

Recognition as Key for Reconciliation

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Recognition as Key for Reconciliation

Israel, Palestine, and Beyond

Edited by

Yoram Meital
Paula M. Rayman



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*This book is dedicated to
Ahmed Abdelal*

*for his vision for
Global Peace, Development, and Culture*



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Foreword

Albie Sachs

About thirty years ago I wrote that all revolutions are impossible until they happen when they become inevitable. Nobody gave South Africa a chance. After three centuries of racial domination, that included slavery, colonialism, and apartheid; how could blacks and whites live together as equals in one country? Whites owned nearly ninety percent of the land and controlled ninety-five per cent of productive capital. Black leaders were in prison, their organizations prohibited. Enmities built up over centuries seemed to be insurmountable. People like Nelson Mandela, Ahmed Kathrada and Dennis Goldberg were locked up for life because they fought for a united, non-racial democracy. They were looked upon as impossible dreamers completely out of touch with reality.

Now the changes that came to South Africa are taken for granted, as though they were inevitable.

Three hundred years of bitter conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland seemed equally destined to go on for another three hundred years. Yet now there has been a settlement in that troubled part of the world. I'm happy to say that the South African experience of converting the impossible into the inevitable played a direct role in encouraging the adversaries in Northern Ireland to find mechanisms for peace.

There are many other examples in my lifetime of what seemed to be completely intractable conflicts and eternal hatreds finding resolution where none had seemed possible. I remember reading a beautiful novel by Romaine Rolland dealing with the deep rage, built up over decades that the Germans and the French had for each other. His French character was called Germaine and his German one Franz. At that stage there had been two bitter conflicts in which millions of French and German lives had been lost. World War II then went on to produce yet a third occupation of Paris by German troops: deportations, resistance, and vicious retaliation. Rolland's forceful vision of brotherhood between the Germans and the French seemed to be in ruins. Yet within a decade Germany and France were to come together to create the foundation of the European Union. The impossible had become the inevitable.

Similar stories can be told about Japan and the United States of America, and Japan and its Asian neighbors. The fact is that there is no problem that humans make that humans cannot unmake. The processes and changes will be as varied as humankind itself. The conjunction of political, physical, legal and economic dimensions and intersections involved will certainly differ

enormously. But one way or the other, in the beginning, the middle and the end, there will have to be radical transformation of attitudes towards and conceptions about each other.

The central argument in this book is that sustainable peace requires a revolution in the relationship between adversarial sides. It is not enough for warring sides to put down their weapons; they must pick up new mutually inclusive identities. 'Transformative recognition' is one term for this revolution in relationship. In South Africa, picking up on the rich philosophical traditions in African society, we have a similar word for transformative recognition – Ubuntu.

Ubuntu is a long-held philosophical notion based on the conception that I am a person because you are a person; that I can't separate my humanity from an acknowledgement of your humanity. It presupposes that I don't strengthen my personality through isolating myself from you; but on the contrary, I benefit from my association with you. My dignity rests on yours.

Our Constitution in South Africa reflects this spirit of Ubuntu. Millions of ordinary people, particularly poor people, in spite of all the insults, humiliations, injustices, and violence wreaked upon them, never lost their sense of Ubuntu, and never gave up on the notion that even the oppressors, people who were behaving so abominably, could now be encouraged to become part of that wider community of free and equal South Africans. Ubuntu, at the very least, requires listening, speaking and dialogue – it gives a voice to everybody; everybody matters.

Our experience was that peace plans that dealt strictly with laws and fences but failed to address the level of human relationship encapsulated in Ubuntu, were destined to failure. It is insufficient to produce what Peace Studies Scholar Johan Galtung described as 'Negative Peace,' the temporary absence of violence. Rather, 'Positive Peace,' the conditions for human flourishing, becomes necessary for enduring change.

Positive Peace requires that all involved in a conflict lucidly understand that their dignity is directly dependent on the dignity of others. That is why Ubuntu in South Africa went beyond the concern for fellow human beings on hard times that any decent person should have. Not only the dignity of the desperately poor was at stake. The dignity of all South Africans was assailed when millions of our fellow human beings were compelled to live as homeless wanderers in the country of their birth.

The importance of this cannot be over estimated. We drafted the South African Bill of Rights as essentially Ubuntu writ large. This meant that the Constitution not only had to speak to those who were fearful of being dispossessed by arbitrary means of what their predecessors had arbitrarily acquired. The

same Constitution had to address the concerns and expectations of those who had been viciously marginalized by the laws of the past.

Calls for Ubuntu or Transformative Recognition in the midst of intractable conflict may seem like barely audible voices in a desert of alienation and rage. But even in the worst times of apartheid, there were people whose words transcended the battle lines. I find the very same spirit and thoughtfulness in documents such as the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement, written in 2002 between a leading Palestinian academic and the former head of Israel's Shin Bet Security Agency, which called for Palestinians and Jews to recognize the other's historic rights with respect to the same land. They could be found in Peace-presaging gatherings of Catholic and Protestant women in Northern Ireland who collectively drafted a National Action Plan for the advancement of women. Today they are encountered in brave voices of Turkish intellectuals who call upon their country to face up to and understand the suffering of their Armenian brothers and sisters.

Whether you call it Ubuntu or Transformative Recognition, it is clear that it will have to be both the agency and the product of any long-lasting peace. The chapters in this volume are clarion calls for action around this essential topic. The authors pick up on what South Africans learned (and are still learning) through many hard years: that lasting sustainable change in a conflict requires something that goes beyond formal negotiations to achieve a lawfully-regulated accommodation, fundamental though that may be. It necessitates a profound alteration in the way we imagine one another and of how we imagine ourselves.

My great hope is that people involved in the struggles in the area covered by this volume not only come to understand the immediate assistance that transformative recognition can give to ending hostility, conflict and suffering. It is that they begin to imagine, even if far down the line, the enormously rich bounty, both material and spiritual, that could flow from active cooperation between the former warring groups. Instead of being at war with each other, geography and history would be aligned in integrated programs where the benefit of one would be the benefit of the other. Imagine the upsurge in cultural life, tourism and the economy in general. Indeed, transforming mutual abhorrence into mutual interactivity is precisely the impossible that can and must become the inevitable in Palestine/ Israel.

Acknowledgments

This volume began as a conversation at Ben-Gurion University among the editors and Provost Ahmed Abdelal of University of Massachusetts Lowell. The Provost strongly advocated for convening interdisciplinary scholarship to advance the prospects for peace in the Middle East. A year following this conversation, the editors led a two day working conference at UML to explore the theme of recognition as a fundamental building block for reconciliation. The workshop reflected the strong commitment of our academic home and sponsors: The Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies & Diplomacy at BGU, and The Middle East Center at UML.

The process of organizing an international conference is always labor intensive and we applaud the energetic and skilled efforts of Seth Izen, assistant director of the UML Middle East Center. Seth significantly contributed to the success of both the workshop and the book.

The vision for justice has always marked the leadership of BGU and UML leadership. We gratefully acknowledge that Provost Abdelal's inspiration and support was essential for the birth and development of this project. We would also like to commend UML Vice President Marcie Williams who helped to shape the spirit of the workshop from the start. Her close colleague, Judge Albie Sachs of South Africa was immensely gracious in taking the time and thoughtfulness to write the forward for this volume.

It takes a village to produce a final manuscript and this is true for ours as well: we thank Judith Izen for her initial editing labor, especially given the broad range of disciplines and perspectives voiced in the pages. Dale F. Eickelman, series editor for Brill, was there from the beginning and successfully stayed with the project to complete the rich epilogue. Nienke Brienen-Moolenaar, Brill editor Middle East and Islam, has always been a source of encouragement and reason during times when things seemed not easy. We are so appreciative of her presence during this two year production and the efforts of all of her staff. We owe special thanks to Amron Gravett, who skillfully produced a useful index for this volume.

Personally, both of us shared phone calls, coffee at the Algiers in Harvard Square and the late at night emails to keep our eyes on the prize. Co-editing is indeed a process itself of reconciliation! We deeply thank all our authors for their persistent patience and staying the course.

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Everett Gendler, Richard Herman, Fathi Mashood, Sue and Bob Nechin, the late Wally and Juanita Nelson, Rita Rayman who before her death reminded us of her desire to see peace break out, the late Rob Read and grandchildren Rusty, Sagan, Robbie and Shayla, who says we all share the colors of the rainbow.

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is a former Constitutional Court Judge in South Africa and was the chief architect of the post-apartheid constitution of 1996. His career in human rights began in law school when he defended people charged with violating apartheid's racist statutes. He worked closely with Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo to draft the African National Congress (ANC) Code of Conduct and Statutes. Targeted by South African Security forces in an assassination attempt, Sachs survived but lost an arm and eye in a car bombing. As a member of the Constitutional Committee and the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC, he played an active role in the negotiations which led to South Africa becoming a constitutional democracy. After the first democratic election in 1994, he was appointed by then President Nelson Mandela to serve on the newly established Constitutional Court. During his years on the court, Sachs was involved in landmark human rights rulings including allowing gay marriage and ending capital punishment. Sachs has also authored several books, including *The Jail Diary of Albie Sachs* (1966), which was published in Britain when he was a banned writer in South Africa. His other books include *The Soft Vengeance of a Freedom Fighter* and *The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law*.

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developments in Egypt have captivated his attention more than any other field. His last book, *Revolutionary Justice: Special Courts and the Formation of Republican Egypt*, was published by Oxford University Press, 2017. His publications on the Arab-Israeli conflict include: *Peace in Tatters: Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East* (2007); *Egypt's Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967–1977* (1997). “The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian Policy After the 1967 War: A Reexamination,” *Middle East Journal* (2000), vol. 54 (1), 64–82. He also studied the history of the Jewish community in Egypt. His book *Jewish sites in Egypt* was published by the Hebrew University in Jerusalem (1995; second print 1997), and an Arabic translation was released in 1996 (*al-athar al-yahudiyya fi masr*). More recently he published “A Jew in Cairo: The defiance of Chehata Haroun,” *Middle Eastern Studies* (2017), Vol. 53 (2), 183–197.

Introduction

Paula M. Rayman and Yoram Meital

This book is rooted in the realization that there can be no sustainable peace building in any of the conflicted regions of our world today without overcoming deep mistrust between communities, peoples, and nations. For too long the zero-sum equation of ‘us’ against ‘them’ has reigned and shaped the politics of local and international affairs. This book also rests on the premise that ethical or transformative recognition is the key ingredient to radically shift the equation towards positive peace and a win-win scenario. It is summed up in phrase “My dignity rests on yours.”

In June 2015 a small group of scholars, negotiators and policy activists convened to explore how recognition could play a transforming role in resolving seemingly intractable conflicts. This book is the result of these conversations and each chapter, in its own way, takes up the challenge of how genuine mutual recognition can be understood and enacted. Chapters explore the relationship between recognition and reconciliation and how asymmetrical power relationships frame possibilities for transformative recognition. It is a call for courageous new thinking of how to approach conflict so that human society can endure with peace, security and justice.

Section: A Personal Reflection by Paula Rayman

“IS THERE NO BALM IN GILEAD?”

JEREMIAH 3:22

“Hate is just as injurious to the person who hates. Like an unchecked cancer, hate corrodes the personality and eats away its vital unity.”

MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. (2010)

RESILIENCY: From the descriptive language of physics and metallurgy, when a special family of metal when placed under extreme heat will lose shape ... but when re-cooled has an amazing capacity to find its way back to its original form...the ability to survive extreme conditions yet retain the capacity to find a way back to expressing the defining quality of being and the essence of its purpose.

JOHN PAUL LEDERACH (2009)

Sitting down to write the Introduction to this book, several images echo in my thoughts. First, the words of my mother in 2012 then nearly 98 years old, who asked me to visit because she had an important question. Thinking it must be about a change in her living will or some medical decision I was startled by her question: “Do you remember what you promised me in 1971?” For a moment I tried to think but then she filled in the blank: “You promised you would work hard to make peace in the Middle East. Well I do not have much time left so you better hurry up!” Forty years later, the situation is more bleak, and the pledge is harder to keep.

The next image is of June 2015 on a lovely early summer day, sitting with colleagues in Lowell Massachusetts at the final session of a Conference on Recognition in Israel/ Palestine and other conflicted regions of our world. In sharing what we had learned from our intense conversations and what we might put into an introduction for the collaborative monograph I suggested it would be important to frame the discussion in a realistic but hopeful way. Immediately my co-facilitator, Yoram, spoke up: “This project does not aim at producing hope or despair! Our goal is to explore *recognition* as a key prerequisite for serious analysis of peace.” After the Gaza War and the recent election of an extreme right wing coalition in Israel his words were stinging but understandable.

Finally, sitting here one week after the Islamic State bombings of Paris the entire world seems to have darkened further still with the very real and symbolic attack on the City of Lights, the awful calls in the United States to bring down our Statue of Liberty’s lifting her arm to light the way for refugees, the irrational unleashing of war machines as if they could break our falling farther into the abyss of reptilian cycles of fear, violence, and attack and counter-attack.

So my wish is that this book be a call for new conversations that keep the Light alive: the Light that lets us move beyond wishful thinking for better days, beyond the escapism which provides only temporary, illusionary security, beyond thinking that the impossible is after all impossible. Instead the authors of this book, each in their own way shed light on *how we can prepare for peace*. We may not have much time but the time to chart a deliberate course away from the darkness is now.

There is a Balm

There is historical evidence that seeds of nonviolent resolution of conflict have existed all along not only in the land of milk and honey but in so many of the conflicted zones on our Mother Earth. I would like to present a few examples of the promise of earlier nonviolent attempts to move away from violent

confrontation and move towards positive peace. I speak here of 'Positive Peace' a term employed by Johan Galtung as not merely negative peace, or the cessation of violence, but rather a peace which manifests "cooperation and harmony for mutual and equal benefit" (2012).

The late historian, Howard Zinn (2005) provides a foundation for creative thinking:

When you have models of how people can come together, even for a brief period, it suggests that it could happen for a longer period. When you think of it, that's the way things operate in the scientific world, so why not socially? As soon as the Wright brothers could keep a plane aloft for 27 seconds, everyone knew from that point on that a plane might be kept aloft for hours. It's the same socially and culturally.

Zinn's reference to scientific breakthrough should not make us think that such progress is always a linear progression. Certainly human progress towards preparing for peace is bound to the complexities of human behavior. In my own lifetime, witnessing the fall of the Berlin Wall, Nelson Mandela becoming President of South Africa, and honoring gay and lesbian marriage have provided profound historical moments of true wonder that show that the 'impossible' can happen.

The heart of this book focuses on the conflict ridden region of Israel and Palestine. Yet, even this seemingly intractable collision of two peoples has had moments of potential reconciliation. In the decades before the establishment of the State of Israel, a number of voices promoted a concept of one country for all the peoples of the region. Recognizing the need to protect the rights of Palestinian peasant and tenant farmers, Emir Feisal Husseini wrote to Lord Herbert Samuel in 1919: "I personally deprecate any differences between Arabs and Jews who ought to unite their efforts in word and deed for promoting the development and happiness of our country." The concept of a bi-national state solution was taken up by the Brith Shalom Association which included members such as Martin Buber and Judah Magnes. Buber's thinking rested on his formulation of an I-Thou relationship between the two peoples, a relationship of mutual understanding and respect. While neither Husseini's position nor that of Brith Shalom reflected the majority of Arab or Jewish population in the region, their commitment to a solution embracing unity rather than zero-sum existed.

Rabbi Everett Gendler in his new book, *Judaism for Universalists* (2015) and peace studies Mary Elizabeth King, author of *A Quiet Revolution* (2007) have documented many instances of the employment of nonviolence as a means

to settle the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Gendler wonders what might have occurred had Martin Luther King been able to complete a plan he had for bringing thousands of nonviolent activists to the Holy Land to foster mutual economic and social cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. King’s murder in 1968 prevented the plan from being realized. Mary Elizabeth King presents an accounting of Palestinian nonviolent resistance from the pre-State period through the first 1987 Intifada. Both Gendler and King carefully consider the endeavors of Sari Nusseibeh, author of *Once Upon A Country* (2007) who participated in many ‘off the record’ dialogues meant to establish a way towards mutual recognition and peace.

Herbert Kelman, a contributor to this volume, has played a key role in promoting the safe space to have such dialogues. His lifelong work early on set the stage for the emergence of the theme of our book, ‘Transformative Recognition’ a special form of recognition of one human being to another, one community to another, one people to another that is rooted in valuing mutual respect and shared humanity. The primal question facing all of us at this moment on earth is whether we can enact such recognition for the sake of saving ourselves, all those who follow us, and our planet.

The fact that such conversations have had a long and continuous history provides two important reasons for sensing a balm even in a dark time: first, that Howard Zinn’s ‘plane’ has already flown for more than 27 seconds and second, that there is still momentum, albeit limited, to create the conditions necessary for resiliency to grow – the ingredients of safety, having equal voice for both people, and secured space – so that healthy communities can emerge. This book recognizes the necessity to continue the conversation so that the hateful cycles of violence do not rust out the hearts of all peoples.

• • •

Twenty-three years after the signing of the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Agreements” (‘Oslo Accords’), the relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) are in a state of perpetual crisis. The causes of the crisis and the reasons for its continuation are manifold and diverse. However, each side has one contention regarding the main reason for not achieving a final status agreement ending the bloody historical conflict. President Mahmoud Abbas (2011) claims that “Settlement activities embody the core of the policy of colonial military occupation of the land of the Palestinian people and all of the brutality of aggression and racial discrimination against our people that this policy entails.” Prime Minister

Benjamin Netanyahu (2011) reiterated his belief that “the core of the conflict has always been and unfortunately remains the refusal of the Palestinians to recognize a Jewish state in any borders.” The end of occupation and mutual recognition were the two pillars of the Oslo Accords, meant to lead to a permanent agreement and a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

The dominant perception among most Israelis is that the widespread opposition within the Palestinian people, especially the Palestinian Authority, to recognize Israel as a Jewish state is an expression of a denial of the legitimacy of Israel’s very existence and reflects opposition in principle to the recognition of its sovereignty. This common perception is rooted in the failure to distinguish between the recognition of Israel and its recognition as a Jewish state. Political and legal recognition of the State of Israel is indeed a necessary condition of peace agreements with any given Arab side. It is legitimate, of course, for the society in Israel to attribute as much Jewish characterizations to their national project. However, the expectation from the Palestinian side to recognize the Jewish identity of the State of Israel is highly problematic.

The status quo in the Israeli–Palestinian arena is fragile and it is doubtful whether it will last much longer. The current situation poses a challenge also for scholars. This volume testifies to the importance of studying recognition as a key for serious discussion of national conflicts, first and foremost the Israeli–Palestinian but also in other societies. Many of the chapters in this volume have in common that they examine the various aspects of recognition in a broad historical, political and social context.

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This book is divided into three primary sections. The first focuses on defining Transformative Recognition in relationship to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Yoram Meital, Hebert Kelman, Amal Jamal and Maya Kahanoff each make distinct and significant contributions to this understanding. The second section turns our attention on transformative recognition to other moments and regions of conflict and violence. Victoria Montgomery investigates the situation for Muslims living in a divided Northern Ireland, Deina Abdelkadar addresses the ongoing unrest in Egypt between secularists and Islamic adherents, and Greg Aftandilian explores the often invisible history of the Armenian genocide. The final section of the book offers insight to the significance of moral imagination and the related concepts of intersectionality and transversal politics by Nira Yuval-Davis and a concluding Epilogue on the significance of advancing Transformative Recognition by Dale F. Eickelman.

In the book's first chapter, Yoram Meital's suggests differentiating between 'Thick' and 'Thin' Recognition, and explores these categories in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. While it is true that there are still Arab parties that oppose any recognition of Israel and give premium to the armed struggle against it, the historical account, shows that it is not true that all Arabs refuse to recognize Israel. On the other hand, Israel's entreaty to the neighboring Arab peoples for thin recognition of the state has been replaced by a demand for thick recognition of the Jewish people's religious and historical rights to the Land of Israel. Similar to the diplomatic initiatives that ended other national conflicts, thin recognition underpinned the agreements that Israel signed with Egypt and Jordan. However, for transformative recognition to occur between Israel and the Palestinians, a new political discourse and bold leadership is needed. Under such reshuffling of the card-deck both sides can acknowledge the suffering, and the legitimate national rights of the other.

Kelman begins the next chapter with a personal history that shapes his life-long work in the field of reconciliation and his launch of 'interactive problem solving' workshops. These workshops offer an early research-action formulation of the basis for transformative recognition that demonstrates how such transformation must start with rebuilding trust for opposing sides. In the case of Israel–Palestine, Kelman emphasizes the import of national identity and tie to land for each people. Overcoming the current denial of each other's claim and getting out of the cycle of violence requires a joint vision for reconciliation preceding negotiation of a principled peace. Kelman lays out a 'one Country/ two State' prescription and a provocative idea that in sharing there will be no more losing.

Jamal's chapter argues that the lack of progress in peace talks and the mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians are rooted at a deep epistemological and psychological level and that the challenge of genuine ethical mutual recognition may lead to resolving the conflict. It demonstrates that the dominant conception of recognition demanded by the two sides, which could be portrayed as ontological recognition, is counterproductive to reconciliation. This demand for recognition is based on negation, since the dominant self-perception of both sides has been antagonistically constructed. This means that the recognition between Israelis and Palestinians entails the dilemma of affirming its negation and validates de-legitimizing the self. This makes ethical transitional recognition indispensable, entailing a lengthy, open dialogue that facilitates the transformation of the prevailing self-perceptions into mutually inclusive identities. Ethical recognition means that traditional national subjectivity, constructed in exclusive ethnic terms must be replaced with an open heteronomous subjectivity that assumes the other as a precondition for a

legitimate identity. Leadership and support from the outside are crucial for such a change to happen. The role of the international community, especially the United States and Europe, must become more active, not in facilitating an institutional solution that is neither realistic nor genuine, but in generating ideas that align with the demographic and geographic realities on the ground.

Rounding out this section, Maya Kahanoff deepens our understanding of the challenging psychological effort that will need to be accomplished to open safe spaces for movement towards positive peace. Her thoughtful discussion of the psychology of victimhood also provides analysis of how victims of violence can become perpetrators of violence. Creatively utilizing personal testimonies of those in Israel and Palestine who have lost family members to violence, Kahanoff traces how transformative recognition can occur, with people moving from seeing the other as an object of hatred to the other worthy of compassion. Echoing John Paul Lederach's (2009) research on the significance of making safe spaces within conflicted zones, Kahanoff calls for internal dialogues to start with uni-national conversations that can then lead to inter-group discussions. Her chapter presents us with possible next steps forward in working towards a more secure future for both peoples.

The second section of the book moves beyond the Middle East region and explores how transformative recognition has meaning in other contested locations. Victoria Montgomery raises essential issues confronting efforts that wish to prepare for peace rather than continue cycles of war: How can we deal with diversity in order to overcome the structural inequities of marginalized groups? Montgomery argues that while the public recognition of collectivities has generally been a difficult concept to embed in Western liberal states, recognition in conflict or post conflict societies such as Northern Ireland is a particularly complex and contested process. Obviously, the growth of diversity within Northern Irish society in recent years has brought with it new challenges, not least in ensuring an equality of citizenship. In addition, while this process has been further complicated by a problematic colonial legacy and decades of violence, it is clear that Northern Ireland, at least in rhetoric, recognizes itself as a multicultural society and celebrates the diversity of its citizens. Yet, in reality, post-Good Friday Agreement Northern Ireland may have transitioned to an uneasy peace, it has not been transformed into a shared and inclusive society where minority communities can integrate easily. Employing the minority communities as a lens through which to explore narratives about recognition, integration, and identity in Northern Ireland; this chapter discusses the link between citizenship, recognition, and integration demonstrating the integration philosophies at work. Furthermore, it seeks to highlight some of the important issues impacting on minority integration and

participation in Northern Ireland including the Good Friday Agreement and legacies of the 'Troubles,' processes of equality and inequality, and the transnational nature of recognition.

Deina Abdelkadar addresses the problem of recognition between the secular elite and the religious majority in Egypt. The atrocities committed in the Rab'a massacre, when over 1,000 protesters of the Muslim Brothers had been killed by security forces, is highlighted to stress the need for recognition, restorative justice, and respect, in order to heal the Egyptian people and bring about a true democratic transition. Although the secular elite lack the power of the military institution, they were utilized in June of 2013 to legitimize the army's coup against the first elected civilian government. She argues that transitioning to democracy requires the population's recognition of all its constituencies, which has not happened yet by the Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi's regime. Tying the historical and ideological roots to what has transpired since the Egyptian revolution of January 25, 2011, exposes the amount of violence the state is engaged in to silence dissents. The need for recognition and restorative justice after the coup of 2013 is emphasized in this chapter. This bleak chapter in the history of Egypt brings forth painful questions regarding how mutual reconciliation can be injected into the current violent climate and how transformative recognition can be a healing dynamic in such contested terrain.

The last chapter of this section by Greg Aftandilian transports us to another time in history in the Middle East region but has relevance in current affairs. He presents a vivid account of the genocide of the Armenian people and how the absence of recognition of the genocide has prevented healthy integration for peoples in the region and world-wide. Aftandilian's chapter movingly describes how three different generations of Armenians have dealt with the lack of recognition of the mass killing of their ancestors and how 'shared memory' between grandparents and grandchildren has opened up new doors of remembrance. He argues that commemorations of the Armenian genocide were not just to honor the memory of the victims, but to call upon the Republic of Turkey, the successor government to the Ottoman Empire, to finally come to grips with its past and recognize these killings as a genocide, which it has heretofore strongly refused to do. In the United States, the Armenian-American community has also demanded that their own government recognize these killings as a genocide, which it has not done, at least in recent decades, because of its desire not to upset its geo-strategic ally, the Turkish government. Non-recognition by the successor government and its main international backer has created and left open a long-festering wound among the offspring of the genocide survivors that will not heal until proper recognition is rendered. This paper will explore the asymmetrical power relationship at play and why genocide is so important to

the world wide Armenian community. It also explores why proper acknowledgement would help to bring closure to the issue. The methodology of the paper takes a generational approach to the analysis and focuses mainly on the Armenian-American community, though some of its findings are pertinent to other Armenian diaspora communities.

The book ends with two significant writings that each strengthen our understanding of Transformative Recognition and the importance of ethical leadership at this moment of history. Yuval-Davis begins with the ways that the ‘politics of recognition’ is a double-edged sword, linking the importance of recognizing social justice for rights of groups to the importance of unmasking the power-relations *within* these groups. She argues that political struggles focused on issues relating to recognition and rights of particular groupings claiming to represent particular social categories and identities have been playing vital roles in different struggles for social justice all over the globe. At the same time such politics tend to mask power relations within these groupings and organizations, to reify boundaries of social collectivities and to homogenize group membership, attachments, and values. The chapter presents intersectionality as a counter-analytical tool and transversal politics as an alternative political strategy. It argues that we cannot – and should not – construct a homogeneous, or even unified, political order as a precondition for reconciliation. Rather, we should engage in a transversal dialogue, bounded by common political values. These values are informed by recognitions of our differential locations and identifications. They are led by a global discourse in which translation, rather than a unitary language, is seen as the political tool which underlies the political projects of belonging of those participating in it, which are multi-layered and inclusive, with shifting, contested, and porous boundaries. Yuval-Davis speaks of a transversal politics, which transport us to a politics of care where we can imagine the other’s perspective and each other’s humanity. As she notes, not an easy vision to hold in these times but a worthy one. Last but not least, Dale F. Eickelman’s epilogue comprehensively discusses “recognition” and “transformative recognition”, emphasizing the difficulty not only in elaborating the content of this key concept but also in terms of applying this socially constructed idea to explicit historical cases.

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PART 1

Israel and Palestine



Sticking Point in Israel–Palestine Peace Talks: ‘Thick’ and ‘Thin’ Recognition

Yoram Meital

Few would deny that the Arab-Israeli conflict, not least its Israeli–Palestinian iteration, revolves around the matter of recognition. This chapter discusses the major transformations both the Palestinian and Israeli approaches to recognition have undergone since the fateful year of 1947. The Arab world’s adamant refusal to offer any sort of recognition to Israel has ceded way to a willingness to grant ‘thin’ recognition. Israel’s entreaty to the Arab states for ‘thin’ recognition of the state has been replaced by a demand for ‘thick’ recognition of the Jewish people’s religious and historical rights to the Land of Israel. My principal argument is that while historically speaking, ‘thin’ recognition has been a *sine qua non* for hammering out mutual agreements to end conflicts between nations, demands for ‘thick’ recognition are liable to stymie negotiations. A case in point is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, which as we shall see falls under the heading of ‘thick’ recognition and essentially blocks off all roads to permanent two-state solution.

To fully comprehend this critical different points of view, though, a crucial distinction must be drawn between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ recognition. The Oxford Dictionary of Law posits that under international law, recognition is “the process by which one state declares that another political entity fulfils the conditions of statehood and that it is willing to deal with it as a member of the international community” (Martin 2002: 471). Thus, ‘thin’ recognition is a state-centric perspective that pertains to a polity’s standing within a preexisting system of states. According to Lisa Strömbom, ‘thin’ recognition is predicated on a framework that guarantees legal status and recognizes actors as juridical subjects with protected social and political rights (Strömbom 2014: 171; Daase et al. 2015). However, ‘thin’ recognition does not satisfy the needs of parties immersed in heated national conflicts over territory that are exacerbated by incompatible historical, religious, and ideological narratives. Aiming to fully comprehend this type of conflict, scholars have coined the term ‘thick’ recognition. This term expresses the demand for recognition of particular qualities that distinguish a certain group or nation from another. As such, it goes beyond

just legal rights and involves the acceptance of particular, rather than universal, traits (Honneth 1995; Lindemann 2010). In other words, the emphasis is on the subjectivity of the other. It is also important to emphasize the evaluative dimension of thick recognition, as a phenomena that always includes particular content linked to real or imagined facts, and is constantly in evolution.

From War to Peace

The genesis of the two-state solution based on mutual recognition dates back to UN Security Council Resolution 181. Issued on November 29, 1947, this 'binding decision' called for a territorial division of Mandatory Palestine, the establishment of two states, and for the two national communities to recognize each other's sovereign rights. Put differently, the adversary parties were called to accept a 'thin' recognition. Mutual recognition was, in fact, the major obstacle. In both societies, the majority of the population aspired to a state of their own in the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine; for both, mutual recognition meant giving up this hope. The Arab peoples, particularly the Palestinians, on principle rejected the idea of a Jewish state in any part of the land of Palestine. Moreover, they objected to the partition borders, which left control over most of the country's territory (55 per cent) in the hands of the demographically smaller group – the Jews (estimated at 620–650 thousand as against 1.3 million Palestinians) (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003: 135–168). The leaders of the Jewish *yishuv* (the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine) also deliberated over the UN's partition proposal. Not all were prepared to yield areas that they considered integral to the homeland and Israel's historical patrimony to the earmarked Arab state. Nonetheless, the national mainstream under David Ben-Gurion managed to get the Zionist national institutions to agree to partition (Shlaim 2000: 22–27). The recognition accorded by the nations of the world to the Jewish state was regarded by most of the leadership as Zionism's crowning achievement. Another important consideration of partition advocates was the possibility of opening up the state's borders to millions of *'olim* (Jewish immigrants), along with the assessment that the Arabs would in any case reject the partition proposal, making it impossible to predict the Jewish state's future and final borders.

In mid-May 1948, the Zionist leadership proclaimed the independence of the state of Israel. The violence that had been escalating between the two sides since the UN vote soon turned into all-out war. When the smoke had cleared, there was a Palestinian refugee problem and roughly 150,000 Arabs had become a minority in their homeland (Morris 2004; Kimmerling

and Migdal: 169–213). These developments would have a direct impact on the positions taken decades later by Israeli and Palestinian representatives on the matter of ‘recognition.’ The Arab’s resounding defeat did not dent the implacable refusal to recognize the state of Israel and enter into political talks with it. Many continued to treat the establishment of the Jewish state as a sin, and its expanding cooperation with western states as a sure sign that it was a pawn designed to further the interests of western powers.

During the first thirty years of Israeli statehood, neither the Israelis nor the Arabs directly addressed the topic of recognition, but it was quite evident that there was an appreciable gap between the two sides on this matter. While the vast majority of the Arab world, including its governments, refused to even countenance formally recognizing Israel, some officials were willing to consider a ‘thin’ recognition in exchange for full Israeli withdrawal from the lands seized in 1948. Be that as it may, the consensus was that signing a peace treaty with Israel was a non-starter.

The Six Days War dealt a new hand in the Israeli-Arab conflict. It imprinted the adversaries with the telltale signs of victory and defeat that continue to linger on, fifty years later. Such was its impact that, in many respects, most of the parties concerned have lived in its shadow ever since. When the canons fell silent the muses began to roar. In Israel, the triumph of the Six Day War was celebrated with glossy albums, medallions, stamps and textbooks. The pre-war anxiety was replaced by a rare euphoria. At school, pupils were taught to sketch the homeland’s new borders. Though the defeat did not lead to regime changes in Egypt, Syria or Jordan, the seeds of change had been sown and were soon plain to see. As the days passed, more and more writers, poets, intellectuals, artists, political columnists and spokespeople began to address the significance of the war, widely referred to as *al-Naksa* – a recurrent blow – and reminiscent of the *al-Nakba* (Catastrophe – as the Palestinians labeled the 1948 War) of 20 years back (al-‘Azm 1968). Israel soon assumed the administration of the occupied territories and population, incorporating commerce, the economy and education into the “Israeli order” whose mechanisms of control invaded all walks of life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the Khartoum Arab Summit (September 1, 1967), the consensus that the political aim is to “remove the traces of aggression,” meaning the achievement of Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied after 5 June 1967, without conducting direct negotiations with Israel, and without a peace treaty between Israel and each of the Arab states, and without implying explicit recognition. That is to say, the central aim was to achieve withdrawal, but not within the framework of a peace treaty with Israel or recognition of her, nor through direct negotiations with her (Meital 2000: 64–82).

President Anwar al-Sadat's peace initiative and his historic visit to Jerusalem reshuffled the cards again. His memorable speech in the Knesset constituted an unmediated and precedent-setting overture to Israel. It revealed the extent to which Egypt's attitudes had shifted in regard to the recognition of Israel and understanding for its security requirements. Sadat continued:

I came here to you to build together a durable and just peace [...] You want to co-exist with us in this part of the world, and I tell you quite sincerely: we welcome you among us in all peace and security. This, in itself, constitutes a sharp turning point, a landmark in a historic and decisive change (*White Paper* 1978: 172).

Aside from emphasizing the drastic shift in policy, Sadat also used the speech to reaffirm some of Egypt's long-standing positions in the conflict:

Our land is not subject to bargaining nor is it a topic of debate. Our national and regional soil is to us the sacred valley in which God spoke to Moses [...] There are certain facts that have to be faced with courage and clear vision. There are Arab territories which Israel occupied [...] We insist on complete withdrawal from these territories, including Arab Jerusalem [...] As for the Palestinian cause, no one can deny that this is the crux of the whole problem. No one in the whole world today can accept slogans raised here in Israel, ignoring the existence of the Palestinian people, and even questioning where is that people? [...] In all faith I tell you that peace cannot be achieved without the Palestinians [...] And direct confrontation with that Palestinian problem, the only language to deal with it for a just and lasting peace, is the establishment of their state change (*White Paper* 1978: 176–179).

In their speeches, Prime Minister Menachem Begin and opposition leader Shimon Peres emphasized Israel's desire for peace, security and normalization with the Arabs; both, however, refrained from relating directly to Sadat's call for the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, Begin wisely delivered a message that enabled the parties to open political negotiations. "I propose," he declared, "that everything will be negotiable [...] No side shall present prior conditions" (*Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin*). These statements, and especially Sadat's words in the Knesset about Egyptian recognition of Israel and its right to exist in security, established a new pattern of relations between the two states. This in turn had provided the foundation on which the subsequent negotiations could be built. Preconditions had been dropped, and

a negotiating process in which each side was free to bring up the arguments as it saw fit had been made possible.

During the ensuing talks between the two states, the negotiators devised a model for settling the conflict that was premised on tradeoffs between security, territorial, and recognition issues. An in-depth analysis of the treaty shows that the negotiators agreed to a “thin-plus” recognition. While Sadat attempted to push off Israel’s insistence on normalizing the ties between the neighboring countries to future generations, he was ultimately forced to acquiesce to this demand. Israel, backed on this issue by the U.S., claimed that normalization of relations must be an integral part of the agreements. Thus, the free movement of people and goods between the two countries was always perceived by many Israelis as the true expression of peace. More important, the signing of the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty shattered one of the most deep-set assumptions shared by Arabs and Israelis, that it was impossible to reach a political accommodation based on significant recognition and painful concessions by the two national communities. For dozens of years, both sides had made much of “zero-sum” rhetoric and abundant explanations, the bottom line of which was “there is no one to talk to and nothing to talk about.”

The leaders of Israel and Egypt charted both the model for resolving the conflict with Israel and the cost in the present for attaining peace in the future. The package deal was the meat of the accommodation: unqualified mutual recognition, Israeli withdrawal and borders, security arrangements and normalization, implementation schedules and guidelines. In the international arena and particularly among large sectors of the Arab public there was increasing awareness that the conflict’s resolution would oblige the Arabs to recognize the existence of the State of Israel and its right to live securely within the borders of June 1967; and oblige Israel to cede its control of the Arab territories it had occupied in the Six Day War and agree to an accommodation for the national aspirations of the Palestinians.

Following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, tens of agreements were hammered out for cooperation in a variety of fields, such as tourism, economic, agriculture, culture and even academic cooperation. At one and the same time, Sadat was well aware of the fact that the vast majority of his constituents were adamantly opposed to warm relations with Israel. Consequently, the Egyptian regime adopted sundry means to prevent the implementation of the agreements that pertained to normalization. Moreover, Egypt’s formidable professional associations imposed sanctions against members that formed ties with Israelis, or so much as visited the country to the north. These measures gave rise to a ‘thin-plus’

recognition, as the two states formally recognized each other, fulfilled the terms of the peace accord (to exclude the field of normalization), and cooperated in the political and security arena. Although the countries' opened their shared borders, mostly Israelis took advantage of this opportunity. Save for a handful of figures, Egyptian society continued to shun normalization. Despite regime and political changes in the Land of the Nile, the 'cold peace' endures to this day. For instance, on March 2, 2016, Tawfiq Okasha, an Egyptian politician, was expelled from parliament for inviting the Israeli ambassador to his home. A sign of change reflected during 2015–2016, when almost ten thousands Egyptian Copt pilgrims flocked to Christian holy sites in Jerusalem.

The Heart of the Conflict

The recognition of Israel earned by virtue of the Camp David Accords and the peace with Egypt were a breakthrough in the Israeli-Arab conflict. Nevertheless, the heart of the conflict was and remains the Israeli–Palestinian dispute. The Palestinian issue had little chance of being resolved as the PLO rejected the Camp David blueprint and Israel and the U.S. would not deal with the organization (because it refused to recognize Israel and it embraced terror in the struggle against it). Fifteen years later on the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim Self-Government (13 September 1993), aimed at resolving the Israeli–Palestinian dispute, was signed. The venue for wrapping up the negotiations between Israel and the Arab side was once more the White House grounds, and the ceremony was laden with symbolism as Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat affixed their signatures to a historic document between Israel and the PLO, the representative of the Palestinian people. The live broadcast on the whole provided favorable coverage. Detractors and opponents, both Israeli and Arab, received marginal exposure. Nevertheless, there was no hiding the apprehensions and uncertainties, even within the camp that had set the historic measure in motion. Israel's government under Rabin behaved as if it had entered stormy waters but had not yet resolved to cross the Rubicon. The Palestinian leadership was also plagued by indecision, about its own Rubicon. For it, the Oslo process was an ideological, political turnabout, as summed up by Yezid Sayigh: "the Palestinian national movement, established with the express aim of liberating Palestine in armed struggle, had proved unable in the intervening years to liberate any part of its national soil by force and had finally accepted the Oslo negotiated compromise, whose terms ran counter to virtually all the principles and aims it had espoused for so long" (Sayigh 1997: 17).

The DOP was the minimalist title for the historic agreement signed by the leaders of Israel and the PLO. Basically, it consists of three chief elements:

recognition, the institution of a “peace process” in the transitional period, and a commitment to settle permanent status and finalize the most entangled issues. Four days before the DOP was signed, Arafat and Rabin exchanged letters on the subject. Arafat wrote:

The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. [...] The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability [...] The PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid (*Israel-PLO Recognition: Exchange of Letters* 1993).

Rabin's reply was curt, no more than a sentence, asserting that “in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process” (*Israel-PLO Recognition: Exchange of Letters* 1993). The commitments of the two leaders were of both practical and symbolic import and made it possible for the DOP to be signed. This exchange of letters between Rabin and Arafat constituted a sort of ‘thin-plus’ recognition. The PLO recognized the State of Israel as well as its right to exist in peace and security. In turn, Israel affirmed that the PLO is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Therefore, it has the authority to conduct negotiations and sign treaties on behalf of the Palestinians. In addition to these letters, the preamble to the September 1993 DOP stated that Israel and the PLO “recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights” and strive “to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security” and “to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process” (*Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements* 1993).

Soon after the talks got underway, the negotiators realized that the matter of recognition was pertinent to many of the critical issues that they would have to resolve, foremost among them Jerusalem and the refugees. Moreover, peace proclamations and speeches soon made way for cries of grief, despair and frustration. The “holes” in the Oslo process grew ever larger and blacker. The DOP, like later agreements that were to be signed by the two sides, were open-ended. The agreements sharply reflected the power relations between the two parties. Israel is not only holding the occupied territories but its armed forces and economy are far stronger than that of the new-born PA. Despite the significant

asymmetry Israel blatantly insisted on the principle of equal concessions by the two parties as a prerequisite for any progress in the peace process.

Moreover, the leaders were little inclined to proffer good will gestures and, over the years, mutual trust dissolved. Distrust, in fact, was quite often fueled by the leaders themselves. They treated major violations too indulgently in the hope that the other side would do the same. The parties mistakenly assumed that during the relatively long transitional period (five years), the advocates of political settlement would grow stronger and a dynamic be generated to sap the oppositionists in both societies. Because of political and national considerations, neither side took a tough stand against saboteurs during this period. This left the field free for oppositionists to disrupt the implementation of interim arrangements and torpedo the possibility of true compromise in permanent-status negotiations. Moreover, when Israelis and Palestinians mangled the accords in both letter and spirit, the United States simply stood by. On the whole, it acquitted itself with laconic statements that one move or another did not serve the cause of peace.

By the eve of the decisive permanent-status negotiations at Camp David (July 2000), the advantages and disadvantages of the Oslo blueprint had been well delineated. Its greatest achievement remains the mutual recognition of the two peoples, attained by the leaders in signed agreements. The recognition was of course attended by myriad details of the painful compromise involved in partitioning the land and settling the decades-long bloody conflict between the two national communities. Soon after the failure of the Camp David Summit and the outbreak of the second Intifada, claims began to surface that were to make up the dominant narratives in both societies over the coming years. These narratives, in turn, provided fertile ground for mischief making. In both societies, mutual aggression nourished the public discourse and vice versa. Israelis and Palestinians were sucked into a vicious cycle of violence, terror, incitement and hatred; a nightmare in which terror and brute force vied with innumerable discussions, declarations and programs on both sides. In both societies, violence and terror sprouted in furrows cultivated by exponents of simplistic narratives that linked what had ostensibly emerged at Camp David with the ensuing rash of violence. Most spokespeople ignored the constraints and considerations that trammel decision-making and omit the context of key events. They shared also another weakness; they were oblivious to the repercussions of the deeds and statements of their own camp on the positions and policy of the rival camp.

In Israel the public discourse presented the second Intifada as the attempt of the PA leadership to obtain by violence what they had failed to obtain at the Camp David negotiating table (Meital 2006: 111–128). According to this

reasoning, the Palestinians were never interested in real peace with Israel, but merely in obtaining territories that would enable them to continue the struggle under more convenient conditions. Whereas most of the Israeli public had come to accept the existence of a Palestinian people and supported partitioning the land into two states, the Palestinian side had not seen a parallel development. The images of killing and destruction wrought by terror perpetrated by various Palestinian groups were a frequent and shocking reminder that the front had moved to public buses, cafes, malls and entertainment sites; venues that frame the daily lives of millions of civilians. Widespread suicide bombings, booby-trapped cars and mortar fire at locations within Israel, numerous cases of shooting and detonation of explosives against soldiers and settlers in the occupied territories, and the strident incitement of Arab spokespeople – all these impacted on Israeli public opinion. More and more Israelis demanded tough action against the Palestinians. Public opinion polls showed that most Israelis considered it to be a war initiated by the Palestinian leadership and rejecting Israel's right to exist. The wide support for anti-Israel terror in Palestinian society attested to a deep-set opposition to the very existence of the State of Israel. In short, the basic principle underlying Oslo, mutual recognition, was thoroughly shaken. In this context, the conception that there is currently “no partner” on the Palestinian side became pervasive.

The ‘no partner’ discourse strengthened Israel's right-wing politically, and during his second term as prime minister Netanyahu (2009–2013) added to it a significant component. In the face of growing international pressure on Israel to resume the peace process with the PA, now led by Mahmoud Abbas, Netanyahu raised the demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state. In other words, Israel demanded a ‘thick’ recognition as a prerequisite to its consent to participate in the final status negotiations. An earlier version of this demand was raised by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, whose government accepted the Quartet Roadmap (April 30, 2003) pending to fourteen reservations. It includes a PA public “renunciation of a right of return” and Israel's right “to exist as a Jewish state.” At the outset of his second term Netanyahu gave a speech at Bar-Ilan University (June 14, 2009) declaring that he was now committed to a two-state solution. In the process, though, he also lodged the demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as the Jewish state. For many observers, both in Israel and abroad, “the Bar-Ilan speech” seemed to herald an ideological and political *volte-face*, as it marked the first time a rightwing leader was willing to countenance full Palestinian autonomy on parts of the historic Land of Israel. That said, most observers turned a blind-eye to the condition that Netanyahu had put forth for a two-state solution. “I hereby state in a clear and lucid voice,” the prime minister stated, “that if we receive a guarantee of

demilitarization and security arrangements that are necessary for Israel, and if the Palestinians recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people, we will be prepared under a future peace treaty to reach a solution of a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside the Jewish state" (*Ha'aretz*, June 14, 2009).

At a state ceremony to mark the 105th anniversary of the death of Theodor Herzl, the father of modern Zionism, Netanyahu announced "I am convinced that the root of the solution is in the refusal to recognize the Jewish state. Therefore, the key to peace is the explicit recognition by the Palestinians of Israel as a Jewish state" (*Ha'aretz*, July 12, 2009). In his speech before a joint session of Congress on May 24, 2011, he argued that peace has not been secured "Because so far, the Palestinians have been unwilling to accept a Palestinian state if it meant accepting a Jewish state alongside it." The conflict, he concluded, "has never been about the establishment of a Palestinian state. It has always been about the existence of the Jewish state" (*Washington Post*, May 24, 2011). Like much of his speech, this assertion garnered a standing ovation from the American representatives, and received in Israel as a symbolic support of this claims.

In essence, the above demand for "thick recognition" transformed the public discourse on the peace process in Israel and, to a certain extent, the discourse overseas as well. The declarations of senior White House officials in favor of recognizing Israel as a Jewish state was a major coup for Netanyahu, as the Obama administration failed to realize that there is a substantial difference between the legitimate demand for recognizing the State of Israel and the demand that it be considered a Jewish state. From this stage onwards, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state – or in its more nuanced version, "the nation-state of the Jewish people" – has been the *sin quo non* of most Israeli citizens for any permanent-status agreement.

Netanyahu's positions are critical to the discourse on Palestinian recognition of Israel. No other Israeli leader has ever gone to such lengths to advance this topic. By cultivating such a principled stance on recognition, the prime minister has managed, both in theory and practice, to clip the wings of a negotiated two-state solution. There are three major implications to the *sine qua non* that Israel be acknowledged as a Jewish state, particularly in the context of final-status negotiations. First, this step repudiates the Palestinian demand for recognition of their own historical rights to this land. Accepting Netanyahu's pre-condition is tantamount to rejecting the Palestinian narrative with respect to the 1948 War (*al-Nakba*). The second implication stems from the fact that Israel has lodged this requirement within the framework of talks over a permanent solution. In the first place, recognition of the Jewish state basically undermines Palestinians' claim to sovereignty over part of Jerusalem, including the Noble Sanctuary, or what Jews refer to as the Temple Mount. If the

Arab world was to relent on this matter, is it conceivable that Israel would still be ready to compromise over Judaism's holiest site or on the refugee issue? Furthermore, such 'thick recognition' would harm the Palestinian citizens of Israel, especially in all that concerns this sector's link to its historical homeland. Over the past decade, Israel's Jewish majority has repeatedly flouted the sensitivities of this minority regarding its identity as an integral part of the Palestinian people. The bloody Arab-Israeli protests in October 2000 indelibly altered the way this group perceives the state as well as how the Jewish majority grasps the Arab minority. Last but not least, the growing political support for the Israeli rightwing, not least its hawkish parties, is making itself felt in the Israeli public discourse and the passage of nationalist legislation.

Israel's demands for 'thick recognition' has further radicalized views on either side of the barricades. In the Arab public discourse, many have warned against the hazards of recognizing Israel as the Jewish state, and this demand was indeed summarily rejected by the Arab world. The Palestinian Authority and President Abbas' approval ratings are constantly falling, while support for the resistance, namely Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, is mounting. In parallel, the Israeli rightwing has grown at a steady pace, as have the settlement enterprise in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Netanyahu has shrewdly avoided slamming the door shut on negotiations with the international community. Throughout this period, he has allowed government representatives to conduct fruitless peace talks. The consensus Israeli opinion whereby the struggle with the Palestinians is intractable and must thus be managed for the time being has indeed become government policy. Owing to this impasse, the international community has ratcheted up its criticism against Israel and the Netanyahu government's relations with the Obama administration reached unprecedented lows. Be that as it may, the cooperation between the two allies has endured, and Washington has even increased the security assistance that it provides to Israel.

Closing Argument

Since 1947, both the Palestinian and Israeli approaches to recognition have undergone major transformations. The earliest Israelis strove to obtain recognition for Israel as the independent sovereign state of the Jewish people. It is true that there are still Arab parties that oppose any recognition of Israel and give premium to the armed struggle against it. The historical account, however, shows that it is not true that all Arabs refuse to recognize Israel. The pan-Arab's adamant refusal to offer any sort of recognition to Israel has ceded way to a willingness to grant 'thin' recognition. The peace agreements signed

between Israel and Egypt, and with Jordan include explicit provisions regarding the recognition of Israel; and on the eve of the signing of the Oslo Accords, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat exchanged letters on the issue. There is no reference in these agreements to recognizing Israel 'as a Jewish state.' Needless to say, diplomatic and legal recognition of the State of Israel is a necessary condition for a peace agreement with any Arab side, and the above agreements contain such explicit references.

Since 2009, the Netanyahu government constantly demand the Palestinian to recognize Israel 'as a Jewish state,' or as 'the nation-state of the Jewish People.' Israel's entreaty to the neighboring Arab peoples for 'thin-plus' recognition of the state has been replaced by a demand for 'thick' recognition of the Jewish people's religious and historical rights to the Land of Israel. In fact, it has ramped up Israel's demand from 'thin' to 'thick' recognition. This turn of events not only embodies the far-reaching transformation of identity politics in Israeli society, and it destroys the prospects for a final-status agreement whereby a sovereign Palestinian state, with its capital in al-Quds (i.e., Eastern-Jerusalem), is founded on the basis of the pre-1967 borders. The (national and cultural) identity of the Israeli society is an internal matter, and it is legitimate for the Israeli consensus to give expression to its Jewish identity, without shattering its commitments to democratic values. Yet, the demand for the Palestinian side to recognize the Jewish identity of the State of Israel is not relevant to the renewal of the final status negotiations and the signing of a peace agreement with them. The way out of this vicious circle must include a change in the public and political discourse of the two sides, but first and foremost in Israel, on what level of recognition they can expect at the current circumstances. Fear, pain, and mistrust of decades would not be vanished by lowering expectations in term of recognition or the renewal of serious negotiations. Similar to the diplomatic initiatives that ended other national conflicts, 'thin' recognition underpinned the agreements that Israel signed with Egypt and Jordan. However, for transformative recognition to occur between Israel and the Palestinians, a new political discourse and bold leadership is needed. Under such reshuffling of the card-deck both sides can acknowledge the suffering, and the legitimate national rights of the other.

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Mutual Recognition of the Other's National Identity: The Essential Ingredient of Israeli–Palestinian Peace and Reconciliation

Herbert Kelman

My engagement with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict – both personal and professional – has deep roots in my life history. I was born into a Jewish family in Vienna in 1927. I was 11 years old at the time of Austria's Anschluss to Nazi Germany. Soon after the Anschluss, my 13-year-old sister and I decided to join a Zionist youth group, which greatly helped us maintain our self-esteem and sense of identity in the face of the massive assault on them. My sister recently found a diary she kept during this period, in which she reports on our search for a suitable group (Kelman, 2010a, p. 363). In one entry she mentions discussions she had with some older boys, who belonged to a right-wing Zionist organization, and describes that organization's solution to the 'Arab problem': "The Arab population of Palestine can be relocated elsewhere in the Arab world, leaving Palestine to the Jews, who have no other country." This idea, she writes, was not well received at home; specifically, she describes my reaction:

Dem Herbert wollte die Lösung der Araberfrage nicht gefallen, 'denn,' sagte en, 'wir können doch die Araber nicht zwingen das Land zu verlassen, in dem sie nun sesshaft sind' ('Herbert did not find the solution to the Arab question to his liking, because,' he said, 'surely we cannot force the Arabs to leave the land in which they are now settled').

KELMAN, 2010a, p. 363

My sister and I eventually joined the religious Zionist youth movement, which was very moderate in those days. I continued my active involvement in this organization during the year we found asylum in Antwerp (1939–40) and for several years after we finally arrived in New York. During those years I was also actively engaged in Jewish and Hebrew studies. My first two published articles appeared in Hebrew-language student magazines. One of these, entitled "On the question of Jewish-Arab cooperation" (Kelman, 1945), discussed "the common interests of Jews and Arabs in Palestine and argued that establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine requires cooperation between the two peoples" (Kelman, 2010a, p. 364).

In the mid-1940s I supported 'Ichud,' a group centered at Hebrew University under the leadership of Martin Buber, Yehuda Magnes, and Ernst Simon, which – along with the left wing of the Labor movement ('Mapam' and 'Hashomer Hatzair') – advocated for a binational state in Palestine. Unfortunately, the concept of a binational state did not have enough support on either side. With the establishment of Israel, Ichud turned its attention to Arab-Jewish relations within Israel. I continued to maintain contact through American Friends of Ichud.

Personal Engagement in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has gradually returned to the top of my agenda, starting in 1967. I had decided to do graduate work in social psychology, received my doctorate in 1951, and focused my research on social influence and attitude change. Starting in 1951, I was actively involved in the development of the peace research movement and the first journal in the field, the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. My research and writing increasingly turned to issues in international relations, including nationalism and national identity, international educational and cultural exchange, and social-psychological contributions to the study of international affairs. I might also mention here that, starting in the mid-1940s, I was actively involved in the American civil rights and antiwar movements.

The summer of 1966 marked a major turning point in my work. I met John Burton and learned about his experiments in unofficial diplomacy (Burton, 1969). I eagerly accepted his invitation to participate, as a member of the third party, in an exercise on the Cyprus conflict in London in November 1966. I came away from the experience convinced that Burton's approach represented a way of putting into practice the ideas about social-psychological contributions to conflict analysis and resolution that I had been writing about (Kelman, 1965).

I first thought about applying Burton's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict at the time of the 1967 war. Together with John Burton, I explored the possibility of organizing an Israeli–Palestinian workshop, but we lacked the necessary Middle East contacts – especially in the Arab world – to put it into effect. I continued to think about the concept, discussed it with several politically engaged Israeli scholars, and published my first article on the problem-solving workshop (Kelman, 1972). I showed a pre-publication copy of that article to Stephen Cohen, a young colleague at Harvard, with whom I was scheduled to co-teach a graduate seminar on social-psychological approaches to international relations in 1971. He was enthused by the concept and proposed that we organize a pilot workshop as part of the seminar, in which the students would participate

as apprentice members of the third party. We had originally intended to focus this pilot workshop on a conflict outside of the Middle East, but in the end it turned out to be an Israeli–Palestinian workshop (Cohen et al., 1977), thus becoming the first in a long series of Israeli–Palestinian workshops that my colleagues and I have organized over the years.

At the time of the 1973 war, I decided to put work on resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict at the top of my agenda and it has remained there ever since. During the 1970s, much of my work was done with a team that included Stephen Cohen and three Arab-American scholars – Samir Anabtawi, Edward Azar, and Hussain Tuma. I began traveling extensively in the Middle East; including Israel and the occupied territories, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, meeting with political figures and academics. My wife, Rose, always traveled with me and was fully involved in all aspects of this work, which soon became the center of our lives. I increasingly participated in a variety of Middle East-related meetings and conferences. Since 1977, I have chaired or co-chaired the Middle East Seminar, sponsored by Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

Problem-solving workshops and related exercises in unofficial or ‘track-two’ diplomacy have been at the center of my Middle East work from the beginning. Starting with the pilot workshop of 1971, we developed our own approach, heavily influenced by the pioneering work of John Burton, which I came to call ‘interactive problem solving’ (see Kelman, 2010b, for the most recent description of the approach). Over the years, my colleagues and I have organized over 80 workshops and related events, mostly with Israeli and Palestinian participants. They have varied with respect to the nature of the participants, the settings, and the specific purposes.

In 1990–1993, Nadim Rouhana and I co-chaired our first continuing workshop (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994). After the Oslo Agreement, we convened a Joint Working Group on Israeli–Palestinian Relations, which for the first time in our work, was committed to producing joint concept papers on the issues deferred to final-status negotiations. The entire group, as well as subgroups, met repeatedly between 1994 and 1999 and published three papers (Alpher, Shikaki et al., 1998; Joint Working Group, 1998, 1999), that were translated into Arabic and Hebrew and widely disseminated. Finally, between 2004–2013, I co-chaired with Shibley Telhami a Joint Israeli–Palestinian Working Group on Rebuilding Trust in the Availability of a Negotiating Partner. This work is now being continued and taken in new directions by the Herbert C. Kelman Institute of Interactive Conflict Transformation, a small organization, based in Vienna and Jerusalem, under the leadership of Wilfried Graf, Gudrun Kramer, and Augustin Nicolescou.

Starting in the late 1970s, I have been publishing articles, book chapters, and op-ed pieces, offering analyses of the conflict and policy recommendations. These writings draw extensively on my observations of the interactions between Israelis and Palestinians in workshops and other contexts, and my discussions with political and academic figures on both sides, and were informed by the perspective of a social psychologist engaged in conflict resolution. One article that particularly stands out because of its impact on my work and, I believe, on the debate about the role of the PLO in negotiating an Israeli–Palestinian peace, was published in *Foreign Policy* magazine after the 1982 Lebanon war (Kelman, 1982). The article reported on my two extensive conversations with Yasser Arafat, offered the hypothesis that he was ready to negotiate a peace agreement with Israel, and urged that this hypothesis be put to the test. This article was subjected to heavy criticism, but it actually advanced my work by enhancing my credibility among Palestinians, as well as among Israelis interested in finding a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The Nature of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

In my first policy article (Kelman, 1978) and in various subsequent publications (Kelman, 1987, 1992, 1998), I have described the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a conflict over national identity and national existence, and identified some of the conditions for mutual reassurance, acknowledgment, and recognition that might address these issues.

The conflict is, of course, a dispute over territory: Each side claims exclusive rights to the land between the river and the sea. But the relationship to that land is a central, indeed, a defining element of the national identity and the historical narrative of each people. In pursuit of their exclusive claims to the land, both sides have denied the national identity of the other – their very existence as a national group, and the national narrative that ties them to the land. Palestinians have argued that Jews are a religion and not a nation, and have described Jewish settlement of Palestine as settler colonialism and Zionism as racism. Israelis have argued that Palestinians are Arabs who happen to be living in Palestine, but not a distinct national group. This view is captured in the old Zionist slogan, “A land without a people for a people without a land” (often misquoted as “a land without people”). Negation of the other's identity has become a component of each group's own identity.

In essence, the conflict at its core can be described as a zero-sum conflict over national existence: Either we are a nation and this is our homeland, or you are a nation and this is your homeland. Actions and rhetoric by extremist

elements on both sides have served as reminders that this zero-sum view persists within each community, along with the readiness to act on it.

At the same time, there have been significant changes over the decades. We have seen serious bilateral efforts to overcome the zero-sum views of the conflict and formulate solutions that would acknowledge and give expression to the national identities of both peoples. Despite my early affinity for the concept of a binational state, I believe that a one-state solution – as currently advocated in different quarters – is a formula for continuing, and perhaps even escalating the conflict. I therefore firmly support a two-state solution at this historic juncture and shall expand on my vision of such a solution below.

The Oslo Accord of 1993 represented a major breakthrough in the search for a win-win solution. I continue to view it as a breakthrough despite the fact that the Oslo process has effectively broken down. The key element of this breakthrough was contained in the letters of mutual recognition exchanged by Rabin and Arafat. A major, and probably inevitable, flaw of the Oslo Agreement was its failure to commit to a Palestinian state, even though it was widely understood that this would be the endpoint of the negotiations stipulated by the agreement. A consequence of this failure was that both sides retained their reserve options; to return to occupation on the Israeli side and to return to armed struggle on the Palestinian side. Actions reflecting these reserve options helped to create an atmosphere that was not conducive to far-reaching negotiations (Kelman, 2007).

Public opinion data on both sides have consistently shown majority support for a two-state solution, but not much confidence in the prospects of negotiations toward such a solution. With the failure of the Camp David summit in 2000 and the onset of the Second Intifada, the discourse in the two communities was dominated by clashing narratives. Opinion polls on the two sides revealed mirror images: Respondents on each side expressed the view that *their own side* had demonstrated its readiness to make major concessions in order to reach an agreement, but that *the other side* had not responded in kind. In the absence of trust in the other side, there was little willingness to pay the price of an agreement and take the risks that an agreement would entail.

Despite occasional signs of progress in the negotiations, the prospects for a negotiated two-state solution have been getting dimmer and dimmer. Events on the ground have increasingly burdened the negotiations. With the continuing settlement process in the West Bank and Jerusalem and Israeli refusal to commit to final borders, it is becoming ever more difficult to carve out a viable, contiguous Palestinian state. The oppressive living conditions of Palestinians, especially in Gaza, the acts of violence on both sides, the pattern of rocket exchanges between Hamas and the IDF every few years – all add up to an atmosphere that is not conducive to negotiations.

Framing a Negotiated Agreement

To revitalize the negotiations would take more than tweaking the *terms* of a proposed agreement. These have been addressed in various documents and venues, including the Clinton parameters of 2000, the Taba deliberations, the People's Voice Campaign (initiated by Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon), the Geneva Initiative, and the subsequent negotiations. The formulas for resolving the outstanding issues are fairly well understood and capable of negotiation – although not easily, especially when the Israeli side is led by Netanyahu, who does not seem ready to accept a truly sovereign, viable Palestinian state. But, even for more open negotiations, the critical need has been to *frame* a negotiated agreement in a way that would elicit public trust and wholehearted support. In this spirit, I am proposing that a significant step toward *reconciliation*, which we usually think of as a post-negotiation process, needs to be taken now, in order to produce momentum for the negotiations and engender public trust and support for the process and the outcome.

To this end, I argue that the terms of the proposed agreement need to be framed by a joint vision of a principled peace, based on a historic compromise, whereby the two peoples agree to share the land that they both claim by enabling each to establish a national state within that land. The vision I have in mind is based on the distinction between country and state, and I have come to call it the 'One-country/Two-state solution' (Kelman, 2011). The essence of this vision is mutual recognition of the other's national identity. This framework for negotiations should ideally be proclaimed in a joint statement of principles by the two leaderships. It should start out with the proposition that the country – the whole country between the river and the sea – belongs to *both* peoples: both have historical roots in it, both are deeply attached to it. The effort by each to gain exclusive control of it has led to violent conflict over decades and may ultimately lead to mutual destruction. They therefore agree to share the land by establishing two independent states, allowing each people to exercise its right to national self-determination and express its national identity in a state of its own within in the shared country, or the common homeland, in Jerome Segal's terms (Segal, 2010).

A central feature of the one-country/two-state solution is that it makes a clear distinction between the *political* level and other levels of societal functioning. At the political level, it envisages a two-state solution, more or less along the lines of what has been presented in various proposals, such as the Geneva Initiative, with some differences in nuance. A key feature of my proposed statement of principles is that it phrases the elements of a solution in terms of the logic of the historic compromise (Kelman, 2009). But beyond the political level, the agreement I have in mind would have important implications

for the nature of the relationship between the two states (and the two populations), based on the concept of *one country*.

There are a number of ways of giving concrete substance to the concept of one country. First, there would be no taboo on expressing sentimental attachments to the parts of the country that are not part of one's state. For example, Palestinians could write poetry about Jaffa and Israeli Jews could trace the origins of their religion to Judea, without the other side feeling threatened. Second, there would be increasingly free movement across the borders, enabling Palestinians to enjoy the beaches in Jaffa and Israeli Jews to pray at Abraham's tomb in Hebron. Third, there would be a range of cooperative activities that treat the *country* as their basic unit, including economic activities, and activities in the realms of public health, environmental protection, water, telecommunication, tourism, and cultural and educational affairs.

Cooperative activities can be institutionalized in a variety of ways. The most important step would be to form, as soon as possible, an economic union. In the 1970s, articles by Abba Eban and Lova Eliav advocated such a union, modeled on Benelux and including Israel, Jordan, and the future Palestinian state. At my first meeting with Arafat in 1980, I asked him what his vision was for the future. His immediate reply, citing Eban's article, was "Benelux, except that I would add Lebanon." Interestingly, when I asked him the same question at my last meeting with him in 2004, shortly before his death he gave me precisely the same answer.

In a recent paper, Rassem Khamaisi (2016) advocates a two-state solution, but highlights permeable borders and spatial planning for the country as a whole as an essential domain of cooperation between the two states. As in the present analysis, Khamaisi starts with the distinction between country and state and emphasizes the need to recognize the socio-cultural attachments of the two populations to places throughout the entire country.

Over time, cooperation might take a political form, along the lines of some variety of federation or confederation, but I strongly urge that such a step be left to future developments, including the experience of cooperation in economic and other non-political domains, as well as growing equality between the two states in their levels of economic and institutional development. I would, however, scrupulously avoid the inclusion of such expectations in a peace agreement. At this historical juncture each people needs a state of its own.

It should be noted, however, that a two-state solution by itself – as envisaged, for example, in the Geneva Initiative – requires a considerable degree of cooperation between the two states. There is no way the two states could coexist in this small piece of land – in which the Palestinian state comprises two

non-contiguous areas, and in which both states must have a presence in the city of Jerusalem – without establishing and maintaining patterns of cooperation between the two states. Thus, proposals for a two-state solution stipulate a secure link between the West Bank and Gaza, which clearly must go through Israeli territory. They envisage Jerusalem as a united city containing the capitals of both states. The Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem would be under Israeli sovereignty and the Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty, “with jointly administered arrangements for security, freedom of movement, and municipal services for the entire city and for governance of the Old City” (Kelman, 2011, p. 39).

Another domain that requires close cooperation in any two-state solution is security arrangements for the two states. If Palestine is to be demilitarized, as stipulated in the various formulas for a two-state solution, then arrangements for providing external security for the state would have to be agreed on. As for internal security, the Palestinian Authority has been very effective in its security operations in the West Bank; a two-state solution would require the extension of such capacities to the Gaza Strip. A final agreement would also have to address Israeli security concerns relating to the Eastern border of the country. To meet these concerns, proposals for a two-state solution have included the placement of an international force in the Jordan Valley for a specified number of years.

The one-country/two-state solution that I am proposing, however, goes beyond the array of cooperative arrangements that are inherent in a two-state solution. For one thing, it calls for deliberate efforts to develop a wide array of cooperative activities that treat the country as a whole as their basic unit and that are designed to enhance the health and well-being of the entire population. Beyond that, it frames the two-state solution in terms of a vision of a united country that belongs to both peoples. In effect, it represents mutual recognition of the other's national identity and acknowledgment of the other's national narrative. It thus constitutes a significant step of reconciliation that can revitalize the negotiation effort.

I believe that a joint declaration of the two leaderships, framing the negotiations in terms of a one-country/two-state solution, could have a dramatic impact on the two publics. It has the potential of reassuring and energizing the publics in a way that would elicit their wholehearted support for the process and outcome of the negotiations. Let me cite several reasons for this assertion:

1. Such a declaration would reassure each public that the negotiations are safe, because the leadership on the other side is tying its own rights to your rights, its own claims to your claims.

2. The declaration by the leadership on the other side that this land is *your* land, just as it is their land, represents an affirmation of your national identity and an acknowledgment of your national narrative that have been systematically denied over the decades. The significance of such an affirmation on the Israeli side is evidenced by the demand that Israel be recognized as a Jewish state, which although it is stated poorly and Netanyahu's motives are questionable, has gained considerable traction in the Israeli public. On the Palestinian side, the insistence on Israeli recognition of the *principle* of the right of return, even if its exercise will be limited, is partly motivated by the sense that the denial of this right implies that Palestinians do not belong in the land and that the land does not belong to them.
3. The one-country/two-state solution activates the sense the justice in the two publics: justice for your people is at least partly restored, and, at the same time, you are acting justly toward the other.
4. Framing the negotiations along the lines I have proposed provides a rationale for the painful concessions the parties will have to make. Making these concessions is not just what they must do because they have no other choice, but it is a necessary element of a historic compromise that is fair and just, and meets both sides' needs.
5. The positive vision of a common future in the shared country helps compensate for the inevitable costs of an agreement. Above all, it means that you are not *losing* your country by agreeing to *share* it with the other people.
6. Finally, the one-country/two-state solution speaks to the situation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. They can feel that they are living in *their own country*, even though they are citizens of a *state* defined by another people. By the same token, Jewish settlers remaining (by common consent) in the state of Palestine can feel that they are living in *their own country*, even though they are citizens (or resident aliens) of a *state* defined by the Palestinian people.

Constructing a Narrative of Reconciliation

The joint declaration by the two leaderships that I have been advocating – framing the negotiations in terms of a one-country/two-state solution, based on mutual recognition of the other's national identity – calls for visionary leadership, as exemplified by Nelson Mandela or Anwar Sadat – or even, in their own unexpected way, the partnership of Arafat and Rabin. Such leadership has not yet emerged on either side. Under the circumstances, the primary

initiative for developing and disseminating such a framework rests with civil society in the two communities.

Civil society has already prepared the ground for such an initiative in the various Israeli–Palestinian people-to-people projects that have promoted communication, cooperation, and reconciliation, and particularly in such enterprises as the Geneva Initiative and the People's Voice Initiative that have developed and disseminated specific ideas for the terms of a final agreement. The challenge now is to build on these efforts by developing and disseminating a *framework* for a negotiated agreement. What this involves, in essence, is the development of a new, transcendent *narrative of reconciliation* without abandoning the core of the two communities' national narratives.

It is neither necessary nor possible for the parties to replace their national narratives of the past with a common narrative. The most that can be expected is that in a process of what we call 'negotiating identity' (Kelman, 1997) they come to acknowledge the other people's narrative in light of its history, and to accommodate the other's identity in their own identity, at least to the extent of removing *negation* of the other's identity, as well as the claim of exclusivity, from their own identities. This can happen in a context in which the core of each people's own identity and its associated narrative are acknowledged by the other.

What is necessary and possible is that the two sides construct a new joint narrative – a narrative of reconciliation – for the *future* of the two peoples and their independent states in the country they have agreed to share “their common homeland,” as Jerome Segal (2010) puts it. This narrative would acknowledge the historical roots of both peoples in the entire country and their attachment to it. It would lay out the range of cooperative activities in economic affairs, public health, environmental protection, scientific research, artistic and cultural endeavors, and tourism in which the two peoples will engage in order to enhance the progress and well-being of the entire population of the country and of the two states in which they are politically organized. Ideas generated through such an interactive process can then be injected into the public debate and the political culture of the two societies and thus promote negotiations toward a two-state solution or, to be precise, toward a one-country/two-state solution.

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Is the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict Resolvable? Ethical Transformative Recognition and Conflict Resolution

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Much has been written about the Israeli–Palestinian talks and many of the people involved have written extensively about the hardships of these negotiations and the possibilities for success. Many have shown that the two sides were very close to reaching an agreement, and others have demonstrated the major gaps between their genuine perspectives on the meaning of the two states, land exchanges, Jerusalem, et cetera. Some have blamed the Palestinians for the failure of negotiations, others have accused the Israeli government, and still others have viewed both as equally responsible. There are almost no more secrets as to the details of the negotiations and the positions of the two entities.

Therefore, the following analysis is not going to be another narrative of the negotiations from a perspective of the past two decades. Rather, it argues that the lack of progress in peace talks and the mistrust are rooted at a deep epistemological and psychological level and that the challenge of genuine mutual recognition may lead to resolving the conflict.

This paper claims that the dominant conception of recognition demanded by the two sides, which could be portrayed as ontological recognition, is counterproductive to reconciliation. This demand for recognition is based on negation, since the dominant self-perception of both sides has been antagonistically constructed. This means that the recognition between Israelis and Palestinians entails the dilemma of affirming its negation and validates delegitimizing the self.

The paper also claims that ethical transitional recognition is needed here, entailing a lengthy, open dialogue that facilitates the transformation of the prevailing self-perceptions into mutually inclusive identities. Ethical recognition means that traditional national subjectivity, constructed in exclusive ethnic terms must be replaced with an open heteronomous subjectivity that assumes the other as a precondition for a legitimate identity. Israelis and Palestinians must be willing to let go of their prevailing exclusive narratives of the self, and be open to remolding their identities in order to enable a common future, while preserving their rights to sovereignty over certain spheres of their lives.

It is a gradual, comprehensive process where the foundations of the dominant collective identity such as national history, peoplehood, territoriality, and sovereignty must be reconstructed and made open for dialogue with the other.

The first part of this paper draws on the relationship between recognition and conflict resolution in intractable conflicts and shows that recognition is not only relevant in intractable conflicts but essential to resolving them. The challenges of recognition in intractable conflicts will be briefly analyzed. The second part presents the difficulties that Israelis and Palestinians have in accepting the basic foundations of their counterparts. The theoretical challenges of recognition are applied to the specific case of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The concluding section draws some lessons from the challenges and illustrates that ethical, transitional recognition is the only way out of the labyrinth.

The Labyrinth of Recognition

The Israeli–Palestinian struggle can be analyzed from various perspectives. These analyses illustrate many dilemmas that we face in intractable conflicts. The conflict's material, historical, strategic, symbolic, and cultural aspects provide sufficient complexity to legitimate endless analytical approaches. This complexity feeds our theoretical understanding of conflicts and assists in contemplating possible paths to resolution and reconciliation.

Notwithstanding this complexity, one must identify a fundamental dimension of the conflict to shed light on its various aspects and illuminate the inevitable stumbling blocks in order to reach a settlement. This dimension does not have to simplify the entire situation and its complexities, but can help make it easier to understand. The dilemma of mutual recognition and its meanings and implications are a good point of departure (Doxtader, 2007; Henderson & Wakeham, 2009; Heins, 2011).

The relevance of recognition to understanding the complexity of intractable conflicts and their resolution has been explored deeply in the literature (Heins, 2011). Although initial debates concerning the challenges of recognition have dealt with internal social strife and the construction of social identities, various scholars have moved the debate to the collective and state level. Axel Honneth (2012) addressed the complexity of recognition between states in response to critiques of his study of dilemmas at the individual level. It has become a well-established assumption that mutual recognition forms a primary source of struggle among groups and states (Heins, 2011). Heins makes clear that struggles for recognition are not individual, but rather collective (2011, p. 217).

Furthermore, recognition is not limited to the master/slave dialectics, which reduce it to relations of domination (Williams, 1997). Although one cannot ignore the possibility of recognition proceeding from, constituting and solidifying an authentic identity, it is also not possible to diminish the contingent ethical dimensions of recognition that open the door to collaboration, mutual engagement, reciprocity, identification, and symmetrical relations (Schmidt am Busch & Zurn, 2010). Furthermore, it is not possible to avoid the historical, social, political and economic circumstances that condition recognition. Recognition is not mere approval of the other, or a statement of equal worth which does not commit to the other side's autonomy and ignores the dominant power relations (Bannerji, 2000). Rather, it is about political organization that guarantees the termination of exploitation and domination, enables true autonomy and freedom, and cures past injustices by establishing new institutional structures based on equality.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the stalemate in the peace process indicate several dilemmas of recognition. In and of themselves, these dilemmas shed light on the problematic relationship between Israelis and Palestinians, despite two decades of in-and-out peace talks. The most important dilemmas are the following:

1) *The Challenge of Identity and Inclusiveness*

One of the major challenges of recognition is the identity of the parties involved. In a complex conflict, we cannot take who gets recognized and who is doing the recognizing for granted. The question of inclusiveness appears to be a central challenge that has to be addressed (Lederach, 2005). Not only does the mere self-perception of the parties pose a theoretical dilemma for the one doing the recognizing, but it also poses a practical one, since he could be exercising his power by the mere act of recognition. Furthermore, one must pay attention to who is included and who is excluded in the process of recognition, since the recognized others' boundaries of identity can be a point of dispute.

The construction of identity is crucial in conflict situations (Yuval-Davis, 2010; Kelman, 2001). It has historical, material, cultural, psychological, cognitive, and moral dimensions. If the nature of the relationship between the two sides is to be defined, identity must be placed in a historical context and the relationship must be considered in connection with the material, territorial, and human surroundings. In circumstances where the mere definition of identity is under dispute, the conflict between the opposing parties becomes portrayed as existential. The need for identity transformation becomes crucial for resolving the conflict. For this reason, modern national subjectivity becomes a stumbling block in conflict resolution.

The assumption of a coherent trans-historical subjectivity is not only theoretically but practically problematic, in the context of a protracted national conflict. Collective subjectivity is elevated to a messianic level in the negotiating process, making it a sacred dimension and causing miscommunication and blocked change. Therefore, constructivist approaches to subjectivity become indispensable for transition and for opening new avenues to reconciliation. This means that the parties to the conflict resolution process must incorporate educational and pedagogical measures in order to reconfigure their past and deconstruct their national narrative (Kriesberg, Northrup & Thorson, 1989). These measures could be translated into speeches by leaders, educational programs, and media content that encourage internal debate about the construction of history and the need for redefining some well-established collective self-perceptions, which make recognition and compromise with the 'other nation' difficult to conceive or realize (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). Such an approach could be facilitated with the help of historians, psychologists, artists, and poets who have been historically central in constructing the national imagination (Kaufman, 2006). In most, if not all conflictual contexts such figures play a major role in determining the building blocks of collective identity and therefore could help facilitate a reconciliatory collective identity. Given the psychological and political implications of such a process, it becomes one of the most serious challenges in conflict resolution and reconciliation processes (Bar-Tal, 2013; Kymlicka & Bashir, 2008).

The necessary 'identity shift' is an indispensable step in such a process, but it does not necessarily mean that either side of conflict must be willing to give up their identity completely. It is possible to develop a common, overarching identity where each party maintains central components of its national identity, but also shares common features that can enable new avenues of communication and symbols of identification. The European identity, which was developed alongside the national identities of various European nations and the South African Rainbow nation, which is based on the multiple racial and ethnic identities in the South African society are two examples of such a venture.

2) *The Challenge of Power Relations and Responsibility*

As Phippen (2000) put it, recognition is a form of social relation in which the freedom of the 'sovereign' agent is revealed and implemented. In other words, recognition does not inherently dismantle power relations. Rather, it takes place within the existing power relations which, to a large extent, determine recognition. This means that through the act of recognition in a situation of domination, the recognizing side affirms not only his/her identity, but also

the domination itself. The mere process of recognition becomes a strategy of one side affirming the subordination of the other. This means that if we are to facilitate a peace process, we must disconnect recognition from power relations. For this to happen, the ethics of recognition must muddle between modern ethics concerning the autonomous subject and post-structural heteronomous subjectivity. The first assumes the subject is an autonomous agent who discovers her own morality in an independent rational process. The latter subjectivity assumes the unconditional presence of the other, which precedes any act of self-construction as an autonomous subject. Muddling between these two modes of ethics is not easy to guarantee in conflictual relations. This demand entails existential threats that must be cured before such a process can take place. This means giving up on a moral identity that has been at the core of a collective's self-perceptions and their belief in their entitlement to group rights. Nonetheless, only through such a process will it be possible for the conflictual parties to gain recognition and become legitimate in the eyes of their 'enemy.' Turning the enemy into a friend conditions the legitimacy of the self and is a challenge that must be dealt with for a peace process to move towards resolving a conflict. Moral responsibility and obligation becomes a precondition for identity to be what it is. This means that parties of conflict are mutually dependent not for the formation of their identities, but mainly for their presence to become legitimate as moral agents.

3) *The Ontological and Territorial Challenge*

Defining the reality of a conflict is one of the most disputed aspects in a situation of struggle. Conflict can be seen as a difference between the parties' perceptions of their relationship. Therefore, one of the challenges becomes determining what exactly it is that one recognizes and on which definitions it is based. Whereas one side may define the nature of the conflict as material, another can define it as cultural, and yet another as existential. It is well known in the literature on recognition that the conceptual tools used to determine the nature of conflict have major implications for its proposed solutions and the means used to promote them.

The realities of intractable conflicts have territorial, cultural, psychological and symbolic dimensions. The cultural, symbolic, and psychological elements, and in particular, the territorial element must be given special attention. The link between identity and a specific territory is central to validating the legitimacy of the self. This is particularly true in conflicts where special ownership rights and an indivisible bond between peoplehood and territory compete with historical and indigenous rights. It is here that we need to differentiate between inherent bonds between peoplehood and territoriality and delegitimizing the

relationship between them. Territoriality is part of peoplehood but it could not and should not be conceived in possessive terms if we are to resolve a conflict with a clear territorial dimension. This means that territory must be an open space, enabling identities to flourish without falling into the trap of ontological security that turns borders into rigid boundaries of existence. Such rigid forms block accessibility and turn territory into a sacred space inherently tied to the self-perception of each side of the conflict. In more concrete terms, in territorial conflicts, parties may render a single territory as part of its respective, exclusive history and a central component of its identity (Gans, 2010). Such an effort feeds antagonism and tension and blocks the ability to share spaces. As Martin Buber (Buber, 1983) has already clarified, shared spaces are important sites of communication. The art of sharing spaces, especially when they are considered sacred by each of the sides, can be a deeply spiritual experience that can be important in conflict resolution and reconciliation. The ability to overcome the narrow physical meaning of space and find symbolic and figurative dimensions that could be shared is not an easy and common mission, but nevertheless possible, as Dionigi & Couroucli (2012) and Barkan & Barkey (2014) illustrate in their examples in the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa.

4) *The Challenge of Sovereignty*

The sovereignty of social and political agents has become a key issue of debate in the last two decades. The Hegelian dialectics of recognition have contributed greatly toward an improved understanding of the master/slave dialectics and of different agents' nature, who mutually recognize dependence and independence. Much of the discussion on sovereignty revolves around the meaning of the concept and its internal contradictions, especially when speaking of intersubjective relations. This is true when speaking about nations, especially those that share a disputed land and cannot fully separate. The question of who is the sovereign to determine what happens in a given territory or for a group of people is paramount to understanding and resolving any political conflict, particularly a national one.

This complexity brings to the fore the meaning of sovereignty in Israel/Palestine and the potential contradictory significance of hostile and antagonistic versus peaceful relations. The Israeli–Palestinian reality reflects a realist view of sovereignty. The exclusive realist interpretation of Israel's sovereignty makes compromises difficult to achieve, as much as the Palestinian demand for realist national sovereignty. If we are to speak of genuine mutual recognition in Israel/Palestine, we need a flexible definition of sovereignty. This means that both political entities need to change gradually in order to enable shared

sovereignty, something which can be implemented in various institutional forms that the two sides agree upon. Shared sovereignty is a flexible concept that entails an agreement to develop common mechanisms of decision-making and law enforcement at the cross-national level, without frustrating the uniqueness and particularities of the way of life, community values and patterns of practicing identities. It is about developing an over-arching institutional and symbolic forum that draws upon common patriotism and identification and provides agreed upon answers to disputed questions. Shared sovereignty is a gradual process that can start with very concrete topics where there is agreement between the two sides of conflict and develop into full-fledged sharing mechanisms that cover most if not all avenues of existence. This conception corresponds with the way reconciliatory identity formation is conceived, where the transformation of conflictual identities result in significant commonalities between the two sides. To comprehend how these theoretical challenges manifest in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, we will now elaborate on their practical meanings.

Major Challenges of Conflict Resolution in Israel/Palestine

1) *Identity and the Challenge of Inclusiveness*

As mentioned above, the identity of the people doing the recognizing and those being recognized forms one of the major stumbling blocks in conflict resolution and reconciliation. One of the primary dilemmas discussed in the literature of recognition is the affirmative versus transformative dimensions (Fraser, 1997). The scope of the recognized identity is not sufficiently determined. When it comes to protracted identity conflict, one of the main problems revolves around the scope of the identities and who is included and who is not included. This challenge is a chief obstacle in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and can be sub-divided into several levels.

The first level addresses the asymmetrical attitudes towards the other, which becomes crucial when we talk about significant gaps in the balance of power, as in the Israeli–Palestinian case. It is sufficient to say that the Israelis' demand for recognition from the Palestinians is based on the assumption that the Palestinians are one people whose members are universally committed to any agreement signed between the Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership and the Israeli government. However, a deep examination of the genuine Israeli position towards Palestinian rights shows that it is based on a counter assumption, namely that different Palestinians have different rights (Jamal, 2000). In other words, the established Israeli standpoint is that resolving the Palestinian

problem does not involve all Palestinians and all of Palestine (Ben-Ami, 2006; Arieli, 2010). Israel demands that each Palestinian group accept the status quo established after 1948. In terms of the refugee problem, the Palestinians in Israel and the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories (OPTs) face different fates with slight modifications. This attitude is reflected in the talks between Israelis and Palestinians, where the Israelis are unwilling to accept that the state's Palestinian citizens are part of the conflict and that their status should be determined from within, rather than outside, the peace negotiations. The official Israeli position views the status of Palestinians in the state as an internal affair and, according to the Israeli narrative, reflects the fragmented view of the Palestinian people.

Notwithstanding this viewpoint, one cannot ignore the fact that several Israeli officials, including an Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Liberman, raised the possibility that a portion of the Palestinian community in Israel should be part of the deal and exchanged with the settlements in the OPTs (Arieli, Schwartz, & Tagari, 2006). This idea of demographic exchange demonstrates the dual Israeli position where on the one hand, the Palestinians are viewed as a unified enemy that should be subordinated to strategic Israeli interests, and on the other hand, the Palestinian community should accept the Israeli perception that it is a fragmented entity.

When it comes to the Israeli demand for recognition from the Palestinians, the basic assumption is that Jews are one unified nation, notwithstanding where they live and their legal affiliation to Israel. Accordingly, the Jewish people are entitled to self-determination, which means the State of Israel. Based on these assumptions, the Israeli negotiating team demands that Israel be recognized as a Jewish state in the national, cultural, and historical sense. This means that Jews are one people and have the right to live in Israel even when they are citizens of other states. All Jews are potential Israeli citizens and therefore, the State of Israel belongs to them. This affiliation is an organic bond that goes beyond principles of citizenship. This belief becomes clear when the national connotation of 'Israeliness' is compared and contrasted with its civic meaning. The Israeli state views Jews across the world as part of its identity and invests its resources in strengthening the connection between Jews and the State of Israel. When comparing this relationship with the link the Israeli state promotes between itself and its Palestinian citizens, one notices that the presumed bond is not only instrumental to Israel maintaining its power, but secondary in terms of importance, emptying any meaning from bona fide civic culture. This position manifests most clearly in the recent bill defining Israel as the 'National Home of the Jewish People' (Lis, 2013).

The cultural dimension of Israel's demand for recognition addresses the Jewish culture as the hegemonic civilization of Palestine. This demand takes on two different meanings. The first has to do with the dominance of the Hebrew language in the Israeli public sphere. One of the best examples is the Israeli High Court of Justice's interpretation of the status of Hebrew and Arabic as official state languages (Saban & Amara, 2004). The former president of the court, Aharon Barak (Saban & Amara, 2004) justifies and thoroughly explains the primary position of Hebrew vis-a-vis the secondary position of Arabic in more than one verdict, despite the fact that both languages are recognized as official languages. The second level of the cultural hegemony can be illustrated by the 'Traditional Sites Plan' presented by the second Netanyahu government, where sites under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority were included. The plan alluded to the Israeli government's dominant view that the entire area west of the Jordan River is under its cultural authority and forms an integral part of the cultural bond between the Jewish people and the land of Israel.

The historical aspect is the most crucial when it comes to Israel's expectation and demand for recognition from the Palestinians. The prevailing Zionist perception of the Jewish people and their relationship with the land of Israel goes back to the divine promise in accordance with the biblical story, leaving no space for alternative views and excluding any competition with other peoples for the same land (Gans, 2010). The chief Zionist narrative established an exclusive, possessive relationship between the Jewish people and the land of Israel. This relationship is eternal and not subject to change according to the occasional opinion of the general public. Israeli legislation on land ownership and the fact that 93 percent of Israel is state land indicates the complexity of this position. Furthermore, legislation in the case of Jerusalem and the current referendum law on territorial concessions show that the official narrative concerning the historical bond between the Jewish people and the land of Israel is not only a matter of belief, but has clear legal ramifications.

Thus, whenever Israel demands recognition from the Palestinians, especially of the state's identity as Jewish, this automatically entails the recognition of the Zionist narrative with all its implications. Such a demand nullifies the historical relationship between the Palestinians and Palestine.

We face a different challenge when it comes to the Palestinian demand for recognition, which is not less problematic than the Israeli one. The Palestinians' basic assumption is that they are the indigenous people of Palestine, were colonized by a settler-immigrant movement and expelled by force from their homeland. They demand recognition of their self-perception and of the past wrongs committed by the Zionist movement. This demand implies correcting past wrongs by recognizing the right of all refugees to return to

the original places where they once lived. This does not necessarily mean the return of all refugees but something which must be acknowledged in principle, as it counters the Jewish claim to the land and their self-defense when facing a Palestinian attack on their rights.

Another Palestinian belief is that the Jewish population which immigrated to Palestine is alien to the land. Although the Palestinian negotiating team does not state this aloud, the Jews who arrived in Palestine before 1948 are not related to the Jews who inhabited Palestine 3,000 years ago. Therefore, they have no right over the land and their arrival is adverse to the basic rights of Palestinians over the land.

Based on that premise, any Palestinian compromise with the State of Israel does not and cannot entail recognition of the Zionist narrative, the Jewish story of the land, and their subsequent rights over the land. The basic Palestinian stance is that the colonization of Palestine and the founding of Israel created demographic and political-legal facts which are accepted, either for moral or realistic reasons. This means that the most Palestinians can accept is recognizing Israel as a fact without recognizing it as a right, as long as it defines itself as it does.

2) *The Dilemma of Asymmetric Power Relations*

As explained above, one of the most central dilemmas of conflict resolution, peace negotiations, and reconciliation is the issue of symmetry – asymmetry. Each party's role in the conflict and their responsibility for it are highlighted differently when viewed from the perspective of symmetry – asymmetry. The way in which both entities' roles and responsibilities are perceived carries major ramifications for the possibility of reconciliation and its formation. It is obvious that each side has an interest in reducing its responsibility for the conflict and accusing the other side.

Furthermore, we differentiated between the ethical meaning of the symmetry – asymmetry dilemma and its practicality. Whereas one of the conflicting sides may stick to the principle of symmetry, the other may reject it. In this regard, one must consider the link between power relations and the imperative need for symmetry. In cases of major power gaps, the asymmetrical becomes the ethical choice. This idea is embedded in Levinas' philosophy of recognition, countering the established idea of symmetry in the understanding and application of recognition promoted by other theorists such as Honneth, Taylor, Ricoeur and others (Williams, 1997).

When examining the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and peace efforts from the view of the symmetry – asymmetry dilemma, we notice that it forms one of the major obstacles to reconciliation. The negotiations between Israelis and

Palestinians have been established on the presumption of symmetry, despite that this belief has not been brought to the fore. The negotiations take place as if the two sides were equally responsible for the consequences of the conflict. Both parties' original stances concerning the conflict's causes, the responsibility of the other party, and the gaps in power between them invalidate the symmetrical foundations on which the peace talks are based. This negotiation has led to much dissatisfaction and frustration on both sides, especially for the Palestinians, who view themselves as the underdog. It is sufficient to interpret the descriptions of the Camp David negotiations between Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak in summer 2000 to understand that ignoring the implications of symmetry leads to major difficulties in negotiating.

Looking at the meaning of symmetry and how the opposing parties view it can help us understand its possible implications. From the Israeli perspective, one of the most important meanings of symmetry is that the relationship between Palestinians in the OPTs and those in the Diaspora is similar to the relationship between Jews in Israel and the Jewish Diaspora. That is to say, the centrality of the Jewish Diaspora in the conflict and Israeli affairs resembles the situation of Palestinian refugees.

Palestinians reject such a perception of symmetry as it distorts the overall nature of the conflict. From the Palestinian perspective, the refugees are victims of the conflict, were expelled, and refused to go back to where they originally lived during and after the 1948 war. The Jewish Diaspora provides Israel with material, political, and diplomatic resources to continue its policies of occupation, oppression, and colonization. The Jewish Diaspora is not forced to remain outside the place it believes to be its homeland. On the other hand, the Palestinian Diaspora is not allowed to return to the area it considers being its homeland. The difference between the two situations is clear for Palestinians, but Israelis belittle or ignore it during negotiations.

Another aspect of the symmetry- asymmetry dilemma has to do with responsibility for the consequences and how they played out. This pertains to the opposing accounts of the conflict, starting with the 1948 war and ending with the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000. The official Israeli narrative fully blames the Palestinians for the current outcome. This position is expressed in the Israeli interpretation of the following:

- how Palestinians treated Jewish immigrants during the British Mandate period,
- the Palestinians' rejection of the November 1947 UN partition plan,
- refugees fleeing and rejecting any plan to settle them in their home countries, and

- the Palestinians' role in the outbreak of the first intifada and their responsibility for whatever Israel did during and as a result of the Palestinian decision to launch a second intifada.

This understanding is reflected in the speeches and writings of Israeli officials, including those deeply involved in the peace negotiations such as Ehud Barak, former chief of staff of the Israeli army and former prime minister, Shaul Mofaz, former chief of staff and former defense minister, and Benjamin Netanyahu, former finance minister and current prime minister.

This view on who is responsible for casualties and the oppressive policies of the Israeli army in the OPTs establishes an asymmetrical relationship between the two sides. Israeli officials promote this asymmetry in order to blame the Palestinians and portray Israeli policies as a response to Palestinian actions. The Israelis blame the Palestinians for rejecting the partition plan and claim that the Palestinian leadership called for an evacuation during the 1948 war, thereby creating the refugee problem. Israelis also say that Palestinians have decided to use force, especially terror, in order to fight against Israeli peace efforts. Moreover, the official Israeli discourse portrays Mizrahi Jews as victims of authoritarian regimes that forced them to leave their home countries and confiscated their property (Shenhav, 2006).

When looking at the Palestinian perception, one cannot help but see the dominant asymmetrical view of the entire conflict. Despite recent changes in official Palestinian discourse and the amendment of the PLO Charter, Palestinians still view Jewish immigration to Palestine as a form of colonialism, where Jews, assisted by foreign powers, have colonized their homeland and expelled hundreds of thousands from their homes. The Zionist movement is viewed antagonistically and the policies of the Israeli state, especially the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, are seen as a clear illustration of the chauvinist nature of Jewish nationalism and its imperial character (Masalha, 2000).

The Palestinian perspective on the conflict is that it is asymmetrical, as the Zionist movement and the Israeli state are deemed fully responsible for what has happened to Palestinians since 1948. This stance also applies to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories since 1967, the confiscation of Palestinian public and private lands, and the settlement policies, which establish demographic and geographic segregation similar to apartheid. Palestinian political discourse increasingly compares Israeli occupation policies to the apartheid regime in South Africa, which lasted from 1948 to 1994. The expansion of settlements, the paving of roads solely for Jewish settlers' use, the closing of major commercial areas in Palestinian cities to facilitate Jewish

movement, and the building of the separation wall, ignoring Palestinian basic needs form a clear indication of the racial ghettoization project that Israel has been promoting since the second Palestinian intifada. Many Palestinians point out the asymmetry between Israeli reality and their own through their daily experience in checkpoints and through the Israeli abuse of Palestinian tax funds to press their leadership to make concessions in matters of concern for them, such as the freeing of prisoners, the control over area C, and the evacuation of Palestinians from areas considered to be part of Israel in the future. An increasing number of Palestinians view the peace negotiations as a creative Israeli policy to dismiss the asymmetrical reality, establishing a 'legitimate' cover for the continuation of the illegitimate colonization policies.

3) *Territoriality and Ontological Security*

One of the foremost challenges of recognition has to do with the basic definition of the conflict, which must be resolved if one seeks to reach an agreement on the nature of the dispute. It is well known from conflict resolution theory that merely agreeing on how to define the conflict is a major step toward rapprochement (Wolff, 2009). Gaps in the basic perception of the conflict are part of the conflict itself and cannot be overcome unless addressed during peace negotiations.

When looking at the Israeli–Palestinian case, we find a serious disparity between the Israeli and Palestinian views, which carries serious repercussions for the behavior of both parties. The Israeli perception has changed over time. Whereas Israelis used to see the Palestinian problem in humanitarian terms for several decades and tried to convince the world that Palestinian nationalism does not exist, most of them now agree that it is an issue of self-determination. There is a deep rift in Israeli society as to how to resolve this matter and the extent of Israel's responsibility for it. Nonetheless, even right-wing nationalists agree that there is a Palestinian national movement which represents the Palestinians and demands a political solution with major implications for Israel and its future.

The official Israeli position views the Palestinian problem as a matter of self-control in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has become clear that Israeli officials cannot avoid speaking about Palestinian political rights in the areas occupied in the 1967 war. Some of them go a long way to discuss how a two state solution would work. This stance, which has emerged in the last two decades, alludes to the possibility of a certain form of Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but a state that is surrounded by Israeli settlements and army forces.

However, Israeli officials make clear that, if the negotiations are to be continued, the Palestinians must agree to certain conditions such as recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, agreeing to territorial swaps, excluding the Palestinian citizens of Israel from a future Palestinian state, and limiting the right of refugees to return. These demands diminish the significance of Palestinian national aspirations, thus invalidating Palestinian statehood, and do not address the roots of the conflict. The established Palestinian position states that Israel has already received 78 percent of their homeland. Negotiating over the remaining 22 percent is another compromise that Palestinians cannot accept unless there are one-to-one territorial swaps.

The mainstream Israeli perspective does not address two chief aspects of the conflict which the Palestinians must resolve in order to redefine it. The first is territoriality, whereby Israeli officials are unwilling to consider the 1967 borders and integrating the West Bank with Gaza as a basic principle of Palestinian statehood. One influential Israeli view deals with the divine and historical right over the land of Israel. Israeli officials and academics establish a deep connection between special ownership rights and the cultural centrality of the land throughout history in Jews' self-perception. This connection makes compromise over parts of Israeli territory a serious challenge for any Israeli leader, especially in a reality where conservative and religious trends are becoming more dominant in Israeli politics.

From the official Israeli viewpoint, the 1967 war and its outcomes form the defining event of the conflict. This understanding, which most Palestinians completely reject, emphasizes that the 1948 war and the injustice done to the Palestinians are not the essence of the conflict, and therefore should not be central to the solution unless the Palestinians take responsibility for their part in the 1948 war. The refugee problem must be resolved in a multi-lateral rather than bilateral framework, something which illustrates Israelis' misunderstandings concerning the unity of the Palestinian people. One can demonstrate the official Israeli stance by examining the way in which Israelis view Palestinians with citizenship. Israelis often say they are not part of the solution, despite the fact that they are perceived as part of the problem (Smooha, 1993). The deeper meaning of this outlook is that the territories within the Green Line, internationally recognized as Israeli territory, are not part of the conflict. These lands are not part of Palestine and have no Palestinian identity. This position is implemented in Israeli policies, cutting off any symbolic or material link with the Palestinian past in various ways such as by demolishing Palestinian villages, renaming areas, specific villages and towns, and the denationalization policies applied toward Palestinian citizens (Jamal, 2007).

Palestinians are reluctant to directly confront Jewish national rights in Palestine. Although they negotiate with Israel and are willing to agree to a historical compromise between the two national movements, they do not accept the Israeli perception of the conflict as one of borders. It is very difficult for them to recognize the Jewish existence in Palestine, let alone the rights of Jews over the land. This is true since 50 percent of Palestinians live as refugees outside their homeland as a result of Israel's establishment. Defining the conflict by borders and statehood does not match the common perception among most Palestinians, who are fully aware of the balance of power and the difficulty of receiving international support for their position. Nonetheless, a large portion of the Palestinian people stick to the original view of the conflict as one which covers the entire territory of Palestine, despite the willingness to accept a partial compromise leading to statehood. The widespread notion among Palestinians is that the conflict centers on the consequences of the 1948 war, and any resolution must address the past wrongdoings which created the refugee problem. Furthermore, many Palestinians, some of whom agree to a historical compromise with Israelis, remain loyal to the Palestinian narrative, which views Zionism as a settler – colonial movement with clear imperialist motives. Continuing to build settlements in the OPTs is unmistakable evidence of the core definition of the conflict. Many claim that the problem is not with Jews and their need for security and statehood, but rather with the hegemonic ideology of the Israeli state, namely the 'judaization' of the whole land of Palestine, the decrease in the number of Palestinian residents in Israeli-controlled areas, and stripping Palestinians of political power, including those with Israeli citizenship (Jamal, 2007).

Israelis stress security and the strategic dilemma they face, but if they fully recognize Palestinian nationalism, then Palestinians will emphasize the issue of justice and thereby disagree with Israelis that the conflict is solely about self-determination.

4) *The Challenging Perception of Sovereignty*

The Israeli–Palestinian negotiations have so far demonstrated that both sides demand a fully independent and sovereign state. From the perspective of both sides, the meaning of 'sovereignty' shows that they are talking about exclusive and supreme power of the state over a defined territory and population. Israel has been a sovereign state since 1948. However, since 1967 the meaning of sovereignty has been shaken as a result of the occupations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where hundreds of thousands of Palestinians live and dispute the territorial and demographic integrity of these areas. Furthermore, Palestinian refugees demand to return to where they once lived within the 1967 borders,

thereby subverting the sovereignty of the Israeli state as the national home of the Jewish people. It is worth mentioning the Israeli expansionist policies in the OPTs, which lead to major internal disputes concerning the definition of sovereignty in a place where millions of Palestinians fight for independence and live under Israeli control with no political rights. The status of the settlements in the OPTs and the Palestinian demand for independence in zones with many settlers complicate the meaning of Israeli sovereignty, leading to complex political and legal reality where demographic and territorial separation become increasingly impossible.

Regarding the Israeli attitude towards the Palestinian demand for sovereignty, the Israeli government insists on demilitarizing the Palestinian state and requires either an Israeli or international military presence on the Jordan River. In terms of economics, the Paris Protocol reflects the Israeli interest in keeping the West Bank and Gaza Strip under Israeli customs law and with the same currency. Such policies would reduce Palestinians' control over their life in a future Palestinian state and negate their sovereignty.

The Palestinian demand for a fair solution to the refugee problem, besides the demand for full independence, puts a heavy strain on their recognition of Israel as legally defined and conceived by the vast majority of its Jewish citizens. The prevailing Palestinian viewpoint, as reflected in the talks between the two sides, accepts Israel as a partner for peace and respects Israeli sovereignty within the 1967 borders. However, most Palestinians, including the negotiating team, do not recognize Israeli sovereignty *a priori* outside the negotiations process. Such a stance means that sovereignty must remain an *a posteriori* issue in regards to settling the conflict. On the one hand, accepting Israel's sovereignty as defined by the Israeli state erases any possibility of resolving the refugee issue. On the other hand, not recognizing Israel as its citizens wish to be seen deepens mistrust and places the Palestinians in an inferior position vis-à-vis Israeli control of the entire territory west of the Jordan River.

The Palestinians find themselves in another catch-22 concerning sovereignty. Their demand for statehood does not match the Israeli *a priori* condition of demilitarization. The demand for a sovereign Palestinian state includes full control of its borders socially, economically, and politically, in addition to the ability to defend itself. Such a demand legitimizes Israeli claims for sovereignty, including the defense of its demographic integrity, and matches Israel's official legal identity as a Jewish and democratic state.

However, the Israeli perception of sovereignty does not relate to consequences for Palestinian citizens, excluding them from the conflict's resolution, something that was addressed previously. Israel's current definition of sovereignty means it is the national home of the Jewish people. Israel is

defined as a democratic state *de jure*, where the institutional structure and practices meet most conditions set by parliamentary democratic theory; *de facto*, however, sovereignty does not extend to the majority of Israelis, but rather the majority of Jews. The Law of Return¹ and the prevailing view of national security in Israel show the gap between legal definitions and practical policies. This gap agitates the Palestinian perspective concerning the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.

Based on the above information, the dominant meaning of sovereignty as seen by both sides has to be modified to match the complex territorial and demographic realities established so far. A genuine mutual recognition embodies an alternative idea of sovereignty that is not based on mutually exclusive foundations.

Conclusions

Based on twenty years of negotiations, one can confidently claim that it is possible to manage the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and maintain the status-quo in the short run, but such a policy adds new complexities to the conflict in the long run, since the realities on the ground intensify the geographic and demographic overlap between the two sides even more. The reluctance of both Israeli and Palestinian leaders regarding border issues and the practical meaning of Israeli statehood is generating a more interwoven reality and deepening the colonization of Palestinian areas that form the main hindrance to a possible separation. This reality not only causes more frustration and mistrust, endangering the status quo and security of both sides, but also prevents recognition of the two nationalities as equal players that have rights which must be met. Taking the explosive reality of continued Israeli territorial expansion into account, it is possible to argue that a comprehensive and genuine reconciliation process is indispensable to avoid resulting cycles of violence. Recognizing both sides' rights is a major challenge that can explain the failure of the negotiations thus far, and assist in promoting a peaceful future.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is partially rooted in the construction of the identity of the socio-political agents that clashed in 1948, leading to a new geopolitical reality. We can only speak about an authentic peace process by bringing the two sides to mutually recognize this reality and express willingness to deal with its various dimensions. Based on other conflicts, it is well known that

¹ The Law of Return was enacted in 1950, two years before the Citizenship Law, granting every Jew the right to come to Israel and automatically become a full citizen.

this is not easy to achieve, especially in cases where the power gap is huge, the justifications for the status quo are shaken, and the legitimacy of the conflicting identities becomes questioned. Nonetheless, the mutually exclusive self-perceptions of the two sides and the lack of integration between their futures will have to change if a resolution is to be reached.

The challenges of recognition show that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is far more complex than the engineers of the Oslo process thought. Their plan to put aside deep-rooted controversial issues such as refugees, borders, or Jerusalem was a necessary step at the time, but turned out to be a minefield that enabled opponents of the process to nullify its practical intentions. The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP) from September 1993 opened a Pandora's Box that has been hard to manage so far. The growing tension in the relations between the two sides and the fact that this tension will not suddenly disappear makes it clear that they have to replace their current strategy with a more comprehensive one. This strategy should be based on transitional justice and reconciliation that considers the dilemmas of recognition explained above, in order to avoid a breaking point in the antagonism between the two sides.

The gaps between the Israeli and Palestinian perspectives around key material, economic, strategic, and existential issues are very wide. Attempting to avoid major differences and dealing with daily relations adds new complexities, which inevitably lead to unexpected behavioral patterns that endanger many on both sides. Israelis increasingly see Palestinians as a hindrance to the normalization of Jewish life in a sovereign state. More and more, Palestinians see the Israelis as apathetic to their aspirations for a dignified life in an independent political entity, and Israelis oppose any serious engagement with past wrongs committed against Palestinian refugees. Simultaneously, both parties understand that neither is going to disappear, and that neither will be able to realize their dream of a reality without challenges that question their basic rights to an identity and a homeland.

The current form of ontological recognition that spurred the Oslo process into action is characterized by domination and animosity. This type of recognition does not correspond to how the other side wishes to be viewed. Therefore, it does not lead to reconciliation. Rather, it has deepened mistrust and resulted in a structural reality full of apathy and suspicion on one side and anger and despair on the other. The present circumstances do not meet the minimum requirements for peaceful conflict management. This explosive reality could burst at any moment and cause hundreds if not thousands of casualties.

The current situation calls for an alternative form of recognition that cannot only redefine the identities of the recognizing parties, but can also improve the

quality of their relations in a way that promotes happiness and hope. Agonistic, ethical recognition overcomes domination and suppression and at the same time remains aware of differences and tension. It is based on open dialogue and establishes an inter-human space that dissolves the current relations of domination and continual colonization as well as denial and resistance.

As long as the strategic status quo, in which Israel is in complete control of all aspects of reality in Israel/Palestine, continues to undermine the legitimacy of ethical recognition and maintain exclusionary, antagonistic relations between the two sides, positive prospects for resolution will not appear on the horizon. Both parties are interdependent and mutual recognition forms a central component of how they view themselves. The dominant self-defined identities of both sides are incompatible with each other. They must be re-configured to include the other's perspective so they can enter into genuine dialogue. In other words, ontological recognition affirming the prevailing identities of the two sides does not benefit productive negotiations. There is a need for ethical recognition that is based on transforming the conflicting identities of Israelis and Palestinians, thus making room for more mutually tolerant self-perceptions. Ethical recognition could start with those aspects that are agreed upon and common to both sides, but not in order to manipulate the opponent, as the Oslo process did. It must be a genuine process of reconciliation, according to which the avenues of agreement lead to developing broader ones, up to a point where the two antagonistic identities are transformed into something that is beyond how they were when the process started.

This is not an easy task. The argument of this paper is based on the presumption that partition has never truly taken place, is difficult to achieve in the current circumstances, and that there are many social forces on both sides that would oppose it. Therefore, one could say that a certain type of 'togetherness' is currently taking place anyway. However, it is a conflictual togetherness characterized by subordination, domination, and violence. If togetherness is there, it might be better to recognize it and turn it into one that is constructive and beneficial for both parties. The lack of alternatives for both parties and the dangers of the current situation make ethical recognition indispensable. It is a long process of reconstructive change that neither side could accomplish alone. It is difficult to strategically remold the self and consequently the relationship between the two sides, but without doing so, another two decades of the Oslo process will not change today's antagonistic circumstances. Leadership and support from the outside are crucial for such a change to happen. The role of the international community, especially the United States and Europe, must become more active, not in facilitating an institutional solution that is neither realistic nor genuine, but in generating ideas that align with the demographic

and geographic realities on the ground. It is clear that both communities do not want to give up their dream to feel at home in the land west of the Jordan River. Therefore, any international intervention must begin with finding the principles and mechanisms that enable the two sides to realize the need for shared sovereignty.

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Collective Trauma, Recognition and Reconciliation in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Maya Kahanoff

This paper explores the relationship between trauma and recognition in protracted ethno-national conflicts and investigates the role of acknowledgment in promoting conflict transformation and reconciliation between groups that have experienced trauma, particularly in the Israeli–Palestinian context.

After a short literature review, I will present findings from two field studies carried out on dialogue groups of Israelis and Palestinians who met in various contexts to discuss the narratives of collective trauma of both peoples.

One of the research conclusions is that psychological difficulties stemming from the paralyzing experience of the collective trauma of one group make it difficult to recognize the suffering of the other group and its collective trauma.

A more encouraging finding relates to the potential for transformation and expansion of awareness (of the other's 'lived reality'), which takes place in intragroup dialogue. I demonstrate that the discourse which develops between the members of the same group in the 'behind-the-scenes dialogues' is much richer, multifaceted and inclusive than what is played out on the stage of the intergroup dialogue.

Thus, I argue that it is essential to develop internal frames of discourse enabling each group to conduct the inner dialogue needed to work through its victim identity and transform its narrow vision of the other and self, thus making recognition of the other's trauma possible.

This, in turn, enables the transformation of the relationship between the rival groups from binary, complementary, mutually negating relations to relations that transcend the position of the two; beyond the victim-victimizer interlock, towards mutual recognition.

The prolonged and violent Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been going on for more than 60 years between two societies that have suffered collective trauma: one is overshadowed by the mass extermination of six million Jews in World War II, known as 'the Holocaust.' The other is overshadowed by the expulsion of some 700,000 Palestinians from their homeland in 1948, the destruction of their villages, and the dissemination of the Palestinian community, known as 'al-Nakba.' It should be emphasized that al-Nakba, the Palestinian catastrophe

of 1948, is incommensurable with the Holocaust, except in one respect: both events were collective and personal traumas for the two nations, and they are living in the shadow of those traumas to this day. Furthermore, for both peoples the trauma continues: The Palestinians live in a reality of occupation, lack of sovereignty, home demolition and land expropriation. Israelis suffer from war and terrorism, experienced as secondary traumas.

Members of both groups are affected by trauma that makes it difficult for them to recognize the suffering of the other group. We should note that even though the Jews are presently politically and militarily stronger, in their existential experience they are still a threatened minority and suffer from a 'siege mentality' (Caplan, 1999; Bar-Tal, 2014), as I will elaborate below. Therefore, the strong/weak dichotomy fails to do justice to the complex reality, and the characterization of the relations between these groups as asymmetric is partial, since beneath the surface both groups feel threatened and yearn for recognition.

The findings of this study will present first the barrier to mutual recognition as played out in intergroup dialogue endeavors, followed by a demonstration of the potential of intergroup dialogue to transform consciousness and open a space for mutual recognition. I will demonstrate the important role that the discourse which develops between the members of the same group in the course of the intergroup dialogue plays in the transformation process.

The Centrality of Trauma in Protracted Conflicts

According to the psychiatrist and social psychologist Vamik Volkan (1997, 2001), disasters experienced by groups cause their members traumas whose effects last for many years after the traumatic conditions are removed. Volkan argues that the mental representation of those traumas in the group's collective memory becomes a sort of marker of its identity and a galvanizing factor for the individuals in the group. Thus the impact of the trauma reaches beyond those who were involved in the events that caused it, creating an intergenerational transmission of the trauma that affects everyone who is "under the ethnic or national tent" (Volkan, 1997, p.45). The members of the traumatized group, even those who had no connection with the people who experienced the trauma personally, can be expected to display post-traumatic symptoms themselves, because the event narrative is imprinted on their psyches. Volkan coined the term 'chosen trauma,' which is the group's unconscious choice to define its identity through the intergenerational transmission of the victimized self, carrying the memory of their ancestors' trauma (Volkan., p. 48).

Groups suffering from collective trauma are characterized by existential fears and disbelief in the possibility of the threat being lifted, and are easily influenced by leaders who use the memory of the traumatic past and fear of its recurrence to push for repeated armed conflicts and thereby perpetuate and escalate conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2014).

Several scholars have written about the historic burden that impedes the resolution of prolonged ethnic conflicts and about traumatic events or their representation in the collective memory that create a 'psychology of victimhood' among members of the injured group (Montville, 1993; Caplan, 1999; Bar-Tal, 2014). These are situations in which the trauma fatally impairs the group members' collective sense of security in their identity, self-worth, and children's future. The psychology of victimhood produces suspicion among the members of the group that were the victim of trauma. They are in a state of constant alert for the next assault or next violent outbreak that might befall them at any moment.

Traumatic events continue to preoccupy the members of ethnic groups and nations, especially in the context of prolonged and intractable conflicts, argues Bar-Tal, because the context of violence and threat brings the experience of the collective trauma back to their awareness. The selected, or 'chosen trauma' (in Volkan's terms) continues to have an impact not only on constituting collective memory but also on shaping world views, values, and practices, especially in the area of the intergroup relations of the society carrying the selected trauma (Bar-Tal, 2014, p. 56).

Or as Mati Steinberg (2015) writes: "The constant and disturbing presence of the past casts its heavy shadow on present problems and prevents really addressing them" (p. 105).

For instance, Jews in Israel have a 'siege mentality' that stems, partly, from the trauma of the Holocaust. This trauma has instilled in Israeli Jews a constant anxiety about their continued physical existence. They feel there is a threat to their existence as a collective, giving rise to feelings of mistrust and suspicion towards other nations.

The Nazi German enemy with its evil characteristics and intentions became a symbol, which was transposed onto the view of Arabs. Israeli Jews carry an internalized anti-Semitic image of the Diaspora Jew who cowered in the face of persecution and went "like sheep to the slaughter" during the Holocaust. It gave rise to a self-image of collective victimhood, which has been defined as "a mindset shared by group members that results from a perceived intentional harm with severe and lasting consequences inflicted on a collective by another group" (Bar-Tal, 2014).

Remembering traumatic Jewish experiences that took place in the distant past affects collective fear in Israeli–Jewish society in relation to the Israeli–Arab conflict, leading Israelis to reject collective guilt for wrongdoing and dismiss views that blame them of the oppression of Palestinians.

In this regard writes Daniel Bar-Tal (2013), groups that perceive themselves as victims tend to deny the very legitimacy of the other side. Ervin Staub (2006) adds that the psychological vulnerability of the members of a particular group who are trauma victims, impacts on their lowered sense of self-esteem, which in turn can cause the victims themselves to become perpetrators.

In a similar manner, it has been argued that it is impossible to understand Palestinian culture and responses without understanding the centrality of the Nakba in their identity and their memory (Kimmerling, 1999; Khalidi, 1998).

The trauma of the expulsion and the dispersion – a tragedy perceived as both personal and national – shapes the Palestinian experience to this day more than any other event. Like the Holocaust, argued Kimmerling, in the harnessing of the Nakba for the purpose of building the collective identity there are constructive and creative principles, alongside destructive and obsessive principles, in terms of Palestinian political, cultural, and social behavior.

In a lecture Kimmerling (1999) gave in the annual conference of Israeli anthropologists he quoted the words of poet Fadwa Tuqan: “In 1948 my father died and Palestine was lost [...] These events gave me the ability to write the nationalist poetry that my father always wanted me to write” (p. 6). A popular culture coming from songs and ballads, poetry and prose, was created around central topics on the mythical timeline of past-present-future: memory of the lost Garden from which the Palestinians were expelled; and the description of the future victorious return to the field, the vineyard, the house, the settlement, and the homeland.

In the symbolic field, claimed Kimmerling (1999, p. 7), Palestinians expect the Israelis, even if they don’t return their lands and homes they usurped from them in 1948, at least to recognize their catastrophe and their suffering, and the fact that the Israeli society and state were founded and built upon the ruins of the Arab society and culture. In the political and practical realm, he further argued, they expect Israelis to take direct responsibility, as a society and as a state, for the rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugee society that they created.

Kimmerling concluded his lecture by suggesting that the very recognition of the Palestinian narrative, collective memory, and suffering and its incorporation as part of the Israeli narrative, is necessary for the maturation of Israeli society itself.

According to historian Rashid Khalidi (1998), that injury has not yet won recognition (among Israelis and Jews) and continues to create pain, rage and insult. Added to the pain of losing their national home, argues Khalidi, the Palestinians suffer from the pain of the injustice of their being ignored and the lack of recognition of their national grievance.

Due to the centrality of trauma in the identity of both of the collectives in the conflict, and in light of its consequences of mutual isolation and delegitimization, it is clear that recognition of the trauma suffered by the 'rival other' is necessary as a key element in any possible reconciliation process between them (Kymlicka & Bashir, 2010).

Recognition and Acknowledgment

Jessica Benjamin's (2011) article "*Acknowledgment of collective trauma in light of dissociation and dehumanization*" discusses the concepts of recognition and acknowledgment. "Recognition," she writes, "is a wide roof sheltering many different phenomena including [...] witnessing and acknowledging realities that are often denied" (p. 207). When we acknowledge a heretofore denied reality of suffering or even violence, she argues, it has a profound impact. "The impact of receiving such recognition, but also of giving it, may be transformational, allowing a person to move into action to repair, rectify, or otherwise deal with something has previously paralyzed them with fear" (p. 208). She further states:

In [...] reciprocal affirmation of the other, especially acknowledgment of suffering that has been denied, there is an implicit affirmation [...] that the suffering of humans matters [...]; that the acknowledgment of pain and suffering gives dignity even to wounds that cannot be repaired; that the recognition of suffering connects or reconnects us to the magnetic chain of humanity in which suffering is our common denominator. (p. 208)

The idea that recognition is fundamental to stable healthy identities has been developed by a number of scholars (Taylor, 1994; Honneth, 2008; Benjamin, 1988): recognition as the acknowledging of the identity of the other, their right to exist, their pain, and the injustice done to them. Taylor (1994) argued that the same holds for entire groups that are consistently oppressed or suffer discrimination.

Demands for recognition have become a major symbolic aspect of conflict and conflict resolution (Honneth, 2008; Fraser & Honneth, 2003). Verdeja (2009) writes that “recognition of injustices is a crucial element of reconciliation, and individuals who suffered massive wrongs need their worth and dignity as fellow humans recognized” (p. 59). The idea of respect as recognition of a person’s inherent dignity emerges in many settings. Survivors from Latin America, Southeast Asia, Africa and North America often frame human rights violations not only as physical and emotional harms, but also as moral wrongs, says Verdeja, using the terms ‘victim recognition’ and ‘victim acknowledgment’ in the broader sense of status parity that includes both symbolic and material components.

In the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, both sides demand recognition not only of their national identity and their legitimate rights, but also of their pain and suffering. (Kampf, 2012; Kelman, 2001, 2008; Nagar & Shamir, 2013; Rouhana, 2010).

At the same time, the deep and ongoing conflict between the sides; which creates layers of insult and injury, grievances, and victimhood; impedes granting recognition to the trauma and victimhood of the other. Such recognition is perceived as a real threat to the status of one’s own side (Jamal, 2001; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; Kelman, 2008; Kahanoff, 2015).

Groups involved in prolonged, violent conflicts tend to view their own group as the victimized group of the conflict, and compete with each other over their victim status (Kelman, 2008). This phenomenon has been termed in the literature ‘intergroup competitive victimhood,’ the tendency of adversarial groups to perceive their in-group as being subjected to more injustice and suffering at the hands of the out-group than the other way round (Noor et al., 2008; Noor et al., 2012). This has been found to be a dominant and destructive feature of the relations between Israeli Jews and Palestinians (Shnabel et al., 2013; Sullivan et al., 2012). The strong need of Israelis and Palestinians to establish their in-group’s victimization makes them unwilling to let go of the grudge they hold against the out-group and to consider the possibility of more harmonious future relations (Shnabel et al., 2013).

Studies also show that this perception of one’s own side as a victim and the ensuing competition over victimhood have a dramatic impact on the dynamics of intergroup dialogues in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Bar-On, 2008; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011).

Why is it so difficult to acknowledge the other’s pain and suffering, particularly when there is a history of collective trauma involved? A deeper exploration of the psychological implications of trauma might give us a better understanding of the ways it impedes prospects of reconciliation and provide us with useful insights for finding the way out of this conundrum.

Psychological Implications of Trauma

Chosen trauma, as a master negative event, writes Volkan (1997, 2001), continues to have a tremendous effect on world-views, values, norms, and practices, especially in the realm of the intergroup relations of the society. The larger group unconsciously defines its identity by transgenerational transmission of wounded selves and the memory of a primordial trauma. These traumatic events are not processed but passed from generation to generation. Each generation automatically reconstructs and ritually relives the early threat to its people's survival as well as the defenses that were activated to cope with the situation. These defense mechanisms prevent the society from undergoing the necessary mourning stages to process the trauma.

Numerous authors describe the continuous, weakening and distorting traumatic effect of the Holocaust that has a particularly strong hold on Jews in general and Israelis in particular (Le Capre, 2001). All agree that even when people seem to have overcome the trauma (albeit in a distorted and delusional manner), it rears its head and strikes them again. Other writers describe the traumatic effects of the Nakba on the Palestinians, asserting that the traumatic effect of losing their property and homeland in 1948 and the attending humiliation are fundamental elements in the identity of Palestinians in Israel and abroad (Sa'di, 2002; Masalha, 2009).

Jessica Benjamin (2011), a relational psychoanalyst, provides a psychoanalytic analysis of possible implications of the traumatic situation. The experience of threat or helplessness, she suggests, may generate a wish to reverse positions, i.e., to humiliate, control and injure, rather than be vulnerable to such violence. This experience, according to Benjamin, contributed to the conviction that being tough and violent is a way to defend yourself and can guarantee safety. Moreover, she argues, "a kind of madness can be created in people when they feel that the truth of what is being done to them is being denied and blacked out by the world, and much violence can be attributed to this" (p.212). Benjamin suggests that a state of continual violence and conflict creates a dynamic of oscillating reactivity, in which each side feels helpless and driven to react and defend itself.

One common mechanism for dealing with a violent and painful past is denial. Cohen (2001) defines denial as an unconscious defense mechanism to cope with guilt, anxiety, and disturbing and uncomfortable feelings that arise from facing reality. This leads to a mental block of information that cannot be tolerated or is unbearable.

This pattern of denial and ignoring is typical of the collective pattern of coping with loss and trauma in Israel. It can be seen from the attitude towards the Holocaust: for the first twenty years after the war ended, Israel ignored

the survivors' suffering – both their traumatic experiences and the painful and heavy emotional burden they carried; the same pattern can be seen in the way Israeli society coped with the suffering and traumas of the many subsequent wars and *intifadas* (Witztum and Melkinson, 2012).

In addition, the trauma narrative plays a role in building group identity and addressing the fears and feeling of threat that arise from prolonged intergroup conflict (Kelman, 2001, 2008). Therefore, any process of becoming acquainted with the other's trauma narrative challenges the group's constitutive, familiar and soothing narrative, and any attempt to change it is likely to be rejected because of the psychological need to maintain cognitive consistency and social commitment to the accepted positions (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; Bar-Tal, 2014).

It is not surprising, then, that until recently it was common for Jews and Arabs to avoid dealing with the matter of traumatic memory and the suffering it entails for the other. This avoidance was given different explanations; some attributed it to the fear that recognizing the other's suffering would lead to partial or even total erasure of the suffering of one's own group. So, for instance, it is common for Palestinians to consider themselves indirect victims of the Holocaust, "because their homeland was taken from them by its direct victims," and they are afraid that discussing the Holocaust serves to establish the State of Israel's legitimacy (Bishara, 1995).

From the other side, Jews' reluctance to engage in joint discussion of both traumas has been explained by the fear that discussing the Holocaust next to the Nakba creates a comparison of the Jewish suffering in the Holocaust and the Palestinian suffering in the events of the Nakba, thereby detracting from the uniqueness of the Holocaust and minimizing it (Ronen, 2005). Others believe the reason it is difficult to discuss the two traumas is fear of giving up the status of being the ultimate and exclusive victim. Yet others regard Israeli Jews' avoidance of discussing the Palestinian trauma as a means to preserve the ongoing silence regarding the matter, out of the fear that uncovering and recognizing the suffering caused to the Palestinians during the war of 1948 might undermine the legitimacy of the establishment of the State of Israel (Rouhana, 2010).

How, then, can a discussion be held on such a loaded subject? Are the conditions present for a dialogue in which each side can listen to the other's trauma? The challenge is particularly formidable in the Israeli–Palestinian case, where each side perceives itself as being subject to an existential threat, and the other side as the enemy responsible for that threat. How do we break the common pattern of (binary) relationship, in which there is always a persecuter and a victim/ an oppressor and oppressed/ a strong side and a weak side? How can we transcend this impasse?

In the remainder of the paper I will present and analyze several dialogue sessions taken from Israeli and Palestinian encounter groups that focused specifically on the topic of the collective traumas of both peoples.

The data was collected in two field studies in which I observed different groups, carried out in different contexts and different time periods. In the first one I followed a group of Jewish and Palestinian educators who convened at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute in 2007–2009. The goal of the group was to study and hold a dialogue on the subject of the Holocaust (naturally, the subject of the Nakba also came up in these meetings). At the basis of this initiative was the idea of connecting between Jews and Palestinians, two peoples who have suffered, in an attempt to focus on understanding the suffering and turn it into a basis for partnership.

The second study followed several dialogue groups of Palestinians and Israelis, who met under the auspices of the Parents Circle – Families Forum (PCFF), a joint Israeli–Palestinian organization of bereaved families promoting peace and reconciliation, during the period of 2010–2015. The focus of these groups was learning the narratives of collective trauma of both peoples, while trying to promote processes of mutual acknowledgement and reconciliation.

In all the cases we will see how important it is for all sides to receive acknowledgement of their collective traumas: Palestinians and Israelis alike are yearning to be recognized by the other. At the same time, trapped in the mutually exclusive dynamics of the conflict, they experience immense psychological difficulty to grant the desired recognition to the other.

I will demonstrate how in the ‘backstage’ of the intragroup encounter, in the protective space of one’s own group, more diverse and inclusive dialogues evolve. I will suggest that it is those internal spaces (‘intersubjective spaces’), in Benjamin’s (2011) terms where the group members hold dialogues with each other and within themselves, that contain the potential for transformation and mutual acknowledgment – of the other’s trauma as well as of one’s own.

My conceptual analysis draws mainly from the conflict resolution and transformation discipline, with an emphasis on social-psychological perspectives and psychoanalytical theories of trauma and recovery.

A Competitive Intergroup Dialogue

The salient experience reported by participants in the first group of Palestinian and Jewish educators conducting dialogue on the subject was a lack of recognition of their trauma. Palestinian participants came out with the feeling that their voice was not heard, and Jewish participants reported they did not feel their pain was understood or recognized. In the interviews I conducted at the end of the project, some of the Jewish participants reported an increased sense

of mistrust and intensified fear of the Palestinians following their encounter, saying: “We have to defend our very existence here.” Similarly, Palestinian participants reported an increased fear of sweeping harm against their people, the potential of which they have come to realize in the course of studying about the incremental process of the annihilating the Jews; in the face of which they felt the need to foster caution and vigilance in their communities.

In the course of the project, the group visited the Yad Vashem Museum of the Holocaust, for the purpose of a hands-on introduction to the Jews’ collective trauma and in the hope of developing understanding and empathy towards their traumatic collective memory. But it appeared that Jews and Palestinians each saw their own suffering there, and could not open up to the other’s trauma or feel it. So, for example, said Abed, one of the Palestinian teachers, after the visit:

It is hard to leave this place with a smile. The attempt to emphasize the personal aspect [...] was very impressive [...] alongside these things there were many things that reminded me of today’s situation, and I ask myself how much we see the similarity – the whole issue of separation, the Separation Barrier, the soldiers taking pictures with corpses¹ [...] and the attempt to push me into the Zionist narrative and the story of the establishment of the State of Israel. And what does the Holocaust have to do with the establishment of Israel? It is a historical museum that is supposed to tell a historical story!

Abed describes the feeling of having a particular story, which is not his, forced on him. He interprets it as domination by the more powerful side, and this arouses his resistance.

Another Palestinian, Sibil, describes her experience:

Today the whole matter of walls stood out a lot. In parallel [to the walls of the ghetto in the past] there are many walls [here and now], physical or psychological, and you do not want to see what goes on behind them so everything that is disgusting there [...] you do not see [...] Do you manage to see the cruelty and the oppression? I ask myself, will we not reach the same situation the Jews were in in the Holocaust?

The sights at Yad Vashem reverberate in them the experiences of their people’s past and ongoing suffering. Along with the pain that arises in them, anger

¹ A reference to ‘trophy pictures’ Israeli soldiers posted on social networks of themselves with killed Palestinians.

and protest at the Jews' denial of their difficult situation come up as well. It seems that the Palestinian teachers could not help seeing themselves in those pictures – their suffering, their misery, their despair. Therefore, they were not at all able to listen to the voices of pain and anxiety expressed by their Jewish colleagues. Being focused on their own troubles, they had difficulty recognizing the trauma of the other, the Jew.

Interestingly enough, the Jewish participants also felt they had no place to express their trauma.

Meir, one of the Jewish teachers, said:

I feel like I am being told: 'You guys are manipulating the whole Holocaust story and have no right to Jewish commemoration of the Holocaust.' It worries me, it seems to tilt the whole thing towards Holocaust denial. During the day I felt my right as a Jew to identify with the Holocaust was questioned.

Another Jewish teacher, Yossi, addresses the Palestinian participant and says:

Look, Sibil, I have no family. I have a grandmother and grandfather on both sides and all of the rest of my family was taken in the Holocaust, this whole room is my family [...] And for me, every day, this state, this is the promise that it is not something that can happen to me [...] again.

A dynamic arises of addressing the other in the expectation of having one's suffering recognized, that wish being denied, and subsequent feelings of insult. The inability to grant that request was most accurately expressed in the words of one of the Palestinian participants after the visit to Yad Vashem: "I am suffering and out of this suffering I cannot see another people's suffering."

As a result, there was a process of mutual withdrawal and stiffening of the line between the two groups. This can be understood as a response to the increased anxiety in the face of the unprocessed and unrecognized trauma (personally and collectively). The challenges of dialogue between Palestinians and Jews regarding collective trauma were similar for both groups, as many participants experienced an existential anxiety, reporting feelings of hurt and vulnerability and the feeling of basic non-recognition of their identity by the other. This absence of recognition seems to have intensified the participants' experience of suspicion, and sense of existential threat. This in turn, led to defensive reactions – withdrawal inwards into one's own group and thickening of borders between the two national groups.

The Jewish-Palestinian group did not manage to reach a common ground and move past the "competitive model of remembrance" (Rothberg, 2008a).

According to this model, memories exclude each other from the public sphere. In this case, the statements of Palestinian participants who compared what is happening today in Gaza to ghettos, were perceived by Jewish participants as an attempt to minimize or erase the memory of the Holocaust. Whereas the statement made by the Yad Vashem guide regarding the necessity of the establishment of Israel as the only solution was perceived by Palestinian participants as a manipulation intended to minimize and silence the memory of the Nakba.

In interviews I held with Palestinian participants at the end of the project I found resistance to recognition of the consequences of the effects of the Holocaust for the present Israeli reality.²

Abed suggested separating the discussion of the Holocaust from the Israeli Jewish experience. He noted that it is particularly difficult for Palestinians to relate to the subject of the Holocaust as long as it is directly connected to the founding of Israel, as was clearly demonstrated in the tour of Yad Vashem. Because Israel was built “at the expense of the lands of people who still live and see,” he explained,

it is hard for the Palestinians to hear that the answer to the Holocaust was creating the State of Israel. Are you punishing the Palestinians because the Germans made you suffer? You do not have to associate between the Holocaust and the State of Israel.

In one of the discussions, Jewish participants asked their Palestinian colleagues to recognize their need for a state of their own. The Palestinian participants also asked their Jewish colleagues to recognize their need for national definition. Neither side was able to grant the other the hoped-for recognition.

The conversation between them went as follows: Shifra, a Jewish teacher, declares her willingness to give the Palestinian citizens of Israel full equality and find a solution for the Palestinian refugees. But she immediately adds a reservation that her willingness depends on recognition of her own right to a state:

But I need my partners to agree that 60 years ago it became clear that the Jews have no other place on earth. In the whole world there was not a single state where it was safe for Jews to be. It doesn't matter what solution was found. I'm willing to live here as a minority. But there is one

² The interviews were held in Hebrew, as the Palestinians who participated in those dialogue encounters spoke the language.

thing I have to know. That in this place the Jews' culture and their religious institutions will exist until further notice. That is the thing I need to hear from you.

Palestinian teachers are surprised by that request from their Jewish colleagues. Sibil turns to Shifra and asks her: "Why do you need that from us?"

After a while the discussion turns to the subject of the Nakba and the refugees. At this point the Palestinian participants ask their Jewish colleagues to recognize their pain. The request is granted partially. Sibil, a Palestinian participant, begins: "I wanted to ask you, do you think about the Palestinians on Independence Day?"

Esther, a Jewish participant, replies:

I always think that this joy was built on the tragedy of another people. I always think about the Nakba. Some people were destroyed here. There are so many villages that no longer have any Palestinians in them. The State of Israel must recognize the Nakba.

Yaffa, a Jewish participant, mentions that anti-Semitism did not begin with the Holocaust. And Nir states that bin Laden wants to destroy the Jewish people.

At this point says Sibil:

You continue to tie yourselves in chains and as a Palestinian that leaves me no place. You don't want to see other things. You see a picture, part of which is imaginary, and you do not only chain yourself but you chain me too. You say we [the Palestinians] will do to you what the Germans did and I need to chain myself to that story.

The discussion reaches an impasse, with each side seeking recognition of the wrongs done to it and assurance of its existence and right to its place, while at the same time being unwilling to grant that very same coveted recognition to the other: recognition of their suffering, needs and aspirations. It seems that sharing the suffering of the other and recognizing their past trauma is hard, if not impossible, in the context of protracted conflicts. It raises feelings of shame, guilt and betrayal of one's own group.

The unequal balance of power between the two groups in the real world creates a categorical and one-dimensional conception of strong versus weak, aggressor versus victim. In this dichotomized discourse, there is only one side which is seen as a legitimate victim asking for recognition of the wrong done to it, and another side that is supposed to give such recognition without having

its own traumatic memory recognized and identity validated. It seems that members of the minority group (or those under occupation) have difficulty developing empathy for the pain of the other, who represents for them the ruling majority, or occupying group, and resist any request that they grant such recognition.

The Jews' request to be viewed as people who were aggrieved is received by the Palestinian participants as an attempt to obfuscate the historic facts and dismiss the experiences of oppression and humiliation caused to them.

At this point I would like to mention Michael Rothberg's (2008b) illuminating argument, that addressing trauma (or memory of trauma) does not need to be subject to an aggressor-victim dichotomy. There should be no confusion, he claims, between the concepts of 'victim' and 'traumatized person.' We can see ourselves as a victim while not having gone through a traumatic process (perhaps because the process of our victimization did not create the kind of destruction typical of trauma). Trauma, Rothberg argues, hints to another state of being, involving the suffering of survival (vulnerability, feelings of threat and helplessness, and constant anxiety about the trauma repeating itself). And not everyone who experiences trauma is a victim (for example, the aggressor can experience trauma due to their participation in a particularly violent or cruel act). Thus, he suggests, it is important to allow for a complex view in which anyone can have a traumatic experience, whether aggressor or victim.

In this spirit, I would propose that even if in some respects – military, political, economic – the Jews are the 'strong' side, in terms of the subjective/existential experience, people in both groups (Palestinian Arabs and Jewish Israelis) are affected and motivated by traumatic experience.

Yearning for Recognition

The yearning for recognition on the part of the Israeli Jews was evident in interviews I conducted with Israeli Jewish participants in another intergroup dialogue on the subject. Said David:

I want them to know that this Holocaust did happen. I saw that for some of them it was a surprise. They didn't know these stories [...] There's a kind of diminishment on their part [...] they try to minimize the issue [...] It's important to me that they recognize we did not come from another planet and we have no intention of going back to somewhere else, and so we have to reach that compromise. The Palestinians should understand

our need, which is very similar to their need – to receive recognition. They ask for recognition and so do we.

David questions the prevailing conception of asymmetrical power relations, which puts him in the ‘strong side’:

I’m not sure about the power [...] we saw the war last summer [the 2014 Gaza conflict], when tunnels reached our homes and threatened the lives of entire families [...] So what kind of power is that? There is no stronger or weaker side, or more just side. That’s not the issue.

Similarly, Ada protests against the one-sided expectation of the Palestinians, voicing her needs too:

I can understand that the Palestinians experience themselves as being under occupation and are unable to see what is going on here with us, and in a way it’s irrelevant to ask them for recognition [...] they are so busy with their own pain. But on the other hand, I am also angry with them [...] I can’t just come to listen to their trauma [...] I know that that’s what they need me to do right now, but it is very hard for me, too. In the war last summer, when there were rocket alarms, it reawakened my trauma. My entire body reacted, and the fear ... And I was with a little boy [...] and the horrible feeling that I could not protect him [...] So I am angry too [...]

In one of the interviews I asked an Israeli participant: why is it so important for you to get this recognition? Michal explained:

When there’s no recognition, it cancels the value of the human beings who were murdered [...] Recognizing the Holocaust is important so as not to erase the people. Behind the numbers there were people ... human beings, families [...] And when the Palestinians say “the Holocaust was a long time ago, let it be,” that’s something that erases – not only the collective memory of the state of Israel but the memory of my family, of the people themselves. My grandfather saw how his parents were murdered [...] you cannot erase that memory, nullify it. The recognition kind of brings the person back, gives respect to the people who were ...

Michal concedes the fact that Israelis do the same thing to the memory of the Nakba when saying “it was in 1948, enough talking about the past, let’s talk about the future.” When the Palestinians come with their keys [the Palestinian

symbol of their lost homes], she says, “it’s the same thing, it’s a memory still burning in the hearts of families.”

Shoshana elucidates the dimension of healing recognition can provide to those who underwent trauma, and shares a moving experience she had in the encounter:

The fact that the Palestinians who are going through such hard things are there with me for a moment in my suffering, in my trauma [...] The wound closes up a little and lets me get close and be with them and their injuries ...

And when Khaled heard my family’s Holocaust story he came to me and apologized for having blamed us for doing to them what the Germans did to us. What I felt cannot be described. In that moment you melt, you feel you have been accepted and recognized, and then you are much more open to see their pain [...] to connect with them and understand what they went through following the Nakba, and today as well ...

She further suggests:

If you go to the political level it’s going straight for the wound. It hurts too much and then you shut down. If you go to the personal level of pain it softens you.

She summarizes her thesis: “We have a wound and so do they. I think going for the political is like performing an operation without anesthetics.”

Between Persecutor and Persecuted

An Israeli participant shared her difficulty hearing the Palestinians’ comparing the Holocaust with their situation today, and challenging the aggressive behaviors of Israelis towards them:

The comparison that the Palestinians made [after their visit to Yad Vashem] with the reality of their lives in the present was difficult for me [...] When Haifa [a Palestinian participant] asked us: why do [Israelis] treat the [Palestinian] prisoners that way [the way the Jews were treated in the camps]?

I said to her: I don’t want to listen to you [...] If that’s what you got after a two-hour tour [of the museum], then we are in two completely different places. I lose my empathy for her ...

Another Israeli participant, Merav explained:

As soon as you hear stories of villages being depopulated in 1947, or checkpoints, arrests [of Palestinians] [...] you are shocked. It shakes your view of your morality, of the morality of the society you live in – on both sides. You hear someone else's story and identify with it and it shakes the entire picture you had constructed for yourself. What do you do with this?

Yet another Israeli, Shoshana adds:

When you recognize the trauma, the picture becomes more complicated and hard to handle, and the fear that if we see all of the complexity we would be weakened by it and could no longer stand up for ourselves – and we mustn't, because we have to be strong! People's feeling that we have to be strong, because if we aren't strong we won't exist ... that is the Jewish experience, in my eyes. It's a basic existential fear that also ruins us.

Identification with the other is also problematic for the Jewish participants, because they come into contact with their image as it is reflected in the eyes of the other as persecuting and aggressive, rather than as being persecuted, the way they perceive themselves. They experience a transformation from victims who deserve compassion to objects of hatred.

I suggest that the panic and threat members of the Israeli–Jewish group feel in response to the Palestinian accusation might set off their old anxiety and throw them back into their collective trauma. In this context, the very willingness to listen to the other and acknowledge his suffering can be viewed as legitimizing what they say. Passively listening to the other as he describes you as a murderer can bring to mind a distant traumatic experience of Jews who went “like sheep to the slaughter.” The Jewish participants' feelings of vulnerability and passivity may be unbearable because they reverberate a traumatic collective past experience. Fear of touching the painful spot and revealing the tremendous vulnerability that is still there and might bring back the feelings of weakness and helplessness that persist into the present make it impossible to listen to the suffering of the other, who is perceived as a rival who wants to hurt you.

On the other hand, Palestinian participants' difficulty feeling the other's pain and recognizing their collective trauma arises from the disempowered and unstable place they occupy today. Recognition of the 'strong party's' pain is perceived by them as threatening to blur their fluid boundaries, to confuse

and deface their as yet uncrystallized identities. The awareness and identity of the members of the 'subjugated' group, which is constituted in contrast with the Jewish other, is threatened by the encounter with him when he is revealed in his human face.

The encounter with the other as a subject, while revealing his human face and vulnerable sides, requires, as I suggested elsewhere, a new, unfamiliar treatment both of the other and the self (Kahanoff, 2016). This might undermine the one-dimensional picture of the Jew as enemy/evil/aggressor, while also undermining the picture of the Palestinian self as good/righteous/victim (if the other is not purely evil, then I am not purely good, either).

At this point the Palestinian participants experience ambivalence towards their Jewish counterparts: they are conflicted between the wish to know the Jew's positive human face and engage with him intimately, and the desire to maintain their total negative image of Jews, against which their own distinct victim identity can be preserved. Thus the anger and desire for recognition and separation exist alongside the yearning for acceptance and belonging.

This interpretation provides a certain explanation for the lack of listening we found in most of the group conversations and for the struggle over speech as an expression of the struggle for life and death. Waiving speech and listening to the other in silence are experienced as helplessness, as nonexistence. Conversely, by speaking, the individual places his group at the center and his story silences the story of the other.

Le Capre, in his book *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (2001), expands the psychoanalytic concept of trauma to political and social contexts, and emphasizes that traumatic experience radically undermines the stability of the subject's identity, and can also cause a collapse of time and with it a collapse of the distinction between the past and present. This is how he explains post-traumatic people's compulsive revisiting of the traumatic events again and again, as though they were taking place in the present.

In his introduction to the Hebrew edition of Le Capre's book, Amos Goldberg writes:

The return of the reawakened trauma and hurt is met with different coping strategies, each problematic in one way or another. In one response the injured person establishes an overly strong and stable identity, based on denial of the particular dimension of the trauma that undermines his identity and integrity (physical and mental) through a fantasy of absolute control. This response is meant to block any possible contact with the feelings of hurt and pain and deny the helplessness that the traumatic experience sparks. The opposite reaction is a sort of absolute acceptance

that blurs the boundaries and distinctions between past and present, between here and there. Such blurring destabilizes and deconstructs identity. (pp. 16–17)

Coping that is considered effective or emotionally sound is such that comes into contact with the feelings of hurt and pain but responds out of the present reality, its conditions and resources.

My argument is that as long as there is a lack of listening and recognition of the collective trauma, the discussion group on the subject is experienced as retraumatization, because of the vulnerability of the situation or because of the mention of the repressed traumatic memory (of the Holocaust or the Nakba). The difficulty to speak about the trauma (of then) is intensified by the very presence of the other (of the present), whose reactions seemingly recreate the painful experience of rejection, humiliation and hurt, without being addressed.

A Different Scenario Where Recognition was Achieved

Now I would like to present a very different scenario, where mutual recognition between the sides was achieved after all. The following exchanges, taken from a dialogue group of Palestinian and Israeli women, exemplify a somewhat different discourse. Participants in a narrative project facilitated by the Parents Circle – Families Forum (PCFF) opened up to listen and validate each other's trauma, and embarked on a dialogue that was attuned to each other's emotions. These women were able to recognize that the abstract notion of collective traumas is actually comprised of personal histories.

An Attempt to Recognize Palestinian Trauma: A Joint Visit to a Demolished Village

After having visited Lifta, a demolished Palestinian village on the outskirts of Jerusalem, the Palestinian participants asked their Israeli partners to recognize their collective trauma – the injustice of 1948 and on, or the continuing Nakba.

Haifa expresses the excitement and turmoil caused by her visit to Lifta:

I was very moved. I didn't feel well because I could imagine myself being in the house when it was demolished [...] I'm not blaming you, she emphasizes, it's not you, it's other people, but I hope you pass it on to your children. We are people who suffered injustice.

She finishes her statement by thanking the women for helping her walk there, "I felt as if I was among my family."

Ibtisam, a Palestinian, shares the powerful experience she had which brought out a lot of pain and also raised her national consciousness: "It hurts us very much [...] Every one of us sees the pain. Every one of us has felt that pain."

And Naela continues:

Today you saw Lifta, you were moved, you were emotional. You felt pain for what happened then, in 1948. What you saw [happened] many years ago, we experience every day. I see that you share the pain, but this is the reality we live with every day. Somebody is shot every day. We very much hope that you feel what we feel and try to pass that on. The suffering of the Palestinian mother is daily.

Yael, an Israeli participant, expressed her appreciation of Naela for coming despite her painful personal story (which she shared with the group earlier) and shares her insights from the visit:

What I understood is that Independence Day is a very happy day for us and it will stay happy. I hope that after our next visit you will understand why. But I cannot ignore the fact that establishing this state, no matter how justified it was, caused the pain of someone else [...] What matters is to understand there was another people here and the very existence of the state denied something from someone else. Now what do we do about it?

I was very moved when Reema asked who picks the fruit now ... I grew up in Jerusalem. One of my childhood memories was going to Lifta to pick fruit. Suddenly, when Reema asked that, I felt the need to say "it's me." I felt like the biggest occupier in the world. I was just a child and these are my memories ... Until today Lifta was something different for me, and now something new was added.

Yona, an Israeli participant, says apologetically that the only thing she heard at school and in her family was about the war that took place between the young Israeli army and the Arab population of the villages.

I remember stories of a disaster where many Jewish fighters were killed ... I never heard anything about Lifta. My whole life I have seen the village houses from the highway. I never asked. Now it is my responsibility as a

mother to show [...] I was very moved by the tour. It was very meaningful for me when we were at [the destroyed mosque] ... to stand at an abandoned place of prayer. To walk through a place that has a story, and the story is absent. It was very hard for me.

A Palestinian participant, Manar, thanks her for sharing her feelings and her honesty. And another Palestinian woman, Naela reassures her Israeli friends:

The goal is not to blame but to find what each one of us can do, how we can change things. God help everyone who felt the pain. Everyone has an inner pain. But if we want to we can change it, to build a new generation that wants to be partners in a peace-seeking country, that is our job.

The women appear to have transcended the binary pattern that usually prevails in these situations and develop a common third space. They emphasize the emotional aspect and reveal the pain and vulnerability on both sides. They construct a mutual understanding and mutual identification by recalling their own childhood memories, where they could see themselves in those places. They show respect for each other and are careful to express their pain without blaming each other for it.

An Attempt to Recognize Jewish Trauma: A Joint Visit to Yad Vashem

The following discussion unfolded after the visit to the Yad Vashem Museum of the Holocaust. Nura, a Palestinian woman, opens:

We have pain, and there is pain in the Holocaust. I am not part of the Holocaust, I am against torturing people that way, treating them like animals. A person who behaves that way does not have human feelings [...] Today I feel your pain, just like you felt my pain.

Manar addresses the Israeli women saying:

I am sorry for the people who never saw their grandfathers and grandmothers, yet ... Today at Yad Vashem I thought about three things. When the guide talked about the [picture of the] woman who was ashamed and sat on the bench, I was in the same place [...] I experienced that. Soldiers attacked me, they didn't want me to stand at the bus stop. When I saw

the model of the crematoria, I went in my head to Gaza in 2000, I passed through fences, narrow passages [...] When I saw [the picture] of the little girl caressing her dead brother, my head went to Gaza [...] my brothers, my brothers. When I saw the bodies, I thought of Mohamed Abu Hdeir.³

Your history is painful, she says, and asks: Work so that our history is not like that. I beg you to try with us.

The painful hold of reality on these women is evident in their attempts to be empathetic to the Israelis' suffering and express their identification, despite the associations it brings up of their own painful experiences. They were able to identify with the other's pain without feeling it negated their own.

It is evident that the information they were exposed to so vividly and intensely came as a shock to the Palestinian women, who were overwhelmed by it. Says Haifa:

As a Palestinian [...] Muslim [...] mother [...], as a bereaved mother I was very moved. I don't know if you noticed but I almost fainted. I couldn't stand it. I heard about the Holocaust but I didn't imagine it was like that.

From here her tone rises and her speech becomes mixed up, between identification with the other's suffering and her own difficulties. She confesses to the fact that she did not want to come that day, as the day before they had buried a young Palestinian who was killed by the Israeli army, "a martyr, 22 years old, he had nothing to do with anything." Visiting Yad Vashem, "I was very moved," she says, and immediately after: "I ask you to try even harder so that there are no more martyrs. Try harder to end the occupation!"

At the same time, the comparison between the situation of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and that of the Jews in the Holocaust is very difficult for the Israeli participants, as Shifra says:

I don't think the Holocaust is something that can happen again. The disaster of the Holocaust is so huge that I cannot understand it. To annihilate a people, not to leave a single person alive [...] On the other hand, I hear Manar and the others and my heart goes out to your pain. Regardless of the Holocaust [...] It is clear to me that Manar's message is my message. There is a great similarity in the difficulty, the feelings, the pain, the empathy [...]

3 A Palestinian boy from East Jerusalem who was kidnapped and burned by Jewish boys from West Jerusalem.

In demanding respect for the memory of the Holocaust, Shifra does not attempt to compare the traumas. She voices her pain, the pain of the Jewish people, while also recognizing the pain of the other participants, the pain of the Palestinian people.

Tirza, another Israeli participant, announces that she would like to hear the feelings and impressions of her Palestinian friends from the visit to Yad Vashem. However, she stresses:

It is the Jews' biggest wound, and today I felt our group expected a great deal of empathy for what happened. I feel there was a real show of interest and attention in the museum, but it's as if we can't get your empathy even for five minutes without going right over to making comparisons.

Then she qualifies her words by saying that during the meeting she understood how difficult the Palestinians' living conditions are, yet, turning to the Palestinian women, she says: "We need that recognition from you, just like you need our recognition of your situation." This offers a significant insight: As Benjamin (1988) suggested, following Hegel, both master and slave need recognition. If the Palestinians fail to recognize the Israelis they will continue to feel they have to defend themselves by fighting them.

Meira joins her, explaining:

My experience at Yad Vashem is very personal. Everything we saw I know from stories [...] Even though it happened a long time ago it is very alive for us. It is my parents' story, of everyone around me, my grandparents, it is in my skin and my blood. The recognition, which is so significant in our story, is very important.

Palestinian participants quickly express their identification. Says Rehab:

I identified with your pain very strongly. I felt something very significant today, that the Jewish people also suffered injustice. It is very different from the picture of the soldier who kills.

At the same time, she expresses surprise: "What is strange is that the soldier who does what he does to Palestinians, he also experienced injustice. It is a very strange thought to absorb."

The discussion ends with a feeling of hope, as Nurit, an Israeli participant says:

I understand it is difficult for you [to understand me] when you are in your own story, in a trauma [...]. I'm here so that you get to know and honor my trauma, as women and as human beings, and so that together we can think how to change things.

The discourse in the two examples above exemplifies a *discourse of recognition*, whereby the personal histories of Jewish and Palestinian women were acknowledged, and empathy was developed for the sufferings of the other.

In his book *Philosophical Writings* Martin Buber (1959) writes of the importance of presence in dialogue: "The most important thing is to be present in the conversation and to turn to the other with attention to "the truth as it is" (pp. 109–110). Buber proposes "knowledge of the heart" as a different way of knowing, involving an authentic and open encounter with the other. The heart of such an encounter is entering a relationship with the other and commitment to respond to their *presence*. Buber suggests that such knowledge has far-reaching potential and might overcome the barriers posed by the traumatic awareness and memory, because "the boundaries of the possibility of dialogue are the boundaries of knowledge of the heart" (p. 117).

As I suggested elsewhere (Kahanoff, 2015) it seems that in places as painful as those where the Jews and the Palestinians are located, and in the present conflict conditions, dialogue reaches its limits. In these places a different kind of dialogue appears to be needed, focusing not on what is said but on what is felt.

On the basis of my observation of the meetings of this women's group, I would dare say that the women succeeded in relating to each other out of "knowledge of the heart." Sometimes it was not even articulated in words but in a dialogic silence. Perhaps because they were a group of women who felt a solidarity and a commonality beyond the conflict which separates them, and maybe it was the processes that occurred in the spaces behind the scenes of the intergroup dialogue. In Benjamin's terms, this group of women managed to establish a moral third pattern and transcend the binary pattern. Benjamin (2011) suggests that:

Part of an intersubjective connection is that the individuals involved reconnect with [...] the moral third [...] In such reciprocal affirmation of the other, especially acknowledgment of suffering that has been denied, there is an implicit affirmation that two or more humans are linked by a third. This third contains or rests on certain principles: that the suffering of humans matters, no matter what their different origins or status; hence, that the acknowledgment of pain and suffering gives dignity even to wounds that cannot be repaired; that the recognition of suffering

connects or reconnects us to the magnetic chain of humanity in which suffering is our common denominator. (p. 208)

We might also say that this discourse reflects a feminist perspective that seeks mutual recognition transcending the complementary pattern of relationships (based on splitting). Benjamin argues that complementary relationships establish relations of control and servitude because they demand that each partner play only one role, sacrificing part of their selfhood, so that one is the “doer” and the other “done-to;” one is the subject and the other the object. Mutual recognition is an overcoming of that splitting so that both partners can be subjects (Benjamin, 2004).

Following Benjamin’s asserting that the intersubjective or ‘third’ space opens up as a result of self-reflection, I would like to suggest that the processes that facilitated this new discourse of recognition were cultivated in the uni-national meetings that are embedded in the intergroup encounter, in the internal dialogues that took place among women of the same identity group. As we shall see below, the participants expressed in the internal discussions their own vulnerability and fear that stems from their group’s participation in the conflict; their embarrassment, and even the pain of losing goodness when confronting injustices caused to the other. This, I would argue, helped them expand beyond the one-sided perspective of self-justifying and blaming of the other.

In the safe spaces of internal discussions held among the women of the same national group, the participants were able to confront their own pain while recognizing their groups’ responsibility for the situation without having to resort to self-justification and blaming of the other.

Moreover, in the protective and supportive environment of one’s own group, the participants could get over their own wish to deny what is unbearable and overwhelming in the situation – to attest to their wrongdoings, as well as suffering.

In Benjamins’ terms, they have learnt to hold different parts of themselves, “the frightened, the wounded, the compassionate as well as the aggressive, and recognize them in others” (2011, p. 207).

New Voices Emerge: Backstage Inner Dialogue⁴

The following are excerpts from an internal dialogue that took place within the Israeli group after visiting the demolished village of Lifta. The facilitator of the

4 The example of inner dialogue relates only to the Israeli group – due to linguistic and ethical constraints of the researcher being an Israeli Jew.

dialogue taking place in the uni-national framework invites the group to ‘enter the shoes of the other’ – to imagine how the village looked in those days, how people lived there, how they saw things, etc., and also to try to figure out the mood of the Palestinians when visiting such a place today. “Try to give a place, recognition of their experience, and the way they perceived it [...] instead of arguing over who did what.” Meira shares her attempt to feel the experience of loss from the other side:

I asked myself, what do they feel there at the spring? I try to go beyond the story we know [...] I had my memory of going to a German city in the 1980s, and feeling moved to see the destroyed Jewish quarter. Imagine yourself there. Looking through the houses at the view, the [Jewish] neighborhood of Givat Shaul, a landscape that is familiar to me, but they look at it with completely different eyes. We will never agree on a single truth, concludes Meira, but it helped me understand where they’re coming from.

Another participant, Lana adds:

What moved me the most was at the end, when the Palestinian guide in Lifta said: now we have 30,000 refugees from Lifta. I tried to think about myself saying, what does it feel like to be a refugee, to be considered part of a village where nobody lives anymore? It touched me in terms of understanding where they are today. Real, essential refugeehood, through generations.

And Yael:

I don’t care about how many percent were expelled or fled. I’m not interested in counting. Maybe historically it’s inaccurate, but it doesn’t change the story that there was a people here, on whose land another people built its country. It helps to understand where they’re coming from, and then I can talk to them...

In the conversation with the Israelis, Yael repeated her memory of picking figs and cactus in Lifta as a girl, and how only during the encounter with the Palestinians did she realize that made her feel like “an occupier.”

Ilana shared her worries that listening to the other will be interpreted as a consent to the accusations made, and suggests that:

We will have to explain to them. We are listening to you, but it doesn't mean silence as consent [...] As if we expelled people who were picking leaves [innocents who had done nothing wrong]. I will not accept that [as if we were the only bad guys].

From a psychoanalytic point of view, as explained Benjamin, the act of recognition involves a lifting of dissociation, a concerted effort to overcome denial. In cases of collective trauma, she suggests, this action is especially difficult (and risky), as uncomfortable 'truths' that others wish to deny are exposed. This not only elicits scorn or condemnation, but also makes the witness the one to bear the anxiety and anger that lifting of dissociation may incur (2011, p. 209).

Thus, an Israeli participant expressed her turmoil after witnessing the demolished village of Lifta and watching a documentary of Palestinian testimonies of the Nakba:

It's hard for us [Israelis] to digest what we just heard. I was raised on the story that the Arabs ran away, not that they were expelled. I was raised on all kinds of other stories. And suddenly to see a movie about [...] people who were murdered when they went out to the fields. You have to put it all out there in detail and see that it's an atrocity, and that we are human beings.

The problem of witnessing suffering caused while being an agent of violence as well as an object of it involves, as Benjamin (2011) suggests, bringing together different self parts that are normally dissociated and split. "The identification with others who are victimized may be very strong, except in the case where it is a threatening enemy other, and this causes a particular kind of break in linking" (p. 210).

Benjamin (2011) argues that acknowledging the suffering caused by one's own wrongdoing raises the fear of losing one's own goodness, and an inability to bear guilt and remorse, and "to free oneself from a feeling of badness" (p. 210).

Perhaps in the protected confines of the identity group one can give and receive recognition and soothe the anxiety that feelings of badness will take over. In this space the Israeli participants could develop the ability to contain different parts of themselves (vulnerability and aggression), and as a result they could recognize the other's trauma and their own group's responsibility for it, without destroying or erasing their self-identity.

The short example of the inner dialogue presented above exemplifies a process of developing multiple perspectives that contain at the same time both

self-criticism of one's own group and understanding and acceptance of one's own suffering.

It is my contention that this inner dialogue, with its emerging new perspectives, is what makes it possible to develop understanding and acceptance of both self and the other.

In this dialogue, a third symbolic space opened that allowed some processing of the Israeli participants' pain and anxiety, experiences or memories of collective trauma, and sense of existential threat, which they carry even though they belong to the group perceived as 'strong' (Abulof, 2015; Bar-Tal, 2012). In most Israeli–Palestinian dialogue groups, these experiences and feelings do not receive recognition by the members of the group perceived as 'weak.'

I think the recognition by the members of their own group of the trauma shared by them all is what enabled them to expose their vulnerability and bring it into contact with their aggressive side.

The fuller view that develops in the dialogic space of the identity group projects on the view of the other as a whole that contains both good and evil, out of the understanding that there are no good guys and bad guys.

Conclusions

The research observations strengthen claims suggesting that those who have experienced trauma during a conflict will need acknowledgment of the wrong they have endured. People who have experienced collective or personal trauma, who are met with a willingness to be heard, experience this as a basic aspect of their feeling of self-worth, ameliorating the pain and the insult, and increasing their willingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the other side to the conflict. At the same time, it is evident that it is very difficult, almost impossible, to listen to and acknowledge the trauma of the other, especially since in these cases the listeners were involved in the trauma.

One of the research conclusions is therefore that psychological difficulties stemming from the paralyzing experience of the collective trauma of one group make it difficult to recognize the suffering of the other group and its collective trauma. The dialogue vignettes demonstrate a prevailing sense of victimhood, a sense of threat, and a need for constant defense in both groups. Thus, it is suggested that groups who feel victimized would find the acknowledgment of the other society's trauma highly problematic.

This research replicates the findings reported in my earlier work, claiming that the intergroup dialogue between Jews and Palestinians is trapped in a binary model, whereby the discourse in the encounter is split into two opposing,

mutually exclusive camps, with only two options: a complementary structure that maintains the relationship of domination and subservience, which brings the dialogue to an impasse (Kahanoff, 2015, 2016). This conclusion illuminates the limits of the familiar intergroup dialogue framework, which encourages opposition, antagonism, competitive memory, and complementary relations of victim and perpetrator.

A more encouraging finding relates to the potential for transformation and expansion of awareness (or integration of the self) that takes place in internal dialogues. In this vein, I demonstrated in my earlier work (2015) that the discourse which develops between members of the same group in the 'behind-the-scenes dialogue' is much richer and multifaceted than what is played out on the stage of the intergroup dialogue. The uni-national framework enables the development of plurivocality, which is flattened and reduced in the conflict discourse; and as we saw here, this gives space and legitimacy to vulnerable voices that have been silenced, on the one hand, and makes it possible to encounter the aggressive sides of one's group, on the other hand. This forms the basis for a possible integration of opposing sides in one's self and group.

I argue that it is this internal transformation, as a result of the external dialogue reverberating in the internal dialogue, that makes recognition of the other's trauma possible. This, in turn, enables the transformation of the relationship between the rival groups from binary, complementary, mutually negating relations to relations that transcend the position of the two; beyond the victim-victimizer interlock, towards mutual recognition allowing one to see the 'lived reality' of the other.

Perhaps the party defined as stronger is the one that must recognize the weaker side. As I have shown in previous work, it is more complicated for the weak side to question the certainty of their story, the anchor they cling to within a chaotic and injuring reality.

Therefore I propose there is a need for intensive work within the group defined as the stronger one in order to overcome its sense of 'minorityhood' and victimhood, and advance a more realistic view of its relative power in the field, so that it does not need recognition from the weak group.

Given these findings it seems that we need to explore the process by which societies and individuals can cope with the negative and enduring ramifications of their collective trauma and develop mechanisms or spaces for transforming the trauma, in order to facilitate acknowledgement of the other, and eventually reconciliation.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, utilized internationally to deal with the violent legacy of conflict and dictatorship (Hayner, 2010) are not relevant at this stage, while the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is still active

and violent. I suggest to focus, for the time being, on each society's ability to acknowledge and contain its own trauma, and develop mechanisms to provide the conditions for such transformational processes, as a necessary step towards acknowledging the other's trauma.

Thus, it is suggested to develop new frames for conducting internal dialogue, within each society, where past wrongs that occurred in the context of the conflict may be discussed; a process to assimilate the collective trauma and its various expressions, while also creating a discussion of our responsibility for past wrongs. A carefully designed process will put the focus on non-judgemental self-reflection and responsibility-taking, and steer it away from denial and blaming the other.

One way to do this could be in uni-national frameworks, built into inter-group dialogue encounters. Another would be to create special public forums designed for this purpose in each society, the aim of which would be to deconstruct the defense mechanisms developed over the years of the conflict, and to enable coping with the repressed aspects of the group's self, thus developing a better integration between the aggressive and the vulnerable sides of our collective (and personal) selves.

We should remember that reconciliation between sides in a protracted conflict, based on mutual recognition, requires reconciling with one's own violent past and with the other's violent acts.

For such a process to occur, there needs to be a listening community, an intimate and respectful presence of others who are willing to support the witness exposing a painful truth about unpleasant past events in the life of the collective, in a non-judgmental manner. We believe this will facilitate recognition of wrongs and suffering caused to others, as it will begin the process of humanization of the self and the other.

It is imperative to handle the internal discussions with empathy, acceptance, and sympathetic understanding of the difficulties the participants experience, such as possible shock and bewilderment. The facilitator's empathy as it is experienced by the participants may be a condition for the success of such delicate dialogue, affecting their ability to withstand the unsettling experience.

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PART 2

Beyond



Multiculturalizing Citizenship: Recognition, Political Agency and Marginalized Groups

Victoria Montgomery

Political agency is a dynamic concept which links the individual to structures in society. On an individual level it takes in confidence in one's own abilities to put issues on the public agenda, to politicize, mobilize, and ultimately to influence and change the circumstances in which one lives. This of course requires a hospitable and inclusive public sphere which will not constrain but engender participation. Agency in itself should have no significant relationship with a particular group, but structures and processes of inequality can and do create such relationships. Power inequalities, discrimination and injustice undoubtedly negatively impact on agency. Institutionalized patterns of inequality may limit agency and this should be considered in both material and cultural terms. The marginalization of minority identities and values from the public sphere make it more difficult for such groups to affect change or identify with public institutions so that full political equality can and often does go hand in hand with participatory inequality (Scholzman, Verba & Brady, 1999). Thus, the political agency of marginalized groups may be influenced by a process of recognition, which would aim to challenge their unequal status in society and of course the processes and sources of this inequality.

This paper aims to build on the idea of political opportunity structure, specifically how political opportunity structure can work differently for different groups and how a process of recognition can impact on this. This paper will consider the relationship between structure, agency, and recognition, with the first part of the paper concentrating on how and in what form recognition may ameliorate the position of marginalized groups, thereby overcoming the structural inequalities constraining their agency. The second part of this paper will view the relationship between agency, structure and recognition in another way, where circumstances of exclusion, inequality and marginalization actually occasion the agency of marginalized groups as they struggle for recognition. Indeed, as Squires (2002, p. 125) points out, demands for recognition have usually emerged from a sense of exclusion, leading to discrimination and inequality. How such agency is viewed or perceived in the face of heightened

anxiety around a particular group identity such as Muslims in Europe will also be commented on.

Negative Recognition & Non-Recognition: Reinforcing Inequality

Before we consider what recognition actually is or should be in order to maximize agency, I will first briefly look at the relationship between inequality and identity and illustrate how Universalist conceptions of citizenship, serve to reinforce structural inequalities.

Entrenched socio-economic patterns of inequality and structural inequalities can also take a cultural form such as negative or discriminatory discourse and attitudes. Public conversations provide the context within which people think and act and thus they are like social structures in Giddens's terms, "both enabling and constraining" (Dryzek 2007, p. 52). Public conversations can act to expand agendas to be social as opposed to specialist issues and thus enfranchise citizens to be a part of political issues from which they were previously marginalized. However, with regards minority and marginalized communities discourses these conversations are often hostile and negative. They can serve to vilify particular groups within the public imagination, be used to justify unequal treatment such as racial profiling, and generally marginalize such groups reinforcing their unequal status. This has implications for recognition and agency since the political mobilization of such groups may be perceived in alarmist terms and this will be discussed later in the paper.

Essentially how identities are treated or included is central to understanding political marginalization which, of course, impacts on agency and participation. As such, exclusive conceptions of citizenship which make no room for particular identities are increasingly problematic in our multicultural societies. In the broadest terms citizenship concerns the legal entitlement to belong to a political community (Wiener 1999, p. 199). It is both a practice with rights and duties as well as a status (Isin & Wood 1999, p. 4). It is often conceived of in idealistic terms by governments and majority communities as being shared and inclusive and neutral in the way that rights are owned by all citizens. Yet this does not always accord with reality. Citizenship can be directly and indirectly discriminatory by not tolerating or even prohibiting expressions of ethnic or religious identity. Moreover, for those wishing to keep a more ethnic form of citizenship, religious and cultural identity symbols such as the veil are purposively mixed up with highly emotive issues such as immigration and terrorism. Structural inequalities then can perhaps be viewed as stemming from exclusive conceptions of citizenship.

Universalist Conceptions of Citizenship

Universalist conceptions of citizenship can take two forms. One which consciously aims for the dilution or even eradication of minority identities and values in the public sphere, to be replaced with an identity as a member of a political community, the content of which minorities do not have the power to define or challenge. In this paradigm 'our' values and identity must be protected from all foreign threats, and so obviously there will be alarm at public expressions of religious or ethnic identity. This assimilationist paradigm is indicative of the unbalance of power within society which leaves no room for collective identities. Clearly a process of recognition is not an option. In fact there is actually a process of negative recognition in play, where those who display expressions of identity outside of the narrative of the 'citizen' will suffer resentment, discrimination, and perhaps even criminalization. Those who cannot or will not assimilate will be marginalized and disaffected from the state. As Young (1990) points out:

When participation is taken to imply assimilation, the oppressed person is caught in an irresolvable dilemma: to participate means to accept or adopt an identity one is not, to try to participate means to be reminded by oneself and others of the identity one is. (p. 165)

A Universalist conception of citizenship can also take a less extreme form which is not so hostile to expressions of difference. Indeed, the state may celebrate the diversity of its citizens although citizenship itself is supposed to be neutral and the state exercises a difference-blind approach in relation to its citizens in order to guarantee their equality. Yet such non-recognition may actually compromise equality by the fact that states are not culturally neutral; the culture of the state will reflect the identity and values of the majority community. The banning of the veil in parts of Europe for example is not about being neutral, but reflects the assumption that all religions should reflect Christian norms (Laden, 2001, p. 3). A neutral public sphere then is effectively a myth and by not acknowledging this, it will act to exclude certain voices and marginalize others (Chandhoke, 2005). Government, institutions, services, and justice are a partial reflection of society, undermining their legitimacy and the possibility of minority and marginalized groups identifying with them. As Young (1990) points out, this sort of Universalist citizenship leaves minorities:

experiencing oneself as invisible at the same time that one is marked out as different. The invisibility comes about when dominant groups fail

to recognize the perspective embodied in their cultural expressions as a perspective. These dominant cultural expressions often have little place for the experience of other groups, at most only mentioning them or referring to them in stereotyped or marginalized ways (p. 60).

The difference-blind approach will also struggle to deal with the unequal status of marginalized groups since it does not recognize that it is contributing to structural patterns of inequality.

Whether the refusal to recognize minority identities is because of hostility to them, or in an attempt to guarantee equality, universalist conceptions of citizenship make it difficult for bearers of the marginalized identity to affect change within society or even to fully exercise their citizenship rights. Universalist conceptions of citizenship which assume full access to political rights “diminishes the citizenship of minorities if their particularities are not recognized and supported within the terms of their incorporation” (Meer, 2010, p. 14).

A Politics of Recognition or Politics of Difference?

Thompson (2002) states that: “there is a growing sense that a just and stable political order must be one in which all citizens enjoy due recognition” (p. 203). It certainly would seem that the structural inequalities and unequal status experienced on a collective basis requires consideration of how the identity of the collective is treated and included. Yet, what recognition is and how to practically implement it is complex. When we talk about recognition maximizing or at least having a relationship with agency, what exactly do we mean by recognition? Recognition could mean to be aware of something, or to appreciate it or accept it (Jones, 2006, p. 28). Of course as we have already discussed, this does not always mean a positive process. Rather, it can take a negative form where awareness of something is perceived as problematic. These various forms of recognition can take place on an individual level or involve a public expressive element. However, a politics of recognition can be considered as a public process of according positive recognition to particular identities or cultures, or to the individual bearers of those identities or cultures. McBride (2009, p. 96) argues that in recognition there are two strands: one to do with respect which is egalitarian in nature and one to do with esteem which is competitive or hierarchical in nature. While I would argue that these two strands cannot be rigidly separated – to esteem the identity or culture may indirectly accord respect to the individual and in reverse to respect the individual may

also indirectly accord respect to their particular identity – they do loosely correlate to what will be termed in this paper as a politics of recognition and a politics of difference. A politics of recognition focuses on the members of a marginalized identity whether this is on an individual or collective level. The importance of the identity itself is in its relationship to the bearers. In contrast, a politics of difference will accord greater focus to the identity or culture and see it as valuable in itself and as central to according respect to its bearers. I will first consider a politics of difference.

A Politics of Difference

A politics of difference may be seen to be rooted in Taylor's much cited work, *The Politics of Recognition* (1994). He argues that the collapse of social hierarchies led to a politics of dignity or universalism, which he sees as imposing a dominant identity on all. Taylor (1994) argues that non-recognition or mis-recognition is damaging and a form of discrimination which can only be remedied by recognizing "the unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctiveness from everyone else" (p. 38). Thus, the starting point for according recognition is to value the identity or culture which is marginalized. Taylor argues that we have no tools which we can use to decide on the absolute value or otherwise of a culture or way of being and therefore, the starting point should be to presume that each culture harbors something of value (cited in Jones 2006, p. 25). Indeed, Parekh in his work, *Rethinking Multiculturalism* (2000), argues for the recognition of cultures as they are intrinsically valuable for society in challenging people to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their own cultures and ways of life. Parekh (2000) states, "Different cultures thus correct and complement each other, expand each other's horizon of thought and alert each other to new forms of human fulfilment" (p. 167). Taken together this aims at a process of recognition where cultures are esteemed, thereby integrating their members, removing the forms of discrimination that mis-recognition implies, and providing a valuable tool for society.

Yet, identity based models of integration or citizenship may be considered as being more concerned with asserting difference, and thus creating a differentiated rather than shared public space. Although proponents of this version of multiculturalism would argue that this is not implicit in the theory itself, it is clear that in practice identity based models may have a tendency to reduce the structural causes of identity mobilization to culture, thereby ignoring the wider context in which demands for recognition are made. It is possible to over-emphasize cultural identities at the cost of a common and

shared identity. Too much emphasis is put on the promotion of cultural identities and not enough on social integration (Lewis, 1997, p. 136), which according to Sivandan (2005) is engendering a culturally divisive society, a process that is referred to as communalism. This politics of difference can result in a situation where the equality of the members of the culture becomes dependent on the public esteem of that culture. The potential for cultural division and segregated communities impacts on participation and agency in that it does not guarantee that marginalized groups can effect change outside of the cultural sphere or their own communities. Indeed, if this paper is looking at the systemic conditions of agency and how structural inequality can constrain it, it is relevant to point out that over focusing on the culture of a marginalized group will not necessarily reduce the structural inequalities that members of the culture experience. Certainly cultural aspects of structure such as negative or hostile discourse may actually increase in such a charged and competitive atmosphere.

We can perhaps illustrate this with an example such as faith based arbitration. Religious law and custom is an intricate and complex matter. Recognizing the value of a community may suggest that it would be more appropriate for religious communities to govern themselves in matters such as family law. As the states of India and Israel attest, this is not an untried approach and would allow states to abstain from making controversial moral judgments on religious practice. However, this completely ignores issues of power, leadership, representation, heterogeneity, and oppression within religious and, indeed, all communities.

Other potentially worrying questions must also be addressed: can a person opt-out of being judged by their religious leaders? What if a religious law contravenes state law? And, who is going to regulate the system to ensure that there is no abuse? These questions arose in Canada in 1991. During the public debate on arbitration, there was particular concern within the Muslim community about the vulnerability of immigrant women who would be unaware of their right to appeal to the regular courts (Bourette, 2004), and the fear that such a system would penalize Muslim women more generally, since in Sharia law women are not treated equally in matters of divorce, inheritance or child custody (Bourette, 2004). So how does this involve agency? Munro (2011) argues that faith based arbitration can improve the deliberative capacities and democratic commitments of certain political actors (p. 104). Mansbridge (1996) also argues that we "ought to foster and value informal deliberative enclaves of resistance" (p. 55). So, while this could encourage participation from some and encourage agency through empowerment, it must also be stated that binding

arbitration is neither informal, nor deliberative and may reduce the agency of those who are forced or pressured to use it.

Moreover, will agency be maximized in a context where it is directed inwards towards community specific issues? Arendt stresses the connection between political action, understood as the active engagement of citizens in the public realm, and the exercise of effective political agency. In her view only the sharing of power that comes from civic engagement and common deliberation can provide each citizen with a sense of effective political agency. Recognition which removes citizens from a shared and inclusive public sphere then will not maximize agency. Indeed, any cultural bias in the justice system or public sphere more generally is not challenged by allowing even limited self-government on family matters. Rather there is the potential to alienate such groups from the wider legal and political system, and reduce deliberation across group boundaries.

A Politics of Recognition

The structural causes of identity mobilization or exclusion are not always or primarily to do with culture, but rather are about the unequal status of the marginalized group. It is about ensuring that the respect and rights accorded to a Muslim citizen are equal to the respect and rights accorded to a Sikh citizen or black citizen. Essentially, a politics of recognition pursues an ideal of equality (Jones, 2006, p. 24). The struggle for recognition and the struggle for equality are for marginalized groups one and the same. The focus then is on the members of a marginalized group either as individuals or as a collective, and not on the content value of their particular identity. Jones (2006) states:

So when a society accords recognition to a group it need not applaud the qualities or identity of the group; it may acknowledge that the group matters, that it should count, that its voice should be heard and its interests given due consideration. (pp. 28–29)

Equal voice and equal consideration or what could be termed equality of opportunity and equality of outcome are integral to a politics of recognition. The right to access an elected representative for example, provides a voice but if that representative refuses access to veiled Muslim women, then that is putting that section of society at a structural disadvantage. Their right of access is being mediated in a culturally biased way so that there is no equality of

outcome. Another rather basic example of how equal status and identity relate to each other is in the provision for particular identities and cultures in state institutions, such as not serving pork to Jewish or Muslim patients in hospitals. Positive action and the cultural interpretation of rights are entirely permissible and may in fact be instrumental in the creation of a more equitable society.

Historic prejudice and disadvantage can after all engender exclusionary processes within society that only government assistance can overcome. Such actions may help to equalize or ameliorate a group's socio-economic or political position in society, thereby allowing them to participate more fully. They may help to defend minorities against mechanisms of discrimination and exclusion, again with hopefully positive consequences for both that particular group and society as a whole. Young (1990) underlines this point:

A democratic public should provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and representation of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged. Such group representation implies institutional mechanisms and public resources supporting, 1. Self-organization or group members so that they achieve collective empowerment and a reflective understanding of their collective experience and interests in the context of society; 2. Group analysis and group generation of proposals in institutionalised contexts where decision makers have group perspectives into consideration. (p. 184)

However, recognition does not have to always take a legislative or policy form and indeed, these forms of recognition are not always the best means of making people feel and be seen as an integral or accepted part of society. Other kinds of recognition can prove equally as helpful in this respect. The invitation to all religious leaders to participate at state functions is one such example. The point is that the unequal status of the marginalized group is improved through challenging a biased public sphere or allowing rights to be interpreted in a culturally and religiously sensitive way so as to facilitate the participation of all citizens. This clearly does not ignore the culture or identity of the marginalized group or individual. When the state aims to equalize the status of a marginalized person or collective by a process of recognition, it is also affirming the integral place of that community and by extension its identity. However, cultural structures of inequality such as discourse and negative public sentiment, although related to, are separate from inequalities in the economy or law, and challenging them is often a more difficult task. In this regard, affirmation of a culture or identity may be relevant, although it should be stressed that this is not the same as the value and recognition accorded to a culture by a

politics of difference. The point is not the identity itself, but the focus remains on equalizing the status of the bearers of the marginalized identity. Affirmation does not require a legal-rights based framework but rather, promoting associational life gives public status to the cultural identity without any moral judgment by the state.

The promotion of culture through associational life is not actually about promoting the culture, but the aim is to attain equality for the members of a marginalized group. Indeed, according respect to an identity is secondary to the potential outcome of increased agency and participation. Associations may not have any specific political purpose, yet, they should be considered as a political resource. Studies by Putnam (1993, 2000) and Fennema & Tillie (1999) have found that higher levels of political participation by minorities are linked to greater associational life. Associations socialize and educate individuals and provide public codes of conduct (Van Londen, et al., 2007, p. 1202). They mobilize, create political discussion and opportunity to be active (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978, p. 81). Thus, by providing such skills and resources, associational engagement serves as socialization for political participation (Putnam, 1993, p. 2000). Indeed, they can help to counter common obstacles to minority participation such as socio-economic inequalities (Gallego, 2007, p. 3). Moreover, many such groups do have direct political consequences by encouraging minorities to use their vote (Ugba, 2005) and by acting as a consultation body on minority issues thereby facilitating contact and dialogue between state and minorities (Ghai, 2003, p. 12). Thus, a politics of recognition based on equalizing the status of members of marginalized groups can and should also affirm their identity through associational life. This multifaceted process undermines structures of inequality, both material and cultural, and helps agency in this regard.

Recognition and the Cultural Context

Even if it is accepted that recognition is limited to equalizing the status of a group who are marginalized by reference to their identity, this is not the end of the complexity. There are limits imposed by the culture of a society. A liberal society for example, should not be at odds with diversity, but it must be recognized that it is a culture in its own right. It has a conception of the good life and is guided by values such as liberty, equality, and autonomy (Horton, 1993, p. 1). Thus, once a culture contravenes liberal principles in a significant way, it becomes difficult to integrate it into a liberal society. Liberals may value toleration as a means to accommodate diversity. Yet, the principle of tolerance itself is limited by the culture in which it operates. This does not negate recognition

but as many theorists who advocate a politics of recognition accept, there is what Mahajan (2005, p. 97) refers to as “permissible diversity” or in other words values collectively cherished by the political community. This argument may seem more relevant to a politics of difference where cultures are given rights and valued in their own terms. However, liberal states tend also to have a secular basis which problematizes recognition for religious communities seeking to redress their marginalization by recognition.

The anti-racism agenda which has been widely accepted in liberal states, if not always implemented, has primarily focused on a political “Black” identity, which as Modood (1992, p. 264) argues, has excluded the concerns and demands of other minority groups. The secular basis of the equality agenda is reflective of the secular tendencies of those most prominent within this area. Jussawalla (2001, p. 975) points out that those who write most about cultural rights theory are secular liberals who are tolerant of people of color but against the cultural rights of specific groups such as Muslims. This academic and intellectual bias is itself reflective of a wider secular hegemony in Western liberal societies. Modood (1994, p. 60) argues that this makes it difficult for a group whose primary identity is faith, to fully identify with and participate in a polity that privileges secularism. This secular hegemony is essentially creating a discriminatory context by putting religious communities at a structural disadvantage.

A public sphere which marginalizes religion is a partial representation of society. It is also the case that such marginalization of those who wish to express a religious identity will often preclude their participation in the social and political activities of society and state. This is of crucial importance; a section of society is not only unable to exercise their citizenship rights but they are also unlikely to be perceived as an integral part of society if they cannot participate. A weak form of secularism where the state does not identify with any one religion is necessary in a society where multiple, often competing religions are present, but this should not preclude the involvement of religion in politics generally and certainly should not preclude the reasonable recognition and accommodation of religious communities if the aim is to equalize their status.

‘Multiculturalizing’ Citizenship: Maximizing Agency

To be a citizen, no less than to have just become a citizen, is to have a double right: to be recognized and to debate the terms of recognition.

MODOOD, 2008

This part of the paper has considered how a process of recognition can challenge the systemic inequalities which constrain agency and provide ways of encouraging it through associational life without making the culture the primary focus. Universalist models of citizenship are rejected since they do not include recognition in any positive way. Thus, a different conception of citizenship which makes room for recognition is needed. A politics of difference would suggest a differentiated citizenship which deals with recognition and cultural bias by ultimately creating parallel communities and fragmenting the public sphere. This should also be rejected.

Rather, a multicultural model of citizenship such as that put forward by Modood (2008) would seem more attractive. This is not adhering to or promoting multiculturalism per se, but rather 'multiculturalizing' citizenship is about contouring the boundaries of citizenship around groups as well as individuals. It is an acceptance that if citizenship is to be a shared and inclusive status, it cannot be burdensome or transcend other identities important to citizens. As Modood (2008) points out: "group identities are ever-present, and each group has a right to be a part of the civic whole, and to speak up for itself and for its vision of the whole." A multicultural model of citizenship critiques cultural assimilation as well as individualism that have no room for groups, and yet as Modood points out, it is not about institutionalizing difference. It does not seek to undermine the unity and equality of citizenship but rather it is grounded in ideas about individual equality and democratic citizenship (Modood, 2008). Indeed, it is a form of citizenship which sees recognition as coming not only from state action, laws, regulations, or prohibitions, but also as the result of public debate and the promotion of civil society.

It is linked to an intercultural framework of identity and integration where minority ethnic communities have a sense of belonging and ownership and can identify with the state and its institutions without diminishing their identity (Farrell & Watt, 2001, p. 180). Attention is also focused on the interaction between the majority and minority communities which leads to reflections on how power is distributed in society and how decision-making is organized (Farrell & Watt, 2001, p. 180). This allows consideration of the cultural sources of structural inequality. 'Interculturalism' seeks to combine multiple collective identities, to recognize diversity without losing sight of need for commonality and shared identity. A multicultural model of citizenship based on an intercultural framework of identity and integration is an empowering form of citizenship, not a controlling one.

Citizenship does not have to become differentiated, but rather, that individual rights can be exercised fully and interpreted in a culturally or religiously sensitive manner where appropriate. As an example, the constitution in the

Republic of Ireland guarantees freedom of profession of religion. The *hijab* may be thus viewed as a profession of faith for some Muslim women who would be protected from discrimination on account of wearing it. Such a process of 'multiculturalizing' the boundaries of citizenship provides recognition of identity which facilitates agency via political empowerment.

The Struggle for Recognition: When Agency Overcomes Structure

So far, this paper has considered how systemic inequalities constrain agency and the possibility for a process of recognition to challenge this structural disadvantage. However, this view sees agency as entirely and completely dependent on structure. Undoubtedly systemic inequalities do constrain the agency of marginalized groups, but this ignores how people continually make and remake the circumstances in which they live. Indeed, any discussion on the relationship between agency, recognition, and structure requires consideration of a conception of agency which has emerged out of contexts of group-based oppression. As Segal (2008) notes: "Political commitments usually flow from those ties of identity and belonging that happen to lead certain people into fighting for equality and justice when puzzling over how to live" (p. 392). This view of agency via injustice may be linked to Honneth's (2003, p. 136) ideas on how misrecognition can mobilize agents. Honneth (2003) states: "In this sense because engaging in political struggle publicly demonstrates the ability that was hurtfully disrespected, this participation restores a bit of the individual's lost self-respect." (Honneth, 2003, p. 164).

Thus, the struggle for recognition maximizes agency in that it enhances self-respect and self-esteem (Maclure, 2003, p. 5). And, it should be noted that in our transnational societies, the international is also a resource. In Cork, Ireland, for example, the Muslim community stage a monthly protest outside shops selling Israeli goods. Such agency then emerges through collective action as well as individual self-reflection. For example, Muslim political agency's first significant assertion in Britain was *The Satanic Verses* affair, where a sense of collective injustice led to a collective challenge to existing paradigms (Modood, 2010, p. xi).

This struggle for recognition does not automatically equate with a politics of difference. As previously stated most activism is a quest to challenge the boundaries of unequal citizenship, which problematize the recognition and participation of marginalized groups. Minority group assertion is not an attempt at a cultural coup but rather they work within existing frameworks of understanding in society, utilizing their individual rights to challenge unequal structures in society and indeed their own communities. The agency

of Muslim women, which is often ignored by western societies, is a prime example of this. Perceived inequality in their standing in the community has led many Muslim women to challenge patriarchal and paternalistic structures. In Glasgow in 2009, a group of young Muslim women dubbed the “Muslim Suffragettes” began a campaign to allow women to become voting members of their mosque. Despite a constitution which states otherwise, their applications were turned down on the grounds of their gender. Rather than accept the situation the women wrote to the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR) asking whether the mosque had undermined its charitable status by refusing to accept their applications to become members. Nazia Iqbal the leader of the campaign argued that women in the UK have had the vote for a century and that the mosque leaders were breaking discrimination laws (Leask, 2009). The women concerned utilized their religious identity as a means of empowerment to challenge patriarchal and cultural attitudes that are giving women a reduced voice and status. The language of rights and democracy are brought to bear on negative attitudes to gender.

However, despite the fact that such agency is about equalizing their status, in societies where prejudicial structures, processes, and ideologies are present, the agency of marginalized or minority groups is not always understood or welcome. Demonstrations or simple expressions of self-identity such as the veil can be misunderstood as aggression. Indeed, in such contexts an action that is aimed at challenging prejudice and inequality can ultimately reinforce it. This is perhaps currently best exemplified by Muslim political agency, of which Europe has witnessed a growth over recent years.

The suspicion surrounding many Muslim communities in parts of Europe means their participation and activism is viewed as disloyal, suspect, and hostile. While a non-Muslim citizen has the right to protest the war in Iraq or Afghanistan and their view point is perceived as a contribution to the debate – even if ignored – Muslims who condemn government actions in relation to the so-called war on terror, are perceived as disloyal and suspect. As a British Muslim commented in the *Guardian* newspaper:

I have to condemn these terrorist attacks louder than any other citizens as anything less disguises hidden support for the murder of innocent civilians ... In fact I cannot support any cause involving Muslims around the world, as this betrays loyalty to Queen and country. (*Guardian Letters*, November 16, 2001).

As national identity and citizenship in Europe are being recast according to security considerations (Fekete, 2004, p. 4), and negative discourse to do with immigration and terrorism is rarely effectively challenged by the state, Muslim

political agency is subsumed within a security paradigm. Furthermore, expressions of group identity such as the veil are narrated as a sign of the growing 'Islamicization' of European societies and are conflated with radicalism. Sometimes this is quite explicit as in the case of Italy where the *burka* is banned using anti-terrorism legislation. Yet, another example is Turkey, which successfully argued before the European Court of Human Rights that veiling had taken on a political meaning or significance and was associated with political Islamists or religious fundamentalists. Right wing groups have also been quick to utilize this narrative of the veil. In Portadown, a town outside Belfast, a group calling itself 'The White Nationalist Party' posted leaflets which stated the proposed mosque should be opposed on the grounds that it would breed terrorism. One of the leaflets was illustrated with a picture of veiled women. The activity and participation of marginalized and vilified groups such as Muslims is no longer independent of public perceptions of them.

In such a poisonous atmosphere, recognition is alleged to be illiberal or as encouraging extremism. In a recent speech the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, wants more oversight placed on organizations a state or government funds. As this paper has previously argued in favor of the active support of associational life to overcome cultural structural inequalities, this statement deserves comment. He argues that if these associations do not pass certain value tests then they should not receive any money (Cameron, 2011). One such test he suggests is judging how organizations encourage integration. Certainly, there will be little support in funding a radical group who supports terrorist action but it seems unlikely they will apply for recognition or funding in the first place. Rather, the danger is judgments will be made within a discriminatory context where any group who does not wholeheartedly subscribe to the government position will be labelled as suspect. As an aside these comments are being made at the same time as the British government is pushing the 'Big Society' idea which aims to give decision making powers and money to communities, reducing engagement in a shared public space.

Muslims in Northern Ireland

The 2011 census showed that Northern Ireland (NI) had a population of less than two million inhabitants, of whom minority communities made up little more than 1.8% of the population and Muslims numbered 3832.¹ The census

1 The NI Census 2011. <http://www.nisra.gov.uk/Census/2011_results_quick_statistics.html>.

showed Islam to be the second largest religion in NI after Christianity. This is an increase of almost 75% since the last census in 2001, although it is widely accepted by Muslim community leaders that this figure is artificially low. In October 2012, the Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC) estimated that there are more than ten thousand Muslims living in Northern Ireland, from forty-two nationalities.² The census also showed that the majority of Muslims live in Belfast. However, there are no Muslim areas or streets; the Muslim communities in NI are not residentially bounded. Muslims in NI are comprised of both Sunni and Shi'i, although Sunni Muslims are by far the more numerous.

Although generally a young community, it does contain several generations, which is indicative of a pattern of sustained settlement dating back to the interwar years (Khan & McCoomb, 2005, p. 32). Early migration was made up mostly of young men, primarily from India and Pakistan, who settled in NI for business opportunities. Despite the onset of political violence in NI in the 1960s, immigration of Muslims into the region continued, and indeed, the 1960s marked the beginning of the arrival of Muslim technocrats, students and doctors, many of whom settled permanently. The 1970s witnessed the in-migration of large numbers of Muslims of mainly South Asian origin, who were leaving Britain due to economic recession (Connolly, 2002, p. 28).

Muslims in NI in general do not conform to patterns of poverty and under-employment that are evident amongst Muslims in some parts of Europe. Irwin & Dunn's (1997) study, although not specifically about Muslims, did discuss the Pakistani community in NI, the vast majority of whom are Muslim. They found that there were high proportions of Pakistanis in NI within the professional (11%) and managerial (28%) classes, although with regards to Muslim women, Marranci (2007, p. 86) estimated that only around 30% are economically active. However, as the community grows and diversifies, their socio-economic make-up may also change. While it is becoming more common to see women wearing the *hijab* in South Belfast (the area where the Belfast Islamic Centre – BIC and Northern Ireland Muslim Family Association – NIMFA are located), generally across Northern Ireland women and men in religious dress is still unusual and the *niqab* is rare. As such, there have been no political or media debates concerning religious dress in Northern Ireland.

Since 2005 the social attitude survey, the *Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey*, has included questions pertaining to Muslims and Islam, which highlighted the existence of negative stereotypes: in 2005 for example, 47% of people thought that it was right to be suspicious of Muslims. Surveys in 2007,

2 The Belfast Islamic Centre. <http://www.belfastislamiccentre.org.uk/bic/about_us>.

2008 and 2009 showed continuing prejudice.³ The 2011 survey showed that 61% of people would accept a Muslim as a friend and just 52% would accept a Muslim as a relative.⁴ However, attitudes towards all minorities have hardened over time, and in 2014, only 41% of people would accept a Muslim as a friend,⁵ and 34% would accept a Muslim as a relative through marriage.⁶ This is in comparison to Eastern Europeans, where the level of acceptance was somewhat higher.⁷

Although the Muslim community in Northern Ireland cannot integrate unless it is permitted, the path to integration is also influenced by factors specific to the Muslim community itself.⁸ The integration of Muslims in NI has been affected by the small size of the community, impacting on their patterns of settlement, religious organization, and choice of language. The fact that they live within society means they are more likely to interact with non-Muslims. However, their isolation from one another means that they are not politically confident enough to assert their presence, or to lobby the local political establishment. Such small numbers spread throughout society also makes Muslims largely invisible within Northern Irish society, with the result that they are still treated as outsiders or immigrants to the state. Demographic makeup has also influenced the issue of language for Muslims in NI. Smaller numbers have meant that there is a different religious and social organization for Muslims in NI than is the case in England or most of Europe. In Europe greater numbers have facilitated the tendency of Muslims to split into subgroups (Marranci, 2003, p. 63), but in the BIC and NIMFA, where prayers are also held, all nationalities share the same space. Therefore, in an effort to ensure unity, English is privileged, a trend that is again in opposition to that which occurs elsewhere. Of course part of the reason for privileging English has been to do with the divided nature of society in NI. Muslims are aware of the problems that minority

3 Northern Ireland Life & Times Survey 2007: <www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2007/Minority_Ethnic_People/Index.html> Northern Ireland Life & Times Survey 2008: <www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2008/Minority_Ethnic_People/Index.html> Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2009: www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2009.

4 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2010: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2010/Minority_Ethnic_People/index.html.

5 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2014: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2014/Minority_Ethnic_People/MUSPAL2.html.

6 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2014: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2014/Minority_Ethnic_People/MUSREL2.html.

7 Acceptance for an Eastern European person as a friend and as a relative was 77% and 76% in 2010. This had decreased to 51% and 47% respectively in 2014.

8 This section and following paragraphs draw heavily on Montgomery 2007.

languages have caused between Protestants and Catholics and do not want to create any negative stereotypes of their own community. Whatever the reason, this is hugely important for integration, as language is the key means of participating within society. The potential for integration is also influenced by socio-economic status (Younge, 2005).

Of course, it is not just a matter of living and working within the wider society that will facilitate greater integration for the Muslim community. To be considered as an integral part of NI, links must exist between Muslim community groups and wider society. Muslim representatives such as the BIC, NIMFA and Al-Nisa Association are regularly asked to take part in consultations, and frequently do so. The Al-Nisa annual report (2002–2004) for example, has eleven pages full of consultations, representations with external organizations and networking events they have taken part in, in an attempt to make Muslim women's voices heard in NI.⁹ NIMFA regularly hosts the Inter-faith Forum, which is consulted on a wide range of issues including education and policing.¹⁰ Also, Muslim community groups frequently host open days and awareness events. Groups such as NIMFA do not have the personnel or financial resources to take part in all the consultations and events they are asked to participate in. Thus, to increase the links that Muslims have with both public bodies and the wider society more funding is needed.

Yet despite the various links that have been established, the Muslim community in NI have not mobilized to become a visible pressure group. They have little or no involvement in local politics and have not been visibly lobbying the political establishment to further some of their needs, which are clearly not being met. Corrigan (2001, p. 296) argues that in terms of Pakistani Muslims in NI, there is a major reluctance to become politically active due to a fear that increased visibility will lead to greater vulnerability. This reflects the isolation that many minorities experience in NI. It also goes some way to explaining why despite Muslims being a vibrant and growing community, actively participating in society, have been reticent about any outward or visible displays of Islam or an Islamic identity in NI. The only thing that identifies the semi-detached house in Belfast as the BIC is a sign that can be easily removed, and was in fact removed after attacks on the house in the aftermath of 9/11 (Marranci, 2004, p. 21). Moreover, the prayer facilities in NI are totally inadequate for the size of the community. Despite planning permission being given for a mosque to be

9 My thanks to Mrs. A.S. Khan MBE and the Al-Nisa Association N.I. for their information concerning Al-Nisa events and activities.

10 My thanks to Mr. Hassan Mansour and the Northern Ireland Muslim Family Association (NIMFA) for their information regarding NIMFA events and activities.

built in the Craigavon area, the project was abandoned in 2003 due to hostile opposition from Protestant councillors and the local community in which it was to be built. Efforts to procure a site for a purpose-built mosque in Belfast have also come to a stand-still. Thus, in spite of the attempts that Muslim community leaders have made to establish links with wider society, the establishment of an Islamic presence in NI has been problematized by the political situation. A distinct Muslim voice, political participation, and even building a mosque require a degree of visibility that engenders a sense of insecurity for Muslims in NI.

Conclusions

The relationship between agency, structure and recognition is a complex one. Indeed, the public recognition of groups is a complex and contested process which raises many difficult questions: Which groups? What form of recognition? Who decides? And where does it end? It is unlikely that any state can fully accommodate every group identity without legal autonomy being given over to particular groups, a situation that few states would favor. And yet, public recognition of identities is vital if an overarching sense of belonging is to be achieved. The importance of public recognition is that it legitimates difference, and such recognition can and should work on a collective as well as individual basis.

This however, does not equate with an automatic conferment of minority rights aimed at improving the status of the culture as opposed to the members of that culture. This will not necessarily serve the interests of integration or for that matter the well-being of minority and marginalized individuals. Of course as stated, cultural sources of structural inequality which may constrain agency can be challenged by assisting a flourishing civil society where different groups engage, debate and deliberate the circumstances of how they live in a shared public space. Systemic inequalities which inhibit participation can be ameliorated by an equality agenda which includes the recognition of identities, without giving way to cultural relativism. The core values of the state can be interpreted in culturally sensitive ways without losing them.

Of course, as the second part of this paper has shown, sources of oppressions and patterns of structural inequality can give rise to, as well as hinder agency and this is particularly on a collective basis. Humans shape as well as are shaped by the circumstances in which they live. Having the ability to effect results is a crucial part of agency but this is partly dependent on how others understand what we are doing. This is particularly problematic in contexts of

prejudice and unequal power relations. Groups engaging in political activity to challenge inequality may find their quest for recognition and thus equality is rejected on account of their activism, which is interpreted as suspect. Indeed, the place and value of diversity within a society can be considered by looking at how the political agency of such diversity is perceived and treated.

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On Recognition: The First Steps to Democratization and the Case of the Egyptian Revolution

Deina Abdelkader

In peace building literature one of the important steps in conflict resolution is ‘recognition’, it is impossible to build peace in a post-conflict situation without recognition. However, the literature also qualifies this recognition process. For example, relations of power are very important in the process of recognition and reconciliation. As Ilan Pappé notes in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the ‘paradigm of parity’ (the Israeli view of the conflict) and the ‘paradigm of the oppressor-oppressed’ (the Palestinian view of the conflict) should be reconciled in an attempt to achieve: “fair recognition and reconciliation”. (Daniele, Giulia, 2014: 87–88).

Not only is it difficult to attempt to define the bases of recognition on a theoretical level, but also on the practical level it is challenging to enact recognition because of the asymmetry of power that usually exists in situations of conflict. In the field of international relations and comparative politics there is a similar notion in post conflict and democratization efforts. The goal in political science though is different because its main focus is on the consolidation of democratization. Valerie Bunce has expanded on the theory of pacting where she emphasizes the need to include the elite in the process of transitioning to “democracy and thus pacting” with the elite, although of course there is asymmetry in power relations. Valerie Bunce’s emphasis on the inclusion of the elites in post conflict situations is based on “maintaining/sustaining” democratic transition. (Bunce, 2011: 706–715).

Thus if we combine both subfields of political science: peace and conflict studies and comparative democratization, the concepts alluded to in terms of reconciliation are similar when one analyzes the term “recognition” and “pacting”, with a difference in goals, i.e. in peace and conflict studies “recognition” is the foundation of conflict resolution and peace building, while “pacting” in comparative literature is the foundation of political stability and democratization. Theoretically therefore there are more similarities than differences because even in the two paradigms, the goals are similar, if one defines peace building within the context of transitioning to democratization.

The importance therefore of recognition is embedded in the reconciliation/peace building literature as well as the post conflict comparative literature on pacting and democratization.

This paper intends to analyze briefly the historical background of the rift between the elite and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt upon their foundation and then continue to focus mainly on the contemporary impasse of conflict between the liberal elites and the Muslim Brotherhood, highlighting Rab'a as the focal atrocity committed by the military with the public support of political liberals, as a pivotal starting point in any peace building attempts in Egypt.

First, one needs to mention the power relations between the two groups discussed in this chapter and how those power relations affected the outcome of the conflict between the "liberals" and the Muslim Brotherhood and their sympathizers.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the election of parliament and the president (in both elections the Muslim Brotherhood won), the "liberals" were not comfortable with the results of those elections, however later in 2012 when Morsi won the presidential elections, the real power and stake holder in Egypt were dismayed: namely, the military. The military and Morsi did not "pact"/"agree" on a number of issues, especially on civilian intervention or even the right to gain access to information regarding the military budget. The military then turned to the "liberals" to utilize their disenchantment to get rid of the Muslim Brotherhood. The "liberals" are not powerful on their own, the military is the de facto power, as many militaries are in the developing world. The "liberals" were used as a pawn in 2013 to cover up and legitimize the kidnapping and jailing of an elected president without even provoking impeachment or any other legal actions against the elected president.

As an institution the military in Egypt has exhibited power and economic existentialism. The military as a political player is also involved in regional politics as well as politics with the U.S.

The relationship between the Egyptian army and its people is an intriguing one because although the army was repeatedly defeated over the years, the image of gallantry and nationalism has consistently played a role in the Egyptian psyche. The army's control over the state from 1952 till today allowed the army the political space to claim victory in each war that they lost by controlling the media, the arts, and most importantly education. Although the defeat in 1967 was announced and Abdel Nasser offered to abdicate as the head of state, nevertheless in the 1970s and specifically after the 1973 war, the army started regaining its ego as an institution. The Egyptian army had initially won the 1973 war because of the element of surprise tactic that they employed, however

soon enough the Israeli army had re-gained its ability to respond to the attacks and a cease fire was established to end further hostilities. As of 1979 when the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed the Egyptian army has become an institution that is extremely hierarchical but also especially in the upper echelons on Western luxury goods. By signing the peace treaty in 1979, the Egyptian army became a docile, highly consumerist institution, and as adequately captured: Egypt became the “Officers Republic” (Sayigh, 2013).

The army since their first coup in 1952 and till current times, have been protective not to establish serious civilian institutions that could play a prominent political role, as Marina Ottaway indicated, during Mubarak’s time the regime was a “semi-authoritarian” regime, that allowed for a multiparty system and a relatively free media, however if any of those parties or media sources threatened the status-quo, they were severely dealt with. As observed in a lot of the writing about the Egyptian revolution, the army’s hold on power is so relentless, that even Mubarak had to establish a strong police force in his attempt to hand over power to his civilian son Gamal. Although Mubarak was a military man himself, his attempt to switch power to a civilian, existentially threatened the military’s power. The military also supported a candidate in the country’s first free election in 2012 however their candidate lost to the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate: a civilian, bringing the political tension to an all time high, when finally the military stepped in, in 2013 as will be discussed further in the chapter.

Secondly, there is a strong relationship between recognition and reconciliation between the “liberals”/intelligentsia and the people (Muslim Brotherhood members, their supporters, and the people who believe in democracy and human rights). If one looks at the efforts of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a left of the center nationalist, or Ayman Nour, the head of the “Tomorrow Party” (Al-Ghad), both are examples of “liberals” attempting to reconcile and normalize the Muslim Brotherhood/Military relationship. As mentioned previously earlier in the introduction, peace and progress are not attainable if recognition and reconciliation are not promoted and acted on. Recognition is quintessential in the case of Egypt because of the sheer horror of the Rab’a and Nahda massacres as will be illustrated in this chapter. Recognition is instrumental in attaining the very basics of reconciliation on a very long road to normalization.

Given the military in Egypt and Egypt’s geo-political position, it is extremely hard to imagine any successful reconciliation efforts. The propaganda mainly waged by the military in the media has demonized the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters. The rift between the military supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood is huge and the attempts at reconciliation without recognition of the atrocities committed in Rab’a, al-Nahda and the brutal violations during

imprisonment,¹ will result in a disingenuous and fake reconciliation. Real recognition will entail a process of societal healing, correcting the history books/curriculum, and restitution. Non-recognition will on the other hand, lead to further polarization, if not a full-fledged civil war.

The Muslim Brothers Perceptions and Resistance to the Liberalists upon Its Inception

The founding of the Brotherhood was based on two goals: one was nationalistic because of British occupation; the second was a reaction to the liberal attempts to derogate the popular attachment to the faith.

The awareness of Hassan al-Banna of this rift gave him the opportunity to enlist public support directly. He was well aware that his message is a national-social message; al-Banna was the first therefore to speak about social justice and religion outside of the confinement of a mosque. He gave his speeches at coffee shops, private homes, and public arenas. The Muslim Brotherhood created a first in religious movements by going outside the traditional bound preaching. (Mitchell, 1969).

The Muslim Brotherhood's view of the liberals was clearly expressed: "There were two kinds of Imperialism: 'external' (al-Isti'mar al-khariji), the brute force of the occupying foreign power, and 'internal' or 'domestic' (al-Isti'mar al-dakhili), the forces which consciously or unconsciously – at best by indifference, at worst by 'treason' to the needs and the wills of the Muslim community- served the interests of that power. 'Domestic imperialism' spread dejection and moral defeat' and diverted Egyptians from their traditional faith to 'a dead pacifism, holy humiliation, and acceptance of the status quo.' (Mitchell, 218).

The upper class therefore created a monopoly and the people ceased to voice their opinion on their perception of governance and egalitarianism. In Banna's view the struggles of the public economically and politically were inseparable from religion and social justice. As an Azharite spoke: "European 'civilization' has developed in us a morbid mentality, a morbid taste and has made of us a morbid community that looks upon its own morbidity and decay as a thong of virtue and a sign of progress. Once corrupt, the greatest corruption is to regard one's own corruption as good and desirable" (Mitchell, 224).

¹ Torture in Egyptian prisons has reached an all time high, many of the prisoners have met their fate as a result of torture and inhumane treatment during imprisonment.

Qutb also emphasizes that: “the enemies who are, the real hurdle to achieving social justice for the poor public. Those enemies are classified as both indigenous and foreign. The indigenous include capitalists, journalists, dark-skinned Britishers- or Egyptians with white mentalities-politicians, and a good number of ‘ulama’ who sold out their religious allegiance for wretched worldly interests.” (Abu Rabi’, 121).

Qutb realizes at this early stage that the society is split between the public (al-Jamahir) and the “coalition of regression”.² Qutb’s views in the early 1930s, 1940s mirror Edward Said’s main argument in “Orientalism” and the more recent contribution of Hamid Dabashi “Brown Skin, White Masks”.

Thus the onslaught and dismemberment of the faith was felt and rejected by the Muslim Brotherhood and was part of their *raison d’etre*. The religious nationalists were born as a result of the violent attempt at removing religion forcefully from the public sphere because of the patronization of colonial powers and more dangerously ‘al-Injileez al-Sumr’ (the dark Britishers) as Qutb named them.

It is important to note here two elements in the Muslim Brotherhood discourse in the early stages, in order to reflect on their contemporary views/policies and their interactions with the liberals: (1) the movement is not a traditional movement that is bent on living a glorious past (aka Salafists), it is rather a movement that is revolutionary/ progressive because it was able to distract from its indigenous culture a formula to address social justice. It was also able to transcend the control of the state over religious institutions and stepped out of the conformity of institutionalization to reach out to the public. (2) Aside from fighting the British occupier as a nationalist entity, the main interest as expressed in many of Qutb’s publications was to seek social justice for the majority of Egyptians. Thus the brotherhood was always historically a mouthpiece for the public that was in opposition to corruption and the abuse of power.³

2 “This coalition of regression that violates basic human rights and values without hesitation, is made up of the following forces: (1) oppressors-exploiters (*tughat wa mustaghilun*); (2) professional men of religion (*rijal al-din al-muhtarifun*); (3) mercenary writers (*kutab mur-taziqun*); and (4) hired journalists (*sahafiyun ma’jurin*)”. See Abu Rabi’, 121.

3 As Maghraoui argues: “It would seem reasonable to consider the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, by Sheikh Hassan al Banna in 1928, and the broad popular appeal the movement still commands today, as a principled rejection of politics that discriminate against local cultures. Yet much of the literature on what is called today ‘political Islam,’ ‘Islamic fundamentalism,’ or ‘Islamic resurgence’ continues to view movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt simply as a negative reaction against failed politics within Islamic discursive traditions- or even spiritual flourishing within Islam- is ethically denied and epistemologically censored.” Maghraoui, 144.

The Roots of Egyptian Liberalism: Western Liberalism and the Inevitability of Secularism

In Foucault's "What is Enlightenment?" he discusses the tendency to confuse two concepts: the "Enlightenment" and "Humanism". He explains that the Enlightenment is a well-defined "set of events" that took place in Europe and stresses its historical specificity (Rabinow 1984: 43). He defines "humanism" as a set of "conceptions of man borrowed from religion, science, or politics" (Rabinow 1984: 44). Foucault concludes that: "I think that, just as we must free ourselves from the intellectual blackmail of being for or against Enlightenment we must escape from the historical and moral confusionism that mixes the theme of humanism with the question of the Enlightenment" (Rabinow 1984: 45).

Foucault's argument is relevant to the Islamist ideas mentioned, because he clearly identifies the rigidity of the Enlightenment ideology and its followers. This rigidity lies at the crux of the liberalists stress on secularism as a pre-condition to democracy and modernization. Actually, 'liberalism' in Egypt equates to secularization because although Western liberalism calls for a number of stipulations, Egyptian 'liberalism' is obsessive about 'secularization'. Therefore, the term liberalism will be used interchangeably with secularism in the Egyptian context.

The Enlightenment focuses on secularization as a pre-requisite for modernity and democratization. Contemporary moderate Islamists are wary of the Enlightenment philosophy's dichotomy and intolerance of differences.

Not all Western theorists have thought that the "Great Separation" as Mark Lilla refers to the faith/reason dichotomy in his 2007 book *The Stillborn God* is necessary to the existence of democracy. Even Jean Jacques Rousseau – the father of the French and American revolutions- was radical in his belief that religion plays an important public role in democratic political life.

The Egyptian "liberals" took those biases and applied them to their own societies. The separation of church and state became part of their discourse and thus the tensions were born long before the revolution happened and long before a leader from the Muslim Brotherhood won the presidential elections.

The Calamity of Rab'a

The secular liberal political divide with the Muslim Brotherhood did not express itself only on the ideological plane, but more seriously on August 14th, 2013. The Rab'a massacre is reported to have been worse in the number of

killed/injured and the way the people were injured, than Tiananmen Square. In a 120-page Human Rights Watch report titled: "All According to Plan", human rights investigators research and report about the massacre from July 2013 to July 2014. (HRW, 2014:14).

According to the Human Rights Watch report there were many red flags regarding the dispersal of overwhelmingly unarmed crowds of civilian demonstrators who were not forewarned to disperse peacefully and were suddenly attacked with lethal force. The authors of the report "Interviewed 200 victims and their family members, witnesses, doctors, journalists, and lawyers. Researchers largely conducted interviews in two periods: one in the days immediately following the events in July–August 2013 and a second one six months later in January–February 2014. The report also makes use of official statements from government officials" (HRW: 14).

One of the Human Rights researchers was in Rab'a also when the dispersal took place. The Human Rights Watch team highlights how difficult it was for them to obtain information under the current regime in power. (HRW: 14–15). According to HRW guestimates the protestors in Rab'a numbered around 85,000 on August 2nd 2013 (HRW: 20), this crowd was 'densely populated with women, children and men', according to the report:

On August 14, authorities used deliberate and indiscriminate lethal force to disperse the two sit-ins, where protestors had remained encamped for 45 days, resulting in one of the most bloody incidents of mass unlawful killings of largely peaceful protestors in recent history, While Egyptian security forces have repeatedly since 2011 used excessive force to respond to demonstrations, the August 14 dispersals were unprecedented in the scale of sheer brutality.

HRW: 20

In order to capture the brutality of the alleged dispersals, it is necessary to discuss the broad lines of what happened according to the HRW report in its overview:

Minutes before opening fire early on the morning of August 14, security forces played pre-recorded loops, calling on protestors to leave and identifying a safe exit, over loudspeakers near at least two of the entrances to the square. The vast majority of the over 100 witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, however, said they did not hear the warning until after forces had opened fire. Many of those in the square only came to know of the dispersal after being awoken by other demonstrators or by the sound

and smell of teargas and gunfire at the entrances to the square [...] The main entrance to the Rab'a hospital, which protestors referred to as 'Sniper Alley', was the target of sniper fire for much of the day, posing serious risk to those seeking medical attention. Security forces opened fire at structures that had turned into makeshift medical facilities, including Rab'a hospital, and the courtyard adjacent to Rab'a mosque. By around 5:30 p.m., police had encircled remaining protestors around Rab'a mosque and hospital, eventually allowing the majority of those remaining to exit, with instructions to leave corpses and the injured behind. As the last protestor left the square, security forces set the central stage, field hospital, mosque, and first floor of the hospital ablaze, likely. Police detained over 800 protestors over the course of the day, some of whom they beat, tortured, and, in several cases, summarily executed [...] The operation involved close cooperation between the police and the army. The police, consisting of both the Central Security Forces (CSF), Egypt's riot police, and the Special Forces (ESF), who usually are reserved for specialized operations, took the lead role during the dispersal and appear to be responsible for most of the lethal force used. While difficult to distinguish between CSF and ESF given the similar armament both forces wore during the dispersal, Interior Minister Ibrahim has said that ESF led the final push into Rab'a Square. The army also played an important supporting role. Army forces secured the entrances, inhibiting protestors from entering and exiting, operated the bulldozers that cleared the way for police to advance, operated some helicopters, including Apaches, which flew over the square, and opened a military base adjacent to Rab'a Square to snipers.

HRW: 21–22

The personal accounts and details are further proof that the Rab'a massacre was horrific to say the least. (HRW: 20–84). The report highlights how officials reacted, chiefly the Minister of Interior Mr. Ibrahim in an interview said that they expect a 10% loss of lives and that he guesstimates that there are 20,000 protestors, i.e. 2,000 will be murdered. However, according to HRW's estimates there were 85,000 protestors so this would amount to 8,500 deaths according to the minister's admission during the interview. If one calculates the median of those two figures, then one would conclude that the deaths numbered anywhere from 2,000 to 5,250 deaths.⁴ The numbers of deaths indicate the brutality of the attack, but it also indicates that the claim that the Muslim Brotherhood members were armed is a false claim. The report indicates that there were

⁴ HRW report estimates at least 817 and well over a 1,000 people were killed in the square alone. (HRW: 51).

weapons found with the Muslim Brothers in a building close to the Square but that their weapons were very few, according to the interior ministry itself: ‘nine automatic weapons, one pistol, five homemade pistols, large quantities of bullets, quantities of bulletproof vests, bladed weapons, and rioting gear’ were found (HRW 50). As HRW notes: “It seems unlikely that the police would be standing atop buildings and on vehicles in the open if there was a significant risk of gunfire from the protestors” (HRW: 50) Also video footage and witnesses indicate that: “the number of armed men among the protestors was limited, likely numbering around 15 or so, which corresponds to the number of protestors” guns the Interior Ministry claims to have found in Rab’a Square, and that arms did not form a core part of the Brotherhood’s defense strategy. As such, their presence did not justify the excessive lethal force used by the authorities, “or their deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of protestors” (HRW: 49).

Treating the Wounded: The Hospital Scene

Similar to the attack on Rab’a in general the make shift hospital were the wounded and dying sought refuge was attacked severely including the medical staff who were there to attempt curing/saving the victims, yet another display of the ruthless attack which proves that the intent was to kill all the demonstrators and not disperse them.

The ordeal at the hospital started late morning and HRW sent a member to witness the scene at the hospital that day at 3:30 p.m. (HRW: 41) After this at “around 4:45 Special Forces (ESF), dressed in black, entered the hospital and immediately ordered everyone, including doctors, out of the hospital,” witnesses said. They issued instructions not to carry any injured with them according to one protester they said, “whoever carries a corpse will lie next to him” Two others were told, “leave now or you’ll end up like them” (HRW: 46).⁵ The dead were carried to the mosque in Rab’a and according to a witness: “there were so many corpses that it felt like it had turned into a cemetery” (HRW: 40).

State Repression Post-The Rab’a Dispersal

Beyond the HRW’s report published in 2014, the state till this day has held no one accountable for the Rab’a massacre. Although the government had a fact finding committee there were no cases brought before the courts regarding the

⁵ Ambulances that were sent to take cases from Rab’a hospital were not allowed to reach the hospital and the drivers and physicians were shot at. (HRW: 39).

massacre. According to HWR: “The police and government to date have refused to acknowledge any wrongdoing on the part of security services in their violent dispersal of the sit-ins or other attacks pm protestors. In a news conference on August 14, Interior Minister Ibrahim said that his ministry successfully had carried out the dispersal of eh Rab’a and al-Nahda sit-ins “without losses”, and referred to a non-existent “international standard death rate of 10 percent in the dispersal of non-peaceful sit-ins. Days later, the Interior Ministry provided all officers that participated in the dispersal with a bonus for their efforts” (HRW: 10) Although largely focused on the Muslim Brotherhood, the state continued after that date to suppress all political factions and opposition groups: secularists, leftists...etc.

A law was passed later in 2013 that allows the interior ministry to “forcibly disperse protests that they have not been approved in advance and to arrest demonstrators on vague grounds such as “attempting to influence the course of justice” or “impeding citizen’s interests” (HRW: 11). It is estimated that between 22,000 and 41,000 people have been arrested till 2014. Mass sentences were handed out without any due process, with sentences varying from life term sentences to the death penalty (HRW: 17–18).⁶

Non-Recognition

In addition to the HRW report, an Egyptian semi-official commission has also criticized police brutality, and the lack of any prosecution against any police or military officers. “One year after the dispersals, not a single police or army officer and other official has been held accountable for the systematic premeditated killings of largely peaceful protestors.” (HRW: 92). On the day of the massacre officials from the ministry of interior claimed that they did not use any live ammunition, then a year later they admitted opening fire but on a ‘limited scale’ (HRW: 93). The government’s narrative after August 14th, 2013 was consistent in its vilification of the Muslim Brotherhood members and their sympathizers in public and private media:

The Egyptian government has been keen to control the narrative of Egypt, in particular since foreign correspondents reporting on the ground were

6 “A criminal court in Minya recommended the death penalty for over 1,200 people in preliminary verdicts in two separate cases in March and April 2014 without allowing defendants the right to mount a meaningful defense or even assess whether they had counsel or were present in the courtroom falling far short of ascertaining their guilt individually. (HRW: 18).

presenting an alternative narrative to that of the authorities. Officials launched a campaign accusing foreign media of biased coverage and offering their own narrative; they blamed pro-Morsi demonstrators and Muslim Brotherhood members for the violence, calling them terrorists and Islamic radicals, and praised the security forces for what they falsely characterized as their adequate and measured response.

HRW: 93

The Human Rights Watch report clearly states the names of officials who are directly and indirectly responsible for what might be considered as “crimes against humanity” (HRW: 87–88). The report specifies that an “attack on a civilian population” based on “murder” and the “persecution of a group on political grounds” amount to “crimes against humanity” (HRW: 86).

In light of the sheer brutality of the massacre and the HRW detailed and accurate account of what transpired in August 2013, one has to ask where are democratic countries from those policies, i.e. what is the United States’ response? What is the European Union’s response?

The United States’ and European Union’s Response to the Rab’a Massacre amidst State Repression

The United States and the European Union have acknowledged the massacre, however their foreign policy towards Egypt has not changed from pre-revolutionary times (i.e. before 2011). A year after the massacre, the United States sent “Apache helicopters⁷ and \$650 million in military aid” to Egypt (HRW: 12). The report notes: “In April 2014, when Egypt’s Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy visited Washington, US Secretary Kerry’s public remarks failed to make any note of the mass killings of July and August 2013” (HRW: 98). The report concludes:

The response of the EU, US, UN, AU and other states and intergovernmental bodies falls far short of steps they have taken in similar contexts. The EU continues to maintain, for example, an arms embargo against China in part as a result of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. The EU went further in the aftermath of the 2005 Andijian Massacre, imposing targeted sanctions, including visa bans and asset freezes, against 12 Uzbeki persons including a sitting minister.

HRW: 99

7 The same helicopters that were used to fire on the demonstrators in Rab’a.

Contemporary Egypt and Antagonistic⁸ “Liberalism”: Old Wine in New Bottles

Although western liberalism is partially built on the acceptance and respect of others, the observance of pluralism, and the protection of both, “liberalism” in Egypt pre and post the 2011 revolution antagonistically rejects and refuses to co-exist with what it views as its main rival: Islamically-oriented politics and parties. Quintessential liberalism is defined by the rejection of a privileged class, religion, or national origin...etc., however “liberals” in Egypt have basically argued and acted on their assumption that they are the “privileged” holders of the truth politically, socially and economically.

Historically speaking the “liberals” in Egypt have copied Orientalist criticisms of the “Occident” and assumed that they are scientific truths with a capital T.⁹ What distinguishes those ‘secular-liberalists’ was that they “uncritically replicated European anti-Arabism and the debasement of the Arabo-Islamic culture” (Maghraoui, 67).

That is to say that, the “liberals” emphasized the same critiques of the Other (the “Orientalist”). They identified with the culture of the Other to the demise of their own culture. They touted those critiques as “scientific truths.” Their “liberalism” was non-inclusive of the public, which is still true today in the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian revolution: “The secular liberal reformers, who emphasized rationality and individualism, were paradoxically trapped in the cultural order of the Other and therefore could not provide an inclusive notion of national identity and an emancipating notion of political community” (Maghraoui, 68).

In the 1920s and 1930s the “liberals” of Egypt adopted whole heartedly the discourse of the “Orientalist” so much so that their writings included: “overt racial and cultural discrimination” (Maghraoui, 85–86). In evaluating the public

8 The antagonistic quality that is added to “liberalism” here expresses the inimical and oppositional stance liberals took against an ideological and socio-economic opponent; namely the Muslim Brotherhood. The antagonistic quality is also in reference to the disrespect and belittling of the majority of the public ideas and beliefs. As former Vice President, Umar Suleiman said (in an ABC interview on 2, 6, 2011) “The Egyptians are not culturally ready for democracy”, which oddly enough echo British colonial views of Egypt during its occupation.

9 Maghraoui lists those liberals: “This group included literary figures such as Taha Husayn, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad, and Tawfiq al-Hakim; social critics such as Fathi Zaghlul and Isma’il Mazhar; Christian Arab emigres, mainly publishers, such as Salama Musa, Farah Antoun, Jurji Zaydan, and Shibli Shumayal; and political leaders such as Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, publicly known as ustadh al-jil, the master thinker of his generation.” Maghraoui, 67.

discourse after the revolution, especially with the ascendance of Morsi to power social media expressed those biases, whether one observes the jokes on Facebook about how he and his wife look, or whether one refers to the dry humor of Bassem Yousef who became an icon of free speech under Morsi.

The language that was used was so derogatory that a television talk show host came outright on public television and addressed it on her show. Although the talk show host had opposing political views, she defended Mrs. Morsi and said that one can critique her ideas if she speaks, but it is unfair to attack her based on her looks or her modest appearance, she said she looks like most middle class women and that aiming those jokes at Mrs. Morsi was a classic case of snobbery and classism. (Reem Majed, 2/7/2012, Masrawy.com).

Religious Public Discourse and Public Policy

Since the presidency of General Sisi, there has been a crackdown on the public display of religiosity including religious institutions and mosques:

Two months ago worshippers at Al-Rahman, a small mosque in the Ain Shams district in eastern Cairo, turned up for prayers on Friday, the Muslim day of rest, to find the doors shut. From now on, they were told, they would have to go to one of the city's main mosques for the most important prayers of the week. Soon after, another restriction was added when a group that met for discussions about Islam was told to stop. Today the mosque is open for weekday prayer only [...] Human rights groups see good reason for all to be worried by the new restriction. "This in effect kills the idea of religious freedom, since Egyptians can't opt for any religious practice not approved by the authorities" (The Economist, August 2, 2014).

Thus public policy towards the Islamic faith has been threatening since the advent of the new political regime in Egypt. Not only do people have restrictions in praying where they want, but also religious practice is controlled and monopolized by al-Azhar, which in turn is controlled by the regime.

More recently the speech given by Mr. Sisi, is also imbued with threats. In his speech, he indicated that the faith needs reform. Sisi's message created waves of discontent and fear:

The religious discourse that should be idolized is one that is relevant to our time, to renew the faith every 100 years. I am talking here to the

people of religion and the people who are responsible for this faith: It is impossible that the ideas that we adhere to are ideas that promote disturbance in the world, worry and killing. I do not mean the faith, but the ideas that are idolized for hundred of years. Discarding those ideas has become very difficult, to the extent that those ideas are the enemy of the whole world. Is it possible for 1.6 billion to kill 7 billion it's impossible! I am saying this at al-Azhar, in front of the scholars of religion. I hold you responsible on the Day of Judgment about what I just said. It is impossible to feel the faith while one is enshrined in it; you have to (exit) the faith to judge it, and for one to be enlightened. You need to stop, we need a religious revolution (January 5, 2015).

Again although opposition or commentary on Mr. Sisi's speech is non-existent, commentaries on social media express their fear and frustration. The perception of Mr. Sisi's speech is that policywise there will be more restrictions on the public practice and public discourse about Islam. For him to refer to a religious revolution and to talk about renewal is reminiscent of the missionary and colonial discourse referred to previously. His call is also contradictory in spirit because Mr. Sisi keeps repeating, "I do not mean the faith", and meanwhile he is de facto addressing the religious scholars. Mr. Sisi also repeats several times that those scholars are responsible: how could he hold them responsible for what happened in Paris for example? Is he using the same discourse that is being used by Western countries to shame the 1.6 million Muslims for the actions of three or four Muslims?

Mr. Sisi's implied assumption that the 1.6 billion Muslims are out to fight the 7 billion is also indicative of Western Islamophobia because his speech has a lot more in common with people gathered at Dresden a few weeks ago to request the ousting of Muslims from Germany, than with the majority of Muslims who are against violence. His call for renewing the faith and revolutionizing it was hailed by Western and Israeli media sources, but to his Muslim audience, it sounded threatening and repulsive. Recent historical facts and research show that when the public will to practice its faith is under attack, the followers of the faith become more radicalized. More importantly, as illustrated the leader of Egypt is repeating age-old colonial, Islamophobic arguments. His public discourse is accusatory of the whole faith and all of its followers: "Is it possible for 1.6 billion to kill 7 billion It's impossible!"

Thus to add salt to injury, Mr. Sisi's speech transgresses identity politics in a country that is well renowned for its faith. Sisi's speech exemplifies the age – old problem with liberalism, basically taking on the Other's argument and adopting it as one's own, without adaptation or allowing public space for the public and what they want.

Conclusions

In conclusion the arguments used by the “liberals” in the 20s, and 30s have not changed in Egypt post- January 2011. The same tactics and opinions are held. The distance between the “liberals” and the public is quite vast. The revolt (‘coup’) carried out by the military supporters was replicated in many countries especially in Turkey’s modern history.

“The Egyptian liberals held that in a culturally ‘backward’ society, the public do not have the capacity to make meaningful choices, and therefore the exclusion of their voices needs no theoretical justification or political explanation. The kind of social and cultural ‘emancipation’ they preached is grounded in a self-evident cultural justification of political subordination. The public became the object of an arbitrary and authoritative discourse telling them how to dress, how to eat, what to read, what to believe, how to cross the street, how to choose a conjugal partner, how to celebrate a birth, and how to mourn and bury the dead. In short, they were expected to renounce their cultural identities and moral values and assume an alien, ‘superior’ political identity, Except for the simplistic and phony racial theories on the inferiority of Arab culture and the superiority of Western civilization, the Egyptian reformers did not bother to offer the public compelling reasons to give up parts of their cultural identity in order to enjoy citizenship rights” (Maghraoui, 88).

It is the disconnect between the few and the public that brought about the current political climate in Egypt. Democratic practice is founded on “the people”, when political actions and speeches go against the public will and ethos, the regime loses legitimacy and ceases to be democratic.

The “liberals” in the 1920s and 1930s were shocked to see the reluctance of the public in adopting their ways: “The public cannot adjust to the historic changes the country is undergoing.” Complained the liberal reformers. Because of their inability to adjust, their allegiance to the new Egyptian nation could not be guaranteed. The public were considered “abnormal”, “socially ill,” and in urgent need of containment, surveillance, and medical treatment. Egyptian society was viewed as a mixture of pathological groups to be treated, literally, by medical experts to “normalize” their integration as abstract individual citizens into the newly defined political community (Maghraoui, 90).

Those realizations noted by Maghraoui have continued to haunt Egyptian politics and act as constraints on the public will but they have come even further pronounced as a result of the 25th of January revolution and the resultant free election of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Oddly enough the liberals ignited the 25th of January revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood were in a constant state of opposition before the revolution,

however, when the public will give birth to a different political view, the “liberals” rushed to erase those choices.

The political-social divide has been addressed by popular media: A well-known pop-singer (Ali el-Haggar) released a song titled: ‘They are a people, and we are a people’. The song vilifies the Muslim Brotherhood as ‘terrorists’ and glorifies the ‘proper’ citizens. As al-Effendi writes in an article published recently: “There is indeed, a belief that the elite belong to a superior race and that the rest of the Egyptian people are up for slaughter as they increase in number. There is not problem, therefore, if they are killed wholesale. There are still debates about the numbers of those who have been killed. Is it four thousand in total or one and a half thousand? In the end, it does not really matter.”

“The conflict in Egypt is not simply a matter of disagreements between secularists and Islamists or between liberals and conservatives it is a dispute between Egypt’s ordinary people, those who are rooted in its soil, and the elite who have been determining the way of things since the time of Muhammad Ali and his successors. These elites are the people who have hijacked the state and monopolized the nation’s wealth for use as a weapon against the people so that they may know their ‘place’” (Middle East Monitor, February 2, 2015).

In conclusion, it is very dangerous to obliterate one side of the population, especially the majority from political participation and discourse. Social movement theories indicate that change can occur from above or from below. If one does a comparative study of the region, Egypt in particular historically has been resistant to change from above. Whether one takes Qasim Amin, Huda Shaarawi as feminists, or Nasserism as a national-socialist experiment, neither feminism from above nor socialist Nasserism gained traction as ideas that mobilized the public.

In examining the history of the Muslim Brotherhood as a social movement, they on the other hand gained traction as a movement and their ideas were popularized because they addressed the real needs of the people: free health-care, free education, transportation, etc. Not only did the brotherhood act as a state within a state providing those services, but also their reluctance to adopt Western liberalism wholesale brought their ideas and convictions closer to the people. The great divide between upper class-liberal versus public-religious is replicated in Turkey and Iran’s modern history: whether we talk about Nejm Eddin Erdogan and his struggles, as a precursor to Erdogan, or Iran pre and post the 1979 Iranian revolution are both proofs that change from above and trying to shove “secularism” down the throat of a religious population does not work. At the end of the day people hide their religious convictions until the system allows them to express those convictions freely.

The underscoring of social justice lies at the heart of this great divide, because as this chapter has illustrated the divide between the elites-interest groups and the public is complex. This divide is also based on the kind of education they received, the historical context of this education (i.e. power relations), and above all the ripples of colonization are still felt till this day in the region.

All accounts discussed in this chapter are proof that Rab'a was evidence of the dehumanization of a political faction in Egypt. There are no proofs provided by the current government that indicate that this group as a whole was in any violation of domestic or international laws. There are no proofs that they are terrorists, otherwise they would have been captured a long time ago by the Egyptian forces, before the people voted for them. However, the vilification of a whole people happened and continues to happen till this day because of the elitist-liberal narrative. As indicated earlier in the chapter: the words, ideas, and actions against the people have dominated the political culture long before shots were fired at Rab'a square. Rab'a only exemplifies classist thinking and acting, which obliterates the will of a people to live peacefully and democratically. The account of one of the political leaders who was vehemently opposed to the Muslim Brothers and who actively participated in overthrowing Morsi, Al Baradei, acknowledges the massacre:

“As you know I saw that there were peaceful alternatives to dispersing this social clash, and that there were acceptable solutions proposed to lead us towards national reconciliation. However, things have reached what they are now. And from similar experiences, reconciliation will eventually come but after exacting a major cost that I believe would've been avoidable. It is now difficult for me to continue to bear responsibility for decisions that I do not agree with and to which I fear their consequences and I cannot bear the responsibility for a single drop of blood before God, before my conscience, and before my citizens, especially as I believe that the bloodshed could've been avoided. Thus unfortunately those who gain from what happened today are those who call for violence, terror, and the more radical groups. And you will remember what I have told you and I delegate my matter to God” (HRW: 63)

The literature on restorative justice and retributive justice is vast and in recent years the idea of restorative justice as a means to bring about liberal democracy has been criticized as a politically motivated remnant of the Cold War and the competition between the United States and the ex-Soviet Union (Thesis, 2014).

However, this chapter focuses on recognition, it does not question the forms of “justice” that should be applied in this case to the perpetrators of violence. This chapter postulates that recognition of the atrocity is the only way to begin

national healing. It is only in this long process of healing that human dignity, egalitarianism, and possibly a pluralist society could emerge in the future. Whether one agrees with the principles and ideological underpinnings of liberal democracy or not, it is unalienable that the public participate and formulate their envisioned just and democratic order

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Recognizing the Armenian Genocide: Closing Long Festering Wounds

Gregory Aftandilian

The year 2015 marked the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, a mass killing directed by the Ottoman Turkish authorities in 1915 to eliminate the Armenian people from their traditional homeland in eastern Anatolia as well as from other parts of the Ottoman Empire. During the course of 2015, Armenians throughout the world commemorated these horrific events in demonstrations, rallies, speeches and conferences. Yet these commemorations were not just to honor the memory of the victims, but to call upon the Republic of Turkey, the successor government to the Ottoman Empire, to finally come to grips with its past and recognize these killings as a genocide, which it has heretofore strongly refused to do. In the United States, the Armenian-American community has also demanded that their own government recognize these killings as a genocide, which it has not done, at least in recent decades, because of its desire not to upset its geo-strategic ally, the Turkish government. Non-recognition by the successor government and its main international backer has created and left open a long-festering wound among the offspring of the genocide survivors that will not heal until proper recognition is rendered. This paper will explore why genocide recognition is so important to the worldwide Armenian community, and why proper acknowledgment would help to heal the wounds and bring closure to the issue. The methodology of the paper takes a generational approach to the analysis and focuses mainly on the Armenian-American community, though some of its findings are pertinent to other Armenian diaspora communities.

The word genocide was not coined until 1944, when a Polish Jewish refugee named Raphael Lemkin, whose relatives were murdered in the Holocaust, put together the Greek word *genos* (meaning people) with the Latin word (*cide*) meaning murder, to describe the intentional killings of a race of people (Jacobs, 2008). Though he coined the word during the Nazi onslaught on the Jews of Europe, he was also a student of history and had read about the mass slaughter of the Armenians during the First World War. Indeed, his interest in genocide sprung from his university days in Poland in the early 1920s where

he followed the trial of Soghomon Tehlirian in neighboring Germany. In 1921, Soghomon Tehlirian, an Armenian refugee from Turkey, whose family was killed in 1915, assassinated Talaat Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of the Interior and the main architect of the killings, who had fled to Germany and had taken on a fictitious name to hide his true identity in the waning days of the First World War¹ (Power, 2002, pp. 17–19).

Lemkin was bothered by the notion that there was no international law against the mass killings of a race of people, compelling Tehlirian to take matters into his own hands. In other words, there was no mechanism in the international community to hold such leaders like Talaat accountable (Power, 2002, pp. 17–19). Hence, Lemkin devoted much of his life, particularly after World War II, to bring about the UN Genocide Convention, for which he was the principal drafter.

Although only a handful of countries have made denial of genocide a crime, chiefly because it runs up against the idea of freedom of speech, international law does indeed call for “restitution” of the crime of genocide. Vrdoljak (2011) has noted: “restitution is not so much a remedy for an international wrongful act as it is a cessation of that wrong” (p. 17).

The Armenian Genocide

During the First World War, the members of Entente Powers, also called the Allies, after discovering the widespread massacres and persecutions of the Armenians, did issue a stern warning to the Ottoman government in May of 1915, which read in part:

In view of this new crime of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the Allied Governments make known publicly to the Sublime Porte that they will hold all the members of the Turkish government as well as those officials who have participated in these massacres, personally responsible.

VRDOLJAK, 2011, p. 17

However, it was not clear under what laws, if any, such officials were going to be held accountable. Nonetheless, they knew that terrible atrocities were being committed against the Armenians.

Although millions of people (both soldiers and civilians) died during World War I, the Armenian Genocide stands out as a state-directed campaign to

¹ See also Jacobs, S.L. (2008). “The Journey of Death’ Lemkin and the Armenian Genocide,” *Journal for the Society of Armenian Studies* (17), 7–18.

eradicate a race of people. As prominent historian of World War I, Jay Winter (2003), has written on the fate of the Armenians:

In the midst of war, a substantial part of the long established and prosperous civilian community with identifiable religious and cultural characteristics had been wiped out; they were sentenced to death *because of* who they were and where they were; in effect, because of their ethnicity. Their fate was indisputably a war crime, which constituted a clear precedent for the Nazi extermination of the Jews (p. 48).

The United States was not a signatory of the Allied statement in part because it was not yet a belligerent in the war, but U.S. diplomats stationed in the Ottoman Empire were eyewitnesses to the carnage against the Armenians and reported on what they saw to U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau in Constantinople and to the State Department in Washington, DC. U.S. Consul, Leslie Davis, who was stationed in Harput (or Kharpert) in the interior of the Empire, for example, wrote in one such cable, dated July 24, 1915:

It has been no secret that the plan was to destroy the Armenian race as a race, but the methods used have been more cold-blooded and barbarous, if not more effective, than I had at first supposed [...] I do not believe that there has ever been a massacre in the history of the world so general and thorough as that which is now being perpetrated in this region or that a more fiendish, diabolical scheme has ever been conceived by the mind of man.

HOVANNISIAN, 1968, p. 147

Ambassador Henry Morgenthau had several meetings with Talaat Pasha to implore him to stop the killings. From Morgenthau's 1915 account, Talaat made no effort to hide the fact that the killings and deportations came directly from the government, claiming the Armenians were disloyal or potentially disloyal, boasting that he had finally "solved" the Armenian Question. Morgenthau described the killings as an extermination of a race (Davis, 1989, p. 156; Morgenthau, 1918).

Moreover, numerous American missionaries stationed throughout the Ottoman Empire were also eyewitnesses to the events, and they sent reports back to their colleagues in the United States about the atrocities against Armenian men, women and children. Soon, these missionaries organized a huge relief campaign to help the survivors that eventually became the Near East Relief, incorporated by an act of Congress (Sacher, 1969, p. 342). From 1916 to 1930, the Near East Relief collected more than \$117 million (about \$2 billion in today's

dollars) to care for the stricken refugees and orphans. President Wilson said the stories of the atrocities made him “sick at heart” (Moranian, 2003, pp. 185–213). Wilson was even in favor of taking on an American mandate for Armenia in the immediate post-war period as a way of helping the Armenian people, but Congress, which became increasingly isolationist, turned him down in June of 1920 (Gidney, 1967, pp. 230–237).

What is surprising about this history – which was well known to the world during and immediately after the First World War – was that it soon went down a ‘memory hole.’ The victorious Allies, which had called for the Ottoman Turkish government to be held accountable for its grave crimes, and in the immediate post-war period called for Armenia to be “redeemed,” turned their backs on Armenia, as did the U.S. Senate in 1920. Believing that it was imperative to restart relations with the new Turkey, that of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who established the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Allies soon forgot about the Armenians. Indeed, in the Treaty of Lausanne, signed between the Allies and Turkey in 1923, no mention was made of the Armenians, only a vague reference that Turkey should respect the rights of religious minorities (Bobelian, 2009, pp. 71–73).

The Armenians thus had no Nuremberg trials. Retribution was meted out by a few Armenians, like Tehlirian, who tracked down and killed about six of the main perpetrators who planned and executed the genocide, but Turkey itself, the successor government of the Ottoman Empire, was never held to account for these crimes by the international community.

Turkey, now largely devoid of its Armenian inhabitants, and soon after devoid of its Greek inhabitants through war and population exchanges, propounded the idea of “Turkey for the Turks” under Kemal Atatürk. Armenians were erased from the history books, and the official narrative was that: Armenians were not as numerous as they claimed; they were disloyal and sided with the Russians in the war; there were many instances of rebellion; the government was compelled to deport them out of the “war zones”; some may have died during the deportations because of wartime scarcities but many people – both Muslims and Christians – died during the war; and there was no government intent to kill them (Hovannisian, 1986, pp. 111–113; Gocek, 2007, pp. 337–367).

While the history of the fate of the Armenians was being re-written in Turkey (Dobkin, 2007, pp. 97–109) (and soon by Turkish apologists in the West), the Armenian refugees were coping with a battle of survival, the loss of all of their wealth and income, and severe psychological wounds. The genocide was devastating on many levels. Out of a pre-war population of 2.1 million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, at least 1.2 to 1.5 million men, women, and

children were killed between 1915 and 1918. Most able-bodied Armenian men had been drafted in the Ottoman Army at the start of the war, then placed into labor battalions, and subsequently butchered to death, thus rendering the Armenian population defenseless. In the city of Constantinople, hundreds of Armenian intellectuals were rounded up and killed, as were Armenian village leaders in the interior of the Empire. The rest, mainly women, children, and the elderly, were forced at gunpoint to be deported from their ancient lands, walking hundreds of miles over mountains and into the Syrian Desert without food and water.

The deportees died in many ways. The Ottoman government set loose criminals to prey upon these caravans, and such criminals were free to kill, rob and rape. Others deportees died of starvation and dehydration or were killed by the Turkish gendarmes escorting the caravans. The final destination point was the town of Der el-Zor in the middle of the Syrian Desert, which became an open concentration camp where many more Armenians were killed by the gendarmes or were starved to death.²

The Survivors

Survivors of the genocide were mostly women and children, as the men were the first to be killed. But these women and children were highly traumatized, seeing their family members killed before their eyes or die of hunger and thirst.

2 For some other scholarship on these events and the impact it had on the survivors, see Robert F. Melson, *Revolution and Genocide. On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) and Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, "An Oral History Perspective on Responses to the Armenian Genocide," in *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective*, ed. Richard Hovannisian (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1986), pp. 187–203. For more recent scholarship on the Armenian Genocide, see the following works: Taner Akcam, *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) and his *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2004); Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Verjine Svazlian, *The Armenian Genocide: Testimonies of the Eyewitness Survivors* (Yerevan: Gitoutyoung Publishing House of the National Academy of Sciences, 2011); Fatma Muge Gocek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789–2009* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Ugar Umit Ungor, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

And they themselves were victimized by rape (including the rape of children), beatings, and near death experiences. Many mothers had faced the terrible choice of giving their children away to a kind Muslim family (Turkish or Kurdish) and not to be able to see them again, or marching with their children, hoping to survive the deportations, though it was rare that any remnant of these families survived intact (Adalian, 2013, pp. 117–155).³

The survivors eventually settled in the Arab countries, France, the United States, Canada, and South America and tried as best they could to begin new lives. In the United States, many of the marriages that took place in the 1920s were of Armenian bachelors who had come prior to 1914 to work in the factories, and Armenian women survivors. Many of these were arranged marriages facilitated by the Armenian church or by compatriotic associations based on provincial identities. With the Allies, including the United States, having abandoned the Armenians, and the small portion of eastern Armenia having been absorbed into the Soviet Union, the survivors had no choice but to live their lives in a new diaspora. They could not go back to their traditional Armenian homeland in eastern Anatolia.

The survivors' main concern was to perpetuate Armenian culture in the diaspora, see to it that their children were protected, and to rise from poverty. In the diaspora, they generally lived in safety, but their sense of loss was enormous (Bobelian, 2009, p. 109). Survivors often had to recount stories to other Armenians from the same village who were lucky enough to leave before 1914 about what happened to this or that relative because of the dearth of news (Personal communication with E. Baronian, author's aunt, Medford, MA, October, 2007). Women survivors would often congregate amongst themselves, sharing stories of suffering but sometimes spliced with a humorous episode as a way of psychological coping. The men often got involved in Armenian political parties in the diaspora, hoping that one day, through these efforts, they might see a redeemed homeland, even though it was a distant dream (Karentz, 2004, pp. 108–130).

3 This article also contains eye-witness accounts of three of the survivors. Since the 1970s, many survivor accounts have been published. Some of them have been translations by their offspring who encouraged their parents to write down their experiences. Many other survivors in the United States recounted their experiences in videotaped interviews conducted by the Zoryan Institute and the University of California-Los Angeles faculty and students in the Armenian Studies Program. The former is now housed at the Zoryan Institute in Toronto, Canada, and the latter have been transferred to the University of Southern California and are undergoing digitization to preserve them for the historical record.

Hence, the survivor community was very insular. Although they adapted as best they could to their new surroundings, they were tied to the 'yerkir' or old country and all that they lost there. Until the mid-1960s, survivors and their descendants usually commemorated the genocide in church halls or other community venues. The outside world had moved on from remembering their ordeals and the only thing the survivors could do was to remember silently. The yearning for what they once had and lost, and the difficulty of coping with the present, was captured by the famous Armenian-American writer William Saroyan. Born in Fresno, California in 1908, Saroyan was a keen observer of the Armenian immigrant situation. In his sensitive short story titled, *Andranik and Armenia*, he wrote about the visit of a famous Armenian general (Andranik) to Fresno in the early 1920s, which he witnessed as a boy. The Armenians were initially greatly excited about the general's visit, but after a time, despondency grew again. Saroyan recounted Andranik's visit to his uncle's office in Fresno:

He came into the office quietly, almost shyly, as only a great man can be quiet and shy, and my uncle jumped from his desk, loving him more than he loved any other man in the world, and through him loving the lost nation, the multitude dead, and the multitude living in every alien corner of the world. And I with my uncle, jumping up and loving him the same way, but him only, Andranik, the great man, fallen to nothing, the soldier helpless in a world now full of cheap and false peace, he himself betrayed and his people betrayed, and Armenia only a memory [...] He talked quietly for about an hour and then went away, and when I looked at my uncle, I saw that tears were in his eyes and his mouth was twisting in agony[...]⁴

SAROYAN, 1943, p. 109

The Second Generation – Complexes and Contradictions

The second generation, that is, the children of these survivors, grew up in this insular environment, but at least in the United States, France, and in South America, had more opportunities to assimilate into the broader culture in which they lived than their parents. In the Middle East, assimilation was more

4 For survivor accounts, see Aliza Harb (with Florence Gillmore), *Aliza. An Armenian Survivor Torn Between Two Cultures* (Belmont, MA: Armenian Heritage Press, 2003) and Alice Agnes Tashjian, *Silences. My Mother's Will to Survive* (Lawrenceville, New Jersey: Princeton Academic Press, 1995).

difficult because of the nature of the societies, where one is labeled by one's religion or ethnicity, and it was very difficult to break out of this mold.

In the United States, the second generation was, in a sense, tied to the insular community but also wanted to 'become American.' Many Anglicized their names and eventually broke away from the community to 'get ahead' in American society. Some believed that maintaining their Armenian identity was a burden because carrying the legacies of their parents' traumas was too much to bear.⁵ Although many Armenian genocide survivors, like Holocaust survivors, did not want to talk about their ordeals in order to shield their children from this pain, the children were not immune from their parents' suffering because they would overhear conversations that the survivors would have among themselves and sometimes see their parents going into depressive states or even being awoken by their nightmares.

Aside from the personal, there was also the political. By the time the second generation came of age, the United States was in the beginning of the Cold War, where Turkey emerged as a geo-strategic ally of the United States, as enunciated in the Truman Doctrine of 1947. Turkey became the recipient of substantial U.S. largesse and became a member of NATO in 1952. Hence, to raise an issue like the genocide of the Armenians that would challenge the narrative, if not the legitimacy, of the Turkish state, could be viewed as 'un-American,' and this label, if applied, could be particularly dangerous in the 1950s during the so-called "McCarthy era" on which accusations flew against many Americans who possibly had "foreign connections." Even for those second-generation Armenian-Americans who remained active in the community, the idea of seeking some type of justice for the Armenians, particularly on the genocide issue, remained quite illusive (Bobelian, 2009, pp. 103–105).

Many American academics during this period also were intellectually corrupted by the Cold War mentality. In the 1950s, Princeton University professor Lewis Thomas, while acknowledging that the Turks overreacted against a perceived threat from the Armenians during World War I, nevertheless seemed to justify the massacres as necessary step for positive Cold War developments. Thomas & Frye (1951) wrote:

In 1918, with the definitive excision of the total Armenian Christian population from Anatolia and the Straits area [...] the heretofore largely peaceful process of Turkification and Moslemization had been advanced in one great surge by the use of force. How else can one access the final

5 The issue of the second generation's "burden" is also explored by William Saroyan in his novel, *Rock Wagram* (1951). New York: Doubleday.

blame expect to say that it was a tragic consequence of western European nationalism upon Anatolia? Had Turkification and Moslemization not been accelerated there by the use of force, there would not today exist a Turkish Republic, a Republic owing its strength and stability in no small measure to the homogeneity of its population, a state which is now a valued associate of the United States (p. 61).⁶

Therefore, for these Cold War apologists for Turkey, they not only “blamed the victims” – which later scholars have said is the final stage of genocide – but seemed to have suggested that the extermination of the Armenians was, in fact, a necessary step in the consolidation of the Turkish state. Whether these “scholars” realized it or not, they were not just making an analytical point, but a political one that denigrated the worth of an entire ethnic group. Even among those who admitted that thousands of Armenians died during the deportations, they blamed the Armenians for instigating the Turks to undertake such measures (Fisher, 1960, pp. 365–366).⁷

The Third Generation and Its Connection to the Survivor Generation

At least in the context of the United States, the Armenian-American third generation did not grow up with an inferiority complex like that of the second generation. Whereas their parents wanted to ‘fit in’ with American society and faced a good deal of prejudice from non-ethnic Americans, who often referred to them as a ‘foreign element,’ the third generation generally did not grow up in such an environment or with these hang-ups.⁸ By the time of the

6 See also Richard Hovannisian *The Armenian Genocide and Patterns of Denial*. In Hovannisian, R. (Ed.), *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective*.

7 Although Fisher stated 500,000 Armenians perished, he claimed that their deaths were due to “inadequate” provisions for Armenians during the deportations and to “unofficial bands” of “marauding and Kurds and Turks.” Fisher also claimed that the deportations were necessary because of Armenian “rebellions.” Other revisionist histories during the timeframe are much less forthcoming on the number of Armenian deaths but include even more outlandish claims. See Altemur Kilic, *Turkey and the World* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), Richard Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), and Eleanor Bisbee, *The New Turks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956). Bisbee called the deportations, for example, “migrations.”

8 Much of this section of the paper is based on the author’s personal observations as a third generation Armenian-American growing up during this period. For sociological studies of

1960s rolled along, America had also changed. The civil rights movement that eventually led to more rights for African-Americans had an impact on the way other ethnic Americans viewed themselves (Stein & Hill, 1977). They started to feel proud of their own heritages, and now wore their ethnic identity on their vests as a badge of honor, instead of something to hide or downplay. Moreover, the intense controversy surrounding the Vietnam War made questioning the U.S. Government an accepted political practice, unlike in the 1950s. If millions of Americans could demonstrate against the Vietnam War, why not question other aspects of American foreign policy? Nothing was sacrosanct any more.

In this environment, the third generation, going to universities in great numbers, started to rediscover their Armenian identity. They redirected their activism on political and social issues that many were involved in to their own ethnic community. In this, they had a special connection to their grandparents, most of whom who were still alive at this time. Many members of the third generation sat down with their grandparents to hear about their ordeals as children or as young adults, and in many cases these grandparents opened up to their grandchildren more than they did to their own children for complex reasons, but perhaps to make sure than their stories would not be forgotten. Thus, there was a strong emotional bond between the survivor generation and their grandchildren (Author's personal observations).

But in high schools or universities, when these same grandchildren saw what was written about the Armenian genocide, they were appalled and angered by what they read. Either the authors of history books dealing with World War I or Middle Eastern history did not mention the genocide at all or adopted the Turkish government's narrative mentioned earlier. And if they referred to "so-called Armenian claims of genocide," they juxtaposed them with the Turkish narrative in an effort to "even-handedness."

The third generation, also read about the sufferings of other peoples, like Jews of Europe during World War II, or the plight of the American Indians whose true story, in terms of U.S. Government persecutions of them, began to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s. It seemed that an exception was being made for the Armenian case but in a negative way. For some reason, the persecution of the Armenians was not being given its proper recognition.

the Armenian-American community (particularly of the first and second generations), see Sarkis Atamian, *The Armenian Community* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955). For the second and third generations, see Anny Bakalian, *Armenian-Americans. From Being to Feeling Armenian* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transactions Publishers, 1993). See also the interviews with former Armenian-American youth activists in *The AYF Legacy: Portrait of a Movement in Historical Review, 1933-1993* (Watertown, MA: Hairenik Press, 1994).

Hence, in the eyes of the third generation, their grandparents – the people who doted over them, cooked them old country dishes, spoke in broken English, and who suffered tremendously in the first genocide of the Twentieth Century – were not given the respect they deserved, especially in the twilight of their years. Scholars either ignored their suffering or even tried to “blame the victim” by claiming that such people had instigated the crimes bestowed on them.

Other developments around the world also heightened the activism of the third generation. In 1965, nationalist Armenian students took to the streets in Yerevan, Soviet Armenia to demand that the Soviet government acknowledge the Armenian genocide and allow the issue to be discussed openly. Some of these students even shouted slogans demanding “our lands” by pointing westward toward Turkey (Bobelian, 2009, p. 122). Although the Soviet Union was at odds with Turkey for many decades because of the Cold War struggle, it was reluctant to deal honestly with the Armenian genocide issue up to this point because of the fear that it would bolster Armenian nationalism and serve to undermine the Communist party’s grip on society. However, this student movement was so strong – even older Armenian intellectuals who were Communist party members joined in – that Soviet authorities acceded to some of the demands, allowing the building of the Armenian Genocide memorial in Yerevan, and allowing intellectuals to write more openly about the genocide.

In the Arab countries, particularly in Lebanon, which has had a large Armenian community, most of whom were genocide survivors and their descendants, many members of third generation were affected by the radicalization around them. The late 1960s and early 1970s was the time of radical Palestinian nationalism and of a sort of Third World-ism, a rejection of the classic East–West struggle and of setting right historical wrongs. Many Armenians in Lebanon saw the cause of justice for the Armenians, the twin demands of genocide recognition and of demanding Armenian lands, as part of a Third World struggle, and some, a few years later, took up the cause in a violent way by forming terrorist groups which targeted Turkish diplomats.

Although the vast majority of Armenian-American youth activists in the 1960s and 1970s did not engage in violence, they were nonetheless aware of what other parts of the worldwide Armenian diaspora were doing, and this awareness fed off each other. As the youth activists were demanding that Turkey acknowledge the genocide of their grandparents’ generation, the Turkish government bolstered its campaign of genocide denial and elicited many American academics to support its side, often with generous research grants and trips to Turkey (Adalian, 2013, pp. 137–138).

As many of the Armenian third generation's grandparents started to die off due to old age, there was a concerted effort within the community to videotape the remaining survivors so that their stories would not be lost (Miller & Touryan, 1986, pp. 187–203). Some of the pro-Turkish American academics went to absurd lengths to discredit this effort, claiming that the interviewees were “coached” to say incriminating things to cast the Ottoman Government of 1915 in as bad a light as possible. These sentiments were particularly galling to the young activists, as they were seen as calling their beloved grandparents liars (The author's personal observations).

As the third generation exercised their activism, members of the second generation, now having reached middle age and a comfortable socio-economic status, began to reassess their former reticent behavior. Many of them now joined the third generation, not in street protests, but in building lobbying organizations that would raise the issue of genocide recognition, not only to try to compel Turkey to admit that the Ottoman Government was guilty of genocide, but to call on the United States Government, Turkey's main international backer, to acknowledge it as well. The passing from the scene of many survivors – the second generation's parents – during this period may have also been a factor in rekindling a sense of activism and doing something positive to honor the memory of their parents. The 1970s, therefore, witnessed the rebirth of Armenian lobbying efforts in the United States, largely dormant since the 1920s, led by the second generation but increasingly fueled by the activism of the third generation.

Since the 1970s, therefore, the Armenian community has focused its attention on genocide recognition, with the exception of the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the Soviet Union was being broken up and the small Soviet Republic of Armenia emerged as an independent state. But once this new state seemed to be secure, the diaspora refocused its energy onto the genocide issue.

As the third generation has become middle age, its sophistication in political lobbying has increased. Although the Government of Turkey has continued its denial campaign, and has put pressure on every U.S. administration **not** to use the “genocide” word to describe the crimes of 1915, Turkey is losing the intellectual argument on the issue as well as political support from many powers.

In this 100th year anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, both the German and Austrian governments – the Ottoman Government's two main allies in World War I – have recognized the genocide. And perhaps more importantly, Pope Francis, in front of a number of Armenian political and religious figures, called it the first genocide of the Twentieth Century this spring. Turkey

predictably reacted angrily to this acknowledgement and recalled its ambassador from the Vatican (BBC, 2015).

The Asymmetry of Power

One of major factors, if not the major factor, in the inability of the Armenian community to compel Turkey to come to grips with its past has been its weak position vis-à-vis Turkey. From the early 1920s to the present day, Turkey has been a relatively strong state, and since the end of World War II, has been generously supported by the United States and other Western countries; first because of its geostrategic position in the Cold War against the Soviet Union; second because of its position as a moderate Muslim state with some democratic institutions and free elections, which many in the West see as a model for the rest of the Islamic world; and third because of its proximity to the unstable Levant region of the Middle East.⁹ Although Armenians have a relatively large and active diaspora (perhaps 8 million today) they are still in a much weaker position compared with the Turkish state of nearly 80 million people, with its large military establishment. And even when the small Soviet republic of historic eastern Armenia became an independent state in 1991, it was too small (only three million people) and beset with internal and external difficulties to even compel Turkey to end its blockade of Armenia (imposed soon after Armenia became independent because of Armenia's conflict with Azerbaijan), let alone account for the crimes of the Ottoman Empire in 1915.

Although the Armenians, because of their rising socio-economic status and political activism, have persuaded a number of countries (chiefly in Europe and South America) to recognize the Armenian Genocide, they have been unable to apply this same political pressure on the Turkish government.

Why Genocide Recognition is so Important for the Armenians

Some observers have claimed that Armenians are hung up on the 'g' word, meaning that they are obsessed about labeling what happened to their parents or grandparents as genocide. To a large extent, this sentiment is true. But the question is: why?

9 For example, the United States uses the Incirlik air base in south central Turkey to launch air strikes against ISIS or Daesh in Syria.

Armenians believe that what happened to their people fits exactly what the definition of the UN Genocide Convention that Raphael Lemkin drafted says it is: that there was Ottoman Turkish governmental intent to exterminate the Armenian race from the Ottoman Empire. Turkish government claims of an inter-ethnic civil war within a world war are fabrications to obfuscate the facts. How can such claims be justified when the elderly, women and children, people who could not have been belligerents in a civil war, died or were slaughtered in very large numbers? Moreover, how could there have been a civil war when the bulk of the able-bodied Armenian male population had been drafted into the Ottoman army, later to put into labor battalions and then killed? Furthermore, how can the Turkish government, and successive U.S. governments, support denial when the archives of the United States and those of most European countries are filled with documents describing the genocide in a way that fit Lemkin's definition?¹⁰

To call it anything less than a genocide would not only diminish the numbers killed, but would negate governmental intent to wipe out not only the Armenian people from historic Western Armenia but their 3,000-year-old civilization in that region. Calling it genocide not only brings out the truth of what happened to their ancestors but puts all of these lies to bed.

Moreover, coping with genocide denial for so long and trying to achieve affirmation of the crime has become part of Armenian identity. As Adalian (2013) has explained:

For the survivors and their descendants the memory of the Armenian Genocide became a central feature of their identity. In the face of official denial and the long silence of the world community, formal recognition of the most catastrophic event in their long history as a community assumed the only form of justice remaining to be obtained. To that end the trend to toward international affirmation of the Armenian genocide

10 For U.S. State Department records affirming that the extermination of Armenians was indeed the Ottoman Turkish Government's plan, also see Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris. The Armenian Genocide and America's Response* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003). For the works of Turkish deniers and Western revisionist scholars, see Kamuran Gurun, *The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1985); Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question* (Istanbul: Foundation for Establishment and Promotion of Centers for Historical Research and Documentation, 1988); Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 2: Reform, Revolution, and Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 1983). For an analysis of the Turkish denial campaign, see Hovannisian, "The Armenian Genocide and Patterns of Denial."

became the method for keeping alive the memory of the events of 1915 and for reminding the world of the horrifying injustices of the Armenian genocide. For a people dispersed around the world, the call for recognition has translated into asking the government of which they ultimately took refuge to issue official acknowledgement of the brutal record of man's inhumanity to his fellow man (p. 138).

Psychologically, clinicians who have studied this issue and have treated some Armenians for the psychological transmission of trauma have noted that denial plays an important role in Armenian identity. They asked rhetorically, "How do you explain who you are to others as well as to yourself when no one acknowledges the reality and validity of your past?" (Boyajian & Grigorian, 1986). Other psychologists, writing in the 1990s, have noted: "the rage and stress created by Turkey's denial, and the widespread acquiescence to that denial, has interfered with the ability of the survivors, their children, and grandchildren to mourn, process, and integrate this painful history" (Kupelian et al., 1998). Hence, there has been no closure on the issue, which is deeply personal because the genocide affected most Armenian families.

Recognition of the crime of the Armenian Genocide would help to heal these wounds and bring closure to the issue. As two other scholars, H.S. Sullivan and J.V. Montville¹¹ specialists on victimization, have noted, validation of a traumatic experience is an essential step toward resolution and closure, and a perpetrator's explicit expression of acknowledgement and remorse has enormous value in healing the victim (Kupelian et al., 1998). More recently, Armen Marsoobian, a historian in the United States has stated that for Armenian descendants of the genocide, "it's an open wound when their suffering hasn't been acknowledged ... One needs that kind of acknowledgement [for] one's mental health" and psychology (Ziv, 2015).

In response to the activism of the Armenian diaspora on the issue of recognition and the success that this activism has had to convince several countries in the world to recognize the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish government in the last few years has made some half-hearted attempts to deal with the issue. It is no longer prosecuting Turkish intellectuals who are acknowledging the genocide, and in 2014, Turkish President Erdogan issued a statement of "condolences" to the grandchildren of the Armenians who "suffered" but he did not

11 Kupelian, Kalayjian, and Kassabian cite two works, H.S. Sullivan, *The Interpersonal theory of psychiatry* and J.V. Montville, *Psychoanalytical enlightenment and the greening of diplomacy*, to explain how the validation of a traumatic experience is an essential step toward resolution, closure, and healing.

call the persecutions a genocide. (The Guardian, 2014). In 2015, he backtracked even from this half-hearted statement.

Some Turks, usually those associated in one way or another with official policy, have also put out the line that there must be acknowledgement of “joint suffering.” What they mean is that if the Turkish nation is to acknowledge the suffering of the Armenians, the Armenians must recognize the suffering of the Turks during World War I. They claim that hundreds of thousands of Turks died of disease and famine, in addition to the large number of Ottoman soldiers who were killed in the war. While certainly many Turks died during the war, they died not because of any genocidal intent. In other words, Armenians see this idea of “joint suffering” as merely a ruse to obscure Ottoman Turkish culpability in genocide (Sanjian, 2014).

These half-hearted statements by the Turkish Government and their supporters are not going to work to bring closure to the issue. Only an unambiguous statement that what took place against the Armenians was indeed genocide, and an official expression of regret and an apology, will heal the wounds. Armenians keenly want this, and will not drop their activism until it is achieved. It is also important to note that Armenians are not inherently anti-Turkish. Armenians acknowledge that many individual Turks aided Armenians during the genocide out of friendship and human compassion. Moreover, whenever a Turkish intellectual admits the genocide in unambiguous terms, he or she is warmly received by the Armenian community, as witnessed by the warm reception given to Professor Taner Akcam of Clark University, one of the first Turkish intellectuals to recognize the genocide.¹²

Is Turkish Government Recognition Possible?

Intellectuals like Akcam have broken the taboo that once existed in Turkey about even discussing the Armenian Genocide. Although some of these early scholars like Akcam started to write about the genocide while living in the West in the 1990s, more and more Turkish intellectuals in Turkey itself have started to address the issue in a more honest and open way in recent years. The assassination of Hrant Dink, a Turkish Armenian intellectual and editor of

12 Taner Akcam received a standing ovation from Armenian-Americans during the centennial ceremonies marking the Armenian Genocide in Washington, D.C. Personal observations, May 9, 2015. Akcam has written several books on the Armenian Genocide and Turkish Government attempts to cover up the truth. See for example, his book, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

the bilingual (Armenian and Turkish) journal, *Agos*, in 2007, appears to have been a galvanizing event. Dink had been outspoken in calling on the Turkish government to recognize the Armenian Genocide, and his assassination by a right-wing Turkish student who may have had links with ultranationalist Turkish organizations seem to have sparked a backlash among progressive-minded Turks. During his funeral, tens of thousands of Turks marched in Istanbul, many holding signs that read in Turkish, “We are all Hrant Dink” or “We are all Armenians.” (The Guardian, 2007).

Many of these progressive-minded Turks see a link between the lack of true democracy in Turkey and the cover-up and denial of the Armenian Genocide. In addition, more and more Turks are discovering that the Armenians were not an alien and subversive element of Ottoman society, but part and parcel of it. Indeed, many Turks have also discovered in recent years that they have some Armenian blood in them. The publication of the book, *My Grandmother*, in 2008, written by Turkish lawyer and human rights activist, Fethiye Çetin, explored how she came to find out that her grandmother was an Armenian toward the end of her grandmother’s life (one of the many Armenian children that were given away to, or taken by, Turkish and Kurdish families during the genocide) (Bilefsky, 2010).

These developments are all positive for convincing more elements of Turkish civil society to accept the notion that recognition is important for healing the wounds of the Armenian issue and to bring about Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. Whether all this will influence the Turkish government down the road to come to the position of full recognition is difficult to say, as the main institutions of the Turkish state – the presidency and the military – remain stubbornly against it, not to mention the right-wing nationalist parties. However, should Turkish progressive elements come to power some day, there is hope for recognition and reconciliation.

What about the issue of reparations? Some scholars have pointed out that with recognition should come reparations because that is the only way to truly account for the crime of genocide. I tend to disagree. While some Armenians will not be satisfied unless recognition is accompanied by the payment of reparations in some form, the majority would be satisfied that the genocidal crimes committed by Ottoman Turkey would be truthfully acknowledged by its successor state. In this way, the death of their ancestors would have been properly recognized, and they themselves would no longer have to carry on the burden of always seeking justice.

Thus, the issue of recognition plays and will continue to play a crucial role surrounding the issue of the Armenian Genocide. But only proper recognition will pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Armenian and Turkish peoples.

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PART 3

Towards Transformative Recognition



Recognition, Intersectionality and Transversal Politics

Nira Yuval-Davis

The argument of this paper is that the politics of recognition (which can also be called identity politics) is a double-edged sword. Political struggles focused on issues relating to recognition and rights of particular groups claiming to represent particular social categories and identities have been playing vital roles in different struggles for social justice all over the globe. At the same time such politics tend to mask power relations within these groups and organizations, to reify boundaries of social collectivities and to homogenize group membership, attachments, and values. The paper presents intersectionality as a counter analytical tool and transversal politics as an alternative political strategy.

“Politics of Recognition,” as an alternative and/or as a complement to the socialist politics or “politics of redistribution,” to use Nancy Fraser’s terminology (1995) became more and more important during the 1970’s and 1980’s. This was due to a variety of historical, social, and political developments which have seen the decline of the older socialist movement and the fall of the Soviet Union and all that it supported in global politics.

In particular, this had to do with the important role identity political movements have played in a growing number of social fields – gender, race, indigenous people, sexuality, and disability – to name but a few. Social and political theorists, such as Charles Taylor (1992) and Michael Walzer (1992), have argued that the need for recognition is one of the driving forces behind nationalist and other identity (or “subaltern”) political movements. Taylor (1992, p. 32) claims that the growing importance of the politics of recognition in the public sphere is an outcome of the growing importance of two supposedly contradictory assumptions – one of human rights which call to award everyone universal dignity and equal respect on the one hand and that of individuation which draws attention to the different unique identities of different individuals and groups.

Socialist feminists, such as Nancy Fraser (1995), Seyla Benhabib (2002), and others, acknowledged some validity in these arguments but insisted that not every claim for recognition should be respected. Unless identity politics is

complemented with politics of redistribution, the emancipatory progressive character of such an acknowledgment can get lost.

While acknowledging the important contribution of Fraser's approach to feminist and generally emancipatory politics, the argument of this paper is that, while helpful as a heuristic device to highlight some of the weaknesses as well as the strengths of identity politics, the dichotomy of recognition and redistribution politics can ultimately be misleading. We need a more sensitive analytical tool which would be able to examine the multi-dimensional, rather than only bi-dimensional, ways in which social inequalities are produced and reproduced, within as well as between social groupings. We need a political approach which would differentiate between social groupings and social attribution (e.g. to be a woman does not mean one belongs to a women's group and being Jewish does not mean one belongs to a Jewish community). We also need to differentiate between those who act on behalf of and/or present themselves as representatives of particular communities and the actual members of these communities who can be quite heterogeneous.

Such an analysis also needs to take into account feminist epistemological insight that, to use Donna Haraway's famous quote that "there is no view from nowhere" (Haraway, 1991, p. 89). In other words, we need to adopt what is known to be an intersectional analysis.

Intersectionality

As is widely recognized, the intersectionality approach has a long history. Bell hooks (1981) has chosen the groundbreaking claim for recognition of Sojourner Truth, an emancipated slave, in 1863 "Ain't I a woman," to be the title of her first book which rejected the homogenization of women's oppression by white feminists. Sojourner Truth was speaking in an abolitionist convention and argued that, given her position in society, she worked hard, carrying heavy loads and other physical labor but this did not make her less than a woman and a mother from women of privileged background that are constructed as weak and in need of constant help and protection as a result of what society considered to be "feminine" ways.

Indeed, intersectional analysis, before getting mainstreamed, was carried for many years mainly by black and other racialized women who, from their situated gaze, perceived as absurd, not just misleading, any attempt by feminists and others since the start of the second wave of feminism, to homogenize women's situation or oppression and specially to find it analogous to that of blacks. As bell hooks mockingly remarked in the introduction of her book: "This implies that all women are White and all Blacks are men."

As Brah and Phoenix (2004, p. 80) point out, other black feminists fulfilled significant roles in the development of intersectional analysis, such as the Combahee River Collective, the black lesbian feminist organization from Boston, who pointed, as early as 1977, to the need of developing an integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking.

The term “intersectionality” itself was also introduced by an American Black feminist, the legal and critical race theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, when she discussed issues of black women’s employment in the USA and the intersection of gender, race and class matters in their exploitation and exclusion. However, what can be called intersectional analysis also developed roughly at the same time by several European and post-colonial feminists (e.g. Bryan, Dadzi, & Scafe. 1985; James, 1986; Lutz, 1991).

My own work in the field of intersectionality (although we called it then “social divisions”) also started in the early 1980’s when, in collaboration with Floya Anthias (1983, 1992) we studied gender and ethnic divisions in South East London and at the same time became engaged in a debate with British black feminists, organized then in the Organization of Women of Asian and African Descent (OWAAD) on the right way to theorize what would be called now an intersectional approach.

As I have argued in my (2006) article (see also 2011a and b), some of the basic debates we had with them, continue to occupy those engaged in intersectional analysis today, after it became mainstreamed and came to be accepted by the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and many other equality and equity policy organizations in many countries. Part of the differences among those who use intersectionality have resulted from the different disciplines and purposes for which it is being used.

Rather than engaging in describing some of the historical debates around intersectionality, whether in Britain or in the UN (as I have done in my (2006) article, see also Brah & Phoenix, 2004, and Woodward, 2005), I am going to outline below the main characteristics of the intersectional approach which I would like to apply so as to transcend the dichotomy of recognition and redistribution.

Three main positions in relation to the intersectionality approach used in this article need to be clarified here. The first relates to the division McCall (2005) makes between those approaches to intersectionality which she calls “inter-categorical” and those she calls “intra-categorical;” the second relates to the relationships which should be understood as existing between the various intersectional categories; and the third relates to boundaries of the intersectional approach and thus the number of social categories included in intersectional analysis.

Inter- or Intra-categories?

According to McCall (2005), different studies which have been using intersectional approach differ as to whether they used inter- or intra-categorical approach. By intercategorical approach she means focusing on the way the intersection of different social categories, such as race, gender, class affect particular social behavior or distribution of resources.

Intra-categorical studies, on the other hand, are less occupied in the relationships among various social categories but rather emphasize the meaning and boundaries of the categories themselves, such as whether black women were included in the category “women” or what the shifting boundaries of who is considered to be “black” in a particular place and time.

I do not see these two approaches as mutually exclusive and call for an intersectionality approach which combines the sensitivity and dynamism of the intracategorical approach with the socio-economic perspective of the inter-categorical approach. As I have developed elsewhere (Yuval-Davis, 2011), I consider as crucial the analytical differentiation between different facets of social analysis – that of people’s positions along socio-economic grids of power; that of people’s experiential and identification perspectives of where they belong; and that of their normative value systems. These different facets are related to each other but are also irreducible to each other.

Moreover, although I consider intersectional analysis to be a development of feminist standpoint theory, I argue that there is no direct causal relationship between the situation of people’s gaze and their cognitive, emotional, and moral perspectives on life. People born in the same families, with the same socio-economic background and geographical location can have different identifications and political views; people can identify themselves as belonging to the same racial or ethnic collectivity and have very different socio-economic backgrounds as well as different political and normative evaluations of these identity categories; and people can share the same political and value systems but come from very different backgrounds as well as memberships in identity groupings. For this reason, it is not enough to construct intercategorical tabulations in order to predict and even more so, understand, people’s positions and attitudes to life.

The Relationship between the Social Categories

The intercategorical approach, if applied on its own, assumes that discourses of race, gender, class etc. have separate concrete meaning. I would argue although these discourses cannot be reduced to each other in terms of what they are about, they have no specific concrete meaning. (Yuval-Davis, 2006a–c). For example, to be a woman is different whether you are a middle or working

class, member of the hegemonic majority or a racialized minority, living in the city or in the country, young or old, straight or gay etc. In other words, in each historical moment, the meanings of specific social categories are mutually constituted with and by other social categories. Viewing intersectional analysis in this way links the interrogation of concrete meaning of categories and their boundaries to specific historical contexts rather than just in abstract.

*The Boundaries of Intersectional Analysis
and Intersectional Categories*

McCall (2005, p. 1774) argues that “in its emphasis on black women’s experiences of subjectivity and oppression, intersectional theory has obscured the question whether all identities are intersectional or whether only mutually marginalized subjects have an intersectional identity.” Indeed, Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, p. 139) defines intersectionality as “the multidimensionality of marginalized subjects’ lived experiences.” Other black feminists (Thornton Dill, 1983; Bryan et al., 1985) also remain within the triad boundaries of race, class and gender. Philomena Essed (1991) even limits it to the two dimensions of “gendered racisms” and “racist genderisms.” Others have added the specific categories they were interested in, such as: age (Bradley, 1996); disability (Oliver, 1995; Meekosha & Dowse, 1997); nomadism (Lentin, 1999), or sexuality (Kitzinger, 1987). In other works, however, feminists attempted to develop complete lists and included in them much higher numbers – for example, Helma Lutz (2002) relates to fourteen categories while Charlotte Bunch (2001) to sixteen categories. Floya Anthias and I (1983; 1992; see also Yuval-Davis, 2006a–c, 2011a–b), strongly argue that intersectional analysis should not be limited to those on its multiple margins of society, but rather that the boundaries of intersectional analysis should encompass all members of society and thus intersectionality should be seen as the right theoretical framework for analyzing social stratification. There is a parallel here with the struggle of many of us during the 1970’s and 80’s, to point out (what these days seems much more obvious), that everybody, not just racialized minorities, have ethnicities and that members, especially men, of hegemonic majorities are not just human beings but are gendered, classed, and ethnocized, etc.

In *Gender Trouble* (1990), Judith Butler mocks the ‘etc.’ which often appears at the end of long (and different) lists of social divisions mentioned by feminists and sees it as an embarrassed admission of a “sign of exhaustion as well as of the illimitable process of signification itself” (1990, p. 143). As Fraser (1995) and Knapp (1999) make clear, however, such a critique is valid only within the discourse of identity politics where there is a correspondence between social

positionings or locations and identifications with particular social groupings. When no such conflation takes place, Knapp finds rightly that Butler's talk:

of an illimitable process of signification' can be reductionist if it is generalized in an unspecified way ... [and] runs the risk of levelling historically constituted 'factual' differences and thereby suppressing 'differences' on its own terms.

KNAPP 1999, p. 130

Knapp's critique of Butler clarifies again the crucial importance of the separation of the different analytical dimensions in which social divisions need to be examined discussed above. Nevertheless, the question remains whether there are, or are not, in any particular historical condition, specific and limited number of social divisions that construct the grid of power relations within which the different members of the society are located.

As I mentioned (Yuval-Davis, 2006a–c), I have two different answers to this question which are not mutually exclusive. The first one is that while in specific historical situations and in relation to specific people there are some social divisions which are more important than others in constructing their specific positionings; there are some social divisions, such as gender, stage in the life cycle, ethnicity, and class which tend to shape most people's lives in most social locations while other social divisions such as disability or statelessness tend to affect less people globally. At the same time, for those who are affected by those and other social divisions not mentioned here, such social divisions are crucial and rendering them visible needs to be fought for, as this is a case where recognition – of social power axes, not of social identities – is of crucial political importance. Therefore, the question of how many social divisions exist in every historical context is not necessarily fixed and is a product of political struggle as well as of an analytical prowess.

This is linked to my second answer which relates to what Castoriadis (1987) (see also Stoetzler & Yuval-Davis, 2002) called the "creative imagination" that underlies any linguistic and other social categories of signification. Although certain social conditions may facilitate this, the construction of categories of signification is, in the last instance, a product of human creative freedom and autonomy. Without specific social agents who construct and point to certain analytical and political features, the rest of us would not be able to distinguish them. Rainbows include the whole spectrum of different colors, but how many colors we distinguish depend on our specific social context and what language we speak. It is for this reason that struggles for recognition always also include an element of construction. It is also for this reason that studying the relationships between positionings, identities, and political values are so important.

The struggle for recognition, therefore, is inherently important to any intersectional analysis. However, as Fraser (1997) and Ben Habib (2002) pointed out, not all struggles for recognition are emancipator, as some struggles for recognition are aimed at reversing power relations rather than transforming society into a more inclusive and equal one and/or are aimed at creating exclusive boundaries based on primordial criteria. (This, by the way, can take place even in feminist contexts, as in recent years there are groups of women who would allow participation in their actions to only 'those who were born women,' thus barring participation from transgender and transsexual women).

There is a need to differentiate between at least two different kinds of solidarity. The first one, which we can call the politics of care (Yuval-Davis, 201b, Ch.6), requires a recognition of the humanity of everyone. As human rights defenders, we would struggle as much as we can to defend all those who are oppressed, dispossessed, racialized, or exploited. However, they would not necessarily become our long term allies. In order to transform humanity into a more just and equal society, we need to establish solidarity and alliance with those we recognize as sharing our basic political values and social vision although their social locations and identifications can be very different from our own. Many of us call this type of solidarity politics "transversal politics."

Transversal Politics

Transversal politics (Cockburn & Hunter, 1999; Yuval-Davis, 1994, 1997, 2006c, 201b) are dialogical politics in which all the participants in the dialogue see themselves not as representatives but as advocates of particular collectivities and social categories. They share similar values but operate according to what the Italian feminists from whom I first heard this term call the principles of 'rooting' and 'shifting,' i.e. being reflexive as well as staying grounded in one's own social location, while also empathizing and imagining what it means to be in the dialogue partners' shoes. The relationships of the feminists participating in such dialogue are often not symmetrical in their individual and grouping social locations and identifications, but they all share feminist politics, respect each other and look for ways to transcend, if not to transform, their national and ethnic conflicts as well as society in general.

The strength of transversal politics as an alternative to identity politics lies in the construction of common dialogical understandings of particular political situations rather than of common political action as different social locations might establish different priorities for emancipator action while sharing the same political values. These common values which signify the boundaries of the dialogues is what differentiates transversal politics from 'rainbow coalitions.' For example, for feminists in particular locations the fight against forced sterilizations might be more urgent than the right for abortions which is the

priority of feminists in other places. For the struggle against forced sterilization they might find an ally in the Catholic Church, but what connects them and the feminists who are fighting for the right for abortion is the feminist value of women's right to control their own bodies, something that the Catholic Church would be against. Thus, transversal politics encompass difference by equality and while continuously crossing collectivity boundaries, the transversal solidarity is bounded by sharing common values.

Transversal politics are based on the symmetrical politics of the Buberian 'I – You' approach (Buber, 1947). But the symmetry and reciprocity is not that of commercial interest, as Levinas claimed in his critique of Buber (Levinas, 1999), but of the reciprocity of trust. One might be engaged in defending the rights and/or helping to fulfil the needs of any individual and collective human beings, whatever their values, transversal common political belonging depends on shared values, although these shared values encompass intersectional individual and collective differential positionings. This trust, based on common values, also differentiates transversal politics from the Habermasian deliberative democracy approach (Habermas, et al., 2000). This is of crucial importance because in this way the transversal perspective helps us to judge which differences matter when and where, and to differentiate between care and compassion towards the oppressed, whoever and wherever they are, and that of accepting them all as potential political allies. Southall Black Sisters (SBS) in London, for instance, are very active in the defence of women of all ethnic and religious communities from domestic violence and abuse, rejecting any cultural and religious justification of such acts. At the same time, they are not the political allies and oppose those who have sought to solve domestic violence caused by migrant men by deporting them from Britain – after all, men of all classes and ethnic communities commit the crime of domestic violence but are not punished by deportation. Racist solutions should not be the answer to sexist problems and SBS would not establish a transversal political alliance with those who do not share their anti-racist values.

We cannot, and should not, construct a homogeneous, or even unified, political order. Rather, we should engage in a transversal dialogue, bounded by common political values. These values are informed by recognitions of our differential locations and identifications and led by a global discourse in which translation, rather than a unitary language, is seen as the cosmopolitan political tool and political projects of belonging are multi-layered, with shifting, contested and porous boundaries.

Having said that, transversal political alliance has its limitations in establishing social and political transformation, unless it finds a way also to be translated into a political work in which structural changes can take place via

formal representative processes. Although transversal politics partly escapes the “tyranny of structurelessness” which Jo Ryan (1975) rightly accused feminist identity politics to suffer from, it did so by activists working as advocates rather than as representatives of political groupings and causes. However, we have not found yet a better alternative decision-making mechanism to that of actual voting and electing nominated representatives which are required for transformative politics to become a transformative and stable social and political change. This, unfortunately, involves long and hard political work to transform people’s values as well as get their support for specific political actions. But it’s worth it.

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Epilogue: Recognition in Its Place

Dale F. Eickelman

To use a term made current by Oxford philosopher Walter Gallie (1968) in the mid-twentieth century, “recognition” is an essentially contested concept. Most everyone can agree what recognition is in the abstract – an act of acceptance, acknowledgement, or admission of validity. The difficulty comes in elaborating or implementing the term and applying it to specific historical and social circumstances. Like other concepts such as social justice, equity, and fairness, recognition has many different meanings. Like many Oxford philosophers, Gallie acknowledges that he sticks with a somewhat artificial notion, such as how to perceive quality in the playing of one’s favorite sports team. Is it a “champion” because of its overall playing style, the raw scores, or other factors? There can be agreement on the game, but not how success in it is evaluated. Few real-life situations are as simple as the games philosophers play, but such logic facilitates identifying how notions such as essentially contested concepts identify what went wrong and how more positive outcomes might be achieved.

Recognitions Compared

Recognition suggests the complexities of reaching agreement and how they have changed over time. The book’s core is the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, although the South African experience and the heritage of the Armenian genocide and references to other “troubles,” to use the evocative euphemism from Northern Ireland, are not far behind. Merely enumerating the elements involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict induces a sense of ineffable complexity: conflicting ideas of entitlement, loss, and the past, the need somehow to synchronize top-down political initiatives with bottom-up ones of at least some of the communities involved, and the multiple agendas of external state and non-state actors, many of whom are indifferent to long-term solutions.

The editorial structure of *Recognition* reveals how important both culture – shared but never immutable understandings of ideas – and process are to achieving peace, or at least a cessation of hostilities, between opposing sides or among warring factions. Albie Sachs introduces the concept of Ubuntu, a Zulu term first used in Zimbabwe and later elaborated as a principle for “transformative recognition.” The term, which black South Africans used in earlier periods to refer to a mutual recognition and common humanity despite differences of

class, social status, ethnicity, or other distinctions, implicitly excluded South Africa's white population. By 1993, however, the term was incorporated into the interim South African constitution of 1993 and referred to all the peoples of South Africa (Gade 2011: 311). Over time, the term has become part of an African lingua franca.

Sachs's preface is appropriately aspirational. "Recognition" in South Africa is an ongoing process that also has setbacks as more and more South Africans recognize sustained and even increasing inequalities in economic and educational opportunity. Campus riots, aggression against sub-Saharan immigrants to South Africa, and other points of collective tension suggest that sustaining recognition is an ongoing, unrelenting process and is subject to reversals. Legal recognition is important, and this South Africa has achieved, but so is the recognition of economic and educational opportunity and the lack of South Africa to meet these expectations with the passage of time.

The South African example is still invoked as a model for reconciliation elsewhere, at least as a point of departure in considering what must be done – and what is missing. A contemporary feature of many such contemporary conflicts elsewhere is the appeal to other models of resolving territorial disputes and the right to "belong" to a political entity. For example, the 2006 proposal of Morocco's Royal Advisory Council on Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) to grant Morocco's Saharan province autonomy draws heavily on Spanish experience with autonomy of some of its regions, including Catalonia and the Canary Islands. Many CORCAS members travel frequently, participating in international conferences are aware of the internal arrangements of countries such as Belgium with its diverse ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian communities. Although the Saharan conflict is much less prominent internationally than the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the long-term impasse at reaching an agreement bears points of resemblance as there is a multi-faceted conflict over who is empowered to speak for the populations involved over territorial and other historical rights.

In arguing for the comparison between the South African conflict and that over Palestine-Israel, Sachs invokes the 6 August 2002 agreement between Palestinian academic Sari Nusseibeh, a leading Palestinian academic, and Ami Ayalon, a former head of Shin Bet – Israel's internal security service – specifying the conditions under which an agreement could be achieved. Nusseibeh and Ayalon, both members of the elite in their respective societies, recognized the need to involve more than the political elite of Israel and Palestine to achieve how a settlement might take place. Their joint statement is fascinating to read and a model of pragmatic realism. Yet like other efforts since 1993, the political will and popular support have been lacking to explore how an agreement might be reached in practice, and the actions of states external to

the region have been contradictory and ineffective. Most Palestinians recognize that there is an Israeli Jewish (and Jewish) narrative for “belonging” but deny its legitimacy. Most Israeli Jews (and other Jews) acknowledge that there is a counterpart Palestinian narrative, but likewise deny its legitimacy. There is some movement toward recognizing Israel as a state, but recognizing it as a Jewish state is, for many Palestinians, a conversation-stopper.

The differences over time and background understandings in understanding the process of recognition are important to consider. Yoram Meital’s distinction between “thick” and “thin” recognition – terms that for some invoke Clifford Geertz’s now-classical notion of “thick” description – is capital. State recognition is a necessary element, but without a corresponding “thick” recognition further progress is stymied. Meital argues that Prime Minister Netanyahu’s insistence that Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state “essentially blocks off all roads to a permanent two-state solution.” Yet Meital’s brilliant account of how the issue of mutual recognition has been transformed since 1947 suggests how, notwithstanding the intransigence of all parties to the dispute, there has been gradual accommodation from below, often brought about by changed circumstances than on one could fully anticipate.

Part of the change is due to shift in language. Consider Judge Sachs’s reference to the resurrection in the 1980s of the term, Ubuntu for South Africa. Primary candidates for the equivalent of Ubuntu in the Palestinian-Israeli dispute are the local Arab notions of hudna or sulh, because these two terms resonate with Islamic and tribal history. In its most basic form, a hudna is a cessation of hostilities in which a calculation of rights and wrongs is set aside in consideration of the shared greater good. Religiously-minded Muslims invoke as an antecedent the treaty of Hudaibiyya in which Muhammad, acting on behalf of the inhabitants of the oasis settlement al-Madina in 628 and not as Prophet, achieved a cessation of hostilities between Madina and his Mecca-based tribe of origin, the Quraysh. The idea of a hudna has occasionally been invoked in current negotiations over the Palestinian territories, involving a time-limited truce or as a confidence-building gesture.

A sulh is a compelling tie of group obligation that settles a conflict through specific agreements in which the parties of both sides – or multiple sides – agree to end a dispute and publicize the terms of the agreement, recognizing the rights of both sides.

In practice, there is a great divide between the hudna of Hudaibiyya or a sulh involving two contiguous sides. One element concerns who legitimately speaks for the affected parties. On the Palestinian side, the number of Palestinians who retain ties with their “homeland,” whether directly in the occupied territories or within Israel itself, increases exponentially. Among Jews in

Israel, there is likewise an ambiguity of who speaks for the country. Complications include foreign funding, both state-to-state and private, direct funding to particular religious groups and settlements, and the conflicting interests of state- and non-state groups that have no necessary interest in achieving settlement. Many of these groups have no direct contact with one another, as opposed to the occupants of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, who have necessary, even if unwelcome, contact with one another. The other complication is that with the passage of time – almost 70 years since the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, an occupation of the West Bank now in its 50th year, and the rising levels of education and exposure to global political currents among Palestinians, the invocation of classical patterns for achieving a cessation of hostilities using the terms used only among Palestinians risks being misunderstood as manipulation or patronization by the dominant party.

In the abstract, there have been many hopeful signs for peaceful resolution since 1948 and even earlier. At the state level, there have been major breakthroughs, such as the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, and occasional signs of hope at other levels. There are numerous private initiatives to provide “safe spaces” to promote dialogues and to explore points of agreement, offering a “balm,” in the word of the editors of this volume, to the seemingly endless conflict. Unfortunately, many have much to gain from short-term instability. For example, Jewish-Palestinian smugglers, among other exploiters of “grey areas” of borders, find ports of entry through seemingly intractable frontiers and profit from them (for example, Bucaille 1998).

For many politicians, there is limited incentive to opt for the long-term perspective. Even as the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the State of Israel pay lip service to the idea of a two-state solution, it is difficult to assert that major progress has occurred toward this goal. There are multiple ideas concerning mutual recognition, territorial delineation, and the status of Jerusalem, but no progress on the part of the Israeli political leadership or Palestinian leadership persuading their respective constituencies – or their counterparts – that they are prepared to take the political risks involved in political recognition: borders, sovereignty, the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, the recognition of Palestine as a sovereign state, and the reaffirmation of the rights of non-Jews in Israel and non-Palestinians in Palestine. As the editors acknowledge in a poignant understatement, “considerable slices of both populations are opposed to mutual recognition on religious, historical and national grounds.”

Yet in terms of tacit understandings, there are numerous points of correspondence in day-to-day cooperation and adjustment. Soon after the 1979 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, criminal syndicates from both countries cooperated in the lucrative business of smuggling goods and people

in both directions (Shokeid 1984, 2017). On a more formal level, opportunities provided by the European Union, for example funding for dance ensembles provided that they involve both settlers and Palestinians, ensures that some cooperation takes place (Kaschi 2003).

Reasons for cautious optimism are based less on the actions of states in the Middle East or elsewhere, but in the circumstances of day-to-day business in the occupied territories and within Israel. Kelman's main point, that "recognition" is a long-term process that must be instigated now and should not wait for a top-down negotiated agreement, is borne out by these incremental changes. Palestinians may not relish use of Hebrew, the occupier's language, but a knowledge of Hebrew is almost a necessity for many work opportunities (such as in tourism), travel, and commercial transactions. Sometimes Hebrew is acquired from classes in Israeli prisons, including lessons given to school children convicted of throwing stones at Israeli soldiers. One sign of change is how Israeli Arabs complain about Israeli state policies. From the 1980s to the present, the complaints among Israeli Arab citizens have shifted from lamenting their perceived second-class status to achieving pragmatic goals such as fair access to government contracts and access to courts (Eickelman 1998). There is also a growing recognition among Israelis, both Arab and Jewish, that the linguistic impediments to learning one another's language in schools partially derives from political stasis (Uhlmann in press).

Likewise, the Palestinian financial system necessitates cooperation with Israeli institutions. Taxes collected by Israel on behalf of the PA account for two-thirds of its revenues, according to some sources, and withholding these funds is occasionally used as leverage against the PA (BBC, "Palestinian Authority," 2015) for political reasons or to connect unpaid electricity bills. For its part, the Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) aspires "[t]o be a full-fledged and modern central bank for an independent and sovereign Palestinian state" (www.pma.ps), but remains an institution in waiting. While waiting for the PMA to become a central bank, the Israeli shekel is the primary currency used throughout Palestine for all day-to-day transactions. The exception is the capital required to register new businesses, for which the PA Ministry of National Economy (MONE) requires use of the Jordanian dinar (US State Department 2016) Remittances no longer go through Israeli banks, although the PMA is heavily monitored to adhere to the standards imposed by Western monetary authorities.

Although the term "rentier state" is generally applied to oil-rich countries, some 80 percent of the revenue of the PA is derived from foreign subsidies, both private remittances and foreign government subsidies. Ironically, such subsidies diminish pressure to achieve a settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli

dispute. Large numbers of Palestinians work in the Arab Gulf and throughout the world, supporting family members who remain behind. Although figures are hard to come by, remittances also support the existence of many Israeli settlements beyond Israel's internationally recognized borders. Lower-earning Palestinians, at least in the Gulf Cooperation Council states, send funds through proliferating money transfer firms that go straight to their towns or regions of origin, including Ramallah, Hebron, and Nablus. Many of these small firms offer more competitive rates than Western Union. Higher-salaried Palestinians transfer funds through banks, especially the Arab Bank and the Palestine Bank. Large transfers, probably like small ones also, are carefully vetted because of US-imposed financial regulations, and the Palestine Monetary Authority oversees both forms of transactions.

Individual and Collective Recognition

Recognition suggests the difficult divides between individual and collective attitudes that must be diminished in order to move beyond the debilitating status quo of mutual distrust and antipathy. Herbert Kelman's poignant personal history of involvement in conflict resolution is rooted in his personal experience as a child growing up in Vienna in the 1930s and experiencing the first years of Nazi rule before seeking refuge elsewhere. He recalls that in one of his earliest essays, published in Hebrew in a student journal in 1945, he argued that the "establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine requires cooperation" between Arabs and Jews. Receiving his doctorate in 1951, he was one of the early contributors to peace research and by the mid-1960s was directly attracted to the idea of "unofficial diplomacy" – which might also be regarded as diplomacy from the ground up.

The term "unofficial diplomacy" masks a congeries of deeply felt elements of national identity and national existence, compounded by the fact that the Jews and Palestinians have deeply conflicting notions of national identity. Key to Kelman's approach is thinking how to persuade large numbers of those involved to transcend thinking of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a zero-sum game. The Oslo Accord of 1993 was one such breakthrough, resulting in an exchange of letters of mutual recognition between Yitzhak Rabin – subsequently assassinated by an extremist Israeli Jewish student – and Yasser Arafat.

The Oslo process ultimately broke down, at least in terms of its formally stated goals, for multiple reasons that shifted over time. One impediment has been the pervasive instability – and one might say mediocrity – of rule at the top both within Gaza and the West Bank. Increasingly, many Palestinians have

ceased to see the PA or Hamas as representing their interests, but rather as organizations whose primary goal was perceived as sustaining sinecures for its supporters. Parallel to this lack of decisive Palestinian leadership is an increasingly polarized Israel and an electoral system that encourages fragmentation, making the achievement of long-term goals uncertain. Israel's former heads of Mossad, its external security service, and Shin Bet, its domestic counterpart, may agree that a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine is essential to long-term Israeli interests, but the country's political leadership has been incapable or unwilling to risk taking decisive action in this direction.

In sum, long-term cooperation between Israeli Jews and Palestinians remains bleak although not impossible. The allocation of water resources, the continuing construction of settlements, land seizures, the sluggishness with which permits for the repair of homes in East Jerusalem, Jaffa, and elsewhere is authorized for Palestinians, and the allocation of infrastructure reinforce inequality.

Kelman's proposal for a one-country two-state solution, which distinguishes between political and economic integration, makes sense. It is "reasonable," but the question remains whether "making sense" is adequate to achieve mutual recognition or at least a two-state solution. In his proposal, all parties accept that both Arabs (Christians and Muslims – the term "Arab Jew," once more common, has fallen into desuetude) and Jews have historic roots in Palestine/Israel. Both people share a common homeland but become citizens of different states in an historic compromise: having an economic union in which Jerusalem is the capital of both states, at least a symbolic right of return for displaced Palestinians, and acceptable security arrangements.

Kelman acknowledges that some Jews would be fanatically opposed to such a solution, as would many Arabs. Perhaps it is too much to expect that both sides will recognize the legitimacy of the other's narrative of entitlement and belonging, but it is possible to achieve recognition that the "other" has a narrative.

Not far behind the incremental issue of day-to-day transactions is the question of anticipation about the future. Many Israeli citizens, including Arab Muslims and Jews, see behind routine events efforts by one community of another to secure advantage prior to a wider settlement of the Israeli/Palestinian dispute. A case in point is the fate of the Grand mosque of Bir al-Saba' (Beer-Sheva after 1948), built in 1906 when the majority of Beer-Sheva's inhabitants were Muslims, including Bedouin from the vicinity. In 2014, the Beer-Sheva metropolitan area had a population of 361,000, the seventh largest metropolitan area in Israel, with 203,600 in the "core," or central urban, area. Of these numbers, 128,500 Arab Muslims lived in the greater metropolitan area, but only

5,000 in the central urban area. In 1948, many of the Bedouin were expelled from Israel to Gaza, and have not been allowed to return. The Great mosque was turned into a detention center in 1948 and subsequently fell into disrepair. By the 1990s, it was strewn with rubbish and covered with graffiti, and a menorah was even placed on its roof. By the mid-1990s, a movement began to restore the mosque, but as an archaeological museum. In 1997, activists who sought to restore the building to a mosque planned to conduct a Friday prayer service on a grassy field adjacent to the mosque. The municipality spread cow manure on the site the night before to deter the demonstration, so demonstrators arrived with plastic sheets.

Two issues appeared to underlie the symbolic (and real) violence behind such confrontations, which had many counterparts throughout Israel. As Yitzhak Reiter (2017: 209–227), a scholar and deputy advisor on Arab Affairs for three Israeli prime ministers, puts it, the ongoing controversy over restoring the Great mosque in Beer-Sheva raises the wider question of how the Arab Muslim minority in Israel is allowed to represent itself collectively in Israeli public space. He has advocated restoring 20 surviving mosques to their status as mosques, and commemorative plaques placed on the 33 that have been destroyed (Economist 2014). Other holy places are shared among Christians, Jews, and Muslims. Into this mix since the 1980s came the feminist Jewish movement, “Women on the Wall.” Reiter (2016) describes how the movement’s politics have changed from the 1980s to the present. Likewise, his discussions of the disposition of Muslim pious endowment (waqf) properties suggest how, as one approaches the present, especially in places such as Acre, suggest how and why abusive or deceptive practices with waqf and so-called “abandoned” properties, sometimes in tandem with compliant Muslims and often with minimal consultation, have given way to greater accommodation since the 1960s. At the same time, the fault lines of dispute have become increasingly transparent, as Yuval-Davis affirms in her essay on intersectionality, indicating the greater awareness of overlapping systems of aggression, domination, and oppression based on gender, sexual orientation, race, social class, language, and other points of cross-cutting points of conflict and possible unity. Intersectionality is also an issue explored elsewhere by Gabriella Djerrahian (2013), showing how Ethiopian Jews in the last two decades have replaced the Mizrahim (Jews primarily of North African and Middle Eastern origin) as what she calls the “new blacks” in Israeli Jewish society.

Reiter’s *National Minority, Regional Majority* (2009) provides an exceptional account of Arab (mostly Muslim) and Jewish relations within Israel, and how these relations closely link with the regional political situation. I qualify his approach as “exceptional” because Reiter gets beyond the “us” versus “them”

approach that permeates much of the literature on Israel's regional role and its treatment of ethno-religious minorities within Israel. As a former "insider" to government decision-making, Reiter (2009: 178, 183–184) correlates the heated policy discussions within the government and the increasingly effective efforts of Israeli Arab lobbying organizations that countered Israeli government misrepresentations of its allocation of resources to Arab minority concerns.

Above all, Reiter (2011) shows the growing fragmentation of voices claiming to represent both "sides" in the Jewish-Muslim Arab dispute within Israel and in the wider region, with multiple voices that blur the lines among protagonist. One concern that has blocked progress is the fear among some Jewish citizens of Israel that the restoration of a mosque such as the one in Beer-Sheva could lead to a designation of the city as binational in case of a settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian dispute and a fundamental change in the character of the Israeli state. Reiter narrates the growing ability of Israel's Arab minority population to work within the Israeli system and to understand the how administrative and political processes work. His comparisons with analogous contests over public space in Bosnia, Cyprus, Indo-Pakistan, and elsewhere place Israeli Jews and Arabs within Israel and the territories within its control within a wider comparative perspective.

The concept of "ethical transformative recognition" (Amal Jamal, this volume) takes place within the context of existing power relations: "through the act of recognition in a situation of domination, the recognizing side affirms not only his/her identity, but also the domination itself". Facilitating the peace process in his view entails disconnecting recognition from power relations. Conflictual separation based on "subordination, domination, and violence" has already taken place, and assumes that Jewish Israelis are one people. Leadership from the outside is essential in order to find ways to achieve shared sovereignty, and both political entities need gradually to change to alternative ideas of sovereignty. Jamal starkly points out the obstacles to achieving reciprocal recognition. Israelis regard everything inside the Green Line (Israeli's pre-1967 borders) as Israeli and Jewish territory, with no Palestinian identity – and 93 percent of land within the pre-1967 borders is state land.

Palestinians are willing to compromise, Jamal argues, but the view excluding a strong Palestinian identity within Israel is not shared. Palestinians and Israelis both have a vision of separate independent and sovereign states, but such a notion is not based on the delineation of borders alone, as separate roads for Jews and Palestinians and continued land seizures throughout the occupied territories and East Jerusalem attest. It also involves the demilitarization of the future Palestinian state, and shared notions of customs and economic opportunities, and the potential for territorial swaps. In the short

term, the conflict can be managed at the cost of continued violence, but a longer term requires mutual recognition of asymmetry that is not just between Jews and Palestinians, including Palestinian Arabs who are citizens of Israel.

Kahanoff (this volume) suggests several points of departure in understanding openings and impediments to achieving mutual recognition. Distinct collective traumas, she argues, forms an impediment to mutual recognition. For Arab Palestinians, including citizens of Israel, the core trauma is the Nakba of 1948, when at least 700,000 Arabs either fled or were expelled from their homes. The Holocaust (in which six million Jews and many others perished) is the counterpart for Jews – although in the 1986 a Mizrahi student asked me during a public talk at Tel-Aviv university whether I thought that European Jews had appropriated the Holocaust as their collective symbol to exclude Jews of Middle Eastern and North African origin. (I invited the audience to discuss the question among themselves, which had nothing directly to do with the talk.) In retrospect, such a question and debate suggests the emerging dynamics of intersectionality.

What happens behind the scenes at encounters involving reciprocal recognition is richer and more multifaceted than what is played out on the stage, and that it is the background action, if any, that makes mutual recognition possible. Learning about other people's tragedies, Kahanoff argues, becomes a marker for collective identity – and often a conversation-stopper in Gallie's sense of the term as some refuse to accept the equivalence of the defining tragedy of the other group because recognizing the collective trauma of the "other" challenges one's own defining group narrative.

An Elusive Common Ground

Conflict resolution, Kahanoff argues, is a transformative discipline. She describes the visit of Arab and Jewish educators to Yad Vashem and subsequently to a demolished Palestinian village. Participants did not reach a common ground, but the experience helped Kahanoff indicate the reasons why both groups of educators excluded the others narrative of trauma from shared public space. Kahanoff also poses a question best articulated by Kevin Avruch (2010) – the difficulty in peace and recognition activities in moving from encounters among individuals willing to participate in shared activities to statements or activities in shared public space.

Montgomery (this volume) focuses on the issue of agency among marginalized groups. Political agency, she argues, works best when individuals have

the confidence to place issues on the agenda in a “hospitable and inclusive” public space, which of course is precisely the issues that this volume explores and what in practice has not always been present. As Reiter affirms, there are local initiatives, sometimes quietly supported by elements in the Israeli administration, that permit mosques to be constructed and offer a more equitable allocation of resources than in earlier eras. Actions such as a major Israeli effort announced in 2016 to hire 1,300 more Arab police officers and open ten additional police stations in Arab areas (Hartman 2016) is part of the incremental process underway to reset the perceived balance among rival communities. Yet such public recognition is a double-edged sword. It is necessary, but at the same time it inadvertently calls attention to differences among groups, such as the statistically higher level of crime in Israeli Arab communities.

Deina Abdelkader (this volume) addresses painful recent events in Egypt, notably the ongoing clash between a secular liberal elite, symbolized by the heavy hand of the military on Egyptian institutions including Parliament and the judiciary, and a religious majority. Even if she overemphasizes the role of the Muslim Brotherhood as the voice of this majority, the Brotherhood has since 1928 emerged as the best organized of Egyptian popular religious movements. It is not the only religious voice. Local and regional saints’ festivals (Schielke 2012), on the one hand, and the organization of the assassins of Sadat (Kepel 1986) on the other, offer but two examples of competing movements, one largely apolitical and nonviolent and the other offering dramatic violence.

Abdelkader affirms that the state demonizes the Muslim Brotherhood as the long-term inciter to violence and the Brotherhood as perceiving the liberal elite as the avatars of Western and domestic anti-religious influence. Reminiscent of Clifford Geertz’s famous depiction of the forces at play in a Javanese cockfight in the 1950s (Geertz 1972), Abdelkader focuses on interpreting a single savage event, the government massacre of protesters at Rab’a al-Adawiya Square on 14 August 2013. The death toll at the square was 817 which, together with actions against demonstrators in Cairo a month earlier, amounted to 1,150 killed – worse than China’s Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Human Rights Watch 2014). The liberal view was that the Egyptian was “socially ill” and therefore needed supervision and treatment, and that the general Egyptian population was backward and needed direction from the elite. However, one can reasonably ask whether the “elite,” including the military, industrialists, and the professional classes, are a unified body. The disjuncture between the “liberal” elite and the rest of the population could not be greater, and Abdelkader points to the events of 2013 that “recognition” in Egypt, bringing together the wider Egyptian public and the self-declared elite, could not be greater than it currently is.

Finally, Gregory Aflandilian (this volume) presents the time dimension of Armenian stages of recognizing and representing what happened to the Ottoman Empire (and Turkey's) Armenian population, and generational differences in the global representation of their ethnic cleansing within Turkey and in the wider world.

In sum, in order for recognition to work it must be socially constructed. It involves "agency" on the part of all constituents and both top-down and bottom-up initiatives involving contest and bargaining on the part of all parties. The process will most likely be long, and requires public leadership. One is unlikely to get many protagonists of any group to agree to the legitimacy of the claims of the other, but with external pressure and support, plus the slow buildup of civil day-to-day transactions. Optimists can invoke the daily life in the Jerusalem market, the Shuk [Arabic suq] Mahane Yehuda, where Jews of many different languages and nationalities of origin, Armenians, and Christian and Muslim Arabs cater to a clientele as mixed as are the vendors. Such civility requires coexistence and civil restraint, and a tacit agreement not to allow collective narratives block the mutually beneficial economy activity and de facto coexistence. The model of the Jerusalem shuk will not in itself solve disputes with deep roots, but it offers an aspirational model of what can be achieved in the shared public space of Jews and Arabs.

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