

**THE QUEST FOR HEGEMONY
IN THE ARAB WORLD**

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
STUDIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST

ÉTUDES SOCIALES, ÉCONOMIQUES ET
POLITIQUES DU MOYEN ORIENT

Editor

C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze

Editorial Advisory Board

Samir Khalaf (Princeton University), M. Fathalla al-Khatib (Cairo University), Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot (University of California at Los Angeles), Şerif Mardin (The American University, Washington DC), Udo Steinbach (Deutsches Orient Institut, Hamburg), Rodney Wilson (University of Durham)

VOLUME LII



THE QUEST FOR HEGEMONY IN THE ARAB WORLD

The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact

BY

ELIE PODEH



E.J. BRILL
LEIDEN · NEW YORK · KÖLN
1995

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Podeh, Elie.

The quest for hegemony in the Arab world ; the struggle over the Baghdad Pact / by Elie Podeh.

p. cm. — (Social, economic, and political studies of the Middle East = Etudes sociales, économiques et politiques du Moyen Orient, ISSN 0085-6193 ; v. 52)

Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.

ISBN 9004102140 (alk. paper)

1. Arab countries—Politics and government—1945- I. Title.
II. Series: Social, economic, and political studies of the Middle East ; v. 52.

DS63.1.P63 1995

909'.0974927—dc20

95-884

CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Pöde, Eli:

The quest for hegemony in the Arab world : the struggle over the Baghdad pact / by Elie Podeh. - Leiden ; New York ; Köln : Brill, 1995

(Social, economic, and political studies of the Middle East ; Vol. 52)

ISBN 90-04-10214-0

NE: GT

ISSN 0085-6193

ISBN 90 04 10214 0

© Copyright 1995 by E.J. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

*Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by E.J. Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.*

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

“As all historians know, the past is a great darkness, and filled with echoes. Voices may reach us from it; but what they say to us is imbued with the obscurity of the matrix out of which they come; and, try as we may, we cannot always decipher them precisely in the clearer light of our own day.”

(Margaret Atwood, *The Handmaid's Tale*, pp. 394–95)

“The world has neither love nor respect for what is dead, wishing only to recall it to life again. It deals with the past as with a man, expecting it to talk sense and have something to say apposite to its plebeian ‘causes’ and engagements. But for the ‘historian,’ for whom the past is dead and irreproachable, the past is feminine. He loves it as a mistress of whom he never tires and he never expects to talk sense.”

(Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics*, p. 166)

“... the Arabs are the least willing of nations to subordinate themselves to each other, as they are rude, proud, ambitious, and eager to be the leader. Their individual aspirations rarely coincide.”

(Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, Vol. I, p. 305)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	xi
List of Abbreviations	xiii
List of Tables	xiv
Map	xv
Introduction	1
I. The Egyptian–Iraqi Struggle for Hegemony in the Arab World	8
Hegemony and World Politics	8
Hegemony in the Arab World	13
Patterns of Struggle for Hegemony	33
II. Western Attempts at Forming a Regional Defense Organization, 1945–53	39
Western Concepts	39
Arab Attitudes	43
The Middle East Command	50
The Middle East Defense Organization	53
Dulles’ “Northern Tier” Concept	59
III. A General Rehearsal: The Arab Struggle over the Turco–Pakistani Agreement	64
The Origins of the Struggle	64
The Arab Response	68
Egypt’s Counterreaction	72
IV. Collision Course: The Origins of the Egyptian–Iraqi Rift	77
Egypt and Regional Defense	77
Iraq and Regional Defense	79
The Sarsank Negotiations	82
‘Abd al-Nasir meets Nuri al-Sa’id	87
V. The Die is Cast: The Turco–Iraqi Pact	91
Nuri’s Visits to London and Istanbul	91

Egypt's Dilemma <i>vis-à-vis</i> the West	96
The Turkish Prime Minister in Baghdad	100
The Arab Response	103
The Cairo Conference	107
Egypt's Final Struggle	112
Iraq Between Arab Constraints and Western Pressures	118
 VI. Syria: The First Round in the Arab Struggle	 126
The Tripartite Declaration	126
Syria's Drift Toward Neutrality	132
Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Consultations	136
Britain's Accession to the Turco-Iraqi Pact	139
 VII. Syria: The Climax of the Arab Struggle	 143
The Struggle Renewed	143
The Impact of the Bandung Conference	147
Egyptian-Iraqi Propaganda Warfare	149
The Struggle over Lebanon	153
Intensifying the Struggle over Syria	155
The Climax: Syria's Presidential Election	159
The Arab Tripartite Axis	162
Syrian Attempts at Maintaining a Balance of Power	167
 VIII. The Fateful Hour: The Struggle over Jordan	 172
Early Attempts at Recruiting Jordan	172
The Turkish President's Visit	175
Setting the Stage	177
The Templer Mission	183
The Climax: Majali's Cabinet	186
The End: Rifa'i's Cabinet	189
 IX. Iraq Under Siege: Containing the Baghdad Pact in the Arab World	 196
Egypt's Attempts at Détente	196
The Struggle over Morocco and Tunisia	202
The Struggle over Saudi Arabia	205
Containing the Baghdad Pact	211

X. Farewell to the Baghdad Pact	223
The Impact of the Eisenhower Doctrine	224
Western Attempts to Revive the Pact	229
Consolidating the Elusive Royalist Coalition	230
Egypt's Counterreaction	234
The Arab Union, the UAR and the Pact	237
Iraq's Withdrawal from the Pact	240
Conclusions	243
Epilogue	253
Appendices	254
Bibliography	258
Index	273

PREFACE

In October 1978, following the signing of the Camp David agreement, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council published a statement, which declared that "the Arab arena is waiting for a veteran knight, capable of confronting the challenges." Later, in March 1979, before assuming presidency, Saddam Hussein called upon the Iraqis to fill "a conspicuous pan-Arab leadership role in the liberation of the whole Arab nation." Eleven years later, when Egyptian President Husni Mubarak addressed the soldiers of the Third Mechanized Division before their departure to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf crisis, he rebuked Saddam Hussein for wanting "to take over the leadership from Egypt. This," he went on to say, "is completely impossible." These and other remarks leave no doubt that the struggle for primacy in the Arab world is still a major feature of its politics.

The struggle over Arab hegemony is the main theme of this study; for, although scholars have alluded to this important feature of Arab politics, they have hardly analyzed it. Hence, this study attempts to put the Egyptian-Iraqi struggle in an analytical framework and in historical perspective. Focussing on the struggle over regional defense between 1945-58, culminating in the conflict over the Baghdad Pact, it sheds new light on Arab politics during the period under review. In contrast with recent publications approaching the Arab world from a global perspective, this research concentrates predominantly on the Arab actors. The underlying assumption is that policies were not necessarily formulated in Washington and London, and that—often enough—major decisions taken in Ankara, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus and other Arab capitals affected decision-makers in Western capitals.

The struggle over the Baghdad Pact had a profound impact on the ideological orientation of the Arab world. Apart from being a power struggle, this dispute was also a clash between two schools of thought of pan-Arabism: one, propagated by the old pro-Western Iraqi elite; the second by the young nationalist leaders in Egypt. This struggle was largely associated with two talented leaders: The veteran Iraqi leader, Nuri al-Sa'îd; and the young, charismatic Egyptian leader, Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir. The outcome of this struggle determined

the course of the Arab orientation at least until the Six Days War in 1967.


Finally, it is a pleasure to acknowledge the influence and aid of many people in preparing this book. To thank all those who have helped me to find my way through the intricacies of this subject is obviously impossible. However, I would like to express my gratitude to Itamar Rabinovich and Shimon Shamir who, with their advice and criticism, had greatly stimulated my thinking. I would also like to thank the late Uriel Dann, who was a great source of inspiration both for me and for many young scholars at Tel Aviv University. Ami Ayalon and Asher Susser were also important at different times and in different ways. Ya'acov Bar Siman-Tov, Benny Miller and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman offered important criticism on the first chapter. Special thanks are due to Gad Gilbar for his friendship and his ceaseless encouragement; and to Daniel Dishon, former editor of the *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, and Judy Krausz, for their meticulous work on the last draft of this manuscript. I am indebted to the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and to Tel Aviv University for their generous grants, which permitted me to devote my time to this study. Thanks also to the staffs of the various archives where I gathered the material: The Public Record Office, the US National Archives, the Israeli State Archive, the Middle East Center at St. Antony's College, Oxford, and the Moshe Dayan Center's Documentation Center. The manuscript would probably have not been completed without the splendid hospitality provided by the head of the department of Near Eastern Studies at Cornell University, Ross Brann. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Elianna, for her love and patience. The book is dedicated to her, and to my daughter Amarelle, survivors of my selfish indulgence in academic life.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACSP	Arab Collective Security Pact
ANZUS	Australian, New Zealand, USA Pact
BMEO	British Middle East Office
BP	Baghdad Pact
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Office (Britain)
DO	Defense Office (Britain)
DS	Department of State (US)
FO	Foreign Office (Britain)
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GNP	Gross National Product
IJMES	International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
IPC	Iraqi Petroleum Company
ISA	Israeli State Archive
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MEC	Middle East Command
MEDO	Middle East Defense Organization
MEJ	Middle East Journal
MENA	Middle East News Agency (Egypt)
MES	Middle Eastern Studies
NA	National Archives (US)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PREM	Prime Minister Office (Britain)
PRO	Public Record Office (Britain)
RAF	Royal Air Force (Britain)
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council (Egypt)
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
SSNP	Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party
UAR	United Arab Republic
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Arab Countries: Area and Population Estimates	15
Table 2: Number of Schools in Arab States, 1958	18
Table 3: Number of Teachers Sent Abroad by the Egyptian Ministry of Education	18
Table 4: Foreign Students at Egyptian Educational Institutions	19
Table 5: Estimated Strength of Arab Armies and Police, 1952	21
Table 6: Size of Arab Armed Forces, Mid-1960	21
Table 7: Geographic Patterns of Trade in the Arab World, 1958	22
Table 8: Oil Revenues in the Middle East, 1951-58	24



INTRODUCTION

On 24 February 1955, Iraq and Turkey signed a military pact, soon to become the kernel of a wider organization, including Britain, Pakistan and Iran as well. The Baghdad Pact, as it came to be known, was devised to interlock with a chain of alliances already surrounding the Soviet Union—NATO, SEATO, ANZUS and the Balkan Pact—and, from the Western perspective, its role was to defend the Middle East against the Soviet menace. The Baghdad Pact episode ushered in a new era in Arab politics and transformed the Arab state system. This study focuses on developments in the Arab world triggered by the formation of the Baghdad Pact.¹

The struggle between Egypt and Iraq for hegemony in the Arab world forms the main theme of the study. It is argued that, for the Arab states, the Baghdad Pact was not simply an offshoot of the Cold War; rather, they viewed it as part of the age-old struggle for regional dominance. Historically, the Egyptian–Iraqi struggle for hegemony is an extension of the old polarization or rivalry between the Mesopotamian and Nile Valleys for control of the lands lying in between—the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula.² Although

¹ Surprisingly, no comprehensive study has been published on the Baghdad Pact. General accounts giving a global perspective can be found in the following sources: J. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East — Problems of American Policy* (New York: 1968); M. Copeland, *The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics* (London: 1969); G. Aronson, *From Sideshow to Center Stage: U.S. Policy Toward Egypt, 1946–1956* (Boulder: 1986); G. Meyer, *Egypt and the U.S.: The Formative Years* (London: 1980); P. Jabber, *Not by War Alone: Security and Arms Control in the Middle East* (Berkeley: 1981); D.J. Decker, *U.S. Policy Regarding the Baghdad Pact* (Ph.D. dissertation: The American University, 1975). The following sources put more of an emphasis on regional implications: P. Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945–1958* (New ed., London: 1986); M.H. Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes* (London: 1986); W. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri Al-Said, 1954–1958* (Baltimore: 1964); A. Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass: 1969); J.P. Vatikiotis, *Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East* (London: 1984). For recent publications that deal indirectly with the subject, see P.L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1956* (Chapel Hill: 1992); S.Z. Freiburger, *Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953–1957* (Chicago: 1992); W.S. Lucas, *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis* (London: 1991).

² C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Sociology of the Middle East: A Stocktaking and Interpretation* (Leiden: 1971), p. 23; M. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals* (3rd ed., London: 1981), p. 2; U. Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History*

this study will concentrate on the Egyptian–Iraqi political struggle during the 1950s, a more comprehensive analytical framework setting out the bases for Egypt’s and Iraq’s claims to Arab hegemony is given in Chapter One.³

The Arab struggle over the Baghdad Pact reflected an ideological clash between two schools of thought only indirectly connected with the Cold War. Both were aspects of the then dominant ideology of pan-Arabism, or the desire to form one political entity to comprise the whole Arab nation, which had emerged after WWI. The first school of thought was propagated by Arab and Iraqi intellectuals and concentrated on Iraq’s leading role in the pan-Arab movement. The Hashemite rulers in Baghdad, whose source of legitimacy sprang from their religious ancestry and their prominent role in the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during WWI, regarded themselves as the natural standard-bearers of pan-Arabism. In their view, it was their “noble mission” to lead the Arab world toward unity, possibly with British support. Iraq’s unity schemes concentrated on the Fertile Crescent area (i.e. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan and Palestine); they did not yet consider Egypt part of the Arab world, and Saudi Arabia was averse to Hashemite designs.⁴ However, beginning in the mid-1930s, Egyptian rulers became involved in inter-Arab politics, and Egyptian and Arab intellectuals began to promote the pan-Arab ideology. This development led to the emergence of the second school of thought, which claimed that for various reasons Egypt was entitled to lead the Arab world towards unity.⁵ These two conflicting views touched off an ideological struggle, which was in essence another facet of the Egyptian–Iraqi conflict over Arab hegemony.

The struggle over the Baghdad Pact was also the story of the personal rivalry between ‘Abd al-Nasir and Nuri al-Sa‘id, the Egypt-

(Jerusalem: 1969), p. 11; P.J. Vatikiotis, “Foreign Policy of Egypt,” in R.C. Macridis (ed.), *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (2nd ed., N.Y.: 1962), p. 342. On the contemporary rift, see R.W. Macdonald, *The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization* (Princeton, New Jersey: 1965), pp. 73–79.

³ On the importance of such an analysis, see A.L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in P.G. Lauren (ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy*, p. 44.

⁴ See, for example, Y. Porath, *In Search of Arab Unity, 1930–1945* (London: 1986), Ch. 1.

⁵ I. Gershoni, *The Emergence of Pan-Arabism in Egypt* (Tel Aviv: 1981); A.M. Gomaa, *The Foundation of the League of Arab States: Wartime Diplomacy and Inter-Arab Politics 1941 to 1945* (London: 1977), pp. 30–56; Porath, pp. 149–59; 257–311.

tian and Iraqi leaders respectively. Their animosity was not surprising, for although they were both Arab nationalists, they represented two different generations. Nuri, born at the end of the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire, participated in the Arab Revolt against the Turks, and he viewed Britain as the major ally of the Arabs. He was one of the founders of modern Iraq and was closely associated with the Hashemite rulers until the collapse of the monarchy in July 1958. In contrast, 'Abd al-Nasir was born thirty years later into a different milieu: by then, Britain was seen as the main enemy, and radical new ideologies were in the air. This generation gap made their mutual hostility well-nigh inevitable;⁶ in the tragic clash, 'Abd al-Nasir emerged the victor. Nuri, aged 70, was brutally murdered during the military coup of July 1958, and, until his death in 1970, 'Abd al-Nasir became the undisputed leader of the Arab world and the champion of pan-Arabism.

Historically, the Arab struggle for hegemony had usually taken place on neutral grounds. Patrick Seale concluded that "a tacit premise underlying the Arab policies of both Egypt and Iraq was that Syria held the key to the struggle for local primacy." In his opinion, "whoever would lead the Middle East must control her."⁷ This thesis was accepted and elaborated upon by several Middle Eastern historians.⁸ Indeed, Syria's geographic location and its central role in the Arab national movement made it a desirable, and at times indispensable, ally in the drive for Arab domination. Egyptian policy-makers and intellectuals alike regarded Syria as a "gateway," constituting a first line of defense. This perception of Egypt's eastern flank led 'Abd al-Nasir to conclude that Syria must be kept within Egypt's orbit, if not actually dominated by it.⁹ Similarly, Iraq's persistent involvement in

⁶ This argument has been almost completely neglected by scholars, except for a brief mention in P.J. Vatikiotis, *Conflict in the Middle East* (London: 1971), p. 95. For 'Abd al-Nasir as a representative of his generation, see Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation* (New York: 1978). On Nuri and his generation, see P.A. Marr, "The Political Elite in Iraq," in G. Lenczowski (ed.), *Political Elites in the Middle East* (Washington: 1975), pp. 110-11. On the problem of the generation gap, see K. Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: 1968), pp. 298-309.

⁷ That is the main theme of Seale's book; see pp. XVI, 1-2.

⁸ Kerr, *The Arab Cold War* (1981), p. 2; Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, p. 226. For an opposite view, see L. Binder, "The Tragedy of Syria," *World Politics*, Vol. 19 (April 1967), pp. 521-49.

⁹ M. Kerr, "Egyptian Foreign Policy and the Revolution," in P.J. Vatikiotis (ed.), *Egypt since the Revolution* (London: 1968), p. 121; M.H. Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign

Syrian affairs indicated that Iraq also regarded Syria as part of its *Lebensraum*. Yet the Arab struggle over the Baghdad Pact raises doubts about Syria's centrality in Arab politics. More precisely, the question posed itself whether Syria indeed constituted the only key to Arab hegemony, or whether the position of other states—i.e., Jordan, Lebanon or Saudi Arabia—might also determine the outcome of the struggle.

The origin of the Baghdad Pact is a controversial issue in the historiography of the modern Middle East. One school of thought maintains that the Western powers initiated the pact, with Iraq and Turkey serving as mere pawns in the global struggle for spheres of influence. According to this version, the central issue is the exact role played by Britain and the United States in orchestrating events.¹⁰ A second school of thought emphasizes the regional character of the Baghdad Pact, claiming that although the pact was an extension of Western ideas on regional defense, it resulted specifically from the initiative of the Turkish and Iraqi heads of state—an initiative which coincided with Western policy.¹¹ Recently declassified documents now allow us to arrive at a more precise evaluation of the origins of the Baghdad Pact.

The origins and aims of Egypt's foreign policy in the early years of the revolutionary regime constitute another problematic issue. While overall Egyptian policy during the Nasserist era is relatively well-researched, the formative period, 1952–55, has been somewhat neglected.¹² There is no denying that pan-Arabism became a major component of Egypt's foreign policy during 1952–55, but scholars disagree on its origins. One approach maintains that 'Abd al-Nasir

policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56 (July 1978), p. 717. See also an interview of the Egyptian secretary-general of the Arab League, 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, *al-Musawwar*, 17 April 1953; and the remarks of Foreign Minister Mahmud Fawzi to the American ambassador, RG59, Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 620, 3 September 1957, 674.83/9–357. P.M. Holt claimed that Syria played a strategic role as a buffer-zone to protect Egypt from an Ottoman invasion, see *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516–1922: A Political History* (Ithaca: 1969) p. 158.

¹⁰ See, for example, E. Kedourie, "Britain, France and the Last Phase of the Eastern Question," in J.C. Hurewitz (ed.), *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East* (New York: 1969), p. 194; S.L. Spiegel, "Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East: A Profile," S.L. Spiegel (ed.), *The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East* (New York: 1988), p. 6; Meyer, p. 101.

¹¹ For sources which emphasized the regional dimension of the Baghdad Pact, see note 1.

¹² See some of the sources cited above: Aronson, Jabber, Meyer, Dawisha and Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*. The most comprehensive account can be found in H.R. Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics* (London: 1972).

and his generation were influenced by pan-Arabism—as mentioned above—which emerged as an important ideological force in Egyptian political life in the 1930s. A second approach views pan-Arabism merely as a tool exploited by Egypt's policy-makers to enhance their domestic and regional position.¹³ Moreover, there is some question as to whether the formation of the Baghdad Pact deflected Egypt from the road of cooperation with the West. According to the first view, there was little probability that Egypt would have linked itself with the West in any case. The second approach, however, suggests that Egypt's abandoning a Western course was not inevitable, but was rather a consequence of Western mistakes. While this study does not presume to deal with the interaction between politics and ideology, the examination of Egypt's foreign policy may clarify the controversy over these questions.

Iraq's policy had an entirely different origin: it was dominated by Britain and shaped by a political elite, described by Elie Kedourie as a series of "factions composed of politicians manoeuvring on the restricted and artificial scene of the capital."¹⁴ The most influential faction was that of Nuri al-Sa'id and his fellow army officers (the "Sharifians") who, after the Arab Revolt, became closely associated with the Hashemite family. Nuri was appointed prime minister for the thirteenth time in 1954, a post he then held for three years. This was an unusually long tenure by Iraqi standards, and his influence on Iraq's foreign policy was decisive. The Baghdad Pact in particular was identified with him personally. It is necessary, therefore, to examine Iraq's policy through the eyes of its policy-makers, taking into account their impulses, passions and interests. It might be argued, for example, that Nuri considered the Baghdad Pact a substitute for the Fertile Crescent plan and the Arab League—schemes he had devised but that were either blocked or taken over by Egypt.

Method and Sources

Until the late 1950s, many scholars approached the study of the Middle East from a global perspective. This tendency was hardly

¹³ Gershoni, pp. 18–20; Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, p. 225; "Egyptian Foreign Policy," p. 343; Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, p. 32, note 5; Dawisha, p. 11.

¹⁴ E. Kedourie, "Political Parties in the Arab World", in *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies* (London: 1974), p. 46.

surprising in light of the Western proclivity to explain events in the Middle East (and elsewhere) in the context of the Cold War. Leonard Binder's study, published in 1958, was the first to regard the Middle East as a self-contained system, albeit subordinate to the global system, with its own features and patterns of behavior, a theory that has since been elaborated on extensively by several Middle Eastern experts.¹⁵ The present study is based on the prevailing premise that within the Middle East system an Arab state system functions as an independent entity, while maintaining reciprocal relations with other systems. The Arab world is held to be a group of "proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system."¹⁶ Clearly, during the struggle over the Baghdad Pact, the Arab world functioned as a relatively self-contained system. Therefore, an attempt to understand this episode by analyzing the foreign policies of the Arab states individually would fail to account for the intensity of the Arab struggle over the Baghdad Pact.

The research is presented as a chronological narrative, that the arrangement of the material being descriptive rather than analytical, and its focus is the players rather than the circumstances. The narrative is guided by what Lawrence Stone has called a "pregnant principle" that contains a theme and an argument¹⁷—i.e., the quest for hegemony in the Arab world. Yet the existence of an underlying theme should not obscure the fact that in essence the narrative, as British historian Herbert Butterfield lucidly remarked, is "an account

¹⁵ For literature on the Middle Eastern subsystem, see: L. Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," *World Politics*, Vol. 10 (April 1958), pp. 408–29; L.J. Cantori and S.L. Spiegel, *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Prentice-Hall, N.J.: 1970), pp. 5–6. M. Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process* (London: 1972), Ch. 3; W.R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 17 (March 1973), pp. 89–117; J.H. Lebovich, "The Middle East: The Region as a System," *International Interaction*, Vol. 12 (1986), pp. 267–89; T.Y. Ismael, *International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East* (Syracuse: 1986), pp. 5–10; Y. Evron, *The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and Wars* (London: 1973), Ch. 6; B. Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East: Regional Dynamic and the Superpowers*, Translated by C. Krojzl (London: 1993), pp. 19–60; R.K. Ramazani, "The Middle East," in W.J. Feld and K. Boyd (eds.), *Comparative Regional Systems* (New York: 1980), pp. 274–99; M. Hudson, "The Middle East," in J. Rosenau et. al (eds.), *World Politics: An Introduction* (New York: 1976), pp. 466–500.

¹⁶ Cantori & Spiegel, pp. 6–7.

of adult human beings, taking a hand in their fates and fortunes, pulling at the story in the direction they want to carry it, and making decisions of their own.”¹⁸ Thus, the course of the events described below is neither inevitable nor accidental, but rather intelligible in light of the circumstantial relations established by the historian.¹⁹

The study is based primarily on newly released documents in British, American and Israeli archives. In the absence of accessible Arab archives, it is supplemented by the extensive use of Arab memoirs, newspapers and radio broadcasts.

The British historian Michael Oakeshott has observed that it is the task of the historian “to understand past conduct and happening in a manner in which they were never understood at the time,” and “to translate action and event from their practical idiom into an historical idiom.”²⁰ I hope I have been successful in so doing.

¹⁷ L. Stone, “The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History,” *Past and Present*, Vol. 85 (1979), pp. 3–4. See also J. Julliard, “Political History in the 1980s: Reflections on its Present and Future,” in T.K. Rabb and R.I. Rothery (eds.), *The New History: The 1980s and Beyond* (Princeton: 1982), pp. 29–44.

¹⁸ H. Butterfield, *George III and the Historians* (London: 1957), p. 206. Quoted from G. Himmelfarb, *The New History and the Old* (Cambridge, Mass: 1987), p. 32.

¹⁹ M. Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics* (London: 1962), pp. 166–67.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

CHAPTER ONE

THE EGYPTIAN–IRAQI STRUGGLE FOR HEGEMONY IN THE ARAB WORLD

Hegemony and World Politics

The term “hegemony” as used today in the field of international relations originated in the Greek language and in Greek history. Initially it denoted “the leadership or predominant authority of one state of a confederacy or union over the others,” according to the Oxford Dictionary.¹ An important distinction existed in ancient Greece between imperialism (*arkhe*) and hegemonic leadership (*hegemonia*). According to the Aristotelian interpretation, a Greek city-state could exercise leadership over other Greek city-states, but a despotic imperialist rule could be imposed only over uncivilized peoples naturally intended for slavery. The ongoing struggle for primacy between Sparta and Athens, for example, resulted in a shifting and temporary self-restrained leadership, or *hegemonia*. This state of affairs was praised by Aristotle, who argued that it was aimed at avoiding slavery and was intended to benefit all city-states. A Greek city-state which rightfully gained hegemony, according to Aristotle, would serve the Greeks best.² With the collapse of the Greek system, the term *hegemonia* faded away.

Once again the term “hegemony” acquired an important place in modern International Relations. According to the hegemonic-stability school of thought, “order in world politics is usually created by a

¹ “Hegemony,” in *The Oxford English Dictionary*, Vol. VII (Oxford: 1989), p. 105. We ignore, as extraneous to our study, the use of the same term in the theory of class rule as developed by Antonio Gramsci. For his concept, see: “Hegemony,” in D. Miller (ed.), *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought* (Cambridge, Mass: 1991), p. 200; D. Forgacs (ed.), *An Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916–1935* (New York: 1988); R. Simon, *Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction* (London: 1982); W.L. Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci’s Political and Cultural Theory* (Berkeley: 1980); R. Boccock, *Hegemony* (London: 1986).

² E. Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with an Introduction, Notes and Appendices* (Oxford: 1946), p. 319; W.S. Ferguson, *Greek Imperialism* (Boston: 1913), pp. 19–22; S. Perlman, “Hegemony and Arkhe in Greece: Fourth-Century B.C. Views,” R.N. Lebow & B.S. Strauss (eds.), *Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age* (Boulder: 1991), pp. 269–86.

single dominant state.”³ In contrast, the balance of power school of thought claimed that only equilibrium can advance stability in the world system and prevent the excessive aggrandizement of any power.⁴ The discrepancy between the two theories notwithstanding, are indirectly linked, as states in the balance of power, according to Kenneth Waltz, are “unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination.”⁵ However, the function of the balance of power, like Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” of the market is to regulate the system and to avoid the emergence of a preponderant power dominating the system.⁶

The term “hegemony” has two interrelated meanings, one that emphasizes political aspects, and another that attaches greater significance to economic factors. The underlying assumption of the “political” school is that global politics generates a demand for leadership. In other words, it is a role that needs to be filled. This need has repeatedly created power struggles between various world powers, extending over many centuries.⁷ Attaining hegemony is likely to bestow prestige and influence upon the hegemon, who is “both capable and willing to provide public goods than other states, which prefer a free ride rather than pay the costs.” Hegemons, so the argument goes, will be more willing to pay the costs “because they benefit greatly from a well-ordered system.”⁸ According to this school, five features characterize an aspiring hegemon: agenda formation (defining problems and setting priorities); mobilization (the ability to

³ B. Miller, “A ‘New World Order’: From Balancing to Hegemony, Concert or Collective Security?” *International Interactions*, Vol. 18 (1992), p. 6.

⁴ On the balance of power and its critics see: *Ibid.*, pp. 4–6; K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Berkeley: 1979), 117–126; M.A. Kaplan, “Variants on Six Models of the International System,” in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (Revised ed., New York: 1969), pp. 292–96; H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: 1977), pp. 101–16; J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (5th ed., New York: 1978), pp. 161–75; I.L. Claude, Jr. *Power and International Relations* (New York: 1967); A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: 1968), ch. 12; M. Wight, “The Balance of Power,” and H. Butterfield, “The Balance of Power,” in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (London: 1966), pp. 132–75.

⁵ Waltz, p. 118. See also Organski, p. 279:

⁶ Waltz, p. 91; Kaplan, p. 296; Miller, p. 5.

⁷ G. Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle: 1987), pp. 12–13. For a different perspective, see A.B. Bozman, *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton: 1960), pp. 81–88.

⁸ Miller, p. 6.

create a coalition in world politics); decision-making; administration (the ability to implement the agenda); and innovation (the ability to steer into a successful future).⁹

Steven Spiegel, who belongs to the “political” school, has argued that hegemony is a particular case of hierarchy, which reflects “the control by one or more states of the foreign policies of one or more other states”; equilibrium, on the other hand, refers to “a mutually acceptable relationship between two or more states of relatively equal power which are potential adversaries.”¹⁰ In his opinion, the dialectic between hegemony and equilibrium is a recurring theme in international politics, with hierarchy and hegemony assuming relatively major importance in the current era.¹¹ After WWII, the international world order was dominated by a “dual hegemony,” but has gradually been replaced by a world system dominated by a single hegemon—the United States, which exerts indirect control through the “radiation” of its influence beyond its boundaries. Furthermore, according to Charles Doran, a causal relationship exists between “hegemonic capacity” and “hegemonic intent.” He claims that “given economic and military preeminence, a state will by force of circumstances, by the extent of its concurrent involvement in interstate affairs, and by government’s natural hunger for enhanced security and prestige expand militarily beyond its borders.”¹²

The second school, while recognizing hegemon’s need for sufficient military power, focuses on economic leadership. Robert Keohane defined hegemony as a “preponderance of material resources,” and hegemonic powers as having “control over raw materials, sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods.”¹³ In Keohane’s view, “a hegemonial structure of world order is one in which power takes a primarily

⁹ Modelski, pp. 14–15. See also J. Lepgold, *The Declining Hegemon: The United States and European Defense, 1960–1990* (New York: 1990), pp. 38–39.

¹⁰ S.L. Spiegel, *Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy* (Boston: 1972), pp. 16–17. See also I. Clark, *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (Cambridge: 1989).

¹¹ Spiegel, pp. 16, 179.

¹² C.F. Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath* (Baltimore: 1971), p. 17. The “political” school might also be considered to include: L. Dehio, *The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of European Power Struggle* (New York: 1962); J.S. Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age* (New Haven: 1988).

¹³ R.O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: 1984), p. 32.

consensual form.”¹⁴ For example, in maintaining the capitalist world order the hegemon does not dominate the various societies through a political superstructure, but rather through “a combination of hierarchies of [the] control and the operation of markets.” The hegemon provides leadership, while the other sovereign states reciprocate with consent based on their subjective surmise that they benefit from this arrangement.¹⁵ This approach was developed further by Immanuel Wallerstein, who maintains that hegemony refers to a situation in which one great power is in a position of *primus inter pares*, i.e., a situation in which one power “can largely impose its rules and its wishes in the economic, political, military, diplomatic and even cultural arenas.” The material base of such power, according to Wallerstein, “lies in the ability of enterprises domiciled in that power to operate more efficiently in all three major economic arenas—agro-industrial production, commerce and finance.”¹⁶ Wallerstein describes a typical cycle of rise, temporary ascendancy and fall of hegemonic powers, implying the inevitable decline of the United States as a hegemonic power and the possible transformation of the capitalist world economy.¹⁷

The definitions described thus far have dealt with the term “hegemony” in relation to the global system. While political scientists have occasionally dealt with “local” (i.e. regional) balances of power,¹⁸ the term “hegemony” has not been applied systematically to regional subsystems in the past. Yet the recent decline in the capability of the superpowers to project effective power around the globe has, according to a recent study, permitted “influential regional states to pursue long-suppressed hegemonic aspirations within local geopolitical arenas.”¹⁹ According to this view, regional hegemon is defined as a state

¹⁴ Keohane thus transposed Gramsci’s notion of consensual hegemony (see note 1), from the domestic to the international scene.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 44–45. This school might also be said to include: R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: 1981); *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: 1987); and, P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: 1987).

¹⁶ I. Wallerstein, “The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World-Economy,” in *The Politics of the World-Economy* (Cambridge: 1984), pp. 38–39.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 43. An attempt to bridge the two schools was made by J.S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: 1990).

¹⁸ See, for example, Bull, pp. 102–103, 106–107.

¹⁹ D.J. Myres, “Threat Perception and Strategic Response of the Regional Hegemons: A Conceptual Overview,” in D.J. Myres (ed.), *Regional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Response* (Boulder: 1991), p. 2.

which "possesses power sufficient to dominate a subordinate state system."²⁰ Though scholars disagree on the number of existing regional subsystems and on the identity of aspiring regional hegemon within them, they share the view that a powerful state seeking to acquire a dominant position is likely to be found in every regional system.²¹

This approach, though it seems to dovetail with recent events in international politics, nevertheless has three major flaws. First, a subsystem may consist of more than a single aspiring hegemon; the Arab system, for example, has long witnessed an intense struggle for hegemony between Egypt and Iraq (or another Arab aspirant), as manifested in the rivalry over the formation of the Arab League (1944–45), the Baghdad Pact (1954–58) and several other incidents, including the recent Gulf war (1991). Second, this approach erroneously attributes the rise of regional hegemons to developments in the global polity. However, regional politics, and Middle Eastern politics in particular, cannot be viewed primarily in terms of the international system, as "the basic processes and components of Middle East politics are there as given."²² Indeed, though the Arab rivalry for primacy may have been aggravated by the superpowers, it was not initiated by their involvement. On the contrary, the Western powers were compelled to adjust their interests to regional realities, thus allowing regional powers and leaders enough leeway to pursue their original objectives. Lastly, the view under discussion offers no clear distinction between political leadership and hegemony. A leading role in a regional system may be attained without coercive means, but full hegemonic status, according to our definition, can be achieved only with sufficient power and means to enforce the hegemon's will on other regional players.

In contrast to the global system, the capabilities needed to transform a regional state into a regional power are relatively modest. Potential aspirants for hegemony base this claim on several factors: geographic location; demographic, military, economic and political

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²¹ According to Myres, these are: the Caribbean basin (the US), Southern Africa (South Africa), the Middle East (Israel), South Asia (India), Southeast Asia (China), South America (Brazil) and West Africa (Nigeria). See *ibid.*, p. viii. This study was inspired by a recent volume edited by R.W. Jones & S.A. Hildreth, *Emerging Powers: Defense and Security in the Third World* (New York: 1986).

²² M. Kerr, "Persistence of Regional Quarrels," in J.C. Hurewitz (ed.), *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East* (N.Y.: 1972), p. 228.

capabilities; and the state's role perception.²³ Combined with the role of the pan-Arab ideology, these factors make the struggle for Arab hegemony a unique case-study in regional politics.

*Hegemony in the Arab World*²⁴

The Middle East, as explained in the introduction, is considered a distinctive regional arena in international relations, subordinate to the global system though operating according to its own patterns of behavior.²⁵ A closer examination of regional politics, however, will tend to elucidate that within the larger Middle Eastern subsystem there exists an Arab state system based on the features mentioned above.²⁶

Until the mid-1950s, this Arab system included only the seven founders of the Arab League—Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Yemen. Libya joined in 1953, Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia followed in 1956. Though this compact system created a sense of membership in a larger family and provided a basis for solidarity, inter-state rivalries and personal animosities between leaders were common features of Arab politics. The struggle for regional hegemony, in which Egypt and Iraq were its main protagonists during the 1950s, was a major—if not the major—feature of the Arab system. This rivalry stemmed from Egypt's and Iraq's relative superiority regarding their demographic, military, economic

²³ For different categories of national power, see the classic work of Morgenthau, pp. 117–55. See also Myres, p. 5; G. Ben-Dor, "Inter-Arab Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1 (Summer 1976), p. 84; P.C. Noble, "The Arab System: Opportunities, Constraints, and Pressures," in B. Korany and A.E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of Arab States* (Boulder: 1984), p. 50; J.J. Malone, & J.E. Peterson, "Egypt: Mainspring of Arab Power," in *Emerging Powers*, pp. 230–34; K.W. Thompson & R.C. Macridis (eds.), "The Comparative Study of Foreign policy," in R.C. Macridis (ed.), *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1962), p. 5.

²⁴ The Arabs usually use the term "hegemony" (*"haymana"*) to refer to the domination of the superpowers, while in the Arab world they talk of "leadership" (*"za'ama"*). The Arab historian Ibn Khaldun used the term *"ri'asa"* for leadership. See, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, translated by F. Rosenthal, Vol. I (New York: 1958), pp. 269–271; 305–307. For the Arabic version, see *Muqaddimah*, Vol. I (Cairo: n.d.), pp. 132–133; 151–152.

²⁵ For further sources, see note 15 in the Introduction.

²⁶ M.H. Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56 (July 1978), pp. 719–20. See also J. Matar & A. Hilal, *Al-Nizām al-Iqlīmi al-'Arabi: Dirāsa fi al-'Alaqat al-Siyasiyya al-'Arabiyya* (Cairo: 1983), p. 31.

and political capabilities, as well as other advantages, over other Arab states. While some scholars have alluded to the centrality of this phenomenon in Arab politics, they have not developed a methodological framework which would explain it. This section aims to provide an analytical framework for studying the prerequisites necessary to potential aspirants for hegemony in the Arab world—a framework which might be found to suit other struggles for “local” hegemonies as well.

Geographic Location

Although generally-speaking communications and modern warfare have eroded the strategic importance of geographic location, it still plays a crucial role in shaping the behavior of states, at least in the Middle East. Geopolitics, sometimes described as an “intellectually illegitimate offspring of political geography,” perceives states as being engaged in a constant struggle for viability and expansion (*Lebensraum*).²⁷ Both of the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt suffered from a deep sense of geographic insecurity, which contributed to their drive for regional hegemony. Historically, the land of Iraq, between the Tigris and the Euphrates, bordered by deserts in the south and mountain passes in the north, had been exposed to numerous invasions and threats of invasion (i.e., from the Arabs, the Mongols, the Turks, the Persians, the British and the Germans). Similarly, Egypt, a long, narrow territory along the Nile Valley and Delta, was subjected to consecutive invasions from the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Fertile Crescent (i.e., by the Greeks, Romans, the Arabs, the Fatimids, the Mamluks, the Ottomans and the British). A collective memory of vulnerability sharpened the geographic self-awareness of Iraqi and Egyptian leaders. They sought conditions likely to enable them to make the necessary preemptive moves in the face of threat, and therefore attempted to make the Fertile Crescent area (especially Syria) a buffer zone under their influence, if not actually under their control. Various rulers in Baghdad (i.e., the Abbasids and the Hashemites) and in Cairo (i.e., the Fatimids, the Ayyubids, the Mamluks, Bonaparte, Muhammad ‘Ali and ‘Abd

²⁷ “Geopolitics,” *The Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought*, eds. A. Bullock and S. Brass (New York: 1977), p. 263. See also R. Savory, “The Geopolitical Impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran on the Gulf Region,” in A. Braun (ed.), *The Middle East in Global Strategy* (Boulder: 1987), p. 185.

al-Nasir) therefore coveted the lands lying between the Nile and Mesopotamia.²⁸

The strategic location of Egypt and Mesopotamia as passageways between East and West also constituted an advantage in the pursuit of their regional hegemonial aspirations. In serving as a bridge between Eastern and Western civilizations and in linking trade routes across Europe, Asia and Africa, both became at various times, Muslim and Arab centers of gravity. Egypt, however, became the more attractive center as its boundaries were more defensible than Mesopotamia's, and its usually predictable Nile floods resulted in higher agricultural yields.²⁹

TABLE 1
Arab Countries: Area and Population Estimates

Country	Area (sq.km.)	Population (1958)
Egypt	1,000,000	24,781,000
Iraq	435,000	6,590,000
Lebanon	9,400	1,550,000
Saudi Arabia	1,600,000	6,036,000
Syria	187,000	4,283,000
Jordan	90,000	1,580,000
Yemen	195,000	4,500,000
Morocco	443,680	10,115,000
Tunisia	125,000	3,815,000
Sudan	2,505,823	10,700,000
Libya	1,759,540	1,136,000

Sources: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Demographic Yearbook* (New York: 1958), Table I. *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1958-1959* (New York: 1959), p. 125.

²⁸ On Egypt's geographical considerations, see: M. Kerr, "Regional Arab Politics and the Conflict with Israel," in P.Y. Hammond and S.S. Alexander (eds.), *Political Dynamics in the Middle East* (New York: 1972), pp. 37-40; G.R. Warburg, "Egypt's Regional Policy from Muhammad Ali to Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat," in C.F. Pinkele and A. Pollis (eds.), *The Contemporary Mediterranean* (New York: 1983), p. 124; C. Issawi, *Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis* (London: 1963), pp. 5-6, 9-10; Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," p. 715; Seale, pp. xvi-xvii; Dawisha, pp. 77-78. On Iraq, see: C.M. Helms, *Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World* (Washington: 1984), p. 43; A.Y. Ahmad, "The Foreign Policy of Iraq," in Korany and Dessouki, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

²⁹ W.B. Fisher, *The Middle East: A Physical, Social and Regional Geography* (Cambridge: 1978), p. 156; Dawisha, pp. 77-78.

Geopolitics continued to play a crucial role in shaping both states' policies in the twentieth century as well. It has often been argued that geography has been cruel to the modern Iraqi state. Indeed, haphazardly carved out of the Ottoman Empire by the Western powers in the aftermath of World War I, Iraq was left with limited access to the Persian Gulf and, more than any other Arab state, was exposed to the Soviet menace. In addition, Iraqi leaders were preoccupied with safeguarding their water supply which originates in neighboring states: the source of the Tigris and the Euphrates is in Turkey, with the latter running through Syria as well. In addition, the headwaters of the Lesser Zab, and the Diyala tributaries of the Tigris, are in Iran, and the east bank of the Shatt al-'Arab forms part of the frontier with Iran. Thus, stable land cultivation and irrigation in Iraq were contingent upon the goodwill of neighboring states and the implementation of existing agreements. While relations with Turkey and Iran were relatively cordial, particularly after the formation of the Baghdad Pact, relations with Syria, among other things, were strained because of possible Syrian water diversion schemes.³⁰

Egyptian leaders, along with Western scholars, have long referred to Egypt's central role in Arab politics as emanating from its geostrategic importance (i.e. the Suez Canal) and vast territory (see Table 1). An Egyptian scholar, Jamal Hamdan, even spoke of his country's "natural leadership," whereas any non-Egyptian Arab leadership outside was merely "experimental" or "temporary."³¹ Egypt, like Iraq, was heavily dependent upon the water supply from its river, and the first priority for any regime in Cairo was to guarantee the uninterrupted flow of Nile water from central and eastern Africa into Egypt. Its southern flank was usually quiescent due to agreements signed with a succession of various friendly regimes in Sudan.³² But its vulnerability on the northeastern flank led Egyptian governments to adopt a more vigorous foreign policy there. 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, the Egyptian Secretary-General of the Arab League, and important pan-Arab ideologist, claimed that Egypt's natural strategy

³⁰ F.I. Qubain, *The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950-1957* (New York: 1958), pp. 55-56. Significantly, a joint irrigation projects committee was established as a subdivision of the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact.

³¹ Jamal Hamdan, *Shakhsiyyat Misr* (Cairo: 1970), pp. 495-507. See also Kerr, "Regional Arab Politics," pp. 36, 42; Dawisha, p. 75; Warburg, p. 144; Malone and Peterson, pp. 223-66; Vatikiotis, *Arab and Regional Politics*, p. 105.

³² Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," p. 715.

is that Syria should be part of its *Lebensraum*.³³ Like his predecessors, 'Abd al-Nasir had a strong sense of *Drang nach Osten*, although he disguised it by his sophisticated theory of Egypt's unique role in the Arab, African and Islamic worlds. "We cannot look stupidly at a map of the world," he wrote in the *Philosophy of the Revolution*, "not realizing our place therein and the role determined to us by that place."³⁴ This role, ostensibly attainable in the wake of the British withdrawal, made the resultant power vacuum seem an Egyptian preserve, ordained by nature and destiny.

Demographic Capabilities

A large population is not necessarily a source of strength or a reliable indication of the power of a state. Since the percentage of illiteracy in the Arab world of the mid-1950s was high, a more precise yardstick for measuring this variable would be the educational level and the proportion of educated personnel.³⁵ Naturally, a large skilled and educated population is highly useful as a reservoir for the government, bureaucracy, and army, for industry and agriculture and in other spheres. Although there is a scarcity of reliable information in this area, the available data indicates that Egypt had a significant advantage over Iraq, and all other Arab states, in terms of human resources (see Table 2). Even taking into account that Egypt's population was quadruple that of Iraq, a striking fact is that in 1958-59 77,170 students were enrolled in Egyptian universities, while only 8,556 were enrolled in Iraqi institutions of higher education. It must be noted, however, that Iraqi government expenditure on education rose in the decade between 1945/46-1957/58 from 9% of the budget to 18%, and the number of institutions of higher education increased to fifteen—the second largest figure in the Arab world.³⁶ The advantage in educated human resources enabled Egypt to send teachers, officers and skilled workers to other Arab states (see Table 3),

³³ 'Azzam's interview to *al-Musawwar*, 17 April 1953.

³⁴ Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Buffalo, New York: 1959), p. 59.

³⁵ Kerr, "Regional Arab Politics," pp. 36-37; Dawisha, pp. 80-82; Noble, Table 3.1, p. 52.

³⁶ United Arab Republic, *Statistical Pocket-book, 1952-1962* (Cairo: 1963), pp. 80-1; A. al-Marayati, *A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq* (New York: 1961), Appendix VIII. See also P.A. Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder: 1985) p. 139; Qubain, p. 219; Dawisha, p. 82; Issawi, p. 98.

TABLE 2
Number of Schools in Arab States, 1958

State	Primary Schools	Secondary Schools	Technical Institution	Higher * Education
Egypt	7,440	950	169	21
Iraq	1,919	217	33	15
Lebanon	?	?	?	?
Saudi Arabia	541	34	7	1
Syria	3,014	286	15	1
Jordan	825	360	3	—
Yemen	2,155	4	18	1
Morocco	?	?	15	6
Tunisia	?	77	87	5
Libya	502	53	8	1

Source: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook* (New York: 1958), Table 177.

* Higher Educations—refers to colleges and universities.

TABLE 3
Number of Teachers sent abroad by the Egyptian Ministry of Education

Year	Arab States	Others	Total
1953–54	580	44	624
1955–56	1,198	111	1,309
1958–59	2,696	256	2,952
1961–62	2,948	556	3,504

Source: United Arab Republic, *Statistical Pocket-book, 1952–1962* (Cairo: 1963), p. 99.

while Arab students came to study at Egyptian universities (see Table 4). One of the long-term results of these developments, though no data is available to substantiate it, was greater Egyptian involvement in Arab affairs and the swift dissemination of Nasserist ideology.³⁷

Egypt's relatively high educational level led to a sense of cultural superiority and enhanced the country's political aspirations for Arab hegemony. However, this sense of supremacy was only partially

³⁷ Kerr, "Regional Arab Politics," p. 37; Dawisha, pp. 174–75. See also Wheelock, p. 224. The tension between Egypt and Iraq led to a decrease in the number of Egyptian teachers in Iraq.

TABLE 4
Foreign Students at Egyptian Educational Institutions

Year	General Education	Technical Education	Higher* Institution	University	Total
1953-54	2,600	278	109	2,513	5,500
1955-56	2,647	295	278	3,102	6,322
1958-59	5,389	171	293	5,268	11,121
1961-62	12,056	927	1,021	6,874	20,878

Source: United Arab Republic, *Statistical Pocket-book*, p. 89.

Note: These figures include Asian and African students.

* Higher institutions other than universities.

justified, for Egypt's high birth rate, the highest by far in the Arab world, constituted a serious impediment to economic growth. Egypt's population soared from 21.4 million in 1952 to 33.3 million in 1970, and the government was compelled to channel vast resources into the domestic infrastructure.³⁸

Another reliable indicator of demographic capability is the extent of the homogeneity of the population. Social fragmentation into ethnic or religious minorities is bound to be a liability for any regime, while a homogenous society is likely to be a source of national strength. Egypt is a largely homogenous society, dominated by a vast Sunni majority (85%–90%). Of the rest, 8–10% are Coptic Christian.³⁹ Iraq, by comparison, is a highly fragmented society; in the absence of reliable data, it is estimated that the Arab Sunni ruling minority—concentrated in the central and northern provinces—represent about 20% of the population; the Arab Shi'ite plurality in the south, about 50%; and the Kurds, located in the north, 20%. Smaller minorities included the Yazidis, Turcomans, Iranians, Armenians, Nestorians, Sabians and Jews.⁴⁰ This heterogeneity, along with the existence of geographical barriers, encouraged political instability and the preservation of traditional loyalties, so that at times the government was unable to exercise overall effective control. Successive Iraqi governments aimed at creating a common basis of identity—whether Iraqi or Arab—for the various ethnic and religious sects. Therefore, it

³⁸ Dawisha, pp. 81–82.

³⁹ Malone & Peterson, "Egypt: Mainspring of Arab Power," pp. 230–34; Dawisha, pp. 79–80.

⁴⁰ Marr, pp. 5–12; Helms, pp. 21–22.

was hardly surprising that the ruling Sunni minority sought a more prominent Iraqi role in the predominantly Arab Sunni world.⁴¹ This may explain Iraq's drive to set up the Arab League, to unify the Fertile Crescent and to form the Baghdad Pact. Thus, while social and ethnic cleavages constituted a serious domestic impediment for attaining Arab hegemony, they encouraged the Sunni rulers to seek regional allies and to aspire to a prominent role in the Arab system.

Military Capabilities

The size and quality of the armed forces is another reliable indicator of the status of a state. Measuring the size of an army is not difficult, but evaluating its quality may be complex. Nevertheless, an analysis of the Arab armies in the early 1950 and the mid-1960s⁴² clearly shows that the Egyptian army was the largest and strongest in the Arab world (see Tables 5 and 6). This conclusion is reinforced by a study of defense expenditure: Egypt spent \$211 million on defense in 1958, Iraq spent \$83.5 million, Syria \$65 million and Jordan \$38 million.⁴³ Furthermore, the Czech arms deal of September 1955 considerably strengthened the Egyptian army. Surprisingly, in spite of Egypt's humiliating military defeat during the 1956 Suez War, the image of a strong Egyptian army remained intact. Iraq, by comparison, had a small, but efficient, army, equipped and trained by the Western powers. The military agreement signed with the United States in April 1954, and Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact further enhanced Iraq's image as a regional military power.

With Arab military might directed mainly against Israel, the Arab states attempted to avoid using armed force in Arab disputes. A single exception was the reactivation of the Egyptian–Syrian military agreement in October 1957, when Egyptian troops landed in Latakyya with the intention of safeguarding Egypt's sphere of influence in light of possible Arab and foreign encroachments against Syria. In contrast, Iraq's frequent threats to intervene militarily in Syria were successfully blocked by the Western powers.

⁴¹ Vatikiotis, *Arab and Regional Politics*, p. 81.

⁴² Having no official Arab data on armed forces in the 1950s, we had to base our analysis on a British estimate from 1952 and on UN estimates from the mid-1960s.

⁴³ Noble, Table 3.3, p. 50; Dawisha, p. 87; Ahmad Yousef, p. 155.

TABLE 5
Estimated Strength of Arab Armies and Police, 1952

Country	Total Ground Forces	Police	Estimated Mobilization Potential
Egypt	86,000	66,000	100,000
Iraq	42,000	22,000	50,000
Syria	39,600	1,800	60,000
Jordan	13,500	5,000	30,000
Saudi Arabia	9,000	—	10,000
Lebanon	7,500	800	7,000

Source: PRO, FO371, 98287.

TABLE 6
Size of Arab Armed Forces, Mid-1960

Country	Personnel (thousands)	Tanks (units)	Planes (units)
Egypt	180	860	370
Iraq	82	535	80
Syria	60	350	94
Jordan	45	150	30
Saudi Arabia	20	30	16
Lebanon	13	42	14
Yemen	10	30	—

Source: Noble, p. 54.

Economic Capabilities

The ability of any state to exert influence beyond its boundaries is also associated with its economic capabilities. Dependency on external trade, imported raw materials and foreign aid are bound to diminish its ability to seek regional hegemony. Egypt, by all economic indicators, is a poor country, with scarce natural resources and one of the lowest per capita income rates in the Arab world.⁴⁴ It was

⁴⁴ One way of measuring economic capabilities is by analyzing each country's

heavily dependent on Suez Canal revenues and on a single export commodity—cotton. It suffered from permanent budget deficits and its foreign trade was largely dependent on the Eastern Bloc, with import significantly outweighing export (see Table 7). Its achievements in agriculture and industry, however, were promising. Egypt produced more wheat, maize, rice, pulses, edible oil and dates than any other Arab state; the output of some of its industries—iron ore, phosphates, refined sugar, cotton yarn and textiles, paper and cardboard, cement, steel and sulphuric acid—was the highest in the Arab world. Industry, in fact, was considered the fastest growing sector in the Egyptian economy and the country's one hope for modernization.⁴⁵

TABLE 7
Geographic Patterns of Trade in the Arab World, 1958

State	Export (millions \$)	Import (millions \$)	Main Trading Areas
Egypt	470.4	661.7	USSR & Eastern Europe
Iraq	566.7	307.4	Western Europe & US
Syria	117.5	204.1	Western Europe & Middle East
Lebanon	34.6	236.5	Western Europe & Middle East
Jordan	8.8	95.3	Middle East & Western Europe

Source: *Economic Development in the Middle East, 1959-1961* (New York: 1961), pp. 154-59.

gross national product (GNP). Organski, for example, suggested an index of national power based only on the population size and political development as reflected by the GNP. His results, however, were disappointing; the power rank in the Arab world, according to his index, was as follows: Morocco, Iraq, Sudan, Tunisia, and Jordan. Egypt did not appear at all among the listed 70 states (pp. 211-12). In addition to this shortcoming, the available data is given in the local currencies, something which complicate the comparison between the Arab states' GNP. See, for example, *United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1959* (New York: 1960). As a result, GNP is not used here for measuring economic capability.

⁴⁵ Noble, Table 3.4, p. 55; Issawi, p. 215; Dawisha, p. 83. For accurate figures, see *Economic Development in the Middle East, 1957-58*, pp. 56-59; 65-68. See also Issawi, Chaps. 7, 8.

Iraq, on the other hand, was a relatively rich country by economic standards. It was the third-largest producer of crude petroleum in the Arab world at the end of the 1950s (after Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), and the fourth-largest producer in the Middle East (after Iran). Although oil had been discovered in Iraq as far back as 1923, export began only in 1934. Consequently, as Phebe Marr had observed, "the development of Iraq's oil sector lagged behind its potential."⁴⁶ By 1958, however, an accelerated pace of production and growing royalties from new concessions negotiated with the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) brought the country's oil income to \$237 million in 1958 (see Table 8), one-third of total government income. Some 70% of this oil revenue was placed at the disposal of the country's Development Board (established in 1950), enabling Iraq to initiate a series of irrigation projects and agricultural development programs. New dams were built and the country achieved self-sufficiency in wheat and rice, as well as becoming the main Arab barley exporter.⁴⁷ The substantial investment in agriculture came at the expense of industry, which declined to become virtually the weakest sector in Iraq's economy. Modest progress was made, however, in the establishment of agricultural-based industries such as textiles, sugar and tobacco, and mineral-based and refining industries during the 1950s.⁴⁸ Unlike Egypt, Iraq did not suffer from budget deficits due to its oil income, nor was its foreign trade heavily dependent on one particular area (see Table 7). However, like Egypt, and in contrast to Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, Iraq was not vulnerable to Arab economic pressures, as its export did not depend substantially on the Arab market.

Yet Iraq's main asset—oil—also proved to be its main liability. Once its pipeline from the Kirkuk oil fields to Haifa on the Mediterranean was shut down in April 1948, 75% of its oil was rerouted to Tripoli and Banyas, making Iraq largely dependent on the goodwill of changing Syrian governments. Indeed, the blowing up of three pumping stations along the Syrian pipeline during the Suez war caused heavy losses to Iraq's economy (compare Iraq's 1957 and 1956

⁴⁶ Marr, pp. 128–29; Qubain, p. 138.

⁴⁷ *Economic Development in the Middle East, 1957–58*, pp. 56–59; Marr, p. 131; Qubain, pp. 30, 140.

⁴⁸ *Economic Development in the Middle East, 1957–58*, pp. 65–68; Marr, pp. 132–33; Qubain, Ch. 9; J. Sassoon, "Industrial Development in Iraq, 1958–1968," *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. xxx (1981) (Hebrew), pp. 23–25.

TABLE 8
Oil Revenues in the Middle East, 1951–58
(millions of dollars)

Year	Iran	Iraq	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia
1951	23	38	30	155
1955	90	206	305	274
1956	152	193	306	283
1957	214	137	365	291
1958	246	237	415	304

Source: *Economic Development of the Middle East, 1957–58*, p. 30.

revenues, Table 8).⁴⁹ Oil interests thus constituted another motivation for Iraq's leaders to ensure a friendly regime in Damascus.

Political Capabilities

Political capabilities, which include the stability of the regime, the degree of its legitimacy, the nature of its leadership (whether charismatic or not) and its instruments of power, are the most difficult to measure. A stable, legitimate regime would be in a better position to pose a claim to regional hegemony. Conversely, an unstable and weak regime would be vulnerable to subversive pressures and its policies would be defensive.⁵⁰ Ever since the termination of the power struggle between 'Abd al-Nasir and General Naguib in November 1954, the Egyptian regime remained stable. Moreover, 'Abd al-Nasir, more than any other Arab leader, enjoyed wide domestic legitimacy due to his charismatic leadership.⁵¹ In contrast, the Iraqi regime—the royal Hashemites and Nuri al-Sa'īd—which seemed secure, did not, in fact, enjoy domestic legitimacy, as was demonstrated in the July 1958 coup. This distrust stemmed from the heterogeneous nature of the Iraqi society (see the demographic capabilities) and the fact that the royal family was an alien dynasty, which originally came from the Hijaz. Also,

⁴⁹ H. Lehrman, "Development in Iraq," in W. Laqueur (ed.), *The Middle East in Transition* (London: 1958), p. 259; Qubain, p. 138.

⁵⁰ Noble, pp. 51–52.

⁵¹ On the legitimacy problem in the Arab world, see M. Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: 1977). On 'Abd al-Nasir's charismatic leadership, see Dawisha, pp. 102–103; J. Lacouture, *The Demigods: Charismatic Leadership in the Third World* (London: 1971), pp. 81–135.

while Nuri al-Sa'id, the main architect of Iraq's foreign policy, was a capable and pragmatic leader, he was nevertheless far from being a charismatic figure.

The ability of a state to project a powerful image is also associated with its instruments of power. At least four instruments were used to acquire political leverage and to influence public opinion: diplomacy, radio and press propaganda, sophisticated cultural activity and subversive operations.⁵²

Diplomacy: The most traditional instrument of foreign policy is diplomacy, which is characterized, according to Adeed Dawisha, by "the interaction of official representatives of two or more states with the purpose of maintaining, modifying or changing their international relations."⁵³ Both 'Abd al-Nasir and Nuri were canny politicians, who skillfully used diplomacy in the pursuit of their goals. Most of the diplomatic exchanges with foreign and Arab officials were held personally by the leaders or by their trustworthy envoys. This pattern of "personal diplomacy" was further strengthened following 'Abd al-Nasir's abortive attempts to turn the Arab League into a rubber-stamp for his foreign policy.

Radio and Press Propaganda: Political propaganda became "the main pillar of public indoctrination and a most effective political weapon."⁵⁴ The new revolutionary Egyptian regime created a sophisticated mass communication and propaganda machine designed to strike at the "reactionary" Arab regimes by means of psychological warfare. This apparatus was headed by 'Abd al-Karim Hatim, who was in turn subordinate to the minister of national guidance, Salah Salim, one of the original Free Officers. The powerful transmitters of Cairo Radio and The Voice of the Arabs reached not only the remotest villages in Egypt, but Arab and Muslim audiences throughout the Middle East and North-Africa. Although the broadcasts were full of slander, fabrications and sheer lies, their effect on the Arab world was enormous. Transmissions also included a variety of songs, plays and poetry which helped popularize the political message.⁵⁵ By contrast, the

⁵² Noble, p. 51; Dawisha, pp. 140-53.

⁵³ Dawisha, p. 159.

⁵⁴ A. Loya, "Radio Propaganda of the United Arab Republic—An Analysis," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol. 13 (April 1962), p. 101.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-110; Dawisha, pp. 162-73. On the role of the media in furthering

propaganda responses of the “target states”—Iraq and Jordan in particular—were mostly apologetic and ineffective and their attempts at jamming were usually unsuccessful. In addition, Egyptian official and semi-official newspapers were distributed or smuggled into all the other Arab states.

Cultural Activity: For long, Egypt had been the cultural center of the Arab world. A major producer of feature films, Egypt regularly exported or smuggled them into all the Arab capitals, along with books and magazines.⁵⁶ This cultural output was exploited by the Free Officers to deliver the political messages of their regime (see below). Although some Arab states tried to ban Egyptian publications, they always found their way into the local markets. Noteworthy too was the role of Egyptian teachers working in Arab countries in disseminating ‘Abd al-Nasir’s nationalist ideology (see above).

Clandestine Subversive Operations: The Egyptian revolutionary regime created a formidable intelligence apparatus which was formally part of the ministry of war but in practise supervised personally by the minister, ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Amir, and ‘Abd al-Nasir himself. This department assigned military attachés and civilian envoys to Arab states, with the responsibility for overt operations (e.g., distributing propaganda materials) and covert activities (recruiting agents, promoting subversion, plotting coups). These activities frequently led Arab governments to submit formal protests to Egypt and even declare Egyptian officials *persona non grata*. Thus, at least ten Egyptian military attachés were expelled (or asked to leave) for alleged activity against the host Arab state during the years 1955–58.⁵⁷ Though the existence of clandestine activity is always difficult to establish, there is ample evidence to indicate, as Dawisha has claimed, that they “constituted an important, if not a major, instrument of Egyptian foreign policy.”⁵⁸ Iraq’s countermeasures in this area were more impressive than in the propaganda field, with the Royal Palace contin-

Egypt’s drive for hegemony, see D. Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: 1962), pp. 255–57.

⁵⁶ Issawi, p. 218; Dawisha, pp. 173–77.

⁵⁷ For figures and dates, see “Analysis of the Nasserist Movement in Its Relations with East and West,” ISA, 3751/13.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 177–78. See also Kerr, “Regional Arab Politics,” p. 37; G. Lenczowski, “The Arab Cold War,” in W.A. Beling (ed.), *The Middle East: Quest for American Policy* (Albany: 1973), p. 59.

uously engaged in covert activity in Damascus. Several abortive coups in Syria, essentially masterminded though poorly executed by Iraqi leaders, attested to the importance attached to this instrument.⁵⁹

Role Perception

According to the role theory developed by K.J. Holsti, an aspiring hegemon is likely to develop a role perception of regional leadership.⁶⁰ The existence of such a perception, whether illusory or realistic, creates *ipso facto* an image of potency, which in turn becomes a capability to be exploited in the struggle for hegemony. Furthermore, a concentration of military, political and demographic capabilities, as Paul Noble suggested, had encouraged Egyptian governments to believe that Egypt was entitled to a dominant position in the Arab system and that it was "readily attainable."⁶¹ For the Egyptians, as Fouad Ajami asserted, Egypt's centrality to the Arab world was "natural and inevitable."⁶²

This perception influenced the superpowers, as well having a powerful impact on other states in the region. Based not only on Egypt's strategic location but on its perceived dominant position in the Arab world, Britain supported the basing of the Arab League in Cairo and offered Egypt a special status in Western defense strategies. This attitude, in turn, sharpened Egypt's sense of preeminence and was successfully used by Egyptian leaders to influence other Arab states. When King Faruq described Egypt as "the keystone of the arch, the nation to whom the others looked for leadership,"⁶³ he was merely reflecting a common Egyptian perception.

⁵⁹ For details on these Iraqi plots, see the records of the People's Court (the al-Mahdawi Trials), as well as Seale's book.

⁶⁰ Holsti described 17 role perceptions. The role of a "regional leader" was defined as "duties or special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in its relation to states in a particular region with which it identifies." According to his definition, Egypt alone could be regarded as a "regional leader." He regarded Iraq as a state with little regional influence. Thus, he was surprised to find that Iraq assumed six roles (out of 17 he defined), second only to Egypt (with eight roles). See K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," in S.G. Walker (ed.), *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis* (Durham: 1987), pp. 20-33.

⁶¹ Noble, p. 62.

⁶² F. Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967* (Cambridge: 1981), p. 80.

⁶³ King Faruq's conversation with the British Ambassador, Campbell to FO, Tel. 24 Saving, 10 February 1948, 68384.

The Western shift toward reliance on Baghdad as the cornerstone of a Middle Eastern defense alliance, however, seriously jeopardized Egypt's leadership image. Conversely, it strengthened Iraq's image as a powerful state. Baghdad was quick to exploit its new status to try to entice other Arab states to join the organization. But Iraq's image of superiority was soon to be eroded by the Suez war and the formation of the UAR. Furthermore, Nuri's collaboration with the West in the formation of the Baghdad Pact stigmatized him as a Western stooge and damaged Iraq's perceived role of Arab leadership in the eyes of Arab nationalists.⁶⁴

Pan-Arab Ideology

Post-WWII Arab politics can not be divorced from the role pan-Arab ideology played in shaping the attitudes of Arab leaders and intellectuals. The function of ideology in the Middle East was to create a political identity for the foundation of modern nationhood and to serve as a legitimacy resource.⁶⁵ While the concept of territorial nationalism was still largely unfamiliar to Arab society after WWI, the pan-Arab ideology was formulated and crystallized during the interwar years.⁶⁶ It aimed at liberating the Arab states from the foreign yoke in the first, and unifying the Arab states in the second stage. The lessons of Arab history, and the parallels drawn from German and Italian national movements, led Arab nationalists to seek a "driving force" (a "Prussia" or a "Piedmont") that would bring about political unity. During the 1920s and 1930s, Arab nationalists considered Iraq to be "the Prussia or the Piedmont of an Arab world awaiting its Bismark or its Cavour."⁶⁷

During that period, when Egypt was not yet considered part of the Arab world, unity schemes concentrated on the Fertile Crescent

⁶⁴ See, for example, Izzat Darawza, *al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya* (Cairo: 1957), p. 605.

⁶⁵ K.H. Karpat (ed.), *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: 1982), p. xxii; Hudson, pp. 20–22.

⁶⁶ On the evolution of the pan-Arab movement, see E. Dawn, "The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years," *IJMES*, Vol. 20 (1988), pp. 67–91.

⁶⁷ E. Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East* (Oxford: 1992), p. 295. See also I. Rabinovich, "Inter-Arab Relations Foreshadowed: The Question of the Syrian Throne in the 1920's and the 1930's," in *Festschrift in Honor of Dr. George Wise* (Tel Aviv: 1981), p. 243; A. Goren, *Haliga ha'arvit, 1945–1954* (Tel Aviv: 1954), pp. 18–19; 31–32. Sami Shawqat (see the following page) wrote in this regard: "Prussia had aspired to unite the German people sixty years ago. Similarly, there is nothing to prevent Iraq from aspiring to unite the Arab states." See, *Hadhihi Ahadafuna* (Baghdad: 1939), p. 3.

area. Though Damascus was considered the center of Arab nationalism, Baghdad, under the charismatic leadership of King Faysal, was perceived as the said "driving force" of the pan-Arab movement. This tendency stemmed from several factors: Iraq's geostrategic location; its economic potential; the fact that it had become the first independent Arab state, member of the League of Nations; and King Faysal's uncontested prestige as the leader of the Arab Revolt.⁶⁸ In his book on the Arab national movement, the Palestinian Izzat Darawza claimed that between 1927-1932, Iraq was in a better position than any other Arab state to fill the role of the "Arab Piedmont." Iraq was to play a leading role in an Arab conference scheduled to take place in Baghdad during 1932, but Saudi objections and eventually Faysal's death in 1933 prevented it from convening.⁶⁹ Two years later, Sami Shawqat, who replaced Sati' al-Husri (see below) as Iraqi director-general of education, predicted that within the next fifty years Iraq would become either a powerful state capable of dictating its will on the Middle East, as under the Caliphs Harun al-Rashid and al-Ma'mun, or else it would become a battleground of imperialism.⁷⁰ In 1937, when Edmond Rabbath, a Christian Arab ideologist from Aleppo, wrote on the unity of the Fertile Crescent, he referred to Iraq as "a pole of attraction," around which Arab unity would crystallize.⁷¹

Nuri al-Sa'id, who was closely associated with the Iraqi Hashemites, thought that after Faysal's death the pan-Arab mantle had fallen on his shoulders.⁷² Consequently, he attempted by various means to bring the Fertile Crescent under Iraqi control. However, his "Fertile Crescent" scheme, submitted to the British in February 1943, was received with little enthusiasm by them and by the Arab leaders who

⁶⁸ A. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (Cambridge: 1984), pp. 294-95.

⁶⁹ Darawza, *Al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya*, pp. 602-3; Khaldun al-Husri, "King Faysal I and Arab Unity," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 10 (July 1975), pp. 323-40.

⁷⁰ Sami Shawqat, *Hadhihi Ahadafuna*, p. 81. It must be admitted, however, that Shawqat envisaged a similar role for Egypt in the Arab West, *ibid.*, p. 94. The topic of German and Italian unification was part of the Iraqi school curricula within the subject "the Unification of the Arab Nation." See Sati' al-Husri, *Mudhakkirati fi al-'Iraq, 1921-1941* (Beirut: 1967), p. 216. See also A. Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'hist Iraq, 1968-89* (Oxford: 1991), p. 113; *idem*, "Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'thi Iraq," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19 (October 1983), p. 449.

⁷¹ Hourani, p. 311.

⁷² Porath, p. 39.

were suspicious of his motives.⁷³ In contrast with Faysal's perceived noble aims, Arab nationalists regarded Nuri's attempts to unify the Arab world, with British support, as motivated by personal and dynastic ambitions. Still in 1954, the Shi'ite intellectual and politician Fadil al-Jamali (who then served as prime minister) stated in a lecture that all Iraqi governments considered the liberation of the Arab states and their unification one of Iraq's duties.⁷⁴ Twenty five years later, Saddam Hussein spoke of Iraq's "conspicuous pan-Arab leadership role in the liberation of the whole Arab nation."⁷⁵ Even the Egyptian intellectual Mohamed Heikal, in his book on the recent Gulf war, spoke of Arabs who still considered Iraq to be the "Prussia of the Arab world."⁷⁶

Pan-Arab ideas gradually infiltrated Egyptian society in the early 1930s. Prominent Egyptian intellectuals and political leaders such as 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Azzam, Muhammad 'Ali 'Alluba, Hasan al-Banna', Ahmed Hussein, Mustafa Nahhas, Hussein Haykal, Karim Thabit and Mirrit Ghali, began to speak of Egypt's place and role within the Arab and Islamic worlds.⁷⁷ 'Alluba, for example, stated that by "its unique virtues, its geopolitical features, its cultural advantages and its spiritual and religious power," Egypt was destined "to bear the crown of all-Arab leadership and oblige it to fulfill its Pan-Arab mission."⁷⁸ However, this leadership, as Ahmed Gomaa rightly observed, was conceived of a moral rather than a political one, based on culture and learning.⁷⁹ This concept was further elaborated by Zaki Mubarak who was greatly influenced by Iraqi Arab ideologists Sati' al-Husri, Fadil al-Jamali and Sami Shawqat during his stay in Baghdad in 1937–38 on behalf of the Egyptian Ministry of Education. To his mind, Egypt was part of the Arab world, and its orientation derived from "its hegemonial position in the Arab world and its innate impulse to all-Arab leadership." Culturally, he added, "Cairo [now]

⁷³ Porath, pp. 51–52; Gomaa, pp. 69–70.

⁷⁴ Fadil al-Jamali, *al-Iraq bayna Ams wal-Yaum* (Baghdad: 1954), p. 28.

⁷⁵ Baram, "Mesopotamian Identity," p. 445, note 84.

⁷⁶ M. Heikal, *Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War* (London: 1993), p. 19.

⁷⁷ Gershoni, pp. 72–83. In another book, he carries a quote from 'al-Arabi (March 1979) attributed to Sa'd Zaghul in the 1920s: "Egypt controls the electric switch; if you push it, all the Arab lands follow." See I. Gershoni & J.P. Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900–1930* (New York: 1986), 236.

⁷⁸ Gershoni, p. 74. See also Gomaa, p. 50.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 51–52.

discharges the duties [once] carried out by Baghdad during the 'Abbasid period, hence it behoves Cairo to bear the expense borne erstwhile by Baghdad."⁸⁰ In 1938, Mirrit Butrus Ghali (the grandson of the Coptic Prime Minister, 1908–10), went a step further in his book *The Policy of Tomorrow* ("Siyasat al-Ghadd"). He charged that:

[Egypt's] political leadership ("al-za'ama al-siyasiyya") is the result of its population; its unity; and its political, social, scientific and cultural advance over the countries of the Near East and North Africa. From the religious point of view, Egypt has been, ever since World War I, the leading Islamic state and the actual world center of Islam. Cairo has replaced [Ottoman] Istanbul in many respects, especially since state and religion have been separated in Turkey. This religious and political superiority is a matter for all Egyptians to take pride in, but it should not be forgotten that it is also a source of many necessary tasks and duties. First, there are the duties of conveying the mission ("al-risala") of Egypt to the neighboring Arabic-speaking, Islamic countries; of bringing to them the spirit of science and culture; of cooperating with them as neighboring and fraternal countries. Should we succeed in all this, Egypt will then become a center of Oriental culture and a connecting factor between the neighboring nations without any one of them losing their own personality and independence.⁸¹

Egypt's central role in the Arab world was also propagated by non-Egyptian thinkers. Sati' al-Husri, the most important Arab ideologist (a native of Aleppo who accompanied Faysal from Damascus to Baghdad after WWI) emphasized Egypt's Arab role. Banished from Iraq for his alleged involvement in Rashid 'Ali's coup of 1941, Husri became the director of the League's Institute of Arab Studies in 1947. Already in 1936, he wrote that "nature has provided Egypt with all the qualities and distinctions which oblige her to take up the task of leadership in the awakening of Arab nationalism." He further expounded the attributes which made her a natural leader of the Arabs:

She [Egypt] lies in the centre of the Arab countries; she forms the largest of those blocs into which the Arab world has been divided by policy or circumstances; this bloc has had a fuller share of the world civilization of modern times, and has become the main cultural centre

⁸⁰ Gershoni, p. 76; Porath, p. 153.

⁸¹ Mirrit Butrus Ghali, *Siyasat al-Ghadd* (Cairo: 1944), pp. 156–57. The translation (with minor alterations) was taken from Gershoni, pp. 82–83. It is interesting to note that Ahmad Hussein, the leader of Young Egypt ("Misr al-Fatat"), spoke of Egypt as the natural choice for leading the Arabs toward union. See J.P. Jankowski, *Egypt's Young Rebels: "Young Egypt: 1933–1952* (Stanford: 1975), p. 54.

of the Arab countries; she is the richest of all of them, and the most advanced in the institutions of the contemporary State, the most accomplished in eloquence and the literary arts.⁸²

Drawing again on the German and Italian models, Husri reiterated that "I am one of those who believe that Egypt has a special place in the Arab world," and that Egypt should "work for the realization of Arab unity as Prussia worked for German unity and as Piedmont worked for Italian unity."⁸³ Husri was not the only non-Egyptian intellectual calling for Egypt to assume such a role in Arab affairs. During the preliminary deliberations on the establishment of the Arab League, Taha al-Hashimi, an important Iraqi politician and historian, recognized in his diaries in 1943 that "Iraq lost her posture to Egypt among the Arab countries."⁸⁴ Even Izzat Darawzah who, in the 1920s and 1930s, advocated a leading Iraqi role, thought that Egypt has all the necessary attributes to lead the Arab movement towards unity.⁸⁵ Thus, the placing of the Arab League headquarters in Cairo reflected not only British interests, but also a change in the pan-Arab ideology with regard to Egypt's role.

Doubtlessly, 'Abd al-Nasir was exposed to pan-Arab ideas during his formative years in the 1930s and 1940s. Furthermore, according to Mohamed Heikal, 'Abd al-Nasir's closest advisor, it seems that the Egyptian leader not only met with Sati' al-Husri in 1954, but was also acquainted with his writings.⁸⁶ Thus, when 'Abd al-Nasir spoke on Egypt's unique role in the Arab, African and Muslim orbits in his *Philosophy of the Revolution*,⁸⁷ he was merely elaborating on a theme familiar since the mid-1930s.⁸⁸

The formation of the Arab League and the placement of its HQ in Cairo undermined Nuri's Fertile Crescent unification scheme. However, he did not desist from his efforts to achieve Arab hege-

⁸² Hourani, p. 316. See also Porath, p. 156; W.L. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati' al-Husri* (Princeton, New Jersey: 1971), pp. 134–35.

⁸³ Cleveland, p. 135.

⁸⁴ Quoted in Porath, p. 207.

⁸⁵ Darawza, *al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya*, pp. 606–7; *idem*, *Mashakil al-'Alam al-'Arabi* (n.p.: n.d.), pp. 188–91.

⁸⁶ M.H. Heikal, *Milaffat al-Sues* (Cairo: 1986), pp. 284–85; Kedourie, *Arab Politics*, p. 295.

⁸⁷ G. 'Abd al-Nasir, *Falsafat al-Thawra* (Cairo: n.d.), pp. 40–1. For the English version, see note 34.

⁸⁸ M. Nasr, *al-Tasawwur al-Qawmi al-'Arabi fi Fikr Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir (1952–1970)* (Beirut: 1981), pp. 77–99; Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, Chs. 2–4.

mony, but simply channeled them into new directions. My approach, he told a *Time Magazine* reporter on June 1957, is: "never be an idealist. Use what is available and don't wait till everything is perfect and [thus] miss your chance."⁸⁹ Indeed, Nuri found the Western idea of regional defense against the Soviet Union a concept, which could be utilized to achieve his goals. As he realized by then that the attainment of Arab unity according to his earlier ideas was unfeasible, Nuri thought that a defense organization centered on Baghdad could achieve the same target. For Nuri, as an Arab nationalist, there was nothing odd about the notion of cooperation with the West, which he considered a natural, if not an inevitable, requisite.

Nuri's concept of pan-Arabism was anathema to 'Abd al-Nasir for two reasons: first, because he had been taught to believe that Egypt, and not Iraq, was entitled to lead the Arab world; and secondly, because his generation perceived opposition to the West as a major component of pan-Arab ideology. For many, Nuri represented the old generation in Arab politics, while 'Abd al-Nasir was an authentic representative of a younger generation of Arab nationalists. Though 'Abd al-Nasir utilized pan-Arabism mainly as a source of legitimacy,⁹⁰ it provided him with a powerful instrument that turned into yet another capability in the struggle for Arab primacy.

Patterns of Struggle for Hegemony

The various variables mentioned above provide the necessary prerequisites for an aspiring hegemon. An analysis of these variables clearly established that among the Arab states only Egypt and Iraq possessed the potential to fill that role, at least during the 1950s. These prerequisites, however, are relevant only where qualified leadership that expresses willingness to fill that role exists. Both 'Abd al-Nasir and Nuri al-Sa'id—though totally differing in their personalities and ruling styles—were capable leaders, who were willing—or rather eager—to bring their country's potential into fruition. Such observation was substantiated by their public statements and by their private conversations with foreign diplomats (see the following chapters).

A major feature of the struggle for Arab hegemony was that the

⁸⁹ Nuri's interview with *Time Magazine*, 17 June 1957.

⁹⁰ Hudson, pp. 238-47.

other Arab states became battlegrounds in the Egyptian–Iraqi confrontation. The Arab struggle over the Baghdad Pact was divided into two phases: it commenced with a clash over the concept of regional defense and over the involvement of the superpowers. It continued with the rupture over the signing of the Turco–Iraqi Pact (February 1955). The struggle was not conducted in all countries at once, but moved from one arena to the other. It commenced with Syria and Lebanon, and then passed on to Jordan, North–Africa and Saudi Arabia, in that order. The struggles, although varying in intensity, nevertheless displayed similar patterns of behavior. The following observations are especially noteworthy:

(1) The involvement of external powers in the regional struggle for hegemony was crucial, but it only partially determined the course of events and the outcome of the struggle. Egypt's vast territory and the Suez base played a major role in Western strategic thinking. However, Dulles' Northern Tier concept (see chapter 2) shifted the center of gravity to the Middle Eastern states on the Soviet southern border, i.e. Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. This shift was not due to a sudden decrease in Egypt's strategic importance, but rather stemmed from its refusal to cooperate with the West. Iraq, on the other hand, would probably not have taken the bold move of signing the pact without having formerly ensured Western (especially British) support. Strengthened by the alliance which guaranteed it Western arms and protected it from a possible attack from the Soviet Union, Iraq was ready to pursue its ambitions for regional hegemony. However, US ambivalence toward the pact, British unwillingness to fully commit itself—as the struggles over Syria and Jordan demonstrated—and finally its alliance with Israel in the 1956 Suez Affair, served to tarnish the image of the Baghdad Pact, and hence of Iraq's. Conversely, the Egyptian Czech arms deal enhanced 'Abd al-Nasir's prestige in two important ways: first, he became the first successful Arab leader to openly challenge the Western powers; second, the deal served to restore the image of the Egyptian army, which had been damaged by the Palestine debacle in 1948 and the Israeli raid on Gaza in February 1955.

(2) Although the Iraqi–Egyptian competition for regional primacy was enhanced by their respective military capabilities, it was not, as in the global system, a central feature of the struggle, which was con-

ducted primarily by political, ideological and economic means. Egypt's and Iraq's military advantage *vis-à-vis* the other Arab states notwithstanding, their leaders made little operative use of it as a coercive instrument. This state of affairs, however, changed when, in October 1957, Egypt sent its forces to Syria—the first time an Arab state intervened militarily in the affairs of another “sister” Arab state—in order to prop up the shaky regime. This pattern was later repeated on numerous occasions both by the Egyptian and Iraqi rulers. The lack of military involvement during the period under review emanated from two reasons: first, because Egypt and Iraq had limited ability to project power beyond their borders; and, second, because they feared an Israeli or Western response.⁹¹ Hence, the image of strength which both states projected was derived entirely from the size of their armies and not necessarily from their quality. Although this hypothesis cannot be substantiated by tangible evidence, speeches and interviews made by Arab leaders during this period (see the following chapters) attest to the fact that Iraq's association with a Western power in the Baghdad Pact, and Egypt's Czech arms deal, helped to solidify the two countries' military image.

(3) The political capabilities became the most significant variable in the Arab struggle. This was hardly surprising in light of the fact that most Arab regimes lacked structural legitimacy; thus, they were prone to the penetration of external forces and ideas, and their stability was at stake. In contrast with the strong but precarious Iraqi regime, 'Abd al-Nasir had a strong and stable regime, which enjoyed wide-based legitimacy. Hence, he felt secure when he embarked on his political struggle against Iraq. Diplomacy, propaganda, clandestine subversive operations and cultural activities became successful tools in his struggle. The use of these tools, in addition to his charisma, enabled 'Abd al-Nasir to mobilize the masses and assured him a triumph in his struggle over the Baghdad Pact. The fear of being exposed to a vicious Egyptian propaganda campaign or to an Egyptian-inspired coup convinced Arab leaders that it was safer to go along with 'Abd al-Nasir's pan-Arabist tide, even though his revisionist ideology, in fact, constituted a permanent challenge to the legitimacy of existing states.

⁹¹ Noble, pp. 50–51.

(4) Ideology has played a crucial role in Arab politics since the mid-1950s. It became both a tool and a source of legitimacy in the Arab struggle for hegemony.⁹² The search for a preponderant power that would unite the Arab states was a major component of the Arab nationalist ideology. The Egyptian and Iraqi drive for hegemony was thus legitimate so long as Arab nationalism was adopted as a major creed. However, “given the natural prospect of polarization between Mesopotamia and the Nile basin,” wrote Van Nieuwenhuijze, Arabism was “less than a bridge across the gap than it might be, precisely because its one pole of orientation lies on yonder side.”⁹³ Thus, pan-Arabism became an important tool in the hands of the shrewd Arab rulers. ‘Abd al-Nasir’s version of pan-Arabism, rather than Nuri’s Hashemite variant, was more appealing to the Arab masses and elites because it challenged the Western powers and because it was based on socialist ideas. Although ‘Abd al-Nasir was considered a genuine representative of his generation (i.e. the decolonization period) and, as such, he probably had a latent disposition towards pan-Arabism, in fact, this ideological tool was adopted by him as soon as he discovered that it served him well in the struggle with Iraq.

(5) The use of economic capabilities in the Arab struggle was always secondary and subordinate to political considerations. Although Iraq was clearly superior to Egypt economically, this leverage was barely exploited in its attempt to influence other Arab states. No satisfactory explanation can be found for this behavior, which often prompted Iraq’s friends in the Arab world to criticize the Iraqi regime for neglecting the financial tool. Only sporadic and limited financial aid was extended to individuals, institutions, political parties or newspapers in the Arab world to promote Iraq’s interests. Such a policy, however, was pursued with greater vigor by Saudi Arabia—whether it was Egypt’s or Iraq’s ally—drawing on its vast oil income. Saudi “gold diplomacy” was utilized discreetly but consistently in order to grease the palms of politicians and newspaper editors. Saudi Arabia’s economic leverage was extended in particular to Syria and Lebanon. On the whole, however, Saudi economic policy was defensive rather than hegemonial during the 1950s.

⁹² Hudson, pp. 20–22; J.A. Bill and C. Leiden, *Politics in the Middle East* (Boston: 1979), pp. 281–83.

⁹³ Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Sociology of the Middle East*, p. 224.

(6) The Arab system contained some elements of the "local balance of power" system. The most important feature of that balance of power was the competition between Egypt and Iraq for allies within the Arab world.⁹⁴ In accordance with Kaplan's fourth rule of the balance of power—"oppose any coalition or single actor that tends to assume a position of preponderance within the system"⁹⁵—both Egypt and Iraq repeatedly attempted to block each other's drive for hegemony. With the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, Egypt organized a counter-coalition that included Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and later Jordan. The new Arab coalition and the Czech arms deal helped Egypt to achieve a new equilibrium in the system, restoring its previous position of late 1940s. Although Syria was not in a position of neutrality in the conflict, it attempted to fill the role of a balancer in the Arab system.⁹⁶ This configuration, however, was swiftly transformed as a result of the growing influence of 'Abd al-Nasir in Arab affairs: Saudi Arabia, Egypt's closest ally, joined Iraq and Jordan in a royalist coalition in 1957, which was tacitly supported by all Arab states except Syria. "Despite the fact that the Middle East lacks an established tradition of balance of power statecraft," wrote S.M. Walt, "the advantages of seeking allies in order to balance against threats have obviously been apparent to the various actors in the Middle East."⁹⁷ This Arab balance of power, which suffered from high superpower permeability and from domestic instability, has usually been successful in checking regional aspirations for hegemony.

Egypt's relative advantages, coupled with Iraq's neglect in applying its economic leverage, resulted in the eventual triumph of the Egyptian regime. Having won the fierce battle over the Baghdad Pact, Egypt acquired the status of regional leader sufficiently powerful to lead the Arab system. However, it lacked the ability to impose its will on Iraq, which continued to regard itself entitled to lead the Arab world by virtue of its capabilities and its role perception in the

⁹⁴ S.M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: 1987), p. 59. On coalition-building in the Arab world, see Y. Evron and Y. Bar Simantov, "Coalitions in the Arab World," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1 (Winter 1975).

⁹⁵ Kaplan, p. 292.

⁹⁶ On the role of the balancer, see Morgenthau, pp. 175, 187; Organski, pp. 279–80.

⁹⁷ Walt, p. 152. See also A. Taylor, *The Arab Balance of Power* (Syracuse: 1982), p. xii.

pan-Arab movement. In other words, Egypt succeeded in setting the Arab agenda, in creating coalitions and in making decisions affecting the whole Arab system, but it was less successful in implementing the agenda and in actually steering the Arab world toward the goals it had set. This conclusion refutes Noble's assertion that the Arab system after 1955 was a "highly unbalanced, virtually one-power system, dominated by Egypt,"⁹⁸ or Roger Owen's conclusion that 'Abd al-Nasir was strong enough "to dictate the terms on which major Arab policy decisions were to be made."⁹⁹ However, it substantiates Carl Brown's claim that after WWI "no single state, either from within the area or from outside, was able to establish effective hegemony and thus to organize the Middle East."¹⁰⁰

Assessing the results of the 1958 Iraqi military coup, Kerr concluded that "Iraq's pretensions on the Arab front were drastically undercut."¹⁰¹ However, its capabilities remained intact and its pretensions to Arab hegemony remained as potent as ever. During the Iraqi Republican regime, the struggle for Arab hegemony between Egypt and Iraq not only persisted, but was even exacerbated. Yet, given their respective geographic locations, their political motivations, their capabilities and the constraints of the Arab system, it remained beyond the reach of either to acquire full hegemonic status in the Arab world.

⁹⁸ Noble, pp. 43, 62.

⁹⁹ R. Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London: 1992), p. 104.

¹⁰⁰ C. Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East* (London: 1984), p. 88.

¹⁰¹ Kerr, "Regional Arab Politics," p. 48.

CHAPTER TWO

WESTERN ATTEMPTS AT FORMING A REGIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION, 1945–53

Two global blocs—West and East—competed for spheres of influence throughout the world after World War II. This struggle, better known as the ‘Cold War,’ led the Western Powers to devise plans to contain what they perceived as the Soviet menace to the “Free World”. The Truman Doctrine (1947), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Marshall Plan (1949) were the major steps taken by the West to defend Europe. Yet these steps were not deemed sufficient; the Middle East, stretching along the Soviet southern flank, was also regarded as an area of potential Soviet expansion. Therefore, Britain and the United States, motivated by vital military and economic interests, sought to establish a Middle East defense organization under their control, preferably similar to NATO. However, regional rivalries and local conflicts jeopardized all such Western efforts until early 1954.¹

Western Concepts

The military agreement concluded by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in July 1937, known as the Sa‘adabad Pact (or the Oriental Entente), marked the first attempt by indigenous states to set up a Middle Eastern security pact. Motivated by Turkey’s apprehensions of Italy, following Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia, as well as by other regional considerations, the pact provided for noninterference, nonaggression, and consultation regarding all international

¹ On the origins and evolution of the Cold War in the Middle East, see B. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* (Princeton: 1980). B. Rubin, *The Great Powers in the Middle East 1941–1947: The Road to Cold War*. For a general description of Western attempts to organize Middle Eastern defense, see E. Podeh, “The Cold War in the Middle East: The Western Quest for a Regional Defense Organization, 1945–1953,” *Orient*, Vol. 33 (June 1992), pp. 265–77; D.R. Devereux, *The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards The Middle East, 1948–56* (London: 1990).

conflicts affecting the common interests of its members.² Officially, the pact was never annulled, but ceased to function for all practical purposes with the outbreak of World War II. An attempt to revive it was made by Turkey and Iraq in 1946 when they signed a bilateral agreement, but a broader regional organization was not re-established. Although the Sa'adabad Pact had no practical impact on regional politics, it set a pattern for an indigenous organization.

As soon as the war ended, the West took up the question of Middle Eastern security. In October 1945, General Paget, Britain's commander-in-chief in the Middle East, submitted a memorandum to the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee proposing a "Middle East Confederacy" embracing the whole region (except Iran) for the purpose of "mutual defence," presumably against the Soviet menace. Although the Foreign Office did not adopt Paget's scheme, preferring to base British policy on existing bilateral treaties, especially the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, it did contemplate the consolidation of these treaties into a regional defense framework sometime in the future.³

A new policy was introduced by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in March 1946, aimed at replacing the current bilateral treaties with Egypt, Iraq and Jordan with agreements that would explicitly recognize the latter's sovereignty. Bevin believed that these would be tantamount to a comprehensive system of military pacts capable of consolidating the British position in the Middle East.⁴ But the British were sharply rebuffed in Egypt and Iraq: the Bevin-Sidqi protocol, signed in October 1946, was rejected by the Egyptian government; and the Portsmouth Treaty with Iraq, concluded in January 1948, was revoked by the Regent, 'Abd al-Allah when riots (known as the *wathba*) spread throughout the country. Only in Jordan were the British successful in ratifying a revised agreement, in March 1946.⁵

In 1949, with the signing of the Atlantic Charter (NATO), Britain

² On the pact, see D.C. Watt, "The Saadabad Pact of 8 July 1937," in U. Dann (ed.), *The Great Powers in the Middle East 1919-1939* (New York: 1988), pp. 333-52. See also the Public Record Office, FO371, file 20786. (Hereafter, all British documents unless otherwise identified, are taken from FO 371.)

³ See the report by the Joint Planning Staff, J.P.(45) 276 (final), 6 November 1945; for Paget's proposal, see Annex, C.C.(45) 25; for the position of the chiefs of staff and the Foreign Office, see Annex, C.O.S.(45) 678 (0), 2 December 1945, E8930/175, 45254.

⁴ R. Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East: Arab Nationalism, the U.S. and Post-War Imperialism* (Oxford: 1984), pp. 105-6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 160-61; on the Bevin-Sidqi Protocol, pp. 244-46; on the implications of the abortive Portsmouth Treaty, pp. 331-44.

was free to devote more attention to the security of the Middle East, considered by the Foreign Office as "second only to the United Kingdom itself." Strategically, the Middle East was seen by the British as a center of communications, a source of oil, a shield for Africa and the Indian Ocean and an irreplaceable offensive base.⁶ Concerned about the Soviet threat to Middle East security, the Foreign Office suggested "some arrangement on the same lines as the Atlantic Pact." Yet it surmised (correctly) that inter-Arab jealousies, Arab nationalism and the question of Israel were likely to jeopardize any comprehensive regional plan. Therefore, the Foreign Office first attempted to engage the peripheral countries—Greece, Turkey and Iran—while remaining convinced that for strategic reasons Egypt must be considered the main wartime base for Anglo-American forces to operate from.⁷ The main obstacle to the implementation of this British plan was Egypt's insistence upon the evacuation of all British forces from its soil. Bevin, therefore, sought an alternative which would enable Britain to maintain control of the Suez base, yet also satisfy Egypt's national demands.

Despite his failures between 1946–48, Bevin maintained in a memorandum to the cabinet in August 1949, that the object must be "to see the whole Middle East area covered by a system of defence arrangements." Thought must be given, he went on, to the desirability of establishing a regional pact to complement NATO. Since the United States was not expected to participate, and because of the prevalence of regional conflicts, Bevin concluded that Britain should "still wish to retain and reinforce" its bilateral agreements. However, he added, Britain "should not object to some kind of general Arab League endorsement of bilateral agreements."⁸ Furthermore, in March 1950, in a private conversation with the Egyptian ambassador, Bevin intimated that, among other possibilities, he "was willing to give consideration to a regional pact" which would give the Middle East "a sense of security."⁹

The chiefs-of-staff, for their part, embarked on a different course. In May 1950, they concluded that "the ideal military arrangement in the Middle East would be a regional pact consisting of the United

⁶ CAB 129/26, C.P. (49) 183, "Middle East Policy," 25 August 1949.

⁷ FO Minute, 23 March 1949, E5020, 75079.

⁸ CAB 129/26, C.P. (49) 183, "Middle East Policy," 25 August 1949.

⁹ Bevin to Campbell (Cairo), Dispatch No. 135, 21 March 1950, JE1051/21, 80376.

Kingdom, the Arab League states, Israel, Turkey, Persia and possibly Greece, in which Egypt, as a willing partner, would provide the base facilities required.”¹⁰ At the same time, the US, Britain and France issued the “Tripartite Declaration” on 25 May. The statement, which was issued within their attempts to avoid a further escalation of the Arab–Israeli conflict, recognized the need of Middle Eastern countries to purchase arms for the purposes of “assuring their internal security, and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole.”¹¹

Six months later, a meeting of the Anglo–American chiefs-of-staff in Washington decided, *inter alia*, that the defense of the Middle East was primarily “the British Commonwealth’s responsibility,” and that the most important goal was to revise the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty in order to make a regional pact feasible.¹² When yet another round of talks with the Egyptians ended in a deadlock, Bevin came to accept the regional formula presented by the chiefs-of-staff. In a memorandum to the cabinet, he proposed that “if agreement on a bilateral basis [with Egypt] is difficult to achieve, I might suggest the possibility of looking for a solution on a basis wider than bilateral.”¹³ In a meeting with the Lebanese foreign minister in November 1950, Bevin similarly broached the idea of a collective defense arrangement, possibly to include Britain, the US, Egypt, Turkey and perhaps other NATO countries.¹⁴ Eventually, however, the conclusion of the Arab Security Pact and the disappointing declaration of the Arab League in February 1951 (see below) caused Bevin to revert temporarily to the bilateral framework.

American security interests in the Middle East were essentially consistent with those of Britain, albeit with slight differences in emphasis. As early as 1947, a National Security Council (NSC) memorandum on the US position held that “the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is vital to the security of the US” and that it would be jeopardized “if the Soviet Union should succeed in its efforts to obtain control of any one of the following

¹⁰ PREM 8/1359; Louis, p. 583.

¹¹ For the text of the declaration, see *The Foreign Relations of the United States* (henceforth *FRUS*), 1950, Vol. V, pp. 167–68.

¹² FO Brief, 21 November 1950, E1193/50, 81964; *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. V, pp. 230–36; Louis, p. 742.

¹³ CAB 129/43, C.P.(50) 284, 27 November 1950. See also C.P.(50), 283. On the cabinet’s decisions, see C.P.(50) 310, 12 December 1950; Louis, pp. 712–14.

¹⁴ Bevin to Bailey (Beirut), Dispatch 212, 9 November 1950, E1193/37, 81964.

countries: Italy, Greece, Turkey, or Iran.”¹⁵ With the establishment of NATO in 1949, the State Department considered three possible options in the Middle Eastern arena: Firstly, extending the pact to include the Middle East; secondly, creating a new separate defense organization (with or without the Western powers); and lastly, relying on existing pacts (the Sa‘adabad Pact and the Arab League).¹⁶ Eventually, however, it rejected all three: the first for fear that the US might be already over-committed in Europe; the second in view of the conflict between the Arab states and Israel; and the third because of the pacts’ ineffectiveness.¹⁷

British and American officials, meeting in Washington toward the end of 1949 concluded, *inter alia*, “that a Middle East pact on the Atlantic model was excluded by the present policy of the US government and, in any case, such a pact did not by itself meet UK strategic requirements.” In addition, they asserted that “bilateral treaties between the UK and Arab countries were necessary and their stabilizing effect was recognized.”¹⁸ The possibility that the US would negotiate multilateral or bilateral pacts with Middle Eastern states was also ruled out during the conferences of the American chiefs of mission in the Middle East (in Istanbul in November 1949; and in Cairo in March 1950).¹⁹ However, a change in the American attitude occurred in 1950 after the Korean War. The US now became convinced that the Cold War was not confined to the European theater and that remote regions such as the Far East and, by implication, the Middle East, were exposed to Soviet penetration and should be defended by the West.²⁰

Arab Attitudes

As the 1940s drew to a close, the Arab world was on the verge of radical political changes. While the reverberations of the 1948 Palestine debacle were about to cause internal political upheavals in most

¹⁵ *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. V, p. 575; *ibid.*, 1948, Vol. IV, pp. 46–47; *ibid.*, 1949, Vol. VI, pp. 39, 56.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1949, Vol. VI, pp. 31–39.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 34–36.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 169; *Ibid.*, 1950, Vol. V, p. 3.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 1950, Vol. V, pp. 274–75; Halle, p. 286; Kuniholm, pp. 419–21.

of the confrontation states, the wider Arab world was preoccupied with the struggle against the last vestiges of Western domination which it found embodied in the bilateral agreements. The Western powers, especially Britain who hoped to maintain their influence in future defense arrangements of some sort, were at pains to convince the Arab leaders of the danger of the Soviet threat. But the Arabs, having had no experience of Russian imperialism, viewed the possibility of Soviet expansionism only as abstract theorizing. British and French colonialism, by contrast, was an experience they had had at first hand, still manifested by the British troops stationed in Arab countries under the terms of the bilateral agreements. Moreover, from the Arab perspective, Israel posed a more imminent threat than the Soviets.

Despite overall Arab opposition to Western regional arrangements, certain Arab leaders attempted to involve the British in regional schemes of their making. As far back as September 1947, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, advised Bevin to conclude an agreement with the League as a first step toward a regional defense arrangement. Following Britain's failure to revise the bilateral treaties, in early February 1948 (see above), 'Azzam repeated his suggestion, claiming that goodwill toward Britain in the Arab world was still widespread.²¹ A few days later, King Faruq of Egypt repeated the offer, but in a vaguer manner, to British Ambassador Ronald Campbell. Faruq thought that establishing a security system between Britain and Middle Eastern states against the Russian threat was an "imperious necessity." He asserted that it was a mistake to deal "piecemeal" with the Arab states, and that Britain should follow the Soviet example and deal with the Arabs *en bloc*. At the same time, Faruq thought that Britain would be wise to settle with Egypt first because it was "the keystone of the arch, the nation to whom the others looked for leadership."²² The British, however, rejected the Egyptian approach; they thought that an overall agreement with the League would "tend to limit facilities to a general minimum while imposing on us the maximum obligation to guaran-

²¹ See the conversation of Chapman-Andrews (the Head of the British Middle East Office in Cairo) with 'Azzam, 7 February 1948, 68384. The latter was in favor of this approach, see his personal letter to Wright, 29 January 1948, E4170, 68385. 'Azzam also discussed his ideas with the British ambassador, see Campbell to Bevin, Dispatch No. 205, 21 April 1948, E5339, 68386.

²² Campbell to FO, Tel. 24 Saving, 10 February 1948, E2057, 68384.

tee the security of the whole group of states.” Moreover, suspecting Faruq’s motives, the British thought he was hoping to use the agreement as a ground for refusing Britain the use of Egypt’s facilities.²³

The question of treaties between the Arab states, Britain and the US had also come up in mid-April 1948 at the Cairo meeting of the League Political Committee. During the deliberations, the Lebanese Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh suggested a resolution of solidarity against Communism or external aggression, recommending that individual Arab states should seek defense agreements with Britain or the US, or both.²⁴ This question was, however, swept aside by the Palestine war in May 1948.

In November 1948, according to Heikal’s version, King Faruq again approached the British, asking to conclude a “strategic alliance” which would serve as the basis for a wider defense organization comprising Turkey, Greece and several Arab states.²⁵ The subject of Western–Egyptian military cooperation was further elaborated upon during two visits to Cairo by Field Marshal William Slim, the British Chief of Imperial Staff, in March 1949, and in June 1950. During the first visit, Faruq agreed with Slim that “Egypt must prepare to play its role in general Middle East defence” against the USSR; the king also accepted in principle Slim’s idea for British–Egyptian staff talks. Egyptian Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Hadi was also in favor of a closer understanding between Egypt and Britain, accepting the idea that “Egypt will be a base for any military operations in the area.”²⁶ During the second visit, Slim proposed to Faruq “a complete new approach to defence based on equal alliance between Egypt and Britain on the lines of the Atlantic Defence Pact.”²⁷ Yet Faruq’s willingness to cooperate with Britain—coming in the wake of the poor Egyptian performance in Palestine—should be seen as an attempt to safeguard his throne against external and internal threats. The British, for their

²³ FO to Cairo, Tel. 255, 14 February 1948, 68385.

²⁴ Campbell to Bevin, Dispatch No. 205, 21 April 1948, E5339, 68386; Chapman–Andrew to FO, Tel. 152, 4 May 1948, E5838, 68386. This idea was further elaborated by Sulh, see: Campbell to FO, Tel. 206, 20 June 1948, E8333, 68386; Chancery Cairo to Chancery Beirut, 19 July 1948, 68386.

²⁵ Heikal, *Milaffat*, pp. 99–102. See documents 25–26, 34–36 at the end of his book. The Arabic version is more detailed than the English one (*Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, London, 1986), and includes translated documents. The above-mentioned documents are supposed to be authentic British documents, but their location is not cited.

²⁶ *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VI, pp. 199–202.

²⁷ PREM 8/1359; Louis, p. 589.

part, decided to defer any action for the time being. Meanwhile, the return to power of the Wafd party, headed by the veteran Mustafa Nahhas, in January 1950, heralded the adoption of a more balanced position by Egypt in foreign affairs. This shift became apparent in late June when Egypt abstained on the American resolution that recommended collective action to defend South Korea.²⁸

The Iraqi and Jordanian Hashemites also approached the British with their own plans for regional defense. In November 1949, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Sa'id, suggested an Arab defense pact tied to the West.²⁹ Already in January 1947, Jordan's King 'Abdallah had been ready to consider a defense agreement between Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Iran.³⁰ In an attempt to further his idea of an Islamic Middle Eastern regional pact, 'Abdallah visited Baghdad and Tehran in July 1949. He then advised the British to act quickly for building a stable organization—while he and Ibn Sa'ud “are alive to help.”³¹ Thus, by the end of 1949, the notion of a Western–Arab regional defense pact was very much on the minds of Arab leaders.

While the Foreign Office was still objecting to a “comprehensive” approach, regional and domestic constraints led to the signing of an Arab defense pact. Faced with persistent domestic problems, Faruq turned to improving Egypt's status in the Arab world, thus hoping to bolster his own position. Attending the October 1949 session of the Arab League, where a possible union between Iraq and Syria was discussed, Faruq proposed forming a broader Arab Collective Security Pact (ACSP). This proposal was apparently not related to the Western schemes, nor to the Soviet menace; rather, it was intended to become a lever for Egypt preeminence on the Arab scene. The Iraqi–Syrian union scheme being presented as an effective weapon against Israel, Faruq decided to “outbid” its advocates by proposing a multilateral pact to coordinate the defense of all Arab states. The mooted Iraqi–Syrian union would then be rendered unnecessary.³² At the same time, Faruq sent one of his confidants to enquire of

²⁸ R. Ginat, *The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945–1955* (London: 1993), pp. 112–18.

²⁹ Troutback (the new head of B.M.E.O) to FO, Tel. 80 Saving, 2 November 1949, E13446, 75080.

³⁰ Kelly (Ankara) to Bevin, Dispatch 23, 16 January 1947, E766/111/80, 62197.

³¹ Trevelyan (Cairo) to Attlee, 29 July 1949, E9547, 75281. See also Harvey (Paris) to the Eastern Department, 15 November, 1949, E13899, 75079.

³² Seale, p. 90; B. Maddy-Weitzman, *The Crystallization of the Arab State System, 1945–1954* (Syracuse: 1993), pp. 143–44.

British ambassador whether the proposed ACSP “might be helpful in connexion with the defence arrangement between Great Britain and Egypt” or any other Arab states. Campbell surmised that Faruq’s intention was to forestall possible British opposition to the ACSP, or to preclude the impression that it “was intended to remove the necessity for an Anglo–Egyptian military arrangement.”³³ The Foreign Office, again, decided not to respond to the Egyptian initiative. Eventually, the Arab Pact—known as the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation—was approved by the League Council in April 1950. Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed it in June 1950, Iraq joined in February 1951, and Jordan in February 1952. It was formally ratified only in October 1953.³⁴

Iraq’s Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa’id was the most determined opponent of the ACSP. Nuri was the most prominent representative of the old guard in Iraqi politics. Born in 1888 in Baghdad when it was still part of the Ottoman Empire, Nuri became a recognized leader in the Arab nationalist movement, playing an important role in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans and in the establishment of modern Iraq. His loyalty to the Hashemites and to the British during the course of his career earned him a fine reputation and much admiration among Westerners (who referred to him as “the Pasha”); the younger Arab generation, by contrast, who struggled for complete liberation from the imperialist yoke, considered him a symbol of Western domination and the embodiment of the *ancien régime*.³⁵ For many years, Nuri tried to achieve Iraqi preeminence, hoping to turn Baghdad into the center of the Arab world. However, both his Fertile Crescent scheme, and his idea of an Arab League headed by Iraq, were rebuffed by both Britain and Egypt. Twelve years after the creation of the League, Nuri still harbored resentment against Britain for having consented to the location of its headquarters in Cairo against his wishes.³⁶ In 1950, at the age of 62, ailing and partially deaf, Nuri might have felt that a regional defense organization under Iraqi leadership would be his last chance to secure Arab hegemony.

Nuri did not object in principle to the idea of a collective defense

³³ Campbell to FO, Tel. 1151, 27 October 1949, E1075/65, 75080.

³⁴ For the text of the ACSP, see *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1952), pp. 238–40.

³⁵ An updated biography on Nuri is yet to be written. The only available biography is by Lord Birdwood, *Nuri As-Sa'id: A Study in Arab Leadership* (London: 1959).

³⁶ Wright (Baghdad) to FO, Tel. 74, 17 January 1957, V1023/3, 125426.

pact, but he believed that it should be closely linked with the West because the Arabs could not remain neutral in a global war. Moreover, since Iraq was the Arab state most exposed to the Soviet menace, Arab leaders should appreciate Iraq's position and "recognize that any weakness in Iraq threatened the whole Arab world."³⁷ Nuri thought of the ACSP as a mere device to enhance Egypt's position in the Arab world. Consequently, he attempted to foil it, or, failing that, to amend it to coincide with Iraq's interests. In November 1950, he requested Syrian Prime Minister Nazim al-Qudsi to persuade Nahhas to consider a regional pact based on the NATO model, or an Iraqi version of the ACSP. Significantly, in private conversations, Syrian and Lebanese leaders showed a marked interest in the idea of a wider defense arrangement, but were reluctant to state their position openly for fear of a harsh Egyptian reaction.³⁸ Nuri pinned his hopes on King Ibn Sa'ud, convinced that his approval would open the way for bringing in Syria and Lebanon and isolating Egypt.³⁹ The King, however, was unwilling to take sides in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, which was the stumbling block for any progress on Arab defense.⁴⁰

In February 1951, Nuri made a last-ditch attempt to undermine the ACSP. In discussions with the new British ambassador in Cairo, Ralph Stevenson, he intimated that he would like to revise the Egyptian proposal so that any state interested in the defense of the Middle East would be eligible to join. The new pact would be directed against any aggressor (and not just against Israel). This, he hoped, would make it possible for the United Kingdom, Turkey and possibly Greece to join.⁴¹ Nuri's motives in making this proposal to the British were

³⁷ Troutback (B.M.E.O.) to FO, Tel. 80 Saving, 2 November 1949, E13446, 75080. See also Mack (Baghdad) to Bevin, 21 March 1950, Dispatch 64, EQ1022/6, 82411.

³⁸ For the Jordanian position, see Kirkbride (Amman) to Furlonge, 15 January 1951, E1071/35, 91202. For the Syrian position, see EY1024/1, 91847.

³⁹ Mack to FO, Tel. 637, 22 November 1950, E1193/42, 81964.

⁴⁰ FO to Jeddah, Tel. 546, 8 December 1950, E1193/57, 81965. See also Trott (Jeddah) to FO, Tel. 333, 30 November 1950, E1193/54, 81964; FO to Baghdad, 23 November 1950, E1192/42, 81964.

⁴¹ Stevenson (Cairo) to FO, Tel. 44, 20 January 1951, E1072/2, 91205. Nuri indicated that the new organization would be established under Article 51 of the UN Charter, whereupon the Foreign Office emphasized the difference between Article 51, which dealt with the right of collective self-defense, and Article 52, which dealt with regional arrangements. Organizations which were established according to the latter were under the supervision of the Security Council and thus exposed to the Russian veto. NATO, for example, was set up in accordance with Article 51.

threefold: Firstly, he claimed that without Western participation the pact would be ineffective. Secondly, he was apprehensive of the threat from the Soviet Union, as Iraq was the Arab state closest to it. Lastly, Nuri was determined to counteract the effect of the Arab League HQ being placed in Cairo, by using the regional defense issue as a lever to enhance Iraq's position. The British, however, were reluctant to impair their relations with Egypt and rejected the Iraqi offer. Nuri was left with no choice but to sign the ACSP, although his reservations were added to the text of the pact.⁴²

Although the pact dealt mainly with inter-Arab relations, Article 10 precluded signatories from entering into any "international agreement which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty, nor to act in international relations in a way which may be contrary to the aims of this Treaty."⁴³ On 23 January 1951, the Arab League convened in Cairo to discuss Arab-Western relations and the future of the ACSP. Nuri submitted a far-reaching resolution on Arab-Western cooperation which was passed only after having been watered down considerably due to Egyptian opposition.⁴⁴ The conferees finally issued a statement complaining that "the big powers persist[ed] in intervening . . . in the domestic affairs of small countries," and adding that the Arab states could not "discharge their international obligations under the UN Charter unless they obtain[ed] the full national [*wataniyya*] rights or settle[d] their all-Arab [*qawmiyya*] affairs."⁴⁵

The terms of the ACSP, and the League declaration, convinced Foreign Secretary Bevin that the time was not ripe for creating a regional organization in the Middle East. In a memorandum submitted to the cabinet in March 1951 he concluded that "the chances of promoting a regional Middle East Defence Organization seem negligible," but that "bilateral defense agreements between the United Kingdom and individual Arab states, and with Israel, may be

Obviously, the British opposed regional organizations based upon Article 52. See the text of the articles in I.L. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (3rd ed; New York: 1964), p. 429.

⁴² Troutback to FO, Tel. 80 Saving, 2 November 1949, E13446/1075/65, 75080.

⁴³ See the text, as note no. 34.

⁴⁴ For Nuri's proposal, see Stevenson to FO, Tel. 55, 24 January 1951, E1071/17, 91202; Tel. 59, 26 January 1951, E1071/19, 91202.

⁴⁵ On the final resolution, see Rapp to FO, Tel. 59, 3 February 1951, E1071/33, 91202. On the conference proceedings, see Dudgeon's Minute, 7 February 1951, E1071/40, 91202.

feasible and the possibilities are being explored."⁴⁶ However, two British attempts at negotiating an Egyptian–British agreement—on 11 April and 8 June 1951—were unsuccessful.⁴⁷ Consequently, the British, backed by the United States, reverted to the regional option, advocating a new plan called the Middle East Command.

The Middle East Command

Both international and regional developments led the Foreign Office and the State Department in the summer of 1951 to consider a new forward policy for the defense of the Middle East. The Korean War, though geographically remote, made it palpable that Soviet aggression could be an acute menace to the Middle East, while Iran's nationalization of its oil industry in March 1951 pointed up the vulnerability of the Western economies.⁴⁸ Both aspects reinforced Western expectation that a way could still be found to persuade Egypt to agree on the use of the Suez base in wartime.

The new Middle East Command (MEC) scheme, launched in September 1951, was the outcome of extensive consultations between the Western powers. It was designed to include the US, Britain, France and Turkey (which, having joined NATO, was now willing to participate) as well as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.⁴⁹ Egypt was asked to join as a founder member on an equal footing, a suggestion intended to overcome the thorny problem of revising the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty. More significantly from the Western perspective, the MEC aimed at maintaining the Suez base with British personnel manning it. Slim termed it “the Empire’s jugular vein,” strategically essential to the effective defense of the Middle East.⁵⁰ The British prime minister gave the MEC his full support. The only chance, he stated, of reaching an agreement with Egypt—slim as it might be—was through this new scheme.⁵¹

On 13 October, the four powers (US, Britain, France and Turkey)

⁴⁶ CAB 129/45, C.P. (51) 94, 29 March 1951; C.P. (51) 95, 30 March 1951.

⁴⁷ CAB 129/46, C.P. (51) 140, 28 May, 1951; C.P. (51) 214, 27 July, 1951.

⁴⁸ *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. V, pp. 8, 24, 259.

⁴⁹ On the contacts and discussions between the Western powers concerning the creation of the MEC, see *ibid.*, pp. 144–267.

⁵⁰ Aronson, p. 29.

⁵¹ CAB 129/47, C.P. (51) 239, 30 August 1951.

handed a formal invitation to Egypt to join the MEC.⁵² Five days earlier, in an attempt to preempt such a step, the Egyptian government had abrogated the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and declared Faruq King of Egypt and the Sudan. In so doing, Nahhas intended to highlight the nationalist and anti-British posture of the Wafd and thus regain some of the popularity his party had enjoyed during the 1920s and 1930s. On 15 October, Egypt conveyed its formal refusal to join the scheme, which it termed a "perpetuation of British occupation," identical to the earlier British proposals.⁵³ Egypt also insisted that Arab states approached by the Western powers must consult with it before making any decisions.⁵⁴

Unlike Egypt, invited as a founder member, the rest of the Arab states were to be associate members only.⁵⁵ Most of the Arab leaders took offence at being relegated to an inferior status. Moreover, they were irritated that Egypt had not consulted with them prior to rejecting the Western offer. Yet they toned down their discontent being at pains not to alienate Egypt; Iraq alone gave vent to its protest. Nuri was vexed with Britain for having approached Egypt first and Iraq next, and for having offered founder member status to Cairo only. He informed the British that if Egypt refused, or posed conditions, Iraq would be willing to replace it. He also declared that Saudi Arabia, too, should be offered founder member status; the rest of the Arab states, he averred, might well remain associates.⁵⁶ Within days, however, Nuri made a complete *volte-face*, asserting that Iraq would not deviate from the Egyptian stance,⁵⁷ a move interpreted by John Troutback, British Ambassador in Baghdad, as intended to avoid the public embarrassment of being invited to join the MEC after Egypt

⁵² For the text of the MEC proposal submitted to Egypt, see M. Khalil, *The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record*, Vol. II (Beirut: 1962), pp. 314–15; *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. V, pp. 209–10. See also Stevenson to FO, Tel. 742, 13 October 1951, E11910/96, 90182; Stevenson to Morrison, Dispatch 344, E11910/126, 90182.

⁵³ For the text of the Egyptian response, see Stevenson to FO, Tel. 744, 15 October 1951, E11910/109, 90182. See also the text given to the American Embassy, *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. V, pp. 226, 392.

⁵⁴ Montagu-Pollock (Damascus) to FO, Tel. 328, 3 November 1951, E1192/266, 91227; Chapman-Andrews (Beirut) to FO, Tel. 589A, 19 October 1951, E1192/186, 91227.

⁵⁵ See, for example, FO to Baghdad, Tels. 1075–77, 13 October 1951, E1192/157, 91224.

⁵⁶ Troutback (Baghdad) to FO, Tel. 780, 13 October 1951, E1192/162, 91224.

⁵⁷ Troutback to FO, Tel. 788, 15 October 1951, E1192/172, 91224.

had rejected the offer.⁵⁸ The ambassador advised against approaching Iraq again, claiming that “Nuri would much like to break away from subservience to Egypt, [but] he still finds it impossible to do so when it comes to the point.” He also warned that if Britain were “to drive a wedge between Egypt and Iraq, we are courting the same result as we met when that policy was tried in 1948” [i.e. the Portsmouth Treaty].⁵⁹

The responses of the other Arab states were similar to Iraq’s, but more muted. The Saudi king was furious upon learning that Egypt had unilaterally abrogated its treaty with Britain.⁶⁰ Yet, his fear of Communist penetration notwithstanding, he was unwilling to approve the MEC so long as the conflict between Egypt and Britain was unresolved.⁶¹ The Syrian and Lebanese governments took the same line in public,⁶² but privately expressed dissatisfaction with the West for not having invited them as founder members, and with Egypt for not having consulted with them. They also felt that the proposals should have been discussed by the Arab League.⁶³ Only Jordan accepted the Western plan, although it raised some reservations later.⁶⁴ The Arab debate over regional security led Egypt to call for a meeting of the Arab League. When this proved impractical, the Arab leaders decided to take up the issue at a meeting of Arab delegations to the forthcoming 1951 UN General Assembly session in Paris.

There, the Egyptian foreign minister set out to persuade the Arab delegations to support Egypt’s refusal to join the MEC. Iraq, having Western support and some Jordanian and Lebanese backing, tried to overcome Egyptian opposition, but failed.⁶⁵ Ultimately, the delegates

⁵⁸ Troutback to Bowker, 16 October 1951, E1192/198, 91225.

⁵⁹ Troutback to FO, Tel. 793, 18 October 1951, E1192/184, 91225.

⁶⁰ Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 578, 15 October 1951, E1192/173, 91224.

⁶¹ Riches (Jedda) to FO, Tel. 211, 18 October 1951, E1192/203, 91225. See also Tels. 227–28, 4 November 1951, E1192/275–6, 91227.

⁶² For example, Syrian President Adib Shishakli’s declaration to *al-Ahram* on October 3, Montagu-Pollock to Morrison, Dispatch 149, 8 October 1951, E1192/168, 91224; and the support given by the Lebanese parliament, Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 589, 19 October 1951, E1192/189, 91225.

⁶³ Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 586, 17 October 1951, E1192/183, 91225; Montagu-Pollock to FO, Tel. 308, 18 October 1951, E1192/181, 91225; Troutback to Bowker, 29 October 1951, E1192/291, 91228.

⁶⁴ Kirkbride to FO, Tel. 336, 13 October 1951, E1192/164, 91224. On Jordan’s subsequent reservations, see Wardrop’s Minute, 2 November 1951, E1192/308, 91228.

⁶⁵ On pressure exerted by Britain and the US, see FO to Amman, Tel. 517, 19 November 1951, E1192/324, 91229; FO to Jedda, Tel. 424, *ibid.* On pressure exerted on the Iraqi and Jordanian delegations in Paris, see FO to British delegation

decided to submit the Egyptian proposal to their governments⁶⁶—a compromise tantamount to a rejection of the MEC. Once again, Egypt had proved capable of dominating Arab politics; while several Arab leaders were tacitly willing to cooperate with the West, they were apprehensive of making a public commitment lest it expose them to Egyptian attack. For the Western powers, the turn of events was a severe setback. Disappointed and resentful, they responded with a declaration underlining their intention to proceed with the MEC plan.⁶⁷ This was intended to avoid the impression that the Western powers were courting Egypt and to demonstrate that they would not revamp the MEC in order to “give more flattery to the Egyptian vanity.”⁶⁸ However, the powers came to realize that there was little point in setting up the MEC so long as Egypt and the Arab states refused to participate.

The Middle East Defense Organization

The failure of the MEC plan prompted Nuri to suggest an alternative. Visiting London in mid-November 1951, he proposed that Britain, the US and Pakistan join the ACSP.⁶⁹ In his opinion, a defense organization based on the ACSP would allow Britain to maintain its forces in the Suez area as well as providing a substitute for the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Nuri even prepared three draft proposals for mediation between Egypt and Britain.⁷⁰ British Ambassador Troutback asked the Foreign Office to study Nuri’s ideas seriously, asserting

in Paris, Tel. 133, 20 December 1951, E1192/409, 91231. On the Lebanese position, see Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 674, 21 November 1951, E1192/330, 91229. On the Jordanian position, see Kirkbride to FO, Tel. 390, 23 November 1951, E1192/342, 91229.

⁶⁶ Lloyd (British delegation in Paris) to Bowker, 12 December 1951, EQ1071/3, 91642.

⁶⁷ For the text of the declaration, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 316–17.

⁶⁸ FO to Washington, Tel. 5175, 18 October 1951, E1192/174, 91225; Tel. 5211, E1192/185, 91225; *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. V, p. 226ff., especially p. 251.

⁶⁹ Furlonge to Troutback, 21 November 1951, EQ1059/29, 91639.

⁷⁰ For Nuri’s drafts, see Bowker to Troutback, 11 January 1952, E1193/2, 98278. Nuri claimed that his ideas were identical with those submitted in Paris (Stevenson to FO, Tel. 12, 2 January 1952, JE1052/3, 96918). However, the Arabic version revealed substantial differences (Tel. 14–15, JE1052/4–5). The Foreign Office indicated that Nuri’s last draft was close to the British position, but still unsatisfactory (Tel. 73, 5 January 1952, *ibid.*). Compare with the text published in *Filastin*, 30 December 1951.

that Britain ought to consider joining a pact modified to eliminate its weaknesses.⁷¹ However, both the Foreign Office and King Faruq rejected Nuri's ideas, the latter because of opposition by the Wafd and the Egyptian public at large, the former because a pact directed against Israel could not serve as a basis for regional defense.⁷² Disappointed, Nuri plaintively expressed the hope that once negotiations with Egypt concerning regional defense resumed, "Iraq would be brought in on an equal footing with Egypt."⁷³

This view was again conveyed by Nuri to General Sir Brian Robertson, the commander of Britain's Middle East forces, during his visit to Iraq in February 1952. Nuri emphasized that Iraq's right to equal status derived from the bases and facilities that it could provide in wartime. He also expressed interest in developing some defense association between the Arab states, Turkey and Pakistan. While Robertson and the JCS thought Nuri had a strong case, the Foreign Office's assessment that Egypt's supreme strategic value could not be compared with Iraq's predominated.⁷⁴

Soon after entering office, in February, new Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden suggested to open bilateral negotiations with Egypt. He argued that Britain should seek a defense agreement with Egypt "which would fit into the framework of the four-Power proposals of 13th October [1951]" (see above), while at some later stage "it will probably be necessary to widen the basis of the discussions and to bring Egypt into a conference of the Powers sponsoring the setting up of the MEC."⁷⁵ The British ambassador in Cairo was accordingly instructed to sound out Egypt as to future discussions of the MEC.⁷⁶ The protracted discussions which ensued convinced Eden that Egypt's insistence upon "complete evacuation" would compel the Western powers to redefine the concept of the MEC.

The Americans, too, realized that, as long as the dispute over the

⁷¹ Troutback to FO, Tel. 991, 28 December 1951, JE1051/543, 90151. See also 4 February 1952, E1071/5, 98262. For an opposing view, see Rapp (B.M.E.O.) to Bowker, 7 March 1952, E1193/31, 98278, and Troutback to Bowker, 10 April 1952, E1193/46, 98279.

⁷² For the Egyptian reaction, see FO to Baghdad, Tel. 8, 2 January 1952, JE1051/543, 90151; Stevenson to FO, Tel. 38, 7 January 1952, JE1052/17, 96918. For the British response, see Bowker to Troutback, 14 January 1952, JE1052/28, 96919.

⁷³ Troutback to FO, Tel. 97, 4 February 1952, E1193/8, 98278.

⁷⁴ Maddy-Weitzmann, pp. 153-54.

⁷⁵ CAB 129/49, C.(52) 32, 11 February 1952.

⁷⁶ Eden to Stevenson, Dispatch 65, 20 February 1952, JE1052/123, 96926.

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was not settled, Egypt would remain resolute in its refusal to take part in the defense of the Middle East. Moreover, the US assessment was that “no other Arab nation is likely to [join] if Egypt does not.” It was assumed that Arab leaders and Arab public opinion “would continue to underestimate, ignore, or be fatalistic about the threat of Soviet aggression” because they regarded it “as far less tangible than the question of Western interference or the Arab-Israeli dispute.”⁷⁷ This evaluation, shared by the British, led the Western powers to consider establishing a “planning organization” composed of the original MEC countries, but with headquarters in Cyprus instead of at the Suez base. Still, they did not abandon hope that Egypt would eventually join, thereby enabling them to revert to the original MEC plan.⁷⁸ Intensive negotiations regarding the revised plan were held between Britain and the United States during the following six months.⁷⁹ By June 1952, the two superpowers were in agreement on the general framework of the new organization, to be called the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO).⁸⁰ The change of title was highly significant. Unlike the MEC, it was not a “command,” but a planning organization with no military forces at its disposal. In addition, the name was intended to circumvent the negative psychological effect the term MEC had had on the Arab world. Wishing to avoid a recurrence of the MEC blunder, Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, proposed sounding out the Arab governments prior to the official publication of the plan.⁸¹ However, the Egyptian military coup of July 1952 suspended further discussions of MEDO.

The coup, headed by General Muhammad Naguib and Colonel Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, did not immediately bring about any significant changes in Egyptian foreign policy. The Free Officers had no specific ideological position on foreign affairs, and their immediate goal was simply to bring about complete British withdrawal. Two different, sometimes contradictory, orientations in Egyptian foreign policy gradually emerged: one favored cooperation with the West, especially with the United States, while the other favored neutrality

⁷⁷ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 195–99.

⁷⁸ FO to Baghdad, Tel. 156, 17 February 1952, 98278.

⁷⁹ For US–UK discussions and contacts concerning the details of the new plan, see *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 178–83, 188–91, 198–99; 213–18; 226–34.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 249–51.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 251–52.

in world affairs. This dualism was to cause great confusion among Western decision-makers, who mistakenly interpreted Egypt's neutral position as a tactic aimed at obtaining concessions from the West rather than as a genuine manifestation of resentment against Western imperialism.⁸²

Egypt's Western orientation was reflected in contact with the CIA established by the Free Officers before the coup, as well as requests for American military and economic aid upon their accession to power.⁸³ Its neutral orientation was reflected in leaflets distributed by the officers before the coup and in various public statements following it.⁸⁴ The neutralist tendency gained prominence, however, as a result of the gradual change in 'Abd al-Nasir's world view during 1953.⁸⁵ During that year he first met with Nehru, a staunch advocator of non-alignment in the Cold War, and was exposed to the theoretical aspects of neutralism.⁸⁶ In actual fact, 'Abd al-Nasir had a latent prior disposition toward neutralism, the natural outcome of the socialization process that had shaped his and the other officers' world view during their formative years. Their generation had been deeply influenced by the political culture of the 1930s and 1940s, especially by organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*) and Young Egypt (*Misr al-Fatat*). "Although they did not subscribe to a common ideology," wrote P.J. Vatikiotis, "the affinity between them derived from a uniform educational preparation, as well as social and economic background—the lower urban and rural classes. They also harboured similar aspirations, suffered common frustrations, and shared vague plans for the overthrow of the existing order."⁸⁷ The decisive event that shaped their world view was the British presence in Egypt. Thus, although the Free Officers admired Western achievements and realized the advantages which might accrue to Egypt through association with the West, they were reluctant to commit themselves to the Western camp.

The Western powers decided to wait for the consolidation of the

⁸² This evaluation was made by the British ambassador in Cairo, Stevenson to Eden, Dispatch 9, 12 January 1954, JE1022/3, 102349.

⁸³ Copeland, Chaps. 3, 4. See also Aronson, p. 48ff.

⁸⁴ On the content of the leaflets, see R. el-Barawy, *The Military Coup in Egypt: An Analytic Study* (Cairo: 1952), pp. 207–11.

⁸⁵ Heikal, *Milaffat*, pp. 187–88.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 200; Meyer, p. 110.

⁸⁷ Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, pp. 49–50.

Egyptian regime, believing that the new leaders offered “a better chance [than the previous regime] of coming to terms with the Egyptians.”⁸⁸ Indeed, early contacts with the Free Officers seemed auspicious. Muhammad Naguib, the officers’ figurehead leader, intimated to the US, on 18 September, that the new regime was completely on the side of the US, and that Egypt would be willing to join area defense plans only after receiving military and financial support.⁸⁹ Britain, however, pressured the US not to render Egypt any assistance prior to the resolution of the Anglo–Egyptian dispute. But when the MEDO plan was unofficially conveyed to Egypt in late October 1952, the Egyptian reaction was not encouraging. While Naguib repeated to the State Department that he was willing to cooperate on MEDO in return for military and financial assistance,⁹⁰ he also confided to the Turkish ambassador that even though participation in MEDO was in Egypt’s interest, Britain must first evacuate the canal zone.⁹¹ ‘Abd al-Nasir was even more outspoken than Naguib; in his opinion, MEDO amounted to nothing more than “replacing one foreign flag over Egypt with another foreign flag.”⁹² Moreover, Egypt’s ambassador in London, Mahmud Fawzi (soon to become foreign minister), told Eden emphatically that Egypt would not join regional defense before the completion of British withdrawal.⁹³

Nuri, for his part, was also unenthusiastic about MEDO, but for different reasons. Like MEC, MEDO did not envisage any role for Iraq in Middle Eastern defense. Consequently, Nuri pressed the British repeatedly to revise their plans. He informed General Robertson, during his second visit to Iraq in February 1953, that a cabinet

⁸⁸ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 251–52; also pp. 271–74.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1860–61; Aronson, p. 51; Ginat, p. 158–59.

⁹⁰ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, p. 52.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 301–5. In this and the many subsequent references to Turkish–Arab exchanges, it must be remembered that the inaccessibility of both Turkish and Arab archives precludes direct quotation. The contents of such conversations are known, if and when one or the other inter-locutor reports on them to Western representatives. The possibility of their being given tendentious slant in the re-telling can, therefore, not always be excluded. A similar mixed message was also conveyed to the Foreign Office, see Stevenson to FO, Tel. 1576, 22 October 1952, JE1052/433, 96933. See also FO to Cairo, Tel. 1690, JE1052/436, 96934.

⁹² Heikal, *Milaffat*, p. 167. Heikal claimed that ‘Abd al-Nasir, Salah Salim and ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Amer, the most prominent of the Free Officers, met with American officials from the embassy on 12 August 1952, and told them that before any progress could be made on Middle Eastern defense, the “Egyptian problem” in its entirety—i.e., the Sudan and the Suez—must be resolved. See *ibid.*, pp. 186, 189.

⁹³ Eden to Stevenson, Dispatch 397, 22 December 1952, JE1052/459, 96934.

committee consisting of himself (in his capacity as defense minister in Jamil al-Midfa'i's government), Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, 'Ali Jawdat and Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, had been set up to consider defense policy. This committee was about to recommend three possible solutions to the cabinet:

- (1) In the event of Egypt reaching an agreement with Britain on a collective regional defense, Iraq should join.
- (2) Should Egypt not join such a plan, Iraq would conclude an arrangement with Britain, and if possible with the US, based on UN Charter Article 51.
- (3) The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1932 should be revised.

In his discussion with Robertson, Nuri also reiterated his desire to base regional defense on the ACSP, an arrangement which would be acceptable to Arab public opinion because it was an "Arab pact." MEDO, by contrast, could well create the impression that the Arab states would have to send their forces outside the Arab world, an argument already used against the abortive 1948 Portsmouth Treaty. Nuri emphasized that the Arab states "cannot organise anything effective without Western support," but that he was "searching for a façade to make things palatable to the public."⁹⁴

Nuri was not the only supporter of the Western regional defense concept. Turkey, once it had joined NATO in 1951, worked assiduously for a pact which would include the Western powers and as many Arab states as possible. Hoping to replace Egypt, Turkey wanted itself to become the linchpin of MEDO, or any other regional pact.⁹⁵ A meeting with Iraqi Crown Prince 'Abd al-Allah in London in late December 1952, convinced Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes that Iraq was likely to join such a pact, followed by Jordan, Lebanon and eventually even Saudi Arabia.⁹⁶

But by March of the following year, Iraq's enthusiasm for a Western regional defense pact had abated considerably. When the Turkish chargé in Baghdad delivered a note inquiring whether Iraq, as the Arab state most exposed to the Soviet threat, was willing to start military talks with Turkey with a view to the establishment of a

⁹⁴ Troutback to FO, Tel. 112, 4 March 1953, E1197/6, 104236. See also Tel. 89, 20 February 1953, E1197/2, 104236; *FRUS*, 1952-54, Vol. IX, p. 350.

⁹⁵ *FRUS*, pp. 348-49, 352-54.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 296-97.

regional defense pact, the response was cautious and reserved. It merely acknowledged the Soviet danger and emphasized Iraq's need for Western arms in order to defend its frontiers.⁹⁷ During the same period, Iraqi Foreign Minister Suwaidi, in a frank discussion with Ambassador Troutback, intimated that Iraq would be unable to withstand the Arab "outcry" if a defense agreement were signed with Turkey, as the Turks seemed to expect. Suwaidi claimed that in the absence of Arab support for any arrangement with the West, Iraq continued to prefer the ACSP.⁹⁸

The lukewarm Iraqi response, obviously disappointing to the Turks, was hardly surprising. Still influenced by the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq was apprehensive that the Turkish plans were no more than a cover for irredentist claims to Mosul.⁹⁹ Two other factors also accounted for Iraq's reserve: First, Prime Minister al-Midfa'i and al-Suwaidi were apparently more aware than Nuri of public opposition to any new direct association with the West and were not willing to take any risks. Second, a breakthrough, in February 1953, in British–Egyptian negotiations over the question of the Sudan, led Iraq to defer its decision.¹⁰⁰

Dulles' "Northern Tier" Concept

Soon after taking office in January 1953, the new Republican Administration in the US, under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and with John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, was quick to consult with the British on the overall coordination of their policies. With respect to the Middle East, the two sides decided that Egypt would be offered an "evacuation formula" in return for its participation in MEDO, the latter to be considered "an essential part of any

⁹⁷ Troutback to FO, Tel. 13 Saving, 28 March 1953, E1197/15, 104236.

⁹⁸ Troutback to FO, Tel. 11 Saving, 16 March 1953, E1197/9, 104226; Troutback to Eden, Dispatch 54, 22 March 1953, E1197/10, 104236. See also an informal Iraqi paper on regional defense which was delivered to the American and British ambassadors, Dispatch 55, 28 March 1953, E1197/17, 104236.

⁹⁹ Nuri, who two years later was to sign an agreement with Turkey, expressed his concern over Turkish designs on Mosul to Troutback in April 1953. See Troutback to FO, Tel. 18 Saving, 20 April 1953, E1197/32, 104237.

¹⁰⁰ Troutback to FO, Tel. 145, 24 March 1953, E1197/11, 104236; Tel. 146, E1197/12, 104236.

settlement.”¹⁰¹ Three months later, Eden still saw MEDO as part of a “package deal” with Egypt, but Dulles argued that he needed more time to study the MEDO scheme, and that he “did not envisage [the] MEDO outline as [a] fixed document for Egyptian acceptance.”¹⁰² Despite these divergent views, a joint American–British offer to resume negotiations was presented to Egypt in March 1953. Naguib, however, replied that Egypt was not prepared to contemplate regional schemes “unless and until the question of withdrawal of British troops has been settled.”¹⁰³ Dulles concluded that in order to reach a settlement it was preferable to separate the Suez base problem from MEDO.¹⁰⁴ The British reached the same conclusion several months later, but by then MEDO was anyway no longer a live issue.

The new Administration thought of the Middle East as a key arena for containing the Soviet Union—an arena heretofore “somewhat neglected by the US.”¹⁰⁵ Consequently, Dulles decided to undertake a comprehensive tour of the Middle East and southeast Asia in May 1953 to study regional problems. However, 24 hours before his arrival in Cairo, the Arab League issued a communiqué declaring, *inter alia*, that “the Arab Pact . . . is considered an adequate guarantee of the defence of the Arab states.”¹⁰⁶ The timing and content of the statement were intended to convey that the Arab world opposed Western involvement. In their conversations with Dulles, Naguib and ‘Abd al-Nasir stressed that the Egyptian people became “alarmed and afraid” whenever the notion of Middle East defense pacts involving the Western powers was raised. The Egyptians were so suspicious, Naguib said, that they would not consider any agreement until they “find themselves free.”¹⁰⁷ ‘Abd al-Nasir went further, asserting that it would be difficult for Egypt to participate in regional defense schemes even after the evacuation of the British, since public opinion would view them as “only a disguised form of the hated joint defense.”¹⁰⁸ In his view, the defense of the Arab world was to

¹⁰¹ CAB 129/58, C.(53) 17 Revise, p. 9; *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 331–33; Aronson, p. 64.

¹⁰² On the Eden–Dulles talks, see *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 2008–11.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 2022. For ‘Abd al-Nasir’s view, see p. 2025.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2023.

¹⁰⁵ S.L. Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict* (Chicago: 1985), pp. 50–51.

¹⁰⁶ Stephanson to FO, Tel. 114 Saving, 15 May 1953, JE1022/7, 102720.

¹⁰⁷ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 10–11.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21, and Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, p. 39.

be undertaken primarily “by the people living in this area,” and the ACSF should become the basis for deterring any aggression. He concluded by assuring Dulles that “we may see our future lying with the West, but this is something that can only be said openly by a truly independent Egypt.”¹⁰⁹

The same attitude was displayed by the other Arab states. Adib Shishakli, the Syrian leader, while showing somewhat greater awareness of the Soviet threat, emphasized that “the Near Eastern people will be the best defenders of their own territory.”¹¹⁰ The Iraqi leaders, though clearly aware of the Soviet menace, maintained that their hands were tied by public opinion. Nuri, the most ardent supporter of a Western-led regional defense pact, affirmed that “Iraq’s job would be to stop the Russians as long as possible at the frontier,”¹¹¹ but even he was hesitant about articulating his ideas so long as the Suez problem remained unsolved.

By the end of his tour, Dulles realized that the Anglo–Egyptian dispute, and anti-Western public sentiment were more immediate issues to the Arabs than the Soviet threat, and circumscribed the Arab leaders’ freedom of action. Thus, despite the strategic importance of the Suez base, Dulles became convinced that the Northern Tier countries—Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria—would form a more realistic basis for a regional defense organization than Egypt and other Arab states.¹¹² Dulles announced his new policy at a press conference on June 4, saying:

A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations shows awareness of the danger. There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.¹¹³

Egypt’s initial reaction was triumphant. *Al-Akhbar* claimed that the Egyptian people were delighted that Dulles had at last realized that

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹¹⁰ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, p. 61.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 379–86.

¹¹³ *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 28, pp. 833–35.

a defense arrangement could not be imposed on the local inhabitants, as "Egypt [had] tried to convince Britain and the US in vain."¹¹⁴ Naguib, in a foreign press conference, reiterated that no region in the world could be defended without local cooperation. But Egypt was still engaged in a struggle of liberation.¹¹⁵ However, initial satisfaction soon gave way to serious doubts; the Northern Tier concept, the ruling officers realized, was bound to diminish Egypt's influence in the Arab world and to jeopardize the current Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Until that time, Egypt had enjoyed a special status in all Western defense schemes because of the strategic importance of the Suez military base. But the Northern Tier concept threatened to relegate Egypt to the sidelines, while the northern states would become the focus of Western defense plans. This would be especially true of Iraq, Egypt's traditional rival for Arab hegemony. The Egyptian media therefore began to vehemently denounce the Northern Tier concept, along with every other Western regional defense concept not based upon the ACSP.

Dulles' concept also threatened to erode Britain's position in the Middle East. Even though the Foreign Office realized that Egypt was not likely to join MEDO, it continued to maintain that any regional framework must center on Egypt, and that any revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty should be within the context of such an organization.¹¹⁶ Turkey, on the other hand, welcomed the American initiative. When Prime Minister Menderes approached Nuri during their visit to London in June 1953, Nuri replied that while he regarded the plan favorably, he was not willing to commit himself before the negotiations between Britain and Egypt were concluded.¹¹⁷ However, in conversations with Minister of State Selwyn Lloyd during the same visit, Nuri was more forthcoming and asserted that Iraq was interested in a pact with Turkey and Iran in the face of the Soviet threat. Lloyd noted that "it seemed to him [Nuri] that such a pact would make much more sense than a pact which brought in Egypt and the other countries of the Middle East. He thought that Turkey and Iraq should make such an agreement whatever happened,

¹¹⁴ MENA, 6 June 1953.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1 August 1953.

¹¹⁶ "Record of Anglo-American conversation between Dulles and Lord Salisbury," 11 July 1953, JE10345/27, 102732.

¹¹⁷ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. IX, p. 387.

but that if Persia would come in then there is no reason why the US and the UK should not also come in.”¹¹⁸ The first seeds of a new Middle East defense arrangement were thus sown in London in 1953. It was, however, to be preceded by the signing of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, also based on the Northern Tier concept.

¹¹⁸ Lloyd's Minute, 1 June 1953, EQ1052/18, 104678. See also Ross to Troutback, 10 June 1953, EQ1052/18, 104678.

CHAPTER THREE

A GENERAL REHEARSAL: THE ARAB STRUGGLE OVER THE TURCO-PAKISTANI AGREEMENT

The Origins of the Struggle

The American interest in setting up a Northern Tier organization coincided with the Turkish and Pakistani desire to benefit from American military aid. In the summer of 1953, therefore, Turkey and Pakistan took steps to strengthen their defense cooperation. By early 1954, the press hinted that a Turco-Pakistani pact, possibly with Iraqi participation, was in the offing. Such a pact was intended to serve as another link in the chain of Western alignments to counteract the Soviet menace.¹ In January 1954, the State Department notified the Iraqi government of the contacts between Turkey and Pakistan. It also indicated that a positive reply to Iraq's request for military aid (submitted in the summer of 1953) could be expected soon, and added that the US hoped that the Middle Eastern states would come to realize that "some regional security arrangement" was needed.² Despite US disclaimers, it was clear that the Turco-Pakistani scheme was not so much a local initiative, but orchestrated by the US.

Iraqi Prime Minister Fadil al-Jamali, who had been appointed in September 1953, welcomed the US message, but sidestepped his guarded reference to a regional arrangement. This was hardly surprising, as Jamali was then busy persuading the Arab states to accept his Federation Plan (*mashru' al-ittihad*) which called for the unification of Arab foreign, defense and economic policies. It had been presented to the Arab League on 14 January.³ Only after the League members, headed by Egypt, had rejected the plan, Jamali changed his mind and told the US Ambassador Berry that he was prepared to "study sympathetically any proposals that might be submitted to him as regards a military pact with Turkey or Pakistan." Jamali claimed that during the League deliberations in Cairo, Egypt did

¹ Aronson, p. 84.

² *FRUS*, 1952-54, Vol. IX, pp. 2363-64.

³ For the text of Jamali's scheme, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 47-49.

not voice any objection in principle to American aid to Iraq, although the Egyptian leaders did express concern that their bargaining position would be weakened if Iraq joined a Western defense pact before the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was settled. But he also said that he had promised Egypt not to prejudice its bargaining position, and to fully inform Egypt "if and when Iraq considers any pacts."⁴

Eisenhower approved Iraq's request for military aid on 26 January 1954. But since American aid to Pakistan was conditional upon its concluding a defense arrangement with Turkey, the State Department thought it fitting to apply a similar condition to Iraq. The Department therefore decided that before making a formal announcement of the aid grant, Turkey should approach Iraq to find out whether it was willing to join as well.⁵ The Turkish ambassador met Jamali on 16 February, but reports on their talks vary. The Turks claimed that Jamali received the news with enthusiasm, expressing reservations only about a possible Israeli accession to the Turco-Pakistani agreement and the possibility that Iraq would have to station its troops beyond its borders.⁶ Jamali, for his part, averred that he could not make out whether the ambassador intended merely to update him or whether he meant formally to invite Iraq to join the agreement. If the latter was the case, he was surprised not to have been asked to share in the earlier consultations. He was particularly apprehensive of the implied US intention to make its aid conditional upon Iraq's joining the pact.⁷ In the event, Turkey and Pakistan announced their intention to conclude an agreement on 19 February, without waiting for the Iraqi response. They added a rider to the effect that the agreement would not involve them in "formal defense commitments."⁸

The Turco-Pakistani declaration, and the rumors of possible Iraqi participation, caused Egypt to launch a propaganda offensive against the agreement.⁹ On 10 February 1954, the Minister of National Guidance, Salah Salim, declared that Egypt's policy, "call it neutrality or what you like," would be based on noncooperation with anyone

⁴ *FRUS*, pp. 467-68.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 474-75.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 486-87. See also Troutback to FO, Tel. 101, 18 February 1954, DY1192/95, 112317; Bowker to FO, Tel. 97, 19 February 1954, DY1192/108, 112318.

⁷ Troutback to FO, Tel. 109, 19 February 1954, DY1192/108, 112318.

⁸ Aronson, p. 85.

⁹ Seale, p. 196.

who “opposes our dignity and freedom” and cooperation with “all who assist and support us.”¹⁰ An influential Egyptian journalist, Ahmad Baha’ al-Din, charged that Western defense organizations were nothing but a new way of safeguarding Western interests—ostensibly more in keeping with the era of decolonization.¹¹ Egyptian opposition stemmed from the fear that the accession of any Arab state to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement would harm Egypt’s bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the British. Even more significantly, the application of the Northern Tier concept to the Arab world would shift the center of gravity from Cairo to Baghdad. The Arab states would start following Iraq’s lead, Egypt would become isolated and its quest for hegemony would be jeopardized. Cairo’s immediate goal, therefore, was to prevent Iraqi accession.

Objection to Iraq’s possible accession were also raised by Iraq’s domestic opposition, namely the National Democratic and Istiqlal parties.¹² This became the issue of anti-government demonstrations and disturbances throughout January and February 1954. Iraq and the West began to fear that any association with the agreement would ignite riots even more widespread and violent than those which had come in the aftermath of the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty. Jamali hurried to assure parliament that any new Iraqi commitment would be presented to it for approval.¹³ At a press conference, however, he stated that if Iraq were invited to join the agreement, it would consider the proposal in the light of its interests.

Jamali’s attitude was ambivalent. In discussions with the Turkish ambassador, he noted that if Iraq were to consider joining the agreement, it would need an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. He also added that he would like to see Syria join the proposed agreement.¹⁴ It would appear that Jamali assumed that his demands would be turned down out of hand, giving him the necessary pretext to evade the agreement. Turkey, however, expressed willingness to allow Iraqi free access to the port of Alexandretta.¹⁵ Later, after having read the

¹⁰ *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 20 February 1954; *al-Masri*, 23 February 1954.

¹¹ Ahmad Baha’ al-Din, “The New Method,” *MENA*, 23 January 1954, p. 13. Baha’ al-Din was a leftist journalist who wrote for *Sabah al-Khair* and was later appointed editor of *al-Musawwar*. See J. & S. Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition* (London: 1958), p. 222.

¹² *Al-Sha’b* (Iraq), 21 February 1954.

¹³ Troutback to Eden, Dispatch 53, 24 February 1954, V1073/7, 110787.

¹⁴ Troutback to FO, Tel. 115, 23 February 1954, DY1192/116, 112318.

¹⁵ Bowker to FO, Tel. 110, 24 February 1954, DY1192/125, 112318.

draft agreement, Jamali told Troutback, on 6 March, that he saw no reason to join, because the 1946 Turco–Iraqi Agreement (see Chap. 2) was more binding. But, he did imply a desire to cooperate with the two signatories in defense matters without formally acceding to the new agreement.¹⁶ The Iraqi Crown Prince, ‘Abd al-‘Illah, was also equivocal, letting Britain know that he would defer his decision until the US responded to Iraq’s request for military aid. He discounted Egypt’s opposition, but asked Britain to use its influence in Damascus in order to obtain Syrian endorsement of, or at least tacit acquiescence with, the agreement.¹⁷

In March, King Faysal, ‘Abd al-‘Illah and Nuri al-Sa‘id went to Pakistan on an official visit (originally scheduled for January but postponed because of fears of domestic deterioration in their absence).¹⁸ The timing of the visit gave rise to suspicions in the Arab world that it was intended to pave the way for Iraq’s adherence to the agreement. These were reinforced by Nuri’s statement on 10 March, two days before his departure, that the security of Iraq was dependent upon the security of its neighbors, and his call for consultations between Iraq, the Arab states, Pakistan and India. (He went on to visit India later on.) Troutback interpreted the visit as showing that “the Turkish–Pakistani Agreement was being considered here more seriously than [had] at first been apparent.”¹⁹ Reviewing the results of the visit, Nuri later stated that Iraq’s geographic location “makes it incumbent on the responsible men to consider the matter [joining the agreement] with wisdom and foresight lest we increase our enemies.” His conclusion was unequivocal: “We should not let Iraq shoulder responsibilities which it is unable to bear so that it will collapse without ensuring an interest beneficial to itself or to the Arab cause.”²⁰ Nuri’s conclusions dovetailed with Jamali’s hesitations, but they also served Nuri’s own interests, for he did not consider the Turco–Pakistani Agreement a useful tool to further Iraqi goals in the Arab world.

Egypt, unaware of Iraq’s reservations, continued its anti-Iraqi

¹⁶ Troutback to FO, Tel. 138, 6 March 1954, V1073/33, 110787.

¹⁷ Troutback to Eden, Dispatch 64, 10 March 1954, V1073/11, 110787.

¹⁸ Troutback to Eden, Dispatch 2, 6 January 1954, VQ1015/3, 110998.

¹⁹ Troutback to Allen, 17 March 1954, V1073/17, 110787. On Nuri’s statement, see *al-Sha‘b* (Iraq), 10 March 1954.

²⁰ Enclosure Troutback to Allen, 27 April 1954, V1073/39, 110787. A copy of this summary was transmitted to the American and Turkish ambassadors, as well as to King Sa‘ud. See *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 2383–84.

campaign. *Al-Gumhuriyya*, the Revolutionary Command Council's semi-official organ, accused Nuri of dragging Iraq into an "alliance" liable to entangle the Arab states in the Cold War.²¹ The Egyptian Foreign Office issued a statement:

We hope that our brothers [in Iraq] will stay away from devious affairs. We feel for our relatives and neighbors nothing but friendship. Therefore, we ask them not to fail. There are things which are appropriate for implementation tomorrow, *while carrying them out today will be a grave mistake* [emphasis mine]. It is very important that the Arab states act shoulder to shoulder, coordinate their steps and not hurry.²²

Egypt next informed the State Department that it would resist Iraq's participation in the agreement "by all means," since such arrangements would weaken Egypt's position.²³ In protest against the propaganda attacks, Iraq recalled its ambassador in Cairo for consultations,²⁴ and canceled the League's meeting in Baghdad.²⁵ In addition, it decided to send only a low-ranking envoy to the League's deliberations in Cairo in order to evade a discussion of controversial issues such as the Turco-Pakistani Agreement.²⁶ However, Egypt's intense attacks, and the unstable domestic situation led Jamali to state publicly on 21 March that Iraq had not been invited to join the agreement, nor was it considering acceding to it.²⁷

The Arab Response

Turkey and Pakistan signed the "Agreement for Friendly Cooperation" on 2 April 1954. The terms of the agreement were loosely defined, with the signatories pledging themselves to consult and cooperate in three areas of defense: in the exchange of information; in meeting arms production requirements; and in determining the methods and the extent of cooperation "should an unprovoked at-

²¹ *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 11 March 1954.

²² Cairo Radio, 19 March 1954.

²³ *The New York Times*, 23 March 1954 (Aronson, p. 87); *Egyptian Gazette*, 23 March 1954; MENA, 27 March 1954.

²⁴ *Zaman*, 28 March 1954; *al-Jihad*, 1 April 1954.

²⁵ Troutback to FO, Tel. 189, 25 March 1954, VQ1015/19, 110988.

²⁶ Troutback to FO, Tel. 181, 25 March 1954, V1073/22, 110787.

²⁷ Troutback to FO, Tel. 178, 23 March 1954, V1073/20, 110787. The ambassador's assessment of Jamali's statement was transmitted in Tel. 177, V1073/21, 110787.

tack occur against them from the outside.” They did not commit themselves to station forces beyond their borders, but only to consult regarding an appropriate response in the event of an attack. In addition, according to Clause 6, any state deemed “useful for achieving the purposes of the present agreement” might accede.²⁸

A day before the conclusion of the agreement, the political committee of the Arab League had issued the following communiqué:

The first question examined . . . concerned the rumors . . . on the possible adherence of one of the Arab states to the Turko-Pakistan alliance and concerning early conclusion of a Military Aid Agreement between certain Arab states and the US. All the representatives . . . proclaimed these rumors are false and have no foundation. As to the Turko-Pakistan alliance, the Iraqi representative affirmed . . . that Iraq has not been invited to join this alliance, [and] that it has not considered joining and that everything which has been said concerning the connection of Iraq with this alliance is without foundation.²⁹

The State Department received the League’s statement with great disappointment. Disillusioned, Dulles became convinced that Arab and domestic pressures applied on Iraq did not leave it enough leeway. He concluded, therefore, that the Iraqis themselves would have to set the pace. By April 1954, he had lost hope that Iraq would publicly acknowledge its interest in regional defense and decided to suspend the requested Iraqi military aid.³⁰ This decision was quickly reversed, however, as the State Department realized that it was bound to sour American-Iraqi relations even further,³¹ and on 23 April, after last-minute changes in the draft agreement, the United States officially announced its decision to grant military aid to Iraq.³²

In contrast to the American vacillation, Britain was firmly resolved from the start not to bring any pressure to bear on Iraq to join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. Stephen Falla, head of the Foreign Office Levant Department, accurately defined British interest in the matter when he noted that if Iraq came in, “there would be a danger that, as the pact is recognised to be an American initiative and is closely

²⁸ See the text of the Turco-Pakistani agreement, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 8 (Summer 1954), pp. 337–38.

²⁹ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 2375–77; *MENA*, 3 April 1954.

³⁰ *FRUS*, 1952–54, *ibid.*, pp. 2375–76.

³¹ For the correspondence concerning the suspension and its subsequent reversal, see *ibid.*, pp. 2377–83.

³² See the text of the US-Iraqi military assistance agreement, *Khalil*, Vol. II, pp. 366–68.

linked with U.S. military aid, Iraq would become less dependent on the Anglo-Iraqi treaty for her security and arms supplies . . . our influence would be correspondingly reduced and our chances of retaining the military facilities we need would diminish."³³ Paradoxically, Britain could not voice its objection to an agreement which, generally-speaking, served the Western interest against the Soviet menace.

Despite Iraq's demurrals, 'Abd al-Nasir asserted that Iraq was under pressure to join the agreement, and stressed that, as long as the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was unresolved, any alliance formed between an Arab or a Muslim country with a NATO member would be regarded as a "stab in the heart of Arab and Muslim unity."³⁴ The day the agreement was signed, he warned that "no Arab country should join the alliance" because it "ignored the interests of the Middle East, and frustrated the Arab League."³⁵ In his first press conference as prime minister on 19 April, he declared that "Egypt's foreign policy is based on non-cooperation with those who capture its land and violate its sovereignty." He went on to say that Jamali had personally promised him that Iraq would not join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement.³⁶

The positions of other Arab states in this dispute were of secondary significance. King Sa'ud's, who had succeeded his father in November 1953, fully endorsed Egypt's foreign policy.³⁷ Syria, where parliament had been reinstated after the ouster of Adib Shishakli in February 1954, was divided along sectarian and party lines. It was the first Arab state to express support for the agreement and even hint that it might consider joining. This statement, however, was qualified within days by a declaration stating that no Arab country could accede to the agreement without the League's approval.³⁸ Thereafter, Sabri al-'Asali's government chose to avoid any association with the agreement. Lebanon was the only Arab state to show some interest in following Iraq's lead in applying for American aid and possibly joining the agreement.³⁹

³³ Falla's Minute, 10 April 1954, V1073/34, 110787.

³⁴ Near East Radio, 14 April 1954.

³⁵ Seale, p. 196.

³⁶ Cairo Radio, 19 April 1954; MENA, 24 April 1954; *al-Gumhuriyya*, 12-15 April 1954.

³⁷ This was expressed during Sa'ud's visit to Cairo in March 1954, see *al-Difa'*, 23 March 1954.

³⁸ G. Torry, *Syrian Politics and Military, 1945-1958* (Columbus, Ohio: 1969), p. 245.

³⁹ Chapman-Andrews to Allen, 18 March 1954, VL1192/3, 110995.

Iraq made efforts to convince certain Syrian leaders of the advantages of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. However, the position of Iraq's sympathizers within the Syrian government was shaky, and the British refused to exert any pressure on the Syrian government.⁴⁰ Egypt, which believed that the Western powers and Iraq had engineered Shishakli's downfall in order to bring Syria into the agreement, worked behind the scenes to forestall such an eventuality.⁴¹

In the spring of 1954, Turkey and Pakistan (and presumably the US) were still hoping to recruit Iraq, or any other Arab country, into the agreement. However, the dismissal of Jamali's cabinet in April 1954 and the nomination of a caretaker government headed by Mustafa al-Umari to supervise elections scheduled for June 1954,⁴² meant that no Iraqi decision would be made during that period.⁴³ Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafarallah Khan came to Cairo in May 1954 in order to persuade Egypt that the agreement was not harmful to Arab or Egyptian interests.⁴⁴ Khan later claimed that 'Abd al-Nasir showed a marked interest and had told him that Egypt might be willing to associate itself with it in the future.⁴⁵ Undoubtedly, however, this was merely a polite gesture, as it was borne out by continuous Egyptian media attacks on the agreement.

Despite the loose nature of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement and the fact that by mid-1954 no Arab country had joined it, the State Department's kept thinking of it as "the most important development in the Middle East since the [1948] Arab-Israeli war" and the basis of the entire American Middle Eastern policy.⁴⁶ Moreover, the

⁴⁰ Gardner to FO, Tel. 192, 27 April 1954, V1023/4, 110995.

⁴¹ N. al-Armanazi, *Ashr Sanawat fi al-Diplumasiyya: Fi Samim al-Ahdath al-'Arabiyya al-dawliyya* (Beirut: 1964), Vol 2, pp. 108-12; M. Appel, *Hayehasim ben Surya ve-Iraq, 1945-1958* (Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 1990), pp. 229-33.

⁴² Jamali claimed in his memoirs that his resignation was caused by a dispute with Nuri over the question of Syrian-Iraqi unity (see *Dhikriyyat wal-'Ibar* [Beirut: 1965], p. 236). The press claimed that mishandling of the flood problem was the main reason for the dismissal of Jamali's cabinet. It would seem, however, that the actual reason was Iraq's position on the agreement (see, for example, Meyer, p. 91).

⁴³ Troutback to Eden, Dispatch 104, 10 May 1954, V1073/41, 110787.

⁴⁴ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 620, 16 May 1954, JE1061/2, 108385. See also Stevenson's bi-weekly summary, 20 May 1954, JE1013/22, 108313; Israel Foreign Office, *Bamizrah Hatikhon* ("In the Middle East"), a weekly survey, No. 77, 24 May 1954.

⁴⁵ Murray (Karachi) to Kimber (Commonwealth Relations Office, CRO), 20 May 1954, V1073/42, 110787.

⁴⁶ Aronson, p. 87.

US hoped that the forthcoming elections in Iraq would bring to power a government favoring accession.

A visit by Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad 'Ali to Ankara in June 1954 provided the occasion for a discussion on tactics for enlisting additional members. Dissatisfied with the ambivalent Iraqi position, and encouraged by a more sympathetic reception on the part of Iran,⁴⁷ Menderes and Muhammad 'Ali decided to press the new Iraqi government to adopt a more forthright attitude. However, the British Foreign Office, never enthusiastic about the agreement, held that the time was not ripe for such a *démarche*, and conveyed Britain's negative position to the Turkish government.⁴⁸

Egypt's Counterreaction

Egypt's campaign against the agreement stemmed from the conviction that Iraq's toying with the idea of acceding to it was in fact "an attempt to encircle" Egypt in the Arab world.⁴⁹ Iraq's denials did not suffice to dissipate Cairo's suspicions, while the granting of American aid to Iraq, even though it was not made conditional upon adherence to the agreement, caused Egyptian leaders to fear that other Arab states might follow Iraq's lead in soliciting Western arms. As we have seen, it was Egypt's view that this was bound to have a negative effect on the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. 'Abd al-Nasir stated his country's point of view vigorously in June 1954, when he said:

Every Arab now realises the glaring fact that the West wants to settle in our land forever. The West wants to remain the master of the world so that it may colonise, enslave and exploit it. The West will give Iraq military equipment, but what for? Is it to strengthen proud Iraq so that she may liquidate the step-daughter of imperialism and the principal enemy of the Arabs, Israel? No, it is to lead her to death in the front lines of the next world war in order to immortalise the Western colonisation of Iraq.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Bowker to Eden, Dispatch 122, 19 June 1954, DY1192/201, 110787; *FRUS*, 1952-54, Vol. IX, pp. 513-16; Laithwaite (Karachi) to Viscount Swindon (CRO), Dispatch 99, 22 July 1954, V1073/51, 110788.

⁴⁸ Hooper (Baghdad) to FO, Tel. 410, 9 July 1954, V1073/45, 110787; FO to Ankara, Tel. 449, 13 July 1954; High Commissioner in Karachi to CRO, Tel. 848, 18 July 1954, V1073/51, 110788.

⁴⁹ Heikal, *Milaffat*, p. 313ff.

⁵⁰ Seale, p. 197. See also 'Abd al-Nasir's remarks to a Lebanese correspondent in mid-June, Wheelock, p. 217.

With regard to Jordan and Lebanon, at least, the Egyptian fears were quite well-founded. Moreover, pro-Iraqi sympathizers in Syria were active trying to bring about an Iraqi–Syrian union.⁵¹ The first Egyptian countermove was to ask Ahmad al-Shuqairi, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Arab League to visit Syria, Lebanon and Jordan in May 1954, ostensibly to discuss coordination against Israel. Simultaneously, Cairo launched new propaganda offensive against several Arab states.⁵² Saudi, Syrian and Jordanian denials at the time of any intention to sign military agreements with the United States⁵³ were undoubtedly precipitated by this Egyptian pressure.

In addition, Salah Salim was dispatched on a tour of Arab capitals. His first stop was at Riyadh (June 6–10); the outcome of his talks there were encouraging to Egypt: a joint statement said that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to unify their armies within the framework of the ACSP and “undermine any attempt at including Arab countries in any alliance which the West desires to create for its own good.”⁵⁴ Militarily, the Egyptian–Saudi agreement was meaningless, but politically and psychologically it signaled the reactivation of the old Egyptian–Saudi axis which had opposed Iraqi leadership.⁵⁵

King Sa‘ud then visited Amman (June 13–17), probably at Egypt’s request, hoping to obtain a similar agreement from Jordan. However, despite courtesy gestures and a vague statement of agreement on “military cooperation within the framework of the ACSP,” nothing substantial transpired.⁵⁶ Sa‘ud also met with Lebanese Prime Minister ‘Abdallah al-Yafi, who came to Amman in order to reassure the Saudis after press reports had spoken of a change in Lebanese policy. In addition, Sa‘ud’s chief adviser, Yusuf Yasin, delivered a note to the Turkish representative in Amman, complaining that Turkish policy was “more and more contrary to Arab interests” and

⁵¹ Jamali was busy at the time to bring the two countries together in a federation or confederation. See Hooper to Falla, 22 June 1954, V1071/36, 110785. On his contacts with the US, see *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 523–24.

⁵² On the various Egyptian attempts to increase Cairo’s influence in the Arab world during this period, see *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 77, 24 May 1954; No. 79, 6 June 1954; No. 80, 14 June 1954.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, No. 79, 6 June 1954.

⁵⁴ *Al-Ahram*, 12 June 1954. For an overall summary of Salim’s tour, see *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, *ibid.*; No. 80, 14 June 1954.

⁵⁵ This was also the assessment of the British ambassador in Jidda. See Pelham to Eden, Tel. 81, 27 June 1954, V1071/42, 110785.

⁵⁶ Duke (Amman) to FO, Tel. 96, 22 June 1954, VJ1942/2, 110953; *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 81, 21 June 1954.

that Turkey was now considered part of the “enemy camp.” The message also contained an appeal to Turkey to join in a common front against Israel. It seems that the Saudi *démarche* had been prompted by the Egyptians.⁵⁷

Salim’s next stop was Yemen, a visit unlikely to affect Arab politics but bound to demonstrate that Yemen was within Egypt’s sphere of influence. The following stop, Beirut, was more significant, for while Lebanon was not a major player in Arab politics, it was a testing ground of Egyptian and Iraqi strength. Lebanon had been the first Arab state to follow Iraq’s lead and approach the West for military aid in June 1954.⁵⁸ Moreover, Lebanese President Kamil Sham’un had told the American ambassador that Lebanon might follow Iraq if the latter joined the Turco–Pakistani Agreement.⁵⁹ In actual fact, Lebanese policy, ambiguous as always, reflected the country’s attempt to play the role of inter-Arab mediator and Arab–Western go-between. Salim’s goal was to bring Lebanon into the Egyptian camp. During Salim’s visit, Yafi suggested going to Baghdad to mediate between Egypt and Iraq, but his offer was rejected by Iraq.⁶⁰ Sham’un’s suggestion (backed by Salim), to convene an Arab summit to discuss the Arab stance toward the West, was likewise turned down in Baghdad.⁶¹ In any case, Salim did succeed in obtaining a statement from Yafi that his government had no intention of joining the Turco–Pakistani Agreement or of becoming associated with any Western pact.⁶²

Although Salim’s aim had been to visit all the Arab capitals—in the words of Radio Cairo, to “smash the chains of imperialism”—Damascus declined to receive him and Baghdad did not give him a reply.⁶³ Looking beyond the rhetoric, Salim’s chief aim was to persuade Arab leaders that all current problems—regional defense, Iraqi–Syrian unity, and Israel—should be tackled only after the completion of the Anglo–Egyptian negotiations. After settling its own problem,

⁵⁷ Chancery Ankara to Levant Department, 3 July 1954, V1073/43, 110787.

⁵⁸ Chapman–Andrews (Beirut) to FO, Tel. 92, 9 June 1954, VL1022/4, 110959.

⁵⁹ Chapman–Andrews to FO, Tel. 100, 23 June 1954, VL1192/96, 110969.

⁶⁰ NA, RG 59, Beirut to Secretary of State, Tel. 22, 6 July 1954, 674.86/7–654; Tel. 26, 8 July 1954, 674.86/7–854.

⁶¹ Beirut to Secretary of State, Tel. 27, 8 July 1954, 674.86/7–854; Dispatch 192, 28 September 1954, 674.86/9–2854.

⁶² *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 81, 21 June 1954.

⁶³ Sterendial–Bennet to Eden, Enclosure to Dispatch 30, 30 August 1954, V1073/22, 110786.

he implied, Egypt would be willing to address the other problems together with its Arab partners. But a unilateral attempt to solve these problems without Egypt, he warned, such as Iraq was undertaking, would elicit Egyptian sanctions in the form of propaganda attacks and measures by the Arab League.

Simultaneously, however, Egypt tried to placate worried Western officials. In a meeting with British Ambassador Ralph Stevenson on 10 June 1954, 'Abd al-Nasir intimated that he was willing to consider the question of regional defense and expressed—in general terms—a desire to participate “in a regional pact and even a Turkish–Pakistani pact.”⁶⁴ However, rather than signal a change in position, this move reflected Egypt's tenuous domestic situation, which prompted Cairo to make every effort to conclude the agreement with Britain, even if this entailed making promises not intended to be kept.

Egypt's immediate goals had thus been attained. It had prevented Iraq's accession to the Turco–Pakistani Agreement, as well as that of other Arab states. It had also stopped other Arab states from signing military agreements with the United States similar to the American–Iraqi Agreement. Egypt's success was particularly impressive in view of the fact that its leadership was then preoccupied with two even more pressing problems: the power struggle between Naguib and 'Abd al-Nasir, and negotiations with the British.

Meanwhile, Iraq did not remain inactive, although its domestic problems limited its scope for maneuver. The June 1954 elections brought Nuri al-Sa'id back to power, but a new government was only formed in August.⁶⁵ Jamali, fearful of Egypt's attempts to isolate Iraq, tried again to persuade the Western powers to support an Iraqi–Syrian federation or confederation, possibly to include Lebanon later on.⁶⁶ He, and subsequently 'Abd al-Allah, visited Beirut where they met both with Lebanese officials and the Syrian prime minister. However, objections by the Western powers, by several Arab states and by certain Syrian domestic quarters, frustrated the Iraqi scheme.

With the initialling of the Anglo–Egyptian Agreement in July 1954, the Western powers assumed that the main obstacle to Egyptian

⁶⁴ M.A.W. Sayyid, *U.S.–Egyptian Relations from the 1952 Revolution to the Suez Crisis of 1956* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1987), p. 187.

⁶⁵ *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. VI (1954), p. 47.

⁶⁶ Hooper to Falla, 22 June 1954, V1071/37, 110785.

participation in a Western pact had been eliminated. Moreover, Nuri's resumption of the Iraqi premiership in August 1954 raised Western hopes for rapid progress in setting up a Middle Eastern defense organization. However, the rivalry between Egypt and Iraq over hegemony in the Arab world, and Egypt's domestic constraints continued to foil Western schemes. In retrospect, the struggle over the Turco-Pakistani Agreement could be viewed as a general rehearsal for the major trial of strength, soon to evolve around the Baghdad Pact. However, there was one more stop on the road—direct negotiations between Iraq and Egypt for the establishment of a regional defense organization.

CHAPTER FOUR

COLLISION COURSE: THE ORIGINS OF THE EGYPTIAN–IRAQI RIFT

Egypt and Regional Defense

The Anglo–Egyptian Agreement, initialled on 27 July 1954, stipulated that in return for complete British evacuation within two years, the Suez base and other facilities would be activated in the event of an external attack against any member of the ACSP or Turkey.¹ The prevailing perception in the West was that Egypt would now be more amenable to participation in a Western-led regional organization. This view, however, ignored Cairo’s fundamental constraints, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the official termination of British “occupation.” Two domestic problems circumscribed ‘Abd al-Nasir’s room for maneuver: First, he continued to be locked in a power struggle with Muhammad Naguib. Second, he could not afford to ignore opposition groups, and public opinion generally which was strongly critical of Egypt’s concessions to Britain, especially its inclusion of an attack on non-Arab Turkey as a reason for activating the Suez base.²

Though Egyptian leaders made several statements favoring cooperation with the West,³ the agreement did not bring about a change in Egyptian foreign policy. When American Ambassador William Caffrey handed Foreign Minister Mahmud Fawzi the draft of the military aid agreement discussed by Naguib and President Eisenhower shortly before (in July 1953), the Egyptian government deferred a decision. Egypt’s ambassador in Washington, Ahmad Hussein, was instructed to explain to the Administration that Egypt did not reject American aid *per se*, but that domestic problems compelled it to distance itself from the West.⁴ ‘Abd al-Nasir told a *New York Times*

¹ For the text of the agreement, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 729–31.

² J.S. Gordon, *Towards Nasser’s Egypt: The Consolidation of the July Revolution and the End of the Old Regime* (Ph.D. dissertation: The University of Michigan, 1987), p. 317. On the power struggle between Naguib and ‘Abd al-Nasir, see *ibid.*, pp. 309–19.

³ Aronson, p. 98.

⁴ Concerning Eisenhower’s promise to Naguib, see *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 2291–92. For the draft of the military agreement submitted to Fawzi, see *ibid.*,

correspondent that “after the Suez settlement, there is nothing standing in the way of our good relations with the West.” But, he added, hammering away at the idea of a pact would only perpetuate old suspicions in the minds of the people; until the Arabs were convinced that there was no element of hidden domination, pressure for a pact would be dangerously premature.⁵

Ambiguity had become the salient feature of Egyptian foreign policy. On 31 August 1954, in an interview with *U.S. News and World Report*, ‘Abd al-Nasir emphasized that Egypt was determined to oppose any form of Middle Eastern pact involving the participation of the United States or Britain and added that Egypt also opposed the idea of any Arab state joining the Turco-Pakistani Agreement.⁶ Two days later, however, the RCC issued a background paper for the foreign press pointing to the Soviet Union as the major threat to the Middle East and indicating Egypt’s preference for allying itself with the West. A rider then said that Cairo “still was not ready to adhere to the projected Middle Eastern defense pact, which would smack of colonialism.”⁷ Such mixed signals were deliberately intended to buy time for winning over domestic opinion while not alienating the West.

Domestic criticism of the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement eroded much of the regime’s popularity during 1954, even though it had solved the chief problem that had faced every Egyptian government during the postwar period—the British presence. In an effort to play down the significance of the concessions it had made for the sake of the agreement, Egypt became more involved in Arab politics and the Arab orientation in its foreign policy became more pronounced.⁸ In a well-timed move, copies of ‘Abd al-Nasir’s booklet *The Philosophy of the Revolution* were distributed throughout the country and its three chapters reprinted in Egyptian press during 1953 and

pp. 2292–93. For Fawzi’s reply, see *ibid.*, pp. 2297–98. See also Ahmad Hussein’s conversation with the State Department, *ibid.*, pp. 2298–99.

⁵ See ‘Abd al-Nasir’s interview with Kenneth Love, *New York Times*, 20 August 1954. Excerpts are to be found in Love, p. 196; Aronson, pp. 98–99; Wheelock, p. 217.

⁶ Stevenson (Cairo) to FO, Saving Tel. 190, 3 September 1954, JE1022/20, 108349. See also Heikal, *Milaffat*, p. 318.

⁷ D. Hofstadter, *Egypt and Nasser*, Vol. 1, 1952–56 (New York: 1973), p. 71. ‘Abd al-Nasir, however, denied this statement in the local press. See also Aronson, p. 100; Ginat, p. 185. Although the background paper was intended for the foreign press, its content was broadcast by Beirut Radio, 2 September 1954.

⁸ D. Dishon, “Mediniyut Hahutz shel Mishtar Hamahapecha Hamitsri,” *Hamizrah Hehadash* (Hebrew), Vol. VII (1956), p. 181.

early 1954.⁹ The third chapter described Egypt's central role in the Arab, African and Islamic orbits, but emphasized the Arab orientation in particular. "There can be no doubt," 'Abd al-Nasir wrote, "that the Arab circle is the most important, and the one with which we are most closely linked. For its people are intertwined with us by history. We have suffered together, we have gone through the same crises."¹⁰ When 'Abd al-Nasir eventually emerged as the RCC's undisputed leader, his booklet remained no longer a merely ideological statement, but turned into a set of guidelines for a new policy more than ever oriented toward the Arab world.¹¹

It was not the Suez agreement, however, that marked a turning point in Egyptian foreign policy, as several scholars claim.¹² Ever since the establishment of the Arab League in 1945, Egypt had been involved in Arab affairs. Even though for the first two years of the RCC's existence, its main preoccupation was with the Suez question and other domestic problems, it never disengaged itself from the Arab world. On the contrary, Iraq's attempts to initiate a regional defense pact consistently met a strong Egyptian response. Thus, historian Harir Dekmejian's assertion that from the July revolution until the end of 1954, Egypt was in state of "splendid isolation" in the Arab world seems misleading.¹³ Rather, an incremental process of deepening Egypt's Arab involvement is discernible—a process speeded up by external events at the end of 1954.

Iraq and Regional Defense

The negotiations between Egypt and Britain for the revision of the 1936 treaty had led Iraq to demand a similar revision of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, due to expire in 1957. The Royal Palace regarded Nuri al-Sa'id, the architect of the 1930 treaty, as the only

⁹ Gamal Abdul Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: 1955). Excerpts of the booklet were sent by Stevenson to FO, Tel. 183, 14 September 1954, 108317. The booklet was published in the US with an introduction by Dorothy Thompson, who added the words "Egypt's Liberation" to the title in the American edition. This did not please Heikal or 'Abd al-Nasir. See St. John, *The Boss*, pp. 193-94.

¹⁰ *The Philosophy of the Revolution.*, p. 88.

¹¹ Gershoni, pp. 18-20.

¹² See for example Dishon, p. 181; Dekmejian, p. 42.

¹³ Dekmejian, p. 42.

figure capable of achieving a new one. With a measure of discretion obviously stemming from a desire to avoid a recurrence of the Portsmouth Treaty events, the British government instructed Troutback in June 1954 to confidently discuss with the crown prince the nomination of a new government strong enough to revise the current treaty.¹⁴ ‘Abd al-illah responded favorably, but pointed out that before a revision could be discussed, the new government would have to gain popular support by undertaking reforms. When he conveyed the scheme to Nuri, the latter agreed on condition that new elections were held to ensure a parliamentary majority.¹⁵

During a visit to London that summer, Nuri took up the plan with the Foreign Office, proposing to link the revision of the treaty with the establishment of a regional defense organization—a notion he had so long wanted to be realized.¹⁶ In talks with Minister of State Selwyn Lloyd, he proposed an Iraqi–Pakistani pact open to other countries concerned with the security of the region. Britain might thus join at a later stage, its accession superseding the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty. More than that: the pact would be a preliminary for two further developments: the creation of a regional defense system based on the ACSP and including Egypt. Should Egypt refuse, Nuri asserted, he was nevertheless determined to proceed, thereby isolating Egypt in the Arab world. Second, Syria and Lebanon would become associated with the Iraqi–Pakistani pact, thus giving Iraq access to the Mediterranean.¹⁷ Nuri also informed the American embassy in Baghdad of his plan. He then placed it on the agenda of his forthcoming meeting with Salih Salim in Sarsank (see below).¹⁸

The elections, held on 9 June 1954, did not produce the expected results, as Nuri’s supporters obtained only a small majority.¹⁹ As soon as he was nominated prime minister in early August, he therefore dissolved parliament, called for new elections on 12 September, and

¹⁴ Lloyd’s Minute to PM, 3 June 1954, VQ1054/21, 111003. This Minute was sent to Baghdad after receiving the approval of the prime minister, Tel. 503, 12 June 1954.

¹⁵ Marr, *Modern Iraq*, p. 115.

¹⁶ Troutback to FO, Tel. 370, 15 June 1954, VQ1054/22, 111003.

¹⁷ See Nuri’s conversations with Lloyd, FO to Hooper, Dispatch 130, 20 July 1954, VQ1015/46, 110990. Nuri also expressed his hope that the British would utilize French influence in Syria and Lebanon to persuade them to become more closer to Iraq.

¹⁸ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 541–43 and note 2.

¹⁹ FO to Hooper (Baghdad), Dispatch 130, 20 July 1954, VQ1015/46, 110990.

unscrupulously eliminated the opposition parties. The September elections, described as “the most rigidly controlled ever,”²⁰ resulted in the formation of the so-called “docile parliament” in which over 100 members (out of 135) supported Nuri.²¹ It was to serve as Nuri’s rubber stamp for more than three years, effective power being shared by Nuri, the palace (‘Abd al-‘Illah in particular) and a small group of loyal ex-prime ministers and politicians of Nuri’s generation. This forum, known as “the old guard,” was convened by Nuri and the palace whenever an important decision had to be taken. Thus, as historian Majid Khadduri wrote, “the parliamentary system, in fact if not in name, was transformed into a working oligarchy with a group of elder politicians operating it.”²² Nuri’s measures elicited sharp criticism both in Britain and Iraq. Troutback personally welcomed the new “strong” government, yet expressed grave doubts concerning the country’s stability, now altogether dependent on Nuri.²³

The virtual elimination of the opposition parties and the acquisition of a sweeping majority in parliament were part of a deliberate design of Nuri’s, the aims of which coincided with British policy. They were to enable him to deal with three interrelated issues from a position of strength: the termination of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty; the formation of an Iraqi-led regional pact under Western auspices; and the containment of the Soviet menace. Once Egypt had initialled its agreement with Britain, Nuri believed the major obstacle to have been removed and thought the time ripe for making his move. However, Nuri was prepared for—indeed: he preferred—an Egyptian refusal to join a Western pact. This would have provided him with the pretext to proceed freely with his own plan. However, Dulles’ Northern Tier concept, and its first tangible expression—the Turco–Pakistani Agreement—did not dovetail with Nuri’s ambitions: the chances of accession by Arab states were slim, and Iraq’s possible adherence could in no way enhance its aspirations for Arab hegemony. No less important, participation in an American-led pact could

²⁰ Khadduri, *Independent Iraq*, p. 306. Al-Husry wrote that only 23 seats were contested, while all the rest “were returned unchallenged (*bi-l-tazkiya*).” See K. al-Husry, “The Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958,” *Middle East Forum*, Vol. 41 (1965), p. 27.

²¹ FO to Hooper, Dispatch 130, 20 July 1954, VQ1015/46, 110990.

²² Khadduri, *Independent Iraq*, p. 259.

²³ Troutback to Eden, Dispatch 206, 24 September 1954, VQ1015/74, 110991; Dispatch 190, 3 September 1954, VQ1015/66, 110991.

not serve as a cover for the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. In order to deflect domestic and inter-Arab opposition, Nuri intended to review his next move with several other Arab leaders. The Egyptian-Iraqi talks in mid-August 1954 must be viewed in this context.

The Sarsank Negotiations

Iraqi-Egyptian relations since the establishment of the Arab League were marked by fundamental disagreements and abiding distrust. Even though Egypt had succeeded in containing joint Hashemite Jordanian-Iraqi designs on the Fertile Crescent, it remained suspicious in this regard. The Iraqi leaders for their part, resentful that the League had been turned into a tool of Egyptian inter-Arab policy (and to some extent: foreign), resisted by every means Egypt's assumption of a central role in Arab politics. The conflict for regional hegemony between Egypt and Iraq, carried on, as we have seen, under the banner of Arab unity, had been going on since 1945. In the past, only one attempt had been made to bring about an understanding between Egypt and Iraq. It occurred in December 1949, when 'Ali Jawdat, the newly nominated Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister Muzahim al-Bajaji, visited Cairo. They drew up a draft agreement stipulating Egypt's and Iraq's non-involvement in internal Syrian affairs for five years, and envisaging a joint endeavor to maintain Syria's stability based on a new constitution. However, upon the return of the Iraqi delegation to Baghdad, the foreign minister was accused by the palace and the old guard of having "capitulated" to Egypt. In consequence, Jawdat resigned.²⁴ The episode accurately illustrated the complexities of Iraqi-Egyptian relationship; these had remained constant since then.

On 13 August, Salim, accompanied by an impressive delegation, arrived for talks with Faysal, 'Abd al-Allah and Nuri in the royal summer resort at Sarsank, the first visit by an Egyptian minister to Iraq since the creation of the League. It was meant to achieve at

²⁴ Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 95, 11 February 1950, 674.87/2-1150; Cairo to Department of State, 28 September 1950, 674.87/1-2850; 6 February 1950, 674.87/2-650. Jawdat and Bajaji were convinced that Nuri's intrigues in Syria had adversely affected Iraqi-Egyptian relations, see Baghdad to Department of State, 23 January 1950, 674.87/1-2350. See also 'Ali Jawdat, *Dhikriyyat 'Ali Jawdat, 1900-1958* (Beirut: 1967), pp. 281-83.

least three goals: to eliminate Iraqi–Egyptian misunderstandings; to mediate between the Iraqi Hashemites and the Saudis; and, to formulate a unified policy on Arab–Western relations, including the question of regional defense. The Egyptians considered the last issue most important one.²⁵ Indeed, while Salim was en route to Sarsank, the Egyptian foreign minister, speaking to British Ambassador Stevenson, expressed his concern that Iraq might make a hasty decision about Middle Eastern defense.²⁶ The remark suggested that the reason behind Egypt’s initiative was its intense desire to prevent a separate Iraqi move.

Nuri–Salim talks became a matter of controversy both among politicians and historians: different, sometimes contradictory, accounts of them were published afterwards. Judging from the entirety of available sources, Nuri’s version seems more credible, although not entirely consistent either. The main issue, he stated, had been that of regional defense. When Salim expressed opposition to any kind of agreement between Iraq and Pakistan, Nuri suggested modifying the terms of the ACSP in accordance with the spirit of Article 51 of the UN Charter so as to allow non-Arab countries (such as Turkey, Britain, Iran, Pakistan and even the United States) to join the ACSP. This elicited a positive reaction from Salim, whereupon Nuri informed the American chargé that he and Salim had agreed that:

- (1) The ACSP would be modified and expanded. Each Arab state would pledge troops and equipment in the event of aggression “from whatever source” against any other Arab country. Since Arab public opinion was basically against sending troops outside the Arab world, the Arab states would give “only general support to non-Arab states, while such states would pledge similar support to Arabs in [the] event of aggression.” Concerning the Western powers, it was agreed that Britain and the US would “confine themselves to military aid and technical support in peace time and to aid any such forces as were feasible in case of aggression.”
- (2) One of the aims of the new pact would be “to prepare for peace with Israel” in accordance with UN resolutions—not in terms of their precise clauses but rather in their spirit. The Arabs could

²⁵ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 961, 10 August 1954, VQ10316/3, 110996.

²⁶ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 965, 10 August 1954, JE11932/1, 108485.

not force Israel to make peace, but Israel “could have peace any time it was ready to talk along UN resolution lines.”²⁷

- (3) The proposal for the modification of the ACSP would be submitted to the Americans and the British for their comments and advice. Iraq and Egypt would take no action, nor consult with other Arab leaders, until the Western response was received.
- (4) Egyptian and Iraqi envoys would meet again in Cairo on 15 September in order to discuss the Western response.²⁸

Upon returning from Sarsank, Nuri expressed his hope to the British chargé that secret talks on the revision of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty could take place within the framework of the comprehensive regional arrangement now being envisaged.²⁹ Moreover, he told the American chargé that the new formula was in fact consonant with the aims of the Middle East Command and the Turco–Pakistani Agreement. While the latter “would be hard to sell [to the] Arab peoples,” he said, his plan was an indigenous initiative “which would be difficult for Arab countries to reject.” Assuring the State Department that he was not abandoning the Turco–Pakistani Agreement, Nuri went on to claim that under the present circumstances his proposal “would have great advantages over the existing plans.”³⁰ He also referred to the likely psychological impact of choosing the organization’s name, advising that the terms “Arab” and “the Middle East” be omitted. This would preclude an associative connection with the ill-fated Middle East Defense Organization, as well as help to attract non-Arab states. He suggested naming the new pact after the place of its signing ceremony.³¹ It is reasonable to assume that the term “Baghdad Pact” already crossed his mind at the time.

²⁷ In this context Nuri told British officials that he was willing to sign a peace treaty with Israel according to Resolution 181 (the partition of Palestine). Salim, however, in reiterating the main themes of the meeting to the American chargé, omitted the question of peace with Israel completely.

²⁸ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 541–43. See the other relevant documents: Baghdad to Department of State, 24 August 1954, 674.87/8–2454; Hooper to FO, Tel. 476, 20 August 1954, V1076/3, 110791; Bowker to Shuckburgh, 27 August 1954, V1076/44; Troutback to Shuckburgh, 2 September 1954, V1076/16. See also Troutback’s minutes concerning his meetings with Nuri and ‘Abd al-‘Illah, 31 August 1954, FO642/241, 1194. Another version was given by Iraqi Ambassador al-Rawi, see Stevenson to FO, Tel. 1151, 31 August 1954, V1076/6, 110791.

²⁹ Hooper to FO, Tel. 476, 20 August 1954, V1076/3, 110791.

³⁰ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 541–43.

³¹ Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 143, 7 September 1954, 780.5/9–754.

While still in Iraq, Salim met with the American chargé there, Philip Ireland, who reported home that Salim's briefing had not differed essentially from Nuri's account. Salim had told him that he had not given much thought to the procedure under which non-Arab states would join the ACSP, or to its timing. He emphasized that Egypt would need time to overcome its suspicions of the West, and that it would have difficulty accepting Pakistani participation in light of its adamant objection to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. Archival material therefore suggests that the main difference between Nuri's and Salim's accounts concerned the timing of the accession of non-Arab countries to the ACSP.³²

In a press conference in Baghdad on 20 August, Salim stated that the ACSP as it then stood was "a dead letter" and needed to be modified to guarantee the safety of Arab borders and the integrity of the Arab countries. Replying to a question on bilateral mergers in the Arab world, he stated that "if two or more Arab peoples wish to unite in some form, Egypt does not object."³³ He was apparently not fully aware of the implications of what he had said, his words being mistakenly interpreted in the West and in some Arab states as implying acceptance of a Syrian-Iraqi union. Consequently, on 29 August, he denied publicly that the question of unity had been discussed at Sarsank or that Egypt approved of any particular union.³⁴

The results of the Egyptian-Iraqi meeting disappointed Dulles. In a memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Henry Byroade, he wrote that he was "greatly disturbed over the report that Iraq is planning a security pact with Egypt and is moving away from the idea of joining up with Turkey and Pakistan." Dulles stressed that American aid to Iraq was based on the premise that it would be associated with the Northern Tier countries and would not "merely build up the Arab League" against Israel. He suggested reconsidering the aid given to Iraq by invoking a clause that referred to reviewing military aid "in light of the international situation at the time."³⁵ Ambassador Caffery in Cairo promptly responded that such a conclusion would be premature as there were differences of interpretation between Egypt and Iraq. Indeed, a few

³² Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 107, 23 August 1954, 674.87/8-2354.

³³ Cairo Radio, 20 August 1954. See also Seale, p. 204.

³⁴ Cairo Radio, 29 August 1954.

³⁵ *FRUS*, 1952-54, Vol. IX, p. 545.

days later, he reported that Salim had exceeded his authority in Baghdad, and that 'Abd al-Nasir would not be willing to cooperate with Iraq and the West.³⁶

The contradictory reports arriving from Baghdad and Cairo confused the Western powers. Nonetheless, the US and Britain clung to their positions. The British still inclined to base regional defense on the ACSP rather than on the Northern Tier countries.³⁷ Troutback was instructed to support Nuri's offer while at the same time to try "shaping his proposals to our advantage."³⁸ The State Department, on the other hand, expressed satisfaction with Egypt's refusal to cooperate with Iraq, hoping that Nuri would consequently focus on the Turco-Pakistani Agreement "which we believe offers [the] only basis for realistic and effective defense planning in [the] Near East."³⁹ These differing views were hardly surprising: the US preferred an American-led agreement (that concluded by Turkey and Pakistan); Britain wished to safeguard its regional interests and to make possible a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.

Shortly after the meeting, a major rift occurred between Salim and 'Abd al-Nasir, probably because of Salim's inaccurate reporting on the talks there. Reports from Baghdad of Nuri's speaking to the American and British ambassadors of an "agreed plan" aroused 'Abd al-Nasir's suspicions.⁴⁰ In a conversation between himself, Salim and the Iraqi ambassador, Najib al-Rawi, on 8 September, 'Abd al-Nasir asserted that it was premature to approach the Western powers "before Egypt and Iraq had reached full agreement . . . and had consulted other Arab states on plans for [the] revision [of] ACSP." He also mentioned twice that he had it from a "reliable American source" that the US had relinquished the idea of Arab adherence to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement.⁴¹ It seems that 'Abd al-Nasir now realized to what extent Salim had exceeded his authority at Sarsank.⁴² The

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 545–46.

³⁷ FO to Baghdad, Tel. 675, 31 August 1954, V1076/4, 110791, and Troutback's reaction, Tel. 497, 1 September 1954, V1076/8.

³⁸ FO to Baghdad, Tel. 711, 13 September 1954, V1076/17, 110791.

³⁹ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, p. 547.

⁴⁰ Cairo to the Secretary of State, Tel. 260, 27 August 1954, 674.87/8–2754.

⁴¹ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 547–48.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 548; Stevenson to FO, Tel. 1234, 10 September 1954, V1076/13, 110791; Brewis' Minute, 30 August 1954, V1076/4, 110791. This was also surmised by Seale, p. 205.

following day, Salim was sent on a month's leave, but was reinstated on 11 September.⁴³

The significance of the Sarsank talks was that they set Egypt and Iraq on a collision course. Nuri's aim was to convince Egypt to participate in a regional defense pact with the West. Failing that, he was determined to proceed in any case. Egypt's target, by contrast, was to freeze, or at least postpone, any independent Iraqi initiative until domestic and regional conditions would permit Egypt to take the lead in setting up a purely Arab defense pact. Salim most probably assumed that the Sarsank understanding was the best way to achieve this. However, he does not seem to have fully realized the implications of what was said there. Nuri for his part, decided to make one last effort to reach an understanding, by meeting personally with 'Abd al-Nasir.

'Abd al-Nasir meets Nuri al-Sa'id

Nuri supposed that Egypt would want to defer any proposal of regional defense until evacuation of the canal zone by the British, due in October 1956. He reiterated to Troutback in early September 1954 that, should Egypt indeed prefer a delay, he was resolved to proceed with his own plan, as outlined to Lloyd in June 1954 (see above). Nuri explained that he personally favored "some quite simple agreement" with Pakistan under which the latter would assist Iraq or one of its neighbors if they were attacked. Once this was approved by parliament, there would be no need for a further parliamentary approval, if and when Britain subsequently adhered to the pact. Troutback thought of Nuri's idea as "an ingenious way" of arriving at a new defense arrangement with Britain while bypassing parliament. "My belief," he summoned up, "is that all Nuri's plans for defense are really designed to that end."⁴⁴ Significantly, despite his secure majority in parliament, Nuri avoided any formal discussion or vote concerning Britain's accession to the mooted pact, fearing a repetition of the Portsmouth Treaty riots.

⁴³ *Al-Hayat*, 10 September 1954; Stevenson to FO, Tel. 1118, 22 August 1954, V1076/4, 110791; Tel. 1139, 30 August 1954, V1076/5, 110791.

⁴⁴ Troutback to Eden, Dispatch 198, 11 September 1954, V1076/26, 110791.

Nuri arrived in Cairo on 15 September.⁴⁵ Middle East defense issue was the main topic on the agenda. Nuri averred that inasmuch as Egypt had unilaterally initialled the agreement with Britain which affected the Arab states (a reference to Article Four concerning the re-activation of the Suez base in the event of an attack against the Arab states or Turkey) Egypt ought now to agree to a revision of the ACSP meant to include Western powers. Nuri made it clear that if Egypt considered the plan untimely, Iraq would take the necessary steps to guarantee its own safety by an arrangement with Turkey, Iran and possibly Pakistan. In his reply, 'Abd al-Nasir did not disavow the Sarsank talks, but claimed that domestic problems—the Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood—compelled him to wait “until sometime after the final agreement with [the] British [was] signed.” Nuri later said that he replied:

That's very well and I will do nothing to prevent your putting your own ideas into effect so long as they are in accordance with Articles 51 and 52 of the UN charter. However, I cannot wait. Iraq is in an exposed position [being subject to the Soviet menace]. I must do something. But whenever I do something I shall have in mind that eventually Egyptians might participate in it.⁴⁶

In an apologetic speech broadcast by Nuri in December 1956 in the aftermath of the Suez War he asserted that 'Abd al-Nasir had given him the “green light,” telling him that he was “free to take whatever measures you may wish in order to protect . . . [Iraq] against danger.”⁴⁷ Egypt responded by publishing a statement, saying that Nuri had wanted to expand the ACSP and link it to the Western powers simply in order to obtain arms, and that he had also been willing to seek “another method” if Egypt refused to modify the ACSP. According to this version, 'Abd al-Nasir had rejected all of Nuri's proposals, arguing that Egypt could not consider any new methods for regional defense before the completion of British evacuation. Nuri had replied that the ACSP was “a dead document,” and that “another method had per force to be sought.”⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Beirut to the Secretary of State, Dispatch 180, 16 September 1954, 674.87/9-1654.

⁴⁶ *FRUS*, 1952-54, Vol. IX, pp. 548-49; Stevenson to FO, Tel. 1296, 16 September 1954, V1076/22, 110791.

⁴⁷ For the text of Nuri's speech, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 255-78. An unidentified source close to 'Abd al-Nasir claimed that the latter had indeed given Nuri a “green light.” Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 397, 23 September 1954, 674.87/9-2354.

⁴⁸ For the Egyptian response, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 279-87.

The accuracy of either version, published in the context of a hostile propaganda campaign between the two countries, is questionable. It would seem particularly doubtful that Nuri had been given "a green light" by 'Abd al-Nasir for whatever he deemed necessary for Iraq's security. While it stands to reason that the Egyptian leader did not object to a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty along the lines of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, he probably opposed any formal pacts with a Western power, and certainly disapproved of an Iraqi-led organization such as the Baghdad Pact. Although, much like the Nuri-Salim talks, the contents of the Nuri-'Abd al-Nasir talks remained somewhat obscure, it became evident, as Heikal noted, that "Nuri went back to Baghdad with the two governments' points of view as far apart as ever."⁴⁹

A visit by the Syrian prime minister and his chief-of-staff to Cairo later in September 1954 constituted a sequel to the Iraqi-Egyptian negotiations. It was meant as a protest against the Sarsank talks which allegedly dealt, *inter alia*, with Syrian affairs without Damascus being consulted.⁵⁰ 'Abd al-Nasir assured the Syrians that Salim had not compromised Syrian interests, nor had he acquiesced in the notion of a Syrian-Iraqi union.⁵¹

In view of the divisive patterns of Arab politics from the creation of the Arab League onward, the Sarsank and Cairo meetings represented a unique attempt to settle Iraqi-Egyptian differences by direct contact. Like the Western leaders, Nuri had apparently believed that the initialling of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement might bring about a change in Egypt's attitude toward regional security. Even if he had had doubts about the outcome of the talks, he was determined to convince Arab public opinion that he had made every possible effort to secure Egypt's support before making a unilateral move. This also explains his obsessive desire to establish the legitimacy of his further steps. In the event, the meetings engendered mistrust, resentment and ultimately hatred between 'Abd al-Nasir and Nuri, and marked the first stage in a bitter personal struggle which only ended with the downfall of the Iraqi monarchy and Nuri's violent death in July 1958. This rivalry was hardly surprising; both men were devout Arab

⁴⁹ Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, p. 54. On the press conference at the conclusion of the talks, see Stevenson to FO, Tel. 1310, 18 September 1954, V1072/24, 110786. See also Gallman, pp. 22-25.

⁵⁰ Gardner to FO, Tel. 339, 20 September 1954, V1076/32, 110791.

⁵¹ Gardner to FO, Tel. 349, 26 September 1954, V1076/39, 110791.

nationalists, but both claimed a broad, all-Arab, leading role for themselves. Moreover, they represented different generations and disparate world views, not to mention the fact that Nuri had forty years of experience in Iraqi and inter-Arab politics, while 'Abd al-Nasir and the other Egyptian leaders were young and politically inexperienced. These gaps were too wide to be reconciled.

The failure of the Iraqi–Egyptian meetings had a major impact on the Arab system in particular and the Middle East in general. Nuri became convinced that Egypt's domestic difficulties limited its scope for maneuver in regional politics and its capability to negotiate with the Western powers. However, he was determined to realize his long-desired plan regardless: to set up a regional defense pact which would place Iraq at the center of the Arab world, serve as a cover for the revision of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty and constitute an effective response to the Soviet menace. Iraq's controlled political milieu, along with Western support for his goal, created propitious conditions for Nuri to pursue his plan despite Egyptian opposition. His subsequent visits to London and Istanbul proved to be significant stages in the evolution of the Turco–Iraqi Pact, in turn to become the basis for the formation of the Baghdad Pact.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE DIE IS CAST: THE TURCO-IRAQI PACT

Nuri's Visits to London and Istanbul

Nuri's first step, following abortive meeting with 'Abd al-Nasir, and his decision to proceed on his own, was to visit London. Although the official reason for his visits to London was the state of his health, they had always provided excellent opportunities to discuss matters of policy. During his meeting with Selwyn Lloyd on 20 September 1954, he reported on the Cairo talks, referring to the domestic pressures in Egypt (see above). Nuri told Lloyd that he had informed 'Abd al-Nasir that Iraq could no longer wait "but would arrange things so that they would come in afterwards if they desired." He proposed to set up a defense arrangement similar to NATO which would also replace the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. He spoke of three possible options: a five-member pact, to include Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Iran and Britain; a four- or five-member pact, to include Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Britain and possibly Pakistan; or a three-member pact, to include Iraq, Pakistan and Britain.¹

Subsequently Nuri gave Undersecretary for Middle Eastern Affairs Evelyn Shuckburgh the draft for an Iraqi-Pakistani agreement. It stipulated (in Article Three) that the agreement was "open for accession by other Arab states or any others interested in strengthening the defense of the Middle East." Nuri explained that he was thinking of Britain and the US, but not of France. He expressed the hope that Britain would join at an early stage and thereby obtain, under the umbrella of the new pact, the military facilities it desired.² Nuri also met (in London) with the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Office, René Massigli, and assured him that a regional defense pact would in no way jeopardize Syria's independence. He asked Massigli to use French influence to persuade Syria to accept his scheme. However, the French were recalcitrant, requesting a formal

¹ Falla's Minute, 1 October 1954, V1076/45, 110791; Falla to Troutback, Dispatch 176, 24 September 1954, V1076/36, 110791.

² FO to Baghdad, Tel. 789, 6 October 1954, V1076/43, 110791.

assurance guaranteeing Syrian independence, which Nuri thought “invidious and unnecessary.”³ Nuri also took advantage of the Pakistani Prime Minister’s concurrent visit to London to discuss the terms of the draft agreement. To his disappointment, the latter let it be understood that Pakistan would prefer a multilateral pact or the adherence of Iraq to the Turco–Pakistani Agreement.⁴

Nuri’s conversations in London indicated both his determination to pressure the matter of regional defense organization and his open mind as to its nature and composition. In contrast to his talks with Arab leaders which had centered on a possible modification of the ACSP, his talks in London showed that he had reverted to his earlier ideas, mooted as far back as 1951, about a Western-led regional organization. He had arrived at the conclusion that a regional pact without Western participation would be meaningless. He was convinced that he must start by associating the Asian countries with Iraq—a move for which Iraqi parliamentary approval could easily be obtained. An agreement between Oriental countries on an equal footing would, he thought, help camouflage the subsequent adherence of Britain.

Nuri explicitly excluded the US from his plans and did not inform the State Department of his London talks, a reflection of his opposition to the Turco–Pakistani Agreement. As we have seen, the US regarded the agreement as the foundation of its Middle Eastern policy, while Nuri considered it an obstacle to a regional pact which would be under Iraqi leadership, as well as provide a cover for revising the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty. Responding to an inquiry from the new American ambassador in Baghdad, Waldemar Gallman, about the talks with Nuri, the Foreign Office instructed Troutback to remain vague and to depict Nuri as having an “open mind” regarding the organization’s participants. Troutback was to state that “for the time being we [the British] think to let him try out his various ideas as regards Middle Eastern States without trying to influence him.”⁵

Nuri’s ideas caused the Foreign Office and the chiefs-of-staff to

³ Falla’s Minute, 2 October 1954, V1073/57, 110788. See also a later report, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 656, 2 March 1955, 682.87/3–255.

⁴ CRO to HC in Karachi, Tel. 133 Saving, 7 October 1954, V1073/56, 110788; HC to CRO, Tel. 1521, 19 October 1954, V1073/65, 110788; Tel. 138, 15 November 1954, V1073/76, 110788.

⁵ Troutback to FO, Tel. 582, 28 September 1954, V1076/41, 110791. See Foreign Office response, Tel. 778, 1 October 1954.

reassess their policies. His plan had certain advantages from their point of view. Firstly, the scheme was a convenient framework for revising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and obtaining military facilities in Iraq. Britain's strategy was to contain the Soviet land forces as far forward as practicable, "if possible in the passes leading from Persia to Iraq" which was feasible only if the Iraqi air bases in Habaniyya and Shu'aiba were "capable of being immediately and effectively used by the RAF in the event of war."⁶ Secondly, Nuri's plan enabled Turkey, a NATO member, to participate in the regional arrangement. Thirdly, the British hoped that relying on the Northern Tier countries rather than on the Arab League would be less antagonizing to Israel. Above all, such a device would help maintain British influence in the region. At the same time, the plan had three major drawbacks: It failed to include the Suez Canal zone; it was bound to perpetuate Arab disputes, especially the Iraqi-Egyptian conflict; and it would reduce the benefit which the British had hoped to derive from the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement.⁷ In light of these complex and partially contradictory considerations, Eden sent out the following note to his missions:

Generally speaking I agree that we should leave Nuri to make the running with other Middle East Governments. I do not wish to put pressure on him to join [the] Turkish-Pakistan Pact if he thinks some other solution preferable. My main concern is that he should find some acceptable political 'umbrella' of Middle East defence under which we can secure revision of [the] Anglo-Iraqi Treaty on satisfactory terms. Meanwhile I am in no hurry to press for discussion of revision of the Treaty. It is important, particularly until [the] Anglo-Egyptian Agreement is signed [rather than initialled], not to give the impression in Cairo that we wish to see Egypt excluded from proposed defence arrangements. The Egyptians themselves told Nuri that they were not yet ready to enter into defence arrangements including the Western countries, and he assures us that they are satisfied about his going ahead without them for the time being.⁸

From London, Nuri proceeded to Istanbul, arriving on 9 October 1954. His visit there coincided with Turkish efforts to improve relations with the Arab states and persuade them to join the Turco-

⁶ CAB 129/68, C.(54) 181, 31 May 1954.

⁷ Falla's Minute, 1 October 1954, V1076/45, 110791.

⁸ FO to Baghdad, Tel. 789, 6 October 1954, V1076/43, 110791.

Pakistani Agreement.⁹ ‘Abd al-Nasir had expressed willingness to meet Adnan Menderes, now that the Suez agreement had been concluded.¹⁰ King Hussein had been accorded a lavish reception during a visit to Istanbul the previous month.¹¹ These were signs reflecting a new openness in Turkish policy toward the Arab states. Despite a deep-seated Iraqi fear of Turkish irridentism in the Mosul area, Turkish–Iraqi relations had gradually improved as well. In September, the crown prince had been invited to Istanbul and the possibility of a bilateral agreement had been discussed.¹²

Nuri’s discussions in Istanbul lasted for ten days. He allowed himself to be persuaded to drop his idea of a bilateral Iraqi–Pakistani agreement in favor of a wider association, comprising all the Arab states as well as Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. Should this prove unfeasible, however, priority would be given to a “northern organization” including Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and, preferably, Syria. Any of these groupings were expected to have Western support.¹³ In a talk with American Ambassador Avra Warren, Menderes reported that Nuri was willing to accept a bilateral agreement with Turkey similar to the Turco–Pakistani Agreement. In fact, Menderes asserted, Nuri was anxious to sign such a pact immediately, but he himself preferred waiting until his planned visit to Baghdad in January 1955.¹⁴ Nuri, however, gave a different account, saying that it was Menderes who had suggested signing a pact pledging each country to come to the assistance of the other if attacked. Nuri had declined, stating that neither state had enough troops to dispatch a contingent beyond its borders, but he suggested air defense cooperation and requested an Iraqi outlet to the Mediterranean.¹⁵ Menderes, for his part, did not press Nuri to join the Turco–Pakistani Agreement, making it clear that if the agreement were not considered suitable, “Turkey was quite ready to modify it, or incorporate it in something else.”¹⁶

⁹ Troutback to Shuckburgh, 17 September 1954, V1076/38, 110791.

¹⁰ Bowker to Eden, Dispatch 189, 16 September 1954, V1076/27, 110791. On Egypt’s positive response, see Bowker to FO, Tel. 465, 6 October 1954, 108359.

¹¹ Duke to Shuckburgh, 14 September 1954, WK1941/2, 112955.

¹² Consul-General in Istanbul to FO, Tel. 323, 14 September 1954, V1076/20, 110791. It was ‘Abd al-Ilah who suggested signing a bilateral agreement, see *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 550–2.

¹³ Bowker to FO, Tel. 500, 20 October 1954, V1073/63, 110788; Bowker to Eden, Dispatch 218, 26 October 1954, V1073/68, 110788.

¹⁴ *FRUS*, *op. cit.*, pp. 554–55.

¹⁵ Troutback to Falla, 27 October 1954, V1073/69, 110788.

¹⁶ Bowker to FO, Tel. 500, 20 October 1954, V1073/63, 110788.

In these conversations, the Turks were at pains not to alienate Egypt, particularly since Turkey was indirectly associated with the Suez agreement. Moreover, the two prime ministers decided to do their utmost to induce Egypt to participate in the envisaged association or, failing that, to draw up a draft agreement which would ensure eventual Egyptian accession. This draft was to be discussed by 'Abd al-Nasir and Menderes at a meeting scheduled to take place in November in Cairo or in December in Ankara.¹⁷ Nuri told Troutback that he was content to let the Turks take the initiative *vis-à-vis* the Egyptians.¹⁸ Both prime ministers also agreed to sound out Pakistan, Iran and Syria.¹⁹

Menderes later assured Ambassador Warren that within six months a "pattern of Middle East defense in [a] manner particularly satisfactory to [the] US and UK" would be established.²⁰ Having consistently objected to a defense pact based exclusively on the Arab League, Menderes asserted that any pact must include Turkey and should enjoy the support of the two Western powers. In his view, the final goal should be an association between all the Arab states, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. But due to Egyptian resistance, this would have to be done by stages, the first bringing together Iraq and Turkey. Though Nuri and Menderes had not reached a joint formula, they made up their mind to proceed with their plan.

In contrast to its previous lukewarm responses, the Foreign Office welcomed the results of the Istanbul meeting. The British were hopeful that during Menderes' forthcoming visit to Baghdad, progress would be made toward setting up that "political umbrella" under which Britain could secure a satisfactory revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.²¹ The last remaining obstacle appeared to be Egypt.

¹⁷ *FRUS*, pp. 554-55; Bowker to Eden, Dispatch 218, 26 October 1954, V1073/68, 110788; Troutback to Falla, 27 October 1954, V1073/69, 110788.

¹⁸ Troutback to Falla, 2 November 1954, V1073/71, 110788.

¹⁹ *FRUS*, pp. 554-55; Bowker to FO, Tel. 500, 20 October 1954, V1073/63, 110788. For additional information concerning Iran, see Stevens (Tehran) to FO, Tel. 1191, 14 October 1954, V1073/58, 110788.

²⁰ *FRUS*, pp. 554-55. For additional details, see pp. 2392-93; Baghdad to State Department, Tel. 191, 2 November 1954, 780.5/11-254; Bowker to Ward, 16 November 1954, V1056/23, 110783.

²¹ FO to Ankara, Tel. 829, 8 December 1954, V1073/86, 110788; Powell-Jones' Minute, 3 November 1954, V1073/85, 110788; Falla's Minutes, 30 October 1954, VQ1054/40, 111003; 25 November 1954, V1056/23, 110783.

Egypt's Dilemma vis-à-vis the West

On 19 October 1954, the Anglo–Egyptian Agreement was finally concluded.²² Representing Britain for the occasion, Minister of State Anthony Nutting held informal talks with ‘Abd al-Nasir during which the Egyptian leader confided that even though the ACSP was not a satisfactory basis for regional defense, public opinion would not allow him to go beyond Clause Seven of the Anglo–Egyptian Agreement, which “links Egypt to NATO through Turkey.” Consequently, Nutting cabled the Foreign Office:

Dangerous as it always is to prophesy, I got the feeling with Nasser that he would certainly like, and would probably try to steer Egypt into some international defence arrangements within, say, the next five years. His anxiety not to rush things seems to be based on a genuine fear of driving public opinion too hard and too fast. This fear I’m convinced results largely from a natural lack of self-confidence.²³

Nutting was not the only Western voice calling for patience; the American ambassador warned that the greatest mistake would be “to force the Egyptian pace towards participation in area security arrangements” with the West. In his view, “the Egyptians, and only the Egyptians, must decide when the time is ripe.”²⁴ These evaluations did indeed reflect Egypt’s domestic difficulties accurately. On 14 November, the struggle between ‘Abd al-Nasir and Naguib finally came to a head: Naguib was dismissed and put under house arrest. In addition, opposition groups denounced the terms of the Suez agreement vociferously, and the Muslim Brotherhood even made an attempt on ‘Abd al-Nasir’s life while he was delivering a speech in Alexandria on 26 October.²⁵ The Free Officers thus felt compelled to play down their association with the West.

Secret visits by British and American military missions in November 1954 highlighted the Egyptian dilemma. When Lord Mountbatten, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in the Mediterranean, visited Cairo, ‘Abd al-Nasir accepted his advice to set up an Egyptian Joint Planning Staff to study Egypt’s role in defending Turkey’s eastern flank and the oil areas. The Egyptian leader also accepted

²² For the text, see Khalil, Vol. I, pp. 731–34.

²³ Nutting’s Minute, 28 October 1954, JE10510/15, 108380.

²⁴ Gordon, p. 462.

²⁵ On opposition activity, see *ibid.*, pp. 369–83.

Mountabatten's suggestion to invite members of the British Middle East Planning Staff to Cairo regularly in plain clothes for discreet meetings with the newly-formed Egyptian Planning Staff. 'Abd al-Nasir spoke of reciprocal visits, informal staff contacts and eventual joint air and naval exercises. Still, his main concern was that Britain would meet Egypt's military deficiencies.²⁶ The British chargé in Cairo, and subsequently the Foreign Office, got the impression that 'Abd al-Nasir had considered these contacts as a preliminary step to comprehensive Middle Eastern defense talks.²⁷

'Abd al-Nasir was less forthcoming in his talks with the American military mission (the Eveland-Gerhardt mission) which arrived to discuss Egypt's military needs. He told the mission that he was willing to accept American aid, but with no strings attached, i.e. he would not sign a written agreement or accept an American supervisory team. Moreover, he stated that only upon the completion of the British evacuation, due within 20 months, would he be prepared to discuss the terms of a military agreement with the United States. As for regional security, 'Abd al-Nasir repeated his familiar theme: a modified ACSP would serve as the framework for a regional organization. Evaluating the achievements of the mission, Colonel Alan Gerhardt wrote the following illuminating description:

He ['Abd al-Nasir] said that there were neutralist elements in Egypt who felt that with a strong national army the frontiers could be defended and the Soviets should not bypass Egypt. He did not accept this view since he did not see within Egypt the capability of developing a sufficiently strong force to deter a Soviet attack on Egypt. Hence, the vacuum between the northern tier and Egypt must be filled. He referred several times to his conversations with Mr. Dulles of two years ago [May 1953] and to the principle that the defense arrangement for the Middle East must be based upon indigenous factors. A MEDO [the Middle East Defense Organization plan of 1952; see above] within a superimposed command structure is out as far as he is concerned.²⁸

²⁶ For details on this visit, see AIR 8/1883. For copies in the Foreign Office, see 23 November 1954, JE1198/2, 113686; 19 November 1954, JE10510/18(B), 108380.

²⁷ Murray (Cairo) to FO, Saving Tel. 245, 22 November, 1954, JE1198/2, 113686; Saving Tel. 251, 30 November 1954, 113686; Tel. 1735, 24 November 1954, JE11932/2, 108485; Tel. 1774, 7 December 1954, JE11932/4, 108485; Bromley's Minute, 24 November 1954, JE1198/2, 113686.

²⁸ *FRUS*, 1952-54, Vol. IX, p. 2320. See also Aronson, pp. 104-6, and W.C. Eveland's memoirs, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East* (New York: 1980), pp. 96-108.

One of the byproducts of the Suez agreement was a *rapprochement* between Egypt and Turkey,²⁹ leading Western observers to conclude that Egypt “was looking westwards.” However, as Seale noted, this development “was no more than a precautionary move in Egypt’s contest with Iraq.”³⁰ The short honeymoon ended abruptly when Egypt realized that Menderes’ aim was to induce it to participate, or to acquiesce, in a Western regional organization. Turkey also came to feel that it had been used by Britain and Iraq to lure Egypt into Western schemes. Consequently, Menderes’ visit to Cairo was postponed indefinitely, while the Turkish ambassador there was declared *persona non grata* following a personal mishap.³¹ Moreover, the rupture between Egypt and Turkey was not an isolated event. ‘Abd al-Nasir, well aware of what Nuri was planning, decided to adopt a firmer attitude intended to block Iraq’s independent moves.

This became evident at the 22nd session of the Arab League in Cairo on 29 November. As expected, the question of regional defense was the main topic on its agenda.³² While two months earlier a British official had sarcastically commented that “all Arab League meetings are futile,”³³ the results of this session proved to be highly significant. During the deliberations, ‘Abd al-Nasir and Foreign Minister Fawzi stressed that they would oppose any “piece of paper” Iraq and Turkey or Pakistan might sign. According to their view, the Arab states should base their security arrangements on the ACSP and should presently avoid any new formal defense commitments.³⁴ The meeting passed the following resolution:

- (1) The foreign policy of the Arab countries is based upon the Arab League Covenant (*mithaq*), the Arab Collective Security Pact (*mu’ahada*), and the UN Charter (*mithaq*), and upon the nonrecognition of other signed alliances (*ahlaf*).
- (2) Cooperation with the Western countries [would be possible] on the following basis: a. finding a just solution to the Arab problems;

²⁹ Seale, pp. 208–9. See also the Turkish president’s speech at the opening session of the parliament on November 1, 1954, Bowker to Eden, Dispatch 231, 9 November 1954, 112925.

³⁰ Seale, p. 209.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Murray to FO, Tel. 1777, 7 December 1954, V1073/84, 110788.

³³ Strendal–Bennett to Eden, Dispatch 33, 27 September 1954, V1072/28, 110786.

³⁴ Murray to FO, Tel. 1780, 7 December 1954, V1073/84A, 110788; Murray to Eden, Dispatch 234, 28 December 1954, V1072/1, 115483.

and b. strengthening the Arab countries to enable them to safeguard their security and existence against any aggressor without their sovereignty being violated.³⁵

However, a secret reservation was added to the resolution, and subsequently turned into another subject of Iraqi–Egyptian controversy. Iraq later claimed that its foreign minister, Musa Shahbandar, had submitted a written reservation to the effect that in light of its geographical vulnerability, Iraq was entitled to conclude any agreements aimed at guaranteeing its security. Egypt, however, affirmed that the reservation dealt solely with Iraq’s right to revise the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty along lines similar to the Anglo–Egyptian Agreement. The reactivation clause would there refer to Iran, rather to Turkey (as did the Anglo–Egyptian clause).³⁶ The controversy was far from being merely semantic; Iraq wanted to show that, contrary to Egypt’s accusations, the proposed Turco–Iraqi pact was in keeping with the League’s decisions. Overall, the League resolution reflected the ambiguity of Egyptian foreign policy: it expressed a vague willingness to cooperate with the West, yet opposed new Western pacts. What it demonstrated firmly was the desire to frustrate any independent Iraqi moves.

This resolution was discussed by Shuckburgh during his visit to Cairo in mid-December. In his discussions with ‘Abd al-Nasir, Fawzi and Salim, he found them displaying “unswerving hostility” toward the Turco–Pakistani Agreement and toward any bilateral agreement Iraq might sign with Turkey or Pakistan. They made it plain that Egyptian policy was based on the ACSP, and that links with the West should be limited and indirect, based on the existing British–Arab agreements, and on informal contacts such as those with Lord Mountbatten (see above). ‘Abd al-Nasir emphasized that no partnership between the West and the Arab League was feasible so long as a “psychological battle” was going on to convince the Arab people of the Communist menace. After winning the “battle of the agreement”

³⁵ For the text of the resolutions, see the memoirs of the deputy secretary of the Arab League, S. Nawfal, *Al-‘Amal al-‘Arabi al-Mushtarak: Madihi wamustaqbaluhu* (Cairo: 1968), Vol. 1, p. 143. A slightly different version can be found in Seale, p. 211. For additional information, see Khalid al-‘Azam, *Mudhakkirat Khalid al-‘Azam* (Beirut: 1973), Vol. 2, pp. 336–38.

³⁶ For the contradictory accounts of Shabandar’s reservation, see Nawfal, p. 143; ‘Azam, p. 338. For the Iraqi version, see Baghdad Radio, 21 January 1955 (*BBC*, No. 538, pp. 43–44); Enclosure Hooper to Eden, Dispatch 41, 8 February 1955, V1073/243, 115491.

with the British, he added, he now faced the “battle of confidence”, which would last until the British evacuated their forces.³⁷

The League’s resolution, the declarations by the RCC leaders and discussions with Western officials all made it clear that Western–Arab cooperation was feasible—‘Abd al-Nasir once spoke of it as “inevitable.”³⁸ But it was obviously Egypt which would determine its timing and scope; no progress could be expected prior to the completion of British evacuation. It would have to be based upon a modified ACSP rather than on a Western alliance, for only thus could Egypt assure its hegemony in the Arab world and block any separate Iraqi move. This approach was not only dictated by Egypt’s domestic and foreign constraints, but also by the mind-set of its young revolutionary leadership. ‘Abd al-Nasir and his generation, brought up in the period of what they termed “British occupation,” aimed to liberate Egypt from the “imperialist yoke” and found it extremely difficult to commit themselves overtly to the Western powers.

The Turkish Prime Minister in Baghdad

Egypt’s opposition to Western pacts caused Nuri to display more caution in his public statements. Addressing parliament on 15 December, he declared that the government intended to terminate the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty according to one of the options suggested by a cabinet committee that had been set up in March 1953 to study defense policy (see Chapter Two).³⁹ Troutback understood that Nuri had reverted to his old “modified ACSP” idea as the basis for a comprehensive arrangement that would include the Western powers, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. He found him determined to submit that plan to parliament in February 1955. Well acquainted with Nuri’s frequent changes of ideas and tactics, he remarked wryly that “it is always a matter of speculation whether Nuri is pulling the wool over

³⁷ On Shuckburgh’s discussions, see Enclosure to Murray’s Despatch 228, 15 December 1954, JE1022/30, 108349. See also G. Abdel Nasser, “The Egyptian Revolution,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 33 (January 1955), pp. 210–11.

³⁸ See the report sent to Eden by R.R. Stokes, M.P., after his meeting with ‘Abd al-Nasir, 20 January 1955, JE1022/3, 113591.

³⁹ On Nuri’s statement, see Troutback to FO, Tel. 797, 16 December 1954, VQ1054/45, 111003. On the committee, see Troutback to FO, Tel. 112, 4 March 1953, E1197/6, 104236. See also, Brewis’ Minute, 23 December 1954, VQ1054/46, 111003.

our eyes or over the eyes of his own people. My belief is that it really is his intention to proceed on the lines which he informed me though it is equally clear that he has as yet no concrete plan.”⁴⁰

Troutback’s assessment turned out to be accurate. Nuri, a master of intrigue and the originator of numerous innovative ideas, had not laid down any specific scheme. Visionary and pragmatic at the same time, he was willing to make details fit his grand design. By contrast, the Turkish prime minister was set on signing a Iraqi–Turkish pact, which would serve as a basis for a comprehensive regional organization.⁴¹ Early in January 1955, he asked for British support, in encouraging Nuri “to plunge” into a defense pact with Turkey.⁴² The British, still unwilling to alienate Egypt, responded that Nuri “must be the best judge of how far he can ignore Egyptian objections,” and that it would be undesirable “to give the impression of forcing the pace and of bringing pressure to bear on Iraq.”⁴³

The State Department, however, was moving along a different path: it instructed Ambassador Gallman to “use every suitable opportunity [to] discreetly encourage and foster Iraqi association with [the Turco–Pakistani] Pact or conclusion [of] bilateral arrangements with either party.” Dulles still believed that the Turco–Pakistani Agreement, despite its loose nature, was the suitable basis from which a “full-fledged defense organization could grow.”⁴⁴ The State Department also complained to the Foreign Office that British thinking on the Northern Tier concept “is not so positive as it was last autumn.” The American aim was to avoid any deterioration in Egyptian–Iraqi relations, or between Egypt and the West. But if Iraq’s accession was to cause the Arab League to break up, the State Department held, the Northern Tier would provide an alternative nucleus around which the Arab states might group themselves.⁴⁵

The visit of the Turkish mission in Baghdad (6–12 January 1955)

⁴⁰ Troutback to FO, Tel. 799, 16 December 1954, V1054/46, 111003.

⁴¹ Scott-Fox to FO, Tel. 565, 27 November 1954, V1073/80, 110788.

⁴² Bowker to FO, Tel. 2, 3 January 1955, V1073/2, 115484; Tel. 8A, 7 January 1955, V1073/5, 115484.

⁴³ FO to Baghdad, Tel. 17, 3 January 1955, V1073/2, 115484. See also Falla’s Minute, 5 January 1955. Concerning British policy, see Levant Department’s Minute, 7 January 1955, VQ1051/3, 115751.

⁴⁴ *FRUS*, 1952–54, Vol. IX, pp. 2402–4. See also the instructions sent by Dulles to Cairo, pp. 565–66.

⁴⁵ Shuckburgh’s Minute following his meeting with Wilson (from the American embassy), 11 January 1955, V1073/26, 115484. Compare with Wilson’s account, London to Secretary of State, Dispatch 1945, 10 January 1955, 780.5/1–1055.

put Nuri under heavy pressure both from Turkey and from Britain to issue a substantive statement concerning future defense arrangements. During the course of the visit he informed the British chargé that he was willing to sign a pact covering staff consultations and the transit of defense material.⁴⁶ Surprisingly, at the conclusion of the visit, the prime ministers published a joint communiqué that anticipated a more binding association than Nuri had envisaged earlier. They pledged to sign a pact aimed at cooperation in the event of external or internal aggression, open to other states “eligible by virtue of their geographical location or their potential contributions.”⁴⁷ The references in the statement to “internal aggression” (“internal,” that is, to the region) as well as to “UN resolutions” (i.e., the 1947 partition plan) were directed against Israel and were intended, as Menderes later explained, to pacify public opinion.⁴⁸ On his way back home Menderes stopped over in Damascus (14 January) and Beirut (14–18 January)—where he also met the Jordanian prime minister⁴⁹—to sound out their governments’ positions on the proposed Turco–Iraqi pact.

Despite their earlier close involvement, the terms of the joint statement took Britain and the US by surprise. The abstract and vague ideas about a regional defense organization seemed suddenly to have assumed a more concrete form. In particular, they were surprised at Nuri’s sudden change of heart and assumed that he had somehow been forced or induced to surrender to Turkish pressure. However, such a view hardly fitted Nuri’s character. More probably, as British Chargé John Hooper suggested, Nuri “felt that by making a maximum bid at the outset he would have room for subsequent manoeuvre

⁴⁶ Hooper to FO, Tel. 18, 10 January 1955, V1073/6, 115484; Hooper to FO, Tel. 25, 12 January 1955, V1073/11, 115484. See a summary of Menderes’ visit, Hooper to Eden, Dispatch 22, 18 January 1955, V1073/90, 115486.

⁴⁷ Hooper to FO, Tel. 31, 13 January 1955, V1073/12, 115484; Baghdad to Department of State, Dispatch 319, 13 January 1955, 682.87/1–1355. See also Gallman’s memoirs, p. 33.

⁴⁸ Consul-General in Istanbul to FO, Tel. 13, 22 January 1955, V1073/76, 115486. See also Hooper to FO, Tel. 32, 13 January 1955, V1073/13, 115484. By contrast, see Menderes’ explanation to Fisher, the Israeli chargé in Ankara, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 1 February 1955, V1073/180, 115489; INA, File 2536/17, 24 January 1955; 28 January 1955, 2 February 1955.

⁴⁹ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIII, pp. 514–15. See also INA, File 2445/13, intelligence survey, 25 January 1955. For an account of the visit to Syria, see Damascus to Department of State, Dispatch 310, 3 February 1955, 682.83/2–355.

and might appear to give way to attacks by other Arab states without having to give up his basic idea."⁵⁰

Following rapid consultations with the State Department, the Foreign Office gave its blessing to the proposed pact. Hooper was to inform Nuri of British hopes that it would become the first building block in a new Middle Eastern defense organization.⁵¹ Simultaneously, Britain told 'Abd al-Nasir of its backing for the pact, hoping that he would use his influence in the League to endorse it, or at least refrain from opposing it.⁵² Events were to prove, however, that British support of the Turco-Iraqi pact only led to Egypt's estrangement from the West.

The State Department took a positive view; at a press conference on 18 January, Dulles described the Turco-Iraqi communiqué as a "very constructive development" in the direction of "building up the so-called 'Northern Tier' of which Turkey and Pakistan are already pioneers." He added that every step aimed at closing the gap between Turkey and Pakistan greatly improved the security of the area.⁵³ Like the Foreign Office, the State Department was anxious to maintain friendly relations with Egypt, and considered fostering a Turkish-Egyptian treaty—a move they thought might be facilitated by the Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry.⁵⁴

The Arab Response

The Arab world received the Turco-Iraqi announcement with astonishment and dismay. Arab leaders regarded the League resolutions of December 1954 (see above) as binding and as reflecting a

⁵⁰ Hooper to FO, Tel. 32, 13 January 1955, V1073/13, 115484; Hooper to Eden, Dispatch 22, 18 January 1955, 115486.

⁵¹ FO to Baghdad, Tel. 45, 14 January 1955, V1073/33, 115484.

⁵² FO to Cairo, Tel. 86, 15 January 1955, V1073/28, 115484. Shuckburgh gave this somewhat naïve description in his diary: "The Egyptians are in a state of fury about Nuri's determination to sign a pact with Turkey, and will not be comforted. I had no idea they were so jealous of Iraq. . . . I am counting on A. E(den)'s visit to Cairo to put some sense back into Nasser." *Descent to Suez: Diaries, 1951-1956* (London: 1986), p. 249.

⁵³ Gallman, p. 46; Aronson, p. 109.

⁵⁴ *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, p. 4. Dulles saw no likelihood of improvement in Egyptian-Iraqi relations. "If Iraq breaks away from [the] Egyptian lead," he remarked, "this might have a salutary effect on [the] area[s] attitude toward regional defense." See Dulles to London, Tel. 3574, 10 January 1955, 780.5/1-755.

common Arab attitude toward defense arrangements. Egypt reacted violently, unleashing an all-out propaganda attack against Iraq in general and Nuri in particular.⁵⁵ The RCC had been the first Arab regime to set up a sophisticated propaganda apparatus which thereafter played an important role in Egypt's foreign policy. Cairo Radio and *Sawt al-'Arab* ("Voice of the Arabs") had broadcast on vituperative anti-imperialist lines from July 1953 onward. The Egyptian press was controlled by the RCC, with *al-Gumhuriyya*, edited by Anwar al-Sadat, becoming its official mouthpiece. The Middle East News Agency (MENA) fed information to the foreign press. The Egyptian Directorate of Information—a euphemism for the propaganda apparatus—was headed by 'Abd al-Qadir Hatem, under the supervision of Salah Salim, Minister of National Guidance.⁵⁶ These powerful weapons were fully utilized by the regime. On 16 January 1955, for example, Salah Salim issued the following statement:

The Government of Iraq has now announced its intention of concluding a separate alliance outside the Arab states, before the Arab pact sees the light of day and without consultation with the other Arab Governments. This is a serious development which may threaten the existence of the Arab League and expose Arab nationalism to grave dangers . . . what is the meaning of a League of our governments if any one of us who wishes to take on his own the most serious and important decisions without consulting or agreement with the rest? If our League is not based on the principle of unifying the policy of its member states, for what purpose was it established and where is it going? Are we to leave foreign policy aside and neglect our defensive pact and confine the work of this League . . . to the coordination of educational and cultural programmes? What would be the meaning of all past and present efforts under this big name, the League of the Arab states?⁵⁷

Salim then called for an urgent meeting of Arab prime ministers in Cairo on 22 January to discuss regional defense. Towards Western diplomats, however, 'Abd al-Nasir and Fawzi adopted a more moderate stance, claiming that Egypt was as anxious to protect the re-

⁵⁵ For examples of the attack, see *BBC*, No. 533, 14 January 1955; No. 534, 16 January 1955; No. 535, 18 January 1955; and Heikal's remarks, Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 1004, 22 January 1955, 682.87/1-2255.

⁵⁶ M. Abdel-Kader Hatem, *Information and the Arab Cause* (London: 1974). See also Seale, p. 196.

⁵⁷ Salim's statement, Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 229-30; Cairo Radio, 16 January 1955 (*BBC*, No. 536, 21 January 1955, pp. 46-50).

gion from external aggression as the Western powers, but viewed Nuri as an "Anglo-American stooge." His independent initiative "would postpone indefinitely any overt move towards cooperation with the West in defense matters." They went on to assert that the Iraqi initiative was both premature and inadequate, as the main danger was from Communist infiltration into the area rather than from open aggression. Fawzi stated explicitly that Egypt disapproved of "the way, the timing and some other ingredients of what Iraq has done," but expressed his hope that whatever Egypt's reaction, Egypt would not be considered unfriendly by "our Western friends." 'Abd al-Nasir explained that the purpose of the Arab premiers' conference was to "knit the Arab countries more closely together" and minimize the ill effects likely to emanate from the Turco-Iraqi Agreement.⁵⁸

Nuri, perturbed by the Egyptian response, told Western officials that since Egypt had not consulted with its Arab partners over the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, he was not obliged to consult with Egypt regarding the pact with Turkey. He even expressed his preparedness for Iraq to leave the Arab League, but added that this would have to be approved by the palace and the cabinet.⁵⁹ In reality, however, Nuri was not free to act entirely on his own initiative, and had to pay lip-service to public opinion. First, he obtained the consent of the Iraqi "old guard" to his policy, a move intended to demonstrate broad public support.⁶⁰ Second, Iraqi officials were instructed to play down the importance of the Turco-Iraqi announcement by stressing that it was not an alliance but rather similar to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. Third, Acting Foreign Minister Bash'ayan stated that Iraq would not send forces beyond its borders. He also called upon Egypt "to take the lead among the Arab states joining the pact."⁶¹ Behind the scenes, however, Nuri asked Britain and the US to approach the Egyptian government in order to arrest the propaganda campaign.⁶²

In contrast to the Egyptian response, other Arab leaders were more equivocal. The Syrian position was ambiguous as a result of

⁵⁸ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 74, 17 January 1955, V1073/27, 115484; Tel. 78, 17 January 1955, V1073/30, 115484; *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, pp. 5-6.

⁵⁹ Hooper to FO, Tel. 39, 17 January 1955, V1073/38, 115485.

⁶⁰ *BBC*, No. 537, 25 January 1955, p. 25.

⁶¹ Gallman, p. 34. See also an Iraqi official statement in *al-Sha'b*, 19 January 1955; Hooper to FO, Tel. 45, 19 January 1955, V1073/45, 115485.

⁶² *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, p. 7.

partisan, sectarian and personal disputes. Responding to leftist pressure, and against his better judgment, Syrian Prime Minister Faris al-Khouri declared that Syria refused to consider a “pledge, pact or agreement” with a foreign state.⁶³ Menderes, who arrived in Damascus following his visit to Baghdad (see above), failed to persuade Khouri to put narrow partisan interests aside in favor of the Turco–Iraqi pact which Khouri himself acknowledged to be in Syria’s interest.⁶⁴ Yet Syrian Foreign Minister Faidi al-Atasi (of the People’s Party) claimed that no difference existed between the Iraqi move and the Anglo–Egyptian Agreement.⁶⁵ Unexpectedly, two days before the opening of the Cairo Conference, Atasi informed the British ambassador that Khouri had removed his objection to the proposed pact. This resulted in Syria adopting a sympathetic attitude toward Iraq during the conference.⁶⁶

The Lebanese attitude was even more encouraging from the Iraqi perspective. Following Menderes’ visit to Beirut, Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh termed the Turkish–Arab *rapprochement* the beginning of a new era of friendship and brotherhood, adding that the proposed pact did not contradict either the ACSP or the League’s resolutions.⁶⁷ Furthermore, President Sham’un declared that if Nuri came to attend the Cairo conference, he was assured of Lebanese and Jordanian support.⁶⁸ Indeed, Jordanian Foreign Minister Walid Salih promised to take “a positive position” if Nuri attended.⁶⁹ Saudi Arabia and Yemen alone adhered to the Egyptian position.

Nuri, however, notified ‘Abd al-Nasir that “for health reasons” he would not attend the conference, adding that he therefore saw no point in convening it. According to medical reports, Nuri was truly indisposed, but he also felt that attending the conference would

⁶³ Seale, p. 215. On the debate on this issue in the Syrian parliament, see Chancery Damascus to Levant Department, 13 January 1955, V1071/3, 115482.

⁶⁴ On Menderes’ visit in Damascus, see Gardner to FO, Tel. 7, 11 January 1955, VY10334/2, 115953; Tel. 17, 15 January 1955, V1073/20, 115484; Gardner to Eden, Dispatch 15, 19 January 1955, V1073/91, 115486; Damascus to Department of State, Dispatch 310, 3 February 1955, 682.83/2–355.

⁶⁵ Gardner to FO, Tel. 19, 17 January 1955, V1073/31, 115484.

⁶⁶ Gardner to FO, Tel. 30, 20 January 1955, V1073/60, 115486.

⁶⁷ *Al-Hayat*, 19 January 1955; Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 61, 18 January 1955, V1073/40, 115485; Tel. 52, 17 January 1955, V1073/29, 115484. Menderes, however, was disappointed with his talks in Beirut, see Tel. 43, 15 January 1955, V1073/21, 115484.

⁶⁸ Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 64, 19 January 1955, V1073/46, 115485.

⁶⁹ Richmond (Amman) to FO, Tel. 20, 20 January 1955, V1073/58, 115485.

appear making "a journey to Canossa."⁷⁰ But if he had thought that his absence would cause the conference to be postponed, if not cancelled, he soon discovered his error.⁷¹

The Cairo Conference

The Cairo Conference opened on 22 January 1955, with the participation of 'Abd al-Nasir of Egypt, Faris al-Khourī of Syria, Sami al-Sulh of Lebanon, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda of Jordan and Crown Prince Amir Faysal of Saudi Arabia. Iraq was not represented at this stage. Libya and Yemen had not been asked to participate, as the conference included only members of the ACSP. It ended on 6 February and can be divided into four phases:

The first phase (22–23 January) was taken up by a preliminary discussion of general issues such as the strengthening of the Arab League and the Palestine question. Meanwhile, the participants hoped that Nuri would yet arrive, or at least send an envoy. An Egyptian attempt to denounce the proposed Turco–Iraqi pact at this early stage was foiled by the Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian delegations so as not to prevent Iraqi participation.⁷² Meanwhile, the Lebanese president was mediating between Nuri and 'Abd al-Nasir. Eventually, Fadil al-Jamali who had been in Beirut waiting for Nuri's instructions, was told to go to Cairo on 27 January, mainly to "keep an eye" on the Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian delegations.⁷³

During the second phase (24–26 January), the premiers debated

⁷⁰ Hooper to FO, Tel. 44, 19 January 1955, V1073/42, 115485; Tel. 46, 20 January 1955, V1073/59, 115485; Hooper to Eden, Dispatch 30, 26 January 1955, V1073/131, 115487.

⁷¹ FO to Cairo, Tel. 133, 21 January 1955, V1073/57, 115485. Fawzi claimed that it was "too late" to postpone the conference, Stevenson to FO, Tel. 104, 22 January 1955, V1073/73, 115485.

⁷² Stevenson to FO, Tel. 114, 24 January 1955, V1073/87, 115486. See also J.M. Muhi al-Din, *Al-'Iraq wal-Siyasa al-'Arabiyya, 1941–1958* (Baghdad: 1980), pp. 263–64. Part of the conference protocols were published later, see *al-Ahram*, 5–6 August 1958. They seem authentic, yet no scholar, to this author's knowledge, has made use of this important source. They were also published by Amin Sa'īd, *al-Thawra min 23 Yulyu 1952 illa 29 Uktuber 1956* (Cairo: 1959), pp. 67–74.

⁷³ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 107, 22 January 1955, V1073/75, 115486; Hooper to Eden, Dispatch 30, 26 January 1955, V1073/131, 115487; Wright to FO, Tel. 54, 22 January 1955, V1073/71, 115486; Chapman–Andrews to FO, Tel. 71, 22 January 1955, V1073/69, 115486; Wright to FO, Tel. 55, 22 January 1955, V1073/71, 115486.

and confirmed the resolution passed at the foreign ministers' meeting of December 1954, while indicating that they had no intention of joining the proposed Turco-Iraqi pact. They also accepted in principle 'Abd al-Nasir's suggestion to set up a joint Arab peacetime command which would determine the troop strength required by each Arab state, commensurate with the aim of mobilizing a unified Arab wartime army.⁷⁴ Syria and Lebanon rejected another Egyptian draft denouncing Iraq, asserting that the pact was in Iraq's interest and did not prejudice Baghdad's commitments to the Arab League. The two prime ministers pointedly refused to discuss the issue so long as no Iraqi delegation was present.⁷⁵

The third phase (27–30 January) began with the arrival of the Iraqi delegation. The Libyan and Yemenite prime ministers had meanwhile also been invited. Addressing the conference, Jamali reiterated the main themes of Iraq's foreign policy, emphasizing that the pact with Turkey dealt with two issues alone: the exchange of information on defense problems, and free transit of military equipment.⁷⁶ Al-Khourī termed the whole episode as a "tempest in a tea cup," reflecting the sense of the conference that Egypt had overreacted. 'Abd al-Nasir, however, rejected Iraq's argument, claiming that the pact contained more than Iraq was willing to admit.⁷⁷ Following the Egyptian response, the debate centered on Iraqi Foreign Minister Shahbandar's reservation of December 1954 (see above). Iraq asserted that the reservation covered the pact with Turkey; Egypt argued that it did not. This controversy led Jamali to propose a new reservation to the effect that while being mindful of its commitments to the Arab League and the ACSP, Iraq had "the right to take any additional measures it deems necessary for its safety."⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Nawfal, p. 145. See also Stevenson to FO, Tel. 124, 26 January 1955, V1073/103, 115487. Concerning the deliberations of January 24, see *al-Ahram*, 5–6 August 1955. The January 25–26 sessions were not included in the published protocols.

⁷⁵ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 124, 26 January 1955, V1073/103, 115487. See also the protocols, *al-Ahram*, 5 August 1958.

⁷⁶ See the protocols, *al-Ahram*, 6 August 1958, sessions 8 and 9; Stevenson to FO, Tel. 133, 27 January 1955, V1073/108, 115487. See Jamali's speech in parliament following the collapse of the Cairo conference on February 6, Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 231–36. See also Nofel, p. 146; Muhi al-Din, pp. 264–65.

⁷⁷ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 142, 28 January 1955, V1073/117, 115487.

⁷⁸ See the protocols, *al-Ahram*, 6 August 1958, session 12. See Nawfal, p. 146; Jamali's speech, Khalil, p. 235; Hooper to Eden, Dispatch 41, 8 February 1955, V1073/243, 115491. See a slightly different—and inaccurate—version in 'Azim,

Reacting furiously, 'Abd al-Nasir decided to drop his suggestion for a unified command, and to withdraw from the ACSP if Iraq's reservation were accepted or the pact signed. In addition, he weighed the possibility of signing separate agreements with the Arab states bordering on Israel.⁷⁹ At this point the conference was on the verge of collapse; a breakdown was temporarily averted when Jordan suggested sending a committee to Baghdad in an attempt to persuade Nuri to modify his position.

The committee, which included Lebanese Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh, Jordanian Foreign Minister Walid Salih, Syrian Foreign Minister Faidi al-Atasi and Egyptian Minister for National Guidance Salah Salim, arrived in Baghdad on 31 January. Its conversations with Nuri made it clear that the differences between the two sides were irreconcilable. Egypt denied Iraq's right to sign a separate pact with a non-Arab state without consulting its Arab partners. This elicited a sharp retort from Nuri who said that he had been an Arab revolutionary for forty years, while the RCC had been in power only two years; it was unthinkable for Egypt to veto Iraqi steps. "They gave me hell," Nuri related of the Egyptian stance, "but I gave them double hell."⁸⁰ After hours of wrangling, a complete fiasco was averted by Sulh's suggestion that Nuri and 'Abd al-Nasir meet in Beirut. In this spirit, a joint communiqué was published.⁸¹ Although Nuri accepted the proposal in principle, he regarded the offer merely as a useful excuse for sending the delegation back to Cairo.⁸² The result of the visit was a *tour de force* on Nuri's part, for he demonstrated that without Iraq the League was paralyzed. "From that day until

p. 338. For the text of the Iraqi statement, see annex of Hooper to Eden, Dispatch 41, 8 February 1955, V1073/243, 115491.

⁷⁹ Nawfal, p. 147; Muhi al-Din, p. 267. The protocols state that 'Abd al-Nasir suggested revoking the ACSP. This version does not necessarily contradict Nawfal's account, as 'Abd al-Nasir believed that Egypt's withdrawal from the ACSP would mean its end. See *al-Ahram*, 6 August 1958, session 11; Jamali's speech, *ibid.*; Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 97, 1 February 1955, V1073/138, 115487; Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 1077, 31 January 1955, 780.5/1-3155.

⁸⁰ Wright to FO, Tel. 86, 3 February 1955, V1073/152, 115488. Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 516, 2 February 1955, 682.87/2-255; Tel. 522, 3 February 1955, 682.87/2-355.

⁸¹ Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 101, 3 February 1955, V1073/149, 115488. Nuri rejected Sulh's suggestion to postpone signing the pact for four months, see Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 519, 2 February 1955, 682.87/2-255. See also Gallman, pp. 46-47.

⁸² Hooper to Eden, Dispatch 41, 8 February 1955, V1073/243, 115491. See also Muhi al-Din, p. 270; Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, pp. 58-59.

Nuri's demise," wrote Jamali in his memoirs, "the wound between us and our brothers in Egypt did not heal."⁸³

With the return of the committee to Cairo, the conference resumed (on 3 February), marking its fourth phase. A last-ditch effort to find a compromise formula was made by an informal committee which drafted a five-point resolution. However, the Iraqi delegation refused to discuss a resolution that prohibited Arab states from joining the proposed Turco-Iraqi pact, while the Syrian and Lebanese delegations equivocated, claiming that they had to consult their governments.⁸⁴ On 6 February, the conference broke up in disarray. The following day Salim issued a declaration:

The Arab world is now standing at a crossroad: it will either form an independent and cohesive unit with its own structure and national character, or else each country will pursue its own course. The latter would mean the beginning of the downfall of Arab nationhood. Our policy . . . is based on Egyptian nationhood and Arab nationhood . . . It was to discuss these matters and the dangers threatening us that we invited the Arab Premiers to the Cairo Conference . . . we achieved no result, because the different Arab countries could not definitely express their views on . . . Iraq's agreeing to enter alliances outside the collective security pact. Egypt made its views quite clear.⁸⁵

It is noteworthy that Salim puts the issue in terms of "Arab nationhood" and cohesiveness vs. Arab particularism (each country pursuing "its own course"). He must have judged that such an appeal to pan-Arab sentiment was the most effective.

In actual fact, during the deliberations 'Abd al-Nasir could count on unswerving loyalty only from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The other Arab delegations refused to surrender to Egyptian pressure. The Syrian prime minister, while refusing to join the proposed pact, nevertheless objected to denouncing Iraq, arguing that in light of the weakness of the ACSP, the pact was legitimate.⁸⁶ The Lebanese delegation backed the Iraqi position behind the scenes, although publicly it played the role of intermediary (forced on it by veiled Egyptian threats

⁸³ Jamali, p. 247. See also Gallman, pp. 46-49.

⁸⁴ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 198, 7 February 1955, V1073/177, 115489. See also 'Azm, p. 336; Muhi al-Din, p. 271; Bash'ayan's telegram in *Mahkamat al-Sha'ab*, Vol. V, pp. 169-70.

⁸⁵ Text of Salim's press conference, Khalil, Vol. II, p. 237; *BBC*, No. 542, 11 February 1955, pp. 29-31.

⁸⁶ *Al-Hayat*, 30 January 1955; Damascus Radio, 1 February 1955.

of economic sanctions⁸⁷). Jordan, despite its close association with Britain, adopted a neutral position, largely the outcome of Walid Salih's sympathy and admiration for the Egyptian regime. In adopting this position, the foreign minister acted against Prime Minister Abu al-Huda's instructions; this led to the former's dismissal and eventual expulsion from Jordan.⁸⁸ The Libyan prime minister, for his part, attempted unsuccessfully to maneuver between the Egyptian and Iraqi delegations.⁸⁹

Immediately after the collapse of the Cairo conference, Nuri convened an emergency session of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence. At the end of a six-hour session, parliament unanimously approved a motion fully supporting the plan to ensure "the safety of Iraq in cooperation with its neighbours" in accordance with the charters of the ACSP, the League and the UN.⁹⁰

The Cairo conference was a vivid manifestation of the most recent phase in the rivalry between Egypt and Iraq, a phase that revolved around the issue of regional defense. Egypt feared that Western reliance on the Northern Tier countries would relegate it to a secondary position in Middle Eastern defense, thus depriving it of the lion's share of Western aid. Moreover, there is reason to believe that 'Abd al-Nasir suspected Nuri's initiative of being a ploy for realizing his old but not-yet abandoned Fertile Crescent scheme. Egypt was greatly surprised at the considerable flexibility of the Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian positions. Resolving to rein them in, Egypt tried various tactics: massive propaganda barrages, intimidation, bribing politicians, and political extortion. 'Abd al-Nasir even threatened to withdraw from the Arab League and set up a new Arab pact

⁸⁷ On Egyptian intimidation of Lebanon, see Stevenson to FO, Tel. 191, 5 February 1955, V1073/169, 115488. Egyptian tourism and the export of Lebanese apples to Egypt gave considerable leverage over the Lebanese economy.

⁸⁸ Richmond to FO, Tel. 43, 5 February 1955, V1073/170, 115488. See also H. al-Majali, *Mudhakkirati* (Al-Quds: 1960), p. 154. It was also rumored that the Lebanese prime minister himself was a customary recipient of Saudi money, see Wright to FO, Tel. 75, 31 January 1955, V1073/129, 115487; Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 526, 4 February 1955, 682.87/2-455; Gallman, p. 46.

⁸⁹ Graham (Tripoli) to FO, Tel. 27, 29 January 1955, V1073/128, 115487. The Libyan prime minister, however, tried to present a neutral stance, see Tripoli to Secretary of State, Tel. 333, 9 February 1955, 682.87/2-955.

⁹⁰ Hooper to Eden, Dispatch 41, 8 February 1955, V1073/243, 115491. For Nuri's speech, see *BBC*, No. 542, 11 February 1955, pp. 39-41. For the text of Baban's speech, see *ibid.*, pp. 41-42. For the text of Jamali's speech, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 231-36.

consisting only of Arab states opposed to foreign alliances.⁹¹ Yet the Arab leaders were not willing to sacrifice their interests to what Ambassador Stevenson termed “Egypt’s mystic egotism.”⁹²

The conference resulted in one of Egypt’s most humiliating defeats in the Arab League since its foundation and signaled to Cairo that it could no longer rely on the League as an efficient instrument of its foreign policy. In retrospect, the conference was a turning point in the role of the League in Arab politics. It was the first all-Arab convention in which ‘Abd al-Nasir participated as leader of Egypt, and his daunting experience there reinforced his doubts about the League as the supreme institution for solving inter-Arab disputes. From then on the League ceased playing a significant mediation role, while other frameworks were sought to mitigate or arbitrate Arab problems.

Egypt’s Final Struggle

The collapse of the Cairo Conference led to an all-out attack by Egypt against Iraq, with the primary goal of detaching the undecided Arab states—Syria, Lebanon and Jordan—from Iraq’s orbit. Of the various means used to achieve this, the most effective was a broadcasting campaign focusing on alleged Iraqi opposition activity, on the intrinsic link between the pact, Israel and Western imperialism, on Nuri’s resolve to implement his Fertile Crescent scheme and on Syria’s intention of joining the pact.⁹³

A second method was to employ local Arab dissidents against their own governments. They were supplied with leaflets and other needed materials. In February 1955, for example, Iraq reportedly seized 36

⁹¹ *Al-Ahram*, 3–5 February 1955; Cairo to Department of State, Dispatch 1520, 4 February 1955, 780.5/2–455; Stevenson to FO, Tel. 220, 10 February 1955, V1073/212, 115489. See also M. Riad, *Mudhakkirat Mahmud Riad: Al-Amn al-Qawmi . . . bayna al-Injaz wal-Fashl* (Cairo: 1986), Vol. 2, p. 73. According to Article 12 of the ACSP, “any one of the contracting states may, after passage of ten years from entry into effect of this Treaty, withdraw from it at the end of one year from the date of notification of withdrawal to the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States.” This meant that in reality Egypt could not withdraw from the ACSP before 1961.

⁹² Stevenson to Eden, Dispatch 24, 10 February 1955, V1073/244, 115491.

⁹³ See, for example, *BBC*, No. 542, 11 February 1955, pp. 31–32; No. 543, 15 February 1955, pp. 25–26; No. 544, 18 February 1955, p. 28; No. 546, 25 February 1955, pp. 37–38.

bags containing propaganda material at the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad.⁹⁴ Nonetheless, part of this shipment went farther, for press reports spoke of leaflets signed by the Free Officers calling for a popular uprising, being distributed in Baghdad and Basra.⁹⁵ Other sources mention 103 bags of leaflets sent to Baghdad later on entitled "The Threat of the Turco-Iraqi Pact to the Arab Nation." Pamphlets were also smuggled into Jordan and other Arab states.⁹⁶ Agents called "special military attachés" were posted to Arab capitals to supervise clandestine Egyptian activity.⁹⁷

A third Egyptian tactic was overt and covert diplomatic activity. This focussed on Syria, in the belief that—because of Syria's pivotal role in Arab politics—a political change there would tip the scales in Egypt's favor. Syria was handled by Mahmud Riad, who had first visited Damascus as a foreign office official on 18 January in order to invite Prime Minister Khouri to the Cairo Conference. Shortly afterwards, he was appointed ambassador to Syria, soon becoming the most influential foreign diplomat in Damascus. By his own account, Riad's immediate task was "to wean Syria away from the Baghdad Pact."⁹⁸ In addition, 'Abd al-Nasir was in constant touch with exiled Syrian President Shukry al-Quwatly, known for his sympathy with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Al-Quwatly publicly opposed the proposed pact.⁹⁹

An unexpected event helped Egypt consolidate its position in Syria. On 7 February, just after the Cairo Conference, Khouri submitted his resignation. Seale concluded that the government had fallen because of the position it had adopted in Cairo, and because of Egyptian activity in Damascus.¹⁰⁰ However, an analysis of the preceding events indicates that the conference might have been used as a pretext and that the downfall of the government was actually triggered by personal rivalries and a political dispute between the People's Party

⁹⁴ *Al-Hayat*, 9 February 1955.

⁹⁵ *Al-Jihad*, 11 February 1955.

⁹⁶ *Zaman*, 29 March 1955. For examples of these pamphlets, see Amman to Department of State, Dispatch 315, 22 March 1955, 682.87/3-2255; Cairo to Department of State, Dispatch 1706, 5 March 1955, 682.87/3-555.

⁹⁷ See, for example, an account of the activities of the Egyptian attaché in Amman, *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 114, 16 February 1955.

⁹⁸ Seale, p. 221.

⁹⁹ *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁰ Seale, p. 218. This version was also accepted by Meyer, p. 99. By contrast, see Torry, pp. 274-79.

and the National Party over key positions in the government.¹⁰¹ The new government was formed on 13 February by Sabri al-Asali, of the National Party, with the participation of the Ba'th Party and the Democratic Block headed by Khalid al-'Azm, who became the foreign minister. The common denominator for this disparate coalition was its members' shared hatred of the People's Party.¹⁰² 'Asali, known for his pro-Western leanings, was nevertheless compelled by the composition of his government to adopt a neutral, and sometimes even a pro-Egyptian, stance; thus he declared in a foreign-policy statement that Syria would not join any foreign pact.¹⁰³

Egypt and Saudi Arabia attempted to portray the downfall of the Syrian government as a direct result of the "lukewarm" position it had taken in Cairo, leading the Syrian president to complain to the British and American ambassadors that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and France were engaged in hostile activity aimed at sabotaging the proposed Turco-Iraqi pact.¹⁰⁴ It would appear that the downfall of the Syrian government had not been initiated by those states, but was utilized by them to enhance their own interests. In any event, it was clear that the new government marked the beginning of Syria's long journey, beset by many vicissitudes, toward the 1958 union with Egypt.

Lebanon and Jordan, despite their secondary roles then in Arab affairs, also turned into battlegrounds in the Egyptian-Iraqi conflict. King Hussein communicated to Iraq his concern over the differences between Iraq and Egypt and offered his good offices in attempt to resolve them.¹⁰⁵ Egypt was more active than Iraq in these two states: Salim was sent to Beirut on 20 February; and close contact was maintained with Fawzi al-Mulki, an ex-prime minister who supported

¹⁰¹ For the possible causes leading to the downfall of the government, see Gardner to FO, Tel. 52, 8 February 1955, VY1015/6, 115945 and Russell's Minute; Chancery Damascus to Levant Department, 9 February 1955, VY1015/12, 115495; Gardner to Eden, Dispatch 21, 17 February 1955, VY1015/14, 115495. *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XIII, p. 515; Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 381, 8 February 1955, 783.00/2-855.

¹⁰² *Al-Hayat*, 16 February 1955.

¹⁰³ Gardner to FO, Tel. 66, 22 February 1955, V1073/305, 115493; Gardner to Eden, Dispatch 28, 26 February 1955, VY1015/20, 115945. See also Gardner to FO, Tel. 61, 16 February 1955, V1073/260, 115492.

¹⁰⁴ Gardner to FO, Tel. 58, 14 February 1955, V1073/235, 115490; Tel. 59, 15 February 1955, V1073/244, 115491. See also Gallman, pp. 43, 53; Torry, p. 276.

¹⁰⁵ Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 553, 8 February 1955, 682.87/2-955, Box 2682.

the Egyptian cause.¹⁰⁶ Egypt also hoped to influence the young King Hussein during his first visit in Cairo on 21 February. Though the visit could not affect the impending signing of the Turco–Iraqi pact in Baghdad (see below), ‘Abd al-Nasir hoped to dissuade Hussein from joining it.

Simultaneously, ‘Abd al-Nasir continued to try and persuade the Western powers that the pact was an unfortunate step bound to have a negative effect on Arab–Western relations. He predicted that within six months Iraqi Communists and nationalists would unite against “foreign domination” and topple Nuri. “I am a soldier, a politician and a psychologist,” he told the American Ambassador, “and I cannot agree that this pact is the way to assure a realistic defense system.” Instead, “such a system must have [the] genuine support of [the] ME people and . . . [that] will only be forthcoming for a defense system based on ACSP without foreign participation.”¹⁰⁷ On 20 February, ‘Abd al-Nasir also tried to persuade Foreign Secretary Eden (en route to a SEATO conference in Bangkok) to abandon the proposed pact. Assuring him that “his interest and sympathy were with the West,” he stressed, however, that the Turco–Iraqi pact was ill-timed and jeopardized the development of effective cooperation with the West.¹⁰⁸ Eden wired London that ‘Abd al-Nasir seemed “forthright and friendly,” and that his objection to the pact emanated from jealousy and a frustrated desire to lead the Arab world.¹⁰⁹ Viewed from the Egyptian perspective, Eden’s attitude appeared paternalistic, and was resented by ‘Abd al-Nasir and his colleagues.¹¹⁰

Egypt’s neutralist orientation, which had become somewhat dormant in the aftermath of the Suez agreement, re-emerged during the

¹⁰⁶ On Salim’s visit to Lebanon, see Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 128, 11 February 1955, V1073/222, 115490. The visit was in response to Sham’un’s offer to ‘Abd al-Nasir to consider the pact as a preliminary step to the creation of a comprehensive regional defense system eventually to include all the Arab states. On the contacts with al-Mulki, see *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 114, 16 February 1955.

¹⁰⁷ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, pp. 15–16.

¹⁰⁸ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 250, 16 February 1955, V1073/263, 115492. For the talks, see Enclosure to Stevenson’s Dispatch 31, February 21 1955, V1073/323, 115493; Stevenson to FO, Tel. 269, 21 February 1955, V1073/289, 115492; Tel. 270, 21 February 1955, V1073/290, 115493. See also Dulles’ report after his meeting with Eden in Bangkok, *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIV, pp. 71–72, and Eden’s memoirs, *Full Circle—The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden* (London: 1960), pp. 221–22.

¹⁰⁹ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 269, 21 February 1955, V1073/289, 115492.

¹¹⁰ On the Egyptian perspective, see Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, pp. 62–64; Love, pp. 198–99; St. John, *The Boss*, p. 191.

struggle against the pact. In February, 'Abd al-Nasir hosted two renowned leaders of the non-aligned movement: the first was Yugoslav President Marshal Tito who passed through the Suez Canal on his yacht on 5 February. After their meeting, both "noted with satisfaction the identity of views on the fundamental questions of the present international situation."¹¹¹ Moreover, Tito agreed with 'Abd al-Nasir that the Turco-Iraqi pact was "a device of Western imperialism," and that Egypt should stay out of it.¹¹² The second visitor was India's President Nehru who arrived in Cairo in mid-February. A joint communiqué issued at the end of his visit condemned, *inter alia*, joining military agreements.¹¹³ The timing of these meetings was carefully planned to precede Eden's visit, signaling that Egypt could not be taken for granted and that the new pact might bring about its estrangement from the West. Publicly, however, 'Abd al-Nasir dismissed the neutralist option. Asked about the possibility of Egypt joining the neutralist Asian camp, he replied that "the distance separating Egypt from these countries was in itself sufficient to prevent such a policy from meeting Egypt's international needs."¹¹⁴

Saudi Arabia was a loyal ally to Egypt in its struggle against the proposed Turco-Iraqi pact. Motivated by an ongoing fear of Hashemite designs to recapture the Hijaz, the kingdom used every possible means to foil such a possibility. Reportedly, influential Syrian, Jordanian and Lebanese figures were in the pay of the Saudis.¹¹⁵ The kingdom spared no effort to support Egypt politically. In an address after the collapse of the Cairo Conference, King Sa'ud criticized certain "brethren" (obviously alluding to Iraq) who, exposing all Arabs to danger, "bear the responsibility toward history."¹¹⁶ Crown Prince and Prime Minister Faysal, the dominant figure at the royal court, told the American ambassador explicitly that the US must "strengthen Arab unity, have confidence in it, work directly with the

¹¹¹ Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, p. 60.

¹¹² St. John, *The Boss*, p. 190. See also Copeland, p. 158.

¹¹³ *New York Herald Tribune*, 17 February 1955.

¹¹⁴ Cairo to Department of State, Dispatch 1520, 4 February 1955, 780.5/2-455. 'Abd al-Nasir's policy during that period is described in my forthcoming article, "The Drift toward Neutrality: Egyptian Foreign Policy in the Early Nasserist Era," *Middle Eastern Studies*. For a different view, see Ginat, pp. 176-90.

¹¹⁵ See, for example, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 526, 4 February 1955, 682.87/2-455.

¹¹⁶ Jidda to Department of State, Dispatch 128, 14 February 1955, 682.87/2-1455.

Arabs [and] not behind the scenes as with Turkey [and] drop the Nuri-Menderes plan,"¹¹⁷ a disappointing message in the American view. The Saudis even raised the possibility of canceling the American Dhahran Airbase lease, although this threat was not taken seriously by the US.¹¹⁸

Iraq's response to the Egyptian and Saudi activity was surprisingly limited, confining itself to counter-propaganda and diplomatic measures. Baghdad's propaganda broadcasts were apologetic, emphasizing that the arrangement with Turkey was only a defense agreement, not an alliance.¹¹⁹ Moreover, Iraq lacked radio equipment powerful enough to match Egypt's broadcasting capability. Although Baghdad asked US Ambassador Gallman to provide four strong short- and medium-wave transmitters (to be supervised by an American engineer), the State Department failed to comprehend the importance of the request, delayed its response, and left Iraq exposed to Egyptian attacks.¹²⁰

Fearing a change in Syria's and Jordan's attitudes, Iraq sent Jamali to Damascus and Beirut on 14 February "to keep up Syrian moral" and avoid a drift toward Egypt.¹²¹ 'Azm, Syria's newly-appointed foreign minister, asked Jamali to postpone the signing of the pact in order to placate Egypt, but Jamali emphasized that the pact would strengthen the Arab world against Israel. Concomitantly, King Hussein arrived in Baghdad for his first ever visit (14–17 February), which served to clear the atmosphere between the two countries following the disappointing Jordanian position at the Cairo Conference.¹²²

¹¹⁷ Jidda to Department of State, Dispatch 133, 27 February 1955, 682.87/2–2755. See also *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, pp. 23–24.

¹¹⁸ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, p. 27. The State and Defense Departments instructed the ambassador "to dispel Saudi idea Dhahran is so important to us we would gratify exorbitant demands." Hoover to Jidda, Tel. 387, 4 March 1955, 682.87/2–2755.

¹¹⁹ *Al-Hayat*, 18 February 1955; *Zaman* editorial, 15 February 1955; Jamali's interview with *al-Sha'b*, 20 February 1955.

¹²⁰ Gallman, pp. 49–50. In the end, the Iraqis turned to the British who supplied the necessary equipment, see Wright to FO, Tel. 145, 18 February 1955, VQ1432/1, 115783; Tel. 192, 26 February 1955, VQ1432/2, 115783.

¹²¹ Wright to FO, Tel. 117, 12 February 1955, V1073/226, 115490; Tel. 124, 14 February 1955, V1073/226A, 115490; Gardner to FO, Tel. 58, 14 February 1955, V1073/235, 115490.

¹²² On Hussein's visit, see Wright to FO, Tel. 137, 16 February 1955, V1073/259, 115492; Richmond to Rose, 21 February 1955, V1073/346, 115494; Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 584, 16 February 1955, 682.87/2–1655.

Iraq Between Arab Constraints and Western Pressures

While Egypt was waging its vicious campaign against the pact, Iraq and Turkey proceeded, with Western mediation, to negotiate its precise terms. The nature and the provisions of the Turco-Iraqi Pact, concluded on 24 February 1955, were essentially determined by Nuri's limited leeway in light of conflicting pressures on the part of the Western powers on the one hand, and the constraints of the inter-Arab system, on the other.

During the initial stage of the Cairo Conference, Nuri had indicated to newly appointed British Ambassador Michael Wright that he was resolved to go ahead with the pact irrespective of the Cairo resolutions. He made it clear that he preferred a pact (he deliberately avoided the term "treaty") that would include Iraq, Turkey, Britain and the US, but would be open to other neighboring Arab states, Pakistan, Iran and even Afghanistan. He intended to obtain "blanket authority" from parliament in February that would allow him to conclude the pact by March or April. Nuri also reiterated that the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty would be revised according to "the spirit of the Portsmouth arrangements."¹²³ In addition, he asked the Western powers to accede as "original signatories" to the pact. The discussion with Wright showed that while Nuri's strategy remained unchanged, his tactics were highly flexible. Presumably, with the outcome of the Cairo Conference still undecided, and as long as Egypt's attacks on Iraq persisted, Nuri's insecure position prompted him to seek full Western participation in the pact.

Nuri's request posed a dilemma for the Western powers. While they supported his plan, they were not prepared to join the pact at such a short notice. Moreover, they were reluctant to antagonize Egypt further. Still, Eden advised the State Department that a long delay, let alone a failure to support Nuri, "would endanger the Turco-Iraqi agreement and consequently our best interests in the Middle East." His initial reaction was that "it would be wise to fall in with Nuri's wishes if he persists in them."¹²⁴ The State Department, unconvinced by Eden's arguments, pointed to two factors that made participation difficult for the US: its inability to undertake military

¹²³ Wright to FO, Tel. 68, 27 January 1955, V1073/115, 115487; Tel. 62, 26 January 1955, V1073/102, 115487; *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, pp. 11-12.

¹²⁴ FO to Washington, Tel. 530, 3 February 1955, V1073/160, 115488.

obligations toward Iraq, and its anticipation of vigorous opposition by pro-Israeli public opinion. However, it promised "to view with favor" any pact between Turkey, Iraq and Britain which might allow for American accession later on.¹²⁵ Fearing a repetition of the MEDO fiasco, and apprehensive of accusations of promoting imperialistic schemes, the State Department instructed its ambassadors to avoid any act "which might be interpreted as suggesting that the Pact was imposed from outside the area." It stressed that "while it is true that the United States has encouraged the proposed Pact, the impetus has come from [an] indigenous realization of the outside threat to the area."¹²⁶

While the Western powers were still engaged in formulating their policies, Nuri had already modified his position. On 5 February, he told Wright that he still desired a four-power pact, but if the US and Britain preferred to accede at a later stage, "that would be equally agreeable."¹²⁷ Undoubtedly, with the Cairo Conference about to collapse, Nuri felt less threatened by Egypt. In addition, strong Turkish pressure for a speedy signing of the pact (see below) did not leave enough time for the accession of the Western powers. Nuri was thus politically and psychologically prepared to negotiate the terms of the bilateral pact with Turkey in early February. His attitude was in line with Menderes, namely, that the main principle of the negotiations was that the bilateral pact "should include the U.K. and the U.S. either at the outset or soon after signature."¹²⁸

Nuri presented Wright with his first draft of the proposed pact on 6 February; his present version was far less binding than the Turco-Iraqi announcement of January 13.¹²⁹ The Turkish draft, handed to the Iraqi and Western ambassadors in Ankara,¹³⁰ was regarded by Nuri as inadequate. To his mind, it was important that Iraq and

¹²⁵ Makins to FO, Tel. 332, 4 February 1955, V1073/161, 115488.

¹²⁶ Makins to FO, Tel. 387, 9 February 1955, V1073/196, 115489. Dulles to certain diplomatic missions, Tel. 463, 15 February 1955, 682.87/2-1555. See also the *aide-mémoire* submitted to the Turks, Ankara to Department of State, Dispatch 403, 17 February 1955, 682.87/2-1755; *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, p. 19.

¹²⁷ Wright to FO, Tel. 90, 5 February 1955, V1073/171, 115488; Tel. 103, 8 February 1955, V1073/182, 115489; Tel. 105, 9 February 1955, V1073/194, 115489.

¹²⁸ Consul-General in Istanbul to FO, Tel. 24, 5 February 1955, V1073/166, 115488.

¹²⁹ For the text of the Iraqi draft, see Wright to FO, Tel. 93, 6 February 1955, V1073/165, 115488; Tel. 90, 5 February 1955, V1073/171, 115488.

¹³⁰ For the text of the Turkish draft, see Consul-General in Ankara to FO, Tel. 25, 5 February 1955, V1073/167, 115488.

Turkey sign his draft within a few days in order to increase the likelihood of Egypt and Saudi Arabia carrying out their threat to leave the ACSP.¹³¹ However, both from the Western and the Turkish perspective, it was the Iraqi draft which looked “inadequate.” Britain objected to the draft’s omitting the “umbrella” clause that would enable it to join the pact later and revise the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty. The US and Turkey thought the Iraqi text was disappointing.¹³² The Turkish draft, on the other hand, was considered by Britain and the US “a satisfactory basis.” In their view, it was a mistake “to sacrifice the chance of a workable defence arrangement to the admitted desirability of a quick conclusion.”¹³³

In light of such triple opposition to his draft, Nuri realized that he must display more flexibility. By 9 February, following the collapse of the Cairo Conference and the vote of support in the Iraqi parliament, he felt confident enough to suggest an amended draft.¹³⁴ The modified text did not meet all Turkish demands, but was met by Menderes with greater satisfaction.¹³⁵ Wright spoke of it as a “considerable advance,” referring particularly to the inclusion of the “umbrella” provision. While aware of the dilemma every British ambassador in Baghdad faced—that “one can never be sure how far Nuri will shift his ground from day to day”—Wright nevertheless estimated that this was “as far as he will go now.”¹³⁶ Fearing Turkish intransigence, the Foreign Office hurried to notify the Turks that Nuri’s new ‘umbrella’ provision seemed “to meet our essential requirement . . . [and] to cover future defense arrangements.” Britain, the Foreign Office concluded, “would be prepared to accede to an agreement . . . containing such a clause.”¹³⁷ It considered the other articles to be

¹³¹ Wright to FO, Tel. 103, 8 February 1955, V1073/182, 115489; Tel. 105, 9 February 1955, V1073/194, 115489.

¹³² Consul-General in Istanbul to FO, Tel. 24, 5 February 1955, V1073/166, 115488; Bowker to FO, Tel. 92, 9 February 1955, V1073/192, 115489. Concerning the British position, see FO to Baghdad, Tel. 172, V1073/192, 115489; Beaumont to Eden, Dispatch 69, 9 March 1955, V1073/463, 115497. For the American position, see Dulles to Baghdad, Tel. 477, 8 February 1955, 682.87/2–755.

¹³³ Makins to FO, Tel. 365, 8 February 1955, V1073/161, 115488.

¹³⁴ Wright to FO, Tel. 105, 9 February 1955, V1073/194, 115489; Tel. 109, V1073/199, 115489; Tel. 113, 10 February 1955, V1073/201, 115489. For the favorable US response, see Dulles to Ankara, Tel. 913, 9 February 1955, 682.87/2–955.

¹³⁵ Bowker to FO, Tel. 97, 10 February 1955, V1073/211, 115489.

¹³⁶ Wright to FO, Tel. 105, 9 February 1955, V1073/194, 115489.

¹³⁷ FO to Ankara, Tel. 199, 10 February 1955, V1073/229, 115490; FO to Baghdad, Tel. 192.

outside its "direct concern," and expected the two parties to settle their differences themselves. The ambassador was to warn the Turks that they "might be wise to take account of Nuri's fears" and to point to the "danger of losing the whole agreement by trying to get too much."¹³⁸ Like the Foreign Office, the State Department preferred "an unsatisfactory text to a deadlock."¹³⁹

Nuri and Menderes worked out the details of the pact during the second week of February with the Western powers closely observing the negotiations, but unwilling to play any part in the formulation of the pact.¹⁴⁰ The British only advised both Turkey and Iraq to take each other's feelings and difficulties into account.¹⁴¹ The major stumbling block was the possible presence of Turkish troops in Iraq. Nuri objected strenuously to a clause which could be subsequently construed as allowing Turkish forces to enter Iraq in wartime, and at one point even threatened to abandon the whole idea over this issue.¹⁴² Though his fears were probably genuine, Nuri's threat was mainly intended to display his dissatisfaction with Turkey's hard line. Nuri also judged—rightly, it must be supposed—that if such a commitment was made initially, the chances of including additional Arab states later would be seriously curtailed.¹⁴³

Nuri understood well that the less binding the pact was, the more attractive it would appear to other Arab states. The Foreign Office, aware of this consideration, and unwilling to put the signing of the pact at risk, notified the Turks that Nuri's draft of 15 February was satisfactory. "We cannot afford to ignore the risk that in his present mood he [Nuri] might change his policy," the Foreign Office asserted, adding that "the Turks would be wise to close with Nuri without further delay."¹⁴⁴ Following receipt of the note, the Turks

¹³⁸ FO to Ankara, Tel. 210, 11 February 1955, 115490; Tel. 228, 14 February 1955, 115492.

¹³⁹ Makins to FO, Tel. 411, 14 February 1955, V1073/231, 115490. However, the State Department did propose some minor changes, see Dulles to Baghdad, Tel. 497, 10 February 1955, 682.87/2-1055. See also Tel. 1337 to Cairo, 17 February 1955, 682.87/2-1655.

¹⁴⁰ Wright to FO, Tel. 116, 11 February 1955, V1073/220, 115490; Bowker to FO, Tel. 111, 13 February 1955, V1073/225, 115490.

¹⁴¹ See, for example, FO to Ankara, Tel. 228, 14 February 1955, 115492; FO to Baghdad, Tel. 218; Wright to FO, Tel. 131, 15 February 1955, V1073/245, 115491.

¹⁴² Wright to FO, Tel. 131, 15 February 1955, V1073/245, 115491.

¹⁴³ Wright to FO, Tel. 135, 16 February 1955, V1073/249, 115491.

¹⁴⁴ FO to Ankara, Tel. 243, 16 February 1955, 115492. However, the Foreign Office suggested several "slight" changes in the final wording. See FO to Baghdad,

accepted Nuri's latest draft; it was to be only slightly amended during Menderes' visit to Baghdad on 23 February.¹⁴⁵

At this point, with all involved parties believing that the last obstacle had been removed, Nuri stunned the Turks with a demand to attach a letter to the pact, stating that in order to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East, Iraq and Turkey "agreed to work in close cooperation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine."¹⁴⁶ The foreign ambassadors could understand neither the motive nor the timing of Nuri's sudden move. Both the State Department and the Foreign Office protested strongly. The British thought the letters "would give the pact a wrong twist, and might, by colouring its public interpretation, make difficulties for acceding powers."¹⁴⁷ They were concerned that instead of diverting Arab attention from the Palestine problem to an external threat, Turkey and the Arab states would now focus on carrying out the 1947 Palestine partition resolution.

Turkey, nevertheless, agreed in principle to include the letters.¹⁴⁸ Yet, when Menderes arrived in Baghdad to sign the pact he managed to introduce two important changes in Nuri's letter. The first, an addition to the section on Palestine, put Iraq and Turkey on record as understanding that the pact would enable them "to cooperate effectively in resisting any aggression directed against either of

Tel. 236, 16 February 1955, V1073/269, 115492. The British objected in particular to the reference to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement in the preamble, fearing that it might sour relations with Egypt. See FO to Baghdad, Tel. 239, 17 February 1955, V1073/269, 115492; Wright to FO, Tel. 142, 17 February 1955, V1073/271, 115492; Tel. 157, 20 February 1955, V1073/285, 115492. The State Department also suggested several minor changes. See Dulles to Ankara, Tel. 980, 18 February 1955, 682.87/2-2155.

¹⁴⁵ See Nuri's last draft, Wright to FO, Tel. 132, 15 February 1955, V1073/245, 115491. See also Tel. 138, 16 February 1955, V1073/250, 115491; Bowker to FO, Tel. 122, 18 February 1955, V1073/273, 115492.

¹⁴⁶ Wright to FO, Tel. 147, 18 February 1955, V1073/276, 115492; Tel. 154, 20 February 1955, V1073/283, 115492. Nuri also intimated that the Iraqi parliament would not approve the pact without the attached letter. See Wright to FO, Tel. 173, 23 February 1955, V1073/314, 115493.

¹⁴⁷ FO to Ankara, Tel. 255, 19 February 1955, V1073/281, 115492; Tel. 260, 20 February 1955, V1073/282, 115492. For the American position, see Hoover to Baghdad, Tel. 522, 21 February 1955, 682.87/2-1855.

¹⁴⁸ Bowker to FO, Tel. 127, 20 February 1955, V1073/287, 115492; Tel. 130, 22 February 1955, V1073/300, 115492. The Turks claimed that they "do not regard [the] language as committing them to any action to implement resolutions beyond UN procedures," Ankara to Secretary of State, No. 950, 21 February 1955, 682.87/2-2155.

us."¹⁴⁹ The second was even more significant from the Western perspective: Menderes convinced Nuri to accept a simultaneous exchange of letters during the signing of the pact, instead of the letters constituting an integral part of, or an annex to, the pact.¹⁵⁰ Thus, the letters would commit the initial signatories alone, but not any other state willing to accede later. The British, unwilling to alienate Nuri or jeopardize the pact, reluctantly gave their blessing. The last-minute inclusion of the letter was a clever move by Nuri, who could now point out to the Arab public that, as a result of his efforts, Turkey's position *vis-à-vis* Israel had undergone a major shift. The Turks, for their part, saw the letters as the crux of the pact, as they envisaged Turco-Iraqi cooperation in resisting aggression, whereas Article 1 of the pact merely contained a vague obligation to cooperate for "security and defense."¹⁵¹

On 24 February, Turkey suggested including an additional clause, stipulating the setting up of a permanent council at ministerial level, as soon as at least four powers became party to the pact.¹⁵² This subsequently became the basis of the annual meetings of the Baghdad Pact. Before the conclusion of the pact, the Iraqis requested one more change: replacing the word "Treaty" (*mu'ahada*) with the term "Pact" (*mithaq*). This change of wording was far from semantic. In Arab political parlance, the term "treaty" had a negative connotation, reminiscent of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty or suggesting an unequal association between an Arab state and a Western power generally, while the word "pact" usually referred to a regional or inter-Arab commitment. Moreover, "pact" was considered legally less binding than "treaty." Thus, opponents of the pact described it as a "treaty" or even an "alliance" (*hulf*), while its advocates spoke merely of a "pact."¹⁵³

The successive versions of the Turco-Iraqi Pact were largely shaped by Nuri's Arab constraints. His first draft, presented by Jamali in Cairo, was couched in loose terms intended to test Arab reaction. Nuri accurately sensed that only an agreement phrased in vague

¹⁴⁹ See the text of the letters, Wright to FO, Tel. 183, 24 February 1955, V1073/337, 115493. The State Department considered the Turkish wording less offensive than that suggested by Nuri. See Hoover to Baghdad, Tel. 528, 23 February 1955, 682.87/2-2255.

¹⁵⁰ Wright to FO, Tel. 182, 24 February 1955, V1073/331, 115493.

¹⁵¹ For the text, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 368-70. (See Appendix One)

¹⁵² See Article 6 of the pact, and Wright to FO, Tel. 179, 24 February 1955, V1073/316, 115493; FO to Baghdad, Tel. 306.

¹⁵³ Hooper to Rose, 1 March 1955, V1073/424, 115496.

language would be acceptable to Arab public opinion and might induce Arab leaders to join later. However, in the face of Western and Turkish pressures, he had to make several concessions, the most significant being the inclusion of an article stipulating cooperation between Turkey and Iraq on their “security and defense.” Careful not to specify the nature of this cooperation—to be “the subject of [subsequent] special agreements with each other”—he wisely gave a wide berth to any immediate military commitments. Turkey, for its part, reluctantly accepted the vague phrasing, sharing Nuri’s hope that it might help to bring in other Arab states. Various other features of the pact also indicated that the Arab setting constituted both a source of pressure and a constraint on Iraqi policy:

- (1) Article Five envisaged that the pact would be open to any Arab League member or any other state “actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognised by both the High Contracting Parties.” This wording was intended to placate Arab public opinion by guaranteeing that Israel, which was not recognized by Iraq, would not be able to join the pact.¹⁵⁴
- (2) The clause laying down that the pact would remain in force for five years, renewable for further five-year periods, was related to the scheduled expiration of the Anglo–Egyptian Agreement within seven years (1961). Nuri, fearing possible reverberations in this context, made sure that he could prolong the pact beforehand.¹⁵⁵
- (3) Article Four stipulated that “the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States.” This article was intended to make it clear that the pact did not contradict Iraq’s obligations *vis-à-vis* the Arab League and the ACSP.
- (4) A reference in the preamble to Article Eleven of the ACSP Charter was meant to prove that Iraq was entitled to sign a separate agreement within the framework of the UN Charter.¹⁵⁶

All in all, however, in contrast to Nuri’s previous attempts to form a regional defense organization, the present constraints were not powerful enough to deter him. The signing of the pact amounted to a monumental defeat for Egypt. Unlike with the MEC, MEDO and

¹⁵⁴ See Article 5 of the pact. See also Gallman, p. 54.

¹⁵⁵ Wright to FO, Tel. 8, 2 March 1955, V1073/396, 115495.

¹⁵⁶ See Article 11 of the ACSP.

the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, its vigorous action failed to impose its will on the rest of the Arab states. Equivocation on the part of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan enabled Iraq to present the pact as a *fait accompli* and thereby make a clear bid for hegemony in the Arab world.

The signing of the Turco-Iraqi Pact was the most significant turning point in Arab politics since the 1948 war. It shattered the Arab system, leading to new political groupings and new patterns. The Arab system was now clearly divided into three camps: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen; Iraq, with Western support; and the "floating" Arab states—Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The possibility of the accession by other Arab states—a possibility provided for in the pact—prompted Egypt to launch an all-out offensive against Iraq and the three wavering states. Syria was to be the first venue for the impending showdown, the first battleground in the Arab struggle over the Baghdad Pact.

CHAPTER SIX

SYRIA: THE FIRST ROUND IN THE ARAB STRUGGLE

The Tripartite Declaration

The day Iraq and Turkey signed their pact (24 February 1955), *Sawt al-‘Arab* broadcast a sharp denunciation:

We regret to announce that . . . the Turkish-Iraqi alliance will be signed this evening . . . Thus, Nuri al-Sa‘id, rejecting the unanimous decision of the Arab peoples, concludes an alliance with the Turks, the enemies of Arabism, the friends of Zionism—an alliance which will destroy Iraq’s aspirations to freedom, Palestine’s hopes of independence and the Arabs’ hopes of unity, integrity and glory. . . . The people of Iraq are not bound by this alliance; they have not signed and will not sign it; they curse it and they will destroy this filthy piece of paper, the Nuri-Menderes alliance.¹

No sooner was the pact concluded than Egypt moved to contain its influence in the Arab world. Minister Salih Salim, arriving in Damascus on 26 February, declared that “the ACSP no longer exists;” he stated that he was about to propose to Syria the creation of a unified Arab army within the framework of a new Arab defense pact which would exclude Iraq and forbid its members to join foreign alliances.² Two days later, on 28 February, Israel launched a raid into the Gaza Strip, the first major military operation since the 1948 war.³ It caused a large number of Egyptian casualties and revealed the inferiority of the Egyptian army. Moreover, the concurrence of the signing of the pact and the raid gave rise to Arab suspicions that the Western powers had acted in collusion with Israel in order to demonstrate Egypt’s vulnerability, thereby pressuring it to join the pact.⁴ Although recent

¹ Cairo Radio, 24 February 1955; *BBC*, No. 547, 1 March 1955.

² *Al-Hayat*, 26 February 1955; *al-Ahram*, 27 February 1955.

³ On the Gaza raid and Israeli motives, see *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIV, pp. 83–86; B. Morris, *Israel’s Border Wars: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation and the Countdown to Suez* (London: 1993), pp. 324ff.

⁴ Anwar al-Sadat, for example, wrote in his memoirs that Egypt’s opposition to the Baghdad Pact and its efforts to prevent others from joining it, “angered Britain and the United States, and resulted in the Anglo-American-inspired ‘retaliation’

documents show that “there was no direct connection between the pact signing and the [Gaza] incident,” it is probable that the attack left behind an “ineradicable suspicion” in ‘Abd al-Nasir’s mind that the two events were part of “a concerted Western plot to destroy the Egyptian revolution, and to reassert the domination of imperialism over the entire Arab world.”⁵ The Gaza raid, in ‘Abd al-Nasir’s apt description, caught him “with my pants down,”⁶ and forced him to seek arms from whatever source against the Israeli menace.

American Ambassador Henry Byroade and his British colleague Ralph Stevenson assessed the psychological effects of these events on ‘Abd al-Nasir in a joint note to the State Department. They felt it would be unwise to make an official approach to ‘Abd al-Nasir concerning the “Alpha” plan at that time. (“Alpha” was the code name for a US–British project to bring about an Egyptian–Israeli settlement.⁷) They thought it “would tend to persuade him of [the] truth . . . that [the] Turco–Iraqi pact was part of [a] deep-laid plot aimed by the US and UK at splitting the Arab world and softening Egypt up.” They also predicted that his diplomatic defeat over the pact would force him to adopt a more nationalistic attitude.⁸ The net result was to put a further distance between Egypt and the West and to reinforce the Egyptians in their belief that Israel, rather than the Soviet Union, was the main threat to the Arabs. The Egyptian media exploited the coincidence of the two events, blaming Nuri and Iraq for the Gaza raid.⁹ Iraq protested against the accusation.¹⁰ Yet, forced to pay lip service to “Arab solidarity,” it offered military support to Egypt, under the terms of the ACSP, and

raid by Israel on Gaza of February 28, 1955.” See Anwar al-Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: 1977), p. 135. See also Muhi al-Din, p. 270; Love, p. 200; Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, p. 67.

⁵ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIV, pp. 83–86; Nutting, *Nasser*, p. 90. See also Vatikiotis, “Foreign Policy,” p. 342.

⁶ See his conversation with Richard Crossman, a British Labor MP, in late December 1955, ISA, file 5938/24, 6 January 1956.

⁷ An excellent overview and analysis of these secret contacts can be found in S. Shamir, “The Collapse of Project Alpha,” in R. Louis and R. Owen (eds.), *The Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences* (Oxford: 1989), pp. 73–100; M.B. Oren, “Secret Egypt–Israel Peace Initiatives Prior to the Suez Campaign,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 26 (July 1990), pp. 351–70.

⁸ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIV, p. 117. See also Sayed, pp. 218–19; Nutting, *Nasser*, p. 90.

⁹ *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 2 March 1955; *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 118, 16 March 1955.

¹⁰ *Times*, 3 March 1955.

requested the Turks to back Egypt's demand for the Security Council to condemn Israel.¹¹

Another effect of the Gaza raid was that it made Syria more eager to conclude a military agreement with Egypt against the Israeli threat.¹² The Syrian army, as well as and the leftist parties, considered the raid an opportunity to accelerate the pace of negotiations for a military agreement between the two countries.¹³ An Egyptian proposal to Syria presented by Salim on 28 February offered forming a unified army, the formation of joint economic and foreign policies that would bar any alliance with a non-Arab power, and Egyptian military and economic aid. Moreover, according to Syrian Prime Minister 'Asali, Egypt threatened to leave the League and the ACSP if its proposal were rejected.¹⁴ Although 'Asali was reluctant to antagonize Iraq, he realized that, with popular sentiment for an agreement with Egypt being so strong, an outright rejection might lead to a military coup in Syria. This in turn would bring in a government willing to accept the Egyptian scheme.¹⁵ Faced with these conflicting pressures, 'Asali decided to sign "an agreement on principles" with Egypt, the publication of which would be delayed pending its being discussed in other Arab capitals.¹⁶ He planned to travel to Amman, Riyadh and Beirut with Foreign Minister 'Azm in order to secure agreement on the "principles" by the governments there.

On 3 March, Salim and 'Azm left for Amman to meet with Hussein and Prime Minister Abu al-Huda (who the British requested to give a noncommittal reply¹⁷). The Jordanians made several reservations and asked for additional time to study the proposal—a task, Huda told the Turkish chargé wryly, which might take "years."¹⁸ Sensing

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 2 March 1955; *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 117, 9 March 1955; No. 118, 16 March 1955.

¹² Riad, p. 102.

¹³ Seale, p. 223; 'Azm, pp. 389–90; Gardner to FO, Tel. 80, 2 March 1955, V1073/361, 115494; Gardner to FO, Tel. 88, 4 March 1955, V1073/390, 115495.

¹⁴ Gardner to FO, Tel. 77, 1 March 1955, V1073/361, 115494; Gardner to Eden, Dispatch 32, 3 March 1955, V1073/415, 115496. See also Riad, p. 101; *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIII, p. 518.

¹⁵ Gardner to FO, Tel. 79, 1 March 1955, V1073/362, 115494.

¹⁶ Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 456, 3 March 1955, 683.74/3–355; Tel. 465, 8 March 1955, 674.83/3–855. And, summary of Salim's visit, see Dispatch 362, 10 March 1955, 674.83/3–1055.

¹⁷ Duke to FO, Tel. 89, 4 March 1955, V1073/373, 115495. See description of the Amman talks, Riad, pp. 103–104; 'Azm, p. 391. A somewhat different version of the Syrian proposal appears in Ahmad Hamrush, *Qissat Thaurat 23 Yulyu: Mujtama' Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir* (Beirut: n.d.), Vol. II, p. 49.

¹⁸ Amman to Secretary of State, Tel. 286, 8 March 1955, 674.83/3–855. See

that their mission had failed, Salim and 'Azm left Amman for Riyadh on 5 March, instead of going to Beirut as originally planned. Their hope was that King Sa'ud's approval would in turn influence Lebanon. As anticipated, Sa'ud endorsed the proposal enthusiastically, suggesting that it be called the "Tripartite Covenant" (*al-mithaq al-thulathi*). On 6 March, two similar joint communiqués were published—by Egypt and Syria, and by Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia—stating that the three governments had agreed on:

- (1) On rejecting the Turkish-Iraqi alliance and any other alliances with non-Arab state.
- (2) On setting up an Arab defense and economic cooperation pact.
- (3) On inviting other Arab states to discuss the implementation of the principles.¹⁹

The Saudi position became clearer in a meeting King Sa'ud held with Admiral Cassady, Commander of US Naval Forces, on 11 March. Cassady's visit in Riyadh was part of a regional tour which included Ankara, Karachi, Baghdad and Tehran, and was intended to study the attitude of these states toward regional defense. In their discussion, Cassady explained that according to Western strategic thinking, the Russians could be best stopped by holding the Zagros mountain line of defense. He made it clear that forces from Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan would be needed in order to stop the Russians, and that it was hoped that "Saudi Arabia and Syria and other Arab countries of the rear area might also provide forces." Sa'ud admitted that Saudi Arabia was friendly to the US and Britain, and that the Saudis "feels as you do about Russia." However, he asked Cassady, "how can the Arabs fight an enemy that is outside and relatively far away, when there is an enemy, Israel, within the Arab house?" Sa'ud further clarified that the Arab tripartite bloc was established because the three Arab states must defend themselves, but that they "are ready to cooperate as a bloc" with the West. Crown Prince Faysal quickly interposed here, saying that "we must wait for a suitable atmosphere, so that the present excitement may die down." Sa'ud also claimed that the Turco-Iraqi Pact was against

also Duke to FO, Tel. 81, 2 March 1955, V1073/373, 115495; Tel. 87, 3 March 1955, V1073/382, 115495. 'Azm claimed in his memoirs that Jordanian Foreign Minister Walid Salah suggested that Egypt and Syria replace the British in subsidizing Jordan. Salim, according to 'Azm, agreed immediately on behalf of Egypt. See 'Azm, p. 391. Jordan denied this allegation, see *al-Ahram*, 7 March 1955.

¹⁹ For the text, see Khalil, Vol. II, p. 239. In Arabic, see *al-Ahram*, 7 March 1955.

the Arab interests, because it separated Iraq from the other Arab states, and because the Arab feelings about Turkey had not been taken into consideration, particularly its relations with Israel. However, Sa'ud's question: "why could you not have put Iraq into a second line of defense with other Arab states?" revealed that the Saudi opposition to the Turco-Iraqi Pact was, in fact, a mixture of jealousy, fear and hatred of the Iraqi Hashemites.²⁰

Salim and 'Azm were initially hopeful that the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi tripartite declaration would also facilitate agreement by Lebanon.²¹ Their optimism was damped when, just prior to their arrival on 6 March, the Lebanese government resolved "not to join any Arab military group which ignores or antagonizes Iraq." Still, they averred, they could not "shut the door" in Lebanon's face.²² Indeed, Lebanon was not willing to join the new Arab pact, although there were differences on this point between the president and the prime minister. Sham'un's suggestion to mediate between Iraq and Egypt was rejected by Salim who stated that the mediation stage was now over. "The problem," he said, "was not restricted to a dispute between two states, but it related to the very existence of the Arab states and their non-involvement in foreign alliances."²³ 'Azm, for his part, stated that Iraq would be able to join the new Arab pact if it withdrew from the Turco-Iraqi Pact.²⁴

The swift formation of an anti-Iraqi axis by Egypt prevented Iraq from using the pact with Turkey as a lever for Arab leadership, while giving 'Abd al-Nasir an advantage in his dealings with the West. He informed Ambassador Stevenson on 5 March that he accepted the Turco-Iraqi Pact as an established fact; yet the West must now regard the new Arab "agreement" as being "an equally accomplished fact." Although it would not be open to Iraq, at least for the present, he promised that it would not be directed against Britain or the

²⁰ For a full account of these talks, see Jidda to Department of State, Despatch No. 139, 17 March 1955, 682.87/3-1755, Box 2683. Admiral Cassady began his tour in the Middle East on 23 February, after attending a tripartite (American-British-Turkish) military staff talks in London. See London to Secretary of State, Tel. 3717, 23 February 1955, 780.5/2-2355, Box 3706. These documents were released under the Freedom of Information Act.

²¹ *Al-Ahram*, 5 March 1955.

²² Beirut to Secretary of State, Tel. 869, 1 March 1955, 780.5/ 3-155; 'Azm, p. 393; Riad, p. 105.

²³ 'Azm, p. 394.

²⁴ *Al-Ahram*, 7 March 1955.

West. He believed that the proposed pact could fill the gap at the back of the northern defense line, and could, together with the existing British–Arab agreements, provide a good foundation for the defense of the area.²⁵ Reiterating his arguments to Byroade a few days later, he admitted that the proposed pact would be somewhat of a liability for him but justified it as necessary to counteract Iraq’s ambitions in Syria and the Arab world. Byroade came away from the meeting convinced that ‘Abd al-Nasir truly felt that he had been cast aside by the West in favor of Nuri, and that he “had conceived that his task was to bring all the Arab states as a block towards the West as quickly as Egyptian and Arab public opinion would permit.”²⁶ In a second discussion with Stevenson, ‘Abd al-Nasir expressed his hope of maintaining “peaceful coexistence” (a Cold War term) between the two groupings, through Jordan or Britain, since his “main objective remains the organization of the defense of the whole area.”²⁷

While ‘Abd al-Nasir’s statements to the Western ambassadors should not be taken at face value, they did reveal his deep-seated resentment of Nuri and the Iraqi Hashemites and a genuine fear of being isolated in the Arab world. Apart from outmaneuvering Iraq, ‘Abd al-Nasir wanted to persuade the Western powers to center regional defense on Cairo, by means of his proposed pact. While he probably did not anticipate a positive response, his approach was obviously aimed at mitigating Western opposition to the Arab pact he envisaged, and at convincing the West that, public declarations notwithstanding, Egyptian foreign policy continued to be Western-oriented. However, the negative responses from the West and Turkey alienated him further.²⁸

His frustration with the Western powers was clearly manifested in a lengthy address to army officers, given on 28 March:

Communism has been considered a danger, but I still believe that imperialism or domination of us by the other side represents another

²⁵ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 350, 5 March 1955, V1073/399, 115495.

²⁶ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIV, pp. 78–79; Aronson, pp. 112–14; Stevenson to FO, Tel. 378, 11 March 1955, V1073/445, 115497; Tel. 380, 11 March 1955, V1073/446, 115497.

²⁷ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 350, 5 March 1955, V1073/399, 115495; Tel. 389, 14 March 1955, V1073/471, 115498.

²⁸ For the adamant Turkish opposition to the tripartite agreement, see Bowker to FO, Tel. 160, 6 March 1955, V1073/402, 115495. The British concurred with the Turkish attitude. See Rose’s Minute, 7 March 1955, V1073/443, 115497; FO to Washington, Tel. 974, 8 March 1955.

danger. We are a state which lived under the yoke of imperialism for 75 years in the form of British occupation. Before the British occupation we had Turkish colonization for 300 or 400 years . . . We have got rid of the British occupation by an agreement for the reactivation of the [Suez] base for seven years. This means that we have an obligation. If war should break out, they will come to occupy the base. But we consider this a minor obligation whereas in the case of alliance or organization for the defense of the Middle East we would enter into other obligations. I am not sure that my present position is such that I would be able to remain sovereign if I were to accept such additional obligations. I consider that Egypt at present, now that she is beginning one phase of liberation, must rid herself completely of every foreign influence . . . After that, if she finds that it is in her interest to conclude an agreement with another state on a basis of equality, she will conclude that agreement to further her inwards; but she will never do so as a result of pressure.²⁹

The speech was particularly illuminating because ‘Abd al-Nasir was speaking to fellow army officers, and his presentation was probably less circumscribed than it would otherwise have been. US Ambassador Byroade rightly attached great significance to the speech, observing that since ‘Abd al-Nasir’s efforts to join the West had been rebuffed, “the domestic pressure on him to turn towards neutralism seems to be increasing in direct proportion with the success of the Turco-Iraqi Pact.” Byroade interpreted the speech as an attempt by ‘Abd al-Nasir to justify his current foreign policy while hinting at a possible change of course in the foreseeable future.³⁰

Despite ‘Abd al-Nasir’s initial success in securing Syrian and Saudi support, negotiations over details were soon deadlocked. Moreover, some Syrian leaders had qualms about the government’s policy. The Arab struggle over Syria therefore resumed.

Syria’s Drift Toward Neutrality

The Tripartite Declaration soon aroused misgivings among many Syrian politicians, who called for the revision of its first clause, so as

²⁹ For the text of ‘Abd al-Nasir’s speech, see *Qala al-Ra’is: Majmu’at Khutab wa-Ahadith al-Ra’is Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir* (Cairo: n.d.), p. 73. For the English version, see Cairo to Department of State, Dispatch 1899, 29 March 1955, 674.00/4-455.

³⁰ See Byroade’s assessment of the speech, Dispatch 1961, 14 April 1955, 674.00/4-1455.

to allow Iraq to join the proposed Arab pact.³¹ Several considerations combined to produce this development: first, growing dissatisfaction by Syrian right-wing elements in the National and People's Parties, including the president himself,³² with the deterioration in Syrian-Iraqi relations; instead, they would have preferred to maintain the Arab balance of power as it was. Second, memories of Iraqi involvement in Syrian affairs in the past, coupled with Iraq's present military superiority, aroused fears of imminent military intervention. Third, the district of Aleppo—the stronghold of the People's Party—was economically dependent upon the Iraqi market. Moreover, the alleged involvement of the United States in Syrian affairs³³ and Turkey's harsh reaction (see below), aroused doubts about the wisdom of Syria's one-sided policy.

Syria therefore sent its foreign minister to Baghdad with a view to reducing tension.³⁴ 'Azm outlined Syria's various interests, first and foremost its concern with the Zionist—rather than the Communist—menace. He let it be understood that Egypt was willing to recognize the Turco-Iraqi Pact and remain in the League in return for Iraq's recognition of the Tripartite Declaration, aimed as it was at countering the Israeli threat. Nuri responded by saying that accession by Syria to the Turco-Iraqi Pact was in Syria's interest.³⁵ Eventually, the Lebanese ambassador found himself mediating between the parties, particularly over the wording of the concluding joint statement.

³¹ Gardner to FO, Tel. 96, 8 March 1955, V1073/423, 115496. Riad claimed that attempts in Syria to torpedo the Tripartite Declaration started as soon as he left Saudi Arabia for Beirut. See Riad, p. 105.

³² The Syrian president told the British ambassador that he supported the Turco-Iraqi Pact and opposed the Syrian-Egyptian agreement, but feared that the army would enforce the agreement in any case. Gardner suggested that Hashin al-Atasi form a right-wing coalition between the People's Party and the National Party, an idea acceptable to the president. Hashin al-Atasi was unable to get the two parties to cooperate. See Gardner to FO, Tel. 95, 8 March 1955, V1073/422, 115496.

³³ On 26 February, the US delivered a note to Syria, requesting support for the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The paternalistic wording of the letter elicited a sharp reaction, particularly after its contents were leaked to the press. On this episode and its ramifications, see Damascus to Department of State, Dispatch 365, 15 March 1955, 682.87/3-1555; *al-Hayat*, 15 March 1955. See also 'Azm's version, pp. 341-42. In addition, US Ambassador Moose and the Turkish chargé informed 'Azm of their dissatisfaction with Syria's intention to sign an agreement with Egypt. See Gardner to FO, Tel. 97, 10 March 1955, V1073/441, 115497.

³⁴ *Al-Hayat*, 15 March 1955; Gardner to FO, Tel. 105, 12 March 1955, V1073/458, 115497. See also Riad, p. 106; 'Azm, pp. 395-96.

³⁵ *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 119, 23 March 1955; 'Azm, pp. 399-400. For more on these talks, see Wright to Eden, Dispatch 79, 24 March 1955, V1073/642, 115504.

The Syrian delegation, having rejected the initial Iraqi draft, then settled for a statement saying that “the Syrian delegation listened to the explanations presented by the Iraqi government and learnt its position.”³⁶ The visit gave Nuri confidence that Syria would refuse to sign an agreement with Egypt along the lines of the Tripartite Declaration, particularly as he had promised the Syrians that no Turkish troops would be permitted to enter Iraq.³⁷

Back in Damascus, ‘Azm told British Ambassador John Gardner that the Iraqis were willing to give him two months to clear the Arab atmosphere. First, he intended to meet ‘Abd al-Nasir and urge him to cease anti-Iraqi propaganda. Then, he would propose a new Arab military agreement that would enable Iraq to join without abandoning the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The new agreement would include a clause preventing any Arab state from signing a separate defense agreement with the Western powers. In the next stage, the Arab prime ministers would meet in Damascus to conclude the new pact as well as to consider the position of the entire Arab bloc on defense arrangements with the West. If the Arab leaders decided they wanted such an arrangement, it would be negotiated directly with the West rather than through Turkey. ‘Azm asked for Western support for his scheme, arguing that it was in keeping with Western interests.³⁸ This plan had not been presented to the Iraqis. The Western representatives dismissed ‘Azm’s efforts as a bid for personal gain, made with a view to his candidacy in the presidential election due in the summer of 1955.

The Baghdad visit resulted in a more balanced Syrian position on Arab affairs. Fears that the implementation of the Tripartite Declaration would exacerbate inter-Arab conflicts prompted the National Party to warn ‘Azm that an agreement with Egypt along the lines of the declaration would lead it to withdraw from the government.³⁹ Moreover, Turkey exerted unrelenting pressure. Two *aides-mémoire* submitted within one week during March 1955 advised the Syrian government that Turkey would consider an agreement with Egypt as “a hostile action.” Unconfirmed press reports on Turkish troop

³⁶ Wright to FO, Tel. 295, 19 March 1955, V1073/527, 115500.

³⁷ Gardner to FO, Tel. 122, 23 March 1955, V1073/558, 115501.

³⁸ For the effects of the forthcoming Syrian presidential elections on ‘Azm’s thinking, see Gardner to FO, Tel. 129, 25 March 1955, V1073/579, 115502.

³⁹ Gardner to FO, Tel. 134, 28 March 1955, V1073/589, 115502.

⁴⁰ Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 520, 24 March 1955, 682.83/3-2455.

concentration along the border made tensions mount further.⁴⁰ Despite continuing bitterness over the Alexandretta problem, Syria was forced to give way to pressure from Turkey, in view of its inferior military position. These pressures elicited conflicting reactions. While US Ambassador Moose in Damascus believed that the Turkish *démarches* were “timely and beneficial,” Iraq grew apprehensive that ill-conceived and ill-timed Turkish pressures might force the Syrians “squarely into Egyptian arms.”⁴¹ Nuri feared that if the rift turned into a controversy of “Arabs versus Turks,” public opinion would force Iraq to side with the Arabs. “Shades of Djamal Pasha remain long in Arab minds,” Gallman wrote to Washington, “and are easily stirred.” Therefore, he advised, the “Turks may be counselled [to] exercise moderation in their dealings with Syria.”⁴² Ankara, however, remained convinced that its tenacity was the main cause for Syria’s more balanced position in Arab affairs.⁴³

In Egypt, the Baghdad visit aroused fears that Syria might disavow the Tripartite Declaration. Sensing that his effort was losing momentum, ‘Abd al-Nasir asked ‘Azm to come to Cairo as soon as possible in order to sign an agreement “in the spirit of the declaration.”⁴⁴ However, internal political disputes in Syria over the nature of the proposed agreement forced ‘Azm to delay. The leftist factions were critical of the visit to Baghdad and ‘Azm announced that Syria was now adopting a neutral position meant to overcome Iraqi-

For the text of one of the Turkish *aides-mémoire*, see Chancery Damascus to Levant Department, 15 March 1955, V1073/537, 115500. See also Gardner to FO, Tel. 120, 22 March 1955, V1073/555, 105501.

⁴¹ Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 509, 23 March 1955, 682.83/3-2255.

⁴² Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 760, 28 March 1955, 682.83/3-2855. Eventually, even Moose advised that “embassy believes more moderate tone on part of Turks is now desirable.” See Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 534, 29 March 1955, 682.83/3-2955.

⁴³ Bowker to FO, Tel. 211, 26 March 1955, V1073/582, 115502. The Turkish threat undoubtedly influenced Syrian thinking. During the subsequent Cairo meeting ‘Azm reportedly claimed that he had no intention of creating a new enemy in the north (Turkey), inasmuch as he already had an enemy in the south (Israel). See INA, Survey No. 233, “Syrian-Turkish Relations,” 4 April 1955, File 2569/B1.

⁴⁴ Gardner to FO, Tel. 134, 28 March 1955, V1073/582, 115502. Tel. 129, 25 March 1955, V1073/579, 115502. Similar concerns were also expressed by the Egyptian ambassador in Damascus. He wrote later in his memoirs that the Baghdad statement changed the course of events, as it raised doubts in Syria about the Tripartite Declaration. See Riad, p. 106.

Egyptian differences.⁴⁵ Clearly, the immediate conclusion of the agreement had become highly unlikely. Iraq was satisfied with its success in having dissuaded Syria, at least for the time being, from committing itself to the Egyptian line. Nuri in particular was pleased with the temporary respite, as it enabled him to conclude negotiations with Britain (see below). Convinced that the accession of Britain to the Turco-Iraqi Pact would encourage Jordan and Lebanon to join as well,⁴⁶ he hoped to conclude the negotiations before the tripartite axis could be consolidated any further.

Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi Consultations

A Syrian delegation arrived in Cairo on 30 March in order to discuss the details of the proposed pact, followed the next day by the “surprising” arrival of Saudi Arabia’s Prince Faysal. The talks concentrated on two proposals: an Egyptian plan drafted by a committee headed by Salim; and a Syrian plan offered by ‘Azm which had been approved by ‘Asali but not endorsed by the Syrian government. ‘Azm cunningly planned to submit his proposal to the Syrian government after having obtained Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia’s approval.⁴⁷ The basically different premises of the proposals led to disagreements between the Syrian delegation on the one hand, and the Egyptian and Saudi delegations, on the other. The main differences between the proposals were as follows:⁴⁸

- (1) The Egyptian plan was called the Project for the Arab Organization for Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation (*mashru‘ mu‘ahadat munazzamat al-difa‘ al-mushtaraq wal-ta‘awun al-iqtisadi al-‘arabi*). ‘Azm’s plan was called The Arab Covenant for the Unification of Foreign, Defense and Economic Affairs (*al-mithaq al-‘arabi lil-tawhid al-shu‘un al-kharjiyya wal-‘askariyya wal-iqtisadiyya*). The

⁴⁵ *Al-Hayat*, 22 March 1955. See also different sources of the Israeli Foreign Office, File 2569/B1.

⁴⁶ Wright to FO, Tel. 260, 14 March 1955, VQ1051/53, 115753.

⁴⁷ ‘Azm, p. 404. ‘Azm claimed that a third proposal was introduced by the Syrian army which he discussed briefly. It seems, however, that some elements of this plan were integrated into ‘Azm’s proposal.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 402–4. For an English version of the plan, see Gardner to FO, Tel. 185, 19 April 1955, V1073/731, 115508; V1073/758, 115509. The plan was leaked to *al-Hayat*, 1 May 1955, according to ‘Azm: by members of the National Party who wanted to foil his move. For an English version, see V1073/758, 115509.

titles attested to the difference in their goals: the Egyptian proposal aimed at establishing a pact between the Arab states, while the Syrian plan called for creating a basis for Arab unity.

- (2) The Egyptian plan called for setting up a permanent council consisting of the foreign, defense and economic ministers of the member states. The council would supervise the implementation of the pact, and its decisions would be binding if accepted unanimously (as was the case with League resolutions). The Syrian plan envisaged the establishment of a permanent council of foreign ministers to formulate joint policy guidelines. Decisions taken by a two-thirds majority would be binding.
- (3) According to the Egyptian proposal, individual members would not be allowed to sign any foreign agreements contradicting the terms of the Arab pact, except with the prior approval of the permanent council. According to the Syrian plan, the permanent council would represent all the signatories in negotiations with, and undertakings toward, other states, whether on political or military matters.
- (4) The Egyptian offer called for investment in joint projects; for lowering tariffs; and selective tax exemptions. The Syrian plan proposed completely free trade between members states; the free movement of nationals without visas; the establishment of a Council for Economic Guidance (*majlis al-tanhij al-iqtisadi*) to regulate the extraction of natural resources; and a unified currency for financing development projects.
- (5) The Egyptian proposal called for a joint military command to operate in parallel with the national armies. Each state would allocate certain forces to the joint command. Its budget would be determined by the permanent council. The Syrian plan suggested a unified Arab army, both in war and peace, under an Arab commander, with headquarters in Damascus. Each country would transfer 10% of its total annual budget to the joint Arab army, the precise use of those funds to be dealt with by a Council for Military Guidance (*majlis al-tanhij al-'askari*). The council would also prepare plans for setting up an arms industry and a single war college.

Disagreements centered on three major issues: First, Egypt opposed concluding pacts between the West and the Arab states as a group, preferring each Arab state to determine whether to join, after

obtaining the approval of the permanent council. Second, Egypt preferred gradual progress toward economic unity rather than rushing into it. The most problematic issue was the joint military command budget. Egypt wanted each state to budget for its own military expenditure, and the command to be engaged in military planning only.⁴⁹ Apparently, Egypt was unwilling to carry the burden of the Arab army almost alone: ten percent of its huge budget would amount to much more than Syria's and Saudi Arabia's share, drawn from their much smaller budgets.⁵⁰

The importance which Egypt attached to the first issue was obvious: with approval by the permanent council to be unanimous, Egypt's control over it was assured. No member of the new Arab pact would thus be able to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact. On the other hand, Egypt considered any discussion of Arab unity along the lines of 'Azm's suggestion as premature. 'Abd al-Nasir emphasized to 'Azm that there was "no need to take untimely steps toward unity," and that a gradual approach to unity was necessary. According to Riad, 'Abd al-Nasir's first priority was to establish "an efficient Arab defense organization joined by as many Arab states as possible."⁵¹ He had no intention of letting Egypt make additional commitments but rather to project an aura of Arab unity under the guise of the tripartite agreement and thereby counterbalance the Turco-Iraqi Pact. Syria, for its part, insisted that Egypt and Saudi Arabia subsidize the proposed pact in light of Syria's economic problems. In any case, Syria refused to sign any draft that excluded the possibility of Iraq's future adherence. As a result, the discussions were soon deadlocked and the Syrian delegation left empty-handed.⁵²

The disappointing results of the Cairo consultations were a blow to 'Abd al-Nasir. He now understood that Syria's consent was not assured and that the foundations of his tripartite coalition were shaky. Moreover, the failure of the Cairo talks coincided with a critical event in the Arab world: within days, Britain was to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

⁴⁹ 'Azm, pp. 406-7.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Riad, pp. 107-8.

⁵² Stevenson to FO, Tel. 475, 4 April 1955, V1073/645, 115504. Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 1471, 4 April 1955, 674.83/4-455; Jidda to Secretary of State, Tel. 475, 11 April 1955, 780.5/4-1155.

Britain's Accession to the Turco-Iraqi Pact

One of Iraq's major aims in concluding the Turco-Iraqi Pact was that Britain's accession to it would bring a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Unofficial preliminary discussions on this point began secretly at the Habaniyya airfield in Iraq on February 22 (two days before the signing of the Pact). This secret format reflected the desire of the Foreign Office "not to relate the talks to the Turco-Iraqi agreement, since we consider that this might foster Arab suspicions that the latter is a Western initiative."⁵³ Nuri's intention was to conclude the negotiations as quickly as possible in order to avoid Arab or Iraqi opposition. He therefore suggested a short bilateral agreement which would be added to the Turco-Iraqi Pact, with subsidiary articles to be worked out at a later stage.⁵⁴ Such a move, he believed, would allow him to bypass parliament which had already approved the principle of concluding agreements emanating from Articles One and Two of the Pact. Above all, he hoped that the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and Britain's adherence to the Turco-Iraqi Pact would facilitate the accession of other Arab states.⁵⁵

Nuri presented his plan to Eden during the latter's visit to Baghdad on 3 March, on his way back from a SEATO conference.⁵⁶ The Foreign Office, well aware of the reasons that motivated Nuri to hurry, and willing to follow his timetable, was nonetheless reluctant to attach a bilateral agreement to a pact of inherently multilateral character, or to leave the details open for discussion at a later stage.⁵⁷ Britain also made it clear that in any case the letters attached to the Turco-Iraqi Pact would not commit London, a stipulation that Nuri had no choice but to accept.⁵⁸

⁵³ FO to Baghdad, Tel. 278, 279, 21 February 1955, VQ1051/9, 115751.

⁵⁴ Wright to FO, Tel. 177, 24 February 1955, VQ1051/21, 115751.

⁵⁵ See a brief prepared in Baghdad for Eden's visit, 9 March 1955, VQ1051/45, 115752.

⁵⁶ See the Iraqi text, Wright to FO, Tel. 222, 5 March 1955, VQ1051/36, 115752. See the ambassador's clarifications of this text, Tel. 223, VQ1051/37, 115752. On Eden's visit, see Tel. 221, VQ1051/35, 115752; Eden, *Full Circle*, p. 222. On his way home, Eden stopped for a secret two-hours visit in Beirut on March 5. He told President Sham'un that the Lebanese government's objective should be to "foil formation of anti-Iraq front." See Tel. 899 from Beirut to Secretary of State, 7 March 1955, 682.87/3-755, Box 2683.

⁵⁷ FO to Baghdad, Tel. 362, 3 March 1955, VQ1051/34, 115752; FO to Baghdad, Tel. 483, 18 March 1955, 115755. Wright urged haste so as to make use of the calm political atmosphere in Iraq, Tel. 239, 8 March 1955, VQ1051/43, 115753.

⁵⁸ Wright to FO, Tel. 228, 6 March 1955, VQ1051/40, 115752.

The divergent British and Iraqi views resulted from their different motivations. Nuri wanted to take advantage of the calm political atmosphere in Iraq to conclude the new arrangement safely, while Britain's interest was in maintaining its military installations in Iraq; the details of the agreement were therefore of utmost importance to it. According to Wright, Nuri was apparently more concerned about his tight schedule than about the exact contents of the modifications suggested by the British, and managed to press the British to conclude the negotiations by the end of March, hoping that Jordan and Lebanon would then join the pact.⁵⁹ It was agreed to initial the agreement in Baghdad on 30 March, and make simultaneous announcements in the British and Iraqi parliaments. The agreement itself would be signed on 4 April, while Britain would join the Turco-Iraqi Pact on 6 April (subsequently changed to 5 April).⁶⁰

The agreement laid down that the two countries would cooperate "for their security and defense"; revoked the 1930 treaty; and specified the nature of British support, including military assistance, in the event of aggression against Iraq. Article Three stated explicitly that the Iraqi government was not making any commitment beyond its borders. Letters attached to the agreement specified the arrangements for transferring Habaniyya and Shu'ayba airfields to Iraqi sovereignty. RAF squadrons, however, remained at the Iraqi airfields.⁶¹

The agreement, and Britain's subsequent adherence to the Turco-Iraqi Pact, were significant achievements for both states. Ever since the abrogation of the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty by the Iraqi regent, the two countries had sought a way of revising the 1930 treaty before it expired in 1957. Iraq wanted to ensure its complete sovereignty, yet ascertain British military assistance in peace and war. Britain, for its part, was willing to sign an "agreement among equals" that would give it the continued use of Iraqi installations in the event of a global war, and would also preserve some of its shrinking influence in the Middle East. The signing of the agreement was also Nuri's greatest personal triumph. By April 1955, after years of frustration,

⁵⁹ Wright to FO, Tel. 260, 14 March 1955, VQ1051/53, 115753; FO to Baghdad, Tels. 427, 428, 11 March 1955, VQ1051/55, 115755.

⁶⁰ Wright to FO, Tel. 329, 22 March 1955, VQ1051/103, 115755; Tel. 331, 23 March 1955, VQ1051/105; Tel. 350, 25 March 1955, VQ1051/115; Tel. 345, 24 March 1955, VQ1051/114; FO to Baghdad, Tel. 518, 24 March 1955, VQ1051/136, 115756.

⁶¹ For the text of the agreement and the discussion on it in the House of Commons, see Cmd. 9429; Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 370-75. See also Gallman, pp. 60-63.

having failed to realize his Fertile Crescent scheme or to take the lead in establishing the Arab League, he had succeeded at last in achieving two other major goals: replacing the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty, and laying the foundations for a regional defense organization centered on Baghdad. Now, he felt, the road was open to expanding this association, particularly in the Arab world.

Egypt did not oppose Britain's membership in the pact in principle; the Egyptian prime minister had told Stevenson in March 1955 that he had no objection to British participation in the Northern Tier. Moreover, 'Abd al-Nasir requested Stevenson to convey his gratitude to Eden for his promise not to press Arab states to join the Turco–Iraqi Pact. However, he did complain that Turkey was exerting pressure on Syria to join the pact.⁶² Indeed, the talk with Stevenson confirmed that 'Abd al-Nasir was disturbed by Egypt's possible isolation in the Arab world as a consequence of Arab states joining the pact (though not necessarily of Britain's accession).

Hoping to calm Egypt, Eden met with the Egyptian ambassador the day the Anglo–Iraqi Agreement was signed and reiterated that the British "were not putting any pressure on other states" to join the Turco–Iraqi Pact. He also expressed his hope that the Egyptian press and radio campaign against Britain and Iraq would cease.⁶³ Under an implied (rather than explicit) understanding, Egypt would desist from its propaganda campaign, while Britain would not press other states to join the pact, even though it was clear that the British were anxious to see Arab states join it of their own accord.⁶⁴ The subsequent cessation of Egypt's propaganda campaign against Britain, and the toning down of its attacks on Iraq suggest that 'Abd al-Nasir sincerely believed that such an understanding did exist. Thus, in comparison with the reaction to the signing of the Turco–Iraqi Pact, Britain's accession passed relatively calmly.⁶⁵

⁶² Stevenson to FO, Tel. 415, 21 March 1955, V1073/544, 115501.

⁶³ Eden to Stevenson, Dispatch 87, 4 April 1955, JE1022/4, 113591.

⁶⁴ W. Wynn, *Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity* (Cambridge, Mass: 1959), pp. 145–46. See also Love, pp. 201–2. Heikal gave a slightly different version of the talks, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, p. 65. Humphrey Trevelyan, who succeeded Stevenson as British ambassador, related in his memoirs that his predecessor was instructed by London to assure 'Abd al-Nasir that no attempt would be made to include additional Arab states in the Turco–Iraqi Pact. *The Middle East in Revolution* (London: 1970), p. 56. For the British desire for independent Arab decisions, see FO to Washington, Tel. 1574, 10 April 1955, 115507.

⁶⁵ A good illustration of this relative calm was the fact that the news concerning

As the pact mainly served British and Iraqi interests, Dulles considered a conciliatory approach to 'Abd al-Nasir meant to enhance his prestige and confidence, following his loss of face over the pact and the Gaza raid. Dulles hoped that such a step might convince 'Abd al-Nasir to take a more positive stance regarding the Alpha plan. Dulles was prepared to grant Egypt political, economic or military support if it contributed to the consolidation of the Northern Tier or to progress toward an Israeli–Egyptian settlement. What Dulles had in mind was a new approach, namely that the US would commit itself not seek new Arab signatories to the Turco–Iraqi Pact, while Egypt would participate in the defense of the Middle East—possibly through the Turco–Pakistani agreement, which was less binding than the Turco–Iraqi Pact—and would also move toward an Egyptian–Israeli settlement.⁶⁶ This was opposed by US Ambassador Byroade who believed that the US should maintain a hands-off position and avoid promises implying that Arab states would be excluded from the Northern Tier. He was also doubtful about the benefits, or even the prospects of Egypt's participation in the Turco–Pakistani Agreement.⁶⁷ Ultimately, Dulles' idea proved stillborn, and it remains unclear why he believed that the Turco–Pakistani Agreement would be more attractive to Egypt than the Turco–Iraqi Pact. Nevertheless, Byroade was instructed to placate 'Abd al-Nasir by conveying to him that even though the US supported the Northern Tier, it had no intention of joining the Turco–Iraqi Pact or of pressing other Arab states to do so.⁶⁸

'Abd al-Nasir let himself be convinced that the US would remain outside the Turco–Iraqi Pact, at least for the time being, and that Britain would refrain from pressing Arab states to join it. However, he was far from complacent, still fearing that Syria, Jordan and Lebanon would leave Egypt isolated in the face of the Israeli threat.⁶⁹ This fear led to the resumption of the Arab struggle over Syria.

Britain's accession to the pact was published in *al-Ahram* of 31 March on page 8, and without any commentary.

⁶⁶ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIV, pp. 127–28.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁶⁸ Dulles to Damascus, Tel. 515, 26 March 1955, 682.87/3–2455; *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, pp. 50–51; Stevenson to FO, Tel. 486, 6 April 1955, V1073/663, 115505.

⁶⁹ Stevenson to FO, Tel. 486, 6 April 1955, V1073/663, 115505.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SYRIA: THE CLIMAX OF THE ARAB STRUGGLE

The Struggle Renewed

It was, as we have seen, the results of the Baghdad and Cairo talks which led to the resumption of Egyptian–Iraqi struggle over Syria. Nuri now believed that “the initiative in the Arab world had passed to him,” and that he must concentrate on bringing Syria into his pact.¹ ‘Abd al-Nasir, however, was determined to prevent Syria from succumbing to Western, Turkish and Iraqi pressures. The struggle frequently spilled over into Lebanon as well. It finally ended with the election of a new president in Syria in August 1955.

Following the failure of the Cairo talks in March–April 1955 (see above), Egypt urged Syria to accept the Egyptian Arab defense plan in principle, leaving the details to be worked out later.² Syria’s Prime Minister ‘Asali responded that he was willing to sign a pact, provided it did not bar the participation of Arab states in the Turco–Iraqi Pact or of Iraq in the pact proposed by Cairo.³ ‘Asali was caught between hammer and anvil: the Syrian right wing—the opposition People’s Party—objected to the pact proposed by Egypt; the National Party was divided, but insisted on the two conditions mentioned above; and the left wing—the Democratic Bloc headed by ‘Azm, the Ba’th and the Communists—supported a pact. The fragmentation of the political system gave the army officers the casting vote.⁴

Army officers had played an important role in Syrian politics from the late 1940s onward. The coup led by Colonel Husni Za‘im in 1949 was the first of a series of military takeovers leading to direct or indirect military control. Even after Colonel Adib Shishakli was overthrown in February 1954, and the army had returned to the

¹ Riad, p. 109.

² *Al-Hayat*, 7 April 1955.

³ Gallagher (Damascus) to FO, Tel. 161, 6 April 1955, V1073/666, 115505; *al-Hayat*, 6 April 1955.

⁴ Gallagher to FO, Tel. 165, 9 April 1955, V1073/673, 115505; Tel. 166, V1073/674, 115506; Gardner to Macmillan, Dispatch 55, 20 April 1955, V1073/759, 115509.

barracks, the influence of the military on politics remained strong. However, the army, too, was split into many partisan factions, and, according to Seale, “came to reflect civilian factionalism in its own structure.”⁵ The most influential faction, headed by Deputy Chief-of-Staff ‘Adnan al-Malki, and allegedly backed by Chief-of-Staff Shawqat al-Shuqair, supported the Ba’th Party. In other words: army opinion indirectly supported the proposed tripartite pact, envisioning it not as directed against Iraq, but as a necessary shield against the Israeli threat.⁶ The officers viewed this as so urgent that they threatened to carry out a *coup d’état*, unless Syria joined the tripartite pact.⁷

Responding to heavy pressure from the army, the National Party agreed on 13 April to endorse Foreign Minister ‘Azm’s draft and asked to set up committees to work out the details. However, the party was emphatic that the wording “must not exclude Iraq or preclude the possibility of member states joining the Iraq–Turkey Pact.” It would appear that the party’s aim was to smooth things over the situation by setting up committees and gaining time. ‘Asali was aware that concluding an agreement could lead to a Iraqi or Turkish military action against Syria. He said that in the case of Iraqi intervention his party would declare its support for Iraq, but the results would be unpredictable.⁸ At the same time, President Hashin al-Atasi—probably with the knowledge of the prime minister—sent notes to Iraq and Lebanon to the effect that a military coup was imminent. In his note to Iraq, Atasi requested temporary Iraqi intervention in the event of a coup, stressing that such a move would be accepted by Arab public opinion, whereas Turkish intervention would bring on a calamity.⁹

In Nuri’s absence due to illness, Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Allah, who

⁵ Seale, pp. 146–47.

⁶ Gardner to Rose, 22 April 1955, VY1015/32, 115945; Gardner to Macmillan, Dispatch 55, 20 April 1955, V1073/759, 115509.

⁷ Gardner to FO, Tel. 175, 14 April 1955, V1073/704, 115507; Gardner to Macmillan, Dispatch 55, 20 April 1955, V1073/579, 115509; Wright to FO, Tel. 454, 13 April 1955, V1073/689, 115506. See also *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIII, p. 520; Riad, p. 118; Appel, p. 276; Torry, p. 281.

⁸ Gardner to FO, Tel. 175, 14 April 1955, V1073/704, 115507; Gardner to Macmillan, Dispatch 55, 20 April 1955, V1073/759, 115509.

⁹ Most of this communication was conveyed through the Iraqi minister. See Gardner to FO, Tel. 176A, 15 April 1955, V1073/712, 115507; Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 300, 16 April 1955, V1073/715, 115507; Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 821, 13 April 1955, 783.00/4–1355; Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 586, 15 April 1955, 783.00/4–1555. Both Atasi and ‘Asali later denied that they had requested Iraqi military intervention; Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 589, 16 April 1955, 783.00/4–1655.

sought pretexts for meddling in Syrian affairs, contacted Britain, the US and Turkey to enquire whether they would agree to Iraqi military intervention in Syria.¹⁰ Britain and the US expressed their objection in the strongest of terms, whereas Turkey was enthusiastically in favor. As soon as he recovered, Nuri informed the British and American ambassadors that he would drop the idea of intervention in light of their objection.¹¹

Turkey and Iraq realized that they must act quickly if they wanted to bring Syria into the pact, or at least keep it in their orbit, exploiting the fact that 'Abd al-Nasir's position in the Arab world was presently tenuous. Ankara warned Damascus that signing a tripartite pact would be regarded as an unfriendly act and asked Britain and Iraq to take a similar stand.¹² Turkey also asked Britain to pressure Jordan to join the pact, pointing to the "considerable psychological effect in the Middle East" this would have, and to the chance of thereby inducing Lebanon to join as well.¹³ Iraq, for its part, offered Syria economic support, but at the same time warned that if it signed a tripartite pact, "Iraq could not be responsible for the consequences." Iraqi Minister Jalil al-Rawi hinted at the possibility of dispatching armed forces to Syria. In addition, Nuri told Wright that Iraq would not recognize any regime which seized power by force.¹⁴

Shortly thereafter, the Iraqi minister in Damascus delivered a sharply-worded note to Syria to the effect that Iraq would consider amending the ACSP, but absolutely rejected the conclusion of any

¹⁰ Wright to FO, Tel. 455, 13 April 1955, V1073/690, 115506.

¹¹ Wright to FO, Tel. 467, 16 April 1955, V1073/715, 115507. Britain's objection stemmed from the fear that intervention would reinforce the Arabs' suspicion that the Turco-Iraqi Pact was intended to implement the Fertile Crescent scheme, thus ending hopes for expanding the pact. See Rose's Minute, 13 April 1955, V1073/710, 115507; FO to Baghdad, Tel. 667, V1073/710, 115507. The US objected to any Iraqi involvement, even if at the demand of the Syrian president. See *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XIII, pp. 520-21; Dulles to Baghdad, Tel. 692, 13 April 1955, 783.00/4-1355.

¹² Bowker to FO, Tel. 241, 7 April 1955, V1073/669, 115505.

¹³ Bowker to FO, Tel. 243, 8 April 1955, V1073/670, 115505. See also Bowker to Shuckburgh, 12 April 1955, V1073/725, 115507. On the British position, see FO to Washington, Tel. 1574, 10 April 1955, 115507; Shuckburgh to Bowker, 15 April 1955, V1073/641, 115504. Dulles objected to Jordan's adherence to the Turco-Iraqi Pact because of the Israeli and Jewish reaction. See Bailey (Washington) to Rose, 13 April 1955, V1073/721, 115507; Dulles to London, Tel. 5107, 6 April 1955, 780.5/4-455.

¹⁴ Gardner to FO, Tel. 171, 13 April 1955, V1073/692, 115506; Wright to FO, Tel. 454, 13 April 1955, V1073/689, 115506.

new agreement. Moreover, the note urged Syria not to join any agreement that would isolate Iraq from its Arab sisters—as did the tripartite pact by excluding Iraq; moreover, this contravened the League Charter by definition.¹⁵ The Iraqi note thus signaled that the conclusion of the pact might cause a rupture between the two states, a development opposed by both the People's Party and the National Party. However, Iraq did not realize that the note might backfire: the pact's supporters depicted it as interference in Syria's internal affairs, thus strengthening their own position.¹⁶ Syria replied that it had never considered revoking the League Charter or the ACSP, but did believe that both needed radical revision. However, the Syrian note continued, since the present Arab atmosphere ruled out such a revision, the Syrian government and parliament, acting in Syria's best interests, were doing preparatory work on the tripartite pact.¹⁷ Egypt rushed to exploit the incident, claiming that the Iraqi "warning" was "part of a plan masterminded by Turkey and Iraq, with the support of some Western countries, to undermine the Arab pact."¹⁸

A dramatic indication of the virulence of the ongoing power struggle in Syria was the assassination of 'Adnan al-Malki by a soldier, a member of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP).¹⁹ Malki, known as a Ba'ath sympathizer, had opposed Western defense plans and supported the proposed tripartite pact, whereas the SSNP was a pan-Syrian party which opposed Arab nationalism and overtly criticized the pact. Predictably, Syrian left-wing elements depicted the murder as an attempt by the Western powers (or Iraq itself) to meddle in Syrian affairs. During the trial of a group of SSNP members, allegations were made that the party had collaborated with the CIA and had contemplated a coup.²⁰ Although the US was probably not

¹⁵ Gardner to FO, Tel. 184, 19 April 1955, V1073/730, 115508. For the full text of the Iraqi note, see *al-Fikha'*, 19 May 1955. For an English translation, see annex attached to Gardner to Macmillan, Dispatch 67, 20 May 1955, V1073/828, 115511.

¹⁶ Gardner to FO, Tel. 189, 21 April 1955, V1073/743, 115508.

¹⁷ See the text of the Syrian reply, *al-Fikha'*, 19 May 1955. For an English translation, see annex attached to Gardner to Macmillan, Dispatch 67, 20 May 1955, V1073/828, 115511.

¹⁸ Cairo Radio, 17 May 1955 (*BBC*, No. 571, 24 May 1955, p. 19).

¹⁹ For background and analysis of the motivation and results of the Malki affair, see Seale, pp. 238–46; Torry, pp. 282–85. See also Gardner to FO, Tel. 201, 25 April 1955, VY1015/28, 115945; Gardner to Macmillan, Dispatch 61, 27 April 1955, VY1015/31, 115945; Damascus to Department of State, Dispatch 446, 27 April 1955, 783.00/4–2755.

²⁰ Seale, p. 241. The Israeli ambassador in Rome, Eliyahu Sasson, claimed that

involved in the assassination, there is ample evidence that it in fact supported the SSNP.²¹ In any event, Malki's death soon became "a glorious symbol of embattled Arabism assailed on all sides by its enemies."²² In the long run, the murder, or rather the way it was portrayed in the media, strengthened the position of the left and of the army.²³

Its immediate effect was twofold: Firstly, the talks between Egypt and Syria concerning the pact were suspended, as Syria was preoccupied with maintaining domestic order.²⁴ Secondly, army officers known for their sympathy with the SSNP were purged, thereby strengthening the position of officers supporting the Ba'ath. Although the army was too fragmented to dominate politics, the shift in army opinion worked in Egypt's favor.

The Impact of the Bandung Conference

The Bandung Conference, held 18–24 April 1955, was the first major gathering of the non-aligned countries. All Arab countries, with the exception of Jordan, were in attendance, having been assured beforehand that Israel would not be invited. 'Abd al-Nasir himself had been urged to attend by Nehru when he visited Egypt in February.²⁵ On his way to Bandung, 'Abd al-Nasir visited Pakistan, India and Burma, with varying results: he failed to dissuade Pakistan's Prime Minister Muhammad 'Ali from joining the Turco-Iraqi Pact,²⁶ but his visit to India was more successful. Later, he was to describe his meeting with Nehru as a turning point in his political understanding,

the Russian ambassador told him that Malki's murder was definitely carried out by "Iraqi agents." See INA, File 2569/1B, 29 April 1955.

²¹ D. Little, "Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945–1958," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 44 (1990), p. 64, in particular note 84 for information on American-SSNP relations.

²² Seale, p. 243.

²³ Gardner to FO, Tel. 209, 1 May 1955, V1073/774, 115509. See also *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. VIII, pp. 537–39.

²⁴ At the time, Iraq considered military intervention in order to maintain order in Syria. See Gardner to FO, Tel. 202, 26 April 1955, VY1015/29, 115945. The Syrian delegation to the Bandung conference returned to Damascus as soon as news of the assassination arrived. See 'Azm, pp. 383–86. On discussions within the Syrian government, see *al-Hayat*, 26–28 April 1955.

²⁵ D. Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World* (Jerusalem: 1973), p. 63.

²⁶ Wheelock, p. 225.

for it was then that he realized that “the only wise policy for us would be [one] of positive neutrality and non-alignment.”²⁷ Furthermore, he realized that it was the only policy likely to gain broad Arab support.²⁸ In Burma, he unexpectedly met with China’s Chou En Lai and first discussed the possibility of receiving military aid from the Eastern Bloc. Subsequent contacts between them in Rangoon and in Bandung led to the first arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia (see below).

Although ‘Abd al-Nasir did not make a particularly distinctive impression at the conference, he was to become one of the four major leaders of the non-aligned movement.²⁹ Curiously, his biographer, Robert St. John, found no satisfactory explanation for this transformation except for ‘Abd al-Nasir’s great personal charm, which visitors “were unable to resist.”³⁰ It would seem that the Egyptian media played a key role in glorifying his role at Bandung.³¹

The conference had no impressive political results, but it became a symbol of independence, freedom, the struggle against imperialism, and the rejection of alliances with the West—concepts that soon became known as “the Bandung spirit.” From an inter-Arab perspective, however, the Bandung Conference was a failure. Egyptian, Syrian and Saudi delegations discussed the proposed tripartite pact, but failed to achieve a breakthrough.³²

The shift toward neutrality in ‘Abd al-Nasir’s world view was also apparent in his discussions with foreign ambassadors following his return. Byroade reported that the Egyptian leader had become “disillusioned” both with the West and the Arab countries. He thought Egypt would now take a more independent line, so that “no nation, including the United States, should have disproportionate influence in Egypt.”³³ The British, for their part, concluded that ‘Abd al-Nasir, like Tito, believed he could negotiate with both sides in order to get

²⁷ Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, p. 69; *Nasser: The Cairo Documents* (New York: 1973), pp. 59–60; Seale, pp. 235–36.

²⁸ G.G. Stevens, “Arab Neutralism and Bandung,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 11 (1957), pp. 148–49.

²⁹ Kimche, p. 74, note 48. For the text of ‘Abd al-Nasir’s speech in Bandung, see *Qala al-Ra’is*, pp. 82–88. See also the assessment by Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Zorlu, Memorandum of Conversation with G.V. Allen, 19 May 1955, 780.5/5–1955.

³⁰ St. John, *The Boss*, p. 202.

³¹ Meyer, p. 119; Gordon, p. 487.

³² ‘Azm, p. 409.

³³ Aronson, p. 125. See also Stevenson to FO, Tel. 633, 17 May 1955, JE1022/4, 113591.

aid without strings and without commitment to either side.³⁴

This line of thought was pursued by several Western scholars, who interpreted Egyptian neutrality as a political tactic, or a “blanket of morality,” intended to exploit the Cold War in order to obtain military and economic aid.³⁵ However, this perception ignored the equally important aspect of genuine ideological appeal that neutrality held for ‘Abd al-Nasir. He became convinced that there existed a direct link between Arab nationalism and neutrality, i.e., that the struggle for Arab independence and unity called for non-alignment.³⁶ More significantly, neutrality in the post-colonial era was a natural choice for most newly independent African and Asian countries anxious to avoid the kind of formal links with the superpowers that were perceived as colonialism in a new guise.

Egyptian–Iraqi Propaganda Warfare

An integral part of the struggle over Syria and over defense pacts was the Arab propaganda war. Egypt’s relentless campaign against Iraq caused Baghdad to set up, on 6 April, a counter-propaganda station called the “Voice of Free Egypt.” Its declared aim was to arouse the Egyptian people against their regime. Its attacks were, as a rule, directed at the nature of the Egyptian military dictatorship which, it claimed, was betraying the principles of the revolution. It also announced the creation of a Free Egypt movement to liberate the Nile Valley.³⁷

Egypt’s response was prompt. Alongside regular broadcasts on *Sawt al-‘Arab*, and apart from jamming (with a certain measure of success) the “Voice of Free Egypt,” it set up a new station, the “Voice of Free Iraq,” which began transmitting on 28 April, probably from

³⁴ Bromley’s Minute, 3 June 1955, JE1054/5, 113608. See also Nutting’s interview with *Newsweek* after his meeting with ‘Abd al-Nasir, 30 June 1955, JE1022/9, 113591.

³⁵ Kimche, pp. 22–23; Vatikiotis, “The Foreign Policy,” p. 357; Binder, pp. 237–38; Wheelock, p. 282; Dawisha, p. 71.

³⁶ Meyer, p. 115.

³⁷ For the broadcasts by the “Voice of Free Egypt,” see *BBC*, No. 559, 13 April 1955, pp. 25–27. For additional broadcasts, see *ibid.*, No. 560, 15 April 1955, pp. 25–27; No. 561, 19 April 1955, p. 27; No. 563, 26 April 1955, pp. 30–32; No. 565, 3 May 1955, pp. 25–27; No. 566, 6 May 1955, p. 24; No. 567, 10 May 1955, p. 21.

the Gaza area.³⁸ These broadcasts were more abusive than *Sawt al-'Arab* and included personal assaults, particularly against 'Abd al-Allah, Nuri and other members of the Iraqi establishment. A typical example was a broadcast of 24 May 1955, on the eve of *'Id al-Fitr*:

Listen carefully to the attacks launched by your free voice against the jailers of the people, the slaves of imperialism, 'Abd al-Allah, Nuri al-Sa'id, Salih Jabr, Jamil al-Midfa'i, Mukhtar Baban, Fadil al-Jamali and the like. Spread the news of the plots and intrigues engineered by these individuals against the people's rights and the homeland's interests. Recount the oppression and tyranny of 'Abd al-Allah and his gang to your children and the old alike. You should know that your weapon in this battle is your organized *jihad* and strong unity. Beware of dissention. Do not allow defeatists to infiltrate into your ranks. Show the dissidents no mercy. Your victory is imminent, and your defeat of the despotic rulers—the slaves of imperialism—will be inevitable. The traitors will eventually fall, regardless of imperialism's protection . . . Your Arab brethren are watching you. 'Abd al-Allah has divided you from your brethren, but the day is not far off when you will deal your deadly blow. Only then will the people breathe freedom, dignity and prosperity. With confidence and determination, you will emerge victorious.³⁹

Unlike in the past, Iraq's response to the Egyptian campaign was effective. It officially condemned Egypt's attacks, warning that the Iraqi government considers the Egyptian attitude to be "hostile," and that Iraq would "take whatever steps are necessary" if Egypt did not desist.⁴⁰ Iraq also jammed the "Voice of Free Iraq," recalled its Cairo ambassador for consultations, and refused accreditation to the newly-appointed Egyptian ambassador in Baghdad.⁴¹ Ambassador Wright had the impression that the Iraqi steps foreshadowed the severance of diplomatic relations.⁴²

However, signs of a *détente* in Iraqi–Egyptian relation emerged in early June 1955, when 'Abd al-Nasir showed a sudden propensity to

³⁸ For the "Voice of Free Iraq," see *BBC*, No. 565, 3 May 1955, pp. 23–25. For *Sawt al-'Arab's* attacks, see *ibid.*, No. 561, 19 April 1955, pp. 22–23; No. 565, 3 May 1955, pp. 21–22; No. 566, 6 May 1955, p. 21; No. 569, 17 May 1955, pp. 17–18.

³⁹ "Voice of Free Iraq," 24 May 1955 (*BBC*, No. 573, 1 June 1955, p. 16). For other attacks on 'Abd al-Allah, see *ibid.*, No. 566, 6 May 1955, pp. 22–24; No. 567, 10 May 1955, pp. 22–23; No. 572, 28 May 1955, pp. 30–31.

⁴⁰ Baghdad Radio, 5 May 1955 (*BBC*, No. 567, 10 May 1955, p. 24).

⁴¹ Iraqi News Agency, 15 May 1955 (*BBC*, No. 570, 20 May 1955, p. 33); *al-Hayat*, 17 May 1955. See also Wright to FO, Tel. 530, 17 May 1955, V1073/813, 115511; INA, File 2410/6, 16 May 1955.

⁴² Wright to FO, Tel. 530, 17 May 1955, V1073/813, 115511.

negotiate a propaganda truce. The explanation for this turnabout lay in Egypt's problems on other fronts. Tension with Israel had peaked as a result of border incidents in the Gaza area, and 'Abd al-Nasir was busy procuring arms from every possible source. In his talks with Byroade between June and August, he repeatedly intimated that if his request for US arms was turned down, he would accept the Soviet Union's offer of unconditional military support. In addition, despite repeated assurances to the contrary, he still believed that the Western powers were at work adding several Arab states to the Northern Tier. In his opinion, the Western powers would next concentrate on the Arab-Israeli conflict; this would result in Egypt's isolation *vis-à-vis* Israel. Two other pressing issues were Sudan's demand for independence and the question of financing the Aswan Dam.⁴³ In light of these formidable problems, a temporary truce with Iraq was useful.

Following preliminary meetings between 'Abd al-Nasir, Salim and Rawi (who had returned to Cairo), a three-point agreement was reached: (1) Egyptian press attacks would cease; (2) both the "Voice of Free Egypt" and the "Voice of Free Iraq" would shut down; and (3) *Sawt al-'Arab's* propaganda campaign would be toned down.⁴⁴ Indeed, on 4 June the Voice of Free Egypt" stopped transmitting, and "Voice of Free Iraq" did so a week later.⁴⁵ During the discussions, Egypt also suggested convening the Arab League in order to modify the ACSP or to formulate some link between the Turco-Iraqi Pact and the proposed tripartite pact. However, Iraq was

⁴³ 'Abd al-Nasir and Fawzi met frequently with American officials during this period. See Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 1881, 9 June 1955, 780.5/6-955; Tel. 1902, 12 June 1955, 684A.86/6-1255; Tel. 1905, 13 June 1955, 780.5/6-1355; Tel. 1929, 17 June 1955, FRUS, 1955-57, Vol. XII, pp. 75-6; Tel. 1936, 19 June 1955, 684A.86/6-1955; Dispatch 2311, 23 June 1955, 674.00/6-2355; Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and Fawzi, 24 June 1955, 611.74/6-2455; 7 July 1955, 684A.86A/7-755; Memorandum of Conversation between Ahmad Hussein and Allen, 21 July 1955, 611.74/7-2155; and Dulles, 29 July 1955, 774.5/7-2955; Cairo to Department of State, Dispatch 129, 29 July 1955, 684A.86/7-2955; 164, 11 August 1955, 611.74/8-1155; Tel. 252, 17 August 1955, 611.74/8-1755.

⁴⁴ *Al-Hayat*, 14 June 1955. See the conversation between Salim and Evans of the British embassy in this connection, Garvey to Bromley, 6 June 1955, V1073/857, 115513.

⁴⁵ For a formal announcement of the closing of the station, see "Voice of Free Iraq," 11 June 1955 (*BBC*, No. 577, 14 June 1955, pp. 31-32). No mention was made of the *détente* between the two countries. Rather, a statement was made that the broadcasts would be stopped until further notice in order to equip the station with more powerful transmitters, capable of overcoming Iraqi interference.

unwilling to go so far, afraid that legitimizing the proposed tripartite pact would undermine the Turco–Iraqi Pact.

The improved atmosphere between the two countries was immediately reflected in two developments: First, the ban on selling Egyptian newspapers in Iraq was lifted, and Egyptian journalists were allowed into the country once again. Second, following a warning by ‘Abd al-Nasir that the Egyptian army would act to foil Israeli attempts to “conquer Gaza,” the Iraqi government declared that it would send any necessary assistance in the event of Israeli attack.⁴⁶ These steps created the impression that a genuine Iraqi–Egyptian thaw was in the offing.⁴⁷ However, a real reconciliation was out of the question. ‘Abd al-Nasir told Byroade explicitly that so long as Nuri al-Sa‘id stayed in power, a *rapprochement* was unlikely.⁴⁸ Furthermore, an official Egyptian spokesman stated:

I would like to explain, in the name of the Egyptian Government, that if Egypt agreed with Iraq that both should cease their strong attacks on responsible individuals in both countries, this does not mean that Egypt has changed her attitude towards Iraq’s policy and Iraq’s adherence to the Turkish–Iraqi pact. Egypt is still firmly convinced that this policy has seriously prejudiced the Arab League and its Charter. It has resulted in the dissipation of Arab strength and has shattered Arab unity. Egypt still believes . . . that the strengthening of Arab solidarity can only be achieved through a purely Arab pact.⁴⁹

Also in June, Iraq and Saudi Arabia reached a propaganda truce.⁵⁰ Half a year later, however, a hasty remark by Nuri about the existence of foreign bases in neighboring states (reference to the American airbase at Dhaharan) triggered the renewal of the propaganda warfare between the two.⁵¹

⁴⁶ *Al-Ahram*, 4–5 June 1955. Nuri, on a visit to London, allegedly stated that Iraq would declare war against Israel if it attacked Egypt. See *Al-Hayat*, 15 June 1955.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Basil Daqaq, *al-Hayat*, 19 June 1955.

⁴⁸ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIV, p. 361. See also Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 252, 17 August 1955, 611.74/8–1755.

⁴⁹ *Sawt al-‘Arab*, 19 June 1955 (*BBC*, No. 580, 24 June 1955, p. 43); *al-Hayat*, 21 June 1955.

⁵⁰ Amin al-Mumayyiz, *al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya Kama ‘Araftuha* (Beirut: 1963), p. 361.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 546.

The Struggle over Lebanon

Lebanon, though thought of as a minor player in Arab politics, became pivotal at various times during the conflict over the Baghdad Pact within the context of the struggle over Syria. Early in March 1955, President Sham'un sought American military and economic aid, hinting that such assistance would favorably affect Lebanon's position regarding accession to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. On a visit to Turkey in early April, Menderes requested Sham'un and Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh to join the pact. While expressing general agreement, they warned that immediate accession would lead to an Egyptian and Syrian "tempest."⁵² In contrast to Turkey's enthusiasm, the State Department decided neither to encourage nor discourage the Arab states which were involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict to join the pact.⁵³ Nevertheless, Nuri visited Beirut in mid-April to persuade Sham'un to join. This, and Lebanon's willingness to accept an Arab-Israeli settlement based on UN resolutions, was likely to gain modest American aid for Beirut.⁵⁴ Sham'un, generally in sympathy with the West, was favorable toward the pact, but many other Lebanese political leaders were unwilling to deviate from Lebanon's traditional conciliatory role in Arab politics. Moreover, Saudi counterpressure (see immediately below) made it clear that Lebanon's adherence to the pact would meet with sharp Arab opposition, to the point of affecting the country's stability.

While Egypt and Syria were bogged down in the tripartite negotiations, Lebanon came under pressure, mainly economic, from Saudi Arabia to prevent its accession to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. Saudi Arabia declined an invitation by Lebanon in late April 1955 to participate in a preparatory conference for a Middle East economic organization to be held in Beirut (26 May-6 June). Riyadh stated that "the policy of the Saudi government in economics, and in other fields, will be the policy determined by the signatories of the joint

⁵² On the visit, see Bowker to FO, Tel. 238, 7 April 1955, V1073/668, 115505; Tel. 243, 8 April 1955, V1073/670, 115505; Ankara to Secretary of State, Tel. 1206, 6 April 1955, 780.5/4-655. During his visit Shamu'n sent a letter to the Syrian president saying that he had new and encouraging information which the Syrian government should consider carefully before making a decision about joining the tripartite agreement. Stevenson to FO, Tel. 475, 4 April 1955, V1073/645, 115504. See also Bowker to FO, Tel. 241, 7 April 1955, V1073/669, 115505.

⁵³ Dulles to Ankara, Tel. 1308, 11 April 1955, 682.87/4-755.

⁵⁴ Beirut to Secretary of State, Tel. 1081, 19 April 1955, 780.5/4-1955.

declaration of the new Arab pact.” The Lebanese Foreign Office expressed regret that a political dispute was holding back Arab economic cooperation.⁵⁵

In early May, King Sa‘ud published three royal decrees: Saudi capital export was prohibited, except under special governmental control; young Saudis at school abroad were instructed to return home; and limitations were placed on summer travel.⁵⁶ All three steps affected mainly the Lebanese economy: Beirut was the financial center of the Arab world, had prestigious boarding schools, and was the preferred resort area of the Arab elite. The Arab press also carried rumors to the effect that Egypt was about to impose economic sanctions on Lebanon.⁵⁷

Saudi Arabia also applied political pressure. Sa‘ud delivered a sharply-worded letter to Sham‘un, criticizing Lebanon’s attempt, under the guise of mediation, to convince Arab states—Syria and Jordan in particular—to join the Turco–Iraqi Pact. Sa‘ud claimed that he was in possession of a copy of a letter sent by Sham‘un to the Jordanian prime minister, as well as of protocols of conversations between Sham‘un and ‘Asali, proving beyond any doubt that Lebanon had acted to persuade them to join the pact. The letter concluded by warning that “Saudi Arabia will not sit idly by, [but] defend itself [by] adopting economic and political countermeasures, as Lebanese policy is directed toward unifying Syria and Lebanon against Saudi Arabia.”⁵⁸

The Lebanese government quickly apologized, reaffirming its neutral position as between the two Arab camps. In addition, Sulh stated in parliament that Lebanon would be willing to join a tripartite pact provided Iraq was permitted to accede as well; for the time being, however, Lebanon would stay out of pacts and agreements and

⁵⁵ *Al-Hayat*, 30 April 1955; 7 May 1955. Saudi Arabia eventually decided that its ambassador in Lebanon would represent it at the conference. On the conference, see Chapman–Andrews to Macmillan, Dispatch 71, 6 June 1955, V1102/5, 115539.

⁵⁶ Beirut to Department of State, Dispatch 642, 9 May 1955, 780.5/5–955. See also *al-Diyyar*, 4 May 1955; 6 May 1955.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 4 May 1955. See Egypt’s denial, *al-Jaridah*, 11 May 1955; Cairo Radio, 18 May 1955 (*BBC*, No. 571, 24 May 1955, p. 19). The Saudi legation in Beirut issued a statement, declaring that Saudi measures were not expected against Lebanon, see Beirut to Secretary of State, Tel. 1146, 5 May 1955, 780.5/5–555.

⁵⁸ For the text of the note, see *al-Jaridah*, 11 May 1955. See also *al-Hayat*, 12–13 May 1955; *al-Akhbar*, 13 May 1955; Chapman–Andrews to Shuckburgh, 11 May 1955, V1073/812, 115511.

attempt to settle Arab differences.⁵⁹ Sham'un also told Saudi Prince Talal (the new Saudi ambassador to Paris who stopped over in Beirut on his way there) that Lebanon's policy was based on "strict neutrality."⁶⁰ The episode came to a close when Sulh visited Saudi Arabia in early August and reiterated that Lebanon would retain its policy of neutrality in the Arab world.⁶¹ Although ostensibly the Saudi carrot-and-stick policy succeeded, Sham'un continued to play a double game, remarking in discussions with Western officials that if a tripartite pact was indeed concluded, "there would be no other alternative but for Lebanon, in company with Jordan, to promptly adhere to [the] Turco-Iraqi pact." Such a step, he hoped, would be matched by sufficient arms aid from the West to modernize the Lebanese forces and build them up to full division strength.⁶²

The timing of the Saudi pressure on Lebanon was carefully calculated, based on the assumption that a Lebanese tilt toward Iraq would be likely to influence Syria's attitude to the tripartite pact. It signaled that such a tilt would invite political and economic sanctions which could ultimately bring Sham'un down.⁶³ It also served as a warning to Lebanon not to succumb to Turkish pressure to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact during the Turkish president's forthcoming visit to Beirut (see below).

Intensifying the Struggle over Syria

Malki's assassination on 22 April had resulted in a freeze of the tripartite negotiations, but by mid-May the battle over Syria had resumed more vigorously than ever. "In Damascus today," a major Arab newspaper wrote, "we witness a real battle between two generations, two schools of thought and two policies, which can determine the future of the Arab world."⁶⁴ The tripartite discussions, resumed in May 1955 at a lower level, revealed that the differences

⁵⁹ Near East Radio, 14 May 1955; Arab News Agency, 14 May 1955 (*BBC*, No. 570, 20 May 1955, p. 29).

⁶⁰ Beirut to Secretary of State, Tel. 1233, 25 May 1955, 780.5/5-2555.

⁶¹ On Sulh's visit to Saudi Arabia, see *al-Hayat*, 23 July 1955; 6 August 1955; *al-Jaridah*, 7 August 1955.

⁶² Beirut to Secretary of State, Tel. 1200, 18 May 1955, 780.5/5-1855.

⁶³ See, for example, Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 338, 3 May 1955, V1073/782, 115512.

⁶⁴ Bassam al-Jisr, *al-Jaridah*, 2 June 1955.

between Egypt and Syria were still considerable. In particular, two major practical issues impeded progress: both Egypt and Saudi Arabia refused to allocate 10% of their budget (200–250 million pounds each) to a unified army, while Syria (which would have to put up only 8.5 million to reach the 10% limit) agreed; also, both opposed economic unity with Syria.⁶⁵ A third strategic difference between the three concerned Iraq's position: Egypt and Saudi Arabia were intent on barring Iraq's participation and denouncing the Turco–Iraqi Pact, while Syria wanted to leave the door open for possible Iraqi accession in the future.⁶⁶

This impasse, and the Arab pressure on Lebanon, led Iraq to send two senior officials, ex-prime ministers Tawfiq al-Suwaidi and Jamil al-Midfai, to Damascus and Beirut respectively in order to explain the Iraqi position. During his visit to Damascus (19–23 May), Syrian leaders brought Suwaidi up to date on the negotiations with Egypt and told him that while Syria still intended concluding an agreement, it would reject a pact excluding Iraq or any other Arab state.⁶⁷ 'Asali also intimated to Suwaidi that Iraq ought to intervene politically in Syria in support of pro-Iraqi Syrian elements. In his opinion, this could be done by forcing Saudi Arabia to stop squandering its oil revenues in Syria, by gaining support within the army, and by fostering positive public opinion.⁶⁸ Suwaidi, for his part, suggested convening an Arab conference to discuss a modification of the League Charter, or alternatively turning the proposed tripartite pact into a five- or six-member pact that would replace the ACSP. He also offered Syria loans on favorable terms.⁶⁹ The talks in Damascus led Suwaidi to realize that the signing of a tripartite pact was still far off. This was highly significant because it meant that Iraq had extra time to consolidate the Turco–Iraqi Pact while undermining the tripartite pact.⁷⁰ On his way back to Baghdad, Suwaidi stopped at Beirut and

⁶⁵ *Al-Hayat*, 12 May 1955; *al-Jaridah*, 19 May 1955. See also Gardner to Rose, 3 May 1955, VY1015/35, 115945; Gardner to FO, Tel. 215, 5 May 1955, V1073/784, 115510; Gardner to Rose, 13 May 1955, VY1015/35, 115495.

⁶⁶ *Al-Hayat*, 19 May 1955; Gardner to Rose, 13 May 1955, V1073/822, 115511.

⁶⁷ *Al-Hayat*, 25 May 1955; *al-Jaridah*, 2 June 1955.

⁶⁸ Gardner to FO, Saving Tel. 2, 24 May 1955, V1073/835, 115512. See also *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIII, p. 527.

⁶⁹ Gardner to FO, Tel. 225, 23 May 1955, V1073/830, 115512; Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 695, 25 May 1955, 783.00/5–2555; *al-Hayat*, 25 May 1955; *al-Jaridah*, 2 June 1955.

⁷⁰ Wright to FO, Tel. 559, 27 May 1955, V1073/838, 115512.

informed Sham'un of his conversations with Syrian officials. Back in Baghdad, Suwaidi rashly reported that Syria would not sign a tripartite pact. Though not far from the truth, the statement elicited an angry response from 'Asali and 'Azm, who declared that, as Suwaidi had been informed in Damascus, Syria's policy was to conclude the tripartite pact to serve the Arab cause against Israel.⁷¹

In late May, Ambassador Gardner reported from Damascus that the right-wing parties were cooperating behind the scenes with the aim of enacting a law that would make the proposed tripartite pact illegal.⁷² They acted from the fear that 'Azm was moving clandestinely to conclude the pact and submit it to parliament as a *fait accompli* in a speech scheduled for 9 June. Although this proved unfounded, 'Azm's speech, reviewing Syrian foreign policy since February, triggered a wave of protest from various sides. 'Azm accused the US, Britain and Turkey of pressuring Syria to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact—a pact intended, he said, to split the Arab world. Attempting to reassure Iraq, he declared that the pact did not exclude Iraq's future participation, once "the causes preventing the agreement from becoming general and comprehensive will disappear." He concluded by stating that the major differences between Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had been surmounted and that the signing of the pact was imminent—an inaccurate assessment, as the gulf between the parties was still wide.⁷³ The speech drew sharp American and British criticism, and a particularly vehement denunciation from Iraq. Baghdad recalled its minister for consultations and an official Iraqi response expressed regret that 'Azm had chosen to make such a speech at a time which heralded the "restoration of tranquility in Arab relations, particularly those between Egypt and Iraq."⁷⁴

'Asali now suggested focusing on the economic aspect of the pact in the hope that a breakthrough in this area would help to overcome the impasse in other areas.⁷⁵ The absence of the domineering

⁷¹ For 'Azm and 'Asali's response, see Damascus Radio, 24 May 1955 (*BBC*, No. 572, 28 May 1955, p. 28).

⁷² Gardner to Rose, 25 May 1955, VY1015/37, 115495; Gardner to Macmillan, Dispatch 76, 14 June 1955, V1073/875, 115513.

⁷³ 'Azm, p. 354. The full text of 'Azm's speech appears on pp. 346–55.

⁷⁴ *BBC*, No. 579, 21 June 1955, p. 24. On the advice of the Foreign Office, Iraq toned down its response. See Wright to Gardner, 22 June 1955, V1073/864, 115513. For the text of the response, see Baghdad Radio, 16 June 1955 (*BBC*, No. 579, 21 June 1955, pp. 24–27).

⁷⁵ Gardner to Rose, 8 June 1955, VY1015/42, 115496.

Khalid al-‘Azm, who was on an extended trip to Paris, London and San Francisco, gave Egypt and Syria greater leeway. Syrian Minister for Economic Affairs Fakhir al-Qiyyali visited Riyadh (27 June–4 July) and Cairo (5–9 July). Saudi Arabia issued a statement to the effect that the talks with him had constituted a major step toward economic unity between the three states.⁷⁶

The media presented Qiyyali’s talks, too, as breakthrough. However, the official communiqué did no more than paper over the main differences.⁷⁷ Saudi Arabia expressed willingness to grant Syria a \$10 million loan and to postpone the first return payment on an earlier loan given to Shishakli.⁷⁸ But the funds were transmitted only in November 1955 (see below). More significant was the agreement to open Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia’s markets to Syrian products. Faced with a possible Iraqi boycott if a tripartite pact were signed, Syria needed alternative markets for its products.⁷⁹ However, when an Egyptian economic delegation arrived in Syria during August, difficulties arose in deciding which products the agreement was to apply to.⁸⁰

Aware that Syria was undecided, Egypt and Saudi Arabia stepped up their pressure on ‘Asali’s government. However, Syrian political groups remained split: one bloc supported signing a pact immediately; another bloc opposed it; and a third remained undecided and advocated further study.⁸¹ ‘Asali, who was considering running for the presidency, chose to defer his decision.⁸² This was tantamount to suspending the negotiations until a new president was elected the following month and a new government appointed. Even ‘Azm, an

⁷⁶ For the text of the statement, see annex to Philips to Macmillan, Dispatch 62, 9 August 1955, V1073/994, 115518.

⁷⁷ Syria proposed that Egypt and Saudi Arabia each pay 40% of the fund’s budget and Syria the rest. See Gardner to Rose, 6 July 1955, V1073/920, 115515. Egypt proposed that each state pay a fixed annual sum. See *al-Hayat*, 7 July 1955. Qiyyali, later revealed that the final decision was that Egypt would contribute 45% of the fund’s budget, Saudi Arabia 40%, and Syria 15%. See Gallagher to Macmillan, Dispatch 108, 28 September 1955, VY1015/90, 115497.

⁷⁸ Philips to Macmillan, Dispatch 62, 9 August 1955, V1073/994, 115518. See also Craston to Commercial Relations and Exports, Board of Trade, 15 July 1955, 115515.

⁷⁹ Iraq imported Syrian products worth 60 million Syrian pounds, while Egypt imported only 3 million pounds. *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 132, 28 June 1955.

⁸⁰ *Al-Hayat*, 13 August 1955.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 17 July 1955; 20 July 1955.

⁸² INA, File 2569/2, 14 July 1955.

outspoken advocate of the pact, decided to play down his support of it so as not to jeopardize his own presidential campaign.

With the prospects for signing the pact slim, the State Department suddenly indicated, in July 1955, that it wanted to avoid an openly antagonistic position toward it and “endeavor to live with [the] pact.”⁸³ This unexpected shift led to intensive British consultations. The upshot was that, unlike the American stance, Britain would oppose the pact, as passive compliance would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.⁸⁴ For obvious reasons, Iraq strongly protested against possible Western recognition of a tripartite pact. Iraq was convinced that such a move would isolate it and weaken the Baghdad Pact, deter other Arab states from joining it, and discourage Iraq’s followers in Syria (who had successfully blocked the pact in parliament). The pact was likely to replace the ACSP and thereby give Egypt a leading role.⁸⁵ However, the results of the Syrian presidential election averted any possible confrontation between the Western powers and any of their Middle Eastern allies.

The Climax: Syria’s Presidential Election

Al-Hayat described the Syrian presidential elections as “a battle between two pacts, both standing at the gates of Damascus.”⁸⁶ It was a struggle between supporters of Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and of Iraq on the other. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were hoping that “their” candidate would push Syria into signing the tripartite pact; Iraq, for its part, sought a candidate likely to bring it into the Baghdad Pact, or at least maintain Syrian neutrality in Arab politics. Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia’s natural candidate was ex-President Shukri al-Quwatly, who had returned to Damascus from his Cairo exile in mid-July 1955.⁸⁷ Both made every effort to insure his nomination

⁸³ Dulles to London Tel. 338, 19 July 1955, 682.87/7-2055.

⁸⁴ FO to Ankara, Tel. 1021, 22 July 1955, 115516. The Turks were also expected to object. See Ankara to Secretary of State, Tel. 100, 22 July 1955, 682.87/7-2255.

⁸⁵ Beaumont to FO, Tel. 654, 25 July 1955, V1073/943, 115516; Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 63, 23 July 1955, 780.5/7-2355; Tel. 108, 9 August 1955, 780.5/8-955.

⁸⁶ Basil Daqaq, *al-Hayat*, 10 August 1955.

⁸⁷ Quwatly was one of the leaders of the National Bloc (*al-Kutla al-Wataniyya*) and Syria’s first president (1943-48), see Seale, p. 24ff. In early 1949, he was deposed

while simultaneously trying to block 'Azm, accusing him of having caused the failure of the tripartite negotiations. Salah Salim explicitly stated that so long as 'Azm stayed in his position (let alone was elected president) Egypt did not anticipate any progress in the tripartite negotiations.⁸⁸ Indeed, in his memoirs, 'Azm commented bitterly that Egypt and Saudi Arabia, along with the United States, devoted considerable time and effort to thwarting his nomination.⁸⁹

Iraq for its part attempted to induce a representative of the People's Party—either its leader, Rushdi al-Kikhya, or the speaker of parliament, Nazim al-Qudsi—to run for the presidency. It also supported another possible candidate—ex-leader of the National Party Lutfi al-Haffar.⁹⁰ Iraqi canvassing was done discreetly through various Syrian politicians in Beirut and Damascus. Jamali, for example, met with President Atasi's son and the Syrian chief-of-staff, Shuqair. The meeting with the latter had surprising results, for he offered reconciliation with Iraq and support for its favored presidential candidate, although he had until then been known for his pro-Egyptian leanings. Ten days before the election, Shuqair met with Suwaidi in Damascus, promising him to support Kikhya, the "Iraqi" candidate. When at the last moment Kikhya decided not to enter the race, the army decided to remain neutral. The Iraqis wondered whether Shuqair's motive was to resume army control over Syria, or whether he was playing off Egypt against Iraq in order to secure his post.⁹¹ Alongside its secret diplomatic contacts, Iraq reportedly also attempted to recruit Syrian army officers to support it; as a result, Syria de-

by Colonel Za'im and forced into exile. His good relations with the Saudi dynasty were due to his family having served as commercial agents for the Saudis in Damascus. Quwatly had also been instrumental in sending out the Syrian Yusuf Yasin, who became Ibn Sa'ud's principal advisor for foreign affairs since the 1920s.

⁸⁸ Murry to FO, Tel. 148, 21 July 1955, V1073/940, 115516.

⁸⁹ 'Azm, pp. 456–57. He gives an account of the presidential election in Ch. 10.

⁹⁰ Gallagher to Rose, 20 July 1955, V1073/950, 115516; Beaumont to Rose, 17 August 1955, VY1015/67, 115946. See also INA, File 2569/2, Survey No. 243/S, 21 August 1955; Gallagher to Macmillan, Dispatch 96, 24 August 1955, VY1015/74, 115947.

⁹¹ Shuqair's contact with Iraq had actually begun in June, through Nazih Fansa, an influential pro-Iraqi Syrian journalist. For details on these secret meetings, see: Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 752, 22 June 1955, 783.00/6–2255; Tel. 760, 27 June 1955, 783.00/6–2755; Tel. 58, 19 July 1955, 783.00/7–1955; Tel. 78, 26 July 1955, 783.00/7–2655; Tel. 82, 29 July 1955, 783.00/7–2955; Tel. 112, 10 August 1955, 783.00/8–1055; Tel. 119, 13 August 1955, 783.00/8–1355; Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 71, 25 July 1955, 783.00/7–2555; Tel. 94, 3 August 1955, 1955, 783.00/8–355.

manded the recall of the Iraqi military attaché.⁹² Iraq also contacted Syrian ex-President Adib Shishakli, who arrived in Lebanon in mid-August to explore his chances for reelection.⁹³ Shishakli, according to American information, had reached agreement with the Turks whereby in return for Turkish assistance he will, after the return to power in Syria, sign a bilateral agreement with Turkey, similar to the Turco-Iraqi Pact.⁹⁴

Eventually, all of Iraq's efforts failed as none of the "Iraqi" candidates entered the presidential race. Iraq and the Syrian right-wing parties reluctantly accepted Quwatly's nomination as the lesser evil, while the People's Party reportedly agreed to support Quwatly in return for his promise not to sign the tripartite pact and to dissolve the present coalition government.⁹⁵ Paradoxically, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq found themselves in a common front against 'Azm, each for its own reasons. In parliament, the People's and National Parties cooperated to secure Quwatly's nomination, while the Ba'th and the Democratic Bloc supported 'Azm. This configuration, coupled with the army's neutral position, assured Quwatly's majority in parliament on 18 August.⁹⁶

⁹² *Ha'aretz*, 11 August 1955. For Iraq's denial, see *al-Difa'*, 12 August 1955; *al-Jaridah*, 13 August 1955. On the Iraqi attaché's activity, see *al-Nahda*, 15 August 1955. See also INA, 2569/2, 14 July 1955. Reports of an Iraqi plot to overthrow the government were published in early August, followed by the arrest of 14 Syrian army officers and two civilians. See *Ha'aretz*, 25 August 1955; *L'Orient*, 28 August 1955; *al-Sayyad*, 8 September 1955. On the general tendency to purge right-wing officers who supported Iraq, see Gallagher to Macmillan, Dispatch 89, 20 July 1955, VY1015/50, 115496.

⁹³ An Iraqi officer was sent to Beirut to learn about Shishakli's intentions. Although Iraq did not trust him, it did not want to alienate him either. See Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 568, 30 July 1955, V1073/958, 115516; Tel. 609, 18 August 1955, VY1015/59, 115946. A reliable source informed the American ambassador that Shishakli had met with Jamali in Beirut and had even visited Damascus on August 17 and 18. See Beirut to Secretary of State, Tel. 221, 30 August 1955, 783.00/8-3055; Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 338, 9 October 1955, 783.00/10-955. Jamali, however, denied these allegations, Tel. 184, 1 September 1955, 783.00/9-155. The visits were also leaked to *al-Hayat*, 23-24 August 1955.

⁹⁴ Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 225, 10 September 1955, 682.87/9-1055, Box 2682. The document was released to the author according to the Freedom of Information Act.

⁹⁵ For details on the understanding with the People's Party, see INA, File 2569/2, Survey No. 243/S, 21 August 1955.

⁹⁶ For an account of the 1955 presidential elections, see Gallagher to Macmillan, Dispatch 94, 24 August 1955, VY1015/73, 115947; Dispatch 96, VY1015/74, 115947; Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 149, 20 August 1955, 783.00/8-2055; Dispatch 86, 21 September 1955, 783.00/9-2155.

Having failed in the presidential campaign, 'Azm resigned. The Ba'th Party and 'Azm's Democratic Bloc withdrew from the government. Forced to resign on 23 August, 'Asali was asked by Quwatly to remain in office. Meanwhile, Quwatly began a series of consultations with leading political figures to set up a "broad national government." When this attempt proved unsuccessful, he invited Sa'id al-Ghazzi to form a government. The latter did so on 14 September. His cabinet was made up of the People's Party and independent members. The National Party, the Ba'th and the Democratic Bloc, which had composed the outgoing government, were now in opposition.⁹⁷ If Quwatly's nomination had signaled a tilt toward Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the formation of Ghazzi's cabinet was intended to counteract this drift and maintain an equilibrium. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that, under Quwatly's leadership, Syria was moving toward cooperation with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The Arab Tripartite Axis

In spite of Egypt's apparent drift towards neutrality, and Soviet willingness to provide Egypt with the necessary military needs, 'Abd al-Nasir still preferred the American option. During the three months that preceded the conclusion of the Czech arms deal, 'Abd al-Nasir, Fawzi and Ahmad Hussein frequently raised the question of arms supply in their discussions with American officials.⁹⁸ In these talks, the Egyptians made no secret of the Soviet offer. While Dulles and the State Department were convinced that 'Abd al-Nasir was trying to blackmail them, Byroade maintained that the Egyptian leader was sincere. "At [the] present moment," he assessed, "it [is] clear he would

⁹⁷ For details on Ghazzi's government, see Gallagher to Macmillan, Dispatch 106, 21 September 1955, VY1015/87, 115947.

⁹⁸ See the records of the frequent meetings between 'Abd al-Nasir, Fawzi and Byroade; and Fawzi, Ambassador Ahmad Hussein and Dulles: Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 1881, 9 June 1955, 780.5/6-955; Tel. 1902, 12 June 1955, 684A.86/6-1255; Tel. 1905, 13 June 1955, 780.5/6-1355; Dispatch 2311, 23 June 1955, 674.00/6-2355; Dispatch 129, 29 July 1955, 684A.86/7-2955; Dispatch 164, 11 August 1955, 611.74/8-1155; Tel. 252, 17 August 1955, 611.74/8-1755; Tel. 318, 27 August 1955, 684A.86/8-2755; Memorandum of Conversation, 24 June 1955, 611.74/6-2455; 7 July 1955, 684A.86A/7-755; 21 July 1955, 611.74/7-2155; 29 July 1955, 774.5/7-2955. See also the author's article, "Egypt's Drift toward Neutralism," *Middle Eastern Studies*, forthcoming.

pull down [the] temple on top of [the] regime rather than suffer what he considers humiliation and pressures upon him, particularly from Israel.”⁹⁹ Although Dulles was eventually convinced by Byroade’s arguments, US willingness to sell limited military equipment to Egypt did not satisfy ‘Abd al-Nasir. As a result, he decided to sign the Czech arms deal, which guaranteed him between 120 and 200 MiG 15 fighters; between 30 and 60 IL 28 bombers; 200 medium and heavy tanks, as well as other equipment.¹⁰⁰ ‘Abd al-Nasir, for his part, maintained that it was a “purely commercial transaction” and an isolated event. The State Department accepted ‘Abd al-Nasir’s explanation.¹⁰¹

The significance of the Czech arms deal went far beyond the military realm. Arab public opinion hailed the move enthusiastically, perceiving it as a sign of liberation from Western patronage and a manifestation of Egypt’s independent foreign policy. The wave of enthusiasm swept over the Iraqi people as well.¹⁰² The transaction also compensated ‘Abd al-Nasir for recent failures. Assessing its repercussions, Humphrey Trevelyan, Britain’s new ambassador in Cairo, wrote that it “has served to offset the fall in the regime’s credit that resulted from the Baghdad Pact and the failure of Major Salim’s Sudan policy.”¹⁰³ It also gave added impetus to Egypt’s struggle against the Baghdad Pact, offsetting Iraq’s political gains from Pakistan’s accession to it on 23 September.¹⁰⁴ Though ‘Abd al-Nasir had not yet decided to detach himself from the West, his struggle against the Baghdad Pact, his appearance at the Bandung Conference and his handling of the arms deal were indications of a growing neutralist orientation in his foreign policy. A more immediate result of the

⁹⁹ Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 1881, 9 June 1955, 780.5/6-955.

¹⁰⁰ For details on the Czech arms deal, see U. Ra’anan, *The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1969). The author claimed that the arms deal resulted primarily from the formation of the Baghdad Pact (Ch. 1). For a more updated study, see Ginat, Ch. 7. For American archival material, see *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XIV.

¹⁰¹ ‘Abd al-Nasir’s interview with UP, see the version published in *al-Ahram*, 12 October 1955; Memorandum of Conversation between Dulles and Ahmad Hussein, 17 October 1955, 611.74/10-1755; *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XIV, pp. 679-80, 768.

¹⁰² Iraq felt compelled to state that the arms deal was Egypt’s “internal affair.” See *BBC*, No. 609, 4 October 1955, p. 17; INA, File 2952/19B, 11 October 1955.

¹⁰³ Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 1437, 13 October 1955, PREM11/859. See also Makins to FO, Tel. 2444, 10 October 1955, V1023/10, 115469.

¹⁰⁴ On Pakistan’s adherence, see *FRUS*, Vol. XII, p. 158. On Egypt’s fear of Pakistan’s and Iran’s accession, see *ibid.*, p. 154.

arms deal was the signing of bilateral military agreements that interlocked Egypt's defense policy with that of Syria and Saudi Arabia.

The appointment of Sa'īd al-Ghazzi's (ostensibly pro-Iraqi) cabinet did not bring about any significant change in Syria's foreign policy. In a policy statement on 21 September, Ghazzi declared that the government would "resume the discussions on the Tripartite Pact provided that these negotiations form the foundation of a new Arab pact to include all the Arab states who wish to join." Moreover, "without harbouring any unfriendliness toward any state whether near or far, Syria declares that it is not in her interest to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact or any foreign pact."¹⁰⁵

Ghazzi (who had also taken over the foreign ministry), arrived in Cairo during the second week of October to participate in a League session of foreign ministers. He returned to Damascus on 14 October, bringing with him a draft agreement.¹⁰⁶ Six days later, Egypt and Syria signed a bilateral agreement. In light of the protracted and unsuccessful negotiations over the tripartite pact, the swift consummation of the agreement was viewed with great surprise. Only a week earlier, after discussions with 'Abd al-Nasir, Iraq's foreign minister had reported to Ambassador Trevelyan that the Arab pact was a "dead letter."¹⁰⁷ According to Riad's version, 'Abd al-Nasir had approved the draft which Ghazzi then took to Damascus. Riad initiated discussions with the army leaders in order to assure their support. Once this was secured, he approached the president and the cabinet. The only snag in the negotiations occurred when Syrian Defense Minister Rashad Barmada demanded that the agreement be directed solely against Israel. Riad objected, claiming that Israel and world Zionism would use it against Egypt and Syria.¹⁰⁸ Barmada then proposed attaching a secret annex with anti-Israeli clause to the agreement. Moreover, the People's Party ministers threatened to resign unless this was done.¹⁰⁹ Convinced that the entire agreement was

¹⁰⁵ For the text of 'Asali's statement, see annex to Gallagher to Macmillan, Dispatch 106, 21 September 1955, VY1015/87, 115497.

¹⁰⁶ Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 384, 19 October 1955, 674.83/10-1955; Tel. 390, 20 October 1955, 674.83/10-2055.

¹⁰⁷ Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 1445, 14 October 1955, JE1022/17, 113591.

¹⁰⁸ Riad, pp. 120-22.

¹⁰⁹ According to *al-Hayat*, the People's Party was willing to approve the agreement, provided that: it would have no political provisions; it would be directed solely against Israel and implemented only in the event of an Israeli attack; and, each state would be entitled to sign similar agreements with other Arab states. Apparently, all these demands were integrated into the agreement. Although some

hanging in the balance, Riad decided to defy instructions and initial the agreement with the secret annex. However, this aroused sharp criticism in the Syrian parliament and the agreement was ultimately ratified without the secret annex.¹¹⁰ Later, when faced with accusations that the agreement was directed against the Baghdad Pact, Ghazzi produced the "secret protocol" laying down that the pact was a defensive arrangement directed against Israeli aggression.¹¹¹

The main points of the bilateral agreement were:

- (1) Both states would consider any armed attack on one of them as an attack against both, and take all necessary measures, and use all means, to repel it.
- (2) Three institutions would be set up: a Supreme Council, to consist of the Foreign and Defense ministers of both states to constitute the highest authority regarding military policy; a Defense Council, to consist of the Chiefs-of-Staff and to serve as an advisory body to the Supreme Council; and a Joint Command led by a Commander-in-Chief, which would function both in peacetime and wartime and be responsible for the forces allocated to it, their equipment and their training.
- (3) The Defense Council would determine the size of the forces allocated to the Joint Command during peacetime. During wartime, the entire fighting strength of both states was to be allocated to the Command. Likewise, all the forces along the Israeli border would be placed under the Commander-in-Chief. The first meeting of the Defense Council was held on 8 November, and General 'Abd al-Hakim al-'Amir was elected head of the joint Egyptian-Syrian command.

of them were included in the secret annex which eventually was not ratified, the agreement was viewed as directed mainly at the Israeli threat. *Al-Hayat*, 22 October 1955. For the conditions, see also Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 390, 20 October 1955, 674.83/10-2055.

¹¹⁰ Riad, pp. 122-23. See also the British Ambassador's account, Gardner to FO, Tel. 450, 16 November 1955, V1073/1287, 115529. The annex reads as follows: "The two contracting parties affirm that the Joint Defence Agreement signed in Damascus on October 20, 1955, between the Government of the Egyptian Republic and the Government of the Syrian Republic is directed solely against any aggression committed by Israel on one of the two contracting parties and against any aggression whatever its source which may result from or be connected with such aggression." See Gardner to Rose, 30 November 1955, V1073/1369, 115533; Damascus to Secretary of State, Dispatch 179, 8 December 1955, 780.5/12-855. The Arab press also hinted at the existence of a secret document, see *al-Hayat*, *al-Jaridah*, 23 October 1955.

¹¹¹ Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 457, 7 November 1955, 674.83/11-755.

- (4) A joint fund would be set up. Each state was to bear half the costs of the Joint Command. Syria would bear 35% of the costs of the required military installations, and Egypt 65%.
- (5) The agreement would be in force for ten years and was automatically renewable for further terms of five years.
- (6) In an annex, both sides underscored the fact that the agreement did not nullify their commitments under the ACSP.
- (7) In a note attached to the agreement, the Egyptian government agreed not to demand of Syria any portion of the costs of the installations to be set up in Egyptian territory or in Palestinian territories under Egyptian supervision.¹¹²

The formulation of the bilateral agreement represented a shift in the Syrian position which can be attributed to army pressure on the government meant to secure military aid. An agreement with Egypt could constitute the basis for providing Syria with the necessary arms.¹¹³ In addition, the agreement promised Syria Egyptian support in the event of an Israeli attack. According to Heikal, “the enthusiasm generated in the army—and among civilians—for Egypt’s [Czech] arms deal was largely responsible for the signature of a military alliance between Egypt and Syria.”¹¹⁴

Still, the new agreement was nothing more than a face-saving device to cover up the dropping of the tripartite pact and to enable Syria to sign bilateral agreements designed to meet the special circumstances of each pair of signatories.¹¹⁵ It also defused the pressure on the Syrian government on the part of the army, the leftists and public opinion to enter into some kind of alliance with Egypt. While the proposed tripartite pact had been thought of as being directed against Iraq, the bilateral agreement was directed against Israel and was thus less likely to provoke Arab opposition.

The breakthrough in Egyptian–Syrian relations paved the way for

¹¹² For the text of the agreement, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 242–45 (English); *al-Hayat*, 4 November 1955 (Arabic).

¹¹³ Gallagher to Macmillan, Dispatch 121, 26 October 1955, V1073/1184, 115526. ‘Abd al-Nasir claimed that Syria had indeed requested Soviet arms from Egypt, but that his answer was negative, Trevelyan to Bromley, 28 October 1955, V1073/1247, 115525; Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 1609, 2 November 1955, V1023/20, 115469.

¹¹⁴ Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, p. 89.

¹¹⁵ Gallagher to Macmillan, Dispatch 121, 26 October 1955, V1073/1184, 115526; Trevelyan to Bromley, 28 October 1955, V1073/1247, 115525.

a similar agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This was concluded on 27 October.¹¹⁶ Simultaneously, Egypt attempted to persuade Yemen to sign an agreement with Saudi Arabia which would have brought it into the Egyptian orbit as well. However, even though Yemen usually supported Egyptian and Saudi policy, it was not willing at that time to conclude a formal agreement with the two.¹¹⁷ The proposed tripartite pact was thus transformed into two separate bilateral agreements dealing with military matters only.

'Abd al-Nasir had certainly been anxious to conclude the bilateral agreements to restore his prestige in the Arab world following the failure of the proposed tripartite pact, but their timing and format were largely dictated by the consolidation of the Baghdad Pact. Pakistan joined the pact on 23 September, Iran followed on 11 October. More than that: the inaugural meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council was scheduled to take place in Baghdad in early November and Iraq made every effort to exploit it to point up Baghdad's central position in the organization. Naturally, Egypt was concerned that what was now a five-power pact enjoying Western support might induce other Arab states to join. Its main aim was therefore to consolidate the tripartite axis as soon as possible, and the two bilateral agreements were one way of accomplishing this. 'Abd al-Nasir's success heralded the end of the Arab struggle over Syria. Though Syria still attempted to maintain a balance of power in Arab politics, Iraq had lost the battle for Syria.

Syrian Attempts at Maintaining a Balance of Power

Immediately after the Egyptian–Syrian agreement was signed, Syria's Defense Minister Barmada met with Iraq's Foreign Minister Bash'ayan in Beirut and proposed drawing up a similar agreement. This would complement the Syrian–Egyptian agreement, he reportedly suggested, and both would be presented to the two parliaments

¹¹⁶ For the text, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 242–45 (English); *al-Hayat*, 11 November 1955 (Arabic). For minor differences between the two agreements, see Cairo to Department of State, Dispatch 475, 31 October 1955, 774.5/10–3155.

¹¹⁷ For Egypt's contacts with Yemen, see Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 218 Saving, 4 November 1955, V1073/1228, 115527; Tel. 240 Saving, 18 November 1955. Yemen eventually joined this system of agreements in April 1956, Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, p. 68.

simultaneously.¹¹⁸ At the same time, Prime Minister Ghazzi, on a visit to Jordan, assured King Hussein that the agreement with Egypt was politically negligible, and that he planned to visit Baghdad soon in order to conclude a military and economic agreement bound to “offset to some extent Egyptian influence.”¹¹⁹ Nuri, unsure whether to take Barmada’s proposal seriously, notified the Syrian government that Iraq would carefully study any draft submitted to it, but was not willing to become party to a pact which contradicted or weakened the ACSP.¹²⁰ In any event, by 5 November, Syria had changed its position: left-wing opposition, along with Egyptian and Saudi pressure, had caused Ghazzi to backtrack and announce that “the question of signing a bilateral defense agreement between Syria and Iraq requires intensive study in view of the international agreements binding Iraq.” The Syrian prime minister thus insinuated that Iraq’s commitments under the Baghdad Pact might conflict with those to be undertaken under a Syrian–Iraqi military agreement.¹²¹

The idea of a military agreement with Iraq was thus being shelved; but Syria still hoped to conclude an economic agreement, clearly in its interest in light of the importance of the Iraqi market for Syrian products.¹²² The People’s Party which represented the commercial interests of the northern Aleppo district, exerted particular pressure for such an agreement.¹²³ Iraq, however, responded unequivocally

¹¹⁸ *Al-Hayat*, 23 October 1955, 3, 22 November 1955; *al-Jaridah*, 23 October 1955. For the Iraqi statement, see Baghdad Radio, 14 November 1955.

¹¹⁹ Duke to FO, Tel. 452, 3 November 1955, V1073/1215, 115527; Haddow’s Minute, 8 November 1955, VY10393/17, 115954. See also Gardner to FO, Tel. 438, 1 November 1955, V1073/1196, 115526.

¹²⁰ Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 417, 1 November 1955, 780.5/11–155; Wright to FO, Tel. 841, 29 October 1955, V1073/1179, 115525; Tel. 855, 3 November 1955, VY10393/14, 115954; Tel. 842, 31 October 1955, V1073/1181, 115525.

¹²¹ *Al-Hayat*, 5 November 1955. This line of reasoning was tenuous as Barmada and Bash’ayan were in agreement that the Baghdad Pact was directed against an external threat (the Soviet Union), while the proposed Iraqi–Syrian agreement was directed against Israel, *ibid.*, 11 November 1955; *al-Jaridah*, 15–16 November 1955. Saudi Arabia made its economic aid to Syria conditional upon “freezing” the Syrian–Iraqi military agreement. See Gardner to FO, Tel. 483, 17 November 1955, VY10393/18, 115954. Subsequently, Barmada denied that he had proposed the agreement at all, see *Al-Jaridah*, 9 November 1955; *al-Hayat*, 13, 15, 19, 22 November 1955. See also Gardner to FO, Tel. 483, 17 November 1955, VY10393/18, 115954.

¹²² Gardner to FO, Tels. 480, 483, 17 November 1955, VY1051/19, 115955. See also *al-Hayat*, 9 November 1955.

¹²³ Gallagher to FO, Tel. 494, 25 November 1955, VY1022/6, 115950; Tel. 495, 25 November 1955, VY1022/6A, 115950.

that while it was willing to sign a combined military and economic agreement, an economic agreement alone was unacceptable.¹²⁴ This refusal derived from Iraq's assessment that an economic agreement would be politically insignificant so long as Syria remained in the Egyptian–Saudi sphere of influence. Yet, inexplicably, Nuri's Syrian policy had always suffered from a measure of indifference. The Iraqi minister in Syria had complained on several occasions that his government was not allocating sufficient resources to check Egyptian and Saudi machinations in Syria. In response, Nuri had claimed that Iraq's modest financial resources would always be outweighed by Saudi Arabia's.¹²⁵ Iraq's lack of enthusiasm for an economic agreement prompted a further deterioration in Iraqi–Syrian relations, reflected mainly in the media. With the battle over Syria seemingly lost, Iraq turned its attention to bringing Jordan into the Baghdad Pact (see Chapter 8).

As for Lebanon, there had been a temporary economic agreement since March 1953. On November 1954, Lebanon rejected a Syrian proposal for complete economic union, but agreed to extend the 1953 economic agreement indefinitely.¹²⁶ Following the conclusion of the military agreement with Egypt, Syria made an attempt to reach a similar arrangement with Lebanon. On 21 October (the day Damascus proposed the above-mentioned military agreement to Iraq) Syria submitted two separate proposals to Lebanon: a draft similar to the Syrian–Egyptian agreement, and a plan for “organizing the Syrian Lebanese front against Israel.” Lebanon's first reaction was to delay until it could consult other Arab states. It indicated that it was not inclined to sign a formal agreement, but was willing to consider certain security arrangements along the Israeli border.¹²⁷

The timing of Syria's proposal to Lebanon was hardly coincidental. Syria believed that the new Lebanese government formed by Rashid Karami in October 1955 (which had pledged to work toward the creation of a new all-Arab pact) might aid it to maintain

¹²⁴ *Al-Hayat*, 31 October 1955, 9, 19 November 1955.

¹²⁵ Hooper to Rose, 12 October 1955, VY10393/8, 115954; FO to Washington, Tel. 4284 Saving, 22 October 1955, VY10393/7, 115954; Wright to FO, Tel. 855, 3 November 1955, VY10393/14, 115954.

¹²⁶ Damascus to Department of State, Dispatch 386, 30 March 1955, 683.83A9/3–3055.

¹²⁷ *Al-Hayat*, 22 October 1955. For the text of the Syrian draft, see *al-'Alaqa al-Lubnaniyya al-Suriyya 1943–1985: Waqa'i, Biblioghafia, Watha'iq* (Beirut: 1986), Vol. II, pp. 192–94.

a balance of power in the Arab world.¹²⁸ However, President Sham'un, backed by Chief-of-Staff Fouad Shihab, had no intention of allowing his prime minister to jeopardize Lebanon's inter-Arab neutrality.¹²⁹ Nonetheless, they were willing to discuss joint Syrian-Lebanese defense measures for the Hasbaya-Marj-'Ayun area against an Israeli attack. After all, they pointed out, the two armies had acted jointly against Israel as far back as 1948.¹³⁰ Eventually, in mid-December, a secret Syrian-Lebanese accord was signed stipulating that, if requested to do so by Beirut, a Syrian brigade would be sent to the Baqa' Valley in the event of an Israeli attack.¹³¹ Further negotiations continued until January 1956, but did not result in a formal military agreement.¹³² Lebanon, characteristically, preferred not to take sides in Arab rivalries.

Also during the second half of 1955, Syria discussed its economic relations with Saudi Arabia. Economic steps agreed to by Riyadh in connection with the tripartite pact had lapsed with the demise of the latter. Instead, a financial and commercial agreement was concluded on 9 November. Syria received a Saudi loan of \$10 million, presumably for arms purchases and for Syria's share in paying for the military installations envisaged under the Egyptian-Syrian agreement. The loan, as well as a previous one of \$6 million, would be repaid over ten years, beginning in 1961, by means of Syrian goods.¹³³ The agreement was ostensibly intended to compensate Syria for the loss of the Iraqi market likely to result from Iraqi-Syrian tension. More probably, Saudi Arabia's real motivation was revealed in a condition barring Syria from concluding a military agreement with Iraq. Syria's deteriorating economic situation compelled it to consent.¹³⁴

¹²⁸ Scott to Macmillan, Dispatch 148, 5 October 1955, VL1016/23, 115725; Scott to FO, Tel. 781, 20 October 1955, V1073/1147, 115524.

¹²⁹ Gardner to FO, Tel. 435, 28 October 1955, V1073/1176, 115525; Scott to FO, Tel. 815, 31 October 1955, V1073/1182, 115525.

¹³⁰ Scott to FO, Tel. 812, 29 October 1955, V1073/1178, 115525.

¹³¹ Beirut to Secretary of State, Tel. 557, 11 September 1956, 683.83A/9-1156; Tel. 570, 12 September 1956, 683.83A/9-1256; Army Message, 19 September 1956, 683.83A/9-1856.

¹³² Beirut to Secretary of State, Tel. 605, 30 November 1955, 780.5/11-3055; Tel. 797, 17 January 1956, 683.83A/1-1756; Tel. 803, 18 January 1955, 683.83A/1-1856; Damascus to Secretary of State, Tel. 674, 19 January 1955, 683.83A/1-1956.

¹³³ For the text of the agreement, see Mckeaney (Jidda) to Macmillan, Dispatch 133, 22 November 1955, V1073/1329, 115532.

¹³⁴ Gardner to FO, Tel. 483, 17 November 1955, VY10393/18, 115954.

By attempting to conclude bilateral agreements with Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, Syria had hoped to become the linchpin in a chain of Arab pacts, and thereby achieve a new equilibrium in the Arab system. However, by December 1955, it was clear that two rival camps had come into existence: one consisted of Iraq, tacitly supported by Jordan and Lebanon, and the second of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. With Lebanon tenaciously clinging to its traditional role as inter-Arab mediator, Jordan became the next target in the Iraqi–Egyptian struggle over the Baghdad Pact.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE FATEFUL HOUR: THE STRUGGLE OVER JORDAN¹

Early Attempts at Recruiting Jordan

“The whole history of the region might have been altered,” noted a Jordanian observer, “had Jordan joined the Baghdad Pact.”² Indeed, the results of the struggle to bring Jordan into the pact largely determined the fate of the pact in the Arab world and consequently in the international arena as well.

Jordan, along with Syria and Lebanon, had long been considered a potential candidate for joining the Turco–Iraqi Pact. Its accession would have military as well as political advantages for the current members: The Arab Legion was considered the best-trained Arab army, and Jordanian membership would have a positive psychological impact on Syria and Lebanon. On the other hand, if Jordan—the ally of Britain and Iraq—refused, the chances of Syria and Lebanon joining would become negligible. Although Jordan had so far remained neutral during the struggle, sooner or later it would have to get off the fence. The time to do so came in November–December 1955.

Jordan’s neutral stand was dictated by the nature of its commitments and interests. On the one hand, Jordan relied on Britain (which, under the 1948 treaty, subsidized the Arab Legion in the amount of £10–12 million annually during the 1950s), and on Iraq because of dynastic links and trade relations. On the other hand, Jordan needed Arab, and particularly Egyptian, support against a possible Israeli attack. Under these circumstances, neutrality in Arab affairs became a natural choice for the young and inexperienced Hussein.³

¹ I would like to state my gratitude to the late Prof. Uriel Dann for his useful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. See his article, “The Foreign Office, The Baghdad Pact and Jordan,” *Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 21 (1987), pp. 247–61; and his last book, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955–1967* (New York: 1989), Ch. 1.

² Merwede Tall, brother of Wasfi Tall, later Jordan’s prime minister. See J. Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography* (London: 1989), p. 22.

³ See, for example, Duke to FO, Tel. 73, 26 February 1955, V1073/343, 115494.

Nonetheless, Jordan occasionally explored Britain's reaction to a revision of the 1948 treaty and to the possibility of joining the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The first overtures regarding the treaty were made by Abu al-Huda's government in December 1954 following the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. The Foreign Office response was that the time was not yet ripe and that negotiations with Iraq would have to be concluded first. The British preferred waiting until some sort of new defense arrangement was formed in the Middle East which would allow incorporation of the revised Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Jordanian agreements.⁴

In mid-March 1955 the king and the prime minister approached British Ambassador Duke more purposefully regarding the advantages for Jordan of entering the Turco-Iraqi Pact.⁵ This time the reply was that if Britain and Jordan were to become members of a defense organization (such as the Turco-Iraqi Pact), Britain would be prepared to consider any Jordanian proposal for the revision of the 1948 treaty.⁶ However, the British believed that Jordan had still merely reached an exploratory stage and had no intention of joining the pact in the immediate future.⁷ Indeed, government statement published at the end of March confirmed that Jordan continued to favor a neutral Arab policy.⁸

In April 1955, Turkey twice asked Britain to bring pressure to bear on Jordan to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact, as this would have "deep psychological impact" on other Arab states.⁹ Although the British

⁴ For early negotiations on the 1948 agreement, see Richmond to Falla, 15 November 1954, VJ1052/12, 115887; Richmond to FO, Tel. 624, 14 December 1954, V1052/14, 115887; Levant Department to Chancery B.M.E.O., 7 January 1955, VJ1051/14, 110886; Abu al-Huda's press conference, *BBC*, No. 543, 15 February 1955, pp. 34-35. See also Haza' al-Majali, *Hadha Boyan Li-Nas: Qissat Muhadathat Templer* (n.p.: n.d.), p. 3. For a translation of this pamphlet, see Enclosure to Duke to Lloyd, Dispatch 10, 8 February 1956, VJ1051/42, 121492. The pamphlet was initially published as a series of articles in *al-Hayat*, 14-20 January 1956. The British ambassador in Cairo reported that Nuri had paid Majali IL 10,000 for "journalistic work," and that he was willing to pay him more if he remained in power, Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 182, 29 January 1956, V1071/68, 121242.

⁵ Duke to FO, Tel. 105, 12 March 1955, V1073/454, 115497; Duke to Rose, 14 March 1955, V1073/507, 115499.

⁶ FO to Amman, 17 March 1955, V1073/543, 115500.

⁷ Duke to FO, Tel. 113, 16 March 1955, V1073/502, 115499.

⁸ *Filastin*, 30 March 1955; Dann, "Baghdad Pact," p. 249.

⁹ Bowker to FO, Tel. 243, 8 April 1955, V1073/670, 115505. See also Bowker to Shuckburgh, 12 April 1955, V1073/725, 115507; Bowker to FO, Tel. 305, 29 April 1955, V1073/769, 115509; Bowker to Macmillan, Dispatch 89, 3 May 1955, V1073/786, 115510.

concurred with the Turkish assessment, the Foreign Office refused to pressure Arab leaders, preferring to let them make up their own minds.¹⁰ This approach coincided with the American position which opposed the adherence of Arab states because of the anticipated harsh reaction by Israel and the likely negative effects on Arab–Israeli peace feelers.¹¹ Turkey (and Iraq) were therefore compelled to wait for a more opportune moment to bring Jordan into the pact.

Soon afterwards, in late May 1955, the appointment of Sa‘id al-Mufti’s government was widely interpreted as indicating a shift in Jordan’s position from neutrality to support for Iraq and the pact.¹² These expectations persisted, even though the government’s policy speech in parliament reflected no shift. Nuri, visiting London in June, told Foreign Office officials that the best way to counter Egypt’s opposition to the pact was to persuade other Arab states to join it, and that Jordan should be first; Lebanon would follow suit.¹³ Nuri’s remarks were apparently meant to give the Foreign Office an understanding of what he expected of it in the forthcoming talks with Hussein. Indeed, in a meeting with Hussein on 17 June, Minister of State Lloyd told the king that Britain was looking forward to Jordan’s accession to the Turco–Iraqi Pact. Hussein’s reply was that Jordan’s policy was to avoid siding with either of the rival Arab blocs, and that he thought it advisable to wait until the situation in Syria became clearer. Nutting concluded that Jordan would not join the pact in the near future.¹⁴

In mid-October 1955, Ambassador Duke reported that there was “no sign of any inclination on the part of the Jordan Government to depart from their neutral attitude towards the pact,” as they believed that they would “get nothing additional” out of it “except abuse from Egyptian propaganda.”¹⁵ Significantly, Jordan’s neutral position was also manifested in its avoidance of any tie with the Syrian–Egyptian–Saudi axis. When Syrian Prime Minister Ghazzi visited Amman after signing the bilateral Syrian–Egyptian agreement in order to

¹⁰ FO to Washington, Tel. 1574, 10 April 1955, 115507.

¹¹ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. 14, pp. 679–80. See also Bailey to Rose, 13 April 1955, V1073/721, 115507; Shuckburgh to Chapman–Andrews, 9 May 1955, V1073/745, 115508.

¹² *Al-Hayat*, 31 May 1955.

¹³ Nutting’s Minute, 24 June 1955, VQ1052/20, 115762.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* See also Rose to Duke, Dispatch 90, 22 June 1955, VJ1941/80, 115717; Duke to Rose, 19 July 1955, V1073/947, 115516; Dann, “Baghdad Pact,” p. 250.

¹⁵ Duke to FO, Tel. 417, 15 October 1955, V1073/1115, 115523.

persuade Jordan to conclude a similar agreement, Hussein replied that Jordan's obligations within the ACSP remained in force and were satisfactory.¹⁶

The Turkish President's Visit

The idea of recruiting Jordan was again raised by Turkey after the Egyptian–Czech arms deal. In mid-October, shortly before Turkish President Çalal Bayar was to visit Jordan, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fetim Zorlu, requested the Foreign Office one more time to pressure Jordan to join the pact. Zorlu claimed that recent events in the Middle East—especially the Czech arms deal and the expanding Russian influence—necessitated an appropriate response, i.e. isolating Egypt by rallying the Arab states around the Baghdad Pact.¹⁷ Although still unwilling to exert pressure, the Foreign Office did agree to President Bayar's raising the issue while in Jordan.¹⁸ Turkey also requested the US to help influence Jordan, but the State Department replied that Jordan's adherence might thwart future American accession. Nevertheless, Dulles promised not to express his objection, should Jordan seek his advice.¹⁹

The conciliatory responses by the superpowers confirmed Turkey in its desire to proceed. During their visit to Jordan (3–8 November), Bayar and Zorlu used every possible argument to convince Jordan of the advantages of joining the pact. They pointed out that Jordan would secure Turkey as an ally, thus enhancing its security *vis-à-vis* Israel.²⁰ It would also secure Turkish support for making the UN

¹⁶ On Ghazzi's visit, see Duke to FO, Tel. 446, 1 November 1955, V1073/1191, 115526; Tel. 452, 3 November 1955, V1073/1215, 115527. See also Majali, *Mudhakkirati*, pp. 164–65.

¹⁷ Stewart (Ankara) to FO, Tel. 734, 14 October 1955, V1073/1111, 115523; Bowker to FO, Tel. 754, 22 October 1955, V1073/1152, 115525; Dann, "Baghdad Pact," p. 251.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* For the Turkish–British exchanges, see Bowker to FO, Tel. 789, 1 November 1955, V1073/1194, 115526; FO to Geneva, Tel. 180, 2 November 1955, V1073/1194A, 115526; Macmillan to FO, Tel. 92, 3 November 1955, V1073/1194B, 115526.

¹⁹ Hoover to Ankara, Tel. 746, 24 October 1955, 780.5/10–2455; Tel. Circular 290, 31 October 1955, 780.5/10–3155; *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, pp. 180–82.

²⁰ The entire Jordanian press quoted Bayar's statement, made while touring the Jordanian–Israeli border, that "In case some day our brotherly Jordanian army should be subjected to an unjustified attack, no one should be surprised if the Turkish

resolutions a basis for negotiating any settlement of the Palestine problem. In addition, Jordan would secure Turkish assistance in countering any military or economic threat from Syria. The Turkish leaders also referred to Foreign Minister Macmillan's promise that Jordan's entry into the pact would speed up the revision of the 1948 agreement and the granting of military and economic aid. However, they stressed, Turkey could not commit the Western powers, and Jordan would have to approach Britain on its own. The Turkish leaders also emphasized the desirability of Jordan joining the pact before 21 November, the date set for the inaugural meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council.²¹

The Jordanians replied that they were inclined to join the pact.²² Following the talks, Hussein and Prime Minister Mufti met with Duke in order to substantiate the Turkish promises. Hussein told Duke that he was prepared to join, provided Jordan received "the necessary backing" from Britain. He and Mufti requested a detailed statement of the tangible advantages to accrue from joining, in order to convince the Jordanian parliament, to rebut Egyptian propaganda, and to counteract Saudi financial influence. Duke reiterated Britain's past promises without going into details or making any firm commitments. Reporting to the Foreign Office, he concurred with the assessment made by John Glubb, commander of the Arab Legion, that this was probably "a moment of crisis and opportunity." In his opinion, "a good push from us now in the shape of firm commitment to treat Jordan generously" was necessary to bring Jordan into the pact. "If they [Jordan] do not do it now," Duke concluded, "I fear they may 'hover' indefinitely."²³

On his way home, Zorlu met with President Sham'un in an attempt to secure his support for Jordan's move, if not actually get

army were found at its side." See *Filastin* and *al-Dif'a*, 6 November 1955; Ankara to Department of State, Dispatch 253, 19 December 1955, 780.5/12-1955. Later, the secretary-general of the Turkish Foreign Ministry attempted to play down the importance of this statement, Stewart to Rose, 15 November 1955, VJ10344/5, 115649.

²¹ On the Turkish visit, see Duke to FO, Tel. 456, 4 November 1955, V1073/1218, 115527; Tel. 461, 6 November 1955, V1073/1225, 115527; Duke to Macmillan, Dispatch 91, 16 November 1955, VJ10344/6, 115649. See also Majali, *Mudhakkarat*, p. 166; Dann, "Baghdad Pact," pp. 251-52.

²² Duke to FO, Tel. 472, 8 November 1955, V1073/1234, 115527.

²³ Duke to FO, Tel. 480, 9 November 1955, V1073/1246, 115528. See also Tel. 477, 8 November 1955, V1073/1235, 115527. For Glubb's assessment, see "Jordan and the Baghdad Pact," attached to Duke to Shuckburgh, 10 November 1955, VJ1051/27, 115653.

Lebanon to join the pact.²⁴ Back in Ankara, he informed British Ambassador Bowker that the groundwork had been laid for Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, and that putting the idea into practice now depended on Britain.²⁵ This assessment was accurate for if until November 1955 Hussein had only toyed with the idea, Bayar and Zorlu had now convinced him conclusively of the advantages Jordan would derive from doing so. Turkey, however, was unable to meet Jordan's expectations, and it was now up to Britain to take the lead. Although Hussein's apprehensiveness about Egypt and Saudi Arabia had not disappeared, he had become convinced that the support of the pact's members and the aid promised him would counterbalance any opposition. Yet, the results of this visit failed to convince the Foreign Office that this was a unique opportunity which must quickly be taken advantage of.²⁶

Setting the Stage

Following Turkey's urging and Britain's positive response, Jordan informally presented an *aide-mémoire* to Duke on 16 November stating that "the time has come to resume negotiations between the two sides in order to determine the nature of the association between both states." The memorandum reiterated Jordan's overall foreign policy principles and outlined its long-term military defense requirements over and beyond current army needs.²⁷ Though the document did not state explicitly that Jordan intended to join the Baghdad Pact, the implication was that if its demands were met, Jordan would consider doing so. Duke viewed the document as an encouraging first step that required a concrete response.²⁸ The British reaction, however, was disappointing, consisting of renewed vague promises to revise the treaty and discuss all military demands. Such a discussion, moreover, would only take place after Jordan had made up its mind

²⁴ Scott to FO, Tel. 847, 9 November 1955, V1073/1243, 115528.

²⁵ Bowker to FO, Tel. 829, 10 November 1955, VJ1051/22, 115653.

²⁶ For the British position, see Macmillan (Geneva) to FO, Tel. 11, 28 October 1955, PREM11/1033; FO to Amman, Tel. 741, 9 November 1955, VJ1051/29, 115653; Duke to FO, Tel. 484, 10 November 1955, VJ1051/24, 115653.

²⁷ For the Arabic text of the *aide-mémoire*, see Majali, *Qissat*, pp. 4–5. For an English version, see Duke to FO, Tel. 498, 16 November 1955, VJ1051/31, 115653.

²⁸ Duke to FO, Tel. 497, 16 November 1955, VJ1051/30, 115653.

on Middle East defense (i.e., on joining the pact). To sweeten the pill, Britain delivered ten Vampire aircraft (which had been promised to Jordan in any case).²⁹

Britain's response showed that the Foreign Office was not sufficiently aware of the urgency of the decision. Subsequently, pressure was exerted on Britain from two directions: its envoys in Jordan, and the members of the Baghdad Pact. Glubb sent sombre reports on Egyptian, Saudi and Soviet efforts to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy and replace it with a republic or divide it up between its neighbors (see below). But the Foreign Office considered Glubb's assessments "exaggerated."³⁰ At the same time, however, one of the main points on the agenda of the forthcoming Baghdad Pact Council was the accession of other Arab states, the discussions focusing on the necessity to bring Jordan into the pact and on ways how to do so.³¹ Foreign Minister Macmillan remained reserved on the question of the price Britain should pay for Jordan's adherence, but upon his return to London from Baghdad, he wrote to Prime Minister Eden:

As an immediate step we must get some other Arab states to join [the Baghdad Pact]. This is most important for Nuri who feels isolated as the only Arab present. The first must be Jordan. I saw our Ambassador in Amman and I have read the telegrams from Glubb. Although I think the latter is often excitable, I very much fear that if we do not get Jordan into the Baghdad Pact, she will drift out of our control.³²

A visit Hussein made to Lebanon from 19–26 November had an important impact on Jordan's position, although it received scant media coverage. Sham'un, an enthusiastic supporter of the Baghdad Pact (even though unwilling to join himself), urged Hussein to come in, provided his military demands were satisfied.³³ The importance of

²⁹ FO to Amman, Tel. 778, 19 November 1955, VJ1051/39, 115654.

³⁰ Glubb's memorandum "Jordan," 28 November 1955, attached to Shuckburgh to Kirkpatrick, 30 November 1955, V1073/1384A, 115532.

³¹ For the deliberations concerning Jordan, see Enclosure Hooper to Rose, 24 November 1955, V1073/1342, 115532; *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, pp. 203–4.

³² Macmillan's Minute, 25 November 1955, PM/55/172, V1073/1336A, 115532. This change was also reflected in a personal telegram sent by Macmillan to Dulles: "It means doing our utmost to get new Arab entrants, for Nuri's position can not be comfortable while he is alone. So we are going to do everything we can to induce Jordan to come in. We may have to pay quite a price but we shall make an immediate effort to achieve it." Tel. 5599, 25 November 1955, V1023/26, 115469; London to Secretary of State, Tel. 2170, 25 November 1955, 780.5/11–2555, Box 3707.

³³ Scott to FO, Tel. 902, 21 November 1955, VJ1051/38, 115654.

Sham'un's support was mainly psychological, as Lebanon was unable to offer Jordan any aid or offset subversive Egyptian and Saudi activity. Iraq's support, needed for the latter's purpose, was surprisingly meager. In light of the dynastic links and the existing agreements between Iraq and Jordan, firmer assistance might have been anticipated. But Iraq counted on Britain to support Jordan and treated Jordan "with disregard amounting almost to contempt," in the words of Ambassador Duke. Consequently, no progress was made in clearing up the outstanding issues between the two states.³⁴ The British ambassadors in Iraq and Jordan consulted as to what could be done to encourage the Iraqi government to take action in Jordan.³⁵

Subsequently, following talks between Nuri and the British and as a result of new developments in the Arab world (i.e., the signing of the Arab bilateral agreements; see above), Iraq's policy changed in two important ways. First, Nuri invited Jordan and Lebanon to discuss bilateral economic agreements (a military agreement with Jordan already existed).³⁶ Second, during the deliberations of the Baghdad Pact Council, Nuri supported measures to bring Jordan into the Pact. Shortly before the Council meeting, on 21 November, Nuri came up with the idea of establishing an economic committee (similar to the projected military committee). This would invite Syria, Jordan and Lebanon to participate in its workings as a preliminary step to full membership.³⁷ At the conference itself, Nuri pressed for including Jordan in the economic committee, but Turkey and Britain preferred Jordan to become a full member of the pact by a single step. The council decided, however, that the economic committee was open to non-members states.³⁸

³⁴ Duke to Hadow, 17 November 1955, VJ10393/3, 115651. A striking example was Jordan's and Iraq's inability to settle the issue of diplomatic representation. Jordan refused to accept Amir Zayd as Iraqi ambassador because in the past 'Abd al-Allah had tried to send him to Jordan as regent when King Talal had been deposed. See Hooper to Rose, 19 October 1955, VJ10393/1, 115651; Duke to FO, Tel. 495, 15 November 1955, VJ10393/2, 115651; Tel. 558, 4 December 1955, V1073/1353, 115532; Wright to FO, Tel. 1000.

³⁵ Duke to Hadow, 17 November 1955, VJ10393/3, 115651.

³⁶ Wright to FO, Tel. 842, 31 October 1955, V1073/1181, 115525; Duke to FO, Tel. 443, 31 October 1955, V1073/1185, 115526; *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, pp. 203-4.

³⁷ Wright to FO, Tel. 925, 17 November 1955, V1104/1, 115540.

³⁸ FO to Amman, Tel. 162, 26 November 1955, VJ1051/42, 115654; Wright to FO, Tel. 982, 2 December 1955, V1104/10, 115540; Duke to FO, Tel. 538, 29

While the Baghdad Pact meeting was still in session, Menderes and Nuri sent Hussein a note urging Jordan to join the pact and promising it any economic aid it requested.³⁹ In Response, a Jordanian delegation led by Haza' al-Majali visited Baghdad (30 November–8 December). Ordinarily, such a visit would not have attracted any special attention, but its timing made it highly significant.⁴⁰ Iraq agreed to invest JD625,000 in the Jordanian potash works and JD 1m. in the phosphate plant, as well as to open branches of Iraqi banks in Jordan.⁴¹ To Amman, this was disappointing: it had expected more tangible assistance.

Although (as we have seen) Egypt's Arab policy during 1955 focused on Syria, it did not ignore Jordan and its emissaries visited Amman frequently. But Cairo viewed Jordan as a Western preserve and did not place great hope in its ability to draw it into associating with the tripartite pact. On the contrary, Jordan's ties with Britain and Iraq made it more likely to join the Baghdad Pact, whether voluntarily or under pressure, thereby tilting the Arab balance in favor of Iraq. Egypt's diplomacy, therefore, aimed at ensuring Jordanian neutrality. In addition, Egypt dispatched agents to refugee camps in Jordan to recruit Palestinians for terrorist activities along the Israeli–Jordanian border. The Egyptian attaché in Amman apparently also recruited fedayeen and so did "recruiting offices" especially set up in Hebron and Amman.⁴² Although the Jordanian prime minister, as well as the defense minister, repeatedly complained to 'Abd al-Nasir, the latter merely expressed surprise at the reports and promised to investigate. Glubb noted that Egyptian activities actually intensified.⁴³ Egypt's aims in launching them were to boost its influence in Jordan and to cause tension along the Israeli–Jordanian border, thus reducing Israeli pressure along the Egyptian border.

Two events caused Egypt and Saudi Arabia to step up their activity

November 1955, V1104/5, 115540; Wright to Macmillan, Dispatch 262, 30 November 1955, V1073/1361, 115533.

³⁹ Wright to FO, Tel. 962, 24 November 1955, V1073/1315, 115532; *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, pp. 203–4. Menderes and Nuri also told Gallman that if a quick approach were made to Sham'un to join the pact, with assurances of arms and economic aid, the Lebanese president could bring his country into the pact.

⁴⁰ See, for example, *al-Hayat*, 8 December 1955.

⁴¹ *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 156, 14 December 1955; *al-Hayat*, 11 December 1955. See also Majali's description of the visit in Baghdad, *Mudhakkirati*, pp. 167–68.

⁴² *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 153, 23 November 1955. See also J. Glubb, *A Soldier With the Arabs* (London: 1959), pp. 382–83.

⁴³ *Ibid.* See also Duke to Trevelyan, 27 October 1955, VJ10316/2, 115645.

in Jordan. First, the signing of the military agreement with Syria allowed Egypt to devote more time and resources to Jordan. Second, there were various indications that Jordan inclined in favor of joining the Baghdad Pact. Cairo and Riyadh viewed the visit by Turkish President Bayar to Amman in early November as a deliberate Western attempt to bring Jordan in. Ambassador Duke reported that growing numbers of refugees were being enlisted at the end of October for armed operations along the border. There were also numerous reports—mostly from Glubb—on Saudi and Egyptian machinations to topple the monarchy and establish a republic.⁴⁴ From his post in Cairo, Ambassador Trevelyan added that, in his opinion, Egypt's intention was to keep Jordan out of the Baghdad Pact, as well as to achieve Glubb's removal—"a Glubless Jordan," according to Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi.⁴⁵

Demonstrations against the pact occurred throughout Jordan during Bayar's visit, probably organized and instigated by the Egyptian embassy.⁴⁶ Egypt also launched a propaganda campaign against Jordan's alleged intention to join the pact, which peaked in December 1955. In late November, leaflets and pamphlets signed by "The Free Jordanian Officers Group Engaged in the National Struggle" were distributed throughout Jordan. They denounced British ties with Jordan and denied Amman's intention to join the pact. There was little doubt that these, too, originated in the Egyptian embassy.⁴⁷

Egyptian propaganda found a positive echo among many Jordanians. The Czech arms deal had been enthusiastically received by the public, and parliament had sent its congratulations to 'Abd al-Nasir.⁴⁸ In addition, the opposition—the National-Socialist Party led by

⁴⁴ Glubb, pp. 382–83. For additional reports by Glubb, see Mason to Rose, 3 November 1955, VJ10316/3, 115645; Garvey to Rose, 5 December 1955, VJ10316/4, 115645; Duke to Shuckburgh, 10 November 1955, VJ1051/27, 115653; Duke to FO, Tel. 512, 19 November 1955, VJ1051/35, 115653; Tel. 507, 18 November 1955, VJ1015/27, 115639.

⁴⁵ Trevelyan to Duke, 4 November 1955, VJ10316/2, 115645.

⁴⁶ Duke to Trevelyan, 27 October 1955, *ibid.* See also Glubb's memorandum "Jordan," 28 November 1955, Shuckburgh to Kirkpatrick, 30 November 1955, V1073/1348A, 115532.

⁴⁷ Glubb, p. 412. On the Free Jordanian Officers, see P.J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion* (London: 1967), p. 100, note 6. A pamphlet signed by the Free Jordanian Officers was published in *al-Ahram* and *al-Akhhbar*, 24 November 1955. See also Chancery Cairo to Amman, 29 November 1955, VJ12012/1, 115684; Duke to Rose, 3 November 1955.

⁴⁸ For the text of the note, see N.H. Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development, 1921–1967* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1967), p. 144.

Suleiman al-Nabulsi and the Ba‘th Party led by ‘Abdallah al-Rimawi—came out against Hussein’s pro-Western policy and for Egypt. The Palestinians (approximately half of the population) feared that Jordan’s entry into the pact would jeopardize the settlement of the Palestine problem. Egypt exploited its propaganda success thoroughly. In a further effort to increase Egypt’s influence, Egyptian War Minister ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Amir paid a visit to Amman in early December, but after reviewing units of the Arab Legion and touring the borders, he left suddenly.⁴⁹ No explanation was given, but his departure might have been related to the dismissal at that time of Glubb’s administrative assistant, Ahmad al-Jundi, presumably because he supported Egypt and differed with Glubb on how to tackle fedayeen infiltration along the Israeli–Jordanian border.⁵⁰ Naturally, Jundi’s dismissal caused a further deterioration of Egyptian–Jordanian relations.⁵¹

Saudi Arabia, too, was also active behind the scenes. Foreign diplomats frequently described Saudi attempts at bribery. The Iraqi minister in Riyadh, Amin al-Mumayyiz, spoke of them as “gold diplomacy.”⁵² During the Baghdad Pact Council discussions, Nuri asked the American observer that oil royalties to Saudi Arabia be suspended for six months.⁵³ Convinced by Nuri’s arguments, Foreign Secretary Macmillan requested the State Department to see if anything could be done to prevent oil revenues from reaching anti-Baghdad Pact activists.⁵⁴

In an effort to clear the “clouds gathering over Jordan,” ‘Abd al-

⁴⁹ P. Snow, *Hussein* (London: 1972), p. 76. See also *al-Ahram* and *al-Gumhuriyya*, 2–4 December 1955.

⁵⁰ *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 155, 7 December 1955; *BBC*, No. 629, 13 December 1955, p. 9.

⁵¹ Hussein claimed in his memoirs that he sent a note to ‘Abd al-Nasir through ‘Amir, listing all the demands Jordan had submitted to Britain. Hussein, King of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head* (London: 1962), pp. 90–91. This claim was also supported by Majali. See Dudgeon (Amman) to Holmer, 3 December 1957, VJ1072/1, 127909. Holmer replied, however, that no evidence was found in the Foreign Office to substantiate Majali’s claim. Later, during the trials conducted in Iraq in 1958 by Mahdawi, Majali reiterated that ‘Abd al-Nasir had been informed of Jordan’s intention to join the Baghdad Pact. See Mason to Hadow, 16 October 1958, VJ10393/215, 134030.

⁵² Amin al-Mumayyiz, p. 319. For other reports on Saudi bribes, see Glubb, p. 394.

⁵³ Enclosure Hooper to Rose, 24 November 1955, V1073/1342, 115532; Macmillan’s Minute, 25 November 1955, PM/55/172, V1073/1336A, 115532; Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 426, 2 November 1955, 783.00/11–255; Tel. 518, 23 November 1955, 780.5/11–2355. See also Eden, *Full Circle*, p. 342.

⁵⁴ FO to Washington, Tel. 5599, 25 November 1955, V1023/26, 115469.

Nasir told Byroade in late November that he had no intention of interfering with the Northern Tier so long as neither the US, nor any Arab state, joined it. Byroade, in turn, recommended to the State Department to delay for several months any attempt to recruit Arab states as a means to gain 'Abd al-Nasir's cooperation in settling the Palestine question. Accordingly, the State Department indicated to Britain and Iraq that it would not advise against Jordan's accession, but warned that, if this occurred before the Israeli-Jordanian dispute was settled, it would add yet another difficulty to a possible US accession.⁵⁵ Eden, however, rejected this approach, replying patronizingly that "the stronger the Northern Tier, the better Nasser will behave."⁵⁶

The Templer Mission

Upon returning from the Baghdad Pact conference, Macmillan persuaded his cabinet colleagues that Jordan's adherence was in Britain's interest. More than that: in view of Egyptian and Saudi opposition, the Foreign Office came to feel that Britain's prestige as a Middle East power was being put to the test. The Defence Committee accepted the Foreign Secretary's recommendations and decided to send the Chief of Imperial General Staff, Gerald Templer to Amman, accompanied by the head of the Levant Department in the Foreign Office, Michael Rose. Templer's instructions were explicit: "Jordan must be made to join the pact."⁵⁷ Assuming that Jordan, like Britain, would want to disguise the aim of the visit, the Foreign Office informed the press that Templer would be dealing with Arab Legion matters.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, the Foreign Office requested Iraq and Lebanon to express support for Hussein joining the Baghdad Pact.⁵⁹

In his initial discussions with the king and the prime minister, Templer presented Britain's proposal to grant Jordan military aid in return for its adherence to the Baghdad Pact. He also promised to

⁵⁵ *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XIV, pp. 488-89; Vol. XII, pp. 181-82.

⁵⁶ Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 1609, 2 November 1955, V1023/20, 115469.

⁵⁷ CAB 131/16, D.C.(55) 16 Meeting, 2 December 1955, Minute 3. See also Dann, "Baghdad Pact," p. 255.

⁵⁸ FO to Amman, Tel. 811, 2 November 1955, VJ1051/51, 115645.

⁵⁹ FO to Beirut, Tel. 1069, 5 December 1955, VJ1051/51, 115645; Fo to Wright, Tel. 1805, 5 December 1955.

immediately begin negotiations for revising the 1948 agreement.⁶⁰ Pleased with the proposal, Hussein and Mufti nevertheless expressed concern about Egyptian and Saudi opposition. Templer noted especially that Mufti seemed hesitant.⁶¹ Concluding his preparatory talks, Templer's assessment was that an immediate Jordanian declaration of intent to join the pact was not likely, but that some sort of secret agreement could be reached.⁶²

Following a cabinet meeting, Mufti reported that four ministers favored an immediate decision to join, while the other four, who were West Bank Palestinians, demanded an extension of two weeks in order to consult with "elements outside the government."⁶³ This stage was later succinctly described by Templer:

The West Bank Ministers were mesmerised by the Palestinian problem. They never went so far as openly to oppose accession to the Pact, but insisted that they needed a fortnight to consult leaders of opinion before making up their minds. They argued that accession to the Pact would divert attention from what they considered to be their country's primary problem; and that it would be unacceptable to public opinion unless it offered the refugees some hope of returning to their homes. I have little doubt that the memory of King Abdullah's death was in their mind and that some of them at least really fear for their own lives. The risk of estranging Egypt was also an important factor, and I am informed that the eventual rupture in the Cabinet was on the question as to whether Colonel Nasser should be consulted in advance.⁶⁴

Attempting to allay the fears of the Palestinian ministers, Templer reiterated the principles regarding the Palestine problem laid down by Eden in his Guildhall speech of 9 November.⁶⁵ He also conveyed Britain's agreement to Jordan becoming a co-signatory of the exchange of letters between Turkey and Iraq on the Palestine issue (see above). Furthermore, he handed Hussein a note promising that "accession to the Baghdad Pact will in no way prejudice Jordan's

⁶⁰ For the text of the military aid offer, see FO to Amman, Tel. 815, 3 December 1955, VJ1051/51, 115645. For the text of the promise to re-negotiate the 1948 treaty, see Tel. 816.

⁶¹ Duke to FO, Tels. 575 and 576, 7 December 1955, VJ1051/68, 115655. See also Templer's summary of his visit, Templer to Macmillan, 16 December 1955, VJ1051/127, 115658 (hereafter Templer's Report).

⁶² Duke to FO, Tel. 577, 7 December 1955, VJ1051/69, 115655.

⁶³ Duke to FO, Tel. 601, 10 December 1955, VJ1051/82, 115656. See also Majali, *Qissat*, p. 6.

⁶⁴ Templer's Report, p. 2.

⁶⁵ On Eden's speech, see Lamb, pp. 177-78.

position with regard to the ultimate settlement of the Palestine problem.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, on 11 December, after another cabinet meeting (this time at the ambassador's residence), Templer reached the conclusion that the chances of obtaining a public commitment from Jordan were negligible. Consequently, at the king's behest, he presented the Jordanian government with a draft of a secret "heads of agreement."⁶⁷ The Jordanian government appointed then a committee to draft a counterproposal, informally passed on to Templer on 13 December, before being discussed by the cabinet.⁶⁸

The Jordanian cabinet met twice in the next two days; the four Palestinian ministers—'Izmi al-Nashashibi, Na'im 'Abd al-Hadi, Sam'an Da'ud and 'Ali Hasana—insisted on showing the counterproposal to Egypt before presenting it to Britain (which had in fact already received it informally). The other ministers, as well as King Hussein, agreed to consult with Egypt, but only after passing the proposal on to the British.⁶⁹ Ultimately, on 13 December, the negative attitude of the Palestinian ministers led Mufti to submit his resignation. The king was still prepared to sign a letter of intent, but Templer and Duke advised him to refrain from doing so in light of the opposition within the government.⁷⁰ Mufti's cautious stand stemmed from the fact that he belonged to the Circassian minority, and as such was reluctant to support a divisive policy. The split between East and West Bank ministers gave him a convenient pretext to resign.

⁶⁶ For the text, see Templer's Report, Annexure B, p. 5. The Foreign Office asked Baghdad and Ankara to allow Jordan to endorse the letters exchanged in the Turco-Iraqi Pact. See FO to Ankara, Tel. 1948, and to Baghdad, Tel. 1855, 12 December 1955, VJ1051/84, 115656. For Iraq's positive response, see Tel. 1025, 12 December 1955, VJ1051/91, 115656; Dann, *Baghdad Pact*, p. 255.

⁶⁷ For the text, see Templer's Report, Annexure A, pp. 4-5. For an Arabic version, see Majali, *Qissat*, pp. 6-8.

⁶⁸ Templer (p. 2) claimed that the committee included two ministers, while Majali (p. 8) noted that it was composed of four, three of whom were Palestinians. Majali was trying to show that the Palestinian ministers, who later resigned, were responsible for the Jordanian draft. For the text, see Templer's Report, Annexure D, pp. 8-9. Majali (pp. 8-9) did not admit that the text had been informally delivered to the British. Compare the two texts, Templer's Report, Annexure A and D. The Jordanian proposal did not differ substantially from the British proposal, except for one important aspect: whereas the British proposal stated Britain's recognition that Jordan undertook "no obligations outside the area of the Baghdad Pact," the Jordanian version specified "no obligations outside the Kingdom."

⁶⁹ Majali, *Qissat*, pp. 10-12; Templer's Report, p. 2. See also Duke to Lloyd, Dispatch 10, 8 February 1956, VJ1051/42, 115492.

⁷⁰ Duke to FO, Tel. 617, 13 December 1955, VJ1051/95, 115657; Templer's Report, p. 2; Glubb, p. 395-96.

The West Bank ministers' main fear was that Jordan's entry into the Baghdad Pact would freeze the Palestine issue. Attempts by their colleagues to allay their fear were unsuccessful.⁷¹ Moreover, the West Bank ministers were believed to be in close contact with the Egyptian embassy. One of the Egyptians they met there at the time was Anwar al-Sadat, ostensibly in Amman to organize a meeting of the Islamic Conference but in fact playing an important role in orchestrating Egyptian subversive activity during Templer's presence. Moreover, according to Duke, Mufti himself visited the Egyptian embassy daily or, more precisely, nightly.⁷²

Mufti's resignation marked the end of the first round in the struggle over Jordan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia had been adept in playing on Palestinian fears that Jordan would relegate the Palestine problem to the sidelines, once it had acceded to the pact. Consequently, the Palestinian ministers brought down the government. The formation of a new cabinet offered the contenders a temporary respite to prepare themselves for the final showdown.

The Climax: Majali's Cabinet

The new prime minister appointed by Hussein on 13 December was Haza' al-Majali, an ardent supporter of the Baghdad Pact. The king's choice was seen as a reflection of his determination to join the pact. The Foreign Office thought of it as evidence of the success of Templer's mission, congratulated the latter, and instructed him to meet with Majali.⁷³ However, London misread events in Jordan, for at that very moment Majali himself sent the assistant foreign minister to tell Duke that he would prefer Templer to leave as soon as possible, so as to avoid the charge of having formed his government under British pressure.⁷⁴ Templer did indeed leave the following day, once he understood that his presence in Amman could

⁷¹ *Al-Jihad, Filastin*, 13 December 1955. See also 'Abd al-Hadi in *al-Hayat*, 3 February 1956.

⁷² Duke to Lloyd, Dispatch 10, 8 February 1955, VJ1051/42, 115492. Upon his return to Cairo, Sadat published a series of articles on the visit in his newspaper, *al-Gumhuriyya*, 24–27 December 1955. In his memoirs, Sadat attributed Jordan's decision not to join the pact to his efforts in Amman. See also Glubb, p. 396; Templer's Report, p. 2; Eden, *Full Circle*, pp. 343–44.

⁷³ FO to Amman, Tel. 894, 14 December 1955, VJ1051/96, 115657.

⁷⁴ Duke to FO, Tel. 629, 14 December 1955, VJ1051/105, 115657.

only make more difficult Majali's efforts to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact.

Before entering office on 15 December, Majali had taken several steps to assure the success of his policy. First, he had asked for, and received, a written undertaking from his new ministers, including the Palestinians, to support his aim of joining the pact.⁷⁵ Second, he had requested Iraq to grant Jordan the aid it had promised during his recent visit to Baghdad (see above), and to provide the Iraqi minister with sufficient funds to influence the Jordanian press. He also turned to Britain to help obtain Iraq's assent to these requests, which the Foreign Office was more than willing to do.⁷⁶ Third, he took steps to counter Egyptian propaganda. In meetings with newspaper editors, he used both cajolery and threats, asserting that he intended to act against the Egyptian and Saudi missions if they engaged in anti-government activities.⁷⁷ Lastly, both Hussein and Majali, in separate official statements, pledged that the Palestinian problem remained the government's chief concern.⁷⁸

No sooner was Majali appointed than riots spread throughout the country. Demonstrators called for the resignation of the new government and for an end to the Baghdad Pact.⁷⁹ Inflammatory broadcasts by *Sawt al-'Arab*, along with provocative local activity orchestrated by the Egyptian and Saudi missions, led to widespread acts of violence. The ring leaders were high school and university students acting on the instructions of nationalist teachers. They were quickly joined by opportunists, urban groups and refugees who were well paid by the Egyptian and Saudi missions.⁸⁰ The opposition parties were also active in organizing the riots. According to the Arab press, the National-Socialist Party was in constant touch with the Egyptian

⁷⁵ Duke to FO, Tel. 639, 16 December 1955, VJ1051/109, 115657. The Palestinian ministers in Majali's government were Muhammad 'Ali al-Ja'bri (the mayor of Hebron), 'Arif al-'Arif (the mayor of Jerusalem), Jalil Badran (the mayor of Ram'allah) and Salah al-Barghuti.

⁷⁶ Duke to FO, Tel. 623, 14 December 1955, VJ1051/102, 115657. For the approval of the FO, see Tel. 1876.

⁷⁷ Duke to FO, Tel. 639, 16 December 1955, VJ1051/109, 115657. See also the Palace statement, Tel. 630, VJ1051/107, 115657.

⁷⁸ For the king's statement, see *BBC*, No. 631, 20 December 1955, p. 18. For Majali's statement, see *ibid.*, p. 19.

⁷⁹ Glubb (p. 398) asserted that the demonstrations began on December 16. According to *al-Hayat* (1 January 1956), they had begun in Nablus on December 14.

⁸⁰ Duke to FO, Tel. 662, 19 December 1955, VJ1015/51, 115640. See also Glubb, p. 398.

embassy, which had become the center of anti-pact activity.⁸¹ In West Bank cities, the riots were organized by local committees. These sent delegations to Hussein and Majali to demand a change in government policy. A national convention of delegates from the West Bank towns met in al-Bireh and elected a central committee to communicate with East Bank opposition quarters with the aim of holding a general conference in Amman.⁸² Western consulates in East Jerusalem were damaged, and Musa al-'Alami's experimental farm in Jericho was nearly destroyed. Slogans carried by the demonstrators included threats to separate the West Bank from Jordan and annex it to Syria should Jordan join the pact.⁸³

Countermeasures were "too little and too late." The police and the army were not equipped to deal with the riots, and the minister of interior did not permit them to use force against civilians. A state of emergency was declared.⁸⁴ Though Duke advised Hussein to send in the Arab Legion to suppress the riots, the king was hesitant.⁸⁵ On 19 December, Hussein admitted to Duke for the first time that the situation in the country was "critical." The next day, after consulting with Majali and Glubb, Hussein decided to dissolve parliament and appoint a caretaker government to supervise new elections. That same day, Majali tendered his resignation.⁸⁶ Soon afterward, order was restored throughout the country. The Jordanian press and the Egyptian media celebrated Majali's dismissal.⁸⁷

The fall of Majali's government signaled the end of the second

⁸¹ *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. VII (1956), p. 130; *al-Hayat*, 15 January 1956.

⁸² *Al-Difa'*, 21 December 1955; *al-Hayat*, 1 January 1956.

⁸³ *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. VII (1956), p. 129; *al-Difa'*, 21 December 1955. See also the reports sent from Amman: Duke to FO, Tel. 657, 19 December 1955, VJ1015/43, 115639; Tel. 652, 18 December 1955, VJ1015/44; Tel. 659, 19 December 1955, VJ1015/47; Tel. 661, VJ1015/90; Tel. 678, 20 December 1955, V1015/63, 115640; Tel. 681, 21 December 1955, VJ1015/64; Tel. 686, VJ1015/67. See also the reports sent from Jerusalem: Willey to FO, Tel. 473, 17 December 1955, VJ1015/41, 115639; Tel. 475, VJ1015/42; Tel. 476, 19 December 1955, VJ1015/59, 115640; Tel. 488, 20 December 1955, VJ1015/65.

⁸⁴ Glubb, p. 400. See also Majali, *Qissat*, p. 18.

⁸⁵ Duke to FO, Tel. 665, 19 December 1955, VJ1051/121, 115658.

⁸⁶ Duke to FO, Tel. 665, 19 December 1955, VJ1051/121, 115658. For the text of the royal decree and Majali's statement, see Duke to FO, Tels. 669 and 670, 20 December 1955, VJ1051/121, 115658. This marked the end of Majali's political career, as in the Arab mind he was branded a collaborator with the West. His pro-Western leanings subsequently led to his assassination on 29 August 1960. *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. XII (1961), p. 110.

⁸⁷ *BBC*, No. 633, 30 December 1955, p. 29.

round in the struggle over Jordan. The question of Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact was no longer a practical proposition. Though Hussein and Majali still hoped that new elections would facilitate Jordan's adherence, the chances for this were slim.⁸⁸ The nature of the Arab struggle over Jordan had changed: Egypt now focused on reinforcing Jordan's neutrality in Arab affairs, while Iraq concentrated on preventing Jordan from drifting into the Egyptian orbit.

The End: Rifa'i's Cabinet

The caretaker cabinet was placed under Ibrahim Hashim, appointed on 21 December. His appointment gave all sides additional time to prepare for possible further rounds.⁸⁹ The constitution laid down that elections must be held within four months from the time parliament was dissolved. However, an unforeseen legal problem arose. A petition submitted to Hussein stated that the dissolution had been illegal, since the minister of interior had not signed the order, as required by the constitution. Indeed, Minister of Interior 'Abbas Mirza, a Circassian, had failed to sign the order for the simple reason that he had resigned before Hussein had issued it. The petition was passed on to the Legislative Supreme Council which ruled that the dissolution had indeed been illegal.⁹⁰ This meant that Hashim's government would have to resign, a new government would have to be appointed, and parliament would remain in session until a new, legal order was issued to disband it. In a way, this was a relief for Hussein and his supporters who had begun to have serious doubts about the wisdom of holding elections at a time when the opposition parties were likely to become stronger.⁹¹ However, the council's decision caused a new wave of rioting which swept through the capital and many West Bank towns from 7–9 January. The new riots sprang from the fear that an appointed government would once again attempt to bring the country into the Baghdad Pact. The opposition parties exploited the demonstrations to press their demand for new

⁸⁸ Duke to FO, Tel. 666, 19 December 1955, VJ1051/121, 115658; Tel. 699, 22 December 1955, VJ1051/130, 115659.

⁸⁹ *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. VII (1956), p. 130.

⁹⁰ *Al-Hayat*, 5 January 1956.

⁹¹ Glubb, p. 400.

elections, in the hope that the prevalent atmosphere would militate to their advantage.⁹²

Although the demonstrations were less wide-spread in mid-December, Hussein's reaction was quite different: a curfew was imposed and Legion units were sent in.⁹³ Following their swift suppression, Hussein asked Samir al-Rifa'i to form a new cabinet. This was done on 9 January 1956. The platform of the government explicitly pledged not to enter into any new pacts, but rather to work toward strengthening ties with the Arab states.⁹⁴

Simultaneously, Hussein secretly approached Britain and Iraq with a request for political and military help. Upon Duke's recommendation, Eden had two paratroop battalions and one infantry battalion sent to Cyprus. In addition, Selwyn Lloyd (who had meanwhile replaced Macmillan as foreign secretary), sent a sharp note to 'Abd al-Nasir rebuking him for his subversive activities in Jordan. He also warned Saudi Arabia that Britain would fulfill its obligations under the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty if Saudi forces on the Jordanian border took aggressive action. All Nuri did was to advise Britain that, in his view, 'Abd al-Nasir was the source of the problem.⁹⁵

Rifa'i was known for his opposition to the "pacts policy." Even before the January demonstrations (when he was foreign minister under Hashim) he had informed Duke that "Jordan's commitments to Great Britain and Iraq were well understood in Cairo and aroused no objection," but "Jordan could not flout Egypt by going further and acceding to the Baghdad Pact for the present."⁹⁶ If any doubts remained, Rifa'i's statement of 26 January dispelled them: "[As] I have already declared . . . it is not our policy to enter into or become associated with any new pacts."⁹⁷

Undoubtedly, Hussein and Majali had failed to accurately assess both Egyptian and Saudi resolve to prevent Jordan from joining the Baghdad Pact and the genuinely hostile feelings of the Jordanian public toward the pact. Although Hussein was concerned from the start about Egyptian and Saudi reactions, and even consulted with

⁹² *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. VII (1956), p. 202.

⁹³ On the role of the Arab Legion, see Glubb, pp. 406-11. For the measures taken by the government, see *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. VII (1956), pp. 202-3.

⁹⁴ *Al-Hayat*, 10 January 1956.

⁹⁵ Eden, *Full Circle*, pp. 345-46; Love, p. 207; *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 163, 1 February 1956.

⁹⁶ Duke to FO, Tel. 7, 2 January 1956, VJ1051/4, 121491.

⁹⁷ *Al-Hayat*, 27 January 1956.

Britain and Iraq how to cope with them, in actual fact he did very little to counteract them. Various reports show that Egypt spent some LE 60,000 and Saudi Arabia between 500,000 and one million Jordanian dinars in financing subversive activities against the pact.⁹⁸ In addition, Egypt and Saudi Arabia apparently subsidized the three Palestinian newspapers published in East Jerusalem.⁹⁹ Despite their awareness of this, Jordan and its allies took no tangible countermeasures.

Moreover, the Jordanian leadership ignored the sensitivities of the Jordanian and Palestinian public. True, Egyptian propaganda helped fan domestic opposition in Jordan, but the public at large was in any case resentful of the Baghdad Pact. Britain's involvement in Jordan being more strongly articulated than in any other Arab state, the nationalists vehemently opposed any further tie with Britain and advocated replacing Britain's subsidy with Arab aid. In addition, the Palestinian population had become convinced that accession to the pact would freeze the Palestine issue and create some sort of indirect link with Israel.

'Abd al-Nasir's and King Sa'ud's motivation in making so many efforts to keep Jordan out of the pact were varied. The Egyptian leader claimed that the British attempt to recruit Jordan into the pact was a breach of the understanding he had reached with Eden in April 1955, namely, discontinuing Egyptian propaganda attacks in return for a British promise to refrain from recruiting Arab states into the pact.¹⁰⁰ However, as Britain saw it, its promise had related to the circumstances in the Arab world at the time; in any event it was not considered a binding agreement. Furthermore, Jordan had itself requested to join, so that the promise was irrelevant.

⁹⁸ Hussein and Majali claimed that these sums were spent in Jordan by Egypt alone. See Duke to FO, Tel. 699, 22 December 1955, VJ1051/130, 115659. See also *Daily Telegraph*, 28 December 1955. The figures concerning Saudi Arabia's involvement were provided by the Jordanian minister in Syria. See Gardner to FO, Tel. 558, 24 December 1955, V1073/1412, 115534. See also the report in the Pakistani newspaper *Dawn* as conveyed by Molyneux from Karachi to CRO, 30 December 1955, V1071/13, 121241.

⁹⁹ The British consul general in Jerusalem was informed in December 1955 that the Saudi consul was paying 600–1000 pounds monthly to the Jordanian newspapers *Filastin*, *al-Jihad* and *al-Difa'*. While he thought those figures might be exaggerated, he was certain that the papers received Saudi financial support. See Wikley to Rose, 28 December 1955, VJ1051/9, 115491. Also see, Duke to FO, Tel. 653, 21 December 1955, VJ1015/68, 115640; Amin al-Mumayyiz, pp. 460, 473.

¹⁰⁰ Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, pp. 88–89.

In his discussions with Western diplomats, 'Abd al-Nasir reiterated his argument that the attempt to expand the Baghdad Pact would cause Egypt to be isolated in the Arab world. He spelled this out when he told Trevelyan that the accession of Jordan would eventually be followed by that of Lebanon, Sudan and Libya, thus isolating Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in the Arab world.¹⁰¹ Another illuminating conversation was held in late December 1955 between 'Abd al-Nasir and Richard Crossman, a British Labor MP, who mediated between Israel and Egypt. The Egyptian leader did not deny the validity of the Northern Tier strategy, but he resented the Western role in it. 'Abd al-Nasir emphasized that he rejected the Turkish concept of adherence to NATO but, at the same time, he rejected Nehru's complete neutrality. "I pointed out a way between isolationist neutrality and NATO type pacts," he told Crossman, and that way is "collective security freely organized by the peoples of the region themselves." With relation to recent events in Jordan, he said the following:

Jordan was completely safe in your vest pocket, and you felt so sure about it that you took it out of your left vest pocket and you held it in the air before popping it into your right vest pocket. Well, you must not be surprised if it nearly got lost on the way. Now why should you take that sort of initiative? Just to put a feather in Nuri Said's cap? Well, you must not expect me, then, to remain inactive, especially when you misjudged the situation.¹⁰²

This was most probably 'Abd al-Nasir's genuine opinion, but it was also a useful disguise for Egypt's drive for hegemony in the Arab world. Since Jordan's accession would represent a triumph for Iraq in its bid for Arab supremacy, Egypt was willing to allocate vast resources in order to foil the Iraqi move. This was aptly described by the Lebanese *al-Zaman* which noted that "the campaign in Jordan is nothing more than the outcome of the internal struggle in the Arab world." It would be erroneous to point to the Baghdad Pact as the cause of the split in the Arab world, the newspaper went on, for the split had occurred before the pact was set up; its root cause was the struggle for Arab leadership.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 5, 1 January 1956, V1071/4, 121241; Tel. 53, 11 January 1956, V1071/19, 121241.

¹⁰² A top secret report on this conversation, see INA, file 5938/24, 6 January 1956.

¹⁰³ "Jordan . . . and the Baghdad Pact," *al-Zaman*, 17 December 1955.

Saudi Arabia, by comparison, had other reasons to oppose Jordan's accession. When the Iraqi minister in Riyadh noted in his memoirs that "the Baghdad Pact was the greatest danger to its [Saudi Arabia's] existence,"¹⁰⁴ he may have been exaggerating, but his appraisal reflected King Sa'ud's apprehensions. Even though Saudi Arabia had no aspirations of its own to lead the Arab world, and no direct interest in the question of Arab military pacts, it consistently supported Egypt against Iraq.¹⁰⁵ The origin of the conflict between Iraq and Saudi Arabia went back to the expulsion of King Hussein (the present king's great-grandfather) from the Hijaz by Ibn Sa'ud after World War I. Saudi Arabia feared that the Hashemites—especially the Iraqi Crown Prince 'Abd al-illah—planned to recapture the Hijaz, and therefore consistently opposed Hashemite unification plans (e.g., the "Fertile Crescent" and the "Greater Syria" plans).¹⁰⁶ The Saudis insisted on a written pledge from the Iraqi Hashemites renouncing any claims to the Hijaz, as a condition for improving dynastic relations. So far, Iraq's kings had refused to do so. It was thus logical—even if it required several steps of reasoning—for the Saudis to disburse funds for the purpose of frustrating the accession of Jordan to the Baghdad Pact.

Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's success was due in no small measure to Iraq's inexplicable indifference to the events in Jordan. Iraq had a clear interest both in overcoming its inter-Arab isolation, and in expanding its Arab influence—two goals which might have been promoted had Jordan joined the Baghdad Pact. But for reasons that are not entirely clear, Iraq displayed a patronizing and contemptuous attitude toward Jordan. A striking example of this occurred precisely at the time when Jordan was struggling to join the pact: the Iraqi chief-of-staff informed the British military attaché that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was presently too busy to send a planning team to Jordan.¹⁰⁷

British and Arab criticism that was leveled at Nuri on this issue resulted in a certain degree of change in Iraq's position. In a memorandum to Hussein in late December 1955, Nuri proposed some financial aid to counteract the demonstrations in Jordan, and expressed

¹⁰⁴ Amin al-Mumayyiz, p. 318.

¹⁰⁵ This assessment of Sa'ud's policy was also offered by 'Abd al-Nasir. See Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 53, 11 January 1956, V1071/19, 121241.

¹⁰⁶ Amin al-Mumayyiz, pp. 323, 356, 359, 428–29.

¹⁰⁷ Hooper to Rose, 15 December 1955, VJ10393/5, 115651.

his desire to raise Iraq's diplomatic representation to embassy level.¹⁰⁸ Even more significantly, Hussein secretly met with King Faysal in Habaniyya in January 1956 in order to discuss Jordan's unstable domestic situation. Although British accounts of this meeting are still classified, it seems that Hussein requested Iraqi military assistance. According to Eden's memoirs, the Iraqi response was favorable, although in the event there were no tangible results.¹⁰⁹ In addition, the *Idha'at al-'Arab* ("Radio of the Arabs") station, presumably funded by Iraq, began broadcasting from Amman as a Jordanian response to Egyptian propaganda.¹¹⁰

These measures, however, came too late; the opportunity to recruit Jordan into the Baghdad Pact had faded away. They were still able, however, to help bolster Hussein's morale and maintain Jordanian neutrality in Arab affairs. Prime Minister Rifa'i told Ambassador Duke that no future Jordanian government would be likely to take the risk of acceding to the pact.¹¹¹ Indeed, no Jordanian government raised the issue again. Significantly, when the Arab Union, comprising Iraq and Jordan, was formed in February 1958 (under the impact of the Egyptian-Syrian merger), Jordan insisted on inserting a proviso exempting it from any obligation to pacts or agreements previously signed by Iraq.¹¹²

The struggle over Jordan determined the fate of the Baghdad Pact in the Arab world. It had become clear that in the existing circumstances no Arab state would dare join the pact. Even though Iraq continued to make efforts for this purpose (see following chapters), no amount of Western aid could compensate for, or counterbalance, the risks involved. The struggle over Jordan also determined the nature of inter-Arab relations over the following years. Support for the

¹⁰⁸ Indeed, in late January 1956 the first Iraqi ambassador arrived in Amman. See, Wright to FO, Tel. 1083, 30 December 1955, VJ1051/149, 115659; *Bamizrah Hatikhon*, No. 163, 1 February 1956.

¹⁰⁹ Eden, *Full Circle*, 345. See also another report on the meeting, Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 182, 29 January 1956, V1071/68, 121242.

¹¹⁰ *Idha'at al-'Arab*, which vehemently attacked Egypt and Saudi Arabia, began broadcasting on 25 January 1956. Its leading commentator was Yunis al-Bahri, an Iraqi journalist who had worked at Berlin Radio. Trevelyan assessed that the station was financed by Nuri who had hired Bahri in the past to edit a Lebanese newspaper. See Tel. 182, 29 January 1956, V1071/68, 121242. See also Love, p. 207. The transmissions were stopped in early March at the instruction of Jordan's prime minister, *al-Djfa'*, 7 March 1956.

¹¹¹ Duke to FO, Tel. 221, 17 February 1956, JE1053/7, 118861.

¹¹² See Article 3 of the Arab Union Charter.

Baghdad Pact connoted identification with the West, imperialism and Zionism. Opposition to the pact meant identification with Egypt, Arab nationalism and the struggle for liberation. Moreover, the consequences of the Jordanian affair intensified the struggle for hegemony in the Arab world between Egypt and Iraq. By late 1955, 'Abd al-Nasir had managed to forge a tripartite axis and to contain the Baghdad Pact in the Arab world. Egypt was now on the point of moving on to the next phase: isolating Iraq in the Arab world. However, Nuri and the Hashemites were far from ready to surrender.

CHAPTER NINE

IRAQ UNDER SIEGE: CONTAINING THE BAGHDAD PACT IN THE ARAB WORLD

Egypt's Attempts at Détente

The Western attempt to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact had failed. Yet 'Abd al-Nasir kept fearing that Britain, Turkey and Iraq would take advantage of every opportunity (as he put it) "to attempt to destroy Egypt's prestige and position in [the] Arab world."¹ He reacted against the perceived attempts in two ways: First, to secure a British and/or American promise not to recruit other Arab states into the pact; and second, to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with Iraq based on the *status quo*. He tried to create the impression in the West that he accepted Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact as a *fait accompli*.² This was hardly the case, but 'Abd al-Nasir used this tactic as part of a long-range plan: first freezing the pact and later bringing about Iraq's withdrawal from it.

In early 1956, 'Abd al-Nasir made a vague offer to Ambassador Trevelyan to establish a link between the ACSP and the Baghdad Pact, with Iraq to serve as a link between them. The timing of his offer was not coincidental, for in light of events in Jordan, the question of recruiting Arab states into the Baghdad Pact had become central in US–British discussions. Both countries agreed, in meetings in Washington during January 1956, that other Arab states ought not be asked to join the pact at that time. Yet, neither Jordan nor any other state should therefore come to think that the superpowers had lost faith in the pact. The State Department stressed the inability of the US to join the pact, lest this trigger an Israeli demand for security guarantees and diminish the prospects for progress in secret Israeli–Egyptian negotiations (the "Alpha Plan").³

¹ See 'Abd al-Nasir's conversation with Robert Anderson, Eisenhower's special emissary for Israeli–Egyptian talks, *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XV, p. 35.

² Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 209, 2 February 1956, VQ10316/21, 121650.

³ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, pp. 216–39; Makins to FO, Tel. 33 Saving, 14 January 1956, V1075/16, 121270; Shuckburgh's Minute, 19 January 1956, V1075/5, 121270.

Still, there remained a considerable gulf between the conclusions reached during these talks and a mutual Western–Egyptian understanding concerning the Baghdad Pact. Trevelyan, the most ardent advocate of a reconciliation, frequently reported on ‘Abd al-Nasir’s willingness to reach an agreement along the lines of freezing the pact, recognizing Iraq’s membership in it as a *fait accompli*, and establishing an informal link between the ACSP and the Baghdad Pact in the future, in return for a commitment from Egypt to end its propaganda campaign against the pact and against Britain. Trevelyan prodded the Foreign Office to accept this proposition before the projected visit to Cairo of the new Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, in early March.⁴

Lloyd’s visit to Cairo, en route to the SEATO conference in Karachi, was largely reminiscent of Eden’s visit there in February 1955. The talks concentrated on the implications of the Baghdad Pact for Egyptian–British relations. ‘Abd al-Nasir reiterated the proposal he had made to Trevelyan, asserting that unless Egypt were assured that no additional Arab states would join, the prospects for improved British–Egyptian relations were dim, and the attacks on the pact would not be halted. Foreign Minister Fawzi added that Egypt would oppose any further attempt to enlist Jordan or any other Arab state. All that Egypt requested, he said, was an undertaking that Britain would not accept any Arab request for membership. Though Lloyd considered this suggestion “intolerable” and a “humiliation,” he promised to consult with the cabinet and to respond promptly. ‘Abd al-Nasir was disappointed with the visit’s lack of tangible results.⁵

While Lloyd was at Cairo, King Hussein dismissed the commander of the Arab Legion, John Glubb.⁶ Eden and many others believed that ‘Abd al-Nasir was behind the dismissal but in actual fact Hussein

⁴ Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 182, 29 January 1956, V1071/68, 121242; Trevelyan to Shuckburgh, 16 February 1956, VQ10316/25, 121651; 9 February 1956, JE1022/8, 118842; 8 March 1956, JE1053/5, 118861.

⁵ On Lloyd’s discussions in Cairo, see Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 413, 2 March 1956, V1071/85, 121243; Trevelyan to Shuckburgh, 5 March 1956, JE1051/17, 118859; 8 March 1956, JE1051/16, 118859; Lloyd’s memoirs, *Suez—1956: A Personal Account* (London: 1978), pp. 44–48; Trevelyan, p. 65; Nutting, *Nasser*, pp. 122–23; *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XV, pp. 278–87, Vol. XII, pp. 253–54.

⁶ On Glubb’s dismissal, see FO371, files 121546–121551. See also Glubb, pp. 419–28; Snow, pp. 80–92; Eden, *Full Circle*, pp. 348–50; Dann, *King Hussein*, pp. 31–39; Lunt, pp. 27–35.

had acted on his own.⁷ Nevertheless, the event reaffirmed Eden's impression that 'Abd al-Nasir was a "Mussolini of the Middle East" whose intention was "to be a Caesar from the Gulf to the Atlantic, and to kick us out of it all."⁸ In Eden's opinion, the struggle was a question of "either him ['Abd al-Nasir] or us [the British]," and he gave instructions to prepare plans for 'Abd al-Nasir's overthrow, or at least his isolation.⁹

In addition, on 5 March, Eden sent a firm letter to Eisenhower. "I feel myself that we can no longer wait on Nasser," wrote Eden. "Indeed," he continued, "if the United States now joined the Baghdad Pact this would impress him more than all our attempts to cajole him have yet done. Certainly we should accept, I think, that a policy of appeasement will bring us nothing in Egypt. Our best chance is to show that it pays to be our friends."¹⁰ Western policy toward Egypt was also discussed during the Dulles-Lloyd talks at the SEATO conference in Karachi at that time. Lloyd was surprised to learn that Dulles was prepared to offer 'Abd al-Nasir a "deal" which would include Western agreement not to recruit additional Arab members into the pact in return for an Egyptian promise: 1) to end all propaganda campaigns; 2) to make every effort to reach a settlement on Palestine; and 3) to accept the Johnston Plan for the distribution of the Jordan River waters.¹¹ Eden rejected this proposal categorically,¹² thus probably helping to eliminate the idea. Still, in his reply, Eisenhower wrote to Eden that despite 'Abd al-Nasir's friendliness toward the Soviets, it was unwise to "close the door on the possibility of working with him," since this could result in forfeiting any chance of obtaining an Arab-Israeli settlement. Eisenhower also questioned once again the advisability of American accession to the

⁷ Love, pp. 208-13; Trevelyan, p. 65; Nutting, *Nasser*, pp. 122-23; Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, p. 96.

⁸ Shuckburgh, pp. 327, 329.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 341, 343, 346, 348.

¹⁰ FO to Washington, Tel. 1246, 5 March 1956, V1075/57, 121271; *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, p. 249; Hoover to Karachi, Tel. 5, 5 March 1955, 780.5/3-556, Box 3709.

¹¹ H.C. Karachi to CRO, Tel. 17, 6 March 1956, V1075/59, 121271; Tel. 29, 9 March 1956, V1075/61, 121271; *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, pp. 250-52; Vol. XV, pp. 302, 309. It is of interest to note that at the same time Dulles entertained for the first time the idea of adhering to the Baghdad Pact. See Karachi to Secretary of State, DULTE 14, 8 March 1956, 780.5/3-856.

¹² FO to Karachi, Tel. 595, 6 March 1956, V1075/59, 121271.

Baghdad Pact, making the same points the US had made on earlier occasions.¹³

By the end of March 1956, Eisenhower and Dulles decided to embark on a new policy. The failure to induce 'Abd al-Nasir to participate in an Arab-Israeli settlement on the one hand, and the recommendation of the joint chiefs-of-staff to immediately join the Baghdad Pact on the other, convinced the administration that a stronger American commitment to its Middle Eastern allies was called for. Undoubtedly, this decision was also prompted by an urgent call by Eden for a drastic American move to hold off the possible collapse of the Baghdad Pact.¹⁴ Consequently, Eisenhower launched a new approach, code-named "Omega," aimed at reinforcing ties with friendly countries, modifying US policy toward Egypt and Syria, and increasing American support for the Baghdad Pact. The new approach was intended, *inter alia*, to show 'Abd al-Nasir that he could not enjoy most-favored-nation status with the US while also cooperating with the Soviet Union. The plan also called for strengthening pro-Western elements in Jordan and Lebanon, and granting military aid to Saudi Arabia.¹⁵ Eisenhower even entertained the idea of building up King Sa'ud as a rival Arab leader to 'Abd al-Nasir.¹⁶ The new policy was immediately reflected in the American attitude toward the Baghdad Pact: high-ranking officials were sent to the Council meeting in Tehran in April, and the US became a full member of the pact's economic and counter-subversion committees.¹⁷

Unaware of the shift in American policy, 'Abd al-Nasir waited in vain for the British reply to his offer to establish a link between the ACSP and the Baghdad Pact. Finally, he gave an interview to the *Observer* and *Sunday Times* correspondents in which he reiterated that Egypt would oppose any attempt to recruit Arab states into the Baghdad Pact, since this would lead to Egypt's isolation.¹⁸ The interview, widely covered in Britain, elicited a sharp reaction from the

¹³ Eisenhower to Eden, 10 March 1955, V1075/71, 121272; *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, p. 250, note 2.

¹⁴ On the recommendations of the JCS, see *FRUS*, pp. 248, 261, 267. On Eden's appeal, see *ibid.*, pp. 262-64.

¹⁵ On Project Omega, see *ibid.*, 1955-57, Vol. XV, pp. 421ff.; Eveland, pp. 181ff.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, p. 259. See also note 82.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-69. On the Tehran meetings, see *ibid.*, pp. 280-93.

¹⁸ *Observer*, 24 March 1956. See also Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 95 Saving, 25 March 1956, JE1053/16A, 118861; FO to Cairo, Tel. 986, 3 April 1956, JE1022/19, 118842; Trevelyan, p. 69; Monroe, pp. 190-91; Nutting, *Nasser*, p. 123.

Foreign Office which stressed that Britain had no intention of putting pressure on other states and that the decision to join the pact must remain the free choice of each country.¹⁹ Fawzi then inquired of Trevelyan whether this official response was the reply promised by Lloyd to 'Abd al-Nasir in Cairo. Lloyd replied that in view of Egypt's attacks against Britain, the official statement did indeed represent Britain's position on the Baghdad Pact.²⁰ Trevelyan noted in his memoirs that 'Abd al-Nasir viewed this statement as a kind of "declaration of war" and proceeded to intensify Egypt's propaganda campaign against Britain.²¹

Nonetheless, during April and May, the Egyptian leader again tried to put out feelers to Britain and to the US, this time through Foreign Minister Fawzi and Egypt's Ambassador in the US, Ahmad Hussein.²² The discussions, however, led nowhere. 'Abd al-Nasir therefore approached Iraq directly: at the end of May, Nuri received word via unofficial channels that 'Abd al-Nasir was interested in improving relations with Iraq and that Nuri might want to visit Cairo. Nuri replied that he would be happy to visit Cairo when time and circumstances permitted, although he told Ambassador Wright that this was not likely to be the case in the near future.²³ 'Abd al-Nasir then inquired of Ambassador Najib al-Rawi whether King Faysal would be prepared to visit Egypt on his way back from his vacation in Spain at the end of May or on his way to Britain in July.²⁴ Realizing that the Egyptian leader was trying to go over Nuri's head,

¹⁹ For the British response, see FO to Cairo, Tel. 911, 25 March 1956, JE1053/16, 118861.

²⁰ Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 608, 30 March 1956, VI071/111, 121243; FO to Cairo, Tel. 988, 3 April 1956, JE1053/13, 118861.

²¹ Trevelyan, p. 69. See also Nutting, Nasser, p. 123.

²² Trevelyan to Watson, 19 April 1956, JE1053/22, 118862; Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 698, 18 April 1956, JE1053/23, 118862; Bailey to Watson, 18 May 1956, JE1022/25, 118842; Trevelyan to Shuckburgh, 26 May 1956, JE1022/28, 118862. In his first meeting with Trevelyan after Lloyd's visit in March, 'Abd al-Nasir tried to persuade the ambassador that his offer to cease the propaganda campaign in return for freezing Arab membership in the pact had been "quite genuine." See Tel. 908, 27 May 1955, JE1053/42, 118863. See also Ahmed Husayn's talks with Dulles and Rountree, 10 May 1956, 611.74/5-1056 CS/W, 17 May 1956, 611.74/5-1756.

²³ Wright to FO, Tel. 592, 25 May 1956, VQ10316/55, 121651 (also PREM11/1465); Hadow's Minute, 1 June 1956, JE1022/33, 118843.

²⁴ Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 925, 29 May 1956, VQ10316/57, 121651 (See also PREM11/1465). Eden wrote on this telegram: "I still don't trust Nasser at all." See also Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 2361, 29 May 1956, 674.87/5-2956.

Baghdad—backed by the State Department—rejected the idea.²⁵

‘Abd al-Nasir then handed Rawi a four-point proposal for Nuri which the ambassador brought to Baghdad on 14 June. Its provisions were:

- (1) Iraq should inform the Arab states that membership of the Baghdad Pact had been frozen;
- (2) Iraq should affirm that it will not invoke assistance from other Arab States under the clauses of the ACSP, if involved in a situation arising from its membership in the Baghdad Pact;
- (3) Iraq should affirm that it will not renew the Baghdad Pact after its expiry without consulting the Arab States;
- (4) Both Iraq and Egypt would undertake to cease press and radio attacks against the other.²⁶

Nuri was furious with Rawi for agreeing to transmit this set of unacceptable conditions (the episode convinced Nuri that he must remove Rawi from his post).²⁷ Meanwhile, he instructed Rawi to convey the following remarks to ‘Abd al-Nasir:

- (1) The Baghdad Pact was in Iraq’s interest because of its geographical position;
- (2) Membership in the pact was a matter for the independent Arab governments to decide;
- (3) If Egypt ceased the propaganda attacks on Iraq, the latter would reciprocate.²⁸

Nuri’s reply showed that he had no intention of reaching an accommodation with ‘Abd al-Nasir. Any concession, he was convinced, would be regarded as a capitulation. At most, he would be willing to arrive at a *modus vivendi* regarding the war of words. Nuri’s antipathy for, and mistrust of, ‘Abd al-Nasir were as deeply felt as ever. While

²⁵ Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 966, 5 June 1956, VQ10316/58, 121651; Hoover to Baghdad, Tel. 1025, 2 June 1956, 674.87/5-2956.

²⁶ Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 1381, 16 June 1956, 674.87/6-1656; Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 1033, 14 June 1956, VQ10316/62, 121651.

²⁷ Wright to FO, Tel. 677, 17 June 1956, VQ10316/63, 121651; Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 2567, 25 June 1956, 674.87/6-2556. Rawi himself stated that he felt he should leave his post. See Trevelyan to Ross, 22 June 1956, VQ10316/64, 121651. He was transferred to Paris in July 1956.

²⁸ Wright to FO, Tel. 677, VQ10316/63, 121651; Trevelyan to Ross, 22 June 1956, VQ10316/64, 121651; London to Secretary of State, Tel. 5846, 19 June 1956, 674.87/6-1956.

visiting London at that time, he expressed the hope that the British “would soon make up [their] mind to finish Nasser off.”²⁹ In any event, the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 ended the efforts at dialogue between the two leaders and set their relations on a collision course which ended with ‘Abd al-Qarim Qasim’s coup in July 1958.

‘Abd al-Nasir’s motive in wanting “to remove this danger [the pact] from his back”³⁰ stemmed from his desire to achieve a truce on at least one major front, as Egypt was immersed in a host of formidable problems: on the international level, the quest for arms and for funds for the Aswan Dam; regionally, protracted negotiations with UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold over border incidents with Israel; and domestically, the plebiscite to ratify the constitution and elect the president. It may be assumed that ‘Abd al-Nasir hoped to reduce tension in the Arab world by reaching some sort of accord with Iraq, after his failure to reach an understanding with Britain on the question of the Baghdad Pact. Iraq’s efforts to recruit Morocco and Tunisia into the Baghdad Pact, and the Western effort to detach Saudi Arabia from Egypt (see below), were a warning to Cairo that the Western powers and Iraq still attached great importance to the Baghdad Pact.

The Struggle over Morocco and Tunisia

In March 1956, in the wake of protracted negotiations with France, Morocco and Tunisia achieved independence. The Arab League recognized them in early April, with the rider that they would soon join the League. No sooner were they independent, than Iraq and Egypt began competing for their friendship. True, the two north African states were located at the periphery of the Arab world and were militarily weak, but considerable political significance was attached to the issue of which Arab camp they would join. In fact, the contest over Morocco and Tunisia, while subdued in comparison with the struggle over Syria, Jordan, or even Saudi Arabia later on, incorporated all the features of the Egyptian–Iraqi rivalry over the Baghdad Pact.

²⁹ Ross to Kirkpatrick, 21 June 1956, VJ10393/50, 121485.

³⁰ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XV, p. 297.

Egyptian propaganda was directed against French rule in North Africa as much as against all imperialist manifestations. Once France began negotiations with Morocco and Tunisia, Egypt focused its propaganda against French policy in Algeria. However, after March 1956, Egypt became fearful that Western pressure would push Morocco and Tunisia into the Baghdad Pact.³¹ Indeed, the issue of Morocco's and Tunisia's recruitment into the pact (or in the work of its committees) quickly became a major issue in Arab politics. In early May, a Tunisian delegation visited Baghdad, exploring the possibility of receiving economic aid from Iraq. Nuri urged Tunisia to join the economic committee of the Baghdad Pact as a means of assuring aid.³² The Foreign Office and the State Department, however, declined to support such endeavors at that time.³³ Iraq nevertheless immediately appointed an ambassador, who was sent out by the end of June—a conspicuously speedy move if compared, e.g., with Iraq's prolonged negotiations with Jordan over the nomination of an ambassador.

Despite British reservations, King Faysal visited Morocco in late May for talks with the Moroccan King, Muhammad V, a visit obviously intended to tighten the friendly links between the two monarchies.³⁴ However, Egypt informed Morocco that it viewed King Faysal's visit as "an unfriendly act."³⁵ Having no desire to become entangled in Arab disputes, Morocco sent Crown Prince Hasan, accompanied by the foreign minister, on a brief visit to Cairo in late June in order to placate Egypt.³⁶

Faysal's visit to Morocco paved the way for an invitation to Nuri to visit Rabat in early July. He planned to take Jamali along with him, the latter would then proceed to Tunisia and Libya.³⁷ The visit was viewed as an attempt to bring them into Iraq's sphere of influence, or more precisely, into the Baghdad Pact, and caused

³¹ Sawt al-'Arab, 6 May 1956 (*BBC*, No. 671, 11 May 1956).

³² Wright to FO, Tel. 543, 9 May 1956, JF1071/9, 119379. The British ambassador in Paris promptly pointed out possible French opposition to this move, Jebb to FO, Tel. 129, 11 May 1956, JF1071/10, 119379.

³³ Dulles to Baghdad, Tel. Circular 813, 22 May 1956, 780.5/5-2356; FO to Baghdad, Tel. 1078, 17 May 1956, JF1071/10, 119379.

³⁴ *NYT*, 11 July 1956. It was rumored that Faysal might marry the Moroccan King's daughter.

³⁵ Trevelyan to Ross, 14 July 1956, JE1022/45, 118844.

³⁶ *BBC*, No. 685, 29 June 1956, pp. 29–30.

³⁷ Wright to FO, Tel. 652, 11 June 1956, VQ10328/1, 121656; Tel. 710, 26 June 1956, VQ10328/1A, 121656.

considerable concern to the British ambassadors in Cairo and Paris. Both anticipated negative reactions from their respective host governments. Trevelyan warned that "a Nuri offensive on Morocco and Tunisia is likely to start the whole cycle of trouble here again and give us plenty of trouble elsewhere. It will look to the whole Arab world as a political move designed against Egypt." Moreover, he concluded, "I have the gravest doubts about Nuri's ability to carry out a political manoeuvre outside Iraq. The Iraqis have so far played their cards extremely badly even in Syria and Jordan."³⁸ Nuri (on a visit to London for medical treatment), raised the question of the adherence of Morocco, Tunisia and Libya to the economic committee of the Baghdad Pact. But the Foreign Office, fearing France's reaction, preferred to "lie low over the Baghdad Pact for the moment," while giving Nuri "unobtrusive but solid support" if he wished to go ahead. Lloyd, in his talks with Nuri, was careful not to raise this sensitive issue.³⁹

In Rabat, Nuri invited the Moroccan leaders to join the economic committee of the Baghdad Pact, simultaneously pointing out to that their adherence to the League would only complicate Morocco's relations with France and Egypt.⁴⁰ In Tunisia, Jamali found interest in joining the economic committee.⁴¹ However, by late July 1956 it became clear that Morocco and Tunisia preferred to remain outside the Baghdad Pact and maintain amicable relations with both Iraq and Egypt. While joining the economic committee might have had certain advantages, these were not capable of counterbalancing the effects of a possible confrontation with France and Egypt. In the event, the question of participation in the Baghdad Pact turned irrelevant under the impact of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.⁴²

The idea of Morocco and Tunisia joining the Baghdad Pact economic committee failed even before it was put to any real test. Still, the episode contained all the features of the Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry over the pact. Their membership would have had no more than

³⁸ Trevelyan to Kirkpatrick, 23 June 1956, JE1053/64, 118864.

³⁹ Ross' Minute, 20 June 1956, VQ1051/32, 121662; Kirkpatrick to Jebb, 29 June 1956, JF1071/49, 119380.

⁴⁰ Freese-Pennefather (Rabat) to FO, 3 July 1956, JM10393/1, 119486; Ross to Trevelyan, 24 July 1956, V1073/292, 121261.

⁴¹ Malcolm (Tunis) to FO, Tel. 94, 12 July 1956, JM1022/1, 119554; Ross to Trevelyan, 24 July 1956, V1073/292, 121261.

⁴² African Department to Chancery Tunis, 4 September 1956, JM1022/4, 119554.

symbolic value, but Iraq's isolation in the Arab world prompted Nuri, possibly in desperation, to seek allies even at the periphery. Practically speaking, the inclusion of the two new states might have turned out to be a burden, but psychologically it might have helped restore the pact's diminished prestige in the Arab world. The episode revealed that the Baghdad Pact was still Egypt's Achilles heel. Despite its overall success in the Arab arena, it still feared that Iraq would make use of the pact to expand its influence and to isolate Egypt. If Egyptian opposition was more restrained than in the past, this did not stem from a change of orientation but rather from the rapid retreat by Morocco and Tunisia.

The Struggle over Saudi Arabia

The Saudi-Hashemite conflict dated back to 1924-26, when Ibn Sa'ud conquered the Hijaz, ousted the Hashemites and declared himself king there. Since then, Hashemite Iraq and Jordan represented a constant threat to the territorial integrity of the Saudi Kingdom.⁴³ Any expansionist move by either was interpreted by Riyadh as a step to prepare them for reconquest of the Hijaz. Saudi Arabia therefore consistently attempted to frustrate any Hashemite move to take over Syria.

A partial reconciliation between Jordan and Saudi Arabia was reached after King 'Abdallah's visit in the summer of 1948. His assassination in July 1951 made a further *rapprochement* easier as his successors, Talal and Hussein, were thrust into a struggle for the very survival of the Jordanian entity and were forced to abandon any notion of expansion. In Iraq, the coming of age of Faysal II forced his uncle, the Regent 'Abd al-illah, to step down although he remained the most influential figure in the royal palace. The succession motivated 'Abd al-illah to try to procure a throne for himself outside Iraq. Damascus was the most cherished prize, although in the mid-1950s he still harbored some vague hopes about the Hijaz.⁴⁴

⁴³ On the sources of the conflict, see N. Safran, *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security* (Cambridge, Mass: 1985), pp. 9-49; and G. Troeller, *The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud* (London: 1976), pp. 216-31.

⁴⁴ Mumayyiz related in his memoirs that Crown Prince 'Abd al-illah asked him to inquire whether the inhabitants of the Hijaz still "like us and want us" (p. 33). The Iraqi minister claimed that Kamil Marwa, the editor of *al-Hayat*, told him that

In contrast to the easing of dynastic tensions between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the dynastic element in the Iraqi–Saudi rift was still vigorous. A cold reception given to then-Crown Prince Sa‘ud at King Faysal’s coronation festivities in 1953, as well as the absence of an Iraqi delegation from Ibn Sa‘ud’s funeral and the coronation of his son, clearly attested to the tension prevailing between the two countries.⁴⁵

The formation of the Baghdad Pact stirred up the embers of the Saudi–Hashemite conflict. From the Saudi perspective, the containment of the Hashemites within their borders was still a prime consideration. Just as Saudi Arabia had had an abiding fear that the League would become a tool manipulated by Iraq in order to promote its interests, so it was now equally concerned that the Baghdad Pact would serve Nuri and the Hashemites to lure Syria and Jordan into implementing the Fertile Crescent scheme.⁴⁶ Egypt shared these fears, and this in turn motivated Saudi Arabia to cooperate with Egypt, subsequently leading to a military agreement signed in October 1955. Their cooperation peaked in December 1955 when they jointly succeeded in preventing Jordan from joining the Baghdad Pact.

The convergence of Egyptian and Saudi interests was largely dictated by the exigencies of the hour, overlaying deeper antagonism. It led to increased Egyptian influence in Saudi Arabia. By mid-1956, it was estimated that at least 1,000 of the 10,000 Egyptians working in Saudi Arabia held influential positions.⁴⁷ Egyptian propaganda, with its anti-monarchist, anti-conservative cast, had an adverse effect on the Saudi public. Likewise, Egypt’s shift from a Western to an eastern bloc orientation greatly annoyed the Saudis who relied on the West, and on the US in particular for their survival. Moreover, Sa‘ud considered ‘Abd al-Nasir’s drive for Arab hegemony a veiled threat to the very foundations of Saudi Arabia.

As early as 1955, King Sa‘ud experienced the repercussions of Egyptian policy at home when an indigenous “Free Officers” movement was uncovered. It had been plotting to depose the king and

‘Abd al-Allah had met King Sa‘ud’s private secretary in 1954 to discuss the possibility of relinquishing all Hijazi claims in exchange for money, but that Sa‘ud had rejected the offer (p. 624).

⁴⁵ Beaumont to Lloyd, Dispatch 116, 10 May 1957, VQ10325/7, 128047.

⁴⁶ Safran, p. 97. See also Amin al-Mumayyiz, p. 323; and Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, *Mudhakkirati* (Beirut: 1969), p. 539.

⁴⁷ See an excellent survey on “Growth of Egyptian Influence in Saudi Arabia,” Jidda to Department of State, Dispatch 59, 5 September 1956, 674.86A/9–556.

establish a revolutionary command council on the Egyptian model. Its leaders were executed, rank-and-file members discharged from the army.⁴⁸ The affair was a clear indication of the possible ramifications of Egyptian influence. This came to the fore again in the distribution of political leaflets by the "Free Saudis" (*al-Sa'udiyun al-Ahrar*), and in a labor strike, calling for the formation of trade unions, held during Sa'ud's visit to the Aramco facilities in April 1956.⁴⁹ Furthermore, there were press demands not to renew the lease of the Dhahran air base to the US, due to expire in June 1956.⁵⁰ Thus, whereas Sa'ud felt that the axis established with Egypt in 1955 had been to his advantage, by early 1956 he began to doubt its wisdom and its value.

Another aspect of the relationship was of a more personal nature. Unlike his father, King Sa'ud was known for his weak personality. He was hesitant, insecure, suspicious and prone to be influenced by others. Foreigners who met him discerned a deep-seated inferiority complex, probably caused by the inevitable comparison between himself and his father. Sa'ud's extravagant life-style seemed to reflect this complex. As British Ambassador Parkes in Jidda aptly remarked, Ibn Sa'ud's career "over-shadows and haunts him, and like every oriental Richard Cromwell who succeeds an Oliver he feels he must go one better, or at any rate run very fast indeed in order to stand still."⁵¹ Moreover, Sa'ud was under the influence of his advisors, Yusuf Yassin, Tahir Radwan and Jamal al-Husseini, and his brother, Crown Prince Faysal, all of whom were inclined to support Egypt.⁵² It was clear that if Sa'ud could be detached from these surroundings, the chances of distancing Saudi Arabia from Egypt would become greater.

The idea of dissociating Saudi Arabia from Egypt was raised by the State Department in March 1956. The underlying assumption was that Egypt's ties with the USSR, coupled with the disturbing influence of Arab nationalism, created a community of interests strong enough to form a solid basis for Iraqi-Saudi cooperation. Seen from the American perspective, such a development was likely to ensure

⁴⁸ U.S. Department of State, Intelligence Brief, "The Cairo-Riyadh Axis: Second Thoughts in Saudi Arabia" (henceforth, "The Cairo-Riyadh Axis"), 10 August 1956, ES10316/18, 120759.

⁴⁹ "The Cairo-Riyadh Axis," p. 3; *al-Hayat*, 24 April 1956. The strike was violently suppressed; subsequently, King Sa'ud issued a royal decree prohibiting strikes.

⁵⁰ *Al-Hayat*, 15 April 1956. See also Safran, p. 81.

⁵¹ For an excellent analysis of Sa'ud's personality, see Parkes to Lloyd, Dispatch 35, 20 May 1956, ES1941/1, 120791. See also Amin al-Mumayyiz, pp. 324-26.

⁵² Parkes to Lloyd, *ibid.*; Amin al-Mumayyiz, p. 324.

the extension of the Dhahran air base lease and the continued flow of oil. It would also help curb 'Abd al-Nasir's growing influence in the Middle East.⁵³ Nuri endorsed the "detachment plan" in discussions with Ambassador Gallman though he raised several reservations and insisted that the initiative for such a *démarche* must come from Sa'ud.⁵⁴ From the Iraqi perspective, the importance of such a move was obvious. King Sa'ud was considered a spiritual leader in his capacity as "Guardian of the Holy Places." If Saudi Arabia could be detached from Egypt, the balance of power in the Arab system might well swing in Iraq's favor.

The British hastened to put the idea into action. Shuckburgh, presenting such a scheme to Eden in March 1956, considered the inauguration of Jidda port in April, with the representatives of many Islamic countries in attendance, as an "excellent opportunity" for beginning the process. However, for reasons that are not quite clear, this Islamic gathering did not take place.⁵⁵ The issue was next raised at a closed session of the Baghdad Pact Council meeting held in Tehran in April. Though the delegates agreed that Saudi financial support for subversive activities must be checked, and that a wedge must be driven between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, no concrete resolutions were adopted.⁵⁶

In an effort to promote the plan, Nuri approached Ambassador Gallman with the information that King Fayisal was prepared to visit Riyadh if Sa'ud accepted three conditions: a preparatory summit in King Hussein's presence in Amman; a joint public statement attesting to the importance of the Baghdad Pact for the Arab and Islamic worlds; and Saudi consent for closer ties between Iraq and Syria. Though this position was clearly extreme, Nuri hinted that Iraq would be willing

⁵³ D.D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961* (New York: 1965), pp. 115-16; Shuckburgh's Minutes after his meeting with the American Counsellor, 6 March 1956, VQ10325/3, 121655; Morris (Washington) to Walmsley, 20 February 1957, ES10345/22, 127155; Memorandum of Conversation with Iraq's Ambassador Shabandar, 11 April 1956, 780.5/4-1156.

⁵⁴ Hadow's Minutes, 12 March 1956, VQ10325/4, 121655; Wright (Baghdad) to FO, Tel. 364, 21 March 1956, ES1021/18, 121755; Bailey (Washington) to Riches, Eastern Department, 24 March 1956, ES1021/21, 121755.

⁵⁵ Shuckburgh, p. 346. On the failure to hold the event, see HC in Karachi to the CRO, Tel. 545, 19 March 1956, ES1021/17C, 121755; Symon (Karatchi) to Garner (CRO), 12 April 1956, ES1021/28, 121755; Parkes (Jedda) to Riches, 20 May 1956, ES1021/31, 121755; FO to Tehran, Tel. 215 Saving, 7 June 1956, ES1021/34, 121755.

⁵⁶ Stevens (Tehran) to FO, Tel. 382, 19 April 1956, V1073/174, 121253.

to show flexibility.⁵⁷ In reply, Sa'ud intimated that he would be willing to meet with a senior Iraqi emissary, whereupon the Iraqi foreign minister informed the Saudis that the ambassador in London, Amir Zayd, would be sent to Riyadh.⁵⁸ But the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956 intervened, and the visit was postponed.

It was the Suez nationalization which eventually provided the impetus for the Iraqi-Saudi *rapprochement*. Sa'ud received the news with dismay, annoyed by 'Abd al-Nasir's disregard for the military pact between them, which would have required him to consult with the king. He was fearful that the Egyptian move might entangle the kingdom in a confrontation with the West; this, in turn, might require use of the oil weapon. As British Ambassador Parkes observed, "the attraction of a ride on the Egyptian band-wagon [had] largely passed," and Sa'ud would gladly "ease himself out of his link with Egypt."⁵⁹ However, Sa'ud was unable to express his reservations publicly because of the overwhelming Arab support for Egypt, Egypt's extensive involvement in Saudi Arabia, and the pro-Egyptian bias in Sa'ud's own entourage.⁶⁰

A short time later, Nuri and 'Abd al-illah, keen to promote a possible reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, sent Amir Zayd to Riyadh. The choice of Zayd was made carefully: he was the fourth and only surviving son of King Hussein whom the Saudis had overthrown in the Hijaz. Despatching him implied—in however guarded a manner—Iraqi recognition of Saudi rule in the Hijaz. A new leaf was to be turned over between the two dynasties.⁶¹

While Egypt was preoccupied with the Suez crisis, the Iraqi-Saudi *rapprochement* gained momentum. In September 1956, Iraq's 'Abdullah al-Damluji was dispatched to Riyadh to make the necessary arrange-

⁵⁷ Shuckburgh's minutes, 4 May 1956, ES1021/30, 121755; Wright to FO, Tel. 524, 7 May 1956, VQ10325/8, 121655.

⁵⁸ Wright to FO, Tel. 692, 21 June 1956, VQ10325/9, 121655.

⁵⁹ Parkes to Lloyd, Dispatch 57, 11 August 1956, ES10316/10, 120759; Parkes to FO, Tel. 241, 8 August 1956, JE14211/474, 119094; Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, pp. 133, 155–57.

⁶⁰ On Egypt's involvement in Saudi Arabia, see "Appendix-Egyptians in Saudi Arabia" attached to Parkes to Lloyd, Dispatch 57, 11 August 1956, ES10316/10, 120759; Jidda to Department of State, Dispatch 59, 5 September 1956, 674.86A/9–556.

⁶¹ On Zayd's visit, see Wright to FO, Tel. 951, 29 August 1956, ES1021/53, 120756; Tel. 954, 30 August 1956, ES1021/55, 120756; Walmsley's Minute, 10 September 1956, ES1021/75, 120757. For an analysis of this process, see my article: "Ending an Age-Old Rivalry: The Rapprochement Between the Hashemites and the Saudis, 1956–58," in A. Susser and A. Shmuelevitz (eds.), *The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World* (London: 1995, Forthcoming).

ments for a summit between the two monarchs.⁶² Damluji had been Ibn Sa'ud's advisor in the 1920s and had later become Iraqi foreign minister; he was considered a natural go-between between the two countries. During a preparatory meeting with Sa'ud, the king promised not to impose an oil boycott nor engage in any hostile activity against the West during the Suez crisis. He also emphasized that he would have no part in supporting "dictators and presidents," but would rather cooperate with "the fellow monarchy of Iraq."⁶³

Faysal and Sa'ud met on 20 September in Damam on the Persian Gulf coast. Faysal became convinced that Sa'ud was genuinely interested in mutual cooperation to repel Communist activity in the Middle East. In addition, Sa'ud reiterated his promise to refrain from any belligerent action and from imposing an oil embargo. At the conclusion of the summit, it was agreed that the level of diplomatic missions would be raised, and that Sa'ud would make a return visit during the coming autumn. The meeting, however, confirmed the widespread assumption that Sa'ud was not the master of his own house. The influence of Crown Prince Faysal and of the advisors was apparent throughout. They immediately advised 'Abd al-Nasir to arrange a "counter-visit" in order to offset whatever gains had been achieved by Sa'ud and Faysal (see below). Though the tangible results of the meeting were modest, the summit represented a significant diplomatic victory for Iraq and a turning point in inter-Arab relations.⁶⁴

No sooner had King Faysal left, than the Egyptian and Syrian presidents arrived on 23 September on a hastily organized visit to arrest a potential Saudi drift toward Iraq. Sa'ud was not at all enthusiastic about the visit, especially since Nehru was scheduled to arrive two days later. Sa'ud counseled 'Abd al-Nasir against "hot-headed" actions and "a policy of defiance and challenge," and cautioned that he would not support an extremist Egyptian policy. He also expressed anxiety that Saudi oil revenues would be jeopardized

⁶² Wright to FO, Tel. 970, 3 September 1956, ES1021/57, 120757.

⁶³ Wright to FO, Tel. 1049, 15 September, 1956, ES1021/72, 120757.

⁶⁴ On Faysal's visit, see Wright to FO, Tel. 1085, 23 September 1956, ES1021/81, 120757; Parkes to FO, Tel. 303, 23 September 1956, ES1021/84, 120757; Parkes to Lloyd, Dispatch 65, Oct. 3, 1956, ES1021/102, 120758. Nuri claimed that the results of the visit were good, but that nothing substantial—such as agreement on cooperation against Communism—was accomplished, Wright to FO, Tel. 1085, 23 September 1956, ES1021/81, 120757; Parkes' evaluation sent from Jidda, Dispatch 65, 3 October 1956, ES1021/102, 120758.

in the event of a military attack on Egypt. In his opinion, the Egyptian propaganda campaign against the Hashemites constituted a threat to all Arab monarchies. The Egyptian president tried to dispel Sa'ud's apprehensions, but without much success.⁶⁵ He also expressed a desire to meet with Nehru. A meeting on Saudi soil between two recognized leaders of the nonaligned movement would have left no doubt as to the Saudi position. Sa'ud, however, hinted that he would not favor such a meeting.⁶⁶ Despite this friction, the text of the joint statement issued at the end of the tripartite meeting alarmed the Iraqi palace. Parkes feared that the positive effect of King Faysal's visit, "if not entirely lost, has been heavily overlaid."⁶⁷ Evidently, although Sa'ud had not changed his position, pressure by the Egyptian and Syrian presidents and by members of the Saudi palace, left him no choice but to support Egypt publicly.

Iraq, however, did not sit idly by. Damluji was sent to inform Sa'ud of a Jordanian request for Iraqi troops against a possible Israeli attack.⁶⁸ Iraq also considered inviting Sa'ud and Hussein to meet with Faysal during Sa'ud's scheduled visit to Amman in November 1956.⁶⁹ Such a tripartite meeting could herald the formation of a new Arab conservative-royalist coalition. Though the Suez War slowed down the process, by November 1956 Saudi Arabia was no longer an integral part of the Egyptian camp.

Containing the Baghdad Pact

'Abd al-Nasir's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 was received with great enthusiasm throughout the Arab world (with the exception of Iraq). The Iraqi leadership's attitude

⁶⁵ Parkes to Lloyd, Dispatch 65, 3 October 1956, ES1021/102, 120758; Parkes to FO, Tel. 355, 30 October 1956, JE1022/60, 118844; Jidda to Department of State, Dispatch 83, 5 November 1956, 787.11/11-556. See also Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, pp. 157-59.

⁶⁶ Parkes to FO, Tel. 317, 1 October 1956, ES1021/93, 120757. On Nehru's visit, see Parkes to Lloyd, Dispatch 64, 3 October 1956, ES10385/10, 120762.

⁶⁷ Parkes to FO, Tel. 318, 2 October 1956, ES1021/94, 120757. For the text of the communiqué, see Cairo Radio, 24 September 1956; Chancery to Eastern Department, 30 September 1956, ES1021/99, 120757.

⁶⁸ Wright to FO, Tel. 1137, 5 October 1956, VJ10393/95, 121487. On Damaluji's visit, see Wright to FO, Tel. 1197, 20 October 1956, ES1021/106, 120758.

⁶⁹ Parkes to FO, Tel. 354, 28 October 1956, ES1021/108, 120758; Wright to FO, Tel. 1216, 26 October 1956, ES1021/107, 120758.

was expressed unequivocally when Iraqi representatives told British officials that London must not let 'Abd al-Nasir "get away with it," or "save face." "Either [Abd al-] Nasser was successful and British influence and Nuri were lost for ever," concluded Iraqi Interior Minister Sa'id Qazzaz, "or Nasser was got rid of and we and Nuri succeeded."⁷⁰ The issue at stake was not just the fate of the Baghdad Pact or Arab hegemony, but the very survival of the Iraqi ruling elite and of British influence. Nuri insisted that the operation against 'Abd al-Nasir be "swift, short and successful." He argued that if the Egyptian president were to reject the proposals offered by the Western powers then Britain should resort to force (with or without the US).⁷¹

The Suez War on 29 October shocked the Arab world.⁷² Britain's allies in the Arab world found themselves in a severe dilemma: not only had a Western power attacked a sister Arab state, but the attack was carried out in collusion with the archenemy—Israel. Iraq's situation was the most difficult of all the Arab states, because of its special ties with Britain and their joint membership in the Baghdad Pact. What distressed Nuri and the palace was less Britain's attack than the unexpected Israeli involvement in the operation. Internal strife in Iraq, combined with Arab pressure on it, led Western officials to conclude that a coup was inevitable and that Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact was imminent. On 31 October, in an effort to halt the domestic deterioration, the Iraqi cabinet imposed martial law.⁷³ Nuri, however, was sceptical about the chances of maintaining order. He told Wright on 2 November that it was impossible to guarantee Iraq's stability for longer than "five or six days," during which Britain must achieve a cease-fire along the Suez Canal and demand Israel's withdrawal.⁷⁴ The ambassador, appalled by the

⁷⁰ Wright to Ross, 29 August 1956, JE10393/2, 118857; Wright to FO, Tel. 955, 31 August 1956, JE10393/3, 118857.

⁷¹ Wright to FO, Tel. 914, 20 August 1956, JE10393/2, 118857; Tel. 951, 29 August 1956, ES1021/53, 120756.

⁷² On the Suez affair, see for example: K. Kyle, *Suez* (London: 1991); W.S. Lucas, *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis* (London: 1991); W.R. Louis & Owen, R. (eds.), *The Suez 1956, the Crisis and Its Consequences* (Oxford: 1989); S.I. Troen & Shemesh, M. (eds.), *The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal* (London: 1990). On the Arab angle during the Suez crisis, see: E. Podeh, "The Struggle over Arab Hegemony after the Suez Crisis," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 1993), pp. 91–110.

⁷³ *BBC*, No. 87, 2 November 1956, II.

⁷⁴ Wright to FO, Tel. 1263, 2 November 1956, VQ1015/94, 121646; Tel. 1250, 2 November 1956, VR1091/484, 121785.

repercussions of the war, reported that “almost all we have built up here over many years and with such pains has been shaken nearly beyond repair.”⁷⁵

Various Iraqi leaders asked the palace to dismiss Nuri, but he, as well as Faysal and ‘Abd al-Allah, believed that such a step would cause “anarchy.” With the palace’s backing, Nuri decided to adjourn parliament until 1 January 1957 so that he could meanwhile shore up his domestic position.⁷⁶ He also requested the British to take some action against Israel that would prove that there was no “collusion” between them. Such a step, he was convinced, would improve the position of Britain’s allies as well as his own. Not surprisingly, however, Wright reported, on November 12, that he had never seen Nuri “more deeply discouraged and depressed.”⁷⁷

Troubles at home notwithstanding, Nuri did not neglect the Arab world. He responded quickly to Hussein’s request to send “up to a division” of troops to Jordan.⁷⁸ While previously, the question of command had been one of the problems that stood in the way stationing troops in Jordan, both parties were now too preoccupied to argue. Nuri was wary of possible Arab accusations that he had refrained from assisting a sister state, while Hussein was perturbed by the possibility of an Israeli attack. It was hastily agreed, therefore, that the Iraqi forces would enter under a joint Iraqi–Jordanian command headed by Jordan’s Deputy Chief-of-Staff ‘Ali al-Hiyari.⁷⁹ Nuri meanwhile assured Britain that the Iraqi units would not fight against Israel unless provoked, and that they would be stationed at Mafraq, far from the Israeli border.⁸⁰

Even though Arab criticism of Iraq focused on its membership in the Baghdad Pact alongside Britain, Nuri refused to surrender to demands voiced in Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world for Iraq to leave the pact. On the contrary, he tried to use the pact as a lever to enhance Iraq’s position in the Arab world. On 3 November, he left for Teheran to participate in a conference of the Muslim members of the pact, a visit which, in light of the tense situation in Iraq,

⁷⁵ Wright to FO, Tel. 1287, 4 November 1956, VR1091/523, 121786.

⁷⁶ Wright to FO, Tel. 1392, 14 November 1956, VQ1015/103, 121647.

⁷⁷ Wright to FO, Tel. 1371, 12 November 1956, VR1091/849, 121797; Tel. 1375, 13 November 1956, V1015/6, 121220; Tel. 1391, 14 November 1956, JE1094/112, 119907.

⁷⁸ Wright to FO, Tel. 1238, 1 November 1956, VJ10393/176, 121489.

⁷⁹ Wright to FO, Tel. 1268, 3 November 1956, VR1091/557, 121787.

⁸⁰ Wright to FO, Tel. 1280, 3 November 1956, VJ10393/182, 121489.

clearly attested to the importance he attached to its results.⁸¹ He hoped to play an active role in bringing the war to an end, as well as in advancing a solution of the Palestine problem—the ubiquitous means of diverting Arab attention from other problems. Nuri arrived with a four-point proposal, approved by his cabinet, calling for restoring Egypt's sovereignty and territorial integrity; ensuring Israel's retreat to the cease-fire lines; repatriating all prisoners of war; and reaching a comprehensive solution to the Palestine problem.⁸² His aim was twofold: to show that the Baghdad Pact played a crucial role in ending the war, and to shift attention from the Suez crisis to the Palestine issue, in which Iraq could play a major role. To his chagrin, however, the conference opened only on 8 November, by which time a cease-fire had already been achieved by the UN.⁸³

Following the conference, Iraq announced it was severing diplomatic relations with France, and would restrict Baghdad Pact meetings to Muslim members (i.e., exclude Britain from the activities of the pact)⁸⁴—decisions which indicated that the Tehran conference had achieved little in solving Iraq's domestic and regional problems. The first move was primarily symbolic, as Iraq's ties with France were then negligible. The second move, however, made without prior consultation with the members of the pact, was surprising, and revealed the extent of the negative political ramifications that the Suez crisis had for Iraq.⁸⁵ Britain and Turkey, aware of Iraq's predicament and assuming that the suspension would be temporary (as Iraq had assured them privately), acquiesced with the decision. Pakistan and Iran, however, strongly protested the unilateral decision, although they were unable to change it.⁸⁶ By suspending Britain from the pact Iraq achieved two goals: it deflected public criticism, and it was able to portray the pact as a genuine regional defense organization

⁸¹ Wright to FO, Tel. 1307, 6 November 1956, VR1091/650, 121790.

⁸² Stevens to FO, Tel. 871, 4 November 1956, VR1091/590, 121788; Stevens to Lloyd, Dispatch 125, 15 November 1956, V1073/405, 121266.

⁸³ On the Tehran conference, see *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, pp. 318–22. For the text of the final communiqué, see Stevens to FO, Tel. 920, 8 November 1956, VR1091/766, 121793.

⁸⁴ *Al-Hayat*, 10 November 1956; Wright to FO, Tel. 49 Saving, 10 November 1956, VQ1094/3, 121682; Tel. 1476, 26 November 1956, VQ1015/108, 121647.

⁸⁵ Wright to FO, Tel. 1348, 9 November 1956, V1073/387, 121265.

⁸⁶ On Iran's reaction, see Stevens to FO, Tel. 932, 10 November 1956, V1073/387, 121265. Concerning Pakistan's reaction, see High Commissioner (Karachi) to Commonwealth Relations Office, Tel. 1878, 13 November 1956, 121265. For Turkey's reaction, see Bowker to FO, Tel. 954, 14 November 1956, V1073/399, 121266.

comprising Muslim states, aimed against Israel and open to other Muslim or Arab members.

In theory, thus, the Baghdad Pact had become an "Islamic pact" open to other states who rejected the participation of the super-powers. Unfortunately, however, the new framework resembled the obsolete and ill-fated 1937 Sa'adabad Pact, the only difference being that Pakistan had replaced Afghanistan.⁸⁷ Iraq now responded to Egypt's repeated assertion that it was Israel that posed the main threat to the Arab world rather than the Soviet Union—an assertion that gained credibility after the Suez War. It insisted that unlike the Baghdad Pact, the "new" pact was directed against aggression from any source, including Israel.

Another drastic shift in Iraqi foreign policy occurred on 13 November, when Iraq announced a new radical position concerning the Palestine question, calling for the liquidation of the State of Israel and the return of the Palestinian refugees.⁸⁸ This marked a *volte-face* compared with Baghdad's earlier, fairly moderate stance: acceptance of the 1947 Partition Plan as a basis for the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The timing of this step was highly significant. Iraq attempted to show that it was the genuine representative of the Palestinians, while the other Arab states had neglected them.⁸⁹ Once again, the Palestine problem was being used in inter-Arab politics as a vehicle for achieving domestic and regional gains.

The arrival in Baghdad on 17 November of Pakistani President Muhammad Ali, accompanied by his prime minister and chief-of-staff, for an unofficial visit, led to another round of quadripartite talks between Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact, similar to the Tehran conference earlier in the month.⁹⁰ The conference dealt with three major issues: the importance of convincing the US to join in order to strengthen the pact; political and military methods of combating Communist penetrating into the Middle East by way of Egypt and Syria; and Western support for Sham'un's shaky regime.⁹¹ Nuri

⁸⁷ See, for example, Basil Daqaq, *al-Hayat*, 13 November 1956.

⁸⁸ *Al-Hayat*, 14 November 1956; *BBC*, No. 98, 15 November 1956.

⁸⁹ *Al-Hayat*, 16 November 1956.

⁹⁰ Wright to FO, Tel. 1415, 17 November 1956, VQ1022/16, 121648. Though the Shah felt insulted at not having been invited, he realized that Nuri was trying to avoid the impression of convening a formal meeting, see Wright to FO, Tel. 1423, 19 November 1956, VQ1022/18, 121648.

⁹¹ Wright to FO, Tel. 1426, 19 November 1956, VQ1022/20, 121648; Tel. 1429,

tried to make a gain substantive enough to use to improve his image with the Arab public. Menderes felt that the Iraqi leaders were in a state of “near panic” in light of the widespread rumors of Israeli-British “collusion” and the resultant propaganda attacks from Cairo and Damascus.⁹² The pact members demanded that Turkey sever its diplomatic relations with Israel; Ankara, however, merely recalled its minister.⁹³

Eventually, the conferees could point to certain successes. Britain indicated that it would remain in the pact; Sham'un was promised military support; and a link was to be established with Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.⁹⁴ In the wake of the conference, the four Muslim members formally asked the US to join the pact. Although the US again declined to become a full member, it was willing to support the members politically: the State Department issued a statement on 29 November to the effect that “the U.S. reaffirms its support for the collective efforts of these nations,” and that “a threat to the territorial integrity or the political independence of these members would be viewed by the U.S. with the utmost gravity.”⁹⁵

Alongside the attempts with regard to the US, Nuri took steps to expand the pact by linking it with Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. He undoubtedly thought that Saudi and Lebanese cooperation, whether with all Muslim pact members, or with Iraq alone, “would weaken Nasser and strengthen the Pact.”⁹⁶ One attempt was made through the Pakistani president who visited Riyadh, and by his prime minister who was sent to Beirut. Another was undertaken by the British and American ambassadors respectively, who were asked to use their good offices with Sa'ud and Sham'un.⁹⁷ Nuri also tried to

20 November 1956, VL1051/16, 121618; Tel. 1449, 21 November 1956, V1022/3, 121223.

⁹² Wright to FO, Tel. 1426, 19 November 1956, VQ1022/20, 121648; Tel. 1449, 21 November 1956, V1022/3, 121223.

⁹³ Despite pressure by the Baghdad Pact members on Turkey to sever diplomatic relations with Israel, Ankara decided only to recall its ambassador from Tel Aviv, stating that the decision to do so would be made public a week later in order not to relate it to the Baghdad Pact meeting. See CRO to all HC, Tel. 629, 26 November 1956, V1073/397B, 121266; Ankara to Secretary of State, Tel. 1240, 26 November 1956, 780.5/11-2656.

⁹⁴ For the text of the final communiqué, see *al-Hayat*, 24 November 1956.

⁹⁵ *Department of State Bulletin*, 10 December 1956, p. 918. For the political reasons for not joining the Baghdad Pact, see *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, pp. 327-60.

⁹⁶ Wright to FO, Tel. 1574, 8 December 1956, V1073/439, 121268.

⁹⁷ Wright to FO, Tel. 1444, 21 November, V1022/2, 121223; Tel. 1449, 21 November 1956, V1022/3, 121223; Ankara to Secretary of State, Tel. 1240, 26

take advantage of a proposal by Iran to convene a conference of Middle Eastern Islamic countries on 9 December. Invitations were sent to Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. However, Iraq alone responded favorably.⁹⁸

Despite the deleterious effects of the Suez crisis for Iraq, the Egyptian president was dismayed to observe that the Baghdad Pact was not on the point of withering away. Rather, it seemed to gain new vitality in the guise of an "Islamic pact" while other Arab states might be induced to join, thereby posing a new threat to Egypt. This was clearly reflected in a letter 'Abd al-Nasir sent King Sa'ud. Although the pact was seemingly frozen, he wrote, "Britain and her allies are thinking of trying to convert it into an Islamic pact which will attract all Islamic countries not already members of the pact." This policy, he feared, was intended to isolate Egypt from Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan.⁹⁹ Though Sa'ud had by then become sympathetic to the aims of the pact, he still was not willing to risk an open breach with Egypt.¹⁰⁰

From the Iraqi point of view, the Baghdad conference of 17 November had been a mistake: student demonstrations, initiated by high school students in Baghdad on 21 November as a protest against Iraq's participation in the pact, then spread across the country and lasted until early December.¹⁰¹ While there is no evidence that the disturbances were instigated from abroad, they were undoubtedly inflamed by Egyptian propaganda, which described them as "bloody riots."¹⁰²

At the same time, a Syrian military source announced on 23 November that a plot had been uncovered to overthrow the Syrian regime with the support of a "neighbouring state."¹⁰³ The conspiracy had in fact been conceived by Iraq and its Western allies as far back

November 1956, 780.5/11-2656; Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 920, 24 November 1956, 780.5/11-2456.

⁹⁸ Stevens to FO, Tel. 1022, 10 December 1956, V1022/14, 121223. For more information, see documents V1022/13-15, 121223.

⁹⁹ Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, p. 209.

¹⁰⁰ Dhahran to Secretary of State, Tel. 248, 26 November 1956, 780.5/11-2656; Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, pp. 210-11.

¹⁰¹ Baghdad Radio, 21 November 1956 (*BBC*, No. 105, 23 November 1956, p. 8; Baghdad Radio, 22 November 1956 (*BBC*, No. 106, 24 November 1956, I).

¹⁰² See, for example, *Sawt al-Arab's* broadcasts, *BBC*, No. 106, 24 November 1956, I.

¹⁰³ Seale, p. 279. See also Damascus Radio, 23 November 1956 (*BBC*, No. 107, 26 November 1956, pp. 8-9). This announcement marked the beginning of vicious Syrian attacks on Iraq. See Damascus Radio, 23-24 November 1956 (*BBC*, No. 107, p. 9).

as April 1956, with most of the details worked out between July and November 1956. The Syrian army discovered arms smuggling from Iraq to Jabal Duruz in late October, and the first arrests were made in early November. It seems reasonable to assume that the timing of the statement about the plot, in late November, was not coincidental but was orchestrated, possibly with the knowledge of 'Abd al-Nasir, to constitute a fatal blow to the Baghdad Pact.¹⁰⁴

The fact that Iraq had joined with Western allies to plot against an Arab state had a disastrous effect on Iraq within the Arab context. Even more serious was the timing: coincidence had led to setting the date for 29 October, the day the Suez operation began. In unprecedented vitriolic attacks, Syria and Egypt accused Iraq of collusion with the Western powers and Israel against Syria. In reply, on 26 November, Iraq delivered a sharp note to the Syrian legation in Baghdad, warning that should Syria persist, Iraq would "spare no effort to defend its reputation and dignity in such a manner as to utilise all the legitimate means at its command."¹⁰⁵

The note caused Syria to tone down its propaganda attacks, but Egypt's broadcasts became more offensive than ever.¹⁰⁶ Together, they added to the internal strife in Iraq, to the point of threatening the very foundations of the monarchy. A number of Iraqi politicians, mainly from the opposition, submitted petitions to King Faysal demanding Nuri's resignation and the appointment of a new government.¹⁰⁷ The crown prince considered replacing Nuri with Jamil al-Midfa'i (then speaker of parliament), but after consulting others, arrived at the time-honoured conclusion: that only Nuri possessed the talent and skill necessary to overcome the present predicament. His resignation would only cause a further deterioration. Indeed,

¹⁰⁴ For details on the plot, see Seale, pp. 270–82; Eveland, pp. 181–233. Many additional details are to be found in the first four volumes of the Mahdawi trial reports. See also two recent articles: D. Little, "Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 44 (1990), pp. 51–75; A. Gorst & W.S. Lucas, "The Other Collusion: Operation Straggle and Anglo-American Intervention in Syria, 1955–56," *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 4 (1989), pp. 576–95.

¹⁰⁵ For the text of the Iraqi note, see Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 292, 30 November 1956, VQ10389/3, 121659; Baghdad Radio, 26 November 1956 (*BBC*, No. 109, 28 November 1956, pp. 7–10).

¹⁰⁶ Examples of these propaganda attacks are: *BBC*, No. 110, 29 November 1956, pp. 1–2; No. 113, 3 December 1956, pp. 1–5; No. 114, 4 December 1956, pp. 4–5; No. 119, 10 December 1956, pp. 17–18; No. 124, 15 December 1956, pp. 2–3.

¹⁰⁷ Wright to FO, Tel. 1476, 26 November 1956, VQ1015/108, 121647.

Nuri's harsh methods—including the arrest of opposition leaders responsible for the demonstrations, and other preemptive steps—were successful in subduing the strife by 3 December and achieving relative calm.¹⁰⁸

By contrast, Nuri's attempts to improve Iraq's inter-Arab position proved futile. The country was completely isolated and—as we have seen—Nuri became the main target of Arab hostility. Jordan was under a hostile nationalist government which asked for the Iraqi forces (stationed there since the Suez War) to be repatriated.¹⁰⁹ The Arab struggle was no longer a matter between Cairo and Baghdad, with the other Arab countries watching from the sidelines; Syria and Jordan were now actively siding with Egypt against the Baghdad Pact and against Nuri.

Searching for a new means to counteract the concerted Arab pressure, Nuri attempted to capitalize on the relatively calm atmosphere in Baghdad by turning directly to the people. He delivered a long and detailed broadcast address on 16 December, focusing on a single theme: Iraq's role in the Baghdad Pact.¹¹⁰ Presenting a balanced account of the preliminary negotiations leading to it, the speech was defensive in nature and did not attack Egypt directly. It was an attempt by Nuri to state his version of events, in the face of abusive Egyptian accusations. He hoped to weaken 'Abd al-Nasir's credibility and gain additional legitimacy for himself. Holding up his honesty and personal prestige as a national hero, Nuri asked the people to

¹⁰⁸ Wright to FO, Tel. 1509, 29 November 1956, VQ1015/113, 121647. Wright claimed that the Egyptian reports on the Iraqi demonstrations were intentionally exaggerated. See his telegrams 1513, 30 November 1956, VQ1015/114, 121647; Tel. 1527, 1 December 1956, VQ1015/116A; Tel. 1536, 3 December 1956, VQ1015/116B.

¹⁰⁹ For the official statement concerning the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Jordan, see Wright to FO, Tel. 1578, 9 December 1956, VJ10393/193, 121489; Baghdad Radio, 9 December 1956 (*BBC*, No. 120, 11 December 1956, pp. 9–10). This statement was made after the Iraqi government received an official note saying that since the crisis had dissipated, Iraqi troops must leave Jordan, Johnston to FO, Tel. 1936, 6 December 1956, VJ10393/192, 121489. Actually, the main reason for the Jordanian demand was the ongoing problem of command. Jordan wanted to place the forces under a joint Egyptian–Syrian–Jordanian command, according to its military agreements. Iraq insisted that its forces remain under joint Iraqi–Jordanian command. Syrian and Saudi forces remained on Jordanian soil. See Johnston to FO, Tel. 1957, 10 December 1956, VJ10393/194, 121489; Tel. 1958, 10 December, VJ10393/194A, 121489.

¹¹⁰ For the text of Nuri's speech, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 255–79 (English); *al-Hayat*, 17 December 1956, pp. 2–3, 8 (Arabic).

put their trust in him as they had in the early days of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. He ended by saying:

Compatriots, You have known me as a struggling young man who advocated and worked for the independence of the Arabs and their unity and for raising the prestige of the Arabs at a time when the word "Arab" would have cost the speaker his neck. This was at a time when those who are today advocating nationalism were prostrating themselves at the feet of the oppressors and of the imperialists and accusing us of treason and atheism. I have exposed my life to danger more than once, and proceeded on my way seeking nothing but the independence of the Arabs, the glory of the Arabs and the dignity of the Arabs. I have also been always frank in what I said and clear in my policy; I believed in what I said and did, and was never afraid of anybody's censure as long as I was acting rightly, nor was I deterred by anybody's words as long as I considered that I was right. The call to Arab nationalism is not accidental to me, but is my very being: I am proud of it, and I strive to promote it and to safeguard it whether I am inside or outside the government. If this, then, was my way in my adolescence and manhood, it is not strange, therefore, that I should still be so in my old age.¹¹¹

It is difficult to imagine that Nuri was naïve enough to believe that the speech could transform the imperialist image of the Baghdad Pact or his personal one as an "Anglo-American stooge." The year 1956 marked the fortieth anniversary of the Arab Revolt. Did Nuri really believe that nothing had changed in the Arab world? The answer to this question is highly complex. Nuri was an astute and cunning politician, who understood the Arab and Iraqi political systems well. It would seem, therefore, that either old age had distorted his thinking, or that he sincerely believed his historic fight for the Arab cause would still attest to his noble aims. In any case, the speech backfired: Egypt promptly presented its own version of the chain of events, and its propaganda campaign, added to by transmissions from Syria and Jordan, became even more abusive.¹¹² Nuri admitted to Wright that his speech may have been a mistake.¹¹³

For the first time since their talks in September 1954, Nuri sent out feelers to 'Abd al-Nasir. Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, Nuri's confidant and

¹¹¹ Khalil, p. 278.

¹¹² For the text of the Egyptian response, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 279–86. Egyptian embassies distributed this text as a pamphlet titled "The Baghdad Pact and Its Real Facts." See VB1071/2, 127822.

¹¹³ Wright to FO, Tel. 1655, 24 December 1956, JE1015/107, 118838.

a former prime minister, was instructed discreetly to propose a private meeting. Justifying this move to Wright, Nuri observed that "after all, disputes between nations seldom lasted indefinitely." Gallman was told that "there is [an] urgent need for a change," and that "we are ready to shake hands and place our relations on a basis of cooperation." Nuri explained that the possibility of convincing the Egyptian president to cooperate against Communism and toward the solution of the Palestine problem should not be neglected.¹¹⁴ Although Nuri's initiative stemmed from his growing isolation in the Arab world, his approach to Egypt came at a time when various Arab sources reported mounting resentment in the Egyptian army, and increasing financial problems in Egypt, both capable of endangering 'Abd al-Nasir's rule.¹¹⁵ Nuri may have believed that in light of these difficulties the Egyptian president would be more forthcoming. In any case, he certainly did not change his opinion of 'Abd al-Nasir. He was only exploring a new possibility of circumventing his own problems in the Arab world.

The Foreign Office, and Eden in particular, were alarmed by the possibility of a reconciliation of the two. A personal telegram from Eden stressed that there was no reason to believe that 'Abd al-Nasir's ambition to become the dictator of the Arab world had changed and that in order to achieve this goal, he was seeking to destroy the biggest stumbling block in his path: the Iraqi regime. The British urged Nuri not to deal with 'Abd al-Nasir, but rather to await his downfall. Then, Iraq would emerge "as the leader of the Arabs, a position in which we should like to see her."¹¹⁶ This last sentence, written in late December 1956, clearly showed Eden's lack of insight regarding Iraq's position in the Arab world. The State Department was also unenthusiastic about Nuri's new approach. Although it described his move as "statesmanlike," Dulles instructed Gallman to encourage Nuri to improve his relations with Sa'ud instead.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Wright to FO, Tel. 1655, 24 December 1956, JE1015/107, 118835; Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 1118, 25 December 1956, 674.87/12-2556.

¹¹⁵ See, for example, Middleton to FO, Tel. 1513, 24 December 1956, JE1015/106, 118838; Wright to FO, Tel. 9, 2 January 1957, JE1015/2, 125411; Tel. 74, 17 January 1957, JE1023/3, 125426; Tel. 20, 4 January 1957, JE1015/6, 125411; Bailey to Watson, 19 January 1957, JE1015/41, 125412.

¹¹⁶ Eden's Minute, 26 December 1956, JE1015/115, 118836. See also the text sent to Baghdad, Tel. 3182, 27 December 1956, 118836. Eden minuted "Excellent" on this version.

¹¹⁷ Dulles to Baghdad, Tel. 1112, 29 December 1956, 674.87/12-2556.

Responding to Nuri in early 1957, 'Abd al-Nasir expressed his willingness to call off the feud with Iraq in return for a public assurance by Iraq not to recruit other Arab states into the Baghdad Pact.¹¹⁸ As anxious as Nuri and the palace were for a *rapprochement*, they were unwilling to give such a guarantee, tantamount to submission to Egypt's terms.¹¹⁹

The end of 1956 represented a watershed in the involvement of the superpowers in the Middle East, with Britain's receding influence being rapidly replaced by that of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Arab world was also at a turning point: 'Abd al-Nasir was emerging as the leader of the Arab nationalist movement, while Nuri and others associated with the Baghdad Pact were irrevocably stigmatized as imperialist lackeys. Iraq, although recovering from the Suez crisis and its reverberations, was unable to regain its former position or stake a serious claim for Arab hegemony. If the December 1955 events in Jordan signified Iraq's inability to mobilize additional Arab states for the pact, the Suez crisis was a threat to the very existence of the Baghdad Pact, as well as to the "old guard" and the Iraqi Hashemite regime. In light of these formidable problems, Nuri's success in riding out the storm and forming a royalist coalition against Egypt and Syria in 1957, was highly impressive. However, in retrospect, it was a temporary device incapable of averting the process that eventually led to the dissolution of the monarchy and Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.

¹¹⁸ Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 2231, 11 January 1957, 674.00/1-1157 HBS.

¹¹⁹ Wright to FO, Tel. 9, 2 January 1957, JE1015/2, 125411; Tel. 74, 17 January 1957, JE1023/3, 125426; Memorandum of Conversation between 'Abd al-Allah and Ambassador Hare, 4 February 1957, 674.87/2-457.

CHAPTER TEN

FAREWELL TO THE BAGHDAD PACT

After the Suez crisis, the Baghdad Pact no longer constituted the major issue on the Arab agenda. New issues came to the fore—i.e., the Arab attitude toward the Eisenhower Doctrine, Israel's withdrawal from Sinai, the internal situation in Jordan and Syria, and Arab unification schemes.¹ Still, common assumptions notwithstanding, the Baghdad Pact did not fade away as an issue in Arab politics until the July 1958 military coup in Iraq. Even though severely and irreversibly damaged by the Suez crisis, Egypt still considered it a major threat. It was this fear, *inter alia*, that led 'Abd al-Nasir to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) in early February 1958.

The public debate of 1956 between Nuri and 'Abd al-Nasir was followed in 1957 by an apparent draw. Although he still hoped to induce other Arab states to join the Baghdad Pact, Nuri realized that the primary issue now was not Arab hegemony, but rather the very survival of the Hashemite elite and the Iraqi monarchy. Any attempt to promote Iraq's position in the Arab world would now have to be carried out outside the pact. However, he did not consider abandoning the pact, a step that would be interpreted as capitulation to Egyptian pressure. Instead, he concluded, Iraq should attempt to isolate Egypt by developing its own relations with fellow conservative regimes threatened by Egypt's and Syria's drift toward Communism.

From Egypt's point of view, meanwhile, political victory over the Suez War had turned into a double-edged sword: Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia came to perceive Egypt's Arab policy—rather than Soviet Communism—as a threat to their own regimes and were willing to act (if only behind the scenes) to curb 'Abd al-Nasir's influence.

¹ See, for example, Kamil Marwa's articles, *al-Hayat*, 1 January 1957; 4 January 1957.

The Impact of the Eisenhower Doctrine

The growing Middle East involvement by the United States at the beginning of 1957 increased Egypt's isolation. The US had decided that it must provide leadership in order "to lift up the Middle East from the morass" and to stop the Soviets from filling the power vacuum caused by British withdrawal.² The State Department also came under heavy pressure from the US Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, as well as from the Baghdad Pact members, to join that organization. "Without some strong power," Pakistani President Mirza claimed, "we are four zeros and those only add up to zero."³ Dulles, however, was reluctant to accede, because in his opinion, the pact had developed the "reputation of being an instrument of UK policy" and had become involved in regional conflicts. Instead, he thought of incorporating the pact into a new and larger grouping of Middle Eastern states, to be called the Middle East Charter, which would also include Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Eventually, however, he decided against the latter plan, not having "much faith in the ability of the Arabs to unite for any constructive purpose" other than their hatred of Israel. Nevertheless, Dulles thought a new Middle East initiative was essential.⁴

A consequence of this thinking, the Eisenhower Doctrine, was announced on 5 January 1957. Its essence was to deter Communist aggression in the Middle East. It made available \$200 million in military and economic assistance to any nation or group of nations "dedicated to the maintenance of [their] national independence." At the heart of the doctrine was a congressional authorization that "overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism would be met by the armed forces of the United States."⁵ The Baghdad Pact members, while welcoming the new initiative,

² *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, p. 351-52; Dulles to Cairo, Tel. 2046, 20 December 1956, 674.00/12-1656.

³ Quoted by 'Abd al-Ilah during his meeting with Dulles, 5 February 1957, 780.5/2-557. On the pressure exerted by the Baghdad Pact members, see *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, pp. 353-54, 365, 369-72. On the favorable attitude of the US army, see *ibid.*, pp. 361-63, 372-76. See also Henderson's recommendations, *ibid.*, pp. 387-89.

⁴ On the Middle East Charter and the deliberations, see *ibid.*, pp. 367, note 2, 376-82, 390-401.

⁵ On the Eisenhower Doctrine, see *ibid.*, pp. 432ff. See also Campbell, pp. 122-26; Gallman, pp. 79-81; Seale, pp. 317-21.

suspected that the Eisenhower Doctrine might be a substitute for the pact, and made every effort in 1957–58 to change the US position. Soon after Congress approved the Eisenhower Doctrine, Congressman James Richards was sent as the president's special envoy to the Middle East in order to explain it and discuss the terms of American assistance. Richards visited all the Middle Eastern states except Egypt and Syria.⁶ Apprehensive of associating the new policy with the Baghdad Pact, the US preferred to channel most of the financial aid through bilateral arrangements and not through the pact.⁷

Like the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower Doctrine, divided the Arab world into two groupings, although the make-up of the camps was somewhat different. Opposed to 'Abd al-Nasir and supporting the doctrine were: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Sudan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, with Jordan increasingly associating itself with this grouping. The other camp included Syria (which publicly rejected the doctrine) and Egypt (which did not formally reject the doctrine but was considered averse to it). Both countries thought of the Doctrine as a direct continuation of the Baghdad Pact—"imperialism under a new guise"—and their propaganda campaigns focused on its connection with foreign pacts like NATO and the Baghdad Pact.⁸

The Eisenhower Doctrine attested to the US view that the Baghdad Pact was not—or no longer—a tool for enhancing Western interests in the Middle East. Still, the pact's members hoped that the doctrine would turn out to strengthen it. Shortly before another meeting of its Muslim members was due (on 19 January 1957 in Ankara), British Ambassadors Wright and Stevens discussed, *inter alia*, the benefit likely to accrue to Iraq from building up a closer relationship with Egypt's neighbors "to the West and South."⁹ Indeed, the Ankara conference then recommended that Saudi Arabia distance itself further from Egypt and that Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Sudan form a closer association with the pact's members to counter Egypt's efforts to control them. Still apprehensive of open association with the pact's

⁶ For details concerning the Richards mission, see *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, pp. 430, 448ff.

⁷ The relatively small sum of \$12.5 was allocated to Baghdad Pact regional projects, *ibid.*, p. 494.

⁸ On the new Arab groupings, see *al-Hayat*, 13, 17, 20 January 1957. See also Cairo Radio, 13 January 1957 (*BBC*, No. 146, 15 January 1957, p. 2).

⁹ Wright to FO, Tel. 73, 17 January 1957, VB1072/21, 127823; Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 19, VB1072/25, 127823.

activities, Nuri decided not to schedule a conference of its council or to resume public meetings of its committees.¹⁰ Pursuant to the last meeting in Baghdad, the members agreed to send the Iraqi crown prince to Washington to informally put four points to the administration: the Eisenhower Doctrine should not be considered a substitute to accession to the pact; American assistance should be channeled mainly through the pact; no support should be forthcoming to Egypt and Syria; and a joint effort should be made to combat radio propaganda transmitted by Moscow, Cairo and Damascus.¹¹

Meanwhile, 'Abd al-Nasir directed his energies at Jordan and Saudi Arabia. On 19 January, representatives of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, meeting in Cairo, signed the Arab Solidarity Pact which committed them to pay Jordan an annual subsidy of LE 12.5 million for a period of ten years as a replacement for the British subsidy.¹² Proceeding from Cairo to Washington, Sa'ud brought with him a memorandum from the heads of these four Arab states that in fact reflected mainly Egypt's attitudes.¹³ On his way back, Sa'ud briefed the three heads of state on the results of his visit. However, in contrast to the first Cairo summit, the second (25–27 February) resulted in disagreement over the Eisenhower Doctrine between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria, on the other. The joint communiqué, to which Sa'ud and Hussein agreed reluctantly, declared adherence to "the policy of positive neutrality in order to preserve . . . [Arab] national interests. The defense of the Arab world should emanate from within the Arab nation, in the light of its real security and outside foreign pacts." However, Sa'ud and Hussein had managed to exclude any criticism of the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹⁴

¹⁰ He did, however, agree to resume meetings of the "technical committees," provided there was no publicity, Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 1294, 25 January 1957, 780.5/1-2557. See also Bowker to FO, Tel. 62, 21 January 1957, VB1072/23, 127824 (also PREM/11 1897); Ankara to Secretary of State, Tel. 1678, 21 January 1958, 780.5/1-2157.

¹¹ For more details on the Ankara conference, see Bowker to FO, Tel. 70, 23 January 1957, VB1072/29, 127824; Bowker to Lloyd, Dispatch 14, 25 January 1957, VB1072/33, 127824. For the communiqué at the conclusion of the conference, see Bowker to FO, Tel. 63, 21 January 1957, VB1072/24, 127824.

¹² For the text, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 287–89.

¹³ For the text of the memorandum and the American response, see Enclosure of Morris to Hadow, 7 March 1957, ES10345/23, 127155.

¹⁴ Most of the details concerning the second Cairo conference, are taken from *al-Hayat*, 1 March 1957. Having no other available sources, the foreign ambassadors

Concurrent visits to Washington in early February 1957 by the Iraqi crown prince and King Sa'ud, though seemingly orchestrated, were in fact coincidental. Iraq and Britain believed that this might spur Sa'ud if not actually to join the pact, then at least to cooperate with it members.¹⁵ From the US perspective, Sa'ud's visit provided an opportunity to extend the Dhahran air base lease and win the king's support for the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹⁶ But both the US and the Baghdad Pact countries shared the hope that the visits would further detach Sa'ud from Egypt.

A meeting between 'Abd al-Allah and Sa'ud eventually took place in Washington on 6 and 7 February 1957, and marked a new stage in the course of Iraqi-Saudi reconciliation, symbolizing the termination of the long and bitter conflict between the two royal dynasties. On practical terms, too, the discussions contributed greatly to improved relations between the two countries and led Sa'ud to adopt a more conciliatory approach to the Baghdad Pact. He also displayed a favorable attitude toward the Eisenhower Doctrine, and indicated his willingness to extend the Dhahran air base lease for another five years (for which Saudi Arabia was to receive substantial military aid). It appeared that the Washington deliberations had succeeded in further distancing Sa'ud from 'Abd al-Nasir. Still, Sa'ud, an inveterate equivocater, made it clear that he was not abandoning the Egyptian president, and issued a statement that the Communist threat in the Middle East was being exaggerated.¹⁷

Although preoccupied with Saudi Arabia, Nuri continued making efforts to bring other Arab states into the Baghdad Pact. More confident after the Ankara meeting, Nuri told Gallman to let Iraq

had to base their accounts on *al-Hayat's* version. See, for example, Middleton to FO, Tel. 8 Saving, 1 March 1957, V1022/11, 127724. For the text of the communiqué, see Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 921-22.

¹⁵ Wright to FO, Tel. 62, 15 January 1957, VQ10325/1, 128047; Morris to Hadow, 26 January 1957, VQ10325/2, 128047. Nuri attached great significance to the meeting hoping that the US would convince Sa'ud to join the pact. See Wright to FO, Tel. 77, 18 January 1957, JE10326/1, 125433.

¹⁶ On the US attitude, see Morris to Hadow, 26 January 1957, VQ10325/2, 128047; Coulson to Beeley, 26 January 1957, ES10345/6, 127155; Caccia (Washington) to FO, Tel. 159, 28 January 1957, VB10345/11, 127813; Tel. 160, 28 January 1957, ES1022/1, 127152.

¹⁷ On the visits of the two leaders, see *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, pp. 1024-37; Caccia to Lloyd, Dispatch 42, 15 February 1957, ES10345/18, 127155; Bailey to Rose, 13 February 1957, VQ10345/1, 128052; Beaumont to Lloyd, Dispatch 116, 10 May 1957, VQ10325/7, 128047.

deal with the Arab countries, since “we know how to deal with our fellow Arabs.” However, he was reluctant to take any decisive steps without Western approval and assistance. Regarding Syria, he was waiting for signs of support from the Western powers for a federation with Iraq. As for Lebanon, he was disinclined to meet Sham’un’s financial request without simultaneous collective Western action. However, the State Department thought such action undesirable as it was bound to unnecessarily antagonize other Arab states or Israel.¹⁸

The US also blocked Iraq’s move in the direction of Morocco. In early January, Morocco asked Iraq to sign a friendship and cooperation agreement. Nuri promptly conveyed a draft agreement open to other countries as well—he apparently thought of Tunisia, Libya and Sudan. He still hoped to include Morocco in the economic committee of the Baghdad Pact. Britain did not reject the idea, but the State Department was opposed.¹⁹ In the event, the draft agreement was leaked to the Iraqi press, and Morocco withdrew, preferring to avoid any overt moves liable to be construed as hostile to Egypt.²⁰ Both ‘Abd al-‘Illah and Sa‘ud, visiting Morocco on their way back from Washington, were unsuccessful in persuading King Muhammad V to take any tangible steps. Fear of Egypt’s reaction led Morocco to put off a decision on the agreement.²¹

Another Iraqi target was Sudan. Prime Minister Sayyid ‘Abdallah Khalil visited Baghdad in late March 1957, and indicated that Sudan supported Iraq’s policy. Responding to a Sudanese demand for economic assistance, Nuri claimed that because of the halt in the flow of oil (since the Suez War), Iraq would not be in a position to consider a loan before the end of 1958. Instead, he said, Khartoum should approach Kuwait or to join the economic committee of the Baghdad Pact. Khalil, however, politely rejected the proposal because of his fear of Egypt’s reaction.²²

¹⁸ Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 1260, 18 January 1957, 683A.00/1-1857; Tel. 1276, 22 January 1957, 780.5/1-2257 HBS; Beirut to Secretary of State, Tel. 1745, 20 January 1957, 683A.00/1-2057; Dulles to Ankara, Tel. 1690, 24 January 1957, 683A.00/1-2457.

¹⁹ Wright to FO, Tel. 54, 12 January 1957, JM10393/1, 125775; Tel. 125, 30 January 1957, JM10393/5, 125775. For the text of the draft agreement that was leaked to the *Iraqi Times*, see Wright to FO, Tel. 126, JM10393/6, 125775. See also Duke (Rabat) to Ross, 27 February 1957, JM10393/14, 125775.

²⁰ Kellas (Baghdad) to African Department, 27 February 1957, JM10393/12, 125775.

²¹ Kellas to Levant Department, 22 November 1957, JM10393/13, 125775.

²² Before Khalil’s visit to Baghdad, the British ambassador advised not to pres-

Western Attempts to Revive the Pact

In March 1957, the US announced its intention to join the military committee of the Baghdad Pact.²³ The US was acting under pressure from the pact's members, particularly Britain which still considered the pact a vehicle for preserving its influence in the Middle East. No longer believing in the expansion of the pact, the Foreign Office had earlier raised the possibility of creating a "Southern Tier" to include the North African countries, Sudan and Ethiopia, and to be linked to the Baghdad Pact through bilateral agreements with Iraq.²⁴ This insightful scheme was shelved, however, when the State Department decided to join the Baghdad Pact's military committee and allocate a certain amount of financial support to its members.

The American decision gave a significant, if temporary, boost to the pact. At the global level, the step indicated, in the words of British ex-Minister of State Anthony Nutting, that "America and Britain were at last playing on the same team, no longer kicking the ball in opposite directions to the delight of the Russians in the grandstand."²⁵ At the regional level, the move posed a new threat to Egypt and Syria. While, as American Ambassador Hare observed, one of Cairo's present aims was "to counter growing Egyptian isolation,"²⁶ the repair of the Iraqi Mediterranean pipeline, Iraq's reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, and the American decision to join the military committee—all pointed to an improvement in Iraq's position in the Arab world. Following a visit to Baghdad, Nutting described a new atmosphere in Iraq:

Inevitably this atmosphere of renewed confidence created a new sense of superiority. Not only did I find that Nasser's name was hardly mentioned in Iraq, I also found that the Iraqis more than any other Arabs took it as natural that they should have by-passed Egypt in the business of making friends and influencing people in the Arab world. It was not so much that they regarded themselves as leaders of Arab thought and action but that they deemed it ridiculous and preposterous

sure Sudan to join the Baghdad Pact, Chapman-Andrews to FO, Tel. 5 Saving, 31 January 1957, JS10393/3, 125977. For the results of the visit, see Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 84, JS10393/6, 125977; Dispatch 87, 5 April 1957, VQ10316/4, 128045.

²³ For the deliberations in Bermuda, see PREM11/1837-8; *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. XII, pp. 462-74. The State Department had notified several diplomatic missions on 12 March that the US was prepared to join the military committee, *ibid.*, p. 459.

²⁴ Ross' Minute, 8 March 1957, V1075/5, 127755.

²⁵ A. Nutting, *I Saw for Myself: The Aftermath of Suez* (London: 1958), p. 37.

²⁶ FO to Washington, Tel. 1030, 4 March 1957, V1022/13, 127724.

that Colonel Nasser should consider himself in the role. As was being shown by the recent comings and goings of King Saud, President Chamoun, and the Prime Ministers of Turkey, Tunisia and the Sudan, the center of activity, if not gravity, was shifting decisively away from Cairo and towards Baghdad, Beirut and other pro-Western Arab capitals.²⁷

Undoubtedly, Nutting's assessment was exaggerated. However, it aptly reflected a new development in Arab politics: four months previously, it had appeared that the Baghdad Pact had petered out, that Iraq was politically isolated in the Arab world, and that the fate of the Iraqi Hashemites was in question. By March 1957, however, Nuri had regained much of his confidence, assuring Wright that 'Abd al-Nasser "was now losing ground."²⁸ He now decided to resume all pact activities with British participation (previously suspended, because of the Suez crisis) and to hold a council meeting in Karachi.²⁹

In joining the military committee, the US had posed a new challenge to Egypt. Although less menacing than the original threat of the Baghdad Pact in 1955–56, Egypt was quick to counterattack by initiating a massive propaganda campaign.³⁰ The broadcasts concentrated on three themes: American participation in the military committee was tantamount to joining the pact; there was no difference between the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine; and American's aim was to maintain Western domination in the Middle East despite Britain's retreat.³¹ Yet, Egypt and Syria had to confront another new challenge in the Arab arena—the emerging coalition of Arab monarchies.

Consolidating the Elusive Royalist Coalition

The *rapprochement* between Iraq and Saudi Arabia foreshadowed the formation of a new royalist axis. Saudi Arabia displayed a marked

²⁷ Nutting, *I Saw for Myself*, p. 41.

²⁸ Wright to FO, Tel. 299, 7 March 1957, VB1072/46, 128823.

²⁹ Wright to FO, Tel. 342, 19 March 1957, VB1072/53, 127825.

³⁰ A striking example was that the second anniversary of the pact (24 February 1957) passed almost unnoticed by the Egyptian radio. See *BBC*, No. 185, 1 March 1957, I.

³¹ See, for example: *BBC*, No. 203, 22 March 1957, p. 3; No. 205, 25 March 1957, p. 3; No. 206, 26 March 1957, p. 3; No. 207, 27 March 1957, pp. 2–3; No. 209, 29 March 1957, pp. 2–3.

interest in Jordanian affairs, as attested to by the dispatch of a Saudi military contingent to Jordan during the Suez War and the signing of the Arab Solidarity Pact in January 1957. Jordan, however, was not yet in a position to join a royalist coalition. Though Hussein showed sympathy for Sa'ud's point of view, his freedom of action was circumscribed by a nationalist cabinet headed by Suleiman al-Nabulsi. But after an abortive coup led by Chief-of-Staff 'Ali Abu Nuwar, in April 1957, the king dismissed al-Nabulsi, appointed a caretaker cabinet, imposed military rule and took advantage of the occasion to demand the withdrawal of the Syrian forces that had remained in Jordan since the Suez War.³² This ended Jordan's short-lived flirtation with Egypt and Syria and allowed Hussein to take his place in what the British Chargé in Baghdad, Richard Beaumont, termed the "Monarchistic Trade Union."³³

Sa'ud's first visit to Baghdad (11–18 May) was a further step in the consolidation of the royalist coalition. During the visit, after an Egyptian plot to assassinate him had been uncovered, Sa'ud said of 'Abd al-Nasir: "I gave him forty million dollars and other help besides and in return he tried to assassinate me."³⁴ Sa'ud asked Nuri to convey a request to Britain to deny Egypt any aid so that 'Abd al-Nasir remain "as poor as possible." He would then be compelled to turn to Sa'ud which would allow his financial leverage to mitigate the Egyptian president's pro-Soviet leanings. Sa'ud also proposed founding an Islamic conference as a "new alignment" in the Arab world. There, 'Abd al-Nasir, if he agreed to participate at all, would find himself in a minority. He stated that "among the objects [of the alignment] would be agreement upon [the] collective right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and recognition that the Baghdad Pact was in accordance with this principle and was of advantage to the Moslim world." Although he had no intention of committing his country to the pact, Sa'ud said, he now understood its *raison d'être* and its aims. Moreover, he hoped to achieve cooperation

³² Seale, pp. 289–90. For an account of the Jordanian crisis, see the memoirs of the British ambassador in Amman, C. Johnston, *The Brink of Jordan* (London: 1972), pp. 34–74. See also Snow, pp. 106–16; Dann, *King Hussein*, pp. 55–67; Lunt, pp. 36–44.

³³ Beaumont to Lloyd, Dispatch 116, 10 May 1957, VQ10325/7, 128047.

³⁴ Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 140, 30 May 1957, VQ10325/13, 128047. On the attempt on Sa'ud's life, see summation of the Lebanese newspapers, 4 May 1957, ES1015/4A, 127150; Wright to FO, Tel. 39 Saving, 8 May 1957, ES1015/5, 127150.

between the Islamic countries against Communism during the conference. However, from fear of 'Abd al-Nasir's propaganda, he explained that his new policy would have to be developed "cautiously and slowly."³⁵

The new alignment of the three monarchies was loosely associated with two other monarchies: Morocco and Libya, as well as with Lebanon, Tunisia, and Sudan, and also through Iraq and Saudi Arabia, with Iran and Pakistan.³⁶ This large grouping highlighted Sa'ud's newly acquired central position, and Egypt's and Syria's comparative isolation in the Arab world. The royalist coalition reached a high point of cohesion in June 1957 when Sa'ud visited Amman and when Hussein visited Baghdad.³⁷ Assessing these developments, British Ambassador in Amman, Charles Johnston, concluded that Sa'ud's visit was "a further step towards the new alignment in the Arab world by which Jordan is linked with Saudi Arabia, and less strictly with Iraq and the Lebanon, in opposition to Egypt and Syria. The new 'Arab caravan'," he observed, "is a much more homogeneous collection of animals than the group which came together with such enthusiasm last January and February [the Cairo conferences] and disintegrated so spectacularly in April and May."³⁸

From the start, the royalist coalition was not a homogenous grouping. Saudi Arabia's position in the alignment was always tenuous. Sa'ud, it must be remembered, consistently refrained from taking any steps that would expose him to subversive activity by Egypt. He cultivated an image of a leader who was above inter-Arab disputes, always serving as the mediator, enjoying the trust and support of all. For example, he visited Damascus and Beirut in September 1957 in order to alleviate tensions in Syria, where the domestic situation had deteriorated nearly to the point of major confrontation (see below).³⁹

³⁵ On Sa'ud's visit, see Wright to FO, Tel. 632, 15 May 1957, JE1152/13, 125471; Tel. 633, 15 May 1957, VQ10325/8, 128047; Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 140, 30 May 1957, VQ10325/13, 128047.

³⁶ Both the Shah and President Sham'un visited Sa'ud during March 1957. See Jidda to Secretary of State, Tel. 534, 17 March 1957, 787.11/3-1757; Dhahran to Secretary of State, Tel. 449, 25 March 1957, 780.5/3-2557.

³⁷ On Sa'ud's visit to Jordan, see Johnston to FO, Tel. 1046, 14 June 1957, VJ10325/11, 127892; Johnston to Lloyd, Dispatch 37, VJ10325/14, 127892. On Hussein's visit to Iraq, see *al-Hayat*, 23 June 1957.

³⁸ Johnston to Lloyd, Dispatch 37, 14 June 1957, VJ10325/14, 127892.

³⁹ Most of the details concerning the Syrian crisis in the summer of 1957 are not available, but a good account is to be found in Seale, pp. 289-306. See also Little,

"Despite his growing bitterness against the Egyptian and Syrian regimes," Wright concluded, "King Saud appears still to wish to maintain his position somewhat *au dessus de la mêlée* and to keep his lines out to all the Arab countries."⁴⁰

Growing self-confidence in the new royalist coalition was clearly reflected in Iraq's policy. In early June, Iraq attended the third annual meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council in Karachi, which was held with full British participation, with the US formally joining the military committee.⁴¹

Another signal of self-confidence was the decision to replace Nuri, in office since August 1954. The palace, feeling its position to be secure, decided to make a show of a seemingly broad support for the regime by a change in the premiership. Wright wryly observed that by this undemocratic procedure the palace had "revert[ed] to the normal Iraqi system of allowing the fruits of office to be enjoyed from time to time by different groups of politicians." Nuri's replacement was 'Ali Jawdat, an old friend and confidant.⁴² The change of personalities was a strategy calculated to demonstrate support for Nuri. Clearly, Nuri would remain the dominant figure behind the scenes.⁴³ In order to allay British fears, the palace assured Wright that no change was expected in Iraq's policy.⁴⁴ "Nuri is not dead yet," Wright remarked in early July 1957; should Egypt "regain some of the impetus that it has now lost in the hearts of Arab Nationalists, not only Iraq but the Western world as a whole may well need him [Nuri]."⁴⁵ His evaluation proved to be prophetic.

pp. 69–74. See in particular a recent book by D. Lesch, *Syria and the United States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo: 1992), pp. 138–209.

⁴⁰ Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 301, 28 December 1957, VQ10325/1, 134039; Crawford (Baghdad) to FO, Tel. 143, 31 January 1958, VY10316/17, 134386.

⁴¹ On the deliberations, see Karachi to Secretary of State, Tel. 3292, 2 June 1957, 780.5/6–257; Tel. 3295, 3 June 1957, 780.5/6–357; Tels. 3305, 3309, 4 June 1957, 780.5/6–457.

⁴² Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 42, 11 March 1958, VQ1015/28, 134198. Jawdat had served as prime minister during King Ghazi's reign (August 1934–March 1935) and under Regent 'Abd al-illah (December 1949–February 1950).

⁴³ Wright to FO, Tel. 771, 17 June 1957, VQ1015/27, 128040; Tel. 760, 18 June 1957, VQ1015/25, 128040; Tel. 763, 18 June 1957, VQ1015/26, 128040; Tel. 778, 21 June 1957, VQ1015/29, 128040. See also the message delivered from Nuri to the Foreign Office, 27 June 1957, V1022/31, 127725.

⁴⁴ Wright to FO, Tel. 791, 24 June 1957, VQ1015/30, 128040.

⁴⁵ Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 176, 9 July 1957, VQ1015/34, 128041. On Nuri's stature in the West see the article in *Time* magazine, quoted in *al-Hayat*, 16 June 1957; and J. Alsop's article, "The Pasha," *New York Herald Tribune*, 27 May 1957.

The new prime minister was expected to follow Nuri's policy, but he failed to mention the Baghdad Pact in his policy statement in parliament.⁴⁶ The Foreign Office, immediately inquiring whether this reflected a change in policy, was assured by the king, the crown prince, the prime minister and the foreign minister that the omission was unintentional.⁴⁷ Yet the semantic change was not incidental, for Jawdat realized that the pact had become more of a liability than an asset for Iraq. Unlike Nuri, Jawdat was not committed to it and therefore free to play down its role. The next prime minister, 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, who replaced Jawdat on 15 December, went even further, pointing out in parliament that in the event of a conflict between obligations to Arab countries and to the pact's allies, the former would come first.⁴⁸ Jawdat's and Mirjan's policies were a further blow to the Baghdad Pact.

Egypt's Counterreaction

By mid-1957, 'Abd al-Nasir had become increasingly isolated in the Arab world. At home there was also a perceptible decline in his popularity.⁴⁹ However, as the Foreign Office correctly observed, his ultimate aim of achieving hegemony remained unchanged and "he [was] simply waiting for suitable opportunities to pursue his old objectives."⁵⁰ And indeed within six months, he had regained his leading position on the Arab scene.

A new threat to Egypt emerged in the summer of 1957 when Syria turned into a battlefield in the global struggle over spheres of influence in the Middle East. On 13 August, the leftist government in Syria expelled three American diplomats whom it accused of plotting against the regime. Fearing that Syria might become a "victim of

⁴⁶ For the text of Jawdat's policy statement, see Baghdad Radio, 6 July 1957 (*BBC*, No. 291, 8 July 1957, pp. 10–11).

⁴⁷ FO to Baghdad, Tel. 1692, 9 July 1957, VQ1015/33, 128040. For the Iraqi response, see Wright to FO, Tel. 840, 10 July 1957, VQ1015/35, 128041; Tel. 856, 15 July 1957, VQ1015/36, 128041.

⁴⁸ Kellas to Chancery Ankara, 13 January 1958, VB10393/1, 133912. On Mirjan's new government, see Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 303, 31 December 1957, VQ1015/2, 134197.

⁴⁹ Dekmejian, p. 112 (Figure 6), pp. 94–95 (Figures 4 and 5).

⁵⁰ "A General Survey of Nasser's Foreign Policy," 30 August 1957, JE1023/24, 125427.

international Communism," the US, in cooperation with Turkey and Iraq, tried by various means to bring down the Syrian regime. The ensuing crisis nearly deteriorated into an open clash between Turkey and Syria. By early October, however, the tension had eased as a result of mediation efforts by King Sa'ud. The Egyptian president, well aware that a Western or a Saudi victory in Syria would jeopardize Egypt's claim for Arab hegemony,⁵¹ formally activated the military agreement of October 1955, and, on 13 October, landed troops in Latakia. Although the crisis had largely dissipated by that time, the move firmly established 'Abd al-Nasir as sole arbiter of the Syrian question; it demonstrated that Syria had remained Egypt's sphere of influence.⁵²

A few months later, in February 1958, the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) transformed the Arab political system. Beginning as far back as 1955, Egypt and Syria had considered various federation schemes, but a merger had not been a realistic choice. Complete fusion conflicted with Egypt's political tradition to maintain an overriding influence over as many Arab states as possible, but to keep them independent. The conventional explanation was that Syria's army officers, along with the Ba'th Party, had forced the union on 'Abd al-Nasir because of the chaotic situation in Syria. This explanation, propagated by Cairo, has on the whole been adopted by scholars.⁵³ However, the element of pressure from Syria has probably been overestimated and Egypt's own motivation for the merger somewhat underrated.

The military intervention in October 1957 had not extricated 'Abd al-Nasir from isolation in the Arab world, which he attributed to the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. His fears of the pact revived when the annual meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council took place (in Ankara, in January 1958), and Dulles attended for the first time. During December 1957 and January 1958, the Egyptian media

⁵¹ On the Syrian crisis during the summer of 1957, see note 39.

⁵² Seale, p. 305; Riad, p. 188. See also "Movement of Egyptian Troops to Syria," 15 October 1957, 674.83/10-1557. The move had been coordinated during Syrian Chief-of-Staff Afif al-Bizri's visit to Egypt in mid-September. See Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 696, 12 September 1957, 674.83/9-1257; Tel. 715, 13 September 1957, 674.83/9-1357.

⁵³ On the UAR, see Seale, pp. 307-21; Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, pp. 1-25; Riad, pp. 193-223; Heikal, *Ma Aladhi Jara fi Suriyya?* (Cairo: 1962), pp. 15-40. For American archival material, see RG 783.00 and 674.83 (November 1957-February 1958).

clearly revealed Cairo's fears.⁵⁴ Heikal later spoke of the formation of the UAR as having dealt "a heavy blow to the imperialist force which attacked our peoples in 1958—the Baghdad Pact."⁵⁵ Isolation and the fear of an American or Baghdad Pact conspiracy thus pushed 'Abd al-Nasir into the union with Syria, or at least contributed to it. While Egypt's fear of the Baghdad Pact at that time may seem surprising in light of the setbacks which the pact suffered during 1956–57, it still influenced 'Abd al-Nasir's thinking greatly.

With the formation of the UAR—the embodiment of the pan-Arab movement—'Abd al-Nasir once again emerged as the champion of Arab nationalism, eliciting an enormous wave of enthusiasm in the Arab world. Ultimately, the UAR, more than any other factor, helped Egypt overcome its isolation. It also enabled 'Abd al-Nasir to obtain a stronger foothold in the Fertile Crescent to counter the Iraqi and Jordanian Hashemites.⁵⁶ In retrospect, Egypt's fear of a revival of the Baghdad Pact turns out to have been exaggerated. The United States did not change its attitude toward the pact, and the possibility of associating it with NATO was never seriously discussed. Dulles' attendance at Ankara was merely intended to satisfy the other participants. Though the imminent union between Egypt and Syria was a major point at a secret session of the conference, the members of the pact were in agreement that it would be unwise for the Western powers "to take the lead in opposing or acting against the union." There was also agreement that Iraq, as a member of the pact, would find it difficult to act alone against the union. However, "any Arab initiative in the direction of forming an alternative expression of Arab unity," it was concluded, "would have the support of all members of the Baghdad Pact and of the United States." The conference recommended creating some form of association between Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and perhaps Lebanon.⁵⁷ However, once

⁵⁴ For examples of the allegations in Egyptian propaganda, see: *BBC*, No. 420, 6 December 1957, p. 3; No. 426, 13 December 1957, I; No. 429, 17 December 1957, p. 4; No. 437, 31 December 1957, pp. 2–3; No. 439, 2 January 1958, p. 3. See also Fikri Abaza, *Al-Musawwar*, No. 1738, 31 January 1958.

⁵⁵ Heikal, *Ma Aladhi*, p. 17. In an article published in *al-Ahram* on 9 February 1958, Heikal claimed that the original date for the proclamation of the union was postponed by five days so as not to coincide with the Baghdad Pact conference in Ankara and to avoid the impression that the union was a response to it.

⁵⁶ Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, p. 228.

⁵⁷ Bowker to FO, Tel. 223, 29 January 1958, VY10316/12, 134386. For more details on the discussions in Ankara concerning the union, see Tel. 195, 28 January

it became clear that the Western powers would not take the lead against the union, it was obvious that if any Arab initiative was undertaken at all, it would be limited.⁵⁸

The Arab Union, the UAR and the Pact

The idea of an association between Iraq and Jordan was raised, not for the first time,⁵⁹ during the Syrian crisis in the summer of 1957. Jordan's Foreign Minister Samir al-Rifa'i raised the possibility of an Iraqi-Jordanian federal union, but the idea was shelved when the crisis ended.⁶⁰ A renewed call came from King Hussein who considered the imminent Egyptian-Syrian union a danger to Jordan's independence. He hoped to include Saudi Arabia and other conservative countries in the plan. Early contacts about a possible association between Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia took place in November 1957, and the issue was explored further during Faysal's visit to Riyadh in early December 1957. Sa'ud, however, remained unwilling to commit himself.⁶¹ When the formation of the UAR appeared imminent (in January 1958), Hussein renewed his efforts to form a federation to offset it. Anxious to succeed, he was willing to accept a federation,

1958; VY10316/10, 134386. For more details concerning the conference itself, see Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 27, 12 February 1958, VB1072/70, 133916. On the American position, see Dulles to Certain Diplomatic Missions, Tel. 702, 1 February 1958, 674.83/2-158.

⁵⁸ It was claimed that Nuri called for military action against the UAR at the Ankara conference and that this was the main reason for his visit in London in June 1958. See Abubaker Saad, *Iraq and Arab Politics: The Nuri As-Said Era, 1941-58* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1987), pp. 274-75. The author based his evidence mainly on *Mahkamat al-Sha'b*, Vol. VI, pp. 2473-74. According to Dulles, Nuri asserted that the UAR "must be opposed," but he did not know exactly how. See Ankara to Secretary of State, Tel. 30, 29 January 1957, 674.83/1-2958. While visiting Washington in December 1957, Nuri had suggested Iraqi military intervention in Syria, with Jordanian support, in order to unseat the Communist-oriented regime. See "Position Paper on Nuri's Plan for Syria," 15 January 1958, 783.00/1-1558. See also Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, p. 503.

⁵⁹ For early attempts at unification between Iraq and Jordan, see Porath, Ch. 1; Abubaker Saad, pp. 173-209.

⁶⁰ FO to Amman, Tel. 1782, 29 August 1957, VJ10393/5, 127898; Johnston to FO, Tel. 1420, 5 September 1957, VJ10393/5A, 127898.

⁶¹ Wright to FO, Tel. 1456, 27 November 1957, 128047; Johnston to FO, Tel. 1647, 24 November 1957, VJ10325/18, 127892; Tel. 1698, 27 November 1957, VJ10325/19, 127892; Wright to FO, Tel. 1530, 12 December 1957, VQ10325/17, 128047.

confederation or even a treaty of friendship and cooperation—anything short of a complete merger.

Iraq immediately agreed to discuss a confederation between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan, or a bilateral treaty between Iraq and Jordan. Perceiving an opportunity at last to gain a foothold in Syria, 'Abd al-Allah approached the Americans and British in early February 1958 about military intervention in Syria. He claimed that the Iraqi government had decided unanimously to take immediate measures "to change [the] course of events in Syria." Iraq was prepared to take military action to aid tribal and urban groups in bringing down the regime, he said, but Baghdad needed American and British assurances of support. The State Department was quick to shatter 'Abd al-Allah's illusions. The US and Iraq, Dulles responded, "would find themselves in an extremely difficult position if they should move overtly to break up [the] union without dependable assurance of public and official support of non-union Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia." If, however, "neighbors of Syria should feel compelled, in the face of provocations from Syria, to take action justifiable as self-defensive under Article 51 of the UN Charter, we would provide political support and aid in the form of material."⁶² Though 'Abd al-Allah has had wide latitude in interpreting the terms "provocations" and "self-defense," he understood that military intervention was not a viable option.

Sa'ud's response was to caution against rushing into a federation without completing the necessary groundwork. He also made his endorsement of the plan conditional on Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact—a convenient pretext to evade the issue. Iraq and Jordan, though not surprised by Sa'ud's inclination to stay on the fence, were nonetheless determined to ensure his political support even if he refused to actually join them.⁶³ Nuri was anxious for Kuwait to participate in the new association so it would take upon itself some of the economic burden of propping up Jordan. The Kuwaiti ruler, however, supported by Britain, managed to resist the Iraqi pressure.⁶⁴

⁶² Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 1283, 6 February 1958, 674.83/2-658; Dulles to Baghdad, Tel. 2050, 8 February 1958, 674.83/2-658. The British response is unknown.

⁶³ Johnston to FO, Tel. 115, 4 February 1958, VJ1071/7, 134036; Johnston to FO, Tel. 141, 9 February 1958, V1072/10, 133813; Caccia to FO, Tel. 269, 7 February 1958, V1072/6, 133813.

⁶⁴ The first proposal to bring Kuwait into the union was made following the Iraqi government meeting on 4 February, Wright to FO, Tel. 162, 5 February

King Faysal arrived in Amman on 11 February 1958, to discuss the details of the proposed union, joined soon thereafter by the Iraqi crown prince and chief-of-staff. Three days later the federation between Jordan and Iraq—termed the Arab Union (*al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi*)—was formed.⁶⁵ Two particularly thorny issues had come to the fore during the negotiations: Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact, and the question of who was to head the union. Hussein and Rifa‘i insisted upon Iraq’s withdrawal from the pact as a prerequisite for their association. Hussein feared that otherwise Jordan would be accused of “indirect” membership in the pact and might thus face the risk of a repetition of the December 1955 riots. “If you had been here then,” Hussein told Johnston, you “would know what an inflammatory subject this was to Jordan opinion.”⁶⁶ Iraq, backed by the Foreign Office, ruled out withdrawing from the pact, but agreed to reconsider its position before the five-year expiration date in light of the international situation as it would then be. Furthermore, it pointed out, Article 3 of the Union Charter stipulated in any case that international commitments made before its inception would remain binding only upon the party having undertaken them originally.⁶⁷

The second issue was resolved by Hussein’s calculated cession of the Federation’s leadership to Faysal. Sa‘ud, meanwhile, dragged his feet until the federation had become a *fait accompli*, and then made

1958, VY10316/37, 134386. On the correspondence between Britain, Iraq and Kuwait on this subject, see Wright to FO, Tel. 163, 5 February 1958, V1072/1, 133813; Tel. 171, 6 February 1958, V1072/4, 133813; Tel. 172, 6 February 1958; Burrows (Bahrain) to FO, Tel. 155, 9 February 1958, V1072/13, 133813; Wright to FO, Tel. 343, 1 March 1958, V1072/39, 133813; Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 34, 25 February 1958, VJ10393/64, 134025.

⁶⁵ The term *ittihad* in Arabic can be translated either as federation or union. The British ambassador and the Iraqi foreign minister decided at the last moment to change the translation from the “Arab Federation” to the “Arab Union”—a more appealing term both to the Arab and the Western public. See Wright to FO, Tel. 250, 18 February 1958, VJ10393/33, 134024; Johnston to FO, Tel. 156, 14 February 1958, VJ10393/6, 134023. On the negotiations between Iraq and Jordan, see Johnston to FO, Tel. 151, 14 February 1958, VJ1072/17, 133813; Tel. 156, 14 February 1958, VJ10393/6, 134023; Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 34, 25 February 1958, VJ10393/64, 134025.

⁶⁶ Johnston to FO, Tel. 141, 9 February 1958, V1072/10, 133813.

⁶⁷ On the Arab Union, see Johnston to FO, Tel. 129, 6 February 1958, V1072/5, 133813; Tel. 121, 5 February 1958, V1072/2, 133813; Tel. 151, 12 February 1958, V1072/17, 133813; Tel. 175, 17 February 1958, VJ10393/24, 134024; Wright to Lloyd, Dispatch 34, 25 February 1958, VJ10393/64, 134025. For the text of the Arab Union, see *BBC*, No. 477, 15 February 1958, pp. 6–8.

it clear that he had no intention of joining in the near future.⁶⁸ His attitude gave a clear indication of the elusive nature of the royalist coalition. Although, like Faysal and Hussein, he thought of the UAR as a threat to the Arab monarchies, he was unwilling to risk associating with the rival union. As Safran put it: "it was clear to Saud that his country would lose its independence if it joined the UAR, would be threatened by the UAR if it joined its rival, and would be vulnerable and isolated if it did neither."⁶⁹ The third option seeming the lesser evil, he adhered to a policy of ostensible, but rather warped, neutrality in Arab affairs.

Although Hashemite–Saudi rivalry no longer loomed over Arab politics, the two dynasties were not to enjoy for a long time the fruits of their accommodation. Sa‘ud’s financial and domestic standing deteriorated; he was forced to terminate his annual subsidy to Hussein and withdraw his units from Jordan. In addition, he was engaged in a power struggle with Crown Prince Faysal. In the end, Sa‘ud’s fate was sealed by his alleged association with the abortive coup in Syria of March 1958, which also included a scheme to assassinate ‘Abd al-Nasir. Subsequently, the Saudi ‘*ulama*’ forced him to transfer his powers to Faysal who was known for his sympathy with, and admiration for, the Egyptian regime.⁷⁰ Sa‘ud remained king, but his influence was severely curtailed.

Iraq’s Withdrawal from the Pact

Western observers began to regard Iraq’s withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact as imminent and the days of the pact itself as numbered. In the spring of 1958, France took advantage of the atmosphere of uncertainty to air the idea of a Western Mediterranean organization, similar to one broached by Britain as far back as 1949.⁷¹ The Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact, on the other hand, discussed the possibility of reviving the Sa‘adabad Pact by establishing

⁶⁸ Johnston to FO, Tel. 175, 17 February 1958, VJ10393/24, 134024; Wright to FO, Tel. 341, 1 March 1958, V1072/35, 133813; *al-Hayat*, 27 February–1 March 1958.

⁶⁹ Safran, p. 85.

⁷⁰ For the events in Saudi Arabia, see *ibid.*, pp. 85–88. See also D. Holden & R. Jones, *The House of Saud* (London: 1982), pp. 198–201; Heikal, *Ma Aladhi*, p. 42; *al-Ahram*, 6 March 1958.

⁷¹ Smith (FO) to Gough (DO), 8 April 1958, J1074/32, 131194.

a federation or confederation between Iran and Pakistan, subsequently to be joined by Turkey and Afghanistan.⁷² Neither notion was realistic, but the discussion signaled to the Western powers that the Baghdad Pact was indeed at a low ebb, and that drastic measures were required to shore it up. However, despite American and British opposition to any plan which jeopardized the pact, the powers inexplicably failed to take any initiative to bolster it.⁷³

Meanwhile, the Iraqi coup of 14 July 1958, which caused the assassination of Faysal, 'Abd al-Allah and Nuri al-Sa'ïd, precipitated the disintegration of the Baghdad Pact.⁷⁴ Its leader, 'Abd al-Karim al-Qasim, proclaimed Iraq a Republic. Ironically, that day, Faysal, 'Abd al-Allah and Nuri were engaged in preparations for a meeting of Baghdad Pact heads of state in Istanbul.⁷⁵ The conferees were forced to drop the planned agenda and instead take up the possible ramifications of the coup. The participants sent an urgent request to the US, asking to implement the Eisenhower Doctrine with regard to Iraq.⁷⁶

Although initially the new Iraqi regime signaled a policy of global neutrality—withdrawal from the Arab Union with Jordan, public declaration of support for the UAR, and the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union—Qasim avoided any open rift with the West and stated that he would honor Iraq's international commitments, including the Baghdad Pact. The West was expected to think of the military coup as a purely "internal affair."⁷⁷ Britain,

⁷² On the idea of replacing the Baghdad Pact with the Sa'adabad Pact, see Chancery Ankara to Eastern Department, 16 April 1958, V1075/2, 133819; Caccia to FO, Tel. 903, 17 April 1958, VB10393/9, 133912; Symon's Minute following his conversation with the Pakistani Prime Minister, 25 April 1958, V1075/3, 133819. The Foreign Office notified the State Department that Iraq had no intention of withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact, Tel. 2101, 18 April 1958, VB10393/9, 133912.

⁷³ American ambassadors were instructed by the State Department not to take any action which might weaken the Pact, see Caccia to FO, Tel. 922, 18 April 1958, VB10393/9, 133912.

⁷⁴ On the Iraqi coup, see Dann, p. 19ff; Gallman, pp. 200–18; Marr, p. 153ff; *Majzarat Qasr Rihab: Tahqiq Suhufi an Masra' al-Ustra al-Hashimiyya al-Malika Yaum 14 Tamuz, 1958, fi Baghdad* (Beirut: 1960); M. Khadduri, *Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958* (London: 1969), p. 15ff.

⁷⁵ On the preparatory meeting in Istanbul, see General-Consul Istanbul to FO, Tel. 110, 6 July 1958, VB1072/131, 133917; Tel. 111, 7 July 1958, VB1072/131B, 133917; Bowker to Lloyd, Dispatch 81, 18 July 1958, VB1072/169, 133918.

⁷⁶ Bowker to FO, Tel. 1105, 16 July 1958, VJ1015/42, 133791. For the text of their appeal, see Tel. 1106, VJ1015/42A. On the Powers' response, see N.J. Ashton, "A Great New Venture? Anglo-American Cooperation in the Middle East and the Response to the Iraqi Revolution July 1958," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 59–89.

⁷⁷ Wright (from emergency headquarters in a Baghdad hotel following the

despite its close relations with the *ancien régime*, and the horror over the bloody massacres, was determined not to lose what remained of its influence. A lucid assessment sent by the Foreign Office to Washington only four days after the coup was particularly illuminating:

The first statements of the new Iraqi junta government are not discouraging . . . rather the opposite. They have been hinting that they might stand by their obligations which means, if anything, the Baghdad Pact. We must not allow our horror and resentment at the murders of our friends to stand in the way of the longer-term interests of the world. We cannot even help our dead friends by so-doing.⁷⁸

Iraq remained in the pact with the concurrence of the other members, but did no longer take any part in its activities. Realizing that the pact had become anachronistic, Britain and the US discussed the possibility of changing its name, reorganizing it, or even setting up an alternative organization. However, Britain persistently resisted any decision that might be used by Iraq as a pretext to officially withdraw from the pact. From the British point of view, so long as Iraq remained a member, the umbrella clause concerning the use of Iraqi installations in wartime was still legally binding. As late as January 1959, in response to an American attempt to recast the pact, Prime Minister Macmillan insisted that "it is a mistake to abandon a game until it is absolutely lost."⁷⁹ However, two months later, on 24 March 1959, when the US signed separate bilateral defense agreements with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, Qasim officially announced Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, thus sealing its fate.⁸⁰ Ever since, this date has been marked in Iraq as "Liberation Day." The remaining members renamed the pact "Central Treaty Organization" (CENTO), with Ankara replacing Baghdad as its headquarters.⁸¹

revolution) to FO, Tel. 15, 20 July 1958, VQ1015/112, 134300; Baghdad to Secretary of State, Tel. 216, 18 July 1958, 687.00/7-1858.

⁷⁸ FO to Washington, Tel. 4792, 18 July 1958, PREM11/2368.

⁷⁹ FO to Washington, Tel. 236, 13 January 1959, EB10345/54, 132921.

⁸⁰ Legally, a member of the pact had to notify withdrawal six months before the pact expired (Article 7). In other words, Iraq should have announced its February 1960 withdrawal in August 1959. For the text of the announcement, see Muhi al-Din, Appendix III, pp. 443-45. The reason for the timing of the statement was not clear: it might have been prompted by domestic repercussions of the suppression of the Shawwaf revolt in Mosul, or it might have been a reaction to the bilateral agreements signed between the US and other members of the pact.

⁸¹ Iran's withdrawal from CENTO in February 1979, following Khomeini's revolution, led to the abolishment of CENTO.

CONCLUSIONS

The Baghdad Pact—the origins, structure and history of which have been the subject of the preceding pages—was meant by the West to become part of its containment policy *vis-à-vis* the USSR, much like NATO and SEATO, further west and east. But rather than serving that purpose it turned, in Dulles' words, into “a forum for Arab politics and intrigue.”¹ Only indirectly reflecting the Cold War, it came instead to stand for struggle between two states with hegemonial aspirations in the Arab world: Egypt and Iraq.

Based on their geographic location, their various capabilities, their role perception, and their different interpretations of pan-Arabism, the two vied for Arab hegemony. Their struggle can be seen as an extension of the old rivalry between the Nile and the Euphrates valleys; yet the contemporary competition had features of its own. While 'Abd al-Nasir viewed the pact as an Iraqi attempt to diminish Egypt's influence and isolate it in the Arab world, Nuri al-Sa'id thought of it as a powerful instrument to enhance Iraq's position, supercede the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and protect it from the Soviets. The ensuing conflict encompassed the entire Arab system, making other Arab states its battleground. The struggle also had significant ramifications for Iraq, accelerating the process that eventually led to the downfall of the Hashemite monarchy.

The struggle over the Baghdad Pact reflected also an ideological clash between two worldviews. Both Iraq and Egypt considered themselves the standard-bearers of pan-Arabism whose mission was to unite the Arab world. However, while the old Iraqi elite regarded Britain as an ally and the Baghdad Pact as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism, the younger Egyptian leadership perceived Britain as a hostile colonial power and the pact as an “imperialist device” aimed at perpetuating Western hegemony in the Middle East. The former therefore felt that the pact was an instrument potentially helpful to attaining unity; the latter thought of it as altogether deleterious to the cause of pan-Arabism. The second view became the “wave of the future” and was thus conducive in crystallizing those precepts of

¹ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, p. 275.

pan-Arabism, which 'Abd al-Nasir made into the most powerful Arab ideology of the mid-50s.

In addition, the deep-seated animosity between Nuri al-Sa'id and 'Abd al-Nasir, the representatives of two different generations, gave the conflict a personal coloration. "This mortal struggle," observed Iraqi historian Khaldun al-Husry, "could only end in the destruction of one side or the other."² Indeed it did: Nuri, the Iraqi king and the crown prince were savagely slaughtered in the 1958 military coup, while, for about a decade, 'Abd al-Nasir became the perceived leader of the Arab world and the champion of the Arab cause.

Contrasting with the continuity in inter-Arab relations during 1945–54, the struggle over the Baghdad Pact caused significant changes in the structure of the system and the patterns of inter-Arab relations. These can be summarized as follows:

- (1) The two major issues that had hitherto preoccupied the Arab world—the Palestinian problem and the Saudi–Hashemite conflict—were relegated to a secondary place and replaced by two more immediate problems: the question of regional defense and the Israeli threat. The defense problem affected the Arab system as a whole, while the Arab–Israeli conflict mainly remained a matter between Israel and its neighbors.
- (2) The ability of the Arab League to play an effective role in defusing Arab problems was considerably curtailed. This trend went back to the late 1940s, but became more pronounced during the mid-1950s. The League, located in Cairo and headed by an Egyptian secretary-general, had become an Egyptian tool—and as such was resented by Iraq and other Arab states. Failing to obtain Arab support for his policy at the prime ministers' conference in January 1955, 'Abd al-Nasir realized that he could no longer rely on the League as a tool in his foreign policy. Major Arab problems thus came to be dealt with in other frameworks. Also, Lebanon's entanglement in the struggle over the Baghdad Pact diminished its ability to fill its traditional role of mediation in Arab politics.
- (3) Consequently, new patterns of inter-Arab relations were created, or previous patterns revived. Their principal features were:

² K. al-Husry, "The Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958," Part II, *Middle East Forum*, Vol. 41 (Winter 1965), p. 25.

- a. As attempts to solve Arab disputes shifted to contacts behind the scenes, Arab emissaries and Western ambassadors became increasingly the primary conduits between Arab leaders.
 - b. Media propaganda bypassing governments and reaching out directly to the masses, became effective as weapon in political conflicts. The Egyptian revolutionary regime, in particular, utilized its propaganda apparatus to undermine Iraq's policies. Such campaign stirred up the Arab masses and played a significant role in inflaming Arab emotions.
 - c. Subversive activities—bribing journalists and politicians, and carrying out clandestine operations to topple unfriendly regimes—were carried out through special emissaries, military attachés and even ambassadors. This had already been a familiar aspect of Arab politics in the past, but it reached unprecedented proportions during the struggle over the Baghdad Pact.
 - d. Military force was used for the first time by one Arab state against another. Although Iraq's rulers had often threatened to intervene in Syria in order to "restore order" and establish a friendly regime, Western opposition had always prevented them from doing so. The landing of Egyptian troops in Latakia in October 1957, while in accordance with the October 1955 military agreement between Egypt and Syria, was a new phenomenon in inter-Arab relations.
- (4) A major polarization developed between the two contenders for Arab hegemony—Iraq and Egypt. Past disputes had never resulted in such all-out confrontations. The struggle over the Baghdad Pact, however, caused the deepest schism ever in the Arab world after WW II. Arab states other than Egypt and Iraq were reluctantly dragged into the struggle, becoming battlegrounds for the chief contenders. This was particularly true of Syria and Jordan. After some vacillation Syria joined Egypt, while Jordan managed to remain in the narrow space between the Arab blocs.
- (5) The struggle over the Baghdad Pact attested to the flexibility of coalitions in the Arab world. The 1955 tripartite coalition of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, formed to oppose Iraq's membership in the pact, soon fell apart again after the Suez War. 'Abd al-Nasir's growing influence prompted the monarchies—Iraqi, Jordanian and Saudi Arabia—tacitly supported by Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan, to form a new coalition against Egypt and Syria, and thus achieve a new equilibrium in the Arab system.

The establishment of the UAR, and the coup in Iraq again transformed the pattern of Arab alliances. Significantly, these structural changes were only indirectly related to international events. If from a Western perspective the Baghdad Pact was aimed at containing the Soviet threat, this had very little to do with the formation or disbandment of Arab coalitions; rather, they were chiefly a product of intricate inter-Arab shifts.³

But the struggle for hegemony in the Arab world was not limited to a specific period of time, nor did it stem from the whims of a particular leader. Rather, it was a prolonged, encompassing struggle between Egypt and Iraq, each claiming primacy on the strength of their geographic location and their various capabilities (see Ch. 1). American Ambassador in Cairo Henry Byroade once remarked that “the Egyptians think about their leadership chiefly when they believe it is challenged.”⁴ Indeed, ‘Abd al-Nasir perceived the Baghdad Pact as a Western move to promote Iraq’s claims and as an extension of Iraq’s old Fertile Crescent scheme. From an Egyptian perspective, the success of any pact centered on Baghdad would signal that the Middle Eastern center of gravity had moved there, leaving Egypt isolated. This was an especially potent threat in light of Israel’s growing military might. However, hegemony has eluded both Egypt and Iraq; although ‘Abd al-Nasir became the recognized leader of the Arab world since the disintegration of the Baghdad Pact, he was unable to impose his will on certain recalcitrant actors (i.e. Iraq).

The Arab struggle over the Baghdad Pact began in Syria and Lebanon, moved on to Jordan, continued in Morocco and Tunisia, and ended, finally, in Saudi Arabia. Unlike Seale’s view that “Syria held the key to the struggle for local primacy,” the Baghdad Pact episode clearly shows that domination of Syria’s political system did not signal Egyptian hegemony. The subsequent battle over Jordan, in December 1955, was, in fact, more decisive in that Jordan, for all its being a pro-Western state linked with Britain and Iraq, refrained from joining the pact under Egyptian and Saudi pressure. This was an ominous sign for the pact’s members. However, Iraq—unable or

³ Y. Evron & Y. Bar Simantov, “Coalitions in the Arab World,” *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1 (Winter 1975), pp. 71–91; A. Yaniv, “Alliance Politics in the Middle East: A Security Dilemma Perspective,” in A. Braun (ed.), *The Middle East in Global Strategy* (Boulder: 1987), p. 140.

⁴ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XII, p. 221.

unwilling to assess the grave consequences of the Jordanian affair—kept up its pressure to bring in some of the peripheral Arab countries. Only after the Suez War did Baghdad realize that the pact was no longer a viable tool to improve its Arab position. Still, Iraq's efforts to detach Saudi Arabia from Egypt were made in the hope that eventually Sa'ud would consider it in his interest to join the pact. Iraq partially succeeded in winning over Sa'ud, but he remained unwilling to antagonize 'Abd al-Nasir by joining the Baghdad Pact.

In retrospect, it would appear that the battle over Amman, and not Damascus, was the main turning point in the struggle over the Baghdad Pact. If Jordan had seemed to be relegated to a secondary role after King Abdallah's death in 1951, the Baghdad Pact period showed that it was still capable of moving to center stage in the Arab system.

While the notion of establishing a Middle Eastern defense organization originated in the West, the Turco-Iraqi Pact—the nucleus of the Baghdad Pact—clearly derived from a regional impetus. In the early 1950s, the Western powers made several abortive attempts to establish a Middle Eastern organization meant to contain the Soviet threat. The West assumed that the Arab states would be eager to assist, and would provide the necessary military facilities. Only Egypt was offered the status of founder member because of the strategic importance of the Suez base. However, successive Egyptian governments adamantly refused to cooperate with the Western powers prior to a revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The Western powers came to understand that they had misjudged Egypt's resolve to oppose Western schemes as long as Britain's withdrawal had not been completed. Likewise, the West had underestimated Egypt's capability to use its political leverage in Arab politics to foil Western plans even at a time when inter-Arab rivalries existed. In June 1953, Dulles decided to dissociate himself from the British and pursue a new policy based on the "Northern Tier," thereby skirting the problem of the Suez base. The US thus opened the way for Turkey and Iraq to lay the groundwork for the Baghdad Pact. Although Kerr maintained that only from 1959 onward did "the crucial decisions governing Arab affairs lay in Arab hands,"⁵ the Baghdad Pact episode, like the formation of the Arab League back in 1945, clearly showed that

⁵ Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, p. 5.

major decisions were made by the Arabs during a period when extensive Western involvement in the Middle East was still a fact of life.

Since the early 1950s, Nuri was doggedly at work to establish a regional defense pact based in Baghdad, but all his efforts were being blocked by Egypt or the Western powers. Only in February 1955, he succeeded in concluding a pact with Turkey which in turn became the basis of the Baghdad Pact. Fear of the USSR constituted an important ingredient in his thinking, but his primary goals were to achieve Arab hegemony and to revise the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. These aims could not have been realized by Iraq joining the US-backed Turco-Pakistani Agreement of 1954. The pact with Iraq was equally important for Turkey in its plans to seize a more central position in global and regional affairs. Moreover, Prime Minister Menderes played an important role in keeping negotiations going whenever Nuri showed signs of weakening under Arab pressure.

Britain's grand design since the end of WWII had been the formation of a regional defense organization under its leadership, guaranteeing it access to several Arab bases in the event of a global war. With the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in October 1954, the British at last realized that, the strategic importance of the Suez base notwithstanding, Egypt would not lead, or even participate in, a Western-led regional defense pact. While still careful not to alienate the Egyptians, the Foreign Office adopted a modified version of Dulles' Northern Tier concept. This meant that although London would still oppose Iraq's accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, it would support independent Iraqi initiatives. This policy gave Nuri and Menderes wide latitude to proceed with their own plans. Once the two leaders had taken the initiative, Britain, and to a lesser extent the US, gave their blessing. But then, as soon as Britain itself became a member of the Turco-Iraqi Pact (in April 1955), it could not help assuming its leadership.

By contrast, American policy-makers viewed Middle Eastern defense entirely through the prism of the Northern Tier concept, hoping that Iraq would join the first link forged there—that between Turkey and Pakistan. Since the US failed to fully grasp either British or Iraqi interests, the State Department was caught by surprise by the Turco-Iraqi Pact. Dulles found himself incapable of opposing a pact directed against the Soviet threat, but he resented Britain's role. "It looks as though the UK had grabbed the ball on the Northern-Tier policy," he complained shortly after the conclusion of the pact, "and

was running away with it.”⁶ Despite pressure by the pact’s members, he refused to join, asserting that “the British have taken it over and run it as an instrument of British policy.”⁷ However, the reasons for the US staying outside—although supporting it politically—were more complex. American accession would have jeopardized the Alpha Plan for an Egyptian–Israeli accommodation, would have unnecessarily antagonized both ‘Abd al-Nasir and King Sa‘ud, and prompted Israel to demand security guarantees. In the end, however, American attempts to please everybody only caused frustration and resentment.

Scholars have viewed the Anglo–Egyptian Agreement and the struggle against the Baghdad Pact as a watershed in Egypt’s Arab policy. The period between July 1952 and October 1954 has even been described as Egypt’s “splendid isolation.”⁸ However, while these events of 1954–55 certainly intensified Egypt’s involvement in Arab affairs, they hardly represented a turning point. Egypt’s interests in the Arab world had remained essentially constant from the founding of the Arab League onward, although in the early 1950s Egypt was greatly preoccupied with domestic problems. Even then, however, it vigorously opposed all Iraqi attempts to lead regional defense arrangements, which, it feared, would isolate Egypt, challenge its perceived leadership role, and jeopardize its bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the British. Egypt’s opposition to the MEC, the MEDO and to Iraq’s accession to the Turco–Pakistani Agreement were cases in point. But the subsequent conclusion of the Anglo–Egyptian Agreement and ‘Abd al-Nasir’s fierce fight against the Baghdad Pact further intensified Egypt’s involvement in Arab affairs.

‘Abd al-Nasir was not averse to tacit cooperation with the West, so long as no strings were attached to his military requests and a modified ACSP was accepted as the basis for regional defense. These terms remained firm and consistent throughout the period under review. ‘Abd al-Nasir probably thought that this position would help secure Arab hegemony and guarantee a flow of Western arms without exposing him to accusations of collaborating with imperialism. His independent stance both surprised and alarmed the Western powers, accustomed to deal with docile Arab leaders. The West, in

⁶ *FRUS*, 1955–57, Vol. XIV, p. 118.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. XII, p. 270.

⁸ Dekmejian, p. 42. See also Dawisha, p. 11; Vatikiotis, “Egyptian Foreign Policy,” p. 341.

turn, made a series of miscalculated moves, especially backing the Turco–Iraqi Pact and procrastinating on the question of arms supply. These further alienated Egypt from the West. ‘Abd al-Nasir himself traced the deterioration in US–Egyptian relations to the Baghdad Pact.⁹ However, Egypt’s drift toward neutralism cannot be solely accounted for by the struggle against the pact; it had as much to do with ‘Abd al-Nasir’s formative years when Egypt was under British control. Neutralism seemed a natural choice in the post-colonial era for a generation that had long been preoccupied with foreign domination. It was the colonial experience along with the spin-off from the Cold War which made Egypt and large parts of the Arab world averse to any formal ties with the West.

While Egypt was constantly preoccupied with the Israeli menace, Iraq was more concerned with forming a security belt against the USSR. Turkey, with its strong army and its status as a member of NATO, was its natural choice for a partner. The two countries had in the past been linked by the Sa‘adabad Pact (1937), and a friendship and cooperation agreement (1946). While the pact of February 1955 (later the Baghdad Pact) was a stronger commitment toward Turkey, it was consistent with Iraq’s desire to seek regional allies against a possible threat from the north.

Another major element of Iraq’s foreign policy was its close association with Britain. Ties between the Hashemites, the Sharifians and the British had been forged as far back as WWI and the Arab Revolt. So long as the Hashemite and Sharifian elite remained in power, British influence was assured. Furthermore, the 1930 Anglo–Iraqi Treaty guaranteed British control over Iraq’s military installations and airfields. Yet the agreement constituted a constant reminder of foreign domination and was continuously under attack by Iraqi nationalists. In an attempt to assuage public opinion, the palace tried (in 1948) to replace it with the Portsmouth Treaty, a new version of the old treaty, revised in favor of Iraq. However, the subsequent riots led Regent ‘Abd al-illah to revoke it. Seven years later, a new agreement was signed within the framework of the Turco–Iraqi Pact. Britain joined the pact in exchange for terminating the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty, but continued to have use of Iraqi military installations under the terms of the new agreement. The pact thus served, among other

⁹ RG 59, Cairo to Secretary of State, Tel. 891, 26 September 1956, 674.00/9–2656.

things, to camouflage for the revision of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty. The Arab public, however, was not deceived and viewed Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact as a continuation of Western imperial domination in a different guise.

Nuri al-Sa’id, despite his unpopularity in Iraq, was considered a strong and talented leader. He worked closely with the Hashemite court to expand Iraq’s sphere of influence, Damascus being their primary target. Failing to persuade the British to back his Fertile Crescent scheme in 1943, Nuri devoted himself to establishing an Arab League under Iraqi leadership. He was sorely disappointed when Egypt took over his initiative and the League headquarters were located in Cairo. Nuri long harbored resentment against the British for allowing this to happen.¹⁰ He subsequently viewed a regional defense pact centered on Baghdad as a powerful countermeasure to Egyptian domination of the League. Such a pact, he believed, would attract other Arab states, leading to Egypt’s isolation and eventually to the League’s disintegration. In 1953, at the age of 65, Nuri probably sensed that his last chance to attain Arab hegemony was arriving and was therefore, for the first time, willing to risk an open showdown with Egypt. The Baghdad Pact, then, can be seen as a modified version of the Fertile Crescent scheme, aimed at achieving the same end by different means. Nuri displayed impressive political skill in forming the pact, which combined three goals that he had pursued for many years: achieving Arab hegemony, revising the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty, and confronting the Soviet threat. Unfortunately for him, the first goal eluded him to the end.

The military coup in July 1958 ended the struggle between Egypt and Iraq over the Baghdad Pact, bringing total defeat to Iraq and devastation to the monarchy. Iraq withdrew from the pact in March 1959 and it was renamed CENTO. Yet the term “Baghdad Pact” entered Arab political parlance as denoting imperialism, foreign domination and betrayal of the Arab cause—an expression frequently used by ‘Abd al-Nasir and other Arab nationalists in their speeches.¹¹ With the termination of the pact and the formation of the UAR, Egypt

¹⁰ Wright to FO, Tel. 74, 17 January 1957, V1023/3, 125426.

¹¹ See examples in these speeches: 22 July 1958, 27 July, 3 September, 27 November, 23 December; 15 March 1959, 30 March, 25 April, 3 November; 10 January 1960, 19 February, 22 February, 3 March; 5 October 1961, 23 December; 22 July 1963, 23 December, *President Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s Speeches and Press-interviews, 1958–1963* (Cairo: n.d.).

acquired a semi-hegemonial regional status, having sufficient power to dominate the overall Arab system, but lacking the ability to impose its will on recalcitrant players such as Iraq. Despite the 1958 transformation of Iraq's political system, its economic and military capabilities remained almost intact. Significantly, the competition for Arab hegemony did not die out with the pact's demise, but rather continued and even intensified. "By the end of the year [1958]," wrote Kerr, "relations between Iraq and the UAR were even worse than they had been in the days of the old regime."¹² Nuri was replaced by Qasim, the monarchy was replaced by a republic, and the Baghdad Pact was replaced by other critical problems. But the quest for hegemony in the Arab world, so trenchantly reflected in the 1950s in the struggle between Egypt and Iraq, remained a dominant theme in Arab politics for years to come.

¹² Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, p. 17.

EPILOGUE

RECALLING NURI AL-SA'ID SPIRIT*

Nizar Qabani

“In the name of million Iraqis you murdered . . .
“With your bare hands
“In the name of the Pact written with your people’s blood
“All over
“And Allah does not pity neither you nor the Pact
“In the name of the English Lord whom you worshiped
“And the conscious you never knew
“And the loaf of bread you stole from the mouths of your people
“In the name of the Arab nation rejuvenated by the struggle against
the pacts
“In the name of beloved Baghdad
“Harbor of the gemmed stars and waterfalls of sweetness
“In her name . . . the one who sounded the first note of Arabism
“Let me talk
“It is possible for us to talk
“Oh, Agent of the night, of terror and blood
“It is possible for us to smile
“We are in your palace . . . in its corridors
The wealth we see inflames us like a volcano”

* Translated from the Arabic, *Al-Musawwar*, 31 October 1958.

APPENDIX ONE

PACT OF MUTUAL COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND TURKEY*

Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood concluded between His Majesty the King of Baghdad Iraq and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on March 29, 1946, which recognised the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies;

Whereas article II of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation between the Arab League States provides that no provision of that treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect, any of the rights and obligations accruing to the Contracting Parties from the United Nations Charter;

And having realised the greater responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling these aims, and for that purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty King Faisal II,

King of Iraq;

His Excellency al-Farik Nuri As-Said,

Prime Minister;

His Excellency Burhanuddin Bash-Ayan,

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs;

His Excellency Jalal Bayar,

President of the Turkish Republic,

* Source: Khalil, Vol. II, pp. 368-70

His Excellency Adnan Menderes,
Prime Minister;
His Excellency Professor Fuat Koprulu,
Minister for Foreign Affairs;

who having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

Article 2

In order to ensure the realisation and effect application of the co-operation provided for in article I above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States. They do not derogate from and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present pact.

Article 5

This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and

peace in this region and which is fully recognised by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date of which the instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with article I, with one or more States parties to the present pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Government of the parties concerned.

Article 6

A Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become parties to the pact.

The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

Article 7

This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties.

Article 8


This pact shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

In Witness whereof, the said plenipotentiaries have signed the present pact in Arabic, Turkish and English, all three texts being equally authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail.

Done in duplicate at Baghdad this second day of Rajab 1374 Hijri corresponding to the twenty-fourth of February 1955.

APPENDIX TWO

BAGHDAD PACT ORGANIZATION*



* Source: RG 59, Fritzlän (Baghdad) to the Department of State, 15 January 1957, 780.5/1-1557.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources

Public Record Office (PRO), London

- | | |
|--------|---|
| FO371 | Foreign Office: General Political Correspondence |
| FO141 | Egypt: Embassy and Consular Archives: Correspondence |
| FO195 | Turkey |
| FO624 | Iraq |
| FO816 | Jordan |
| FO953 | Foreign Office: Information Department |
| FO1018 | Lebanon |
| DEFE4 | Chief-of-Staff Committee Meetings |
| DEFE5 | Chief-of-Staff Memoranda |
| DEFE11 | Chief-of-Staff Committee: Registered Files |
| DEFE13 | Private Papers Office: Minister of Defence |
| CAB128 | CM (Cabinet Conclusions) (29–30) |
| | CC (Cabinet Conclusions) (26–28) (31) |
| CAB129 | CP (Cabinet Papers) Series |
| CAB130 | Ad-hoc Committees: Gen. & Misc. Series |
| CAB131 | Defence Committee |
| CAB134 | Official Committee on the Middle East (OME) |
| PREM8 | Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence & Papers, 1945–51 |
| PREM11 | Prime Minister's Office: 1952–57 |

The National Archives (NA), Washington

The Department of State Files

- | | |
|----------------|--|
| RG59 110.11–DU | Dulles' Correspondence |
| RG59 120.1580 | Richard's Mission |
| RG59 611.87 | US Relations with Iraq |
| RG59 682.83 | Iraqi–Syrian Relations |
| RG59 682.87 | Iraqi–Turkish Relations |
| RG59 684A.86 | The Arab–Israeli Dispute |
| RG59 740.5 | NATO and Middle East Defense |
| RG59 780.5 | The Baghdad Pact and Middle East Defense |
| RG59 786.00 | General Political Developments in the ME |
| RG59 787.00 | General Political Developments in Iraq |

General Records of the Department of State

- | | |
|------|-------------------------------|
| RG59 | Lot File No. 61 D 12 (Box 2) |
| RG59 | Lot File No. 61 D 43 (Box 2) |
| RG59 | Lot File No. 60 D 533 (Box 3) |
| RG59 | Lot File No. 60 D 58 |
| RG59 | Lot File No. 61 D 12 |

Israeli State Archive (ISA), Jerusalem

Israeli Foreign Office Files, 1948–58

Israeli Foreign Office Weekly Survey, *Bamizrah Hatikhon* ("In the Middle East"), 1952–57

*Private Papers and Oral History**St. Antony's College, Middle East Center, Oxford*

Chatham House Papers

File 3 RIIA Mediterranean Study Group—First Draft Report File 4 RIIA Mediterranean Study Group—Correspondence, Notes, Memoranda, 1956–57

File 1 RIIA Mediterranean Study Group—Reports 1–27, 31–41 (1956–57)

Glubb, Lt.-Gen. Sir J.A.—Memoranda, Reports, Telegrams and Correspondence Relating to Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, 1920s–50s.

E. Monroe's Papers—"Egyptian Efforts to Dominate the Arab World" (4/57: B.447[R]).

Rapp, Sir T.—Unpublished Memoirs Covering His Service.

Slade-Baker, Lt. Col. J.B.—Complete Set of Diaries, Dispatches and Memoranda Collected during his Service with the *Sunday Times*, 1952–65, Vols. I–X.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Christain A. Herter: Papers, 1957–61.

Oral History Interview with:

Winthrop Aldrich, October 16, 1972

George Allen, June 6 and June 8, 1972

Raymond Hare, June 16 and August 8, 1972

Loy Henderson, December 14, 1970

Robert D. Murphy, October 12, 1972

Charles Yost, September 13, 1978

Edited Collections of State Papers

Foreign Relations of the United States (*FRUS*). The Near and Middle East. 1949. Vol. VI. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977.

FRUS, The Near and Middle East. 1950. Vol. V. 1978.

FRUS, The Near East and Middle East. 1951. Vol. V. 1977.

FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, Part 1 & 2. 1986.

FRUS, 1955–57, Vol. XII, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq. 1991.

FRUS, 1955–57, Vol. XIII, Jordan–Yemen. 1990.

FRUS, 1955–57, Vol. XIV, Arab–Israeli Dispute, 1955. 1989.

FRUS, 1955–57, Vol. XV, Arab–Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956. 1989.

FRUS, 1955–57, Vol. XVI, Suez Crisis July 26–December 31, 1956. 1990.

Al-'Iraq, Wizarat al-Difa'. *Mahkamat al-Sha'b: Al-Mahkama al-'Askariyya al-'Ulya al-Khassa* (The People's Court: The Special Higher Military Trials). 22 vols. Baghdad: 1960–62.

United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs. *Economic Development in the Middle East*. New York:

1949/50–1952/53

1953/54–1956/57

1957/58–1961/63

United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*. Vols. 6–10 (1954–58). New York.

- United Nations, *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics*. 1958–59. New York.
 United Arab Republic, *Statistical Pocket-book, 1952–1962*. Cairo: 1963.
 Arab Republic of Egypt, *Statistical Yearbook 1952–1980*. Cairo: 1981.
Mukhtarat fi al-Ihsa'at al-'Amma lil-Gumhuriyya al-'Arabiyya al-Mutahhida, 1951/52–1965/66 (A Selection of Statistics of the United Arab Republic, 1951/52–1965–66).
 Cairo: 1966.

Unofficial Collections of Documents

- Al-'Alaqaq al-Lubnaniyya-al-Suriyya, 1943–1985: Waqa'i, Biblioghafia, Watha'iq* (Lebanese–Syrian Relations, 1943–1985: Events, Bibliography, Documents). 2 vols. Beirut: 1986.
Khutab wa-Tasrihat al-Ra'is Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir, 1952–1959 (Speeches and Statements by Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir, 1952–1959). Vol. V. Cairo: n.d.
 Al-Mahadir al-Siriyya lil-Ijtima' al-Rua'sa' (The Secret Protocols of the Prime Ministers Meeting). *Al-Ahram*, 5–6 August 1958.
President Gamal Abdul Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews. Cairo: 1958–63.
Qala al-Ra'is: Majmu'at Khutab wa-Ahadith al-Ra'is Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir (Thus Spoke the President: A Collection of Speeches and Interviews by 'Abd al-Nasir). Cairo: n.d.

Radio Broadcasts

- BBC (British World Broadcasts/The Middle East), 1954–58.
 Middle East News Agency, Weekly Review (MENA).
 Summary of Daily Arab Broadcasts (Hebrew):
 1954 (Vols. 299, 301, 303).
 1955 (Vols. 305, 307, 309, 311).
 1956 (Vols. 313, 315, 317, 319).

Newspapers

English

- The Daily Telegraph
 Egyptian Gazette
 Financial Times
 New York Herald Tribune
 The New York Times
 The Sunday Times
 The Times

Arabic and Hebrew

- Al-Ahram (Egypt)
 Al-Akhbar (Egypt)
 Akhbar al-Yawm (Egypt)
 Barda (Syria)
 Al-Difa' (Jordan)
 Al-Diyyar (Lebanon)
 Al-Fikha' (Syria)
 Filastin (Jordan)
 Al-Gumhuriyya (Egypt)

Ha'aretz (Israel)
 Al-Hayat (Lebanon)
 Al-Hawadith (Lebanon)
 Al-Jaridah (Lebanon)
 Al-Jihad (Jordan)
 Al-Masri (Egypt)
 Al-Musawwar (Egypt)
 Al-Nahar (Lebanon)
 Rose al-Yusuf (Egypt)
 Al-Sayyad (Lebanon)
 Al-Sha'b (Iraq)
 Al-Sha'b (Egypt)
 Zaman (Iraq)

Works in Arabic and Hebrew

- Abu al-Sa'ud, 'Abd al-Salam. *Hilf Baghdad* (The Baghdad Pact). Cairo: 1958.
- Ahmad, Youssef Ahmad. *Al-Sira'at al-'Arabiyya-al-'Arabiyya, 1945-1981* (The Inter-Arab Rivalries, 1945-1981). Cairo: 1988.
- 'Arab, Fouad. *Siyasat Lubnan al-Khariyya* (The Foreign Policy of Lebanon). Beirut: 1959.
- Appel, M. *Hayahasim ben Surya ve-Iraq, 1945-1958* (Relations between Syria and Iraq, 1945-1958). Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 1990.
- Al-'Arif, Ismail. *Asrar Thawrat 14 Tamuz wa-Ta'asis al-Gumhuriyya fi al-'Iraq* (The Secrets of the July 14 Revolution and the Formation of the Republic in Iraq). London: 1986.
- Al-Armanazi, Najib. *'Ashr Sanawat fi al-Diblumasiyya: Fi Samim al-Ahdath al-'Arabiyya al-Dawliyya* (Ten Years of Diplomacy: Amidst Arab and International Affairs). 2 vols. Beirut: 1964.
- Al-A'zami, Walid. *Nuri al-Sa'id wal-Sira' ma'a 'Abd al-Nasir* (Nuri al-Said and the Struggle Against 'Abd al-Nasir). Baghdad: 1988.
- Al-'Azm, Khalid. *Mudhakkarat Khalid al-'Azm* (The Memoirs of Khalid al-'Azm). 3 vols. Beirut: 1973.
- Baghdadi, 'Abd al-Latif. *Mudhakkarat 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi* (The Memoirs of 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi). Vol. I. Cairo: n.d.
- Basri, Meer. *Al-'Ulum al-Siyasiyya fi al-'Iraq al-Hadith* (Political Personalities in Modern Iraq). London: 1987.
- Al-Chadirchi, Kamel. *Min Awraq Kamel Chadirchi* (From the Papers of Kamel Chadirchi). Beirut: 1971.
- Al-Dajani, Ahmad. *'Abd al-Nasir wal-Thawra al-'Arabiyya* ('Abd al-Nasir and the Arab Revolution). Beirut: 1973.
- Darawza, I. *al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya* (Arab Unity). Cairo: 1957
- *Mashakil al-'Alam al-'Arabi* (The Problems of the Arab World). n.p.: n.d.
- Dawarah, Fouad. *Suqut Hilf Baghdad* (The Collapse of the Baghdad Pact). Cairo: 1958.
- Dishon, D. "Mediniyut Hahutz Shel Mishtar Hamahapecha Hamitzri" (The Foreign Policy of the Egyptian Revolutionary Regime). *Hamizrah Hehadash*. Vol. VII. 1956.
- Goren, A. *Haliga ha'arvit, 1945-1954* (The Arab League, 1945-1954). Tel Aviv: 1954.
- Ghali, Butros Butros. *Dirasat fi al-Diblumasiyya al-'Arabiyya* (Studies in Arab Diplomacy). Cairo: 1973.
- Ghali, Butrus Mirrit. *Siyasat al-Ghadd* (The Policy of Tomorrow). Cairo: 1944.
- Al-Hakim, Hasan. *Mudhakkarati: Safahat min Ta'rikh Suriyya al-Hadith, 1920-1958* (My

- Memoirs: Pages from Modern Syrian History, 1920–1958). 2 vols. Beirut: 1965–66.
- Hamdan, Jamal. *Shakhsīyyat Misr* (Egypt's Personality). Cairo: 1970.
- Hamrush, Ahmad. *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu: Mujtama' Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir* (The Story of the July 23rd Revolution: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir's Society). Vol. 2. Beirut: 1978.
- 'Abd al-Nasir wal-'Arab ('Abd al-Nasir and the Arabs). Vol. 3. Beirut: 1978.
- Al-Hasani, 'Abd al-Razzaq. *Ta'rikh al-Wizarat al-'Iraqiyya* (History of the Iraqi Cabinets). Vols. IX–X. Baghdad: 1988.
- Al-Hashimi, Taha. *Mudhakkarat Taha al-Hashimi, 1942–1955* (The Memoirs of Taha al-Hashimi, 1942–1955). Vol. II. Beirut: 1978.
- Heikal, Muhammad Hasanayn. *Ma Alladhi Jara fi Suriyya?* (What Happened in Syria?). Cairo: 1962.
- *Milaffat al-Sues* (Suez Files). Cairo: 1986.
- Al-Husri, Sati', *Mudhakkirati fi al-'Iraq, 1921–1941* (My Memorials in Iraq, 1921–1941). Vol. I. Beirut: 1967.
- Hussein, Fadil. *Suqut al-Nizam al-Malaki fi al-'Iraq* (The Downfall of the Royalist Iraqi Regime). n.p.: 1974.
- Kaba, Muhammad Mahdi. *Mudhakkirati ma'a Samim al-Ahdath, 1918–1958* (My Memoirs in the Midst of the Events, 1918–1958). Beirut: 1958.
- Khannah, Khalil. *Al-'Iraq, Amsuhu wa Ghaduhu* (Iraq, Its Past and Its Future). Beirut: 1966.
- Jamali, Fadil. *Dhikriyyat wal-'Ibar* (Recollections and Lessons). Beirut: 1964.
- *Al-'Iraq bayna Ams wal-Yawm*. Baghdad: 1954.
- *Al-'Iraq al-Hadith* (Modern Iraq). n.p.: n.d.
- Jawdat, 'Ali. *Dhikriyyat 'Ali Jawdat, 1900–1958* (The Memoirs of 'Ali Jawdat, 1900–1958). Beirut: 1967.
- Al-Madi, Munir & Musa, Suleiman. *Ta'rikh al-Urdun fi al-Qarn al-'Ishrin* (The History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century). n.p.: 1959.
- Al-Majali, Hazza'. *Mudhakkirati* (My Memoirs). Al-Quds: 1960.
- *Hadha Bayan Lil-Nas: Qissat Muhadathat Templer* (A Note to the People: The Story of Templer's discussions. n.p.: n.d.
- Majzarat Qasr al-Rihab: Tahqiq Sahafi 'an Masra' al-Usra al-Hashimiyya al-Malika, Yawm 14 Tamuz 1958 fi Baghdad* (The Massacre at Rihab Palace: A Journalistic Inquiry into the Death of the Royal Hashemite Family, 14 July 1958 in Baghdad). Beirut: 1962.
- Al-Matar, Jamil & 'Ali al-Din Hilal. *Al-Nizam al-Iqlimi al-'Arabi: Dirasa fi al-'Alaqat al-Siyasiyya al-'Arabiyya* (The Arab Regional System: A Study of Arab Political Relations). Cairo: 1983.
- Muhi al-Din, Jihad Majid. *Al-'Iraq wal-Siyasa al-'Arabiyya, 1941–1958* (Iraq and Its Arab Policy, 1941–1958). Baghdad: 1980.
- Al-Mumayyiz, Amin. *Al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya kama 'Arafuha* (Saudi Arabia As I Knew It). Beirut (?): 1963.
- Mushtaq, Talib. *Awraq Ayyami, 1900–1958* (Records of My Days, 1900–1958). Vol. I. Beirut: 1968.
- Nasr, M. *al-Tasawur al-Qawmi al-'Arabi fi Fikr Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir (1952–1970)*. Beirut: 1981.
- Nawfal, Sayyid. *Al-'Amal al-'Arabi al-Mush taraq: Madihi wamustaqbalih* (Joint Arab Action: Past and Future). Vol. 1. Cairo: 1968.
- Nuwar, 'Abd al-'Aziz Suliman. *Misr wal-'Iraq: Dirasa fi Ta'rikh al-'Alaqat baynahuma hata Nushub al-Harb al-'Alamiyya al-Ula* (Egypt and Iraq: A Study of Their Relations Until World War I). Cairo: 1968.
- Rafi', 'Abd al-Rahman. *Muqaddimat Thawrat 23 Yulyu, 1952* (The Prelude to the 23 July 1952 Revolution). Cairo: 1957.
- *Thawrat 23 Yulyu 1952* (23 July 1952 Revolution). Cairo: 1959.
- Riad, Mahmud. *Mudhakkarat Mahmud Riad: Al-Amn al-Qawmi... bayna al-Injaz wal-*

- Fashl* (The Memoirs of Mahmud Riad . . . Between Success and Failure). Vol. 2. Cairo: 1986.
- Al-Sadat, Anwar. *Qissat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya* (The Story of Arab Unity). Cairo: 1957.
- Sa'id, Amin. *Al-Thawra min 23 Yulyu 1952 ila 29 Oktubir 1956* (The Revolution From 23 July 1952 Until 29 October 1956). Cairo: 1959.
- Sassoon, J. "Hahitpathut Hatáasiyatit Béiraq, 1958-1968" (Industrial Development in Iraq, 1958-1968). *Harmizrah* Hehadash. Vol. XXX. 1981.
- Shawqat, Sami, *Hadhihi Ahadafuna* (These Are Our Goals). Baghdad: 1939.
- Suwaidi, Tawfiq. *Mudhakkirati* (My Memoirs). Beirut: 1969.
- Al-Tawil, Muhammad. *Lu'bat al-Umam wa-'Abd al-Nasir* (The Game of Nations and 'Abd al-Nasir). Cairo: 1989.
- Ya'ari, E. *Mitzraim ve-Hafidayyin, 1953-1956* (Egypt and the Fedayeen, 1953-1956). Givat Haviva: 1975.

Books in Other Languages

- Abdel-Malek, A. *Egypt: Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser*. Translated by C. Lam Markmann. New York: 1968.
- Abu-Jaber, F. *Egypt & The Cold War 1952-1956: Implications for American Policy*. Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1966.
- Abdul Nasser, Gamal. *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*. Washington, D.C.: 1955.
- Abul Fath, Ahmad. *L'affaire Nasser*. Paris: 1962.
- Acheson, D. *Present at The Creation: My Years in The State Department*. New York: 1969.
- Adamson, W.L. *Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory*. Berkeley: 1980.
- Al-Akhrass, S. *Revolutionary Change and Modernization in the Arab World : A Case from Syria*. Damascus: 1972.
- Ajami, F. *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967*. Cambridge: 1981.
- Al-Arif, I. *Iraq Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After*. New York: 1982.
- Aronson, G. *From Sideshow to Center Stage: U.S. Policy Toward Egypt 1946-1956*. Boulder: 1986.
- Aruri, N.H. *Jordan: A Study in Political Development, 1921-1965*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1967.
- Badeau, J. *The American Approach to the Middle East*. New York: 1968.
- Baker, R.W. *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat*. Cambridge, Mass: 1978.
- Baram, A. *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968-89*. Oxford: 1991.
- El-Barawy, R. *The Military Coup in Egypt: An Analytic Study*. Cairo: 1952.
- Barker, E. *The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with an Introduction, Notes and Appendices*. Oxford: 1946.
- Batatu, H. *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers*. Princeton: 1978.
- Ben-Dor, G. *State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Post-Colonial State*. New York: 1983.
- Bialer, U. *Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation, 1948-1956*. Cambridge: 1990.
- Binder, L. *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*. New York: 1964
- Birdwood, Lord. *Nuri As-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership*. London: 1959.
- Bocock, R. *Hegemony*. London: 1986.

- Bozman, A.B. *Politics and Culture in International History*. Princeton: 1960.
- Braun, A. (ed.). *The Middle East in Global Strategy*. Boulder: 1987.
- Brecher, M. *The Foreign Policy of Israel: Setting, Images, Processes*. New Haven: 1972.
- Brown, C. *International Politics and the Middle East*. London: 1984.
- Bull, H. *The Anarchical Society*. New York: 1977.
- Bustani, E. *Doubts and Dynamite: The Middle East Today*. London: 1958.
- Campbell, J. *Defense of The Middle East—Problems of American Policy*. New York: 1968.
- Cantori, L.J. & Spiegel, S.L. *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach*. New Jersey: 1970.
- Caractacus. *Revolution in Iraq*. London: 1958.
- Carlton, D. *Britain and the Suez Crisis*. Oxford: 1988.
- Childers, E. *The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations*. London: 1962.
- Clark, I. *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order*. Cambridge: 1989.
- Claude, I.L. *Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*. 3rd ed. New York: 1964.
- *Power and International Relations*. New York: 1967.
- Cleveland, W.L. *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Saï' al-Husri*. Princeton, New Jersey: 1971.
- Copeland, M. *The Game of Nations: The Amoralities of Power Politics*. London: 1969.
- Cremeans, C. *The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy*. New York: 1953.
- Dann, U. *Iraq under Qassem: A Political History, 1958–1963*. Jerusalem: 1969.
- *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955–1967*. New York: 1989.
- Dawisha, A. *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*. London: 1976.
- Decker, D.J. *U.S. Policy Regarding the Baghdad Pact*. Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1975.
- Degaury, G. *Three Kings in Baghdad, 1921–1958*. London: 1961.
- Dehio, L. *The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of European Power Struggle*. New York: 1962.
- Dekmejian, H.R. *Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics*. London: 1972.
- Devereux, D.R. *The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948–56*. London: 1990.
- Doran, C.F. *The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath*. Baltimore: 1971.
- Eden, A. *Full Circle—The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden*. London: 1960.
- Eisenhower, D.D. *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961*. New York: 1965.
- Elliot, J.F. & R. Reginald. *Arms Control, Disarmament, and Military Security*. Santa Barbara: 1989.
- Evron, Y. *The Middle East: Nations, Super-Powers and Wars*. London: 1973.
- Eveland, W.C. *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East*. New York: 1980.
- Faddah, M.I. *The Middle East in Transition: A Study of Jordan's Foreign Policy*. London: 1974.
- Fawzi, M. *Suez 1956: An Egyptian Perspective*. London: 1986.
- Ferguson, W.S. *Greek Imperialism*. Boston: 1913.
- Fisher, W.B. *The Middle East: A Physical, Social and Regional Geography*. Cambridge: 1978.
- Forgacs, D. (ed.). *An Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916–1935*. New York: 1988.
- Freiberger, S.Z. *Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953–1957*. Chicago: 1992.
- Gaddis, J.L. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947*. New York: 1972.
- Gallman, W. *Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri Al-Said, 1954–1958*. Baltimore: 1964.
- Gershoni, I. *The Emergence of Pan-Arabism in Egypt*. Tel Aviv: 1981.

- & Jankowski, J.P. *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900–1930*. New York: 1986.
- Gilpin, R. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: 1981.
- *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton, New Jersey: 1987.
- Ginat, R. *The Soviet-Union and Egypt, 1945–1955*. London: 1993.
- Glubb, Sir J.B. *A Soldier with the Arabs*. London: 1959.
- Goldstein, J.S. *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. New Haven: 1988.
- Gomaa, A.M. *The Foundation of the League of Arab States: Wartime Diplomacy and Inter-Arab Politics 1941 to 1945*. London: 1981.
- Gordon, J.S. *Towards Nasser's Egypt: The Consolidation of the July Revolution and the End of the Old Regime*. Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1987.
- Hahn, P.L. *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1956*. Chapel Hill: 1992.
- Haim, S. *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*. Berkeley: 1976.
- Halle, L.J. *The Cold War as History*. New York: 1971.
- Hammond, P.Y. & Alexander, S.S. (eds.). *Political Dynamics in the Middle East*. New York: 1972.
- Harris, J. *Iraq: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture*. New Haven: 1958.
- Hasou, T. *The Struggle For the Arab World: Egypt's Nasser and the Arab League*. London: 1985.
- Al-Hasso, N.T. *Administrative Politics in The Middle East: The Case of Monarchical Iraq, 1920–1958*. Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1976.
- Hassouna, A.H. *The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A Study of Middle East Conflicts*. New York: 1975.
- Hatem, Abdel-Kader. *Information and the Arab Cause*. London: 1974.
- Heikal, M.H. *Nasser: The Cairo Documents*. New York: 1973.
- *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes*. London: 1986.
- *Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War*. London: 1993.
- Helms, C.M. *Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World*. Washington: 1984.
- Himmelfarb, G. *The New History and the Old*. Cambridge, Mass: 1987.
- Hofstadter, D. *Egypt and Nasser*. Vol. 1. 1952–56. New York: 1973.
- Holden, D. & Jones, R. *The House of Saud*. London: 1982.
- Holt, P.M. *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516–1922*. Ithaca: 1969.
- Hopkins, H. *Egypt the Crucible: The Unfinished Revolution of the Arab World*. London: 1969.
- Hourani, A. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*. Cambridge: 1984.
- Hudson, M.C. *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*. New Haven: 1977.
- Hurewitz, J.C. *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*. Vol. II. New Haven: 1979.
- Hussein, King of Jordan. *Uneasy Lies the Head*. New York: 1962.
- Ibn Khaldun. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. Translated by F. Rosenthal. Vol. I. New York: 1958.
- Ionides, M. *Divide and Lose: The Arab Revolt of 1955–1958*. London: 1960.
- Ireland, P.W. *Iraq: A Study in Political Development*. New York: 1938.
- Ismael, T. *International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in World Politics*. Syracuse: 1986.
- Issawi, C. *Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis*. London: 1963.
- Izzeddin, N. Abu. *Nasser of the Arabs: An Arab Assessment*. London: 1980.
- Jabber, P. *Not by War Alone: Security and Arms Control in the Middle East*. Berkeley: 1981.
- Jankowski, P. *Egypt's Young Rebels: "Young Egypt: 1933–1952*. Stanford: 1975.
- Johnston, C. *The Brink of Jordan*. London: 1972.
- Jones R.W. & Hildreth, S.A. *Emerging Powers: Defense and Security in the Third World*. New York: 1986.
- Kahin, G.M. *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, Apr. 1955*. New York: 1956.

- Karpat, K.H. (ed.), *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*. New York: 1982.
- Kedourie, E. *Politics in the Middle East*. Oxford: 1992.
- Kennedy, P. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: 1987.
- Keohane, R.O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord on the World Political Economy*. Princeton: 1984.
- Kerr, M. *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals*. 3rd ed. London: 1981.
- Khadduri, M. *Independent Iraq 1932–1958: A Study in Iraqi Politics*. London: 1960.
- *Arab Contemporaries: The Role of Personalities in Politics*. London: 1973.
- *Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958*. London: 1969.
- Khalil, M. *The Arab States and The Arab League: A Documentary Record*. 2 vols. Beirut: 1962.
- Khan, R.A. *Radio Cairo and Egyptian Foreign Policy, 1956–1959*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1967.
- Kimball, L.K. *The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958–1971*. New York: 1972.
- Kimche, D. *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of The Third World*. Jerusalem: 1973.
- Kirk, G.E. *Contemporary Arab Politics*. New York: 1961.
- Korany, B. & Dessouki, A.H. (eds.). *The Foreign Policies of Arab States*. Boulder: 1984.
- Kuniholm, B.R. *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece*. Princeton: 1980.
- Kyle, K. *Suez*. London: 1991.
- Lacouture, J. *The Demigods: Charismatic Leadership in the Third World*. New York: 1970.
- & S. *Egypt in Transition*. London: 1958.
- *Nasser*. New York: 1973.
- Lamb, R. *The Failure of the Eden Government*. London: 1987.
- Laqueur, W.Z. *Nasser's Egypt*. London: 1956.
- Leppgold, J. *The Declining Hegemon: The United States and European Defense, 1960–1990*. New York: 1990.
- Lerner, D. *The Passing of Traditional Society*. New York: 1962.
- Lesch, D. *Syria and the U.S.: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East*. Boulder, Colo: 1992.
- Little, T. *Modern Egypt*. London: 1967.
- Lloyd, S. *Suez—1956: A Personal Account*. London: 1978.
- Longrigg, S.H. *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*. Oxford: 1925.
- *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*. London: 1953.
- Louis, W.R. *The British Empire in The Middle East 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, The U.S. and Post-War Imperialism*. Oxford: 1984.
- & Owen, R. (eds.) *The Suez 1956, The Crisis and Its Consequences*. Oxford: 1989.
- Love, K. *Suez: The Twice-Fought War*. London: 1970.
- Lucas, W.S. *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis*. New York: 1991.
- Lunt, J. *Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography*. London: 1989.
- Macdonald, W. *The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization*. Princeton, New Jersey: 1965.
- Macmillan, H. *Riding the Storm, 1956–1959*. London: 1971.
- McGhee, G. *Envoy to the Middle East: Adventures in Diplomacy*. New York, 1969.
- Maddy-Weitzman, B. *The Crystallization of an Arab State System: 1945–1954*. Syracuse: 1993.
- Mansfield, P. *Nasser's Egypt*. London: 1965.
- Al-Marayati, A. *A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq*. New York: 1961.
- Marlowe, J. *Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800–1956*. 2nd ed. London: 1965.

- *Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism: A Study in Power Politics*. London: 1961.
- Marr, P.A. *The Modern History of Iraq*. Boulder: 1985.
- McLaurin, R.D. et al. *Foreign Policy-making in the Middle East: Domestic Influences on Policy in Egypt, Iraq, Israel and Syria*. New York: 1977.
- Meyer, G. *Egypt and the U.S.: The Formative Years*. London: 1980.
- Mikdadi, F.H. *Gamal Abdel Nasser: A Bibliography*. New York: 1991.
- Mitchell, W. *Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1967.
- Modelski, G. *Long Cycles in World Politics*. Seattle: 1987.
- Monroe, E. *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956*. London: 1965.
- Morgenthau, H.J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th ed. New York: 1978.
- Morris, B. *Israel's Border Wars: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation and the Countdown to Suez*. Oxford: 1993.
- Murphy, R. *Diplomat among Warriors*. New York: 1964.
- Myres, D.J. (ed.). *Regional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Response*. Boulder: 1991.
- Neguib, M. *Egypt's Destiny: A Personal Statement*. London: 1955.
- Nieuwenhuijze, C.A.O. van. *Sociology of the Middle East: A Stocktaking and Interpretation*. Leiden: 1971.
- Nutting, A. *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez*. London: 1967.
- *Nasser*. London: 1972.
- *I Saw for Myself: The Aftermath of Suez*. London: 1958.
- Nye, J.S. Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: 1990.
- Oakeshott, M. *Rationalism in Politics*. London: 1962.
- Oren, M. *Origins of the Second Arab–Israel War: Egypt, Israel and the Great Powers 1952–56*. London: 1992.
- Organski, A.F.K. *World Politics*. New York: 1968.
- Owen, R. *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. London: 1992.
- Penrose, E. & E.F. *Iraq: International Relations and National Development*. London: 1978.
- Porath, Y. *In Search of Arab Unity, 1930–1945*. London: 1986.
- *From Riots to Rebellion: The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929–1939*. London: 1977.
- Qubain, F.I. *The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950–1957*. New York: 1958.
- Ra'anan, U. *The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy*. Cambridge, Mass: 1969.
- Rajwan, N. *Nasserist Ideology: Its Exponents and Critics*. New York: 1974.
- Ramazani, R. *The Northern Tier: Afghanistan, Iran & Turkey*. Princeton: 1966.
- Riad, M. *The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East*. London: 1981.
- Rivlin, R. & Szyliowicz, J.S. *The Contemporary Middle East—Tradition and Innovation*. New York: 1965.
- Rubin, Barry. *The Arab States & The Palestine Conflict*. Syracuse, New York: 1981.
- Saad, Abubaker M. *Iraq and Arab Politics: The Nuri As-Said Era, 1941–1958*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1987.
- Sadat, A. *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography*. New York: 1977.
- Safran, N. *Saudi-Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security*. Cambridge, Mass: 1985.
- *From War to War*. New York: 1969.
- Said, E. *Orientalism*. New York: 1978.
- Sayed, M.A.W. Ahmed. *U.S.–Egyptian Relations From The 1952 Revolution to The Suez Crisis of 1956*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1987.
- Sayegh, F. *Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment*. New York: 1958.
- (ed.). *The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World*. San Francisco: 1964.
- Seale, P. *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Politics, 1945–58*. New ed. London: 1987.

- Shikara, A.R. *Iraqi Politics 1921-41: The Interaction Between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*. London: 1987.
- Shuckburgh, E. *Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951-56*. London: 1986.
- Shwadran, B. *Jordan A State of Tension*. New York: 1959.
- Simon, R. *Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction*. London: 1982.
- Snow, P. *Hussein*. London: 1972.
- Spiegel, S.L. *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Chicago: 1985.
- (ed.). *The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East*. New York: 1988.
- *Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy*. Boston: 1972.
- Stephens, R. *Nasser: A Political Biography*. London: 1971.
- St. John, R. *The Boss: The Story of Gamal Abdel Nasser*. New York: 1960.
- Taylor, A. *The Arab Balance of Power*. Syracuse: 1982.
- Thomas, H. *The Suez Affair*. Revised edition. London: 1986.
- Torry, G.H. *Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958*. Columbus, Ohio: 1969.
- Trevelyan, H. *The Middle East in Revolution*. London: 1970.
- Troeller, G. *The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud*. London: 1976.
- Troen, S.I. & Shemesh, M. (eds.). *The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal*. London: 1990.
- Vatikiotis, P.J. *Conflict in the Middle East*. London: 1971.
- *Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East*. London: 1984.
- *Nasser and His Generation*. New York: 1978.
- *The History of Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*. 3rd ed. Baltimore: 1985.
- *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion*. London: 1967.
- *The Egyptian Army in Politics*. Bloomington: 1961.
- Walker, G. (ed.). *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*. Durham: 1987.
- Walt, S.M. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: 1987.
- Waltz, K. *Theory of International Politics*. Berkeley: 1979.
- Wheelock, K. *Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis*. London: 1960.
- Willets, P. *The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance*. London: 1978.
- Al-Windawi, M. *Anglo-Iraqi Relations 1945-58*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Reading, 1989.
- Wynn, W. *Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity*. Cambridge: 1959.

Articles

- Abu Jaber, F. "The Egyptian Revolution and Middle East Defence: 1952-1955." *Middle East Forum*. Vol. 4, 1969.
- Ajami, F. "On Nasser and His Legacy." *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. XI, 1974.
- "Geopolitical Illusions." S.L. Spiegel (ed.). *The Middle East and the Western Alliance*. London: 1982.
- Ashton, N.J. "A Great New Venture? Anglo-American Cooperation in the Middle East and the Response to the Iraqi Revolution July 1958." *Diplomacy and Statecraft*. Vol. 4, 1993.
- "The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955-58." *Review of International Studies*. Vol. 19, 1993.
- Badeau, J. "The Middle East: Conflict in Priorities." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 36, 1958.
- "A Role in Search of a Hero: A Brief Study of the Egyptian Revolution." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 9, 1955.
- "The Baghdad Pact: Origins and Political Setting." *Chatham House Memoranda*. Royal Institute for International Affairs. 1956.

- "The Baghdad Pact: Northern Buttresses of Islam." *The Round Table*. June 1957.
- Baldwin, H. "Strategy of the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 35, 1957.
- Baram, A. "Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'thi Iraq." *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, 1983.
- Ben-Dor, G. "Inter-Arab Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict." *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, 1976.
- Binder, L. "The Tragedy of Syria." *World Politics*. Vol. 19, 1967.
- "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System." *World Politics*, Vol. 10, 1958.
- "Nasserism: The Protest Movement in the Middle East." M. Kaplan (ed.). *The Revolution in World Politics*. New York: 1962.
- Campbell, J. "From 'Doctrine' to Policy in the Middle East." *Foreign Policy*. Vol. 35, 1957.
- Chejne, A.G. "Egyptian Attitudes Toward Pan-Arabism." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 2, 1957.
- Coury, R.M. "Who 'Invented' Egyptian Arab Nationalism?" *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 14, 1982.
- Dann, U. "The Foreign Office, The Baghdad Pact and Jordan." *Asian and African Studies*. Vol. 21, 1987.
- Dawisha, A. "Jordan in the Middle East: The Art of Survival." P. Seale (ed.). *The Shaping of an Arab Statesman*. London: 1983.
- Entelis, J. "Nasser's Egypt: The Failure of Charismatic Leadership." *Orbis*. Vol. 18, 1974.
- Evron, Y. & Bar Siman-Tov, Y. "Coalitions in the Arab World." *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 1, 1975.
- Gorst, A. & Lucas, S.W. "The Other Collusion: Operation Straggle and Anglo-American Intervention in Syria, 1955-56." *Intelligence and National Security*. Vol. 4, 1989.
- Grassmuck, G. "The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 14, 1960.
- Harbison, F. "Two Centers of Arab Power." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 37, 1959.
- Heikal, M.H. "Egyptian Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 56, 1978.
- Holsti, K.J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," S.G. Walker (ed.). *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*. Durham: 1987.
- Horrocks, B. "Middle East Defense—The British View." *Middle Eastern Affairs*. Vol. 6, 1955.
- Hourani, A. "The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 9, 1955.
- "Near Eastern Nationalism Yesterday and Today." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 42, 1963.
- Al-Husry, K. "The Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958." *Middle East Forum*. Vol. 41, 1965.
- "King Faysal I and Arab Unity," *Journal of Contemporary History*. Vol. 10, 1975.
- Issawi, C. "Negotiations from Strength? A Reappraisal of Western-Arab Relations." *International Affairs*. Vol. 35, 1959.
- "The Bases of Arab Unity." *International Affairs*. Vol. 31, 1955.
- Jalal, A. "Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Cold War, 1947-55." *International History Review*. Vol. 2, 1989.
- Al-Jamali, F. "Iraq under General Nuri." *Middle East Forum*. Vol. 40, 1964.
- Jasse, R.C. "The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 27, 1991.
- J. Julliard, "Political History in the 1980s. Reflections on its Present and Future." T.K. Rabb and R.I. Rotberg (eds.). *The New History: The 1980s and Beyond*. Princeton: 1982.
- Kaplan, M.A. "Variants on Six Models of the International System," in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy*. New York, Revised ed.: 1969.
- Kedourie, E. "Misreading the Middle East." *Islam in the Modern World and Other Studies*. London: 1980.

- "Britain, France and the Last Phase of the Eastern Question." J.C. Hurewitz (ed.). *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East*. New York: 1969.
- "Political Parties in The Arab World." *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*. London: 1974
- "The Kingdom of Iraq: A Retrospect." *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies*. New edition. London: 1984.
- Kelidar, A. "Iraq: The Search for Stability." *Conflict Studies*. No. 59, 1975.
- Kerr, M. "Egyptian Foreign Policy and the Revolution." P.J. Vatikiotis (ed.). *Egypt Since the Revolution*. London: 1968.
- "Coming to Terms with Nasser: Attempts and Failures." *International Affairs*. Vol. 43, 1967.
- "Persistence of Regional Quarrels." J.C. Hurewitz (ed.). *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East*. New York: 1972.
- Khadduri, M. "The Problem of Regional Security in the Middle East: An Appraisal." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. II, 1957.
- Khalidi, W. "Political Trends in the Fertile Crescent." W. Laqueur (ed.). *The Middle East in Revolution*. London: 1958.
- K(irk), G. E. "Iraq, Egypt and the Arab League." *World Today*. Vol. 11, 1955.
- "The Syrian Crisis of 1957." *International Affairs*. Vol. 36, 1960.
- Kuniholm, B. "Strategies for Containment in the Middle East." T.L. Deibel & J.L. Gaddis (eds.). *Containment Concept and Policy*. Washington: 1986.
- Lebovich, J.H. "The Middle East: The Region as a System." *International Interactions*. Vol. 12, 1986.
- Lehrman, H. "Development in Iraq." W. Laqueur (ed.). *The Middle East in Transition*. London: 1958.
- Lenczowski, G. "The Objects and Methods of Nasserism." *International Affairs*. Vol. 41, 1965.
- "The Arab Cold War." W.A. Beling (ed.). *The Middle East: Quest for American Policy*. New York: 1973.
- Little, D. "Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 44, 1990.
- Little, T. "The Arab League: A Reassessment." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 10, 1956.
- Longrigg, S.H. "New Groupings among the Arab States." *International Affairs*. Vol. 34, 1958.
- Loya, A. "Radio Propaganda of the United Arab Republic—An Analysis." *Middle Eastern Affairs*. Vol. 13, 1962.
- Lucas, S.W. "Redefining the Suez 'Collusion'." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 26, 1990.
- Malone, J.J. & Peterson, J.E. "Egypt: Mainspring of Arab Power." R.W. Jones & S.A. Hildreth (eds.). *Emerging Powers: Defense and Security in the Third World*. New York: 1986.
- Mannheim, K. "The Problem of Generations." *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: 1968.
- Mansfield, P. "Nasser and Nasserism." *International Affairs*. Vol. 28, 1973.
- Al-Marayati, Abid. "Modern Iraq." *Middle East Forum*. Vol. XXIV, 1968.
- Marr, P.A. "The Political Elite in Iraq." G. Lenczowski (ed.). *Political Elites in the Middle East*. Washington D.C.: 1975.
- "Iraqi Leadership Dilemma: A Study in Leadership Trends, 1948-1968." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 24, 1970.
- "The Iraqi Revolution: A Case Study of Army Rule." *Orbis*. Vol. 14, 1970.
- McFadden, J. "The Strategic Arena." B. Reich (ed.). *The Powers in the Middle East: The Ultimate Strategic Arena*. New York: 1987
- Miller, B. "A 'New World Order': From Balancing to Hegemony, Concert or Collective Security?" *International Interactions*, Vol. 18, 1992.
- Nahas, A. "State-Systems and Revolutionary Challenge: Nasser, Khomeini and the

- Middle East." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 17, 1985.
- Nasser, Gamal Abdul. "The Egyptian Revolution." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 33, 1955.
- Oren, M. "Secret Egypt-Israel Peace Initiatives Prior to the Suez Campaign." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 26, 1990.
- "The Tripartite System and Arms Control in the Middle East, 1950-1956." in D. Gold (ed.). *Arms Control in the Middle East*. Tel-Aviv: 1990.
- Perlman, S. "Hegemony and Arkhe in Greece: Fourth-Century B.C. Views." R.N. Lebow & B.S. Strauss (eds.). *Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age*. Boulder: 1991.
- Perlmutter, A. "The Fiasco of Anglo-American Middle East Policy." M. Curtis (ed.). *People and Politics in the Middle East*. New Jersey: 1971.
- Podeh, E. "The Struggle over Arab Hegemony After the Suez Crisis." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 29, 1993.
- "The Cold War in the Middle East: The Western Quest for a Regional Defense Organization." *Orient*. Vol. 33, 1992.
- "The Drift toward Neutrality: Egyptian Foreign Policy during the Early Nasserist Era." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Forthcoming.
- "In the Service of Power: The Ideological Struggle during the Gulf Crisis." *Conflict Quarterly*. Vol. 14, 1994.
- "Ending an Age-Old Rivalry: The Rapprochement Between the Hashemites and the Saudis, 1956-58." A. Susser and A. Shmuelevitz (eds.). *The Hashemites in the Arab World*. London: 1995.
- Polk, W. "A Decade of Discovery: America in the Middle East, 1947-1958." *Middle Eastern Affairs*. No. 2. St. Anthony's Papers. No. 11, 1961.
- Pool, D. "From Elite to Class: The Transformation of Iraqi Leadership, 1920-1939." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 12, 1980.
- Al-Qazzaz, A. "Power Elite in Iraq 1920-1958: A Study of the Cabinet." *Muslim World*. Vol. 61, 1971.
- Rabinovich, I. "Inter-Arab Relations Foreshadowed: The Question of the Syrian Throne in the 1920's and the 1930's." *Festschrift in Honor of Dr. George Wise*. Tel Aviv: 1981.
- Raleigh, J.S. "The West and the Defense of the Middle East." *Middle Eastern Affairs*. Vol. 6, June-July 1955.
- Ried, B.H. "The 'Northern Tier' and the Baghdad Pact." J.W. Young (ed.). *The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, 1951-1955*. Leicester: 1988.
- Remba, O. "The Baghdad Pact: Economic Aspect." *Middle East Forum*. Vol. 9, 1958.
- Rubin, B. "America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957." *Political Science Quarterly*. Vol. 97, 1982.
- Rustow, D. "Defense of the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 34, 1956.
- "The Politics of the Near East: South-west Asia and Northern Africa." G. Almond & J.C. Coleman (eds.). *The Politics of Developing Areas*. Princeton: 1971.
- Salame, G. "Inter-Arab politics: The Return of Geography." W.B. Quandt (ed.). *The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David*. Washington, D.C.: 1988.
- Salem, E. "Emerging Governments in the Arab World." *Orbis*. Vol. 6, 1962.
- Sharabi, H.B. "Power and Leadership in the Arab World." *Orbis*. Vol. 7, 1963.
- Silbermann, G. "National Identity in Nasserist Ideology, 1952-1970." *Asian and African Studies*. Vol. 8, 1972.
- Simon, R. "The Hashemite 'Conspiracy': Hashemite Unity Attempts, 1921-1958." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 5, 1974.
- Spain, J.W. "Middle East Defense: A New Approach." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 8, 1954.
- Stevens, G.G. "Arab Neutralism and Bandung." *Middle East Journal*. Vol. 11, 1957.
- Stone, L. "The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History." *Past and Present*. Vol. 85, 1979.

- Thompson, W.R. "Delineating Regional Subsystems: Visit Networks and the Middle Eastern Case." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 13, 1981.
- Vatikiotis, P.J. "Foreign Policy of Egypt." R. Macridis (ed.). *Foreign Policy in World Politics*. 2nd ed. New York: 1962.
- "Some Political Consequences of the 1952 Revolution in Egypt." P.M. Holt (ed.). *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt*. London: 1968.
- "Dilemmas of Political Leadership in the Arab World: The Case of the UAR." *International Affairs*. Vol. 37, 1961.
- "The Soviet Union and Egypt: The Nasser Years." I.J. Lederer & W.S. Vuchinich (eds.). *The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era*. Stanford: 1974.
- Vigneau, J. "Ideology of the Egyptian Revolution." W. Laqueur (ed.). *The Middle East in Transition*. London: 1958.
- Wallerstein, I. "The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World-Economy." *The Politics of the World-Economy*. Cambridge: 1984.
- Warburg, G.R. "Egypt's Regional Policy from Muhammad Ali to Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat." C.F. Pinkele & A. Pollis (eds.). *The Contemporary Mediterranean World*. New York: 1983.
- Watt, D.C. "The Saadabad Pact of 8 July 1937." U. Dann (ed.). *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919-1939*. New York: 1988.
- M. Wight, "The Balance of Power," in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*. London: 1966.
- Wright, E. "Defense and the Baghdad Pact." *The Political Quarterly*. Vol. 28, 1957.

INDEX

- 'Abdallah, King of Jordan, 46, 184, 205, 247
- 'Abd al-Hadi, Na'im, 185
- 'Abd al-illah, Iraqi Regent and Crown Prince, 40, 58, 67, 75, 80–82, 84 (n.), 140, 144, 150, 179 (n.), 193, 205, 209, 213, 218, 222 (n.), 226–28, 233 (n.), 238–39, 241, 243, 250
- 'Abd al-Nasir, Gamal 2, 17, 24–26, 32, 34–35, 37–38, 55, 91, 95, 113, 127, 130, 134–136, 143, 145, 150, 152, 180, 182 (n.), 183, 192, 209, 212, 218, 229–30, 234–35, 243–45, 249
- Baghdad Pact, 183, 192, 195–97, 199–201, 217, 222–23; 235, 243, 246, 249–251
- Bandung Conference, 147–49
- Bilateral agreement with Syria, 164–67
- Britain, 141, 196–97, 199–200, 243
- Cairo Conference, 107–12
- Czech arms deal, 162–64, 181
- Eden, 115, 191, 198, 200 (n.)
- Elections for presidency, 202
- Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact, 184, 190–92, 197
- Middle East defense, 57, 60–61, 75, 77–78, 86, 96–100, 103–105, 115, 130–32
- Nationalization of the Suez Canal company, 211
- Naguib, 75, 77, 96
- Nehrū, 56, 147
- Neutrality, 56, 116, 132, 148–49, 163, 250
- Pan-Arab ideology, 26, 32, 36, 78–79, 138, 149
- al-Sa'id, Nuri, 2–3, 24–25, 33, 87–90, 98, 105, 107, 115, 131, 152, 192, 200–202, 212, 219–23, 244
- Sa'ud, 210, 217, 227, 231–32, 240, 247
- Tito, 116
- Turco-Iraqi Pact, 103, 115–16, 130, 141
- Turco-Pakistani Agreement, 70–72, 75
- UAR, 235–36
- United States, 142, 148, 151 (n.), 183, 196, 198–99, 250
- World view, 56, 78–79, 100, 131–132, 149–50, 192, 249–50
- Abu al-Huda, Tawfiq, 107, 111, 128, 173
- Abu Nuwar, 'Ali, 231
- Acheson, Dean,
- Afghanistan, 39, 118, 215, 241
- al-'Alami, Musa, 188
- Aleppo, 133, 168
- Alexandretta, 66, 135
- 'Ali, Muhammad, 72, 92, 147, 215
- Alpha Plan, 127, 196, 249
- 'Alluba, 'Ali, 30
- 'Amir, 'Abd al-Hakim, 26, 165, 182
- Anderson Robert, 196 (n.)
- Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1936), 40, 42, 51, 53, 55, 62, 247
- Anglo-Egyptian Agreement (1954), 75, 77–79, 89, 93, 96, 98–99, 105–106, 115, 124, 132, 173, 248–49
- Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930), 58, 70, 79–82, 84, 86, 89, 91–93, 95, 99–100, 123, 250
- Revision of, (see also al-Sa'id Nuri): 118–20, 139–40, 248, 251
- Anglo-Jordanian Treaty (1948), 40, 173, 184, 190
- ANZUS, 1
- Arab Collective Security Pact (ACSP, 1950), 42, 46–49, 58–59, 61–62, 73, 77, 80, 83–86, 88, 92, 96–100, 106–111, 112 (n.), 115, 120, 124, 126–28, 145–46, 151, 156, 159, 166, 168, 175, 196–97, 201, 249
- Link with Baghdad Pact, 196–97, 199
- Arab hegemony (see hegemony)
- Arab-Israeli Conflict, 42, 55, 151, 153, 182–84, 187, 198–99, 215, 221, 244
- Arab League, 5, 12, 16, 25, 31–32, 41–47, 52, 60–61, 64, 68, 70, 74–75, 79, 82, 85, 89, 93, 95, 98–101, 103–106, 124, 128, 133,

- 137, 141, 146, 151–52, 156, 164, 202, 204, 206, 244, 247, 249, 251
 Cairo Conference, 107–12
 Egypt, 5, 64, 82, 112
 Iraq, 5, 20, 49, 69
 Turco–Pakistani Agreement, 68–69
 Arab Legion, 172, 176, 182–82, 188, 190, 197
 Arab Nationalism (see pan-Arabism)
 Arab Revolt (1916), 2, 5, 29, 47, 220, 250
 Arab Solidarity pact (1957), 226, 231
 Arab state system, 1, 6, 13, 12–38, 90, 118, 125, 171, 208, 243, 245, 247, 252
 Hegemony, 12–38
 Baghdad Pact, 6, 244–46
 Arab Union (1958), 194, 237–40, 241
 Baghdad Pact, 239
 Arabian Peninsula, 1
 al-‘Asali, Sabri, 70, 114, 128, 136, 143–44, 156–58, 162
 Aswan Dam, 151, 202
 al-Atasi, Faidi, 106, 109
 al-Atasi, Hashim, 133, 144, 160
 Australia, 50
 al-‘Azm, Khalid, 114, 117, 128–30, 134–36, 138, 143–44, 157–62
 ‘Azzam, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 16, 30, 44
- Baban, Ahmad Mukhtar, 58, 150
 Baghdad Pact (see also: ‘Abd al-Nasir, ACSP, Arab state system, Arab Union, Britain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, al-Sa‘id Nuri, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAR, United States), 1–7, 34, 37, 76, 84, 89–90, 123, 125, 153, 159, 163–64, 167–68, 175, 177–78, 180–83, 187, 189–99, 202–205, 208, 212–15, 218–20, 222–25, 227, 230–31, 234–35, 238, 240, 243–52
 Change of name, 242
 Council meetings, 167, 178–80, 182, 199, 208, 225–26, 230, 233, 235–36, 241
 Economic Committee, 179, 202–205, 228
 Eisenhower Doctrine, 224–26
 Iraq’s withdrawal, 222, 240–42
 as Islamic Pact, 215, 217
 Military Committee, 229, 233
 Palestine problem, 214
 Structure, Appendix Two
 Baha’ al-Din, Ahmad, 66
- al-Bahri, Yunis, 194 (n.)
 al-Bajaji, Muzahim, 82
 Balkan Pact, 1
 Bandung Conference, 147–49, 163
 al-Banna’, Hasan, 30
 Barmada, Rashad, 164, 167–68
 Bash‘ayan, Burhan al-Din, 105, 164, 167, 168 (n.)
 Basra, 113
 Ba‘th Party (Syria), 114, 143–44, 146–47, 161–62, 235
 Ba‘th Party (Jordan), 182
 Bayar, Çalal, 175, 177, 181
 Bevin, Ernest, 40–42, 49
 Bevin–Sidqi Protocol, 40
 Bowker, James, 177
 Britain (see also: Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Anglo–Egyptian Treaty, Anglo–Egyptian Agreement, Anglo–Iraqi Treaty, Anglo–Jordanian Treaty), 1, 39, 48, 53, 63, 83, 91, 131, 222
 Accession to the Turco–Iraqi Pact, 138–42
 Alpha Plan, 127
 Baghdad Pact, 4, 34, 183, 196, 198, 200, 203–204, 214, 216, 229, 233–34, 241–42, 248
 Middle East Command (MEC), 50–53
 Middle East Defense, 40–43, 49–50, 86, 93, 96–97, 247–48
 Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), 53–59
 Tripartite pact, 159
 Turco–Iraqi Pact, 100–103, 118–23, 127, 136, 139–42, 248
 Turco–Pakistani Agreement, 67, 69–70, 72, 86, 248
 United States, 196, 198, 248–49
 Burma, 147–48
 Byroade, Henry, 85, 127, 131–32, 142, 148, 151, 162, 183, 246
- Caffrey, William, 77, 85–86, 96
 Cairo Conference (1955), 106, 107–12, 113, 116–20
 Campbell, Ronald, 44, 47
 Cassidy, Admiral, 129–30
 CENTO, 242, 251
 Chou En-Lai, 148
 CIA, 146
 Cold War, 1–2, 6, 39, 43, 68, 131, 149, 243, 250
 Communism (see Soviet Union)

- Copts, 19
 Crossman, Richard, 127 (n.), 192
 Cyprus, 55, 190
 Czech arms deal, 20, 34–35, 37, 148, 162–64, 166, 175, 181

 al-Damluji, ‘Abdallah, 209–11
 Darawzah, Izzat, 29, 32
 Da‘ud, Sam‘an, 185
 Democratic Bloc (Syria), 114, 143, 161–62
 Dhahran airbase, 117, 152, 207, 227
 Duke, Charles, 173–77, 179, 181, 185–86, 188, 190, 194
 Dulles, John Foster, 59, 85, 97, 101, 151 (n.), 167, 178 (n.), 198–99, 221, 224, 235–36, 238, 243, 247
 Middle East Tour, 60–62
 Northern Tier Concept, 34, 59–63, 81, 101, 247–48
 Turco-Iraqi Pact, 142, 145 (n.)

 Eden, Anthony (see also: ‘Abd al-Nasir), 54, 60, 93, 115–16, 118, 139, 141, 178, 190–91, 194, 197–199, 200 (n.), 208, 221
 Guildhall speech, 184
 Egypt (see also: ‘Abd al-Nasir, Iraq, Israel), 2, 13, 15, 18, 21
 Arab League, 112, 244
 Baghdad Pact, 5, 35–37, 163, 183, 192, 195–202, 205, 215, 219, 229–30, 234–35, 249
 Britain, 40–42, 44–48, 50–51, 54, 59, 75, 96–97, 101, 141, 191, 196–200, 243, 247–48
 Cairo Conference, 107–12
 Czech arms deal, 148, 162–64
 Demographic capabilities, 17–20
 Domestic opposition, 77–78
 Eastern Bloc, 22, 148
 Economic capabilities, 21–24, 35
 Eisenhower Doctrine, 225
 Foreign policy, 4–5, 55–56, 70, 77–79, 96–100, 111, 131–32, 162–63, 180, 192, 202, 241–42, 249
 Geographic location, 14–17
 Hegemony, 1–2, 12–13, 33–38, 46, 62, 66, 76, 115, 159, 192, 195, 206, 234–35, 243, 249, 252
 Jordan, 178, 180–82, 186–92, 223, 226
 Lebanon, 74, 130, 153–55, 223
 Middle East Command (MEC), 50–53, 249
 Military capabilities, 20–21, 35
 Military coup (1952), 55, 79
 Morocco, 202–205
 Neutrality, 56, 115–16, 132, 148–49, 163, 250
 Northern Tier, 61–62
 Pan-Arabism, 2–5, 28–33, 78–79, 96–100, 110, 149, 222, 243
 Political capabilities, 24–27, 35
 Propaganda, 25, 35, 104, 111–12, 141, 149–52, 181, 187, 191, 206, 216–18, 220, 230, 245
 Role perception, 27–28
 Saudi Arabia, 70, 73, 116, 156–59, 167, 206–207, 209–211, 217, 223, 231–32
 Soviet Union, 131, 207
 Subversive activities, 26, 111, 113, 191, 206–207, 245
 Sudan, 16, 151, 228
 Syria, 16–17, 20, 34–35, 71, 82, 89, 113–14, 126, 128, 135–38, 143, 146–47, 156–67, 234–35, 245
 Syrian-Iraqi union, 46, 85, 194
 Tripartite pact, 136–38, 143
 Tunisia, 202–205
 Turco-Iraqi Pact, 103, 115–16, 120, 124, 132, 250
 Turco-Pakistani Agreement, 65–66, 68, 70, 72–76, 78, 85, 249
 Turkey, 95–96, 98, 103
 United States, 55–56, 77, 97, 142, 148, 151 (n.), 162–63, 196, 198–99, 207, 230, 249–50
 Yemen, 74
 Eisenhower, Dwight, 59, 65, 77, 197 (n.), 198–99
 Eisenhower Doctrine, 223–27, 230, 235, 241
 Ethiopia, 39, 229
 Eveland-Gerhardt mission, 97
 Euphrates, 14, 16, 243

 Falla, Stephan, 69
 Fansa, Nazih, 160 (n.)
 Faruq, King of Egypt (1936–52), 44–46, 51, 54
 Fawzi, Mahmud, 77, 83, 98–99, 104–105, 151 (n.), 162, 181, 197
 Faysal, King of Iraq (1921–33), 29–31
 Faysal II, King of Iraq (1953–58), 67, 82, 194, 200, 203, 205–206, 208, 210–11, 213, 218, 237, 239–41, 243
 Faysal, Saudi Crown Prince, 107, 116, 129, 136, 207, 210, 240

- Fedayeen, 180, 182
 Fertile Crescent (see also: al-Sa'id Nuri), 1-2, 14, 20, 29, 82, 236
 Foreign Office (see Britain)
 France, 91-92, 114, 202-205, 214, 240
 Free Officers (Egypt), 56-57, 96, 113

 Gallman, Waldemar, 92, 101, 117, 135, 180 (n.), 208, 221, 227
 Gardner, John, 134, 157
 Gaza Raid, 34, 126-28, 142
 Ghazzi, King of Iraq (1933-39), 233 (n.)
 al-Ghazzi, Sa'id, 162, 164, 168, 174
 Ghali, Butrus Mirrit, 30-31
 Global system, 8-13
 Glubb John, 176, 178, 180-82, 188
 Dismissal, 197-98
 Greater Syria Plan, 193
 Greece, 41-43, 45, 48
 al-Gumhuriyya (Egypt), 68, 104

 Habaniyya airfield, 93, 139-40, 194
 al-Haffar, Lutfi, 160
 Hammarskjold, Dag, 202
 Hare, Raymond, 229
 Hasan, Crown Prince (Morocco), 203
 Hasana, 'Ali, 185
 Hashim, Ibrahim, 189-90
 al-Hashimi, Taha, 32
 Hashemites (Iraq), 2, 24, 29, 46-47, 79, 82-83, 116, 130-31, 193, 195, 205-206, 222-23, 230, 236, 243
 Hashemites (Jordan), 46, 82, 116, 205, 211, 236, 250
 Hatim, 'Abd al-Karim, 25, 104
 Haykal, Hussein, 30
 Hegemony
 Arab Hegemony, 66, 76, 81, 125, 130, 192, 206, 223, 235, 243, 245-46, 249, 251-52
 Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry, 1-2, 12-38, 66, 192, 195, 219, 246, 251-52
 Pan-Arab ideology, 28-33
 World politics, 8-13
 Heikal, Mohamed, 30, 32, 45, 89, 166
 Hijaz, 24, 116, 193, 205, 209
 al-Hiyari, 'Ali, 213
 Hooper, John, 102
 al-Husri, Sati', 29-32
 al-Husry, Khaldun, 244
 Hussein, Ahmad (Misr al-Fatat), 30, 31 (n.)
 Hussein, Ahmad (Egyptian Ambassador), 77, 162, 200

 Hussein, King of Hijaz, 193, 209
 Hussein, King of Jordan, 94, 114-15, 117, 128, 168, 172, 174-78, 182, 184-90, 193-94, 197, 205, 208, 211, 213, 226, 231-33, 237-40
 Hussein, Saddam, 30
 al-Husseini, Jamal, 207

 Ibn Khaldun, 13 (n.)
 Ibn Sa'ud, King of Saudi Arabia (1932-53), 46, 48, 52, 160 (n.), 193, 205-207, 210
 Idha'at al-'Arab (radio station), 194
 India, 67, 147
 Iran (Persia), 1, 16, 34, 39, 41-43, 50, 61-63, 83, 88, 91, 93-95, 99-100, 118-19, 123, 129-30, 208, 213-14, 215 (n.), 217, 232, 241-42
 Accession to Baghdad Pact, 163 (n.), 167
 Iraq (see also: Turco-Iraqi Pact), 1, 13, 15, 18, 21, 34, 39, 46, 51
 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930), revision of, 80, 90, 118-25
 Arab Collective Security Pact (ACSP), 47-48, 53, 145
 Baghdad Pact, 4, 20, 35, 183, 196, 201, 213-14, 219-20, 222, 229-30, 233-34, 239, 240-43, 246-47, 250
 Britain, 34, 40, 63, 80-81, 87, 91-95, 100-101, 105, 212-13, 221, 234, 242-43, 250-51
 Cairo Conference (1955), 107-12
 Demographic capabilities, 17-20
 Domestic affairs, 66, 71, 75, 79-82, 212, 217-18
 Economic capabilities, 21-24, 36
 Egypt, 65, 68, 72, 80, 82-89, 98-99, 103-104, 105, 110-14, 117-19, 127, 131, 146, 149-52, 195-96, 200-202, 212, 218, 220-22, 236, 243-46, 251
 Eisenhower Doctrine, 225
 Foreign policy, 5, 48, 90, 108, 233-34
 France, 214
 Geographic location, 14-17
 Hegemony, 1-2, 12, 28, 33-38, 47, 66, 76, 81, 90, 125, 130, 192, 195, 212, 221-22, 229-30, 243, 248, 251-52
 Jordan, 46, 117, 174, 179-80, 187, 189-190, 193-94, 203, 211, 213, 219 (n.), 230-34, 237-40

- Lebanon, 117, 130, 142, 145,
 153-54, 179, 228
 Middle East Command (MEC),
 51-52
 Military capabilities, 20-21
 Military coup (1958), 3, 24, 38, 89,
 202, 241, 246, 251
 Morocco, 202-205, 228
 Palestine question, 215
 Pakistan, 66, 80, 83, 87, 91-92
 Pan-Arabism, 2, 28-33, 243
 Political capabilities, 24-27, 35
 Propaganda, 26, 117, 149-52
 Role perception, 27-28
 Saudi Arabia, 29, 83, 116, 152, 193,
 205-11, 216, 227, 230-34,
 237-40, 247
 Soviet Union, 49, 81, 90, 241, 248,
 250
 Sudan, 228
 Syria, 3-4, 20, 25-26, 46, 71, 73,
 75, 82, 89, 117, 128, 131,
 133-34, 138, 143-46, 156-57,
 160-61, 167-70, 208, 217-18,
 228, 238, 245
 Tripartite pact, 159
 Tunisia, 202-205
 Turco-Pakistani Agreement, 64-68,
 248
 Turkey, 58-59, 65-66, 93-95,
 100-102, 250
 United Arab Republic (UAR), 241,
 252
 United States, 20, 64, 69, 84-85,
 91-92, 105, 221, 238
 US-Iraqi Assistance Agreement
 (1954), 20, 65, 69, 75
 Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), 23
 Ireland, Philip, 84-85
 Israel (Zionism), 20, 34-35, 42-44, 46,
 48-49, 54, 65, 72, 74, 83-85, 93,
 101, 109, 112, 117, 124, 126-29,
 133, 135 (n.), 142, 144, 145 (n.),
 147, 151-52, 157, 164-66, 168 (n.),
 169-70, 172, 174-75, 180, 182,
 191-92, 196, 202, 211-15, 218,
 223-24, 244, 246, 249-50
 Istiqlal Party (Iraq), 66
 Italy, 39, 43

 Jabr, Salih, 150
 al-Jamali, Fadil, 30-31, 64-67, 71, 75,
 107-108, 110, 117, 123, 150, 160,
 161 (n.), 203-204
 Turco-Pakistani Agreement, 64-68
 Jawdat, 'Ali, 58, 82, 233-34
 Johnston, Charles, 231 (n.), 232, 239
 Johnston Plan, 198
 Jordan (see also: Iraq, Egypt, Saudi
 Arabia), 13, 15, 18, 20-21, 23, 26,
 34, 37, 46-47, 52, 58, 73, 112-14,
 125, 128, 131, 147, 168, 171, 223,
 225-26, 236, 245
 Abu Nuwar coup (1957), 231
 Baghdad Pact, 34, 170-195,
 196-197, 202, 219, 239, 245-47
 Britain, 40, 46, 111, 172-74,
 176-78, 183-86, 190-91, 226
 Lebanon, 178-79
 Palestine problem, 183-87, 191
 Palestinians, 180, 182, 184
 Riots, 187-90
 Syria, 174-76, 231
 Turco-Iraqi Pact, 102, 106, 109,
 111, 115, 136, 140, 142, 145,
 154-55, 172-73
 Turkey, 173-79
 United States, 145 (n.), 174-75, 183,
 199
 al-Jundi, Ahmad, 182

 Karami, Rashid, 169
 al-Kaylani, Rashid 'Ali, 31
 Khalil, Sayyid 'Abdallah, 228
 al-Khoury, Faris, 106-108, 113
 al-Kikhya, Rushdi, 160
 Korean War, 43, 46
 Kurds, 19
 Kuwait, 23, 228, 238

 Lebanon (see also Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,
 Saudi Arabia), 13, 15, 18, 21, 23,
 36, 42, 47-48, 52, 58, 73, 75, 112,
 114, 125, 130, 133, 143-44, 156,
 171, 183, 215, 228
 Baghdad Pact, 34, 178-79, 180 (n.),
 183, 192, 215-16, 223, 225, 232,
 236, 245
 Mediator in Arab affairs, 74, 130,
 133, 153-55, 170
 Middle East Defense, 80
 Syria, 169-70
 Turco-Iraqi Pact, 102, 106, 108,
 110, 136, 139 (n.), 140, 176-77
 Turco-Pakistani Agreement, 70, 74
 Turkey, 153
 United States, 153, 199, 228
 Libya, 13, 15, 18, 107-108, 111,
 192, 203-204, 223, 225, 228,
 232, 245

- Lloyd, Selwyn, 62, 80, 91, 174, 190, 197–98, 200, 204
- Macmillan, Harold, 178, 182, 190
- al-Mahdawi trials, 182 (n.)
- al-Majali, Haza', 173 (n.), 180, 182 (n.), 186–88, 190
- Dismissal, 188
- Assassination, 188 (n.)
- al-Malki, 'Adnan, 144, 146–47
- Marshall Plan, 39
- Marwa, Kamil, 205
- Massigli, René, 91
- Mediterranean Sea, 14, 66, 80, 94, 96
- Menderes, 'Adnan, 58, 62, 72, 94–95, 98, 100–103, 106, 117, 119–23, 126, 153, 180, 216, 248
- Mesopotamia, 1, 14
- Middle East Charter, 224
- Middle East Command (MEC), 50–55, 84, 124, 249
- Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), 53–60, 62, 84, 97, 119, 124, 249
- Middle East News Agency (MENA), 104
- Middle East system, 6, 12–13
- al-Midfa'i, Jamil, 58–59, 150, 156, 218
- Mirjan, 'Abd al-Wahhab, 234
- Misr al-Fatat ("Young Egypt"), 31 (n.), 56
- Moose, Edwin, 133 (n.), 134
- Morocco, 13, 15, 18, 223, 225, 232, 245–46
- Baghdad Pact, 202–205, 228
- Mosul, 94
- Mountbatten, Lord, 96–97, 99
- Mubarak, Zaki, 30
- al-Mufti, Sa'id, 174, 176, 184–86
- Muhammad V, King of Morocco, 203, 228
- al-Mulki, Fawzi, 114, 115 (n.)
- al-Mumayyiz, Amin, 182, 193, 205 (n.)
- Muslim Brotherhood, 56, 88, 96
- al-Nabulsi, Suleiman, 182, 231
- Naguib, Muhammad, 23, 55–57, 60, 62, 75, 77, 96
- Nahas, Mustafa, 30, 46, 48, 51
- Nashashibi, 'Izmi, 185
- National Bloc (Syria), 159 (n.)
- National Democratic Party (Iraq), 66
- National Party (Syria), 114, 133–34, 143–44, 146, 160–62
- National-Socialist Party (Jordan), 181, 187
- Nehru, 56, 116, 147, 210–11
- Neutralism, 56, 116, 132, 148–49
- New York Times (NYT), 77
- New Zealand, 50
- Nile Valley, 1, 14, 149, 243
- Non-Alignment (see Neutralism)
- Northern Tier, 59–63, 66, 85–86, 93, 101, 103, 111, 141–42, 151, 183, 192
- North Africa (see also: Libya, Morocco, Tunisia), 14, 34, 229
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1, 39–43, 45, 48, 50, 58, 70, 91, 93, 192, 225, 236, 243
- Nutting, Anthony, 96, 149 (n.), 174, 229–30
- Omega Plan, 199
- Ottoman Empire, 2–3, 15–16, 47, 59, 220
- Pakistan (see also: Turco-Pakistani Agreement, Iraq), 1, 53–54, 61, 65, 71–72, 83, 87–88, 91–92, 94, 98, 100, 118, 129, 147, 214–16, 224, 232, 241–42
- Accession to Baghdad Pact, 163, 167
- Palestine question (see Arab-Israeli Conflict)
- Palestine War (1948), 43, 45, 71
- Pan-Arabism, 28–33, 36, 236, 243–44
- Parkes, Roderick, 207, 209, 211
- People's Party (Syria), 106, 113–14, 133, 143, 146, 160–62, 164, 168
- Persian Gulf, 16
- Portsmouth Treaty (1948), 40, 52, 58, 66, 80, 87, 118, 140, 250
- Qasim, 'Abd al-Karim, 202, 241, 252
- Qazzaz, Sa'id, 212
- al-Qiyyali, Fakhir, 158
- al-Qudsi, Nazim, 48, 160
- al-Quwatly, Shukry, 113, 159–62, 210–11
- Rabbath, Edmond, 29
- Radwan, Tahir, 207
- Rashid 'Ali (see al-Kaylani)
- al-Rawi, Jalil, 145
- al-Rawi, Najib, 84 (n.), 86, 151, 200–201
- Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), 68, 78–79, 100, 104, 109
- Riad, Mahmud, 113, 138

- Richards, James, 225
 al-Rifa'i, Samir, 190, 194, 237, 239
 Rimawi, 'Abdallah, 182
 Robertson, Brian General, 54, 57–58
 Rose, Michael, 183
 Royal Air Force (RAF), 93, 140
- Sa'adabad Pact (1937), 39–40, 43, 215, 240, 250
 al-Sadat, Anwar, 104, 126 (n.), 186
 al-Sa'id, Nuri (see also: 'Abd al-Nasir, Iraq), 2–3, 24–25, 47, 59, 67–68, 75, 104, 115, 134–36, 143–45, 150, 153, 169, 173 (n.), 182, 194 (n.), 195, 219–20, 230, 233
 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, revision of, 79–81, 84, 100, 118–25, 139–41, 243, 248
 Arab Collective Security Pact (ACSP), 47–48, 53, 58
 Assassination, 241, 243
 Baghdad Pact, attempts to recruit Arab states, 174, 179–80, 190, 202–205, 216–17, 227
 Cairo Conference, 106–12
 Defense plans, 46–49, 53–54, 57–58, 61–62, 67, 80–81, 83–89, 91–92, 100
 Dismissal, 213, 218, 233
 Fertile Crescent Plan (1947), 5, 29–30, 32–33, 47, 111–12, 141, 145 (n.), 193, 206, 246, 251
 Iraqi hegemony, 141, 248, 251–52
 Iraqi policy, 5, 47
 Middle East Command (MEC), 51–52
 Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), 57–58
 Pan-Arabism, 33, 36, 220
 Sarsank talks, 82–89
 Saudi Arabia, detaching from Egypt, 208–11
 Turco-Pakistani Agreement, 67
 Turkey, negotiations with, 93–95, 100–102, 118–25
 United Arab Republic (UAR), 237 (n.)
- Salah, Salim, 25, 65, 73–74, 80, 99, 104, 109, 114, 126, 128–30, 136, 151, 160, 163
 Sarsank talks, 82–87
 Salih, Walid, 106, 109, 111, 129 (n.)
 Sarsank talks, 82–87
 Sasson, Eliyahu, 146 (n.)
 Sa'ud, King of Saudi Arabia (1953–64), 70, 73, 116, 129–30, 154, 193, 199, 206–11, 217, 221, 226–28, 232–33, 235, 237, 239–40, 247, 249
 Arab Union, 237–38
 Meeting with 'Abd al-illah, 227, 230
 Visit in Baghdad, 231
- Saudi Arabia (see also: Egypt, Iraq), 13, 15, 18, 21, 23, 36–37, 47, 51–52, 58, 73, 113, 120, 125, 192, 223, 225–26, 236, 245
 Baghdad Pact, 34, 193, 202, 206, 215–16, 227, 231, 238, 246
 Britain, 129, 190, 208
 Jordan, 116, 182, 186–88, 190–91, 193, 205–11, 230–34, 237–40
 Lebanon, 116, 153–55
 Syria, 156–66, 169–71, 210, 232
 Tripartite Declaration (1955), 128–29
 Tripartite pact, 136–38, 148
 Turco-Iraqi Pact, 106, 110, 114, 116, 129–30, 154
 Turkey, 73–74, 106, 141
 United States, 116–17, 129, 199, 207–208, 227, 249
- Saudi-Hashemite conflict, 205–206, 227, 240, 244
 Sawt al-'Arab, 104, 126, 149–52, 187
 SEATO, 1, 115, 139, 197–98, 243
 Shahbandar, Musa, 99, 108
 Sham'un, Kamil, 74, 106–107, 115 (n.), 130, 153–56, 170, 176, 178–79, 180 (n.), 215–16, 230
 Sharifians, 5, 250
 Shatt al-'Arab, 16
 Shawqat, Sami, 29–30
 Shihab, Fouad, 170
 Shi'ites, 19
 Shishakli, Adib, 61, 70–71, 143, 158, 161
 Shu'aiba airfield, 93, 140
 Shuckburgh, Evelyn, 91, 99
 al-Shuqair, Shawqat, 144, 160
 al-Shuqairi, Ahmad, 73
 Slim, William Field Marshall, 45, 50
 South Africa, 50
 Soviet Union, 1, 34, 41–44, 46, 49–50, 55, 60–62, 64, 70, 78, 81, 88, 97, 99, 127, 129, 133, 151, 162, 168 (n.), 198–99, 207, 210, 215–16, 222–24, 227, 229, 232, 235, 241, 243, 246–48, 250
- SSNP, 146–47
 State Department (see United States)
 Stevens, Roger, 225

- Stevenson, Ralph, 48, 54, 75, 83, 106, 112, 127, 130–31, 141
- Sudan, 13, 15–16, 51, 59, 151, 163, 192, 223, 228–30, 232, 245
- Suez agreement (see Anglo-Egyptian Agreement)
- Suez base, 41, 50, 55, 60, 77, 88, 247–48
- Suez Canal, 22, 93, 116, 212
Nationalization, 202, 204, 209, 211
- Suez crisis, 209–10, 217, 222–23
- Suez War, 20, 34, 88, 211–12, 215, 223, 228, 231, 245, 247
- al-Sulh, Riad, 45
- al-Sulh, Sami, 106–107, 109, 153–54
- al-Suwaidi, Tawfiq, 58–59, 156–57, 160, 220
- Syria (see also: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia), 3, 13–15, 18, 21, 23, 34, 36–37, 47–48, 52, 61, 91, 94–95, 112, 125, 192, 223, 225–26, 229–30, 232, 245
- Arab hegemony, 3
- Army, involvement in politics, 133 (n.), 143–47, 160–61, 165–66, 218
- Baghdad Pact, 34, 113, 171, 179, 202, 219, 245–46
- Balancer in Arab affairs, 133, 167–71
- Bilateral agreements, 164–67
- Britain, 145, 157
- Domestic affairs, 113–14, 128, 134–35, 143–44, 158–62, 232, 234–35
- Iraqi coup (1956), 217–18
- Middle East Defense, 80, 129
- Presidential elections (1955), 134, 158–62
- Tripartite Declaration (1955), 128–29, 132–35
- Tripartite pact, 136–38, 143, 148, 153 (n.), 164
- Turco-Iraqi Pact, 102, 105–106, 108, 110, 114, 133, 142–43, 157, 164
- Turco-Pakistani Agreement, 66–67, 70–71
- Turkey, 133–35, 144–46, 157, 161, 235
- United States, 133–35, 157, 160, 199, 234–235, 238
- Talal, Prince, 155
- Talal, King of Jordan (1951–53), 179 (n.), 205
- Tall, Merwede, 172 (n.)
- Tall, Wasfi, 172 (n.)
- Templer, Jerald, General, 183–86
- Thabit, Karim, 30
- Tigris, 14, 16
- Tito, Marshall, 116
- Trevelyan, Humprey, 163–64, 181, 192, 196–97, 200, 204
- Tripartite Declaration (1950), 42
- Tripartite Declaration (1955), 126, 128–30, 133–34
- Tripartite pact, negotiations for, 136–38, 144, 146, 148, 151–52, 154–59, 164, 166–67
- Troutback, John, 51–53, 59, 66, 80, 87, 92, 100–101
- Truman Doctrine, 39
- Tunisia, 13, 15, 18, 223, 225, 228, 230, 232, 245–46
- Baghdad Pact, 202–205
- Turco-Iraqi Agreement (1946), 40, 67, 250
- Turco-Iraqi Pact (1955), 1, 34, 90, 99–103, 105, 107, 113, 115–17, 118–25, 126, 129–30, 132, 134, 138–39, 142–43, 147, 151–52, 156, 161, 184, 185 (n.), 247–50
- Text, Appendix One
- Turco-Pakistani Agreement (1954), 63–76, 81, 84–86, 92–94, 99, 103, 105, 125, 142, 248
- Turkey (see also: Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Turco-Iraqi Pact, Turco-Pakistani Agreement), 4, 34, 39, 41–43, 45–46, 48, 54, 61–62, 73–74, 77, 83, 88, 91, 93, 96, 98, 117, 129–31, 134–35, 141, 161, 230, 235, 241–42, 250
- Baghdad Pact, 4, 196, 214, 247, 250
- Israel, 130, 175 (n.), 216
- Middle East Command (MEC), 50
- Middle East Defense, 93–95, 98, 105, 248
- Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), 58
- NATO, 58
- ‘Umari, Musrafa, 71
- United Arab Republic (UAR), 114, 223, 235–38, 240–41, 246, 251–52
- Baghdad Pact, 236
- United Kingdom (UK, see Britain)
- United Nations (UN), 214
- United Nations Charter, 48 (n.), 83, 88, 98, 111, 124, 231, 238

- United Nations Resolution 181 (1947),
 84 (n.), 102, 122, 153, 175–76, 215
 United Nations Security Council, 128
 United States (US, see also: Egypt,
 Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi
 Arabia, Syria, Britain), 39, 43, 83,
 222
 Alpha Plan, 127
 Baghdad Pact, 4, 34, 183, 196,
 198–99, 215–16, 224–26, 229,
 233, 236, 241–42, 249
 Middle East Command (MEC),
 50–53
 Middle East Defense, 40–43, 50,
 54–55, 63, 91, 95, 101–102, 129,
 224–25, 247–49
 Middle East Defense Organization
 (MEDO), 53–59
 Northern Tier concept, 59–63
 Omega Plan, 199
 Tripartite pact, 159
 Turco–Iraqi Pact, 102–103, 118–22,
 127, 142, 145, 153, 248
 Turco–Pakistani Agreement, 64, 67,
 69, 71–72, 84–86, 101, 248
 USSR (see Soviet Union)
- Voice of the Arabs (see Sawt al-‘Arab)
 Voice of Free Egypt, 149–52
 Voice of Free Iraq, 149–52
- Wafd Party, 46, 51, 54
 Warren, Avra, 94–95
 West Bank (Jordan), 188
 Wright, Michael, 118–25, 140, 145,
 150, 200, 212, 220–21, 225, 230,
 233
- al-Yafi, ‘Abdallah, 73–74
 Yassin, Yusuf, 73, 160 (n.), 207
 Yemen, 13, 15, 18, 21, 37, 47, 74,
 107–108, 110, 125, 167, 171
 Turco–Iraqi Pact, 106
- Zafarallah Khan, 71
 Zaghulul, Sa’d, 30 (n.)
 Zagros Mountain, 129
 Za‘im, Husni, 143, 160 (n.)
 Zayd, Amir, 179 (n.), 209
 Zionism (see Israel)
 Zorlu, Fetim, 198 (n.), 175–76

Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East/Études sociales, économiques et politiques du Moyen-Orient

Brill's *Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East* series is designed to present the results of scholarly research into social, cultural, economic and political conditions in the Middle East today. It covers the past only insofar as it provides an introduction to the twentieth century. The series includes monographs, collaborative volumes and reference works by social scientists from all disciplines.

EDITED BY C. A. O. VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE

1. NIEUWENHUIJZE, C.A.O. VAN. *Sociology of the Middle East*. A stocktaking and interpretation. 1971. ISBN 90 04 02564 2
2. ZUWIYYA, J. *The parliamentary election of Lebanon 1968*. 1972. ISBN 90 04 03460 9
3. MANSUR, F. *Bodrum, a town in the Aegean*. 1972. ISBN 90 04 03424 2
5. FRY, M.J. *Finance and development planning in Turkey*. 1972. ISBN 90 04 03462 5
6. KHALAF, S. and P. KONGSTAD. *Hamra of Beirut*. A case of rapid urbanization. 1973. ISBN 90 04 03548 6
7. KARPAT, K.H. (ed.). *Social change and politics in Turkey*. A structural-historical analysis. 1973. ISBN 90 04 03817 5
8. WEIKER, W.F. *Political tutelage and democracy in Turkey*. The Free Party and its aftermath. 1973. ISBN 90 04 03818 3
9. BENEDICT, P., E. TÜMERTEKIN and F. MANSUR (eds.). *Turkey*. Geographic and social perspectives. 1974. ISBN 90 04 03889 2
10. ENTELIS, J.P. *Pluralism and party transformation in Lebanon*: Al-Kata'ib, 1936-1970. 1974. ISBN 90 04 03911 2
12. BENEDICT, P. *Ula, an Anatolian town*. 1974. ISBN 90 04 03882 5
13. AMIN, G.A. *The modernization of poverty*. A study in the political economy of growth in nine Arab countries, 1945-1970. Photomech. repr. 1980. ISBN 90 04 06193 2
14. LANDAU, J.M. *Radical politics in modern Turkey*. 1974. ISBN 90 04 04016 1
15. FRY, M.J. *The Afghan economy*. Money, finance, and the critical constraints to economic development. 1974. ISBN 90 04 03986 4
16. KRANE, R.E. (ed.). *Manpower mobility across cultural boundaries*. Social, economic and legal aspects. The case of Turkey and West Germany. 1975. ISBN 90 04 04008 0
17. KARPAT, K.H. (ed.). *Turkey's foreign policy in transition, 1950-1974*. 1975. ISBN 90 04 04323 3
19. ABADAN-UNAT, N. (ed.). *Turkish workers in Europe, 1960-1975*. A socio-economic reappraisal. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04478 7
20. STAFFA, S.J. *Conquest and fusion*. The social evolution of Cairo A.D. 642-1850. 1977. ISBN 90 04 04774 3
21. NIEUWENHUIJZE, C.A.O. VAN (ed.). *Commoners, climbers and notables*. A sampler of studies on social ranking in the Middle East. 1977. ISBN 90 04 05065 5
23. STARR, J. *Dispute and settlement in rural Turkey*. An ethnography of law. 1978. ISBN 90 04 05661 0
24. EL-MESSIRI, S. *Ibn al-Balad*. A concept of Egyptian identity. 1978. ISBN 90 04 05664 5

25. ISRAELI, R. *The public diary of President Sadat*. 3 parts. 1. The road to war. 1978. ISBN 90 04 05702 1 2. The road of diplomacy: the continuation of war by other means. 1978. ISBN 90 04 05865 6 3. The road of pragmatism. 1979. ISBN 90 04 05866 4
26. EISENMAN, R.H. *Islamic law in Palestine and Israel*. A history of the survival of Tanzimat and Shari'a in the British Mandate and the Jewish State. 1978. ISBN 90 04 05730 7
28. ALLMAN, J. *Social mobility, education and development in Tunisia*. 1979. ISBN 90 04 05875 3
29. GRANDIN, N. *Le Soudan nilotique et l'administration britannique*. Éléments d'interprétation socio-historique d'une expérience coloniale. 1982. ISBN 90 04 06404 4
30. ABADAN-UNAT, N., D. KANDIYOTI and M.B. KIRAY (ed.). *Women in Turkish society*. 1981. ISBN 90 04 06346 2
31. LAYISH, A. *Marriage, divorce and succession in the Druze family*. A study based on decisions of Druze arbitrators and religious courts in Israel and the Golan Heights. 1982. ISBN 90 04 06412 5
32. TOPRAK, B. *Islam and political development in Turkey*. 1981. ISBN 90 04 06471 0
33. EL-MEHAIRY, T. *Medical doctors*. A study of role concept and job satisfaction. The Egyptian case. 1984. ISBN 90 04 07038 9
34. ATIŞ, S.M. *Semantic structuring in the modern Turkish short story*. An analysis of *The Dreams of Abdullah Efendi* and other short stories by Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar. 1983. ISBN 90 04 07117 2
35. PARLA, T. *The social and political thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924*. 1985. ISBN 90 04 07229 2
36. KAMALI, M.H. *Law in Afghanistan*. A study of the constitutions, matrimonial law and the judiciary. 1985. ISBN 90 04 07128 8
37. NIEUWENHUIJZE, C.A.O. VAN. *The lifestyles of Islam*. Recourse to classicism—need of realism. 1985. ISBN 90 04 07420 1
38. FATHI, A. (ed.). *Women and the family in Iran*. 1985. ISBN 90 04 07426 0
40. NIEUWENHUIJZE, C.A.O. VAN, M.F. AL-KHATIB, A. AZER. *The poor man's model of development*. Development potential at low levels of living in Egypt. 1985. ISBN 90 04 07696 4
41. SCHULZE, R. *Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert*. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der islamischen Weltliga. 1990. ISBN 90 04 08286 7
42. CHILDS, T.W. *Italo-Turkish diplomacy and the war over Libya, 1911-1912*. 1990. ISBN 90 04 09025 8
45. LIPOVSKY, I.P. *The Socialist Movement in Turkey 1960-1980*. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09582 9
46. RISPLER-CHAIM, V. *Islamic Medical Ethics in the Twentieth Century*. 1993. ISBN 90 04 09608 6
47. KHALAF, S. and P. S. KHOURY (eds.). *Recovering Beirut*. Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction. With an Introduction by R. Sennett. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09911 5
48. MARDIN, Ş. (ed.). *Cultural Transitions in the Middle East*. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09873 9
49. WAART, P.J.I.M. DE. *Dynamics of Self-Determination in Palestine*. Protection of Peoples as a Human Right. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09825 9
50. NORTON, A.R. (ed.). *Civil Society in the Middle East*. Volume I. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10037 7

NORTON, A.R. (ed.). *Civil Society in the Middle East*. Volume II. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10039 3

51. AMIN, G.A. *Egypt's Economic Predicament*. A study in the Interaction of External Pressure, Political Folly and Social Tension in Egypt, 1960-1990. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10188 8
52. PODEH, E. *The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World*. The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact. 1995. ISBN 90 04 10214 0