The Minority Concept in the Turkish Context

Muslim Minorities

Editors

Jørgen S. Nielsen, University of Copenhagen
Felice Dassetto, University of Louvain-la-Neuve
Aminah McCloud, DePaul University, Chicago

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The Minority Concept in the Turkish Context

Practices and Perceptions in Turkey, Greece and France

By

Samim Akgönül

Translated from Turkish by

Sıla Okur

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To my Maya

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NOTE BY THE AUTHOR

This book is the collation of my thoughts on subjects that I have been working on for more than a decade. Naturally, these studies lie at the intersection of various university disciplines, most notably history, sociology and political science. The concept of "minority" as a "total social fact"[1] constituted the common ground of all my studies, which led me to approach the subject from various perspectives to grasp the essence of the issue, namely the matter of collective otherness in the "Turkish" context in its widest sense. To this purpose, I concentrated my thoughts on four areas that interact with each other. First, I attempted to clarify the meaning of concepts such as "minority," religious minority," and "majority." This conceptual approach has been dealt with in the Introduction section below, and Chapter 1 in particular, where I examine the Turkish concept of minority. This is followed by three sections where I attempt to depict the complexity of the minority issue in Turkey and for Turks living abroad.

Chapter 2 is dedicated to a synthesis of minority issues in Turkey. It is an approach that focuses specifically on non-Muslim minorities as my field of expertise. Nevertheless, my thoughts on whether Kurds and Alevis should be considered theoretical minorities are also expressed in this section. Moreover, the Alevi question is reiterated in Chapter 4, where I deal with the Turkish minority in France.

The third section is composed of my thoughts on the Muslim Turks of Greece—a very particular example where the community in question struggles with a quest for identity, religious belonging, ethnic belonging and transnationality. This minority constructs its future solely through this plural belonging, and does so with close ties to the situation of the Greek minority in Turkey, together with the negative ramifications of the concept of mutuality.

[1] "The Total Social Fact" as devised by the French sociologist Marcel Mauss is a methodical tool to investigate social situations. According to this concept, the fact must be approached from all angles to grasp the social fact. These angles may include the political, religious, economic, historical or artistic. Total Social Facts are imposed upon the individual by the society, internalized by the individual nevertheless, and influence all aspects of the individual's life.

The fourth and last chapter is the culmination of my eight-year study of Turkish nationals in France, whom I consider a religious and ethnic minority. Of course, this group is typical in terms of the definition of religious minority due to its many sociological and historical characteristics.

The backbone of this text is the concept of "minority"—used with ever more frequency but very difficult to grasp in its entirety. It is rather difficult indeed to define minority in a way that will achieve total agreement. International legal texts prescribe a restrictive definition of this concept both to ensure that a community is not deprived of the protection it may need, and to protect the fragility of the State, which if violated may spawn opposition and obstruction. The concept of minority as used in this text must be perceived in a much wider perspective.

This book was first written in French, then it was widely developed and published in Turkish. This English version is due to the Mr. Sıla Okur's attentive translation. I thank him very much for this work. Malcolm Cox, my PhD student, has also worked on the final text and made some judicious corrections. Brill's editorial team, especially Ms Nicolette van der Hoek and Ms Gera van Bedaf have been very helpful during the preparation of the final manuscript. Of course, all the ideas and possible errors are my responsibility. This book, like everything that I write, is dedicated to my Maya.

Samim Akgönül
Strasbourg / Istanbul
October 15, 2012

INTRODUCTION

Since the relationships between minorities and majorities are constructed upon "awareness of the other" and "dominancy" above all, the concept of "religious minority" constitutes the foundation of the "minority" concept. Religious belonging has been the primary type of belonging since Ancient Rome, and the rulers of the Middle Ages imposed their faiths on the societies they dominated. In other words, the first minorities were religious ones, and their feeling of "otherness" arose out of how they approached the sacred. Be that as it may, we can chart the course of the emergence of religious minorities from a political perspective by developing the idea of a "contradictory religious organization."

Used in the most simplistic sense, this "religious organization," in other words, a collective movement of a religious community, composed of individuals who believe they hold a common faith, to assume sovereignty over their own community, is also a "reaction of the minority against the majority."[1] The organization of a religious minority is viewed as the sole path to existence within the majority faith, which is viewed as a threat, regarded heresy, and believed to pursue expansionist policies.

This results in a continual state of competition, occasionally interrupted by conjectural alliances, not only between the majority and the religious minority, but also among a number of religious minorities vying to achieve legitimacy: "If the sole common point of people sharing the same land but representing different cultural values is the notion of difference, these individuals are under the risk of eventually becoming enemies … multiculturalism may be a legitimate way to protest against the nationalist argument advocating a uniform culture … but does not constitute a path to a fairer society. … In the long run and completely inadvertently, this will sow the seeds of conflict between communities of different color and culture."[2]

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[1] Louis Favreau, Laval Doucet (ed.), *Théorie et pratiques en organisation communautaire*, Québec: Presses de l'Université de Québec, 1991.

[2] Harry Goulbourne, "New issues in black British Politics", in *Information sur les sciences sociales*, vol. 32. issue 2, 1992, p. 355–378, quoted and translated by Michel Giraud, "L'éthnicité comme nécessité et comme obstacle", in Gilles Ferréol (ed.), *Intégration, Lien social et citoyenneté*, Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 1998, p. 137–165.

In order to shed some light on the concept of otherness and the resulting notion of competition, the problems associated with the definitions of the concepts of "minority" and "majority" must be considered. Unfortunately, this is a discussion with no end and no definition can fit all situations. Nevertheless, I would like to make a few points about the meaning I give to the concept of "minority" in the following pages in order to explain the issue.

This concept may cover two areas:

From a sociological perspective, a minority is a community of individuals possessing a common sense of belonging. Their number is less than another larger community that possesses a different sense of belonging. They are socially persecuted, or at least they believe to be so.

In the wider context, most minorities have two "objective" qualities: Language and faith as the two determinants of a community identity. Serge Moscovici's "minorité nomique"[3] strives to preserve these two indispensable pillars of its identity at all costs. However, in the case of minorities under the sovereignty of another culture, preserving the native language takes great effort. This is especially difficult in modern societies, where the interaction between the minority and the majority is continuous. Therefore, the minority faith, being the second pillar of the community, is prioritized as it is easier to transfer, facilitates detachment from the rest of the society and enclosure within itself, and is more discursive. The definition of religious minority considers this second pillar that prevents the adoption of the majority culture. Based on Capotorti's timeless definition,[4] the concept of minority in general and religious minority in particular may be defined as follows:

a) *Being different from the majority* both by belonging to a different group and engaging in different behavior. Contemporary documents describe these "differences" as ethnic, religious and linguistic in nature. Based on this, a minority can be defined as a subgroup surrounded by a geographically larger group (nation/society/community) where members of the subgroup possess qualities that are different from the surrounding larger group.[5]

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[3] Serge Moscovici, *La Psychologie des minorités actives*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996.

[4] Francesco Capotorti, *Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities*, Nations-Unies, 1979.

[5] Henry Fairchild (ed.), *Dictionary of Sociology*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1944, p. 134.

b) *Being fewer in number* within the borders of a country recognized as a state. It is unimportant whether the minority is regionally a majority in any part of the country. While easily applicable in the case of unitary nation-states, this criterion is harder to apply in the federal case, and has a number of inherent problems. Nevertheless, almost all bilateral and multilateral international documents require a minority to reach a certain level of concentration in a given geographical region without prescribing specific numbers or percentages in order for it to benefit from specific rights. Since modern states grant the freedom of worship to all citizens without regard for geographical concentration, these specific rights are usually centered on language.

c) *Not being culturally dominant.* The concept of dominance requires definition. "Dominant majority" and "oppressed minority" carry different meanings in American and European sociology.[6] While American sociology uses the term "minority" for all groups that feel oppressed by one or more dominant majorities by any means, the same term is used in Europe for groups that demonstrate "objective" differences that give rise to discrimination. The relations between being oppressed and being dominant are best explained in Bourdieu's work.[7] Regardless of the field of study, including "minorities," the workings of the society is always based on the structural mechanisms of competition and dominance. These mechanisms are consciously or unconsciously reproduced by individuals and groups that form part of the socialization process, and become habituses that are transferred by schools and the family in particular.[8] Therefore, dominance constitutes one of the primary criteria for being in the minority. As a result, a dominant religion cannot be construed as a minority religion even if its followers are regionally fewer in number.

d) *Being citizens of the state in question.* If the individuals forming a group are not citizens, they are classified as "aliens." Although the measure of citizenship is unanimously accepted from a legal perspective, it has problems in practice. From a sociological point of view, there are many communities that cannot benefit from rights granted to minorities despite

[6] Charles Marden, *Minorities in American Society*, New York: American Book Co., 1952, p. 26.

[7] Laurent Mucchielli, "Pierre Bourdieu et le changement social", in *Alternatives économiques*, 175, 1999, p. 64–67.

[8] Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron, *La reproduction. Éléments pour une théorie du système d'enseignement*, Paris: Minuit, 1970, p. 19.

possessing all qualities describing a minority. Groups that constitute sociological minorities but are not citizens of the state they live in may be the result of various historical, political and sociological occurrences. There are three frequent cases: Changes of state not accompanied by the summary exile or exchange of a population, as in former Yugoslavia;[9] forced population exchanges; and, more recently, immigration. Considering this last point, while there is frequently a legal distinction between citizens and aliens in the same immigrant communities in Europe, this distinction does not exist from a sociological perspective. From that perspective, even if a group that holds a faith different from the majority is not naturalized within the state it lives in, it should still be considered a religious minority. In practice, citizens and aliens within the same immigrant community view themselves as a part of one and the same community, and share places of worship.

e) A fifth and "subjective" measure must be added to the above four "objective" criteria: The presence of *minority consciousness.* "As social classes cannot exist without class consciousness, minorities cannot exist without minority consciousness."[10] This consciousness may become manifest, or sometimes manufactured, by associating with a group. Sometimes, this association is dictated by the majority. In both cases, the religious minority is aware that it is a minority. Awareness of this special situation manifests itself in various ways during the identity building process. The majority that dominates this process may strive to disregard the ramifications of this consciousness or to prevent it from becoming manifest. Other countries where the minority religion in another country is in the majority make efforts to preserve or even encourage this consciousness. For example, influential Islamic countries strive to protect and strengthen Islam that is in the minority in non-Islamic countries, while countries where Catholicism is in the majority worry about the situation of minority Catholics in Muslim countries.

While this definition of religious minority is open to development, it lays the foundation for the meaning of a second definition, namely the concept of "minority religion." Minority religion may be explained as a belief, behaviour and belonging category that a group which follows its identity is endangered utilizes to prove its existence from an

[9] Emmanuel Decaux, Allain Pellet (ed.), *Nationalité, minorités et succession d'États en Europe de l'Est*, Paris: Montchrestien, 1996.

[10] Baskın Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar, Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama*, Istanbul: İletişim, 2005, p. 26.

identity perspective.[11] At the same time, minority religion is the product of the manifestation of the identity of a community in reaction to the majority.

On the other hand, Durkheim argues that religion is, above all, a system of powers. An individual who observes the requirements of the religion feels a power that he is not used to feeling in his everyday life. Durkheim goes even further to assert that these individuals are struck by madness "under a collective motivation that leads them to commit acts, some of which they cannot believe they have done afterwards."[12] This esoteric definition may be used for minorities as well. Minority religion is a source from which individuals draw the strength they need to remain in solidarity against external threats.

The observation of the manifestations of minority religion reveals some qualities that structuralist studies cannot detect. When studies concentrate on the unique historical frameworks of minorities, two conflicting occurrences may be observed. First of all, minority religion is among the most popular of identity bonds. Therefore, the devotion of the members of a minority may result in the religion's refusal to develop, and may contribute to radicalization and in some cases violence. When the followers of a minority religion feel powerless, justified or otherwise, the immutability of religion becomes one of the factors that define the identity. This leads to some observers believing that the practice of the religion and the religious perspective contribute to the nourishment of a conservative "view of the world."[13] It is surprising to discover that the followers of the same religion that are in the majority usually derive their energy from the fundamentalism of the minority. "Exit from the religious"[14] does not apply to minority religions that resurrect the religious fact in its entirety during their quest for legitimacy of autonomy.

Contrary to the above statement, it must be noted that minority religions, precisely because they are in the minority, are in constant touch

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[11] In this particular sense, *belief* is the anthropological belief examined by Marcel Mauss. In other words, it emphasizes the identity and social aspects of believing in a supreme being and observing the requirements of this belief. Cf. Marcel Mauss, *Oeuvres. 1. Les fonctions sociales du sacré*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1968.

[12] Emile Durkheim, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Le système totémique en Australie*. Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, (1912) 1968.

[13] Cf. Erwan Dianteill, Michael Löwy, *Sociologies et religion, 2: Approches dissidentes* Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005.

[14] Coined by French philosopher Marcel Gauchet, the concept of "Sortie de religion" is less the abandonment of religion and more the shaping of the individual's behavior rationally and independent of religious beliefs even though they may be believers. Cf. Patrice Bergeron, *Sortie de Religion. Introduction à la Pensée de Marcel Gauchet*, Montréal: Athéna, 2009.

with other religions, especially the majority religion that surrounds them. The minority religion is not always in the opposition. Their contacts with majority religion and other minorty religions have led to a variety of outcomes in the history of religions: from syncretism[15] to Jewish massacres. Far from these two extremes, minority religions are more adaptable—or are forced to be more adaptable—and incorporate the behaviors and sometimes even the rituals of the majority religion, consciously or otherwise. Indicators are plenty, from small historical facts to ideological arguments and pro-assimilation arguments. These varying levels of forced contact have given rise to the widespread admiration for dialog among religions—a concept that refuses change in religion due to its intrinsic meaning. It is surprising that minority religions are more advanced than mainstream beliefs in terms of rapport between religions. Depending on the acts of people who are in disagreement of the identity significance of religion for the minority, the above two cases may coexist, occur in succession, or contest one another.

As will be demonstrated, the existence of both religious and ethnic minorities depends on the awareness of a minority identity and the expression of the same. In other words, the Foucaultian approach conditions the existence of the minority on the expression of such existence. There is no minority that does not voice its existence.[16] This expression and the resulting question of visibility have always been seen as a threat to singular and monolithic nation-states. Visibility is not confined to freedom of thought and expression, and may be understood as the freedom to exist, or even the legitimacy of existence. This legitimate visibility may encounter a variety of obstacles introduced by the state or society, ranging from speaking Kurdish in Turkey to expressing Turkish ethnicity in Greece and wearing headscarves in France.

In modern democracies, the concept of thought crime is, in essence, the crime committed by *expressing* one's thoughts. Freedom of thought is said to be present when a person living in a given society upholds facts or ideas that are against the generally-accepted "true" facts and ideas, and does not face threats against their fundamental and other rights. In the same manner, the first step to freedom of expression is the ability to access original thought, which is part of the freedom of communication. In summary, freedom of expression as one of the main pillars of democracy enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of

[15] Thomas Wilson, Hastings Donan, *Border Identities. Nation and State at international frontiers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

[16] Michel Foucault, *Les Mots et les choses*, Paris: Gallimard, 1990.

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and included in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other documents (the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Moscow Document, etc.) of the resulting Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe should be viewed as a series of freedoms in three stages: the freedom of access to any and all kinds of news and facts; the freedom to form individual thought based on these news and facts; and the freedom to express this thought in any manner.

When it comes to the expression of identity, perhaps the expression of belonging based on identity as regarded illegitimate by social perception, we again have a three-pronged approach.[17]

- Passive expression: This type of expression may be considered esoteric. In other words, it is an expression of existence in everyday life using the signs of the minority identity, and the legal and social restrictions imposed on this freedom.
- Active expression: This is both esoteric and exoteric. While individuals actively work to prevent the disappearance of the signs of the minority identity in an esoteric sense, they publicly express their ideas, thoughts and demands for the recognition, appreciation and preservation of the minority identity in an exoteric sense.
- Reactive expression: Used only exoterically, this type of expression may become violent. The aim is to oppose the majority discourse and develop a contrasting discourse that prioritizes the signs of the minority identity.

As an ideal-typical rule, it must be noted that there is a type of hierarchy, an organic connection between these three types of expression. In other words, legal and/or social restrictions and prohibitions imposed upon passive expression give rise to active expression. When active expression is considered illegitimate, separatist, dangerous and therefore "banned," reactive expression is born, heightening social tensions and completing the vicious circle that spawns new ways of radical expression and new prohibitions.

[17] Samim Akgönül, "Seni Bir Tek Sessizliğin Kurtarabilir". Azınlık Kimliğinin İfadesi: Türkiye'de Toplumsal ve Hukukî Engeller, Taner Koçak, Taylan Doğan, Zeynep Kutluata (ed.) in *Türkiye'de İfade Özgürlüğü*, Istanbul: bgst Yayınları, 2009, p. 212–230.

Expressions of Minority Identity, Reactions and Outcomes

	Examples	Direction	Majority Reaction	State Reaction	Outcome
Passive Expression	• Using the minority religion in daily life • Using minority symbols	• Towards the minority	• Viewing minority signs as a threat • Social persecution • Perception of minority signs as embarrassing	• Banning the use of minority signs • Changes to toponymy • Banning patronymy • Banning the use of minority languages	• Alienation in the majority • Marginalization in the minority → • Minority compelled to active expression • Radical segment compelled to reactive expression
Active Expression	• Seeking legitimacy in the society through mass media • Seeking rights at courts • Pressure on individuals to use minority signs	• Towards the minority • Towards the majority • Towards state mechanisms	• Viewing the quest for rights as separatism • Public campaigns • Conspiracy theories	• Lawsuits • “Exemplary” punishments of minority leaders • Restricting or banning the political expression capa-bilities of the minority	• Emergence of opposing discourses in the majority and the minority • Enmity → • Reactive expression
Reactive Expression	• Development of a discourse contradictory to the majority discourse • Opposing taboos • Violence	• Towards a change in regime • Towards influencing laws • Towards the majority	• Oppressing the state and legitimate violence • Hate discourse • Categorization of minorities	• Use of force • Deportation • Ethnic cleansing	• Separatist movements • Terrorism → • Civil war

Since this book aims to examine minorities in the Turkish context, the series of causes and effects I attempted to theorize above is constructed upon Turks in minority and minorities in Turkey.

Minorities are created; they do not emerge on their own. In some cases, a group is reduced in number. This may occur through massacres, exiles and exchanges. The group that decreases in number is made into a minority by the dominant group; meaning it is oppressed or deprived of its rights. In other cases, a group migrates from a region, possibly to avoid wars, oppression, poverty or massacre, or simply to look for a better life. The majority in the receiving country, who see themselves as the “owners” of the country transforms the newcomers into a minority, oppresses them or deprives them of their rights. In both cases, the majority—the group that sees itself entitled to every right—alienates the minority. On the other hand, the majority expects signs or proofs of loyalty from the minority, sometimes to an extent not expected of its own members, until the minority succumbs to the demands of the majority and abandons its own identity symbols. Even when assimilation is achieved, the individuals comprising the minority are sometimes reminded of their minority, because the proximity of otherness is very frightening for the majority. The religious or ethnic majority does not want to incorporate the individuals that it considers illegitimate for fear of dissolution, adulteration or at least “degeneration.” In short, being a minority in the sociological sense is linked to the legitimacy of existence. Until this legitimacy is gained, the minority views itself thus, and is thus perceived by the majority.

CHAPTER ONE

MINORITIES/MINORITY RELIGIONS: REFLECTIONS ON THE TURKISH CONTEXT

Introduction

In the Turkish context, the concept of minority is adulterated. Concepts have a dynamic life—they are born; they develop and change, and they die. The concept of minority in Turkey is in an unfavorable stage of life. The adulteration in perception extends over both sides in the Turkish context: the minorities in Turkey who are not Turks, are not considered Turks, and do not feel themselves to be Turks; and the minorities outside Turkey who are considered to be Turks or close to being Turks.

This section is less on the minorities in Turkey and more on minority religions. In other words, this part of the study attempts to investigate the practice of religions whose believers are in the minority both in numbers and from a sociological perspective, and the shifts in the dogmas of those religions. What this text argues and attempts to substantiate is that the social and historical function of a religion changes when it is in the minority, and that these changes bear similarities in the contexts of Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and even other widespread religions like Buddhism.

When focusing on fairly complex thought, faith and behavior systems, we must take care not to fall into the trap of holism, and consider the collective circumstances that shape behavior and action/reactions. Weber's rationalist analyses consider religions as systems of ideas and descriptions that serve to express one fact or another, and develops the argument that religion is an instrument adopted to reach temporal and spiritual objectives.[1] When in the minority, religious belonging needs self-confirmation and symbols, as do ethnic belonging and/or dependency on an outside society. Taking this into consideration, it is inevitable that members adopt references to religion as instruments; what is more, they form

[1] Michael Löwy, Heinz Wismann, "Max Weber, la religion et la construction du social", in *Archives de sciences sociales des religions*, n° 127, July–August 2004.

identity-based religions that not only fulfill spiritual duties, but encompass the entire socialization function.

Danièle Hervieu-Léger attempted to overcome the conflict between the "functional" definition that derails the subject because it contains too many elements, and the "nominal" definition that is too externalizing because it is dependent on "historical" religions.[2] I would argue that this text only lightly touches on theological and philosophical aspects, while emphasizing more the utilitarian and functional definitions of minority religion. Consequently, it unjustly confines the spiritual aspect to the background.

a. *Minority Religions*

I take the concept of "minority religion" to mean two things:

1. *A religion whose believers associate themselves with a group that is considered to be (or considers itself to be) smaller in number compared to a wider society.* In this case, Régis Debray suggests that the role of the religion is to "transform a mass into a whole,"[3] or to prevent the whole from deteriorating into a mass, that is, to maintain the continuity of the community throughout time and place, while adding meaning to individual existence.

Based on this definition, the Orthodox community in Turkey or the Muslim communities in Greece or France may be considered to be members of a minority religion to varying degrees. Speaking of "historical" minorities like the Orthodox in Turkey or the Muslims in Greece, there are some problems inherent in the said "belonging." From an official perspective, these minorities are "religious." It should also be noted that the majorities in both countries utilize the "religious belonging" criterion beside linguistic and historical properties to define themselves. This in turn means that the Greeks in Turkey and the Turks in Greece can only achieve legal and social existence as the products of religious existences. It is a fact that religious belonging does not encompass all criteria that establish the identity of the individuals in these minorities. What is more, even individuals who do not worship or feel spiritual ties to the religion do not oppose such categorization, and may demand it as a right when the

[2] Cf. Danièle Hervieu-Leger, *La religion pour mémoire*, Paris: Cerf, 1993.

[3] Régis Debray, *Les communions humaines: pour en finir avec 'la religion'*, Paris: Fayard, 2005.

preservation of the collective identity is in question. This means that a religious minority cannot be defined solely by considering the piety of the individuals. Religiousness is *sui generis* and independent of the behavior of the individuals. This applies in particular to the societies emerging from the Ottoman system where religious classification was the main axis that separated the society into categories. In these societies, the collective identity and belonging generated by the minority religion is stronger compared to others. The minority religion is an instrument of protection against assimilation by the majority, and a symbol of difference that must be preserved and developed.

"New minorities" such as the immigrant Muslim communities of Western Europe are not very different. Interestingly, these minorities, who live in Western societies that have abandoned the religious system and/or individualized religious faith, are in a bilateral, collective quest for identity. On the one hand, the demanded legitimacy of existence is at an individual level. In other words, individuals comprising these groups demand that their existence in the area they live in is recognized, and that they are considered equals of the other people with whom they share their environment, regardless of whether they are legally citizens. On the other hand, they are involved in a strong collective movement. Legal and sociological recognition granted to the individuals comprising the majority must also cover the entire Muslim community. It is true that the efforts to establish European Islam encounter serious ethnic, linguistic or sociological obstacles; however, belonging to the "Muslim community" is now an element of belonging to the country where they live and/or which they are citizens of. This at least applies when considering the perspective of the minority. Religious difference is not considered alien by the third generation, and the right to be different is part of the struggle for legitimacy. The collective quest for legitimacy under the umbrella term "Muslims" is also bilateral. Their discourse, with respect to the recognition and internalization of the social and cultural existence of Islam, is targeted towards the majority which is classified as "Christians" by the minority. Nevertheless, the next generation of minority, educated both in the schools of Western countries and in their neighborhood mosques, has a quest for legitimacy within itself.

Sometimes this young generation finds the religious practice of their parents rather restrained, believes that they strive to keep their practices under cover, deviating from the essence of their religion, and develops a different religiousness that is considered "truer to its roots." In other cases, the approach to religion is inspired by the positivist, individualistic

thinking of the West. In this context, religiousness becomes a method to survive in a hostile environment. According to Stéphane Lathion, the Muslim youth "frequently views their religion as an obstacle to their integration into the European community.[4] I argue that minority devotion, viewed as a continuous and contextual restructuring, is not perceived as a threat to integration—in whatever form it may take.

Turks in Europe establish a different form of religious structuring because the ethnic element in religion (and the religious element in ethnicity) is still predominant. As suggested by Niemonen,[5] American sociology, focusing on the relations among ethnic groups, did not place much importance on religious belonging. The works of Anthony Smith[6] and Michael Banton[7] support this argument. In European sociology, it is Albert Bastenier who adds the religious dimension to the analysis of ethnic groups.[8] Other sociologists like Bartheleu assert that, in their entirety, the relations among religious groups comprise part of the relations among ethnic groups.[9] Moving on from the ideas of Bastenier, we can argue the "portability" of the religion of the Turks in Europe with some nuances. In other words, all layers of religion in Turkish society, from religious orders to associations that blend politics and religion, ideological organizations and individual beliefs, have been brought to Europe since the 1960s, where they have blossomed and multiplied, and ultimately influenced developments in Turkey. But this religiosity is also dynamic, under the influence of the social environment.

One of the properties of minority religions is how they evolve pursuant to their contact with the majority community. These changes are observable in both the practice and the dogmatic structure of religion. They then cause changes in countries where the same religion is in the majority, while also shaping the development of the majority religion of the country they are in. Focusing empirical assessments on the merger of different communities where the outcome is not necessarily the assimilation of one by the other, and on the interactions of these groups, we deviate from the

[4] Stéphane Lathion, *Musulmans d'Europe: l'émergence d'une identité citoyenne*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003, p. 24.

[5] Jack Niemonen, "The race relations problematic in American sociology: A case study and critique" *The American Sociologist*, 1997, vol. 28, issue 1, p. 15–54.

[6] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnical Revival in the Modern World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

[7] Michael Banton, *Racial and Ethnic Competition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

[8] Albert Bastenier, *Qu'est-ce qu'une société ethnique*, Paris: PUF, 2004.

[9] Hélène Bertheleu, "Idéologie urbaine et relations interethniques: quelques remarques" *les Cahiers du CERIEM*, 9, 2002, p. 79–92.

ethnic group issue clarified by Fredrik Barth[10] in the context of minorities in Turkey.

The attempts of communities in Turkey to differentiate themselves becomes manifest in their difference from the "Christians" and from other Muslims, especially the Arabs. As a consequence, differentiation and interaction occur between Turks and Christians, Turks and other Muslims, and Turks living in Europe and Turks living in Turkey. The debate on headscarves is probably the best example to this trilateral interaction. Two reasons have been asserted to support banning headscarves in French schools: one being the incompatibility between the school and religion, and the other the forced subservience of young girls to their elders / men. In other words, the ultimate goal of the ban was to emancipate Muslim women from the yoke of religion and patriarchy.

According to this perspective, the practice of religion and the male approach would become more flexible. However, it was less a collective desire, namely the desire to "isolate themselves within their community," and more a need to emphasize their individual identity that motivated girls to cover their heads.[11] In other words, the perception of the headscarf did not represent the perception of the majority, who condemned the isolation of the community and demanded the individual liberation of Muslim girls. What is more, they treated those girls in the same way that their own communities did. Although fewer in number compared to other Muslim minorities in France, Turks were the first group to mobilize against the ban—particularly with the efforts of the "Süleymancı" community—which influenced the entire Muslim community in France, and even that in Turkey. Owing to this trilateral interaction, Turks in France, as minorities in two senses, played a key part in changing the attitude towards headscarves in Turkey.

2. *A system of belief reduced to minority status by another system of belief that is—or perceived to be—dominant.* In this respect, it can be argued

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[10] Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, London: Allen&Urwin, 1969. Especially in the works cited by Vermeulen and Govers, the author argues that religious belonging and its manifestation must be reprioritized within the scope of ethnic studies: Fredrik Barth, "Enduring and emerging issues in the analysis of ethnicity", in Hans Vermeulen, Cora Govers (ed.), *The Antropology of Ethnicity: Beyond Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1996.

[11] Khadija Mohsen-Finan, Vincent Geisser, "Enjeux et sens de l'affichage de son 'Islamité' dans le champs scolaire français", Remy Leveau, Khadija Mohsen-Finan (ed.), in *Musulmans de France et d'Europe*, Paris: CNRS, 2005, p. 122.

that Catholicism was a minority religion in late 19th and early 20th century France. This was not due to believers (or observers) being few in numbers; it was because they were reduced to a minority by rationalists and laics. The same can be said of Russian Orthodoxy starting with the Bolshevik revolution and ending with the restoration of religious rights revoked during the Stalin era. Similarly, the Kemalist and laic elite in Turkey reduced the Muslim community—whose numbers far surpassed that of the elite—into a minority in the 1930s and then again in the 1980s. In Turkey and France, the reduction of religion to minority by a political system or a "modernist" ideology usually occurs within the scope of the ideal-typical and exceedingly dynamic concept of "laicism."

Comparing concepts and facts is one of the most effective ways to gain an understanding of the significance of the concepts and facts in question. According to Simiand, "an unprecedented event cannot set an example."[12] The comparative method adds factual value to the assessments of a researcher who is compelled to investigate a situation in relation to another. One advantage of this method is that it prevents the abuse of the templates created. "Encountering the same phenomenon somewhere else after analyzing a problem and making deductions within a specific geographical region compels us to be more reluctant to generalize."[13] Comparing the Turkish and French instances of the concept of laicism, which is as connected to the state as to the society, is quite an onerous task. This is both due to the unawareness on the Turkish researchers' part of how tumultuous the history of laicism in France was, and the inability of the French researchers, who have come to regard French laicism as the "true" model of secularism that becomes adulterated in the event of any contextual change or adaptation, to grasp the situation in Turkey.

It is a fact that this concept has variations in political, legal and sociological perspectives in Turkish and in French. This is precisely why "…comparing the same institutions, traditions and ideas with more complete, outstanding and typical phenomena also encountered elsewhere not only facilitates determining and classifying the concept, but also makes its meaning easier to grasp."[14] The historical development of a concept such as laicism, the dynamic and interactive nature of its meaning, its fields of application, and even its internalization by societies cannot be the

[12] François Simiand, *Méthode historique et science sociale*, Paris: Archives contemporaines, 1987 [1903], p. 148.
[13] Nancy Green, *Repenser les migrations*, Paris: PUF, 202, p. 9.
[14] François Simiand, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

same. This is not only due to the difference in historical and sociological contexts, but is also owed to the fact that the existence of "concurrent societies"[15] is merely an intellectual construct devised to advance thought.

Two pitfalls that observers should avoid when utilizing the comparative method are related to "appellation." Sometimes, a concept that bears common social and political connotations may not have the same name in the two contexts. This may lead to confusion throughout the analysis and reduce the number of comparative devices.[16] In other cases, a common name that provokes a desire to compare may be used in two distinct contexts. A good example is the concept of secularism, frequently used interchangeably with laicism. In the way used by Gino Germani to analyze the nature of the transition from the ancient to the modern, this concept covers a variety of areas from the political system to family life, social reforms and demographics.[17]

The issue of homonymic concepts having different meanings in different societies is exacerbated by conceptual mobility: the meaning in question is not static; on the contrary, it is dynamic and flexible. In addition to having multiple meanings, the concept goes through stages of meanings within a given society: it matures, degenerates, and sometimes ceases to exist. Max Weber, for example, granted privileges to some dynamic concepts by restricting secularism between the sacred and profane, or by determining the location of socialization (*Vergesellschaftung*) between the community (*Gemeinschaft*) and the society (*Gesellschaft*). In the Turkish context, "modernization" is synonymic with "Westernization" or "development" and "enrichment," and is a good example of the evolution of concepts.

The above applies to the concept of laicism used across Europe, but in particular in France and in Turkey. One must take into account the illusions that may appear due to the same word being present in various European languages. The ultimate goal of investigating the stages of laicism in the two countries is to find an answer to whether forced laicism reduced Catholicism in France and Sunni Islam in Turkey to "minority religion" status.

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[15] Marc Bloch, "Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes", in *Mélanges Historiques*, Paris: EHESS, 1983 [1928], p. 16–40.

[16] 36 Mattei Dogan, Dominique Pelassy, *Sociologie politique comparative*, Paris: Economica, 1981, p. 28.

[17] Gino Germani, *Politique, société et modernisation*, Paris: Duculot, 1972, p. 64.

In almost all languages, there is conceptual and semantic confusion among "secularism," "anti-religion," "unreligious" and "disregard of the church." This is the same for Turkey. It is interesting to note that, although it has been more than one hundred and thirty years since the first Ottoman parliament was established, much of the political jargon is still of French or English origin, and this despite the "purification" efforts on the language in the 1930s. Perhaps due to the fact that Ottoman intellectuals became aware of parliamentary democracy in 1867 and did not have much time to reflect on concepts while incorporating and adapting the system to the Ottoman state, hundreds of new words were suggested to replace the words of foreign origin, to little avail.

Debate on the adaptation of some concepts to the Ottoman Turkish language first came up during the Turkish Reform era. This happened because the language, comprising Turkish, Persian and Arabic with traces of Greek, was not coherent from a linguistic perspective.

For example, throughout the late 19th century, three words could be used to express "freedom": *serbesti* (Persian: Reşit Pasha); *azad* (Persian: Şinasi) and *hürriyet* (Arabic: Rifat Pasha). The Turkish *özgürlük* was adopted as late as the 1960s. The same applies to the concept of "culture": at first, Ottomans used the word *maarif*. When this word later changed meaning to become "education," the word *irfan* entered the vernacular. This was followed by *hars* in the 1910s in the writings of sociologist Ziya Gökalp. The word started to gain connotations and took its place in the nationalist vernacular. *Kültür* has been in circulation since the proclamation of the Republic, and is rather vague at best.

The concept of laicism faced a similar fate. At first, the Arabic *ladini* ("non-religious") was used. Then, because the word also meant "heathen," it was replaced with the French *layik* in the Republican era, without regard to the significance of the word in French history. This word quickly became an ideological term instead of remaining political or sociological. Today, being "laic" in Turkey means being an individual who is completely Westernized and has severed all ties with religion. Nevertheless, the word is gradually changing meanings again with the rise of "Muslim democrats" to power.

The concept of laicism in Turkey is closely tied to power. This connection may be observed on two levels. The first is domestic: in 1924, the Kemalist regime annulled the caliphate to smother any desire to return to monarchy—a threat for the young Republic because the caliph was none other than the last sultan of the Ottoman dynasty, albeit removed from all power and privileges. The second is international: the goal was to make

the ethnicity of the Turkish nation take precedence over its religious properties, differentiating it radically from the young Arab nations of the time. Language was also an important factor in emphasizing this difference. The effort to distance the nation from the Arabic identity was not extended to other communities in the Balkans or Caucasia, who were converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. This was mainly due to the fact that the Turkish population in the 1920s included many people of Balkan or Caucasian origin who had sought refuge in Anatolia throughout the 19th century.

Nevertheless, laicism in neither Turkey nor France can be reduced to a struggle for power. Turkish laicism was a large and ambitious social design within a national project: the new nation-state would of course be Muslim, but Western at the same time—religion would be restricted to a personal spiritual role. At many turns, Kemalists associated the most folkloric aspects of Turkish Islam with superstitions that had no place in a modern society: "Is it possible to view a community of people being swayed by sheiks, sages, masters, mentors, fathers and prophets, left to the devices of sorcerers, fortunetellers and healers, as a nation?"[18]

The association between religion and "belated development" manifested itself in two interacting areas. On the one hand, following the annulment of the caliphate, a law was adopted to bring all secular or religious educational institutions established throughout the 19th century under one roof. But contrary to the practice in France, the unity of education law resulted in the closure of all religious schools until after World War II, when vocational religious schools were established with the alleged purpose of meeting the needs of the clergy. While Catholic schools continued to exist in France, Kemalists were able to close down all religious schools at once; this owed to the authoritarian regime in Turkey as much as to the lack of a permanent, institutional influence like that represented by the Catholic Church in France. Secularizing education to create a nation was desired in France too, and this became manifest in the education debate in the second half of the 19th century. Another differentiating factor is that "the Republic [in France] was established on the foundation of education,"[19] while the Republican schools in Turkey were established on a Kemalist foundation.

[18] Mustafa Kemal, Nutuk, http://ekitap.kulturturizm.gov.tr/belge/1-37409/ulkede-dirlik-ve-duzeni-kurmak-icin-uygulanan-olaganust.html; online 02.02.2013.

[19] Jean-Paul Burdy, Jean Marcou, "Introduction", in *Laicité/Laiklik, CEMOTI*, 19, janvier-juin 1995, p. 6.

On the other hand, one year after the education reform, in 1925, all religious orders and their lodges—the backbone of popular Islam in Turkey—were closed down, and were excluded from public and private spheres. There may be similarities between this ban and the ban enforced upon Catholic communities in France, but what is surprising, and even disturbing, in the Turkish case is that while more than a century had passed between the “first stage of laicism” and the “separation of religion and State” in the words of Jean Baubérot in France, the two occurred simultaneously in Turkey.

Nevertheless, one should not consider Turkish laicism as opposing religion. To the contrary, the occurrence in question is closely related to a newly emerging state feeling compelled to take the existing religious structure under its control, much like the French revolutionaries did in 1789. The Constitution of the Church adopted in 1790 required the expropriation of Church property, that the clergy swear an oath of loyalty to the Constitution, and that the same clergy continue to work as public servants, employees of the state. This is very similar to the measures adopted in Turkey in 1924. However, in 1920s Turkey, there was no clergy in the French sense due to the Ottoman Islamic system. This is why we witness the transition from a theocratic religious authority (caliphate) to a political religious authority (office of religious affairs) with the abolition of the caliphate. In this way, rural imams were not subject to attacks like the French rural pastors were, but became part of the state system, effectively domesticated by the state. If teachers are the guardians of laicism in France, imams in Turkey are second in place in the guardianship of laicism, whether they like it or not.

The two types of laicism in France and Turkey shared an immediate need for symbols and displays in everyday life to be adopted. This process of symbolization in France took place with a more radical but doubtlessly more effective, almost quasi-mystic approach that was based on a highly organized “theist and rationalist”[20] doctrine, which compelled Buisson to observe “laic devotion.”[21] In the Turkish case, anthropologist Altan Gökalp speaks of the existence of three religions: Turkish Sunni, Alevi and laic. Although conceptualized differently to how it is in France, the symbolism associated with laicism was created through the determined efforts of the

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[20] *Ibid.*

[21] For Buisson’s concept of “la foi laïque”, cf. Vincent Peillon, *Une religion pour la République: La foi laïque de Ferdinand Buisson*, Paris: Seuil, 2010.

revolutionaries. From the Kemalist perspective, laicizing place and time was only possible by "being purged of Islam," in other words, Westernization. In a strange turn of events, this process led to an ostensible "Christianization." The laicization of time occurred with the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, ignoring the names of the saints representing each day. With the adoption of Sunday as the weekly holiday, Friday became less observed as a religious holiday. Declaring only Sunday as the weekly holiday was indicative of the desire to conform to "European time." Finally, January the 1st was declared a national holiday to help spread New Year's Eve celebrations. This development was accelerated with the expansion of the television network in the 1970s. Although few Turks know that it is Saint Sylvester's day, Santa Claus brings presents to urban Turkish children on the night of December 31st!

The laicization of the environment (or the purging of Islam from it) by way of schools and People's Houses[22] was inspired by the role played by schools and municipalities, regarded as the true symbols of a modern society, in French villages. By halting the construction of new mosques in the 1920s (this went on until the 1950s, and mosque constructions boomed in the 1980s), Turkey hoped for a secular architecture to replace the classical religious architecture. Finally, the elite in both countries were very concerned about personal appearance. It is without a doubt that the enmity towards the priest's robe and the worry about the headscarf have developed under different circumstances, but under close examination, they both represent a social perspective that requires religiousness to be invisible in the public sphere.

What motivated the Kemalists in Turkey was the concealment of markers of religious identity, hopefully followed by religion losing its significance. It is worth noting that the ban on wearing religious attire in public (1934) and the attire reform (1925) met with more resistance than adopting the Latin script. Although the attire reform is purported to be aiming at changing the attitudes and mentalities of the people, the desire of Kemalists to replace the old society with a new, European-looking people at the touch of a magic wand cannot be overlooked. This made Muslims into a minority and the headscarf or *turban* was perceived as an instrument of opposition and a reaction to the desire to hide the visible differences between the Turkish and Western societies. Interestingly, the

[22] Kemal Karpat, "The Impact of the People's Houses on the Development of Communication in Turkey (1931–1951)", in Kemal Karpat, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays*, Leiden: Brill, 2004, p. 401–417.

generals of the 1980 military coup took the "Turco-Islamic synthesis" approach[23] to new heights to prevent communist and religious movements from taking hold on one hand, while they strengthened the measures against wearing headscarves in the public sphere on the other. The objective may be considered to be increasing the influence of Islam while erasing its appearance. To this end, a series of decrees were adopted in 1981 and 1982 to impose strict dress codes on all public servants from government office clerks to professors, and on all students from primary school to university. Since the adoption of these decrees, wearing a headscarf came to be considered a "not-so-innocent" behavior.

The emergence of a headscarf issue in primary and secondary schools in France coincides with these developments in Turkey. There, the purpose was to determine the degree to which the Muslim phenomenon could be in concord with democracy and laicism. However, neither the society nor the elite in France were prepared for such a confrontation at the time. As a result, the reactions of the French authorities were almost identical to those in Turkey: banning headscarves in schools; the establishment of a representative authority to help the state keep religion under control (CFCM); the desire for imams working in France to be trained in a manner specific to the country; and the demand to ensure that the observance of Islam in the country is harmonized with the prevailing circumstances (and the resulting argument that a French Islam exists). In the last analysis, the attitude of the central French government is not that different from that of the central Turkish government. The public display of Islam is perceived a threat to laicism, a pillar of government in both countries.

The headscarf case reinforces anxieties and doubts in France and Turkey within the same context, and creates a perpetual environment of argument and opposition. The adaptation and implementation of the concept of laicism in France draws the reaction of both conservative Muslim circles and some Protestants who view these measures as a threat against freedom of faith. Meanwhile, a constant tension exists between public schools and private (Catholic and Protestant) schools with respect to the content of the curriculum, admission to schools, and funding. In Turkey, these measures meet with reaction from various segments of society and spark debates. While liberal democrats consider Turkish laicism

[23] For the imposition of the Turco-Islamic synthesis on masses, cf. Etienne Copeaux, *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine*, Istanbul: İletişim, 2006.

too governing and interfering, the Alevi accuse laicism of not recognizing their religion and giving the Sunni an advantage. Even conservative Sunnis criticize Turkish laicism for being essentially Kemalist laicism. This debate has never died down since the proclamation of the Republic, and has intensified with the emergence of political Islam in the 1960s. However, as of 2010, this religious-political movement holds and exercises power legitimately and singlehandedly for the first time. This is why the debate has become of paramount importance to the Westernized elite who worry that this turn of events will corrode and eventually destroy laicism. The implications of the laicism debate extend over public and even private life, the place of religious education in public schools, and the influence of the armed forces on politics.

The uses of the concept of laicism have unique properties when a group that does not belong to the majority religion is in question. First and foremost, in unitary and uniform states like France and Turkey, the relationships between minorities and the state are more problematic, and the concept of laicism gains additional meanings. From the perspective of religious minorities, laicism generates two types of reaction: some minorities view it as the guarantee of freedom of faith and worship, and support it, while others experience it as a restriction in the minds of the dominant majority against accepting their identities, and criticize it. Both reactions can be observed in Turkey and in France.

We can speak of a change in the foundation and practice of laicism in France: there is a transition from the "laicism of struggle" between two establishments represented by the State and the Church to an institutionalized laicism, and then to another form of laicism which, despite having strengthened its position, has an uncertain future, and is being challenged. Similarly, laicism in Turkey changes from an imposed Republican laicism to a coercive yet institutionalized laicism, followed by a "laicism of struggle" that preserves its institutional quality nevertheless. In both cases, the fourth stage of "laicism becoming laic" has not yet occurred.

Even if we assume that laicism is systematic and secularism is societal, the implementation and perception of these two concepts change when minorities are in question. The state has a propensity towards dominating and exercising a monopoly on all aspects of socialization, particularly in nation-states. This monopoly is accepted by the dominant group of the nation-state, in other words, the religious community that comprises the nation, but the religious minority rejects the intervention of the state in its religious affairs, and its attempts at making religion normative in lieu of minority institutions. In this respect, the minority views the state as a

challenger and the state perceives the minority as a group before which the state has to make compromises in sovereignty. On both sides, the social practice of religion and particularly its appearance go well beyond the spiritual and become political in the etymological sense of the word. If it is assumed that laicism is a system in which the state remains at equal distance to all religious institutions, the minority groups that have not been legitimized, or included in the nation, remain outside the system, whether the state recognizes no religions (the French case), all religions (the Belgian case) or only some institutionalized religions (the German case).

One cannot deny that minorities have a special position regarding secularization. It is known that language and religion are the most important markers of identity. In these cases, religion becomes the vital support mechanism of the minority identity which always feels under threat. In other words, minorities are theoretically less secular compared to contexts where the same groups are dominant. The latter piece of data naturally plays a large part in the minority-state and minority-majority relations.

b. *Religious Identity and Minority Identity: The Use of Belonging*

The connection between religious identity and minority identity can be sought in two fields: first in the relationships among members of a group that constitutes a majority (in the context of Benedict Anderson's "imagined" emotional bonds that exist in parallel to the sentiment of national loyalty[24]), and secondly in the relationships between minorities and majorities (in Georg Simmel's approach, within the geographical but contested bonds that exist in parallel to the struggle for legitimization[25]). The first field, or the field that contains the bonds between ethnic identity and religious identity, has become well known since the work of Dominique Schnapper. According to Schnapper, the dimension of religion that pertains to a "vertical" superior being gradually transformed into a "horizontal" dimension that represents the ideal of solidarity between people.[26]

[24] Cf. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, New York: Verso, 2000.

[25] Pierre Noreau, "Le droit comme forme de socialisation: Georg Simmel et le problème de la légitimité", in *Revue française de Science Politique*, 1995, 45 (2), p. 282–304.

[26] Dominique Schnapper, "Le religieux, l'Ethnique et l'Ethnico religieux", in *Archives des Sciences Sociales des Religions*, 81, 1993.

Throughout the nation building process, from the second half of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century, religious belonging has been one of the key elements of ethnic belonging.[27] As long as religion continues to play a role in the foundation of nations, the ethnic-national identity will continue to utilize religious symbols that also help to fortify the unity of the group as a means to display its difference from the "other nearby." This is the phenomenon that is called the "symbolization of religious distinctions" by Hervieu-Léger: "The inclination towards associating the ethnic with the religious emerges from the fact that both create social bonds stemming from a family tree claimed by the other (a natural family tree due to its references to blood and land on one hand, and a symbolic family tree due to being created by belief in a legend or a founding narrative on the other)."[28]

These two systems often intersect; religious belonging serves to complete national loyalty, and acts as a shield against the opposing group that is in the majority and the surrounding minority groups, usually effectively. Loyalty to the national identity is more intense in diasporas, as seen in Jews, Armenians[29] and even the Turkish.[30]

This intensified loyalty more often than not chooses to utilize religious symbols instead of national ones, as seen in Ireland or in multi-religious regions like the Balkans. Alexandre Popovic's works show that Islam is an instrument of collective association that is far more important than language or ethnicity.[31] Similarly, other researchers point out that religious revival accompanies ethnic revival, and even has priority over it.[32] The close bond between religious belonging and ethnic belonging is not unique to Europe. Despite the overarching discourse on the adoption of the American identity, religious belonging in Catholic, Jewish[33] and

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[27] Cf. Gabriel Audisio (ed.), *Religion et identité*, Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l'Université de Provence, 1998.

[28] Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *La religion pour mémoire*, Paris: Cerf, 1993, p. 228.

[29] Cf. Martine Hovanessian, *Le lien communautaire, trois generations d'Arméniens*, Paris: Armand Colin, 1992, p. 194–199.

[30] Cf. Samim Akgönül, *Religions de Turquie, religions des Turcs: nouveaux acteurs dans l'Europe élargie*, Paris: L'Harmattan, collection "competences interculturelles", 2005, p. 97–108.

[31] Cf. Alexandre Popovic, *Les musulmans des Balkans à l'époque post-ottomane*. Histoire et politique, Istanbul: Isis, 1994.

[32] Cf. Xavier Bougarel, Nathalie Clayer (ed.), *Le nouvel Islam balkanique: les musulmans acteurs du post-communisme*. 1990–2000, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001.

[33] Nathan Glazer, Daniel Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot. The Negroes, Puertoricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963.

Muslim[34] communities in the United States is very important in preserving ethnic belonging.

This phenomenon of a fusion between religious and ethnic identities is observed in the unitary nations of Western Europe, and includes majority groups. According to Hervieu-Léger, this "ethnic-religious reconquest" has reasons that stem directly from modernization:

> The mutual competition between ethnic revivals and religious revivals in the democratic societies of the West provides a field that is as conducive for analyzing the possible connection between these two phenomena as any other. At the starting point of this analysis, it must be noted that both methods of renewal give a similar –affectionate and sentimental– response to the desires to understand the individual *raison d'être* and to be accepted. The abstractness of modern societies that are governed by the classification of individuals based on personal effort and achievement uncovers this response in an ever more urgent way: the religious and ethnic factors act in parallel or in unison to contribute to the concessionary reconstruction of the 'we' that modernization devastates and ironically exacerbates the need for.[35]

To this analysis we must add the increasing visibility of minority religions, which manifests the contest between minority religions with the established religion, and is accepted more and more within the framework of the values upheld by human rights. Meanwhile, the majority religion considers itself legitimate and develops strategies for self-defense. In this respect, the increase in the number of baptized adults in France[36] cannot be explained simply by the rebirth of religion. This is also a response to religions other than Catholicism that come into the limelight (including Islam). As a result, we witness changes in majority religions that are in the process of modernization with the newfound partnership between religion and the ethnic. In the post-modern Western world, religion is now a part of "modernity."[37]

Religious elements that are used for the establishment, protection and reinforcement of social bonds within the minority have a similar inherent logic, save for some differences unique to minorities. In both minorities that have been established through migration or population exchanges

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[34] Malika Zeghal, "L'Islam aux Islam aux Etats-Unis: une nouvelle religion publique?", in *Politique étrangère,* 1, 2005, p. 49–60.

[35] Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

[36] Only 2000 adults were baptized in the 1980s compared to 10,000 in 2005: http://www.eurel.info/spip.php?rubrique21; online 02.02.2013.

[37] Cf. Antony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

and minorities whose legitimacy is derived from being a historically established community (in some cases, such as the Greeks in Turkey, the history of the minority on the land may be older than that of the majority[38]), the pillars of identity have three elements: the minority language, minority religion, and loyalty to the same group that is the majority elsewhere. The protection of consistency within the minority group hinges on the ability of the group's elite to use these three elements. What is more, when a group is in the minority, carrying the minority language becomes exceedingly difficult due to the dominance of the surrounding majority language, and the denial of sanctity to language rights. This applies to minorities that have their own education systems, like the Muslim communities of Greece or Bulgaria.[39]

The recent advances in travel and communication have facilitated bonding with the "motherland." However, these bonds spark the accusation that the minority group maintains dual or multiple loyalty to other states, and are regarded with suspicion by the majority group. This attitude applies to Jews in Europe.

In this way, religious belonging becomes the pillar that is the easiest to transfer (and is the most untouchable), and wholly undertakes the role of being an element of association.

Demand for Rights / Separation into Categories

Voltaire, when defining "identity" in his *Dictionnaire philosophique,* says, "this term means 'sameness'. The same meaning could have been given with the word 'sameness'. ... In short, what creates your identity, or the sameness of your personality, is only memory." Religious belonging is one of the elements that create this sameness. It is not unexpected therefore that it thrives in an environment of "otherness", in other words, minorities. Of course, religious identity is not the only element that makes a community. Identity is not singular and is a complex entity where meanings can be variable. It is neither singular nor constant; neither uniform nor has a single meaning.[40]

However, when minorities are in question, religion fulfills a function that is beyond its role pertaining to spirituality and time. This applies

[38] Cf. Samim Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-Devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci*, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007.

[39] Cf. Samim Akgönül, *Une minorité, deux États: la minorité turco-musulmane de Thrace occidentale*, Istanbul: İsis, 1999.

[40] Amin Maalouf, *Identités meurtrières*, Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 1998, p. 16.

particularly to the regions where the world's three main religions have their roots.[41] Transformation to a religion of identity influences other regions where the coexistence of Christians, Muslims and Jews became commonplace with easier collective community movements. In the words of philosopher Pierre Million, the "identical core of religion"[42] invades all layers of belonging in the case of minorities. Religion is not merely a belonging, but moves in this direction when a group fears the annihilation or assimilation of its differences, whether with or without cause.

This is where the minority makes its bilateral demand for rights—a demand that the majority has difficulty understanding. First, "active minorities" demand the legitimacy of their belonging with the entire society, wanting to have identical rights before law and identical status before the society. This demand of being "identical" applies to both "historical" and immigrant minorities. On the other hand and in contradiction, the same "active minorities" defend their difference with fervor and seek to ensure its protection. This bilateral demand for rights ("identity" and "difference") causes tension in the society. The majority, because religious difference is a most significant otherness, rejects this identity by restricting the minority to delimited categories on one hand, and demands that the minority behaves the way the majority behaves on the other. Based on the thoughts of Schnapper, we can assert the following: having severed its ties with principal belongings and behaviors under the supervision of religious institutions and transformed into a repository of signs and values, religion becomes a very malleable and symbolic raw material that is subject to being reshaped in accordance with the interests of certain groups. These groups render objects of faith gradually more metaphoric, absent references to a personal God.

Customs and Attitudes: The Use of Behaviors

Behaviors and ways of life that emerge in connection with a religion enable individuals to socialize within a group while providing consistency to that group to preserve its difference. In this respect, monotheistic religions where the behaviors in question are fairly well-coded have a special position, at least in Western societies. In the case of minorities, any behavior that does not conform to these rules of coding results in

[41] Cf. Bernard Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, London: Phoenix, 1999.
[42] Yves Lambert, "Noyau identitaire du religieux face à l'analyse comparatiste", in *Philosophie, Langages et Cognition*, 1998, 19, p. 17–44.

the exclusion of the individual from the group, and is even viewed as betrayal. The symbolic legacy of historical religions has not only been made available to individuals to freely create a spiritual world that enables them to add meaning to their existence, but also has paved the way for collective utilizations where symbols, primarily religious ones, are used in identical mobilization.

In many cases, worship means more than a simple manifestation of faith. Under authoritarian regimes, observing religious requirements meant opposing the authority—hence a large number of people claimed they "worshipped without believing."[43] Minority religions also have worshippers who do not believe. Individuals of minorities, who would have become distanced from religion due to their social, economic and intellectual profiles had they been in the majority, develop an affinity with the places where the minority group congregates. Religious observance is the first among these. Consequently, worship cannot be used as a measure of faith or observance, at least in the case of minority religions. Nevertheless, as one of the arguments in this text is the increasing importance of religion when in the minority, worship cannot be wholly overlooked. Le Bras says, "Since the door to the shelter of spirits is firmly locked, let us be content with studying the behavior."[44]

The—now criticized—conceptualization of "religious commitment" by Stark and Glock is comprised of five dimensions:[45]

- Faith
- Worship
- Consciousness
- Experience
- Belonging

These elements are regarded relatively independent of each other, and must be supported by statistical research. However, it should not be forgotten that "religious commitment" as a whole cannot be summarized in five categories. A quantitative study of religious faith and worship requires the definition of religious commitment and a description of what the

[43] Cf. Patrick Michel, *La société retrouvée, Politique et Religion dans l'Europe soviétisée*, Paris: Fayard, 1988.

[44] Cf. Gabriel Le Bras, *Études de sociologie religieuse*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956.

[45] Rodney Stark, Charles Glock, *American Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment*, Los Angeles: Press of California University, 1970, p. 57–64.

researcher accepts as worship. If faith is composed of behaviors acquired by individuals in relation to a superior being or a force perceived as sublime and mysterious, it first and foremost "represents a relationship of subservience, restriction, and the acceptance of the powerlessness of humankind."[46]

In contrast, when religious commitment is in the minority, it is shaped as much by worldly concerns as by religious concerns. The individuals of a minority rely on the "formality" of their ways of existence and life resulting from the "authenticity" of the culture they possess to assign a utilitarian meaning to their behavior. In relation to religious experience, we often observe that individuals resort to two methods to make faith formal.[47] This occurs first by rendering the faith rational to make it an important, even ordinary, part of everyday life, and then by establishing—or adhering to—more or less consistent institutions that ensure the continuity of this faith across times and places, and the meaningfulness of its existence.

When an individual feels in the minority, the "continuity and meaningfulness of existence" begins with the protection of vital values considered to be under threat of disappearing. Under these circumstances, becoming part of a structure serves three functions: First, the individual understands that they are not alone and that the group continues to exist, casting aside their concerns and enabling them to gain confidence. Second, a collective campaign is launched against other individuals that threaten the continuity of the group; and third, a message of strength and legitimacy is given to the majority, which is considered to be threatening the existence of the group and the legitimacy of the minority religion.

Measuring the level of worship is not easy. The study of worshipping in minorities must consider both the personal and the collective meanings given by the actors to their behaviors. The "Phota" feast of retrieving a cross from the sea on January 6th to celebrate the Epiphany also serves to prove to Turks that the Greeks in Turkey still exist, few in numbers as they may be. A young person retrieves the cross, which shows that the minority still has vigor and strength. Similarly, the celebration of Muslim feasts in Haguenau is a manifestation of unity with other people from Turkey, and even with all the Muslims of the world, and the evidence of belonging to a much larger global community. A religious minority acts locally, but feels the need to act in a way that is appropriate to a diaspora to prove that it

[46] Sabino Acquaviva, Enzo Pace, *La sociologie des religions*, Paris: Cerf, 1994, p. 82.

[47] Cf. Jean-Pierre Deconchy, *Orthodoxie religieuse et sciences sociales*, Paris: Mouton, 1980.

belongs to a group that is dominant, or at least demographically more influential, elsewhere in the world.[48] Herzhaft-Marin illustrates that the meticulous religious observance of the Jewish community in a city as diverse as London is an indication of their strong fidelity to Jews across the whole world.[49]

Determining the number of worshippers by following in the footsteps of Gabriel Le Bras is not only beneficial but also necessary. However, when the relationship between the minority and the majority is in question, the frequency and intensity with which minority individuals worship has no bearing on the categories established by the majority or the minority itself. An Orthodox in Turkey is an Orthodox, regardless of whether he worships or not. This applies to the Orthodox in Albania and the Muslims in France.

Being able to sever their ties with religion more easily, members of the majority take the ways of life of outsiders who have settled in the country only recently as a starting point to consider religious minority groups too isolated, and their practices and beliefs too outdated. On the other hand, active minorities continually test the religious memory to maintain a "formality" that is appropriate to a founding legend and customs observed elsewhere.

c. *Authenticity and Newness: Reshaped Religious Memory*

Halbwachs' approach is functional in two ways regarding the study of religious minorities:[50] in modern societies, "the increasing pace of change, the dominance of instant communication, and the widespread roaming of commodities, people, capital, information and symbols lead to issues of memory and forgetfulness being central to the efforts for understanding the modern world."[51] In the case of established religious minorities, religious memory becomes one of the primary instruments of protecting the

[48] Cf. Christian Bromberger, Pierre Centlivres, Gérard Colomb, "Entre le local et le global: les figures de l'identité", in Martine Ségalen (ed.), *L'Autre et le semblable*, Paris: Presses du CNRS, 1989, p. 137–145.

[49] Yvette Herzhaft-Marin, "Les Juifs de Londres", in Maurice Blanc, Sylvie Le Bras (ed.), *Les minorités dans la cité: perspectives comparatives*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993, p. 53–68.

[50] Passages from two works by Maurice Halbwachs have been cited in the following lines: *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1925 and *La mémoire collective*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950.

[51] Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Jean-Paul Willaime, *Sociologies et religions: approches classiques*, Paris: PUF, 2001, p. 196.

identity. Time is perceived by these religious minorities as a threat because it plays a part in adopting the majority culture, and the rediscovered and relayed memory becomes the best defense.

According to Halbwachs, individual memory cannot develop independently of collective memory. The social and cultural conditions of the present direct the collective movement of memories and cause the creation of a powerful and exclusionary religious memory in religious minorities. Such creation has to incorporate new contextual elements, willingly or otherwise. However, when the representatives of the historical legitimacy of oldness and authenticity approach these new elements with a very strict attitude, fossilization occurs.

Halbwachs speaks of memories that become plural across time and place. This fragments collective memory into smaller units that concern communities with low population only. But this does not apply to minorities. Being in the minority prevents fragmentation. Memory, particularly religious memory, is preserved carefully, relayed, and is mostly closed to changes. What is more, fossilization usually contains only the simplest and most visible elements of customs. Customs that are defunct and forgotten where a religion is in the majority are either preserved or utilized as a way of reaction when the same religion is in the minority, and become pillars for the minority to support itself within the majority.

According to Halbwachs, religious memory is hybrid: "All religions, more or less symbolically, trace the history of migrations, the interfusion of races and peoples, important events that serve as the foundation of worshipping societies, and of wars, institutions, inventions and reforms."[52] In other words, religious memory is under continuous restructuring. "[It is in] an effort for a mythology of interpretation that perverts the ways of thinking, or at least the organization, of institutions of old."[53] In this way, individuals of religious minorities resort to bringing rational explanations to customs in order to give them legitimacy in the eyes of the majority. Fasting in Islam is defended by the argument that it helps digestion; the Copts in Egypt defend circumcision for sexual health, etc. Consequently, a custom is never back on the agenda with the meaning it used to possess in the past. The return to the roots of a religion is never authentic.

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[52] Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Paris: Albin Michel, 1994, p. 178.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 182.

Resilience and Revival: Properties of Minority Religions

Customs that are presented as the heritage of ancestors are in fact revivals created by adaptation. This revival takes ownership of a memory that is under continuous reconstruction, or attempts to bring new explanations and affirmations to an existing memory.

The inclination of customs blended with conservatism to keep up with the modern times may be illustrated by three examples. On March 18th 2005, a female American imam, Amina Wadud (Professor of Religion and Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University) of a New York mosque led the Friday prayer of a mixed-gender community (male and female believers stood together), and delivered the sermon afterwards.[54] Although this was a behind-the-scenes attempt as expressed by the conservative community, what is interesting here is that the attempt was made under circumstances where the community was in the minority by population, and had been pushed further into minority status due to the negative image of Islam in the aftermath of 9/11. An advance that shook the establishment so severely could not have occurred in an environment where Islam was in the majority, or where the population of Muslims was large in number.

The second example illustrating the need for adapting customs to the present day when in the minority is the evolutionary but sometimes contradictory fatwas issued by the European Council for Fatwa studied by Alexandre Caeiro. As the minority status of Islam is gradually recognized and heeded, fatwas try to adapt to the contemporary context. For example, the issue of Muslim women marrying non-Muslims is frequently discussed. Until recently, fatwas strongly condemned such marriages; whereas now, they tend to tolerate interreligious marriages: "Men in Europe do not dominate women; therefore, women are not barred from practicing and observing their religion."[55]

Another example of the propensity of attitudes towards change is the support given by the Orthodox clergy in Turkey to dialog among religions through frequent attempts. This includes dialog among Christian denominations. However, the Greek Church opposes both the dialog between Islam and Christianity, and Geneva's call to unite all Christian churches.

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54 *New York Times*, 19.03.2005.

55 Alexandre Caeiro, "The European Council for Fatwa and Research", in *The Production of Islamic Knowledge in Western Europe*, 4th Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 19–23 March 2003. http://www.academia.edu/1578719/CAEIRO_The_Making_of_the_Fatwa; online 02.02.2013.

I do not argue that the dogma went through a change. What changes are religious attitudes. Ultimately, this may result in the slow evolution of the dogma. In truth, dogma does not need to be transformed. By adopting staunch, unchanging religious principles, the pious actually reinterpret them while also keeping the majority in mind.

This may be the reason why minority religions are so open to dialog among religions. Dialog is a popular issue today and the number of groups making such initiatives is on the rise, books on the subject become bestsellers, conferences attract a large number of participants, and politicians and clergy, along with the believers, pay more and more attention to the phenomenon.

Cases of dialog among religions have been increasing since the early 1990s, particularly in Europe: Leaders of different religions make joint declarations; religions come together to advocate the same issues or to commemorate or condemn an important item on the global agenda at the time; believers of different religions organize regular events together; and a growing number of associations that bring together different denominations expend a great effort to nurture a climate of interreligious tolerance.[56]

The most important struggle of the representatives of a religious movement in any society is that against the secularism associated with atheism. Meanwhile, the debate on irreligion or blasphemy[57] has come to be accompanied by a much larger discussion that includes other religions and considers their plurality, diversity, and the similarities or contentions among them. This discussion emphasizes the importance of accepting and tolerating other religions. Migration has caused irreversible changes to the religious landscapes of developed nations. It cannot be denied that this recent occurrence has enabled people of different religions to coexist in a more peaceful environment over the last three decades. Multi-religious establishments existed before, but the separate communities were living in a state of mutual indifference.

Meanwhile, there are voices of warning or even objection that draw attention to the hazards of an extremely widespread movement, state

[56] Anne-Sophie Lamine, *La cohabitation des Dieux: pluralité religieuse et laïcité*, Paris: PUF, 2004, p. 2.

[57] Interreligious dialog was born in 1893 with the convention of an "international religious parliament" to bring together all forces for the purpose of fighting against "all kinds of irreligion." Jean-Claude Basset, *Le dialogue interreligieux. Histoire et avenir*, Paris: Cerf, 1996, p. 409–410.

their concerns and hesitations, and claim the need to take precautions parallel to the growing interest in other religions and the expansion of interreligious dialog. From the Muslim perspective, a large number of fundamentalist movements regard these attempts at dialog as missionary moves by Christians to win proponents for their ulterior motives, and openly and strictly denounce such attempts. As for Protestants, the Protestant and Lutheran (Reformed) churches are wary of these developments, while Evangelist movements openly oppose and condemn them.

As for the Catholic community, the *Dominus Iesus* document published in 2000 serves as a strict reminder of the limits to those choosing to initiate dialog with other religions. Unrelated events like the instability in many Arab nations, particularly in Algeria, and the 9/11 attacks have led some circles to believe that any sort of dialog with Islam is impossible. In this context, there are talks of religions that only maintain enmity and belligerence against other religions, whose inherent intolerance leads to murders and even massacres.

Despite all these problems and difficulties, dialog among religions continues to have an undeniably positive image among Western nations. It is necessary to create and maintain this positive image of dialog among religions. All parties to this dialog are in varying degrees of doubt and conflict. They continue to doubt the true motives of their counterparts, while displaying genuine warmth and maintaining the desire to continue this partnership because it will be in the interests of both parties. To discuss the motives and expected outcomes of dialog among religions, first we must classify the various forms of dialog, know the parties better, and quantify the attempts made.

Dialog among religions occurs in various ways. Some are low-key events while others may be highly significant, with more or less important outcomes. We may start with the most visible attempt: talks between the spiritual leaders of religions. We must exercise caution here. Dialog among religions is not the theological study, analysis and understanding of religions. It is without a doubt that spiritual leaders who initiate this dialog have a certain amount of information about their "counterparties." But the purpose of dialog is not to collect more theological data about the other religion. In fact, while Christian leaders are keenly interested in knowing and understanding Islam better, this sentiment is not shared by Muslim leaders. As a result, religions almost always have asymmetrical knowledge of each other. Notwithstanding, at least a minimum level of knowledge is required to establish tangible dialog. Parties must know who they are talking to, and on what subject. Not knowing enough about the other party

may lead to contempt for that party. The very purpose of dialog among religions is to overcome these disagreements and prejudices.

Dialog between two religions is not negotiation. It is not an approach that asserts its righteousness or defines "others" as people of wrong ideas and heretic faith. Neither is it the comparison of opposite beliefs that all groups have acquired in response to the beliefs of others. The comparison of faiths may have disastrous outcomes as most faiths are dogmatic and it is impossible to persuade others that their creed is wrong. Dialog between two religions does not involve proselytizing. Dialog among religions should not be confused with ecumenism either. Ecumenism aims to unite the various Christian denominations (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Anglican, etc.). Its objective is to achieve a commonality of denominations that have their roots in the same faith. Ecumenism has also awoken the desire for greater expansion in some Christian movements.

Dialog between two religions occurs between two main religions, or their followers. In other words, dialog is not between Christianity and Islam, but between Christians and Muslims. Its purpose is neither to unite these two religions nor to merge them into a "super-religion." Nor is dialog among religions the fortification of religions against a secular world composed of "heathen" individuals. To the contrary, negotiation between "laics" and believers is not overlooked.

The secondary players in the dialog are ordinary believers who are influential on a local level. These attempts aim to maintain good terms with the others locally. In other words, the majority and the minorities try to overcome their differences to prevent tension, not to become enriched with the knowledge of other religions.

A third type of dialog is not on a level of individuals (spiritual leaders or ordinary believers), but on a level of communities, groups or "Christian circles." This is the most widespread form of dialog among religions, particularly in the West. Especially in France, local dialog groups exist even in the smallest towns without the tangible input of the clergy there. This frequently occurs in towns with a Muslim community. In other words, the presence of Muslims in "non-Christian countries" (a problematic term in its own right) and the efforts of the Christians to understand them and to quell the tension arising out of cohabitation act as a catalyst to dialog among religions, and even among cultures. I believe that if the presence of Muslim communities was not perceived as a "problem," one of the reasons this third level of dialog exists would disappear.

Circumstances of dialog may vary depending on the situation, due to the fact that the players have different agendas. The two extremes of

dialog are "syncretism" and "expansion for expansion's sake." The true motives of the players are somewhere in between. It is possible to classify these motives. It should however be noted that motives may vary depending on external factors, and that the same player may possess a variety of motives without a clear explanation. Motives change from simple intellectual curiosity to a genuine desire to coexist in peace, interacting with the believers of other religions as an everyday occurrence, a desire to convert, a quest for mysticism, and seeking personal benefits or benefits for one's own religious community.

Similarly, the desired outcomes vary depending on the situation. It must be admitted that religion-related tangible demands have much greater priority among these outcomes than debates related to spiritual dogmas. No religion aims to change the essence of its religion or the practices of it blended with the group's own culture, customs and various interpretative explanations through dialog among religions. The purpose is limited to different religious groups knowing and understanding each other[58]; this almost never results in being influenced by the spiritual world of the counterparty or becoming a part of it, at least in the short or medium term.

When talking about the "civil" ambitions of dialog among religions, it is often asserted that modern society has become global. This view argues that the world is one large settlement where everyone lives together. According to this approach, dialog is not only necessary, it has become unavoidable as all peoples mingle with each other. From this perspective, we may posit four scenarios:[59]

- First is "conflict," where all groups vie for supremacy. A group imposes its laws, customs, culture and religion on all others, resorting to enslaving and even annihilating entire communities. This scenario does not allow for dialog among religions. In Max Weber's terms, this is the epicenter of the "war of the gods"—or to put it a better way, "war in the name of gods."
- The second scenario is "laicism," which requires the indiscriminate enforcement of an identical system, laws and rules for everyone, regardless of differences among cultures or religions. Anyone wishing to

[58] According to the statement of the Rome and Asiz conventions of the Interreligious Assembly in October 1999, dialog among religions is an "expedition."

[59] André Gounelle, "Le dialogue interreligieux", conference at the Protestant Church of Vannes, France, 01.12.2001.

preserve their differences may not do so in public areas—the home or specially designated locations are to be used for this purpose. This scenario has the "liberal" nomenclature in the US and "laic" in Europe, and has worked quite well in many Western or Westernized nations where the church and the state are segregated. However, it has some inherent problems. First of all, common rules inevitably represent the values of one of the groups involved. Therefore, these values uphold an artificial universality or impartiality.

- Third is the scenario of "syncretism" which believes that all religions should unite and fuse in order to alleviate differences and create a united people. In this case, the gains of each and every religion will be accepted by all and applied in unison. This will result in a single religion and single culture that considers the values, customs and even doctrines of all groups, merges these elements, and blends them within syncretism. This view has been discussed or foreseen by the American philosopher Emerson and British historian Toynbee.
- The fourth and last "diagonal" scenario is humbler, less-planned but more pragmatic than the others. Contrary to the second scenario above, differences are not avoided or otherness is not excluded by society. Differences are not meant to be alleviated by violence or mutual understanding as discussed in the first and third scenarios, respectively. "Otherness" will need to be observed here: diversity must be embraced without attempting to conceal or annihilate it, and this must be done by trying to understand differences, to know each other better, and to communicate with others.

The two most important organizations that support dialog among religions today follow the fourth scenario. These are the International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF) and the World Conference of Religions for Peace. As their names imply, the intents of these organizations are not religious in the restricted sense of the word, but civil or societal.

The visible outcomes of these different methods of dialog contradict each other. Although lacking a clear objective and being condemned by all religions, pro-syncretism movements exist. For example, American universalists in the United States hold masses where passages from the Bible, Buddhist mantras and verses in Koran are read and other religious—and even profane—practices are brought together. It is not uncommon for Japanese tea rituals to be followed by the Communion in these masses. It is becoming more commonplace for individuals to construct their

personal spiritual world by taking elements from various religions. Belief in reincarnation is merged with Christian rites and doctrines, and sprinkled with some Buddhist traditions. This leads to a smorgasbord of religious elements where an individual is at liberty to pick and choose as he or she likes, creating a personal religion as opposed to a faith for a community. But syncretism follows a different path. Its purpose is to craft a monolog out of dialog among religions, where all ideas merge and fuse. Without going that far, it can be observed that some behaviors that had been religious in the beginning are now cultural. These customs may be adopted by groups that have had no involvement in establishing them, or even by groups that compete with the religion that has created the custom in question. For example, Santa Claus is a common sight in the streets of large cities in Muslim countries. Similarly, circumcision has become common practice in many Western countries that have Muslim or Jewish populations.

Of course, it is difficult to assert that these shifting customs are the direct result of dialog among religions. This is the result of social and cultural communication more than spiritual proximity. What is more, some theology experts, although few in numbers, believe that dialog among religions has spiritual reasons. According to Gérard Reynal, "Christians will nurture a more insatiable and careful belief in the sublimity, greatness and indisputable oneness of God thanks to Muslims, and Muslims will realize that they need to make connections between the sublimity of God and His closeness to mortals, thanks to Christians. … Buddhists have helped some Christians rediscover their inner worlds and start to derive pleasure from meditation again."[60] This Christian perspective, of course, is not accepted by everyone, and gives rise to syncretic attitudes. Some religions like the Turkish Alevi, on the other hand, are composed of syncretism by nature.

Historically, the concept of "syncretism"[61] was first used to express the concord between various philosophical or religious doctrines, and then the fusing (or the illusion thereof) among these doctrines. Subsequently, historians of religions used this concept to describe religions that cannot maintain their initial uniqueness and are thus receding: this is the reason why the Eastern idolatries (worship in Isis, Serapis, Mithra and others) reinterpreted by the Hellenes during the Ancient Roman era, particularly

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[60] Gérard Reynal, "le dialogue interreligieux ou l'art de la rencontre", http://ict.iscam.net/

[61] "Syncretism" derives from the Greek "συνκρετισμος," literally, "the union of Cretans."

during the 2nd century AD, are considered religions that are the product of syncretism. Today, the concept of syncretism refers to the phenomenon of religions mingling with one another. The mingling of religions may give rise to new and hybrid movements, or may be restricted to a certain religious group adopting elements that are alien to it. Contrary to the concept of "synthesis" which is associated with organic fusion, "syncretism" usually has negative connotations because it is a non-denominational mixing that gives way to a hybrid religion. The rise of certain beliefs, such as the expanding Christian belief in reincarnation, is associated with the phenomenon of syncretism. Another example is the "New Age" phenomenon that brings together discrete religious elements (Western occultism with Eastern religious doctrines and contemporary theories in psychology). The majority of religious leaders condemn syncretism because they consider it the outcome of a unionist motive, therefore finding it artificial.[62] This is actually wrong since syncretic behavior appears to be occurring naturally, by itself. The contribution of dialog among religions to this phenomenon is less than the effect of religions coexisting for a long period of time.

The second outcome of dialog among religions that is condemned as harshly as syncretism by the clergy of the three main religions, but that is more widespread is conversion. At first, this term[63] was used to describe a nonbeliever who started to believe. Today, it expresses the transition from one religion to another. Obviously, conversion is always condemned by the religion that is abandoned. Furthermore, the "genuine" (by-birth) representatives of the new religion are suspicious of the converts because they do not trust their sincerity. It is worth noting that a community of Jews who converted to Islam in the 17th century in the Ottoman empire—converts or "Salonicans"—are still regarded false Muslims today, and the authenticity of their faith is still suspected.[64]

Individual conversion is more commonplace today. These conversions have motives ranging from discovering a different religion and feeling a

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[62] "Syncrétisme", *Théo, l'encyclopédie catholique pour tous*, Paris: Droguet-Ardant/Fayard, 1992, p. 533.

[63] "Conversion" derives from the Latin "convertere," meaning to change or revise. Interestingly, the Ottoman word for conversion, "ihtida," means "to become a Muslim." In other words, the language never even considered converting from Islam to another religion. The opposite of "ihtida" is "irtidat," which means "rejection" (of the religion).

[64] Although irrelevant to the subject matter at hand, the converts are still a debated issue today. For more on the subject, refer to Ilgaz Zorlu, *Evet, Ben Selanikliyim*, Istanbul: Belge, 1998.

genuine connection to it to worldly reasons like marrying a person of a different religion. In any case, conversion appears to be the involuntary outcome of dialog among religions and cohabitation with the believers of other religions. The collective consternation against converts who abandon their religion inevitably brings up the issue of proselytism—an issue that is much contested and condemned by the opponents of dialog among religions in Turkey. The meanings of proselyte and proselytism[65] have frequently shifted throughout the centuries. For the Jews, a proselyte was someone who abandoned paganism in favor of Judaism. After a long period of exclusive use in Judaism, this term came into circulation for groups adopting Christianity. It did not have a negative connotation at the time. Proselytism was gradually associated with becoming Christian, and today's Muslims understand the word in that sense. Any non-Muslim initiatives in Turkey (non-Muslim schools, dialog between two religions, publications, humanitarian aid movements, etc.) are accused of being missionary activities intent on separating Muslims from their faith. Proselytism is used for religions or thought systems that look for new proponents, and has a stained image. This negative connotation is present within Christianity itself: some Christian denominations criticize others for acting in proselytism, accusing them of winning over believers to their side. For example, starting in the 1990s, the Russian Orthodox Church has been accusing the Protestant Church of encroaching upon its geographical boundaries. The same church condemns the Greek Orthodox Patriarchy of Constantinople for proselytizing in Balkan nations. In other words, dialog among the denominations of the same religion (such as between Catholics, Protestants and the Orthodox or the Sunni, Alevi and Shiite) is usually more problematic in comparison to dialog between two different religions.

These two extremes aside, dialog among religions may help the creation of a mutual understanding that continues to expand and provides the opportunity for shared events, as long as they do not cross over to the area of doctrines. Ranging from regular gatherings to one-time initiatives (conferences, joint masses, collective humanitarian relief campaigns, etc.), these events are beneficial to all religions, provided that people are open to and tolerate the existence of other religious beliefs.

In order for dialog between two religions to take place, religions must be dynamic and active as defined by Serge Moscovici. "Active" in this sense

[65] "Proselytism" derives from the Greek "προσελυτος", meaning "resident alien."

does not necessarily have a negative image. Active religions are those that, although staying true to the unquestionable doctrines of the dogma, are open to either imposed or voluntary external contributions with noticeable dynamism, and show conscious or unconscious change in time. A certain segment within the main religions displays this phenomenon: the segment makes positive active attempts, and when the changes begin to take hold, the segment spreads its influence over the entire religion. In most cases, minority religions are most susceptible to external influence.

Depending on the acts of people who disagree on the identical significance of religion for a minority, these two possibilities may coexist, arise in turn, or enter into conflict with each other. What would happen if a religious identity contested another identity? What parameters make religion prevail and take priority, or cause it to be pushed to the background? The situation of Orthodox Albanians and Orthodox Greeks in Albania illustrate the issue. The Gregorian-Armenian minority in Turkey and the Muslim-Turkish minority in Greece are the two groups that oppose the removal of the religion field on identity cards. With respect to the individuals or groups who have converted in the past or the present, the new religion effectively supersedes all identity related to land, language and ethnicity, and provides a new and authentic identity[66] to its followers.

d. *Interreligious Initiatives in Turkey*

Catholic Initiatives

The awakening of interreligious dialog in Turkey may be connected to the new perspective of the Catholic denomination in viewing the world in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council convened between 1963 and 1965. The declaration *Nostra Aetate* [*In Our Time*], issued by the council of many high-ranking clergymen of the Catholic denomination, discusses the relation of the Church to non-Christian religions. The following is an excerpt from the text:

> The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they revere Him as a prophet. They also

[66] Cf. Bartholomé Bennasar, *Les chrétiens d'Allah, histoire extraordinaire des renégats aux 16è et 17è siècles*, Paris: Perrin, 1989.

> honor Mary, His virgin Mother; at times they even call on her with devotion. In addition, they await the day of judgment when God will render their deserts to all those who have been raised up from the dead. Finally, they value the moral life and worship God especially through prayer, almsgiving and fasting.
>
> Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have arisen between Christians and Moslems, this sacred synod urges all to forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom.

This acceptance of Islam serves as the foundation of the desire of Catholics to establish dialog between religions. The same Council issued declarations on ecumenic dialog among Christians and improving relations with the Jewish. It must be noted that Pope John XXIII, who assumed the initiative of the Council, knew Turkey very closely and had conducted Mass in Istanbul for a long time prior to being elected Cardinal, and then Pope. It must also be noted that the Turkish Minister of Culture attended the ceremony for the beatification of John XXIII by the Vatican in 2000, and the name of the former Pope was given to the street where the Embassy of Vatican is located. Speaking at a conference held as part of the "Ad Limina Apostolorum" visit of bishops in Turkey in February 2001, Pope John Paul II said, "I was gratified to be able to join you and the entire Christian community in your joy with my prayers during the festivities held in honor of the Saint John XXIII in Istanbul. I admire the Turkish authorities, who, in a gesture of kindness, gave his name to the street where the historical Vatican delegation building is located, and honored the memory of the 'friend of the Turks' by a series of extensive cultural events."

Following the Second Vatican Council, separate offices were instated within the Vatican government to initiate the interreligious dialog stipulated by the declarations. The purpose was to support ecumenic dialog (dialog among Christian denominations) with relations to non-Christian religions, primarily Islam and Judaism (granting Judaism a special place due to it being the only non-Christian religion that influenced Christianity), and dialog with atheists.

Speaking of good relations desired with the Muslims, the attempts have gained pace since 1964, when the Secretariat for Non-Christians was established.[67] The Pontifical Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies[68] has been

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[67] The Secretariat was renamed the "Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialog" (Pontificum Consilium pro Dialogo Inter Religiones) in 1988.

[68] Pontificio Istututo Di Studi Arabi e D'Islamistica.

publishing an annual publication titled *Islamochristiana, Dirasetun Islamiyyetun Masihiyye* since 1974. In 1970, high-ranking officials of the main religions took a pioneering step and came together in Kyoto, Japan within the scope of the World Conference of Religions for Peace. The main theme of the conference was the thought that "our common qualities are more important than our differences."[69] The Muslim-Jewish-Christian Conference Organization was established in 1974. This organization held international conferences on "Food/Energy and Main Religions" in 1975 in Italy, and on "The New World Order and Religions of the World" in 1977 in Portugal.

Catholic initiatives in Turkey became significantly more energetic from 1981. In that year, Monsignor Pierre Dubois was appointed as Ambassador of Vatican in Turkey and brought new life to dialog between religions. He organized an interfaith conference titled "Aristotle and Mediterranean Culture" in Istanbul in 1983, and the papers presented at the conference were published by the French Institute for Anatolian Studies in 1985.

Since the 1990s, Catholic authorities in Turkey made important attempts to develop closer ties with other religions, including the Orthodox faith. The Santa Claus Foundation, which held regular joint conferences, masses and other events and received much attention from the followers of Fethullah Gülen, was established around these times. The efforts of Catholic Jesuit priest Michel Thomas,[70] who gave lectures in faculties of

[69] This perspective is influenced by Mircéa Eliade and the studies of the Chicago School. The studies assert that there exist profound similarities or even kinship between certain religions despite manifest differences. Common points include the significance of the sacred, discourse deriving from myths, the importance of rituals and the high regard for the moral. Consequently, communicating with another faith means discovering the commonalities with our own faith and recognizing ourselves in that religion. As such, a profound and strong sense of commonality that surpasses the differentiating and excluding properties of religions exists among believers helps them realize similarities and come together. On the other hand, there is another perspective that is fundamentally different. According to this, religions are fundamentally, radically and entirely different from each other. There is no common point between Christianity and Buddhism, Islam, African animistic faiths or the indigenous American spiritual world. Accepting all of the above as religions certainly does not mean establishing kinship among them. In this case, communicating with the follower of another religion means consorting with an alien. The systems in question are different; there is nothing to learn from the other side, and there is nothing to share with them. What matters is making an effort to coexist in peace. This will allow everyone to practice and observe his or her faith in peace and safety. Under these circumstances, interreligious dialog remains restricted to the civil and social, and does not consider the spiritual aspect.

[70] A book by Michel Thomas is still included in the syllabi of faculties of theology in Turkey: *Hıristiyan Tanrıbilimine Giriş. Dinler Tarihine Katkı*, Istanbul: Ohan, 1992.

theology and universities in Ankara, Izmir and Konya between 1987 and 1990, must be mentioned. In 2000, the "International Symposium on Abraham the Prophet" was held under the auspices of the Turkish Ministry of Culture with the initiative of the Vatican and the Fethullah Gülen-aligned Journalists and Writers Foundation.

Finally, a treaty was signed between the Vatican and the Turkish government in 2002 to support dialog between religions. The Catholic news agency Zenit called this occurrence a first (28 April 2002). The "declaration of intent"—it was truly more like a declaration than a treaty—was signed by the Director of Religious Affairs Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz on behalf of the Turkish side. Catholic authorities were aware that having a government authority as a counterpart was out of the ordinary. Monsignor Michel Fitzgerald, then-President of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialog, connected the reason for this initiative to the complicated relations between religious authorities and governments in Muslim countries (including Turkey where laicism is sublimated), and felt the need to confirm and explain: "If we need to have a counterparty to establish dialog with the Muslims in Turkey, this counterparty must be a representative of the government." Agreements between the Vatican and the religious institutions of various Muslim countries existed before, but this was the first document signed with a state authority. (Another agreement around the same time was the document signed with the Libya World Islamic Call Society in March 2002.) Monsignor Fitzgerald had also said that they felt compelled to "establish dialog with countries like Iran, Turkey, Libya, Egypt and others due to the lack of a central authority in the Islamic world or a direct counterpart of the Pope." This declaration intends to enable religions to know each other better, while protecting the freedom of faith and conscience.[71]

It must be noted that the Vatican's activities in Turkey draw the attention of Muslim circles and bring questions to mind due to the Catholic community in Turkey being too small. For example, Pope John Paul II commented in 2001 that "by educating Turkish youngsters in the 26 highly reputable institutions directed by Catholics, by making initiatives in social and professional life, and provided that these take place under good relations with local authorities, interreligious dialog in Turkey possesses 'absolute priority.' The Pope also mentioned the importance of 'unity of faith

[71] http://www.religioscope.com/info/notes/2002_048_actu05.htm; online 02.02.2013.

with the universal church' when discussing the mission of Catholics in Turkey."[72] This was perceived as the desire to Christianize Muslims, and was severely condemned.

Orthodox Initiatives: The Activities of Bartholomew

(Ecumenic)[73] Patriarch Bartholomew's initiatives prioritize environmental issues and interreligious dialog. He has conducted many activities that have a purpose of advancing this cause, but also serve to prove that the Patriarchate is the owner of the initiatives and is indubitably superior in this area. The first event was a conference on environmental issues at the Holy Theological School of Halki in 1992, attended by the Duke of Edinburgh, Prince Philip.

In February 1994, while civil war was raging in Yugoslavia, the Patriarchate (and the New York-based Appeal of Conscience Foundation) held a conference on "Peace and Tolerance" in the opulent atmosphere of the Swissotel in Istanbul. Interest and participation in the conference was surprisingly high. In addition to the representatives of the three monotheistic religions, business circles also attended the sessions, which was noteworthy. Until then, Patriarch Bartholomew had succeeded in changing the perception of the Patriarchate, at least among progressive circles. This led to a highly positive regard of the conference in the liberal Turkish press.[74] Meanwhile, the nationalist press condemned the conference, mainly based on the allegations of self-proclaimed Turkish Orthodox Patriarch, Pope Eftim II, who has no followers. According to Pope Eftim II, the conference was one of the steps to "the establishment of a Vatican-like state in Fener (Phanar) neighborhood."[75] Although sessions were closed to the press, the minority press in Istanbul covered the event extensively.[76]

The leaders of various religious communities in Turkey took part in the conference, with the exception of the Armenian Patriarchate of Turkey, who argued that they were not allowed to voice their opinions. It was believed that the real reason behind their absence was the denial of entry visas to the delegation from Armenia that intended to take part in the

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[72] http://www.zenit.org/article-2820?l=french; online 02.02.2013.

[73] For the first Turkish-language publication on the ecumenicity of the Patriarchate, cf. Cengiz Aktar (ed.), *Tarihi, Siyasi, Dini ve Hukuki Açıdan Ekümenik Patrikhane*, Istanbul: İletişim, 2011.

[74] "Dini Liderlerden Barışa Destek", *Cumhuriyet*, 09.02.1994 or "Dinler İstanbul'da Buluştu", *Milliyet*, 09.02.1994.

[75] *Türkiye*, 09.02.1994.

[76] *Apoyevmatini*, 10.02.1994.

conference.[77] The most interesting aspect of the conference was the active participation of the Turkish Director of Religious Affairs, Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz. Muslim circles responded to this differently. While *Milli Gazete* did not appear to be perturbed,[78] *Zaman* opposed the Patriarch.[79]

Prominent politicians from all over the world sent messages of support to the conference, including United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, US President Bill Clinton, President of Azerbaijan Haydar Aliyev, and the President of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel. The business world was represented by many leaders, most notably Rahmi Koç.

The cause of the problems was the final declaration. Public opinion in Turkey was more concerned about the form of the document than its content. First of all, in contrast to the practice, the declaration was not named after the city it was signed in. It was named the "Bosphorus Declaration." For some, this was a workaround that avoided the use of either Istanbul or Constantinople in the name. The second criticized aspect of the conference was more complex. The prevailing text of the Declaration was in English, and the first signatory was Bartholomew with the title "Ecumenical Patriarch." Meanwhile, the Turkish text mentioned Bartholomew simply as "Patriarch." This was perceived insidious because the Director of Religious Affairs Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz, who did not speak English, had signed the Declaration, and in a way had, on behalf of the Turkish state, recognized the universality claimed by the Patriarchate.[80] This brings up the subject of titles and toponymy, which constitutes an area of symbolism to which public opinion in Turkey is extremely sensitive. There is no doubt that people in Turkey overreacted: the English website of the Patriarchate[81] consistently uses the "Ecumenical Patriarch" title. Bartholomew himself uses the title in all of his visits abroad. Turkish politicians are greatly disturbed by this. For example, in April 1994, upon returning to Turkey after making the opening speech of the European Parliament where he was received with great acclaim,[82] the Patriarch had expressed his wish to establish missions in Strasbourg and Brussels.[83]

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[77] *Iho*, 09.02.1994.

[78] *Milli Gazete*, 10.02.1994.

[79] "Patriğin Cihan Rüyası" *Zaman*, 09.02.1994. Aligned with the Fethullah Gülen movement, *Zaman* has since then changed its approach entirely.

[80] *Türkiye*, 10.02.1994.

[81] www.patriarchate.org (online on 12. 05.2010). The site has been using the title Ecumenical Patriarch ("Ekümenik Patrik") on its Turkish-language pages since 2008.

[82] *O Politis*, 04.1994.

[83] *Anatoli*, 06.1994. Despite condemnation by the Turkish authorities, the relations between the Patriarchate and the EU did not stall. Many delegations of European

Not only was this petition turned down by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but a number of Members of Parliament aligned with the rightist parties in the National Assembly submitted a query to the administration a few months later with the intention of starting an investigation:[84]

- Although the Treaty of Lausanne requires that the activities of the Patriarchate are limited to religious events, why is the Patriarchate also involved in political activities?
- Is the Patriarchate the center of the obsession with the *Megalo Idea* (sic)?[85]
- What is the true purpose of the Conference on Peace and Tolerance held in Istanbul between February 7 and 9? Is it true that the Patriarch signed the declaration as the "Ecumenical Patriarch?"
- Could Bartholomew have played a part in the explosion of the Turksat satellite at a time when Cross TV had recently gone on air?
- Was Bartholomew introduced as the "Ecumenical Patriarch" by the European Parliament on 2 April 1994?
- Is it true that Bartholomew intends to gather the Orthodox of the world under the roof of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Fener?
- Is it true that the Patriarch used his Turkish passport to visit the church of the Serbians who massacred the Muslims of Sarajevo?
- Have the properties located in the 500 square-meter area surrounding the Hagia Sophia been sold? If so, for what reason?
- Is it true that the Patriarch of Bosnia visited Istanbul at the beginning of the massacres to receive orders from the Patriarch of Fener?
- Does the Patriarch of Fener follow economic policy in Christian and Jewish nations to direct other Orthodox Churches?

It is clear that the tone of voice, type of concern, lack of confidence and the perception of the Patriarchate as an enemy spy organization have not changed much over the course of time.

The following year, in 1995, the Patriarchate held the sequel to the 1992 Halki conference on the Greek island of Patmos, located close to the Turkish coastline. The "Revelation and the Environment" conference was another international success with the attendance of religious, political

Parliamentarians came to visit the Patriarchate in Fener after this event. For example, cf. *Episkepsis*, 30.06.1998.

[84] *Zaman*, 03.11.1994.

[85] A very frequent misspelling of *Megali Idea*.

and business leaders from all over the world.[86] The day before the opening of the ceremony, Rahmi Koç had held a ceremony for the establishment of TURMEPA—Clean Seas Association, and Bartholomew was among the attendees.[87] The next day, Bartholomew was on board the *Preveli*, sailing towards Patmos, while discussing two of his concerns with members of the minority press. First was the negative propaganda launched by the nationalist Turkish press against him for his use of the "Ecumenical Patriarch" title. Bartholomew said that he had expended considerable effort since his election as Patriarch to improve the situation, but that the "tarnished reputation was the legacy of his predecessors," and was not easy to reverse. The second concern was related to Liani Papandreou, the new wife of the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou. Bartholomew believed that Liani Papandreou was campaigning for the appointment of people close to the Church of Greece to the churches under the direction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. On the other hand, Bartholomew also explained that their "activities were limited to religious initiatives only and had no political motives."[88] On September 25, the vessel bound for Patmos called at Ephesus for a concert that was to take place as part of the event program.[89] The Turkish press saw this concert as a display of the sublimation of Orthodoxy and "Greekness".[90] Some members of the clergy from Vatican were disturbed by the fact that business leaders were also attending the conference.[91] On the last day of the symposium, Turkish newspapers accused Bartholomew of turning the event into a "personal show" to reinforce his superiority.[92]

The most memorable of the series of environment conferences took place on the Black Sea beween September 20 and 28, 1997.[93] The "Symposium on Religion, Science and Environment" was held on board a ship made available for the conference by a Cretan ship owner (due to an oversight in communication, the ship was named *Eleftherios Venizelos*, the person who, in the eyes of the Turks, had led the occupation of

[86] Among the participants were the environmental advisor to Bill Clinton, Prince Philip, Rahmi Koç, Mehmet Dülger, Kriton Curi, Orhan Uslu and others. However, no representative from the Office of Religious Affairs attended this time. *Apoyevmatini*, 23.09.1995.

[87] *Iho, Cumhuriyet*, 23.09.1995.

[88] *O Politis*, 09.1995.

[89] *Apoyevmatini*, 26.09.1995.

[90] *Cumhuriyet*, 26.09.1995.

[91] *Apoyevmatini*, 28.09.1995.

[92] The declaration was again signed by the "Ecumenical Patriarch." *Türkiye*, 29.09.1995.

[93] The Patriarch had previously attended an Orthodox summit held in Thessaloniki; *O Politis*, 12.1996.

Anatolia).[94] The aim of the organizers was to tour the Black Sea with the vessel and make short stops at all cities. Businessman Rahmi Koç had made his personal aircraft available to transfer participants to Trabzon, where the voyage would begin.[95] The itinerary of the journey (Trabzon, Batumi, Novorossiysk, Yalta, Odessa, Varna and Istanbul, with the closing ceremony to take place in Thessaloniki) was severely criticized by Turkish nationalists, who accused the Patriarchate of calling at all the ports of the former "Pontific Empire"[96] with an ulterior motive of reviving this empire. The final straw that enraged the nationalist[97] and Islamist[98] press was an old map handed out during the symposium.

Despite all the difficulties, the symposium was an international success. First of all, the meeting itself was greatly supported by Jacques Santer, Chairman of the European Commission, and US Vice-President Al Gore. Funding was provided by the World Bank, the UN Environment Program and the Commerce Bank of Greece for an aggregate amount of 1.5 million dollars.[99] Among the 400 participants of the event were the determined Patriarchate supporter Georgios Papandreou, former US Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, Karim Aga Khan IV, Jordanian Prince El Hassan, US Senator John F. Kerry, and representatives of the Western Jewish world. On the other hand, no representatives from the Vatican or Moscow were present despite all the efforts of the Patriarchate. The symposium was covered by 107 reporters from all over the world.

The ship's stopover in Istanbul was also eventful: the visit to the Hagia Sophia, a very important symbolic event, met with great reaction in Islamist circles.[100] The closing of the symposium also came under attack by Turkish nationalists. The official reception held for Bartholomew in Thessaloniki was the proof of the close ties and "complicity" between Athens and the Patriarchate.[101]

Since his election as Patriarch, Bartholomew has expended great efforts in reviving the relations with the other religious minorities in Turkey. The leaders of the Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish communities have come

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[94] *Iho*, 22.09.1997.

[95] *Apoyevmatini*, 21.09.1997.

[96] The Empire of Trebizond (1207–1461).

[97] *Türkiye*, 23.09.1997, *Ortadoğu*, 24.09.1997.

[98] *Milli Gazete*, 23.09.1997, "The administration allowing this treachery should step down immediately. Naming Black Sea the 'Pontific Lake' is proof of the treachery."

[99] *Iho*, 23.09.1997.

[100] *Milli Gazete*, 28.09.1997.

[101] *Sabah*, 29.09.1997.

together to celebrate all holy days of the three religions since 1991. For example, the celebration of the 539th anniversary of the establishment of the Armenian Patriarchate was held at the Hilton and was attended by the Armenian Patriarch Mesrob II as well as the Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew, the representative of the Chief Rabbinate Hayim Kohen, the Vatican Ambassador Luigi Canti, the Vice-Patriarch of the Syriac Church Yusuf Çetin, the Spiritual Leader of the Catholic of Istanbul Louis Pelatre, the Spiritual Leader of the Syriac Catholic Church Yusuf Sağ, Bishop Apostolos of Heybeliada, Bishop Yakovos of Phanar the Spiritual Leader of the German Catholic Church Gerhard Duncker, and the Spiritual Leader of the Protestant Church of America, Douglas Anderson.[102] Similarly, the representatives of various religions visited the Rabbinate of Istanbul to celebrate Passover. For example, on April 23 and 24, 2000, Chief Rabbi David Asseo received "His Excellence" Bartholomew, Louis Pelatre, Yusuf Sağ, "His Excellence" Yusuf Çetin, the Secretary to the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul Çolakyun, and the Spiritual Leader of the Chaldeans in Turkey Paul Karataş.[103] Almost all of these people came together for Easter celebrations at the Patriarchate.[104] These calls of courtesy, common participation in events intended to garner dialog, conferences and other gatherings are new for Turkey and render the relations between various communities progressively more peaceful. Considering the centuries-long competition between the three main minorities recognized by Turkey in the past, the efforts become even more worthy of respect.

Muslim Initiatives

As stated above, almost all Muslim initiatives for interreligious dialog in Turkey were led by the Office of Religious Affairs representing the official religion of the country. The initiatives officially began with the 1st Council on Religion held in 1993. The Council emphasized the importance of interreligious dialog and said that meetings and events to this purpose were very positive. The 2nd Council on Religion convened in Ankara in 1998 was a tangible move for the Office in supporting interreligious dialog. As noted in an article written in 1991,[105] Catholic priests had already realized that

[102] *Agos*, 08.06.1999.
[103] *Şalom*, 26.04.2000.
[104] *Apoyevmatini*, 28.04.2000.
[105] Xavier Jacob, "L'enseignement religieux dans la Turquie moderne", in Paul Dumont, François Georgeon, *La Turquie au seuil de l'Europe*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991.

religious officials in Turkey were more inclined towards dialog between Islam and Christianity than before, and were making radical changes to their discourse and conduct in recent years. The 2nd Council on Religion saw the establishment of a "Commission for Dialog." Academics from various theology schools in Turkey and Muslim, Christian and Jewish religious leaders (235 representatives from 32 countries) comprised this council, and the fairly surprising resolutions were very similar to the resolutions of the Second Vatican Council. An example of this is the acceptance of the officials of Turkish Islam that there are other faiths in the world that deserve as much respect as Islam, and that interreligious dialog is mandatory for a world where no religion seeks to expand its influence and different religions coexist in peace. The declaration issued at the conclusion of the Council says the following:[106]

> …On the other hand, as the world becomes increasingly global, the need for dialog among religions and cultures becomes paramount. To this end, believers of different religions have to develop common ideas and beliefs that will contribute to world peace, expedite interreligious dialog, and fight against injustices of freedom of faith and conscience while observing human rights without any discrimination of religion and nationality. There is now a need to hold meetings on the past, present and future of holy religions, to ensure that the followers of different religions have correct information about each other's religions, and to nurture an environment of religious plurality and coexistence. Therefore, 'Interreligious Dialog' is included in the Council's agenda.

Chapter Three of the Declaration is dedicated to interreligious dialog:

> III. INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOG[107]
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> 26. Believers of different religions have to develop and spread common ideas and beliefs that will contribute to world peace.
>
> 27. Interreligious dialog initiatives should not appear to be religious propaganda for any faith. Care should be taken to avoid hidden agendas, political and otherwise, in dialog, and these should be left out of educational initiatives.
>
> 28. Believers of different faiths should a) try to learn about other religions free of prejudice and fanaticism; b) ensure that its officials are educated about other religions in a healthy manner, and cooperate for this purpose.
>
> 29. Believers of all religions should cooperate in the fight against narcotics and terrorism.

[106] "II. Din Şurası Sonuç Bildirisi", http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/diyanet/ocak1999/sura3.htm; online 02.02.2013.

[107] http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/diyanet/ocak1999/sura1.htm; online 02.02.2013.

30. Fight against injustices of freedom of faith and conscience while observing human rights without any discrimination of religion and nationality, support disadvantaged nations and communities, and undertake joint initiatives to this purpose.

31. Textbooks, school courses and mass media channels should provide clear and sound information about other religions.

32. Past experience of religious life should be studied to build on experience and reapply best practices.

33. The Office of Religious Affairs should take the lead to instate mutual fellowships between institutions of current religions, especially Judaism and Christianity, in order to educate specialists in the source languages of these religions.

34. Guidance and doctrine of holy religions should be reviewed from a perspective of religious plurality and coexistence.

35. Efforts should be made to ensure that interreligious dialog is not restricted to scholars, but is expanded to a wider audience.

36. a) A meeting on the past, present and future of Abrahamic religions should be held in Turkey.

b) The "faith tourism" initiative of the Ministry of Tourism should be supported with sound information about the religions concerned.

37. A Secretariat of Interreligious Dialog should be established within the Office of Religious Affairs to ensure that interreligious dialog initiatives are more effective.

a) A "Center for Study and Documentation of Global Religions" should be incorporated in this secretariat.

b) This center should develop joint projects with similar institutions across the world to conduct and publish research.

38. Office of Religious Affairs personnel, especially muftis, preachers and imams should undergo training on other religions both locally and abroad, and seminars should be held on this subject.

The Council resolutions related to interreligious dialog were severely criticized by the conservative groups in Turkey. What infuriated fundamentalists the most was how the official Islam was embracing non-Muslim religions. But they were also angry at not being invited to the Council.[108]

Another 1998 event was the international symposium on "Intercultural Dialog" organized by the pro-Islamic City of Istanbul. Participants were Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Jewish and Zoroastrian. Among the guests were representatives of minority religions in Turkey, such as Bartholomew, Yusuf Çetin, and the Vatican representative Khalid Akeshes. Fethullah Gülen, who had met with the Pope in Rome the same year, was

[108] "The Office of Religious Affairs had not invited Islamic fundamentalists to the Council. This meant that "fundamentalists" were less worthy of dialog than Armenians, Greeks and Jews. And this was interreligious dialog!", http://www.beyt.de/index.php/mesaj-m-z; online 02.02.2013.

also invited. The following year, in 1999, a Center for Interreligious Dialog was established as recommended by the 2nd Council on Religion. The efforts of official Islam culminated in the meeting of Pope Jean Paul II with Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz, the Director of Religious Affairs in 2000. This meeting paved the way for the agreement signed between the Vatican and Turkey in 2002.

Beside these official activities, the tendency of various religious movements to embrace other religions and change their perspective of them gives rise to the idea that interreligious dialog is sometimes being used as a means. The initiatives of the unofficial congregation centered around Fethullah Gülen is noteworthy. A former imam, Fethullah Gülen is now at the head of an empire of media channels and private schools in addition to being the leader of the Gülen movement, claimed to have a moderate Islamist attitude. The private schools are scattered across the Balkans and Central Asia. Although supported by a great number of political figures, the Gülen movement is nevertheless accused of contemplating the installation of an Islamic republic in Turkey. As of 2010, there has been debate in Turkey as to whether the Gülen movement is trying to secure footholds in education, law enforcement and other institutions.[109] Although not legally barred from entry to Turkey, Fethullah Gülen resides in the United States. The efforts of the Gülen movement extend in two directions, especially through the Journalists and Writers Foundation, of which Gülen is the honorary chairman: establishing good relations with the Catholic world and the Orthodox Patriarchate. It is difficult to ascertain when these efforts began. However, the promotion of the "Tolerance and Dialog" perspective at a grand meeting held at the Çırağan Palace in Istanbul in 1995, or the abrupt change in the anti-Bartholomew stance of the *Zaman* daily in 1996[110] suggest that they started in the mid-1990s. For example, 1996 saw the participation of the Gülen community in the activities of the Santa Claus Foundation, together with Catholic authorities and the 500th Year Foundation, an organization of Turkish Jews.[111] In June 1997, the Journalists and Writers Foundation held the "Congress on Dialog between Civilizations" at the Istanbul Hilton,[112] followed by the "Abetment

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[109] There are many provocative publications on this subject; cf. Hanefi Avcı, *Haliçte Yaşayan Simonlar. Dün Devlet Bugün Cemaat*, Ankara: Angora: 2010.

[110] This is the conclusion of a comparison of stories on the Patriarchate printed before and after 1996. Samim Akgönül, "Les activités du Patriarcat "oecuménique" du Phanar dans les années 1990 et l'opinion publique turque" in *CEMOTI*, 33, 2002, p. 195–216.

[111] *Zaman*, 26.12.1996.

[112] *Zaman*, 12.06.1997.

of National Understanding" held at the same place in December of that year.[113] The same foundation holds annual meetings in the town of Abant, where religion-related matters ("Islam and Laicism," "Globalization;" "Islam, Laicism and Democracy: The Turkish Experience;" "The Republic, Cultural Diversity and Europe," etc.) are discussed.[114]

Fethullah Gülen's efforts to befriend the Catholic world were rewarded in 1998, when his request for an audience with the Pope was granted despite his lack of a religious or official title or capacity.[115]

The relationship between Fethullah Gülen and Bartholomew began in 1997, when both were in the United States. According to some, this was encouraged by Washington, who supports the Patriarchate for the Orthodox world, and believes that the Gülen movement may intercept the rise of the more fundamentalist Islamic movements in Turkey. Observers of the close ties between Bartholomew and Gülen suspect Gülen of two motives: one is that he supports the reopening of the Holy Theological School of Halki, paving the way for establishing his own religious schools in Turkey. The second may be an intention to open a school in Thessaloniki: Gülen requested Bartholomew to liaison with the Greek authorities in exchange for Gülen's support in the reopening of the Holy Theological School of Halki. Gülen confirms this request in an interview appearing on his own website titled "Dialog, Love, Tolerance."[116] As the name suggests, this is the specific way that Gülen defends himself. This has reached such a level in Turkey that any person using one of these three words is immediately branded as a member of the Gülen movement.[117] The change in the Gülen movement's attitude towards Bartholomew is as abrupt as it is surprising. It is as though a trigger event happened in 1996.

The change in attitude is reflected in other publications, like the *Aksiyon* magazine, that are part of the same conglomerate. Articles would be run with titles like "The Patriarch Goes Too Far."[118] In this specific example, the article explained how Bartholomew was "cunningly" working to resurrect the Byzantine Empire, how deleterious he was for Turkey and how he needed to be stopped. Less than a year after this article, the same

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113 *Zaman*, 26.12.1996.
114 http://www.abantplatform.org/; online 02.02.2013.
115 "Papa ile görüşmeye yeşil pasaportla gitti", *Hürriyet*, 09.02.1998.
116 http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/3027/128/; online 02.02.2013.
117 On this subject cf. Emre Öktem, "Le dialogue Islamo-chrétien: un signe de la fin des temps?", in *Les Annales de l'Autre Islam*, 6, 1999, p. 169–181.
118 *Aksiyon*, 01.–07.07.1995.

magazine ran another article, entitled "Towards Dialog."[119] This article talked about how the efforts of both Bartholomew and Fethullah Gülen towards dialog were worthy of respect. In fact, the article argued that the two religious leaders would be allies in the endeavor to host the Olympic Games in Istanbul in 2004! On the other hand, the relations between the Gülen movement and non-Muslims were a great disturbance to the more radical segments of Turkish Islam and the nationalists, who saw this as treachery.[120]

In a country like Turkey, where religion, society and the state are in complex trilateral relationships, it is normal for interreligious attempts to garner a wealth of (positive and negative) reactions. Catholic initiatives are sometimes commended as the genuine acceptance of Turkey's unique position among Muslims, and sometimes condemned as a Catholic attempt to infiltrate the country and convert Muslims to Christians. Orthodox initiatives, on the other hand, are severely condemned simply because the Patriarchate is in Istanbul. Both Islamists and nationalists accuse the Patriarch of attempting to establish a Vatican-like state in Istanbul. The attempts by the Office of Religious Affairs and the Gülen movement are criticized by the laic and Kemalist circles for hiding their ulterior motives of insidiously converting Turkey into an Islamic nation. In the eyes of the opposition, interreligious dialog is a Trojan horse at the gates of Kemalist and laic Turkey.

Meanwhile, there is no shortage of positive reactions. Good relations with the Catholic world play an important part in Turkey's efforts to stay closer to Europe. Activities associated with the Patriarchate are supported because they improve the Turkish image abroad. Finally, by initiating dialog with other religions, Turks portray the moderate and tolerant face of laicism-infused Turkish Islam, and change its image in a positive way.

In this respect, analyzing the reactions of the Muslim Turks living in non-Muslim countries to interreligious dialog attempts may prove to be of worth. The author has personally experienced these attitudes, and has supported two local initiatives as a "nonbeliever."

The first example is the small town of Bischwiller in Alsace. Since 2000, all the religious leaders of this town (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Jew and Muslim) have convened in a series of interreligious dialog events. Almost all Muslims living in this town are Turkish and the mosque is under the supervision of the Turkish Office of Religious Affairs. The imam,

[119] Aksiyon, 13–19.04.1996.
[120] An example is www.hakikat.com.

who is appointed by the Turkish government, is committed to taking part in this dialog, and in addition to being an open-minded person, it is clear that he is also acting upon orders received in favor of interreligious dialog. The initiatives of the interreligious dialog group in Bischwiller are respected by the various communities in the town. The events range from joint prayers for world peace (especially during the onset of the war in Iraq) to conferences on a variety of subjects, and even to the exchange of home-cooked treats between Christian and Muslim families for Christmas or the Feast of Ramadan. Apparently, this "common" attempt at interreligious dialog is not too dissimilar to the "elite" initiatives in Turkey. Nonetheless, the attitude of the Turks in Bischwiller towards these initiatives is generally very positive. Meanwhile, it must be noted that the "civil" events of the interreligious dialog group (exchange of cakes and pastries, etc.) are more popular than religious events (joint prayers).

The second example is Metz in Lorraine, where a series of important interreligious conferences entitled "Spring of the Religions" are held at the magnificent City Hall. Although Turks do take part in these events, the Muslim community is predominantly represented by North Africans. Turks do not play an active part in this meeting and observe from a distance; in fact, some are not even aware of this event. The people of Turkish origin in this city are divided both religiously and ideologically. There are seven political-religious associations in Metz, but there is little communication among them. Therefore, the Turks in Metz do not have a spiritual, charismatic or unifying leader who directs them to dialog with the other communities in the city.

On the contrary, the radical Islamist Turkish groups in Europe live under the constant fear that young Turks will be swayed by the majority religion. Therefore they continually accuse humanitarian aid societies, support organizations, Christian student associations and groups that provide education to immigrants of attempting to proselytize Turkish youth. For these congregations, any attempt from outside the community is an attempt at Christianization. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the fundamentalist segment of European Turks, being a minority within minorities, are highly suspicious of interreligious dialog.

e. *Religious Minorities and States: Vying for Sovereignty*

The relationship between the public authority and religious minorities is conflictual in two ways. This is particularly intensive in nation-states that

have been founded on myths of ethnic, linguistic and religious unity. On the one hand, the modern, centralized and sovereign state emerged throughout the 19th century, when nations were being constructed, and was involved in a perpetual dialectic of conflict and cooperation with religious institutions. Regarding religious belonging as one of the consolidatory powers of the nation, the state gradually abolished the political and even social privileges granted to religious institutions. This is by no means unique to Christian nations. This is an indicator that the state views religions as contestants in the battle for sovereignty and wants to cast them aside. On the other hand, the complete elimination of a religious movement is also regarded a threat by the state, because such organizations liaison between the state authority and believers, and, when the state is suspicious of religion, enables it to keep the content of religion under surveillance. When minority religions are in question, a second dimension is added to the suspicion: the first, as indicated, is the fact that the adversary is a religion, and the second is the unreliability of the religion in question because it is the faith of a minority group, thus being different. The state both feels the need to keep minority religions outside of the political arena, and seeks to reinforce existing hierarchical institutions or to establish new ones in order to have a counterbalance and keep those religions under supervision.

Meanwhile, the sovereign state attempts to localize the minority religion to sever its ties with the main religion. In other words, just as urgent as it was for the Republic of Turkey to create a "Turkish Orthodoxy" in 1923, coupled with a necessity to construct a "Greek Islam," establishing a "French Islam" was urgent for the French in the 1990s. Territorialization was also applied to majority religions in the beginning. The attempts to distance the French Catholic Church from the Vatican in the late 19th century, the efforts to establish a new corps of clergy in Turkey in the 1920s, and the support given to the Greek Orthodox Church throughout the 19th century and in the early 20th century were the fruits of the French Republican state's reluctance towards the meddling of the Vatican, the Turkish Republic's fear of the resurrection of the old theocratic regime, and the wish to avoid the Greek state's influence over the Patriarchate that was under Turkish supervision, respectively. This is the struggle of the state to dominate religion—a struggle that emerges together with the social project under construction. Although majority religions are believed to have gained a degree of independence and secured their autonomy when detached from their respective centers that are regarded

contestants, minority religions do not share this fate and remain perpetual "rivals."

As a result, states that adopt the republican regime seek a delicate balance between the privileges granted to the institutions of majority religions to ensure that they have counterparties they can address in a hierarchical structure. Similarly, minority religions that are usually associated with "foreign" institutions feel a need to organize in the land of the sovereign state so that they become integrated into the state's own system and can earn a legitimate position without being accused of dual or multiple loyalties.

Being congruous with the Chicago School line of thought, particularly with the utilitarian theory of Talcott Parsons, my approach may be criticized for ambiguity. It is true that Parsons' theory oscillates between the attempt to understand the perspective of the individual that is caught within the occurrences (the volitional superiority of social behavior) and the attempt at the discovery of how the social system can function regularly in spite of its inherent complexity (the superiority of the system).[121] In both cases, the distinction between the "acting individual" and the "individual directed by the system" prevents understanding the dialectics between the personal motives comprising the system and the behaviors that are shaped by the system. Therefore, the mutual interaction theories of Barth and particularly Mead[122] are more conducive to explaining the complexity brought by being in the minority. According to this, the individual makes constant use of symbols to keep the environment that he always challenges under control. Committing any act means being involved in mutual interaction based on symbolic descriptions. This perspective argues that the behavior of the players are both directed by social structures, and that these behaviors are the very architects of that structure.

In this structure, state institutions and minority institutions are in continuous interaction. Minority institutions have a special position. When I say "institution," I mean a group of individuals that possess a hierarchy that is more or less functional within itself and contains a specific system. What bring these people together are shared motives. A minority

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[121] Cf. Talcott Parsons, *Action theory and the human condition*, New York: Free Press, 1978.

[122] George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

organization requires an authority, but this does not have to be an internal authority. It requires specific rules for everyone, demands rules unique to the minority, but the organization has to have its internal rules as well. Meanwhile, it needs mechanisms for legitimization—both in the eyes of the state and the society in which it exists, and within itself. Finally, a degree of agreement within the organization must be reached with respect to the means and the ends.

At this point, we encounter a contradiction unique to minorities: members of a minority usually strive to protect their autonomy. The more a religion institutionalizes and becomes legitimate, the greater the desire for independence becomes for its actors. From the perspective of the majority, the more legitimate a minority group is, the stronger the minority becomes as an institution, and the more its members yearn for and demand autonomy from the majority group. In the case of religious minorities, rejection of the religion or the violation of its rules leads to the exclusion of the individual from the group. The group's pressure to protect its integrity is so great that individuals who would have easily detached themselves from the religion were they in the majority adhere to the rules defined by the group to continue their loyalty to the group because it is in the minority.

The typology of minority organizations may be inspired by two conceptualized typologies, starting, of course, with the ones defined by Max Weber or Ernst Troeltsch.[123] Then comes the phenomenon of sectarianism, which is very useful for religions that have a minority status.[124] Similar to sects, minority religions are both seeking legitimacy under the "religious rules" adopted by the majority, and to win new followers. Meanwhile, groupings similar to sects are gradually accepted by the main religions, and incorporated in them like the denominations of Catholicism or the political-religious movements in Islam. The distinction brought by Weber, who regards the Church an institution for deliverance and orders as community groups where believers congregate out of their own accord, becomes slightly less accurate when the church that is the protector of the said principles remains in the minority.

According to Weber, any religious organization is unavoidably related to a religious authority. If this authority is outside the borders of the

[123] Cf. Ernst Toerltsch, *Systematische christliche religion*, Berlin, Leipzig:B.G. Teubner, 1909.

[124] Cf. Bryan Wilson, *The social dimensions of sectarianism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

sovereign state, there are some consequences for religious minorities. First of all, the state rejects this religious authority, and even perceives it as a threat, similar to the cases of European Islam, Greek Islam or Albanian Orthodoxy. Then, the state attempts to establish a national authority that is independent of outside religious control. Depending on the religion in question and the political agenda, four social-religious authority models may interact with the state in different ways:

- A theocratic model where the authority is derived from God (e.g. Papacy);
- An election-based council model (e.g. Orthodox Sacred Synod; French Council of Muslim Faith);
- A charisma-based model (e.g. Dalai Lama or Fethullah Gülen);
- A traditional model (e.g. fatwas from the Al Azhar University in Egypt).

It is easy for the state to resist an external traditional or charismatic authority, but if the authority in question has legitimacy, in other words, is based on the theocratic or election models, it will not be as easy for the state to resist. The state's distrust of the outside authority manifests itself first in its policy towards the clergy. Training "French" imams has long been on the agenda of French authorities.[125] These imams must, at a minimum, speak French and be educated in France. In the case of Turkey, the Holy Theological School of Halki would rather remain closed for fear of having non-Turkish clergy educated in the school, and does not allow the appointment of Orthodox or Armenian priests who are not nationals of Turkey. Bulgaria has been rejecting imams sent by Turkey for a long time, and the same applies to Greek clergy sent to Albania. This is another aspect of the desire to localize, which has been covered before. Unitarian states and centralized legitimate religious institutions are concerned about two occurrences in postindustrial societies, owing mostly to minority religions:

- The individualization of sub-institutional faith, termed personal religious patching by sociologists based on the works of Hervieu-Léger;
- The emergence of a universal and super-institutional loyalty conceptualized as a desire for unity of faith by Debray.

These two occurrences shape the minority religion policies of the state.

[125] Franck Frégosi, *La formation des cadres religieux musulmans en France: approches socio-juridiques*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998.

Conclusion: On Religious Plurality

Like individuals, social groups are always on the lookout for guarantees of loyalty. Members of minorities, particularly those of religious ones, are faced with demands for guarantees by the majority, these demands being oftentimes conflicting. The majority group feels threatened and utilizes a discourse wherein ideas such as integration, assimilation, harmonization or joining the majority are frequently expressed, expecting guarantees from the minorities that they will not betray the majority. In areas associated with language, marriage, culture and others, the demand for harmonization appears justified to the majority group; however, in the case of religious conversion, the majority is aware that they cannot demand such a shift. Therefore, the most notable religious practices that are believed to be the easiest to change, or at least to adapt, are targeted. A unique aspect of being in the minority is the expectation of its own members to display guarantees of loyalty with a view towards preserving the integrity of the social group. Any behavior that is in violation of the religion, any type of solidarity developed independently of the minority come under suspicion as signs of distancing oneself from the minority culture and adopting the culture of the majority, and such individuals are rejected and excluded by the minority group. Similar to unitary states, religious minorities have difficulty accepting multiple loyalties. In truth, these multiple loyalties, when lined side by side, comprise elements of the complex identity structure.

The reflex-like opposition against dual or multiple loyalties is the primary reason for debates on religious pluralism or multiculturalism in postindustrial societies—societies that should be pluralistic by nature. Majority groups feel, if unconsciously, that the policy of pluralism will result in a society where all groups are reduced to minorities and no single dominant or dominated group remains. On the other hand, minorities, also mostly unconsciously, know that if the said level of pluralism is attained, they will suffer many "losses," i.e. a large number of individuals will leave the group, perhaps resulting in the elimination of the minority group. When all groups in a society are reduced to minorities, the struggle will lose its cause and the pressure of the minority group on its members will reduce. Therefore, as explained by Gilbert Vincent[126] after Moscovici, religious minorities who feel dominated cooperate to achieve legitimacy

[126] Gilbert Vincent, "Du statut de minorité du protestantisme français", in Jean Bauberot (ed.), *Pluralisme et minorités religieuses*, Louvain, Paris: Peeters, 1991, p. 115–125. Cf. Axel Honneth, *La lutte pour la reconnaissance*, Paris: Cerf, 2002.

in the eyes of the society. Examples are the solidarity between Protestants and Muslims in France, the cooperation between Orthodox and Gregorian communities in Turkey, and in a wider context, the camaraderie between Turks and Macedonians in Greece. Legitimacy is not gained easily. It is the fruit of a "protracted struggle."[127] Factors such as time, numbers and image play large parts. Furthermore, the closer a minority comes to legitimacy, the one-time partnership between minorities quickly evolves into competition, because once a minority becomes legitimate, it becomes a dominant group for the remaining minorities.

The resistance against religious pluralism stems from the reaction against the idea of interreligious initiatives, because the nature of monotheistic religions makes them opposed to the "interreligious": "…the emerging 'interreligious' area among denominations as a sphere of control based on doctrinal consensus is perceived by monotheistic religions as a different method of distancing from highly-categorized identity values and religious truths about which a certainty bordering on fanaticism prevails, and which are regarded as a means of perpetuating the enmity between communities of different faiths."[128] In other words, religion is a matter of power—even more so when in the minority—and this power is threatened by the possibility of a truly pluralistic system being established. Piety is an *energia* that is injected into a special structure of existence that is indispensable if a minority is to remain a minority. The desire to preserve, increase and utilize this energy causes the rise of new forms of piety in minority religions.

[127] *Ibid.*

[128] Pierre Million (ed.), *Religiosité, religions et identités religieuses*, Paris: Recherches sur la Philosophie et le Langage no. 19, 1998, p. 9.

CHAPTER TWO

MINORITIES IN TURKEY: MINORITIES AND THE BUILDING OF THE TURKISH IDENTITY

Introduction

Nations are structures that can be dated and analyzed, and are under an ongoing process of restructuring as they are in continuous interaction with their surroundings, other nations, and their developments. In other words, determining the conditions for loyalty to a nation is closely related to the context that applies to the moment. This is also the case for the Turkish nation, whose loyalty criteria were defined ambiguously and somewhat obscurely in the early 20th century.

The building of the Turkish nation was fairly belated in comparison to similar movements in the Ottoman Empire. The non-Muslim confessional communities, *millet*s under the Ottoman regime,[1] had retained their religious attributes due to this system, and evolved into ethnic and religious groups that became nationalized. Forming separate pockets of autonomy within the empire, these groups struggled against the governmental authority, associated with the Turks, and ascended to nationhood. The concept of "Turks" had been in circulation since the establishment of the Ottoman State in the 13th century. However, during the classical ages of the empire (15th to 17th centuries), Turks were the common peasants in the eyes of the elite. The ruling class of the Ottoman Empire consisted of Turks, Muslim converts and the clergy of all religious communities.

Following the "uprisings" for independence, with religious, and then national motives, Ottoman thinkers and the elite found themselves confronted with peoples that were dedicated to the cause of independence, and started looking for ways to save the Empire, or more accurately, the intermittently despotic and constitutional monarchy. Three ways

[1] It must be noted that the Millet System is not the ONLY social framework in which the ottoman society was organized. There are other social sturctures as geographical hierarchy or professionnal stratification which cross the Millet system. In other words this system is not a mechanical and pyramidal social classification one.

prevailed. These three ideologies also shaped the thought system of 20th century Turkey.[2]

The Ottomanism movement called for the restructuring of the Ottoman social structure based on religious or both religious and ethnic differences, and the establishment of a new "nation"—the Ottoman nation where all these differences would lose their reason to exist. The new Ottoman nation would be founded on a social structure where the loyalties of the individuals would lie not with a religious or ethnic community, but in Ottomanhood. This required the further Ottomanization of Ottoman history, accentuating the difference of the Ottoman nation from Western nations. This project seemed implausible for a number of reasons: First of all, the non-Muslim communities of the empire had long since started the process to become ethnically autonomous, with institutionalization to follow in natural progression. This meant that it was too late to support the cause of Ottomanism where all differences would be eliminated (the support was never wholehearted anyway). Secondly, the preeminent figures, particularly religious leaders in non-Muslim communities were naturally not in favor of the elimination of a *millet*-based society because such a change would mean the loss of their political, legal and even economic privileges. Perhaps most importantly, the Ottoman elite realized that the Western civilization was far advanced in "modernization" compared to the Ottoman empire, and believed it was superior in this respect. Therefore, the idea to posit the Ottoman nation against the Western nations became too fraught with risk.

Another movement attempted to convene those who wished for a front that stood against Christianity. This Islamist movement aimed for the establishment of a confessional community that would not only oppose Western Christianity, but also be positioned against the non-Muslim population of the Empire, which defined their differences (partially) on a religious basis. According to the supporters of this movement, the fact that the Ottoman Sultan was also the Caliph could aid the movement's success, and the Ottoman monarchy could be saved with the cooperation of all Muslims. But this movement too met with obstacles: non-Turkish Muslims (particularly Near Eastern Arabs) were already attempting to build their own nations against Ottoman sovereignty, which made a Muslim alliance impossible. Meanwhile, the idea of building a secular society that was based more on regional than religious loyalty was advancing.

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[2] On "three ways of politics" see François Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri, Yusuf Akçura(1876–1935)*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005.

The third and last movement that remained was the building of a Turkish nation that had unclear criteria for loyalty. The idea of creating a Turkish nation was first timidly attempted by the Young Turks, followed by a much more committed effort by the Kemalists. This required the rejuvenation of the loyalty to "Turkishness" that had gradually lost its importance during the Ottoman rule by resorting to various means. Elements of identity would have to be reconstructed, and Ottoman and Anatolian history cast aside in favor of the Central Asian Turkish history. The building of the nation stemmed from a contradiction: the War of Independence was fought against Western imperialism led by Britain and France, but then the Western model was chosen for the society. Nevertheless, the actual fighting was not against Western states; the war was fought against the brothers-in-arms—the Greek forces that occupied Asia Minor with Britain's assistance, depending on the support of the Greek population that lived in Anatolia. As a result, the identity of the Turkish nation was not built in reaction to distant Western societies that were envied at first and imitated later on, but on top of a distinction from much closer communities that the Turks had lived together with for centuries, particularly the Greeks. The building of the Turkish nation stemmed from the most severe, visible and controllable otherness felt towards the closest community, and targeted Greeks as well as other non-Muslim communities.

Nevertheless, Turkish identity was not fully detached from the two seemingly abandoned approaches. Turkish nationalism prevailed in the 1920s and 1930s without concealing its desire to eliminate the old regime. The objective was not merely to change the Ottoman monarchy and the social structure based on the *millet* system; the state would no longer be Islamic thanks to the abolition of the Caliphate and the adoption of laicism and the Civil Code. However, the remnants of the other two movements began to return to the fore in the definition of the Turkish identity from the 1950s onwards. This was specifically through gradually rebuilding the reputation of Ottoman history and adding Islamic values to identity criteria. As a result of this complex process, Turks have come to associate themselves with the Muslim communities in the old Ottoman social structure (Bosniacs, Circassians and others). This shows that there are great differences between the legal and national definitions of minorities.

However, understanding the situation of non-Muslim minorities in contemporary Turkey is not possible without considering historical significance, the present-day context, and Turkey's relations with its immediate neighbors that emerged from the Ottoman system. This text attempts

to explain the phases which minorities underwent, emerging during Ottoman society, transforming with the minority policies of the Turkish Republic, and finally attaining a new position through the EU acquisition process.

a. *Ottoman Society and the Concept of Minority*

The Concept of Minority

The concept of minority does not have a single, universal definition. The search for a definition became mired in international law and politics from the birth of the concept of nation-state in the 18th and 19th centuries.

There are of course many attempts at defining it, all with their nuances. These nuances decide on the fates of peoples. The most concise and political definition that we can use is the one mentioned in the introduction of the book. We must summarize the key points of this definition here to be able to apply it to the Turkish case: I believe that a group must comply with five criteria to be considered a sociological and political minority:

- Displaying differences from the majority in many fields[3]
- Being a minority in terms of population size within the boundaries of a nation recognized as a state
- In terms of Bourdieu's definition,[4] not being politically or economically dominant[5]
- Being nationals of the state in question
- Being aware of the minority status[6]

These criteria are fairly new and have gradually emerged during the 19th and 20th centuries to award minority status to a group. The emergence of the concept of minority coincides with the emergence of religious identities, followed by these groups gaining national consciousness. We can use

[3] Henry Fairchild (ed.), *Dictionary of Sociology*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1944, p. 134.

[4] Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron, *La reproduction. Éléments pour une théorie du système d'enseignement*, Paris: Minuit, 1970, p. 19 and cf. Laurent Mucchielli, "Pierre Bourdieu et le changement social", in *Alternatives économiques*, 175, 1999, p. 64–67.

[5] Charles Marden, *Minorities in American Society*, New York: American Book Co., 1952, p. 26.

[6] Baskın Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar, Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2005, p. 26.

the negotiations for "protecting Christian minorities" between Western powers and the Ottoman Empire from the 17th century onwards as a historical backdrop to the analysis of the geographical region in question. The attempts of the West to "extend protection" to the Christian communities living in the Ottoman Empire had become an important instrument to supervise the policies of the Ottoman state during the 19th century.[7]

The idea of "extending protection" effectively introduced the concept of minorities to the Ottoman structure. However, in contrast to Western states, change did not occur rapidly in the Ottoman system. When examined closely, it is apparent that the core of the Ottoman system did not change despite the constitutional monarchy regimes following the Ottoman Reform era (1839–1878). Although some observers believe that the *millet* regime was replaced by a system of "extending protection to minorities" during this period,[8] the Ottoman social structure founded on ethnic and religious communities was not disrupted, and Ottoman subjects did not become individuals.

The Millet *System*

Although "millet"[9] means "nation" in contemporary Turkish, it had a different meaning within the ottoman system. In the Ottoman context, it was not connected to the French term "nationalité" used by colonialist empires, or the word "nation" used to refer to the more or less equal groups within federal states. The word referred to autonomous religious communities whose levels of autonomy varied depending on place, time and the group in question. *Millet*s were under the authority of their own religious leaders, who were responsible for the acts and behaviors of their community before the central administration. Although this term referred to religious loyalties until the 19th century, it then began to gain ethnic and linguistic features. For example, the Bulgarians living under Ottoman rule were considered a part of the Greek *Millet* because of their religious loyalty, until their Church separated from the Greek Patriarchy. Similarly, Catholic

[7] Salahi Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, Ankara: The Historical Society Printing House, 1993, p. 109–111.

[8] Paul Dumont, "La période des Tanzimat", in Robert Mantran (ed.), *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris: Fayard, 1989, p. 497 and others.

[9] This is the Turkicised form of the Arabic *mellah* meaning "word" in the Koran. The word then began to mean "a community of individuals adopting a word or a holy book" and came to being used to refer to confessional communities that were accepted as confessional by the Ottoman administration. Xavier De Planhol, *Minorités en Islam. Géographie politique et sociale*, Paris: Flammarion, 1997, p. 413.

Armenians and Gregorian Armenians were members of different *millets* due to their religious affiliation.[10]

Analyses made through lenses of current affairs lead contemporary researchers of Ottoman society to mention minorities frequently. Turkish historiography is influenced by Western methods and approaches in many areas. This may lead to false conclusions when analyzing Ottoman society: *millet*s are not minorities, and the very unique and dynamic *millet* system is not a regime of protecting minorities. Arguing that it was is nothing but anachronism. Furthermore, treating the Ottoman Empire as a block and discussing this or that aspect of the Empire as if it never altered for seven centuries are fallacies. Neither the positions, nor the living conditions and treatment of the various communities comprising the Ottoman population remained the same from the 15th to the 19th century.

The Ottoman Empire did have a variety of cultures,[11] but this certainly did not mean that a multicultural system was in place. The Empire was not a federation of ethnic communities either. It was rather the predominant group's acceptance of a series of unique attributes in order to achieve social peace and maintain its sovereignty over the lands of the Empire. The religious communities comprising the Ottoman population did not have identical statuses. Legal, economic and social status varied by group and period. Moreover, the aforementioned predominant group was not a dominant ethnic group like today's. It is true that the heroic past and the Turkic background of the group is referred to and sublimated, yet "Turkishness" was associated with unsophisticated peasants or uncivilized nomadic tribes that occupied the lowest rungs of the prestige hierarchy. The only certainty about this predominant group was that its members belonged to the Muslim group by birth or conversion. Meanwhile, some non-Muslim groups, such as the Phanariot Greeks who were the Greek aristocracy, were at the top of the hierarchy, while other Muslim communities like the Kurds and Albanians (and to a degree, Arabs) were at the bottom of it.

Ultimately, the *millet* system divided Ottoman society into almost independent compartments. Each group had its own religious jurisdiction. These groups had come under the sovereignty of the "Ottoman elite" that was composed of the "Turkish" dynasty ruling the empire and the

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[10] Gülnihal Bozkurt, *Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukukî Durumu* (*1839–1914*), Ankara: TTK, 1989, p. 181–186.

[11] Stefanos Yerasimos, "Ethnies et minorités en Turquie: quelques réflexions sur un problème insoluble", in *Les temps modernes*, 41 (456–457), 1984, p. 96–122.

prominent figures of ethnic-religious groups and former members of these groups who had converted to Islam after five or six hundred years of Ottoman rule depending on the region conquered.

In an instance of contradiction, the hierarchy between the Dominant *Millet* and the Subject *Millets* in the Ottoman system crystallized in the 19th century, when the nationalist movement was emerging and the system was being pushed out of circulation. This hierarchy existed and was visible during the classical age of the Ottoman Empire, but the lack of a concept of "nation" prevented the hierarchy from entering into conflict during the 16th and 17th centuries. Although the *millet* system was abolished in the 19th century, the three styles of politics led to the consideration of loyalty to Islam as identical to loyalty to Turkishness, and while individuals and groups belonging to the Muslim *millet* were believed to be open to assimilation into the Turkish nation, the groups belonging to the Subject *Millets* were excluded from the definition of the Turkish Nation. This exclusion continued into the early years of the Republic. Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, deputy of Antalya and the president of the House of Turks organization during these years had insisted that non-Muslims be classified as "Turks by nationality" with the argument that if called Turks, they could make claims of rights in the future, and his approach was adopted. This led to Article 88 of the Constitution of 1924: "The population of Turkey is considered "Turk" by nationality without regard for religion and race."

This hierarchic approach resulted in a series of consequences on identity that have continued to present day. First, many groups within the Dominant *Millet* were "successfully" assimilated from the late 19th century onwards. Among these are Bosniacs, Albanians, Dagestani and Circassians who migrated to Anatolia, or even Cretan Muslims, who ended up in Anatolia relatively late with the forced population exchange. These groups defined themselves as Turks, both due to the influence of the singular nationalistic discourse and particularly the education system, and because they considered themselves members of the Dominant *Millet*, adopted the Turkish supra-identity and reduced their sub-identity to folklore.

The second consequence is the result of the failure to assimilate the peoples indigenous to Anatolia, who were not migrants. The Kurds in particular made great efforts to preserve their autonomy in Ottoman society and revolted numerous times (the most recent being during the last 30 years) against the Turkish dominance in the Republic, while also rejecting the minority status established with the Treaty of Lausanne because they consider themselves a part of the Dominant *Millet*.

Similarly the Alevi, who consider themselves Turkish (sometimes more Turkish than the Sunni) have never abandoned the Alevi identity. However, perceiving themselves to belong to the Dominant *Millet*, they have also rejected minority status even though they were subject to discrimination and even violence throughout Ottoman rule. In fact, the reason behind the support given by the Alevi group to the coercive laicist character of the state is rooted in the desire to ensure that the dominant group remains restricted to Turks, hence making them a member of the dominant group.

The third consequence was how the non-Muslim groups who had somehow stayed in the Republic of Turkey caused the minority idea to be associated with the Subject *millet* status. These groups, after being subjected to the extermination process detailed below, were not confronted with assimilationist policies, contrary to what was to be expected. The "Citizen! Speak Turkish!" campaign was not intended to assimilate, rather to render invisible. Non-Muslims were never expected to become "true" Turks. In other words, the oppressive minority policies of the Republic were not enforced to assimilate them; they were enforced to make them silent and invisible. Even today, the concept of minority is synonymous with being a remnant of the Subject *Millets*.

Naturally, there are internal hierarchies within the Dominant *Millet* and the Subject *Millets*. The Turks in the former and the Greeks in the latter are *primus inter pares*.[12] There is yet a second hierarchy within these hierarchies. The religious elite of the Subject *Millets* were included in the political elites of the society. The Dominant *Millet* ideology never forgave the abolition of the *millet* system in 1839 or the attempts at creating an Ottoman nation with a discourse of something similar to equality. The reason the palace did not heed the demands of the Eastern Anatolian Armenians after 1847 was its fear of the great backlash that occurred in 1839. The *millet* system and the Dominant *Millet* ideology survived past 1839, and remained in force in 2011.

The emphasis of the nationalist discourse on how Muslims fell as martyrs in wars and conquests while non-Muslims grew richer by trade stems from the fact that the Subject *Millets* were forbidden from carrying weapons. Although this began to change gradually from 1856 onwards, the idea that it is dangerous for non-Muslims to be allowed weapons because they might "betray" the country at any time survives to date. Thus, the Dominant *Millet* / Subject *Millet* hierarchy, thought to have been

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[12] First among peers.

abolished in the 19th century, had in fact started to shape the perceptions of the world in all the nations in the region, particularly Turkey, from that point onwards.

The Birth of Nations

The rise of the minority issue in the Ottoman Empire coincided with the emergence of "nations" in the Balkans. The term *ekalliyet* in Ottoman only entered circulation after Western powers began to call the non-Muslim communities of the Empire "minorities." The concept remained alien to the Ottoman system until then, and only entered the language with the adoption of the vocabulary of the enemies. Since the concept was not suited to the Ottoman system, it was unclear who comprised the majority, and the corresponding term *ekseriyet* was rarely used.

The gradual entry of the term and the concept of minority into Ottoman vernacular was caused by the treaties signed after the increasingly frequent defeats of the Empire beginning in the late 17th century. The goals of the Western powers who won the wars included expanding their influence in the East with the help of their fellow believers living in the Empire. Sometimes they genuinely intended to protect their fellow believers, but other times they used them as instruments of their power in the East. For example, the Treaty of Karlowitz signed in 1699 granted Poland the right to intervene in the interests of the Ottoman Catholics.

The 19th century was a turning point for the protection by Western powers of the non-Muslim communities living in the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Paris, signed in 1856 to end the Crimean War, granted Europe the right to protect the non-Muslim peoples of the Empire, and enabled Europe to regain its pre-Napoleonic boundaries and balance. This introduced a system of collective protection.

Two other developments in the 19th century played a large part in the concept of minority penetrating into the Ottoman Empire. The first was the rapid transition from religious minority to national minority in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Its impact reverberated in the Ottoman society: the non-Muslim peoples of the Empire were no longer satiated by religious rights, and began to demand political rights as well. Secondly, with the advent of nations and nationalist ideologies—like the Young Turks attempted to do—there emerged a tendency to develop a supra-identity in which subordinate identities were to be assimilated. This attempt at assimilating sub-identities exacerbated the sentiment of "otherness" among non-Muslims as well as non-Turkish Muslim groups.

The connection between this conceptual evolution and the overall circumstances of the day must be made. 19th century Europe was the battleground of national competition, particularly in gaining control over raw material sources. This fostered colonialism among others, which created a new type of minority: the minority of those who are greater in numbers. During this time of struggle, no one European power was able to gain superior and monopolistic control in the East, and collective action was required. Bilateral treaties containing provisions on minorities were gradually replaced with multilateral agreements that transformed the issue of minorities into a case of international law.

The establishment of the League of Nations was owed to these contested bilateral relations reaching the international level. The League of Nations introduced a technical aspect to the protection of minorities immediately after its establishment. Its implementation was far from universal, and was only enforced upon the defeated powers of World War I. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923 with the effect of recognizing the Turkish State, was the final link in a chain of treaties on minorities exercised under the umbrella of the League of Nations.

The tripartite criterion of minorities, namely "ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities" was expressed officially for the first time within the League of Nations policy for protecting minorities. This is a bilateral policy: on the one hand, it serves a purpose that can be termed negative or passive. It aims to prevent discrimination. On the other hand, it aims to protect recognized minorities, representing a positive or active purpose.

The minority policy is based on two principles that are (or at least appear to be) contradictory: The sovereign state will be one and indivisible; and the continuity and protection of minorities under the same state will be guaranteed. This balance is precarious at best. If one of these principles is believed to have come under threat in a state, severe internal and external crises may erupt. The "external crisis" is owed to a factor that has not been mentioned yet: not all, but most of these minorities are in close ties with nations that have established their own states, and those same states claim the right to supervise the living conditions of groups that are of the same descent and live outside their borders. Meanwhile, the same minorities are occasionally utilized by their "motherlands" as a means of political influence in border disputes and other political claims. This sparks attempts at external intervention. However, the issues between minorities and sovereign states cannot be explained solely by the intervention of a third state. It is true that the concept of minority was introduced after the concepts of nation and nationalism.

Nevertheless, the existence of a minority nationalism that surpasses the nationalism of dominant groups in severity cannot be denied.[13] There are many examples, past and present, that affirm this. The situation leads to a distrust of minorities in the eyes of the sovereign states in whose territories those minorities live. The distrust may evolve into oppression or the desire to assimilate under certain conditions, which in turn fuels the nationalism of minorities. This common situation compels sovereign states into a vicious cycle: the oppression of the state sparks separatist thoughts in minorities, which provokes the state to exert even more oppression, and so on. Considering that the best reactionary way to protect against the onslaught of minority nationalism is the nationalism of the majority, both types of nationalism become radical and lead to issues that cannot be resolved.[14] This approach yields positive results only in federalist states (federalism, in itself, sometimes being inadequate), or in states that introduce regional administration. Nevertheless, since the parameters of contest between minorities and the sovereign state are many and very complex, we can assert that each case is unique and that it would be hazardous to suggest a unified model for all cases.

b. *Establishment of the Republic and the Concept of "Turkishness"*

Turkish nationalism was fairly belated in coming; it is literally a "reactionary" movement. Turkish nationalism is plural. Firstly, it is plural in the sense of ambition: throughout the nation-building process, the different segments of the Ottoman-Turkish elite pursued different goals—from attempts at saving the Ottoman monarchy to the creation of a religious union to fight against the "Christian" forces of the West. Even those who were influenced by Western nations and determined to build a Turkish nation could not agree on the geographical, religious, linguistic or historical aspects of loyalty to this nation. Turkish nationalism is plural in the sense of time as well: although a degree of continuity and commonality exists between the nationalism of the early Young Turks and the pan-Turkic ideology of the present-day nationalists, differences are plenty.

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[13] Howard Williams, "Rights and minority nationalism", in Michael Watson (ed.), *Contemporary minority nationalism*, New York: Routledge, 1990, p. 166–173.

[14] André-Louis Sanguin argues that this leads to "excluding the nationalism of others." "Quelles minorités pour quels territoires?", in André-Louis Sanguin (ed.), *Les minorités ethniques en Europe*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991, p. 7.

By examining the entire nation-building process,[15] we can observe that nations shaped themselves in a way that would display differences from communities of other identities, they fought to gain independent unity, and achieved this unity by establishing a nation-state. In the Turkish context, since the myth of saving the Empire was on the agenda for a long time and the first steps towards the foundation of a Turkish Nation were fairly belated, it can be argued that the Turkish State was founded before the nation had been built. The building process is yet to be completed today in the 21st century.

Proclaiming itself as a nation-state, Turkey attempted to define the Turkish nation and the aspects of loyalty to this nation despite the difficulties brought by the complexity of the cultural and ethnic history of Anatolia. The population in Anatolia was purged via a bilateral population movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The first was the influx of Turks and other Muslims who were believed to be close to Turks in the wake of the *millet* system from the Balkans and Caucasus at a time when the Empire was shrinking rapidly. The second was the "separation" of the non-Muslim (i.e. unacceptable as Turk) population in two stages: In 1915, Armenians were accused of collaborating with the Russians and, using this pretext, have been the main victims of the first genocide of the century; in 1923, the compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey caused the relocation of Orthodox Greeks to Greece.

As a result, the majority of the population immediately after the proclamation of the Republic[16] consisted of Sunni Muslims of Turkic origin, who had been largely scorned in Ottoman society; the Alevi of Turkic origin, who had been accused of heresy, and the Sunni or Alevi Kurds, who had been able to preserve their authenticity and the clan system within the Muslim *millet*. The foundation of the Turkish Republic was established on these three intertwined groups. This was made in a setting dominated by "Turks," where the desire to bring a Constitutional definition to "Turkishness" was manifest. Accordingly, any citizen of Turkey was a Turk. With the revamping of the social structure from top to bottom as in this example, the society was no longer founded on groups but on individuals, and these three groups reached some sort of an agreement with great ordeal and difficulty; however, this is nothing but a tenuous and

[15] For example cf. Anne-Marie Thiesse, *La créations des identités nationales*, Paris: Seuil, 2001.

[16] The population census of 1927 reports a population of 13 million.

temporary compromise in which the tension never subsides. Non-Muslim groups who have managed to stay within the Republic of Turkey throughout its history, and even the Alevis and the Kurds were excluded from the dominant group. The approach of the majority presents two issues here: first, the majority was unable to view the members of non-Muslim groups as individuals in their own right. Non-Muslims never gained independence from the groups they were associated with. Therefore, we can argue that the *millet* system continued into the Republic, at least for the non-Muslim groups. Second, unlike the Laz or linguistic groups such as the refugees from the Balkans or Caucasus, non-Muslims were never able to become a part of "Turkishness" in the eyes of the Turkish people. This in a way affirms the Kemalist definition of "Turkishness": A Turk is an individual who comes from the Turkish culture, lives in Turkey, is a Muslim (sometimes restricted to Sunni), and has either individualized his religion or distanced himself from religion, preserving only the festive and/or cultural aspects of Islam.

The reason only non-Muslims are considered minorities in the Turkish case is because it is believed that non-Muslims cannot be assimilated into the nation-building ideal. Therefore, non-Muslims were meant to be exterminated, not assimilated, during the efforts to build a homogeneous nation. As in all nation-building processes, the utopia of a homogeneous nation in Turkey based itself on three principal mechanisms: extermination, assimilation and folklorization. In the first stage of this process, non-Muslims were removed from Anatolia in one way or another. The Armenian massacre and exile in 1915, followed by a forced population exchange in 1923 removed the groups that could not be assimilated from the national perspective, and even from the collective memory. The remaining pockets of non-Muslims were either made invisible, forced to flee, or "ornamentalized." Following extermination, all the Muslims who had arrived or remained in the country were assimilated through the *millet* system approach, and this was largely a success. Finally, the ethnic, religious and cultural differences that survived the assimilation stage were branded as harmless folkloric elements, and the particular victims of this folklorization stage were the Laz, Circassian and Bosniac identities. The only identity that stood against the process outlined above, and was not eliminated—exterminated, assimilated or reduced to authentic cultural heritage—was the Kurdish identity. Therefore, the Kurdish identity is the most sociologically significant minority identity of Turkey.

Who are Minorities?

Minorities began to define themselves slowly in this complex environment, and established fixed positions in the early years of the republic. Throughout the negotiations for the Treaty of Lausanne, the objective of the Turkish delegation was to abolish the Ottoman system and to build a new nation purged of social differences proven to be harmful in the Ottoman experience. The delegation headed by Mustafa Kemal's right-hand man İsmet Pasha strongly opposed the proposition to grant minority status to Muslim groups. However, they had to concede this status to non-Muslim groups.

As a result, Chapter III of the Treaty of Lausanne entitled "Protection of Minorities" concerns only the non-Muslims, or is perceived to only do so.[17] However, the implementation of the Treaty was quite different from its letter. The rights were fairly restrictive to begin with, and implementation was even more limited. The Treaty does not specify a group by name. Only the term "non-Muslim" is used. The rights were extended to three groups who, being locals of Istanbul, were visible in the public eye: Orthodox Greeks, Gregorian Armenians and Jews.

The orthodox Greek minority consisted of Istanbul Greeks, who were held exempt from the forced population exchange between Turkey and Greece in January 1923. Initially, the Turkish delegation had openly stated its desire to include the Greek Patriarchate of Phanar (Constantinople) in the exchange. According to the Turkish officials, the Patriarchate represented an alien institution that did not fit the definition of "Turkishness," and threatened to betray Turkey.[18] These beliefs were held sincerely, and caused much friction during the negotiations. The determined efforts of the Greek and British delegations compelled Turkey to concede to the Patriarchate remaining in Turkey, but on one condition: the influence area of the Patriarchate was limited to the religious affairs of the Greek community in Istanbul, effectively making the Patriarchate a parish. This meant that the Patriarchate lost its status as the leader of the *millet* in the Ottoman Empire, and would no longer be the political leader and head of the Greek

[17] A deeper look into this chapter reveals provisions that address larger groups of communities not limited to the non-Muslim. Baskın Oran divides these rights into four categories: rights given to the non-Muslims; rights given to people whose native language is not Turkish; rights given to all citizens of Turkey; and rights given to all individuals living in Turkey. Baskın Oran, *op. cit.*, p. 61–80.

[18] For the image of the Patriarchate and its evolution over time, cf. Samim Akgönül, "Les activités du Patriarcat 'oeucuménique' du Phanar dans les années 1990 et l'opinion publique turque", in *CEMOTI*, 33, 2002, p. 195–216.

millet. However, contrary to belief, the title and duties of the Patriarchate are not restricted in the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty does not name minorities either. In order for the Patriarchate to manage the religious affairs of a community, a community that required its services had to exist in the first place. The Orthodox Greek population of Istanbul was excluded from the population exchange to provide this community.

From a religious perspective, the Orthodox Greek minority in the country is represented by the "Patriarchate of New Rome and Constantinople." According to the Patriarchate, the title of this institution is the "Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople." Turkish authorities name the same institution the "Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Fener," Fener being the name of the neighborhood. Another reason the Turks use this title is because Turkey refuses to recognize the supranational, or universal, aspect of this institution.[19] The Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey had a population of 150,000 immediately after the Treaty of Lausanne. Today, the population is in the several thousands, and mostly lives in Istanbul and the Aegean islands Gökçeada and Bozcaada (Imbros and Tenedos).

The Greek (Ecumenical) Patriarchate of Constantinople competed with other ancient Patriarchates (the Patriarchates of Rome, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, comprising the Pentarchos), the newer Patriarchates (Moscow, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia), the Orthodox Church of Georgia and many other autonomous Orthodox churches for supremacy, and claims universality, or the spiritual leadership of the Orthodox of the world.

In time and with the support of the global context, the Patriarchate emerged from the local parish it had been reduced to by the Republic, and became a global church. The internationalization of the Patriarchate began in the 19th century. With the rise of nationalism, The Patriarchate turned inward and began to take on the appearance of an ethnic church. The other Orthodox groups of the Ottoman Empire gradually established their own churches and confined the Patriarchate (Phanar) neighborhood within its geographical area and to the Greek. Starting with the global migration of the Greek Orthodox in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and with the gradual dispersion of the Greek community in Turkey after 1923, the Patriarchate embarked upon a de facto journey of internationalization. Its reputation and significance increased as the Greek population in Turkey declined, and it expanded its influence overseas through its dominance particularly over the Orthodox Church of North America.

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[19] On this subject cf. Samim Akgönül, *Le patriarcat orthodoxe de Constantinople: de l'isolement à l'internationalisation*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2005.

However, the egress from locality is less sociological than geostrategic. As Stalin softened the policy of oppression on the Patriarchate of Moscow during and after World War II, the United States, realizing that it could be instrumental in Soviet foreign policy, decided to balance the scales of power. The Patriarchate of Constantinople was ideal for this task, and the US national Athenagoras was imposed as the Patriarch to Turkey, the country being recently included into NATO. Although the Patriarchate gradually went international, it retained its character as a Greek church nevertheless. In other words, it became the global spiritual leader of the Greek Orthodox. In spite of the numerous disputes with the independent church of Greece (properties of the Church in the "new territories," the 12 Islands and Crete having allegiance to Constantinople instead of Athens, etc.), the international reputation was reluctantly admitted by Athens.

The Patriarchate's transition from a national church with international influence to a multinational church with international influence gained pace in the 1990s. With the demise of the USSR, many new nation-states aligned with the former Soviet bloc were founded, and those states that wished to remain fully clear of Moscow's influence began looking for alternatives to the Church of Moscow. The Patriarchate provided the solution for non-Greek nations and groups because of its inability to exert national pressure (the Patriarchate is in Turkey after all! It could have been an issue if it were in Greece), while having a very high reputation internationally. These churches are aware that when they recognize the authority of the Patriarchate, they will not be hegemonically oppressed in the way that Moscow did.

The outstanding example is the Church of Estonia. Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchate are in a tug-of-war over the small Orthodox minority in the country. The government-supported Apostolic Orthodox Church of Estonia was recognized as an aligned, autonomous church by the Patriarchate in 1996, and this caused a strong reaction on the part of the Patriarchate of Moscow. Severing all ties with Constantinople, Moscow declared that it would not recognize any church other than the aligned Orthodox Church of Estonia, and that it would not take part in any pan-Orthodox councils where the other church was represented. Although Moscow and Constantinople met many times to look for solutions to the property dispute between these two churches, a permanent solution was not found.

The more important issue is Russia's quest for dominance over Ukraine, which it considers a natural extension of its influence. The visit of Patriarch Bartholomew to Ukraine between July 25 and 28 2008—strangely entirely overlooked by the mainstream media—is a very important step. The Patriarch was invited by President Viktor Yushchenko (unlike Russian

Patriarch Alexi II) for the celebration of the 1020th year of the conversion to Christianity. Arriving in Ukraine, Bartholomew was greeted with an official ceremony by Yushchenko himself. The streets of Kiev were decorated with the posters of Bartholomew. Although the Church of Ukraine was in the territory of the Russian Patriarchate, Patriarch Alexi II was not received with the same pomp. This is because Ukraine wants to establish its own independent church as a step in its internal and external policy to gain freedom from Russian hegemony. To prove the point, Yushchenko openly asked for Patriarch Bartholomew's support for the independent Church of Ukraine.

The Patriarchate is usually open to these initiatives with the aim of enhancing its reputation and strengthening its position in Turkey, but Bartholomew, being a successful strategist, avoids any sudden disruption to the balance of power. Therefore, the Patriarch has decided not to fan the flames of separation in the Church of Ukraine—for now.

However, it is apparent that the Patriarchate of Constantinople will rise in importance within a very complex set of international relations where the subject of religion is of great matter in both Muslim and Christian circles.[20]

There are other followers of the Orthodox denomination in Turkey who are affiliated with other patriarchates not recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Among these is the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate, which separated from the Greek Patriarchate during the War of Independence. Today, this is a ghost church that continues to exist in two structures that are never visited by followers.

Also to be mentioned are the Orthodox of Antakya, with allegiance divided between the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Patriarchate of Antioch. Unlike their fellow believers in Istanbul and despite being included in the "Greek Orthodox" category, the Orthodox of Antakya descend from the Arabic culture. More and more members move to Istanbul, and their population is in the ten thousands. The fact that the Orthodox of Antakya who speak Arabic are considered within the "Greek" category shows that the *millet* attitude still survives.

Other Christian communities that uphold the customs and traditions of the East are frequently confused with the Orthodox. Among these communities are the Melkit Catholics, the Marunî, the Nasturi and the Keldian-Syriacs.

The majority of the remaining Christians in Turkey is affiliated with the Armenian Gregorian Patriarchate. The number of Turkish Armenians is

[20] Aslı Bilge, Samim Akgönül, "Patrikhane ve Uluslararasılaşma", *Radikal*, 09.18.2008.

close to 70,000. A small number are Catholic or Protestant. Furthermore, Turkey has been receiving illegal immigrants from Armenia since 1991. Immigration rose sharply after the devastating earthquake of 1998. Although the exact number of illegal Armenian immigrants living and working in Turkey is unknown, estimates vary between 40,000 and 100,000. Ninety-three percent of all Armenian immigrants are illegal and almost all are women and children.[21]

The presence of Armenian illegal immigrants is known and purposely "overlooked" by the administration in Turkey. This community was almost used as a hostage in unexpected developments in the relations between Turkey and Armenia. Following the signing of two protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and opening borders in October 2009, expectations were high for both parties, but when the two governments failed to ratify the protocols, Turkey used the illegal immigrants in Turkey as a trump card. In October 2000, when the US Congress brought up the Armenian Genocide issue once again, Tansu Çiller, the opposition leader in Turkey at the time and the President of the True Path Party, suggested the deportation of Armenian citizens in Turkey as retaliation.[22] When France adopted the Genocide bill in October 2006, Republican People's Party Istanbul deputy Şükrü Elekdağ made the same suggestion.[23]

Another threat of deporting illegal Armenian immigrants in retaliation was made in March 2010. Speaking on how Armenia had failed to follow through with the requirements of the signed protocols, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan said to the BBC:

"There are 170,000 Armenians in my country. 70,000 of them are my citizens. But the rest, we turn a blind eye. But it turns out that I may tell them 'Off you go,' sooner or later. Why will I do this? They are not my citizens. I don't have to keep them in my country. We approach them with understanding, but they keep pushing us with this attitude and they don't know it."[24]

This is reminiscent of how the Greek citizens were used as an apparatus of pressure on the Cyprus issue in 1964, and eventually deported.[25]

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[21] Alin Ozinian, *Identifying the state of Armenian Migrants in Turkey*, Eurasia Partnership Foundation, Istanbul Kültür University, 2009.

[22] *Hürriyet*, 02.10.2000.

[23] *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, issue 22, Summer 2006.

[24] http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2010/03/100316_bbc_erdogan_intw_update.shtml.

[25] For the 1964 deportations cf. Hülya Demir, Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2004.

In short, minorities, "aliens" and those who are "not of us" can very easily be sacrificed for other interests. It is almost impossible for them to be viewed as individuals.

There are a number of Protestant Churches in Turkey. These are scattered around the country and represent a very small percentage of the total population. Their communities consist of "new" Christians—Muslims who have converted—or foreigners settled in Turkey. The activities of Protestant churches in Turkey were always regarded with suspicion and closely followed. Starting in the 1990s, Turkish society became convinced that these churches had proselytizing goals. As a consequence of this atmosphere, the Malatya branch of the Istanbul-based Zirve Publishing House, a Protestant religious publisher, was attacked on April 18, 2007. German national Tilnman Geske and Turkish national Necati Aydın died in the attack, and Uğur Yüksel died of injuries in hospital. Upon arriving at the scene, the police arrested 5 suspects attempting to flee by jumping out of a third floor window, while the prosecutor focused more on "missionary activities" than the murder itself.

The Roman Catholic Church has existed in Anatolia since Byzantium. The number of its followers is estimated at 20,000 with the majority living in Istanbul, Izmir, Antakya, Iskenderun, Diyarbakır, Trabzon, Tarsus and Adana. The community consists of the descendants of the Ottoman Levantines and the Westerners living in Turkey. Like Protestants, the Catholics in the country are viewed with suspicion. Attacks against Catholic clergymen are on the rise lately. On February 5, 2006, the Italian Catholic Priest Andrea Santoro was shot dead at the Church of Santa Maria in Trabzon, where he was appointed by the Vatican. Committed by a 16-year-old student, this murder occurred at a time of crisis connected to the cartoons of Mohammad published in Denmark. This was also a time when the media was frequently reporting an increase in missionary activities in Trabzon, the abundance of apartment-churches in the city, and the claims that priests were paying 100 dollars per person to attract them to the church.

On July 1, 2006, the French priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Samsun, Pierre Brunissen, was stabbed in the hip. The assailant was reported to be a diagnosed schizophrenic who had previously filed a complaint against Father Brunissen for spreading Christian propaganda. On December 17, 2007, Father Adriano Francini of the Church of Saint Antoine in Bayraklı, Izmir was stabbed by a 19-year-old assailant. The assailant was reported to have come to Izmir from Balıkesir to learn more about Christianity, and to have assaulted the priest in a sudden flash of fury after

the mass he had attended. The Iskenderun-based Catholic clergyman Luigi Padovese was stabbed to death in his home on June 3, 2010. His driver, also reported to be a Catholic, was arrested on suspicion.

Finally, the Jewish population in Turkey should be mentioned. With the exception of large cities, the population of Jews in Turkey has decreased drastically. Up until the 1930s, there was a considerable population of provincial Jews in Eastern Thrace. This community migrated to Istanbul in the aftermath of the events of 1934.[26] The population of Jews in present-day Turkey is estimated to be not more than 30,000, with 90% of them being the descendants of Sephardi Jews who had sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire in 1492 following their escape from Spain. This community continues to speak in Ladino—or Jewish Spanish—, a dialect that is close to Spanish.[27]

The remaining 10% consists of Marans (Jews of Portuguese origin descending from the Italian culture), Ashkenazi (Jews descending from German culture, having sought refuge in Eastern Europe) and Karaites (Hellenized Turks who joined a Jewish denomination founded in Iraq in the 9th century). The small Jewish community in Antakya descends from the Arabic culture. There is a very small number of indigenous or local Jews, who are the Romaniots from Byzantine Galatia.

As the above illustrates, although the populations of these religious communities are very small compared to the Sunni or Alevi Muslims, Turkey is not a religiously homogeneous country. This religious diversity poses a great challenge for keeping religious affairs under control, paving the way for the Sunni to become predominant as a consequence.

A central theme of this section is whether the Alevi should be considered a religious minority. As will be discussed in the section on Turkish nationals living in France, the Alevi, with a population of 15 to 20 million, are both sociologically and demographically a minority. However, this definition has two inherent problems.

First, the Alevi have collaborated with the founding elite of the country, supported the elite in bringing Sunni Islam under control, and have become somewhat dominant in this respect. As we will recall, not being dominant is the cornerstone of being a minority. In contrast, the attempt to keep the Sunni under control led to the state and state authorities

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[26] In 1934, the public was provoked against the Jews living in the Thracian provinces of Edirne, Kırklareli and Tekirdağ, effectively forcing them to migrate to Istanbul. For more information cf. Rıfat Bali, *1934 Trakya Olayları*, Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2008.

[27] On the Ladino language cf. Marie-Christine Varol, *Le judéo-espagnol d'Istanbul*, Bern: Peter Lang, Coll. Sephardica, 2008.

becoming Sunni via the Office of Religious Affairs, resulting in complexities with regard to compulsory religion courses in schools and the funding of religious practices. Migration to large cities and emigration to Europe from the 1960s created an urban Alevi identity, with demands for recognition being made on a political level.[28] Notwithstanding, Alevism had long been regarded a way of life or a philosophy until then. This new definition (despite the old one still being in circulation) made the recognition of the Alevi faith a key demand for the Alevi.[29] There will be more on this subject in the following pages.

The second problem with regarding the Alevi in Turkey a minority stems from the fact that the Alevi strongly refuse minority status. The status of being a minority in Turkey is tainted to such a level that the largest religious and ethnic minorities of the country, the Alevis and the Kurds, respectively, neither demand nor accept it.

c. *Nation-Building and Counter-Building: An Abundance of Identities*

Minority Policies

Throughout the history of the republic, minority policies were in a dual attitude that appears contradictory but is frequently observed when the relationships between minorities and majorities are in question. First is the majority's expectation of the minority to provide a continuous series of guarantees of allegiance, and the second is their unchanging dissatisfaction with the guarantees offered. The majority cannot associate minorities with the idea of "Turkishness" (in other words, although the Constitution states that "any citizen of the state of Turkey" is officially a Turk,[30] they cannot perceive minorities as Turks); on the other hand, they make continued attempts to render minorities invisible starting with the initial phases of nation-building in the 1930s (as we observed during the "Citizen! Speak Turkish! campaign[31] which advocated speaking only one language in the country).

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[28] On this subject cf. Elise Massicard, *Türkiye'den Avrupa'ya Alevi Hareketinin Siyasallaşması*, Istanbul: İletişim, 2007.

[29] A recent study shows that 75% of the Alevi consider Alevism a way of life, a philosophy and a heritage. 40% consider it a faith. A further 20% of the survey group consider Alevism a political standpoint as well. Deniz Koşulu, *La construction des revendications alévies: analyse croisée*: France (Strasbourg-Metz); Turkey (Istanbul), Aix-En Provence: Unpublished master's thesis, 2009.

[30] Article 66 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.

[31] Samim Akgönül, "Les Grecs d'Istanbul dans les années 1930", in Δελτίο Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών, 14 (2004), p. 203–278.

Due to this dialectic incidence of exclusion and attempts to make minorities invisible, tension between the majority and minorities tends to rise whenever there is a social crisis in Turkey, a clash with one of the countries with which a minority group is aligned (Greece, Armenia and Israel) occurs, or international political crises emerge (Cold War, accession to the EU, etc.). Turkey's 20th century history has a number of instances where minorities were oppressed due to such tensions. For example, although Turkey was not a belligerent nation in World War II, the country suffered from the ensuing economic and political difficulties. Throughout the war, minorities were oppressed with acts like the "wealth tax"[32] or "20-draw draft."[33] Of course, these acts are not at all related to the annihilation of Jews or Gypsies in Western Europe during the same period.

In a similar fashion, the enduring Cyprus issue since the 1950s has caused eruptions of clashes between Turkey and Greece, which have led to acts that damaged the relations between the countries, such as the violent acts of September 6–7, 1955 or the deportation of Greek citizens from Turkey in 1964.[34]

On the other hand, whenever there are positive developments in bilateral or multilateral relations, the conditions of minorities tend to improve. Both examples prove that minorities are regarded as external elements by the Turkish nation despite being nationals of Turkey. This may be the reason why the concept of "aliens within" is frequently used.

Demands for New Identities

The 1990s were an important turning point in the ongoing building of the Turkish nation. The emergence of new international context, the recognition of the differences between groups in Turkey similar to the case in the Balkans, and an increase in the pace of democratization in the country provided a platform on which demands for uniqueness were voiced more loudly and more clearly.

The political clash between the two opposing and hostile blocs throughout the Cold War had pushed miscellaneous types of otherness more or

[32] For more information on this subject, cf. Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, Istanbul: İletişim, 2000.

[33] Rıfat Bali, "Yirmi Kura İhtiyatlar Olayı", *Tarih ve Toplum*, 179, 1998, p. 4–18.

[34] For more information on these two acts, cf. Samim Akgönül, "Chypre et les minorités gréco-turques: chronique d'une prise d'otage", in *Gremmo-Monde arabe contemporain. Cahiers de recherches, 29 "Recherches en cours sur le problème chypriote"*, 2001, p. 37–51.

less into the background. The elimination of these two polarizing ideologies spawned new types of otherness or resurrected existing ones. In regions like Yugoslavia or Caucasia, this led to atrocities.

These new instances of uniqueness, or the fact that former instances of otherness are exacerbated and can now be expressed, influenced the building of the Turkish nation and the definition of the concept of "Turkishness." Repercussions are felt on two levels: ethnic and religious.

From an ethnic perspective, the geopolitical changes that occurred in the 1990s suddenly brought the Turkic peoples of Asia and communities of the Balkans, formerly inaccessible—or at least regarded so by Turkish history writing—due to Soviet domination, within reach, and introduced a new aspect to the Turkish nation. The Turkish minorities living in the Balkans or Caucasia were made a part of the "Turkish world" thanks to interviews by journalists and books by academics. Furthermore, the Turkic states in Central Asia became targets for Turkish politicians and investors. The horizon of the Turkish world expanded greatly in a very short period of time, leading to the concept of "external Turks." This external ethnic expansion in Turkey caused an important issue to surface within the borders of the nation. This culminated in the rejection of non-Turkic peoples, particularly the Kurds who had begun to rediscover their own identities in the mid-1980s, of belonging to the Turkish nation. Armed conflict between Kurds and Turks exacerbated the otherness of the identity. Meanwhile, the concept of minority gained such notoriety in Turkey that even Kurdish nationalists never demanded to be granted this status. The most radical Kurdish nationalists began a struggle to either gain autonomy or at least be included among the "founding elements" of the country.

Policies introduced symptomatically since the "Kurdish inclusion" initiative of 2007 reveal a complete disregard of the "minority" aspect of the situation, and even avoid using the term altogether. Nevertheless, the rightful demands of a section of Kurds for education in their native language and democratic autonomy may be considered minority rights in themselves according to Council of Europe standards.

The same period saw a separation between the Sunni and Alevi. Alevism constitutes the second most common faith after Sunni Islam in Turkey, and the Alevi population in the country is estimated to be between 12 and 15 million with both Turks and Kurds in the populace. Although rooted in Islam, Alevism is classified as a separate religion by scholars. There is great discrepancy between how the religion is viewed by scholars and by Alevis themselves, because many Alevis who are Turkish nationals consider themselves Muslim. In fact, Alevism should not be considered one with

the other religious movements and alignments in Turkey with respect to either doctrine or practice. Alevism is a blend of various evolved systems of faith, and the practices of religion change from group to group while also evolving over time.[35] These differences are so noticeable that it is still difficult to give a catch-all definition of Alevism today. This faith bears the traces of a wide range of religions from Animism to Shamanism, pre-Islamic Turkic faiths, Eastern Christianity, Shi'a and Sunni Islam.

The Alevis of Turkey have been seeking legitimization before the Turkish society and state for more than a decade. The codification, or dogmatization, of Sunni Islam in the Ottoman era led to the persecution of the Alevis by the Sunni and the Ottoman state. In the laic Republic, Atatürk's reforms which initially aimed to personalize religion, provided the Alevi with some relief. This is why the Alevi tend to vote for the pro-laic Kemalists. Then, with the resurrection of religious identities in Turkey, starting with the Hanefi Sunni identity in the 1990s, the Alevi identity became more religious. Affiliation with a religious identity caused tensions to rise between the Alevi and the Sunni as well as the Alevi and the state. This led to occasional violent outbursts: in 1993, a number of guests invited to take part in an Alevi festival in Sivas came under attack and were trapped in a hotel by fanatic Sunnis, and in the deliberate fire that ensued, 37 people suffocated or burned to death. Today, Alevis differ in opinion with regard to the strategy for gaining the legitimacy they desire. In an environment where accession to the EU has enabled religious issues to be discussed more openly, Alevi leaders have demands in at least three distinct areas:

- First is the exemption of Alevi students from the compulsory religion courses given in secondary and high schools. According to the discourse of political leaders, some ground has been covered in this area. While the courses used to focus solely on Hanefi-Sunni Islam, limited information about Ali was added. However, Alevi students are still not exempt from these courses.
- The second demand is being allowed to have "Alevi" in the "Religion" field of the public identity cards. Some ground has been covered in this area as well. With a decree published in the Official Gazette on October 23, 2006, it is now possible to leave that field blank or replace Islam with another faith.

[35] Thierry Zarcone, *La Turquie moderne et l'Islam*, Paris: Flammarion, 2004, p. 297.

- Finally, some Alevis demand the Office of Religious Affairs to provide financial support to the Alevi "community-houses" like it does to mosques. They also want Alevi clergy to become public servants like Sunni imams are. Other Alevi leaders disagree with these demands because once the state begins to support the Alevi faith financially, it may then seek to bring it under its control.

Similarly to the Kurdish case, the talk of "Alevi inclusion" has been on the agenda since 2007. The underlying theme of this movement is the public recognition of Alevism. The key demand is the official recognition of community houses as places of worship. The non-governmental Cem Foundation appealed to the Office of the Prime Minister in 2005 for "classifying community houses as places of worship," "setting aside a budget for worship" and "hiring Alevi faith leaders at the Office of Religious Affairs," which were turned down at the time. The Foundation then filed a plea of repeal at an administrative court against the decision of the Office of the Prime Minister. The court overruled the plea, arguing that the three demands of the Foundation were in violation of the Constitution and Turkish law. Upon the ratification of this judgment by the Council of State, the domestic legal process came to an end and the Foundation decided to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.

Another hot debate on the Alevi issue relates to the compulsory religion courses. Pursuant to Article 26 Paragraph 4 of the Constitution of 1982, in force as of October 2010, "Teaching of religion and morality is made under state supervision and authority. Religion and morals is among the compulsory courses in primary and secondary schools." Accordingly, primary and secondary schools have a religion course that is congruent with the Muslim-Sunni-Hanefi philosophy. Alevi demands against compulsory religion courses are made in two ways. The Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Society in particular argues for the abolition of religion courses, and, taking the Kurdish boycott of some schools in 2010, asserts that the Alevi should boycott religion classes. Those closer to the Cem Foundation demand that Alevism is included in the syllabus. The Foundation has participated in the workshops held by the government and the Federation of Alevi and Bektashi within the framework of the Alevi inclusion movement.

In 2003, one of the executives of the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Society demanded that his son be exempt from compulsory religion courses because he was Alevi. The Council of State overruled this demand on August 5, 2003. The case was referred to the ECHR in 2004, and the Court of Strasbourg passed judgment in 2007. The judgment said that "the state

must respect the religious beliefs of parents in education," and ruled compulsory religion courses to be in violation of Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights on the "right of education." The Court further stated that the Ministry of Education decree dated 1990 that exempts Christian and Jewish students in Turkey from religion courses was not adequate to guarantee "freedom of faith," and added that the existence of this practice was proof that there is discrimination in religion courses. Based on the above judgment of the ECHR, the Council of State judged in favor of two parents demanding exemption for their children from compulsory religion courses in March 2008.

Non-Muslims: Fewer in Numbers, Greater in Volume

Liberalization in laws (and perhaps society) during the process for EU accession has brought a number of social changes. Of course, there are people who still believe that the non-Muslims could betray Turkey; nevertheless, this cynical approach is slowly being replaced by more realistic and even more humane attitudes.

With the added freedom of expression under the new circumstances, discussions on minorities have become more prolific in terms of opinions and perspectives. The three minorities in question (Greeks, Armenians and Jews) can also take part in the discussions concerning them, and express their opinions. Non-Muslims are the center of attention in liberal circles. Books are published and exhibitions are held about these minorities, and advocating the minorities has become a staple of liberal thought. This is related to the global resurfacing of the minority issue after 1990. However, there may be another local reason specific to Turkey: the segment of society termed the "White Turks," particularly the intellectual middle-class of Istanbul, is now faced with a new type of otherness, with the "Islamist" movement—with the headscarf as an icon—on one side and the Kurdish presence, associated with violence, on the other. Under these circumstances, nostalgia is felt for the "former others," together with a firm belief that Istanbul was more cosmopolitan, "civilized" and "habitable" before the non-Muslims were deported or forced to flee. After an initial influx of nostalgic publications, more scientific and coolheaded research was conducted. In short, the interest in non-Muslims can be defined as a contextual *trend*. The author of this book and the book itself may be considered a product of the said trend. On the other hand, this trend has had many positive outcomes, including the study of minority-majority relations in Turkey and a confrontation with the recent history of the nation.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that being in the minority still means being in a dilemma. Majorities always view minorities as blocs and in accordance to their most distinguishing differences. Considering that the difference in this section is religious loyalty, it is difficult for the members of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey to become individuals. In other words, these individuals can never be regarded as individuals due to their minority status and how they are perceived. Aside from the majority perception of the minority as a bloc, there are internal factors that prevent individualization. Minorities do not look favorably upon the detachment of their members—their individualization—from the group identity, and regard this as a threat to the existence of the minority. This causes an internal pressure, and applies to the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.

The most important element that guarantees the existence of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey are foundations. Non-Muslim minorities were severely harmed by the discriminatory legal restrictions imposed upon minority foundations in the 1970s, 80s and even 90s. The foundation system acts as a tether for minority institutions—religiously and symbolically as well as financially. The adoption of new laws prevented foundations from acquiring new property, even by way of donations, and the properties which they had acquired by donation or purchase since 1936 but not declared in the property statement made in the same year were expropriated. Although some subsequent legal changes slackened the rules, minority foundations continue to pose a significant issue. Minority foundations are placed in a category separate from other foundations, and are treated differently as a result.

Congregational Foundations as of 2010[36]

Greek Orthodox Foundations

Beykoz Aya Paraşkevi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Büyükada Panayia Aya Dimitri Profiti İlya Greek Orthodox Church and School Foundation
Heybeliada Aya Triada Hill Monastery Foundation
Heybeliada Aya Nikola Greek Orthodox Foundation
Heybeliada Greek Theological School Foundation
Büyükada Greek Boys' Orphanage Foundation

[36] This list is a compilation from the website of the General Administration of Foundations: http://www.vgm.gov.tr/sayfa.aspx?Id=38.

Kınalıada Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Burgazada Aya Yorgi Karipi Monastery
Burgazada Aya Yani Greek Orthodox Church and School Foundation
Fener Maraşlı Greek Primary School Foundation
Fener Yoakimion Greek High School for Girls Foundation
Fener Greek High School for Boys Foundation
Feriköy 12 Apostol Greek Orthodox Church and School Foundation
Fener Tekfursaray Panayia Hançerli Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Fener Vlahsaray Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Fener Meryemana Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Kurtuluş Aya Tanaş Aya Dimitri Aya Lefter Greek Orthodox Church and School Foundation
Beyoğlu Greek Orthodox Churches and Schools Foundation
Beşiktaş Cihannüma Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Beşiktaş Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Yenimahalle Aya Yani Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Bebek Aya Haralambos Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Çengelköy Aya Yorgi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Fatih Eğrikapı Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Aksaray Langa Aya Todori Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Ayvansaray Aya Dimitri, Aya Vlaharne Greek Orthodox Church and School Foundation
Üsküdar Profiti İlya Greek Orthodox Church and School Foundation
Arnavutköy Aya Strati Taksiarhi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Yeşilköy Aya İstepanos Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Altı Mermer Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Cibali Aya Nikola Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Kuzguncuk Aya Pandeliimon Greek Orthodox Church
Kumkapı Aya Kiryaki Elpida Greek Orthodox Churches Foundation
Balat Aya Strati Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Balat Panayia Balino Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Zapion Greek High School for Girls Foundation
Sarmaşık Aya Dimitri Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Topkapı Aya Nikola Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Hasköy Aya Paraşkevi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Salmatomruk Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Kuddusü Şerif Rum Patrikhanesi'ne Bağlı Yeniköy Aya Yorgi Church and Monastery Foundation
Galata Greek Primary School Foundation
Tarabya Aya Paraşkevi Greek Orthodox Church and School Foundation
Paşabahçe Aya Konstantin Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Ortaköy Aya Fokas Aya Yorgi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Kuruçeşme Aya Dimitri Aya Yani Greek Orthodox Church Foundation

Yeniköy Panayia Greek Orthodox Church and School Foundation
Boyacıköy Panayia Evangelistra Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Kadıköy Greek Orthodox Churches and Schools Foundation
Balıklı Greek Hospital Foundation
Büyükdere Aya Paraşkevi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Bakırköy Aya Yorgi Aya Analipsiz Greek Orthodox Churches and Schools Foundation
Kandilli Metemorfosis Hz. İsa Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Koca Mustafa Paşa Belgrat Kapı Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Koca Mustafa Paşa Samatya Aya Nikola Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Koca Mustafa Paşa Samatya Aya Yorgi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Samatya Aya Analipsiz Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Koca Mustafa Paşa Samatya Aya Konstantin Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Samatya Aya Mina Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Beyoğlu Yenişehir Evangelistra Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Fener Rum Patrikhanesi Avlusunda Aya Yorgi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Yeniköy Aya Nikola Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Dereköy Aya Marina Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Tepeköy Evangelismos Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Zeytinliköy Aya Yorgi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Bademliköy Panayia Kimisiz Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Bozcaada Kimisiz Teodoku Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Gökçeada Merkez Panayia Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
İskenderun Greek Orthodox Church Foundation for the Impoverished
Antakya Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Altınözü Tokaçlıköyü Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Samandağı Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
İskenderun Arsuz Greek Orthodox Church Foundation
Altınözü Sarılar Mahallesi Greek Orthodox Church Foundation

Armenian Foundations

Feriköy Surp Vartanaş Armenian Church Foundation
Üsküdar Surp Garabet Church, School and Cemetery Foundation
Üsküdar Surp Haç Armenian Church, School and Cemetery Foundation
Eyüp Surp Yeğiya Armenian Church Foundation
Eyüp Surp Astvazazin Armenian Church and Arakelyan School and Cemetery Foundation
Narlıkapı Surp Hovannes Armenian Church Foundation
Rumeli Hisarı Surp Sanduth Armenian Church Foundation
Kadıköy Surp Takavor Armenian Church Aramyan Uncuyan School and Cemetery Foundation
Kuzguncuk Surp Kirkor Lusavoriç Armenian Church Foundation

Beşiktaş Surp Astvazazin Meryemana Armenian Church Foundation
Ortaköy Surp Kirkor Lusavoriç Armenian Catholic Church Foundation
Ortaköy Surp Astvazazin Meryemana Armenian Church and School Foundation
Boyacıköy Surp Yeris Mangas Armenian Church Foundation
Kandilli Surp Arakelos Armenian Church Foundation
Kartal Surp Nişan Armenian Church School Foundation
Yenikapı Surp Tetaos Patriğimeos Armenian Church Foundation
Kınalıada Surp Kirkor Lusavoriç Armenian Church, School and Cemetery Foundation
Gedikpaşa Armenian Protestant Church and School Foundation
Gedikpaşa Surp Hovhannes Armenian Church Foundation
Bakırköy Surp Astvazazin Meryemana Armenian Church and School Foundation
Balat Surp Hreştegabet Armenian Church and School Foundation
Karaköy Surp Pırgıç Armenian Catholic Church Foundation
Beyoğlu Anarathıgutyun Armenian Catholic Sisters Monastery and School Foundation
Beyoğlu Üç Horon Armenian Church Foundation
Beyoğlu Ohannes Gümüşyan Armenian Church Foundation
Beyoğlu Aynalı Çeşme Armenian Protestant Church Foundation
Beyoğlu Surp Gazer Armenian Catholic Mihitaryan Monastery and School Foundation
Pangaltı Armenian Catholic Mihitaryan Monastery and School Foundation
Yeniköy Küddipo Surp Astvazazin Armenian Church Foundation
Şişli Karagözyan Armenian Orphanage Foundation
Taksim Surp Agop Armenian Hospital Foundation
Kumkapı Surp Harutyun Armenian Church and School Foundation
Halıcıoğlu Meryemana Surp Astvazazin Armenian Church and Kalfayan Orphanage Foundation
Kumkapı Meryemana Armenian Church and School Foundation
Kuruçeşme Surp Haç Armenian Church Foundation
Büyükdere Surp Hripsimyans Armenian Church Foundation
Koca Mustafa Paşa Surp Kevork Armenian Church, School and Cemetery Foundation
Koca Mustafa Paşa Anarathigutyun Armenian Catholic Church Foundation
Topkapı Surp Nikagos Armenian Church and School Foundation
Galata Surp Lusavoriç (Cerçiş) Armenian Church and School Foundation
Yeşilköy Surp İstepanos Armenian Church, School and Cemetery Foundation
Hasköy Surp İstepanos Armenian Church and School Foundation
Apeloğlu Andon Vakfı Hayratından Yeniköy Surp Ohannes Mığırdıç Armenian Church Foundation
Büyükdere Surp Boğos Armenian Church Foundation
Büyükada Surp Astvazazin Verapohum Armenian Catholic Church Foundation
Sakız Ağacı Armenian Catholic Church Foundation

Beyoğlu Surp Yerurtutyun Armenian Catholic Church Foundation
Kadıköy Surp Levon Armenian Catholic Church Foundation
Tarabya Surp Andon Armenian Catholic Church Foundation
Yedikule Surp Pırgiç Armenian Hospital Foundation
Kumkapı Meryemana (Drasular) Armenian Church Foundation
Beykoz Surp Nikagos Armenian Church Foundation
İskenderun Karasun Manuk Armenian Catholic Church Foundation
Samandağı Vakıflı Köyü Armenian Orthodox Church Foundation
Kayseri Surp Kirkor Armenian Church Foundation
Diyarbakır Armenian Surp Küçük Kilise Hıdır İlyas Surp Gregos Churches Foundation
Mardin Armenian Catholic Church Foundation
Kırıkhan Armenian Orthodox Church Foundation

Jewish Foundations

Büyükada Hased Leavram Jewish Synagogue Foundation
Hasköy Mealem Jewish Synagogue Foundation
Beyoğlu Jewish Rabbinate Foundation
Beyoğlu Seferadimi- Neveşalom Jewish Synagogue Foundation
Ortaköy Jewish Etz-Ahayim Synagogue Foundation
Sirkeci Jewish Synagogue Foundation
Kuzguncuk Bet-Yaokov Synagogue Foundation
Galata Yüksek Kaldırım Eşkenazi Jewish Synagogue Foundation
Hasköy Turkish Karaite Jewish Synagogue
Kadıköy Hemdat İsrael Synagogue Foundation
Balat Or-Ahayim Jewish Hospital Foundation
Balat Ahrida Jewish Synagogue Foundation
Ankara Jewish Synagogue Foundation
Bursa Turkish Jewish Congregation Foundation
Çanakkale Mekor Hayim Jewish Synagogue Foundation
Antakya Jewish Synagogue Foundation
İskenderun Jewish Synagogue Foundation
Kırklareli Synagogue of Moses Foundation

Syriac-Keldani Foundations

Diyarbakır Syriac Ancient Mary Church Foundation
Beyoğlu Syriac Ancient Mary Church Foundation
Mardin Syriac Catholic Church Foundation
Mardin Syriac Ancient Deyrulzafara Monastery and Churches Foundation
Mardin Syriac Protestant Foundation
Midyat Syriac Protestant Foundation

Midyat Syriac Deyrulumur Margabriel Monastery Foundation
Midyat Syriac Ancient Congregation Marborsom and Mart Şemuni Churches Foundation
İdil Syriac Ancient Church (Mardodo) Foundation
Diyarbakır Keldani Catholic Church Foundation
Keldani Catholic Church Foundation
Mardin Keldani Catholic Church Foundation
Elazığ Syriac Ancient Mary Church Foundation

Other non-Muslim Foundations

Antakya Greek Catholic Church Foundation
Independent Turkish Orthodox Churches and Patriarchate Foundation
Edirne Sveti Gorci Church Foundation
Bulgarian Exarchate Orthodox Church Foundation
Şişli Georgian Catholic Church Foundation
Mersin Tomris Nadir Mutri Church Foundation

On the one hand, European pressure on Turkey in relation to these issues disturbs nationalist circles and is perceived as an attempt by "the West" to destroy the unity of the Republic of Turkey. The proponents of this idea frequently draw parallels between the fall of the Ottoman Empire and current issues, referring to the allegation that the West destroyed the Empire by collaborating with the non-Muslims living in the Empire. This is proof that the notion of otherness that emerged as a consequence of the demise of the *millet* system is still alive. Non-Muslim minorities are still not included in the nation, despite constitutional nationality and a secular nation discourse.

On the other hand, minorities have broken their silence and begun to openly stand up for their rights, as explained above. Their demands are being backed primarily by the democrats and liberals in Turkey. This opposition naturally results in tension.

The circumstances unique to every minority can be summarized as follows:

The population of the small Greek Orthodox minority dropped from more than 100,000 in 1923 to approximately 5000 in 2006.[37] There are problems in two different areas concerning this minority: The first being the

[37] For the reasons of the gradual disappearance of this minority, cf. Samim Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-Devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci*, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007.

issues unique to the minority. These include the number of students in minority schools, textbooks used in these schools, and the properties of the Greek nationals deported from Turkey in 1964. Almost all of these issues stem from the mutual negative and restrictive construal of Article 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne on minorities by Turkey and Greece.[38] This article was incorporated to ensure that the two nations expend efforts to protect the peace of the minorities who are their citizens. In other words, the states, and not the minorities, have reciprocity between them. However, this article has been used by both states to restrict minorities or to persecute them to put pressure on the opposing state.

Second is the disagreement over the Orthodox Patriarchate. There is no doubt that the Patriarchate, allowed to remain in Istanbul on the condition that it would operate as a local parish, plays an important international role and is entitled to be "ecumenical." The public and the state of Turkey are unhappy with the increasing international influence of the Patriarchate, and believe that this may not be "in the own interests of the Turkish nation." On the same subject, it should be mentioned that the Orthodox Greek have been without a theological school in Turkey since 1971, although they need these schools to train Orthodox clergymen in the practice of religion. The discussion around the reopening of the Theological School of Halki caused many repercussions within the Turkish society and Turkey's relations with the West.

The issues of the minorities are being voiced by intellectuals within and outside the minority. An event that was the first of its kind in the history of the Greek Orthodox minority took place in 2006: Greeks of Istanbul origin living all over the world gathered at a meeting held in Istanbul between June 30 and July 2, and both the actors and the observers of the issue discussed the problems of the minorities that remained in Turkey.[39] The most important rational issue of the Greek minority in Turkey is of course the issue of physical existence. This stems from the increasing difficulty of remaining a Greek citizen of the Republic of Turkey as the population wanes. In this respect, the sociological aspect of the concept of minority is

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[38] Article 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne states that the rights granted to the non-Muslims in Turkey by Articles 38 to 44 are also granted to the Muslims in Greece. This article led both nations to assume reciprocity between the two minorities and was used to the disadvantage of the minorities. For more on this issue, cf. Samim Akgönül (ed.), *Reciprocity. Greek and Turkish Minorities: Law, Religion, Politics*, Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2008.

[39] The collection of papers for this meeting was printed in Greek: *Συνδεσμος Αποφοιτϑν Ζϑγραφειου, Συναντηση στην Πολη: Το Παρον και το Μελλον*, Athens: Kaleidoskopio, 2009.

still operational in the Turkish context. The analysis of socialization in this context can still be made by using minority-majority relations as a tool, while the concept of minority may be inadequate to analyze the society in post-industrial nations where individualization is somewhat easier, or in societies where standing against one's own identity is acceptable to both the majority and minority.[40]

The Armenian minority is suffering from the international agenda. The population of this minority is estimated to be between 50,000 and 70,000, with most members living in Istanbul and haunted by the tragic memories of the atrocities that took place in 1915 and are considered "genocide" by more and more Western nations, led particularly by France. The Armenian minority in Turkey feels the repercussions of every crisis around the "genocide" issue by bearing the wrath of the public. Furthermore, relations between Armenians in Turkey and Armenia are difficult due to the suspension of relations between the two neighboring countries. The disagreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan further complicates Turkish-Armenian relations. The society only realized the magnitude of the difficulties suffered by this minority, particularly the issue of minority foundations, through the efforts of Hrant Dink, the former editor-in-chief of theTurkish-language minority newspaper *Agos*, who was assassinated in January 2007. The energy created by *Agos* led many Turkish intellectuals and humanists to support this minority. However, the issue of genocide/explusion is closely related to the birth of Turkey, and even that of modern "Turkishness," which is why it is still a very hot issue in the public opinion. In a way much like the Greek minority in Turkish-Greek relations and the Jewish minority in Turkish-Israeli relations, the Armenian minority feels like a hostage and under constant threat in the trilateral relations between Turkey, Armenia and the Armenian diaspora. Although the relative improvement in Turkish-Greek relations and the regional alliance between Turkey and Israel (excepting the 2010 crisis) have somewhat relieved the situation for the two minorities in question, the Armenian minority is still under threat. The assassination of Hrant Dink in January 2007 or the threat made by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan in March 2010 that if Armenia were to continue with the allegations of genocide, the Armenian immigrants in Turkey would be deported are but two examples.

[40] For a critique of analyzing social relations through a prism of minority and majority, cf. Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

The Jews in Turkey are mostly Sephardi, being the descendants of the Jews who fled Spain in the 15th century, and have a population of about 30,000. Contrary to other minorities, the Jewish elite side with the official attitudes of Turkish authorities. This becomes particularly apparent in the 500th Year Foundation and the *Shalom* newspaper. We should also bear in mind the fact that Turkey, under the supervision of the United States, is the sole regional ally of Israel. The recent political events had implications on the balance of relations between Turks and Jews in Turkey. On the one hand, the political situation in the Middle East compelled Turks to side with Palestine, leading to the emergence of an anti-Semitic discourse. On the other hand, there are voices of dissent among the Jewish population, implying that the "gratitude" felt towards Turkey is diminishing.

In conclusion, a trilateral change that applies to all three minorities can be asserted: First, the minorities are no longer the spectators of the social change in Turkey; to the contrary, they take part in it. Second, the Turkish public has begun to approach all minorities with a range of sentiments from solidarity to enmity. Third, Turkish authorities, under pressure from Europe, have begun to make important, albeit reluctant, decisions with respect to minorities.

Conclusion

The changes in the Turkish society and the uncertainty of Turks towards themselves and others indicate that the Turkish nation-building has entered a new stage. This may also be thought of as the battleground for a variety of ill-defined approaches. Some of these approaches are "exoteric:" there is no denying the presence of a conservative movement that associates being Turkish with speaking the Turkish language, being Sunni, possessing the Turkish culture and being loyal to the Central Asian and Ottoman heritage. Others are "esoteric," where loyalty to the Turkish nation stems from the country of Turkey. Being "of Turkey" means being a Turkish national; hence, Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims and any and all ethnic or religious communities comprising Turkey are considered part of the Turkish nation.[41]

[41] This approach is thoroughly discussed by Baskın Oran: *op. cit.* p. 131 and others.

Intending to respect the uniqueness of all groups comprising the country, thereby relieving tension and achieving a new type of national unity, this approach is not without obstacles. The causes of great separations and occasional violent conflicts in the 1970s were ideological or political in nature. It was the environment of violence that led Turkey to the military coup of September 12, 1980, the subsequent military regime in the 1980s, and the resulting national devastation. Masses were purged of politics in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, but the tension lost its political nature and assumed an ethnic character, particularly in the Kurdish issue. While ethnic discrimination ensued, a new type of separation emerged: beginning in the mid-1990s, social, and even economic issues were associated with religion, which seriously divided the self-defined laic group and the also self-defined conservative group.

The dream of the nation-state is a nation with no classes or subgroups. The military paradigm is identical to the religious paradigm in the sense that it is constructed on indivisibility, non-fragmentation and absence of differences. Social fractures are terrifying to nation-states and groups who hold the nation-state to be indispensable, and are utilized as instruments.

There is a religious fracture in Turkey, but it is not caused by religious or denominational differences. The British example of differences between the members of the Anglican and Catholic churches spawning ethnic conflict is not the case in Turkey. Violent clashes did occur between Sunni and Alevi believers, sometimes culminating in events like the Malatya or Sivas massacres where the right of existence was denied. However, these conflicts have not escalated to fractures, particularly due to the Alevi community avoiding fundamentalism. It would also be wrong to claim that the religious fracture is between the devout and the non-believers. It would be inappropriate to regard the hundreds of thousands who took part in the Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir demonstrations for "laicism" in 2008 as non-believers. If a fracture does exist, it is with regard to the position of religion in social and political life. A segment of the middle and upper-middle classes is perturbed by the public presence of Islam, and believes that the religion should be kept under strict state supervision. This fracture manifests itself in symbolic issues concerning daily life, such as wearing headscarves or consuming alcohol. The abovementioned group argues that too much religious freedom will restrict the lives of those who believe in religion but do not accept the religious way of life. A statist and laic dogma is built to replace the threat of a religious dogma, and constructed upon the fundamental pillars of Turkey.

Religion can be defined in two ways: the vertical one, meaning the relationship between the individual and God; and the horizontal one, being the sense of community among individuals. In all monotheistic religions, the transcendental relationship between the individual and God has evolved into the common loyalty that transforms individuals into a community, and the social definition has mostly surpassed the spiritual. In societies like France, the individualization brought by the Industrial Revolution condemned religion to its spiritual definition, made it private, and attempted to prevent it from constituting a social element. Taking the French nation-state as an example, Turkey assumed that the same could be done to Islam, given time. But Turkish society is the descendant of Ottoman society and still possesses the remnants of the *millet* system, and religious loyalty constitutes one of the dominant criteria of common loyalty.

Another fracture in loyalty may be considered one of identity in nature. This identity fracture has two tributaries that feed into each other. One is the state focus on the concept of "Turkishness," owing to the Turkish state being established before the nation. From 1923 to the 1960s, this fracture existed between Muslim Turks and non-Muslims, becoming manifest in events like the "Citizen! Speak Turkish!" campaign, the Law on the Allocation of Some Professions to Turks, the Wealth Tax, forced labor camps in Aşkale, the riots of September 6 and 7, 1955, and the deportation of 1964. Although the Muslim-non-Muslim fracture continued after 1980, the ethnic conflict evolved into the Turk-Kurd opposition, and culminated in armed conflict in the 1990s. In the last analysis, the attempt to position "Turkishness" as a framework of loyalty failed, sub-identities particularly the Kurdish identity became radical, and, in response to this radicalization, the Turkish identity was made radical instead of constituting a framework loyalty. Establishing a national state before the nation-building process was complete as a last resort to defend against imperialism led to a series of inevitable problems; in the same manner, the attempt at becoming a post-industrial nation without being an industrial nation complicates individualization.

It is at this point that the second tributary of the identity fracture, namely exoteric nationalist movements, emerges: in resemblance to dogmatic religions, these movements of nationalism reject each other, feed from each other, and regard those groups and individuals who share the same nationality but are not aligned with their group as traitors. As conflict escalates, those who resist choosing sides are accused of being the pawns of "foreign agitators," conspiracy theories are advanced,

nationalism evolves into protectionist paranoia, and end-of-the-world (or nation) arguments are born. In societies where nationalism is dominant, ethnic conflict is inevitable and existing without being a nationalist becomes difficult. Furthermore, corrupt nationalism denies the right of existence to those it considers “others,” which results in murders.

In short, the concept of minority in the Turkish context is undergoing a change of state, and at this stage of nation-building, the struggle between identical individualization and social grouping gives rise to new minorities.

CHAPTER THREE

RELIGIOUS BELONGING AND TRANSNATIONALITY: THE MUSLIMS OF GREECE

Introduction

Because it contains the ill-defined word "nation," the meaning of "transnationality" changes according to individual perspective and varies in time, and its interpretation is dependant on the language used and the current political context. In the wider sense of the term, the advent of communication technologies and the ease of transmission has shrunk the world to such an extent that the national unity of a country is no longer defined by its borders; thus all nations are transnational. Mass migrations, expulsions and border changes throughout the century have given rise to many sovereign states within various nations. Nevertheless, these nations continue to preserve their notions of identity, and even reinforce it in some cases.

Transnationality has been the subject of research for many scholars of social sciences in two areas: economic relations and political engagement. Minorities have both had very close economic ties with the country of origin or motherland (ethnic business), and have always contributed to the political and social developments in that country. The identity aspect of transnationality has been studied in the context of immigrant communities. Michel Oriol's study on the children of Portuguese immigrants may be considered a pioneering effort.[1] This and subsequent surveys show that transnationality has contradicting effects on identity-building in older and newer minorities.

Since there is no set definition of "Turkishness" and history has induced much variation in the context, the Turkish case is a very good example of transnationality. The experience of Turks with Greek citizenship, who comprise a small part of the Turkish nation, may be appropriate for

[1] Michel Oriol, *Les variations de l'identité: Etude de l'évolution de l'identité culturelle des enfants d'émigrés portugais en France et au Portugal*, Nice: IDERIC, Université de Nice, 1984.

explaining the situation of other communities in Europe. Although very complex, the situation of the Turks in Greece is not a unique case. In order to understand how transnational societies work, solutions to identity issues, legal nationality problems, ethnic, linguistic, religious and socio-psychological belonging questions must be analyzed closely.

First of all, concise information about the community is required to understand how this transnationality manifests itself, and to what degree the relations of the Greek state with its citizens are unique. The Muslim minority in Greece was established as a consequence of Eastern European national liberation movements in the early 20th century, considered "uprisings" in Turkish history writing. In the aftermath of the Turkish-Greek war between 1920 and 1922, called the "War of Independence" by Turks and the "Asia Minor Catastrophe" by Greeks, a protocol for forced population exchange was signed by the two countries in 1923.

As a consequence of this protocol, all Muslims in Greece and all Orthodox Greeks in Turkey, with the exception of the Orthodox Greeks in Istanbul and the Muslim Turks in Greek Western Thrace, were exchanged. The Muslim minority in Western Thrace has close ties to both Bulgaria and Turkey due to geographical location. The Muslim Pomaks[2] have close ties with Bulgaria and Turkey, while Muslim Turks have close ties with Turkey. Furthermore, there is strong presence of Western Thracian Turks in Germany. This Muslim minority had gained rights under Articles 39 to 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne, in the form of both negative and positive rights. Negative rights aim for the equal treatment of minorities and the majority alike; in other words, they are anti-discriminatory in nature. Positive rights are additional rights granted to the minorities to enable them to reach equal status in religion, education and civil law. Positive rights do not affect the fact that the members of the Greek Muslim minority are Greek nationals.

The minority has been suffering from issues associated with this dual loyalty. The foremost of these is the reciprocity of treatment with the Greek minority in Turkey. The issues lie in education (textbooks, teachers and schools), legal structures and religion (as in the mufti and foundations issues).

[2] Although there are close ties between the Pomaks of Greece and Bulgaria, both groups feel great affinity to Turks, which may be considered a repercussion of the *millet* system.

a. *The Mufti Issue: The Battle of a Religious Institution with National Interests*

Among these issues, the problems related to muftis are the most suitable to explain the issue:

Considering the ethnic and religious attributes of the 19th-century Ottoman *millet* system, it is apparent that the muftis were not restricted to a religious role for the Muslim minority in Greece. In addition to their religious tasks, muftis attend a variety of family issues such as marriage, divorce, alimony, child custody and inheritance in cases where no will is found. However, the decisions of the mufti have to be ratified by the competent legal authority.

A Greek law adopted on February 4, 1991 prohibits the enforcement of a decision made by the mufti unless it is ratified by the competent local court. The actual purpose of the court in question is to decide whether the decisions of the mufti are within its jurisdiction. In other words, the Greek local court does not attempt to change Islamic rules or intervene in decisions made pursuant to those rules. Its responsibility is to determine whether the case at hand will be resolved by the court or the mufti.

The presence of this procedure in Greece bears the mark of Ottoman influence. Furthermore, Greek laws even establish the position of the head mufti, who will be the leader of the muftis and act in a capacity similar to the *şeyhülislam* (chief religious authority) in the Ottoman Empire. This position was created as a counterpart to the Patriarch in Istanbul, but no one was appointed to this post. Only two of the three mufti offices are occupied, namely those of Komotini and Xanthi. A mufti office is not instituted in Alexandroupoli.

The debate on the election of muftis may help to explain the concept of minority in the Turkish context. Although the position of the head mufti was established with the Treaty of Athens in 1913, no official has been appointed to the post, owing to the abolition of the *şeyhülislam* post in the new Republic of Turkey, and the Greek intentions to respect this decision and refrain from provoking Turkey.

Secondly, pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty of 1913 and the Law numbered 2345/1920, muftis must be elected by the votes of the Muslim population in the regional unit. The same law enables the Minister of Religious Affairs to exclude any unauthorized nominees from the election. The problem arises because neither the treaty nor the law have specific provisions on how this election is to be held. The impression is that voters cast their votes at the ballot box to elect their muftis. Islam has no

organization comparable to the Orthodox Sacred Synod. Since neither the treaty nor the law is enforced for mufti elections, all muftis have been appointed officials so far. Among these appointed officials, there were individuals who were considered representatives of the minority, and received popular support.

Due to the misinterpretation of the reciprocity between the Greek minority of Turkey and the Muslim minority of Greece,[3] when the mufti of Xanthi died in 1985, Muslim elites began to demand that mufti elections in Greece were held in a manner similar to the election of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul. The rejection of this demand came at a time when Turkish nationalism was on the rise in Western Thrace, and a harsh opposition movement formed around Sadık Ahmet, who was supported by Ankara. In 1990, show-of-hands elections were held in mosques for the appointment of two muftis. The prominent figures in the minority still reject the legitimacy of the two muftis appointed by the central government. Such election of religious officials was a tradition in the Ottoman Empire. In other words, the religious organization of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace continues the Ottoman tradition. As of 2010, both election systems are in force. Two muftis have been elected in mosques, and two have been appointed by the Greek state. A struggle for religious power ensues between these muftis and the "elite" Muslims.

Legal powers bestowed upon muftis by the state lead to significant problems. The legal judgments passed by elected muftis regarding the members of the minority (marriage, divorce, inheritance and others) are only valid for the minority and are not recognized by the Greek state or law. Uneducated peasants who are sacrificed for the interests of the Muslim religious officials are the most disadvantaged. As of 2010, four scenarios are being debated:

1. Status quo, or the continuation of this dual (quadruple) situation. However, this situation undeniably leads to legal and social problems. From a legal point of view, those who go to the elected muftis are aggrieved; from a social point of view, this affirms the fact that the

[3] Article 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne impose a number of responsibilities to both states regarding the minorities within their borders. However, the provisions do not require reciprocity between the policies to be carried out with respect to these minorities. Cf. Samim Akgönül (ed.), *Reciprocity and Greek and Turkish minorities: Law, Religion, Politics*, İstanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2008.

minority identity is being rejected and the minority is still perceived as "others" and outsiders by the Greek administration. Furthermore, Greece has twice been adjudged to be in violation of religious freedoms by the European Court of Human Rights.

2. Reorganization of the system, removal of the appointed muftis from office, and the appointment of the elected muftis. Although demanded by the minority, this solution appears difficult to implement given the current state of affairs. Since muftis still have to be appointed in order to continue their duties, subsequent elections may be dominated by nominees who are closer to the central government.
3. Appointed muftis continue their legal and administrative appointments while elected ones are restricted to religious office. Although this seems to be the ideal solution at first sight, it will give rise to obscurities of concept, representation and legitimacy. This approach will formalize the duality and continue the tension.
4. A bold reform that will enable the minority to choose its own leader as a religious community, as is the case in developed European countries, followed by a new law to annul the legal and administrative powers of the elected leader so that the position remains solely religious.

The final option warrants further discussion.

From the Greek perspective, this solution may be required of a democratic nation. In the last analysis, just as improbable as it is for France to appoint the leaders of its Jewish, Protestant and Muslim citizens despite their opposition, it is unacceptable for the Greek administration to appoint a religious leader for the Muslim community. But since there are administrative and legal responsibilities involved, the appointment becomes somewhat legitimate. The annulment of these administrative and legal responsibilities will further legitimize and strengthen the minority's demand for electing its own leader. This will also mean that Greece complies with ECHR judgments.

Due to the concept of transnationality mentioned at the beginning of this section, it is unrealistic to ignore the influence of Turkey with respect to such a reform. Turkey views itself as the protector of the Western Thracian Turkish minority, this view is affirmed and internalized by the minority, and all Greek policies on minorities are approached with a policy of reciprocity that does not, and should not, exist in the first place.

Although unique in definition, Turkey is a laic country where the clergy has no legal responsibilities. The translation of its own internal development, namely legal secularization, to the minority in Western Thrace is

expected to appease Ankara; the same applies to religious schools. What is more, the assumed "reciprocity" has been out of the question since 1926, when, in the process of the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey relinquished their unique civil law regimes, albeit in a controversial way. To put it briefly, if two Greek nationals of Turkey are to be legally married, the act has to take place before the municipality. This does not prevent a religious wedding at the church, much as it does not prevent a wedding sermon by the imam. This could be a possible solution for Western Thrace.

Minorities usually oppose any attempts to take back the rights given to them, as these attempts are seen as a blow to the existence of the group. Therefore, although some social reforms are called for by the majority, the reactionary attitude is maintained towards the outside. A similar initial reaction should be expected against such a reform. However, further reflection reveals that a solution in the manner above would contribute to many causes upheld by the minority.

Firstly, the minority tries to communicate that it is not a religious minority, rather a national one. There are reactions against being named the Muslim minority by Greece, and rightful objections are made to the ban against national references in the names of civil organizations. Under these circumstances, advocating the continuation of the legal and administrative responsibilities of religious officials gives rise to a paradox. This constitutes an important step towards the recognition of the national identity of the majority. At the same time, this solution leaves the administration of minority foundations entirely in the hands of the minority, which is their inalienable right.

b. *Physical Transnationality*

Motivated by economic, social and identity-related factors, individuals of the Muslim minority began to emigrate in the 1950s. The population of Muslims in Greece was around 120,000 in 1923, and this number has not changed to date despite a relatively high birth rate (2.5%) in the minority. This is the phenomenon of a small diaspora, the signs of which are the detachment of the "Turkish" minority in Greece from their homelands to live in another country, the development of strong identity ties within the community, most marriages taking place within the community rather than intermarrying with Greeks, strong economic ties to the country where the minority is in the majority; i.e. Turkey, and multiple and complex loyalties of the individuals in the minority.

Western Thracian Turks have emigrated to various countries and developed different legal relations in each:

- There are approximately 200,000 Western Thracian Turks in Turkey, mostly in Bursa and Istanbul.
- Approximately 30,000 members of this minority are in Europe, mostly in Germany.
- Minority members have migrated to other regions in Greece, with numbers reaching thousands in Thessaloniki and Athens, among others.
- Some have emigrated to more distant countries. For example, there is a population of Western Thracian Turks in Australia who have emigrated for economic reasons. Libya, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are attractive for "students".

Wide geographical dispersion has brought equally complex legal relations. Three examples stand out:

Greek citizens: The members of the Turkish minority are Greek nationals; however, much of the population living in the two largest cities in the region (Komotini and Xanthi) travels frequently between Greece and Turkey. Some have economic interests in the "motherland" (properties; business ventures, etc.) while others have family members (children in Turkish high schools or universities). In this case, Greek nationals enter Turkey as tourists and have to leave and reenter every three months. Others (particulatly retirees) obtain residence permits to spend half the year in Greece and the other half in Turkey. It should be remembered that Turkey waived visa requirements for Greek nationals in 1989. During the Turkish-Greek reconciliation period in the late 1980s, then-Prime Minister Turgut Özal waived visa requirements unilaterally, with the Western Thracian minorities who had to travel between the two sovereign (and occasionally enemy) states frequently reaping the most benefit. However, the motive behind the waiver was trade, as was fitting to Özal's view of the world.

The situation is clearer for students. Minority education in Greece is wholly inadequate and students must take exams to be admitted to university. On the other hand, Turkey has a quota for foreign students. Many young minority members apply through this quota to study in Turkey for a year or two, then gain the ability to transfer to universities in Greece. They preserve their Greek nationality while in Turkey, of course. In both

cases, Greek nationals belonging to the "Turkish nation" profit from the benefits of their dual legal and psycho-sociological loyalties to the full.

Greek nationals of Turkish origin also emigrate to Western European countries, most notably Germany. There are two types of emigration: one is short-term. Especially the Pomaks living in the Rhodope Mountains travel back and forth between Greece and Germany as seasonal workers. The other is long-term, and like the Turkish migrant workers in Germany, Greek nationals of Turkish origin also emigrate to Germany. In both cases, Greek nationals have a clear advantage over Turkish nationals: as European citizens, they are free to travel and settle across Europe. Western Thracian Turks living in Germany are very active in minority affairs; much more active, in fact, than their fellow minorities in Western Thrace. Approximately twenty Western Thracian Turk societies gathered under the umbrella of the "Federation of Western Thracian Turk Associations in Germany" undertake initiatives that aim to improve the living conditions of the minority. These may take the form of public demonstrations, such as the one attended by 2000 people on January 23, 1988, or appeals to international institutions (for example, numerous delegations have been sent to the European Commission between 1983 and 2010). These initiatives aim to attract the attention of the international community to the Turkish minority in Western Thrace, and are fairly effective. As a result of these campaigns, public pressure in Europe was mobilized to support the demands of the minority, and European authorities, becoming aware of the problems suffered by the minority, began to pressure Greece to resolve a series of legal issues, particularly Article 19 of the Citizenship Law. However, it must be noted that the Federation approaches issues with a markedly nationalist attitude and follows in the footsteps of Ankara's policies.

Turkish citizens: The group in question is not the Turks who emigrated from the Balkans to Turkey in the 19th and 20th centuries and acquired Turkish citizenship in 1923; rather, Western Thracian Turks who have been emigrating to Turkey en masse and acquiring citizenship in one way or another since the 1950s.

Turkey's approach has not been constant. During the Turkish-Greek reparation period in the 1930s, a Settlement, Trade and Navigation Treaty and a protocol to limit naval forces were signed between the two parties. According to Article 1 of the Treaty, the nationals of both countries gained the right to "settle in, move freely within the borders and leave the other country, provided that the laws of the country are respected." Pursuant to the Treaty, Turkey allowed free immigration to the Muslims of

Greece in 1958. As a consequence of this arrangement, and rumors that a new population exchange was being planned, the rate of immigration to Turkey grew steadily in the late 1950s. The Free Immigration Agreement was terminated in 1964, when tensions escalated between the countries. However, during the 33 years in which the agreement remained in force, the Turkish minority in Western Thrace lost its most wealthy and enterprising members.

Immigration to Turkey caused a shift in the social and professional status of Western Thracians. Immigrants settled mostly in large and important hubs like Istanbul and Bursa. Interestingly, Edirne was not the city of choice. Edirne whould have been expected to attract more immigrants due to its location. However, the fact that Western Thracians did not settle in Edirne or elsewhere in Eastern Thrace is indicative of their psyche during immigration: they wanted to settle in the motherland permanently and by severing their ties with the region they were born in. Istanbul and Bursa were attractive for a number of reasons. Istanbul was important due to two reasons. First, it was an important source of employment, for Western Thracians and Eastern Anatolians alike. Moreover, an organization that facilitated the settlement of Thracians in the city was active, and continues to operate to date. When Western Thrace was invaded by Germany and Bulgaria in 1941, an influx of refugees arrived in Turkey, and Turkey had to take measures to accommodate these refugees. Most refugees at the time took residence in a building in Sirkeci, Istanbul that served as a refugee house. The refugees who managed to find jobs would leave this settlement to reside elsewhere in Istanbul. With the second wave of immigration caused by the civil war in Greece between 1945 and 1951, the Thracians who had previously settled in Istanbul took to the task of helping their fellow countrymen in their new lives. The Western Thracian Immigrants Solidarity Association was established in 1946 for this purpose. The society changed its name in 1975 and became the Western Thracian Turks Solidarity Association, which is still operational. The Society became an active organization with its own media facilities thanks to the financial support of wealthy Thracians who had settled in the country. The chairs of the Society are always chosen among businesspeople. The tasks of the chair include lobbying and propaganda as well as supporting the newly-arrived immigrants in finding employment and settling in the city.

Bursa has similar advantages. It has a steady rate of economic development, and is growing constantly, getting closer to Istanbul. Similar to Istanbul, Bursa is also accustomed to Thracian immigrants. Since the Balkan Wars, Turkish communities emigrating from Bulgaria and Greece

have been settled in Bursa on orders from Istanbul. The fact that there are many Western Thracian businesspeople and politicians in Bursa who are very active in helping newcomers makes this province very attractive to Thracian immigrants. Another indubitable reason this city attracts Thracian immigrants is the presence of a good university where admission is easier than the universities in Istanbul.

Although Istanbul and Bursa were the cities of choice for Thracian immigrants, some were forced to take residence in other cities in what is called "forced settlement." The Thracians settled in the first two cities were Muslims who were Greek nationals; Western Thracians who sought asylum in Turkey were settled in the forced settlement cities. The waiver of Greek nationality remained a prerequisite to asylum for a long time. Those who waived their Greek nationality were sent to the cities in Eastern or Central Anatolia by the Turkish government. The purpose was of course to counterbalance the Kurdish population there and to pursue a settlement policy not unlike the "conviviality" policy of the Ottomans. This procedure caused difficulties because the refugees usually held properties in the west of the country. For example, six families of 22 people crossed the Evros River, the border between Greece and Turkey, in June 1988 and sought shelter in a police station in Edirne. The police captain informed them that their residence permit was good for the eastern province of Adıyaman only, upon which they fled to the Western Thracian Turks Solidarity Society, and asked for help from then-chairman Mustafa Rumelili. Mustafa Rumelili intervened and enabled the families to settle in Bursa. This was a widely publicized case, and similar cases occur frequently. Actually, the forced settlement policy is in place to limit the number of asylum seekers. It contradicts the Turkish policy that aims for investment in Turkey from Western Thrace. People who invest in Turkey will follow their investments into the country, sooner or later.

The stateless: Although very intriguing from a sociological perspective, statelessness is a painful experience for those experiencing it. At the root of statelessness lies Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law. Adopted in 1955, the essence of this article is: *"The departure of a citizen of non-Greek origin from the country with no intent of returning may result in loss of citizenship. This is applicable to persons whose parents are Greek citizens and who are born and residing abroad. In the event that both parents or the only surviving parent loses Greek citizenship, children of such persons who are minors may lose their citizenship. Removal from citizenship requires the joint decision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Parliament* (*Vouli*)*."*

This article clearly states that the Ministry of Internal Affairs may withdraw a person of non-Greek origin's citizenship if it is decided that the person left the country with no intention of returning. This article was founded upon discrimination due to its references to racial and ethnic origins, and was in stark violation of universal human rights and the 1975 Greek Constitution. The article explains nothing regarding how to determine that a person who leaves the country has no intentions of returning. According to rumors, when a citizen of non-Greek ethnicity leaves the country, state officials interrogate their neighbors and have the mayor of the district sign a paper stating that the person in question has left the country permanently. Then, the person's citizenship would be withdrawn by the joint decision of the Ministry and the Parliament, and this decision would not even be notified to the party. Oftentimes, Greek Muslims would find out about their statelessness only when they called at a border to enter their country. The first international condemnation of this article was in the human rights report of the US Congress in 1990 (Chapter D, Section 2). According to the information in the report, 122 Muslims were expelled from Greek citizenship in 1988, and 66 more in June 1990. Local Turkis newspapers printed a list of hundreds of expelled individuals in October 1990, and pointed out that the youngest person to lose citizenship was born only in 1987! In the first few months of 1991, 544 more people lost their citizenship. Pressure by the US Department of State and international organizations like the Helsinki Watch brought some leniency to this article. In response to the questions of Turkish journalist Ertuğrul Özkök, then-Prime Minister Konstantin Mitsotakis said that they were "determined to abolish this remnant of an age gone by." At the same time, European neighbors of Greece began to criticize the "only discriminatory law in Europe." The European Union condemned the article in its annual report of 1993.

Nevertheless, there was another side to this state of affairs: some members of the minority were trying to lose their Greek citizenship deliberately in order to become Turkish citizens. Deliberate egress from citizenship decreased significantly when Greece became a member of the EU and Turkey removed the requirement of waiving Greek citizenship in citizenship applications. In 1994, while Article 19 was still under heavy debate, the former King of Greece, Constantine II, also fell victim to its enforcement. The new chairman of the Western Thracian Turks Solidarity Association brought the issue to a conference on racism and anti-Semitism held at the Council of Europe in 1995, and placed it back on the agenda. Greek authorities annulled this article only in January 1998. However, the

annulment of the law does not allow for the expelled stateless party's Greek citizenship to be reinstated, so they remain in an uncertain situation. They are unable to benefit from civil rights either in Turkey or in Greece, nor can they travel between countries. In 1981, 3000 Western Thracian stateless were given Turkish citizenship under military rule. Even so, there are an estimated 2000 to 3000 stateless in Turkey. The efforts of Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgios Papandreou led to a naturalization (politografisi) campaign in 1999; however, there are still thousands of stateless individuals in Greece as well. It must be noted that most stateless reside in Turkey and wish to be given Turkish nationality.

In conclusion, Western Thracian Turks living in Greece, Turkey and anywhere else in the world are in complex relationships with both states. Greece and Turkey continue to conjure up new forms of national allegiance without ever taking minorities off the agenda. Meanwhile, the minorities live in a heightened state of being in the minority due to these difficult experiences. Regardless of whether they live in Greece, Turkey or Germany, are Greek, Turkish or European citizens or even stateless, the Turks of Western Thrace feel that they belong to the Turkish minority of Greece, and view the world through this perspective.

c. *Religious or National: A Discussion on Qualifiers*

Since the late 1990s, or when ideological conflict within Europe subsided and the identities of the various groups were back on the agenda, the problems surrounding the definition of the Western Thracian minority by themselves and the majority group took on a subjective nature. The issue is whether the Western Thracian minority is religious or national—are they Western Thracian Turks or Muslims? The Turks of Greece demand to be classified as a Turkish minority due to their profound ties to the "motherland" and in order to preserve their identities. Over time, this demand became the fundamental cause of struggle. The leaders of the minority who continue to reside in Greece as well as the societies established in Turkey or Germany to defend the rights of the Turks of Greece are determined in their efforts. The most extensive lobbying comes from the Federation of Western Thracian Turk Societies in Germany. The Federation works with the Council of Europe and other European institutions to have Greece recognize the minority as "Turks."

The Greek approach is far from subjective and enforces the law to the letter. Authorities argue that the Treaty of Lausanne stipulates a religious

(i.e. Muslim) minority, and that no reference is made to the ethnicity of the group. It is in the interest of Greece that the group remains a religious minority. If the minority is recognized as a national community, Turkey's existing intervention in Greek policies on behalf of the Turkish minority will become legitimate. Greece draws attention to the fact that the minority is divided into three groups based on ethnicity and language, and argues that the group should remain a religious minority. It is true that the minority is composed of Turks, Pomaks and Romanies. However, the proponents of this argument sustain a fallacy: the Pomaks and the majority of the Romanies speak Turkish fluently and describe themselves as "Turks" in the heritage of the Ottoman classification. Furthermore, the schools and media channels of the minority use the Turkish language.

The quest for identity in the Western Thracian minority dates to the 1980s, when a nationalist group began to use the Turkish identity to pressure the Greek government. Sadık Ahmet[4] rose as a leader during this period, and received wide support from the Turkish nationalists in Turkey. Meanwhile, the members of the minority who immigrated to Germany in the 1970s and '80s, following the crisis in the tobacco industry in Thrace, began to draw the attention of the international community to the problems of the minority in Greece.

Greece's response to the sudden explosion of demand for identity was equally harsh. As an example, all minority organizations with the word "Turk" in their name were banned throughout the 1980s. Tension rose sharply when two deputies of Turkish origin (Sadık Ahmet and İsmail Rodoplu) were elected to the Parliament.[5] The refusal of Greece of the Turkish identity of the minority is symptomatic in nature. These arguments show that identity associations, greatly variable in time and already very complex, become further complicated in a region where intertwined loyalties adopt a singular approach, mostly due to the incompleteness of the nation-building process in the wake of the *millet* system.

Despite Greek and Turkish efforts to improve bilateral relations, the identity issue is yet to be resolved. In March 2008, the European Court of Human Rights found Greece guilty of violating Article 11 of the European Human Rights Convention on freedom of association due to its banning of

[4] For more information on Sadık Ahmet, cf. Samim Akgönül, "Qui est Sadık Ahmet? Parcours d'un nationaliste turc en Grèce", in *Balkanologie*, V, 3, December 2002, p. 213–227.

[5] Ioannis Grigoriadis, "On the Europeanization of minority rights protection: Comparing the cases of Greece and Turkey", in *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2008, p. 26.

the Turkish Association of Xanthi and the Rhodope Turkish Women's Culture Association. While Western Thracian Turks celebrated and the Greek government finally had an argument to appease the Greek society and nationalists, Athens' appeal against the judgment surprised everyone. This illustrates the extreme sensitivity of Greece and Turkey to the identity of the minority.

Conclusion

Observable improvements have occurred in the daily lives of the Muslim in Western Thrace in the last two decades. Following the relative neglect of the 1980s, the 1990s saw difficulties in daily life arising from the nationalist reaction given to being in the minority, and Western Thrace took on the appearance of a separate, underdeveloped Middle Eastern country within Greece. Members of the minority suffered severely from problems relating to driving licenses, construction permits, recognition of equivalence of diplomas, taxation, and even citizenship. Some of these problems have been resolved or at least improved upon. However, identity questions seem to have superseded them all. In other words, contrary to expectations, a relative improvement in daily life does not negate the feeling of being oppressed or wronged in a minority. Identity problems, particularly those national and religious in nature (class or sexual identities may be included in other contexts), dominate other problems and, while not triggering them, sustain them.

Specifically in Western Thrace in 2010, all perceived issues are abstract problems related to identity. Even the problem of appointment versus election of muftis is related to identity: the minority sees the Greek state as a "foreign" power and opposes its appointment, while muftis and even imams take office by appointment in Turkey.

Similarly, the efforts to remove the word "Turk" from the names of organizations evolved into a subjective identity struggle instead of legitimizing the interest of Western Thrace in Turkey. The minority feels that the legitimization of its identity is critical to its survival as a minority, and brings its national identity to the forefront despite the solidifying strength of its religious identity. Had Greece recognized the national identity and oppressed the religious identity instead, the minority would probably have held on to the oppressed identity, and given priority to its Muslim identity.

In conclusion, the situation in Western Thrace is complicated by the multitude of actors in transnational minorities, and all actors seek to reinforce their respective dominances.

CHAPTER FOUR

SINGLE RELIGIOUS BELONGING, MULTIPLE NATIONAL BELONGING: PEOPLE FROM TURKEY IN FRANCE

Introduction

The "Turkish identity" must be considered as a whole to investigate the identity attributes of the people of Turkey living in France, to determine what stage they are at in their identity-building, and to understand the role religion plays in this quest for identity. Considering that the complex structure of the Ottoman society and the multiple and dynamic properties of loyalty criteria make it difficult to ascertain the definition of "Turkishness" even in Turkey, it is probably not necessary to explain that this is even more difficult for Turks who are in the minority.

The education system in Turkey makes all students learn an acceptable definition by heart through countless repetitions. Starting in primary school, Turkish students are given a "checklist:"[1] one language, one religion, one history, one ideal. The rigid implementation of these loyalty criteria gives rise to a variety of problems. These problems, which we will analyze, constitute the common line of questioning for all Turks, whether living in Turkey or abroad. One final remark must be made before the explanation: the Turks in Europe implement these criteria in an order of priority from the most important to the least.

The Turks in Europe cast the legal definition of "Turkishness" aside and uphold its cultural (meaning national, therefore subjective) attributes. Among the primary reasons for this attitude is the fact that many of the 5 million people of Turkish origin living in Europe have been naturalized in the country they live in. Meanwhile, even the constitutional definition of Turkishness has been under debate in Turkey lately. (Article 66: "Any citizen of the state of Turkey is a Turk.") Individuals who have been unable to adapt to the checklist mentioned above for any reason (for example, because they had different demands or were excluded by the majority)

[1] Anne Marie Thiesse, *La création des identités nationales*, Paris: Seuil, 2001, p. 14.

have caused the emergence of a new debate on supra-identities and sub-identities.[2]

The quest for identity in minorities suffers setbacks: actions that are considered "anti-minority" are being condemned with greater fervor and the transfer of identity qualifications has become a matter of life and death. Groups who feel in the minority—or under threat—interpret the loyalty criteria mentioned above in complex, sometimes contradictory ways.

On the one hand, the group maintains some flexibility in the loyalty criteria to fill their ranks and prove their weight before the majority. For example, young generations who are not fluent in their mother tongues are tolerated and regarded a part of the minority. On the other hand, requirements to comply with the behaviors that represent the identity of the majority become stricter. Failure to remain within the strict codes of conduct cause the exclusion of the individual. Some acts which are accepted with more ease when in the majority (such as marrying someone not belonging to the group) backfire in the case of minorities. Such "house rules" of minorities apply to the people of Turkish origin living in France. With a population of almost 400,000, this group follows the discussions within Turkey very closely. Nevertheless, they create their identity not only by following the developments in Turkey, but also under the influence of being in the minority. The criteria which evoke the sentiment of loyalty to an ever-restructuring group cause the community to undergo continuous changes, and help it to evolve from an imagined community to a group that needs to be fought for if it is to survive.[3] To achieve this, minorities naturally place great importance on loyalty criteria and the transfer of the collective memory.[4]

People of Turkish origin in France devise two types of strategies. The first is an approach where radical religious acts and intercommunal marriages are supported with emphasis on the minority being "Turkish" and attempting to preserve this characteristic at all costs. The indivisible unity of the community is paramount. The second is an approach that, similar to the case in Turkey, springs and feeds from differences among classes and groups, and results in religious and ideological separations.

[2] Cf. Baskın Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar, Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama*, Istanbul: İletişim, 2004.

[3] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, New York: Verso, 2000.

[4] Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Paris: Albin Michel, 1994, p. 178.

The position of religion in these two strategies utilized by the Turkish in France to protect their identities will be discussed later; first, an overview of religious structuring must be given and the relations between various modes of loyalties should be studied. Finally, the position of the Turkish community within the Muslim community in France and its key differences can be highlighted.

a. *People from Turkey in France: Identity Strategies*

Due to differences between the French and Turkish definitions of "nation" and "citizenship," it is not possible to determine the exact population of the "Turkish" community in France. The French census system has only two main categories: French citizens and resident aliens. However, a subcategory lists "naturalized French citizens" by their ethnicity. The Turkish system is a mix of the French (*jus soli*) and German (*jus sanguini*) systems, and apart from the non-Muslim minorities identified in the Treaty of Lausanne, ignores the legal presence of minorities. The Turkish census is the continuation of the Ottoman *millet* system in that it identifies minorities by their religious affiliation. Although the proclamation of the Republic meant that the Turkish state was restructured with the individual at the forefront instead of groups, the Ottoman reflex of ethnic-religious classification had been internalized by the people and the government. Any citizen of Turkey may be a Turk according to the Constitution, but the criteria for belonging according to "Turkishness" is very relative from a cultural perspective.

Turks living abroad are subject to a redundant count by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of Turkey due to the obscure definition of "Turkishness." The Ministry includes the Turkish nationals living in France and the French of Turkish origin (regardless of whether dual nationality was obtained afterwards) in the Turkish nation. The fact that France does recognize dual nationality in practice further complicates the issue.

There are three distinct types of Turkish populations in France: "French of Turkish origin," "alien Turkish nationals" and "ethnic Turks." This is why a census of the "Turkish population" or "French population of Turkish origin" yields different results according to the procedure used. A census based on the legal definition of groups may be different from another based on ethnic, identical or cultural classifications. French and Turkish statistics are widely different, which sometimes sparks

discussions which are far from being objective (such as the xenophobic and/or nationalistic discourses of the extreme rightists in Turkey and Europe).

There were three different categories in the 1999 French census: Turkish aliens (resident aliens of France who are Turkish nationals), ethnically Turkish French citizens who later applied for naturalization in Turkey (dual nationals), and French of Turkish origin. The second category is proof that Turkish nationals naturalized in France can maintain their Turkish nationality if they wish. In any case, dual citizens are subject to French laws even though they are also Turkish citizens. Turkish nationality is maintained by a legal procedure carried out by Turkish embassies. Both France and Turkey recognize dual citizenship in practice; however, a bilateral agreement clarifying the issue is not signed as in the US case. This means that the same individual may declare himself a Turkish citizen or a French citizen in the census.

Turkish nationals who belong to a minority not recognized by Turkey (Turkey recognizes non-Muslim minorities only; but even this is restrictive and only Greeks, Armenians and Jews may exercise partially minority rights) may occasionally be registered in other ethnic groups. Kurds in particular are listed as Kurdish despite being citizens of Turkey. Although no "Kurdish citizenship" is recognized by international law, people are regularly registered under Kurdish nationality in some official French statistics (and sometimes even in residence permits issued by Governor's Offices!). The same anomaly occurs in the Tibetan case: regardless of the sensitivity of French public servants to the Tibetan issue and their sympathy for Tibetans, there is no "Tibetan nationality" in international law. Nevertheless, some public authorities continue to use the term "Kurdish immigrants." This may be construed as some French authorities (such as the former FASILD—"Fonds d'Action et de Soutien pour l'Intégration et la Lutte contre les Discriminations"—Action and Support Fund for Integration and Stopping Discrimination) implicity recognizing the country of Kurdistan, which is severely condemned by Turkish authorities. Other groups that may be considered cultural or sociological minorities and be treated as of a different ethnicity in France despite being Turkish citizens are Armenians, Greeks, Keldani-Syriacs and the Laz.

The French population of Turkish origin consists of Turkish-born immigrants who were naturalized by legal procedures, and persons born in Turkey from a parent who is a French national. Upon closer examination, the statuses of its members are:

- Turkish-born citizens of Turkey who reside in France and have gained French citizenship by way of naturalization, marriage or having a parent who is a French citizen;
- Children of Turkish parents who, being born in France, either gained French citizenship at birth or applied for naturalization (persons born before the 1993 Pasqua Act gained citizenship automatically, and those born after the Act can apply for naturalization);
- Levantines, Armenians, Jews and other citizens of Turkey who are not ethnic Turks may be naturalized in France or regain their French citizenship (there is at least one French Prime Minister and several French deputies who have gone through this process).

Among the Turkish in France is a small number of refugees (Turkish citizens who sought and gained asylum) and stateless (political dissidents or military service objectors who had their citizenship revoked by the government of Turkey). These individuals are considered citizens of Turkey or without citizenship until their French citizenship is granted.

In addition to the cases above, there are groups of ethnic and cultural Turks who are citizens of other States and have settled in France from countries other than Turkey. These people keep their native citizenship unless they obtain French citizenship. Among these may be members of the Turkish minorities living in the Balkans (from Greece, Bulgaria or former Yugoslavia); Turkish minorities in Caucasia or the Middle East (Cypriots, Iranians, Syrians, Iraqis or Afghans), or native-born citizens of Turkey who emigrated to other countries for naturalization (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, United States, etc.). Furthermore, cross-border immigrant Turkish marriages are becoming common within the European Union. For example, a French citizen of Turkish origin may marry a German citizen of Turkish origin, or a European of Kazakh origin may marry in Kazakhstan and the spouse may settle in Europe due to unity of family.

Nevertheless, statistics are based on simple classifications. This procedure yields categories such as "Turkish aliens," "Europeans of Turkish origin" or "persons born or not born in Turkey." In other words, the data is representative of an affiliation only, and does not provide absolute results.

According to official Turkish data, there were 370,000 Turks or ethnic Turks residing in France as of 2004. Among these, 196,000 were citizens of Turkey and 174,000 (47%) were citizens of France. The 1999 census data in France shows a total of 258,817 citizens of Turkey, 175,986 of whom were

immigrants. 136,361 were male and 122,456 were female. Based on these figures, it is readily understood that dual citizens are considered French citizens rather than Turkish. The Turkish data for the year 1999 reveals 301,209 citizens of Turkey living in France. Only 169,049 of them hold residence permits (children below 16 are considered dependents and do not have residence permits). It can be deduced that although the Turkish cultural presence in France is expanding, this is not reflected in French statistics. This is not limited to France and applies to Europe in general. While the Turkish cultural presence in France grows, the statistical increase is very small in relation. German statistics suggest that the number of Turkish individuals remains stable. In other countries such as Belgium and Sweden, this number is falling. A major contributor to this is the naturalization of Turkish citizens in Europe and dual citizens being considered citizens of the country of their residence. The role of permanent resettlement in Turkey, rarely captured by European or Turkish statistics, is very small in this area.

Other "Turks" have been appearing in French statistics for a while, including Azeris (population of 1083 in 2002), Kazakhs (625), Uzbeks (353), Kyrgyz (183) and Turcomans (35). These new arrivals should not be grouped together with Turkish immigrants, despite the fact that close ties are already developing between these communities and the greater Turkish community. The relations are formed by shared values despite having different backgrounds and countries of origin (intercommunal marriages, cooperation between associations, etc.). A case in point is the relationship developing between three Azeri groups: those who have sought asylum from Iran, those who have emigrated from Turkey, and the Azeri officials appointed as diplomats and Council of Europe members as well as students in Europe.

Turkish Migration Movements[5]

According to French law, only persons who are "born outside France in alien (non-French) citizenship and reside in France" may be classified as immigrants. Based on this legal definition, the following may be deduced:

[5] For an in-depth analysis of statistics, cf. Samim Akgönül, Stéphane De Tapia, "Turcs en France: tout compte fait", in Altay Manço, *Turcs en Europe: l'heure de l'élargissement*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006, p. 57–65.

- Former Turkish nationals who were born in Turkey and naturalized in France are no longer "Turkish aliens," but are still considered "immigrants."
- People of Turkish origin born in a country other than Turkey who have gained French citizenship are considered "immigrants." These people were not included in the "Turkish aliens" category prior to French citizenship, and are not in the "Turkish immigrants" category after gaining citizenship.
- People of Turkish origin born in a country other than Turkey who have not applied for naturalization in France are still considered "immigrants," but are not featured in statistics concerning "Turkishness."

Statistical data should be considered in this light. The 1999 census shows that there were 174,160 Turkish immigrants in France. Considering the above, it must be borne in mind that these 174,160 immigrants include Turkish citizens, dual citizens, French citizens who are ethnic Turks, and people born in a country other than Turkey (Iraq, Bulgaria, Greece, etc.) who have gained Turkish citizenship prior to immigrating to France. These statistics provide no data on the Turkish citizens born in France, dual citizens born in France, ethnically-Turk French citizens born in France, and ethnic Turks of other citizenship born in countries other than Turkey. These caveats apply to other European countries as well.

Meanwhile, records of the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE)[6] enable us to distinguish between immigrants from Turkey and from other countries per decade. For example, of the immigrants arriving in France between 1990 and 1999, 14% were from Turkey, 22% from Germany, 7% from Morocco, 6% from Algeria, 5% from Switzerland, 3% from Portugal, and 3% from Great Britain. Forty percent of the immigrants are classified as "from other countries." Ethnic Turks are present in this 40%, as well as the immigrant populations from Germany or Switzerland. Although most marriages occur between European Turks and Turkish Turks, the main reason for immigration is marriage nevertheless. In recent years, "immigrants from Turkish culture" have begun to represent a significant tributary of immigration to France.

[6] INSEE – Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.

Although a large number of Turks had immigrated to France by 1999, the Turkish community is significantly smaller than other communities. Turks comprise 4% of the total immigrant community in France, while Algerians and Portuguese account for 13% each, Moroccans 12%, Spanish 7% and Italians 9%. It must be noted that immigrants from European Member States like Portugal, Spain or Italy are less interested in acquiring French citizenship compared to immigrants from non-EU countries.

Since the year 2000, an average of 14,000 Turkish citizens immigrate to France annually. Half of these seek asylum in thr country. Migrant workers account for a progressively smaller portion of immigration; however, with the efforts of Turkish contractors in France to bring workers from Turkey, their numbers are also rising, to the point that French authorities have begun to doubt the effectiveness and benefits of this procedure, particularly in the construction business. The issue is how the procedure facilitates the settlement of people with low professional qualifications in the country.

After a stable period between 1996 and 2001, the number of family unions (the relocation of the spouses or parents of French citizens in France) has begun to rise, but since the source documents of this increase are obtained by varying methods, an exact figure is impossible to attain. The law named after then-Minister of Internal Affairs Sarkozy (the "Sarkozy" Law) and the new law adopted in April 2006 yield more reliable results, while also limiting the number of immigrants entering the country.

The number of Turkish asylum-seekers in France, regardless of refugee status pursuant to the Geneva Convention, is fairly high. This number is expected to decrease with progress in European-Turkish negotiations and the quest for a peaceful resolution to the Turkish-Kurdish issue. With efforts by the European Union, the Council of Europe and Turkish society, Turkey has taken tangible steps to advance human rights. Economic development has occurred in the meanwhile. Whether the number of Turkish immigrants will decrease remains to be a study area of the future, but the number is still high in the current situation. The image of ships carrying Turkish refugees foundering off the coast of Côte d'Azur and Fréjus (The French Riviera) is still fresh in people's memory.

Statistics also distinguish between "permanent" and "temporary" immigration. Since the two types of immigration are different, so are the residence permits obtained as a result. Seasonal workers, interns, students and others are expected to leave the country when their contract expires

or education is over. Transition from "temporary" to "permanent" immigration occurs frequently; not the least of which is in relation to "intellectual migration:" some students settle in the country where they were educated and begin working there. Some refugees who were denied asylum attempt to remain in the country illegally rather than leaving it. For some, the transition occurs due to personal affairs or external factors. The immigration office cannot be expected to accept all immigrants into the country, and the powers of the immigration officials are limited. For example, it is difficult to refuse someone who applies for permanent residence on grounds of marriage. That said, marriage (whether official, religious, by contract or as domestic partners) is one of the most important "personal affairs" resulting in transition from one category to another.

A great majority of the 58,266 Turkish families residing in France consists of couples with children, while only 8.5% are single-parent units. Less than 20% of this population is in "mixed marriages," and even in these cases, marriages with French citizens who are ethnic Turks are also considered "mixed." In other words, the marriage of Turks with non-Turks is a rare exception.

The 1999 census data also shows that the Turkish community in France is younger in comparison to other communities. The percentage of the population of working age, i.e. individuals between 20 and 59 years of age, is significantly high compared to other communities. The 0–19 age group also accounts for a significant portion. These high percentages occur in other immigrant communities, such as those from the Subsaharan Africa. Nevertheless, the Turkish immigrant community has the highest workforce percentage among immigrant communities, therefore suffering from the highest unemployment. Another noteworthy aspect is that the ratio of the children of Turkish immigrants in France to the population of the community is quite low at 5.6%. On the other hand, this ratio is 17.9% of the entire population in the same age group. This low percentage is most probably owed to these children being classified as French citizens, being neither immigrants nor aliens.

Education data shows that a quarter of Turkish immigrants in the secondary education age range are enrolled in vocational schools. The 1999 census data provides plenty of information on the education levels of Turkish immigrants. The overall education level of adults from Turkey is very low, and lower in comparison to other immigrant communities. This is not only related to the fact that these immigrants are from the least-developed regions of Turkey, but also to the motives for Turkish

immigration (such as family union) and the social and professional statuses of those immigrants in Turkey. Only 6% of the immigrants have undergraduate degrees while 70% have no diploma at all. Nevertheless, 12% of the children in the university education age range are enrolled in a higher education institution.

Number of immigrant households in France according to the ethnicity of the head of family[7]

Country	All households		Households with children younger than 25			
Turkey	Total	Conjugal families	Total	Conjugal families	Single-parent households	Percentage of single-parent households
58266	58266	53447	49132	45100	4212	8.5

Couples where at least one partner is an immigrant by ethnicity (%)

Country	Total number of couples	Mixed couples	Couples with immigrant men	Both partners of same immigrant ethnicity	Couples of different immigrant ethnicities	Total
Turkey	65726	18.7	13.3	78.6	2.7	100

Percentage of immigrants by country of departure

Country	1962	1968	1975	1982	1990	1999 (%)	1999 (number of immigrants)
Turkey	1.4	1.3	1.9	3.0	4.0	4.0	174,160

[7] These statistics have been published by the INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies).

People of Turkish origin in some EU countries[8]

	People of Turkish origin		Turks who are EU citizens	
	Total population	Turkish citizen	EU citizen	% of EU citizenship
Belgium	123186	2.9	123186	2.9
Denmark	378649	8.8	378649	8.8
Germany	571874	13.3	571874	13.3
France	316232	7.3	316232	7.3
Netherlands	45065	1.0	45065	1.0
Austria	499138	11.6	499138	11.6
Sweden	522504	12.1	522504	12.1
Great Britain	574208	13.3	574208	13.3

Sources: Eurostat, German Federal Statistics Office, Center for Turkish Surveys, Essen 2003

According to the table above, there were 370,000 Turkish citizens and ethnic Turk French citizens living in France in 2004, 196,000 of them were Turkish citizens and 174,000 (47%) French citizens. It is not possible to ascertain whether these figures include all categories defined in the preceding pages, but such coverage would be highly unrealistic.

Number of immigrants in France by country of birth

Country of birth	Number of immigrants	Ratio to total immigrants (%)
Germany	123186	2.9
Italy	378649	8.8
Portugal	571874	13.3
Spain	316232	7.3
Switzerland	45065	1.0
Other European countries	499138	11.6
Morocco	522504	12.1
Algeria	574208	13.3

8 www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=178540.

Country of birth	Number of immigrants	Ratio to total immigrants (%)
Tunisia	201561	4.7
Subsaharan Africa	393289	9.1
Turkey	174160	4.0
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	159750	3.7
Other countries	346478	8.0
Number of immigrants	4306094	100
Number of non-immigrants	54207606	///

Source: INSEE 1999 census

Immigrants in France in 1999

1. Great Britain (3%)
2. Portugal (3%)
3. Switzerland (5%)
4. Algeria (6%)
5. Morocco (7%)
6. Turkey (14%)
7. Germany (22%)
8. Other countries (40%)

Permanent and temporary immigration from Turkey to France

Categories	2003	2002	2001	1999	1998	1997	1996	1993
Laborers	339	335	210	47	66	79	63	371
Non-laborer workers	5	10	2	13	12	11	5	3
Refugee status	857	665	643	375	403	427	500	783
Refugees with residence permits	3192*	1	4	–	–	–	–	–
Family union	2768	2871	2425	2581	2639	2551	2059	4589
Members of French families	372	447	366	642	794	491	430	594
Persons with French parents or spouses	3073	3167	2428	–	–	–	–	–
Spouses of scientists		10	7	–	–	–	–	–
Members of refugee families		310	299	225	260	290	246	413
Members of stateless families		1	2	–	–	–	–	–

Categories	2003	2002	2001	1999	1998	1997	1996	1993
Foreign nationals born in France		0	6	–	–	–	–	–
Minors who have resided in France since the age of 10		111	128	–	–	–	–	–
Personal or family relations		317	304	–	–	–	–	–
Persons residing in France for more than 10 to 15 years		97	96	–	–	–	–	–
Visitors (including workers)	112	127	140	233	741	328	123	89
Persons with work disability income (+20%)	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	6
To be reviewed		2	0	98	1867	894	–	–
Subtotal 1	8568	8472	6860	5734	6782	5072	3426	6846
Persons in France due to personal and family reasons	121	–		1520				
Temporary work permit holders		51	73	27	20	29	30	23
Interns	1	2	11	6	5	4	6	5
Artists and writers	0			0				
Students	355	434	311	235	227	185	122	119
Asylum-seekers	6761	7701	5473	2219	1621	1367	1205	1286
Subtotal 2								
Grand Total								

Source: Régnard (2005)

Breakdown of immigrants by country of departure and age

Country	0–14	15–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+	Total
Spain	0.9	1.6	4.8	16.1	16.9	18.4	41.3	100.0
Italy	0.8	1.1	3.4	9.4	16.8	18.9	49.5	100.0
Portugal	2.2	3.7	18.8	26.0	25.1	16.4	7.9	100.0
Other EU countries (EU-15)	5.9	7.8	13.6	16.9	16.5	14.4	24.7	100.0
Other European countries	5.9	7.3	12.5	13.2	15.9	11.8	33.4	100.0
Algeria	3.9	7.0	15.5	18.9	20.3	19.8	14.7	100.0
Morocco	4.1	14.5	18.8	21.6	22.4	12.1	6.4	100.0

Country	0–14	15–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+	Total
Tunisia	2.6	5.8	12.8	23.0	24.7	15.2	15.9	100.0
Other African countries	7.0	14.7	24.2	28.6	16.1	6.0	3.2	100.0
Turkey	5.6	17.6	30.4	18.4	16.3	6.3	5.4	100.0
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	4.5	8.9	22.1	24.8	19.1	9.1	11.5	100.0
Other Asian countries	7.7	15.3	24.1	26.7	14.6	5.8	6.0	100.0
Americas, Oceania	14.8	14.6	18.7	23.0	15.7	6.6	6.7	100.0
Total immigrants	*4.3*	*8.4*	*16.2*	*20.4*	*19.2*	*13.7*	*17.8*	*100.0*
Total population	17.9	13.1	14.4	14.7	14.0	9.4	16.7	100.0

Source: INSEE 1999 census

Students enrolled in a school as of 2002 and their institutions

School	Total number of students
Preschool	19433
Primary school	28347
Private school (primary, secondary and high)	2633
Secondary school	14425
High school (general and technical)	2804
Vocational high school	3856
Preparatory year	42
Technical college	327
University	1924
Total	73791

Source: DIHIY 2003 (2002 report), Ankara

Country	No diploma; primary school	Secondary school; vocational certificate; vocational school	High school	Undergraduate and above	Total
Spain	31	43	11	15	100
Italy	32	40	12	16	100
Portugal	59	31	5	5	100

Country	No diploma; primary school	Secondary school; vocational certificate; vocational school	High school	Undergraduate and above	Total
Other EU countries (EU-15)	10	19	20	51	100
Other European countries	19	24	20	37	100
Algeria	45	32	8	15	100
Morocco	53	22	9	16	100
Tunisia	48	28	9	15	100
Other African countries	34	24	15	27	100
Turkey	70	18	6	6	100
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	42	25	14	19	100
Other Asian countries	30	14	16	40	100
Americas, Oceania	19	14	16	51	100
Total immigrants	41	27	11	21	100
Non-immigrants	21	42	14	23	100
Total population	22	41	14	23	100

Source: INSEE 1999 census

The 1999 census includes data on the ratio of employment within immigrant populations. At 64%, the employment rate in Turkish immigrants is significantly lower than that of other communities. A closer look at the table reveals that employment is very low among women only, with just 37% of women employed. The employment rate among men is 87%. For these reasons, unemployment within the Turkish immigrant community is very high at 25%. This ratio is 16% among immigrant communities in

general and 7% when non-immigrants are considered. The overall unemployment rate in the entire population is 8%. It must be noted that unemployment among immigrants from EU countries is very low (6%) while being remarkably high among African immigrants (approximately 26%). These results are of course related to the social and economic contexts, education levels, and discrimination in job applications.

Level of employment among immigrants based on country of departure (%)

Country	Total Population	Men	Women
Spain	85	–	–
Italy	80	–	–
Portugal	88	96	79
Algeria	65	85	48
Morocco	68	90	45
Tunisia	73	–	–
Other African countries	80	93	68
Turkey	64	87	37
Total immigrants	*76*	*91*	*62*
Non-immigrants	*88*	*95*	*81*
Total population	87	94	79

Source: INSEE 1999 census

Considering the industries in which Turkish immigrants are employed, the majority of the community still has worker status. The community is still regarded a "class of laborers" and almost half of the laborers have low professional qualifications. Of course, the data applies only to immigrants; French citizens who are ethnic Turks are not considered. Nevertheless, Turkish immigrants do encounter problems climbing the social ladder.

b. *Who are the Turks in France?*

Perpetual First Generation Strategy

After all that confusing statistical data, we can now look into the identity strategies developed by the people of Turkish origin in France.

Breakdown of immigrants by country of departure and professional category (%)

Professional categories	All immigrants	Spain	Italy	Portugal	Other EU	Algeria	Morocco	Tunisia	Other Africa	Turkey
Farmer	1	3	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	1
Craftsman, tradesman, business manager	8	8	9	8	9	7	8	10	4	17
Executive; intellectual occupations	10	9	12	2	24	7	9	9	9	2
Self-employed	12	15	16	9	20	15	10	8	11	5
Server	28	33	27	30	24	30	22	24	38	11
One-on-one service employees among servers	*12*	*15*	*10*	*21*	*8*	*8*	*8*	*8*	*14*	*4*
Worker	41	32	34	50	21	41	51	49	38	64
High professional qualifications	*24*	*20*	*24*	*32*	*13*	*25*	*24*	*28*	*18*	*33*
Low professional qualifications	*17*	*12*	*10*	*18*	*8*	*16*	*27*	*21*	*20*	*30*
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Ratio of workers with low professional qualifications	42	38	29	35	39	40	53	42	52	48

Naturally, we will discuss religious loyalty and associated behaviors, because in the case of minorities, particularly Turks, religious loyalty is considered the guarantee and proof of national loyalty. The transfer of the national identity, consequently the religious identity, is directly correlated to the transfer of the collective memory to new generations.

The transfer of the collective memory for the purposes of ensuring unity and integrity rests on three identity pillars: the longing for and loyalty to “the Motherland” (Turkey in general and the hometown or village in particular); transfer of the Turkish language to the younger generation despite French being the official language; and the continuation of customs and traditions believed to be rooted in religion. The reason the community is so fervently attached to these three topics is their desire that the Turkish children born in France share the same sentiment of “Turkishness” with them. Various methods are employed by the community to transfer these three elements to new generations. The leading method has to be the perpetual first generation strategy. What is meant by this is the marriage of young French people of Turkish descent to Turkish brides and

grooms who preferably live in Turkey, and even more preferably are brought to France for marriage from the region of the French family's hometown.[9] In other words, young French people of Turkish origin rarely marry people who are of French or other nationalities, and seldom marry other members of the Franco-Turkish community. As a result, a second or third generation of ethnic Turks has not arisen in France. From a statistical point of view, one of the parents (usually the mother) of all Turkish (and Kurdish) children born in France is a new arrival in France. The "fresh blood" are received as the representatives of genuine "Turkishness" (particularly in terms of language and religion) who will help to correct the degeneration in the "Turkishness" of ethnic Turks who have lived in France for too long.

The loyalty of the ethnic Turks in France to Turkey becomes manifest even in how they call Turkey the "Motherland." The pillars of identity-building in the community are language (Turkish and/or Kurdish) and religion (Sunni or Alevi). But the two pillars need a hinterland. The hinterland is primarily Turkey, but expands to concentric circles of the home villages, towns and provinces of the immigrants. The ties with their country are both physical and mental. Physical ties are the result of frequent travel to Turkey, whether for business, school or leisure, following the developments in Turkey via newspapers, television and other media, and contact with the country by phone or the internet. These three methods of contact have developed significantly in the last two to three decades: flights and voyages between the two countries are plenty and the fares are low; the number of national and local television stations has boomed and these stations can be received abroad; the internet provides a means to communicate at minimal cost while phone tariffs are also going down. All of these enable the ethnic Turks in France to keep in contact with Turkey. Interaction with Turkey is now ubiquitous.

It is more difficult to grasp the emotional or mental ties with Turkey. My opinion is that the ties are correlated to two approaches:

- First, the ethnic Turks in France are more interested in Turkish politics than French internal affairs. In fact, they pay close attention to the political environment in Turkey, and want the political context in Turkey either to change or remain as it is; much like their compatriots in Turkey.

[9] Gökalp Altan, De Tapia Stéphane, Akgönül Samim, *Les conjoints des jeunes Français originaires de Turquie*, Paris, FASILD, 2005.

From this perspective, the change in the discourse of French Turks regarding the accession of Turkey to the EU is noteworthy. Although they desire Turkey and France to be members of the same union for emotional and practical reasons, they too have begun to voice the anti-French and anti-European discourse recently on the rise in Turkey. Meanwhile, none of the Turkish associations or organizations in France have attempted to block Turkey's accession to the EU. They desire the membership of Turkey for two somewhat irrational reasons: one is the desire for the Turkish state to attain a better future and position. Second is their hope that the accession of Turkey will legitimize their presence in France and improve their image in the eyes of the French public. This attitude reveals that the people of Turkish origin have evolved into a "diaspora" as defined by Kim Butler. According to Butler, members of the diaspora continue to be interested in the politics of the root nation. The interest is not necessarily in the way of support. To the contrary, a section of the diaspora may even side with the opposition. But it is interest that matters; not its direction.[10]

- These irrational ties may be explained by Benedict Anderson's imagined communities theory. In other words, the Turks in France associate themselves with the other individuals comprising their community (even if they do not know all of them personally) and root for the success and victory of other Turks in a setting of competition with the majority, brought about by being in the minority.

The motherland had irrational ties with the Turks in Europe until recently. For years, every administration tried to prevent European Turks from acquiring citizenship of the countries they were living, and even born, in. They feared that by acquiring a different nationality, European Turks would detach from "Turkishness" and Turkey. Legal attachment to the motherland seemed more important than emotional and identity loyalty. This was partly influenced by Germany's denial of dual-citizenship status. It should be remembered that the nationalist mindset considers national identity one and singular. As Max Weber suggests, nationalism is a system of belief over all, and just as a person may be loyal to only one religion among monotheistic faiths, so must an individual choose to be loyal to only one nation. Multiple national loyalty is severely condemned. Nevertheless, a recent radical change occurred in Turkey's approach to the

[10] Butler Kim, "Defining diaspora, refining a discourse" in *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 10*, no. 2, 2001, p. 189–219.

issue: since the late 1990s, but particularly after 2002, European Turks have been expected to acquire the citizenship of their country of residence. This will give them a voice in the national and local politics of their respective countries, and allow them to lobby in favor of Turkey.

Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan's show of strength with the Turks in France on April 7, 2010 may indicate that, contrary to belief, there is no significant change in the concept of external Turks. This term is used for Turks—identified as such based on race and religion—who live outside the borders of the Republic of Turkey. The perception of the concept by political authorities and society (consequently the media) is clearly evident in Article 66 of the Constitution of 1982. ("Any citizen of the state of Turkey is a Turk. The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk.") The first sentence forcibly includes those who live in Turkey but are not ethnically Turkish in the Turkish nation. The second sentence places the children of ethnically and religiously "Turkish" parents, even if they may live abroad, within Turkishness from an ethnic and especially religious perspective.

In more open terms, the Greeks, Armenians, and for some the Kurds who live outside the borders of Turkey are not included in the concept of "external Turks" even if they are Turkish citizens and were even born and raised in Turkey.

Although seemingly narrow, the scope of this concept may expand depending on context and political view. Sometimes "external Turks" include the remnants of the Ottoman society in the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasia. In other cases, groups like the Pomak and Circassian, who are not ethnically Turkish but may be incorporated into Turkishness in the *millet* system mindset due to religion, may be included. The racial approach may be extended to communities who lack even a relative relationship with Turkishness or Turkish citizenship. The confusion goes far enough for the establishment of a government authority under the name "Office of Expatriate Turks and Related Communities,"[11] and the legalization of the concept of "aliens of Turkish descent" in Article 47 of the Turkish Citizenship Law dated 2009 (numbered 5901).

The emigration of Turks to Western Europe from the 1960s did help to expand the concept of external Turks. With the settlement of migrant workers from the mid-70s onwards, a group of immigrants scorned by the elite while being cherished for their accumulation of wealth and transfer

[11] *Radikal*, 24.04.2010.

of capital emerged as the backbone of "external Turks." After 20 years of neglect, this group was framed within the "omnipresent fatherly State" in the wake of the 1980 junta. One purpose of this framing was to prevent them from "taking the wrong path." The wrong path, of course, was paved with leftist movements and dissenting religious organizations.[12]

The real danger was assimilation, "forgetting" Turkishness and abandoning loyalty to Turkey. So while this group was exposed to Turkish propaganda by print, media, imams and teachers commissioned from Turkey, they were prevented from entering into any kind of multiple loyalty. As per the knee-jerk reaction of nation-states whose strength is questionable, the perpetual first generation strategy was imposed upon generations born in Europe.

The objective was to ensure that ethnic Turks born in Europe were at least as loyal to the country as those who came from Turkey, and the strategy was adopted and implemented by European Turks. The rejection of multiple loyalty applied to the change in legal affiliation—acquiring citizenship of the country of residence.

Administrations in Turkey considered change in citizenship or an additional citizenship dangerous for decades. Turks who acquired the citizenship of their country of residence would make compromises from Turkishness, and their loyalty would diminish. So they were expected to remain purely Turkish.

This policy has been amended since the 2000s. The relief brought by globalization led Turkish officials to believe that European Turks were no longer under threat of assimilation, to decide that these communities would lobby for European relations, and to encourage them to acquire the citizenship of their countries of residence. Nevertheless, these groups are still viewed as apparatuses that are at the disposal of the Republic of Turkey.

From another angle, these people are being called upon as soldiers: 10 years ago, their duty required them to be Turkish citizens; now, they are instructed to become French or German citizens. Wealth accumulation of the migrant workers is still seen as a remedy to economic distress; the sentimental discourse around homesickness, loyalty and the motherland is

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[12] For more information cf. Akgönül Samim "L'État turc et les Turcs européens : une tentative permanente d'encadrement paternaliste", in Dumont Paul, Pérouse Jean-François, De Tapia Stéphane, Akgönül Samim, *Migrations et mobilités internationales: la plate-forme turque*, Istanbul: Les Dossiers de l'IFEA, 13, décembre 2002, p. 79–99.

still maintained—to the extent of sheer emotional exploitation as seen in the most recent Paris rally; and the idea is that the migrant workers are the soldiers (envoys) of Turkey: all of these make it clear that the motherland's view of the migrant communities has not radically changed.

The improvement and expansion of communication technologies removes the threat of assimilation that came with switching to French or German citizenship. Although multiple legal affiliation has become acceptable, this is not the case for cultural loyalties. Multiple cultural loyalties are still viewed as dangerous and even treasonous.

We had mentioned that cultural loyalty was built on two pillars: language and religion. When in the minority, teaching the language to new generations becomes particularly difficult. Naturally, the language of the majority immediately becomes the dominant language in a social environment. Furthermore, France insists on fluency in French as a prerequisite to integration in the country, and this has come to be accepted by the majority as well as the minority, who originally resisted the idea. Fluency in French is the most important measure of good integration. As a result, lack of fluency in Turkish no longer poses a threat to loyalty to "Turkishness."

Meanwhile religious loyalty, being sacred and therefore immune to intervention, gained great importance and took priority. In a contradictory way, this type of loyalty became an indispensable and paramount element of "Turkishness" for both Sunni and Alevi Turks in France. However, filling the gap left by language with religion gave rise to a number of issues in the French case: the French system is constructed on the principle of laicism and Turkish immigrants have diverse cultural and social backgrounds.

Religious Organization

The solidarity among people of Turkish origin in France, or even across Europe, in the 1960s and 1970s expanded via two ideological movements. The foundation for solidarity was laid by the community itself when emigration to Europe began. At the time, neither the receiving countries (France, Germany…) not Turkey was interested in the matter. Both parties hoped for this migratory movement to be transient. According to both parties, Turkish migrant workers were in Europe for a limited period, after which they would return to Turkey. This did not require the countries to organize to meet the needs of this temporary community. Under these circumstances, Turkish immigrants were left to their means, and started to

organize with what they had: either ideological accumulation or regional, family and religious loyalty. The seeds of solidarity within the community of migrant Turkish workers, who were away from home, lonely, exploited and sometimes unemployed, were sown by leftist movements. Led by these movements and influenced by the unionist organizations gaining strength in Western Europe in the 1960s and '70s, European Turks began to organize and protest living and working conditions, if hesitantly at first. It is interesting to note that, as a consequence of the international aspect of the Marxist ideology, these leftist movements fused with French leftist movements within time.

The second ideology that created solidarity among Turks was religion. It is not accurate to claim that the initial religious signs in the Turkish community in Europe were ideological: they emerged as a means of meeting the spiritual needs of the community. As an example, rooms were set aside and furnished for prayer in worker housing facilities. These small prayer rooms came under the influence of the European factions of the *Millî Görüş* movement only after the 1970s. As *Millî Görüş* expanded and gained popularity across Turkey in the 1970s, it became the prominent ideology within the diaspora of Turkish workers in Europe. The popularity of the movement in Europe was owed to its transition to a popular movement that appealed to worker and peasant classes. As most of the Turkish immigrants in Europe belonged to these classes and maintained their ties with their rural origins, the movement expanded and became deeply entrenched in Europe. Even today, *Millî Görüş* chapters are the leading representatives of Turkish Islam in France, Germany and the Benelux countries.[13]

During and after the junta established in the aftermath of the military coup, the Turkish state realized the importance of Turkish people living in Western Europe, and subjected these communities to a rigid system of control and command. This was done in order to prevent the spread of Marxist and religious fundamentalist ideas, which were considered dangerous. Another movement "dangerous" to the Turkish state emerged as Kurdish nationalism in the 1990s.

The interest of the Turkish state in European Turks may be explained with two more developments, one domestic and the other foreign. An ideology of "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" was established within Turkey in the

[13] Akgönül Samim, "Millî Görüş: Institution religieuse minoritaire et mouvement politique transnational" in Amghar Samir (dir.), *Islamismes d'Occident, les voies de la renaissance*, Paris: Lignes de repères, 2006.

1980s as a line of defense against communism. As the movement was conceptualized and shaped into a tangible entity, Sunni Islam regained its status as an indispensable part of the Turkish identity. The construction of mosques, prayer rooms and religious high schools was accelerated greatly and political Islam became one of the leading movements of thought in Turkey. As a result, the State of Turkey had no option but to keep European Turks under religious control.[14]

The foreign development was such that the migrant workers did not return to Turkey as expected. The families of the workers who were permanently residing in Europe began to settle in those countries in the 1980s. As the children of the emigrants also began to immigrate to Europe, the Turkish state undertook the duty to export "true Islam" to Europe. This attitude was legitimized in Article 62 of the Constitution of 1982:

"The State takes the measures necessary to preserve the family unity of Turkish citizens working abroad, to ensure that their children receive education, their cultural requirements are met and social security is provided, to maintain their ties with the motherland, and to assist them in their return to the country."

Based on this article, a new division called "Office of Religious Affairs Turkish Islamic Union" (DİTİB) was established under the Office of Religious Affairs in 1983 to serve the Turks living in other countries.

Starting in 1983 in Germany and 1985 in France, hundreds of associations gathered under the umbrella of DİTİB. New associations were founded with the initiative of the Union. Nevertheless, joining DİTİB did not necessarily mean adopting the ideology of the Union or accepting the official Islam that Turkey wanted to export to Europe. There are many significant advantages to membership, and associations are attracted by these. Membership to DİTİB means better relations with Turkish embassies and entitlement to request imams (and sometimes trainers) sponsored by the Turkish state. Considering the financial difficulties encountered by the associations of immigrant communities in France, this is an important source of financial support. Moreover, many associations assign their properties to the Office of Religious Affairs, freeing themselves from repair and maintenance costs. In short, DİTİB is not a

[14] For an in-depth analysis of the said control, cf. Akgönül Samim, "L'Etat turc et les Turcs européens: une tentative permanente d'encadrement paternaliste", in Paul Dumont, Pérouse Jean-François, De Tapia Stéphane, Akgönül Samim, *Migrations et mobilités internationales : la plate-forme turque*, Istanbul : Les Dossiers de l'IFEA, 13, December2002, p. 79–99.

predominantly ideological organization like *Millî Görüş* or the "Süleymancı" movement.

An individual who believes to be a part of a minority chooses to join minority organizations for three reasons other than ideological motives:

- Increasing the number of minority members to ensure the group's survival;
- Joining the frontline against other groups and individuals who are perceived as threats to the stability of the community;
- Sending out a message of strength and legitimacy to the majority.

The above three points should be kept in mind when examining Turkish religious organizations in France. These organizations not only meet the spiritual needs of the community, but also cater to a series of diverse needs.[15] Analysis of the religious ideologies of people of Turkish origin in France shows that DİTİB does not represent a specific doctrine. The activities of DİTİB members and non-members alike are not restricted to religious events. The non-religious activities and officials of the associations are not affiliated to the Turkish state. Furthermore, the ties claimed between DİTİB and *Millî Görüş* are not very realistic as the two organizations do not serve the same type of loyalty.

Communities, Organizations, Associations

As in the rest of Western Europe, people of Turkish origin in France are not limited to the *Millî Görüş* or DİTİB organizations. Ideological organizations that were unable to express themselves under the circumstances in Turkey enjoyed a legal and political environment that was conducive to growth and expansion in Europe. These organizations were born and nurtured in Europe, and then exported to Turkey. In the case of France, there are three main groups: the "Süleymancı" movement (congregational organization), the "Idealists" (nationalist ideological organization) and the Alevi (religious/cultural organization). The Süleymancı community was established by Sheikh Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, who died in 1959.[16] Members of the congregation began to play important roles in Turkish domestic policy starting in the 1950s but most notably during the 1980s.

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[15] Acquaviva Sabino, Pace Enzo, *La sociologie des religions*, Paris : Cerf, 1994, p. 123.

[16] For one of many Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan biographies, cf. Akgündüz Ahmet, *Silistreli Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan*, Istanbul: OSAV, 1997.

Many politicians today do not feel the need to hide their close relations to the Süleymancı community. Although very similar to the "Nurcu" community, the Süleymancı argue that the ancestry of their sheikh is rooted in the Naqshbandi, meaning Central Asia (particularly the Indian chapter of the Naqshbandi). Although the Süleymancı do not have official houses of worship in Turkey, it is known that they are very active in many mosques that are under the supervision of the Office of Religious Affairs, and provide religious education to large groups of students both in Turkey and abroad.[17]

The Süleymancı in Europe have a large number of mosques and religious complexes operating from their headquarters in Cologne. The congregation runs Koranic schools and summer schools in lavish houses of worship, providing religious education to children of Turkish origin to prevent them from taking the "wrong path." The Süleymancı actively organize Hajj and Umrah trips for immigrant Turks in Europe and protest against political acts thought to be targeting Muslims. An important example was how Süleymancı individuals rallied after the banning of headscarves in French schools in 2004. The fact that associations affiliated with the Süleymancı community appear as closed religious orders gave rise to rumors and concerns about the community. The movement decided to open up to society in recent years to become better known and understood by the general public. One of the results has been increased communication and stronger ties with other Turkish associations and French authorities. For example, after a long period of refusing to take part in interfaith dialog meetings held by Christian churches, they have begun to appoint representatives to these events since the 2000s, albeit reluctantly still. This quest for legitimization in the eyes of the Turkish community of Europe, the European countries of residence, and Turkey made the activities and thoughts of the Süleymancı community open for everyone to see and follow, which played an important part in the opening up of the community.

Süleymancı associations usually carry names like "Turkish Civic Center" or "Turco-Islamic Culture Center" and aim to provide religious education

[17] Theologist Yaşar Nuri Öztürk claims that the Süleymancı have 6 media channels, 2100 associations, 14 foundations, 1750 housing facilities and schools and 28 companies. The *Millî Görüş* organization has 37 media channels, 330 associations, 33 foundations, 8 tutoring institutions and 48 companies. The same author claims that the followers of Fethullah Gülen operate 16 media channels, 23 associations, 220 foundations, 24 housing facilities, 570 schools and tutoring institutions and 96 companies. Cf. Öztürk Yaşar Nuri, *Türkiye'yi Kemiren İhanet—Allah ile Aldatmak*, Istanbul: Yeniboyut, 2008.

to Turkish children via Koranic schools and summer schools. These activities are carried out in facilities owned by the community, sometimes complete with dormitories.[18] The Süleymancı community in France and Europe in general is more rigid in organizational terms and particularly with regard the transfer of religious and moral values in comparison to other communities. This discipline is owed to the Süleymancı thought that all phases of socialization, whether private or related to the community, must occur in accordance with the principles of the community. As is the case in other dogmatic communities, it is utterly meaningless to separate public and private life.[19] After being considered within the dissenting Islamic circles for a long time, the Süleymancı are becoming closer to the ruling classes, integrating with the new conservative elite in Turkey and continuing expansion in Europe.[20] This domestic and international warming of relations has two aspects: the approach and discourse of community members towards the outside world is becoming more moderate; however, this change is believed to be a pretense by Kemalists.[21] On the other hand, the fact that some members of the new ruling elite were housed in facilities operated by the Süleymancı community during their university education helped them to establish closer ties with the community.

Associations of the nationalist "Idealist" movement should be considered in another context that is neither religious nor national. The main reason is the way that these organizations isolate themselves from others to create closed groups. Uniting under the umbrella of the "Turkish Federation of France," these associations rarely take part in joint activities with Millî Görüş or DİTİB. Due to the negative image created by the French extreme rightist party, Idealist leaders keep repeating and underlining that they do not belong to any religious movement. Posters of the nationalist movement leaders (Alparslan Türkeş or Devlet Bahçeli) are on prominent display in their offices. In other words, the French context shapes the

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[18] According to Ahmet Akgündüz, the Süleymancı community possesses approximately 2500 Koranic schools globally; Akgündüz Ahmet, *op. cit.,* p. 114. Caymaz Birol believes this figure is exaggerated: cf. Caymaz Birol, *"Les mouvements Islamiques turcs à Paris*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002, p. 104.

[19] Hervieu-Léger Danièle, "Peuple de Dieu, entre exclusivisme communautaire et universalisme" in Wieviorka Michel (ed.), *Racismes et modernité*, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, p. 98–105.

[20] Çakır Ruşen, "Le mouvement Islamique entre religion et Etat" in *Confluences Méditerranée*, no. 23, 1997, p. 33–38.

[21] For example, cf. Göçeri Nebahat, *Dinî grupların eğitim anlayışı*, Adana: Karahan, 2004.

impression the nationalists want to make in France in an indirect way. Attitude-wise, they are very different from other Turkish organizations. For example, they stay out of debates on Islam in France or do not argue that French politics merits greater attention than Turkish politics. Almost all of the imams appointed to houses of worship maintained by Idealist organizations are affiliated with the Turkish branch of the nationalist movement, and come from Turkey. Since the military coup of 1980, the Idealists have associated themselves with religion and begun to view it as an aspect of "Turkishness." The pan-Turkic ideology of "Turanism" was cast aside as it did not encompass the religious aspect, and was replaced by the Turco-Islamic synthesis ideology. Nevertheless and without exception, the Idealist imams in France are strangers to the country with no knowledge about it whatsoever. The number of Idealist organizations in France is very small compared to Millî Görüş or DİTİB associations.

In addition to these four prominent organizations in France (DİTİB, Milli Görüş, the Süleymancı and the Idealists), there are a variety of smaller organizations. For instance, the Naqshbandi order, which is highly influential in Turkey and Central Asia, maintains several lodges in France.

The "Kaplancı" congregation, founded by Cemalettin Kaplan but now almost facing extinction, has a few mosques in France. This is a Sunni extremist organization that is inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini despite his being Shiite, and wants the laic regime in Turkey to be overthrown and replaced by the caliphate.

In France, there are approximately 130 organizations under the umbrella of DİTİB, and approximately 70 under Milli Görüş. The number of Süleymancı and Idealist organizations is in the 10s and 20s.[22] The breakdown of organizations of Turkish origin in France as discovered by the author is below:

Network of religious organizations of Turkish origin in France

- Süleymancı: 12–5%
- Nationalist: 11–5%
- DİTİB: 126–58%
- Kaplancı: 9–4%
- Milli Görüş: 61–28%

[22] Akgönül Samim, "Islam turc, Islams de Turquie" in *Politique étrangère*, 1/ 2005, p. 37–49.

c. *Legitimacy and Market Strategies*

Separations and Mergers

An analysis of the relationships among the organizations founded by people of Turkish origin in France unveils three different strategies. One is the desire to become a representative group and a counterparty to the authorities, which is frequently found in minority groups. This is of even more importance in France, because French authorities have been pressuring Muslims to organize and to come up with a single and official representative of French Islam since the early 2000s. As a hallmark of Jacobin states, this approach prescribes a single, authorized spokesperson between the state and the Muslims, who will inform the public on the leading issues (such as headscarves, imams or sacrificial slaughter).

Turks initially believed this to be an issue between Arabs and the French state, and did not take it seriously. Later, the DİTİB, Milli Görüş and Süleymancı organizations began sending representatives to Regional Councils of Muslim Faith and the French Council of Muslim Faith to emerge from the shadows, and, from 2007 onwards, to step forward as representatives of French Muslims. As a result, Millî Görüş began to receive support from other Muslim associations such as Moroccan organizations, and DİTİB representative Haydar Demiryürek was nominated for chairman of the French Council of Muslim Faith to succeed Dalil Boubeker. Although the alliance strategy won the support of non-Turkish Muslims, Demiryürek was forced to withdraw:

Coordination Committee of the Muslim Turkish Associations of France

STATEMENT

Haydar Demiryürek is nominated for the presidency of the Muslims Council of France

Paris, 9 May 2008

Convening in Paris on May 8, the Committee of the Muslim Turkish Associations of France nominated Chairman Haydar Demiryürek for the presidency of the Muslims Council of France with the approval of the 23 representatives sitting on Local Muslim Councils.

The representatives are confident that Demiryürek, who has been the Secretary-General of the Muslims Council of France since its establishment in 2003, will help to overcome the quandary in the Council with his extensive experience.

Demiryürek, 39, has a Master's degree on "laicism and freedom of worship" and believes that his attitude of mutual understanding will help to relieve the tension, increase the effectiveness of the Muslims Council of France, and meet the expectations of the Muslims of France.

Haydar DEMİRYÜREK
17 Place de la Nation 75011 Paris
Tel: 01 44 64 92 Fax: 01 44 64 94 49
Mail: ccmtf@yahoo.fr

In the 2008 elections, Haydar Demiryürek was elected as the vice-president of regions to the Muslims Council of France. The table on the following page is the list of the officials in the Muslims Council of France, and includes two Turkish nationals.[23]

The presence of Turks in the Muslims Council of France has led to the French state acknowledging Turkish Islam and its claim of uniqueness. Those sitting on local Muslim Councils act as a conduit that legitimizes the religion they represent in the eyes of the ethnic Turks living in the respective region. This dual legitimization is one of the most important stages of integration for people of Turkish origin. As these people join national institutions to play a more active part in religion across France, they prepare to take part in French domestic politics: although living in France for more than 40 years, people of Turkish origin ran for local administrations for the first time in the elections of 2009, and 27 of them won the elections. Time will show whether this is a new trend set by the acceptance of dual loyalty, or the establishment of a lobbying organization that will work on behalf of Turkey with the support of Turkish authorities.

The dual initiative in religious and political branches lays the foundation of the phenomenon I call the "market strategy." An explanation of this concept is in order. It is only natural that all organizations or thought movements seek to expand by winning new members or followers. On the other hand, it would be inaccurate to argue that the organizations established by people of Turkish origin seek to win over the members of other

[23] For information on the first election in 2005, cf. Akgönül Samim, *Religions de Turquie, Religions des Turcs : nouveaux acteurs dans l'Europe élargie*, Paris : L'Harmattan, 2005, p. 191–192.

	Chairman MOUSSAOUI Mohammed (RMF)	
Vice-President of Regions DEMİRYÜREK Haydar (CCMTF)	*Vice-President of Reforms and Planning* ALAOUI Fouad (UOIF)	*Vice-President of Commissions* HAFIZ Chems-eddine (GMP)
Secretary-General	RMF	KBIBECH Anouar
Assistant Secretary-General	AISD	TIMOL Aslam
Treasurer	UOIF	BEN AHMED Okacha
Assistant Treasurer	GML	KABTANE Kamel
Missions Officer	FFAIACA	FASSASSI Assani
Missions Officer	Foi et pratique (Association of Faith and Practice)	HAMMAMI Hamadi
	FNMF	....
	GME	MERROUN Khalil
	Mantes la Jolie	SEBTI Taoufik
	Islah	AINOUCHE Azzedine
	RMF	EL ALAOUI TALIBI Hassan
	GMP	NADOUR Slimane
	CCMTF	BAYRAM Celil

organizations.[24] Instead, the group tries to gain "representative authority," or a significant share in the "market" of representation. Contestants include DİTİB and Millî Görüş, with a smaller number of Süleymancı initiatives following. It is not the number of followers, but the size of mosques and houses of worship that plays an important part in the elections for Regional Councils of Muslim Faith or the French Council of Muslim Faith.

[24] For an analysis of such strategies, cf. Remy Jean, Voyé Liliane, *Produire ou reproduire*, Bruxelles : vie ouvrière, 1978.

Competition in "gaining legitimacy" and "representing" in political and social spheres gives rise to two contradictory consequences. The separations on a European level are noteworthy. There are three important examples. The Kaplancı movement was founded in Cologne in 1983 by Cemalettin Kaplan, a former mufti reporting to the Office of Religious Affairs who moved to Germany in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup. Kaplan had initially joined the fledgling Millî Görüş movement in Germany, but decided to establish his own congregation, finding Millî Görüş too moderate. The foremost desire of the Kaplancı congregation is the overthrow of the Republic in Turkey in favor of an Islamic regime. This separation brought with it some contradictions. Although seemingly independent and even in opposition, religious organizations are not as introverted or as isolated as commonly believed.

Many of the imams working in Millî Görüş mosques were originally employed by the Office of Religious Affairs. These people waited for their retirement to settle in France, or resigned from their job when their commission in France was over. The situation escalated to such a level that the Office of Religious Affairs started to prevent imams from taking their families with them to compel them to return to Turkey when their commission was over. Turkey was worried that the children of imams who went to schools abroad would sooner or later deviate from the true path of their fathers. Furthermore, some of the mosques used by the members of the Kaplancı congregation in fact belong to the Millî Görüş movement, which is proof that there are bridges between seemingly warring factions.

It would be a mistake to think that believers are congregated in discrete groups due to these differences. Believers choose their places of worship for practical reasons and do not always worship at the same place. For example, a believer who usually worships at a Millî Görüş mosque would not hesitate to enter a DİTİB mosque he may come across and neither party would react to this choice of mosques; however, the situation was not as peaceful in the 1980s. During that decade, Millî Görüş was in opposition to the official Islam in Turkey, and Turkish authorities made every effort to have this organization included in the list of terrorist organizations until the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, Millî Görüş argued that a prayer enacted behind an imam reporting to the Office of Religious Affairs would be in vain before Allah. Both sides can be said to have made much progress.

An example on a local scale is the occurrence in the city of Metz (Lorraine, France). The disagreements and splitting within the Süleymancı

community in Turkey reached this city, and the Süleymancı imam split from the main branch of the community to establish his own house of worship in 2002. Despite this division, the congregation continued to visit both places of worship until 2006.

Finally, a number of "youths" have detached from the Millî Görüş movement: with the support of Jean Pierre Chevenement, a football club was founded in the city of Belfort (Franche-Comté, France) in 1985. In 1992, this football club was restructured with the encouragement of local authorities to include other conservative youth organizations, and consolidated into a federative organization named the Multicultural Youth Council. Today, it is known as "COJEP International" with COJEP being its French acronym (*Conseil de la Jeunesse Pluriculturelle*). "Multicultural" is more wishful thinking than fact, as 99% of its members have been of Turkish origin since its foundation. The Council brought together young adults whose parents belong to the Millî Görüş and Idealist movements, and COJEP evolved into the youth organization of the Millî Görüş movement.[25] However, disagreement between the older group and younger group began to arise: from the mid-1990s onwards, COJEP members began their demands for greater voice within Millî Görüş, and pressured the organization to focus its activities on France. The older generation, who had always prioritized Turkish domestic politics, did not sympathize with this demand and refused the younger generation. This attempt at an internal coup failed due to the context of the day and the inherent shortcomings in the COJEP structure. As a result, COJEP declared its independence in 1996, relocated its center to Strasbourg (Alsace, France) and adopted a new discourse. The new discourse has no room for religion or places of worship. COJEP became an organization that supports intercultural dialog and European policies. The rift with the older generation opened in the year 2000, when the activities of COJEP and Millî Görüş separated completely and became independent. An emotional connection may still be felt nevertheless; in fact, Millî Görüş even took steps to reunite the two organizations. It is also interesting to note that since 2002, when the Justice and Development Party was elected into office in Turkey, COJEP began to focus on Turkey while maintaining its activities related to European and Balkan youths. Within this scope, COJEP organized a number of congresses and meetings to come together with other non-governmental organizations. Although religious issues were not explicitly discussed in

[25] Akgönül Samim, "Islam turc—Islams de Turquie : nouveaux acteurs et anciens réseaux dans l'espace européen", in *Politique étrangère*, 1/2005, p. 37–49.

these meetings, they appeared between the lines, such as when the campaign against alcohol was discussed. It is widely known that COJEP is being endorsed and supported by Turkish authorities to continue its activities, including financial support from the Fund for the Promotion of Turkey established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, the activities of the organization have focused on Turkey's accession to the EU as of 2002, and even more particularly since 2004. However, their discourse has changed radically: they have adopted the approach maintained by the majority of Turkish society with regard the EU, and have begun to take part in anti-European discourse.

French authorities and media play an undeniable role in this change of attitude. The positioning of these institutions against Turkey's accession to the EU is in line with the condemning attitude of Turkish organizations. The consolidated Turkish reaction to French discourse spawned a short-lived unity between competing associations and opposing political views. This reactive camaraderie died down as rapidly as it emerged, and with growing disagreements in Turkey, a common and solid response could not be given to current discussions in France, such as the headscarf issue. The disagreement among the Turks and the conflict between France and Turkey extended into the "Turkish Season in France" held between September 2009 and March 2010.

With the exception of the Süleymancı community, Turkish associations in France stayed out of the issue surrounding the headscarf ban in secondary and high schools. The Süleymancı community, on the other hand, rallied and fought against the implementation of the ban. However, their activites were mostly turned inward and rarely had repercussions outside the community. One particular example was the brief media attention on a girl who came to school with a shaved head to protest.[26]

As the anti-Turkish discourse in France escalated, the words uttered began to offend people of Turkish origin. In reaction, there was an attempt at creating a union of Turkish organizations while maintaining different perspectives. Even Embassy officials worked towards this purpose, all to no avail. The attempts at establishing a federation were most concentrated in the Alsace and Ile de France regions. However, even organizations like *The Assembly of Citizens of Turkish Origin* (RACORT) fell victim to ideological separations in Turkey and were unable to establish a union in France.

[26] *Libération*, 2 October 2004.

Official Islam / Dissenting Islam

The aversion of Turkish associations to unite under one roof is the result of the presence of a dissenting Islamic movement that is in conflict with the official Islam in Turkey. An in-depth analysis of the division reveals that the rift is not as wide or severe as it seems or is commonly believed to be.

Dissident Islamic movements opposed to the official Islam have existed throughout the Ottoman Empire and continued to do so in the Republic of Turkey. Both states, wanting to dictate and control religious thoughts and practices, considered those who reject whatever is imposed as subversive elements threatening unity and security, and branded them as heretics. Dissenting Islamic movements resisted annihilation when the Jacobin Kemalist regime saw them as a threat against the newly-founded laic regime, and their resistance brought them strength. People of the Anatolian Islamic culture, foıllowers of heterodoxic faiths and practices in various congregations and even some Sufis were devastated when their religious orders, lodges or holy tombs where they congregated were banned and closed. However, contrary to the wishes of the state, the banning of religious orders did not diminish their importance, particularly in rural areas. They continued their existence in hiding. The state began to rein the religion in with the Office of Religious Affairs established in lieu of the abolished Caliphate. Religious orders that fell outside the planned official religious project were classified as dissident Islam, even though some were not even remotely connected to politics. These orders remained hidden until the 1950s, when the Democrat Party came to power with the votes of the rural population, and then began to take part in politics as the Democrat Party viewed conservative Islam favorably. The orders joined a variety of political movements until the mid-1960s, but “political Islam” was not yet developed. The foundation of political Islam occurred during the relatively liberal environment created in the wake of the military coup of 1960. Millî Görüş established its association in the 1970s and became one of the leading political parties in Turkey. To eliminate any previous misconceptions, it must be noted that the “dissidence” of this party is first and foremost political, and not tied to religion. On the contrary however, Millî Görüş holds the belief that Islam already has a very special place in the private and social lives of the people or Turkey; it is only missing in the political arena. The purpose is not to discuss religion and draw a roadmap; it is to introduce religion into the world of politics. In this political environment, Millî Görüş managed to stay away

from radical Islamic movements despite incorporating smaller fundamental groups. As explained above, despite the fact that the armed forces and other groups of the society did not acknowledge its legitimacy, the Millî Görüş movement became an indispensable part of politics, or the "system," beginning in the 1970s. Kemalist circles were unable to prevent the political parties stemming from the Millî Görüş movement from entering coalitions and finally becoming the ruling party in 2002. Although the Justice and Development Party argues that it is not connected to the movement, the leaders of the party are all from the Millî Görüş movement, and their constituency is composed of voters loyal to the same movement.

Due to these reasons, it is difficult to differentiate official Islam and dissident Islam. In the European case, such a difference has lost its *raison d'etre*.

Considering Islam as a system of belief that shapes all the aspects (personal and social) of an individual's life, dissident Islam may be said to be composed of individuals who desire a greater degree of religion in social life. Looking from this perspective, it becomes easier to understand why the people of Turkish origin in Europe place so much importance on religion. First and foremost, their inadequacy in the other loyalty measures of "Turkishness" causes religion to gain more importance within these communities. The prioritization of religion is a phenomenon that is observable in all minority groups, and even constitutes one of the minority theories in sociology today: minorities value religion more than their compatriots who are in the majority in another country; or, non-religious practices are accepted with more ease if the community in question is in the majority.

In addition to the above, being a supporter of the widespread Millî Görüş movement in Europe has two advantages. Siding with this movement is not limited to supporting an ideology that plays a significant part in Turkish domestic politics. As the importance of Millî Görüş rises in Turkey, the proponents of the party in France become even more legitimate within the Muslim community and gain a surer foothold. In other words, members of Millî Görüş organizations in France are not there because they are interested in Turkish domestic politics; they are there to attain a better social status in France.

Finally, while still valid to a degree in Turkey, the distinction between official Islam and dissident Islam is becoming irrelevant for the Turks in France. This is not in scorn of the thorough establishment of the Millî Görüş organization in Germany and the importance of its activites

there, or its legitimacy in Turkey: the movement represents a very important segment of the Turkish political system, and with the rise of a spin-off political party to power in 2002, this distinction should no longer be made, even in Turkey. Warming relations between the so-called official religion and its dissidents are apparent in many areas. From the close ties between Turkish authorities and Millî Görüş organizations abroad to the communiqué of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to its diplomats telling them not to worry any longer about the Fethullah Gülen schools in their countries, examples are aplenty. Deputies of the Justice and Development Party who come to Strasbourg to attend Council of Europe meetings make courtesy visits to the Eyüp Sultan Mosque at every opportunity. Considering that Turkish authorities were working hard to have Millî Görüş included in the list of terrorist organizations in the 1990s, the distance covered is impressive. The same applies to the Süleymancı, Fethullahçı or even Naqshbandi communities: associations linked to these organizations have become a part of the Turco-Islamic synthesis in France.

The Alevi: Between Religion and a Philosophy of Life

Millî Görüş was an important wing of political opposition in Turkey in the 1970s and 80s. However, Turkey's most significant passive social opposition wing is the Alevi. As ideological loyalties lost their importance and were gradually replaced by religious and ethnic loyalties in the late 20th century, the religious element began to supersede other identity criteria in the Alevi. Consequently, the Alevi of France may be considered from two perspectives: First, there are Alevi organizations in France that have no connections to religion, whose activities are limited to social, cultural and sometimes political events. The members of these organizations believe that the Turkish Sunni organizations are comprised of fundamental Islamists, defend laicism as a reaction against these organizations, and are unhappy with the fact that "Turkishness" is associated with Sunnism and is represented by Sunni organizations in France. Meanwhile, there are religious organizations that are directly linked to Alevism, and therefore in opposition to the official Islam in Turkey. Of course, other organizations can be mentioned beside these two, including the ethnic Kurdish Alevi organizations and leftist political organizations whose members are Alevi.

In other words, it would be inaccurate to include all organizations whose members are Alevi in an umbrella category of "Alevi organizations."

It must also be noted that the same applies to the Sunni. Starting with the initial flow of migrant workers to France, but particularly during the 1980s when the migrants began to settle in France, the Alevi established dozens of social solidarity associations or political organizations. The majority of these organizations were not religious in nature; they served a purpose of social, cultural, political and/or ethnic solidarity. Nevertheless, as Sunnism began to dominate in Turkey in the 1990s, these organizations began to underline their Alevi identity. During the same period, a debate ensued in Turkey to shed light on the meaning and definition of Alevism, which was closely followed by the public in Turkey as well as the Turkish community in France.

Society accepted the state's opinion of Alevism over that of the Alevi. As an example, Turkish authorities rejected the argument that the congregational houses of the Alevi ("cemevi") are places of worship. At a time when all social and political problems were made ethnic or religious, the Alevi began to emphasize the religious aspect of their loyalty. This new search for an identity caused political and social frictions with the established regime and Turkish Sunnism. In a display of power, more than 10,000 Alevis from all over Europe gathered at the Zenith concert hall in Strasbourg on June 14, 2008 for a celebratory event. The gathering was both religious and political at the same time.

Alevis emphasize being "Turkish" on the one hand, while objecting to representation exclusively by Sunni organizations of European Turks before European society and authorities.

These developments led to Alevism being perceived less as a "culture" or "lifestyle" and more as a "religion" in both France and Turkey. In this respect, it would be true to claim that the religious identity is being resurrected in France.[27] Alevism in France is in the shadow of Sunnism, which receives more media coverage and represents the official religion of Turkey. Another reason Alevism is left in the shadows is the inclination of the French public to associate Turks with Sunnism and even with the Maghreb. The fact that Alevis are not active participants in the Islam-related debates in France (examples are headscarves and the position of women in society) cause the French to have little to no awareness of this minority within a minority. Lately, municipalities face increasing demands

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[27] Çamuroğlu Reha, "Some Notes on the Contemporary Process of Reconstructing Alevilik in Turkey" in Kehl-Bhodrogi Krisztina, Kellner-Heinkele Barbara, Otter-Beaujean Anke (ed.), *Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East*, Leiden: Brill, 1997, p. 25–34.

to establish Alevi congregational houses, which has led to an increasing awareness of the unique issues of the Alevi and their needs that are completely dissimilar to those of the Sunni.

As the debate on Islam continues in France, the Alevi have begun to adopt an anti-Sunni discourse. This reactive discourse attempts to prove that "Turkishness" and Turkish Islam (i.e. Alevism!) is entirely different from the North African version of Islam: Alevism does not have the issues of covering the head, sacrificial slaughter or the position of women in society. These visible aspects aside, the intra-communal code of conduct in the Alevi minority is just as rigid as that in the Sunni. For example, the percentage of endogamic (within-group) marriages is higher among the Alevi than the Sunni.

d. *Ethnic Turks and the French Context*

The French Concept of Laicism: Turkification of Islam-State Relations

The attitude of French Turks towards religion cannot be explained by the political developments in Turkey alone. The unique atmosphere of

the French context shapes the behavior of the Turks, and gives rise to discussions that are unique to France. Studies by Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel to compare the French and German contexts show that Turks emigrating from the same social stratum and during the same movement exhibit different religious attitudes in the two countries.[28]

Which of the below do you feel closer to?

	Germany		France	
	Number of Respondents	Percentage	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Citizen of Turkey	256	24.0	213	35.5
Turk	240	22.5	145	24.2
Kurd	45	4.2	23	3.8
Muslim	348	32.7	96	16.0
Muslim Turk	424	39.8	244	40.7
Alevi	35	3.3	22	3.7
Citizen of Germany or France	74	6.9	54	9.0
Half Turk, Half German/French	77	7.2	106	17.7
European Turk	60	5.6	36	6.0
Global Citizen	56	5.3	64	10.7
Citizen of EU	22	2.1	25	4.2
Other	10	1.0	1	0.2
Total	1065	100.0	600	100.0

The table reveals that 33% of the people of Turkish origin in Germany consider themselves as only Muslims. Meanwhile, in France, where defining oneself by religion sparks discussions of laicism, this percentage is significantly lower at 16%. There is no doubt that French secularism

[28] Kentel Ferhat, Kaya Ayhan, *Euro-Turks. A Bridge or a Breach Between Turkey and the European Union: A comparative study of German-Turks and French Turks*, Bruxelles: Center For European Policy Studies, 2005, p. 59 and others.

shapes the way people of Turkish origin perceive the relationship between society and religion. It can be argued that the approach of generations educated in France undergo a process of "Frenchification." On the other hand, the percentage of those who define themselves as "Muslim and Turk" is the same in both countries (40%). When in the minority, the religious identity becomes as important as the national and/or ethnic identity. In some cases the religious identity replaces national identity; in others, they are equally important. In conclusion, it must be noted that the respondents in both countries differentiate between the ethnic and national (Turk or Kurd) and religious and national (Muslim and Turk). The Turks in the minority still bear the hallmarks of the Ottoman *millet* system.

How religious are you?

	Germany		France	
	Number of Respondents	Percentage	Number of Respondents	Percentage
I observe all requirements of the religion	80	7.5	58	9.7
I try to observe all requirements of the religion	571	53.6	279	46.5
I am a believer but I do not worship	377	35.4	197	32.8
I am not a believer	26	2.4	28	4.7
I am an atheist	11	1.0	35	5.8
No response			3	0.5
Total	1065	100.0	600	100.0

The number of worshippers is in the majority both in Germany and France with 61% and 56%, respectively. For national communities that are in the minority, worship is not simply a display of religious loyalty. Since the religious elements of identity are stronger and more visible than the ethnic, worship is an instrument that underscores the national and even ethnic loyalties of the individual.

A questionnaire by IFOP (French Institute of Public Polling) published in January 2007 reveals the unique attributes of the Turks among the other Muslims in France.[29]



The TESEV report published in 2006 contains important clues about how the Turks living in Turkey interpret the concepts of laicism and Islamism.[30]



Examining the influence of context on immigrants once again, it is interesting to note that while 6% claim to be atheists in France, this is as low as 1% in Germany.

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[29] IFOP, *La Croix, Enquête sur l'évolution de l'Islam de France, 1989–2007*, January 2007.

[30] Toprak Binnaz, Çarkoğlu Ali, *Değişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset*, Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, November 2006, p. 39.

Should religion and state be separate?

	Germany		France	
	Number of Respondents	Percentage	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Yes	483	45.4	466	77.7
No	424	39.8	96	16.0
No idea	158	14.8	38	6.3
Total	1065	100.0	600	100.0

The attitude towards the concept of laicism is another consequence of context. People from Turkey come from a constitutionally laic, yet socially partially secular country, and are influenced by the relationship of the state to religion in the country where they settle. In Germany, where the state and the church are fairly intertwined, 45% of ethnic Turks believe that the state and the church should be separate; whereas in France, where the distinction has been clear-cut since the law of 1905, the ratio increases to 77%. Even ethnic Turks adopt the perspective of the majority towards society.

Territorialization of the Religion: An Attitude Unique to Nation-States

Important changes have occurred in the attitude of the French state towards laicism and the French perception of secularism in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Manifest both in discourse and in legislation, these changes are connected to the presence of Muslims in France and their quest for legitimacy. This situation has a direct and an indirect connection to the Muslims in France. The first is a structural connection. Four to five million Muslims may have acquired French citizenship, but they have not achieved legitimacy in the eyes of the French society yet. These "new" French want their presence to be accepted, both individually and as a religious community with special rights. The quest for legitimacy causes tension in French society from various perspectives. On the one hand, the French government has been trying to establish an authority that will represent the Muslims of France in an attempt to create a French Islam for more than 15 years; while the public is not in favor of such an authority believing that it will create separate communities in society.

Speaking of the contextual reasons for the change in the French system of laicism, the dark image of Islam in Western societies after the 1990s, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, must be investigated. Spreading fear as a symbol of threat, and even leading to Muslims being viewed as enemies, this new image has had repercussions throughout the French society. Although the French are not particularly enthusiastic about the "clash of civilizations," a large number of people want the Muslims in France to go through the laic system to adapt to society, effectively bringing the religion under state control. As part of the same approach, French society wants imams to be raised in the French culture and to address their congregations in French in order to keep abreast of the religious thoughts taking root in French soil. From this perspective, it can be argued that the French system of laicism, having clearly separated the state from the church in its time, is now evolving to overcome the issues brought by the Muslims—a new element in society. Similar to Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s, the idea that the state should keep religion under strict control is gaining support.

This is a process of territorialization of Islam in France. After the oppression of the foreign and heretic French Protestantism, the nationalization of French Catholicism with the law of 1905, and the digestion of Judaism which had been accused of dual loyalty for many years, now is the time to nationalize and localize Islam. The objective is to replace the Islam in France with a French Islam that is unique to France. The hottest debate surrounds imams, and the leading issue on the agenda today is the education and training of imams who will work in France. There are three groups of imams working in French mosques. One group consists of the imams sent from Muslim countries. This is the group that is the least accepted by French society. Imams who will serve the people of Turkish origin in France have been appointed by DİTİB, or in other words the Office of Religious Affairs which has reported directly to the Turkish Prime Minister, since 1983. These imams work within the Turkish organizations in France and their wages are paid by the government of Turkey through the "social affairs attaches" working in consulates. It is not difficult to understand why the organizations request imams from Turkey: on the one hand, they are received as the representatives of the true "Turkishness" that the ethnic Turks in France have lost over time, due to their excellent grasp of the language and the religion, while their affiliation with the state of Turkey serves to confirm the allegiance of the organization to the official religion of Turkey. Of course, all this and more is available for free! These organizations are far from being rich, so not having to pay the wages of the imam

comes as a great relief. In fact, the finances of some organizations are so precarious that they choose to assign their properties to the Office of Religious Affairs to ensure that imams are sent on a regular basis and building maintenance is paid for by the Office.

Despite the negative reaction by the public, French authorities do not object to the imams sent from Turkey because they are under the supervision of the Turkish state, and present less of a threat than local imams who are not controlled by any country. For as long as there is no institution to provide education to local imams in France, it is important that foreign imams are under the supervision of the country they come from. If the country is laicist like Turkey, this procedure is all the more valuable. The foremost criticism of imams is that they do not speak French. Taking this criticism into consideration, the Office of Religious Affairs started a new procedure in 2005: about a hundred young individuals are chosen from the countries of immigration (France, Germany, the Netherlands…), travel to Ankara to receive religious education, and are sent back to their countries. In this respect, it must also be mentioned that the Office of Religious Affairs is not disturbed by imams being educated in Europe. The Office of Religious Affairs supports education abroad on one condition: contributing to the education so that the Office can continue to keep imams serving in Turkish mosques under its supervision.

The second group of Turkish imams in France are those serving for non-DİTİB organizations, such as Millî Görüş. Most of these clergymen come from Turkey. In their case, the wages are paid by the organizations. Issues surrounding this group of imams are similar to those of the first group, mainly their lack of knowledge in the French language and culture. Some of the imams serving in Millî Görüş or Süleymancı mosques are former employees of DİTİB. They have either resigned and remained in Europe when their assignment was over, or chosen retirement.

The third group of imams have few members. They are from the North African community of France who have no affiliation with any national or international organizations, and work on a voluntary basis in North African organizations. They are mostly elderly individuals who have been residing in France for a long time and have some command of the language. On the other hand, these imams usually lead the prayer only and do not deliver sermons. Unlike the imams in the other two groups, they are not responsible for delivering religious education to children. The Turkish community in France does not have any unaffiliated associations that are not tied to an organization, therefore there are no independent imams.

The attempts to localize Islam in France focus on the education and training of imams as a priority.[31] As explained before, French society distrusts imams sent from abroad. After a long and tense struggle that succeeded in the end to instate French as the language of Catholic worship, France desires a similar evolution for Islam: the language of worship should not be Arabic or Turkish, but French instead. It must be noted that Turkey went through a similar attempt at localizing religion in the 1920s and 30s. The attempt in Turkey met with a degree of success with the establishment of the Office of Religious Affairs, but there are hard limits, such as the rejection of the call to prayer being sung in Turkish.

To summarize the situation in France briefly: French laicism is undergoing change due to Islam, but French Islam is evolving alongside. This interaction has led to changes in the Turkish community in France too.[32] Differences from the old ways arise in subjects such as covering the head[33] or sacrificial slaughter.[34]

When in the minority, all religions take on two contradictory aspects. On the one hand, they resist changes that would have been readily adopted had they been in the majority, while trying to adapt to the country, if begrudgingly, on the other. This contradiction can be observed in the Turkish community of France. Meanwhile, because religious loyalty refers to national loyalty, individuals adopt a religious attitude in an attempt to prove their loyalty to the community and nation to which they belong.[35] This attempt to prove loyalty occurs through bringing rational explanations to religious behaviors (such as claiming that pork is bad for health), and arguing that religion has a very important place within the community because it constitutes a critical element of everyday life. By becoming an institution, the community manifests its existence in the eyes of the

[31] Cf. Frégosi Franck, *La formation des cadres religieux musulmans en France*, Paris: Bayard Editions, 1999.

[32] Changes in the Turkish community were small at first, but became more significant as Turks began to take part in national religious organizations and politics more recently. Nevertheless, the religious organizations of the Turkish community in France have not severed their strong ties with Turkey yet: cf. Caymaz Birol, *Les mouvements Islamiques turcs à Paris,* Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002.

[33] For the new significance of covering the head for Muslims, cf. Weibel Nadine, *Par-delà le Voile: femmes d'Islam en Europe*, Paris: Complexe, 2000.

[34] For the significance and meaning of sacrifice in Europe, cf. Brisebarre Anne-Marie, Gökalp Altan, *Sacrifices en Islam: espace et temps d'un rituel*, Paris: CNRS Editions, 1999.

[35] Deconchy Jean-Pierre, *Orthodoxie religieuse et sciences sociales*, Paris: Mouton, 1980.

majority, and reaffirms the fact that it will continue to exist throughout time and place. As an example, while the Turkish community had kept its distance from the Muslims Council of France and the local councils in the beginning, they have since become a part of these organizations for strategic purposes.

CONCLUSION

Although more than 40 years have elapsed since the first emigration of Turks to France, terms like “French Turks” or “half French-half Turk” are still problematic today. The obstacles to overcome have structural and contextual elements. In Turkey as well as in France, “multiculturality” is asserted on the surface; however, the truth is different: both states are founded on national unity above all. In other words, both states, drawing on their experience of nation-building, prefer that their citizens belong to one and only one nation. National loyalty and the resulting notion of nationalism sharply reject the idea of multiple loyalties. Therefore, the French are unable to associate the immigrant communities with their idea of a Nation, even when they have acquired French citizenship or were born in France. There is a great difference between Turks and North Africans on this point: the struggle of North Africans is to be accepted as “French” and gain legitimacy as French, people from Turkey fight to have their Turkish or Kurdish presence in France recognized and made legitimate. Between 2006 and 2008, I had the opportunity to ask a number of questions to 200 Turkish students taking their baccalauraete exams. A great majority of them were born in France (98%) and were French citizens (91%). Furthermore, 22% had a parent who was born in France. Despite this, none of them answered the question “Where are you from?” with the name of the city they were born or living in. Without a single exception, all answered the province in Turkey where their parents or at least the head of family (in most cases, the paternal grandfather) came from. This did not change even if those individuals had no family or physical ties to these provinces, had never even been there, and had poor command of Turkish. Based on these responses, we can confidently claim that neither the majority nor the Turkish minority have internalized the concept of multiple loyalties. This serves to prove that having dual citizenship is not an indication of feeling emotional ties to both nations.

This structural data should be accompanied by a contextual explanation: the “perpetual first generation” strategy. The intentional or unintentional practice of this strategy (marriage of people born and raised in France to spouses born and raised in Turkey) enables the Turks in France

and across Europe to remain in close contact with Turkey, the Turkish language, and the religion. Generations born in France do lose their command of Turkish, but this shortcoming is compensated for by religion, customs, loyalty to the "motherland" and the cultural accumulation of parents who have recently emigrated from Turkey. In other words, multiple loyalty is experienced but not expressed, and is even rejected.

Minority theory may explain the situation: all minorities create rules for socializing that will prevent their members from becoming individual. Even if a member of the minority gains the freedom to define himself as an individual, he will continue to be perceived and treated as a member of a minority by the majority and the minority alike. Weber's theory of methodological individualism cannot be used for minorities where the unity and integrity of the identity is paramount. But the antithesis, Durkheim's holism, is inadequate as far as the socializing system is concerned. Among the theories that will answer this paradigm is the methodological complex individualism conceptualized by Jean Pierre Dupuy.[1] This appears to be the best way to break the rigid barriers of the individual/minority/majority triangle. I believe that focusing solely on multiple loyalties[2] in a situation where the minority is still not legitimate in the eyes of the majority and is seen as an outside element is inadequate. For religious minorities that are yet to become legitimate in society, the demand of the majority for them to adapt their religious customs and practices to the new context in which they settle occurs as oppression: by submitting to the demand, they will distance themselves from their culture. Although not accepted by the members of the minority for the purpose of preserving their uniqueness, religion—or religious practices, like all other aspects of a cultural whole, are expected to adapt to the new circumstances and surroundings. It cannot be denied that the religious attitudes and overall approach of the people of Turkey in France changed as a result of this interaction. On the other hand, because the same group is also in danger of alienation from their cultures and assimilation, these developments win the favor of neither the Turkish society nor the minority itself. Returning to Turkey, the people in France are confronted with changes in their behavior as if it was a crime. The worst insult to Turks coming from France is to tell them they have become French. Owing to the

[1] Dupuy Jean Pierre, "Vers l'unité des sciences sociales autour de l'individualisme méthodologique complexe" in R*evue du MAUSS*, n° 24, 2004, p. 310–328.

[2] Sutter Jacques, "Overture" in Bauberot Jean (dir.), *Pluralisme et minorités religieuses*, Louvain, Paris: Peeters, 1991, p. 2.

phenomenon of interaction, a member of this community very naturally brings together and uses religious symbols that belong to the Turks in Turkey with those belonging to the majority in France. Collective behavior is shaping the behavior of the individual, and individual discourses are creating the collective behavior.[3]

[3] Mead George, *Herbert Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

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