necessitate discrimination against others” (Anderson, 2003: 8), such privileging/establishment (particularly in the form of “traditional” religion) may, and indeed does, as is shown with the case of Islam in Eastern Europe further below, create conditions for religious discrimination.

One may notice that while the countries falling into the last category (“separation”/“secular” system) are all of Western Christian (Catholic) heritage

with no historical (autochthonous) Muslim communities, those in the second and third categories include not only Catholic and Orthodox Christian majority countries, but also Muslim majority countries. The first category (“state church” system) is comprised exclusively of Orthodox majority countries, all with the exception of Moldova, having historical (autochthonous) Muslim communities. Since all these different models (or systems) inevitably produce, at times profoundly, different practical outcomes of the governance of religion in this part of Europe, it may be expected that there is not a uniform regime of governance of Islam in post-communist Eastern Europe, but rather a plethora of regimes. As Astor aptly observes, “[t]he influence of modelling practices on the governance of Islam is especially important to consider in newly emerging democracies seeking to solidify their status as modern, progressive nation-states. In such settings, approaches to regulating religious diversity inherited from the past may be politically untenable or at odds with accepted international norms” (Astor, 2014: 1718). However, as is evident from numerous court cases, involving various religious collectivities, including but not limited to Muslim ones, the new practical approaches to regulating religious diversity by governments in post-communist Eastern Europe, in fact, are often at odds with accepted international norms. This is dealt with in detail in Chapter 5.

Indeed, in many post-communist Eastern European countries, as Elbasani argues, “[r]e-regulating the relationship between the state and Muslim communities proved especially complicated in the context of exclusive national paradigms, long-running ethno-religious animosities, oft-fabricated collective memories, and the inherited majoritarian ‘traditions’” (Elbasani, 2017: 5). In none of the Eastern European states is Islam recognized as a state religion, as all of the Muslim majority countries in the region (namely, Kosovo, Albania, and, tentatively, Bosnia) in their constitutions one or another way declare themselves secular and without state (official) religion. Furthermore, none of these three constitutions even refer to Islam, at the same time affirming constitutional equality among religions in respective countries.

However, in a range of post-communist Eastern European countries, Islam, nonetheless, is recognized as a “traditional” religion, either in the constitution, by a *lex specialis*, or by bilateral state-Muslim agreement. These include Russia, Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia. In several states (including Muslim majority Albania), Islam (first of all, in its legalist form but also in such a heterodox form as Bektashism) is regarded as a “traditional” religion, though there is no specific legislation making this official. So, for instance, in Ukraine, where Muslim Crimean Tatars have been living for more than half a millennium, Islam (in the forms practiced by Tatars) is generally accepted as traditional to the country, though there

is no explicit official endorsement of this in any legal act. In Bulgaria, the law on religions “expresses respect” for Islam, next to the other two named religions, namely, Christianity and Judaism.

The fact that in a number of post-communist Eastern European states Islam is recognized officially (and in a number unofficially) as a traditional religion, when talking about governance of Islam, makes the Eastern European context significantly different from the Western European. Designating Islam as a “traditional” religion may mean that the State recognizes Islam, through its followers and their representative organizations, as “indigenous” (as opposed to the universal view of Islam in Western Europe as alien, and therefore in need of domestication). For instance, the Lithuanian Constitutional Court has argued that by passing the law on religions, the Parliament merely acknowledged that Sunni Islam is a traditional religion in Lithuania rather than establishing it as such: “The constitutional establishment of the institute of recognition of churches and religious organisations as traditional means that such recognition by the state is irrevocable. Tradition is neither created nor abolished by an act of the will of the legislature. The naming of churches and religious organisations as traditional is not an act of their establishment as traditional organisations but an act stating both their tradition and the status of their relations with society, which does not depend on the willpower of the legislature” (Constitutional, 2007). Arguing in this vein, Islam may not be purposefully domesticated by the State, as it is already domestic by virtue of having been present in the country for centuries. Though the Lithuanian case may be exceptional and one of the more extreme (the other similar cases being Polish and Belarusian), it nonetheless is symptomatic and representative of the differences in governance of Islam between Western and Eastern Europe. Recognition of Islam as traditional may also mean that the very act of recognition of Islam as a traditional religion is, on the side of the State, an act of its domestication or completion of the process of domestication. But this is possible only in countries with a system of traditional religions where Islam is not (yet) recognized as traditional. Latvia could be an example, though admittedly more theoretical than practical.

Governance of Islam in Eastern Europe very much like in Western Europe, is based on and executed through legal regulation of its institutionalization, which itself is an expression of “accommodation” or “domestication.” However, in those Eastern European countries where there is a national (though not officially state) religion or Church, which is locally seen as a foundational part of the very nation of that country, there sometimes might be inherent obstacles that do not allow for full exercise of freedom, cooperation, and autonomy in the relations between the State and religions. Moldovan and North Macedonian Orthodox Churches are powerful, yet openly hostile to Islam and Muslims,

and are two obvious cases but other countries (for instance, Serbia and Bulgaria) may also be added.

Top-down led institutionalization of Islam, rather than the desired accommodation, may, and indeed in post-communist Eastern Europe does, become co-optation and serves as part of the “churchification” of Islam, when the State expects that representative Muslim organizations model themselves after and function like... Christian Churches with their ecclesiastical hierarchical structures. Though this state-pursued strategy of churchification of Islam is not universal in Eastern Europe, one may discern its features in half a dozen post-communist Eastern European countries, for instance, Bosnia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Bulgaria and several others. What is understood here as churchification, is the requirement or at least expectation on the State’s side that national Muslim communities found representative religious organizations headed by spiritual authorities, who not only serve as interlocutors between the State and the Muslim population, but also as the sole (hierarchically structured) ecclesiastical institutions, staffed by professional religious servants of different ranks in subordination to each other.

In a number of cases, in its governance of Islam, with the aim to co-opt but also to enable its control, the State expects (through setting legal requirements) that Muslims form a unitary (umbrella) religious organization to represent all Muslims of the country—irrespective of their denomination, background or ideology. Hungary, Serbia, Latvia, North Macedonia and Slovakia are representatives of this approach by the State, all in their own ways. So, for instance, in Latvia the law requires religious communities to form representative bodies on the basis of “one body per religion/confession.” But to do that, there have to be no less than ten registered congregations of that particular religion. As Muslims may have only one representative religious organization (association), it would have to either unite disparate registered Muslim religious congregations of different nature (denomination or ideology-wise) or be representative of just one particular denomination or ideology, but at the expense of all others. There has been no attempt to form such a representative Muslim religious association in the country.

In Hungary, after the promulgation of a new law on religions, Muslims were forced to come up with a representative body; so the two major Muslim religious organizations (the Hungarian Muslim Church and the Islamic Community of Hungary) in 2012 joined together to form such a representative Muslim umbrella body, the Hungarian Islamic Council, which although not a legal entity, has been recognized by the State as the highest Islamic religious collectivity in the country. In Serbia, there are at least two rival Muslim religious organizations which claim to be representative of the country’s Muslim

population; however, none is fully recognized as such by the State. In North Macedonia, Bektashis have failed to secure the State's permission to form their independent representative organization. Finally, in Slovakia, in order to register a religious organization, Muslims have to produce a membership list with 50,000 adult signatories, who need to be citizens of Slovakia and permanently residing in the country. In a country, where the total estimated number of people of Muslim cultural background is 5,000, such a requirement is impossible to implement. Thus, in Slovakia, institutionalization (let alone any accommodation) of Islam in the foreseeable future is out of the equation.

There is an argument that “[t]he overall proportion of Muslims also plays a decisive role: the greater the number of Muslims, the greater the recognition by the state of a representative body” (Godard, 2007: 183). However, this is not necessarily always the case. For instance, in Lithuania, Poland, and Belarus, religious organizations of autochthonous Muslim Tatars (having membership of just several thousand) are recognized by the State as representative bodies of the respective countries’ (entire) Muslim populations, though numerically they do not make majorities (in fact, Tatars are estimated to make up just a tenth of the Muslim population in both Poland and Belarus, while in Lithuania they make up half of the Muslim population in the country). On the other hand, though Muslims constitute a third of North Macedonia’s population, for the first decade of its independence, the State did not recognize Islam as one of the traditional religions in the country. This was done, by mentioning it in the Constitution next to Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant Christianity, and Judaism, only in the wake of an armed uprising by the Albanian minority who make the bulk of the country’s Muslim population. In Kosovo, where citizens of Muslim background make the overall majority, Muslim religious organizations to this day have to operate as NGOs because the State has failed to register them as religious organizations.

Ferrari argues that “the need for structured representation at the national level is alien to the Islamic tradition and it thus seems unusual for many Muslims who come from countries where the relationships between state and religion are not organized according to such a model” (Ferrari, 2010: 22). Though he may be right, both from the historical point of view in regards to both Muslim majority countries and Western Europe, such an argument is not sustainable in the case of autochthonous Muslim communities in Eastern Europe; in these countries, in many cases, there has been some sort of structured representation at the national level for decades (and in the Russian case, for centuries), sometimes since the founding of the very sovereign nation states (in most of the Balkan states but also Lithuania and Poland) or even earlier (as in Bosnia). Eastern Europe is different from Western Europe not only in that

Islam in many Eastern European countries has been institutionalized a long time ago, but that the State has recognized representative Muslim religious organizations (couched in spiritual administrations headed by (chief) mufti).

However, the challenge that has emerged is that some Muslim groups reject the authority of Muslim religious organizations recognized by the State as representative of the entire Muslim population in the country; they seek to register their own (independent) religious organizations which then aspire to rival the older established ones in their aspirations to being representative of the country's Muslims and to play the role of interlocutors between the State and Muslims. As Elbasani aptly observes, “[f]rom Bulgaria to Bosnia and Albania, the formalization of religious freedom triggered the fragmentation of the Islamic scene into autonomous groups of faithful, which sometimes complement but at other times compete with the ‘official’ traditional strand of Islam in terms of the organizational structure, relations to the state and religious doctrine” (Elbasani, 2017: 15). This is very much true of other, non-Balkan, post-communist Eastern European states. Poland is probably the best example, but Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia, and Romania also fit the pattern—in all of these countries, there are parallel, if not rival, Muslim religious organizations claiming to be representative of, if not the entire Muslim populations, then the majority of them, which seek recognition by the State as such.

The collapse of both the USSR and socialist Yugoslavia set in motion a process of the nationalization of Islam in newly formed states. It was particularly expressed in the successor states of Yugoslavia, but is also discernible in such former constituent Soviet republics like Lithuania and Belarus. Though spearheaded by national representative Muslim religious organizations, this process of the nationalization of Islam was very much supported and at times pushed for by state authorities themselves. While Bosnia and Kosovo—Muslim majority countries—are the two most obvious examples, Serbia, North Macedonia, and Montenegro are other instances of the nationalization of Islam through institutionalization, when formerly pan-Yugoslav Muslim religious organizations became not only national but practically autocephalous, in a process reminiscent of earlier autocephalization of Orthodox Churches in this part of Europe. Thus, Islam did not merely become Islam in... Serbia, Montenegro, or Bulgaria but rather Islam of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, if not altogether Serbian, Montenegrin, or Bulgarian Islam. Ultimately, in the Eastern European realm, the institutionalization of Islam, along with its co-optation and bringing it under state control, served the purpose of its nationalization, a secondary “domestication.” Therefore, the earlier referred to observation that “religion policy in particular allows European governments to gradually take ‘ownership’ of their Muslim populations because it grants them unique influence

over organizations and leadership within this hard-to-reach minority” (Laurence, 2012: 12), is very relevant in the post-communist Eastern European context.

Furthermore, the governance of Islam in countries with autochthonous Muslim communities (with their various forms of Islamic religiosity) significantly differs from governance of Islam in Western Europe also in that, though not universally, in many parts of Eastern Europe “nationalized” Islam is often pitted against forms of Islamic religiosity deemed alien. This way, groups espousing revivalist Islam (such as Salafis or Islamists) sometimes tend to be doubly marginalized and excluded—first by state-recognized representative Muslim religious organizations, then by the states themselves, out of security concerns but often on advice from representative organizations. Ultimately, there is a tentative tandem emerging between the dominant Muslim religious organizations, as a rule run by the autochthonous Muslims, and the State to control, marginalize (often through securitization) and, if need be, eradicate unwelcome forms of Islamic religiosity. With followers of non-indigenous forms of Islamic religiosity still being in a clear minority, such an approach may work. However, if and when Muslims of Salafi and other revivalist leanings grow in numbers (through converts, immigrants, and even autochthon Muslims), the balance of power may be, if not immediately upset, then at least formidably challenged. Then the states in Eastern Europe may need to reconsider their practiced models of state-religion relations, and particularly the governance of Islam.

Though it may be argued that, if willing, the patterns of state-religion relations and governance of Islam in Eastern Europe may be placed into a three-fold analytical system applied in research on state-religion relations in Western Europe, by doing so one would have to ignore the multiple aspects peculiar to Eastern Europe, not least of which is the recognition of Islam practiced by autochthonous Muslim populations in some Eastern European states as a “traditional” religion in the respective country. At the same time, the accommodation or domestication of Islam, often talked about in research on Islam in Western Europe, takes on a different course than in Western Europe, not only because of the different origins and nature of Islam and Muslims in most Eastern European countries, but because the nation- and state-building processes there often involve a religious dimension; in a number of Eastern European countries autocephalous Orthodox Churches are tied to the national identity with Islam often being seen as anti-thesis to the very nationhood of the states under question.

Therefore, in many, if not most, post-communist Eastern European states, one sees a substantial involvement of the State in seeking to mold Islam (and

its representative organizations) into forms acceptable to the State. Often, this is being done by co-opting the Islamic leadership through recognition of their religious organizations as representative of the entire Muslim population of the country, this way endorsing the chosen form of Islamic religiosity as almost official Islam in the State, all at the expense of other forms of Islamic religiosity. As Elbasani argues, “[t]he way in which institutions, interpretations, and legitimising arguments have developed in post-communist contexts (...) reflects the crucial role of the state in establishing, framing, and maintaining an organised ‘religious field.’ This organised ‘field’ implies collaboration between state institutions, intellectual circles, and nationwide religious hierarchies in enforcing ‘official’ versions of Islam, which develop in tandem with government exigencies and policies” (Elbasani, 2016: 254). In this regard, post-communist Eastern Europe is once again markedly different in its governance of religion (including Islam) from Western Europe.

Finally, state-Islam relations and the governance of Islam in Eastern Europe have so far not been greatly affected by immigration (the exceptions being Central European states), when incoming Muslims bring their own forms of Islamic religiosity, which they see as traditional (normative) to their contexts and which they may want to institutionalize alongside the established forms of Islamic religiosity historically practiced in the region. In the current constellation of state-Islam relations, they may find this very difficult if not impossible altogether, as they need to position themselves against both the “representative” Muslim religious organizations and the State. If and when this happens, Martikainen’s caution that “strong state involvement can lead to the clientization of immigrants as well as to a pathologization of cultural and social difference” and that “with time, these processes may create permanent structures that support the status quo, in which many people of immigrant background are in a disadvantaged position” (Martikainen, 2007: 258), may also become relevant in Eastern Europe.

Drawing on Fetzer and Soper (2005), Maussen argues that in the study of the causal relationship between “the forms and degrees of accommodation of religious needs” and the “policy legacy left by a country’s history of church-state patterns,” one needs to focus on “(1) the more formal constitutional, institutional and legal framework, which creates robust constraints and opportunities; (2) the political argumentations and forms of public reasoning and the ways Muslims (and other stake-holders) (explicitly) make references to the ‘national model’ and to prevailing church-state practices in order to legitimize public demands (or to oppose them) and the structuring of political arguments in national contexts that results from these ongoing processes of public debate; and (3) the ways interpretations and ideas about ‘national models’ and

church-state practices are being interpreted, drawn upon and applied by public officials and administrators who occupy key positions when it comes to the implementation of policies in institutions where church-state conflicts around Islam arise" (Maussen, 2007: 50 – 51). By this Maussen (as Fetzer and Soper before him) makes a direct link between the present regimes of governance of religion and the historical legacy, in the case of Eastern Europe, covering both the pre-communist and recent communist periods. The analysis in the following Chapters 5 and 6 roughly follows the three aspects identified by Maussen.

## Three Levels of (Non)Accommodation of Islam in Eastern Europe

### 5.1 Legal Level

The legal basis for the governance of religion (including Islam), and, arguably, by extension, the top-down churchification or securitization of Islam, in the post-communist Eastern European countries under investigation is laid down first of all in the national constitutions. However, as constitutions, in general, tend to be concise documents, attention to religious matters in them is usually very limited and basic. Most countries have a special law (*lex specialis*) devoted to the governance of religions. These special laws are perceived to be a detailed expose of and elaboration of the constitutional norms. However, as is noted by legal experts, it sometimes happens that the law in some of its injunctions appears to contradict the national constitution. In such cases, it is referred to the Constitutional Court, the decisions of which bind the two documents into a single doctrine. The Constitutional Court decisions either endorse the law's injunctions found to appear to be unconstitutional, or state that the law has deficiencies to be remedied in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Constitution. For this and other (political) reasons, national laws on religious governance are regularly amended. Sometimes, even constitutional clauses on religious matters get amended, as happened in 2001 with the North Macedonian Constitution. As the legal level, in view of the proposed analytical model (Figure 2), is deemed to be the first level of the churchification and securitization of Islam, the present section presents the sum of national constitutional norms, injunctions of *lex specialis* and Constitutional Court decisions pertaining to the governance of religion (and particularly, Islam), which are found to be relevant for the analysis of the churchification and securitization of Islam in the countries under investigation.

The Constitutions<sup>1</sup> of all countries under research one or another way make clear that the states are secular (for instance, Art. 13.2. of the Bulgarian

---

1 The texts of Constitutions are drawn from the Constitute database ([constituteproject.org](http://constituteproject.org)). The latest version of the Hungarian Constitution, which over the course of its short life has already seen numerous amendments, including several pertaining to the registration and status of religious collectivities, is taken from the Hungarian government's site

Constitution declares: “Religious institutions shall be separate from the state”; Art. 7.3. of the Hungarian Constitution reads: “The State and religious communities shall operate separately”; and Art. 19 of the North Macedonian Constitution states: “The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are separate from the state”). Such constitutional norms, however, have been challenged by some religious organizations. So, for example, Anderson reports that the Catholic Church in Poland intervened in the constitutional debate: “When a full constitution was finally debated in 1995 – 97 the [Catholic] Church sought to include some reference to God and natural law in the preamble, to prevent the use of the word ‘separation’ in reference to church-state relations, and to introduce a constitutional guarantee of the right to life from the moment of conception” (Anderson, 2000: 4).

Some Constitutions also explicitly state that religious communities are autonomous. For instance, the Hungarian Constitution (Art. 7.3.) states that “Religious communities shall be autonomous” and the Polish Constitution (Art. 25.3.) also acknowledges autonomy of churches and other religious organizations. Moreover, equality among religions (or rather citizens with different faiths) is firmly established (for instance, in Art. 4 of the Bosnian, Art. 6.2. of the Bulgarian, Art. 15.2. of the Hungarian, Art. 29 of the Lithuanian, Art. 19 of the North Macedonian, and Art. 25.1. of the Polish Constitution). Consequently, no Constitution establishes any religious tradition as official/ state religion.

However, at the same time, some Constitutions name particular religious tradition(s) or organizations, intrinsically, if not elevating them above all others, making them *primus inter pares*. So, for instance, while the the Preamble of the Polish Constitution acknowledges “the Christian heritage of the Nation,” the Hungarian Constitution not only “recognize[s] the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood” in its Preamble but also commands (Art. R.4.) that “The protection of the constitutional identity and Christian culture of Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the State,” the Bulgarian Constitution (Art. 13) mentions Eastern Orthodox Christianity and the North Macedonian Constitution (Art. 19) mentions the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, Evangelical Methodist Church, and the Jewish Community.<sup>2</sup> It may be mentioned that the Constitution of Republika Srpska, a constituent entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, specifically mentions (Art. 28) the Serbian Orthodox Church as “the church of

---

([http://www.kormany.hu/download/f/3e/61000/TheFundamentalLawofHungary\\_20180629\\_FIN.pdf](http://www.kormany.hu/download/f/3e/61000/TheFundamentalLawofHungary_20180629_FIN.pdf)). Accessed February 25, 2019.

2 The original version of the Constitution adopted in 1991 named only the Macedonian Orthodox Church.

the Serb people and other people of Orthodox religion.” An earlier version of it even stipulated that “[t]he state provides material assistance to the Orthodox Church”; this clause, however, has been removed through a Bosnian Constitutional Court’s decision.

Such positive exclusion of some religious traditions and organizations implies their being, if not official/state religions, then “traditional”/“historical” to the country. Most explicitly this is done in the Bulgarian Constitution where in Art. 13.3, it is declared that “Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria.” Grekova et al. argue that “[t]he designation of the Orthodox Christianity as a ‘traditional’ religion in Bulgaria on the one hand avoids the politically incorrect label of ‘official religion,’ but on the other firmly asserts that the Orthodox Christianity is the religion of Bulgarians, regardless of the fact that Bulgarian citizens profess other religions as well” (Grekova et al., n.d.: 5). The Lithuanian Constitution (Art. 43) states that “The State shall recognise the churches and religious organization[s] that are traditional in Lithuania” but does not name any, leaving this for the *lex specialis*.

Thus, from the constitutional point of view, the countries under investigation fall into one of two broad categories—those (Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Poland) that have an expressed constitutional notion of traditional religions/religious organizations, and those (Bosnia and Czechia) that do not have it (either at all or disclosed). For the purposes of the present research, Islam (in the person of the Islamic Religious Community in North Macedonia) is included among traditional religions only in the North Macedonian Constitution, and only since the 2001 armed conflict between the overwhelmingly Muslim Albanian minority (comprising a third of the population) and the predominantly Christian Orthodox Macedonian majority. In several countries, as is shown further below, the *lex specialis* makes the situation somewhat more complex.

Several Constitutions foresee cooperation between the State and religious communities. So, for instance, the Hungarian Constitution (Art. 7.4.) allows that “The State and religious communities may cooperate to achieve community goals. At the request of a religious community, the National Assembly shall decide on such cooperation. The religious communities participating in such cooperation shall operate as established churches. The State shall provide specific privileges to established churches with regard to their participation in the fulfilment of tasks that serve to achieve community goals.” Likewise, the Polish Constitution (Art. 25.3.) states that the relationship between the State and churches and other religious organizations shall be based “on the principle of cooperation for the individual and the common good.”

Finally, though freedom of religion is declared inviolable (for instance, Art. 37.1. of the Bulgarian, Art. 7.1. of the Hungarian, and Art. 26 of the Lithuanian Constitution), some Constitutions have clauses that permit the State to restrict this freedom. So, for instance, the Lithuanian Constitution (Art. 26) states that “[f]reedom of a human being to profess and spread his religion or belief may not be limited otherwise than by law and only when this is necessary to guarantee the security of society, the public order, the health and morals of the people as well as other basic rights and freedoms of the person.” The Polish Constitution (Art. 31.3) has a similar but broader clause pertaining to security. The Bulgarian Constitution (Art. 37.2.) goes a step further by establishing that “[t]he freedom of conscience and religion shall not be practised to the detriment of national security, public order, public health and morals, or of the rights and freedoms of others.” In Krussteff’s opinion, this limitation clause “poses a complex problem in theory and practice. (...), in contrast to international standards, it includes *national security* as grounds for limitation. Requirements of ICCPR and the ECHR—limitations to be prescribed by law, proportional, and necessary in a democratic society—are missing” (Krussteff, n.d.a). The inclusion of national security as grounds for limitation may be seen as reminiscent of legal frameworks on non-democratic states (and this apparently is Krussteff’s concern), but for the purposes of the present research, limitation clauses, and particularly those that include “national security,” may be seen as laying ground for the securitization of religion (or, more precisely, certain religious collectivities, particularly non-registered).

Constitutional provisions on state-religion relations are further elaborated in respective *lex specialis*, which, for the sake of simplicity, henceforth will be referred to as “law on religions.” Such law, in one form or another, existed in virtually all countries under investigation during the communist period. However, while in some countries it was swiftly either overhauled or altogether replaced with a new one, in others it remained in force until rather late. So, for instance, Poland adopted a new law on religions as early as 1989, in the middle of regime transformations, which, albeit with numerous amendments, was in force at the time of writing (2019). Lithuania passed its post-communist law on religions (still in force as of 2019) in 1995, while in Bulgaria, Bosnia, Czechia, and North Macedonia current laws on religions date back to the early and mid-2000s. In Bulgaria, a communist era law on religions of 1949 was in use (albeit with some post-1989 amendments) until 2003, when the current law came into force. As Krussteff observes, “the 1949 Law on Religious Denominations continued to be anachronistically in force (...), having been created during the most sinister period of the communist regime in Bulgaria. Indeed, some of its most restrictive provisions were indicated as anticonstitutional with Decision

No. 5 of 1992 of the Constitutional Court, but the rest of that law continue[d] to be enforced unimpeded, retaining great control and regulatory powers of the executive branch with respect to the religious life in the country” (Krussteff, n.d.b). Hungary adopted a new law on religions in 2011 (replacing the one of 1990) but at the end of 2018 completely overhauled it.

Practically all laws on religions under investigation have had their critics, both from within the (minority) religious communities and from legal experts. The Hungarian law seems to have caused most negative reaction inside and outside Hungary. In reaction to both the external (first of all, on the level of pan-European institutions) and internal criticism and pressure, as well as the Constitutional Court’s decision ruling parts of the law unconstitutional, the government has several times proposed amendments, which, however, failed to pass in the Parliament. Latest amendments were passed by the Parliament in late 2018. But it is not only the latest law that has received unfavorable opinions: the earlier law also drew criticism from politicians and some legal experts, in particular, for being alleged permeated by “pro-religious liberalism” (Enyedi, 2003: 155.). The critics decried the law for allowing not only registration of New Religious Movements but of essentially business ventures.<sup>3</sup> Schanda has argued that “[t]he easy accessibility of the legal entity ‘church’ has turned out to be in fact an invitation to various controversial groups and even to doubtful commercial undertakings to get this privileged status” (Schanda, 2002: 352). This has happened, according to him, because, “[a]s churches can be founded for exercising a religion, when judges decide on the registration of the group, their decision inherently acknowledges the religious character of the group concerned. Until the present time the procedure of registration was highly formal and judges did not enter into substantive issues. Consequently, even groups like the Scientologists that are not regarded as religious in most European countries are registered as ‘churches’ in Hungary” (Schanda, 2002: 348).

The various versions of Bulgarian law on religions also saw their critics both before and after the passing into force.<sup>4</sup> Like in Hungary, the Bulgarian Parliament passed major amendments to the Bulgarian law on religions in the very end of 2018, with some more amendments passed in the spring of 2019. The Lithuanian Parliament has also considered twice amending existing law on religions but on both occasions abandoned the attempts.

3 Interview with Fischl Vilmos, Lutheran priest, Head of the Ecumenical Council of Hungarian Churches, Budapest, October 3, 2018.

4 For the critique of the Bulgarian law on religions, see Krussteff, n.d.b; Petkoff, 2010; Evstatiev, 2019: 94; also Hajdinjak, 2005: 388 – 391.

After reiterating the general clauses on religious freedom, separation of State and religion, equality among religious communities, the laws on religions subsequently dwell in detail on governance of religion in respective countries. First, they establish distinctions among religious collectivities of different nature. So, for instance, the North Macedonian law, in its very title, implies a distinction among churches, religious communities, and religious groups. Unfortunately, the difference remains unexplained in the text of the law. As noted by Metaj-Stojanova, “the law does not make any distinction in the legal status between a church, a religious community, and a religious group. All three entities are apparently treated alike” (Metaj-Stojanova, 2015: 161). The interviewed experts in North Macedonia could not explain the difference among them either. Nonetheless, in practice there are religious organizations registered precisely under these three categories (Commission, n.d.). Similarly, the Lithuanian law in its title nominally distinguished between “religious associations” and “religious communities” but, like the North Macedonian, fails to establish that distinction in its text. Polish law (Art. 2.1.) implies a distinction between “churches” and “other religious associations” but nowhere in the body text explains it either.

Although Hungarian law distinguishes between churches, denominations, and religious communities, throughout the text it lumps them all under the label “church.” Art 7.1 of the law reads: “A church, denomination or religious community (hereinafter referred to as ‘church’) shall be an autonomous organisation recognised by Parliament, consisting of natural persons sharing the same principles of faith; it shall be self-governed; it shall be established and shall operate primarily for the purpose of practicing religious activities.” Schanda, himself a constitutional law expert and a Constitutional Court justice, notes that the generically used term “church” throughout the body text of the law, *inter alia*, “covers religious groups that do not regard themselves to be ‘churches’ in respect of their theological understanding” (Schanda, 2002: 348), and then argues that “[r]eligious communities may apply any of the legal organizational forms compatible with their activities, but they are not obliged to do so. It is important to underline that neither the private nor the collective exercise of religion is bound to any legal-organizational form. Rather, it is ensured to everyone and every registered and unregistered group equally. A religious group registered as a ‘church’ enjoys the same religious freedom and protection as a religious group registered as an association or a religious group that is not registered at all. Differences in registration are more of symbolic value rather than factual differences in rights and obligations” (Schanda, 2002: 349).

The Bulgarian law refers to religious collectivities as “religious denominations” (Bul. вероизповедание, *veroizpovedaniye*). But, as Petkoff notes,

“[f]or the purposes of the Denominations Act 2002 the term ‘religious denomination’ designates the sum of religious beliefs and principles, the religious community itself and its religious institutions” (Petkoff, 2010: 156). On the other hand, the law, in Additional Provisions, makes a distinction between a religious community and a religious institution: “1. ‘Religion’ is the combination of belief convictions and principles, the religious community and its religious institution. 2. ‘Religious community’ is a voluntary union of individuals for professing of given religion, implementing of divine service, religious ceremonies and rituals. 3. ‘Religious institution’ is the religious community, registered in compliance with the Law of the religions, which has the quality of corporate body, its management bodies and statute.” Bosnian law (Art. 2.3.) defines churches and religious communities as “communities, institutions or organizations of believers founded in accordance with their own precepts and regulations, doctrines, beliefs, traditions and practices, and of which the legal personality is recognized and which are registered in the Register of Churches and religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina”; in Czech law (Art. 3.a.), churches and religious societies are defined as “voluntary associations of persons with its own structure, organs and internal rules, religious worship and expressions of faith, established for the purpose of public or private expression of a specific faith and, in particular, having collective assembly, divine service, instruction and spiritual service”; in North Macedonian law (Art. 2.1.), churches, religious communities and religious groups are understood to be “voluntary communit[ies] of physical personalities that exercise the freedom of religion through their religious beliefs and the sources of their teaching, united by religion and identity reflected with equal performance of religious service, prayer, rites and other forms of manifestation of one’s religion”; Polish law (Art. 2.1.) describes churches and other religious associations as those which are “established for the purpose of professing and spreading religious faith, having their own system, doctrine and worship rituals”; and Lithuanian law (Art. 4.) considers religious communities to be “group[s] of individuals seeking to implement the objectives of the same religion,” while religious associations as “unions of churches and equivalent religious organizations, namely, communities, seeking to implement the objectives of the same religion.” It also introduces the concept of “religious centre,” which is defined as a “higher governing bod[y] of religious associations.”

All the different labels accorded religious collectivities in laws on religions bring back not only the general question of what is and what makes a religion, but also the distinctions among and contents of labels such as “church,” “religious group” “religious community,” “religious denomination” and even (albeit more by extension) “sect” and “cult,” discussed in Chapter 1. As Schanda

correctly notes, in the Hungarian case, “[c]ertainly a ‘church’ does not have to call itself a ‘church’ to be so registered” (Schanda, 2002: 348). And vice versa. Thus, as Kříž, talking about the Czech case, notes, in the Czech law on religions, the word “church” does not imply Christian religion and each religion may use the term the way it suits them.<sup>5</sup> In general, as discussed above, the laws on religions in the countries under investigation pay very little attention, if at all, to the sociological typology of religious collectivities and certainly ignore both the classical Weberian-Troeltschian typology, and the later critique and development of it. Therefore, any (including non-Christian) religious collectivity can become a “church” in Hungary or a “denomination” in Bulgaria. This has incidentally happened to Muslim religious organizations in the two countries.

It may be noted that neither the term “sect” nor the term “cult” are used in the laws under investigation. This is in a big part due to the fact that both labels have exceptionally negative connotations in post-communist Eastern Europe, and are customarily applied to anti-systemic (or perceived as such) religious groups (first of all in the person of New Religious Movements) that are either routinely denied state registration or themselves do not seek it. So, although, in the contemporary Eastern European context, the two labels may be seen as quazi-legal terms, they are more political terms than anything else and certainly not sociological analytical categories. But it is not the labels that matter here but rather the internal structures of religious collectivities that make them into sociologically understood “churches,” “denominations,” “congregations,” “sects” or “cults.” The laws on religions, through registration requirements, expectations for internal structures and regulation of religious training of “clergy” and their public activities, inadvertently push religious collectivities into assuming sociologically definable church-like, denomination-like or sect-like features.

Laws on religions carry over, whenever applicable, the constitutional notion of “traditional” religious communities/organizations. So, Bulgarian law on religions not only reiterates the traditionality of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, established in the Constitution, but in its Preamble “under[ies] the special and traditional role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the history of Bulgaria in the formation and development of its spirit and culture,” this way, as argued by Kalkandjieva, “confir[ing] Orthodoxy to a national or even nationalistic frame” (Kalkandjieva, 2006: 110). Art. 10 provides a grounding for it: “(1) Traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria is the East Orthodox. It has historic role for the Bulgarian state and actual significance for its state life.”

---

5 Interview with Jakub Kříž, a legal expert, Prague, October 1, 2018.

Thus, the law names the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as its expression and representative, effectively making it into a “quasiestablished church” (Petkoff, 2010: 151). Commenting on Art. 10 of the Bulgarian law on religions, establishing the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as the traditional denomination, Petkoff intimates that he does “not think that the legislators could have got any closer to a clear concept of established church in a parliamentary democracy. Although explicit establishment on a constitutional level or a statutory level is lacking, the above text suggests several important things. First, that there is some kind of a relationship between the BOC [Bulgarian Orthodox Church] and the state on the level of polity” (Petkoff, 2010: 152). Besides Christianity, the law (in the Preamble), also “expresses respect” for Islam and Judaism, implicitly labeling them also “traditional.” However, as “the Preamble does not have legally binding force” (Avramov, 2014: 7), this purported recognition of Islam and Judaism as traditional religions in Bulgaria remains tentative, as it is not carried over into the body text of the law.

The Lithuanian law (Art. 5), following upon the Constitution, declares that “[t]he State shall recognize nine traditional religious communities and associations existing in Lithuania, which comprise a part of Lithuania’s historical, spiritual and social heritage: Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran, Evangelical Reformed, Russian Orthodox, Old Believer, Judaist, Sunni Muslim and Karaite” (Račius, forthcoming). Though the Bosnian Constitution does not allude to any traditional religions, its law on religions (Art. 8.2.) effectively establishes the traditionality of four religious organizations by “confirm[ing] the continuity of legal personality of the historically based churches and religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church and the Jewish Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Naming the Islamic Community as a (or, indeed “the”) traditional Muslim religious organization in Bosnia raises its status above all other existing and future organizations. Some tie it, *inter alia*, to its credibility in the eyes of the State, which sees it (like other traditional religious organizations) as a partner.<sup>6</sup> Contrary to the other cases, the North Macedonian law on religions does not name any “traditional” or in fact any religions by name, though the Constitution implies such a status to five named religious institutions (Churches and communities). Neither do the Hungarian nor Czech nor Polish laws refer to any religions/communities as traditional.

Practically all laws under investigation have a clause proscribing registration of religious collectivities with the same name. So, the Hungarian law

---

<sup>6</sup> Interviews with faculty members of the Faculty of Islamic Studies, Sarajevo, October 24, 2018.

(Art. 25.1.) declares that “[t]he name and symbols of other organisations may not give the impression that the organisation or its activities relate to the operation of a previously registered church,” while the Bulgarian law (Art. 15.2.) states: “Inadmissible shall be to exist more than one corporate body as religion with one and the same name and headquarters,” and the North Macedonian law (Art. 10.1.) prescribes that “[t]he name and official insignia of each new church, religious community and religious group shall be different from the names and official insignia of already registered churches, religious communities and religious groups.” Similarly, the Czech law (Art. 4.4.) requires that churches and religious societies do “not use a name or names which could be confused with an existing registered church” and reiterates it (Art. 10.3.) by requiring that the name of a new applicant church be “different from the name of any legal entity operating in the territory of the Czech Republic and from the name of any other legal entity submitting a request for registration.” The Lithuanian (Art. 12.3.) and the Polish (Art. 32.2.1) laws also have similar clauses. The Bosnian law (Art. 18.1.) goes a step even further and stipulates that “[a] new church or religious community may not be founded bearing the same or similar name as that of an existing church or religious community.” The Islamic Community of Bosnia, together with some other religious communities, is credited for managing to include this stipulation into the law (Smajić, 2017: 85 – 87). In view of this almost universal clause, newly registering Muslim religious collectivities have to be creative, and in their official name are either to avoid the common identity terms like “Sunni Muslim,” “Ahl al-jama’a wa as-Sunna” or use them in conjunction with other (potentially superfluous from the point of view of the members of the collectivity) words, some of which may be, although of common use in the European parlance, alien to the Islamic tradition.

Conditions for registration of religious organizations vary not only across the countries under investigation, but also for different religious collectivities within one and the same country. Traditional (both formally recognized as such and informally held to be) religious communities, as a rule, have the easiest way to register or are even not required to register, as, for example, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Whereas all other (including historical) religious communities need to register their religious organizations with the State, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church does not. This recognition of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church *ex lege* has been challenged in the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, the majority (though short of the qualified majority) of whose justices found it unacceptable.

Deemed non-traditional, in particular, religious groups of “foreign” origin or of New Religious Movement nature, in post-communist Eastern Europe often

have it most difficult. As Barker aptly notes, “[o]ne way that the state may control religious minorities and, to some extent, religious majorities also, is through registration. (...) Registration may, for example, require a mandatory minimum of 10,000 members (unless, as in the case of the Czech Republic, the religion is a member of the World Council of Churches, in which case, only 100 members are necessary), thus effectively excluding many minority religions; another criterion may be the length of time the religion has been in existence in the country, with a period of, say, one hundred years effectively excluding new and/or most foreign religions” (Barker, 2002: 79 – 80). The 10,000-member threshold Barker refers to is actually enshrined in Czech law on religions, while the age threshold is a feature of Hungarian law.

Some of the countries under research have effectively two-tier systems of recognition by the State. Lithuania, in fact, has a three-tier system. As a rule, the first level is attained rather easily. So, for instance, Bosnian law (Art. 18.1.) stipulates that “[n]ew church or religious communities may be formed by 300 (three hundred) adult citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without regard to their entity citizenship.” Czech law (Art. 10.2.c.) requires “original signatures of 300 adherents, who shall be either citizens of the Czech Republic or aliens with permanent residence in the Czech Republic.” Polish law (Art. 31.1.) sets the threshold at “100 Polish citizens with full legal capacity.” Lithuanian law (Art. 11), compared to the laws of other countries under investigation, is rather liberal as it requires only “at least 15 members, namely adult citizens of the Republic of Lithuania.”

The second level recognition, which provides for more rights for religious collectivities to sustain, strengthen, practice, and spread their faith, is, however, much more difficult. Lithuanian law (Art. 6.) foresees that “(non-traditional) religious associations may be granted state recognition as being a part of Lithuania’s historical, spiritual and social heritage if they are backed by society and instruction and rites thereof are not contrary to laws and morality. State recognition shall denote the State’s backing of the spiritual, cultural and social heritage of religious associations. State recognition shall be granted by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. Religious associations may request state recognition after the lapse of at least 25 years from the date of their initial registration in Lithuania. If the request is denied, it may be resubmitted after the lapse of 10 years from the day the request was denied. The issue of recognition shall be dealt with by the Seimas upon receiving a conclusion from the Ministry of Justice.”

Similarly, Hungarian law places hard conditions on newly formed religious collectivities wishing to be registered. Art. 14 of the law spells them out in the following manner: “1. The representative of an association which primarily

performs religious activities (...) is authorised to initiate the recognition of represented association as a church by submitting a document signed by a minimum of 1 000 individuals applying the rules governing popular initiatives. 2. An association shall be recognised as a church if (...) it has been operating internationally for at least 100 years or in an organised manner as an association in Hungary for at least 20 years. 3. Based on the popular initiative, the parliamentary committee dealing with religious affairs (...) submits a bill regarding the recognition of the association as a church to Parliament.” Hungarian law foresees that the State may enter into bilateral agreements with religious organizations of a higher registration level. Although Polish law does not envision different levels of registration, it, like its Hungarian counterpart, allows for bilateral state-religious organization agreements that effectively lift the organizations that have such an agreement with the State onto a higher level. Czech law also makes it difficult for religious collectivities of first-level recognition to upgrade their status, for it (Art. 11.1.) stipulates that “[a] registered church may submit an application to be granted permission to exercise special powers, provided that it (a) has been registered under this Act without interruption for a minimum of ten years as of the date of submission, (b) has published without interruption annual reports on its activities in calendar years for a minimum of ten years prior to the date of submission.” Moreover, it (11.4.) requires that the application for the recognition on the second level must include “(a) original signatures of adherents of the church, who shall be citizens of the Czech Republic or aliens with permanent residence in the Czech Republic, in an amount at least equal to one (1) person for every one thousand (1,000) Czech nationals of majority according to the most recent population census; (c) texts of its annual reports (...), and final accounts for the ten-year period prior to the submission of the application.”

Finally, the third level of recognition—“traditional”—is almost unattainable, because it would involve either changing the Constitution (as in the Bulgarian and North Macedonian cases) or the law on religions (as in the Lithuanian and Bosnian cases). For instance, the Lithuanian Constitutional Court has ruled that “[t]he constitutional establishment of the institute of recognition of churches and religious organisations as traditional means that such recognition by the state is irrevocable. Tradition is neither created nor abolished by an act of the will of the legislature. The naming of churches and religious organisations as traditional is not an act of their establishment as traditional organisations but an act stating both their tradition and the status of their relations with society, which does not depend on the willpower of the legislature” (*Decision on construing*, 2007). The higher the level of registration the more financial assistance a religious collectivity may expect from the State, if

such support is foreseen at all. For instance, in Lithuania and Bulgaria, only religious organizations representing “traditional” faith communities receive annual state pay-outs.

Some laws under investigation establish the separation between the State and religious collectivities in more detail. So, for instance, Bosnian law (Art. 14.2. and Art. 14.6) unequivocally establishes that “[t]he state shall not have the right to interfere in the affairs and internal organization of churches and religious communities” and that “[t]he public authorities shall not have any involvement in the election, appointment or dismissal of religious dignitaries, the establishment of the structures of churches and religious communities, or of organizations performing religious services and other rituals.” Hungarian law (Art. 10.2. and Art. 10.3.) stipulates that “[t]he State may neither operate nor establish any organ for controlling or monitoring churches. (3) No state power may be used to enforce decisions based on the principles of faith, the internal laws or the rules of organisation and operation of a church, or other rules equivalent to them (together hereinafter referred to as ‘internal ecclesiastical rules’); public authorities may not examine such decisions. Public bodies may not modify or override decisions made by a church based on internal ecclesiastical rules, and they shall have no competence to adjudicate disputes arising from internal legal relationships not regulated by rules of law.” Bulgarian law (Art. 4.2.), meanwhile, is straightforward: “Inadmissible shall be state interference in the internal organisation of the religious communities and the religious institutions.” Petkoff argues that this clause appeared in the law chiefly “[f]rom the background of the painful clash of religion and state in the schism of the BOC [Bulgarian Orthodox Church], the in-fighting within the Supreme Muslim Council during the 1990s, and in recent European Court of Human Rights cases” (Petkoff, 2010: 152), which is analyzed in more detail in the following sections of this book.

Nonetheless, all laws under investigation have not only the established procedure of registration of religious collectivities, but also designate a particular state institution (or several) to register religious collectivities and to supervise state-religious collectivities relations. Bulgarian law (Art. 15.1.) on religions stipulates that the registration of religious organizations is administered by court: “The registration of the religious communities as corporate bodies shall be implemented by the Sofia city court.” This is seen as an improvement from the previous norm, for as Petkoff argues, “[t]he novel approach of the Denominations Act 2002 is that registration of a religious institution is transferred from the Denominations Directorate to the judiciary (Sofia City Court)” (Petkoff, 2010: 157). Art. 16., however, foresees that the court “can require expert statement in connection with the registration of the religious communities

from Directorate ‘Religions’ of the Council of Ministers.” This Directorate is defined in Art. 35. as “a specialised administration of the Council of Ministers,” which, among its other functions and duties, is charged with co-ordinating the relations of the executive power with the religions, organizing and managing the work of an expert consultative commission for the problems of the religions, giving expert conclusions and statements, giving statements about request for permission for stay in the country of foreign religious servants who are invited by the central management of the registered religions, checking signals and complaints of citizens about violations of their rights and liberties, and checking signals and appeals about implementing illegal religious activity.

Reflecting on this aspect of the law, Petkoff argues, “[t]he dynamics of Church-state relations under the Denominations Act 2002 involved a substantial transformation of the administration of religious affairs in two directions. On the one hand, it promoted greater independence of religious communities, administration of their affairs being moved from the executive to the judiciary and the judiciary being given more transparent guidelines in the application of substantive law. On the other hand, the administration of religious communities remained centralized, this time partly in the hands of the judiciary, partly in the hands of the executive” (Petkoff, 2010: 156). Amendments to the law passed by the Bulgarian Parliament in 2018, however, further empower the Denominations Directorate by charging it with the management of annual registers of property and personnel of religious organizations. It includes sanctions against those violating the requirement to submit such registers.

The North Macedonian law also foresees that the registration is done through the courts. However, it is another law—the Law on the Organisation and Operation of the State Administration Bodies—that (Art. 29.1.) designates a special state entity, the Commission for relations with the religious communities and religious groups, which is entrusted with “conduct[ing] the affairs related to the legal position of the religious communities and religious groups, as well as the affairs related to the relations between the state, religious communities and religious groups.” The Lithuanian and Bosnian laws entrust the Ministry of Justice of respective countries to register and manage relations with religious organizations, whereas in Czechia, it is the Ministry of Culture, which is charged with maintaining relations between the State and religious collectivities and, in Poland, it is the Ministry of the Interior and Administration that registers religious organizations (Hoffmann, 2007: 82). The Hungarian law of 2011, on the contrary, has transferred the registration procedure from the courts to the legislator (the Parliament). Entrusting the Parliament with such authority was almost immediately challenged in the Constitutional Court,

which “declared unconstitutional parts of the law regulating the parliamentary registration of churches” (Halmai, 2015: 79). However, as Halmai reports, “in response to this decision, the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law in April 2013 elevated the annulled provisions into the main text of the Fundamental Law, with the intention of excluding further constitutional review. Even though the Constitutional Court argued that the registration of churches by the Parliament does not provide a fair procedure for the applicants, this procedure became part of the constitution. That effectively means a very serious restriction on the freedom to establish new churches in Hungary” (Halmai, 2015: 79).

Naturally, the laws on religions of all the countries under investigation contain clauses on grounds for rejection to register or de-registration of religious collectivities, which in essence follow the limitations set forth in the Constitutions. Barker notes that “not being registered might mean that a religious body is unable to hire a hall for meetings, or even to use its own premises for acts of worship; it may even mean that it cannot function as a religious organization in some societies” (Barker, 2002: 80). In fact, the Bulgarian law, and particularly since the passing of its amendments in 2018, appears to mean that, i.e. several of its clauses give a feeling that only registered religious groups may engage in the practice of their faith publicly. Petkoff dwells on these ambiguous clauses: “According to Article 21 (1) only registered communities have the right to own property and probably even to sign binding contracts to rent property. This could possibly suggest that in practice, only a registered religious community could organize public worship in designated ritual places. According to Article 27, only registered religious communities are entitled to set up separate non-profit legal persons to assist their activities. The statute remains vague in many of its provisions regarding whether religious communities or believers have the right to manifest their belief if they are not registered. The transitional provisions (Section 5) repeal a provision under the Denominations Act 1949, which prevented religious groups from registering as non-profit organizations. Article 29 (2) provides that non-profit organizations do not have ‘the right to accomplish activities which represent the practice of religion in public.’ The precise interaction of these provisions is unclear, but the intent appears to be to say that only registered religious organizations have the right to engage in the public manifestation of religion” (Petkoff, 2010: 159). Krussteff is therefore dismissive of it when he accuses the Bulgarian law on religions of failing “to explicitly protect the right to practice collectively without formal registration of the respective community” (Krussteff, n.d.a). Krussteff also offers a reminder that the Bulgarian Constitutional Court in its “Decision No. 12/2003 explicitly reviewed the issue and concluded that registration is a constitutional right,

and practice without registration is fully legitimate, but this decision remained without binding legal effect due to lack of the required qualified majority” (Krussteff, n.d.a).

The clause in Bosnian law (Art. 5.1.f.), prohibiting “[t]he formation of associations of religious officials or believers without the consent of the relevant church or religious community authorities,” implies that believers of a particular faith, which has a registered (representative) religious organization, may belong only to that organization. So, in the case of Islam, formation of an association of Muslim believers outside of and without the consent of the Bosnian Islamic Community (BIC) is illegal. If this is so, Islam is seen to be represented exclusively by the BIC, which then serves as a sort of national Muslim church.

As indicated above, Islam is, in one way or another, recognized as a traditional religion in five out of the seven countries under investigation. Only in Hungary and Czechia is it seen as of entirely “foreign” origin. Muslim representative religious organizations have been duly registered in all of the countries with Islam as a traditional religion. But while in Bosnia, North Macedonia, and Bulgaria, these representative Muslim spiritual administrations are the sole registered Muslim religious organizations, in Poland and Lithuania, alternative Muslim religious organizations have also been registered. In Czechia, an umbrella Muslim religious organization—the Headquarters of Muslim Communities comprised of two member organizations—has been registered; while in Hungary, two registered Muslim religious organizations (the Hungarian Muslim Church and the Islamic Community of Hungary) have formed an umbrella body—the Hungarian Islamic Council—which, though recognized by the State, is itself not a legal entity. Finally, in all countries under investigation, numerous independent effectively Muslim religious groups have been registered as NGOs or public enterprises.

Some laws under investigation elaborate on the autonomy of the internal structures and rules of registered religious collectivities. For instance, Bosnian law (Art. 6.1.) states that “[c]hurches and religious communities have an established code of religious rights and duties pertaining to their members, which are in conformity with the nature of their calling and other precepts of the Church or religious community to which they belong.” It (Art. 11) further elaborates: “1. Churches and religious communities shall be self-administering in accordance with their own laws and doctrines, which shall have no civil-legal effect and shall not be forcibly imposed by the public authorities nor applicable to non-members. 2. Churches and religious communities shall autonomously regulate their internal organization in accordance with their internal regulations, laws and doctrines. 3. Churches and religious communities shall

have autonomy in the selection, appointment and dismissal of their personnel in accordance with their respective requirements and regulations.” Likewise, Czech law (Art. 4.3.) states: “Churches and religious societies shall administer their own affairs; in particular, they shall establish their bodies, appoint and remove their clergy (*duchovní*), and establish and abolish religious orders and other church institutions, independent of State authorities.” North Macedonian law (Art. 5) puts it in the following manner: “The church, religious community and religious group has the right, internally, to be freely organized with their own bodies of management, hierarchy and competence, to designate persons who will represent and present them, and to adopt their own acts in this regard.” Finally, Lithuanian law (Art. 7) establishes that “[r]eligious communities and associations shall have the right to freely organize based on their hierarchic and institutional structure, and manage their inner life according to their canons, statutes and other norms.” Hungarian law falls a bit out of the context not only because of its notion of religious collectivities as essentially churches, referred to above, but also because it is permeated by Christian vocabulary. When dealing with the internal structures and rules of registered religious collectivities, it (Art. 12.1.) talks of “ecclesiastical legal personality,” “internal ecclesiastical rules of the church,” and “church institutions.” It (Art. 13.1. and 13.2.) also talks about “church personnel,” which are defined as “natural persons defined in accordance with the internal ecclesiastical rules of the church and in the service of the church or the internal ecclesiastical legal persons. Church personnel shall perform their service in a specific church service, in an employment relationship or in other legal relationship.” The law (Art. 12.2.) also stipulates that “[a]s church institutions are ideologically committed, they may determine the recruitment and the establishment, maintenance and termination of employment as deemed necessary to preserve the specific identity.” This, and possibly some other clauses in Hungarian law, allowed Schanda to argue that “[c]hurch autonomy can be seen as the most important difference between entities registered as religious communities and other registered legal entities such as associations, political parties, or trade unions. Autonomy in the stricter legal sense means that the internal acts of organizations registered as ‘churches’ are not subject to any kind of state interference. This means that whereas an internal decision of an association can be brought before court (...), an internal decision of a church entity, like a bishop or a synod, cannot be challenged before state courts. Churches are also not bound by the principle of democratic internal structure, while associations have to be democratic. Churches determine their structure independently from the State; neither consent nor notification is required, for example, in the case of creating new dioceses” (Schanda, 2016: 196).

Although practically all laws under investigation refer to religious personnel (as a rule, called clergy), only the North Macedonian law and the Bulgarian law provide a more detailed explanation of them. The North Macedonian law (Article 2.2.) states: “A religious servant is a person who, by his or her belief, belongs to a church, religious community or religious group, and performs religious services, teaching and organizational and humanitarian activities on its behalf and in accordance with the norms of the supreme organ of the registered church, religious community or religious group.” It (Art. 18.5.) warns that “[a]ny false presentation as a religious servant and abuse of religious clothing and insignia of a registered church, religious community or a religious group is forbidden.” Bulgarian law (Additional provisions 1.4) states: “Clergymen’ are persons with a spiritual rank in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church—the Bulgarian Patriarchate, and in the registered denominations, who serve under a legal relationship to exercise the respective denomination in accordance with its statutes, canons and traditions. The spiritual titles of religious institutions are defined in their statutes” (National Assembly, 2018) Bosnian law (Art. 6.2.d.) foresees that “[r]eligious officials or persons preparing for such service shall be exempt from military service, but shall not be prohibited from military service if it is their wish to serve, in accordance with the law.”

All laws on religions under investigation contain clauses pertaining to religious instruction and education. For the purposes of the present research, only those dealing with the training of religious personnel are relevant. So, Bosnian law (Art. 10.3.) permits “churches and religious communities” to “[f]ound cultural, charitable, health and educational institutions of various types and for various purposes, with rights equal to those enjoyed by institutions founded by the State or other authorized entities, and carry out the activities appropriate to the said institutions and manage the said institutions autonomously and directly in compliance with the Law.” Bulgarian law (Art. 33.7.) establishes that “[h]igher ecclesiastical schools shall be opened upon proposal by the management of the registered religions with a permission by the Council of Ministers.” Czech law (Art. 6.3.a.) also foresees that “A registered church or religious society, in order to fulfil its mission, may (...) teach and educate its clergy and laity in its own schools and other institutions and in theological universities and faculties.” Similarly, Polish law (Art. 22.1.) also foresees that churches and other religious associations may have their own “spiritual schools and spiritual seminaries.” North Macedonian law (Art. 22.1.) also opens such an opportunity by establishing that “[a] church, religious community or religious group have the right to establish religious schools for all levels of education, except for primary education, for the purposes of educating priests and religious officials.” However, it (Art. 25) also foresees that “1. Instruction at religious schools can be

carried out by a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia. (2) As an exception, if a church, religious community or religious group needs appropriate staff, the instruction at a religious school may be conducted by foreign citizens, in accordance with the regulations on the stay of foreign nationals in the Republic of Macedonia and upon an approval by the body competent for relations between the State and religious communities.”

It may also be mentioned that among the countries under investigation, it is in Bosnia, Bulgaria and North Macedonia where major Islamic holidays (their first day, to be precise) are public holidays.<sup>7</sup>

Several concluding general remarks may be drawn, relevant to the present research, on the legal framework of governance of religion in the seven countries under investigation. First of all, as the national constitutions establish general freedom of religion allowing for the practice of virtually any faith, whose articles of faith and rituals do not impinge on the freedoms and rights of others. Though in some cases a certain branch of Christianity (and even a particular Christian religious organization, i.e. Church) may be seen as being prioritized by the constitution, the practice of any other faith, including Islam (in its multiple forms), is made legal by constitutions in all of the countries under investigation.

The laws on religions establish a nominal distinction among religious collectivities by placing them under one of these distinct categories—churches, denominations, religious communities, or religious associations; however they fail to elaborate on their distinct features and, as a rule, throughout the text lump them together. The laws, however, make another, hierarchical, distinction among religious collectivities in the country—they are divided into “traditional” and others. Those religious collectivities that are treated in the law as “traditional” are accorded more rights and may expect certain favors, including financial support, from the State. In five out of the seven countries under investigation, certain Muslim religious collectivities are recognized in the law as “traditional.” In Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Bosnia, it is particular Muslim religious organizations that are recognized as “traditional.”

The laws on religions in some countries, however, narrow the right to practice one’s religion publicly to only registered religious organizations. Furthermore, the set rules and regulations for registration of religious organizations place certain limiting conditions; Muslim religious collectivities, like any other, wishing to register as religious organizations, need to meet certain formal criteria. In the laws on religions of several of the countries under investigation (namely, Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Bosnia), one finds a clause proscribing

---

7 Article 4 of the Law on Public Holidays of the Republic of Macedonia.

registration of religious organizations with the same or similar name and articles of faith. This limits the prospect of different Muslim religious collectivities with similar, let alone identical, names and articles of faith to be registered and obtain the right to publicly practice their religion. Consequently, individual Muslims and their collectivities are forced to operate through already registered Muslim religious organizations. By restricting the number of registered Muslim religious organizations, the laws on religions effectively limit recognition by the State to one “representative” Muslim religious organization, in some cases foreseen (as “traditional”) in the very law at the time of its passing. This way, Islam is legally framed like Christian Churches—one organization per faith.

Furthermore, as the laws on religions are permeated by Christian vocabulary and terminology, the foreseen internal structures and affiliate bodies of registered religious organizations, among them Muslim, are expected to follow the Christian understanding of religious organization, as a rule, understood in the form of a church. The laws on religions routinely identify spiritual leaders as (professional) “clergy” of different ranks employed by registered religious organizations. This all inadvertently affects the institutionalization of Islam in the countries under investigation to the point where, as is shown in Chapter 6, the registered Muslim religious collectivities are forced to mold their internal structures to fit the expectations set in law in generally Christian terminology; subsequently making muftis into bishops and patriarchs, imams into clergy, mosques into churches, imam training institutions into seminaries or divinity schools, local Muslim communities clustered around mosques into parishes etc. In the end, Muslim religious organizations, and particularly “traditional” “representative” ones among them, are seen by the State through the legal prism as yet more “churches.”

Though both the constitutions and laws on religions in the countries under investigation place certain restrictions on registration and activities of religious organizations, and even foresee their disbanding in cases of breach of the law, none of the legal acts directly securitize any religion or religious collectivity. However, the existing laws on religions in some countries (foremost Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Hungary, and Czechia) do have clauses that may be seen as indirectly securitizing certain religions and religious collectivities, including Islam and Muslims, through close state control of their registration and activities. The recent amendments to some of these laws are seen by commentators to have been passed with the intention of wielding tighter control on Muslim religious collectivities, this way furthering the securitization of Islam and Muslims in respective countries.

Schanda, referring to the Hungarian case, argues that “[i]t is not only the church but also any religious community or teaching with which the State may not institutionally connect itself; the state may not take a position in religious matters. The State cannot intervene in the autonomy of the religious communities in such a way as to affect the specific religious character, apart from regulations of the organizational form in which such communities were to function” (Schanda, 2002: 350). However, as is shown in the following section, state interference in Muslim affairs in post-communist Eastern Europe sometimes extends beyond the setting of regulations of the organizational form in which such communities were to function. Both the churchification and securitization of Islam are at play then.

## 5.2 Practical Politics Level

On the practical politics level, the churchification and securitization of Islam in Eastern Europe work in a classical top-down way: it is the political actors, both mainstream and nationalist-populist, who pursue strategies of churchification and/or securitization of Islam in their respective countries. It needs, however, to be asked: what determines which of the two strategies dominates, if at all? One may suggest that it is the historical experience and memory among the non-Muslim majority, and particularly those in power positions, that determines the perception and view of Islam and Muslims and their place and role in the State and society. It may also be current migratory and radicalization trends. Nationalism, particularly in its religious form is a formidable force, and, is arguably a major factor playing a role in domestic politics pertaining to the perception of and policies toward Muslim populations in Eastern European states. The number and background of Muslims and their bargaining power may also be seen as a determinant. There are also other practical political, social, demographic, economic and other concerns that influence the realm of practical politics on this issue.

Furthermore, post-communist Eastern European states, and particularly those which are member states of the EU, besides their own national legislation on state-religion relations, are obliged to abide by international legal agreements signatories of and parties to which they are. Therefore, quite often practical political or court decisions on the national level (like changes to laws on religions, denial of registration of a religious collectivity, or dismissal of a private complaint on religious grounds), and particularly those that appear to limit religious freedom and securitize religion or religious groups (in this case,

Islam and Muslims), become issues of pan-European concern either at the EU level, at the European Court of Human Rights, or another supra-national institution.

On the other hand, the EU and its institutions themselves have been seen as facilitating the securitization of Islam/Muslims in Eastern Europe—particularly the Western Balkans—through their overemphasis on the perceived crime-terror nexus in this part of Europe, which consequentially otherizes and distinguishes Muslim populations of the region as a potential risk or even threat group, in other words, “suspect communities” (Rexhepi, 2015: 189 – 214). Rexhepi argues that “EU securitization measures employed in the enlargement process, through various conditionality mechanisms, are appropriated by local governments in Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo in their attempt to meet the EU integration criteria” (Rexhepi, 2015: 192). Though not covered in Rexhepi’s research, North Macedonia, an EU candidate country, certainly fits the picture. Therefore, rather than being just reactive and reflexive, EU level policies and decisions related to the governance of religion in Eastern Europe in the broadest sense, particularly, in the enlargement process context, may be agenda-setting for the governments of the candidate and potential candidate states. As a result, as Rexhepi argues, “when appropriated locally, EU securitization measures influence the local policing of what are acceptable Islamic practices, which frequently results in the establishment of suspect communities and the depoliticization of Muslim communities by relegating Islam only to the private sphere. The defensive articulation of Balkan Islam as secular, peaceful and European against the ‘newer’ radical strains of Islam allegedly coming from the Middle East is one such example” (Rexhepi, 2015: 207). Though Rexhepi limits his observations to “Balkan Islam,” Islam of other autochthonous groups such as Lithuanian and Polish Tatars fits the general picture painted by him.

The seven countries under investigation in the present book fare indeed differently on all these counts: while Bulgaria, Bosnia and North Macedonia all have long-term (some would argue traumatic) experience of having been under political control by a Muslim empire, the consequence of which is sizable Muslim populations of both autochthonous and colonist nature, Lithuania and Poland, though never having experienced direct Muslim rule, have long-established Muslim minorities. And while Hungary and Czechia’s Muslim populations are almost all of immigrant background, there is little Muslim immigration to Lithuania, Bulgaria, Bosnia or North Macedonia; on the contrary, there is observable emigration of autochthonous Muslims from these countries to the West. Poland stands alone as a country that, having its autochthonous Muslim population, experiences immigration from Muslim-majority

regions. Finally, the level of radicalization among Muslim inhabitants, though varying, is comparatively low (if judged by the numbers of those who had gone to live in and possibly fight for the Islamic State), and none of the countries under investigation have experienced any sustained massive terrorist attacks.

Among the political actors whose activities are related to politics of governance of religion (churchification, securitization or else), two categories are discernible: those falling under the label of mainstream political forces (first of all in power but also in opposition) and those falling under the label of nationalist-populist political forces (so far, in post-communist Eastern Europe, mainly in opposition but increasingly finding their ways into power positions in the parliaments and governments). There are also nascent extreme far right movements, which, however, have not made it that far into the parliamentary politics and for the time being may be regarded as elements on the social actor level rather than the political actor level.

In those countries where Muslim communities, with their representative religious organizations, are one way or another formally recognized as “traditional” to the land (and this is done through the inclusion of autochthonous Muslim populations into the national “Us”), mainstream political actors as a rule accept the status quo and either actively partake in the churchification of Islam in their respective countries or at least do not object to it. This does not mean that there are no securitizing actors among political actors, but those remain marginal with little to no real following (electorate). On the contrary, in countries with no autochthonous Muslim populations, and, in fact, with fledgling Muslim populations, composed chiefly of recent immigrants, their progeny and local converts making up a meager share in the overall population, even mainstream (governing) political actors pursue the securitization of Islam through changes in the legislation related to the governance of religion.

Even though the post-communist national legislation (both the constitutions and *lex specialis*), as shown above, in a liberal spirit, established freedom of religion, equality of religious collectivities before the State and among themselves and non-interference of the State in internal matters of religious collectivities, the experience of the past three decades (of the post-communist period) shows that in post-communist Eastern Europe, political forces, and particularly those in government, have had temptations and made numerous attempts that stand contrary to the letter and the spirit of the national legislation and international norms. In a number of cases, political forces in power have made, at times successful, attempts to change the very legislation, including the constitution, sometimes to the detriment of the very freedom of religion. So, for instance, the laws on religions in Hungary and Czechia, but also Bulgaria, have been changed (amended) several times, each time not only

making it more difficult for religious collectivities (particularly those deemed “non-traditional”) to attain a higher status of registration or to register at all, but also increasing the State’s controlling powers over religious collectivities. In Bulgaria, those changes in legislation are in line with the churchification of Islam, while in both Hungary and Czechia they are reflective of the increasing securitization of Islam and Muslims. All these changes often affect the status of Muslim religious collectivities, which are some of the most vulnerable among the religious collectivities in many post-communist Eastern European countries.

The most notorious case of these trends is arguably that of Hungary, where, starting with as early as 1993, multiple attempts were made by MPs from right-wing parties to change the law on religions. So, for example, in 1993, “a motion was submitted by four members of Parliament to change the requirements for gaining the legal status of a ‘church.’ Instead of the [then] rule that one hundred natural persons are allowed to found a church, this number would be changed to 10,000 or the authorities would require 100 years of presence in the country” (Schanda, 2002: 352). As the motion was not pursued by the Parliament, there was yet another practically identical attempt in 1998, which also failed (Schanda, 2002: 352). In the end, the Fidesz-led government resurrected the idea and finally succeeded in pushing it through.

After the promulgation of the new law on religions in 2011, one of the three formerly registered Muslim religious organizations was stripped of its held status as a “church”—its official name even was Islamic Church, while the remaining two, though recognized among three dozen “lucky” ones as “churches” by the Parliament, were indirectly forced by the State to set up a (mock) umbrella organization reminiscent of the Islamic Councils in Western Europe. The Islamic Church eventually ceased to exist. Following the law, any new Muslim religious collectivities, which would wish to obtain official registration as “churches,” besides having to prove that they represent a historical branch of Islam, would also have to “reach a 2/3 majority in a parliamentary vote on their recognition” (Mackintosh, 2017). Thus, as Mackintosh aptly observes, “[t]his meant that smaller minority denominations of Islam were particularly vulnerable as members of parliament could effectively decide which religions they liked—and which they didn’t” (Mackintosh, 2017). In late 2018, the Hungarian Parliament adopted yet another version of the law on religions, which does not seem to make registration and functioning of (new) Muslim religious collectivities any easier.

Though the Hungarian legislation prefers to refer to religious collectivities as churches (*egyház*), the existing Muslim religious collectivities in the country do not function as churches, i.e. they are not required by law and do not

have (yet) church-like ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structures staffed by professional clergy. In this regard, the churchification of Islam in Hungary is hardly discernible. After adoption of the latest version of the law on religions, which distinguishes between “listed churches” (*nyilvántartásba vett egyház*), “registered churches” (*bejegyzett egyház*) and “recognized churches” (*bevett egyház*) and accords them different rights and privileges, the existing Muslim religious collectivities may decide to seek a higher status, which would require them to turn into more church-like organizations. But this prospect, like in Czechia, is rather distant, if at all feasible. On the other hand, similar to Czechia, there is a rising tide of Muslimophobia and religious nationalism among top Hungarian political actors, including Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who, though not as blunt as the Czech President Miloš Zeman, are known to have expressed Muslimophobic views.

Similarly to the Hungarian case, the newly enacted (2002) law on religions in Czechia, though enabling Muslims to finally officially register their umbrella organization in 2004—the Headquarters of Muslim Communities—has at the same time effectively prevented Muslim religious collectivities from attaining the second, a much more favorable, level of registration, as it requires a minimum of 0.1 per cent of the total population to be full members of the religious collectivity seeking such status (Kompérová, 2017: 34). Though the total number of inhabitants of Czechia of Muslim background is estimated to be around 20,000, it is unlikely they would choose to be members of a particular single Muslim religious collectivity. Therefore, the domestication and full institutionalization of Islam (and its churchification, as the second level of registration, through according certain special rights to religious collectivities, facilitates their turning into church-like religious organizations) in Czechia remains a distant prospect, unless the set legal threshold is lowered or Muslim religious collectivity(ies) gets an exception. The latter option is also unlikely in the current atmosphere of increasing securitization of Islam by the country’s top political actors.

The proposed new amendments to the law on religions in Bulgaria, widely perceived to be an “Islam law”<sup>8</sup> that would be tightly connected to national security (hence, its securitizing dimension), deliberated on in the Parliament in the second half of 2018, foresaw sever limitations to the freedom of activities of the Muslim Denomination and increased control of them by the State. It was argued that among the Bulgarian religious collectivities, Muslims are the

---

8 Interview with a faculty member of the Higher Islamic Institute, Sofia, October 17, 2018; Interview with Plamen Makariev, professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of Sofia University, Sofia, October 17, 2018.

most problematic as they are under the influence of foreign actors, both state and non-state.<sup>9</sup> The draft law, for instance, aimed at forbidding the financing of religious collectivities from outside of Bulgaria. The proposed cutting of foreign financial channels would have been a debilitating blow to the Muslim Denomination, which has been heavily reliant on financial assistance from Turkey—the Muslim Denomination’s annual budget has been some four million Euros, while the State provided only 75,000 Euros;<sup>10</sup> many religious activities are almost exclusively dependent on this finance. Turkey has been the sole financier of the Higher Islamic Institute, the sole supplier of imams in Bulgaria, and has the right of the last word in its matters; its vice-rector is reportedly always a Turkish citizen appointed by Turkey.<sup>11</sup> The draft law, however, foresaw increased state funding for organizations representing traditional religious communities—including the Muslim Denomination.

The amendments to the law on religions adopted by the Bulgarian Parliament in late 2018 stipulate that those religious collectivities whose members make no less than 1 per cent of the population (as recorded in the population census) are to receive a fixed annual payout per member in the amount of 10 Bulgarian levas (around 5 EUR) (National Assembly, 2018). Though the lion’s share is naturally to go to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Muslim Denomination is the only other religious organization entitled to such annual state support, which was estimated at over three million EUR for 2019 (*The Sofia*, 2018), a forty-fold increase compared to what it used to get from the State previously.

The proposed amendments also require that religious personnel (clergy) be citizens of Bulgaria and have finished their religious education in Bulgaria. The amended law, however, allows foreign (and foreign-trained) clergy to preach and perform other religious activities in the country but they have to get permission from a state institution, charged with supervising the activities of religious personnel. But, most importantly, the amended law also stipulates that the salaries of clergy of “traditional” religious collectivities (that is, the BOC and the Muslim Denomination) are to be paid by the State (National Assembly, 2018). It can be mentioned that the training of Islamic catechists is being taken over by the State. The University of Library Studies and Information Technologies has started training Islamic catechists in a specially designed non-degree

---

9 Interview with Hayri Emin, representative of the Bulgarian Muftiate, Sofia, October 15, 2018; Interview with Plamen Makariev, professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of Sofia University, Sofia, October 17, 2018.

10 Interview with Hayri Emin, representative of the Bulgarian Muftiate, Sofia, October 15, 2018.

11 Interview with Aziz Shakir, independent researcher, Sofia, October 15, 2018.

program.<sup>12</sup> Thus, through inserting the State's financial support to the Muslim Denomination in the amendments to the law on religions, the State has tied it closer to itself and the amended law generally further nationalizes Islam in Bulgaria, and subsequently makes the Muslim Denomination dependent on and at the mercy of the State. Hence, though the amendments were initially proposed with a securitizing agenda in the background, the final version of the amended law has in fact further facilitated the churchification of Islam in Bulgaria.

The Polish case is at the other end of the spectrum: with one of the oldest laws on religions still in effect among post-communist Eastern European countries, Poland, *inter alia*, has not revoked the interwar agreement between the State and the Muslim Religious Union, which in the post-communist era is anachronistic on many counts. As pointed out by Agata Skowron-Nalborczyk, "some of its provisions are even contrary to the freedom of conscience and religion, for instance the compulsory character of the Union, to which, according to the Act, all Muslims in Poland have to belong and mandatory religious education to be received by all Muslim students at schools financed entirely by the state or they are contrary to other legal regulations, for instance, state funding for the MZR (Muslim Religious Union—*my insertion*)" (Skowron-Nalborczyk, 2016: 95). In this regard, the contemporary Polish State formally carries on with the interwar recognition of the national Muslim religious collectivity—the Muslim Religious Union—as the sole national Muslim Church, though the reality on the ground has made it obsolete. As Nalborczyk and Ryszewska observe, "even though legislation is designed to ensure the equality of rights of religious organizations and associations, it seems that Polish authorities continue to follow the still binding yet anachronistic Act of 1936, considering MZR to be the organization representing all Polish Muslims. This could indicate that we are witnessing a transitory situation: namely, the legal framework for the functioning of Islamic organizations has changed, but the government's perception of Polish Muslims has remained unchanged, and there is little awareness of the fact that, apart from Tatars, since 1989 there have been an increasing number of immigrant Muslims" (Nalborczyk and Ryszewska, 2013: 33). They further argue that "[t]he state strives to maintain cooperation with MZR as the only Islamic organization with which it has established specific communication and behavioural rules. In this case, the aim of such routinized operation is, undoubtedly, to prevent a potential conflict. It suits the state to have one partner rather than a number of them who could have dissimilar

---

12 Interview with Plamen Makariev, professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of Sofia University, Sofia, October 17, 2018.

views on a range of matters” (Nalborczyk and Ryszewska, 2013: 31). A very similar situation may be observed in Lithuania, where the political actors have not dared to change the law on religions in any way in which “traditional” (among them, Muslim) religious collectivities would be adversely affected.

But even within the framework of the legislation in force, the states on all three levels of power (parliaments, government institutions, and courts) in some of the countries under investigation have made decisions with ensuing policy outcomes where certain Muslim religious collectivities or individual believers have been put in a precarious position. This, first of all, pertains to registration of (alternative) Muslim religious collectivities, which wish to be independent of the State-preferred Islamic spiritual administrations (a.k.a. “national Muslim Churches”). For instance, in North Macedonia, an alternative “Muslim Community” was rejected registration by the State authorities allegedly because “the Islamic Religious Community (...) was already a recognised institution representing all the Muslims of Macedonia. Thus, if the Muslim Community were to be registered, there would have been two parallel Muslim Organisations in Macedonia, which is not allowed by the (...) law” (Idriz and Ali, 2016: 87). The North Macedonian case is symptomatic as a number of Eastern European states’ laws on religion, as shown above, stipulate that there may not be more than one officially registered religious collectivity with either identical or even similar name or articles of faith.

Besides a refusal to register in certain cases, state authorities have clamped down on the activities of “alternative” Muslim religious collectivities, deeming them not only illegal but also dangerous. So, for instance, in Bulgaria, “in March 2003, two members of the Caliphate Muslim Society were arrested in the Roma quarter of Pazardzhik on allegations of Islamic fundamentalism. No formal criminal charges were pressed. In May 2003, press reports and police sources claimed that the authorities prevented an “unauthorized gathering of Muslims who had come under the influence of a Lebanese Islamic movement” in South Bulgaria” (Petkoff, 2010: 173). There have been numerous such cases in North Macedonia and Bosnia. Arrests and other forms of harassment of leaders and activists of informal Muslim collectivities may suggest a bent by the State authorities on the securitization of Islam in the concerned countries. Yet, in the light of the churchification of Islam that the legal level is permeated by, and other policy decisions, these practical political actions are nothing but meant to protect the designated national Muslim Churches against possible rivals.

However, often those Muslim religious collectivities, irrespective of whether they seek state registration or not, do not position themselves as oppositional or rival to the “national Muslim Churches” but see themselves as parallel to them. The Ahmadi communities are of this type. However, in a number of

Eastern European countries they have also had difficulties to register and publicly perform religious practices. The case of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Bulgaria is a telling example of how post-communist Eastern European states not only churchify Islam, but seek to keep it within the confines of the institutionalized national “Muslim Church.” Ahmadis in Bulgaria have not only been denied registration as a religious organization, but their registered NGO was also “closed based on accusations that it was involved in activities that are only allowed to communities registered under the DA2002 (law on religions—*my insertion*)” (Petkoff, 2010: 173).

The refusal to register the religious collectivity of Ahmadis is reported to have been based on an alleged “lack of a sufficiently precise and clear indication of the beliefs and rites of the Ahmadi religion in the association’s constitution. The domestic court had concluded that the constitution did not meet the statutory requirements of the Religions Act, which sought to distinguish between the various religions and to avoid confrontation between religious communities” (admin\_HRWF, 2017). Ahmadis appealed locally but upon losing the case turned to the European Court of Human Rights, which in its decision “took the view that the approach adopted by the Court of Cassation would lead in practice to refusing registration of any new religious association having the same doctrine as an existing religion” (admin\_HRWF, 2017). The ECHR indirectly noted the existing practice of the churchification of the “acceptable” local forms of Islam in Bulgaria by the state agencies and courts, when it underlined that the Bulgarian courts’ “approach could result in allowing the existence of only one religious association for each religious movement and in requiring all followers to adhere to it. (...) In a democratic society, the State did not need to take measures to guarantee that religious communities were placed or remained under a single administration. (...) The authorities’ role was not to take measures capable of giving priority to one religious denomination over another, or to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but consisted in ensuring that opposing groups tolerated each other” (admin\_HRWF, 2017).

The case of Ahmadis in Bulgaria is not to be seen as related to the securitization of Islam; the refusal to register their organization did not stem from any perceived security threat they may pose but because they posed a threat to the joint efforts by the State and the Muslim Denomination to consolidate the “Bulgarian Muslim Church” (in the person of the very same Muslim Denomination), something not only noted but also indirectly criticized by the ECHR in its decision.

But even the “national Muslim Churches” have not been immune from the State’s interference in their internal affairs. Interference of government in the internal affairs of Muslim communities are arguably most blatant in the

Balkans. For instance, in Bulgaria, “[t]he most serious interference of this kind aimed at the unity of the Bulgarian Muslims took place in 1995 and resulted in a long-term split which lasted for more than sixteen years” (Shakir, 2017: 95 – 96). The government of the then victorious Socialist Party issued a decree “that led to the removal of the first democratically elected (1992) Chief Mufti, Fikri Sali Hasan, from his position. Right after that the Directorate of Religious Denominations of the Council of Ministers issued a decision which stated that, it had registered a new leadership of the Bulgarian Muslim community headed by Nedim Gendzhev, a former Chief Mufti (1987 – 1992)” (Shakir, 2017: 95 – 96). This change of the top leadership was challenged by the supporters of the dismissed Mufti in the European Court of Human Rights, which, in its ruling from 2000, declared that there was “interference with the internal organization of the Muslim religious community and with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion.” There were numerous other litigations, decisions, and overriding decisions before, finally, “[t]he entire saga of the internal division within the Muslim denomination and the state interference in it seemingly was brought to an end” (Avramov, 2014: 19 – 20) in April of 2011, when “the Sofia Court of Appeals quashed the decision of the Sofia City Court refusing to register a Supreme Muslim Council headed by Mustafa Hadji and supported by the vast majority of Muslim believers in Bulgaria. The Appellate Court ordered the registration of the new leadership in a decision which was not subject to appeal” (Avramov, 2014: 20).

Though some of the policy decisions, as those discussed above, by governments and other State institutions, indicate instances of the securitization of Islam, particularly, in the post 9/11 period, the overall practical stance of governments, in five countries out of the seven under investigation (the exceptions being Hungary and Czechia) in this book, indicates their stable and continuous treatment on the practical politics level of the chosen (and even State-protected through legislation and court decisions) Muslim religious collectivities as “national Muslim Churches.” The leadership of the “national Muslim Churches” in Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and, above all, Bosnia, have been routinely invited to State level celebrations, where occasionally they are awarded State medals, members of “national Muslim Churches” are officially congratulated on the occasion of Islamic holidays, celebrations of which are attended by State officials, “national Muslim Churches” are members of State-controlled or State-promoted inter-faith forums and their representatives are sometimes included in working groups, set up by State institutions, to deal with issues involving religious matters. For instance, in Poland, the Muslim Religious Union “functions on the basis of a special act of 1936 and an agreement with the state which gives it a higher status than other Islamic

organizations in Poland, considering it the leader of all Islamic organizations. This unique status is confirmed by the state authorities, which invite only MZR [Muslim Religious Union] representatives to meetings on the occasions of national or religious holidays” (Nalborczyk and Ryszewska, 2013: 31). Furthermore, “[u]ntil 2009, only MZR was entitled to issue halal certificates” (Nalborczyk and Ryszewska, 2013: 31).

However, it may be argued that 9/11 in post-communist Eastern Europe hastened both the appearance of the securitization of Islam and increased efforts of top-down churchification through policy outcomes ensuing from practical politics, particularly efforts to amend relevant national legislation, as well as court decisions. Additionally, the so-called “migration crisis” of 2015 – 2016, spearheaded the securitization of Islam and Muslims, inspired by growing religious nationalism, at times, at the expense of churchification. In the wake of this “crisis,” the securitization of Islam in Eastern Europe has been gaining momentum not only among nationalist-populist, but also among moderate political actors. The two courses, the churchification and securitization of Islam, though, should not be seen as contradictory or mutually exclusive but rather as parallel, usually with different target groups—churchification for “our” “good” Muslims and securitization for “alien” “bad” Muslims, however they are determined. Muslims, or those who are identified as Muslims, of recent migrant background more than others fall into the latter category.

The crisis-induced securitization of migration in Eastern Europe almost by default translates into the securitization of Islam and Muslims, as irregular migrants who have come to Europe in and around 2015 are invariably perceived and portrayed by practically all securitizing actors as adherents of Islam, Muslims. More often, however, irregular migrants are explicitly labelled as Muslims. Consequentially, though technically the current securitization is about immigration, it is practically inseparable from the religious nationalism induced securitization of Islam and Muslims; it is them who are perceived to pose challenge, if not the threat, to the survival of the societies and states as “Christian” or of “Christian heritage.” In other words, had the majority of migrants been perceived to be non-Muslim (and particularly Christian), though the securitization of migration may have occurred, it would have not been coupled with the securitization of Islam and Muslims. The cases of the Višegrad states and particularly the Hungarian one, where the governments promote, at least rhetorically, acceptance of Christian refugees, are indicative of this nexus between migration of perceived Muslims and the securitization of Islam.

The securitization of migration and with it of Muslims and Islam by governments in the wake of the refugee crisis has been developing unevenly in the countries under investigation. So, for instance, Lithuania, which was least

TABLE 5 Levels of official securitization of irregular migration of 2015 – 2016

	<b>Sever securitization</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hungary</li> <li>• Czechia</li> </ul>
	<b>High securitization</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poland</li> </ul>
	<b>Moderate securitization</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bulgaria</li> <li>• North Macedonia</li> </ul>
	<b>Low securitization</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lithuania</li> <li>• Bosnia</li> </ul>

COMPILED BY AUTHOR

affected by the movement of itinerant migrants, has hardly seen any real-time securitization of migration/Muslims by the State or even non-State actors. Bosnia, which experienced some influx of migrants after neighboring countries had closed their borders, has not been affected by the securitization of migration that much either. On the other hand, Czechia and Poland, though also spared the mass movement of migrants, however, have seen both plenty of securitizing rhetoric and certain corresponding policy outcomes (Strapáčová and Hloušek, 2018; Pędziwiatr, 2017: 421 – 422). Of the three countries most affected by direct transiting of migrants through their territories, Hungary has developed almost institutionalized securitization of migrants/Muslims; Bulgaria and North Macedonia, both with their own numerous Muslim populations and being countries of mass emigration, trailed behind not only Hungary but also Czechia and Poland in their securitization of migration.

In the process of the securitization of migration/Muslims, government rhetoric and subsequent policy outcomes related to general governance of religions, specifically pertaining to Islam, are often accompanied by ingrained othering of either Islam and Muslims in general or (more often) specific forms of Islamic religiosity and their adherents. The most extreme cases of othering amount to Islamophobia/Muslimophobia. So, for instance, the aforementioned Czech President Miloš Zeman, though his real political power as a president is rather limited, has said that he is sure that “there is a strong connection between the wave of migrants and the wave of jihadis,” and that he is “against Islamic migration,” because he thinks that “there is full incompatibility of culture—as one example only, the attitude of Islamic migrants to women. Completely different from European culture” (Buckley, 2016). Zeman is quoted

as having said that “migrants threaten Europe by creating ghettos of ‘culture of murderers and religious hatred’” and that “[b]ecause of the ‘national, ethnic, religious, social and economic structure of immigrants has Europe zero chance to absorb them’” (Strapáčová and Hloušek, 2018: 11). Similarly, Andrej Babiš, the leader of the winning ANO party in the 2017 Czech parliamentary elections and the prime minister to be, has promised “to protect the Czech Republic from Muslims”: “If there will be more Muslims than Belgians in Brussels, that’s their problem. I don’t want that here. They won’t be telling us who should live here” (Bauerova and Winfrey, 2017).

The Hungarian Prime Minister has also expressed similar views. There are dozens of public statements from Viktor Orbán asserting that both Islam and Muslims do not belong to/in Europe, yet seek to invade or conquer it (AFP, 2015; Pasha-Robinson, 2018; Gjevari, 2018). His comrades in the governing Fidesz party also express Muslimophobic sentiments and this is arguably done “to satisfy the conservative, pro-Christian and ‘xenophobic’ sentiment of parts of the voter base” (Pap and Glied, 2017: 122). So, for instance, the head of the Fidesz parliamentary group Lajos Kósa is reported to have stated in October 2015 (during the peak of the so-called “migration crisis”) that “Muslim culture is so radically different from European culture that there is no hope of integration” (“Press,” 2015; also Pall and Sayfo, 2016). Halmai argues that “[t]he refugee crisis of 2015 demonstrated the intolerance of the Hungarian governmental majority, which styled itself as the defender of Europe’s “Christian civilization” against an “Islamic invasion” (Halmai, n.d.: 4). The securitization of Islam in Hungary appears to have gone so far as the government considering the banning the building of mosques; in a TV interview the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, Gergely Gulyás (himself member of the ruling Fidesz), hinted at this, and conceded that the government is “forced” “to treat the presence of Islam in a country as a matter of national security, not of freedom of religion” (Sereghy, 2018: 316; see also Spike, 2017). Vilmos Fischl, the Head of the Ecumenical Council of Hungarian Churches however, argues that the Hungarian government is not generally Islamophobic but “is Islamophobic of radical Islam.”<sup>13</sup>

Sometimes the securitization of Islam may take on bizarre local forms. So, for instance, in 2016, László Toroczka, the mayor of the small Hungarian border town Ásotthalom, himself a member of the ruling Fidesz party “issued an order banning the construction of mosques or minarets, the Muslim call for prayer, the wearing of the chador, the niqab, the burqa and the burkini, as well

13 Interview with Vilmos Fischl, Lutheran priest, Head of the Ecumenical Council of Hungarian Churches, Budapest, October 3, 2018.

as LGBT ‘propaganda’ and Gay Pride marches in the village. Toroczkai argued that he wished to set a positive example to other Hungarian municipalities in order to guarantee the ‘centuries-old traditions’ of local communities in the face of mass migration to the country” (Sereghy, 2017: 267). Though initially the central government did not react to such a policy move, after the court ruled restrictions unconstitutional the municipality had to recall them. It is ironic that after a short while, the town council re-adopted the same restrictions, just carefully reworded so as to conceal their openly anti-Islamic nature.

Interestingly, Jobbik, the second largest Hungarian political party, until the so-called “migration crisis” had positioned itself as pro-Islamic/pro-Muslim. Back in 2010, its leader, Vona Gábor wrote a sort of open statement expressing his own and his party’s position on Islam. In it, he wrote: “Jobbik, including me, has expressed many times its sympathy to the Muslim world” (“Vona Gábor,” 2010). He even went so far as to claim that “there’s only one culture left which seeks to preserve its traditions: it is the Islamic world. And of course I do not favour suicide bombers and ruthless wars, but at the same time I declare that today the mankind’s last remaining bastions of traditional culture—experiencing the transcendent in everyday life—is the Islamic world” (“Vona Gábor,” 2010). However, the party’s tentative “pro-Islamic/Muslim” stand changed in 2015 and, though in opposition to the ruling Fidesz, turned to practicing Muslimophobia and calling for the securitization of Islam and Muslims almost as much as the governing Fidesz (Pap and Glied, 2017).

The leadership of the ruling Polish Law and Justice party, foremost its leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski, is also reported to have expressed securitizing statements toward irregular migrants, implicitly regarded as Muslims (Cienski, 2015; Przemyski and Kłos, 2017). The Interior Minister Mariusz Błaszczak spoke practically along the same lines (Cienski, 2017). However, on an official level, none of those statements amounted to the open Muslimophobia seen in the Czech and Hungarian cases.

Though Bosnia is a nominally Muslim majority country, its constituent entity Republika Srpska has an overwhelmingly Orthodox Serb population, which on the political level is represented by several leading nationalist parties. The head of one of them, Milorad Dodik from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), became the Serb representative in the rotating triumvirate Bosnian presidency in 2018, and is known for his openly anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim statements. So, for instance, in 2016, “after the B&H Council of Ministers accepted the draft agreement between the state and the Islamic Community, the party is reported to have stated that the agreement is discriminatory and that it “dictates shariah law” (Karcic, H., 2017: 94). But the Bosnian Serb Muslimophobic and securitizing agenda does not stem from the so-called

“migration crisis,” but rather from the simmering entho-confessional tensions continuing from the Bosnian war of 1992 – 1995 and Serb religious nationalism. On the other hand, the so-called “migration crisis” may have made some more arguments available for Serb nationalists to demonize Muslim Bosniaks and their religion—Islam—especially, since Serbia did serve as a major transit territory for irregular migrants, who have been securitized in both Serbian official and popular discourse.

In the three Balkan countries under investigation, though the legislation explicitly forbids formation of political parties on religious and ethnic basis, the rank and file of most major political parties come from particular ethno-confessional groups; this makes those parties, if not religious nationalist, certainly ethno-nationalist. Thus, there are also “Muslim ethnic” parties, the electorates of which come from the Bosniak, Albanian, and Turk ethnic background. As a rule, leadership of these parties have close relations with the Muftiates and reinforce them as no less than national spiritual administrations, if not “Muslim churches.” Though the Bosnian case is probably the most referred to, the Bulgarian and the North Macedonian cases are equally telling. However, as “Muslim ethnic” political parties in Bosnia, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia have splintered into rival independent political parties, relations of the leadership of some of them with the Muftiates’ leadership have become strained. This, however, does not mean that the newly emerged “Muslim ethnic” political parties do not view Muftiates as national spiritual administrations (“Muslim Churches”); it is the leadership of them that the parties have issues with.

While the level of othering and Muslimophobia and consequently securitization of Islam among government and State officials, with several notable exceptions (like the case of the Czech President), remains comparatively moderate and whose statements are often indirect and veiled, nationalist-populist political forces with a bent on religious nationalism are much more blunt and almost unequivocally securitization-prone.<sup>14</sup> So, for instance, the leadership of the Bulgarian far-right political party Ataka is reported to have “openly incited hatred against Turks-Muslims in Bulgaria by a persistent defamation campaign through its newspaper and television channel skat tv” (Shakir, 2017: 101). Besides Ataka, another party NFSB (National Front for Salvation of Bulgaria), has also used its television channel to disseminate Muslimophobic views (Hayri, 2017: 112). This party and another nationalist party, IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), both junior members in the coalition government, submitted an amendment to the law on religions, which stipulated banning of mosque loudspeakers, which allegedly “threaten national security”

---

14 See analysis of the Czech situation by Strapáčová and Hloušek, 2018.

(Hayri, 2017: 116). Such restriction has found its way into the amendments to the law on religions passed by the Bulgarian Parliament in late 2018. Representatives of these parties in the government, in 2017, also submitted “an ordinance to the Council of Ministers, according to which the imams have to undergo an examination and pass loyalty tests” (Emilova, 2018: 132), which, however, was not included in the passed amendments.

The leadership of the Czech political party Christian and Democratic Union—the Czechoslovak People’s Party—is known to have publicly expressed anti-Muslim and securitizing views: in June 2009, when plans to build a mosque in Brno were announced, David Macek, then deputy chairman of the party, “was among the most prominent protesters. He voiced his disagreement with the fear that the number of Muslims would rise, as it has happened in several Western European countries. His other big fear was coming from the literature, where he read about the death penalty for unfaithful women” (Komπέrová, 2017: 37; also iDNES, 2017). An even more serious attempt at the securitization of Islam in Czechia was a motion by six MPs from the Dawn of Direct Democracy party when they tabled an amendment to the law on religions called “An act on generally dangerous religious societies.” The amendment contained stricter registration rules and control by special State agencies of what would be considered “dangerous religious societies.” And though it did not explicitly refer to Islam, it has been reported in the media that one of the six MPs, who was himself a member of the Initiative We Do not Want Islam in the Czech Republic, has revealed that “the bill had been prepared by the mentioned initiative” (Němec, forthcoming). The successor parties of the Dawn of Direct Democracy, when it split in 2015, Dawn—National Coalition (Ú-NK) and the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD), carried on with their securitization efforts (Strapáčová and Hloušek, 2018: 18 – 19). Dawn—National Coalition is reported to have called for European borders to be closed to irregular migrants, border police forces to be reestablished in border regions of Czechia, no asylum to be granted to any refugee within the Czech territory, and local population to be permitted to organize home guards, thus arguably “augmenting state armed forces” (Strapáčová and Hloušek, 2018: 18). The SPD is reportedly to be even more extreme, as in its rhetoric, “[a]part from ‘othering,’ there is a strong element of dehumanization of immigrants” (Strapáčová and Hloušek, 2018: 19). The party’s leader promotes the view that Muslim immigrants to Europe are “uneducated and nonworking individuals misusing the social system, who were raised in the armed culture of violence starting with street criminality to terrorism because of their religious radicalism. The rising number of Moslems would mean the collapse of the Czech Republic” (Strapáčová and Hloušek, 2018: 19). Another fringe party, the non-parliamentary National

Democracy, argues that “Islam is not a faith in the strict sense but it is a political ideology with religious elements which can be compared to ideologies of Zionism or Marxism” (Strapáčová and Hloušek, 2018: 20). Stripping Islam of its religious nature and presenting it as nothing more than a political ideology, and that which is dangerous, makes the its churchification obsolete and warrants other strategies, namely, securitization, which the Czech political establishment is known for.

The above provided examples reveal that in practically all countries under investigation, with the exception of Lithuania, on the level of practical politics, the othering of Islam and Muslims has permeated not only non-parliamentary political actors and fringe and populist political parties but has found its way into mainstream politics, where the othering of Islam and Muslims, in the wake of the so-called “migration crisis,” has been effectively translated into the securitization of Islam. In countries with established autochthonous Muslim communities (Poland, North Macedonia, and Bulgaria), the securitizing actors among mainstream political actors make a tentative distinction between “our good” and the “foreign dangerous” Muslims and their practiced forms of Islamic religiosity, but in Hungary and Czechia, where fledgling Muslim communities are overwhelmingly of immigrant background, such a distinction is hardly made. Consequently, in Poland, North Macedonia, and Bulgaria, the securitization of (dangerous) Islam is balanced off by continued State policies of churchification of (nationalized) Islam enshrined in national legislation, namely, constitutions and *lex specialis*; in Hungary and Czechia, the securitization of Islam on the practical politics level proceeds at the expense of its churchification.

Ultimately, Czechia and Hungary belong to the category of post-communist Eastern European countries where Islam has not (and indeed, is not being) domesticated, let alone nationalized. On the contrary, it appears that the political elite in the form of consecutive governments, Prime Ministers and/or Presidents, contrary to the common trends throughout Europe, seeks to marginalize the Islamic presence in the country and limit its public visibility and role to a bare minimum. As argued by Pall and Sayfo, “[g]iven the absence of a notable Muslim population, verbal Muslim-bashing has proven to be a conduit through which Hungarian society’s frustrations can be channeled in politically and socially safe ways. Islamophobia in this small Central European country should be viewed through a domestic political lens and also in light of the ongoing experimentation of the right-wing to reconstruct Hungarian identity, styling Hungarians as the true defenders of Europe, in the face of both the ‘corrupt, liberal West’ and the ‘invading Eastern hordes’” (Pall and Sayfo, 2016). The Czech case is practically identical. In such political circumstances, one may

not talk about any great strides in churchification of Islam, either top-down or bottom-up, in these two countries.

While the strategies of securitization and churchification of Islam by political actors are not to be seen as mutually exclusive, in the different countries under investigation different levels of both are discernible. The highest levels of securitization of Islam by political actors are observed in Hungary and Czechia, where the churchification of Islam is altogether eschewed by the political elite. In Bulgaria and North Macedonia (but also Bosnia), all with high levels of churchification of Islam, the securitization of Islam by the political elite is on the rise, as it is in Poland, which has a much lower level of churchification of Islam. Finally, there is little to no securitization of Islam in Lithuania by any political actors, while the level of State-pursued churchification of it, though comparative to that in Poland, is lower than in North Macedonia, Bulgaria and certainly Bosnia.

The answer to what determines which of the two strategies dominates needs to take into account the historical experience and memory among the non-Muslim majority, and it lies primarily with the numbers and especially the background of Muslims and the forms of Islamic religiosity practiced by them. With the rise in nationalism, and particularly religious, in the face of the current migratory and radicalization trends, the respective country's political elite tend to securitize what is perceived by them as "foreign" Islam and Muslims (meaning purportedly "foreign" forms of Islamic religiosity practiced by either Muslims of foreign origin (immigrants) or autochthons), while ostensibly "indigenous" forms of Islamic religiosity and their carrier collectivities, are sought to be churchified. So, in Hungary and Czechia, where there are no historical "domestic" forms of Islamic religiosity, and the bulk of the population of Muslim background is of immigrant and convert background practicing "foreign" Islam, the securitization of Islam is currently the only strategy pursued by the political elite. On the other end of the extreme, one may find Lithuania, which to this day has little immigration; the prevailing forms of Islamic religiosity are either truly indigenous (represented by Tatars) or close to them (represented by Soviet-time colonists of Muslim background and their progeny). The remaining countries (Poland, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Bosnia) fall in-between the two extremums; Muslim collectivities representative of "domestic" forms of Islamic religiosity are stirred by the political elite toward churchification, while alien ("foreign") forms of Islamic religiosity, particularly, those of a revivalist nature and coming from either Arab countries or Turkey, are being progressively securitized. In the latter group of countries, the two strategies complement each other.

Though the political actors, and especially those in government, are bound to act within the framework of legislation, in the case of the governance of religion, and particularly Islam, in a number of countries under investigation, they often engage in practical politics which is contrary to the legal framework, thus creating a tension between legal and practical politics levels. Since 2011, and even more so since the time of the so-called “migration crisis” of 2015 – 2016, political actors in the countries under investigation have sought policy outcomes, which would affect the relevant legislation. First of all, the law on religions but also other laws, and sometimes even the Constitution itself. Thus, the advent of the securitization of Islam on the practical politics level post-9/11 has made its way, through policy decisions, into the legal level. This new trend does not imply the demise of the strategy of the churchification of Islam, hitherto permeating the national legislation and pursued by political actors, but rather complicates the picture of the governance of Islam in the countries under investigation; it reveals the tensions on the political actors’ level itself, which has become a sort of battleground between those in favor of viewing Islam as yet another religion (which may and should be domesticated-nationalized-churchified), and those viewing it as a dangerous political and militant ideology (which must be prevented from spreading and the securitization of it is a means to that end).

### 5.3 Non-Muslim Social Actors Level

Although it is the political actors who, through their policy decisions, may change the legislation, in the democratic political systems, where the political parties’ and individual politicians’ fate depends on the voters’ will, social actors play an indispensable role in swinging the electorates in one direction or another. Therefore, practical politics level often directly depends on the social actors level. The connection here is two-way and works on a supply-demand basis. Though Muslim religious collectivities and individuals are also part of the social actors’ scene, their expectations vis-à-vis the State (in the person of political actors) in regards to the governance of Islam are distinctly different from those held by non-Muslim social actors. This sets the two groups (non-Muslim and Muslim) of social actors apart from each other and warrants their distinct ways of engaging with the political actors level. The present section is devoted exclusively to the non-Muslim social actors.

On the level of non-Muslim social actors, who take part in the development of the securitization and churchification of Islam in Eastern Europe, one may

discern such different actors as fringe far-right movements, civil society, media and (national) Christian Churches. As is argued for the Czech case, “[t]he anti-Islam camp in the Czech Republic involves Euroskeptics of all sorts, evangelical Christian fundamentalists, secular liberal feminists, Roman-Catholic traditionalists, opponents of Turkish EU membership, proponents of the separation of church and state who view Islam as a religion of governance, etc” (Schneider, 2007: 128). In other countries under investigation, the proponents of the securitization of Islam come pretty much from the same backgrounds as those in Czechia, though the dominant segment may differ from country to country. Overall, non-Muslim social actors in the debates on the status, place, and role of Islam in Eastern Europe appear to be tilting towards the securitizing side, though there are those actors who vehemently oppose it. Those in favor of securitization work in tandem with political actors who promote the agenda of Islam’s securitization and denounce those politicians who desist securitization (and speak in favor of normalization, to be understood here as churchification).

Poland and Czechia have seen the highest numbers of grass-root securitization initiatives of a secular extreme-right nature. For instance, in Poland, the Europe of the Future Association, which, although set up in the late 2000s, has been gaining popularity in the wake of the so-called “migration crisis,” has set as its mission to halt the “development of Islamism in Europe, in particular in Poland,” which it sees to be “a movement of totalitarian nature and one hostile to democracy” (Europe, n.d.). Though in their Mission Statement, the Europe of the Future Association talks about Islamism, its subsequent rhetoric betrays that under this label practically any public appearance of Islam (or publicly practiced Islam) is meant.

Czechia is, however, unique among the countries under investigation, as it, unlike others, has seen the biggest volume of anti-Muslim grass-root initiatives. The above mentioned Initiative We Do not Want Islam in the Czech Republic (as well as the short-lived attempt at a the political party, Bloc against Islam), was co-founded by outspoken Muslimophobe Martin Konvička, who, in 2016, staged what has been described as a publicity stunt in the center of the Czech capital Prague where he and his followers performed a mock invasion of Czechia by the Islamic State (Jůn, 2016). While Konvička personally is known for numerous outrageous Muslimophobic public statements, (“Czech anti-Islam,” 2017; Strapáčová and Hloušek, 2018: 20) the Initiative was also unequivocal in its view of Islam: Islam is an “aggressive political ideology, historically presented as a religion, which is expansively attacking Europe for the past 1,400 years. Any actions to contain Islam will be taken with cooperation with any political party or subject with the same goal to let people perceive that

Islam is totalitarian and warrior's ideology using violence and comparable with Nazism or Communism" (Strapáčová and Hloušek, 2018: 19). As this and numerous similar statements show, for securitizing Muslimophobes in Eastern Europe, Islam is not a religion but rather yet another totalitarian ideology. Such a view stands at the opposite end of viewing Islam as just another religion with a church, as the national legislation across Eastern Europe directly or less so implies.

Though not NGOs, music groups may be taken to represent interest groups of civil society. Some of them have been vocal on migration and migrant integration issues. For instance, in Czechia, a number of bands produced songs containing strong opinions on incoming Muslim immigrants and Islam (Rosůlek, 2018: 65 – 72). While not all lyrics in such songs should be viewed as directly securitizing Muslims or Islam, they generally tend to be Muslimophobic in their spirit. As reported by Rosůlek, some of those bands are rather known and liked by the public (Rosůlek, 2018: 67). Some of the lyrics, however, go so far as to call for defensive measures. For instance, Olivie Žižková, in her song "Breathe, Europe," calls the migration crisis an invasion and demands through her lyrics as an active defense against what she sees as Europe's Islamization (Rosůlek, 2018: 68).

NGOs and civil society groups engaged in activities and public actions related to the securitization of Islam get publicity through media but also maintain their own channels of social media. So, for instance, in Czechia, "[t]he establishment of an 'anti-Islam camp' was considerably encouraged by the foundation of the website Eurabia and by registration of Antimešita (Anti-Mosque), the first association officially declaring its anti-Islamic objective. (...) Face-book community entitled Islám v České republice nechceme (We don't want Islam in the Czech Republic) enjoyed a great popularity, since the number of their supporters reached 60,000 people, which is several times more than the total of Czech Muslims" (Ostřanský, 2013: 2). It was the association *We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic* that organized an online petition against the possible upgrading of the Czech Muslim umbrella organization to the second level of registration (Kompérová, 2017: 34 – 35). As reported by Kompérová, the petition was signed by more than 24,500 people (Kompérová, 2017: 34 – 35; also Novinky, 2014). There are similar, though possibly less popular, online anti-Islamic activities in Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria.

Apart from Bosnia and, possibly, North Macedonia, in the rest of the countries under investigation, as, in fact, in most of Eastern Europe, non-Muslim majority populations have very little, if any, first-hand experience of Islam and direct contact with Muslims. It has become a truism that most of what they know or assume to know about Islam and Muslims comes from media, both

classical printed (newspapers and magazines), audio-visual (radio and TV) and contemporary (first of all social media and other internet sources). The role of media in sustaining the othering of Muslims in Europe and this way advancing the securitization agenda has been researched extensively (Baker et al., 2013; Ewart et al., 2016; Ahmed and Matthes, 2016; Saeed, 2007). The media's role in the securitization of migration has also been addressed (Williams, 2003; Watson, 2009; Vultee, 2011). The media, however, may be seen as either a mere channel through which all other actors express and promote their views or as an actor in itself, consciously creating and sustaining the rhetorical discourse of othering and calling for the securitization of Islam and Muslims.

As noted by Szalai and Göbl, in the case of Hungary, but purportedly also in Czechia and Poland, "in most cases it merely serves as a forum through which the securitizing actors communicate their own frame. In the case of migration, the media's coverage has indeed been mostly reflecting the claims of the governing elites" (Szalai and Göbl, 2015: 5 – 6). Pędziwiatr draws attention to Polish national radio and TV which was taken over by the ruling party and its supporters: "With the new leadership of tvp [national TV] and PR [national Radio], placed there by the victorious right-wing Law and Justice Party and its parliamentary supporters, particularly the information programmes of tvp (and to a smaller degree of PR) started to undergo a deep transformation opening the television and radio studios not only to a whole range of new right-wing journalists and commentators but also to far-right and openly Islamophobic individuals" (Pędziwiatr, 2017: 424). The same development is observed in Hungary, where it is not only that the public broadcaster has become a mouthpiece of the ruling Fidesz party, but the share of independent opposition media has been steadily shrinking. Tkaczyk has exposed increasing securitization of irregular migration in the context of the so-called "migration crisis" in the Czech online news media (Tkaczyk, 2017). And although very few migrants from among those moving through its territory sought asylum in Czechia, the country's leading online news portals, through bombardment of their audiences with threat-mongering news pieces, must have contributed to an increase in public anxiety and the sense of insecurity, which has then been strengthened by other, particularly anti-immigrant (and by extension anti-Muslim), securitizing actors.

The media is used by public intellectuals (as media uses them) whose ideas are disseminated on it. Though some such public intellectuals come from academic circles (as the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's advisor Miklós Maróth, who "has suggested that European countries should not only bar

Muslim migrants from entering Europe, but has even argued that European Muslims should be stripped of their citizenship, and that Muslim refugees and migrants ‘should be wrapped in pork skin’ if they do not accept European norms” (Pall and Sayfo, 2016)), many are former public servants. So, for instance, in Hungary, a former top official of the State’s secret services, László Földi, has been a common guest on TV and radio programs. In his dismissive statements on refugees (seen as Muslims), (Barnes, 2016) he is reported to have expressed hope “that a refugee camp on Hungary’s southern borders would be turned into a POW camp” (Pall and Sayfo, 2016). In one of his numerous TV appearances, he claimed that Muslims “who arrive here do not want to integrate, and this is about more than not following laws; practically speaking, they will take power culturally, and in a socio-political sense” (Bodissey, 2017), and otherwise passionately sought to demonized and securitize Muslim immigrants to Europe (Bodissey, 2017; also LTG, 2016). Some of these public intellectuals have a receptive ear with rather wide audiences of the public and thus serve as, if not opinion makers, then social influencers, who help to seal the political actors’ efforts of the securitization of Islam and Muslims in their respective countries.

Another category of involved non-Muslim social actors is Christian Churches. When it comes to the position of the (national) Christian Churches toward Muslims in their respective countries, on the officially declared level, there are various inter-faith dialogue platforms, some state supported and even institutionalized, some of a more grass-root nature. In such formats, which, besides an array of Christian Churches and Judaist religious collectivities, include the Muftiates, the national Islamic spiritual administrations are treated as “partner churches”—their representatives are perceived to be the ecclesiastical heads of the national “Muslim churches.” The most advanced such platform among the countries under investigation is probably in Poland, where the Common Council of Catholics and Muslims, initiated and sustained solely by the efforts of the Catholic Church in Poland, has been operating for the past two decades. The activities of this Polish inter-faith dialogue platform vividly show that the Catholic Church in Poland recognizes in the Muslim Religious Union, if not a national, then still a “Muslim Church” at the helm of which is a top ecclesiastical figure, namely, the Mufti of Poland, akin to that of the Catholic cardinal. In such capacity, the Mufti of the Muslim Religious Union, “[a]s one of the main guests (and the member of the Common Council of Catholics and Muslims), (...) participates in the celebrations of the Day of Islam in the Catholic Church in Poland, delivers a speech and leads an occasional prayer” (Nalborczyk, 2017: 307). Bosnia, North Macedonia, and Bulgaria all have similar interfaith dialogue

platforms, which include “national Muslim Churches.” Hungary and Czechia also have them but there Muslim religious organizations are not represented. Lithuania does not have any at all, however.

On the other hand, individual members of dominant Christian Churches, sometimes even high-ranking, espouse positions and opinions that are not only of an othering nature but openly Muslimophobic and securitizing of Islam. This is, arguably, more pronounced in the Orthodox-majority countries, like North Macedonia and Bulgaria, but, with the so-called “migration crisis,” it has become discernible in the countries with nominal (formerly) Catholic majorities, namely Poland, Hungary, and Czechia. So, for instance, in the context of the heightened numbers of migrants in and around 2015, the overwhelming majority of whom were of Muslim background, moving through the territory of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church called for closure of the State borders to migrants, as it was alarmed that “[t]his is a wave that looks like an invasion” and argued that “the Bulgarian people must not pay the price by disappearing (MEE, 2015).

Othering of Muslims in North Macedonia and Bulgaria in general, but particularly by the Slavic Christian Orthodox majorities, is closely interrelated with othering of ethnic minorities, such as Albanians and Turks who carry the double stigma of being both non-Christian and non-Slavic. Often, in othering, the ethnic side takes over the religious, so that the religious affiliation/identity is seen as a corollary to ethnic background and identity. This is particularly apparent in the othering the Macedonian Orthodox Church engaged in around the internal armed conflict in 2001. Then, the Church is reported to have “issued several communiqués in which it has demanded heavier military action against Albanian guerillas, referring to them as ‘terrorists’ and using very sharp language” (Vangeli, 2010: 86), and the head of the Church, Patriarch Stefan, wrote an open letter in which he contended that “[w]hen the freedom and defence of our people cannot be achieved with other means, then we should get rid of those who endanger our lives and who are trying to split our homeland”; (Latifi, 2001) he is reported to have “called for a holy war against the Albanian “terrorists who are stealing our territory” (Perica, 2002: 175). Bishop Petar, in his turn, is reported to have openly “called for revenge against Muslims” (Farnam, 2001). Later, the Church objected to the peace process and the peace agreement between rebelling Albanians and the State when it insisted that “the country should not submit to the illegitimate demands for constitutional changes and to maintain its “character” with regard to the provisions given to minorities, meaning that it should give primacy to the ethnic Macedonians” (Vangeli, 2010: 87). Though the Macedonian Orthodox hierarchy lamented that the recognition of the constitutional equality of Albanians

“undermines Christianity” (Farnam, 2001), the Churches failed to preclude/reverse government decisions. The North Macedonian government had to endure the Church’s wrath but it persisted and did not give in. This shows that in the State-Orthodox Church nexus, at least in North Macedonia, the stronger partner (still) is the State, which not only manages to stop the Church-pushed de-secularization process but also hold, if not minimize, the effects of the othering (stigmatization and securitization) of Islam and Muslims by the rank and file of the local (national) Orthodox Church.

In the eyes of Christian majorities, Muslims in the Balkans loosely fall into two distinct categories, one comprised of non-Slavic Albanians and Turks, the other of Slavic speaking Muslims, be it Serbo-Croatian speaking Bosniaks, Macedonian speaking Torbeshis or Bulgarian speaking Pomaks. This latter category of Muslims is often seen by respective Christian majorities as the lost part of “us.” There have been attempts in history, particularly in Bulgaria, to “return” Slavic-speaking Muslims to the Orthodox Christian fold by forcefully baptizing them. As forceful baptizing is practically impossible today, some Orthodox priests resort to what could be labeled “coercive proselytism.” So, for instance, it is reported that in Bulgaria a certain priest, himself of Muslim Pomak origin, has been engaged in Christianization of local Pomaks and Turks, allegedly offering a cash reward for conversion to Christianity or baptizing children in orphanages (Aliş, 2012).

Though Pope Francis urged European Catholics to be compassionate toward arriving refugees, his call not only fell on the deaf ears of some Catholics in post-communist Eastern Europe, but was met with unequivocal rejection, both in rhetoric and action, by certain top-ranking Catholic clergymen. So, for instance, in Czechia, where Catholics still make up the biggest, though no longer majority, faith community, in the wake of the so-called “migration crisis,” top Catholic cleric, Cardinal Dominik Duka, “warned against underestimating the danger of Islam and an open door policy for refugees from the Islamic world” (“Cardinal Duka,” 2016).

Similarly, in Hungary, Péter Erdő, archbishop of Esztergom-Budapest and primate of the Catholic Church in Hungary “described helping refugees as ‘people-trafficking.’” (Halmai, n.d.: 5) Another high-ranking Hungarian Catholic clergyman, the bishop of Szeged-Csanád, László Kiss-Rigó, is reported to have said: “They’re not refugees. This is an invasion. They come here with cries of ‘Allahu Akbar.’ They want to take over. I’m in total agreement with the prime minister [Viktor Orbán]. The Pope doesn’t know the situation which is that, Europe is being inundated by people who are posing as refugees but actually present a grave threat to the continent’s Christian universal values” (Barcsa, and Máté-Tóth, 2016: 5). Yet another high-ranking Catholic clergyman, Béla

Balás, bishop of Kaposvár, is reported to have “published an apocalyptic letter (...), where its title is both flabbergasting and telling: ‘Evening news from the European caliphate in the first century after Christianity.’ In this letter, Balás envisioned churches that were blown up and destroyed, the persecution of Christian believers and priests, the beheading of political leaders, banning pork and wine, censorship, and the European citizens’ migration. At the end, he closes his letter with a prayer, called ‘Evening prayer from the last one of the continent’s Christians’ where he prays for Europe’s future in it” (Barcsa, and Máté-Tóth, 2016: 5 – 6). Further, Gyula Márfi, bishop of Veszprém, is also known as among those Catholic hierarchs in Hungary who are inclined toward scandalizing and thus securitizing Islam (Kovacs, 2016). He is quoted as having stated that, in his opinion, “Europe is becoming enslaved by Islam with faith instead of guns. It is a holy war for the Muslims. They are ready to risk their lives in order to arrive to their new home, Europe” (Barcsa, and Máté-Tóth, 2016: 6), and that “Muslims cannot and do not want to adapt. As I said, they came to conquer, not to adapt” (Barcsa, and Máté-Tóth, 2016: 6; see also Pall and Sayfo, 2016).

Though in Poland, there were just a few openly Muslimophobic public statements by the Catholic hierarchy and, arguably, “among Polish bishops there were more supporters of ‘building bridges’ and a cautious acceptance of refugees than supporters of ‘building walls,’” (Kaczmarek, 2016) in the opinion of Pędzwiatr, “in an atmosphere of reinvigorated processes of sacralization of the nation and the banalization of Islamophobia, the Catholic clergy has, however, done little to deconstruct the widespread representations of Muslims as bloodthirsty, violent, aggressive and undemocratic, and of refugees from the Middle East as terrorists in disguise” (Pędzwiatr, 2018: 476). In any case, there were some Polish bishops, who “have openly questioned the applicability of the papal call to Poland” (Pędzwiatr, 2018: 462). So, for instance, Archbishop Henryk Hoser of Warsaw-Praga, himself a former president of the Vatican’s Pontifical Mission Societies, argued that if allowed into the country, Muslims would proceed with opening “ghettoes which give birth to violence and terrorism,” while another, retired, bishop, Edward Frankowski, has warned his congregation that the incoming refugees may include “masked jihadists waiting to strike” (Luxmoore, 2017). Finally, there were several young priests who took “an active part in anti-refugee and anti-Muslim demonstrations” (Pędzwiatr, 2018: 462).<sup>15</sup> Pędzwiatr argues that “[t]hese Church figures have played an important role in the significant rise of Islamophobic sentiments that have, in the

---

15 Pędzwiatr reports on the case of a former priest-turned-far right nationalist, who has become an activist in the anti-Islam/Muslim camp.

context of the migration crisis and Islamist terrorist attacks, moved from the margins of society to the mainstream” (Pędziwiatr, 2018: 462).

As shown above, hierarchs and high standing clergy in both national Orthodox and Catholic Churches in a number of countries under investigation have taken an othering stand toward Islam and Muslims—in particular those coming to Europe as refugees. In Orthodox majority countries, foremost North Macedonia and Bulgaria, such a stand confirms not only the State-Church nexus, but the intertwining of religion and ethnicity that produces religious nationalism on the side of the majority Orthodox Christian Slavs. In Catholic majority countries, like Hungary, Czechia and, to a much lesser extent, Poland, however, negative views of the Catholic bishops toward Islam and Muslims are not to be seen as expressions of general religious nationalism, because the bulk of their populations are effectively in a state of post-religiousness and either do not identify with Catholicism at all or do this only tentatively, but rather as verbal support extended to the government’s Muslimophobic and securitizing agenda.

All the above-mentioned groups of social actors one way or another are active in the churchification and securitization of Islam in their countries through direct or less so lobbying and pressure over political actors. As has been shown, most of the publicly visible non-Muslim social actors concerned with the status of Islam and its governance have been prone to the securitization of Islam with just some, foremost among Christian Churches, sticking to the churchification of it. Though it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between the activities of these social and political actors’ decisions (policy outcomes), one may feel a connection between the two, i.e. they are mutually reinforcing each other. This is not to say that if there were no political actors who would resort to the securitization of Islam, then there would be no social actors calling for or supporting it. And vice versa, the absence of securitizing social actors would not warrant abstaining from the securitization of Islam among political actors.

The influence of social, but also political, actors on the public on questions of the churchification and securitization of Islam is hard to measure and in any case outside of the scope of the present research. This, however, does not mean that the public does not have its position vis-à-vis the governance of Islam and the strategies the State should adopt toward the Muslim population of the country. Populations in the countries under investigation, in fact, are very opinionated on issues caused by and related to the so-called “migration crisis.” The various public opinion polls conducted since 2015 show an increase in social distancing accorded by citizens of the countries to either Muslims or immigrants/Arabs, invariably perceived to be Muslims. It should be pointed

out that none of the seven countries under research were target countries of the arriving immigrants during the so-called “migration crisis,” and two of them, because of the geographical location (namely, Lithuania and Poland) were not even transit territories, while Hungary and North Macedonia served as primary transit territories and Bosnia and Bulgaria as secondary.

But the countries under investigation, as shown above, have experienced migration very differently not only in the context of the recent so-called “migration crisis” but also the longer retrospective. While Poland, Hungary and Czechia, over the past three decades have become destination countries for immigrants and expatriates from around the world, with Muslim populations in them exponentially growing several (if not tens of) times, the remaining four countries have not received any significant numbers of immigrants, asylum seekers, economic migrants or otherwise, and the fluctuation in the share of Muslim populations there depended more on birth rates and emigration. Thus, commonly high levels of social distancing of immigrants (refugees) and Muslims need to be seen in the perspective of these different experiences.

The cases of Lithuania and Poland, the two countries with minuscule, yet historical (autochthonous) Muslim populations, stick out. By the time the two sovereign republics of Poland and Lithuania emerged in the aftermath of the WWI, Muslim Tatars had become an integral part of the “Us” in both countries, and have remained so well into the post-communist period (Dziekan, 2011; Račius, 2013). However, unlike Tatars as an ethno-confessional national minority, Islam has undergone a transformative process in which it has turned from an unproblematic “just another religion” into a “dangerous ideology.” “New” Muslims in the person of expatriates and immigrants but also local converts to Islam have been increasingly perceived by the wider public as representing this “dangerous ideology” and thus subsequently otherized into “Them” as opposed to Tatars who are deemed to be part of “Us.” Consequentially, the othering of Muslims has led to Muslimophobia, apparently increasingly more pervasive in Poland as compared with Lithuania, which has not experienced immigration or conversion of locals to Islam to the same degree as Poland has. Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr argue that there is a “gradual shift in the Polish imagination from a considerable openness towards its Muslim minorities to increasing hostility, and the emergence of Poland as one of Europe’s most anti-Muslim countries” (Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr, 2017: 452), which can only have been accelerated by the so-called “migration crisis” or rather media reports on it.

Yet, there are common features and trends in most of the survey and opinion poll results across Europe. Cesari, basing her conclusions on the analysis of surveys and opinion polls in Western Europe, concludes that “[t]he primary

trends identified from these surveys are as follows: (1) Muslims have not and will not integrate. (2) Muslims are a threat to national identity now and in the future. (3) Public practices, such as mosque-building, prayer, and clothing, should be kept to a minimum. (4) Islam and Muslims are incompatible with national and Western values” (Cesari, 2013: 14). These same trends are also clearly discernible on the social actors’ level and among the general public in post-communist Eastern Europe.

Even before the so-called “migration crisis” populations in Eastern Europe tended to be Muslimophobic. So, for instance, as Narkowicz and Pędzwiatr report, “[r]esearch from 2011 revealed that 47% of Poles believed that ‘too many Muslims live in Poland.’ Among the eight nations involved in the research, Poles were the most critical towards Islam. Nearly 62% of the Polish respondents agreed with the thesis that ‘Islam is an intolerant religion’ and only one in five believed that Muslim culture could adapt to life in a European/Polish society” (Narkowicz and Pędzwiatr, 2017: 452).

The polls conducted in the wake of the so-called “migration crisis” reveal high levels of both anti-Muslim and anti-refugee sentiment. The highest social distancing toward immigrants (refugees) and Muslims is recorded for Hungary and Poland. So, in a Pew Research Center survey in 2016, 72 per cent of Hungarians and 66 per cent of Poles were found to have an “unfavorable opinion of the Muslims in their country” (Pew, 2016: 4). Furthermore, 76 per cent of Hungarian and 71 per cent of Polish respondents thought that “refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in our country” (Pew, 2016: 3). A Chatham House survey in 2017 showed that some 71 per cent of Poles and 64 per cent of Hungarians agree with the statement that “All further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped” (Goodwin, 2017).

In Czechia, according to one survey from mid-2016, “61% of respondents were against the country accepting any refugees on its territory” and “92% of respondents saw the immigration as a security threat to the Czech Republic” (Strapáčová and Hloušek, 2018: 3). In an interesting observation, Slačálek and Svobodová argue that, unlike neighboring Poles, who remain staunch Catholics, Czechs, being “among the least religious of nations,” fear Islam “as a religion, not as a rival religion” (Slačálek and Svobodová, 2018: 480). Results of surveys and opinion polls conducted in Lithuania show that “50 % of respondents would not like to live in a neighbourhood with refugees, while 58 % would not like to live near Muslims. In addition, 86 % of respondents agree that refugees might increase the level of criminality in Lithuania; while 82 % think that refugees can trigger social disorder” (Sabatauskaitė et al., 2016: 334). For North Macedonia, a third or more of whose population is of Muslim background, the so-called “migration crisis” was arguably “a significant development in how

members of North Macedonian society have come face to face with people whom the general public assume are Muslims, but who are also identified as foreigners. This phenomenon separated the ethnic component from religion in regards to the perception of Muslims in Macedonia” (Georgiev, 2016: 363).

According to a 2018 Pew Research Center survey, in Czechia, only 12 per cent of the respondents answered positively to the questions of whether “they would be willing to accept Muslims as members of their family” (Pew, 2018: 3). The share in Lithuania was 16 per cent, 21 per cent in Hungary, 32 per cent in Bulgaria, 33 per cent in Poland, and 42 per cent in Bosnia, far below the share in Western European countries (Pew, 2018: 5).

Slačálek and Svobodová maintain that “Czech Islamophobia is much more similar to what Brubaker labels ‘Northern and Western European’ populism, found in Western Europe and anchored in the defence of liberal and secular values, than to the conservative Islamophobia of the Polish and Hungarian nationalists” (Slačálek and Svobodová, 2018: 481). In any case, unlike in Northern and Western Europe, othering of Muslims, or Islamophobia, in Hungary, Czechia and Poland may be termed as “phantom Islamophobia” (Włoch, 2009: 65) or even “Platonic Islamophobia” (Górak-Sosnowska, 2006), as it is generally Islamophobia without Muslims. Lithuania, another country covered in this book, would also fit this picture; however, its level of Muslimophobia is considerably lower.

In some countries under investigation, there has been a sort of nexus between the political actors and the non-Muslim social actors in their mutual effort to securitize Islam, particularly since the so-called “migration crisis.” So, for instance, in Hungary, “[i]n the wake of 2015’s refugee crisis, organizations close to the Fidesz government established the Migration Research Institute, which has since published reports on the security risks posed by Muslims in Europe, providing an ‘academic’ justification for the government’s anti-migrant policies” (Pall and Sayfo, 2016). But, more importantly, the presumed nexus between the political actors and the non-Muslim social actors in the securitization of Islam reveals itself through some organizations, NGOs and others, as well as individuals serving in the double capacity of being both part of political actors and social actors levels. Various NGOs and other non-governmental organizations as well as public intellectuals and media serve as the mouthpiece and proxies of political actors and this way, rather than being independent (and critical) actors, attend to the political actors securitizing agenda. It may be concluded that the Muslimophobic non-Muslim social actors who securitize Islam should be seen as being very close to the political actors and often even dependent on them. It is through these non-Muslim social actors that securitizing political actors seek to influence public opinion, which is

subsequently turned into votes in the next elections (and this is very evident in the Hungarian, Czech and also, albeit to a lesser extent, Polish cases). As the will of the political actors and the expectations of the supportive non-Muslim social actors coincide, policy outcomes ensuing from the political actors represent the anticipations of a much broader spectrum of actors than just those political actors making political decisions.

The connection between the two levels of actors on the question of the governance of Islam is further made closer by hierarchs of Christian Churches, most notably, of national Orthodox Churches, but also of the Catholic Church, who routinely otherize Islam and Muslims and thus serve as securitizing actors. This is here where religious nationalism comes into the scene and the close connection, on the one hand, between national Orthodox Churches and the State (as in Bulgaria and North Macedonia), and, on the other hand, between national and religious identities, transpires into a broad front of securitizing actors, in effect, putting Muslim populations in general and their religious collectivities in particular on the defensive. One may observe that in countries with historic Orthodox heritage (like Bulgaria and North Macedonia, but also in Republika Srpska, a constituent part of Bosnia and Herzegovina), it is primarily the Orthodox Churches that lead among non-Muslim social actors in the securitization of Islam and Muslims, while in the countries with Catholic heritage, it is mainly secular NGOs and social movements that push for the securitization of Islam on the legislative level in their countries; Catholic hierarchs also playing a role in it, albeit on an individual basis.

## Bottom-Up View: Dynamics in the Islamic Field

### 6.1 From Islamic Spiritual Administrations into National Muslim Churches

Muslim religious collectivities, foremost the registered ones, but also the non-registered, in Eastern Europe, being at the receiving end of the course of churchification and securitization of Islam, have to get to grips with the expectations stemming from all the legal, political, and non-Muslim social actor levels. So, they have to establish their position vis-à-vis the legislation governing religion in their respective countries, as well as to decide on establishing or not relations with the political elites, all the while listening to the voices coming from the non-Muslim social actors and sensing the mood of the public.

The Muslim social actors' scene in post-communist Eastern Europe in general, and certainly so in the countries under investigation, may be seen as being comprised of three categories of Muslim religious collectivities—the first one is composed of registered Muslim religious organizations, which claim to be and are recognized, formally or informally, by the State as “representative” Islamic spiritual administrations. The second category encompasses also officially registered Muslim religious organizations, though they are either not recognized by the State as “representative” Islamic spiritual administrations or they themselves do not aspire to such status. The third category is made up of those Muslim religious collectivities that have either been denied official registration (with or without being banned) or themselves do not seek it. All these Muslim religious collectivities, in respect to their reaction to the churchification and securitization of Islam, fall into two tentative opposing camps: one represented by the dominant “representative” Muslim religious organizations (aka “national” Islamic spiritual administrations, the Muftiates), the other—by all others (Table 6).

As seen from Table 6, not all countries under investigation have dominant “representative” Muslim religious organizations (aka “national” Islamic spiritual administrations, or Muftiates); neither Hungary nor Czechia has a sole towering Muslim collectivity that is, even if only informally, recognized by the State as “representative.” The umbrella Muslim organizations in the two countries are reminiscent, in their *raison d'être* and composition, of the Islamic Councils in Western Europe, but neither of them is functional and therefore hardly has any relations with the State. It is their constituent registered Muslim

TABLE 6 Muslim religious organizations in countries under research

Country	Dominant (“representative”) organization	Rival/alternative organizations
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Islamic Community (1882)	None
North Macedonia	Islamic Religious Community (1991)	None
Bulgaria	Muslim Denomination (1919)	Faction headed by former Chief Mufti Nedim Gendzhev (since 1992)
Poland	Muslim Religious Union (1925)	Muslim League (2001)
Lithuania	Spiritual Center of Sunni Muslims—Muftiate (1998)	Council of Muslim Religious Communities—Muftiate (2018)
Hungary	No dominant organization (nominal umbrella organization Hungarian Islamic Council (2012))	Hungarian Muslim Church (2000), Islamic Community of Hungary (1988)
Czechia	No dominant organization (nominal umbrella organization Center of Muslim Communities (2004))	None

COMPILED BY AUTHOR

religious organizations that are the true Muslim social actors. While the member organizations of the Czech Center of Muslim Communities are filial organizations, the two Hungarian Muslim religious organizations—namely, the Hungarian Muslim Church and the Islamic Community of Hungary—are more parallel Muslim collectivities and competitors both between themselves and in relations to the State.

All of these Muslim religious organizations have had strained relations with the state—Vladimir Sanka, the leader of Czechia’s Muslims, has been accused of and tried in the court of justice for allegedly spreading radical Islam, though ultimately was found innocent (Irozhlav, 2018). The Hungarian Prime Minister

Viktor Orbán and his ruling Fidesz party officials' rhetoric is seen by Muslims in Hungary as Muslimophobic, something which needs to be exposed and responded to; since this new anti-Islam narrative is becoming mainstream, an NGO, the Hungarian Muslim Defense League, was founded in 2016 under the auspices of the Hungarian Muslim Church. As one of its members puts it, the reaction of the government to the migration crisis was the incentive to create the League to monitor Islamophobia in the country.<sup>1</sup> Rank and file in Muslim communities in both countries contend that, although official anti-Muslim and securitizing rhetoric is geared toward immigrants of Muslim background, particularly those posing as refugees, the long-term Muslim residents and citizens of the two countries are also at the receiving end of it; non-Muslim social actors do not make any distinction among Muslims and the Muslim organizations—their members and property—have experienced a number of hate crimes and vandalism from the non-Muslim social actors and petty criminal side (Peachey, 2018; Heijmans, 2017). Though the leadership of these organizations try to do their best to explain that Islam and Muslims in Hungary and Czechia do not pose any threat, they are in despair as they cannot match the volume of Muslimophobic rhetoric coming from State and private channels (Schultheis, 2016; Peachey, 2018).

The remaining five countries under investigation do have “representative” Muslim religious organizations, though their status, both in the State in general and among Muslim populations, as well as their relations *vis-à-vis* other Muslim religious collectivities, differ. The “representative” Muslim religious organizations in Bosnia and Bulgaria, the Islamic Community and the Muslim Denomination, respectively, are both the oldest and the longest surviving institutionalized Muslim religious collectivities among those in the countries under investigation. As such, they have gone through various developmental stages, reflected in their internal constitutions/statutes, which among other things also reflect the changing nature of State-religion relations and the status of Muslim religious collectivities in their respective countries over the course of more than a century. The two organizations underwent a profound change in the wake of the collapse of the communist system, when, from once having been suppressed and even collaborationist organizations, but yet almost fully controlled by the communist regimes of their respective countries, they broke free. The communist-time statutes that made them subservient to the atheistic State with its anti-religious agenda and stifling legislation were changed with completely new ones crafted in the new spirit of regained religious freedoms

---

1 Interview with a member of the Hungarian Muslim Defense League, Budapest, October 3, 2018.

and rights. The subsequent amendments to the statutes in the following decades have been more of cosmetic-technical nature, and have not changed the *raison d'être* of the organizations.

However, back in the early 1990s, when Bosnia was still part of Yugoslavia, through the seminal changes in its statute, in the words of Perica, “[t]he Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina was in the process of becoming another Yugoslav “national church,” dedicated, like the Christian churches of Serbia and Croatia, to the making of ethnic nations” (Perica, 2002: 88). Soon, a brand new ethnic group, Bosniaks, the backbone of the new sovereign Bosnian State and its nation, was born out of the Yugoslav-time “Muslim” nationality. The Bulgarian Muslim Denomination was not in a position to carve out an ethnic nation, but it had to go through the process of cleansing itself from the collaborationist past, which, as has been shown above, led to its splintering into two rival Muftiates and a subsequent protracted reconciliation period.

The Polish “representative” Muslim religious organization—the Muslim Religious Union—that had been in a lethargic, if not paralyzed, state for more than four decades, was also revived after the collapse of the communist regime, under the legal basis it held in pre-wwII Poland, where, as was argued in Chapter 4, it was legally seen as an autocephalous “Muslim church.” Though, in pre- and communist times, neither North Macedonia, nor Lithuania, had their own formally recognized national Muslim religious collectivities, the ones that emerged in the post-communist era may be seen as follow-ups of the Yugoslav (for North Macedonia) and the inter-war Polish (for Lithuania) Islamic spiritual administrations. Therefore, as much as the Yugoslav and Polish Islamic spiritual administrations may be seen as national “Muslim churches,” the North Macedonian and Lithuanian ones have inherited this essential organizational and functional feature. Idriz and Ali compare the Islamic Community of Macedonia to the former Yugoslav Islamic Community and claim that “the newly independent Islamic Religious Community of Macedonia quickly began to rearrange its institutional structure; however, it almost followed the similar functioning tools of the former regime’s norms and forms with little changes. This was due to the constitutional and legislative framework of the communist Yugoslav states, which had a strong effect on all their post-communist counterparts” (Idriz and Ali, 2016: 86). Finally, Hungarian and Czech Muslim religious collectivities, even those that are institutionalized, on the other hand, being of recent formation, lack all the features of the above-mentioned Islamic spiritual administrations.

In part due to its longevity, but also the circumstances in which it was founded and the conditions it has been developing in, the Bosnian Islamic Community is arguably the most advanced on the bottom-up path of churchification.

Since its inception, it has adopted a dozen or so of its constitutions, most recently in 2014. With every constitution, the internal structure of the IC would be adjusted, allegedly to correspond to political changes and meet new socio-demographic realities. However, all these changes in its administrative structure have left the overall underlying principle of the IC as a church-like organization with the supreme spiritual-administrative leadership in the person of *rais al-ulama* intact, save for the communist period. On the other hand, the changes would facilitate the IC's oscillation between the different types of churches—from episcopal to congregational to synodal and back. The Bulgarian Muslim Denomination, over the course of its history has been less turbulent than that of the IC in terms of its development, and it also has a rich sequence of statutes with the most recent dating from 2011. The Polish Muslim Religious Union as well as the recently established Macedonian Islamic Religious Community and the Lithuanian Spiritual Center of Sunni Muslims-Muftiate have just had some amendments to their original statutes. In this section, only the current statutes of these organizations are analyzed.<sup>2</sup> Next to the statutes, other relevant internal documents and decisions made by the supreme legislative bodies of the Muftiates, as well as public statements and practical actions are analyzed against the definition of church worked out in Chapter 1, where the church is defined as:

- A. institutionalized (legally recognized) religious community,
- B. encompassing the totality of believers of that faith understood here as a set of dogmas, rituals and ethics,
- C. which has an ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure staffed by professional (ordained) clergy,
- D. and which has a positive relationship and attitude to society and the State.

The first and last conditions/criteria are met by all of the above-mentioned Muslim religious collectivities, including Hungary and Czechia, as they have long become institutionalized and legally recognized religious communities. Their statutes are both the institutional basis for their structure and functioning and their very existence, based on which the states have legally recognized (registered) these organizations. Moreover, as shown in the preceding chapters, in five countries out of the seven under investigation (the exceptions being Hungary and Czechia), the Islamic spiritual administrations have been

---

<sup>2</sup> The texts of the statutes were either found online, on the websites of the respective organizations, or acquired with the help of colleagues based in the countries of the respective organizations. The author expresses his gratitude to those who facilitated acquiring the texts of non-publicly available statutes.

accorded special status by the State (either in the constitutions, *lex specialis* or bilateral agreements), in one way or another establishing their status as virtually national representatives of historical/ “traditional” Muslim communities in the respective countries. The statutes of registered Muslim religious collectivities positively position the respective organizations *vis-à-vis* the State and wider society, as they all declare loyalty and submission to the constitutional order of the State they operate in. The remaining two criteria are more substantive and need a more detailed *exposé*.

**6.1.1 “Encompasses the totality of believers of that faith understood here as a set of dogmas, rituals and ethics”**

The statutes of practically all “representative” Muslim religious organizations under scrutiny set forth the articles of faith (as a rule, required by law for registration purposes), this way spelling out the criteria for membership in the community representative of which the organization claims to be. So, for instance, the statute of the Bosnian Islamic Community confines membership to Sunni Hanafis of Maturidi tradition, which is seen to be the core of the “Bosniak tradition.” Several articles of the Constitution simultaneously make the IC effectively an exclusively ethnic (Bosniak) Muslim religious institution and a national (Bosnian) one. Bosnian Muftis emphasize this in their public speeches and texts. For instance, the current Mufti Husein Kavazović has stated that “[t]he Islamic Community is the institutional form and the traditional framework of religious life of Bosniaks, an indigenous European Muslim people” (Kavazović, n.d.: 7), and that “the principal value of the Islamic life of Bosnian Muslims is its religious foundation and organizational structure embodied in the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Kavazović, n.d.: 10).

However, what makes the Bosnian IC a church is not only its close resemblance to institutional church structures and hierarchies, but the foundations of not only both its *modus vivendi* and *modus operandi* but essentially its very *raison d'être*, i.e. the so-called “Islamic tradition of Bosniaks.” Karčić has made an attempt (which appears to have been accepted by the IC) to define the “Islamic tradition of Bosniaks” (Karčić, F., 2006). According to him, “the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks’ is not a theoretical construct but reality of understanding and living of Islam by our people for the last five centuries” (Karčić, F., 2006: 58 – 59). Karčić lists six elements, which he sees collectively as making up the “Islamic tradition of Bosniaks”:

1. Ahl al-sunnah branch of Islam, including application of Maturidi thought in aqaid and Hanafi madhhab in fiqh, with respective Sufi orders (tariqats);
2. Belonging to an Ottoman-Islamic cultural zone;

3. Existence of elements of “Islamized” practice of inhabitants of pre-Ottoman Bosnia;
4. Tradition of Islamic reformism (*islah*) in interpretation of Islam;
5. Institutionalization of Islam in the form of the Islamic Community;
6. Practice of expression of Islam in a secular state.

So defined, the “Islamic tradition of Bosniaks,” on the one hand, makes all Muslim Bosniaks by default members, if not formally of the IC, then certainly of the “national Muslim church,” and, on the other hand, ostracizes and even excommunicates anyone who actively transgresses or opposes it, either as a sort of deviant, if not altogether “apostate,” or non-believer. Karčić’s formulation of features of the “Islamic tradition of Bosniaks” not only endorses its belonging to “European” Islam, but effectively contraposes it to any “alien” forms of Islamic religiosity, presumably coming from the outside. As such, the “Islamic tradition of Bosniaks” both predates *fiqh al-aqalliyat* and goes beyond its framework. In other words, Bosnia’s Muslims are in no need of *fiqh al-aqalliyat* as they have the time-tested “Islamic tradition of Bosniaks” that squarely places their Islam within the confines of “European” Islam.

The constitution of the Macedonian Islamic Religious Community (Art. 1 of General Provisions), like the Bosnian, also places it within the confines of the Hanafi legal tradition, something that apparently makes its relations with and pretensions at inclusion of heterodox Bektashis into the structure and framework of the IRC anomalous.

The Lithuanian Spiritual Center of Sunni Muslims-Muftiate, in its very title as well as certain articles in its statute, limits its membership to exclusively Sunni Muslims. As the then head of the Muslim congregation of the capital city Vilnius, Asanavičius explained, “the Muslims could expect to receive financial support from the state only if they put ‘Sunni’ in the title of their organization” (Sitdykovas, 1999a: 1), otherwise, their organization would not have been regarded as an organization of one of the nine officially protected “traditional confessions” (where, in the law on religions, Sunni Islam is explicitly recognized as traditional in Lithuania). Though the Muftiate was established exclusively by Tatars, the then Mufti Romas Krinickis is reported to have insisted that “that does not mean its ethnic self-isolation” and emphasized that “Muslims of all ethnicities have a full right to take part in its activities” (Sitdykovas, 1999b: 3).

According to its statute, the Polish Muslim Religious Union is understood to encompass Polish Tatar Muslims, all of whom are obliged in the agreement of 1936 between the State and the Polish Muslim Religious Union to be members of the MRU. The standing version of the statute (adopted in 2009 with amendments in 2014), however, not only does not limit membership to Tatars but

even states (Point 11 of General provisions) that membership of the MRU is open to “any Muslim person with the right to stay on the territory of the Republic of Poland and not affiliated with any other religious association in Poland.” However, it immediately adds that “[t]he right to vote and holding positions is vested in persons with Polish citizenship.” The MRU through its statute (§ 24) also awards itself the duty to “car[e] for the doctrinal purity of religion, including countering theories disseminated by groups claiming to be Muslim but considered by collective of Muslims as non-Muslim.”

The statutes of some organizations establish them as the sole representatives of a particular branch of Islam or even of Islam as such in the concerned country. So, for instance, the Constitution of the Bosnian IC (Art. 1) declares it to be “the one and the only community of Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Sandžak, Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia, of Muslim Bosniaks outside their homeland, and of other Muslims who accept it as their own,” in other words, as Alibašić and Begović note, “a centralized nationwide organization with de facto exclusive authority in governing the community religious affairs” (Alibašić and Begović, 2017: 20). What is exceptional in the Bosnian case, compared with the rest of Eastern Europe, is that the IC claims as its flock Muslim Bosniaks abroad, both in the former Yugoslav republics and further afield. This makes the IC not merely a national representative Muslim organization but a transnational one and, by extension, a transnational Muslim Church, similar to, for instance, the Armenian Apostolic Church.

Similarly, the statute of the Bulgarian Muslim Denomination “expressly states that the Muslim denomination is a voluntary association of all citizens professing Islam” (Avramov, 2014: 30), and that “[a]ll Muslims in the Republic of Bulgaria belong to the Muslim tradition in the country irrespective of their ethnic origins and the direction of Islam to which they belong and are subject to the provisions of this Statute, to other internal acts of the denomination and to its governing bodies.”<sup>3</sup> On its official website (<http://www.grandmufti.bg/en/about/mission.html>), the Bulgarian Muftiate presents itself as the sole representative of Bulgaria’s Muslims, almost a Bulgarian Muslim Church, a counterpart to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Like its North Macedonian counterpart, the Bulgarian Muslim Denomination includes non-Sunni (and non-orthodox) Alevi (also known as Kizilbash) Muslims in its structure (Dzhekova et al., 2015: 33). Not surprising then that the constitution of the Macedonian Islamic Religious Community in its Preamble also declares that “the Islamic Religious Community of Macedonia, due to its historical background, is the sole legal inheritor of all religious institutions and is the

---

3 Art. 11.2 of the Statute of the Muslim Denomination of Bulgaria.

representative organisation of all Muslims in the territories of Macedonia” (Idriz and Ali, 2016: 89).

According to its Statute (Art. 1.1.), the Lithuanian Spiritual Center of Sunni Muslims—Muftiate is “the supreme governing body of Lithuania’s Sunni Muslims.” Moreover, as per Art. 3.5., “newly forming religious communities must corroborate their statutes and actions with the Muftiate.” Some time before the split in the Lithuanian Muslim community, the head of the Lithuanian Spiritual Center of Sunni Muslims—Muftiate Mufti Romas Jakubauskas—reasoned that it was good that the State recognized only one Mufti, for it would not be wise to have more than one for such a small number of Muslims as there are currently in Lithuania.<sup>4</sup> However, asked if he served all Muslims residing in Lithuania, Jakubauskas admitted that he did not serve Shi‘is, while the Muftiate represented some one thousand Muslims who belonged to the officially registered congregations whose members served on the Board of the Muftiate.

The three biggest national Islamic spiritual administrations—the Bosnian, the North Macedonian, and the Bulgarian—are thus the national Muslim Churches which, besides the main body of believers composed of Sunni (of Hanafi legal tradition) Muslims, make space for “denominations,” as defined in Chapter 1, Sufi, Bektashi and Alevi/ Kizilbash, respectively. The leadership of the Macedonian IRC, in its statute (Art. 36) is vested not only with the right to set the rules of Sufi brotherhoods (among which Bektashis are included) and supervise their work, but also to approve the selection and appointment of shaykhs, this way, taking away from the brotherhoods the most symbolic aspect of their independence—the succession of shaykhs. As is shown further below, in their practical policies, these national Islamic spiritual administrations also make gestures toward independent “sects,” as defined in Chapter 1, that would be willing to become “denominations” under the respective aegis of the national Muslim Churches. The Bosnian IC’s approach to Salafi congregations (the so-called “para-jamaats”) is a telling example of how the denominationalization of “sects” is facilitated. The Lithuanian and Polish national Islamic spiritual administrations are both exclusively Sunni, though only the Lithuanian has made it official. At the same time, all five are ethnic (Bosniak, Albanian, Turk and two Tatar, respectively) “churches.”

### 6.1.2 *“Has an ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure staffed by professional (ordained) clergy”*

Having an ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure staffed by professional (ordained) clergy is probably the main feature of a religious collectivity being

<sup>4</sup> Interview with Mufti Roms Jakubauskas, March 22, 2011, Vilnius.

(functioning) as a church, irrespective of whether it is a Christian or a non-Christian religious collectivity. The most elaborate ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure may be found in the case of the Bosnian Islamic Community, where besides a complex hierarchy on the national level, it includes structural units outside of Bosnia. The constitution (Chapter v) of the IC foresees a three-level structure with local (*jama'at and majlis*), regional (*regional muftiate*) and national (*Riyasat* (the Executive Committee), Sabor (the Assembly), the Constitutional court) bodies. Interestingly, the statute foresees that Sufi brotherhoods may also be an integral part of the IC. Alibašić and Begović argue that “[t]he rationale of this tightly organized form of authority is twofold. Theologically, it aims to protect the authenticity of Bosnian tradition of religious interpretation. Administratively, it aims to oversee the rights of the community and to provide the necessary conditions for Muslims to perform their religious obligations” (Alibašić and Begović, 2017: 25). Though they may be right, this tightly organized form of authority or, in other words, the hierarchical combination of these administrative and spiritual bodies, inevitably makes the IC into a church-like institutional structure, where the top spiritual leader—*rais al-ulama*<sup>5</sup>—is effectively the top ecclesiastical leader overseeing the totality of the religious officials, who effectively are professional clergy subordinated and accountable to him. His legitimacy as the head of the Bosnian Muslim Church comes from the election but is sealed by the procedure of investiture where he is presented with a sort of pledge of allegiance in the form of a written certificate, known as a *manšur*.

In the Bulgarian and North Macedonian cases, due to the share size of the communities, ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structures are also quite composite, but decidedly not as much as that of the Bosnian IC. The statute of the Bulgarian Muslim Denomination envisions two levels of constitutive bodies: the national (the National Muslim Conference (NMC), the Council of Spiritual Leaders, the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) and the Chief Mufti) and the regional (regional muftiates) (Avramov, 2014: 30). Similarly, the Macedonian Islamic Religious Community is structured on local, regional (regional muftiates) and national (the Council and Rijaset) levels (Idriz and Ali, 2016: 89).

In comparison, the ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structures in both Polish and Lithuanian cases are rudimentary with practically none existing in the case of the registered Hungarian and Czech Muslim religious collectivities. For

5 The very title, *rais al-ulama*, today applied solely in Bosnia, translates as “the head of the learned men.” Karčić notes, that it has been taken “from the Osmanli learned hierarchy in which *Ra'is al-'Ulama'* was an honorific title given, first, to the mufti of Istanbul and, later on, to the qadi of the European part of the Osmanli state” (Karčić, F., 2015: 164).

instance, the statute of the Polish Muftiate foresees (§ 7) the following organizational structure of the MRU: 1. Muslim communities, (2) Representatives of MRU in cities and voivodeships, (3) Field Imamate of the Polish Army, (4) Muslim schools, (5) Muslim associations and foundations, (6) Office of the Mufti (Muftiate), and (7) Muslim Cultural Centers. § 17.1 of the statute defines the Supreme Collegium as the executive body of the MRU with wide-ranging duties. The institutionalized religious collectivities in Czechia and Hungary, as foreseen in their statutes, have practically only an administrative structure, with a very limited role for the Islamic clergy (muftis and imams) in them.<sup>6</sup> While in the Muftiates, it is the Mufti (*rais al-ulama*) who is the head of the entire ecclesiastical-bureaucratic administration, in Czechia and Hungary the statutes of the Muslim religious organizations make the lay chairperson (president) the leader of the organization. In this regard, neither the Czech nor Hungarian Muslim religious collectivities fulfill the requirement of having “an ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure staffed by professional (ordained) clergy” to be counted as a (Muslim) church.

The foreseen structures need to be staffed, both by lay and religious personnel. While the administrative positions may be equally filled by either lay or religious personnel, positions involving spiritual functions, like rituals and spiritual counseling, may be occupied only by religious personnel. Within the ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structures of the organizations under scrutiny, this religious personnel is seen as nothing less than clergymen. For instance, in the statute (Art. 95.1) of the Bulgarian Muslim Denomination, imam, called in the statute, imam-khatib, is defined as “a clergyman (Bul. свещенослужител) who performs and directs the religious rituals.” Similarly, in the statutes of the Lithuanian, Polish, and Czech organizations, imams are called clergymen (*dvasininkas*, *duchowny* and *duchovní*, respectively) The level of their professionalism and expectations of ordainment, however, vary.

The professionalization of the profession of imam, or its ecclesification, may be best grasped through imam training programs, as the churchification of Islam, *inter alia*, proceeds through institutionalized higher religious education, in particular faculties of Shari‘a and Islamic theological seminaries. The very concept of a “Islamic theological seminary” is, however, somewhat problematic as it hardly existed, in its present form, in the classical Middle East. The chrestomatic *madrassa* differed from today’s “faculties of Sharia” and “Islamic theological seminaries” in Europe not only in curricula but, and this is most

---

6 Interview with Szultan Sulok, head of the Hungarian Muslim Church, Budapest, October 5, 2018; interview with Vladimír Sanka, head of the Headquarters of Muslim Communities, Prague, October 1, 2018.

important, in the system of degree awarding. While the degree in *madrassa* has been more of a conventional matter, in present-day “faculties of Sharia” and “Islamic theological seminaries” in Europe (and particularly, Eastern) it has been formalized to the maximum—only graduates with a degree are recognized as legitimate and full-fledged *ulama* eligible to take up the position of imam or other religious functionary. The emergence of such establishments has facilitated the ecclesification of *ulama* by turning them from the classical and/or idealized image of “men of learning”/ “scholars of religion,” or as, Sedgwick has called them, “doctors of the law” (Sedgwick, 2003: 40), into nothing less than Islamic clergy.

Once again, Bosnia is most advanced in this as the IC has had an Islamic studies faculty, where imams are being trained, since 1977 and, according to one faculty member, through which the IC “has invested considerable resources in future religious cadres that would uphold the principles of Islamic tradition of Bosniaks” (Smajić, 2017: 87). Moreover, as Karčić notes, “[a]lthough a number of Balkan countries today and a few West European countries have established their own Islamic theological faculties in recent decades, the Faculty of Islamic Studies of the University of Sarajevo is today the only Islamic theological faculty at state level in Europe” (Karčić, H., 2012: 41). Furthermore, practicing imams, in order to advance on the ladder of the hierarchy, have to go through a combination of examination and fixed terms.<sup>7</sup> The Macedonian Islamic Religious Community opened a Faculty of Islamic Sciences in 1997. The Bulgarian Muslim Denomination established its own seminary, a Higher Islamic Institute, in 1998. However, throughout its existence, the Institute has been operating without State accreditation and, “as a result, the diplomas of the Institute are not officially recognized and its graduates cannot take on certain appointments” (Shakir, 2017: 105). The Turkish Diyanet, which substantially financially and otherwise supports the Institute, has facilitated the possibility for Institute graduates to undergo an additional year of studies at Ankara University’s Faculty of Theology and receive a diploma, (Shakir, 2017: 105) which is then recognized through the nostrification procedure back in Bulgaria. Bosnian, North Macedonian, and Bulgarian Muftiates also maintain *madrasas*, where catechists and potential future imams are trained. None of the remaining four countries has any local imam training programs, though the Polish Muslim Religious Union and the Lithuanian Spiritual Center of Sunni Muslims have set an internal condition that their spiritual leadership has to have formal Islamic religious education. So, the Polish and Lithuanian Muftis

---

7 Interview with Mensur Karadža, representative of the Bosnian Islamic Community, Sarajevo, October 24, 2018.

as well as some (younger) imams belonging to the two Muftiates, do have degrees in Islamic religious studies obtained at foreign institutions of higher learning.

Needless to say that in all these educational establishments religious education is of a confessional nature, be it conventional traditional Bosniak, North Macedonian Albanian or Bulgarian Turkish, approved and strictly guarded by the Muftiates. All these educational and numerous administrative-spiritual subordinate institutions produce, convey, disseminate, and propagate Islamic knowledge, the contents of which is in strict conformity to the idea of the officially nationally endorsed “traditional”/“European” Islam (particularly, its normative forms). This can be observed in institutions of Islamic education, in the form of *madrasas* and university faculties of Islamic theology, which early on were made into tools to first revive and then perpetuate this “traditional” Islam through producing and reproducing the corpus of “correct” beliefs instilled in the young generation of *ulama* and Islamic educators. So, particularly in the Balkans, as argued by Elbasani, the “[o]fficial Muslim organizations, each based near centres of political power in Sarajevo, Prishtina, Tirana, Skopje, Sofia and so on, maintain organizational devices—the faculty of Islamic Studies, a network of Madrasas, as well as intellectual, publication and humanitarian activity nets—that distribute the national/traditional vision of Islam” (Elbasani, 2015: 8).

However, what is also important, there is a tendency, in Bosnia bottom-up and in Bulgaria more top-down, to require prospective imams to hold degrees from local institutions. So, for instance, in the Bosnian case, there is an internal “written official policy of the IC not to employ those who graduated from Islamic faculties outside the country, irrespective of the repute of the certificate awarding university, if they did not graduate from one of the IC madrasas” (Alibašić, 2003: 21). Alibašić argues that “[t]his is deliberately adopted policy to prevent those young men who went to Islamic schools in the Arab world through ‘alternative’ channels such as foreign aid workers or domestic salafis” (Alibašić, 2003: 21) from spearheading unacceptable, from the point of view of the IC, religious ideas and practices. In the Bulgarian case, it is the State, or rather certain actors in the political arena, who have been promoting the ban on foreign-trained religious functionaries operating in the country. Such an envisioned ban was included in the first draft of the amendments to the Bulgarian law on religions, which, however, was ultimately rejected by the Parliament. If adopted, it would have certainly affected some of the smaller Christian denominations, which have to use the services of foreign and foreign-trained priests and ministers. It is believed that their vehement opposition to the ban was decisive in why it was not included in the voted for version of the

amendments. Nonetheless, the greatest affect would have befallen the Muslim Denomination, a great number of whose imams, albeit Bulgarian citizens, would not be allowed (any more) to lead local Muslim congregations. The situation would be somewhat alleviated if the State finally accredited the Higher Islamic Institute and financed its study programs. In both cases,—Bosnian and Bulgarian—placing limits on the activities of foreign and foreign trained imams allows for further consolidation of the contents of Islam as “national Islam” represented by an autocephalous “national Muslim Church,” independent of foreign tutelage and influence, only that in the Bosnian case, it appears to be a bottom-up, while in the Bulgarian case, a top-down (through legislation) approach.

The existence of ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structures requires not only a mass of personnel, but also orders them in ranks. Invariably, the top spiritual (but mostly also administrative) figurehead, according to the statutes of the five Muftiates under scrutiny, is Mufti (in Bosnia and North Macedonia holding the title of *rais al-ulama*), who, by default, needs to have a theological education and in effect be a clergyman. So, for instance, the statute of the Lithuanian Muftiate explicitly states (Art. 3.7) that Mufti is “the highest cleric, with theological education.” The Statute of the Polish MRU also includes (§ 20) a requirement for Mufti to have completed “higher theological studies in the field of the religion of Islam.” As such, Muftis, who preside over the highest communal bodies and are invested with powers to appoint and dismiss clergymen of lower ranks (imams and regional muftis), are in effect the ecclesiastical heads, akin to patriarchs of autocephalous Orthodox Churches, of their respective “Muslim Church.” For instance, in the statute (Art. 39) of the Macedonian IRC, the Mufti (*rais al-ulama*) is presented as representing “religious unity of members of Islam.”

Then, there are regional muftis, who serve as surrogate bishops. In Bosnia, at the ceremony of appointment to the post of regional mufti the appointee has to take an oath before *rais al-ulama* (Islamic, n.d.). And, finally, at the bottom of the ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure, there are imams (and in some places *mu’azzins*), heading what may be called local congregations clustered around parish (neighborhood) mosques. In Bosnia, the IC tutelage extends to over one thousand “full – time imams” and almost one and a half thousand “active congregations” (Alibašić and Begović, 2017: 25), while in Bulgaria, the Muslim Denominations commands the body of also some one thousand imams serving in nearly one thousand and a half congregations (Shakir, 2017: 105). Internal documents of some Muftiates (for instance, Bosnia and Bulgaria) foresee that imams may serve only the congregations they have been appointed to.

From the surveyed statutes of the national Islamic spiritual administrations, it is evident that their institutional structure is very closely reminiscent of that found in Christian Churches. Furthermore, even if membership in them is sometimes explicitly limited to those adhering to certain forms of Islamic religiosity (chiefly, Sunni), these Islamic spiritual administrations make claims to represent the entirety of the Muslim populations of their countries. This, and the fact that they are registered and officially recognized by states as representatives, often sole, of “traditional” Islam in their countries, effectively makes the Islamic spiritual administrations into national “Muslim Churches.”

Judging from the statutes and the factual institutional structures of these dominant (or at least seeking to be such) Muslim religious organizations, it may be seen that they obediently follow the rules pertaining to the governance of religions set by the national legislation, including those that effectively seek to turn Muslim religious collectivities into church-like religious organizations. Even more so, they seek to fulfill the expectation (sometimes implicit but other times explicit) found in the legislation to become the sole national “representative” Islamic spiritual administrations. In this, these organizations, as will be shown below, in effect, instrumentalize the legislation to their advantage not only to emerge as the national Muslim Churches but to fend off any possible contenders, even if this means engaging in the securitization of rival/alternative/parallel Muslim religious collectivities in the country.

Since the “representative” Islamic spiritual administrations are viewed by the political elites as nothing less than national Muslim Churches, their relations with them tend to be amicable—as indicated above, they have a favorable approach by government institutions, which may be seen as courting the “representative” Islamic spiritual administrations, which, in their turn, reciprocate in kind. Thus, in general, the relations between the “representative” Islamic spiritual administrations and the State (in the person of the government) have a tendency to be mutually respectful. The “representative” Islamic spiritual administrations, as a rule, do not have too many direct relations with non-Muslim social actors, with the exception of Christian Churches, who, like the State, tend (even if sometimes reluctantly) recognize them as not only “representative” Islamic spiritual administrations but some sort of “sister Churches.” The situation with the other, both registered and non-registered Muslim collectivities, is profoundly different.

## 6.2 Inner-Islamic Plurality and Community Dynamics

The indigenization of religious identity, along with the ethnicization of Islam, coupled with the drive to monopolize the Islamic domain by the leadership of

“representative” Islamic spiritual administrations, in the age of profound changes in the demographic composition of Muslim populations, caused by both in- and out-migration as well as the emergence following the collapse of communist regimes in many countries of Eastern Europe of a small, but already strong, convert Muslim segment, has inadvertently led to intra-communal frictions, divisions and splits along what might look as the ethnic background of Muslim groups but are at the same time along the lines delimiting the different understandings of the contents of Islam. In a nutshell, the diversification of the Islamic institutional landscape in post-communist Eastern Europe depends on two mutually related trends: the emergence of greater diversity of forms of Islamic religiosity and ideologies, and the appearance of groups of Muslims of immigrant and convert background.

The notion, fixed in the statutes of the Muftiates, that they are the sole institutional representatives of Islam in their respective countries or that they unite all of the country’s Muslims, tacitly supported by the legislation and political elite, on a practical level has led the national Islamic spiritual administrations to adopt certain stance and policies *vis-à-vis* “out-groups,” for, as Alibašić aptly notes, “[n]o official Islamic administration likes alternative Islamic organizations,” and adds: “the Bosnian IC is no exception” (Alibašić, 2003: 20). Though the real situation varies from country to country, generally Muslim religious collectivities independent of the Muftiates fall into two categories—those institutionalized and registered with the State and those that due to whatever reasons remain informal and unregistered. All of them, based on their positioning (or, sometimes perceived positioning) *vis-à-vis* the national Islamic spiritual administrations, may be characterized as falling into three crude categories: rival, alternative, and parallel.

As a rule, the Muftiates seek to limit the influence of rival Muslim religious collectivities on the Muslim flock claimed by the Muftiates, often, and particularly in the cases of informal rival Muslim collectivities (labelled as Wahhabis or Salafis), by demonizing and securitizing them. Alternative Muslim religious collectivities are usually first invited to (re)join the national Islamic spiritual administrations’ structures, sometimes as autonomous “departments” but, in the case of refusal are often rebranded as “rival” and from then on belittled and securitized. The parallel Muslim religious collectivities, and particularly those that are not deemed a potential threat to the monopoly of the national Muslim Churches, are left in peace. In exceptional cases, there has been a cooperationist approach, when the Muftiates chose, apparently for tactical reasons, to temporarily treat “out-groups” as partners.

However, a contrary approach is also evident, i.e. the refusal to let go separatist Muslim religious groups that seek to become independent parallel Muslim religious collectivities. This is the case of Bektashis, who have been, so far

unsuccessfully, seeking to break free from the Macedonian Islamic Religious Community. The IRC grounds its refusal on the notion that Bektashis are, sociologically speaking, a denomination that lacks the features to make it a full-fledged independent Muslim religious collectivity. The heterodox North Macedonian Bektashi community makes claims of its distinctiveness from the Sunni Islamic Religious Community based on the Albanian example, where Bektashis are officially recognized as a non-Sunni Muslim religious collectivity for almost a hundred years, and has sued the North Macedonian State for not registering it as an independent Muslim religious collectivity (European Court, 2017). Likewise, the Bosnian Islamic Community treats Sufi brotherhoods as denominations (a sort of monastic orders) and has a separate department devoted to it.

Many, if not most of the “out-groups” formed as splinter groups from the national Islamic spiritual administrations and were a direct outcome of emerging inner-Islamic plurality within the Muftiates. The basic division, both within the Muftiates and even more so between the Muftiates and the “out-groups” runs along the line of how to treat and relate to “tradition.” The leadership and the majority of supporters of the Muftiates are firm “traditionalists,” understood here as proponents that local religious and cultural traditions of Muslims be recognized as national forms of “European” Islam, one way or another documented as such in relevant national legislation. In this, they are also secularists, abiding by the separation of the sacred and the profane realms and advocating faith as a private matter, as found in the national Constitutions and legislation governing religion.

Those who oppose the traditionalism of the Muftiates are advocates of the Islamic revival, and thus may be labeled as “revivalists,” though in practice they represent an array of, at the time, very opposing worldviews, ranging from conservative through moderate to liberal and even progressive Islamic revivalism. However, what unites practically all revivalists, is their aversion to “tradition,” which they see, at best, as deviation and, at worst, apostasy. Revivalists, being transnationalists and universalists, are also generally averted to the concept of “European Islam,” though there are exceptions among them. Finally, revivalists are anti-secularist, as they are convinced that Islam may not be confined to the private space of the home, and needs to encompass the social as well as political life of the entire society. For their voiced opposition to the “traditional”/“European” forms of Islamic religiosity, revivalists are often accused by the Muftiates of being radicals, extremists, or even supporters of terrorism. Moreover, the presence of revivalist groups, at the hands of the Muftiates, “is generally externalized and denounced as attempts by foreign

Middle Eastern extremist groups attempting to radicalize local (...) Muslims” (Rexhepi, 2015: 201).

In fact, foreign missionary groups indeed flocked to the then newly opening post-communist Eastern Europe, particularly to countries with sizable Muslim populations. Incoming missionaries coupled their religious work with humanitarian aid for which they set up numerous NGOs. In Bulgaria alone, some three dozen such NGOs “conducting (or pretending to be conducting) Islamic religious activities” (Shakir, 2017: 105), were founded in the early 1990s. After pressure, firstly from the USA in the aftermath of 9/11, by the beginning of the 2010s there were “only three legally registered Islamic ngos active in Bulgaria that can be considered heirs of the main ‘Arabic’ actors from the 1990s” (Shakir, 2017: 110). Similar trend is observable in Bosnia and, to a lesser degree, North Macedonia. These external actors “enabled new channels for the discovery of faith by providing funds for impoverished communities; building new infrastructure; offering scholarships for studying theology abroad; funding translation of foreign literature and sophisticated theological debates; creating new educational institutions; and hosting numerous conferences, workshops, Quran courses, and so forth” (Elbasani and Tošić, 2017: 503). This way, while raising religiosity among local Eastern European Muslims, foreign actors laid the ground for the emergence of the inner-Islamic plurality permeated by parallel and competing revivalist trends, hitherto unknown to the region, which in a number of Balkan countries, matured around the turn of the millennium.

The most vocal criticism of the Muftiates comes from informal groups of conservative revivalists (though there have also been registered organizations, like Active Islamic Youth in Bosnia), routinely, particularly in the Balkans, labeled as Wahhabis or Salafis. In Bosnia, these conservative revivalists, chiefly natives of Bosnia, managed to build independent congregations, which are by their opponents from the IC and the public pejoratively called para-jamaats. For a time, they practically controlled several dozens of mosques staffed with their own local imams. As reported, their congregations and organizations “flourished particularly during the chaotic and porous institutional order that is emblematic of the 1992 – 95 war and immediate post – war period, when foreign missionaries and funds entered the country without any state controls” (Alibašić and Begović, 2017: 29 – 30). A 64-page booklet by ‘Imad al-Misri, “one of the main authorities within Bosnian salafi circles” (Alibašić, 2003: 16), “Attitudes that we have to change” (Imad El Misri, n.d.), from 1993, addresses heads on what the author deems unacceptable innovations prevailing in the Islamic traditions of Bosniaks. According to Alibašić, “[t]his remains the most

important and direct explication of salafi ideas in Bosnian context and its recommendations are widely accepted among salafis” (Alibašić, 2003: 16).

The peak of the conservative revivalist movement in Bosnia is put by Karčić (Karčić, H., 2010a: 163) at around 1999 – 2000, when they not only had a regular magazine publication but also organized a number of summer schools, Islamic and Shari‘a courses. They even challenged the Islamic Community by issuing fatwas on their websites (Karčić, H., 2010a: 163). Also, the monopoly of the IC in some areas, like the organizing of qurban (sacrificial animal) or zakah (alms-giving) collection, “has been challenged by both Islamic FBOs and individual scholars. In 2005, for example, a local charity contested the IC’s exclusive right to organize slaughtering animals for those who are unable to do it themselves. The charity even attained a fatwa from Shaykh Yusuf al – Qaradawi, an international scholar, in order to strengthen the case. The IC responded with a counter – fatwa. Some organizations have also contested the IC’s monopoly over informal Islamic education, fatwa giving, and publication of Islamic literature, thus challenging some of the aspects of the centralized model for governing Islamic affairs” (Alibašić and Begović, 2017: 30) Such cases, however, are rare and sporadic and do not pose any real challenge to the IC’s supremacy in Bosnia and its functioning as a national Muslim Church. Like in Bulgaria, however, a security clampdown in the aftermath of 9/11 “has curtailed their major sources of financial support and banned some of them” (Alibašić and Begović, 2017: 30), leaving just a handful of hard-line revivalists operating, albeit in a severely diminished capacity. The Active Islamic Youth ceased its activities in 2006.

Yet, this has not prevented the remaining groupings from being openly vehemently opposed to the leadership of the Islamic Community, whom those para-jamaats have routinely accused of having but almost apostacized and the whole Islamic Community having become un- or even anti-Islamic Community. The bulk of oppositional activities toward the IC have moved to the Internet and social media, where such conservative revivalist groupings as followers of Nezim Halilović Muderis, IslamBosna, and Kelimetul-Haqq congregate. The latter has posted a number of videos on Youtube under the general title of “The true face of the (un)Islamic Community” (Bos. Pravo lice (ne)islamske zajednice), which allegedly expose un-Islamic behavior of rank and file of the IC. The Faculty of Islamic Studies has been rebranded by the Bosnian conservative revivalists as the Faculty of anti-Islamic Studies (Alibašić, 2003: 17). The most serious challenge to the integrity of the Islamic Community, though, came in the form of an alleged plot by the conservative revivalists to establish a parallel Islamic Community, made up of their jamaats, which, with time would grow bigger and stronger, until eventually becoming more powerful than the existing Islamic Community and replacing it (Kadrbeđović, 2007: 4; Karčić, H.,

2010b: 531). Though this plan may have been more wishful thinking than a serious plot, the Islamic Community did not take any chances and embarked upon a wholesale offensive to crush the fledgling conservative revivalist organizations and para-jamaats. The Islamic Community offered them a choice between an olive branch and a stick, which has led some of the conservative revivalist individuals and their groups to (re)join the Islamic Community. An advisor to the Mufti of the Islamic Community is quoted as having said that, because of the efforts of the IC, the number of para-jamaats in two years had been reduced from 76 to 21 (Brelie, 2018). There are, however, reports of Bosniak conservative revivalists opposing the IC operating from Austria (Babić, 2017: 185).

The representatives of the remaining, rebellious, congregations, in an open letter to the leadership of the Islamic Community, not only lamented their fate, i.e. the stigmatization and refusal by the IC to engage in dialogue with them, but also accused the IC of effectively having gone astray—having abandoned the principle of the true Hanafi tradition in favor of the “Bosniak tradition,” which, according to the authors of the letter, has itself been distorted by the IC (Čajić, 2016). On another occasion, the same representatives of independent congregations reproached the IC for its alleged high-handedness in its dealings with independent congregations, which the IC is accused of trying to eliminate through ultimatums and unfair agreements (Arapčić, 2016). The representatives were apparently referring to the Platform for Cooperation of the IC with Islamic FBOs Operating in BiH, adopted at the very end of 2013. Among other things, “[t]he Platform affirms the IC as guarantor of ‘full authenticity in the interpretation of Islamic doctrine and practice.’ It also affirms the exclusive authority of the IC in governing all aspects of the life of the community (...). [T]he conditions for cooperation are based on the ‘full respect for the religious tradition of Muslims in BiH, the mission of the IC and state laws’” (Alibašić and Begović, 2017: 30).

In relation to the IC’s efforts to diminish, if not altogether eliminate, unwanted revivalist elements, one high ranking representative of the IC claimed that “[t]he Islamic Community is actively engaged in dialogue with individuals and groups operating in so-called parallel structures outside of the Islamic Community that advocate interpretations of Islam foreign to Bosnian Islamic tradition. Not all of these groups call for violent extremism, but some of them promote extremist and reductionist interpretations of reality and faith that can breed intolerance or even violence. The Islamic Community views the prevention of violent extremism as one of its top priorities. It is evident that such social and religious parallel structures can only appear if space is granted to them by the state, society, or traditional religious community. For this reason

the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is planning numerous activities focused on youth and oriented towards society” (Jusić, n.d.: 31). Another representative asserted that “[t]he Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina closely follows phenomena and acts of tendentious interpretation that have the tendency to usurp Islamic values and institutions. Unfounded and distorted interpretations oppose reasoned and plausible interpretations. Such actions are to be exposed and prevented. This is particularly true when individuals promoting an interpretation of this type attempt to institutionalize. Broad actions have been taken against these pseudo-congregations, so-called *parajamats*” (Čolić, n.d.: 18). Bearing in mind the success rate of the IC in eliminating *para-jamaats* and other collectivities of conservative revivalists, the saga of conservative revivalist congregations in Bosnia is not fully over, but their fate seems sealed.

If the alleged plot of the Bosnian conservative revivalists to eliminate the national Islamic spiritual administration may be dismissed as mere wishful thinking, the Macedonian Islamic Religious Community at one point faced an imminent takeover by a faction of local conservative revivalists (Babić, 2014; International, 2006). The spread of Islamic revivalism in North Macedonia may be largely attributed to the war in neighboring Kosovo around 1998 – 1999, where some of the Kosovar freedom fighters had been radicalized. With a porous border between the two countries, the movement of people, goods, and ideas facilitated the rise in Islamic revivalism (in forms of Salafism, Wahhabism, and even jihadism) on the North Macedonian side of the border. This allowed for *para-jamaats* of conservative revivalists, like the ones in Bosnia, with their own mosques staffed by their own imams, to mushroom in the Muslim inhabited areas of North Macedonia (Jovanovska and Gjorgjeski, 2010). According to Qehaja and Perteshi, those *para-jamaats*, in the period between 1999 and 2004, established “effective control in some key mosques” (Qehaja and Perteshi, 2018: 12). In 2010, Mufti Sulejman Efendi Rexhepi “requested help from authorities of Albanian political parties and the international community in dealing with radical groups the Wahhabis and called for measures to stop the spread of radical Islam in Macedonia” (Babić, 2014: 387). It took some time before the mediating efforts of moderate *ulama* bore fruit and the permanent spilt in the Macedonian Islamic Religious Community was averted while the “traditional” flank regained the upper hand. Since then, the IRC has been on alert for possible troublemakers. However, the infighting arguably has left the IRC very weakened with low trust among the Muslim population (Stojkovski and Kalajdziovski, 2018: 14).

Conservative revivalists appeared in Bulgaria around the same time as elsewhere in the Balkans and most successfully spread their ideas among ethnic

Roma Muslims of city slum-like suburbs, (Mancheva and Dzhekova, 2017; Dzhekova et al., 2015: 37) and ethnic Pomak villagers. Nonetheless, neither their numbers nor organizational structures have ever matched those of Bosnian conservative revivalists, thus their challenge to the Muftiate's supremacy has been minimal. Though the Muftiate undertook some (mainly rhetorical) measures to limit the reach of the most outspoken activists among conservative revivalists, it was State agencies, which took the initiative into their hands to eliminate them from the Islamic scene. Eventually, a number of the Muftiate's imams—an informal conservative revivalist preacher and a dozen or so conservative revivalists—were arrested and tried in several trials over the period between 2012 – 2015 for their alleged radicalism-related activities. The trials gave an opportunity for interested parties to securitize segments of the country's Muslim population, but the Muftiate stood by its imams and argued that they had been wrongly accused (Dzhekova et al., 2015: 47). In an interview back in 2010, Mufti of the Bulgarian Muslim Denomination, Mustafa Alish, still lamented that “if the Mufti's Office was allowed to be stronger, we could be much more effective against such radicalization” (Öktem, 2010: 30). Irrespective of this, as has been shown earlier, the Bulgarian Muslim Denomination, rather than being challenged by “out-groups” suffered a protracted schism, during the time of which rival Muftiates, or rather rival leaderships aspiring to head the Muftiate, demonized and occasionally securitized each other, accusing each other of either fundamentalist inclinations or leniency toward fundamentalists (Dzhekova et al., 2015: 51 – 52).

Moderate revivalists in the person of local avatars of the Muslim Brotherhood are also critical of the Muftiates; however, their critique is not as scathing and they refrain from *takfir* (the Islamic version of excommunication) that is common among conservative revivalists. Rather than working toward the churchification of Islam in Europe, they seek to make it into a corporatist body where socio-political concerns take precedence over purely faith-related matters of believing and worshiping. Revivalist Muslim Brothers, at the expense of national Muslim Churches, which they see as imbued with unacceptable accretions in both the contents of belief and the worship, offer a vision of a rejuvenated unifying transnational pan-European Islam. Such representative pan-European organizations of moderate revivalists as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe and the European Council for Fatwa and Research are called by Qandil “Euro-Islamists” (Qandil, 2010). In a sense, “Euro-Islamists” are engaged in the project of “Euro-Islam,” only this time not top-down but bottom up and on their own terms.

The pluralization of the Islamic institutional landscape in Poland started almost immediately with the fall of the communist regime, when two Shi'i and

an Ahmadi religious organizations filed for and were registered with the State. Several Islamic NGOs, including Sunni, were also set up in the first post-communist decade, mainly by Muslims of immigrant and convert background. However, the Muslim Religious Union remained the sole formal Sunni Islamic spiritual administration in the country. Then, in 2001, a new Sunni (though of moderate revivalist leanings) religious collectivity—the Muslim League—emerged to challenge the Muslim Religious Union’s monopoly and exclusive hold on Sunni Muslims in Poland. Nalborczyk and Ryszewska, however, note that “LM adopted and remodeled its strategic behaviour largely on MZR’s experiences,” and that the content and form of its statute “are quite similar to those of MZR” (Nalborczyk and Ryszewska, 2013: 26). Nonetheless, structurally, as foreseen in its statute, the Muslim League does not resemble a church, as there is no ecclesiastical-bureaucratic structure, just administrative bodies.

Though the Muslim Religious Union’s chief spiritual leader has been declared (since 2009, the Statute of the Muslim Religious Union explicitly endorses this, apparently in reaction to the election by the Muslim League of its own mufti (Nalborczyk, 2017: 312)) and tacitly acknowledged by the State as the Mufti of Poland, the Muslim League not only does not recognize him as their or all-Polish Mufti but has its own mufti, who is internally (§ 51 of the Statute of the Muslim League) regarded as their highest cleric (*najwyższy duchowny*), a sort of *primus inter pares*. As such, he heads the body of imams, who, according to the statute of the Muslim League, “must have a higher theological education of a Muslim university or documented many years of experience and religious knowledge with reliable Muslim scholars.” Therefore, technically, since 2004, when the Muslim League was registered with the State, there are two parallel, if not rival, muftiates in Poland with multiple congregations dispersed throughout the country, often in the same urban localities. As in Poland there are no independent local Muslim religious parishes, all local communities are branches of national organizations—foremost the MRU and ML (Nalborczyk and Ryszewska, 2013: 22). In many respects, in its short life, the Muslim League has overtaken the Muslim Religious Union: for instance, it has built a sprawling headquarters with a mosque topped with a minaret, and has established a research institution—the Institute for the Study of Islam. Though not an open rivalry, the tension between the two leading Muslim religious collectivities in Poland is apparent in that the Tatars of the MRU do not fail to use every opportunity “to stress their indigenoussness, Europeanness and sameness with other Poles while at the same time implicitly or explicitly pointing to the alienness and difference of the more recent Muslim migrants” (Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr, 2017: 445).

The Lithuanian case somewhat resembles the Polish, in that there ultimately formed a rival Muftiate—the Council of Muslim Religious Communities of Lithuania—in 2018, initiated by a mix of expatriates, converts, and Tatars who were frustrated with the Mufti's inactivity and the virtual paralysis of the Spiritual Center of Sunni Muslims. The bulk of the founders of the rival Muftiate, particularly expatriates and converts, are of moderate revivalist leanings, though some individuals may even have conservative revivalist inclinations. The Tatar communities, which joined the newly formed Muftiate, however, did this not so much because of religious differences with the original Muftiate, but mainly because of personal issues.

In its statute (Art. 1.1), like its mother Muftiate—the Spiritual Center—the Council also confines its membership to Sunnis and even narrows it down to “traditional Lithuanian Sunni Muslim communities.” Though, according to the statute (Art. 3.17.1), the Mufti has to have “theological knowledge,” he is not required to have higher theological education and is nowhere referred to as a cleric. On the contrary, the statute (Art. 3.16) confines the Mufti's functions to those comparable to a CEO in a business venture. Neither the qualifications nor functions of imams are defined in the statute, and imams are appointed by the Board and not the Mufti. All this makes the Council, unlike the mother Muftiate, a very different Muslim religious collectivity devoid of the church-like features that the original Muftiate has. Nonetheless, the Council has lobbied the relevant ministry (the Ministry of Justice) not only to register it (which the Ministry has promptly and duly done), but to recognize it as *the* representative of Lithuania's Sunni Muslims stripping the original Muftiate of this status and also deregistering it altogether. The Center, in turn, has bombarded the Ministry with letters accusing the Council of illegitimate formation and demanded that the Ministry not register it. The Ministry has refused this and, for the time being, there are two openly antagonistic Muftiates in Lithuania both claiming to be the representative Muslim religious collectivities.

While disapproval of rival and alternative Muslim religious collectivities by Muftiates is quite understandable as they vie for power and influence, occasional opposition to parallel Muslim religious collectivities is reminiscent of witch hunting and fight against “sects.” So, for instance, in Bulgaria, the Muslim Denomination's involvement in seeking to ban Ahmadiyya in the country, where it is reported that the Mufti “advised the Bulgarian court not to allow the registration of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community” (Ghodsee, 2009: 243), is symptomatic of such activity. Even in Lithuania, in 2002, the Muftiate addressed the Ministry of Justice with a request “not to register newly forming Muslim congregations without permission from our Spiritual Center of Sunni

Muslims—Muftiate, as it is stipulated in the Article 3.5 of our Statute” (Spiritual Center, 2002).<sup>8</sup> Subsequently, two new congregations received the Muftiate’s blessing to be registered as “traditional” religious communities and were incorporated into the Muftiate’s structure. This, as has been shown, did not save the Muftiate from eventually splintering into two rival groups of congregations, both with their own muftiates.

Muslim religious collectivities in post-communist Eastern Europe, both institutionalized and not, have one way or another been taking part in the game thrust upon them by the legal system and both political and non-Muslim social actors, i.e. the progression of the churchification and securitization of Islam. The institutionalized Muslim religious collectivities, foremost the Muftiates, abiding by the national legislation on governance of religion, submit to the churchification of Islam and desist its securitization by political and non-Muslim social actors; they engage in the bottom-up self-churchification, meanwhile themselves securitizing rival, as a rule, non-institutionalized, Muslim religious collectivities. Muftiates, playing by the rules set out by the State through legislation governing religions, institutionalize the churchification of Islam in their statutes and other internal documents. The statutes also serve as the basis for the Muftiate’s relations with the State and other Muslim religious collectivities.

Non-institutionalized Muslim religious collectivities, however, seek to desist the churchification of Islam advanced by the State and to expose the churchification of Islam by the Muftiates as, if not outright their collective apostasy, then a serious deviation by the Muftiates’ leadership and to counter the Muftiates’ securitization efforts, sometimes by similar securitization counter-efforts. They also seek to counter securitizing acts committed by political and non-Muslim social actors. However, as their internal structures are not as sophisticated as those of the Muftiates, non-institutionalized Muslim religious collectivities have difficulties getting their message across, let alone making an influence on either of the actors in the field.

The bargaining powers of the two camps (the Muftiates and the rest of Muslim religious collectivities) are unequal and with the State tacitly siding with the Muftiates, rival/alternative/parallel, and especially the non-institutionalized among them, Muslim religious collectivities are on a losing streak. As Rexhepi notes, “[t]he concession that Muslims (to be understood as Muftiates and their followers—*my insertion*) in the Balkans are prompted

---

<sup>8</sup> Article 3.5. of the Statute of the Spiritual Centre of the Lithuanian Sunni Muslims—Muftiate reads: “The newly establishing religious communities are obliged to coordinate their statutes and actions with the Muftiate.”

to make in appropriating the ideological exclusion of other Muslims not only divides them from the rest of the Ummah but also leads them to condone the surveillance, incarceration and policing of those Muslims who are considered to be operating outside the boundaries of Balkan Islam” (Rexhepi, 2015: 201 – 202). In other words, internal othering among Muslims leads to stigmatization, marginalization, and subsequent securitization of non-“traditional” (or simply, non-conventional) forms of Islamic religiosity and their practitioners by the national Islamic spiritual administrations, a.k.a. national Muslim Churches.

Ultimately, the State, in the person of consecutive governments, not only puts up with the official church-like institutions’ policies toward out-groups but actively aids them, through political and legal actions, in the pursuit of their objectives, particularly those that coincide with those of the State itself. As Elbasani points out, “[s]tate authorities and official Islamic institutions often ally together to protect the official traditional line and consequently portray competing forms of revival of faith as ‘foreign’ and alien to the ideas of national identity, thus antagonizing many ‘born-again’ Muslims” (Elbasani, 2015: 8). This way, the historical plurality of Islamic forms is brought into conformity with and under the governance of the officially recognized church-like institutions espousing quazi-legalist “European” Islam, formally or informally recognized by the State as “traditional.” Likewise, the plurality of contemporary forms is suppressed or even rejected through legal measures by criminalizing certain forms of Islamic revivalism in the name of a double preservation of the pristine and pure “traditional” and “European” Islam and the general security and order. As shown in the preceding chapters, there are many cases in post-communist Eastern Europe of such tandem of the State and its officially recognized church-like Islamic institutions.

## Conclusions: The Winners, the Losers, and the Prospects

Governance of Islam in Western Europe is routinely spoken of as its domestication. As the term “domestication” implies making something alien into that which is local or at least locally acceptable, the concept hardly suits in the analysis of the governance of Islam in countries with centuries-long Islamic presence, like many of the Eastern European countries, where Islam has long been domesticated. Unlike in Western Europe, where Muslim populations are primarily of recent immigrant background and who adhere to a plethora of forms of Islamic religiosity brought over from the overseas, Eastern European Muslims are overwhelmingly autochthonous and almost universally follow local forms of Islamic religiosity. As the State- and nation-building processes, the development of State-religion relations and the history of Muslim religious collectivities in Western and Eastern Europe sharply differ, the governance of Islam in the two halves of the continent differs significantly too. Furthermore, as was shown in Section 4.3., regimes of governance of religion (and of Islam) and the status of Islam differ significantly among post-communist Eastern European countries; so much so that one may not talk of a universal (post-communist) pattern but rather one needs to realize the differences, caused by a plethora of circumstances, among which the size and longevity of Muslim populations, their relations with the State and non-Muslim populations, as well as the historical State-religion relations are of utmost importance. And since simple “domestication” may not explain the strategies adopted by the States in governance of Islam in post-communist Eastern Europe, new analytical instrumentarium, even if built on the concepts developed for the analysis of the accommodation of Islam in Western Europe, needs to be sought out.

On the one hand, governance of Islam in post-communist Eastern Europe is permeated by what in this research is called the “churchification of Islam.” The Weberian-Troeltschian sociological understanding of church served as a springing board that opened the possibility to instrumentalize the concept of church for the study of governance of non-Christian religious collectivities, and led to the development of a working definition of churchification that has been applied in the present research. Churchification in this research is, first of all, understood as State-pursued policy strategy in the governing of religious plurality in post-communist Eastern European nation-states, whereby the national legislation pertaining to governance of religions, including Islam, foresees institutional and structural churchification of registered religious

collectivities along the lines of the (once) dominant (national) Christian Churches. Most of the mainstream political elites in Eastern Europe have been honoring the constitutional and broader legal *status quo* and have been, on the level of practical politics, following through this strategy of churchification, in this case, of Islam. This is what in this book has been labelled churchification from above or the “top-down” churchification of Islam.

Then again, the churchification of Islam appears to be a strategic approach by certain registered Muslim religious collectivities, particularly those which have been recognized (formally or at least informally) by the State and the political elite as “representative” Muslim religious organizations. Such Muslim religious organizations, whose rank and file, as a rule, are comprised of autochthonous Muslims, claim to be professing a local (national) form of diasporic Islam, generally presented as “European” Islam. The vision of “European” Islam, advanced by dominant Islamic spiritual administrations in Eastern Europe, coincides with “traditional” Islam historically practiced by autochthonous Muslim populations for centuries. This “European” Islam, as belonging in and to Europe, is particularly predisposed to bottom-up churchification of Islam engaged in by national “representative” Islamic spiritual administrations.

Ultimately, therefore, there is a triangle of positive relationships among the legal level, the mainstream political elite level, and the “representative” Muslim religious organization level in terms of the churchification of Islam in respective countries. The churchification of Islam, both top-down and bottom-up, has led to the “representative” Muslim religious organizations being turned into nothing less but national “Muslim Churches.”

The churchification of Islam, be it top-down or bottom-up, is however, viewed with contempt by some, usually marginal, Muslim religious collectivities, most of which are of revivalist (Wahhabi, Salafi, or Muslim Brotherhood) leanings and who have critical opinions about the local forms of Islamic religiosity hailed as “traditional,” promoted by national Muslim Churches. As an outcome, these Muslim religious collectivities are critical of the national Muslim Churches themselves—their hierarchical bureaucratic-ecclesiastical structures, institutions, doctrines and relations with the State, which they see as monopolizing usurpers of the public Islamic landscape. Though some among these Muslim religious collectivities also recognize their own practiced forms of Islamic religiosity as forms of diasporic Islam, their vision of how Islam, institutionally, structurally, and otherwise, is to develop in Europe, sharply contrasts with those of the State (through existing legislation and practical politics) and the national Muslim Churches. Collectively, these Muslim religious collectivities remain true to the notion that there is no, and there may not be, a Church in Islam.

The seven post-communist Eastern European countries under investigation, in respect to “representative” Islamic spiritual administrations, fall into two broad categories: those that have developed, both top-down and bottom-up, national Muslim Churches (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, North Macedonia, and Poland) and those that have not (Czechia and Hungary). The distinction, apparently, runs along the line of whether the country has had an autochthonous Muslim community, no matter, how large or small, or not. However, based on general trends, the countries in the first category may be further subdivided into those that have preserved and even consolidated the unitary single national Muslim Church system (Bosnia, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia), and those that are moving towards the pluralization of the landscape of Islamic religious collectivities (Poland and Lithuania). Here, the fault lines are both the share size of the Muslim population and its nature (whether it is the autochthons, immigrant or convert Muslims who dominate demographically). In the latter subcategory, the former sole Muslim representative religious organizations (a.k.a. Muslim Churches) have been (tentatively successfully) rivaled by alternative Islamic religious organizations, which, being of immigrant (and convert) background in both their rank and file as well as their understanding of the patterns and functions of institutionalized Islam, disrupt the formerly cozy *status quo*. As a result, then, currently, there are three discernible groups of countries:

1. Those firmly holding onto a single national Muslim Church (Bosnia, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia), where the churchification of Islam, both top-down and bottom-up, is almost a *fait accompli*;
2. Those with the national Muslim Church existing in an increasingly plural environment of parallel, alternative, and rival Islamic religious organizations (Poland and Lithuania), where the churchification of Islam, sustained by top-down instruments (legislation) is upset (if not offset) by bottom-up developments on the ground;
3. Those with a plural Islamic institutional landscape with no (historical) national Muslim Church but with an umbrella organization akin to the Islamic Councils in Western Europe (Czechia and Hungary), where there is (still) no intent towards churchification, neither top-down nor bottom-up.

Churchification of Islam is, however, just one side of the governance of Islam in post-communist Eastern Europe, the other being its securitization. Securitization of Islam, based on the conceptualization of securitization by the Copenhagen School spearheaded by Buzan and Weaver, is understood in this research as policy strategy engaged in by political actors with the participation of non-State actors, who seek to transform the subject of religion and believers

into a matter of “security” to enable extraordinary legislative and political means to be used in the name of security against the securitized subjects. The degree of securitization of Islam in particular countries under investigation depends on a range of factors and securitizing actors across all levels—political actors, non-Muslim social actors, and that of the various Muslim communities.

Unlike churchification of Islam, which is positively viewed and pursued by both, most political elites and the national “representative” Muslim religious organizations, on the question of securitization of Islam, many political actors and the national Muslim Churches find themselves at the opposite ends. While the political actors increasingly turn to securitization of Islam (all the way to changing the legislation pertaining to governance of religion (*inter alia* or, sometimes, foremost, of Islam)), national Muslim Churches seek to fend it off and preserve the *status quo* enshrined in the relevant national legislation. Furthermore, many non-Muslim and Muslim social actors are also at the opposite ends on the issue, while more and more non-Muslim social actors become securitizing actors, calling for greater securitization of Islam on the legislation and the practical politics levels, Muslim social actors find themselves at the receiving end and in an undesirable position.

Finally, there is the internal dynamics among Muslim religious collectivities in some of the countries concerned, which has led to internal (bottom-up) securitization of Islam by Muslim social actors, some of whom—foremost, the national Muslim Churches—become securitizing actors themselves *vis-à-vis* perceived or real rival, alternative, or parallel Muslim religious collectivities (holding or presented as holding revivalist, if not extremist, views) in the country. The securitization of Islam, or, to be more precise, some forms of its religiosity (variably called Wahhabism and Salafism), is indirectly promoted by national Muslim Churches, which seek to neutralize potential or actual rival Muslim actors’ challenge to their grip on Muslim populations and the monopoly over the Islamic field. The national Muslim Churches, in their fight against unwanted forms of Islamic religiosity, routinely use the trump card of themselves being custodians of “traditional” (read, “European”) forms of Islam, while accusing opponents of practicing and preaching alien and dangerous, if not altogether wrong, forms of it. In their fight, national Muslim Churches sometimes ask for and are supported (and sometimes even pressurized to do more) by the political elite and non-Muslim social actors. So, like churchification of Islam, its securitization goes both directions—top-down and bottom-up. Paradoxically, this bottom-up intra-communal securitization strengthens the image and position of the dominant Islamic spiritual administrations as national Muslim Churches.

It is a race against time for the “national Muslim Churches” to survive in an era with an almost universally increasing appetite for the securitization of Islam. They have been forced by non-Muslim actors on all levels to dig in to defend their right to be seen as nothing less than “yet another church.” At the same time, they see it as indispensable to “otherize” rival/alternative/parallel Muslim religious collectivities, who display their open disapproval of the churchification of Islam at the hands of the national “representative” Islamic spiritual administrations.

In regards to the securitization of Islam, the seven countries under investigation fall between the two extremes: the one, where the political elite favors it (the most extreme case being Hungary) and the one, where it (still) does not perceive or view Islam and Muslims through the national security prism (the most extreme case of this trend being Lithuania). The so-called “migration crisis” of 2015 – 2016 has triggered a number of countries across Europe but particularly in its eastern part, where the migrant route went through, to follow the path of increasing othering of Muslims and Islam, by both the political and non-Muslim social actors. Othering of migrants taken to be Muslims has led in some countries to unprecedented levels of almost institutionalized Muslimophobia (most notably, in Hungary), which securitizing actors (both on the political and non-Muslim social actor levels) have used to securitize Islam and Muslims in general.

The researched countries, taking into account all levels—the legal, political actors, and social actors (including both non-Muslim and Muslim)—may be positioned in the system of coordinates of churchification/securitization of Islam as shown in Figure 3: the most churchification and the least securitization of Islam is discernible in Bosnia and Lithuania, whereas the most securitization and least churchification of Islam is evident in Hungary and Czechia; Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Poland fall in-between the two extremums. In, Bosnia and Lithuania, two countries with very different histories in terms of the State- and nation-building processes, the development of State-religion relations, and the history of Muslim religious collectivities have one common feature—autochthon-dominated Muslim populations; here the churchification of Islam is high and its securitization is low apparently for one reason as Islam is not perceived to be a challenge, let alone, danger. On the contrary, in Hungary and Czechia, two fairly similar countries in terms of the state- and nation-building processes, the development of State-religion relations and the history of Muslim religious collectivities (their Muslim populations, like in Western Europe, are chiefly of recent immigrant background), the securitization of Islam is high and its churchification low since, like in much of Western Europe in recent decades, Islam has been increasingly perceived, if not as a




FIGURE 3 Location of the countries under research on the churchification-securitization coordinate system  
COMPILED BY AUTHOR

threat, than certainly a challenge (admittedly, so far as potential, though). In Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Poland, even though the churchification of Islam is still firmly part of the legal level, on the levels of political and non-Muslim social actors, one can see an increasing turn to the securitization of Islam.

In the constellation of the governance of Islam in post-communist Eastern Europe, there is a loop of sorts (Figure 4) where, at the ends, there are churchifying actors—national legislation, at one end, and national Islamic spiritual administrations, on the other, while in the middle, there are securitizing actors, ranging from different political actors to a plethora of non-Muslim social actors. While the national Islamic spiritual administrations, in their tireless efforts to stick to the churchification agenda, find themselves always at the receiving and defensive end, the State-endorsed churchification of Islam is constantly under threat of being taken over by securitization. The governments, depending on the political forces forming them, are often oscillating between the legislation-induced churchification of institutionalized religious collectivities and the temptation, for practical political expediency and in reaction to the general mood, to securitize Islam. There is a clear turn toward the securitization of Islam in Hungary and Czechia recently with increasing securitization tendencies in Poland. Finally, there have been attempts, some of




FIGURE 4  
The churchification-securitization  
loop  
COMPILED BY AUTHOR

them successful (foremost, in Hungary), to change the very legislation related to the governance of religions; formerly rather liberal legislation has been replaced with a progressively restrictive one, sprinkled, if not saturated, with securitization elements. Though it may seem that the developments in the realm of the governance of religion in general and Islam in particular, in Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Czechia, may be taken to be symptomatic of what awaits the rest of post-communist Eastern Europe, the developments in other countries under investigation reveal that Hungary and Czechia are more of an exception than a rule; in most of the countries in the region, and more so in the countries with autochthonous Muslim populations, the churchification of Islam is the predominant game of the day.

As for future prospects concerning the dynamics of churchification and securitization, first of all, in the counties under research but also in the rest of post-communist Eastern Europe, one has to acknowledge that a complex array of factors (and actors behind them), as shown in Figure 2, could potentially lead the development of governance of Islam into different directions, i.e. further churchification or further securitization. These factors may be tentatively divided into extra- and intra-communal, where the extra-communal factors are often closely related (and are a reaction to) intra-communal factors. So, for instance, religious nationalism of non-Muslim majorities may be aroused by real or perceived triggers emanating from the Muslim side. As the so-called “migration crisis” of 2015/6 has shown, the migration of people of Muslim background, even if they were just transiting through the territories of the countries concerned, was a strong incentive to revive religious nationalist sentiment and legitimize the securitization of Islam and Muslims. One may

expect that in the event of another significant wave of migration—especially if some of the migrants chose to settle or were forcefully settled (through pan-European relocation schemes or the like) in Eastern European countries—the Muslimophobic securitizing backlash would be even stronger.

On the other hand, there may be incentives, with or without any significant increase in the share of population of Muslim background, for states to follow the Western European patterns of domestication and naturalization of Islam through a guided institutionalization of it, subsequently leading to the formation of non-church-like (or, at least, non-Catholic/non-Orthodox Church) umbrella organizations (aka “Islamic councils”). Such a tilt would lead to stripping the dominant Islamic spiritual administrations of the status of national Muslim Churches and replacing the Muslim uni-church system with a Muslim multi-church system; in other words, moving from the Orthodox- and Catholic-like (episcopal) Muslim Churches into Protestant-like (congregational) Churches. There is also a hypothetical possibility where the legislation on religions (in the form of *lex specialis*) is profoundly changed to abandon any expectations that institutionalization of religious collectivities needs implicitly to carry their churchification. This, admittedly, is a distant prospect, if feasible at all.

The future prospects of churchification of Islam to a great extent also depend on the stance of both the current Islamic spiritual administrations and other current and future Muslim religious collectivities. With the changing demographics and ideological distribution in the Islamic field, Muslim religious collectivities in Eastern Europe will increasingly have to reassess their relation to the non-Muslim environment and the place of Islamic practices in it. There will predictably be increased intra-community discussions on the contents and value of “traditional” Islam, understood to be a form of “European” Islam, as opposed to novel forms of Islamic religiosity. This is already observable in many of the countries with established national Muslim Churches run by autochthonous Muslims, with Bosnia being one of the better examples. However, as the Bosnian case shows, the relative disbalance of negotiating power so far allows the Islamic Community to dominate and fend off any undesired changes to the essentially Muslim uni-church system.

The contents of diasporic Islam and the place of Islamic jurisprudence (and foremost of *fiqh al-aqalliyyat*) in Eastern European countries will also have to be reopened, particularly if and when expatriate Muslims, with their own understanding of the contents of Islam, will increase the share of the Muslim population. Additionally, with Euro-integration processes picking up pace, the question of building a pan-European “Euro-Islam,” particularly at the hands of moderate revivalists, like Muslim Brothers, will increasingly bother Eastern

Europe's Muslims. There are already signs of this happening (particularly in Lithuania and Poland, where rival/alternative Muslim religious collectivities to the traditional national Muftiates show inclinations toward "Euro-Islam" at the expense of "traditional" national Islam).

Thus, coupled together, intra- and extra-communal developments in post-communist Eastern European countries may facilitate a variety of directions that the governance of Islam may take. In the context of the present research, in the near future, however, it looks like that the strong national Muslim Churches—such as those in Bosnia and Bulgaria—will not face any real challenge to their status, let alone survival. The Macedonian Islamic Religious Community, though being challenged by unruly imams refusing to submit to its authority, does not face an external rival Muslim collectivity that could seriously challenge its status in the foreseeable future. In both Poland and Lithuania, however, as shown above, the era of the sole national Muslim Church is practically over, though it remains to be seen, what direction the governance of Islam there will take and what becomes of the rivalry between the muftiates in the two respective countries. Finally, churchification of Islam in Hungary and Czechia, though envisioned in the national legislations governing religions, in practical terms, has not even taken off the ground and, in the current atmosphere of almost institutionalized Muslimophobia, it does not look like it might any time soon.

Though it would be too pretentious to claim that the seven countries analyzed in this book are representative of the full spectrum of State-Islam relations and trends of churchification/securitization of Islam in post-communist Eastern Europe, the discerned phenomena of churchification and securitization of Islam, often proceeding parallel to each other, though to varying degrees, may be recognized in a range of other countries in the region. Besides more comprehensive and in-depth research on the trends of churchification and securitization of Islam in the wider post-communist Eastern Europe, including Russia, comparative research on them in Eastern and Western parts of Europe would also be desirable. It would be highly intriguing to discover, how the developments in the governance of Islam related to its possible churchification or securitization in Western Europe, differ or, on the contrary, are similar to those observed in Eastern Europe as analyzed in this book. Admittedly, this would be a colossal endeavor, requiring the efforts of a team of researchers. It is only wished that such research is undertaken some time in the near future.

# Bibliography

- admin\_HRWF. 2017. "European Court / Bulgaria: Ahmadiyya Muslim Community denied registration." Human Rights Without Frontiers, June 19, 2017. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://hrwf.eu/european-court-bulgaria-ahmadiyya-muslim-community-denied-registration/>.
- AFP. 2015. "Islam was 'never part of Europe': Hungary's Orbán." *The Times of India*, October 16, 2015. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/islam-was-never-part-of-europe-hungarys-orban/photostory/49421003.cms>.
- Agbaria, Ayman. 2018. "Engaging Critically with Religious Authority in Islamic Education: A Socio-Theological Perspective on Intellectual Rigidity." in *Religious Education: Between Radicalism and Tolerance*, edited by Ednan Aslan and Margaret Rausch, 203 – 221. Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Ahmed, Saifuddin, and Jörg Matthes. 2016. "Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A meta-analysis." *International Communication Gazette* 79 (3): 219 – 244.
- Akbarzadeh, Shahram, and Fethi Mansouri. 2007. *Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Akgün, Lale. 2015. "Ich möchte keine Verkirchlichung des Islam." Deutschlandfunk, May 18, 2015. Accessed April 13, 2019. [https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/lale-akguen-ich-moechte-keine-verkirchlichung-des-islam.886.de.html?dram%3Aarticle\\_id=320102](https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/lale-akguen-ich-moechte-keine-verkirchlichung-des-islam.886.de.html?dram%3Aarticle_id=320102).
- Albrecht, Sarah, Tobias Boos, Veronika Deffner, Matthias Gebauer and Shadia Husseini de Araújo. 2016. "Editorial: Conceptualising 'Muslim Diaspora.'" *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 5 (1): 1 – 9.
- Albrecht, Sarah. 2016. "Searching for the 'Homeland' of Islam Concepts of Diaspora in Contemporary Islamic Discourse on Muslims in the West." *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 5 (1): 106 – 131.
- Alibašić, Ahmet and Nedim Begović. 2017. "Reframing the Relations between State and Religion in Post – War Bosnia: Learning to be Free!" *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 19 (1): 19 – 34.
- Alibašić, Ahmet. 2003. *Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Cambridge Programme for Security in International Society Working Paper N° 2.
- Aliş, Mustafa. 2012. "The Bulgarian Muslims who made headlines recently were demanding that they be given their rights." *The Pen*, April 9, 2012. Accessed January 17, 2020. <http://www.thepenmagazine.net/problems-and-religious-organization-of-bulgarian-muslims/>.
- Alwani, Taha Jabir al-. 2010. *Towards a Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic Reflections*. London and Washington: The International Institute of Islamic Thought.

- Ammerman, Nancy T. 2011. "Congregations: Local, Social, and Religious." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, edited by Peter B. Clarke, 562 – 580. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Anderson, John. 2000. *Justifying religious "privilege" in transitional societies*, ECPR Workshops, Copenhagen. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/84fd47d2-1b97-4644-8555-79f8a337e9ef.pdf>.
- Anderson, John. 2003. *Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies: The Politics of Religion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Arapčić, Mirza. 2016. "Saopćenje Koordinacije nezavisnih džemata povodom Izvještaja Rijaseta IZ." *Istina*, April 26, 2016. Accessed March 13, 2018. <https://istina.ba/saopcenje-koordinacije-nezavisnih-dzemata-povodom-izvjestaja-rijaseta-iz/>.
- Astor, Avi. 2014. "Religious Governance and the Accommodation of Islam in Contemporary Spain." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40 (11): 1716 – 1735.
- Avramov, Orlin. 2014. *Annotated Legal Documents on Islam in Europe: Bulgaria*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Babić, Marko. 2014. "Muslims and Islamic Fundamentalism in Macedonia." *Politeja* 30: 387 – 398.
- Babić, Marko. 2017. "Salafism in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook*, 1 – 4.
- Bader, Veit. 2007. "The Governance of Islam in Europe: The Perils of Modelling." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (6): 871 – 886.
- Baker, Paul, Costas Gabrielatos and Tony McEnery. 2013. *Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: the Representation of Islam in the British Press*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barcsa, Krisztina, and András Máté-Tóth. 2016. "The Hungarian Religious Leaders' Statements from the Beginning of the Migration." *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe* 36 (3): 1 – 14.
- Bardos, Gordon N. 2013. *Ethnoconfessional Nationalism in the Balkans: Analysis, Manifestations and Management*. PhD diss. New York: Columbia University. <https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8ZP4D94>
- Barker, Eileen. 2002. "The Protection of Minority Religions in Eastern Europe." In *Protecting the human rights of religious minorities in Eastern Europe*, edited by Peter G. Danchin and Elizabeth A. Cole, 58 – 86. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Barker, Philip W. 2009. *Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God be for us*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
- Barnes, Joe. 2016. "Intelligence expert warns thousands of 'Muslim soldiers' are ready to 'ATTACK' Europe." *Express*, October 5, 2016. Accessed March 14, 2019. <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/717475/muslim-army-attack-europe-intelligence-expert>.
- Barten, Ulrike. 2015. *Minorities, Minority Rights and Internal Self-Determination*. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

- Bartoszewicz, Monika Gabriela. 2016. "Festung Europa: Securitization of Migration and Radicalization of European Societies." *Acta Universitatis Carolinae Studia Territoria* 16 (2): 11 – 37.
- Baumann, Martin. 1998. "Sustaining 'Little Indias': Hindu diasporas in Europe." In *Strangers and Sojourners: Religious Communities in the Diaspora*, edited by Gerrie ter Haar, 95 – 132. Leuven: Peeters.
- Bayraklı, Enes, and Farid Hafez (eds.). 2016 – 2018. *European Islamophobia Report*. Istanbul: SETA, <http://www.islamophobiaeurope.com/>.
- Becker, Howard. 1932. *Systematic Sociology: on the Basis of the Beziehungslehre and Gebildelehre of Leopold von Wiese*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Behloul, Samuel M. 2016. "Religion and the (de-)construction of Diaspora A Comparative View of Albanian and Bosnian Muslims in Switzerland." *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 5 (1): 65 – 86.
- Berger, Peter L. 1954. "The Sociological Study of Sectarianism." *Social Research* 21 (4): 468 – 469.
- Bianchini, Stefano. 2015. *Eastern Europe and the Challenges of Modernity, 1800 – 2000*. London: Routledge.
- Bodissey, Baron. 2017. "László Földi: How Will Citizens Defend Themselves When They Feel the Law No Longer Protects Them?" *Gates of Vienna*, November 14, 2017. Accessed March 22, 2019. <https://gatesofvienna.net/2017/11/laszlo-foldi-how-will-citizens-defend-themselves-when-they-feel-the-law-no-longer-protects-them/>.
- Bollerup, Søren Rinder, and Christian Dons Christensen. 1997. *Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Causes and Consequences of the National Revivals and Conflicts in Late-Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bougarel, Xavier. 2005a. *The role of Balkan Muslims in building a European Islam*. Issue Paper No. 43. Brussels: European Policy Centre.
- Bougarel, Xavier. 2005b. "Balkan Muslim Diasporas and the Idea of a 'European Islam.'" In *Balkan Currents. Essays in Honour of Kjell Magnusson*, edited by Tomislav Dulić, Roland Kostić, Ivana Maček and Jasenka Trtak, 147 – 165. Uppsala Multiethnic Papers 49. Uppsala: Uppsala University Press.
- Bowen, John R. 2007a. *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bowen, John. 2007b. "A View from France on the Internal Complexity of National Models." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (6): 1003 – 1016.
- Braginskaia, Ekaterina. 2010. "Official Discourses and Patterns of State Engagement with Muslim Communities in Britain and Russia." *Diversities* 12 (1): 38 – 55.
- Brelie, Hans von der. 2018. "Foreign influence taking over Bosnia and Herzegovina?" *EuroNews*, April 27, 2018. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.euronews.com/2018/04/26/insiders-foreign-influence-taking-over-bosnia-and-herzegovina>.
- Brubaker, Roger. 2005. "The 'diaspora' diaspora." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28 (1): 1 – 19.

- Brubaker, Roger. 2012. "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches." *Nations and Nationalism* 18 (1): 2 – 20.
- Buckley, Neil. 2016. "Czech president calls for economic migrants to be deported." *Financial Times*, October 1, 2016. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.ft.com/content/8bae2ec6-8725-11e6-bbbe-2a4dce95797>.
- Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 2003. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cacanoska, Ruzhica. 2003. "The Process of De-Secularization in Macedonian Society." *New Balkan Politics*, 5. Accessed January 17, 2020. [http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/item/The-Process-of-De-Secularization-in-Macedonian-Society#.Wx\\_DmfZuJzF](http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/item/The-Process-of-De-Secularization-in-Macedonian-Society#.Wx_DmfZuJzF).
- Čajić, Emir. 2016. "Otvoreno pismo Rijasetu IZ povodom isteka ultimatum." *Istina*, March 2, 2016. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://istina.ba/otvoreno-pismo-rijasetu-iz-povodom-isteka-ultimatuma/>.
- Capotorti, Francesco. 1991. *Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities*. New York: United Nations.
- Cerić, Mustafa. 2007. "The challenge of a single Muslim authority in Europe." *European View* 6: 41 – 48.
- Cerić, Mustafa. 2016. "Towards a European-Islamic Identity." In *Rethinking Islamic Law for Minorities: Towards a Western-Muslim Identity*, edited by Jasser Auda, 21 – 32. London: Association for Muslim Social Scientists. [https://www.jasserauda.net/new/pdf/kamil\\_fiqh\\_alaqalliyat.pdf](https://www.jasserauda.net/new/pdf/kamil_fiqh_alaqalliyat.pdf).
- Cerić, Mustafa. 2017. "Invitation: A Declaration of European Muslims." *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe* 37 (5): 5 – 6.
- Cesari, Jocelyne. 2010a. "Introduction." In *Muslims in the West after 9/11: Religion, Politics, and Law*, edited by Jocelyne Cesari, 1 – 6. London and New York: Routledge.
- Cesari, Jocelyne. 2010b. "Securitization of Islam in Europe." In *Muslims in the West after 9/11: Religion, Politics, and Law*, edited by Jocelyne Cesari, 9 – 27. London and New York: Routledge.
- Cesari, Jocelyne. 2013. *Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cesari, Jocelyne. 2018. "Foreword." In *The Idea of European Islam Religion, Ethics, Politics and Perpetual Modernity*, by Mohammed Hashas, xi-xii. London and New York: Routledge.
- Ciensi, Jan. 2015. "Migrants carry 'parasites and protozoa,' warns Polish opposition leader." *Politico*, October 14, 2015. Accessed March 24, 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/migrants-asylum-poland-kaczynski-election/>.
- Ciensi, Jan. 2017. "Why Poland doesn't want refugees." *Politico*, May 21, 2017. Accessed March 24, 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/politics-nationalism-and-religion-explain-why-poland-doesnt-want-refugees/>.

- Cilingir, Sevgi. 2016. *The Securitization—Integration Dilemma: The Case of British Muslims*. Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Prague. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://ecpr.eu/Events/PaperDetails.aspx?PaperID=31506&EventID=95>.
- Cohen, Robin. 1996. "Diasporas and the State: From Victims to Challengers." *International Affairs* 72 (3): 507 – 520.
- Cohen, Robin. 1997. *Global Diasporas. An Introduction*, First edition. London and New York: Routledge.
- Cohen, Robin. 2007. *Global Diasporas. An Introduction*, Second edition. London and New York: Routledge.
- Čolić, Razim. n.d. "Activities of the Islamic Community that Seek to Prevent Different Interpretations of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina." In *The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union: Main Policy Considerations*, by Grand Mufti Husein Kavazović, Razim Čolić, Senaid Kobilica, Dževada Šuško, Muhamed Jugo and Muhamed Fazlović, 16 – 18. Sarajevo: Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Groups. n.d. Преглед на регистрирани цркви, верски заедници и религиозни групи. (Overview of registered churches, religious communities, and religious groups). Accessed January 18, 2020. <http://www.kovz.gov.mk/pocetna/pregled.nspk>.
- Crews, Robert D. 2006. *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dawson, Lorne L. 2011. "Church-sect-cult: Constructing Typologies of Religious Groups." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, edited by Peter B. Clarke, 525 – 544. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Department of State. 2015. *Macedonia 2015 International Religious Freedom Report*, Department of State Report. Accessed April 19, 2019. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/256427.pdf>.
- Dzhekova, Rositsa, Mila Mancheva, Maria Doichinova, Lyubomira Derelieva, Tihomir Bezlov, Maria Karayotova, Yavor Tomov, Dimitar Markov and Miryana Ilcheva. 2015. *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*, Report 32, Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.
- Dziekan, Marek. 2011. "History and Culture of Polish Tatars." In *Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe. Widening the European Discourse on Islam*, edited by Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, 27 – 39. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu.
- Edmunds, June. 2012. "The 'new' barbarians: governmentality, securitization and Islam in Western Europe." *Contemporary Islam* 6 (1): 67 – 84.
- Elbasani, Arolda, and Jelena Tošić. 2017. "Localized Islam(s): interpreting agents, competing narratives, and experiences of faith." *Nationalities Papers* 45 (4): 499 – 510.
- Elbasani, Arolda, and Olivier Roy. 2015. "Islam in the post-Communist Balkans: alternative pathways to God." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 15 (4): 457 – 471.

- Elbasani, Arolda. 2015a. "Introduction: Nation, State and Faith in the Post-Communist Era." In *The Revival of Islam in the Balkans: From Identity to Religiosity*, edited by Arolda Elbasani and Olivier Roy, 1 – 19. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Elbasani, Arolda. 2015b. *The Revival of Islam in the Post-Communist Balkans: Coercive Nationalisms and New Pathways to God*. Research Paper No. RSCAS 2015/28. Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
- Elbasani, Arolda. 2016. "State-organised Religion and Muslims' Commitment to Democracy in Albania." *Europe-Asia Studies* 68 (2): 253 – 269.
- Elbasani, Arolda. 2017. "Governing Islam in Plural Societies: Religious Freedom, State Neutrality and Traditional Heritage." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 19 (1): 4 – 18.
- Emilova, Sonya. 2018. "Islamophobia in Bulgaria: National Report 2017." In *European Islamophobia Report 2017*, edited by Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, 127 – 142. Istanbul: SETA.
- Emin, Hayri. 2017. "Islamophobia in Bulgaria. National Report 2016." In *European Islamophobia Report 2016*, edited by Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, 103 – 126. Istanbul: SETA.
- Engelhardt, Jan Felix. 2017. *Islamische Theologie im deutschen Wissenschaftssystem: Ausdifferenzierung und Selbstkonzeption einer neuen Wissenschaftsdisziplin*. Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Enyedi, Zsolt. 2003. "The Contested Politics of Positive Neutrality in Hungary." In *Church and State in Contemporary Europe: the Chimera of Neutrality*, edited by John T.S. Madeley and Zsolt Enyedi, 157 – 176. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
- Etienne, Bruno. 1989. *La France et l'islam*. Paris: Hachette.
- Europe of the Future Association. n.d. *Mission Statement*. Europe of the Future Association. Accessed March 24, 2019. <http://english.euroislam.pl/sample-page/>.
- European Court of Human Rights. 2017. *Bektashi Community and Others v. FYROM*. ECtHR Registrar Press Release, April 12, 2017. Accessed March 12, 2018. <https://hrwf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/FYROM2018.pdf>.
- Evstatiev, Simeon. 2019. "Milletic Secularism in the Balkans: Christianity, Islam, and Identity in Bulgaria." *Nationalities Papers* 47 (1): 87 – 103.
- Ewart, Jacqui, Mark Pearson and Guy Healy. 2016. "Journalists' and Educators' Perspectives on News Media Reporting of Islam and Muslim Communities in Australia and New Zealand." *Journal of Media and Religion* 15 (3): 136 – 145.
- Fadl, Khaled Abou El. 1994. "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries." *Islamic Law and Society* 1 (2): 141 – 187.
- Farnam, Arie. 2001. "In Macedonia, religion a weapon." *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 19, 2001. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0919/p6s1-woeu.html>.

- Fedele, V. 2013. "The diasporic Islamic masculinity and the reformulation of European Islam: Theoretical approaches and interpretative perspectives." *Nómadas. Critical Journal of Social and Juridical Sciences* 40 (4): 139 – 174.
- Ferrari, Silvio. 2010. "The Creation of Muslim Representative Institutions in the "Secular" European States." *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 8 (2): 21 – 27.
- Fishman, Shammai. 2006. *Fiqh al-Aqallīyyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities*. Research Monographs on the Muslim World, Series No 1, Paper No 2. Washington, CD: Hudson Institute.
- Fox, Jonathan, and Yasemin Akbaba. 2015. "Securitization of Islam and religious discrimination: Religious minorities in Western democracies, 1990 – 2008." *Comparative European Politics* 13 (2): 175 – 197.
- Gábor, Vona. 2010. *Vona Gábor about the Islam*. Jobbik Movement for a better Hungary, December 9, 2010. Accessed February 25, 2019. [https://www.jobbik.com/vona\\_gabor\\_about\\_islam](https://www.jobbik.com/vona_gabor_about_islam).
- Georgiev, Mitre. 2016. "Islamophobia in Macedonia: National Report 2015." In *European Islamophobia Report 2015*, edited by Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, 356 – 373. Istanbul: SETA.
- Gerber, Haim. 1994. *State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Ghodsee, Kirsten. 2009. "Symphonic secularism: Eastern Orthodoxy, ethnic identity and religious freedoms in contemporary Bulgaria." *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 27 (2): 227 – 252.
- Gilani, Sayyid Muhammad Yunus. 2010. "The Institution of the 'Ulama': Origin and Early Development in the Formative Period." *Al-Idah* 2010 21: 1 – 13.
- Gjevori, Elis. 2018. "Orbán: Europe and Islam don't mix." TRTWorld, December 26, 2018. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.trtworld.com/europe/orban-europe-and-islam-don-t-mix-22841>.
- Gleeson, Brian. 2008. "Images, Understandings, and Models of the Church in History: an Update." *Australian eJournal of Theology* 12 (1): 1 – 34.
- Godard, Bernard. 2007. "Official Recognition of Islam." In *European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society*, edited by Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michael Emerson, 183 – 203. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Goodwin, Matthew, Thomas Raines and David Cutts. 2017. *What Do Europeans Think About Muslim Immigration?* Chatham House. Accessed March 13, 2019. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/what-do-europeans-think-about-muslim-immigration>.
- Górak-Sosnowska, Katarzyna. 2006. "Platoniczna islamofobia?" [Platonic Islamophobia?] Portal Spraw Zagranicznych, February 2, 2006. Accessed March 23, 2019. [www.psz.pl/92-polska/katarzyna-gorak-sosnowska-platoniczna-islamofobia](http://www.psz.pl/92-polska/katarzyna-gorak-sosnowska-platoniczna-islamofobia).

- Gözaydın, İftar B. 2006. "A Religious Administration to Secure Secularism: The Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey." *Marburg Journal of Religion* 11 (1): 1 – 8.
- Gözaydın, İftar B. 2013. *Religion, Politics and the Politics of Religion in Turkey*. Liberal Institute. Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71743456.pdf>.
- Greeley, Andrew M. 1968. *The Crucible of Change*. New York: Sheed & Ward.
- Grekova, Maya, Iva Kyurkchieva and Maya Kosseva. n.d. *Challenges of Religious Accommodation in Family-Law, Labor-Law and Legal Regulation of Public Space and Public Funding*. Bulgarian Socio-Legal Research Report. Sofia: IMIR. Accessed January 17, 2020. [https://patternsofgoverningreligion.weebly.com/uploads/2/7/0/3/27037565/religare\\_project\\_challenges\\_of\\_religious\\_accommodation\\_bulgarian.pdf](https://patternsofgoverningreligion.weebly.com/uploads/2/7/0/3/27037565/religare_project_challenges_of_religious_accommodation_bulgarian.pdf).
- Gunn, Thomas Jeremy. 2006. "Managing Religion through Founding Myths and Perceived Identities." In *La nouvelle question religieuse. Régulation ou ingérence de l'État? / The New Religious Question. State Regulations or State Interference?*, edited by Pauline Coté and Thomas Jeremy Gunn, 33 – 48. Brussels, Bern, Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Vienna: Peter Lang.
- Hajdinjak, Marko. 2005. "Inter-religious relations in Bulgaria in the Context of the new legislation." In *Religion and Democracy in Moldova*, edited by Silvo Devetak, Olesea Sirbu, Silviu Rogobete and Jasmina Klojčnik, 381 – 395. Maribor-Chisinau: ISCOMET and ASER.
- Hajji, Khalid. 2015. "The Risks and Challenges of Europeanizing Islam." Alsharq forum, December 7, 2015. Accessed April 18, 2019. <http://www.sharqforum.org/2015/12/07/the-risks-and-challenges-of-europeanizing-islam/>.
- Halmaj, Gábor. 2015. *Religion and Constitutionalism: State-Church Relations and Religious Freedom*. MTA Working Paper, No. 2015/05.
- Halmaj, Gábor. n.d. The Role of Religion in the Illiberal Hungarian Constitutional System. Unpublished paper. Accessed April 19, 2019. [https://me.eui.eu/gabor-halmaj/wp-content/uploads/sites/385/2018/11/Role\\_of\\_Religion\\_in\\_Hungary.pdf](https://me.eui.eu/gabor-halmaj/wp-content/uploads/sites/385/2018/11/Role_of_Religion_in_Hungary.pdf).
- Hannova, Daniela. 2014. "Arab students inside the Soviet Bloc: a case study on Czechoslovakia during the 1950s and 60s." *European Scientific Journal* 2: 371 – 379.
- Hashas, Mohammed. 2013. *On the Idea of European Islam: Voices of Perpetual Modernity*. PhD diss. LUISS University of Rome.
- Hassan, Said Fares. 2013. *Fiqh al-Aqalliyāt: History, Development, and Progress*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heijmans, Philip. 2017. "Czech Republic's tiny Muslim community subject to hate." *aljazeera.com*, November 13, 2017. Accessed December 18, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/czech-republic-tiny-muslim-community-subject-hate-17112063523840.html>.

- Hertel, Bradley R. 1977. "Church, Sect, and Congregation in Hinduism: An Examination of Social Structure and Religious Authority." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 16 (1): 15 – 26.
- Hinnells, John R. 1997. "The study of diaspora religion." In *A New Handbook of Living Religions*, edited by J.R. Hinnells, 682 – 690. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hoffmann, Henryk. 2007. "Religion and Politics in Contemporary Poland." In *Náboženství a politika*, edited by Henryk Hoffmann and Tomáš Bubik, 80 – 87. Pardubice: Pantheon.
- Hoge, Dean R. 2011. "The Sociology of the Clergy." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, edited by Peter B. Clarke, 581 – 598. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Humphrey, Michael. 2009. "Securitisation and Domestication of Diaspora Muslims and Islam: Turkish immigrants in Germany and Australia." *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 11 (2): 136 – 154.
- Hunger, Uwe, and Nils Johann Schröder. 2016. *Staat und Islam—Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Hussain, Yasmin, and Paul Bagguley. 2012. "Securitized citizens: Islamophobia, racism and the 7/7 London bombings." *The Sociological Review* 60 (4): 715 – 734.
- iDNES. 2009. "Nechceme v Brně další mešitu, vzkazují muslimům jihomoravští lidovci." iDNES, July 27, 2009. Accessed January 17, 2020. [http://brno.idnes.cz/nehceme-v-brne-dalsi-mesituvzkazuji-muslimum-jihomoravstilidovci-1jw-/brno-zpravy.aspx?c=A090727\\_154852\\_brno\\_pje](http://brno.idnes.cz/nehceme-v-brne-dalsi-mesituvzkazuji-muslimum-jihomoravstilidovci-1jw-/brno-zpravy.aspx?c=A090727_154852_brno_pje).
- Idriz, Mesut, and Muhamed Ali. 2016. "Islam in Macedonia: The Origins, Evolution and Role of the Islamic Religious Community from the Ottoman Period to the Present." *Islam and Civilizational Renewal* 7 (1): 81 – 97.
- International Crisis Group. 2006. *Macedonia: Wobbling toward Europe*, Update Briefing, Europe Briefing N°41. Brussels: International Crisis Group. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://d2071andvipowj.cloudfront.net/b41-macedonia-wobbling-toward-europe.pdf>.
- Irozhlas. 2018. "Soud definitivně osvobodil Vladimíra Sáňku, který šířil radikální islámskou knihu," *Český rozhlas*, August 11, 2018. Accessed December 18, 2019. [https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/vladimir-sanka-sireni-radikalni-islamske-knihy-soud\\_180511108\\_jak](https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/vladimir-sanka-sireni-radikalni-islamske-knihy-soud_180511108_jak).
- Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. n.d. *The Structural Organisation of the Islamic Community*. Accessed March 29, 2019. <http://english.islamskaza-jednica.ba/the-islamic-community/modules-menu/the-structural-organisation-of-the-islamic-community>.
- Jenkins, Everett (Jr). 1999. *The Muslim Diaspora: A Comprehensive Chronology of the Spread of Islam in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas*. 2 vols. Jefferson-London: Macfarland & Company.

- Johnson, Benton. 1963. "On Church and Sect." *American Sociological Review* 28 (4): 539 – 549.
- Johnstone, Ronald L. 2016. *Religion in Society: A Sociology of Religion*. 8th edition. London: Routledge.
- Jones, Peter. 1989. "The Ideal of the Neutral State." In *Liberal Neutrality*, edited by Robert E. Goodin and Andrew Reeve, 9 – 38. London: Routledge.
- Jovanovska, Svetlana, and Branko Gjorgjeski. 2010. "Radical Islam in Macedonia worries Western observers." *EU Observer*, July 8, 2010. Accessed March 28, 2019. <https://euobserver.com/news/30446>.
- Jůn, Dominik. "Populist politician stages 'Islamic State Invasion' in Old Town Square." *radio.cz*, August 22, 2016. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.radio.cz/en/section/curaffrs/far-right-politician-stages-islamic-state-invasion-in-old-town-square>.
- Jusić, Muhamed. n.d. "The Bosnian Islamic Community's Experience in Preventing Violent Extremism and Potential Cooperation with EU Institutions." In *The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union: Main Policy Considerations*, by Grand Mufti Husein Kavazović, Razim Čolić, Senaid Kobilica, Dževada Šuško, Muhamed Jugo and Muhamed Fazlović, 29 – 32. Sarajevo: Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Kaczmarek, Kamil. 2016. "Głos biskupów wdebacie o przyjmowaniu migrantów." Paper presented at the Polish Sociological Association conference "Religion and the Challenges of the Present from a Social Sciences Perspective," Cracow, 17 – 19 November 2016.
- Kadrbegović, Aziz. 2007. "Uništenje Islamske zajednice glavni dugoročni cilj!" (Destroying the Islamic Community, Main Long-term Goal!) *Preporod* 6/848, March 15, 2007. Quoted in Aid Smajić. 2017. "Bosnia and Hercegovina." In *Islamic Leadership in the European Lands of the Former Ottoman and Russian Empires*, edited by Egdūnas Račius and Antonina Zhelyazkova, 68 – 88. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Kalkandjieva, Daniela. 2006. "The Consent of State and the Blessing of Church: A Case Study on the New Bulgarian Denominations Act." *Romanian Journal of Political Science* 6 (2): 101 – 114.
- Kalkandjieva, Daniela. 2011. "A Comparative Analysis on Church-State Relations in Eastern Orthodoxy: Concepts, Models, and Principles." *Journal of Church and State* 53 (4): 587 – 614.
- Kanev, Krassimir. 2002. "Law and Politics toward the Muslims in Bulgaria." In *Protecting the human rights of religious minorities in Eastern Europe*, edited by Peter G. Danchin and Elizabeth A. Cole, 315 – 344. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Karasik, Theodore and Cheryl Benard Muslim Diasporas and Networks, Angel M. Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Theodore Karasik, Rollie Lal, Ian Lesser and David Thaler. 2004. *The Muslim World After 9/11*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

- Karčić, Fikret. 2006. "Šta je to 'islamska tradicija Bošnjaka.'" (What is „Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks“) *Preporod*, no.23/841, December 1, 2006.
- Karčić, Fikret. 2015. *The Other European Muslims: a Bosnian Experience*. Sarajevo: Center for Advanced Studies.
- Karčić, Harun. 2010a. "Globalisation and Islam in Bosnia: Foreign Influences and their Effects." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 11 (2): 151 – 166.
- Karčić, Harun. 2010b. "Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina: International Actors and Activities." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 30 (4): 519 – 534.
- Karčić, Harun. 2012. "From Mekteb-I-Nuwwab to the Faculty of Islamic Studies: A Short History of Bosnia's Leading Islamic Educational Institution." *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe* 31 (1), Article 4. <http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol31/iss1/4>.
- Karčić, Hikmet. 2017. "Islamophobia in Bosnia and Herzegovina: National Report 2016." In *European Islamophobia Report 2017*, edited by Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, 84 – 101. Istanbul: SETA.
- Karyotis, Georgios, and Stratos Patrikio. 2010. "Religion, securitization and anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Greece." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (1): 43 – 57.
- Kastoryano, Riva. 1999. "Muslim diaspora(s) in Western Europe." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 98 (1 – 2): 191 – 202.
- Kavazović, Husein. n.d. "Address by the Grand Mufti." In *The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union: Main Policy Considerations*, by Grand Mufti Husein Kavazović, Razim Čolić, Senaid Kobilica, Dževada Šuško, Muhamed Jugo and Muhamed Fazlović, 5 – 12. Sarajevo: Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- King, Charles, and Neil J. Melvin. 1999/2000. "Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia." *International Security* 24 (3): 108 – 138.
- Klausen, Jytte. 2005. "The Re-Politicization of Religion in Europe: The Next Ten Years." *Perspectives on Politics* 3 (3): 554 – 557.
- Koenig, Matthias. 2006. "Konstruktionen muslimischer Identität zwischen nationaler und europäischer Staatsbürgerschaft." In *Soziale Ungleichheit, kulturelle Unterschiede: Verhandlungen des 32. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in München*, edited by Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, 2136 – 2144. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.
- Koenig, Matthias. 2007. "Europeanising the Governance of Religious Diversity: An Institutionalist Account of Muslim Struggles for Public Recognition." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33 (6): 911 – 932.
- Kompérová, Aneta. 2017. *The influence of Islam on integration of Muslims into Czech society*. Bachelor Thesis, Brno University. Accessed December 22, 2019. [https://is.mendelu.cz/lide/clovek.pl?zalozka=13;id=47871;studium=73106;zp=52628;download\\_prace=1;lang=cz](https://is.mendelu.cz/lide/clovek.pl?zalozka=13;id=47871;studium=73106;zp=52628;download_prace=1;lang=cz).

- Kovacs, Andras. 2016. "Sie kommen, um Europa zu besetzen"—Interview mit Erzbischof Gyula Marfi von Veszprém über Migration und Islamisierung." *Katholisch-es: Magazin für Kirche und Kultur*, July 23, 2016. Accessed March 22, 2019. <https://katholisches.info/2016/07/23/sie-kommen-um-europa-zu-besetzen-interview-mit-erzbischof-gyula-marfi-von-veszprem/>.
- Kozák, Gyula. 2009. *Muslims in Romania: Integration Models, Categorization and Social Distance*, Working Papers in Romanian Minority Studies, no. 18, Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Institute For Research On National Minorities.
- Krämer, Gudrun and Sabine Schmidtke. 2006. "Introduction: Religious Authority and Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies. A Critical Overview." In *Speaking for Islam: religious authorities in Muslim societies*, edited by Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, 1 – 14. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Krussteff, Atanas. n.d.a *Bulgaria*. Unpublished paper.
- Krussteff, Atanas. n.d.b *On Some Issues Related to Controversies between the 2002 Religious Denominations Act and the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria*. Unpublished paper.
- Laitin, David D. 1995. "Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Nationality in the Post-Soviet Diaspora." *Archives européennes de sociologie* 36 (2): 281 – 316.
- Laitin, David D. 1998. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Latifi, Veton. 2001. *Religious Strife Fuels Macedonian Conflict*, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, July 12, 2001. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/religious-strife-fuels-macedonian-conflict>.
- Laurence, Jonathan. 2012. *The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims: The State's Role in Minority Integration*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Law on Public Holidays of the Republic of Macedonia*. n.d. Issued In "Службен весник на Република Македонија," number 21/98 and 18/07, 2007. [http://www.mtsp.gov.mk/WBStorage/Files/zakon\\_praznici.pdf](http://www.mtsp.gov.mk/WBStorage/Files/zakon_praznici.pdf). Accessed March 24, 2020.
- Lazarová, Daniela. 2016. "Cardinal Duka warns against Dangers of Islam." Czech Radio, August 9, 2016, Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.radio.cz/en/section/news/cardinal-duka-warns-against-dangers-of-islam>.
- Lenz-Raymann, Kathrin. 2014. *Securitization of Islam: A Vicious Circle: Counter-Terrorism and Freedom of Religion in Central Asia*. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.
- Leustean, Lucian. 2008. "Challenges to Church-State Relations in Contemporary Europe: Introduction." *Journal of Religion in Europe* 1 (3): 247 – 250.
- Little, David. 2002. "Religious and Civic Nationalism: A Response to Mehmet Aydin." *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 39 (1 – 2): 42 – 47.
- Loizides, Neophytos G. 2009. "Religious Nationalism and Adaptation in Southeast Europe." *Nationalities Papers* 37 (2): 203 – 227.
- Loobuyck, Patrick, Jonathan Debeer and Petra Meier. 2013. "Church – State Regimes and their Impact on the Institutionalization of Islamic Organizations in

- Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 33 (1): 61 – 76.
- Louthian, Robert, and Thomas Miller. 1994. *Defining "Church"—The Concept of a Congregation*. EO CPE Text. Accessed December 21, 2019. <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopica94.pdf>.
- LTG. 2016. "Hungarian Intelligence Expert Describes How Muslim Conquest of Europe May Play Out," *Limits to Growth*, October 11, 2016. Accessed March 22, 2019. <https://www.limitstogrowth.org/articles/2016/10/11/hungarian-intelligence-expert-describes-how-muslim-conquest-of-europe-may-play-out/>.
- Lumen Learning. n.d. "Religious Organizations." *Boundless Sociology*. Accessed April 18, 2019. <https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-sociology/chapter/religious-organizations/>.
- Luxmoore, Jonathan. 2017. "Eastern Europe's church leaders face growing criticism over refugees." *National Catholic Reporter*, Mar 9, 2017. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/eastern-europes-church-leaders-face-growing-criticism-over-refugees>.
- Mackintosh, Alex. 2017. "A Brief History of Hungary's Controversial 'Islamic Churches.'" Culture trip, March 29 2017. Accessed March 12, 2019. <https://theculturetrip.com/europe/hungary/articles/a-brief-history-of-hungarys-controversial-islamic-churches>.
- Madeley, John T.S. 2003. "European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious Neutrality." In *Church and State in Contemporary Europe: the Chimera of Neutrality*, edited by John T.S. Madeley and Zsolt Enyedi, 1 – 22. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
- Mahmood, Saba. 2016. *Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mancheva, Mila and Rositsa Dzhekova. 2017. *Risks of Islamist Radicalisation in Bulgaria: A Case Study in the Iztok Neighbourhood of the City of Pazardzhik*. Working Paper. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2017.
- Mandaville, Peter. 2003. "Communication and Diasporic Islam: A Virtual Ummah?" In *The Media of Diaspora*, edited by Karim H. Karim, 135 – 147. London: Routledge.
- Mandelbaum, M. 2000. "Introduction." In *The New European Diasporas: National Minorities and Conflict in Eastern Europe*, edited by Michael Mandelbaum, 1 – 18. Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations Press.
- Martikainen, Tuomas. 2007. "The Governance of Islam in Finland." *Temenos* 43 (2): 243 – 265.
- Martin, David A. 1962. "The Denomination." *The British Journal of Sociology* 13 (1): 1 – 14.
- Martin, David A. 1965. *Pacifism: an Historical and Sociological Study*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Maussen, Marcel. 2007. *The governance of Islam in Western Europe A state of the art report*. IMISCOE Working Paper, no. 16.

- MEE and agencies. 2015. "Don't let Muslim refugees in, says Bulgaria's Orthodox Church," *Middle East Eye*, September 26, 2015. Accessed December 21, 2019. [www.middleeasteye.net/news/dont-let-muslim-refugees-says-bulgarias-orthodox-church-1024482681](http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/dont-let-muslim-refugees-says-bulgarias-orthodox-church-1024482681).
- Meer, Nasar. 2017. "Muslim diasporas and their framing(s): Muslim migration rethought." *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 40 (3): 396 – 400.
- Mendel, Miloš. 1998. "The Islamic religious community in Bohemia and Moravia (1934 – 1945)." *Quarterly Journal of African and Asian Studies* 66 (2): 127 – 141.
- Mentzel, Peter. 2000. "Introduction: Identity, Confessionalism, and Nationalism." *Nationalities Papers* 28 (1): 7 – 11.
- Merdjanova, Ina. 2013. *Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans between Nationalism and Transnationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mestiri, Mohamed. 2016. "From the Fiqh of Minorities to the Fiqh of Citizenship: Challenges of Conceptualization and Implementation." In *Rethinking Islamic Law for Minorities: Towards a Western-Muslim Identity*, edited by Jasser Auda, 33 – 43. London: Association for Muslim Social Scientists. [https://www.jasserauda.net/new/pdf/kamil\\_fiqh\\_alaqalliyat.pdf](https://www.jasserauda.net/new/pdf/kamil_fiqh_alaqalliyat.pdf).
- Metaj-Stojanova, Albana. 2015. "Religious Freedoms in Republic of Macedonia." *SEEU Review* 11 (1): 159 – 165.
- Mihelj, Sabina. 2007. "Faith in nation comes in different guises': modernist versions of religious nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 13 (2): 265 – 284.
- Miller, Kathryn A. 2000. "Muslim Minorities and the Obligation to Emigrate to Islamic Territory: Two fatwās from Fifteenth-Century Granada." *Islamic Law and Society* 7 (2): 256 – 288.
- Mirtaheri, S. Amir. 2010. "European Muslims, secularism and the legacy of colonialism." *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies* 3: 73 – 86.
- Misri, Imad El. n.d. *Shvatanja koja trebamo ispraviti*. Accessed December 22, 2019. <http://dzihad.freesevers.com/contact.html>.
- Moghissi, Haideh (ed.). 2007. *Muslim Diaspora: Gender, Culture and Identity*. London: Routledge.
- Moghissi, Heideh, Saeed Rahnama and Mark J. Goodman (eds.). 2009. *Diaspora by Design: Muslims in Canada and Beyond*. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press.
- Monsma, Stephen V., and J. Christopher Soper. 2008. *The Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State in Five Democracies*. Second edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Moore, Kathleen. 2010. *The Unfamiliar Abode: Islamic Law in the United State and Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mortkowitz, Bauerova Ladka and Michael Winfrey. 2017. "'We don't want the euro,' says Czech tycoon poised to be premier." Bloomberg, June 25 2017. Accessed January 17, 2020. [www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-25/-wedon-t-want-the-euro-says-czech-tycoon-poised-to-be-premier](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-25/-wedon-t-want-the-euro-says-czech-tycoon-poised-to-be-premier).

- Mujadžević, Dino. 2017. "Ottoman and Yugoslav Legacy." In *Islamic Leadership in the European Lands of the Former Ottoman and Russian Empires*, edited by Egdūnas Račius and Antonina Zhelyazkova, 31 – 44. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Muslim Denomination of Bulgaria. n.d. *Statute of the Muslim Denomination of Bulgaria*.
- Mustafa, Mohanad, and Ayman K. Agbaria. 2016. "Islamic Jurisprudence of Minorities (Fiqh al-Aqalliyat): The Case of the Palestinian Muslim Minority in Israel." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 36 (2): 184 – 201.
- Nalborczyk, Agata S. 2017. "Poland." In *Islamic Leadership in the European Lands of the Former Ottoman and Russian Empires*, edited by Egdūnas Račius and Antonina Zhelyazkova, 293 – 313. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Nalborczyk, Agata S. and Monika Ryszewska. 2013. "Islamic Organizations in Poland: From Monopoly to Pluralism." In *Islamic Organizations in Europe and the USA. A Multidisciplinary Perspective*, edited by Matthias Kortmann and Kerstin Rosenow-Williams, 13 – 36. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nalborczyk, Agata S., and Paweł Borecki. 2011. "Relations between Islam and the state in Poland: the legal position of Polish Muslims." *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 22 (3): 343 – 359.
- Narkowicz, Kasia, and Konrad Pędziwiatr. 2017. "From unproblematic to contentious: mosques in Poland." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43 (3): 441 – 457.
- National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria. 2018. Закон за изменение и допълнение на Закона за вероизповеданията (Law on changes to the Law on Denominations). National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria. December 21, 2018. Accessed December 12, 2019. <https://www.parliament.bg/bg/laws/ID/78252>.
- Němec, Damián. Forthcoming. *Annotated Legal Documents on Islam in Europe: Czech Republic*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Niebuhr, Richard. 1929. *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*. New York: Henry Holt and Co.
- Nielsen, Jørgen S. 1993. "State, religion and laicity: the western European experience." In *Muslims and Christians in Europe: Breaking New Ground*, edited by Gé Speelman, Jan van Lin and Dick Mulder, 90 – 99. Kampen: Kok.
- Nielsen, Jørgen S. 1999. *Towards a European Islam*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nielsen, Jørgen S., Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić, Brigitte Maréchal and Christian Moe. 2009. *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*. vol. 1. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Novinky. 2014. "Petici proti rozšíření práv muslimů v ČR podepsalo skoro 25 tisíc lidí." *Novinky.cz*, September 11, 2014. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/347439-petici-proti-rozsireni-prav-muslimu-v-crpodepsalo-skoro-25-tisic-lidi.html>.
- Okey, Robin. 1992. "Central Europe / Eastern Europe: Behind the Definitions." *Past & Present* 137: 102 – 133.
- Öktem, Kerem. 2010. *New Islamic actors after the Wahhabi intermezzo: Turkey's return to the Muslim Balkans*. Oxford: University of Oxford.

- ORF. 2017. "Religionsrechtler: Islam in Europa wird „kirchlicher“." ORF, March 23, 2017. Accessed April 13, 2019. <https://religion.orf.at/stories/2832773/>.
- Ostřanský, Bronislav. 2013. *What is the nature of anti-Muslim sentiments in the Czech Republic? The Manifestations and the Paradoxes of Islamophobia in the Czech Republic*. Unpublished paper.
- Pall, Zoltan, Omar Sayfo. 2016. "Why an anti-Islam campaign has taken root in Hungary, a country with few Muslims." *V4Revue*, September 14, 2016. Accessed January 17, 2020. <http://visegradrevue.eu/why-an-anti-islam-campaign-has-taken-root-in-hungary-a-country-with-few-muslims/>.
- Pap, Norbert, and Viktor Glied. 2017. "The Hungarian Border Barrier and Islam." *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 6 (1): 104 – 131.
- Pasha-Robinson, Lucy. 2018. "Europe is being overrun': Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán steps up anti-immigrant populist rhetoric ahead of elections." *Independent*, February 21, 2018. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/viktor-orban-hungary-elections-prime-minister-anti-immigration-islam-fidesz-party-a8221121.html>.
- Peachey, Paul. 2018. "Hungary's Muslims fear fallout from anti-Islam rhetoric." *The National*, March 10, 2018. Accessed December 18, 2019. <https://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/hungary-s-muslims-fear-fallout-from-anti-islam-rhetoric-1.711823>.
- Pędzwiatr, Konrad. 2017. "Islamophobia in Poland: National Report 2016." In *European Islamophobia Report 2017*, edited by Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, 411 – 443. Istanbul: SETA.
- Pędzwiatr, Konrad. 2018. "The Catholic Church in Poland on Muslims and Islam." *Patterns of Prejudice* 52 (5): 461 – 478.
- Perica, Vjekoslav. 2002. *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Permoser, Julia Mourão. 2010. "Religious Organisations as Political Actors in the Context of Migration: Islam and Orthodoxy in Austria." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36 (9): 1463 – 1481.
- Petkoff, Peter. 2010. "Religion and the Secular State in Bulgaria." In *Religion and the Secular State: Interim National Reports*, edited by Javier Martínez-Torrón and W. Cole Durham: Brigham Young University.
- Pew Research Center. 2013. *The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society*. Pew Research Center.
- Pew Research Center. 2015. *The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010 – 2050*. Pew Research Center.
- Pew Research Center. 2016. *Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs*. Pew Research Center. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/>. Accessed 2019-03-19.

- Pew Research Center. 2017a. *Europe's Growing Muslim Population*. Pew Research Center.
- Pew Research Center. 2017b. *Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe*.
- Pew Research Center. 2018. *Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance of Religion, Views of Minorities, and Key Social Issues*. Pew Research Center. Accessed April 9, 2019. <https://www.pewforum.org/2018/10/29/eastern-and-western-europeans-differ-on-importance-of-religion-views-of-minorities-and-key-social-issues/>.
- Potz, Richard. 2008. "State and Church in the European countries with an Orthodox tradition." *Derecho y Religión* 3: 33 – 54.
- Press conference given by Viktor Orbán and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. June 5, 2015. Accessed January 17, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmOTO6QCAtU>.
- Przemysłski, Jan, and Aleksander Kłos. 2017. "Kaczyński: Nie możemy w to wchodzić." *Gazeta Polska Codziennie*, May 22, 2017. Accessed March 24, 2019. <https://gpcodzien.pl/64284-kaczynskiniemozemywtowchodzic.html>.
- Qandil, Yunis. 2010. "Euro-Islamists and the Struggle for Dominance within Islam." In *The Other Muslims: Moderate and Secular*, edited by Zeyno Baran, 33 – 53. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Qaradawi, Youssef al-. 2003. *Fiqh of Muslim Minorities: Contentious Issues and Recommended Solutions*. Cairo: Al-Falah Foundation for Translation, Publication and Distribution.
- Qehaja, Florian, and Skënder Perteshi. 2018. *The Unexplored Nexus: Issues of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Macedonia*. Report 3. Kosovar Centre for Security Studies. Accessed January 17, 2020. [http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Extremism\\_in\\_macedonia\\_402663.pdf](http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Extremism_in_macedonia_402663.pdf).
- Račius, Egdūnas, and Antonina Zhelyazkova. 2017. *Islamic Leadership in the European Lands of the Former Ottoman and Russian Empires*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Račius, Egdūnas. 2013. "Both Muslim and European? An Inquiry into the Case of the Muslim Community in Lithuania." *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 2 (2): 165 – 185.
- Račius, Egdūnas. 2014. "The place of Islamophobia among the radical Lithuanian nationalists—the neglected priority?" In *In the Tracks of Breivik. Far-Right Networks in Northern and Eastern Europe*, edited by Michael Minkenberg, Mats Deland and David Payne, 141 – 154. Vienna and Muenster: LIT Verlag.
- Račius, Egdūnas. 2015. "Muslims of Interwar Lithuania: The Predicament of a Torn Autochthonous Ethno-Confessional Community." In *Muslims in Interwar Europe: A Transcultural Historical Perspective*, edited by Bekim Agai, Umar Ryad and Mehdi Sajid, 178 – 204. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Račius, Egdūnas. 2018a. *Muslims in Eastern Europe*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

- Račius, Egdūnas. 2018b. "Governance of Islam in Europe: an Eastern European perspective." In *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, edited by Oliver Scharbrodt, Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić and Egdūnas Račius, 1 – 20. vol. 10. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Račius, Egdūnas. 2020. "The Legal Notion of 'Traditional' Religions in Lithuania and its Socio-Political Consequences." *Journal of Law and Religion* 35 (1): xx.
- Rexhepi, Piro. 2015. "Mainstreaming Islamophobia: The Politics of European Enlargement and the Balkan Crime-Terror Nexus." *East European Quarterly* 43 (2 – 3): 189 – 214.
- Riedel, Sabine. 2008. "Models of Church-State Relations in European Democracies." *Journal of Religion in Europe* 1 (3): 251 – 272.
- Rieffer, Barbara-Ann J. 2003. "Religion and nationalism Understanding the consequences of a complex relationship." *Ethnicities* 3 (2): 215 – 242.
- Robertson, Roland. 1972. *The Sociological Interpretation of Religion*. Second edition. New York: Schocken Books.
- Rosůlek, Přemysl. 2018. "Islamophobia on Facebook: The Current "Migration Crisis" and the Songs of the Czech Singers Critical of Islam, Muslims and Refugees." *Understanding and Explaining Islamophobia in Eastern Europe*, Special Issue No. 1: 65 – 72.
- Roudometof, Victor. 2014. "Forms of Religious Glocalization: Orthodox Christianity in the Longue Durée." *Religions* 5: 1017 – 1036.
- Rouzeik, Fawzi. 1988. "L'islam francais vu d'algerie." *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 27: 139 – 150.
- Roy, Olivier. 2003a. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Roy, Olivier. 2003b. "EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?" *The National Interest* 71. <https://nationalinterest.org/article/euroislam-the-jihad-within-517>.
- Roy, Olivier. 2014. *Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ruiter, Bert de. 2017. *Re-Theologizing Of Euro-Islam Muslims In Europe And The Response Of The Church*. Unpublished paper. Accessed January 18, 2020. <https://independent.academia.edu/BertdeRuiter>.
- Sabatauskaitė, Birutė, Eglė Urbonaitė Tilindienė, and Karolis Žibas. 2016. "Islamophobia in Lithuania: National Report 2015." In *European Islamophobia Report 2016*, edited by Enes Bayraktılı and Farid Hafez, 327 – 353. Istanbul: SETA.
- Saeed, Amir. 2007. "Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media." *Sociology Compass* 1 (2): 443 – 462.
- Safran, William. 1991. "Diasporas in modern societies: myths of homeland and return." *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1 (1): 83 – 99.
- Şahin, Ertuğrul. 2017. *Europäischer Islam—Diskurs im Spannungsfeld von Universalität, Historizität, Normativität und Empirizität*. Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Said, Edward W. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books.

- Saint-Blancat, Chantal. 2002. "Islam in Diaspora: Between Reterritorialization and Extraterritoriality International." *Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 26 (1): 138 – 151.
- Sandberg, Russell. 2008. "Church-state relations in Europe: from legal models to an interdisciplinary approach." *Journal of Religion in Europe* 1 (3): 329 – 352.
- Sarkissian, Ani. 2009. "Religious Reestablishment in Post-Communist Polities." *Journal of Church and State* 51 (3): 472 – 501.
- Schanda, Balázs. 2002. "Protection of Minority Religions in Hungary: A Comparative Analysis." In *Protecting the human rights of religious minorities in Eastern Europe*, edited by Peter G. Danchin and Elizabeth A. Cole, 345 – 362. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Schanda, Balázs. 2010. "The Recent Developments of Church–State Relations in Central Europe." In *Law and Religion in the 21st Century: Relations between States and Religious Communities*, edited by Silvio Ferrari and Rinaldo Cristofori, 157 – 165. London and New York: Routledge.
- Schanda, Balázs. 2016. "Borders of Religious Autonomy in Hungary." In *Religious Rules, State Law, and Normative Pluralism—A Comparative Overview*, edited by Rossella Bottoni, Rinaldo Cristofori, Silvio Ferrari, 193 – 208. Cham: Springer.
- Scharbrodt, Oliver, Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić, Jørgen S. Nielsen and Egdūnas Račius. 2018. *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*. Vol. 10. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Schiffauer, Werner. 2004. "Vom Exil-zum Diaspora-Islam. Muslimische Identitäten in Europa." *Soziale Welt* 55 (4): 347 – 368.
- Schlentz, Dace. 2010. *Did 9/11 matter? Securitization of asylum and immigration in the European Union in the period from 1992 to 2008*, Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper Series No. 56. Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Schmid, Hansjörg, Amir Dziri, Mohammad Gharaibeh and Anja Middelbeck-Varwick (eds.). 2014. *Kirche und Umma—Glaubensgemeinschaft in Christentum und Islam*. Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet.
- Schneider, Jiří. 2007. "Muslim Minorities and Czech Society." In *Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe*, edited by Pamela Kilpadi, 131 – 135. Budapest: Open Society Institute.
- Schultheis, Silja. 2016. "'Die Stimmung Wird Aggressiver'- Vladimír Sánka Über das Leben als Moslem in Tschechien." Radio Prague International, February 3, 2016. Accessed December 18, 2019. <https://www.radio.cz/de/rubrik/schauplatz/die-stimmung-wird-aggressiver-vladimir-sanka-ueber-das-leben-als-moslem-in-tschechien>.
- Schumann, Christoph. 2007. "A Muslim 'Diaspora' in the United States?" *The Muslim World* 97 (1): 11 – 32.
- Sedgwick, Mark. 2000. "Sects in the Islamic World." *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 3 (2): 195 – 240.
- Sedgwick, Mark. 2003. "Is There a Church in Islam?" *ISIM Newsletter* 13: 40 – 41.

- Sedgwick, Mark. 2004. "Establishments and Sects in the Islamic World." In *New Religious Movements in the 21st Century: Legal, Political, and Social Challenges in Global Perspective*, edited by Phillip Charles Lucas and Thomas Robbins, 283 – 312. New York: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Sengers, Erik. 2012. "The concept of 'church' in sociology and global society: genealogy of a word and transformation of a position." *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 12 (1): 55 – 70.
- Sereghy, Zsolt. 2017. "Islamophobia in Hungary: National Report 2016." In *European Islamophobia Report 2017*, edited by Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, 257 – 272. Istanbul: SETA.
- Sereghy, Zsolt. 2018. "Islamophobia in Hungary: National Report 2017." In *European Islamophobia Report 2018*, edited by Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, 305 – 323. Istanbul: SETA.
- Shakir, Aziz. 2017. "Bulgaria." In *Islamic Leadership in the European Lands of the Former Ottoman and Russian Empires*, edited by Egdūnas Račius and Antonina Zhelyazkova, 89 – 122. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Shavit, Uriya. 2015. *Shar'ā and Muslim Minorities: The Wasati and Salafi Approaches to Fiqh al-Aqallīyyat al-Muslīma*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shepard, William. 2002. "'Denomination' as a Label for Some Islamic Phenomena?" *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 6 (1): 155 – 164.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir, Munir Sendich, and Emil Payin (eds.). 1994. *The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Sitdykovas, Galimas. 1999a. "Lietuvos musulmonų sunitų dvasinis centras atkurtas." ("The Spiritual Centre of the Lithuanian Sunni Muslims re-established") *Lietuvos Totoriai*, 18: 1.
- Sitdykovas, Galimas. 1999b. "Muftijui reikia padėti darbe, o ne tik kritikuoti už klaidas." ("The Mufti Needs to be Assisted in His Work, not merely Criticized for Mistakes") *Lietuvos Totoriai* 27: 3.
- Skowron-Nalborczyk, Agata. 2016. "Relations between the State and Islam in Finland and Poland." In *Muslim Minority-State Relations: Violence, Integration, and Policy*, edited by Robert Mason, 83 – 105. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Slačálek, Ondřej, and Eva Svobodová. 2018. "The Czech Islamophobic movement: beyond 'populism'?" *Patterns of Prejudice* 52 (5): 479 – 495.
- Smajić, Aid. 2017. "Bosnia and Hercegovina." In *Islamic Leadership in the European Lands of the Former Ottoman and Russian Empires*, edited by Egdūnas Račius and Antonina Zhelyazkova, 68 – 88. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Spike, Justin. 2017. "Gergely Gulyás: There will be no mosques in Hungary." *The Budapest Beacon*, November 6, 2017. Accessed April 20, 2019. <https://budapestbeacon.com/gergely-gulyas-will-no-mosques-hungary/>.

- Spiritual Center of Sunni Muslims—Muftiate. 2002. “Dél naujų musulmonų religinių bendruomenių registravimo.” (“Concerning Registration of New Muslim Religious Communities”), letter to the Ministry of Justice, June 28, 2002.
- Stan, Lavinia. 2009. *Church-State Relations in the Expanded Europe: Between Religious Pluralism and Church Establishment*, Paper prepared for the “South East and Eastern European Countries EU Accession Quandary” Conference, University of Victoria, British Columbia, January 16 – 17, 2009.
- Steinberg, Stephen. 1965. “Reform Judaism: The Origin and Evolution of a ‘Church Movement.’” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 5 (1): 117 – 129.
- Stojkovski, Filip, and Natasia Kalajdziovski. 2018. *Community Perspectives on the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Macedonia*. Country Case Study 1. Berlin/Skopje: Berghof Foundation and Democracy Lab. [https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other\\_Resources/WB\\_PVE/CTR\\_CaseStudy1\\_Macedonia\\_e.pdf](https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other_Resources/WB_PVE/CTR_CaseStudy1_Macedonia_e.pdf).
- Strapáčová, Michaela, and Vít Hloušek. 2018. “Anti-Islamism without Moslems: Cognitive Frames of Czech Antimigrant Politics.” *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics* 12 (1): 1 – 30.
- Sunier, Thijl, Nico Landman, Heleen van der Linden, Nazlı Bilgili, and Alper Bilgili. 2011. *Diyanet: The Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs in a changing environment*. Amsterdam and Utrecht: VU University Amsterdam, Utrecht University.
- Sunier, Thijl. 2006. “Religious Newcomers and the Nation-State: Flows and Closures.” In *Paths of Integration Migrants in Western Europe (1880 – 2004)*, edited by David Feldman, Leo Lucassen and Jochen Oltmer, 239 – 261. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Sunier, Thijl. 2012. “Beyond the domestication of Islam in Europe: A reflection on past and future research on Islam in European societies.” *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 1 (1): 189 – 208.
- Sunier, Thijl. 2014. “Domesticating Islam: exploring academic knowledge production on Islam and Muslims in European societies.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37 (6): 1138 – 1155.
- Susedíková, Michaela. 2017. “Czech anti-Islam movement figures experience some social exclusion of their own,” romea.cz, June 28, 2017. Accessed March 14, 2019. <http://www.romea.cz/en/news/czech/czech-anti-islam-movement-figures-experience-some-social-exclusion-of-their-own>.
- Szalai, András and Gabriella Göbl. 2015. *Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary*. Working paper. Budapest: Central European University.
- Taha, Dina. 2013. “Muslim Minorities in the West: Between Fiqh of Minorities and Integration.” *Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law* 1: 1 – 36.
- Tatari, Eren. 2009. “Theories of the State Accommodation of Islamic Religious Practices in Western Europe.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35 (2): 271 – 288.

- Tezcan, Levent. 2016. "Islam." In *Handbuch der Religionsgeschichte im deutschsprachigen Raum*, edited by Peter Dinzelbacher, vol. 6/2, 151 – 176. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
- The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2007. *Decision on construing the provisions of a Constitutional Court ruling related with the status of the churches and religious organisations that are traditional in Lithuania*. December 6, 2007. Accessed April 8, 2019. <http://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1375/content>.
- The Sofia Globe* staff. 2018. "Bulgaria's Parliament approves second reading of Religious Denominations Act amendments." *The Sofia Globe*, December 21, 2018. Accessed December 16, 2019. <https://sofiaglobe.com/2018/12/21/bulgarias-parliament-approves-second-reading-of-religious-denominations-act-amendments/>.
- Tibi, Bassam. 2001. *Islam between Culture and Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Tibi, Bassam. 2010. "Euro-Islam: An Alternative to Islamization and Ethnicity of Fear." In *The Other Muslims: Moderate and Secular*, edited by Zeyno Baran, 157 – 174. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tibi, Bassam. 2014. *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe From Jihadist to Institutional Islamism*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
- Tiesler, Nina C. 2009. "Diaspora ohne Religion? Zur Konjunktur des Diaspora-Konzepts in den Sozialwissenschaften." *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 61 (2): 157 – 170.
- Tınaz, Nuri. 2005. "A Social Analysis of Religious Organisations: The Cases of Church, Sect, Denomination, Cult and New Religious Movements (NRMs) and Their Typologies." *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi, Sayı 13*: 63 – 108.
- Tincq, Henri. 2016. "Il faut accepter le lien de la majorité des musulmans de France avec l'islam de l'Algérie ou du Maroc." *Slate*, September 7, 2016. Accessed April 14, 2019. <http://www.slate.fr/story/122995/dialogue-islam-france>.
- Tkaczyk, Michal. 2017. "Between Politicization and Securitization: Coverage of the European Migration Crisis in Czech Online News Media." *Communication Today* 8 (2): 91 – 110.
- Toennies, Ferdinand, Georg Simmel, Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber. 1973. "Max Weber on Church, Sect, and Mysticism." *Sociological Analysis* 34 (2): 140 – 149.
- Triandafyllidou, Anna. 1998. "National identity and the 'other.'" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21 (4): 593 – 612.
- Troeltsch, Ernst. 1919. *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
- Troeltsch, Ernst. 1931. *Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*. Trans. O. Wyon. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Twardzisz, Piotr. 2018. *Defining "Eastern Europe" A Semantic Inquiry into Political Terminology*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Vangeli, Anastas. 2010. "Religion, Nationalism and Counter-secularization: The Case of the Macedonian Orthodox Church." *Identity Studies in the Caucasus and the Black Sea Region* 2: 79 – 97.
- Vertovec, Steven. 2000. *Religion and Diaspora*. Paper presented at the conference on "New Landscapes of Religion in the West," School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, 27 – 29 September 2000. Accessed January 18, 2020. <http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/Vertovec01.PDF>. Accessed April 18, 2019.
- Vinding, Niels Valdemar. 2018. "Churchification of Islam in Europe." In *Exploring the Multitude of Muslims in Europe: Essays in Honour of Jørgen S. Nielsen*, edited by Niels Valdemar Vinding, Egdūnas Račius, Jörn Thielmann, 50 – 66. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- Vukomanovic, Milan. 2008. "The Serbian Orthodox Church as a Political Actor in the Aftermath of October 5, 2000." *Politics and Religion* 1: 237 – 269.
- Vultee, Fred. 2011. "Securitization as a media frame: What happens when the media 'speak security.'" In *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 77 – 93. New York: Routledge.
- Wardana, Amika. 2013. "Institutionalising diasporic Islam: multiculturalism, secularism and the integration of Muslim immigrants in Britain." *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 3 (1): 31 – 72.
- Watson, Scott D. 2009. *The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and Sinking Boats*. New York: Routledge.
- Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society*. ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich. Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press.
- Weine, Stevan. 2012. "Building resilience to violent extremism in Muslim diaspora communities in the United States." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 5 (1): 60 – 73.
- Whelan, Charles M. 1977. "'Church' in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems." *Fordham Law Review* 45 (5): 885 – 928.
- Williams, Michael C. 2003. "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (4): 511 – 531.
- Wilson, Bryan R. 1959. "An Analysis of Sect Development." *American Sociological Review* 24 (1): 3 – 15.
- Wilson, Bryan R. 1969. "A Typology of Sects," In *Sociology of Religion*, edited by Roland Robertson, 361 – 383. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Włoch, Renata. 2009. "Islam in Poland. Between Ethnicity and Universal Umma." *International Journal of Sociology* 39 (3): 58 – 67.
- WordTruth. 2010. *Church—Do You Know What It Means?*, WordTruth, Inc. Accessed April 18, 2019. <https://www.wordtruth.org/PDF/Church-Do%20You%20Know%20What%20It%20Means.pdf>.
- Wuthnow, Robert. 2015. "In Polls We Trust." *First Things*, August 2015. Accessed January 18, 2020. <https://www.firstthings.com/article/2015/08/in-polls-we-trust>.

- Yemelianova, Galina M. 2002. *Russia and Islam: a Historical Survey*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Yinger, Milton J. 1946. *Religion in the Struggle for Power: A Study in Sociology and Religion*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Yinger, Milton J. 1957. *Religion, Society and the Individual: An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Yinger, Milton J. 1970. *The Scientific Study of Religion*. New York: Macmillan.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira. 2006. "Belonging and the politics of belonging." *Patterns of Prejudice* 40 (3): 197 – 214.
- Zubaida, Sami. 2011. "Sects in Islam." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, edited by Peter B. Clarke, 545 – 561. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zwemer, Samuel M. 1944. "The Clergy and Priesthood of Islam." *The Muslim World* 34 (1): 17 – 39.

### Interviews

- Interview with Romas Jakubauskas, Mufti of Spiritual Center of Sunni Muslims of Lithuania, March 22, 2011, Vilnius.
- Interview with Jakub Kříž, a legal expert, Prague, October 1, 2018.
- Interview with Vladimír Sanka, head of the Headquarters of Muslim Communities, Prague, October 1, 2018.
- Interview with Vilmos Fischl, Lutheran priest, Head of the Ecumenical Council of Hungarian Churches, Budapest, October 3, 2018.
- Interview with a member of the Hungarian Muslim Defense League, Budapest, October 3, 2018.
- Interview with Szultán Sulok, head of the Hungarian Muslim Church, Budapest, October 5, 2018.
- Interview with Aziz Shakir, independent researcher, Sofia, October 15, 2018.
- Interview with Hayri Emin, representative of the Bulgarian Muftiate, Sofia, October 15, 2018.
- Interview with a faculty member of the Higher Islamic Institute, Sofia, October 17, 2018.
- Interview with Plamen Makariev, professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of Sofia University, Sofia, October 17, 2018.
- Interview with a faculty member of the Faculty of Islamic Studies, Sarajevo, October 21, 2018.
- Interview with Mensur Karadža, representative of the Bosnian Islamic Community, Sarajevo, October 24, 2018.
- Interview with faculty members of the Faculty of Islamic Studies, Sarajevo, October 24, 2018.

# Index

- accommodation (of Islam, Muslims) 8, 9, 11, 63–65, 70, 101, 214
- Active Islamic Youth 205, 206
- Ahmadis 5, 164, 165, 210, *see also* Ahmadiyya
- Ahmadiyya 165, 211, *see also* Ahmadis
- Albanians 37, 38, 42, 109, 112, 132, 139, 171, 180, 181, 196, 200
- Alevis 195, 196
- apostasy 204, 212
- Arab Spring 111
- Arabs 112, 183
- asylum 82, 83, 85–87, 172, 178
- asylum seekers 184
- atheist 6, 57, 123
- atheization 123
- autocephalization 133
- autocephalous (religious organizations) 113, 121, 133, 134, 191, 201
- autochthonous (Muslims) 4, 7, 34, 35, 39, 44, 45, 50, 59, 60, 80, 84, 86, 87, 109, 111, 112, 114, 132, 134, 158, 159, 173, 214, 215, 216, 220, 221
- autochthonous Muslim communities 34, 87, 132, 134, 173
- autochthons 6, 7, 45, 57, 109, 174, 216
- Balkan Chaliphate 116
- beached diaspora 38
- Balkan Islam 60, 158, 213
- Bektashis 112, 132, 194, 196, 204
- Bektashism 129
- Berlin Wall 125
- bishop 21, 75, 77, 153, 156, 180, 181–183, 201
- Bosniaks 37, 38, 99, 112, 171, 181, 191, 193–196, 199, 200, 205, 207
- Bosniak tradition 193, 207, *see also* Islamic tradition of Bosniaks
- brotherhood, Sufi 109, 110, 196, 197, 204
- bureaucratic-ecclesiastical (structure, institution) *See* ecclesiastical-bureaucratic
- catechists, Islamic 72, 162, 199
- Catholic Church 4, 76, 106, 138, 145, 179, 181, 183, 187
- Center of Muslim Communities (Czechia) 189
- chief mufti 119, 120, 166, 189, 197
- Christian Churches 3, 9, 25, 28, 74, 75, 89, 102, 116, 131, 156, 176, 179, 180, 183, 187, 191, 202, 215
- church in Islam 3, 27–29, 215
- Church of Islam 27, 29, 33
- civic nationalism 91, 92, 98
- civil society 52, 53, 55, 78, 84, 88, 126, 177
- clergy 1, 15, 21–23, 26–30, 32, 33, 74, 75, 77, 80, 89, 96, 118, 120, 124, 144, 153, 154, 156, 161, 162, 182, 183, 192, 196–199, *see also* clergymen
- clergymen 22, 30, 154, 181, 198, 201, *see also* clergy
- clericalization (of state) 97
- Common Council of Catholics and Muslims (Poland) 179
- congregation 12, 16–18, 20, 21–23, 26, 32, 33, 122, 131, 144, 182, 194, 196, 201, 205, 207, 208, 210–212
- Constitutional Court 130, 137, 139, 141, 142, 146, 148, 150, 151
- converts (to Islam) 4, 7, 13, 15, 48, 109, 112, 115, 134, 159, 174, 184, 203, 211, 216
- cooperation system 62
- Council of Muslim Religious Communities—Muftiate (Lithuania) 189, 211
- cult 12, 16, 19, 26, 27, 31, 33, 73, 144
- cultural talk 83, 89
- dar ad-dawa* 43
- dar al-harb* 40, 42, 43
- dar al-ifta* 30
- dar al-islam* 40, 42, 43, 44
- dar ash-shahada* 42
- dar as-sulh* 42
- defense nationalism 94
- denominalization 33, 196
- denomination 12, 14–16, 18, 21, 22, 25–27, 31–33, 107, 113, 121, 123, 131, 140, 142–145, 154, 155, 160, 165, 166, 195, 196, 200, 204
- denominationalism 14
- de-secularization 97, 181
- devşirme* 115

- dhimmi* 118
- diaspora 32, 35–45, 47, 50, 51, 69, 79, 103, 113
- diasporic Islam 3, 10, 40, 44, 45, 51, 56, 68, 215, 221
- Diyanet 3, 4, 199
- domestication (of Islam) 49, 51, 54, 69, 71, 75, 91, 98, 102, 130, 134, 161, 221
- ecclesia 17, 18
- ecclesiastical leader 197
- ecclesiastical-bureaucratic (structure, institution) 1, 2, 18–20, 24–26, 30, 73–75, 117, 161, 192, 196–198, 201, 210, 215
- ecclesification 1, 2, 74, 75, 118, 198, 199
- ethnic nationalism 91–93, 98
- ethnization of Islam 203
- ethnoclericalism 96
- ethno-confessional nationalism 99
- Euro-Islam 10, 45, 52–57, 68, 78, 103, 209, 221, 222
- Euro-Islamists 209
- European Council for Fatwa and Research 49, 51, 209
- European Court of Human Rights 55, 149, 158, 165, 166
- European Islam 10, 45, 50, 52, 54–61, 68, 72, 78, 194, 200, 204, 213, 215, 221
- Europeanization (of Islam) 51–54, 60, 61, 68, 72, 74, 75, 80
- expatriate 35, 84, 111, 184, 211, 221
- extremists 87, 204
- Faculty of Islamic Sciences (North Macedonia) 199
- Faculty of Islamic Studies (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 51, 124, 199, 200, 206
- fatwa* 47, 49, 52, 117, 206
- fiqh* 46, 48
- fiqh al-aqalliyat* 10, 44, 46–51, 53, 78, 103, 194, 221
- fiqh al-mahjar* 44
- fiqh* for minorities 44, 46, *see also fiqh al-aqalliyat*
- fiqh* of minorities 50, *see also fiqh al-aqalliyat*
- folk Islam 59, 109, 110
- folk religiosity 2, 60
- foreign fighters 85, 111
- fundamentalism 73, 84, 91, 164
- fundamentalist 79, 80, 176, 209
- governance of Islam 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 45, 62, 65, 69, 99, 101–103, 105, 120, 124, 125, 129–131, 134, 135, 175, 183, 187, 214, 216, 219, 220, 222
- governance of religion 7, 8, 10, 23, 56, 61–65, 67, 68, 71, 73, 74, 76, 91, 101, 106, 125–127, 129, 135, 136, 137, 142, 155, 158, 159, 168, 175, 202, 212, 214, 217, 220
- Higher Islamic Institute (Bulgaria) 162, 199, 201
- Hungarian Islamic Council 131, 152, 189
- Hungarian Muslim Church 131, 152, 189, 190
- imam 4, 28, 30, 32, 72, 73, 76–79, 87, 121, 124, 156, 162, 172, 198–201, 205, 208–211
- immigrants 7, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 45, 48, 57, 69, 71, 83, 86, 92, 93, 109, 115, 134, 135, 159, 169, 172
- indigenization of religious identity 58, 202
- inner-Islamic plurality 204, 205
- institutionalization of Islam 67, 68, 71, 72, 75, 78, 116–118, 131, 133, 156, 161, 194
- instrumental pious nationalism 94, 95
- integration 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 69, 71, 73, 74, 79, 80, 83, 86, 91, 98, 158, 169, 177
- intra-communal securitization (of Islam) 103, 217
- Iron Curtain 125
- Islam council 78
- Islamic Church 29, 80, 160
- Islamic clergy 30, 74, 120, 198, 199
- Islamic Community (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 63, 113, 118, 145, 146, 152, 170, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 204, 206–208, 221
- Islamic Community (Hungary) 113, 131, 152, 189
- Islamic mysticism 109, *see also* Sufism
- Islamic religiosity 4, 5, 56, 57, 59, 61, 79, 103, 109, 110, 112, 134, 135, 168, 173, 174, 194, 202–204, 213–215, 217, 221
- Islamic Religious Community (North Macedonia) 138, 139, 164, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, 197, 199, 204, 208, 222
- Islamic revival 124, 204

- Islamic revivalism 204, 208, 213
- Islamic spiritual administration 11, 30, 61, 89, 107, 111, 113, 114, 118, 122, 164, 179, 188, 191, 192, 196, 202–204, 208, 210, 213, 215–219, 221
- Islamic State 111, 159, 176
- Islamic theological seminary 198, 199
- Islamic tradition of Bosniaks 193, 194, 199
- Islamism 73, 84, 176
- Islamization of Europe 54, 88, 99
- Islamophobia 88, 168, 173, 182, 186, 190
- Jewish 18, 25, 28, 30, 35, 138, 145
- Jihad 111
- Jihadi 111, 168, 182
- Jihadism 73, 84, 208
- Judaist 145, 179
- jurisprudence of minorities 45–50, *see also* *fiqh al-aqalliyat*
- Kizilbash 195, 196
- law on religions 101, 130, 131, 140, 141, 144, 145, 147, 148, 151, 160–165, 171, 172, 175, 194, 200, *see also* *lex specialis*
- lex specialis* 10, 18, 23, 101, 127, 129, 137, 139, 140, 159, 173, 193, 221, *see also* law on religions
- liberation nationalism 94
- madrasa* 59, 123, 198, 199, 200
- mahjar* 43, 44
- manšur* 197
- migration crisis 5, 85, 87, 95, 167, 169–171, 173, 175–178, 180, 181, 183–186, 190, 218, 220
- mu'azzin* 201
- mufti 30, 42, 49, 51, 111–113, 117–121, 124, 133, 156, 166, 179, 193, 194, 196–199, 201, 207–211
- muftiate 1, 30, 33, 78, 79, 80, 89, 102, 111–114, 117–119, 121, 123, 171, 179, 188, 192, 194–201, 203–205, 209–212, 222
- Muslim Brotherhood 113, 209, 215
- Muslim Brothers 209, 221
- Muslim Church 1, 2, 4, 6, 29, 30, 73, 74, 77, 79, 80, 89, 95, 102, 118, 122, 131, 152, 163–166, 171, 180, 189, 191, 194, 195, 196, 201–203, 206, 209, 213, 215–218, 221, 222
- Muslim Defense League (Hungary) 190
- Muslim Denomination (Bulgaria) 161–163, 165, 166, 189–192, 195, 197–199, 201, 209, 211
- Muslim diaspora 34, 40–42, 44, 47
- Muslim League (Poland) 189, 210
- Muslim minorities 11, 43, 46, 66, 70, 83, 85, 102, 103, 158, 184
- Muslim religious collectivities 1, 25–27, 32, 33, 46, 70, 80, 89, 102, 103, 114, 118, 146, 155, 156, 160, 161, 164, 166, 175, 188, 190–193, 197, 198, 202–203, 210–212, 214, 215, 217, 218, 221, 222
- Muslim Religious Union (Poland) 121, 163, 166, 167, 179, 189, 191, 192, 194, 199, 210
- Muslim social actors 100, 188, 189, 217
- Muslim spiritual administration 78, 112, 117, 121, 152, *see also* Islamic spiritual administration
- Muslimophobia 88, 89, 102, 115, 161, 168, 170, 171, 184, 186, 218, *see also* Islamophobia
- national Islam 201, 222
- nationalization of Islam 104, 113, 133
- New Religious Movements 24, 141, 144
- normative Islam 44, 110
- Orthodox Church 95–98, 106, 116, 117, 126, 127, 130, 133, 134, 138, 139, 144–146, 149, 154, 162, 180, 181, 187, 195, 201
- othering 71, 73, 82, 83, 88, 89, 93, 98, 101, 102, 104, 115, 116, 168, 171–173, 178, 180, 181, 183, 184, 186, 213, 218
- para-jamaat 196, 205, 206–208
- politics of belonging 96
- Pomaks 112, 181, 209
- post-Christianity 106
- post-religiousness 183
- Protestant (Christianity, Church) 24, 30, 76, 80, 106, 107, 108, 132, 221
- radicalism (Islamic, religious) 73, 85, 87, 110, 172, 209
- radicalization 50, 54, 72, 86, 87, 89, 91, 157, 159, 174, 209

- rais al-ulama* 111, 118, 121, 192, 197n, 198, 201  
 refugee 35, 116, 167, 169, 172, 179, 181–186, 190  
 religious associations 142, 143, 147, 154, 155  
 religious communities 16, 21, 39, 67, 68, 74,  
     82, 97, 115, 119, 123, 125, 126, 131, 138,  
     141–147, 149–155, 157, 162, 165, 192, 196,  
     212, 212n  
 religious diversity 8, 129  
 religious freedom 70, 90, 126, 133, 142, 157,  
     190  
 religious groups 16, 24, 35, 66, 93, 95, 96, 106,  
     126, 128, 142–144, 146, 150–152, 157, 203  
 religious minorities 32, 70, 92, 119, 147  
 religious nationalism 10, 83, 91, 94, 95, 98,  
     99, 126, 161, 167, 171, 183, 187, 220  
 religious personnel 154, 162, 198  
 revivalist Islam 60  
 revivalists (Islamic, Muslim) 5, 43, 54, 110,  
     204–209, 221  
 Roma (ethnic group) 112, 164, 209  
  
 Salafi 5, 110, 114, 134, 196, 205, 206, 215  
 Salafis 31, 134, 200, 203, 205, 206  
 Salafism 73, 112, 208, 217  
 sect 12–16, 19, 22, 24, 25–27, 30, 31, 33, 51, 73,  
     143, 144, 196, 211  
 secularism 55, 85, 89  
 secularization 61, 109, 110  
 securitization agenda 178  
 securitization of immigration 83, 86, 87, *see*  
     *also* securitization of migration  
 securitization of migration 167, 168, 178, *see*  
     *also* securitization of immigration  
 securitizing actors 82, 84, 88, 89, 159, 173,  
     178, 183, 186, 187, 217, 218, 219  
 securitizing acts 212  
 securitizing agenda 94, 163, 170, 183, 186  
 securitizing agent 81  
 securitizing discourse 89, 99  
 securitizing factors 50, 86  
 securitizing move 81, 82  
 self-churchification 103, 212  
 separation system 62, 64  
 Shari'a 47, 50, 52, 59, 72, 118, 123, 170, 198, 199,  
     206  
 shaykh (Sufi) 110, 196  
 Shi'i 5, 30, 31, 209  
 significant other 92, 93, 98, 102  
 social distancing 183–185  
  
 Spiritual Center of Sunni Muslims—Muftiate  
     (Lithuania) 189, 192, 194, 196, 199, 211  
 state church 17, 62, 64  
 state church system 62, 64, 129  
 state neutrality 61, 76  
 state religion 17  
 State-Church nexus 183  
 State-church relations 67, 69, 116, 117, 125  
 State-Islam relations 8, 11, 124, 125, 135  
 State-Orthodox Church nexus 96, 97  
 state-religion relations 2, 10, 56, 61, 65,  
     125–127, 134, 140, 157, 190, 214, 218  
 Sufi 5, 29, 59, 109, 110, 111, 124, 193, 197, 204  
 Sufism 109, 110, 112  
 Sunni 4, 27, 28, 30, 31, 45, 111, 112, 130, 145,  
     146, 193, 194, 195, 196, 202, 204, 210, 211  
 syncretism (religious) 110  
  
*takfir* 209  
 Tatars 42, 58, 98, 109n, 112, 115, 121, 129, 132,  
     158, 163, 174, 184, 194, 196, 210, 211  
*tekke* 110  
 transnational Muslim Church 195  
 traditional confessions 7, 8  
 traditional Islam 4, 111, 200, 202, 213, 215, 221,  
     222  
 traditional religions 8, 115, 127, 128, 139, 145,  
     148, 149, 155, 164  
 traditional religious communities/  
     organizations 149, 155, 162, 212, 174,  
     177, 179, 183, 184, 185, 190  
 Turks 41, 42, 112, 115, 171, 180, 181, 196  
  
*ulama* 27–31, 42, 51, 74, 75, 78, 199, 200, 201,  
     208  
  
 Verkirchlichung 2  
 Višegrad Four 87, 113  
 Višegrad states 167  
  
 Wahhabi 114, 215  
 Wahhabis 31, 203, 205, 208  
 wahhabisation (of Balkan Islam) 60  
 Wahhabism 208, 217  
*waqf* 123  
  
 xenophobia 82  
  
*zawiyya* 110