

AL-ḲĀSIM B. IBRĀHĪM
ON THE PROOF
OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

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AL-ḲĀSIM B. IBRĀHĪM ON THE PROOF OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

Kitāb al-Dalīl al-Kabīr

EDITED WITH TRANSLATION,
INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

To my parents

Rahel and Eliyahu Abrahamov

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PREFACE

The present work is an adaptation of a part of my Ph.D. thesis—*The Theological Epistles of al-Ḳāsim ibn Ibrāhīm*—originally written in Hebrew. This thesis was supervised by Prof. Michael Schwarz, to whom I am grateful for his guidance. I am also indebted to Prof. Etan Kohlberg, who encouraged me to edit and translate this epistle into English, read the translation and notes and made valuable remarks. Thanks are also due to Prof. Hans Daiber for his important remarks and suggestions. I wish to thank Dr. Toby Mostisher for correcting my English. My thanks are also extended to the Ambrosiana Library in Milano, and the Orientabteilung der Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, for permission to use microfilms of the manuscripts mentioned below and to edit the text. The last acknowledgement I should like to make is to my wife Shuli and my children Hanan, Zipi, Nadav, Idit and Zeevi for encouraging me in the writing of this book.

Tel Aviv, June 20, 1988

Binyamin Abrahamov

ABBREVIATIONS

- ‘Abd al-Djabbār, *K. al-madjmū‘* = ‘Abd al-Djabbār, *K. al-madjmū‘ fī’l-muḥīt bi’l-taklīf*, ed. J. J. Houben, Vol. I, Beirut 1965.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I. The main subject of our epistle is the argument from design. This argument proves the existence of God through the wonderful design observed all over the universe. The argument from design was already used by the ancients. It is ascribed to Socrates by Xenophanes¹ and Plato² and also used by Cicero³. In his early work *De Philosophia* (fragm. 12a), Aristotle proves the existence of God from the order of the movements of the heavens⁴. In like manner, the Stoa proves God's existence⁵. Both Aristotle and the Stoa employ the teleological argument, which is a part of the argument from design (see below pp. 5, 8f), to refute the notion, held inter alios by Heraclitus, that all occurrences in the universe take place on account of chance or necessary fate⁶. The argument from design may have been passed from Greek philosophers to the Christians who lived in Islamic lands through the writings of Christian thinkers like Augustine (d. 430)⁷ or Boethius (d. 524)⁸. In the eighth and ninth centuries, we find the argument from design in the writings of both Christian and Muslim Mutakallimun. Among the Christians one can mention John of Damascus (d.c. 750), Theodore Abū Ḳurra (d.c. 825)⁹ and 'Ammār al-Baṣrī (d.c. 845)¹⁰. The Christian Mutakallimun may have exerted influence on the Muslim Mutakallimun in this subject matter through polemical meetings¹¹ or through conversions of Christians to Islam¹².

¹ See *Memorabilia*, IV. 3.

² See *Phaedo* 96ff.

³ See *De Natura Deorum* II. 5. Wolfson, "Notes", p. 582. Idem, *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion*, Cambridge Mass. 1977, Vol. I, p. 568.

⁴ See B. Effe, *Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der Aristotelischen Schrift "Über die Philosophie"*, München 1968 (= Zetemata 50), pp. 88ff.

⁵ See M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Göttingen 1964, Vol. I, p. 94f. W. J. Oates (ed.), *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers*, New York 1940, pp. 235ff. E. Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, tr. from the German by O. J. Reichal, revised ed. New York 1962, p. 174.

⁶ See Daiber, *Mu'ammār*, p. 161.

⁷ See Q. Huonder, *Die Gottesbeweise*, Stuttgart 1968, p. 40. G. Grunwald, *Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter bis zum Ausgang der Hochscholastik*, Münster 1907, p. 7f.

⁸ See Huonder, *ibid.*, p. 36.

⁹ See Davidson, "John Philoponus", pp. 373ff.

¹⁰ See 'Ammār al-Baṣrī, *K. al-masā'il wa'l-adjawiba*, ed. M. Hayek, Beirut 1977, p. 95f. Griffith, "'Ammār al-Baṣrī's'", p. 160f.

¹¹ See M. A. Cook, "The Origins of Kalam", *BSOAS* 43 (1980), p. 40f.

¹² See J. van Ess, "The Beginnings of Islamic Theology", in *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning*, eds. J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla, Dordrecht and Boston, 1975, p. 100.

The argument from design was frequently discussed by the Muʿtazilite Mutakallimun and from them probably passed into Zaydite theological literature¹³. There are some Muʿtazilites, contemporaries of al-Ḳāsim, who are recorded as having used this argument. Hishām al-Fuwaṭī (fl.c. 825), a Basrian Muʿtazilite, employs the argument from design saying that bodies (*adjsām*) with their colours and their combination and separation prove that God is their Creator and Director (*mudabbir*)¹⁴. In his opinion, accidents alone do not demonstrate God's existence, since the arguments for God's existence must necessarily (*bi-dṭirār*) be known, whereas the existence of accidents is known through inference (*istidlāl*) and speculation¹⁵. Bodies prove God's existence, since their existence is known through the senses. The argument from composition advanced by Hishām al-Fuwaṭī is nothing but a restatement of the argument from design. For the composition is one of the signs attesting the existence of one who makes (composes) wisely, and this cannot be other than God¹⁶. Al-Nazzām, a Basrian Muʿtazilite too, uses the argument from composition. But unlike Hishām al-Fuwaṭī, he first infers from the composition observed in the world the coming of the world into being. Only at the second stage does he deduce God's existence from the coming of the world into being. Al-Nazzām says that heat and cold are opposites, hence they cannot be combined by virtue of themselves in a single place. Finding that they are in fact combined, he knows that someone combined them and compelled them to be combined in contradiction to their nature. That which is compelled is weak, and the fact that it is weak and that the compeller directs it, proves its being brought into being and that someone brought it into being and created it¹⁷. Al-Djāḥiẓ (d.869), al-Nazzām's disciple, is probably the author of a treatise entitled *K. al-ʿibar wa'l-iʿtibār* ("The Book of Illustrations and (their) Learning")¹⁸. This

¹³ See Gibb, "The Argument from Design", p. 152.

¹⁴ See al-Khayyāt, *K. al-intiṣār*, p. 49, ll. 8-9 of the Arabic text.

¹⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 49, ll. 1-6. Cf. al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq*, p. 162. ʿAbbād ibn Sulaymān (d.ca. 864), Hishām's disciple, followed his master in this matter. See al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 225, l. 14- p. 226, l. 1, p. 227, ll. 3-5.

¹⁶ See Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 388f.

¹⁷ See al-Khayyāt, *K. al-intiṣār*, p. 40f. From the combination of opposites al-Māturīdī once infers the coming of the world into being and another time God's existence. See *K. al-tawḥīd*, p. 12, ll. 3-4, p. 18, ll. 1-2. Al-Nazzām's argument is reminiscent of the argument of John of Damascus (d.ca. 750), who deduces the existence of a creator from the combination and arrangement of opposite elements into a well-designed universe. Cf. Davidson, "John Philoponus", p. 373f.

¹⁸ Gibb ("The Argument from Design") translates the title: "The Book of Illustrations and Evidence (or Admonition)". The authenticity of this work has been doubted by Ch. Pellat in his "Ġāḥiẓiana III. Essai d'inventaire de l'oeuvre Ġāḥiẓienne", *Arabica* 3(1956), p. 159 and approved by J. van Ess in his "Early Islamic Theologians", p. 78f, n. 7. On the two versions of this treatise see Daiber, *Muʿammar*, p. 159. J. van Ess, *ibid.*

Muʿtazilite work aims at proving God's existence and unity through the order of the natural phenomena observed in the universe. That the design in the universe serves not only as an argument for God's existence but also for His unity, wisdom, knowledge and might is shown through the writings of another contemporary of al-Ḳāsim, namely, al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857), an orthodox Mutakallim¹⁹.

Although the argument from design was not accepted by the dogmatic schools, and consequently was not formulated in scholastic terms, like the argument from coming into being (*dalīl al-ḥudūth*) and the argument from admissibility (*dalīl al-djawāz*), it is found in Islamic Theology from the ninth century onwards alongside these two arguments²⁰. The Muʿtazilite historian al-Maḳḍisī (d. 966) considers the design observed in the universe an argument for God's existence²¹. The assumption underlying this argument is that there is no sign without a maker, and there is no making without a maker²². Al-Maḳḍisī also uses other arguments: a. The argument from particularization (*takhṣīṣ*); b. The argument from changes; c. The argument from composition. His arguments b and c are in effect arguments from design in other terms (see below). The first argument examines the difference seen between the created things. If things were produced by the natures of other things (*mukawwana bi'l-ṭibāʿ*)²³, their conditions would be equal. Since we find created things in a contrary condition, i.e., they are not equal to one another and are in different degree, we know that a director directed them (*mudabbir dabbarahā*) and an arranger arranged them (*murattib rattabahā*), and this is

D. H. Baneth considers al-Djāḥiẓ's work a source used by both al-Ghazālī in his *K. al-ḥikma fī makhluqāt Allah* and Baḥya ibn Paḳuda in his *al-Hidāya ilā farāʾid al-ḳulūb* (chs. I, II). See "The Common Teleological Source of Baḥyā Ibn Paḳoda and al-Ghazzālī" (in Hebrew) in *Sefer Magnes*, ed. by F. J. Baer and others, Jerusalem 1938, pp. 23-30. Cf. G. Vajda, *La théologie ascétique de Baḥya Ibn Paḳoda*, Paris 1947, pp. 24ff.

¹⁹ See van Ess, *al-Muḥāsibī*, p. 163. Asked what his proof is that the Creator is one, al-Muḥāsibī answers that the Omnipotent proves His unity and omnipotence through the internal uniformity of the divine rule, i.e., the immanent design in the universe. Cf. al-Māturīdī, *K. al-tawḥīd*, p. 21, ll. 15-20. If there were two gods or more the universe would be annihilated. See van Ess, *ibid.*, p. 166. Cf. al-Ashʿarī, *K. al-lumaʿ*, p. 8 of the Arabic text. This notion is already expressed in the Ḳurʾān (sura 21, v. 22, sura 27, v. 61), but not commonly. Many verses in the Ḳurʾān (e.g. sura 2, v. 164, sura 5, v. 10) show that the design in the universe proves God's existence and indirectly His wisdom, but proofs of unity are rare. See van Ess, *ibid.*, p. 168. In cosmological treatises we often find the notion that the design in the universe expresses God's might, wisdom and unity. See Heinen, *Islamic Cosmology*, pp. 44, 46, 50.

²⁰ See Wensinck, "Les preuves", p. 20. *Dalīl al-djawāz* is also known as the argument from particularization (*takhṣīṣ*). See below p. 10f. Wolfson, *Kalam*, pp. 434-444.

²¹ See al-Maḳḍisī, *K. al-badʿ*, Vol. I, p. 64, ll. 8-10, pp. 56, 58, 69, 72-73.

²² See *ibid.*, pp. 58, 68-71.

²³ Cf. J. van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, pp. 136-137, 169. Al-Bāḳillānī refutes the view that the world was created by one of the natures. See *K. al-tamhīd*, pp. 34ff.

God²⁴. Among the myriad of signs proving God's existence there are signs of changes that take place in man. Man is incapable of preventing changes like defects or weakness from occurring in his body, and this proves that someone else causes them to occur²⁵. Every made thing proves that it has a maker: Building materials do not become a house nor does a spun thread become cloth by themselves. Materials need someone to transform them from one state into another and to make something else of them. Since the actions taking place in the world are perfect, they must have a wise agent who can only be God²⁶. The third argument, which is confused with the second, deals with the signs of composition (*āthār al-tarkīb*) in the world. The existence of the four elements together, though they are contrary to each other, proves that an able and wise director composed them²⁷.

The Ash'arite Mutakallim al-Bāḳillānī (d. 1013) proves that the universe was brought into being according to the standard Kalam argument of the coming of accidents into being. Afterwards he infers God's existence from the design observed in the universe²⁸.

The Zāhirite theologian Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064) assigns a place, by the side of the argument for God's existence from the coming of the universe into being, to the general argument from design. He refers to signs of making (*āthār al-ṣanʿ*) observed in the universe, from which the existence of the Creator can be inferred. As examples he cites the celestial spheres, which move in a fixed order, the stars and the bodies of man and animal. All these are produced and composed things, whose being produced and composition necessarily assume the existence of an agent who ordered all that out of intention (*kāṣid ilā ṣanʿa*). Ibn Ḥazm states that it is known through necessary and immediate knowledge (*maʿlūm bi-ḍarūrat al-ʿaql wa-awwalihī*) that making indicates the existence of a maker²⁹.

²⁴ See al-Maḳḍisī, *K. al-badʿ*, p. 65, ll. 6-12.

²⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 67, ll. 8-10, p. 76, ll. 5-8.

²⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 68-70. Cf. al-Ash'arī, *K. al-lumaʿ*, pp. 6-7 of the Arabic text. Al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat*, p. 12, ll. 1-6. *Idem.*, *K. al-milal*, p. 66. Al-Bāḳillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 23, art. 39.

²⁷ See al-Maḳḍisī, *ibid.*, p. 67, l. 12-p. 70, l. 4. The Jewish theologian Saadia (d. 942), who was influenced by Muʿtazilite Kalam, uses the argument from composition as an independent argument supported by the argument of the coming of accidents into being. See my article "Al-Kāsim ibn Ibrāhīm's Argument from Design", pp. 267-270.

²⁸ See *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 22f.

²⁹ See Ibn Ḥazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. I, p. 22f. Wensinck, "Les Preuves", p. 21. A necessary knowledge (*ʿilm ḍarūri*) is defined as knowledge that reaches man without the latter doing anything to attain it and without being able to prevent it from reaching him. Its opposite is acquired knowledge (*ʿilm mukṭasab*), i.e., knowledge which is attained through an intellectual effort. See Peters, *God's Created Speech*, Leiden 1976, pp. 53-56. Schwarz, "Iljā", p. 420, n. 29.

The argument from design figures also in the writings of al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). This argument, says al-Ghazālī, being acquired, since it is taught by the Qurʾān, shows the right way to know God and to achieve certainty with regard to divine matters³⁰. Al-Ghazālī's attitude in this matter is almost the same as that of Ibn Rushd (d. 1198). For the Ḥashwiyya (gross literalists)³¹, Ibn Rushd states, the mentioning of God in the Qurʾān is sufficient proof of His existence. The Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilites take the opposite view: they prove God's existence by reason, abandoning revelation and tradition as proofs. For the mystics the question of God's existence constitutes a part of their theory. If the soul is free of passion and is dedicated to contemplation, it attains the knowledge of God and of existing things.

Ibn Rushd rejects the methods mentioned above, preferring the arguments appearing in the Qurʾān, which man can learn easily, because of his inborn disposition (*fiṭra*). The first argument, according to him, is the argument from providence (*dalīl al-ʿināya*) and the second is the argument from origination (*dalīl al-ikhtirāʿ*). For our purpose the first argument is relevant. It is based on two premises: a. All things in the world accord with man's existence. b. This accord derives necessarily from an agent, who intends and wants it, since it is inconceivable that such an accord should exist incidentally. (These two premises reminds one of al-Fārābī's method in his *Risāla fī 'l-siyāsa*³² in which he states that "nature does not act purposelessly". From this statement he infers that all existent things have causes of their existence and the last cause is the Creator who is the cause of causes³³). Whoever observes day and night, the sun and the moon, discovers that they accord with man's needs and behaviour. So also animals, plants and inanimate matters accord with man, and Divine Providence evidently operates in both human and animals organs, i.e., the organs are suited to life. In this manner the argument from providence, which is a teleological argument, is identified with the argument from design. The design in the world aims at benefiting man³⁴.

³⁰ See al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, Cairo 1967-68, Vol. IV, pp. 540-546. Idem, *al-Maḥṣad al-asnā, sharḥ asmāʿ Allah al-ḥusnā*, Cairo 1968, pp. 64ff. Wensinck, "Les preuves", p. 21f.

³¹ See on them EI², Vol. III, p. 269. Peters, *God's Created Speech*, p. 22f. Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 151f.

³² Ed. by L. Cheikho in *al-Mashrik* 4(1901), pp. 648-653. See Daiber, *Muʿammar*, p. 160f.

³³ See al-Fārābī, *ibid.*, p. 650f.

³⁴ See Ibn Rushd, *Manāhidj al-adilla*, pp. 151-155. Wensinck, "Les preuves", p. 23. Ibn Rushd attaches great importance to teleological arguments for the existence and nature of God. According to him, these arguments can teach all classes of men, but the more learned they are the more they understand art and the Artisan. See Ibn Rushd,

To the list of writers who have dealt with the argument from design one can add the philosopher and theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209). That the universe is made harmoniously serves for al-Rāzī as a proof of the existence of God who wills³⁵. He treats the argument from design in his commentary on verses 22, 164 of sura 2. Commenting on verse 22, he sets forth the argument from particularization, which, as we have seen, figures in the writings of al-Maḥḍisī as a support of the argument from design. The celestial bodies (*adjsām falakiyya*) and the bodies composed of the four elements (*adjsām ʿunṣuriyya*) are equal to one another in their corporeality (*djismiyya*). The fact that some bodies are particularized by some qualities, which are measures (*maḥādīr*), forms (*ashkāl*) and places (*ahyāz*) is not because of corporeality or what is not separated from corporeality (*lawāzim*), since if some bodies were particularized by some qualities because of corporeality, all bodies would be equal in these qualities. Consequently it is proved that there is a creator who created the bodies as they are. Using such a method of proving is, according to al-Rāzī, the best way to be understood by people³⁶. In his commentary on verse 164, he deals in detail with the arrangement and design of the stars and the celestial spheres and design on earth as a proof of God's existence. Here he repeats the argument from particularization and mentions the argument from changes, which we have seen in al-Maḥḍisī. The argument from design is identified with the teleological argument and interwoven with it also in al-Rāzī. Al-Rāzī's exposition, however, is different from his predecessors in that he uses not only Qurʾān verses to prove the design existing in the universe but also available scientific knowledge in astronomy, geography and biology³⁷.

II. Al-Ḳāsim ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ḥasan ibn al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī was born in 169/785. There is no information about his youth, but he probably grew up in al-Madīna. Al-Ḳāsim came to Egypt before 199/815 and stayed there till 212/826. In Egypt al-Ḳāsim took part in discussions with philosophers and theologians, Muslims and non-Muslims. These discussions are recorded in some of his epistles: *Masʿalat*

K. faṣl al-maḥāl wa-taḥrīr mā bayna al-sharīʿa waʾl-ḥikma min al-ittiṣāl, ed. G. F. Hourani, Leiden 1959, p. 5f. G. F. Hourani, *Averroes*, (A translation, introduction and notes of Ibn Rushd's *K. faṣl al-maḥāl*) London 1967, p. 84, n. 11. Cf. Ibn al-Nafīs, *al-Risāla al-kāmiliyya fīʾl-sīra al-nabawiyya*, ed. and annotated translation by M. Meyerhof and J. Schacht, Oxford 1968, pp. 6-8 of the Arabic text, pp. 40-44 of the translation. J. Schacht and M. Meyerhof, "Maimonides against Galen on Philosophy and Cosmogony", *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Cairo University* V 1(1939), pp. 53-88 and especially p. 70f.

³⁵ See Wensinck, "Les preuves", p. 23.

³⁶ See al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, Cairo 1938, Vol. II, pp. 98-100.

³⁷ See *ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 203-228. Al-Rāzī, *Munāẓarāt*, p. 18.

*al-ṭabariyyayni*³⁸, *K. al-radd ʿalā al-Mulḥid*³⁹, *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk al-laʿīn ibn al-muḥaffa*⁴⁰ and *K. al-radd ʿalā al-naṣārā*⁴¹. After leaving Egypt, al-Ḳāsim settled in al-Rass near al-Madīna, where he died in 246/860. Al-Ḳāsim was not likely to have been a Zaydite Imam, although later Zaydite dogma stated that he was an Imam after his brother Muḥammad. He appears in his writings as a teacher and preacher of the true religion, and its defender against all sorts of enemies; oppressors, sinners, anthropomorphists, philosophers, Rāfiḍites, Christians and Manicheans⁴². He was influenced to a large extent by Muʿtazilism and his writings paved the way for the acceptance of Muʿtazilite doctrines by the later Zaydites of Yemen. The main theological issues discussed by al-Ḳāsim are: the arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the world, God's unity and attributes, theodicy, belief and unbelief, the imamate⁴³.

K. al-dalīl al-kabīr is one of al-Ḳāsim's four epistles which deal with the arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the world. The other three epistles are *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaḡhīr*, *K. al-radd ʿalā al-mulḥid*⁴⁴ and *K. al-tawḥīd*⁴⁵. Already at the beginning of our epistle, al-Ḳāsim introduces the argument from design. In the world there are many signs attesting that the world and what is included in it are made and created. Every produced thing must have a producer, and every created thing

³⁸ See my "The Ṭabaristānis' Question".

³⁹ See Ms. Berlin, fols. 58b ff.

⁴⁰ Edited and translated into Italian by M. Guidi in his *La lotta tra l'islam et il manicheismo*, Rome 1927.

⁴¹ Edited and translated into Italian by I. Di Matteo in his "Confutazione contro i Cristiani dello Zaydita al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm", *RSO* 9(1921-1923), pp. 301-364.

⁴² In *K. al-katīl wa'l-kitāl* (*The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 287-309. Ms. Berlin fols. 100b-103b) and *K. al-hidjra* (*The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 341-432. Ms. Berlin fols. 114b-125a), al-Ḳāsim expresses his attitude towards oppressors, sinners and unbelievers. Two entire epistles are devoted to the refutation of the anthropomorphists. These are: *K. al-mustarshid* (*The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 108-203. Ms. Berlin fols. 71b-81a) and *Ṣifāt al-ʿarsh wa'l-kursī wa-tafsīruhumā* (*The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 240-286. Ms. Berlin fols. 94b-100b). An anonymous philosopher is refuted in *K. al-radd ʿalā al-mulḥid* (Ms. Berlin fols. 58b ff.). Al-Ḳāsim refutes the Rāfiḍites in *K. al-radd ʿalā al-rāfiḍa* and *K. al-radd ʿalā al-rawāfiḍ min aṣḥāb al-ghuluww*. See my "Al-Ḳāsim ibn Ibrāhīm's Theory of the Imamate", *Arabica* 34(1987), pp. 80-105.

⁴³ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, pp. 86-96.

⁴⁴ Madelung considers these last two epistles to be spurious. See *Der Imam*, pp. 97, 100. I shall refer later on to the question of the authenticity of *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaḡhīr*. See pp. 11-13 below. For the authenticity of *K. al-radd ʿalā al-mulḥid*, see my "Al-Ḳāsim ibn Ibrāhīm's Argument from Design", pp. 281-284.

⁴⁵ This epistle occurs in two Mss. of the Ambrosiana library (C 186 and C 131) under the name *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaḡhīr*, but it is not identical with *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaḡhīr* which appears in Ms. Berlin. At the end of Ms. C 186, which is earlier and better written than C 131, it is entitled *K. al-tawḥīd*, which may be the ancient name of the work. In order to prevent confusion we shall call it *K. al-tawḥīd*. See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 97f.

must have a creator. Since the signs are perfect, they must have a creator and a producer who does things wisely and well, and such a one can only be God. In the first part of the argument, then, al-Ḳāsim proves (or, rather asserts) that according to the evident signs of creation the world was created, and in the second part he proves that it is God who created the world, since the signs are perfect⁴⁶. But more often al-Ḳāsim infers the existence of God directly from the signs in the world⁴⁷. Generally the creation of the world and what is included in it is proved by man's experience: Man sees that things are made, i.e., created. Yet in one place, al-Ḳāsim inserts the beginning of a speculative argument, which is elaborated in his *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*⁴⁸. The body is brought into being, since it is connected with movement (*ḥaraka*) and time (*azmān*) which are brought into being. Al-Ḳāsim, however, does not prove that movement and time are brought into being⁴⁹.

The signs in the world attest not only its creation but also its being directed and ruled. This direction and rule, which are perfect and which

⁴⁶ See pp. 80, 134ff. below.

⁴⁷ See p. 76f. below and elsewhere too: "O my son, whoever sees a book, knows that there is someone who wrote it, even if the writer is absent. Also whoever sees a sign, knows that there is someone who made it, and whoever sees a painting, knows certainly that there is someone who painted it, and whoever hears a voice, knows that there is someone who sounded it. This is also (the case of) this wonderful creation that is seen; whoever considers and thinks, knows certainly that it has a creator". See *K. al-tawhīd*, Ms. Ambrosiana C 131, fols. 71a and 64b, 68a. *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 139b. *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawhīd*, p. 103, ll. 21-25. *K. al-radd ʿalā al-naṣāra*, p. 309, l. 13. *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk*, p. 24, l. 23- p. 25, l. 5, p. 41.

⁴⁸ The third argument used by al-Ḳāsim in *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr* to prove the creation of the world, the argument from accidents, is the standard Kalam argument for the creation of the world. See Wolfson, *Kalam*, pp. 392-406. Davidson, "John Philoponus", pp. 384ff. It proves that accidents are brought into being, and since the body is not free of accidents, it is also brought into being. In al-Ḳāsim this argument reads as follows: "We find the world either as a body (*djism*) or that which is not a body (*lā djism*). The body is not free of (*ghayr munfakk*) both movement (*ḥaraka*) and rest (*sukūn*), and since they are both brought into being (*muḥdath*), the body must necessarily be brought into being... And what is your proof (*dalīluka*) that both movement and rest are brought into being?... If movement were eternal (*kadīma*), the body would move and not rest, but since we find it sometimes moving and at other times resting, we know that its movement and rest are both brought into being... and it is most appropriate for that which is not a body to be brought into being, since it does not exist except in that which is brought into being". See Ms. Berlin, fol. 135a, l. 22-135b, l. 3. The words "that which is not a body" may be taken in the sense of atom, of which the body is composed. Although al-Ḳāsim was influenced to a great extent by Muʿtazilite Kalam notions, here he does not employ the term *djawhar* to indicate atom, and in his first argument he uses the term *ṣūra* (form) very probably in the meaning of accident, instead of the common term *ʿarad*. See *ibid.*, fol. 135a. Cf. *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk*, p. 47f. *K. al-radd ʿalā al-mulḥid*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 59a, l. -1-fol. 59b, l. 3. In our epistle and *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk* Kalam terms do not occur either. Yet I have found a usage of *djawhar* and *ʿarad* only in *K. al-mustarshid*. *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 111, ll. 7-8. Ms. Berlin, fol. 72b.

⁴⁹ See p. 70 below.

aim at benefiting man, are only God's direction and rule. God makes the winds blow, and these carry ships in all sorts of seas. Man finds his way day and night by the light of the sun and the moon. When the moon does not shine, God enables man to find his way by the light of the stars, which He created for this purpose. That the celestial bodies are ruled and controlled is demonstrated from the facts that no star deviates from its course, its velocity is stable and it appears and disappears at fixed times. The earth is stable, since God put heavy loads (mountains) on it. If the earth were not stable, it would shake man and other animals, the rivers would burst and break through, and the salt water would mix with the fresh. Consequently, man could no longer exist⁵⁰. In this way the argument from design is also a teleological argument:⁵¹ man sees that there is a purpose to what happens in the world, that is to benefit him. The things in the world were not made in vain or without purpose (*ʿabathan*)⁵², but out of wisdom⁵³.

To support his view that God is the creator of the world, its director and ruler, al-Ḳāsim proves that the creation of the world its direction and rule cannot possibly be ascribed to man. God creates, produces, sustains, vivifies and kills etc., since it is demonstrated in reality that man cannot fulfil these actions. Man's inability is shown by the fact that he does not have power over two opposites, e.g., whoever cannot salt water, cannot desalt it either and vice versa⁵⁴. Al-Ḳāsim adds another reason to prove that man cannot be the creator and the director of things. Man does not create the four elements (earth, air, fire and water), and whoever does not create the four elements, cannot make things, which are produced out of them⁵⁵.

Thereafter al-Ḳāsim proves that man was created from earth, one of the four elements. The proof of man's being made of earth is that after his death his body becomes earth. Every composed thing that becomes decomposed is turned into the thing of which it was composed; e.g. snow is turned into water of which it was composed. This principle applies also to seeds and plants, which are composed of the four elements⁵⁶. It seems that al-Ḳāsim, when referring in our epistle to the composition and decomposition of things, alludes to the argument from composition, which, as we have seen, is noting but a restatement of the argument from

⁵⁰ See p. 102 below.

⁵¹ Cf. Wensinck, "Les preuves", p. 20.

⁵² See below p. 187, note 47.

⁵³ See below p. 90. Cf. ʿAbd al-Djabbār, *al-Mughni*, Vol. XI, pp. 58-67.

⁵⁴ See below p. 186 note 37.

⁵⁵ See below p. 84.

⁵⁶ See below p. 88.

design⁵⁷. This argument is stated in *K. al-tawhīd* in a clear manner. First al-Ḳāsim asserts that the world was brought into being (or created) and afterwards that someone brought it into being (or created) it: “Every composed thing was undoubtedly produced (or created)” (*wa-kull murakkab fa-huwa lā maḥālata maṣnūʿ*). The composition of a thing attest to its being brought into being (*al-tarkīb muḥdath*), and every thing that is brought into being has a bringer and a producer, and this cannot be other than God⁵⁸. Al-Ḳāsim does not prove his assumption that every composed thing is brought into being. In *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr* he directly deduces God’s existence from the signs observed in the world, among which there are signs of composition and decomposition⁵⁹.

Signs of another type serving as an argument for God’s existence and creation of the world, also to be subsumed under the argument from design, are the wonderful changes that take place in nature. This changes cannot be explained as being due to man himself; rather they are due to a wise creator⁶⁰. In *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr* the changes in the world serve also as a proof that the world was brought into being. Only in the second stage does al-Ḳāsim deduce the existence of Creator who brought the world into being⁶¹. An allusion to the assertion that things that change are brought into being can be found in our epistle in p. 134, ll. 8-12.

Al-Ḳāsim supports the argument from design by the argument from particularization (*takhṣīs*). As we have seen in al-Maḳḍisī, this argument deduces the existences of God from the diverse phenomena in the world. According to al-Ḳāsim, the fact that in the world there exist different things, perfect and imperfect, high and low and so forth, proves the existence of a creator who particularized them (*khaṣṣahā*) by means of the different qualities shown in them. If there were no particularizer i.e., God, all the phenomena would be equal one to another⁶².

The argument from particularization is one of the Mutakallimun’s arguments for God’s existence brought forward by Maimonides in *The Guide of the Perplexed* (part a, ch. 74, the fifth way). According to their view, both the world in general and any of its parts may exist either in the forms, sizes and accidents found in them, and in the places and times in which they are, or in the opposite of these forms, sizes, accidents, and places and times. The particularization of one part of the world by a certain form, size, accident, time and place, although their opposite may

⁵⁷ See Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 388f. See above p. 2.

⁵⁸ See *K. al-tawhīd*, Ms. Ambrosiana C 131, fols. 67b, 68a, 69a.

⁵⁹ See Ms. Berlin, fol. 139b f.

⁶⁰ See below p. 90. *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, fol. 135b, ll. 9-17.

⁶¹ See Ms. Berlin, fol. 135a.

⁶² See below p. 114.

exist, serves as an argument for a particularizer and chooser who willed one of the two possibilities. The need of the world in its entirety or of one of its parts for a particularizer proves that the world was brought into being, since there is no difference between a particularizer (*mukhaṣṣiṣ*), an agent (*fāʿil*), a creator (*khāliq*), a bringer into existence (*mūdjīd*), a bringer into being (*muhdith*) and an intender (*kāsid*)⁶³.

Stating that if God did not particularize things, all of them would be equal to each other, al-Ḳāsim does not pay attention to the principle underlying his argument: In order for all things to be equal one to another, there is a need for a particularizer who will render them equal. (In that case the act of particularization would refer to the time and place of the things, not to their particular properties). The argument set forth by al-Ḳāsim seems to be a rather popular and imperfect *takhṣiṣ* argument, as opposed to the perfect argument occurring in the writings of later Muslim theologians⁶⁴.

According to Madelung, the argument from design for God's existence is not the traditional argument currently used by the Muʿtazilite school. The Muʿtazilites prove that the universe was created and man could not create it, and hence infer the existence of an eternal creator. The design in the universe serves for the Muʿtazilites as proof of God's knowledge⁶⁵. Nevertheless, we have seen that some Muʿtazilites use the argument from design (see above p. 2), as do the Ashʿarites, whose doctrine concerning the proofs of God's existence was influenced by that of the Muʿtazilites⁶⁶. Al-Ḳāsim on the one hand follows some Muʿtazilite thinkers proving God's existence directly from the design of creation, but on the other adopts the usual Muʿtazilite approach proving first, though not speculatively, as we have seen, that the world was created, according to creation signs observed in it, and after that, in the second stage, that God created it, since the signs are perfect. Also al-Ḳāsim allots much space to proving that man cannot create. Al-Ḳāsim elucidates the argument from design by using two arguments included in the first, that is a. the argument from composition and b. the argument from changes and adds to these arguments a supporting argument, that from par-

⁶³ Cf. Wolfson, *Kalam*, pp. 434f. S. Pines, "The Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed", in his translation of the Guide, Chicago 1963, p. CXXIX. Al-Bākillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 23f, art. 41. Al-Djuwaynī, *Lumaʿ al-adilla fī kawāʿid ʿaḳāʾid ahl al-sunna waʾl-djamāʿa*, ed. Fawḳiyya Ḥusayn Maḥmūd, Cairo 1965, p. 80f. Al-Ghazālī, *al-Iktīṣād*, p. 16.

⁶⁴ See Wolfson, *Kalam*, pp. 434-444.

⁶⁵ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 106. Cf. ʿAbd al-Djabbār, *K. al-madjmūʿ*, p. 114f. Idem, *Sharḥ*, pp. 156ff.

⁶⁶ See al-Ashʿarī, *al-Lumaʿ*, p. 6f. of the Arabic text.

ticularization. Al-Ḳāsim's use of these arguments proves his being influenced by the Mu'tazilites, since two of them, the arguments from changes and from particularization, figure in *The Guide of the Perplexed* as Kalam arguments⁶⁷ for the creation of the universe⁶⁸, the argument from changes is used by al-Ash'arī as an argument for God's existence⁶⁹, and the argument from composition is set forth by the Mu'tazilite al-Nazzām, a contemporary of al-Ḳāsim. The fact that al-Nazzām, al-Djāhīz and Hishām al-Fuwaṭī used the argument from design suggests that it was perhaps an ancient Mu'tazilite argument, which was ejected from its central position in the doctrine of the Mu'tazilites when they accepted the doctrine of accidents, which served them as proof of the creation of the world. The Mu'tazilites seem to have realized that the argument from design was not sufficiently based, since according to it one can learn of God's existence, but not of God's creation of the world. The Mutakallimun had to respond to the Aristotelian argument that the design is eternal. Presumably they therefore replaced the argument from design by a philosophical argument. Saadia (d. 942), who was influenced by the Kalam, supported the argument from composition by the argument from accidents⁷⁰, and his work may point to a stage in which the argument from composition began to lose its position in favour of other arguments, though it still preserved its independent position. According to al-Shahrastānī (*Nihayat*, p. 11), Saadia's contemporary, al-Ash'arī (d. 935), who used the argument from design (see above p. 4, n. 26), connected the notion of composition with atomism, in order to originate a doctrine refuting the doctrine of the eternity of the world⁷¹. It is thus not astonishing that the argument from design should occur in al-Ḳāsim's *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr* in its general form⁷² and in the form of the argument from composition and the argument from changes as well⁷³, in spite of

⁶⁷ In this matter there is no difference between Ash'arite Kalam and Mu'tazilite Kalam. See Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 86.

⁶⁸ See part a, ch. 74, the first and fifth way. They do figure there as arguments for the creation of the universe, but from them—as they are set forth by Maimonides—one can infer God's existence without first proving the creation of the world. In one place, Maimonides points out that the design in the universe must serve as a proof of God's existence. See *The Guide*, part a, ch. 46. S. Pines, "The Philosophic Sources", p. XXXIII.

⁶⁹ See above p. 4, n. 26.

⁷⁰ For this point see my "Al-Ḳāsim ibn Ibrahim Argument from Design", pp. 267-270.

⁷¹ Cf. Wolfson, *Kalam*, pp. 386-388.

⁷² See Ms. Berlin, fol. 139b, l. 17-fol. 140a, l. 10.

⁷³ See *ibid.*, fol. 135a, ll. 11-12, fol. 135b, ll. 9-17. In this epistle too, God's existence is either directly inferred from the design in the world or after proving that the world is composed, i.e., brought into being.

Madelung's assertion that this epistle "is directly influenced by the dogmatics of the Mu'tazilite school"⁷⁴.

Consequently, it is possible to draw the following conclusions: a. The argument from design was not uncommon in al-Ḳāsim's era in Mu'tazilite circles, contrary to Madelung's view⁷⁵ and in conformity with Gibb's view that it was frequently used by the Mu'tazilites and passed from them to the Zaydites⁷⁶. b. In this matter al-Ḳāsim was directly influenced by the Mu'tazila, again contrary to Madelung's assertion⁷⁷. Furthermore, the principles of the doctrine of accidents—a clear Mu'tazilite doctrine serving as a proof of the creation of the universe—figure in two epistles *K. al-dalīl al-kabīr*⁷⁸ and *K. al-tawḥīd*⁷⁹, whose main theme is the argument from design. Supplementary proofs are introduced elsewhere⁸⁰ to demonstrate that al-Ḳāsim knew the principles of the Mu'tazilite doctrine well and was influenced by them, but preferred often not to use Mu'tazilite terminology⁸¹. c. The discussion up to this point leads to doubt about Madelung's assertion that *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaḡhīr* is not authentic, since the argument from design figures there in the same way as in our epistle and *K. al-tawḥīd*, whereas Madelung argues that *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaḡhīr* lacks notions characteristic of al-Ḳāsim⁸².

III. Al-Ḳāsim's position among the theological schools and mainly the degree of influence exerted on him by the Mu'tazila have already been dealt with by Strothmann and Madelung. Strothmann states that al-Ḳāsim appears as a Mu'tazilite thinker in his disputation with the predestinarians, with the anthropomorphists and with the Murdji'a⁸³. Madelung disapproves of Strothmann's stand. He has reached the conclusion that the works attributed to al-Ḳāsim and in which direct Mu'tazilite influence is dominant are not al-Ḳāsim's authentic

⁷⁴ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 97. Madelung fails to mention the occurrence of the argument from design in *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaḡhīr*.

⁷⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 107.

⁷⁶ See above p. 2.

⁷⁷ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 97.

⁷⁸ See above p. 8. In *K. al-radd 'alā al-zindīk* (p. 47f), al-Ḳāsim argues that bodies are brought into being (*muḥdath*) since accidents (*suwar!*), of which bodies are not free, are also brought into being. The coming of accidents into being (*ḥudūth*) is proved by their appearance and disappearance. It is inadmissible that a body should move and rest simultaneously. The rest (*sukūn*) is brought into being when the movement (*ḥaraka*) stops.

⁷⁹ See Ms. Ambrosiana C 131, fol. 68a. Here al-Ḳāsim points out that the composition is brought into being, yet he does not prove it. Cf. 'Abd al-Djabbār, *al-Mughnī*, Vol. 5, p. 54, l. 5.

⁸⁰ See my "Al-Ḳāsim ibn Ibrāhīm's Argument from Design", ch. IV.

⁸¹ See above note 48.

⁸² For further information on this epistle see my article which is mentioned above.

⁸³ See R. Strothmann, "Die Literatur der Zaiditen", *Der Islam* 2 (1911), p. 53.

writings⁸⁴. Thus, according to Madelung, al-Ḳāsim was not a Muʿtazilite theologian, although the influence of the Muʿtazila is manifested in certain aspects of his doctrine.

The question of who was an early Muʿtazilite is difficult to answer, since it is difficult to define what the early Muʿtazilite doctrine was. The early Muʿtazilite writings have been lost and what is now available is the heresiographical literature, which relates the views of the early Muʿtazilites not always accurately, because of its polemics with the latter⁸⁵, and a few works of later Muʿtazilites such as al-Khayyāṭ and ʿAbd al-Djabbār. It stands to reason that both theologians regarded the early Muʿtazila through Muʿtazilite ideas prevalent in their time. Even the heresiographical works do not represent a unified and crystallized Muʿtazilite doctrine, but many different views. Notwithstanding this statement, however, the heresiographical works and the extant Muʿtazilite writings allow for establishing some basic views of the early Muʿtazilite theology, upon which almost all the Muʿtazilites have agreed. These are the five fundamental principles which later Muʿtazilites have regarded as binding⁸⁶. “It is almost impossible to err, when one considers with H. S. Nyberg⁸⁷ these five fundamental principles the original and main points of the Muʿtazila propaganda plan and directly attributes them to Wāṣil”⁸⁸, whom some Islamic sources deem the founder of the Muʿtazila. Some of these principles derive directly from the teachings of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī⁸⁹, who had been Wāṣil’s master for a long time until he left al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s circle and distinguished himself in his special doctrines.

⁸⁴ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 97.

⁸⁵ See M. Schwarz, “Can We Rely on Later Authorities for the Views of Earlier Thinkers?”, *IOS* 1(1971), pp. 241-248.

⁸⁶ Al-Khayyāṭ states in his work *K. al-intiṣār* (p. 93), which is the earliest extant Muʿtazilite treatise, that whoever does not admit the five principles is not a Muʿtazilite. Probably the acknowledgement of the Muʿtazilites of the five principles was an early tenet. According to al-Nasafī in his *Fī baḥr al-kalām*, Abū al-Hudhayl wrote a book entitled “The Five Principles” (*al-khamsat al-uṣūl*), and people knew that whoever read this book belonged to the Muʿtazila. See ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān’s introduction to his edition of ʿAbd al-Djabbār’s *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, p. 26.

⁸⁷ See H. S. Nyberg, “Muʿtazila”, *EI*¹, Vol. III, pp. 787ff.

⁸⁸ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 7.

⁸⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 8. Schwarz (“The Letter”) proves that ideas and concepts expressed by al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in his epistle to the Khalif ʿAbd al-Malik appear later in the Muʿtazilite teachings.

According to Nallino, only the principle of the intermediate position (*manzila bayna al-manzilatayn*) could be a fundamental principle of the early Muʿtazila, while in other dogmatic questions there were various opinions. See C. A. Nallino, “Sull’ origine del nome dei Muʿtaziliti”, *RSO* 7(1916), p. 448. Likewise, Watt assumes that the five principles were first established by al-Khayyāṭ and his contemporaries, that is, in the second half of the ninth century, as criteria of Muʿtazilism. See W. M. Watt, “The Political Attitude of the Muʿtazila”, *JRAS* (1963), pp. 52ff.

In al-Ḳāsim's time, however, one might have been called a Muṭazilite, without necessarily adhering to all of these principles. According to al-Shahrastānī, Muḥammad ibn Shabīb, Abū Shimr and Mūsā (or Muways or Yūnus) ibn ʿImrān accompanied the Muṭazilite al-Nazzām, a contemporary of al-Ḳāsim (d. 836 or 845), in spite of the fact that they disagreed with him on the principles of *waʿīd* and *manzila*⁹⁰. Muḥammad ibn Shabīb and Mūsā ibn ʿImrān are recorded in Ibn al-Murtaḍā's *Ṭabaḳāt al-muṭazila* in the seventh generation⁹¹, even though they held *irdjāʿ*; i.e., they did not accept the principle of *manzila*. Ghaylān al-Dimashkī, who appears in the fourth generation of the Muṭazila⁹², expressed the same attitude towards the five principles. Al-Khayyāṭ's denial of the Murdjiʿite inclination of the personalities mentioned here⁹³ seems to be an attempt to rewrite the history of the early Muṭazila in accordance with the criteria prevalent in his time.

The conclusion that may be derived from all this is that although the five principles generally serve as a criterion for assessing one's Muṭazilism, it should not be strictly applied, since even those who disagreed with the Muṭazila on one or two of the five principles, were occasionally regarded as Muṭazilites⁹⁴.

IV. The five fundamental principles occur in al-Ḳāsim's theology. Two of them, the principle of God's unity and the principle of God's justice, occupy an important place in it. According to al-Ḳāsim, God's unity is external as well as internal. That God is one means that there is no god except Him, and it also means that He is not composed of parts⁹⁵. God's external unity is proved in several ways. One way is based on Ḳurʾān verses which state that God is one and that there is no God except Him.⁹⁶ This way, however, was not sufficient for the refutation of those who did not believe in the Ḳurʾān, namely, sceptics, Manicheans and Christians. Therefore al-Ḳāsim also uses Kalam speculative arguments for the purpose of proving God's unity. One of

⁹⁰ See *K. al-milal*, p. 41.

⁹¹ See p. 71.

⁹² See *ibid.*, p. 25, p. 58, l. 9.

⁹³ See *K. al-intiṣār*, p. 93.

⁹⁴ See al-Malaṭī, *al-Tanbīh wa'l-radd ʿalā ahl al-ahwāʾ wa'l-bidaʿ*, ed. S. Dederer, Leipzig 1936, p. 32.

⁹⁵ See al-Ḳāsim, *Masʾalat al-ṭabariyyayni*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 97-99. Ms. Berlin, fols. 52b-53a. *K. al-mustarshid*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 120-124. Ms. Berlin, fols. 74a-76b. *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk*, p. 16. *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 103, l. 6. Cf. al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat*, p. 90, ll. 5-9. Al-Djuwanī, *K. al-irshād*, p. 52.

⁹⁶ See e.g., sura 112, v. 1, sura 28, v. 88, sura 4, v. 171. *Masʾalat al-ṭabariyyayni*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 97. Ms. Berlin fol. 52b. *K. al-mustarshid*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 115f. Ms. Berlin, fol. 74a.

these arguments is the argument from hypothetical mutual prevention (*tamānu*)⁹⁷.

The refutation of both dualism and trinitarianism account for much of the discussion of God's unity in Islamic theology. Al-Ḳāsim is no exception; he dedicates some passages in two epistles (*K. al-radd 'alā al-zindīk* and *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulḥid*) to the refutation of dualism in its Manichean version and an entire epistle (*K. al-radd 'alā al-naṣārā*), to the refutation of the doctrine of the Trinity.

In *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulḥid*, the *mulḥid* says to al-Ḳāsim: "Those (the holders of dualism) say that since there are good and evil in the world, it proves that both are derived from two eternal elements" (*min aṣṣayni kadīmayni*)⁹⁸. Al-Ḳāsim's answer consists of several arguments⁹⁹: a. The existence of good and evil proves that the Creator of the universe is one. What demonstrates this is the fact that good and evil are attached (*mu'takibayni 'alā*) to good man and to evil man respectively and both are brought into being (*muḥdathayni*). The existence of a thing which is brought into being entails a bringer into being which is not brought into being¹⁰⁰. b. The opposition between good and evil does not prove their eternity. It is no more than an opposition between forms (*ṣuwar* sin. *ṣūra* see p. 13, n. 78 above) which proves that there is one who made the opposition between both of them and created both of them as oppositional¹⁰¹. c. A thing may be good because of one cause (*ma'nā*) and evil because of another cause. Thus we see that good and evil are combined (*yadjtami'āni*) at one time. If this is so, both of them are combined on account of themselves or by someone else. They cannot be combined by virtue of themselves, for opposites cannot be combined with each other; consequently, there is one who combines them¹⁰². d. If the existence of good and evil proved that both of them have two external principles, then the existence

⁹⁷ On this argument see note 89 to the translation.

⁹⁸ See *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulḥid*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 60b, ll. 26-27. The two eternal elements are the light, from which every good thing derives, and the darkness, from which every evil thing derives. Cf. 'Abd al-Djabbār, *al-Mughnī*, Vol. V, p. 10. R. Strothmann, "Thanawīyya", EI¹, Vol. IV, pp. 736-738.

⁹⁹ See *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulḥid*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 61a, ll. 1-4.

¹⁰⁰ See Saadia, *K. al-amānāt*, p. 53, ll. 1-14. Al-Māturidī, *K. al-tawḥīd*, p. 162, ll. 8-12. Al-Khayyāt, *K. al-intiṣār*, p. 30, art. 17. Al-Bāḳillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 67f, art. 120, p. 68f, art. 122. These four theologians prove that oppositional acts can be derived from one agent and they do not refer to the question of creation, whereas 'Abd al-Djabbār, basing himself on the doctrine of the coming of accidents into being, proves that the two eternal elements according to the doctrine of dualism, light and darkness, are brought into being. See *al-Mughnī*, Vol. V, pp. 22-24.

¹⁰¹ Cf. 'Abd al-Djabbār, *ibid.*, p. 45f.

¹⁰² Cf. Al-Khayyāt, *K. al-intiṣār*, p. 31, art. 18. 'Abd al-Djabbār, *ibid.*, p. 30, p. 40, l. 9-p. 41, l. 10. Idem, *Sharḥ*, p. 289.

of the four natures (*al-ṭabāʿi* ^ʿ *al-arbaʿ*) would prove that they have four eternal elements¹⁰³.

In *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk*, al-Ḳāsim refutes dualism whose exponent is the heretic Ibn al-Muḳaffaʿ. One of al-Ḳāsim's arguments against dualism, the like of which we find in *K. al-radd ʿalā al-mulḥid* (see above argument c.), is that it is impossible to state that light is absolutely good and that darkness is absolutely evil, for light sometimes produces benefits and sometimes causes harm and the same holds true for darkness¹⁰⁴. According to the Manichean dualism, the things in the world are the result of a mixture between the two eternal elements once they have been separated¹⁰⁵. Al-Ḳāsim argues against this doctrine stating that light and darkness are opposites, and opposites cannot be combined with each other in such a manner that they will remain as they are after the combination, since when opposites join, one opposite destroys the other, or they both turn into something different¹⁰⁶. When the opposites become a different thing, they both actually make a third form, which proves that things are brought into being¹⁰⁷. It follows that al-Ḳāsim's main argument against dualism in the two epistles mentioned above is that since the two elements are brought into being, they need a bringer into being. Al-Ḳāsim regards both of them as accidents, although he fails to mention the common term *ʿarad*¹⁰⁸. The argument from the creation of accidents seems to have been one of the main Kalam arguments for the refutation of dualism¹⁰⁹.

Al-Ḳāsim refutes the doctrine of the Trinity as accepted by three Christian sects, the Byzantines, the Nestorians and the Jacobites¹¹⁰, all of whom were known to the Muslims as being orthodox in their adherence to the doctrine of the Trinity¹¹¹. Al-Ḳāsim describes this doctrine as follows: "God is three separate 'persons' (*ashkhāṣ*), and the three 'persons' are one and unified nature" (*ṭabīʿa wāḥida mutṭafīka*)¹¹². The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are "in essence and nature one and unified (*fi'l-dhāt wa'l-ṭabīʿa wāḥid fard*)... but in the hypostases which are the 'persons' (*bi'l-aḳānīm allati hiya al-ashkhāṣ*) they are three in

¹⁰³ Cf. Saadia, *K. al-amānāt*, p. 84f.

¹⁰⁴ See al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk*, p. 5f. Cf. ʿAbd al-Djabbār, *Sharḥ*, p. 289.

¹⁰⁵ See al-Ḳāsim, *ibid.*, p. 4, ll. 14-15.

¹⁰⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 7, ll. 3-14.

¹⁰⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 51, ll. 17-21.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. "Light and darkness are created and brought into being, existing and missing... going and coming...". *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 103, ll. 18-19.

¹⁰⁹ See ʿAbd al-Djabbār, *al-Mughnī*, Vol. V, pp. 22ff.

¹¹⁰ See al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-radd ʿalā al-naṣārā*, p. 314, l. 2- p. 317.

¹¹¹ See Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 321.

¹¹² See al-Ḳāsim, *ibid.*, p. 314, l. 2- p. 315, l. 1.

number. The nature combines and unifies them and the “persons” separate between them and count them. The Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Spirit...for the Father begets and is not begotten, and the Son is begotten and does not beget, and the Spirit which is the third existent neither begets nor is it begotten... All the three persons have always been together three in number, no one has ever preceded the other in existence¹¹³. Among the three “persons” there is no difference with respect to Godship, eternity, ability, rule and will”¹¹⁴.

The first statement on which al-Ḳāsim bases his argumentation against the doctrine of the Trinity is that divinity cannot be but to one God¹¹⁵. Al-Ḳāsim argues that everything which is begotten resembles the begetter and that the branch of a thing has what its roots have¹¹⁶. Consequently, if the Father, who is God, begot, as the Christians assert, His Son would be like Him in essence and attributes. Hence there would be two eternal gods who would be equal in their attributes, which is inconceivable, since it is inconceivable that the Son would be the god of his Father¹¹⁷. Likewise, if God has a son, then the son is brought into being, and if the Father equals the Son, the Father is also brought into being, while they maintain that God is the Producer who is not produced¹¹⁸. Had Jesus been God, argues al-Ḳāsim, his mother would also have been God, since she is like him in essence. But no Christian claims that Jesus’ mother is God, as they claim that Jesus is God; they all claim that she is a human being. If she is a human being, his nature is like hers, and all Christians admit that Jesus behaved like a human being¹¹⁹. Al-Ḳāsim quotes Ḳurʿān verses showing that Jesus was but a human being¹²⁰.

Al-Ḳāsim also adds to his polemics against the Christians the argument from hypothetical mutual prevention (*tamānu*^c see below p. 190, n. 89). Ḳurʿān verses follow to prove that God is one and that there is no one like him¹²¹.

¹¹³ See *ibid.*, p. 315, l. 4- p. 316, l. 3. Cf. ‘Abd al-Djabbār, *al-Mughnī*, Vol. V, p. 81. Idem, *Sharḥ*, p. 291. J. van Ess, *Frühe muʿtazilitische*, p. 76, ll. 12-16. Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 128f.

¹¹⁴ Al-Ḳāsim, *ibid.*, p. 315, ll. 5-6. In order to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity, al-Ḳāsim cites the example prevalent among the Christians (see *ibid.*, ll. 10-14) to the effect that the sun is like the Father, its light is like the Son and its heat is like the Holy Spirit. Cf. Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 320.

¹¹⁵ See al-Ḳāsim, *ibid.*, p. 305, ll. 19-20.

¹¹⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 305, ll. 1-12, p. 306, l. 22.

¹¹⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 305, ll. 15-25.

¹¹⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 311, l. 8- p. 312, l. 10.

¹¹⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 307, ll. 1-19.

¹²⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 308. Sura 5, v. 75, sura 23, vv. 33-34. Cf. Wolfson, *Kalam*, pp. 305ff.

¹²¹ See *ibid.*, p. 310.

According to al-Ḳāsim, the refutation of the doctrine of the Trinity is also based on the differentiation between three categories of names: a. names indicating essence (*asmāʾ ṭabīʿiyya dhātiyya djawhariyya*); b. names indicating persons (*asmāʾ shakhṣiyya uḵnūmiyya*); c. names indicating accidents (*asmāʾ ḥāditha ʿaraḍiyya*). A name of essence shows the thing itself, not its genus, and does not change, e.g., earth, heaven, fire and water. Names of persons (*aḵānīm*) are names like Abraham, Moses, David and Jesus. And names of accidents designate things on account of acts which they perform or which are performed on them or on account of accidents which take place in them¹²². The question then arises: to which category do the Christians attribute the names Father and Son. If they call a person the Father because he begot a son, it is neither a name of essence nor of persons but of accidents, since the name was made when the son was made. Among the names of essence and of persons there is no place for the names Father and Son¹²³. It follows that the Father and the Son were brought into being. The Son was brought into being for he was begotten, and the Father was brought into being for he is like the Son, which contradicts their doctrine that the Father and the Son are equal in their eternity. The last conclusion is self-derivable. For some reason al-Ḳāsim does not reach it clearly through his course of argumentation.

Al-Ḳāsim also uses what is related in the Gospels¹²⁴ to prove that Jesus was born as every human being¹²⁵ and that the Father, God, is not only the Father of Jesus but of all the apostles as well¹²⁶. Verses in the New Testament in which Jesus is said to have been the Son of God must be interpreted metaphorically (i.e. by *taʾwīl*); man designates the person whom he adopts and whom he loves "son", even though the latter is not his real son. The sage calls his disciple "son", and the disciple calls his master "father"¹²⁷. Jesus states that God is a father to whoever obeys

¹²² Al-Ḳāsim's discrimination between names indicating essence and names indicating accidents is reminiscent of Aristotle's statement that the relation between subject and predicate may be one of four types of relation: property, definition, genus and accident. See *Topica* I, 4, 101b, 25. A term describing a "property" of a thing, says Aristotle, "belongs to that thing alone". See *ibid.*, 5, 102a, 18-19.

¹²³ See al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-radd ʿalā al-naṣārā*, p. 318, l. 16- p. 319, l. 13.

¹²⁴ In al-Ḳāsim's version of the Sermon on the Mount (see *Matt.* ch. 4, vv. 24-72. Al-Ḳāsim, *ibid.*, p. 326f) there are some deviations from the Greek version of the New Testament. Pines points out that the version from which al-Ḳāsim learned this sermon may have been a Judeo-Christian version. See S. Pines, "Notes on Islam and on Arabic Christianity and Judeo-Christianity", *JSAI* (forthcoming).

¹²⁵ See al-Ḳāsim, *ibid.*, p. 321, ll. 17-19, p. 322, ll. 1-3, 12-18.

¹²⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 321, ll. 20-21. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. I, p. 56, ll. 8-10. Ibn Ḥazm asserts that the union between God and man does not appear in the New Testament. See *ibid.*, p. 53.

¹²⁷ See al-Ḳāsim *ibid.*, p. 322, l. 18- p. 323, l. 7.

Him and that the Devil is a father to whoever obeys him; in the New Testament Jesus is shown to be obeying God¹²⁸.

To sum up, in his refutation of the doctrine of the Trinity, al-Ḳāsim refers to the external unity of God, while the basis for the rejection of the Trinity is generally the argument that the Trinity does not coincide with the internal and absolute unity of God¹²⁹. Al-Ḳāsim's refutation of the doctrine of the Trinity derives from three points of departure: a. The statements of the Christians themselves contradict their own doctrine; b. The New Testament shows that Jesus was a human being; c. The Ḳurʿān¹³⁰ shows that Jesus behaved like a human being. Of the three methods known to refute the Christians—interpretation of verses from the New Testament and the Ḳurʿān; speculative argumentation; and Aristotelian philosophy—al-Ḳāsim applies the first two. The main exponent of the last method is the philosopher al-Kindi (d. 873)¹³¹.

V. Al-Ḳāsim's teaching on God's qualities is not concentrated in one epistle nor is it consistently and systematically set forth—aside from one passage in *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*—but occurs in the form of separate sayings and short passages in several epistles. Hence great care must be taken when trying to establish his doctrine of qualities.

The question of the internal unity of God serves as a point of departure for the discussion of the ontological aspect of qualities¹³². Al-Ḳāsim

¹²⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 324, ll. 7-22.

¹²⁹ Cf. ʿAbd al-Djabbār, *al-Mughnī*, Vol. V, p. 86. Idem, *Sharḥ*, p. 292. Wolfson, *Repercussions*, p. 9. Al-Kindī claims that the doctrine of the Trinity includes the notion of composition, and whatever is composed cannot be eternal. See Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 321.

¹³⁰ The Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation as they occur in the Ḳurʿān do not conform with these doctrines as accepted by the Church councils. In the Ḳurʿān the Trinity consists of God, Jesus and Mary (see sura 5, v. 116). The notion of the Incarnation as it appears in the Ḳurʿān is generally that advanced by the Monophysites, who state that Jesus has one nature which is divine. See Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 304f.

¹³¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 318ff. For Jewish refutation of the doctrine of the Trinity see D. J. Lasker, *Jewish Philosophical Polemics Against Christianity in the Middle Ages*, New York 1977.

¹³² The problem of God's qualities in the *Kalam* has two aspects: a. ontological, and b. semantic. The ontological aspect discusses the question of whether the terms predicated of God in the Ḳurʿān, such as "living" and "knowing" and "powerful" mean the existence in God of real spiritual beings (life, knowledge and power), that on the one hand are not separated from God's essence, but on the other hand are distinct from it. The semantic aspect deals with the relation between the meaning of the Ḳurʿānic terms qualifying God and the meaning of these terms in other contexts. Since God, according to the teaching of the Ḳurʿān, is unlike anything (see sura 42, v. 11, sura 112, v. 4), the terms qualifying Him in the Ḳurʿān must necessarily be interpreted in a way that is different from the way they are interpreted when applying to other things. See Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 206.

asserts that God is one in the sense that He is not composed of parts¹³³. Also there is no change in God, because actions do not take place in Him. Thus God is absolutely one and simple¹³⁴. Al-Ḳāsim's affirmation of the absolute simplicity of God and the denial of any composition in Him imply the denial of qualities as real separate entities eternally existing in God, a doctrine of the Muʿtazilites following Djahm, who was influenced by Neoplatonic teachings¹³⁵. The Muʿtazilites argued as follows: a. Whatever is eternal must be God. b. The unity of God denies multiplicity of qualities in Him, even though these qualities are eternally united in God and not separated in Him¹³⁶.

In our epistle, al-Ḳāsim, however, does not continue the usual course of the Muʿtazilite Kalam thought, which denies the existence of real separate entities eternally existing in God on the basis of His absolute unity. He concludes from God's absolute unity that God is absolutely different from the creation and makes God's absolute difference His sole quality¹³⁷. Al-Ḳāsim's notion that the difference between God and creation is His only quality does not occur in the Muʿtazilite Kalam literature. The Muʿtazilites hold the view that God is different from creation, but He is different in His essence, in his qualities and in the way that these qualities are related to Him. They do not, however, deem the difference itself a quality of God. Also the Muʿtazilite theology does not admit the concentration upon one quality and the identification of God's quality, essence and existence. Al-Ḳāsim does not distinguish between God's essential qualities (*ṣifāt dhātiyya*) and His factual qualities (*ṣifāt fiʿliyya*), a distinction which is a basic doctrine of the Muʿtazilite theology¹³⁸.

Basing himself on a fragment in our epistle and on a fragment in *Masʿalat al-ṭabariyyayni*¹³⁹, Madelung regards al-Ḳāsim's assertion on

¹³³ See al-Ḳāsim, *Masʿalat al-ṭabariyyayni*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 97f. Ms. Berlin, fols. 52b-53a. K. al-mustarshid, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 124. Ms. Berlin, fol. 76b. *Ṣifat al-ʿarsh waʾl-kursi*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 241. Ms. Berlin, fol. 94b. Cf. Wolfson, *Repercussions*, p. 20.

¹³⁴ See below p. 140. K. al-mustarshid, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 122, l. 1. Ms. Berlin, fol. 75b: "God does not change" (*lā yataghayyaru*). *ibid.*, p. 123, ll. 12-13. fol. 76a: "God's action does not include Him, nor is it included [in Him]" (*laysa fiʾluhu lahu biḥāwin, wa-lā fiʾluhu aydan mahwiyyin*).

¹³⁵ See R. M. Frank, "The Neoplatonism", p. 414f. Madelung holds that Djahm's perception of God's qualities of knowledge and power is not Neoplatonic. See "The Shiite and Khāridjite Contribution to Pre-Ashʿarite Kalām", in *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, ed. P. Morewedge, New York 1979, p. 134f., n. 45.

¹³⁶ See Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 132f.

¹³⁷ See below p. 66. Cf. *Masʿalat al-ṭabariyyayni*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 97. Ms. Berlin, fols. 52b-53a.

¹³⁸ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, pp. 112-114.

¹³⁹ See note 137 above.

God's absolute difference as his sole view concerning the problem of qualities. Madelung seems, however, to have overlooked some other passages in al-Ḳāsim's writings, or failed to ascribe to them the importance they deserve. Some verses (21-24) from sura 59 deal with God's names, which al-Ḳāsim identifies with His qualities. These qualities include essential qualities (e.g. knowledge) and factual qualities (e.g. creation), which al-Ḳāsim does not distinguish between¹⁴⁰. There are other fragments proving that al-Ḳāsim admits God's several qualities and does not concentrate upon one quality. He states that God's qualities are not different and that all of them prove His unity¹⁴¹. In another place he refers to God's qualities—factual ones—and also to God's creation which is, according to al-Ḳāsim, His quality¹⁴².

Thus, according to al-Ḳāsim, God has many qualities, contrary to Madelung's understanding of al-Ḳāsim's view. If so, what is the relation between the quality of the absolute difference of God from the creation and the other qualities. Another question, no less difficult, arises in consequence of the following fragment which occurs in our epistle: "His names are infinite, unlimited and absolute. All of them are gathered together in Him, glory be to Him, and not separated. There is no limit that limits any name..."¹⁴³ Al-Ḳāsim's assertion that God's qualities are infinite in number and eternal, and that they exist in God but do not separate His essence contradict the above mentioned Mu'tazilite assertions. How can al-Ḳāsim's assertion about the eternity of qualities existing in God be reconciled with his assertion that these qualities do not separate His essence? Or is it possible to affirm the absolute simplicity of God and the denial of any composition in Him, and at the same time affirm the real existence of eternal qualities. The answer to this question may be implied in al-Ḳāsim's saying quoted above: "All His qualities prove His being one", i.e., in the identification of the qualities with God himself. Was al-Ḳāsim perhaps influenced by the teaching of Abū al-Hudhayl? Abū al-Hudhayl affirmed the reality of God's qualities occurring in the Ḳur'ān, yet he asserted that this affirmation does not imply separation and multiplicity in God's essence. According to Abū al-Hudhayl, God knows by virtue of knowledge and His knowledge is Himself, and it is so with regard to the other qualities. He identified the

¹⁴⁰ See p. 140 below. *Ṣifat al-ʿarsh wa'l-kursī, The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 246, l. 17- p. 247, l. 1. Ms. Berlin, fols. 95a, 96a. *Masʿalat al-tabariyyayni*, ibid., p. 98f. fol. 53a. Al-Ḳāsim's contemporary ʿAbdallah ibn Kullāb (d. 854) identifies God's names with His essential qualities. See al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 173, ll. 1-2, p. 546, ll. 8-9.

¹⁴¹ *wa-lā mukhtaliḳ (Allah) fi'l-awṣāf. bal tadullu awṣāfuhu kulluhā ʿalā wāḥid aḥad*. See *Ṣifat al-ʿarsh wa'l-kursī, The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 245, l. 3. Ms. Berlin, fol. 95b.

¹⁴² See p. 122 below.

¹⁴³ See p. 140 below.

quality with God Himself¹⁴⁴. But since Abū al-Hudhayl's formula does not deal with qualities existing in God, but with qualities predicated of God, which really belong to God and show Him, it seems unlikely to regard him as the source for al-Ḳāsim, who asserts that the qualities are identified with God's essence and do not only really belong to Him. Although the problem of al-Ḳāsim's contradictory assertions remains unsolved, it is evident beyond any doubt from the last quoted saying and others that according to him the multiplicity of God's qualities do not interfere with God's unity and simplicity.

As to the relation between the quality of the absolute difference of God from the creation and the other qualities, the answer is probably to be found through examining the semantic aspect of qualities. It seems likely that al-Ḳāsim thinks that most of the qualities qualifying God in the *Ḳur'ān* can at least partially qualify man. The only quality that can apply to God alone is His difference from anything. "This is the quality which nobody participates in with God, may He be extolled and exalted, and there is none who has this quality with Him, may He be exalted"¹⁴⁵. This is the only quality that can qualify His essence. In *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 140a, in answering the question "What is God", al-Ḳāsim says that His name is Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate, His quality is Allah the Omniscient and the Omnipotent, and His essence means that there is no thing like Him¹⁴⁶. Because of this al-Ḳāsim asserts: "His quality glory be to Him, is only He"¹⁴⁷. The truest saying concerning God, which expresses His absolute difference from everything, is that He is He. Any other saying about God does not express His being exalted above everything, since it can be in some way or other applied to man. Indeed, al-Ḳāsim says that "God is exalted in all His qualities and in all His beautiful names, above any likeness to creation in any sense"¹⁴⁸ and that "there is not a second with God nor is there one like Him except Him in the [real] sense of the word one"¹⁴⁹, but the quality that includes these sayings is His difference from the creation.

We have seen, according to the fragments mentioned above, that al-Ḳāsim has not a systematic and consistent doctrine of qualities; He does

¹⁴⁴ See Frank, "The Divine Attributes", pp. 450-473. Wolfson, *Kalam*, pp. 225-232.

¹⁴⁵ See p. 66 below.

¹⁴⁶ See *K. al-mustarshid*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 124. Ms. Berlin, fol. 76b.

¹⁴⁷ See *Mas'alat al-ṭabariyyayni*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 98f. Ms. Berlin, fol. 53a.

¹⁴⁸ See *Ṣifat al-ʿarsh wa'l-kursī*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 247, ll. 6-7. Ms. Berlin, fol. 96a.

¹⁴⁹ See *K. al-mustarshid*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 125, ll. 3-4. Ms. Berlin, fol. 76b.

not refer to the contradiction between his statement, on the one hand, that God is one and simple and his statement, on the other hand, that His qualities eternally exist in Him. Al-Ḳāsim regards all the qualities referred to God in the Ḳurʿān as God's qualities, but, at the same time, considers God's absolute difference a quality, which neither occur in the orthodox doctrine of qualities nor in that of the Muʿtazila. He fails to deal with the relation between the quality of difference and other qualities. Notwithstanding these facts, there is no doubt that in stating that God is one and simple and in emphasizing God's difference from the creation al-Ḳāsim's doctrine manifests clear signs of Muʿtazilite influence.

In one epistle, *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, al-Ḳāsim forms a doctrine of qualities according to the method of al-Nazzām who, as we have seen¹⁵⁰, exerted his influence on al-Ḳāsim concerning the arguments for the existence of God. Al-Ḳāsim's solution to the opposition between God's unity and simplicity and the multiplicity of qualities consists here in the denial of the reality of the qualities. God does not know by virtue of knowledge which is other than Himself, for if He knew by virtue of eternal knowledge, this would entail two eternal entities, God and His knowledge, and if His knowledge were brought into being, then before its having been brought into being He would not know. God knows by virtue of Himself, and so with regard to all the essential qualities¹⁵¹. Following al-Nazzām, al-Ḳāsim states that the meaning of the saying God is knowing is that He is not ignorant. This formula applies to all the essential qualities. Thus al-Ḳāsim like al-Nazzām denies the positive actuality of the qualities¹⁵². Here al-Ḳāsim differentiates, as do all the Muʿtazilites¹⁵³, between essential qualities and factual ones. The former are eternal, while the latter are not¹⁵⁴.

The Muʿtazilite doctrine of qualities occurring in *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr* cannot serve as a proof of the spuriousness of this epistle. For this doctrine agrees with God's absolute unity which al-Ḳāsim holds; it may be considered a continuation of al-Ḳāsim's statements that God is one and simple and that acts do not take place in Him. Al-Ḳāsim seems to have chosen finally al-Nazzām's doctrine of qualities since it accords with his doctrine of God's unity and does not make a contradiction between

¹⁵⁰ See p. 12 above.

¹⁵¹ See *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 136b, l. 24-fol. 137a, l. 5. Cf. al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 486, ll. 10-13. Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 225.

¹⁵² See *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, fol. 137a, ll. 4-7. Cf. al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, pp. 166f., 486f. Frank, "The Divine Attributes", p. 469f., n. 65.

¹⁵³ See al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 508f. M. Allard, *Le problème des Attributs Divins dans la doctrine d'al-Ashʿarī et de ses premiers grands disciples*, Beirut 1965, p. 115.

¹⁵⁴ See *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, fol. 137a, ll. 17-19. Cf. Allard, *ibid.*, p. 115f.

God's unity and the multiplicity of His qualities. A repercussion of al-Ḳāsim's first conception of God's difference as a divine quality is to be found in al-Ḳāsim's definition of God's essence in this epistle; His essence means: "there is no one like Him"¹⁵⁵.

VI. The refutation of anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*)¹⁵⁶, which al-Ḳāsim

¹⁵⁵ See *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaḡhīr*, fol. 140a. *K. al-mustarshid*, fol. 76b.

¹⁵⁶ *Tashbīh* means the likening of God to something of creation in general and specifically the likening of God to man (anthropomorphism), that is, attributing to God man's condition, form and actions. The view opposing *tashbīh* maintains that God is not like anything in creation, and hence He is not like man.

Both views have their basis in the Ḳurʿān. The Ḳurʿān states on the one hand that there is nothing that equals God, and that He has no like (sura 42, v. 11, sura 112, v. 4), but on the other hand it describes Him by anthropomorphic expressions, i.e., as having a face hands and eyes and as talking and sitting on the throne (sura 55, v. 17, sura 38, v. 75, sura 54, v. 14, sura 2, v. 153, sura 20, v. 5). The likeners (*mushabbihūn*), those who held *tashbīh*, supported their view not only with Ḳurʿān verses but also with traditions. See for example the report of al-Baḡhdādī which reads as follows: "Those said: 'We likened Him to man's image because of His saying, may He be exalted: 'Surely We created man in the most beautiful creation' (sura 95, v. 4). They said: 'The most beautiful creation is a creation in the image of God'. Also they brought as a proof the saying of the prophet, may God bless him and give him peace: 'God created man in His own image'. And they brought as a proof for His having organs His saying: 'The face of your Lord does last' (sura 55, v. 27) and 'I created by my hands' (sura 38, v. 75). And (it is said) in a tradition: 'The Omnipotent put His foot in fire'. And they related: 'The believer's heart is between two of God's fingers.' " See *Uṣūl al-dīn*, p. 74, l. 14-p. 75, l. 2. Al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat*, p. 103, l. 13- p. 104. Idem, *K. al-milal*, p. 77, ll. 15-18. Al-Ḳāsim, *Ṣifat al-ʿarsh wa'l-kursī*, p. 263. On the historical development of the tradition that God created man in His image see W. M. Watt, "Created in His Image", in *Glasgow University Oriental Society*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 38-49.

The two views concerning the nature of God have a philosophical as well as Ḳurʿānic basis. The doctrine holding that God is a body is based upon the general view that only bodies have existence. Since God exists, it must be concluded that He is a body. See al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 34, l. 2. W. Madelung, "Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam", EI², Vol. III, pp. 496-498. Also whoever acts, must be a body, according to what is seen in reality (*fi'l-shāhid*) and according to reason (*fi'l-maʿkūl*). Since God acts, He must be a body. See al-Bākillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 196, ll. 14-16. Al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaḡhīr*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 136b, ll. 8-11.

The view opposing *tashbīh* maintains that it is impossible to liken God to a body, since any body is composed of parts and God is one, and since any body is produced in time whereas God is eternal. See al-Bākillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, pp. 191-193. Al-Ashʿarī, *K. al-lumaʿ*, p. 17, l. 14, p. 8, l. 1, p. 9, l. 18- p. 10, l. 8. Al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat*, p. 105, ll. 8-10. Al-Māturīdī, *K. al-tawḥīd*, p. 38, ll. 3-7. Al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 103.

Who were the *Mushabbihūn*? Al-Shahrastānī says that they were a group of extreme Shīʿites (*djamaʿa min al-shiʿa al-ghāliya*) and a group of gross traditionists (*djamaʿa min aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth al-hashwiyya*). See *K. al-milal*, p. 76, ll. 17-18. *Nihāyat*, p. 103, l. 10. Cf. al-Maḳdisī, *K. al-badʿ*, Vol. V, p. 139, ll. 12-13. Al-Khayyāt (*K. al-intiṣār*, p. 105, ll. 3-4) states decisively that there is no Rāfiḍite (i.e. Imamite) on earth, except those who follow the Muʿtazila, who does not say that God has man's form. In fact al-Ashʿarī (*Maḳālāt*, p. 34, ll. 1-4, p. 35, ll. 3-6) points out the existence of Rāfiḍites groups that did not posit *tashbīh*. According to him, the early Rāfiḍites posited *tashbīh*, whereas the later followed the Muʿtazila and the Khawāridj maintaining that God is unlike anything. But the reports about the likeners are not always unequivocal. A good example is Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam, an Imamite theologian and a contemporary of the Imams Djaʿfar al-Ṣādiq

regards as the main obstacle to God's absolute unity, occupies much space in al-Ḳāsim's writings. It seems to me that in this issue al-Ḳāsim was extensively influenced by the Mu'tazila, not only regarding content but also regarding the methods he used¹⁵⁷.

According to al-Ḳāsim, the obligation to know that God is one and that He has no like is the first and supreme obligation imposed by God upon believers¹⁵⁸. If God is truly one, there cannot possibly be anything like Him¹⁵⁹. Al-Ḳāsim denies any possible likeness of God to creation. *Tashbih* is not only likening God to man's form, but also thinking about Him in terms of creation¹⁶⁰.

Al-Ḳāsim proves that God is not like anything in the following manner: God is not like anything, because God is eternal whereas things are temporary¹⁶¹. God cannot be a body or like a body, since any body is formed (*muṣawwar*), limited (*maḥdūd*) and composed (*murakkab*), and there is no form without a former and no composed thing without one who composes, and since God forms and composes, He cannot possibly be formed and composed¹⁶².

Al-Ḳāsim uses some Ḳur'ān verses (e.g. sura 42, v. 11, sura 112, v. 4) as a firm basis for the refutation of *tashbih*. But he cannot ignore verses

and Mūsā al-Kāẓim, who was described as a *mushabbih*. See al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-radd 'alā al-rāfiḍa*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 112a. According to Ibn Taymiyya, Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam was the first theologian in Islam to claim that the Eternal is a body. See *Risālat al-furkān* in *Madjmu'at al-rasā'il al-kubrā*, Beirut 1972, p. 115, l. 7. Idem, *Minhādij al-sunna al-nabawiyya*, ed. Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, Beirut n.d., Vol. I, p. 238, l. 12. But al-Ash'arī informs us (*Maḳālāt*, p. 33, ll. 8-11) that in the course of a single year Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam expressed varying views concerning God, among them that God is not a form and that God is a body unlike other bodies. (On the latter formula see note 189 below). Nevertheless there are individuals and groups that different sources call likeners. Such is Muḳātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 767), a Ḳur'ān exegete, who is reported as saying that God is a body, flesh and blood. See Ibn Ḥazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. IV, p. 205, l. 16. Al-Maḳdisī, *K. al-bad'*, Vol. V, p. 41, ll. 1-2. Al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf*, Vol. I, p. 261, l. 14. Al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 209, ll. 7-12. Watt, "Created in His Image", p. 44f., n. 3.

The Mu'tazilites severely reproved the likeners to such an extent that some regarded the likeners as unbelievers. See al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 267, l. 11.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. G. L. della Vida's criticism of Guidi's edition of *K. al-radd 'alā al-zindīk* in *Oriente Modern* 8 (1928), p. 87.

¹⁵⁸ See al-Ḳāsim, *K. uṣūl al-'adl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 98f. (This epistle is also regarded by Madelung as spurious. See *Der Imam*, p. 100.) Idem, *K. al-'adl wa'l-tawḥīd*, pp. 102-105. *al-Uṣūl al-khamsa* in *Rasā'il al-'adl wa'l-tawḥīd*, ed. M. 'Imāra, p. 142. idem, *Min kalāmīhi*, in 'Imāra's op. cit., p. 158. Idem, *Ṣifat al-'arsh wa'l-kursī*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 240f. Ms. Berlin, fol. 94b.

¹⁵⁹ See *Ṣifat al-'arsh wa'l-kursī*, ibid. *K. al-mustarshid*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 120ff. Ms. Berlin, fol. 75b.

¹⁶⁰ See *Ṣifat al-'arsh wa'l-kursī*, *The Theological Epistle*, Vol. II, pp. 240f., 255f. Ms. Berlin, fols. 94b, 98b-99a.

¹⁶¹ See *Mas'alat al-ṭabariyyayni*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 97. Ms. Berlin, fol. 52b.

¹⁶² See *K. al-dalīl al-saghīr*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 136b.

that attribute human organs and acts to God. He interprets these verses in a manner that does not impair God's unity arguing that the likeners justified their view by using ambiguous verses (*mutashābihāt*), which they distorted by their wrong interpretation¹⁶³. Thus for al-Ḳāsim the basis for the refutation of *tashbih* is the right interpretation of these Ḳurʿān verses, which are likely to mean that God has bodily qualifications. Here al-Ḳāsim adopts a clear Muʿtazilite method, which claims that verses in the Ḳurʿān that, when taken literally, attribute human organs and actions to God, must be interpreted metaphorically¹⁶⁴. Thus, e.g., he interprets the word "hand" in the verse: "I created by my hands" (sura 38, v. 75) to mean God's ability and knowledge, and the same word in the verse: "But His hands are extended" (sura 5, v. 64) to mean instances of God's grace¹⁶⁵.

In his *K. al-masāʾil*¹⁶⁶, al-Ḳāsim explains thoroughly what he means by self-evident verses (*muḥkamāt*). A self-evident verse is one whose proof appears reasonable (*ṣaḥḥat ḥudjdjatuḥu fīʿl-albāb*). It is the basis of the book (*umm al-kitāb*) and the basis of the knowledge of everything. It is clear (*mubīn*) and not hidden (*ghayr khafī*) part of knowledge. It is indubitable, and one does not need to talk long when elucidating it. There is no contradiction in it between its literal meaning (*tanzīl*) and its interpretation (*taʾwīl*). Al-Ḳāsim gives sura 42, v. 11, sura 6, v. 103, sura 39, v. 9 and sura 10, v. 44 as examples of self-evident verses.

In contrast to self-evident verse, an ambiguous verse (*mutashābih*) is one whose meaning is hidden (*bāʾin, khafī*). Only God knows it, and also he who is taught by God¹⁶⁷.

Al-Ḳāsim says that there are some self-evident verses that several sages, because of their wrong thought and delusive imagination, claim that they are ambiguous¹⁶⁸. Indeed, according to Ibn Ḥanbal, the first

¹⁶³ See *K. al-ʿadl waʿl-tawḥīd*, p. 105, ll. 8-9. The origin of the term *mutashābihāt* and its opposite *muḥkamāt*, i.e., self-evident verses, is to be found in sura 3, v. 7 that reads as follows: "It is He who brought down by you the book (al-Ḳurʿān); in it there are self-evident verses that are the basis of the book (*umm al-kitāb*) and others that are ambiguous. Those who deviate from the right way (lit. those in whose hearts there is a deviation from the right way) follow the ambiguous verses for the purpose of [brining about] dissension and of interpreting them (the ambiguous ones). Only God and the most erudite persons (lit. those who are deeply rooted in knowledge) know the interpretation of these verses (the ambiguous ones). Those (the most erudite persons) say we believe in them (in the ambiguous verses), everyone (every ambiguous or self-evident verse) is from God, and only the clever people pay attention to [it]".

¹⁶⁴ See ʿAbd al-Djabbār, *K. al-madīmūʿ*, p. 199, l. 16. I. Goldziher, *Die Richtungen*, p. 116f.

¹⁶⁵ See al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-ʿadl waʿl-tawḥīd*, p. 107f. Idem, *K. al-masāʾil*, fol. 25a.

¹⁶⁶ See *ibid.*, fol. 31.

¹⁶⁷ See al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-nāsikh waʿl-mansūkh*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 129a, ll. 11-16.

¹⁶⁸ See *ibid.*, ll. 16-17. Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf* to sura 3, v. 7.

two verses mentioned above, which al-Ḳāsim regards as self-evident, belong to the category of the ambiguous verses. Thus, Madelung¹⁶⁹ rightly points out that, in the debates among the Islamic schools, reliance on self-evident verses could not be effective, since there was no general agreement on the verses that must be regarded as self-evident¹⁷⁰.

Al-Ḳāsim's method of dealing with the interpretation of the ambiguous verses is to explain them in the light of the self-evident verses. "As to the root of the book (*aṣl al-kitāb*), it is the self-evident (lit. precise *muḥkam*) part, in regard to which there is no controversy (*la ikhtilāfa fīhi*) and whose interpretation does not emerge as contradicting its literal meaning (*lā yakhruḍju ta'wīluhu mukhālīfan li-tanzīlihi*)¹⁷¹. As to its ambiguous branch (*wa-far'uhu al-mutashābih*)... it is returned to its root, concerning which there is no controversy among the interpreters (*ahl al-ta'wīl*)"¹⁷². Such a method is also used by the Mu'tazilite al-Ṣāhib ibn 'Abbād. In his commentary, al-Zamakhsharī declares this to be the correct method to follow¹⁷³.

Al-Ḳāsim adheres to the Mu'tazilite teaching in respect of several questions whose common theme is the refutation of *tashbih*. The first deals with God's place¹⁷⁴. Al-Ḳāsim dedicates an entire chapter in his *K. al-mustarshid*¹⁷⁵ to refuting "whoever maintains that God is in the heaven

¹⁶⁹ See *Der Imam*, p. 130. Idem, "The Origins", p. 508.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. al-Razī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb* to sura 3, v. 7.

¹⁷¹ The same view is expressed by al-Iskāfī, a Mu'tazilite contemporary of al-Ḳāsim (d. 868). See al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 224, ll. 1-3. It was also current in orthodox circles. See al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fī 'ulūm al-ḳur'ān*, Cairo 1957, Vol. I, p. 69, ll. 7-8.

¹⁷² See al-Ḳāsim, *Uṣūl al-'adl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 97, ll. 12-14. Idem, *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulḥid*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 60a. Cf. Madelung, *Der Imam*, pp. 98, 129.

¹⁷³ See al-Ṣāhib ibn 'Abbād, *Risāla fī'l-hidāya wa'l-dalāla*, ed. Ḥusayn 'Alī Maḥfūz, Tehran 1955, p. 50. Al-Zamakhsharī in his commentary to sura 3, v. 7. Cf. R. L. Netter, "Ibn Khaldun's Proof for God's Unity: A Problematic Passage in the Muqaddimah", *JSAI* 1(1979), p. 179f.

¹⁷⁴ The question is whether God is in a certain place, in the heaven or on the Throne, as some Ḳur'ān verses teach, or He is everywhere as some other Ḳur'ān verses teach. The Mu'tazilites following the Djahmites hold that God is everywhere, since if He were in a certain place, He would be limited, as a body. See Frank, "The Neoplatonism", p. 403. 'Abd al-Djabbār (*K. al-maḍjmū'*, p. 199, l. 15) says that whatever is possible concerning bodies must be denied from God. Cf. Ibn Hazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. II, p. 122. Adhering to the literal meaning of some verses, the likeners think that God is in the heaven and that He really sits on the Throne. See sura 6, v. 3, sura 43, v. 84. Cf. al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, p. 76f. Most of the Mu'tazilites hold the view that "God is everywhere" means that He directs and rules every place (*Maḳālāt*, p. 157, ll. 2-4) and that His direction and rule are found everywhere. In holding this view they want to cancel any possibility of contact between God and a place. Since if God were everywhere, one would claim that He is also in degrading places. See al-Ash'arī, *al-Ibāna*, p. 32. Al-Bāḳillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 260. Answering the claim that if God is everywhere He is also in degrading places, some later Mu'tazilites state that God is nowhere. See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 115.

¹⁷⁵ I am now preparing an edition and annotated translation of this epistle.

and not in other places''¹⁷⁶. God's existence in the heaven and earth, he argues, does not mean a physical existence involving a place which contains and encompasses Him. God is everywhere, in the sense that He directs and guards every place and takes care of it (*mudabbir, ḥāfiẓ, kā'im ʿalā*)¹⁷⁷. An entire epistle (*Ṣifat al-ʿarsh wa'l-kursī wa-tafsīruhumā*)¹⁷⁸ is devoted by al-Ḳāsim to elucidating Qurʾān verses stating that God sits Himself upon the Throne¹⁷⁹ and the verse stating that God's Throne comprises the heaven and the earth¹⁸⁰. These verses support the anthropomorphists' claim to the effect that God is in one place and not in many. Following the Muʿtazila, who used to disregard the literal meaning of anthropomorphic expressions and understand them metaphorically, al-Ḳāsim interprets the word Throne to mean God's kingship, power, rule and ability¹⁸¹.

The question of whether one is permitted to describe God as a thing (*shayʾ*) is also included in the broad subject of *tashbih*¹⁸². Although al-

¹⁷⁶ See Ms. Berlin, fols. 71b-72b.

¹⁷⁷ See *ibid.*, fols. 71b, 76b. Cf. Daiber, *Muʿammar*, p. 140.

¹⁷⁸ See Ms. Berlin, fols. 94b-100b.

¹⁷⁹ See sura 7, v. 54, sura 10, v. 3, sura 13, v. 2, sura 20, v. 5, sura 25, v. 59, sura 32, v. 4. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. II, p. 123.

¹⁸⁰ See sura 2, v. 255.

¹⁸¹ See *Ṣifat al-ʿarsh wa'l-kursī, The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 245-247. Ms. Berlin, fols. 95b-96b. Cf. al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, Vol. II, p. 530, Vol. III, p. 408f. Maimonides, *The Guide*, part a, ch. 9.

In two other places, al-Ḳāsim interprets the word Throne to mean the roof of the heaven. See *Ṣifat al-ʿarsh wa'l-kursī, The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 261. Ms. Berlin, fol. 100a. *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk*, p. 36f. This is a traditional interpretation also used by Ibn Ḥanbal. See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 111. It is difficult to agree with Madelung's statement to the effect that this meaning of the Throne hardly fits into al-Ḳāsim's abstract doctrine of God (See *ibid.*), for al-Ḳāsim's interpretation of the Throne does not indicate likening of God to the creation, so that God is only in the high heaven, rather it indicates that the Throne is not a real throne but the high heaven. In the epistle in which al-Ḳāsim interprets the Throne to mean the roof of the heaven, he does not interpret the word *istawā* literally, but as the exaltation of God's rule over the high heaven. God rules the high heaven as well as the low heaven. See *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk*, p. 35, ll. 16-21.

¹⁸² Djahm ibn Ṣafwān claims that it is forbidden to describe God with terms applied to the created beings, since this description entails *tashbih*. See al-Shahrastānī, *K. al-mīlāl*, p. 60, ll. 7-9. al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq*, p. 211, l. 12- p. 212, l. 1. God may be qualified only with qualities which belong to Him, such as Creator or Agent. See *ibid.*, p. 212, ll. 2-3. Hence, it is inconceivable that God should be denominated a thing (*shayʾ*), since if God were a thing He would be likened to things. See al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 280, ll. 2-3. According to al-Shahrastānī, Djahm says that a thing is whatever is brought into being (*muhdath*) and that it is God who makes things (*mushayyʾ al-ashyāʾ*). See *Nihāyat*, p. 151, ll. 9-10. Cf. al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 181, ll. 2-3, p. 518, ll. 5-6. Al-Maḳdisī, *K. al-badʾ*, Vol. V, p. 146, ll. 8ff. Al-ʿIdjī, *K. al-mawāḳif*, Vol. II, p. 212, l. 4. According to another report, Djahm states that a thing is an existent body (*djism mawdūd*), and since God is not a body, it is inadmissible to qualify Him by the word thing. See al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 494, l. 15.

Following the Neoplatonists, the Djahmites held the view that God is totally different

Ḳāsim deems the denial of anthropomorphic expressions a principal element of his doctrine, he—unlike Djahm—does not go so far as to forbid the designation of God as a thing. For al-Ḳāsim, a thing is what exists; it is the contrary of non-existence¹⁸³. The word “thing” does not indicate any quality in the substance which is called “a thing”. When designating substances things, one is not indicating that the substances are equal to or different from each other, but only that they are existent¹⁸⁴. Since a thing is what exists, says al-Ḳāsim, it is possible to call God a thing, but God is a thing which differs from other things; things are made, but God is not made¹⁸⁵. Most of the Zaydites¹⁸⁶, the Ash‘arites¹⁸⁷ and the Maturidites¹⁸⁸ hold this view.

In *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, al-Ḳāsim continues his polemics, this time not against the Djahmiyya, who hold that it is forbidden to designate God a thing in fear of *tashbīh*, but against orthodox Muslims who maintain: “If you claim that God is a thing unlike other things, you cannot deny that He is a body unlike other bodies”¹⁸⁹. The basis of their argument

from His creation, is infinite and absolutely transcendent, is above any being which can be perceived by reason, and consequently must not be qualified by a term qualifying a created being. See Frank, “The Neoplatonism”, pp. 399-402.

¹⁸³ See *K. al-mustarshid*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 117. Ms. Berlin, fol. 74b. *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, fol. 136a. Cf. al-Ash‘arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 518, ll. 10-11.

¹⁸⁴ See *K. al-mustarshid*, *ibid.*, pp. 118-120. fols. 74b-75a. *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, *ibid.*, ll. 22-24. Cf. ‘Abd al-Djabbār, *Sharḥ*, p. 221, ll. 3-6.

¹⁸⁵ See *K. al-mustarshid*, *ibid.* *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, *ibid.*, ll. 9-10.

¹⁸⁶ See al-Ash‘arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 70, ll. 3-4.

¹⁸⁷ See al-Bāḳillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 193, ll. 17-18. Al-Īdjī, *K. al-mawāḳif*, Vol. II, p. 211, l. 9. Al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf*, Vol. I, p. 729, ll. 11-12.

¹⁸⁸ See al-Māturīdī, *K. al-tawḥīd*, p. 104, ll. 8-12. Abū Muṭī‘, *K. al-radd ‘alā al-bida‘*, p. 67, l. 3, p. 95, l. 16. According to al-Ash‘arī, this is the stand of all the Muslims. See *Maḳālāt*, p. 181, ll. 3-4. Cf. *Fikh akbar* II, art. 4, in Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*, p. 190. Daiber, *Mu‘ammar*, p. 190f. van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, pp. 192-199.

¹⁸⁹ See *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, fol. 136a, ll. 16-17. According to al-Ash‘arī (*Maḳālāt*, p. 518, l. 9), the likeners say that the words “God is a thing” mean “God is a body”, but the formula “a body unlike bodies” is not mentioned here. Thus it is possible to assume that al-Ash‘arī does not consider those who adhere to the formula “a body unlike bodies” likeners.

Wolfson is of the opinion that the ancient formula “a body unlike bodies” is related to the method of analogy (*kiyās*) employed by the Muslims in the *Fikh*. According to this method, two things may be alike in some aspects, but unlike in other aspects. The likeness between God and man which is implied in some *Qur‘ān* verses is not in every aspect but in some. The denial of anthropomorphism in the *Qur‘ān* refers to a total denial not to a partial one. That is, the likeness between God and man in the *Qur‘ān* is only a likeness in some aspects. According to Wolfson, those who held this formula were Muslims who on the one hand rejected *tashbīh* and on the other hand opposed the view that it is forbidden to interpret anthropomorphic verses. See *Kalam*, pp. 10-17. It is worth noting that when the Shī‘ite Mutakallim Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam withdrew some anthropomorphic expressions, he used the formula “a body unlike bodies”. See al-Ash‘arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 33, ll. 8-11.

is the possibility of using an analogy; just as one employs the analogy “a thing unlike other things”, one may employ the analogy “a body unlike other bodies”¹⁹⁰. Al-Ḳāsim answers this argument by stating that each body has dimensions and parts. Whatever has dimensions is brought into being, and whatever is brought into being is unable, and inability cannot be attributed to the Creator. If God were a body, He would be like a body, since bodies have qualities, while the word “thing” does not indicate qualities but only existence and it applies to everything existent¹⁹¹. Asked why a body is like another body and a thing is unlike another thing, al-Ḳāsim answers as follows: Just as a created thing is like another created thing, since the opposite of a created thing, namely, an eternal thing, is different from a created thing, so a body is like another body, since the opposite of a body, namely, that which is not a body, is different from a body¹⁹².

The refutation of *tashbīḥ* includes the contention that the Ḳurʿān¹⁹³ was

¹⁹⁰ See ‘Abd al-Djabbār, *Sharḥ*, p. 221, ll. 1-2. Al-Māturīdī, *K. al-tawḥīd*, p. 39, ll. 20-21.

¹⁹¹ See *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, fol. 136a, ll. 17-24. Cf. al-Bākillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 193, l. 17- p. 194, l. 6.

¹⁹² See *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, *ibid.*, ll. 25-29.

¹⁹³ The Ḳurʿān occupies an important place in al-Ḳāsim’s doctrine. It serves him as a cardinal means of proving his views. No wonder then that al-Ḳāsim dedicates three of his works to glorifying the Ḳurʿān: *K. al-madīḥ al-kabīr*, *K. al-madīḥ al-ṣaghīr* and *K. al-nāsikh wa’l-mansūkh*. In the first treatise al-Ḳāsim emphasizes the meaningful, unequivocal and comprehensive character of the revelation of the Ḳurʿān. The Ḳurʿān does not include opposites and contraries. Therefore it can be a guide for the believers. See Ms. Berlin, fol. 66a. Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 125. The Ḳurʿān is also a proof against the sinner and the unbeliever. See *ibid.*, fol. 67a. Al-Ḳāsim argues against those who claim that a part of the Ḳurʿān has been lost. He seems to have thought about a group of the Imamiyya who claimed to know of a revelation about ‘Alī which was lost. See *ibid.*, fol. 67b. Madelung, *ibid.*, p. 125f. At the end of this epistle he speaks of *i’djāz al-ḳurʿān*, which he still sees in its entirety, without distinguishing between content and form, as does the Muʿtazilite al-Nazzām. See *ibid.*, fol. 69a.

K. al-madīḥ al-ṣaghīr, in addition to the praises of the Ḳurʿān occurring in it, is actually an introduction to the interpretation of the Ḳurʿān. Contrary to the interpretations of the despots and their supporters, namely, the scholars of the masses (See p. 188, n. 69 below), who distorted the meaning of the Ḳurʿān out of arbitrariness, al-Ḳāsim promises to interpret the Ḳurʿān according to the teaching of God. He relies on the Arabic language, which, according to him, is the key to understanding the Ḳurʿān. See *ibid.*, fol. 71a. Madelung, *ibid.*, p. 126.

In *K. al-nāsikh wa’l-mansūkh*, which is devoted almost entirely to the praises of the Ḳurʿān, there appears first the question concerning the abrogation of the Ḳurʿānic verses. Al-Ḳāsim tries to prove that the abrogation or the exchange of verses does not amount to cancelling or denying part of the Ḳurʿān, but to changing, complementing and lightening it. See *ibid.*, fols. 126ff. Madelung, *ibid.*, p. 126f.

It was probably the raising of the rank of the Ḳurʿān that made al-Ḳāsim devalue the Sunna, the second source after the Ḳurʿān, according to which the Islamic law is established. This devaluation is expressed in al-Ḳāsim’s fourth principle (see below p. 38): “The Sunna is whatever is expressed in the Ḳurʿān and what the Ḳurʿān intends”. Con-

created. Basing themselves on the verse “to Moses God spoke directly”¹⁹⁴, the likeners argue that God “speaks by tongue and lips and that speech derives from Him as it derives from the creatures”¹⁹⁵. Al-Ḳāsim, who regards this statements as unbelief, interprets the verse mentioned to mean that God created speech, and whatever is heard from God is created, since whatever is heard does not create itself¹⁹⁶. Al-Ḳāsim seems to hold that the phrase God’s speech should not be taken literally. In order to contact man, God produces a voice which can be heard, and this voice is metaphorically called a speech¹⁹⁷. He remains faithful to the notion that all human acts which depict God in the Ḳurʿān must not be interpreted literally. Whatever comes from God “is unlike the act of the lost ones”¹⁹⁸.

Al-Ḳāsim states that whatever is outside God is created, since whatever is outside God did not exist then it came into existence¹⁹⁹. Consequently, the Ḳurʿān, God’s speech, and all God’s books are created. The proof of the Ḳurʿān’s having been created occurs in the Ḳurʿān itself in the verse “We have made it (*djaʿalnāhu*) an Arabic Ḳurʿān” (sura 43, v. 3). The verb *djaʿala* means *khalāḡa*, i.e., he created. Other verses are adduced to prove that the Ḳurʿān was brought into being (*muhdath*), e.g., “a renewed (or brought into being) Remembrance which came to them from their God” (sura 21, v. 2). Whatever is brought into being and comes from God is created²⁰⁰.

According to Madelung, the main dispute concerning the Ḳurʿān in the pre-Miḡna epoch (the Miḡna lasted from 827 to 848) was between traditionists—who insisted that the Ḳurʿān was really God’s speech and denied its having been created without making their denial a positive doctrine, namely, stating the Ḳurʿān’s eternity, since they adhered to the view that God really spoke in order to defend their anthropomorphic con-

trary to al-Ḳāsim’s statement that the Ḳurʿān is the judge of the Sunna, al-Shāfiʿī states that the Sunna equals the Ḳurʿān in degree. Al-Shāfiʿī teaches that a precept of the Sunna can be abrogated only by another precept of the Sunna not by the Ḳurʿān. The Sunna never contradicts the Ḳurʿān but elucidates its meaning. In fact, this means that the interpretations of the Ḳurʿān should be in keeping with traditions. Traditionists living after al-Shāfiʿī made a further step stating that a Sunna of the Prophet can abrogate what is said in the Ḳurʿān. See Madelung, *ibid.*, p. 127f and the references given there.

¹⁹⁴ See sura 4, v. 164. According to the Ḳurʿān, Moses is the only prophet who heard God speaking to him directly without a mediator.

¹⁹⁵ See *K. al-ʿadl waʾl-tawḡīd*, p. 109, ll. 8-9.

¹⁹⁶ See *ibid.*, ll. 11-16.

¹⁹⁷ See *Ṣifāt al-ʿarsh waʾl-kursī*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 255. Ms. Berlin, fol. 98b. Madelung, “The Origins”, p. 506. Cf. Peters, *God’s Created Speech*, pp. 336ff.

¹⁹⁸ See *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk*, p. 33f., p. 37, ll. 10-11, p. 38. *K. al-ʿadl waʾl-tawḡīd*, p. 108, l. 12- p. 109, l. 6.

¹⁹⁹ See *ibid.*, ll. 15-16. Madelung, “The Origins”, p. 509.

²⁰⁰ See *K. al-ʿadl waʾl-tawḡīd*, p. 109, l. 17- p. 110, l. 3.

ception of God—and those who held the view, whose origin was Djahmite²⁰¹, that God did not speak but created his speech²⁰². After the Miḥna, the discussion concerning the Qurʾān was closely related to the question of the real qualities existing in God. Believing in the existence of real and eternal qualities in God, the Ashʿarites thought that the Qurʾān, which is God's speech, was eternal like God's other qualities, while the Muʿtazilites, who denied the existence of real and eternal qualities in God, held the view that God created the Qurʾān, that is, created His speech after its non-existence²⁰³. In keeping with Madelung's thesis we may thus conclude that al-Ḳāsim's *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*, in which the writer refutes the notion that God speaks, was not written after 848, which supports our assumption that al-Ḳāsim is its author. The passage from this epistle, with which we have dealt just now, is properly interwoven with al-Ḳāsim's anti-anthropomorphic doctrine and with his doctrine of God's unity which states that whatever is outside God is created²⁰⁴.

Considering *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*—the only epistle in which al-Ḳāsim dealt with the question of the creation of the Qurʾān—unauthentic, Madelung tries to explain why al-Ḳāsim disregarded the question of whether the Qurʾān was created or not, notwithstanding the fact that the debate about this question reached its climax in his time and also turned into political issue. "It is possible that al-Ḳāsim, who did not adapt to the distinction between eternal and essential qualities and between created and factual ones, took a view which differed from that of the Muʿtazila. Like ʿAbdallāh ibn Kullāb, he might have regarded God's speech as eternal and the Qurʾān's form as created. If this is the case, his silence might be ascribed to his reluctance to alienate his closest allies. Solidarity with the contemporary Zaydite masters, who refrained from expressing an opinion on this point, probably plays a role in this case as well. It is also possible, however, that he did agree with the Muʿtazilite thesis in essence, but did not consider speaking of the Qurʾān as created suitable for its rank and honour"²⁰⁵. Madelung's explanation seems to

²⁰¹ See Ibn Ḥanbal, *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zanādiqa*, p. 315, l. 19, p. 326.

²⁰² See Madelung, "The Origins", pp. 504-514.

²⁰³ See *ibid.*, p. 516. J. Bouman, *Le conflit autour du Coran et la solution d'al-Bāqillānī*, Amsterdam 1959, pp. 14-16.

²⁰⁴ The external pieces of evidence cited by Madelung to prove the spuriousness of this epistle are not convincing: the work of Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq (d. 1033) (*K. al-ifāda fī taʾrīkh al-aʾimma al-sāda*), who does not mention *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd* in his list of al-Ḳāsim's works, is not complete. In his *K. al-ḥadāʾiq al-wardiyya fī manāḳib aʾimmat al-zaydiyya*, al-Muḥallī (d. 1254) does mention this epistle. Internal pieces of evidence (style and content) do not show that the work is unauthentic either.

²⁰⁵ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 124, l. 6- p. 125, l. 6.

me unconvincing: If al-Ḳāsim's view did in fact differ from that of the Mu'tazila, why did he not express his opinion? Was it the sole issue, according to Madelung, on which al-Ḳāsim did not agree with the Mu'tazila? According to Madelung himself we see that al-Ḳāsim did not hesitate to express his views on those points about which he disagreed with the Mu'tazila, e.g., the question of predestination and free will (see below p. 45). Moreover, even when the Zaydites refrained from giving their opinion on the issue under discussion they made a point of saying something. Aḥmad ibn 'Īsā, one of the ancient Zaydite masters (d. 861), stated that when speaking of those who held the opinion that the Ḳur'ān was created, as well as when speaking of those who did not hold this opinion, one should have said *tarahḥama 'alā* (i.e. may God have mercy upon them)²⁰⁶. In like manner, one may say that if al-Ḳāsim had thought that to speak of the Ḳur'ān as having been created was unbefitting its rank and honour, he would have expressed this opinion in his writing, or would at least have alluded to it.

In *K. al-mustarshid*, al-Ḳāsim refutes other anthropomorphic notions:

- Relying on some Ḳur'ān verses, some likeners state that God has a soul (*nafs*)²⁰⁷. According to al-Ḳāsim, God's soul indicates His essence²⁰⁸.
- The notion that God is light²⁰⁹ was prevalent among Shī'ite groups²¹⁰ and related mainly to two Shī'ite Mutakallimun, Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam (d. between 795 and 815) and Hishām ibn Sālim al-Djawālīkī (fl. 800)²¹¹, but it can also be found among orthodox Muslims²¹². God cannot be a light, says al-Ḳāsim, since the light is created. Following the general line of the traditional Islamic interpretation of the Ḳur'ān, al-Ḳāsim explains "God is the light of the heavens and the earth" (sura 24, v. 35) to mean "God has a light" or "God lights". Since the signs all over the world serve as proof of God's existence and of the distinction between the

²⁰⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 82, ll. 1-4. Also whoever does not refer to the question of whether the Ḳur'ān was created or not expresses his attitude that: "We neither say 'it was created' nor do we say 'it was not created' ". See al-Dārimī, *K. al-radd 'alā al-djahmiyya*, ed. G. Vitestam, Leiden and Lund 1960, p. 89.

²⁰⁷ See al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb* in his commentary on sura 5, v. 116. Ibn Ḥanbal states that God has a soul which differs from the human soul. See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 115, n. 103. In al-Murtaḍā's *Amālī* (Vol. 1, p. 324) we find a tradition according to which God has a soul like the human soul.

²⁰⁸ See *K. al-mustarshid*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 111-113. Ms. Berlin, fols. 72b-73a. *K. al-'adl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 110, ll. 13-19. Cf. al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, Vol. II, p. 7.

²⁰⁹ See Ibn Ḥazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. II, p. 119.

²¹⁰ See al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 7, ll. 1-3, p. 34, ll. 13-14.

²¹¹ See al-Shahrastānī, *K. al-milal*, p. 141, ll. 2-3, p. 141, l. 1- p. 142, l. 3. Al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 31, l. 10- p. 32, l. 1, p. 34, l. 9, p. 207, l. 8, p. 209, l. 14.

²¹² See al-Ash'arī, *ibid.*, p. 211, l. 6.

Creator and the created things, God lights these signs to enable men to find the way to Him more easily²¹³. c. Some Islamic sects, mainly extreme Shi'ites, maintain, on the basis of Qur'ān verses, that God has a face²¹⁴. Al-Ḳāsim rejects the view that God has a face by the argument from God's unity. God is one and has no parts, therefore it is inconceivable that part of Him should remain²¹⁵. The face related to God in the Qur'ān means God's essence or reward²¹⁶.

d. A subject of much controversy among Muslim theologians is the question of the visibility of God in this world and the world to come. Some of them, especially the Mu'tazilites, connected this question with the question of *tashbih*²¹⁷. The Mu'tazilites, the Zaydites, the Khāridjites and most of the Murdji'ites maintained that the visibility of God is impossible²¹⁸. The Mu'tazilites held that the answer to the question of whether God can be seen by man is to be found in examining God's essence. Since God, in their view, is neither a body (*djism*) nor an accident (*ʿaraḍ*), He cannot be seen either in this world or in the world to come. If God were a body, as the likeners maintain, He could be seen²¹⁹. Most of the Mu'tazilites, with the exception of Hishām al-Fuwaṭī and ʿAbbād ibn Sulaymān, held that to see God means to know Him²²⁰. The likeners maintained that it was possible to see God in this world and the world to come, since God is a body²²¹. On the other hand, the so-called orthodox theologians, basing their opinion on some Qur'ān verses (see

²¹³ See K. al-mustarshid, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 113-115. Ms. Berlin, fols. 73b-74a. Cf. ʿAbd al-Djabbār, *Mutashābih*, Vol. II, p. 526. Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, Vol. III, p. 67. *Tafsīr al-Tabarī*, Beirut 1972, Vol. XVIII, p. 105.

²¹⁴ See e.g. sura 28, v. 88: "All things perish, except His face". The first extreme Shi'ite sect mentioned in al-Ash'arī's *Maḳālāt*, al-Bayāniyya, states, on the basis of this verse, that God has the form of a human being and that He will perish except His face.

²¹⁵ See K. al-mustarshid, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 125f. Ms. Berlin, fols. 76b-77a.

²¹⁶ See K. al-mustarshid, *ibid.*, pp. 126f., 128f. fols. 77a-77b. K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawhīd, p. 110, ll. 8-12. In this issue, al-Ḳāsim follows al-Nazzām and most of the Baṣrian and Baghdadian Mu'tazilites, who state that God's face indicates His essence. See al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 189, ll. 3-9.

²¹⁷ See ʿUthman, *Nazariyyat al-taklīf*, p. 269. ʿAbd al-Djabbār, K. al-madjmūʿ, pp. 206ff. Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 22. Cf. A. K. Tuft, *The Origins and Development of the Controversy over 'Ru'yā' in Medieval Islam and its Relation to Contemporary Visual Theory*, unpublished Ph.d thesis, University of California, Los Angeles 1979, University Microfilms International Ann Arbor Michigan 1982.

²¹⁸ See ʿAbd al-Djabbar, *al-Mughnī*, Vol. IV, p. 139.

²¹⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 140, ll. 1-4. Idem, *Mutashābih al-ḳur'ān*, Vol. II, p. 673. Cf. Saadia (Rosenblatt), *The Book of Beliefs*, p. 129) who says that things are seen only because of their colours (i.e. accidents), whereas there is no accident in the Creator.

²²⁰ See al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 157, ll. 12-13, p. 216, ll. 12-13. Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, Vol. II, p. 116.

²²¹ See ʿAbd al-Djabbār, *al-Mughnī*, Vol. IV, p. 139.

e.g. sura 75, vv. 22-23, sura 10, v. 26, sura 85, v. 15, sura 7, v. 143), held that God would be seen in the world to come only. They also argued that it was possible to see any existing thing, and that since God exists, it is possible to see Him²²². Following the Muʿtazila, al-Ḳāsim argues that God will be seen neither in this world nor in the world to come, since He is absolutely unlike things, and whatever is absolutely unlike things cannot be seen²²³. It is also argued by al-Ḳāsim in *K. al-ʿadl waʾl-tawḥīd* that God cannot be seen, since He is unlimited²²⁴.

As we have seen, al-Ḳāsim's main method of refuting *tashbīḥ* is to reject the literal meaning of anthropomorphic expressions and generally to interpret them metaphorically. He supports this method by employing parables, expressions current in ancient Arabic language and poems²²⁵. He also uses the speculative way of reasoning called *ilzām*²²⁶. Indeed, this method of rejecting the literal meaning of anthropomorphic expressions was employed before al-Ashʿarī's time by all the speculative theologians: the Muʿtazila, Ḍirār ibn ʿAmr, the pseudo-Djahmites of the school of Abū Ḥanīfa, the Ibādites and various Khāridjites. In Ḳurʾān exegesis this method was already used by Mudjāhid, ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿAbbās' disciple²²⁷. However, when accompanied by other Muʿtazilite methods and notions one cannot consider this one in isolation from Muʿtazilite influence, but rather as a part of it. One may not assume that a Muʿtazilite influence was exerted on the Zaydite Sulaymān ibn Djarīr who opposed *tashbīḥ*, but did not follow the Muʿtazilite view about God's unity, and who held predestination²²⁸.

VII. Also in the topic of God's justice al-Ḳāsim was influenced by the Muʿtazila concerning both ideas and terms. But al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's influence on him is observed too.

²²² See Ibn Ḥazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. III, p. 3. ʿUthman, *Nazarīyyat al-taklīf*, p. 269, l. 3- p. 270, l. 2. al-Rāzī, *Munāẓarāt*, p. 223.

²²³ See *K. al-mustarshid*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 135-139. Ms. Berlin, fols. 78b, 79a-80b.

²²⁴ See p. 106: *wa-kayfa yaraʾnahu biʾl-abṣār. wa-huwa lā maḥdūd wa-lā dhū aḳṭār*. Cf. al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Ḳāsim (al-Ḳāsim ibn Ibrāhīm's descendant d. 1013), *K. al-tawḥīd waʾl-tanāḥī waʾl-tahdīd*, in J. van Ess, *Göttliche Allmacht im Zerrbild menschlicher Sprache*, *Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph*, Vol. XLIX, Beirut 1975-76, p. 656, ll. 12-17.

²²⁵ See Goldziher, *Die Richtungen*, p. 116f. Al-Murtaḍā, *Amālī*, Vol. I, pp. 324-327.

²²⁶ This method of arguing means forcing (*ilzām*) the imaginary opponent to admit views which are either absurd or heretical. It is done through inferring conclusions from the opponent's opinions. See J. van Ess, "The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology", in *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum, Wiesbaden 1970, p. 25f.

²²⁷ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 59. Even Ibn Ḥanbal frequently used this method. See al-Ghazālī, *Fayṣal al-tafriqa*, p. 10.

²²⁸ See on him Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 64f.

Al-Ḳāsim holds that the principle of God's justice²²⁹ is directly drawn from the principle of God's unity; whoever is really One does no wrong,

²²⁹ The principle of God's justice (*al-ʿadl*), one of the five principles of the Muʿtazila, was formulated in consequence of the ancient discussion—which may constitute the earliest stage of Islamic theology (Cf. van Ess, *Anfänge* and M. Cook's comments on this work in his *Early Muslim Dogma*, Cambridge 1981)—about the question of free choice and predestination. The belief in predestination was current in the first and second centuries of Islam, and the Umayyad khalifs supported its adherents. Some verses in the Ḳurʿān seem to vindicate the belief in predestination: "If your Lord willed, all those in the earth would believe...it is not for any person to believe except by the permission of God..." sura 10, v. 99-100. "But you will not will, save it be that God wills..." sura 76, v. 30. Cf. van Ess, *Anfänge*, pp. 46ff of the Arabic text. But there are some other verses that seem to vindicate the belief in free choice: "...Who wills, let him believe, and who wills let him disbelieve..." sura 18, v. 29 "...Some of you want this world and some of you want the world to come..." sura 3, v. 152. Cf. al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 111. Most of the traditions dealing with this question prefer predestination to free choice, apparently because of the influence of the pre-Islamic heritage. See Watt, *Free Will*, ch. I. H. Ringgren, *Studies in Arabian Fatalism*, Uppsala and Wiesbaden 1955. Schwarz, "Acquisition", p. 355. Believers in free choice were the Ḳadarites, whose famous proponent was al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. See on him J. van Ess, "Ḳadariyya", EI², Vol. IV, pp. 368-372. Watt, *The Formative Period*, pp. 82-118. The Ḳadarites, the forerunners of the Muʿtazila, opposed the prevailing belief in predestination asserting that if man's evil actions were preordained by God, God would wrong man in denying him his chance to do good and consequently deserve his reward. The Muʿtazilite purpose in upholding man's free choice was twofold: a. to defend God's justice that rewards and punishes, and b. to encourage human moral behaviour, because the notion that God preordains man's evil actions may serve as a justification for man to do evil. See Schwarz, *ibid.*, p. 356.

The orthodox (*ahl al-hadīth wa-ahl al-iḥbāt*) disagreed with the Muʿtazilite doctrine, since they thought that it impugns the omnipotence of God, who creates everything including human action. But they did not go too far like Djahm ibn Ṣafwān, who held that man's action is only metaphorically attributed to him. See al-Ashʿarī, *Makālāt*, p. 279, ll. 4-9. *Ahl al-iḥbāt* (i.e. those who affirmed [*athbata*] that the *ḳadar* belongs to God. See on them Watt, *Free Will*, pp. 112-116. Idem, *The Formative Period*, p. 117f.) and al-Ashʿarī and his followers tried to solve the problem of the contradiction between God's omnipotence and His justice by stating that although God creates man's action, man performs (*kasaba*) it, and consequently he is morally responsible for it. See Schwarz, "Acquisition", pp. 357, 381. On the development of the meaning of the term *kasb* (lit. acquisition) in the Ashʿarite school up to al-Ghazālī see *ibid.*, pp. 373ff. An attempt to analyze the philosophical structure of al-Ashʿarī's theory of *kasb* has been done by Frank. See "The Structure of Created Causality According to al-Ashʿarī. An Analysis of the *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ*, arts. 82-164", *SI* 25(1966), pp. 13-75.

It should be noted that both the Muʿtazilites and their opponents, the traditionists and the Ashʿarites, held that God is just, but they had different conceptions of His justice. According to the Muʿtazilites, the meaning of evil and wrong-doing is absolutely determined by reason; Actions of wrong-doing and lying, says ʿAbd al-Djabbār, are always evil, whoever performs them. See *al-Mughnī*, Vol. VI, pp. 122-126. The principle that applies to man applies also to God. See *ibid.*, p. 203, ll. 6-8. G. F. Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism, The Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbār*, Oxford 1971, p. 101. Al-Djuwaynī, *K. al-irṣhād*, pp. 265f, 289, 295. Cf. Joseph ben Abraham al-Baṣīr, *al-Kitāb al-muḥtawī*, ch. XIX, ed. M. Klein, Budapest 1913, p. XI. According to al-Ashʿarī and his followers, the meaning of evil is determined by God's precepts and prohibitions; Whoever transgresses God's precepts and prohibitions is reckoned an evil-doer. Since God is not obliged to obey His precepts and prohibitions, He cannot be reckoned an evil-doer. See al-Ashʿarī, *al-Lumaʿ*,

because wrong-doing only exists in him who is not really one, i.e., man. Whoever does not liken God to man must affirm God's justice²³⁰.

God's justice figures as the second principle of what al-Ḳāsim calls the five principle of Islam. (These are: a. God is one. b. God is just. c. God both promises and threatens. d. The Ḳur'ān is a homogeneous book without contradictions, and the Sunna is what is mentioned in the Ḳur'ān and what the Ḳur'ān intends. e. It is forbidden, in the place where oppressors rule, to use property and to engage in commerce and profits making²³¹.) In *Min kalāmihi* (ibid.), Al-Ḳāsim explains this principle as follows: "God, glory be to Him, is just and not wrong-doing (*ʿadl. ghayr djāʿir*). He imposes on man only what he is capable of doing (*la yukallifu nafsān illā wusʿahā* sura 2, v. 286), and He does not punish man except for his sin. He does not prevent anyone from obeying Him, but commands him to obey [Him] (*lam yamnaʿ aḥadan min tāʿatihi bal amarahū bihā*), and He does not cause anyone to disobey Him (lit. He does not make anyone enter disobedience. *wa-lam yudkhill aḥadan fī maʿṣiyatihi*), but forbids him to disobey (*bal nahāhu ʿanhā*)."

Thus the first question raised is whether God requires man to do anything beyond his power (*taklīf mā lā yuṭāqu*). God orders man to believe in Him. If God preordains a man to be an unbeliever, he is unable to believe; hence God orders man to do what he is unable to do. God must be considered unjust, if He punishes man for doing what he cannot avoid, or for not doing what he is unable to do. Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī holds that reward for morality presupposes an ability of man to act. God does not impose on man to do anything beyond his ability²³². This is also the Muʿtazila's view according to which imposition implies existence of ability or power (*ḳudra*). It is inconceivable to the Muʿtazila that God should order man to do what he is incapable of doing, not only because of the teaching of some verses of the Ḳur'ān (sura 2, v. 286, sura 6, v. 152, sura 7, v. 42, sura 62, v. 23), but also because of justice and reason.

p. 71, arts. 169-170 of the Arabic text. Al-Bākillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 341f, arts. 574-575. Al-Djuwaynī, *K. al-irshād*, pp. 258-270. (It must be admitted, however, that according to this conception God is neither just nor unjust, because the criterion of precepts and prohibitions does not apply to Him.)

²³⁰ See al-Ḳāsim, *Min kalāmihi*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 65a, ll. 3-4. Idem, *K. al-ḳatīl wa'l-ḳitāl*, fol. 101a.

²³¹ See al-Ḳāsim, *Min kalāmihi*, fols. 132a-132b. M. ʿImāra (ed.), *Rasāʾil al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 142. The text of the five principles was edited by E. Griffini in *RSO* 7(1917), p. 605f. Cf. Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 104f.

²³² See Schwarz, "The Letter", p. 28f. The letter of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī was edited by H. Ritter in "Studien zur islamischen Frömmigkeit I., Ḥasan al-Baṣrī", *Der Islam* 21 (1933), pp. 67-83.

Man is morally responsible only concerning acts he wills according to the free choice that is given to him by God²³³.

According to the Ash'arites *taḳlīf mā lā yuṭāqu* is possible. God imposes on unbelievers to hear the truth and to accept it, to believe in God and to obey Him, even though they are unable to hear. When God orders them to believe, He is not obliged to make them able to do so²³⁴. This view of the Ash'arites is based on the principle that the ability to act and the act itself come simultaneously, as opposed to the Mu'tazilite view maintaining that the ability to act precedes the act. Thus when man is ordered by God to act, he does not yet have the ability to act²³⁵. According to al-Ḳāsim, who follows the Mu'tazilites, the ability (*istiṭā'a*) or the power (*kuwwa*) precedes the act²³⁶. Power is regarded as the soundness and the perfection of the soul and the organs. On this point al-Ḳāsim agrees only with some Mu'tazilites, Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir, Thumāma ibn al-Ashras and Ghaylān. Some other Mu'tazilites, Abū al-Hudhayl, Mu'ammār and al-Murdār hold that power is an accident²³⁷.

Al-Ḳāsim maintains that "the knowledge about God, His mercifulness and His wisdom that He is worthy of, includes the knowledge that God did not impose and He will never impose on one of His servants what he is incapable of doing" (See *Mas'alat al-ṭabariyyayni*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 101. Ms. Berlin, fol. 53b). This principle is discussed in al-Ḳāsim's epistle *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*. Basing his argumentation on some Ḳur'ān verses (sura 2, v. 286, sura 65, v. 7, sura 64, v. 16, sura 3, v. 97), al-Ḳāsim claims that God did not impose on his servants what is beyond their power "but imposed on them less than they are able to do, and did not impose on them all they are able to do"²³⁸. Al-Ḳāsim quotes the verse "There is no sin upon a blind or a lame or a sick person" (sura 24, v. 61) to prove that God does not require disabled persons to perform precepts, since God causes their disability. Al-Ḳāsim affirms that disease, death and other calamities are preordained by God, but not

²³³ See al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 230, ll. 14-15. Watt, *Free Will*, p. 69. Cf. Saadia, *K. al-amānāt*, Rosenblatt, *The Book of Beliefs*, p. 186. Brunschvig, "Devoir et pouvoir", pp. 10ff.

²³⁴ See al-Ash'arī, *al-Ibāna*, p. 52f. Idem, *al-Luma'*, p. 58, ll. 10-13, p. 68, ll. 11-16 of the Arabic text. Al-Bākillānī, *K. al-tamḥīd*, p. 293, l. 16, p. 295, l. 7.

²³⁵ See al-Djuwaynī, *K. al-irshād*, p. 228. (The Maturidites, in contrast to the Ash'arites, held that it is inadmissible that God should impose on man what he is incapable of doing. See Brunschvig, "Devoir et pouvoir", p. 23.

²³⁶ See *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 115f. Watt, *Free Will*, pp. 69ff. On the usage of the words power (*kuwwa*) and ability (*istiṭā'a*, *kudra*) see *ibid.*, p. 90, n. 37.

²³⁷ See al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 229, ll. 11-16. Daiber, *Mu'ammār*, p. 361.

²³⁸ See *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 111, ll. 13-14.

sins²³⁹. But God does not regard the unbeliever or the adulterer or the thief as people upon whom there is no sin, “since He did not do it (the sin) in them (*lam yaf'al dhālika bihim*) nor did he cause them to sin (lit. make them enter the sin. *wa-lā yudkhillum fīhi*), and He did not predestine it (the sin) nor did He decree it (*lam yaq'di dhālika wa-lam yuqaddirhu*). God does not do such a thing, since it is injustice (*djwar*), and God does not predestine injustice”²⁴⁰. Al-Ḳāsim polemicalizes against the predestinarians, whom he identifies with the scholars of the masses (*ḥashw al-umma*), who attributed to God injustice in judgement and freed themselves from injustice and evil²⁴¹.

One of the main controversial issues in this area, which was already dealt with by theologians in the first half of the second century of the Hijra, is the question of who is the creator of human action, God or man²⁴². When al-Ḳāsim affirms that God did not do (*fa'ala*) the sin in man, he also means that God did not create (*khalaka*) the sin in him²⁴³. The argument advanced by al-Ḳāsim to prove that God does not create man's actions is that He warns man, praises or censures him, speaks to him, promises and threatens him. And if God created man's actions, He would not speak to him and warn him with regard to his actions. “God has spoken to them only because they have been given the choice (i.e. the possibility to choose the right way or the wrong way), and He has not spoken to others (e.g. He has not asked the blind why they have become blind), since they have not been given the choice and nor have they chosen”²⁴⁴.

Al-Ḳāsim asserts that the mission of man is to worship God, basing his assertion on sura 51, v. 56 “I have created (*khalaktu*) the demons (*djinn*) and mankind only to worship me”²⁴⁵. Thus it is impossible to assume

²³⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 118, l. 16- p. 119, l. 5. *idem*, *K. al-radd 'alā al-mudjbira*, p. 155. (This epistle is also regarded by Madelung as spurious. See *Der Imam*, p. 101f.) All the Mu'tazilites, except 'Abbād ibn Sulaymān, held that God creates the evil that is disease. See al-Ash'arī, *Maqālāt*, p. 245, l. 14.

²⁴⁰ See *K. al-'adl wa'l-tawhīd*, p. 111, ll. 20-21. The term *qadā'* usually designates God's eternal decree, i.e., predestination, and the term *qadar* God's decree that operates within time. *Al-qadā' wa'l-qadar* when occurring together in one expression have the general meaning of the decree of God. See L. Gardet, “Al-Ḳadā' Wa'l-Ḳadar”, *IEJ*, Vol. IV, pp. 365-367. Schwarz, “The Letter”, p. 20f.

²⁴¹ See p. 142 below.

²⁴² See Schwarz, “Acquisition”, p. 356f.

²⁴³ See *K. al-'adl wa'l-tawhīd*, p. 117, l. 23- p. 118, l. 4. The verb *fa'ala* (he did) can be interpreted to mean *khalaka*, i.e., he created, brought something into existence. See Schwarz, *op. cit.*

²⁴⁴ See *K. al-'adl wa'l-tawhīd*, p. 118, ll. 4-14. *Wa-innamā khāṭabahum idh hum mukhayyarūn wa-taraka mukhāṭabat al-ākharīn idh hum ghayr mukhayyarīn wa-lā mukhtārīn*.

²⁴⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 114, ll. 15-16. *Idem*, *K. al-radd 'alā al-mudjbira*, p. 144. The worship of God is also the purpose of creation. See *Idem*, *K. al-radd 'alā al-zindīk*, p. 34, ll. 10-20. *Idem*, *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulhid*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 61a, l. 3- fol. 61b, l. 1.

that God prevents man from worshipping Him. This is one of the Muʿtazila's arguments in favor of the free choice of man²⁴⁶. This verse serves as point of departure for polemics against the predestinarians, who counter with the following verse "We have created (*dharaʿnā*) for Hell (*li-djahannama*) many of the demons and of mankind" (sura 7, v. 179). This verse was interpreted by them to mean that at the beginning of creation God designated certain people for Hell, namely He predetermined that they would be unbelievers. Al-Ḳāsim, evidently following al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, regards the preposition *li* in *li-djahannama* as *lām al-ʿākiba*, i.e., as a particle of result, and not as a particle indicating purpose. Thus the verse means: Many demons and many men have been created, and they will finally arrive in Hell. Al-Ḳāsim quotes a verse of the Ḳurʿān to illustrate this usage of the preposition *li*: "The House of Pharaoh picked him (Moses) up, and he eventually became a foe and sorrow to them" (*li-yakuna lahum ʿaduwwan wa-ḥazanan* sura 28, v. 8). Also he quotes two lines of poetry: "We collect our property and eventually it reaches the heirs/We build our houses and they end up with destruction. Every nursing woman fosters her child and eventually he dies/The Creator of souls creates them and eventually they die"²⁴⁷. Alternatively al-Ḳāsim says that the verb *dharaʿnā* (we have created) can be interpreted to indicate the future tense, *sa-nakhluku* (we shall create), that is to say, God will create in the day of the last judgement some people for Hell. This usage is borne out by e.g., sura 7, v. 44: "The dwellers of the Garden called (*nādaw*) to the dwellers of the Fire". And the right meaning is "shall call" (*sa-yunādūna*)²⁴⁸.

According to al-Ḳāsim, God does not preordain man's actions. If He preordained them, He would be angry at what He preordained and displeased with what He wanted²⁴⁹, since God commands man to do good not evil. "It cannot be denied that good and doing good (*iḥsān*) come from God. But what contradicts what God commands comes from man, and God is free (*barīʿ*) of it. The good, that God commands us to do, comes from God, but God is not to blame for (man's) disobedience and contempt of Him, since God speaks ill of them and reproves them.

²⁴⁶ See Schwarz, "The Letter", p. 16f and the references mentioned there.

²⁴⁷ *amwālunā li-dhawī al-mirāthi nadjmaʿuhā/ wa-dūrunā li-kharābi al-dahri nabnihā. wa-liʿl-manāyā turabbī kullu murđiʿatin/ wa-liʿl-ḥutūfi barā al-arwāḥa bārīhā*. See K. *al-radd ʿalā al-mudjbīra*, p. 153, l. 18- p. 154, l. 12. These two lines occur in *Lisān al-ʿarab*, Beirut 1970, entry l.w.m., Vol. III, p. 415. Cf. Ritter, "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī", p. 76f. Schwarz, "The Letter", p. 26f and the references given there.

²⁴⁸ See al-Ḳāsim, *ibid.*, p. 154, ll. 13-18.

²⁴⁹ See K. *al-ʿadl waʿl-tawḥīd*, p. 117, ll. 20-21. K. *al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk*, p. 24, ll. 9-10. Cf. Schwarz, "The Letter", p. 18.

What deserves disgrace according to God cannot possibly come from Him''²⁵⁰.

Al-Ḳāsim comprehends God's decree (*ḡaḡā*) as a prohibition (*nahy*) against committing sins (*ma'āṣin*) and as a penalty He inflicts on the sinners (*wa'l-ḡukm 'alā ahliha bi'l-'uḡūba wa'l-nakāl*). His comprehension of God's decree is substantiated by sura 6, v. 57: "Judgement (*ḡukm*) belongs only to God, (He) passes a true sentence (*yakḡḡ al-ḡaḡḡ*), and He is the best decider" (*wa-huwa ḡhayr al-fāṣilīn*). The verb *ḡaḡā* has twofold meaning: a. to decree b. to judge or to pass a sentence, and thus supports al-Ḳāsim's understanding²⁵¹. Al-Ḳāsim's conception of God's decree is identical with that of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, who asserts that God's decree (*ḡaḡā*) is His commandment (*amr*)²⁵². The Mu'tazilites followed al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in this matter²⁵³.

Al-Ḳāsim also uses the consensus of the community (*idjmā' al-umma*) to prove that God does not decree man's sins nor does He determine them²⁵⁴. The consensus asserts that all the acts of disobedience and abomination (*al-ma'āṣī wa'l-fawāḡish*) are injustice (*djawr*) and falsehood (*bāṡil*) and wrong (*ḡulm*), and that God does not decree the injustice and the falsehood, and that the wrong does not come from Him. People submit to God's decree (*muslimūn li-ḡaḡā Allah*) and are not displeased with it, as long as what is meant by this decree is illness, death and other calamities, but they are displeased with evil-doers and recalcitrants and censure their deeds and penalize them²⁵⁵. Thus al-Ḳāsim distinguishes between two kinds of decrees: a. a decree in the sense of commandment, and b. a decree in the sense of disasters that God inflicts upon man.

If God does not create or do man's evil actions, does not cause him to do them and does not predestine him to do them, who is then their author and source? According to al-Ḳāsim, man himself is the source of his evil actions and also Satan who misleads man. "We attribute the sins to ourselves and to Satan, our enemy"²⁵⁶. The opinion that man and Satan are both the source of man's evil actions was already expressed by

²⁵⁰ See al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-masā'il*, fol. 23b.

²⁵¹ See *K. al-'aḡl wa'l-tawḡīḡ*, p. 111, l. 29- p. 112, l. 1.

²⁵² See Ritter, "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī", p. 69, l. 19- p. 70, l. 4. Schwarz, "The Letter", p. 19, l. 3- p. 20, l. 18.

²⁵³ Cf. Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 8f.

²⁵⁴ According to the Mu'tazila, there are four kinds of indications (*dalāla*); one whose authority derives from human reason (*ḡudjdjāt al-'aḡl*) and the other three whose authority derives from divine revelation: the Ḳur'ān, the Sunna and the Idjmā'. Pines, *Beiträge*, p. 126. 'Abd al-Djabbār, *Sharḡ*, p. 88. Peters, *God's Created Speech*, p. 67f.

²⁵⁵ See *K. al-'aḡl wa'l-tawḡīḡ*, p. 118, l. 18- p. 119, l. 5.

²⁵⁶ *nudjfu al-ma'āṣī ilā anfusinā wa-ilā al-shayṡān 'aduwwinā*. See *ibid.*, p. 117, ll. 16-17, p. 112, l. 17- p. 113, l. 4, p. 116, l. 22- p. 117, l. 13, p. 119, ll. 11-14. *K. al-radd 'alā al-mudjbira*, p. 147f. below p. 142.

al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. Al-Ḥasan deems man and Satan the source of man's evil actions and God the source of man's good actions²⁵⁷. This is also the teaching of a group of Ḳadarites²⁵⁸. Khushaysh ibn Aṣram quotes a tradition in which the Ḳadarites are blamed for holding the view that good comes from God and evil from Satan²⁵⁹.

It is interesting to note that about three centuries later ʿAbd al-Djabbār, in setting forth the Muʿtazilite doctrine that all human actions, good as well as evil, are created by man, quotes a saying ascribed to Muḥammad: "Good is in Your hand (God's hand), but evil does not belong to You"²⁶⁰. Even ʿAbd al-Djabbār, who teaches that all man's actions come from man, still emphasizes first of all that God does not create man's evil actions. Al-Ḳāsim holds two conceptions; in *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd* (p. 117, l. 23- p. 118, l. 1) he follows the Muʿtazilites, but in other places (*K. al-masāʾil*, fol. 23b and p. 41f above) he follows al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's doctrine.

Al-Ḳāsim's inclination towards the Muʿtazilites seems more pronounced when he treats the notion that God does not compel (*djabara*, *adjbara*) man to do evil or good actions. According to al-Ḳāsim, when man acts in conformity with his choice, the action belongs to him and he is consequently responsible for it, but if he is compelled to act, the action does not belong to him, and thus he is not responsible for it. It is impossible to assume God compelling man to do something after He commands him to do it. Since if He compelled him, the action would be His action, because God is its source, and thus man would not be responsible for his actions, and it would not be appropriate to reward him for his good actions and to punish him for his evil ones²⁶¹.

We have seen that according to al-Ḳāsim if God compelled man to act, the action would be God's not man's. Al-Ḳāsim does not continue the course of his discussion of the problem to conclude that if God compelled man to do evil, it would be God's evil action, and thus God would be evil, since whoever does evil, is evil. The question of whether God who does evil or creates it is evil has been much debated in the Kalam. Al-Djubbāʾī (d. 914), the head of the Muʿtazilite school of Baṣra and al-Ashʿarī's master, says: "God is good by doing good, since he from whom comes much evil (*man kathura minhu al-sharr*) is named evil (*sharīr*)"²⁶².

²⁵⁷ See Schwarz, "The Letter", pp. 18f, 23, 24.

²⁵⁸ See Watt, *Free Will*, p. 52.

²⁵⁹ See al-Malaṭī, *K. al-tanbīh wa'l-radd ʿalā ahl al-ahwāʾ wa'l-bidaʿ*, ed. S. Dederling, Leipzig 1936, p. 129, l. 3. Cf. al-Ashʿarī, *al-Ibāna*, p. 7, ll. 14-16. Abū Muṭīʿ, *K. al-radd ʿalā al-bidaʿ*, p. 64.

²⁶⁰ See *al-Mughnī*, Vol. VIII, p. 264, ll. 5-6.

²⁶¹ See below p. 172. Cf. *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīq*, p. 20, ll. 13-19, p. 24, ll. 8-9.

²⁶² See al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 537, ll. 4-5.

Very probably this notion is common to all the Muʿtazilites. Al-Bāḳillānī refutes it maintaining that the Muʿtazilites are mistaken when they draw the conclusion that since a man who does wrong (*fāʿil al-ẓulm*) is called wrong-doer, also God would be called a wrong-doer if He did wrong. When man does wrong, he is wrong-doer only because he is forbidden to do wrong, and because he does wrong in himself and for himself. But God creates wrong for others, not for Himself, in others, not in Himself. Moreover, He is not forbidden to do wrong, and when He does wrong, He does not disobey any commandment of anyone who must be obeyed by Him²⁶³.

When al-Ḳāsim says: “If God wished He would keep them from disobedience and they would believe in Him” (see below p. 150), he alludes to the later Muʿtazilite theory of *ildjāʿ* (compulsion). Man can choose freely between belief and and disbelief, obedience and disobedience. But God has the power to compel (*aldjaʿa*) the unbelievers to believe in Him and to obey Him. Yet such coerced belief and obedience would not entitle them to reward²⁶⁴.

Al-Ḳāsim’s principle that there is no connection between God and evil—which constitutes part of the general Muʿtazilite principle of God’s justice—is also expressed in a passage in *Masʿalat al-ṭabariyyayni*. “God did not impose and He will never impose upon one of His servants what he is incapable of doing, and He will not command him [to do] what He does not deem good. God will never want of him what He forbids him, He is exalted above it, and He will never reprove him for [doing] what He wants of him, nor will He forbid him what He wants of him”²⁶⁵. Al-Ḳāsim says that according to his opponents: “God commands what He does not will, and forbids what He wills”²⁶⁶. Al-Ḳāsim’s assertions are identical to those of the Muʿtazilites as reported by al-Ashʿarī²⁶⁷: “All the Muʿtazilites, except Abū Mūsā al-Murdār, maintain that it is inadmissible that God, glory be to Him, should will the acts of disobedience to exist in any sense. It is inadmissible that He should command what He does not will to be, and that He should forbid what He wills to be”. According to the Muʿtazilites, the proof that God wants good actions is that He commands man to perform them, just as the proof that He does

²⁶³ See al-Bāḳillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 308, art. 528. Cf. al-Ashʿarī, *al-Lumaʿ*, p. 44, art. 97 of the Arabic text.

²⁶⁴ See Schwarz, “The Letter”, p. 25 and the references given there. Idem, “Iljāʿ”, pp. 413-427. D. Gimaret, “La notion d’“impulsion irrésistible” (*ilgāʿ*) dans l’éthique muʿtazilite”, *JA* 259(1971), pp. 25-62.

²⁶⁵ See Ms. Berlin, fol. 53b. Cf. Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 8.

²⁶⁶ See *K. al-radd ʿalā al-mudjibira*, p. 144, ll. 18-19.

²⁶⁷ See *Maḳālāt*, p. 512, ll. 6-9.

not want evil actions is that He forbids man to perform them. God's commandment demonstrates His will, and His prohibition demonstrates His unwillingness. Actually, a commandment does not exist independently, but is an expression of will²⁶⁸.

The point of departure for the orthodox in the question of whether God wills evil is His Omnipotence. God wills evil, since He wills all the things, and He wills them, since He creates them. Also it is impossible to assume that God is imperfect; if God did not will everything that exists, He would be imperfect²⁶⁹.

In sum, al-Ḳāsim upholds the principle of God's justice: Man is free to choose his way and God does not compel him to act. The importance al-Ḳāsim attaches to this principle is also proved by his connecting it with the principle of God's unity. A person who ascribes injustice to God is guilty, according to al-Ḳāsim, of attributing-a-copartner-to-God (*shirk*), since he likens God to evil-doers²⁷⁰. Al-Ḳāsim is in the question of free choice and predestination in agreement with the Muʿtazila and in opposition to the early Zaydiyya. The early Zaydites affirm predestination and the view that God creates man's actions²⁷¹.

Madelung tries to demonstrate that though al-Ḳāsim is in agreement with the Muʿtazila, some of his sayings do not sound Muʿtazilite²⁷². Al-Ḳāsim goes on to say in the passage from *K. al-masāʾil* (fol. 23b. quoted above p. 41) that: "It is sufficient, if God wills, and a righteous person or one who speaks only about what he knows (and knows correctly) cannot deny or reject it. It is forbidden to discuss what lies beyond this and to deal with it". Madelung considers al-Ḳāsim's last words to be an allusion to the traditional prohibition against dealing with the question of *ḳadar*. In addition, Madelung states that al-Ḳāsim does not deal with the question of predetermination, that he is careful not to interpret God's decree (*ḳadāʾ*, *ḳadar*) as only God's order, command and judgement, and that he describes his adversaries not as *Ḳadariyya* but as *Mudjawwira* and *Mudjbira* (according to Madelung *Mudjbara*). Madelung maintains also that al-Ḳāsim does not express his view on whether man's actions are created by God²⁷³. Madelung's assertions seem erroneous, and I shall try to comment on them one by one.

²⁶⁸ Cf. D. Gimaret, "Un problème de théologie musulmane: Dieu veut-il les actes mauvais? Thèses et arguments", *SI* 40(1974), pp. 5-73, 41(1975), pp. 63-92.

²⁶⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 32ff.

²⁷⁰ *wa-man djawwara Allah fi ḥukmihi fa-kad ashraḳa bihi idh shabbahahu bi'l-djāʾirīn*. See *Min kalāmihī*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 131b, l. 1- fol. 132a, l. 3.

²⁷¹ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, pp. 69, 81f, 84f.

²⁷² See *ibid.*, p. 118.

²⁷³ See *ibid.*, p. 118f.

a. The last words in the quoted passage appear to be al-Ḳāsim's usual way of writing in *K. al-Masā'il*. Evidently he requires his followers not to question what he himself asserts or to add anything to it. The believer must follow his leader without doubting the leader's way. This explanation of al-Ḳāsim's last quoted sentence is supported by a note he adds to his interpretation of sura 3, v. 154 which reads as follows: "...If you had been in your houses, those who were written down as to be killed (*ḳutiba 'alayhim al-ḳatl* or those who were predestined to death) would have gone out to the places where they lie..." Al-Ḳāsim regards the writing as God's knowledge and His confirmation (*idjāb*). But he does not interpret the writing/knowledge to mean that God imposed death upon them or brought death into existence. Finally he says: "Others of your brothers have said other things concerning this verse than we have said to you. But the believers are not allowed to answer or to discuss what the knower (i.e. al-Ḳāsim) says"²⁷⁴.

b. As we have seen, al-Ḳāsim deals with *ḳadar* in his *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*. He considers *ḳadar* a prohibition and a penalty and designates its followers as *Ḳadariyya*. In *K. al-radd ʿalā al-mudjbira* (p. 144, l. 12, p. 147, l. 5), the name *Ḳadariyya* appears along with *mudjawwira* (as an attribute of *Ḳadariyya*) and *Mudjbira* (as a noun). But in some of his epistles, al-Ḳāsim seems to prefer to use the name *Mudjbira*, which he identifies with the name *Ḳadariyya*. In response to a question posed by his son Muḥammad as to what is meant by the designation *Ḳadariyya* he says: "The *Ḳadariyya* are those who uphold compulsion (*al-Mudjbira*)"²⁷⁵.

c. According to al-Ḳāsim, God does not create man's actions. This view is expressed not only in *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd* (see above p. 40), that Madelung considers to be spurious. It figures also in *K. al-masā'il*, al-Ḳāsim's responsa to his sons' questions, whose authenticity is certain. About sura 37, v. 96 *wa-Allah khalaḳakum wa-mā taʿmalūna*, al-Ḳāsim is asked whether it could be interpreted to mean that God creates man's actions. The pronoun *mā*, appearing in the verse, can be interpreted either as *mā maṣdariyya* or as *mā mauṣūla*. Thus in the first case the meaning of the verse is "God has created you and your action (*ʿamalakum*)", and in the second case "God has created you and that which you make (*mā taʿmalūnahu*)," i.e., the idols. (The verb *ʿamila* means to make or to act.)²⁷⁶ Al-Ḳāsim interprets the verse the second way: "God had created them and the stones of the idols which they have worshipped" (*wa-Allah*

²⁷⁴ See *K. al-masā'il*, fol. 32a.

²⁷⁵ See *ibid.*, fol. 47a.

²⁷⁶ Cf. Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-ḳurʿān al-ʿaẓīm*, Beirut 1970, Vol. VI, p. 23. Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, Vol. III, pp. 345-347.

khalakahum wa-hidjārata al-aṣnām allati kānū yaʿbudūna). He substantiates his interpretation of the verse by using the juxtaposition of our verse and the preceding one which reads as follows: “Do you worship that which you carve?” (*a taʿbudūna mā tanḥitūna*) The verb ʿamila (to worship) according to al-Ḳāsim is parallel to the verb *naḥata* (to carve), and the pronoun *mā* in both verses must be *mā mawṣūla*²⁷⁷. Al-Ḳāsim holds not only that God does not create man’s actions, but that He does not even create the results of human actions (i.e. the idols). God creates only the material (i.e. the stones), from which man generates the idols²⁷⁸.

A treatment of these two verses occurs later in al-Ashʿarī’s writings. In response to the question: “Why do you maintain that man’s actions are created by God?” (*lima zaʿamtum anna aksāb al-ʿabd makhlūka li-Allah*), al-Ashʿarī quotes two verses: “God has created you and your action” (sura 37, v. 96) and “as a reward for their action” (*djazaʿan bi-mā kānū yaʿmalūna* sura 46, v. 14). Al-Ashʿarī then deduces by analogy that since the reward applies to their actions, God is the creator of them²⁷⁹. Now al-Ashʿarī is asked about the conclusion that can be drawn from the juxtaposition of verses 95, 96 of sura 37. “Has God not said: ‘Do you worship that which you carve?’ (sura 37, v. 95) and He means the idols that they have carved. Why, then, do you deny that His words ‘has created you and that which you make’ mean the idols that they have made.” Al-Ashʿarī answers: “Your supposition is wrong, since the idols were really carved by them, and thus God’s words ‘Do you worship that which you carve?’ refer to the idols, whereas the wood was not really made by them so that His words ‘has created you and that which you made’ refer to it”²⁸⁰. Al-Ashʿarī is of the opinion that the verb ʿamila means to make, and he distinguishes between this verb and the verb *naḥata*, that means to make the form of something not the material, whereas al-Ḳāsim evades the difficulty posed by al-Ashʿarī by interpreting the verb ʿamila to mean ʿabada (to worship); God creates the stones of the idols, which man worships²⁸¹.

VIII. Al-Ḳāsim, again following the Muʿtazila, derives the principle of “the promise and the threat” (*al-waʿd waʿl-waʿid*) directly from the principle of God’s justice. Since God’s justice is proved, the promise to the obedient (to stay eternally in Paradise) and the threat to the transgressors (to stay eternally in Hell) are necessarily proved from it²⁸². It

²⁷⁷ See *K. al-masāʾil*, fol. 39b. Cf. al-Zamakhsharī, *ibid.*, p. 346, l. 8.

²⁷⁸ See below, p. 82.

²⁷⁹ See al-Ashʿarī, *K. al-Lumaʿ*, p. 37, art. 82 of the Arabic text.

²⁸⁰ See *ibid.*, art. 83. Cf. al-Bākillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 304, art. 519.

²⁸¹ Cf. further information on the interpretation of these verses in D. Gimaret, *Théories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane*, Paris 1980, pp. 361-368.

²⁸² See *Min kalāmihī*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 65a. Cf. Madelung, *Der Imam*, pp. 9, 120.

is inadmissible that God should punish man for actions he is compelled to do or for actions God wants him to do. Such a punishment is not a just judgement²⁸³. The proof of the principle of the promise and the threat is not based on the acknowledgement of God's justice alone, but also on some verses of the *Qur'ān*²⁸⁴.

It is important to note that the debate between the Murdji³ites, whom the orthodoxy followed though with some slight differences, and the Mu'tazilites focused on the term *wa'īd*, since all the theologians agreed that whoever does good actions is entitled to reward. The Mu'tazilites, with whom the Zaydites agreed, held that unbelievers and those who do not repent of grave sins (*kabā'ir*) will stay in Hell forever²⁸⁵. Yet the Mu'tazilites agreed that the grave sinner's punishment will be lesser in Hell than that of the unbeliever, and his degree will be higher than the latter's²⁸⁶. Also in this point al-Ḳāsim agrees with the Mu'tazila²⁸⁷. According to the orthodox approach, following that of the Murdji³ites, no Muslim, even if he commits grave sin, will be punished by an eternal sojourn in Hell. (Only one group of the Murdji³a maintained that the threat applies to those who attribute a copartner to God (*mushrikūn*) alone²⁸⁸. In keeping with this approach, it is admissible that God will forgive not only the sinner, who did not repent before his death, but also the unbeliever²⁸⁹.

IX. The Mu'tazilite principle of the intermediate position (*manzila bayna al-manzilatayn*)²⁹⁰ occurs in al-Ḳāsim's writings in two forms. But

²⁸³ See below p. 144.

²⁸⁴ See e.g. sura 10, v. 4, sura 53, vv. 29-31, sura 4, vv. 123-124. below pp. 144ff.

²⁸⁵ See Ibn Hazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. IV, pp. 44f, 63. Al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 274, l. 7, p. 74, ll. 3-4. A grave sin is generally considered to be one for the commitment of which the *Qur'ān* threatens punishment in the world to come. Cf. A. J. Wensinck and L. Gardet, "Khaṭi'a", EI², Vol. IV, pp. 1106-1109.

²⁸⁶ See Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Ṭabaḳāt*, p. 4, ll. 4-7.

²⁸⁷ See *K. al-'adl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 129, ll. 6-7.

²⁸⁸ See al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 147, ll. 7-8.

²⁸⁹ See al-Bāḳillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 354, ll. 8-17, p. 351, ll. 3-10.

²⁹⁰ The question of what belief (*īmān*) and unbelief (*kufr*) are aroused much controversy among Muslims, and resulted in the division of the Muslim community into sects, the first of which were the Khawāridj. See Ibn Taymiyya, *K. al-īmān*, Damascus 1961, p. 142. T. Izutsu, *The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology*, Tokyo 1965, p. 1. The Khawāridj considered 'Alī and Mu'āwiya and their respective adherents to be unbelievers, since they had committed grave sins. They held that belief is not a fixed value, but increases or decreases in keeping with man's actions. To be a believer means to be free of grave sins. See al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 86. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*, p. 40. But some of the Khawāridj (e.g. Nadjda) expressed more tolerant views concerning this question. Cf. Watt, *The Formative Period*, pp. 25-33. The Murdji³a, the Khawāridj's violent adversaries, held that man's actions were irrelevant to belief. Belief was not impaired by sin. A Muslim who commits a grave sin is considered a believer. See *ibid.*, p. 45. Al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, pp. 132ff. Abū Muṭṭi', *K. al-radd 'alā al-bida'*, p. 67f. According to al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, a grave sinner is a hypocrite (*munāfiq*). See Ritter, "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī", p. 42. The

before pointing at these two forms, let us put forward al-Ḳāsim's basic features of his doctrine of belief.

One of the main features of al-Ḳāsim's doctrine of belief is his emphasis on the importance of man's actions²⁹¹. Belief means man's being protected from the transgression of the transgressors (*amān min ʿiṣyān al-ʿāṣīn*), and a believer is he who is protected (*amina*) from grave sins of unbelief and transgression, i.e., he who does not commit such sins²⁹². Possibly al-Ḳāsim's view concerning belief follows the doctrine of the Muʿtazilite al-Naẓẓām, who was of the opinion that belief is evading grave sins (*idjtināb al-kabāʾir*)²⁹³. Al-Ḳāsim argues against the Murdjiʿa who maintain that belief is "saying without acting" (*kawl bi-lā ʿamal*)²⁹⁴ and that God will not punish him who acknowledges Him (*aḡarra*) and His messengers and His books by his tongue (alone), even though he commits every grave sin of his sins of disobedience"²⁹⁵. According to al-Ḳāsim, the main evil in the Murdjiʿite doctrine, that promises the grave sinner Paradise, is the moral corruption that derives from it, since man is not afraid of committing grave sins²⁹⁶.

Yet it is impossible according to al-Ḳāsim for man to believe, i.e., to obey God, without knowing Him. Man's certain knowledge of God

doctrine of Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭā, the supposed founder of the Muʿtazila, must be distinguished from the three doctrines mentioned: The grave sinner is neither a believer, nor an unbeliever, nor a hypocrite, but he is in an intermediate position (*manzila bayna al-manzilatayn*). See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 10f. Al-Khayyāt, *K. al-intiṣār*, p. 118 of the Arabic text. The Muʿtazilites following Wāṣil, held this doctrine and called the person committing grave sins a sinner or a transgressor (*fāsiḳ*). See ʿAbd al-Djabbār, *Sharḥ*, pp. 697ff. Al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 269, l. 16- p. 270, l. 1. If he repents before death, he will be again regarded as a believer and condemned as a believer, but if not, he will stay in Hell forever. See Ibn Ḥazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. IV, p. 44f. Whereas the doctrine of the promise and the threat was directed mainly against the Murdjiʿa, the doctrine of the intermediate position was directed also against the Khawāridj. Yet Wāṣil agreed with the Khawāridj that the grave sinner who does not repent before his death, will be condemned to eternal punishment in Hell. See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 11.

²⁹¹ His general statement that honoring God by knowledge surpasses honoring Him by action (see Ms. Ambrosiana F 61, fol. 280b) is not characteristic. Cf. Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 120.

²⁹² See below, p. 150. *K. al-hidjra*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 342, ll. 9-10. Ms. Berlin, fol. 115a. *K. al-masāʾil*, fols. 23b, 60a, 65a. *K. al-ʿadl waʾl-tawḥīd*, p. 124, l. 2. On the connection between *amina*, to be protected (the first form), and *amana*, to believe (the fourth form) see Lane, *Lexicon*, Vol. I, p. 100. M. M. Bravmann, "On the Spiritual Background of Early Islam and the History of its Principal Concepts", *Le Muséon* 64 (1951), pp. 343-348. R. B. Sergeant, "Ḥaram and Ḥawṭa", in *Mélanges Taha Husain*, Cairo 1962, p. 57, n. 11.

²⁹³ See al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 268, l. 13.

²⁹⁴ See *K. al-masāʾil*, fol. 47b. *K. al-ʿadl waʾl-tawḥīd*, p. 121, ll. 2-3.

²⁹⁵ See below p. 162. *K. al-hidjra*, *The Theological Epistle*, Vol. II, p. 366, l. 3- p. 367, l. 17. Ms. Berlin, fol. 121a. *K. al-ʿadl waʾl-tawḥīd*, p. 121.

²⁹⁶ See *K. al-ʿadl waʾl-tawḥīd*, *ibid*.

brings him to obey Him and to perform good actions²⁹⁷. Thus al-Ḳāsim reaches the conclusion that the gravest sin in the eyes of God and the righteous people is to deny God (*al-inkār bi-Allah*) or to doubt His existence (*al-ilhād fī Allah*) or doubt man's knowledge of God (*al-irtiyāb fī maʿrifat Allah*)²⁹⁸. This is one kind of unbelief. It includes not only he who denies God's existence directly, but also he who denies one verse of the revealed book or one messenger of His messengers, since the denial of them eventually causes the denying of God's existence²⁹⁹.

In *Masʿalat al-ṭabariyyayni*, al-Ḳāsim distinguishes between two types of persons among those who deny a verse or a precept mentioned in the Ḳurʿān. Whoever denies a verse or a precept because of going astray or misinterpretation is subsumed in the first type. Such a person is called a sinner (*fāsiq*) or a profligate (*fādjir*). He is no longer called a believer, since he has already abandoned belief, yet he is also not an unbeliever (*kāfir*) or one who attributes a copartner to God (*mushrik*). Whoever does not know a precept or denies its having been revealed by God is subsumed in the second type and called *kāfir* and *mushrik*³⁰⁰. The intermediate position then applies, according to al-Ḳāsim, to one who denies a precept or a verse out of going astray or misinterpretation. It is to be noted that he does not use here the term itself.

Some Muslim theologians, Muʿtazilites as well as orthodox, distinguish between he who sins because he thinks that his action is permitted (*ʿalā istiḥlāl*), and he who sins and knows that his action is forbidden (*ʿalā taḥrīm*), but nevertheless he sins out of negligence or temptation. There is no controversy as to one who sins because he thinks that his action is permitted; all regard him as an unbeliever³⁰¹. This is also the opinion of al-Ḳāsim, since he maintains that whoever denies a precept due to lack of knowledge or denial of its having been revealed is considered to be an unbeliever. Actually this is one kind of permission (*istiḥlāl*). Al-Ḳāsim, however, adds another kind of permission which is derived from going astray or from wrong interpretation. The judgement that applies to whoever permits in this way is the same judgement that applies to a grave sinner according to the Muʿtazilites, i.e., he is in intermediate position. Although in this way also one permits the forbidden, al-Ḳāsim is quite lax and does not call him an unbeliever.

²⁹⁷ See below p. 160. *K. al-tawḥīd*, Ms. Ambrosiana C 186, fol. 18a.

²⁹⁸ See *K. al-tawḥīd*, ibid. Cf. Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 120.

²⁹⁹ See *Masʿalat al-ṭabariyyayni*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 98f. Ms. Berlin, fol. 53a. *al-Madīḥ al-kabīr li'l-Ḳurʿān al-mubīn*, Ms. Berlin, fol. 66a, ll. 22-26. *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 124, ll. 4ff.

³⁰⁰ See *Masʿalat al-ṭabariyyayni*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 101f. Ms. Berlin, fol. 54a.

³⁰¹ See al-Baghdadi, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, p. 266. Al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, p. 268, ll. 3-6.

Thus al-Ḳāsim puts his own idea of the intermediate position into the doctrinal framework of the Muʿtazila without using the term itself. This moderate attitude towards the sinner does not coincide with what al-Ḳāsim states in two other epistles, *K. al-ḳaṭl wa'l-ḳitāl* and *K. al-hidjra*³⁰², in both of which even the believer who becomes a friend of the unbeliever or of the evil-doer is considered an unbeliever. Nor does it fit the Muʿtazilite approach appearing in *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*³⁰³. Generally, however, al-Ḳāsim regards the grave sinner as unbeliever, but he differentiates between the latter and the unbeliever who attributes a copartner to God. Likewise the definition of the *munāfiḳ* is not homogeneous. In one place the *munāfiḳ* is whoever commits grave sins, which is in keeping with both al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's and the early Zaydiyya's doctrine³⁰⁴. Elsewhere the *munāfiḳ* is considered whoever conceals unbelief in his heart³⁰⁵. A third definition of *munāfiḳ* is alluded to in *K. al-hidjra* in which the *munāfiḳ* seems to be a Muslim who supports unbelievers³⁰⁶. In my opinion, rather than proving that the works in which there appear clear Muʿtazilite definitions are unauthentic, these various definitions show that al-Ḳāsim changed his mind. Even in the authentic works according to Madelung we do find contradictory statements. For example, whoever becomes a friend of the Jews and the Christians is defined in one place as an unbeliever who attributes a copartner to God³⁰⁷, and in another place as an unbeliever and evil-doer³⁰⁸.

In his doctrine of belief al-Ḳāsim was influenced by the Muʿtazila, even in the works considered authentic by Madelung, mainly with respect to the strong emphasis on the importance of man's actions. Verily al-Ḳāsim's doctrine of belief does not agree with that of Wāṣil, who clearly distinguishes between a pure and conceptual knowledge of God and acts³⁰⁹, but one may assume that al-Ḳāsim follows a later Muʿtazilite doctrine of belief which considers the intellectual knowledge of God the first act of obedience³¹⁰.

³⁰² See *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 341ff. Ms. Berlin, fols. 114b ff.

³⁰³ See pp. 127-129.

³⁰⁴ See *K. al-ḳaṭl wa'l-ḳitāl*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 293. Ms. Berlin, fol. 102b.

³⁰⁵ See *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*, p. 129, l. 2.

³⁰⁶ See *K. al-hidjra*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 350. Ms. Berlin, fol. 117a.

³⁰⁷ See *K. al-ḳaṭl wa'l-ḳitāl*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 290. Ms. Berlin, fol. 101b.

³⁰⁸ See *K. al-hidjra*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 345. Ms. Berlin, fol. 115b.

³⁰⁹ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 120.

³¹⁰ If belief, according to the Muʿtazilites, is frequently defined as the total amount of the acts of obedience (*djāmīʿ al-tāʿāt* Cf. al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 266f.), then one may consider the intellectual knowledge of God the first and basic act of obedience. See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 13, n. 22.

The principle of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar* (the command or the urge to do what is approved and the prohibition against doing what is reprehensible) occurs also in al-Ḳāsim's writings. In this principle the Mu'tazilites expressed their will to protect and propagate the true religion. The Mu'tazilites were even ready to resort to violence to defend the law. They usually added to this principle the words: "by tongue, by hand and by sword, as far as possible"³¹¹. In *K. al-hidjra*, al-Ḳāsim deals with this principle without mentioning the term itself³¹², but in *K. al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd* the term occurs verbatim³¹³.

X. The last two Mu'tazilite principles (*manzila bayna al-manzilatayn* and *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar*) occupy very little space in al-Ḳāsim's teachings—even in the works considered by Madelung to be spurious on account of their Mu'tazilism—in comparison to the first three principles (*al-tawḥīd*, *al-ʿadl*, *al-waʿd wa'l-waʿīd*). Thus al-Ḳāsim's Mu'tazilism is summed up mainly in three principles, those which occur as the first three in his five principle of Islam³¹⁴. It is worth noting that the Mu'tazilite al-Khayyāt, who states that whoever does not admit the five principles is not a Mu'tazilite, when asserting that the whole community confirm the Mu'tazilite principles, reduces the number of principles to three: God's unity, His justice and His fulfilling the promise and the threat³¹⁵. How can one explain al-Khayyāt's omission of two principles, *manzila* and *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf*, and his basing of Mu'tazilism on three principles, while afterwards he puts forward five principles? This inconsistency in al-Khayyāt's statements may be reconciled on the basis of 'Abd al-Djabbar's assertions. According to Mānkdim, to whom 'Abd al-Djabbār dictated his *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa* and who also comments on this text, 'Abd al-Djabbār states in *al-Mughnī* that the Mu'tazila has two principles: God's unity and His justice, all other three principles being included in the first two, while in his *Mukhtasar al-ḥasanī* he establishes four Mu'tazilite principles, God's unity, His justice, the prophecy (*al-nubuwwāt*) and the law (*al-sharāʿi*). In this last work, 'Abd al-Djabbār points out that *al-waʿd wa'l-waʿīd*, *manzila* and *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* are subsumed under *al-sharāʿi*. In *Sharḥ*, however, he deals with the five principles. Mānkdim says that it is very appropriate that the prophecy and the law should be subsumed under God's justice. That is, since if God

³¹¹ See al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 278, ll. 7-9.

³¹² See *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, pp. 351, 357, 364. Ms. Berlin, fols. 117a, 119a, 120b.

³¹³ See p. 130, ll. 15-16.

³¹⁴ See above p. 38.

³¹⁵ See *K. al-intiṣār*, p. 13, l. 5- p. 14, l. 7.

knows that man's benefit (*ṣalāḥ*)³¹⁶ consists in His sending messengers to him and in man's worshipping God through the law brought by Him, it is incumbent on God to send messengers and on man to worship Him, and justice obliges that God should not renege on His duty. The principle of the promise and the threat is also included in God's justice, since if God promises reward to the obedient and threatens the transgressors with punishment, it is unjust that He should break His promise and lie. Likewise, if God knows that man's benefit means that God urges him to worship Him through applying names and judgements (*al-asmā' wa'l-aḥkām*) to those who are obliged to carry out religious duties (This application constitutes the basis of the principle of *manzila*³¹⁷), God must urge man to worship Him through this benefit, and it is just that God should not infringe the duty incumbent on Him. In the same manner the principle of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* is a part of the law³¹⁸.

Now it may be assumed that al-Ḳāsim thought that both the principle of *manzila* and the principle of *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf* were subsumed under the principle of God's justice and therefore he did not include them in his five principles, although he mentioned both of them elsewhere. We have shown clearly that he regards the first two principles, God's unity and His justice, as very important ones to which the believer must adhere. In his *K. al-masā'il* (fol. 64b), al-Ḳāsim is asked what one who holds God's unity and justice should do if his wife does not hold both principles. Al-Ḳāsim answers that such a man must make an effort to cause his wife to believe in these two principles. The fact that according to al-Ḳāsim the relations between spouses are influenced by these two principles proves once more the significance that he attaches to both of them.

To sum up, according to the criterion of the five principles, it is possible to deem al-Ḳāsim a Mu'tazilite thinker. But to strengthen our assessment of al-Ḳāsim's Mu'tazilism one may adduce other criteria: the methods of al-Ḳāsim's argumentation and the notions and terms he employs even those used not in connection with the five principles.

XI. It is impossible to accept Strothmann's statement, with which Madelung agrees, to the effect that al-Ḳāsim's method is not to bring proofs except of the Ḳur'ān and the Sunna³¹⁹. Al-Ḳāsim uses dialectical methods of argumentation, which were the main weapon of the

³¹⁶ 'Abd al-Djabbār considers the word *ṣalāḥ* a synonym of the word *naḥ* (benefit). See *al-Mughnī*, Vol. XIV, p. 35. Cf. R. Brunschvig, "Mu'tazilisme et Optimum (*al-aṣṣalāḥ*)", *SI* 39 (1974), pp. 5-23.

³¹⁷ Cf. Peters, *God's Created Speech*, p. 155.

³¹⁸ See 'Abd al-Djabbār, *Sharḥ*, p. 122f.

³¹⁹ See Strothmann, "Die Literatur der Zaiditen", *Der Islam* 2 (1911), p. 54. Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 2.

Muʿtazila, in addition to proofs from the Qurʾān (he makes almost no use of the Sunna), even in the works considered by Madelung to be authentic³²⁰. Al-Ḳāsim's refutation of the Manichean dualism in *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk* and of the doctrine of the Trinity in *K. al-radd ʿalā al-naṣārā* probably reflects the ways of polemics employed by the early Muʿtazilites against the Manicheans and the Christians³²¹. Proofs based on reason is also present³²². Indeed, the Qurʾān serves as his chief basis, but so too do idiomatic expressions in Arabic and pieces of evidence from early Arabic poetry. The last two means of proof, characteristic of the early Muʿtazila, are well preserved in al-Murtaḍā's *Amālī*, which retains much Muʿtazilite material³²³. There are some other features in al-Ḳāsim's writings which demonstrate Muʿtazilite influence: a. interpretation of ambiguous verses in the light of self-evident verses. b. the use of the method of *al-istidlāl bi'l-shāhid ʿalā al-ghāʾib*. c. much use of the method of refutation called *ilzām*. d. the view that there is no belief but that which is based on intellectual knowledge. e. concerning the proofs of God's existence and the creation of the world, al-Ḳāsim follows the prevalent Muʿtazilite method which first proves the creation of the world and then God's existence. The argument from design and the proof supporting it (i.e., the argument from particularization) are Muʿtazilite proofs later adopted by the Ashʿarites³²⁴. In the course of his discussion of the argument from design, al-Ḳāsim expresses the Muʿtazilite ideas that it is man who produces accidents³²⁵ and that a capable person is whoever can perform an act and its opposite³²⁶.

Al-Ḳāsim does not deal with the political aspect of the question of the imamate, although his writings seem to show that he acknowledges Abū Bakr and ʿUmar as legitimate Khalifs, and in doing so he agrees with the Muʿtazila³²⁷. He treats two other issues, the obligation to appoint an imam and the signs attesting to the legitimate imam. Most of the sects in Islam held that the obligation to appoint an imam was absolute³²⁸. But

³²⁰ E.g. our epistle, *Masʿalat al-ṭabariyyayni* and *K. al-mustarshid*.

³²¹ See Guidi's introduction to his edition of *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk*.

³²² See above pp. 15-20.

³²³ See Vol. I, pp. 324-327, 590-592, Vol. II, p. 218.

³²⁴ See above pp. 2-4.

³²⁵ See below note 35 to the translation.

³²⁶ See below note 37 to the translation.

³²⁷ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 24. For a detailed discussion of the question of the imamate according to al-Ḳāsim see my "Al-Ḳāsim ibn Ibrāhīm's Theory of the Imamate" *Arabica* 34(1987), pp. 80-105.

³²⁸ Only the Nadjdites, a sub-sect of the Khawāridj, Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm and Hishām al-Fuwaṭī, opposed this principle maintaining that if all the people are righteous and just, all of them are equal to one another, and there is therefore no reason to obey one of them. See al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat*, p. 481f. Idem, *K. al-milal*, p. 92. Al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 125,

the dispute about the signs attesting to the legitimate imam divided among them³²⁹. The opinions of the Mu'tazila with respect to the question of whether the imam should be only the most excellent man (or the best man, *fāḍil* or *afḍal*) or whether there can be an imamate of one-who-is-known-to-be-excelled-by-others (*maḥḍūl*) differed. Some of them held the imamat of the *fāḍil* and others the imamate of the *maḥḍūl*³³⁰. Among those who held the imamate of the *fāḍil* was al-Nazzām, a contemporary of al-Ḳāsim, whom, as we have seen, he seems to have influenced in the issues of both the argument from design and the doctrine of belief. It seems probable that al-Ḳāsim's advocacy of the imamate of the *fāḍil* was influenced by al-Nazzām too, even though he certainly did not accept al-Nazzām's stand that Abū Bakr was the best excellent.

In fine, al-Ḳāsim knew the science of Kalam and the particular theology of the Mu'tazilite school and was influenced by them. It is true that extraneous influences, Jewish or Christian³³¹, do appear now and then but these belong to his first works, especially *K. al-radd 'alā al-zindīq*, written during al-Ḳāsim's stay in Egypt, i.e., no later than 815³³². In his later works the Mu'tazilite influence increase to the extent that some of these are clearly affected by Mu'tazilite doctrine. Taking into account everything discussed up till now, al-Ḳāsim seems to have been a Mu'tazilite thinker.

XII. The early Zaydites were not influenced by the Mu'tazila, and were in fact sharp opponents of the latter on the question of predestination. The author of *Madjmū' al-fikh* was anti-Ḳadarite and an avowed adherent of predestination³³³. Likewise, the author of *Tafsīr gharīb al-ḵur'ān al-madḥid*, attributed to Zayd ibn 'Alī, states that evil is created by God³³⁴. This was also the view of three eminent Zaydite scholars of the ninth century: Aḥmad ibn 'Īsā (d. 861)³³⁵, Maḥmūd ibn Manṣūr al-

ll. 11-12, p. 460, ll. 9-11. Al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, p. 271f. According to the Mu'tazilite theologian al-Nāshī³ (See van Ess, *Frühe Mu'tazilitische*, p. 49f, arts. 82-83 of the Arabic text), the Mu'tazila were divided into two groups in regard to the obligation to appoint an imam. One maintained that this obligation is absolute, the other that the Muslims have the right to appoint an imam or not. Al-Aṣamm is not mentioned by al-Nāshī³ among those who denied the obligation to appoint an imam. According to al-Nāshī³, he asserts that in disorderly times, when one imam cannot rule, there may in fact be several imams. Thus al-Ash'arī's report about al-Aṣamm would seem to be based on an implication rather than a clear statement. Cf. Watt, *The Formative Period*, p. 226f.

³²⁹ See e.g. al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 461f.

³³⁰ See van Ess, *Frühe Mu'tazilitische*, pp. 51-61.

³³¹ See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 108f.

³³² See *ibid.*, p. 90f.

³³³ See *ibid.*, p. 55f.

³³⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 57.

³³⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 82.

Murādī who still worked in 866³³⁶ and al-Ḥasan ibn Yaḥyā who was also a contemporary of al-Ḳāsim³³⁷.

On the issue of God's unity too, the early Zaydites did not follow the Muṭazilite conception. Indeed, some of them opposed anthropomorphic expressions³³⁸, but at the same time thought that God knew through eternal knowledge³³⁹. As we have already noted, one should not regard an opposition to anthropomorphism severed from other Muṭazilite notions as a result of Muṭazilite influence³⁴⁰.

Consequently, there emerges the remarkable contrast between the essentially Muṭazilite doctrines of al-Ḳāsim and the doctrines of the early Zaydiyya. Al-Ḳāsim's fundamental doctrines remain uninfluenced by the Zaydite teachings. He may have been influenced by the Zaydites in some regards, but even here it is impossible to point to a direct influence. When al-Ḳāsim defines *nifāk* as unbelief, he agrees with the early Zaydites. His severe attitude towards the grave sinners in *K. al-ḳatl wa'l-ḳitāl* may have been influenced by the approach of the Zaydites who held that one should take to the sword against a despot. But the change in al-Ḳāsim's stand towards grave sinners, which is expressed in *K. al-hidjra*, namely, the abandonment of the place of sin, was in no way connected to the Zaydite doctrine³⁴¹. Likewise, al-Ḳāsim's theory of the imamate differs from that of the Zaydiyya.

It is impossible to assert that al-Ḳāsim belonged to either the Djārūdite or the Batrite wing of the Zaydiyya. Madelung states that "in his theory of the imamate al-Ḳāsim clearly rejects the point of view of the Batriyya. 'Alī was from the beginning the only legitimate successor of the Prophet as the Djārūdites thought'"³⁴². But al-Ḳāsim does not say explicitly in any place in his writings that the Prophet appointed 'Alī to be his successor. Answering the question of whether 'Alī was appointed by the Prophet to be an imam by a testament (*waṣīyya*) which said "you are the imam after me", al-Ḳāsim says diffidently: "It was a sufficient and defined allusion"³⁴³. The passage asserting that 'Alī must be given priority over

³³⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 84f.

³³⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 85.

³³⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 58, 65.

³³⁹ See *ibid.*, p. 65 and note 142 there.

³⁴⁰ See above p. 36.

³⁴¹ See Ms. Berlin, fols. 114b-124b.

³⁴² See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 144.

³⁴³ See *K. al-masā'il*, fol. 23b. Madelung, *ibid.*, p. 143. According to the Shī'ite principle of *naṣṣ* (i.e. the delegation of the imamate through clear appointment), the Prophet, before his death, clearly appointed 'Alī to be his successor. See U. Rubin, "Prophets and Progenitors in the Early Shī'a Tradition", *JSAI* 1(1979), p. 48f, n. 43. This is the view of the Djārūdites. See van Ess, *Frühe Muṭazilitische*, p. 42, art. 66 of the Arabic text.

others³⁴⁴ does not prove that al-Ḳāsim illegitimizes the imamate of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, but it comes to assert that ʿAlī was the most excellent among the first khalifs³⁴⁵. The notion that ʿAlī is the most excellent, but that Abū bakr and ʿUmar are nevertheless still legitimate khalifs is a Batrite notion according to the report of the Muʿtazilite heresiographer al-Nāshī: “ʿAlī ibn Abi Ṭālib was the most excellent person (*afḍal al-nās*) after the messenger of God, may God bless him and give him peace, and the best-suited person for the imamate (*wa-awlāhum biʾl-imāma*). They (the Batrites) claimed that the oath of allegiance (*bayʿa*) that was given to Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, may God be pleased with both of them, was not a fault (*khṭaʿ*), since ʿAlī gave both of them an oath of allegiance, and approved of their imamate...”³⁴⁶. This notion was also accepted by the Muʿtazilites of Baghdad who are described by some of the sources as a Zaydite sect³⁴⁷. Also Sulymān ibn Djarīr, an early Zaydite theologian, about whom little is known, regarded the appointment of Abū Bakr as a fault (*khṭaʿ*), but not as a sin (*fisk*), since the imamate of the *maḥḍūl* is valid, if he is wise and has good qualities³⁴⁸. Like al-Ḳāsim, Sulaymān ibn Djarīr holds that the Prophet alluded to the imamate of ʿAlī, but did not designate him explicitly to be an imam (*wa-ashāra ilayhi ʿalā ghayr sabīl al-naṣṣ*)³⁴⁹.

When al-Ḳāsim takes a stand against the Khalif ʿUmar, it is not a stand on the political question of the imamate³⁵⁰. According to Madelung, he criticizes Umar’s knowledge, not his having been a ruler³⁵¹. And Madelung adds: “Basically al-Ḳāsim’s polemics is less directed to the second khalif than to the tradition of the school which is

³⁴⁴ “It is incumbent upon people to obey ʿAlī and give him priority (over others) (*taḳdīmuhu*), because of his excellence in the religion of God (*li-faḍl ʿAlī fi dīn Allah*)... Whoever gives another priority over him, gives the one who is known to be excelled by others (*maḥḍūl*) priority over the most excellent man (*afḍal*)...” See Ms. Berlin, fol. 131b. The imamate belongs to the best man among the people on earth (*khayr ahl al-arḍ*), whose excellence (*faḍluhu*), abstinence (*zuhduhu*) and knowledge (*ʿilmuhu*) become evident to people. See al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-radd ʿalā al-rawāfiḍ* Ms. Berlin, fol. 106b, ll. 5, 19-21. Cf. S. Pines, “Shīʿite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi’s *Kuzari*”, *JSAI* 2(1980), p. 169f. In response to the question of the possibility of the existence of two imams in one generation, al-Ḳāsim, pointing at sura 12, v. 76, says that there is always one who surpasses others in his knowledge. See *K. al-masāʾil*, fol. 57b.

³⁴⁵ Al-Ḳāsim also asserts that the loyalty to ʿAlī (*walāya* or *muwālāt*) is among the most important precepts incumbent upon every Muslim. See *K. al-masāʾil*, fol. 23a.

³⁴⁶ See van Ess, *Frühe Muʿtazilitische*, p. 43, art. 68 of the Arabic text. Madelung, *Der Imam*, pp. 50, 76.

³⁴⁷ See Madelung, *ibid.*, p. 42f.

³⁴⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 63. Watt, *The Formative Period*, p. 165.

³⁴⁹ See van Ess, *ibid.*, p. 44, art. 69 of the Arabic text.

³⁵⁰ See Madelung, *ibid.*, p. 149f.

³⁵¹ See *ibid.*, p. 150, l. 8-.

connected with him (ʿUmar) and his son ʿAbdallah. Against the proponents of this school, al-Ḳāsim exalts Ibn ʿAbbās who accepted a tradition of another school in al-Madina which ʿUmar and his son appreciated only slightly”³⁵².

We have seen that al-Ḳāsim does not illegitimize the imamate of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, so that in this matter he agrees with the Batrites³⁵³. But his view concerning the signs attesting to the legitimate imam differs from those of both the Djārūdites and the Batrites: He does not consider taking to the sword a sign of the imam, and he holds that the imam must not be chosen by the community. In addition to the relationship to the Prophet, a sign attesting to the legitimate imam accepted both by the Djārūdites and the Batrites, al-Ḳāsim regards knowledge and wisdom as a sign. This sign figures in the later Zaydite doctrine of the imamate from the time of al-Ḳāsim’s grandson, al-Hādī (d. 911), alongside taking to the sword³⁵⁴.

Al-Ḳāsim does not point out a clear way to identify the imam. He does not assert exactly what he means by near relationship to the Prophet, and his vague assertion can result in controversy, of which he warns his adversaries, who favor the choosing of the imam. Also he does not answer the question of how a large group of people can agree on one person. Furthermore, what makes the finding of the imam more difficult is al-Ḳāsim’s assertion that the imam must not declare “I am the imam”³⁵⁵. Truly, in *K. al-imāma*³⁵⁶ al-Ḳāsim says that whoever proves that he is the wisest man, is the imam, but here too the approval of his imamate should come from the community. Al-Ḳāsim seems to hold that the imam’s personality is so superior to the other’s, that there will be no dispute concerning his identity.

Al-Ḳāsim did not openly claim the imamate for himself, though he possibly considered himself suitable for it, and he alludes to that suitability from time to time. If he considered himself suitable for the imamate, he did not act according to the Zaydite doctrine asserting that the real imam of the Prophet’s family cannot be one who willingly leaves the rule over the Muslims in the hand of those who usurped it³⁵⁷. As we have noted, the later Zaydites maintained that al-Ḳāsim took to the sword and was even an imam, but all this seems to be rewriting of history for Zaydite purposes. Throughout al-Ḳāsim’s writings there is no prop-

³⁵² See *ibid.*, pp. 132, 150f.

³⁵³ See note 6 in my article mentioned in note 327 above.

³⁵⁴ See Madelung, *ibid.*, p. 144.

³⁵⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 143. *K. al-masāʾil*, fol. 60b.

³⁵⁶ See Ms. Berlin, fol. 58a.

³⁵⁷ See Madelung, *ibid.*, p. 145.

aganda for rebellion and there are not even external and reliable pieces of evidence proving that he rebelled or was considered as an imam³⁵⁸. However, as a result of the Zaydite contention, al-Ḳāsim's doctrines preserved authority which other Zaydite scholars could not oppose.

XIII. *The manuscripts*

1. Ms. هـ

This is the Berlin Ms., whose description is given in W. Ahlwardt's Mss. list. (*Verzeichnis der arabischen Handschriften der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin*, Berlin 1887-1889, BD. 4, S. 290, nu. 4876, Glaser 101.). It consists of 149 folios, with between 21 and 31 lines per page. The pages measure 265mm × 200mm or 235mm × 140-170mm. The first fifty folios have emendations in the margins. The last folios are damaged. The manuscript is written in a rather large, dense and clear *naskhī*. Sometimes the diacritical points are lacking and sometimes vowels are unmarked. Folio 132b bears the date of the manuscript, 544 H (1149 A.D.) in the month of Shaʿbān.

2. Ms. ص

This is the Ambrosiana Ms. C186. (E. Griffini, "Lista dei manoscritti arabi nuovo fondo della Biblioteca Ambrosiana di Milano", *RSO* 8(1919-1920), pp. 293-297, no. 442[C186]) It is described by I. Di Matteo in the introduction to his edition of *K. al-radd ʿalā al-naṣārā*, *RSO* 9(1921-1923), p. 303. It consists of 187 pages, but al-Ḳāsim's epistles occupy only the first 130 pages. The manuscript is not complete; it lacks the passage from p. 120, l. 3 to page 126, l. 18. The pages measure 250mm × 175mm, and in each page there are between 25 and 30 lines. Emendations in the margins occur infrequently. The manuscript is written in a little and dense *naskhī*. From folio 116a onwards the handwriting is bigger and different than that of the first folios. The number of lines in these folios is between 21 and 23 per page. In most cases diacritical points are lacking. Vowels are unmarked. According to folio 174a the copying was completed on 12th Muḥarram 651 (1252 A.D.).

3. Ms. ح

This is the Ambrosiana Ms. C131 which is listed by E. Griffini in *RSO* 7 (1917), pp. 603-607, no. 387(C131) and described by I. Di Matteo (See

³⁵⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 91-96.

ibid., p. 303f). It contains 165 + II folios. The pages measure 294mm × 207mm, and each has between 23 and 31 lines. It is written in a small but very clear *naskhī*. Diacritical points are frequently omitted, and vowels are not marked. According to folio 165a, Ms. C131 is dated the 12th Sha^cbān 1092 H (1681 A.D.).

4. Ms. د

This is the Ambrosiana Ms. F61. (See E. Griffini, op. cit., p. 604). The manuscript is described by I. Di Matteo (See ibid., p. 304). It consists of 340 folios, but only the first 246 are numbered. The pages measure 208mm × 154mm, and each contains between 20 and 31 lines. It is written in a large, clear *naskhī*. The vowels are almost always marked, but not always accurately. Interpretations of the text are occasionally found in the margins. The copying was completed on the second of Rabī^c II 1083 H (1672 A.D.).

5. Ms. هـ

This is the Ambrosiana Ms. D468, which is described by I. Di Matteo (See ibid., p. 304). It includes only a part of al-Ḳāsim's epistles. It has 243 folios, of which only the first 210 are numbered. The pages measure 175mm × 134mm, and have between 13 and 15 lines each. The handwriting is a very large *naskhī*. Diacritical points are frequently left out and vowels are usually not marked. The first few folios and some other passages of *K. al-dalīl al-kabīr* are missing. In the introduction to his edition and translation of *K. al-radd 'alā al-zindīq al-la'īn ibn al-mukaffa^c*, M. Guidi cites E. Griffini as stating, though without proof, that this manuscript was copied c. 800 H (1400 A.D.).

The method of the critical edition of the text

The critical edition of the text is based on Ms. ا , since it is the earliest, the most complete, the most clearly written and the most accurate manuscript of all the five manuscripts. (An exception is the passage corresponding to Ms. Berlin folio 9a, which was prepared according to the four Ambrosiana Mss., since I could not obtain this page.) All the variant readings of the other four manuscripts are given in the margins. Also the margins contain references to Ḳur^ʿān verses enumerated according to the Cairo Ḳur^ʿān of 1346 H.

II. TEXT AND TRANSLATION

TEXT

كتاب الدليل الكبير

١ (ب) ١ بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم. الحمد لله وبه نستعين^١. وصلواته^٢ على خير خلقه
اجمعين. سيدنا النبي^٣ واهل بيته الطاهرين. وسلم تسليمًا^٤. حسبي الله^٥.
قال الحسين بن القاسم بن ابراهيم^٦: سألت ابي يومًا^٧ رحمة الله عليه^٨ عن
ما يقال للزنادقة والملحددين^٩. فيما يسألون عنه من الدليل على الله رب
العالمين. تقدست اسماءه. وجل ثناؤه. فقال: سألت يا بني^{١٠} عن اكرم
مسائل السائلين. وعن ما بجهله هلك اكثر^{١١} قدماء الاولين. فتخط فيه^{١٢}
منهم عماية من تخط. وافرط بجهله فيه منهم من افرط. بغير ما حجة ولا
برهان لمنكرهم في انكاره^{١٣}. ولا عدم دليل مبين فيما هلك به من
اختياره^{١٤}. الا ما اتبعوا من مضل اهواء^{١٥} الانفس. وضلوا به لتقليد
اسلافهم من غواة الجن والانس. وحجج الله عليهم^{١٦} تبارك وتعالى في العلم
به قائمة ظاهرة. وشواهد معرفته سبحانه لكل ما خالفها بانكار او
اختيار^{١٧} غالبه قاهرة. فالحمد لله ذي^{١٨} الغلبة والسلطان القاهرة. ولمعرفته
والعلم به الحجة والبرهان الزاهر. ١٥

فدليل العلم بالله يا بني^{١٩} وعصم^{٢٠} اسبابه. واقرب ما جعل للعلم به

١ الحمد - نستعين: ص: الحمد لله حق حمده. ح: وبه نستعين. الحمد لله رب العالمين. ك: بالله تعالى نستعين. والحمد
لله رب العالمين. ٢ ح: وصلى الله. ٣ ح ك: محذوف. ٤ وسلم تسليمًا: ك: وسلامه.
٥ حسبي الله: ح ك: محذوف. ٦ الحسين - ابراهيم: ص: محمد بن القاسم عليهما السلام. وفي حواشي ص:
الحسين. ح: الحسين بن القاسم يرحمه الله. ٧ ص: محذوف. ولكن موجود في الحواشي. ٨ رحمة الله عليه:
ص: محذوف. ولكن موجود في الحواشي. ك: صلوات الله عليه. ٩ ح: والملاحدة. ١٠ يا بني: ص:
محذوف. ١١ ح: محذوف. ١٢ ح: محذوف. ١٣ ح: انكارهم. ١٤ ص ح ك: وفي حواشي
ه: اختياره. ١٥ ص: اهوى. ١٦ ص ح ك: محذوف. ١٧ ص ح ك: اختيار. ١٨ ص:
الذي له. ١٩ بالله يا بني: ص: يا بني بالله. ٢٠ ص ح: وعظم.

TRANSLATION

THE EPISTLE OF THE GREAT PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Praise be to God, on Him we call for help. God's blessing and peace be upon all His best creatures, our master, the prophet Muḥammad and his pure family. May God be my share and it is sufficient for me.

Al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Ḳāsim ibn Ibrāhīm said: One day, I asked my father, may God have mercy upon him, how should we answer the heretics' (*zanādiqa*)¹ and the unbelievers' (*mulhidūn*)² question about the proof of the existence of God, the Lord of all created beings³, may His names be sacred and His praise be exalted? He said: You asked, O my son, the most venerable question one can ask. Most of the early ancients perished since they did not know it (i.e. the answer to that question); some stumbled in dark blindness and others exceeded the bounds in their ignorance. The denier among them did not bring any argument or proof to [support] his denial; nor⁴ did he substantiate clearly the confused notions (lit. confusion)⁵ which brought about his perdition, but [brought] deceiving passions, which they followed and by which they were deceived, because they followed their seducing ancestors blindly, devils and human beings. The arguments that cause [people] to know God and compel⁶ them [to believe in Him] are both existent and clear, and so pieces of evidence that cause [people] to know God⁷, glory be to Him, overcome and overwhelm anyone⁸ who contradicts the knowledge of God by denial or confusion. Praise be to God, to whom belong the vanquishing victory and rule, since to the knowledge of Him belong the illuminating argument and proof.

The proof, O my son, [that causes people] to know God, the secure ways [to obtain knowledge about God] and the nearest entrances that

١ من مداخل ابوابه. ما اظهر في الاشياء سبحانه من آثار ٢١ الحكمة المتقنة. التي لا تكون الا من مؤثر متقن. وابان في الاشياء من شواهد التدبير الحسنة المحكمة. التي تكون الا من حكيم محسن. كما قال سبحانه: «ذَلِكَ عَالِمُ الْغَيْبِ وَالشَّهَادَةِ الْعَزِيزُ الرَّحِيمُ. الَّذِي أَحْسَنَ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلَقَهُ وَبَدَأَ خَلْقَ الْإِنْسَانِ مِنْ طِينٍ. ثُمَّ جَعَلَ نَسْلَهُ مِنْ سُلَالَةٍ مِنْ مَاءٍ مُهِينٍ. ثُمَّ سَوَّاهُ وَنَفَخَ فِيهِ مِنْ رُوحِهِ وَجَعَلَ لَكُمُ السَّمْعَ وَالْأَبْصَارَ وَالْأَفْئِدَةَ قَلِيلًا مَّا تَشْكُرُونَ» ٢٢. فكل ما ذكر سبحانه فجعائل لا بد لها من جاعل. وفعائل لا تقوم ابدًا ٢٣ الا بفاعل. ولن يوجد جاعلها وفاعلها الا الله ذو الاسماء الحسنى. البري من مشابهة الجعائل والفعائل في كل معنى.

١٠ ومن اسباب العلم به ودلائله. بعد الذي ابان من اثر التدبير في جعائله. اوثق وثائق ٢٤ الاسباب. مما فطر عليه بنية الالباب. من العلم البت. واليقين المثبت. الذي لا يعتري فيه بحقيقة شك ولا مرية. ولا تعترض فيما جعل ٢٥ من بصائره شبهة معشية. من ان لكل ما احس او عقل. مما اثر سبحانه/وجعل. خلاق متيقن معلوم. لا تدركه الحواس ولا الوهم. يعقل ٢ (أ) ويعرف بخلاف ما عقلت به الاشياء وعرفت. فتخالفه ويخالفها بغير ما به في نفسها ٢٦ اختلفت. فهذان اصلان مجملان. لمعرفة الله ٢٧ ثابتان. وشاهدان عدلان. على العلم بالله باتان.

ولن يخلو العلم بالله والوصول الى المعرفة لله من ان يكون مدركا بمباشرة حس فيكون كمحسوس. او يدرك من مباشرة نفس فيكون كبعض ما يدرك من ٢٨ النفوس. وليعلم من وصل اليه كتابنا هذا في ذكر درك النفس ان فلاسفة الروم. يزعمون ٢٩ ان للنفس ٣٠ دركا ليس بدرك الحواس ولا درك

٢١ ما - آثار: هـ: مشطوب. ٢٢ سورة السجدة (٣٢) ٦-٩. ٢٣ ص: محذوف. ٢٤ ح: وثاق. ٢٥ ح: + سبحانه. ٢٦ ص ح ك: انفسها. ٢٧ ح ك: + عز وجل. ٢٨ ص: محذوف. ٢٩ ص: تزعم. ٣٠ ص ك: + عندهم.

God has established to know Him are the perfect signs of His wisdom, signs which He has manifested in things. These signs come only from a wise well-doer, one who makes signs (*mu'aththir*)⁹ perfectly, and they are the beautiful and the perfect manifested pieces of evidence for His providential design¹⁰. As God, glory be to Him, has said: "This is the Knower of the hidden and the revealed, the Mighty and the Merciful, Who made everything He created well. He began to create man from clay. Then He made his descendants from a refined draught of despised fluid. Then He formed him and breathed of His spirit into him and created hearing and sight and hearts for you, [yet] you thank [Him] but little." (sura 32, vv. 6-9) All the things God, glory be to Him, mentioned are creations which must have a creator and acts, which cannot be made at all without a maker. There is no creator or maker of these creations but God, Who has the most beautiful names and Who cannot be likened to the creations and to the acts in any sense.

Of the ways to know Him and the proofs of His existence, after He has manifested the sign of His providential design in His creations, this is the most secure way. It derives from an absolute knowledge and a fixed certainty which are initially impressed in the hearts. This is a certain knowledge, which is not really harmed by doubt or discussion, and a blinding doubt does not hinder the power of understanding created by God from [stating] that all the things perceived by the senses and by reason, in which God made signs and which He created, have a definite and known creator, who cannot be perceived either by the senses or fancies. He is perceived by reason and known not in the same way by which things are perceived and known. Things are different from God and He is different from them not by the quality by which they are different from each other. These are two¹¹ comprehensive and firm principles which give evidence of knowing God, approved witnesses which give decisive judgment concerning the knowledge of God.

The knowledge of God and its attainment must be perceived either directly by a sense, in which case God would be like a perceived object, or by the direct perception of the soul, in which case God would be like one of the perceived souls. Let him whom our book reaches know in respect of the soul's perception that the Greek philosophers¹² maintain that the soul has perception which is neither the senses' perception nor

١ الوهوم. ولا سيما عندهم اذا كانت النفس معرة من الاجسام. ومبرة مما هي عليه ٣١ من اوعية الاجرام. او بدرك ٣٢ من وهم جائل. فيكون كمتوهم بالمخايل. او يكون دركه سبحانه بظن. فيكون دركه كالمتظن. الذي يصيب فيه الظن مرة ويخطىء. ويسرع المتظن بظنه فيه ويبطىء. او يدرك من دليل مبين. فيكون مدلولاً عليه ببت يقين. او يكون مدركا سبحانه بحال واحدة ٥ مما عددنا ٣٣ دون احوال. او بما ٣٤ يمكن اجتماعه من كل ٣٥ ما وصفنا من الخلال. او مدركا بجميع ما قلنا وحددنا ووصفنا. من الامور كلها وعددنا. او مدركا سبحانه بخلافه لكل محسوس ٣٦ الاشياء ومعقوها. في جميع ما يدرك من فروع الاشياء واصولها.

١٠ وهذا الباب من خلافه سبحانه لاجزاء الاشياء كلها. فيما يدرك من فروع الاشياء جميعا واصلها. فما ٣٧ لا يوجد ابدا الا بين الاشياء وبينه. ولا يوصف بها ابدا غيره سبحانه. وهي الصفة التي لا يشاركه عز وجل ٣٨ فيها مشارك. ولا يملكها عليه تعالى مالك. ولا يعم جميع ٣٩ الاشياء اختلاف عمومته. ولا تصحح ٤٠ ابدا الالباب الا لله معلومه. لانه وان وقع بين الاشياء ما يقع من الاختلاف. فلن يوجد واقعا الا بين ذوات الاوصاف. وكل واحد ١٥ منها ٤١ وان خالف غيره في صفة فقد يوافقه في صفة اخرى. كان مما يعقل او كان مما يلمس او يرى ٤٢. فان اختلف محسوسان في لون او طعم. اتفقا فيما لهما من حدود الجسم. وان اختلف معقولان في فعال ٤٣ او همة. اتفقا فيما يعقل من اصولهما المتوهمه. كالملائكة والانس والشیاطین التي اصولها في النفسانية واحدة متفقة. وهمها وافعالها مختلفة مفترقة. فهم ٢٠

٣١ ص: فيه. ٣٢ ك: يدرك. ولعله الاصح. ٣٣ بحال - عددنا: ص ح ك: مما عددنا بحال واحدة. ٣٤ او بما: ي: وبما. ح: او بكل ما. ٣٥ ه: د(ق). ٣٦ ص: + من. ٣٧ ح: عما. ٣٨ عز وجل: ص: شيء. ح ك: سبحانه. ٣٩ ص: ح: محذوف. ٤٠ ح: تصح. ٤١ ص: منها. ٤٢ او يرى: ح: ويرى. ٤٣ ص: فعل.

the fancies' perception, especially, in their opinion, when the soul is separated from the body (lit. bodies) and stripped of its corporeal covers. It is also¹³ possible for God to be perceived by transient fancy, in which case His perception would be like [the perception of] one who is absorbed in vain fancies. Or God may be perceived by supposition, in which case His perception is like the perception of one who supposes, i.e. sometimes his supposition is right and sometimes it is wrong, sometimes he supposes quickly and sometimes slowly. [Also] God may be perceived by a clear proof, in which case His [existence] is proved with absolute certainty¹⁴. God may be perceived only by one way, not by others, of the above listed ways, or by a possible combination of ways described above. Or He may be perceived by all the ways which we have talked about, defined, described and listed. Or He may be perceived by His difference from all things, from their roots and their branches which are perceived by the senses or by reason.

This type of difference deals with the difference between God, glory be to Him, and all the disparate things, that is, the perceived roots and their branches. This type of difference does not exist at all except between Him and things, and a being other than God, glory be to Him, cannot be qualified by it at all. It is a quality which nobody shares with God, may He be extolled and exalted, and there is no one who has this quality along with Him, may He be exalted. There is no difference like the difference between God and things which pertains to all things, and reason does not regard knowledge of [this] difference as possible except about God. Since if there is a difference among things, it does not exist except among those which have qualities. Even though every thing is different from every other in a certain quality, each may be identical to something else in another quality, which is perceived by reason or by touch or sight. If two things perceived by the senses are different in color or taste, they can be identical in their bodily limits. If two things perceived by reason are different in action or aspiration, they may be identical in their presumed properties which are perceived by reason, for example, angels, men, and devils, who have identical principles of the soul, but whose aspirations and actions are different and distinct from each other. The

٢ (ب) ١ الملائكة/الاحسان والتسييح. وهمم الشياطين العصيان والقيح. وهمم انفس الانس فمختلفة كاختلافها. في قصدها واسرافها. فتحسن مرة وتبر. وتسيء تارة وتشر. وكل خلق من الملائكة والانس والشياطين فقد جعل الله له صفة متممة ذاتية. بها بان بعضهم من بعض وكانت لكل من جعلها الله له خاصة ٤٤ صنفية. فهي لهم وبينهم ٤٥ ولكلهم اختلاف. وكلهم بها وبما جعل الله منها اصناف. بعضهم غير بعض. كما السماء غير الارض.

وليس من وراء ما قلنا في الدرك لمعرفة الله والوصول الى العلم بالله قول ٤٦. ولا بعد الذي عددنا وحددنا في اصول المعارف بالله اصل معقول. ولا بد من النظر لمن اراد يقين المعرفة بالله. في تصحيح كل ما وصفنا صفة بعد صفة في ٤٧ معرفة الله. لياتي المعرفة بالله من بابها. وليسلم بذلك من شكوك النفس وارتياها. فانه لن تزكو نفس ٤٨ ولن تطيب. ولن يهتدى امرؤ ولن يصيب. [ان] ٤٩ اعتلج في صدره بالله ريب مريب. ولا كان فيه لشك في الله نصيب.

فستعين بالله على معرفته ويقينها. ونرغب اليه في يقين اوليائه ودينها. فان ذلك ما لا يثبت لمن ادعاه بدعوى غير ذات بينة ولا اصل. فضلا عن ٥٠ من كذب دعواه في ذلك من العامة بسوء الفعل. فقال اعرف الله بلسانه. وكذب ما ٥١ ادعى من المعرفة له بكبير عصيانه. فاذا قيل له: بم عرفت ما تزعم؟ ومن اين علمت ما تقول انك تعلم؟ قال: ٥٢ سبحان الله ومن يجهل الله؟ وهل يسأل احد عن معرفة الله وليس عنده من وجوه المعارف التي عددنا كلها وجه؟ ولا له في الجهل بالله لفاحش عصيانه مثل ولا شبه. يقول ٢٠ ابدا فيكذب. ويخوض ابدا ويلعب. فقلوه خوض وزور. وفعاله فساد وبور. لا

٤٤ ص: خاصة. ٤٥ ص: وفيهم. ٤٦ ك: + مقول. ٤٧ ص: من. ٤٨ ص ح ك: انفس. ٤٩ هـ ص ح ك ي: محذوف. ٥٠ ص: محذوف. ٥١ ح: من. ٥٢ ص: فقال يا. ح ك: + يا.

angels' aspirations are to do good and to praise, whereas the devils' aspirations are to disobey and to do wrong. The aspirations of men's souls are different, just as are their souls, which may follow the right way or the wrong way, since sometimes the souls are good and do good and sometimes are evil and do evil. God has created in all the angels, men and devils a perfect and essential quality by which they are distinct from one another. Everything which has been created by God has a quality that distinguishes its genus, and this quality constitutes the difference between it and every other genus¹⁵. According to these distinguishing qualities and to what has been created out of them, all [things] are divided into distinct genera, such as the heaven and the earth.

There is nothing more to say than what we have said with regard to the attainment of the knowledge of God and the coming to it, and there is no principle perceived by reason beyond the principles of knowledge which we have defined and counted. Whoever wants to know God with certainty must reflect on everything we have said regarding the knowledge of God step by step in order to verify it [and] in order to reach the knowledge of God through the gate leading to it and to be free from the soul's doubts. For the soul will not be purified and cleansed at all and man will not follow the right way and reach the truth, [if] a troublesome doubt regarding [the existence of] God is stirred in his heart and [if]¹⁶ he has any portion of doubt concerning God.

On God we call for help to know Him and to make our knowledge of Him certain. We ask God to know Him and to believe in Him with certainty as His friends do¹⁷. Since the true knowledge of God cannot be proved by someone who claims [that he can prove it] by a claim which lacks rational proof and has no foundation, let alone one of the common people who claims falsely in this matter, and does wrong in saying: I know God. He lies in his claim that he knows God because of his great disobedience. When he is asked: How do you know what you claim to know? And from where do you know what you say you know? He says: God forbid! is there anyone who does not know God? Is it possible that someone will be asked about the knowledge of God [and he will not know]¹⁸? [Such a] man has not one of the types of knowledge above counted, and he has no like and equal in his ignorance of God because of his disgraceful disobedience. In his words he always lies and amuses himself with vain talk¹⁹. His words are vanity and lies, and his deeds are

١ يصدق قوله بفعال. ولا تقوم دعواه الا بحال. لا يفهمه عنه لبيب. ولا يصوب مذهبه فيه مصيب. كالبهيمة المهملة الراجعة. التي لا همة لها الا في مأكل او متعة^{٥٣}. كما قال الله عز وجل^{٥٤}: «وَالَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا يَتَمَتَّعُونَ وَيَأْكُلُونَ كَمَا تَأْكُلُ الْأَنْعَامُ وَالنَّارُ مَثْوًى لَهُمْ»^{٥٥}. وقال سبحانه: «أُولَئِكَ كَالْأَنْعَامِ بَلْ هُمْ أَضَلُّ أُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْغَافِلُونَ»^{٥٦}. وقال سبحانه: «ذَرُهُمْ يَأْكُلُوا وَيَتَمَتَّعُوا وَيُلْهِهِمُ الْأَمَلُ فَسَوْفَ يَعْلَمُونَ»^{٥٧}. فنعوذ بالله يا بني^{٥٨} من/مثل حالهم. (أ) ٣ ونرغب اليه في السلامة من سوء فعالهم. وحسبنا الله في معرفته دليلا^{٥٩} وداعيا. وموفقا^{٦٠} سبحانه للعلم به وهاديا.

فاول باب وصفناه من دركه^{٦١} بمباشرة الحس. والباب الثاني من دركه بمباشرة النفس. ففاسد ان يكون الله سبحانه بواحد منهما مدركا او معروفا. ١٠ لانه ان عرف او ادرك^{٦٢} بما ادركا به او عرفا كان بصفتها موصوفا. يجري عليه ما يجري عليهما. ويضاف اليه ما يضاف اليهما. من تجزئة الكل والابعاض. ولم به ما يلزم بهما من الالام والاعراض. لان ما يدرك من كل محسوس. وان كان خلافا لما يعقل من النفوس. فلن يخلو من ان^{٦٣} يكون خلطين^{٦٤} خلطا فامترجا فتوحدا. او اخلاطا كثيرة عدن مزاجا واحدا. ١٥ فتبدلن عن حالهن الاولى. وصرن كونا من الاكوان التي تبلى. وما كان كونا لزمه ما يلزم الاكوان. ولم يتقدم الحركة ولا الازمان^{٦٥}. وكان فيهما محظوران^{٦٦}. وبما حظرهما^{٦٧} من الحدث محصورا^{٦٨}. وحدث الحركة والازمان^{٦٩}. وقرائنها من الجسم والصورة والمكان. فما^{٧٠} لا ينكره الا بمكابرة لعقله. او فاحش ٢٠

٥٣ او متعة: ح: ومتعة. ٥٤ الله عز وجل: ص ح ك: الله جل جلاله عن ان يحويه قول او يناله. ٥٥ سورة محمد (٤٧) ١٢. ٥٦ سورة الاعراف (٧) ١٧٩. ٥٧ سورة الحجر (١٥) ٣. ٥٨ يا بني: ص: محذوف. ٥٩ ي: + وكافيا (?). ٦٠ ح: وموفقنا. ٦١ ك: + سبحانه. ٦٢ ان - ادرك: ك وفي حواشي ه: ان ادرك او عرف. ٦٣ من ان: ص: بان. ٦٤ ص: خليطين. ٦٥ ص: الزمان. ٦٦ ص: محضورا. ح: محظورا. ٦٧ ح: خطرهما. ٦٨ ك: محظورا. ٦٩ ص ح ي: الزمان. ٧٠ ح: مما.

corrupt and worthless. His words will never match his deeds nor his claim be correct except on the basis of an impossibility. The wise man will not understand his words, and he who does know will say his way is not right. He is like a neglected beast pasturing in the field, who wants nothing but to eat and enjoy life. As God, may He be extolled and exalted, has said: "Those who have not believed will enjoy life and eat as the cattle eat, but Fire (i.e. Hell) is their abode." (sura 47, v. 12) And God, glory be to Him, has said: "These are like cattle, more so, they err more than the cattle. They are the neglectful." (sura 7, v. 179) And God, glory be to Him, has said: "Let them eat and enjoy life, and let [false] hope divert them, [but] at last they will know." (sura 15, v. 3) May God protect us, my son, from a state like theirs. We shall ask God to be free of their evil deeds. God is sufficient proof for us to know Him, and as one who urges [man to knowledge] helps and guides [man] to know Him.

It is unsound that God can be perceived or known either by the first described kind, namely, the direct perception of God by the senses, or the second kind, namely, the direct perception of Him by the soul. Since if He is known or perceived by the thing by which they both (the senses and the soul) perceive or know, He will be qualified by their qualities, what is applied to them will be applied to Him, and what is attributed to them will be attributed to Him, namely, the division between the whole and the parts, and pains and diseases which hurt them will hurt Him. For everything perceived by the senses, even though it is different from the souls perceived by reason, is inevitably [composed] either of two components which have been mingled, mixed and united, or of many components which have become one mixture and changed from their first state into perishable being. That which is a being is constrained by what constrains beings. It does not precede either motion or time; it exists within the limits of motion and time and is restricted by the coming into existence (*hadath*)²⁰, which limits motion and time. The coming into existence of motion and time and the coming into existence of body, form and place, which are bound to motion and time²¹, are not denied by a sane man, whose senses are not defective, except by one who opposes his

١ مستنكر من جهله. من سلمت من الخبل نفسه. ونجت من نقص الافات حواسه.

وكل نفس فذات قوى شتى مختلفة. كل ٧١ صفة منها فسوى غيرها من كل صفة. واختلاف قوى كل نفس فمعروف غير منكر منها للتوهم والفكر. ٥ وغيرهما من التذكر ٧٢ والخطر. وقوى كل نفس فمتمة لها. لا يمكن ان تزايلها. لانها ٧٣ ان زايلتها قوة من قواها المتمة لكونها. وما وصفناه من محدود كمال شؤونها. كان في ذلك من زواله زوالها ٧٤. وزال عن النفس بزواله عنها كمالها. وفيت النفس بفنائها. ولم تبق النفس بعد بلائه. الا ترى ان قوى النفس المتمة لكونها. ومحدود كمال شؤونها. كحر الشمس ونورها. وغيرهما ١٠ مما لا قوام للشمس دونه من امورها. وكذلك قوى النار في احراقها وحرها. كقوى النفس في توهمها وذكرها. فان فني حر الشمس او نورها ٧٥ ففيت. وان بلي اسخان النار او احراقها بليت. وكذلك النفس ان زايلتها. ما جعله الله من القوى لها. فزال فكرها عنها. او فني توهمها منها. ففيت بفنائها. ٣ (ب) ١٠ وبليت/مع بلائه. وفي ذلك اذ كان كذلك دليل مبين. وعلم ثابت صحيح يقين ٧٦. فان ٧٧ النفس كثيرة عددا. وانها ليست شيئا واحدا. فكل نفس فغير واحدة. ولكنها كثيرة ذات عدة. والله تبارك وتعالى فواحد فرد. وقوته فمفردة ليس لها حد. ومن لم يكن واحدا فردا. ونهاية في الدرك صمدا. كان متحادا معدودا. واشتاتا متناهايا محدودا.

٢٠ والباب الثالث من دركه سبحانه بمخايل ٧٨ الاوهام. ففاسد لتشبيهه فيه بتوهم مخايل الاجسام.

والباب الرابع من دركه ٧٩ بالظن. فقد يمكن ويكون. اذ كانت قد ٨٠

٧١ ك ي: وكل. ٧٢ ي: التذلل. ٧٣ ص: محذوف. ٧٤ ص ح: والها. ٧٥ حر الشمس
او نورها: ص ح: نور الشمس او حرها. ٧٦ ص: ويقين. ٧٧ ح ي: بان. ٧٨ ص: بخائل.
٧٩ ك: + سبحانه. ٨٠ ص: محذوف.

reason²², whose ignorance is detestable.

Every soul has different powers, and the quality of each of the soul's powers is different from the quality of every other. The difference among the soul's powers, i.e. powers of fancy, thought, memory and reflection, is known and not denied. The powers of every soul make it complete, and it is impossible that they should leave the soul. For if one of the soul's powers, which completes its being and the perfection of the permanent qualities (lit. matters) described by us, should leave the soul, it will bring about the soul's destruction as a result of the destruction of its qualities. The soul's perfection will be destroyed with the destruction of these qualities. The soul will perish with the death of its qualities and not remain after their extinction. Do you not understand that the soul's powers, which make its being and the perfection of its permanent qualities complete, are like the heat of the sun, and its light and other things without which the sun cannot exist? Also the powers of fire when it burns and heats are like the powers of the soul when it fancies and remembers. If the sun's heat or light perishes, the sun will perish, and if the fire's heat or [power] of burning becomes extinct, the fire will become extinct. The same applies to the soul; if the powers, which God has created for it, leave the soul, its thought will be destroyed and its fancy will perish, the soul will perish with the extinction of its powers. If this is so, it is clear proof and firm, sound and certain knowledge. For the soul has many parts and it is not one thing. Each soul is not one, but has many parts. But God, may He be blessed and exalted, is one and single. His power is one and without limits. But he who is not one, single, eternal and the final goal of perception, is limited, his parts are countable and they have end and limit.

The third kind, the perception of God, glory be to Him, by fancies, is invalid, since He is likened to the vain fancies of the body.

The fourth kind, the perception of God by supposition, is possible, and

^١ تخطيء وتصيب الظنون. فصواب الظن في انه. فقد ^{٨١} يصيب فيه سبحانه. وخطأ الظن فيه فمتنحي ^{٨٢} عنه. مقطوعة الاسباب فيما بينها وبينه.

والباب الخامس من دركه سبحانه بالدلالة فموجود لا يعنف. وصحيح ثابت ^{٨٣} في الالباب لا يختلف.

^٥ والباب السادس من دركه سبحانه بحال واحدة مما عددنا. ففساد فيه تبارك ^{٨٤} وتعالى بما افسدنا.

والباب السابع من دركه سبحانه بكل ما عددنا وحددنا من الخلال. فاحول ما يتوهم من وجوه المحال. لما يجمع مما لا يجتمع في حس ولا عقل ولا وهم. وفي ذلك ان يكون كذلك اعدم العدم.

^{١٠} والباب الثامن معرفته سبحانه بخلاف الاشياء كلها فلباب كل لباب. واصح ما يدركه به سبحانه من خلقه اولو الالباب. لانه اذا صح انه غير مدرك سبحانه بدرك هذه الاشياء واصافها. وكان لا بد لمن ادرك هذه الاشياء دركا صحيحا من ان يكون مدركا بصحة لخلافها. بيقين من دركه لها مبتوت. كدرك الحياة وخلافها من الموت. ودرك الصحة وخلافها من السقم. ^{١٥} ودرك الشباب وخلافه من الهرم. وغير ذلك من اختلاف الاشياء كلها. وما يوجد لها من الاختلاف ^{٨٥} في فرعها ^{٨٦} واصلها ^{٨٧}. واذا كان ذلك كذلك. وصح ما ذكرنا في النفوس من ذلك. كان واجبا وجوب اضطرار. وثابتا من النفوس في اثبت قرار. دركه سبحانه ووجوده عند دركها ووجودها. اذ هو خلاف سبحانه لكل ما يوجد من موجودها.

^{٢٠} فان قال قائل: فلم لا تجعل خلاف الاشياء كلها العدم. فقد يحيط/بخلافه للاشياء كلها الوهم؟ قلنا: ان العدم ليس بمعنى موجود. وليس ^٤ (أ) مما له انية ولا حدود. وانما مطلبنا ^{٨٨} فيما قلنا للخلاف بين ما قد عقلنا من

^{٨١} ك: قد. ^{٨٢} ح: فمتنحي. ^{٨٣} ح ك: + واحد. ^{٨٤} ص: محذوف. ^{٨٥} ص: اختلاف. ^{٨٦} ص: فروعها. ^{٨٧} ص: او اصلها. ^{٨٨} ص: طلبنا.

may occasionally occur, since suppositions are sometimes right and sometimes wrong. The right supposition concerning God's existence (*annihi*)²³, sometimes says the right thing about God, glory be to Him. The wrong supposition concerning God is a deviation which in no way pertains to God.

The fifth kind, the perception of God, glory be to Him, by proof, exists, it is fixed in the hearts and not reproached, it is right and no one disagrees with it.

The sixth kind, the perception of God, glory be to Him, by [only] one of the ways counted by us is invalid regarding Him, may He be blessed and exalted, as we have said.

The seventh kind, is the perception of God, glory be to Him, by all the above counted and defined ways. This is the most impossible thing which comes to mind. Since this kind brings together what cannot be brought together by sense, reason and fancy. So that this perception [indicates] an absolute absence [of God].

The eighth kind, the knowledge of God, glory be to Him, by His difference from all things is the purest thing and the rightest [way] by which His intelligent creatures will perceive Him, glory be to Him. For if it is right that He, glory be to Him, cannot be perceived as these things and their qualities can be perceived, and if he who has a correct perception of them must perceive the difference among them correctly and with absolute certainty, like the perception that life is different from death, the perception that health is different from illness, the perception that youth is different from old age, and other patterns which show the differences among all things and the differences existing within things' roots and branches. If it is so, and if what we have mentioned concerning the souls is right, then the perception of God and His existence are necessarily required and well established in the souls, when one perceives things and [approves] of their existence, since He, glory be to Him, is different from all existent things.

If someone asks: Why do you not assert that the difference from all things is non-existence (*ʿadam*), since it is possible that fancy can completely grasp that non-existence is different from all things? We will answer that non-existence is an entity that is not existent (*laysa bi-maʿnā mawdjūd*)²⁴, it has neither existence (*anniyya*)²⁵ nor limits. We want to speak only about the difference between tangible existing beings, which

١ ذوات الانية الموجودة الثابتة بالحس. او الشهادة^{٨٩} الباتة من درك النفس. او
 ما يدرك خلافا لهما جميعا. فيوجد اثر تديره بينا^{٩٠} فيهما معا. فاما ما ليس
 بذى ايس^{٩١}. ولا يدرك درك^{٩٢} محسوس. ولا يعرف بفرع ولا سوس^{٩٣}. ولا
 يبين عن نفسه باثر من تدبير. ولا يستدل على وجوده بدليل منير. فليس فيه
 لنا^{٩٤} مطلب. ولا لنا اليه بحمد الله مذهب. وانما قولنا^{٩٥} في العدم. انه
 خلاف في الوهم^{٩٦}. لا في حقيقة للعدم^{٩٧} موجودة. ولا عين منه قائمة ولا
 محدودة. فانما^{٩٨} يطلب خلاف الاشياء كلها في حقائق الاعيان. بما يدرك في
 العقل والعلم من الاختلاف بيت الايقان. وكذلك وجدنا الاختلاف
 الصحيح اليقين يكون. بين^{٩٩} ما يحس او يعقل من الاشياء التي لها كون.
 فاما العدم الذى هو ليس. والذي لم يتوهم له قط ايس^{١٠٠}. فليس في بعده
 من ان يقال مختلف بحقيقة او مؤتلف وهم. وليس لاحد^{١٠١} علينا والحمد
 لله في اختلاف منه ولا ايتلاف متكلم. هو^{١٠٢} غير ذي^{١٠٣} شك عدم
 الاعدام. وما يرتفع عنه الا بعبارة المنطق^{١٠٤} نطق الكلام.
 والحمد لله على ما جعل لنا من السبيل بما قلنا وغيره الى معرفته. ودلنا
 عليه في محكم القرآن منا واحسانا من صفته. فقال سبحانه فيما عرفنا منه
 وثبت لنا من انه يعرف بالاعلام^{١٠٥} القائمة الدالة^{١٠٦}. والشهادات^{١٠٧}
 القاطعة العادلة. التي لم تبرح في الانفس والافاق شاهدة مشهودة. ولم تزل
 في السموات والارض وما بينهما في سالف الاحقاب قائمة موجودة. تشير الى

٨٩ ص: الشاهدة. ٩٠ ص: + بما. ٩١ ح: انس. في حواشي ه: اس. ٩٢ ولا يدرك درك: ح:
 ولا يدرك. ٩٣ ح: بسوس. ٩٤ فيه لنا: ح: لنا فيه. ٩٥ ص وفي حواشي ه: قلنا. ٩٦ في
 حواشي ه: للوهم. ٩٧ في حواشي ه: + غير. ٩٨ ك: وانما. ٩٩ ص: بينهما. ١٠٠ في
 حواشي ه: اس. ١٠١ ص: احد. ١٠٢ ح: وهو. ١٠٣ ص: محذوف. ١٠٤ ص:
 بالمنطق. ١٠٥ ح: بالعلامة. ١٠٦ ح: الدلالة. ١٠٧ ح: والشاهدة.

we perceive either by reason or by spontaneous knowledge (*al-shahāda*)²⁶ of the soul or about what we perceive as different from [the objects of] both [kinds of perception]. The sign of His providential design exists manifestly in both. But what does not exist and is not perceived by the senses, or known either by its root or by its branch, and does not reveal itself by any sign of providential design, and whose existence is not proven by clear proof, that something we neither seek nor have any opinion about. We say that non-existence is different [from all things] only in [that it is perceived through] fancy and not by virtue of any existent reality (*ḥakīka*)²⁷ or any subsisting and defined concreteness (*ʿayn*)²⁸. One must search for the difference from all things in substantial things, according to a difference which is perceived with utmost certainty by reason and knowledge. Thus we find that the right and certain difference is among existent things perceived by the senses or by reason. But, given its remoteness (?), one should not say that non-existence, which “is not” and which fancy cannot at all conceive of as having existence, is different from or similar to [reality] in the fancy. Praise be to God, there is no one who will argue against us, saying that non-existence is different [from real things] or similar [to real things]. Non-existence is undoubtedly absolute. It is impossible to speak of it except from a logical point of view.

Praise be to God, for having made for us the road leading to the knowledge of Him by what we have said and by other things and for indicating (*dalla*) for us—through His favor and beneficence—His quality in the self-evident verses of the *Ḳurʿān* (*muḥkam al-ḳurʿān*)²⁹. God, glory be to Him, tells what enables us to know Him and proves to us that He can be known through existing signs, which indicate [His existence], and by means of conclusive and just pieces of evidence in people and in the far ends of the earth, which have not ceased to attest [to His existence]. These pieces of evidence have always been and existed in previous generations, in the heavens and the earth and what is in between, pointing, with the palm of the hand and the finger tips, to [the way] to know Him, and indicating [how] to know God to everyone who

١ معرفته ١٠٨ بكف وبنان. وتومىء الى العلم بالله لكل من كان له قلب وعينان. كما قال الله سبحانه: «وَكَايِّنَ مِنْ آيَةٍ فِي السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ يَمُرُّونَ عَلَيْهَا وَهُمْ عَنْهَا مُعْرِضُونَ» ١٠٩. وقال سبحانه: «وَفِي الْأَرْضِ آيَاتٌ لِلْمُوقِنِينَ وَفِي أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَفَلَا تُبْصِرُونَ. وَفِي السَّمَاءِ رِزْقُكُمْ وَمَا تُوعَدُونَ. ٥ فَوَرَبِّ السَّمَاءِ وَالْأَرْضِ إِنَّهُ لَحَقُّ مِثْلَ مَا أَنْتُمْ تَنْطِقُونَ» ١١٠. قال سبحانه: «سُنُرِهِمْ آيَاتِنَا فِي الْأَفَاقِ وَفِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُمْ أَنَّهُ الْحَقُّ أَو لَمْ يَكْفِ بِرَبِّكَ أَنَّهُ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ شَهِيدٌ» ١١١. فمن شهادته سبحانه لها لما ٤ (ب) كان منها مدبر مريد. ثم قرر ١١٢ لنا سبحانه/شهادة دلائله. بما اظهر في السموات والارض والانفس من اثر جعائله. بتوقيف منبه لكل بصير حي. ١٠ وتعريف لا يجهل بعده الا كل ضليل ١١٣ عمي. فقال سبحانه ١١٤ في توقيفه. وما نبه ١١٥ من تعريفه: «إِنَّ اللَّهَ فَالِقُ الْحَبِّ وَالنَّوَى يُخْرِجُ الْحَيَّ مِنَ الْمَيِّتِ وَمُخْرِجُ الْمَيِّتِ مِنَ الْحَيِّ ذَلِكُمْ اللَّهُ فَأَنَّى تُؤْفَكُونَ. فَالِقُ الْأَصْبَاحِ وَ[جَعَلَ ١١٦] اللَّيْلَ سَكَنًا وَالشَّمْسَ وَالْقَمَرَ حُسْبَانًا ذَلِكَ تَقْدِيرُ الْعَزِيزِ الْعَلِيمِ. وَهُوَ الَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُمْ النُّجُومَ لِتَهْتَدُوا بِهَا فِي ظُلُمَاتِ اللَّيْلِ قَدْ فَصَّلْنَا الْآيَاتِ لِقَوْمٍ يَعْلَمُونَ. وَهُوَ الَّذِي أَنْشَأَكُمْ مِنْ نَفْسٍ وَاحِدَةٍ فَمُسْتَقَرٌّ وَمُسْتَوْدَعٌ قَدْ فَصَّلْنَا الْآيَاتِ لِقَوْمٍ يَفْقَهُونَ. وَهُوَ الَّذِي أَنْزَلَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مَاءً فَأَخْرَجْنَا بِهِ نَبَاتَ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ فَأَخْرَجْنَا مِنْهُ خَضِرًا نُخْرِجُ مِنْهُ حَبًّا مُتَرَاكِبًا وَمِنَ النَّخْلِ مِنْ طَلْعِهَا قِنْوَانٌ دَانِيَةٌ وَجَنَّاتٍ مِنْ أَعْنَابٍ وَالزَّيْتُونَ وَالرُّمَانَ مُشْتَبِهًا وَغَيْرَ مُتَشَابِهٍ أَنْظَرُوا إِلَى ثَمَرِهِ إِذَا أَثْمَرَ وَيَنْعِهِ إِنَّ فِي ذَلِكُمْ ٢٠ لآيَاتٍ لِقَوْمٍ يُؤْمِنُونَ» ١١٧. ففلق الحب يا بني والنوى والاصباح. واخراج

١٠٨ ص: معرفة الله. ح: + تعالى. ١٠٩ سورة يوسف (١٢) ١٠٥. ١١٠ سورة الذاريات (٥١) ٢٠-٢٣. ١١١ سورة فصلت (٤١) ٥٣. ١١٢ ح: قدر. ١١٣ ص: + عي. ١١٤ ص: محذوف. ١١٥ ص ح ك ي: + به. ١١٦ هـ ص ح ك: جاعل. ١١٧ سورة الانعام (٦) ٩٥-٩٩.

has a heart and eyes. As God, glory be to Him, has said: "How many signs are there in the heavens and the earth which they pass by, averting their eyes from it." (sura 12, v. 105) And God, glory be to Him, has said: "And in the earth are signs for those whose faith is certain and in yourselves, will you not see then? And in the heaven is your sustenance and what you are promised. So by the Lord of the heaven and the earth, it is surely true, as it is true that you are talking." (sura 51, vv. 20-23) God, glory be to Him, has said: "We shall show them Our signs all over the world (lit. on the horizons) and in themselves, until it becomes evident to them that He is the truth. Does it not suffice, in regard to your Lord, that He is witness over all things?" (sura 41, v. 53) His testimony, glory be to Him, on the signs is also in the fact that He designs and wills them. Also, He, glory be to Him, has established for us testimony of the proofs [of His existence] by manifesting the signs of His creation in the heavens, in the earth and in people, [namely] by teaching (*tawkīf*)³⁰ every living and seeing person to know Him. He who does not know [God] after that is nothing other than blind and misguided. God, glory be to Him, has said, teaching and urging [man] to know Him: "Verily it is God who splits the grain of corn and the date-stone. He brings forth the living from the dead, and He is the bringer forth of the dead from the living. That is God, how, then, are you deviated [from the truth]? He splits the dawn, and has established the night as a time of rest, and the sun and the moon as a reckoning [of the festivals]. That is the decree of the All-mighty, the Omniscient. And it is He who has established for you the stars to guide you in the darkness of the land and sea. We have already detailed the signs for people who have knowledge. And it is He who has produced you from one soul, and you, then, abide on the earth and are deposited in the womb (lit. a place of abiding and a place of deposit). We have already detailed the signs for people who understand. And it is He who has brought down water from the heaven, and thereby We have produced shoots of every kind, and from them We have produced green, from which We produce close-packed grain, and palm trees from whose spathes come down hanging clusters of dates, and [We have produced] gardens of grapes, and the olive and the pomegranate, like and unlike. Look at its fructifying and ripening when it produces fruit; verily in that are there signs for people who believe." (sura 6, vv. 95-99) The splitting of the grain of corn, and the date-stone, and the dawning,

١ الحي من الميت والميت من الحي باوضح الايضاح. وما جعل من الليل سكنا. ولباسا مكننا. ومن الشمس ١١٨ والقمر حسبانا معدودا. وما جعل في النجوم للسارين ١١٩ من الهدى. وانشأ البشر من نفس واحدة. فما ١٢٠ لا تنكره ١٢١ فرقة ملحدة ولا غير ملحدة. وما استودع منهم في الارحام والاصلاب. وما استقر منهم في قرار الارض وعلى متن التراب. وما نزل ١٢٢ من الماء. من جو السماء. وما اخرج به من كل نبات. واحيا به من الارض بعد الموات. وما اخرج به من خضر ١٢٣ الالوان المختلفة. واصناف الحبوب ١٢٤ المتراكبة المتصنفة. وما اخرج به من النخل وطلعها. وقنوانها الدانية عند ينعها. وما اخرج به من جنات الاعناب ذوات الالوان. وما تشابه او لم يتشابه من الزيتون والرمان. فمعان كله بما قال الله فيه مشهود. ١٥ بين فيه كله اثر صنع الله موجود. لايقدر له احد ١٢٥ بحجة على انكار. ولا يمتنع حكيم على الله فيه من اقرار.

ومن توقيفه سبحانه المكرم. وتعليمه تبارك وتعالى المحكم. قوله: «قُلْ مَنْ يَرْزُقُكُمْ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ وَالْأَرْضِ أَمْ مَنْ يَمْلِكُ السَّمْعَ وَالْأَبْصَارَ وَمَنْ يُخْرِجُ الْحَيَّ مِنَ الْمَيِّتِ وَيُخْرِجُ الْمَيِّتَ مِنَ الْحَيِّ وَمَنْ يُدَبِّرُ الْأَمْرَ/فَسَيَقُولُونَ اللَّهُ فَقُلْ أَفَلَا تَتَّقُونَ. فذُ لَكُمْ اللَّهُ رَبُّكُمْ الْحَقُّ فَمَاذَا بَعْدَ الْحَقِّ إِلَّا الضَّلَالُ فَأَنْتِ تُصْرِفُونَ» ١٢٦. وكل ما ذكر الله سبحانه من هذا فقد علمنا بيقين. وادركنا بقلب وعين. انه مرزوق غير رازق. ومخلوق ليس لنفسه بخالق. ومملوك غير مالك من نفسه لشيء. ومخرج ومحبي غير مخرج لنفسه ولا محي. وكل امر السماء والارض فقد يعاين مدبرا غير مدبر. ويرى اثرا بأعين ١٢٧ شواهد ٢٠

١١٨ ص: والشمس. ١١٩ ح: للسارين. ١٢٠ ح: بما. ١٢١ ك: ينكره. ١٢٢ ص: انزل. ١٢٣ ص: جنس. ١٢٤ ح: الحيوان. ١٢٥ له احد: ح ي: احد له. ١٢٦ سورة يونس (١٠) ٣١-٣٢. ١٢٧ ح: بين.

O my son, and the bringing forth of the living from the dead and the dead from the living, [these] are the clearest explanation. The establishment of the night for rest and as a wrapping garment, and the sun and the moon as a reckoning, and the stars as a guide for travelers, and the production of man from one soul—there is no sect, whether heretic or not, which denies all this. The people who have been deposited in the womb and in the loins, and those who dwell inside the earth and on it, and the water He has brought down from the heavens, and all the plants He has produced with that water, and the earth He has revived after its death, and the different types of plants He has brought forth, and the types of close-packed grains, and the palm trees clusters when they ripen, and gardens of coloured grapes, and the olive and the pomegranate, like and unlike, all these things God has brought forth with water. All of these things are manifest to the sight and God has testified to them in His words. The signs of God's creation exist and manifest themselves in all these things. No one can deny them by any claim, and the wise man cannot refrain from admitting that they [give evidence] of God.

Out of the venerated teaching of God, glory be to Him, [who teaches man to know Him] with certainty [comes] the verse: "Say: 'Who gives you the means of subsistence from the heaven and the earth, or who owns hearing and sight? And who brings forth the living from the dead, and the dead from the living, and who directs the course of events?' Then they will say: 'Allah'. So say: 'Will you not then fear God?' That is Allah, your true God, and after the truth, what is there but error? How then are you turned away?' " (sura 10, vv. 31-32) We have shown for certain and have perceived by heart and eye that everything God mentions in this verse receives the means of subsistence and does not give them, is created and itself does not create, is owned and does not own itself, is brought forth and restored to life but does not bring forth or revive itself. The arrangement of the heaven and the earth in their entirety is clearly shown as directed and not as directing, and is a visible

١ التأثير من مؤثر. فلا بد بيت ١٢٨ اليقين من رازق ما يرى من الارزاق. ومدير ما يعاين من اثر التدبير في السموات والافاق. ومالك ما يرى مملوك غير مالك من السمع والابصار. ومخرج الحي من الميت والميت من الحي بمواقيت واقدار. ولا بد من مدير الامر الاعم الكلي. ولن يوجد الا الله الاعلى فوق كل علي. ومن ذلك ايضا فقوله تبارك وتعالى: «أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا تُمْنُونَ أَأَنْتُمْ ١٢٩ تَخْلُقُونَهُ أَمْ نَحْنُ الْخَالِقُونَ» ١٣٠. فالله سبحانه ١٣١ هو الخالق ونحن الممنون. ليس لنا في ذلك غير امناء المنى من صنع. ولا نقدر بعده لما قدر بيننا من الموت على منع. فتقدير ١٣٢ صنعنا كله وتدييره. وتبديل خلقنا ان شاء خالقنا وتغييره. الى من تولاه دوننا. وكان منه لا منا. كما قال سبحانه: «نَحْنُ قَدَرْنَا بَيْنَكُمْ الْمَوْتَ وَمَا نَحْنُ بِمَسْبُوقِينَ. عَلَىٰ أَنْ نُبَدِّلَ أَمْثَالَكُمْ وَنُنْشِئَكُمْ فِي مَا لَا تَعْلَمُونَ. وَلَقَدْ عَلِمْتُمُ النَّشْأَةَ الْأُولَىٰ فَلَوْلَا تَذَكَّرُونَ» ١٣٣. فقرر ١٣٤ سبحانه بمعلوم غير مجهول. وذ كر بما لا ينكره سليم العقول. من نشأة الصنع الاولى. فتبارك الله العلي الاعلى. ثم قال سبحانه: «أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا تَحْرُثُونَ أَأَنْتُمْ ١٣٥ تَزْرَعُونَهُ أَمْ نَحْنُ الزَّارِعُونَ» ١٣٦. فالله ١٣٧ هو الزارع ونحن الحارثون. ١٥ ليس لنا في الزرع سوى حرثه من حيلة معدومة ولا موجودة ١٣٨. ولا نقدر بعد الحرث له على انشاء منه لسنبلة مذمومة ولا محمودة ١٣٩. وقدرتنا فانما هي على الحرث والاعتمال. وعلى خلافيهما من الترك والاغفال. وكذلك فله من القدرة بعد على ابطال الزرع وابلائه. مثل الذي كان له من القدرة قبل ١٤٠ على تثميره وانماؤه. ولا يقدر على امر الا من يقدر على خلافيه. وعلى فعل كل ما كان من نوعه واصنافه. فمن لم يكن كذلك ٢٠

١٢٨ ص: ثبت. ١٢٩ ص: أنتم. ١٣٠ سورة الواقعة (٥٦) ٥٨-٥٩. ح ك: + نحن قدرنا بينكم الموت وما نحن بمسبوقين. ١٣١ ص: محذوف. ١٣٢ ص: تقدير. ١٣٣ سورة الواقعة (٥٦) ٦٠-٦٢. ١٣٤ ح: فقدر. ١٣٥ هـ ح: أنتم. ١٣٦ سورة الواقعة (٥٦) ٦٣-٦٤. ١٣٧ ح: + سبحانه. ١٣٨ معدومة ولا موجودة: ك: موجودة ولا معدومة. ١٣٩ مذمومة ولا محمودة: ح: محمودة ولا مذمومة. ك: محمودة ولا موجودة. ١٤٠ ي: محذوف.

sign of the Creator (lit. one who makes signs) according to the clearest pieces of evidence of the creation (lit. of the making of signs). There must be absolute certainty of a provider of visible means of subsistence, and a director of the visible signs of direction in the heavens and throughout the world (lit. on the horizons), and an owner of sight and hearing, which are visible as being owned, but no one owns them. [Also] there must be someone who brings forth the living from the dead and the dead from the living according to times and measures. [Consequently], there must be a director of the whole world, and there exists none such except God, the highest of the high. And out of that [comes] also His verse, may He be blessed and exalted: “Have you considered what you ejaculate? Do you create it, or are We the Creators?” (sura 56, vv. 58-59) God, glory be to Him, is the Creator and we are the ejaculators, and in this creation we are only the keepers of the semen. After God has ordained our death, we cannot prevent it. God has decreed our whole creation and directed it, and He is able to create something else or to change our creation, if He wills, [all that] belongs to Him, Who has taken our creation upon Himself, not to us, since He has created, not we. As God, glory be to Him, says: “We have decreed death [to be] amongst you and We are not to be evaded, so that We may put others like you [in the place you occupied] and make you again in a manner that you do not know. Surely you have known the first making, why, then, do you not consider [that]?” (sura 56, vv. 60-62) God has confirmed³¹ what is known, not unknown, and He has reminded [us] of the first making, which the sane do not deny. May God, the most High, be blessed. God, glory be to Him, also has said: “Have you considered what you sow? Do you cause the growing or do We?” (sura 56, vv. 63-64) God causes the growing and we sow, and we have no cunning whatsoever³² concerning the seed but to sow [it]. After sowing the seed we are not able to produce from it any spike. Our ability is only to sow and cultivate³³ the land, or on the contrary, leave the sowing undone (*tark*)³⁴ and to neglect [the cultivation]³⁵.

God has the ability (*kudra*)³⁶ to nullify and destroy the seed, as He earlier had the ability to cause its growing and sprouting. Only he who can do the opposite of a thing can do the thing itself and everything that is (included) in its kinds and types. He who is not like that, that is, lacks

١ وتصح صفته بذلك كان بريا من القدرة عليه. وكان العجز في ذلك منسوباً إليه. كما قال سبحانه ١٤١ في الزرع ١٤٢ بعد اكماله: «لَوْ نَشَاءُ لَجَعَلْنَاهُ حُطَامًا فَظَلْتُمْ تَفَكَّهُونَ. / إِنَّا لَمُعْرِمُونَ. بَلْ نَحْنُ مَحْرُومُونَ» ١٤٣. وكذلك اعداب الماء. وما يعاين من تنزيله من جو السماء. فلا يقدر على اعداب الماء وانزاله. الا من يقدر على ايجاجه واقلاله. كما قال الله سبحانه: «أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ أَلْمَاءَ الَّذِي تَشْرَبُونَ. أَنْتُمْ ١٤٤ أَتْرُكُمُوهُ مِنْ أَلْمَزْنِ أَمْ نَحْنُ الْمُنْزِلُونَ. لَوْ نَشَاءُ لَجَعَلْنَاهُ أُجَاجًا فَلَوْلَا تَشْكُرُونَ» ١٤٥. وكل فعل فرع لا يتم الا باصله. ففاعل الاصل اولى بفعل ١٤٦ فرع اصله. كشجرة النار. واصول الاشجار. التي هي من الارض والماء. والجو والسماء. فصنع هذه الفروع لمن كان له ١٤٧ صنع الاصول. لا ينكر ذلك منكر ولا يدفعه الا بمكابرة فطر العقول. ١٠ كما قال الله سبحانه: «أَفَرَأَيْتُمُ النَّارَ الَّتِي تُورُونَ. أَنْتُمْ ١٤٨ أَنْتُمْ شَجَرَتُهَا أَمْ نَحْنُ الْمُنْشِئُونَ. نَحْنُ جَعَلْنَاهَا تَذْكِرَةً وَمَتَاعًا لِلْمُقِيمِينَ» ١٤٩. فكل ما نبه ١٥٠ له من هذا ودل عليه. فداع من معرفته سبحانه الى ما دعا اليه. ومن ذلك ايضا فقوله تبارك وتعالى: «إِغْلُظُوا أَنَّ اللَّهَ يُحْيِي الْأَرْضَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِهَا قَدْ بَيَّنَّا لَكُمُ الْآيَاتِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَعْقِلُونَ» ١٥١. فاذا كانت حياة الارض بعد موتها موجودة. وميتها التي كانت تعلم قبل احيائها مفقودة. فلا بد اضطرابا ثابتا. وبقينا لا تدفعه النفوس باتا. من اثبات مميتها وحييها. اذ بان اثر تديره فيها باكثر من ما يعقل من الاثار. واكبر ١٥٢ من ما تعرفه النفوس من الاقدار. مما لم ير له من الحياة قط مؤثر. ولم يوجد له من المدبرين قط مدبر. ٢٠ الا من يزعم انه من الله لا منه. ومن يقر انه من الله دونه. مثل المسيح ابن

١٤١ ص: الله. ي: الله تبارك وتعالى. ١٤٢ ص: + سبحانه. ١٤٣ سورة الواقعة (٥٦) ٦٥-٦٧. ١٤٤ هـ ح ك ي: أنتم. ١٤٥ سورة الواقعة (٥٦) ٦٨-٧٠. ١٤٦ ص ح وفي حواشي هـ: بفعله. ١٤٧ ص: + به. ١٤٨ هـ ح ك: أنتم. ١٤٩ سورة الواقعة (٥٦) ٧١-٧٣. ص: + فسيح بسم ربك العظيم. ١٥٠ ي: + به الله. ١٥١ سورة الحديد (٥٧) ١٧. ١٥٢ ص: واكثر. ح: اكثر.

this ability, is bereft too of the ability to do the thing itself and inability can be ascribed to him in this matter³⁷. As God, glory be to Him, has said of the seed after its completion: “Had We wished, We would have made it dust, and you would have been left wondering [saying]: ‘Really we are in debt, nay we are deprived.’ ” (sura 56, vv. 65-67) The same applies to the desalting of water and its being brought down from the air of the heaven, which we can see. Only he who can salt water and hold its flowing back can desalt it and bring it down. As God, glory be to Him, has said: “Have you considered the water you drink, do you bring it down from the clouds, or are We the Bringers? Had We wished, We would have made it salty; why, then, do you not give thanks [to God]?” (sura 56, vv. 68-70) No action that branches off from its element (lit. root) can be carried out except by virtue of its element, since he who makes the element, is the best [qualified] to make that which branches off from it, like the fire tree and the elements of trees which are earth, air and heaven. The making of these branched off things (lit. these branches) pertains [only] to him who can make the elements. There is no one to deny and reject this except one who opposes his natural disposition of reason. As God, glory be to Him, has said: “Have you considered the fire you ignite, do you produce the tree for it (lit. of it), or are We the Producers? It is We who have made it as a reminder and delight for dwellers in the desert.” (sura 56, vv. 71-73) All the things that God has called man’s attention to and pointed at are motives leading to the knowledge of God, glory be to Him.

Concerning this, God, may He be blessed and exalted, has also said: “Know that God revives the earth after its death. We have already explained to you the signs so that you will understand.” (sura 57, v. 17) If the earth’s life exists after it has become dead, and its death, which was known before its revival, does not exist, then, of fixed necessity and certainty, which cannot at all be rejected, one cannot avoid affirming that the earth has someone who puts it to death and revives it, since the impression (*athar*) of His direction on it is evident according to many more signs (*āthār*)³⁸ than reason can comprehend and on a larger scale than people can know. In life one cannot at all see anyone who makes the signs (*mu’aththir*) of things [in the universe] nor find any director of things amongst directors, except one who claims (i.e. he can find only one who claims) that the signs are from God, not from him (man) and who admits that they are from God, not from him, as Jesus³⁹, the son

١ مريم عليه السلام^{١٥٣}. وغيره ممن اعطيه من ولد ادم.
 ومن تعريفه القريب. وتوقيفه العجيب. قوله سبحانه: «قُلْ لِمَنِ الْأَرْضُ
 وَمَنْ فِيهَا إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تَعْلَمُونَ. سَيَقُولُونَ لِلَّهِ قُلْ أَفَلَا تَذَكَّرُونَ»^{١٥٤}. فلما كانت
 الارض مملوكة ومن فيها. بما تبين^{١٥٥} من اثر الملك عليها. ثبت مالها عند
 ٥ معايتها غير مدفوع. ووجد صانعها باضطرار غير مصنوع. ومن توقيفه
 ايضا وتعريفه قوله سبحانه: «قُلْ مَنْ رَبُّ السَّمَوَاتِ السَّبْعِ وَرَبُّ الْعَرْشِ
 الْعَظِيمِ»^{١٥٦}. فلما وجد ما وقف الله سبحانه عليه من ذلك مربوبا غير
 متمنع^{١٥٧}. بما تبين^{١٥٨} فيه من شواهد كل مربوب متخشع^{١٥٩}. وجد رها
 كلها بيقين مبتوت^{١٦٠} عند وجودها. وشهد له بالربوبية ما شهد بالصنع
 عليها من شهودها. ثم قال سبحانه لتوقيفه وتعريفه مرددا. وعليهم^{١٦١} بما لا
 ١٠ تدفعه النفوس من الشهود مستشهدا: «قُلْ مَنْ بِيَدِهِ مَلَكُوتُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ
 وَهُوَ يُجِيرُ وَلَا يُجَارُ عَلَيْهِ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تَعْلَمُونَ»^{١٦٢}. فلما كان كل شيء يحس
 ٦ (أ) بحس. او يعقل ان لم يكن محسوسا بنفس. في قبضة محيطه به من قدرة
 وملكوت^{١٦٣}. بما لا يدفع^{١٦٤} عن نفسه من بلاء او موت. كان ملك
 الملكوت^{١٦٥} للاشياء^{١٦٦} كلها معلوما باضطرار. ومن يجير ولا يجار عليه اذ
 ١٥ الملكوت كلها له غير ممتنعة^{١٦٧} منه بجار.
 ومما يقظ به سبحانه لمعرفته. ودل منه^{١٦٨} باوضح دليل على ربوبيته. وما
 تفرد به من صنع البدائع. وتوحد بابتداعه من بدع الصنائع^{١٦٩}. قوله
 سبحانه: «وَاللَّهُ خَلَقَكُمْ مِنْ تُرَابٍ ثُمَّ مِنْ نُطْفَةٍ ثُمَّ جَعَلَكُمْ أَزْوَاجًا وَمَا

١٥٣ عليه السلام: ي: محذوف. ١٥٤ سورة المؤمنون (٢٣) ٨٤-٨٥. سيقولون - تذكرون: ص: محذوف.
 ١٥٥ ص: بين. ١٥٦ سورة المؤمنون (٢٣) ٨٦. ١٥٧ ك: ممتنع. ١٥٨ ص: بين.
 ١٥٩ ص: مختشع. ١٦٠ ص: مثبت. ١٦١ ص: عليهم. ١٦٢ سورة المؤمنون (٢٣) ٨٨. ح: +
 سيقولون لله قل فاني تسخرون. ١٦٣ ك: او ملكوت. ١٦٤ ك: ي: يدفعه. ١٦٥ ك: ملكوت.
 ١٦٦ ح: ك: الاشياء. ١٦٧ ص: ممتنع. ١٦٨ ص: عليه. ١٦٩ ك: بدائع.

of Mary, may peace be upon him, and others who have been given [the capacity of influence and direction] have said⁴⁰.

[An example] of God's wonderful teaching⁴¹, through which God causes man to know [Him] in a comprehensible and sound way, is His verse, may He be blessed: "Say: 'To whom belong the earth and those in it, if you know?' They will say: 'To God'. Say: 'Will you not, then, observe?' " (sura 23, vv. 84-85) Since the earth and those in it are ruled [as shown] by the sign of rule, which is manifest in them, then, when one looks at the earth, one proves in an unrejectable manner that it (the earth) has a ruler and that the maker of the earth necessarily exists and is not made. [Another example] of God's teaching, through which God causes man to know [Him], is His verse, glory be to Him: "Say: 'Who is the Master of the seven heavens and of the mighty throne?' " (sura 23, v. 86) Since the things about which God teaches man exist as mastered and subdued, [which is demonstrated] by evidence existing in every mastered and humbled thing, and manifest in the things [that God shows man], it is absolutely certain that the master of all things exists with their existence. The evidence attesting that things have been produced, attests to His mastership. God, may He be blessed, has also said, repeating His teachings and the knowledge He has given and giving people evidence that they cannot reject:⁴² "Say: 'In whose hand is the kingdom over all things, giving protection and seeking none, if you have knowledge?' " (sura 23, v. 88) Since everything perceived by the senses or by reason—if not by the soul—is totally in the hand of ability and kingdom, so that by itself it cannot ward off destruction and death, then the owner of kingdom over all things is necessarily known; [it is] he who gives protection and seeks none, because the whole kingdom is in his hand and is not taken from him by [any other] giver of protection.

One of the things by which God, may He be blessed, awakens man to know Him, and in which He proves through the clearest proof His mastership and that He alone has produced the wonderful things and that only He has from the first made the excellent things, is His verse, glory be to Him: "God created you of dust, then of sperm, and then made you

١ تَحْمِلُ مِنْ أَنْثَى وَلَا تَضْعُ إِلَّا بِعِلْمِهِ وَمَا يُعَمَّرُ مِنْ مُعَمَّرٍ وَلَا يُنْقَصُ مِنْ عُمْرِهِ إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ إِنَّ ذَلِكَ عَلَى اللَّهِ يَسِيرٌ» ١٧٠. فلما ان ١٧١ كان خلقنا الذي هو اول انشائنا. وهو ادم ١٧٢. الاب المقدم. مما ذكر الله ١٧٣ تبارك وتعالى ١٧٤ انه ابتداه منه من التراب. كنا مخلوقين مما خلق منه وان نحن جرينا بعده نطفًا في الاصلاب. والدليل البت اليقين. الشاهد ١٧٥ العدل المبين. على ان ادم عليه السلام ١٧٦ بدئ من التراب وخلق. مصير نسله ترابا اذا بلي وفرق. وكل مركب انتقض من الاشياء. فعاد الى شيء عند تنقضه بالفرقة والبلاء. فممنه ركب وخلق غير شك ولا امتراء. كالثلج والجليد. والبرد الشديد. الذي يعود كل واحد منهما اذا انتقض ١٧٧ وفرق. الى ما ركب منه من المياه وخلق. وكمركب الاشجار والحبوب وغيرهما من ضروب ١٧٨ الاغذية. التي تعود عند بلائها الى ما ركبته من الارضين والمياه والنيرون والاهوية. وادم عليه السلام ١٧٩ في انه من تراب وان كان كما ١٨٠ واما كاولاده. يجرى عليه في انه من تراب ما يجرى على اجزائه وواحداه ١٨١. وما يعاين من معاد انساله التي هي اجزاؤه ١٨٢ من كماله الى الرفات الجامد. والتراب الهامد. يلحق به مثله. اذ هم جزؤه ونسله. وما لحق بالاجزاء. من الموت والبلاء ١٨٣. فلاحق لا محالة بالكمال. والكمال والاجزاء فجارية منه ١٨٤ على مثال. اذ كانت اشباها متماثلة. وامثالا لا يجهل تماثلها ١٨٥ متعادلة. واما يقين خلقه ايانا سبحانه من نطفة. وما جعل منا ازواجا مختلفة في الخلقة غير مؤتلفة. فمعانينا معلوم. لا تدفعه العيان ولا الحلو. الا ترى

١٧٠ سورة فاطر (٣٥) ١١. ١٧١ ص: محذوف. ١٧٢ ح: + صلى الله عليه. ١٧٣ ح: محذوف. ١٧٤ تبارك وتعالى: ك: محذوف. ١٧٥ ص ك: والشاهد. ١٧٦ عليه السلام: ص: محذوف. ١٧٧ ص: نقض. ١٧٨ ح: صروف. ١٧٩ عليه السلام: ص: محذوف. ١٨٠ في حواشي ه: كاملا. ١٨١ ص ح: وآحاده. ١٨٢ ص: اجزاء. ١٨٣ ك: والفناء. ١٨٤ ص: محذوف. ١٨٥ ص: بمثلها.

pairs. No female conceives or brings forth but He knows of it. No one whose life is prolonged (*mu^ʿammar*)⁴³ has life prolonged nor life shortened, unless it is [recorded] in a book. Verily, this is easy for God.” (sura 35, v. 11) Since the creation of our father Adam, the first father, our beginning, was a creation of dust, as God, may He be blessed and exalted, has said, we have been created of that which Adam was created, even though after him we flowed as sperm in the loins. The absolute and certain proof—which is like an honest witness speaking clearly—that Adam, peace be upon him, was created of dust is that the end of his progeny is dust, when [their bodies] disintegrate and decompose. Every composite thing that is demolished, and turns, when it is demolished through decomposition and disintegration into [another] thing, is undoubtedly composed and created of that thing. [It is] like snow, ice, and heavy hail, each of which turns when it disintegrates and decomposes into water, of which it was created and composed. The same holds for the trees and seeds and other kinds of food that are composed [of the four elements], when they disintegrate, they turn into earth, water, fire and air, of which they were composed⁴⁴. Adam, peace be upon him, was composed of dust like his children, even though he was perfect and [our] father. He was composed of dust, just as his descendants (lit. parts) are composed of dust⁴⁵. The end of his progeny, who are parts of his perfection, as we clearly see, is inanimate bones and lifeless dust. A similar [process] applies also to him (Adam), since they are part of him and his progeny. Death and disintegration, which apply to the parts, apply undoubtedly to the perfection. The source of the perfection and parts is equally dust, since they are the same and equal and their equality cannot be unknown.

The certain fact that God, may He be blessed, created us of sperm⁴⁶ and made different and dissimilar pairs of us in creation, is clearly seen in us and known, neither sight nor reason can reject it. Do you not understand that if there were no sperm, you would not be, and if it did

١ ان النطفة لو لم تكن لما كنت. ولو عدمت اذن لعدمت. وما كان اذا عدم
 ٦ (ب) عدمت. فممنه غير شك^{١٨٦}/خلقت وقومت. الا ترى ان كون المرعى
 والاشجار. مما ينزل الله لها من المياه والامطار. فاذا عدم الماء والمطر. هلك
 المرعى والشجر. او لا ترى ان كل ثمرة فمن سجاتها^{١٨٧}. فاذا عدمت
 ٥ السجات عدمت ثمراتها. وما عجب الله به سبحانه من صنعه في تكثيره
 منه للقليل المفرد^{١٨٨}. ونشره تبارك وتعالى للكثير من واحد العدد. فاعجب
 عجاب. عجب له من خلقه اولو الالباب. بينا نحن تراب ميت^{١٨٩} اذ
 احيانا. ونطفة واحدة اذ كثرتا فاثرا. فجعل سبحانه منا^{١٩٠} بنطفة
 تمنى^{١٩١}. ذكرنا يعاين وانثى. حكمة منه سبحانه^{١٩٢} لا عشا. كما قال تبارك
 وتعالى: «أَيَحْسَبُ الْإِنْسَانُ أَنْ يُتْرَكَ سُدًى. أَلَمْ يَكُنْ نُطْفَةً مِنْ مَنِيٍّ يُُمْنَى.
 ١٠ ثُمَّ كَانَ عَلَقَةً فَخَلَقَ فَسَوَّى. فَجَعَلَ مِنْهُ الزَّوْجَيْنِ الذَّكَرَ وَالْأُنْثَى. أَلَيْسَ
 ذَلِكَ بِقَادِرٍ عَلَى أَنْ يُحْيِيَ الْمَوْتَى»^{١٩٣}.

فصرنا بعد خلق خلقا ترابا ثم نطفة^{١٩٤} ثم تارة علقا تصاريف لا يدعي
 على الله فيها مدعي دعوى فيعلن بدعواه فيها^{١٩٥}. ولا يسير^{١٩٦} بها نجوى
 ١٥ تبريا الى الله الخالق منها. وتضاؤلا في^{١٩٧} جميع الاشياء عنها. وكل هذه
 التصاريف فلا بد لها من مصرف. وما^{١٩٨} عدد من شتيت^{١٩٩} هذه
 الاصناف فلا بد لها من مصنف. لاتدفع الالباب وجوده. ولا تكذب^{٢٠٠}
 الاكاذب شهوده.

وما ذكر سبحانه من حمل كل انثى ووضعها بعلمه. فما لا ينكره احد

١٨٦ ك: + ولا امتراء. ١٨٧ ح ك ي: سجاتها. ١٨٨ ك: + من خلقه. ١٨٩ نحن تراب ميت:
 ح: نحن نرى ترابا واحدا. ك: نحن نرى ترابا ميتا. ١٩٠ فجعل سبحانه منا: ك: فجعل منا سبحانه.
 ١٩١ ك: المنى. ١٩٢ منه سبحانه: ح: منه الله سبحانه. ك: منه تبارك وتعالى. ١٩٣ سورة القيامة (٧٥)
 ٣٦-٤٠. ١٩٤ ك: نطفة. ١٩٥ مدعي - فيها: ك: مدع بدعواه فيها. ١٩٦ ح: يسر.
 ١٩٧ ص: من. ١٩٨ ح: وما. ١٩٩ ص ح: تشتيت. ٢٠٠ ك: يكذب.

not exist, you would not exist either. The thing whose non-existence causes your non-existence is undoubtedly the source of your creation and shaping. Do you not understand that the existence of pasture and trees [derives] from water and rain which God brings down for them. If water and rain should disappear, the pasture and trees will perish. Do you not understand that each fruit derives from water, and if there is no water, there is no fruit. The thing, by which God, glory be to Him, caused [people] to marvel, namely, His production in which He multiplied the few and the one (lit. the single one) and in which God, may He be blessed and exalted, dispersed the many, whose source is one, is the most wonderful thing at which His wise creatures marveled. For when we were lifeless dust, He bestowed life upon us, and when we were one drop of sperm, He multiplied us. As can be seen, God, may He be blessed, made us, male and female, out of an ejaculated drop of sperm in His wisdom, may He be blessed, not purposelessly (*‘abathan*)⁴⁷. As God, may He be blessed and exalted, has said: “Does man think that he will be left purposeless? Was he not a drop of sperm that was ejaculated? Then he became a blood-clot, and He created and formed him. Then He made of him the two sexes, the male and the female. Is not He able to restore the dead to life?” (sura 75, vv. 36-40)

After God created us of dust, then of a drop of sperm, then of a blood-clot, He changed us with changes concerning which no one can make assertions against God⁴⁸ and publicize his assertions, nor can he conceal them as a secret, out of his desire to be free of them before God, the creator, and out of his weakness [to express] them with regard to all things⁴⁹. All these changes must have a changer, and all these counted classes must have a classifier, whose existence reason cannot reject, nor can lies disprove his presence⁵⁰.

The fact mentioned by God, glory be to Him, that the pregnancy and delivery of every female are with His knowledge⁵¹, is undeniable by one

١ وهبه الله حكمة من حكمه. وما لا يأباه منقوص بعد التقرير الا بعد المكابرة منه لعقله ٢٠١. مع ٢٠٢ الاقرار منه لنا صاغرا راغما بمثله. واذا كان بمثله مقرا. كان بانكاره له مكابرا. بل يعطي فلا ٢٠٣ يأبى ٢٠٤. الا مجانة والعبا ٢٠٥. انما هو اصغر صغرا. وايسر اضعافا قدرا. من حمل الانثى ووضعها. وتأليف اعضاء الولدان وجمعها. وما فيها من حسن التصوير. وداخل معها من لطيف ٢٠٦ التدبير. لا يقوم معتدلا. ولا يبقى متصلا. طرف عين. بايقن يقين. الا بعلم من عليم. وتدبير متقن من حكيم. لا تلم به سنة ولا نوم. ولا تنازعه الاشغال ولا الهموم ٢٠٧.

وكذلك تعمير المعمر. وما ينقص له من عمر. فلا يكون ابدا الا في كتاب. اذ كانت الايام والليالي ٢٠٨ بحساب. ولا يكون نقص العمر وزيادته. الا لمن به قوامه ومادته. فمن يدبر الايام والليالي. ولن يوجد ذلك الا عن الله الكبير المتعالي. ولا ٢٠٩ يكون كتاب ذلك الذي هو علمه على من وسع الاشياء كلها تدبيرا. /الا خفيفا لا يؤوده ٢١٠ حفظه عليه تبارك وتعالى كما قال (أ) ٧ يسيرا.

١٥ ثم ٢١١ اخبر سبحانه صدقا. ونبا في كتابه حقا. بقدرته على ان يخلق من الاشتات المختلفة. واحدا غير مختلف في الصفة. لانه من قدر على خلق الاشتات من المؤلف. الذي لا يختلف. قدر على خلق الواحد المشتبه من الاشتات التي لا تأتلف. كخلقه سبحانه لاحدان. ما خلق من الدر واللحمان. من مختلف البحار واشتاتها. بايين اختلاف من اجاجها وفراتها.

٢٠١ الا - لعقله: ص ح: الا بمكابرة لعقله. ك ي: الا بمكابرة منه لعقله. ٢٠٢ ص: ومع. ٢٠٣ ص ك: محذوف. ٢٠٤ ص ك وفي حواشي ه: فيأبى. ٢٠٥ ص: تلعبا. ٢٠٦ ح: لطف. ٢٠٧ ح: وفوق الكلمة في ه: الوهم. ٢٠٨ الايام والليالي: ح: الليالي والايام. ٢٠٩ ح: ولن. ٢١٠ ص ك: يؤده. ح: يؤد. ٢١١ ح: محذوف.

on whom God bestows some wisdom of His wisdom. Nor would a fool refuse [to accept this fact] after he is brought to know it, unless he opposes his own reason, even though he reluctantly admits a similar [fact] to us. If he admits a similar [fact], then in his denial he opposes his own reason. Moreover, he agrees (to accept a similar fact) and refuses (to accept the first one) only out of frivolousness and sport. Surely something smaller and tinier than the pregnancy and delivery of a female, the composition and combination of babies' organs, their beautiful form and precise providential design (*tadbīr*), will with most certainty neither exist nor remain for an instant, except with the knowledge of a knower and the perfect providential design of a wise being, whom neither slumber nor sleep overcomes⁵², and within whom neither worry nor care struggles.

Moreover, neither the prolongation of one's life (lit. of the life of one whose life is prolonged) nor the shortening of it occurs at all, but by God's decree (*kitāb*)⁵³. Since days and nights are counted, the shortening of one's life and its prolongation are only in the hands of one who sustains man, supplies him with food and directs days and nights. Such a thing is not found at all except in God, the Great and the Most High. The decreeing of these things, which is His knowledge⁵⁴, is not but easy for Him who spreads His direction over all things, and their remembering is not difficult for Him, may He be blessed and exalted, but easy, as He has said⁵⁵.

Similarly God, glory be to Him, has truly informed and really notified in His book, that He could create a single thing with unchanging quality out of different disparate parts. For whoever can create different things out of a single thing, which does not differ [from other things], can create a single thing out of different things, which are not similar to one another. Just as God, glory be to Him, created pearls and snails out of the seas, which clearly differ from one another, some being salty and others fresh, so God, glory be to Him, created out of them one similar

١ فجعل سبحانه منها. مع خلافه بينها. لحما واحدا مشتبهها طريا. ولباسا واحدا من الدر حسنا بهيا. وحمل سبحانه على ظهورها. مع خلافه بينها في امورها. الفلك المشحون السائر. وردها بعد التفريغ فيه مواخر. ليعلم من عجب تديرها ٢١٢. وباختلاف ٢١٣ الحال في مسيرها. اذ تسير شاحنة ٢١٤ مالية. كما تسير ماخرة خالية. واذ تسير بحاليها جميعا في اجاج البحار. كما تسير بهما في فرات الانهار. ان لها لمسيرا ٢١٥. لا تختلف في قوته الاشياء. ومدبرا قويا لا تساويه الاقوياء. وان تسييرها مقبلة ومدبرة. وشاحنة ٢١٦ في البحرين ٢١٧ وماخرة. الى من يدبر ما سارت به من مختلف الرياح المسيرات. ومن يملك ما جرت فيه من الماء الاجاج والفرات. ومن له ملك ما لو لا هو ٢١٨ لم تكن الرياح الجاريات. ولم يوجد الملح ٢١٩ من المياه ولا الفرات. ومن ايلاجه سبحانه الليل في ٢٢٠ النهار. وما قدر بهما ٢٢١ من المواقيت والاقدار. وتسخيره سبحانه للشمس والقمر. اللذين بهما دبر مسير الفلك في البحار كل مدبر. كان لتديره في المسير بهما في بحر حكمة. او فيهما ٢٢٢ لفلك ٢٢٣ بعد الله من نجاة عصمة. لما ٢٢٤ جعل سبحانه فيهما من الضياء. وبصر بهما في المسير من القصد للاشياء. وبصر ٢٢٥ تبارك وتعالى بغيرهما. اذا افقد في ظلمة الليل ما جعل ٢٢٦ من البصر بتسخيرهما. من النجوم السير التي جعلها هدى للسائرين ٢٢٧ في الظلمات. سروا في البحار او كان سراهم في الفلوات ٢٢٨. كما قال الله سبحانه: «وَهُوَ الَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُمُ النُّجُومَ لِتَهْتَدُوا بِهَا فِي ظُلُمَاتِ اللَّيْلِ وَالْبَحْرِ قَدْ فَصَّلْنَا الْآيَاتِ لِقَوْمٍ يَعْلَمُونَ» ٢٢٩.

٢١٢ من عجب تديرها: ص: من تدبر عجب امرها. ح: من عجب تدير امرها. ٢١٣ ص: وراى اختلاف. ح ك: واختلاف. ٢١٤ ص: شاحنا. ٢١٥ ص وتحت الكلمة في ه: مسيرا. ٢١٦ ص: وشاحنا. ٢١٧ ي: البحر. ٢١٨ ما - هو: ص ح: ما لولاه. ك: ما تولاه من لولاه. ٢١٩ ص: الماء المالح. ح: المالح. ٢٢٠ ص: من. ٢٢١ قدر بهما: ص: قدرهما. ٢٢٢ ص وفوق الكلمة في ه: فيه. ٢٢٣ ص: الفلك. ك: لقلب. ٢٢٤ ص: ما. ٢٢٥ ص: او بصر. ٢٢٦ ح ك: + سبحانه. ٢٢٧ ك: للسائرين. ٢٢٨ ك: + الكفار. ٢٢٩ سورة الانعام (٦) ٩٧.

soft snail and one beautiful and splendid dress of pearl, in spite of the difference between them. God, glory be to Him, carried the loaded sailing ships and brought them back on the seas after they were unloaded, in spite of the difference between them (the seas), so that it would be known, through His wonderful direction and through the different state in their sailing—since they (the ships) sail loaded while they return unloaded, and since they sail in both states, on salt seas as well as on sweet seas—that there is someone who makes them sail and exercises His power upon all things equally (lit. things are not different with respect to His power) and that there is a strong direction whom the strong do not equal. And it would be also known that making the ships sail, when they are going and coming back, full and empty on the two kinds of seas, is in the hands of He who directs the different winds which make [the ships] sail, who rules the salt water and the fresh on which the ships sail, and [that] if His rule did not exist, winds would not blow and there would be neither salt water nor fresh. Through God's making the night enter the day and through His fixing the times and their measure in them (in day and night) and through His subjection of the sun and moon, by means of which He directs the sailing of ships on the seas, God's direction of every directed thing as it sails on the sea by means of the sun and the moon, has wisdom. And ships have defense, that is, salvation, by the sun and the moon after God [directed them]⁵⁶. That is because of the light that God created in the sun and the moon, by which He lighted the right way for their going towards things. When God, may He be blessed and exalted, bereft people of sight in the darkness of night, since He subjected the sun and moon, He lighted [their way] to them by the moving stars, which He created as a guide for travelers in the dark, whether they travel on seas or in deserts. As God, glory be to Him, has said: "It is He who created for you the stars that you may find your way thereby in the dark of land and sea. We have already explained the signs for people who have knowledge." (sura 6, v. 97)

١ وتسخير ما ذكر ٢٣٠ الله سبحانه ٢٣١ من الشمس والقمر. وتسخيره
 لغيرهما من النجوم السير. فظاهر بحمد الله غير متوار ولا خفي. يبصره عيانا
 كل ذي عقل حيي. لما فيها من اثر التسخير. وبين معها من دليل التدبير.
 بتفاوت نورها. وغيره ٢٣٢ من امورها. في السرعة والابطاء. والظهور
 والخباء ٢٣٣. والرجوع والتحير. والدأب ٢٣٤ في التدور. فهي راجعة في المسير
 ومتحيرة. ومقبلة للدوب ٢٣٥ ومدبرة. فهذه حال المسخر غير مرية ولا شك.
 ٧ (ب) جرى بها فللكها او كانت جارية/بانفسها في الفلك. والتفاوت بينها في
 الضياء. فكغيره ٢٣٦ من التفاوت بين الاشياء. ولا يقع حكم التفاوت ابدا
 بين متفاوت. الا كان له وفيه من فاوت. بينه في حاله وكان مملوكا اضطرارا
 غير مالك. وكان ملكه لمن أسلكه من التفاوت في تلك المسالك. وكذلك
 ١٠ حال ٢٣٧ تفاوت هذه النجوم. يجري من الله فيه بحكم محكوم. ولله سبحانه
 من ملك كل نجم وفلك. ما له من ملك كل مملوك ٢٣٨. والحمد لله اله الالهة
 وملك الملوك. ومدبر كل نجم وغيره. بما لا يخفى من اثر تدبيره. في الهيئة
 والتصوير. والمقام والتحير والتسيير. ذلك قوله سبحانه فيما وصفنا من قدرته
 ١٥ على خلق الواحد المشته من شتيت الاصناف. وخلقه للكثير المختلف من
 الواحد الذي ليس بذي اختلاف. وما ولى الله سبحانه من تدبير النجوم
 وتسخيرها. واجراء الفلك في مختلف البحار وتسييرها. وايلاجه سبحانه الليل
 في النهار. وتقديره لذلك كله باحسن الاقدار. «وَمَا يَسْتَوِي الْبَحْرَانِ هَذَا
 عَذْبٌ فُرَاتٌ سَائِغٌ شَرَابُهُ وَهَذَا مِلْحٌ أُجَاجٌ وَمِنْ كُلِّ تَاكُلُونَ لَحْمًا طَرِيًّا
 وَتَسْتَخْرِجُونَ حَلِيَّةً تَلْبَسُونَهَا وَتَرَى الْفُلْكَ فِيهِ مَوَازِرَ لِيَتَّبِعُوا ٢٣٩ مِنْ فَضْلِهِ ٢٠

٢٣٠ ما ذكر: ح: محذوف. ٢٣١ ك: محذوف. ٢٣٢ ك: وغيرها. ٢٣٣ ص: والاختفاء.
 ٢٣٤ ص: الدؤوب. ٢٣٥ ص: في الدوب. ح ك: بالدأب. ٢٣٦ ح: فكثير. ٢٣٧ ك وفي
 حواشي ه: حكم. ٢٣٨ ص ك: + وما ملك. ٢٣٩ ص: ولتبتغوا.

The subjection of the sun and moon mentioned by God, glory be to Him, and the subjection of the moving stars, is manifest, praise be to God, and is neither concealed nor hidden. Every wise and living person sees it (the subjection) with his own eyes, because of the sign of subjection in them, and the clearly visible indication of direction in them which consists of differences in their light and in various other properties (lit. things *umūr*) in them, namely, speed and slowness, appearance and disappearance, coming back and going, and the continuity of circling. For they (the stars) come back and go on their way and continue to do that. This is undoubtedly the state of the subjected object, whether the celestial sphere (*falak*) moves because of the stars' movement or the stars themselves move in it⁵⁷. The difference in the light of the stars is like [every] other difference in things. The principle of difference never applies to anything unless it has a difference in itself (lit. it has a difference and there is a difference in it), that differentiates between its two states and unless it is necessarily ruled and does not rule. The rule over it is in the hands of him who made it go in these different ways. This is also the state of the difference among these stars, which derives from God according to a law He decreed. God, glory be to Him, rules every star and celestial sphere, just as He rules every ruled object. Praise be to God, the God of gods and the King of kings, who directs every star and every other thing by a directing whose sign is not hidden in their shape and formation, place and the movement and going He causes them. These are the words of God, glory be to Him, concerning His ability, which we have described, to create a single similar thing out of different kinds and to create many different things out of one thing, which is not different from [others] of its kind. Concerning the direction and subjection of the stars, which God, glory be to Him, rules, the making of ships sail on different seas and the night enter the day, and the establishment of all these things according to the finest measures [the verse says]: "The two seas are not alike, the one sweet, fresh, good to drink, the other salt, bitter. And from each you eat fresh meat, and bring forth ornament that you wear. And you see the ships sailing on it that you may seek His bounty, and that

وَلَعَلَّكُمْ تَشْكُرُونَ. يُوَلِّجُ اللَّيْلَ فِي النَّهَارِ وَيُوَلِّجُ النَّهَارَ فِي اللَّيْلِ وَسَخَّرَ الشَّمْسَ وَالْقَمَرَ كُلٌّ يَجْرِي لِأَجَلٍ مُّسَمًّى ذَلِكُمُ اللَّهُ رَبُّكُمْ لَهُ الْمُلْكُ ٢٤٠ وَالَّذِينَ تَدْعُونَ مِنْ دُونِهِ مَا يَمْلِكُونَ مِنْ قِطْمِيرٍ ٢٤١. فصدق ٢٤٢ الله تبارك وتعالى. ذو الملك والقدرة والامثال العلاء. انه هو الله ربنا. ومنا منه كان خلقنا وتركيبنا. له الملك ومنه عجيب التدبير. ومن دعي معه او دونه فما يملك ٢٤٣ من قطمير. والقطمير فاصغر ما يملكه متفرد ٢٤٤ به ٢٤٥ مالك. او يشرك ٢٤٦ مليكا ٢٤٧ في ملكه مشارك.

فكل ما ذكر الله من هذه الامور. فني ٢٤٨ بين ٢٤٩ غير مستور. يشاهده ويحضره ويعاينه ويبصره من امن بالله شكرا. او صد عن الله كفرا. او لا ٢٥٠ تسمع قوله ٢٥١ سبحانه: «أَوَلَمْ يَرِ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا أَنَّ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ كَانَتَا رَتْقًا فَفَتَقْنَاهُمَا وَجَعَلْنَا مِنَ الْمَاءِ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ حَيٍّ أَفَلَا يُؤْمِنُونَ. وَجَعَلْنَا فِي الْأَرْضِ رَوَاسِيَ أَنْ تَمِيدَ بِهِمْ وَجَعَلْنَا فِيهَا فِجَاجًا سُبُلًا لَّعَلَّهُمْ يَهْتَدُونَ. وَجَعَلْنَا السَّمَاءَ سَفًّا مَحْفُوظًا وَهُمْ عَنْ آيَاتِهَا مُعْرِضُونَ. وَهُوَ الَّذِي [خَلَقَ] ٢٥٢ اللَّيْلَ وَالنَّهَارَ وَالشَّمْسَ وَالْقَمَرَ كُلٌّ فِي فَلَكٍ يَسْبَحُونَ» ٢٥٣. ففتق السموات والارض ٢٥٤ فيهن ظاهر لا يتوارى. يراه ويعاينه ٢٥٥ كل ذي عين ترى. وما يعاين فيهن ويرى فتقا. فشاهد على انهن كن قبله رتقا. اذ لا يكون فتق الا لمرتبق. كما لا يكون رتق الا لمفتق. ولا ٢٥٦ فتح الا لمتعلق. ولا ٨ (أ) بد يقينا لكل مفتوق من فاتقه. كما لا بد لكل مفتوح من فاتح اعلاقه ٢٥٧.

٢٤٠ له الملك: ص: محذوف. ٢٤١ سورة فاطر (٣٥) ١٢-١٣. ٢٤٢ ص: وصدق. ٢٤٣ ك: يملكون. ٢٤٤ ص ح ك: متفردا. ٢٤٥ ص: محذوف. ٢٤٦ ح: يشاركه. ولعله الاصح. ك: يشاركه. ٢٤٧ ص: محذوف. ٢٤٨ ص: محذوف. ك: فمير. ٢٤٩ ص: فين. ٢٥٠ اولاً: ص: الا. ٢٥١ ص: لقوله. ٢٥٢ هـ: ص: جعل. ٢٥٣ سورة الانبياء (٢١) ٣٠-٣٣. ٢٥٤ ك: + يا بني. ٢٥٥ ح: تعاينه. ٢٥٦ رتق - ولا: ص: محذوف. ٢٥٧ ص: لمغلقه.

maybe you will be thankful. He makes the night enter the day and the day enter the night, and He has subjected the sun and moon, each running to an appointed term. That is Allah, your Lord, to Him belongs the rule [over all things], and those to whom you pray instead of Him, do not rule [even] over the pellicle of a date-stone.” (sura 35, vv. 12-13) God, may He be blessed and exalted, the Owner of rule, ability and the highest parables, has spoken the truth. Truly He is Allah, our Lord. Our creation and making were through His favor. He owns rule [over all things] and from Him [comes] the wonderful direction⁵⁸. And those to whom you pray in addition to God or instead of to Him, do not rule [even] over the pellicle of a date-stone. The pellicle of a date-stone is the smallest thing over which one can rule by oneself, or over which another partner may share rule.

All these things mentioned by God are plain, clear and not hidden. They are seen and witnessed both by whoever trusts (or believes) in God out of gratitude towards Him and by whoever turns away from God out of unbelief. Do you not hear His verse, glory be to Him: “Have not the unbelievers considered that the heavens and the earth were connected and We separated them, and that We have made every living thing of water? Will they not then believe? And We placed firm mountains in the earth lest it should quake with them, and placed in them wide passes, roads, so that they will find their way. And We made the heaven a roof preserved, yet they turn away from their signs. It is He who created the night and the day, the sun and the moon, each moving in [its] celestial sphere.” (sura 21, vv. 30-33) The separation of the heavens and earth is manifest in them and not hidden. It is seen by every person who has an eye that sees. The separation seen in them (in the heavens and earth) testifies that they were connected before, since one can separate only the connected thing, just as one can connect only the separated thing and untie only the tied thing. Every separated thing must necessarily have one who separates it, just as every untied thing must have one who unties its ties⁵⁹.

١ وما جعل الله من الماء من الحيوان. فموجود ما ذكر الله منه بالعيان. لان كل ٢٥٨ شجرة قائمة. حية او دابة ناطقة او بهيمة. فمن الماء جعلتها. وبه قامت جبلتها. الا ترى ان الشجرة اذا فقدت ٢٥٩ من الماء غذائها. وفارق الماء قلبها ولحائها. يبست فماتت. وانحطمت فتهافتت. فذلك الدليل على ٥ انها من الماء جعلت. اذ كانت اذا عدم الماء عدمت. اولا ترى ان لو لا مياه الذكران والاناث التي هي النطف. لما وجد من البشر والبهائم طارف يطرف. فذلك الدليل على انهم من الماء جعلوا. اذ كان الماء اذا عدم عدموا. وذلك قوله سبحانه: «فَلْيَنْظُرِ الْإِنْسَانُ مِمَّا خُلِقَ. خُلِقَ مِنْ مَّاءٍ ذَافِقٍ. يَخْرُجُ مِنْ بَيْنِ الصُّلْبِ وَالتَّرَائِبِ» ٢٦٠. وقوله: «وَهُوَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ مِنَ الْمَاءِ بَشَرًا فَجَعَلَهُ نَسَبًا وَصِهْرًا» ٢٦١.

وما جعل الله سبحانه في الارض ٢٦٢ من رواسي الجبال. وغيرها مما ثقلها به من الاثقال ٢٦٣. كيلا تميد بمن ٢٦٤ عليها من الانسان. وغيره من انواع الحيوان. التي ٢٦٥ لا بقاء لها ٢٦٦ ولا قوام ٢٦٧ مع الميدان. فموجود بايقن الايقان. اذ توجد ٢٦٨ بالعيان الافلاك تمر من تحت الارض ٢٦٩ دائرة. وتخفى بممرها ٢٧٠ تحتها وتظهر عليها سائرة. ولا يمكن ان يكون مسيرها تحتها ٢٧١ ومقبلها ومدبرها الا في خلاا او عراء ٢٧٢. او هواء او ماء. واي ٢٧٣ ذلك ما ٢٧٤ كان مسيرها فيه ٢٧٥ احتاج من على الارض من ساكنها ٢٧٦ الى ما جعلهم الله محتاجين اليه من تثقيل قراهم بما ثقله الله به ٢٧٧ من رواسي

٢٥٨ ص: لكل. ٢٥٩ ص: فارقت. ٢٦٠ سورة الطارق (٨٦) ٥-٧. ٢٦١ سورة الفرقان (٢٥) ٥٤ ص: + وكان ربك قديرا. ٢٦٢ ص: في الارضين. ٢٦٣ وغيرها - الانتقال: ص: محذوف. ٢٦٤ ص: بما. ٢٦٥ ص ح ك: الذي. ٢٦٦ ص ح ك: له. ٢٦٧ ح: دوام. ٢٦٨ هـ فوق الكلمة: تجدد. ٢٦٩ ص: الارضين. ٢٧٠ ح: ممرها. ٢٧١ ص: محذوف. ٢٧٢ ص: وعراء. ٢٧٣ ح: اي. ٢٧٤ ص: محذوف. ٢٧٥ ص ك: + ومقبلها ومدبرها. ٢٧٦ ص ك: ساكنها. ٢٧٧ ك: محذوف.

The animals, which God mentioned that He created of water⁶⁰, exist as they are seen with the eyes, since every existing and living tree and every man or animal are created and produced of water. Do you not understand that when the tree loses its food, namely, water, and when the water leaves its core and inner bark, it dries up and dies, is broken and collapses? This is the proof that the tree was created of water, for when there is no water, there is no tree. Do you not understand that if there were no water of males and females, which are drops of sperm, no human being or animal would exist⁶¹. This is the proof that they were created of water. For when there is no water, they do not exist. This is His verse, glory be to Him: “So let man consider of what he was created; He was created of water poured forth which comes forth from between the loins and ribs.” (sura 86, vv. 5-7) And His verse: “It is He who created man of water and related him by descent and marriage.” (sura 25, v. 54)

The firm mountains created by God, glory be to Him, on earth, and other loads that God made heavy, so that the earth would not quake people and other kinds of animals, which could not exist and live with the quake, all these exist with absolute certainty⁶². That is, since the celestial spheres are found by sight to go around and pass under the earth and to be hidden when passing under the earth and visible when coming over the earth, it is impossible that their going under the earth and their coming and departing should be in anything other than empty space or in air or in water. Wherever the celestial spheres go, the earth dwellers need what God created them to need, that is, the weighting down of their

١ الجبال. وغيرها مما ثقلها ٢٧٨ به سبحانه مما عليها من الاثقال. لكيما يكون
 كما قال الله قرارا. ولما جعله الله خلالها انهارا. ولو لم تكن سكنا قرارا ٢٧٩. لما
 احتملت من انهارها نهرا. ولو مادت ٢٨٠ لاضطربت غير مستقرة ولا هادئة.
 ولو لم تستقر وتهدأ لكانت انهارها متفجرة غير جارية. لا ينفع ما جعل الله
 ٥ حاجزا وبرزخا ٢٨١. وحبسا ثابتا مرسخا ٢٨٢. من ٢٨٣ منسح ٢٨٤ عذب
 مياهها ٢٨٥. وملحه ومفسد امورها ٢٨٦ ومصلحة. فاختلط ٢٨٧ فراثها
 باجاجها. وبطل ما جعل فيها من سبل منهاجها. حتى لا يكون فيها لفلک
 سبيل مسير. ولا لطامي جم مياهها صوت خرير. ولو كان ٢٨٨ ذلك فيها
 كذلك لكان فيها من فساد التدبير. وجفاء ٢٨٩ الفعل ٢٩٠ في حسن التقدير.
 ١٠ ما لا يجهل ولا يخفى. لكنه ٢٩١ تبارك ٢٩٢ وتعالى الطف في التدبير لطفًا.
 واعلم بالامور كلها ٢٩٣ علما. من ان يدبر الا محكما. الم تسمع لقوله
 سبحانه: «أَمَّنْ جَعَلَ الْأَرْضَ قَرَارًا وَجَعَلَ خِلَالَهَا أَنْهَارًا. وَجَعَلَ لَهَا
 رَوَاسِيَ وَجَعَلَ بَيْنَ الْبَحْرَيْنِ حَاجِزًا ۗ أَلَيْسَ اللَّهُ بِأَعْلَمَ بِأَكْثَرُهُمْ لَا
 يَعْلَمُونَ» ٢٩٥.

٨ (ب) ١٥ فان قال قائل: فما جعل ٢٩٦ من الاثقال/عليها والجبال لا يزيدها الا ثقلا
 وكل ما ازداد ثقلا. هوى وذهب سفلا. فنحن اذن نهوى [سافلين] ٢٩٧. وقد
 ترانا بالعيان عالين. فهذا من القول تناقض واختلاف. لا يصح لذي لب به
 اقرار ٢٩٨ ولا اعتراف. قلنا: قد قيل فيما تحت الارض وما يحملها.

٢٧٨ ك: + الله. ٢٧٩ ح: قرارا. ٢٨٠ ص: مارت. ٢٨١ ك: او برزخا. ٢٨٢ ص:
 مرشحا. ٢٨٣ ص ح ك: بين. ٢٨٤ ك ي: منسح. ص: محذوف. ٢٨٥ ص: فراثها.
 ٢٨٦ ح: امرها. ٢٨٧ ص: فيختلط. ٢٨٨ ص: محذوف. ٢٨٩ ح: خفاء. ٢٩٠ ص:
 للعقل. ٢٩١ ص ك: ولكنه. ٢٩٢ ص: محذوف. ٢٩٣ ي: محذوف. ٢٩٤ ص ك: اله.
 ٢٩٥ سورة النمل (٢٧) ٦١. ٢٩٦ ح: + عليها. ٢٩٧ ه: محذوف. ٢٩٨ ص: قرار.

stability by mountains and other loads, by which He weighted down the earth, so that [the earth] would be, as God has said, stable⁶³. And since God created rivers in (*khilālahā*)⁶⁴ it (the earth), if it were not unmoving and stable, it would not carry a single one of its rivers. If the earth shook, its rivers would be turbulent, neither stable nor quiet. If the earth were not stable and quiet, its rivers would burst and not flow [in their channels], and what God created as a fixed barrier and a stable dam between spoiled rivers and proper ones would not avail. The sweet water would be mixed with the salty. The path of the flow God established in the rivers would be cancelled, until a boat could not move in rivers and the purl of the much overflowing water would not be heard. If this were so, the providential design (*tadbīr*) of the rivers would be spoiled and His action defective, [which opposes] proper making, which is not unknown and not hidden. But He, may He be blessed and exalted, makes favors best (*altāf*)⁶⁵ in His providential design and knows all things best so that he providentially designs [the universe and everything in it] only perfectly. Have you not heard His verse, glory be to Him: “Was it not He who made the earth stable and placed rivers and firm mountains in it and placed a barrier between the two seas? Is there a god along with God? Nay, but most of them know not.” (sura 27, v. 61)

If someone asks: The heavy loads and the mountains God put on the earth add only weight to it, and everything that increases in weight falls and comes down. We, then, fall down, whereas you see us with your [own] eyes being elevated. Therefore, there is a contradiction in this statement which is inadmissible for a wise person to either admit or acknowledge. We shall answer: Different views were put forth by groups of heretics and non-heretics concerning what is under the earth and what

١ ويمسكها ٢٩٩ بحيث هي ويقلها. اقوال كثيرة غير واحدة. قالتها فرق ملحدة وغير ملحدة. فمنهم من قال تحت الارض خلاء. ومنهم من قال تحتها هواء. ومنهم من قال تحتها لج ماء. ومنهم من قال ليس تحتها شيء من الاشياء. وهي غاية الثقل ومنتهاه. وكل ثقل فاليها انتهاؤه ٣٠٠. فليس لجرم من الاجرام ثقلها. ٥ ولا شيء من الاشياء في الثقل مثلها. فهي اثقل الاثقلين. واسفل الاسفلين. وما كان وهو ٣٠١ اخف منها. فغير شك انه مرتفع عنها. او قار عليها. او داخل ٣٠٢ فيها. وقرارها بحيث هي زعموا ٣٠٣ قرار طبيعي. ومنهم من قال ان ٣٠٤ قرارها بحيث هي قرار موضعي. وانها انما ثبتت بحيث هي من موضعها. واستقرت ثابتة في موقعها. لانها زعموا ٣٠٥ معتدلة في الوسط. غير مائلة الى جهة من الجهات بفطرط. مستوية كاستواء كفة الميزان. ممتنعة ١٠ لاستوائها عن الميلان. يمينا وشمالا ٣٠٦. او علوا او سفالا. وقال حشو هذه الامة المختلف. الذي ٣٠٧ لا يفقه ٣٠٨ ولا ينصرف ٣٠٩. قرار الارض زعموا على ظهر حوت. ونعتوا حوتهم في ذلك بالوان من النعوت. واشبه هذه الاقوال عندنا بالحق. واقرب ما قيل به ٣١٠ فيها من الصدق. ان يكون ما تحت الارض ١٥ خلاء منفهقا. او هواء ٣١١ من الاهوية متخفقا. ليس فيهما لسالكهما رد يرده. ولا للمقبل والمدبر فيهما صد يصده. لقول الله سبحانه: «وَهُوَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ اللَّيْلَ وَالنَّهَارَ وَالشَّمْسَ وَالْقَمَرَ كُلٌّ فِي فَلَكٍ يَسْبَحُونَ» ٣١٢. وليس احد من هذه ٣١٣ الفرق كلها التي وصفنا. وان قالوا من مختلف الاقوال بما ألفنا. الا مقر لا يناكر. ومعترف لا يكابر. ان الشمس والقمر

٢٩٩ ص: ويسكها. ٣٠٠ ح: منتهاه. ٣٠١ ي: هو. ٣٠٢ او داخل: ص: ودخل. ٣٠٣ ص: زعم. ٣٠٤ ص: محذوف. ٣٠٥ ص: زعم. ٣٠٦ ص: ك: او شمالا. ٣٠٧ ص: التي. ٣٠٨ ص: تنفقه. ٣٠٩ ص: ك ح ي: يتعرف. وهو الأصح. ٣١٠ ص: محذوف. ٣١١ او هواء: ص: وهواء. ٣١٢ سورة الانبياء (٢١) ٣٣. ٣١٣ ك: محذوف.

carries and holds it (in its place) and keeps it aloft. Some people say that there is empty space under the earth, others say that there is air under it, and others say much water⁶⁶. And others say that there is nothing under it and that it is the summit of heaviness and every heavy thing [comes] to it finally; there is no celestial body which has the heaviness of the earth and there is nothing which equals the earth in heaviness. The earth is the heaviest and lowest [of the celestial bodies]. Everything that is lighter than the earth undoubtedly rests above it or settles firmly on it or enters into it. They maintain that its stability is in and of itself natural stability⁶⁷. Others say that its stability is in and of itself stability in relation to place. The earth stands stable in and of itself only because of its place. The earth stands stable in its place, because, they maintain, the earth is situated exactly in the middle without leaning excessively to any side. It is balanced like the balance of pans on a scale, and because of its balance it is kept from leaning either right or left, upwards or downwards⁶⁸. All types of scholars of the masses (*hashw hādhihi al-umma*)⁶⁹ who do not understand and who have no knowledge about the stability of the earth maintain that [the earth rests] on a big fish⁷⁰. They describe the fish by various kinds of attributes. Among these views, the view closest to the truth, in our opinion, and the nearest thing to the truth held [by people] about the earth is that what under the earth is wide open space or moving air of a sort. There is no one who turns back what moves in them, and no one who makes whatever comes and goes in them stray. Since God, glory be to Him, has said: “It is He who created the night and the day, the sun and the moon, each moving in [its] celestial sphere.” (sura 21, v. 33) There is no one of all the people of the sects we describe, even if they profess different opinions, which we wrote about, who does not acknowledge or objects to or does not agree with or opposes [the fact] that the sun and the moon move by themselves, or that

١ يسلكان بانفسهما. او يسلك فلكهما بهما. فيما يرى ٣١٤ من دورهما. ويعاين ٣١٥ في كل حين من مرورهما. من تحت الارض لا من فوقها. يعرف ٣١٦ ذلك بغروب الشمس في كل يوم وشروقها. لا يسلكان يمينا ولا يسارا. ولا يختلف مسلكهما تحتها ليلا ولا نهارا. والشمس والقمر مجسمان. ٥ مدركة جسميتهما بالعيان. يدرعان درع الاجسام. وينقسمان بايين الانقسام. لهما اوساط واطراف. وفيهما كل وانصاف. والارض فذات جسم مصمت معلوم. لا يمكن ان يسلكه جسم ٣١٧ مثله/من النجوم. ولا يمكن ٩ (أ) ان يسلك جسم ٣١٨ الا في هواء او خلاء. او فتق ٣١٩ ان سلك في ارض او ماء. او في ٣٢٠ جو من الاجواء. وان ٣٢١ كان مسلكه من الارض او الماء. ٣٢٢ انما يكون في فتق ٣٢٣ ففي الخلاء يسلك ٣٢٤ او الهواء. وان هو احتجب ٣٢٥ عن العيون فلم ير وان كان مسلكه في فتق ٣٢٦ من ارض او ماء ٣٢٧. لا فيما قلنا به من هواء او خلاء. انتقض ما اجمعوا عيانا عليه. واجتمعت اقوالهم جميعا فيه. من ان مسلك النجوم. من وراء قاصية التخوم. وما جعل الله في الجبال الرواسي. وغيرها من القنان الشمخ الطوال العوالي. ١٥ من فجاج السبل. ومن الطرق الذلل. فما لا يمتري في وجود صنعه وتقديره. بما يرى فيه من احكام الصنع وتدييره. منتصف انصف في نظر ٣٢٨ لنفسه. قاض على الامور كلها ٣٢٩ بحقيقة درك حسه. لانه قد ادرك بحسه دركا [باتا] ٣٣٠. وايقن بقلبه يقينا مثبتا. ان اصغر ما يرى من هذه الفجاج سبيلا. لم يتهيا لسالكه سلوكه ولم يمكنه حتى ذلل تذليلا. وان هذه الفجاج

٣١٤ ص: يعاين. ٣١٥ ص: ويرى. ٣١٦ ص ي: ظاهر. ٣١٧ يسلكه جسم: ح: جسم يسلكه. ٣١٨ ص: جسم ان يسلك: ك ي: ان يسلك جسما. ٣١٩ ص ح: فيق. ٣٢٠ ح ك: مخدوف. ٣٢١ ح: فان. ٣٢٢ او الماء: ح: والماء. ٣٢٣ ص ح: فيق. ٣٢٤ ح ك ي: سلك. ٣٢٥ ص ح: احجب. ٣٢٦ ص ح: فيق. ٣٢٧ ارض او ماء: ح: الارض او الماء. ٣٢٨ ح: نظره. ٣٢٩ ص ح ك: فيها. ٣٣٠ ص ح: بينا. ك ي: بتا.

their celestial sphere moves them, [which is proved] by their circling and passing which are seen at all times under the earth [and] not above it⁷¹. This is known by the daily sunset and sunrise. The sun and the moon move neither to the right nor to the left. Their movement does not change under the earth, neither at night nor during the day. They are two bodies whose corporeality is perceived by eyes. They wear the garment of bodies and are divided by a clear division. They have edges and middles and in them there are wholes and halves. The earth has a known solid body through which no other body like it of the stars can pass. It is impossible that a body should move anywhere but in air or in empty space or in a cleft, if it moves in the earth or in water or air. If its movement in the earth or in water is only in a cleft, (which is in the earth or in water), then it moves in empty space or in air, even if it is hidden from [our] eyes and not observed. If its movement is in a cleft in the earth or in water, and not as we held, in empty space or in air, the view, on which everyone unanimously agrees on the basis of sight, that the movement of the stars is beyond the far borders of the earth, is not correct.

The wide and flattened roads which God created in the firm mountains and in other mountains, namely in elevated, high and lofty peaks, are something which no righteous person, who does justice to himself in [his] reflection and adjudicates all things according to correct sense perception, can doubt that they were created (lit. the existence of their creation) and made according to measure following the rules of creation and providential design he sees in them (i.e. in the roads). For he perceives with clear sense perception, and has certainty fixed in his heart that the smallest road among these roads that he sees was not made ready for walking and that a walker could not walk on it until it was well flattened and made flat, and that these roads which were meant to be roads, and

التي جعلت سبيلا. و[هيئت] ٣٣١ مع صعوبتها طرقا ذللا. لم تتأت ٣٣٢
وتتوطأ ٣٣٣ سبلا وصرطا في حزون الجبال الشواخ. ويطون البيدان ٣٣٤
الرواسخ. الا بقوة ايد من قوي شديد. وتديير رشيد. من عزيز حميد. لا
يؤده حفظ شيء ولا صنعه. ولا يتمتع منه قوى وان عز بمنعه. ذلك الله العزيز
الاقوى. ومن لا يماثل في شيء ولا يساوى. فيصعب عليه ما يصعب على
الامثال. من صنع فجاج رواسي الجبال. وما جعل فيها من السبل المسهلة.
وما من به في ذلك من النعم المفضلة. التي لا يمن بمثلها منان ٣٣٥. ولا
يختمها سوى احسان الله احسان. ولا يدعي المنة فيها مع الله احد. ولا يقوم
بها سوى مجد الله مجد.

ومن ينكر الا بمكابرة لنفسه. او اكذاب ٣٣٦ لحقائق درك حسه. ان ٣٣٧
السماء جعلت ٣٣٨ كما قال الله ٣٣٩ سبحانه سقفا محفوظا. وقد يعاين سمكها
عيان ٣٤٠ غير مرفوعا ٣٤١. واياتها ٣٤٢ من نجومها دائبة ٣٤٣ غروبا وطلوعا. وترى
السماء كما قال الله سبحانه محفوظة في مكانها ثابتة غير زائلة. وترى الشمس
والقمر وغيرهما من نجومها مقيمة على هيئة ٣٤٤ واحدة غير حائلة. وتعلم يقينا
وتوقن بتا ٣٤٥ انه مستنكر مدفوع. و مقبح ٣٤٦ في اللب مشنوع. ان يتوهم
حفظ ٣٤٧ ما ذكرنا. ودوام ما ٣٤٨ عاينا وابصرنا. دائما ثابتا مقيما. ومن البلاء
والزوال سليما. الا بحافظ عزيز ٣٤٩. وحرز من الحفيظ ٣٥٠ حريز. لا تحيط به
الملاات. ولا تلتبس به الغفلات. ذلك الله العزيز الحكيم. المقتدر العليم.
ومن يشك فيما قال الله من اعراض الناس عن آيات السماء. وهم بكل ما

٣٣١ ص ح ك ي: هيئت. ٣٣٢ ص: توات. ح: توات. ٣٣٣ ي: ولم تتوطأ. ٣٣٤ ص: البلدان.
٣٣٥ ك ي: مان. ٣٣٦ او اكذاب: ح: واكذاب. ٣٣٧ ك: وان. ٣٣٨ ص: محذوف.
٣٣٩ ح: محذوف. ٣٤٠ ح ك ي: عين. ٣٤١ غير مرفوعا: ح ك ي: محذوف. ٣٤٢ ص: واياتها.
٣٤٣ ص: دانية. ٣٤٤ ص: هبة. ٣٤٥ ك ي: تبيينا. ٣٤٦ ص: مصحب (?). ٣٤٧ ي:
+ مثل. ٣٤٨ ك: قد. ٣٤٩ ح: غريز. ٣٥٠ وحرز من الحفيظ: ح: وحفظ من الحرز. ك ي:
وحفظ من الحفظ.

were made ready to be flattened roads, in spite of the difficulty it entailed, were not prepared and flattened to be roads in the hard ground of the elevated mountains and in the belly of the firm deserts except by the power of the Almighty and the just providential design of the praiseworthy Omnipotent for Whom it is easy to create something and to preserve it and Who can possess every type of power even the strongest. This is God the Almighty the Omnipotent. For one who is neither like [God] nor equal [to Him] in any thing, it is difficult [to do] what is difficult for those who are like him, namely, to create roads in the firm mountains, to make ways easy to [travel on], and [to grant] what he granted in this, namely, excellent favors, the like of which no [other] benefactor can grant, that necessarily exist only because of God's doing good. No one can claim that he grants favors with God, only God's power grants them.

Whoever denies that the heaven, as God, glory be to Him, has said, was created as a preserved roof⁷², and that its ceiling is seen raised⁷³, by people's sight, and that the signs of the heaven, that is, its stars keeping on rising and setting, does so only in opposition to his own reason and in denial of the reality perceived by his senses. And you see the heaven, as God, glory be to him, has said, preserved in its place, firm and stable, and see too the sun and the moon and other stars keeping one form without any change. [Then] you know with absolute certainty that the denier expresses notions that are disgraceful, groundless, repugnant and repulsive to reason, if he imagines that the preservation we mentioned and that the persistence we saw (in the stars), as perpetual, firm, stable and free from extinction and destruction, are not [brought about] by a powerful preserver and by the excellent defense of a defender whom weariness does not seize and in whom negligence does not exist. This is God, the Powerful, the Wise, the Almighty and the Omniscient. Those who doubt what God says concerning people's turning away from the signs of the heaven are the most ignorant of the signs of the heaven. They

١ فيها من آياتها اجهل الجهلاء. لا يعتبرون من عبرها ٣٥١ بظاهر مقيم. لا ولا
٩ (ب) بسائر دائب مديم./ لا يني في مسيره ولا يفتر بخفى في مسيره مرة ويظهر
مدبر يحث حثا. لا يحتمل غفلة ولا عبثا. في رجوع ولا مقام ولا مسير. ولا
في شيء مما له من صنع ولا من ٣٥٢ تدبير.

٥ ومن تنبيهه ايضا ٣٥٣ قوله تبارك ٣٥٤ وتعالى: «أَفَلَا يَنْظُرُونَ إِلَى الْإِبِلِ كَيْفَ خُلِقَتْ. وَإِلَى السَّمَاءِ كَيْفَ رُفِعَتْ. وَإِلَى الْجِبَالِ كَيْفَ نُصِبَتْ. وَإِلَى الْأَرْضِ كَيْفَ سُطِحَتْ» ٣٥٥. فخلق الابل الذي هو صنعها فيها موجود.
ورفع السماء معها معان مشهود. ونصب الجبال اوتادا. وسطح الارض
مهادا. متيقن معلوم. ومعان مفهوم. وهذه كلها فقد ثبتت صنعا. وثبت
١٠ كل صنع بدعا. بما بان فيها وشهد عليها من دلائل الصنع وتدييره. ومعالم
البدع وتأثيره. فإين خالق الابل وصانعها. وممسك السماء ورافعها. وناصب
الجبال وموتدها. وساطح الارض وممهدها. اذ لا بد اضطارا لكل
مصنوع ٣٥٦ من صانع. ولكل مرفوع من الاشياء كلها من رافع. ولكل
منصوب موتد من ناصبه وموتده ٣٥٧. ولا بد لكل ٣٥٨ مسطوح ممهد ٣٥٩ من
ساطحه وممهده ٣٦٠. ذلك الله رب العالمين. وصانع الصانعين. الذي جعل
١٥ الارض والابل ٣٦١ والجبال صنعا له مصنوعا. والسماء سقفا بحفظه له ثابتا
محفوظا ٣٦٢ مرفوعا.

ومن توقيفه وتفهيّمه. وتنبيهه وتعليمه. قوله سبحانه: «أَنْتُمْ أَشَدُّ خَلْقًا أَمْ
السَّمَاءُ بَنَاهَا ٣٦٣. رَفَعَ سَمَكَهَا فَسَوَّاهَا. وَأَغْطَشَ لَيْلَهَا وَأَخْرَجَ ضُحَاهَا.
٢٠ وَالْأَرْضَ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ دَحَاهَا. أَخْرَجَ مِنْهَا مَاءَهَا وَمَرْعَاهَا. وَالْجِبَالَ أَرْسَاهَا.

٣٥١ ك: غيرها. ٣٥٢ ي: محذوف. ٣٥٣ ص: محذوف. ٣٥٤ ي: ترك. ٣٥٥ سورة
الغاشية (٨٨) ١٧-٢٠. ٣٥٦ ص: صنع. ٣٥٧ ناصبه وموتده: ص: ناصب وموتد. ٣٥٨ ولا بد
لكل: ص: ولكل. ٣٥٩ ص: ومهد. ٣٦٠ ساطحه وممهده: ص: ساطح ومهد. ولا بد - وممهده: ي:
محذوف. ٣٦١ ص: محذوف. ٣٦٢ ص: محذوف. ٣٦٣ ح: + الى قوله والجبال ارساها.

do not learn the lessons of the signs [either] those that appear steadily (in specific places) or others that move perpetually. [The planets] do not tire of moving nor do they even once languish in their movement, when they are concealed from us. [In all this] a director who urges them [to move] comes into view. Neither negligence nor purposelessness (*‘abath*)⁷⁴ is conceivable in relation to Him, neither in coming back nor in staying out nor in movement or in any one of the things that He creates and directs.

Among the verses by which He induces [man] to know Him, there is His verse, may He be praised and exalted: “Will they not look at the camels, how they were created? At the heaven, how it was raised up? At the mountains, how they were set up? At the earth, how it was spread flat?” (sura 88, vv. 17-20) The creation of the camels is found on the earth and the raising up of the heaven in relation to the earth is seen by the eyes and witnessed. The setting up of the mountains as pegs, and the spreading out of the earth as flat⁷⁵ are certain, known, seen by the eyes and understood. That all these [things] were created and that every created thing came into being is proved by means of what has had clear expression on the earth and by what gives evidence of it, that is, the indications of [God’s] creation and direction and [His] signs of bringing into being and of the impressions He leaves. Where is the creator of the camels, the holder up and raiser of the heaven, the one who sets up the mountains and positions them as pegs and the one who spreads out the earth and makes it flat? Since every created thing necessarily has a creator, every raised thing among all things necessarily has a raiser, every set up and positioned thing necessarily has one who sets it up and positions it, and every spread out and flat thing necessarily has one who spreads it out and makes it flat. This is God, the Lord of all created things and the Creator of creators, who established the earth, the camels and the mountains as His creation, and the heaven as a fixed, preserved and raised roof by preserving it [lest it should fall].

Among the verses which come to teach [man] to know God and cause [him] to understand God and arouse [him to learn a lesson] there is His verse, glory be to Him: “Are you more difficult to create, or the heaven He built, whose roof He raised, and which He flattened? He made dark its night and brought out its dawn. And after that He levelled the earth and brought from it its water and pasture. And the mountains He posi-

١ مَتَاعًا لَكُمْ وَلِإِنْعَامِكُمْ» ٣٦٤. فلا بد في ٣٦٥ حس ولا عقل ٣٦٦. ولا عند مضرور بخبل. لكل بناء غاب او حضر من بانيه. ولا بد ٣٦٧ لكل مرفوع ومسوى من رافعه ومسويه. ولا بد ٣٦٨ لكل ليل مغطش من مغطشه. كما لا بد لكل عرش معروش من معرشه. ولا بد لالخارج الضحى من مخرج وان كان لا يرى. ولا بد لدحو الارض من داحيها. لما تبين من شاهد ٣٦٩ الدحو عليها. ولا بد لخروج الماء ٣٧٠ والمرعى من مخرجه ومرعيه. ولا بد لما [ارسي] ٣٧١ من الجبال من مرسيه. لما فيها بينا من علم ٣٧٢ كل مرسى. وان كان هذا كله يدرك عقلا وحسا. فلا بد من صانع السماء وبانيها ٣٧٣. ورافع سمكها ومسويها ٣٧٤. ومغطش ليلها ومخرج ضحاها. ولا بد ٣٧٥ ممن خلق الارض ودحاها. واخرج منها ماءها ومرعاها. ومن نصب الجبال وارساها. ثم لا بد ١٠ اذ لم يوجد ٣٧٦ ذلك شيئا مما وجد بالحواس الخمس. ولا شيئا مما ادرك بالعقول ٣٧٧ من كل نفس. ان يثبت باثبت الثبت. وايقن اليقين البت. ان صانع ذلك كله. ومن تولى فيه احكام فعله. خلاف سبحانه لكل محسوس. ولكل ما/يعقل من النفوس. (أ) ١٠

١٥ ومن ذلك وفيه. ومن الدلائل عليه ٣٧٨. قول ابراهيم. عليه من الله افضل الصلاة والتسليم ٣٧٩. فيما دار بينه وبين قومه. في الله من الجدال والخصام: يا قوم ٣٨٠. «مَا هَذِهِ التَّمَاثِيلُ الَّتِي أَنْتُمْ لَهَا عَاكِفُونَ» ٣٨١. قَالُوا وَجَدْنَا آبَاءَنَا لَهَا عَابِدِينَ. قَالَ لَقَدْ كُنْتُمْ أَنْتُمْ وَآبَاؤُكُمْ فِي ضَلَالٍ مُّبِينٍ. قَالُوا أَجِئْتَنَا

٣٦٤ سورة النازعات (٧٩) ٢٧-٣٣. متاعا لكم ولانعامكم: ص ح ك: محذوف. ٣٦٥ ص: + كل. ٣٦٦ ولا عقل: ص: وعقل. ٣٦٧ ص ي: محذوف. ٣٦٨ ص: محذوف. ٣٦٩ ص ح: شواهد. ٣٧٠ يخرج الماء: ح: لخروج هذا الماء. ك: لخروج المرعى والماء. ٣٧١ هـ: لدسي. ص ح ك ي: ارى. ٣٧٢ ص: علو. ٣٧٣ ص: وبناؤها. ٣٧٤ ص: واستوائها. ٣٧٥ ص ي: محذوف. ٣٧٦ ك: + من. ٣٧٧ ك: بالعقل. ٣٧٨ ومن الدلائل عليه: ص ك ي: محذوف. ٣٧٩ افضل الصلاة والتسليم: ص: اكثر السلم. ح: اكبر التسليم. ٣٨٠ يا قوم: ك: محذوف. ٣٨١ ح: + الى قوله وانا على ذلكم من الشاهدين.

tioned as pegs as sustenance for you and your flocks.’’ (sura 79, vv. 27-33) According to the senses and the reason, [even] in the opinion of a person blinded by insanity, there must be a builder, either hidden or seen, for each building, a raiser and flattener of each raised and flattened thing, a darkener of each darkened night, and also a spreader of each spread-out couch, someone who brings out the dawn, even if he is not seen. There must be a leveller for levelling of the earth, because of the evidence of the levelling which became manifest in the earth. There must be a bringer out of the brought-out water and a producer of pasture, a positioner of the mountains that were positioned as pegs, since the sign of every thing that is positioned as a peg is manifest in the earth. If all this is perceived by reason and by senses, then the creator of the heaven and its builder, the one who raises its roof and flattens it, who darkens the night and brings out the dawn, who created the earth and levelled it and brought out its water and pasture, and who positioned the mountains as pegs, necessarily exists. Moreover, since that one exists neither as a thing perceived by the five senses nor as a thing perceived by reason, it must be proved by the firmest proof and with absolute certainty that the Creator of all this and the One who took upon himself to make [all this] perfectly is different, glory be to Him, from anything either perceived by sense or by people’s reason⁷⁶.

Among the proofs [of the existence] of God is the statement of Abraham, upon him be the best blessing and peace from God, concerning the dispute and quarrel which took place between him and his people about the [existence] of God: O my people! ‘‘What are these statues to which you adhere? They said: ‘We found our fathers worshipping them.’ He said: ‘Verily you and your fathers were manifestly going astray.’

١ بِالْحَقِّ أَمْ أَنْتَ مِنَ اللَّاعِينَ. قَالَ بَلْ رُبُّكُمْ رَبُّ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ الَّذِي فَطَرَهُنَّ وَأَنَا عَلَى ذِكْكُمْ مِنَ الشَّاهِدِينَ» ٣٨٢. فشهد صلى الله عليه شهادة الحق ٣٨٣ لله رب العالمين ٣٨٤. ونبههم بشواهد ٣٨٥ الله ودلائله. بما قد يرويه راي عين من صنعه وجعائله.

٥ او لا يعلم من يعمى ويجهل. فضلا عن يبصر ويعقل. ان لو كانت هذه البدائع والاصول. وما تدركه ٣٨٦ منها عيانا العقول. على ما يقول به فيها الجاهلون انها كانت وجاءت. كما ارادت وشاءت. لما فضل بعضها ابداء بعضها. ولما كانت الارض سفلا وارضا. ولما قصر اوضاع الاشياء وادناها. عن درجة ارفع الاشياء واعلاها. ولكانت الاشياء جميعا سواء. ولما كان بعضها من بعض اقوى. حتى يكون كلها شيئا واحدا. وحتى لا يوجد شيء منها لشيء ضد ٣٨٧. وقد ٣٨٨ يوجد باليقين ٣٨٩ من تضادها. ويبين ٣٩٠ من صلاحها وفسادها. لكل حاسة من الحواس الخمس ٣٩١. ومن ٣٩٢ سلمت له حواسه من جميع الانس. فقد يستدل بما يرى ٣٩٣ فيها من الاختلاف والنقائص ٣٩٤. على ان لها صانعا خصها ٣٩٥ بما بان فيها من الاختلاف والخصائص. بري تبارك وتعالى من شبهها في النقص والاختلاف. متعال عما ١٥ يوجد فيها او في واحد منها من الاوصاف.

فدل سبحانه على صنعه للاشياء كلها. بما ابان فيها من تصرف احوالها وتنقلها. واحتج ابراهيم ٣٩٦ عليه السلام عند محاجته لقومه فيه ومنازعتهم لهم. فيما ٣٩٧ كانوا يعبدون من النجوم معه وانما هي صنع من الله صنعه بافول

٣٨٢ سورة الانبياء (٢١) ٥٢-٥٦. ٣٨٣ شهادة الحق: ص: بشهادة للحق. ٣٨٤ لله رب العالمين: ص: لرب العالمين. ٣٨٥ ص: لشواهد. ٣٨٦ ص: + عيانا. ٣٨٧ يوجد - ضدا: ص: يجد احد لشيء منها ضد. ك ي: يوجد شيء لشيء منها ضدا. ٣٨٨ ص: او قد. ٣٨٩ ح: بالعين. ٣٩٠ ح: وتبين. ٣٩١ ك: + تضادها. ٣٩٢ ص: من. ٣٩٣ ص: محذوف. ٣٩٤ ي: والخصائص. ٣٩٥ ص: يخصها. ٣٩٦ ص: + صلى الله عليه. ٣٩٧ ح: ما.

They said: 'Did you bring us the truth or are you one of those who deceive?' He said: 'Nay but your Lord is the Lord of the heavens and the earth, who created them, and I am one of those who testify thereunto.' '' (sura 21, vv. 52-56) [Abraham], may God bless him, gave true testimony of God, the Lord of all the created beings, and induced people [to know Him] through God's testimonies and the indications of His acts, which they see with their own eyes.

Do the blind and the ignorant, let alone the clever and the wise not know that if those things that come into being and those elements⁷⁷ that reason perceives through them by sight had prior existence and came [back] according to their will and desire, as the ignorant believe, then, one part [of the things that come into being] would not excel the other part, the earth would not be either earth or low, and, also, the rank of the lowest and the most inferior thing would not be less than the rank of the highest and loftiest thing? All things would be equal to each other, and none would be stronger than the others, until all of them would be one thing and none of them would have an opposite. But opposition between things exists for certain, and the fact that some things are sound and others defective is clear to every one of the five senses. One whose senses are unimpaired can prove from the differences and defects which he sees in things that they have a creator who particularized them (*khaṣṣahā*) through the differences and distinctive features which are clearly manifest in them. He, may He be blessed and exalted, is free from likeness to things with regard to defectiveness or differences, and He is exalted above the qualities in [all] things or in one of them⁷⁸.

God, glory be to Him, has proved that He created all things by manifesting the change in their states and their transfer from one place to another⁷⁹. Abraham, may peace be upon him, argued against his people about God, when he argued against and disputed their simultaneous worship of the stars and of God, whereas the stars are nothing but

١ النجوم التي كانوا يعبدون والكواكب. وقفهم^{٣٩٨} على ان كلها صنع الله مغلوب غير غالب. بما اراهم صلى الله عليه من الافول فيها والزوال. وبما ابان عليها من اثر التبدل^{٣٩٩} والانتقال. وتصرف ما لا ينكرونه فيها من الاحوال. فلما اراهم انها من الزائلين. قال لهم: «لَا أَحِبُّ الْآفِلِينَ»^{٤٠٠}. يقول^{٤٠١} صلى الله عليه عند افول الكواكب: «لَا أَحِبُّ الْآفِلِينَ». «فَلَمَّا رَأَى» صلى الله عليه^{٤٠٢} «الْقَمَرَ بَارِغًا قَالَ هَذَا رَبِّي فَلَمَّا أَفَلَ قَالَ لَيْتَنِي لَمْ يَهْدِنِي رَبِّي لَأَكُونَنَّ مِنَ الْقَوْمِ الضَّالِّينَ»^{٤٠٣}. وكذلك قال: «فَلَمَّا»^{٤٠٤} رَأَى الشَّمْسَ بَارِغَةً قَالَ هَذَا رَبِّي هَذَا أَكْبَرُ». قال الله: «فَلَمَّا أَفَلَتْ قَالَ يَا قَوْمِ إِنِّي بَرِيءٌ مِمَّا تُشْرِكُونَ. إِنِّي وَجْهْتُ وَجْهِيَ لِلَّذِي فَطَرَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ حَنِيفًا وَمَا أَنَا مِنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ»^{٤٠٥}. /والفاطر هو^{٤٠٦} المبتدئ الصانع. والحنيف هو^{٤٠٧} المحب^{٤٠٨} الخاشع. فاستدل صلوات^{٤٠٩} الله عليه بدلائل الله^{٤١٠} من سمواته وارضه. على ان الله صانع لذلك كله لا لبعضه. وتبرأ صلى الله عليه من شرك كل من اشرك. اذ رأى كل نجم منها انما يسلك كما اسلك. بما رآه بينا في جميعها. من تدبير بديعها^{٤١١} في الجيئة والطلوع. والذلة والخشوع. وعلم انه لا يكون ما رأى منها عيانا. وادركه فيها ايقانا. من الطلعة والافول. الا من مصرف^{٤١٢} ناقل^{٤١٣} غير منقول. فقال صلى الله عليه وما انا من المشركين. الذين اشركوا بين المالك والمملوكين. تجاهلا بما يعلمون. ومكابرة لما يرون. من التزايل والفرق. بين الخالق والخلق. والمبتدع والبدائع. والصانع والصنائع. وفي الدلالة على الله بدلائله. وبما جعله دليلا عليه من جعائله ما يقول

٣٩٨ ح: فوقهم. ولعله الاصح. ك: وقفهم وفوقها فوقهم. ٣٩٩ ص: التبدل. ٤٠٠ سورة الانعام (٦) ٧٦. ٤٠١ ص: بقوله. ٤٠٢ صلى الله عليه: ص: محذوف. ٤٠٣ سورة الانعام (٦) ٧٧ ما عدا صلى الله عليه. ٤٠٤ هـ ص ح ك ي: لما. ٤٠٥ سورة الانعام (٦) ٧٨-٧٩ ما عدا قال الله. ٤٠٦ ص: فهو. ٤٠٧ ص: فهو. ٤٠٨ ص: الخاضع. ٤٠٩ ص: صلى. ٤١٠ ص: + سبحانه. ٤١١ ص: بدائعها. ٤١٢ ص: + لكل. ٤١٣ ص: منقول.

God's creation, and based his argument on the disappearance of the stars they worshipped. He taught them that all the stars are God's creation and that they are ruled and do not rule, by showing them the stars' disappearance, the sign of their change and transfer, and the change of their states, which they could not deny. When [God] showed them that they disappeared, [Abraham] said [to his people]: "I do not want the things which disappear." (sura 6, v. 76) [Abraham], may God bless him, said when the stars disappeared: "I do not want the things which disappear." "And when he saw," may God bless him, "the moon rising he said: 'This is my Lord.' But when it disappeared, he said: 'Truly, if my Lord does not guide me, I shall surely be among the people who go astray.' " (sura 6, v. 77) And he also said: "When he saw the sun rising, he said: 'This is my Lord, this is greater.' " (sura 6, v. 78) God has said: "But when it disappeared, he said: 'O my people, I am free from your attribution of a copartner to God. Because I have turned my face towards Him who created (*faṭara*) the heavens and the earth as a *ḥanīf*⁸⁰, and I am not one of those who attribute a copartner to God.' " (sura 6, vv. 78-79) *Al-fāṭir* is the Creator. *Al-ḥanīf* is the submissive and the humble person before God. [Abraham], may God bless him, proves, by indications which God brought from His heavens and earth, that God is the Creator of all this [and] not of a part of it. [Abraham], may God bless him, was free from the attribution of a copartner to God, since he saw that each star moved only as it was moved by the direction of their Creator, which he saw clearly in all of them, in their coming and rising and in their submission and humility. He knew that the stars' rising and disappearing, which he saw with his own eyes, by which he perceived them (the rising and the disappearing) with certainty, are only [brought about] by a changer and a carrier who is not carried⁸¹. And he, may God bless him, said: "I am not one of those who attribute a copartner to God," who associate the ruled persons with the ruler, pretending ignorance of what they know and denying the difference they see between the Creator and created things, the Bringer into being and the things brought into being and the Producer and the things produced⁸².

As to the proof (*dalāla*) of God's existence] by His indications (*bi-dalāʾilihi*) and the creations which He created as proof (*dalīl*) of Himself,⁸³

١ لهم صلى ٤١: الله عليه. فيما كانوا من الشرك فيه: «أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا كُنْتُمْ تَعْبُدُونَ. أَنْتُمْ وَأَبَاؤُكُمْ الْأَقْدَمُونَ. فَإِنَّهُمْ عَدُوٌّ لِي إِلَّا رَبَّ الْعَالَمِينَ. الَّذِي خَلَقَنِي فَهُوَ يَهْدِين. وَالَّذِي هُوَ يُطْعِمُنِي وَيَسْقِين. وَإِذَا مَرِضْتُ فَهُوَ يَشْفِين. وَالَّذِي يُمِيتُنِي ثُمَّ يُحْيِين. وَالَّذِي أَطْمَعُ أَنْ يَغْفِرَ لِي خَطِيئَتِي يَوْمَ الدِّينِ» ٤١٥. ولما رأى صلى الله عليه ما رأى من عالم ومعلوم. وكلما أدركه وهم من الوهم. ملكا مربوبا. وصنعا مغلوبا. قال صلى الله عليه «إِلَّا رَبَّ الْعَالَمِينَ». الذي هو رب السموات كلها والأرضين. ثم ابتداء احتجاجا عليهم لله في معرفته. بما لا يوجد سبيل إلى دفعه من صفته. وما ٤١٦ بان الله به من خصائص الانعائ. التي لا توجد إلا فيما له من الصفات. قال صلى الله عليه: «الذي خلقني فهو يهدين. والذي هو يطعمني ويسقيني. وإذا مرضت فهو يشفين. والذي يميتني ثم يحيين. والذي أطمع أن يغفر لي خطيئتي يوم الدين». فهو الله الخالق الذي لا خالق سواه. والهادي الذي لا يشبه هذا هداه. والمطعم الساقى الذي لا يطعم ولا يشرب إلا من أطعمه وسقاه. والشافى من كل سقم الذي لا يشفى من سقم أبدا إلا من كشف عنه سقمه فشفاه. والمميت المحيي الذي لا يموت أبدا ولا يحيا إلا من أماته وأحياه. والغافر الذي لا يظفر بالمغفرة إلا من وهبها إياه. لا تؤخذ ٤١٧ المغفرة منه كرها ولا قسرا. ولا ينالها إلا من كان ٤١٨ له مغفرا. إلا تسمع كيف يقول صلى الله عليه: «والذي أطمع أن يغفر لي خطيئتي يوم الدين» ٤١٩. ويوم الدين ففيه يغفر الله لمن يشاء أن يغفر له من المذنبين. فاستدل صلوات ٤٢٠ الله عليه ودل بما عدد من هذا كله على رب العالمين. وليس

٤١٤ ص ح: صلوات. ٤١٥ سورة الشعراء (٢٦) ٧٥-٨٢. فيما كانوا - يوم الدين: ح: محذوف. ٤١٦ ح: وبما. ٤١٧ ح: منه. ٤١٨ ص ك ي: + الله. ٤١٩ يوم الدين: ص: محذوف. ٤٢٠ ص: صلى.

[Abraham], may God bless him, said to them concerning their attribution of a copartner to God: "Did you consider what you worshipped, you and your ancestors? Truly, they are an enemy to me, except for the Lord of all created beings, who created me, and guides me to the right way, who gives me food and drink, and when I am sick heals me, who causes me to die and then brings me to life and who, I expect, will forgive my sin on the Day of Judgment." (sura 26, vv. 75-82) When [Abraham], may God bless him, considered that there was a knower and a known thing (that is, God and other things), and that what any fancy perceives was a ruled thing and a subjected creation, he, may God bless him, said: "Except for the Lord of all created beings," who is the Lord of all the heavens and the earth. Then he began to argue against them⁸⁴ on behalf of God about knowing that God [exists] by His quality, which there is no way of rejecting, and by the special qualities through which God is clearly distinguished [from others], and which are found only in Him. He, may God bless him, said: ... "who created me, and guides me to the right way, who gives me food and drink, and when I am sick heals me, who causes me to die and then brings me to life and who, I expect, will forgive my sin on the Day of Judgment." (sura 26, vv. 77-82) This is God the Creator except for whom there is no creator, and the Guide to the right way, and there is no guidance like His. The giver of food and drink, and no one eats and drinks except he to whom God gives food and drink. The Healer of every illness, and no one is healed of illness except he from whom God removes the illness and heals him. The Causer of death and the Bringer to life, and no one dies or lives but he whom God causes to die and brings to life. The Forgiver, and no one gains forgiveness from Him but he to whom God grants it. The forgiveness cannot be taken from God by force and compulsion. Only He whom God forgives gains forgiveness. Do you not hear how [Abraham], may God bless him, says: ... "And who, I expect, will forgive my sin on the Day of Judgment." (sura 26, v. 82) On the Day of Judgment God will forgive those sinners whom He wants to forgive. [Abraham], may God bless him, brought proof of the existence of God and proved the existence of the Lord of all the created beings by enumerating all this. Every piece

١ مما ٢١ دل به صلى الله عليه من دليل صغير ولا كبير. يدل ابدًا مستدلا الا على الله العلي الكبير. فذكر ابراهيم عليه السلام مننا. من الله ٢٢ لا يمن بها/مان. واحسانا من الله لا يمثل به احسان. منها خلقه لاعضاء الانسان ١١ (أ) السليمة الظاهرة القوى. التي ليس فيها لمدع من الاولين والآخرين دعوى. والتي كلهم ٢٣ في الحاجة اليها سواء ٢٤. وكيف يصح في ذلك لمدع شيء لو ادعاه. وهو لا يقدر على ان يزيد مثقال ذرة في شيء من خلقه ولا قواه. فكيف يعطي معط شيئا من ذلك احدا سواه. فهذا والحجة البالغة لله فما لا يمكن فيه الكيف ٢٥. ولا يتوهمه بصحة من الدعوى قوي من الخلق ولا ضعيف. والحمد لله على ما ابان من حجته ٢٦. لابراهيم صلى الله عليه في محاجته. وفي ذلك ما يقول سبحانه فيه لابراهيم صلى الله عليه: «وَتِلْكَ حُجَّتُنَا آتَيْنَاهَا إِبْرَاهِيمَ عَلَى قَوْمِهِ نَرْفَعُ دَرَجَاتٍ مَنْ نَشَاءُ إِنَّ رَبَّكَ حَكِيمٌ عَلِيمٌ» ٢٧. وما ذكر صلى الله عليه من فعله به في المطعم والمشرب. والشفاء من المرض والوصب. والموت والحياة. والمغفرة للخطيئة والاساءة. فما ٢٨ [لا يدعيه] ٢٩ مدع ولا يدعي له ابدًا بصدق ولا كذب. ولا يوجد ما يرى من صنعه وتدبيره ابدًا الا للرب. كما لا ٣٠ يرى صنع الارض والسموات ٣١. وما بينهما من الفتوق والفجوات. من صانع ولا خالق سوى الله. فكذلك ما ذكر ابراهيم ٣٢ لا يكون الا من الله. فلو لا صنع الله سبحانه للسماء. لما ارتوى اهل الارض من الماء. ولو لا ما صنع الله منها ومن الارض والهواء. لما اغتذى احد ابدًا ولا ارتوى. ولخفت كل مغتذ مواتا. ومات اذ لم يغتذ خفاتا. فاحتج ابراهيم صلى الله عليه في الدعاء الى الله من صنعه وخلق. ورزقه ٢٠

٢١ ي: بما. ٢٢ ح: + سبحانه. ٢٣ ي: + جميعا. ٢٤ في - سواء: ح: اليها جميعا في الحاجة سواء. ٢٥ ك: التكييف. ٢٦ من حجته: في حواشي ه: من برهانه. ك: من برهانه وحجته. ٢٧ سورة الانعام (٦) ٨٣. ٢٨ ح: بما. ٢٩ لا يدعيه: ه: ص: محذوف. ٣٠ ح: محذوف. ٣١ الارض والسموات: ح: ك: السموات والارض. ٣٢ ح: + عليه السلام.

of evidence, either small or large, that Abraham, may God bless him, brought, only proves the existence of God, the Most High, the Great. Abraham, upon him be peace, mentioned God's favors which no one [else] can bestow and God's benevolence which cannot be likened to the benevolence of others. One of these favors is His creation of man's sound organs, whose powers are manifest and which no pretender, neither of the early generations nor of the late ones, can pretend to have created, and which all people need equally. If someone made such a pretense, how could his pretense be true, while he cannot add [even] the weight of a speck of dust either to part of his [own] creation or to his powers⁸⁵. How can someone other than God give something of all these to another person? Moreover, it is impossible to refute⁸⁶ the conclusive argument for [God's existence], nor is it possible that either a strong person or a weak one should imagine he can refute [God's existence] by a correct claim. Praise be to God for the argument for His [existence] which He manifested to Abraham, may God bless him, when he argued [against his people]. Concerning this matter, God, glory be to Him, said to Abraham, may God bless him: "This is Our argument. We gave it to Abraham against his people. We raise in rank whom We will. Verily your Lord is wise, knowing." (sura 6, v. 83) No one pretends either truly or falsely that he [can do] what [Abraham], may God bless him, mentioned, namely, God's deeds to man in giving [him] food and water, healing illness, causing death and bringing to life, forgiving sins and harming [him], for His creation and direction which are observed are only in His hands. Also no creator is seen, who created the earth and the heavens and the clefts between them, except God. Likewise, what Abraham mentioned is only from God. If God, glory be to Him, did not create the heaven, people would not quench their thirst. And if what God created from water, and earth and air did not exist, no one would be nourished nor his thirst quenched, and whoever is nourished would die suddenly, since he would not be nourished. Concerning the invocation [of the people] to God⁸⁷, Abraham, may God bless him, brought, from

^١ وغير رزقه. بما لم تزل أنبياء^{٤٣٣} الله عليهم السلام قبله وبعده. تحتج^{٤٣٤} به لله على كل من انكره وجحدته.

فمن كان قبله ممن وهبه الله رسالته. ودل على معرفة الله دلالاته. نوح صلى الله عليه. اذ يقول لقومه فيما يدعوهم اليه. من عبادة الله^{٤٣٥} ومعرفته. ويدلهم عليه بالخلق والصنع من صفته: «مَا لَكُمْ لَا تَرْجُونَ لِلَّهِ وَقَارًا. وَقَدْ خَلَقَكُمْ أَطْوَارًا. أَلَمْ تَرَوْا كَيْفَ خَلَقَ اللَّهُ سَبْعَ سَمَوَاتٍ طِبَاقًا. وَجَعَلَ الْقَمَرَ فِيهِنَّ نُورًا وَجَعَلَ الشَّمْسَ سِرَاجًا. وَاللَّهُ أَنْبَتَكُمْ مِنَ الْأَرْضِ نَبَاتًا. ثُمَّ يُعِيدُكُمْ فِيهَا وَيُخْرِجُكُمْ إِخْرَاجًا. وَاللَّهُ جَعَلَ لَكُمْ الْأَرْضَ بِسَاطًا. لِتَسْلُكُوا فِيهَا سُبُلًا فِجَاجًا»^{٤٣٦}. فابان لهم صلى الله عليه فيما عدد كله^{٤٣٧} اثر صنع الله برهانا واحتجاجا. بخلقه لهم في انفسهم اطوارا. يريد بالاطوار طبقات ومرارا. مرة من تراب وطين. وطورا من ماء مهين. ومرة مضغة وطورا علقة. يصرفهم سبحانه خلقه بعد خلقه^{٤٣٨}. ثم خلق الانسان عظاما. ثم كسا/العظام لحما. ثم انشأها خلقا اخر بشرا. قد جعل له سمعا وفؤادا^{٤٣٩} وبصرا. كما قال سبحانه: «قُلْ هُوَ الَّذِي أَنْشَأَكُمْ وَجَعَلَ^{٤٤٠} لَكُمْ أَلْسِنَةً وَالْأَبْصَارَ وَالْأَفْئِدَةَ قَلِيلًا مَّا تَشْكُرُونَ. قُلْ هُوَ الَّذِي ذَرَأَكُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَإِلَيْهِ تُحْشَرُونَ»^{٤٤١}. ومعنى ذراكم. فهو كثركم وانماكم. وكذلك فعل رب العالمين. كما قال^{٤٤٢}: «فَتَبَارَكَ اللَّهُ أَحْسَنُ الْخَالِقِينَ»^{٤٤٣}.

ومن دلائل من كان بعده من رسل الله وانبيائه. الذين جعلهم من ذرية ابراهيم عليه السلام وابنائهم. قول يوسف صلى الله عليه. لصاحبي السجن

^{٤٣٣} ح: امناء. ^{٤٣٤} ح: يحتجون. ^{٤٣٥} ح: + سبحانه. ^{٤٣٦} سورة نوح (٧١) ١٣-٢٠. ^{٤٣٧} ح: محذوف. ^{٤٣٨} ك: خلقه خلقا. ^{٤٣٩} سمعا وفؤادا: ح: فؤادا وسمعا. ^{٤٤٠} الذي انشأكم وجعل: ي: الذي جعل. ^{٤٤١} سورة الملك (٦٧) ٢٣-٢٤. ^{٤٤٢} ح: + تبارك وتعالى. ^{٤٤٣} سورة المؤمنون (٢٣) ١٤.

God's creation and from the fact that God [either] sustains man or keeps sustenance from him, proofs which God's prophets, upon them be peace, before Abraham and after him, have not ceased to bring on behalf of God against whomsoever denied God and disbelieved in Him.

Among [those prophets] before Abraham upon whom God bestowed His mission, and who brought proof, similar to Abraham's proof, causing [people] to know the [existence] of God, there is Noah, may God bless him. For Noah talked to his people about the worship of God and the knowledge of His [existence], to which he called them, and brought to them as a proof of God[']s existence] the creation, which is His quality. "Why do you not expect dignity in God, whereas He created you in stages? Have you not considered how God created seven heavens in layers and placed the moon in them as a light, and the sun as a lamp? Truly God caused you to grow out of the earth, then He will certainly return you to it and bring you forth. God made the earth a carpet for you that you pass through open ways in it." (sura 71, vv. 13-20) [Noah], may God bless him, showed them clearly the sign of God's creation in everything he enumerated as proof and argument, [for example] in the fact that God created them themselves in stages; by "stages" He means phases and times, at one time from dust and clay and at another time from despised fluid, at one time from a piece of flesh and at another time from a clot of blood. [God], glory be to Him, changed people by graded creation. Then He created bones for man, and then He covered the bones with flesh. Then He made it (the bones) into another creation, [namely], human being⁸⁸, to whom He established hearing, understanding and sight. As [God], glory be to Him, has said: "Say: 'It is He who made you and established to you hearing, sight and understanding, [but] you give Him small thanks!' Say: 'It is He who multiplied you (*dhara'akum*) on the earth and unto Whom you will be gathered.' " (sura 67, vv. 23-24) The meaning of *dhara'akum* is "increased your number". And the Lord of all created beings did so, as He has said: "Blessed be God, the best of creators." (sura 23, v. 14)

Among the proofs of those who came after Noah, namely, the messengers and prophets whom God appointed from the progeny of Abraham, upon him be peace, and from the progeny of Abraham's sons, [are] the words of Joseph, may God bless him, to the two companions

١ اللذين كانا معه فيه. وهو يدلّهما على ما^{٤٤٤} تفرد الله به من الربوبية. وما هو له لا لغيره سبحانه من الوجدانية: «يَا صَا حَبِيَّ أَلَسَّجَنَ الرَّبَّابُ مُتَفَرِّقُونَ خَيْرٌ أَمْ اللَّهُ الْوَاحِدُ الْقَهَّارُ. مَا تَعْبُدُونَ مِنْ دُونِهِ إِلَّا أَسْمَاءَ سَمَّيْتُمُوهَا أَنْتُمْ وَآبَاؤُكُمْ مَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ بِهَا مِنْ سُلْطَانٍ»^{٤٤٥}. يقول صلى الله عليه الرباب^{٤٤٦}

٥ الربوبية بينهم ليست بخالصة لواحد منهم خير في الربوبية امرا. واعلى في الفضيلة قدرا. او تكون الربوبية لواحد^{٤٤٧} خاصة. ولرب لا لربين اثنين خالصة. فمن يمتنع من الاصحاء. سمع او لم يسمع من النصحاء^{٤٤٨}. ان الربوبية لرب واحد^{٤٤٩} افضل^{٤٥٠} منها فضلا وفي رب واحد اكمل منها في اثنين. وبين ربين. واعلى لانها لو كانت لاثنتين كان كل واحد من الربين منقوصا. وكل^{٤٥١} اله من الالهين بالنقص مخصوصا. فان كانوا وهم اكثر عددا. كان كل واحد منهم انقص ابدا. فكيف يكون المنقوص الها او يثبت ربا. واين الاعلى من الاشياء. كلها قدرا ممن له اضداد واكفاء. وربنا^{٤٥٢} فمعلوم في الالباب غير مجهول. وثابت لا يدفع في العقول. لان كل اثنين فبينهما تباين لا يخفى في الاحوال. يبين به احدهما على صاحبه في الفضل والكمال. وان افضلهما ابدا احوالا. واكملهما في الفضل كالا. واولاهما بالاثرة والتقدمة. واحقهما بالطاعة والتكرمة. واذا كان ذلك موجودا في العقل كذلك لم تصح الربوبية ابدا الا لرب واحد. وثبتت الحجة في التوحيد واثبات الالهية لله على كل ملحد. وانقطع بين الموحد والملحد في ذلك كله التشاغب. وذهب بصدق الحجة لله في ذلك كله التكاذب. ونفي الحق من الباطل وتبرأ. فلم يعم عنه الا من لا يبصر ولا يرى. ولا يجيب الى

٤٤٤ ك: محذوف. ٤٤٥ سورة يوسف (١٢) ٣٩-٤٠. ٤٤٦ هـ ص: ارباب. ٤٤٧ ك: لرب واحد. ٤٤٨ ح: + من. ٤٤٩ لرب واحد: ي: لواحد. ٤٥٠ ح: + فضلا. ٤٥١ ح: وعلى كل. ك: وكان كل. ٤٥٢ ص ح ي: ربنا.

who were with him in prison, when he brought before them a proof of the divinity which God alone possesses, and the unity which belongs only to Him, glory be to Him, and not to others. “O my two fellow prisoners! Are various Lords better, or God the One, the Victorious? Those whom you worship other than Him are but names which you and your fathers named, and for which God sent down no authority.” (sura 12, vv. 39-40)

Is the divinity of Lords, whose divinity does not belong exclusively to any one of them better and more excellent? Or [is it better] that divinity should belong to only one God exclusively, not to two? Who among men of sound reason would refrain, whether he listens or does not listen to sincere advisers, from [acknowledging] that the divinity of one Lord is more excellent and perfect than that which belongs to two Lords and which is divided between two Lords. Such divinity is higher, since if it belonged to two [Lords], each of the two would lack [a part of divinity], and the lack would be characteristic of each of the two Lords. If there were many of them, each would always be very lacking. How is it possible that one who lacks [divinity] should be God or proved to be God? How great a difference there is between the Most High above all things in capacity and one who has opposites and equals. Our Lord is known by wisdom and proved by reason and is not to be rejected. Since in their states, every two things have differences which cannot be hidden and by which one is clearly distinguished from the other in excellence and perfection, the one whose state is always most excellent and who is most perfect of the two in excellence is the most entitled to be chosen and preferred, obeyed and honored. Since this [argument] is reasonable, divinity too is entitled only to one Lord⁸⁹. The argument for God’s unity and the establishment of His divinity is proved against any unbeliever, and the controversy concerning all this between the believer in God’s unity (*muwahhid*) and the unbeliever (*mulhid*) ceases. The lie about all this disappears because of the right argument for God’s [unity] and because the truth (*al-hakk*)⁹⁰ is free from falsehood. No one will stray from the truth except he who does not observe and does not see, who does not res-

١ الحقائق لله داعيا. ولا يسمع بالدعاء الى الله مناديا. كما قال ٤٥٣: سبحانه: «وَإِنْ تَدْعُوهُمْ ٤٥٤: إِلَى الْهَدَى لَا يَسْمَعُوا وَتَرَاهُمْ يَنْظُرُونَ إِلَيْكَ وَهُمْ لَا يُبْصِرُونَ» ٤٥٥.

١٢ (أ) ومن مقال رسل/الله بعد يوسف صلى الله عليه وعليهم. واحتجاجهم لله على عباده بدلائله فيهم. قول موسى وهارون. اذ ارسلهما الله الى فرعون: «إِنَّا رَسُولُ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ» ٤٥٦. فقال فرعون: «وَمَا رَبُّ الْعَالَمِينَ» ٤٥٧. قال موسى: «رَبُّ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا إِنَّ كُنْتُمْ مُوقِنِينَ» ٤٥٨. يقول صلى الله عليه ان كنتم ممن يوقن في غيب بيقين. او يستدل فيما ٤٥٩ غاب عنه بدليل مبين. استدلال ذوي العقول والالباب. على ما غاب عن ابصارهم بتوار واحتجاب. وانما يدرك ما غاب من الامور بالفكر واليقين. ويدرك ما حضر منها بالحواس من العين او غير العين. وذلك فانما هو درك البهائم الخرس. التي لا تدرك شيئا الا بحاسة من الحواس الخمس. ولا توقن ايدا بغائب غاب عنها. ولا تدرك الا ما كان شاهدا قريبا منها. فاما اهل الالباب والعقول. فيستدلون موقنين على الجاعل بالمجعول. وعلى الغائب المتواري الخفي. بالحاضر ٤٦٠ الظاهر الجلي. وكلما عظم من الدلائل وازداد عظما. ازداد به موقعه يقينا وعلما. فلما كانت السموات والارضون. اعظم ما يرون من الدلائل ويبصرون. دلهم بهما على ربهما. واخبرهم انهم ان لم يوقنوه بهما. لم يوقنوه بغيرهما. لما فيهما من دلائل اليقين بصنعه وتدييره. فقال فرعون «لِمَنْ حَوْلَهُ أَلَا تَسْتَمِعُونَ» ٤٦١. فسألوا موسى كما سأله الملعون. وارتابوا في قوله ٤٦٢: كما ارتاب فرعون. فقال ٤٦٣ موسى صلى الله عليه لهم: «رَبُّكُمْ وَرَبُّ

٤٥٣ ح: + الله. ٤٥٤ ك هـ: تدعهم. ٤٥٥ سورة الاعراف (٧) ١٩٨. ٤٥٦ سورة الشعراء ٤٥٩ ح: بما. ٤٥٧ سورة الشعراء (٢٦) ٢٣. ٤٥٨ سورة الشعراء (٢٦) ٢٤. ٤٥٩ ح: بما. ٤٦٠ ك: بالخاطر. ٤٦١ سورة الشعراء (٢٦) ٢٥. ٤٦٢ ح: قولهم. ٤٦٣ ح: + لهم.

pond to one who calls [him] to the divine truth and does not hear one who calls [him] to God, as God, glory be to Him, has said: "If you call them to the guidance they do not hear. And you see them looking at you but they do not observe." (sura 7, v. 198)

Among the words of God's messengers after Joseph, may God bless him and them, and their arguments against the people on behalf of God—[this argument is based] on the indications of God in people—are the words of Moses and Aaron, when God sent them to Pharaoh: "We are the messenger of the Lord of all the created beings." (sura 26, v. 16) Then Pharaoh said: "What is the Lord of all the created beings?" (sura 26, v. 23) Moses said: "The Lord of the heavens and the earth and what is between them, if you know with certainty." (sura 26, v. 24) [That is to say], Moses, may God bless him, said: If you are among those who know for certain what is hidden, or among those who prove by clear indication, as do wise and intelligent people, what is hidden from them through concealment or disappearance. Hidden things are perceived only by thinking with certainty, [whereas] things which are present are perceived by the senses, the sense of sight or another sense. Sense perception is merely the perception of mute animals which perceive nothing except by one of the five senses. Animals know with certainty nothing that is hidden, and perceive only what is in front of them and near to them. But wise and intelligent people prove [the existence of] the Creator with the certain indications of the created [things] and [prove] the [existence of] hidden, concealed and disappearing [things] through present, visible and evident [things]⁹¹. Whenever the indications grow so do the knower's certainty and knowledge. Since the heavens and the earth are the greatest indications seen and observed by people, Moses brought them as proof for their Lord, and informed them that if they do not know Him with certainty through them (the heavens and the earth), they will not know Him with certainty through other things, because in them there are certain indications of His creation and direction. Pharaoh said: "to those round him: 'Are you not listening?' " (sura 26, v. 25) They asked Moses just as the cursed one (i.e. Pharaoh) had asked him, and doubted his words just as Pharaoh had doubted. Then Moses, may God bless him, said to them: "Your Lord and the Lord of your ancestors." (sura

١ أَبَائِكُمْ الْأَوَّلِينَ» ٤٦٤. فاخبرهم ان كلهم وكل من كان قبلهم عبد لله
 مربوب. ان كلهم وكل ما كان قبلهم ٤٦٥ مصرف مقهور مغلوب. يسقم
 ويفنى ويموت. ويحل به السقم والموت. فقال لهم فرعون: «إِنَّ رَسُولَكُمْ الَّذِي
 أُرْسِلَ إِلَيْكُمْ لَمَجْنُونٌ» ٤٦٦. فقال لهم موسى صلى الله عليه ٤٦٧ اذ عاودوا ٤٦٨
 ٥ يسئلون: «رَبُّ الْمَشْرِقِ وَالْمَغْرِبِ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تَعْقِلُونَ» ٤٦٩.
 فقرهم صلى الله عليه من ذلك ٤٧٠ بما لا ينكرون. ان كانوا يوقنون بغائب او
 يعقلون. ودلهم على الله سبحانه بدليل مبين. فيه لمن ايقن ادل الدلائل وايقن
 اليقين. وكذلك قال الله ٤٧١ سبحانه في القوم الذين لا يعلمون. اذ سألوا ٤٧٢
 من رؤيته ما لا يمكن ولا يكون. اذ يقول سبحانه: «وَقَالَ الَّذِينَ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ
 ١٠ لَوْ لَا يُكَلِّمُنَا اللَّهُ أَوْ تَأْتِينَا آيَةٌ كَذَلِكَ قَالَ الَّذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِهِمْ مِثْلَ قَوْلِهِمْ
 تَشَابَهَتْ قُلُوبُهُمْ قَدْ بَيَّنَّا آيَاتِ لِقَوْمٍ يُوقِنُونَ» ٤٧٣. فاخبر سبحانه ان بيانه
 انما هو للذين يعقلون ويوقنون. من الغيب بما لا يرون ولا يبصرون. فاما اشباه
 ١٢ (ب) البهائم الذين لا يعلمون. الا ما يرون ويبصرون. فان الله سبحانه انتفى/من
 البيان لهم وتبرأ. وذلك فمما ٤٧٤ يدل على علم الله وحكمته. ولطيف خبره
 ١٥ باحوال بريته.

ومن ذلك قوله سبحانه لكفرة قريش والعرب. ولمن كان معهم من كل
 ذي لسان معرب: «أَلَمْ يَأْتِكُمْ نَبَأُ الَّذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِكُمْ قَوْمِ نُوحٍ وَعَادٍ وَثَمُودَ
 وَالَّذِينَ مِنْ بَعْدِهِمْ لَا يَعْلَمُهُمْ إِلَّا اللَّهُ جَاءَتْهُمْ رُسُلُهُمْ بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ فَرَدُّوا
 أَيْدِيَهُمْ فِي أَفْوَاهِهِمْ وَقَالُوا إِنَّا كَفَرْنَا بِمَا أُرْسِلْتُمْ بِهِ وَإِنَّا لَفِي شَكٍّ مِمَّا

٤٦٤ سورة الشعراء (٢٦) ٢٦. ٤٦٥ ي: مثلهم. ٤٦٦ سورة الشعراء (٢٦) ٢٧. ٤٦٧ ص: محذوف. ٤٦٨ ص ك: عاودوا. ٤٦٩ سورة الشعراء (٢٦) ٢٨. ٤٧٠ من ذلك: ص: محذوف. ٤٧١ الله سبحانه: ص ح: الله سبحانه لا شريك له. ك: الله لا شريك له. ٤٧٢ ح: + موسى. ٤٧٣ سورة البقرة (٢) ١١٨. ٤٧٤ ك: فما.

26, v. 26) And Moses informed them that all of them and all those who came before them were slaves, ruled by God, and were subject to change, and were conquered and subjected, and they would become sick, perish and die, and sickness and death would lodge in them. Pharaoh said to them: “Truly, your messenger who has been sent to you is mad.” (sura 26, v. 27) Moses, may God bless him, said to them, when they asked again: “The Lord of the East and West and all that is between, if you are intelligent.” (sura 26, v. 28) Moses, may God bless him, forced them to know what they could not deny if they had certain knowledge of the hidden [things]⁹² or if they were intelligent, and proved God[’s existence] to them by the clearest indication about God and with absolute certainty to one who [can] know with certainty. Likewise God, glory be to Him, said about people who did not know, when they asked to see Him⁹³, [that such] seeing is impossible and will not be. For God, glory be to Him, has said: “Those who have no knowledge say: ‘Why does not God talk to us, or a sign come to us?’ So said those before them. Their hearts are alike. We have made clear the signs to people who know with certainty.” (sura 2, v. 118) God, glory be to Him, made it known that His explanation was directed only to those who were intelligent and knew with certainty the hidden [things] which they did not see or observe. But those who were like animals and who knew only what their eyes saw, God, glory be to Him, refrained from explaining to them. This proves God’s knowledge and wisdom and His precise cognizance of the states of His creatures.

And concerning this, there are the words of God, glory be to Him, to the unbelievers of Ḳuraysh, and to the Arabs and all those who spoke with them Arabic: “Has not come to you the story of those before you, the people of Noah, ‘Ād and Thamūd and of those after them whom only God knows? Their messengers brought them clear signs, but they put their hands in their mouths, and said: ‘We disbelieve in the Message you have been sent with, and really we are in grave doubt concerning what

١ تَدْعُونَنَا إِلَيْهِ مُرِيبٌ. قَالَتْ ٤٧٥ رُسُلُهُمْ أَفِي اللَّهِ شَكٌّ فَاطِرِ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ ٤٧٦. الذي ٤٧٧ يستدل عليه منهما بكل شيء فيهما من كل أو بعض. فقالت رسلهم في ذلك لهم. ما قالت الرسل لامهم قبلهم. واحتجوا لله عليهم. بمثل حجج نوح وإبراهيم فيهم. ودلوهم على الله بدلائله. من فطره وصنعه ٤٧٨ وفعائله. وتعجبوا من شكهم. وما هم فيه من شركهم. مع ما يرون من الدلائل في السماء ٤٧٩ والأرض ويصرون. مما ٤٨٠ يوقن باقوله فيما غاب عنهم الموقنون.

ومن ذلك وفيه. ومن الدلائل عليه. قول الله سبحانه ٤٨١ لرسوله. صلى الله عليه وعلى ٤٨٢ الطيبين من آله: «أَلَمْ تَرَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ خَلَقَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ بِالْحَقِّ إِنْ يَشَأْ يُذْهِبْكُمْ وَيَأْتِ بِخَلْقٍ جَدِيدٍ. وَمَا ذَلِكَ عَلَى اللَّهِ بِعَزِيزٍ» ٤٨٣. فنبه سبحانه في ذلك من دلائله على ما فيه لمن اعتصم به من الشك ٤٨٤ أحرز الحرز الحريز. ثم قال سبحانه ٤٨٥ في ٤٨٦ هذه السورة. تكريرا بالحجة المنيرة ٤٨٧: «اللَّهُ الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ وَأَنْزَلَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مَاءً فَأَخْرَجَ بِهِ مِنَ الثَّمَرَاتِ رِزْقًا لَكُمْ وَسَخَّرَ لَكُمْ الْفَلَكَ لِتَجْرِيَ فِي الْبَحْرِ بِأَمْرِهِ وَسَخَّرَ لَكُمْ الْأَنْهَارَ. وَسَخَّرَ لَكُمْ الشَّمْسَ وَالْقَمَرَ دَائِبَيْنِ وَسَخَّرَ لَكُمْ اللَّيْلَ وَالنَّهَارَ. وَأَتَاكُمْ مِنْ كُلِّ مَا سَأَلْتُمُوهُ وَإِنْ تَعُدُّوا نِعْمَةَ اللَّهِ لَا تُحْصُوهَا إِنَّ الْإِنْسَانَ لَظَلُومٌ كَفَّارٌ» ٤٨٨. يقول سبحانه الذي خلق ذلك كله وصنعه. لا صانع فيه غيره ولا صانع له معه. فذلك كله وإن كابرُوا فما لن يدعوه. وإن لم ياتهم فيه قصص الله ٤٨٩ ولم يسمعه. كما قال تبارك وتعالى:

٤٧٥ ص: + لهم. ٤٧٦ سورة إبراهيم (١٤) ٩-١٠. ٤٧٧ ص: محذوف. ٤٧٨ ح: صنعه. ٤٧٩ في السماء: ص: من الماء. ٤٨٠ ك: ممن. ٤٨١ قوله الله سبحانه: ص: قوله سبحانه. ٤٨٢ ح: + اهله. ٤٨٣ سورة إبراهيم (١٤) ١٩-٢٠. ٤٨٤ ص: + فيه. ك: + به. ٤٨٥ ص: عز وجل. ٤٨٦ ص: محذوف. ٤٨٧ بالحجة المنيرة: في حواشي ه: لحججه المنيرة. ص: للحجة المنيرة. ك: الحجة فيها المنيرة. ٤٨٨ سورة إبراهيم (١٤) ٣٢-٣٤. ٤٨٩ فيه قصص الله: ص: قصص الله فيه.

you call us to.' Their messengers said: 'Is there any doubt concerning God, the Creator of the heavens and the earth?' '' (sura 14, vv. 9-10) from which one brings proof for God[']s existence] through every thing in them, be it a part or a whole. Concerning this, their messengers said to them what the messengers had said to their nations before them and argued for God[']s existence] as Noah and Abraham had argued before their people (lit. in them). They proved God[']s existence] according to His indications, namely His creations and actions. The messengers were astonished at their doubt and unbelief despite what they (the unbelievers) saw and observed in the heaven and on the earth, namely despite the indications, fewer of which [serve] those who know God with certainty to prove what is hidden from them.

Concerning this matter and about it, and within the indications of God[']s existence], there are the words of God, glory be to Him, to His messenger, may God bless him and his good relatives: "Have not you seen that God has created the heavens and the earth in truth? If He wants He will destroy you and bring a new creation. This is not a great matter for God." (sura 14, vv. 19-20) Concerning this, [God], glory be to Him, has called attention to His indications, which are the most protected shelter from doubt, for him who adheres to them. Then [God], glory be to Him, said this sura repeating His enlightening argument: "It is God who created the heavens and the earth, and brought water down from the heavens, and thereby brought forth fruits as sustenance for you. He subjected the ships for you that they might sail on the sea by His command, and subjected the rivers for you, and He subjected the sun and the moon for you constant in their course, and He subjected the night and day for you. He gave you all you asked of Him, and if you number the favors of God, you will not be able to count them. Verily man is a persistent wrongdoer and ungrateful." (sura 14, vv. 32-34) These are the words of God, glory be to Him, who created all this. There is no Creator in the universe except Him, and there is no Creator of the universe in addition to Him. Even if they deny all this they cannot maintain [against God that He is not the Creator], even if God's stories do not reach them and they do not hear them. As [God], may He be blessed and exalted,

١ «خَلَقَ السَّمَوَاتِ بِغَيْرِ عَمَدٍ تَرَوْنَهَا وَآلَقَى فِي الْأَرْضِ رَوَاسِيَ أَنْ تَمِيدَ بِكُمْ وَبَثَّ فِيهَا مِنْ كُلِّ دَابَّةٍ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مِنْ السَّمَاءِ مَاءً فَأَنْبَتْنَا فِيهَا مِنْ كُلِّ زَوْجٍ كَرِيمٍ ٤٩٠. هَذَا خَلْقُ اللَّهِ فَأَرُونِي مَاذَا خَلَقَ الَّذِينَ مِنْ دُونِهِ بَلِ الظَّالِمُونَ فِي ضَلَالٍ مُبِينٍ» ٤٩١. فصدق الله لا شريك له في ان من لم يعرف هذا كله ٤٩٢ صنعاً له ٤٩٣ وخلقاً وحقاً يقينا صدقا فهو في ايين الضلال. واخبل صاغر الخبال. والحمد لله كثيرا رب العالمين. على ما ابان من حججه على الملحددين. فكيف يا ويله يلحد ملحد. او يهن او يضعف لله موحد. ودرك السموات والارض وما بينهما من الخلق بالعيان. والعلم بالله ٤٩٤ سبحانه فمدرك باوضح من ذلك من العلم والايقان. واليقين بالله فما لا يشاركه ولا يختلط به ابدا شك. /وعلم الابصار والعيان والحواس فعلم بين الانسان ١٣ (أ) والبهائم مشترك. وقد تعلم البهائم وتدرك بما جعل الله لها من حواسها من السمع والبصر. كلما يدرك مدرك بالحواس من جميع البشر. وكيف ويلهم يرتابون او يلحدون. او يعتقدون من الشك في الله والشك بالله ما يعتقدون. والله يقول جل جلاله. عن ان يحويه قول او يناله: «اللَّهُ الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا فِي سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍ ثُمَّ اسْتَوَى عَلَى الْعَرْشِ مَا لَكُمْ مِنْ دُونِهِ مِنْ وَلِيٍّ وَلَا شَفِيعٍ أَفَلَا تَتَذَكَّرُونَ. يُدَبِّرُ الْأَمْرَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ إِلَى الْأَرْضِ ثُمَّ يَعْرُجُ إِلَيْهِ فِي يَوْمٍ كَانَ مِقْدَارُهُ أَلْفَ سَنَةٍ مِمَّا تَعُدُّونَ» ٤٩٥. الولي ٤٩٦ فهو ٤٩٧ النصير المانع. والشفيع فهو ٤٩٨ الطالب الشافع. فاخبر سبحانه ان تدبيره وصنعه من العرش لما بعد عنهم. كتدبيره وصنعه لما قرب في الارض منهم. وان بعد ما بين العرش وهو ذرى ٤٩٩ السموات العلى. وبين ٢٠

٤٩٣ ص: محذوف.

٤٩٢ ص: + جميعا.

٤٩١ سورة لقمان (٣١) ١٠-١١.

٤٩٠ ص: بهج.

٤٩٧ ص: هو.

٤٩٦ ص ح ك: والولي.

٤٩٥ سورة السجدة (٣٢) ٤-٥.

٤٩٤ ك: لله.

٤٩٩ ح: ذر.

٤٩٨ ص: هو.

has said: “He created the heavens without pillars that you can see, and cast firm mountains into the earth lest it should quake you, and He spread in it all kinds of beasts. We brought water down from the heaven and caused [plants] of every noble kind to spring up therein. This is the creation of God. Show me, then, what others have created. Nay, the evildoers are in manifest error.” (sura 31, vv. 10-11) God, who has no partner, told the truth [saying] that he who does not know truly and with certainty that all this is God’s creation is most clearly going astray in the most ignominious stupidity. Much praise be to God, the Lord of all created beings, for manifesting His arguments against the unbelievers. How can the unbeliever, woe unto him, disbelieve, or how can one who professes God’s unity be feeble or weak, while the heavens and the earth and what is between are perceived by sight, and the knowledge of God[’s existence] is perceived by certain knowledge which is more evident than sensual perception? Doubt has no part in certain knowledge of God[’s existence] nor mingles with it. The knowledge attained by sight and the [other] senses is common to both man and animal⁹⁴. Animals may know and perceive through their senses, such as hearing and sight, created for them by God, all that every human being perceives by senses. How can they, woe unto them, disbelieve in God, doubt or think of doubting Him and attributing a copartner to Him, whereas God—He is too exalted for words to contain or grasp—has said: “It is God who created the heavens and the earth and what is between in six days, then seated himself on the throne. You have no protector (*walī*) nor intercessor (*shafiʿ*) except Him. Will you not then remember? He directs the world (lit. affair) from the heavens to the earth, then it ascends to Him in one day, whose measure is one thousand years in your counting.” (sura 32, vv. 4-5) *Al-walī* is the protector and *al-shafiʿ* is the intercessor. [God], glory be to Him, informs [them] that He directs and creates what is distant from them, from the throne, just as on the earth He directs and creates what is near to them, and that the measure of the distance between the throne, which is the peak of the highest heavens,

١ ما ٥٠٠ تحتهم مما ترى اعينهم من الارض الاولى. مقدار الف سنة كاملة مما يعدون. وان الاشياء كلها لا تبعد عنه كما يستبعدون ٥٠١. وكيف يبعد عنه ٥٠٢ سبحانه من الاشياء شيء. وانما ينشئ منها ما ينشئ. اذا اراد له ابداء او اعادة. بان يريد ٥٠٣ سبحانه ارادة بعد ارادة ٥٠٤. كما قال سبحانه: «إِنَّمَا قَوْلُنَا ٥٠٥ لَشَيْءٍ إِذَا أَرَدْنَاهُ أَنْ نَقُولَ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ» ٥٠٦. وكيف يشك ملحد في صنع الله للاشياء ٥٠٧ كلها. او في ما يرى من دق الاشياء او جلها. وقد ٥٠٨ يرى كيف احكمت فاستحكمت. وانقادت للصنعة فتقومت. ودلت على ما فطرت. واضطرت كما اضطرت. فكلها ٥٠٩ مصرف مضرور. وجميعها بدع ٥١٠ مفطور. لا يمتنع من ٥١١ القهر والذلة ٥١٢ والخشوع. ولا عن ما ابان الله فيه من اثر صنعة كل مصنوع. لا ينظر منه ناظر الى طرف. ولا يلتفت ٥١٣ الى كنف. الا وجد اثر الصنع فيه واضحا بينا. ووجده بصنع الله له مخبرا مبينا. ولما ثبت اضطرابا بما لا تدفعه العقول ٥١٤ مما ٥١٥ لا مرية فيه. وبما جميع العقول كلها مجمعة عليه. ان لكل ما يرى او يسمع او يشم. او يذاق او يلمس او يتخيل فيتوهم. مدبرا لا يخفى تدبيره. ومؤثرا بينا لكل ٥١٦ عقل تأثيره. ثبت ٥١٧ وجوده ٥١٨ خلاف المدبر مدبرا غير مدبر ٥١٩. ووجد ٥٢٠ خلاف المؤثر مؤثرا غير مؤثر ٥٢١. لا يمكن غير ذلك علما. ولا يتخيل ٥٢٢ خلافا لذلك فهما ٥٢٣. لانه لما كان ما

٥٠٠ ص: وما. ٥٠١ ك: تستبعدون. ٥٠٢ ك: عليه. ٥٠٣ ح: يريد. ٥٠٤ يريد - ارادة: ك: يريد سبحانه بعد ارادة ارادة. ٥٠٥ ص ي: امرنا. ٥٠٦ سورة النمل (١٦) ٤٠. ٥٠٧ صنع الله للاشياء: ص: صنع الاشياء. ٥٠٨ ك: قد. ٥٠٩ ص: كلها. ٥١٠ ص: بدع. ٥١١ هـ ص ح ك ي: من. والاصح عن. ٥١٢ القهر والذلة ص ح ك: الذلة والقهر. ٥١٣ ص ك: + منه. ٥١٤ بما - العقول: ص: محذوف. ٥١٥ ص: بما. ٥١٦ ص ح: + ذي. ٥١٧ ح ك: + يقينا. ٥١٨ ص ح ك: وجود. ٥١٩ غير مدبر: ك: محذوف. ٥٢٠ ص ح ك: وجود. ٥٢١ ص: + لا يخفى تأثيره. ٥٢٢ ص: يتحل. ٥٢٣ خلافا لذلك فهما: ص: خلافا لذلك وهما. ك: خلافا فيهما وهما.

to the lowest (lit. first) earth seen by people beneath them is a full thousand years⁹⁵ in their counting, and [He also informs them] that all things are not far from Him as they believe⁹⁶. How can a thing be far from [Him], glory be to Him, whereas only He creates what He creates, when He wants to create a first creation or to create again⁹⁷ (by resurrecting the dead) by that He wants them time and again, as [God], glory be to Him, has said: “When We will a thing, We only say to it ‘be’ and it is.” (sura 16, v. 40) How can an unbeliever doubt that God created all things, or that He created the fine things or the rough things which he sees, whereas he sees how things were perfectly made, how they submitted to their making and how they were formed, and prove their having been created and having been forced as they were [actually] forced [to come into being]. All of them are subject to change and damage, and all of them are created products in which coercion and submission and the sign of creation of every created thing which God makes manifest in them cannot be avoided. [When] one looks at a side of a created product or turns his attention to a corner, he immediately finds the sign of creation in them, clear and manifest and he finds it informing and showing him that God created them. Since it is necessary and undoubtedly proved by proofs which reason cannot reject but must agree with without dispute that everything that is seen, heard, smelled, tasted, touched and perceived by imagination has a director, whose direction is not hidden, and a maker of signs (*mu’aththir*)⁹⁸, whose making is evident to every intelligent man, the existence of God as an undirected director who is different from the thing directed is proved, and He is [also] found to be the one who makes signs, not made by signs, who is different from what is made by signs. With regard to knowledge nothing else is possible, and with regard to understanding nothing else can be imagined. Since all

١ وجد من الاشياء كلها مدبرا. وصنعا وخلقا مفتطرا^{٥٢٤}. احتيج الى علم مدبره ومفتطره. وثبت يقينا وجود المفتطر المدبر بما وجد من تديره ومفتطره^{٥٢٥}. فلا بد كيفما كان النظر في ذلك فارتفع او لم يرتفع من ان
١٣ (ب) يثبت^{٥٢٦}/مدبر صانع. لم يدبر ولم يصنع. وذلك^{٥٢٧} فما^{٥٢٨} لا يوجد ابدا
٥ غير الله جل ثناؤه. وتقديست بكل بركة اسمائه. فهو الله الصانع غير المصنوع. والاول المبتدع غير المبدوع.

ولما كان كل عزيز من ذل. انما يعز في بعض لا في كل. كان^{٥٢٩} العز كلا وبعضا. ولم يوجد العز كله لواحد^{٥٣٠} محضا. ايقنا^{٥٣١} ان بعض العز مملوك للمليك. وايقنا ان كل العز للمالك غير ذي شريك. لانه لو كان له فيه شريك. او له معه مليك. لكان انما له بعضه لا كله فرجعنا الى الخطة الاولى. وعاد العز ذلا. اذ كان مشاركا فيه. لانه انما له احد شطريه. وذلك يرده الى ان يكون عزيزا ذليلا. وان يكون ما يستكثر من عزه قليلا. لان نصف العز اقل من ضعفه. وضعف العز اكثر من نصفه. وما ملك غيره من^{٥٣٢} احد شطري العز. فليس له بملك^{٥٣٣} ولا عز معز. ولكنه للملكه دونه. ليس^{٥٣٤} له شيء منه. فكلاهما ذليل وان عز. وغير محرز من العز الا لما احرز. فجميعهما قليل عزه. اذ لم يملك العز كله فيحرزه. فليس العزيز الذي لا يذل. الا من له العز الذي لا يقل. بان تشاركه فيه الشركاء. او ان^{٥٣٥} تنقسمه بملكها له الملكاء. وذلك فهو الله العزيز الاعلى. يهب لمن يشاء عزا ويذل من يشاء اذلالا. اذ^{٥٣٦} بيده الملك وهو على كل شيء قدير. كما قال سبحانه: «فَعِمْ الْوَلَى وَنِعَمَ النَّصِيرُ»^{٥٣٧}. معما في القرآن من هذا

٥٢٤ ص ك: + لا. ٥٢٥ ك: وتفتطره. ٥٢٦ ك: + وجود. ٥٢٧ ص: محذوف.
٥٢٨ ح: مم. ٥٢٩ ك: وكان. ولعله الاصح. ٥٣٠ ص: لا حد. ٥٣١ ص: علمنا فايقنا. ح:
فايقنا. ٥٣٢ ح: محذوف. ٥٣٣ ص: بملك. ٥٣٤ ح: وليس. ٥٣٥ او ان: ص: وان.
٥٣٦ ص ح ك: محذوف. ٥٣٧ سورة الحج (٢٢) ٧٨.

things that exist are directed, produced and created, there is a need⁹⁹ to know their director and creator. And since the existence of a creator and director is certainly demonstrated by his direction and creation which exist, there is no way of avoiding the demonstration, however one considers this matter, and whether one cancels his consideration or not, that there is a director and creator who is neither directed nor created and [that] there can be none such at all except God, may His praise be exalted and His names be sanctified by every blessing. This is God, the Creator who is not created and the First One, the Producer who is not produced.

Since every powerful being who is also weak (lit. with regard to weakness), is powerful in some [things] and not in all [things], and since power consists of the whole and its parts, and since power does not belong in its entirety to anyone alone, we know with certainty that part of power is possessed by a [certain] possessor. [Also] we know with certainty that power in its entirety is possessed by a possessor who has no partner. Since if he had a partner in power or if there were a possessor of power with him, he would have only a part of power, not the whole; consequently, we would return to the first matter, and power would turn into weakness, since someone else participates in it, because he has only one part of its two. This brings him (the possessor of power) to a state of being powerful and weak [simultaneously], and to a state in which his power, which he wants to increase, is small, since half of power is less than its double, and double power is more than half. A part of power possessed by one person is not in possession of another person nor does it belong to him, but belongs to its possessor alone and the other person has no share in it. Both of them are weak; even if they are powerful [in relation to other beings], and have only [a part] of the power which they attained. Both of them have scant power, since they do not possess power in its entirety nor attain it. The only powerful being who does not become weak is he who has power which is not decreased by the participation of partners or by others sharing its possession. But such a one is God the Powerful, the Most High¹⁰⁰. He gives power to whom He wills and weakens whom He wills, for He possesses [everything], and He can do everything. As God, glory be to Him, has said: “[He is your Protector]. What a wonderful Protector and what a wonderful Helper,” (sura 22, v. 78) as well as

١ ومثله. مما يكثر عن ان يحيط كتابنا هذا بتفسيره او جملة.
 فاما دلائله لنا سبحانه على انه خلاف للاشياء. ولكل ما يعقل في
 جميعها من العجزة والاقوياء. فقولُه سبحانه: «لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ وَهُوَ
 السَّمِيعُ الْبَصِيرُ»^{٥٣٨}. وما ليس كمثله شيء. وهو خلاف لكل شيء. وقوله
 ٥ سبحانه في سورة التوحيد والافراد. بعد تنزيهه^{٥٣٩} فيها سبحانه عن الوالد
 والاولاد: «وَلَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُ كُفُوًا أَحَدٌ»^{٥٤٠}. ومن لم يكن له كفوا احد. فهو
 خلاف لكل احد. وما كان خلافا للاحاد كلها. كان خلافا اضطرارا
 لاصلها. لان الاصل في نفسه وحداده. فهو غير شك جميع آحاده.
 فالله^{٥٤١} هو خلاف الاحاد المعدودة. وجميع ما يعقل من الاصول الموجودة.
 ١٠ وهو الله الصمد الحق الذي^{٥٤٢} ليس من ورائه مصمد يصمد اليه صامد.
 والله الملك القدوس الذي ليس من ورائه ملك ولا قدوس يجده واجد. والله
 الاول قبل الاوائل المتقدمة. والعظيم قبل جميع^{٥٤٣} الاشياء المعظمة. فليس قبله
 اول موجود. ولا بعده معظم معمود. ومن وراء كل عظيم عظيم. حتى ينتهي
 الى الله الذي ليس من ورائه عظيم. وفوق كل ذي علم عليم. حتى ينتهي الى
 ١٥ الله الذي ليس فوقه عليم. والصمد فهو النهاية القصوى في الوجود^{٥٤٤}. وفيما
 ١٤ (أ) يرغب اليه/فيه في الآخرة والدنيا من كل^{٥٤٥} محمود. والاحد فما ليس له قبل
 ولا بعد يفترقان فيه. وما لا تجري مدد الدهور والازمان عليه. لانه ان افترق
 فيه القبل والبعد. زال من^{٥٤٦} صفة الاحد والصمد. اذ^{٥٤٧} هما فيه
 اضطرارا^{٥٤٨} مفترقان^{٥٤٩}. فهما عليه بالمقارنة لا شك متداولان. لا خلوة له
 ٢٠ من^{٥٥٠} احدهما. يجري عليه من المقارنة ما يجري عليهما من حدهما. ويزول

٥٣٨ سورة الشورى (٤٢) ١١. ٥٣٩ ص: تنزيه. ح: تنزيهه. ٥٤٠ سورة الاخلاص (١١٢) ٤.

٥٤١ ح: + سبحانه. ٥٤٢ وهو - الذي: ص: والله هو الصمد الذي. ٥٤٣ ح: محذوف.

٥٤٤ ص وفي حواشي هـ: الجود. في حواشي ص: الوجود. ٥٤٥ ص: محذوف. ٥٤٦ ك: عن.

٥٤٧ ص ح: + ما. ٥٤٨ في حواشي هـ: اضطرارا. ٥٤٩ ك: مقترنان. ٥٥٠ ح: عن.

[other] verses like this and similar ones in the *Ḳurʿān* which are too numerous for our book to encompass in its interpretation or summing up.

As for the proofs God has shown us that He is different from [other] things and from all things perceived by reason, whether they are weak or powerful, there is His verse, glory be to Him: “There is nothing like Him and He is the All-Hearing and the All-Seeing.” (sura 42, v. 11) That which has nothing like itself is different from everything. His verse, glory be to Him, in the sura of Unity, after He [has stated] in it that He is far above having a father and child, is: “There is no one like Him.” (sura 112, v. 4) He who has no one like him is different from everyone. That which is different from all individual things (*āḥād*) is necessarily different from their root. For the root in itself and in its outer borders undoubtedly [includes] all individual parts [that compose it]. God is different from all individual enumerated things and from all existing roots which can be perceived by reason. This is God to-whom-one-directs-himself (*al-ṣamad*), the True, beyond Whom there is no one to whom one can direct himself¹⁰¹. God is the King, the Most Holy, beyond Whom there is no king and no holy being whom one can find. God is the First before the early beginnings and the Exalted above all exalted beings. There is no first being before Him, nor is there an exalted and worshipped being after Him, whereas beyond every exalted being there is [another] exalted being until [this chain of exalted beings] ends at God beyond Whom there is no exalted being. And above every owner of knowledge there is a knower until [this chain of knowers] ends at God beyond Whom there is no knower. *Al-ṣamad* means the utmost end¹⁰² in existence, and [the end] of all the praiseworthy things to pray for in this world and in the world to come. As for the “One” (*aḥad*)¹⁰³, there is no division of “before” and “after” in Him. Periods of time do not apply to Him, since if¹⁰⁴ there were a division of “before” and “after” in Him, the quality of [being] the one who is exalted and above whom there is no exalted being would leave Him, for in that case [“before” and “after”] are necessarily divided in Him and undoubtedly alternate with each another interdependently, without His being free of either of them. [This] interdependence would apply to Him, just as their being limited

١ عنه من الوجدانية ما زال عنهما. ولا يتوهم ابدا خاليا منهما. وكذلك ما جرت عليه مدد الازمان والدهور. غيرته تغييرها لغيره من الامور. كما قال الله ٥٥١ سبحانه: «هُوَ الْأَوَّلُ وَالْآخِرُ وَالظَّاهِرُ وَالْبَاطِنُ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمٌ» ٥٥٢. فاوليته سبحانه آخريته. وباطنيته ظاهريته. لا يختلف من ذلك ما وصف به. كما لا يختلف سبحانه ٥٥٣ في نفسه. وكذلك اسماءه كلها الحسنی. وامثاله كلها العلی. فاسماءه ٥٥٤ لا تنتهي مرسله مطلقة. مجمعة كلها فيه سبحانه لا مفترقة. ليس لاسم منها حد محذور. ولا لمثل منها حصار محصور ٥٥٥. فيكون الحد حينئذ للمحدود ثانيا. وما حظر ٥٥٦ بالحد من المحدود متناها. ولكنه كما قال سبحانه: «فَاعْبُدْهُ وَاصْطَبِرْ لِعِبَادَتِهِ هَلْ تَعْلَمُ لَهُ سَمِيًّا» ٥٥٧. ولا لن يوجد له سمي. اذ لا تجد الالباب له كفيا. وكما قال تبارك وتعالى: «وَلَهُ الْمَثَلُ الْأَعْلَى» ٥٥٨. وكذلك هو سبحانه اذ لا تجد له الالباب مثلا. وما قلنا به في هذا من دلالة التفاضل ٥٥٩ فموجود والحمد لله لا ينكره عقل عاقل ومضطرة الالباب الى علمه. لا يدفعه الا متجاهل مع ما لا ياتي عليه. وان بولغ ٥٦٠ تعديدنا. ولا يستقصيه وان جهد تجديدنا. من لطيف شواهد معرفة الله سبحانه وجلالها. وما جعل الله من شواهد المعرفة به ٥٦١ ودلائلها. وكفى بما ذكرنا لمعرفة ٥٦٢ الله عز وجل ٥٦٣ علما منيفا شامخا. وعلما بالله يقينا في النفوس ثابتا راسخا. لا يدفعه الا بمكابرة ٥٦٤ للعقول ملحد. ولا يصدف عن الاقرار به الا معاند ملد ٥٦٥. والحمد لله الذي لا يهتدي للخير ابدا الا من هداه. ولا يصيب الرشد الا من آتاه

٥٥١ ك: محذوف. ٥٥٢ سورة الحديد (٥٧) ٣. ٥٥٣ ي: محذوف. ٥٥٤ ح: + اسماء. ٥٥٥ ص: محذور. ٥٥٦ ص ح وفي حواشي ه: حصر. ٥٥٧ سورة مريم (١٩) ٦٥. ٥٥٨ سورة الروم (٣٠) ٢٧. ٥٥٩ ك: التفاصيل. ٥٦٠ ك: بلغ. ٥٦١ ص: محذوف. ٥٦٢ ح: من معرفة. ٥٦٣ عز وجل: ك: جل وعز. ٥٦٤ ص: مكابرة. ٥٦٥ ص: ملحد.

applies to them, and unity would not apply to Him, just as it does not apply to them, and it would be completely impossible to imagine that He is free of them. The same holds true for the thing to which periods of time apply and change it to other thing. As God, glory be to Him, has said: "He is the First and the Last, the Visible and the Hidden, and the Omniscient." (sura 57, v. 3) His being first is His being last, and His being hidden is His being visible. His qualities are not different from each other, just as God, glory be to Him, is not different within Himself^{f05}, the same applies to all His most beautiful names and all His highest parables. His names are infinite, unlimited and absolute. All of them are gathered together in Him, glory be to Him, and not separated. There is no limit that limits any name, nor is there any restriction that restricts any parable, so that the limit limits the limited thing, and the limited thing that is limited by a limit is finite. But He is like what God, glory be to Him, has said: "Worship Him, then! And be patient in His worship! Do you know His namesake?" (sura 19, v. 65) No, His namesake will not be found at all, since reason does not find an equal to Him. As God, may He be blessed and exalted, has said: "He is to be compared to the highest." (sura 30, v. 27) And this is how God is, since reason does not find a parable for Him. The proof for God's superiority, which we discussed, exists, praise be to God, and the reason of the intelligent person cannot deny it, and reason is compelled to know it. Only he who feigns ignorance rejects it in spite of the precise and lofty pieces of evidence God created attesting to the knowledge of His [existence]. Our enumeration of these pieces of evidence cannot be complete even if we overdo it, nor can our efforts extract [everything from these pieces of evidence], even if we exert ourselves exceedingly. What we have mentioned is sufficient, as high and lofty knowledge of God, may He be exalted and extolled, and as certain knowledge of God which is fixed and deeply rooted in the hearts, which the unbeliever can reject only in opposition to his reason, and only a person who resists stubbornly can deviate from acknowledging it. Praise be to God! Only He whom God guides is guided rightly and only he whom God brings to the right

١ اياه ٥٦٦. كما قال سبحانه: «وَلَقَدْ آتَيْنَا إِبْرَاهِيمَ رُشْدَهُ مِنْ قَبْلُ وَكُنَّا بِهِ عَالِمِينَ» ٥٦٧. وقال سبحانه ٥٦٨: «وَكَذَلِكَ نُرِي إِبْرَاهِيمَ مَلَكُوتَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَلِيَكُونَ مِنَ الْمُوقِنِينَ» ٥٦٩.

فقلب ٥٧٠ الايمان من كل عصيان اليقين بالله وعلمه ٥٧١. وبراء الضمائر من توهمه. فانه لا تجول اوهام المتوهم. الا في كل ذي صورة وتجسم. ومن توهم الله جسما. فلم يصب بالله علما. ولم يقارب من اليقين بالله شيئا. ولذلك كان حشو ٥٧٢ العامة من اليقين بالله ٥٧٣ براء ٥٧٤. ولما التبس بقلوبهم ١٤ (ب) وانفسهم من ذلك واعتقاده. اقتادهم وليهم/ابليس بالمعصية في قياده. فحثوا له بالعصيان لله سراعا عنقا. واثروا رضاه على رضى الله اذ لم يؤمنوا ٥٧٥ به ٥٧٦ فسقا. فبدلوا معالم اموره. وعموا عن ضياء نوره. ثم لم يزدادوا في العمى عن الله الا تماديا. ولم يجيبوا له ٥٧٧ الى الهدى من الهادين الى الله ٥٧٨ داعيا. وعدوا اساءتهم فيما بينهم وبين الله احسانا. وكفرهم بالله ورسله وكتبه ايمانا. وجعلوا الله مثل السوء وهم المثل الاعلى. فتبارك الله عما قالوا به عليه وتعالى. ونسبوا الى الله سبحانه جور الحكم. وبراوا انفسهم من الجور والظلم. وهم بما نسبوا اليه سبحانه من الجور والظلم ٥٧٩ اولى. وله سبحانه لا لهم المثل الاعلى. ومثل السوء فلهم كما قال سبحانه: «هُمْ ٥٨٠ أَلْكَاذِبُونَ» ٥٨١. «وَتَصِفُ ٥٨٢ أَلْسِنَتُهُمُ الْكَذِبَ أَنَّ لَهُمُ الْحُسْنَى لَا جَرَمَ أَنَّ لَهُمُ النَّارَ وَأَنَّهُمْ مُفْرَطُونَ» ٥٨٣. وقال سبحانه: «لِلَّذِينَ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِالْآخِرَةِ مَثَلُ السُّوءِ وَلِلَّهِ أَلْمَثَلُ الْأَعْلَى وَهُوَ الْعَزِيزُ الْحَكِيمُ» ٥٨٤.

٥٦٦ ص: محذوف. ٥٦٧ سورة الانبياء (٢١) ٥١. ٥٦٨ وقال سبحانه: ح ك: وقال جل جلاله عن ان يحويه قول او يناله. ٥٦٩ سورة الانعام (٦) ٧٥. ٥٧٠ ح: فقلت. ٥٧١ ح ي: ويعلمه. ٥٧٢ ك: هذه. ٥٧٣ ص: به. ٥٧٤ ص: بريا. ٥٧٥ ص: يوقنوا. ٥٧٦ ي: بالله. ٥٧٧ ص: لهم. ٥٧٨ الى الله: ص: محذوف. ٥٧٩ ص: محذوف. ٥٨٠ ك ي: وهم. ٥٨١ سورة النحل (١٦) ١٠٥. هـ: كاذبون. ٥٨٢ ص: تصف. ٥٨٣ سورة النحل (١٦) ٦٢. ٥٨٤ سورة النحل (١٦) ٦٠.

way reaches it. As God, glory be to Him, has said: "We already gave Abraham his right way, and We know him." (sura 21, v. 51) And God, glory be to Him, has said: "Thus did We show Abraham the kingdom of the heavens and the earth, in order that he may be one of those who know with certainty." (sura 6, v. 75)

The belief which is pure of any act of disobedience is the certain knowledge (*yaḳīn*) of God and the freeing of thought from fancying God. For the fancies of the fancier occupy his thought only with regard to every owner of form and body. Whoever fancies God as a body, neither knows Him rightly, nor approaches [even] slightly the certain knowledge of God. Therefore the scholars of the masses (*hashw al-ʿāmma*)¹⁰⁶ are devoid of the certain knowledge of God. On account of the confused belief in their hearts and souls, their friend, the Devil, has led them with his reins, by [their] disobedience. They were hastily incited to disobey God because of the Devil, and preferred the approval [of the Devil] to God's approval, since, on account of their sin, they did not believe in God. They changed the things which God established as road signs, and strayed from the path to the brightness of His light. They also strayed persistently from the road to God. They did not respond, because of the Devil, to any one of God's guides who called them to the right way. They regarded their evil deeds, which were between them and God, as good deeds, and their unbelief in God, His messengers and His books as belief. They compared God to what is evil and themselves to the highest¹⁰⁷. May God be blessed and exalted above what they believed about Him. They attributed injustice in judgment to God, glory be to Him, and freed themselves from [imputations of] injustice and evil, [but] they were most deserving of the [label of] injustice and evil which they attributed to God, glory be to Him, and He, not they, is to be compared to the highest, and they are to be compared to what is evil¹⁰⁸. As God, glory be to Him, has said: "They are the liars." (sura 16, v. 105) "Their tongues expound the lie that the goodly [reward] will be theirs. Without any doubt the fire (of Hell) will be for them, and they will be hustled in." (sura 16, v. 62) And God, glory be to Him, has said: "Those who do not believe in the world to come are to be compared to what is evil, but God is to be compared to the highest; He is the Mighty, the Wise." (sura 16, v. 60)

١ ولعمري ما امن بالآخرة مصدقا. ولا وجد لما حقق الله منها محققا. من
 اكذب وعدها وويعيدها. وانكر من جزاء المحسن والمسيء عتيدها. والله يقول
 سبحانه: «إِلَيْهِ مَرْجِعُكُمْ جَمِيعًا وَعَدَ اللَّهُ حَقًّا إِنَّهُ يَبْدَأُ الْخَلْقَ ثُمَّ يُعِيدُهُ
 لِيَجْزِيَ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ بِالْقِسْطِ وَالَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا لَهُمْ شَرَابٌ
 ٥ مِنْ حَمِيمٍ وَعَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌ ٥٨٥ بِمَا كَانُوا يَكْفُرُونَ» ٥٨٦. ويقول سبحانه:
 «فَاعْرِضْ عَنْ مَنْ تَوَلَّى عَنْ ذِكْرِنَا وَلَمْ يُرِدْ إِلَّا الْحَيَاةَ الدُّنْيَا. ذَلِكَ مَبْلَغُهُمْ
 مِنَ الْعِلْمِ إِنَّ رَبَّكَ هُوَ أَعْلَمُ بِمَنْ ضَلَّ عَنْ سَبِيلِهِ وَهُوَ أَعْلَمُ بِمَنِ اهْتَدَى.
 وَلِلَّهِ مَا فِي السَّمَوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ لِيَجْزِيَ الَّذِينَ أَسَاءُوا بِمَا عَمِلُوا
 وَيَجْزِيَ الَّذِينَ أَحْسَنُوا بِالْحُسْنَى» ٥٨٧. ويقول سبحانه: «لَيْسَ بِأَمَانِيِّكُمْ وَلَا
 ١٠ أَمَانِي أَهْلِ الْكِتَابِ مَنْ يَعْمَلْ سُوءًا يُجْزَ بِهِ وَلَا يَجِدْ لَهُ مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ وَلِيًّا
 وَلَا نَصِيرًا. وَمَنْ يَعْمَلْ مِنَ الصَّالِحَاتِ مِنْ ذَكَرٍ أَوْ أَثْنَى وَهُوَ مُؤْمِنٌ
 فَأُولَئِكَ يَدْخُلُونَ الْجَنَّةَ وَلَا يُظْلَمُونَ نَقِيرًا» ٥٨٨. ويقول عز من قائل ٥٨٩: «يَا
 أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَأْكُلُوا أَمْوَالَكُمْ بَيْنَكُمْ بِالْبَاطِلِ إِلَّا أَنْ تَكُونَ تِجَارَةً عَنْ
 تَرَاضٍ مِنْكُمْ وَلَا تَقْتُلُوا أَنْفُسَكُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ بِكُمْ رَحِيمًا. وَمَنْ يَفْعَلْ ذَلِكَ
 ١٥ عُدُوًّا وَظُلْمًا فَسَوْفَ نُصْلِيهِ نَارًا وَكَانَ ذَلِكَ عَلَى اللَّهِ يَسِيرًا» ٥٩٠. ويقول
 سبحانه: «وَقُلِ الْحَقُّ مِنْ رَبِّكُمْ فَمَنْ شَاءَ فَلْيُؤْمِنْ وَمَنْ شَاءَ فَلْيُكْفُرْ إِنَّا
 أَعْتَدْنَا لِلظَّالِمِينَ نَارًا أَحَاطَ بِهِمْ سُرَادِقُهَا وَإِنْ يَسْتَغِيثُوا يُغَاثُوا بِمَاءٍ كَالْمُهْلِ
 يَشْوِي الْوُجُوهَ بِئْسَ الشَّرَابُ وَسَاءَتْ مُرْتَفَقًا» ٥٩١.

وعدا من الله ووعيدا. وجزاء من الله للفریقین عتيدا. لا تكون الآخرة
 ٢٠ ابدا الا وهو معها. ومن انكره ودفعه انكر الآخرة اضطرارا ودفعها. وله

٥٨٥٠ وعذاب اليم: ي: محذوف. ٥٨٦ سورة يونس (١٠) ٤. ٥٨٧ سورة النجم (٥٣) ٢٩-٣١.

٥٨٨ سورة النساء (٤) ١٢٣-١٢٤. ٥٨٩ ويقول - قائل: ص ح: ويقول سبحانه. ٥٩٠ سورة النساء

(٤) ٢٩-٣٠. ٥٩١ سورة الكهف (١٨) ٢٩.

Upon my life, whoever denies the promise (*waʿd*) and the threat (*waʿid*)¹⁰⁹, and whoever denies that the reward for the good-doer and the evil-doer is ready in the world to come (*ʿatīd*)¹¹⁰, neither believes sincerely in the world to come nor is found believing in the things of the world to come which God made certain. God, glory be to Him, has said: "To Him all [of you] will return; it is the promise (*waʿd*) of God in truth. He originates the creation, then restores it (a second time) that He may justly reward those who believe and do good works. But for those who disbelieve there is a boiling drink and painful punishment, on account of their disbelieving." (sura 10, v. 4) God, glory be to Him, has said: "So turn from those who turn their backs on Our Reminder, and desire nothing but the life of this world. That is the extent of their knowledge. Verily, your Lord knows best those who stray from His way, and He knows best those who are guided. To God belongs whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth, that He may recompense those who do evil for what they have done, and may recompense those who do good with the best." (sura 53, vv. 29-31) God, glory be to Him, has said: "It is neither in accordance with your desires nor the desires of the People of the Book. Whoever does evil will be recompensed for it, and will not find for himself either protector or helper other than God. And whoever does good works, be it male or female, and is a believer, will enter Paradise and not be wronged¹¹¹ [even as much as] the speck in a date-stone." (sura 4, vv. 123-124) And He who is more powerful than any sayer has said: "O, those who believe, do not consume your property among yourselves in vanity, except through trading by mutual consent, and do not kill each other, because God has compassion on you. Whoever does that in enmity and wrong, We shall roast in fire, and that is easy for God." (sura 4, vv. 29-30) God, glory be to Him, has said: "Say: 'The truth is from your Lord; so whosoever wants to, let him believe, and whosoever wants to, let him disbelieve.' Verily, We have prepared for the evil-doers Fire whose tent encompasses them. If they call for aid they will be aided with water like molten copper which burns their faces. What an evil drink, and what an evil place to lie in." (sura 18, v. 29)

[God has made these statements] as a promise and a threat and as a recompense prepared for the two groups (the believers and the unbelievers). The world to come exists only with the reward in it. Whoever denies and rejects the existence of the recompense necessarily denies and rejects the existence of the world to come. The world to come

١ جعلت الآخرة وثبتت ٥٩٢. وثبت باقيا ابدا معها ما بقيت. ولو امكن فناؤه
 لا يمكن فناؤها. وما بقيت الآخرة بقي معها ٥٩٣ جزاؤها. فبقاء كل بكل
 معقود. وكل من ٥٩٤ الله وعد ٥٩٥ موعود. لا يدخله ابدا كذب ولا خلف.
 ولا يزول من اوصاف الله ٥٩٦ فيه بصدق الوعد وصف. ولا ٥٩٧
 ١٥ (أ) ° اكفر/بالآخرة وامرها. وما ٥٩٨ ذكر الله من بعث الامم وحشرها. ممن ٥٩٩ زعم
 ان الله يحكم يومئذ فيها بغير العدل. ويقضي بين اهلها فيها بغير قضاء
 الفصل. فيعذب من عذب فيها. بامور هو حمل المعذب عليها. حتى لم يجد
 من ارتكابها بدا. ولا عما ارتكب منها مصدا. وان عمل ٦٠٠ ما شاء الله فيها
 وارتضى. وحكم الله به منها وقضى. عذب بالوان العذاب. وعوقب ٦٠١ باشد
 ١٠ العقاب. فوصفوا الله باخلاف الميعاد. ونسبوا اليه ما تبرأ منه من ظلم
 العباد. فقال ٦٠٢: «إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَظْلِمُ مِثْقَالَ ذَرَّةٍ وَإِنْ تَكُ حَسَنَةً يُضَاعِفْهَا
 وَيُؤْتِ مِنْ لَدُنْهِ أَجْرًا عَظِيمًا» ٦٠٣. وقال ٦٠٤: «إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَظْلِمُ النَّاسَ شَيْئًا
 وَلَكِنَّ النَّاسَ أَنْفُسَهُمْ يَظْلِمُونَ» ٦٠٥. وقال تبارك وتعالى: «وَمَا أَنَا بِظَالِمٍ
 لِلْعَبِيدِ» ٦٠٦. وقال سبحانه فيما قالوا به عليه من اخلافه في الوعد ٦٠٧
 ١٥ والوعيد: «وَعَدَ اللَّهُ حَقًّا وَمَنْ أَصْدَقُ مِنَ اللَّهِ قِيلًا» ٦٠٨. وقال سبحانه:
 «لَكِنَّ الَّذِينَ اتَّقَوْا رَبَّهُمْ لَهُمْ غُرَفٌ مِنْ فَوْقِهَا غُرَفٌ مَبْنِيَّةٌ تَجْرِي مِنْ تَحْتِهَا
 الْأَنْهَارُ وَعَدَ اللَّهُ لَا يَخْلِفُ اللَّهُ الْمِيعَادَ» ٦٠٩. وقال تبارك وتعالى في حكمه
 يوم القيامة بين الخلق بعدله ٦١٠. وقضائه يومئذ بين العباد ٦١١ بعدل

٥٩٢ ص: محذوف. ك: وقيت. ٥٩٣ ك: محذوف. ٥٩٤ ص: فمن. ٥٩٥ ح: فوعد.
 ٥٩٦ ح: + سبحانه. ٥٩٧ ص: + كفر. ٥٩٨ ص: وبما. ٥٩٩ ص: من.
 ٦٠٠ ح: ك: على. ٦٠١ ح: ك: عاقب. ٦٠٢ ك: + سبحانه. ٦٠٣ سورة النساء (٤) ٤٠.
 ٦٠٤ ص: ح: + سبحانه. ي: + تبارك وتعالى. ٦٠٥ سورة يونس (١٠) ٤٤. ٦٠٦ سورة ق (٥٠) ٢٩.
 ٦٠٧ في الوعد: ح: ك: للوعد. ٦٠٨ سورة النساء (٤) ١٢٢. ٦٠٩ سورة الزمر (٣٩) ٢٠.
 ٦١٠ ي: محذوف. ٦١١ يومئذ بين العباد: ص: بين العباد يومئذ.

was created and established for the recompense, and the recompense exists forever with the world to come, as long as that exists. If it were possible for the recompense to perish, it would be possible for the world to come to perish; and as long as the world to come exists, the recompense exists with it; the existence of each is dependent on the existence of the other. Each one is a promise promised by God, into which neither a lie nor a breach of promise will ever enter. Because of the sincere promise of recompense none of the qualities existing in God will disappear¹¹². There is no one lacking in belief in the world to come and everything connected with it (lit. its matter) and in the resurrection of the nations and their gathering [to the place of judgment] mentioned by God than he who maintains that God will judge people unjustly on that day in the world to come without distinguishing among them and that He will torment a person tormented there for doing things which God compelled him to do, till he could not help but do them nor avoid doing them. [He also maintains] that even if he does works which God wills and is pleased with and which God commands him and enjoins him to do, he will be tormented with different kinds of torments and punished with the gravest punishments. They described God as a promise breaker and attributed to Him wronging people of which He is free¹¹³. God has said: "Verily, God wrongs not [so much as] the weight of an ant, and if it is a good [deed], He will double it and give [the doer] an immense reward from Himself." (sura 4, v. 40) And He has said: "Verily, God does the people no wrong at all, but the people wrong themselves." (sura 10, v. 44) And God, may He be blessed and exalted, has said: "I am not one who does wrong to the people (lit. slaves)." (sura 50, v. 29) God, glory be to Him, has said concerning His breaking the promise and threat which has been imputed to Him: "...God's promise in truth; and who is more truthful in words than God?" (sura 4, v. 121) God, glory be to Him, has said: "But those who fear their Lord, for them are chambers with upper chambers built above them and rivers flowing beneath them, as God's promise. God does not break His promise." (sura 29, v. 20) God, may He be blessed and exalted, has said concerning His judging the people justly on the Day of Judgment and the just discrimination He will make among people on that day: "Today every

١ فصله ٦١٢: «الْيَوْمَ تُجْزَى كُلُّ نَفْسٍ بِمَا كَسَبَتْ لَا ظُلْمَ الْيَوْمَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ سَرِيعُ الْحِسَابِ. وَأَنْذَرْنَاهُمْ يَوْمَ الْأَزْفَةِ إِذِ الْقُلُوبُ لَدَى الْحَنَاجِرِ كَاطْمِينَ مَا لِلظَّالِمِينَ مِنْ حَمِيمٍ وَلَا شَفِيعٍ يُطَاعُ. يَعْلَمُ خَائِنَةَ الْأَعْيُنِ وَمَا تُخْفِي الصُّدُورُ. وَاللَّهُ يَقْضِي بِالْحَقِّ وَالَّذِينَ يَدْعُونَ ٦١٣ مِنْ دُونِهِ لَا يَقْضُونَ بِشَيْءٍ إِنَّ اللَّهَ هُوَ السَّمِيعُ الْبَصِيرُ» ٦١٤. وقال سبحانه: «هَذَا يَوْمُ الْفَصْلِ جَمَعْنَاكُمْ وَالْأَوَّلِينَ. فإِنْ كَانَ لَكُمْ كَيْدٌ فَكِيدُونِ» ٦١٥. يقول تبارك وتعالى ٦١٦ يوم القضاء بالعدل الذى كنتم به تكذبون: «أَحْشَرُوا الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا وَأَزْوَاجَهُمْ وَمَا كَانُوا يَعْبُدُونَ. مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ فَاهْدُوهُمْ إِلَى صِرَاطِ الْجَحِيمِ. وَقَفُوهُمْ إِنَّهُمْ مَسْئُولُونَ» ٦١٧. فلعله سبحانه فى الحكم. وتعالى عن كل ظلم. وقفوا ١٠ فعرفوا. وبعد المسئلة ما ٦١٨ صرفوا. الى ما استحقوا من الجحيم. واستوجبوا من العذاب الاليم.

فاستقبل حشو العامة ما بين الله من هذا كله بجحده. وجأهروا الله واوليائه علانية برده. فكلما دعاهم المهتدون ليهتدوا. استكبروا عن الهدى ٦١٩ وصدوا. وكلما ذكروهم بالله ليذكروا. اعرضوا عن تذكيرهم بالله وفروا. فكلهم مصر مستكبر. مول عن الهدى مدبر. كانهم فى ذلك بفعلهم. وما اصروا عليه من جهلهم. قوم نوح ٦٢٠ اذ يقول فيهم صلى ٦٢١ الله عليه لا عليهم: «رَبِّ إِنِّي دَعَوْتُ قَوْمِي لَيْلًا وَنَهَارًا. فَلَمْ يَزِدْهُمْ دُعَائِي إِلَّا فِرَارًا. وَإِنِّي كُلَّمَا دَعَوْتُهُمْ لِتَغْفِرَ لَهُمْ جَعَلُوا أَصَابِعَهُمْ فِي آذَانِهِمْ وَاسْتَعْشَوْا ثِيَابَهُمْ وَأَصْرُوا وَاسْتَكْبَرُوا اسْتِكْبَارًا» ٦٢٢. فكلهم عدو ٦٢٣ الصادقين ٦٢٤ ٢٠ على الله مكذب. وفؤاد كل امرئ منهم عن الايمان بالحق منقلب. وذلك اذ

٦١٢ ص: من قضائه. ٦١٣ هـ: تدعون. ٦١٤ سورة غافر (٤٠) ١٧-٢٠. ٦١٥ سورة المرسلات (٧٧) ٣٨-٣٩. جمعناكم - فيكيدون: ص: محذوف. وان - فيكيدون: ح ك: محذوف. ٦١٦ ح: + هذا. ٦١٧ سورة الصافات (٣٧) ٢٢-٢٤. ٦١٨ والأصح حذف ما. ٦١٩ ص: الحق. ٦٢٠ ح: + عليه السلام. ٦٢١ ص: صلوات. ٦٢٢ سورة نوح (٧١) ٥-٧. ٦٢٣ ح: عدوا. ٦٢٤ ح ك: للصادقين.

person will be recompensed for what he has done¹¹⁴ (lit. earned). There is no wrong-doing today, since God is quick to reckon. And warn them of the day of the last judgment, when the hearts are in the throats, repressing their anger. The wrong-doers have neither ardent friend nor intercessor who will be heeded. He (God) knows the treachery of the eyes, and what is concealed in the breasts. God judges by the truth, whereas those whom they call upon except Him do not judge by anything. Verily, God is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing.” (sura 40, vv. 17-20) And God, glory be to Him, has said: “This is the Day of Discrimination, [on which] We have brought you and those of olden times together. So if you have any wit, outwit me.” (sura 77, vv. 38-39) And God, may He be blessed and exalted, will say on the day of the just judgment which you have denied: “Gather the wrong-doers and their wives and that which they have worshipped other than God, and guide them to the path of Hell, and stop them [there], since they must be questioned.” (sura 37, vv. 22-24) They were instructed and enabled to know God’s just judgment and His exaltation above all wrong deeds (but they refuse to know). [Therefore] after they are questioned about their [deeds], they are turned towards Hell, to the painful punishment they deserve.

The scholars of the masses¹¹⁵ responded to all that God explained by denying it and declared openly, against God and His saints, that they rejected it. Whenever those who are rightly guided called upon them (those scholars) to be guided, they raised themselves above the right way and deviated from it. Whenever God was mentioned to them so that they would mention Him, they turned from their mentioning of God and fled. All of them are stubborn and arrogant, straying from the right way and turning their backs on it. In this matter, that is, in their deeds and the ignorance on which they insist, they are like the people of Noah, when Noah, may God bless him, not them, has said about them: “O my Lord, I have called my people night and day. But my calling has only added to their flight. Verily, whenever I call them that You may forgive them, they put their fingers in their ears and cover them with their garments and become obstinate and arrogant.” (sura 71, vv. 5-7) All of them are the enemies of the veracious, and attribute lies to God. The heart of every person of them deviates from belief in the truth. This is because

١٥ (ب) لم يؤمنوا به ٦٢٥/اول مرة. وكانوا به اذ سمعوه عند الله من الكفرة. الم تسمع الى قوله سبحانه ٦٢٦: «وَنُقَلِّبُ أَفْئِدَتَهُمْ وَأَبْصَارَهُمْ كَمَا لَمْ يُؤْمِنُوا بِهِ أَوَّلَ مَرَّةٍ وَنَذَرُهُمْ فِي طُغْيَانِهِمْ يَعْمَهُونَ. وَلَوْ أَنَّا نَزَّلْنَا إِلَيْهِمُ الْمَلَائِكَةَ وَكَلَّمَهُمُ الْمَوْتَى وَحَشَرْنَا عَلَيْهِمْ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ قُبُلًا مَا كَانُوا لِيُؤْمِنُوا إِلَّا أَنْ يَشَاءَ اللَّهُ وَلَكِنْ أَكْثَرُهُمْ يَجْهَلُونَ» ٦٢٧. فقلوه سبحانه يشاء انما هو خبر عن قدرته عليهم. وقوة سلطانه تبارك وتعالى فيهم. ولو انه شاء لمنعهم من المعصية وكانوا به مؤمنين. اذ ٦٢٨ كان الايمان عندنا انما هو امان من عصيان العاصين. ومن منعه الله من المعصية جبرا ٦٢٩ فمأمون عصيانه. واذن ٦٣٠ كان الاحسان في ذلك المنع احسان الله لا احسانه. وكان فيما منع منه من المعصية غير مطيع لله. ١٠ ولا مستوجب لثواب من الله ٦٣١. اذ منع من المعصية بجبر. وحمل على الايمان منها بقسر ٦٣٢.

فاتبدئ يا بني في طلب ٦٣٣ فعل الصالحات. واكتساب الخيرات. اذا ابتدأت بطلب اليقين بالله. وحقيقة العلم لله. فانك ان تفعل اهتديت لكل بركة وخير. وظفرت بالخط ٦٣٤ الكبير. وامنت باذن الله من العمى. ورويت بمعرفة الله من الظماء. وشاركت الملائكة المقربين في عبادتهم. وازددت مما ١٥ يمكنك من فعل كل خير كزيادتهم ٦٣٥. وانسك ٦٣٦ يقينك بالله من كل وحشة مرعبة. واكتفيت بصحبة الله من كل صاحب وصاحبة. وخف ٦٣٧ عليك من عبادة الله عبء الاثقال. فكنت اماما للصالحين في صالح الاعمال. فدانت بالبر اعمالك. وصدق قولك في الخير فعالك. فكنت الى ٢٠ الله حبيبا محببا. وكان سمت الصالحين لك سمته. ومن الى الله من اوليائه لك

٦٢٥ ك: بالله. ٦٢٦ الى قوله سبحانه: ك: لقول الله. ٦٢٧ سورة الانعام (٦) ١١٠-١١١.
 ٦٢٨ ك: اذن. ٦٢٩ ي: محذوف. ٦٣٠ ص: وان. ٦٣١ لثواب من الله: ك: لثوب الله.
 ٦٣٢ ص: بشر. ٦٣٣ ي: محذوف. ٦٣٤ ك: بالخص. ٦٣٥ ص ح ك وفي حواشي ه: مثل زيادتهم.
 ٦٣٦ ص: انسك. والأصح انسك. ٦٣٧ ص: وجرت.

they did not believe in it the first time, and when they heard it, they were considered unbelievers by God. Have not you heard the verse of God, glory be to Him: “We shall turn about their hearts and eyes, just as they did not believe in it the first time; and We shall leave them in their arrogance wandering blindly. Even if We had sent down the angels to them and the dead had spoken to them, and We had gathered everything in array for them, they would not have been such as to believe, unless God had so willed, but most of them are ignorant.” (sura 6, vv. 110-111) His word “willed” is but an assertion of His ability [to act] on them as He wills and of the power of His rule, may He be blessed and exalted, over them¹¹⁶. If He wished, He would prevent them from transgression and they would believe in Him¹¹⁷. For belief (*īmān*), in our opinion, is but man’s being protected (*amān*) from the transgression of the transgressors¹¹⁸. He whom God prevents from transgression through compulsion is protected from transgression. But doing good in this prevention belongs, then, to God, not to man. By being prevented from transgression man does not become obedient to God, nor does he deserve reward from God, since he is prevented from transgression by compulsion, and forced to be protected from it.

If you begin on your own initiative¹¹⁹ to seek the certain and the true knowledge about God, then, begin, O my son, on your own initiative to seek out good deeds to do and carry them out (*iktisāb*)¹²⁰. If you do so, you will be rightly guided to every blessing and good, and obtain great happiness. You will be protected, God willing, from blindness, and will quench your thirst by knowing God. You will join in the archangels’¹²¹ worship of God, and you will be able to increase doing good, as they do so. Your certain knowledge of God will make you forget all frightening loneliness, and you will be content with God’s company more than with the company of any man or woman companion. Through your worship of God, your burden will be lightened. In your good deeds you will be a model to the righteous and your deeds will be deeds of kindness. Your deeds will confirm your words about good [deeds]. You will be beloved of and humble before God. The way of the righteous will be your way. Whosoever of His friends who comes near to God will be your friend,

١ وليا. وما رضىه من الاشياء عندك رضىا^{٦٣٨}. ورأيت السوء حيث كان
سوءا. واتخذت عدو الله عدوا. وكنت من خاصة الله وخلصانه. واهل العلم
بالله وابقانه. وانفتحت لك^{٦٣٩} بعد اليقين بالله ابواب العلوم. وكنت في
الارض قيما من قومة الحي القيوم. فقرت بالله عينك. وتزيد كل يوم بالله
يقينك^{٦٤٠}. وانشرح بمعرفته صدرك. وعز بامره سبحانه امرك. فلم تهب ولم
تحش غيره. ولم ترج من الخير الا خيره. وعلمت انه سبب الخيرات الاول.
وان بيده الفضل الكبير^{٦٤١} الاطول. فامنت باذن الله مسكنة الفقراء.
وامتلأت يدك^{٦٤٢} من الغنائم الكبرى. وكنت على ملوك الدنيا ملكا. ونجوت
باذن الله من هلكة الهلكى.

١٠ ففي طلب اليقين بالله يا بني فادأب. ومن رجوت عنده على اليقين بالله
عوننا فقارن واصحب. فانهم الفاء كل رحمة. وقرناء كل حكمة. لا يرغب
لبيب الا فيهم. ولا تنزع نفس حكيم الا اليهم. فمن لم يكن منهم فاعرض
عنه واتركه. ومن كان منهم فاشدد به يدك^{٦٤٣} وامسكه. فانه بلغني ان
حكيمًا من الحكماء^{٦٤٤}. قال لبعض لمن^{٦٤٥} كان له علم كثير من
١٦ (أ) القدماء^{٦٤٦}. يا هذا لا ترين انك علمت شيئا وان علمت كل شيء. ما لم
١٥ تكن عالما بالله الاول الحي. الذي هو سبب كل خير كان او يكون. والذي
تعالى^{٦٤٧} ان يلحق به حركة او سكون. ثم قال: يا هذا اني كنت قبل ان
اعرف الله اروى واطمأ بالطباع. ولما عرفت الله رويت بغير طباع. نعم روي
فشفي بالهدى. من حر الغلة والصدى. ولما صار الى^{٦٤٨} اليقين بالله^{٦٤٩}
٢٠ تبارك وتعالى. الذي هو سبب الخيرات الاول الاعلى. غني بالله غنى الابد.

٦٣٨ ص: مرضيا. ٦٣٩ ص: محذوف. ٦٤٠ وتزيد - يقينك: ح ك وتحت هذه الجملة في ه: وتزيد بالله
كل يوم يقينك. ٦٤١ ك: محذوف. ٦٤٢ ح: يدك. ٦٤٣ به يدك: ص: بدلك به. ح: به بدلك.
ك: به يدك. ٦٤٤ ص: القدماء. ٦٤٥ ح ك: من. وهو الاصح. ٦٤٦ ص: الحكماء.
٦٤٧ ص: + عن. ٦٤٨ ص: محذوف. ٦٤٩ ص: بان الله.

and what he will be content with, you will be also content with. You will consider evil, wherever it be, evil, and also God's enemy [your] enemy. You will be one of God's chosen, and among those who are sincerely devoted to Him and who know God with certainty. After you know God with certainty the gates of sciences will open up before you. On earth you will be one of the righteous of the Living and the Everlasting, and delighted at Him. Your certain knowledge of God will increase every day, and you will be joyful because of your knowledge of Him. You will be strong because of God. You will not be afraid of anyone except Him, and you will hope for good only from Him. You will know that He is the first cause of the good things, and that in His hands is the greatest and the widest favor. You will be protected, God willing, from the poverty of the poor, and your hands will be filled with much profit. You will be the king of the world's kings, and you will be saved, God willing, from the destruction of the lost.

O my son, persevere in seeking certain knowledge of God. You must associate with those in whom you hope to find help in obtaining certain knowledge of God; since they are merciful and wise (lit. they are near to mercy and wisdom), the intelligent person and the soul of the wise person desire only them (the merciful and the wise men). Turn away from him who does not belong to them (the wise men) and leave him! But adhere to him who belongs to them and hold into him! For it has come to my ears that one of the wise men said to one of the ancients who possessed much knowledge: "O you, do not think that you know anything, even though you know everything, unless you know God, the First, the Living, Who is the cause of everything good which is or will ever be, and Who is too exalted above motion (*haraka*) or rest (*sukūn*)¹²² for them to adhere to Him." Then he said: "O you, before I knew God I quenched my thirst with water (lit. sources of water), but after knowing God, I quenched my thirst without water (lit. sources of water)." Verily, he quenched his thirst and was cured of the heat of burning thirst. When he knew God, may He be blessed and exalted, the First, the Most High, Who is the cause of the good things, with certainty he was always content

١ وصار الى الغنى الباقي المخلد. وسكن اضطراب نفسه وقلقها. اذ علمت يقينا ٦٥٠ ان الله هو ربها وخالقها. وبلغني ان حكيما آخر من حكماء الاولين. كان في امة تعبد الاصنام من الامم ٦٥١ الخالين ٦٥٢. كان يقول: من ايقن بالله ايقانا نقيا. لم يزل بالله في عاجل الدنيا ما بقي غنيا. وايقن ليقينه بالله بكل حقيقة علم معلومة. وادرك ليقينه بالله من العلوم كل ذات سر مكتومة. فاطلع بما ينور الله من قلبه على خفي سرها. وامن ان تتعبده الدنيا برق مسكنتها وفقرها. وبلغني ايضا ٦٥٣ عن بعض من تقدم وخلا. من الامم السالفة الاولى. انه كان يقول: لا يشك احد ولا يمتري ممن خلا ولا ٦٥٤ ممن بقي في ان من جهل الصانع كان للعقوبة مستوجبا مستحقا. نعم ولم يؤمن عندي ان لا يكون ممن يعرف من الحقوق كلها حقا. الا معرفة فاسدة ٦٥٥ مختلطة. مقصرة عن التحقيق او مفرطة. لان من جهل ما كثرت دلائله وشهوده. ووجد بمظاهر الايات فلم يدفع وجوده. حري حقيق. وجدير خليق. ان يكون بكل شيء جاهلا. وان لا يعتقد من علم شيء طائلا. اما رأيت العامة بما هي فيه ٦٥٦ من الجهل بالله الاعلى. اذ جهلت ما قلنا مما كثر الله على معرفته ٦٥٧ الادلاء. كيف قلت بحقائق الامور علومها. وضلت بعد جهلها بمعرفته حلومها. فقالت في دينها بكل قول متناقض مذموم. لا يصح لفحش تناقضه في الالباب ولا الحلوم. فهي فيه داعية ٦٥٨ تخبط كل ٦٥٩ عشوى. وصادة ٦٦٠ عن سبيل كل تقوى. ترى ٦٦١ معتقد باطلها فيه حقا. وزور قولها فيه على الله صدقا. وقبيحها فيه حسنا جميلا.

٦٥٠ ص: ييقن. ٦٥١ ص: أم. ٦٥٢ حكماء - الخالين: ي: محذوف. ٦٥٣ ص: محذوف.
 ٦٥٤ ص: ح: لا. ٦٥٥ ص: محذوف. ٦٥٦ ح: ك: عليه. ٦٥٧ على معرفته: ص: ح: عليه من
 معرفته. ٦٥٨ فهي فيه دائبة: ص: فهي دائبة فيه. ح: فهي دائبة. ي: فهي فيه دائبة. ٦٥٩ ح: خبط.
 ٦٦٠ ح: + به. ٦٦١ هـ: + على.

with God, and God was always sufficient for him. The confusion and anxiety of his soul calmed down, since it knew with certainty that God was its Lord and Creator¹²³. It has come to my ears that another of the ancient wise men, who lived in a pagan nation which had perished, used to say; "Whoever knows God with a certain and pure knowledge, will always be content with Him as long as he lives in this world. Because of his certain knowledge of God he will know with certainty every known truth of every science, and also perceive out of all sciences that which has a hidden secret. [Also] he will know in his heart, which is illuminated by God¹²⁴, the concealed secret of the sciences, and he will be protected from being enslaved by this world with the slavery of poverty and misery." Likewise, it has come to my ears on the authority of one of the people of the first nations, which perished, who used to say: "There is, neither among those who have perished nor among those who are living, anyone who doubts that whoever does not know the Creator deserves punishment¹²⁵. I am sure that [whoever does not know God] is among those who do not know a single truth of all truths, but their knowledge is unsound, confused, unreal and cannot prove [anything]. Since for one who knows nothing about something which has many indications and testimonies and which exists according to the literal meaning of the verses, and whose existence cannot be rejected, it is fitting and suitable to know nothing and not to believe that there is any use in knowing anything.

Do you not see the common people's ignorance of God, the Most High? For they do not know the many indications which we mentioned and which God brought so that they would know Him. Do you not see how the common people's knowledge of the truth of things decreases, and how their intelligence goes astray after they do not know God? Concerning their religion, they hold every reprehensible and mutually contradictory opinion, which is wrong because of [these] abominable contradictions according to reason and intelligence. They persevere, stumble in their blindness and turn away from every path of piety. They regard their false opinion concerning God as truth, their untrue opinion about God as right, their abominable opinion about Him as good, and

١ وجهلها به علما جليلا. فمن جهل الله تبارك وتعالى. فلن يدرك بحقيقة من الاشياء الا شبهها او خيالا ٦٦٣. ولن يزال متحيرا في الامور. خباطا ومقصرا في حقائق الامور ٦٦٣. او مقرا ٦٦٤ بما لا يقر به قرار علم فيسكن. ولا يذل لحق في حجة ٦٦٥ فيذ عن. ولا يزال مفتريا على المحقين كذابا. ومدعيا من الباطل دعوى عجابا. ليس لها من الله سبحانه تصديق. ولا يشهد ٦٦٦ لها في الالباب من برهان تحقيق. وان كانت في نفس مدعيها ذات حقيقة وبرهان. فانها في حقائق الامور كسراب القيعان. كما قال الله سبحانه: «وَالَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا أَعْمَالُهُمْ كَسَرَابٍ بِقِيعَةٍ يَحْسَبُهُ الظَّمْآنُ مَاءً حَتَّى إِذَا جَاءَهُ لَمْ يَجِدْهُ شَيْئًا وَوَجَدَ اللَّهَ عِنْدَهُ فَوْقَهُ حِسَابَهُ وَاللَّهُ سَرِيعُ الْحِسَابِ. أَوْ كَظُلُمَاتٍ فِي بَحْرٍ لُجِّيٍّ يَغْشَاهُ مَوْجٌ مِنْ فَوْقِهِ مَوْجٌ مِنْ فَوْقِهِ سَحَابٌ ظُلُمَاتٌ بَعْضُهَا فَوْقَ بَعْضٍ إِذَا أَخْرَجَ يَدُهُ لَمْ يَكِدْ يَرَاهَا وَمَنْ لَمْ يَجْعَلِ اللَّهُ لَهُ نُورًا فَمَا لَهُ مِنْ نُورٍ» ٦٦٧. انظر كيف يمثله لاغفاله. فيما يراه حقا من باطله. بامثاله من ذوي ٦٦٨ الظلمى. وعن ينظر في الظلماء. فلا يرى يده ولا يكاد. فكيف يقود او ينقاد له في الظلماء ٦٦٩ منقاد. الا ان يكون مثله عميا. لا يرى لعمى قلبه شيئا. فهو ينقاد في ظلمة وعشوى. لمن لا يبصر ولا يرى. ولن اثر الضلالة على الهدى. فهو متورط في ورطات الردى. يركب بعضه في كل هوة بعضا. رافض ٦٧٠ لحقيقة كل ٦٧١ علم رفضا. لا يسمع لكتاب الله به ٦٧٢ نداء. ولا يقبل من الله فيه هدى. محبة ٦٧٣ به في خبوت الضلال ركائبه. عظيمة عليه في هلكة ٦٧٤ الدين والدنيا مصائبه. غير متحفظ من هلكاته بحفظ. ولا متعظ من عظات الله بوعظ. غلق بين اطباق خطياته.

٦٦٢ او خيالا: ص: وخيالا. ٦٦٣ ص ح ك وفي حواشي هـ: العلوم. ٦٦٤ او مقرا: ص: ومقرا. ٦٦٥ ح: حجته. ٦٦٦ ك: يشهدا. ٦٦٧ سورة النور (٢٤) ٣٩-٤٠. ٦٦٨ من ذوي: في حواشي هـ: بذوي. ٦٦٩ ص: الظلمة. ٦٧٠ ص: رافضا. ٦٧١ لحقيقة كل: ح ك وفي حواشي هـ: لكل حقيقة. ٦٧٢ ص: محذوف. ٦٧٣ ص: مجذ (?). ٦٧٤ ح: هلكات.

their ignorance of Him as sublime knowledge. Whoever does not know God, may He be blessed and exalted, will never perceive things truly, but through imagination and fantasy. He will always be confused in [perceiving] things and fail to [perceive] the truth of things, or he will always acknowledge that which firm knowledge neither acknowledges nor trusts. He will not submit to one whose argument is right, and he will always forge lies against those who are right, and he will adduce false and amazing claims. God, glory be to Him, does not endorse their truth, nor does rational proof attest to their being right. Even though there is some truth and evidence in the soul of those who adduce false arguments it is the truth of things as a mirage in a desert. As God, glory be to Him, has said: "Those who disbelieve their deeds are as a mirage in a desert which the thirsty man supposes to be water, until he comes to it and finds nothing; there he finds God, and He then pays him his account in full. God is quick at the reckoning. Or [their deeds are] as darkness on a very deep sea. There covers him wave above wave and cloud above all, and darkness one upon another. When he puts out his hand he can hardly see it. He for whom God does not create light, for him there is no light." (sura 24, vv. 39-40) Consider how He compares the unbeliever to a thirsty man and to one who looks at darkness and hardly sees his hand, since he pays no attention to [the fact] that he regards his lies as a truth. And how does he lead, or how is one led by him in darkness, unless like his leader he is blind and sees nothing because of the blindness of his heart? He is led in darkness by one who neither discerns nor sees and by one who prefers going astray to right guidance being hurled down into the hollows of perdition, piled one after another (*ba^ṣduhu ba^ṣdan*)¹²⁶ in every abyss, rejecting the truth of every science, nor hearing the call of God's book and not accepting God's right guidance as found in God's book. His riding animals wander with him in the plain of going astray, and his disasters will be hard on him because he has lost his religion and this world. He is not cautious of calamities, and does not take warning from God. He is swallowed up in the layers of his sins and drowned in

^١ غرق في بحور عماياته. لما عطل من يقين علم الكتاب. ورضي بصحبته من شكوك الارتياب.

فبالله يا بني فعذ من مولاته. والرضى بما رضي به من ^{٦٧٥} تعطيل ^{٦٧٦} ما عطل من كتاب ربه واياته. واذا اردت ان ترى عجائب الانباء والانبياء. وتعلم فضل عدل ^{٦٧٧} حكم الله في الاشياء. فاسمع من الكتاب ولا تسمع عليه. واكتف بحكم الله على العباد فيه. فانك ان تسمع عنه باذن واعية. ثم تقبل عليه بنفس منك لحكمته ^{٦٧٨} راعية. تسمع صوتا منه بالهدى صيتا. وتعرف من جعله ^{٦٧٩} الله حيا ممن جعله ^{٦٨٠} ميتا. فلعلك حينئذ عند معرفتك به للاشياء. تهرب من الميتين وتلحق بالاحياء. فتجد طيب طعم الحياة. وتثق بالقرار في محل النجاة. فتنزل يومئذ منازل العابدين. وتؤمن الموت حينئذ امن الخالدين. ففي مثل ذلك فارغب. وله ما بقيت فانصب. فللرغبة فيه والحرص عليه استنزل ^{٦٨١} ابليس اباك ادم فاغواه. وبالخلد في معصية الله ^{٦٨٢} مناه. فقال له ولزوجته معه: «مَا نَهَاكُمَا رَبُّكُمَا عَنْ هَذِهِ الشَّجَرَةِ إِلَّا أَنْ تَكُونَا مَلَكَيْنِ أَوْ تَكُونَا مِنَ الْخَالِدِينَ». وفي ذلك ^{٦٨٣} «وَقَاسَمَهُمَا إِنِّي لَكُمَا لَمِنَ النَّاصِحِينَ» ^{٦٨٤}. فذلاهما كما قال الله «بِغُرُورٍ» ^{٦٨٥}. وكذبهما فيما مناهما به من الامور. فاعقبا برجائهما في المعصية لله ندما. ونسي آدم صلى الله عليه فلم يجد الله له عزما. كما قال سبحانه: «وَلَقَدْ عَهِدْنَا إِلَى آدَمَ مِنْ قَبْلِ فَنَسِيَ وَلَمْ نَجِدْ لَهُ عَزْمًا» ^{٦٨٦}. فلو لم يعص الله للبت فيها ابدا. ولو اطاع الله في الشجرة لبقى فيها مخلدا. فكذلك يبقى فيها يوم القيامة. وفي

^{٦٧٥} بما - من: ص: محذوف. ^{٦٧٦} ص: بتعطيل. ^{٦٧٧} ص: + علم. ^{٦٧٨} بنفس منك لحكمته: ص ك: منك بنفس لحكمته. في حواشي ه: منك بنفس لحكم الله. ^{٦٧٩} ص: جعله. ^{٦٨٠} ص: + الله. ^{٦٨١} ص ح ك وفي حواشي ه: استنزل. ولعله الاصح. ^{٦٨٢} وبالخلد - الله: ص: وفي الخلد في معصيته لله. ^{٦٨٣} ه ص ح ك: قاسمهما. ^{٦٨٤} سورة الاعراف (٧) ٢٠-٢١. ^{٦٨٥} فذلاهما بغرور: سورة الاعراف (٧) ٢٢. ^{٦٨٦} سورة طه (٢٠) ١١٥.

the seas of his blindness. For he nullifies the certain knowledge of the Book and is content to be surrounded by doubts.

O my son, I swear by God, take care not to associate with him and be content with what he is content with, that is, the nullification of what he nullifies of God's books and miracles. If you wish to see the wonderful news and the wonders of the prophets and to know the superiority of God's just judgment of things, hear from the book and not from [what is said] against it, and be content with God's judgment of the people, [which is written] in the book. For if you open your ears to hear from it, and then come to it with your soul expecting its wisdom, then you will hear a loud voice coming from it to guide you to the right way, and you will know to distinguish between him whom God will restore to life and him whom God will kill. Perhaps then, when you know things by means of the *Qurʾān*, you will escape from the dead and join the living, find the good taste of life and be confident of the world to come as a place of redemption. You will be in the rank of God's worshippers and be safe from death, with the safety of the immortals¹²⁷. Wish this thing and try to obtain it as long as you live. The Devil (*iblis*) made your father, Adam, err; he seduced Adam and made him wish to disobey God, because Adam desired eternal life and did his utmost to obtain it. [The Devil] said to Adam and his wife: "Your Lord has only forbidden you [to eat] from this tree, lest you should both be angels or immortals." (sura 7, v. 20) And concerning this, "he swore to them [saying]: 'I am a good adviser to you.' " (sura 7, v. 21) The Devil "deceived them" (sura 7, v. 22) as God has said, and lied to them about things he made them want to do. They returned to God out of regret, since they hoped that God would forgive them for their disobedience. [But] Adam, may God bless him, forgot and God found no constancy in him. As God, glory be to Him, has said: "Verily, We made a covenant with Adam in the past, but he forgot, and We found no constancy in him." (sura 20, v. 115) If Adam had not rebelled against God, he would have stayed in Paradise forever, and if he had obeyed God concerning the tree, he would have abided in it eternally. Likewise, whoever obeys God and fears Him, as he is

١ الاخرة الباقية الدائمة. من اطاع الله في هذه الحياة الدنيا. وقام ٦٨٧ بما يجب له عليه فيها من التقوى. فيدوم في الجنة له النعيم والتخليد. ويبقى له ما هو فيه من نعيمها فلا يبيد. فطاعة الله مفتاح الخلد في الجنة. واليقين بالله مفتاح كل طاعة وحسنة. فايقن بالله تحسن. واحسن بالله تؤمن. (أ) ١٧

٥ واعلم يا بني انك لن توقن حتى تعرف الموقنين. ولن تؤمن حتى تؤمن للمؤمنين. ومن الموقنين ابوك ابراهيم خليل الرحمن. والمؤمنون فمن ٦٨٨ امن من كبائر الكفر والعصيان ٦٨٩. واعمال الموقنين من البر فدليل على ايقانهم. وترك المؤمنين لكبائر الكفر والعصيان ٦٩٠ فحقيقة ايمانهم. فاسمع لخبر الله الذي لا خبر كخبره ٦٩١ عن يقينهم. وما كانوا يعملون به لله في دينهم من الصالحات. ويسارعون فيه من الخيرات. فانه يقول سبحانه: «إِنَّ الَّذِينَ هُمْ مِنْ خَشْيَةِ رَبِّهِمْ مُشْفِقُونَ. وَالَّذِينَ هُمْ بِآيَاتِ رَبِّهِمْ يُؤْمِنُونَ. وَالَّذِينَ هُمْ بِرَبِّهِمْ لَا يُشْرِكُونَ. وَالَّذِينَ يُؤْتُونَ مَا آتَوْا وَقُلُوبُهُمْ وَجِلَةٌ أَنَّهُمْ إِلَى رَبِّهِمْ رَاجِعُونَ. أُولَئِكَ يُسَارِعُونَ فِي الْخَيْرَاتِ وَهُمْ لَهَا سَابِقُونَ» ٦٩٢. ويقول سبحانه: «إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ الَّذِينَ إِذَا ذُكِرَ اللَّهُ وَجِلَتْ قُلُوبُهُمْ وَإِذَا تُلِيَتْ عَلَيْهِمْ آيَاتُهُ زَادَتْهُمْ إِيمَانًا وَعَلَىٰ رَبِّهِمْ يَتَوَكَّلُونَ. الَّذِينَ يُقِيمُونَ الصَّلَاةَ وَمِمَّا رَزَقْنَاهُمْ يُنْفِقُونَ. أُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ حَقًّا لَهُمْ دَرَجَاتٌ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ وَمَغْفِرَةٌ وَرِزْقٌ كَرِيمٌ» ٦٩٣. ويقول عز وجل ٦٩٤: «إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا بِاللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ وَإِذَا كَانُوا مَعَهُ عَلَىٰ أَمْرٍ جَامِعٍ لَمْ يَذْهَبُوا حَتَّىٰ يَسْتَأْذِنُوهُ إِنَّ الَّذِينَ يَسْتَأْذِنُونَكَ أُولَئِكَ الَّذِينَ يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ فَإِذَا أَسْتَأْذَنُوكَ لِبَعْضِ شَأْنِهِمْ فَأَذَنَ لِمَنْ شِئْتَ مِنْهُمْ وَاسْتَغْفَرَ لَهُمُ اللَّهُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ» ٦٩٥.

٦٨٧ ص: + فيها. ٦٨٨ ص: ممن. ٦٨٩ كبائر الكفر والعصيان: ص ح ك وفي حواشي هـ: الكفر وكبائر العصيان. ٦٩٠ لكبائر الكفر والعصيان: ص: لكبائر الكبائر والعصيان. ٦٩١ ص: كخير. ٦٩٢ سورة المؤمنون (٢٣) ٥٧-٦١. ٦٩٣ سورة الانفال (٨) ٢-٤. ٦٩٤ عز وجل: ص: سبحانه. ٦٩٥ سورة النور (٢٤) ٦٢.

required to do, in the life of this world, will abide in Paradise on the Day of Resurrection and in the everlasting world to come. He will stay in Paradise forever enjoying happiness and everlasting life, and the happiness of Paradise will endure and not perish. Obedience to God then is the key to eternal life in Paradise, and the certain knowledge of God is the key to every obedient and good work. If you know God with certainty, you will perform good works, and if you perform good works, you will believe¹²⁸.

O my son, know that you will never know God with certainty unless you recognize those who possess the certain knowledge [of God], and you will never believe unless you obey the believers. And among those who know God with certainty is your father, Abraham, God's friend. The believers are those who are safe from the grave sins of unbelief and disobedience. The righteous deeds of those who know God with certainty serve as proof of their certain knowledge; and their avoidance of (*tark*)¹²⁹ the grave sins of unbelief and disobedience is their real belief. Listen, then, to God's words, which no words equal, about their certain knowledge and about the good deeds which they did and hurried to do in their religion for the sake of God. For God, glory be to Him, has said: "Verily, those who tremble in fear of their Lord, and those who believe in the signs of their Lord, and those who do not attribute a copartner to their Lord, and those who give (to the poor) what they give with quaking hearts, because they will return to their Lord, these hurry to [do] good works and they are the first to [do] them." (sura 23, vv. 57-61) God, glory be to Him, has said: "The believers are only those whose hearts quake when God is mentioned, and whose faith increases when God's verses are recited, and who trust in their Lord; who perform the prayer and spend of what we have provided them. These are the true believers. For them are ranks in the presence of God and forgiveness and generous provision." (sura 8, vv. 2-4) And God, may He be extolled and exalted, has said: "The believers are only those who believe in God and His messenger, and when they are with him on some common affair do not go away until they ask his permission. Those who ask your permission (Muhammad's) are those who believe in God and His messenger. So, if they ask your permission for some affair of their own, give your permission to whomever you will of them, and ask forgiveness for them from God, since God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate." (sura 24, v. 62)

١ وبقول سبحانه: «إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا بِاللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ ثُمَّ لَمْ يَرْتَابُوا وَجَاهَدُوا بِأَمْوَالِهِمْ وَأَنْفُسِهِمْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ أُولَئِكَ هُمُ الصَّادِقُونَ» ٦٩٦. وقال عز من قائل ٦٩٧: «إِنَّمَا يُؤْمِنُ بِآيَاتِنَا الَّذِينَ إِذَا ذُكِّرُوا بِهَا خَرُّوا سُجَّدًا وَسَبَّحُوا بِحَمْدِ رَبِّهِمْ وَهُمْ لَا يَسْتَكْبِرُونَ. تَتَجَافَى جُنُوبُهُمْ عَنِ الْمَضَاجِعِ يَدْعُونَ رَبَّهُمْ خَوْفًا وَطَمَعًا وَمِمَّا رَزَقْنَاهُمْ يُنْفِقُونَ» ٦٩٨.

انظر كيف وصفهم الله سبحانه في الخشوع والدين. بما نسبته مما ٦٩٩ سكن قلوبهم من حقيقة اليقين. فاولئك هم ٧٠٠ الذين وصفهم الله بالايمان وحلاهم. وسماهم به ٧٠١ في كتابه ودعاهم. وهم اوجب الجنان والرحمة. ومنه استحقوا الرضوان والعصمة. فمن خرج من صفتهم ونعتهم فغير مؤمن ٧٠٢ ولا نعمى عين. ولا مستوجب من الله الرحمة والرضوان ٧٠٣ في يوم الدين. وداره غير دار المؤمنين. ومثواه من النار مثوى الظالمين.

وقد زعم غيرنا ان من لم يؤمن كبير عصيانه. فيكون ٧٠٤ لاحد منه امان بايمانه. ممن ذكر الله بالايمان وحلى. انه ٧٠٥ ولي لله سبحانه فيمن تولى. خلافا على الله ومشاقة. ومجانبة لكتاب الله ومفارقة. وزعم ان الله لا يعذب من اقر به وبرسله وكتبه بلسانه. وان ارتكب كل كبيرة من كبائر عصيانه. ١٥ تمنيا على الله وافتراء. واستكبارا عن تبيانه ٧٠٦ واجتراء. فاسمع يا بني لقول الله في خلافهم. وما وصف فيما زعموا من خلاف اوصافهم. فانه يقول سبحانه: «فَلَا وَرَبِّكَ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ حَتَّى يُحَكِّمُوكَ فِيمَا شَجَرَ بَيْنَهُمْ ثُمَّ لَا يَجِدُوا فِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَرَجًا مِمَّا قَضَيْتَ وَيُسَلِّمُوا تَسْلِيمًا» ٧٠٧. فلم يرض سبحانه منهم له بالتحكيم. دون ما وصف ٧٠٨ من الرضى/ والتسليم. فقال ٢٠(ب) ١٧

٦٩٦ سورة الحجرات (٤٩) ١٥. ٦٩٧ عز من قائل: ح: سبحانه. ٦٩٨ سورة السجدة (٣٢) ١٥-١٦. ٦٩٩ ص: ما. ٧٠٠ ص: ح: محذوف. ٧٠١ ص: محذوف. ٧٠٢ ك: + بالله. ٧٠٣ الرحمة والرضوان: ص: لرحمة ولا رضوان. ٧٠٤ ك: ولا يكون. ٧٠٥ ص: وانه. ٧٠٦ ص: ح: بيانه. ٧٠٧ سورة النساء (٤) ٦٥. ٧٠٨ ح: وصفه.

God, glory be to Him, has said: "The believers are only those who believe in God and His messenger, then, they do not doubt, but strive with their wealth and lives for the cause of God. Those are the ones who speak sincerely." (sura 49, v. 15) And He, who is exalted above any sayer, has said: "Only those believe in Our signs who, when they are reminded of them, fall down prostrate and hymn the praise of their Lord without being arrogant, [and] leave withdrawing from their beds to call upon their Lord in fear and desire, and spend of that which We provide them with." (sura 32, vv. 15-16)

Consider how God, glory be to Him, describes them, with regard to submissiveness and religion, by the true and certain knowledge which dwells in their hearts and which God ascribes to them. These are [the people] whom God describes in His book as believers; He adorns them with belief and calls them by it. He grants them refuge and mercy. And from Him they deserve contentment and protection. Whoever is not included in their description is neither a believer, nor respected or deserving of mercy and contentment from God on the Day of Judgment. His abode in the world to come is not that of the believers, and his dwelling in Hell is that of the evil-doers.

Others maintain that he from whose grave sin of disobedience people are not safe, so that one is not safe from his belief¹³⁰, is one of those whom God mentions and describes as His friends. [They claim this] out of controversy with God and dissension, and out of turning away from and abandoning His book. They maintain that God will not punish him who acknowledges Him and His messengers and His book by his tongue (alone), even though he commits every grave sin of his sins of disobedience¹³¹, through slandering and fabricating lies against God and through arrogance and insolence against His book (lit. explanation *tibyān*). O my son, listen to God's words about what they controvert and to the description by which He describes them and which contradicts their description (of themselves), as they maintain. For God, glory be to Him, has said: "No, by your Lord, they do not believe until they make You judge in their dispute, then they do not find difficulty in your verdicts but accept them wholly." (sura 4, v. 65) God, glory be to Him, is not content with their making Him judge without their consent and submission, which He described. God, glory be to Him, has said: "No, by

١ سبحانه: «فَلَا وَرَبِّكَ يُؤْمِنُونَ». وقالوا هم بلى خلافا على الله هم مؤمنون. والاقرار بالله ورسله ٧٠٩. غير الرضى والتسليم لحكمه ٧١٠. فاي خلاف لقائل او اختلاف. او فرط عن قول بغير حق ٧١١ او اسراف. ايبن مما تسمع وترى ٧١٢. مما قالوه جرأة وافتراء. ويقول سبحانه: «إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا بِاللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ وَإِذَا كَانُوا مَعَهُ عَلَى أَمْرٍ جَامِعٍ ٧١٣ لَمْ يَذْهَبُوا حَتَّى يَسْتَأْذِنُوهُ إِنَّ الَّذِينَ يَسْتَأْذِنُوكَ أُولَئِكَ الَّذِينَ يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ فَإِذَا أَسْتَأْذِنُوكَ لِبَعْضِ شَأْنِهِمْ فَأَذَنَ لِمَنْ شِئْتَ مِنْهُمْ وَاسْتَغْفَرَ لَهُمُ اللَّهُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ» ٧١٤. واستيذانهم له غير اقرارهم بالله ورسوله. فاين ما قالوا في الايمان فوصفوا ٧١٥. مما قال الله به ان انصفوا. والله يقول سبحانه ٧١٦: «لَا يَسْتَأْذِنُكَ الَّذِينَ يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ ٧١٧ أَنْ يُجَاهِدُوا بِأَمْوَالِهِمْ وَأَنْفُسِهِمْ وَاللَّهُ عَلِيمٌ بِالْمُتَّقِينَ» ٧١٨. إِنَّمَا يَسْتَأْذِنُكَ الَّذِينَ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ وَارْتَابَتْ قُلُوبُهُمْ فَهُمْ فِي رَيْبِهِمْ يَتَرَدَّدُونَ» ٧١٩. فالله يقول: ٧٢٠ لا يؤمنون بالله ان استاذنوا. وهم يقولون: بلى ان اقروا فقد آمنوا. فاي مجاهرة لله بخلاف. او مقالة بغير حق في اسراف. ايبن على الله ٧٢١ خلافا. او في قول بغير حق اسرافا. من قول هذا مخرجه. وسبيل اهله في القول ومنهجه. او ما سمعوا لقول الله تبارك وتعالى: «يَسْأَلُونَكَ عَنِ الْأَنْفَالِ قُلِ الْأَنْفَالُ لِلَّهِ وَالرَّسُولِ فَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ وَأَصْلِحُوا ذَاتَ بَيْنِكُمْ وَأَطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ مُؤْمِنِينَ» ٧٢٢. يخبر سبحانه انهم ان لم يطيعوا امر رسوله ويقبلوه. ويفعلوا ٧٢٣ ما يامرهم ٧٢٤ ان يفعلوه. فليسوا مؤمنين ٧٢٥ به. لا ولا

٧٠٩ ص: ورسوله. ٧١٠ ص: بحكمته. ٧١١ بغير حق: ص: بحق. ٧١٢ ح: وأبرى. ٧١٣ ح: + الى قوله ان الله غفور رحيم. ٧١٤ سورة النور (٢٤) ٦٢. ٧١٥ ي: ووصفوا. ٧١٦ ص: محذوف. ٧١٧ ح: + الى قوله فهم في ريبهم يترددون. ٧١٨ لا يستأذنك - بالمتقين: ي: محذوف. ٧١٩ سورة التوبة (٩) ٤٤-٤٥. ٧٢٠ فالله يقول: ح: والله يقول سبحانه. ٧٢١ ح: + سبحانه. ٧٢٢ سورة الانفال (٨) ١. ٧٢٣ ص: ولم يفعلوا. ٧٢٤ ي: + به. ٧٢٥ ح: بمؤمنين.

your Lord, they do not believe.” (sura 4, v. 65) But in contradiction of God they say: Nay, they are believers. The acknowledgement of God and His messengers is not consent and submission to His judgment. Is it likely that one would express a more controversial opposing and exaggerated assertion, arising from an unsound and extremely erroneous opinion, which is more obvious than that which you hear and see, namely, what they say out of arrogance and falsehood. God, glory be to Him, has said: “The believers are only those who believe in God and His messenger, and when they are with him on some common affair do not go away until they ask his permission. Those who ask your permission (Muhammad’s) are those who believe in God and His messenger. So, if they ask your permission for some affair of their own, give your permission to whomever you will of them, and ask forgiveness for them from God, since God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate.” (sura 24, v. 62) Their asking permission from him is not an acknowledgement of God and His messenger. What an enormous difference there is between what they say about belief and the way they describe it, and what God says about it, that is to say, be righteous! God, glory be to Him, has said: “Those who believe in God and the Last Day do not ask your permission to exempt them from striving with their wealth and lives, and God knows those who fear Him. Only those who do not believe in God and the Last Day and whose hearts are doubtful ask your permission to exempt them [from going forth] and in their doubt they hesitate”¹³². (sura 9, vv. 44-45) God has said that if they ask [to be exempted from going forth], they do not believe in God, whereas they say, on the contrary, if they acknowledge God, they believe. What open declaration of controversy against God or false assertion or false opinion based on extreme error constitutes a clearer manifestation of controversy against God than an opinion expressed in the way that the people who hold this [opinion] express it? Do they not listen to the words of God, may He be blessed and exalted: “They ask you about the spoils of war. Say: ‘The spoils of war belong to God and the messenger, so fear God, set right what is between you and obey God and His messenger if you are believers.’ ” (sura 8, v. 1) God has informed them that if they do not obey His messenger’s order and accept it and do what the messenger orders them to do, they will be believers neither in him (the messenger), in God, his

١ بالله ربه. ولا يرسل الله وكتبه. او ما سمعوا لقوله ٧٢٦ سبحانه: «وَأَعْلَمُوا أَنَّمَا غَنِمْتُمْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ فَإِنَّ لِلَّهِ خُمُسَهُ وَلِلرَّسُولِ وَلِذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَالْيَتَامَىٰ وَالْمَسَاكِينِ وَآبِئِ السَّبِيلِ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ آمَنْتُمْ بِاللَّهِ وَمَا أُنْزِلْنَا عَلَىٰ عَبْدِنَا يَوْمَ الْفُرْقَانِ يَوْمَ التَّقَىٰ أَجْمَعِينَ وَاللَّهُ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ» ٧٢٧. يقول سبحانه لمن شهد من المهاجرين والانصار بدرًا. وكان له ولرسوله من عدوهما منتصرا. ٥
ان كنتم بما وصفت آمنتم. فامضوا ما به امرتم. فان لم تمضوه على ما نزلت ٧٢٨ من حكمه. فلستم بمستحقين لثواب الايمان ولا اسمه. فاي حجة لاحتج اقوى. او ضياء نور اضوأ. فيما اختلفنا ٧٢٩. ووصفوا ووصفنا. مما ٧٣٠ تلونا جملا ٧٣١ لا تأويلا. ووحيا انزله الله ٧٣٢ تنزيلا. فاسمع في ذلك يا بني ٧٣٣
١٠ عن الله تنزيل وحيه. وما نزل فيه صراحا مكشوبا على نبيه. فانه يقول سبحانه ٧٣٤: «وَيَقُولُونَ آمَنَّا بِاللَّهِ وَبِالرَّسُولِ وَأَطَعْنَا ثُمَّ يَتَوَلَّىٰ فَرِيقٌ مِنْهُمْ مِنْ ٧٣٥ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ وَمَا أُولَٰئِكَ بِالْمُؤْمِنِينَ» ٧٣٦. فالله تبارك وتعالى يقول وما اولئك بالمؤمنين. وهم يقولون بلى اذا كانوا بالله وما جاء من عنده مقرين. وانما اخرجهم الله من الايمان/بتوليهم. وبذلك نزل وحيه فيهم. وعليه عاتبهم لا على انكار. الا ترى ان قولهم آمنا قول اقرار. لم يدعهم اليه. ولم يعاتبهم فيه. ١٨ (أ) ١٥

فاعرف الحق يا بني ومن خالفه ٧٣٧. فانك تعرف حينئذ ٧٣٨ الحق ومن آلفه ٧٣٩. واعلم ان معرفة الحق قسمان معلومان. وجزءان عند المحققين مقسومان. احدهما معرفة الحق في نفسه ونعته ٧٤٠. وما ابانه الله به من ضياء

٧٢٦ ص: لقول الله. ٧٢٧ سورة الانفال (٨) ٤١. ٧٢٨ ص: نزلنا. ٧٢٩ ح: اختلفوا. ٧٣٠ ص: لما. ٧٣١ ح: جملا. ٧٣٢ ح: محذوف. ٧٣٣ فاسمع - بني: ح: فاسمع يا بني في ذلك. ٧٣٤ ح: + وتعالى عن كل شيء شأنه. ٧٣٥ ص: محذوف. ٧٣٦ سورة النور (٢٤) ٤٧. ٧٣٧ فاعرف - خالفه: ص: فاعرف يا بني الباطل فخالفه. ح: فاعرف يا بني الحق ومن خالفه. ٧٣٨ فانك تعرف حينئذ: ح: فانك يا بني حينئذ تعرف. ٧٣٩ ومن آلفه: ص: والافه. وفي حواشي ص: ومن خالفه. ٧٤٠ ك: بعينه.

Lord, or in God's messengers and books. Do they not listen to the words of God, glory be to Him: "Know that whatever you seize as spoils of war, a fifth of it belongs to God and to the messenger, and to the relatives, the orphans, the poor and the wayfarer, if you believe in God and what We sent down to Our servant on the day of salvation (*furkān*)¹³³, the day the two parties met. God is Omnipotent." (sura 8, v. 41) God, glory be to Him, has said to the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār, who witnessed the battle of Badr and who took revenge on the enemy of God and His messenger on behalf of both: If you believe in what I describe, do what you are ordered to do; but if you do not act according to the judgment I sent down by revelation, you deserve neither the reward nor the name of a believer. What argument is stronger for one who argues, or what flash of light better illuminates the matter we dispute and which we and they described, than what we quoted as sentences [as they are] not as interpretation and revelation sent down by God. O my son, listen in this matter to the words of God sent down by revelation and to what He has sent down to His prophet, which is evident and clear, for God, glory be to Him, has said: "They said: 'We believe in God and in the messenger and obey.' Afterwards a group of them turned away, and they are not believers." (sura 24, v. 47) God, may He be blessed and exalted, has said those are not believers, whereas they say, on the contrary, [they are believers] if they acknowledge God and what comes from Him. [But] God excluded them from belief (i.e. from being believers) only because they turned away. On account of that He sent down His revelation into them and reproved them for that, not on account of their denial [of Him]. Do you not understand that their statement "we believe" is an acknowledgement for which God neither called them to Him nor reproved them.

O my son, know the truth and those who oppose it; then, you will know the truth and those who associate with it. Know that the knowledge of truth is divided by the truthful persons into two known parts: one part is the knowledge of the truth itself and the knowledge of its quality and the clear and illuminating evidence God shows by means of it; and the

١ بينته ٧٤١. والآخر معرفة ما خالفه من الباطل. والبراءة الى الله من جهل كل جاهل. فاعرفهما جميعا تعرف الحق وتوقنه. وتعرف قبح ٧٤٢ كل امر كان او يكون ٧٤٣ وحسنه. ولا تغتر بهما جهلا. ولا تكن لواحد منهم ٧٤٤ معطلا. فتجهل بعض الحق او تعطله ٧٤٥. ولا تؤمن ٧٤٦ ان تركب بعض الباطل او تفعله. ومتى لا تعرف ٧٤٧ الباطل. لا تتبرأ من اهله. ومن لا يتبرأ من المبطل. حل من السخط في محله. ومتى تجهل بعض الحق. لا تؤمن من ٧٤٨ البراءة من الحق. ومن تبرأ من المحقين تبرأ ٧٤٩ الله منه. ومن اعرض عنه المحقون سخطا اعرض الله عنه. والمحقون من خلق الله فهم المؤمنون. والمؤمنون فهم البررة الرحماء المتحابون. والمتحابون فهم المحبون في الله لمن احبهم وتولاهم ٧٥٠. والمعادون لمن حاد الله ربههم ومولاهم. فاسمع يا بني لما ذكر الله ٧٥١ في ذلك سبحانه عنهم. وعرف اوليائه في ذلك منهم. اذ يقول ٧٥٢ لا شريك له ٧٥٣: «وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ وَالْمُؤْمِنَاتُ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ يَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ يُقِيمُونَ الصَّلَاةَ وَيُؤْتُونَ الزَّكَاةَ وَيُطِيعُونَ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ أُولَئِكَ سَيَرْحَمُهُمُ اللَّهُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَزِيزٌ حَكِيمٌ» ٧٥٤. ويقول ٧٥٥ سبحانه: «لَا تَجِدُ قَوْمًا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ يُوَادُّونَ مَنْ حَادَّ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ وَلَوْ كَانُوا آبَاءَهُمْ أَوْ أَبْنَاءَهُمْ أَوْ إِخْوَانَهُمْ أَوْ عَشِيرَتَهُمْ أُولَئِكَ كَتَبَ فِي قُلُوبِهِمُ الْإِيمَانَ وَأَيَّدَهُم بِرُوحٍ مِنْهُ وَيُدْخِلُهُمْ جَنَّاتٍ تَجْرِي مِنْ تَحْتِهَا الْأَنْهَارُ خَالِدِينَ فِيهَا رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمْ وَرَضُوا عَنْهُ أُولَئِكَ حِزْبُ اللَّهِ أَلَا إِنَّ حِزْبَ اللَّهِ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ» ٧٥٦. ومحادة الله تبارك وتعالى في حدوده.

٧٤١ ص: تبيينه. ٧٤٢ ك ي: قبيح. ٧٤٣ او يكون: ح: ويكون. ٧٤٤ ص: منهما. ٧٤٥ او تعطله: ص: وتعطله. ٧٤٦ ك: يؤمن. ٧٤٧ ومتى لا تعرف: ص: ومن لا يعرف. ٧٤٨ ح: محذوف. ٧٤٩ ص: يتبرأ. ٧٥٠ ي: محذوف. ٧٥١ ح ك: + سبحانه. ٧٥٢ ح: + سبحانه. ٧٥٣ لا شريك له: ص: محذوف. ٧٥٤ سورة التوبة (٩) ٧١. ٧٥٥ ص: واذا يقول. ٧٥٦ سورة المجادلة (٥٨) ٢٢.

other is the knowledge of the lie, which opposes the truth, and the return to God free of the ignorance of all ignoramuses. If you know the two parts of truth, then you will know with certainty the entire truth and the good and evil which exist in everything, whether now or in the future. Do not err about either out of ignorance and do not nullify one of them so that you will not know part of the truth or nullify it, and so that you will not be safe from following a small lie or of telling one. When you do not know the lie, you cannot free yourself from its people; and God is as angry with whomever does not free himself from the liar as He is with the liar (*mubtil*)¹³⁴. When you do not know a part of the truth, you are not safe from freeing yourself from the truthful person. Whoever frees himself from truthful persons, God frees Himself from him. He from whom truthful persons turn away out of anger, God turns away from. The truthful persons of God's creatures are the believers and the believers are the pious, the merciful and those who love one another. Those who love one another are those who for the sake of God love those whom God loves and with whom God associates and who hate those who hate God, their Lord and Master. O my son, listen to what God, glory be to Him, has mentioned in this matter concerning them and what he has taught His friends about them, when He who has no copartner has said: "The believers, men and women, are friends one of the other, they order [doing] the right [works] and forbid the wrong [ones], and observe the prayer and pay the alms, and obey God and His messenger. They are those on whom God will have mercy, for God is Omnipotent and Wise." (sura 9, v. 71) God, glory be to Him, has said: "You cannot find people who believe in God and the Last Day associating with those who hate God and His messenger, even though they are their fathers, or their sons, or their brothers, or their clan. As for those, He writes faith upon their hearts and supports them by a Spirit from Himself. He will make them enter the Garden under which rivers flow, therein to abide forever. God is content with them and they are content with Him. Those are God's party. O, verily, God's party are the successful." (sura 58, v. 22) The hatred of God, may He be blessed and exalted, on account of His

١ خلاف المخالفين فيما حدد من امره ٧٥٧ وعهوده. فالله يقول سبحانه لا تجده ٧٥٨ وهم يقولون. بلى هم كثير موجودون. والله يشهد سبحانه ومن قبل وحيه على خلاف ما عليه يشهدون. وما في كتاب الله من بيان خلافهم ٧٥٩. وشهادته ٧٦٠ بغير اوصافهم. فكثير بمن الله جم. يخص من بيان الله فيه ويعم.

وليس لقلة ذلك ولا عسره. ولا للمتبس ٧٦١ ليس من امره. ضل القوم عنه ولا تاهوا. ولكن لما سن فيهم ٧٦٢ ملوك بني امية ٧٦٣ وشبهوا. ولقهر ٧٦٤ بني امية لهم وغلبة سلطانهم ٧٦٥. قوي عليهم ٧٦٦ فيه ٧٦٧ سلطان شيطانهم ٧٦٨. فالفوه حتى انسوا به لطول الصحبة. وعز ٧٦٩ فراقه في انفسهم لما كان يكون ٧٧٠ في خلافه من الانكال المعطبة. ولما كان من جهله يومئذ لديهم منكلا ٧٧١ محروما. عاد مجهوله يومئذ فيهم بعد جهله معلوما. ثم خلفت من ١٨ (ب) بعدهم/اخلاف السوء. التي اتت عداوتها للاسلام من وراء عداوة كل عدو. فكانت اكلف ٧٧٢ بما سن لها اسلافها كلفا. واسرف في الاحتجاج للباطل سرفا. فالله المستعان للمحققين عليهم ٧٧٣ وفيهم. وفيما خالفوهم فيه من حكم ٧٧٤ رهم عليهم. فقد اصبحوا وامسوا عن الحق بكما وصما وعميا. ١٥ وصاروا هم وائمتهم من بني امية لانفسهم في ذلك داء ٧٧٥ دويا ٧٧٦. لا تقبل شفاء الادوية. ولا يسوغ فيه ولا ينفع دواء الاشفية. كما لا يسوغ في البكم ولا في العمى ٧٧٧ ولا في الصمم دواء ولا شفاء ابدا. الا ان يكون الله بشفائه متوحدا. وكذلك داؤهم من الجهل والضلالة والكفر. فلن يشفى

٧٥٧ من امره: ص: لامره. ٧٥٨ ح ك: + قوما. ٧٥٩ من بيان خلافهم: ح: على خلاف من بيان.
 ٧٦٠ ح: وشهادتهم. ٧٦١ ح: بملتبس. ٧٦٢ ص: فيه. ٧٦٣ ص: + وبعض ما كان قبلهم.
 ٧٦٤ ح: بقهري. ك: ولقهر. ٧٦٥ وغلبة سلطانهم: ص ك: عليه بسلطانهم. ٧٦٦ ي: عليه.
 ٧٦٧ ح: محذوف. ٧٦٨ ك: شياطينهم. ٧٦٩ ص: وعن. ٧٧٠ ص: محذوف.
 ٧٧١ ح: مشکلا. ٧٧٢ ح: اكلفت. ٧٧٣ ص: محذوف. ٧٧٤ ص: + الله من حكم.
 ٧٧٥ ص: محذوف. ٧٧٦ ص: + ذاعيا. ٧٧٧ ص: الاعمه.

ordinances is the opposition of those who oppose His order[s] and the laws He established for them. Since God, glory be to Him, has said (in the above verse) “you cannot find people”, while they say, on the contrary, there are many people like them. God, glory be to Him, and those who received His revelation give evidence opposing their evidence. God’s book, by His graces, does a great deal to explain their opposition and evidence, both in a detailed and in general manner, without describing them.

It is not on account of an insufficient and difficult explanation (of religious issues) or its obscurity, of which there is none, but on account of the law established for them by the kings of the Umayyads¹³⁵ and the confusion which the latter produced in them, that people went astray and deviated from God. And it is on account of the control the Umayyads had over them and the victory of the Umayyads’ rule over them, that the Devil’s rule overcame them during this period. They became accustomed to the Devil till they liked his company because of the[ir] long proximity to him; and it was difficult for them to break away from him because of the destructive punishments (*ankāl*)¹³⁶ involved in opposing him. For whoever did not know him (the Devil) was severely punished and ill-treated by them, [so that] the unknown thing (the Devil) became known to them, after they had not known it. Afterwards, evil people whose hatred for Islam was stronger than the hatred of any other enemy, took their place (of the Umayyads). These [evil people] very much loved the law established for them by their ancestors, and greatly exaggerated their false arguments. God helps the truthful against these people and concerning them and concerning the thing by which they oppose the truthful, namely, by God’s judgment against them. They became people who neither tell the truth, nor hear it, nor see it ever. They and their Umayyad imams became in this matter a severe disease to themselves, which is not cured by medicines, is impossible to cure, and is useless to cure by medicines. The fact that it is altogether impossible to cure and make healthy a dumb, blind, or deaf person unless God alone cures him is like the fact of their illness, which is ignorance, going astray and unbelief; they will never be cured of it unless God compels them to belief.

١ منهم الا باكره من الله لهم على الايمان وجبر. وذلك فما لا يكون منه بعد
 ان امرهم. ولانه لو كان منه بجبر لكان ايمان^{٧٧٨} لمن جبرهم. واذن كان له
 لا لهم. وكان^{٧٧٩} فعله لا فعلهم. لانه منه لا منهم. فالاحسان فيه له^{٧٨٠}
 دونهم. فهذا يا بني فاعرفه^{٧٨١} من امرهم. ومما^{٧٨٢} هم فيه من جهلهم
 وكفرهم^{٧٨٣}.

واعلم يا بني ان جهل الناس بالله وبدينه. وما هم عليه من العمى عن
 الله تبارك وتعالى^{٧٨٤} وعن تبينه. يدعيان جهلا مضاعفا. وعمى متبرا^{٧٨٥}
 متلغا. لا يرجى^{٧٨٦} الا بالله لاهلهما منهما سلامة. ولا يزدادان على
 صاحبهما طول^{٧٨٧} الدهر الا مداومة. وانما قيل في الجهل انه مضعف. لان
 صاحبه لا يعرف ولا يعرف انه لا يعرف. فجعله هذا جهلان. وهلكته
 بجعله هلكتان. بل لو قيل ان جهله هذا جهل^{٧٨٨} مضعف اضعافا ثلاثة
 متراكبة. لكانت مقالة من قال ذلك في جهله صادقة لا مكذبة. لانه جهل
 فكانت تلك منه جهلا. ثم جهل انه جاهل فكانت تلك لجهله مثلا. ثم
 راي ان^{٧٨٩} جهليه جميعا علما. فكان ذلك منه جهلا ثالثا وظلما. وانما قيل
 ان عماه^{٧٩٠} متبر متلف. ليس له الا بالله عنه زوال ولا تكشف. لان
 صاحبه لا يالم به^{٧٩١} ولا يجده. فهو يزيده دائبا ويمده. اذ لا يجد له في نفسه
 الما. ولا يعد عماه فيه عمى. فلذلك ما ازداد^{٧٩٢} داؤه. وقل من عماه شفاؤه.
 ولو وجده فلمسه. او الم بالمه^{٧٩٣} فحسه^{٧٩٤}. لطلب له الشفاء. ولما كان
 متبرا متلغا. ولو طلب وبه طب^{٧٩٥} ما به من دائه. عند^{٧٩٦} من جعل الله

٧٧٨ الاصح ايمانا. ٧٧٩ ص ح: كان. ٧٨٠ فيه له: ص: له فيه. ٧٨١ ص ك وتحت الكلمة في
 هـ: فاعلمه. ٧٨٢ ص: ومما. ٧٨٣ فهذا - وكفرهم: ح: محذوف. ٧٨٤ تبارك وتعالى: ص:
 محذوف. ٧٨٥ في حواشي هـ: مبرا. ٧٨٦ ك: ترجى. ٧٨٧ على صاحبهما طول: ص ك: لاهلهما
 على طول. ح: لاهلهما على طول. ٧٨٨ ي: محذوف. ٧٨٩ ك: محذوف. ٧٩٠ ي: + عمى.
 ٧٩١ ح ك: له. ٧٩٢ ص: اثر. ٧٩٣ الم بالمه: ح: لم يالمه. ٧٩٤ ي: فاحسه.
 ٧٩٥ ص: + حياته. ٧٩٦ ص: عنه.

But it is inconceivable that God should compel them [to believe] after He ordered them [to believe]; for if He compelled them to believe, it would be the belief of the one who compels them; therefore, it would be His belief, not theirs, His action, not theirs; for it is from Him, not from them, and doing good in this matter is His, not theirs¹³⁷. O my son, know this concerning their condition, and the ignorance and unbelief in which they live.

O my son, know that the people's ignorance of God and of His religion and the condition in which they live, namely their deviation from God, may He be blessed and exalted, and from His elucidation (the *Qurʾān*), on account of their blindness, are called twofold ignorance and annihilating and destructive blindness, from which there is no hope of being saved except by God, and which would only add to its owners' persistence in the course of time. It is only said that the ignorance is twofold because the ignorant does not know, and does not know that he does not know. His ignorance, then, is twofold, and his destruction on account of his ignorance is [also] twofold. Moreover, if it is said that his ignorance is threefold ignorance, that statement concerning his ignorance would be truthful and unfalse. For he does not know, and this is ignorance with regard to him. Then he does not know that he does not know, and this is an example of his ignorance. Then he thinks that his entire twofold ignorance is knowledge. Therefore it is threefold ignorance and deviation on his part. It is said that his blindness does nothing but annihilate and destroy and that God alone can discover and remove it, since he does not feel pain on account of his blindness, or realize it. He increases his blindness and prolongs it through his persistence, since he does not feel the pain of his own blindness and does not regard his blindness as blindness. Therefore his illness increases and his cure decreases by reason of his blindness. If he were to feel his blindness and to discern it, or to become aware of it and sense it, he would seek a cure for it and for what it annihilates and destroys. If he, woe unto him, were to seek a remedy for his illness among those in whom God placed it for him, namely, the

عنده طبه من اهل الحق واوليائه. لوجد عندهم من ذلك شفاء لمشافيا^{٧٩٧}. ونورا لما عدم من بصره كافيا. ولكنه اصر عن آيات الله مستكبرا. وعد عماه عن الله وعن تبينه بصرا^{٧٩٨}. فكانت مقالته على الله كاذبة. ونفسه فيما بينه وبين الله للاثام كاسبة. كما قال^{٧٩٩} العليم باصرار المصرين^{٨٠٠}. في امثاله من الائمة المستكبرين: «وَيْلٌ لِّكُلِّ أَفَّاكٍ أَثِيمٍ. يَسْمَعُ آيَاتِ اللَّهِ تُثَلَّى عَلَيْهِ ثُمَّ يُصِرُّ مُسْتَكْبِرًا كَأَن لَّمْ يَسْمَعْهَا فَبَشِيرُهُ بِعَذَابٍ أَلِيمٍ. وَإِذَا عَلِمَ مِنْ آيَاتِنَا شَيْئًا اتَّخَذَهَا هُزُوًا أُولَئِكَ لَهُمْ عَذَابٌ مُّهِينٌ. مِنْ وَرَائِهِمْ جَهَنَّمُ وَلَا يُغْنِي عَنْهُمْ مَا كَسَبُوا شَيْئًا وَلَا مَا اتَّخَذُوا مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ أَوْلِيَاءَ وَلَهُمْ عَذَابٌ عَظِيمٌ. هَذَا هُدًى وَالَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا بِآيَاتِ رَبِّهِمْ^{٨٠١} لَهُمْ عَذَابٌ مِنْ رِجْزِ أَلِيمٍ. اللَّهُ الَّذِي سَخَّرَ لَكُمُ الْبَحْرَ لِتَجْرِيَ الْفُلُكُ فِيهِ بِأَمْرِهِ وَلِتَبْتَغُوا مِنْ فَضْلِهِ وَلَعَلَّكُمْ تَشْكُرُونَ. وَسَخَّرَ لَكُم مَّا فِي السَّمَوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ جَمِيعًا مِنْهُ إِنَّ فِي ذَلِكَ لَآيَاتٍ لِقَوْمٍ يَتَفَكَّرُونَ»^{٨٠٢}.

١٩ (أ)

فكذلك^{٨٠٣} هو فكما^{٨٠٤} قال وان لا فمّن سخره. هل ادعى تسخير ذلك احد قط او ذكره^{٨٠٥}. لا ولو ادعاه مدع اذن^{٨٠٦} لكان كذبه مكشوفاً. ولكان بكذبه في كل قرن خلا او بقي من القرون موصوفاً. وما ادعى ذلك فرعون في جهله وعتائه. ولقد ادعى غيره في^{٨٠٧} ملكه لنظرائه^{٨٠٨}. وما ادعى لهم خلقا ولا صنعا. ولو ادعاه لكان ذلك كذبا مستشنعا. وانما تأويل قول فرعون: «أَنَا رَبُّكُمْ أَلَّا عَلَى»^{٨٠٩} انا سيدكم ومليكم لا ما^{٨١٠} قال موسى. ولم يرد انا لكم رب خلاق. ولا انا لكم اله

٧٩٧ شفاء شافيا: ص ح ك ي: شفاء له شافيا. ولعله الاصح. ٧٩٨ ولكنه - بصرا: ي: محذوف.
٧٩٩ ي: + الله. ٨٠٠ باصرار المصرين: ص وتحت الكلمتين في هـ: باسرار المسرين. ٨٠١ ح: الله.
٨٠٢ سورة الجاثية (٤٥) ٧-١٣. ٨٠٣ ك: وكذلك. ٨٠٤ ح: كما. ٨٠٥ ك: ذكر.
٨٠٦ ص: اما. ٨٠٧ ص ح: من. ٨٠٨ ح: لنصرائه. ٨٠٩ سورة النازعات (٧٩) ٢٤.
٨١٠ ص: من.

truthful friends of God, he would find in them a curative remedy for his illness and sufficient light to see with, which he lacks. But he displays arrogance and stubbornness towards God's signs and deems his deviation from God and His elucidation (the *Ḳur'ān*) seeing. His words about God are false and his soul commits sins in matters between him and God. As He who well knows the stubbornness of the stubborn has said about people like him among the leaders who display arrogance: "Woe unto every sinful liar who hears the signs of God recited to him, then persists in arrogance as if he had not heard them. Inform him of a painful punishment. When he knows something of Our signs, he mocks them. For them there is a humiliating punishment. Behind them lies Hell, and what they have acquired and those whom they have taken as protectors, other than God, will be of no avail to them. For them there is a severe punishment. This is guidance. For those who disbelieve in the signs of their Lord there is a painful punishment of wrath. It is God who has subjected the sea to you so that the ships may run therein at His command, and so that you may seek His favor and perhaps will thank Him. And He has subjected to you whatsoever is in the heaven and whatsoever is in the earth; all from Him. Verily, in that are signs for people who reflect." (sura 45, vv. 7-13)

Thus is God, as He has said, and if not, who has subjected [the heavens and the earth]? Has anyone ever maintained or mentioned that he has been the subjector? No. If anyone had maintained that, he would have lied openly and have been described by this lie in every generation which was and is. [Even] Pharaoh in his ignorance and arrogance did not maintain that. Pharaoh maintained something else concerning his rule over his equals. He did not maintain that he created them. If he had maintained that, it would have been an abominable lie. Pharaoh's statement: "I am your highest Lord (*rabbukum*)" (sura 79, v. 24) means only "I am your master (*sayyid*) and king," not what Moses had said. He did not mean to say I am your Lord and Creator, nor [did he mean to say]

١ رزاق. لان كل رب في لسان العرب فسيد ومليك. ولا سيما اذا كان وليس له عند نفسه فيما ملك شريك. او لا تسمع يا بني وترى. انه لم يزعم انه رب لغيرهم من اهل القرى. التي لا ملك له عليها. ولا سلطان له فيها. فلما لم يوقن بغيره. ولم يستدل على الله بتدبيره^{٨١١}. وكذب من^{٨١٢} الله بما لم تره عيناه. وكان كل من صدقه مثله لا يوقن الا بما عاينه ورآه. وما^{٨١٣} كان لذلك مثلاً ونظيراً. قال انا ربكم ومليككم^{٨١٤} ولم يدع لهم صنعا ولا تدبيراً. صغراً^{٨١٥} او تضاًؤلاً^{٨١٦} عن تلك ودعواها. فلما صغر عنها وتضاءل كان ادعائه لسواها. مما يدخل به وفيه^{٨١٧} غلط وامترأ. وما يمكن في مثله^{٨١٨} عندهم الادعاء. ولو ادعى فيهم خلقاً. او انتحل لهم رزقاً. لما اعترتهم في كذبه مع تلك مرية. ولا اعمتهم من الشهرة^{٨١٩} في امره معمية. ولكنهم لما لم يوقنوا بالله وتدبيره. ولم يقرؤا الا بما رأوا^{٨٢٠} او مثله^{٨٢١} من فرعون وغيره. وانكروا ما لم يروا^{٨٢٢} او يكون مثلاً لما رأوا^{٨٢٣} فدفعوه. وجاز^{٨٢٤} عندهم لفرعون ولهم في فرعون ما ادعوه. فحمد الله الذي خسر^{٨٢٥} كل من ايقن او تحير عن ان يدعي من صنع الله وان جهله صنعا. فيكون فيه لشبهة^{٨٢٦} او تحير لمبطل مدعا^{٨٢٧}.

١٥ وان كان اثر التدبير فيه بانه صنع مصنوع باديا. وكان^{٨٢٨} هدى الله فيه^{٨٢٩} لمن لم يهتد^{٨٣٠} اليه بالهدى مناديا. فنداؤه^{٨٣١} باحداث الله له اعلى من كل علي. وتبدييه بانه صنع لله وتدبيره ابدى من كل جلي^{٨٣٢}.

٨١١ الله تدبيره: ح: الله تعالى في تدبيره. ٨١٢ ح: محذوف. ٨١٣ ص: او ما. ٨١٤ ص: والحكم. ٨١٥ ص ح ك: + منه. ٨١٦ او تضاًؤلاً: ص ح ك: وتضاًؤلاً. ٨١٧ ص: فيه. ٨١٨ ص ح ك ي: له. ٨١٩ ح ك: الشبهة. ولعله الاصح. ٨٢٠ يقرؤا - رأوا: ص: يقرؤا بالامان. ٨٢١ او مثله: ح: مثله. ٨٢٢ ح: يروه. ٨٢٣ ح: يروه. ٨٢٤ ص ح ك: جاز. ولعله الاصح. ٨٢٥ ح: اخسر. ٨٢٦ ح: شبهة. ٨٢٧ ح: مدعى. ٨٢٨ ح: وان كان. ٨٢٩ ح: محذوف. ٨٣٠ لم يهتد: ص: يهتدى. ح ك: اهتدى. ٨٣١ في حواشي ه: ونداه. ٨٣٢ ص: خفي. ح: + بدى. ك: بدى وفوق الكلمة جلي.

I am your God and Provider. For every *rabb* in the language of the Arabs is master and king, especially if he maintains he has no copartner in his kingdom. O my son, do you not hear and see that Pharaoh did not claim that he was the lord of the people of cities over which he neither reigned nor ruled. Since he did not know [God] with certainty by any other means, and did not prove [the existence of] God through His direction; and since he lied concerning God on account of things his eyes did not see; and since whoever, like Pharaoh, believed in Pharaoh's words, knew with certainty only what his eyes saw and his other senses perceived, Pharaoh said I am your lord and king, and he did not maintain that he was their creator and director, for he felt himself too small and weak to make such a pretense. Since he was too small and weak to make such a pretense, he made another pretense about which it was possible to err and which could be doubted, and which, in their opinion, could also be applied to [other] persons like him. If he had made a pretense concerning them that he created them or attributed to himself their sustenance, they would have had no doubt that his pretense was false and blindness would not have prevented them [from seeing] the doubtfulness¹³⁸ of his assertion. But since they did not know God and His direction with certainty and acknowledged only what they saw and what their other senses perceived, namely Pharaoh and others, and since they denied and rejected what they did not see or what could serve as an example of what they saw, it was possible, in their opinion, for Pharaoh and for them [to make] the pretense they made about Pharaoh. Praise be to God who leads astray whomsoever knows with certainty that God's creation is his own or is [so] confused [as] to make such a pretense, even if he is ignorant of God's creation, so that one can argue against him concerning creation on account of the doubt or confusion of one who has false opinions.

If the sign of direction is evident in man, that he is a created creation, and if God's guidance found in man calls to him who had not been guided by it, then his call stating that God had brought him into being is higher than the highest thing and his appearance as created and directed by God is more evident than any other evident thing.

١ فتبارك الله احسن الخالقين خلقا. واحق في جميع الحقائق ٨٣٣ متحققا. الذي لم يزل ولا يزال. ومن له الكبرياء والجلال. رب الارباب المعظمة. وولي كل احسان ونعمة. الاول الذي ليس كمثله شيء وهو القوي العزيز القهار ٨٣٤ الغلاب. «رَبَّنَا لَا تُزِغْ قُلُوبَنَا بَعْدَ إِذْ هَدَيْتَنَا وَهَبْ لَنَا مِنْ لَدُنْكَ رَحْمَةً إِنَّكَ أَنْتَ الْوَهَّابُ» ٨٣٦. وصل على جبريل امينك وعلى ملائكتك المصطفين. وعلى محمد رسولك وعلى جميع الرسل ٨٣٧ والنبیین ٨٣٨. والحمد لله رب العالمين. وصلواته على سيدنا محمد خير خلقه اجمعين. واهله الطاهرين وسلامه. تم كتاب الدليل. على الواحد الجليل.

٨٣٣ واحق - الحقائق: ص: احق جميع الحقائق. ح: احق جميع الخلائق. ٨٣٤ ص: القاهر. ٨٣٥ ص: فلا. ٨٣٦ سورة آل عمران (٣) ٨. ٨٣٧ ص ح ك: المرسلين. ٨٣٨ اختتام الكتاب بعد الكلمة النبیین: ص: وسلم على المرسلين. والحمد لله رب العالمين. ح: وسلام على المرسلين. والحمد لله رب العالمين. وصلى الله على محمد خاتم النبیین. وعلى اهله الاكرمين. وسلم عليه وعليهم اجمعين. ك: وسلام على المرسلين. والحمد لله رب العالمين.

Blessed be God, the best creator and the truest of all the truths. He has not ceased to be and will forever be, to Him belongs the glory and the splendor, and He is the Lord of the sublimest lords. He bestows every good thing and grace. He is the First, the like of whom there is no other, and He is the Mighty, the Omnipotent, the Subduer and the Victorious. "O our Lord, do not lead our hearts astray after You have guided us, and bestow upon us mercy from You, since You are the Bestower." (sura 3, v. 8) Bless Gabriel, your faithful, and your chosen angels, and Muḥammad, your messenger, and all the messengers and prophets. Praise be to God, the Lord of all created beings, His blessings and peace be upon our master Muḥammad, the best of all His creatures, and upon his pure family. The epistle of the proof of the existence of the One, the Lofty, is finished.

III. NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION

1. The original meaning of the arabized word *zindīk* (pl. *zanādika* and *zanādik*) is vague. The word probably derives from the Pahlavi, in which *zand* means commentary, and especially commentary on the Avesta, the sacred book of the Mazdakis. The Pahlavi word *Zandik* is formed by adding the classical suffix *ik*. A *zandīk* is a person who adheres to an unorthodox commentary. Karter (or Kirdīr), the famous Magian, who played an important role in the accusal and execution of Mani (277 A.D.), used *zandīk* to refer to the disciples of the chief unbeliever, namely Mani, since Karter undoubtedly saw Mani as a disbelieving Mazdakī. In consequence the word *zandīk* came to mean unbeliever. The Arabic word *zindīk* has a twofold meaning; in the broader sense it designates an unbeliever and an innovator in the field of religion; in the narrow sense it is a synonym of Manichaeism, i.e., one who believes in dualism. See G. Monnot, *Penseurs musulmans et religions iraniennes. 'Abd al-jabbār et ses devanciers*, Paris 1974, p. 98f. The second sense of the word appeared for the first time in Irak in 742, in connection with the execution of Dja'd ibn Dirham. (The verb *tazandaqa*, meaning "he became a *zindīk*" and the noun *zanādika* refer in later texts to Arabs who adopted Mazdakism in pre-Islamic Mecca. See M. J. Kister, "Al-Hīra, some notes on its relations with Arabia", *Arabica* 15(1968), p. 144f. Al-Malaṭī, *K. al-tanbīh wa'l-radd 'alā ahl al-ahwā' wa'l-bida'*, ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, Baghdad and Beirut 1968, p. 92. Al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūdj al-dhahab*, Paris 1861-77, Vol. II, p. 195. Al-Shahrastānī, *K. al-milāl*, p. 192. However, later writers may have applied the term *zindīk*, understood in their times as Manichaeism, to Arabs in Mecca's pre-Islamic era, since Mazdakism was a Manichaeism doctrine.) The term appeared again in 783-786 when an official inquisition was established by the Abbasid caliph to persecute the *zanādika*. See L. Massignon, "Zindīk", *EI*¹, vol. IV, p. 1228. Yet as early as the beginning of the Abbasid era *zanādika* was applied not only to dualists but also to those who deviated from orthodox Islam, e.g., extreme Shī'ites; to those who neglected the fulfillment of the religious precepts; and to those who presumed to outdo the literary beauty of the Qur'ān. See G. Vajda, "Les Zindīqs en pays d'Islam au debut de la periode abbasside", *Rivista Degli Studi Orientali*, 17(1938), pp. 173-229. There is no way to prove that whoever was accused of *zandaqa* after 786 was in fact a Manichaeism, with the exception of 'Abd al-Karīm ibn Abī 'Awdjā'. See Badawī, *Min ta'rīkh al-ilhād*, p. 39. From the second century of the Hidjra onwards, the term *zandaqa* is used by various theologians to designate any intellectual or practical approach which seems to pose the threat of heresy. The Hanbalites applied *zanādika* to those who denied the creation and the Crator, to various kinds of Manichaeism and to the ascetics (*zuhhād*) who, alleging that their souls were united with God, did not fulfill the precepts. Sufis were executed as *zanādika* because of their doctrine of divine love. (e.g. al-Ḥallādj, d. 922) For the same reason moderate Shī'ites considered radical Shī'ites *zanādika*. See *EI*¹, *ibid*. The Hanbalite Ibn Ḳudāma (d. 1223) con-

sidered anyone who occupies himself with Kalam to be a *zindīk*. See Ibn Qudāma, *Tahrīm al-naẓar fī kutub ahl al-kalām*, ed. and tr. G. Maḳdisī, London 1962, p. 54 of the Arabic text. The Malikites of the West condemned *zanādika* as offending the prophet. The Muʿtazilites regarded as *zanādika* all who wished to free themselves from religious precepts. See EI¹, *ibid*. According to the Shīʿite al-Ḳummī, the *zanādika* are one of the extreme Shīʿite sects. In his *K. al-maḳālāt waʾl-firaḳ* (ed. Muḥammad Djawād Mashkūr, Tehran 1963, p. 64), he describes them as depriving God of divinity while placing it in man's body. According to him, they see God as light in man's body. Cf. al-Nawbakhtī, *K. firaḳ al-shīʿa*, ed. H. Ritter, Istanbul 1931, p. 41.

Al-Ghazālī regards as *zanādika* the philosophers who assume the world's eternity and deny the existence of a creator and the coming of the Day of Judgment. See *al-Munḳidh min al-dalāl*, ed. Djamīl Ṣalība and Kāmīl ʿIyād, Beirut 1967, pp. 76-77. Al-Ghazali distinguishes two levels of *zandaqa*: an absolute *zandaqa*, consisting of a negation of both the Day of Judgment and the existence of God as a creator, as opposed to a limited *zandaqa*, consisting of a denial of some of the events of the Day of Judgment and an acknowledgement of God's existence as creator paired with a denial of His omniscience. *Idem*, *Fayṣal al-tafriḳa*, p. 14f.

For al-Ḳāsim the word *zindīk* means a Manichaean. See al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīk*. But it also denotes an evil-doer and sinner. See *idem*, *al-Madīh al-kabīr liʾl-Ḳurʾān al-mubīn*, MS Berlin, fol. 68a, ll. 13-15. *Idem*, *K. al-hidjra, The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 356, MS Berlin, fol. 118f.

See also in addition to the above bibliography: I. Goldziher, "Ṣāliḥ B. ʿAbd al-Ḳuddūs und das Zindīkthum während der Regierung des chalifen al-Mahdī", *Transactions Congr. Or. London*, II, 1892, pp. 104-129. This article is included in I. Goldziher's *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Joseph Desomogyi, Hildesheim 1969, Vol. III, pp. 1-26. B. Lewis, "Some observations on the significance of Heresy in the History of Islam", *Studia Islamica* 1(1953), pp. 43-63 and especially pp. 54-56. F. Gabrieli, "La 'Zandaqa'", pp. 23-38.

2. *Alḥada* (inf. *ilḥād* part. *mulḥid*) originally means "he deviated from something". See *Lisan al-ʿarab* (in three volumes) Beirut 1970, Vol. III, p. 348. From this broad sense emerged a narrow one, which means "he deviated from religion". In texts of the third and the fourth centuries of the Hidjra the word *mulḥid* denotes an unbeliever (but not one who attributes a copartner to God—*mushrik*). *Mulḥid* refers in this period to any one who deviates from Islam in general or from one of its tenets. Ibn al-Rāwandī, who lived in the third century of the Hidjra, was named a *mulḥid*. Ibn al-Rāwandī maintained that reason is superior to tradition, that the prophets are only magicians and that the Ḳurʾān is not an inimitable book. See Badawī, *Min taʾrīkh al-ilḥād*, pp. 106-121. Gabrieli, "La Zandaqa", p. 32. H. S. Nyberg, "ʿAmr ibn ʿUbaid et Ibn al-Rāwendī, deux reprouvés", in *Classicisme et Declin Culturel dans l'Histoire De l'Islam, Actes du symposium international d'histoire de la civilisation musulmane*, organized by R. Brunshvig et G. E. von Grunebaum, Paris 1957, p. 133. Abu Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakariyya al-Rāzī (d. circa 925), who is also called a *mulḥid*, impugns religion in general, and prophecy and scriptures in particular. See Badawī, *ibid.*, pp. 201-228. (Neither Ibn al-Rāwandī nor al-

Rāzī were, however, atheists as we understand this term today. See M. Plessner, "Heresy and Rationalism in the First Centuries of Islam", (in Hebrew) in *The 'Ulamā' and Problems of Religion in the Muslim World*, Jerusalem 1971, pp. 3-10. Al-Djuwaynī (*K. al-irshād*, p. 376) describes the *mulhida* as those who despise the law of Islam.

The Aristotelian philosophers, who believed in the eternity of the world and denied the Kalam doctrine of atoms, are named *mulhidūn*. See Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 505f. Al-Djuwaynī, *K. al-irshād*, pp. 18, 23. (But they are also named *zanādiqa*. See R. Arnaldez, "Falsafa", EI², Vol. II, p. 770, col. 2, quoting al-Kiftī, *Ta'rikh al-khulafā'*). Likewise in al-Kāsim, the *mulhid* appears as an Aristotelian philosopher. See *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulhid*, MS. Berlin, fol. 60a. ff. Pines, *Beiträge*, p. 99f, n. 2. Wolfson, *Kalam*, p. 506. But there are other uses of the word in al-Kāsim's writings: A *mulhid* is anyone who doubts that God created all things. See above p. 134. He is also someone who denies Qur'ān verses by distorting them (according to sura 41, v. 40), [See *K. al-nāsikh wa'l-mansūkh*, MS. Berlin, fol. 126b, ll. 20-22, fol. 129b, ll. 9-10], and whoever doubts the literary beauty of the Qur'ān. See *ibid.*, fol. 127b, ll. 2-3. Pre-socratic philosophers are also called *mulhida* by al-Kāsim. See above p. 104.

Finally there is a close affinity in the meanings of *zindīk* and *mulhid* both of which point to unbelief or deviation from religion, though the term *mulhid* generally applies to those who criticized religion from a rational and philosophical standpoint.

3. For this translation of *rabb al-ʿālamīn* see Lane, *Lexicon*, Vol. V, p. 2141.
4. *wa lā ʿadam*. Either *lā* or *ʿadam* seems to be redundant, since only one is required for negation. The form *ʿdm* may be read as a verb (*ʿadima*) and the sentence translated: "And there is proof of his confusion, on account of which he perished". But this possibility is weak, since it nullifies the parallel which begins with the words "the denier among them" and ends with "nor did he".
5. The reading *ikhtiyārihi* of some MSS. (see note 14 to the text) also conveys a reasonable meaning: "nor did he clearly substantiate his choice" (i.e., his false opinion which he held by choice). This reading makes sense on p. 62, l. 10 of the Arabic text, but not on l. 14, in which the reading *iḥtiyār* is undoubtedly preferable. Therefore it seems better to read *iḥtiyār* in l. 10 too.
6. The notion expressed here is that by creating a perfect world God adduces arguments for His existence. The arguments consist of the perfect phenomena which are manifest all over the world. God enjoins people to believe in Him and causes them to believe by showing them these arguments, and if they do not believe in spite of these arguments, they will be accused of unbelief. On God bringing arguments before people see Ritter, "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī", p. 68, ll. 5-6, p. 70, ll. 7-8. Schwarz, "The Letter", p. 20, par. 4. In al-Kāsim this notion occurs frequently. See e.g., *Uṣūl al-ʿadl wa'l-tawḥīd*, pp. 96-100.
7. It seems to me that al-Kāsim uses *maʿrifa* as a synonym for *ʿilm*, both of which mean knowledge. Cf. Peters, *God's Created Speech*, p. 56. F. Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant*, Leiden 1970, pp. 129-142. Al-Bāḥillānī, *K. al-iṣṣāf*, Cairo 1963, p. 13.
8. *li-kull mā*. *mā* appears here for person instead of the usually employed *man*.

For this usage see H. Reckendorf, *Arabische Syntax*, rep. of the Heidelberg 1921 ed., Heidelberg 1977, art. 210, 4.

9. *Mu'aththir* means one who makes signs, or leaves signs in, impressions on something. The signs made are a proof of the existence of a maker of signs.
10. *tadbīr*. In some places in our epistle, however, I have translated *tadbīr* as "direction", which seems to be required by the context. Cf. S. H. Griffith, ("Ammar al-Baṣrī's", p. 157) who renders the word "divine economy" and Heinen (*Islamic Cosmology*, p. 50) who renders it "divinely instituted order".
11. The two principles are: a. the proof of God's existence according to the signs made by Him, and b. the absolute difference between God and all creation. See above p. 74.
12. *falāsifat al-rūm*. Or maybe al-Ḳāsim means Christian apologetes who have had philosophical training.
13. I.e. it is also possible to perceive God in ways other than this non-sensual and non-imaginative perception. Al-Ḳāsim counts different ways of obtaining knowledge of God; then he says that each way can be applied separately or together.
14. In *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulhid*, fol. 60a, al-Ḳāsim counts four sources of knowledge: a. the five senses, b. the soul (*nafs*) which produces different feelings such as fear, joy, sorrow, and also imagination, c. reason [the knowledge derived from reason is divided into two parts: spontaneous knowledge (*badiha*), for example the recognition of good as good and of evil as evil and knowledge depending on a rational proof (*istidlāl, istinbāt*); our knowledge of the Creator is obtained, according to al-Ḳāsim, through the latter category], d. supposition (*ẓann wa-hisbān*), i.e., judgments unsupported by proofs: they may be true or false. Cf. S. Pines, "Some problems of Islamic Philosophy", *Islamic Culture* 11(1937), p. 67, n. 4.
At the beginning of this epistle al-Ḳāsim examines the sources of knowledge by which the existence of the Creator can be proved. He enumerates the sources he mentions in *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulhid*, and likewise states that certain knowledge of God can be obtained through rational proof. Yet concerning imagination there is a difference between our epistle and *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulhid*; imagination in our epistle appears first as a part of the soul's activity (p. 72, l. 4) as in *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulhid* and later as a separate source of knowledge (*ibid.*, l. 20).
15. The particularizing quality produces differences between one genus and the other genera.
16. The *lā* here seems to be redundant. Cf. n. 4 above.
17. Or: We ask God the certainty and belief which His friends have. The suffix in *dīnihā* refers to *awliyā'* against the rule.
18. The notion that God's existence is innate knowledge from which man cannot escape is expressed by Ghaylān al-Dimashkī, a pre-Mu'tazilite theologian [died probably towards the end of the reign of Hishām (724-43)]. See van Ess, "Early Islamic Theologians", p. 66f. Al-Ḳāsim obviously does not here refute this theological notion but attacks the common people's approach which he sometimes identifies with the approach of the literalists. See below pp. 142, 148. Wolfson, "Notes", p. 576.
19. Cf. sura 52, v. 12.

20. For the translation of *ḥadath*, see Peters, *God's Created Speech*, pp. 110-113.
21. See introduction p. 8.
22. *Kābara 'aḳlahu* means he stated something which is either explicitly opposed to his rational perception or which is clearly a lie. See al-Djurdjānī, *K. al-ta'rifāt*, rep. of Flügel's ed. (Leipzig 1845) Beirut 1969, p. 245, ll. 15-16. Ibn Ḥazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. I, p. 6. Al-Ḳāsim uses this locution frequently, for instance see *K. al-radd 'alā al-zindīk*, pp. 4, 38. *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulḥid*, MS. Berlin, fol. 60a, l. 6, fol. 61a, l. 7.
23. The word *ann* occurs generally in Arabic philosophical texts in the meaning of *anniyya*, i.e., existence. See S. van den Bergh, "Anniyya", EI², Vol. I, p. 513f. Ibn Ḥazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. II, p. 174. The origin of the word *anniyya* is in Syriac translations of Greek philosophical texts. See R. M. Frank, "The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term انية", *Cahiers de Byrsa* 6(1956), pp. 181-201. Cf. Daiber, *Mu'ammār*, p. 146f. In *K. al-radd 'alā al-mulḥid* fol. 58b we find the philosopher (*mulḥid*) asking: "What is the proof of the Creator's existence?" (*ma al-dalīl 'alā anniyyat al-ṣānī*).
24. For the notion that non-existence is neither an entity nor a thing see Ibn Ḥazm, *K. al-fiṣal*, Vol. I, p. 14. Al-Djuwaynī, *al-Shāmīl fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. 'Alī Sāmī'al-Nashshār, Alexandria 1969, pp. 124ff. Al-Ḳāsim's assertion opposes that of the Mu'tazilites began to consider the relatively non-existent, which can be actualized (*al-ma'dūm al-mumkin*) as a thing (*shay'*) or as a being (*ḥaḳīka*, *dhāt*, *'ayn*). See al-Māturīdī, *K. al-tawḥīd*, p. 86, l. 3. van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, p. 192. Frank, *Beings*, p. 36, n. 42.
25. See note 23 above.
26. *Al-shahāda* seems to be used here in place of the term *'ilm al-shāhid*. It is possible that by *al-shahāda* al-Ḳāsim understands what is generally termed *badāha* or *badīhiyyāt*, namely, spontaneous knowledge. Al-Ḳāsim's usage differs from Saadia's in which *'ilm al-shāhid* means the knowledge perceived by the senses. See Saadia, *K. al-amānāt*, p. 14. Rosenblatt, *The Book of Beliefs*, p. 16. Cf. van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, p. 166. Elsewhere al-Ḳāsim names spontaneous knowledge *badīha*. See note 14 above.
27. For the rendering of *ḥaḳīka* as reality see Frank, *Beings*, p. 80, n. 5. Peters, *God's Created Speech*, p. 78f.
28. The Arabic philosophers generally use the term *'ayn* to indicate things which can be observed in the world, i.e., concrete objects as opposed to things which exist in the mind. See S. van den Bergh, "'Ayn", EI², Vol. I, p. 784f. Daiber, *Mu'ammār*, p. 66f.
29. The opposite of self-evident verses (*muhkam al-ḳur'ān*) is ambiguous verses (*mutashābih al-ḳur'ān*). The term *muhkam al-ḳur'ān* can be understood to apply to the whole *Ḳur'ān*. See al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, Cairo 1938, Vol. VII, p. 179. See introduction p. 27f.
30. *Tawḳīf* refers to what God teaches man, to a doctrine which derives from a divine source. P. Kraus translates this term as "übernatürliche Belehrung". He regards it as an infinitive of *wakḳafa 'alā* in the sense of "to explain", "to teach", "to instruct". See P. Kraus, "Beiträge zur islamischen Ketzergeschichte. Das 'Kitāb az-Zumurrud' des Ibn ar-Rāwandī", *Rivista degli studi orientali* 14(1933), pp. 127-129. This meaning corresponds well to the meaning of the first form of the verb: *wakḳafa 'alā al-amr: fahimahu wa-tabayyanahu wa-'ittala'a 'alayhi* (see *al-Mundjid*). Further-

- more, the second form (*waḥkafa*) occurs in al-Bāḳillānī's *K. al-tamhīd* (p. 178, l. 4.) in the sense assumed by Kraus. Cf. al-Suyūṭī, *al-Muḥḥir*, Part I, pp. 8-28. L. Gardet, M. M. Anawati, *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane*, Paris 1948, p. 40. L. Kopf, "Religious Influences on Medieval Arabic Philosophy", *Studia Islamica* 5(1956), p. 56, l. 1.
31. Al-Ḳāsim seems to refer here to the Mu'tazilite notion that the Ḳur'ān serves as a confirmation of the basic structures of the world which are known through reasoning. See Peters, *God's Created Speech*, p. 100f.
 32. Literally the clause reads: "We have neither non-existent trick nor existent trick", namely, we have no trick whatsoever. See also the following sentence. This is a figure of speech called *taflīḳ* (division) which occurs in al-Ḳāsim's writings frequently. *Taflīḳ* means the writing of a pair of antonyms one after another in order to convey a general meaning. See G. Bergsträsser, *Uṣūl naḳd al-nuṣūṣ wa-nashr al-kutub*, Cairo 1969, p. 66. When *taflīḳ* appears as a positive phrase it means wholeness, e.g., *bayna 'l-khawāṣṣ min al-ʿArab wa'l-ʿawāmm*, i.e. all Arabs. See *K. al-radd ʿalā zindīq*, p. 38, l. 18. When it appears as a negative phrase it means absolute negation, e.g., *wa-lā tūḍjadu bi-fahm fī djuḥalāʾ wa-lā ʿulamāʾ*, i.e., no one understands at all. See *ibid.*, p. 35, l. 6.
 33. For this rendering of *iʿtimāl* see Lane, *Lexicon*, Part V, p. 2158.
 34. The verb *taraka* (lit. to omit or to leave) was already used by al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in the sense of "not to do", "to abstain from doing". See Ritter, "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī", p. 77, ll. 5-6. Schwarz, "The Letter", p. 29 at the bottom. Cf. van Ess, *Anfänge*, p. 56. [M. Cook (*Early Muslim Dogma*, Cambridge 1981) does not accept the authenticity of the epistles edited by J. van Ess.]
 35. Al-Ḳāsim, then, believes that man produces accidents (*aʿrād*), i.e., man's action is not creation; it is God who creates bodies (*adjsām*). Accordingly, when man neither sows nor cultivates the land, he neglects it, and his neglect is an action, whereas when God does not create, He does not act, since His action means the bringing of bodies into being, and bodies have no opposites. Cf. Saadia, *K. al-amānāt*, pp. 74, 156f. Rosenblatt, *The Book of Beliefs* p. 85f, 187. Ibn Rushd, *Manāhidj al-adilla*, p. 232. Several views concerning the question of whether God can grant man the ability to produce bodies or accidents are brought forth by al-Ashʿarī in his *Maḳālāt* (p. 377, l. 8 - p. 378, l. 13, p. 563, l. 12 - p. 567, l. 4). Extreme Shīʿites held that God can enable (*yukḍiru*) man to produce bodies and accidents. Abu al-Ḥusayn al-Šāliḥī, a Murdjiʿite theologian, asserted that it is admissible to attribute to God the ability (*ḳudra*) to enable man to produce accidents such as life, death, knowledge, ability and others. As for the Mu'tazilites, Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir (fl. in the beginning of the 9th century A.D.) rejected this idea, but affirmed that God can enable man to produce colours, tastes, odours, warmth, coldness, wetness and dryness. According to al-Nazzām (d. 836 or 845) the only accident is motion, and man can produce it by the ability bestowed upon him by God, but odour, sound, coldness, warmth etc. are bodies, and it is inadmissible that God should enable man to produce bodies. A different approach was introduced by Abū al-Hudhayl (d. between 840 and 850), who said that it was admissible to hold that God can enable men to produce motion, rest, sounds, pains and other accidents which man knows how they are pro-

duced (*mā yaʿrifūna kayfiyyatahu*), but not accidents which man does not know how they are produced, such as colours, tastes, odours, life, death, ability and inability. The orthodox theologians held (according to al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, p. 83, l. 7) that God creates both the bodies and the accidents.

S. Pines (*Beiträge*, p. 29f.) assumes that the formulation of the question of whether God can enable man to produce bodies or accidents reveals a clear polemical tendency. The Muʿtazilites wished to beat their adversaries by using the latter's weapon. These adversaries who condemned the Muʿtazilites for limiting God's omnipotence, themselves denied God's ability to bestow anything of His power upon man. But the Muʿtazilites also restricted God's ability to grant man anything of His power to the production of accidents; and even the production of accidents is subject to limitations according to the majority of the Muʿtazilites.

36. Alternatively *ḡudra ʿalā* can be translated "power over". Cf. Watt, *Free Will*, p. 90, n. 37. Peters, *God's Created Speech*, pp. 200ff.
37. According to al-Ḳāsim, an able agent is one who can do something and its opposite (who has power over an action and over its opposite as well.) This principle occurring here with regard to God's power (Cf. *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīq*, p. 22, ll. 5-6) serves as the basis for the doctrine of free will of the Muʿtazilites. They hold that "the power precedes the action, and that it is a power over the action and over its opposite as well". See al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 230, ll. 12-13. If the power is not over the action as well as over its opposite, there is no choice. See ʿAbd al-Djabbār, *al-Mughnī* Vol. VIII, p. 90, ll. 2-4. Cf. M. Schwarz, "The Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār's", p. 254f. Idem, "The Letter", p. 28. Yūsuf al-Baṣīr, *al-Kitāb al-Muḥtawī*, chs. 25-29, ed. I. Banda, Budapest 1906, ch. 29, p. XIV, ll. 12ff. Saadia, *K. al-amānāt*, p. 155. Rosenblatt, *The Book of Beliefs*, p. 186f. Al-Bāḳillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 288, ll. 2-3. Al-Khayyāt, *K. al-intiṣār*, pp. 17-18. The Ashʿarites, on the other hand, taught that the power for a particular action is created at the same time as the creation of the action itself, and therefore it cannot be power over both the action and its opposite. See al-Ashʿarī, *K. al-lumaʿ*, p. 56f, arts. 125-127. Idem, *Maḳālāt*, p. 283, ll. 6-10. Al-Bāḳillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, pp. 287-289, arts. 489-492.
38. *Athar* (pl. *āthār*) can be understood to mean either impression or sign. See Lane, *Lexicon*, Part I, pp. 18-19.
39. "When God said: 'O Jesus, son of Mary, did you say to the people': 'Take me and my mother as two gods apart from God'? He said: 'Glory be to You! it is not for me to say what to me is not true...' " (sura 5, v. 116)
40. The notion al-Ḳāsim expresses here is that even those who have the ability to make signs and to direct things acknowledge that this ability is given to them by God.
41. See note 30 above.
42. See note 6 above.
43. For *muʿammar* (one whose life is prolonged) see Lane, *Lexicon*, Part V, p. 2154. Abū Ḥātim al-Sidjīstānī, *K. al-muʿammarīn*, ed. I. Goldziher, *Abhandlungen zur arabischen Philologie*, Hildesheim and New York 1982 (rep. of Leiden 1899).
44. Empedocles of Akragas (fl. in the 5th century B.C.) taught that there are

four fundamental, eternal and unchangeable elements. Objects come into being through the mingling of the four elements and cease to be through their separation. See F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, New York 1962, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 78-82. The mention of the four elements as earth, water, air and sky(!) elsewhere in this epistle (see p. 84, l. 9 above) is inexplicable.

45. *Yadjrī 'alayhi fī annahu min turāb mā yadjrī 'alā adjzā'ihī wa-awḥādihi*. Cf. al-Ḳāsim's *K. al-radd 'alā al-naṣārā*, p. 306, ll. 20-21: *yadjrī 'alayhi min ḥukm Allah fī annahu 'abd li-Allah mā yadjrī 'alayhim*.
46. The view that man is produced from a drop of sperm was known since Aristotle's time. See Daiber, *Aetius Arabus*, pp. 220-224. J. Preuss, *Biblisches-Talmudische Medizin*, Berlin 1923, p. 448.
47. *'Abath* means a purposeless or useless act. Its opposite is an act done wisely, i.e., a purposeful and useful act, and such are the Creator's acts. Cf. Peters, *God's Created Speech*, p. 89f. L. V. Berman, "Maimonides, the Disciple of al-Fārābī", *IOS*, 4(1974), p. 164, n. 34. O. Leaman, "'Abd al-Jabbār and the Concept of Uselessness", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 41(1980), pp. 129-131. J. M. Pessagno, "The Uses of Evil in Maturidian Thought", *SI* 60(1984), p. 67. Daiber, *Mu'ammār*, pp. 232ff.
48. I.e. no one can assert that he is the changer, not God.
49. Publicizing such an assertion is impossible; nor can one conceal it because he wants to avoid a dispute with God, or because, being weak and unimportant, he cannot examine all things. Thus, man must draw the proper conclusion from changes.
50. For the argument from changes see introduction p. 10.
51. See sura 35, v. 11.
52. See sura 2, v. 255.
53. One of the meanings of the word *kitāb* in the Ḳur'ān is decree. See Frants Buhl, "Die Schrift und was damit zusammenhängt im Qur'ān", in *Oriental Studies dedicated to Paul Haupt*, Leipzig 1926, p. 369, n. 1.
54. The Muslim theologians have unanimously agreed that God decrees man's birth, form and span of life. The controversial issue was whether God's prescience and human free choice are compatible. On this question see van Ess, *Anfänge*, pp. 44, 50 of the Arabic texts. Schwarz, "The Letter", p. 29f.
55. See sura 35, v. 11, sura 2, v. 255.
56. I read here *wa-fīhimā* instead of the *aw-fīhimā* written in MS Berlin. I am not sure of the translation of this sentence.
57. Here al-Ḳāsim refers to the famous theory of concentric spheres first developed by the mathematician and astronomer Eudoxus of Cnidus (408-355 B.C.). By spheres Eudoxus meant imaginary, interconnected and concentric balls whose common centre is the earth. He held that the motion of each planet resulted from the motion of the spheres. See Cohen and Drabkin, *A Source Book*, pp. 101-103. M. K. Muniz (ed.), *Theories of the Universe*, New York 1957, p. 62. W. Hartner, "Falak", *EI*², p. 761f. Cf. al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, Vol. IV, p. 207, l. -6. In his commentary on Genesis ch. I, v. 1, the Ḳara'ite al-Ḳirḳisānī speaks of two kinds of planets, planets which move because of the motion of their sphere and planets which have double motion; their own motion and the motion resulting from the motion of their sphere. See H. Ben Shammai, *The Doc-*

trines of Religious Thought of Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb al-Qirḡisānī and Yefet ben ʿEli, unpublished Ph.D thesis (in Hebrew), Jerusalem 1977, p. 155.

According to al-Baghdādī (*Uṣūl al-dīn*, p. 64), Muslims, Christians and Jews hold that there are seven immovable spheres in which the planets move.

58. *ʿAdjīb al-tadbīr*. See note 10 above.

59. Cf. Heinen, *Islamic Cosmology*, p. 10 of the Arabic text, p. 204 of the interpretation. This description of creation, which does not occur in the *Qurʾān*, seems to derive from some vague knowledge of Genesis ch. 1. Cf. R. Bell, *The Qurʾān, translated, with a critical re-arrangement of the Surahs*, Edinburgh 1937, Vol. I, p. 307, n. 1.

Al-Kāsim does not tackle the question which could be posed by Aristotelians to the effect that the heavens and earth has always been rent.

60. See the verse quoted above and also sure 24, v. 45.

61. Literally: no one would twinkle his eye. Cf. Lane, *Lexicon*, Part V, p. 1841.

62. On the mythic significance of mountains see A. J. Wensinck, "The Ideas of the Western Semites concerning the Navel of the Earth", *Verhandeligen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam*, n.s. 17:1 (1916), esp. pp. 1-10.

63. See sura 27, v. 61, sura 40, v. 64.

64. *Khilālahā*. The word *khilālahā* is used here in the sense of "in". See sura 17, v. 91, sura 27, v. 61.

65. *Altaf* has two additional meanings: a. one who knows best the finest and the most delicate matters. b. one who is very subtle in his cunning. Accordingly it is possible to translate as follows: a. But He, may He be blessed and exalted, knows best the finest and the most delicate matters in the providential design. b. But He, may He be blessed and exalted, exercises subtle ways in His providential design.

66. Thales of Miletus (d. 546 B.C.) said that the earth rests upon water, Anaximenes (fl. 545 B.C.) said that it rests upon air, and Anaximander (fl. in the sixth century B.C.) said that there is empty space under the earth. See Cohen and Drabkin, *A Source Book*, pp. 92, 144f.

67. This is the view of the ancients as expressed in the mythologies of different peoples. The earth is perceived as the base of the universe.

68. This is Anaximander's view. See Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, 295b, 10. Cohen and Drabkin, *A Source Book*, p. 92.

69. *Hashw al-umma* or *hashwiyya* or *ahl al-hashw* is a pejorative term whose origin lies in the word *hashw*- useless verbosity. In its broad sense it means scholars of little value, especially traditionists. But in its narrow sense it denotes traditionists who accept anthropomorphic traditions as true and interpret them literally. The Muʿtazilites apply this term to the majority of the traditionists, because, in spite of their dissociating from total anthropomorphism through the *bi-lā kayfa* formula, they nevertheless accept some anthropomorphic expressions. See EI², Vol. III, p. 269. Al-Kāsim applies this term, which he undoubtedly also regards as disparaging, to pro-Umayyad traditionists, who accepted Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal as their principal authority and who opposed the Shīʿites and the Abbasids by relying on the tradition of ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿUmar in al-Madīna. Those scholars followed the tradition of the Umayyads and considered the latter

their imams. See above p. 170. Al-Ḳāsim criticizes them severely; they, together with the Rāfiḍites are condemned for holding *tashbīḥ* (likening God to man). See K. *al-mustarshid*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 137 (MS Berlin fol. 80a). They attribute to God wrong-doing and free themselves from it. And they also deny the *waʿīd* (the threat of the punishment in Hell) openly. See above pp. 142ff. The inability of the scholars of the masses to refute the unbelievers induced al-Ḳāsim to compose his treatise refuting Ibn al-Muḳaffaʿ. See K. *al-radd ʿalā al-zindīq*, p. 15. Cf. Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 151f.

70. In the mythology of many peoples we find the view that the earth rests on an animal and that this is the cause of earthquakes. The animals mentioned are the bull, turtle, fish, whale, frog, snake, elephant and birds. See S. Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk Literature*, Copenhagen 1955, p. 165. The view that the earth rests on a fish seems to have come at first from India, from which it spread to other countries. See U. Holmberg, *Siberian Mythology*, in the *Mythology of All Races*, New York 1964, Vol. IV, pp. 310-312. Heinen, *Islamic Cosmology*, p. 13, art. 36 of the Arabic text, p. 208 of the interpretation, p. 36, art. 2 of the Arabic text, p. 235 of the interpretation.
71. Probably al-Ḳāsim means that the sun and the moon encircle the earth when the full circle is not above the earth, so that one can see its lowest part, but a part of the circle is above the earth and another part is beneath the earth.
72. See sura 21, v. 32.
73. See sura 79, vv. 27-28.
74. See note 47 above.
75. See sura 78, v. 7.
76. See pp. 64ff above.
77. I.e. the four elements. See note 44 above.

For the argument from particularization (*takhṣīṣ*) see introduction pp. 3f, 10f.

79. For the argument from changes see introduction pp. 4, 10.
80. Despite various studies which have been carried out up till now, the origin of the term *ḥanīf* and the development of its meanings remain unclear. (For a list of these researches see R. Paret, *Der Koran, Kommentar und Konkordanz*, Stuttgart 1971, p. 33). Occidental scholars tend to associate the word *ḥanīf* with the Syriac word *ḥanpa*, meaning a pagan; this is what the word *ḥanīf* means in pre-Islamic poetry. Frequently in Syriac the word has the second meaning of a person cultured in Hellenism, so that it may well apply to persons who have philosophic tendencies and who are basically monotheists. The Ḳurʿān develops some of the secondary meanings and neglects the original one. This is a semantic process known in other languages. See W. M. Watt, "Ḥanīf", EI², Vol. III, p. 166.

The Arabs derive the word *ḥanīf* from the stem *ḥnf* in the first form (*ḥanafa*), which means "he inclined". See Lane, *Lexicon*, Part II, p. 658. Hence the meaning of *ḥanīf* is one who departs from the ruling, or false religion to God's religion, to the true religion. See al-Bayḍāwī, *Anwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-taʾwīl*, ed. H. O. Fleischer, Vol. I, p. 86, l. 25. Al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, Vol. IV, p. 90. There are commentators who turn the

negative sense of *aḥnaf*—one who has crooked legs—into positive one—*mustakīm*—straight. See e.g., al-Ṭabarī, *Djāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl al-ḥurʾān*, ed. M. M. and A. M. Shākir, Cairo 1374 H, Vol. III, p. 104, ll. 4-8. Hence *al-ḥanaf* means *al-istiḥāma ʿalā dīn ibrahīm*—to follow Ibrāhīm's religion without deviation. See *ibid.*, p. 107, l. 12. In the Ḳurʾān the word *ḥanīf* applies especially to Ibrāhīm as an example of one who devoted himself to God's worship. See sura 2, v. 135, sura 3, vv. 67, 95, sura 4, v. 125, sura 6, vv. 79, 162, sura 16, vv. 121, 124, sura 22, v. 32. In most of these verses *ḥanīf* is the opposite of *mushrik* (one who attributes a copartner to God). Also the Ḳurʾān says that Ibrāhīm was neither a Jew nor a Christian and that the people of the book (*ahl al-kitāb*—the Jews and the Christians) were initially ordered to worship God as *ḥunafāʾ* (sura 98, v. 5). In the two remaining passages in which *ḥanīf* occurs in the Ḳurʾān, Muḥammad and his followers are ordered to worship God as *ḥunafāʾ* and not as *mushrikūn*.

In Islamic writings *ḥanīf* generally denotes one who follows the original true monotheistic religion. Frequently it is an equivalent of Muslim. See EI², *ibid.*, p. 165. Al-Ḳāsim regards *ḥanīf* as a person submissive and humble before God, which is exactly the meaning of *Muslim* in al-Ṭabarī's commentary on the Ḳurʾān. See *Djāmiʿ al-bayān*, Vol. VI, p. 494, ll. 1-5.

81. Cf. the unmoved mover. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XI, ch. 7.
82. Cf. al-Ashʿarī, *Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām*, in *The Theology of al-Ashʿarī*, ed. and tr. into English R. J. McCarthy, Beirut 1953, p. 89, art. 7 of the Arabic text.
83. Al-Ḳāsim does not seem to use *dalīl* (pl. *dalāʾil*) and *dalāla* as technical terms, as they are used in ʿAbd al-Djabbār's writings. Cf. Peters, *God's Created Speech*, pp. 65-68.
84. See note 6 above.
85. See note 50 above.
86. Four MSS (ص, ح, ي, هـ) here read *al-kayf* (meaning "how") which cannot be integrated in the text to make any sense. The reading of MS د *al-takyif* is also difficult, but can be interpreted to make sense. The verb *kayyafa* of which *takyif* is the infinitive, means "he cut" (see *Lisān*, s.v., k.y.f.); al-Ḳāsim may use this word figuratively in the sense of "he refuted". Such an usage of *takyif* is unknown to me elsewhere. The usual meaning of *kayyafa* ("he asked how"). Cf. al-Dārimī, *K. al-radd ʿalā al-djahmiyya*, ed. Gösta Vitestam, Lund and Leiden 1960, p. 8 of the Arabic text) may also convey a reasonable sense here. Thus one can render: It is impossible to ask how, i.e., to doubt.
87. God was invoked as the Creator and Sustainer.
88. See sura 32, vv. 7-8, sura 22, v. 5, sura 23, vv. 12-14, sura 40, v. 67.
89. If divinity were divided between two or more, al-Ḳāsim maintains, each of its owners would lack a part of divinity, since he would have a copartner to divinity, and he who lacks a part of divinity cannot be God. Therefore divinity must belong to one God. Likewise, al-Ḳāsim later maintains (see below p. 136) that power in its entirety cannot be divided into two parts without each of its two owners becoming weak relatively, since neither owner can dominate the other's sphere. Hence power in its entirety belongs only to one, and this cannot be anyone but God. This argument for God's unity adduced here by al-Ḳāsim in two ways has much in com-

mon with the argument from hypothetical mutual prevention (*tamānu*⁶). The logical basis of both arguments is that the existence of two beings entails one or both of them being weak or unable, and a weak or an unable being cannot be God. The difference lies in the process of the proof and in the use of terms. Al-Ḳāsim asserts that each of the two owners of power dominates his own sphere; hence neither can penetrate the other's sphere, and hence each is weak. Through the *tamānu*⁶ argument one can reach the same conclusion, but by asserting that each prevents the other from acting. One who is prevented is unable, and an unable being is not eternal.

Answering the question "why do you say that the Producer of things is one?" al-Ash'arī states that two producers cannot act harmoniously and that inability (*ʿadjz*) is necessarily attached to one or to both of them. That is, since if one of the two wishes to endow a man with life and the other to cause his death, one of three possibilities must follow: a. the will of both will be carried out. b. the will of neither will be carried out. c. the will of only one will be carried out. Now, the first possibility cannot occur, since a man cannot be dead and alive simultaneously. The second possibility means that both are unable, and an unable being can be neither God nor eternal (*kādim*). In the third possibility, the one whose will is not carried out is unable, and an unable being can be neither God nor eternal. This proves that the Producer of things is one. See al-Ash'arī, *K. al-luma*⁶, p. 8, art. 8 of the Arabic text. According to al-Ash'arī, the origin of this argument is in the Ḳur'ān (especially sura 21, v. 22). See idem, *Risāla fī istiḥṣān al-khawḍ*, ed. McCarthy, p. 89, art. 8. This argument was accepted by many Mutakallimūn. See e.g., al-Bākillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 25, ll. 13-20. Al-Maḳdisī, *K. al-bad'*, Vol. I, p. 87f. Al-Māturīdī, *K. al-tawhīd*, p. 20, ll. 10-15. ʿAbd al-Djabbār, *Sharḥ*, 278f. Idem, *al-Mughnī*, Vol. V, p. 48, l. 6f. Al-Djuwaynī, *K. al-irshād*, p. 53f. Al-Ghazālī, *al-Iktisād*, pp. 40-44. Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī, *K. al-hidāya min al-kifāya fī l-hidāya fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Fathallah Kholeif, Cairo 1969, p. 40f. Al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat*, p. 91f. Saadia, *K. al-amānāt*, p. 86, ll. 5-15, p. 53, l. 29-p. 54, l. 2. Rosenblatt, *The Book of beliefs*, pp. 97-98, 60-61. Maimonides, *The Guide*, Part I, ch. 75, the first way. For a criticism of this argument see Ibn Rushd, *Manāhidj al-adilla*, p. 156f.

Al-Ḳāsim's argument for God's unity is further developed in the course of his proof and in his use of terms current in the *tamānu*⁶ argument in his *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*. In this epistle the *tamānu*⁶ argument occurs in its entirety: "If the [bringers of the world into being] were two they would necessarily be in one of several states; either each of the two would be able (*kādir*) to hide something he made from his peer (cf. Saadia, *ibid.*, tr. Rosenblatt, p. 98), or each of the two would not be able to hide anything from his peer, or one of the two would be able to hide something he made from his peer and the other would not be able to do so, then the other would be unable (*ʿadjiz*). If each of the two is able to cause his peer's ignorance (*tadhīl ṣāhibihī*), this makes both of them qualified by the quality of deficiency, by a mark of having been brought into being and by signs of having been produced (*fa-dhālika yudkhilluhumā fī ṣifat al-naḳṣ wa-ʿalam al-ḥadath wa-āthār al-ṣanʿ*), since the weak one is unable, and an unable being must have someone who makes him unable (*muʿdjiz yuʿdjizuhu*). Thus the

eternity of both is annulled (*ibṭāl kidamuhumā*) and they are made to [be qualified] by having been brought into being.

If each of the two is unable to hide something from his peer, then both of them are unable, and inability proves their having been brought into being, since the unable being must have a maker who made him unable and a bringer into being who brought him into being; thus [the possibility] that both brought the world into being is cancelled out (*ifsād ihdāthihimā*), since they have both been brought into being, while the world must have one bringer into being who brought it into being. If one of the two is able to hide something he made from his peer, and the other is unable to do so, then the able one is the Creator of the world (*al-khālik li'l-ʿālam*) and its director, and the one who is unable to do so is unable, weak and brought into being. On account of his [own] inability and his peer's ability to make him ignorant, the matter turns out to be One who has no equal, and He who brought things into being and created them is One, He has no like and is greatly exalted." See *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr*, MS. Berlin, fol. 135b, l. 27- fol. 136a, l. 9. The three hypothetical states al-Ḳāsim mentions, namely, that both of them are able, both of them are unable, and one is able and the other is unable, correspond to the three hypothetical states mentioned in al-Ashʿarī's argument. Al-Ḳāsim uses the same terms as al-Ashʿarī does: inability (*ʿadjz*) and eternity (*kidam*). The affirmation of the opposition between inability and eternity which is a widespread and characteristic part of the *tamānuʿ* argument is found in both al-Ḳāsim and al-Ashʿarī. But it does not appear in another epistle of al-Ḳāsim's named *K. al-radd ʿalā al-naṣārā*. In this epistle al-Ḳāsim, while using the *tamānuʿ* argument in refutation of the Trinity, maintains that the unable being cannot be God, without affirming that inability opposes eternity. See *ibid.*, p. 309, ll. 4-18. Cf. al-Ḳāsim, *Ṣifat al-ʿarsh wa'l-kursī*, in *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 241. MS Berlin, fol. 94b.

A different formulation of the *tamānuʿ* argument, in which the term itself is used, is found in al-Ḳāsim's *K. al-radd ʿalā al-mulhid*. Responding to the sceptic's (*mulhid*) question as to what the argument is that proves that the Creator of the world (*ṣāniʿ al-ʿālam*) is one, al-Ḳāsim says: "If he (the Creator of the world) were more than one, then each of the two creators would have to be either living and able (*ḥayy kādir*) or not. If each of the two is living and able it is not inconceivable (*lam yakun min al-muḥāl*) that when one wishes to create a thing the other should prevent him (*an yamnaʿahu*) from creating this thing itself. If his peer prevented him from [doing] that, he who is prevented (*mamnūʿ*) would be unable (*ʿadjiz*), and his inability would prove to you his having been brought into being (*dallaka ʿadjzuhu ʿalā hadathihi*). If both of them prevent each other (*tamānaʿā*) [from acting] and their powers are equal (*takāfaʿat kuwāhumā*), there will be damage; neither of the two will create anything, and inability will be attached to each of the two, since each of the two would be unable [to do] what he wishes. Since we find the world organized and its direction harmonious, [this] proves us that the Creator is not two and not more than two." See fol. 60b, ll. 10-17. Finally, it is very interesting to see how an argument appearing in non Kalam terms in *K. al-dalīl al-kabīr*, is formulated in Kalam terms in *K. al-dalīl al-ṣaghīr* and *K. al-radd ʿalā al-mulhid*.

90. The word *al-ḥaḥḥ* may also mean God. Hence, "God is free from falsehood."
91. Here al-Ḳāsim refers to the Kalam way of proving God's existence and qualities from His actions observed on earth known as *al-istidlāl bi'l-shāhid 'alā'l-ghā'ib* (lit. inferring what is absent from what is present) or *ḳiyās al-ghā'ib 'alā al-shāhid* (lit. judging what is absent by analogy with what is present). See Abrahamov, "Al-Ḳāsim ibn Ibrāhīm's Argument from Design", n. 103.
92. I.e., they are forced to know God if they generally know that man's knowledge of the hidden is derived from man's knowledge of the revealed.
93. On the visibility of God in this world and the world to come see introduction p. 35f.
94. Cf. al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, Cairo 1967-68, Vol. IV, p. 137.
95. Cf. *Psalms*, ch. 90, v. 4. *Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin*, fol. 97a. This sentence is also reminiscent of the Christian idea of Millennium. Cf. *The New Testament*, Peter II, ch. 3, v. 8. M. G. S. Hodgson, "A Note on the Millennium in Islam", in *Millennial Dreams in Action*, ed. S. L. Thrupp, New York 1970, p. 218f.
96. For the question of God's place see introduction p. 28f.
97. See sura 10, v. 4, sura 30, vv. 11, 27, sura 27, v. 64, sura 29, v. 19, sura 21, v. 104, sura 85, v. 13, sura 7, v. 29, sura 71, v. 18, sura 17, v. 51, sura 20, v. 55.
98. See note 9 above.
99. Al-Ḳāsim does not refer to the issue of the duty to know God's existence. For a discussion of how some theologians dealt with this question see van Ess, "Early Islamic Theologians".
100. See note 89 above.
101. For the various meanings of the word *ṣamad* see F. Rosenthal, "Some Minor Problems in the Qur'ān", in *The Joshua Starr Memorial Volume*, New York 1953, pp. 72-83. U. Rubin, "Al-Ṣamad and the high God. An interpretation of sura CXII", *Der Islam* 61(1984), pp. 200-206. Arne A. Ambros, "Die Analyse von Sure 112", *Der Islam* 63(1986), pp. 219-247. Cf. al-Ṭabarī, *Djāmi' al-bayān 'an ta'wīl āy al-ḳur'ān*, Cairo 1954, Vol. XXX, p. 347, ll. 6-7. Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, Vol. IV, p. 298. Al-Ghazālī, *al-Maḳṣad al-asnā sharḥ asmā' allah al-ḥusnā*, Cairo 1968, p. 126. Al-Ḳāsim explains further on in the epistle that God is the highest end that man must try to reach, for beyond this there is nothing, and He is most entitled to be praised in this world and the world to come. This notion is identical to what al-Ḳāsim says in the last sentence and is well interwoven in the general context. Madelung, on the other hand, who reads *djūd* instead of *wudjūd* (see note 544 to the text), is of the opinion that "al-Ḳāsim interprets God's name *al-ṣamad* completely differently from all the Muslim interpreters, as meaning an extreme measure of generosity (*djūd*) and all that is praiseworthy which one can long for in the world to come and in this world." See Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 110f. Madelung's reading is corroborated by a sentence found in *K. al-radd 'alā al-naṣārā* (p. 310, l. 2) *wa'l-ṣamad fa-huwa al-ghāya fī kull khayr...*, but the reading *wudjūd* finds substantiations as well. See *Ṣifat al-'arsh wa'l-kursī*, p. 241, ll. 4-5. *K. al-radd 'alā al-zindīk*, p. 3, ll. 2-3, p. 16, l. 23- p. 17, l. 12. *K. al-radd 'alā al-naṣārā*, p. 309, ll. 15-16.

102. The word *nihāya* has a dual meaning: a. aim and b. terminus. The English word "end" has the same two denotations.
103. See sura 112, v. 1.
104. The text has *in*, which seems inappropriate, instead of *law*.
105. On the issue of God's qualities see introduction pp. 20-25.
106. This expression is undoubtedly identical with *hashw al-umma*. See above note 69.
107. See below sura 16, v. 60.
108. On God's justice (ʿ*adl*) see introduction pp. 36-47.
109. On *al-waʿd wa'l-waʿd* see introduction p. 47f.
110. ʿ*Atid* means something ready in the world to come. See sura 50, vv. 18, 23.
111. The word *yuzlamūna* may also be translated as "they were made to suffer loss" (see Lane, *Lexicon*, p. 1920); but here and in the following verses the translation of *ẓulm* as "wrong-doing" or "evil-doing" (see Lane, *ibid.*) seems preferable, since the opposite of this word is justice (ʿ*adl*).
112. If god failed to keep His promises and were untruthful, His qualities of keeping promises and truthfulness would disappear.
113. On the connection between the promise and threat and free will see introduction p. 47.
114. On *kasaba* see note 120 below.
115. See note 69 above.
116. For God's will see Peters, *God's Created Speech*, pp. 273-276.
117. Here al-Ḳāsim alludes to the later Muʿtazilite theory of *ildjāʿ* (compulsion). See introduction p. 44.
118. A believer, according to al-Ḳāsim, is one who is protected (*amina*) from grave sins of unbelief and transgression, i.e., one who does not commit such sins. See introduction p. 49.
119. The verb *ibtadaʿa* means to act without external incentives or asking reward. Thus for example, *ibtadaʿahu bi-waʿdin* may be understood to mean: he made a promise without being asked. See Lane, *Lexicon*, p. 163. R. Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, Leyde 1881, Vol. I, p. 56, especially the citation from *Kalīla wa-dimna*. Cf. al-Ṭabarī's interpretation of sura 10, v. 44 in Shākir's ed. Vol. XV, p. 97, ll. 1-4. For ʿAbd al-Djabbār *mubtadaʿ* is a deed which does not require any preceding action to serve as its cause. See Peters, *God's Created Speech*, pp. 205ff. R. M. Frank, "The Autonomy of the Human Agent in the Teaching of ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār", *Le Muséon* 95(1982), p. 326. Concerning God, *ibtadaʿa* means that God bestows His favour on man freely, and not as a reaction to man's deed, while *thawāb* is a reward God gives man for a good deed. See al-Ashʿarī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 448, ll. 8-10. Cf. al-Ḳāsim, *K. tathbūt al-imāma*, in *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 204, l. 5. MS. Berlin, fol. 81b. Idem, *K. siyāsāt al-naḡs*, MS. Berlin, fol. 87b. Al-Ashʿarī, *K. al-lumaʿ*, art. 169. Saadia, *K. al-amānāt*, p. 176, l. 18. Rosenblatt, *The Book of Beliefs*, p. 213, l. 19. Abu Bakr al-Rāzī, *Rasāʾil falsafiyya*, Beirut 1973, p. 91.
120. The meaning of the verb *iktasaba* is identical here with the meaning of the verb *kasaba*, which denotes the performance of an act for which its agent deserves praise or blame, reward or punishment, i.e., an act for which the agent is responsible. See Schwarz, "Acquisition", pp. 355-387.
121. On *al-malāʾika al-muḳarrabūn* see EI¹, Vol. III, p. 190.

122. These two words usually appear in Kalam manuals in proofs of the existence and coming into being of accidents. See for instance al-Bāḳillānī, *K. al-tamhīd*, p. 18, art. 30, p. 22, art. 37.
123. ‘Abd al-Djabbār defines knowledge as “the *ma‘nā* that supposes (*yakṭadī*) that the knowing subject is characterized by tranquility of the soul” (*sukūn al-naḥs*). See *al-Mughnī*, Vol. XII, p. 13. Peters’ tr. in his *God’s Created Speech*, p. 50, and also *ibid.*, pp. 48-50. G. F. Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, Oxford 1971, p. 17.
124. On the mystic notion of knowledge as light, see F. Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant*, Leiden 1970, ch. 6.
125. Probably al-Ḳāsim is referring to the Zaydite view that knowledge of the true belief is common to all people. See al-Nawbakhtī, *K. firāḡ al-shi‘a*, ed. H. Ritter, Istanbul 1931, p. 50. This is why anyone who does not know God deserves punishment. In another epistle (*K. al-tawhīd*, MS. Ambrosiana C 186, fol. 18a), al-Ḳāsim states plainly that the gravest sin in the eyes of God and the pious is denying God (*al-ilhād li-allah*), doubting His existence (*al-ilhād fī allah*) and doubting that man has knowledge of God (*al-irtiyāb fī ma‘rifat allah*). Later (see below p. 169) he makes certain knowledge of God the condition for *imān*—the state of man’s being protected against committing grave sins. See introduction p. 49f.
126. The text should have *ba‘duhā* instead of *ba‘duhu*, since it is the hollows, not perdition, which come one after another. There seems to be here a case of an attraction. See H. Reckendorf, *Arabische Syntax*, Heidelberg 1921, p. 167f.
127. Probably al-Ḳāsim means those believers who risked their lives for the sake of God. Those will not die but live forever in Paradise. Cf. sura 3, v. 169.
128. On the question of belief see introduction pp. 48-51.
129. See note 34 above.
130. The reading of Ms. 5 (*wa-lā yakūnu*) seems to convey the correct meaning.
131. This is the Murdji‘ite view that a man remains a believer despite committing grave sins. See al-Ḳāsim, *K. al-masā’il*, fol. 47b. *Idem.*, *K. al-‘adl wa’l-tawhīd*, ed. M. ‘imāra, p. 121f. *Idem.*, *K. al-hidjra*, in *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 365f (MS. Berlin, fol. 121a). Watt, *The Formative Period*, p. 126f.
132. In corroboration of this translation of the verse see al-Ṭabarī, *Djāmi‘ al-bayān*, ed. Shākir, Vol. XIV, p. 274.
133. The word *furkān* occurs several times in the Ḳur‘ān. See sura 2, vv. 53, 185, sura 3, v. 4, sura 8, vv. 29, 41, sura 21, v. 48, sura 25, v. 1. In most cases it means revelation or book of revelation. It is also used to mean salvation, redemption, discrimination, distinction and criterion.

The origin of the word lies in the Syrian *furkānā*, which means redemption. This is also the meaning of the word in Christian sources. In our verse the Syrian meaning of the word is combined with the meaning of the Arabic verb *faraka*, that is, he discriminated, distinguished or divided, to the effect that salvation in the battle of *badr* (the day the two parties met) discriminates between the believers and the unbelievers. See R. Paret, “Furkān”, EI², Vol. II, p. 949.

In another place al-Ḳāsim uses the word *furkān* in the meaning of the detailed Ḳur‘ānic explanation in which God elucidates the right way: *al-*

tafṣīl min allah fīhi li-rushdihī. See *K. al-madīḥ al-kabīr*, MS. Berlin, fol. 66b, l. 16. But the Qurʾān itself is called *furkān*. See *ibid.*, fol. 68a, l. 19. *Masʾalat al-ṭabariyyaynī*, *The Theological Epistles*, Vol. II, p. 98. (MS. Berlin, fol. 52b)

134. *Mubṭil* means a liar and also one who holds false opinions. See Schwarz, "The Letter", p. 28.
135. The Umayyad caliphs serve al-Ḳāsim as an example of despotic rule. According to him, they corrupted Islam. In *K. al-radd ʿalā al-zindīq* (p. 29, ll. 8-11) al-Ḳāsim says: "But I see him (Ibn al-Muḳaffaʿ) considering our religion and imagining our Lord's laws as Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān's laws and as the partially unjust and contradictory laws established by the kings of Banī Marwān after Muʿāwiya. Those are the enemies of our religion. Their law is different from ours. In the law of our religion injustice never mingles". In his legislations al-Ḳāsim says that the Umayyads violate the Sunna. Cf. Madelung, *Der Imam*, p. 148f.
136. For this word (*nakāl* pl. *ankāl*) see sura 2, v. 66, sura 5, v. 38.
137. See note 117 above.
138. It is also possible to read according to MSS. *هـ، ص، ي* *al-shuhra* (see note 819 to the Arabic text) and to translate: "and blindness would not prevent them [from seeing] his manifest state". But the parallel to the previous sentence makes the reading of MSS. *ح، ك* seem preferable.

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