

Urban Autonomy in Medieval Islam

Islamic History and Civilization

STUDIES AND TEXT

Editorial Board

Hinrich Biesterfeldt
Sebastian Günther

Honorary Editor
Wadad Kadi

VOLUME 128

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/ihc*

Urban Autonomy in Medieval Islam

*Damascus, Aleppo, Cordoba, Toledo,
Valencia and Tunis*

By

Fukuzo Amabe



BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: The narthex-gallery of the Zaytūna mosque in Tunis, added to the old prayer room by the Zīrids at the end of the tenth century.

Names: Amabe, Fukuzo, author.

Title: Urban autonomy in medieval Islam : Damascus, Aleppo, Cordoba, Toledo, Valencia and Tunis / by Fukuzo Amabe.

Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2016] | Series: Islamic history and civilization ; volume 128 | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016007029 (print) | LCCN 2016008803 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004310261 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9789004315983 (E-book)

Subjects: LCSH: Islamic Empire—Historical geography. | Islamic Empire—Autonomous communities. | Baghdad (Iraq)—History. | Damascus (Syria)—History. | Aleppo (Syria)—History. | Córdoba (Spain)—History. | Toledo (Spain)—History. | Valencia (Spain)—History. | Tunis (Tunisia)—History.

Classification: LCC DS36.57 .A43 2016 (print) | LCC DS36.57 (ebook) | DDC 956/.014091732—dc23

LC record available at <http://lcn.loc.gov/2016007029>

Want or need Open Access? Brill Open offers you the choice to make your research freely accessible online in exchange for a publication charge. Review your various options on brill.com/brill-open.

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: "Brill". See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 0929-2403

ISSN 978-90-04-31026-1 (hardback)

ISSN 978-90-04-31598-3 (e-book)

Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents

Preface VII

Abbreviations VIII

Introduction 1

1 Ninth-to-Eleventh-Century Baghdad: An Early Abortive Example 17

2 Damascus during the Later Tenth Century 26

3 Aleppo during the Eleventh to Early Twelfth Centuries 54

4 Cordoba during the Early Decades of the Eleventh Century 85

5 Toledo during the Eleventh Century 118

6 Valencia during the Later Eleventh Century 140

7 Tunis during the Eleventh to Twelfth Centuries 162

Conclusion 184

Bibliography 191

Index 209

Preface

It has been assumed that Western Europe was the only area to develop autonomous cities, virtually independent of large- or medium-sized monarchies, in which citizen-notables were normally power-holders. However, the Middle East was the first area to develop cities and then empires. The Islamic World with its extension to Gujarat and the Konkan coast in western India was the first to transform 'political and farmer cities' of ancient origin to economic and commercial-industrial cities, followed by China and then parts of Western Europe. This book is a modest attempt to rectify the traditional view, showing that not a few Muslim cities were virtually autonomous, albeit mostly of short duration, after the collapse of traditional large-sized states. However, this book is not bold enough to propound a new theory that Muslim autonomous cities were beginning to develop their own version of capitalism in a grandiose style, though it is very possible in a more limited scale. Moreover, the development and flourishing of merchant capitalism is possible even under centralized, autocratic rulers, like ninth-century Abbasid caliphs, Chinese Song, Yuan and Ming emperors since the eleventh century, and eleventh-century Chola rajas of the Coromandel coast (southeastern India).

I have concentrated on this study for the last ten years, struggling to excavate obscure facts almost exclusively from Arabic sources to reveal urban autonomy in medieval Islam (I failed to consult potentially important numismatic data, unless they have been previously dealt with by other authors). The so-called republic of Cordoba in post-Umayyad al-Andalus is well-known, but even the Jahwarid leaders of this 'republic' were treated like kings by medieval Muslim historians, and sometimes even by modern Western historians. The Khurāsānid leaders of Tunis are more often regarded as kings. The civil leaders of Damascene, Aleppine and Toledan autonomy have been largely neglected; only the qāḍī Ibn Jaḥḥāf of Valencia is famous for his resistance to Rodrigo el Campeador.

Such an account covering a wide scope could not have been written without the labors of my senior scholars in their respective areas of investigation, not least Cahen, Ashtor, Halm and Brett. It remains to thank my teachers of classical Arabic, the late professor Kosai Ban and Professor Osamu Ikeda of Osaka University of Foreign Studies (now part of Osaka University), and my teachers of Islamic history and Middle Eastern Studies, the late professor Johei Shimada of Chuo University (Tokyo) and Professor Yuzo Itagaki of Tokyo University. Professor Tadayoshi Kikuchi of International Buddhist University, Shitennoji (Osaka), has always afforded me warm encouragement and goodwill. I'm also grateful for Tokyo Keizai University (the University of Economic Studies at Tokyo) for granting a sabbatical year in 2013, enabling me to complete the draft of this book.

Tokyo, September, 2015

Abbreviations

Journals, Encyclopedias and Book Series

<i>Arabica</i>	<i>Arabica. Revue d'Études Arabes</i>
BEO	<i>Bulletin d'Études Orientales de l'Institut Français de Damas</i>
<i>Brill's New Pauly</i>	<i>Brill's New Pauly: Encyclopaedia of the ancient world</i> , ed. H. Cancik and H. Schneider, 20 vols., Leiden: Brill 2002–10.
CCM	<i>Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale</i>
CHAL	The Cambridge History of Arabic Literature
<i>Der Islam</i>	<i>Der Islam. Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients</i>
EHR	<i>Economic History Review</i>
EI ²	<i>The Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , 2nd ed., 12 vols., Leiden: Brill 1954–2004
EI ³	<i>The Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , 3rd ed., Leiden: Brill 2007–
EOBA	<i>Estudios Onomástico-Biográficos de Al-Andalus</i>
HdO	Handbuch der Orientalistik
IHC	Islamic History and Civilization
IJMES	<i>International Journal of Middle East Studies</i>
IOS	<i>Israel Oriental Studies</i>
ITS	Istanbuler Texte und Studien
JA	<i>Journal Asiatique</i>
JMH	<i>Journal of Medieval History</i>
JRAS	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
JTS	<i>Journal of Turkish Studies</i>
JWH	<i>Journal of World History</i>
MMED	The Medieval Mediterranean
<i>Qanṭara</i>	<i>al-Qanṭara. Revista de Estudios Árabes</i>
REI	<i>Revue des Études Islamiques</i>
RIEEI	<i>Revista del Instituto Egipcio de Estudios Islámicos</i>
RSO	<i>Rivista degli Studi Orientali</i>
SHSM	Studies in the History and Society of the Maghrib
SILS	Studies in Islamic Law and Society
SMEH	Studies in Middle Eastern History
TAVO	Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients
VCSS	Variorum Collected Studies Series

Arabic Sources

A'lāq: see Ibn Shaddād in Bibliography.

A'māl: see Ibn al-Khaṭīb.

Bughya: see Ibn al-'Adīm.

dhayl: see Anonymous chronicle of the *mulūk al-ṭawā'if*.

Ḥulla: see Ibn al-Abbār.

Iḥāṭa: see Ibn al-Khaṭīb.

Itti'āz: see al-Maqrīzī.

Muntaẓam: see Ibn al-Jawzī.

Muqaffā: see al-Maqrīzī.

Muqtabis: see Ibn Ḥayyān.

Ṭawq: see Ibn Ḥazm.

Tibyān: see 'Abdallāh b. Buluggīn.

Tuḥfa: see al-Ṣafadī.

Wāfi: see al-Ṣafadī.

Zubda: see Ibn al-'Adīm.

Introduction

The farmers of agriculturally productive but sparsely-populated areas during primitive times were compelled to assemble in relatively closed, tightly-knit localities, abandoning some of their freedom, in preparation against real or possible predatory incursions of neighboring, less productive peoples. The society of the latter was normally based on very loosely-knit clans or tribes, mostly composed of nomads or mountain-dwelling peoples (supporting themselves through farming and stockbreeding). That is the reason why the first states were mostly cities, often encircled by defensive walls and surrounded by extensive farms to feed citizens. Under these circumstances, the archaic citizens were mostly peasants and their rulers were landowners (before the formation of landowners, the redistribution of food, clothing and utensils, collected by temples and palaces and recorded by priests and officials, had been normal). Gradually, the rulers of particular cities became outstandingly powerful enough to subject nearby cities to their control. There were also many cases in which clannish or tribal peoples were united across the division of clans under charismatic leaders, conquering as many cities as possible to found new medium- or large-sized states, in which these conquerors-tribesmen formed the almost exclusive ruling class under the leadership of their charismatic leaders or their successors (routinization of charisma).¹

Since the Assyrian domination during the eighth and seventh centuries BCE, nearly all the cities and regions of the Middle East with their extensions to the Mediterranean regions continued to be under the relatively centralized sway of extensive patrimonial states (so-called empires) founded by initially peripheral groups, such as the Chaldeans, Achaemenid Persians, Macedonians, Parthians, Romans and Arab Muslims. These cities were controlled through the agency of local governors, bureaucrats and indigenous patricians, nominally subject to central governments, but often virtually exercising the power of decision-making on the spot. It is important to notice that the empires of Alexander the

1 Primitive states were mostly cities including their hinterlands; that is the reason why the word 'city' could mean a state in many languages. In contrast, villages were of late ancient or medieval origin, often transformed from estates or shrunken cities. Recently, the monopolistic part played by the temple and palace in ancient Iraqi city economy including long-distance trade in the form of reciprocity and redistribution began to be reconsidered in favor of a more important role of nascent market economy. Aubet, *Commerce and Colonization*, esp. 7–113. For the state-formation by tribal peoples under the command of charismatic leaders see Amabe, *State-Building*.

Great and the Romans also originated from Middle Eastern peripheries and were essentially confederations of Middle Eastern cities.² The cities, in most cases, retained not only their own rural hinterlands, but also many of their own institutions under governors imposed by central governments. That is the reason cities tended to recover independence with the decline of central power.

During these imperial times, the new types of cities, as distinct from archaic cities formed by synoecism (dwelling together), were founded by medium- or large-sized states, as capitals, frontier defensive posts, commercial headquarters or centers of freshly developed agricultural areas.³ However, ancient economy did not develop beyond a closed domestic economy with production aimed at meeting local needs and with little exchange beyond domestic consumption. Then since the mid-ninth century, the Middle East, especially Iraq, entered into an economic upsurge based on long-distance trade and the growth of agricultural and industrial production geared to urban consumption and export to other regions. This process was later followed by China, and then parts of Western Europe.⁴ As a result, in contrast to the preponderance

-
- 2 The viewpoint nearest to the author's in recent works is found in Cline and Graham, *Ancient Empires*; McEvedy, *Penguin Atlas of Ancient History*. The Assyriologist Mario Liverani also stresses that the 'Oriental' city was not quite different from the classical city and that the Islamic city was the heir of the Hellenistic and Roman-Byzantine city. Liverani, Power and Citizenship, in *The Oxford Handbook of Cities in World History*, ed. P. Clark, 164–6, 177.
- 3 Notice a very different situation of the formation of cities in Western Europe. Most northern European cities were born in the middle of chaotic strife between small independent warlords as small colonies of craftsmen and traders clustered around fortresses (sing. *burgus*, *castrum*) or small trading posts equipped with sea or river ports (*portus*, *emporium*), as a result of agricultural and commercial growth since the later tenth century. On the other hand, Roman cities in Italy, which had diminished in scale and abandoned many public buildings, began expanding as a result of the population growth of Italy since the later tenth century. Then citizens began asserting power at the expense of bishops, who had controlled them as imperial surrogates. Boucheron and Menjot, *La ville médiévale* 66–96; Scott, *The City-State in Europe* 5–24; Keene, Towns and the Growth of Trade, in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4, part 1, ed. D. Luscombe and J. Riley-Smith, 48–62.
- 4 Wink, *Al-Hind* i, 34–64, 306–34; Goitein, The Rise of the Near-Eastern Bourgeoisie, *JWH* 3 (1957), 583–604; Lombard, *The Golden Age* 161–239; Watson, *Agricultural Innovation* 91–136. In China the meteoric rise of production for export and the prevalence of a monetary system began during the Five Dynasties (907–960) and the early Northern Song dynasty (960–1126), following the fall of ancient nobles and the rise of small landowners in the late Tang period. Shiba, *Commercial Activities during the Sung Dynasty* [in Japanese]; Yabuuchi (ed.), *History of Chinese Science and Technology in the Song and Yuan Dynasties* [in Japanese]; McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* 24–62. For ancient economy see Aubet, *Commerce and Colonization* 10–1 (based on Karl Bücher, a founder of non-market economics).

of farmer and political cities during ancient times up until early Islamic times, medieval citizens were mostly composed of craftsmen and merchants,⁵ and economically-minded despite the fact the patricians and notables were still mostly landowners, not big traders.

By the time when the centralized governmental authority fell to pieces in the Middle East during the tenth to eleventh centuries (the Abbasid-Buwayhid state after the death of the *amīr al-umarā'* Aḍud al-Dawla in 372 AH/983 CE, the Andalusi Umayyad state after the fall of the 'Āmirid *ḥājibs* in 399/1009, the Fāṭimid state after the death of the *wazīr-qāḍī* al-Yāzurī in 450/1058, the Zīrid state of Ifrīqiya (Roman Africa, mainly Tunisia) after its defeat in Ḥaydarān at the hands of Hilāli Arab nomads in 443/1052, and the Byzantine Empire after the battle of Manzikert at the hands of the Seljuqs and Türkmen nomads in 463/1071), many cities were willy-nilly forced to recover their autonomy under their own leaders.

Initially, the rulers of these cities, usually styled *amīrs*, were often either former soldiers of now defunct states or leaders of tribal peoples (nomads or mountain peoples) who had conquered these cities or been invited by citizens to defend them. Feeble *amīrs* had to rely on the support and cooperation of patricians or notables,⁶ variously called *shuyūkh*, *mashyakha*, *a'yān*, *ashrāf*, *akhyār* and *wujūh* (that is citizens having enough wealth and leisure to devote their time to public matters as well as social standing to command respect. In Islamic society the knowledge of Islamic learning including Prophetic traditions, jurisprudence, Arabic grammar, Islamic history, astronomy, arithmetic, medicine etc. was also very important). This is what Hodgson called the *a'yān-amīr system*.⁷ However, it required much efforts for notables to supplant *amīrs* and establish their own oligarchy; Islamic patrician domination was

5 The distinction between traders and craftsmen is not fundamental. While the craftsman “works on the things he has bought, so as to re-sell them in a different form,” the trader “buys to re-sell what is physically the same as what he had bought,” but supplies it “at a place or at a time which is of more use to his customer.” Hicks, *A Theory of Economic History* 28–9, 141–2.

6 Patricians are aristocratic families of ancient origin or authoritarian governing elites, while notables are elite citizens in general. In egalitarian Islamic society, which refused to recognize aristocracy except for the Hāshimites (clan of the Prophet), both terms are virtually interchangeable. In this book the term ‘notable’ is usually used, but the term ‘patrician’ is also occasionally used to denote hereditary governing elite families.

7 Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* ii, 91–135. According to him the *a'yān-amīr system* was comparatively freer from observing traditions, and ad hoc rational legal reasoning was more often applicable than other cases of Weberian ‘traditional domination.’ However, he seems to overemphasize the difference between the city and the village and the predominant role of big traders.

the advanced type of the *a'yān-amīr* system whose *amīrs* became nominal or even defunct.

On the other hand, the non-elite common people (populace or plebeians), the middle and lower echelons of society composed of mainly craftsmen and traders, were generally called *ʿamma* or *ra'īyya* (*ahl* and *nās* could comprise both the privileged classes and the *ʿamma*). Among them carders, tanners, stallholders, street vendors, peddlers, domestic workers, carriers, water suppliers, garbage collectors, beggars, swindlers,⁸ gamblers, pickpockets and thieves were regarded as belonging to the lower echelons, while the men belonging to the middle classes were mainly engaged in the production, processing and selling of textiles, foods, metals, pottery, glass, wood, paper, soap and arms, but there was a huge difference in income and status even between the middle echelons. Mainly due to the high level of division of labor, children tended to inherit the crafts of their parents and rarely immigrated to other cities, hampering the entry of immigrants of rural origin into the existing business. At the same time social enhancement and descent linked to the wealth was the rule rather than the exception, partly as a result of the partition of inheritance among children in even shares.

Normally, the people were absorbed in the immediate concerns of everyday life and traditional social relationship. Many individually came under the patronage of notables; class consciousness rarely surfaced unless popular riots developed into class struggles.⁹ 'Rogues' harmed both the populace and notables; criminal elements, including prisoners set free by riots, played no more than a marginal role in political disturbances. However, in case of the disintegration of states and the politicization of citizens part of the middle and lower echelons of citizens became armed supporters of an oligarchy of notables (patrician domination) or a 'tyrant' (illegitimate ruler).¹⁰ In exceptional

8 For swindlers and tricksters see Bosworth, *The Mediaeval Islamic Underworld* 1–47.

9 An exceptional case of class consciousness expressed by a thief (*liṣṣ*) of Baghdad, Ibn Ḥamdī, is recorded. He claimed governmental oppression. He refrained from harming small merchants possessing less than a thousand dirhams, claiming that his crimes were no more serious than those committed by the government. Tanūkhī, *Faraj* iv, 238–9.

10 According to Weber (*Economy and Society* 1307, 1316–7, 1319) tyrannies were born out of "the ambition of individual noblemen to utilize the *popolo* for the erection of a personal tyranny." He also says, "[O]n the whole the regime of the tyrants was based on sections of the middle class and on the debtors of the patricians, and their foes were the noble families. . . . Once established, the tyranny was usually supported by the small peasants, a party of the nobility which was in alliance with them, and parts of the urban middle classes. . . . The tyrants perceived themselves, and were perceived everywhere, as specifically 'illegitimate' rulers." "Within the city a power seeker normally could most easily gain

cases, they themselves seized power (plebeian domination). In flexible Middle Eastern society the people, both notables and the populace, freely chose and switched their patrons, resulting in the rapid rise of popular leaders including leaders of lower-class origin.

The use of the terms 'patrician and plebeian domination' and 'tyranny' is an attempt to capture the most essential about social phenomena, though somewhat exaggerated and simplified, enabling readers to penetrate the surface of a complicated situation to approach reality and find routes to navigate safely in the vast sea of facts. At the very least we can take refuge in 'patrician and plebeian domination' and 'tyranny' as safe harbors from the boisterous sea. These kinds of domination are what Max Weber called non-legitimate domination in marked contrast to traditional, charismatic and legal forms of domination.¹¹ Among these kinds, Weber classified the domination of new rich people of plebeian origin, based on the support of the populace at the expense of old patricians, into plebeian domination. Especially in northern Italian cities, where patrician members were largely fixed to the exclusion of rising traders and financiers, the latter were obliged to form their own parallel government composed of non-patricians (*popolo*) alongside the old patrician government. In Islamic society, however, newly-risen people were more easily accepted among the existing notables. That is the reason why I restrict plebeian domination to the domination of the populace under the leadership of one of their own peers. Damascus of the later tenth century and Florence after the revolt of the Ciompi (lowest-echelon, non-guild craftsmen) in 1378 are its notable examples. Besides, tyranny should be separated from plebeian domination to form one independent category alongside patrician and plebeian domination.

Damascus (Ar. Dimashq), located in Syria between the Buwayhid *amīrs* based at Baghdad and the Fāṭimid caliphs who had transferred from Tunisia to Cairo, became the first virtually autonomous city under the leaders of its citizens of either patrician or plebeian origin, called *ru'asā'* (sing. *ra'īs*), during the latter part of the tenth century. Patrician and plebeian forms of domination alternated in rapid succession there. (Chapter 2) After the establishment of Fāṭimid rule in Damascus, Aleppo (Ar. Ḥalab), in its turn, sandwiched

support from the broad lower strata of craftsmen ordinarily excluded from active participation in the administration."

11 For three types of domination, see Weber, *Economy and Society* 212–301. For non-legitimate domination see *Idem* 1212–1372; *The City*, trans. D. Martindale and G. Neuwirth. In many European cities, newly-risen people stopped their strife after they were given the status of patricians, e.g. Valladolid in 1322, Strasbourg in 1330, and Zurich in 1336. *La ville médiévale* 339.

first between the Fāṭimid state and the Byzantine Empire, then between the Seljuq Empire and the crusader state of Antioch (Antiocheia, Ar. Antākiya, Turk. Hatay), temporarily became a patrician city at least on two occasions. (Chapter 3)

In al-Andalus, after the total collapse of the Umayyad state at the beginning of the eleventh century, many cities suddenly became independent under patrician rule. In Cordoba (Ar. Qurṭuba), once the Umayyad capital, patrician domination lasted for long under the rule of one of the bureaucrats and his descendants (the Jahwarids), styled *wazīrs*. (Chapter 4) On the other hand, in rapidly developing Seville (Ar. Ishbiliya) the biggest landholders, the ‘Abbāids, fairly swiftly succeeded in establishing their dictatorship, transforming a patrician city to a monarchy. Moreover, the ‘Abbāids rapidly advanced to absorb many patrician-dominated cities and Berber states, unifying the larger part of southern al-Andalus (present-day Andalucia, Murcia and Algarve).

When the incursions of the united kingdom of Leon-Castile became increasingly threatening and began exacting tribute from almost all the *mulūk al-ṭawā’if* kings, including the ‘Abbāids, in the latter half of the eleventh century, the resistance of both notables and populace of many cities, especially Toledo (Ar. Ṭulayṭula) and Valencia (Balansiya), against their kings subservient to Christian monarchs was activated, resulting in their banishment or murder and the establishment of patrician domination (to a lesser extent, in Zaragoza [Saraqusta] and Granada [Gharnāṭa] also). (Chapters 5 and 6)

Zīrid Ifriqiya crumbled when its monarch al-Mu‘izz was crushingly defeated by the Hilālī Arabs at the battle of Ḥaydarān near Gabes (Ar. Qābis) in 443/1052 and then had to abandon his capital al-Qayrawān (Fr. Kairouan) and all inland regions, taking refuge in al-Mahdiyya on the Mediterranean coast (the Sāḥil) in 449/1057. At first Zīrid rule was limited to only al-Mahdiyya and Monastir. As the result, many surviving coastal and inland cities became independent under the monarchical rule of ex-Zīrid soldiers or under patrician domination, notably Tunis (under Khurāsānid leadership) and Sousse (Ar. Sūsa), often paying tribute to Arab nomads. (Chapter 7)

Then during the twelfth century, following the loosening of Qarakhānid grip, many Central Asian city notables called *imāms*, *raʿīs*, or *ṣadrs*, mainly landowners but armed with scholastic knowledge, came to exert a preponderant influence over city governments vis-à-vis the Qarakhānids. Especially in Bukhārā the Burhānids (Āl-i Burhān), taking the honorific title of *ṣaḍr al-suḍūr*, continued to lead the citizens to defend their oligarchic rule against the interference of Seljuq sultans, Western Liao khans and Khwārazm shahs for nearly 150 years until they were overthrown by a popular revolt led by a

vendor of shields.¹² In Nīshāpūr under Sāmānid and Ghaznavid rule the Mikālis of Central Asian origin (but they had transferred here from Baghdad) continued to monopolize the post of *raʿīs*, albeit by royal appointment, for nearly one hundred years. They were representatives of local notables as well as royal dignitaries in charge of the maintenance of order in Nīshāpūr.¹³

It is well-known that the notion of the economic and social uniqueness of the Occident was put forward by Max Weber. In contrast to medieval northern Italian and northern European cities which were formed as a result of the confraternization of all citizens, Weber designated Chinese and Indian cities as based on magical, taboo-bound sibs (clans) or caste organizations, inhibiting the development of rationalism, the spirit of freedom, and the concept of 'bourgeois' estate or city commune. On the other hand, he regarded ancient Iraqi-Syrian cities as nearer to Greco-Roman and medieval European cities due to the relative weakness of magical sib bonds and a lack of impediments to confraternization.¹⁴ His avoidance of the discussion of Islamic cities might be due to not only his lack of knowledge, but also his fear toward the invalidation of his notion of European socio-economic singularity. As the result, Weber compared Greek cities to medieval northern Italian and northern European cities, paying close attention to their parallel development and concentrating his discussion on the central theme of his whole work: why modern rational capitalism grew solely in northern European cities.

Weber considered that ascetic Protestantism, particularly Calvinism, played a key role in forming and spreading the spirit of modern rational capitalism, and that the European citizens, especially sincere and diligent craftsmen and traders organized into guilds and confraternities were its rational, ethical and even ascetic vanguards. In contrast to European cities the lack of guilds in pre-Ottoman Islamic cities is a well-known theory.¹⁵ However, it seems that Muslims, Christians and Jews of the same trade, whose shops were

12 C.E. Bosworth, Şadr, in *EI*², viii, 748–9.

13 Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids* 84, 179–85; Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur* 66–8.

14 *Economy and Society* 1226–31, 1240–1, 1261 (*The City* 80–6, 95–6, 119). For the deconstruction of Eurocentrism see Clark (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Cities*.

15 After Lewis (*The Islamic Guilds*, *EHR* 8 (1937), 20–37) put forward his theory of Islamic guilds, many authors denied that theory. Stern, *The Constitution of Islamic City*, in *The Islamic City*, ed. A.M. Hourani and S.M. Stern, 25–50; A. Raymond, Şinf, in *EI*², ix, 644. For Ottoman guilds see Hanna, *Guilds*, in *The City in the Islamic World*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi et al., ii, 895–922; P. Ghazaleh, *Guilds*, in *EI*³, 2015–1, 130–4.

concentrated on a few lanes of *sūqs* (e.g. a lane of shoemakers), were in one way or another associated with each other: moreover, since the late-twelfth century a major part of Muslim craftsmen and traders were organized into Sufi orders. Weber, seemingly to save himself the trouble of distinguishing medieval European cities from Islamic cities, turned to early Islam, designating Islam as a warrior religion, not a religion of salvation (including Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism as well as Christianity and Judaism), because it was dominated by an extravagant (not ascetic) life-style and the status interest of Arab warriors (exacting tribute from the peoples they had conquered).¹⁶ This belief is one of the major flaws in his arguments of Islam, resulting in his failure to complete a treatise on Islam, despite the fact he depended on the researches of the most prominent Islamicists of his days, Julius Wellhausen, Ignaz Goldziher, Carl H. Becker, and Snouck Hurgronje.¹⁷

Many European Islamicists have been eager to distinguish Islamic cities from European ones, as Brett summarized and analyzed their viewpoints in his study of the autonomy of medieval Tripoli, Libya.¹⁸ Brunshvig argued that the absence of legal persons or corporations in the *sharīʿa* (Islamic law) and the consequent prevalence of private interest over public one encouraged the individual to act as he or she pleased in so far as there was no immediate conflict with others. Coupled with this argument, von Grunebaum stressed that Islamic law “does not concede a special status to the town” within the unified Islamic community (*umma*), because the universal character of the *sharīʿa* precludes any distinction of the Muslims of a city from others and presupposes a small government consisting of a governor, *qāḍī* (judge), *muḥtasib* (market

16 Turner, *Weber and Islam* 95, 98, 138–41. Schluchter (Hindrances to Modernity, in *Max Weber and Islam*, ed. T.E. Huff and W. Schluchter, 60–4, 113) argues for a probability that Weber actually finished writing his treatise on Islam, but its manuscripts were lost after his death. On the other hand, Huff, though he points to the fact that Weber seems to have been ignorant of huge Muslim contributions to the development of modern mathematical and natural sciences (*Max Weber and Islam* 27), supports Weber's theory of Islam as a warrior religion. His arguments are mainly based on the slave soldier theory of Crone and Pipes (Idem 5–7, 39–45). Crone, *Slaves on Horses* 74–81; Pipes, *Slave Soldiers* 140–58. For the opposite view that the Abbasid soldiers of Central Asian origin recruited by al-Ma'mūn and al-Mu'taṣim were not generally of slave origin see Amabe, *The Emergence of the Abbāsīd Autocracy* 129–69. For important comments see Kennedy, *The Armies of the Caliphs* 118–47; La Vaissière, *Samarcande et Samarra* 143–271.

17 Sunar, *Marx and Weber* 95–8.

18 Brett, The City-State in Mediaeval Ifriqiya, *Cahiers de Tunisie* 34 (1986), 69–72, 76; Neglia, Some Historiographical Notes on the Islamic City, in *The City in the Islamic World*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi et al., i, 3–17.

inspector) and a few other officials imposed upon citizens from above, resulting in the exclusion of autonomy. Furthermore, Stern categorically denied the existence of guilds in Islamic cities or the survival of late Roman municipal organizations into the Islamic period. However, as Shatzmiller says, Muslim craftsmen and traders were probably organized in informal ways; it must have been facilitated by division and subdivision of labor into numerous trades (she counts 598, mainly manufacturing sectors of food processing, construction, wood and wicker working, and the production of textile, leather, metal, glass, pottery, paper, ink, dyes, soap, essential oil, medicine etc.). Other associations including Sufi brotherhood, neighborhood association and, more dubiously, esprit de corps based on *futuwwa* (qualities of young men) might also have helped their cultivation of friendship.¹⁹

It must be admitted that many of these arguments are true in comparison with medieval European cities. However, even in medieval Europe, not only municipal laws, but also monarchical decrees and parliamentary or diet statutes were also enforced across individual cities; later, Roman law was increasingly introduced into autonomous cities with the support of emperors and kings. On the other hand, some Islamic cities had their own municipal laws; notably Valencia's customary law of water distribution by time units, measured by water clocks or the length of shadows,²⁰ whose civic court (the Tribunal de las Aguas) met every Thursday before the great mosque (the court has continued up to now on the same spot before the Apostoles gate of the cathedral).

Besides, Islamic law was not immutable or irrational. Weber judged trials by *qāḍīs* to be based on their arbitrary application of the *sharī'a* according to their independent reasoning (*ijtihād*). In his reasoning this fact, together with the lack of autonomous cities and ascetic life-style, constitutes fundamental causes of the failure of the growth of rational capitalism in Islamic society. It is well-known, however, that Islamic law, even after its crystallization and stiffening (and the formation of legal schools) during the tenth and eleventh centuries, continued to be reinterpreted and adapted to local and ad hoc needs by authoritative (but often local) jurists called *muftīs*, who were entitled to

19 Brunschvig, *Urbanisme médiéval et droit musulman*, *REI* 15 (1947), 127–55; Grunebaum, *The Structure of the Muslim Town*, in his *Essays* 141–58; Stern, *The Constitution of Islamic City*; Maya Shatzmiller, *Artisans (pre-1500)*, in *EI*³, 2012–2, 31–2. For *futuwwa* see note 26. Brunschvig's theory of Islamic law with reference to urban morphology is followed by Hakim, *Law and the City*, in *The City in the Islamic World*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi et al., i, 71–92.

20 Glick, *Irrigation and Society* 213–5, *From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle* 79, 88. Water rights of peasants and the usufruct of pastures available to nearby Bedouins in the Ghūṭa can be regarded as part of Damascene law.

issue *fatwās* (legal opinions) and exerted considerable influence over *qāḏīs* up through the Ottoman period. Weber himself partly recognized this fact, and, in light of English common law, even had to admit that to some extent modern rational capitalism can prosper under a variety of legal systems, conceding that economically powerful groups can operate successfully despite irrational legal systems.²¹ It seems that the setback of medieval capitalism in Islamic society was chiefly caused by the failure of entrepreneurs to resist the oppression by the rulers and bureaucrats of patrimonial states rather than the lack of entrepreneurship or religious self-restraint.

It is true that autonomous cities survived many vicissitudes for several centuries only in medieval and early modern Europe. These phenomena peculiar to Europe were mainly caused by the lack of strong and relatively centralized patrimonial states which were equipped with bureaucrats and standing armies nourished by lifelong, non-hereditary prebends. Even royal capitals, London, Paris, Barcelona and Prague became autonomous to some extent. However, with the development of agriculture and commerce, rising patrimonial states began absorbing autonomous cities. In northern Italy, city-republics transformed into territorial and monarchical states, and successful entrepreneurs became landowners just like their counterparts in the Middle East.²²

On the other hand, the development of autonomy in Islamic, Byzantine and Sicilian-Neapolitan cities was hampered by strong regimes of large, wealthy, centralized patrimonial states, itself the result of relatively high productivity of agriculture. Weber himself admitted this fact, saying, "The competition between the non-urban powers, in particular the conflict of the central power with the great vassals and the hierocratic power of the church, came to the aid of the cities. . . . [T]he more unitary the organization of the larger political association, the less was the development of urban political autonomy. . . . [A]s soon as their political and financial resources permitted the royal or provincial patrimonial powers to develop the necessary administrative apparatus, they tried to destroy the autonomy of the cities again."²³

21 *Economy and Society* 819–21, 890. cf. Turner, *Weber and Islam* 120–1. For the influence of *muftīs* over *qāḏīs'* application of the *sharī'a* under Ottoman rule, see Peters, What does it mean to be an Official Madhhab? in *The Islamic School of Law*, ed. P. Bearman et al., 147–58; Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*² 219–22; Zilfi, The Ottoman Ulema, in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. S.N. Faroqhi, 212–6; Hathaway, *The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule* 116–21. For the development of traditional merchant capitalism in medieval Islamic society, see Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism* 28–75; Koehler, *Early Islam and the Birth of Capitalism* 105–86.

22 A standard work of Italian autonomous cities, Waley and Dean, *The Italian City-Republics*, 4th edition.

23 *Economy and Society* 1352; *The City* 210.

Ashtor was the first Islamicist to study the medieval Islamic city as a self-governing municipal entity, paying attention to the Banū l-Ṣūfī *raʿīs* of Damascus during the late eleventh to the mid-twelfth centuries. He came to the conclusion that the *raʿīs*, who managed to cope with mainly Turkish conquerors (the Seljuqs, Būrids, and Zangids) on one hand, and the proletariat within the city on the other, can be compared to a mayor (head of a municipality) or chief of police, representing the haute bourgeoisie of the city, but supported by a militia of popular origin called *aḥdāth*. Moreover, he propounded the continuity of Hellenistic and Roman civic tradition of autonomy up until Islamic times, claiming the survival of *hipparchos* (commander of the cavalry) or *nycteparchos* (police chief) and *agoranomos* (market overseer) as *raʿīs* and *muḥtasib*. The decline and eventual disappearance of *raʿīs* and civic autonomy is only observed under the centralized Zangid and Ayyūbid states.²⁴

A little later, Cahen made a comprehensive survey of Syrian and Jazīra (the northeastern part of the Syrian republic and its adjacent regions of Turkey and Iraq) cities during the tenth to twelfth centuries, in which he discovered the civic autonomy of Damascus and Aleppo under the hegemony of *raʿīs*. In contrast to Ashtor, he compared the early Islamic city up to the late eleventh century to the contemporary Italian city, regarding the *aḥdāth* as akin to the *milites* of Italian cities under Byzantine rule.²⁵ His important point is that not only *raʿīs*, but also *qāḍīs* and *muḥtasibs* elected from among intellectuals, could be leaders of autonomous cities. He also distinguished the *aḥdāth* whom he regarded as a disciplined militia organized for civic autonomy from the *ʿayyārūn* and *fityān* of Iraq and Iran who were characterized basically as villains tending to support military leaders of outside origin.²⁶

24 Ashtor-Strauss, *L'administration urbaine*, esp. 92–3, 115–8.

25 The *milites* (sing. *miles*) descended from the mass of people, but were placed between them and the lay aristocracy. They were later incorporated into the warrior order as knights. Flori, Knightly Society, in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4, part 1, ed. D. Luscombe and J. Riley-Smith, 149.

26 Cahen, *Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain*, *Arabica* 5 (1958), 225–50; *Aḥdāth*, in *ET*², i, 236. In contrast to the *muruwwa* of pre-Islamic Jāhiliyya and early Islam, that is the virtue of self-composedness and courage expected in the prime of manhood, the *futuwwa* seems to have been invented during the eleventh century, supposedly reviving the pre-Islamic Iranian virtues of the impatient sense of justice and gallantry peculiar to the youth (*fityān*). The *fityān* of Iran and Central Asia often caused factional strife inside cities. Cahen, *Mouvements* 6 (1959), 27–34, 55–6. According to Bosworth, “[T]he *futuwwa*. . . was usually a clearly-defined social and para-military unit in society, and can be generally distinguished from the *ʿayyārs*, who emerge from the sources as a more lawless and anti-social element. . . Their [*ʿayyārs*] ubiquity in Khurasan, as in other parts of Persia and Iraq, suggests that they included bandits, vagabonds and irregular troops,

Coping with Cahen's criticism, Ashtor modified his former theory. He recognized that ancient Syrian cities declined during early Abbasid rule just like the Italian cities of those days, but began attracting a large number of migrants (craftsmen, traders and *'ulamā'*) from Iraq, following the rise of trade since the tenth century. According to him, the later tenth-century bourgeoisie favored the rule of the industry-trade-friendly Fāṭimids at the expense of the proletariat who tenaciously continued to resist their rule. Despite their occasional confrontations, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat cooperated for their common interest, resulting in the virtual establishment of autonomy around the year 1070, especially in the port-cities of Tyr (Ṣūr) and Tripoli (in Damascus the people rebelled against the Fāṭimids, forcing out Berber occupation forces in 461/1069).²⁷

More recently, Éddé compared Tyr and Tripoli to contemporary Amalfi under Byzantine suzerainty as merchant city-republics. Obviously, in the little seaport cities of Tyr and Tripoli surrounded by small agricultural hinterland, traders and shipowners must have played a more important role than Damascus, Aleppo, Cordoba, Toledo or Valencia. However, it seems that the resurrected Mediterranean trade of Tyr and Tripoli with the Byzantines and Italy since the late tenth century depended on the local products of coastal Lebanon (e.g. sugar and silken textiles), not long-distance trade through Damascus or Aleppo; the latter's notables remained mainly landowners rather than international traders, and there is little evidence that they attached too much importance to seaborne trade interest in the tenth and eleventh centuries.²⁸ Meanwhile, Amalfitan trade was mainly directed to Ifrīqiya then Egypt, not Lebanon.²⁹

and that they were continually replenished by desperadoes loving an unfettered life, by peasant... by discharged and unemployed soldiers, etc." *The Ghaznavids* 167–8. For the development of post-Mongol *futuwwa* and *akhīs* in the Irano-Turkish world see many works of F. Taeschner, conveniently, *Futuwwa*, in *EI*², ii, 966–9.

27 Ashtor, *Républiques urbaines dans le Proche Orient*, *CCM* 18 (1975), 117–31.

28 For Tyr and Tripoli see Éddé, Bresc and Guichard, *Les autonomismes urbains des cités islamiques*, in *Les origines des libertés urbaines* 101–3; A. Mallett, (Banū) 'Ammār (Syria), in *EI*³, 2014–3, 24–5; Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society* i, 310–1; Havemann, *Rīāsa und Qaḍā'* 143; Harris, *Lebanon* 47–9, 53 (based on Umar Tadmuri, *Ta'rikh Ṭarābulus al-siyāsi wa-l-ḥaḍarī 'abra-l-'uṣūr*, 2 vols., Tripoli 1978–1).

29 For pre-crusade Amalfitan trade with the Arabs see Kreuzt, *Ghost Ships*, *JMH* 20 (1994), 347–57; Citarella, *The Relations of Amalfi with the Arab World*, *Speculum* 42 (1967), 299–312. For a classical account of pre-crusader Italian trade with the Arabs see Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant* i, 93–128.

Both Ashtor and Cahen tended to pay too much attention to the particular terms, *raʿīs*, *aḥdāth* and others, virtually neglecting other players of similar roles; conversely, even the same offices and organizations used to have variant roles in different ages or areas. More recently, Havemann, paying attention to the ambiguity of terms and the plurality of their meanings, made a distinction between rebels against their monarchs on one hand, and 'bureaucratic' officeholders loyal to monarchs on the other, resulting in a more in-depth analysis of socio-political structure. According to him, even after the reestablishment of strong, large-sized states equipped with standing armies and bureaucrats, *aḥdāths* survived as royal auxiliary forces while *raʿīs* became important royal bureaucrats.³⁰ That is to say, both the *aḥdāth* and the *raʿīs* had two conflicting roles, namely, the role of vanguards for civic autonomy and that of the bureaucrats and forces of patrimonial monarchs.

One important question is whether Syrian cities declined since late antiquity, following the example of Italian cities. Many recent archeological studies appear to indicate it. Although the Arab conquerors (*muhājirūn*) settled in Syrian cities, many of them began declining since the early Abbasid period and sometimes even disappeared like Apamea (Afāmiya), Bostra (Buṣrā), Gerasa (Jarash), Gadara, Philadelphia (ʿAmmān) and Scytopolis (Baysān).³¹ On the other hand, Damascus, Aleppo, Antioch, Edessa (Ar. al-Ruhā, Turk. Urfa), Ḥimṣ (Emesa), Baʿlabakk, Tyr, Jerusalem and many others survived and even expanded, though they also possibly underwent a temporary decline during the early Abbasids before the beginning of economic upsurge. In Ifrīqiya too, many Roman cities declined and ultimately disappeared under Byzantine or early Islamic rule, like Carthage, Lepcis Magna, Sabratha, Sufetula (Sbeitla), Thysdrus (El Djem), Thugga (Dougga), Bulla Regia, Madauros, Thubursicum

30 Havemann, *Riʿāsa und Qadāʾ* 113–42 (his critique of paying too much attention to particular terms, 116–7); Raʿīs, in *EI*², viii, 402–3. Similar viewpoints were put forward by former East German Marxist historian G. Hoffmann in his *Kommune oder Staatsbürokratie?* 51–121. He defined Abbasid society as feudal and Syrian popular movements as anti-feudal movements.

31 Apart from vast literature on individual cities, for comprehensive survey see Walmsley, *Early Islamic Syria*; Milwright, *An Introduction to Islamic Archaeology*; Bartl and Moaz (eds.), *Residences, Castles, Settlements*; Kennedy, *From Polis to Madina, Past and Present* 106 (1985), 3–27; The Last Century of Byzantine Syria, *Byzantinische Forschungen* 10 (1985), 141–83. Kennedy's theory of urban decline in late antiquity is now somewhat being rectified by Walmsley (*op. cit.* 71–112) and Magness (Early Islamic Urbanism and Building Activity, in *Money, Power and Politics* 147–63), who argue for continued prosperity well into the ninth century. For agricultural development Kennedy, *The Impact of Muslim Rule*, in *La Syrie*, ed. P. Canivet and J.-P. Rey-Coquais, 291–7.

Numidarum, Thamugadi, Lambaesis and Cuicul (Djemila). It seems that most of these cities had been in an advanced stage of declining at the time of Arab conquest.

By the end of the tenth century the amalgamation of the descendants of Roman citizens and Arab settlers had been completed in not only Syrian cities, but also most Andalusī and Ifrīqī cities (in al-Andalus Visigoth noblemen were more important than older Roman landowners), preserving rent-oriented society, in which notables were mainly composed of landowners, but including a rising number of big traders. The landowners of a city possessed their farms mainly within its dependent territory, just like their counterparts of the resuscitated northern Italian cities of ancient origin and the newly-founded Flemish and Brabantine cities, rapidly rising since the eleventh century in competition with bishops and feudal lords.³²

In contrast with Syrian cities, the study of urban autonomy in al-Andalus and Ifrīqiya has been patchy at most. Though the so-called party-kings (*mulūk al-ṭawāʿif*) of eleventh-century al-Andalus have attracted attention, really these 'kings' were often leaders of citizens or condottieri invited from outside by the citizens. In Ifrīqiya Brett's research on Tripoli, where civic autonomy under Ibn Hānīsh and the Maṭrūḥīd *shaykhs* supposedly prevailed during the eleventh-to-twelfth centuries, is almost the only good study.³³

The survival of late Roman institutions into the tenth century is not probable anywhere with the possible exception of *muḥtasibs* or *ṣāḥib al-madīna* (zalmedina). *Muḥtasibs*, however, never played an important role in autonomous cities. The leaders of civil autonomy were *raʿīs* or *qāḍīs* in Syria, *wazīrs* or *qāḍīs* in al-Andalus, and *shaykhs* or *raʿīs* in Ifrīqiya. The populace as distinct from the *khāṣṣa* (privileged men) and the notables (*aʿyān*) were generally

32 It was often claimed that in contrast to northern Italian cities, northern European cities lacked their own dependent territories outside their walls. Recently, however, it was accepted that most cities of Flanders, Brabant, Germany and Switzerland possessed their own dependent territories with a few exceptions, e.g. Cologne, Augsburg, Sankt Gallen. Scott, *The City-State* 130, 146, 230. For the importance of landowners in Flemish cities see Idem 11–2, 58, 129, 133.

33 Brett, *The City-State*, 81–3. Éddé (Les autonomismes urbains) strangely treated inland Syria, Ifrīqiya and al-Andalus perfunctorily, concentrating attention to Tyr, Tripoli and Palermo. Nef doubts the civil autonomy of Palermo, criticizing Amari's theory based on his own republicanism. Probably she is right if she means that there did not exist a city council composed of notables in normal times. Nef, *Islamic Palermo*, in *A Companion to Medieval Palermo* 49–51. The almost only source suggesting its autonomy is Nuwayrī, *Nihāya* xxiv, 206–7; "The affairs of the Palermitans were confided to its *mashyakha*, and (the Kalbi governor) al-Ṣamṣām was expelled." However, possibly the Palermitan notables henceforth ruled the city.

called *‘amma* or *ra‘iyya* everywhere (the *ahl* or *nās* more usually included both *khāṣṣa* and *‘amma*, the *ahl* sometimes meant only *khāṣṣa* or *a‘yān*). A militia was called *aḥdāth* only in Syria apart from security forces in early Abbasid Baṣra and Kūfa.³⁴ Generally speaking, while the lower classes, especially able-bodied young men, had incentives for war because they had nothing to lose in turmoil, the rich and middle-class shopkeepers and artisans were inclined to make peace with outside powers to restore order at the cost of paying heavy dues.

Wherever patrician domination survived for generations its leadership tended to be lifelong and even hereditary, resulting in the virtual establishment of monarchies like the ‘Abbāids of Seville (and to a lesser extent, the Jahwarid *wazūrs* of Cordoba, the Khurāsānid *shaykhs* of Tunis and the ‘Ammārid *qāḍīs* of Tripoli, Lebanon). In contrast, northern Italian and northern European patrician cities averted dictatorship or monarchical rule by the appointment of plural top leaders of government and their very short terms of office to the exclusion of reappointment, together with the establishment of committees and the nomination of officials equipped with veto power and/or the power of judging top leaders after the expiration of their terms. That is partly because the concept of corporation (like *polis* or *res publica*) or democracy was lacking among medieval Muslims,³⁵ to whom only caliphate (*khilāfa*), dynasty (*dawla*), imperium (*imāra*), royal power (*mulk*), al-Māwardī’s *wizārat al-tafwīd* (ministry of delegation), or Khaldūnian *‘aṣabiyya* (basic bond of human society based on consanguinity and affiliation)³⁶ were available.

Besides, the militarization of Muslim citizens lagged behind European citizens. The survival of Arab *jund* warriors of Umayyad Syria, Ifrīqiya and al-Andalus into the tenth century is not verified. At least *jundīs*, as such, never

34 The *aḥdāth*, originally meaning ‘young men’ or ‘incidents,’ was a term usually combined with *shurṭa* and *ma‘ūna* in the duties of the governors of Abbasid Baṣra and Kūfa. Accordingly, it came to mean police forces. Gordon, *Aḥdāth*, in *ET*³, 2010–2, 37–40; Kennedy, *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, ed. Yar-Shater, xxix, 76, note 206; Bosworth, *Idem* xxx, 40, note 162; Cahen, *Mouvements populaires* 5, 248–50.

35 Muslim philosophers should have known Greek democracy. Al-Fārābī’s *al-madīnat al-jamā‘iyya* can be interpreted as deriving from Grecian *demokratia*. Sadiki, *Islam, in The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy* 124, 126–7.

36 Ibn Khaldūn (*Kitāb al-‘Ibar* ii, 672–4) understands urban autonomy as arising from the *‘aṣabiyya* of citizens based on their close contact and association (*iltihām, ittishāl*) with one clique of the notables (*shūrā, mashyakha*) predominant. In exceptional cases of a division of patricians, according to him, plebeian leaders of lowest origin (*sufḥa, ghawghā, dahmā*) might seize power, based on plebeian *‘aṣabiyya*. However, his treatment of this topic is very short, citing only the examples of fourteenth-century Ifrīqi cities during the Ḥafṣid enfeeblement in their middle age.

played an important role in the establishment of autonomous cities. However, the Khurāsāni leaders of Tunisian autonomy were probably descendants of the Abbasid revolutionary soldiers of Khurāsāni origin (Tunis was an Arab cantonment founded during the Umayyad caliphate).

In marked contrast to Muslim citizens, the medieval northern Italian citizens were partly militarized. Bourgeois citizens eagerly imitated the lifestyle of knights, who had been forced to abandon their fortress-residences in the countryside and immigrate inside walled cities. Young citizens frequently received military training in the form of jousts, mock battles, palios and regattas, sometimes resulting in open struggles between youth organizations or between urban districts. These feasts and games facilitated the municipalities' control over young men. On the other hand, the youths, who opposed the value system of older generations and the old order they represented, organized themselves by adopting distinctive rules and ceremonies. They were prone to violence and burglary, provoking police forces on the streets.³⁷ In Islamic cities too, the people took advantage of youths' susceptibility to violence to form armed groups or militias. In al-Andalus and Ifrīqiya, however, the organization of lower- and middle-class people into militias lagged behind Syria, except the *dā'ira* and *jund al-baladiyyīn* of Cordoba, and the citizens of Tunis trained as footmen.

Lastly, all the cities treated in this book included many Christians and to a lesser extent Jews, albeit minorities.³⁸ The Christians played an important role in the struggles of Damascus, Aleppo and Valencia (the Jews also in Damascus), but their activities were less obvious in other cases.

This study does not aim at a total revision or sharp criticism of older theories, but is intended as an overall survey of civic autonomous Muslim cities from Syria to al-Andalus during the later tenth to early twelfth centuries. Its theoretical framework is indebted to Weber's patrician and plebeian forms of domination, though these concepts are considerably remodeled. Despite rather short-term survival as compared with medieval European cities, autonomous cities did exist in medieval Islam in a more significant degree than has been hitherto considered.

One problem in conducting this kind of study is to tackle the often ornate, ambiguous style of Arabic texts open to different interpretations, especially Ibn Ḥayyān's *Matīn* and Ibn Bassām's *Dhakhīra*. That is the reason why the author decided to quote rather lengthy English translations of key Arabic texts.

37 Crouzet-Pavan, *A Flower of Evil*, in *A History of Young People* i, 173–221; *Venice Triumphant* 249–51.

38 For a general survey of the Islamization of al-Andalus and Ifrīqiya see Valerian (ed.), *Islamisation et arabisation*. For recent works on the Arabization of Mozárabes and their struggle for survival see Christy, *Christians in Al-Andalus*; Aillet, *Les mozarabes*.

Ninth-to-Eleventh-Century Baghdad: An Early Abortive Example

Civic movements and attempts at establishing patrician domination first developed in Baghdad since its plebeian resistance in support of the 'legitimate' Abbasid caliph al-Amīn (193–8/809–813) against the besieging Khurāsāni-Central Asian warriors dispatched by his brother al-Ma'mūn (198–218/813–33) during the years 196–8/812–3.¹ Militiamen of lower-class origin fought much more tenaciously than the privileged *abnā' al-dawla* (descendants of the Khurāsāni revolutionary warriors of Arab and Iranian origin). They were called 'ayyārūn (also called *dhu'ār*, *shuṭṭār*, *fussāq*, *ghawghā'* and *andhāl*, generally meaning bad people),² either because they were thinly dressed ('*urā*, '*uryān*),³ or because they were paid in kind (e.g. corn, textile, gold, silver and bronze wares) in certain measures ('*yārs*).⁴ Even after the Khurāsāni occupation of Baghdad its people, both *abnā'* and 'ayyārūn, continued their armed resistance against the Khurāsāni-Central Asian warriors, establishing their own rival government under the 'caliph' Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī, until al-Ma'mūn's return to Baghdad in 204/819.⁵

In the absence of effective authority one important leader of *abnā'* origin, Abū Ḥātim Sahl b. Salāma al-Anṣārī, recruited the people of his neighborhood by distributing stipends and enjoined them to live according to the precepts of the Qur'ān and Sunna under the slogan of *al-amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-n-nahy 'an al-munkar* (commanding right and forbidding wrong), tacitly ensuring the right of property. He went so far as to oppose Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī's

1 For the siege of Baghdad see Shaban, *Islamic History* 2 41–7; Kennedy, *The Early Abbasid Caliphate* 135–63; *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates* 148–54.

2 Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh* iii, 849, 858, 865–7, 872–907.

3 Ṭabarī, iii, 896–7.

4 Ṭabarī, iii, 869, 897; Shaban, *Islamic History* 2 45. For the late appearance of the word 'ayyār in classical Arabic dictionaries and, moreover, the attribution of strange meanings to it see Tor, *Violent Order* 27–34, esp. 51, note 64; 'Ayyār, in *ET*³, 2014–1, 38–40. Tor, disregarding Baghdadi 'ayyārūn, propounded his theory of *mutaṭawwi'a* (frontier volunteer jihadist warriors) origin of 'ayyārūn in both Byzantine Thughūr and Sīstāni frontiers with Zābulistān (land of the king Zūbīl, modern Ghazni region). *Violent Order* 46, 51 (note 64), 81–4.

5 Ṭabarī, iii, 1008–12, 1023–5, 1034–6, 1075.

rival government.⁶ Another young *abnā'* leader, Aḥmad b. Naṣr b. Mālik b. al-Haytham al-Khuzā'ī, also rose in another quarter under the banner of *al-amr bi-l-ma'rūf*.⁷ This movement of Sahl and Aḥmad b. Naṣr can be understood, not necessarily in terms of the separation of state and religion⁸ or the nascent conservative Ḥanbalite movement,⁹ but in terms of the establishment of patrician domination.

Although al-Ma'mūn banned the *amr* and *nahy* movement after his return to Baghdad,¹⁰ the xenophobic people of Baghdad never ceased to bully Khurāsāni-Central Asian warriors, now called Atrāk or *ghilmān*, eventually forcing Caliph al-Mu'taṣim (218–27/833–42) to found a new cantonment for them in Sāmarrā.¹¹ Moreover, the doctrine of the created Qur'ān, imposed by al-Ma'mūn, al-Mu'taṣim and al-Wāthiq (227–32/842–7), aroused the anger of both conservative intellectuals and the common people.¹² The people were enraged by not only the downgrading of the Qur'ān, but also the imposition

6 Ṭabarī, iii, 1010.

7 Khaṭīb, *Ta'rikh Baghdād* v, 176; Ṭabarī, iii, 1344

8 Lapidus, The Separation of State and Religion, *IJMES* 6 (1975), 363–85. Contrary to Lapidus' supposition, the first Abbasid caliphs before al-Ma'mūn refrained from claiming the monopoly of interpreting law and doctrines for themselves, but were willing to collaborate with the *'ulamā'*, whom they were patronizing. Zaman, *Religion and Politics* 70–166; Shaban, *Islamic History* 2, 53–5. For a critique of Lapidus' theory and the secular character of Muslim governments after the failure of al-Ma'mūn's *miḥna* see Anjum, *Politics, Law, and Community* 38–42.

9 Shaban (*Islamic History* 2 46), Lapidus and Madelung (The Vigilante Movement of Sahl b. Salāma, *JTS* 14 (1990), 331–7) suggested that Sahl and his men were followers of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and nascent conservative, even 'right wing' (Shaban) Ḥanbalites (anti-Abbasid according to Lapidus, pro-Abbasid according to Madelung). Contrary to their opinions, Cook (*Commanding Right* 101–13, 116) argued, I think rightly, that Ibn Ḥanbal was himself apolitical and quietist, never attempting to impose his authority in the quarters whose population was expected to be less sympathetic to his value or seek to enlist the aid of the authorities in the enforcement of the *amr* and *nahy*. He himself condemned Sahl's actions, accepting any authorities in fear of division and dissolution of the Muslim community. See also Hurvitz, *The Formation of Hanbalism* 98–101. However, Ibn Ḥanbal opposed al-Mu'taṣim's imposition of the doctrine of the created Qur'ān by gathering the populace (*āmma*, *ghawghā'*) on the streets. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Ṭabaqāt* 124. On the other hand, Shaban and Kennedy (*The Early Abbasid Caliphate* 157) were perfectly right when they regarded Sahl's activities as tacit defense of the propertied classes.

10 Khaṭīb, xii, 350–1.

11 Ṭabarī, iii, 1179–81.

12 The doctrine was probably based on a Ḥanafi interpretation by Aḥmad b. Abi Du'ād and Bishr al-Marīsī, not a nascent Mu'tazilite doctrine. Melchert, The Adversaries of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, *Arabica* 44 (1997), 234–53; M. Hinds, Miḥna, in *ET²*, vii, 5.

of law and doctrine by autocratic caliphs at the expense of the Muslim community at large and the *'ulamā'* in particular, who had hitherto been assigned the task of its interpretation. The *abnā'* and notables of Baghdad, with an old *amr* and *nahy* leader, Aḥmad b. Naṣr, at their head, took the initiative in hatching a plot to overthrow Khurāsāni domination and recapture their privileged position lost in the civil war, but their conspiracy in collaboration with the populace (*'amma*) miscarried in 231/846 during the caliphate of al-Wāthiq.¹³ If it was successful, Baghdad might have been a patrician city under nominal Abbasid rule. As for the doctrine of the created Qur'ān, al-Mutawakkil (232–47/847–61) banned its controversy¹⁴ without going so far as to outlaw it.¹⁵

During the caliphate of al-Musta'in (248–52/862–6), part of the Sāmarrā army took refuge in Baghdad as a result of a split among them, forcibly carrying the caliph with them. They withstood a siege by the majority of their 'Atrāk' compatriots. The soldiers and populace (*'amma*, *'ayyārūn*, *mubayyaḍa*,¹⁶ *ghawghā'*) of Baghdad decided to seize this opportunity to take revenge on Khurāsāni-Central Asian soldiers. The populace acted rather independently under their own leaders, such as Yantawayh, Daykawayh and al-Mukharrāmī; so this is an occasion of the possible establishment of a plebeian city.¹⁷ After this abortive attempt the caliphs returned to Baghdad at the end of the ninth century, finally eliminating the possibility of the establishment of an autonomous city.

Thereafter, as a result of the strengthening of caliphal power in Baghdad it seems that there were no more attempts by notables whatsoever to establish their oligarchic rule. On the other hand, popular movements took the form of either assisting innocent legitimate caliphs who were bullied by upstart soldiers of barbarian origin¹⁸ or remonstrating with the caliphs and the authorities

13 Ṭabarī, iii, 1343–8; Khaṭīb, v, 176–9.

14 Ṭabarī, iii, 1412–3.

15 Melchert, Religious Politics of the Caliphs, *Islamic Law and Society* 3 (1996), 320–30.

16 The *mubayyaḍa* might have been former rebels under the banner of al-Muqanna'. Crone, *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran* 142.

17 Ṭabarī, iii, 1550–2, 1560–5, 1586–92, 1626–36, 1639, 1661–6.

18 The populace (*'amma*) of Sāmarrā frequently rushed to succor Abbasid caliphs who were bullied by Central Asian soldiers. After al-Mutawakkil's assassination and the inauguration of his son al-Muntaṣir at the hands of Central Asians in 247/861, the populace reacted by joining the praetorian guards (*al-shākiriyya*) in attacking the Ja'fariyya palace. Ṭabarī, iii, 1479. When Central Asian commanders inaugurated al-Musta'in after al-Muntaṣir's death half a year later, the populace attacked the Jawsaq palace in support of al-Muntaṣir's brother, al-Mu'tazz, whom they regarded as legitimate successor of

whom they regarded as ignoring their sacred traditional obligations, typically defense against foreign aggressors¹⁹ and the maintenance of traditional order and faith. The latter included so-called moral economy based on traditional paternalism as opposed to market economy. Moral economy often came to the forefront in times of price soaring caused by forestalling and engrossing (*tarabbuṣ*). It seems that most non-Ḥanbalite popular movements in Baghdad

al-Mutawakkil. They continued to procure arms, armors and horses in the Jawsaq and the palaces of Central Asian commanders until they were squashed by the Central Asians and the Maghāribā (Egyptian Arabs recruited as praetorians after the abolishment of the Egyptian *jund*). Ṭabarī, iii, 1503–5. Then in 252/866, the people forced their way into the Jawsaq, together with the Maghāribā, protesting the Central Asians' oppression of Caliph al-Mu'tazz. Ṭabarī, iii, 1680–1. In 256/870, when the Central Asians attacked the Jawsaq to murder Caliph al-Muhtadī the people rushed to save the caliph together with the Maghāribā. Ṭabarī, iii, 1816.

The populace of Baghdad was not inactive either. They took to the streets, demanding the accession of al-Muwaffaq, when his brother Caliph al-Mu'tazz was murdered in Sāmarrā in 255/869. Ṭabarī, iii, 1714–5. In 296/908 the populace helped the eunuch Mu'nīs to defend the boy-caliph al-Muqtadir (295–32/908–32) from a coup d'état. Ṭabarī, iii, 2283; 'Arīb, *Šila* 28; Miskawayh, *Tajārib* i, 7; Hamadhānī, *Takmila* 5. When the preponderance of the *amīr al-umarā'* over caliphs became evident, the populace helped to oust the all-powerful Barīdī ruler, demanding that Caliph al-Muttaqī (329–33/940–4) appoint his own son as *amīr* (commander in chief) in 329/941. Miskawayh, ii, 17–8; Šūlī, *Akhhār* 203.

- 19 In 249/863, when famous frontier fighters, 'Umar b. 'Ubaydallāh al-Aqṭa' and 'Alī b. Yaḥyā al-Armanī, were killed in fighting the Byzantines, the populace (*'amma*) of Baghdad took to the streets, demanding a dispatch of expeditionary forces. The people of Sāmarrā also followed suit. Ṭabarī, iii, 1509–12. In 312/924 the populace of Baghdad rose in protest against the powerlessness of the government to cope with a Qarmaṭi attack on the pilgrims to Mecca and their advance toward Baghdad itself. Women also came out barefoot, disheveling hair and beating their faces. Miskawayh, i, 120–2; Hamadhānī, *Takmila* 43–4. In 323/935 too, the populace of Baghdad demanded a dispatch of an army against the Qarāmiṭa after their annihilation of Iraqī pilgrims (Šūlī, 69). Meanwhile, in the years 316/928 and 319/931, when the refugees from a southern Iraqī city, Qaṣr Ibn Hubayra, appealed for help against Qarmaṭi incursions, the populace of Baghdad took to the streets, taking the government to task for their incompetency. Ḥamza, *Sinī* 158, 162. In 320/932 the people of Thughūr and Iṣfahān took refuge in Baghdad from Byzantine and Daylamite attacks, resulting in popular riots in Baghdad and their remonstrance with al-Muqtadir. 'Arīb, 173–4; Ḥamza, *Sinī* 162–3. Later in 361/971–2, in the wake of Byzantine successful raids in Naṣībīn (Nisibis), Jazīra, the populace of Baghdad proceeded to the palace of Caliph al-Muṭṭī' (334–63/946–74), reviling him on a charge of his ineptitude at coping with the situation. Miskawayh, ii, 303–7; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil* viii, 619–20; Tor, *Violent Order* 276–7.

were either food or religious riots, largely spontaneous and leaderless, often claiming that the authority was failing to fulfill its traditional obligations.

Why did the people take such action? According to Weber, the people rose in revolt when they saw that their master failed to observe the traditional limits of his power ('traditionalist revolution').²⁰ Then, Marxist historian George Rudé, on the basis of his study of the French Revolution and its coeval civil and peasant revolts in Britain, put forward his theory that even the most militant revolutionary 'mobs' were more or less organized, retaining their own discipline and ideas (e.g. constant supply of cheap bread as opposed to market mechanism and the establishment of administrative means to warrant it).²¹ On the other hand, Gregory, siding with Émile Durkheim, stressed the religious (rather than economic) motives of popular movements from his study of the religious controversies on the divinity of Jesus in fifth-century Constantinople.²² The most persuasive theories (and conformable to the theories above) are those of Thompson (moral economy) and Natalie Davis (purification ritual elements in religious riots).²³

Most popular riots and movements in Baghdad since the late ninth century were, in fact, either food riots²⁴ or religious ones aiming at the defense

20 Weber, *Economy and Society* 227.

21 Rudé, *The Crowd in History*, esp. 226–7.

22 Gregory, *Vox Populi*, esp. 115 (questioning the importance of economic motives).

23 Thompson, *The Moral Economy, Past and Present* 50 (1971), 76–136; Davis, *The Rites of Violence, Past and Present* 59 (1973), 51–91.

24 In 272/886, following the suspension of Mosuli flour cargoes, the populace (*amma*) of Baghdad attacked the residence of a very big tax farmer, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ṭā'ī, who had suspended the distribution of flour to manipulate the prices (*tarabbuṣ*). Ṭabarī, iii, 2110. In 308/921 the *amma* reacted against the alleged manipulation of prices by the *wazīr*-tax farmer Ḥāmid b. al-'Abbās, looting the flour traders' stores and preventing the prayer in mosques. Al-Muqtadir was forced to abrogate the tax-farming of al-Ṭā'ī and order the opening of the granaries of his family, civil and military dignitaries and traders. Miskawayh, i, 72–5; 'Arīb, 84–5, 109; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Muntaẓam* xiii, 194; Ḥamza, *Sinī* 155; Hamadhānī, *Takmilā* 21. In 319/931 the *amma* attacked the Ḥasanī palace, then the residence of Sa'īd b. Ḥamdān, a kin of the governor of Mosul, probably because they suspected that the governor had suspended the cargoes of flour. 'Arīb, 157–8; Ḥamza, *Sinī* 161. In 324/935 the *amma*, protesting against the soaring of corn prices, were entrenched in the mosque of al-Ruṣāfa. The *wazīr* had to lower the prices by condoning the use of debased silver coins. Ṣūlī, 71. In 326/938 the people (*nās*) protested against the imposition of new taxes, forcing the authority to dismiss the responsible police chief. However, the prices soared, and a protest by the *'ayyārūn* of the east bank developed into fighting with the soldiers of the *amīr al-umarā'* Ibn Rā'iq. Ṣūlī, 98, 104. In 333/944, the *amma*, reacting

of traditional rites and faith as well as attacks on the Christians.²⁵ Ritual and symbolic elements of Muslim riots were typically observed in the prevention of prayers in mosques (and sometimes the destruction of pulpits) and the march of women disheveling their hair. More recently, Cohn, in his comprehensive study of the late medieval European revolts of the urban populace and peasants, downplayed the importance of economic causes (poverty, rent increase and the aggravation of laboring conditions), stressing the lust for liberty (participation in politics and the acquisition of citizenship) on the part of insurgents.²⁶

In Islamic history, Sabari and Ben Abdallah stressed economic causes of popular movements in Baghdad as a result of the spread of military *iqṭāʿ*s and the consequent destitution of the populace.²⁷ It is true that many Central Asian commanders were given estates as *iqṭāʿ*s or *qaṭīʿas* by caliphs²⁸ and sometimes even grabbed estates from their legitimate owners or were nominally given estates by their owners for the purpose of tax-evasion (*taljīʿa*).²⁹ However, it is not known how far those practices had been widespread before Buwayhid rule. Besides, it seems that a huge number of Iraqi peasants were immigrating to Baghdad and other cities to seek opportunities of economic success, not being compelled out of poverty or lack of land, just like their predecessors of the Umayyad period. They were determined never to return home, but the majority remained as carriers and other underpaid day laborers, passing the night in mosques and hammams.³⁰ These poor men concentrated in

against the billeting of Daylamite soldiers in their houses gratis and then the imposition of taxes on date cargoes from Baṣra, nearly collided with troops. Şūli, 203, 206.

- 25 In 271/884–5 the *ʿamma* destroyed and looted an old monastery, which was later rebuilt by a Christian dignitary. Ṭabarī, iii, 2107. In 284/897, they demanded that Qurʾanic punishments (*ḥadd*) be applied to the Christian court physician of Caliph al-Muʿtaḍid (279–89/892–902). Ṭabarī, iii, 2162. Two months later the *ʿamma* violently reacted against al-Muʿtaḍid's ban on the celebration of Nawrūz (Iranian new year day corresponding to summer solstice), forcing him to lift the ban. Ṭabarī, iii, 2163. In the same year, al-Muʿtaḍid refrained from having Muʿāwiya publicly cursed and ʿAlī praised in fear of possible popular riots. Ṭabarī, iii, 2164–6, 2177–8.
- 26 Cohn, *Lust for Liberty*, esp. 67–70 (attributing most revolts to political causes).
- 27 Sabari, *Mouvements populaires à Bagdad* 45–54; Ben Abdallah, *De l'iqṭaʿ étatique à l'iqṭaʿ militaire* 32–53. Ben Abdallah criticized Sabari for the lack of analytical methods, himself adopting Marxist analytic methods (e.g. modes of production, superstructure as determined by infrastructure).
- 28 Ṭabarī, iii, 1535, 1796.
- 29 Ṭabarī, iii, 1801. For details see Gordon, *The Breaking of a Thousand Swords* 118–24.
- 30 Ṭabarī, iii, 900. The same phenomena repeated in Ottoman Anatolia during the late sixteenth-to-early seventeenth centuries, resulting in frequent Jelāli rebellions. Faroqi, *Crisis and Change, in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* ii, 435–8.

Nahr al-Dajjāj and Qaṭīʿat al-Kilāb south of the commercial quarter of Karkh.³¹ They remained unorganized.

The proto-Ḥanbalites were the best organized group to mobilize a great number of the populace in tenth-century Baghdad. The populace in general inclined toward the conservative interpretation of the nascent Ḥanbalism, which was in the process of formation at the hands of al-Khallāl (d. 311/923), the collector of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal's (164–241/780–855) teachings, and al-Barbahārī (d. 329/941), an activist calling for *al-amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-n-nahy 'an al-munkar*.³² In 310/923 they prevented the funeral of the great scholar al-Ṭabarī,³³ probably because he had not recognized Ibn Ḥanbal as a legal expert or the people regarded his way of law interpretation as too rationalistic.³⁴ In 317/929 the Ḥanbalite *ʿamma* fought with other *ʿamma* over the interpretation of a verse in the Qurʾān.³⁵ In 321/933 the *ʿamma* opposed the government's attempt at having Muʿāwiya cursed in mosques. On this occasion, al-Barbahārī went into hiding, but many Ḥanbalite scholars were exiled to Baṣra.³⁶ In 327/938 the Ḥanbalite *ʿamma* molested the people who were on their way to join non-Islamic festivities, then attacked and lynched musicians and slave dealers. Al-Barbahārī was driven into hiding again. Two years later, taking advantage of the death of the *amīr al-umarāʾ* Bajkam (326–29/938–41), they destroyed the Shīʿi mosque of Barāthā.³⁷ Ḥanbalite private patrolling culminated in the looting of shops, setting of fire and trespassing into houses. The authority, however, succeeded in containing their atrocities by banning the gathering of al-Barbahārī's followers in 323/935.³⁸ Then al-Barbahārī himself died in hiding in 329/941, leaving his movement in fiasco.

The economic interest of the *ʿamma* was evidently incompatible with that of tax farmers, landowners and flour traders. It is possible, however, to regard the Ḥanbalite popular movement initiated under the leadership of al-Barbahārī as an attempt by notables to establish patrician domination, for their ultra-conservatism in the name of *al-amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-n-nahy 'an al-munkar* was in conformity to the general interest of the notables and the rich, just like the

31 Sabari, *Mouvements populaires* 12.

32 Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law* 143–53; (al-)Barbahārī, in *ET*³, 2009–3, 160–1; Cook, *Commanding Right* 114–8; Sabari, *Mouvements populaires* 104–6.

33 Miskawayh, i, 84; Ibn al-Athīr, viii, 134.

34 Melchert, *The Formation* 153, 191.

35 Ibn al-Athīr, viii, 213.

36 Miskawayh, i, 260–1; *Muntaẓam*, xiii, 316–7.

37 Şūlī, 135–6, 198.

38 Miskawayh, i, 322; Şūlī, 65; Hamadhānī, *Takmila* 91–2; Ibn al-Athīr, viii, 307–8.

movement initiated by Sahl in the wake of al-Amīn's defeat.³⁹ Their popular conservatism seldom collided with the fundamental principles of the government and jurisconsults (*faqīhs*). The later Sunnis would recognize the legitimacy of all the previous caliphs, including the Umayyad caliphs, following Ḥanbalite examples. On the other hand, although it seems that al-Barbahārī himself was of rich merchant origin, the association of his movement with other notables is not proven beyond doubt.

Finally, a short notice would be enough for later *'ayyārūn*. The first appearance of *'ayyārūn* in a new form as robbers and outlaws as distinct from ad hoc militiamen was observed in 306/918. Then, 'thieves (*luṣūṣ*)' and *'ayyārūn* activated and defied the police, following al-Muqtadir's edict issued to the police chief and *faqīhs* to restrain overzealous policemen from oppressing the people (*nās*).⁴⁰ These *'ayyārūn* should be distinguished from their earlier namesakes, though both were mostly of plebeian origin. Far from being actual champions of the poor, these *'ayyārūn* often terrorized and oppressed those very ranks they came from. They continued sacking and looting in the deserted west bank of Baghdad with impunity in 315/927, when its *'amma* took refuge in the east bank for fear of impending Qarmaṭi attacks.⁴¹ Thereafter, *'ayyārūn* frequently appeared as robbers, looters and incendiaries,⁴² but they seldom played an important role in popular riots; rather, they sometimes sided with the government, continuing the oppression of the people and even taking on the role of the *shurṭa* (police) during the emirate of Ibn Rā'iq (324–6/936–8, 329–30/941–42).⁴³

All outlaws and robbers need high ranking protectors or their own organizations for their continuing operations and survival.⁴⁴ During Buwayhid rule they sometimes received Abbasid protection⁴⁵ and organized gangs under their own leaders, often called *ra'īs*.⁴⁶ Around the year 364/975 *'ayyār* leaders, including the thinly-dressed Aswad al-Zubd, were styled *qā'ids* (commanders), riding through streets on donkeys and freely extorting *khifāras*

39 Shaban, *Islamic History* 2 46. The Ḥanbalite association with Abbasid caliphs became intimate only from the eleventh century. Cook, *Commanding Right* 124–8.

40 'Arīb, 71; Miskawayh, i, 69.

41 Miskawayh, i, 179.

42 Şūlī, 104, 133, 262.

43 Şūlī, 89, 119–21, 223, 250, 259. For their taking the part of the *shurṭa*, Şūlī, 119.

44 Blok, The Peasant and the Brigand, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 14 (1972), 494–503.

45 Tanūkhī, *Nishwār* i, 86–8.

46 Cahen, *Mouvements populaires*, 6, 37–40; Sabari, *Mouvements populaires* 81–5; Donohue, *The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq* 338–43; Miskawayh, ii, 305.

(protection fees) from *sūqs* (markets) and lanes (*durūb*).⁴⁷ At the nadir of Buwayhid power in Baghdad during the years from 416/1025 to 428/1036 in the emirate of Jalāl al-Dawla (416–35/1025–44), conflicts between the Buwayhid police force and *ʿayyārūn* culminated in the burning down of many markets and blocks. Especially in the five years since 420/1029 the *raʿīs* al-Burjamī dominated the eastern bank of Baghdad and even dared to confront police forces. He ran the gamut of looting and extorting *khifāras*, forcing the people to call himself *qāʿid*.⁴⁸

Ibn al-Jawzī goes so far as to say, “(In 426/1035) the *ʿayyārūn* sheltered in the houses of the Atrāk soldiers and their dependents (*hawāshū*) during the day, going out in the nighttime. . . . They virtually took possession of the city (*balad*).”⁴⁹ Hence, Tor regarded these *ʿayyārūn* of Buwayhid Baghdad as militant Sunnis closely related to notables and Sunni Atrāk soldiers and posed against the Shīʿites of Karkh and Bāb al-Tāq (some of them were even of notable origin!).⁵⁰ However, it is reported that there were both pro-Abbasid and pro-ʿAlid *ʿayyārūn* who created commotions in Baghdad in 392/1002.⁵¹

Even if they were sometimes under the protection of Abbasids and Atrāk their activities can be regarded as a protest of the lower classes against state and society. On the other hand, they badly oppressed men of the middle and lower classes as well and tended to make compromises with the government. In sum, it is difficult to regard their activities as popular political movements, but if the government of Baghdad had ceased to exist their leaders might have organized a more broadly-based caretaker government, resulting in forming a plebeian city, just like their nearly contemporary Damascene governments of Qassām and al-Duhayqayn.

47 *Muntaẓam*, xiv, 235.

48 *Muntaẓam*, xv, 171, 175, 200, 204, 226, 233–7, 239–41; Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 353, 431, 591–2.

49 *Muntaẓam*, xv, 245–6.


50 Tor, *Violent Order* 265–87. According to Tor (Idem 275–6), Sunni *ʿayyārūn* activities “appear to have been particularly endemic during the Buyid period, most likely due to the fact that the Buyids were themselves Shīʿites and permitted the Shīʿites to openly express their religion, most particularly on the *ʿĀshūrāʿ*.”

51 Hilāl, *Taʾrīkh* 439.

Damascus during the Later Tenth Century

Introduction

Damascus (Dimashq), a prominent city since the beginning of the first millennium BCE, was originally an independent city under its own monarchs until it was conquered by Assyria in the eighth century BCE. It was then successively incorporated into the empires of the Chaldeans, Achaemenid Persians, Macedonians, Romans and Arab Muslims.¹ Damascus is also the first city in which notable-led citizens, based on the militia called *aḥdāth*, won autonomy



MAP 2 *Damascus City*

1 For a general survey of Damascene history see Burns, *Damascus: A History*; Brill's *New Pauly* iv, 54–7. For the surviving monuments see Burns, *Monuments of Syria* 72–108.

in the course of their resistance against Fāṭimid advance during the later tenth century; moreover, it was one of the few cities in which the populace succeeded in seizing power. That is the reason why this chapter is almost exclusively devoted to that period, instead of the Šūfi and Tamīmi *raʿīs*-dominated twelfth century, which has hitherto attracted more attention.

The territory of Damascus outside its encircling walls was large, comprising the whole Ghūṭa oasis. The administrative and fiscal district (*ʿamal*, pl. *aʿmāl*) of Damascus was even larger, extending from Ḥawrān (Aurantis) and al-Bathaniyya (Batanea) in the south to the Anti-Lebanon Mountains (Jabal Sanīr) and the southernmost tip of the Biqāʿ Valley in the north, and was composed of mainly fertile cultivated land, but included rugged mountains and extensive steppes as well. Many people from this countryside moved into the city and sometimes played an important role in uprisings.

Damascus within its Roman walls was also large; its 26 meter-wide decumanus running from the Bāb al-Jābiya to the Bāb Sharqī ('Straight Street' in the *Acts*) had a length of 1,350 meters. In the late fourth century, the great temple of Hadad or Jupiter and its inner enclosure (temenos), surrounded by a huge outer compound (peribolos), was converted to a Christian church dedicated to St John the Baptist, which was in its turn rebuilt as mosque by Walid I (86–96/705–15). A palace of Byzantine governors, located in the southern peribolos was later expanded eastward to be used as the palace of the Umayyad caliphs (Dār al-Khaḍrāʿ), directly connected with the prayer room of the mosque through a door (later used as the palace for Abbasid and Fāṭimid governors).² A small Roman castrum (citadel) located in the northwestern corner of the walled city seems to have survived but was rarely used.

Damascus of the tenth century was still in the middle of transformation from a Roman city to a medieval Islamic city. We cannot know how far this transformation advanced then (e.g. how much the ancient thoroughfares including the 'Straight Street,' the forum (agora) and the peribolos were built up or constricted by shopping stalls),³ but it was probably in an advanced stage of transformation: winding culs-de-sac replacing open straight streets, houses of both sides jutting out toward streets, and upper floors made of mud and bricks protruding over lower floors built on stone, often forming overhanging

2 For this palace see Burns, *Damascus* 109, 115, 137. A new palace for Abbasid governors was built on the site of an Umayyad prince's palace (Qaṣr al-Ḥajjāj) outside the southwestern wall, facing Bāb al-Jābiya (Idem 133).

3 Kennedy, *From Polis to Madina* 17, 26; Burns, *Damascus* 86–8. The transformation began in the sixth century or earlier and was completed by the late eleventh century.

rooms over streets. So in times of emergency it was relatively easy to barricade streets to prevent the intrusion of enemies. On the other hand, fire spread quickly because the upper floors were wooden-framed, including the sumptuous houses of Ḥajar al-Dhahab (located between the Umayyad Mosque and the citadel).

The shops and houses developed outside the walls, especially to the north. Al-Maydān or Midān west of the walled city was the only open space in the Ghūṭa. It was used as a parade ground for cavalrymen, but seasonal fairs were also held there, resulting in the increase of stalls, permanent ateliers and shops. The Ghūṭa was traversed by many rivers and canals descending from the Anti-Lebanon, notably the Baradā, Thawrā and Yazīd, and besides the highways, narrow paths crisscrossed through the Ghūṭa with twists and turns, often fenced off by mud walls on both sides. As the result, the Damascenes could easily prevent or at least slow down the advance of enemies by destroying wooden bridges and ambushing them from walnut trees.⁴

Most Arab warriors dispersed to settle in the villages of the Ghūṭa, mingling with the indigenous people and patronizing converts, especially powerful men, as *mawālī*. By the mid-tenth century it seems that the citizens were composed of mostly Arabic-speaking Muslims, leaving Christians and Jews in their own quarters (but not ghettos). The Muslims of Damascus and Ḥimṣ, however, did not favor Abbasid rule and continued to pour scorn on the authority of Abbasid governors, forcing them to move out of the Khaḍrā' palace to the palace outside the walls (Qaṣr al-Ḥajjāj), even if large-scale outright rebellions were rare. The Abbasid caliphs, al-Ma'mūn and al-Mutawakkil, also constructed their splendid palaces near al-Ṣālihiyya on the foothills of Mt. Qāsiyūn, north of the walled city.⁵

As remarked above, Ashtor was the first to study the Ṣūfi *ra'īs* and the *aḥdāth* of Damascus under Seljuq (471–97/1078–1104) and Būrid (497–549/1104–54) rulers, comparing *ra'īs* to mayors or police chiefs, representing the haute bourgeoisie and supported by a militia of lower-class origin, called *aḥdāth*. He first stressed the continuity of Hellenistic and Roman municipal traditions up until early Islamic times, but then recognized that Roman cities in Syria declined under early Abbasid rule and began recovering, following the rise of trade since the tenth century. Accordingly, the bourgeoisie, he said, favored business-friendly Fāṭimid rule at the expense of the proletariat until Fāṭimid

4 Bianquis, *Damas et la Syrie* i, 74–9, Les derniers gouverneurs ikhchidides, *BEO* 23 (1970), 183, note 2.

5 For Syrian urban rebellions see Cobb, *White Banners* 181–5.

oppressions became unbearable in 461/1069.⁶ Cahen also paid attention to *ra'īs*, but he considered *qādīs* and others too as possible leaders of autonomous cities and regarded the *aḥdāth* as a 'disciplined' militia necessary for municipal autonomy, distinguishing it from the *'ayyārūn* of contemporary Iran and Iraq. Then Havemann made an important contribution to the study by distinguishing the popular leaders (*ra'īs*) and militias (*aḥdāths*), who resisted rulers of foreign origin, from bureaucrats and auxiliary forces loyal to monarchs. He also pointed to the fact that people from the countryside of Damascus played an important role in rebellions.⁷ Detailed accounts of the activities of Damascene notables and *aḥdāths* are found in general political histories of Syria under Fāṭimid, Seljuq and Būrid rule.⁸

Although the writings of contemporary Damascene notables including 'Abd al-Wahhāb b. Ja'far al-Maydānī (338–418/949–1027) and the 'Alid Akhū Muḥsin (d. 398/1008) were lost, part of them is preserved, either in quotations or summaries, in the histories and the collections of biographies written by later Damascene authors, Ibn al-Qalānisī (465–555/1073–1160), Ibn 'Asākir (499–571/1105–76), al-Dhahabī (673–748/1274–1348) and al-Ṣafadī (696–764/1297–1363).⁹ The lost contemporary accounts written by the Egyptian Ibn Zūlāq (306–86/919–96) were also utilized by later Egyptian authors, Ibn al-Dawādārī and al-Maqrīzī (766–845/1364–1442). The histories written by an Antiochian Melkite Christian physician of Egyptian origin, Yaḥyā b. Sa'īd (d. ca.1066. He moved to Antioch from Cairo in 405/1014), and an Abbasid-Buwayhid bureaucrat of Baghdad, Hilāl al-Ṣābī (359–448/969–1056), are also very important (the latter mostly survived in quotations except for a small surviving section covering the years 389–393/999–1002).

6 For the Damascene revolt in 461 see Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'āt* xii, 446, 450, 455, 456, 465–8; Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Dhayl ta'riḫ Dimashq* 96–7.

7 Havemann, Non-urban Rebels in Urban Society, in *Bilād al-Shām during the Abbāsīd Period*, ed. A. al-Bakhit and R. Schick, 81–90.

8 For the Fāṭimid period see, Bianquis, *Damas et la Syrie*. For Seljuq and Būrid periods see Mouton, *Damas et sa principauté*; Zouache, *Armées et combats en Syrie*.

9 The relevant information of governors, *qādīs* and 'Alid notables during the Ikshīdīd period, contained in Ibn 'Asākir's *Ta'riḫ madīnat Dimashq* and al-Dhahabī's *Ta'riḫ al-Islām*, was culled by Bianquis from the manuscripts of Damascus (al-Zāhiriyya) and Paris (la bibliothèque nationale). Les derniers gouverneurs, 170–5. Bianquis (Idem 170–1, *Damas et la Syrie* i, 87, 96, 108, 113, 120, ii, 671–3) suspected that Ibn al-Qalānisī, instead of faithfully quoting his sources, rewrote them concerning the activities of *aḥdāth* and Bedouins in order to not only curry favor with his Būrid and Zangid lords, but also warn his contemporary citizens of their treachery and atrocities.

Anti-Ikshīd Resistance and the Beginning of the Movement for Autonomy

Since the mid-tenth century, Egypt and Aleppo fell under the control of the Ikshīd Muḥammad b. Ṭughj (323–34/935–46) and a Ḥamdānid prince, Sayf al-Dawla (333–56/944–67), respectively. The former was a third-generation Abbasid elite soldier of Central Asian royal origin, while the latter was a late-comer, an Arab (Taghlibi) cavalryman from Jazīra (his brother Nāṣir al-Dawla had seized power in Mosul since 322/934). Both struggled for the control of Damascus until a compromise was reached between them in 334/945, resulting in Ibn Ṭughj's rule of Damascus. From 334/946 on, Egypt and Damascus were ruled by the black eunuch Kāfir as protector of Ibn Ṭughj's sons (reigning in his own name 355–7/966–8). It is understandable that the Damascenes felt more disgruntled at their control from Egypt than from Baghdad.

A Damascene civil riot broke out in 349/960, when notables (*shuyūkh, ashraf*), backed by the craftsmen and merchants of *sūqs*, demanded the removal of the newly-appointed deputy-*qāḍī* Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh b. al-Walīd (acting for his father, *qāḍī* of Egypt), a young man dispatched from Egypt, and his replacement by a Damascene *faqīh*, Yūsuf b. al-Qāsim al-Mayānājī. It implicitly demanded some Damascene autonomy under patrician domination. The poor people called *awbāsh* or *aḥdāth* from the quarter of Bāb al-Ṣaghīr (the southwestern gate), under the leadership of Banū Karawwas,¹⁰ attacked these notables, including Abū l-'Abbās al-Sukkarī, Abū l-Ḥasan b. Abī Hishām and Ḥamza b. Aḥmad (Akhū Muḥsin's cousin), during their march to the camp of Ikshīd soldiers, presumably located outside the walls. It seems that their request was accepted despite the opposition of these poor people.¹¹

The fairs of sheep and pack animals (*sūq al-ghanam, sūq al-dawwāb*) were held outside the gate of Bāb al-Ṣaghīr near the spacious cemetery, in which the peasants of the Ghūṭa and the nomads of nearby steppes gathered as sellers and buyers. The quarter of Bāb al-Ṣaghīr inside was densely populated by relatively lower layers of craftsmen, such as makers of ropes and coarse clothes, and simple carriers, including recent settlers from the Anti-Lebanon and nearby steppes.¹² They did not necessarily favor the young Egyptian *qāḍī*;

10 Karawwas means a big head. It can be a personal name. Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-'Arab* xii, 68–9.

11 Ibn 'Asākir, *Ta'rikh madīnat Dimashq*, Beirut, liii, 320–1 (quoting from al-Maydānī's autograph); *Les derniers gouverneurs* 193–4. For his father, Ibn al-Walīd, see Ṣafādī, *Wāfi* xvii, 18–9.

12 Bianquis, *Les derniers gouverneurs* 186–7.

they were evidently dissatisfied with notables and their supporters composed of the shopkeepers of the central *sūqs*.

Following the dismissal of the popular governor Fātik al-Ikhshīdī in 357/968, both notables and the populace including the poor joined in a resistance to the new governor Fanak al-Kāfūrī, a black eunuch. Fanak, after his failure in the struggle for Egyptian power in the wake of Kāfūr's death, had taken refuge in Syria, where he was appointed as governor of Damascus by al-Ḥasan b. 'Ubaydallāh (or 'Abdallāh) b. Ṭughj, the governor of Syria with his headquarters at al-Ramla, Palestine. Soon a huge number of the Damascenes (*ahl al-balad*) took to the streets to fight the soldiers, resulting in wide-spread fires and depredations. Obviously, the replacement of the popular Fātik by an alien eunuch and the possible strengthening of Egyptian control triggered the riot, suggesting the citizens' inclination for Damascene autonomy and autocephaly. Fanak decided to escape from Damascus, taking advantage of the timely advance of Byzantine Emperor Nicephoros Phocas (963–9) toward Ḥimṣ. He called the citizens to assemble in arms at the Thaniyyat al-'Uqāb Pass northeast of the walled city against the Byzantines. When the people advanced as far as the villages of Dūma and Ḥarastā near al-'Uqāb, he escaped to the Lebanese coast by way of the 'Aqaba Dummar Pass, thereby creating the situation ripe for the establishment of patrician domination.¹³

The Damascene notables (*shuyūkh*) decided to invite the Ikhshīdīd governor of al-Ṣanamayn (Aere), al-Bathaniyya, and a powerful Arab leader, Ṣāliḥ b. 'Umayr al-'Uqaylī, either as condottiere or governor of their own choice. After Ṣāliḥ's entry into Damascus, al-Ḥasan b. 'Ubaydallāh b. Ṭughj attacked Damascus, but soon confirmed Ṣāliḥ as governor to cope with Fātimid advance into Syria. Another 'Uqayli leader, Zālim b. Mawhūb, helped a Ḥamdānid prince, Sa'd al-Dawla, succeed to the governorship of Aleppo after the death of his father Sayf al-Dawla in 356/967. Zālim then attempted to seize Damascus by force, but was repulsed by its citizens (*ahl al-balad*) who rushed to arms under their governor Ṣāliḥ.¹⁴ These facts point to the fact that the *a'yān-amīr system* with a strong touch of patrician domination was working in Damascus then.

It seems that a large number of 'Uqayli and Kilābi tribesmen, former supporters of the Qarāmiṭa movement in Baḥrayn (present-day al-Ḥasa' facing the Persian Gulf), were then drifting north to Syria, Jazīra and the region of Mosul after its compromise with the Abbasid Establishment in return for

13 Ibn 'Asākir, Beirut, xlvi, 215, 457; Dhahabī, *Ta'rikh al-Islām*, 351–380AH, 166; Ṣafadī, *Tuhfa* 295–7; *Wāfi* xxiv, 95.

14 Dhahabī, 351–380AH, 192; *Wāfi* xvi, 268; *Tuhfa* 294; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar* 121.

khifāras (protection fees) in the mid-tenth century (especially after the death of their great military leader Abū Ṭāhir in 332/944).¹⁵ Accordingly, many ‘Uqayli tribesmen were then residing in a vast arid zone extending from the Euphrates to Ḥawrān and the Biqā’ Valley. Some leaders built fortresses on the Euphrates, but others, including Ṣāliḥ, Ḍālim and Mulhim, were entrusted with the maintenance of order in Ḥawrān and al-Bathaniyya by Kāfūr. Later, the Fāṭimid army, after its conquest of Palestine in 359/970, used their rivals, Murra and Fazāra tribesmen, to drive them out of Ḥawrān and al-Bathaniyya toward Ḥimṣ.¹⁶

The Qarāmiṭa of Baḥrayn resumed their offensives into Syria after a long lapse under the leadership of Abū Ṭāhir’s nephew, al-Ḥasan al-A’ṣam. Presumably, their aim was not a confrontation with the Abbasid state under Buwayhid tutelage, but the elevation of their own status and the redistribution of wealth to their best advantage within the state. Only a month later after driving back Ḍālim from Damascus, Ṣāliḥ b. ‘Umayr suffered a setback at the hands of al-Ḥasan al-A’ṣam, being forced to flee Damascus. Al-Ḥasan still met a stiff resistance from the citizens, but ultimately made a compromise with them, leaving his deputy there. Then he advanced to al-Ramla to put its Ikhshīdid governor, al-Ḥasan b. ‘Ubaydallāh, to flight toward Egypt.¹⁷ However, the status quo ante was back to Syria soon after al-Ḥasan al-A’ṣam’s return to Baḥrayn in 358/969. The populace of Damascus, called *aḥdāth* or *shabāb*, rose in arms to oust al-Ḥasan al-A’ṣam’s governor, welcoming back Ṣāliḥ to their city. Al-Ḥasan b. ‘Ubaydallāh also returned to al-Ramla. Again, Ḍālim hurried back to Damascus, pressing a siege of Dārāyā, a large village of the Ghūṭa, as long as fifty days. In this crisis, Ṣāliḥ returned to al-Bathaniyya, obeying al-Ḥasan b. ‘Ubaydallāh, who sent a new governor, Shamūl, to Damascus.¹⁸

Civic movements for political participation in Damascus during the Ikhshīdid period were mostly led by notables, who put the populace under their control with a possible exception of the poor people of Bāb al-Ṣaghīr quarter. Even after expelling the Ikhshīdid governor Fanak, however, notables were unwilling or unable to establish their oligarchy, instead inviting Ṣāliḥ, an

15 Ibn al-Dawādārī, 132; Ibn al-‘Adīm, *Bughya* i, 543–9 (based on a work of his teacher al-Asadī).

16 Zakkar, *The Emirate of Aleppo* 69–71, 74–5; Kennedy, *The Prophet* 289, 292–3; Bianquis, *Damas et la Syrie* i, 41, 125–6. For fortresses on the Euphrates see Ibn ‘Asākir, Beirut, xxv, 211.

17 Yaḥyā, *Ta’rikh al-Anṭākī* 128; *Tuhfa* 294, 303; *Wāfi* xvi, 268; Maqrīzī, *Muqaffā* iii, 151; Dhahabī, 351–80AH, 192.

18 Dhahabī, 351–80AH, 192; *Wāfi* xvi, 268; *Tuhfa* 294–5, 303–4; Ibn ‘Asākir, Beirut, xxv, 211.

Arab leader of the region loyal to the Ikhshīdids, due to either an insufficiency of their fighting capability or a division among themselves.

An Attempt at the Establishment of a Patrician City after the Fall of the Ikhshīdids

The Fāṭimid army, mainly composed of Berber Kutāma tribesmen, under the command of one of the Ṣaḡālība (freedmen including many eunuchs, mainly Slavs and the people of the Mediterranean coast abducted by pirates), Jawhar al-Ṣiqillī (the Sicilian), conquered Egypt in Shaʿbān 358/July 969. The following year, a Kutāma commander, Jaʿfar b. Falāḥ, dispatched by Jawhar from Egypt, summarily defeated al-Ḥasan b. ʿUbaydallāh near al-Ramla and captured him. Shamūl, al-Ḥasan's governor of Damascus, who had watched how the wind blew, hurried to Tiberias (Ṭabariyya) on the Sea of Galilee to join the Fāṭimid army, leaving his deputy and a few troops in his city.¹⁹ It seems that Damascus, meanwhile, virtually became a patrician city.

Soon a Damascene delegation, composed of notables (*mashāʾikh*) including Abū l-Qāsim Ismāʿīl b. Abī Yaʿlā (Abbasid) and ʿAqīl b. al-Ḥasan b. al-Ḥusayn (Akhū Muḥsin's cousin), visited Jaʿfar b. Falāḥ in Tiberias to conciliate him in fear of an impending Fāṭimid attack on their city. It seems that they came under Fāṭimid suzerainty, renouncing an Abbasid one, though it is doubtful if they considered that Fāṭimid Caliph al-Muʿizz (341–65/953–75) was more legitimate than Abbasid Caliph al-Muṭīʿ (334–63/946–74). Probably they negotiated for their autonomy and autocephaly, but the negotiation must have ended in an inconclusive result. It is said that in the absence of the notables no authority (*sultān*) was left in Damascus, and criminals called *dhuʿār* (vicious men) or *ḥummāl al-silāḥ* (armed men) became rampant.²⁰

Once back to Damascus, the Abbasid notable Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, now called *raʿīs*,²¹ succeeded in establishing the oligarchic authority of notables and restoring public order. Soon he, together with Muḥammad b. ʿAṣūdā and Ṣadaqa al-Shawwāʾ, openly rose in revolt, leading armed 'young men,' called *aḥdāth* or *shabāb*, of middle and lower orders from both the intramural city and the

19 Ibn al-Dawādārī, 121–3, 125; Maqrīzī, *Ittīʿāz* i, 191–2; *Muqaffā* ii, 515.

20 Ibn al-Dawādārī, 126; *Ittīʿāz* i, 193; *Muqaffā* ii, 516. According to Bianquis (*Damas et la Syrie* i, 76, ii, 685), these *ḥummāl al-silāḥ* comprised mainly butchers, tanners and other craftsmen related to the use of knives; other craftsmen and traders seldom participated in uprisings.

21 *Ittīʿāz* i, 194.

Ghūṭa. They expelled Shamūl's deputy from the city and returned their homage to the reigning Abbasid caliph.²²

After the Damascenes succeeded in repulsing a Fāṭimid vanguard and their Bedouin allies (Murra and Fazāra), who had pursued 'Uqayli tribesmen as far as Ḥimṣ and plundered the Anti-Lebanese villages, they had to make peace with the main Fāṭimid army commanded by Ja'far b. Falāḥ as a result of several days' heavy fighting outside the gate of Bāb al-Jābiya, accepting Fāṭimid authority (Dhū l-Ḥijja 359/October 970). In this fighting, the Damascene army conspicuously comprised cavalrymen (*khayl*); it is deplorable that we do not know whether these cavalrymen were remains of the ancient Arab *jund* or Ikshidid soldiers (Shamūl's men) or 'Uqayli tribesmen. Ibn Abī Ya'fā, whose support was dwindling, had escaped into the desert toward Baghdad, but he was captured near Palmyra by his former ally, a Bedouin 'Adawi chief, who handed him over to Ja'far. On the other hand, Muḥammad b. 'Aṣūdā succeeded in taking refuge with the Qarāmiṭa in Baḥrayn, inciting them to attack Syria. Twelve leaders of the *ḥummāl al-silāḥ* were also captured and executed. They were replaced by more moderate notables, Abū l-Qāsim Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn al-'Aqīqī ('Alid) and Abū l-Ḥasan b. Abī Hishām (once a leader of the resistance against the Egyptian *qāḍī* Ibn al-Walīd). Heavy duties (*jibāya*) were imposed on the Damascenes and they were humiliated; their women were made to appear with their faces and hairs exposed and mudded. Ja'far and his men, however, refrained from settling inside the walls, but had their luxurious houses built in al-Dikka on the upper Nahr Yazīd west of the walled city.²³

A serious attempt to establish patrician domination ended in failure. However, if one leader, Ṣadaqa 'the seller of roast meat,' was of plebeian origin, the populace should have been influential in decision-making from the beginning. At least, a division of patricians between advocates of a total resistance to the Fāṭimid troops and pacifists facilitated the rise of plebeian influence, paving the way for their future seizure of power. It is also important to note that the men whom many Damascene authors complimentarily called *aḥdāth* or *shabāb* were largely identical with the *ḥummāl al-silāḥ* or *dhu'ār*, derogatory appellations adopted by more suspicious writers. *Aḥdāth* might have begun developing as an organized militia under Ṣadaqa.

The Damascenes did not favor Shī'ī Fāṭimid rule from Egypt; they were Umayyad partisans called Umawiyūn, always conscious of Umayyad

22 Ibn 'Asākir, Beirut, lxvii, 138–40 (Les derniers gouverneurs 192–3); Sibṭ, *Mir'āt* xi, 225–6. Their summaries, Dhahabī, 351–80AH, 220–1; *Wāfi* xxiv, 172; *Tuḥfa* 297–9; *Itti'āz* i, 195–6; *Muqaffā* ii, 516.

23 *Muqaffā* ii, 517–8; *Itti'āz* i, 193–6; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 125–9. For al-'Aqīqī, see *Wāfi* vi, 347–8.

tradition,²⁴ of which the Umayyad Mosque and palace were always reminiscent. Their loyalty to the Abbasid caliphs, who had virtually abandoned the defense of Thughūr (Byzantine frontier regions, present-day southeastern Turkey) from Byzantine inroads, cannot have been stronger than ever either. So, Bianquis' remark that the Damascenes were solidified as Sunnis and therefore resisted the Shī'i (Ismā'īli) Fāṭimids²⁵ is only partially true. On the one hand, Sunnism was then developing toward formation in Buwayhid Baghdad.²⁶ On the other, it seems that Fāṭimid Ismā'īlism had not yet developed its peculiar cosmology based on neo-Platonism, apart from its 'coreligionists' of al-Rayy and Eastern Iran, with whom the Fāṭimids had only a tenuous relationship.²⁷

Almost simultaneously with the Fāṭimid conquest of Egypt, the Byzantines succeeded in occupying Maṣṣīṣa (Mopsuestis), Ṭarsūs (354/965) and then Antioch (358/969), forcing proto-Sunni ascetic-warriors and mujahidin to take refuge in Syria south of Antioch, especially in Bāniyās within the *a'māl* of Damascus.²⁸ It is only a few months after their surrender to the Fāṭimids that the inhabitants of the *a'māl* of Damascus participated in the Fāṭimid abortive expedition for the recovery of Antioch.²⁹ Soon, the Damascenes entered the Sunni camp. As Bianquis says, it seems that Akwākh near Bāniyās became a propaganda center for the nascent pro-Umayyad Sunni ideology originating with an early Abbasid *faqīh* of Kūfa, Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778), and began exerting a strong impact on the Damascenes since the late tenth century (e.g. the historian Ibn al-Maydānī).³⁰ A venerable Palestinian ascetic (*zāhid*), Ibn al-Nābulusī al-Ramlī, successfully dissuaded the Fāṭimid commander Ja'far from plundering al-Ramla.³¹ He is said to have later trumpeted his

24 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 16.

25 *Damas et la Syrie* i, 50–1, 166–7, ii, 683. Bianquis recognized in other places (i, 88, 115, 140, 165) that Sunni-Shī'i ideological confrontation was not attested in the sources.

26 Kennedy, *The Prophet* 229–31; The Late 'Abbāsīd Pattern, in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 1, ed. C.F. Robinson, 387–93.

27 Halm, *The Empire of the Mahdi* 288–97. cf. Brett, *The Rise of the Fatimids* 205–18.

28 Muqaddasī, *Aḥsan* 160.

29 Ibn al-Dawādārī, 132–3; *Itti'āz* i, 196–7.

30 Muqaddasī, 188; Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-buldān* i, 241; Ibn 'Asākir, Damascus, xviii, part 2, 462–5; Khaṭīb, ix, 423–4. For the Kūfan-Syrian origin of the school of Sufyān al-Thawrī see H.P. Raddatz, Sufyān al-Thawrī, in *ET*², ix, 770–2; Judd, *Religious Scholars and the Umayyads* 80–90. For the origin of pious (but not necessarily subservient to late Umayyad and early Abbasid caliphs) jihadist warrior-ascetics see Tor, *Violent Order* 39–68; J. Chabbi, Ribāṭ, in *ET*², viii, 498.

31 Sibṭ, xi, 225; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 1.

opinion that the Muslims were under obligation to fight the Fāṭimids, rather than the Byzantines, resulting in Caliph al-Muʿizz's censure of him and his ultimate execution.³²

The Failure of a Popular-led Anti-Fāṭimid Resistance

The next opportunity for the Damascenes to win autonomy was brought about by the second Qarmaṭi occupation of Damascus. As a result of Fāṭimid supremacy in Damascus al-Ḥasan al-Aʿṣam lost the annual revenues of three hundred thousand dinars. Moreover, he was incited by Syrian refugees, Muḥammad b. ʿAṣūdā and Zālim b. Mawhūb, and also encouraged by the Buwayhid *amīr* Bakhtiyār (356–67/967–78) and the Ḥamdānid governor of Mosul, Abū Taghlib (356–69/967–79). Al-Ḥasan advanced on al-Raḥba along the Euphrates, leading the Bedouins of Baḥrayn and Syria (Zālim's men) and former Ikhshidid soldiers, then defeated and killed Jaʿfar b. Falāḥ to the north of Damascus in Dhū l-Qaʿda 360/August 971. After leaving Zālim as governor there to levy taxes (*kharāj*), al-Ḥasan advanced to occupy al-Ramla and besieged Fāṭimid troops in Jaffa (Yāfā).³³ Incorporating the Palestinian Ṭayyʾ Bedouins under the leadership of the Jarrāḥids in his army, al-Ḥasan advanced to Egypt, attacking Cairo twice (361/971, 363/974), but was driven away and forced to return to al-Ḥasaʾ (Baḥrayn).

Abbasid suzerainty was back in Damascus under Qarmaṭi rule. However, when the governor Zālim was dismissed by al-Ḥasan al-Aʿṣam, he escaped with the taxes he had collected to his fortress on the Euphrates, leaving the payment of stipends (*ʿatāʾ*) to al-Ḥasan's two thousand troops in arrears. The notables refused the new governor's demand to make up for the loss, resulting in a mounting tension. Taking advantage of this situation, Zālim, defecting to the Fāṭimids, initiated his assault on Damascus. However, the Fāṭimid army under the command of Abū Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm b. Jaʿfar³⁴ soon arrived at Damascus in Ramaḍān 363/June 974, replacing Zālim and his men.³⁵ It seems that the

32 Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 4; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 159, 161–2; *Ittīʿāz* i, 263–4; *Wāfi* ii, 44; *Damas et la Syrie* i, 50, 54–5, 166, ii, 683. Bianquis suggested that Ibn al-Nābulusī's adamant anti-Shīʿi stance was exaggerated and embellished by the Sunni circle of Baghdad. *Idem* i, 88–9.

33 Ibn al-Dawādārī, 133–6; *Muqaffā* ii, 518–20; *Ittīʿāz* i, 197–8; Sibṭ, xi, 225–6; *Tuḥfa* 301, 304.

34 According to Maqrīzī, *Muqaffā* i, 113 and Ibn al-Dawādārī, 160, he was son of Jaʿfar b. Falāḥ. Bianquis (*Damas et la Syrie* i, 69) denied that on the basis that Damascene authors do not remark on their relationship. However, it is more logical to think that Egyptian authors were more knowledgeable about Egyptian generals.

35 *Tuḥfa* 304–6, 316; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 3–4; *Ittīʿāz* i, 261, 263; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 144, 160–1.

supply from Egypt was suspended,³⁶ resulting in Kutāma troops' plundering of villages, Damascene notables' estates (*ḍay'as*) and caravans with impunity, probably under Ibrāhīm's tacit consent.³⁷

Ibn al-Qalānisi's account of the uprising of the citizens and the villagers of the Ghūṭa against the Fāṭimid army, probably based upon some contemporary source, is outstandingly vivid and detailed, being worthy of citation.

When the general Abū Maḥmūd settled in Damascus with his army, the people were greatly disturbed. The Maghāriba (mainly Kutāma troops) produced great mischief in every corner of the city (*balad*), capturing travelers they encountered on the roads. . . . Evildoers (*ghawghā'*) and armed men (*ḥamalāt al-silāḥ*) appeared to kill Fāṭimid garrison troops, and the common people (*'awāmm*) who provoked disturbances increased. The Maghāriba wished to loot villages and caravans outside the walled city. Abū Maḥmūd was unable to restore order among his troops because he had no money to pay them; the troops did not obey his order. . . . Travelers were forced to turn away from the trodden roads, and villagers vacated their villages, taking refuge in the walled city. . . .

On Thursday in the middle of Shawwāl 363/June 9, 974, some troops plundered the district of fullers located near al-Maydān outside the walls. Many men cried out for help; some people (*nās*) took up arms and *aḥdāth* rose in riot. Even Zālim's men appeared, joining the fighting. Zālim himself appeared, promising justice and defense of the city. The people seized this opportunity to complain of what had happened. One day, some Maghāriba troops ambushed a caravan from Ḥawrān in Ḥurjulla (near al-Kiswa, the southern Ghūṭa), killing three men. When the survivors carried their bodies to expose them in the Umayyad Mosque, the people gathered around them, feeling disgust at their murder. The *sūqs* were closed and the people were upset and scared away.

On Monday, Dhū l-Qa'da 17, 363/August 9, 974, a young boy cried in the distance, "Rush to Qayniyya and al-Lu'lu'a (western suburbs outside the walls) in arms." . . . Maghāriba cavalymen and infantrymen had spread from Qayniyya to al-Lu'lu'a and the Qanawāt as far as the gates of Bāb al-Jābiya and Bāb al-Ḥadīd, capturing the fullers of the Bāb al-Ḥadīd and stripping them of clothes. The people (*nās*) shouted, "Rush in arms." Zālim's men joined the people (*ra'yya*). The Maghāriba approached the walls, finding no Damascenes to resist them. Then, the citizens

36 According to Bianquis, the Fāṭimids shaped a principle to entrust fund raising to expeditionary forces dispatched to Syria themselves. *Damas et la Syrie* i, 74, 132–3.

37 Ibn al-Dawādārī, 162; *Muqaffā* i, 114; *Itti'āz* i, 264.

(*ahl al-balad*) rushed from every direction; particularly, archers inflicted great damage upon the Maghāribā, forcing them to shift their direction toward the southern gate of Bāb al-Ṣaghīr. Hotly pursued, some Maghāribā troops ascended the mill of al-Ash'ariyyīn (outside the Bāb al-Farādīs), and began throwing stones and fires. This is the first fire thrown in the city (*balad*). The people (*ra'īyya*) and Zālim's men rushed to fight back and drove them into a corner, forcing them to climb the mosque of Ibrāhīm in Marj al-Ash'ariyyīn³⁸. . . . An ambush posted near the old hospital (al-maristān al-'atīq) suddenly attacked the *aḥdāth* and Zālim's men, dislodging them from Marj al-Ash'ariyyīn and pursuing them.

When Zālim knew their defeat he left the governor's palace (*dār al-imāra*) and rushed to the bridge over the Baradā, ordering the closure of the gate of Bāb al-Ḥadīd and placing his men on the bridge of the Bānās canal as reinforcements to the citizens (*nās*). When he saw the citizens being routed and pursued by the Maghāribā, he, after hitting his thigh by his hand, took up a lance and crossed the bridge with a detachment of his men. He attacked the Maghāribā vanguard, repulsing them from before the *aḥdāth*. . . . Eventually, he was routed. The Maghāribā entered the lanes of al-Farādīs (a high-profile suburb neighboring Marj al-Ash'ariyyīn) and climbed its roofs, from where they threw fires everywhere in al-Farādīs, the most beautiful suburb of Damascus, which contained most beautiful, gorgeous, high-rise buildings, never seen anywhere else. The flames spread east as far as the mosque of the *qādī*, destroying all the houses of Banū Ḥudhayfa and devouring the buildings located between al-Fākhūra, Ḥammām Qāsim and the church of Mār Yūḥannā. When the Maghāribā occupied Marj al-Ash'ariyyīn and al-Maydān, they gave shouts of joy. The archers and spectators occupying the roofs dispersed as far as the Qanawāt or took refuge inside the walls from the Bāb al-Ḥadīd. The cavalry pursued Zālim through the Ghūṭa as far south as al-Shammāsiyya, though they themselves were sometimes attacked by *aḥdāth*. They continued to set fire to the suburbs of al-Lu'lu'at al-Kubrā, al-Lu'lu'at al-Ṣughrā, the Qanawāt and Qayniyya.

The people (*nās*) passed the worst night in extreme fear. During that night, the flames were strengthened, devouring the lanes of Faḥḥāmīn (charcoal burners) and Qaṣṣārīn (fullers), and then spread west to the mosque of Mu'āwiya, burning down the lane of al-Summāqī and its adjacent places as far as Ḥammām al-'Iṣmī. These flames also spread to

38 For the mosque of Ibrāhīm see Ibn 'Asākīr, *Ta'rikh madīnat Dimashq* i, ed. Munajjid, 101.

the lane of Mashshāṭīn (comb-makers) and the Qanawāt. The flames of al-Lu'lu'a also raged, spreading east as far as al-Raṣīf (all apparently outside the walls). They sometimes entered the Bāb al-Ḥadīd and set fire to the palaces of 'Amr b. Mālik and (al-Ḥasan) b. Ṭughj b. Juff. The flames were even more strengthened by engraved wooden ceilings and their cloth coverings. In the nighttime, these flames, together with those of al-Farādīs, looked like high-flying tongues or giant sparks of fire. They also set fire to the Bāb al-Ḥadīd and the arcade before the palace of al-Ḥamāmī leading to Ḥajar al-Dhahab. Finally they reached Raḥbat al-Sammākīn (Fishers' square) opposite the palace of Ibn Muqātil, where they were prevented from entering further lanes by the people (*ra'īyya*). Some people entered the arcade, attempting to extinguish fire, but the flames of Ibn Mālik's palace raged even more furiously until it devoured its adjacent area extending from the mill to Ḥammām Ḍaḥḥāk. Then the fire turned south, destroying the houses around Ibn Ṭughj's palace, extending to Qaṣr Ātika, the sūq al-Ja'farī with its shops (*ḥawānīt*) and Qaṣr al-Ḥajjāj. The following morning, no building was left standing in that quarter.

During that night the inhabitants of Ḥajar al-Dhahab, al-Fusqār (the western part of the 'Straight Street') and the Bāb al-Ḥadīd quarter assembled to prepare for the fighting expected to occur in lanes, alleys and the gates of palaces. Before daybreak, they had filled up the chinks of the Bāb al-Ḥadīd gate.... The following morning the Fāṭimid army descended from their camp at al-Dikka toward the walled city. The people (*nās*) had arrived at al-Maydān and climbed the roofs to see the army approaching.... When the criers placed on the roofs saw the army descending, they shouted, "Take up arms." When the people heard it some rushed in full arms, but most people came with only spears, sticks, axes, clothes, slings and donkeys carrying stones.... Abū Maḥmūd approached with his army, pitching his tent at al-Maydān. The people had seen great hardships and ordeals. Thereupon, they went out of the walls, followed by many notables (*akhyār*) and veiled, honorable men (*mastūrīn*), imploring God for peace. When they approached the army, one of them shouted to cavalymen, announcing that the notables (*ashraf*) wished to see the commander. They were given an audience.³⁹

Although Abū Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm granted pardon upon them, he refrained from entering the intramural city, returning to his camp at al-Dikka; instead,

39 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 4–7. cf. *Muqaffā* i, 114–5.

two men from the Maghāribā and former Ikhshīdīd soldiers were appointed as police (*shurṭa*) chiefs, attempting to place the city under strict control and terminate patrician domination. Maghāribā troops also entered the city to do some shopping.⁴⁰

However, the Damascenes still hated to see Maghāribā troops inside the walls. Particularly, the people of Bāb al-Ṣaghīr organized some armed groups to patrol the lanes of their quarter, both inside and outside the gate, in the nighttime and drew cordons here and there. These armed groups were called *ahl al-shirra* or *shuṭṭār al-aḥdāth* (vicious *aḥdāth*). They dared to defy Maghāribā troops and bother notables, not hesitating at the resumption of war.⁴¹ They were probably recruited from the lower classes of the quarter including relatively recent immigrants from the villages of the *a'māl* of Damascus. From the notables' standpoint they could be supporters or opponents, resulting in the ambiguity of their appellation (*ahl al-shirra*), meaning holders of youthful ardor or evildoers. All in all, they were a rabble, neither tightly organized nor disciplined. On the other hand, the *shuṭṭār al-aḥdāth* were something more akin to an organization, having its own chief (*ra's*), named 'Alā' b. al-Māward (son of rose water).⁴² They were called *shuṭṭār* because they were not under the control of notables and prone to independent activities.

The interpretation of Ibn al-Qalānisī's detailed account is not always easy. It seems that, contrary to Bianquis' remarks,⁴³ the notables, not the populace, closed the gate of Bāb al-Ṣaghīr on their own initiative to prevent the entry of Maghāribā troops from the *sūq al-dawwāb* market outside the gate in fear of possible collisions. The closure of the gate should have been a great nuisance for the common people of the quarter as well as travelers and villagers. These spontaneous measures of notables constituted a serious challenge to the authority of Abū Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm, who gathered notables and ordered them to open the gate to facilitate the communication. The *ahl al-shirra* and *shuṭṭār al-aḥdāth* also pushed them to open the gate. As expected, soon one senior Maghāribā soldier was killed in the vegetable market by one of the *ahl al-shirra* as a result of a quarrel over a boy. Taking advantage of this incident, the notables rushed to the closure of the gate to prevent the inroads of

40 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 7; *Itti'āz* i, 264; *Muqaffā* i, 115.

41 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 8; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 166. The *shuṭṭār* were also called *juhhāl al-nās*.

42 *Muqaffā* i, 116; *Itti'āz* i, 271.

43 *Damas et la Syrie* i, 81.

Maghārība troops. Arms were distributed to the citizens and the shops of *sūqs* were closed.⁴⁴

The following day, the Fāṭimid army attacked the Bāb al-Ṣaghīr. Responding to Ibn al-Māward's appeal, the *aḥdāth* and the people (*ra'īyya*) rushed in arms to the gate and spread to the cemetery and the *sūq al-dawwāb* outside as far as the bridge over the Wādī Qulayṭ. The Maghārība, in retaliation, set fire to the mosque of al-Khiḍr in the cemetery⁴⁵ and the houses around it. Abū Maḥmūd advanced to the muṣallā (open space for prayer) outside the cemetery, ordering his men to penetrate into the cemetery to remove the citizens entrenched there. In the middle of intense fighting, a delegation of moderate notables, led by Abū l-Ḥasan b. Abī Hishām and Abū l-Qāsim al-ʿAqīqī (ʿAlid), went out of the gate of Bāb al-Jābiya to visit Abū Maḥmūd in the muṣallā, reaching an agreement with him in accepting a police force inside the walls on condition that he should retreat to al-Dikka (Dhū l-Ḥijja 363/September 974).⁴⁶

Once the police chief (*ṣāhib al-naẓar*, *ṣāhib al-shurṭa*), a Maghārība soldier, was allowed to enter the walls, he attempted to impose strict discipline in the city. A few weeks later, the *dhu'ār* and *aḥl al-shirra*, including a large number of refugees from the villages of the Ghūṭa, took advantage of the on-the-spot execution of an armed young dyer at the hands of the police chief to rise in arms. They expelled him and his men out of the walls and appealed to the citizens to gather in the Umayyad Mosque in arms. This time, the war lasted over six months (from Muḥarram to Rajab 364), in which new leaders of lower-class origin appeared, such as Ibn Shirāra (son of a spark), Ibn Būsharāt (son of a refuse woman) and Ibn al-Mughanniya (son of a female singer).⁴⁷ Among others, Ibn Shirāra is said to have been *ra'īs* of the organized *aḥl al-shirra*, which was divided into bands (*ḥizbs*). Each leader was in charge of the defense of a gate of the walls, commanding a band furnished with its own flags and bugles. Even catapults (*arrādas*) were placed on the gates. At this stage the organized *aḥl al-shirra* became little different from *shuṭṭār al-aḥdāth*.

Intense fighting continued to be exchanged day and night around the walls, especially the southwestern part between the gates of Bāb al-Ṣaghīr and Bāb al-Jābiya and the southeastern part between the gates of Bāb Sharqī (near the

44 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 8–9; *Muqaffā* i, 116.

45 For the mosques in and near the cemetery see Ibn ʿAsākir, i, 80.

46 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 8–9; *Ittiʿāz* i, 265; *Muqaffā* i, 116–7.

47 As Bianquis (*Damas et la Syrie* i, 83) said, these leaders were obviously of lower-class origin, for they were not called by *kunya*; instead each of them was called son of his mother (usually abject businesswoman), characteristic of the lower classes.

Christian quarter) and Bāb Kaysān (near the Jewish quarter) as well. Probably, Christians and Jews also participated in the defense.⁴⁸ The Fāṭimid army massacred the inhabitants of suburbs and estates (*ḍayʿas*) and threw fires inside the walls, burning down quarters (*ḥāras*) and blocks. Several times peace was concluded at the notable's initiative and new police chiefs were appointed, but each time peace was soon broken. The authority of notables was at its lowest ebb; the lower classes got the upper hand.⁴⁹

It seems that even Ibn al-Māward and Ibn Shirāra were unable to restrain *ahl al-shirra*. Abū Maḥmūd, for his part, made a decision to concentrate Fāṭimid attacks on *ahl al-shirra*, distinguishing them from the common people (*raʿīyya*). As a result of deteriorating famines and increasing depredations at the hands of *ahl al-shirra*, the notables succeeded in gathering support at the expense of Ibn al-Māward and Ibn Shirāra. The notables gathered the people in the Umayyad Mosque, persuading them to swear by the Qurʾān or the Bible not to molest Fāṭimid troops or officials inside the walls. Caliph al-Muʿizz, on his part, replaced Abū Maḥmūd by the eunuch Rayyān al-Khādīm, governor of Tripoli, in Rajab 364/April 975.⁵⁰ However, it seems that the acts of atrocity were still rife at the hands of hooligans (*ahl al-fasād, dhū l-ʿayth*).⁵¹

As Bianquis stressed, the notables tended to give priority to the restoration of order, even accepting Qarāmiṭa or Fāṭimid authority and the payment of a large amount of taxes, though their best choice should have been home-rule of their own. It is likely that not only the notables but also middle-class shopkeepers preferred peace and stability to disorder, being prepared to accept Egyptian rule, if necessary. On the other hand, many poor men, including recent immigrants and refugees, favored disorder or the order under their own control, in which they could find an abundant supply of opportunities.⁵² These activists outside the control of notables were called *ahl al-shirra* (the *dhuʿār* was a more general term connoting hooligans, looters or extorters), while plebeian militiamen organized in one way or another under the loose control of notables were called *aḥdāth*. However, Ibn al-Māward's *aḥdāth* undertook their

48 *Damas et la Syrie* i, 86. Generally speaking, the Christians and the Jews needed the protection of Muslim authority against possible depredations at the hands of Muslim mass. They joined their Muslim neighbors, besides obvious self-defense reasons against foreign invaders, to avert attacks from the *ahl al-shirra*.

49 *Muqaffā* i, 117–8, ii, 558; *Ittiʿāz* i, 265–6; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 9–10; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 166–7; *Tuhfa* 313–6.

50 *Muqaffā* i, 118–9; *Ittiʿāz* i, 266; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 10; *Tuhfa* 307.

51 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 12.

52 *Damas et la Syrie* i, 72, 80–1, 86.

own independent patrolling and the exaction of protection fees, often objecting to the peace proposed by notables, so they were called *shuṭṭār al-aḥdāth*.⁵³ Later, part of *ahl al-shirra* was more or less organized under their own leaders, making their difference with *shuṭṭār al-aḥdāth* superficial. This is the beginning of the transformation from a patrician-led to plebeian-led movement, which nearly resulted in the temporary formation of a plebeian city. It is probably the rise of the populace that hastened the notables to make peace with the Fāṭimids.

Notables' Recovery of Power in Alliance with a Foreign Military Leader

At this moment, the Damascene notables found an opportunity to bolster their power at the expense of Fāṭimid authority, taking advantage of the exile of Buwayhid Atrāk ('Turks') cavalrymen to Syria. During the siege of Damascus, a conflict between the Buwayhid *amīr al-umarā'* Bakhtiyār and his Atrāk cavalry of Khurāsāni-Central Asian origin was intensified, resulting in the latter's victory. The Atrāk, called *ghilmān* or even *ṭarkhāns*,⁵⁴ supported the new Abbasid caliph al-Ṭā'ī' (363–81/974–91), thereby joining the nascent Sunni camp, at the expense of the Shī'ī (Ithnā 'Ashari) Bakhtiyār.⁵⁵ At this moment, however, the Buwayhid *amīr* of Fārs, 'Aḍud al-Dawla (338–72/949–83), invaded Iraq, forcing the Atrāk cavalrymen, numbering three to four hundred, under their new leader Alptegin to flee Baghdad to Syria via al-Raḥba as far as Jawsiya south of Ḥims.⁵⁶

At the request of the Damascenes, Alptegin, who was seeking a new paymaster, entered Damascus in Sha'bān 364/May 975, after the Fāṭimid governor Rayyān had escaped for Tripoli before an impending Byzantine attack under the command of Emperor John Tzimisce (969–76). Even if Ibn al-Māward was the first to invite Alptegin to oust the Fāṭimid army,⁵⁷ it is the notables

53 For similar arguments see Havemann, *Ri'āsa* 139–40.

54 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 11. A *ṭarkhān* was a superintendent of war horses in the Türk Empire of Central Asia during the sixth-to-eighth centuries.

55 For important comments on the Atrāk cavalrymen and *ghilmān* of this age see Kennedy, *The Prophet* 206–8, 224–6.

56 Miskawayh, ii, 317–43; Yahyā, *Ta'rikh al-Anṭākī* 154–7, 161; *Itti'āz* i, 269–70; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 167–9; *Wāfi* xxvii, 369. Alptegin is often misspelled as Haftakīn in printed editions (Alpethgān in Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography* 174–5). A *tegin* or *tigin* was a son or brother of *khāns* (emperors) in the Türk Empire.

57 For 'at the request of Ibn al-Māward,' see *Itti'āz* i, 270; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 169.

(*shuyūkh, ashraf*) who made a bilateral contract with him. Alptegin swore to give the Damascenes his protection (*himāya*) from Fāṭimid attacks and the atrocities of hooligans in return for their allegiance and upkeep of his soldiers. The caliph's name mentioned in *khuṭbas* (sermons in the Friday service) was also restored to Abbasid caliphs. Alptegin, after restoring order inside the walls, prevented Bedouin inroads into the peripheries of the Ghūṭa, while reconfirming their traditional right of *iqṭā'* (probably usufruct of some pastures and fallow grounds inside the Ghūṭa). He also occupied the Biqā' as far as Ba'labakk, ousting the 'Uqayli chief Zālim, to restore Damascene rule of its *a'māl* in its entirety.⁵⁸ When John Tzimisce advanced from Ba'labakk to Damascus with a formidable army including former Muslim mujahidin from Ṭarsūs, Alptegin, together with Damascene notables (*ashraf, shuyūkh*) and Ibn al-Māward, sought for an interview with him outside the walls. He managed to make a truce (*hudna*) with the emperor, promising the payment of annual tribute. He even succeeded in persuading the emperor to arrest Ibn al-Māward.⁵⁹

It was the citizens who persuaded Alptegin to resist Fāṭimid forces by promising their unlimited assistance and unsparing efforts, for there were a lot of chances for Alptegin to enter the service of the Fāṭimids or the Byzantines. This is a kind of the *a'yān-amīr system* with a strong touch of patrician domination, just like the short-term rule of Ṣāliḥ b. 'Umayr, who had also been invited by the Damascenes. Later, when a Fāṭimid army laid siege to Damascus, Alptegin gathered notables, saying, "You know that I did not become arbitrator of your quarrels or executor of your decisions unless you urged me to accept. It is beyond my power to deal with this sultan (al-'Azīz)'s pursuit. I'm willing to leave your country and enter Byzantine land to seek some place to settle in and secure what I need." The Damascenes recognized that they had put their affairs under his charge on condition that he could freely leave the city.⁶⁰

Alptegin secured an alliance with the Qarāmiṭa of Baḥrayn to stem the Fāṭimid army advancing from al-Ramla under the command of Abū Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm. While al-Ḥasan al-A'ṣam chased the Fāṭimid army to Jaffa, Alptegin turned north, taking over Sidon (Ṣaydā) and Acre ('Akkā) from the Fāṭimids. However, he and al-Ḥasan had to retreat to Damascus and Baḥrayn,

58 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 11–2; Yaḥyā, 162; *Itti'āz* i, 270–1; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 169–70; *Tuḥfa* 308.

59 Yaḥyā, 162–3; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 12–4; *Itti'āz* i, 271; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 171; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography* 174–5 (*Ta'riḫ al-zamān* 68). Soon afterwards, the Byzantines became riven with civil wars; they were prevented from intervening in Syrian affairs, mainly due to the revolt of Bardas Sclerus lasting from 976 up to 989.

60 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 15–6.

respectively, before the advance of a formidable Fāṭimid army dispatched from Egypt by the new caliph al-ʿAzīz (365–86/975–96), under the command of Jawhar (the conqueror of Egypt). Alptegin ordered the transportation of cereals from Ḥawrān and al-Bathaniyya to Damascus in preparation for an imminent siege. Then Jawhar arrived at Dārayyā in the Ghūṭa in Dhū l-Qaʿda 365/August 976 and began digging trenches around the camp of his forces. Zālim b. Mawhūb also joined Jawhar.⁶¹

Under this mounting pressure “Alptegin gathered *ḥummāl al-silāḥ* from the city (*balad*), reassuring *shuṭṭār* and *dhuʿār* that he would not molest them. Among them nobody was more courageous than Qassām. He was a notorious veteran chief (*raʿīs*) of the *ḥummāl al-silāḥ* composed of *shuṭṭār* and *dhuʿār*. Therefore, in fighting with Jawhar, Alptegin commanded the *dhuʿār* who had assembled, paying a stipend (*riṣq*) to their chief (*kabīr*) Qassām. Mobilization orders were issued from the pulpits in the Umayyad and other mosques, and they made sorties, resulting in fierce battles with Jawhar’s men.”⁶²

It is said that Qassām was an Arab of the tribe of al-Ḥārith b. Kaʿb (a subtribe of the Yemenite Madhḥij), coming from Talfitā, a village of the Anti-Lebanon. He lived by carrying off dust and waste on a donkey (*tarrāb, zabbāl, saqqāṭ*).⁶³ If true, he would have belonged to the lower classes of the *aʿmāl* of Damascus. He first distinguished himself in the band (*ḥizb*) of *aḥdāth* under the command of Aḥmad b. al-Justār (Qusṭār? a village chief in charge of raising taxes).⁶⁴ Eventually, Qassām organized his own band, recruiting his men from the villages of the Ghūṭa.⁶⁵

The fighting lasted for five months. As winter set in Fāṭimid provisions and funds were nearly depleted amid heavy snows. Moreover, the octogenarian al-Ḥasan al-Aʿṣam’s arrival at the request of Alptegin obliged Jawhar to retreat to al-Ramla and then to Ascalon (ʿAsqalān), where he endured a seventeen-month siege before his humiliating surrender. Thereupon, Caliph al-ʿAzīz himself took the field, and after incorporating the Ṭayyʾ tribesmen under the Jarrāḥid leadership, inflicted a crushing defeat on the combined forces of

61 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 15–6; *Ittiʿāz* i, 284–5; *Muqaffā* i, 119–20, ii, 552–3; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 175–7.

62 Ibn al-Dawādārī, 177; *Ittiʿāz* i, 285 (*aḥdāth* instead of the first *ḥummāl al-silāḥ* that appears in translation); *Muqaffā* ii, 553.

63 A contemporary Jacobite doctor, Jūrjis b. Yūḥannā al-Yabrūdī of Yabrūd north of Damascus, followed an early career similar to Qassām’s. He used to carry bushes to Damascus on a donkey for sale. One day he met a doctor inside the gate of Bāb Tūmā, opening his career. Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, iii, 234.

64 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 26–7; *Ittiʿāz* i, 297; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 195–6; Ibn ʿAsākir, Beirut, ii, 324; *Tuhfa* 317–8; *Wāfi* xxiv, 242–3. For *qusṭār* see *Damas et la Syrie* i, 118, note 1 (citing Jean Maspero).

65 *Ittiʿāz* i, 296; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 209.

Alptegin and al-Ḥasan at Birkat al-Khayzurān near al-Ramla in Muḥarram 368/August 978, forcing the Qarāmiṭa to make peace (on condition that the caliph would guarantee them an annual subsidy) and return to al-Ḥasa'.⁶⁶ As for Alptegin, he was captured alongside his Atrāk and sent to Egypt, being taken into Fāṭimid service. However, Fāṭimid rule of Palestine was still precarious, for the caliph had to give the governorship of Palestine to the unreliable Jarrāhid al-Mufarraj b. Daghfal.⁶⁷

The Damascene notables succeeded in containing the rising power of plebeians by inviting Alptegin as arbitrator-condottiere, having him consistently decline the Fāṭimid offer to invest him with the governorship of Damascus.⁶⁸ From the standpoint of the notables, the Atrāk were no more than mercenaries; however, Alptegin, who enjoyed an unlimited term of office and whose authority was not bound by written laws, could potentially exercise power stronger than that of podestàs (chief magistrates of foreign origin in medieval northern Italian cities). The disappearance of Alptegin and a delay of the arrival of Fāṭimid forces left Damascus in the hands of the citizens, resulting in a struggle between the notables and the populace.

Formation of a Plebeian City

In Alptegin's absence, Qassām's power prevailed in Damascus, overpowering both the notables and Alptegin's deputy Tegin (left behind with some Atrāk cavalrymen) and exacting *khifāras* (protection fees) from the villagers of the Ghūṭa at will. His men were variously called *aḥdāth*, *shuṭṭār*, *ghawghā*, *aḥl al-shirra* and *'ayyārūn*. They were organized and furnished with their characteristic sign of *qihfs* (woolen bonnets, shovels or wooden bowls?)⁶⁹ imprinted on flags and cuirasses. In order to avert further Fāṭimid assaults, Qassām gathered the citizens in the Umayyad Mosque, persuading them to accept Fāṭimid suzerainty in return for the exemption of taxes.

The successive Fāṭimid governors sent by al-'Azīz with small detachments for the next three years failed to exercise their power; the first one, the 'Uqaylid

66 According to Ibn al-Qalānīsī, al-Ḥasan died after returning to al-Ḥasa'. Maqrīzī and Ibn al-Dawādārī made him die at al-Ramla, soon after his arrival there. Canard, al-Ḥasan al-Aṣam, in *ET*², iii, 246.

67 *Ittī'āz* i, 285–8; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 179–80, 187–9; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 16–21; Yahyā, 179–81; *Tuhfa* 309; *Wāfi* xxvii, 369.

68 Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 12, 15–6, 18.

69 Dozy, *Supplément* ii, 318; *Damas et la Syrie* i, 118.

Ḥumaydān b. Jawwāsh, was dominated by Qassām, finally being forced out of Damascus, and the third one, Salmān, son of Jaʿfar b. Falāḥ, was humiliatingly dismissed at the request of Qassām before he could ever enter the walled city from his camp,⁷⁰ because he attempted to ban the bearing of arms and the exaction of *khifāra*. The second and fourth governor, Abū Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm, refrained from intervening in the affairs within the walls, devoting himself to the rehabilitation of villages in Ḥawrān and al-Bathaniyya, which had been depredated by the Fazāra and the Murra. The last one, Abū Maḥmūd's nephew, Jaysh b. al-Ṣamṣāma, was governor only in name.

During Abū Maḥmūd's governorship, Qassām succeeded in repelling the Ḥamdānid prince of Mosul, Abū Taghlib, who had crossed the Syrian Desert from al-Raḥba after his banishment from Mosul at the hands of ʿAḍud al-Dawla and settled in the village of al-Mizza in the Ghūṭa for several months, seeking his investment as governor of Damascus from al-ʿAzīz.⁷¹ Qassām was also closely associated with the Fāṭimid Jewish intendant in charge of the stipends of troops, named Manashā b. al-Furār (Qazzāz?),⁷² freely corresponding with al-ʿAzīz in letters, hence Bianquis' suggestion of a possible favor given to Qassām by the Fāṭimid ex-Jewish *wazīr*, Yaʿqūb b. Killis.⁷³ For more than five years Qassām secured support in the assembly held in the Umayyad Mosque at the expense of notables and even managed to place the chief tax collector (*ʿāmil al-kharāj*) under his control. It is said that he was even called king of the people (*malik al-rijāl*) or king of Damascus; he and his important men lived in large houses. Damascus then was no less than a plebeian city.⁷⁴

Al-ʿAzīz had tolerated Qassām's rule of Damascus for a long while, for he lost confidence in the capability of his Kutāma troops on the one hand,⁷⁵ and he judged that Qassām could be useful as a buffer against ʿAḍud al-Dawla's future advance to Syria on the other.⁷⁶ In Damascus, however, Qassām's decisions met with increasingly greater opposition from not only notables, but also the

70 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 21–5; *Ittiʿāz* i, 291–6; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 190–6; *Tuhfa* 314–9.

71 After leaving Damascus Abū Taghlib invaded Palestine. He was defeated, captured, then executed near al-Ramla by a Fāṭimid army and the Ṭayy' under the command of al-Mufarraǰ b. Daghfal. Ibn al-Qalānisi, 22–3; *Ittiʿāz* i, 293; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 193–5; Miskawayh, ii, 402–3.

72 Probably he was identical with Menasse b. Ibrāhīm al-Qazzāz of the Jewish sources, later administrator of Damascus. For Menasse see Mann, *The Jews in Egypt* i, 19–21.

73 *Damas et la Syrie* i, 147.

74 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 21–3, 25; *Ittiʿāz* i, 291–6; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 190–3, 195–6, 206, 209–10; *Tuhfa* 314–9; Miskawayh, ii, 401–2.

75 *Ittiʿāz* i, 286–7.

76 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 23.

populace (*jumhūr, ra'īyya*). By the death of 'Aḍud al-Dawla (372/983), al-'Azīz had built up a considerable corps of Atrāk cavalymen. Finally, he dispatched large Kutāma-Atrāk expeditionary forces under the command of Iltegin, one of Alptegin's Atrāk *ghulāms*, into Syria. Manashā attempted to persuade Qassām to make a spontaneous surrender, but Qassām turned down this proposal, gathering militiamen from the Ghūṭa and posting fighters and catapults on the gates. The siege began in Muḥarram 373/June–July 983; suburbs were inflamed and the fighting was concentrated before the gates. Popular support for Qassām was rapidly dwindling; it is especially his attempt to ban plunders that alienated his followers. He hid his wife and children in the synagogue of al-Baṭṭāṭīn, suggesting his friendly relationship with the Jews. After eight days of fighting, the notables (*mashā'ikh*) forced Qassām to agree to a capitulation, sending a delegation to Iltegin to sue for peace. The houses of Qassām and his right-hand men were occupied by the citizens who had lost theirs in fire. Qassām hid himself but two days later delivered himself to Manashā. He was sent to Egypt, but eventually set free.⁷⁷

Damascus finally came under Fāṭimid rule. Qassām's fall, however, did not mean the disappearance of *aḥdāth* or *ahl al-shirra*, for Iltegin was indulgent to them. Besides, the notables' fierce spirit of home rule might create the second Alptegin in the person of his former colleague, Iltegin. Moreover, a discord that arose between al-'Azīz and his *wazīr* Ya'qūb b. Killis cast a long shadow on Damascus; al-'Azīz alienated Iltegin, Ya'qūb's favorite. At that moment, one of Sayf al-Dawla's *ghilmān*, Begchūr (Bakjūr) 'the Circassian,' then ruler of Ḥimṣ and former ruler of Aleppo,⁷⁸ asked al-'Azīz for his investment as governor of Damascus, undertaking the conquest of Aleppo for the Fāṭimids. Al-'Azīz, who favored the forward policy, replaced Iltegin by Begchūr five months after the fall of Damascus. Begchūr (373–8/984–8) had the Jewish manager (*wakīl*) of Ya'qūb's estates in Damascus killed, confiscating those estates. More importantly, it is said that he massacred three thousand *aḥdāth* to nip future autonomy in the bud.⁷⁹

77 Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 25–6; *Ittī'āz* i, 296–7; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 205–9; *Tuḥfa* 314, 321, 323; Yaḥyā, 200.

78 Begchūr al-Kāsakī was a Circassian (Kashak in Georgian) *ghulam*. Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubda* 99; Kennedy, *The Prophet* 283. For his early career in Aleppo see Canard, *Histoire de la dynastie des Hamdanides* i, 681–90. For his role as ruler of Ḥimṣ see *Damas et la Syrie* i, 125–6, 133, 135. He rehabilitated agriculture in the region and maintained communications with Damascus to provide the city with food.

79 *Ittī'āz* i, 296–7; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 205–9; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 25–6; *Tuḥfa* 314, 321, 323; Yaḥyā, 201; Ibn 'Asākīr, Beirut, x, 375–6; Rüdhrāwarī, 209.

Many *aḥdāth* survived, however. In 378/988 Ya‘qūb b. Killis finally managed to replace Begchūr by a Ṣaḡālība eunuch, Munīr al-Khādīm, and had Manashā persuade Begchūr to make a voluntary capitulation.⁸⁰ In due course, Munīr followed a conciliatory policy toward Aleppo and the Byzantines. Soon after Ya‘qūb’s death however, al-‘Azīz revived his forward policy in Syria, dismissing Munīr in 381/991. Munīr raised an open rebellion, gathering *aḥdāth* and *ḥummāl al-silāh*. It is a leading notable, Ibn Abī Hishām, who wrote to Mengütegin,⁸¹ an Atrāk commander dispatched from Egypt, to hasten his march to Damascus and handed over the city to him, for he had dreaded the rehabilitation of *aḥdāth* and the inflammation of the city.⁸² Schematically saying, Begchūr and Mengütegin were al-‘Azīz’ partisans, expansionists, centralists and anti-*aḥdāth* in contrast to Iltegin and Munīr.

Qassām’s old *aḥdāth* had shrunk by this time, but there was an abundant supply of *ahl al-shirra* and *ḥummāl al-silāh*, who would be easily recruited to form new *aḥdāths*. Following the failure of Mengütegin’s several attempts to seize Aleppo before the arrival of Byzantine reinforcements in Syria (commanded by Emperor Basil II (976–1025) himself in 385/995), the lower-class people of Damascus seized another chance to rise in arms, taking advantage of a discord between the governor of Damascus and the power holder in Cairo. This time an Ifrīqī Arab commander, al-Ḥasan b. ‘Ammār (belonging to the Kalbi dynasty, rulers of Sicily⁸³), seized power during Caliph al-Ḥākim’s (386–411/996–1021) childhood and favored Kutāma troops at the expense of the Atrāk, inducing Mengütegin’s revolt. After Mengütegin was routed by the Egyptian army under the command of Salmān b. Ja‘far b. Falāḥ at Ascalon in 387/997 and hastened back to Damascus, a large number of the *‘amma* including the villagers of the region of Hijjāna in the Ghūṭa, mainly *ḥummāl al-silāh* and *ahl al-shirra*, prevented his entry. They seized this opportunity to loot his house and treasuries (*khazā’in*). Then they attempted to resist the Fāṭimid army too. It is the notables (*shuyūkh, ashraf*) again under the leadership of the ‘Alid leader (*naqīb*) Mūsā b. Ismā‘īl who persuaded them to lay down arms and surrender the city.⁸⁴

80 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 30–1; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 220–2; *Itti‘āz* i, 298–9; *Wāfi* x, 202.

81 Manjūtākīn in Ibn ‘Asākīr, Beirut, lx, 278; Rūdhrawārī, 217; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography* 179 (*Ta’riḫ al-zamān* 72). Probably, not Yankūtākīn (*Tuḥfa* 327).

82 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 40; Yahyā, 221; *Itti‘āz* i, 303; Ibn al-Dawādārī, 232; *Tuḥfa* 325–6.

83 Brett, *The Rise of the Fatimids* 242, 315, 320; Walker, *Caliph of Cairo* 28–9.

84 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 45–8; *Itti‘āz* i, 328–30; *Muqaḥḥā* ii, 559; Yahyā, 238–9; *Tuḥfa* 320, 322, 326–7; Rūdhrawārī, 223–4.

Several months later within the same year (387/997), on hearing of the fall of al-Ḥasan b. ‘Ammār at the hands of the eunuch Barjawān the populace of Damascus joined the mutiny of Mashāriqa (Atrāk and Daylamite) troops, killing Maghāriba troops and ousting the governor Salmān. Then many *raʿīs* of the *aḥdāth* divided the quarters (*maḥāll*) of Damascus among themselves, levying *khifāra* and seizing the properties of the rich. Their top leader was called al-Duhayqayn (probably little *dihqān*, that is a small farmer),⁸⁵ suggesting his rural origin from the Ghūṭa. Jaysh b. al-Ṣamṣāma was dispatched as new governor, but he lagged in al-Ramla for some time, waiting for a change of mind on the part of the Damascenes. Eventually, he was welcomed by the notables and several *raʿīs* of the *aḥdāth*, but he cautiously settled in Bayt Lahyā outside the gate of Bāb Tūmā (Dhū l-Qaʿda 388/November 998). There he murdered twelve *raʿīs* including al-Duhayqayn whom he had invited to dinner as usual; simultaneously, his soldiers massacred 1,000 (or 3,000) *aḥdāth* from the walled city, the Ghūṭa and Marj ‘Adhrā’ (pastureland northeast of the Ghūṭa). Henceforth, a police force was posted inside the walls and 500,000 dinars was imposed on the citizens. This was another *aḥdāth* rule, lasting a little over one year.⁸⁶ Jaysh was known as repressive due to his extermination of *aḥdāth* and efficient control of Damascus. It seems that Damascene attempts at home rule, either patrician or plebeian, largely came to an end at this point.

Qassām’s rule was rather broadly-based and moderate, gathering notables in the Umayyad Mosque, ‘consulting’ and persuading them, while recognizing Fāṭimid suzerainty and nominally accepting Fāṭimid governors. He even banned plunders during the siege, alienating most hooligans. Al-Duhayqayn also might have followed this example. They attempted to restrain rampant atrocities at the hands of hooligans, while they extorted *khifāra* from the intramural city and, if possible, the villages of the Ghūṭa too to feed their *aḥdāth*. It seems that their rule secured a certain support from the middle classes and managed to make a compromise with the notables.

Damascene *aḥdāth* did not disappear after al-Duhayqayn, however. In 410/1020 unorganized *aḥdāth*, together with the lower classes (*raʿāʿ*) of Ḥawrān, rose in arms under a butcher (*jazzār*), named Muḥammad b. Abī Ṭālib, ostensibly in support of the popular governor of Damascus, ‘Abd al-Raḥīm (or ‘Abd al-Raḥmān) b. Ilyās, al-Ḥākim’s cousin and heir presumptive, who was about to be deposed on suspicion of sedition. They continued to fight the Fāṭimid garrison until they ousted them out of the walls, even killing the *qāḍī* and many notables. Finally, the upper- and middle-class citizens (*ahl al-salāma*)

85 Cahan, *Mouvements populaires* 5, 236; Havemann, *Non-urban Rebels* 89.

86 Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 49–54; *Ittiʿāz* i, 333–5, 343–4; Yahyā, 240–1; Rūdhrawārī, 224–30.

succeeded in opening the gate of Bāb Sharqī to the Fāṭimid army and arresting Ibn Abī Ṭālib.⁸⁷

The *raʿīs al-balad* who reappeared in the late eleventh century were notables and were moreover appointed as salaried dignitaries in charge of security and the levying of some commercial dues by the city's monarchs (the Seljuqs, Būrīds and Zangīds). They played the role of *ṣāhib al-shurṭa* and *muḥtasibs*, using *aḥdāth* as their men. This *aḥdāth* fought foreign enemies as auxiliaries to professional cavalries. The post of *raʿīs* was virtually hereditary in the hands of first the Ṣūfis and then the Tamīmīs who were often invested with the vizierate also.⁸⁸ Therefore, their activities were not necessarily civic or popular movements, though possibly they might have established some home rule in case of the total collapse of monarchical power.

In Ikhshīdid Damascus of the mid-tenth century class struggles between notables and part of the lower classes called *aḥdāth* or *awbāsh* were reported, with the craftsmen and traders of *sūqs* siding with the former. Soon notables, under their own leaders called *raʿīs*, sought virtual autonomy, leading an armed resistance to the Egyptian powers of Ikhshīdid and then Fāṭimid dynasties as well as the Qarāmiṭa. On the whole, the middle and lower classes joined this resistance under their leadership. Particularly, the Fāṭimids shaped a principle to entrust the fund-raising to Syrian expeditionary forces themselves, resulting in Kutāma troops' tendency to loot Damascus and the villages of the Ghūṭa as well as caravans. Apart from their short attempt at founding a patrician city under the *raʿīs* Ibn Abī Ya'lā (969–70) after the extinction of Ikhshīdid rule, the notables had to invite first an 'Uqaylid Bedouin chief, Ṣāliḥ b. 'Umayr (968–9), then an ex-Buwayhid Atrāk commander, Alptegin (975–8), as hired *amīrs*.

The craftsmen of Islamic cities lacked guilds and the opportunities of military training. However, Damascus had an abundant supply of militiamen from young men of the middle and lower classes, not only craftsmen, traders, day laborers and hooligans inside and outside the walls, but also the villagers and carriers of the Ghūṭa and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. Especially the lower classes were an important source of improvised footmen, often called *aḥdāth*

87 Yahyā, 351–2; Sibṭ, xii, 78 (ed. Rassi, 166–7); Ibn 'Asākir, Damascus, xlii, 166–8; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 70; Dhahabī, 401–420AH, 278–9; Bianquis, *Damas et la Syrie* i, 379–83; Harris, *Lebanon* 45–7.

88 Havemann, *Ri'āsa* 86–91, 125–42, 157–8; Cahen, *Mouvements populaires* 5, 237–9, 245–6. For the concurrent holding of the offices of *raʿīs* and *wazīr* see Mouton, *Damas et sa principauté* 203–7, 231–7; Havemann, *The Vizier and the Ra'is in Seljuq Syria*, *IJMES* 21 (1989), 233–42.

or *shabāb*. They tenaciously fought foreign intruders on the one hand, and often turned to looting, theft and extortion on the other. On the contrary, the notables, and to a lesser extent the middle classes also, did have a tendency to make a compromise with the Fāṭimids in fear of damages inflicted on their properties. So, Ashtor was roughly right in his remarks that the haute bourgeoisie relatively favored Fāṭimid rule, but his ascription of their motives to international trade interest is unacceptable (except for the cases of Tyr and Tripoli).

At first the notables and their leaders, *raʿīs*, managed to prevail over *aḥdāth*. However, during the long second Fāṭimid siege (974–5) *aḥdāth* were organized in bands under their own leaders. They even attempted to maintain order through private patrolling. Their top leader called himself *raʿīs*, seizing the title of leaders of notables. *Aḥdāth* were called *shuṭṭār* when they were beyond the control of notables. The unorganized mob was even more despised and feared by notables as *ḥummāl al-silāḥ*, *ahl al-shirra*, *ʿayyārūn*, *zuʿār* and *ghawghāʿ*.

Ibn al-Māward, the first popular *raʿīs* of *aḥdāth*, who began to prevail over notables during the second Fāṭimid siege, was eventually eliminated by Alptegin who had been invited to Damascus by its notables. However, even Alptegin and the notables needed the help of the lower and middle classes, paving the way for the comeback of *aḥdāth* and their *raʿīs*. After the fall of Alptegin at the hand of a Fāṭimid army, the new *aḥdāth* leader, Qassām, from the Anti-Lebanon, virtually ruled Damascus at the expense of Fāṭimid governors and notables (978–83). During his rule his *aḥdāth* became a rather regular army, being paid from the *khifāra* exacted from the people; in return private extortion and plundering were banned. However, the support that the lower classes gave to him quickly evaporated upon a fresh Fāṭimid siege. Only Fāṭimid internal squabbles facilitated the second formation of plebeian domination under the *raʿīs* al-Duhayqayn (997–8).

During a relatively short period of time Damascus experienced several forms of polity, following a similar course of medieval north Italian autonomous cities (*comunes*) from the eleventh to thirteenth century; a typical *comune* transformed from a patrician oligarchy electing many short-term consuls to an oligarchy of delegating authority to a chosen, salaried *podestà* of foreign noble origin, and then to the establishment of a parallel government of the *popolo* (people) alongside the old patrician government with the reins in the hands of the former (the *capitano del popolo* and other leaders were of rich plebeian origin). Finally, the republican system collapsed with the rise of tyrants (*signori*) often of *condottiere* origin, who were equipped with standing armies and were widely supported by the populace. The main differences between Damascus and *comunes* are the facts that the patrician leaders of Damascus were not elected and that its popular leaders were men of poor plebeian origin.

Besides, the notable-friendly Šāliḥ and Alptegin had their own cavalries and were potentially more powerful than *podestàs*, but they surrendered to strong centralized states before becoming tyrants or monarchs.

The fundamental reason why Damascene autonomy did not last long should not be ascribed to the characteristics of 'Asian society,' but to the existence of strong centralized states nearby, equipped with efficient professional cavalries. If these strong states had been nonexistent, patrician oligarchy would no doubt have survived much longer, developing their own militias and bureaucracy. A secondary reason of the failure of autonomy is the lack of military tradition among both patricians and the populace in contrast to northern Italian cities comprising many feudal lords (knights) as well as the militarized bourgeois; the Arab conquerors' military tradition probably survived little even among notables. The organization of the middle classes were less developed than those of the lower classes, facilitating the seizure of power by the leaders of organized *aḥdāth*, largely due to the lack of guilds and the lack of cohesion on the part of the citizens. So, the old theories of Islamic society are not totally off the point.

Around the turn of the eleventh century, similar resistance against outside powers was observed in other Syrian cities too. It seems that resistance was initially led by men of the middle and lower classes, but soon notables (traders in coastal Syria) seized the initiative. In 359/970 the Ḥamdānid prince of Mosul, Abū Taghlib, had to go on an expedition himself to squash a revolt of the people of Ḥarrān including *aḥdāth*.⁸⁹ In 388/998 the people of Tyr called *aḥdāth* joined an anti-Fāṭimid revolt launched by a sailor (*mallāḥ*) named 'Allāqa, appealing to the Byzantines for help.⁹⁰ In Tinnīs, a port city of Egypt famous for the production of linen textiles, an anti-Fāṭimid popular uprising occurred in 361/972.⁹¹ This movement culminated in the renouncement of Fāṭimid suzerainty and the establishment of virtual city-republics by rich *qāḍīs*, Ibn Abī 'Aqīl and Ibn 'Ammār, in Tyr and Tripoli in 462/1070.⁹² The last cases indicate the soundness of Kennedy's remarks that the Fāṭimid use of naval power to control Syria, coupled with rising Amalfitan trade, led to the beginnings of a revival in the fortunes of coastal cities and traders.⁹³

89 Ibn al-Athīr, viii, 608–9.

90 Yahyā, 240–1; *Ittī'āz* i, 335; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 50.

91 *Ittī'āz* i, 199–200.


92 Havemann, *Ri'āsa* 106–7, 142–4, 149, 168; Éddé et al., *Les autonomismes urbaines des cités islamiques* 101–3.

93 Kennedy, *The Prophet* 328; Harris, *Lebanon* 47–8.

Aleppo during the Eleventh to Early Twelfth Centuries

Introduction

Aleppo (Ar. Ḥalab, Gr. Beroia) has continued to be the metropolis of northern inland Syria since the Yamkhad kingdom (1780–1595 BCE), located in the middle of a vast, fertile plain producing wheat, olive, fig, grape, pistachio and cotton. Besides, it has been situated in a strategic position between Iraq, Iran and the Indian Ocean on the one hand, and Anatolia, Greece, Italy and the Mediterranean on the other. Its location on the borders between the Mediterranean agricultural zone and nomadic steppes has given it access to an abundant supply of crops and sheep, but at the same time exposed the peripheries of its agricultural zone to the encroachments of nomads,



MAP 3 *Aleppo City*

notably the Bedouin Tanūkh during fifth to sixth centuries who founded their settlement (*ḥāḍīr*) outside the encircling walls of Aleppo.¹ In a similar way, during Abbasid decline in the first half of the tenth century, a number of Bedouin tribesmen, mainly Kilābis, advanced on Aleppo.

Early Islamic Aleppo inherited the nearly square Roman walls, but converted the Roman *forum*² into the great mosque similar to the Umayyad mosque of Damascus, covered with mosaics and marbles, during the caliphates of Walid I and Sulaymān. The 20–25 meter-wide, porticoed decumanus extending roughly one kilometer gradually transformed into a few narrow, parallel lanes, forming the covered markets (*sūqs*). However, it is not known when Roman orthogonal streets were transformed to medieval Islamic winding, narrow alleys. The rocky eminence rising steeply at the easternmost end of these *sūqs* was fortified under Seleucid rule as a citadel (later *qal'a*) and encircled by walls since the mid-tenth century, in which palaces, administrative offices and barracks were established. It is at the turn of the thirteenth century that new walls were constructed to the east of the citadel to double the area of the intramural city.³

The realization of civic autonomy in Aleppo lagged behind Damascus, despite the almost simultaneous rise of notables in political influence and the subsequent establishment of the *a'yān-amīr* system during the later tenth century. However, this trend was interrupted in Aleppo by its ruler Maṣṣūr's attempt to restore autocracy and the Bedouin Mirdāsīd conquest of the city. Patrician domination was realized only at the end of the eleventh century before the Seljuq conquest under a *ra'īs*, and then in the 1120's after the Seljuq loss of power under a *qāḍī*. The Christians were very numerous up to the beginning of the twelfth century, continuing to play an important role in the bureaucracy and civic movements. Among Muslims, the Shī'īs almost rivaled the Sunnis in number and influence.

1 Ibn al-'Adīm, *Bughya* i, 562–3.

2 Before the Arab conquest, the *forum* had been converted into gardens and a cemetery attached to the neighboring cathedral of St. Helen. Ibn Shaddād, *A'lāq* i, part 1, 30–1, 123.

3 For detailed accounts of historical topography and architecture of Aleppo see Sauvaget, *Alep* 33–67 (Hellenistic, Roman and Byzantine), 68–108 (early Islam); Ḥalab, in *Er*², iii, 85; Gaube and Wirth, *Aleppo* i, 59–221 (from thirteenth to eighteenth centuries). For surviving monuments see also Burns, *Monuments of Syria* 28–44.

As for the sources, many contemporary local accounts of upheavals like Byzantine raids, Türkmen immigration, Seljuq advance, and the incursions and settlement of crusaders are lost⁴ except the geography of Ibn Ḥawqal of Nisibis (Ar. Naṣībīn), northeastern Jazīra (on the Turkish side of Qamishliye), the history of an Antiochian Melkite doctor, Yaḥyā b. Sa'īd, and a summarized history of Syria written by a notable of Aleppo, al-'Aẓīmī. However, many scattering, nearly contemporary accounts are preserved in later compilations, both local and world histories, written by Ibn al-Qalānisī of Damascus, Ibn al-Athīr of Mosul (555–630/1160–1233), Ibn al-'Adīm of Aleppo (588–660/1192–1262) and Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī (581–654/1185–1256) of Baghdad, then Damascus (based on the chronicles written by Baghdadi bureaucrats, Hilāl al-Ṣābi and his son, Ghars al-Ni'ma). Particularly, a biographical dictionary of Aleppines, *Bughyat al-ṭalab*, compiled by Ibn al-'Adīm, though only approximately a third of the whole is preserved, comprises a tremendous amount of nearly contemporary accounts.⁵ The histories of Aleppo written by Ibn Abī Ṭayyī' (575–630/1180–1233), a Shī'ī notable of Aleppo, were also dissipated, but are partly preserved in the historical geography of Ibn Shaddād (613–84/1217–85) and the world history of Ibn al-Furāt (735–807/1334–1405).

The *a'yān-amīr* System and the Beginning of Aleppine Civic Movements

Taking advantage of Abbasid decline at the turn of the tenth century, Bedouins began incursions into the peripheries of the agricultural zone ranging from Syria to Jazīra and Mosul in alliance with the Qarāmiṭa, converting them into pastures and exacting fees in return for 'protection.' They were of promiscuous tribal origin, but they were coalesced into the Kilāb in northern Syria, the Numayr in western Jazīra (Ḥarrān and Edessa) and the 'Uqayl in Mosul region.⁶ As opposed to them, Taghlibi tribesmen seem to have been older

4 For a survey of lost sources see Cahen, *La Syrie du nord* 40–3; Dahan, The Origin and Development of the Local Histories, in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. B. Lewis and P.M. Holt, 111–3; Zakkar, *The Emirate of Aleppo* 15–21.

5 Édde surveys a large number of the sources utilized in the *Bughya* on Sayf al-Dawla's reign. Édde, *Les sources d'Ibn al-'Adīm*, in *Texts, Documents and Artefacts*, ed. C.F. Robinson, 121–56.

6 Ibn Ḥawqal, *Ṣūrat* 228. General accounts, Zakkar, *The Emirate* 71–2; Kennedy, *The Prophet* 289–91; The Uqaylids of Mosul in *Actas del XII congreso de la U.E.A.I.*, 391–402; Heidemann, *Die Renaissance der Städte* 29–144 (a monumental account based on not only written sources, but also archeological and numismatic data).

inhabitants in eastern Jazīra; they produced Ḥamdānid leaders during a disturbance in Sāmarrā and submitted to the resurgent Abbasids in 283/896. After the Ḥamdānid governor of Mosul, Nāṣir al-Dawla (317–56/929–67), solidified his rule of the region, his brother Sayf al-Dawla succeeded in seizing Aleppo in cooperation with the Kilāb in 333/944. Thereafter he, as governor of northern Syria and Jazīra, undertook the defense of Thughūr, the frontier land with the Byzantines, almost singlehandedly.⁷

The Ḥamdānid state was a centralized, bureaucratic state despite its alliance with the Kilāb and other Arab and Kurdish tribesmen. It seems that Sayf al-Dawla's army was mainly composed of *ghilmān* cavalymen of Caucasian-Central Asian origin and Daylamite infantrymen, paid from the tax revenues collected by the Persian *wazīr* Abū l-Ḥasan al-Maghribī, once an official of the Abbasid bureau for collecting taxes from the western provinces (*dīwān al-maghrib*).⁸ Sayf al-Dawla himself built his magnificent palace on the Quwayq river in al-Ḥalba, a western suburb of Aleppo.⁹ It is said that his rule was oppressive, characterized by heavy taxation and the confiscation of private estates (*milks*),¹⁰ for the purpose of feeding his large army, Arab auxiliaries and frontier garrisons. He was at first highly successful vis-à-vis the stronger Byzantines, but since the year 347/958 one defeat followed another, resulting in the fall of many frontier fortresses and cities into Byzantine hands.¹¹

Among others, in 351/962 the Byzantine frontier forces unexpectedly advanced on Aleppo under the commander Nicephorus Phocas, defeating Sayf al-Dawla's small army and the Aleppine populace (*amma, ghawghā*). After Sayf al-Dawla's escape, Aleppine notables (*shuyūkh*) attempted a negotiation with Nicephorus in vain, ending up in the storming of the city. Aleppo suffered a week-long plunder, destruction and murder.¹² This is a spontaneous self-defense activity on the part of the citizens, demonstrating the fact that the disappearance of monarchs would foster the oligarchy of notables. In a broader perspective, since late Roman times the people of northern Syrian cities, especially Antioch, had been accustomed to defending themselves against Persian assaults when their Roman masters failed to supply them with

7 Canard, *Histoire de la dynastie des Ḥamdānides*; Ḥamdānids, in *EI*², iii, 126–31; Kennedy, *The Prophet* 267–84; Bianquis, Sayf al-Dawla, in *EI*², ix, 103–10.

8 P. Smoor, al-Maghribī, in *EI*², v, 1210–1.

9 Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Zubdat al-Ḥalab* 81; *Bughya* i, 349; *A'lāq* 29.

10 Ibn Ḥawqal, 177, 180, 225–6; *Zubda* 105, 121; *Bughya* i, 59.

11 Canard, *Ḥamdānides* 598–618, 741–827; Honigmann, *Die Ostgrenze* 70–86.

12 *Zubda* 78–82; Yahyā, 97–8; Ibn al-Athīr, viii, 540–2; *A'lāq* 16, 23–4; 29; *Bughya* i, 349, 416; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography* 168–9 (*Ta'rikh al-zamān* 62–3); Michael, iii, 128.

adequate fighting forces and concluding surrender agreements with them of their own will to avert their total annihilation.¹³

The people of Aleppo henceforth had to play a more important role in battles. Even after Byzantine withdrawal, Sayf al-Dawla remained in Mayyāfariqīn (Martyropolis, Turk. Silvan), the northeasternmost city of Jazīra, leaving one of his *ghilmān*, Qarghūya, in reconstructed Aleppo.¹⁴ In 354/965 the Aleppines joined Qarghūya's forces in defense against the assaults of former garrisons of the fortresses of Thughūr, which had fallen into Byzantine hands.¹⁵ Two years later they supported Qarghūya again, who meanwhile had the walls of the citadel and the city rebuilt, in his resistance against Sa'd al-Dawla's return after the death of his father, Sayf al-Dawla.¹⁶

In 359/970 the Byzantine army besieged Aleppo again after having taken Antioch the previous year. It is after Qarghūya obtained the consent of notables that he concluded a treaty effectively making Aleppo a Byzantine protectorate. It imposed an annual payment of tribute in the form of poll tax (*jizya*) at the rate of one dinar per person as well as other duties levied by imperial officials, a guarantee of the free passage of caravans between Antioch and Aleppo, and the cooperation of the Aleppines with Byzantine forces against other Muslim forces. In addition, the emperor reserved his right to appoint Qarghūya's successor. Many notables (*shuyūkh*, *mashā'ikh*) of Aleppo belonging to the houses of Abū Usāma, Kisrā, Abū 'Īsā, al-Khashshāb, Abū Ṭālib, al-'Aṭṭār and al-'Abbās (called Banū Hāshim)¹⁷ attested to the articles, and moreover some notables were handed over to the Byzantines as hostages. Muslim sources call this treaty a long-term truce (*hudna mu'abbada*), but the Christian Yaḥyā calls it a *ṣulh*, that is peace treaty concluded mainly between unequals of different religions, suggesting the subordinate position of Aleppo.¹⁸ It seems that henceforth most Aleppine rulers up to the Mirdāsids would continue to recognize Byzantine suzerainty.

These facts amply show that Aleppo under Qarghūya's rule transformed into a virtually autonomous city under an *a'yān-amīr* system. However, struggles among the *ghilmān* were rife, involving the people of Aleppo; in 364/975

13 Levy-Ruben, *Non-Muslims* 21–32.

14 *Zubda* 85–6; Yaḥyā, 108.

15 *Bughya* viii, 3656–8, x, 4592–3; *Zubda* 86–8; Yaḥyā, 108–9.

16 *Zubda* 93–4; Yaḥyā, 125–8; Ibn al-Athīr, viii, 597–8.

17 For the Abbasids of northern Syria see Kennedy, *The Early Abbasid Caliphate* 74–5. For other references to the Abbasids of Aleppo see Ibn al-Athīr, x, 115; *A'lāq* 16, 23, 31.

18 Ibn Ḥawqal, 177–8; *Zubda* 95–8; Yaḥyā, 135–6; Ibn al-Athīr, viii, 604; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography* 173 (*Ta'rikh al-zamān* 66).

Qarghūya was detained by his comrade Begchür and other *ghilmān*. One or two years later, the Aleppines (*ahl al-balad*), who were guarding the north-western gate of Bāb al-Junān, surrendered their city to Sa'd al-Dawla who was investing it in alliance with the Kilāb. In compensation, Begchür was given the governorship of Ḥims.¹⁹ In 382/992 too, when a Fāṭimid siege was prolonged, the citizens (*ahl*) threatened to surrender Sa'd al-Dawla's son and successor, Abū l-Faḍā'il, to the Fāṭimid commander Mengütegin. Ultimately, Abū l-Faḍā'il succeeded in baffling Mengütegin's assaults by receiving relief from the Byzantine governor of Antioch this time, then Emperor Basil II himself three years later.²⁰

After the death of Abū l-Faḍā'il in 392/1002, one of the *ghilmān*,²¹ Lu'lu', seized power. Lu'lu' attempted to conciliate notables, returning their private estates (*milks*) confiscated by Sayf al-Dawla and Sa'd al-Dawla, reducing the rate of land tax (*kharāj*) to its original level and annulling the special taxes introduced for the payment of tribute.²² He also had his palace and a mosque built inside the gate of Bāb al-Junān in the residential area,²³ suggesting his friendly relationship with the citizens as well as the separation of civil administration and military command (taken by commanders posted in the citadel). However, the *a'yān-amīr* system set up during the governorship of Qarghūya and Lu'lu' was threatened by several attempts to recover lost power at the hands of the Ḥamdānid princes and Begchür.

The Retrogression from the *a'yān-amīr* System under the Mirdāsids

After Lu'lu's death in 399/1009 his son and successor, Manṣūr, attempted to enhance his power at the expense of the *a'yān-amīr* system despite his continuation of the separation of civil administration from military command for the time being. He also continued Byzantine protectorate over Aleppo, but at the same time he accepted his investiture from the Fāṭimid caliph, al-Ḥākim, following the example of Sa'd al-Dawla, who had recognized

19 *Zubda* 98–9; Ibn al-Athīr, viii, 683; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 24.

20 *Zubda* 105–8; Yaḥyā, 224–8; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 40–3; Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 89–90; Rūdhrawārī, 217–21.

21 More accurately, Lu'lu' is said to have been a *mawlā* (protégé) of Ḥajrāj, one of Sayf al-Dawla's *ghilmān* (*Zubda* 112). Canard's identification of Ḥajrāj with the Jarrāḥids, Palestinian Ṭayy'i chieftains, seems to be a mistake. Lu'lu', in *ET*², v, 820.

22 *Zubda* 105.

23 *Zubda* 112; *A'lāq* 28–9.

al-‘Azīz’ sovereignty in 376/986.²⁴ Almost simultaneously, one Kilābi leader, Šāliḥ b. Mirdās, seized al-Raḥba located at an important ford on the middle Euphrates, taking aim at the seizure of Aleppo.²⁵ Soon in 400/1009, some Aleppines intrigued for Ḥamdānid restoration in alliance with the Kilāb. This time, Manṣūr succeeded in inducing the defection of the Kilāb by guaranteeing them the conferment of *iqṭā*’s in the peripheries (*barāniyya*) of the *a‘māl* of Aleppo. However, Manṣūr did not fulfill his obligations, inducing Kilābi intrusions into the peripheries and their cutting down of olive trees. Finally in 402/1012, Manṣūr invited their leaders (*umarā*’) to the citadel for dinner ostensibly to effect reconciliation, but treacherously detained or killed many of them.²⁶

In 405/1014, after two years’ detainment Šāliḥ escaped from the citadel and gathered Kilābi and other tribesmen, forcing Manṣūr to mobilize not only *ghilmān*, but also the craftsmen of *sūqs* (*sūqa*) and the lower classes (*awbāsh*) including a large number of Christians and Jews. After Manṣūr was defeated and captured at the battle of al-Nuqra east of Aleppo, in which two thousand citizens are said to have perished, the Muslim notables (*mashā’ikh*) negotiated with Šāliḥ, concluding a *ṣulḥ* which stipulated an equal division of the tax revenues of not only the peripheries (*zāhir*), but also the center (*bāṭin*).²⁷ Once liberated, however, Manṣūr repudiated his promises, inducing Šāliḥ to intercept provisions carried into Aleppo. The following year (Rajab 406/January 1016), he was ousted out of Aleppo by his *ghilmān* garrisoned in the citadel, taking refuge in Antioch and entering into Byzantine service. The populace rushed to sack his palace and destroyed bound ledgers (*dafātir*). The *ghilmān* invited the Fāṭimid governor of Apamea to Aleppo to forestall Šāliḥ’s takeover, introducing the first Fāṭimid rule of Aleppo and suspending Byzantine protectorate. The Fāṭimid governors had their new fortified palace built close to the citadel to strengthen their grip of military command. Šāliḥ was at last given what had been promised by Manṣūr.²⁸

24 Sibṭ, xi, 615 (ed. J. Rassi, 70); *Zubda* 102, 112, 114; Zakkar, *The Emirate* 48. Sibṭ’s detailed accounts of Aleppo are based on the history of Hilāl al-Šābī (Sibṭ, xi, 635; ed. Rassi, 90). The *Zubda* is seemingly indebted to Yaḥyā. Zakkar, *The Emirate* 49–50.

25 Sibṭ, xi, 591, 615 (ed. Rassi, 46, 70); Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 210–1.

26 Yaḥyā, 315–8; *Zubda* 112–4; Sibṭ, xi, 616 (ed. Rassi, 71). According to Zakkar (*The Emirate* 46) Manṣūr promised the sharing of “the revenue and rulership of the outer regions.”

27 Yaḥyā, 319–21; *Zubda* 115–8; Sibṭ, xi, 616–8 (ed. Rassi, 71–3); Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 228–9.

28 Sibṭ, xi, 635–9 (ed. Rassi, 91–5); Yaḥyā, 321–4; *Zubda* 118–22. According to Zakkar (*The Emirate* 56), ‘volumes of manuscripts in the library of the palace’ instead of bound ledgers.

However, Šāliḥ still desired the possession of Aleppo. It is said that he concluded a pact with Ḥassān b. al-Mufarraǰ, Jarrāḥid leader of the Ṭayy' of Palestine, and Sinān b. 'Ulyān, leader of the Kalb of central Syria, to cooperate for the division of Syria under Byzantine connivance, if not approval. At least Šāliḥ fought the Fāṭimids on Ḥassān's side in Palestine.²⁹ It is during his fighting in Palestine that the siege of Aleppo began. The interpretation of the sources on Aleppine response to Šāliḥ's seizure is rather difficult. A contemporary Egyptian historian, al-Musabbihī (366–420/977–1030), transmits the anti-Šāliḥ reports that reached the Fāṭimid court in Cairo.

Šāliḥ b. Mirdās, also known as Ibn al-Dawqaliyya, left Damascus for Aleppo. His secretary (*kātib*) had sold all the crops, houses, instruments and others owned by Šāliḥ in Aleppo. After he (Šāliḥ) gathered Bedouins he advanced on Aleppo to invest it. He only felt uneasy about his men staying inside the walled city.³⁰

Šāliḥ b. Mirdās continued to correspond with some citizens (*ahl al-balad*) during his siege of Aleppo until its conquest. When his men entered the city they began destroying towers of the walls. When the citizens saw that they judged that he was preparing to hand over the city to the Byzantines,³¹ and joined the (Fāṭimid) garrison of the citadel, in which Mawṣūf al-Šaqlabī was entrenched. They all fought Šāliḥ until they ousted his men out of the city, inflicting a great damage upon a party of them. In total, the citizens killed 250 men of Šāliḥ's.³²

According to this story, anti-Byzantine citizens joined the Fāṭimid garrison against Šāliḥ. The Christian doctor, Yaḥyā b. Sa'īd, tells a little different version.

(While Šāliḥ b. Mirdās was fighting the Fāṭimid governor in Palestine) his secretary Abū Maṣṣūr Sulaymān b. Ṭawq occupied Ma'arrat Miṣrīn in the territory (*'amal*) of Aleppo, capturing and fettering its governor. In Rajab, (415)/October, 1024, he advanced on Aleppo with many Bedouins, resulting in battles between them and its Fāṭimid governor, *Amīr* Sadīd al-Mulk Thu'bān b. Muḥammad, and the commander of the citadel, Mawṣūf al-Šaqlabī. After sporadic skirmishes, on Sunday Ramaḍān 17/

29 Yaḥyā, 390; *Zubda* 126.

30 Musabbihī, 181.

31 According to Zakkar (*The Emirate* 93–4), Šāliḥ destroyed towers to make future Bedouin recapture of Aleppo easier due to their lack of siege engines.

32 Musabbihī, 210.

November 22 Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdās arrived there from Palestine with a lot of horsemen, having sacked coastal districts on the way. He camped opposite the gate of Bāb al-Junān, demanding that the *qāḍī* and notaries (*'udūl*) come out. Upon their refusal, he left there, but returned the following day with more horses and pack animals, resulting in continuous battles over fifty days and the death of many fighters on both sides. The commander of the citadel, Mawṣūf, accused Abū l-Murajjā [Sālim] b. al-Mustafād al-Ḥamdānī, leader of the surviving Ḥamdānid *ghilmān* in Aleppo, of having deserted the Fāṭimid cause.... Many Ḥamdānid *ghilmān* and citizens (*ahl al-balad*) joined him. At once he rode to one of the gates called Bāb Qinnasrīn, opening it and meeting Ṣāliḥ, who gave safe-conduct to all the citizens. On Saturday Dhū l-Qa'ḍa 13/January 18, 1025, Ṣāliḥ entered Aleppo. *Amīr* Thu'bān took refuge in the fortified palace that the former Fāṭimid governor, 'Azīz al-Dawla Fātik, had built at the foot of the citadel. Five days after the fall of Aleppo Ṣāliḥ began attacking the citadel. He ordered the Aleppines to fight the men entrenched in the citadel, threatening them when he saw them slacken their efforts. He placed mangonels and catapults against the citadel and attacked it fiercely, producing copious fallen men on both sides. The walls of Fātik's palace were pierced.... Ṣāliḥ rushed into the palace on Saturday, Muḥarram 10, 416/March 13, 1025, allowing the people to loot what was inside.... A tunnel leading to the source of water inside the citadel was built; they cut off the ropes of buckets and threw stones, bodies and others into it....

For the assault on the citadel, Ṣāliḥ had asked the Byzantine governor of Antioch, Constantine Dalassenus, for reinforcements. He sent 300 men.... but Emperor Basil ordered their evacuation.... Ṣāliḥ appointed Sālim b. al-Mustafād governor of Aleppo, entrusting the assault on the citadel to him and his own secretary, Sulaymān b. Ṭawq. He himself left for Palestine (to fight the Fāṭimids) on Tuesday, Rabī' 1 3. The defenders of the citadel wrote to Sālim b. al-Mustafād and Sulaymān b. Ṭawq to sue for peace on some conditions on Wednesday, Rabī' 11 10. Their appeal was ignored. In the evening they placed crosses on the walls of the citadel, raising a war cry, "Oh Basil. Oh Victor."... At the dawn of the following day they placed the crosses on the walls again, cursing Caliph al-Zāhir (411–27/1021–36) and praying for Basil. These crosses, together with another large cross, remained in place for three days until Friday. That day the people, after finishing the congregational prayer, brandished spears (*rimāḥ*) to whose edges copies of the Qur'ān were fastened in *sūqs*. When they were called out, all rushed in arms to the citadel and

continued to fight for three days. Many Maghāriba troops of the citadel sued for life, being rewarded with robes. . . . and money. . . .

A black commander (*zimām*) of the Berber Maṣmūda troops stationed inside the citadel, named Abū Jum'a, went down from the citadel to a hammam in the city. He was prevented from returning to the citadel (by Mawṣūf, evidently due to a split in the Fatimid camp). He managed to climb the negotiable esplanade from the rampart (*sadd*). The people (*nās*) rushed to the citadel, scaling that rampart from every side. The Maṣmūda troops of the citadel drew up their commander by a ladder. When Mawṣūf saw it he threw down keys from a window; they opened the gate, entering the citadel on Wednesday, Jumādā I 1 (416)/June 30, 1025. The rest of Maghāriba and other troops left the citadel and their houses were sacked. Mawṣūf, Thu'bān and the *qādī* Ibn Abī Usāma were arrested. . . . (After returning to Aleppo) Ṣāliḥ killed Mawṣūf and Ibn Abī Usāma, but set free Thu'bān.³³

In Yaḥyā's account both Ṣāliḥ and the Fāṭimid garrison of the citadel appealed to the Byzantines for reinforcements at different stages. At the final stage the Fāṭimid garrison desperately appealed to the Byzantines, going so far as to censure the Fāṭimid caliph for his inactivity. According to al-Musabbihī, Ṣāliḥ was suspected of handing the city over to them. However, it seems that Basil II favored his protectorate over Aleppo under the rule of Ḥamdānid *ghilmān*, rather than independent-minded Ṣāliḥ. Aleppine traders would also fear the suspension of trade with Byzantine Antioch and ports.³⁴ On the other hand, Shī'i citizens would have been understandably pro-Fāṭimid;³⁵ many citizens rushed to the defense of the citadel on the side of the Maghāriba when the Kilābis entered inside the walls. Then they continued to resist Ṣāliḥ's order to join the Kilābis in their assault on the citadel. Among others the Shī'i *qādī*, Ibn Abī Usāma, was a Fāṭimid partisan and executed by Ṣāliḥ alongside the Fāṭimid commander, Mawṣūf. Many other notables' estates (*amlāk*) were also confiscated by Ṣāliḥ.³⁶ However, when the Fāṭimid garrison desperately appealed to the Byzantines and Christian citizens for succor, the Muslim populace reacted by rushing to the assault on the citadel. It is not known if Christian citizens joined their Muslim compatriots in this final battle.

33 Yaḥyā, 392–400. cf. *Zubda* 129–30; *Bughya* ix, 4161–2. '*Rimāḥ* (spears)' of the *Zubda* is adopted here instead of '*qubṭārīyāt* (white linen clothes)' of Yaḥyā, 397.

34 Yaḥyā, 324, 328.

35 *Bughya* ix, 4161; Yaḥyā, 325.

36 *Zubda* 144; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 75.

The power-thirsty Manṣūr and Ṣāliḥ, who lacked legitimacy in the eyes of citizens, were obliged to have recourse to Byzantine and Christian support. Christians, including Tādrus (Theodorus), al-Mu'ammal al-Shammās (deacon) and Tūmā (Thomas), monopolized the vizierate and secretaryship in the early Mirdāsīd emirate.³⁷ The promotion of Christians, despite occasional interruptions, continued until the end of Mirdāsīd rule, suggesting a high rate of Christian citizens, albeit a minority.³⁸ However, after Ṣāliḥ was defeated and killed by the Fāṭimids at al-Uqḥuwāna on the shore of Lake Galilee in 420/1029, Emperor Romanus III Argyrus (1028–34) attempted to seize Aleppo from Ṣāliḥ's sons, Naṣr (420–9/1029–38) and Thimāl (in charge of the citadel). The populace (*awāmm*) and the lower classes (*ra'ā'*) of Aleppo participated in this war alongside Kilābi light horsemen, resulting in a Byzantine defeat at A'zāz, a small ancient city north of Aleppo, and the conclusion of a new armistice (*hudna*) ensuring the restoration of the protectorate and the resumption of tribute-paying. Soon afterward, Naṣr succeeded in ousting his brother, Thimāl, from the citadel in 421/1030, effectively ending the separation of civil administration from military command.³⁹

Ḥamdānīd princes had patronized Shī'īs. Sayf al-Dawla built a mausoleum of al-Muḥassin, son of al-Ḥusayn, called Mashhad al-Dikka, on the foot of Jabal Jawshan west of the walled city, encouraging Shī'īs and the descendants of Caliph 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib to settle in Aleppo.⁴⁰ His son Sa'd al-Dawla was the first to introduce the Shī'ite formula, "Come to the best work. Muḥammad and 'Alī are best people (*Ḥayya 'alā khayr al-'amal, Muḥammad wa 'Alī khayr al-bashar,*" in the call for prayer, and had *khuṭbas* (Friday sermons) pronounced in the name of Fāṭimid Caliph al-'Azīz in 376/986.⁴¹ Manṣūr continued to have the *khuṭba* delivered in the name of al-'Azīz' son, al-Ḥākīm, accepting an investiture from him. In the wake of a ten-year armistice (*hudna*) concluded between the Byzantines and the Fāṭimids in 427/1036, Naṣr also recognized

37 *Zubda* 132, 136, 141; Zakkar, *The Emirate* 243.

38 *Zubda* 161, 181, 203; *Bughya* x, 4338; Zakkar, *The Emirate* 239–44.

39 Yaḥyā, 410–7, 422–3; *Zubda* 131, 135; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography* 191 (*Ta'riḫ al-zamān* 83). Zakkar (*The Emirate* 105–18) quoted several versions of the account on Romanus III's expedition and Thimāl's banishment including an eleventh-century Byzantine historian, Michael Psellus. According to him, Romanus' purpose to seize Aleppo was to forestall Fāṭimid recapture of it.

40 *Bughya* i, 60 (Sayf al-Dawla deported the Shī'īs of Ḥarrān to Aleppo), 411–2; *A'lāq* 48–9; Heidemann, *Die Renaissance* 56.

41 *Zubda* 100, 102; Bianquis, Sayf al-Dawla, in *ET*², ix, 109; Canard, *Hamdanides* 656–7; Burns, *Monuments* 43.

Fāṭimid suzerainty the following year.⁴² However, the Mirdāsids failed to prevent Fāṭimid retakeover of Aleppo twice (429–33/1038–42, 449–52/1057–60). It is even claimed by the *qāḍī* Ibn al-Khashshāb that the Shī'is outnumbered the Sunnis at the beginning of the twelfth century.⁴³ When the Mirdāsīd prince Maḥmūd had the *khutba* pronounced in the name of the Abbasid caliph in 462/1070, he took troubles to persuade the populace (*ʿamma*) to agree to this alteration in contrast to the notables (*mashā'ikh*).⁴⁴ Even the Seljuq governor Aq Sunqur al-Ḥājib (1087–94/480–7) had to rebuild the Mashhad al-Dikka.⁴⁵

However, the Sunni-Shī'i conflict was evidently less serious in Aleppo than Baghdad, in which Ḥanbalite influence on proto-Sunnis was very strong. The dividing line, which seems to have been mainly pro-ʿAlī stance of the Shī'is without going so far as anti-Abbasid, must have been slight in Aleppo before the solidification of Sunnis in the late eleventh century.

The people's mistrust of the Mirdāsids was demonstrated when Naṣr was defeated and killed by the Fāṭimid army under the command of Anūshtegin al-Dizbarī,⁴⁶ governor of Damascus, in 429/1038. Thimāl, taking advantage of this defeat to return to Aleppo, could not find support from its notables, and took refuge with his brother's ally, the Numayri chief Shabīb b. Waththāb, ruler of Ḥarrān. In Aleppo, while the populace (*ʿamma*) was engaged in looting the palace and the properties of traders, the notables surrendered the city to the Fāṭimid army. In response to it, the Fāṭimids returned the estates (*amlāk*) seized by Ṣāliḥ and Naṣr to notables, appointing a notable from the Abū Jarāda family (ancestor of the historian Ibn al-ʿAdīm) as new *qāḍī*.⁴⁷

In the early eleventh century the Aleppines were divided among proto-Sunnis, Shī'is, Jacobites, Melkites, Jews and Kilābi tribesmen, with Shī'is and Kilābis ascendant, making it difficult to form their united front against assertive rulers to preserve the *a'yān-amīr* system. They failed to get rid of the Byzantine protectorate either, despite the uplifting of *jihād* spirit at the hand of Ibn Nubāta (d. 374/985) through his rhyming sermons encouraging the Muslim Aleppines to fight them.⁴⁸ In 395/1005 a landowner of Sarūj near Edessa, called al-Aṣfar, became vexed at Aleppine subservience toward the Byzantines, gathering Muslim villagers and Numayri and Kilābi tribesmen for

42 *Ittīʿāz* ii, 44, 46.

43 *A'lāq* 97; Sibṭ, xii, 472 (ed. Ali Sevim, 143); Zakkar, *The Emirate* 252, 254.

44 Sibṭ, xii, 471–2 (ed. Ali Sevim, 142–3); *Zubda* 173.

45 *Bughya* iv, 1955.

46 Anūshtegin was from Khotan, Sinkiang. *Muqaffā* ii, 243.

47 *Zubda* 142–5; *Bughya* iii, 1223; *Muqaffā* ii, 245; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 74–5.

48 Canard, Ibn Nubāta, in *ET*², iii, 900; Hillenbrand, *The crusades* 101–2.

a *jihād* with Antioch as target. However, the scarcity of his support among the Aleppines resulted in Lu'lu's imprisonment of him in the citadel at the behest of the Byzantines.⁴⁹

The *Aḥdāth* as Mirdāsīd Auxiliary Troops and the Decline of Notables

The armed people called *aḥdāth* under the control of *ra'īs* grew in power under Mirdāsīd rule. The fundamental problem is whether they represented popular power in opposition to the Mirdāsīds. At the same time, Aleppo saw the immigration of peasants and nomads, resulting in the foundation of new quarters equipped with mosques and hammams, both inside and outside the encircling walls, at the hands of the Christian *wazīr* al-Mu'ammal and his brother.⁵⁰

1. Aleppine *aḥdāth* first appear in the sources, when a leader of the Ḥamdānid *ghilmān*, Sālīm b. al-Mustafād, who had opened a gate of Aleppo to Ṣāliḥ, was appointed *ra'īs* of Aleppo and leader (*mutaqaddim*) of the *aḥdāth* by Ṣāliḥ.⁵¹ It seems that this *aḥdāth* was an organization of more or less fixed members, composed of armed young men of lower- and middle-class origin. Ibn al-Mustafād himself was living in the quarter of al-Zajjājīn (glass makers), probably in close relationship with craftsmen, small traders and laborers, and was largely indigenized.⁵² These men probably had taken part in the assault on the citadel, in which the Fāṭimid garrison was entrenched. Ṣāliḥ found them useful as auxiliary troops and a police force, putting them under the command of Ibn al-Mustafād, rather than one of the notables. However, he, as an indigenized man, opposed Naṣr's spontaneous submission to the Byzantines after his victory at A'zāz and his resumption of the payment of tribute.⁵³ It is probably this opposition that induced the Byzantine governor of Antioch to request Ibn al-Mustafād's execution from Naṣr in 425/1034.⁵⁴ It is not recorded whether the *aḥdāth* survived Ibn al-Mustafād's death under a new leader.

49 Yaḥyā, 254–5; *Bughya* ii, 698–700; *Zubda* iii; Heidemann, *Die Renaissance* 65–7.

50 *Zubda* 136.

51 *Zubda* 141; *Bughya* ix, 4162.

52 *Zubda* 129.

53 Yaḥyā, 418, 423; *Zubda* 140.

54 *Bughya* ix, 4163; *Zubda* 141.

2. *Aḥdāth* reappeared in 433/1042, when Anūshtegin was forced out of Damascus, taking refuge in the citadel of Aleppo as a result of the intensification of his discord with the *wazīr* al-Jarjarā'ī, head of the Cairene government. After Anūshtegin's death, the Aleppines (*ahl al-madīna*) looted governmental granaries (*ahrā'*) and attacked Maghāriba troops remaining in the city, surrendering the city to Thimāl, who had been appointed as its governor by the *wazīr*. The following year the Aleppines including *aḥdāth* stormed the citadel in which Anūshtegin's Atrāk *ghilmān* were entrenched; henceforth *aḥdāth* were given comparatively good stipends (*arzāq*, 'atā').⁵⁵ Thimāl at once resumed the payment of tribute to the Byzantines who awarded him the titles of *magistros* (*mākhistrus*) and then *exarchos* (autonomous governor of a frontier province).⁵⁶

Although a supreme leader of these *aḥdāth* was not appointed, names of many leaders appear in the sources, Kindī, Ibn al-Zaghrā, Ibn 'Antar, Ibn al-Nāqid, Ibn Ḥayyūn, Ibn al-Maghāzili, Şubḥ, Ibn al-Aqrāşī, al-Shuṭayṭī, al-Labbād, Ibn Abī l-Rayḥānī, Ibn Naṭr, Ibn al-Shākiri and Bahlūl, suggesting their non-patrician origin.⁵⁷ They were apparently freshly organized by Thimāl, and had no more than a tenuous relationship with Şāliḥ's *aḥdāth* organized eighteen years ago. Their number was not attested anywhere, but unlikely to be over one thousand.⁵⁸ In contrast to the *aḥdāth*, the notables of Aleppo were distrusted, and in 440/1048 when a Fāṭimid army advanced from Damascus the *qāḍī* Ibn Abī Jarāda and many other notables (*a'yān*, *amāthil*) were detained and one was even killed by Thimāl. It is probable that the *aḥdāth* was included in Thimāl's army composed of Kilābi tribesmen, Aleppines and nearby peasants (*fallāḥīn*), which attempted to intercept this Fāṭimid army at Kafarṭāb.⁵⁹ Instead of Aleppine Christians, the notables and bureaucrats of al-Raḥba (center of Thimāl's power) and Mosul were successively appointed as *wazīrs*.⁶⁰

55 *Zubda* 146–7; *Muqaffā* ii, 245.

56 *Zubda* 148, 151. Ibr.d.rs of the published text should be Iks.rk.s (exarchos).

57 *Zubda* 156, 160, 163.

58 Ohta, The Military Organization of the Mirdāsīd Dynasty [in Japanese], *The World of Islam* 25/26 (1986), 35.

59 *Zubda* 149; Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 549.

60 *Zubda* 149, 151; *Bughya* ii, 896, iii, 1225.

3. The early Mirdāsīd state was fundamentally based on Kilābi tribal solidarity, but its relationship with the tribesmen tended to be tense.⁶¹ It is because Thimāl found it difficult to satisfy their economic demand and remedy his relationship with his brother ‘Aṭīyya, ruler of nearby Bālis (Maskane), that he made a fatal decision to concede Aleppo to the Fāṭimids in return for the governorship (rather appanages) of Beirut and Acre in 449/1058.⁶² His *aḥdāth* left behind in Aleppo was dissatisfied with the restored Fāṭimid rule, because their demand for the increase of stipends was ignored. They rose in revolt and appealed to Naṣr’s son, Maḥmūd, handing over Aleppo to him in 452/1060. The people of Aleppo sacked the house of the ‘Alid *qādī*, who remained faithful to the Fāṭimids, ousting him out of the city. In retaliation, the Fāṭimids helped Thimāl attack his nephew Maḥmūd. In this conflict the *aḥdāth* was divided between Thimāl and Maḥmūd. A group of the *aḥdāth* opened a gate to Thimāl, while others remained faithful to Maḥmūd, resulting in the latter’s defeat in a battle engaged in the outskirts.⁶³ Thimāl, now ruler of Aleppo, executed fifteen *aḥdāth* leaders who had sided with Maḥmūd, and broke off with the Byzantines, executing other *aḥdāth* leaders who had conspired with the Byzantines.⁶⁴ After the death of Thimāl in 454/1062, his *aḥdāth* invited his brother ‘Aṭīyya from al-Raḥba, preventing other Aleppines from surrendering the city to Maḥmūd.⁶⁵
4. The fall of *aḥdāth* began when ‘Aṭīyya recruited 500 Türkmen nomads from northeastern Jazīra under the command of their prince (son of their *khān*, king) as mercenaries,⁶⁶ settling them in al-Ḥāḍir outside the

61 It seems that Ohta is to the point when she says, “(The way of payment to Kilābis) was changed for convenience’ sake and never established as a system. . . . no more than rewards supplementary to the booty won at the battlefield. . . . Therefore, Kilābi horsemen were unwilling to join the Mirdāsīd army unless substantive profits were anticipated.” Ohta, *op. cit.* 33. To the contrary, Bianquis regarded Kilābi horsemen as professional cavalrymen who were trained mounted swordsmanship like *ghilmān* and devoid of nomadic elements. (Banū) Mirdās, in *ET*², vii, 115. This is dubious enough; the *iqṭā*’s promised by Maṣṣūr were probably pastures or fallows assigned to clans, not the right of collecting taxes from farms assigned to individual horsemen. It seems that Bianquis himself sometimes suggested so. *Damas et la Syrie* i, 313, ii, 459.

62 *Zubda* 154; *Muqaffā* iii, 203; Zakkar, *The Emirate* 150–4.

63 *Zubda* 156–60; Zakkar, *The Emirate* 156–62.

64 *Zubda* 162–3.

65 *Zubda* 166.

66 Ohta, *The Military Organization* 37–40. It is said that the number of Türkmens reached 500 in 457/1065 under the command of a son of the *khān* (Sibt, xii, 433, ed. Ali Sevīm, 122)

walls.⁶⁷ After his victory over Maḥmūd, however, ‘Aṭīyya’s *aḥdāth* did not miss the first chance to annihilate their potential rivals, Türkmens, driving the remnant and their prince to join Maḥmūd.⁶⁸ Then in 457/1065, Maḥmūd succeeded in seizing Aleppo in alliance with this Türken group and sided with them in a collision which occurred between them and the citizens, annihilating leaders of the rival *aḥdāth*. After Maḥmūd’s death, part of his *aḥdāth* aided his son Naṣr in repulsing the Türkmens of Anatolia in 468/1076. The following year, the *aḥdāth* joined the Türkmens under the command of Aḥmad Shāh and Kilābis in a siege of Byzantine Antioch by order of Maḥmūd’s other son Sābiq.⁶⁹

The first *raʿīs* was not a notable but one of the Ḥamdānid *ghilmān*, and after his execution, no more *raʿīs* was appointed. The organized *aḥdāth*, who were paid stipends by princes, continued to act as auxiliary troops and a police force loyal to them.⁷⁰ Because of this loyalty, they were divided between supporters of two claimants to the throne and fought each other, resulting in their shrinking. Even the survivors had to struggle for stipends with Türken mercenaries, far superior to them in combating strength. Therefore, the Aleppine *aḥdāth* and *raʿīs* under Mirdāsīd rule were similar in functions to their namesakes of Damascus under Seljuq and Būrid rule, never playing the role of the vanguard of civic movement in support of Muslim notables. Rather, the *aʿyān-amūr* system receded under Mirdāsīd rule.

Failure of Attempts at Patrician and Plebeian Domination

With Mirdāsīd loss of power, influential notables began organizing their own *aḥdāth* to vie with princes for power. Sometimes weak, isolated princes were forced to rely excessively on their own *aḥdāth*.

and 1,000 in 472/1080 under the command of Aḥmad Shāh (Sibt, xiii, 21–2, ed. Ali Sevīm, 153); *Zubda* 193. In 475/1082 Muslim b. Quraysh imprisoned their remnant, 300 horsemen (*fāris*). Sibt, xiii, 140 (ed. Ali Sevīm, 215–6).

67 For their settlement in al-Ḥāḍir see Sibt, xii, 433 (ed. Ali Sevīm, 122); Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 109; ‘Azīmī, 361.

68 Sibt, xii, 434 (ed. Ali Sevīm, 122); *Zubda* 167–8; ‘Azīmī, 357; Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 233–4; Zakkar, *The Emirate* 166–8.

69 *Zubda* 172–3, 189; Sibt, xii, 435, xiii, 72–3, 105 (ed. Ali Sevīm, 124, 175, 191).

70 Ohta (*op. cit.* 35–7) also regarded Aleppine *aḥdāth* as Mirdāsīd mercenaries.

In 463/1071 when Seljuq Sultan Alp Arslan (455–65/1063–73) besieged Aleppo, pitching his camp on a southern hill, henceforth called Tall al-Sulṭān, and demanded that the Mirdāsīd prince Maḥmūd do homage to him, the Aleppines gallantly defended its walls and gates until Maḥmūd decided to tread on the sultan's carpet.⁷¹ In 471/1079 too, Sultan Malik Shāh (465–85/1073–92), in response to the complaint of Sābiq's brothers and Kilābis against Sābiq's preference toward the Türkmens under the command of Aḥmad Shāh, sent his brother Tutush to lay siege to Aleppo for the second time. Among the besiegers were numerous Türkmens and Arab horsemen composed of 'Uqayli, Numayri, and Kilābi tribesmen.⁷²

This time a new *aḥdāth* was organized by notables, and the Abbasid self-styled *ra'īs*, al-Ḥasan b. Hibatillāh al-Khutaytī, became leader (*naqīb, mutaqaḍdim*) of this *aḥdāth*, which seems to have been freshly recruited from among the populace. The *aḥdāth* and other Aleppines withstood the investment despite Aḥmad Shāh's death in battle, forcing the besiegers to retreat before winter. During the siege the 'Uqaylid prince of Mosul, Muslim b. Quraysh (453–78/1061–85), had begun secret negotiations with Sābiq and the Aleppines (*ahl*) to encourage them to withstand the siege, selling what they needed. The following year (472/1080), soon after returning to Mosul, Muslim was invited by al-Khutaytī and other notables to depose the Mirdāsīds, because the Aleppines were suffering from the lack of food caused by more depredation of northern Syria at the hands of the Türkmens who had joined Tutush's expedition from Khurāsān. In return, Muslim amply awarded the *aḥdāth* and supplied the citizens with provisions he had brought from Mosul.⁷³

Al-Khutaytī's concession of power and the reestablishment of the *a'yān-amīr system* indicate a failure of the notables' attempt to found patrician domination. Obviously Muslim was the stronger partner. He soon imposed a tax (*kharāj*) increase on the Aleppines and confiscated the properties of notables.⁷⁴ He dreamed of establishing a state extending from northern Syria, to Jazīra and Mosul, in rivalry with the Seljuq prince of Damascus, Tutush (471–88/1079–95). The people of Ḥarrān, whom similar measures were supposedly applied to, rose in arms against Muslim under the leadership of their *qāḍī* Ibn Jalaba

71 *Zubda* 175. cf. Sibṭ, xii, 479–80 (ed. Ali Sevim, 144–6); Zakkar, *The Emirate* 176–9.

72 *Zubda* 193–5; *Bughya* iii, 1299–1300, ix, 4078–80; 'Azīmī, 362; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 112.

73 *Zubda* 195–8, 201–6; *Bughya* i, 54, ix, 4081–2; *A'lāq* 18; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 115; Sibṭ, xiii, 114, 121–2, 126, 141 (ed. Ali Sevim, 198, 202–3, 207, 216); Zakkar, *The Emirate* 202–3, 215; Heidemann, *Die Renaissance* 156–8.

74 *Zubda* 206, 214.

(Jabala) and other notables (*a'yān*), seeking nearby Türkmen reinforcements and defending the walls by mangonels, in 476/1083.⁷⁵

However, Muslim faced a reaction of the Seljuq sultan of Anatolia, Sulaymān b. Qutulmish, who led the Türkmens of Anatolia in conquering Byzantine Antioch, and then defeated and killed Muslim at nearby Qarzāḥil in 478/1085. It is said that 600 *aḥdāth* fought for Muslim, resulting in the death of 400 men. In Aleppo al-Khutaytī, who controlled the city, and the 'Uqaylid garrison in the citadel withstood an investment by Ibn Qutulmish until the latter was defeated and killed by Tutush near Aleppo in 479/1086. It is during this siege that al-Khutaytī, who feared the treachery of Aleppine opponents, had the fortress of Qal'at al-Sharīf built outside the southern gate of Bāb Qinnasrīn and had it encircled by walls and trenches.⁷⁶ In fact, one of the big traders (*tujjār*) named Ibn al-Bar'awī and some *aḥdāth* members beckoned in Tutush's troops from one of the towers of the walls. Once inside the city, Tutush exiled al-Khutaytī to Jerusalem, but treated the *aḥdāth* well.⁷⁷ Soon afterward, in the same year (479/1086) Sultan Malik Shāh himself advanced to extend his direct control over Jazīra and Syria at the expense of Tutush, appointing his governors of Edessa, Aleppo and Antioch. His governor of Aleppo (except the citadel) was Aq Sunqur al-Ḥājib.⁷⁸

It seems that al-Khutaytī failed to secure enough support. Even some *aḥdāth* supported another notable. That is partly because the citizens were unaccustomed to patrician domination, but more importantly because they witnessed an irresistible advance of Seljuq power. Unexpectedly Aq Sunqur paid minute attention to the life of the Aleppines and looked after their interest in a paternalistic way, allegedly introducing the age of peace and prosperity.⁷⁹

75 Sibṭ, xiii, 147–8 (ed. Ali Sevim, 221–3); *Zubda* 210–1; 'Azīmī, 364; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 127. For the later *aḥdāth* of Ḥarrān see Heidemann, *Die Renaissance* 254–5.

76 Sibṭ, xiii, 158–60, 165–6, 169 (ed. Ali Sevim, 229–30, 234–5, 237); *Zubda* 216–7, 221; *Bughya* i, 55, ix, 4157; 'Azīmī, 365; *Al'āq* 18; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 118–9.

77 *Zubda* 219–21; 'Azīmī, 366; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 147–8; Sibṭ, xiii, 177 (ed. Ali Sevim, 239); Ibn al-Qalānisī, 119.

78 Aq Sunqur was one of Malik Shāh's comrades (*aṣḥāb, atrāb*), who had been brought up with him and soon became one of his close associates (*awlīyā'*). Abū Shāma, *Rawḍatayn* i, 139. He was appointed governor of Aleppo by Malik Shāh. *Zubda* 221–2; *Bughya* iv, 1954, 1956, 1958; 'Azīmī, 366–7; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 119; Ibn al-Azraq, ed. Awad, 237. It is often claimed that the Seljuq army was composed of slave soldiers, but its evidences need to be clarified. It is more probable that Seljuq *ghilmān* or *mamlūks* were successors of Buwayhid *ghilmān*.

79 *Zubda* 222; *Bughya* iv, 1954–5, 1960–1; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 119.

Aleppo even witnessed a growth of plebeian power. Aq Sunqur appointed al-Mujann Barakāt al-Fū'ī, once one of the highwaymen (*luṣūṣ, quṭṭā' al-ṭarīq*) from the nearby village of Fū'a, as *ra'īs*, depriving the *aḥdāth* of notables' influence.⁸⁰ It is said that Abū Naṣr b. al-Naḥḥās, a notable and *wazīr* since the Mirdāsīd period, was executed at the instigation of al-Mujann.⁸¹ However, the notables were still influential. A notable from the Badī' family (descendants of Sayf al-Dawla's Daylamite soldier)⁸² was appointed as *wazīr*,⁸³ and a Shī'ite notable, the *qādī* Abū l-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā b. al-Khashshāb, was allowed to build the existing minaret attached to the great mosque in 482/1089.⁸⁴

When Aq Sunqur was defeated and killed by Tutush at the battle of Tall al-Sulṭān in 487/1094, two years after Malik Shāh's death, the *aḥdāth* of Aleppo, who had taken part in this battle, handed over the city to Tutush.⁸⁵ The following year, after Tutush was killed near al-Rayy in his bid for the Great Seljuq throne, his eldest son, Riḍwān (488–507/1095–1113), attempted to preserve his father's territory in Syria with his headquarters at Aleppo, but met with strong opposition in Damascus, where his brother Duqāq was supported by part of Tutush's *ghilmān*. Riḍwān continued to pursue his project at the expense of a concert with other Seljuq and Arab rulers of Syria, resulting in his isolation.⁸⁶ For example, in 490/1097 he changed the Abbasid caliph mentioned in the Friday sermons for the Fāṭimid caliph for a while,⁸⁷ appointing an Ithnā 'Ashari notable of the Abū Usāma family as *khaṭīb* (preacher).⁸⁸ The following year, he failed to join the army of Syrian rulers including Duqāq to rescue Antioch from the crusaders.⁸⁹

Therefore, Riḍwān betrayed the confidence of not only Aleppine Sunni notables, but his own *atabeg* (senior Seljuq soldier acting as father-in-law of a Seljuq prince), Janāḥ al-Dawla (later ruler of Ḥims), being obliged to depend on his own Turkish troops and the *aḥdāth* for support. For example, al-Mujann and the *aḥdāth* killed one of Tutush's former commanders, Yūsuf b. Abaq,

80 *Zubda* 233, 242.

81 *Zubda* 203, 226, 242; *Bughya* ix, 4102.

82 *Zubda* 243

83 *Zubda* 227.

84 *A'lāq* 33–6; *Zubda* 222; *Bughya* iv, 1955; 'Aẓīmī, 367.

85 *Zubda* 226, 229; *Bughya* iv, 1957; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 126; Ibn al-Azraq, ed. Awad, 243–5.

86 Éddé, Riḍwān: prince d'Alep, *REI* 54 (1986), 104–5, 110.

87 Four weeks later, Riḍwān changed the *khuṭba* back to the Abbasid caliph. Idem 116.

88 *Bughya* vi, 3012–3; *Zubda* 235–6; Éddé, Riḍwān 120.

89 *Zubda* 237–40.

and acted as his troops alongside the Turks and Bedouins.⁹⁰ It seems that the only notables who were trusted by Riḍwān were his own *wazīr* Hibatullāh b. al-Mawṣūl and the *raʿīs* Ṣāʿid b. Badīʿ.⁹¹ Besides, Abū Ghānim b. Hibatillāh of the Sunni Abū Jarāda family continued to hold qāḍiship and the office of preacher since the murder of his Ḥanafī predecessor, Faḍl Allāh al-Zawzanī al-ʿAjāmī of Khurāsāni origin, in 495/1102 until his own death in 534/1139, though he did not have a great presence with him.⁹² Riḍwān's mistrust of the citizens was best demonstrated during its siege by Mawdūd, Seljuq governor of Mosul, who was conducting a campaign against the crusaders by order of Sultan Muḥammad Tapar (498–511/1105–18) in 505/1111. Riḍwān took precautions against the surrender of the city by its citizens, posting only his troops and Niẓāris on the walls and taking hostages from notables.⁹³

Riḍwān's excessive dependence on the *aḥdāth* ended up in al-Mujann's virtual control of the city and Riḍwān's confinement in the citadel (plebeian domination). Though details are unavailable, al-Mujann's rule naturally alienated notables who found that they had more in common with the prince. Riḍwān could temporarily ally with these notables against their common enemy and succeeded in appointing Ṣāʿid b. Badīʿ as *raʿīs* and *muqaddam* of the *aḥdāth*, resulting in al-Mujann's capture and execution in 491/1098.⁹⁴

Henceforth, Riḍwān carefully avoided his dependence on the *aḥdāth*, finding new allies and unpaid mercenaries in the remarkably anti-Fāṭimid and anti-Seljuq Niẓāris (Bāṭiniyya, so-called Assassins), a breakaway faction of the Egyptian Ismāʿīlis.⁹⁵ He allowed the establishment of their headquarters (*dār al-daʿwa*) and their free activities in his territory and gave the fortress of Qalʿat al-Sharīf to them, estranging the Sunnis and the Ithnā ʿAsharis all over Syria and Iraq.⁹⁶ It is even said, “The Bāṭini power grew strong in Aleppo in his father (Riḍwān)'s days. Many people followed their tenet (*madhhab*) to seek

90 *Zubda* 233–4; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 255; ʿAzīmī, 371.

91 *Zubda* 241–2; ʿAzīmī, 372; *Bughya* ii, 805, 997.

92 *Zubda* 236, 322; Éddé, Riḍwān 120.

93 *Zubda* 254; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 175; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 486–7; Ibn Abī Ṭayyʿ, ed. ʿAshmāwī, 642, 646–7.

94 *Zubda* 242–3; *Bughya* viii, 3663; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 255; ʿAzīmī, 372.

95 Hodgson, *The Secret Order* 89–90, 92–3; Daftary, *The Ismāʿīlis* 349, 358–9. These pro-Ismāʿīli books suggest the possibility that Riḍwān became a genuine believer of Niẓāris, but we should side with Crawford in his judgment that Riḍwān's alliance with the Niẓāris was a political expediency. Riḍwān the Malign, in *The World of Islam*, ed. J. Kritzeck and R.B. Winder, 135, 138–9.

96 *Zubda* 246, 250; *Bughya* viii, 3661; *Aʿlāq* 18; Éddé, Riḍwān 116–9. For the Aleppine Ithnā ʿAshari enmity to Ismāʿīlism see Ibn Abī Ṭayyʿ, 175.

their influence for their own use. Everyone who wanted freedom from murder and oppression sought their protection.”⁹⁷

Simultaneously the Antiochian crusaders were intensifying their raids. In 493/1100 the Norman prince of Antioch, Bohemond I (1098–1104), seized the district (*kūra*) of al-Jazr (Idlib), Aleppo’s granary, and three years later he imposed the annual payment of tribute⁹⁸ and the humiliating installation of a bell on the citadel mosque.⁹⁹ Further, in 503/1110 an important center of agriculture, al-Athārib, west of Aleppo, fell into the Antiochian hands, endangering the supply of provisions and traffic safety.¹⁰⁰ The Antiochians continued the looting of caravans and villages despite their reception of tribute.¹⁰¹ Riḍwān, getting into financial difficulties, had to resort to the sale of public land (sixty abandoned estates, *khirbas*) to notables, the imposition of un-Qur’anic market taxes (*mukūs, rusūm*), and an outright seizure of the loads of an incoming caravan.¹⁰²

Every Muslim ruler had to strive for his survival. In 509/1115 when the Seljuq governor of Hamadān, Bursuq b. Bursuq, was ordered by Sultan Muḥammad Tapar to advance to Syria to exterminate crusader states, Syrian Muslim rulers, including Riḍwān’s successor, the eunuch Lu’lu’ al-Bābā (or Yāyā), Ṭughtegin of Damascus, former *atabeg* of Duqāq, and Īl Ghāzī, Türkmen Artuqid ruler of Mārdīn, northeastern Jazīra, tactfully brought Bursuq’s expedition to a dismal failure, acting in secret concert with crusader rulers. They “really wanted the survival of the Franks to secure their own present position.”¹⁰³

Patrician Domination under the Leadership of the *Qāḍī* Ibn al-Khashshāb

In the critical moment of increasingly daring crusaders’ encroachments and the Nizāri preponderance inside, most citizens, both notables and the

97 *Zubda* 259.

98 More accurately, ‘truce bribe’ as a substitute for winning booty on raids, rather than tribute. Crawford, Riḍwān 143, note 1.

99 *Zubda* 245–6; *A’lāq* 40–1; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography* 244, 249 (*Ta’rikh al-zamān* 132, 137); Éddé, Riḍwān 108. Ibn al-Khashshāb forced Riḍwān to move the bell to the church of St. Helen through a renegotiation with Antioch.

100 *Zubda* 252–3.

101 *Zubda* 252, 256, 260; ‘Azīmī, 380–1.

102 *Zubda* 253, 256, 259, 276; *Bughya* viii, 3661.

103 *Zubda* 262–5; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 192–3; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 509–11; Gibb, Zengi and the Fall of Edessa, in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. K.M. Setton, i, 450.

populace, Sunnis and Shī'is, were united in opposition to Riḍwān, under the leadership of the *qāḍī* Abū l-Ḥaḍl b. al-Khashshāb (he might have been a Shī'ī *qāḍī* alongside the Sunni *qāḍī*, Abū Ghānim b. Abī Jarāda) and his son Abū l-Ḥasan, paving the way for patrician domination. Even the *aḥḍāth*, hitherto more or less auxiliary troops for monarchs, gradually transformed to play the role of home guard under the leadership of notables.

In 505/1111 when a rich caravan was about to be seized by the Nizāris, the people and the *aḥḍāth* rose in arms, killing some Nizāris and ousting others out of the city with impugntiy.¹⁰⁴ A few years later (507/1113), Ṣā'id b. Badī', *ra'īs* and leader of the *aḥḍāth*, took advantage of Riḍwān's death to annihilate or imprison Nizāris including their chief, Abū Ṭāhir al-Ṣā'igh, partly at the instigation of the *qāḍī* Ibn al-Khashshāb.¹⁰⁵ The Artuqid prince, ʿĪl Ghāzī, also tactfully refused to hand over Qal'at al-Sharīf to the Nizāri *shaykh*, Abū Muḥammad in 514/1120, allowing its destruction at the hands of the citizens under the leadership of Ibn al-Khashshāb. The remnants of Nizāris were expelled out of the city and all their properties were sold by another Artuqid prince, Balak b. Bahrām, in 517/1124.¹⁰⁶

The *aḥḍāth* became the only mainstay for Riḍwān's son Alp Arslan, apart from his army whose loyalty was also dubious. He succeeded in confiscating the property of the *ra'īs* Ṣā'id b. Badī' and exiling him to Qal'at Ja'bar (Qal'at Dawsar), an 'Uqaylid stronghold on the Euphrates, and installed one called Ibrāhīm al-Furātī of obscure origin (non-Aleppine notable?) as *ra'īs*. However, Alp Arslan continued to be threatened by his troops under the command of Lu'lu'. When he sought the protection of Ṭughtegin, ruler of Damascus, he was eliminated in his palace of the citadel in 508/1114 and replaced by his six-year old brother, Sulṭān Shāh.¹⁰⁷

Lu'lu' was also threatened by the citizens. He attempted to win legitimacy in the eyes of Sunni citizens by founding the first *khānqāh* (monastery for Ṣūfīs) in Aleppo, defying a considerable Shī'ite opposition.¹⁰⁸ Finally 510/1117 he lost the struggle to the Badī'is. He was compelled to flee toward Qal'at Ja'bar, resulting in his murder on the way at the instigation of the former governor of Mosul, Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqī, who had recently been appointed as governor of

104 *Zubda* 255–6; *Bughya* viii, 3662–3.

105 *Zubda* 260; 'Azīmī, 382; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 189–90; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 499; *A'lāq* 18–9.

106 *Zubda* 287; Ibn Abī Ṭayy', 172–3.

107 *Zubda* 260–2; *Bughya* iv, 1984–6; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 191; 'Azīmī, 382–3; Ibn Abī Ṭayy', 129–30.

108 Ibn Abī Ṭayy', 167–70; *Zubda* 259; *A'lāq* 93. For the role of *khānqāhs* and *madrasas* in social integration and the legitimization of rulers see Safi, *The Politics of Knowledge* 82–104.

Aleppo by Muḥammad Tapar.¹⁰⁹ The notables of Aleppo, however, insisted on rejecting al-Bursuqī, who was equipped with a comparatively powerful army and competent bureaucrats, until he was forced to retreat before the advance of the Antiochians under the command of their prince, Roger (1112–9).¹¹⁰

Obviously, Aleppo had been a patrician city since the last days of Lu'lu', though the citadel remained in the hands of Riḍwān's family and his troops. It seems that Cahen shared this view. However, he considered that a 'republican' form of patrician domination terminated with the Artuqid takeover of Aleppo, regarding ʾĪ Ghāzī and Balak as kings of Aleppo.¹¹¹ Ibn al-ʿAdīm's detailed accounts, however, would betray the continuation of patrician domination even after ʾĪ Ghāzī's entry into Aleppo.

Sulṭān Shāh's authority, that is his command of the army and management of affairs, was entrusted to the superintendent of the army, the *amīd* Abū l-Maʿālī al-Muḥsin b. al-Mulaḥḥā. Aleppo was weakened; its revenues diminished and its districts (*aʿmāl*) were deserted. In 511/1117 ʾĪ Ghāzī b. Artuq arrived at Aleppo, but the people lodged him in Qalʿat al-Sharīf, preventing him from entering the citadel. He controlled the management of affairs and the education of Sulṭān Shāh. . . . ʾĪ Ghāzī arrested Ibn al-Mulaḥḥā, but the revenues were insufficient for the upkeep of ʾĪ Ghāzī and his Türkmens. He failed to regulate the affairs. He mistrusted the Aleppines and its Seljuq army, leaving Aleppo for Mārdīn. . . . Ibn al-Mulaḥḥā was set free and resumed his tasks. . . . ʾĪ Ghāzī had left his son Temür Tash in Aleppo as a pledge for his return. In this year (511) the *atabeg* ʿUḡtegin and Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqī also arrived at Aleppo, demanding that its people (*aḥl*) surrender it. However, the people refused, saying, "We don't want any Easterners." They summoned the Franks of Antioch for its defense, forcing Aq Sunqur and ʿUḡtegin to retreat to al-Raḥba and Damascus, respectively.

Food prices soared up in Antioch and Aleppo due to the scarcity of water, devastating winds and the flight of peasants out of fear. The people of Aleppo summoned Ibn Qaraja, ruler of Ḥimṣ, because he had succeeded in regulating its affairs and strengthening its fortifications. He came to Aleppo, but stayed in the urban palace (*qaṣr*) for fear of

109 Ibn Abī Ṭayy', 132–6; *Zubda* 265–6; *Bughya* iv, 1985; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 531; 'Aẓīmī, 383; *Bustān al-Jāmi'* 117. The *raʿīs* Abū l-Barakāt b. Badī' as reported by Ibn Abī Ṭayy' was probably identical with Ṣā'id b. Badī'.

110 *Zubda* 266–7; 'Aẓīmī, 384.

111 Cahen, *La Syrie du nord* 269, 283–4.

enraging ʿĪl Ghāzī. . . . (After the Franks sacked a caravan advancing from Damascus to Aleppo at al-Qubba,) Ibn al-Mulaḥḥā asked them to observe the truce (*hudna*), not to break the pact (*ʿahd*), giving presents to the prince of Antioch, who gave back all the loads of the caravan. Frankish desire for Aleppo grew stronger due to its lack of succor. They often broke the truce, sacking Aleppine territory and carrying away innumerable goods. . . . The Franks relentlessly attacked Aʿzāz, which was on the brink of surrendering. The Aleppines were heartbroken because provisions would no more be available after the fall of Aʿzāz. The rest of Aleppine territory had been in Frankish hands; the eastern districts were barren. The provisions remaining in Aleppo were scarce. . . .

The people of Aleppo agreed that they would send a delegation composed of notables (*aʿyān*, *muqaddamīn*) to summon ʿĪl Ghāzī to repel the Franks, because they considered that he would come with an army large enough to drive them away. They promised to pay his troops money which would be levied from Aleppo. He in fact came with a small army. Although some eunuchs supervised the citadel, the *qāḍī* Abū l-Faḍl b. al-Khashshāb was responsible for maintenance of order (*ḥifẓ*) and public interests (*maṣāliḥ*). The citizens were divided; many opposed ʿĪl Ghāzī, causing him to leave. The *qāḍī* Ibn al-Khashshāb and notables finally succeeded in reassuring him. He returned to Aleppo, being handed over the citadel from which its garrison and Riḍwān's men were ousted. He settled Sulṭān Shāh and his sisters in an urban house. He also arrested the servants of the eunuchs, depriving them of Riḍwān's properties which belonged to them after his death.

He negotiated with the Franks for their evacuation from Aʿzāz in return for money, but they insisted on its seizure to enfeeble Islamic power. . . . The people of Aʿzāz despaired of driving away the Franks, surrendering the city to them. The Aleppines were compelled to negotiate for a revised peace treaty (*ṣulḥ*), promising the concession of Tall Harāq and the payment of a fixed tribute (*qaṭīʿa*) of 1,000 dinars every four months, and leaving the districts north and west of Aleppo in Frankish hands. . . . Only the provisions barely enough to feed the Aleppines were brought into Aleppo. ʿĪl Ghāzī left for the east to gather more soldiers with whom he would return. The *atabeg* Ṭuḡtegin met him at Qalʿat Dawsar and agreed to his plan. . . . ʿĪl Ghāzī returned to Mārdīn with Ṭuḡtegin. They wrote to Muslim troops and Türkmens near and far, succeeding in gathering a large army. ʿĪl Ghāzī returned with more than 40,000 men in 513/1119, crossing the Euphrates at the fords of Badāyā and Sanja. His army ravaged Tall Bāshir and Tall Khālīd (located on the present-day Syrian-Turkish

border), killing, plundering, abducting and winning booty as much as possible. Then Aleppine messengers came to him, urging him to return to Aleppo to cope with Frankish raids from Athārib.¹¹²

Despite Ibn al-ʿAdīm's monarchist view, it is clear that ʿĪl Ghāzī, even during his second stay, could control only the citadel and the property of the Seljuq family; the city (*madīna*) itself was firmly under the control of notables, especially the Shīʿī *qādī* Abū l-Faḍl b. al-Khashshāb and his son Abū l-Ḥasan,¹¹³ as Ashtor pointed.¹¹⁴ Although Ibn al-Mawṣūl was confirmed as *wazīr* by ʿĪl Ghāzī,¹¹⁵ the market taxes (*rusūm*) imposed by Riḍwān were abolished at the behest of the citizens.¹¹⁶ For them ʿĪl Ghāzī was no more than a condottiere, and his soldiers composed of a small number of professional cavalymen and numerous Türkmen horsemen were economical part-time mercenaries, who should be fed and paid only during their stay in Aleppo. The main objective of Türkmens in warfare was to win booty, and they freely left the battlefield as soon as they were satisfied or disappointed, making it impossible for ʿĪl Ghāzī to establish his effective domination over Aleppo.¹¹⁷

The reconciliation between the Sunnis and the Shīʿis is best demonstrated by the foundation of the first Aleppine *madrassa* in the district of al-Zajjājīn in 516/1122. An ʿAlid leader, Zuhra b. ʿAlī al-Ḥusaynī, soothed the anger of the hostile Shīʿī populace (*ʿamma*), and a Sunni-Shāfiʿī *faqīh*, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. al-ʿAjamī, was appointed as its professor.¹¹⁸ Later under Ayyūbid rule the Shīʿī al-Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. al-Khashshāb was described as a true friend (*ṣadiq*) by the Sunni Ibn al-ʿAdīm. He also transmitted many *ḥadīths* from Sunnis,

112 *Zubda* 267–70. For Ibn al-Mulaḥḥā who spoke Turkish fluently, see Ibn Abī Ṭayyʿ, 137–42.

113 Abū l-Faḍl was not an unrivaled leader. His dispute with another *qādī*, Abū Ghānim b. Abī Jarāda, over the border of their estates (*qaryas*) was resolved through Riḍwān's mediation. *Bughya* viii, 3662. His kin, the *qādī* al-Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. Saʿīd b. Yaḥyā al-Khashshāb (d. 648/1250), was also a Shīʿī. *Bughya* v, 2247.

114 Ashtor-Strauss, *L'administration urbaine* 97.

115 *Zubda* 280. When Ibn al-Mawṣūl died in 516/1122, a notable of al-Raḥba, Abū l-Rajāʿ b. al-Saraṭān, was appointed *wazīr* by the Artuqid prince, Sulaymān. *Zubda* 262, 280, 283; *Bughya* ix, 4238; ʿAzīmī, 391. However, according to Ibn Abī Ṭayyʿ, 150, Temür Tash dismissed the *wazīr* Ibn al-Mawṣūl, replacing him with Ibn al-Saraṭān in 518/1124.

116 *Zubda* 276.

117 Gibb, *Zengī* 451; Hillenbrand, *The Career of Najm al-Dīn ʿĪl-Ghāzī*, *Der Islam* 58.2 (1981), 268, 271–5. Though ʿĪl Ghāzī probably had a small cavalry paid from the revenues of Mārdīn, he was essentially a chief of an important group of Türkmen nomads.

118 *Zubda* 283, 301; *Bughya* iv, 1959–60; ʿAzīmī, 390; *A'lāq* 96–7.

carefully avoiding accusing the Prophet's companions (*aṣḥāb*).¹¹⁹ Muslim solidarity was accomplished by making the Christian minority scapegoats. After Joscelin I (1118–31), count of Edessa, attacked Aleppo in 518/1124, destroying and desecrating Muslim tombs, including the Mashhad al-Dikka, outside the walls, Abū l-Faḍl b. al-Khashshāb and his son Abū l-Ḥasan took the initiative in converting four Christian churches including the cathedral of St. Helen to mosques. These were later converted to Ḥanafī madrasas.¹²⁰

Ibn al-Khashshāb's success would have derived partly from his authority as learned *qāḍī* and unrivaled *jihād* orator.¹²¹ Weber defined patrician and plebeian domination as illegitimate, but Ibn al-Khashshāb's rule was partly traditional as *qāḍī* and partly charismatic as orator. In contrast, al-Khutaytī, who had failed to establish his own domination under late Mirdāsīd rule, was heavily dependent on his own *aḥdāth* and always threatened by his rival patricians. Probably Ibn al-Khashshāb often consulted with other patricians either in the great mosque or individual houses and could persuade the populace or receive petitions from them in the great mosque during Friday prayers. Regarding taxation, it seems that the suburbs outside the walls continued to be subject to the *wazīrs* appointed by the commanders of the citadel.

Īl Ghāzī visited Aleppo for the third time in 513/1119, leading more numerous professional cavalymen and Türkmēn horsemen at the behest of the Aleppines. This time he won a spectacular victory resulting in Roger's death near the village of al-Balāṭ in the 'Afrīn valley. In this battle Ibn al-Khashshāb harangued, holding a lance aloft, to encourage the Muslims to fight. However, due to a swift dissipation of Türkmēns, Īl Ghāzī failed to recover any land from the crusaders or establish his domination over Aleppo.¹²² Īl Ghāzī soon returned to Mārdīn to recruit more Türkmēns, but eventually he made only one more short visit to Aleppo,¹²³ because he received a sultanīc command to lead the forces against the Georgians from Seljuq Sultan Maḥmūd (511–25/1118–31), continuing to be involved in these expeditions until his death in 516/1122.

119 *Bughya* v, 2246–7.

120 *Zubda* 286; *Bughya* i, 62, 412; 'Aẓīmī, 393; *A'lāq* 41, 45, 110, 114, 116.

121 Hillenbrand (*The Crusades* 108–11) regards Ibn al-Khashshāb as one of the first Muslim ideologues to preach *jihād* against crusaders alongside a Damascene notable, al-Sulamī (d. 500/1107), author of the *Kitāb al-Jihād*. A little later some embellished accounts of the Muslim conquest of Syria were written and attributed to an early Abbasid historian, al-Wāqīdī (d. 207/822), to encourage Muslims to fight the crusaders. Paret, *The Legendary Futūḥ Literature*, in *The Expansion of the Early Islamic State*, ed. F.M. Donner, 163–75.

122 *Zubda* 270–4; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 200–1; 'Aẓīmī, 386–7; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 554–5; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography* 249 (*Ta'rikh al-zamān* 137); Ibn al-Azraq, ed. Hillenbrand, 150 (trans. 36).

123 *Zubda* 274, 280.

The *aḥdāth* under the command of the *raʿīs* al-Furātī and his successor, Makkī b. Qurnāṣ from Ḥamā, did not play an important role in this patrician domination. Rather, they cooperated with the Artuqid princes to help establish their position.¹²⁴ Nor did they fight the crusaders at the battle of al-Balāt; they left Aleppo to ravage Antiochian territory, only after this victory.¹²⁵ In 514/1121 Makkī faithfully obeyed the order of ʿĪl Ghāzī who was away at Mārdīn, allowing the destruction of Qalʿat al-Sharīf at the hand of Ibn al-Khashshāb and ousting Seljuq troops from it. However, when ʿĪl Ghāzī’s deputy in the citadel, his son Sulaymān, rose in revolt, Makkī decided to join this son, resulting in his execution and his replacement by Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-ʿAjlānī from Bālis.¹²⁶ It seems that both Makkī and al-ʿAjlānī lacked sufficient support from the local people, undermining a close relationship between *raʿīs* and the *aḥdāth*.¹²⁷

Nine months after ʿĪl Ghāzī’s death, his nephew Balak b. Bahrām besieged Aleppo, setting fire to villages and crops and carrying away animals. The Aleppine notables were divided between anti-Balak (and probably anti-Khashshābi) Sunnis including the Badīʿis, ʿAjamis, Ṭarsūsīs and Jarrādas on the one hand, and pro-Balak realists including the Khashshābis and Mundhiris on the other. After Aleppine notables, Muqallad b. Saqawīq and Mufarraḡ b. al-Faḡl, opened a gate to him, Balak destroyed the western gate of Bāb Anṭākya and the northeastern gate of Bāb al-Yahūd to discourage the citizens from further resistance, asserting more power at the expense of the citizens.¹²⁸ However, Balak also lacked an infrastructure to realize his effective rule of Aleppo, because he relied on Türkmens, and his stronghold of Khartpert (Ar. Ḥiṣṣ Ziyād, Turk. Kharput, Harput) was located in the faraway, isolated mountains of the Upper Euphrates. In fact, several months after his seizure of Aleppo, taking advantage of his presence in Khartpert, Joscelin besieged Aleppo and continued to cut olive trees and desecrate Muslim tombs in its vicinities until Balak returned there.¹²⁹

124 *Zubda* 278; ʿAzīmī, 387.

125 *Zubda* 273.

126 *Zubda* 278–80; ʿAzīmī, 388.

127 Havemann, *The Vizier and the Raʿīs* 237–8.

128 Ibn Abī Ṭāyy, 144–6; *Zubda* 284–5; ʿAzīmī, 391; *Bustān al-jāmiʿ* 119; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 209; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 611. Pro-Balak realists were not necessarily Shīʿis.

129 *Zubda* 286–7; ʿAzīmī, 392.

After he returned to Aleppo from Khartpert, Balak arrested and exiled the *qāḍī* Abū l-Faḍl b. al-Khashshāb,¹³⁰ together with the *raʿīs* Sulaymān al-ʿAjlānī, who was replaced by another foreigner, Muḥammad b. Saʿdāna from Ḥarrān. Patrician domination was suspended for a while, until Balak was killed two months later in 518/1124 during his siege of the citadel of Manbij (Hierapolis) near the Euphrates.¹³¹ Although his cousin Temür Tash (Īl Ghāzī's son), ruler of Mārdīn (516–48/1122–54), rushed to Aleppo, entering the citadel, he soon proved powerless before civil power. He had to appoint Faḍāʿil, son of the *raʿīs* Ṣāʿid b. Badīʿ of Aleppine notable origin, as *raʿīs* and to kill al-ʿAjlānī, facilitating the *aḥdāth*'s recovery as home guards. Probably Ibn al-Khashshāb was also rehabilitated. However, some Aleppines were willing to accept the Arab Mazyadid former prince of al-Ḥilla, Central Iraq, Dubays b. Ṣadaqa, who had fled Iraq after he had been defeated by Abbasid Caliph al-Mustarshid (512–29/1118–35), but their plan was foiled by Faḍāʿil.¹³²

Soon, a huge coalition army, consisting of the crusaders of Antioch and Edessa under the command of Baldwin II, king of Jerusalem (1118–31) (regent of the prince of Antioch), and Joscelin I on the one hand, and the Muslim forces of Dubays, Seljuq Prince Sulṭān Shāh and one of the Artuqid princes on the other, began a siege of Aleppo, forcing Temür Tash to leave Aleppo to its fate and return to Mārdīn (Rajab 518/August 1124). While 500(?) cavalymen were left in the citadel under the command of Temür Tash's cousin, "The *qāḍī* Abū l-Faḍl b. al-Khashshāb managed the affairs of the city, that is maintenance of its order and expense of its money and crops, acting like a *raʿīs*." Sometimes, volunteers (*ghuzāt*) made daring sorties from the southeastern gate of Bāb al-ʿIrāq, facing no besiegers, and successfully attacked the enemy from behind.¹³³ A delegation of Aleppine notables, led by the Sunni *qāḍī* Abū Ghānim b. Abī Jarāda and the leader (*naqīb*) of the ʿAlids, Zuhra, was sent to Mārdīn, and after they met with a roundabout rejection from Temür Tash, they were compelled to turn to the new Seljuq governor of Mosul, Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqī, whom the Aleppines had hitherto shunned.¹³⁴ His invitation would mean the termination of autonomy.

130 Cahen, *La Syrie du nord* 298; Balak, in *ET*², i, 983; Ashtor-Strauss, *L'administration urbaine* 98; Havemann, *Riʿāsa* 101.

131 *Zubda* 287–9; ʿAzīmī, 393–4; Michael, iii, 210–1; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography* 251 (*Taʿrīkh al-zamān* 139); Ibn al-Azraq, ed. Hillenbrand, 160 (trans. 54).

132 *Zubda* 290–1; Ibn Abī Ṭayyʿ, 150, 649.

133 *Zubda* 291–3; Ibn Abī Ṭayyʿ, 148–9; *Bustān al-jāmiʿ* 120. The quotation is from *Zubda* 293.

134 *Bughya* iv, 1964–7; *Zubda* 293–4; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 623; Ibn Abī Ṭayyʿ, 152.

After sending ample provisions for free distribution to the citizens, al-Bursuqī was welcomed into the city in Dhū l-Ḥijja 518/January 1125, forcing the besiegers to pull out. Ibn al-Khashshāb insisted that al-Bursuqī should chase and exterminate the retreating crusaders, but al-Bursuqī, fearing the rehabilitation of patrician domination, ignored that advice.¹³⁵ He transferred his *wazīr* here from Mosul, establishing his effective rule even during his absence.¹³⁶ Ibn al-Khashshāb was soon assassinated in al-Zajjājīn near his house in the nighttime, effectively terminating patrician domination lasting over ten years (ca 1114–1125).¹³⁷ The next opportunity for patricians to regain their domination arose when al-Bursuqī was assassinated in Mosul in 521/1127. The citizens, led by the *raʿīs* Faḍāʿil, attacked the citadel which one of al-Bursuqī's *ghilmān*, Khutluḡ Abeh, had seized, protesting his confiscation of the properties of notables.¹³⁸

Soon an important Seljuq general, Zangī (son of Aq Sunqur al-Ḥājib, governor of Aleppo during Malik Shāh's sultanate), entered Aleppo as governor. He exiled Faḍāʿil from Aleppo, appointing Ṣafī al-Dīn ʿAlī, a brother of the former *raʿīs* Sulaymān al-ʿAjlānī, who had loyally served ʾĪl Ghāzī, as his *raʿīs* and tax collector from the citizens, effectively making *raʿīs* one of monarchical bureaucrats.¹³⁹ It is also Zangī who strengthened the fortification of the citadel.¹⁴⁰ The citizens and nearby peasants (*fallāḥīn*) continued to be mobilized for warfare against crusaders, but this mobilization almost became a draft, being counted as one of his oppressive measures.¹⁴¹

In 539/1145 Zangī put Abū l-Ḥasan b. al-Khashshāb, who had opposed a tax increase, under house arrest in Mosul.¹⁴² His son born in Mosul, also named Abū l-Faḍl, had such a huge influence over Shīʿite citizens that he was killed and his estate (*qarya*), named al-Hūta, was confiscated in 570/1174 by Zangī's grandson (Nūr al-Dīn's son), Ismāʿīl (569–77/1174–81),¹⁴³ thus nipping the restoration of patrician domination in the bud.

135 *Zubda* 295; *Bughya* iv, 1966; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 624; Ibn Abī Ṭayyʿ, 151–3.

136 *Zubda* 299; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 634.

137 Ibn Abī Ṭayyʿ, 175–6; *Aʿlāq* 35; ʿAzīmī, 395–6.

138 *Bughya* vii, 3216–9, viii, 3845–6, 3851; *Zubda* 299–302; ʿAzīmī, 398–400.

139 *Zubda* 302; ʿAzīmī, 400; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 650–1; *Aʿlāq* 35.

140 *Aʿlāq* 24.

141 *Bughya* viii, 3852.

142 *Aʿlāq* 36, 97.

143 Abū Shāma, ii, 216–8; *Aʿlāq* 124.

Although Ashtor, Cahen and Havemann noticed patrician domination of Aleppo under the leadership of the *qāḍī* Ibn al-Khashshāb, it is more often than not that *raʿīs* of notable origin and the *aḥdāth* of popular origin, who sustained the power of *raʿīs*, are regarded as the core of civic movements for political participation.

In late tenth-century Aleppo under Byzantine protectorate, the successors of the Ḥamdānid princes of their *ghilmān* origin, Qarghūya and Luʿluʿ, were compelled to seek the approval and cooperation of notables (the *aʿyān-amīr system*). However, Begchūr, who supplanted Qarghūya, and Maṣṣūr, Luʿluʿ’*s* son and successor, asserted their authority at the expense of civil power, taking advantage of the division of citizens into proto-Sunnis, Shīʿis, Christians and Jews and playing off the Kilāb against the citizens. Maṣṣūr’s proclivity for autocracy and his faithless attitudes toward the Kilāb paved the way for his overthrow and subsequent Fāṭimid takeover of Aleppo with the support of Muslim citizens and the Ḥamdānid *ghilmān*, and then the seizure of Aleppo by Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdās, a Bedouin chieftain of the Kilāb, who comparatively favored Christians. Ṣāliḥ’s sons and successors, Naṣr and Thimāl, sought Byzantine protection to cope with Fāṭimid threat from Damascus, alienating the majority of Muslim notables. This fact, coupled with the excessive demand of the Kilābi tribesmen for more shares of Aleppine wealth, resulted in two more Fāṭimid takeovers of Aleppo.

The *aḥdāth* of Aleppo was organized by Ṣāliḥ and Thimāl as troops auxiliary to Kilābi tribesmen, and one of the Ḥamdānid *ghilmān* was appointed as *raʿīs* by Ṣāliḥ; later no more *raʿīs* was appointed by Mirdāsīd princes. The *aḥdāth* of this period was no civil power; the *aʿyān-amīr system* declined in Aleppo under Mirdāsīd rule. Later, the *aḥdāth* was divided between Maḥmūd and Thimāl, who was coming back to the Aleppine throne, and largely supplanted by Türkmen mercenaries during late Mirdāsīd rule. Byzantine suzerainty also evaporated since the second reign of Thimāl (453–4/1061–2).

The first serious attempt to establish patrician domination, based on a new-type *aḥdāth*, was launched by a Sunni Abbasid notable, al-Khutaytī, who styled himself *raʿīs* and freshly organized an *aḥdāth* recruited from the populace. However, he failed to unite the forces of notables and the populace before the relentless advance of the powerful Sunni Seljuqs and the shrewd intrigues of the ʿUqaylid prince of Mosul, Muslim b. Quraysh. It is a Seljuq governor who appointed one named al-Mujann of plebeian origin as *raʿīs*, getting rid of the notables’ control of the *aḥdāth* and making it his auxiliary troops. The only possible plebeian domination was attempted by this al-Mujann, who virtually placed the city under his control at the expense of the friendless Seljuq prince,

Riḍwān, who had heavily relied on the *aḥdāth*. After al-Mujann's successor, Ṣā'īd b. Badī' of notable origin, *ra'īs* continued to be selected by Seljuq and Artuqid princes from the Aleppine populace or men of foreign origin, acting as loyal monarchical officials.


Patrician domination was virtually realized in Aleppo under the leadership of the *qāḍī* Ibn al-Khashshāb during the guardianship of Lu'lu', Riḍwān's successor. Although *qāḍīs* had never played an important role in Aleppine politics, they were natural leaders of citizens like the *qāḍīs* of Tyr, Tripoli, Seville, Silves and Valencia. Facing a growing crisis caused by crusader aggressions, which would deprive the Aleppines of provisions and the safety of caravans, Ibn al-Khashshāb made a huge contribution to the revival and diffusion of *jihād* spirit and the consolidation of Muslim unity through his harangues and his shrewd tactic to make the Christian minority scapegoats.

However, despite his domination lasting over ten years in the city, the citadel and its garrison remained firmly in the hands of Seljuq commanders. The Aleppines, lacking the tradition of chivalry, were unable or unwilling to expel foreign cavalymen from the citadel. They needed more horsemen against the crusaders and had to resort to the recruitment of foreign cavalymen and Türkmens. For the patricians Türkmens leaders from faraway lands, like Artuqid princes, were preferable as part-time condottieri for the benefit of the continuation of their domination, but their very lack of efficiency at timely succor ultimately resulted in the citizens' appeal to the strong Seljuq governors of Mosul, Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqī and then Zangī, equipped with professional cavalymen and financial officials, and the incorporation of Aleppo in their centralized state. In fact, neither al-Bursuqī nor Zangī was very interested in warfare against crusaders, chiefly devoting himself for his own aggrandizement within the Seljuq Empire.

Cordoba during the Early Decades of the Eleventh Century

Introduction

Cordoba (Ar. Qurṭuba, Latin, Corduba) was a walled Roman metropolis of native foundation and the capital of the province of Baetica (nearly equivalent to modern Andalucía) as the Roman stone bridge, called alcántara (<Ar. *al-qanṭara*), and the ruins of a Roman temple and a Roman theater testify (an amphitheater, bathhouses and forums disappeared). It was also the chief center of Roman intellectual life in Iberia, producing Seneca and Hosius, its bishop. It is located on the north bank of the middle Guadalquivir (<al-Wādī l-Kabīr) and on the northern edge of a vast, gently-undulating, labor-intensive agricultural zone of la Campiña (Qanbāniya), rich in the production of wheat, grapes and olives. On the other hand, the plateau of Los Pedroches



MAP 4 Cordoba City

(Faḥṣ al-Ballūt), covered with evergreen oaks and extending north up to the Sierra Morena Mountains, was famous for the production of coal, lead and zinc alongside the extensive raising of sheep and horses.

The Germanic Visigoths fixed their capital at Toledo located on the middle Tajo in central Iberia, but the Arabs chose Cordoba as their capital after their conquest of al-Andalus in the early 710s. The first Umayyad *amīr*, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān I (138–72/756–88), founded the great mosque (mezquita in Castilian <*masjid*>) and his palace (alcázar <*al-qaṣr*>) north of the alcántara on the east and west sides of the Roman *cardo*, respectively. At the height of the Umayyad centralized state during the later tenth century Cordoba expanded from the vertical old city (*madīna*) encircled by the Roman walls to the suburbs (*arbāḍ*) founded to the west (al-Gharbiyya), east (al-Sharqiyya>Ajerquía), and north (al-Ruṣāfa). Further to the west of al-Gharbiyya was located the luxurious palatial city of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III’s (300–50/912–61) foundation, Madīnat al-Zahrā’, while the ‘Amīrid *ḥājib* (chamberlain-turned-prime minister), al-Manṣūr, had his own city, al-Madīnat al-Zāhira, built up on the southeastern side of al-Sharqiyya. Al-Sharqiyya was densely populated, resulting in its encirclement by new walls during the eleventh century. Present-day Cordoba is essentially composed of the *madīna* and Ajerquía. Al-Gharbiyya and al-Ruṣāfa contained spacious gardens, woods, orchards and vacant lots, disappearing after the fall of the Umayyad state (partly excavated now). Particularly, al-Gharbiyya was filled with the middle- and lower-classes, who were mainly composed of recent immigrants from Qanbāniya and Faḥṣ al-Ballūt, dreaming of their promotion, but meeting with a hard fact of life. They provided the hotbed of popular movement.¹

Following a tremendous increase of population (all estimated figures are unreliable), capital-intensive irrigated gardens were developed outside the suburbs to produce roses, violets and others for sale and also to adapt the crops introduced from the eastern Mediterranean (the Middle East) to the climate and soils of al-Andalus. In the middle of these orchards and woods many villas (*munyas*) belonging to caliphs, *amīrs*, and dignitaries including Ṣaqālība were established. Ṣaqālība were originally slaves including many eunuchs imported through France and Italy, mainly Slavs of eastern Europe captured by

1 For the characterization of each suburb of Cordoba see Clément, *Pouvoir et légitimité* 185, note 2. For the excavation of Fontanar in al-Gharbiyya, see Mazzoli-Guintard, *Vivre à Cordoue* 78, 170, 190–1; Córdoba, in *EF*³, 2014–1, 59–60. For Andalusī cities in general see Torres Balbas, *Ciudades hispano-musulmanas*; Pavón, *Ciudades hispanomusulmanas*.

the Germans of Ostmark and the people of the Mediterranean coast abducted by pirates.²

At the beginning of the eleventh century internal struggles suddenly imploded in Cordoba, involving not only the *khāṣṣa* (privileged class) composed of old landholding, civil and military dignitaries, called *mawālī*, of Visigothic and Syrian origin³ and 'Āmirid Ṣaḳāliba servants, together with the Berber mercenaries of Moroccan and western Algerian origin, recruited by al-Manṣūr and his son al-Muẓaffar, but also civilian notables (*a'yān*) and the populace (*'amma*). After 'Āmirid fall, persistent challenges offered by the populace against these foreign Berber mercenaries led to a series of protracted civil wars, ending up with the formation of Cordovan patrician city (extending its rule over Qanbāniya and Faḥṣ al-Ballūt). Finally the patricians 'abolished' the caliphate altogether, setting up one of the former Umayyad dignitaries as *wazīr*. One characteristic of Cordovan case is the lack of *ra'īs* or *aḥdāth*; the populace including the middle and lower classes were more generally called *'amma*, and sometimes *qawm*, *khalq*, *ra'īyya*, *nās* or *ahl* also.⁴

The monumental histories of Dozy and Lévi-Provençal told detailed and reliable stories of these civil wars but largely lacked analytic accounts. Ashtor's history of Andalusī Jews is more analytic but often includes 'fictions.' More recently, Wasserstein and Clément introduced their comprehensive studies of eleventh-century al-Andalus (mainly the age of Ṭā'īfa kings, *mulūk al-ṭawā'if*) with detailed accounts of the ups and downs of individual power holders' fortune during the civil wars.⁵ The most detailed and the most analytic account

2 For the concentric circular structure of Cordoba with its suburbs, surrounding gardens and farther agricultural and pastoral zones, and the economic role of *munya* see Ruggles, *Gardens, Landscape, and Vision* 11–21, 35–52. For the region's agriculture see Ruggles, *The Countryside*, in *The City in the Islamic World*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi, ii, 795–815. For the excavation of a large *munya*, al-Rummāniyya or al-Ghirā', a few kilometers west of Madīnat al-Zahrā' see Anderson, *The Islamic Villa*. For a balanced view of Ṣaḳāliba see Guichard and M. Meouak, al-Ṣaḳāliba, in *EI*², viii, 879–80.

3 It seems that Umayyad dignitaries of non-Quraysh Syrian and indigenous origin since the foundation of the Andalusī Umayyad state were amalgamated by the mid-tenth century as *mawālī*, as shown in the disposition of officials at caliphal receptions. Barceló, *The Manifest Caliph*, in *The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1, ed. M. Marín, 447–55. So, these *mawālī* are comparable to hereditary aristocrats, not the armed populace like *fityān* or *aḥdāth* as Clément claims (*Pouvoir* 170, 179, 183).

4 Clément, *Pouvoir et légitimité* 158–60, 193.

5 Dozy, *Spanish Islam* 534–92; Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane* ii, 291–341; Ashtor, *The Jews of Moslem Spain* ii, 3–22, 46–7, 82; Wasserstein, *The Rise and Fall of the*

was given by Scales, who regarded these civil wars as struggles between the supporters of the Marwānids (Shī‘at al-Marwāniyya), Ṣaḡālība and Berber mercenaries. However, the Cordovan populace was treated as passively mobilized mobs; Scales went so far as to interpret the *‘amma* as Marwānid nobility, downplaying the role of the populace, particularly the lower classes.⁶

Main sources include nearly contemporary accounts of *al-Muqtabis* (History of the Umayyads of al-Andalus) and *al-Matīn* (History of the Ṭā‘ifa kings), written by Ibn Ḥayyān, son of a secretary of al-Manṣūr. However, as he was in the early twenties at the outbreak of the civil wars in 399/1009, the last parts of the *Muqtabis* are composed of extracts from the accounts of his older contemporaries, particularly those of the *faqīh* Abū l-Muṭarrif b. ‘Awnillāh. On the other hand, the *Matīn* was authored by Ibn Ḥayyān himself, who gathered detailed information from every corner of al-Andalus. Although both works are lost (many pre-Manṣūr parts of the *Muqtabis* are extant), large parts of the *Muqtabis* are preserved in summarized forms in a history of al-Andalus and Maghrib compiled by an early fourteenth-century Moroccan, Ibn ‘Idhārī,⁷ and the encyclopedic work of an Egyptian bureaucrat, al-Nuwayrī (677–733/1279–1333). Many parts of the *Matīn* are also quoted in an anthology of eleventh-century Andalusī prose and poetry compiled by Ibn Bassām (d. 543/1147) of Santarém (Shantarīn), Portugal. Ibn Ḥayyān criticizes both the populace and Berber mercenaries, who brought about the collapse of the Umayyad state and the division of Andalusī Muslims.

Other important sources are collections of the biographies of Andalusī *faqīhs* and authors, written by Cordovans Ibn al-Faraḍī (351–403/962–1013) and Ibn Bashkuwāl (494–578/1101–83). On the other hand, Berber views are betrayed in the autobiography of the last Berber Zīrid king of Granada (Ar. Gharnāṭa), ‘Abdallāh (465–83/1073–90), and a history of Maghrib, written by al-Raqīq, an early eleventh-century bureaucrat of the Ifrīqī Zīrids, which was also utilized by Ibn ‘Idhārī.

Party-Kings 45–81; Clément, *Pouvoir et légitimité* 132–6, 161–86. For the most detailed, comprehensive account of the Ṭawā‘if age see Viguera Molíns (ed.), *Historia de España por Menéndez Pidal* viii, part 1, Los reinos de Taifas.

6 Scales, *The Fall of the Caliphate of Cordoba* 67.

7 A general history of al-Andalus, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, composed by Ibn al-Khaṭīb (713–76/1313–75), *wazīr* of the Naṣrid kings of Granada, though valuable, is less detailed than (and might have been indebted to) the history of Ibn ‘Idhārī. However, Scales (*The Fall* 52) always cites Ibn al-Khaṭīb before Ibn ‘Idhārī in his notes.

The Islamization of Andalus State and Society

The legitimacy of Andalusī Umayyad rule had been contested from the start. The monarchs styled themselves merely *amīrs* instead of *amīr al-mu'minīn*, despite the fact that they were descendants of Syrian Umayyad caliphs. This lack of legitimacy, coupled with the survival of Arab tribes and clans, as Guichard stressed,⁸ caused frequent revolts of Arab *junds* and Berber clans since the foundation of the emirate as well as the political movements of *muwallads* (Muslims of Visigothic or Roman origin)⁹ seeking local autonomy or more shares of economic and social benefits vis-à-vis Arabs and their *mawālī* during the ninth century.¹⁰ Even the Cordovan populace, who should have been more loyal to their rulers, rose in arms in the early ninth century.

The Islamization of Andalusī society lagged behind the Abbasid East. However, many Muslims of al-Andalus continued to go on pilgrimage to Mecca and study nascent Islamic studies, including Arabic language, *ḥadīths* and the *shar'īa* of Awzā'i, Māliki and Shāfi'i law schools at Medina, al-Fuṣṭāṭ, al-Qayrawān and even in Iraq, as eagerly as the Muslims of Khurāsān.¹¹ The Medinese school of Mālik (d. 179/796), as interpreted by Ibn al-Qāsim (132–91/749–806) of al-Fuṣṭāṭ and Saḥnūn (160–240/777–855) of al-Qayrawān, coupled with their works, *al-Muwaṭṭa'* and *al-Mudawwana*, became preponderant in al-Andalus mainly through the propagation of Cordovans Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā (Berber, d. 234/848) and al-'Utbi (d. 254/868).¹² Together with this Islamization of Muslim society, the Arabicization of the Andalusī Christians and their eventual conversion (or inability to continue being Christians) left less and

8 Guichard, *Structures sociales*; The Population of the Region of Valencia 129–81. He stressed the survival of clan structure up to the sixteenth century, particularly in the mountains and narrow valleys of Valencia, Teruel, Santaver (Cuenca) and Murcia. However, it is presumed that tribes and clans disappeared in Andalucía and other developed areas by the end of the tenth century, except their survival in *nisbas*.

9 P. Chalmeta, *Muwallad*, in *ET*², vii, 807–8. A *muwallad* was a man/woman who was brought up in the Islamic religion by his/her recently-converted father, not a man/woman of an Arab Muslim father and an indigenous Christian mother, who was definitely regarded as an Arab. For Fierro's view see note 13.

10 Fierro, Four Questions, in *The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1, ed. M. Marín, 305, 311, 313; *Abd al-Rahman III* 32.

11 Bernards, *Ṭalab al-'Ilm*, in *Abbasid Studies, Occasional Papers, 2002*, ed. J.E. Montgomery, 33–46.

12 Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools* 156–63; Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution* 175–6; Carmona, The Introduction of Mālik's Teachings, in *The Islamic School of Law*, ed. P. Bearman et al., 41–56.

less Christians, paving the way for the unification of the Muslim inhabitants of southern al-Andalus as Andalusis.¹³ Detribalization was also under way, accompanying the Islamization of society, despite the persistent survival of tribalism in Valencia, Teruel and Cuenca.¹⁴

Against this background, the Umayyads at last acquired their legitimacy in the eyes of Muslims under ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III, resulting in the imposition of the Abbasid model of state and society entailing centralization and caliphal autocracy.¹⁵ This was consummated when he adopted Māliki interpretation of the *sharī‘a* as the official school of law¹⁶ and took the title of *amīr al-mu‘minīn* in 317/929, after having vanquished Ibn Ḥafṣūn’s sons, *muwallad* leaders, and unified southern al-Andalus in the previous year. He also issued gold dinars in Cordoba for the first time since 122/741.¹⁷ Despite the unification of al-Andalus and the centralization of administration, he allowed the Upper and Middle Marches (Thughūr, sing. Thaghr) (Zaragoza and Toledo) virtual autonomy.¹⁸ Under Mālikism, free converts were regarded as *mawālī* (clients) of the Islamic community as a whole (virtually *mawālī* of the caliph), resulting in the increase of Umayyad supporters¹⁹ and the diminution of Christian resistance to conversion, which had been rampant since the suicide martyrdom movements during

13 According to Fierro, “[*M*]uwallad designates someone who was ‘Arabized’ but not necessarily ‘Islamized’. . . . With the passing of time, linguistic and cultural assimilation would lead to religious assimilation, and in this fashion. . . . the term came to be understood as ‘Muslim convert’. . . . [C]onversion would have been mainly due not so much to a voluntary passage to the new religion, but to an involuntary inability to continue being a Christian.” Fierro, *Mawālī and Muwalladūn*, in *Patronate and Patronage*, ed. M. Bernards and J. Nawas, 228–9; Four Questions 309–10, 328; *‘Abd al-Rahman III* 17, 31. The term *muwallad* ceased to be used in the early days of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III, because all Muslims were more or less unified as Andalusis. On the other hand, the northern Iberian Christians came to pejoratively call the Christians of former Muslim lands they had conquered as *mozárabes*, derived from *musta‘riba* (the people who seek to be Arabs), since the beginning of the ‘reconquista’ in the mid-eleventh century, probably because these Christians were more sympathetic to Muslims. P. Chalmeta, *Mozarab*, in *ET*², vii, 246–9; de Epalza, *Mozarabs*, in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi, 149.

14 Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain* 196–9, 208.

15 For the legitimation of caliphal autocracy as expressed in titles, ordinances, ceremonies and monuments see Safran, *The Second Umayyad Caliphate*, esp. 51–97.

16 Fierro, Proto-Malikis, Malikis, and Reformed Malikis, in *The Islamic School of Law*, ed. P. Bearman et al., 57–76.

17 Canto García, From the Sikkat al-Andalus, in *The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1, ed. M. Marín, 329–45.

18 Fierro, *‘Abd al-Rahman III* 61–4; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain* 93.

19 Fierro, *‘Abd al-Rahman III* 23.

the emirate of Muḥammad I (238–73/852–86). Hereafter, Cordovan Christians were rarely referred to despite their evident survival; bishops continued to act as diplomats and translators up to the mid-tenth century.

At the same time, caliphal autocracy necessarily led to the estrangement of the Cordovans from their caliph. As al-Mu‘taṣim founded Sāmarrā, as Louis XIV built the palace of Versailles, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III began the foundation of his palatial city, named Madīnat al-Zahrā’, to the west of Cordoba, from the year 325/936.²⁰ He also fostered the import of Ṣaḡālība as loyal servants and bureaucrats; their seniors were called *fatā* (pl. *fiṭyān*), ‘young man.’ Al-Manṣūr continued the entrustment of important tasks to his own Ṣaḡālība, rather than to traditional Umayyad *mawālī* of largely Syrian or Visigothic origin.²¹ The number of Ṣaḡālība is said to have reached 2,000 during the ḥājibate of his son, ‘Abd al-Malik al-Muḏaffar.²²

On the other hand, Berber (Zanāta) mercenaries of Moroccan and Algerian origin were introduced during the caliphate of al-Ḥakam II (350–66/961–76), ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III’s son, but their recruitment was much expanded during the dictatorship of the *ḥājib* al-Manṣūr (368–92/978–1002). They were recruited not by individuals, but by groups led by their own tribal leaders, and settled in the outskirts of Cordoba, particularly the northern suburbs of al-Ruṣāfa,²³ at the expense of old Arab *jund* warriors, who had betrayed their incompetence at the battle of Simancas in 327/939. Part of Berber mercenaries were stationed at the reconstructed frontier cities of Medinaceli (Madīna Sālim) and Soria, located between the Upper and Middle Marches²⁴ to cope with the threat posed by the Leonese and Castilian Christians, who were relentlessly advancing along the upper Duero by founding or refounding fortified cities (repoblación).²⁵ Al-Muḏaffar (392–9/1002–8) continued the recruitment of Berbers, including a large group of the Talkāta (Ṣanhāja) of central Algeria, hitherto bitter foes of the Zanāta, under the leadership of Zāwī b.

20 For detailed accounts of its significance and individual buildings see Ruggles, *Gardens* 53–109.

21 Scales, *The Fall* 127–8, 134–5; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain* 86, 117.

22 Ibn Bassām, *Dhakhūra* vii, 81.

23 Ibn Ḥayyān, *Muqtabis* vii, 191–3; *Mafākhīr al-Barbar* 44; Ibn ‘Idhārī, ii, 274; *Tibyān* 44; Scales, *The Fall* 165–73; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain* 104–5, 117–9. Picard (*Le Portugal musulman* 277, 288) claims that al-Manṣūr conceded villages and districts to Berber mercenaries as *iqṭā’s*. As Scales (*The Fall* 59–61) surmised, however, probably the Berber mercenaries were fed by the payment of cash stipends (*‘atā’*) and the booty won at the battlefield, for it seems that they were not given farms and tenants except their leaders.

24 400 Berber cavalymen were garrisoned at Medinaceli in 399/1009 (Ibn ‘Idhārī, iii, 85).

25 Fierro, *‘Abd al-Rahman III* 69; Collins, *Caliphs and Kings* 139, 148, 172.

Zirī, a brother of the Zirid monarch of Ifrīqiya (nominally Fāṭimid governor), Buluggīn (361–73/972–84),²⁶ resulting in the deepening of the rift among Berber mercenaries.²⁷ Moreover, these Berbers regarded themselves not as mere mercenaries subordinate to the ʿĀmirid rulers, but as mujahidin devoted to fighting northern Christian states. Both Ṣaqāliba servants and Berber mercenaries were hated as aliens exercising power unduly and illegally by the Cordovan populace.²⁸

The Overthrow of the ʿĀmirids

Al-Manṣūr confined Caliph Hishām II (366–99/976–1009, 400–3/1010–3), al-Ḥakam II's son and successor, to the alcázar in Cordoba and Madīnat al-Zahrā', founding his own palatial city, al-Madīnat al-Zāhira, and monopolizing the caliphal power. This new order was widely regarded as illegitimate and a direct challenge to Islamic caliphal order of concentrating political power in the persons of caliphs who would be assisted by a hierarchical bureaucracy. Al-Manṣūr attempted to lessen this immense unpopularity by claiming caliphal concession of power and conducting biannual campaigns against the northern Christian states (Leon, Castile, Navarre and Catalan counties), in addition to the enlargement of the great mosque of Cordoba and the burning of controversial books which had been owned by al-Ḥakam II. On the other hand, he continued to show tolerance toward the Christians and the Jews.²⁹

Al-Manṣūr, however, faced some setbacks. In 379/989 his son ʿAbdallāh, who was staying in Zaragoza, the Upper March, secured support from its Tujibid autonomous leader and the governor of Toledo (an Umayyad prince) in his intrigue against his father, ending up with his execution.³⁰ More portentous was the rancor implanted in the minds of the northern Christians in reaction to al-Manṣūr's devastation of Christian cities including their capitals, Leon, Pamplona and Barcelona, and his abduction of their citizens,³¹ though it contributed much to his winning of popularity in Cordoba through the influx of a tremendous volume of booty and enslaved captives. He also failed to expand

26 For Zāwī see Handler, *The Zirids of Granada* 9–34.

27 Ibn Bassām, vii, 81–2; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Iḥāṭa* i, 432; Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 263; *Mafākhīr* 26.

28 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 25.

29 Ashtor, *The Jews of Moslem Spain* i, 375–6.

30 Ibn ʿIdhārī, ii, 282–5; Ibn al-Abbār, *Hulla* i, 216; Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire* ii, 240; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain* 115–6; Scales, *The Fall* 129.

31 P. Chalmeta, al-Manṣūr, in *ET*², vi, 431–2.

Muslim territory due to the lack of venturesome Muslim colonists.³² Not only northern Iberia, but also the whole of Europe was then entering the age of the reclamation of arable lands, population increase, the rise of trade and cities and outward expansion,³³ even al-Manṣūr would not be able to hold this torrential current in check. One important ramification of these campaigns was partial militarization of Cordovan citizens as a result of a mobilization call (*istinḡār*) for *jihād*.

After al-Manṣūr's death in 392/1002 the people (*nās*) of Cordoba, probably including notables and the populace, gathered before Madīnat al-Zahrā' demanding that Hishām II take the political and military initiative, but they were dispersed by al-Muẓaffar.³⁴ Al-Muẓaffar's annual (not biannual) campaigns were less successful than his father's, however, and his booties and captives were correspondingly smaller. After his campaign to the Frankish county of Ribagorza, eastern Aragon,³⁵ in 396/1006, the people of Cordoba complained that his slaves were fewer than his father's.³⁶ As a result, the following year, he had to write to the Cordovans, announcing his destruction of Clunia, a key Castilian fortress on the upper Duero, and received the honorific title of al-Muẓaffar ('the victorious') from Hishām II.³⁷

Both al-Muẓaffar and his brother and successor, 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ma'mūn called Shanjūl (<Sancho, Little Sancho, a grandson of Sancho Garcés II (971–95) and a cousin of Sancho Garcés III (1004–35), kings of Navarre),³⁸ were experienced warriors, but they rather lacked political insight and interest in practical administration, leaving day-to-day business to the Andalusi *wazīr* of obscure origin (not Umayyad *mawlā*), 'Īsā b. Sa'īd (Ibn al-Qaṭṭā'), and a Ṣaqāliba leader, Ṭarafa. These men were disposed to get rid of the 'Āmirids, either for

32 During al-Muẓaffar's campaign to the Frankish county of Pallars, western Catalonia, in 393/1003 he attempted Muslim colonization of Mumaqaṣr (Monmagastro) by promising the payment of two dinars a month to each colonist. Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 6–7; Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire* ii, 284–5; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain* 123.

33 Fossier, *The Rural Economy and Demographic Growth*, in *The New Cambridge Medieval History* iv, ed. D. Luscombe and J. Riley-Smith, part 1, 14, 28, 34; Barton, *Spain in the Eleventh Century*, in *Idem*, part 2, 173.

34 Nuwayrī, *Nihāya* xxiii, 406.

35 For the Frankish counties of Pallars and Ribagorza (These counts were kins of the counts of Toulouse) see Collins, *Caliphs and Kings* 221–4.

36 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 13.

37 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 14–7.

38 'Abd al-Raḥmān III's grandmother (mother of his father) is said to have been a daughter of the king of Navarre, Fortun Garcés (870–905). Fierro, *Abd al-Rahman III* 25, 38. Şubḡ, mother of Hishām II, was also a Basque.

their personal ambition or for fear of the aggravation of an unstable political situation. This deadlock should have been brought to an end through either the restoration of Umayyad leadership or ʿĀmirid takeover of the caliphate.

Al-Muẓaffar succeeded in getting rid of ʿArafā in 393/1003.³⁹ Then in 397/1006, he forestalled a widely-supported intrigue to install a more competent, more ambitious grandson of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān III (Hishām II's cousin), named Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, as caliph, executing this man and ringleaders including the *wazīr* ʿĪsā.⁴⁰ This conspiracy was portentous because many Umayyad traditional *mawālī* like Banū Fuṭays and Banū Ḥudayr were involved. So it is not surprising that Shanjūl, within two months after succeeding his brother, who died in Ṣafar 399/October 1008 during his winter campaign directed against the count of Castile, Sancho García (995–1017), hurriedly persuaded Hishām II to designate him as his heir presumptive. This measure gave resounding shocks not only to the Umayyads and their *mawālī*, but also to the notables and the populace of Cordoba, inducing their participation in a conspiracy to overthrow the ʿĀmirids.⁴¹ The next expected stage should have been Hishām's deposition and Shanjūl's accession to the caliphate, because Shanjūl must have feared that Hishām's death in his mid-forties might lead to the accession of a more competent caliph and his own purge. Shanjūl had himself called caliph during his winter campaign directed against the count of Castile.⁴² However, most anecdotes in the sources depicting him as a fool and the accounts of Dozy and Lévi-Provençal based on these are influenced by his unfortunate and ignominious end and upheavals following his death.⁴³

Muḥammad II, son of Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, was chosen as caliph, taking the caliphal title of al-Mahdī, the renovator of the Umayyad caliphate. It gathered extensive support from all levels of society including even al-Muẓaffar's mother, who suspected that her son had been poisoned by Shanjūl.⁴⁴ In Jumādā II 399/February 1009, taking advantage of Shanjūl's presence in Toledo

39 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 24–6.

40 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 27–35; Ibn Bassām, i, 123–8.

41 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 36–47 (esp. 43); Nuwayrī, xxiii, 407–10.

42 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 49, 66, 73.

43 Most of these anecdotes should be treated very carefully. It is hard to judge an episode that Shanjūl ordered Andalusī dignitaries to wear Berber turbans instead of traditional *qalansuwas* (long, high bonnets) (Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 48). Scales (*The Fall* 51, 67) judged it to be a fiction created to explain later Andalusī tumults. To the contrary, according to Glick (*Islamic and Christian Spain* 183) “As the Berbers became more powerful and prestigious, it became more acceptable and common for Arabs to imitate them. . . . Berber modes were adopted even by the Arab aristocracy.”

44 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 60–1; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 242.

during his hurriedly prepared campaign,⁴⁵ they seized the alcázar in Cordoba, forcing Hishām II to abdicate, and then destroyed al-Madīnat al-Zāhira.⁴⁶ The fact that the populace was in the majority of the rebels is shown by the following accounts.

Muḥammad watched for an opportunity until ‘Abd al-Malik’s death and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (Shanjūl)’s accession. . . . After his departure for a campaign, the city (*balad*) was cleared of troops. The *faqīh* Ḥasan b. Ḥayy⁴⁷ and Muṭarrif b. Tha‘laba encouraged Muḥammad to revolt. Muḥammad, while he was in hiding, used to associate with ‘brigands (*ṣa‘ālik*),’ who would be undaunted in any events. They agreed to gather on condition that he would pay five to ten mithqāls or even more to each of them. Eventually, about 400 men gathered. Many Umayyad members also supported him out of resentment for their loss of power to the ‘Āmirids. . . . Muḥammad ordered thirty trustable men armed with swords to enter the gate of Bāb al-Qanṭara separately and stand under the eaves projecting over the corniche (al-Raṣīf) and the Guadalquivir as if they were enjoying a promenade. He also instructed them to do nothing until he would order, fixing the time for the last hour before sunset. . . . Others were on the alert, waiting for the appointed time. Muḥammad crossed the alcántara alone on a horse up to the Bāb al-Shikāl gate of the alcázar. His men standing at the Bāb al-Qanṭara joined him and forced their way through the Bāb al-Shikāl, eliminating its guards. . . . His men grew larger, gathering the populace (*‘awāmm*) and suburbanites (*ahl al-bādiya*). They rushed into the alcázar from the gates of Bāb al-Sibā’, Bāb al-Junān and Bāb al-Sudda. . . . He ordered them (his new *ḥājib* and *ṣāḥib al-madīna*, police chief⁴⁸) to compose a register (*dīwān*) of all new soldiers who gathered before them including ascetics (*zuhhād*, *‘ubbād*) and prayer leaders (*a‘imma*) as well as rich merchants and to pay them stipends (*‘atā’*). Other people from the suburbs (*ahl al-bawādi*) and the peripheries (*atrāf*) also followed him. . . . Mobilization orders (*naḥr*) were issued from the pulpit of the great mosque to fight Shanjūl. Provincials (*ahl*

45 Ibn ‘Idhārī, iii, 39, 48; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 240.

46 Ibn Ḥazm testifies that his father, who was serving the ‘Āmirids, had to return from his house in a suburb (*rabaḍ*) adjacent to al-Madīnat al-Zāhira to his old house located in Balāt Mughīth, al-Gharbiyya, on this occasion. *Ṭawq* 111.

47 For al-Ḥasan (al-Ḥusayn) b. Ḥayy, *qāḍī* of Jaen, see Ibn Bashkuwāl, *Ṣīla* 140–1.

48 For this obscure office see Vallvé Bermejo, The Zalmedina of Córdoba, in *The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1, ed. M. Marín, 389–424; Ṣāḥib al-Madīna, in *EI*², viii, 833–4.

al-aqālīm) from every corner of al-Andalus reached Cordoba, showing off their arms. Muḥammad appointed doctors, weavers, butchers and saddle-makers as commanders (*quwwād*) of his army. He camped in Faḥṣ al-Surādiq (an open field north of al-Ruṣāfa), ordering provincials to settle around his tent (*surādiq*).⁴⁹

Then they (the Umayyad members) rendered homage to Muḥammad secretly. He (and his father before him) had sent Cordovan emissaries (*du'āt*) to encourage people to rise against 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Abī 'Āmir, inducing many men (*khalq*) to render homage to him. He used to meet their leaders (*wujūh*) he trusted secretly at the foot of its mountains out of the sight of 'Āmirid supporters (*shī'a*), fixing the date of rising. . . . His emissaries began circulating tidings of an impending revolution led by an Umayyad renovator (*qā'im*) without mentioning his name, and foretelling his victory and 'Abd al-Raḥmān's fall. . . . When 'Abd al-Raḥmān left for an expedition Muḥammad had completed these measures. He mobilized his partisans (*anṣār*) and dispatched emissaries.⁵⁰ . . . As soon as the populace (*'amma*) gathering from the *sūq* and the suburbs (*arbāḍ*) of al-Gharbiyya saw the head of 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar b. Abī 'Āmir (*ṣāhib al-madīna*), they all rendered homage to Muḥammad. When they saw the Bāb al-Shikāl closed in accordance with the custom during 'Āmirid absence (to shut up the caliph inside), they cried there. Hearing of these cries, Muḥammad broke the lock for them to enter. These men were composed of innumerable goatherds, butchers, men of the lower echelons (*sufḥa*) and other rabbles (*ghawghā'*) of *sūqs*. . . . They were armed with worn-out arms rarely seen. (Muḥammad had ordered them to be armed with even the tools of polishers and shield-makers.) Soon he sent his men to open the people's prison to set free thieves, vicious men (*dhu'ār*) and other criminals, who hurried to join him. . . . Caliph Hishām had the gates of the alcázar closed, posting his Ṣaqāliba eunuchs on guard. He climbed a gate to look down on the populace (*'amma*) with two eunuchs on both sides who lifted copies of the Qur'ān, signing them to be silent by his hand. However, they cried, "We don't need you." . . . Muḥammad ordered the populace to pierce the alcázar's walls or break its gates, promising them ample rewards. They made strenuous efforts, carrying ladders from the *sūq* of lumber and binding them by ropes. The populace climbed the wall up to the ceiling and stormed many nearby kiosks, plundering some of them. . . . They seized nearby armories, thereby strengthening their

49 Nuwayrī, xxiii, 240–3.

50 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 53–4.

power. . . . He flatly refused Hishām's entreaty for a compromise, inciting the populace to advance. The *fatā* Fātin, who was in charge of the gates, opened them. Immediately, Muḥammad entered the throne room in the evening of Tuesday. . . . In the evening of this fatal day a multitude of the populace (*ʿamma*), whom Muḥammad sent with a detachment of his men, hurried to al-Madīnat al-Zāhira. The number of the populace who invested it was so large as to make its site appear congested.⁵¹

According to Ibn ʿAwnillāh, on early Wednesday morning, the *qāʿim* (Muḥammad) decided to declare war on the people of al-Madīnat al-Zāhira, entrusting the command to his cousin, the new *ḥājib* ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. al-Mughīra, and ordered the enlistment of the people as infantrymen and cavalrymen on blank spaces of the register of soldiers (*dīwān al-jund*). After caliphal arms were distributed to them they were sent with ʿAbd al-Jabbār. Innumerable booty-hungry populace (*ʿamma*) gathered. . . . The populace occupied al-Ḥājibiyya, al-Muẓaffar's palace adjacent to al-Zāhira, accommodating his son and mother (al-Dhalfāʿ). They sacked it and its adjacent buildings, expelling al-Dhalfāʿ and seizing her huge property, with which she had helped the *qāʿim*. At noon, the people of al-Zāhira proposed their surrender on condition that Muḥammad would give them safe-conduct (*amān*). . . . ʿAbd al-Jabbār seized al-Zāhira at once. The populace dispersed to loot, . . . destroying most treasuries of clothes, carpets, furniture, perfumes, ornaments, jewels, arms and other military equipments and continuing to plunder innumerable things until evening. . . . The *qāʿim* allowed his popular supporters to destroy al-Zāhira, carry away its marbles that were torn off and uproot its palaces and kiosks. They could achieve its destruction which should take them a long time in a few days.⁵²

According to his (al-Raqīq's) book, it is said that many of al-Mahdī's followers were from the lower echelons of Cordovan society. He paid them all stipends (*ʿaṭāʾ*). For several days cuppers (*ḥujjām*), gatherers of human wastes (*kunnāf*) or men of other humble professions were never seen on the streets. During their sack of al-Madīnat al-Zāhira the mobilized populace (*ʿamma*) looted gold, silver, arms, treasuries and royal furniture that were found there and even tore off strong gates, giant pieces of wood and others from the palaces to sell them anywhere. . . . All these

51 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 56–8.

52 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 62–4.

were carried out by some tens of the most abject men including cuppers, butchers, gatherers of human wastes and sweepers.⁵³

According to the *Kitāb al-Iqtidāb*, when this al-Mahdī established his power in Cordoba for the first time, he hid Hishām and spread the rumor of his death, resulting in a speedy estrangement of the *mawālī* and the *khawāṣṣ* (privileged men) from him and in the unrest of the Umayyad members. He had organized an army composed of the populace (*‘amma*) and the people from the fringes of society (*aṭrāf al-nās*). Moreover, he had sought their company, preferring them to ‘Āmirid slaves (*‘abīd*, that is Ṣaqāliba) and Berber clans (*tawā’if*).⁵⁴

These accounts are told by well-educated witnesses, who deplored the turmoil following the ‘Āmirid fall. They criticize both the ‘Āmirids and Muḥammad II but above all the lower-class populace as initiators of the collapse of the state and society, casting some doubt on how closely Muḥammad was really associated with the lower-class populace. Scales attempted to downplay their role, denying their recruitment and the payment of stipends to them by reading *‘amma* as the nobility. Defying the sources, he regarded Muḥammad’s popular supporters as men of the middle classes.⁵⁵ However, it is undeniable that the populace of Cordoba and its environs including the craftsmen and traders of *sūqs* brought about the ‘Āmirid fall, though it seems that the leaders of the revolution at this stage were mainly Umayyad *mawālī* and Cordovan notables (e.g. the *faqīh* Ḥasan b. Ḥayy, Muṭarrif b. Tha’alaba and the *qāḍī* Aḥmad b. Dhakwān). If not a few Cordovans had ever experienced battles with northern Christians, their enlistment would be more understandable. It is not known if Muḥammad was only compelled to rely on the populace to cope with Shanjūl’s Berber army, which was on its way back from Toledo to squash his revolt, or, as Kennedy says, he deliberately formed a new army to dispense with Berbers and Ṣaqāliba.⁵⁶ The motives of the populace were partly their economic expectation, including looting and their enlistment as regular soldiers, but their genuine sympathy for the Islamic model of state and society under caliphal leadership was perhaps more important.

As compared with the role played by the populace, ‘Āmirid internal squabbles were minor affairs, despite exaggerated reports of the conspiracies formed

53 Ibn ‘Idhārī, iii, 61, 74 (Nuwayrī, xxiii, 244).

54 Ibn ‘Idhārī, iii, 51, 82.

55 Scales, *The Fall* 61–4, 67–70.

56 Kennedy, *Muslim Spain* 125–6.

by al-Muẓaffar's mother.⁵⁷ The ascription of Shanjūl's failure to his personal incompetence and profligacy⁵⁸ is even more untrustworthy.

Notwithstanding the fact that Shanjūl had allegiance paid to himself at Qal'at Rabāḥ (Calatrava la Vieja) in return for the issuing of deeds (*ṣukūk*) granting houses and estates (*diyā'*) to individuals,⁵⁹ most Berber mercenaries and volunteers including old Arab *jund* warriors had deserted before he reached Armilāt near Cordoba. The Berbers returned to their Cordovan homes in small groups, resulting in Shanjūl's swift murder alongside his Ṣaqāliba servants and a great northern Christian nobleman (*qūmis*), called Ibn Ghūmis,⁶⁰ at the hands of the troops sent by Muḥammad II in Rajab 399/March 1009. The success of the revolution was mainly due to Shanjūl's underestimation of gravity of the conspiracy and massive Cordovan participation on the one hand, and unexpected Berber neutrality on the other. It is said that "the Berbers saw what they could not understand, but were convinced that they should not fight the people (*aḥl*) of Cordoba lest their properties and families would fall into the hands of the people of the city (*balad*). They agreed on their delivery of 'Abd al-Raḥmān to them." The *qādī* Ibn Dhakwān, who had accompanied the army, incited Berbers to desert Shanjūl. He is said "to have severed his ties with 'Abd al-Raḥmān, accusing him as libertine. He took issue with 'Abd al-Raḥmān's proposal to fight the Muslims of Cordoba, fearing that the army would occupy Cordoba and kill the people who happened to be there, despite the existence of honest people and innocent children."⁶¹

57 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 52; *A'māl* 109.

58 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 80, 87, 92, 99; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 245, 249.

59 According to Scales' interpretation (*The Fall* 61), Shanjūl attempted to restore the traditional system of land distribution among Arab warriors, which had been largely abolished by his father. However, inasmuch as the bulk of his army at Qal'at Rabāḥ was composed of Berbers, it should mean that Shanjūl desperately attempted to keep Berber support fixed on himself.

60 Dozy (*Spanish Islam* 544) and Lévi-Provençal (*Histoire* ii, 287, 303) considered that this man was García Gómez, count of Carrion (located between Leon and Burgos), an 'Āmirid ally since al-Manṣūr's days. However, Scales (*The Fall* 54–6), considering his kinship with Shanjūl, put forward a theory that he was García Ramírez, 'king' of Viguera, La Rioja, who was a nephew of the king of Navarre, Sancho Garcés II, Shanjūl's grandfather. It seems that Kennedy (*Muslim Spain* 128) also followed him. The king of Navarre had seized eastern La Rioja including Viguera and Arnedo from 'Abd al-Raḥmān III. Bishko, Salvus of Albelda and Frontier Monasticism, in his *Studies in Medieval Spanish Frontier History* 560–2.

61 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 49–50, 66–74 (esp. 67); Nuwayrī, xxiii, 243–4.

The Cordovan Populace at War with the Berber Mercenaries

The overthrow of 'Āmirid dictatorship should have paved the way for the restoration of the caliphal model of state and society. "The people (*ahl*) of Cordoba were greatly pleased with Muḥammad II's accession, holding banquets and wedding ceremonies lasting several days in the open spaces (*riḥāb*) of Cordoba and its suburbs (*arbād*) and moving from a place to another with flutes and instruments. They wished the perfect realization of their hope and the stability of their new state of affairs."⁶² However, the 'Āmirid Ṣaqāliba evidently had no part in this new order. They hurriedly escaped from Cordoba, taking refuge in the ports of arid Sharq al-Andalus, Tortosa (Ṭurṭūsha), Valencia (Balansiya), Denia, Murcia and Almeria, which had been rapidly developing extensive irrigation. Some of them installed sons of al-Muḥaffar and Shanjūl as rulers, aiming at the partial restoration of 'Āmirid order.⁶³ Regarding the Berber mercenaries, they had no more homelands to return in Maghrib. It is difficult to judge whether Muḥammad II really wanted to form a new army composed of newly enlisted populace or conciliate Berber mercenaries, continuing to use them as the mainstay of the Umayyad army. However, it is rather unrealistic to believe that popular soldiers could fight the battle-hardened Castilian and Catalan soldiers on equal terms.

The populace who had awakened to their potential power fiercely opposed the maintenance of the Berber forces. According to pro-Berber al-Raqīq, Muḥammad II's guards "were composed of foolish eunuchs and recruits of popular origin (*amma*) having mean professions. They were not selected. They roughly treated (Berber) soldiers and their leaders who entered the palace to seek safe-conduct from him. They slighted the authority of commanders and leaders when they entered and left the palace owing to their ignorance and foolish hopes, demanding that they lay arms on entering the palace and abusing them without distinguishing seniors from juniors." Moreover, many Berber houses, including the residences of the Ṣanhāja leaders, Zāwī and his nephew Ḥabbūs b. Māksan, located in al-Ruṣāfa, were sacked by new recruits of popular origin.⁶⁴

The popular hatred of the Berbers has much in common with the rancor that the populace of Baghdad nursed against the Khurāsāni-Central Asian warriors fighting on the side of al-Ma'mūn. It is essentially their irritation at the promotion of foreign warriors, whom they regarded as idiosyncratic

62 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 74.

63 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 77, 83; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 245.

64 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 75–6.

barbarians, to higher ranks than themselves. This is aggravated by a conflict of economic interest (a struggle for stipends) as a result of massive recruitment of Cordovan populace. One result is the dismissal of 7,000 new recruits as soon as Muḥammad II's position was consolidated.⁶⁵ Al-Raḳīq claims that what the Andalusis call the Berber tumult (al-fitnat al-Barbariyya) must be called Muḥammad's tumult, ascribing all the responsibility to him and the populace.⁶⁶ However, it is the Berber mercenaries who opened the next conflict.

In Shawwāl 399/June 1009, taking advantage of the concentration of the army in Faḥṣ al-Surādiq, the Berber mercenaries, together with dismissed soldiers of popular origin, rose in revolt to install one of 'Abd al-Raḥmān III's grandsons as caliph. They besieged the alcázar, but they were driven back by the populace (*amma*) of the walled city and al-Gharbiyya, resulting in the death of their 'caliph.' They escaped to Qal'at Rabāḥ, where they installed his nephew Sulaymān b. al-Ḥakam under the caliphal title of al-Musta'in. Neutral Berbers remaining in Cordoba were annihilated at random, together with Maghribi mujahidin, scholars and merchants who happened to be staying in Cordoba; the houses of Berbers were looted and their wives and children were enslaved.⁶⁷ The Berbers, who had escaped to Qal'at Rabāḥ, responded to Muḥammad II's envoy offering them safe-conduct on condition that they would return to Maghrib to their former life, "Even if he forgives us his people (*ra'iyya*) would never forgive us. Even if the populace forgive us his army (*jund*) would never forgive us."⁶⁸ This turmoil is evidently a conflict between the Berber mercenaries and the Cordovan populace as Ibn 'Idhārī expressly states, not a conflict among the populace as Clément claimed on the basis that the dismissed soldiers of popular origin took sides with the Berbers.⁶⁹

Wādiḥ, Ṣaqāliba commander of the frontier garrison at Medinaceli, had refrained from hurrying to save Shanjūl, rendering homage to Muḥammad II without delay.⁷⁰ He now attacked the Berber mercenaries on the run, ousting Berber cavalymen from his garrison. The Berbers, suffering from the lack

65 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 78; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 245.

66 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 76.

67 A traditionist from Malīla (Melilla) on the Moroccan coast (belonging to Spain now), Khalaf al-Jarāwī, who was associated with the *qāḍī* Ibn Dhakwān, was killed by the populace. Another traditionist, Khalaf al-Balawī, escaped from Cordoba, but died soon in Elvira. Ibn Bashkuwāl, 177–8.

68 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 51, 78–84 (esp. 82). For a conflict between the Berbers and the *amma*, see Idem 81.

69 Clément, *Pouvoir et légitimité* 163.

70 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 69, 76.

of provisions and clothing, were compelled to sack frontier cities and even appeal to the count of Castile, Sancho García, who had managed to cope with al-Muẓaffar's incursions on equal terms, for assistance. The combined forces of the Berbers and Castile, after summarily defeating Wāḍiḥ at Alcalá de Henares (Qal'ā 'Abd al-Salām), advanced on Córdoba. Anticipating his defeat in a battle, Muḥammad II had a trench encircling the suburbs, Faḥṣ al-Surādiq and many *munyas* excavated and had wheat, firewood and salt stored inside.⁷¹ The Cordovans, who were posted in the trenches and even participated in the coming pitched battle, were mainly composed of the populace of suburbs, as shown by the following accounts.

The people (*ahl*) of Córdoba gathered before the alcázar from every suburb, saying, "We must kill these Berbers, their women and children, who are remaining with us, for they are more dangerous and harmful than the attackers." However, they could take refuge with Cordovans, villagers and travelers, who sheltered them. . . . Muḥammad posted men (*rijāl*) at the entrances of suburbs, gates and walls. He himself rode to Faḥṣ al-Surādiq, placing commanders, soldiers and his populace (*'amma*) in the trenches of suburbs. Among his commanders were al-Qaṣā'irī the doctor and Ibn 'Āmir the estate-manager (*wakīl*). Even fishmongers, butchers and their likes were armored, lifting flags and drums before them, but they looked so awkward as to incur laughter. The suburbs, open spaces and cemeteries were filled with people from outer regions (*ahl al-bawādī*) and Andalusī cities and regions (*aqālīm*). . . . Criers announced that every adult must join battle, resulting in their absence in Córdoba.⁷²

In Rabī' I 400/November 1009, after occupying Armilāt, the Berber-Castilian army descended to the plain near Córdoba, summarily defeating the Cordovans and Wāḍiḥ's frontier army at Qantīsh. While Muḥammad II and Wāḍiḥ escaped from the battlefield, it is said that the number of the Cordovans who were killed in this battle or drowned in the Guadalquivir reached 30,000 or 10,000 (no doubt an exaggerated figure, but suggesting considerable casualties), including several scholars such as Aḥmad b. Muṭarrif b. Hānī al-Juhānī the Qur'ān-reciter and Sa'īd b. 'Uthmān, Berber *qāḍī* of Badajoz.⁷³

71 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 85–7, 104; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 246.

72 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 87–8.

73 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 17, 210, 488.

The survivors fled to Cordoba, but went out to welcome Sulaymān two days later, rendering homage to him in the great mosque.⁷⁴

The Umayyad state as supported by Berber mercenaries appeared to have been reconstituted. Sancho García was compelled to return to Castile empty-handed without receiving the border fortresses that had been promised.⁷⁵ It seems that Sulaymān promoted reconciliation between the Berbers and the Cordovans, executing the Berber mercenaries who had plundered suburban houses.⁷⁶ On the other hand, he demoted Muḥammad II's new cavalrymen into infantrymen, separating Berbers from citizens and settling them in the barracks of Madīnat al-Zahrā' or Shaqunda (Secunda) south of the alcántara. However, popular antipathy to the Berber mercenaries was rife. According to al-Raḳīq, "The people of Cordoba continued to harm Berbers maliciously. They killed Berbers who were found alone. When Berbers entered the *sūqs* of Cordoba, they feared the populace (*āmma*). If a horse neighed at another, they run headlong, fearing popular factional rancor."⁷⁷

When Muḥammad II escaped to Toledo, the garrison at Medinaceli decided to support him. Ramón Borrell (992–1017), count of Barcelona, and the count of Urgel were persuaded to join these Muslims on condition that each cavalryman would receive two dinars a day in addition to provisions. When they advanced on Cordoba, its anti-Berber populace was exempted from conscription, resulting in their near absence on both sides.⁷⁸ Accordingly the battle of 'Aqabat al-Baqar Pass north of Cordoba (Shawwāl 400/May 1010) was fought between the frontier and Catalan armies on the one hand, and the Berber mercenaries on the other, resulting in the latter's defeat. After the Berbers fled to southern Andalucia together with their families, the Cordovan populace sacked Madīnat al-Zahrā', killing the Berbers they found there and

74 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 51, 83, 88–9; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 246–7; Ibn Bassām, i, 43–4.

75 Soon after returning from Cordoba, Sancho García took Tierra de Campos (the region of Carrion) from Leon. Bishko, Fernando I and the Origins of the Leonese-Castilian Alliance with Cluny, in his *Studies* 15–6. It is said that Sancho García threatened Wāḍiḥ, during the second reign of Muḥammad II, to return all the cities and over 200 fortresses, which had been acquired during the ḥājibate of al-Manṣūr. Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 103–4; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 250. However, the Castilians did not hold the upper Duero fortresses definitely except for short duration until 1059. Scales, *The Fall* 187–204.

76 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 90–1.

77 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 92; Ibn Bassām, i, 37.

78 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 94; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 247–8; Ibn Bassām, i, 45.

seizing everything including the door panels, pulpit, lamps, Qur'anic copies and carpets of its mosque.⁷⁹

It is likely, however, that the Cordovan populace, with few exceptions, failed to join the punitive expedition hurriedly dispatched by Muḥammad II to hunt down the Berbers, for this army was chiefly composed of cavalymen including Catalans. Soon, this army was defeated by a Berber countercharge at the battle of Guadiaro (Wādī Āro) near Ronda. The frontier cavalymen run headlong to Cordoba, and the Barcelonese cavalymen, who had suffered a bigger loss in this battle, returned home, neglecting Muḥammad's entreaty to remain with him for the defense of Cordoba. He was forced to recruit Cordovan populace and had trenches and walls encircling Greater Cordoba reconstructed. In light of this situation, Wāḍiḥ, in alliance with his Ṣaḳāliba comrade, Khayrān of Almeria, and the Tuj̄ibid al-Mundhir I b. Yaḥyā, Andalusi lord of the Upper March, deposed and killed Muḥammad II, reinstating Hishām II, who could be more acceptable to not only the Cordovan citizens, but also the frontier soldiers, Ṣaḳāliba and even Berber mercenaries (Dhū l-Ḥijja 400/July 1010).⁸⁰

However, Berber tribes decided not to hurry back to Cordoba but to divide southern Andalusia among themselves to settle there. For example, the largest group, the Ṣanhāja, under the leadership of Zāwī b. Zīrī and his nephew Ḥabbūs, conquered the fertile *vega* of Elvira,⁸¹ and smaller Zanāta groups, the Īfran under Abū Nūr b. Abī Qurra, the Dammar under Muḥammad b. Nūḥ and the Khazrūn under Muḥammad b. Khazrūn, seized the smaller regions of Ronda, Moron (Mawrūr) and Arcos (Arkush), respectively. Jaen (Jayyān), a relatively large city east of Cordoba, also fell into the hands of the Īfran and the Birzāl.⁸² Picard might be right when he says that these regions had already been promised as tribal *iqṭā'*s by al-Manṣūr or Shanjūl.⁸³

79 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 95, 107. Some scholars were killed in this battle on both sides. Ibn al-Burīlī, *qāḍī* of Tudela, Navarre, who had been engaged in *jihād*, joined Muḥammad II. Ibn Bashkuwāl, 488. On the other hand, Cordovan Qur'an-reciters, Ibn al-Ghammāz and Ibn Barīl, and Ibn Qand the grammarian joined Sulaymān's army; the last was closely associated with Sulaymān. Idem 20, 195, 250. It is not known on which side Ibn al-Faṣāl fought. Idem 489. According to Christian sources, the Catalan count of Urgel was killed in this battle. Scales, *The Fall* 76–7.

80 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 96–100; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 248–9. In this battle the bishops of Girona and Vic were killed. Collins, *Caliphs and Kings* 199.

81 *Tibyān* 45–6; *Mafākhir* 43.

82 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 113, 270–1.

83 Picard, *Le Portugal musulman* 284. Sulaymān is said to have divided southern Andalusia among Berber chiefs (*ru'asā'*) in his second reign (Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 113–4), but this grant is,

It is four months after the battle of Guadiaro (Rabī' I 401/November 1010) that the Berbers occupied Shaqunda, then Madinat al-Zahrā', effectively beginning the siege of Cordoba. Because they adamantly rebuffed a compromise to accept Hishām II and because the Cordovans (*ahl*) were militant enough, the siege lasted as long as two years and a half. The massive inflow of the people of the environs congested the area inside the trenches, leading up to the soaring of prices and the outbreak of plagues. The Berbers crossed the trenches and sacked suburbs, forcing Wāḍiḥ to destroy al-Ruṣāfa for fear of its fall into their hands.⁸⁴ One year later, Wāḍiḥ was killed by the Cordovan army (*jund*) because he proposed a new peace plan to the Berbers. It is said that despite the gravity of the situation those who proposed peace were killed on the spot.⁸⁵

His successor, an 'Āmirid *mawlā*, Ibn Munāw (or Manyūh),⁸⁶ took more prudent attitudes, obtaining the consent of *faqīhs* and Ṣaḳāliba before proposing peace to the Berbers. It would not seem a leap in logic to think that Cordoba nearly became a patrician city under the leadership of the ex-*qāḍī* Ibn Dhakwān and Ibn Munāw. Ibn Munāw, in his last attempt at a compromise, recognized Sulaymān as the top of the government and Hishām II's successor, but met with Berber rebuff.⁸⁷ After he escaped to Badajoz (Baṭalyaws), the Lower March, Ibn Dhakwān, suppressing the opposition of many other *faqīhs*, led a delegation to offer a surrender and the payment of an indemnity. Sulaymān was at once recognized as caliph by the Cordovans (Shawwāl 403/May 1013). Despite the grant of safe-conduct, Cordoba, particularly al-Gharbiyya, was sacked and many anti-Berber scholars were killed or escaped from Cordoba.⁸⁸

if true, merely a reconfirmation of the fait accompli. Tibi, *Tibyān* 198, note 60. It is also reported that the people of Elvira appealed to Zāwī for protection. *Tibyān* 46.

- 84 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 101–2, 106; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 250. After the looting of his house in Balāt Mughith at the hands of Berbers, Ibn Ḥazm took refuge in Almeria. *Ṭawq* 117; Scales, *The Fall* 80. The former *qāḍī* of Toledo, Khalaf b. Marwān b. Ḥaywa, also escaped from Cordoba to his native town, Ṣakhra Ḥaywa, western al-Andalus. Ibn Bashkuwāl, 162–3.
- 85 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 103–5; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 250–1.
- 86 Ibn Munāw in Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 107, 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Manyūh, an 'Āmirid *mawlā*, in Ibn Sa'īd, *Mughrib* i, 156. He might be identical with 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Matyūh, a temporary ruler of Toledo (*A'māl* 177), for Cordoba was often corresponding with Toledo during the siege. Then, he should have moved to Toledo after escaping from Cordoba and taking refuge in Badajoz.
- 87 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 107–9; Ibn Sa'īd, i, 156. Relatively pro-Berber Ibn Dhakwān was dismissed in 401/1010 and exiled to Wahrān (Oran), Algeria, but after Wāḍiḥ's death was allowed to return to Cordoba without regaining his office. Ibn Sa'īd, i, 216.
- 88 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 112–3, 115; Iyād, *Tartīb* vii, 178–81; Ḍabbī, *Bughyat al-multamis* 19; *Ṭawq* 118. Ibn al-Faraḍī (author of a biographical dictionary), Ibn al-Jabbāb, Ibn Khamīs, Sa'īd, son

It seems that the Cordovan populace had been getting weary for some time.⁸⁹ The people who were posted in the trenches and walls refrained from making sorties during the siege, leaving Berbers to plunder crops and animals at will.⁹⁰ Public order inside the trenches was maintained on the whole. It is only after the lack of food forced the people to eat human bodies and the blood of slaughtered animals that they went out of the trenches by night to gather food, risking their lives.⁹¹ War advocates on the Cordovan side were mainly *Ṣaḡāliba* and the frontier soldiers from the Upper March in addition to some *faḡīhs*. This phase of the war was essentially a struggle for power among the ruling classes. Another result of the fall of Cordoba and the *mawālī*'s loss of power was a virtual merger of the Umayyad *mawālī*-dignitaries and the civil notables.

On the other hand, Berber reconciliation with the Cordovans was hard to realize, making it impossible for them to settle in or near Cordoba. Because they expected this hard fact, they had conquered southern Andalusia as their new homes. However, they could have managed to compromise with the Cordovans including Umayyad *mawālī*, *faḡīhs*, notables and the populace, and the frontier soldiers of the Middle and Upper Marches, settling in southern Andalusia and taking the field from there against northern Christians. They had consistently rebuffed this compromise, only because they wanted to satisfy their thirst for revenge and monopoly of power to the exclusion of the Umayyad *mawālī*. It was clear for everybody that this new Berber order would necessarily be unstable, resulting in the deepening of the rift of Andalusian society.

Cordovan Successful Resistance against the Ḥammūdids

Cordoba was placed under Berber rule, as Ibn 'Idhārī says, "This Sulaymān marked the beginning of the Berber dynasty (Dawlat al-Barābir), putting an

of the *qādī* al-Mundhir b. Sa'īd, the ascetic Ibn Najda and the Umayyad al-Jālītī (the last *imām* of Madīnat al-Zahrā') were killed by Berbers. Ibn Bashkuwāl, 27, 163, 212–3, 232, 251–2, 490–1; Ḍabbī, 114, 321–2. Rāshid b. Rāshid escaped for the Lower March, but was killed on the way. The strongly anti-Berber *qādī* of Cordoba (successor of Ibn Dhakwān), Abū Bakr Yaḡyā b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Wāfid al-Lakhmī, was imprisoned, but he was soon found dead. Ibn Bashkuwāl, 186, 663–4; Ibn Sa'īd, i, 155–6, 216.

89 Scales (*The Fall* 85–8) supposed that Ibn Ḥayyān followed al-Ṭabarī's accounts of the siege of Baghdad by the Khurāsāni-Central Asian army, concluding that the Cordovan mob was bellicose and eager to sack the houses of rich, peace-seeking notables freely. However, his 'evidences' (e.g. Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 107) have nothing to do with the populace.

90 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 101–2.

91 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 105–7.

end to the Umayyad dynasty in al-Andalus. It lasted 268 years and 43 days.⁹² Sulaymān and a small Berber band settled in Madīnat al-Zahrā' to avoid frictions with the Cordovans, conceding Shaqunda to other Berbers under the command of al-Qāsim b. Ḥammūd, an Idrīsid prince of Morocco, who had taken part in the siege.⁹³

However, Sulaymān's writ run only in Andalucia (except Almeria) and al-Gharb (Algarve and Baixo Alentejo). The people and garrisons of the Marches severed all ties with Cordoba, eventually accepting the monarchical rule of their military leaders, such as the Andalusi Tujībids of Zaragoza and Berber old-settlers, the Dhū n-Nūnids of Toledo and the Aftāsids of Badajoz, who had been invited from outside to strengthen their defense against the northern Christian states. On the other hand, Ṣaqāliba leaders founded their small principalities in Tortosa, Valencia, Denia, and Almeria, consistently rebuffing Sulaymān's proposal.⁹⁴ Even in Cordoba, the citizens and the Umayyad *mawālī* did not conceal their enmity against the Berber mercenaries and Sulaymān, making the restoration of the Umayyad state of Islamic model impossible.

The only possible candidate who could rebuild the caliphal state, attracting the support of the Cordovans, Berbers and Ṣaqāliba, if not Marchers, was apparently not an Umayyad member, but an Idrīsid member of northern Morocco, 'Alī b. Ḥammūd, governor of the port city of Ceuta (Sabta) on the Moroccan side of the Straits. He was a descendant of al-Ḥasan, son of the fourth orthodox caliph, 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, and Fāṭima, a daughter of the Prophet, and a royal member of the extinct Idrīsid dynasty, which had been supported by the Awraba and Zanāta Berbers of northern Morocco, making him an ideal candidate acceptable to both Andalusis and Berbers.⁹⁵ Moreover, his elder brother, al-Qāsim b. Ḥammūd, governor of Tangier (Ṭanja) and Aṣīlā (Arzila),⁹⁶ had taken part in the siege of Cordoba and settled in Shaqunda after the siege with his Zanāta followers, supplying a reliable base for 'Alī.

It seems that the most important Ṣaqāliba leader, Khayrān of Almeria, after his return from Cordoba, had a clandestine understanding with the

92 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 114. At this point (Sulaymān's reinstatement), Ibn 'Idhārī's accounts become scanty and virtually identical with Ibn Ḥayyān's accounts quoted by Ibn Bassām in his *Kitāb al-Dhakhīra*. Probably these extracts of an ornate style were quoted from the *Matīn*, not *Muqtabis*, contrary to Scales' statement (*The Fall* 90), suggesting that by the time of Ibn 'Idhārī the *Matīn* had already been scattered.

93 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 113.

94 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 115.

95 For Ḥammūdīd genealogy and chronology based on the study of literature and coinage see Wasserstein, *The Caliphate in the West* 50–97.

96 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 113–4.

Ḥammūdids to revenge his defeat at Cordoba.⁹⁷ Even among the Berber victors, Zāwī b. Zīrī, leader of the Ṣanhāja and ruler of Elvira, was sympathetic to ‘Alī. In 405/1014–5 ‘Alī rose in open revolt, crossing the Straits to Malaga with his Zanāta followers.⁹⁸ After long negotiations with various powers he left Malaga for Cordoba, incorporating the men of his brother al-Qāsim, Khayrān and Zāwī on the way and entering Cordoba in Muḥarram 407/June 1016. After confirming Hishām II’s death he killed Sulaymān in the alcázar, acceding to the caliphal throne himself. His honorific title, al-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh, is the same as ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III’s,⁹⁹ demonstrating his intention to reconstruct the Islamic-modeled centralized state.¹⁰⁰ The Cordovan populace refrained from opposing his entry, facilitating his attempt to reconcile Andalus and Berber mercenaries by treating them equitably.

‘Alī b. Ḥammūd continued to be friendly with the people (*aḥl*) of Cordoba [for the first eight months], then he perceived their hatred of his dynasty. When he became caliph he checked Berbers so eagerly that even the weakest people (*ra’īyya*) could file suits against Berber leaders on any charges and win the cases. . . . [‘Alī himself presided at the court of appeal (*maẓālim*).¹⁰¹ Its door was open and its draperies were drawn up.] In his court he himself inflicted Qur’anic punishments (*ḥadd*). When a group of Berber seniors (*akābir*) was brought to him on a charge related to a widow necessitating an exemplary punishment he ordered their beheading. Many sheikhs (*wujūh*) of their tribes and clans were merely watching,

97 Pro-Umayyad Ibn Ḥazm, who opposed Khayrān’s plan to install ‘Alī b. Ḥammūd, was ousted from Almeria, taking refuge with the Tujībids. Later, he joined al-Murtaḍā’s movement in Valencia. *Tawq* 118.

98 ‘Alī’s renunciation of allegiance to Sulaymān is testified by the coins issued by him in Ceuta in 405 (July 1014-June 1015), dropping the name of al-Musta’in. Wasserstein, *The Caliphate* 71. Ashtor (*The Jews of Moslem Spain* ii, 311, note 7) also put ‘Alī’s arrival at Malaga between the fall of 1014 and the spring of the next year. Lévi-Provençal (*Histoire* ii, 324) placed ‘Alī’s arrival at the end of 406. However, no sources support him, as Scales (*The Fall* 92, note 215) noticed.

99 Scales (*The Fall* 93–5) claimed that ‘Alī took plural honorific titles including *al-Mutawakkil ‘alā-llāh*, dwelling on its ‘significant hidden’ meaning at great length. However, his source (Ibn Bassām, i, 97) only says that Abbasid al-Mutawakkil’s son (al-Muwaffaq), ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III and ‘Alī b. Ḥammūd were all styled *al-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh*.

100 Ibn Bassām, i, 41–2, 97; Ibn ‘Idhārī, iii, 115–7, 120, 122; Ḍabbī, 22.

101 The *maẓālim* was a court in which caliphs or their deputies (*wazīrs* or governors) judged suits filed against *qāḍīs* or dignitaries whom *qāḍīs* found it very difficult to judge equitably. Hallaq, *Origins* 99–100.

refraining from interceding for them. . . . A Berber who said, "I took it as others do so," was beheaded by his order on charge of stealing a load of grapes, and his head was carried around the city.¹⁰²

Despite these exaggerated accounts of 'Alī's administration of justice, it is questionable whether 'Alī, who relied on Zanāta support, could assume such firm attitudes toward them. At least in the eyes of Khayrān and al-Mundhir I b. Yaḥyā, the Tujībid ruler, he looked to be too pro-Berber. These men rose in revolt against 'Alī in Valencia, installing one of 'Abd al-Raḥmān III's great-grandsons as caliph with the honorific title of al-Murtaḍā, after receiving Barcelonese reinforcements from its count, Berenguer Ramón (1017–35). However, they failed to unite the forces of Sharq al-Andalus in this all-out effort, for Mubārak of Valencia and Mujāhid of Denia refused to go to their aid. These allied forces advanced on not Cordoba, but Elvira, the headquarters of Zāwī's Ṣanhāja, ending up with a dismal failure and al-Murtaḍā's murder, because Zāwī had abandoned Elvira to take refuge in the nearby defensible hills of Alhambra and Albaicin, Granada.¹⁰³

'Alī b. Ḥammūd changed his attitudes toward the Cordovans as a result of this revolt, judging them to be sympathetic to al-Murtaḍā. According to Ibn Ḥayyān, "He swiftly abandoned the favor he had shown to the Cordovans, turning to favor the Berber party (*ḥizb*) and ignoring their oppression and injustice. The Cordovans reverted to their former ignominious state during Sulaymān's days. He imposed market taxes (*maghārim*), confiscated arms, destroyed houses, prevented deputy-judges (*ḥukkām*) from administering justice and fined the populace (*'amma*). . . . Many notables (*a'yān*) who had served Sulaymān were put on trial and confiscated their properties." Among them was found Abū l-Ḥazm b. Jahwar, later *wazīr* of the Cordovan 'republic'.¹⁰⁴

In Dhū l-Qa'ḍa 408/March 1018, before the beginning of the siege of Granada, 'Alī b. Ḥammūd was killed in the hammam of the alcázar at the hands of his Ṣaqāliba attendants. Possibly this assassination was instigated by Umayyad *mawālī* or notables. His Zanāta troops, discarding his son and heir-presumptive Yaḥyā, invited 'Alī's sexagenarian elder brother al-Qāsim b.

102 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 121. Words inside box brackets are quoted from Ibn Bassām, i, 97, 99.

103 Ibn Bassām, i, 453–7; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 121, 125–8; *Tibyān* 47–9; *Iḥāta* i, 93, 515–6. For the siege of Granada see Handler, *The Zirids of Granada* 24–8. For an inter-Ṣaqāliba struggle between Khayrān and Mujāhid see Scales, *The Fall* 137–40. In 410/1019–20, Zāwī, fed up with unceasing discords, returned to the Zirid court in Ifrīqiya, leaving Ḥabbūs in Granada. Ibn Bassām, i, 457–60; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 128–9; Handler, *The Zirids* 29–34.

104 Ibn Bassām, i, 99–100; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 123. cf. Scales, *The Fall* 98 (partial trans.).

Ḥammūd, then governor of Seville (Ishbiliya), to install him as caliph with the caliphal title of al-Ma'mūn.¹⁰⁵

Despite the deepening of the rift of society, it seems that al-Qāsim made the last attempt to patch things up during his three-year reign, giving safe-conduct to all men, abolishing additional taxes (*taqwiya*),¹⁰⁶ and retaining *qāḍīs*, deputy-judges (*ḥukkām*) and other servants. On the other hand, he recruited black (Sūdān) infantrymen, appointing them as commanders of districts (*a'māl*), for he needed his own power base independent of Cordovans and Berbers. The Zanāta troops reacted against it by inviting Yaḥyā b. 'Alī to Malaga from Morocco, forcing al-Qāsim to flee to Seville. The Zanāta of Malaga immediately advanced to Cordoba, installing Yaḥyā as caliph in the alcázar in Jumādā I 412/August 1021.¹⁰⁷ However, Yaḥyā's domain was limited to Cordoba and Malaga; even Berber-dominated Jaen fell into the hands of al-Muẓaffar's son in the same year.¹⁰⁸ It seems that so far the Cordovan populace was not involved in these upheavals.

Yaḥyā also made a half-hearted effort to reconcile the Cordovans and the Berbers by promoting Umayyad *mawālī* and Cordovan notables to high posts. This policy naturally instigated the Zanāta troops to take action against Yaḥyā, forcing him to escape to Malaga only one year and a half later. Al-Qāsim was duly reinstated in Cordoba, but his domain was limited to Cordoba, Seville and Jerez (Sharīsh). Moreover, the Zanāta troops overpowered him. Only a half year later (Jumādā II 414/September 1023), the people of Cordoba rose in arms, occupying the alcázar after a siege and ousting al-Qāsim and several thousand Zanāta troops from al-Gharbiyya after a two-month battle. Al-Qāsim and his Zanāta troops were ousted from Seville too by its citizens, taking refuge in Jerez, where he was captured by Yaḥyā.¹⁰⁹

The Ḥammūdīd caliphs attempted to rebuild the traditional caliphal state by conciliating the Andalusis and restraining Berber troops, for the most part. Eventually, they failed courtesy of Zanāta opposition. The people of Cordoba, who tenaciously fought the Zanāta until they ousted them out of Cordoba, were, no doubt, mainly the populace under the leadership of *mawālī*-notables. It seems that caliphal guards, called *dā'ira*,¹¹⁰ and a regular army (*jund*

105 Ibn Bassām, i, 100–1; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 122.

106 An obligation imposed on every citizen to feed soldiers, Berber soldiers in this case. Clément, *Pouvoir et légitimité* 168, 195; Scales, *The Fall* 103.

107 Ibn Bassām, i, 481–2; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 130–1.

108 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 133.

109 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 134–5; Ibn Bassām, i, 484–6.

110 Dozy, *Supplément* i, 474; Clément, *Pouvoir et légitimité* 170, 179, 183.

al-baladiyyīn) were recruited from these men either during Yaḥyā's caliphate or soon after Ḥammūdīd expulsion, paving the way for the greater role of the lower classes.

From Semi-Plebeian City to Patrician City

The prolonged struggles between the Cordovans and the Berbers finally ended in the former's victory. Inasmuch as the restoration of the Umayyad centralized state was obviously impossible, the Cordovan *mawālī*-notables were compelled to establish their own oligarchy under nominal Umayyad caliphs, just like the contemporary Sevillians under the triumvirs composed of the *qādī* Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl b. 'Abbād, the *faqīh* Abū 'Abdallāh al-Zubaydī and the *wazīr* 'Abdallāh b. Maryam.¹¹¹ When the notables and the populace assembled in the great mosque to elect al-Murtaḍā's son as caliph from several candidates, the populace and some notables who still hoped for stronger caliphs, together with the *dā'ira* and the *jund*, forced their way into the mosque to impose Muḥammad 11's brother as Caliph al-Mustaẓhir bi-llāh. Although al-Mustaẓhir dispatched emissaries to persuade the people of al-Andalus to render him homage, he found no response; his writ run only in Cordoba and its environs. He not only promoted traditional *mawālī*, including Ibn Ḥazm, but also formed a small Zanāta cavalry, imposing new taxes on the citizens and confiscating the properties of some *mawālī*-notables. Naturally he rapidly lost the support of notables and the populace.¹¹²

Even the *dā'ira* incited the populace (*'amma*) to riot, saying, "We have overcome Berbers, ousting them out of Cordoba. This man is attempting to call them back to us." Only one month and a half after his installment, the populace forced their way into the alcázar, murdering al-Mustaẓhir and his Zanāta troops and installing another great-grandson of 'Abd al-Raḥmān 111 found inside as Caliph al-Mustakfi bi-llāh in Dhū l-Qa'da 414/January 1024. He was a nominal caliph from the very first, just like his Abbasid namesake (333–4/944–6).¹¹³ The people's power reached the peak under his nominal authority, making Cordoba virtually a semi-plebeian city. Ibn Ḥayyān was indignant over this state of affairs from the standpoint of *mawālī*-notables.

111 dhayl 314–5; Ibn Bassām, iii, 15, 19.

112 Ibn Bassām, i, 48–52; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 135–8.

113 Ibn Bassām, i, 53–5, 433–4; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 138–41.

This caliph al-Mustakfī was invested with an office for which he was not fit. He gave a friendly audience to anyone, trying to humor him. . . . He considered that even an abject person could deputize for him. He used to say, "Name the office you want." In his age not only junior secretaries and eunuchs, but also ignoble bodyguards (*dā'ira*) and watchmen (*nuzẓār*) styled themselves *wazīrs* either individually or collectively. Traders and plebeians (*āmma*) found works in the higher and lower polices (*shurṭas*). The people (*nās*) gathered before the gate of his palace and settled in its court, seeking these posts. However, once his ineffective rule became evident, they rebuffed these posts, swearing that they had never been invested with such offices, particularly when fines were repeatedly levied from them to make up a loss. . . . Finally he deflowered the learned class including *faqīhs*, elevating their most learned advisers, who used to issue *fatwās*, to the vizierate and thereby mingling them with the above-mentioned abject eunuchs, bodyguards and watchmen. . . . Al-Mustakfī promoted many junior *faqīhs*, that is inkwell carriers and examiners of legal questions (*masā'il*), to members of the *shūrā*,¹¹⁴ for which only high-ranking *faqīhs*, entitled to issue *fatwās*, should be eligible. Their number then reached forty in Cordoba, more numerous than ever. It is rumored that he would replace members of the *dā'ira* with others.¹¹⁵

This is not a form of plebeian domination, for it seems that the lower echelons of the *mawālī*-notables benefited most under al-Mustakfī; a relatively small number of the populace were recruited in the *dā'ira*, and even fewer were promoted. In Rabī' 1 416/May 1025 the upper echelons of *mawālī*-notables, called *mala'*,¹¹⁶ forced him to escape to Ucles (Uqlish), Santaver, where he was later killed.¹¹⁷ For six months no more caliph was installed under patrician domination. The caliph of Malaga, Yaḥyā b. 'Alī b. Ḥammūd, reoccupied Cordoba in Ramaḍān/November, but was compelled to return to Malaga four months later (Muḥarram 417/March 1026), leaving a Zanāta garrison in Cordoba behind, which would be soon expelled by the people (*ahl*). At last Hishām III, al-Murtaḍā's aged brother, who was staying in Alpuente (al-Būnt), Valencia, was unanimously elected as caliph after the people of the Marches were

114 In al-Andalus it is mandatory for *qāḍīs* to solicit the legal opinions of *faqīhs*, who formed an advisory body (*shūrā*), before giving decisions. Hallaq, *Origins* 89.

115 Ibn Bassām, i, 434–6.

116 A *mala'* "denoted no more than an occasional group of notables." U. Rubin, *Mala'*, in *ET*², xii, 573.

117 Ibn Bassām, i, 436–7; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 142.

consulted, but he continued to stay in Alpuente until he arrived at Cordoba in Dhū l-Ḥijja 420/December 1029.¹¹⁸ In the meantime, and even after his arrival, the *mawālī*-notables continued their oligarchy as *wazīrs* and members of the council (*shūrā*).

However, Hishām III made an attempt to restore caliphal authority, while leaving day-to-day chores of the government to the competent *wazīr* Ḥakam b. Saʿīd al-Qazzāz, as testified by Ibn Ḥayyān's account below.

Among the ʿĀmirid retainers accompanying Hishām was a famous weaver (*ḥāʾik*) from the Cordovan lower classes (*abnāʾ al-zaʿānif*), named Ḥakam b. Saʿīd, who had been forced out of Cordoba by the civil war to take refuge with frontier leaders (*umarāʾ*). He recognized Hishām when the latter appeared in the frontier due to their acquaintance in Cordoba in their youth. He had political ambition, soon monopolizing the reins of the government. . . . He (Hishām) presided over the *mazālim* court and increased the number of Qurʾān reciters in the great mosque when he heard that Makkī and his comrade were only reciters there. He also increased the stipend of each notable of the *shūrā* up to fifteen dinars a month. They accepted that increase, ignoring doubtful sources of money, and enjoyed the dinners that *faqīhs* had never tasted before. Their predecessors never accepted such rewards from monarchs who imposed illegal trade taxes (*mukūs*).¹¹⁹

Ḥakam b. Saʿīd promoted market dealers, weavers and 'young, ignorant ʿ*ayyārūn*,' forcing traditional *mawālī*-notables (*aḥrār*, *mashyakha*, *shuyūkh*, *aʿyān*) and wealthy traders (*aʿyān al-tujjār*) to purchase governmental assets at high prices and seizing *waqfs* and unclaimed assets (*māl al-ghayba*). He also suspended the payment of stipends to the uncontrollable *jund al-baladiyyīn*. These measures made his regime nearly plebeian-dominated under his tyranny.¹²⁰

In Dhū l-Ḥijja 422/December 1031 Ḥakam was assassinated on the street near the alcázar, and then Hishām III was deposed after the *jund* and the populace (*ʿawāmm*) forced their way into the alcázar. Some plebeians still conspired to install another Umayyad caliph (Umayya b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-ʿIrāqī), but the *wazīrs* of *mawālī*-notable origin agreed in their council not to install

118 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 143–6.

119 Ibn Bassām, v, 516–7.

120 Ibn Bassām, v, 518–20, 523–4; Ibn ʿIdhārī, iii, 146–9.

another caliph, at least for the time being (virtual abolition of the caliphate),¹²¹ establishing the oligarchy of notables (*mala'*, *jamā'a*)¹²² under the leadership of the *wazīr-ra'īs* Abū l-Ḥazm b. Jahwar.¹²³ Each eminent notable was given an appropriate office, and the *jund* was recruited from notables (*a'yān*), excluding Zanāta tribesmen except individual Ḥfrani soldiers. *Wazīrs* were unpaid and the expensive caliphal court was abolished, producing a surplus of Cordovan finance. This is no less than a patrician form of domination. The prices at last came down, making life easier. The population increased, fostering commercial deals.¹²⁴

Since al-Mustakfī's installment in 414/1024, Cordoba was virtually a patrician city. Al-Mustakfī and the *wazīr* Ḥakam b. Sa'īd attempted to form stronger regimes under their authority in alliance with the lower echelons of *mawālī*-notables and the populace, but they were eliminated by the upper notables, who no longer installed any caliphs. In many cities of al-Gharb too (e.g. Niebla (Labla), Silves (Shilb), Faro (Shantamariyya) and Mertola), patrician oligarchy was established around the year 1024. However, in Seville, which was developing into a metropolis, the *qādī* Ibn 'Abbād's son, al-Mu'taḍid (433–61/1042–69), rapidly consolidated his sole leadership at the expense of other notables and styled himself as *ḥājib* of pseudo-Hishām II, paving the way for his own elevation to tyranny or monarchy. He soon began incorporating other cities, both Andalusi patrician cities and Berber-dominated cities, relying on the support of their Andalusi citizens, and eventually made Seville the capital of a large centralized state.

121 As Wasserstein (*The Caliphate* 48–9, 146–61) stressed, it is quite illegal for the notables of a city to abolish the caliphate altogether; the notables of Cordoba could not and did not abolish it, but decided not to install a new caliph. The Ṣanhāja Zirids of Granada continued to recognize the Ḥammūdid caliphs of Malaga, and the Andalusi 'Abbāids of Seville installed pseudo-Hishām II as caliph. Many other kings recognized either caliph, inscribing that name in their coins. Even Cordoba continued to mint coinage in Hishām II's name since 422/1031. Often, coins were issued in the name of 'Abdallāh or other caliphal titles without personal names. Wasserstein, *op. cit.* 109–19, 138–9, 159; Clément, *Pouvoir et légitimité* 245–7. For the survival of the Marwānid party (*sh'ra*) as represented by al-Murtaḍā's son in Cordoba until the Jahwarids expelled them see Ibn Bassām, ii, 606.

122 For *jamā'a* as notables or their council see Dozy, *Supplément* i, 216. Recently Nef challenges Amari's interpretation of *jamā'a* as a city council composed of notables. Nef, *Islamic Palermo, in A Companion to Medieval Palermo*, ed. Nef, 50–1, note 57; Amari, *Storia dei musulmani di Sicilia*² ii, 285. See Introduction, note 33.

123 Abū l-Ḥazm and Abū l-Walid are named as *ra'īs*. Ibn Bassām, ii, 602, vii, 239.

124 Ibn Bassām, ii, 602–4, v, 525–9; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 149–52, 186–7.

On the other hand, in Cordoba, neither Abū l-Ḥazm b. Jahwar (d. 435/1043) nor his son Abū l-Walīd failed to establish strong leadership, resulting in the preservation of 'republican' system. Moreover, Abū l-Walīd in his last days delegated day-to-day chores of the administration to a man of seemingly popular origin, named Ibrāhīm b. al-Saqqā', who recruited his own guards from 'the lowest-class populace' (*arādhil al-ṭabaqāt, muṣāṣ shirār al-nās*) and monopolized power at the expense of the Jahwarids and *mawālī*-notables. His new palace, called Dār al-Ladhdha, became the headquarters of Cordovan government. Finally in 450/1058, Ibn al-Saqqā' was killed by Abū l-Walīd's son, 'Abd al-Malik, and the mint master, Abū Ishāq b. Ḥumām.¹²⁵ It seems that 'Abd al-Malik also attempted to consolidate his position in alliance with part of the lower classes (*suffāl, suqqāt al-nās*), continuing to disturb Cordovan politics for a long time.¹²⁶

Strong neighbors, the Dhū n-Nūnids of Toledo, the Aḫṣāsids of Badajoz and the 'Abbāsid of Seville, vied for the possession of Cordoba. Finally in 461/1069, during an Aḫṣāsīd siege the 'Abbāsid al-Mu'tamid (461–84/1069–91) succeeded in seizing it, taking advantage of 'Abd al-Malik's appeal to him for succor. In 467/1075, however, the people of Cordoba rose in arms under the leadership of Ibn 'Ukkāsha, a *dā'ira* guard and Ibn Saqqā's friend, murdering al-Mu'tamid's governor (his son) who was commander of the Sevillian garrison. They assembled in the great mosque, agreeing to invite al-Ma'mūn from Toledo. However, after a six-month stay al-Ma'mūn died in Cordoba, and the people of rich al-Sharqīyya soon opened a gate to an 'Abbāsid army.¹²⁷ Though details are unavailable, the upper classes seem to have favored stronger 'Abbāsid rule in marked contrast to the populace, possibly to bring plebeian power under control.¹²⁸

In the anti-Āmirid revolution of 1009 the Cordovan populace (*amma*) acted rather spontaneously (but producing no eminent leaders), even if they were incited and organized by Umayyad *mawālī* and Cordovan notables. Eventually some were enlisted in the regular Umayyad army and paid stipends, but most of them remained unorganized and leaderless unlike the *ayyārūn* of ninth-century Baghdad or the *aḥdāth* of tenth-century Damascus. These popular

125 Wasserstein, *Toledan Rule in Cordoba*, *IOS* 12 (1993), 249–51, 259–62 (casting doubt on the popular origin of Ibn al-Saqqā', for he inherited his father Muḥammad's legacy. Ibn Bassām, vii, 239); *The Caliphate* 34–49; Clément, *Pouvoir et légitimité* 178–80.

126 Ibn Bassām, ii, 607–9, vii, 238–45 (esp. vii, 241); Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 232, 251, 258.

127 Ibn Bassām, ii, 609–14, iii, 266–73; *Hulla* ii, 176–9; *Tibyān* 88, 93; *A'māl* 151–2, 158–9.

128 Wasserstein, *The Caliphate* 247–70; Clément, *Pouvoir et légitimité* 182–5.

participants in uprisings must have been mostly violence-prone young men with some kinds of craftsmen of *sūqs* and the day laborers of al-Gharbiyya predominant. Then they continued to fight against the ‘Āmirid Berber mercenaries of Moroccan and Algerian origin, just like the Baghdadi ‘*ayyārūn* fighting with the Khurāsānis and the Central Asians whom they regarded as strange ‘barbarians’ and supporters of the would-be usurper, al-Ma’mūn. It seems that the Cordovan populace began growing weary of fighting since their defeat at the battle of Qantīsh in 1009. During the Berber siege of Cordoba (1010–3) the populace remained rather inactive, and the Umayyad *mawālī* and Cordovan notables succeeded in seizing power from the frontier army, virtually establishing patrician domination under the leadership of an *ex-qāḍī* and a former dignitary. After the Cordovans capitulated to the Berber mercenaries in 1013, Cordovan militias were dissolved, but the populace continued to be hostile to their old enemies, forcing them to settle in southern Andalusia.

After Ḥammūdīd strenuous efforts (1016–23) to reconcile the citizens and the Berbers by treating them equitably and reestablish a centralized state ended in failure (mainly because the Andalusis were not convinced of their legitimacy and the Berbers were unwilling to concede part of their interest), the Cordovan populace succeeded in ousting the Zanāta troops and their caliph in 1023. Some people were enlisted in a caliphal guard (*dā’ira*) and a small regular army (*jund al-baladīyyīn*) in the shadow of *mawālī*-notables.

After the expulsion of the Zanāta troops, the Cordovan *mawālī*-notables installed an Umayyad caliph to assert the legitimacy of their new government in 1023. Thereafter, struggles for power between Umayyad caliphs and the upper echelons of Cordovan *mawālī*-notables lasted up until the year 1031 (part of the lower echelons of *mawālī*-notables and the populace sided with caliphs). In contrast to the Damascenes who experienced both patrician and plebeian domination, patrician domination prevailed in Cordoba since 1024. However, Caliph al-Mustakfī and the *wazīr* Ḥakam b. Sa’īd attempted to restore some Umayyad authority at the expense of the upper *mawālī*-notables in alliance with their lower echelons and part of the populace. The upper *mawālī*-notables reacted against it by establishing their oligarchy in 1031 with the *wazīr-ra’īs* Ibn Jahwar at the helm of their government. Struggles continued, however; it seems that Ibn al-Saqqā’ even attempted to establish his tyranny in alliance with the populace. Finally, the traditional *mawālī*-notables decided to surrender Cordoba to the ‘Abbāḍids of Seville in 1069, following the example of the Damascene notables, who, detesting a plebeian domination under the leadership of Qassām, opened a gate to the Fāṭimids in 983, resulting in the incorporation of Cordoba and Damascus in larger centralized states.

Popular power reached its zenith under the *wazīr* Ḥakam b. Saʿīd and Ibn al-Saqqāʾ. They attempted to consolidate their leadership in alliance with the populace at the expense of *mawālī*-notables, particularly their upper echelons. However, although Ḥakam is said to have been of lower-class origin, he had been promoted to be one of the ʿĀmirid retainers before being invested with the vizierate; he did not seize power, relying on popular support, and continued to rule legally as caliphal *wazīr*. Ibn al-Saqqāʾ also, even if he was of lower-class origin, was already one of the eminent notables (*malaʾ*) when he seized power. The Cordovan populace remained leaderless and divided; men of popular origin backed by popular militias rarely seized power in contrast to the Damascene cases. Only Ibn ʿUkkāsha attempted to seize power, mainly relying on popular support in 1075. In conclusion, Cordoba never saw genuine plebeian domination.

Toledo during the Eleventh Century

Introduction

Toledo (Ar. Ṭulayṭula, Latin, Toletum), located in the center of the Iberian Peninsula, is surrounded by the vast, undulating, semi-desert plateau (Meseta) gently sloping from the eastern high mountains westward down to the Atlantic Ocean. However, the region of Toledo, particularly northwest and northeast of the city, formed an irrigated oasis (*vega*), famous for its quality wheat since Roman times. Under Muslim rule, Roman barrages and flumes were replaced by relatively small reservoirs called *birkas* (albercas) and huge water-raising wheels called *nā'ūras* (norias) or *dūlābs*, automatically driven by currents, which raised water from the deep Tajo (Tājuh, Tagus) and its tributaries. *Birkas* were necessary for the regulation of the flow of water from *nā'ūras* to fields.¹ The abundant supply of water fostered pomiculture and the culture of other crops of Middle Eastern origin, which were introduced and acclimatized to the soils and climate of La Mancha in the royal botanical garden (later Huerta del Rey?) by agronomists, such as Ibn Wāfid (d. 467/1075) and Ibn Baṣṣāl (d. 487/1105).² Besides, the sheep and cattle raised in the mountains of Guadarrama and Gredos (al-Shārāt) were brought to the animal market (sūq al-dawābb>Zocodover) in Toledo by so-called bringers (*jallābūn*).³

The walled city of Toledo was built on a steep hill surrounded on three sides, east, south and west, by a bend of the Tajo and encircled by very strong walls. Toledo was a medium-sized city during early Roman times, but it was chosen as capital of the new province of Hispania Carthaginensis (roughly La Mancha, Murcia and Alicante) separated from Hispania Tarraconensis by Emperor Diocletian in 298. Toledo became a center of Christianity in Iberia during the fourth century. Then it served as the political and religious capital of the Visigothic kingdom covering Iberia (except the Basque regions and Asturias) and Septimania (Languedoc-Roussillon) since the sixth century until

1 Idrīsī, *Nuzha* ii, 551–2; Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain* 74–5; *From Muslim Fortress* 82; D.R. Hill, *Na'ūra*, in *ET*², vii, 1037.

2 G.S. Colin, *Filāḥa*, in *ET*², ii, 901; Watson, *Agricultural Innovation* 118–9; Ruggles, *Gardens* 18–9, 22–4, 217.

3 Idrīsī, ii, 552.

it was conquered by the Muslims in 92/714. Meanwhile many Visigothic noblemen and priests settled there.

After the Muslim conquest relatively few Arabs settled in semi-desert La Mancha. However, rich Toledo was seemingly an exception. Among the Arabs who settled there we can find the Quraysh of Mecca including descendants of the second caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, the Anṣār of Medina, nomadic tribes of northern Arabia, Fahm (Qaysite), Bāhila, Kināna, and the Yemenite mountain-dwellers of Ghāfiq (a sub-tribe of ‘Akk).⁴ The tribal *nisbas* of later Toledan scholars would testify to the existence of the settled Yemenite tribes of Tujīb, Azd, Yaḥṣub (a Ḥimyarite tribe) and Ṣadaf, as well as the nomadic Quḍā’ite tribe of Khushayn from northern Arabia.⁵

On the other hand, Berbers settled mainly in the arid and poorer regions of the Middle and Lower Marches (Extremadura, Portuguese Estremadura and Alto Alentejo), Sharq al-Andalus and northwestern Iberia (Castile-Leon and Galicia), engaging in sheep raising, dry farming and micro- and meso-scale irrigation in narrow valleys and on the terraces of mountain slopes. However, they soon retreated from northwestern Iberia to the Guadarrama and Gredos Mountains. They often practiced macro-scale transhumance, seasonal migration between summer pastures in these mountains and winter ones in the Guadiana (Wādī Āna) basin.⁶ Near Toledo, the Berber tribesmen of Maghila and Makhshī from the Dahar Mountains, southern Tunisia, settled in Talavera (Ṭalabīra) and Guadalajara (Wādī l-Ḥijāra). Particularly, a large number of the Hawwāra settled in Santaver (Shantabariyya), the western slopes of the Cuenca Mountains, founding the fortresses of Huete (Wabdha) and Ucles under the leadership of the Dhū n-Nūnids (Zannunids) since the mid-ninth century. Not only the Hawwāris, but also the tribesmen of Malzūza, Madyūna, Ṣadīna, Nafza and ‘Azzūn settled in Santaver, engaging in livestock raising and husbandry.⁷ The regions of Santaver and Guadalajara had much in common

4 Ṭāha, *The Muslim Conquest and Settlement* 120, 129–31, 144; Guichard, *Structures* 224, 232–3. El Alamin, a village on the foot of the Gredos, northwest of Toledo, preserves the name of al-Fahmiyyīn (Idrīsī, ii, 552).

5 Urvoy, *Le monde des ulémas* 60; The ‘Ulamā’ of al-Andalus, in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi, ii, 859.

6 For micro- and meso-scale irrigation and transhumance see Glick, *From Muslim Fortress* 65; *Islamic and Christian Spain* 103–4. For historical geography of La Mancha and Extremadura see Bishko, *The Castilian as Plainsman: The Medieval Ranching Frontier in La Mancha and Extremadura*, in his *Studies* 48–50.

7 *Muqtabis* iii, 18–9; Ṭāha, *The Muslim Conquest* 171, 175–6; Guichard, *Structures* 269–71, 274; Dunlop, *The Dhunnunids of Toledo*, *JRAS* 74 (1942), 78–82; Dhū’n-Nūnids, in *ET²*, ii, 242–3;

with the inland plateaus and mountains of Morocco and Algeria, enabling Berber lifestyle and clan system to persist remarkably.⁸

When Berbers evacuated northwestern Iberia in 122/740 after their anti-Arab revolt was squashed at the battle of Guzalete (Wādī Salīṭ), a tributary of the Tajo, Toledo suddenly became the frontal city facing the so-called No-Man's Land,⁹ alongside Nafza (Vascos?),¹⁰ Talavera, Alcala de Henares and Guadalajara. It seems, however, that the No-Man's Land was really sparsely inhabited, but outside the administrative control of the Leonese kingdom.¹¹ On the other hand, extremely arid La Mancha between Toledo and the Sierra Morena was really almost uninhabited except a small fortress-city of Qal'at Rabāḥ (Calatrava la Vieja) on the Guadiana. The Umayyad government constituted three Marches (Thughūr) along the No-Man's Land, granting virtual autonomy and fiscal immunity in return for the defense against incursions conducted by the northern Christian kingdoms.¹² As Moreno pointed out, the Marches were stable 'enclosing frontiers,' separating two distinctive and mutually exclusive economic, social and cultural areas; *jihād* was not encouraged and seldom conducted.¹³ Toledo became the central city of the Middle March despite its advance position, while Merida (Augusta Emerita) and Zaragoza (Saraqusta, Caesaraugusta), the centers of the Lower and Upper Marches, were located well inside their Marches, far from advance bases.

So, Toledo was virtually autonomous since the mid-eighth century. However, it is not Arabs, but Visigothic noblemen-converts (*muwallads*) who held the reins of this autonomy. They often refused to render even nominal homage to the Umayyad *amīrs* of Cordoba. Moreover, many Christians chose to escape from Toledo to found Zamora (Samūra) on the middle Duero in the No-Man's Land in 280/893 under Leonese patronage.¹⁴ It is during the tenth century after they surrendered to 'Abd al-Raḥmān III in 320/932 that the Toledans were culturally assimilated to the Muslims of Andalusia, bequeathing splendid Islamic buildings constructed during the tenth to eleventh centuries, such as the gates of Bāb Shāqra (Antigua de Bisagra) and Bāb al-Qanṭara and the small

T. Lewicky, *Hawwāra*, in *ET*², iii, 296–9. According to Ṭāḥa, Corral de Almaguer, a city east of Toledo, and Almagil and Megina near Guadalajara are named after the Maghila.

8 Glick, *Structures* 289–90.

9 Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire* i, 46, 52, 69–71.

10 Collins, *Caliphs and Kings* 169.

11 Collins, *Caliphs and Kings* 138–40; Moreno, *The Creation of a Medieval Frontier*, in *Frontiers in Question*, ed. D. Power and N. Standen, 43–4.

12 Kennedy, *Muslim Spain* 52–3.

13 Moreno, *The Creation* 35–6, 41–2.

14 *Muqtabis* iii, 109.

mosques of Bāb al-Mardūm (Cristo de la Luz), Tornerías and al-Dabbāghīn (San Sebastian), to the moderns.

It is well-known that Arab and Islamic tradition tenaciously persisted up until the sixteenth century under Christian rule, and most churches and synagogues continued to be built in Mudéjar style, making Toledo the major Mudéjar city. Even the Christians, who continued to be a relatively large minority, were largely assimilated to Andalusī lifestyle, adopting Arabic and Andalusī culture, except their own peculiar form of Christian faith and rites as distinct from Catholicism. That is the reason why the later Castilian conquerors called them Mozárabes (from *mustaʿriba*, Arabized people) pejoratively. It seems that the Toledan Mozárabes often acted in concert with their Muslim brothers in civic movements under Muslim rule.

On the other hand, the strategic importance of Toledo declined during the tenth century, for Medinaceli, located on the border between the Upper and Middle Marches, was refounded in 335/946 by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān III to cope with Leonese advance to the upper Duero and their foundation of many strong fortresses (later the huge fortress of Gormaz was constructed by al-Ḥakam II nearby). By the late tenth century Castile replaced Leon as the major Christian power threatening the Marches. Despite unrelenting campaigns conducted by al-Manṣūr and al-Muzaffar from the base of Medinaceli, the might of Castile was hardly reduced.¹⁵

After the collapse of the Umayyad central government in the early 1010's, the Marches became independent, but faced Christian incursions. While in the Upper March the strong Tujībīd ruler al-Mundhir I simply became independent (they were replaced by the Andalusī Hūdids in 431/1040), the patricians and soldiers of the Middle and Lower Marches, who were unable to cope with Christian threat, were compelled to appeal to nearby powerful leaders of Berber mountain-dwellers. The Dhū n-Nūnids of Santaver were invited to Toledo, eventually replacing traditional patrician domination. This 'illegitimate' rule was to stir up civic movements involving both patricians and the populace, against the Dhū n-Nūnid 'kings,' Yaḥyā al-Ma'mūn and his grandson Yaḥyā al-Qādir. The Toledan movement had much in common with the Aleppine one in sharing the imminent danger of absorption into Christian states and the expulsion of Muslim citizens.

There is almost no study of Toledan civic political movement during the eleventh century; most studies have focused on 'kings.' However, Marín made an important contribution to the study of scholarly families who were mostly identical with patricians. Besides, Ashtor, Fierro and Torar discovered a

15 Collins, *Caliphs and Kings* 254; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain* 123.

significant struggle waged between the Ḥadīdī ‘*wazīr*’ Abū Bakr Yaḥyā and his patrician opponents.¹⁶

Available sources are not wealthy, but Ibn Bassām and ‘Abdallāh b. Buluggīn, Zīrid king of Granada, report their contemporary events of Toledan resistance against al-Qādir’s policy and Castilian incursions. A biographical dictionary of Toledan *faqīhs*, written by Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muṭāhir al-Anṣārī (d. 489/1096), is mostly preserved in the biographical dictionary of Ibn Bashkuwār. A short history of al-Andalus by a late twelfth-century writer, Ibn al-Kardabūs of Tozeur (Tūzar), southwestern Tunisia, and an anonymous history of eleventh-century al-Andalus are evidently based on contemporary sources, sometimes giving unique information.

Toledan Society up to the Tenth Century

The loyalty to the Umayyad *amīrs*, whose legitimacy was open to doubt, was slight almost everywhere in al-Andalus, particularly in the Marches. The patrician oligarchs of mostly Visigothic origin, who ruled Toledo autonomously, did not hesitate to ally with Leonese kings across the frontier against the Umayyads. We don’t know exactly when they supplanted Arabs or how many Arabs were found in the patrician class, for many Visigothic patricians adopted Arab tribal *nisbas* in the tenth century.

While the first rebels in Toledo, Hishām b. ‘Urwa (or ‘Udhra) al-Fihri (of the Quraysh) (147/764) and Sulaymān, Hishām’s brother (172/788), were evidently Arabs, it seems that ‘Ubayda b. Ḥumayd (or Ḥamīr), who rebelled in 181/797, was the first *muwallad* leader of Visigothic origin. Al-Ḥakam I (180–206/796–822) could not afford to dispatch an army from Cordoba, appointing ‘Amrūs (probably Latinized Arabic name), Visigothic *muwallad* nobleman of Huesca (Washqa), the Upper March, as governor of Toledo. Eventually ‘Amrūs eliminated ‘Ubayda and other Toledan patricians in ‘the Day of the Trench (*khandaq*).’¹⁷ However, soon in 214/829 another *muwallad*

16 Marín, *Familias de ulemas en Toledo*, *EOBA* 5 (1986), 229–71; Ashtor, *The Jews of Moslem Spain* iii, 227–40; Fierro, *El proceso contra Ibn Ḥātīm*, *EOBA* 6 (1994), 187–215; Heresy in al-Andalus, in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain* ii, 898–902; Toral, Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥadīdī, *EOBA* 6 (1994), 395–413.

17 Ibn ‘Idhārī, ii, 69–70; Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire* i, 157–8; Kennedy, *Muslim Spain* 57; Collins, *Caliphs and Kings* 32–3. Collins misidentified ‘Amrūs as a Berber; evidently he was a nobleman of the Upper March. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain* 15, 39.

leader, Hāshim al-Ḍarrāb (mint master?), rose in revolt,¹⁸ and then in 239/853 *muwallad* leaders joined a revolt all at once, even appealing to the king of Leon, Ordoño I (850–66). Toledo was not subdued until 259/873; moreover, its autonomy was confirmed under the governors of their own choice, Muṭarrif b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥabīb and Ṭarbīsha b. Masūna, in return for the payment of some tribute.¹⁹ It is probably for the disconnection of Toledan communications with the northern kingdoms, rather than for its defense, that Muḥammad I (238–73/852–86) had the fortresses of Esteras, Penahora (Binna Furāta), Talamanca, Madrid (Majrīṭ) and Canillas constructed north and west of Toledo.²⁰

Toledo soon recovered its independence, taking advantage of a political chaos lasting since the middle years of Muḥammad I. However, the Berbers of Santaver under their Dhū n-Nūnid leaders threatened Toledo, carrying away its livestock. In 274/888 the Toledans under the command of Lubb, son of Ṭarbīsha, were defeated by Mūsā b. Dhī n-Nūn. For the sake of security, Muṭarrif and another patrician, Yahyā b. Qaṭām, invited the Qasī (Casius) ruler of the Upper March, Muḥammad b. Lubb, to Toledo as ruler (*malik*) in 283/896. The Toledans soon renounced his sovereignty, however, murdering him at its gate during his siege of Toledo in 285/898.²¹ The Toledan patrician domination thus continued in one way or another, perhaps under duumvirate, though we know very little about the internal structure of this patrician domination.

It took two years’ siege for ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III to force the Toledans to surrender their city in 320/932. A strong garrison was placed in the alcázar of Toledo, and its governors were often selected from the Umayyad *mawālī*, including Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh b. Ḥudayr and Hishām b. Jahwar.²² Soon a large frontier army was placed in Medinaceli, probably reducing the Toledan garrison. It is not known how much governors dispatched from Cordoba could exert their power in face of Toledan patricians. However, Cordovan control of the Marches was greatly tightened by the presence of Ghālib, ‘Abd

18 Ibn ‘Idhārī, ii, 83.

19 *Muqtabis* ii, 292–8, 329–30; Ibn ‘Idhārī, ii, 94–5, 101; Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire* i, 200–1, 291–5; Collins, *Caliphs and Kings* 40, 43–4.

20 Canillas is near Toledo, 14 km to the west in the middle of its *vega*. Talamanca is near Madrid, 38 km to the north, Penahora is near Guadalajara, 24 km to the north, and Esteras is very near from Medinaceli. Olmos (Wulmush) and Calataifa (Qal‘at al-Khalifa) were also built at this time. J.D. Litham, *al-Thughūr*, in *EI*², x, 448.

21 *Muqtabis* iii, 17–8, 118, 128, 140.

22 *Muqtabis* v, 280–4, 287, 317–22, 332, 462; Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire* ii, 25–9; Lévi-Provençal [J.P. Molénat], *Ṭulayṭula*, in *EI*², x, 605.

al-Raḥmān III's powerful Ṣaqāliba general, in Medinaceli since 335/946 until his murder in 371/981 and then al-Manṣūr's biannual expeditions.

On the other hand, the Leonese kingdom expanded their control over Christian population remaining in the No-Man's Land, encouraging the settlement (*re población*) of their own people in the repopulated cities of this virgin land as free farmer-warriors. These new settlers spread the cultivation of wheat in this new territory (olive culture is climatically impossible here),²³ placing northwestern Iberia, alongside central France, at the head of European development since the late tenth century. This European economic development necessarily led to its outward expansion, notably into al-Andalus, Sicily, southern Italy and Eastern Europe east of the Elbe. In Iberia, after the unification of Leon and Castile the king of the united kingdom, Fernando I (1035–65), greatly advanced frontiers by conferring *fueros* (charters of immunities and freedom) on towns in return for offensive military service (*fonsado, hueste*) as well as defensive one in emergencies (*apellido*). Alfonso VI (1072–1109), on his accession after his brother's murder, founded many cities south of the Duero, such as Segovia, Sepulveda, Avila and Salamanca, reversing the balance of power with the Muslims as a result of population increase and the militarization of Christian society.²⁴

Toledan Patricians versus the Dhū n-Nūnids during the Eleventh Century

When a civil war broke out between the Cordovans and the Berber mercenaries in 399/1009, the people of the Marches at first quietly looked on its development and then appealed to the Cordovans for a compromise with the Berbers. As the Berber siege of Cordoba was prolonged, the Toledans were obliged to form their own government under the leadership (*ri'āsa*) of their *qāḍī* Ya'īsh b. Muḥammad b. Ya'īsh al-Asadī.²⁵ Ya'īsh must have been a Toledan notable, for his father had acted as a Toledan representative when he, together with the *qāḍīs* and notables of other cities, participated in the ceremony of paying homage to the very young Hishām II to legitimate his accession to the

23 Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain* 92–3, 96.

24 Powers, *A Society Organized for War* 13–24; Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla* 118–24.

25 'Iyād, viii, 41–2; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 276; Nuwayrī, xxiii, 258; Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ* v, 243; Ibn Khaldūn, *Ibar* vii, 347; Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 288; Ibn Bashkuwāl, 689. For Ya'īsh's details, mainly based on 'Iyād, see Fierro, *The Qāḍī as Ruler*, in *Saber religioso y poder político*, ed. M. García-Arenal and M. Marín, 72–8.

caliphate.²⁶ However, struggles for power ensued under patrician domination; it is said that Yaʿīsh's rival judge, Aḥmad b. Saʿīd b. Kawthar al-Anṣārī, died in prison at Santarem (403/1012).²⁷ Then Yaʿīsh himself was ousted out of Toledo, taking refuge in Calatayud (Qalʿat Ayyūb), and died there in 418–9/1027–8.²⁸ Meanwhile, a new ruler named ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Manyūh (identical with Cordovan ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Manyūh or Ibn Munāw?) emerged, but he soon died. His successor, his brother ʿAbd al-Malik, was very unpopular.²⁹

Struggles among patricians jeopardized its security from the Christian states, so that the Toledan elites invited their former opponent, Dhū n-Nūnid leader of Santaver, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ismāʿīl (Mūsā's great-great-grandson), giving him leadership (*riʾāsa*). He sent his son Ismāʿīl to Toledo. The sources are so meager and confused that the dates of ousting Yaʿīsh, then ʿAbd al-Malik b. Manyūh and the date of Ismāʿīl's entry are not known. If we believe Ibn Khaldūn, Ismāʿīl, after taking Ucles in 409/1018–9, was invited by the Toledans (the year 427/1036, given by Ibn Khaldūn, is evidently too late). However, according to the more trustable Ibn Ḥayyān, Caliph Sulaymān (403–7/1013–6) appointed Ismāʿīl as *wazīr*, giving him the title of Naṣīr al-Dawla.³⁰ The date of Ismāʿīl's death and the succession of his son Yaḥyā al-Maʿmūn is also unknown, either 429/1038 or 435/1043–4.³¹

Very probably the Toledans did not invite Ismāʿīl as their king. They could not like him, for they did experience many conflicts with the Dhū n-Nūnids in the past. The Hawwāra Berbers under Dhū n-Nūnid control lagged behind in Andalusization and urbanization, still engaged in autarkic husbandry and stockbreeding. Besides, they partly preserved their clan system, demonstrating their military valor in Umayyad expeditions into the northern Christian states.³² So, Ismāʿīl should have been regarded by the Toledans as a condottiere or a strong arbitrator of foreign origin rather comparable to Ṣāliḥ b.

26 *Aʿmāl* 54. For Muḥammad's details see Fierro, *The Qāḍī as Ruler* 73; Ibn al-Faraḍī, ii, 789–90.

27 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 36–7. According to ʿIyāḍ, viii, 41–2, Aḥmad was killed by another Toledan notable.

28 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 689. Fierro considers that Yaʿīsh lost popular support due to his severe measures to uphold moral society, e.g. his ban on women's leaving Toledo following funeral processions and their processing of high-quality flour (*darmak*).

29 *Aʿmāl* 177. See also chapter 4, note 86. Ibn Saʿīd, i, 156; Ibn ʿIḍhārī, iii, 109.

30 Ibn Bassām, vii, 143; Ibn Khaldūn, vii, 347. For the virtual choice of rulers by the local elite see Wasserstein, *The Rise and Fall* 142; Toral, Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥadīdī 411.

31 429/1038 in Ibn Khaldūn, vii, 347; Qalqashandī, v, 243, 435/1043–4 in Nuwayrī, xxiii, 258.

32 Ibn ʿIḍhārī, ii, 276. For their late Andalusization see Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain* 180. For their pre-Toledan military activities see Guichard, *Structures* 321.

‘Umayr and Alptegin of Damascus. It is partly corroborated by the fact that a Toledan *ḥadīth* transmitter, Ibn Mushkiyālī al-Khushanī, treated Ismā‘īl just like other students studying in his house, forbidding them to stand up in honor of him.³³ Ismā‘īl is also said to have been very thrifty, denoting his lack of financial control.³⁴

Influential patricians (*mashyakha*) from the families of al-Ḥadīdī,³⁵ Maḥqūr, Lubbūn (<lupe, wolf, evidently of *muwallad* origin), al-Faraj (eponymous Berber founder of Madīnat al-Faraj/Guadalajara) and Mughīth took part in decision-making, forming their oligarchy (*ḥamalāt al-dawla*), but struggles for power among them were rife.³⁶ These patricians individually built mosques and hammams. For example, among the existing ones, Ḥammām Ya‘īsh, south of the great mosque (present-day cathedral), was probably founded by Ya‘īsh, and the beautiful mosque of Cristo de la Luz near the gate of Bāb al-Mardūm was built in 390/1000 by Abū ‘Umar Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Ḥadīdī (Abū Bakr’s grandfather), as testified by its inscription.³⁷ They did not acknowledge the legitimacy of Ḥammūdīd caliphs, and instead recognized the restored Umayyad ones, still entertaining strong doubts about the legitimacy of these powerless caliphs.³⁸

Ismā‘īl gradually strengthened his position, finally taking the titles of al-Zāfir (the victorious, a rather common, lesser title in al-Andalus) and *dhū l-rī‘āsātayn* (typical vizierial title).³⁹ The execution of a reverend *faqīh*, Hishām b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī, following his trial (*miḥna*) in 434/1043 is possibly due to his opposition to the Dhū n-Nūnid Yaḥyā’s monopoly of power.⁴⁰

33 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 487.

34 Ibn Bassām, vii, 143.

35 Abū ‘Umar Aḥmad and his son Sa‘īd were famous *faqīhs*. ‘Iyāḍ, vii, 187, viii, 38–9; Marín, Familias de ulemas 248–50; Toral, Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥadīdī 395–6.

36 Ibn Bassām, vii, 145; Ibn ‘Idhārī, iii, 277.

37 Ocaña Jiménez, La inscripción fundacional, *Al-Andalus* 14 (1949), 175–83.

38 Ibn Bassām, vii, 143–5.

39 According to an inscription of 423/1031. Lévi-Provençal, *Inscriptions arabes* 65–7. Many leaders or princes adopted the vizierial title of *dhū l-wizāratayn* (‘Abbādids) or ‘Āmirid titles of al-Mansūr, al-Muẓaffar and al-Ma‘mūn or dignitary titles of x al-Dawla (helper of the dynasty). The *dhū l-rī‘āsātayn* of Ismā‘īl and al-Faḍl b. Sahl (*wazīr* of the Abbasid caliph al-Ma‘mūn) was synonymous with *dhū l-wizāratayn*. Al-Zāfir is also a rather common title of princes including the third Cordovan Jahwarid *wazīr* ‘Abd al-Malik and the ‘Abbādīd al-Mu‘tamīd’s son (governor of Cordoba). Wasserstein, Toledan Rule in Cordoba 251, note 9. Clément (*Pouvoir et légitimité* 222–6) composed lists of the titles of Ṭā‘ifa princes.

40 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 651.

It is this Yaḥyā, who adopted the titles of al-Ma'mūn and Sharaf al-Dawla, who succeeded in elevating his power to royalty, terminating the patrician domination of Toledo, like many Italian *signores*, the Della Scala of Verona, the Este of Ferrara, the Visconti and the Sforza of Milano, and the Gonzaga of Mantova, who were all of condottiere origin. The Berber Aḥṣāsids of Badajoz followed the example of the Dhū n-Nūnids around the same time.

These princes aimed at the aggrandizement of their territories at the expense of their neighbors. Al-Ma'mūn was also soon engaged in a war with the first Hūdīd ruler of the Upper March, al-Musta'in I (431–9?/1040–7?), since 435/1043 over the possession of Guadalajara. Al-Ma'mūn needed the reinforcements of the king of Navarre, García Sanchez III (1035–54) in this war because al-Musta'in had allied with Fernando I, king of Leon-Castile (1037–65), resulting in Christian devastation of Muslim land and the first Muslim payment of tribute to the Christians (later al-Ma'mūn became a junior ally of Fernando). Al-Ma'mūn sought the assistance of al-Mu'taḍid, prince of Seville, too, in this war, paying homage to pseudo-Hishām II, whom al-Mu'taḍid had installed in Seville.⁴¹ When al-Mu'taḍid ceased to keep this nominal caliph in 451/1059 after his own legitimacy had been consolidated,⁴² al-Ma'mūn also followed his example. Al-Ma'mūn, while imposing additional taxes on the citizens, built gorgeous villas (*munyas*) surrounded by gardens and farms outside the walls, such as al-Manṣūra and Majlis al-Na'ūra, in addition to the alcázar in the intramural city. Ibn Bassām, who witnessed later Christian advance, criticized al-Ma'mūn.

I wish this Ismā'il would have lived longer despite his rudeness, unconventional and reckless conduct. He was somewhat vigilant and prepared because the memory of the age of unity (*jamā'a*) was still fresh and he could even feel the recovery of loyalty to the Umayyads. Besides, he could expect the support of many patricians (*mashyakha*) and leaders (*zu'amā'*) of other classes (*tabaqāt*). His successor, however, was arrogant and negligent, giving up winning victory and seeking the assistance of Christian parties. As the result, his peace was only deceptive and superficial and his wars were erroneous and misleading, because he relied on heathens (*mushrikīn*), seeking protection from them, and he was on his guard against Muslims, seeking revenge upon them.⁴³

41 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 219–20, 277–83 (wars with the Hūdīds and Christian devastation). Wasserstein, *The Caliphate* 106; *The Rise and Fall* 119–21, 127–30.

42 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 249.

43 Ibn Bassām, vii, 145–9. The quotation is from p. 145.

According to Weber's theory, a tyrant could consolidate his power at the expense of ruling classes in alliance with their 'enemies,' craftsmen, urban plebeians and small peasants as well as his allies within the nobility and patricians. Al-Ma'mūn also divided Toledan patricians, allying with the smaller clique including the Ḥadīdīd Abū Bakr Yaḥyā and the Farajid Abū Sa'īd, who were included in his privy council (*shūrā*), while estranging other patricians, typically the Maḥqūris and the Lubbūnis, whom his father had recommended as his advisors. It is said that Ibn al-Ḥadīdī took charge of finance and civil administration, while Ibn al-Faraj was entrusted with the management of the army (*tadbīr al-ajnad, al-a'māl al-dīwāniyya*).⁴⁴ However, at the end of the Dhū n-Nūnid rule, the Lubbūnid Abū Shujā' was reinstated as governor of Huete, an old Dhū n-Nūnid stronghold, while a Farajid member was governor of Cuenca.⁴⁵

It seems that the majority of patricians, including the Mughīthis, opposed al-Ma'mūn's alliance with the 'Abbāids to cope with Hūdīd threat, but in 436/1044–5 a Toledan delegation under the leadership of the *qādī* Ibn al-Ḥadhdhā was sent to Seville to ratify this alliance.⁴⁶ Patricians attempted to raise a revolt, taking advantage of al-Ma'mūn's presence in Valencia. On hearing of this news from Abū Bakr b. al-Ḥadīdī, al-Ma'mūn hurried back to Toledo to squash it.⁴⁷ Al-Ma'mūn's subservience to Fernando I was particularly unpopular. Fernando advanced to Alcala de Henares, imposing heavy annual tribute called *paria* from 453–4/1062 up until his death and the outbreak of a civil war between his two sons, Sancho II and Alfonso VI,⁴⁸ three years later. Al-Ma'mūn, feeling relieved, gave refuge to Alfonso who had been defeated by his brother in 464/1072.⁴⁹ However, al-Ma'mūn resumed the payment of tribute after Alfonso acceded to the Leonese-Castilian throne, following Sancho's murder nine months later. In 467/1074 he even joined Alfonso's campaign to exact tribute from the Zīrid king of Granada.⁵⁰

Taking advantage of his own immunity from Fernando's incursions, al-Ma'mūn advanced to incorporate Valencia in 457/1065⁵¹ and even took

44 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 66g; Ibn Bassām, vii, 151. It is said that Abū Bakr b. al-Ḥadīdī had been constantly consulted by Ismā'īl (Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 277). However, it is unbelievable that he continued to hold the reins of government as long as forty years.

45 Ibn al-Kardabūs, 82–3; *Hulla* ii, 169.

46 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 278–9 (containing a lacuna); Ibn Bashkuwāl, 57.

47 Ibn Bassām, vii, 151.

48 Ibn al-Kardabūs, 76–7. For details see Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla* 52–67.

49 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 232; Ibn Bassām, vii, 160.

50 Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla* 117–8.

51 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 252–3, 266–7; Ibn Bassām, v, 41–3, vi, 854–6.

Cordoba from the ‘Abbādids in 467/1075.⁵² On the other hand, he failed to win back Guadalajara from the Hūdids or seize Almeria from its Andalusi Şumādihi ruler, al-Mu‘taşim (443–84/1051–91). As the result, the Dhū n-Nūnid state at the time of al-Ma‘mūn’s death had grown up to be one of the most powerful states in al-Andalus, rivaling the ‘Abbādids of Seville who would seize Murcia in 471/1078, the Zīrids of Granada who had incorporated Malaga, and the Hūdids of Zaragoza, who had absorbed the Şaqāliba states of Tortosa and Denia. However, al-Ma‘mūn’s way of aggrandizement at the expense of Muslim states, while subordinate to a Christian power, incurred popular wrath. At the same time, Christian advance into al-Andalus culminated in Fernando’s seizure of Coimbra (Qulumriyya)⁵³ and the crusader conquest of Barbastrō⁵⁴ in the same year (456/1064), giving tremendous shocks to the Andalusi Muslims whose spirit of *jihād* temporarily flared up.⁵⁵

Patrician Resistance to al-Ma‘mūn and Ibn Ḥātim’s Trial

Abū Bakr b. al-Ḥadīdī was friendly with Ibn al-Ḥadhdhā’s successor, the *qādī* Abū l-Walīd Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Şā‘id (d. 449/1057, father of Şā‘id, famous historian of science),⁵⁶ but disputed with Ibn Şā‘id’s successor, Abū Zayd ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. ‘Īsā, called Ibn al-Ḥashshā, from Cordoba (d. 473/1071),⁵⁷ over the trial of ‘Abdallāh b. Aḥmad b. Ḥātim al-Azdī indicted on a charge of ‘heterodoxy.’⁵⁸ Precious information on this trial is preserved in Ibn Sahl’s collection of legal cases (*nāzila*, pl. *nawāzil*), enabling us to catch a rare glimpse of Toledan society and politics.

Islam had no concept of ‘heterodoxy,’ but it did have ‘*bid‘a*,’ innovative belief or practice abhorrent to most Muslims as opposed to Muḥammad’s established custom (Sunna). Since the early Abbasid period, men called *zindīqs*, who were mostly Muslim converts, but consciously or unconsciously brought their former ‘Manichaeen’ belief (e.g. dualism and salvation from sins) into Islam, had been persecuted. However, such men were rarely put on trial on suspicion of

52 Ibn Bassām, ii, 609–14; *A‘māl* 151–2, 158; *Tibyān* 90–3.

53 Ibn ‘Idhārī, iii, 238, 253.

54 Ibn Bassām, v, 179–90, Ibn ‘Idhārī, iii, 224–7; Ibn al-Kardabūs, 72–3.

55 The flaring-up of the spirit of *jihād* was rare in al-Andalus, and it soon subsided. Catlos, *The Victors and the Vanquished* 82–9.

56 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 56. For Şā‘id see G. Martinez-Gros, Şā‘id al-Andalusī, in *ET*², viii, 867–8.

57 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 340–1; ‘Iyāḍ, viii, 143.

58 Toral, Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥadīdī 400, 404, 412.

bid'a, except for politically-motivated cases.⁵⁹ Some Andalusī intellectuals, including Ibn Ḥātim, were accused as *zindīqs* in the eleventh century. He cannot have been influenced by Manichaeism; probably his case was similar to that of another '*zindīq*', Ibn Gharsiya, a Ṣaḡālība servant of Mujāhid (ruler of Denia), who stressed non-Arab cultural supremacy over the Arabs, thus introducing the *shu'ūbiyya* movement into al-Andalus.⁶⁰ Al-Ma'mūn cultivated 'the sciences of the Ancients ('ulūm al-awā'il)' including philosophy, mathematical sciences (astronomy and technology) and natural sciences (medicine and agronomy), probably following the example of Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'mūn.⁶¹ Among the notable scholars of eleventh-century Toledo (e.g. astronomer Ibn al-Baghūnish, astrolabe-maker Ibn Khalaf, agronomists Ibn Wāfid and Ibn Baṣṣāl, mathematicians al-Tujībī and al-Waqqashī),⁶² al-Zarqālī was the first to make a series of long-term observations in Toledo, building two large water-clocks on the banks of the Tajo. It seems that Ibn Ḥātim also belonged to this group in light of his thoroughly rationalistic thinking minimizing the function of feeling.⁶³

Ibn Ḥātim was one of the notaries whose testimonies were accepted at the court (*maqbul al-shahāda*). However, he was indicted for being a *zindīq* by the *muhtasib* Muḥammad b. Labīd al-Murābiṭ in 457/1065. According to this indictment, Ibn Ḥātim divested God of His attributes (*ta'īl*). He was also accused of abusing the Prophet, his wife 'Āisha, his son-in-law 'Alī and the second caliph 'Umar, saying, "Muḥammad was an orphan. His asceticism was imposed by poverty, not his virtue. 'Umar and 'Alī were idiots."⁶⁴ After the advisory council submitted to the *qāḍī* that he should be executed he was allowed to escape to Badajoz during a stay of execution granted for his vindication (*i'dhār*). After he fled Badajoz upon Toledan demand of his extradition, he was finally arrested by *muhtasibs* in Cordoba under 'Abbādid rule in 464/1071. In the last trial he claimed that his accusers, Toledan judges and *faqīhs*, were

59 F.C. de Blois, *Zindīq*, in *EI*², xi, 510–3.

60 H. Monés, Ibn Gharsiya, in *EI*², iii, 773; S. Enderwitz, *Shu'ūbiyya*, in *EI*², ix, 513–6.

61 O'Learly, *How Greek Science passed to the Arabs*; Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*; Goodman, *The Translation of Greek Materials into Arabic*, in *Religion, Learning and Science in the Abbasid Period*, ed. M.J.L. Young et al.; Saliba, *Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance*.

62 Ṣā'id, *Tabaqāt* 178–81, 194–5; Ibn Bashkuwāl, 653; Rushāṭī, *Iqtibās* 59–60.

63 Fierro, *El proceso* 211–3; Samsó, *The Exact Sciences in al-Andalus*, in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain* ii, 960–5; Terés, *Le développement de la civilisation arabe à Tolède*, *Cahiers de Tunisie* 18 (1970), 73–86; Urvoy, *Le monde des ulémas* 56–61. For al-Zarqālī see Hill, *Islamic Science and Technology* 55, 126; J. Samsó, al-Zarqālī, in *EI*², xi, 461–2.

64 Ibn Sahl, *Les nawāzil*, *Hesperis-Tamuda* 14(1973), 93; Fierro, *El proceso* 190, 205–7.

motivated by their own secular (political) ends. After his vindication was judged inadequate, he was executed.⁶⁵

The legal advisors who judged Ibn Ḥātim guilty included the Lawrānkid Aḥmad b. Saʿīd (d. 469/1078), the Mughīthid Aḥmad b. Mughīth al-Ṣadafī (d. 459/1067, writer of a collection of the forms of contracts and notaries' notes)⁶⁶ and Muḥammad b. Qāsim b. Masʿūd al-Qaysī (d. 466/1074).⁶⁷ Soon in 460/1068, al-Ma'mūn, who was then staying in Valencia, put his prominent opponents on trial (*miḥna*) upon receiving an urgent warning from Abū Bakr b. al-Ḥadīdī, resulting in the dismissal of the *qāḍī* Ibn al-Ḥashshā and the imprisonment of six patricians in the castles of Cuenca and Huete. The populace under their influence attempted to rise in arms, but it proved abortive. Not only the sheikhs of the houses of Lawrānkī, Mughīth, Labīd and Arfa'a Ra'sahu,⁶⁸ but also the *qāḍī* of Cuenca, Muḥammad b. Khalaf b. Saqqāt of Cordoba (d. 485/1087), were involved in this incident. Only 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Salama (d. 478/1085) succeeded in escaping to Badajoz after the *miḥna*.⁶⁹ As the result, the power of al-Ma'mūn and Ibn al-Ḥadīdī was solidified, enabling al-Ma'mūn's appointment of Ṣā'id (historian of science), then Saʿīd, son of Ibn al-Ḥadīdī, as *qāḍīs* of Toledo.⁷⁰

As Toral and Fierro expounded, the lawyers who judged Ibn Ḥātim guilty are rather identical with al-Ma'mūn's patrician opponents, inducing the probability that the true motives of Ibn Ḥātim's trial were an indirect attack on al-Ma'mūn's subservience toward Fernando I and his promotion of the sciences of the Ancients.⁷¹ Not only al-Ma'mūn but many Muslim kings were compelled to pay huge amounts of tribute to Alfonso VI to avert his offensives,⁷² resulting in heavy taxation and their unpopularity. Most Toledans abhorred Muslim subservience to Christian kings; the populace in particular would have been hardliners due to their essential xenophobia, alongside the immigrants from Cordoba, who had not been reared in an atmosphere of coexistence.

65 Ibn Sahl, 95.

66 Published as Aḥmad b. Mughīth al-Ṭulayṭulī, *al-Muqni' fi 'ilm al-ṣurūt*, ed. Francisco Javier Aguirre Sádaba, Madrid: Instituto de Cooperación con el Mondo Árabe 1994.

67 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 60, 64–5, 547; 'Iyāḍ, viii, 145–7.

68 For the houses of Mughīth and Arfa'a Ra'sahu see Marín, Familias 238–9, 265–6. It is unknown if contemporary *faqīhs* of the Arfa'a Ra'sahu and the Lawrānkī including Aḥmad b. al-Qāsim and 'Uthmān b. 'Īsā b. Yūsuf (*qāḍī* of Talavera), were involved in these affairs. 'Iyāḍ, viii, 146; Ibn Bashkuwāl, 405.

69 Ibn Bassām, vii, 151; Ibn Bashkuwāl, 341–2, 558–9; 'Iyāḍ, viii, 150.

70 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 223, 236.

71 Toral, Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥadīdī 401–10; Fierro, El proceso 207–9, 212–3.

72 Ibn al-Kardabūs, 77.

Even the Toledan patricians, despite their usual tolerance of coexistence with 'others,' were magnifying the situation due to their antipathy toward the growing power of the Ḥadīdids.⁷³

Al-Ma'mūn (and Ibn al-Ḥadīdī) might have considered that if he continued to absorb Muslim states while he was enduring Christian arrogance, he could reverse the balance with the united kingdom of Leon-Castile (in light of population increase and the militarization of society on the Christian side, the reversal would have been, in fact, difficult). On the other hand, the tribute contributed much to the development of crafts in al-Andalus, because its large part, apart from the donation to Cluny and the construction expenses of new churches, returned to al-Andalus through the purchase of luxury goods made in al-Andalus, such as silk fabrics, saddles, glass wares and ivory caskets.⁷⁴

Al-Qādir and Patrician Domination

Al-Ma'mūn's death in Cordoba (467/1075) was possibly a murder at the hands of Toledan patricians rather than Cordovan sympathizers of the 'Abbādids.⁷⁵ His body was carried by Abū Bakr b. al-Ḥadīdī with great speed to Toledo. It seems that his grandson and heir-presumptive, Yaḥyā al-Qādir, had collected support from these opponents, both patricians and the populace. Al-Qādir, upon his succession, abrogated his grandfather's last instructions, attempting to stop the payment of tribute to Alfonso VI.⁷⁶ Although the pro-Ḥadīdī populace forced their entry into the patio of the alcázar to rescue Ibn al-Ḥadīdī, al-Qādir eventually succeeded in his assassination in cooperation with the *qāḍī* of Cuenca, Ibn al-Saqqāt,⁷⁷ and dismissed Ibn al-Ḥadīdī's son, Sa'īd, from the *qāḍī*ship. He set free the patricians from the prisons of Cuenca and Huete, entrusting important tasks to Lawrānki and Mughīthi sheikhs.⁷⁸ Ibn Bassām gives us rather lurid details on the division of the Toledans.

73 Ashtor, *The Jews of Moslem Spain* iii, 230. However, the father of Šā'id, the historian of science, was an immigrant from Cordoba.

74 Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain* 126, 128.

75 Toral, Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥadīdī 410–1.

76 Bishko, Fernando I 47. Ashtor (*The Jews* iii, 228) said that the tribute continued.

77 Ibn al-Mashshāt (Ibn Bassām, vii, 154). Lévi-Provençal adopted Ibn al-Saqqāt. Alphonse VI et la prise de Tolède, in *Islam d'Occident* 124.

78 This Mughīthi sheikh might be 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Mughīth, who led prayer at the funeral of a Lawrānkid *faqīh*, Abū Ja'far Aḥmad b. Sa'īd, in 469/1076–7 (Ibn Bashkuwāl, 64–5). cf. Tibi, *The Tibyān* 229, note 261.

When al-Ma'mūn's death in Cordoba was announced in Toledo his victims flocked to his grandson and successor al-Qādir, inciting him to harm Abū Bakr b. al-Ḥadīdī because of his monopoly of power and self-aggrandizement. Really, they wanted to topple him from power. They pointed to his shrewd machinations, claiming that al-Qādir could not establish his power unless he killed him. Ibn al-Ḥadīdī's friend, Abū Sa'īd b. al-Faraj, attempted to dissuade al-Qādir from following their advice, threatening him with bad results. However, al-Qādir, ignoring Abū Sa'īd, sent his soldiers to receive his grandfather's coffin on the way from Cordoba, secretly ordering them to kill Ibn al-Ḥadīdī. . . . When Ibn al-Ḥadīdī noticed it he cursed the tyrant (*tāghūt*) and left the coffin, turning to his estates (*diyā'*) with his partisans (*shī'a*) and followers. . . . Then Ibn al-Ḥadīdī entered the city (*balad*) by night and stood on guard until next morning. . . . Messengers went back and forth between al-Qādir and Ibn al-Ḥadīdī, resulting in their meeting. When Ibn al-Ḥadīdī visited al-Qādir, he was guarded by his supporters composed of the common people (*dahmā'*) and the mob (*ghawghā'*) who were clinging to his stirrups. They filled the patios of the alcázar, making terrific uproars. Al-Qādir was frightened, ordering Ibn al-Ḥadīdī to go out. He went out, accompanied by all kinds of people, patricians (*a'yān*) on his both sides and the populace (*'amma*) before and after him. He thanked and praised them. . . . He accused two sheikhs of royal servants, called Mu'ammal(?) and Ibn Ṣarūm(?), inciting the populace (*'amma*) to murder them and loot their properties, for these two were ringleaders of the disturbance (*fitna*). . . . However, this party (*ḥizb*) carried a lot of pull with al-Qādir, spreading rumors of Ibn al-Ḥadīdī's viciousness and persuading their master to set free their friends (*tā'ifa*) imprisoned in Huete. . . . and make them his helpers (*a'wān, anṣār*) to facilitate the success of their machinations. These men were allowed to enter the city (*balad*) secretly from one of the posterns and given an audience on Friday Muḥarram 10, 468/ August 26, 1075.

The *qāḍī-faqīh* Ibn al-Saqqāṭ(?), who was then residing in Cuenca, used to be friendly to Ibn al-Ḥadīdī. He allured him in a vicious way by suggesting his intercession with the king for safe-conduct, really delivering him to his enemies. After Ibn al-Ḥadīdī entered the alcázar and was granted an audience by al-Qādir he soon noticed a treachery, judging by their facial expression. He was convinced of his death, for it was too late to escape. . . . When al-Qādir stood up from his throne, Ibn al-Ḥadīdī attempted to follow him to save his life, but they surrounded him and killed him. Outside, the populace (*'amma*) noticed his murder plan. They

rose in arms to rescue him and drew up a cordon on every street, distinguishing fleeing enemies from their friends. However, when they understood that they could not rescue him they began sacking the houses of the Ḥadīdis. . . . They (the anti-Ḥadīdis) thought that they could manipulate al-Qādir to their advantage. . . . Ibn al-Ḥadīdī's death and their survival did not lessen evils. The people (*nās*) continued to be divided among parties (*aḥzāb*).⁷⁹

Al-Qādir's policy to recover Toledan independence from Castile soon proved to be hasty and untimely. It seems to have been necessary at least to make an anti-Castilian alliance with other Muslim monarchs before breaking with Alfonso VI. Within several months after al-Ma'mūn's death the Cordovan patricians welcomed the Sevillian army back into the city, and Valencia recovered virtual independence. The Hūdids of Zaragoza occupied Molina and parts of Santaver, while Alfonso VI began incursions into the Middle March after taking La Rioja from Navarre,⁸⁰ forcing al-Qādir to resume the payment of tribute.⁸¹ This resumption of payment, in its turn, accelerated the opposition of al-Qādir's former supporters, both patricians and the populace, against himself, resulting in his escape to Cuenca, where the Farajid Abū Sa'īd was governor, and his appeal to Alfonso for succor. Even the Lubbūnid Abū Shujā', governor of Huete, defected.⁸² Ibn Bassām's account on the establishment of patrician domination in Toledo is important.

Efforts were made to patch up a relationship between al-Qādir and the liberated men from the prison. . . . However, when al-Qādir heard of their cries one night he was unsettled, escaping in a fright from the alcázar protected by his slaves and high-rise walls. It is said that his wife, daughter of 'Abd al-Malik al-Muẓaffar (prince of Valencia), and his daughter accompanied him, walking over two farsakhs (12 km) before they could catch riding-animals. The Toledan notables (*mashyakha*) assembled in

79 Ibn Bassām, vii, 152–6. For the looting of patrician houses see also Ibn al-Kardabūs, 81.

80 Ibn Bassām, vii, 156; Reilly, *Alfonso VI* 66–92, 116–24; *The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain* 76–8. Taking advantage of the assassination of the king of Navarre in 1076, Alfonso VI took La Rioja.

81 Ibn al-Kardabūs, 79–82; Ibn Bassām, vii, 156. It is not known exactly when al-Qādir resumed the payment of tribute. Bishko (Fernando I 47) surmised that it took place at the beginning of 1077, for Alfonso could donate double the amount of his father's to Cluny in the middle of the year 1077.

82 Ibn al-Kardabūs, 81–3.

the patio of the alcázar in a state of emotion, and the populace (*‘amma*) was arrogant toward al-Qādir. The privileged (*khāṣṣa*) believed that power was in their hands, understanding that al-Qādir was present nearby. However, they found his escape from one of the posterns. . . . The remainder of his men joined al-Qādir, and his troops took refuge in one of his fortresses (*huṣūn*).⁸³

After his escape the Toledans were left leaderless for several days, falling into a state of disorder. They had no ruler (*amīr*) or good advisor (*mushīr*). They deliberated which *ṭā’ifa* king should be invited to rule them, looking for a king from neighboring states who had never taken plunder from them or dispatched a cavalry against them. One vicious, avaricious, bloodthirsty, but cowardly man, Abū Muḥammad Yūsuf b. al-Qalās of Badajoz, recommended his prince, al-Mutawakkil ‘Umar, son of al-Muzaffar b. al-Afṭas (king of Badajoz), claiming that he was king of a small state, indulged in pleasure. Their messenger rushed to invite him with a lot of fanfare. Al-Mutawakkil advanced in a reserved manner, entering Toledo at the end of the year 472/June 1080.⁸⁴ He stayed there for ten months in a confused and disgraceful state. Meanwhile, al-Qādir was prepared to enter Cuenca, sending a messenger to Alfonso VI, who was waiting for an opportunity, reminding him of the old contract (*‘ahd*) and the favor he had received from al-Ma’mūn when he was an obscure refugee during his conflict with his brothers, Sancho and García. Alfonso, upon hearing of al-Qādir’s complaint, began advancing on Toledo together with him carefully and deceitfully with the intention to seize Toledan territory. In Toledo al-Mutawakkil was forsaken, stripped of thick carpets, large tents, golden wares and gorgeous books befitting kings. . . . When he looked into the situation he had to hurry back to his capital Badajoz.⁸⁵

Al-Qādir secretly promised that he would evacuate Toledo after subduing the city, though he publicly proclaimed that he would retain Toledo, assuring Alfonso his payment of money and the handing over of

83 Ibn Bassām, vii, 157–8. This translation is summarized here and there.

84 Huici Miranda (*Historia musulmana de Valencia* i, 200) dated al-Mutawakkil’s adventures in Toledo to 1079–80 against Ibn Bassām’s chronology. Reilly (*Alfonso VI* 127, note 44) also supported this hypothesis. Alfonso conquered Coria, the northernmost fortress of the Lower March, by September 1079, threatening al-Mutawakkil’s homeland. This might have induced his abandonment of Toledo. Reilly, *Alfonso VI* 125.

85 Ibn Bassām, vii, 158–61. cf. Ibn al-Kardabūs, 83 (The Lubbūnid governor of Huete rebuffed al-Qādir).

sons of influential patricians (*amjād*) and fortresses⁸⁶ as securities. The people of Toledo were prepared for perdition in face of the siege; their only wish was the murder of al-Qādir. On the day of the sacrifice (*naḥr*) of the year 474 (May 1082), the Toledans at last launched an all-out assault on al-Qādir, continuing to fight on the roads all day long at the peril of their lives. They found their way to Alfonso VI, complaining of al-Qādir's misbehavior and crying for help against him, but he drove them away by throwing stones. They dispersed in every direction; Ibn Mughīth, their leader (*kabīr*) and devil (*tāghūt*), died in Castile among the Christians. His sons returned to Islamic territory to rise in revolt in Madrid against al-Qādir, gathering a large number of people. Most of them were killed. . . . Upon returning to Toledo, al-Qādir asked the citizens (*aḥl*) to buy back those fortresses and pay the money he had promised Alfonso. He turned Toledan society upside down, promoting the lower-class people to highest posts. Even the poor aimed at the wealth of the rich and the weak became audacious against the strong.⁸⁷

Evidently, Toledo was under patrician domination from al-Qādir's expulsion around the year 1079 up until his return in May 1082. It seems that al-Mutawakkil acted as a purely military leader; that is precisely the reason why the Toledan patricians chose him (of course, he should have wished to elevate his position in Toledo in case of his successful defense). Many patricians considered that they could continue their oligarchy under Alfonso's suzerainty, sending a delegation to him for negotiations. After this attempt ended in failure, some Toledan patricians attempted to set up their government in Madrid.⁸⁸ Once al-Qādir regained Toledo, he was determined to hold on to its throne, seemingly allying with the populace at the expense of patricians. Ibn Bassām's account that al-Qādir had secretly promised its surrender to Alfonso must be an afterwit. As for Alfonso, it is doubtful that he really wanted his direct rule of a purely Islamic-Mozarabic metropolis at this stage. It would be more

86 According to Christian sources, these fortresses were Zirita de los Canes and Canturias. Reilly, *Alfonso VI* 128, 134. Islamic sources suggest Soria and Coria, but these were non-Dhū n-Nūnid cities. Ibn al-Kardabūs, 83; Ibn Bassām, iii, 249, iv, 655; Lévi-Provençal, *Alphonse VI*, in *Islam d'Occident* 127.

87 Ibn Bassām, vii, 162–4. cf. Ibn al-Kardabūs, 83–4.

88 A Toledan *ḥadīth*-transmitter, Ibn Shūqa (Yūnus b. Aḥmad al-Azdī), died at Madrid in Rabī' I 474/August 1081 (Ibn Bashkuwāl, 687).

advantageous and convenient for him to have a subject-king, making his reinstatement of al-Qādir on Toledan throne fully comprehensible.⁸⁹

However, it seems that Toledo was transforming into a quasi-plebeian city, for al-Qādir employed men of popular origin as tax-collectors or soldiers. The populace began plundering the houses of the wealthy, forcing many patricians and scientists to take refuge in the Hūdid court of Zaragoza, which was also cultivating arts and sciences.⁹⁰ It, in its turn, made the collection of money more difficult. When al-Qādir's incompetency was revealed Alfonso decided to change his policy in favor of direct control of Toledo.⁹¹ He gradually tightened his encircling net of Toledo, seizing fortresses one by one and blocking the roads leading to Toledo, until he reached the rich *vega* of Toledo in the fall of 477/1084 and settled in the Manṣūra palace outside the walls. Alfonso himself often returned to his capitals, Leon and Sahagun, leaving his army to continue the siege, and even campaigned against Seville and Zaragoza. Despite occasional skirmishes and sallies, he averted pitched battles, gradually starving out the Toledans.⁹²

It is said that al-Qādir finally proposed his surrender of Toledo on condition that Alfonso would help him retake Valencia.⁹³ Simultaneously, the patricians (*a'yān*, *mashyakha*) negotiated with Alfonso on their own terms, putting forward their conditions including his assurance of Islamic faith and Muslim lives and properties, their exemption from taxes except the poll-tax (*jizya*), his permission of the refugees' return to Toledo and recovery of their former properties, and the free emigration of Muslim citizens. It seems that Alfonso accepted most of these conditions. Then, Toledo surrendered to Alfonso in Muḥarram 478/May 1085, and al-Qādir retreated back to Cuenca, whose Farajid governor remained loyal to him.⁹⁴

Most patricians and intellectuals took refuge in other cities under Muslim rule, notably Valencia, leaving behind middle- and lower-class Muslims. However, some intellectuals remained in Toledo, Madrid or Guadalajara until

89 *Tibyān* 89–90, 113; Ibn al-Kardabūs, 83; Reilly, *Alfonso VI* 127.

90 Ibn al-Kardabūs, 84. A *ḥadīth*-transmitter of Cordovan origin, Ja'far b. 'Abdallāh al-Tujībī, was killed in his house on the day of the sacrifice of 475/May 1083 (Ibn Bashkuwāl, 129).

91 Reilly (*Alfonso VI* 128–9, 134–5) considered that Alfonso's change of mind began as early as 1079, and was completed by the middle of 1081. However, this is, I think, too early, considering his reinstatement of al-Qādir taking place in May 1082.

92 Ibn Bassām, vii, 163–9 (French trans. Vlamincx, La reddition de Tolède, *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 16 (1985), 186–96); Ibn al-Kardabūs, 82–3. For the details of Alfonso's siege and conquest of Toledo see Reilly, *Alfonso VI* 164–70.

93 Ibn Bassām, v, 93; dhayl 304; Ibn al-Kardabūs, 85; *Primera* 99.

94 Ibn al-Kardabūs, 84–5; Ibn Bassām, vii, 165–6.

their death, like biographer Ibn Muṭāhir (d. 489/1096) and traditionist Ibn Jumāhir al-Ḥajrī (d. 488/1095).⁹⁵ The Muslims, who remained in the region of Toledo, called *Mudéjars* or *Moros*, retained their Islamic faith, continuing to be carriers of superb Mudéjar culture as represented in architecture, handicraft and arts, alongside Christian *Mozárabes* and Jews, who continued to speak and write in Arabic for more than two hundred years.⁹⁶ The Castilians drew back from immigrating to this purely Arabic metropolis for a very long time.⁹⁷ Although its great mosque was consecrated as the Christian cathedral in Rabīʿ I 478/July 1085,⁹⁸ it seems that the Castilian kings abode by the pact on the whole, stabilizing Toledan society. In the early twelfth century the Latin translation movement of Arabic science and philosophy began in Tarazona (Ṭarasūna) and Tudela (Tuṭila) of the Upper March, and during the mid-twelfth century Toledo became its center, attracting talented Italian, British, German and French scholars, who devoted their lives to translation with the cooperation of the Jews and *Mozárabes* of Toledo. It is well-known that Toledo played an extremely important role in the history of academic learning of the West including the Middle East and Europe.

Toledo, the seat of the Middle March, had been virtually autonomous under Visigothic-*muwallad* patrician domination since the late eighth century up until ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III’s conquest in 932. It seems that duumvirate was in force in Toledo for a long time; its power was divided between the houses of Ṭarbīsha and Muṭarrif, at least since a compromise was reached with the Umayyad government in 879. Possibly, patrician domination continued in a diluted fashion under centralized Umayyad rule from Caliph ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III to the *ḥājib* al-Muzaffar. Toledo became virtually independent during the Berber siege of Cordoba (1010–3). After the death of the last Umayyad-appointed governor struggles for power among its patricians

95 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 70, 343, 562.

96 For *Mudéjars* see P. Chalmeta, *Mudéjar*, in *ET*², vii, 286–9; Pavón Maldonado, *Arte Toledano: Islámico y mudéjar*; Molénat, *Mudéjars, captifs et affranchise*, in *Tolède XII^e–XIII^e*, ed. L. Cardaillac, 112–24; *L’arabe à Tolède*, *Qanṭara* 15 (1994), 473–96. For *mozárabes* see López Gómez, *The Mozarabs: Worthy Bearers of Islamic Culture*, in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi, i, 171–5; Miller, *The Mozarabs*, in *The Literature of al-Andalus*, ed. M.R. Menocal et al., 417–20.

97 In the Upper March too, conquered by Aragon and Navarre about thirty years after Toledo, most Muslims remained in cities and the countryside, hampering Christian immigration and preserving Muslim society almost intact for about 200 years. Catlos, *The Victors and the Vanquished* 100–20; Washka, in *ET*², xi, 159.

98 Ibn Bassām, vii, 168. Rodrigo Jiménez, in *Christians and Moors* i, 89.

were intensified. Even the *qādī* Yaʿīsh was eventually ousted from the Middle March. Finally, during the years between 1116 and 1119, the Toledan patricians agreed to invite Ismāʿīl, Berber Dhū n-Nūnid ruler of Santaver, as military and political leader, partly to put an end to their own internecine struggles and partly to strengthen its defense against the northern Christian states.

Ismāʿīl and his son Yaḥyā al-Maʿmūn gradually built up their power at the expense of patricians, chiefly on the basis of their Berber Hawwāra tribesmen, but also in alliance with a relatively small number of patricians, notably the Ḥadīdis and the Farajis, making Dhū n-Nūnid rule widely unpopular among the Toledans including a major part of the populace (but seemingly still not in the majority, considering a large pro-Ḥadīdi populace). Particularly, al-Maʿmūn's diplomatic policy to expand his domain at the expense of other Muslim states, while continuing his subservience to Fernando I and Alfonso VI and his levy of heavy taxes to pay them, made the opposition party grow stronger year by year. Moreover, his wars with the Hūdids proved to be futile and disastrous. Modern Spanish Arabists found the probability that this conflict was closely associated with al-Maʿmūn's unique policy to cultivate mathematical and natural sciences for the benefit of agricultural and industrial development. In this situation, it seems that the opposition party inclined to support his grandson Yaḥyā al-Qādir.

Upon al-Maʿmūn's death in 1075 al-Qādir hastily changed his grandfather's policy, provoking Alfonso's incursions. Al-Qādir was forced to return to his grandfather's policy with possible heavier tribute and more lack of independence, which outraged even his former supporters, pushing them into diehard opposition. Al-Qādir was expelled from Toledo in 1079, resulting in the establishment of patrician domination in Toledo. However, it proved ephemeral, for Alfonso attacked Toledo and reinstated al-Qādir in 1082. Al-Qādir became even more dependent upon Alfonso, being driven to form an alliance with part of the populace, just like Umayyad Caliph al-Mustakfi of Cordoba. Some opposition patricians conspired to establish their own domination under Alfonso's suzerainty. This disturbance, coupled with massive emigration of Toledan patricians and intellectuals, made his rule and his levy of money impossible, forcing Alfonso to decide on his outright absorption of Toledo. Finally the patricians had to accept Castilian rule in 1085 on some conditions favorable for the Muslims who decided to remain in Toledo.

Valencia during the Later Eleventh Century

Introduction

Valencia (Ar. Balansiya) was the center of Sharq al-Andalus, the eastern coast (Levante) of the Iberian Peninsula stretching from Tortosa facing the Ebro to Murcia and Almeria in the south, and separated from the Meseta by a series of high mountains in eastern Iberia. This long and slender plain is divided by the Alcoy Mountains into two parts, Valencia and Alicante-Murcia, making communication between the two difficult (only the pass of Alcoy-Cocentaina was passable).¹ The fertile, irrigated area (*huerta*) surrounding Valencia is watered by the Turia (Guadalaviar < al-Wādī l-Abyaḍ) and a great reservoir, Albufera (al-Buḥayra). Another great river, Jucar (Shuqr), is flowing parallel to the Turia to the south, irrigating the vast *huertas* of Alcira (Jazīra Shuqr), Jativa (Shāṭiba) and Gandia.² The region (*iqlīm*) of Valencia was enlarged during the eleventh century to include Almenara (al-Manāra), Onda, Segorbe (Shubrub), Banicanena (Banū Kināna), Jerica (Shāriqa), Cullera (Qulayayra), Alcira, Burriana (Buryāna) and Sagunto (Murviedro, Murbīṭar).³

During the eleventh century Valencia became an important export port of not only the crops of its hinterland, but also saffron, kermes, the pine timbers of the Cuenca Mountains and the high-quality paper produced in Jativa. In the following century the route connecting Valencia with Santiago de Compostela was opened, and the ships of Genoa and Pisa regularly visited Valencia, though it seems that the direct communications with Maghrib, Sicily, Egypt and Syria remained underdeveloped.⁴

It is important to notice, however, that the region of Valencia was increasingly arid, sparsely populated and underdeveloped during late Roman and early Islamic times with the progress of aridification and the decline of irrigation. Valencia was a small rectangular city (a long side was about 350 meters); other cities, Sagunto, Jativa, Denia, Orihuela (Uryūla) and Cartagena (Qarṭājanna) dwindled into small Christianized towns (Roman forums and theaters were converted into cemeteries and fortresses). Most Roman villas ceased to exist

1 Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence* i, 56–7.

2 Idrīsī, ii, 556.

3 ‘Udhri, 20.

4 Constable, *Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain* 17, 20, 43, 45, 66, 132, 172, 190, 195–6.

or were transfigured into villages (*qaryas*>alquerías).⁵ It is these Christianized towns and villages that the Muslims found during their early eighth-century conquest.⁶ Contrary to Lévi-Provençal's theory, few Arabs settled in Sharq north of the Alcoy Mountains.⁷ Only part of the Arabs of the Egyptian *jund*, who were settled in the region of Murcia (Tudmīr) in the 740's, spilled over into the region of Valencia north of the Alcoy.⁸

As Guichard expounded it is mainly Berber clans who colonized both the plains and mountains. Probably the Hawwāra and other Berber tribes (*qabā'il*) of Santaver immigrated into Sharq north of the Alcoy during the ninth century, initiating the development of their style of irrigation there.⁹ They often renounced the suzerainty of Umayyad *amīrs*;¹⁰ Umayyad governors and *qāḍīs* are rarely recorded in this region, indicating its late Islamization and Arabicization.¹¹

Guichard's grounds for his argument are mainly the names of villages of both plains and mountains, beginning with Beni (children), which he regarded as Berber clan communities (a typical village consisted of ten to fifty houses and its farms extended 0.5 to 2.5 km). It seems that the Berbers of Sharq crossed further to Majorca, Minorca and Ibiza as numerous place names there beginning with Beni indicate.¹² However, counterarguments have been made. According to one theory, *qaryas* were not independent communities, but subject to nearby cities and often owned by absentee proprietors; villagers were sharecroppers.¹³ Possibly, many *qaryas* of the mountains retained Berber

5 Guichard, *Structures* 179, 192; Sharq al-Andalus, in *ET*², ix, 351; Glick, *From Muslim Fortress* 3, 5, 11–2.

6 Gutierrez Lloret, From Civitas to Madina, in *The Formation* i, 217–63.

7 Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire de l'Espagne* i, 84, 90. Kināna and Quḍā'a tribesmen settled in Sharq (the latter in Onda). Guichard, *Structures* 224, 233, 243. For the *jund* of Tudmīr see his *Les musulmans de Valence*, ii, 283.

8 *Muqtabis* vii, 201.

9 Guichard, The Population of the Region of Valencia, in *The Formation* i, 154–5, 162–3, 173–7; Siḥr al-Sayyid 'Abd al-'Azīz, *Shāṭiba* 40–7.

10 Ya'qūbī, *buldān* 355.

11 Guichard, *Structures* 195; *Les musulmans de Valence* i, 281–2. Acien Almansa also posited the late Islamization of Sharq. Glick, *From Muslim Fortress* 53.

12 Guichard, *Structures* 179, 192, 233, 261–2, 267–9, 272–4, 328–41; Glick, *From Muslim Fortress* 19, 31–6, 80, 134. There are many villages beginning with Beni in Algeria and Morocco too. *Idem* 35.

13 María Jesús Rubiera, quoted in Glick, *From Muslim Fortress* 23–6; Burns and Chevedden, *Negotiating Cultures* 17–8, 311, 233, 238; Moreno, Quelques considérations, in *Islamisation et arabisation*, ed. D. Valérian, 247–63.

characteristics for some time, but the 'clan' *qaryas* of the plains were, together with old *qaryas* of Roman origin, transformed into estates belonging to absentee landowners, just like newly-founded estates (*ḍay'a*, *raḥal*, *riyād*),¹⁴ as a result of the development of the cultivation of commodity crops geared to the demand of urban markets during the eleventh century.

Guichard's other grounds for Berber origin of villages include Berber-styled meso- and micro-scale irrigation systems of mountain *qaryas*, data gained from the superficies reconnaissance of hilltop fortresses (*ḥiṣns*) and the information of *qaryas* and *raḥals* culled from post-reconquista repartimiento (the division of Muslim lands and buildings among the Christian conquerors) documents.

Muslims began developing macro-scale irrigation or restoring Roman ones in the plains during the later tenth century, building many canals from the Turia and the Jucar. As the name of Favara (<Hawwāra), a canal (*sāqiya*) running along the Turia near the city of Valencia, indicates, many canals were named after Berber tribes or clans, suggesting their origin as joint properties of their tribal communities. In meso- and micro-scale irrigation of the mountains water was carried from springs and brooks through flumes or underground aqueducts of Iranian origin, called *qanāts*, then raised by *na'ūras* (norias) and animal-driven wheels into cisterns (*birkas*, *jubbs*, *ṣihrijs*). Water was distributed to each peasant within a given period of time measured by water clocks; the maintenance and control of water was jointly supervised by villagers, a task suitable for egalitarian tribal society. The right of the use of water was also salable.¹⁵

Contrary to the centralization theories of Hegel and Wittfogel these irrigational systems were locally controlled and maintained on the basis of custom and local laws, continuing to be very stable despite political upheavals and the change of dominant religions.¹⁶ According to Glick, available water was so wealthy that upstream irrigators had absolute priority in the use of water over the people living downstream, even not returning unused water to the stream

14 A *ḍay'a* often meant a *qarya*, especially in Lerida, the Upper March. A *raḥal* was normally a small estate on the edge of irrigated plains, sometimes a pasture too. *Riyād* were irrigated orchards or gardens. In al-Andalus and Sicily, *munya*, *ḍay'a* and *raḥal* were often used interchangeably. For *raḥal* see Lagardère, *Campagnes et paysants d'al-Andalus* 58–64.

15 Glick, *From Muslim Fortress* 65, 69, 73–9, 82–3, 89. Even Butzer, who downplayed Arab role in the development of irrigation and agriculture in Iberia, recognized the importance of Arab role in the development of macro-scale irrigation from great rivers in the plains, the spread of meso-scale irrigation in the mountains and the introduction of Eastern methods of cultivation and cultivars. Butzer et al., *Irrigation Agrosystems in Eastern Spain*, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 75 (1985), 479–509.

16 *From Muslim Fortress* 68–70, 73–9, 89–91.

for the benefit of the latter (the names of rivers often change at the point where they pass from mountain terrains into plains), and mills were located farthest from the water sources.¹⁷

The superficial reconnaissance of *hişns* developed since the late 1970's has shown that the peasants of seven to ten adjacent villages located on the foothills of mountains used to take refuge in a hilltop *hişn* in times of unrest since the ninth century. These villages constituted an administrative and fiscal unit, itself called *hişn* too. A fortress was equipped with a donjon called *salūqīya* (celoquia) standing on the top and a vast walled space, called *baqqar* (albacar), located on gentle slopes immediately below. Some *hişns* had permanent residential areas for peasants called *rabaḍs* on the foot. A *hişn* was administered by a representative of the government called *qā'id* (alcaid, alcaide). Opinions are divided on the interpretation of the albacar. While some identified it with an enclosure of oxen levied as taxes, regarding a *hişn* as the center of local taxation, Guichard considered it as an emergency refugee camp for the villagers under the control of a *hişn*.¹⁸ However, villagers had no feudal obligations to their *qā'ids*, except *sukhra* (sofra), an obligation of transporting water and firewood to *hişns*; *qā'ids* had no judicial power over villagers.¹⁹

Valencia was underdeveloped culturally too. No Valencian is included in Ibn Bashkuwāl's biographical dictionary up to the end of the ninth century. Even during the tenth century only five, fewer than neighboring Tortosa, are recorded.²⁰ Some nationalist Catalan scholars propounded the theory of Romance-speaking indigenous people's nominal conversion to Islam with the change of rulers in the early eighth century without undergoing Arabicization, downplaying the Arab character of the region of Valencia or its individuality as distinct from Catalonia. It is true that the Islamization and Arabicization of the region of Valencia was much slower than other regions; during the tenth

17 Idem 70, 80–2.

18 Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence* i, 171–242, ii, 375–85, 460–3; Lagardère, *Campagnes et paysans d'Al-Andalus* 86–101, 175–226; Glick, *From Muslim Fortress* 18–24, 29, 84–7, 134. This *hişn-qarya* system is observable in Lerida, (Catlos, *The Victors* 57; Glick, *From Muslim Fortress* 84), Huesca (Sénac, *La frontière et les hommes* 226–32, 252–66) and the regions of Velez Malaga, Almuñecar and Alpujarras (Acién Almansa, *Settlement and Fortification, in The Formation of al-Andalus* i, 347–76). Probably Glick made an error when he extended the *hişn-qarya* system to the whole of al-Andalus. According to him, there is no such *hişn-qarya* system in Morocco. *From Muslim Fortress* 29, 109–111.

19 *From Muslim Fortress* 17, 26; Catlos, *The Victors* 58–9.

20 *Les musulmans de Valence* ii, 282.

century few scholars had Arab tribal *nisbas*. However, such scholars dramatically increased to reach two thirds during the twelfth century.²¹

Valencia developed into a large city and a great cultural center under Ṣaqāliba and ʿĀmirid rule during the eleventh century. Its notables gradually built up their leadership during late ʿĀmirid rule and launched an armed resistance against their 'king' al-Qādir, resulting in the establishment of patrician domination under the leadership of their *qāḍī* Ibn Jaḥḥāf and the deputy judge Ibn Wājib.

Castilian scholars have taken more interest in Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, called el Campeador or el Cid (<Sīdī, Sayyidī, my lord), the hero of the *Cantar de mio Cid*, than Valencian history under Muslim rule. One such scholar, Menéndez Pidal, praised Rodrigo Díaz, accusing Ibn Jaḥḥāf. He put forward his theory that the Muslims of al-Andalus relatively easily accepted Christian rule because they were descendants of the Romans and the Visigoths. A Valencian historian, Huici Miranda, reacted against this Castilian-centric view by stressing Rodrigo Díaz' selfish intentions and rehabilitating Ibn Jaḥḥāf's honor, and declared that no Muslim favored Christian rule.²²

Arabic contemporary sources are not wealthy, but the relevant parts of Ibn Ḥayyān's *Matīn* are quoted in Ibn Bassām's *Dhakhīra*. In the same way, the Valencian Ibn ʿAlqama's (428–509/1037–1116) accounts of Rodrigo Díaz' siege of Valencia under Ibn Jaḥḥāf's rule are preserved in Ibn ʿIdhārī's history. Lévi-Provençal demonstrated that many parts of the Castilian chronicle, *Primera Crónica General (Estoria de España)*, compiled by order of Alfonso X (1252–84), are rather free adaptations of Ibn ʿAlqama's history.²³ A history of al-Andalus, written by Muḥammad b. ʿĪsā b. Muzayn, leader of Silves, is also quoted by Ibn al-Abbār. The only important purely Christian source is *Historia Roderici*, a biography of Rodrigo Díaz, written in plain Latin during the twelfth century, probably in the Christian-occupied Upper March.²⁴

21 Idem i, 172–4; *From Muslim Fortress* 53–9.

22 Menéndez Pidal, *La España del Cid*, English trans. *The Cid and his Spain*; Huici Miranda, *Historia musulmana de Valencia* i, 190–294, ii, 1–164; El cadí de Valencia, *RIEEI* 11–12 (1963–4), 149–67; Lévi-Provençal, *Le Cid de l'histoire*, in *Islam d'Occident* 153–85; Sīd, in *ET*², ix, 533–4. Reilly criticized Menéndez Pidal's tendency to believe in the historicity of *Cantar de mio Cid*. *Alfonso VI* 37–9, 43, 49–51, 77, 83, 130–3, 233, 284.

23 Lévi-Provençal, *La prise de Valence*, in *Islam d'Occident* 187–233.

24 *Historia Roderici*, in *The World of El Cid* 90–147.

The Establishment of Ṣaqaḷiba Rule in Valencia in the Early Eleventh Century

History of Valencia before the eleventh century is obscure. Valencia was a small, more or less autonomous city. An Umayyad prince, ‘Abdallāh, son of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān I, after his failure of revolt against his nephew, al-Ḥakam I (180–206/796–822), was given the region of Valencia as his appanage.²⁵ It is also reported that the Dhū n-Nūnid leader of Santaver, ‘Āmir b. Abī Jawshan, ruled Jativa, Alcira and Valencia before succumbing to ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III.²⁶ Then Berber leaders were eliminated from the region, resulting in its control from Cordoba. This fact, coupled with recent economic development, induced Ṣaqaḷiba (‘Āmirid *mawālī* or ‘*abīd*) to take refuge in Sharq and establish small states in port cities after the outbreak of the civil war between the Berber mercenaries and the Cordovan citizens in 399/1009. The most powerful Ṣaqaḷiba leaders, Khayrān and Mujāhid, settled in Almeria and Denia respectively around the year 403/1012–3.²⁷

It is said that Valencia was initially under Mujāhid’s rule, but then became independent under his Ṣaqaḷiba men, Mubārak and Muḏaffar.²⁸ These two men were not refugees from Cordoba, but officials of the spot in charge of the control of irrigation (*wikālat al-sāqiya*). They were dismissed in 401/1010–1 as a result of a change of the government during the civil war, but were later reappointed through the good offices of a *wazīr*. In this duumvirate they were equal to each other, sharing the same alcázar beside the great mosque (present-day cathedral), except the harems (the alcázar’s ruins were found underground in Plaza de la Almoina); only the name of Mubārak always preceded that of Muḏaffar. After the siege of Cordoba they did not recognize Sulaymān ‘the Berber caliph’²⁹ or al-Mu‘ayṭī, counter-caliph installed by Mujāhid in 405/1014.³⁰

Reports on internecine wars among Ṣaqaḷiba rulers are scanty and conflicting, resulting in varied interpretations. According to Siḥr’s rather plausible

25 Ibn ‘Idhārī, ii, 71; Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire de l’Espagne* i, 197–8.

26 ‘Udhri, 14–5; *Muqtabis* v, 190, 249.

27 It is said that Mujāhid, governor of Denia, was the first to establish an independent power around the year 400, but Wasserstein (*The Caliphate in the West* 120–8; Mujāhid, in *ET*², vii, 292–3) considers that his establishment of power in Denia might have been in 405/1014 on the basis of his study of literary sources and coinage.

28 dhayl 302. For the *ṣāhib al-sāqiya* see Glick, *Irrigation and Society* 198–203.

29 Ibn Bassām, v, 14–5, 22; *A‘māl* 222.

30 Ibn ‘Idhārī, iii, 116; Ibn Bassām, i, 41; Ibn Bashkuwāl, 269. Al-Mu‘ayṭī’s installment is also confirmed by the coins issued at Elota, the mint of Denia, in the name of ‘Abdallāh, probably identical with al-Mu‘ayṭī. *The Caliphate in the West* 100–1, 123, 133–6.

reconstruction, Mujāhid of Denia originally placed Jativa, Valencia and Tortosa under his control, but Labīb, one of his Ṣaḡāliba men, became independent in Tortosa, then advancing to seize Jativa famous for its impregnable hilltop castle. Mubārak and Muẓaffar, taking advantage of this long war, managed to induce Khayra al-Ṣaḡqal, Mujāhid's governor of Jativa, to defect to them.³¹ The revenues accruing from the regions of Valencia and Jativa amounted to 70,000 and 50,000 dinars a month, respectively. Mubārak and Muẓaffar strenuously levied land tax (*kharāj*) even from the people (*ra'īyya*) of the mountains who had hardly paid it, driving some of them into more remote mountains.³² Consequently, their rule was as unpopular as other Ṣaḡāliba's among the people of Sharq, who were suffering from heavy taxes (*kharāj* or *'ushr* as land tax and *maḡhārim* as trade taxes).³³ Ibn Ḥayyān gives us a vivid but exaggerated anti-Ṣaḡāliba account from an Andalusī standpoint.³⁴

As a result of their attempt to levy taxes in a most forceful way, the people (*ra'īyya*) were ruined. They ran away one by one until their original regions (*aqālīm*) became desolate. . . . They appointed the most vicious tax collectors (*'ummāl*), increasing tax burden upon the people day and night and compelling many of them to wear hides or plainly-woven clothes and eat herbage (*baql, ḡhashīsh*). The impoverished people (*qawm*) had no other means of resistance than running away from their homes and evacuating their villages. These two foreigners and their men never regretted, nor did they fear that new settlers would repeat the same kind of response. To the contrary, they confiscated deserted villages, making them royal estates (*dīyā' mustakhlaṣa*). When a notable (*kabīr*) became the owner of such an estate, its original inhabitants returned there, expecting a sharecropping (*suhmān*) with the new owner and his protection from unexpected disasters. This is a normal way of most rebels (illegal rulers) in frontiers after the collapse of the Cordovan central government.³⁵

31 Siḡr, *Shāḡība* 66–70. Her surmise that Muẓaffar and Mubārak divided their territory, the former Valencia and the latter Jativa, is dubious. Idem 73–5.

32 Ibn Bassām, v, 15–6; *A'māl* 225–6.

33 Data on obscure Umayyad and Ṭawā'if taxation are collected. Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire de l'Espagne* iii, 30–46; Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence* ii, 247–54.

34 Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence* ii, 292–5.

35 Ibn Bassām, v, 15–6, 19–20. For *mustakhlaṣ* see Dozy, *Supplément* i, 393.

Apart from ‘Āmirid Ṣaḡālība who took refuge in Valencia and Jativa as tax collectors, bureaucrats and soldiers, many Andalusī scholars (*‘ulamā’*), poets, and skilled artisans of Cordoba also sought employment at the Valencian court, including Ibn Ḥazm.³⁶ The most famous Cordovan refugee scholar in those days was a Mālikī *faqīh*, Ibn al-Fakhhār (d. 419/1028), who had great influence over the Valencian rulers and populace (*‘amma*).³⁷ Irrigation facilities were extended in the outer regions and the mountains. Many newly-constructed residences in the city were beautified with carved marbles, wooden columns and gardens irrigated by flumes. Craftsmen and traders opened their shops in new *sūqs*. As a result, Valencia developed into a large city, roughly eight times as large as the old city, and new encircling walls were built by Mubārak and Muẓaffar (the north-south length was nearly 1 km).³⁸ A little later their successor, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, strengthened its walls and gates.³⁹ According to Glick, its population reached eleven to fifteen thousand people.⁴⁰

Jativa developed too, particularly playing an important role as the first refuge for Cordovans and an assembly place for armies bound for Cordoba. For example, Caliph Sulaymān took refuge in Jativa after being ousted from Cordoba in 400/1010, and Khayrān gathered troops in Jativa before advancing to Cordoba to save its citizens from a Berber siege. When the siege was prolonged, Hishām II was advised to flee to Jativa by his Ṣaḡālība. It is in Jativa too that Khayrān gathered soldiers before advancing on Cordoba to install al-Murtaḏā as caliph in 408/1018.⁴¹ However, Mubārak and Muẓaffar refrained from intervening in Cordovan affairs. On the other hand, when the Tujībīd ruler of Zaragoza, al-Mundhir I, attacked Tortosa, Mubārak rushed to help Labīb repulse this attack.⁴²

It seems that Ṣaḡālība rulers welcomed these Andalusī refugees, as long as they were not opponents. The Cordovan Ṣaḡālība had been assimilated into the Andalusīs in religion, culture and language, greatly facilitating their mingling with Andalusī refugees, the enforcement of the *sharī’a* and the rapid Islamization and Arabicization of Sharq. Politically, however, Andalusī

36 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 169, 203, 253, 279, 307, 384–5, 422; Ḍabbī, 290, 330, 379, 476, 504; *Tawq* 118.

37 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 510–2.

38 Ibn Bassām, v, 16–8, 21–2. For historical maps of Valencia during the eleventh century see Huici Miranda, *Historia musulmana* i, 24, 27; Glick, *Les musulmans de Valence* i, document 20. These maps are conflicting in many minor points.

39 ‘Udhri, 17–8.

40 Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain* 114.

41 Ibn ‘Idhārī, iii, 95–6; *A’māl* 120; Ibn Bassām, i, 456.

42 *A’māl* 225–6.

citizens opposed Ṣaqaḻiba rulers. It is said that when Mubāarak died, falling off his horse at the alcántara over the Turia,⁴³ Muḏaffar was ousted to Jativa by the Valencians who lost no time in attacking the alcázar. Labīb was invited by the Valencians, but had to retreat to Tortosa before Mujāhid's relentless assaults. This Labīb was also unpopular among the people of Tortosa, because he was regarded as too subservient to the count of Barcelona, Ramón Borrell (992–1017). Later, the people of Tortosa rose in arms, ousting Labīb and inviting the Hūdīd ruler of nearby Lerida, to defend the city from Mujāhid.⁴⁴

In Dhū l-Ḥijja 411/March–April 1021 the Ṣaqaḻiba of Valencia decided to invite fifteen-year-old 'Abd al-'Azīz (411–52/1021–60), son of their former 'Āmirid master Shanjūl, who had been given refuge by the Tujībīd ruler of Zaragoza, al-Mundhir I, as puppet ruler to take precautions against their internal squabbles. Accordingly, the new Valencian government was essentially a Ṣaqaḻiba coalition under 'Abd al-'Azīz' rather nominal rule. It recognized Ḥammūdīd Caliph al-Qāsim and gave no subsidies to other 'Āmirid members, only building a *munya* for 'Abd al-'Azīz on the other side of the Turia (its ruins were found in the southern corner of Villa Nueva).⁴⁵ It succeeded in regaining Jativa from Zuhayr, Khayrān's successor as ruler of Almeria (419–29/1028–38),⁴⁶ and temporarily seized Murcia, Lorca and Almeria, taking advantage of Zuhayr's murder during his campaign against Granada in 429/1038. However, its governor of Almeria, the Tujībīd Ma'n b. Ṣumādīḥ,⁴⁷ declared independence in 433/1042, and then Murcia followed its example under a patrician, Aḥmad b. Ṭāhir, about seven years later.⁴⁸

It seems that a fresh import of Ṣaqaḻiba slaves was suspended. This fact, coupled with a high ratio of eunuchs among the Ṣaqaḻiba and their Andalusization, greatly reduced their number in a short time, resulting in the disappearance of Ṣaqaḻiba governments and their replacement by Andalusī patrician domination.

43 The date is unknown. According to dhayl 302, first Muḏaffar, then Mubāarak died in 408 or 409 (1017–9), but the chronology of the dhayl is often confused.

44 Ibn Bassām, v, 20–1; dhayl 302.

45 Ibn Bassām, v, 249, 251; dhayl 301–2.

46 'Udhri, 83.

47 P. Guichard, Ṣumādīḥ, in *ET*², xii, 766.

48 dhayl 301–2; Ibn Bassām, ii, 663, 730–1, v, 21, 228, 249; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 167, 191–3, 239–40; 'Udhri, 84; *Hulla* ii, 81.

The First Patrician Domination in Valencia

With the shrinking of Şaḡāliba population the domination of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and his son ‘Abd al-Malik (452–7/1060–5) was increasingly destabilized and threatened by the Valencian notables and populace (*dahmā*).⁴⁹ It is said that under ‘Abd al-‘Azīz his Andalusī *wazīr*, Abū ‘Āmir Muḥammad b. Sa‘īd al-Tākurunnī, and his secretary (*kātib*), Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, called Ibn Rūbash of Cordoba, seized leadership from the Şaḡāliba.⁵⁰ Given ‘Abd al-‘Azīz’s weakness, it seems that Valencia had been nearly under Andalusī patrician domination since his last days. Though details remain unknown, Ibn al-Tākurunnī and Ibn Rūbash likely constantly consulted other Andalusī and Şaḡāliba dignitaries, *qāḏīs*, *muḥtasibs*, notaries and notables. This transition to quasi-patrician domination was smooth, not battle-scarred, with royal *wazīrs* and *kātib*s as main holders of power or coordinators, as indicated by Ibn Bassām’s following account.

Four secretaries (*kuttāb*) called ‘four seals (*ṭabā’ir*)’ served him (‘Abd al-‘Azīz), that is Ibn Ṭālūt (evidently a Berber), Ibn ‘Abbās, Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and Ibn al-Tākurunnī, writer of royal letters, whose culture, knowledge and wisdom was so renowned that he continued to be promoted until he was invested with the vizierate. He also lived in opulence. In 452/1060, when he (‘Abd al-‘Azīz) suffered from an incurable disease... his men agreed to install his son ‘Abd al-Malik. Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, secretary of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and manager of state affairs, known as Ibn Rūbash al-Qurṭubī, acted for him (‘Abd al-Malik). This secretary was famous for his forbearance, and he helped him as much as possible, consolidating his authority. As a result, ‘Abd al-Malik’s position was stabilized despite his weak basis due to his lack of money and men and the confusion of many districts (*a‘māl*).⁵¹

After the death of Ibn Rūbash in 457/1065 his son Abū Bakr succeeded him in the midst of an unfavorable change of international relationship.⁵²

49 Ibn Bassām, v, 250.

50 Ibn Bassām, v, 40, 250; Ḍabbī, 70; *Hulla* ii, 129; dhayl 303. For *wazīrs* and *kātib*s in Sharq see *Les musulmans de Valence* ii, 314–9. Abū Bakr later styled himself as *wazīr*. *Hulla* ii, 129.

51 Ibn Bassām, v, 250.

52 Huici Miranda (*Historia musulmana* i, 188–9) misidentified this Abū Bakr as a son of the king ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, seemingly on the basis of the *dhayl* 303. However, Ibn Ḥayyān and Ibn Muzayn (quoted in the *Hulla*) are more trustworthy than the *dhayl*, as Husayn Mu‘nis

Not only the Hūdid king of Zaragoza, al-Muqtadir (441–75/1049–82), but also Fernando I of Leon-Castile and al-Ma'mūn of Toledo took aim at rich but militarily weak Valencia. For example, al-Muqtadir was conceded Tortosa by its Ṣaḡāliba rulers who were suffering from popular resistance in 452/1060,⁵³ and then directed his attention toward Sharq, ultimately occupying Denia in 468/1076. Among others, Fernando I made a long drive against Valencia in 455/1063, defeating the poorly armed Valencian populace (*ra'ā'*), mainly composed of craftsmen (*mahana*, *ṣunnā'*), at the battle of Paterna (Baṭarna) outside Valencia.⁵⁴

In light of this situation the Valencians had to accept al-Ma'mūn's 'protection,' giving Prince 'Abd al-Malik's daughter to al-Ma'mūn's grandson al-Qādir. Then Abū Bakr b. Rūbash, soon after succeeding his father, invited al-Ma'mūn from Cuenca into Valencia to depose 'Abd al-Malik and was himself invested with the governorship of Valencia by al-Ma'mūn.⁵⁵ However, Valencian autonomy continued under Abū Bakr's leadership in its internal affairs. For example, Abū Bakr strengthened the walls and fortifications of Valencia, which is located in the indefensible coastal plains, and reformed the collection of taxes, increasing the stipends of soldiers.⁵⁶ The autonomy of Valencia probably expanded under al-Qādir, grandson and successor of al-Ma'mūn since 467/1075, without renouncing his authority until 476/1084.⁵⁷ Ibn Bassām himself compares Abū Bakr's style of rule as *wazīr* to that of Abū l-Ḥazm b. Jahwar in Cordoba, demonstrating some similarity of patrician domination in Cordoba and Valencia (but he regards their style of rule as *imāra*, personal domination).⁵⁸

After al-Ma'mūn's death al-Qādir's weakness gave free rein to the lust of the Hūdid king al-Muqtadir for Valencia. He even recruited Castilian troops under the command of Rodrigo (Ar. Ludhriq) Díaz, called el Campeador (al-Qanbīṭūr

(*Hulla* ii, 129–30, note 1) suggested. See also Qalqashandī, v, 244–5. Wasserstein (*The Rise and Fall* 97), Bosworth (*The New Islamic Dynasties* 19), Guichard (*Les musulmans de Valence* 62, document 22), Fierro (The Qāḍī as Ruler 84, note 51) and Molina Martínez (*Historia de España por Menéndez Pidal* viii, part 1, 93) all followed Huici Miranda. It seems, however, that Clément (*Pouvoir* 101, 249) rectified it.

53 Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 250; M.J. Viguera, Ṭurtūsha, in *EI*², x, 739.

54 Ibn Bassām, vi, 849–50, 854–7; Qalqashandī, v, 245.

55 Ibn Bassām, v, 41. 250–1; Ibn 'Idhārī, iii, 266–7; *Hulla* ii, 129; dhayl 303. According to the dhayl, Ibn Rūbash, not his son, handed over Valencia to al-Ma'mūn (probably an error).

56 dhayl 303.

57 Coins continued to be issued in Valencia in the name of al-Ma'mūn during the years 457–62/1065–70, then in the name of al-Qādir during the years 470–6/1077–84. *Les musulmans de Valence* i, 63.

58 Ibn Bassām, v, 42.

or *ṣāhib al-faḥṣ*,⁵⁹ commander of field warfare), a powerful but disobedient Castilian nobleman from Vivar near Burgos.⁶⁰ It is said that al-Muqtadir or one of his sons purchased the dominium of Valencia from Alfonso VI at 100,000 dinars, beginning his offensives against the city.⁶¹ After al-Muqtadir's death in 475/1082 his two sons divided his territory; one son, al-Mundhir, inherited the eastern part including Lerida, Tortosa, Denia and 'Valencia,' allying to the count of Barcelona, Berenguer Ramón II (1076–97). On the other hand, the king of Zaragoza, al-Musta'in (476–503/1083–1110, al-Muqtadir's grandson), gave his protection to Valencia, being given Abū Bakr's daughter in marriage.⁶²

According to Husayn Mu'nis, the quarrel of Abū Bakr's two sons after his death in 478/1085 was mainly caused by a difference of diplomatic policy to cope with al-Mundhir's threat; who should be the protector, either al-Musta'in or Alfonso VI.⁶³ When al-Qādir and a Castilian army under the command of a great nobleman, Alvar Fáñez (Albarhānis), laid siege to Valencia in Dhū l-Qa'da 478/February 1086, after al-Qādir's surrender of Toledo to Alfonso, the oligarchic notables (*ahl*) decided to surrender several days later, without having heavy engagements, thus terminating the first patrician domination. While al-Qādir settled in the alcázar, Alvar Fáñez and a Castilian detachment garrisoned al-Ruṣāfa, a mainly Mozarabic southern suburb, imposing heavy dues for their maintenance amounting to 600 dinars a day. These 'liturgies' alienated the upper- and middle-class Valencians from al-Qādir.⁶⁴

Many Toledan patricians and scholars also settled in Valencia, including the Farajis and a mathematician, al-Waqqashī. However, the Maḥqūris, who had resisted al-Ma'mūn and al-Qādir, settled in Jativa and continued their resistance to al-Qādir, appealing to al-Mundhir for succor and recognizing his suzerainty.⁶⁵ Another Toledan patrician family of Lubbūn was divided. While Abū 'Īsā settled in Sagunto and virtually became independent, his brothers continued to serve al-Qādir in various posts (e.g. his deputy in charge of the

59 dhayl 305.

60 Powerful Castilian noblemen tended to disregard royal decrees. Rodrigo, who had valiantly served Sancho II, Alfonso VI's brother, attacked villages near Medinaceli placed under Alfonso's protection in return for the payment of parias, resulting in his banishment from Castile around the year 1081. Reilly, *Alfonso VI* 129, 162–4.

61 Ibn Bassām, v, 42–3. Alfonso was prepared for an incursion into Valencia from Zaragoza in 1076, but instead seized this opportunity to take La Rioja. Reilly, *Alfonso VI* 118.

62 dhayl 304; Ibn al-Kardabūs, 80–1; Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence* i, 64.

63 *Ḥulla* ii, 167–8, note 2.

64 dhayl 304–5; Ibn Bassām, v, 93; *A'māl* 182; Ibn al-Kardabūs, 86–7; *Primera* 99–101.

65 *The Cid and his Spain* 200; Siḥr, *Shāṭiba* 119; Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence* i, 66; Ibn Bashkuwāl, 653–4.

alcázar during his absence).⁶⁶ On the other hand, many Valencian notables took refuge in Sagunto and other places, abandoning their land in and near the walled city of Valencia, notably the *qāḍī* ‘Uthmān, son of Abū Bakr b. Rūbash, who had once been leader of the party sympathetic to al-Musta‘īn against al-Qādir. Only a small number of notables supported al-Qādir, such as Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Ṭāhir, the former ruler of Murcia.⁶⁷ To the contrary, according to the *Primera Crónica General* (probably based on Ibn ‘Alqama), the lower classes, variously called ‘criminals, idle youths and evildoers,’ gathered under the command of Alvar Fáñez, taking part in his campaigns to Denia and Burriana and obtaining a large amount of sheep, cattle, mares, clothing and other valuable items, which were auctioned off in the *sūqs* of Valencia.⁶⁸

El Cid and the Second Patrician Domination under the Qāḍī Ibn Jaḥḥāf

It is Rodrigo Díaz and the blue-veiled Muslim Ṣanhāja nomads called Murābiṭūn, appearing out of the western Sahara (present-day Mauritania and Western Sahara) to conquer Morocco and western Algeria, that threatened al-Qādir and Alfonso VI.⁶⁹ Before the great Muslim victory over Alfonso at the battle of the plain of al-Zallāqa (Sagrajas) outside Badajoz in Rajab 479/October 1086, the Castilian garrison was compelled to evacuate al-Ruṣāfa,⁷⁰ inducing al-Mundhir and a Barcelonese detachment to assault Valencia. Al-Qādir appealed for succor to al-Musta‘īn, king of Zaragoza, who, together with his condottiere, Rodrigo Díaz, succeeded in repelling al-Mundhir.⁷¹

However, Rodrigo Díaz soon began going his own way. Al-Qādir recognized Rodrigo as protector from all possible invaders including al-Mundhir, undertaking to pay 100,000 dinars annually (less than a half of the money paid to Alvar Fáñez) for the upkeep of his soldiers composed of both Muslims and

66 *Ḥulla* ii, 167–9; Ibn Sa‘īd, ii, 275–6. It seems that Abū ‘Īsā’s brother, Abū Muḥammad, seized Lorca near Murcia, founding another Lubbūnid principality.

67 *A‘māl* 201–2; *Ḥulla* ii, 124–5; *Primera* 101–3.

68 *Primera* 101.

69 Lagardère, *Les Almoravides jusque’au règne de Yūsuf*, 1989, *Les Almoravides: Le djihād andalou*, 1998; R. Benhsain and J. Devisse, *Les Almoravides et l’Afrique occidentale, Arabica* 47 (2000), 1–36; H.T. Norris & P. Chalmata, (al-)Murābiṭūn, in *ET*², vii, 583–91; R.A. Messier, *Almoravids*, in *ET*³, 2009–3, 75–80.

70 Ibn al-Kardabūs, 92.

71 Ibn al-Kardabūs, 98; Ibn ‘Idhārī, iv, 31; Ibn Bassām, v, 94–5; *Roderici* 114.

Christians.⁷² After he defeated and captured Berenguer Ramón, count of Barcelona, at the battle of Tevar west of Tortosa in 483/1090,⁷³ forcing him to renounce his suzerainty over al-Mundhir's son and successor Sulaymān, he extracted tribute from other rulers and commanders (*quwwād*) of cities and *hišns* including Sagunto, Segorbe, Jerica, Albarracin and Alpuente to feed his growing *oikos* (a ruler's household) composed of his mercenaries and officials.⁷⁴ Rodrigo continued to fight in the Upper March and La Rioja, depositing cereals and animals which he had gathered as booty and tribute in Alcludia (al-Kudya) on the other side of the Turia facing Valencia under the control of his steward (mayordomo). According to Christian sources, Tortosa, Jativa and Denia also paid tribute to Rodrigo.⁷⁵

By now he had built up an extensive sphere of influence in Sharq north of Jativa extending to Tortosa and Albarracin. Extraordinarily, he had no territory under his own direct control, satisfying the want of his household wholly through forceful extraction, not legitimacy. From al-Qādir's standpoint Alfonso VI was only replaced by cheaper (but more dangerous) Rodrigo as his protector. In Valencian internal politics Rodrigo functioned as a deterrent to the restoration of patrician domination.

However, the Murābiṭūn advanced to Murcia in 484/1091, then Denia and Jativa the following year, constituting an insurmountable barrier against Rodrigo's extension of influence and even threatening his position in Valencia.⁷⁶ The *qāḍī* of Valencia, Abū Aḥmad Ja'far b. 'Abdallāh b. Jaḥḥāf al-Ma'āfirī, and the deputy judge (*ṣāḥib al-aḥkām*),⁷⁷ Abū l-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. Wājib

72 Ibn al-Kardabūs, 100, 103; *Roderici* 114–5.

73 Al-Musta'in opposed Rodrigo's attempt to subjugate Tortosa and Lerida, but after he and Berenguer were defeated by Rodrigo at Tevar, was reconciled with him to be prepared against the incursions of Sancho Ramírez, king of Aragon (1063–94) and Navarre. *Roderici* 122–8; *The Cid and his Spain* 250–87; Reilly, *Alfonso VI* 228.

74 For *oikos* and this kind of liturgical provision see *Economy and Society* 123–4, 381.

75 *The Cid and his Spain* 262; Huici Miranda, *Historia musulmana* ii, 38; Siḥr, *Shāṭiba* 127–34. It is said that three brothers of Beni Betir ruled Tortosa, Jativa and Denia, as regents of Sulaymān, but paid tribute to Rodrigo. The story of these brothers is not supported by Muslim sources and is intrinsically implausible. For his deposit in Alcludia see *Primera*² 115.

76 Ibn 'Idhārī, iv, 31; Ibn al-Kardabūs, 101–2; *Primera*² 115.

77 No details are known about *ṣāḥib al-aḥkām* or *ḥākim*, a judge under the jurisdiction of a *qāḍī*. Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence* ii, 314, 335–6, 545, 549. Probably Ibn Jaḥḥāf and Ibn Wājib were almost equal in prestige, necessitating their simultaneous appointment as *qāḍī* and *ṣāḥib al-aḥkām*. Suits could be filed at either court. However, the *ṣāḥib*

al-Qaysī, both from the most prominent landholding families of Valencia,⁷⁸ took the lead of the anti-Rodrigo, anti-Qādir movement. The Wājibis were relative newcomers, but it is said that Muḥammad b. Wājib was a man of noble character and loved by the citizens.⁷⁹

It is said that al-Qādir was notified of an impending coup by the Farajis, sending his family and part of his property to the frontier fortresses of Segorbe and Olocau (al-ʿUqāb). In Ramaḍān 485/October 1092, taking advantage of Rodrigo's presence in Zaragoza, the Valencians rose in arms under the leadership of their powerful notables (*ahl al-ʿaqd wa-l-ḥall*), ousting Rodrigo's men from the suburbs and storming the alcázar. Al-Qādir escaped from the alcázar, but was found in a private house near the hammam and murdered at the hands of a family member of the Toledan Ibn al-Ḥadīdī. An oligarchic government under the leadership (*riāsa*) of the *qāḍī* Abū Aḥmad Ibn Jaḥḥāf was established, confiscating al-Qādir's property left in Valencia and inviting a very small Murābiṭ detachment of cavalry from nearby Alcira to be garrisoned in the alcázar. Rodrigo hurried back to Valencia from Zaragoza, pitching his camp on a hill at the northern edge of the *huerta* near the castle of Cepulle (Juballa, El Puig). He offered to protect Ibn Jaḥḥāf on the same condition as given to al-Qādir (in addition, the return of his property seized at Alcudia as well as the expulsion of the Murābiṭ garrison). However, the Valencians refused to sever their ties with the Murābiṭūn.⁸⁰

al-aḥkām was inferior in prestige to the *qāḍī* or he even could be a delegate of the *qāḍī*. Fierro, *The Qāḍī as Ruler* 74, note 14, 84–5, note 53.

78 Jaḥḥāf b. Yumn (d. 327/939), who was appointed *qāḍī* by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān III after his recovery of Valencia, was apparently the first Jaḥḥāfī *qāḍī*. His son ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and grandson Jaʿfar (d. 376/986, Abū Aḥmad's grandfather), who had studied at Cordoba, were also appointed *qāḍīs* of Valencia. Ibn al-Faraḍī, i, 189, 191; Ḍabbī, 245; Rushāṭī, 29; Ibn al-Abbār, *Takmila* ii, 545. Jaʿfar's brother, ʿAbdallāh (d. 417/1026), called Ḥaydara, and the latter's son Abū l-Muṭarrif ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (d. 472/1079) were also *qāḍīs*. Ibn Bashkuwāl, 262–3, 340, 385, 524; Ḍabbī, 274–5, 333, 354. See also Huici Miranda, *Historia musulmana* ii, 140–3; Fierro, *The Qāḍī as Ruler* 83–7 (According to her, Abū Aḥmad was opposed to both Rodrigo and the Murābiṭūn). It seems that Abū Aḥmad was also called Abū l-Muṭarrif (Ibn ʿIdhārī, iv, 34, 36; *Aʿmāl* 204); or these are mistakes on the part of our sources? On the other hand, the pro-Almoravid Wājibis were relatively new-comers. Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar b. Muḥammad b. Wājib (d. 476/1083–4) first appeared as deputy judge. Ibn Bashkuwāl, 403. The Jaḥḥāfis and the Wājibis were big landholders. Guichard, *The Population of the Region of Valencia* 161–2; *Les musulmans de Valence* ii, 297, 342–3.

79 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 574–5.

80 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iv, 31–3; *Primera*² 115; Ibn al-Kardabūs, 103; Ibn Bassām, v, 95–7; *Aʿmāl* 182, 203–4; dhayl 305; *Hulla* ii, 125; *Roderici* 135. Valencian cavalrymen were only 300, including the

During this long siege, Rodrigo resorted to forceful extraction of food from the commanders of *ḥiṣns*. Facing this situation, the Lubbūnids handed over Sagunto to the ruler of Albarracín.⁸¹ On the other hand, Valencia continued to be provided with food despite intermittent skirmishes.⁸² However, after Rodrigo advanced his headquarters to Alcudia, destroying the neighboring *munya* of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and tightening a blockade of the walled city in Jumādā II 486/ July 1093, the provision of food became difficult for the Valencians. When a Murābiṭ relief army ended in failure the citizens agreed to accept Rodrigo’s suzerainty on condition that they would compensate for his loss at Alcudia, hand over al-Qādir’s property, pay the same amount of tribute as al-Qādir’s to him and expel the small Murābiṭ garrison in return for the security of Valencian life and property. Although Rodrigo posted his Muslim treasurer (*mushrif*) in Alcudia, he placed his troops in Cepulle castle, allowing Valencian internal autonomy headed by Ibn Jaḥḥāf to continue.⁸³

It seems that Ibn Jaḥḥāf succeeded in reestablishing the collection and accounting of land taxes (*ushr*, *diezma*) from small cities and *ḥiṣns* in the region of Valencia through assessors-collectors (*qubbād*) and treasurers (*mushrif*s). According to Ibn ‘Alqama who was critical of his ultimate failure, Ibn Jaḥḥāf behaved like a king during the early stage of the siege, though he continued to stay in his own house situated in the quarter of Raḥbatolcadi (<Raḥbat al-Qāḍi), near the mosque-church of Santa Catalina.⁸⁴

Ibn Jaḥḥāf had princely manners, assigning stipends (*arzāq*) to the army and bureaucrats. He put on princely clothes and showed royal grandeur, desiring to follow the example of the *qāḍi* Muḥammad b. Ismā‘īl b. ‘Abbād. However, his administration was tactless, nor was he favored by fortune. When he sat down he was surrounded by *wazīrs*, *faqīhs* and

Valencian *jund* since Ṣaḳāliba rulers, Murābiṭ garrison and perhaps some freshly-hired cavalrymen.

81 *Ḥulla* ii, 115, 168.

82 Ibn ‘Idhārī, iv, 32; *‘Amāl* 203–4.

83 Ibn ‘Idhārī, iv, 33, 39; dhayl 305–6; *Roderici* 135–6.

84 Husayn Mu‘nis, *Ḥulla* ii, 126, note 1. Guichard (*Les musulmans de Valence* i, 69, 74) regarded Abū Aḥmad Ibn Jaḥḥāf just like a king. According to a late source (Ibn al-Abbār, *Takmila* ii, 455) Ibn Jaḥḥāf relegated his qāḍiship to his cousin ‘Abdallāh b. Abī l-Muṭarrif ‘Abd al-Raḥmān upon seizing power. Rather, he probably only appointed his cousin as his deputy. Fierro (The Qāḍi as Ruler 85–6) considered that Ibn Jaḥḥāf was inaugurated into the office of *ra‘īs*, relinquishing his qāḍiship, and then was replaced by Ibn Wājib as *ra‘īs*. More possibly, he might have been continually *qāḍi* throughout this period without assuming the title of *ra‘īs*.

notables (*zuʿamāʿ*) with soldiers (*ghulma*) standing in front of him. When he rode out black infantrymen (*ʿabīd*) and military policemen (*ṭard*) guided him, and regular soldiers (*jund*) tailed after him. The people saluted him, praying for him and praising his achievements.⁸⁵

On the other hand, Ibn Bassām stressed Ibn Jaḥḥāf’s inexperience and lack of political maneuvers.

When Abū Aḥmad’s power, or his royal power (*sultān*) as he claimed, was consolidated, it resulted in political chaos, in which even gazelles would disperse, kicking up a dust. That is because he faced insoluble problems which he had never experienced and was put in charge of difficult political affairs whose settlement he did not know. Nor did he know that the management of regions (*aqālīm*) is not like judgments over contenders and that the setting up of banners to mobilize people is not like judgments among several contracts or the sifting of the trustworthiness of witnesses. He was preoccupied with the discovery of unrecovered properties of al-Qādir and his party (*shūʿa*) and the supervision over taxation. He expended such small revenues for the upkeep of Murābiṭ cavalry.⁸⁶

While Menéndez Pidal accused Ibn Jaḥḥāf, justifying Rodrigo’s incursion, Huici Miranda attempted his rehabilitation. Really, he continued to live in his house, averting royal titles and consulting notables (*malaʿ*, *mayorales*). As Guichard indicated this is nothing less than patrician domination.⁸⁷ It is Rodrigo who preferred monarchy in Valencia, because a subject-king was more convenient and laborsaving.⁸⁸ Ibn Jaḥḥāf himself was more conciliatory to Rodrigo, who was willing to support any top leader, rather than his rival, Ibn Wājib. As Menéndez Pidal, Huici Miranda, and more recently Lagardère supposed, Ibn Wājib was probably more popular among the citizens who were still looking forward to seeing a Murābiṭ relief.⁸⁹

Several months after the conclusion of the pact, a fresh Murābiṭ army at last arrived at Murcia. The Valencians openly demanded the abrogation of the

85 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iv, 32. cf. *Aʿmāl* 203. For *ṭard* see Lagardère, *Les Almoravides* 1989, 135.

86 Ibn Bassām, v, 96–7. For his search of al-Qādir’s property see also *Primera*² 115.

87 Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence* i, 70–1.

88 *The Cid and his Spain* 329–30.

89 Lagardère, *Les Almoravides* 1989, 135–7; *The Cid and his Spain* 305–7, 318; Huici Miranda, *Historia musulmana* ii, 84–5, 95, 144; Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence* i, 73–4; Fierro, *The Qāḍī as Ruler* 87. Ibn Wājib seemingly remained a staunch pro-Almoravid partisan.

pact. It seems that Ibn Wājib was overpowering Ibn Jaḥḥāf. Rodrigo reacted by destroying bridges and inundating the *huerta* to prevent a further advance of the Murābiṭūn who had reached Almussafes, twenty kilometers south of Valencia. Then, after recruiting mercenaries from Aragon, Navarre and Castile, he began a blockade with his headquarters at Villa Nueva to starve out the Valencians. He himself obtained provisions by plundering the villages of the *huerta*, and drove away peasants inside the walls of Valencia to accelerate its starvation.⁹⁰ There are many accounts of this terrible scene from the pens of Ibn ‘Alqama and Ibn al-Kardabūs.

In the year 487/1094, when the Murābiṭ army of Abū Bakr b. Ibrāhīm (Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn’s nephew) retreated from Valencia by a trick of fate, the people inside the walls were sure of their disaster, deeply disappointed and depressed. The enemy (Rodrigo)’s hatred grew stronger and his mind became pitiless. Most of the people were on the brink of starvation; they even ate hides and beasts of burden. As for the people who took refuge in the Christian camp, their eyes were put out, their hands were cut off, their legs were broken, or they were even murdered. The people preferred to die in the city. This situation was several times as disastrous as that of Toledo due to the prolongation of the siege. The enemy’s hatred doubled because the people endured that hardship, still seeking succor (from either the Murābiṭūn or al-Musta‘īn, king of Zaragoza).

According to Ibn ‘Alqama, in Rabī‘ I a *raṭl* (approximately 500 grams)⁹¹ of wheat cost one mithqal and a half, a *raṭl* of barley one mithqal, a *raṭl* of seeds of flax three quarters of a mithqal, an ounce (*ūqiya*, approximately 30 grams) of cheese three dirhams, an ounce of onion a dirham, a *raṭl* of vegetables five dirhams, a chicken egg three dirhams, a *raṭl* of mule meat six dinars, and a *raṭl* of cattle hide five dirhams. The following month (Rabī‘ II), the situation became more disastrous and the prices doubled. Both the poor and the rich suffered from the lack of food. Ibn Jaḥḥāf ordered raids into private houses in search of food. . . . At the end of this month a *raṭl* of wheat cost 2.75 mithqals; other food followed wheat. Only the rich could procure sustenance. Other people managed to survive by eating hides, resins and liquorice (*sūs*) roots, and the lower classes by eating mice, cats and human carrions. . . . At the beginning of Jumādā I Valencia finally ran out of food, resulting in the death of people.

90 Ibn ‘Idhārī, iv, 33; dhayl 305; *Roderici* 136–7; *Primera* 111.

91 E. Ashtor, Makāyil, in *ET*², vi, 120–1. For the details of *ūqiya* and *raṭl* see Fākhūrī and Khawwām, *Mawsū‘at waḥdāt al-qiyās* 357–62, 387–98.

Only a few people survived. . . . In the middle of this month a *raṭl* of wheat cost three mithqals, a *raṭl* of barley two mithqals and a half, an ounce of cheese ten dirhams, and a chicken egg eight dirhams.⁹²

He (Rodrigo Díaz) besieged Valencia for twenty months until he stormed it. As the result, its people faced a hunger never experienced by any people, in which a mouse cost a dinar. . . . During this siege the worst Muslims, called rogues (*ashrār*), scum (*ardhāl*), libertines (*fujjār*), vicious men (*fussād*) and many people called *dawāʿir* who behaved as they liked flocked to al-Qanbīṭūr and others. They wrought havoc on Muslims, raping women, killing men and carrying away women and children. Most of these men apostatized, neglecting the *sharīʿa* of the Prophet and going so far as to sell an abducted Muslim at a loaf of bread, a cup of wine or a *raṭl* of fish. As for the people who could not pay their ransoms, their tongues were cut off and their eyes were pulled out on the spot.⁹³

Finally, the Valencians decided to surrender their city to Rodrigo, persuading Ibn Jaḥḥāf to accept this plan through the agency of the Toledan scholar al-Waqqashī. In Jumādā 1 487/June 1094, Ibn Jaḥḥāf reached an agreement (*ʿuqūd*, *mawāthiq*, *ʿuhūd*) with Rodrigo on condition that Rodrigo would give safe-conduct (*amān*) to all people and their properties in return for the handing over of all al-Qādir's property. At once food was brought into the city from Rodrigo's camp by retailers (*bāʿa*). The details of the actual agreement are unknown. It seems that Ibn Jaḥḥāf was left as *qāḍī*, resulting in the possible continuation of patrician domination in internal affairs under the suzerainty of Rodrigo, who would largely stay away from the walled city, only placing his treasurer (*mushrif*) Ibn ʿUdays in the city. It is said that the defense of the walls was to be entrusted to Valencian Mozārabes (*al-Rūm al-baladiyyīn*) for the time being, but really his soldiers at once seized the gates and towers of the walls.⁹⁴ Rodrigo soon decided to rule on his own. According to the *Primera*, he attempted to assuage the Valencians including nearby villagers, delivering a conciliatory speech rather successfully.⁹⁵

However, this happy coexistence did not last long. In Shaʿbān/September, only three months after its surrender, a Murābiṭ army at last advanced on Valencia from Murcia, reaching Mislata (Manzil ʿAṭāʿ), seven kilometers west of the walled city. As a matter of fact, Rodrigo suspected most Muslim citizens and

92 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iv, 33, 38–9.

93 Ibn al-Kardabūs, 103.

94 Ibn ʿIdhārī, iv, 34, 39; dhayl 305–6; Ibn Bassām, v, 98; *Hulla* ii, 125–6.

95 *Primera* 114–9; Ibn ʿIdhārī, iv, 34.

villagers to be sympathetic to the Murābiṭūn. Under obscure circumstances he forestalled the Murābiṭūn, defeating them at the battle of Cuarte de Poblet in Dhū l-Qa'da/December.⁹⁶ Now he did not hesitate to burn Ibn Jaḥḥāf alive on a charge of regicide⁹⁷ and fined the notables (*mala'*, *a'yān*) 200,000 mithqals, putting an end to the two-year patrician domination of Valencia by appointing a new obedient *qāḍī*, al-Waqqashī.⁹⁸ If we believe Ibn 'Alqama, he appointed Jews as *wazīr*, inspectors (*umanā'*), collectors of taxes (*mutaṣarrifūn*), chamberlains (*aṣḥāb al-rusūm*) and leviers of caravan and harbor dues (*khuddām al-barr wa-l-baḥr*), making them overpower Muslims.⁹⁹ Moreover, he settled in the alcazār and requisitioned neighboring houses for his troops. Many Muslims were compelled to move to Alcudia, being replaced by the suburban Christians. The great mosque was also consecrated as a cathedral.¹⁰⁰

Now Rodrigo was a monarch of the region of Valencia, extending his sphere of influence to all Sharq north of Alcira and Jativa. However, he found it extremely difficult to invite Christians from as far away as Castile, being compelled to keep Muslim inhabitants, both notables and the populace. This fact facilitated a Murābiṭ attempt to restore Valencia as an Islamic city once they conquered Valencia in 495/1101, two years after Rodrigo's death. Under Murābiṭ rule a son of Abū Aḥmad b. Jaḥḥāf, Abū Muḥammad, was appointed as *qāḍī*. However, patrician domination was never reestablished in Valencia until the collapse of the Murābiṭ state under the leadership of the *qāḍī* Marwān b. 'Abdallāh b. Marwān b. 'Abd al-'Azīz in 539/1145.¹⁰¹

Valencia was virtually a new city, beginning its development since the mid-tenth century. Accordingly, it had no traditional patricians unlike Toledo. During the first half of the eleventh century, 'Āmirid Ṣaqāliba bureaucrats stayed in power, first under the leadership of Mubārak and Muẓaffar, then under their 'Āmirid former master, 'Abd al-'Azīz (1021–60). However, their natural aging

96 Ibn 'Idhārī, iv, 34–6; *Roderici* 137–8. Muslim and Christian sources are conflicting on this battle. Huici Miranda, *Historia musulmana* ii, 116–37.

97 Ibn 'Idhārī, iv, 37–8; dhayl 306; Ibn Bassām, v, 98–9; Rushāṭī, 15; Ḍabbī, 182, 240–1; Huici Miranda, *El cadí de Valencia* 155–64; *Historia musulmana* ii, 138–40, 147–61.

98 Yāqūt, *Muṣjam al-buldān* v, 381.

99 Ibn 'Idhārī, 40–1.

100 *Roderici* 146; *The Cid and his Spain* 359–60, 366–7.

101 *Ḥulla* ii, 218–20. For his details see Fierro, *The Qāḍī as Ruler* 101–3. For other Andalusī autonomous cities during the mid-twelfth century after the fall of Murābiṭ domination, Cordoba (under the *qāḍī* Ḥamdīn b. Muḥammad, Ibn Ḥamdīn), Murcia (under the *qāḍī* Ibn Abī Ja'far), and Malaga (under the *qāḍī-amīr* Ibn Ḥassūn) see Fierro, *The Qāḍī as Ruler* 87–101.

and shrinking paved the way for Andalusī seizure of power. Meanwhile, spectacular economic and cultural development and massive immigration fostered the formation of the new haute bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. The four secretaries (*kātib*s), themselves Andalusī immigrants (including an old Berber settler), took the helm of government toward the end of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz’s reign, probably consulting with *qāḍī*s and rising notables. This bureaucrat-led patrician domination, similar to the post-Umayyad government of Cordoba, is supposed to have been strengthened under the authority of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz’s son, ‘Abd al-Malik, whom they had installed in 1060.

One of these secretaries, Ibn Rūbash, then his son Abū Bakr, gradually built up their predominant leadership. However, Abū Bakr had to call in al-Ma’mūn, king of Toledo, to Valencia in 1065 in the face of threats posed by al-Muqtadir, king of Zaragoza, and Fernando I, king of Leon-Castile. Thereafter, Valencia continued to recognize the suzerainty of al-Ma’mūn, then his grandson al-Qādir, virtually retaining its own internal autonomy and patrician domination, until al-Qādir’s incompetence became manifest in 1084. This patrician domination lasting more than twenty years was terminated when al-Qādir and a Castilian detachment under the command of Alvar Fáñez occupied Valencia in 1086, forcing many Valencian notables including Abū Bakr’s son ‘Uthmān to flee to nearby cities and fortresses.

Al-Qādir’s jurisdiction was confined to the region of Valencia; and after the withdrawal of the Castilian garrison, his rule became even more precarious before Murābiṭ advance into al-Andalus, inducing the incursions of al-Musta’in (al-Muqtadir’s grandson) and his condottiere, Rodrigo Díaz, on the one hand, and al-Mundhir, king of Tortosa, Lerida and Denia, and the count of Barcelona on the other. Rodrigo began acting on his own, finally building up his own vast sphere of influence in Sharq north of Alcira and Jativa including Valencia in 1087 without holding any territory under his direct control. He extracted tribute from the rulers of cities and the commanders of fortresses, storing his property, mainly food, in Alcudia. However, his southward expansion toward Denia and Jativa was hampered by Murābiṭ advance, which stirred up Valencian expectation of their liberation from Christian yoke, resulting in a revolution toppling al-Qādir and the reestablishment of patrician domination under the leadership of the *qāḍī* Ibn Jaḥḥāf and the deputy judge Ibn Wājib in October 1092.

This second patrician domination in Valencia lasted for two years. The first half of this period until Rodrigo tightened his investment of Valencia in July 1093 saw a typical patrician domination, reminiscent of the cases of Seville, Tripoli, Tyr and Aleppo under the leadership of *qāḍī*s. Thereafter, however,

Valencian patrician domination was put under extraordinary pressure during its tightened siege by Rodrigo; it seems that political struggles between diehard proponents of resistance and pacifists willing to accept Rodrigo's suzerainty were increasingly intensified until the dire situation forced the citizens to surrender their city in June 1094. At first it seems that Rodrigo agreed to his indirect rule, accepting Ibn Jaḥḥāf as his subject-ruler. However, he soon changed his mind, deciding to rule Valencia himself while retaining Ibn Jaḥḥāf as *qāḍī*. Six months later, after a fresh Murābiṭ incursion, he executed Ibn Jaḥḥāf, appointing a more faithful *qāḍī* and nipping the bud of a pro-Murābiṭ revolution.

Tunis during the Eleventh to Twelfth Centuries

Introduction

Tunis (Ar. *Tūnis* or *Tūnus*, Latin, *Tunes*) is facing a low-water lagoon called Lake Tunis, situated at the base of the Gulf of Tunis, on the east side. It is also located on the eastern foot of a hill looking over the saline lake (*sabkha*) of Sedjoumi to the southwest. It was originally founded by the people of nearby Carthage situated at the tip of a peninsula jutting out into the Gulf. Tunis was a small city during Roman and Byzantine times; so, it was virtually founded by the Arab conquerors to replace Carthage, which they destroyed for fear of Byzantine naval counterattacks around the year 700. Arab warriors were garrisoned there on a permanent basis. Its vast hinterland extended from the very fertile Mejerda (Bagradas) valley, the so-called ‘granary of Rome,’ in the west to the equally fertile Cape Bon Peninsula in the east and Mt. Zaghwān (Ziqua), the source of water for Carthage and Tunis, in the south.

Although an arsenal (*dār al-ṣināʿa*) was founded at an early stage, a canal cutting through the lagoon from the port of Tunis to La Goulette (Ḥalq al-Wādī), the mouth of the lagoon, was dug only at the end of the eighth century during the early Abbasid caliphate to ease access to the open sea. Now Arab warriors easily went out to sea, raiding the coast of Byzantine territories. On the other hand, from the ninth century onward these Arabs sometimes rose in revolt against Abbasid governors of Ifrīqiya, who were based at al-Qayrawān, resulting in the establishment of the virtually hereditary Aghlabid governorship in Ifrīqiya under Abbasid suzerainty. The Aghlabid governors of Khurāsāni origin attempted to conciliate the Arabs and the Khurāsānis of Tunis, founding the great mosque of Zaytūna in 250/864. After the Shīʿī Fāṭimids replaced Aghlabid rule in 296/909 and founded their new capital al-Mahdiyya in the Sāḥil (the east coast of Ifrīqiya) in 300/912–3, they transferred with their bureaucrats and Kutāma soldiers to Egypt in 361/972. Soon, at the end of the tenth century, their Ṣanhāja Zīrid governors had encircling walls and five gates (roughly 1200 meters from the northern gate of Bāb al-Saqqāʾīn to the southern gate of Bāb al-Jazīra) constructed, and added a narthex-gallery on the Meccan side and porticos on the other three sides of the courtyard to the Zaytūna.¹

1 For geography and early history of Tunis see P. Sebag, *Tūnis*, in *ET*², x, 629–31.

After the Zīrid governor al-Muʿizz b. Bādīs (406–54/1016–62) broke ties with the Fāṭimids, rendering homage to the Abbasids, the Arab tribes living in Egypt, Hilāl and Sulaym, began invading Barqa (northern Cyrenaica), Tripoli and Tunisia, defeating the Zīrid army under the command of al-Muʿizz at the battle of Ḥaydarān near Gabes (Ar. Qābis, Latin, Tacape) in 443/1052, then forcing him to escape from his capital al-Qayrawān to al-Mahdiyya in 449/1057. Henceforth, Zīrid rule covered only a small part of the Sāḥil ranging from al-Mahdiyya to Monastir, resulting in the virtual independence of coastal and inland cities, which were forced to pay tribute to Hilālī tribal chiefs. Among others, Tunis, Sousse (Sūsa, Hadrumetum), Tripoli (Ṭarābulus, Oea), Tozeur (Tūzar, Thusurus) and probably al-Qayrawān became patrician cities. In Tunis the Khurāsānids established their hereditary leadership similar to that of the Jahwarids of Cordoba and the ʿAmmārids of Tripoli, Lebanon.

As for modern studies, Idris' monumental study of Zīrid history includes a detailed treatment of Khurāsānid Tunis.² Arabic sources are meager. The continuations of al-Raḡīq's history of Ifrīqiya, written during the later Zīrids by a court poet, Ibn Sharaf (settling in al-Andalus in 449/1057, d. 460/1067), an astronomer of al-Mahdiyya of Andalusian origin (a disciple of al-Waqqashī), Abū l-Ṣalt (460–529/1067–1134), and the Zīrid prince Ibn Shaddād, are fundamental sources. These accounts are al-Mahdiyya-centered, however, paying scant attention to Tunis. Moreover, all these histories are lost; relatively small parts are summarized or quoted in the works of thirteenth- to fourteenth-century historians and travelers, notably Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Tijānī and Ibn Khaldūn. The history of Ibn Shaddād, who took refuge in Palermo under Norman rule, then in Syria, after Norman conquest of al-Mahdiyya in 543/1148, was utilized by eastern historians, Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn Khallikān and al-Nuwayrī. Especially, al-Tijānī's long quotations of these authors in his travel accounts are important. However, he largely avoided reference to his native city. Regarding Hilālī invasion and settlement in Ifrīqiya, Ibn Khaldūn's accounts of individual clans, based on their own oral traditions,³ are by far the most detailed. On the other hand, a fairly large number of contemporary Arabic inscriptions of buildings and tombstones are available; they were collected by Zbiss.⁴

2 Idris, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Zīrides*.

3 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 27–174.

4 Zbiss, *Corpus des inscriptions arabes de Tunisie* i, Inscriptions de Tunis.

Independence of Ifrīqi Cities after Zirid Disintegration

The first independent city in Ifrīqiya was Tripoli. The region of Tripoli was a fertile oblong plain of the Jifāra extending from Misrāta in the east to Zuwāra in the west on the foot of the Nafūsa Mountains, isolated from the other regions of Ifrīqiya by the vast arid belt of southern Tunisia. Its prosperity in Roman times is testified by the huge ruins of Roman cities of Lepcis Magna (Labda or Khumṣ<Ḥimṣ) and Sabratha. It is natural that this region became the first to be independent after the relaxation of centralized state system.

The western part of Ifrīqiya composed of Constantine (Qusṭanṭīna, Constantina), Setif (Saṭīf, Sitifis), Bejaia (Bijāya), Ḥuḍna, the Awrās Mountains and Zībān (the region of Biskra), roughly corresponding to northeastern Algeria, was also a well-defined area as distinct from Ifrīqiya proper. That is the reason why a Zīrid prince, Ḥammād b. Buluggīn, succeeded in founding his own Ḥammādid state in this region in 405/1015 with his capital at Qal'at Banī Ḥammād, freshly built in the Ḥuḍna Mountains. His example was to be followed by many later Ḥafṣid princes from the late thirteenth century onward with Bijāya as their capital.⁵

Ḥuḍna is directly communicated with the region of Tripoli through Zībān and the southern Tunisian oases of Gafsa (Qafsa, Capsa), Tōzeur and Gabes. In 391/1001 part of the Maghrāwa (a Zanāta tribe), after they were defeated by the Zīrids, were compelled to flee Ḥuḍna to the Jifāra plain under the leadership of the Khazarid Fulful b. Sa'īd b. Khazrūn. They occupied Tripoli and became its rulers.⁶ Although the Zīrid al-Mu'izz succeeded in evicting Fulful's brother Warrū in 400/1009–10, his governor of Tripoli revolted in 413/1022, reacting to the execution of the *wazīr*, who happened to be the governor's brother. Soon afterward Warrū's son Khalifa was conceded Tripoli by its Zīrid governor, restoring Khazarid rule which lasted up until the conquest of Tripoli by the Norman king of Sicily, Roger II.⁷

In the meantime in 407/1016–7, a popular riot led by an influential *faqīh* and an owner of many estates (*amlāk*) in the hinterland, 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. al-Munammad al-Faraḍī, toppled the Zīrid government of Tripoli, massacring Ismā'īlis and proclaiming allegiance to the Abbasid caliph. Ibn al-Munammad temporarily seized political power as *ra'īs*, and even after the restoration of Khazarid rule, continued to exert political influence. In 430/1039 he was involved in Khazarid internal squabbles, resulting in his banishment to

5 For the Ḥafṣid state of Bejaia see Rouighi, *The Making of a Mediterranean Emirate*.

6 Ibn Khaldūn, xii, 958, xiii, 83–6; T. Lewicky, *Maghrāwa*, in *ET*², v, 1180–2.

7 Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 328; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 115; Ibn Khaldūn, xiii, 88.

Ghānīma, a village near Misrāta at the hands of Warrū's nephew al-Muntaṣir, who had emerged as victor.⁸ However, Khazarid authority continued to decline; after the *qāḍī* Muḥammad b. Fāḍil al-Bakrī was ousted by the citizens in 444/1052–3, a *faqīh*, 'Abdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm b. Hānīsh, continued to lead the Tripolitans as both *qāḍī* and *ra'īs* over thirty years until he lost his power in 477/1084–5.⁹ These facts indicate that the Tripolitans, even under Khazarid rule, virtually enjoyed an extensive autonomy, making Tripoli look like a patrician city, rather than a city under the *a'yān-amīr* system.

Even after Roger II conquered Tripoli in 541/1146, placing a Norman garrison there, he was indulgent of the enforcement of the *sharī'a* and civil autonomy under a council of ten notables (*a'yān al-balad, wujūh*) including a Maṭrūḥid notable (*shaykh*) and a *qāḍī*. This council was held in the mosque outside the Norman-entrenched fortress (*qaṣba*). This council was abolished when Ifrīqi cities including Tripoli fell into Muwaḥḥid hands in 555/1160, but it seems that patrician domination under Maṭrūḥid leadership remained in force to some extent until they were ousted to Alexandria in 586/1190.¹⁰

A massacre of the Ismā'īlis at the hands of pro-Abbasid citizens occurred at al-Qayrawān too in 407/1016–7.¹¹ However, unlike Tripoli patrician domination did not come true immediately in al-Qayrawān. After a Hilāli clan, Zughba, killed Sa'īd b. Khazrūn, Khazarid ruler of Tripoli, in 429/1038, probably in a battle, the Hilāli coalition defeated the Zirid and Zanāta armies under the command of al-Mu'izz and al-Muntaṣir, Khazarid ruler of Tripoli, at the battle of Ḥaydarān in 443/1052, sweeping over Ifrīqiya and advancing on al-Qayrawān.¹² Al-Mu'izz was compelled to escape to al-Mahdiyya in 449/1057, leaving his lieutenant, Qā'id b. Maymūn, behind at al-Qayrawān in charge of the defense and administration of inland regions as far as Tunis.¹³ However, Qā'id was also compelled to take refuge in al-Mahdiyya three years later before the advance

8 Tījānī, *Rihla* 265–7; Brett, *The City-State* 8; Idris, *Berbérie orientale* i, 160–5.

9 Tījānī, 263.

10 Tījānī, 237, 241–3; Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 343–4, xii, 958–9; Ibn al-Athīr, xi, 108–9, 204; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 136; Ibn Khallikān, vi, 217; Idrīsī, i, 297; Brett, *The City-State* 82–5; Idris, *Berbérie orientale* i, 350–2, 383–4, 395.

11 Ibn 'Idhārī, i, 268–9, 273–4; Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 294–5; Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 28–9. This incident might have been provoked by the Zirids themselves. *Berbérie orientale* i, 144–6.

12 Ibn 'Idhārī, i, 289–93; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 119–20; Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 567–9; Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 32–3; Tījānī, 18.

13 Tījānī, 328–30; Ibn 'Idhārī, i, 294, 298; Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 34, 326–7; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 120; Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 569. Ibn al-Athīr sometimes mistook Tunis for Gabes (e.g. x, 51), as Idris (*Berbérie orientale* i, 230, note 110) pointed out.

of not only Hilāli tribesmen¹⁴ but also the Hawwāra, a neighboring Berber mountain people.¹⁵

As a result of Hilāli invasion, inland cities dwindled. Al-Qayrawān, after Qā'id's evacuation, was supposedly an autonomous city under patrician domination, paying tribute to Hilāli chiefs. However, the Hilāl who massively settled in Tunisia were divided between tribal chiefs, competing for the extension of their own respective territories. It is said (evidently falsely) that al-Mu'izz at first gave his three daughters to Hilāli (Mirdāsi) chiefs, Fāris b. Abī l-Ghayth, his brother 'Āmir¹⁶ and al-Faḍl b. Abī 'Alī, attempting to use their tribesmen as his mercenaries.¹⁷

The major part of the Hilāl soon abandoned the steppe region of al-Qayrawān. The Mirdās, the core group of the Riyāḥ who constituted the most important part of the besiegers of al-Qayrawān, advanced on Gabes and Tunis under the leadership of Mu'nis b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣinnabarī and 'Āmir b. Abī l-Ghayth, respectively, leaving behind the Zughba around al-Qayrawān. Another large group of the Mirdās reached Beja, the center of the middle Mejerda valley, then continuing to advance as far as 'Annāba (Būna, Hippona).¹⁸ The (al-)Athbaj and the 'Adī, who were defeated by the Riyāḥ in inter-Arab struggles, immigrated to Ḥuḍna, acting as Ḥammādid mercenaries.¹⁹

Taking advantage of Hilāli division, Qā'id b. Maymūn recovered al-Qayrawān by order of Tamīm (454–501/1062–1108), son of al-Mu'izz, probably after the Ḥammādid prince al-Nāṣir (454–81/1062–88) was defeated at the battle of Sabība in 457/1065,²⁰ but six years later he rendered homage to al-Nāṣir, who still wielded more power than Tamīm. However, when Tamīm attacked al-Qayrawān, Qā'id fled to Qal'at Banī Ḥammād, presumably leaving al-Qayrawān in the weak hands of the Zughba. Soon Qā'id moved to Sfax (Ṣafāqus), whose ruler, Ḥammū b. Mallīl, had also paid allegiance to al-Nāṣir,

14 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 327; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 126–7; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 49–51.

15 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 288; Ibn 'Idhārī, i, 294; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 126; T. Lewicki, Hawwāra, in *ET*², iii, 297.

16 He is variously printed as 'Āmir, 'Ābid and 'Āmil in the Beirut edition. As it is not known which is right, the most common personal name, 'Āmir, is adopted here.

17 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 34.

18 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 33–4, 326.

19 Ibn Khaldūn, xiii, 93–4; Ibn 'Idhārī, i, 294; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 121.

20 It is said that al-Nāṣir's defeat was due to the defection of his Athbaji and 'Adawi mercenaries. Ibn al-Athīr, x, 44–6; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 122–4; Ibn 'Idhārī, i, 299; Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 42–3, 355. Under pressure from the Hilāl al-Nāṣir soon began building his new capital in Bejaia. His son al-Manṣūr finally abandoned Qal'at, settling in Bejaia in 483/1090.

and gave money to the Zughba, persuading them to hand over the city to him.²¹ However, al-Qayrawān continued to be autonomous under Hilālī suzerainty, for the most part.

Tozeur, a large inland oasis city in Qasṭīliya, was also a patrician city for a while under the council (*shūrā*) of ten leaders (*mutaqaddimūn*). Its leader (*zaʿīm*) was Yaḥyā b. Muḥammad b. Yamlūl, who claimed Arab (Tanūkh) origin.²² However, Tozeur was soon absorbed by the ruler (former Zīrid governor) of Gafsa belonging to the Banū l-Rand of Jerba origin. This ruler was also compelled to pay tribute (*itāwa*) to an Arab group.²³

Other inland cities, Beja and Tebourba (Thuburbi Minus), were also under patrician domination at the beginning of the twelfth century. In each of these cities a notable (*shaykh*) managed to maintain leadership in decision-making. However, the leader of Beja, Maḥmūd b. Yazāl, invited a Ṣanhāja soldier, Barūgsan (?) b. Abī ʿAlī (a former Ḥammādid soldier), from a nearby fortress (*qalʿa*), entrusting the defense from Arabs to him. It resulted in this freelance rallying of outlaws (*dhuʿār, ahl al-dhiʿāra*) and dropouts from tribes (*awbāsh al-qabāʿil*) and his relentless looting. Similarly, in Le Kef (al-Kāf, Shiqqabanāriya, Sicca Veneria), a citizen named ʿĀyyad b. Naṣr Allāh al-Kalāʿī rallied outlaws and dropouts, putting this city, then the neighboring city of al-Urbus (Lares) too, under his control.²⁴

Moreover, in Bizerte (Banzart), a northern coastal city internecine struggles continued between two factions of citizens, resulting in the establishment of an extraordinary domination of Abū l-Rajāʿ al-Ward al-Lakhmī, leader of a nearby armed group based on a mountain fortress (*qalʿa*), who had forcibly extracted tribute (*itāwa*) from villages (*qurā*). Probably he was invited by the citizens themselves, being entrusted with security from Arabs and other armed groups. His rule was inherited by his son, grandson and great-grandson.²⁵ These examples indicate a numerical increase of outlaws and above all dropouts from both Arab tribes and indigenous peoples.

21 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 327; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 126–7; Ibn ʿIdhārī, i, 300; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 51. The Zughba moved to Ḥammādi territory, joining their campaigns. Idris, Hilāl, in *ET*², iii, 386. As Idris (*Berbérie orientale* i, 273, note 102) pointed out, it is not known who supplied money and became the suzerain of al-Qayrawān, either Ḥammū (Ibn Khaldūn, Nuwayrī) or al-Nāṣir (Ibn ʿIdhārī).

22 Ibn Khaldūn, xii, 928–9; *Berbérie orientale* i, 222–3, 258.

23 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 338–9.

24 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 347–9.

25 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 345–6.

Regarding Sāḥīli cities, Sousse was the only patrician city under the council (*shūrā*) of notables from 446/1054 until it was reabsorbed by the resurgent Zīrids in 456/1064.²⁶ Tamīm recovered not only Sousse, but also another important port city of Sfax, which had been under the rule of Ḥammū b. Mallīl, cousin of the Zīrid Berber governor whom he had killed, from 451/1059 to 493/1100.²⁷ Gabes²⁸ also became independent under the protection of a Riyāḥi chief, Mu'nīs al-Şinnabarī, when its Şanhāja governor, al-Mu'izz b. Muḥammad b. Walmiya (?) rebelled together with his two brothers, Zīrid dignitaries. Its citizens rose in arms in 489/1096, however, murdering the last Şanhāja ruler (al-Mu'izz' brother) and inviting a Zīrid prince, but eventually Gabes fell into the hands of a Riyāḥi (Dahmāni) chief, Maggan b. Kāmil b. Jāmi', becoming the only Arab-ruled city.²⁹

All in all, the autonomy of many cities was short-term. The notables of Tripoli, Bizerte and Beja established their domination, but conceded part of their power to outside armed groups (or 'bandits') composed of Berber clans or indigenous dropouts, whom they had to invite to ensure more security from Arab or other armed groups. In Le Kef, it seems that one of the notables succeeded in establishing his unrivaled leadership in cooperation with an outside armed group. Probably, al-Qayrawān itself, except for the short periods under Qā'id's rule, continued to be under patrician domination while paying tribute to nearby Arabs. The independence of Sousse, al-Urbus and Tozeur under patrician domination was terminated when they were absorbed by the Zīrids and the rulers of Le Kef and Gafsa, respectively. It seems that autonomy and patrician domination were prolonged only in Tunis, Tripoli and al-Qayrawān.

26 Tījānī 28–9; Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 326; Ibn 'Idhārī, i, 293, 299.

27 Ḥammū renounced his allegiance to the Fāṭimids, promising to pay tribute to the neighboring Arabs. He also sent an embassy to affirm his homage to al-Nāşir (Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 354), then attacked the Zīrid capital, al-Mahdiyya. Accordingly, he recognized Abbasid suzerainty, minting his coins in a Sunni style. *Berbérie orientale* i, 225–7.

28 Gabes was then encircled by stone-made Roman walls, located on the top of a hill, corresponding to present-day Sidi Boulbaba, the southernmost suburb of modern Gabes, which is situated on the foot of hills along the river. M. Talbi, Kābis, in *ET*², iv, 339.

29 Tījānī, 96–100; Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 328, 340–3, xii, 945–6; Bakrī, *Masālik wa-l-mamālik* 18–9; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 129; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 257; Ibn 'Idhārī, i, 302. The Berber name of the grandfather of this Şanhāja governor is variously written, for example, Walmiya (Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 340), Wānammū (Bakrī, 18) and İlmū. *Berbérie orientale* i, 237, 238, note 170. Maggan is also variously written. *Idem* i, 297, note 234. It is not known if Maggan conquered Gabes or was invited by its people.

The Establishment of Patrician Domination in Tunis

Just like the citizens of al-Qayrawān and Tripoli, the Tunisians were also generally antipathetic to the Ismāʿīlis and the Fāṭimids. In 406/1016 the people of Tunis rose in arms, murdering many Ismāʿīlis (Mashāriqa) and plundering the granary of an Ismāʿīli speculative merchant, Ibn al-ʿAzīm, partly at the instigation of Muḥriz b. Khalaf (d. 413/1022), the so-called 'ascetic educator (*al-muʿaddib al-ʿābid*),' later regarded as the patron saint of Tunis, who was advocating the restoration of Sunnism.³⁰ The inter-citizen struggles of the year 423/1032 were so dangerous that al-Muʿizz himself had to visit Tunis to assuage the people.³¹ After the battle of Ḥaydarān, Tunis accepted many refugees from inland areas.³²

The Ḥammādid al-Nāṣir became stronger than the Zīrid rulers after the battle of Ḥaydarān, resulting in the defection of the Zīrid governors of al-Qayrawān and Sfax and the people of Tozeur to al-Nāṣir. When a Mirdāsīd chief, ʿĀmir b. Abī l-Ghayth, invaded the environs of Tunis, imposing payment of tribute, the people of Tunis were also compelled to seek protection from al-Nāṣir. Ibn ʿIdhārī and Ibn Khaldūn are telling similar stories, probably based on the same source (Abū l-Salt?).

They (Arabs) laid siege to Tunis and its nearby cities, Beja, al-Urbus and others. The Ḥammādid coveted Ifrīqiya, temporarily holding the district of al-Qayrawān by currying favor with the Arabs and giving presents to them. Al-Muʿizz's sovereignty disappeared from Tunis and other cities and his dynasty in al-Mahdiyya was too weak to protect them. The notables (*ashyākh*) of Tunis visited al-Nāṣir in his capital of Qalʿat Banī Ḥammād, asking him to take care of their city and send a governor (*wālī*) for them. Al-Nāṣir ordered them to choose a notable (*shaykh*) from among them to conduct their own affairs as long as his rule would last. It is the Tunisians, it is also said, who desired to choose an elder (*kabīr*) from among themselves. However, the chosen person insisted on declination. Then al-Nāṣir appointed ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Khurāsān

30 *Berbérie orientale* i, 119, 147, ii, 656; Ch. Pellat, Muḥriz b. Khalaf, in *ET*², vii, 474. Almost the only source is the untrustworthy *Manāqib Muḥriz*. Ibn Maqdīsh of Sfax (seventeenth century) quoted it. *Nuzhat al-anzār* i, 368–9. Muḥriz was already venerated in the twelfth century. Harawī, *Ishāra* 51.

31 Ibn al-Athīr, ix, 426.

32 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 33; Idrīsi, i, 285.

their governor. He continued to conduct his duties as *wālī* until his death in 488/1095.³³

The Arabs divided districts (*‘amālāt*). Many cities including Sousse, Sfax and Gabes refrained from rendering homage to the Zīrids, and the people of Ifrīqiya inclined to rely on the Ḥammādids of Qal‘at. Consequently, the latter took possession of al-Qayrawān, and Tunis also escaped from al-Mu‘izz’s rule. Its notables (*mashyakha*) visited al-Nāṣir, who appointed ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Khurāsān their governor. It is said that he was one of the Tunisians. Apparently, he was from Ṣanhāja tribes. He conducted their affairs, but shared his power with them, showing affection toward them. On the other hand, he made a pact with the neighboring Arabs, paying fixed tribute (*itāwa*) to them to avert their atrocities. . . . He continued to fulfill his duties until his death in 488.³⁴

It seems that the Tunisians were determined to preserve their autonomy under a leader of their own choice. The aim of their delegation to al-Nāṣir was to win his protection, not to receive his governor. However, their prime candidate declined to receive the office, resulting in his replacement by ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq. The latter only styled himself with the title of *shaykh*, nothing more, as confirmed by the Kufic inscription (474/1081) of one of the gates of the Zaytūna mosque on the side of Sūq al-‘Aṭṭārīn.

In the name of God . . . this is built by order of *Shaykh* Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Khurāsān in the month of Ramaḍān of the year 474. The builders are ‘Abd al-Ghanī b. al-Malīlī and ‘Iwaḍ b. al-Qabīṭī.³⁵

Idris accepted Ibn Khaldūn’s surmise that ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq was a Ṣanhāja.³⁶ This is possible, because some Fāṭimid or Zīrid Ṣanhāja soldiers of central Algerian origin must have been garrisoned in Tunis. However, it is more probable that they, together with the Aghlabids, were descendants of the Abbasid Khurāsāni soldiers, who had been dispatched from Baghdad to quell Berber Ibāḍi rebellions during the early Abbasid caliphate. These Khurāsāni soldiers settled in

33 Ibn ‘Idhārī, i, 315.

34 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 334–5.

35 Zbiss, 38.

36 *Berbérie orientale* i, 264; Idris, (Banū) Khurāsān, in *Et*², v, 60.

al-Qayrawān, Tunis and Ṭubna (Thubunae), Ḥuḍna, and many became land-owners and notables of these cities.³⁷

Henceforth, the citizens of Tunis retained their autonomy under a leader of their own choice, while paying allegiance to the Ḥammādids. No detailed reports are available on the real state of this oligarchy. Zbiss gave full play to his imagination, when he said, "The administration of the city was confided to a council, whose members were either persons known for their integrity and prestige (scholars of sciences and religious studies, descendants of Muḥammad, big traders, big workshop-owners, ship-owners, etc.) or representatives of different interests of the city. In either case, their appointment as members of this council automatically entitled them to the title of *shaykh*, that is senator."³⁸ In fact, in the epitaph of a woman named Amat al-Ḥaqq, her Khurāsānid husband, who seems to have been 'Abd al-Ḥaqq's uncle, is called *shaykh*.³⁹ On the other hand, Idris considered that the council of Tunis was comparable to a Berber *jamā'a*.⁴⁰ However, this *jamā'a* (*thajma'ith*) is a Berber clan assembly composed of all male adults or heads of families, especially in mountain-residing Berber egalitarian tribal society, quite distinct from the oligarchy of wealthy urban notables in highly hierarchical society.

Given the fact that he was not the top candidate, 'Abd al-Ḥaqq at first should not have been superior to others in decision-making. Other notables could be equally influential and independent-minded as shown by the inscription of the most important gate of the Zaytūna mosque on the side of Sūq al-Fakkāh, saying, "This is made by order of *Qāḍī* 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. *Faqīh* Muḥriz in the month of Rabī' I of the year 457/February-March 1065."⁴¹ The construction of a monumental gate of the great mosque was initiated by one notable (grandson of the educator Muḥriz?). Unfortunately, it is unknown whether decisions were made at meetings in the great mosque or private houses, or individual opinions were manifested separately, then put together to produce conclusions. In either case, opinions should have been normally respected according to the importance of those speakers. In the former case 'Abd al-Ḥaqq must have conformed to majority opinions. In the age of his

37 Amabe, *State-Building and Autonomy* 33–50.

38 Zbiss, 59.

39 Zbiss, 67.

40 Idris, *Berbérie orientale* i, 264; (Banū) Khurāsān, in *EI*², v, 60. For a similar view regarding Palermo, see Amari, *Storia dei musulmani di Sicilia*² ii, 285 (mainly based on Nuwayrī, xxiv, 206–7). For Berber *thajma'ith* see Brett, and Fentress, *The Berbers* 248–51; R. Le Tourneau, Kabylia, in *EI*², iv, 362.

41 Zbiss, 37.

son and grandson, the process of decision-making probably became simplified, approaching monarchical decision-making based on advices of the inner circle composed of friendly notables.

It is not known either how many notables participated in decision-making. Without meetings it would have been difficult to fix permanent members. No doubt, members were qualified by Islamic culture and the knowledge of *ḥadīth* as well as the possession of wealth (mainly landholding, but trading also), coupled with the enjoyment of leisure and prestige. In Islamic society knowledge played an especially important role; ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq was also supposedly taught by his cultured father and his uncle Muḥammad, a grammarian.⁴² Traditional family prestige was also important in Tunisian society, but relatively new settlers were not excluded (e.g. Muḥriz).

The Tunisians had to defend themselves. Their first trial came in 458/1066, when the Zīrid Tamīm laid siege to Tunis, leading his regular soldiers (*ajnād*) including black infantry (*‘abīd*) and Zughba Arabs under the command of their leader (*amīr*), Yabqā b. ‘Alī, following his victory over the Ḥammādid al-Nāṣir at Sabība the previous year. The Tunisians sustained a fourteen-month siege, demonstrating their solidarity,⁴³ but finally paid allegiance to Tamīm without renouncing their virtual autonomy.⁴⁴

The militarization of citizens as infantry was confirmed by an account of the year 543/1148–9 during direct Ḥammādid rule. According to this account, citizens were reviewed near the port outside the seaside gate of Bāb al-Baḥr by the Ḥammādid governor who was standing in the customhouse (*dīwān*), located in the upper story of the gate.⁴⁵ The existence of a cavalry is also confirmed in the account of a sortie carried out by the Tunisians during a Muwaḥḥid investment of Tunis.⁴⁶ Probably former Zīrid Ṣanhāja cavalrymen and Arab allies constituted the mainstay of this cavalry, but the possible existence of a few upper- and middle-class cavalrymen, descendants of the early Islamic Arab and Khurāsāni *junds*, cannot be excluded.⁴⁷ Horses were raised in the neighboring Cap Bon Peninsula, making their supply to Tunis easier.⁴⁸

42 Ibn Bashkuwāl, 86.

43 All sources agree on a fourteen-month siege, except Ibn Khaldūn (four months, obviously an error). *Berbérie orientale* i, 265, note 71.

44 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 335; Ibn ‘Idhārī, i, 299; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 126–7 (mistaking ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq for his grandson Aḥmad); Ibn al-Athīr, x, 50–1 (mistaking Tunis for Gabes).

45 Ibn ‘Idhārī, i, 313.

46 Marrākushī, *Muʿjib* 162.

47 Idris considered that this cavalry included no Tunisians. *Berbérie orientale* i, 377, note 391.

48 *Berbérie orientale* ii, 631.

Nearby Arab nomads and 'bandits' bothered the Tunisians with their plundering of villages, farms and caravans, but they were also utilized as mercenaries or allies when stronger external foes threatened Tunis. Extraordinary leaders of these groups composed of promiscuous freelance horsemen can be regarded as Weberian charismatic leaders, endowed with exceptional qualities in attracting these men, breaking up traditional ethical discipline and satisfying the wants of their men through non-routinized ways, particularly plundering and extortions.⁴⁹

Financially, patrician domination was a very cheap government, depending on the non-remunerative, voluntary services of leisured notables, as far as new salaried offices or monumental public buildings were not created at public expense. Citizens were also armed at their own expense. As is common to all forms of patrician domination, the Tunisian government was a non-permanent, unsystematized institution characterized by administrative minimization and *ad hoc* administrative measures responding to individual emergencies.⁵⁰

From Oligarchy to Tyranny?

In case of the prolongation of oligarchy, top leaders tended to be over-powerful, and their position tended to be hereditary just like the Jahwarids of Cordoba, and sometimes even became monarchical like the 'Abbādids of Seville. The Khurāsānids were no exception. In the northern European and northern Italian patrician cities, the multi-top system and short term of offices (reappointment not allowed) were often established from the very beginning, and other officials or councils armed with veto power or the inquiry into top leaders after the expiry of their terms were instituted to prevent the emergence of dictators. By contrast, the mono-top system and lifetime appointment was the norm in medieval Islamic cities. That is partly because medieval Muslims had no other conception than dynasty (*dawla*) or monarchy (*mulk*) instead of *res publica* (commonwealth) or democracy.⁵¹ That is the reason why even the Khurāsānids and the Jahwarids had to be classified as dynasties in medieval Islamic literature.

49 Weber, *Economy and Society* 241–51, 1111–55; Swedberg, *The Max Weber Dictionary* 31–3.

50 *Economy and Society* 1061.

51 For some acceptance of Grecian notions of democracy by medieval Muslim scholars see Sadiki, Islam, in *Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy*, ed. B. Isakhan and S. Stockwell, 121–130.

In the case of Tunis, ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq’s two sons possibly deputized for their aging father, before the latter’s death in 488/1095, as indicated by the following Kufic inscriptions. One is an inscription of a gate of the Muḥriz mosque (in front of his mausoleum)⁵² in the northernmost part of old Tunis near the gate of Bāb al-Suwayqa (which replaced nearby Bāb al-Saqqā’in), and the other is an inscription of the domed mausoleum of the Khurāsānids inside their castle of al-Qaṣr near the western gate of Bāb al-Manāra.

This is built by order of the most glorious (*ajall*) *shaykh* Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq b. Khurāsān in the month of Ramaḍān of the year of 485/October-November 1092.

This dome (*qubba*) is built by order of the *al-sultān al-manṣūr* Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al-‘Azīz . . . and Abū l-Ṭāhir Ismā‘īl, two sons of *Shaykh* ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Khurāsān, in the month of Jumādā II of the year 486/June 1093. . . . The builders of this dome are ‘Abd al-Ghanī b. al-Malīlī and. . .⁵³

These monumental buildings were built by ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq’s sons before his death, indicating their growing power. The tombs of these brothers were installed below this dome. According to the epitaph of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, who was simply called *shaykh*,⁵⁴ he died on Muḥarram 5, 499/September 17, 1105 in contrast to the literary sources, which indicate the beginning of 500/September 1106.⁵⁵ According to the epitaph of his brother Ismā‘īl, he died a little later in Rajab 500/March 1107. More significantly he was called *amīr* in this epitaph.⁵⁶

Zbiss surmised from the bombastic title of *sultān* that ‘Abd al-‘Azīz was ambitious enough to aspire to the throne of all Ifrīqiya at the expense of the Zīrids. On the other hand, Idris downplayed the importance of this title, defining it as *primus inter pares*.⁵⁷ On top of that Idris posited the division of role between two brothers, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz at the top of the government and Ismā‘īl as commander. He also considered that ‘Abd al-‘Azīz was overshadowed by his brother because he is said to have been a weak man (*muḍ‘if*).⁵⁸ However, it

52 This inscription is much deteriorated and in many parts undecipherable.

53 Zbiss, 41–2.

54 Zbiss, 58. In the epitaphs of his daughter and grandson, he is simply called *shaykh* (Zbiss, 69–70). In the epitaph of another daughter he had no title (Zbiss, 66).

55 Ibn ‘Idhārī, i, 315; Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 345.

56 Zbiss, 62. In the epitaph of Ismā‘īl’s daughter he had no title (Zbiss, 55–6).

57 Zbiss, 43, 59; *Berbérie orientale* i, 265.

58 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 335; *Berbérie orientale* ii, 525.

seems that both made extreme arguments, considering the importance of the title of Seljuq monarchs and the obvious Khurāsānid incompetency to conquer Ifrīqiya. It is more probable that *sultān* and *amīr* were used interchangeably within their inner circle; both ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and Ismā‘īl pretended to be monarchs privately, but were satisfied with the ‘*shaykh*’ in public life.

It seems that the brothers renounced their allegiance to the Zīrid Tamīm, for Tamīm attacked Tunis once more in 491/1098, after having recovered Sfax and Jerba.⁵⁹ Once again, Tunis accepted Tamīm’s suzerainty without receiving Zīrid governors or garrison, ensuring virtual continuation of its autonomy. This compromise proved to be short-lived, for Tamīm’s grandson, ‘Alī b. Yaḥyā (509–15/1116–21), had to take the field against Tunis in 510/1116, forcing ‘Abd al-‘Azīz’ son Aḥmad render homage to him. Then in 514/1120 Aḥmad had to swear allegiance to the Ḥammādid al-‘Azīz b. al-Manṣūr.⁶⁰

According to Zbiss and Idris, after the death of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ismā‘īl was the sole ruler for one and a half years until he was killed by his nephew Aḥmad.⁶¹ However, Ibn Khaldūn and Ibn ‘Idhārī transmit similar stories, probably from the same source, that both Ismā‘īl and Aḥmad were joint leaders of oligarchy until Aḥmad killed his uncle, attempting to monopolize power at the expense of patrician domination.

His son Aḥmad fulfilled his father’s public duties. Then Aḥmad killed his uncle Ismā‘īl out of jealousy over his superior position (*makān rasmihi*).⁶² Abū Bakr (Ismā‘īl’s son) was compelled to escape to Bizerte, staying there in fear of his life. Aḥmad assumed a royal lifestyle, deviating from the lifestyle of notables (*mashyakha*) and tyrannizing over his people. He was one of the famous Khurāsānid *shaykhs*. He monopolized power in Tunis at the beginning of the sixth century, keeping order in Tunis and building its walls. He also dealt with the nearby Arabs to ensure the safety of travelers. He had Khurāsānid *quṣūr* (palaces) built. He sat with the ‘*ulamā*’ whom he loved. . . . He continued to rule Tunis until Yaḥyā b.

59 Ibn ‘Idhārī, i, 302; Ibn al-Athīr, x, 279; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 130.

60 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 329, 335 (mistaking ‘Alī for Tamīm’s great-grandson); Ibn al-Athīr, x, 521; Nuwayrī, xxiv, 134.

61 Zbiss, 54, 63; *Berbérie orientale* i, 266.

62 I adopt Idris’ reading, *makān rasmihi*, instead of *makān tarshihi* of the Beirut edition. *Berbérie orientale* i, 266, note 79.

al-'Azīz's commander, Muṭarrif b. 'Alī b. Khazrūn,⁶³ came with an army from Bejaia to Ifrīqiya to assault him in the year 522/1128.⁶⁴

His son Aḥmad continued to be ruler (*wālī*) of Tunis for twenty two years until he was ousted from there to Bejaia by Muṭarrif b. 'Alī b. Khazrūn. He had a palace named Qaṣr Banī Khurāsān constructed in Tunis. . . . He tyrannized over his people and deviated from the lifestyle of notables (*ashyākh*), adopting the behavior of tyrants (*jabābirat al-mulūk*). He even killed his uncle Ismā'īl, who was more entitled to the post than himself. Ismā'īl' son Abū Bakr fled to Bizerte, staying there in fear of his life. Aḥmad expelled many Tunisians and its notables (*ashyākh*) to al-Mahdiyya and other cities, ruling Tunis as he wished until al-Manṣūr (*sic*),⁶⁵ ruler of Bejaia, hearing about his doings, dispatched an army under the command of Muṭarrif b. 'Alī b. Khazrūn against him.⁶⁶

Since 'Abd al-Ḥaqq's last days, the duumvirate of his two sons, 'Abd al-'Azīz and Ismā'īl, then Ismā'īl and 'Abd al-'Azīz's son Aḥmad, prevailed. However, it seems that Aḥmad wished to establish his monarchy, as indicated by some material evidences, notably the palace-castle (*qaṣr, quṣūr*) he constructed in the western part of the intramural city near the western gate of Bāb al-Manāra containing palaces and an existing mosque for the ensuring of his own safety (this castle was later called al-Qaṣr as distinct from al-Qaṣba, the Muwaḥḥid and Ḥaḥṣid castle). Aḥmad's close relationship with scholars was also a conventional policy of legitimating unpopular autocratic rule. Finally in 522/1128 Muṭarrif b. 'Alī b. Khazrūn, Khazarid commander of the Ḥammādid army, captured and carried him to Bejaia, temporarily suspending Tunisian autonomy.

'Abd al-'Azīz and Ismā'īl might have wished to enhance their power, but publicly they pretended to preserve patrician domination. The heredity of leadership was a characteristic of medieval Islamic society in contrast to medieval European patrician domination, enabling Muslim leaders to build up an extensive patron-client relationship with many other notables and the populace and paving the way for the establishment of 'monarchy.' Even in medieval European cities the Medicis of Florence became virtually hereditary dictators ('tyrants') by building up an extensive patron-client relationship

63 I adopt Idris' reading, Khazrūn, instead of Ḥamdūn (in fact, Ibn 'Idhārī writes 'Khazrūn' instead of Ḥamdūn, i, 310). *Berbérie orientale* i, 339, note 207.

64 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 335.

65 Really al-Manṣūr's grandson, Yaḥyā b. al-'Azīz (?–547/?–1152).

66 Ibn 'Idhārī, i, 315 (mentioning Ḥamdūn). cf. *Idem* 310 (mistaking Bejaia for al-Ḥijāz, but mentioning Khazrūn instead of Ḥamdūn).

network among the Florentine populace. However, it is not known to what extent Aḥmad succeeded in winning popular support and consolidating his tyranny.

The Rise of Popular Power and the Restoration of Khurāsānid Rule

For twenty years Tunis was under the rule of four Ḥammādid governors, Karāma b. al-Manṣūr, his brother Abū l-Futūḥ, the latter's son Muḥammad and finally Karāma's brother Ma'add, all Ḥammādid kin. The first two died a natural death in office, but the last two were ousted by the citizens,⁶⁷ indicating a strong resistance of Tunisian notables and populace to Ḥammādid rule. Ibn 'Idhārī's accounts of a Tunisian rising against Ma'add are incomparably detailed and important and therefore worth quoting.

Jurjī b. Mikhā'il al-Anṭākī (George of Antioch), commander of the ruler of Sicily, Roger II (1112–54), was knowledgeable about the gaps in al-Mahdiyya and other places, because his father (*sic*) was one of the Christian servants of Tamīm.⁶⁸ He and Roger never ceased to aim at al-Mahdiyya until they took it in 543/1148.... The people (*ahl*) of Tunis feared the Christians after the ruler of Sicily conquered Sfax and took the people of 'Annāba captives. The people began preparing against their expected assaults, standing in rows from time to time before the Bāb al-Baḥr in the presence of their governor, Ma'add b. al-Manṣūr, who was in the customhouse above the gate. One day, when they went out of the gate to receive a review, they saw a boat (*qārib*) carrying cereals. The populace (*amma*) suspected cereals to be exported to a Norman region in the middle of this famine. They gathered to prevent it, roaring in rage. Ma'add's men attempted to restore order, but the populace brutally put them and his black guards (*abīd*) to the swords. They set fire to the tower of the customhouse, forcing Ma'add to descend to surrender. Although the populace did not harm the governor, they separated his men and

67 Ibn 'Idhārī, i, 316; Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 336.

68 He originally served Byzantine Emperor Alexius I (1081–1118) in Constantinople, but after his boat was captured by Tamīm he went into his service. After Tamīm's death he escaped to Sicily to enter Roger II's service. *Muqaffā* ii, 493–5, English trans., Johns, *Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily* 80–2. Officially George was Roger's *wazīr* and *amīr al-umarā'* (amiratus amiratorum). For George and Philip of al-Mahdiyya see Takayama, *The Administration of the Norman Kingdom* 53, 66–8, 90–1.

black guards from him to murder them. Ma'add was forced to stay in Tunis by the populace. At his request a galley warship (*ghurāb*) was sent from Bejaia. After he boarded it with his sons and returned to Bejaia, the administration of Tunis was entrusted to one of the Ṣanhāja commanders [al-ʿAzīz b. Dāfāl] for a while, but he also deserted. The city was left in the hands of the populace (*āmma*).

There broke out a fighting between the people (*ahl*) of the suburb outside Bāb al-Suwayqa and the people of the suburb outside Bāb al-Jazīra. Because the Tunisians feared the rulers of Sicily and Bejaia, particularly the latter's preparation against them, they followed the advice of their leader, *Qāḍī* Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Munʿim b. *Imām* Abī l-Ḥasan, to invite Muḥriz b. Ziyād the Arab⁶⁹ [lawless ruler of the nearby fortress of La Marga (Carthage), leader of the ʿAlī clan of the Riyāḥ] to make him ruler. [Muḥriz had continued to fight the Tunisians and even asked the Zīrid ruler of al-Mahdiyya (al-Ḥasan) for reinforcements before the Norman conquest of al-Mahdiyya.] When Muḥriz arrived at Tunis the *qāḍī* and notables (*ashyākh*) went out to receive him. Thereupon, one of the populace (*āmma*) shouted, "No obedience to an Arab or a Türkmen (Ghuzz)," causing a disturbance and forcing Muḥriz to return to La Marga. The *qāḍī* attempted to return inside the walls, but was prevented and ousted by the populace, being obliged to accompany Muḥriz to La Marga. He stayed there for a long time until his death. It is said that while he was sleeping on a high arch (of the Roman aqueduct) in summer he fell down from it and died. It is also said that he was thrown down from it. Then the populace (*āmma*) sent for Abū Bakr b. Ismāʿīl. When he arrived at Tunis by night, he was raised in a basket up to the top of the wall and installed as ruler of Tunis. Seven months later he was killed by his nephew ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz.⁷⁰

The populace (*āmma*) appeared in the sources as active participants in the struggles against the last Ḥammādid governor, demonstrating their power in prevailing over the Ḥammādid garrison. However, both notables and the populace were divided between the supporters and opponents of the Khurāsānid Abū Bakr, who was invited from Bizerte. The majority of notables seem to have favored the reconstitution of true patrician domination under the leadership of the *qāḍī*, as is often the case with many Islamic cities. They were also ready

69 Maymūn b. Ziyād in Tornberg's edition of Ibn al-Athīr, xi, 31, probably a mistake.

70 Ibn ʿIdhārī, i, 313–4. Words inside box brackets show quotations from the parallel account of Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 336.

to accept Muḥriz and his mainly Arab (Hilālī) horsemen as mercenaries to supplement their small cavalry, making it very possible for Muḥriz to become virtually a monarch or illegal tyrant just like the Berber leaders of Toledo and Badajoz. To the contrary, some notables and the majority of the populace obviously supported the restoration of Khurāsānid rule. They never trusted Muḥriz, who had not eased his offensives on Tunis with the military aid of the Zīrid al-Ḥasan b. ‘Alī b. Yaḥyā (515–43/1121–48), ousting the *qāḍī* who had invited him.

As for the struggles between the peoples of the suburbs of Bāb al-Suwayqa and Bāb al-Jazīra, Amari regarded it as a class struggle, assuming that Bāb al-Suwayqa was a popular district in contrast to Bāb al-Jazīra, an upper-class district.⁷¹ Really, both were recently-settled, semi-rural suburbs, which were congested with refugees escaping from Arab depredations, who could not afford to purchase houses inside the walls. Comparatively speaking, it is probable that the inhabitants of nearby villages and small cities north and west of Tunis took refuge in Bāb al-Suwayqa, while Bāb al-Jazīra accommodated refugees from southern inland regions and al-Qayrawān, including intellectuals and the wealthy who could not find adequate houses inside the walls. However, this struggle between the suburbs was basically an inter-popular one, possibly between the anti-Muḥriz people of Bāb al-Suwayqa who had suffered from his depredations and the supporters of the *qāḍī* and patricians in Bāb al-Jazīra.

Muḥriz was not simply a robber. He had founded the fortress of La Marga (al-Mu‘allaqa) on the top of a hill inside the ruins of Carthage, utilizing twenty four big vaulted cisterns and the arched aqueduct carrying water from Mt. Zaghwān.⁷² Arabs not only plundered the Tunisians, but also supplied food to them in normal times, as indicated by al-Idrīsī’s account written in the 1140’s,⁷³ partially explaining the existence of numerous citizens in favor of inviting him inside the city.

71 Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia*² iii, 436. These semi-rural districts lagged behind in the foundation of mosques. The first *jāmi‘* in Bāb al-Suwayqa located just outside the gate, *Jāmi‘ Abī Muḥammad*, was constructed by a Muwaḥḥid governor around the year 1200, while the first *jāmi‘* in Bāb al-Jazīra, *Jāmi‘ al-Hawā’* (or al-Tawfiq), facing Place du Leader, was founded by the wife of Ḥafṣid Caliph Abū Zakariyyā’ (627–47/1229–49). P. Sebag, *Tūnis*, in *EI*², x, 631–2.

72 Idrīsī, i, 286; Bakrī, 43.

73 Idrīsī, i, 284–5. He compiled his book after a fifteen-year gathering of information (Idem i, 6), completing it in 548/1154, as testified by his postscript found at the end of six manuscripts. G. Oman, (al-)Idrīsī, in *EI*², iii, 1032. For the relationship between al-Idrīsī and the kings of Sicily, see Metcalfe, *Muslims and Christians in Norman Sicily* 101–2.

It is a beautiful city completely surrounded by plains (*fuḥūṣ*) and farms of wheat and barley, its most important crops. Its people transacted business with Arab leaders (*thiqāt, umarāʾ*). At the time of this compilation, it is populous and well-provisioned, in which peoples are taking refuge from far and near. It is encircled by solid earthen walls penetrated by three (*sic*) gates. All orchards and kitchen gardens (*mazāriʿ buqūl*) are inside its walls, not outside. Arab neighbors are carrying various kinds of crops, honey and butter there to satisfy its people. Various kinds of bread, which cannot be made in other cities, are also produced.

Ibn Khaldūn is the only author to report a temporary rule of Tunis by a person called Qahrūn b. Ghannūsh, who has much in common with Muḥriz in character, but originally had been supported by the populace.

After being installed by the populace (*ʿamma*), Qahrūn was ousted by the people (*ahl*) of Tunis due to his misconduct (*li-sūʾ sīratihī*). Then Qahrūn settled in Manzil Daḥmūn (near Oudna), building up a fortress (*ḥiṣn*) partly on the ruins of Roman arches (*ḥanāyā*) and gathering dropouts from tribes (*awbāsh al-qabāʾil*). He continued to raid Tunis, working havoc in its region. They (Tunisians) asked Muḥriz b. Ziyād for reinforcements against him, and he responded to their appeal. Hearing of his plight, Mudāfiʿ b. ʿAllāl, ruler of Tebourba, gave his daughter to him, settling him in one of the fortresses, named Qalʿat Ibn Ghannūsh, inside his territory. Both helped each other in devastating the region. Their sons succeeded them after their death until ʿAbd al-Muʾmin's arrival at Ifriqiya in the year 554/1159.⁷⁴

Idris was obviously mistaken in placing Qahrūn's rule of Tunis before the beginning of Khurāsānid rule,⁷⁵ because Qahrūn was Muḥriz's contemporary and his son was finally vanquished by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, indicating Qahrūn's activities during the mid-twelfth century. It is probably true that Qahrūn exerted an influence in the politics of Tunis, because we find a fortress named Qalʿat Ibn Ghannūsh located on the shore of the lake of Tunis, near which the Khurāsānid Abū Bakr fell down from a boat (*qārib*) or was thrown into water.⁷⁶ The period of Qahrūn's rule in Tunis can be safely located after the termination of Ḥammādid direct control and before Khurāsānid restoration. Qahrūn might

74 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 348 (probably based on oral traditions).

75 Idris, *Berbérie orientale* i, 235; (Banū) Khurāsān, in *ET*², v, 59.

76 Ibn ʿIdhārī, i, 316.

have been a former Ḥammādid Ṣanhāja soldier like al-ʿAzīz b Dāfāl before he became a robber baron.

The restored Khurāsānid domination faced the opposition of other notables. Abū Bakr died an unnatural death in the lagoon seven months later, probably at the hands of either opposition notables or his nephew ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Ismāʿīl, who seems to have been dissatisfied with his half-hearted posture toward the notables. During his ten-year leadership up until his death, ʿAbdallāh executed three influential notables, the *qāḍī* Abū l-Faḍl Jaʿfar b. Ḥalwān, his son and a son of his sister, Ibn al-Bannād, on grounds of attempting to introduce Arabs inside the city,⁷⁷ indicating his reliance upon popular support. The government of Tunis since Khurāsānid restoration was thus really akin to tyranny under one patrician ruler despite its patrician domination facade.

It is said that ʿAbdallāh accepted his investment as governor (*āmil*) of Tunis from Roger II.⁷⁸ He soon concluded a trade agreement with the archbishop of Pisa too. Moreover, Muḥriz was also forced to ally with the Khurāsānids before a Muwaḥḥid onslaught under the command of Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʿmin's son ʿAbdallāh in 552/1157 after Muwaḥḥid occupation of Bejaia and Constantine. A sortie of Tunisian cavalymen, composed of mainly Ṣanhāja cavalymen and Muḥriz's Arabs, was successful, resulting in the retreat of the Muwaḥḥid army.⁷⁹ However, his alliance with Muḥriz must have diminished Khurāsānid influence in Tunis. Then, ʿAbdallāh's death shortly afterward seems to have helped the restoration of real patrician domination.

Five months after ʿAbdallāh's death (554/1159), ʿAbd al-Muʿmin himself, commanding a tremendous army, arrived before Tunis.⁸⁰ According to al-Tijānī's account, three days later, on Jumādā I 13 (according to Ibn al-Athīr, probably based on Ibn Shaddād, the following day on Jumādā II 25)⁸¹ a delegation of

77 Ibn ʿIdhārī, i, 316.

78 Marrākushī, 162. Idris denied that ʿAbdallāh recognized the suzerainty of Roger II, but he failed to produce his grounds. *Berbérie orientale* i, 377 (note 390), 378.

79 Ibn Khaldūn, xi, 337; Ibn ʿIdhārī, i, 316; Marrākushī, 162; Tijānī, 345. ʿAbdallāh announced this victory to the Pisans in his still existing Arabic letter confirming the recent trade agreement. *Berbérie orientale* i, 392, ii, 682; Jehel, *L'Italie et le Maghreb* 108.

80 According to Ibn al-Athīr, ʿAbd al-Muʿmin's fleet consisting of seventy galleys (*shīmī*), transport ships (*ṭarīda*) and flatboats (*shalandā*) also joined the siege of Tunis. It was prevented from entering the lagoon by a storm. See *Berbérie orientale* ii, 538.

81 Amari (*Storia dei musulmani di Sicilia*² iii, 487) interpreted the difference of 42 days between two accounts as a gap between ʿAbd al-Muʿmin's failed first attack of Tunis and his successful second one, placing his expedition to al-Qayrawān and Sousse in between. Idris (*Berbérie orientale* i, 387) considered that this siege of Tunis really lasted 42 days.

Tunisian notables (*ashyākh, aʿyān*) visited him to ask for pardon without fighting on land. This delegation was composed of twelve notables including three members of the ‘Abd al-Sayyid, Maṣṣūr b. Ismā‘īl’s two sons and cousin, Muḥammad al-Khārījī, Ḥamza b. Ḥamza and ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Qammūdī according to al-Tijānī (seventeen according to Ibn al-Athīr). It is not known if ‘Abdallāh’s Khurāsānid successor, ‘Alī b. Aḥmad, who was not included in this delegation, agreed to the surrender of Tunis. Perhaps he had lost power.

The notables were determined to surrender Tunis in return for safe-conduct. They had to accept ‘Abd al-Mu‘min’s severe conditions that they would concede half of their estates (*ribāʿ, amlāk*) and movables (*amwāl*) to the Muwaḥḥid treasury (*makhzan*) except the clothes on their backs, but the people of villages (*qurā*) and small cities (*bilād*) in the region were allowed to retain their houses and land, only conceding half of their movables. ‘Alī b. Aḥmad also accepted these conditions, but was ordered to move to Bejaia with his family (he died on the way there). First a Muwaḥḥid police force entered Tunis to prevent the looting of the city at the hands of Muwaḥḥid troops, and then inspectors (*umanāʾ*) entered to seize half of the immovables and movables. Even after ‘Abd al-Mu‘min left Tunis to seize al-Mahdiyya from the king of Sicily three days later, a forcible requisition of the half continued. Estates and houses were sold as much as possible. Each Tunisian who owned a single house had to pay a rent (virtually a new tax) for the sequestered half of his own house. The citizens who could not afford to pay rents had to sell their houses and received only half the amount.⁸² The construction of al-Qaṣba also began soon to accommodate Muwaḥḥid governors and soldiers.

It seems that popular power was growing at the expense of notables under the last Ḥammādids, who had trained the populace as footmen. After Ḥammādīd expulsion, the notables’ attempt to establish their genuine domination under the leadership of their *qāḍī* in alliance with Muḥriz was foiled by the populace. Accordingly, the Khurāsānid domination restored by popular backing was only seemingly patrician domination, but really under rather strong popular influence; a tension gradually built up between the Khurāsānids and the majority of notables. ‘Abdallāh revealed tyrannical tendency, murdering a *qāḍī* and other influential notables. He even acknowledged the suzerainty of the king of Sicily to consolidate his position in Tunis and also to take precautions against Muḥriz. However, in the face of ‘Abd al-Mu‘min’s investment, it seems that the populace shrank back, and the majority of notables probably overpowered ‘Abdallāh’s successor, ‘Alī, and surrendered Tunis virtually without fighting, abandoning patrician domination altogether.

82 Tījānī, 345–6; Ibn al-Athīr, xi, 242.

Almost every city became independent with the collapse of the Zīrid centralized state as a result of its defeat at the battle of Ḥaydarān in 1052. In many cities notables seized power, electing their leaders, while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Ḥammādid of Qal'at Banī Ḥammād or nearest Arab chiefs. In extraordinary cases they allied with charismatic leaders of newly-formed gangs of 'bandits' composed of dropouts of Arab and indigenous origin. Tunis was one of these cities, recognizing Ḥammādid suzerainty and electing one of its notables, 'Abd al-Ḥaqq of the Khurāsānid family, as leader (*shaykh*). In his last days, in 1090's, 'Abd al-Ḥaqq was virtually deputized by his two sons, 'Abd al-'Azīz and Ismā'īl, but it seems that almost everything went as before.

However, after 'Abd al-'Azīz' death, his son Aḥmad began monopolizing power at the expense of the oligarchy, murdering his uncle Ismā'īl in 1107. His aspiration to become a 'monarch' is demonstrated by his construction of secluded, walled al-Qaṣr, containing his palaces and a mosque. This 'illegal' tyranny was supposedly supported by friendly notables and, among others, a relatively large part of the populace. However, Tunis, just like other autonomous cities of Ifrīqiya, was militarily weak, chiefly due to the deficiency of cavalry apart from former Zīrid Ṣanhāja cavalymen and a delay of the militarization of its citizens. This, in its turn, induced Zīrid and Ḥammādid attacks.

After a twenty-year Ḥammādid rule of Tunis (1128–48), the militarily disciplined populace rose in arms and succeeded in ousting the Ḥammādid governor and garrison out of the city. The citizens were divided between the supporters of Khurāsānid domination and true patrician domination under the leadership of *qāḍīs*, but militarily dependent upon Muḥriz. Finally, popular power prevailed, resulting in the restoration of Khurāsānid leadership. 'Abdallāh was more intransigent toward notables than his uncle Abū Bakr. However, his successor 'Alī rapidly lost power with the drawing back of the populace before a tremendous Muwaḥḥid army. The notables probably acted on their own initiative in negotiating with 'Abd al-Mu'min to procure safe-conduct for all the citizens in return for paying a high price.

Conclusion

Autonomous cities did exist in the medieval Islamic world, but they proved to be short-lived, lasting often less than a few years or at most several decades. They came into being, following the decline and collapse of relatively centralized, large-scale states (the Abbasid, Andalusi Umayyad, Fāṭimid, Zīrid and Seljuq states) during the tenth to twelfth centuries before their absorption into emerging centralized states.

Originally, almost all the cities of the Middle East, Greece and Italy, having their own hinterlands including many agricultural settlements, estates (*villas*, *ḍayʿas*) and pasture, were independent states since their foundation until they were forcibly conquered by the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Persians, Macedonians, Parthians and ultimately Romans. However, during Roman and Byzantine times these cities seem to have retained some tradition of autonomy under the domination of landholding hereditary patricians, who were constituted decurions or curials (councilors running local municipal government and collecting imperial taxes). Moreover, Syria and Jazīra often became the battlefield; the Parthians, then the Sasanians often made incursions into Roman Syrian and Mesopotamia. The patricians were compelled to defend their cities on their own, and sometimes concluded surrender agreements with these Iranians, facilitating their smooth surrender to the Arab Muslims during the seventh century.

Autonomous and virtually independent cities reappeared in northern Italy and northern Europe since the late tenth century. Weber classified these medieval European and ancient Greek cities into patrician and plebeian cities. In Greco-Roman and medieval Italian aristocratic society patricians were privileged, hereditary noblemen, while in more egalitarian Islamic society leading citizens should be in principle respected notables, rather than aristocratic patricians (Cordoba, Toledo and Zaragoza were exceptions, where the descendants of Visigothic noblemen survived). On the other hand, the plebs meant all non-patricians including newly-risen, wealthy merchants and entrepreneurs of plebeian origin, resulting in Weber's inclusion of these wealthy plebeian-dominated cities with the backing of the populace into plebeian cities. In the Islamic world these cities should be classified into tyrant-dictated cities as distinct from plebeian- or patrician-dominated cities (caliphs and kings who were attempting to regain their lost power in alliance with the populace should be included in this category). Therefore, Islamic plebeian cities should be the cities in which the lower- and middle-class people really dominated and produced leaders.

In early ninth-century Baghdad, it is not the hereditary upper-class *abnā'* or notables, but the populace (*ʿamma*), particularly militiamen called *ʿayyārūn*, who took the lead in defending their own city and the reigning Abbasid caliph. This was merely a spontaneous self-defense, not a political movement aiming at securing autonomy under their own hegemony. However, the attempt of some *abnā'* leaders to uphold *al-amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-n-nahy ʿan al-munkar* was nothing less than a movement to establish their own patrician domination in Baghdad. In the same way, perhaps one minimum aim of the conspiracy of the *abnā'* and notables remaining in Baghdad against the Abbasid caliphs and the Atrāk, who had moved to Sāmarrā, was to establish Baghdadi autonomy under their own domination. When the Buwayhid control of Baghdad was at its lowest ebb in the first half of the eleventh century, the *ʿayyārūn*, now lower-class populace organized into gangs under the leadership of their bosses (*raʿīs*, *qāʿids*), nearly came to control parts of the city. Strictly speaking, this was not a plebeian domination either, for it lacked their own infrastructure of control or the will to form a government.

Damascus was the first city to be virtually independent as a result of the collapse of the Abbasid state and Fāṭimid intrusions into Syria. The people of Damascus not only resisted Ikhshīd control of the city from Egypt, but also demonstrated their resoluteness to defend their own city against Fāṭimid armies. In the course of this defense Damascus experienced both patrician and plebeian domination under the leadership of the *raʿīs* of patrician and plebeian origin, who were supported by their own *aḥdāth* (plebeian militias), during the later tenth century before it succumbed to Fāṭimid rule. One characteristic of the Damascene case is a rather long-term duration of its plebeian domination.

The people of Aleppo were activated, following their Ḥamdānid ruler's defeat at the hands of the Byzantines and Byzantine threat on their city during the latter half of the tenth century. Finally, their notables took the lead in concluding a surrender agreement with the Byzantines. Thereafter, the rulers of Ḥamdānid *ghilmān* origin and Mirdāsīd Kilābi origin largely continued to abide by this agreement. Some rulers of Ḥamdānid *ghilmān* origin consulted with the notables, but Maṣṣūr and many Mirdāsīd rulers were prone to autocracy, alienating the citizens in general. Under Mirdāsīd rule Christian citizens were given important tasks, and part of the populace were organized into *aḥdāth* as royal auxiliary troops. The Aleppine patrician domination nearly came true under an Abbasid *raʿīs* who organized his own *aḥdāth* at the end of Mirdāsīd rule before the Seljuq takeover of the city. However, this was short-lived. A *qāḍī* established more durable patrician domination during the incursions of the Antiochian and Edessan crusaders in the early twelfth century.

He failed to withstand their attacks, finally surrendering the city to the autocratic Seljuq governor of Mosul. On the other hand, the only possible attempt at plebeian domination of Aleppo based on *aḥdāth* proved to be abortive during the rule of an isolated Seljuq prince, who had lost confidence of all the citizens.

The anti-ʿĀmirid and anti-Berber uprisings of the Cordovan populace in 1009 had something in common with the anti-Khurāsāni-Central Asian struggles of the Baghdadi *ʿayyārūn*. The Cordovan common people (*ʿamma*) also, even if they were incited and organized by Umayyad *mawālī* and Cordovan notables, acted rather spontaneously, and some of them were enlisted in the regular army. However, a division of Cordovan society between the Andalusī citizens and the Berber mercenaries caused the collapse of the Andalusī Umayyad state and long-term political turmoil in Cordoba. They surrendered their city to the Berber mercenaries after enduring a nearly three-year siege, but finally succeeded in ousting them and their Ḥammūdīd caliph in 1023. The first patrician domination was realized during the siege under the leadership of an *ex-qāḍī* and a dignitary (1012–3). In 1023 too, Cordovan *mawālī*-notables attempted to establish their domination, but the restored Umayyad caliphs or their *wazīrs* resisted them in alliance with part of the populace. The *mawālī*-notables reacted against it by establishing their oligarchy in 1031 with the *wazīr* Ibn Jahwar at the top of their government. However, struggles between *mawālī*-notables and the populace continued until the former decided to surrender Cordoba to the ʿAbbāḍids of Seville in 1069.

Southern Andalusī cities became independent with the collapse of the central government and established patrician domination under their *qāḍīs* or other notables. Among others, the ʿAbbāḍid *qāḍī* of Seville or his son succeeded in transforming his leadership to monarchy rather swiftly.

Toledo, the seat of the Andalusī Middle March, had been virtually autonomous under Visigothic-*muwallad* patrician domination (often under the duumvirate of the houses of Ṭarbīsha and Muṭarrif) since the late eighth century up until their surrender to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān III in 932. After the collapse of the Cordovan central government at the beginning of the eleventh century, struggles for power among its patricians were intensified. After ousting a *qāḍī*, the Toledan patricians agreed to invite a Berber Dhū n-Nūnid leader of Santaver as military and political leader, partly to put an end to their internecine struggles, but also to strengthen its defense against the northern Christian states. The Dhū n-Nūnid al-Maʿmūn gradually built up his power at the expense of patricians in alliance with some friendly patricians. Particularly, al-Maʿmūn's diplomatic policy to expand his domain at the expense of other Muslim states, while paying heavy tribute to the kings of Leon-Castile, made him widely unpopular

among the Toledans. His grandson al-Qādir was ousted from Toledo, resulting in the reestablishment of patrician domination. Al-Qādir, once reinstated by Alfonso VI, was driven into an alliance with part of the populace against opposition patricians. This situation made his rule impossible, compelling Alfonso to decide on his outright absorption of Toledo in 1085.

Valencia began its development since the mid-tenth century. During the first half of the eleventh century ʿĀmirid Ṣaḡāliba continued to stay in power, but their natural aging and shrinking paved the way for Andalusī seizure of power. The four Andalusī secretaries (*kātib*s) took the helm of government toward the end of the old prince's reign in the mid-eleventh century, probably consulting with *qāḍī*s and rising notables. One of these secretaries, Ibn Rūbash, and then his son Abū Bakr gradually built up their predominant leadership. However, Abū Bakr had to accept al-Ma'mūn's suzerainty in 1065 in the face of threats posed by the kings of Zaragoza and Leon-Castile, while retaining its internal autonomy. This patrician domination was terminated when al-Qādir and a Castilian detachment occupied Valencia in 1086. Al-Qādir's unstable government induced the incursions of Rodrigo Díaz, a condottiere of the Hūdid king of Zaragoza, leading up to the formation of his vast sphere of influence. On the other hand, Murābiṭ advance to Jativa stirred up Valencian expectation of its liberation from Christian yoke, resulting in a revolution toppling al-Qādir and the reestablishment of patrician domination under the duumvirate of a *qāḍī* and his deputy judge in 1092. After the surrender of the Valencians two years later, Rodrigo decided to rule Valencia himself, executing the *qāḍī* and nipping the bud of pro-Murābiṭ revolution.

In Ifrīqiya almost every city became independent with the collapse of the Zirid state as a result of its defeat at the battle of Ḥaydarān in 1052. In many cities notables seized power, electing their leaders, while recognizing the suzerainty of the Ḥammādid or nearest Arab chiefs. Some cities did ally with the leaders of newly-formed bands of 'bandits' composed of Arab and indigenous dropouts.

Tunis was one of these cities, acknowledging Ḥammādid suzerainty and electing one of its notables, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq of the Khurāsānid family, as leader (*shaykh*). During his last years it seems that he was deputized by his two sons (duumvirate). However, his grandson Aḥmad began monopolizing power at the expense of the oligarchy, possibly in alliance with some friendly notables and a relatively large part of the populace, building walled, secluded al-Qaṣr for his own security. After the twenty-year Ḥammādid interlude of Tunis (1128–48), the populace rose in arms and succeeded in expelling the Ḥammādid garrison out of the city. The citizens were divided between the supporters of Khurāsānid restoration and those of true patrician domination

under the leadership of *qādis*. Finally, popular power prevailed, resulting in the restoration of Khurāsānid leadership. However, the last Khurāsānid leader rapidly lost support before a tremendous Muwahḥid army. Mainstream notables took the initiative in negotiating with Caliph ‘Abd al-Mu’min to procure safe-conduct for all citizens.

‘Republican’ autonomous cities were mostly under patrician domination. Real plebeian cities were rare and were typically Damascus under the control of Ibn al-Māward (974–5), Qassām (978–983) and al-Duhayqayn (997–8), and possibly Aleppo under the control of al-Mujann (–1098). However, some ambitious monarchs (Caliph al-Mustakfi of Cordoba, al-Qādir of Toledo and Riḍwān of Aleppo), *wazīrs* or dignitaries (Ḥakam b. Sa’id and Ibn al-Saqqā’ of Cordoba) and notable-rulers (‘Abdallāh b. Khurāsān of Tunis and ‘Abd al-Malik b. Jahwar of Cordoba) desperately did attempt to boost their shrinking power in alliance with the lower echelons of ruling classes and part of the lower classes (tyranny). The ‘Abbāids of Seville did succeed in becoming virtually monarchs, though we do not know how much popular support they enjoyed.

It has been claimed that *aḥdāths*, chiefly composed of the lower classes, were real popular power promoting civil autonomy in medieval Islamic cities and that *raʿīs* were their leaders and leaders of autonomous cities. This is largely true in tenth-century Damascus, though its *raʿīs* were often of lower-class origin (e.g. Ibn al-Māward, Qassām and al-Duhayqayn) and the *aḥdāths* under their command were rather akin to the *ʿayyārūn* of Buwayhid Baghdad, albeit more disciplined. On the other hand, the *aḥdāth* of Aleppo was first organized by Mirdāsīd rulers and their first *raʿīs* was a professional soldier. Although later Aleppine *aḥdāths* were often organized and commanded by *raʿīs* of notable origin (but al-Mujann was of plebeian origin), they seldom played a very important role in Aleppine civil autonomy except the cases of an Abbasid notable, named al-Khutaytī, who withstood a Seljuq siege of Aleppo in 1079 and another notable, Ibn Badī’, who succeeded in ousting Lu’lu’ from Aleppo in 1117. Later *aḥdāths* of both Damascus and Aleppo were quasi-regular auxiliary troops, and their *raʿīs* acted as royal bureaucrats.

After the successful anti-ʿĀmirid revolution in Cordoba in 1009, part of the populace (*ʿamma*) who rose in arms were enlisted in the army under commanders of middle-class origin. They must have been fired as a result of Berber victory in 1013, but it seems that, after the expulsion of the Berbers in 1023 (or during late Ḥammūdīd rule), caliphal guards (*dāʿira*) and regular soldiers (*jund al-baladiyyīn*) were freshly recruited from the populace. They tended to support would-be tyrants, not necessarily acting on their own. After 1023 some lower-ranking *mawālī*-notables were also promoted to higher posts

by ambitious politicians al-Mustakfī, Ḥakam b. Sa'īd, Ibn al-Saqqā' and 'Abd al-Malik b. Jahwar. If their attempts had been successful, they would have been 'tyrants' in alliance with the lower echelons of *mawālī*-notables and the lower classes.

It seems, however, that not only these militarized citizens but also the populace in general were mobilized to defend their cities, often ending up in their disasters like the battle of Paterna near Valencia and the sieges of Damascus, Aleppo, Cordoba, Toledo and Valencia. In Tunis the citizens were trained as footmen and received reviews from their Ḥammādid governors. The military weakness of Islamic autonomous cities was chiefly due to the lack of cavalry, inducing them to recruit horsemen from outside, 'Turkish' *ghilmān* (Damascus), Berber mountain peoples (Cordoba, Toledo, Badajoz), Arab nomads (Damascus, Aleppo, Tunis), Türkmens (Aleppo) and Murābiṭūn (Valencia).

Sometimes in the cities where bureaucratic tradition was strong, like Cordoba and Valencia, leaders of patrician domination took the title of *wazīr* for purely legitimating reasons. In cities of more egalitarian tradition, particularly in Ifrīqiya like Tunis, Sousse and Tripoli, all leading patricians were equally called *shaykhs*.

Qādīs of notable origin were very often elected as leaders of patrician domination. Ibn Abī 'Aqīl of Tyr, Ibn 'Ammār of Tripoli, Lebanon, Ibn al-Khashshāb of Aleppo, Ibn Hānīsh of Tripoli, Libya, Ibn Dhakwān of Cordoba, Ibn Jahḥāf of Valencia, Ibn 'Abbād of Seville, Ibn Muzayn of Silves, and Ya'īsh of Toledo were the most famous examples. Tunisian *qādīs* also threatened Khurāsānid leadership after their restoration to power. However, there appeared no prominent *qādī*-leaders in Damascus.

In Islamic tradition leadership is normally monocephalous and hereditary, hampering the development of democracy and communalism (the cohesive spirit of a city to assemble and unite its individual citizens). As a result, the Muṭarrifid and Ṭarbīsha leaders of Toledo, the Jahwarid *wazīr-ra'īs* of Cordoba, the 'Abbādid *qādī* and *ḥājibs* of Seville, the 'Ammārid *qādīs* of Tripoli, Lebanon, the Khurāsānid *shaykhs* of Tunis and the Maṭrūḥid *shaykhs* of Tripoli, Libya, became hereditary leaders. However, duumvirate was often observable, for example in Toledo (the Muṭarrifids and the Ṭarbīshas), Cordoba (the *qādī* Ibn Dhakwān and Ibn Munāw, the Jawharid Abū l-Walīd and Ibn al-Saqqā'), Valencia (the *qādī* Ibn Jahḥāf and the *ṣāḥib al-aḥkāṃ* Ibn Wājib) and Tunis ('Abd al-Ḥaqq's two sons). The only reported triumvirate is that of the *qādī* Ibn 'Abbād, the *faqīh* al-Zubaydī and the *wazīr* Ibn Maryam in Seville, but it seems that this is not a triumvirate in a strict sense, but a collective leadership composed of many members.

More importantly, public spirit and communalism were relatively underdeveloped in medieval Islamic cities. According to Brunschvig, medieval schools of Islamic law allowed every Muslim to do as he or she pleased provided there was no immediate conflict with others' interests, resulting in paying scant attention to nuisances to others and hampering the solidarity and cohesion of the citizens of any cities. Despite his often criticized Orientalistic viewpoints which were prone to overemphasize the difference between the Islamic and Christian worlds (differences were really often caused by medieval European relative backwardness, or they were merely questions of degree), it is hard to deny that there are some kernels of truth in his arguments.

This study is a modest attempt to seek to find out universality, rather than peculiarity; the author considers the European and American studies on medieval Islamic studies so far to be paying too much attention to the peculiarity of medieval Islamic cities from Euro-centric viewpoints. Nevertheless, peculiarity did exist, and old western theories on medieval Islamic cities contain some truth.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

- ‘Abdallāh b. Buluggīn, *The Tibyān: Memoirs of ‘Abd Allāh b. Buluggīn*, trans. Amin T. Tibi, Leiden: Brill 1986.
- Abū Shāma, *Kitāb al-Rawḍatayn fī akhbār al-dawlatayn*, ed. Ibrāhīm Shams al-Dīn, 5 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya 2002.
- Anonymous chronicle of the *mulūk al-ṭawā’if*, in an appendix to Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib* iii, 287–316.
- ‘Arīb al-Qurṭubī, *Ṣilat ta’rīkh al-Ṭabarī*, ed. M.J. de Goeje, Leiden: Brill 1897.
- al-‘Azīmī, La chronique abrégée d’al-‘Azīmī, ed. Cl. Cahen, *JA* 230 (1938), 353–448.
- al-Bakrī, Abū ‘Ubayd, *Kitāb al-Masālik wa-l-mamālik (Description de l’Afrique septentrionale)*, ed. and trans. McG. de Slane, Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve 1965.
- Bustān al-jāmī’*, Une chronique du VI^e/XII^e siècle, ed. Cl. Cahen, *BEO* 7–8 (1937–8), 113–58.
- al-Ḍabbī, *Bughyat al-multamis fī ta’rīkh rijāl ahl al-Andalus*, ed. F. Codera and J. Ribera, Madrid: Josephum de Rojas 1884.
- al-Dhahabī, *Ta’rīkh al-Islām wa waḥyāt al-mashāhīr wa-l-a’lām*, ed. ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Salām Tadmūrī, vol. (351–380AH), Beirut 1989, vol. (401–420AH), Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī 1993.
- al-Hamadhānī, *Takmilat ta’rīkh al-Ṭabarī*, ed. Albart Kan‘ān, Beirut: al-Maṭba‘at al-Kāthūlikiyya 1961.
- Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī, *Kitāb Sinī mulūk al-arḍ wa-l-anbiyā’*, Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāt no date.
- al-Harawī, *Al-Ishāra ilā ma’rifat al-ziyārāt*, ed. ‘Alī ‘Umar, Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfat al-Dīniyya 2002.
- Hilāl al-Ṣābī, *Ta’rīkh*, ed. H.F. Amedroz, in al-Rūdhrawārī, *Dhayl tajārib al-umam*, 333–460.
- Ibn al-Abbār, *Al-Ḥullat al-siyarā’*, ed. Ḥusayn Mu’nis, 2 vols., Cairo: La société arabe de publications 1963.
- , *al-Takmila li-Kitāb al-Ṣila*, ed. F. Codera, 2 vols., Madrid: Josephum de Rojas 1886.
- Ibn Abī Ṭayy’, *Kitābāt Ibn Abī Ṭayy’ al-Ḥalabī fī l-maṣādir al-Islāmiyya*, ed. Shīrīn Shalabī Aḥmad al-‘Ashmāwī, Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfat al-Dīniyya 2010.
- Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, *Uyūn al-anbā’ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭṭibā’*, ed. Samīḥ al-Zayn, 3 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfa 1987.
- Ibn al-‘Adīm, *Bughyat al-ṭalab fī ta’rīkh Ḥalab*, ed. Suhayl Zakkār, 11 vols., Damascus: Maṭābi‘ Dār al-Ba‘th 1988.

- , *Zubdat al-ḥalab min taʾriḫ Ḥalab*, ed. Khalīl al-Manṣūr, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1996.
- Ibn ʿAsākir, *Taʾriḫ madīnat Dimashq*, vol. 1, ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid, Damascus: Institut Français du Proche-Orient 2008.
- , *Taʾriḫ madīnat Dimashq*, ed. Sukayna al-Shihābī et al., multi-vols., Damascus: Majmaʿ al-Lughat al-ʿArabiyya 1963–.
- , *Taʾriḫ madīnat Dimashq*, ed. ʿUmar b. Gharāma al-ʿAmrawī et al., 80 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Fikr 1995–2001.
- Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil fī l-taʾriḫ*, ed. C. Tornberg, 13 vols., Beirut: Dār Ṣādir 1965–7.
- Ibn al-Azraq al-Fāriqī, *Taʾriḫ Mayyāfāriqīn wa-Āmid*, as *Taʾriḫ al-Fāriqī* (the Marwānid and early Seljuq periods), ed. B.A.L. Awad, Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī 1974.
- , as *A Muslim Principality in Crusader Times: The Early Artuqid State*, ed. and trans. C. Hillenbrand, The Hague: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut 1990.
- Ibn Bashkuwāl. *Kitāb al-Ṣila fī taʾriḫ aʿimmat al-Andalus*, 2 vols., Cairo: Al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li-l-Taʾlif wa-l-Tarjama 1966 (consecutive pages through volumes, vol. 1, 1–320, vol. 2, 322–698).
- Ibn Bassām, *Kitāb al-Dhakhīra fī maḥāsīn ahl al-Jazīra*, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās, 4 parts, 8 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfa 1979.
- Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmiʿ al-ghurar*, vol. 6, ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid, Cairo: Harrassowitz 1961.
- Ibn al-Faraḍī, *Taʾriḫ ʿulamāʾ al-Andalus*, ed. Ibrāhīm al-Abyārī, 2 vols., Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Miṣrī 1983.
- Ibn Ḥawqal, *Ṣūrat al-arḍ*, ed. J.H. Kramers, 2 vols., Leiden: Brill 1938–9.
- Ibn Ḥayyān, *Al-Muqtabis fī akhbār balad al-Andalus (or min anbaʾ ahl al-Andalus)*.
 ———, vol. 2, ed. Maḥmūd ʿAlī Makkī, Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī 1973.
 ———, vol. 3, ed. M.M. Antuña, Paris: P. Geunthner 1937.
 ———, vol. 5, ed. P. Chalmeta, Madrid: Instituto Hispano-Arabe de Cultura 1979.
 ———, vol. 7, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAlī al-Ḥājī, Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfa 1983.
- Ibn Ḥazm, *Ṭawq al-ḥamāma*, ed. Ḥasan Kāmil al-Ṣayrafī, Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Istiḳāma no date.
- Ibn ʿIdhārī, *Al-Bayān al-mughrib fī akhbār al-Andalus wa-l-Maghrib*, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās, 4 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1980.
- Ibn al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntaẓam fī taʾriḫ al-mulūk wa-l-umam*, ed. Muḥammad and Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā, 18 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1995.
- Ibn al-Kardabūs, *Taʾriḫ al-Andalus li-Ibn al-Kardabūs*, in *Revista del Instituto de Estudios Islámicos en Madrid* 13 (1965–6), 7–126.
- Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-Ibar*, 14 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī 1983–6.
- Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-aʿyān*, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās, 8 vols., Beirut: Dār Ṣādir 1972.

- Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, ed. É. Lévi-Provençal, Beirut: Dār al-Makshūf 1956.
- , *Al-Iḥāṭa fī akhbār Gharnāṭa*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abdallāh 'Inān, 4 vols., Cairo: Al-Khanghi 1973.
- Ibn Manzūr, *Lisān al-Arab*, ed. 'Alī Shīrī, 18 vols., Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī 1988.
- Ibn Maqdīsh, *Nuzhat al-anzār fī 'ajā'ib al-tawārikh wa-l-akhbār*, ed. 'Alī al-Zuwārī and Muḥammad Maḥfūz, 2 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī 1988.
- Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazila*, ed. S. Diwald-Wilzer, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 1961.
- Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh Dimashq*, ed. H.F. Amedroz, Leiden: Brill 1908.
- Ibn Sahl, *Al-Aḥkām al-kubrā*: al-Bāb fī masā'il al-iḥtisāb, Les Nawāzil d'Ibn Sahl: section relative à l'iḥtisāb, *Hesperis-Tamuda* 14 (1973), 7–107.
- Ibn Sa'īd, *Al-Mughrib fī ḥulā al-Maghrib*, ed. Shawqī Ḍayf, 2 vols., 2nd edition, Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif 1964.
- Ibn Shaddād, *Al-A'lāq al-khaṭira fī dhikr umarā' al-Sha'm wa-l-Jazīra*, vol. 1, part 1 (Ḥalab), ed. D. Sourdel, Damascus: Institut Français de Damas 1953.
- al-Idrīsī, *Nuzhat al-mushtāq fī khtirāq al-āfāq*, 2 vols., Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfat al-Dīniyya no date.
- 'Iyāḍ b. Mūsā, *Tartīb al-madārik wa taqrīb al-masālik li-ma'rifat a'lām madhhab Mālik*, ed. Sa'īd Aḥmad A'rāb, 8 vols., Rabat: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shu'un al-Islāmiyya 1983.
- al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, 14 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1985.
- Maḥākhir al-Barbar*, ed. É. Lévi-Provençal, Rabat: Ma'had al-'Ulūm al-'Ulyā al-Maghribiyya 1963.
- al-Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz al-ḥunafā' bi-akhbār al-a'immat al-Fāṭimiyyīn al-khulafā'*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Qādir, 2 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 2001.
- , *Al-Muqaffā al-kabīr*, 6 vols., ed. Muḥammad 'Uthmān. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 2010.
- al-Marrākushī, 'Abd al-Wāḥid. *Al-Mu'jib fī talkhīṣ akhbār al-Maghrib*, ed. R. Dozy, London 1847, revised ed., Leiden 1881, repr. Amsterdam: Oriental Press 1968.
- Miskawayh, *Tajārib al-umam*, ed. H.F. Amedroz, 2 vols., Oxford-London 1920–1, repr. Baghdad: Al-Muthannā no date.
- al-Muqaddasī, *Aḥsan al-taqāsīm fī ma'rifat al-aqālīm*, ed. M.J. de Goeje, Leiden: Brill 1906, repr. Cairo: Maktabat al-Madbūli 1991.
- al-Musabbihī, *Akhbār Miṣr*, ed. W.G. Millward, Cairo: al-Hay'at al-Miṣriyyat al-Āmma li-l-Kitāb 1980.
- al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, ed. Mufid Qamīḥa et al., 34 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 2004–5.

- al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā fī šināʿat al-inshā*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Shams al-Dīn. 15 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 2012.
- al-Rūdhrawārī, *Dhayl tajārib al-umam*, ed. H.F. Amedroz, Oxford 1921, repr. Baghdad: Al-Muthannā no date.
- al-Rushāṭī, *Iqtibās al-anwār*, ed. Muḥammad Sālim Hāshim, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 1999.
- al-Ṣafadī, *Tuḥfat dhawā l-albāb*, ed. Iḥsān bint Saʿīd Khulūṣī and Zuhayr Ḥumaydān, Beirut: Dār al-Ṣādir 1999.
- , *Al-Wāfi bi-l-wafayāt*, ed. Helmut Ritter et al., 29 vols., Beirut: Franz Steiner 1962–2010.
- Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī, *Ṭabaqāt al-umam*, ed. Ḥayāt Bū ʿAlwān, Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿa 1985.
- Sibt Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mirʿāt al-zamān fī taʾrīkh al-aʿyān*, ed. Kāmil Salmān al-Jubūrī, 15 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 2013.
- , 395–411AH, ed. J. Rassi. Damascus: Institut Français du Proche-Orient 2005.
- , as Ibnū'l-Cevzī, *Mirʿātü'z-zeman*, 448–480AH, ed. Ali Sevim, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 1968.
- al-Sulamī, *Kitāb al-jihād*, in *Arbaʿ kutub fī l-jihād*, ed. Suhayl Zakkār, Damascus: Taakwen 2007, 41–165.
- al-Ṣūlī, *Akḥbār al-Rāḍī wa-l-Muttaqī*, ed. Heyworth Dunne, Beirut: Dār al-Masīra 1983.
- al-Ṭabarī, *Taʾrīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. M.J. de Goeje, 3 series (I, II, III), 15 vols., Leiden: Brill, 1879–1901.
- al-Tanūkhī, *Al-Faraj baʿda-l-shidda*, ed. ʿAbbūd al-Shālījī, 5 vols., Beirut: Dār Ṣādir 1978.
- , *Nishwār al-muḥāḍara wa akḥbār al-mudhākara*, ed. ʿAbbūd al-Shālījī, 8 vols., Beirut: Dār Ṣādir 1971–3.
- al-Tijānī, *Riḥlat al-Tijānī*, ed. Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, Tunis: Al-Maṭbaʿat al-Rasmiyya 1958.
- al-ʿUdhri, *Tarṣīʿ al-akḥbār fī gharāʾib al-buldān*, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ahwānī, Madrid: Maʿhad al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya 1965.
- al-ʿUmarī, Ibn Faḍlallāh, *Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. Kāmil Salmān al-Jubūrī, 27 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 2010.
- Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd al-Anṭākī, *Taʾrīkh al-Anṭākī: Šila taʾrīkh Ūtikhā (Eutychios)*, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī, Tripoli (Lebanon): Jarūs Burs 1990.
- al-Yaʿqūbī, *Kitāb al-buldān*, ed. M.J. de Goeje, Leiden: Brill 1892.
- Yāqūt, *Muʿjam al-buldān*, 5 vols., Beirut: Dār Ṣādir 1957.
- Bar Hebraeus (Ibn al-ʿIbrī), *The Chronography of Gregory Abu'l Faraj*, trans. E.A.W. Budge, vol. 1, London: Oxford University Press 1932, repr. Piscataway: Gorgias 2003.
- , Arabic trans. as *Taʾrīkh al-zamān*, trans. Iṣḥāq Armaleh, Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq 1991.

Michael the Syrian, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, trans. J.-B. Chabot, 4 vols., Paris: Ernest Leroux 1899–1910, repr. Brussels: Culture et Civilisation 1963.

Historia Roderici, in *The World of El Cid: Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest*, trans. S. Barton and R. Fletcher, Manchester: Manchester University Press 2000, 90–147.

Primera Crónica General, in *Christians and Moors in Spain*, ed. and trans. C. Smith, Warminster: Aris & Phillips 1988, i, 98–119.

———, in *Le Cid: Personnage historique et littéraire*, ed. and trans. M. de Epalza and S. Guellouz, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose 1983, 114–5 (cited as *Primera*²).

Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, *De rebus Hispaniae*, in *Christians and Moors in Spain* i, 88–91.

Secondary Sources

Acién Almansa, M., Settlement and Fortification in Southern al-Andalus: The Formation of a Land of Ḥuṣūn, in *The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1, ed. M. Marín, 347–76.

Aillet, C., *Les mozarabes: Christianisme, Islamisation et arabisation en péninsule Ibérique (IX^e–XII^e siècle)*, Madrid: Casa de Velázquez 2010.

Amabe, F., *The Emergence of the ‘Abbāsīd Autocracy*, Kyoto: Kyoto University Press 1995.
———, *State-Building and Autonomy in ‘Abbāsīd Frontiers*, Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Center 2005.

Amari, M., *Storia dei musulmani di Sicilia*, 3 vols., Catania: Romeo Prampolini ²1933–9 (rev. ed.).

Anderson, G.D., *The Islamic Villa in Early Medieval Iberia: Architecture and Court Culture in Umayyad Córdoba*, Farnham: Ashgate 2013.

Anjum, O., *Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought: Taymiyyan Movement*, New York: Cambridge University Press 2012.

Ashtor-Strauss, E., L’administration urbaine en Syrie médiévale, *RSO* 31 (1956), 73–128.

Ashtor, E., Républiques urbaines dans le proche Orient à l’époque des croisades? *CCM* 18 (1975), 117–31.

———, *The Jews of Moslem Spain*, 3 vols., Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America 1973–84.

Aubet, M.E., *Commerce and Colonization in the Ancient Near East*, New York: Cambridge University Press 2013.

Baadj, A.S., *Saladin, the Almohads and the Banū Ghāniya: The Contest for North Africa* (SHSM 7), Leiden: Brill 2015.

al-Bakhit, M.A. and R. Schick (eds.), *Bilād al-Shām during the Abbāsīd Period (132/750–451/1059)*, Amman: The University of Jordan 1991.

- Barceló, M., The Manifest Caliph: Umayyad Ceremony in Córdoba, or the Staging of Power, in *The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1, ed. M. Marín, 425–55.
- Bartl, K. and Abd al-Razzaq Moaz (eds.), *Residences, Castles, Settlements: Transformation Processes from Late Antiquity to Early Islam in Bilad al-Sham*, Rahden: Marie Leidorf 2008.
- Barton, S., Spain in the Eleventh Century, in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4, part 2, ed. D. Luscombe and J. Riley-Smith, 154–90.
- Barton, S. and R. Fletcher (trans.), *The World of El Cid: Chronicles of the Spanish Reconquest*, Manchester: Manchester University Press 2000.
- Bearman, P., R. Peters and F.E. Vogel (eds.), *The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution and Progress*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School 2005.
- Ben Abdallah, H., *De l'iqta' étatique à l'iqta' militaire: Transition économique et changements sociaux à Bagdad, 247–447/861–1055*, Uppsala: Uppsala University Press 1986.
- Benhsain, R. and J. Devisse, Les Almoravides et l'Afrique occidentale XI^e–XII^e siècles, *Arabica* 47 (2000), 1–36.
- Bernards, M., *Ṭalab al-ʿIlm* amongst the Linguists of Arabic during the 'Abbasid Period, in *'Abbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of 'Abbasid Studies*, Cambridge, 6–10 July 2002, ed. J.E. Montgomery, Leuven: Peeters 2004, 33–46.
- Bernards, M. and J. Nawas (eds.), *Patronate and Patronage in Early and Classical Islam* (IHC 61), Leiden: Brill 2005.
- Bianquis, Th., Les derniers gouverneurs ikhchidides à Damas, *BEO* 23 (1970), 167–96.
- , *Damas et la Syrie sous la domination fatimide, 359–468/969–1076*, 2 vols., Damascus: Institut Français de Damas 1986–9.
- Bishko, C.J., *Studies in Medieval Spanish Frontier History*, London; Variorum Reprints 1980.
- Blok, A., The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 14 (1972), 494–503.
- Bosworth, C.E., *The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1963.
- , *The Mediaeval Islamic Underworld: The Banū Sāsān in Arabic Society and Literature*, part 1, Leiden: Brill 1976.
- (trans.), *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, vol. 30, Albany: State University of New York 1989.
- , *The New Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical Manual*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1996.
- Boucheron, P. and D. Menjot, *La ville médiévale*, Paris: Editions du Seuil 2003, 2^e011 (rev. ed.).
- Brett, M., The City-State in Mediaeval Ifriqiya: The Case of Tripoli, *Cahiers de Tunisie* 34 (1986), 69–94 (included in his *Ibn Khaldun and the Medieval Maghrib*).
- , *The Rise of the Fatimids: The World of the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the Tenth Century* (MMED 30), Leiden: Brill 2001.

- , *Ibn Khaldun and the Medieval Maghrib* (VCSS), Aldershot: Ashgate 1999.
- Brett, M. and E. Fentress, *The Berbers*, Oxford: Blackwell 1996.
- Brunschvig, R., Urbanisme médiéval et droit musulman, *REI* 15 (1947), 127–55.
- Bryce, T., *Ancient Syria: A Three Thousand Year History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014.
- Bulliet, R.W., *The Patricians of Nishapur*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1972.
- Burns, R.I. and P.E. Chevedden, *Negotiating Cultures: Bilingual Surrender Treaty in Muslim-Crusader Spain* (MMED 22), Leiden: Brill 1999.
- Burns, R., *Monuments of Syria: An Historical Guide*, London: I.B. Tauris 1992.
- , *Damascus: A History*. London: Routledge 2005.
- Butzer K.W. et al., Irrigation Agrosystems in Eastern Spain: Roman or Islamic Origins? *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 75 (1985), 479–509.
- Cahen, Cl., *La Syrie du nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche*, Damascus: Institut Français de Damas 1940.
- , Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du moyen âge, *Arabica* 5 (1958), 225–50, 6 (1959), 25–56, 233–65.
- Canard, M., *Histoire de la dynastie des Hamdanides de Jazîra et de Syrie*, vol. 1, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1953.
- Canivet, P. and J.-P. Rey-Coquais (eds.), *La Syrie de Byzance à l'Islam: VII^e–VIII^e siècles: Actes du colloque international*, Damascus: Institut Français de Damas 1992.
- Canto García, A., From the Sikkat al-Andalus to the Mint of Madînat al-Zahrâ', in *The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1, ed. M. Marín, 329–45.
- Cardaillac, L. (ed.), *Tolède XII^e–XIII^e: Musulmans, chrétiens et juifs; Le savoir et la tolérance*, Paris; Autrement, 1991.
- Carmona, A., The Introduction of Mālik's Teachings in al-Andalus, in *The Islamic School of Law*, ed. P. Bearman et al., 41–56.
- Catlos, B.A., *The Victors and the Vanquished: Christians and Muslims of Catalonia and Aragon, 1050–1300*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004.
- Christys, A., *Christians in Al-Andalus: 711–1000*, London: Routledge 2002.
- Citarella, A., The Relations of Amalfi with the Arab World before the Crusades, *Speculum* 42 (1967), 299–312.
- Clark, P. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Cities in World History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013.
- Clément, F., *Pouvoir et légitimité en Espagne musulmane à l'époque des taifas: L'imam fictif*, Paris-Montreal: L'Harmattan 1997.
- Cline, E.H. and M.W. Graham, *Ancient Empires from Mesopotamia to the Rise of Islam*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011.
- Cobb, P.M., *White Banner: Contention in 'Abbāsid Syria, 750–877*, The University of Chicago 1997.

- Cohn, S.K. Jr., *Lust for Liberty: The Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200–1425*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 2006.
- Collins, R., *Caliphs and Kings: Spain 796–1031*, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell 2012.
- Constable, O.R., *Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: The Commercial Realignment of the Iberian Peninsula 900–1500*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994.
- Cook, M., *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000.
- Crawford, R.W., Riḍwān the Maligned, in *The World of Islam: Studies in Honor of Philip K. Hitti*, ed. J. Kritzeck and R.B. Winder, London: MacMillan 1960, 135–44.
- Crone, P., *Slaves on Horses*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1977.
- , *Pre-industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-modern World*, Oxford: Oneworld 2003 (rev. ed.).
- , *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012.
- Crouzet-Pavan, E., A Flower of Evil: Young Men in Medieval Italy, in *A History of Young People in the West*, ed. G. Levi and J.-C. Schmitt, vol. 1, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1977, 173–221.
- , *Venice Triumphant*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2002.
- Daftary, F., *The Ismāʿīlīs: Their History and Doctrines*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990.
- Dahan, S., The Origin and Development of the Local Histories of Syria, in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. B. Lewis and P.M. Holt, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1962, 108–17.
- Davis, N.Z., The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-century France, *Past and Present* 59 (1973), 51–91.
- Donohue, J.J., *The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq, 334/945 to 403/1012* (IHC 44), Leiden: Brill 2003.
- Dozy, R., *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, 2 vols., Leiden: Brill 1881, repr. Beirut: Librairie du Liban 1981.
- , *L'histoire des musulmans de l'Espagne jusqu'à la conquête de l'Andalousie par les Almoravides*, 4 vols., Leiden: Brill 1861 (F.G. Stokes (trans.), *Spanish Islam*, London: Chatto & Windus 1913, repr. New Delhi: Goodword 2001).
- Dunlop, D.M., The Dhunnunids of Toledo, *JRAS* 74 (1942), 77–96.
- Éddé, A.-M., Riḍwān, prince d'Alep de 1095 à 1113, *REI* 54 (1986), 101–25.
- , Les sources d'Ibn al-'Adīm sur le règne de Sayf al-Dawla en Syrie du nord, in *Texts, Documents and Artefacts; Islamic Studies in Honour of D.S. Richards* (IHC 45), ed. C.F. Robinson, Leiden: Brill 2003, 121–56.
- Éddé, A.-M., H. Bresc and P. Guichard, Les autonomismes urbaines des cités islamiques, in *Les origines des libertés urbaines: Actes du XVI^e congrès des historiens médiévistes de l'enseignement supérieur*, Rouen: L'université de Rouen 1990, 97–119.

- de Epalza, M., Mozarabs: An Emblematic Christian Minority in Islamic al-Andalus, in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi, i, 149–70.
- Fākhūrī, Maḥmūd, and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khawwām. *Mawsūʿat waḥdāt al-qiyās al-ʿArabīyya wa-l-Islāmiyya*, Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān 2002.
- Faroqhi, S.N., Crisis and Change, in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. H. Inalcik, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994, 411–636.
- (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006.
- Fierro, M., Heresy in al-Andalus, in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi, ii, 895–908.
- , El proceso contra Ibn Ḥātīm al-Ṭulayṭulī (anos 457/1064–464/1072), *EOBA* 6 (1994), 187–215.
- , The Qāḍī as Ruler, in *Saber religioso y poder político: Actas del simposio internacional (Granada, 15–18 octubre 1991)*, ed. M. García-Arenal and M. Marín, Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional 1994, 71–116.
- , Four Questions in Connection with Ibn Hafsun, in *The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1, ed. M. Marín, 291–328.
- , *ʿAbd al-Rahman III: The First Cordoban Caliph*, Oxford: Oneworld 2005.
- , Mawali and Muwalladun in al-Andalus, in *Patronate and Patronage*, ed. M. Bernards and J. Nawas, 195–245.
- , Proto-Maliki, Maliki, and Reformed Maliki in al-Andalus, in *The Islamic School of Law*, ed. P. Bearman et al., 57–76.
- (ed.), *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010.
- , *The Almohad Revolution: Politics and Religion in the Islamic West during the Twelfth-thirteenth Centuries* (vcss), Farnham: Ashgate 2012.
- Flori, J., Knightly Society, in *the New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4, part 1, ed. D. Luscombe and J. Riley-Smith, 148–65.
- The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1 (History and Society), ed. M. Marín, part 2 (Language, Religion, Culture and the Sciences), ed. M. Fierro and J. Samsó, Aldeshot: Ashgate 1998.
- Fossier, R., The Rural Economy and Demographic Growth, in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4, part 1, ed. D. Luscombe and J. Riley-Smith, 11–46.
- Gaube, H. and E. Wirth, *Aleppo: historische und geographische Beiträge zur baulichen Gestaltung, zur sozialen Organisation und zur wirtschaftlichen Dynamik einer vorderasiatischen Fernhandelsmetropole* (TAVO B58), 2 vols., Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert 1984.
- Gibb, H.A.R., Zengi and the Fall of Edessa, in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. K.M. Setton, Madison: The University of Wisconsin 1955, i, 449–62.

- Glick, T.F., *Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1970.
- , *Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1979.
- , *From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle: Social and Cultural Change in Medieval Spain*, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1995.
- Goitein, S.D., The Rise of the Near-Eastern Bourgeoisie in Early Islamic Times, *JWH* 3 (1957), 583–604.
- , *A Mediterranean Society*, vol. 1 (Economic Foundations), Berkeley: University of California Press 1967.
- Goodman, L.E., The Translation of Greek Materials into Arabic, in *Religion, Learning and Science in the 'Abbasid Period*, ed. M.J.L. Young et al., 477–97.
- Gordon, M.S., *The Breaking of a Thousand Swords*, Albany: State University of New York Press 2001.
- Gregory, T.E., *Vox Populi: Popular Opinion and Violence in the Religious Controversies of the Fifth Century*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1979.
- Grunebaum, G.E. von, The Structure of the Muslim Town, in his *Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1955, repr. Whitefish, Montana: Kessinger 2006, 141–58.
- Guichard, P., *Structures sociales <orientales> et <occidentales> dans l'Espagne musulmane*, Paris: Mouton 1977.
- , The Population of the Region of Valencia during the First Two Centuries of Muslim Domination, in *The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1, ed. M. Marín, 129–81.
- , *Les musulmans de Valence et la reconquête, XI^e–XIII^e siècles*, 2 vols., Damascus: Institut Français de Damas 1990–1.
- Gutas, D., *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, London: Routledge 1998.
- Gutierrez Lloret, S., From Civitas to Madīna: Destruction and Formation of the city in South-east al-Andalus, in *The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1, ed. M. Marín, 217–63.
- Hakim, B.S., *Arabic-Islamic Cities: Building and Planning Principles*, London: Kegan Paul 21988 (rev. ed.).
- , Law and the City, in *The City in the Islamic World*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi et al., i, 71–92.
- Hallaq, W.B., *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.
- Halm, H., *The Empire of the Mahdi: The Rise of the Fatimids (HdO)*, trans. M. Bonner, Leiden: Brill 1996.
- Handler, A., *The Zirids of Granada*, Coral Gables: University of Miami Press 1974.
- Hanna, N., Guilds in Recent Historical Scholarship, in *The City in the Islamic World*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi et al., ii, 895–922.
- Harris, W., *Lebanon: A History, 600–2011 (SMEH)*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012.
- Hathaway, J., *The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516–1800*, Harlow: Pearson 2008.

- Havemann, A., *Rīāsa und Qaḏāʾ: Institutionen als Ausdruck wechselnder Kräfteverhältnisse in Syrischen Städten von 10 zum 12 Jahrhundert*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz 1975.
- , The Vizier and the Raʿīs in Seljuq Syria: The Struggle for Urban Self-representation, *IJMES* 21 (1989), 233–42.
- , Non-urban Rebels in Urban Society: The Case of Fatimid Damascus, in *Bilād al-Shām during the Abbāsīd Period*, ed. M.A. al-Bakhit and R. Schick, 81–90.
- Heidemann, S., *Die Renaissance der Städte in Nordsyrien und Nordmesopotamien: städtische Entwicklung und wirtschaftliche Bedingungen in ar-Raqqā und Ḥarrān von der Zeit der beduinischen Vorherrschaft bis zu den Seldschuken* (IHC 40), Leiden: Brill 2002.
- Heyd, W., *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen âge*, 2 vols., Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz 1885.
- Hicks, J., *A Theory of Economic History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1969.
- Hill, D.R., *Islamic Science and Technology*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1993.
- Hillenbrand, C., *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1999.
- , The Career of Najm al-Dīn ʾIl-Ghāzī, *Der Islam* 58(2) (1981), 250–92.
- Hodgson, M.G., *The Secret Order of Assassins*, The Hague: Mouton 1955, repr. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2005.
- , *The Venture of Islam*, 3 vols., Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1974.
- Hoffmann, G., *Kommune oder Staatsbürokratie?: Zur politischen Rolle der Bevölkerung Syrischer Städte vom 10 bis 12 Jahrhundert*, Berlin: Akademie 1975.
- Honigsmann, E., *Die Ostgrenze des Byzantinischen Reiches von 363 bis 1071*, Brussels: L'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales 1935.
- Hourani, A.M. and S.M. Stern (eds.), *The Islamic City*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1970.
- Huff, T.E. and W. Schluchter (eds.), *Max Weber and Islam*, New Brunswick: Transaction 1999.
- Huici Miranda, A., El cadí de Valencia Ibn ʾYahḥāf quemado vivo por el Cid, *RIEEI* 11–12 (1963–4), 149–67.
- , *Historia musulmana de Valencia y su región*, 3 vols., Valencia: Ayuntamiento de Valencia 1970.
- Hurvitz, N., *The Formation of Hanbalism: Piety into Power*, London: Routledge 2002.
- Idris, H.-R., *La Berbérie orientale sous les Zīrīdes*, 2 vols., Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959.
- Imber, C., *The Ottoman Empire*, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan 2002, ²2009.
- Isakhan, B. and S. Stockwell (eds.), *The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2012.
- Jayyusi, S.K. (ed.), *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, 2 vols., Leiden: Brill 1992.

- Jayyusi, S.K. et al. (eds.), *The City in the Islamic World*, 2 vols., Leiden; Brill 2008.
- Jehel, G., *L'Italie et le Maghreb au moyen âge: Conflicts et échanges*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2001.
- Johns, J., *Arabic Administration in Norman Sicily: The Royal Dīwān*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002.
- Judd, S.C., *Religious Scholars and the Umayyads: Piety-minded Supporters of the Marwānid Caliphate*, London: Routledge 2014.
- Keene, D., Towns and the Growth of Trade, in *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4, part 1, ed. D. Luscombe and J. Riley-Smith, 47–85.
- Kennedy, H., *The Early Abbasid Caliphate: A Political History*, London: Croom Helm 1981.
- , From Polis to Madina: Urban Change in Late Antique and Early Islamic Syria, *Past and Present* 106 (1985), 3–27 (included in *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East*).
- , The Last Century of Byzantine Syria: A Reinterpretation, *Byzantinische Forschungen* 10 (1985), 141–83 (included in *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East*).
- , *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, London: Longman 1986.
- , The Uqaylids of Mosul: The Origins and Structure of a Nomad Dynasty, in *Actas del XII Congreso de la U.E.A.I.*, Madrid 1986, 391–402 (included in *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East*).
- (trans.), *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater, vol. 29, 1990.
- , The Impact of Muslim Rule on the Pattern of Rural Settlement in Syria, in *La Syrie de Byzance à l'Islam*, ed. P. Canivet and J.-P. Rey-Coquais, 291–7 (included in *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East*).
- , *Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus*, London: Longman 1996.
- , *The Armies of the Caliphs*, London: Routledge 2001.
- , *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East* (vcss), Aldershot: Ashgate 2006.
- , The Late 'Abbāsīd pattern, 945–1050, in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 1, ed. C.F. Robinson, 387–93.
- Koehler, B., *Early Islam and the Birth of Capitalism*, London: Lexington 2014.
- Kreutz, B., Ghost Ships and Phantom Cargoes: Reconstructing Early Amalfitan Trade, *JMH* 20 (1994), 347–57.
- La Vaissière, É. de, *Samarcande et Samarra: Élités d'Asie centrale dans l'empire abbasside*, Paris: Association pour l'avancement des Études Iraniennes 2007.
- Lagardère, V., *Les Almoravides jusqu'au règne de Yūsuf b. Tāšfīn*, Paris: L'Harmattan 1989.
- , *Campagnes et paysants d'Al-Andalus, VIII^e–XV^e s.*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose 1993.

- , *Les Almoravides: Le djihâd andalou, 1106–1143*, Paris; L'Harmattan 1998.
- Lapidus, I.M., The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society, *IJMES* 6 (1975), 363–85.
- Lévi-Provençal, É., *Inscriptions arabes d'Espagne*, Leiden: Brill 1931.
- , *Islam d'Occident*, Paris: Maisonneuve 1948.
- , Alphonse VI et la prise de Tolède, in *Islam d'Occident*, 109–35.
- , Le Cid de l'histoire, in *Islam d'Occident*, 153–85.
- , La prise de Valence par le Cid, in *Islam d'Occident*, 187–233.
- , *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane*, 3 vols., Paris; Maisonneuve et Larose 1950–3.
- Levy-Ruben, M., *Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011.
- Lewis, B., The Islamic Guilds, *EHR* 8 (1937), 20–37.
- Liverani, M., Power and Citizenship, in *The Oxford Handbook of Cities in World History*, ed. P. Clark, 164–80.
- Lombard, M., *The Golden Age of Islam*, trans. J. Spencer, Amsterdam: North-Holland 1975, repr. Princeton: Markus Wiener 2006.
- López Gómez, M., The Mozarabs: Worthy Bearers of Islamic Culture, in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi, i, 171–5.
- Luscombe, D. and J. Riley-Smith (eds.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 4, part 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004.
- Madelung, W., The Vigilante Movement of Sahl b. Salāma al-Khurāsānī and the Origins of Ḥanbalism Reconsidered, *JTS* 14 (1990), 331–7.
- Magness, J., Early Islamic Urbanism and Building Activity in Jerusalem and at Hammath Gader, in *Money, Power and Politics in Early Islamic Syria: A Review of Current Debates*, ed. J. Halden, Farnham: Ashgate 2010, 147–63.
- Mann, J., *The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fāṭimid Caliphs*, 2 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press 1922, 1969.
- Marín, M., Familias de ulemas en Toledo, *EOBA* 5 (1986), 229–71.
- Mazzoli-Guintard, Ch., *Vivre à Cordoue au moyen âge; Solidarités citadines en terre d'Islam aux X^e–XI^e siècles*, Presses Universitaires de Renne 2003.
- McEvedy, C., *The New Penguin Atlas of Ancient History*, London: Penguin Books 2002.
- , *The New Penguin Atlas of Medieval History*, London: Penguin Books 1992.
- McNeill, W.H., *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society*, Oxford: Blackwell 1982.
- Melchert, C., Religious Politics of the Caliphs from al-Mutawakkil to al-Muqtadir, *Islamic Law and Society* 3 (1996), 320–30.
- , The Adversaries of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, *Arabica* 44 (1997), 234–53.
- , *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th–10th Centuries* (SILS 4), Leiden: Brill 1997.

- Menéndez Pidal, R., *The Cid and his Spain*, trans. H. Sunderland, London: John Murray 1934, repr. London: Frank Cass 1971.
- Menocal, M.R., R.P. Scheindlin and M. Sells (eds.), *The Literature of al-Andalus* (CHAL), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000.
- Metcalfe, A., *Muslims and Christians in Norman Sicily*, London: Routledge 2003.
- Miller, H.D., The Mozarabs, in *The Literature of al-Andalus*, ed. M.R. Menocal et al., 417–34.
- Milwright, M., *An Introduction to Islamic Archaeology*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2010.
- Molénat, J.-P., Mudéjars, captifs et affranchise, in *Tolède XII^e–XIII^e*, ed. L. Cardaillac, 112–24.
- , L'arabe à Tolède du XII^e au XVI^e siècle, *Qanṭara* 15 (1994), 473–96.
- Molina Martínez, L., Las taifas, chapter 2 of *Historia de España por Menéndez Pidal*, vol. 8, part 1, ed. M.J. Viguera Molín, 39–121.
- Moreno, E.M., Quelques considérations sur les toponymes en banū- comme reflet des structures sociales d'al-Andalus, in *Islamisation et arabisation*, ed. D. Valérian, 247–63.
- , The Creation of a Medieval Frontier: Islam and Christianity in the Iberian Peninsula, in *Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700–1700*, ed. D. Power and N. Standen, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan 1999, 32–54.
- Mouton, J.-M., *Damas et sa principauté sous les Saljoukides et les Bourides, 468–549/1076–1154*, Cairo: Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale 1994.
- Mu'nis, Ḥusayn, *Al-Thaghr al-A'lā al-Andalusī fī 'aṣr al-Murābiṭīn wa suqūṭ Saraquṣṭa fī yad al-Naṣārā ma' arba' wathā'iḳ jadīda*, Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfat al-Dīniyya 1992.
- Nef, A., Islamic Palermo and the *Dār al-Islām*, in *A Companion to Medieval Palermo: The History of a Mediterranean City from 600 to 1500*, ed. A. Nef, Leiden: Brill 2013, 39–59.
- Neglia, G.A., Some Historiographical Notes on the Islamic City with Particular Reference to the Visual Representation of the Built City, in *The City in the Islamic World*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi et al., i, 3–17.
- The New Cambridge History of Islam*, 6 vols., vol. 1, ed. C.F. Robinson, vol. 2, ed. M. Fierro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010.
- Ocaña Jiménez, M., La inscripción fundacional de la mezquita de Bib al-Mardum en Tolèdo, *Al-Andalus*, 14 (1949), 175–83.
- Ohta, K., The Military Organization of the Mirdāsīd Dynasty [in Japanese], *The World of Islam* [Isuramu Sekai] (Tokyo) 25/26 (1986), 26–48.
- O'Learly, De Lacy, *How Greek Science passed to the Arabs*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1949, repr. New Delhi: Goodword 2001.

- Paret, R., The Legendary Futūḥ Literature, in *The Expansion of the Early Islamic State*, ed. F.M. Donner, Aldershot: Ashgate 2008, 163–75.
- Pavón Maldonado, B., *Arte Toledano: Islámico y mudéjar*, Madrid: Instituto Hispano-Arabe de Cultura 1973, 2¹⁹⁸⁸ (rev. ed.).
- , *Ciudades Hispanomusulmanas*, Madrid: Mapfre 1992.
- Personnaz, Ch., *L'empereur Nicéphore Phocas: Byzance face à l'Islam 912–969*, Paris: Belin 2013.
- Peters, R., What does it mean to be an Official Madhhab? Hanafism and the Ottoman Empire, in *The Islamic School of Law*, ed. P. Bearman et al., 147–158.
- Picard, Ch., *Le Portugal musulman*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose 2000.
- Pipes, D., *Slave Soldiers and Islam*, New Haven: Yale University Press 1981.
- Powers, J.F., *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000–1284*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1988.
- Reilly, B.F., *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988.
- , *The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain, 1031–1157*, Oxford: Blackwell 1992.
- Rodinson, M., *Islam and Capitalism*, trans. B. Pearce, Austin: University of Texas Press 1978.
- Roughi, R., *The Making of a Mediterranean Emirate*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2011.
- Rudé, G., *The Crowd in the French Revolution*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1959.
- , *The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England 1730–1848*, New York: John Wiley 1964.
- Ruggles, D.F., *Gardens, Landscape, and Vision in the Palaces of Islamic Spain*, State College: Pennsylvania State University Press 2000.
- , The Countryside; The Roman Agricultural and Hydraulic Legacy of the Islamic Mediterranean, in *The City in the Islamic World*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi, ii, 795–815.
- Sabari, S., *Mouvements populaires à Bagdad à l'époque 'abbasside IX^e–XI^e siècles*, Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve 1981.
- Sadiki, L., Islam, in *The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy*, ed. B. Isakhan and S. Stockwell, 121–130.
- Safi, O., *The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 2006.
- Safran, J.M., *The Second Umayyad Caliphate: The Articulation of Caliphal Legitimacy in al-Andalus*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 2000.
- Saliba, G., *Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance*, Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 2007.
- Samsó, J., The Exact Sciences in al-Andalus, in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi, ii, 952–73.

- Sauvaget, J., *Alep: Essai sur le développement d'une grande ville syrienne des origines au milieu du XIX^e siècle*, Paris: P. Geuthner 1941.
- Scales, P.C., *The Fall of the Caliphate of Córdoba: Berbers and Andalusis in Conflict*, Leiden: Brill 1994.
- Scheidel, W., I. Morris and R.P. Saller (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007.
- Schluchter, W., Hindrances to Modernity: Max Weber on Islam, in *Max Weber and Islam*, ed. T.E. Huff and W. Schluchter, 53–138.
- Scott, T., *The City-State in Europe, 1000–1600*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012.
- Sebag, P., *Tunis au XVII^e siècle: Une cité barbaresque au temps de la course*, Paris: L'Harmattan 1989.
- Sénac, Ph., *La frontière et les hommes, VIII^e–XII^e siècle: Le peuplement musulman au nord de l'Ebre et les débuts de la reconquête aragonaise*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose 2000.
- Setton, K.M. (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, vol. 1 (The First Hundred Years), ed. H.W. Hazard, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1969, 1975.
- Shaban, M.A., *Islamic History: A New Interpretation 2, AD 750–1055*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1976.
- Shiba, Y. *Commercial Activities during the Sung Dynasty (So-dai Shogyo-shi no Kenkyu)* [in Japanese], Tokyo: Kazama Shobo 1968, 21989 (rev. ed.).
- Siḥr al-Sayyid 'Abd al-'Azīz Sālim, *Shāṭiba: al-Ḥiṣn al-amāmī li-Sharq al-Andalus fī l-'aṣr al-Islāmī*, Alexandria: Mu'assasat Shubbāb al-Jāmi'a 1995.
- Smith, C. (ed. and trans.), *Christians and Moors in Spain*, vol. 1 (AD 711–1150), Warminster: Aris and Phillips 1988.
- Stern, S.M., The Constitution of Islamic City, in *The Islamic City*, ed. A.H. Hourani and S.M. Stern, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1972, 25–50.
- Sunar, L., *Marx and Weber on Oriental Societies in the Shadow of Western Modernity*, Farnham: Ashgate 2014.
- Swedberg, R., *The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2005.
- Ṭāha, A.D., *The Muslim Conquest and Settlement of North Africa and Spain*, London: Routledge 1989.
- Takayama, H., *The Administration of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily*, Leiden: Brill 1993.
- Terés, E. Le développement de la civilisation arabe à Tolède, *Cahiers de Tunisie* 18 (1970): 73–86.
- Thompson, E.P., The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, *Past and Present* 50 (1971), 76–136.
- Tor, D.G., *Violent Order: Religious Warfare, Chivalry, and the 'Ayyār Phenomenon in the Medieval Islamic World* (ITS 11), Würzburg: Ergon 2007.

- Toral, I., Yahyā b. al-Ḥadīdī, un notable en la corte de los Dū l-Nūn de Toledo, *EOBA* 6 (1994), 395–413.
- Torres Balbas, L., *Ciudades hispano-musulmanas*, Madrid: Instituto Hispano-Arabe de Cultura 1971, 21985 (rev. ed.).
- Turner, B.S., *Weber and Islam: A Critical Study*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1974.
- Urvoy, D., The ‘Ulamā’ of al-Andalus, in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. S.K. Jayyusi, ii, 849–77.
- , *Le monde des ulémas andalous du v/xi^e au vii/xiii^e siècle*, Geneva: Droz 1978.
- Valérian, D. (ed.), *Islamisation et arabisation de l’Occident musulman médiéval, vii^e–xii^e siècle*, Paris: Sorbonne 2011.
- Vallvé Bermejo, J., The Zalmedina of Córdoba, in *The Formation of al-Andalus*, part 1, ed. M. Marín, 389–424.
- Van Berkel, M., N.M. El-Cheikh, H. Kennedy and L. Osti, *Crisis and Continuity at the Abbasid Court: Formal and Informal Politics in the Caliphate of al-Muqtadir* (IHC 102), Leiden: Brill 2013.
- Viguera Molíns, M.J. (ed.), *Historia de España por Menéndez Pidal*, vol. 8, part 1 (Los reinos de Taifas: Al-Andalus en el siglo xi), Madrid: Espasa Calpe 1994.
- Vlaminckx, K., La reddition de Tolède (1085 AD), *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 16 (1985), 186–96.
- Waley, D. and T. Dean, *The Italian City-Republics*, Harlow: Pearson, 1969, 1978, 1988, 42010 (rev. ed.).
- Walker, P.E., *Caliph of Cairo: Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press 2009.
- Walmsley, A., *Early Islamic Syria: An Archaeological Assessment*, London: Duckworth 2007.
- Wasserstein, D., *The Rise and Fall of the Party-Kings*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985.
- , Toledan Rule in Cordoba, *IOS* 12 (1993), 247–70.
- , *The Caliphate in the West*, Oxford: Oxford University Clarendon Press 1993.
- Watson, A.M., *Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World: The Diffusion of Crops and Farming Techniques, 700–1100*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983.
- Weber, M., *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich, 3 vols., New York: Bedminster 1968 (consecutive pages through volumes).
- , *The City*, trans. D. Martindale and G. Neuwirth, London: Heinemann 1960.
- Wink, A., *Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World*, vol. 1 (Early Medieval India and the Expansion of Islam, 7th–11th Centuries), Leiden: Brill 1991.
- Yabuuchi, Y. (ed.), *History of Chinese Science and Technology in the Song and Yuan Dynasties (So-Gen Jidai no Kagaku-Gijutsu-shi)* [in Japanese], Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten 1967, Kyoto: Hoyu Shoten 21997 (rev. ed.).

- Yar-Shater, E. (ed.), *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, 38 vols., Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Young, M.J.L., J.D. Latham and R.B. Sergeant (eds.), *Religion, Learning and Science in the 'Abbasid Period* (CHAL), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990.
- Zakkar, S., *The Emirate of Aleppo, 1004–1094*, Beirut: Dar al-Amanah and El-Risalah 1971.
- Zaman, M.Q., *Religion and Politics under the Early 'Abbāsids: The Emergence of the Proto-Sunni Elite*, Leiden: Brill 1997.
- Zbiss, S.-M., *Corpus des inscriptions arabes de Tunisie*, vol. 1 (Inscriptions de Tunis et de sa banlieue), Tunis: Direction des Antiquités et Arts 1955.
- Zilfi, M.C., The Ottoman Ulema, in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3, ed. S.N. Faroqhi, 209–25.
- Zouache, A., *Armées et combats en Syrie, 491/1098–569/1174*, Damascus: Institut Français du Proche-Orient 2008.

Index

- ‘Abbādids 6, 15, 111, 114n, 115, 116, 126n,
128–30, 132, 173, 186, 188
Muḥammad b. Ismā‘īl b. ‘Abbād 111, 114,
155
see also al-Mu‘taḍid and al-Mu‘tamid
- Abbasids 3, 8n, 12, 13, 15–7, 19, 19n, 24, 24n,
27, 27n, 28–32, 34–6, 43, 44, 56, 57, 65,
72, 81, 90, 108n, 162–5, 168n, 170, 184, 185
Syrian Abbasids 33, 58, 70, 83
- ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abd al-Mu‘min 181
- ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān I 145
- ‘Abdallāh b. Buluggin 88, 122
- ‘Abdallāh b. al-Manṣūr 92
- ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Shanjūl 147, 149, 159, 160
- ‘Abd al-Jabbār b. al-Mughīra 97
- ‘Abd al-Malik b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 134, 149, 150,
160
- ‘Abd al-Malik b. al-Manṣūr *see* al-Muẓaffar
- ‘Abd al-Mu‘min 180, 181, 181n, 182, 189
- ‘Abd al-Raḥmān I 86
- ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III 86, 90, 90n, 91, 93n, 99n,
108n, 120, 121, 123, 138, 145, 154n, 186
- ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. al-Manṣūr *see* Shanjūl
- ‘ābid* (pl. *‘ubbād*) 95, 169
- ‘ābid* 98, 145, 156, 172, 177, 178
- abnā’ al-dawla* 17, 19, 185
- Abū Bakr b. Ibrāhīm b. Tāshfīn 157
- Abū Bakr b. Rūbash 149n2, 152, 160, 187
- Abū l-Faḍā‘il (Ḥamdānid) 59
- Abū Ḥātim Sahl b. Salāma al-Anṣārī 17, 18,
18n, 24
- Abū Jarāda *see* Ibn Abī Jarāda
- Abū Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm b. Ja‘far 36, 37,
39–42, 44, 47
- Abū Muḥammad (Qarmaṭī) 75
- Abū l-Rajā’ Ward 167
- Abū Taghlib (Ḥamdānid) 36, 47, 47n, 53
- Abū Ṭāhir (Qarmaṭī) 32
- Abū Ṭāhir al-Ṣā‘igh 75
- Abū Usāma *see* Ibn Abī Usāma
- Abū Zakariyya’ (Ḥafṣid) 179n
- Achaemenids 1, 26
- Acre (‘Akkā) 44, 68
- ‘Aḍud al-Dawla 3, 43, 47, 48
- Africa (Roman) 3
- ‘Afrīn Valley 79
- Aftasids 107, 115, 127
- Aghlabids 162, 170
- agoranomos* 11
- ‘ahd* (pl. *‘uhūd*) 77, 135, 158
- ahdāth* 11, 13, 15, 15n, 26, 28, 29, 29n, 30,
32–4, 37, 38, 40–3, 45, 45n, 46, 48–53,
66–73, 75, 79–81, 83, 87, 115, 185, 186,
188
- ahl* 4, 15, 31, 38, 59, 61, 62, 67, 70, 76, 87, 99,
100, 102, 105, 108, 112, 136, 151, 177, 178,
180
- ahl al-‘aqd wa-l-ḥall* 154
- ahl al-bādiya* (*bawādī*) 95, 102
- ahl al-fasād* 42
- ahl al-salāma* 50
- ahl al-shirra* 40–2, 42n, 43, 46, 48, 49, 52
- Aḥmad b. Abī Du‘ād 18n
- Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal 18n, 23
- Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Tā‘ī 21n
- Aḥmad b. Naṣr b. Mālik b. al-Haytham 18, 19
- Aḥmad Shāh 69, 69n, 70
- ahrār* 113
- Ajerquía *see* al-Sharqiyya
- al-‘Ajlānī
Sulaymān 80–2
Ṣafi al-Dīn 82
- akhī* 12n
- Akhū Muḥsin 29, 30, 33
- akhḃār* 3, 39
- albacar (*baqqar*) 143
- Albaicin and Alhambra 109
- Albarracin 153, 155
- alberca (*birka*) 118, 142
- Albufera 140
- Alcala de Henares 102, 120, 128
- alcántara*
Cordoba 85, 86, 95, 96, 103
Valencia 148
- alcázar*
Cordoba 86, 92, 95, 101, 102, 108–11, 113
Toledo 123, 127, 132–5
Valencia 145, 148, 151, 152, 154, 159
- Alcira 140, 145, 154, 159
- Alcoy Mountains 140, 141

- Alcudia 153–5, 159, 160
 Alentejo 107, 119, 127
 Aleppo vii, 5, 11–3, 16, 30, 31, 48, 49, 54–84,
 121, 160, 185, 188, 189
 Alexandria 165
 Alexius I 177n
 Alfonso VI 124, 128, 131, 132, 134n2, 134–7,
 135n, 137n, 139, 151–3, 151n2, 187
 Alfonso X 144
 Algarve 6, 107 *see also* al-Gharb
 Algeria 87, 91, 105n, 120, 141n, 152, 164
 ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib 22n, 64, 107, 130
 ‘Alī b. Ḥammūd 107–9, 108n3
 ‘Alī b. Yahyā (Zirid) 175
 Alicante 118, 140
 ‘Alids 68, 78, 81
 ‘Allāqa the sailor 53
 Almeria 100, 104, 105n, 107, 108n, 129, 140,
 145, 148
 Alp Arslan, Sulṭān 70
 Alp Arslan b. Riḍwān 75
 Alptegin 43–6, 48, 51–3, 126
 Alpuente 112, 113, 153
 Alpujarras 143n
 Alvar Fáñez 151, 152, 160
 ‘amal (pl. *a‘māl*) 27, 35, 40, 44, 45, 60, 61, 76,
 110, 149, 170
 Amalfi 12, 53
amān 97, 158
 Amari 14n, 114n, 179
amāthil 67
 ‘amīd 76
 ‘āmīl (pl. *‘ummāl*) 47, 146, 181
 amīn (pl. *umanā’*) 159, 182
 al-Amīn 17, 24
 amīr (pl. *umarā’*) 3–5, 51, 60, 61, 86, 89, 113,
 120, 122, 135, 159n, 172, 174, 175, 180
amīr al-umarā’ 3, 4, 20n, 21n, 23, 43, 177n
 ‘Āmir b. Abī l-Ghayth 166, 169
 ‘Āmirids 3, 86, 87, 92–6, 95n, 98, 99n, 100,
 117, 126n, 144, 148, 159, 186, 187
See also al-Manṣūr, al-Muẓaffar, Shanjūl,
 ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and ‘Abd al-Malik
amjād 136
 ‘amma 4, 15, 18n, 19, 19n, 20n, 21n, 22n, 23,
 24, 49, 57, 65, 78, 87, 88, 96–8, 100–3,
 109, 111, 112, 115, 133, 135, 147, 177, 178, 180,
 185, 186, 188
 ‘awāmm 37, 64, 95, 113
 ‘Ammān 13
 ‘Ammārids 15, 53, 163
al-amr bi-l-ma‘rūf wa-n-nahy ‘an al-munkar
 17, 18, 18n, 19, 23, 185
 ‘Amrūs 122
 Anatolia (Asia Minor) 22n, 69, 71
 Andalusia 6, 85, 89n, 103, 104, 104n, 106, 107,
 116, 120, 121
 al-Andalus 3, 6, 14–6, 86, 88–90, 106–60, 163,
 186
 Andalusis 90, 90n, 104, 107, 108, 110, 114,
 114n, 116, 125, 129, 147, 148, 149, 160, 186,
 187
andhāl 17
 ‘Annāba (Būna) 166, 177
 Anṣār 96, 119
 Anti-Lebanon Mts. 27, 28, 30, 34, 45, 51
 Antioch 6, 13, 29, 35, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63, 66, 69,
 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 80, 81, 185
 Anūštegin 65, 65n, 67
 Apamea 13, 60
 Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqī 75, 76, 81, 82, 84
 Aq Sunqur al-Ḥājib 65, 71, 71n, 72, 82
 ‘Aqabat al-Baqar 103
 ‘aqd (pl. *uqūd*) 158
 al-‘Aqīqī, Abū l-Qāsim Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn
 34, 41
 Arab conquerors-settlers (*muhājirūn*) 13, 28,
 53, 99, 99n, 162, 167, 172, 184
 Arab nomads 3, 6, 9n, 29n, 34, 36, 44, 56, 61,
 73, 167, 168n, 169, 170, 172, 173, 175,
 179–81, 183, 187, 189
 Aragon 93, 138n, 153n, 157
 Arcos 104
ardhāl or *arādhil* 115, 158
 (Banū) Arfa’ Ra’sahu 131
 Armilāt 99, 102
 Arnedo 99n
 Artuqids 74–6, 78n, 80, 81, 84
 ‘aṣabīyya (tribal solidarity) 15, 15n, 68
 Ascalon (‘Asqalān) 45, 49
 al-Aṣfar 65
 (Marj) al-Ash‘ariyyīn 38
ashrāf 3, 30, 39, 44, 49
 Ashtor 11–3, 28, 52, 78, 83, 87, 121
 ‘Ashūrā’ 25n
 Aṣīlā 107
 Assassins *see* Niẓāris
 Assyria 1, 26, 184

- Asturias 118
 'atā' 36, 67, 91n, 95, 97
 atabeg 72, 74
 al-Athārib 74, 78
 al-Athbaj 166, 166n
 'Atīyya b. Šālīḥ 68, 69
 atrāf al-nās 98
 Atrāk 18, 19, 25, 43, 46, 48–50, 67, 185
 Augsburg 14n
 Avila 124
 awbāsh 30, 51, 60
 awbāsh al-qabā'il 167, 180
 Awraba 107
 Awrās Mountains 164
 Awzā'ism 89
 a'yān 3, 14, 15, 67, 71, 77, 87, 109, 113, 114, 133, 137, 159, 165, 182
 a'yān-amīr system 3, 3n, 4, 31, 44, 55, 58, 59, 65, 69, 70, 83, 165
 'Ayyād b. Naṣr Allah 167
 'ayyārūn 11, 11n, 17, 17n, 19, 21n, 24, 25, 25n, 29, 46, 52, 113, 115, 116, 185, 186, 188
 Ayyūbids 11, 78
 A'zāz 64, 66, 77
 Azd 119
 al-'Azīz 44–9, 60, 64
 al-'Azīz b. al-Manšūr (Ḥammādid) 175
- Ba'alabakk or Ba'labakk 13, 44
 Bāb (Aleppo)
 Bāb Anṭākya 80
 Bāb al-'Irāq 81
 Bāb al-Junān 59, 62
 Bāb Qinnasrīn 62, 71
 Bāb al-Yahūd 80
 Bāb (Baghdad)
 Bāb Tāq 25
 Bāb (Cordoba)
 Bāb al-Qanṭara 95
 Bāb al-Shikāl 95, 96
 Bāb al-Sudda 95
 Bāb (Damascus)
 Bāb al-Farādīs 38
 Bāb al-Ḥadīd 37–9
 Bāb al-Jābiya 27, 27n, 34, 37, 41
 Bāb Kaysān 42
 Bāb al-Šaghīr 38, 41
 Bāb Sharqī 27, 41, 51
 Bāb Tūmā 45, 50
 Bāb (Toledo)
 Bāb al-Mardūm 121, 126
 Bāb al-Qanṭara 120
 Bāb Shāqra (Bisagra) 120
 Bāb (Tunis)
 Bāb al-Baḥr 172, 177
 Bāb al-Jazīra 162, 178, 179, 179n
 Bāb al-Manāra 174, 176
 Bāb al-Saqqā'in 162, 164
 Bāb al-Suwayqa 174, 178, 179, 179n
 Badaĵoz 102, 105, 107, 130, 135, 152, 179, 189
 Badī'ids 72, 80
 Faḍā'il b. Šā'id 81, 82
 Šā'id b. Badī' 73, 75, 84, 188
 bādīya (pl. *bawādī*) 95
 Baghdad 5, 7, 17–25, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36n, 65, 100, 106n, 115, 116, 170, 185
 Baḥrayn 31, 32, 34, 36, 44
 Bajkam 23
 Bakhtiyār 36, 43
 Balak b. Bahrām 75, 76, 80
 al-Balaṭ 79, 80
 Baldwin 11 81
 Bālis 68, 80
 Bānās canal 38
 Bāniyās 35
 Baradā river 28, 38
 al-Barbahārī 23, 24
 Barbastro 129
 Barcelona 10, 92, 103, 104, 109, 148, 151, 152, 160
 Barīdis 20n
 Barjawān 50
 Barqa 163
 Basil 11 49, 59, 62, 63
 Basques 118
 Bašra 15, 22n, 23
 al-Bathaniyya 27, 31, 32, 45, 47
 Baysān 13
 Bedouins *see* Arab nomads
 Begchūr (Bakjūr) 48, 48n, 49, 59, 83
 Beirut 68
 Beja 166–9
 Bejaia (Bijāya) 164, 166n, 176, 178, 181, 182
 Beni- 141, 141n

- Berbers
 Berbers in Maghrib 101, 120, 166, 168–71
 Berber conquerors-settlers in al-Andalus
 89, 102, 107, 119–21, 123, 141, 142, 145, 149,
 160, 186, 189
 Berber Fātimid troops 12, 33, 63 *see also*
 Maghāriba
 Berber mercenaries in Cordoba 6, 87, 88,
 91, 91n2, 92, 94n, 98–111, 106n, 114, 116,
 124, 145, 147, 186, 188
- Berenguer Ramón I 109
 Berenguer Ramón II 151, 153, 153n
- bid'a* 129, 130
 al-Biqā' Valley 27, 32, 44
 Birkat al-Khayzurān 46
 Birzāl 104
 bishop 2n, 14, 91
 Bizerte 167, 168, 175, 176
 Bohemond I 74
 Bostra (Buṣrā) 13
 bourgeoisie 7, 12, 16, 28, 53
 haute bourgeoisie 11, 28, 52, 159
 entrepreneur 10, 184
- Brabant 14, 14n
 Brett 8, 14
 Brunschvig 8, 190
 Bukhārā 6
 Buluggīn b. Zīrī 92
 bureaucrats 1, 10, 13, 29, 53, 55, 67, 76,
 82, 88, 91, 92, 147, 155, 159, 160, 162,
 188, 189
- Burgos 151
 Burhānids (Āl-i Burhān) 6
 Būrids 11, 28, 50, 69
 al-Burjamī 25
 Burriana 140, 152
 Bursuq b. Bursuq 74
 Buwayhids 3, 5, 22, 24, 25, 25n, 29, 32, 35, 36,
 43, 71n, 185
 Byzantines 3, 6, 10–3, 20n, 27, 31, 35, 36, 43,
 44, 44n, 49, 53, 57–61, 63–8, 83, 162,
 177n, 184, 185
- Cahen 11–3, 29, 76, 83
 Cairo 5, 29, 36, 49, 60
 Calatayud 125
 Calatrava la Vieja *see* Qal'at Rabāḥ
- Calvinism or Protestantism 7
 el Campeador *see* Rodrigo Días
Cantar de mio Cid 144, 144n
 Cap Bon Peninsula 162, 172
 capitalism
 medieval capitalism 10
 merchant capitalism vii, 10n
 rational capitalism 7, 9
- cardo 86
 Carrion 99n, 103n
 Cartagena 140
 Carthage 13, 162, 178, 179 *see also* La Marga
 Castile 91–4, 100, 102, 103, 121, 122, 136,
 138, 139, 144, 150–2, 151n, 157, 159, 160
see Leon-Castile
- Catalonia 92, 93n, 100, 103, 104, 143
 catapult (*arrāda*) or mangonels 41, 48, 62,
 71
 (urban) cavalry 34
 celoquia (*salūqiya*) 143
 Central Asia 6, 7, 11n
 Central Asian warriors (soldiers)
see Khurāsāni-Central Asian warriors
- centralized (patrimonial) states vii, 1, 3, 10,
 11, 53, 57, 84, 86, 90, 108, 111, 114, 116, 142,
 164, 183, 184
- Cepulle (El Puig) 154, 155
 Ceuta (Sabta) 107, 108n
 Chaldeans 1, 26, 184
charisma 1
 charismatic form of domination 5, 79
 charismatic leaders 1, 11n, 173, 183
- China vii, 2, 2n
 Chola vii
 Christians
 Christians under Muslim rule 16, 22, 22n,
 28, 29, 42, 42n, 55, 60, 63, 64, 66, 67, 79,
 83, 84, 89–92, 89n, 90n, 120, 121, 138, 159,
 185
 Western European Christians 90n, 91,
 92, 98, 106, 107, 120, 121, 124, 125, 127, 129,
 131, 132, 136, 139–41, 144, 157, 159, 160,
 177, 186
- citadel
 Aleppo 55, 58, 60–4, 66, 67, 71, 73–8,
 80–2, 84
 Damascus 27, 28

- Ciampi 5
 city
 archaic city 1, 2
 autonomous city 5, 9, 10, 13, 15n, 16, 19, 26, 29, 33, 36, 48, 51, 52, 55, 58, 81, 122, 123, 145, 150, 155, 160, 165–8, 171, 172, 175, 176, 184, 188, 189
 Byzantine city 10
 Chinese city 7
 city-republic 10, 12, 53
 farmer city vii, 1, 3
 Flemish and Brabantine city 14
 (ancient) Greek city 7, 15n, 184
 Hellenistic civic tradition 11, 28
 hinterland (dependent territory) 11n, 2, 12, 14, 14n, 162, 164, 184
 Indian city 7
 (ancient) Iraqi-Syrian city 7
 medieval commercial-industrial city vii, 2, 3, 7
 northern Italian city 2n, 5, 7, 11–4, 14n, 15, 16, 46, 52, 53, 173, 176, 184
 northern European city 2n, 7, 9, 14n, 15, 173, 176, 184
 Roman city 2n, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 27, 28
 (medieval) Syrian city 11–4, 53
 Clunia 93
 Cluny 132, 134n
 Coimbra 129
 Cologne 14n
 communalism 189, 190
 comune 7, 52
 condottiere 14, 31, 46, 52, 84, 125, 127, 152, 187
 confraternization 7
 Constantine (Qustaṅṭīna) 164, 181
 Cordoba vii, 6, 12, 15, 16, 85–117, 123, 124, 129–34, 137n, 145, 147, 159n, 160, 184, 186, 189
 Coria 135n
 Coromandel coast vii
 corporation 8, 15
 craftsmen (*ṣunnāʾ*, *mahana*) 2n, 3, 3n, 4, 5, 5n, 7–9, 12, 30, 33n, 51, 60, 66, 128, 147, 150
 createdness of the Qurʾān 18, 18n, 19
 crusaders 6, 73, 74, 79n, 80–2, 84, 185
 Cuarte de Poblet 159
 Cuenca 89n, 90, 128, 131–5, 137, 150
 Cuenca Mountains 119, 140
 Cullera 140
 curial 184
daftar (pl. *dafātīr*) 60
 Dahar Mountains 119
dahmāʾ 15n, 133, 149
 Dahmān 168
dāʾī (pl. *duʾāt*) 96
dāʾīra 16, 110–2, 115, 116, 188
 Damascus vii, 5, 9n, 11–3, 16, 25–53, 55, 61, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72, 74, 76, 77, 79n, 115, 116, 126, 185, 188, 189
 Dammar 104
dār al-ṣināʾa (darsena) 162
 Dārayyā 32, 45
 Davis, Natalie 21
dawāʾir 158
dawla 15, 173
 Day of the Trench 122
ḍayʿa (pl. *ḍiyāʿ*, estate) 22, 37, 42, 99, 133, 142, 142n, 184 *see also qarya*
 Daylamites 20n, 22n, 50, 57, 72
 decumanus 27, 55
 decurion 184
 democracy 15, 15n, 173, 189
 Denia 100, 107, 109, 129, 140, 145, 145n, 150–3, 160
 Dhū l-Nūnids 107, 115, 119, 121, 123, 125–9, 186
 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ismāʿīl 125
 ʿĀmir b. Abī Jawshan 145
 Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 82, 125–7, 128n, 139
 Mūsā b. Dhī l-Nūn 123, 125
 See also al-Maʾmūn and al-Qādir
 dhū l-rīʾasatayn 126, 126n
 dhū l-wizāratayn 126n
dhuʿār 17, 33, 34, 41, 42, 45, 96, 167
dihqān 50
 al-Dikka 34, 39, 41
 division of labor 4
dōwān 95, 97, 128, 172, 173
ḍiyāʿ mustakhlaṣa 146
 Djemila (Cuicul) 14
 Dubays b Ṣadaqa 81
 Duero 91, 93, 103n, 120, 121, 124
 al-Duhayqayn 25, 50, 52, 188

- Dümā 31
 Duqāq b. Tutush 72, 74
 Durkheim 21
durūb (sing. *darb*) 25
 duumvirate 123, 138, 145, 176, 186, 187, 189
- Ebro 140
 Edessa (al-Ruhā, Urfa) 13, 56, 65, 71, 79, 81, 185
 Egypt 12, 20n, 30, 32–6, 36n, 37, 45, 48, 49, 53, 140, 141, 162, 163, 185
 Elvira 101n, 104, 105n, 108, 109
 eunuch 30, 31, 33, 42, 49, 50, 77, 86, 96, 100, 112, 148
 Euphrates 32, 36, 60, 75, 77, 80
 (western) Europe vii, 2, 2n, 10, 93, 124, 138
 (northern) Europe 2, 2n, 7 *see also* city
 (eastern) Europe 86, 124
exarchos 67
 Extremadura 119
- Fahm 119, 119n
fahṣ (pl. *fuhūṣ*) 180
 Fahṣ al-Ballūṭ 86, 87
 Fahṣ al-Surādiq 96, 101, 102
 Fanak al-Kāfūrī 31, 32
faqīh 24, 30, 35, 78, 88, 95, 105, 106, 111, 112, 112n, 113, 122, 126, 126n, 130, 131n, 147, 155, 164, 165
 al-Fārābī 15n
 al-Farādis 38, 39
 Farajids 126, 151, 154
 Abū Saʿīd 128, 133, 134, 137, 139
 farmer-warrior 124
 Faro (Shantamariyya) 114
 Fārs 43
 Fāṭimids 3, 5, 6, 12, 27, 28, 31–7, 37n, 39, 41–8, 50–3, 59, 61–8, 72, 73, 83, 92, 116, 162, 163, 168n, 169, 170, 184, 185
 Fātiq al-Ikhshīdī 31
fatwā 10, 112
 Favara canal 142
 Fazāra 32, 34, 47
 Fernando I 124, 127–9, 131, 139, 150, 160
 feudalism 13n, 14
 Fierro 90n, 121, 131
fitna 101, 133
fiṭyān 11, 11n, 87n, 91, 97
- Flanders 14, 14n
 Florence 5, 176, 177
 food riot 21
forum 27, 55, 55n, 85, 140
 France 86, 124, 138
 Franks (Faranj) 74, 76–8, 93
fuero 124
fujjār 158
fussād 158
fussāq 17
 al-Fuṣṭāṭ 89
 Fuṭaysids 94
fuṭuwwa 9, 11n, 12n
- Gabes 6, 163, 164, 166, 168, 168n, 170
 Gafsa 164, 167, 168
 Galicia 119
 Galilee 33, 64
 Gandia 140
 García Gómez 99n
 García Ramírez 99n
 García Sanchez III (Navarre) 127
 Genoa 140
 George of Antioch 177
 Georgia 79
 Ghālib 123
 al-Gharb 107, 114
 al-Gharbiyya 86, 95n, 96, 101, 105, 110, 116
ghawghāʾ 15n, 17, 18n, 19, 37, 46, 52, 57, 96, 133
 Ghaznavids 7
 Ghazni 17n
ghilmān (sing. *ghulām*) 18, 43, 48, 57–60, 62, 63, 66, 67, 68n, 69, 71n, 72, 82, 83, 156, 185, 189
 Ghūṭa 9n, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 37, 38, 41, 44–51
ghuzāt 81
 Girona 104n
 Glick 142, 147
 Gormaz 121
 Granada 6, 88, 88n, 109, 109n, 148
 Gredos Mountains 118, 119, 119n
 Guadalajara 119, 120, 120n, 123n, 126, 127, 129, 137
 Guadalaviar 140
 Guadalquivir 85, 95, 112
 Guadiana 119, 120
 Guadiaro 104, 105

- Guazalete 120
 Guichard 89, 141–3, 156
 guild 5, 7, 51, 53
 Gujarāt vii
- Habbūs b. Māksan 100, 104, 109n
ḥadd 22n, 108
 Ḥadīdids 126, 132
 Abū Bakr Yahyā 122, 128, 128n, 129, 131–4,
 139, 154
 Abū ‘Umar Aḥmad 126, 126n
 Sa‘īd b. Yahyā 131, 132
ḥādir 56, 68
ḥadīth 78, 89
 Ḥafṣids 15n, 164, 176, 179n
 Ḥajar al-Dhahab 28, 39
ḥājib (pl. *ḥujjāb*) 3, 86, 91, 95, 97, 114
 al-Ḥakam I 122, 145
 al-Ḥakam II 91, 92, 121
 Ḥakam b. Sa‘īd 113, 114, 116, 117, 188, 189
 al-Ḥākim 49, 50, 59, 64
ḥākim (pl. *ḥukkām*) 109, 110, 153n
 Ḥamā 80
 Hamadān 74
 Ḥamdānids 21n, 30, 31, 36, 47, 57, 59, 60, 62,
 64, 83, 185
 Ḥāmid b. al-‘Abbās 21n
 Ḥammād b. Buluggīn 164
 Ḥammādids 164, 166, 166n, 167, 167n,
 169–72, 175–7, 181–3, 187
 ḥammām 2, 38, 39, 63, 66, 109, 126, 154
 Ḥammū b. Mallil 166, 167n, 168, 168n
 Ḥammūdids 107–110, 114n, 116, 126, 186
 Ḥanafism 18n, 73, 79
 Ḥanbalism, Ḥanbalite movement 18, 18n,
 23, 24, 24n, 65
ḥāra 42 *see also maḥalla*
 Ḥarrān 53, 56, 64n, 65, 70, 81
 al-Ḥasa’ 31, 36, 46, 46n *see also* Baḥrayn
 al-Ḥasan b. ‘Alī b. Yahyā 178, 179
 al-Ḥasan b. ‘Ammār 49, 50
 al-Ḥasan b. Ṭughj b. Juff 39
 al-Ḥasan b. ‘Ubaydallāh b. Ṭughj 31–3
 al-Ḥasan al-Aṣam 32, 36, 44–6, 46n
 Ḥāshim al-Ḍarrāb 123
 Ḥassān b. al-Mufarraǰ 61
 Havemann 13, 29, 83
 Ḥawrān 27, 32, 37, 45, 47, 50
- Hawwāra 119, 125, 139, 141, 142, 166
 Ḥaydarān 3, 6, 163, 165, 169, 183, 187
 Hījāna 49
 Hilāl 3, 6, 163, 165–7, 166n, 179
 Hilāl al-Ṣābī 29, 56, 60n
 Ḥilla 81
ḥimāya 44
 Ḥimṣ 13, 28, 31, 32, 34, 43, 48, 58, 72, 76
 hipparchos 11
 Hishām I 92–8, 93n, 104, 105, 108, 124, 147
 (pseudo-) Hishām I 114, 114n, 127
 Hishām II 112, 113
 Hishām b. ‘Abd al-Jabbār 94
ḥiṣn (pl. *ḥuṣūn*) 142, 143, 153, 155, 180
 Ḥiṣn Ziyād *see* Khartpert
ḥiṣn-qarya system 143n
ḥizb (pl. *aḥzāb*) 41, 45, 133, 134
 Ḥudayrids 94, 123
 Hūdids 121, 127–9, 134, 137, 139, 148, 149,
 187
 See also al-Musta‘īn I, al-Muqtadir,
 al-Mundhir, al-Musta‘īn II and
 Sulaymān
- hudna* 44, 58, 64, 77
 Ḥuḍna 164, 166, 171
huerta 140, 154, 157
 Huesca 122, 143n
 Huete 119, 128, 131–4
 Huici Miranda 144, 149n, 156
ḥummāl (*ḥamalāt*) *al-silāh* 33, 33n, 34, 37,
 45, 49, 52
- Ibādism 170
 Ibn Abī ‘Aqīl 53
 Ibn Abī Hishām 30, 34, 41, 49
 Ibn Abī Ja‘far 159n
 Ibn Abī Jarāda 65, 67, 80
 Abū Ghānim b. Hibatillāh 73, 75, 78n,
 81
 Ibn Abī Usāma 58, 63, 72
 Ibn Abī Ya‘lā 33, 34, 51
 Ibn al-‘Adim 56, 65, 76, 78
 Ibn al-‘Ajamī
 Faḍl Allāh 73
 ‘Abd al-Raḥmān 78
 Ibn ‘Allāl 180
 Ibn al-‘Alqama 144, 152, 155, 157, 159
 Ibn ‘Awnillāh 88, 97

- Ibn Baṣṣāl 118, 130
 Ibn Bassām 16, 88, 107n, 122, 127, 132, 134, 136, 144, 149, 150, 156
 Ibn Dhakwān 98, 99, 101n, 105, 105n
 Ibn al-Fakhkhār 147
 Ibn al-Faraḍī 88, 105n
 Ibn Gharsiya 130
 Ibn al-Ḥadhdhā 128, 129
 Ibn Ḥafṣūn 90
 Ibn Ḥalwān 181
 Ibn Ḥamdīn 159n
 Ibn Hānish 14, 165
 Ibn al-Ḥashshā' 129, 131
 Ibn Hātim al-Azdī 129–31
 Ibn Ḥayy 95, 98
 Ibn Ḥayyān 16, 88, 106n, 107n, 109, 111, 113, 125, 144, 146
 Ibn Ḥazm 95n, 105n, 108n, 111, 147
 Ibn Ḥumām 15
 Ibn 'Idhārī 88, 101, 106, 107n2, 144, 163, 169, 175, 177
 Ibn Jaḥḥāf *see* Jaḥḥāfids
 Ibn Jalaba (Jabala) 70–1
 Ibn Kawthar 125
 Ibn Khaldūn 15, 15n, 125, 163, 169, 170, 175, 180
 Ibn al-Māward 40–4, 52, 188
 Ibn al-Mawṣūl 73, 78, 78n
 Ibn al-Maydānī 29, 35
 Ibn al-Mulaḥḥā 76, 77
 Ibn al-Munammār 164
 Ibn Munāw (Manyūh) 105, 125
 Ibn al-Mustafād 62, 66
 Ibn Muṭāḥir 122, 138
 Ibn al-Nābulusī al-Ramlī 35–6
 Ibn Naḥḥās 72
 Ibn Nubāta 65
 Ibn al-Qalānisī 29, 37, 40, 56
 Ibn al-Qāsim 89
 Ibn al-Qaṭṭā' 93, 94
 Ibn Rā'iq 21n, 24
 Ibn Rūbash 149, 160, 187
 Ibn al-Saqqā' 115–7, 115n, 188, 189
 Ibn al-Saqqāṭ 131–3
 Ibn Shaddād 163, 181
 Ibn Shirāra 41, 42
 Ibn Ṭāḥir 148, 152
 Ibn al-Tākurunnī 149
 Ibn 'Ukkāsha 115, 117
 Ibn Wāfid, Abū Bakr Yaḥyā 106n
 Ibn Wāfid, 'Alī (Abenguefit) 118, 130
 Ibn Wājib 144, 153, 153n, 154, 155n, 156, 157, 160
 Ibn Yamlūl 167
 Ibn Yazāl 167
 Ibrāhīm b. Ja'far *see* Abū Maḥmūd
 Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī 17
 Ibrāhīm al-Furātī 75, 80
 Idris, Hady-Roger 163, 170, 171, 174, 175, 180
 al-Idrīsī 179, 179n
 Idrīsids 107
 Īfran 104, 114
 Ifrīqiya 3, 6, 12–5, 15n, 16, 49, 92, 109n, 162–83, 187, 189 *see also* Tunisia
ijtihād 9
 Ikhshīds 30–4, 36, 40, 51, 185
 ʾl Ghāzī 74–8, 78n, 79, 80, 82
 Iltegin 48
imām (pl. *a'imma*) 95, 106n
imāra 15, 150
iqḷīm (pl. *aqālīm*) 96, 102, 140, 146, 156
iqṭā' 22, 44, 60, 68n, 91n, 104
 Iran or Iranian 11, 17, 35 *see also* Persia
 Iraq 2, 11, 11n, 12, 73, 81, 89
 irrigation
 macro-scale irrigation 142, 142n
 meso-scale irrigation 119, 142, 142n
 micro-scale irrigation 119, 142
 Iṣfahān 20n
 Islamic law *see shari'a*
 Ismā'ilism 35, 73, 73n, 164, 165, 169
Istinfār or *nafīr* 93, 95
 Italy 2n, 5, 10, 12, 86, 138 *see also* city
itāwa 167, 170
 Ithnā 'Asharism 43, 72, 73, 73n

 Jacobites 45n, 65
 Jaen 95n, 104, 110
 Ja'far b. Falāḥ 33–6, 36n, 47
 Jaffa (Yāfa) 36, 44
 Jaḥḥāfids vii
 'Abdallāh b. Abī l-Muṭarrif 155n
 Abū Aḥmad Ja'far 144, 153–61, 153n, 154n, 155n
 Abū Muḥammad b. Abī Aḥmad 159
 Jāhiriyya 11n

- Jahwarids vii, 6, 15, 114n, 115, 123, 163, 173
 ‘Abd al-Malik 115, 126n, 188, 189
 Abū l-Ḥazm 109, 114, 114n, 115, 150, 186
 Abū l-Walid 114n, 115
- Jalāl al-Dawla 25
- jamā’a* 114, 114n
- jamā’a (thajma’ith)* 171
- Janāḥ al-Dawla 72
- Jarash (Gerasa) 13
- al-Jarjarāī 67
- Jarrāḥids 36, 45, 46, 59n, 61
- Jativa 140, 145–8, 151, 153, 159, 160, 187
- Jawhar al-Ṣiqqilī 33, 45, 46
- Jaysh b. al-Ṣamṣāma 47, 50
- Jazīra 11, 20n, 30, 31, 56–8, 68, 70, 71, 74, 184
- al-Jazr 74
- Jelālī 22n
- Jerba 167, 175
- Jerez 110
- Jerica 140, 153
- Jerusalem 13, 71, 81
- Jews 16, 28, 42, 42n, 47, 48, 60, 65, 83, 87, 92, 138, 159
- Jifāra Plain 164
- jihād or mujāhidīn 17n, 35, 35n, 44, 65, 66, 79, 79n, 84, 92, 93, 101, 104n, 120, 129, 129n
- jizya* 58, 137
- John Tzimisces 43, 44
- Joscelin I 79–81
- jubb* 142
- Jucar 140, 142
- jumhūr* 48
- jund* (pl. *ajnād*) 15, 20n, 34, 89, 91, 97, 99, 101, 105, 114, 128, 141, 155n, 156, 172, 188
- jund al-baladiyyīn* 16, 110, 111, 113, 116
- kabīr* 45, 146, 169
- Kafartāb 67
- Kāfūr 30–2
- Kalb 61
- Kalbids (Sicily) 14n, 49
- Karkh, Baghdad 23, 25
- kātib* (pl. *kuttāb*) 61, 149, 160, 187
- Kennedy 8n, 13n, 18n, 53, 98
- al-Khadrā palace 27, 28
- al-Khallāl 23
- khalq* 87, 96
- khān* 43n, 68, 68n
- khandaq* 122
- khānqāh* 75, 75n
- kharrāj* 36, 47, 59, 70, 146
- Khartpert (Kharpūt) 80, 81
- Khashshābids 58
- Abū l-Ḥasan b. Yaḥyā 72
- Abū l-Faḍl 65, 74n, 75, 77, 78n, 79, 79n, 80–4
- Abū l-Ḥasan b. Abī l-Faḍl 75, 78, 79, 82
- al-Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. Sa’īd 78, 78n
- khāṣṣa* (pl. *khawāṣṣ*) 14, 15, 87, 98, 135
- khatīb* 72, 73
- Khayrān 104, 107–9, 108n, 145, 147
- Khazarids 164, 165
- Fulful b. Sa’īd b. Khazrūn 164
- Khalifa b. Warrū 164
- al-Muntaṣir b. Khazrūn 165
- Muṭarrif b. ‘Alī b. Khazrūn 176
- Sa’īd b. Khazrūn 165
- Warrū b. Sa’īd b. Khazrūn 164
- Khazrūn 104
- khifāra* (protection fee) 24, 32, 43, 46, 47, 50, 52, 56
- khilāfa* 15
- khirba* 74
- Khotan 65n
- Khurāsān 11n, 70, 73, 89
- Khurāsāni revolutionaries 16, 17, 172
- see also abnā’ al-dawla*
- Khurāsāni-Central Asian warriors (soldiers) 17–9, 19n, 20n, 22, 30, 43, 57, 100, 106n, 116, 162, 170, 186
- Khurāsānids (Tunis) vii, 6, 15, 16, 163, 169–83, 187–8
- ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq 174–6, 183
- ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Khurāsān 169–72, 174, 176, 183, 187
- ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 178, 181–3, 188
- Abū Bakr b. Ismā’il 175, 176, 178, 181, 183
- Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz 175–7, 183, 187
- ‘Alī b. Aḥmad 182, 183
- Ismā’il b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq 174–6, 183
- Muḥammad b. Khurāsān 172
- Khushayn 119
- al-Khutaytī 70, 71, 79, 83, 188
- khutba* (Friday sermon) 44, 64, 65, 72, 72n
- Khutlugh Abēh 82

- Khwārazm shāh 6
 Kilāb 55–7, 59, 60, 63–5, 67, 68, 68n, 69, 70,
 83, 185
 knight 16, 53
 Konkan coast vii
 Kūfa 15, 35
kūra 74
 Kurds 57
 Kutāma 33, 37, 47–9, 51, 162

 La Goulette 162
 La Mancha 118–20
 La Marga 178, 179
 La Rioja 99n, 134, 134n, 151n, 153
 Labīb 146–8
 Labīdids 131
 Lambaesis 14
 Landowners (landholders) 1, 2n, 3, 6, 12, 14,
 14n, 22, 23, 142, 171, 172, 184
 Languedoc 118
 law
 customary law in Islamic cities 9, 9n
 municipal law 9
 Roman law 9
 Lawrānkids 131, 132, 132n
 Le Kef 167, 168
 Lebanon 12, 31
 Leon 91, 92, 103n, 120–4, 137
 Leon-Castile (United Kingdom) 6, 119, 124,
 127, 128, 132, 134, 186, 187
 Lepcis Magna 13, 164
 Lerida 142, 143n, 148, 151, 153n
 Lévi-Provençal 87, 94, 99n, 141, 144
 long-distance trade 2, 12
 Lorca 148, 152n
 lower class 5, 15–7, 25, 28, 40–2, 45, 49, 51–3,
 60, 66, 86–8, 96–8, 111, 113, 115, 117, 136,
 137, 152, 157, 185, 188, 189 *see also sufla*
 Lubbūnids 126, 128, 151, 155
 Abū 'Īsā b. 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Lubbūn 151
 Abū Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh b. Lubbūn
 152n
 Abū Shujā' Arqam b. Lubbūn 128, 134
 Lu'lu' (Ḥamdānid) 59, 66, 83
 Lu'lu' (Seljuq) 74–6, 84, 188
 Lu'lu'a 37–9
luṣūṣ (sing. *liṣṣ*) 4n, 24, 72, 96 *see also*
 quṭṭā' al-ṭariq
 Ma'add b. al-Manṣūr 177, 178
 Macedonians 1, 26, 184
 Madhḥij 45
al-madīnat al-jamā'īyya 15
 al-Madīnat al-Zāhira 86, 92, 95, 95n, 97
 Madīnat al-Zahrā' 86, 91–3, 103, 105, 106n,
 107
madrasa 75n, 78, 79
 Madrid 123, 123n, 136, 136n, 137
 Maggan b. Kāmil b. Jāmi' 168
 Maghāriba
 Abbasid 20
 Fāṭimid 37, 38, 40, 41, 50, 63, 67
maghārim 109, 146
 Maghila 119, 120n
 Maghrāwa 164
 Maghrib 88, 100, 101, 140
 al-Maghribī 57
magistros 67
maḥalla (pl. *maḥāll*) 50 *see also ḥāra*
 al-Mahdī (Umayyad) *see* Muḥammad 11
 al-Mahdiyya 6, 162, 163, 165, 168n, 169, 176–8,
 182
 Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad, Sulṭān 79
 Maḥmūd b. Naṣr 65, 68–70, 83
 Maḥqūrīds 126, 128, 151
 Majorca 141
makhzan 182
 Makkī b. Qurnāṣ 80
maks (pl. *mukās*) 74, 113
māl al-ghayba 113
mala' 112, 112n, 114, 117, 156, 159
 Malaga 108, 108n, 110, 112, 129, 159n
malik (pl. *mulūk*) 123, 176
 Mālik b. Anas 89
 Malik Shāh 70, 71, 71n, 72
 Mālikism 89, 90, 147
 Malzūza 119
mamlūk 71n
 al-Ma'mūn (Abbasid) 8n, 17, 18, 18n, 28, 100,
 116, 126n, 130
 al-Ma'mūn (Dhū l-Nūnid) 115, 121, 125–33,
 135, 139, 150, 150n, 151, 160, 186, 187
 Manashā b. al-Furār 47–9
 Manbij 81
 Manichaeism 129, 130
 al-Manṣūr ('Āmirid) 86, 88, 91–3, 91n, 99n,
 103n, 104, 121, 124

- al-Manşūr (Ḥammādid) 166n
 Manşūr b. Lu'lu' 55, 59, 60, 64, 68n, 83, 185
 al-Manşūra palace 127, 137
 Manzikert 3
 Marches *see also* Thughūr
 Lower March 105, 106, 106n, 119–121, 135n
 Middle March 90, 91, 106, 119–21, 134, 138, 139, 186
 Upper March 90, 91, 104, 120–3, 127, 138, 138n, 142n, 144, 153
 Mārdīn 74, 76, 77, 78n, 79–81
 maristān 38
 Marwān b. 'Abdallāh 159
 Marxist 13n, 21, 22n
 maşāliḥ (maşlaḥa) 77
 mashā'ikh 33, 48, 58, 60, 65
 Mashhad al-Dikka 64, 65, 79
 mashyakha 3, 14n, 15n, 113, 126, 127, 134, 137, 170, 175
 Maşmūda 63
 Maşşīša 35
 mastūr 39
 al-Matīn 88, 107n, 144
 Maṭrūḥids 14, 165
 ma'ūna 15n
 mawālī (sing. mawlā) 28, 59n, 90
 Andalisi 'Āmirid mawālī 105, 105n
 Andalusi Umayyad mawālī 87, 87n, 89, 91, 94, 98, 106, 107, 109–17, 123, 145, 186, 188–9
 al-Māwardī 15
 Mawdūd 73
 Mawşūf al-Şaqlabī 61, 63
 Al-Mayānajī 30
 al-Maydān (Midān), Damascus 28, 37–9
 Mayyāfāriqin 58
 maẓālim 108, 108n, 113
 Mazyads 81
 Mecca 89, 119
 Medina 89, 119
 Medinaceli 91, 91n, 101, 103, 121, 123, 123n, 124, 151n
 Mejerda 162, 166
 Melilla (Malīla) 101n
 Melkites 29, 65
 Mengütegin 49, 59
 Merida 120
 Mertola 114
 Meseta 118, 140
 mezquita, Cordoba 86, 92, 95, 103, 111, 113, 115
 middle class 4, 4n, 15, 16, 25, 42, 50–3, 66, 86, 87, 98, 137, 151, 188
 miḥna 18n, 126, 131
 Mikālis 7
 militarization of citizens 15, 16
 milites 11, 11n
 militia or militiamen 11, 16, 17, 24, 26, 28, 29, 34, 42, 48, 51, 53
 milk (pl. amlāk) 57, 59, 63, 65, 182
 Minorca 141
 Mirdās (Hilāl) 166, 169
 Mirdāsids 55, 58, 64–6, 68–70, 72, 83, 185, 188
 Misrāta 164, 165
 Mizza 47
 Molina 134
 Monastir 6, 163
 moral economy 20, 21
 Morocco 87, 88, 91, 107, 110, 120, 141n, 143n, 152
 Moron 104
 Mosul 21n, 30, 31, 36, 47, 56, 67, 70, 73, 75, 82, 84, 186
 Mozārabes 90n, 121, 136, 138, 151, 158
 al-Mu'ammal al-Shammās 64, 66
 Mu'āwiya b. Abī Sufyān 22n, 23
 al-Mu'ayṭī 145, 145n
 Mubārak 109, 145–8, 148n, 159
 mubayyaḍa 19, 19n
 al-Mudawwana 89
 Mudéjars 121, 138
 al-Mufarraj b. al-Daghfal 46, 47n
 Mufarraj b. al-Faḍl 80
 muftī 9, 10n
 Muḡhīthids 126, 128, 131, 132, 136
 Muḡammad I 91, 123
 Muḡammad II al-Mahdī 94–104, 103n, 111
 Muḡammad b. Abī Ṭālib 50, 51
 Muḡammad b. 'Aşūdā 33, 34, 36
 Muḡammad b. Tuḡḡj 30
 Muḡammad Tapar b. Malik Shāh, Sulṭān 73, 74, 76
 al-Muḡassin b. al-Ḥusayn 64
 Muḡriz b. Khalaf 169, 171, 172, 174
 Muḡriz b. Ziyād 178–83

- muhtasib* 8, 11, 14, 51, 130, 149
 al-Mu'iz (Fātimid) 33, 36, 42
 al-Mu'iz (Zirid) 6, 163–6, 168–70
 al-Mu'iz b. Muḥammad b. Walmiya 168
 Mujāhid 109, 130, 145, 145n, 146, 148
 al-Mujann 72, 73, 83, 188
mulk 15, 173
mulūk al-ṭawā'if 6, 14, 87, 88, 135
 al-Mundhir b. al-Muqtadir (Hūdid) 151, 152, 160
 al-Mundhir I b. Yaḥyā (Tujībid) 104, 109, 121, 147, 148
 Munīr al-Khādīm 49
 Mu'nīs 20n
 Mu'nīs b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣinnabārī 166, 168
munya 86, 102, 127, 142n, 148, 155
muqaddam 73, 77 *see also mutaqaaddim*
 Muqallad b. Saqawīq 80
 al-Muqanna' 19n
al-Muqtabis 88, 107n
 al-Muqtadir (Abbasid) 20n, 21n, 24
 al-Muqtadir (Hūdid) 150, 160
 Murābiṭūn 152–61, 187, 189
 Murbiṭūr *see* Sagunto
 Murcia 6, 89n, 100, 118, 129, 140, 141, 148, 152, 153, 156, 159
 Murra 32, 34, 47
 al-Murtaqā 108n, 109, 111, 112, 114n, 147
murūwwa 11n
 Mūsā b. Ismā'īl 49
muṣallā 41
mushrif 155, 158
 Muslim b. Quraysh 69n, 70, 71, 83
 al-Musta'in (Abbasid) 19, 19n
 al-Musta'in (Umayyad) *see* Sulaymān
 al-Musta'in I (Hūdid) 127
 al-Musta'in II (Hūdid) 151, 152, 153n, 157, 160
 al-Mustakfi (Umayyad) 111, 112, 114, 116, 139, 188, 189
 al-Mustarshid (Abbasid) 81
 al-Mustazhir (Umayyad) 111
 al-Mu'taqid (Abbasid) 22n
 al-Mu'taqid ('Abbādid) 114, 127
 al-Mu'tamid ('Abbādid) 115, 126n
mutaqaddim 66, 70, 167
 Muṭarrifids (Toledo) 123, 138, 186
mutaṣarrif 159
 al-Mu'taṣim (Abbasid) 8n, 18, 18n, 91
 al-Mu'taṣim (Ṣumādīhid) 129
mutaṭawwi'a 17
 al-Mutawakkil (Abbasid) 19, 19n, 20n, 28, 108n
 al-Mutawakkil (Aḫṣid) 135, 135n, 136
 Mu'tazilites 18n
 al-Mu'tazz 19n, 20n
 al-Muṭī' 20n, 33, 34
 al-Muttaqī 20n
 al-Muwaffaq 20n, 108n
 Muwahḥids 165, 172, 176, 179n, 181–3, 188
muwallad 89, 89n, 90, 90n, 120, 122, 123, 126, 138, 186
al-Muwaffa'a 89
 al-Muẓaffar (Āmirid) 87, 91, 93–5, 93n, 97, 100, 102, 110, 121, 138
 Muẓaffar ('Āmirid *mawlā*) 145–8, 148n, 159
 Nafūsa Mountains 164
 Nafza (Berber tribe) 119
 Nafza (fortress) 120
 Nahr al-Dajjāj 23
naqīb 49, 70, 81
nās 4, 15, 21n, 24, 37–9, 63, 87, 93, 112, 134
 Naṣībīn (Nisibis) 20n, 56
 al-Nāṣir (Ḥammādid) 166, 166n, 167n, 168n, 169, 170, 172
 Nāṣir al-Dawla 30, 57
 Naṣr b. Ṣāliḥ 64–6, 83
 Naṣrids 88n
nā'ūra (noria) 118, 142
 Navarre 92, 93, 93n, 99n, 127, 134, 134n, 138n, 153n, 157
 Nawrūz 22
nāzila (pl. *nawāzil*) 129
 Neo-Platonism 35
 Nicephoros Phocas 31, 57
 Niebla 114
nisba 119, 122, 144
 Nishāpūr 7
 Nizārites 73, 73n, 75
 nomads 1, 30, 54, 66, 68, 152 *see also*
 Arab nomads
 No-Man's Land 120, 124
 non-legitimate domination 5
 non-market economy 2n, 20, 21
 Normans 74, 163–5, 177
 notaries (*'udūl*) 62, 130, 131, 149

- Numayr 56, 65, 70
 al-Nuqra 60
- oikos* 153
 Olocau 154
 Onda 140, 141n
 Oran (Wahrān) 105n
 Ordoño I 123
 Orihuela 140
 Ottomans 10, 10n, 22n
- Palermo 14n, 163
 Palestine 31, 32, 35, 36, 46, 47n, 61, 62
 Pallars 93n
 Palmyra 34
 Pamplona 92
paria 128, 131, 132, 151n
 Parthians 1, 184
 Paterna 150, 189
 patrician city or domination 4–6, 15–9, 23,
 30, 31, 40, 43, 44, 50–3, 55, 70, 71, 75, 76,
 79–84, 87, 105, 112, 114, 116, 121, 123, 125,
 127, 134, 136, 138, 144, 148–51, 153, 156,
 158–61, 165–8, 173, 175, 176, 178, 181, 182,
 184–9
 patricians 1, 3, 4n, 5, 5n, 15n, 34, 52, 79, 82,
 87, 121–3, 125, 126, 128, 131–4, 136–9, 151,
 159, 179, 181, 184, 186, 187
 patrimonial state 10, 13 *see also* centralized
 (patrimonial) states
 Persia or Persians 1, 11n, 26, 57, 184 *see also*
 Iran
 Pisa 140, 181, 181n
 plebeian city or domination 5, 15n, 16, 19,
 25, 31, 33, 34, 43, 50, 52, 73, 79, 83, 111–3,
 116, 117, 137, 184, 185, 188
 podestà 46, 52, 53
 police force 16, 24, 25, 40–2, 50, 66, 69, 95
see also shurṭa
 polis 15
popolo 4n, 5, 52
 price soaring 20, 21n, 105
Primera Crónica General 144, 152, 158
 prison, prisoners 4, 96
- qāḍī* 8–10, 10n, 11, 14, 15, 29, 30, 38, 50, 53, 55,
 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 81,
 84, 95n, 99, 102, 104n, 105n, 106n, 108n,
 110, 111, 112n, 114, 116, 124, 128–30, 132, 141,
 144, 149, 152–4, 153n, 154n, 158–60, 159n,
 160, 165, 171, 178, 179, 181–3, 185–9
 al-Qādir 121, 122, 132–7, 134n, 137n, 139, 144,
 150–6, 150n, 158, 160, 187, 188
 Qahrūn b. Ghannūsh 180
qā'id (pl. *quwwād*) 24, 25, 96, 143, 153, 154n,
 155n, 185
 Qā'id b. Maymūn 165, 166, 168
qā'im 96, 97
qal'a 167
 Qal'at Banī Ḥammād 164, 166, 166n, 169
 Qal'at Ibn Ghannūsh 180
 Qal'at Ja'bar (Dawsar) 75, 77
 Qal'at Rabāḥ 99, 99n, 101, 120
 Qal'at al-Sharif 71, 73, 75, 76, 80
qanāt 142
 Qanawāt 37–9
 Qanbāniya 85–7
 Qantish 102, 116
 Qarakhānids 6
 Qarāmiṭa (Qarmaṭīs) 20n, 24, 31, 32, 34, 36,
 42, 44, 46, 51, 56
 Qarghūya 58, 83
qarya (pl. *qurā*) 78n, 82, 141, 142, 142n, 167,
 182
 al-Qaṣba or *qaṣba* 165, 176, 182
 (Banū) Qasī 123
 al-Qāsim b. Ḥammūd 107–110, 148
 al-Qaṣr (al-Quṣūr) (Tunis) 174–6, 183, 187
 Qaṣr al-Ḥajjāj 27n, 28, 39
 Qassām 25, 45–50, 52, 116, 188
 Qasṭīliya 167
qaṭī'a 22, 77
qawm 87, 146
 al-Qayrawān 6, 89, 162, 163, 165–71, 167n, 179
 al-Qubba 77
qubbād 155
qūmis 99
 Quraysh 119, 122
quṭṭā' al-ṭariq 72 *see also luṣūṣ*
 Quwayq river 57
- ra'ā'* 50, 64, 150
rab' (pl. *ribā'*) 182
rabaḍ (pl. *arbād*) 86, 95n, 96, 100, 143
raḥal 142
raḥba (pl. *riḥāb*) 39, 100, 155

- al-Raḥba 36, 43, 47, 60, 67, 68, 76, 78n
ra'īs (pl. *ru'asā'*) 5–7, 11, 13, 14, 24, 27–9, 33,
 41, 45, 50, 51, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 75, 80–4,
 87, 104n, 114, 114n, 155n, 164, 165, 185, 188
ra'yya 4, 15, 37–9, 41, 42, 48, 51, 52, 55, 87,
 101, 108, 146
 al-Ramla 31–3, 35, 36, 44–6, 46n, 47n, 50
 Ramón Borrell 103, 148
 (Banū) l-Rand 167
 al-Raqīq 88, 97, 100, 101, 103, 163
 al-Rayy 35, 72
 Rayyān al-Khādim 42, 43
 redistribution 1
 religious riot 21
 repartimiento 142
 repoblación 91, 124
res publica 15
 Ribagorza 93
 Riḍwān b. Tutush 72, 73, 73n, 74, 74n, 75, 77,
 78, 78n, 84, 188
riyād 142
 Riyāḥ 166, 168, 178
rizq (pl. *arzāq*) 45, 67, 155
 Rodrigo Días vii, 144, 150, 151n, 152–61, 153n,
 187
 Roger, prince of Antioch 76, 79
 Roger II 164, 165, 177, 177n, 178, 181
 Roman law 9
 Romans 1, 2, 2n, 14, 26, 57, 85, 89, 118, 144,
 162, 164, 184
 Romanus III Argyrus 64
 Ronda 104
 Rudé, George 21
 al-Rummāniyya 87n
 al-Ruṣāfa
 Baghdad 21n
 Cordoba 86, 91, 96, 100, 105
 Valencia 151, 152
rusūm 74, 78

ṣa'ālik (sing. *ṣu'lūk*) 95
 Sabiba 166, 172
 Sābiq b. Maḥmūd 69, 70
 Sabratha 13, 164
 Sa'd al-Dawla 31, 58, 59, 64
 Ṣadaqa al-Shawwā' 33, 34
ṣadr 6
 Sagunto 140, 151–3, 155

 Sahagun 137
ṣāḥib al-aḥkāṁ 153, 153n
ṣāḥib al-madīna 14, 95, 96
ṣāḥib al-shurṭa 41, 51
 Sāhil 6, 162, 163, 168
 Saḥnūn 89
 Ṣā'id b. Badī' *see* Badī'ids
 Ṣā'idids
 Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān 129, 132n
 Ṣā'id b. Aḥmad 129, 131
 St. Helen cathedral 55n, 74n, 79
 Salamanca 124
 Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdās 60–6, 83
 Ṣāliḥ b. 'Umayr al-'Uqaylī 31, 32, 44, 51, 53,
 125–6
 al-Ṣāliḥiyya 28
 Salmān b. Ja'far b. Falāḥ 47, 49, 50
 Sāmānids 7
 Sāmarrā 18, 19, 19n, 20n, 57, 91, 185
 al-Ṣanamayn 31
 Sancho II 128, 135, 151n
 Sancho Garcés II 93, 99n
 Sancho Garcés III 93
 Sancho García 94, 102, 103, 103n
 Sancho Ramírez 153n
 Ṣanhāja 91, 100, 104, 108, 109, 152, 162, 167,
 168, 170, 172, 178, 181, 183
 Santarem 88, 125
 Santaver 89n, 112, 119, 123, 134, 141, 145
 Ṣaqāliba 33, 49, 61, 86–8, 91–3, 96, 98, 100,
 101, 104–7, 109, 124, 129, 130, 144, 145,
 147–50, 155n, 159, 187
sāqiya 142, 145
 Sarūj 65
 Sasanians 184
 Sayf al-Dawla 30, 31, 48, 57–9, 64, 64n, 72, 74
 Sbeitla (Sufetula) 13
 Scales 88, 98, 99n, 106n
 Segorbe 140, 153, 154
 Segovia 124
 Seljuqs 3, 6, 11, 28, 51, 55, 65, 69–71, 71n, 72,
 74, 76, 78–80, 83, 84, 175, 184–6
 separation of state and religion 18
 Setif 164
 Seville 6, 15, 110, 111, 114, 127, 128, 137, 160, 186
 Sfax 166, 168–70, 175, 177
shabāb 32–4, 52
 Shabib b. Waththāb 65

- Shāfi'ism 78, 89
shākiriyya 19n
 Shamūl 32–4
 Shanjūl ('Abd al-Rahmān) 93–6, 94n,
 98–101, 99n, 104, 148
 Shaqunda (Secunda) 103, 105, 107
sharī'a (Islamic law) 8, 9, 10n, 89, 90, 147,
 158, 165
 Sharq al-Andalus 100, 109, 119, 140, 141, 141n,
 147, 150, 153, 159
 al-Sharqiyya (Ajerquía) 86, 115
shaykh (pl. *shuyūkh*, *ashyākh*) 3, 14, 15, 30,
 31, 44, 49, 57, 58, 113, 165, 167, 169–71,
 174–6, 178, 182, 183, 187, 189
 Shī'at (or Shiya') al-Marwāniyya 88, 104n
 Shi'ism 23, 25, 25n, 34, 35, 35n, 43, 55, 56,
 63, 64, 64n, 65, 72, 75, 78, 82, 83
shūrā 15n, 112, 112n, 113, 128, 130, 167, 168
shurṭa 15, 24, 40, 41, 112
shuṭṭār 17, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 52
 Shu'ūbiyya 130
 Sicily 10, 49, 124, 140, 142n, 164, 177, 177n,
 182
 Sidon (Ṣaydā) 44
 Sierra Morena Mountains 86, 120
signore 52, 127
sihrīj 142
 silk 12, 132
 Silvez 114, 144
 Simancas 91
 Sīstān 17n
 Slav 86
 slave soldier 8n, 71n
 sofrā (*sukhra*) 143
 Song vii, 2n
 Soria 91
 Sousse (Sūsa) 6, 163, 168, 170, 189
 standing army 10, 13
 Straight Street 27, 39
 Sūdān 110
suffāl 115
 (Banū) l-Ṣūfi 11, 27, 28, 51
 Sufism 8, 9, 75
sufḷa 15n, 96
 Sufyān al-Thawrī 35
suhmān 146
 al-Sulamī 79n
 Sulaym 163
 Sulaymān al-Musta'īn 101, 103, 104n2, 105–9,
 108n, 125, 145, 147
 Sulaymān b. 'Abd al-Malik (Umayyad) 55
 Sulaymān b. 'Abd al-Rahmān I 122
 Sulaymān b. Īl-Ghāzī 78n, 80
 Sulaymān b. al-Mundhir (Hūdīd) 153, 153n
 Sulaymān b. Qutulmish 71
 Sulaymān b. Ṭawq 61, 62
sulḥ 58, 60, 77
sultān 174, 175
 Sultān Shāh b. Riḍwān 75–7, 81
 Ṣumādihids 129, 148
 Sunna 17, 129
 Sunnism 24, 25, 25n, 35, 35n, 36n, 43, 55, 65,
 72, 73, 75, 78, 80, 83, 168n, 169
sūq 8, 25, 30, 31, 37, 39, 41, 51, 55, 60, 62, 96,
 98, 103, 116, 147, 152, 170, 171
sūq al-dawwāb
 Damascus 30, 40, 41
 Toledo 118
 surrender agreement 58, 184, 185
 synagogue 48, 121
 Syria 11, 12, 14–6, 31, 32, 34–6, 37n, 43, 44n,
 47, 56, 57, 61, 70–3, 87, 87n, 140, 163, 184,
 185
 al-Ṭabarī 23, 106n
 Ṭabariyya (Tiberias) 33
 Taghlib 30, 56
 al-Ṭā'ī, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad 21n
 Tajo 86, 118, 120, 130
 Talavera 119, 120, 131n
taljī'a 22
 Talkāta 91
 Tall Bāshir 77
 Tall al-Sultān 70, 72
 Tamīm b. al-Mu'izz 166, 168, 172, 175, 177,
 177n
 Tang 2n
 Tangier (Ṭanja) 107
 Tanūkh 56, 167
taqwīya 110
tarabbuṣ 20, 21n
 Ṭarafa 93, 94
 Tarazona 138
 Ṭarbīshas 123, 138, 186
ṭard 156
ṭarkhān 43, 43n

- ʿarsūs 35, 44
 tax-farmer (*ʿāmil*) 21n, 23
 ʿayyʾ 36, 45, 47n, 61
 Tebourba 167, 180
tegin or *tiġin* 43n
 Temür Tash 76, 78n, 81
 Teruel 89n, 90
 Tevar 153, 153n
 Thamugadi 14
 Thimāl b. Šālīh 64, 65, 67, 68, 83
 Thompson 21
 Thuʿbān b. Muḥammad 61–3
 Thughūr
 al-Andalus 107, 112, 122–4 *see also*
 Marches
 Byzantine 17n, 20n, 35, 57, 58
 al-Tijānī 163, 181, 182
 Tinnīs 53
 Toledo vii, 6, 12, 86, 90, 92, 94, 98, 103, 105n2,
 107, 115, 118–39, 151, 157, 159, 179, 184, 186,
 187, 189
 Tortosa 100, 107, 129, 140, 143, 146–8, 150, 151,
 153, 153n
 Toulouse 93n
 Tozeur 122, 163, 164, 167–9
 (big) trader (*tujjār*) 2n, 3, 3n, 12, 14, 21n, 23,
 53, 63, 65, 71, 95, 113, 171, 172
 traditional form of domination 3n, 5, 79
 traditional revolution 21
 Tripoli
 Lebanon 12, 14n, 15, 42, 43, 52, 160
 Libya 8, 14, 163–5, 168, 169, 189
 ʿTubna 171
 Tudela 104n, 138
 Tudmīr 141
 ʿTughtegin 74–7
 Tuġīb 119
 Tuġībids 92, 104, 107, 108n, 109, 121, 147
 Tunis vii, 6, 15, 16, 162, 163, 165, 166, 168–83,
 187, 189
 Tunisia 3, 5, 119, 122, 163, 164, 166 *see also*
 Ifriqiya
 Turia 140, 142, 148, 153
 Türk empire 43n2
 Türkmen 3, 68, 68n, 69–71, 74, 76–8, 78n, 79,
 80, 83, 84, 178, 189
 Turks 11, 43, 72, 73
 Tutush 70–2
 Tyr 12, 13, 14n, 52, 53, 160
 tyrant 4, 4n, 5, 52, 53, 113, 114, 116, 128, 176,
 179, 181, 183, 184, 188, 189
 ʿUbayda b. Ḥumayd 122
 Ucles 112, 119, 125
 ʿulamāʾ 12, 18n, 19, 147, 175
 ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb 119, 130
 Umayyads
 al-Andalus 3, 6, 15, 86, 87n, 88–90, 94–6,
 100, 103, 111, 120–2, 125–7, 138, 141, 184,
 186
 Syria 15, 16, 22, 24, 34, 89
 Umayyad mosque
 Aleppo 55, 79
 Damascus 27, 28, 35, 37, 41, 42, 45–7,
 50, 55
umma 8
 ʿUqayl 31, 32, 34, 46, 56, 70, 75
 ʿUqaylids 70, 71, 83
 al-Uqḥuwāna 64
 al-Urbus 167–9
 Urgel 103, 104n
 ʿushr 146, 155
 al-ʿUtbi 89
 ʿUthmān b. Abī Bakr b. Rūbash 152, 160
 Valencia city vii, 6, 9, 12, 16, 100, 107, 109, 128,
 131, 134, 137, 140–61, 187, 189
 Valencia region 89n, 90, 159, 160
vega 104, 118, 122n, 137
 Velez Malaga 143n
 Viguera 99n
villa 184
 Villa Nueva 148, 157
 village 1n, 3n
 Visigoths 14, 86, 87, 89, 118–20, 122, 138, 144,
 184, 186
 Wādīh 101, 102, 103n, 104, 105, 105n
wajh (pl. *wujūh*) 3, 96, 108, 165
wakīl 48, 102
 wālī 169, 170
 Walīd I 27, 55
 want satisfaction 153, 173
waqf 113
 al-Wāqidī 79n
 al-Waqqashī 130, 151, 158, 159, 163

- warrior religion 8, 8n
 water distribution 9, 9n, 130
 al-Wāthiq 18, 19
 wazīr, vizierate 6, 4, 15, 21n, 47, 51, 57, 64, 66, 67, 72, 78, 78n, 79, 82, 87, 93, 108n, 109, 111–4, 117, 122, 125, 126n, 145, 149, 149n, 150, 155, 159, 164, 177n, 186, 188, 189
 Weber, Max 3n, 4n, 5, 7, 8, 8n, 9, 10, 16, 21, 79, 128, 173, 184
 Wittfogel 142

 Yaḥsub 119
 Yaḥyā b. ‘Alī (Ḥammādid) 109–12
 Yaḥyā b. al-‘Azīz 175, 176, 176n, 178
 Yaḥyā b. Sa‘īd 29, 56, 58, 60n, 61, 63
 Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā 89
 Ya‘īsh 124–6, 125n, 139
 Yantawayh 19
 Ya‘qūb b. Killis 47–9
 (Nahr) Yazīd 28, 34
 al-Yāzurī 3
 Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn 157

 (Mt.) Zaghwān 162, 179
 zāhid (pl. *zuhhād*) 35, 95
 al-Ẓāhir 62

za‘īm (pl. *zu‘amā’*) 127, 156, 167
 al-Zajjājīn 66, 78, 82
 Ẓālim b. Mawhūb 31, 32, 36–8, 44, 45
 al-Zallāqa 152
 zalmedina *see* *ṣāhib al-madīna*
 Zamora 120
 Zanāta 91, 104, 107–12, 114, 116, 164, 165
 Zangī 82, 84
 Zangids 11, 50
 Zaragoza 6, 90, 92, 107, 120, 137, 151, 151n, 154, 184, 187
 al-Zarqālī 130
 Zāwī b. Zīrī 91, 92, 100, 104, 105n, 108, 109, 109n
 al-Zaytūna mosque 162, 170, 171
 Zbiss 163, 171, 174, 175
 Zibān 164
zindīq 129, 130
 Zīrids
 al-Andalus 88, 114n, 122, 128, 129
 Ifriqiya 3, 6, 88, 92, 109n, 162–5, 165n, 167–70, 174, 175, 179, 183, 184, 187
 zu‘ār 52
 al-Zubaydī 111
 Zughba 165–7, 167n, 172
 Zuhayr 148
zuhd 130
 Zuhra b. ‘Alī al-Ḥusaynī 78, 81